How do “Emerging” Donors Differ from“Traditional” Donors?
̿An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia―
Jin Sato, Hiiroaki Shiga, Takaaki Kobayashi and
Hisahiro Kondoh

No. 2
March 2010

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How do “Emerging” Donors Differ from “Traditional” Donors?
―An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid in Cambodia―
Jin SATO*, Hiroaki SHIGA**, Takaaki KOBAYASHI***, and Hisahiro KONDOH****

Abstract
Debate about the role and impact of the so-called “emerging donors” is becoming increasingly
heated. The common reaction to these new donors, distinct from that accorded traditional
donors, has had the unfortunate effect of obscuring two important aspects of the evolving aid
landscape: 1) commonalities between the emerging donors and traditional Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) donors; and 2) an evident diversity among the emerging donors.
The biases at play are derived not only from a lack of sufficient information about how thesenew donors operate on the ground, but also from a lack of effort to integrate and analyze
information that is available. This paper examines the impact of four emerging donors —China, India, the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as “Korea”), and Thailand — on
Cambodia’s development, with a specific focus on the processes of aid provision by these newdonors. By accounting for the experiences of the recipient country, this paper also challenges
the conventional view that aid fragmentation should be reduced a priori.

Keywords: emerging donors, Cambodia, harmonization, aid fragmentation, institution*

Associate Professor, University of Tokyo/Visiting Fellow, JICA Research Institute.
(Sato.Jin@jica.go.jp)**
Senior Research Officer, JICA Research Institute. (Shiga.Hiroaki@jica.go.jp)*** Research Associate, JICA Research Institute. (Kobayashi.Takaaki@jica.go.jp)**** Associate Professor, Tokyo International University. (hkondoh@tiu.ac.jp)

The authors would like to thank all the interviewees on the Cambodian side, as well as officials working
in aid agencies and embassies. Special thanks go to Mr. Eiichiro Hayashi and Mr. Mikio Masaki of the
JICA Cambodia office, who supported our mission. We also thank Mr. Shunichiro Honda, who conductedeffective ground work and provided logistical support for our research. Two reviewers gave us excellent
feedback and we are grateful. Views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not represent
the organizations to which the authors belong.

1Introduction
The global foreign aid landscape is changing rapidly (Woods 2008). In Asia, traditional
donors such as Japan are no longer overwhelmingly dominant in terms of volume, andso-called “emerging donors” are becoming increasingly influential (see Figure 1). Amongthese latter, China, India, Korea and Thailand are emerging as key sources of foreign aid topoorer countries such as Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar. Unlike earlier literature which has
characterized emerging donors as monolithically distinct from their traditional counterparts, we
examine their commonalities with the traditional donors by placing the various emerging
donors in a timeline. To follow this approach, we focus on the above four donor countries
because they not only provide full aid packages, including concessional loans, grants, andtechnical cooperation, 1 but also because their presence in Cambodian development has
become increasingly prominent.
Many emerging donors have track records of providing aid for as long as have traditional
donors: China, for example, has provided grants to less-developed countries (LDCs) almost
since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, with programs in Africa beginning in the
1950s (Woods 2008; Lin 1996). Perhaps for this reason, some commentators refer to emerging
donors as “non-Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors”2. Regardless of whenthese countries actually initiated their aid-like activities, it is the recent impacts that we areconsidering as “emergent;” these countries are emerging not simply as providers of aid but asinfluential players in aid politics who can no longer be ignored by traditional donors.

1

Other emerging Asian donors, such as Singapore and Malaysia, do not provide concessional loans aspart of their aid packages. See our definition of “aid” in comparison to the definition of ODA in
Appendix 1.
2
See, for example, Informal Working Group (2008) on the question of labeling. That document
criticizes the term “non-DAC donors” as defining the group by what it is not rather than what it is.

2

Figure 1: Disbursement (gross) to Cambodia from Individual Donors (1992-2008)
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Source: CDC (2008)

In this sense, the term “emerging donor” refers not only to the magnitude of the aid
provided by these donors individually, but also to their impact collectively on the institutions
built by traditional donors, as is discussed later3.
Alarmed by the increasing activities of the emerging donors, scholars and commentators
have begun to pay serious attention to these new participants in the international “aid market.”
Although a full-scale investigation of the subject of emerging donors has yet to be launched,
there is already a spectrum of perspective on them, ranging from friendly to relatively hostile.
At the relatively hostile extreme, Moisés Naím, editor of Foreign Policy magazine, calls
aid from China, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela “toxic” (Naím 2007). He argues that
non-democratic countries like China “have begun to undermine development policy throughtheir activist aid programs” (Naím 2007, 96) that seek only “money, access to raw materials,
and international politics” (Naím 2007, 95) without regard to the environment or long-term
3

Acknowledging its flaws and limitations, Rowlands (2008:3) provides another rationale for using theterm: “its correspondence with the term ‘emerging market’ and because it serves as a challenge to some3concern for the well-being of the host country’s inhabitants. In short, according to Naím,emerging donors represent a “threat to healthy, sustainable development” while “pricing
responsible and well-meaning aid organizations out of the market in the very places where they
are needed most” (Naím 2007, 95).
Other authors are much friendlier toward emerging donors. Reisen (2007) and Woods(2008) defend China by providing quantitative evidence on the issue of debt sustainability in
Africa. Woods argues that Chinese aid has strengthened trade links in Africa, allowing
improved growth and terms of trade, and increasing both the export volumes and public
revenues of recipient African countries (Woods 2008). He argues also that China has not beendeaf to international voices and has to some extent behaved in accordance with UN policies, asevidenced by its cooperative efforts with the United Nations and the African Union to end the
Darfur Conflict in Sudan (Woods 2008, 1208). Woods further argues that the rise of emerging
donors is a manifestation of the dissatisfaction of recipient countries with the traditional
development assistance regime (Woods 2008, 1212).
Manning (2006), positioned between these two extremes, gives a pioneering overview
on this issue, claiming that although emerging donors allow greater aid access and a wider
range of options to poorer countries, the advent of new donors has introduced three risks: 1)
that greater access to aid may once again condemn recipient countries to unsustainable debt; 2)that governance reform proposed by traditional donors in exchange for aid may be unduly
postponed; and 3) that the absence of careful investment appraisals may result in the
proliferation of over-ambitious or unproductive capital projects (Manning 2006, 381-82).
Manning recommends that these risks be contained through heightened contact and dialogue
with emerging donors, to bring their performances more or less to the same level as traditional
donors.
A common thread in the literature is an emphasis on the distinctiveness of emerging
of the more traditional notions of donor.”4

donors as compared to traditional donors in terms of the negative impact they are accused ofhaving on such socio-economic aspects of their recipients as debt sustainability, governanceand environmental quality. This is a narrow characterization, however, which often fails to givedue consideration to the particular institutional arrangements which these donors make witheach recipient. We propose that the recent characterization of emerging donors as distinct has
had the unfortunate effect of obscuring two important features of the new aid landscape: 1)
commonalities between emerging and traditional donors, and 2) diversity among emerging
donors. The emphasis on the distinctiveness of emerging donors leads us to take a dichotomous
approach of “one or the other” — emerging or traditional — in aid coordination efforts, as is
manifest in questions such as “how should we involve them?” Failure to perceive theirdiversity forces us to lump emerging donors into a single group, and an emphasis on outcome
as the sole means of judging the state of affairs limits our understanding of exactly how theiraid projects are managed.
These biases are derived from a lack of information about how emerging donors
formulate aid strategies, set priorities, and assist development projects. To overcome this, welook at the processes of aid provision to one particular recipient country to observe theindividual arrangements these donors have managed to organize. This is in order to crystallize
differences among the emerging donors and not treat them as monolithic.
This paper is based on original research and is focused on the perspective of therecipient — in this case, Cambodia. Many of the criticisms of emerging donors focus on their
purported negative contributions to growth, debt burdens, human rights, and the environment
without supporting evidence based on research grounded on the recipient. We chose Cambodia
because as one of the world’s most aid-dependent countries (Chanboreth and Hach 2008, 3) itgives us an excellent vantage point for a comparative observation of the operations of both
emerging and traditional donors. We collected data through interviews with aid officials in
Cambodia and donor countries (for a list of our contacts in Cambodia, see Appendix 3). The

5authors are fully aware of the politically loaded nature of the topic. This paper is not written to
support any particular position a priori; rather, it is an investigation of the facts andmechanisms of aid to Cambodia for the purpose of building a foundation for future cooperation
between emerging and traditional donors.
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, we describe the “aid market” in Cambodia,
review the relevant literature, and discuss our approach to the issue of emerging donors.
Second, we provide evidence, based on our own observations, of the “on-the-ground”
operations of emerging donors in Cambodia and suggest the possible driving forces behindthese operations. Third, we discuss the implications of emerging donor activities for the
institutional landscape of foreign aid, challenging conventional notions of aid dominated bytraditional donors. Practical and theoretical implications are highlighted in the conclusion.

