Policy Paper - 1

FOSTERING SYNERGETIC RELATIONS BETWEENINDIA AND JAPAN

by
D.S. Rajan&
Dr. Sridhar Krishnaswami

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mr. D.S. Rajan

Mr. D.S.Rajan (73) is a former senior official in the Government of India. He has
held responsible positions both at home and abroad (Hongkong, Tokyo and Beijing). He
is a qualified Chinese and Japanese linguist, fluent in speaking both the languages, aswell as an analyst of China and East Asian affairs for more than five decades - 38 years
with the government and 16 years post-retirement.
After acquiring a First Class Bachelor's degree in Mathematics and completing a
two year Master's degree in the University of Madras, he joined the Civil Service in
1963. Since then, till his retirement in 2002, he served in several central establishments,
including those dealing with sensitive policy issues. To equip him with the necessary
skills, he was sent for the Interpretership Diploma course in Chinese language,
conducted by the School of Foreign Languages of the Ministry of Defence, where hesecured a distinction. He was then sent abroad for advanced studies in Chinese (inHongkong) and Japanese (in Tokyo). He has received high level government awards forhis meritorious services.
After his superannuation, Mr D.S.Rajan worked as a Senior Analyst in the Observer
Research Foundation in New Delhi and is presently a Distinguished Fellow of theChennai Centre of China Studies. He is a member of the Board of the Jawaharlal Nehru
University, New Delhi, tasked to select Chinese language and area studies teaching staff.
He is also a member of the China Studies Core Group, Indian Council of World Affairs,
New Delhi and a visiting Faculty of the University of Madras, Pondicherry University,
S.V.University, Tirupati, National Institute of Advanced studies (NIAS), Bangalore andthe Asian College of Journalism, Chennai. On invitation, he regularly delivers lectures
on China at national and international seminars. Among the inviting institutions are - theDefence Services Staff College at Wellington, Army War College at Mhow, IndianCouncil of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade,3

Kolkata, Indian Institute of Management, Indore, the Harvard Project on Asian andInternational Relations, Taipei, Prospects Foundation, Taipei, the University of
St.Petersburg, Russia and Sam Nunn Institute of International Affairs, Georgia Tech
University, Atlanta, US.
Mr D.S.Rajan is the editor of six books on China and his articles on China, many
based on original Chinese language material, regularly appear in various national andInternational websites, journals and books ( for e.g ” The Rise of China - Implications for
India”, edited by Prof Harsh V. Pant, Cambridge University Press; “Indian National
Security Annual Review ”and ”Political and Security Dynamics in South and South East
Asia, ISEAS, Singapore). In addition, Mr D.S.Rajan is regularly interviewed by theprint and visual media both in India and abroad, including the Times Now, BBC,Yomiuri Shimbun, Global Times (Beijing) and China Economic Daily (Beijing).

4

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Sridhar Krishnaswami

Dr. Sridhar Krishnaswami has been a Journalist for 27 years. For 18 years, he
was the Foreign Correspondent with The Hindu in Washington D.C. (1995-2005)
covering North America and the United Nations. For three years he was with The Press
Trust of India (2005-2008) in Washington D.C., and for four years he was in Singapore(1991-1995) in charge of South East Asia and the Asia Pacific with The Hindu.
Dr. Krishnaswami is the Special Assistant to the Vice Chancellor of SRM University andHeads the Center for Press, Publicity and Media Communication of that institution.
Besides being a Professor in the Department of Journalism and Mass Communicationof the Faculty of Science and Humanities he supervises Research Scholars doing their
Ph.D work.
Dr. Krishnaswami has a Ph.D in Political Science from the Miami University ofOhio(USA) specializing in International Relations, International Law and Organization,
and Comparative Politics (Asian Political Systems). He holds a Master's Degree inInternational Affairs from Ohio University (USA), with a concentration in South East
Asia, and a Master's Degree in Political Science from the University of Madras(Presidency College). A Bachelor's Degree in Political Science from the University ofMadras (Madras Christian College), he did his Pre-University at the Vivekananda
College, Chennai and schooling at Don Bosco, also in Chennai.
Dr. Krishnaswami has been a Fellow with The Japan Foundation, Tokyo, and a
Journalist Fellow with The Foreign Press Center of Japan in Tokyo. He is the recipient of
The Radio Tampa Broadcasting Award of Japan for his writings in The Hindu on the
Asia-Pacific and Oceana. He is also the recipient of a Cash Prize and Citation from the
Presidency College for securing the First Rank in Political Science in the University
Examinations.
5A regular Visiting Fellow at the Department of Communication of the College of
Liberal Arts at the University of Central Oklahoma, Dr. Krishnaswami continues tocontribute articles to scholarly journals and media publications like The Hindu,
The Hindu Business Line, The New Indian Express, Deccan Chronicle, The Sahara
Time, The Diplomat of Tokyo / Washington, The Atlantic Post of Washington DC and
The South Asia Monitor.

PREFACE
B.S. Raghavan, IAS (Retd.)
Former Policy Adviser to UN(FAO)
Former US Congressional Fellow

The Centre for Japanese Studies established by the Indo-Japan Chamber of Commerce &Industry (IJCCI), Chennai, India, ventures to step into the public domain with this Policy Paper
produced by D.S.Rajan and Sridhar Krishnaswami, who are two of India's foremost exponents
on international affairs.
As will be evident from the brief profiles of both of them following this preface, Rajan's stature
as a widely respected expert on East Asian Affairs has been notably enhanced by his knowledge of,and fluency in, Chinese and Japanese languages, while Sridhar Krishnaswami, currently heading
the Department of Journalism and Mass Communications at the SRM University near Chennai,
holds a doctorate in Political Science and has distinguished himself as a foreign correspondent of
The Hindu in Singapore and Washington D.C., Professional Fellow with the Japan Foundation and a
Journalist Fellow with the Foreign Press Centre of Japan in Tokyo. Their commentaries and articles,
published in scholarly journals and by the media at large, on a wide variety of topics touching theirexpertise have greatly helped broaden the awareness of the implications of issues impacting India's
relations with other countries. Their close association with the Chennai Centre for China Studies andparticipation in the activities of many other think tanks provide balance and objectivity to theiranalyses of policies and issues. These impressive credentials vest this paper with depth andauthenticity, and add weight to its recommendations. In brief, it is a paper in a class of its own.
On the contents of the paper itself, I would let the reader visit them on his own rather thaninterpose myself between him and the authors. To the best of my knowledge, this is the firstattempt which gathers together in a holistic sweep, all the dimensions and directions of theevolution of the past and present relations between India and Japan, and brings out the enormous,
but hitherto unexploited, possibilities they hold for the future for the lasting good not only of thetwo countries, but the world community as a whole. In the process, the paper takes a critical andclinical account of inter-connectivities of globalization, the prevailing geo-political and security
environment, and the win-win political, economic, cultural and people-to-people strategies thatwould conduce to harmony and solidarity among the nations of the world. The paper caps it allwith a blue-print for action which is an eminently doable package of concrete measures.
I have great pleasure in commending the effort to the attention of friends of India and Japan,
and indeed, of everyone who has peace and prosperity of all humankind at heart.
7ABSTRACT
The common assumption in both India and Japan is that the bilateral relations is notwhere it is supposed to be meaning neither New Delhi nor Tokyo has taken advantage ofthe generally good political warmth that existed between the two countries. All thisappears to be changing but only some of it can be attributed to the forces of globalization
and revolutions in the realm of information technology. The thrust of the changing
equations in the bilateral relationship has much to the evolving security and strategic
environment in the neighborhood of both India and Japan. And the common
denominator to both these countries is China along with the declining role of the UnitedStates in the Asia Pacific.
The particular focus of this paper is not only the political and strategic
compulsions of India and Japan but also the growing economic potentials and theopportunities that are seemingly in abundance but relatively untapped. Why is that
the Japanese corporate houses still are so hesitant about India and what is it that India
will have to do in order to pave the way for a major Japanese foray into India? This isespecially pertinent when it comes to India seeking cutting edge technology inmilitary and civilian sectors.
This Policy Paper is a modest attempt to put India-Japan relations in perspectivewith the basic objective to see the potentials for forward movement. It is not by anymeans a fault finding exercise on the “missed opportunities” that have been addressedenough in academic and media circles.

