RESOURCE PAPER - 4

India-Japan
Relations in a
Changing Asia

byM.K. Narayanan

India-Japan
Relations in a
Changing Asia
byM.K. Narayanan

PREFACE
Japan and India have been friends for a very long time, but it
is only recently the relations between the two countries are
evolving into a matured partnership. Mr. M.K. Narayanan, who
has held very high positions in the Government of India for over
30 years and had been a member for nearly 6 years (2004-2010) asa Special Advisor and National Security Advisor to the Prime
Minister of India, was able to have a close look and also shape thepolicy for the future. In an Address to the Indo-Japan Chamber ofCommerce and Industry recently on the occasion of theInauguration of the Centre for Japanese Studies in the Chamber,has delineated clearly and concisely the evolution anddevelopment of India's foreign policy. The Chamber thought that
it would be appropriate if his speech could reach a wider audienceand hence publishing it as a Resource Paper. We are thankful to
Mr. M.K. Narayanan for his address and we hope the readers willfind it informative and interesting.

November 2015

N. KumarPresidentIndia-Japan Relations in a Changing Asia

Recent years have been a reminder that stability is hardly thenatural state of either the regional or global strategic environment.
Peace, by and large, also tends to be elusive. Regions can often
turn anarchic, as we currently see in Syria and Iraq, and someother pockets of West Asia. Central and South Asia have been
witnessing years of turbulence and violence, while East Asia has
been beset with simmering problems - often threatening to turninto serious conflicts, if not all out war.
With Asia's emergence in the 21st Century as an economic
power house, we often hear that the 21st Century belongs to Asia.
Former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, observed in 2011,that the history of the 21st Century would be scripted in Asia, andthat the Asia-Pacific or the Indo-Pacific would become a key
driver of global politics. This has spurred demands today forcharting a new Asian history. The well-regarded ideologue andAdvisor to former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee,
Sudheendra Kulkarni argued in a recent news paper article that all
history is geographically located and influenced. Similarly, allgeography is shaped, defined and redefined by history.
5We have today a resurgent Asia - an Asia on the march. New
paradigms of thought, action and behaviour are overtaking andreplacing old ones. Economic growth is meanwhile
conspicuously transforming the Indo-Pacific region. The AsianDevelopment Bank estimates that by 2050 or even earlier, Asia
would more than double its share of global GDP to 52%. By 2050,
half of the world's top twenty economies will be in the IndoPacific. China, Japan and India are by then expected to be among
the top five economies of the world.
During the past Century, South Asia and East Asia have had
different but not entirely dissimilar experiences. Both regions
have faced major conflicts including wars. Since the mid-20th
Century, the South Asian region has witnessed four wars between
India and Pakistan and one major Sino-Indian confrontation (in1962). East Asia, starting with the war in Korea, has witnessedwars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.
Pre 21st Century geo-politics has still not disappeared from
Asia. Asia's dramatic rise should not, hence, obscure the realitythat the region confronts serious challenges, even now. There areboth centrifugal and centripetal forces at work. While Asian
economies appear integrated to a considerable extent at thepolitical and strategic levels, Asia remains a theatre of conflictand rivalry.
Nowhere is this more manifest than in the current tensions inEast Asia. Almost all of these concern China. China appears
determined to enforce its ever widening maritime claims in theSouth China and East China Seas through might. Some of theseclaims extend more than 1,000 kms. off China's Southern Coast for which there are multiple claimants. China and Japan, for6

