Marine Stewardship Council

Northeast Atlantic Pelagic Fisheries – Management
Challenges for Straddling Fish Stocks
Final Report
June 2023

Page intentionally left blankNortheast Atlantic Pelagic Fisheries – Management
Challenges for Straddling Fish Stocks
Final Report

June 2023

Northeast Atlantic Pelagic Fisheries – Management Challenges for Straddling Fish Stocks

Marine Stewardship Council

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Project noNortheast Atlantic Pelagic Fisheries – Management Challenges for Straddling Fish Stocks
Final Report
Marine Stewardship Council
June 2023
R.4069R/5145/1

02/12/2022
25/05/2023
19/06/2023
21/06/2023

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Prepared (PM)S.F. Walmsley

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ABPmer, (2023). Northeast Atlantic Pelagic Fisheries – Management Challenges for Straddling Fish Stocks, Final Report, ABPmer
Report No. R.4069. A report produced by ABPmer for Marine Stewardship Council, June 2023.

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Executive Summary
The North East Atlantic (NEA) pelagics are among the largest populations of commercially exploited fishstocks in the world. Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus), blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) andAtlanto-Scandian herring (Clupea harengus) support large-scale fisheries in all major fishing nations in
the region and contribute to food security both in the region and around the world, providing a lowcost source of protein as well as an important source of fish meal used in aquaculture production.
This report sets out the current situation in relation to the management and governance of these stocks
and explores options and approaches for establishing quota shares and limiting exploitation tosustainable levels.
All three pelagic stocks are straddling stocks, which occur in the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of
coastal states as well as on the high seas. Management of these stocks requires coastal states and fishingstates to jointly agree on a total allowable catch (TAC) in line with scientific advice, and define how itwill be shared between states by agreeing on how they will allocate quota shares among them.
Currently, coastal states agree on the TAC aligned with scientific advice, but then set unilateral quotasthat exceed it. This has the same effect as not being able to agree on the TAC, nor follow the scientificadvice. The outcome is that the overall catch from the combined national quotas is substantially higher
than the scientific advice, putting these stocks at risk of overexploitation and stock decline.
The latest scientific advice (for 2023) for the three pelagic stocks indicates that stock biomasses are
currently healthy, but biomass can fluctuate with both environmental variability and levels of fishingpressure. Fishing pressure on the stocks currently exceeds the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)
reference points, and for herring and blue whiting it is also higher than the precautionary reference
point.
The lack of agreement on quota shares for these stocks has resulted in quotas, and catches, being above
sustainable levels advised by ICES for many years. As a result, fishing mortality is not currently
constrained by the management arrangements, threatening their sustainability. Fisheries for thesestocks have had their MSC certification suspended and many have subsequently withdrawn from theProgram.
All three stocks in the past have had agreements for quota shares involving some or all of the coastal
and fishing states. When agreements are in place, the total combined quotas are generally in line withthe scientific advice, offering protection and good management for these stocks. However, agreements
have broken down in recent years, in part due to the shifting stock distributions changing the relative
abundance and availability in each coastal state’s waters. Climate-related impacts on fish stock
distribution are likely to result in these pressures continuing and increasing in the future, therefore
stock-wide management through science-based TACs and agreed quota allocations is necessary tosupport effective future management of these stocks.
The report explores different approaches to defining and implementing quota shares, overarching
agreement structures, and options in the absence of agreement. Quota shares can be based on historicallandings records, zonal attachment and other criteria. Once agreed, quota allocations can remain fixedindefinitely, or may have an agreed mechanism for their adjustment and review. This can enable quota
allocations to be updated as stock distributions shift, without needing to renegotiate the whole
agreement. However, this creates an added level of complexity to the initial agreement. Building

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additional flexibility into agreements, such as the potential for parties to swap, trade or lease quota, as
well as provide access within EEZ, can also help to match fishing opportunities with industry needs.
Agreements for quota shares can be reached for individual stocks with the relevant parties, or a single
agreement may cover multiple stocks. Multi-stock agreements may be more difficult to reach initially,
as several stocks are under consideration, and it may increase the number of parties involved. However,they may allow compromises that trade-off benefits between different stocks and other associatedissues such as access to waters, which can increase resilience of the agreement in the longer-term.
The process for reaching agreement is principally a political one, influenced by many factors with key
considerations around criteria such as historic rights, economic dependency on fishing, where the stocks
reside and their biology. While data can be used to inform decisions, it can also be used in support ofdiffering negotiating positions. Even science-driven approaches have a level of subjectivity in selecting
the criteria and approach to analysing the data to determine quota shares. However, fisheries
management has always had to deal with imperfect data in an ever-changing environment, and this isa key challenge for securing a long-term management framework that can give fish stocks the best levelof protection.
Within agreements, consideration should be given to the merits of majority voting rather than the needfor consensus decision-making, with the aim of avoiding the breakdown of agreements. Incorporationof an objection procedure to enable decisions to be reviewed by a panel, as well as a dispute resolution
procedure should be considered. This would provide a framework that can handle new and changing
information over time, with the objective that agreements are resilient and management remains inplace, with effective adoption and implementation by the coastal and fishing states.
Sustainable management of internationally shared fish stocks is a challenge that is common to all ocean
areas. The North East Atlantic pelagic stocks benefit from a strong science base, relatively few coastal
and fishing states involved in their exploitation and management, and currently healthy stock
biomasses. However, they currently lack a comprehensive governance framework, including quota
shares, that is able to ensure that total catches are constrained to the level of scientific advice.
Management needs to be adaptive and resilient, incorporating the best available evidence and involving
all relevant stakeholders, to be able to effectively manage exploitation levels and respond to changes
in biomass of these dynamic and economically important stocks. It needs to include arbitration anddispute resolution procedures, as well as majority-voting, to ensure the integrity of agreements areupheld through the challenges that come with decision-making in a variable environment.
The key factor for driving an agreement is political will – a willingness to compromise, together with acommitment to ensuring sustainable exploitation of the stocks. However, good governance also entails
the collective effort by all stakeholders with an interest in the future health and sustainability of fisheries
to influence and require that the principles of good fisheries management as set out by UNCLOS, UNFSA
and FAO, are upheld for the benefit of the marine environment and wider society. This includes civilsociety actors, industry, supply chain interests, academia and others to help influence momentum
towards lasting agreements.
By finding a path forward to achieve a comprehensive agreement on management and quota sharesfor these stocks, the coastal states and fishing states can demonstrate that they are globally at theforefront of fisheries sustainability, helping to ensure the future productivity of the stocks, while
maintaining the food security and economic benefits that the fisheries provide.

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Contents
Disclaimer.................................................................................................................................................. vi
1

Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1

2

International Fisheries Governance Framework ............................................................. 43

NEA Pelagics Stock Status and Management ................................................................. 5

4

Certification and Market Implications ............................................................................. 14

5

Options and Approaches ..................................................................................................... 17

6

Conclusions............................................................................................................................... 26

7

References ................................................................................................................................. 298

Abbreviations/Acronyms ..................................................................................................... 34

9Glossary ...................................................................................................................................... 35

3.1
3.2
3.3
4.1
4.2
5.1
5.2
5.3

Blue whiting ...................................................................................................................................................6
Atlanto-Scandian herring .........................................................................................................................8
Atlantic mackerel ...................................................................................................................................... 10
Sustainability and certification ............................................................................................................ 14
Market implications and response .................................................................................................... 14

Options for establishing quota shares and agreement structures ....................................... 18
Process for reaching agreement ........................................................................................................ 23
Options in the absence of quota share agreements.................................................................. 24

AppendicesA

MSC Fisheries Standard and Conditions ........................................................................ 37

BManagement Framework .................................................................................................... 40

A.1
A.2
B.1
B.2
B.3

MSC Fisheries Standard requirements............................................................................................. 37
Certification conditions and failures for NEA pelagics .............................................................. 38

International framework ........................................................................................................................ 40
Regional arrangements ......................................................................................................................... 43
Coastal states arrangements ............................................................................................................... 43

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TablesTable 1.
Table 2.
Table 3.
Table 4.
Table 5.
Table A1.

Coastal states and fishing states for each stock .............................................................................1
Summary of stock status ..........................................................................................................................5
Management plan status and HCRs for each stock ......................................................................6
Catches inside the NEAFC Regulatory Area (international waters), and outside the
NEAFC Regulatory Area (within coastal states’ EEZs), 2018-2021 ........................................ 13
NEA pelagic fisheries withdrawn and suspended from the MSC Program ....................... 15
Reasons for lack of progress on conditions, and failure against the MSC Standard......................................................................................................................................................................... 39

FiguresFigure 1.
Figure 2.
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Figure 7.
Figure 8.
Figure 9.
Figure 10.
Figure 11.
Figure 12.

Estimated distribution of blue whiting, Atlanto-Scandian herring and mackerel in
the North East Atlantic ..............................................................................................................................1
Status of agreements involving all coastal and fishing states, 1996–2022 .......................... 2
Scientific advice on catch levels, and the sum of unilateral quotas and catches forblue whiting, 2002-2022 ..........................................................................................................................6
Target fishing mortality for blue whiting based on spawning stock biomass as set
out in the management plan..................................................................................................................7
Scientific advice on catch levels, and the sum of unilateral quotas and catches for
Atlanto-Scandian herring, 2002-2022.................................................................................................9
Target fishing mortality for Atlanto-Scandian herring based on spawning stock
biomass as set out in the management plan ...................................................................................9
Scientific advice on catch levels, and the sum of unilateral quotas and catches formackerel, 2002-2022 .............................................................................................................................. 11
Mackerel catches by nationality, as a percentage of total catch, 2004–2021 .................. 12
NEA pelagics’ performance against key aspects of management ....................................... 17
Quota share criteria ................................................................................................................................. 19
Fixed and adjustable quota shares.................................................................................................... 20
Single-stock and multi-stock agreements ..................................................................................... 22

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Disclaimer
The North East Atlantic pelagic fisheries had their MSC certificates suspended or withdrawn between
2019 and 2021, due to the lack of effective and comprehensive management frameworks that caneffectively limit fishing pressure on the stocks. The MSC has commissioned this independent report toset out the historical and current situation in relation to these stocks and the challenges for theirsustainable management, with the aim of promoting discussion and supporting the fisheries as well as
managers and other civil society actors, in the consideration of options for addressing the issues andpolitical impasse.
The MSC is a non-profit organisation with a mission to use its ecolabel and fishery certification program
to contribute to the health of the world’s oceans by recognising and rewarding sustainable fishingpractices, transforming the seafood market to a sustainable basis and influencing the choices people
make when buying seafood.
The views and opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not reflect the official
policy or position of the MSC.

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Introduction

The North East Atlantic (NEA) pelagics are among the largest populations of commercially exploited fishstocks in the world. Atlantic mackerel (Scomber scombrus), blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) andAtlantic herring (Clupea harengus), together with European sprat (Sprattus sprattus) account for more than
65% of the total catches and 95% of pelagic catches in the North East Atlantic (Fernandes et al., 2020).
They have resulted in the development of large-scale fisheries in all major fishing nations in the region
and contribute to food security both in the region and around the world, providing a low-cost source ofprotein as well as an important source of fish meal used in aquaculture production.
This report focuses on three key NEA pelagic stocks: North East Atlantic blue whiting; Atlanto-Scandian(AS) herring; and Atlantic mackerel. These stocks are widely distributed, spanning several different coastal
states’ waters as well as high seas areas (Figure 1). They are widely distributed, and migrate between
different areas at different times of year for spawning, feeding and over-wintering. As a result, there are
a number of coastal states (states in whose waters a stock is present), and fishing states (states who fishfor the stocks, either on the high seas or in other coastal states’ waters through access agreements)
involved in their exploitation and management (Table 1).

Source: MSC

Figure 1.

Estimated distribution of blue whiting, Atlanto-Scandian herring, and mackerel in the
North East Atlantic

Table 1.

Coastal states and fishing states for each stock
EU

Blue whiting
Atlanto-Scandian herring
MackerelCS
FS
CS

Key: Coastal state (CS); Fishing state (FS)Faroe
Islands
CS
CS
CS

Greenland
FS
FS
CS

Iceland

NorwayRussia

UK

CS
CS
CS

CS
CS
CS

FS
CS
FS

CS
CS
CS

Sustainable management needs to take into account and control fishing pressure from all sources (coastal
states and fishing states), and management, data collection and research need to be coordinated among
all relevant parties. As a result, the NEA pelagic stocks present a particular challenge for coordination offisheries management across various jurisdictions, with the parties involved needing to agree on
sustainable catch limits, as well as the distribution of quotas among them.

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Currently, for the NEA pelagics, states agree on management of the stocks and set the overall TAC in linewith scientific advice, but there are no agreed quota shares for determining what proportion of the TAC
can be fished by each state. As a result, each country sets itself a national (unilateral) quota, however thesum of these unilateral quotas exceeds the agreed overarching TAC. Over the period 1996-2022, there
has been only one year in which all coastal and fishing states agreed on management and quota sharesfor these pelagic stocks (Figure 2).
The agreements have generally broken down, primarily due to shifting stock distributions, which change
the relative abundance and availability in each coastal state’s waters, leading to challenges related to how
to share the quotas. Climate-related impacts on fish stock distribution are likely to result in these pressurescontinuing and increasing in the future, with a recent study finding that 23% of transboundary stocks will
have shifted and 78% of the world’s Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) will have experienced at least one
shifting stock by 2030 (Palacio-Abrantes et al., 2022).

Source: ICES, 2022a, b, c; and sources in Section 3.

Figure 2.