BACKGROUND
There is something about the relations between India and Japan that is both puzzlingand baffling. The two countries have had hundreds of years of civilization interaction,
Buddhism made its way to Japan from India and the first people of India are said to havesettled in Japan around the time of the First World War. The two countries are establisheddemocracies and have not had contentious issues troubling the bilateral relations. Yet,despite all the warmth in the relationship, it would seem that it has not really taken off by
any stretch of imagination.
9

In spite of all the goodwill in Japan in the post second world war with the dissenting
voice of the Indian Judge at the War Crimes tribunal, Japan's India relations or India's
Japan relations has been in fits and starts from the 1960s till about the end of the 1990s.
But there seems to be a discerning change in the attitude of both New Delhi and Tokyo in
the 21st century, which is lending hope to the belief that the two countries are seemingly
poised for a new phase in the bilateral relationship that is clearly showing signs of depth,
width and vision.
The most natural question that would come to anyone's mind is the rationale for thechanging mindset of both Tokyo and New Delhi and if this changing mindset has to dowith internal compulsions or external constraints. On the one hand, the argument can bemade that the changing political environments in both countries are paving the way forsomething different in the bilateral relationship. And on the other hand, the argument can
as well be made that the strategic compulsions being what they are, Japan and India areperhaps “forced” to come together.
What has also to be kept in mind is that the strategic compulsions of not just India
and Japan are pushing the two countries to edge closer. It is also the fact that the strategic
environment of the Asia Pacific is undergoing a tremendous change that is literally
forcing many in this part of the world to look beyond the immediate concerns and to lookat the larger picture. Take a look at Japan and the current strategic environment in East
Asia and the Asia Pacific - threatening North Korea, a historically troublesome China
with a new found belligerence over the Senkakus and a Japan-United States alliance thatis fraught with uncertainties. Economically Japan finds itself strapped domestically andhaving to face stiff competition from South Korea, Taiwan and the People's Republic ofChina(PRC), with each one of these countries having an agenda of its own in the region
and beyond.
And the strategic environment of India is no less challenging. The “noise” within theneighborhood aside, New Delhi has had to deal with China over its String of Pearlsstrategy, the inroads of Beijing in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Nepal, and not to speak of thecontinuous and ever growing nexus with Pakistan. It is not as if India is looking at
forming alliances to counter China but is in a deep necessity to come to terms with astrategy that factors in national interests. The persisting border dispute with China is one
10irritant that will remain absorbing for India's leaders, but now New Delhi will have toanswer the aggressive challenge of Beijing in international waterways such as the South
China Seas.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ASIA PACIFIC
It is in this evolving context that one would have to factor in the role of the UnitedStates in the Asia Pacific. A once dominant actor in the scene, Washington is paring down
its commitments much to the angst of countries like Japan. At the same time, the upbeat
relationship between the United States and India from the times of President Bill Clintonand George W Bush has raised the “red flag” in China, which sees the Washington-New
Delhi recent nexus as some sort of a containment of China. Washington, on the one hand,is drawing down its role in Asia Pacific and on the other hand wants countries like Japan,
India and Australia to be drawn into some sort of “sharing of the burden” in the Asia
Pacific. Strategically, it would appear that the United States-Japan; United StatesAustralia and the United States-India strategic maneuvers in the last decade are more of aquadrilateral arrangement aimed at coming to terms with the newer challenges of theregion.
For instance, the United States-India “Malabar Exercises” have already been turned
into one inviting Australia and more recently, of Japan being involved in the Naval
exercises in July 2015, much to the unease of China. And the cooperation between India,
the United States and Japan does not stop with periodical military exercises; it extends toa range of other areas - notably, enhanced military hardware purchases from the UnitedStates by India and potential exchanges in military and civilian nuclear high technology
from the United States and Japan.
The Malabar exercises of 2015 are significant for more than one reason. This is thethird time Japan is taking part in the highly complex and enhanced maritime exercisesthat the United States and India have been holding regularly since 1992, except for a briefhalt in the aftermath of Pokhran II nuclear testing by India in 1998. India, it has to be
pointed out, had kept this Malabar Naval maneuvers to a bilateral one since China
protested the 2007 exercise, as it involved the navies of Australia and Singapore also.
11

The two-phase exercise in the harbour and sea will see in action the American nuclear
powered aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington and an assortment of submarines,
destroyers, P-3s, helicopters and amphibious aircraft of the three navies. The 18th
edition of the Malabar Exercises will see carrier strike operations and surface and antisubmarine warfare.

THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS IN INDIA AND JAPANIf there is the new momentum in India-Japan relations, the changing domestic
political environment in the two countries has indeed been a contributing factor, without
a doubt. Strapped in an era of coalition politics for nearly two decades in whichgovernments have had constraints in dealing with issues of economy, defence andsecurity-strategy, there is the new dispensation in India since May 2014 that, at least on
the surface, gives the impression of going about foreign policy in an assured anddetermined fashion, especially when it comes to defence and economic policies. The
foreign tours of Prime Minister Narendra Modi have invariably had a twin focus deepening economic bonds and at the same time, fine tuning the strategic needs andcompulsions.
For a country that for decades pegged to a Peace Constitution imposed on it by theUnited States, the domestic political environment of Japan is also showing signs ofchange but in its own slow pace. If the country took on a modest deviation in the 1990s by
sending peacekeepers to Cambodia, Japan is now willing to take the extra step in“breaking out” of the Peace Constitution by empowering its defence forces for a moreenlarged role in the region of the Asia Pacific, keeping in mind its changing andchallenging strategic environment.
On what was once called Japanese Self Defence Force (JSDF) with no offensive intent
but defense, there is now a political debate in Japan which is giving a new meaning to therole of its own armed forces. But the leadership in Japan is fully aware of the fact that all thishas to be done carefully keeping in mind the domestic political opposition and opinion, as
well as of that of its neighbors in East and South East Asia. Memories of the Japanese armyin these parts of the world during the Second World War are still very fresh and fanned
persistently by China which had to bear the brunt in the 1940s.
12If the Japanese foreign policy of the 21st century is raising eyebrows in East Asia andbeyond, it is on account of the fact that Japanese leaders of today have been forced to cometo terms with the global realities. For nearly five decades Tokyo had the luxury of American
security “protection”, an aspect of the Peace Constitution that leaders in Japan cleverly
exploited. Shigeru Yoshida, Japan's first Prime Minister after World War II, is said to haveremarked once, “It may seem devious, but let the Americans handle our security… If theAmericans complain, the constitution gives us a perfect pretext”. The Article 9 of theConstitution and the fact that Japan cannot spend more than 1 per cent of its GNP on
defence, were comfortable features of the Cold War era. But what Japanese Prime Ministers
even before Mr. Abe had to face were the grim realities of the post Cold War era.
“This grand strategy known as the Yoshida Doctrine worked brilliantly for the Cold
War years when the U.S. security guarantee could be assumed. But it left Japan ill-prepared
for the post Cold War era. Incredibly, the Japanese had no plan or legislation that would
allow the government to deal with national emergencies. Japan, supposedly a sovereigncountry, had in effect no plans for ensuring its national security. Dependence had become
the foundation of the nation's foreign policy”, says Kenneth Pyle of the National Bureau of
Asian Research in his June 2014 article, “The Sea Change in Japanese Foreign Policy”.
“Throughout the postwar period, Japan has occupied a uniquely subordinate
position in the American world order. The result of unconditional surrender, occupation,
and an imposed alliance subordinate independence has compelled Japanese deference toAmerican hegemony. The cost of such deference to national self-respect has been
considerable. Although not openly revealed, the recovery of a more autonomous foreign
policy is fundamental to Abe's agenda. The hegemonic alliance was intended to achieve adouble containment: containment of Communist expansion, but also containment ofJapan. The United States did not want an independent Japanese rearmament or a Japanthat might tilt toward neutrality in the Cold War. While the immediate goal of adopting aninterpretation to allow collective self-defense is to bring about a tighter U.S.-Japan
alliance, the larger goals of the foreign policy revolution now underway are not yet clear.
Historically, modern Japan has always adapted to the perceived changes in theinternational order. Today, that structure is changing with the rise of an assertive China,
the travails of the U.S.-led world order, and the increasing likelihood of a multi polarorder in its place”, Pyle notes.
13

JAPAN AND THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTOn the one hand, Japan has had to come to terms with the changing international
system in the post Cold War era as it pertained to national states and their changing
stances. Yet on the other hand, Japan had also to face challenges from non-state actors the rise of global terror outfits going beyond the al Qaeda and its associated fringe groups
to even more bloodthirsty groups like the ISIS, or Daesh as it is referred to. The back-toback beheadings of two Japanese citizens, one of them being a respected journalist,
brought about the horrors of terrorism to Japanese family rooms. But what was theconnection between ISIS and Japan? On the surface it would seem un-related anddisconnected but the fact that Mr. Abe, in a visit to Egypt, offered some US$ 200 millions
in humanitarian assistance to those nations affected by the ISIS seems to have been thetrigger. The bottom line to Mr. Abe and other policy makers is how does Japan respond tothese newer dangers? For India, the question of how all this is relevant to it, is becoming
important.
The Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with his 'pro-active pacifism' as basis, isengaged in a massive revamping of the country's defence and security policies; with thelikely emergence of a resurgent Japanese military looking beyond self-defence, there canbe further change in the power balance in East Asia which already stands affected by therise of the People's Republic of China (PRC). What appears to be in stake is the future ofgeopolitics in the Asia-Pacific region and there is an urgent need for other major regional
powers like India to carefully watch and respond to the emerging trends.
There is no doubt that Abe's changes will result in more teeth to and expansion of therole of Japan's military; to make it happen, the leader seems to be in a comfortable
position to pass necessary amendments to the country's constitution, overcoming theprevailing internal differences on the subject. The changes definitely look as responses
to the evolved perceptions of the Abe administration on the current level of threats toJapan's security; reflecting them are the contents of Japan's latest annual Defense White
Paper (July 21, 2015), which are sure to play a role in shaping the future contours of its
security and foreign policies. The document's ranking of China as the main source of
security concerns, makes certain that Abe's approach in the coming years will become
more and more China-centric.