1. Analytical Framework and Case Selection
1-1 Why Cambodia?
A map of roads in Cambodia built or restored by foreign donors reveals the participationof a striking number of various aid agencies (Figure 2). Since 1993, 96.7% (in length) of
Cambodia’s main national roads have been built or rehabilitated by foreign donors. Multilateral
donors such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank (WB), traditional
bilateral donors such as Japan, and newer donors such as China, Korea, Thailand and Vietnam
are all significant financers. (India has thus far not provided aid in this sector.). During ourfieldwork, we learned that Kuwait also is preparing to fund a road project close to the Thaiborder (interview with MPWT, 17 February, 2009).

6

Figure 2: Cambodian Roads Built or Rehabilitated by Foreign Donors

Source: IRITWG 2008, p.5

Its extremely diverse development needs attract a continuous flow of foreign aid into
Cambodia. In fact, Cambodia is among the most aid-dependent countries in Asia — theproportion of its total public expenditure derived from aid has remained at nearly 90% since2005 (CDC 2008). Total aid provided to Cambodia amounted to about USD $5.5 billion overthe last decade (1998-2007) alone, totaling roughly USD $640 million each year for the past 5
years (2003-2007) (CDC 2008). Cambodia’s per capita aid received in 2005 was USD $38,
more than double the average among low-income countries (USD $17) (Chanboreth and Hach2008).
As a post-conflict LDC struggling to cope with the legacy of a protracted civil war and the7brutal Pol Pot regime, Cambodia is one of the poorest countries in Asia4, with a desperate needfor development at all state strata. Its social conditions also are poor; Cambodia was ranked
136th out of 179 countries on the UN Human Development Index 2008. Life expectancy atbirth is 58.6 years, giving Cambodia a rank of 142nd out of the 179 countries. At the same time,
however, Cambodia has successfully maintained a trajectory of robust economic growth5,
necessitating significant infrastructure upgrades6.
Another of Cambodia’s important features is that it shares borders with regional economic
engines, including Thailand and Vietnam, with roads providing connections on to more distantcountries such as China. As a result, Cambodia has been obliged to pursue diverse
development goals, ranging from the eradication of fatal diseases such as HIV/AIDS to theestablishment of a basic infrastructure network that will allow economic connections with
fast-growing foreign economies.
Against this backdrop of enormous development challenges, a massive influx of aid began
flooding into Cambodia after the 1991 Paris Peace Accord. The flow of aid has maintained its
momentum to the present day. This is partly because of robust economic growth averaging
9.8% for the past 5 years (World Bank 2009) and the concomitant need for infrastructure, andpartly because traditional donors have accelerated their focus on Cambodia and other LDCs toattain the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) (Figure 3). It is important to note not only
the total volume of aid and Cambodia’s degree of aid dependency, but also the sheer variety of
the aid agencies active in Cambodia. As of June 2008, 35 official donors were assisting 710
on-going projects in Cambodia (Chanboreth and Hach 2008, 23) 7 . Table 1 shows the4

Per capita income in Cambodia was USD $592 in 2008; among East Asian countries, only Myanmar
was lower (IMF 2008).
5
The average growth rate over the past decade exceeded 8.2% per annum (CDRI 2008).
6
An illustrative example of Cambodia’s underdeveloped infrastructure is its extremely low
electrification rate (countrywide) of 20.1%, nearly the same as Eritrea (20.2%) (IEA 2006:568-570).
7
In addition to government aid, considerable investments are made by NGOs, particularly in the healthsector. There are 1495 local NGOs registered in Cambodia under the Ministry of Interior and 337
international NGOs registered under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation(CDC 2007:15). The important point here is not the volume of aid provided by NGOs but the fact thatgovernment donors rely on NGOs to implement aid projects. For example, the Netherlands implements

8

approximate division of labor among the major donors in the major sectors. We notice thatcertain sectors, such as transportation and water and sanitation, are dominated by a limited
number of donors, while education and health involve many more. Based on this situation, we
consider Cambodia to be a typical example of a post-conflict country in which aid needs run
the gamut from basic infrastructure to human resources development.

Figure 3: Official Donor Disbursements (Gross) in Cambodia
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aid programs in Cambodia exclusively through NGOs, while countries such as the Finland, New
Zealand and the US have mixed records (CDC 2007: 15).

9

Table 1: Disbursement (Gross) by the Five Largest Donors to Selected Sectors in 2007
HealthUSA

33.5

GlobalFund

21.1

UNFPA/W
HO/UNICEF
UK (D)

13.6

Japan
Sub-total

9.5
7.4
85.0

Total sector 152.1
aid
5
largest 56%(% share)

Agriculture
Japan
UN(IFA
D/WFP)(
L)
Australia

France(L)
ADB (L)
Sub-total

10.
3
8.1

Transport
Infrastructure
China (L)
Japan

6.5

ADB (L)

3.8

Korea (L)

3.6
32.
2
Total
43.
sector aid 3
5 largest 74(% share) %Education
42.
3
37.
9

ADB (L)

8.5

Sweden (D)6.4
World Bank
1.6
Sub-total
96.
7
Total sector aid 99.
2
5 largest (% 98share)%

Japan (L)

15.
3
13.
1
7.7

World Bank 7.3
(L)
EC
6.8
Sub-total
50.
2Total sector 88.
aid
2
5 largest (% 57share)%

Water &
Sanitation
ADB
5.8
France (L)World Bank 3.5(L)
UN(UNICEF)Japan
Sub-total

Source: CDC (2008), pp. 27.

Cambodia thus suffers from serious donor fragmentation 8 . In 2007, the Donor
Fragmentation Index in Cambodia was 0.91, significantly higher than the average value of allrecipient countries (=0.7) and nearly equal to heavily aid-dependent African countries such as
Mozambique (0.91) and Ethiopia (0.92) (Knack and Rahman 2008, 336). Donor fragmentationin Cambodia has been a constant issue for foreign aid commentators. It has continuallyworsened since 1992, with only a temporary alleviation between 1998 and 2000 due to theincreased share of Japan in total aid disbursement (Figure 4). Fragmentation is thought toimpose increased transaction costs on a recipient due to the increased administrative burden
required to accept donor missions or to a heightened competition for capable officials. The
result is degraded aid effectiveness and skewed public investment decisions (Knack andCambodia ranks 9th among 11 countries in Asia on its level of technical cooperation harmonization in
the field, lower than other Southeast Asian countries (OECD 2009).

10

1.4

1.0
16.
4
Total sector 17.
aid
4
5 largest (% 94share)%[Units] USD millions.
[Notes] D, some or all funds are delegated to other implementing partners such as NGOs; L,
some or all funds are loans.

8

4.6

Rahman 2008).

Figure 4: Trends in Donor Fragmentation in Cambodia

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The donor fragmentation index is constructed by subtracting the Herfindahl Index ofdonor concentration from 1. The Herfindahl Index is calculated by summing thesquared shares of disbursement by each donor over total disbursement by all donors to
Cambodia each year. Thus, the donor fragmentation index is calculated by thefollowing equation: DFI = 1-∑i(Si)2 (Si is the share of each donor over total
disbursement each year). The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values representing
greater donor fragmentation. See Knack and Rahman (2004, 18) for more details. Notethat for reasons of data availability, UN agencies are treated as a single UN
organization.

1-2 Framework and Literature
Our approach to foreign aid is institutional. The broadest definition of institution is “ahumanly devised constraint that structures human interaction” (North 1990, 3). In this paper,
we define institution as a humanly devised constraint that structures interactions among aid
actors, including governments, with a primary objective of reducing transaction costs. By
paying attention to how institutions evolve over time in response to changes in domestic andinternational circumstances (Kondoh et al. 2010), both emerging and traditional donors can be

11

placed on a timeline 9 . If we furthermore take institutions to be the accumulation ofself-constraining activities by established groups to minimize risks, we can view emerging
donors as challengers to the dominance of institutions created by those established groups (i.e.,
DAC communities) that may disturb the aid norms set by them. For example, the massive useof tied loans by emerging donors may invite the relaxation of current regulations on tied aid on
the side of traditional donors who are pressured by domestic economic interests. On the other
hand, this challenge provides us an opportunity to re-consider the present practices of
traditional donors, offering a critical perspective that is difficult to obtain by adhering to DAC
principles alone.
To clarify the contrast, let us highlight the institutional characteristics of traditional donors.
Because foreign aid is a kind of investment in the realization of some future vision, institutions
must incorporate donors’ visions of a desirable future and acknowledge the risks inherent inmaterializing those visions. In this regard, traditional donors have groomed their institutions(e.g., DAC principles) to pursue development impact through less uncertainty and cost thanmight come from fragmented aid. While donors’ visions may vary greatly (ranging from those
based on national interests to more altruistic commitments to eradicate poverty), perceptions ofrisk vary even more significantly, depending on the changing conditions of each recipient aswell as on the varying emphases of other donors operating in the same target country.
Traditional donors, who are DAC members, have institutionalized beliefs and valuecommitments which are shared among DAC member countries. First of all, they share a moral
commitment to eradicate poverty and promote global development without becoming
entangled in the national interests of individual member countries. To support this commitment,
donors have agreed upon a definition of “official development assistance” (ODA) that
9

The assumption that becoming a donor is a linear process provokes further debate. Although we are
not ready to propose a specific hypothesis on this topic, we believe that the pressure to follow the
principles of accountability eventually make it difficult for newcomers, particularly smaller countries, tocompletely ignore such principles.