Status of agreements involving all coastal and fishing states, 1996–2022

Over time, fishing these stocks in excess of the scientifically advised limits can lead to overfishing 1, a
reduction in stock biomass such that the stock is considered overfished 2, and in the most extreme case,stock collapse 3. The stock status and advice for the NEA pelagic stocks, and the contrast between TACs,
quotas and catches, is explored in Section 3.
The Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery provides an important example of stock collapse, driven by
overfishing, recruitment failure and climate change. In the 1960s, the stock collapsed from 10 million
tonnes to 10 thousand tonnes and took several decades of restricted catches to recover. In Iceland, thiscaused a decline in gross domestic product, exports, currency exchange rate, household expenditure, as
well as social effects such as unemployment, emigration and the decline of settlements dependent on
herring (Sigurdsson, 2006).
The lack of coastal state agreement on quota shares for these stocks has resulted in the suspension ofsustainability certification from the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) for fisheries targeting the stocks
and subsequent withdrawal from the MSC Program when their certification period ended. This reflects
the lack of an over-arching governance framework that is able to ensure that total catches comply withthe level of scientific advice. It also has a number of implications for the supply chain, particularly for thosebusinesses that have committed to sourcing from sustainable, certified fisheries. Sustainability and supply
1

2

3

A stock that is subject to overfishing has a fishing mortality (harvest) rate that is higher than the rate that produces
maximum sustainable yield (MSY).
A stock is considered overfished when exploited beyond an explicit limit beyond which its abundance is considered "toolow" to ensure safe reproduction. Often the term is used when biomass has been estimated to be below a limit biologicalreference point that is used as the signpost defining an "overfished condition". This is often taken as being FMSY but theusage of the term may not always be consistent (FAO, 2023).
Stock collapse is an abrupt decline in stock biomass, followed by an ensuing period of prolonged depletion, indicative of
impaired production (Yletyinen et al., 2018).

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chain implications are discussed in Section 4, and the management and governance framework for thesestocks is described in Appendix B.
There are a number of options for developing quota shares for international and shared fish stocks, interms of the criteria and methods for determining shares, and the frameworks for implementing thoseagreements. All have their pros and cons, and these are set out and explored in Section 5, followed byconclusions in Section 6.
The converging impacts of climate change and political changes in the region create an additional layerof management complexity that must be addressed and mitigated through effective stock management
plans and agreements that are adaptive and resilient to environmental and political changes. Addressingthese issues through effective and comprehensive long-term management arrangements could offer a
blueprint for other highly dynamic, straddling stocks that cover multiple jurisdictions.
The agreement of quota shares is difficult, but not impossible. The responsibility for sustainable
management of fish stocks lies firmly with the coastal states in whose waters those stocks reside, as wellas the fishing states that exploit the stocks. For these stocks, which are some of the most productive,
fished by some of the wealthiest nations in the world, with world-class fisheries science and research, it is
not beyond political capability to come to an agreement on their sustainable management andexploitation. Industry, coastal states governments, the supply chain, and other stakeholders all have a roleto play in in supporting quota share agreements for these fisheries.

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International Fisheries Governance
Framework

All three pelagic stocks are straddling stocks, which occur in the EEZs of coastal states as well as on thehigh seas. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets the overarching legal
framework for the conservation and management of these fish stocks, and has been ratified by all relevant
states in the region (UNTC, 2022). States must cooperate on management, either directly, or throughappropriate subregional or regional organisations, such as Regional Fisheries Management
Organisations (RFMOs). Among the matters they must agree on are participatory rights (e.g. allocation ofallowable catch) and decision-making rules (as detailed in the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement(UNFSA), UN, 2013). Appendix B provides more detail on the management framework in the North East
Atlantic, regional and coastal states arrangements.
Sustainable fisheries management requires that stock status is assessed, and a level of catch is definedand implemented that enables the stock to maintain its biomass, subject to natural fluctuations, into the
future. Ensuring that the advised level of catch is adhered to by fishing fleets, and enforcing the agreed
limits is an important part of achieving sustainable fisheries management.
For stocks like the NEA pelagics that are distributed throughout the waters of several coastal states, aswell as international waters, this requires coastal states and fishing states to jointly:Agree on a total allowable catch (TAC) in line with scientific advice; AND
Define how the TAC will be shared between states by agreeing on quota shares.

Robust Harvest Control Rules (HCRs) support the process of setting the TAC in line with scientific advice,so that the level of fishing pressure is adjusted as the stock size changes. This can help to ensure
exploitation at maximum sustainable yield (MSY), and fishing pressure is reduced if stock biomass falls,
allowing the stock to rebuild. This is particularly important for these pelagic stocks, where stock size canfluctuate according to environmental conditions, to ensure that fishing pressure is aligned with stock
biomass, and the scientific advice is able to advise on TAC limits within this management framework.
The coastal states have chosen to pursue management arrangements for each stock individually throughdirect cooperation between relevant states, rather than operating through the RFMO, the North East
Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). NEAFC takes management measures for the part of each stockthat occurs within the Regulatory Area, but only after the relevant coastal states have agreed on TACs andallocations outside of NEAFC (OECD, 2009).
Coastal states undertake annual consultations to agree on conservation and management measures forthe stocks. Scientific advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is taken
into account, and TACs are generally set in line with scientific advice. However, the agreements all
currently lack defined quota shares. As a result, the sum of quotas set by individual countries exceed theTAC, risking overexploitation of the stocks.

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NEA Pelagics Stock Status andManagement

The latest scientific advice (for 2023) for the three pelagic stocks indicates that while stock biomasses are
currently healthy (above MSY Btrigger, Bpa and Blim), fishing pressure exceeds the MSY reference points (FMSY),
and for herring and blue whiting is also higher than the precautionary reference point (Fpa) (Table 2).
Fishing mortality is not currently constrained by the management arrangements for the stocks, due tounilateral quotas being set that exceed the scientific catch advice, risking stock sustainability.
Table 2.

Summary of stock status

Stock
Mackerel (Scomber scombrus) in
subareas 1–8 and 14, and in
Division 9.a (Northeast Atlantic
and adjacent waters)
Herring (Clupea harengus) in
subareas 1, 2, and 5, and indivisions 4.a and 14.a,
Norwegian spring-spawning
herring 4 (Northeast Atlantic andArctic Ocean)Blue whiting (Micromesistius
poutassou) in subareas 1–9, 12,
and 14 (Northeast Atlantic andadjacent waters)

Spawning Stock Biomass
 Above MSY Btrigger, Bpa, andBlimFishing Mortality
 Fishing pressure on thestock is above FMSY but
below Fpa and Flim

 Above MSY Btrigger, Bpa, and Fishing pressure on the Above MSY Btrigger, Bpa, and Fishing pressure on the

Blim

Blim

stock is above FMSY and Fpa
but below Flimstock is above FMSY and Fpa
but below Flim
Source: ICES, 2022a, b, c

The ICES advice highlights, for all three stocks, that the setting of unilateral quotas that exceed the TAC is
not in line with the management plans. The scientific advice assumes catches will be limited to the levelof the advised TAC, yet there has been a consistent overshoot of the TAC. ICES highlights that the FMSY
reference point that is used as a basis for the advice (and Fmgt for herring) has been derived from anevaluation that assumed that annual catches would be aligned with the scientific advice based on the
MSY approach. Failing to adhere to the advised catches may not be precautionary. Specifically, ICES saysthat “this may result in an increased risk for the stock to fall below Blim, loss of catch in the longterm, and unsustainable utilization of the resource” (ICES, 2022a; 2022b; 2022c).
Blue whiting and herring both have long-term management strategies agreed by all relevant coastal
states, which establish a reduction in fishing mortality as stock biomass falls below the precautionaryreference point. However, mackerel does not currently have such a management strategy in place(Table 3). Further details on management arrangements and history for each stock are provided in thefollowing sections.

4

Atlanto-Scandian herring

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Table 3.

Management plan status and HCRs for each stock

Stock
Blue whiting

Management Plan HCR
 Target F reduces if
SSB<SSB Btrigger

AS herringTarget F reduces if
SSB<SSB Btrigger

MackerelNo management
plan agreed by allparties involved in
the fishery

Parties (CS) Involved
EU, Faroe Islands, Iceland,
Norway, UK( all CS)
Russia, Faroe Islands,
Iceland, Norway, UK( all CS)
EU, Faroe Islands,
Greenland, Iceland,
Norway, UK

3.1

Blue whiting

3.1.1

Summary of ICES advice for 2023

Marine Stewardship Council

Notes
Greenland and Russia as
observers
EU and Greenland as
observers
Russia as observer

The combined unilateral quotas, and catches, for blue whiting have been exceeding the ICES-advised TAC
since 2014 (Figure 3). In 2021, the combined unilateral quotas exceeded the ICES advised catches by 25%.

Source: ICES, 2022a.

Figure 3.

Scientific advice on catch levels, and the sum of unilateral quotas and catches for blue
whiting, 2002-2022

For 2023, the ICES advice is an 81% increase in the TAC (compared with the 2022 advice); hence, the total
catch must not exceed 1,359,629 tonnes (ICES, 2022a). This equates to a 23% increase in catch, comparedwith 2022. The increase in the 2023 ICES advice is due to a large upward revision of the estimatedrecruitment in 2021 (age 1). This 2020 year class was an historical high and will be fully recruited to thefishery in 2023. The ICES advice for 2023 also highlights that fishing mortality has exceeded the
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precautionary reference point since 2014. This does not adhere to the precautionary approach and in thelong term could result in increased risk of stock collapse and loss of yields.
A long-term management strategy exists for blue whiting, agreed by the European Union, the Faroe
Islands, Iceland and Norway in 2016 (Anon, 2016) (and subsequently by the UK in 2021 following its exitfrom the European Union). It was originally agreed for five years, but remains in place until the parties tothe agreement decide that the necessary information to review it is available (Anon, 2021a). It includes a
reduction in the target fishing mortality as the spawning stock biomass drops below the MSY Btrigger
reference point (2,250,000 tonnes) (Figure 4), and a TAC constraint that avoids changes of more than 20%
below or 25% above the previous year’s TAC. ICES evaluated the management strategy and found it tobe precautionary. Subsequently, the TAC constraint was removed in the event of catch advice being morethan 40% above the previous year’s advice. This has not been assessed by ICES. The management planalso allows inter-annual transfers of up to 10% of unutilised quotas, and fishing of up to 10% beyond
quotas allocated (deducted from the following year’s allocation).

Figure 4.

3.1.2

Target fishing mortality for blue whiting based on spawning stock biomass as set out
in the management plan

History of management arrangements and quota shares

In the 1990s, fishing nations agreed that a cooperative sharing scheme was necessary to prevent
overexploitation of blue whiting, but could not agree on how to share the TAC. Countries often set theirown quotas, which greatly exceeded the recommended TAC and the stock was being harvested outsideof safe biological limits.
Coastal states started discussing a possible management regime and quota sharing arrangement for theblue whiting stock. Different coastal states had different views on the appropriate method to determine
quota shares. Norway claimed that the stock should be shared according to zonal attachment 5, whereas
the EU, Faroe Islands and Iceland, claimed that TAC allocation should be on the basis of recorded catchesfrom each state’s exclusive zones. Economic dependency was also included as an argument in some cases,
5

Zonal attachment considers the biomass in each zone or country’s waters, integrated over the whole year, and considering
different life history stages.

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and historical fishing patterns were also used by all sides to support their position or invalidate others.
The sum of the quota claims totalled 160% of the TAC (OECD, 2009).
An agreement was reached in 2006 between the four coastal states (EU, the Faroe Islands, Iceland andNorway), which also provided an allocation to NEAFC for Greenland and Russia. This included a longterm management plan, maximum catch limits and allocation based on fixed percentages (EU 30.5%,
Faroe Islands 26.1%, Iceland 17.6%, Norway 25.7%, and an additional allocation to NEAFC). The multiannual management plan would progressively reduce the TAC until fishing mortality reached the target
level (Anon, 2005). This successfully reduced the total catch limits and catches, and over the years 2010–2013 these were broadly in line with scientific advice.
Interestingly, during the summer of 2005, prior to the coastal state agreement, various fishermen’sorganisations from the EU, Iceland, and Norway negotiated and signed an agreement, similar to the one
signed by officials from the coastal states later that year (Bjørndal, 2009).
The blue whiting agreement broke down in 2014, and each party started to set its own unilateral quotas,
the total of which exceeded the scientific advice (Figure 3). The breakdown in the arrangements followedchanges to the stock assessment methodology and the report of a NEAFC Working Group (which had
been convened on request of the coastal states) to collate information on the distribution of blue whitingin the North East Atlantic (NEAFC, 2013). This indicated that the agreed quota allocation percentages
might not be in line with the spatial distribution of the stock, prompting the questioning of thepercentages that had previously been agreed.
Coastal states have been unable to reach an agreement since. Despite agreeing on the TAC in line with
scientific advice, each party sets its own quota. Over the period 2014-2021, quotas exceeded the scientificadvice by 32% and catches by 35%.