In order to understand the magnitude of the security policy shift in Japan, it would benecessary to examine Abe's measures in detail. Chronologically, they include creation of
a National Security Council (November 2013), which was followed by formulation ofJapan's first National Security Strategy (December 2013) which listed the following
three objectives (i) strengthen the “deterrence” necessary for maintaining Japan's peaceand security and for ensuring its survival , (ii) improve the security environment of the
Asia Pacific region, and prevent the emergence of and reduce direct threats to Japan,
through strengthening the Japan-US Alliance, enhancing the trust and cooperative
relationships between Japan and its partners within and outside the Asia Pacific regionand (iii) build a peaceful, stable, and prosperous international community bystrengthening the international order based on universal values and rules, and by playing
a leading role in the settlement of disputes. Catching attention are key terms in the list“deterrence”, “reducing threat”, “Japan-US alliance” and “relationships with partners”;
these are certainly going to shape Abe's policy agenda from now on.
As an important measure, Abe's cabinet reinterpreted in July 2014, Article 9 of theJapanese constitution which had been restricting the operational scope of JSDF since its
founding in 1954; it allowed Japan to exercise the right to 'collective self-defense', whichmarked a major defense policy shift in the post World War II era, allowing the JSDF tofight alongside allies on foreign soil for the first time. China's response to thereinterpretation has been predictably negative. The PRC Foreign Ministry in a low-key
response suggested that constitutional reinterpretation raised doubts about Japan'scommitment to peaceful development. A Xinhua comment (July 2, 2014) described themove as a 'brutal violation 'of the spirit of Japan's pacifist constitution.
The Abe regime took two more initiatives. The First marked a lifting of the ban onarms exports (April 2014) the first such instance in 50 years, which permitted Japan to
jointly develop arms with allies and give its defense industry access to new markets andtechnology. China responded by saying ( Foreign Ministry, February 25,2014) that
“Japan had to address its neighbors' concerns about allowing the export of weapons;
Against the backdrop of an intensifying swing to the right for Japanese politics, theintention behind and effect of massively loosening restrictions on the export of weapons
1) http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/131217anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf, December 17,201315

really worries people”. The second related to Japan's hiking of the defense budget to
US$ 42 billion (January 2015) to which China responded by saying (January 15, 2015)that they “hope Japan can draw lessons from history and follow the path of peacefuldevelopment”.
Having strategic significance are the Japanese Prime Minister's subsequent threesteps - finalizing of defense cooperation guidelines with the US (April 2015), passing of
two national security bills (May 2015) and issuing of Japan's annual Defense White
Paper (July 21, 2015). The Guidelines with the US focused on how Japan and the US will
respond to the security concerns that directly affect Japan's security. It, however, did notcover how the two countries will cooperate in regional and global activities. Thisomission needs study as there are opinions both in Japan and the US about the limits to the
Abe regime's ability to apply the 'collective self defense' principle. “The mainachievement of issuing the new guidelines is to intensify and reinforce the deterrence andresponsiveness to the complex new security environment in East Asia,” said (May 1,2015) Yasuhisa Kawamura, press secretary at the Japanese foreign Ministry.
China (foreign ministry) reacted to the guidelines by saying that “the U.S. and Japanare responsible to ensure that their bilateral alliance does not jeopardize a third party's
interests including China's, nor undermine peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. The
U.S.-Japan alliance is a bilateral arrangement forged during the Cold War period. In
today's world … the Cold War is long-gone”. Its defence official stated that a “military
alliance is an out-dated product which goes against the trends of times featuring peace,development, cooperation and mutual benefit. Any attempts to strengthen military powerby forging military alliance, contain the development of other countries and seek selfish
gains will turn out to be futile”. The PRC President Xi Jinping himself remarked at theConference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA, May
2014) that “countries should move away from reliance on military alliances and the2) Japan's constitutuion change: a brutal violation of its spirit, English.news.cn 2014-07-02 20:40:06
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/video/2014-07/02/c_133455889.htm
3) Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Press conference, July 2,2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1132459.shtml
4) Japan defense hike prompts hopes for peaceful path. By Chen Heying, Global Times,
January 15,2015 , http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/902020.shtml
16

outdated thinking of Cold War.” Instead, he promoted “An Asia for Asians” security
concept as well as a new “code of conduct for regional security.”
The two security bills passed in May 2015 in the Lower House of the Japanese Diet,
provided for rights to the government to use force to aid an ally under attack, even if
Japan itself is not attacked. They stipulated establishment of a new permanent law toallow the JSDF to provide logistic support for a foreign military engaging in U.N.backed operations. China's reaction was prompt, but measured. Speaking to the visiting
Secretary General of National Security Secretariat Shotaro Yachi of Japan, PRC StateCouncillor Yang Jiechi voiced (Beijing, July 16, 2015) “stern concern and solemn
stance” of China over the issue. Yang expressed that “due to historical reasons, Japan's
moves in the military and security field are closely watched by its Asian neighbors andthe international community. The approval of the new security bills by Japan's House ofRepresentatives is an unprecedented move taken by Japan in military and security field
since the World War II. In the international circumstances of seeking peace,development, cooperation and win-win collaboration, the Japanese side runs against thetide of the times and the general trend of the world by accelerating the build-up of its
military muscles and significantly changing its military policy”.
AN ASSERTIVE CHINA AND JAPANThe Abe administration's next measure was issuance of a defense white paper inJuly 2015 which said that “Japan's security risk has worsened overall”. Unambiguously
putting China on the top of the country's security concerns, it blamed Beijing as “acting
in an assertive manner including coercive attempts at changing the status quo
particularly on maritime issues” and warned that its actions in the East and South China
5) Peter Lee, “U S. Signs off on Japanese Collective Self Defense”, December 2, 2014.
http://www.internationalpolicydigest.org/2014/02/12/obama-administration-relents-japanese-pressurecollective-self-defense/
6) China Decries New US-Japan Defense Guidelines hediplomat.com/2015/05/china-decries-new-usjapan-defense-guidelines/
7) Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei's Regular Press Conference on April 28, 2015 ,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceng/eng/fyrth/t1258874.htm
17Seas “could trigger contingencies.” It has specifically cited in this connection, China's
building an offshore gas platform in the East China Sea and reclamation work in theSouth China Sea. The white paper also included the continuing missile and nuclear
threats from North Korea and terrorist threats from the Islamic State group as othersources of security challenges. The threat perceptions in the paper are certain to form apolicy backdrop to Abe.
China's foreign and defense ministries criticized (July 21, 2015) the “needlessprovocations in Japan's defense white paper”. A statement released by the Foreign Ministry
said that the Japanese paper “creates tensions by maliciously exaggerating the Chinese
threat”. About the alleged Chinese gas platform in East China Sea, it described the project
as “legal and appropriate” because they were being conducted within Chinese territorial
waters where there are no disputes with other nations. Regarding the disputed Senkaku
Islands in the East China Sea, it said China “will continue to take necessary measures,”including “patrols into Chinese territorial waters.” It also criticized the Japanese white
paper for raising the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and charged that “Japan isinterfering in the issue and trying to stir up tensions in the region.” Meanwhile, a statement
released by the Chinese National Defense Ministry described the Japanese white paper as“throwing dirt on the image of the Chinese military.” It said the Abe administration “istrying to greatly change national security policy, even while claiming to pursue a course ofan exclusively defensive posture and peaceful development. Such actions are creating
disadvantageous effects on the peace and stability of the surrounding region.” A Xinhua
commentary on the same day said that the white paper “exaggerated the 'Chinese threat' inmaritime issues and showed that Japan is trying to become a major military power.”

SECURITY DILEMMA IN THE REGION
Abe's measures need to be juxtaposed with the security dilemma which certainly
seems to face regional nations. Taking first the case of Japan, it can be seen that Tokyo
8) China Decries New US-Japan Guidelines, the Diplomat, May 1,2015
9) “Yang Jiechi Voices Solemn Stance of China to Japan over Forcing Through the New Security Billsby the House of Representatives of the National Diet of Japan”, July 16,201518

has to choose between the two unwelcome possibilities! one concerning more security
threats coming from an assertive China and the other in the form of probableuncertainties over the US role in the region. Concerns on the likely impact of China's
military modernization and its sovereignty claims over Senkakus, are creating doubts inJapan about the PRC's intentions in the East China Sea and South China Sea, and theadequacy of Japan's security. To deal with such a situation, Prime Minister Abe has
envisaged a “security diamond” concept whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the US
state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from theIndian Ocean region to the western Pacific. The concept appears to reflect Japan's growing
desire not to exclusively depend on US alliance and to look for 'partners' within the region. It
is possible that Japan is uncomfortable with the somewhat neutral stand of the US on thestatus of Senkakus, (called Diao Yu by the Chinese), perceives the US as a declining power
and feels the need to build independent military capabilities as against the uncertainty on
the US capabilities to come to its aid in case of a conflict with China. Japan may also be waryof the negative impact on its US alliance, of the growing US-China relations. Also ofinterest is Abe's desire to get closer to Southeast Asian nations; he expressed (Shangrila
Dialogue, Singapore, 30.5.2014) his country's intention to play a bigger and more proactiverole in ensuring peace and security in the region and pledged support for Southeast Asian
nations in their efforts to protect their territories.
The ASEAN nations also face a security dilemma similar to that of Japan. More
importantly, divisions exist among them on how to respond to China's policy on theSouth China Sea. The failure of ASEAN foreign ministers to agree on a final
communiqué in their meeting in 2012 and their not naming China in the corresponding
document of the 2014 session, illustrate this point. China has alleged that Vietnam and
the Philippines, with US support, are 'hijacking', and isolating China from the ASEAN
to achieve their purpose of enlisting the support of the regional organization for theirSouth China Sea claims.
China's security dilemma also comes out clear. It wants to protect the country's 'coreinterests' through a policy of assertiveness. China's neighbors are becoming concerned10) Beijing lashes out at defense white paper depiction of 'Chinese threat' july 22 15
http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201507220060
19

