DOING IT RIGHT!

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND REACTOR EXPORTERS’

PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCTS e oul , Kor ea | January 1 , 2 0 1 5 *C O N TENTSPREA MB LE

PREAMBLE

Considering that responsible use of nuclear power plant technology is vitalto help meet global energy requirements and address climate change in asustainable manner;

PRINCIPLE 1. Safety, Health,and Radiological Protection
PRINCIPLE 2. Physical Security
PRINCIPLE 3. Environmental
Protection and the Handling of
Spent Fuel and Nuclear Waste
PRINCIPLE 4. Compensation
for Nuclear Damage
PRINCIPLE 5. Nonproliferationand Safeguards
PRINCIPLE 6. Ethics
APPENDIX A. Appendix to
Principle 5: Nonproliferationand Safeguards
APPENDIX B. References

Desiring to continuously improve safety, security, and environmental protection;		Conscious of the sensitive nature of nuclear materials and technology, andthus the necessity of using nuclear power plant technology exclusively forpeaceful purposes;
Inspired by and seeking to complement national laws and regulations, international laws and norms, and the recommendations of vital institutions suchas the International Atomic Energy Agency that promote the peaceful use of
nuclear technology as a safe, secure, reliable, and efficient source of energy;1
Committing to export strictly in compliance with Nuclear SuppliersGroup guidelines and with the laws and policies of Vendor andCustomer States;
Recognizing that the establishment of any nuclear power program requires
an effective legal and regulatory framework and technological and industrial infrastructure, and qualified personnel;*In keeping with the Preamble, participants will review and revise the Principles of Conduct as appropriate. To
allow for regular updating of the text, vendors have agreed that new updates to the text will go into effect onJanuary 1 of the subsequent year. The Principles of Conduct were first finalized in Brussels, Belgium, in May 2011.
They have been updated as follows:• Seoul, Korea, October 22, 2014 • Brussels, Belgium, March 6, 2014 • Toronto, Canada, September 26, 2013
• Tokyo, Japan, January 16 2013 • Pittsburgh, PA, U.S.A., July 10, 2012 • Moscow, Russia, December 8, 2011
• Brussels, Belgium, May 20, 2011
1 These Principles cite documents in Appendix B, which will be reviewed by the participants as they evolve.
Documents are highlighted in boldface text.
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1Mindful that a harmful event at a nuclear power
plant anywhere can be considered to be a harmful
event everywhere, and limit the contributions of
nuclear energy;

subcontractors, and other participants in the nuclear
power plant industry about the nature, purposes,
and benefits of these Principles of Conduct, and recommend their cooperation in applying them.

Seeking to enhance public confidence by upholding
high standards of transparency, integrity, ethicalbehavior, and social responsibility and to promote
continuous improvement toward the implementation of global best practices;

These Principles are voluntary, create no legal duty,
and are not legally binding, but nevertheless reflect
the genuine aspiration of the participants to apply these principles and make a good faith effort
to achieve these goals. The reference language ofthese Principles of Conduct is English.

Acknowledging that Customer States have theultimate responsibility to regulate the construction,
operation, and decommissioning of nuclear power
plants in their jurisdictions;
Vendors adopting these Principles of Conduct will
undertake good faith efforts to implement the bestpractices described in six principles: Safety, Security,
Environmental Protection, Compensation for Nuclear Damage, Nonproliferation, and Ethics.
These principles are based upon best practices derived from the experience of nuclear power plantvendors and operators and the guidelines of theInternational Atomic Energy Agency. They weredeveloped for the public good over several years
through a nongovernmental consensus processfacilitated by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, with input and advice from regulators,
operators, and internationally recognized experts.
These Principles have been and will be reviewed andrevised as appropriate, including to reflect the lessons learned from the Fukushima nuclear accident
following the earthquake and tsunami.
Participating Vendors express their intention tofollow these principles in designing nuclear power
plants and in performing their activities. Participating Vendors will inform their customers, suppliers,

2

PRINCIPLE 1: SAFETY, HEALT H , A N D
RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION
Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear
power plant to a Customer, Vendors expect that
the Customer State:
1.1

Is an active party to the IAEA’s Convention
on Nuclear Safety, or has indicated its
intention to become an active party before
operation of the plant begins.

Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear
power plant to a Customer, Vendors will have madea reasonable judgment that the Customer State has:
1.2

A legislative, regulatory, and organizational
infrastructure needed for implementing asafe nuclear power program with due
attention to safety either in place or underdevelopment following the guidance provided in the IAEA Safety Standard“Establishing the Safety Infrastructure
for a Nuclear Power Programme” (Theinformation on infrastructure and the plansconcerning its development should be
provided by the Customer State based on its
self-assessment or an independent external
assessment such as a peer review conductedunder the auspices of the IAEA);NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND REACTOR EXPORTERS’ PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT1.3

Either an existing industrial infrastructure to
support safe long-term operation, or a credible plan to develop such an infrastructure
before operation of the nuclear power plant
begins; and2

1.4

Taken into account international operating
experience and severe accident considerations in determining the plant site.

1.5.7

Incorporate design provisions to address
severe accident management and to take 		
into account emergency response
requirements.

1.6

Exchange information with the scientists andexperts of the Customer State, as needed, toassist plant designers in adequately understanding the site-specific environmental andother circumstances affecting nuclear safety
so as to be able to adapt the design asnecessary to local conditions. Specifically,
the adaptation should adequately address
the extreme site specific hazards that may
challenge safe plant operations.

Vendors commit to:
1.5

Export nuclear power plants that:

1.5.1

Apply consistent, high safety standards,
reflecting the Vendors’ safety goals and 		which are compatible with physicalsecurity requirements;

1.5.2

Reflect the uncompromising application ofrecognized safety principles, including the
IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles;

1.5.3

Are based on reliable technology, which isproven either a) in operation or b) by a test
program or analysis consistent with internationally recognized safety principles,
before operation of the plant begins;

1.5.4

Are designed in accordance with the IAEA
Safety Requirements,3 giving due consideration to relevant IAEA Safety Guides,
and meeting regulatory requirements of
the Customer State;

1.5.5

Use components manufactured in accordancewith the Vendors’ technical specifications 		
consistent with appropriate nuclear standards;

1.5.6

Ensure their supply chain is subject to the 		
Vendors’ rigorous overall corporate quality
assurance requirements; andWhen contracting to supply a nuclear power plant,
Vendors will address the tasks and issues that requiredue attention during project implementation forachieving and demonstrating a high level of safety
and quality. The responsibility for these tasks and issues should be clearly assigned in the contractual arrangements between the Vendor and the Customer.
1.7

Among the tasks which the parties shouldseek to address in contracting are:

1.7.1

Provision of safety documentation andvalidated safety analysis reports that are atleast as rigorous as what one would provide
if the nuclear power plant was built in the
Vendor State;

1.7.2

Promotion of a high safety culture as definedin the IAEA International Nuclear Safety
Group report “Key Practical Issues inStrengthening Safety Culture,” in all

2 An essential part of this industrial infrastructure is a power transmission
grid suitable to provide reliable external power supply to the nuclear
power plant.
3 See entry in Appendix B under IAEA Safety Standards.

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work on the nuclear power plant sitethroughout the construction project;41.9Integrate essential safety enhancements in 		
future nuclear power plants they offer; and1.7.3

Assurance of competent construction
management;

1.10

Implement these changes, when requested 		and separately agreed upon with the operators.

1.7.4

Assurance that the systems, structures, andcomponents of the plant are constructed or
manufactured and installed to meet therequirements in the specified standards;

Recognizing their unique expertise, Vendors may
provide, if requested by the Customer and separately
agreed, relevant information and guidance to theCustomer’s State and the Customer to help:

1.7.5

Making possible subcontracts on design,
construction, manufacturing, installation,and quality control only with companies thathave proven their qualifications andcompetence or have been evaluated andfound to meet the requirements by
the Vendor;

1.11

1.7.6

1.7.7

1.7.8

Managing the work of the subcontractors
as needed to ensure their performance incompliance with the specified standards
and requirements;
Development of the Customer’s humanresources and competencies for safe,
long-term operation; andDevelopment of written work procedures,and other guidance needed for safe operation, including emergency operatingprocedures and severe accident
management procedures.