12

excludes military and commercially driven aid. More specifically, DAC members have agreed
that a grant element of at least 25% is required in order to qualify as “aid,” with an additional
mutual disapproval of “tied aid10” for LDCs.
Second, traditional donors share the belief that “development assistance” requires
collective and coordinated effort in which individual donors restrain their own activities inorder to contribute to the whole. Various agreements and forum statements for defining sector
priority 11 and harmonization 12 of aid activities have been issued through mediation bymultilateral agencies such as the UN and the Word Bank.
Third, in order to pursue these values, traditional donors emphasize the importance oftransparency of aid activities so that the critique and monitoring of mutual activities can further
improve development performance. The Creditor Reporting System (CRS)13, which has beenin operation since 1973, is one of the institutional devices that support aid transparency. In
addition, periodic peer reviews by DAC members serves to enhance transparency and joint
assessments of development goals. A recent example reflecting these emphases is the collective
endorsement of the MDGs and the Paris Declaration for Aid Effectiveness of 2005. These
efforts aim to reduce the cost of uncoordinated aid.
The tendency among donors to form a coalition can be traced back to the Cold War era,
when development assistance was used by the West as an international tool to combat the
spread of communism in the Third World (Rist 1997). However, since the end of the Cold War,aid institutions have struggled to find a new mandate that justifies the continuation of a
coalition in the absence of an identifiable “common enemy” to coalesce against. Global issues
such as poverty and environmental degradation take on new significance in this light, as
intrinsic yet dispersed targets of the development efforts of Western countries. Aid institutions,10

http://webdomino1.oecd.org/horizontal/oecdacts.nsf/linkto/DCD-DAC(2001)12
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/doukou/mdgs.html
12
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf
13
http://www.oecd.org/dac/htm/crs.htm/ 㻌1113

in response to the changing environment, offer an appropriate analytic arena that allows us toobserve how donors perceive the world.
Two levels of institutions must be distinguished here. The first includes international
institutions established among donors or between donors and recipients. The second comprises
domestic institutions that facilitate the provision of aid to and reception of aid from foreigncountries. International institutions tend to use formalized written agreements or resolutions,while domestic institutions have more latitude for informal arrangements.
Generally speaking, emerging donors have not yet established aid institutions among
themselves; rather, each of them has evolved its own ways of channeling aid to its recipients.
The lack of a DAC-like institution among emerging donors might tempt us to treat them as
idiosyncratic and unpredictable; however, as we shall see, most emerging donors haveinstitutionalized to some degree their relationships with their recipients, and some are even in
the process of institutionalizing aid schemes with DAC donors. Some countries, such as South
Korea and Thailand, seemingly are willing to align their institutions with the international
standards set by DAC. It is, therefore, important that we conduct our analysis by taking
account of the temporal dimension. The way China currently formulates projects in Cambodia,
for example, is very similar to the manner in which Japan formulated its aid projects in the
1970s and 80s. As DAC donors have necessarily changed over time, emerging donors, too, arein the process of changing over time. The time factor not only helps clarify our view ofdiversities and commonalities among donors, but it also widens our options in engaging withthese new aid actors.
Although the primary interest of the institutional school in foreign aid has been to
examine the impact of aid on recipient countries’ governance reform (e.g., Shirley 2008), we
focus instead on institutional arrangements for the provision and receipt of aid with reference
to the specific countries in question. This is because we aim to look beyond the aggregate links
between aid and development at the macro level, which are often based on input-output models,14

and delve deeper into the micro processes of project identification between donors andrecipient countries.
An important concept that comes out of the institutional school for analyzing emerging
donors is that of “transaction cost” (Coase 1937; Coase 1960; North 1990). In the trade context,
Coase and North define transaction cost as the cost of searching for a trade partner, finding theright information, measuring quantities and qualities of traded goods and services, andnegotiating a contract; as well as monitoring, evaluating and enforcing the contract14. In the aid
context, “trade” is simply replaced with “aid”. Unlike trade, however, where traders deal
directly among themselves, aid is mediated by donor agencies with double constraints fromboth international and domestic institutions.
Analysis of social settings based on transaction cost is particularly valuable in the context
of foreign aid. This is because from an institutional perspective foreign aid operates under thecondition of a “broken feedback loop” (Martens 2005) where taxpayers in donor countries
have no direct channel through which to hear the voices of beneficiaries in developing
countries. This in turn creates a tendency for privileged foreign aid agencies to play decisiveroles in mediating the otherwise tenuous link between taxpayers in donor countries andbeneficiaries in recipient countries. The continued existence of aid agencies despite repeatedcriticism can be explained by the mediation functions that these agencies perform in obtaining
information from recipient counties, especially from governments, and transmitting it totaxpayers in donor countries.
This raises an interesting question regarding emerging donors: what are the functions ofthese new donor agencies compared with those of traditional donors? How different are theirroles in comparison with those of traditional donor agencies? We found that most emerging
14

The root cause of this cost is uncertainty (Martens 2005). The particular uncertainty pertaining toforeign aid consists of 1) ex ante uncertainty in the appropriate target population, their needs, and themeans to transfer resources to them; and 2) ex post uncertainty about the actual use of transferredresources based on the preference alignment between donor and recipient (Martens 2005). According toMartens, aid organizations exist in order to reduce this uncertainty.

15

donor agencies do not yet play the mediation role that Martens assigns to traditional donor
agencies; on the contrary, they lessen the need for recipient government accountability byfunding controversial projects that traditional donors are reluctant to support and that would
require more complete explanation to their public. Because there is no “mediator” between theemerging donors’ beneficiaries in recipient countries and their taxpayers at home, theinformation that flows from the former to the latter is extremely limited.
This difference in “mediating function” can be explained by four factors. First is theextent of penetration of donor organizations within recipient countries. Few emerging donors
have specialized aid organizations, such as United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) or Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), to support
development projects on site, and even those that do, such as Thailand, with the Thailand
International Cooperation Agency (TICA), do not have liaison offices in the countries where
they implement projects. The second factor is the influence of democracy and governancewithin donor countries on their foreign aid policies. This includes the roles of the parliament,
the media and academics who attempt to push the governments of donor countries to justify
their aid expenditures. Third is the volume of aid in relation to the size of the donor’s economy.
In general, the smaller the proportion of aid relative to total public expenditures of a donor
country, the less likely the government will need to justify the aid, which reduces the need foraid agencies to mediate aid beneficiaries and taxpayers. Finally, the severity of development
problems within the donor country itself may influence how donors justify aid and retain theiraccountability to their public. India, for example, is an emerging donor facing its own serious
domestic poverty. In the context of India’s stable and mature democracy, this peculiar
background requires the Indian government to defend and justify all external aid flowing out of
the country15.
15

These factors suggest that pressure towards accountability is different even within emerging donors.
They also suggest that in countries such as China, where there is little pressure for accountability, there
is more freedom to pursue national interests in foreign aid operations.

16

The priority given to domestic factors in donor countries might explain why “aidproliferation” that lacks coordination is so prominent in the poorer parts of Asia, wherecompetition among donors is fierce. In Cambodia, the establishment of approximately 121
parallel project implementation units (PIUs)16 and 358 donor missions, reviews and studies per
year have been reported (OECD 2009, 84 and 88, Chanboreth and Hach 2008, 2). “Aidproliferation” has been viewed as a major concern that necessitates efforts towards “aidcoordination.” This concern is directed at emerging donors who, because they have not yet
become involved in coordination efforts, pile further “transaction costs” on recipient countries.
The “aid proliferation” criticism by the DAC community is quite understandable given thelong history of that community’s mandate to coordinate their various development agendas(Rowlands 2008, 4). However, the issue is argued mostly from the traditional donors’
perspective, not from that of the recipients. For this reason, we examine aid from theperspective of recipients and the environment surrounding them.