with that policy. The PRC, at the same time, considers ties with neighbors as very
important and is accordingly wooing them through extending economic benefits. It thus
has come to face the question as to how to balance its two requirements - the need forbeing assertive towards neighbors, and at the same time promoting friendship with them.
India's security dilemma also looks similar to those of Japan's. The country wants toengage China and at the same time considers important, the ties with powers like the US
and Japan, irrespective of the latter being China-wary. Strategically, India is required tomake counter balancing efforts against China's assertiveness, especially the latter's
moves to forge economic, political and security partnerships with countries falling under
Indian traditional sphere of influence, like Myanmar, Indian Ocean states, Persian Gulfand east coast of Africa. India has chosen a 'multi-vectored' foreign policy providing for
simultaneous engagements with all countries, irrespective of the fact that the latter havetheir own differences; this policy allows India to convey its own critical views to China.
The reference to maritime security and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea in
the India-US agreement on “Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean
region”, signed at the time of President Obama's visit to India, proves this point.
Asian nations on the whole are searching for a regional security architecture inwhich a militarily strong China does not dominate. They, in particular, face the question
whether or how to involve in such an exercise with the US, a power challenging China
through its Asia-Pivot policy. At the same time, they are being compelled to take into
account the likely negative impact of such efforts on their ties with the PRC. They areaware that China may perceive in these efforts a symbol of an anti-China gang up in theregion, aimed at encircling it; that in turn, can make the PRC assert more and increase its
military capabilities, inviting other powers to retaliate and thus, result in an arms race inthe region. It thus appears that the regional powers are caught in a security dilemma.
11) Prime Minister Abe's Key Note Address, the IISS Shangrila Dialogue, Singapre, May 30,2014
https://www.iiss.org/en/events/shangri%20la%20dialogue/archive/2014-c20c/opening-remarks-andkeynote-address-b0b2/keynote-address-shinzo-abe-a787 accessed on January 20,201512) Teddy Ng, “ Vietnam, Philippines hijacking ASEAN to press South China Sea Claims”, South China
Morning Post, quoting a book published by the China Institute of International Studies, 5.6.2014,
http://hongkong.gotnewswire.com/news/vietnam-philippines-hijacking-asean-to-press-south-china
sea-claims, accessed on January 20,2015
20

They on one hand want a security relationship among themselves to resist a rising China; on
the other, they find themselves in no position to ignore Chinese sensitivities on the same.

JAPAN's SECURITY APPROACH TOWARDS INDIA
Meriting focus is the relevance of Abe's measures to the current stage in Japan-India
security ties. It would be important to note that Abe is an admirer of India, which he sees as ademocracy like Japan. He has called India as Japan's natural ally. In his recent book,Towards a Beautiful Country, he has praised India and calls for the establishment ofstrategic relations between Japan and India. Between India's democracy and China's
opaque political system, non-military transparency in particular, he sides with the former.
Abe's inclination towards making his country's ties with India closer and the reciprocationof Indian Prime Minister Modi to the same, have been visible when the latter was in Japan in
September 2014. Most importantly, the occasion saw Japan and India upgrading theirpartnership to the level of 'Special Strategic and Global Partnership'; Tokyo agreeing with
New Delhi to enhance their defense and strategic cooperation to a new level, of whichnotable in particular, being the willingness of the two sides to discuss availability of US-2
amphibian aircraft to India and Japan promising US$35 billion to India through public andprivate funding over the next 5 years for developmental projects, along with its decision to
double FDI in India. The fact that there was no progress on the occasion with regard to abilateral civil nuclear deal indicated the limits to Japan-India strategic ties. Tokyo
apparently has insisted on a tougher safe-guard regime and a ”no nuclear test” clause in any
bilateral agreement on the subject.

CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS INDIA- JAPAN TIESThe PRC wants to get benefits out of its economic ties with Japan, but at the sametime is not prepared to compromise on its strategic interests while dealing with Japan. At
the moment, it is keen on maintaining high level contacts with Japan. President Xi has13) Mohan Malik, “ China and India Today: Diplomats Jostle, Militaries Prepare” , World Affairs
journal, July-August 2012 issue, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/china-and-india
today-diplomats-jostle-militaries-prepare , accessed on January 20,2015
21

had a summit meeting with Prime Minister Abe in November 2014 and another one isreportedly being planned around September 2015 (Reuters, July 16, 2015). Similar
conditions prevail in the case of China's ties with India also. It would thus be importantfor both India and Japan to factor China's attitude as they conduct their bilateral strategic
relations.
Firstly, Beijing's target of attack seems to be Tokyo, not New Delhi. The PRC's
official media have warned against “any attempt by Japan to form a united front against
China with India”, while at the same time showing an understanding that India will notgive up its 'independent foreign policy' in order to strike a balance in its ties with Japanand China. The editorial in the Chinese Communist Party-affiliated Global Times,
referring to Prime Minister Modi's observations on “18th century expansionist mindset”
while in Japan, saw in the Indian leader's description “some nationalistic sentiments
against China”, but added that “India policy would be dictated by its national interests.
China's GDP is five times that of India's. Mutual trust between Beijing and New Delhi,
facing strategic pressure from the north, is difficult to build as there is also an unresolved
border conflict between the two. Sino-Indian ties can in no way be counterbalanced by
the Japan-India friendship. Both as new emerging countries and members of BRICS,
China and India have plenty of interests in common. Geopolitical competition is not themost important thing for the two countries, at least at present”.
Secondly, at unofficial levels in China, a thinking prevails that the US and Japan
may support India on the question of unsolved India-China border; if reflected atgovernment levels in China, this could complicate India's strategic ties with Japan aswell as the US. Influential Chinese writers (like Professor Zhang Li, South Asia
Research Center, Sichuan University) have said that the support of Washington “led to ahardening of India's position on disputed border with China like that in Aksai Chin,
Sikkim and Southern Tibet”. Prof Wang Dehua has remarked that "the Indian army's
intrusions into the Chinese side were encouraged by the US so as to make some noise to
distract China from the South China Sea, where it is in a spat with its sea neighbors suchas the Philippines and Vietnam over the disputed islands. But India is neither on the USside nor on China's side, but has its own agenda”. Scholars (like Zhang Mi of the14) “Modi-Abe intimacy brings scant comfort”, Global Times, September 2, 2014
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/879478.shtml
22

Independent Dujia Network based in Beijing, www.dooo.cc) have alleged ( April 9,2015) that the US is provoking India in the latter's relation with China, by offering thebait of support to India's permanent membership in the UN Security Council, adding thatIndia remains unmoved.
Chinese suspicions on Japan's stand on the India-China border issue are notable.
For the first time, Japan has sided with India on Arunachal issue (Foreign Minister
Kishida, New Delhi, January 2015, while offering Japan's support to India's
development projects in the Eastern Sector). Also, for the first time in recent years, aforeign power seems to have come in open support of India on the issue. Kishida's
position definitely marks a de facto recognition by Japan that Arunachal Pradesh is partof India. Interesting is his clarification, “India basically and effectively controls[Arunachal], and China and India are continuing consultations on the border issue, I
made the remark taking these facts into account”. With apparent concern over any
internationalization of the Arunachal issue, the Chinese foreign ministry promptly
conveyed its 'serious concern' to Japan on this count. A PRC scholar affirmed that
Kishida's words had “unveiled Japan's intent of 'uniting' the countries that have territorial
disputes with China, in an attempt to create a strong impression that Japan, along with
China's other neighboring countries, is bullied by a rising China.”
In connection with what has been said above, it will be useful to have a look into theexisting official positions of the US and Japan on the Sino-Indian border issue. The
official US line is that it accepts the McMahon line as defining the Sino-Indian border, as
observed by former US Ambassador to India J.K. Galbraith in October 1962.
Washington is however, non-committal on the status of Aksai Chin. Japan's official
position is that it does not take sides on the Sino-Indian border issue. One can expect thatat a time when the US and Japan are engaged in a geo-political contest with China in the
Asia-Pacific region, they may not like to further annoy China by giving open support toIndia on the Sino-Indian border issue.
Thirdly, relevant to India-Japan strategic ties, is the developing Chinese thinking on
the initiative (June 2015) of a new trilateral involving India, Japan, and Australia. Japan15) http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1758, Chinese Intrusions into India's Borders
Ever End? Paper No. 5915 Dated 14-Apr-201523

is also expected to be a part of the next bilateral India-U.S. annual naval exercise, theMalabar; this could be the second time that Japan joins these exercises in the Indian
Ocean region.
To sum up, the India-Japan strategic ties are likely to deepen in future. Besides the
China factor, the rising demands on the part of India for Japanese investment andtechnology, and the need being felt by Tokyo to get closer to regional partners like India,
looking beyond the alliance with the US for the purpose of balancing China, will
determine the future directions of such ties. From the point of view of India, it may haveto realize that there will soon be a legal foundation in Japan to Abe's 'collective selfdefense' initiative based on his reinterpretation of the country's constitution; it is boundto result in an unprecedented expanded role for the country's Self-Defence Forces. New
Delhi should not miss the significance of the fallout from Abe's changes which can bethree fold - Japan's ties with China may undergo further strains, the rivalry between the
US and China may intensify more and lastly, Japan may even get more autonomy inregional security matters. It may become necessary for India to craft a strategic line
towards Japan which best suits its economic, political and security interests; in doing so,
it is required to take care in ensuring that the development of its relationship with Japanis not seen by Beijing as an exercise to 'contain' China.