instance, have a serious dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyo Islandsin the East China Sea, while the Philippines and Vietnam contest
China's claims in the South China's Sea. Across the India-Pacific,
there are many other disputes arising out of rights and obligations
contained in the provisions of the New Law of the Sea under
UNCLOS-III.
Tensions are likely to intensify further given the growing
importance of the 'Blue Economy', which has converted theoceans into 'development spaces' intended for conservation,
sustainable use, mineral wealth extraction, sustainable energy
production and marine transport. Consequently, disputes relating
to freedom of access to sea lanes, as well as to oil and gas reserves
and lucrative fishing grounds, are set to expand. Already deep sea
bed mining has emerged as a contentious issue.
The emergence of an aggressive China has several
consequences. The 10-Member ASEAN is today divided. A split
Asia, lacking an institutional framework of the kind that helped
maintain peace in Europe for the past seventy years, poses a security
problem for several of the smaller countries in the region. China
dwarfs all other countries of the region - with the exception of India- specially as far as its military muscle is concerned. The one aspectthat has possibly prevented any of the serious inter-State conflicts in
the region from flaring up into something more dangerous, for thetime being is the realization that their economies today areinterdependent, even if the security perceptions are different.
The shift in the locus of economic power to the East thus has
no doubt enhanced Asia's geo-economic importance, but has
aggravated strategic consequences. Asia's power dynamics hasconsequently become complex. While many of the old sources of7stability in Asia have broken down, many threats have emerged.
Growing religious orthodoxy is one. A significant increase in
extremist, radicalist and Islamist tendencies is another and isleading to increasing turbulence.
The most important shift, however, has been in the military
domain. Military power is often derived from wealth. This isparticularly true in Asia of China. China's share in global defence
spending has taken a quantum leap over the past two decades:
China's new-found wealth has been employed to vastly expand its
military capacity, specially in high-tech weaponry so as to 'shock
and awe' its neighbours. Acquisition of high-end capability has
prompted China to establish 'No-Go-Zones' and also Air Defence
Identification Zones (ADIZ) in its vicinity.
As its military strength has grown, so have its militaristic
tendencies. China appears buoyed with the US tactical retreat
from the Indo-Pacific, notwithstanding talk of the US pivot /rebalance to Asia. Its assertiveness in the East and South China
Seas, has already become more apparent. China's 2015 Defence
White Paper now talks of shifting from 'off shore water defence'
to 'open ocean protection'.
China's main concern it would seem is with India and Japan.
Both countries have longstanding disputes with China, and areamong the countries that have a capability to pose a challenge to
China in the economic sphere. India, for its part, also has theability to counter China militarily - whether on land, sea or air.
China possibly may have an edge over India in the area of nuclear
weapons and missiles. It is evident, nevertheless, that India is the
only country is Asia that cannot be overawed by China's militarymight.

8

As a policy, and despite efforts by several countries, India has
avoided entering into any kind of strategic alliance with othercountries. It has shunned all attempts to be part of any military
alliance. For this reason, India refused to be part of the
Quadrilateral (Japan, India, US and Australia), lest China
perceives it as directed against it.
India is, no doubt, part of the arrangements in place to deal
with maritime challenges, including piracy. It also participates inNaval Exercises involving the US and Japan. The thrust of these
Exercises though, is to increase levels of comfort with regard tointer-operability among the concerned Navies, so as to achieve
optimum results in humanitarian rescue operations and during
natural calamities on the seas. China, however, prefers to see suchmoves as directed against it, and as 'an index of a growing antiChina coalition'.
Japan's case is different. Years of self-imposed 'pacifism'based on its post war Constitution, have seen Japan
voluntarily surrender responsibility for its defence to the US.
Till recently, it remained comfortable living under the 'US
umbrella', and its external relations involved scrupulous
adherence to pacifism.
This is beginning to change, and not only because of theperceived decline in US interest towards the Asia-Pacific. Rather,
the shift away from a pacifist Japan and towards a more active
defence policy, owes a great deal to the vision of Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe. This mirrors a belief that in the context of China's
assertiveness in the East and South China Seas, Japan is in no
position to defend itself. Also that its Self-Defence Forces are nomatch to China's military machine.

9In this second stint as Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe hence took
the initiative to issue a Defence White Paper (July, 2015). This
begins with a Preamble, that Japan's security risk has worsened
overall. It blames Beijing for 'acting in an assertive manner' andusing coercive attempts to change the status quo, particularly on
maritime issues. Prime Minister Abe has now taken a number ofsteps (i) to create a National Security Council; (ii) lay down a
National Security Strategy, predicated on strengthening
deterrence to ensure Japan's survival; (iii) improve the security
environment of the Asia-Pacific region, and reduce direct threats
to Japan; (iv) modify Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution so as
to exercise 'the right of collective self-defence'; (v) lift the ban onarms exports; and (vi) hike the Defence Budget.
China meanwhile sees an anti-China conspiracy emerging in
the region. It envisages India and Japan making common cause,and becoming part of a wider US based grouping to check China's
rise. It has openly accused Japan of aggravating tensions 'by
maliciously exaggerating the Chinese threat'. It has been morecircumspect vis-a-vis India, but it clearly views India as a serious
threat to its ambitions of becoming the regional hegemon.
It would be a mistake to view the current warmth in IndiaJapan relations as some kind of a 'zero-sum' game. Any
impression that the warmth derives from a common fear, orconcern, about China's ambitions in Asia would be wrong. It istrue that India-Japan relations during the second half of the20th Century tended to be correct, rather than warm. The change
took place following the path breaking visit to India of JapanesePrime Minister Yoshiro Mori in 2000. This led to the launch of theJapan-India Global Partnership in the 21st Century. Admittedly, it

