How Can Myanmar Enhance
Its Aggregate Fiscal Disciplinefrom Medium Term to Long
Term?

Swe Zin Maw
Visiting Scholar, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, JapanThe views expressed are based on the personal view of the author and not those of the Ministry of Planning,
Finance and Industry of Myanmar, nor the Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance, Japan

Contents
List of Tablei

Lists of Figuresi

List of AnnexesiAbstract

1

I
II
II.1
II.2
III
III.1
III.2
IV
V
V.1
V.2
VI

Introduction
Myanmar’s Economic Background and Fiscal Condition
Myanmar’s Economic BackgroundFiscal Condition
Literature View on Aggregate Fiscal Discipline and Analytical Framework
for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
Literature View on Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
Analytical Framework for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
The Analysis for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
Findings and Policy Implications on Current Practicing Mechanisms toEnhance Aggregate Fiscal Discipline from Medium Term to Long Term
Findings on Current Practicing Mechanisms to Enhance Aggregate Fiscal
Discipline
Policy Implications on Current Practicing Mechanisms to Enhance Aggregate
Fiscal Discipline from Medium Term to Long Term
Conclusion

3
4
4
5
7
7
10
13
17
17
19
21

List of Table
1

Table 1. Myanmar’s Major Economic Indicators

5

Lists of Figures
2

Figure 1. Union revenue, expenditure, the deficit as nominal value and percentage of
GDP according to the Myanmar accounting method
Figure 2. Union revenue, expenditure and the deficit as nominal value and percentage
of GDP according to the analytical aggregate method

3

6
6

List of Annexes
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9

Annex 1. Setting the borrowing limit (debt rule) on the Union Budget Law and actual
borrowing
Annex 2. Abstract clauses from the Public Debt Management Law

23

Annex 3. The percent deviation between total actual spending and aggregate expenditure in
the budget
Annex 4. The percent deviation between total actual revenue and aggregate revenue in thebudgetAnnex 5. The practice of medium-term fiscal framework – revenue and expenditure
estimation and its challenges
Annex 6. The abstract sections from procedural fiscal rules on the 2008 Constitution

27

Annex 7. Abstract procedural fiscal rules from the law relating to drafting andsubmitting the Union Budget
Annex 8. The duties and responsibilities of controlling officers and drawing officers
abstract from rules and regulations on the Financial Management of
Myanmar (Ministry of Planning and Finance’s Notification No. 35/2017)
Annex 9. The comparison of budget ceiling and annual budget, budget ceiling andthe Cabinet-approved budget, and the Cabinet’s approved budget and thelegislature’s approved budget

33

25

27
28
30

35

37

i

How Can Myanmar Enhance Its Aggregate Fiscal Discipline from Medium
Term to Long Term?
Abstract
Aggregate fiscal discipline plays a vital role to keep a balance between resource availability
and social and infrastructure development needs. It is also critically important to maintain fiscal
sustainability from medium term to long term. Myanmar has already set strengthening publicfinance management to support stability and efficient resource allocation as Strategy 2.4 of the
Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan (2018-2030). The government is striving to achieve it.
Moreover, when the resources are used as allocated, the national economic policy and objectives
for sustainable development and delivery of public services are more comfortable to obtain.
This paper tries to analyze the current practicing mechanisms for aggregate fiscal discipline
in Myanmar. This paper also tries to identify the mechanisms that can enhance the aggregate fiscal
discipline from medium term to long term. The paper creates an analytical framework by binding adiagnostic questionnaire for the aggregate fiscal discipline from the World Bank’s Public
Expenditure Management Handbook with scoring by the fiscal-rule characteristics created by
Schaechter (2012), IMF to analyze the characteristics of the fiscal rules based on fiscal data andinformation.
The analysis results show that there is a little improvement of aggregate fiscal discipline inrecent years according to the revenue and expenditure outturn data. Moreover, Myanmar has someof the necessary foundations that can support improvements in aggregate discipline in the shortterm. They are setting the borrowing limit for one year at the national level, checking actual
financing with other development partners’ debt sustainability benchmarks, a good legal basis,
excellent coverage and sound enforcement by the Parliament for existing numerical fiscal rules andfiscal matters. However, the study also finds that the current practicing mechanisms for aggregate
fiscal discipline still need to improve from medium term to long term. The current practicing
mechanisms are only focused on the respective fiscal year and not taking the medium term into
consideration.
The policy implications for enhancing aggregate fiscal discipline from medium term to longterm are developing capacities and strengthening medium-term forecasting for macroeconomic
outlook, the fiscal framework and investment planning, upgrading the numerical fiscal rules,
reducing the supplementary grant gradually and enforcing enhancement of the budget monitoringby the departmental heads, strengthening the revenue mobilization, and initiating the managementof assets and liabilities, and fiscal risks.
JEL classification numbers: H110, H610, H620, H630, H680
Keywords: aggregate fiscal discipline, institutional arrangement, fiscal rule, Myanmar

1

Acknowledgement
First of all, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to the Policy Research Institute,
Ministry of Finance, Japan, for the visiting scholar program and the financial support.
I also would like to express thanks to the ex-Director Generals of the budget department
and current Director General of the Budget Department, Ministry of Planning, Finance andIndustry for giving me such a great opportunity.
In addition, I also wish to express my appreciation to Professor Dr. Hideaki Tanaka forproviding helpful comments on the paper.
Moreover, I would like to express my special thanks to the staff from the International
Cooperation Division of PRI, for their support and for helping me with all the necessary assistanceduring my stay in Japan.
Furthermore, I must express my thanks to all staff from the Union Budget Compilation
Section, Budget Department for taking my responsibilities while I was absent from the office.
Finally, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my parents for supporting me in all thenecessary areas.

2

I. Introduction
Nowadays the world is changing rapidly with advanced technologies and full of uncertainty,of which macroeconomic uncertainties and imbalance are severe. This impacts Least Developed
Countries, which are especially vulnerable, including Myanmar as it has low revenue (revenue
analytical method to GDP ratio is approximately 18.4%) and heavily depends on natural resources(natural resource revenue to GDP is approximately 4.4%1), and the annual financing from both
domestic and external sources is approximately 3% of GDP, and the debt outstanding to GDP ratio
was 38% of GDP in fiscal year 2017-2018, the same level the IMF suggested as a debt
sustainability benchmark in 2018. On the other hand, Myanmar’s expenditure required for social
and infrastructure development needs is high.
Aggregate fiscal discipline plays a vital role keeping a balance between resource
availability and social and infrastructure development needs, and to maintain fiscal sustainability
from medium term to long term. Myanmar has already set the strengthening of public financemanagement to support stability and efficient resource allocation as Strategy 2.4 of the Myanmar
Sustainable Development Plan (2018-2030), which the government is striving to achieve.
Aggregate fiscal discipline is a basis for public finance management. It can support theachievement of the objectives of efficient resource allocation, effective expenditure management
and sustainable fiscal condition from medium term to long term. A lack of discipline and budgetary
realism in making strategic policy choices leads to a mismatch between policies and resources.
Furthermore, fiscal stability creates an environment that encourages the sound allocation of
resources in accordance with strategic priorities and the efficient and effective use of resources in
the implementation of strategic priorities (WB, 1998). Moreover, when the government uses theresources as allocated, it can support the attainment of the national economic policy and objectives
for sustainable development and delivery of public services.
This paper tries to analyze the current practicing mechanisms of Myanmar for aggregate
fiscal discipline and to identify the mechanisms that can enhance aggregate fiscal discipline in
Myanmar from medium term to long term. The research focuses on aggregate fiscal discipline byaddressing the following questions.
What is the current aggregate fiscal discipline condition in Myanmar?
What are the current practicing mechanisms to improve aggregate fiscal discipline?

1

Fourth MEITI (2016-2017 FY)

3How could we enhance aggregate fiscal discipline in Myanmar?
This paper creates an analytical framework by binding a diagnostic questionnaire foraggregate fiscal discipline from the World Bank’s Public Expenditure Management Handbook(1998) with scoring by the fiscal-rule characteristics by Schaechter (2012) to analyze the aggregate
fiscal-discipline condition in Myanmar. This paper also uses fiscal data and information to analyze
aggregate fiscal discipline in Myanmar.
The structure of the paper has six chapters, including this introduction. The second chapter
exposes Myanmar’s economic background and fiscal condition. The third chapter is about theliterature view and analytical framework for aggregate fiscal discipline. The fourth chapter is theanalysis for aggregate fiscal discipline, the fifth chapter is findings and policy implications, and thefinal chapter is the conclusion.
II. Myanmar’s Economic Background and Fiscal Condition
II.1. Myanmar’s Economic Background
Myanmar has a population of over 53 million people, real GDP per capita was
1,195,548 kyats,2 and the inflation rate was approximately 5% in the 2017-2018 fiscal year. It has
been facing dual deficits—budget deficit and current account deficit. The budget deficit wasapproximately 3% of GDP (according to the GFS analytical method), and the current accountdeficit was approximately 6% of GDP in the 2017-2018 fiscal year. The current account deficit has
improved to 4% in the 2018-2019 fiscal year according to IMF WEO data. The main factors ofbudget deficit were a decrease of state-owned economic organizations’ revenue, low tax revenue
and rising current expenditure. The critical element that caused the current account deficit was atrade deficit in which import exceeds export. The current account deficit is financed by capital
inflows (especially foreign direct investment inflow). Moreover, government debt outstanding to
GDP was 38% in the 2017-2018 fiscal year the same as the debt sustainability benchmark that wasrecommended by the IMF till 2018. Country’s GDP has been growing moderately (about 6.8 %growth rate), and the unemployment rate was about 1% of the total labor force. Myanmar’s humandevelopment index was 0.578 (Table 1).3

2

It is approximately US $1200.