2. Operations of Emerging Donors in Cambodia
2-1 Welcoming Fragmentation?
This section searchers for a more precise understanding of emerging donors by analyzing
the strategy and actual performance of four Asian emerging donors — China, India, Korea andThailand — in the specific context of Cambodia, as well as the strategy of the Cambodian
government with respect to these emerging donors. We chose these four countries, not only
because they provide full packages of aid, including both loans and grants, but also because
they are being increasingly recognized by Cambodia as reliable development partners in termsof both the quantity and the quality of the aid that they provide. In addition to their impact on
16

PIU is a special unit established at the request of donors outside the government of the recipient
country for the implementation of donor-aided projects. Donor practices such as paying salary
supplements to talented local PIU staff distort their incentives by turning their attention toward thedonor’s projects and away from other responsibilities (Knack and Rahman 2008).

17

Cambodia, these donors are also significantly advancing their profiles in other of the poorer
parts of Asia, such as Laos and Myanmar.
Upon initial observation of the highly fragmented Cambodian “aid market”, an observer
might intuitively conclude that the entry of emerging donors exacerbates the fragmentation andfurther undermines Cambodia’s development efforts. This judgment would accord with theconventional wisdom that donor fragmentation does harm to the recipient country byburdening it with tremendous transaction costs for donor-recipient coordination. However, thepuzzling reality is that the Cambodian government, an apparent “victim” of fragmentation,
seems to allow and even welcome the new donors17.
We argue that the Cambodian government accepts aid from emerging donors as acarefully considered strategy which welcomes these donors as providers of alternatives for
Cambodia’s balanced development rather than out of a passive willingness to “accept whateveraid is offered.” Three factors lie behind this argument:
First, we find that the Cambodian government, hoping for support focusing primarily on
economic growth, is largely dissatisfied with the traditional donors’ supply-driven
concentration on social sectors, such as health, that often exceeds Cambodian demand in termsof volume (CDC 2007, 11). Second, emerging donors fit nicely into existing gaps inCambodia’s infrastructural needs. Third, the additional fragmentation caused by the entry of
emerging donors is overshadowed by the benefits these countries offer, not only in terms of
direct investments but also by providing alternatives that give the Cambodian government
more room to maneuver. We elaborate on each of these points below.
The unease felt by the Cambodian government with respect to traditional donors is wellsummarized in an official statement from a high-ranking Cambodian official: “Fordevelopment partners there needs to be a change in mindset, behaving less like aid bureaucrats,
17

Here we refer not only to donors such as China, but also newly emerging actors like Kuwait andVietnam.

18

serving your own agendas, and more like development professionals, understanding thecontext of Cambodia” (CDC 2008, 3). Traditional donors fail to satisfy Cambodia’s
development needs in both aggregate volume and sectoral allocation. The total amount of aid
falls short of the aggregate requirements stipulated in the Cambodian government’s National
Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) and even worse, the aid is largely unpredictable from therecipient’s perspective 18 . Furthermore, the allocation of aid is often unaligned with theintentions of the Cambodian government; for example, the infrastructure sector is currently
experiencing

aseriousfinancing

shortage

while

sectorssuchashealthandgovernment/administration are receiving an excess of funds from numerous donors andnon-governmental organizations (NGOs) (CDC 2008, 15-16).
The second source of Cambodia’s dissatisfaction is technical cooperation (TC), a major
aid modality used by traditional donors. The Cambodian government, particularly the
Cambodian Development Council (CDC), has voiced doubts about the effectiveness of TC by
the traditional donors, arguing that supply-driven and uncoordinated assistances by them often
results in mutually-contradictory advice and intervention from various aid agencies and isunresponsive to Cambodia’s unique situation (CDC 2007, 30: CDC 2008, 4, 14 and 28:
Chanboreth and Hach 2008, 23)19. The government also is dissatisfied that TC from traditional
donors, especially the dispatch of long-term advisors, does not always involve a transfer ofskills that contribute to the capacity development of local personnel but provides instead for“capacity substitution,” which is only the temporary cover for a lack of capable local personnel(CDC 2007, 30 and 47: Chanboreth and Hach 2008, 13)20. The validity of this criticism must
18

According to the Cambodian Government, significant progress has been made over the past 2 years in
improving the predictability of aid (CDC 2008:17).
19
An illustrative example is the “cohabitation” of two national development strategies—namely, theSecond Socio-Economic Development Plan (SEDP-II) led by ADB and the National Poverty Reduction
Strategy (NPRS) led by WB.
20
The WB evaluation department also has been very critical of TC in general. For example, one of theirreports on Africa states that “the Bank’s traditional tools—technical cooperation and training—haveoften proved ineffective in helping to build sustained public sector capacity.” (World Bank Evaluation
Department, Capacity Building in Africa (2005)). See Konishi (2007:17).

19

be evaluated based on the evidence, which is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the factthat the Cambodian government has openly expressed dissatisfaction with aid in an official
report (such critical statements were absent in previous reports) must be taken seriously21. This
shift in tone might be a result of having secured an “emerging donor option” that has given the
Cambodian government confidence to criticize traditional donors.

2-2 Aid Strategies and Underlying Values of Emerging Donors
Since many emerging donors do not officially disclose complete information on foreignaid, our discussion here is uneven at best22. With this limitation in mind, let us now describe
the strategies and value orientations of the emerging donors.23
The four emerging donors examined here have adopted a similar strategy of actively
financing infrastructure using tied loans; this reflects a similarity in their objectives of
securing lucrative markets for their own construction industries24. However, we should not
overlook the point that whatever their intentions, their emphasis on infrastructure fills afinancing gap created by the traditional donors’ overemphasis on the social sector.
China in particular provides massive amounts of aid to Cambodia for infrastructure
projects, including roads, bridges, and transmission lines. In the transportation sector, where
the gap between NSDP and aid from traditional donors is especially large, the risingprominence of China is evident (see Figure 5). China’s share in the total disbursement (gross)of all official donors to Cambodia’s transportation sector for the period FY2005-FY2008 was
50.6%25. Korea is also a bilateral source of aid for the infrastructure sector. The Korean
21

Previous CDC reports have expressed concern about ownership and disbursements; but no specificcriticisms, such as those that appear in the latest report, were made in those earlier ones.
22
Some countries, such as Thailand, do make aid strategies available to the public. Thailand has
recently published its first ODA report.
23
For a detailed list of aid projects by the four emerging donors in Cambodia, refer to Appendix 2.
24
It is important to remember that the emerging donors are active in areas other than infrastructure.
Significant contributions were made in the field of humanitarian aid after the 2004 tsunami by China,
India and South Korea, among others (Cotterell and Harmer 2005).
25
Calculated from tables in CDC (2007:63-64) and CDC (2008:33-34).

20

International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) selected infrastructure as one of Korea’s fourpriority sectors in Cambodia, and the Economic Development Cooperation Fund (EDCF) also
focuses on road construction projects, such as National Road No. 3 (interview with KOICA’s
Phnom Penh Office, 18 February 2009). Thailand provides assistance on road projects
connecting Cambodia and Thailand, such as National Roads Nos. 48, 67 and 68. The volumeof Thai loans to the road sector amounts to 2.29 billion baht (USD $6 million). India providedloans for other infrastructure projects, including irrigation (USD $10 million) and powertransmission lines (USD $35.2 million)26 in 2002 and 2007, respectively.

Figure 5: Share of Major Donors in Total Disbursement (gross)to Cambodia’s Transportation Sector

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Source: CDC (2007), pp.63-64, and CDC (2008), pp. 33-34

The fact that from 1993 to 2007 45.2% of the total length of rehabilitated national road in
Cambodia was funded by emerging donors confirms the growing eminence of these donors in
the infrastructure sector (see Figure 6).

26

India News, May 21, 2007.

21

Figure 6: Share of Donors in Rehabilitated Road Length (1993-2007)&DPERGLD:%

9LHWQDP


.RUHD


-DSDQ
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$'%
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Source: Calculated by Author based on data in IRITWG 2008:5.

Concessional tied loans are the main modality employed by all four emerging donors intheir support of infrastructure development27. Here, we notice an important strategy common
to all of them: pursuit of their own economic interests over and above development impact.
China and India, both self-proclaimed leaders in South-South Cooperation, rationalize thefusion of development aid projects and the pursuit of their own economic interests under thebanner of “equality and mutual benefit” (Kobayashi 2008,34). Similarly, in an attempt tostrengthen economic ties with ASEAN countries under the “Look East Policy” following its
1991 comprehensive economic liberalization, India has strategically supported the entry ofIndian companies into the Cambodian market.
For Korea, economic interest is also the main incentive for providing aid. Some Korean
government ministries, such as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance, have traditionallybelieved that aid should be used for economically defined national interests, such as stable27

For example, the ratio of loan disbursement against total disbursement to the transportation sector
between FY2005 and FY2008 was 94% for China and 75% for Korea. Calculated from the table in CDC(2007:63-64) and CDC (2008:33-34).