3.2 Atlanto-Scandian herring
3.2.1 Summary of ICES advice for 2023
The combined unilateral quotas, and catches, for AS herring have exceeded the ICES advised TAC since2013 (Figure 5). In 2021, the combined unilateral quotas exceeded the ICES advised TAC by 35%, and in
2022 by 38%.
For 2023, the ICES advice is a 15% reduction in TAC (compared with the 2022 ICES advice); hence, thetotal catch must not exceed 511,171 tonnes (ICES, 2022b). This equates to a 38% reduction in catch,compared with 2022, because catches have been exceeding the scientific advice. The ICES advice for 2023
also states that SSB is predicted to decline by a further 11% in 2023 (it has been in decline since 2008),
and is predicted to fall below MSY Btrigger in 2024. The stock size has been declining as a result of low
recruitment since the large 2016 year class. Furthermore, while fishing mortality (F) is below Flim, it
exceeds both the FMSY and Fpa reference points.
A long-term management strategy for the stock has been agreed by the European Union, the Faroe
Islands, Iceland, Norway and Russia in 2018 (Anon, 2018) (and subsequently by the UK in 2021 following
its exit from the European Union) and is due to be reviewed in 2023. It includes a reduction in the target
fishing mortality as the spawning stock biomass drops below the MSY Btrigger reference point(3,184,000 tonnes) (Figure 6), and a TAC constraint that avoids changes of more than 20% below or 25%
above the previous year’s TAC. When the stock size is above or equal to MSY Btrigger, the fishing mortality
to be applied is Fmgt (0.14), which is more precautionary than FMSY (0.157). The management plan also
allows inter-annual transfers of up to 10% of unutilised quotas, and fishing of up to 10% beyond quotas

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allocated (deducted from the following year’s allocation). ICES evaluated the management strategy andfound it to be precautionary. The management strategy is due to be reviewed in 2023.

Source: ICES, 2022b.

Figure 5.

Scientific advice on catch levels, and the sum of unilateral quotas and catches for
Atlanto-Scandian herring, 2002-2022

Figure 6.

Target fishing mortality for Atlanto-Scandian herring based on spawning stock
biomass as set out in the management plan

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3.2.2 History of management arrangements and quota shares
There has been no quota sharing agreement for Atlanto-Scandian herring since 2012 (Figure 2). The sumof the unilateral quotas for herring have exceeded the scientific advice since 2013 (Figure 5) and theresulting catches have exceeded the scientific advice by on average 31% since then.
After the herring stock collapsed in the late 1960s, the fishery reopened in the mid-1990s, and a coastal
states’ agreement was put in place that included setting and sharing the TAC among the four coastal
states at the time (Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands and Russia). The harvest allocations were based on thezonal attachments of the resource. However, the EU set its own quota in 1996, and was subsequently
brought into the agreement in 1997. The stock was managed cooperatively by the five states and wasconsidered a model of cooperative resource management (Lodge et al., 2007).
Changes in the abundance and distribution of herring caused a breakdown in cooperation in 2003, with
Norway and Russia demanding a higher allocation based on zonal attachment arguments (Bailey et al.,no date; OECD, 2009). A new agreement was reached for 2007, which allocated Norway 61%, Iceland
14.51%, the Russian Federation 12.82%, the EU 6.51%, and the Faroe Islands 5.16% of the TAC.
Once again, in 2012, stock distribution changes prompted a coastal state – this time the Faroe Islands –to request a revision to its allocation, which equated to 31,000 tonnes. The Faroe Islands withdrew fromthe agreement and in 2013 set a unilateral national catch limit of 105,000 tonnes (Weissenberger, 2013).
The introduction of trade sanctions against the Faroe Islands and restrictions on the use of EU ports by
Faroese vessels fishing for herring and mackerel stocks prompted the Faroe Islands to set a lower quota,
but an agreement has not yet been reached by coastal states.
The coastal states agreed to establish a Working Group to collect and collate information on the
distribution of all life stages of herring, to update the zonal attachment analysis. This reported in 2014
(Coastal States WG Herring, 2014), but quota shares have not yet been agreed. While the TAC is agreed
in line with scientific advice, with a lack of agreed quota shares, unilateral quotas continue to result inoverall catches above scientific advice.

3.3 Atlantic mackerel
3.3.1 Summary of ICES advice for 2023
The combined unilateral quotas for Atlantic mackerel have exceeded the ICES advised TAC since 2009
(Figure 7). In 2022, the combined unilateral quotas exceeded the ICES advised TAC by 42%.
For 2023, the ICES advice is a 2% reduction in TAC (compared with the 2022 ICES advice); hence, the total
catch must not exceed 782,066 tonnes. Due to catches exceeding the scientific advice in 2022 (catches of
1,131,416 tonnes compared to scientific advice of 794,920 tonnes), this would result in a 31% decline incatches compared to 2022. The 2022 ICES advice also states that SSB is predicted to decline by 1% in
2024, but will continue to be above MSY Btrigger, Bpa, and Blim. However, while fishing mortality (F) is
below Fpa, and Flim, it exceeds FMSY.

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Source: ICES, 2022c.

Figure 7.

Scientific advice on catch levels, and the sum of unilateral quotas and catches formackerel, 2002-2022

3.3.2 History of management arrangements and quota shares
There has been no quota sharing agreement for mackerel since 2007 (Figure 2). The sum of the unilateralquotas for mackerel has exceeded the scientific advice since 2009 (Figure 7) and the resulting catches
have exceeded the scientific advice by on average 40% since then.
Prior to 2006, the mackerel stock was predominantly present in Norwegian, EU (including UK), and Faroesewaters, and a stable agreement existed between the three parties, keeping quotas and catches in line with
scientific advice.
Expansion of the mackerel stock, and changes to its migratory pattern resulted in the stock being present
in coastal states’ waters where it had not previously been (Iceland, Greenland), and increasing inabundance in others (Faroe Islands). This led to setting unilateral quotas outside of the agreement in
2007/2008, and some parties claiming a greater proportion of the TAC. The quota sharing arrangement
between Norway, EU and Faroe Islands broke down in 2009 (although unilateral quotas had been set bystates outside of the agreement since 2007/8).
All three states significantly increased their catches of mackerel (Figure 8). Iceland increased its catches ofmackerel from 363 tonnes to 112,000 tonnes in the space of a few years (from 2005 to 2008) and set anational annual quota of 152,141 tonnes in 2021. The Faroe Islands increased its quota from 25,000 to
150,000 tonnes (Scottish Parliament, 2014), and its catches increased from around 13,000 tonnes annually
over the period 2002-2009, to 130,000 tonnes annually over the period 2011-2014. Greenland also begansetting its own quota for mackerel, going from just 62 tonnes of catches in 2011 to 78,581 tonnes in 2014
(ICES, 2022c).

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Source: ICES, 2022c.

Figure 8.

Mackerel catches by nationality, as a percentage of total catch, 2004–2021

A tripartite agreement was achieved between the EU (including UK), the Faroe Islands and Norway from2014–2018, which also provided an allocation to other fishing states (e.g. Russia) through NEAFC, set at
15% of the TAC 6. However, Iceland and Greenland, who claimed coastal state status due to the stock now
occurring in their waters, were not party to the agreement. As a result, the agreement did not involve all
relevant parties and did not constrain overall effort on the stock. Over this period, quotas were still 46%
above the scientific advice on average, and catches 47% above. The tripartite agreement was time-limited
because the Faroe Islands were only prepared to agree to the allocation key for a specific time period, sothat if the distribution of the mackerel stock were to shift further, renegotiation of the allocation key could
be undertaken (ABPmer, 2018).
Since 2018, each party has set its own unilateral quota, based on the percentage of the TAC that it thinks
it has the right to. This has resulted in total quotas exceeding scientific advice by 28% on average (overthe period 2019-2022) and catches by 16% (over the period 2019-2021). A comprehensive agreementthat involves all relevant parties is still elusive.
A recent report on mackerel distribution found that the stock has experienced a large-scale northward
and westward expansion particularly from 2010-2019. However, from 2018 onward there has been a
reduction in abundance of mackerel in the western area, and a substantial decline of mackerel in the
Icelandic and Greenland waters from 2018-2020 (Anon, 2022b). This has coincided with an increase inmackerel catches from international waters, from 21% in 2018 to 24% in 2020 (ICES, 2022c). In 2021, theRussian Federation did not report catches inside versus outside the NEAFC Regulatory Area, but ICES
notes that around 90% of Russian catches in the past have been taken from inside the NEAFC Regulatory
Area. Applying this to Russia’s catches for 2021 results in around 29% of all catches potentially comingfrom international waters (Table 4).
6https://www.arctictoday.com/greenland-moves-to-join-north-atlantic-mackerel-fishing-agreement/

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Table 4.

Catches inside the NEAFC Regulatory Area (international waters), and outside the
NEAFC Regulatory Area (within coastal states’ EEZs), 2018-2021

Year

Inside the
NEAFC RA

Outside the
NEAFC RA

Total catch

2018

213,608

809,536

1,023,144

2020

247,901

791,6121,039,513

2019

207,200

2021 (excl Russia)*
2021 (Russia)**

2021 incl Russia*****

Marine Stewardship Council

195,939
122,558
318,497

632,527
749,427

13,618763,045839,727
945,366
136,176

1,081,542

Percentage
inside the
NEAFC RA
21%
25%
24%
21%
90%
29%

2021 data are reported without catches from the Russian Federation, as it did not report catches
inside/outside the NEAFC RA for 2021.
In the past, around 90% of Russian catches were taken inside the NEAFC RA. This assumes the same splitof catches inside vs outside the NEAFC RA by the Russian Federation, applied to 2021 official catch data.

Unlike blue whiting and herring, there is no long-term management strategy agreed to by all parties forthe mackerel stock. In 2019, Norway, the EU (including the UK) and the Faroe Islands requested ICES toreview Harvest Control Rule (HCR) 7 options for a long-term management strategy. The advice waspublished in August 2020 (ICES, 2020). The request does not specifically address the inclusion of Russia,
Greenland and Iceland in the implementation of the strategy (Lloyds Register, 2021). However, an
important aspect of a comprehensive management plan is to ensure that it includes all nations applying
pressure on the stock.

7

A Harvest Control Rule is an algorithm for pre-agreed management actions as a function of variables related to the statusof the stock, e.g. a control rule can specify how F or yield should vary as a function of spawning biomass; also known as‘decision rules’ or ‘harvest control’.

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4

Certification and Market Implications

4.1

Sustainability and certification

The lack of overarching agreements between all relevant states on management of the stocks andallocation of quota shares has significant implications for sustainability. As shown in Section 3, this has
resulted in quotas, and catches, being above sustainable levels as advised by ICES, for many years. As aresult, fisheries for these stocks have had their MSC certification suspended and have subsequently
withdrawn from the Program (Table 5). The suspension from the MSC Program has been primarily related
to the management frameworks, and their inability to effectively constrain fishing effort on the stocks.
The lack of agreement on TAC shares, resulting in unilateral quotas being set, and both quotas and catches
exceeding the ICES scientific advice, means that the harvest strategy (where one exists) is not achieving
its objectives, and the harvest control rules and tools (i.e. TACs and quotas) do not constrain the
exploitation levels of the stock. Further details on the reasons for the lack of progress on certification
conditions, and failures against the MSC Fisheries Standard, are provided in Appendix A.

4.2 Market implications and response
The suspension of certification for these fisheries and their subsequent withdrawal from the MSC Program
causes supply chain issues for companies that have commitments to source from certified sustainablefisheries. The suspension has resulted in a significant reduction of pelagics in the MSC Program (Table 5),affecting the availability of certified, sustainable product. It has contributed to the 20 % reduction in MSC
global sales of fish in 2021-2022, as well as a 6% drop in worldwide production of certified marine feed
ingredients between 2020 and 2021 (Makefood International, 2022).
Many processing businesses, producers of aquaculture feed, and retailers have sustainable sourcing
policies that commit them to buying from certified fisheries and the suspension and/or subsequent
withdrawal of blue whiting, AS herring and mackerel from the MSC Program affects the availability ofcertified product. Some buyers are switching, or considering switching, their sourcing for pelagics toChilean jack mackerel (MSC certified) to replace the loss of certified product from the NEA pelagic fisheries(Makefood International, 2022). North Sea herring (also MSC-certified) offers another option for supply
chains seeking sustainable product.
The North Atlantic Pelagic Advocacy Group (NAPA) 8 is a supply chain initiative which was established tohelp drive improvements in the NEA pelagic fisheries. It was created in 2019 in response to the suspensionof the mackerel fishery from the MSC Program. NAPA was formed by processors, retailers, food service
businesses and buyers from Europe, Africa, Canada, Australia and Japan. It represents nearly 50 membersthat collectively account for €800 million of NEA pelagic purchasing. In 2022, NAPA released a position
paper with three key demands for resolving the issues around the pelagic stocks: to agree an appropriate
allocation mechanism; to employ a dispute resolution mechanism; and to consider a cap on catches ininternational waters (NAPA, 2022).

8

https://napafisheries.org/

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Table 5.