3

Human Development Indices and Indicators: 2018 Statistical Update, Myanmar

4

Table 1. Myanmar’s Major Economic Indicators
Year

Subject Descriptor

2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 2016-2017 2017-2018 2018-2019 2019-2020 BE
Population (Million)

60.98

61.57

51.99

52.45

52.92

53.39

53.71

Gross domestic product, constant prices( growth rate)

5.60

7.30

8.40

8.00

7.00

5.90

6.80

6.80

7.00

Inflation, average consumer prices

6.83

0.36

5.76

5.14

7.26

9.10

4.62

8.00

6.71

Current account balance(% of GDP)

-1.70

-1.74

-0.60

-4.18

-3.08

-4.02

-6.45

-4.16

-4.77

Government deficit( including Local) (% of GDP)

-3.7

-2.1

-1.6

-1.3

-4.4

-2.8

-3.1

-6.25*-6.87

Government gross debt (% of GDP)

34.92

36.41

33.26

38.15

35.60

38.36

37.11**

954,969 1,015,273

1,076,763

1,129,828

1,195,548

1,978,100

4

0.8

2.1

1

0.564

0.569

0.574

0.578

Real GDP per Capita at 2010/2011 prices (Kyats)35.40
889,744

Unemployment rate (% of total labor forces)

4.01

Human Development Index (value)

0.549

4.01

2,180,755

Sources: Ministry of Planning and Finance and Industry, Ministry of Labor, Immigration and Population, and IMF WEO Data.
Note: *Government deficit is revised estimate data and **Government gross debt (% of GDP) is till 30 June 2019.

II.2. Fiscal Condition
Myanmar runs a budget deficit every fiscal year. Myanmar’s budget deficit to GDP ratio
was between 5% and 9% from the1989-1990 fiscal year to the 2001-2002 fiscal year except forthe1992-1993 fiscal year and the 1993-1994 fiscal year, and under 4.5 % of GDP from the 20022003 fiscal year to the 2017-2018 fiscal year according to the Myanmar accounting method.
Myanmar’s budgeting and accounting system records revenue inflow from all transactions andrecords expenditure outflow from all transactions except for selling and redeeming of Treasury
bonds and bills. Myanmar’s budget has three main types which are current, capital and financial on
both the revenue and expenditure side.
Although Myanmar’s budget deficit was under 4.5% of GDP, which was recommended by
the IMF, Myanmar hit its debt sustainability benchmark 38% of GDP in the 2017-2018 fiscal year.
On the other hand, Myanmar’s funding needs for infrastructure development, and social andeconomic development are high as Myanmar is still a Least Developed Country and ranks low in
the Human Development Index. The incumbent executive and legislative branches approved tospend more than 5% of GDP in the 2018-2019 fiscal year and the 2019-2020 fiscal year to
implement infrastructure and social development. And according to the legislature’s approved
budget data, the government budget deficit to GDP ratio will be 5.01% and 5.65% in the Myanmar
accounting method (Figure 1). If we calculate using the international accounting method that does
not take in consideration borrowing and principal repayment of debt and the flow of data offinancial assets in the revenue and expenditure calculations, the budget deficit will be 6.25% and6.87% (Figure 2) in the 2018-2019 fiscal year and the 2019-2020 fiscal year respectively.

5

Figure 1. Union revenue, expenditure, the deficit as nominal value and percentage of GDP according to the
Myanmar accounting method
35,000,000

50.00

30,000,000

40.00

25,000,000

kyats in Million

15,000,000

20.00

10,000,000

10.00

Percentage of GDP

30.00
20,000,000

5,000,000
0.00
0‐10.00‐5,000,000‐10,000,000

Revenue

Expenditure

Deficit

Deficit (% of GDP) (right axis)

Revenue (% of GDP) (right axis)

Expenditure (% of GDP) (right axis)‐20.00Fiscal Year

Note: Consolidations for inter-transactions have not been made.
Source: Budget Department

Figure 2. Union revenue, expenditure and the deficit as nominal value and percentage of GDP according to
the analytical aggregate method
35,000,000

30.0%

30,000,000

Revenue (Analytical)

Expenditure (Analytical)

Deficit(Analytical)

Deficit to GDP ratio( Analytical) (Right Axis)

Revenue to GDP ratio( Analytical) (Right Axis)

Expenditure to GDP ratio( Analytical) (Right Axis)

25.0%

25,000,000
20.0%

15.0%

15,000,000

10,000,000

10.0%

5,000,000

5.0%

Percentages of GDP

Kyats in Million

20,000,000‐15,000,000

2019‐2020 (BE)2018‐2019 (RE)2017‐20182016‐20172015‐20162014‐20152013‐20142011‐20122012‐2013

Fiscal Year2018 (6 Months)‐10,000,000

2010‐20112009‐20102008‐20092007‐2008

2006‐20072005‐2006‐5,000,000

2004‐2005

0
0.0%

‐5.0%

‐10.0%

Note: Consolidations for inter-transactions have not been made.
Source: Budget Department

6III. Literature View on Aggregate Fiscal Discipline and Analytical Framework for Aggregate
Fiscal Discipline
III.1. Literature View on Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
Andrews and Campos (2003) describe that “aggregate fiscal discipline refers to thealignment of public expenditures with total revenues (domestic revenues plus a sustainable level offoreign borrowing). It means that total revenue and expenditure are kept in line with intended
targets for the fiscal deficit and do not make unsustainable levels of public borrowing” (page 2).
Allen and Tommasi (2001) state that “fiscal discipline pertains to effective control of thebudget totals, by setting the ceiling on expenditure that are binding on both aggregate level andindividual spending entities. An effective budget system is one that has a disciplined total. Controlof the total is the first purpose of every budget system. There would be no need for budgeting if thetotals were permitted to float upward to satisfy all demands” (page 19).
Schick (1998) also describes that “the spending (and other budgets) totals needs to be set
independently of and before decisions are made on the various parts of the budget to improve theaggregate fiscal discipline. If it is not, the spending or deficit totals will drastically increase toaccommodate budget request. The totals must be reasonably firm—hard constraints rather than softtargets—and must be enforced throughout the year while spending is underway, not just during theperiod when the budget is being prepared. Moreover, the aggregates must be sustainable over the
medium term or longer through policies and instruments that enable the government to maintaindiscipline year after year. Unless spending is controlled, there is a strong possibility that theexpenditure objective will be compromised and that the government will seek to achieve thedesired fiscal posture by raising taxes or disposal of assets instead of limiting expenditure” (page12-13).
Campos and Pradhan (1996) describe that “Aggregate fiscal discipline will depend upon: (i)the existence of a medium-term expenditure framework based upon a consistent macroeconomic
program; (ii) the relative dominance of the central ministries; and (iii) the existence of formal
constraints on spending and the deficits. But while such rules may exist on paper, they may not bebinding. The allowing mechanisms can help improve accountability and/or transparency and thus
impose political costs on politicians and bureaucrats from violating the rules: (i) reconciliation
between ex-ante and ex-post aggregate spending and deficits; (ii) sanctions against overspending;(iii) publication and dissemination of the results to the public; and (iv) integration of all
expenditures within the budget, including extra-budgetary funds” (page 5).
Cangiano et al (2013) state that “A well-established body of theoretical and empiricalanalysis also shows how budgetary institutions can influence fiscal outcomes. Institutions aredefined as the laws, procedures, rules, and conventions—including the bodies created by thosenorms—that influence fiscal policy decision-making and management. Strong institutions can
7improve fiscal performance by highlighting the need for sustainable policies, exposing the full costof public interventions, and raising the cost of deviating from stated fiscal objectives. By
increasing the credibility of announced policies, strong institutions can also foster more favorable
macroeconomic conditions and improve market confidence, which further support the restorationof fiscal sustainability” (page 6).
Von Hagen (2002) states that “Fiscal institutions have important consequences for the
spending performance of governments, both in terms of the level of spending, the composition of
spending, and the levels of deficits and debts. Appropriate institutional design can help mitigate
problems of waste, divergences between public preferences and what the public sector delivers,
and fiscal profligacy.” “Centralization of the budget process leads to lower government deficits anddebts can be considered as empirically well-established today. It has been confirmed in very
different geographical and political settings. Thus, one can conclude that centralization of thebudget process is an important and effective way to mitigate the common pool problem of publicbudgeting” (page 276).
Alesina et al (1996) also state that “budgetary institutions are all the rules and regulations
according to which budgets are drafted, approved and implemented. Budget institutions caninfluence fiscal outcomes because they determine how the “game is played” amongst agents withdifferent incentives concerning fiscal discipline. One can identify three types of budgetary
institutions: i) laws (constitutional or not) which establish fiscal constraints, such as balanced
budget laws; ii) procedural rules; iii) rules concerning the transparency of the budget” (page 4).
Von Hagen and Harden (1996) state that “The budget process, in the broadest sense, is asystem of rules, both formal and informal, governing the decision-making process that leads to theformulation of a budget by the executive, its passage through the legislature, and its
implementation. These rules divide this process into steps and determine which steps are taken
when. The rules also assign roles and responsibilities to the participants and regulate the flow of
information among them and thus distribute strategic influence and create or destroy opportunities
for collusion” (page 1).
Shah (2007) states that “Budgeting institutions is generally defined as the collection of theformal and informal rules and principles governing the budgeting process within the executive andthe legislature. Budgeting institutions divide the budgeting process into different steps, determine
who does what and when in each step, and regulate the flow of information among the various
actors” (page 29).
Campos and Pradhan (1996) argue that “institutional arrangements can be effective only ifthere are mechanisms that bind public officials to institutional arrangements. They argue thatpublic officials will incur a sufficiently high cost if they violate the arrangements. They show thatcertain mechanisms that enhance transparency and accountability can indeed introduce such costs
and thus lead to better expenditure outcomes” (page 35).
8