22

access to Cambodia’s natural resources and the promotion of Korean exports andinvestments28. To promote Korean private investments in Cambodia, Korean aid has beenutilized to build infrastructure, particularly through EDCF loans (interview at Korean
Embassy in Phnom Penh, 18 February 2009). In a way, as many DAC countries also havedone, the government of Korea is using the aid channel to reduce uncertainties in the private
sector that might otherwise inhibit them from investing in a poor country like Cambodia.
Another strategy common to the emerging donors is the pursuit of geopolitical interests
through aid which tends toward expansion of cross-border trade and suppression of negative
inflows such as illegal migration. Thailand, the only emerging donor among the four studied inthis paper sharing a border with Cambodia, particularly stands to benefit in this regard. Since
Thailand is surrounded by the poorest countries in Asia — Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar —aid is one of the means it uses to minimize the cross-border risks that it faces. In this sense,
Thai aid must be viewed within a regional historical context of conflict and political tension.
Despite recent political tension at the Thai-Cambodian border near Preah Vihear Temple, forexample, aid projects at the operational level seem less impacted by politics than might be
expected. Aid from Thailand gives high priority to the neighboring countries, with more than
70% of Thai loans and grants going to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Close examination ofThailand’s aid objectives reveals that it has gradually entered into an institutionalized aid
scheme patterned after those of the traditional donors. This was apparent in the publication of
its first ODA report in 2009, with assistance from UNDP (TICA 2009).
China also is motivated by geopolitical considerations. The Chinese government statesclearly that China places high priority on the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS)29, which28

In 2007, South Korea exported USD $280 million and imported USD $9 million worth of products,
while its recorded investment was USD $148 million (cumulative total as of 2007) (MOFAT 2007). As
for foreign direct investment, South Korea is second after China. Over 14 years since 1994, South Korea
invested USD $2.75 billion in Cambodia while China spent USD $5.7 billion (Yonhap News, 31
December 2008).
29
The GMS comprises Cambodia, China (Yunnan Province and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous
Region), Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam.

23

includes Cambodia, as a land bridge connecting China with South and Southeast Asia. Basedon a recognition that GMS countries are “all friendly neighbors of China” and “abundant withnatural resources,” China seeks to “consolidate and develop China’s traditional relationships
with the other GMS countries and jointly create a regional environment characterized by peaceand stability, mutual trust, and win-win cooperation,” in which China can consequently pursue
its diplomatic and economic objectives.
What can we conclude from these observations on the actual operations of the emerging
donors? First, unlike DAC donors, the self-restraint capabilities of emerging donors have yet
to be developed. The absence of constraints, as contrasted with the strict rules and regulations
set by DAC, has given these countries a certain level of freedom to pursue their own national
interests through their aid activities, sometimes without paying due attention to theramifications (for the environment, among others) of their aid projects. With no liaison offices
on site, emerging donors tend to rely entirely on information from central governments, apractice which may narrow learning opportunities helpful to them in redirecting theirdevelopment efforts.
Second, although emerging donors are often classed as a single group, there is asignificant degree of diversity among them that reflects their own unique experiences. Manyof their features actually resemble current or former institutional features of the traditional
donors, who also attempted to reduce risk and uncertainty in order to secure economic benefits
through aid.
The diversity among emerging donors can be observed in three institutional dimensions:strategy, value orientation and sector allocation. First is diversity in strategy. The most focused
aid strategy is that of Korea, which set a clear target of gaining DAC membership 30 .
Reasoning that increasing aid output, particularly to LDCs such as Cambodia, would appeal to30

Under the presidency of Lee Myung-bak, South Korea joined DAC in January 2010.

24

DAC, Korea identified Cambodia formally as a high-priority aid recipient in 200731. Thailand
in following South Korea’s path, aiming to become an internationally recognized donor byadhering to the basic norms set by DAC (epitomized by the MDGs and the Paris Declaration).
These two examples are in stark contrast with China, who has shown no interest in aligningwith DAC.
Second is diversity in value orientation, i.e., the broader ideas underlying aid strategies.
The salient feature of Chinese and Indian aid is their labeling of aid activities as “South-South
Cooperation;” Korea and Thailand place less emphasis on that concept. Hoping to be
categorically insulated from the ODA of traditional donors, India neither attends donor
meetings (interview with Indian Embassy in Phnom Penh, 18 February 2009) nor discloses
information regarding the aid amounts it provides. By contrast, Korea seems ready to act inaccord with the norms established by traditional donors, as evidenced by its DAC aspiration.
Korea is working to harmonize its aid institution and policies with DAC guidelines. It has
submitted to DAC a memorandum for special peer review in which the Korean government
emphasizes its efforts to meet internationally shared goals: the MDGs, the Paris Declaration
on aid effectiveness, and increased aid volume (MOFAT 2008a, 1; 2008b, 1). Korea also isparticipating in sector policy coordination forums called Technical Working Groups (interview
with KOICA’s Phnom Penh Office, 18 February 2009).
Third is diversity in sectoral allocation. In contrast to Chinese aid, which is concentrated
in infrastructure, aid from Korea and India both is characterized by allocation to a broad rangeof areas. For example, Korea’s KOICA established the following as priority sectors for
Cambodia: (1) rural development (water resources development), (2) education, (3) publichealth, and (4) infrastructure; while EDCF loans have been provided for projects related to
vocational training, road construction/rehabilitation, water resources development, and
31South Korea’s Mid-term Country Assistance Strategy puts high priority on 18 recipient countries,
including Cambodia. In 2005, Cambodia was the fourth biggest recipient of Korean aid (EDCF 2006:
37).

25

expansion of local administration networks (MOFAT 2009). As a result, among 21 official
donors, Korea ranks 13th on the sector fragmentation index32. India provides loans for theconstruction of infrastructure and technical cooperation for Cambodian trainees invited to
India for various courses, and it even provided assistance for Cambodia’s General Election in2003 and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (USD $1 million) in 2005 (MEA 2007).

2-3 Project identification
We now turn to an examination of the actual project identification process followed by the
emerging donors. The process of project identification deserves special attention, since it is at
this stage when attempts by donors and recipients to link various stakeholders in an
institutional arrangement can be clearly observed. Our objective is to examine whether
commonalities or divergent features among emerging donors are reflected in their actual
activities. We also aim to determine whether there are any notable differences between the
traditional and the emerging donors in the project identification process that might reflect
institutional characteristics.
Before we elaborate on the emerging donors’ project identification processes, we briefly
outline the division of labor in the Cambodian administration with regard to foreign aid. Threeministries and organizations regulate individual line agencies such as the Ministry of Public
Works and Transport (MPWT), which is responsible for sector-policy formulation regarding
the construction of infrastructure such as roads and bridges. First is the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation (MoFAIC), which deals mostly with diplomatic
formalities including necessary contacts and communication with the governments of donor
countries. Second is the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), which deals primarily withthe formulation of national economic and fiscal policies and a budget that incorporates all
32

In contrast, China ranks 3rd in concentration of aid (CDC 2007:8). India and Thailand were notincluded in this calculation due to a lack of data.

26

foreign-aided projects, but also with the management of loans, including debt sustainability
analysis and the signing of loan agreements. Third is the Cambodian Rehabilitation andDevelopment Board of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC/CRDB), which is
expected to function as a “one-stop shop” vis-à-vis the donor community by playing an
overarching role in mobilizing and allocating external assistance to implement the priorities set
out in NSDP and other sector development plans, as well as in harmonization among donors33.
In fact, CDC/CRDB functions as the Cambodian counterpart in policy dialogue with Japan,
Australia, New Zealand and Thailand. However, CDC/CRDB’s role has been limited to hosting
donor meetings, such as the Cambodian Development Consultative Forum or Technical
Working Groups, and with collecting and analyzing information on aid in line with NSDP
formulated by the Ministry of Planning (MoP). Its impact on actual aid policy is consideredweak in comparison to other line ministries.
The actual operations of two of our emerging donors — China and Thailand — present
contrasting cases (Figures 7 and 8). Since the process of providing aid differs significantly
according to the modality used, we have chosen to analyze the process of identifying loan
projects as an illustrative example. The project identification processes used by China andThailand share several similarities with those of traditional donors since the aid activities ofboth emerging and traditional donors are executed on bilateral government-to-government
bases. Loans are provided in response to formal requests from the Cambodian government
conveyed through diplomatic channels. Loan agreements are duly signed and delivered
between the Cambodian MEF and an aid agency of the donor country (for example, China
EXIM Bank or NEDA).
Despite the apparent similarities of these processes, significant differences exist in thesteps taken before the formal request is made by the Cambodian government. In the case of
33

Article 13 of Sub-decree No. 147 ANK BK dated 29 December 2005, regarding the role andresponsibilities of CRDB.