NEA pelagic fisheries withdrawn and suspended from the MSC Program

Fishery
PFA, DPPO, KFO, SPSG & Compagnie des Pêches
St Malo Northeast Atlantic blue whiting Pelagic
Trawl
Faroese Pelagic Organization North East Atlantic
blue whiting
ISF Iceland North East Atlantic blue whiting
Norway North East Atlantic blue whiting
SPSG, DPPO, PFA, SPFPO & KFO AtlantoScandian purse seine and pelagic trawl herring
Faroese Pelagic Organisation Atlanto-Scandian
herring
ISF Icelandic summer spawning herring trawl andseine
Norway spring spawning herring
MINSA North East Atlantic mackerel
Northern Ireland Pelagic Sustainability Sea
herring fishery Group (NIPSG) Irish Sea-Atlantic
mackerel & North Sea herring
ISF Iceland mackerel
Faroese Pelagic Organisation North East Atlantic
mackerel*Marine Stewardship Council

Stock/Species
Blue whiting

StatusWithdrawn

Annual Tonnage
292,000 t (2019)Blue whiting

Withdrawn

340,808 t (2019)Blue whiting
Blue whiting
AS herring

Withdrawn
Suspended
Withdrawn

270,870 t (2019)
438,426 t (2018)
36,000 t (2019)

AS herring

Withdrawn

115,502 t (2019)

AS herring

Withdrawn

81,726 t (2019)*

AS herring
AtlanticmackerelAtlanticmackerel

Suspended
Withdrawn

309,322 t (2016)
778,341 t (2019)

Withdrawn

10,701 t (2020)

AtlanticmackerelAtlanticmackerelWithdrawn

129,584 (2019)

Withdrawn

61,021 t (2019)

AS herring only (the fishery used to target two herring stocks and only AS herring has been withdrawn)

Fishery Improvement Projects (FIPs) have been established for the three stocks. These are multistakeholder initiatives that aim to help fisheries work towards sustainability. Responsible sourcing policies
usually allow sourcing to continue from FIPs, although FIPs must be credible and show measurable
improvement. Mackerel and AS herring are in a NAPA policy FIP, which is working with stakeholders to
implement management improvements with a goal to re-certify the fisheries against the MSC Standard
by 2024 (Pickerell, 2022). Blue whiting, which is predominantly used to produce fish meal, is in a MarinTrust
Improver Programme FIP 9. MarinTrust is an international certification programme for marine ingredient(fish meal and fish oil) certification.
Industry bodies are calling for a resolution to the issue, and the establishment of agreed quota shares toensure the sustainability of the stocks (SPSG, 2022; EAPO, 2022). Individual companies have madestatements that if a FIP for one of these stocks should fail to make progress, they may:





9

Stop sourcing from the fishery;
Reduce sourcing from the fishery;
Pay a lower price; andReview their sourcing policies.

https://www.marin-trust.com/ne-atlantic-blue-whiting

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In particular, Youngs Seafood, the largest seafood processor in the UK, has indicated it would stop
sourcing from these fisheries if coastal states do not reach an agreement on managing the stocks (The
Guardian, 2022):“Young’s considers that the unilateral setting of quotas is an unacceptable threat to shared-stock
fisheries and that the coastal states involved in these fisheries should support securing an agreement
on total allowable catches in line with ICES [International Council for the Exploration of the Sea] advice
and strive for a long-term science-based management agreement”
The loss of MSC certification has implications for the fisheries themselves, including a reduction in priceachieved for their product (Makefood International, 2022). Blue whiting prices fell by more than 20% in
2021, alongside the loss of MSC certification, although prices are also influenced by quotas and fisheries
for other species such as capelin, Peruvian anchovy and sandeel (Fishing News, 2022). Despite the loss of
MSC certification, the fisheries have been able to continue selling their catch, partly due to theimplementation of the FIPs and rating guides that have green ratings for these stocks, but also throughselling to other overseas markets, particularly in Africa and Asia, that may not have the same sustainability
requirements for certified seafood products.

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5

Marine Stewardship Council

Options and Approaches“The negotiation of …[the] allocation of participatory rights,
and the outcome, is subjective and highly politicized”

Lodge et al., 2007.

The NEA pelagic stocks are succeeding in two out of three key aspects of management, failing when it
comes to agreeing quota shares (Figure 9).
Management plan for the stock, agree on setting the TAC in line with scientific advice(for herring and blue whiting – a long term management plan is not currently in place
for mackerel)
No agreement of shares of the TAC, resulting in the sum of individual quotas
exceeding the TAC and risking catches exceeding the scientific advice
Enforcement and compliance with quota limits set
Figure 9.

NEA pelagics’ performance against key aspects of management

Quota shares are recognised as one of the key difficulties in managing shared stocks. Lodge et al. (2007)
identified the main difficulties encountered in allocation mechanisms (specifically in relation to RFMOs,
but they also apply to coastal state agreements) as:

The inability to agree on a TAC because of the concomitant limits it would impose on national
fleets;An inability to accommodate new members with an interest in fishing within allocation regimes;
and
Non-compliance with national allocations owning to perceived inequalities.

NEA coastal states agree on the TAC aligned with scientific advice, but then set unilateral quotas thatexceed the TAC. This has the same effect as not being able to agree on the TAC or follow scientific advice.
Difficulties in accommodating new members are reflected in the break-down of arrangements as stocks
shift in their distribution and abundance (e.g. the expansion of mackerel distribution, which resulted in
Iceland and Greenland becoming new coastal states as the stock became increasingly abundant in theirwaters). However, coastal states and fishing states do demonstrate good compliance and enforcement of
their national quota allocations.
Game theory approaches provide an indication of the conditions required for a stable and cooperative
outcome for shared management (Bjørndal et al., 2022). Specifically:
1.
2.
3.
4.

There must be effective communication between all parties;
There must be an anticipated return from a cooperative arrangement that is at least as great asthat from non-cooperation;
The arrangement should be collectively rational for all parties, i.e. there is not an alternative
solution that would make one or more players better off, without harming the others;
The arrangement must be resilient in the face of unpredictable shocks (environmental, economic
or political).

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Based on an analysis of game theory and the historical development of the NEA pelagic fisheries, Bjørndal
et al (2022) conclude that. The fourth condition – resilience in the face of external shocks – has also notbeen met, illustrated by the repeated breakdown of arrangements for the different stocks over time. Theyfind that there may be incentives for cooperation when stock sizes are declining or low 10, so that the stock
can recover, but the incentives reduce when stock sizes are healthy, leading to cycles of more and lesscooperation.
The key requirement for a stable agreement is political will. Assuming that this exists – and the continued
discussions and willingness of coastal states to engage with each other suggests it does – an agreement
is possible. The right incentives need to be in place to help ensure that the benefits of reaching anagreement outweigh the costs. Market demands for sustainable and well-managed fisheries have an
important role to play in this, including benefits of medium- to long-term sustainability and stability of
production. This section therefore explores a series of options for different ways of establishing quota
shares and possible agreement structures, and their pros and cons. Additionally, a series of options that
could be adopted to avoid catches exceeding scientific advice are considered.

5.1

Options for establishing quota shares and agreement
structures

This section explores various approaches to establishing quota shares, to defining them and theoverarching agreement structure. Experience to date shows that allocations have invariably been apolitical decision, a negotiated outcome between sovereign states (Lodge et al. 2007).
Quota shares can be based on a range of different criteria. Most common are those based on historicallandings records, although zonal attachment criteria are gaining increasing visibility (Figure 10). Historicallandings is a relatively straightforward way of determining allocations, as supporting data are usuallyreadily available, and it reflects the available catching capacity of the states involved. However, it can limit
the potential for new entrants to the fishery, and can result in states increasing their targeting of a stock
to support their claim for higher quota shares. The EU’s Relative Stability is predominantly based on
historical landings records, although there have been adjustments to account for the loss of distant water
fishing grounds, and economic dependency of coastal communities on fishing.
Zonal attachment can be used to determine quota shares, taking into account the distribution of thevarious life history stages of the species, including nursery and spawning grounds. The resulting
allocations reflect the distribution of the stock, but determining zonal attachment can require large
amounts of data and it may be subject to changes as stock distributions shift, putting agreements underpressure. Quota shares under the EU-Norway bilateral agreement are based on zonal attachment, andhave not been revisited since the original agreement (except to accommodate a three-way agreement
between the EU, UK and Norway after Brexit).
Other criteria can also be incorporated in, or form the basis of, quota allocations. These might include thelevel of contribution to science and management of the stock, dependency of coastal communities onfishing the stock, and the national level of economic dependency on fisheries. Possible criteria are set out
in UNFSA, although the ways of calculating such criteria quantitatively are not (see Appendix B).
Furthermore, incorporation of multiple criteria may require the relative weighting of each one to be
determined and agreed, which presents an additional area for agreement and various national interests
will be at play.

10

The likelihood of a coalition increases with falling stock biomass, perhaps because a stock collapse will be harmful to allparties and the only way to avoid it is through cooperation.

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Historic landings

Zonal attachment

Other criteria

Description

Quota shares are based on
historic landings by eachcountry’s fleet, from anagreed reference period.
Favours those parties withhistorical participation in
the fishery.

Quota shares are
determined by the
proportion of the stock
biomass (over all life
history stages).
Favours those parties inwhose waters the stock
resides.

Various other criteria canbe incorporated, such as:level of contribution toscience and managementof the stock; dependencyof coastal communities onfishing the stock; level of
economic dependency on
fisheries.

Pros Reflects past interestand involvement in thefishery Data easily available todetermine relevant
quota shares Reflects distribution of
the stock in coastal
states’ waters

 A variety of criteria canbe considered, andtailored to specificinterests of the parties
involved

Cons Does not enable newentrants to the fishery,
although they may havea valid claim to a quota
share Parties may delay
allocation decisions until
they have increased
their participation in thefishery to a level thatthey feel will give thema ‘fair’ share Data hungry approachand may never bepossible to achieve fullknowledge of complete
distribution of all life
history stages
 May not provide astable basis for quota
allocations in the face ofenvironmental changes

 Additional criteria makethe process of defining
shares more
complicated Criteria options are set
out in UNCLOS, but theirquantitative definition is
not agreed
 Weighting between
criteria may be difficult
to agree on, andultimately is a subjective
and political choice

Examples

EU Relative Stability (withadjustments to takeaccount of other aspects)

EU-Norway bilateralagreement

EU Relative Stability
includes someadjustments tocompensate for loss of
distant-water fishinggrounds and dependence
on fisheries

Figure 10.

Quota share criteria

If the criteria can be agreed on for an initial quota allocation, a further issue is to decide whether quota
allocations should stay fixed indefinitely, or whether there should be an agreed mechanism for theiradjustment and review (Figure 11). Since quota allocations can be difficult to agree, having fixed quota
allocations can provide stability and predictability. Several long-standing agreements use fixed quota
shares without specific mechanisms for their revision, e.g. EU Relative Stability, the EU-Norway bilateralagreement (now EU-Norway-UK trilateral agreement), and the more recent EU-UK Trade and Cooperation
Agreement. However, fixed does not mean inflexible, and it should be noted that the EU Relative Stability
quota allocation key has been updated to accommodate new entrants (e.g. Spain and Portugal’s accession

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to the European Economic Community) and more recently the exit of the UK from the European Union.
However, fixed quota allocations mean that shares may not reflect the current distribution of stocks, norcurrent national interests in fishing those stocks, and may be put under strain as stock distributions
change.
Fixed Quota Shares

Adjustable Quota Shares

Description

Quota shares are agreed and remain
fixed for an indefinite period, with noprocess for review or adjustment

Quota share agreements have a builtin review period and agreed approachto adjust shares according to changes
in stock distribution, new entrants

Pros

 Provides clear and stable quota
shares for involved parties
 Avoids continual revisiting of sharesand possible breakdown/
disagreement

 Quota shares adjust (periodically) toreflect changes in stock distribution,
adaptable to climate-induced shiftsCons Shares may not reflect current
distribution of stocks, nor interest infishing those stocks – a mechanism
for quota transfers can help address
this Can break down when changing
stock distributions become
apparent, e.g. NEA pelagic stocks

 Creates winners and losers as quota
shares change*
 May be difficult to negotiateagreement on criteria for
determining adjustment of quota
shares Additional costs involved in datacollection and analysis for revisionof quota shares

Examples EU Relative Stability (Peñas-Lado,2016)
 EU-UK Trade and Cooperation
Agreement (after phase-in period) EU-Norway bilateral agreement, andnow EU-Norway-UK trilateralagreement Parties to the Nauru Agreement(PNA) tuna fishery (see Box 1)
 Pacific Halibut Convention(see Box 1)* although additional mechanisms can be incorporated to allow parties to trade and access quota that
their industry needs
Figure 11.

Fixed and adjustable quota shares

In contrast to fixed allocations, quota shares can be adjusted, so that they adapt to changing stock
distributions or have an agreed process for accommodating new entrants where appropriate. This does
not necessarily mean that quota shares change annually, but a periodic review system, and agreed process
for revising allocations, can be put in place. This can enable quota allocations to be updated as stock
distributions shift, without needing to renegotiate the whole agreement. However, this is likely to create
winners and losers, and creates an added level of complexity to be agreed along with the initial quota
shares. This may be worth pursuing, as the alternative may be the breakdown of the agreement andpotential over-fishing of the stock, which would mean that all parties would be losers in the longer-term.