Recognizing that the prime responsibility for existing
nuclear power plants they have provided rests with
their operators but that Vendors do possess pertinent
expertise and share with the operators a strong commitment to their safe operation. Vendors agree to:
1.8

Partake in identifying appropriate safety 		
improvements to the nuclear power plants 		
they have supplied;

Improve the elements of the Customer State’s
national infrastructure that influence safe 		
nuclear power plant operation, for example:

1.11.1 Safety aspects of the site selection process;1.11.2 Development of local skills needed tomaintain the nuclear plant in safe
operational conditions;1.11.3 Development of comprehensive plans for 		
offsite emergency management, including
local and regional infrastructure;
1.11.4 Transparent and public communication,
including timely provision of informationin emergency situations.5
Before operation of the nuclear power plant begins,
the Vendors will inform Customers of the benefitsof establishing connections with other operators of
nuclear power plants, including pre-start-up reviewsby the IAEA and World Association of Nuclear
Operators,6 and study their relevant best practices
for the purpose of learning from others’ experiences
and safety practices.

4 Vendors can also draw attention to the World Association of Nuclear
Operators’ Principles “Traits of a Healthy Safety Culture” as best practices
for implementing the IAEA general principles on safety culture.
5 As specified by the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear

Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency.

6 For more information, see the Charter of the World Association of
Nuclear Operators.

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NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND REACTOR EXPORTERS’ PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCTP R INCIPL E 2: PH Y SICA L A N D
C Y B ER S ECURITY
In designing nuclear power plants, Vendors will:security, including adequate policies
and procedures governing:8
2.8.1

Allocation of responsibility for security 		
among government and plant management;

2.1

Incorporate comprehensive design provisions
made for security, including cyber security;

2.8.2

2.2

Ensure security design provisions arecompatible with safety and emergency
response requirements;7Implementation of a security response
capability appropriate to the Design Basis
Threat; and2.8.3

The interests of the population at large withrespect to physical security provisions.

2.3

Cooperate with the Customer to incorporate
the Customer State’s Design Basis Threat;

2.4

Incorporate within design provisions thepotential for damage from security threatsin accordance with the Customer State’s
Design Basis Threat.

Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear
power plant to a Customer, Vendors will have madea reasonable judgment that the Customer State hasor in a timely fashion and in good faith will have:
2.5

Provided information to the Vendor on
the results of the Customer State’s Design 		Basis Threat analysis sufficient to allow the 		
Vendor to complete the design. The threat 		and risk analysis should take into account 		
plant location and conditions in the region, 		
consideration of the threat posed by potential
cyber-attacks as well as internationallyaccepted standards;

Recognizing their unique expertise in support of effective security provisions, Vendors may provide, if
requested by the Customer and separately agreed,
relevant information and guidance to the Customer
State and the Customer to help establish in a timely
fashion that:
2.9

Plant physical security provisions have been
undertaken based on a well-establishedstandard, such as the IAEA’s Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials, which typically:

2.9.1

Use the Design Basis Threat to determine
how to appropriately equip security staff
and to limit the potential use of force toonly that necessary;

2.9.2

Establish appropriate standards for theselection, training, and testing of security
staff and provisions to enforce them;

2.6

Become an active party to the IAEA’s Con		 2.9.3
vention on the Physical Protection of 		
Nuclear Materials and its 2005 Amendment;

2.7

Participated in the United Nations International Convention for the Suppressionof Acts of Nuclear Terrorism; and2.8

Developed a national legislative andregulatory infrastructure for nuclear

Incorporate and address plant design
sensitivities, including provisions for 		
the protection of sensitive informationand sensitive information assets

7 As discussed in the International Nuclear Safety Group’s report on theInterface between Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants.
8 An example of such a nuclear security framework is given by the IAEA’s
Nuclear Security Fundamentals: Objective and Essential Elements ofa State’s Nuclear Security Regime.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND REACTOR EXPORTERS’ PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT

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52.9.4

Take into account provisions for efficientplant operation, safety, and emergency
response in security planning; and2.9.5

Ensure physical plant security andacknowledge respect for human rights;

2.10

Routine evaluations of the sufficiency of
security response capabilities are undertaken.