JAPAN AND ASIA - THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION
Devastated by the Second World War and humiliated into surrendering, Japan
literally rose from the ashes to becoming one of the economic giants in East Asia and in
the process, not only benefitting from trading with the outside world but also becoming amodel of development to many of the developing countries. In one sense, it can beargued that in the absence of anything to worry about on the security/ strategic front, by16) http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/arunachal-pradesh-border-row-chinese-expert-cautionsindia-against japan-tricks/1/414886.html
17) Geng Xin, Renmin University, Beijing, “New Delhi won't fall for Tokyo's attempts to stir up trouble with
Beijing” , Global Times, January 23, 201518) Jeff M. Smith, “ A forgotten war in the Himalayas”, Yale Global online, 14.9.2012. He asks for US
support to India on the border issue with China in the current context.s
24

way of the Security Treaty of 1952 with the United States, leaders of Japan focused on
economics and business and very early on in the ball game, started acting independently.
Very early on, say in the mid-1960s, Japanese leaders also realized that for theireconomic exploration of Asia, the region will have to be relatively calm and free ofconflicts. It is here that the American involvement in Vietnam came to be a stumbling
block. There is one school of thought that has taken the view that Tokyo quietly
benefitted from the American war in Vietnam by way of off shore procurements. But
research has also shown that Japanese leaders were telling Washington that the war in
Vietnam was hampering Japanese developmental plans for the region of South East Asiaand beyond. A conflict free environment is something that came to be of deep concern toJapan when it came to India, as business houses were constantly worried about the war
phenomenon between India and Pakistan over Kashmir --hence the initial reluctance toexplore the market potential in India.
But the economic dimension of Japan in South Asia, or for that matter, specifically
India, is a different cup of tea altogether. Writing in 2005 on “Japan and South Asia:
Toward a Strengthened Economic Cooperation”, Professor Monir Hossain Moni of theJapan Study Center of University of Dhaka, Bangladesh, argued that Japan had a re-lookat South Asia in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. “South Asia has frequently been
regarded as a conflict-prone region or Kashmir, a nuclear flashpoint. But there is no
denying the fact that the nations of this region, amongst the worst victims, ultimately
were able to loosen the two centuries old colonial stronghold after a heroic struggle forindependence. The end of the Cold War has indeed brought a number of noteworthy
repercussions to South Asia, which might genuinely appeal to Japan's attention to be
more responsive to the region's changing needs. While most South Asian countries now
have democratically elected governments, they have come to understand that their earlier
restrictive economic strategies will not be in tune with the changing realities of the
globalization process… ironically, in this region's sprawling vibrant landscape, the only
backward sub-region that has not yet kept pace with this changing trend is South Asia.
Despite the magnitude of Japanese development aid to all South Asian nations, theregion's share in Japan's global trade and investment is too small to merit much attention.
Moreover, in Tokyo's strategic-diplomatic agenda, South Asia has in fact figured little fora long time, because it has been relevant neither to Japan's security necessities nor the25needs for a global economic governance framework. Nonetheless, Japan has very
recently shown a heightened interest in expanding its cooperation with South Asia
(particularly India)”.
That was a comment made some ten years ago and the question to be asked is if
Japan has indeed tapped the resources of South Asia, India in particular, to the fullest
extent possible. The former U.S. Secretary of State, John Hay, said in 1903 that “theMediterranean is the Ocean of the past, the Atlantic is the Ocean of the present and thePacific is the ocean of the future. If the Asia Pacific has become so vital to India's andJapan's national interests in every possible question, the question arises as to why leadersof Japan and its watchful bureaucracies were, to a very large extent, apprehensive ofprojecting the potential in the realm of economics, trade and investments. If Japan is very
well known in South Asia and India for its generous Official Development Assistance(ODA), how then can one explain the lag in areas of trade and foreign direct investment(FDI)?
“The South Asian economies have already tried their best to attract Japanese
investors by offering a package of incentives and facilities. But the reality is that they
have not yet shown synergy through moving forward with their investment resources inthis region. Likewise, there has always been a huge trade deficit on South Asia's part in its
business with Japan, whereas Japan holds a notable position in South Asian trade.
However, while the strategic significance of South Asia in a fast moving Asia is now
recognized, it is unfortunate that the tarnishing image of most South Asian nations
abroad intrinsically caused by poor governance and political volatility, exists more
gloomily against all their positive but not properly projected potentials”, comments
Professor Moni. And a decade later, can one attribute the Japanese reticence toaggressively project themselves for the same reasons?
In fact for its own economic security, Japan ought to have cultivated South Asia andIndia. The region is at the heart of Japan's energy security as oil imports pass throughfrom the Gulf through these strategic waterways. South Asia, in effect, connects the
Pacific and the Atlantic Oceans as the Indian Ocean is actually a transshipment or transit
point of the entire oil tankers pass through these sea lanes. The Andamans is a case inpoint, and so is Sri Lanka, that is of strategic geographic importance to Japan. And even26

leaving geography aside for a moment, South Asia and India have a large middle classthat has buying power, a well qualified and skilled yet relatively cheap labor force, andestablished democracies like India that bring with it solid legal systems.
For all the arguments that the Japanese have been slow to respond economically to avibrant region of South Asia, particularly India, it is only appropriate to point out that thereticence of Japan had much to do with the region and India. In the case of India, forseveral decades since Independence, the country for all practical purposes was on the socalled Socialist track shunning foreign direct investments in the name of nationalism andtrading with capitalistic countries out of ideological compulsions. Socio-political unrest
was not one of the factors that kept Japan out of India but bureaucratic inertia andcorruption, together with the License and Babu Raj certainly took a toll. In fact many
would agree that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao's policy of liberalization in the 1990s
found its first opposition not from political parties but from bureaucracies who felt theywould be left powerless in a system that had embedded them with anything andeverything. Even if in the 1990s, New Delhi was trying to impress upon nations that theera of the past was over; a country like Japan was slow to accept that at face value. Japan's
investments in South East Asia and East Asia continued at a brisk pace even when India
was offering generous incentives.

ABSENCE OF A SUSTAINED TRACK RECORD
What is striking in India-Japan relations is that the two countries have not had asustained track record, politically and economically. This can be seen in the fact that after
the 1961 visit of Prime Minister Ikeda, it was not until 1984 that another Japanese Prime
Minister, Nakasone, came to India; and likewise, the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
in 1988 was after a break of thirty years. About the only heartening thing that took place inthe meantime were the investment of the Suzuki Corporation in the 1980s and the continued
flow of ODA. But the depth of the friendship was such that in 1991, Japan was one of thehandful of nations that came to the help of India in the balance of payment crisis.
In the present context, it should be borne in mind that harping on missed
opportunities by the two sides is not going to set right matters. For that matter the blame27

game is not going to be productive either. It is the time to look forward and in a mannerthat factors in, the mistakes and shortcomings of the past. And it is here that Tokyo andNew Delhi appear to have set in motion a process for the 21st century that takes on amulti-faceted approach and one that has a frank assessment on the range of cooperationthat the two countries can have. And it is here that the visit of Japanese Prime Minister
Yoshiro Mori in 2000 gave the much needed push to bilateral relations.
From this time on there has been no looking back. In fact an argument can be madethat through the formation of The Global Partnership, the two countries have been
constantly challenging one another in not only strengthening the complementarities but
going to the extent of looking for synergistic relations in diverse areas and candidly
talking about issues of common strategic concerns and convergences. What started off
with Prime Minister Mori continued with another boost coming in 2006 when Prime
Ministers Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe agreeing to enhance and upgrade The
Global Partnership to The Global and Strategic Partnership that sees an annual
meeting of the Prime Ministers in alternating capitals, the first of its kind that Japan has
with any country.
It has been generally commented in the media and elsewhere that the structuralchanges initiated in the bilateral dialogue has had a highly positive impact in a number ofareas especially that of security/strategic issues and economic engagement. The
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement that was inked in 2011 set the tone for
exploring the complementarities in the partnership, especially in the realm of
exploration of natural resources, manufacturing and service sectors, technology(
including defence and civilian nuclear), Japan's investments and also in the potentials of
the large middle class markets of India. What has evolved in the last decade or so is thatJapan has maintained its consistency in the disbursements of ODA and the long termloans for the development of the infrastructure of the country. New Delhi has alreadyseen the benefits of Japan through its metro and very soon Tokyo is slated to be involved
in mega projects - the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor, the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial
Corridor and the Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial Corridor.
Since 2003-04, India has been the largest recipient of Japan's ODA with the
cumulative commitment reaching Yen 3808 billions. Further it is being pointed out that28