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With both fixed and adjustable quota shares, building in additional flexibility to agreements, such as thepotential for parties to swap, trade or lease quota, can help to match fishing opportunities with fish
availability on the ground, and industry needs (ABPmer, 2018).
There are some examples of agreements with adjustable quota shares (Box 1).
Box 1: Case studies – Adjustable quota shares
Pacific halibut
Pacific halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis) are found along the continental shelf in the North Pacific and
the Bering Sea, and are commercially harvested by Canada and the USA. Through the Canada-USA
Halibut Convention, the International Pacific Halibut Commission (IPHC) sets out management areas,
conducts stock assessments and decides on total removals of Pacific halibut in all management areas
on an annual basis. The management areas are delineated along national boundaries, so that thedetermination of removals from each management area effectively represents the division of the TAC
between the two parties (ABPmer, 2018).
Through annual stock assessments, IPHC estimates the coastwide exploitable biomass. Exploitablebiomass by regulatory area (eight areas in total) is then calculated based on survey data, and a fixed
exploitation rate is applied to that biomass to obtain an allowable yield for each regulatory area
(Bailey et al., no date). As such, the percentage of the TAC allocated to different management areas
varies by year according to the stock assessment results; it is not a fixed percentage.
The IPHC sets catch limits, fishing seasons, and can also adopt other regulatory recommendations,which are enforced by national authorities. The governments of Canada and the USA also adopt
domestic regulations to manage the portions of the fishery in their respective waters.
This provides an example of an approach to quota shares between two parties, where the percentage
allocations vary annually based on biomass estimates from surveys, such that they adjust each year
to the distribution of the fishable portion of the stock.
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) Vessel Day Scheme
The tuna fishery of the Western Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) is one of the largest and most valuable
fisheries in the world, with an estimated delivered value to processors on the order of US$3.4 billion(World Bank, 2016). The tuna resources are distributed in large part across the interlocking EEZs ofcoastal states, which cover 14.8 million square kilometres, but are also in high seas areas. The eight
Pacific States in the PNA have developed a Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) for purse seine tuna vessels,
which aims to establish a management system that both conserves the resource and secures the flowof net economic benefits from the fishery (Arnason et al., 2015).
There is a limit on the total number of fishing vessel days, and these are allocated among the coastal
states according to an agreed formula (Havice, 2013, cited in World Bank, 2016). The allocation key
is based on several criteria, including one which adjusts according to stock distribution – a sevenyear moving average of the distribution of tuna catch in the waters of member countries. The
allocation is unlikely to be skewed or manipulated by strategic fishing behaviour, because fishing ismostly carried out by third country vessels, which will fish in the area that is most advantageous tothem in terms of the cost of a vessel day and the anticipated returns from fishing (ABPmer, 2018).
Vessel days can be transferred between the parties, and sold to fishing states/companies. A minimum
price is set to avoid distant water fishing nations from pitting PNA members against each other to
see which offer the lowest price. The ability to transfer days between the parties mean that if one
party has sold all its fishing days, it can purchase more from another member, if foreign vessels arestill interested in fishing in its waters. This helps to ensure that all parties receive benefits from theagreement.

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Under the Pacific Halibut Convention, quotas are set for specific areas which align with nationalboundaries, and are based on annual biomass surveys, effectively providing an allocation mechanism that
adjusts with changing stock biomass distribution. The Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) tuna fisheryprovides an example of a data-driven, adaptive allocation system, that also provides for trading of fishing
opportunities between parties, maximising their potential uptake.
Agreements for quota sharing can be reached for individual, single stocks with the relevant parties, or asingle agreement may cover multiple stocks (Figure 12). A series of single-stock agreements is theapproach that has so far been taken with the NEA pelagics. In this case, each stock is treated in isolation,and lack of agreement for one stock does not prevent agreement being reached for another. However,where the same parties have interests in several stocks, a single agreement can be reached which
incorporates all relevant stocks. Multi-stock agreements may be more difficult to reach initially, as several
stocks are under consideration, and it may increase the number of parties involved (as there may bedifferent combinations of coastal and fishing states for the different stocks). However, they may provide
an opportunity to facilitate agreement by allowing compromises to be made that trade-off benefits
between different stocks and other associated issues such as access to waters, and may be more resilientin the longer term, as withdrawing from the agreement would put the associated and wider benefits at
risk.
Series of single-stock agreements

Multi-stock agreement

Description

Individual, separate agreements foreach stock

Single agreement that encompasses
management and quota shares forseveral stocks

Pros

 Each stock treated in isolation,agreement can be made for one stockeven if it is not reached for otherstocks Benefits can be traded off between
stocks, and include other associatedbenefits such as access to waters,
which may facilitate compromise Maydiscourage
partiesfromwithdrawing from the agreement as
the potential losses across several
stocks may be greater than under asingle stock agreementCons If a party decides to withdraw fromthe agreement, there are no otherconsequences in terms of their accessto other stocks (unless othercountries impose other measures, e.g.
trade sanctions) May be difficult to reach agreement
across several stocks
 Increases the number of parties
involved, as different stocks may havedifferent combinations of coastal
states and fishing states

Examples

Tripartite agreement for mackerel
between the EU, Faroes and Norwayfrom 2014-2018

EU Relative Stability
2016)
EU-UK
Trade
and
Agreement

Figure 12.

(Peñas-Lado,
Cooperation

Single-stock and multi-stock agreements

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5.2 Process for reaching agreement
The process for reaching agreement is predominantly a political one, and while data can be used to inform
decisions, different data sources can also be used in support of differing negotiating positions. Sciencedriven approaches may be used to determine quota shares, such as through analysis of population
dynamics, stock distribution, abundance and life histories, to determine zonal attachment shares. Such an
approach may be considered to be objective and neutral, but there is still a level of subjectivity in selecting
the criteria and approach to analysing the data to determine zonal attachment. There are disadvantages
to data-driven approaches; the more data-hungry an approach is, the more expensive it is to collect andanalyse the required data. Having perfect knowledge of all aspects of a stock is not possible to achieve,
so there will always be a level of uncertainty, and all approaches will be open to criticism. However, it is
not necessary to have perfect data on the stocks in order to reach an agreement. Agreements areultimately political and represent a trade-off in the interests of the parties involved. There is a level ofsubjectivity, and the relative power of the players in the negotiating process can influence the overalloutcome.
Currently in the NEA pelagic fisheries, agreements are based on consensus decisions, meaning all involved
parties must agree. This avoids minority interests being overruled by others, but also means a lack ofconsensus results in no agreement and unsustainable practices continuing. The South Pacific Regional
Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) and Chile manage the Chilean jack mackerel fishery, andSPRFMO uses majority voting in instances where consensus cannot be reached, together with an objection
procedure which enables decisions to be reviewed by a panel, and dispute resolution procedure (Box 2).
Such an approach enables agreement to be made, and issues of concern challenged, without the complete
breakdown of agreements.
Box 2: Case study – Chilean jack mackerel
The Chilean jack mackerel (Trachurus murphyi) stock occurs in the South Pacific in the Chilean EEZ
and in international waters. The South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation(SPRFMO) Convention came into force in 2012, aiming to address the international conservation andmanagement of fishery resources and protection of marine biodiversity in high seas areas of theregion. In 2013, Chile introduced a new Fisheries Law which allowed the adoption of SPRFMO TAC
limits and Conservation and Management Measures within the Chilean EEZ (Lloyds Register, 2019).
The TAC is set by the RFMO and there are agreed percentage allocations and quotas for each Member
and cooperating non-contracting party (CNCP). Ten different states have an allocation of jackmackerel quota, and are based on previous catch proportions. These were originally set based on
their share of 2010 catches as reported to the Executive Secretary (PCA, 2013), and are periodicallyreviewed (for example quota shares were set and agreed for the period 2018 to 2021). Transferability
is incorporated – a Member or CNCP may transfer all or part of its catch entitlement to anotherMember or CNCP.
In instances where consensus cannot be reached in SPRFMO, majority voting is used. For questionsof procedure, a simple majority vote is used, and for questions of substance a three-fourths majority
is required. An objection procedure is available which allows contracting parties to object to a
Commission decision and for it to be reviewed by a panel. If resolution cannot be reached, Article 34(Settlement of Disputes) is initiated, which implements the dispute resolution of the UNFSA (SPRFMO,
2015). The SPRFMO objection process has been tested and proven to be effective in relation to quota
share disputes for jack mackerel, including objections involving Ecuador and Russia.

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5.3 Options in the absence of quota share agreements
If quota shares cannot be agreed, there are some options that could be brought into agreements andtheir overarching frameworks, that could help to avoid a lack of consensus on quota shares resulting incatches exceeding scientific advice. Building these fall-back options into agreements would also increase
the incentives for agreeing quota shares, making resilient arrangements more likely. These are explored
below.
If coastal states fail to reach agreement on catch shares, the TAC for the stock could be set to zero andthe fishery would be effectively closed for that year, if the closure is enforced. This ‘zero TAC’ option has
been proposed by Dankel et al. (2015). The zero TAC would make the benefits of an agreement outweighthe costs of no agreement, encouraging agreement of catch shares. However, there is no mechanism toimplement this, and coastal states would lose out compared to the current non-cooperation option whichis to continue fishing under nationally-set unilateral quotas. It would therefore be very difficult to envisage
coastal and fishing states adopting such an approach.
Alternatively, the fishery could be closed when total catches reach the agreed TAC. This would involveall coastal and fishing states stopping fishing when catches reach the agreed TAC. This would prevent
total catches exceeding the TAC, ensuring scientific advice is adhered to for the fishery. However, it would
encourage an ‘olympic’ fishery where participants seek to fulfil their quota as quickly as possible. This canlead to a glut of supply (affecting processors and markets) and the fish being caught at a non-optimal
time. Different states fish at different times of the year, so this would introduce inequalities of access to
the resource. It also presents problems with enforcement, as currently there is no mechanism for realtime sharing of catch data, which would be needed to implement this option. This option is unlikely to be
acceptable to coastal and fishing states.
The current agreements allow for an inter-annual quota flexibility, where states can fish up to 10% inexcess of the current year’s quota (which is then deducted from the following year’s quota), and any
unfished quota from one year is transferred and added to the following year’s quota. In the current
situation where the sum of quotas exceeds scientific advice, the ability to transfer unfished quota to
subsequent years does not reflect sustainable management practices. Having no transfer of unfishedquota between years, when there is a lack of agreement on quota shares, would help to reduce thedegree to which catches exceed scientific advice in subsequent years through the transfer forward of
quota. This would not be sufficient to avoid catches exceeding scientific advice, but it represents a
responsible action that states could easily incorporate into the existing agreements.
If coastal states fail to reach agreement on catch shares, states could agree to a reduced TAC. This
reduced TAC should take into account the level to which unilateral quotas have overshot the scientificadvice in the past. By agreeing a TAC lower than the scientific advice, this would help ensure that the sumof unilateral quotas would not exceed the scientific advice itself (on the basis that coastal and fishingstates continue to set their unilateral quotas as the same percentage of the agreed TAC as before). This
would make the benefits of an agreement outweigh the costs of no agreement, encouraging agreementof quota shares, as parties should be able to achieve higher shares by coming to a TAC allocationagreement and setting the TAC in line with scientific advice. However, there would still be a risk that, inthe absence of a quota sharing agreement, states could set quotas that still exceed the scientific advice.
Coastal states would have to agree to this as a fallback position in the event of lack of agreement on catchshares, and it would be unlikely to be in their interests to agree to this (as they could achieve a higher
quota by setting unilateral quotas, continuing the status quo). It would also affect coastal states that havemaintained, rather than increased, their quota shares in recent years. However, such an approach could
provide a starting point for quota share negotiations, allowing some headroom for quota shares to be

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adjusted to account for: recent expansion of catches beyond stock availability; historic dependency andinvestment in the fishery; national economic dependency on fisheries, etc.
In the absence of agreed quota allocations, states and the market could establish a level of ‘responsible’quota for each party, independent of the quota that each party actually sets. This could be based on, forexample: catch from their EEZ in recent years; the most recent sharing agreement that was in place; andtaking into account other countries not included in that agreement. This level of ‘responsible quota’ could
then be used as the basis for other decisions and actions, such as withdrawing bilateral accessarrangements for countries not setting ‘responsible’ quotas; or supply chain sourcing decisions so thatpurchases are only made from fleets whose competent authorities have set ‘responsible’ quotas. This may
provide additional leverage and act as an incentive for states to reach agreement on quota allocations.
However, there is no specific body or organisation that has the remit, nor agreed approach, for setting
such quota levels, and the current situation with the NEA pelagics fisheries has demonstrated that there
are global markets available for the catches of these fisheries where sustainable certificationconsiderations are not of prime importance.
Management of fishing pressure in international waters could help to restrict excessive exploitationon the high seas. In recognition of the recent Treaty on Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National
Jurisdiction (BBNJ, the ‘High Seas Treaty’), biodiversity considerations in high seas areas are increasingly
being recognised. This demonstrates the need for comprehensive agreements involving both coastal
states and fishing states, to ensure that all sources of fishing pressure on the stocks is accounted for andmanaged within sustainable limits.

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Conclusions

The history of management and exploitation of the pelagic stocks is peppered with failed agreements as
stocks shift and states increase their quotas to force a renegotiation of previous arrangements. With
climate change likely to bring further alterations to stock distributions (Fernandes et al., 2020), similar
future challenges to the management of these stocks are foreseeable.
More data may not be the answer. Reports on distribution of stocks have in some cases resulted in the
breakdown of existing arrangements. A 2014 report on the distribution of herring has not resulted in theagreement of quota shares. The recent report on the distribution of mackerel was not conclusive in
defining zonal attachment shares, and the complexities of the natural world mean there will never be
perfect knowledge on stock biology and distribution. The zonal attachment principle is not always easy
to apply, as there are a number of complicating factors such as fish stock migrations, shifting distributions
due to climate change, and feeding grounds (Bjørndal et al., 2022), which mean that there is a level ofsubjectivity in its calculation. As a result, determination of quota shares is likely to be a political rather
than scientifically-driven process, representing a negotiated outcome between sovereign states (Lodge etal. 2007) – while they may (and should) take scientific information into account, they are unlikely to be
decided by it (Shepherd & Horwood, 2019, cited in Bjørndal et al., 2022).
The management arrangements for the pelagic stocks need to ensure sustainable exploitation and berobust to future changes. A framework is required that includes quota allocations and does not allow
unilateral quotas to be set in excess of scientific advice, nor for states to walk away from agreements.
There must be compliance with, and enforcement of, agreed TACs and quotas. An effective decisionmaking framework, objection procedure and dispute resolution process are needed that recognise thelack of an agreed quota allocation key as a dispute among states that must be resolved as part ofresponsible and sustainable fisheries management. The use of majority voting, backed up by objection
procedures and dispute resolution mechanisms, may be a way of enabling agreements to be made andadjusted, and issues of concern challenged, without the complete breakdown of agreements.
To increase the chance of a stable cooperation arrangement, the scope of negotiation should be as wide
as possible, including for example other fisheries, access to waters, landing ports, and wider issues suchas trade and security arrangements. The UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is an example
of an agreement that includes fisheries, trade, transportation, aviation and more (UKTPO, 2021), andtherefore the fisheries aspects agreed to are likely to persist due to the negative consequences of abreakdown of the other aspects of the agreement.
The fishing industry has potential for a key role in the process, as it is their interests that coastal states’
governments are trying to protect in the negotiations. Agreeing quota shares could help to prevent stock
decline and lead to higher future harvests, and a reduction in overall quotas may increase prices, raisingprofit margins for industry. Industry bodies in the relevant countries can put pressure on national
competent authorities and negotiating teams to reach quota share agreements, and potentially could
discuss and reach their own agreement for catch shares for the various stocks. This approach was
successful in achieving an agreement for blue whiting in 2006. Agreement at coastal state government
level would then likely follow swiftly.
Wider stakeholders and supply chain NGOs, should continue to raise the visibility of this issue and support
affected fisheries in finding a resolution to the quota share issue. The supply chain should continue toensure strong sourcing commitments to only source from sustainable fisheries with an effective
overarching management framework.