27

traditional donors, a series of formal or informal policy dialogues is conducted between thedonor and the Cambodian government and candidate projects for financing are selected basedon their compliance with NSDP, sector development policy and the Public Investment Program.
By contrast, Chinese projects are formulated on what may seem, from a Western perspective,
to be a rather ad hoc basis. Chinese companies, maintaining close contacts with Cambodianline ministries, promote Chinese loan financing schemes; they thus consult on candidate
projects directly with line ministries. The list of candidate projects which are prepared by line
ministries is requested from MEF by the Chinese government (MOFCOM㸧through the
Economic and Commerce Counselor Office and the Chinese Embassy. After Chinese
examination of the requested projects, inter-governmental framework agreements forconcessional loans between MEF and the Chinese government are concluded. According to theframework agreements, MEF signs loan agreements with the Chinese EXIM Bank, which is incharge of policy-based financing authorized by the Chinese government.
The leading role played by private Chinese companies in providing aid, as well as thefact that the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the EXIM Bank —whose main function is topromote Chinese commercial interests abroad — handle these loan schemes, suggests that the
pursuit of Chinese economic interests constitutes the main pillar of China’s aid strategy34.
Despite its ad hoc appearance from a Western perspective, this process actually reflects an
institutional arrangement that China has developed with Cambodia35.
An institutional arrangement to pursue its own economic interests does not mean that
Chinese aid is implemented without due attention to Cambodian national or sector
development policy. Although policy dialogue between the Chinese and Cambodian
governments on a shared development strategy has not yet taken place, line ministries in
34

This was a typical method taken by the Japanese government until the 1980s, when Japan was heavily
criticized by the international community for its commercial orientation.
35
Being the second largest economy in the world, Chinese aid is more diverse and the role of aid is only
one element among various strategies employed to promote its national interests.

28

Cambodia request Chinese financing according to the priorities established by their nationaland sector development policies (interview with Ministry of Public Works, 17 February, 2009).
With aid competition and pressure from traditional donors, we can expect that further
formalization of Chinese aid at an international level between donor and recipients will occur
in the near future.

Figure 7: Identification of Chinese Road-Building Projects in Cambodia<Cambodian Society>䠘Chinese Side䠚䐡Loan Request

MEF
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29

Figure 8: Identification of Thai Road-building Projects in Cambodia<Cambodian Side>䠘Thai Side䠚䐡Loan Request
䐡
e

Thai
Government
(MOF)

MEF

䐠Request

Embassy of Thailand
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CambodianLine Ministry䐢
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Dotted line arrows denote informal
processes.

Thai
Companies

䐟Exchange of
information

Unlike Chinese aid projects, in which private companies play key roles, the initial stepfor Thai projects involves direct “line-to-line” communication with Cambodia. For example,
the Thai Department of Highways (DoH) and the Cambodian Department of Public Works
have a “hotline,” allowing them to communicate directly by mobile phones at the departmental
level, and direct communication with aid agencies such as NEDA is frequent. While thesearrangements formally fall under the ACMECS (Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic
Cooperation Strategy) scheme, personal connections between government officials in Thailand
and Cambodia are often established through various training programs organized by TICA andother ministries providing aid (personal interview and MPWT, 2009). These informal channels
form part of an institution that helps to increase the predictability of future candidate-projects
funded by Thailand and thus reduce transaction costs for both the Thai and the Cambodian
Governments. Similar arrangements have not yet been established between China andCambodia.

30

Geographic proximity, and the various risks it creates, might be one explanation for thedifference between Chinese and Thai aid in the context of Cambodia. The geographic
immediacy of Thailand and Cambodia necessitates investment and close monitoring to containsecurity threats, not only military but also economic and political (e.g., flows of illegal
migrants, drugs, and diseases) which makes the role of the public sector more prominent;
whereas in the case of China, the greater distance allows private companies to play greaterroles in formulating aid projects.

2-4 Cambodia’s Strategy toward Emerging Donors
Faced with diverse development challenges and with crucial needs that have goneunanswered by traditional donors, the Cambodian government seems to have adopted astrategy of inviting emerging donors to fill financial gaps. In other words, the Cambodian
government, for the purpose of achieving balanced development, aims to make the most of theemerging donors’ distinctive strategies and value orientations.
This strategy, however, is not without complications: One is the negative effects ofincreased donor fragmentation caused by the entry of the emerging donors. Why does the
Cambodian government — already facing extreme donor fragmentation — risk further
fragmentation by inviting the participation of new donors? Our answer to this question is thatthe fragmentation caused by the emerging donors is much less harmful in the infrastructure
sector than in other sectors, such as health; hence, as major financers to the infrastructure
sector, emerging donors are largely uninvolved in fragmentation problems.
In the transportation sector, for example, both donor fragmentation and projectproliferation are relatively modest. Between 1992 and the present, a total of only eight donors36
have financed no more than 50 projects (average project cost USD $37.5 million) in the road
36

These includes Japan, US, ADB and WB from the traditional donor group, and China, South Korea,
Thailand and Vietnam from the emerging donor group.

31sub-sector37. In sharp contrast, in 2006 alone, there were 17 projects in the health sector,
totaling USD $1.97 million, concentrated on policy and planning at the sub-sector level andincurring unsustainable transaction costs for coordination to the point of crowding out
important government activities such as policy identification (CDC 2007, 23).
Surprisingly, China seems to be a “good performer” in terms of overall harmonization
efforts in Cambodia. Firstly, China tends to concentrate its aid in the transportation sector,
where fragmentation and harmonization are much less problematic. Secondly, China’s policyof distributing aid to a limited number of sectors38, recommended among traditional donors to
reduce the transaction costs of fragmentation, has the perhaps unintended consequence ofreinforcing the division of labor among donors. Thirdly, China is immune to Project
Implementation Unit (PIU) problems, since no Chinese PIU has thus far been observed39.
China also seems to demonstrate good performance in terms of alignment with recipient
countries’ needs and predictability of aid. In response to criticism that it aid lacks transparency
and due cooperation with respect to Cambodia’s endeavor to bolster strategic budgetingthrough the Multi-Year Indicative Financing Facility (MYIFF), China disclosed its projected
aid disbursement for FY2007-FY2009 at the first CDCF meeting in 2007,40 and actually
disbursed more than projected: 101% in 2007 and 122% in 2008 (CDC 2008,18).
In light of this behavior, it is clear why Cambodia welcomes Chinese aid — China
responds to Cambodia’s call for financing of its under-funded infrastructure sector byproviding massive aid in a predictable manner and with relatively little additional donor
fragmentation. We can add two more reasons why Cambodia is satisfied with Chinese aid:
expeditious implementation and low cost.
37

Bridge construction projects are included. See JICA, Transport Infrastructure Sectors in the Kingdomof Cambodia (Jan. 2007, IRITWG).
38
In 2008, China financed only two sectors, with 93% of Chinese aid going to the transportation sector.
See CDC (2008,34)
39
In 2007, the number of PIUs established by ADB and FAO accounted for 75% of the total number of
PIUs observed. See CDC (2007,38)
40
In contrast, major traditional donors, such as Japan and the United States, declined to provide

32When asked about the advantages of Chinese aid, Cambodian officials never fail tomention China’s quick delivery and low cost. Speed in aid delivery consists of two factors:
efficient decision making (i.e., a short time period between the Cambodian government’s
request and the signing of the loan agreement) and swift implementation. At the risk ofover-simplification, we attempt to quantify the swiftness of construction of Chinese-fundedroad rehabilitation projects by simply dividing rehabilitated National Road length (in kms) by
the construction period (in years) reported in IRITWG (2008, 5). The calculations show that
under Chinese-financed projects, some 42 km per year were constructed, while ADB andJapanese projects completed some 28 km and 17 km, respectively. With regard to project cost,
unit cost for one kilometer of Chinese-financed projects was 0.4 million USD, while for ADB
and Japanese projects, it was 1.3 million USD and 0.8 million USD, respectively41. This seems
to be clear evidence of the competitiveness of this emerging donor42.
Judging from the limited data available, we consider the main reason for cheap and swift
construction by emerging donors to be the low specifications used in their projects. For
example, almost all projects financed by emerging donors employ low-cost pavement (i.e.,
double bituminous surface treatment), in sharp contrast to Japanese projects, which often use
more expensive materials (i.e., asphalt concrete). Since an insufficient amount of time has
passed since the completion of these projects, it is too early to determine whether the emerging
donors’ projects are “cheap and dirty,” or whether Cambodia received value for its money.
What about other emerging donors? We argue that for various reasons Cambodia is
willing to accept activities of the other three emerging donors — Korea, India and Thailand —as favorable alternatives to traditional donors, and that other non-traditional donors are likely
longer-term commitments (Chanboreth and Hach 2008, 25).
Calculation of both speed and cost were made, based on the data in IRITWG 2008, p.5.
42
Cost and speed of construction are influenced by various factors, including the number of structures(e.g., small bridges or culvert boxes), the width of the road or type of pavement (e.g., asphalt concrete or
double bituminous surface treatment). However, the lack of such detailed technical data necessitates asimplified comparison. We believe that the risk of over-simplification is alleviated to some degree by
Cambodia’s relatively flat topography and geology, which reduce the need to consider geographic
41