as of early 2013 there were 66 projects under implementation with Japanese loan
assistance totaling Yen 1640 billions. In its economic bulletin, the Indian Embassy inTokyo says that the projects involved are in the sectors of power environment andforests, urban transportation, urban water supply and sanitation, rural drinking watersupply, tourism, irrigation, agriculture, shipping, railways, renewable energy andfinancial services.
What has been disappointing however, and something that both countries would
have to work on at very high levels, is in the realm of trade. In FY 2012-13, bilateral trade
was about US$ 18.6 billions, or slightly higher than the US$ 18.4 billions posted in theprevious year. Worse, the period April- February 2014-15 showed that the value dropped
to US$ 14 billions with India's exports at around US$ 5 billions and imports at US$ 9.3
billions. While the share of the total trade has been around 1 per cent of Japan's total
trade, it is around 2.5 per cent of total India trade. India's exports to Japan have been
petroleum products, iron ore, gems and jewelry, marine products, oil meals, ferroalloys,
inorganic/organic chemicals and imports from Japan are machinery, transport
equipment, iron and steel, electronic goods, organic chemicals and machine tools.
Another area where there is much work to be done and one that holds a lot ofpromise, is in the realm of investments. Statistics show that Japan's investments in India
is around US$ 18 billions with plans to doubling this to around US$ 35 billions in five
years. Japan is the fourth largest investor in India and if the plan to double theinvestments over a five year period materializes, that would push India closer toSingapore and Mauritius in terms of Japanese investments.
But if there is one area in which Japan and India would have make real headway it isin the realm of nuclear energy exports where the stance of Tokyo has been in fits andstarts and mostly out of domestic political considerations. In the aftermath of the historic
civilian nuclear agreement between India and the United States in 2008, Japan did
evince interest to engage India in nuclear energy exports and there was the hope andexpectation that a civilian nuclear deal with Japan on the lines of the 2008 agreementwith the United States would fructify. For one thing, it has been pointed out thatcompanies of both France and the United States wanting to enter the Indian market use
Japanese components in critical segments. And for another, Japanese corporate houses
29were keen on making inroads into the Indian market independently. But if the 2011
Fukushima disaster slowed down the process, so did domestic opposition within Japan.
That opposition stemmed from the fact of Japan having to engage a non-NPT signatory.
There is now the renewed hope in India in the aftermath of the recent visit of the
Indian Prime Minister to Japan and in Narendra Modi's plain talking of moving ahead
vigorously, the bilateral partnerships by getting rid of red-tapism and loopholes. The
advantage before the Modi government is that it inherited a strong bilateral relationship,knowing fully well that Japan too was looking beyond East Asia, (China in particular).
Some of the onus is on New Delhi to convince the domestic opposition in Japan on
India's nuclear moratorium on testing.
Writing for the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses in September 2014, Titli
Basu observed, “One of the expectations from Modi in the coming years is to narrow thedifferences and inculcate confidence among the Japanese citizens regarding India's
voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing. Despite India's demonstrated commitment
towards non-proliferation, critical differences over principled position on NPT and
CTBT continued to make the negotiation on the Agreement for Cooperation in thePeaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy difficult. It is difficult for Japan to justify to thedomestic constituencies given India's status as a non-signatory to NPT and CTBT, thus
jeopardizing Japan's identity as a crusader of non-proliferation and disarmament.
Besides India, the agreement is important for the commercial interests of the Japanese
nuclear businesses who are struggling to cope with the post-Fukushima financial loss.
Delay in signing the agreement runs the risk of mounting cost”.
One other aspect of Modi's visit to Japan was on the subject of defence equipment
and high end technology cooperation. While a formal agreement of sorts did not comethrough, progress is said to have been registered. Once again, New Delhi has to take thelead in pressuring Japan on the issue, especially at a time when there has been a marked
departure in policy on the subject of transfer of defence equipment and technology.
“India is eager to secure supply of high-end defence technology and collaborative
projects in defence equipment and technology with Japan since it is among the foremost
manufacturer of sophisticated military technologies. Negotiators are weighing theoption of assembling the US-2 aircraft in India which will offer India the chance toaccess Japanese military technology” says Basu.
30

THE CULTURAL DIMENSION TO JAPAN-INDIA RELATIONSIn 1916, the great Indian poet Rabindranath Tagore is said to have told a Japaneseaudience in Tokyo, “ While travelling in a railway train I met, at a wayside station, some
Buddhist priests and devotees. They brought their basket of fruits to me and held theirlighted incense before my face, wishing to pay homage to a man who had come from theland of Buddha. The dignified serenity of their bearing, the simplicity of theirdevoutness, seemed to fill the atmosphere of the busy railway station with a golden lightof peace. Their language of silence drowned the noisy effusion of the newspapers. I feltthat I saw something which was at the root of Japan's greatness”.
Tagore continued saying that his welcome had left him with the conclusion that “…
such outburst of sincerity, was owing to the fact that Japan felt the nearness of India toherself, and realised that her own heart has room to expand beyond her boundaries andthe boundaries of the modern time.” Nearly a century after what Tagore had said, thequestion naturally comes to mind if the two countries have explored and exploited theone aspect that has always drawn them closer by history and civilisation for nearly 2000
years, the cultural dimension to the relationship, which if had been fully developed
would have gone the distance in bring the two nations closer in any number of ways.
What started off as first exchanges in the 6th century AD with the introduction of
Buddhism to Japan, the direct exchanges in the modern era started only in the Meiji
Era in the late 19th century when Japan took the path to modernity. What has been
consistently pointed out in academic research and scholarly articles is that the imageof Japan in India and that of India in Japan has been consistently positive and looking
beyond Justice Pal's stand during the War Crimes Tribunal: It is said that Japanesebusiness houses and people recall with warmth their association with India at the timeof reconstruction. The beginnings of the favorite Indian “curry rice” in Japan aside,
India in 1951 was one of the first post colonial countries to set up a scholarship forforeign students and this has undoubtedly till date served as a platform for young
Japanese men and women of Indian studies to get a first hand account of the country.
And then the 1980s saw the blossoming of extensive cultural festivities between thetwo countries, the early 1990s saw the Japan Foundation setting up its presence in
New Delhi.
31

Bilateral relations have further been strengthened by the Parliamentary Exchange
programme. The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, in association with the Confederation ofIndian Industry, has been organising visits of Members of Parliament since 2004. There
have been at least ten delegation visits in the last decade. The Federation of Indian
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) established the India-Japan Forum of
Parliamentarians in 2005 and at least two delegations have visited Japan thus far. IndiaJapan relations have further received a fillip with the signing of the Science andTechnology Agreement in 1985 followed by the launching of the India-Japan Scienceand Technology Initiative in 2006.
Addressing the Fourth Symposium of Indian Scientists Association in Japan in
October 2013, Indian Ambassador Deepa Gopalan Wadwha observed “… the scientificestablishments in both countries have been extremely receptive to initiatives to enter into
agreements between leading institutions on both sides which will result in joint researchand publication and cross-fertilisation of ideas and technological advances”. She went
on to point out that the cooperation between India and Japan that started in 1985 has thus
far supported more than 400 hundred research projects in varied disciplines and 1600
exchange visits by scientists. And the New Science and Technology Initiative since 2005
had also identified theme based disciplines such as Information Technology, Nano
Sciences and Biomedical Research.
Perhaps one of the biggest developments in the realm of culture, civilization andhigh level exchanges has been the visit of the Japanese Emperor Akihito and Empress
Michiko to India in November 2013, a visit that only could be seen as the deepening andwidening of the global partnership between India and Japan. The Emperor and the
Empress last visited India in 1960 as Crown Prince and Princess and had the high honorof being in the midst of the then President of India, Rajendra Prasad and Prime Minister
Jawaharlal Nehru.
There are two aspects that have to be worked on between India and Japan if moremeaningful cooperation is to come about. On the face of it, it is indeed impressive to
speak of the cultural and civilizational context and exchanges that have come about andin listing all the agreements that have come about in the last six decades or so. The glaringomission in this people-to-people contact is that barely 500 Indian students are enrolled32

in institutions of higher learning in Japan. Japan, academics and scholars feel, would
have to find ways to attract Indian students. Tokyo is not unaware of the fact that about
100,000 Indian students find their way to American institutions every year, contributing
to more than US$ 3 billion to the American economy!
Likewise the question to be asked of India is the extent to which it has used the Indian
community in Japan for the betterment of bilateral relations. People from India arrived inJapan since the 1870s for business and commercial interests in the ports of Yokohama
and Kobe and subsequently, relocated to the Kansai region in the aftermath of the Great
Kanto Earthquake of 1923. Focussed on electronics, textiles, commodities and gems andjewelry, the Indian community established the Indian Merchants Association in 1929 at
Yokohama; and the trading Indian community has seen diversity amongst its mix withthe arrival of IT professionals and engineers working for Japanese and Indian firms.
The comparison of the role of Indians in Japan and that of the Indian American
community may not be appropriate but it has to be pointed out that in a relatively shortspan of time, the Indian Americans numbering about 3 million are a powerful politicalforce in the United States and an active lobbying group for furthering the interests ofIndia. The people from India in Japan may not enjoy the same immigration status as thatof those living in the United States due to the complexities and peculiarities of theJapanese immigration system, but productive ways must be found to channelize thepotentials of Indians living in Japan.
The bottom line prescription to both the governments of India and Japan is that theywould have to look ahead in a way that factors in their interests bilaterally, in the region of
the Asia Pacific and globally. Neither Tokyo nor New Delhi seems to have taken
advantage of the one critical aspect of their bilateral relationship-the absence of any“baggage”. And what has happened in all these decades is the singular lack of political
will and determination. What had weighed down India in the past was its so-called
nationalistic pride and the socialist rhetoric making the political leadership unwilling tolook at other countries beyond the myopic vision of being “running dogs of American
imperialism”.
And for its part, political leaders of Japan have been reluctant to look at India
because their business and corporate leaders were uncomfortable doing business with33