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A future agreement or agreements should consider the following, and the recommendations on allocation
practices for RFMOs are also relevant to all parties involved in the NEA pelagic fisheries (see Box B2 inAppendix B):












Each party will have to accept that a reduction in the percentage of the TAC that they currently
allocate themselves will be necessary to reach agreement. The currently healthy stock biomasses
should help facilitate agreement by avoiding the need for substantial reductions in absolute
tonnages. Agreement on quota shares could consider trade-offs between stocks to reach an
overall agreement encompassing all three pelagic stocks.
A mediator, expert reviewer or panel could be appointed to help resolve issues (as provided forin the Model Framework Agreement, see Appendix B). Such an approach can be incorporated
into arrangements to prevent any one member from exercising a de facto veto over theagreement of quota shares.
Where there is no agreement on quota shares, and unilateral quotas are likely to exceed scientificadvice, there should not be any transfer of unfished quota between years, and other penalties or
incentives could be considered to encourage cooperation.
Arrangements should provide flexibility to adapt to future changes in stock distribution while
maintaining the resilience of the agreement. This could be achieved through an agreed period
and approach to adjusting quota shares, or by ensuring that the agreement sets out alternative
arrangements for a situation where agreement cannot be reached. Arrangements to allow transfer
of quota (e.g. through swaps or leasing) between parties can help match interest in fishing thestocks with the quota allocated to each party.
All relevant parties should be involved in the agreements. For example, although mackerel is nolonger in Greenland waters, their involvement in the agreement and quota share arrangement
could enable trade-offs and agreements across other stocks. If bilateral or multi-lateralarrangements are made that do not include all fishing pressure on a stock, measures must be
taken to ensure the total effort does not exceed the scientific advice and that the other states arebrought into the management plan and quota share arrangement.
The inclusion of wider aspects such as access to waters, permitted landing ports and trademeasures might provide additional benefits to an agreement and could help balance reductionsin quota shares.

Sustainable management of internationally shared fish stocks is a challenge that is common to all ocean
areas. The North East Atlantic pelagic stocks benefit from a strong science base, relatively few coastal andfishing states involved in their exploitation and management, and currently healthy stock biomasses. The
coastal states follow scientific advice in setting the Total Allowable Catch, but the lack of a quota sharing
agreement involving all relevant coastal and fishing states means that the sum of individual quotas is
above sustainable levels, threatening the long-term sustainability of the stocks. Climate and politicalchanges are likely to continue and potentially increase in the future. Management frameworks therefore
need to be adaptive and resilient, incorporating the best available evidence and involving all relevant
stakeholders, to be able to effectively manage these dynamic and economically important stocks.
The three stocks currently have healthy stock biomass levels, but biomass can fluctuate with both
environmental variability and levels of fishing pressure, underlining the importance of internationalframeworks that can effectively manage exploitation levels and respond to changes in biomass. The
coastal states have made good progress engaging in negotiations, but a comprehensive agreement
including quota shares has so far remained elusive. There are different approaches available fordetermining quota shares and for structuring agreements, as well as options that could be used to limit
fishing pressure in the absence of a quota sharing agreement. However, the key factors for driving anagreement are political will and compromise, together with a commitment to ensuring sustainable
exploitation of the stocks. A collective effort by all stakeholders with an interest in the future health and

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sustainability of these fisheries including governments, civil society actors, industry, supply chain interests,
academia and others can help to secure long-term and lasting fisheries agreements.
By finding a path forward to achieve a comprehensive agreement on management and quota shares forthese stocks, the coastal states and fishing states can demonstrate that they are globally at the forefrontof fisheries sustainability, helping to ensure the future productivity of the stocks, while maintaining thefood security and economic benefits that the fisheries provide.

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Northeast Atlantic Pelagic Fisheries – Management Challenges for Straddling Fish Stocks

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ICES, (2020). EU, Norway, and the Faroe Islands request for advice on the long-term management
strategies for Northeast Atlantic mackerel (full feedback approach). In Report of the ICES Advisory
Committee, 2020. ICES Advice 2020, sr.2020.07. 12 pp. https://doi.org/10.17895/ices.advice.7446.
ICES, (2022a). Blue whiting (Micromesistius poutassou) in subareas 1-9, 12, and 14 (Northeast Atlantic
and adjacent waters). In Report of the ICES Advisory Committee, 2022. ICES Advice 2022, whb.27.191214. https://doi.org/10.17895/ices.advice.19772470.
ICES, (2022b). Herring (Clupea harengus) in subareas 1, 2, 5 and divisions 4.a and 14.a, Norwegianspring-spawning herring (the Northeast Atlantic and Arctic Ocean). In Report of the ICES Advisory
Committee, 2022. ICES Advice 2022, her.27.1-24a514a. https://doi.org/10.17895/ices.advice.19772380
ICES, (2022c). Mackerel (Scomber scombrus) in subareas 1-8 and 14 and division 9.a (the Northeast
Atlantic and adjacent waters). In Report of the ICES Advisory Committee, 2022. ICES Advice 2022,
mac.27.nea. https://doi.org/10.17895/ices.advice.7789
Lloyds Register, (2019). MSC Sustainable Fisheries Certification. Chile Purse Seine Jack Mackerel. Final
Report. 26 April 2019. Available at https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/eu-south-pacific-midwaterotter-trawl-jack-mackerel-fishery. Accessed 3 December 2022.
Lloyds Register, (2021). MINSA North East Atlantic Mackerel, Surveillance Report. March 2021.
Lodge, M., Anderson, D., Løback, T., Munro, G., Sainsbury, K. & Willock, A. (2007). Recommended Best
Practices for Regional Fisheries Management Organisations. Report of an independent panel to develop
a model for improved governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. ISBN: 978 1 86203
188 3. Chatham House. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 141 pages.
Makefood International, (2022). ‘NEA pelagic buyers look to South American alternative’. 14 June 2022.
Available at https://www.makefood-international.com/news/nea-pelagic-buyers-look-to-southamerican-alternative/. Accessed 9 October 2022.
Miller, D. (2011). ‘Climate change and the management of high seas, straddling and migratory fishstocks’ in OECD, The Economics of Adapting Fisheries to Climate Change, OECD Publishing,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264090415-en.
MSC Surveillance Reports: https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/
NAPA (2022). Position Paper: The collective voice of the market is calling for change: will Coastal States
listen? February 2022.
NEAFC (2013). Report from the NEAFC Working Group on Collating Information on the Distribution of
All Life Stages of Blue Whiting in the North-East Atlantic and the Distribution of Catches from the Stock.
London, 26–28 November 2013. Available online at http://neafc.org/system/files/NEAFC_BWWG_report2013_webversion.pdf. Accessed 19 June 2023.
NEAFC, (2016). Working Group on Allocation Criteria, 20-21 September 2016, London. Report. Available
at https://www.neafc.org/node/15759. Accessed 9 October 2022.
NEAFC, (2017). Working Group on Allocation Criteria, 8-9 June 2017, London. Report. Available athttps://www.neafc.org/node/16443. Accessed 9 October 2022.

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Marine Stewardship Council

NEAFC, (2017b). Working Group on a Framework for Coastal State Negotiations, 22-23 March 2017,
Report. Available at https://www.neafc.org/node/16437. Accessed 9 October 2022.
NEAFC, (2017c). Report on the 36th Annual Meeting of the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission,
13-17 November 2017. Available at https://www.neafc.org/node/16449. Accessed 9 October 2022.
NEAFC, (2022). Becoming a Contracting Party. Webpage. https://www.neafc.org/becomingacp Accessed
28 April 2022.
OECD (2009). Strengthening Regional fisheries Management Organisations. Paris: OECD Publishing. 123
pages. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264073326-en. Accessed 30 September 2022.
Palacios-Abrantes J., Frölicher T.L., Reygondeau G., Sumaila U.R., Tagliabue A., Wabnitz C.C.C., Cheung
W.W.L. (2022). Timing and magnitude of climate-driven range shifts in transboundary fish stocks
challenge their management. Global Change Biology 28(7): 2312-2326. doi: 10.1111/gcb.16058.
PCA, (2013). In Proceedings Conducted by The Review Panel Established under Article 17 and Annex II of
the Convention on the Conservation and management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in the South
Pacific Ocean with regard to The Objection by the Russian Federation to a Decision of the Commissionof the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation. Findings and Recommendations of
the Review Panel 5 July 2013. Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). The Hague, the Netherlands.
Available at: https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/History/Russian-Objection-2013/Findings-andRecommendations-of-the-Review-Panel-dated-5-July-2013.pdf. Accessed 3 December 2022.
Peñas-Lado, E. (2016). ‘The Common Fisheries Policy: The Quest for Sustainability’. ISBN: 978-1-11908564-5. Wiley-Blackwell. 390 pages.
Pickerell, T., (2022). Summary of FIP for Atlantic Mackerel and Atlanto-Scandian Herring in the NorthEast Atlantic Ocean. Available online at https://www.seafish.org/document/?id=4583d9d1-0e01-4cd987b2-f42b54d5e3e3. Accessed 29 November 2022.
Scottish Parliament (2014). The Reformed Common Fisheries Policy 2014. 30 June 2014. SPICe briefing
14/49. Available online athttps://archive2021.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S4/SB_14-49.pdf. Accessed 30
September 2022.
Sigurdsson, T., (2006). The collapse of the Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery: Effects on the Icelandic
Economy. IFFET 2006 Portsmouth Proceedings. Available athttps://ir.library.oregonstate.edu/downloads/kd17ct88g. Accessed 9 October 2022.
SPRFMO, (2015). Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in
the South Pacific Ocean. South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO).
Available online at https://www.sprfmo.int/assets/Basic-Documents/Convention-web-12-Feb-2018.pdf.
Accessed 3 December 2022.
SPSG, (2022). Scottish Pelagic Industry Briefing Document. Scottish Pelagic Sustainability Group (SPSG),
Available at https://www.spsg.co.uk/scottish-pelagic-industry-briefing-document/ Accessed 9 October
2022.
UKTPO, 2021. Taking stock of the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement: Trade in Goods. Briefing
Paper 52 – January 2021. Authors: Ayele, Y., Gasiorek, M., Holmes, P., Jerzewska, A. and Walmsley, S.
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2022.

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UN, (2013). The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement. Background Paper. Available athttps://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/Background%20paper%20on%20UNFSA.pdf.
Accessed 8 November 2022.
UN (2022). Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and therelated Agreements. Oceans & Law of the Sea, United Nations. Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of
the Sea. Available at https://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_
of_ratifications.htm#Agreement%20for%20the%20implementation%20of%20the%20provisions%20of%2
0the%20Convention%20relating%20to%20the%20conservation%20and%20management%20of%20stra
ddling%20fish%20stocks%20and%20highly%20migratory%20fish%20stocks. Accessed 8 November
2022.
UNTC (2022). United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Montego Bay, 10 December 1982.
Status as at: 08-11-2022 10:15:41 EDT. United Nations Treaty Collection. Available athttps://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXI6&chapter=21&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en. Accessed 8 November 2022.
Undercurrent News, (2022). Russian actions cast doubt on chances of NE Atlantic pelagics quota sharing
deal. 14 March 2022. Available at https://www.undercurrentnews.com/2022/03/14/russian-actions-castdoubt-on-chances-of-ne-atlantic-pelagics-quota-sharing-deal/. Accessed 9 October 2022.
Weissenberger, J. (2013). North-East Atlantic fish stock disputes: The mackerel and herring conflicts.
European Parliamentary Research Service. Briefing. 09/12/2013. Available online at
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/bibliotheque/briefing/2013/130686/LDM_BRI(2013)130686_RE
V1_EN.pdf. Accessed 30 September 2022.
World Bank (2016). Tuna fisheries. Pacific possible series; background paper no. 3. Washington, D.C.:
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Accessed 2 December 2022.
Yletyinen, J., Butler, W.E., Ottersen, G., Andersen, K.H., Bonanomi, S., Diekert, F.K., Folke, C., Lindegren, M.,
Nordström, M.C., Richter, A., Rogers, L., Romagnoni, G., Weigel, B., Whittington, J.D., Blenckner, T.,
Stenseth, N.C., (2018). When is a fish stock collapsed? BioRxiv. https://doi.org/10.1101/329979.