The World Bank (1998) states that “Comprehensiveness and transparency are essential for
effective aggregate fiscal discipline. Formal rules designed to achieve aggregate fiscal discipline
create incentives for evasion, particularly to take activities off-budget or to engage in creative
accounting. Extra budgetary funds, earmarking and quasi-fiscal activities are among the egregious
examples of ways of getting around aggregate fiscal discipline” (page 28).
Schaechter et al (2012) state that “A fiscal rule imposes a long-lasting constraint on fiscal
policy through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates. The boundaries are set for the fiscal
policy which cannot be frequently changed and some operational guidance is provided by
specifying a numerical target that limits a particular budgetary aggregate” (page 5).
Pattanayak (2018) defines that “A fiscal rule imposes a long-lasting constraint on fiscal
policy through numerical limits on budgetary aggregates. Fiscal rules typically aim at correcting
distorted incentives and containing pressures to overspend, particularly in good times, so as toensure fiscal responsibility and debt sustainability” (page 75).
The World Bank (1998) states that “An MTEF is a whole-of-government strategic policy
and expenditure framework within which ministers and line ministries are provided with greater
responsibility for resource allocation decisions and resource use. The key to a successful MTEF isthat institutional mechanisms assist and require relevant decision-makers to balance what isaffordable in aggregate against the policy priorities of the country. The MTEF consists of a topdown resource envelope, a bottom-up estimation of the current and medium-term costs of existing
policy and, ultimately, the matching of these costs with available resources. The matching of costs
should normally occur in the context of the annual budget process, which should focus on the needfor policy change to reflect changing macroeconomic conditions as well as changes in strategic
priorities of the government. Conservatively defining the medium-term aggregate resourceenvelope should help change the psychology of budgeting from a “needs” to an “availability”
mentality as well as enhance the predictability of resource flows and policy over the medium andshort term” (page 48).
Many papers have examined and analyzed the importance of aggregate fiscal discipline andthe factors that can affect it. According to the literature and empirical view, aggregate fiscal
discipline depends on the ability to keep the alignment of public expenditures with domestic
revenues plus a sustainable level of foreign borrowing. Setting the budget constraint in advance
independently, the existence of a medium-term expenditure framework and appropriate
institutional design and transparency can support aggregate fiscal discipline.
The World Bank’s Public Expenditure Management Handbook (1998) highlights the factthat good analysis and sound policy are not enough to ensure sound and sustainable outcomes. If
the institutional arrangements are not supportive or demanding of good performance, the results
will not be sustainable on the ground. That handbook includes checklists and questionnaires toanalyze aggregate fiscal discipline, and the paper uses that diagnostic questionnaire for aggregate
9fiscal discipline which is part of a questionnaire to assess the quality of institutional mechanisms toanalyze aggregate fiscal discipline.
The paper also uses the methodology of scores by fiscal-rule characteristics that was
created by Schaechter (2012). It is especially focused on the detail of numerical fiscal rules andprocedural rules to enforce numerical rules. To analyze fiscal rules, scores by fiscal-rulecharacteristics are more comprehensive for the formal institutional setup than the diagnostic
questionnaire for aggregate fiscal discipline. However, it does not explicitly account for the degreeof compliance with the rules, and it also not include the mechanisms to analyze the quality ofcompliance for revenue and expenditure implementation. The World Bank’s Public ExpenditureManagement Handbook focuses on rules in general and compliance of the rules for aggregate fiscal
discipline.
The paper creates the following analytical framework by binding on the methodology ofWorld Bank’s Public Expenditure Management Handbook—diagnostic questionnaires for theaggregate fiscal and scores by fiscal-rule characteristics to analyze aggregate fiscal discipline.
III.2. Analytical Framework for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
A lot of empirical evidence shows that aggregate fiscal discipline is essential for the fiscal
sector and focusing on the current fiscal year is not enough. Medium-term to long-termsustainability, institutional arrangement, fiscal transparency, medium-term macroeconomic
forecasting, budgeting and planning can support improvements in aggregate fiscal discipline.
According to empirical evidence, many countries practiced different institutionalarrangements depending on their countries situations—formal institutional restraints on aggregate
expenditure (Indonesia) through formal laws (Maastricht, New Zealand, Australia) to public
commitments by the executive (with or without the commitment of the legislature—the U.S.)—toimprove aggregate fiscal discipline.
The paper uses the following analytical framework to analyze the practicing mechanisms
for aggregate fiscal discipline in Myanmar. It is created by binding the methodology of the WorldBank’s Public Expenditure Management Handbook by using diagnostic questionnaires for
aggregate fiscal discipline with Schechter’s (2012) scoring by fiscal-rule characteristics. The
highest scores reflect the best practice of institutional arrangements for aggregate fiscal discipline.
Legal basis: What is the highest legal basis of the rule?
1: Political commitment,
2: Coalition agreement,
3: Statutory,10

4: Constitutional.
Coverage:
Which sector of the government is covered by the rule?
1: Central government,
2: General government or the wider public sector.
Which type of debt is covered?
1: Only domestic or foreign,
2: Both domestic and foreign.
Enforcement: Are these enforcement mechanisms in place?
Formal enforcement procedure (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Monitoring mechanism of compliance outside the government (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Imposing and monitoring by the donor (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Enforcement to publish actual figure relative to the constraint (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Existence of formal rules that guard against overspending by the agencies relative tobudgeted amounts (Yes: 1 or No: 0),
Publication of reconciliation of actual expenditures versus budgeted amounts (Yes:
1 or No: 0),
Taking punitive action against overspending agencies (Yes: 1 or No: 0),
Enforcement to report on aggregate fiscal outcomes relative to targets (Yes: 1 or
No: 0),
Timely report (Yes: 1, No: 0),
The percentage deviation between the aggregate spending in the annual budget andthe total amount actually spent at the end of the fiscal year (less than 5%: 3, morethan 5% but no more than 10%: 2, more than 10% but no more than 20%: 1: morethan 20%: 0),

11

The percentage deviation between the aggregate spending in the annual budget andthe total actual revenue at the end of the fiscal year (less than 5%: 3, more than 5% but
no more than 10%: 2, more than 10% but no more than 20%: 1: more than 20%: 0),
Supporting procedures and institutions: Are these procedures or institutions in place?
Multi-year expenditure ceilings (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Publication of multi-year ceiling. (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Fiscal responsibility law (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Independent body setting budget assumptions (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Independent body monitoring budget implementation (Yes: 1, No: 0),
The percentage difference between the aggregate spending in the medium-term
projection and that of the annual budget (less than 5%: 3, more than 5% but nomore than 10%: 2, more than 10% but no more than 20%: 1: more than 20%: 0),
The percentage difference between the aggregate spending ceiling in Ministry of
Finance budget circular and that of the annual budget (less than 5%: 3, more than
5% but no more than 10%: 2, more than 10% but no more than 20%: 1: more than
20%: 0),The percentage difference between the aggregate spending proposed by the
Cabinet and that approved by the legislature (less than 5%: 3, more than 5% but nomore than 10%: 2, more than 10% but no more than 20%: 1: more than 20%:0),Flexibility: Are these flexibility characteristics in place?
Clearly-defined escape clauses (Yes: 1, No: 0),
Fiscal balances defined in cyclically adjusted terms (Yes: 1, No: 0),12

IV. The Analysis for Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
The following is an analysis for aggregate fiscal discipline in Myanmar.
Institutional
Arrangements

Scores

1. Legal basis

3

2. Coverage4

2.1. Sectoral coverage

22.2 . Coverage of types of

2

debt

Findings of the author
The Budget Law that is approved by Parliament every year
includes the borrowing limit (debt rule) (Annex 1).
The borrowing limit that is enacted in the Union Budget Law
covers all government organizations, including state-owned
economic organizations and Region and State (Local)
Government. However, it does not set a detailed sector limit
separately.
The borrowing limit covers both domestic and foreign.
Nevertheless, it does not set the domestic borrowing limit andthe foreign borrowing limit separately. Nor is it constant overthe medium term.

3. Enforcement
3(a). Formal enforcement
procedure

8.5
13(b). Monitoringmechanism ofcompliance outside
the government

1

The representatives of the Parliament check the complianceof the borrowing limit by comparing the actual borrowing
with enacted borrowing limit in the annual debt reportsubmitted by the Ministry of Planning and Finance.

3(c). Imposing andmonitoring by thedonors0.5

The official borrowing limit is set in the Union Budget Law
by executive and legislative branches. The IMF also conducts
debt sustainability analysis and releases the debt sustainability
benchmark. Although the government does not follow thisbenchmark officially, they check the borrowing limit bylooking at the IMF-suggested debt benchmark.