India for a host of reasons, most of which were valid. Even though the Suzuki Motor
Corporation appeared to have broken the ice in the 1980s, private business houses inJapan were unwilling to plug in their money for reasons of red tapism, lack oftransparency and corruption, factors that will continue to be raised by business houses
not only in Japan but the world over. The Modi government has made a solemn pledge
to set things right so that its Make in India slogan will become a reality. But only time
will tell!
BLUE PRINT FOR THE FUTURE
This is the time for both Japan and India to look forward and give a synergestic
boost to bilateral ties. Both nations have seen vital changes in internal political
dynamics. The Modi government, one may argue, is yet to capitalize on the 2014
clear mandate; and it could be said that one year is too short a time for a government
to make a turnaround in domestic and foreign policy. As far as India is concerned, itshould take a close look at what is transpiring in Japan. The changes that are beingsought or pushed forward by the current government could have far reaching
implications for East Asia and beyond. Japan, in many ways, has to come to termswith reality of the post cold war era that is basically seeing the United States yet todefine its role in the Asia Pacific in any clear cut fashion.
A belligerent China, a Russia that sees China as a pivotal ally in Asia, an unsure
United States and newer challenges by way of terrorism and extremist groups are
all making Tokyo quite apprehensive and hence, the leadership there is anxious tomove away from the Peace Constitution. India for its part has also its share of woesin the region of South Asia and beyond - an aggressive China needling at theborders, encircling India and yet playing the friendly neighbor card, a China thathas consistently propped up its client state Pakistan shockingly even on theterrorism front and a Russia that is keen on maintaining its military relations with
India and at the same time, wanting to balancing the perceived tilt of India towards
the United States by getting closer to Pakistan, are all worrisome trends. In thisframework there should no apologies for India and Japan wanting to get closer. The
leadership of the two countries should evolve mechanisms that bolster further
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security and strategic ties and if there are those who are going to lose sleep overthis, that should be hardly of any concern to either New Delhi or Tokyo
On the economic front, it is indeed a crying shame that the two countries have notcapitalized on the political warmth of seven decades or so. Japan's economic forays
in India have been in fits and starts and in its view, for legitimate reasons. Absenceof clear policies, political paralysis, bureaucratic red-tapism and corruption has
taken its toll. By the same token it can be asked if Japanese corporate houses did
indeed look at India with all the seriousness it should have in the 1990s and 2000s,
when red-tapism and corruption were assumed to be a part of the system. The factthat some of the major companies are making slow inroads, reflect a change ofthinking and it remains to be seen how much of that Make in India slogan of the
Indian Prime Minister, is going to make a difference.
The onus is more on India to drive home the point that things are different in theenvironment of business. Until the Japanese businesses are fully convinced, they
will continue to be reticent in their dealings and major Japanese businessorganizations in India will be unwilling to bat for India to their home crowd. The
objective of the Government of India ought to be on finding ways to substantiallyboost Japanese direct investment in India, which is now around a measly US$ 1.2,
to at least US$ 20 billions over the next five years.
If foreign direct investment of Japan is to be a major thrust area of focus, both India
and Japan should look at ways to enhance the volume of trade between the twocountries. India's trade with Japan is around two per cent of its total trade and anargument has been made that with the reduction or outright abolition of tariffs, it iswell within the realm of possibility to push this up to 10 per cent of the total tradeover the next five years. It has to be remembered that India's trade with China is
about 8 per cent of the total trade. And analysts have made a pertinent observationthat there are a number of areas in the trade with Japan that could be focused on.
One such area is textiles, with Japan heavily importing from such countries as
China, Italy, South Korea, Thailand and Vietnam. India's share of Japan's textiles
import is below 1 per cent. Likewise, it has been pointed out that there is a heavy
demand for knitted garments in Japan and India's share in this domain is less than35

0.5 per cent leaving this market to such countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia,
China, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey and Vietnam. In many ways the ball is in
India's court as its business houses will have to come up with a game plan to
substantially raise this segment of exports since Japan, by the Comprehensive
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), has agreed not to levy any import dutyon Indian exports of knitted and woven apparel. Perhaps this is also the time for thegovernments of the two countries to set up a Ministerial level Monitoring Group to
check the progress and pace of the implementation of CEPA, which has now beenin the making for more than seven years.
India-Japan relations will not be complete in the absence of people-to-people
contacts that on the surface, are still ways to go. This is not to say that Festivals of
India in Japan or that of Japan in India are the only mechanisms to fill the void. The
governments should ask the question if such institutions like the Japan Foundation,
Japan International Cooperation Agency and Indian Council of Social Science
Reseearch(ICSSR) have their parts to foster cultural, intellectual and academic
relations to the extents they should have. Funding, or the lack thereof, has always
been put forth as a major impediment and it is here, that the two governments must
make a conscious decision to allocate resources, for this is one aspect of thebilateral relations that will always withstand the test of time even if political
relations get sour for some reasons.

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APPENDIX :India- Japan Relations: Joint Statements Issued during High level Exchanges ofVisits; Present Status of Agreements.
Diplomatic relations between India and Japan was established in June 1952
through a peace treaty signed by them. In the first decade since then, several high levelexchanges took place. Given below are their details.
1957:

Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi visits India

1957:

Indian Prime Minister Nehru Visits Japan (two elephants gifted to Japan)

1958:

India's President Rajendra Prasad visits Japan1960:

The Japanese Crown Prince Akihito and Crown Princess Michiko visit India

1961:

Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda visits India.

1969:

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visits Japan

1982:

Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi visits Japan

1984:

Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone visits India (the 23 year gap withrespect to Visits to India by a Japanese prime minister indicate an inactive
phase in bilateral ties)

1985:

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits Japan

1987:

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi visits Japan

1992:

Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visits Japan

2000:

Japanese Prime Minister Mori visits India (path breaking; “the Japan-India
Global Partnership in the 21st century” was launched).

2001:

Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visits Japan (“Japan-India Joint Declaration”,
issued providing for high-level dialogue, economic co-operation, and military
and anti-terrorism co-operation).
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2005:

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visits India (Joint Statement on “Japan-India
Partnership in the New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global
Partnership” was issued).

2006:

Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh, visits Japan (flags off the IndiaJapan Friendship Year. The two sides decide to establish a Strategic and Global
Partnership between Japan and India, imparting stronger political, economic
and strategic dimensions to bilateral relations and start annual prime ministerial
summits- elevation of 2005 Description, marking a new level of relationship)

2007:

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visits India (Joint Statement said that thePartnership between Japan and India, the two major democracies in Asia, is an
essential pillar for the future architecture of the entire region. The two sides setforth a Roadmap for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global Partnershipin terms of Political, Security and Defence Cooperation. They recognizedJapan- India common interests in such fields as maintaining the safety andsecurity of sea lanes in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean region, andfighting against transnational crimes, terrorism, piracy and proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Signs of both sides converging on the role ofrising China?)

2008:

India's Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh visits Tokyo (The Joint
Declaration issued on Security Cooperation of India and Japan provided for
information exchange and policy coordination on regional affairs in the Asia
Pacific region and on long-term strategic and global issues, bilateral
cooperation within multilateral frameworks in Asia, in particular the East Asia
Summit and ASEAN Regional Forum, Defence dialogue and cooperation
within the framework of the Joint Statement signed in May 2006 between the
two Defence Ministries and cooperation between two Coast Guards. The
security accord is momentous, with Tokyo and New Delhi having concluded
such an agreement with only one other country each - Australia and the U.S.,
respectively. Its significance actually parallels the 2005 Indo-U.S. defence
framework accord).
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2009:

Japan's Prime Minister Dr Yukio Hatoyama visits India (The Joint Statement
issued reaffirmed that the two nations share common values and strategicinterests and pledged to further develop their Strategic and Global Partnershipin an effort to strengthen their bilateral relations ).

2010:

India's Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh visits Japan. (The two sides in a
Joint Statement agreed to foster increased business exchanges, people-topeople contact and signed a memorandum of understanding to simplify visa
procedures for each other's citizens).

2011:

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda visits India in December (IndiaJapan Joint Statement contained several important decisions- plans for joint
naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, a $4.5 billion investment by Japan in amuch-needed freight corridor between Delhi and Mumbai, and the expansionof an existing currency swap arrangement from $3 billion to $15 billion.
Earlier, in February, in line with similar agreements with Singapore and South
Korea, India signed a two-way Comprehensive Economic Partnership
Agreement (CEPA) with Japan which provides a framework for enhanced
cooperation between the two countries and aims to facilitate trade in goods andservices and increase investment opportunities, besides protecting intellectual
property rights. It seeks to eliminate tariffs on goods that account for 94 percent of their two-way trade over ten years).