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8

Marine Stewardship Council

Abbreviations/Acronyms

AS
BBNJ
CNCP
CS
$
EAPO
EEZ
EU
excl
F
FAO
FIP
FS
HCR
ICES
incl
IPHC
MSC
MSY
NAPA
NEA
NEAFC
NGOs
OECD
PCA
PI
PNA
RA
RFMO
SPRFMO
SPSG
SSB
TAC
TCA
UK
UKTPO
UN
UNCLOS
UNFSA
UNTC
USA
VDS
WCPO
WG

Atlanto-Scandian herring
Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction
Cooperating Non-Contracting Party
Coastal States
Dollar (US)European Association of Fish Producers Organisations
Exclusive Economic Zone
European Union
ExcludingFishing mortality
Food and Agriculture Organization
Fishery Improvement Project
Fishing States
Harvest control ruleInternational Council for the Exploration of the Sea
IncludingInternational Pacific Halibut Commission
Marine Stewardship Council
Maximum Sustainable Yield
North Atlantic Pelagic Advocacy Group
North East Atlantic
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
Non-Governmental Organisations
OECD Publishing
Permanent Court of Arbitration
Performance Indicator
Parties to the Nauru Agreement
Regulatory Area
Regional Fisheries Management Organisation
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation
Scottish Pelagic Sustainability GroupSpawning stock biomass
Total Allowable Catch
Trade and Cooperation Agreement
United Kingdom
UK Trade Policy Observatory
United Nations
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement
United Nations Treaty Collection
United States of America
Vessel Day Scheme
Western Central Pacific Ocean
Working Group

Cardinal points/directions are used unless otherwise stated.
SI units are used unless otherwise stated.

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9

Marine Stewardship Council

Glossary

Blim

Limit reference point for spawning stock biomass (SSB)

Bpa

Precautionary reference point for spawning stock biomass (SSB)

Coastal state

A state in whose waters a fish stock is present

EEZ

Exclusive Economic Zone, an area of the sea in which a sovereign state has
special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, defined
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

Fishing mortality(F)

Instantaneous Rate of Fishing Mortality; when fishing and natural mortality
act concurrently, F is equal to the instantaneous total mortality rate (Z),multiplied by the ratio of fishing deaths to all deaths; expressed on an
exponential scale: F=0.5 means

Fishing state

A state that fishes for fish stocks, either on the high seas or in other coastal
states’ waters through access agreements

Flim

Limit reference point for fishing mortality (over defined age range)

Fmgt

Fishing mortality target defined in the management plan

FMSY

Fishing mortality consistent with achieving Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY)

Fpa

Precautionary reference point for fishing mortality (over-defined age range)

Harvest Control
Rule (HCR)

An algorithm for pre-agreed management actions as a function of variables
related to the status of the stock, e.g. a control rule can specify how F or yieldshould vary as a function of spawning biomass; also known as ‘decision rules’or ‘harvest control’

Maximum
Sustainable Yield(MSY)
MSY Btrigger

The largest average catch or yield that can continuously be taken from a stock
under existing environmental conditions

Overexploitation

A stock that is overfished, or overexploited, has a biomass level depleted to adegree that the stock's capacity to produce MSY is jeopardised

Overfishing

A stock that is subject to overfishing has a fishing mortality (harvest) rate thatis higher than the rate that produces maximum sustainable yield (MSY)Quota

An allocation of a right [privilege] to harvest a certain amount of fish in acertain period of time

Spawning stock
biomass (SSB)
Total Allowable
Catch (TAC)

Total weight of all sexually mature fish in the stock

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A biomass reference point that triggers a cautious response within the ICESMSY framework

A catch limit set for a particular fishery, generally for a year or a fishing season.
TACs are usually expressed in tonnes of live-weight equivalent, but are
sometimes set in terms of numbers of fish

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AppendicesNortheast Atlantic Pelagic Fisheries – Management Challenges for Straddling Fish Stocks

Marine Stewardship Council

A MSC Fisheries Standard and Conditions
A.1 MSC Fisheries Standard requirements
The MSC Fisheries Standard sets out requirements for fisheries to ensure that stocks remain healthy,
environmental impacts are minimised, and fisheries are managed effectively. These form the threeprinciples of the Standard.
MSC Principles of the Fisheries Standard:

Principle 1

Sustainability of the stock: fishing must be at a level that ensures it cancontinue indefinitely, and the fish stock can remain productive and healthyPrinciple 2

Ecosystem impacts: fishing operations need to be managed to maintain the
structure, productivity, function and diversity of the ecosystem upon which thefishery depends, including other species and habitatsPrinciple 3

Effective management: all fisheries need to meet local, national andinternational laws and have an effective management system in place that isable to adapt to changing environmental circumstances

All fisheries have to meet a certain level against all three principles to achieve certification, assessedagainst a number of individual Performance Indicators (PIs) for each Principle. The Standard also
encourages fisheries to make improvements and work towards best practice, through the setting ofspecific conditions which must be resolved, usually within the five-year period of certification.
All fisheries targeting the three NEA pelagic stocks had conditions set relating to aspects of stock
sustainability and the management framework, to ensure that stocks are healthy and the management
framework is robust in protecting the future health of the stocks. Progress against these conditions was
being monitored through annual surveillance audits. Ecosystem impacts of the fisheries are minimal,and no conditions have been set under Principle 2 for the pelagic fisheries.
The re-assessment of the Icelandic Atlanto-Scandian herring fishery identified a potential concern
relating to effective decision-making processes and their ability to respond to serious issues (a potential
fail for PI3.2.2b) and prompted a re-scoring of all MSC-certified AS herring fisheries. They failed to reachthe minimum required score under PI 1.2.2 and PI 3.2.2. Because similar management systems anddecision-making processes exist for all the NEA pelagic fisheries, the re-scoring and harmonisation was
extended to blue whiting and mackerel fisheries as well. The latest Fisheries Certification Process (v2.1)
requires harmonisation ‘in scoring and condition setting in overlapping fisheries’.
The key aspects of the standard for pelagic fisheries are interlinked:
Principle 1 – Harvest strategy (PI1.2.1) and Harvest Control Rules and tools (PI1.2.2)
o This requires a harvest strategy (PI1.2.1) with well-defined and effective harvest control
rules to be in place. In conjunction with this, harvest control rules and tools (PI1.2.2)
must be in place and consistent with the harvest strategy, that reduce exploitation rates
as limit reference points are approached; take into account the main uncertainties; andtools for implementing them (such as TACs) are appropriate and effective in achieving
the exploitation levels required under the HCRs.

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Northeast Atlantic Pelagic Fisheries – Management Challenges for Straddling Fish StocksMarine Stewardship Council

Principle 3 – Management framework, specifically the legal and/or customary framework(PI3.1.1) and decision-making processes (PI3.2.2)
o This requires a management system that is capable of delivering sustainable fisheriesin accordance with P1 and P2, and which incorporates an appropriate dispute resolution
framework (PI3.1.1). Coupled with this, effective decision making processes (PI3.2.2)
must result in measures and strategies to achieve the objectives, and an appropriate
approach to disputes.

A.2 Certification conditions and failures for NEA pelagics
MSC-certified fisheries for the three pelagic stocks had several conditions that needed to be met within
the five-year certification period, relating to Principles 1 and 3. In addition, the rescoring of PI1.2.2 andPI3.2.2 across all the pelagic fisheries found that these fisheries no longer met the requirements of the
MSC Fisheries Standard, and in 2020 the blue whiting and herring fisheries were suspended from the
MSC Program, i.e. they lost their certificate temporarily. The fisheries at the end of their certification
cycle have subsequently withdrawn from the program.
Blue whiting – conditions were set that required coastal states to reach a quota-sharing
agreement by November 2020;
AS herring – conditions were set for the MSC-certified herring fisheries that required coastal
states to reach a quota-sharing agreement by November 2020;
Mackerel – conditions were set for the MSC-certified mackerel fisheries that required all the
relevant states to reach a quota-sharing agreement by November 2021. In March 2019, thecertificates were suspended in advance of this deadline, due to a stock assessment which foundstocks to be below the threshold for sustainable reproduction. Although the stock assessment
was later revised and the stock status was found to be above the threshold, the certificate was
not reinstated due to the lack of progress on the condition requiring a quota sharing agreement
to ensure long-term sustainability.

The failure to continue to meet the requirements of the Standard, and to close out conditions, acrossall three fisheries, is ultimately due to the lack of a quota sharing agreement among the coastal states(Table A1). The stocks are highly migratory stocks, and therefore overarching management at theinternational level is a necessary prerequisite for any national management system to work within 11.

11

In accordance with GSA4.1 and GSA4.1.1 (MSC Guidance to the Fisheries Standard v2.01), the fishery-specificmanagement system considered is, “the management system directly applied to the fishery. The focus should be on
the management system of the fishery, which for some fisheries will include both national and international
components” (Table GSA9). Consequently, the management system considered here consists of the wider internationalframework that the highly migratory species are managed under, not just that part of the decision-making process that
occurs within the national system.

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Table A1.

Marine Stewardship Council

Reasons for lack of progress on conditions, and failure against the MSC Standard

PI
1.2.1

AspectHarvest strategy

1.2.2

HCRs and tools

3.1.1

Management
framework

3.2.2

Decisionmaking
processes

Reason for Failure/Lack of Progress
With no quota allocation key, and unilateral quotas being set, catches are
consistently exceeding scientific advice, and fishing mortality is above
FMSY levels, therefore the harvest strategy is not achieving its objectives.
With no quota allocation key, the actual TAC (i.e. sum of unilateral quotas)
does not follow scientific advice nor the long-term management plan.
Therefore, the tools (TAC) and arrangements for sharing the TAC are notworking and not effective at constraining the exploitation of the stock.
In addition, for mackerel, there are no well-defined HCRs in place toensure the exploitation rate is reduced as the precautionary reference
point is approached.
International cooperation mechanisms exist but are not completely
effective – they do not result in the agreement and delivery ofmanagement actions consistent with sustainable management advice.
Ongoing disputes are a clear indication that the management systemdoes not have a mechanism to address disputes that is ‘effective indealing with most issues.
For herring, the withdrawal of Faroes from the agreement in 2012 with noformal resolution indicated that the dispute resolution framework was
not effective.
Lack of agreement on TAC shares, resulting in unilateral quotas being set,
and both quotas and catches systematically exceeding the ICES advice.
Coastal states are not responding to this serious issue in any meaningful
way, therefore the requirement for decision-making processes to address‘serious issues’ is not being met.

Source: MSC Surveillance Reports.

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B

Management Framework

B.1

International framework

Marine Stewardship Council

Coastal states must cooperate in the conservation of shared, straddling and high seas fisheries resources
through arrangements to determine sustainable stock levels and management measures (Miller 2011).
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sets the overarching legal framework
for the conservation and management of fish stocks in coastal states’ waters (EEZs) and on the highseas. It has been ratified by all relevant states in the region (UNTC, 2022).
It requires states to cooperate in the management of shared stocks (stocks whose distribution extends
across two or more coastal states’ jurisdictions), straddling stocks (stocks that occur both within the EEZ
and in an adjacent high seas area) and highly migratory stocks listed in Annex I (tuna and tuna-likespecies, oceanic sharks and cetaceans). UNCLOS sets out that coastal and fishing states should
cooperate, either directly, or through appropriate subregional or regional organisations, such as
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs).
The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) sought to strengthen the implementation ofprovisions in UNCLOS relating to straddling and highly migratory fish stocks with a view to ensuring
their long-term conservation and sustainable use (UN, 2013). It has been ratified by all relevant statesin the region (UN, 2022) and includes the key principle to follow the agreement’s legal obligations to“ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory
fish stocks.”
UNFSA sets out more detail than UNCLOS in relation to matters which states are expected to agree on
for sustainable fisheries management, including:






Management measures;
Agreement on participatory rights (e.g. allocation of allowable catch and/or effort);
Decision-making rules;
Mechanisms to acquire scientific advice; andEnsuring compliance with management measures.

While the UNFSA indicates a preference for cooperation to take place through regional fisheriesorganisations (FAO, 2004), for straddling stocks such as the NEA pelagics, Örbech et al. (1998), conclude
that it permits each regional fisheries organisation to choose a bottom-up (coastal states determine
management measures which then apply in the high seas), or top-down (the regional fisheriesorganisation determines the management measures, which then also apply in the EEZ) approach.
It is therefore clear that:The international legal framework requires states to ensure long-term conservation andsustainable use of shared and straddling fish stocks;
This requires states to cooperate (either directly or through RFMOs) to agree on management
measures;Management measures should be informed by scientific advice, and compliance andenforcement of management measures must be ensured;
Agreement on the allocation of participatory rights (quota shares) is a key part of this, to ensurethat the agreed management measures are adhered to in practice.

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Marine Stewardship Council

Box B1: Role of NEAFC in the NEA pelagics management
NEAFC is a regional fisheries management
organisation (RFMO) with international
legal competence to manage fisheries in
the North East Atlantic. Its managementrole is mainly on the high seas, but
measures can apply to areas within national
jurisdiction where the relevant coastal statesuggestssuch
anarrangement(Ásmundsson & Corcoran, 2016).
Most of the waters within the NEAFC
Convention Area are under the fisheries
jurisdiction of the Contracting Parties,
which results in management for manystocks being led by coastal states’
arrangements. Four large areas ofinternational waters make up the NEAFC
Regulatory Area (see map).
There are six contracting parties to NEAFC:
Denmark (with respect to the Faroe Islands
and Greenland, the EU, Iceland, Norway,
the Russian Federation, and the United
Kingdom. This includes all the coastal
states and major fishing states in theregion. In addition, the Cooperating NonContracting Parties are the Bahamas,
Canada and Panama (NEAFC, 2022).