3(d). Enforcement topublish actual figures
relative to theseborrowing constraints

0.5

The debt management law has been enacted to report theborrowing and repayment of debt during the fiscal year, andoutstanding debt to the government and Parliament. Although
It was not promulgated to publish the actual figures relative tothe constraints in debt management law, the government
reports actual figures relative to the borrowing constraint.
Moreover, the Parliament checks government debt throughthe annual debt report. The borrowing limit was kyats 5,400
billion, and actual borrowing was kyats 3,847 billion in the
2017-2018 fiscal year.

The Debt Management Law 2016 has been enacted to
manage the debt by the government and the Ministry ofPlanning and Finance and to report to the Parliament (Annex2).

133(e). Existence of formal
rules that guard
against overspendingby the agencies
relative to budget
amounts

1

There is a formal rule. According to the rules and regulations
on the financial management of Myanmar (Ministry ofPlanning and Finance’s notification no. 35/2017), any
government organization cannot overspend more than the
total amounts in the Union Budget law and the Union
Supplementary Appropriation Law. The Budget Department
reports on the enacted budget and issues budget sanctions inaccordance with the Union Budget Law and the Union
Supplementary Appropriation Law to the ministries andorganizations, and sends the copy of those sanctions to the
Myanmar Economic Bank, Auditor General Office andTreasury Department every year. The Myanmar Economic
Bank monitor so as to not spend more than the total stipulated
amount in the budget sanctions by all agencies. The Auditor
General Office checks the implementation of the ministries
and organizations, and compliance annually.

3(f). Publication of actual
expenditures versus
budget amounts
reconciliation
3(g). Taking punitive
action against
overspending
agencies

0

As the reconciliation between the actual expenditure versus
budget amounts was not made, the reconciliation between theactual expenditure versus budget amounts was not published.

0

There is not that kind of action. Procedural rules andregulations on the financial management of Myanmar(Ministry of Planning and Finance’s notification no. 35/
2017) has already been issued the duties and responsibilitiesof the controlling officer and drawing officer. It includes theclause not to spend more than the budget. Moreover, theMyanmar Economic Bank monitors ministries’ accounts tomake sure not to spend more than the total stipulated amountin the budget sanctions. The Auditor General Office checks
the implementation and compliance of the rules annually.

3(h). Enforcement toreport on aggregate
fiscal outcomes
relative to targets

13(i). Timely report

0.5

The procedural rule (the law relating to drafting andsubmitting the Union budget) has already been enacted, and it
includes the clauses to report the implementation of thegovernment organizations to the Parliament. The Ministry ofPlanning and Finance submits monthly reports, quarterly
reports, semi-annual reports and annual reports to the Union
Government and the government submits semi-annual reports
and annual reports to the Parliament. Quarterly reports, semiannual reports and annual reports are published on the
Ministry’s website.
The quarterly reports are published within two months, andsemi-annual reports are published within a quarter.
Temporary actual reports are published within four months,
but provisional actual and actual are taken nearly a year.

143(j). Enforcement of assets
and liabilities
management including
fiscal risk management

0

There is no centralized agency that monitored financial assets
except cash. The Treasury Department monitors financial
liabilities, such as foreign borrowing and repayment. The
Ministry of Planning and Finance compiles the flow data offinancial assets and liabilities included in the respective fiscal
year budget as financial revenue and expenditure and submits
it to the Parliament. However, the records of stock offinancial assets except cash are maintained in the respective
organizations. The Union Auditor General Office haschecked the financial assets when they conduct annual
auditing and has reported it to the Parliament in recent years.
The Ministry of Planning and Finance compiles the flow dataof non-financial assets included in the respective fiscal year
budget as capital revenue and expenditure and submits it to
the Parliament. The stock data for non-financial assets are
only available in the respective departments. A systematicrecord of assets was not available, and most of the records
were only for machinery, and equipment names and quantity,and did not include values and lifetime. Infrastructure asset
records are weaker than records of office equipment.

3(k).The percentage
deviation between theaggregate spending in
the annual budget andthe total amountactually spent at theend of the fiscal year

1

The percentage deviation of the aggregate actual spending
was -2% on the original approved budget and -11.4% on therevised estimate (approved by the legislature) in the 2017/18
fiscal year (Annex 3).

3(l). The percentage
deviation between theaggregate revenue inthe annual budget andthe total actual revenue
at the end of the fiscal
year
4. Supporting
procedures andinstitutions
4(a). Multi-year
expenditure ceilings

2

The percentage deviation of the aggregated actual revenue
was 7.1% on the original approved budget and -5.6 % on therevised estimate (approved by the legislature) in the 2017/18
fiscal year (Annex 4).

40

The government has been forecasting the medium-term fiscal
framework. However, there are a lot of challenges inforecasting the medium-term fiscal framework (Annex 5).
The Ministry of Planning and Finance has issued a one-year
expenditure ceiling to the line ministries since the 2015-2016
fiscal year and has not practiced multi-year expenditureceilings yet.

15

4(b). Publication of multiyear expenditureceiling.

0

As the government has not practiced multi-year expenditureceilings, it has not been published.

4(c). Fiscal responsibility
law0

Myanmar does not have a fiscal responsibility law. However,the duty and responsibilities of the implementing agencies,
the government, the Ministry of Planning and Finance and theParliament are enacted in the 2008 Constitution (Annex 6),
the law relating to drafting and submitting the Union Budget(annex 7), and rules and regulations on the financial
management of Myanmar (Ministry of Planning and
Finance’s notification no. 35/2017)4 (Annex 8).

4(d). An independent bodysetting budget
assumptions

04(e). An independent bodymonitoring budget
implementation
4(f). The percentage
difference between
the aggregate
spending in themedium-term
projection and that in
the annual budget

1

Myanmar does not have an independent body setting budget
assumptions. But the IMF forecasts government revenue andexpenditure and makes press releases for all four sectors
every year.
The Union Auditor General Office and the Parliament havetaken the roles of external oversight and monitored the budget
implementation.
The percentage difference between the total budget ceilingand total budget in the annual budget was 31% in the 20192020 fiscal year (Annex 9).

4(g). The percentage
difference between
the aggregate
spending ceiling in
the Ministry of
Finance budget
circular and that in
the Cabinet approved
budget0

40

The percentage difference between the total budget ceilingand the Cabinet-approved budget was 32% in the 2019-2020
fiscal year (Annex 9).

The 2008 Constitution is available at http://burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf , and the law
relating to Drafting and Submitting the Union Budget is available at https://www.presidentoffice.gov.mm/?q=hluttaw/law/2015/07/16/id-10466 and amending Law relating to Drafting and Submitting theUnion Budget is available at https://www.constitutionaltribunal.gov.mm/lawdatabase/my/law/1594 in the Burmese
language.

164(h). The percentage
difference between
the aggregate
spending proposed by
the Cabinet and thatapproved by thelegislature
5. Flexibility
5(a). Clearly-defined
escape clauses

35(b). Fiscal balances
defined in cyclicallyadjusted terms

0

Total

0
0

The percentage deviation between aggregate spending
proposed by the Cabinet and the legislature-approved budget
was -1.3% in the 2019-2020 fiscal year (Annex 9).

The escape clauses are not defined. If the government
presumes to add additional borrowing requirements before
enacting supplementary law, it can raise the borrowing limiton the Union Supplementary Appropriation Law. If thegovernment needs additional borrowing after enacting theUnion Supplementary Appropriation Law, they cannot raise
the additional borrowing limit.
As the calculation of cyclically adjusted fiscal balances needs
a lot of capacity and reliable information, the government
cannot define cyclically adjusted fiscal balances.

18.5/39

V. Findings and Policy Implications on Current Practicing Mechanisms to Enhance
Aggregate Fiscal Discipline from Medium Term to Long Term
V.1. Findings on Current Practicing Mechanisms to Enhance Aggregate Fiscal Discipline
Myanmar has improved aggregate fiscal discipline a little in recent years according torevenue and expenditure aggregate outturn data than before. Moreover, Myanmar also has some basic
foundations that can support improvement in aggregate discipline for the short term. They arehaving:(1). Good legal basis on the - Enacting the borrowing limit annually in the Union
existing numerical fiscal
Budget Law with the approval of the Parliament
rule(Pyidaungsu Hluttaw).
(2). Excellent coverage by - Covering the whole public sectors’ borrowing limit
the existing numericaland covering both domestic and foreign borrowing.
fiscal rule(3). Sound enforcement on - Enacting the responsibilities for monitoring andreporting by the government and the Ministry of
the existing numericalfiscal rulePlanning and Finance to the Parliament in debt
management law. It has been monitored by the
17

-

-

Parliament.
Conducting the debt sustainability analysis andreleasing the debt sustainability benchmark by the
IMF and checking the actual borrowing and debt
outstanding with the IMF-suggested benchmark by
the government.
Stipulating the procedural rules to monitor andguard against overspending by the departmental
head in the rules and regulations on the financial
management of Myanmar (the Ministry of Planningand Finance’s notification no. 35/2017) andmonitoring by the office of the Union Auditor
General and the Parliament for compliance.