10took nearly half a Century for the two countries to establish thislevel of relationship notwithstanding the goodwill for India inJapan in the immediate aftermath of World War II and JusticeRadha Binod Pal's dissenting judgement at the War Crimes
Tribunal. The visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Japan (2001)
thereafter opened the way for economic co-operation, andmilitary and counter-terrorism co-operation. The two countries,
however, had to wait till Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi's visit to India in 2005 for a strategic orientation to be
imparted to the Japan-India Global Partnership.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh - and the Prime Minister's
Office during his tenure (of which I was a Member for nearly six
years as a Special Advisor and National Security Advisor) - wasunabashedly pro-Japan. Prime Ministers Junichiro Koizumi,
Shinzo Abe and Yukio Hatoyama visited India during this period,
and were among the most favoured foreign leaders. The current
warmth between Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister
Narendra Modi is a reflection of the steady build up during thepast decade and more.
The years 2005-2009 were probably the most productive todate in terms of economic and defence matters. During Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan (2006), it was decided
to upgrade relations to the level of a Strategic and Global
Partnership and impart a more comprehensive economic,
political and strategic dimension to bilateral relations. The 2006
visit also marked the start of Annual Prime Ministerial Summits
which has helped nurture the relationship.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to India in 2007 led to theunveiling of a road map titled 'New Dimensions to the Strategic

11and Global Partnership'. This provided a new thrust to the IndiaJapan Political, Security and Defence Co-operation. The 2008
return visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan,
expanded the scope of this relationship to cover: long-term
strategic and policy co-ordination; Global and Regional affairs in
the Asia-Pacific region; and bilateral co-operation within
multilateral frameworks such as the East Asia Summit and theASEAN Regional Forum etc. Security co-operation between the
two Defence Ministries, and between the two Coast Guards, werealso enhanced. The Strategic and Global Partnership forged
between the two countries got a further fillip during the visit ofPrime Minister Hatoyama to India in 2009.
During Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Japan (inSeptember, 2014) a 'Tokyo Declaration for India-Japan Special
Strategic and Global Partnership' was agreed upon. The two sides
endorsed the need to advance peace and stability in the AsiaPacific region, safeguard maritime security, and ensure freedomof navigation and overflight throughout the region, specially in
the South China Sea. Japan and India also signed a Memorandumof Co-operation and Exchange in the field of Defence which also
contained a provision for the transfer of defence equipment andtechnology.
Plans for Joint Naval Exercises between the India and Japan
Naval units in the Indian Ocean date back to 2001. Japan was,however, invited only very recently to participate in the Malabar
Naval Exercises (which were till then confined to India and theUS). A Trilateral dialogue is now being held between India, Japanand the US on a regular basis. A Two plus Two dialogue between
India and Japan is in place.

12While defence and strategic co-operation have now been
included, economic relations have been the bed-rock of the IndiaJapan relationship. India is the larger recipient of Japan'sInternational Development Assistance. No other country has
contributed in the same measure to India's infrastructure andindustrial projects. Visible evidence of this is to be found inJapanese assistance to the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, theWestern Dedicated Freight Corridor, and the Chennai-Bangaluru
Industrial Corridor. Japan has very recently offered a soft loan of$15 billion to finance India's first bullet train linking Mumbai and
Ahmedabad.
India and Japan have further agreed on the mutual advantage
to both countries of the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement entered between them to facilitate Tradeand Goods Services. Likewise both countries have highlighted
the utility of the RCEP in increasing investment opportunities.
Where do India-Japan relations go from here? The era of the
Indo-Pacific is not an idle dream. Relations between the threemajor powers in the Indo-Pacific - India, Japan and China together with the overarching presence of the US - are beset bymore contradictions than commonalities. This has led to unsettled
conditions in many parts of South, South-East and East Asia,
where new patterns of conflict are now in evidence. The
dynamics of relations between China and India, China and Japan,
Japan and the US, and increasingly, US and India, will have a
direct impact in shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific.
Aspects such as security of the Sea Lanes of Communication
which are critically important for all Asian nations today, but
specially for China, Japan, India and the US, have already been13