33

to be welcomed in the future.
Cambodia welcomes Korean aid, since its aid volume and its emphasis on infrastructure
make it a promising emerging donor. The expected rise in fragmentation-related transaction
costs from Korea’s wide-ranging participation in many sectors may be worrisome for
Cambodia; but this could be offset by the donor’s receptivity to harmonization in its efforts tobecome a DAC member.
India has potential to act as a counterweight to China’s growing prominence in the
Cambodian aid market because of its recent economic growth and it long history of rivalry
with China for influence and leadership in the Third World. Due, however, to the relatively
small amount of its aid43 and to the slow implementation of its aid projects44, India has thus far
disappointed Cambodia’s expectations (interview with Cambodian Government official in
Phnom Penh, February 2008).
Thailand has always been an important trade partner for Cambodia45, providing an
economic reason for Cambodia to rely on Thailand for the development of infrastructure in theborder region. Despite periodic political tension between the two countries, aid activities seemto be consistently on the rise. For example, TICA officials stress that, based on Thailand’s
negative experience as a receiver of foreign aid due to the supply-side imposition of donorinterests, they wish to take a more demand-driven approach in providing aid. They also foreseethat future aid from Thailand will align with DAC principles, making it easier to justify
engagement in aid activities to Thai taxpayers (interview at TICA, March 18, 2009).
In summary, Cambodia’s room for economic growth is expanded by the opportunities
provided by emerging donors. As we have seen, the leverage of the Cambodian Government
variation.
43
Thus far, India has concentrated its aid activities in neighboring countries and African countries.
44
India’s Foreign Minister has officially admitted that Indian-aided projects have experienced slow
implementation. Questions and Answers in Lok Sabha (Lower House), 5 March 2007.
45
From 1999 to 2003, the volume of trade between Thailand and Cambodia was about USD $486.9
million per year and showed an average growth rate of 17.9% (Development Analysis Network 2005,
153).

34

exists not only in the gap between traditional and emerging donors, but also in the differencesamong emerging donors. While it cannot be denied that Cambodia’s strategy for accepting
foreign aid is at times purely political, it is also true that a greater number of donors withdiverse institutional characteristics (in their values, strategies and modalities) encourages
healthy donor competition and thus may contribute to the development plan of the Cambodian
government.

Discussion and Conclusion
In the past, arguments against emerging donors depended largely on an over-simplified
dichotomy of the emerging versus the traditional that assumed the former to be distinct or evenidiosyncratic in aid strategy, value orientation and actual performance. We found from ourresearch in Cambodia, however, that in certain aspects emerging donors share significant
similarities with traditional donors, including an emphasis on infrastructure and tied aid. We
also found that emerging donors are in the process of developing their own institutionalarrangements with the recipient government.
But we also found significant diversity among the emerging donors. Some, like Thailand
and Korea, are more willing to adopt DAC principles, while others, like China and India,
prefer to go it alone. Sector allocation is also diverse; while China and Thailand put muchemphasis on infrastructure, India and Korea have broader investment portfolios. Looking at thesituation in Cambodia, the most striking area of diversity among the emerging donors is in
their formation of institutional arrangement with the recipient government. Emerging donors
establish aid institutions only individually, i.e., country by country; they have yet to establish
aid institutions that bind them together.
However, we should not assume that the emerging donors now characterized by thesefeatures will remain static. By taking a time sensitive dynamic perspective we can begin aconstructive dialogue between DAC donors and emerging donors. Emerging donors coming

35

late to a game where the rules have already been set by traditional donors are playing in adifferent court. Cambodia, for one, has found this to be a court where the new donors fit quite
well. With regard to the different history from which they come, emerging donors haveattempted to find their place within an aid landscape that has been arranged primarily bytraditional donors. Some emerging donors, such as Thailand, try to utilize their own
experiences as former and current ODA recipients when they enter this aid landscape(interview at TICA, February 2008).
Some commentators may argue that the massive use of tied loans by emerging donors inpursuit of their own economic benefits is harmful to their recipients, depriving them of theopportunity to procure the best goods and services through international competitive bidding.
We suggest an alternative view: Many of the present DAC members, particularly Japan, havebeen criticized by other DAC members for their tied aid, but they gradually evolved theirprograms into the present forms following long struggle and debate, both domestically andinternationally. The same opportunity to “evolve” their aid institutions should be accorded
emerging donors. Cambodian official documents, in fact, clearly state that tied loans are “notof concern and need not occupy excessive amounts of time in the Cambodia aid effectivenessdialogue” (CDC 2007, 31). This position may be based on the objective fact that the rate oftied aid in Cambodia is comparatively low (14%, while the average among 55 developing
countries was 25% in 2005) (CDC 2007, 37, OECD 2009). Alternatively, the statement could
be interpreted as a cover by the Cambodian government to protect a source of valuable
financing for large-scale infrastructure projects. Whichever the case, we expect that just as
traditional donors have evolved aid institutions over time, so too will emerging donors.
Our most important finding is that emerging donors are beginning to serve as real
alternatives to traditional donors. Emerging donors offer recipients a choice, something whichbecomes critical in negotiations with other donors. The Cambodian Government has been able
to widen its policy options thanks to availability of choices made possible by competition36

among emerging donors. For example, recent participation by Kuwait in agricultural activities
near the Thai-Cambodia border has freed Cambodia from a reliance on aid from Thailand,
which had traditionally dominated the market for Cambodia’s agricultural goods throughinfrastructure funding to border regions46. It is the upstream competition among the donors
rather than the downstream competition among the contractors that has the potential tostimulate change beneficial to recipient governments.
Certain features of emerging donors, therefore, should be evaluated positively asenhancing the diversity of the aid market. By increasing the alternatives available to recipient
countries, healthy competition and division of labor is facilitated among donors in countries
previously dominated by DAC-oriented mindsets. China’s focus on infrastructure, for example,
allows other donors to concentrate their resources on areas in which they perceive the highest
comparative advantage (Munro 2005). From the viewpoint of the Cambodian Government,
Chinese aid is not “rogue,” i.e., aid unacceptably deviant from the established normative
standards of the traditional donor community. On the contrary, China seems to be a good
performer in terms of harmonization, alignment with the needs of the Cambodian government
and predictability. Based on our interviews, high-ranking Cambodian government officials
seem satisfied with the amount, speed of delivery, cost, and responsiveness to Cambodian
aspirations of aid from China.
In line with the traditional donors’ emphasis on “ownership,” we support the view that
more weight should be given to how the recipient countries’ governments actually value aid.
This discussion does not, however, point to the complete abandonment of present efforts
towards coordination under DAC principles; it simply questions the appropriate scope of aid
coordination. Coordination efforts should extend beyond a concentration on coordination ofdonor interests and remain carefully tailored to meet the needs of recipients.
46

Kuwait, an oil-rich country, has recently extended its interest in securing food resources, not only
through trade, but by obtaining agricultural land in other countries.

37

Although our argument has tended to support the emerging donors, that support is notunconditional. By no means is it our intention to defend emerging donors carte blanche. Rather,
our aim is to explore current realities regarding the activities of emerging donors from theperspective of the recipient country government.
In order for emerging donors to function as fully favorable alternatives for developing
countries, more transparency is required in their long-term investment portfolio. Healthy
competition among diverse donors in the aid market is possible only under conditions of
information disclosure which would help reduce transaction cost for recipient countries. In thisregard, we hope China and India will formulate and disclose their comprehensive aid strategies
for Cambodia, as Thailand and Korea have already done. It is particularly the responsibility of
China, as a top donor to Cambodia47, to disclose its overall assistance strategy for that country.
What does this case study have to offer institutional theory? It confirms that the way
institutions work depends on the specific context, and it attempts to identify this context in
Cambodia. The nature of institutions varies according to the stage of development of a donor.
With some limited exception, institutionalists have often underplayed the analysis of how
donors make arrangements with individual recipients, focusing instead on the institutions
among donors, such as DAC, or within recipient countries. We found in Cambodia that donors
develop their own institutions according to their stage of development and to their individual
relations with the recipient country. Perhaps what is needed further in Cambodia is not an
arbitrary critique by outside experts, but an assessment by the people of Cambodia, themselves,of aid performances, whether funded by the emerging or the traditional donors.

47

China is projected to be a top donor in 2009 in gross disbursement basis (CDC 2008, 35).