2012:

The Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh could not visit Japan for theannual summit after the Japanese government dissolved the lower house ofparliament and announced early elections.

2013:

In May, India's Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh visits Japan (The Joint
Statement issued applauded the commemorative events held to celebrate the60th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the twocountries in 2012 and expressed resolve to further consolidate and strengthen
the Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan in the years
ahead, taking into account changes in the strategic environment). Japan's
Emperor Akihito and Empress Michiko were on a week-long visit to India
from 30 November 6 December 2013.
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2014 :

Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visits India, in January. (He was Chief
Guest at the Republic Day parade in New Delhi. Both the Prime Ministers
signed a Joint Statement sharing their vision on intensifying the India-Japan
Strategic and Global Partnership. They also expressed satisfaction that the
Trilateral Dialogue between India, Japan and the US has been held on a regularbasis and also that the 3rd two plus two dialogue and the 4th Defense Policy
Dialogue are to be held before the end of the year. Prime Minister Abeappreciated India's invitation to Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Forces(JMSDF) for the next ”Malabar” maritime exercise. The two sides also agreed
to seek early reforms in the United Nations, including the expansion of the
UNSC in both permanent and non-permanent categories, particularly throughthe efforts of the G-4 so as to reflect contemporary geopolitical realities The
two Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction with the holding of the 1st meetingof the Joint Working Group (JWG) on the US-2 amphibian aircraft in
December 2013 in Delhi and welcomed the 2nd meeting of the JWG which isscheduled for March 2014 in Japan. Welcoming the expansion of the bilateralcurrency swap arrangement from 15 to 50 billion US dollars and signing of thecontract for its entry into force in January 2014, the two Prime Ministers
expressed their expectation that this expansion will further strengthen
financial cooperation and contribute to the stability of global financial markets
including emerging economies).
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Japan in September:“Tokyo Declaration for India - Japan Special Strategic and Global
Partnership”, September 01, 2014, issued. (The two sides through the
Declaration pledged to realize the full potential of India - Japan Strategic andGlobal Partnership for continuing progress and prosperity for their people andfor advancing peace, stability and prosperity in Asia and the world. The
Declaration elevated the relationship to a Special Strategic and Global
Partnership. It affirmed the shared belief of the two sides that at a time of
growing turmoil, tensions and transitions in the world, a closer and stronger
strategic partnership between India and Japan is indispensable for aprosperous future for their two countries and for advancing peace, stability and40

prosperity in the world, in particular, in the inter-connected Asia, Pacific andIndian Ocean Regions, commerce, and peaceful settlement of disputes inaccordance with international law. It said that the two countries are joined
together by convergent global interests, critical maritime inter-connection andgrowing international responsibilities.
The leaders reaffirmed “the importance of safeguarding maritime security andensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region,
especially in the South China Sea.” They also called “on all parties to avoid thethreat or use of force” in maritime disputes. Addressing business leaders ofJapan and India, Prime Minister Modi obliquely commented against China for“having ideas of the 18th century, engage in encroachments and enter seas (ofothers)”.
The Tokyo Declaration expressed satisfaction with progress in
official level trilateral dialogue among India, Japan and the United States andexpressed the hope that this would lead to concrete and demonstrable projects
to advance their shared interests and that of other partners. It affirmed theurgent need for comprehensive reform of the UN and affirmed the importanceof India-Japan civil nuclear cooperation, welcoming the significant progress innegotiations on the Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear
Energy. Recognizing the special quality of bilateral engagement between India
and Japan imparted by multi-sectoral ministerial and Cabinet-level dialogues,in particular, those between their Foreign Ministers, Defence Ministers andMinisters dealing with finance, economy, trade and energy, it said that the twosides have decided to intensify and invigorate such exchanges.
It welcomed the signing by Japan and India of the Memorandum of
Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defence and in this context,
attached importance to the regularization of bilateral maritime exercises as wellas to Japan's continued participation in India - US Malabar series of exercises.
Prime Minister Modi welcomed the recent developments in Japan's policy ontransfer of defence equipment and technology. Modi and Abe welcomed
progress made in discussions in the Joint Working Group on cooperation in41

US-2 amphibian aircraft and its technology, and directed their officials to accelerate their
discussions.
The two Prime Ministers affirmed their commitment to work together for India to
become a full member in the four international export control regimes: Nuclear SuppliersGroup, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement and Australia
Group, with the aim of strengthening the international non-proliferation effort.The two
Prime Ministers decided to set a target of doubling Japan's foreign direct investment andthe number of Japanese companies in India within five years as an objective to be jointly
achieved. They also decided to work closely towards further expanding bilateral traderelationship to the next stage.
The two Prime Ministers welcomed the progress in the ongoing flagship projects ofIndia-Japan economic partnership, such as the Western Dedicated Freight Corridor(DFC), Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor (DMIC), and Chennai-Bengaluru Industrial
Corridor (CBIC) and committed to accelerate their implementation. They affirmed thecommitment of both counties to actively engage in the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations and to make RCEP a modern,comprehensive, high-quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement.

PRESENT STATUS OF AGREEMENTS
In 2000, Prime Minister Mori's path breaking visit to India resulted in the twonations entering into a “Global Partnership in the 21st century”; in 2005, it became“Global Partnership with Strategic Orientation”; in 2006, it gained the status of“Strategic and Global Partnership” and in 2014, the relations stand further elevated as“Special Strategic and Global Partnership”. Such a transformation of the status ofbilateral ties is definitely due to changes in strategic thinking of the leaders of the twocountries. The changes have mainly come due to the increasing compulsions on India andJapan to respond to a rising China. There are other reasons also. They include thedemands on the part of India for Japanese investment and technology, and the need being
felt by Japan to get closer to regional partners like India. Given below is a description of
the present status of India-Japan ''Special" relationship.
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Annual Summits: They are taking place regularly. Japan has the same system with
China and South Korea (Trilateral), EU and ASEAN. The summits show the importancebeing given by Tokyo and New Delhi to their growing ties.
China's challenge: This condition is factored by both India and Japan and is likely
to be so in the future. Admittedly, India-Japan joint statements make no mention of China
as a challenge. However, India's concerns over China have come out clear. Prime
Minister Modi while in Japan has referred to “expansionist” tendency among somecountries which ”encroach” upon seas of other. Japan's worries about China's maritime
assertion are well known. The similar perception on a rising China between the twonations is likely to influence their strategic ties for a long time to come.
Convergence of interests: The strategic interests of India and Japan are now
converging. The same will be the main driver of their relations for years to come. As
stated in their joint statements, they are “ensuring prosperous future for their countries
and advancing peace, stability and prosperity in the world, in particular, in the interconnected Asia, Pacific and Indian Ocean Regions”.
India-Japan-US Trilateral dialogue: This is a theme found in various India-Japan
joint statements. It will definitely impact the region's politics and economy. The impact
will grow further. Though the theme is definitely not directed against China, Beijing may
perceive in it, an anti-China grouping. The three powers may therefore, have to be carefulin pursuing the theme.
Defence Cooperation: India and Japan have progressed steadily in this regard. The
momentum is likely to go up in future. Symbolic is the signing of India-Japan
Memorandum of Cooperation and Exchanges in the Field of Defence, under which thebilateral maritime exercises are getting regularized. A certainty is Japan's continued
participation in India - US Malabar series of exercises. Japan has announced its policyon transfer of defence equipment and technology which is going to benefit India. Highly
relevant in this regard are discussions in the India-Japan Joint Working Group on
cooperation in US-2 amphibian aircraft and its technology.
Civil Nuclear Cooperation: This remains an elusive issue between India andJapan. The two sides remain unable to narrow down differences. Japan insists on a43

tougher safe-guard regime and a "no nuclear test" clause in a bilateral agreement with
India. It wants India to conduct more stringent inspections of its nuclear facilities toensure that spent fuel is not diverted to make bombs. Japan insists that no reprocessing ofspent fuel would be done in India and that in the event of a nuclear test by India, thecomponents supplied would be immediately returned to Japan. On the other hand, India
has been insisting on self-imposed moratorium on its tests and does not agree to Tokyo's
insistence on the clause in the text of the agreement that provides for automatic
termination of nuclear ties, if India conducts test in future. This being so, there are somepositive signs - the two nations have agreed to accelerate negotiations on this subject andconclude a deal at an early date. Important is the decision of Japan to lift a ban on HAL
and five other Indian entities from being end users of Japanese technology, which had
been imposed in the aftermath of India's 1998 nuclear tests. Also, Japan has expressed its
support to India's becoming a full member in the four international export control
regimes: Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar
Arrangement and Australia Group.
UN Security Council Reforms: In collaboration with Brazil, Germany and India,
Japan is calling for expanding the number of both permanent and non-permanent
members of the 15-member Security Council, so it can better represent the realities of theinternational community of the 21st century. Prime Ministers Modi and Abe, during
their bilateral talks (Tokyo, September 2014), called for a concrete outcome in thisdirection by the 70th anniversary of the UN in 2015 and decided to enhance efforts
bilaterally, and under the G-4, to realise this.

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