However, some mechanisms needed improvement to enhance aggregate fiscal disciplinefrom medium term to long term. They are:(1). Setting the borrowing limit is only one debt rule and it is un-secure for compliance for
unforeseeable events such as natural disasters, setting the borrowing limit
incrementally. The government breached the borrowing limit in 2008-2009 fiscal yearand 2015-2016 fiscal year due to Cyclone Nargis, and massive floods and landslides,
and has been setting borrowing limit incrementally every year since then.
(2). The non-existence of a medium-term budget ceiling consistent with macroeconomic
conditions and medium-term investment planning based on resource availability.
(3). The high deviation:
between the expenditure forecasting and expenditure approved by the Cabinet,
between the expenditure forecasting and expenditure approved by the Parliament,
between the actual expenditure and the legislature-approved budget in the revised
estimate due to a high supplementary grant and low implementation.
(4). Underestimation of revenue by the line agencies on the original budget estimate andoverestimation in the revised estimate projection by the implementation agencies.
(5). Lack of comprehensive management in assets and liabilities and fiscal risk.

18

V.2. Policy Implications on Current Practicing Mechanisms to Enhance Aggregate Fiscal
Discipline from Medium Term to Long Term
Using a combination of literature view and analysis of data and information, the policy
implications for enhancing Myanmar aggregate fiscal discipline from medium term to long termare:(1). To strengthen the medium-term forecasting and developing the capacities for:a. Macroeconomic assumptions and outlook,b. Fiscal framework binding with debt sustainability and comprehensive revenue
forecasting,c. Investment planning,d. The analysis of any significant deviation, taking the necessary actions andexplaining any significant changes in the above forecasting areas.
(2). To submit the medium-term fiscal framework and medium-term investment planning to
the Cabinet and getting approval from them, and report the medium-term revenue floor
and expenditure ceiling that has been approved by the Cabinet to the line agencies,(3). To upgrade numerical fiscal rules by:a. Setting for the medium term and avoiding raising it year by year,
b. Adding the escape clauses for natural disasters,c. Adding additional fiscal rules such as a current revenue to expenditure ratio.
(4). To reduce supplementary grants gradually and enforce the enhancement of budget
monitoring by the departmental heads to make sure the budget is spent as they planned
and achieved the intended objectives,(5). To initiate management of:a. Fiscal risks, starting from the management of contingent liabilities of public
corporations and the Social Security Board,b. All assets and liabilities.
As Myanmar does not have independent body setting budget assumptions, the budget
assumption set by the government is critically important to support for better budget planning bykeeping a balance between resource availability and resource requirement from medium term tolong term consistent with the macroeconomic conditions. The government has already set up (10)Sectoral Coordination Groups and one of them is the Macroeconomic Management Coordination
Group led by the Union Minister for Ministry of Planning and Finance. Under that group, it hasorganized five implementing teams, namely the CBM-MoPF Coordination Team, Revenue Forecasting
19and Monitoring Team, Medium-Term Fiscal Framework Team, Expenditure Management Team,and Financing and Fiscal Risk Management Team. Moreover, they have discussed and presented
their respective areas at the Macroeconomic Management Coordination Group meeting.
The policy implication for forecasting macroeconomic assumptions and outlook is toorganize the technical team under these five implementation teams, forecast once a quarter onmacroeconomic conditions by the technical team and report their forecasting results to theimplementation teams, the implementation teams review and recommend their respective sector
and get the agreement on the forecasting results and report to the Macroeconomic Management
Coordination Group. When the next quarter comes, both the technical team and implementation
teams should review their forecasting and actual situation to improve their forecasting in themacroeconomic conditions.
The medium-term fiscal framework forecasting team should use the forecasting results ofthe technical team for macroeconomic assumptions, the revenue forecasting and monitoring team,and the financing and fiscal risk management team as the input to forecast the whole fiscal
framework consistent with macroeconomic conditions, resource availability and debt sustainability
for the medium term. And then forecasting the result of financing in the medium-term fiscal
framework should be used as the borrowing limit for the medium term, and the forecasting resultof expenditure in the medium-term fiscal framework should be informed to the Planning
Department to forecast medium-term investment planning consistent with resource availability.
After that, the Ministry of Planning, Finance and Industry should submit the forecasting
results of the medium-term fiscal framework and medium-term investment planning to the Cabinet
to make discussions on both the medium-term fiscal framework and the medium-term investment
planning, and to get approval and commitment from the Cabinet as the budget based on the final
approval of the Cabinet for the executive branch. After getting approval of the Cabinet, theMinistry of Planning, Finance and Industry should report this medium-term fiscal framework andmedium-term investment planning to line agencies to improve the predictability of resource levels
and to know the availability of their resources for the medium term.
For improving the legal framework, enforcement and compliance for the medium-term
fiscal framework forecasting and ceiling, medium-term investment planning, and the managementof assets and liabilities, these three areas should be added in the public finance management billthat has been discussed between executive branch and legislative branch for over four years since 2015.

20

VI. Conclusion
Fiscal policy should be geared towards aggregate fiscal discipline for long-termsustainability while the development policy is anchored to achieving the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). Moreover, when the government uses resources as allocated, the national economic
policy and objectives for sustainable development and delivery of public services are easier to beobtained.
Enhancing aggregate fiscal discipline from medium term to long term has become an
important policy challenge for many developed and developing countries, including Myanmar.
Low resource availability and high development needs in Myanmar, and aggregate fiscal disciplinefrom medium term to long term are of critical importance for sustainable development of thenation. Furthermore, enhancing aggregate fiscal discipline can support the achievement of theobjectives of efficient resource allocation, effective expenditure management, and vice versa.5
Analyzing aggregate fiscal discipline in Myanmar by using fiscal data and information, thispaper finds that there is a little improvement of aggregate fiscal discipline in Myanmar based on
aggregate expenditure outturn and revenue outturn. Moreover, Myanmar has already set up somefundamental laws, numerical fiscal rules and procedural fiscal rules. Furthermore, the existing
numerical fiscal rules covers the whole public sector, and the Parliament has made strong
enforcement on the existing numerical fiscal rules.
Nevertheless, the existing rules is still needed to be upgraded further for the medium term.
Furthermore, the medium-term forecasting for macroeconomic conditions, fiscal framework andinvestment planning, and management of assets and liabilities are also weak.
The policy implications for enhancing aggregate fiscal discipline in the medium term tolong term are developing capacities and strengthening medium-term forecasting for
macroeconomic outlook, fiscal framework, and investment planning, upgrading the numericalfiscal rules, reducing the supplementary grant gradually and enforcing the enhancement of budget
monitoring by the departmental heads, strengthening the revenue mobilization and initiating themanagement of assets and liabilities and fiscal risks.

5World bank (1998)

21

References
Alesina, A., Hausmann, R., Hommes, R., & Stein, E. (1996), Budget Institutions and fiscal
performance in Latin America, NBER WP 5586
Allen, R., & Tommasi, D. (2001). Managing public expenditure: A reference book for transition
countries. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Andrews, M., & Campos, J. E. (2003). The management of public expenditures and its
implications for service delivery. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
Campos, E., & Pradhan, S., (1996) Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcomes- Binding
Governments to Fiscal Performance, World Bank, policy research working paper, 1646
Cangiano, M. M., Curristine, M. T. R., & Lazare, M. M. (2013). Public financial management andits emerging architecture. International Monetary Fund.
Fourth Myanmar Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Report (2016-2017 FY)International Monetary Fund (2018), IMF Country Report No. 18/90, Myanmar: 2017, Article IV
Consultation -press release; staff report; and statement by the executive director for
Myanmar
Myanmar Sustainable Development Plan 2018-2030
Pattanayak, S. (2018). Fiscal Transparency Handbook (2018). International Monetary Fund
Schaechter, A., Kinda, T., Budina, N. T., & Weber, A. (2012). Fiscal rules in response to the crisistoward the next-generation rules: A new dataset, IMF WP/12/18
Schick, A. (1998). A contemporary approach to public expenditure management. World Bank
Institute, 68, 2-111.
Shah, A. (Ed.). (2007). Budgeting and budgetary institutions. The World Bank
Von Hagen, J., & Harden, I. J., (1996) “Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline,”
IMF Working Paper 96/78 (Washington: International Monetary Fund)Von Hagen, J., (2002) Fiscal Rules, Fiscal Institutions, and Fiscal Performance, The Economic andSocial Review, Vol. 33, No. 3 (P 263-284)
World Bank, (1998). Public Expenditure Management Handbook, World Bank Publications

22

Annex 1. Setting the borrowing limit (debt rule) on the Union Budget Law and actual
borrowing
The borrowing limitation (debt rule) is enacted in the Union Budget Law every year, but
it is not fixed for multiple periods. The Union Budget Law is drafted by the Ministry of Planningand Finance, and approved by the Financial Commission, the Cabinet and the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw (Parliament) for one fiscal year. So the borrowing limit also is only in effect for a fiscal
year. The borrowing limit is changed and incremented almost every fiscal year to cover therespective fiscal year financing provision. Moreover, the limitation of borrowing can be amended
by the Union Supplementary Appropriation Law if the government assumes that they need toborrow more than the borrowing limitation in the Union Budget Law due to additional budget
requests in the Supplementary Budget. Although the numerical fiscal rule has already been set up,
it did not have a medium-term perspective except the 2013-2014 fiscal year and the 2014-2015
fiscal year, which were stable for two years.
The borrowing limits that were enacted on the Union Budget Law and Union
Supplementary Appropriation Law at the respective fiscal year are as follow.
(Kyats in Billion)
Borrowing Limit
Fiscal Year
The Union Budget Law
2007-2008
2008-20092009-20102010-20112011-20122012-20132013-20142014-2015
2015-20162016-20172017-20182018
2018-20192019-2020