38

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41

Appendix 1: Aid and ODA
In order to accommodate the activities of the emerging donors, in this paper we use the term“aid” in a broad sense, different from the well-established term “official development
assistance” (ODA). In our usage, “aid” on a government-to-government basis refers to thoseresource transfers (grants, loans and technical cooperation) from donor countries to recipient
countries that have some development impact, regardless of the level of concessionality.
Our inclusive definition of “aid” stems from the difficulty of applying to the activities of
emerging donors the official OECD definition of ODA, which requires a grant element of atleast 25% and a main objective of promoting economic development and welfare. This isdifficult for the following two reasons:
(1)

(2)

There is a lack of the detailed information on the financial terms of individual loans by
emerging donors which is indispensable for calculation of the grant element, andtherefore for verification of the concessionality.
There is difficulty in confirming whether the main objective of each separate activity is
the promotion of development and welfare.

Because loans by Chinese or Indian EXIM Banks are subsidized by their respective
governments, making them more similar to ODA than to OOF (other official flows) withsemi-commercial terms, and because government officials of the emerging donors repeatedly
express commitment to developmental objectives (such as poverty reduction), we argue thatthe “aid” provided by emerging donors is not categorically different from ODA although we
acknowledge that it does not qualify as ODA according to the formal definition of the term.

42Appendix 2: Aid Activities of Emerging Donors in Cambodia
China

Loans

GrantsHuman
Resources
Development

South Korea

ThailandIndia

Interest-free Loan
160.2 Mil. USD
Loans for construction of 45.2 Mil.USD (2002(2000-2008, 960 mil.
120 Mil. USD (2008Road No.48,67,68 (2.29 2008)
Yuan)
2011, pledged by EDCF) bn.Bahts)
Concessional Loan
(2000-2008, 885 mil.
Yuan)
Preferential Buyer's
Credit (2006-2008, 500
mil. Yuan)
447.5 Mil. Yuan (20002008)
0.7 Mil. USD (20002008)
700 water pumps(provided by Guangxi
Province)
50 electric cars
(provided by Hubei
Province)

165 CambodianStudents (2004-8)
666 Cambodian
Officials, Policemen,
Army officers (2004-8)

39.5 Mil. USD (1991Construction of Training
2008)
Center in Phnom Penh
20 ambulances toGrant from H.R.H.
Ministry of HealthSirindhorn for
20 laptops, 20 printers Construction of Schools
and 20 fax machines for (0.2 Mil.B)
National Disaster
Construction of 4
Management Committee bridges on Road No. 48
Construction of Road
No. 67 (18 km)
Provision of 12 tons of
medicine/medical
equipment(2007)
Construction of HealthCenter along Road
1,384 Cambodian
Short-and long-term
trainees (1994-2008)
training for 1,340
181 Korean volunteers participants (2000in Cambodia (19942009)2008)
Youth volunteers under
21 Korean experts inthe program of “Friends
Cambodia (2001-2008) from Thailand”

15 Mil.Rupee (1992)
6 Mil.USD (2004-2008)
8.5 Mil.USD (pledged
in 2008)
Establishment ofEnglish Language
Center andEntrepreneurship
Development Center

456 persons (20022008)

Source:Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia, except for data regarding Thailand.
TICA and NEDA for data regarding Thailand.

43

Appendix 3:

List of Interviewees
Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC)
Vannden, Leaph
Deputy Secretary General
Courtnadge, Phillip
Senior Advisor, Multi Donor Support Program (MDSP)
Masaki, Mikio
Aid Coordination and Partnership Advisor
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF)
Chhon, Keat
Minister of Finance
Vissoth, Vongsey
Deputy Secretary General
Chief of Division, Bilateral Cooperation Division, Department of
Yutha, Por
Investment and Cooperation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MoFAIC)
Visalo, Long
Secretary of State
Chun, Thai
Director, Asia 2 Department
Sophearin, Chea
Deputy Director, Asia 1 Department
Vireak, SimJapan Desk Officer, Asia 2 Department
Ministry of Public Works and Transport (MPWT)
Borey, Kem
Director General, General Directorate of Public Works
Vaddhanak, Nou
Director, Road Infrastructure Department
Harada, Tatsuo
JICA Expert, Transport Policy Advisor
Kubota, Tsuyoshi
JICA Expert, Road Management Advisor
Ministry of Industry, Mines and Energy (MIME)
Washizawa, Takeshi JICA Expert, Power Sector PlanningEmbassy of the People's Republic of China
Lei Pengqin
Attache, Economic and Commercial Counsellor's Office
Embassy of the Republic of Korea
Kim Sang HoonCounsellor
Korea International Cooperation Agency
Kim, Byung-Gwan
Representative, Cambodia Office
Son Sungil
Deputy Representative, Cambodia Office
Embassy of India
Ray, Saurav

First Secretary

Asian Development Bank
Goswami, Arjun
Country Director, Cambodia Resident Mission
The World Bank
Sann, Ratha

Infrastructure Operations Officer, Cambodia Country Office

Embassy of Japan
Maruyama, Norio
Tamura, Misa

MinisterAid Coordination Advisor

Japan International Cooperation Agency
Yoneda, Kazuhiro
Chief Representative, Cambodia Office
Hayashi, Eiichiro
Aid Coordination Advisor, Cambodia Office44

Abstract (in Japanese)せ⣙᫖௒ࠊ࠸ࢃࡺࡿࠕ᪂⯆ࢻࢼ࣮ࠖ࡟㛵ࡍࡿ㆟ㄽࡀάⓎ໬ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࠋࡋ࠿ࡋࠊ᪤Ꮡ◊✲ࡢከࡃࡣఏ⤫ࢻࢼ࣮࡜ࡢ┦㐪Ⅼࢆᙉㄪࡍࡿ࠶ࡲࡾࠊ᪂⯆ࢻࢼ࣮ࢆ୍ᯛᒾⓗ࡟ᤊ࠼ࡿഴ
ྥࡀ࠶ࡗࡓࠋࡇ࠺ࡋࡓ◊✲ࡢ೫ࡾࡣࠊఏ⤫ࢻࢼ࣮࡜᪂⯆ࢻࢼ࣮ࡀඹ᭷ࡍࡿ㢮ఝⅬࠊࡑࡋ࡚ࠊ୍ᣓࡾ࡟ࡉࢀࡀࡕ࡞᪂⯆ࢻࢼ࣮㛫ࡢከᵝᛶࢆ┳㐣ࡉࡏࡿࠋ☜࠿࡟ࠊ᪂⯆ࢻࢼ࣮࡟㛵ࡋ࡚බ㛤ࡉࢀ࡚࠸ࡿ᝟ሗࡢ୙㊊ࡣࠊࡉࡲࡊࡲ࡞᠈

ࢆ࿧ࡧࠊᐈほⓗ࡞グ㏙ࡸศᯒࢆᅔ㞴࡟ࡋ࡚ࡁࡓࠋࡑࡇ࡛ࢃࢀࢃࢀࡣࠊ࢝ࣥ࣎ࢪ࢔࡜࠸࠺᥼ຓࡢཷࡅᡭ࡟↔Ⅼࢆ⤠ࡾࠊ୰ᅜࠊ࢖ࣥࢻࠊ㡑ᅜࠊࢱ࢖ࡀࠊࡑࢀࡒࢀ࡝ࡢࡼ࠺࡞᥼ຓάືࢆᒎ㛤ࡋ࡚࠸ࡿࡢ࠿ࢆ⌧ᆅㄪᰝ࡟ᇶ࡙࠸࡚ゎ᫂ࡋࠊ᪤Ꮡ◊✲ࡢ೫ࡾࢆಟṇࡍࡿࡼ࠺ヨࡳࡓࠋᮏ◊✲ࡀᥦ㉳ࡍࡿ㔜せ࡞ㄽⅬࡢ  ࡘࡣࠊ᪤Ꮡ◊✲ࡢከࡃࡀ᥼ຓࢻࢼ࣮ࡢቑຍ࡟ࡼࡿ᥼ຓࡢ᩿∦໬ࢆၥ㢟どࡋ࡚࠸ࡿ୰࡛ࠊཷࡅධࢀᅜᨻᗓഃ࠿ࡽࡳࢀࡤ᪂⯆ࢻࢼ࣮ࡢྎ㢌࡜࠸࠺ࠕ᩿∦໬ࠖࡢせᅉࡀࡴࡋࢁ஺΅ࡢᮦᩱ࡜࡞ࡾࠊᙼࡽ࡟࡜ࡗ࡚㛤Ⓨ஦ᴗࡢ㑅ᢥ⫥ࢆᗈࡆࡿຠᯝࢆࡶࡗ
࡚࠸ࡿྍ⬟ᛶ࡛࠶ࡿࠋ


45