Source: NEAFC

NEAFC’s involvement in management varies depending on the distribution of the stocks (OECD,2009):
 For stocks that primarily fall within the NEAFC Regulatory Area, NEAFC takes management
measures for the whole stock (e.g. pelagic redfish, deep-sea species).
 For stocks that occur both inside the Regulatory Area and the EEZ of a single coastal state,
NEAFC takes management measures for the part of the stock that occurs within theRegulatory Area (e.g. Rockall haddock).
 For stocks which occur both inside the Regulatory Area and the EEZs of several coastal states,
NEAFC takes management measures for the part of the stock that occurs within theRegulatory Area, but only after the relevant coastal states have agreed on TACs andallocations outside of NEAFC (OECD, 2009). This is the case for blue whiting, Atlanto-scandian
herring and mackerel, which are commercially the most significant stocks in the region.
The result is that NEAFC’s role in the management of the NEA pelagic stocks is relatively constrained.
The coastal states take the main decisions (often on a stock-by-stock basis, with different coastal
states involved in the negotiations for the different stocks). NEAFC fisheries conservation andmanagement measures only apply to the portion of the stock within the NEAFC Regulatory Area
(unless parties agree that NEAFC measures should also apply to areas within national jurisdiction). As
a result, other NEAFC processes, such as the dispute resolution mechanism, also do not apply de facto
to the pelagic fisheries. Furthermore, NEAFC’s dispute resolution mechanism has not yet been ratified
by the Russian Federation and therefore is not yet in force.

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Marine Stewardship Council

UNCLOS does not specify criteria for the allocation of fishing rights, but Article 11 of UNFSA sets out anumber of principles to be taken into account for the allocation of participant rights for new members
or participants (in addition to the status of the stocks and the existing level of fishing effort in the fishery):
i)
ii)
iii)
iv)
v)

The respective interests, fishing patterns and fishing practices of new and existing members or
participants;
The respective contributions of new and existing members or participants to conservation andmanagement of the stocks, to the collection and provision of accurate data and to the conductof scientific research on the stocks;
The needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks;
The needs of coastal states whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitationof living marine resources; andThe interests of developing states from the subregion or region in whose areas of national
jurisdiction the stocks also occur.

Box B2: Recommendations on Allocation Practices from Lodge et al, 2007
In the following text, ‘RFMO’ has been replaced with ‘coastal states’ arrangement’, and ‘participatory
rights’ with ‘quota shares’, to ensure direct relevance to the NEA pelagics.
In each coastal states’ arrangement, members should ensure that:
1. To the extent practicable, quota shares are allocated only when the membership of a coastal
states arrangement includes all relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas for the
relevant stocks.
2. Decisions on total allowable catch or total allowable effort are insulated and separate fromdecisions on allocation. Quota shares should be expressed as percentages of agreed allowable
catch or effort rather than as absolute tonnages.
3. There is agreement in advance as to how new members will be accommodated in the scheme of
quota shares. Accommodating new members must not be allowed to result in increases of catchor effort with regard to stocks that are fully subscribed or oversubscribed.
4. There is a pre-agreed formula about how any increases or decreases in catch or effort limits will
be distributed among members.
5. Strong measures exist to ensure the integrity of allocations, including penalties for breaches ofnational allocation and reductions in future allocations for breaches of other conservation
measures. Coastal states’ and fishing states’ records of compliance with conservation andmanagement measures should be an essential criterion for allocation.
6. The process through which allocations are negotiated and the basis for the allocation aretransparent. When decisions on allocation require mandatory consensus there is provision for a‘circuit breaker’, such as the appointment of an ad hoc expert panel or a conciliator, that prevents
any one member from exercising a de facto veto over the allocation of quota shares.
7. There is an agreed process and timeframe for the review of quota shares.
8. New coastal states’ arrangements or coastal states’ arrangements with no previous history of
allocation consider establishing an advisory panel of external experts in order to facilitate
reaching agreement on decisions about allocation.
9. The impacts of the allocated rights, including any measures on the transferability of those rights,
are closely monitored for their potential to change fishing dynamics and to have unintended
consequences on both target stocks and the broader marine ecosystem.

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How to assess each of the principles, and what weight to give to each one in an allocation system, is offundamental importance and likely to be subject to intense discussion and negotiation. Politicalconsiderations and the implications of each criterion to the possible allocation will be weighed up by
each state involved. Lodge et al. (2007) also provide recommendations on allocation practices, directed
at RFMOs, but relevant for coastal state arrangements as well (Box B2).

B.2 Regional arrangements
For blue whiting, AS herring and mackerel, which predominantly occur within coastal states’ waters
rather than in international waters, the coastal states have chosen to pursue management arrangements
through direct cooperation between relevant states for each stock, rather than cooperating through
NEAFC, the RFMO.
The coastal states undertake annual consultations to agree on conservation and management measures
for the stocks. They take scientific advice from ICES on the stocks, and regularly agree to set TACs inline with scientific advice. A portion of the agreed TAC is allocated to NEAFC (to be fished against by
non-coastal states) and NEAFC takes management measures for the part of the stock that occurs within
the Regulatory Area.
Once the TAC is agreed, the next step would be for the states to agree on what portion of the TAC is tobe fished by each party (quota shares). There have been periods for which this has worked for eachstock, with agreed fixed allocation percentages for each country. However, in many cases, this has been
the point at which all involved states are unable to reach agreement, or for agreements breaking down.
Reasons include:States that are not part of the agreement believe they have a claim to fish a portion of the stock(for example, due to changes in the stock distribution which brings it increasingly into their EEZ)
and therefore set their own unilateral quotas in addition to those quotas set under theagreement.
States that had previously been part of an agreement, believe they are entitled to a greater
share of the TAC and leave the agreement to set their own (higher) unilateral quota.

These types of actions have caused the various agreements for mackerel, blue whiting and AS herring
to break down.

B.3 Coastal states arrangements
This section provides an overview of the state-of-play in the NEA region for the pelagic stocks. In 2016,
two Working Groups were established in NEAFC to consider allocation criteria and a framework forcoastal state negotiations. Information on the work of these groups is presented, followed by the latest
state-of-play of coastal states’ consultations, and work to support allocation discussions.

B.3.1 Coastal states Working Group on Allocation Criteria
The Working Group on Allocation Criteria was established at the 34th Annual Meeting of NEAFC in 2015,
in response to the second Performance Review of NEAFC which recommended that NEAFC agrees on
and applies objective criteria for determining allocations (although noting that these are not necessarily
within NEAFC’s remit but the responsibility of the coastal states). It was highlighted that criteria-based
allocation keys should allow allocations to respond to changes, and would be likely to include both

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historical levels of participation and the distribution of the stock under consideration. The terms ofreference for the group were to consider:






The criteria for quota allocations on stocks occurring in the North East Atlantic, both discrete
stocks in the Regulatory Area and straddling stocks occurring both in the waters of the Coastal
States and the Regulatory Area;
The appropriate reference period;
The weighting to be given to each of those criteria;
The minimum time period for which the allocation criteria should apply and the consequent
timing of any review.

The group met three times in 2016, conducting extensive discussions on all points and in particularweightings and time periods, but was unable to reach conclusions and therefore further work wasconsidered necessary. The Working Group discussed a series of criteria to be taken into account inallocation decisions (NEAFC, 2016):








zonal attachment;
fishing patterns;
the needs of coastal states whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the
exploitation of living marine resources;
the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the stock;conservation and management of the stock;the collection and provision of accurate data; and,the conduct of scientific research on the stock.

The group agreed that zonal attachment was a ‘major criterion’ in allocation exercises and the mostimportant one, however there was no common understanding on the meaning or interpretation of anumber of criteria, nor on the relative importance or weighting of criteria in quantitative terms (NEAFC,
2016).
Two further meetings were conducted in 2017, and followed a scientific sub-group meeting on applying
zonal attachment in practice. Discussions in 2017 focussed on the definition of different criteria, but
again there was no final agreement on the issues (NEAFC, 2017). The group has not met since 2017.

B.3.2 Coastal states Working Group on Coastal State Negotiations
The Working Group on a Framework for Coastal State Negotiations aimed to develop principles,
guidelines and good practice aimed at enhancing predictability and cost-effectiveness of negotiations,
reducing uncertainty and promoting an atmosphere of trust. It met three times in 2016 and once in
2017.
The terms of reference for the Working Group were to discuss and agree on:






A common approach to the conduct of negotiations taking into account international principles
and guidelines as well as good practices;
Rules on the duration, termination and opting out of coastal state arrangements; and anegotiation process in the event that the arrangement ceases to function;
The process to be followed in the case of negotiating a new arrangement, e.g. the developingof a report of the parties on the recent trends in the spatial distribution of the stock(s) andassociated catches;
A model arrangement, including management options;

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Practical arrangements on the organisation of the coastal State negotiations, including interalia, location, timing and duration, and the possible role of the NEAFC secretariat to thenegotiations;
Rules of procedure to address inter alia, agenda, appointment and role of chairperson(s), useof media, and presence of observers.

The group developed Draft Guidelines for Coastal State Consultations in the North East Atlantic, and an
example Model Framework Arrangement (NEAFC, 2017b). The guidelines propose annual consultations
on conservation and management measures for each stock, and also framework arrangements whichshould be in place for at least five years. Coastal states should ‘endeavour’ to reach consensus onframework arrangements involving all coastal states. The proposals allow for coastal states to opt outof the framework arrangements, and in the absence of consensus for more limited frameworkarrangements to be established that do not include all participants.
A chapter was included in the 2016 draft on ‘settlement of disagreements’, but no content was provided
and this was removed from the final draft. However, the final draft did include a proposal for a mediatorto help resolve issues where a framework arrangement is not reached.
The Model Framework Arrangement includes the requirement for scientific advice from ICES, a longterm management plan, and established quota shares. However, it does not provide a mechanism forresolving disputes, instead allowing parties to opt out of the agreement, and for reports on zonal
attachment to be produced, to support a new framework arrangement to be agreed. Some parties
expressed a desire for more robust provisions on decision making and settlement of disagreements(NEAFC, 2017b).
The inclusion in the Guidance and Model Framework Arrangement of the possibility for parties to opt
out does not advance the current status quo in relation to the lack of any mechanism to resolve
disagreements, and is likely to result in a reversion to the practice of setting unilateral quotas that exceed
the scientific advice.
The Draft Guidelines and Model Framework Arrangement were adopted by the NEAFC Annual Meetingin 2017, and it was agreed there was no need for further meetings of the working group (NEAFC, 2017b).
The Annual meeting noted that the Guidelines would have a non-binding nature even after formal
adoption, and the Model Framework Arrangement remains as an example only (NEAFC, 2017c). The
MSC surveillance report for the MINSA mackerel fishery also notes that the recommendations remain
as guidelines and do not require mediation to resolve disputes (Lloyds Register, 2021).

B.3.3 Coastal states consultations since 2021
In 2021, coastal states failed to reach quota sharing agreements for 2022 in the October meetings.
However, those meetings did set out steps for continuing to consider quota shares:For herring and blue whiting, they agreed to address the issue of quota-sharing arrangements
as early as possible in 2022, and to develop and coordinate their scientific research activities toimprove the information available for the assessment and the management of the stocks. They
also agreed to establish Working Groups to continue to update existing reports on distributionof the stocks (the Report of the Coastal States Working Group on the distribution of Norwegian
Spring Spawning Herring in the North-East Atlantic and the Barents Sea, and the ‘Report fromthe NEAFC Working Group on Collating Information on the Distribution of All Life Stages ofBlue Whiting in the North-East Atlantic and the Distribution of Catches from the Stock, London,
26-28 November 2013’) (Anon, 2021a; Anon, 2021b).

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For mackerel, they agreed to continue consulting on a comprehensive and inclusive quotasharing arrangement as early as possible in 2022, with the best endeavours to reach a swift
conclusion, and Parties were invited to provide concrete proposals from January 2022. Termsof Reference for a Working Group on mackerel distribution were set out, with a report to bepresented by the end of February 2022, to inform the delegations on the distribution of themackerel stock (Anon, 2021c).

In February 2022, they received updates on the status of technical reports on the geographicaldistribution of each stock, and affirmed their ambition to agree long-term, comprehensive, and inclusive
quota-sharing arrangements on each stock in the course of 2022 (Anon, 2022a).
The mackerel distribution report was presented in March 2022. Whilst the report found that each survey
provides a representative, overall view of the stock distribution at the time of the survey, they do notprovide complete coverage of the stock distribution. No single methodology or survey strategy iscapable of providing data on all life stages (i.e., from eggs to adults), over a complete annual cycle andthe entire spatial distribution of the stock (Anon, 2022b).
There are gaps in the data in relation to some life history stages of the stock, and surveys do notencompass the whole distributional area of each life history stage. The EU pelagic industry concluded
that the report ‘does not provide a basis for taking a zonal attachment approach to the quota-sharing
arrangements for this stock’ (EAPO, 2022), and coastal states failed to reach agreement on quota sharesat the meeting. The report therefore was not conclusive in defining zonal attachment shares, anddeficiencies in the available data mean there will never be perfect knowledge on the stock biology anddistribution.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could present further difficulties for the negotiations in 2022 (Undercurrent
News, 2022), particularly for herring for which Russia is a coastal state.
In 2023, coastal states met several times in the first quarter to discuss a new suite of management
measures for the mackerel stock, including a long-term quota-sharing arrangement. However, whilst
they reported that good progress had been made, a comprehensive and inclusive set of arrangements
including quota shares was not achieved. They agreed to continue their consultations, and that those
consultations for the remainder of 2023 would be chaired by Iceland (Defra, 2023).

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