600
600
600
1,800
2,500
2,600
3,600
3,600
3,900
5,000
5,200
4,200
7,200
9,000

The Union Supplementary
Appropriation Law
200
200
1,200
900

200
500

Total
800
800
1,800
2,700
2,500
2,600
3,600
3,600
3,900
5,000
5,400
4,200
7,700
9,000

Source: Budget Department

When the government sets a borrowing limit, the government considers how much the
Myanmar accounting deficit will be and the amount of foreign loans that will be available within
the fiscal year. Myanmar’s numerical fiscal rule is based on how much the government would liketo spend and how much domestic resources are available. The relationship between setting theborrowing limit and budget provision is as follows.
23

(Kyats in billion)
Fiscal year

2011-20122012-20132013-20142014-2015
2015-20162016-20172017-20182018 (6months)2018-20192019-2020(BE)

Myanmar Accounting Method (RE)
Deficit
Revenue
Expenditure(Domestic
financing)
6,306
8,466
2,160
11,866
13,531
1,665
13,86916,7552,886
16,892
19,443
2,552
17,872
21,531
3,659
17,095
21,106
4,010
18,832
22,7603,929

Borrowing
limit(BE+SG)

Foreignborrowing
(RE)

Total
financing

5
976
960
638
1,410
1,264
1,903

2,165
2,641
3,846
3,190
5,070
5,275
5,831

2,500
2,600
3,600
3,600
3,900
5,000
5,400

8,526
21,867

10,547
27,160

2,021
5,293

995
2,213

3,016
7,507

4200
7,700

25,20031,919

6,719

2,445

9,164

9,000

Note: BE= Budget Law, SG= Supplementary Appropriation Law, RE= BE+SG
Source: Budget Department

45%

45000

40%

40000

35%

35000

30%

30000

25%

25000

20%

20000

15%

15000

10%

10000

5%

5000

0%
2006‐
2007

2008‐
2009

2009‐
2010

2010‐
2011

2011‐
2012

Domestic Debt flow

703

970

1647

1893

Foreign Debt Flow

1

2

3

3

3,771

4,741

6,388

8,281

16,273 18,125 21,575 22,032 27,970 28,861 34,699 35,550 39,241

704

972

1,650

1,896

1,660

1,580

1,648

841

4,005

2,931

3,487

1,987

16%

16%

19%

22%

21%

21%

20%

19%

21%

22%

23%

24%

22%

Foreign Debt to GDP ratio(LHS)

14%

14%

16%

14%

17%

13%

15%

14%

15%

Total Debt to GDP ratio(LHS)

35%

35%

36%

33%

38%

36%

38%

38%

37%

Debt Stock(year end )3,068

Total Debt Flow during fiscal year
Domestic Debt to GDP ratio(LHS)

18%

2012‐
2013

2013‐
2014

1657

886

3

694

2018‐
2018
2019
(6
(30‐6‐
Months)
2019)

2007‐
2008

2014‐
2015

2015‐
2016

2016‐
2017

2017‐
2018

1190

473

3237

2296

2705

1562

1,228

458

368

768

635

782

425

2,463

0

kyats in Billion

Percentage of GDP

Actual borrowing (debt flow) and stock data for the respective fiscal year

3,691

Source: Treasury Department and Budget Department (Foreign Debt to GDP ratios before 2011-2012 are not available)66

Debt stock at the end of the year were not the same to debt stock at the beginning of the year, plus debt flow during
the year and debt stock at the end of the year were calculated based on the respective year’s last date’s exchange rate.

24

In the 2007-2008 and the 2008-2009 fiscal year, the borrowing limit was set the samelevel at kyats 800 billion, and the actual borrowing was kyats 709 and 970 billion respectively.
Although borrowing was set as kyats 800 billion, the actual borrowing was kyats 970 billion, andthe government borrowed over 20% more than what was stipulated in 2008, the Union Budget
Law and the Union Supplementary Appropriation Law, as both the revenue and expenditure wereaffected by Cyclone Nargis in 2008. In the 2009-2010 fiscal year, the government stipulated theborrowing limit as kyats 600 billion on the Union Budget Law (original budget) and then theyraised additional borrowing limit kyats 1200 billion on the Union Supplementary Appropriation
Law. The borrowing limit has been increasing year by year since then, except for the 2014-2015
fiscal year which had the same borrowing limit as the 2013-2014 fiscal year. Even though thegovernment had increased the borrowing limit every year, they breached the borrowing limit thatwas stipulated in the 2015-2016 fiscal year’s Union Budget Law, and it was affected by floods
and landslides in 2015. The additional borrowing limit was not stipulated in the Union
Supplementary Appropriation Law from the 2011-2012 fiscal year to the 2016-2017 fiscal year.
Additional borrowing limit was set on the Union Supplementary Appropriation Law to cover theirfinancing need in the 2017-2018 fiscal year and 2018-2019 fiscal year, but actual financing wasunder the initial borrowing limit. A few representatives in the Parliament discussed increasing theborrowing limit on the 2019-2020 fiscal year’s Union Budget Bill more than the borrowing limiton the 2018-2019 fiscal year’s Union Budget Law and discussed keeping the borrowing limit thesame level as the 2018-2019 fiscal year’s Union Budget Law. However, most of therepresentatives have agreed to raise the borrowing limit to cover financing needs for the 20192020 fiscal year and they approved it as the government submitted borrowing limit.
Annex 2. Abstract clauses from the Public Debt Management Law
3. The Union Government, instead of the nation may, with the approval of the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw, take loans for the following matters:(a) to finance for the Budget deficit of the nation,(b) to finance for the projects and investments,(c) to reschedule or restructure the debt and to make repayment of the debt before the due date,(d) to maintain credit balance of the single Treasury account within the specified amount that is
specified by the minister of the Ministry of Planning and Finance,(e) to fulfil foreign reserve requirement, if necessary, which is maintained at the Central Bankof Myanmar,(f) to make repayment for liabilities of the government guarantees,(g) to on-lend to the Region or State Government, municipalities, state-owned economic

25

organizations and other organizations that have already been approved by the Parliament,(h) to carry out protection, reduction and elimination of the effects of the natural andenvironmental disasters, and contingency situations of the nation,(i) to finance for other matters that are enacted on the Union Budget Law.
4. Borrowing money for the above matters shall incur only for matters that have already been
approved by the Cabinet for borrowing in accordance with debt management law.
5. The Minister of the Ministry of Planning and Finance may borrow from domestic or external
by signing loan agreements, issuing government security bonds or issuing government guarantees
in accordance with the stipulation for taking loans on the Union Budget Law. Borrowing shall bein line with the objectives and limitations of the Union Budget Law.
6. The Union Government may empower the Union Minister for the Ministry of Planning and
Finance to enable implementation of all or part of the matters contained in this chapter. The
Minister for the Ministry of Planning and Finance may, on behalf of the Union, furnish guarantees
for taking loans contained in this chapter.
34. (a) The Ministry of Planning and Finance shall record public debt, lending, on-lending,guarantees and all financial matters that are related to public debt management in accordance withbudget accounting heads and types.
34. (b) The record of all financial matters that relate to public debt shall be maintained inaccordance with rules and regulations and by-laws. Bookkeeping of public debt shall obey the
Myanmar financial and fiscal reporting standard.
35. All state administrative organizations, Union ministries and departments, Region or State
Government, municipalities and state-owned economic organizations shall make the provision on
the budget for their borrowing and repayment in accordance with directives of the respective
fiscal year’s budget circular, and submit to and get the approval of the Parliament.
37. The Minister of the Ministry of Planning and Finance shall submit an annual debt report that
relates to the operation of public debt management, the government’s guarantees and thegovernment’s lending to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw not later than six months at the end of the fiscal
year. The annual debt report shall describe the following matters:(a) the objective and basic concepts of the debt management strategy,(b) the operation of the debt management situation during the fiscal year,26

(c) the new borrowing contracts during the fiscal year, and their rules,(d) the debt outstanding of the state administrative organizations, the Union ministries anddepartments, State or Region Government, municipalities and state-owned economic
organizations,(e) all lending and on-lending,(f) all government guarantees,
38. (a) The Union Auditor General Office shall conduct auditing functions annually to check theeffectiveness of government debt and monitoring of debt management.
38. (b) The audit report and findings shall be submitted to the President and the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw simultaneously.
Annex 3. The percent deviation between total actual spending and aggregate expenditure in thebudgetFiscal Year2011-20122012-20132013-20142014-2015
2015-20162016-20172017-20182018 (6 Months)

Expenditure
Percent Deviation on Original Budget
Percent Deviation on Revised Estimate
9.8%
-3.0%
13.5%
0.7%
-7.6%
-11.0%
-8.7%
-9.4%
-4.6%
-8.7%
-6.8%
-10.5%-2.0%-11.4%-9.3%

Annex 4. The percent deviation between total actual revenue and aggregate revenue in thebudgetRevenue
Fiscal Year

Percent Deviation on Original Budget

Percent Deviation on Revised Estimate

2011-20122012-20132013-2014

20.0%
31.3%
7.1%

3.1%
11.2%
2.1%

2014-2015
2015-20162016-20172017-2018

1.8%
-2.1%
0.1%
7.1%

-0.4%
-6.8%
-0.6%
-5.6%

2018 (6 Months)