mentioned earlier. Another aspect viz., the strategic potential of theoceans where deep sea bed mining is becoming of vital importance,
has also been touched upon. This latter aspect is leading nations in
the Indo-Pacific littoral to increase their Blue Water capabilities,
and China is making an all out effort to outpace India and Japan. The
last named has been a slow starter, but can be expected to catch up.
China has lately reinforced its aggressive mien, which runs
contrary to its professed preference for 'peaceful rise'. The 2015
Chinese Defence White Paper highlights the need to build strong
National Defence and powerful Armed Forces as a strategic
objective and a security guarantee for China's peacefuldevelopment. It further affirms, that China faces more challenges
in terms of national security and social stability, and that China
must resolutely oppose attempts to instigate a 'colour revolution'in the country, as also protect the security of its Overseas interestsand strategic Sea Lanes of Communication. The White Paper also
highlights Beijing's intention to further expand the Chinese Navyand extend its range of operations.
China has also re-affirmed its determination to protect its'core national interests'. By implication, this would mean that
China would continue with its assertive external policies. A newelement which coincides with China's aggressive pursuit of its'One Belt, One Road Initiative' and its 'Maritime Silk Road
(MSR) Project', is the emphasis on 'strategic opportunities' thathave since become available.
China's postures will have major and adverse repercussions
as far as its neighbours are concerned. Many of them like Japan
have, so far, remained content with the benefit of US protection,
but this is no longer the case. The change is already evident, and14

new avenues are being explored by many countries in the region
including Japan. India would normally have been the candidate of
choice for many countries in the region as a possible security
provider. India has, however, preferred to remain a 'recessed
power', one that refused to enter into any kind of security
arrangement directed against a third country.
In the contested geo-politics of the Asia-Pacific, marked byenduring rivalries and conflicts, there is another factor present
viz., the presence of many nuclear States - China, Korea, Pakistan
and India. The danger of a nuclear conflict is often underplayed,
but it is real and should be a matter of serious security concern.
Some States do not have a well-defined nuclear doctrine. Others,
like Pakistan are enlarging the scope for using nuclear weapons,by experimenting with battlefield or tactical nuclear missiles.
References to possibilities of a genuine strategic partnership
between many of the Asian countries, including India and Japanand India and China, are possibly overstated. China, Japan andIndia have different approaches to the many different, and often
contradictory nature of the concentric circles of security andeconomic relationships. China's is a case apart. For instance,
India is only a dialogue partner in ASEAN, and its position is
tenuous as far as the East Asia Summit is concerned. Its positionin the RECP is uncertain, while it has been excluded from theTrans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) sponsored by the US, in whichcountries like Japan would enhance their trade competitiveness at
the expense of countries like India. Civil Nuclear Co-operation
between India and Japan remains elusive.
Hence, and notwithstanding, the growing warmth inrelations between India and Japan as their interests in the Indo-

15

Pacific converge, there is no gainsaying the fact that India andJapan today remain at two different ends of the spectrum on both
economic and strategic issues. Their strategic interests may
converge, but there are limits on what can be achieved. Defence
co-operation again will have to remain restricted for the present.
India, on its part, will hence proceed with care. It requires tobuild on existing relations with the US and Japan, but this cannot
be achieved in a manner that it is seen to posit a direct challenge to
China. In January this year, during the visit of President Obama to
Delhi, India and the US adopted a document which contained
their 'Shared Vision for the Indo-Pacific and Freedom of
Navigation in the South China Sea'. This predictably raised
China's hackles. Managing the India-Japan relationship on the
one hand, US-India relations on the other, and the more criticalIndia-China relations at yet another level, will thus prove to be
one of India's more critical challenges in the period ahead.

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