7.6%

27

Annex 5. The practice of the medium-term fiscal framework – revenue and expenditure
estimation and its challenges
Medium-term fiscal framework (MTFF) forecasting has been implemented by the
Ministry of Planning and Finance since the 2015-2016 fiscal year. The objectives are to achieve
higher budget credibility, to keep fiscal sustainability, to improve the strategic resource allocation
strategy by providing the expenditure ceiling ministry-wide based on available resources and topractice top-down budgeting and bottom-up planning to be in line with international standards
based on government policy. The macroeconomic indicators used in forecasting MTFF are thereal GDP growth rate, the nominal GDP growth rate, the nominal GDP, inflation, the import
growth rate, the exchange rate, the interest rate of T-bonds and T-bills. The baseline forforecasting the MTFF is the previous year’s revenue and expenditure. All items are taken into
consideration for forecasting the MTFF such as the potential revenue, domestic and foreign loans,and foreign grants, repayment of principal and interest on domestic and foreign loans based on
available information. The MTFF is forecasted for the upcoming three years, and the MTFF teamforecasts the revenue firstly, and then they forecast current expenditure, and finally, they forecast
capital expenditure based on the ratio of current and capital expenditure.
When the MTFF team forecast current expenditure, they also forecast grant transfer from
Union to State or Region based on six indicators, which include three development needs
indicators and three fiscal constraints indicators, and the development needs indicators are total
population, poverty index, and area, and the fiscal constraints indicators are urban population, percapita tax collection, and per capita GDP. The grant transfer from the Union to Region and Stateis the general purpose grant. They can use this grant for any purpose.
There are a lot of challenges in forecasting the medium-term fiscal framework. The firstchallenge is collecting the macroeconomic indicators. Forecasting the macroeconomic condition
is not easy and it depends on the interrelation of four sectors – real, fiscal, monetary and external
sectors. The gross domestic product (GDP) and fiscal indicators (revenue, expenditure anddeficit), the balance of payment, and foreign exchange rate and monetary reserve and interest rate
are somewhat interrelated with each other, which data contributes to which and to get othermacroeconomics indicators is always questionable. A realistic medium-term fiscal framework has
to be started by constructing the macroeconomic framework. It can be done by binding the IMF’s
technical assistance for macroeconomic forecasting and the World Bank’s technical assistance for
MTFF. However, they do not bind—they go in parallel. The medium-term fiscal framework
forecasting team collects the macroeconomic indicators from the respective department, which are
forecasted by each department separately instead of constructing the macroeconomic framework.
The second challenge is identifying the index for forecasting of each component ofrevenue and expenditure. For example, when the MTFF team forecasted the other current revenue(including the revenue from oil and gas), they usually assumed that if the economy grows, therevenue will increase. So the MTFF team used the nominal GDP growth rate or the real DGP

28

growth rate as the index for calculating other current revenue. In reality, the natures of othercurrent revenue vary depending on which kind of sources. If they are natural resources revenue, itwill depend on the global price of the respective product, the exchange rate, production and theshare of contact for production. Those kinds of information are not available in the Ministry ofPlanning and Finance. So, information sharing and cooperation and coordination are crucial.
The expenditure forecasting is also challenged as the budgeting has been focusing on how
much a given entity needs. The line ministries do not submit detailed costs for each program.
Moreover, the Budget Department does not have all the information for the respective ministry
resources needs and their priorities. Therefore, forecasting the expenditure is also hindered by alack of information.
Achieving a reliable and realistic medium-term fiscal framework is not easy work. The
people who do the forecasting need to get information such as the multi-year detailed plans ofrespective ministries and sound macroeconomic indicators for forecasting. The information on themulti-year detailed plans of respective ministries and sound macroeconomic indicators are also
not readily available. It needs the capacity to forecast medium term to long term, and informationsharing arrangements are also needed. Moreover, the cooperation and coordination are also
critical in forecasting macroeconomic framework and the medium-term fiscal framework.
Furthermore, the revenue floor and expenditure ceiling of the Union organizations are notsubmitted to the Union Government or Cabinet before issuing the Union budget circular by the
Ministry of Planning and Finance. The Ministry of Planning and Finance issues the budget
circular to the line organizations and the budget circular includes the revenue floors andexpenditure ceiling for the coming year. Although the Ministry of Planning and Finance hasreported the revenue floors and expenditure ceiling for the coming year, some line ministries
assume the revenue ceiling and expenditure floors. They prepared their budget proposals in excessof the constraints (budget ceiling), and the financial commission and Cabinet approved budgets
which were more than the ceiling on the budget circular every year. Nevertheless, the Ministry ofPlanning and Finance submits the transfer amount from the Union to State or Region, to theUnion Government every year to inform the respective Region and State.
Both the Union budget ceiling and Region and State transfer ceiling that were included in
the budget circulars did not cover for the medium term.
Thus, forecasting the medium-term fiscal framework was not comprehensive.
Furthermore, they needed to achieve political and managerial support for multi-year perspectives
and decision-making, and need to achieve approval and commitment from the Cabinet as thebudget is based on final approval of the Cabinet for the executive branch.

29Annex 6. The abstract sections from procedural fiscal rules on the 2008 Constitution
The abstract sections about the procedural fiscal rules on the 2008 Constitution Law are as
follows:
100(b) Bills relating to national plans, annual budgets and taxation, which are to besubmitted exclusively by the Union Government shall be discussed and resolved at the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw in accordance with the prescribed procedures.
102
The Bills, which are to be discussed and resolved exclusively at the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw need to be vetted before being discussed at the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, those
Bills shall be vetted jointly by the Pyithu Hluttaw Bill Committee and the Amyotha
Hluttaw Bill Committee, and the findings and remarks of the Joint Committee together
with the Bill shall be submitted to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw session in accordance withthe prescribed procedures.
103(a) The President or the person assigned by him, on behalf of the Union Government,
shall submit the Union Budget Bill to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
(b) The following matters included in the Union Budget Bill shall be discussed at the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw but not refused or curtailed:(i) salary and allowance of the heads and members of the Union level organizations
formed under the Constitution and expenditures of those organizations;(ii) debts for which the Union is liable and expenses relating to the debts, and otherexpenses relating to the loans taken out by the Union;(iii) expenditures required to satisfy the judgment, order, decree of any Court or
Tribunal;(iv) other expenditures which are to be charged by any existing law or any
international treaty.
(c) Approval, refusal and curtailing of other expenditures except the expenditures
specified in Sub-Section (b) shall be passed by the majority consent of the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
(d) The Union Government shall perform as necessary in accordance with the Union
Budget Law enacted by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
(e) If in respect of the relevant financial year a need has arisen to authorize theestimated receipts and authorized expenditures in the Union Budget Law enacted
by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw and in addition to estimate receipts and to authorize
expenditures, the Supplementary Appropriation Law shall be enacted in the above
manner.
(f) The Union Government shall perform as necessary in accordance with the30Supplementary Appropriation Law enacted by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
190

193

(a) Bills relating to the regional plans, annual budgets and taxation of the Region
or State, which are to be submitted exclusively by the Region or State
Government, shall be submitted to the Region or State Hluttaw in accordance withthe prescribed procedures.
(a) The Region or State Annual Budget Bill to which only by the Region or State
Government has the right to be submitted only to the Region or State Hluttaw inaccordance with the prescribed procedures.
(b) Relating to the Bill in Sub-Section (a), the Region or State Budget including
finance received from the Union Fund of the Region or State under the Union
Budget Law or the Supplementary Appropriation Law with the recommendation of
the Chief Minister concerned shall be discussed, as may be necessary by the
Region or State Hluttaw concerned and shall be carried out and approved, refused,curtailed with majority consent. In doing so, the following matters may be
discussed at the Region Hluttaw or the State Hluttaw, but not refused or curtailed:(i) salary and allowance of heads and members of the Region or State level
organizations formed under the Constitution and expenditures of thoseorganizations;(ii) salary and allowance of heads and members of leading bodies of the selfadministered area formed under the Constitution and expenditures of thosebodies;(iii) debts for which the Region or State is liable and expenses relating to the debts,
other expenses relating to the loans taken out by the Region or State;(iv) expenditures required to satisfy judgment, order or decree of any Court or
Tribunal;

212

221

222

(v) other expenditures which are to be charged by any law enacted by the Region
Hluttaw or the State Hluttaw.
(a) Except for Union budget matters, the President shall have the right to promulgate
an ordinance for administrative matters that need immediate action during theinterval between sessions of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.
The Union Government shall draft the Union Budget Bill based on the Annual Union
Budget, after coordinating with the Financial Commission, and submit it for approvalto the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
The Union Government shall, if the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw is unable to promulgate theUnion Budget Bill before the end of the Budget Year, expend within the framework of

31

229

the general expenditure included in the last-enacted Budget Law of the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw.
(a) The Financial Commission shall be formed with the following persons:(i) The President - Chairperson,(ii) Vice-Presidents Vice-Chairpersons,(iii) The Attorney-General of the Union - Member ,(iv) The Auditor-General of the Union - Member,(v) Chief Ministers of the Regions and States - Members,(vi) The Nay Pyi Taw Council’s Chairperson- Member,(vii) The Minister of Finance of the Union - Secretary.
(b)(i) Forming the Financial Commission, the President may appoint a suitable person
as a temporary member if there is a vacancy for any reason.

230(ii) The President shall promulgate the formation of the Financial Commission.
Moreover, necessary orders or directives, so forth, for the Financial Commission
may be promulgated either by the President or the person assigned by him.
(a) The budgets of the Union ministries and Union level organizations are to be vetted
by a Vice-President assigned by the President, and the estimated budgets of theUnion level organizations including the Union ministries are to be submitted to the
Financial Commission.
(b) The budgets of the Region or State are to be vetted by the other Vice President
assigned by the President. The estimated budgets of the Region or State are to besubmitted to the Financial Commission.
(c) The Financial Commission shall;(i) submit to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw with the recommendation for the Union
Budget which includes the expenditure of the Union territory, supplementaryfinance as suitable to the Regions or States from the Union Fund, giving grants
as a special matter and permitting loans;(ii) to advise financial matters that should be undertaken;(iii) carry out the duties assigned by the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw through the32promulgation of law for the emergence of a substantial financial system.
(d) The Financial Commission shall submit with the recommendation to the President,
the Bill of Union Budget, which includes Union Budget, the distribution of suitable
funds from Union Fund accounts to Regions or States, the provisions of funds as a
special case and disbursing of necessary loans for submission them to the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.

252

253

(e) The Financial Commission may, if necessary, seek advice from financial experts.
The Region or State Government shall, in accordance with the provisions of theConstitution, submit the Region or State Budget Bill based on the Annual Union
Budget to the Region or State Hluttaw concerned.
The Region or State Government shall, if the Region or State Budget Bill is unable topromulgate before the end of the budget year, expend within the framework of thegeneral expenditure included in the last-enacted budget law of the Region or State
Hluttaw.

Annex 7. Abstract procedural fiscal rules from the law relating to drafting and submitting
the Union Budget
The procedures and timeline for drafting and submitting the Union Budget Bill by theUnion Government to the Parliament are as follows.
(1) The Union Budget Bill has to be submitted to the Parliament by the Union
Government before 15 July annually.
(2) The Supplementary Appropriation Bill has to be submitted to the Parliament by theUnion Government before 30 April annually.
The necessary documents that shall be submitted by the Union Government (Executive
Budget Proposal and its Supporting Documents) to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw are as follows:(1) The Union Budget Bill
(2) The Summary of the Revenue and Expenditure(3) Endorsement of Financial Commission(4) The Minister of Ministry of Planning and Finance’s Presentation on(a) Provision on Medium-Term Fiscal Framework
1. Revenue
2. Expenditure
3. Budget Deficit
4. Financing
5. Borrowing
6. Transfer to State and Region

33

(b) Fiscal Policy Strategy
1. Generalization on Fiscal Policy
2. Revenue Policy, Expenditure Policy, and Borrowing, Lending and Investment
Policy3. Priority Sector
4. The following year revenue and expenditure provision
5. Other necessary information(c) Statement on Macroeconomic Situation
1. Generalization on Economy
2. GDP Growth Rate
3. Import, Export, General Reserve, Trade Balance
4. Fiscal Condition
5. Macroeconomic Outlook(d) The condition of implementation on the Minister’s Presentation on the previous
year(e) The implementation situation of the respective Ministry on the current fiscal year(f) The summary statement of the outstanding Government debt.
(5) Union Budget Brief,(6) The state-owned economic organizations profit and loss and financial situations,(7) The provisions of foreign borrowing and foreign aid for the following fiscal year.
The timelines for submitting findings of respective Joint Scrutinizing Committees’ members who
are assigned by the Speaker of the Parliament are as follows.
(1) The Joint Scrutiny Boards organized with the respective members of the Pyithu Hluttaw
and Amotha Hluttaw who has been assigned by the Speaker of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw to
scrutinize the matters of the Annual Union Budget shall submit their findings to the Joint
Bill Committee and Joint Public Account Committee before 31 July annually.
(2) Joint Public Account Committee shall submit their appraisal and recommendation on
Union Budget Bill that are submitted by the Union Government to the Pyidaungsu
Hluttaw before 21 August annually.
(3) Joint Bill Committee shall submit their appraisals and recommendations on Union Budget
Bill that are submitted by the Union Government to the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw before 21
August annually.
(4) The Joint Scrutiny Boards organized with the respective members of the Pyithu Hluttaw
and Amotha Hluttaw who has been assigned by the Speaker of the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw to
scrutinize the matters of the Union Supplementary Appropriation Bill shall submit theirfindings to the Joint Bill Committee and Joint Public Account Committee before 10 May
annually.
(5) Joint Public Account Committee shall submit their appraisals and recommendations on

34

Union Supplementary Appropriation Bill that are submitted by the Union Government to
the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw before 24 May annually.
(6) Joint Bill Committee shall submit their appraisal and recommendation on Union
Supplementary Appropriation Bill that is submitted by the Union Government to the
Pyidaungsu Hluttaw before 24 May annually.
Note: Although the law structures of clauses are separated according to the Budget and Supplementary Grant, the paper re-groups the clauses into
the executive branch and legislative branch - the respective Joint Scrutinizing Committees. The numbers are not reflected original law’s
clauses.

Annex 8. The duties and responsibilities of controlling officers and drawing officers
abstract from rules and regulations on the Financial Management of Myanmar(Ministry of Planning and Finance’s Notification No. 35/2017)
The duties and responsibilities of the controlling officer are as follows:
73. The controlling officer shall be responsible for his department or organization on behalf of theminister under the Budget Law.
74. The departmental head assigned to administer the department or organization shall be responsible
for budget supervision and budget administration. Since he undertakes budget supervision and budget
administration of the department or organization, he shall not be absent in monitoring the budget
operation of the department or organization regardless of having a separate accounting department
under his administration.
75. Every controlling officer is responsible for supervising the functions of collecting officers and toalways monitor so that failure, omission or delay may not occur in collecting revenues from department
or organizations. The controlling officer is fully responsible for collecting all the revenues anddepositing all these collected revenues into a bank without any delay.
76. The controlling officer who has the responsibility of supervising all the financial matters related tothe expenditure from the permitted allocation for the financial year shall undertake as follows. The
aforementioned controlling officer;(a) shall not spend more than the permitted appropriation amount;(b) shall be engaged only for the matters planned and already included in the preparation of thebudget;(c) shall administer expenditure aimed for the benefit of the public;(d) shall supervise and control to ensure correctness and accuracy of financial operations,compliance of financial rules and regulations, the proper way of spending funds and avoidanceof wastage or losses of its office and subordinate office.
77. The departments and organizations shall not spend any expenditure more than the permitted35

amounts for the financial year.
78. The controlling officer shall not delegate his power on financial management and supervision to an
employee whose rank is lower than the gazette officer without the approval of the ministry or anybody
who is assigned by the minister. It is worth recognizing that delegating duties and powers in this way
shall not mitigate his duties. The controlling officer may appoint one or more drawing officer. In such
event as the assignment of duties and powers on financial management and supervision for theirdepartment and organization to employees from other departments and organizations, approval from theministry shall be requested in advance.
The duties and responsibilities of the drawing officer are as follows.
79. Every drawing officer shall:(a) not spend more than the funds appropriated and allocated;(b) monitor the increase of expenditures in comparison with allocation; budgets for accountadjustment, due liabilities and other factors affecting their expenditures shall be examined;(c) spend the funds only for the matters planned;(d) comply with financial norms for expenditures;(e) inform in time for the controlling officer to adjust the funds once overspent funds or surplus
funds can be predicted out of allocated funds;(f) comply with major financial practices;(g) be responsible for collecting all the receivable funds of their department and organization
immediately and wholly deposit into the bank.

36Annex 9. The comparison of budget ceiling and annual budget, budget ceiling and the
Cabinet- approved budget, and the Cabinet -approved budget and thelegislature’s approved budget(Kyats in Million)
3c. The difference between the ceiling that wasissued in a budget circular by the Ministry ofPlanning and Finance, and revenue andexpenditure in the annual budget
Revenue floor and expenditure ceiling that was issued
in a budget circular by the Ministry of Planning and
Finance (Kyat in billion)
The revenue and expenditure in an annual budget(Kyat in billion)
Difference (%)
4a. The difference between the budget ceiling in abudget circular by the Ministry of Planning and
Finance, and the budget approved by the
Cabinet for 2019-2020 fiscal year.
Revenue floor and expenditure ceiling that were issued
in a budget circular by the Ministry of Planning and
Finance (Kyat in billion)
The revenue and expenditure approved by the Cabinet(Kyat in billion)
Difference (%)

Current
Revenue

Expenditure

17,122

20,87021,427

27,38225%

31%

17,122

20,87021,327

27,59825%

32%

Note: Revenue was only current revenue (excluding interest revenue) and expenditure was current and capital
expenditure that will be funded by domestic resources in the budget circular. So the Cabinet approved
budget has been adjusted to consistent with ceiling in the budget circular.

4b. The difference between the Union
Cabinet’s approved budget and thelegislature’s approved budget for 20192020 fiscal year.
Approved by the Union Cabinet (Kyat inbillion)Approved by the Legislature (Kyat inbillion)Difference (%)

Revenue

Expenditure

Deficit25,31332,340-7,02725,200-0.4%

31,919-1.3%-6,719-4.4%

Note: It includes all revenue and all expenditure37