2.11

2.12

An integrated safety and security oversightorganization is established with responsibility for establishing, monitoring, andcontinuously adjusting the balance among
security, safety, emergency response, andefficient plant operation; andBefore entering into a contract to supply a nuclear
power plant to a Customer, the Vendor will havemade a reasonable judgment that the Customer
State either has or will have in a timely manner:

3.1.1

Enacted national nuclear laws or developeda regulatory framework that:Formalizes and keeps current a credible
national strategy and/or a plan to, in a safe,
secure and environmentally sound manner:

3.1.1.1 Store, treat/recycle, or otherwise manage
spent fuel and radioactive waste;
3.1.1.2.Decommission closed-down nuclear
facilities; and

6

3.1.2

Addresses safeguards obligations, safety,
national and international security, humanhealth, effective management of radioactive
releases at all times, and environmental
stewardship; and3.2

Ratified, accepted, or otherwise applied theprinciples of the IAEA’s Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management.

Vendors will seek to design plants that:
3.3

Enhance environmental benefits andminimize environmental impact inoperations, including waste production,
by applying relevant best practices such as
those defined by International Standards 		
Organization and the IAEA;93.4

Provide for safe and secure on-site storageof spent fuel; and3.5

Facilitate ultimate plant decommissioning.

Continuous improvement and coordination
between law enforcement, other Customer
State agencies, and plant security are
undertaken through follow-up, support,
and joint training.

PRINCIPLE 3: ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND THE HANDLING OF
SPENT FUEL AND NUCLEAR WASTE

3.1

3.1.1.3.Dispose of all radioactive wastes;

In contracting to sell nuclear power plants, Vendors
will seek to:
3.6

Address the responsible management by
Customers of spent fuel and otherradioactive materials and waste.

Recognizing their unique expertise, Vendors will
undertake, as specifically agreed, to cooperate withand provide relevant information to pertinent governments and Customers to help promote:3.7

Protection of the environment through the
responsible use of natural resources, thereduction of waste and emissions, and theminimization of harmful impacts to the

9 Including the ALARA principle.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND REACTOR EXPORTERS’ PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT

liable and will be channeled to one
single competent court;

environment, in accordance with the best
technically and economically sound practicesof the worldwide nuclear power industry;
3.8

3.9

4.1.4

Includes compensation for personal injury,
property damage, environmental damage,loss of income, economic loss, andpreventive measures;

4.1.5

Does not allow compensation amounts tobe set aside or reduced by unilateral strict
reciprocity requirements; and/or

4.2

A treaty relationship with the Vendor State
under either the IAEA’s Vienna Convention
on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, as
amended or, if eligible, the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development’sParis Convention on Third Party Liability
in the Field of Nuclear Energy, as
amended; and/or

4.3

The IAEA’s Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage(CSC)—which is the IAEA’s unified global
nuclear liability regime that any State canjoin if it is a Party to the Vienna Convention
or Paris Convention or has a domestic lawthat is consistent with the CSC Annex. Suchaction would enable global treaty relations
crucial to assure worldwide compensationand liability protection during plant
operation and transnational transport.

A precautionary approach to the environment consistent with the definition provided
in the United Nations Global Compact 		
and the Rio Declaration; andDevelopment in Customer States of systems
for the long-term management of spent fueland/or radioactive waste that are rational,
economic, safe, secure, and consistent with
Customer States’ safeguards obligations.

P R INCIPL E 4: COMPEN SA TION FOR
N U CL EAR DA MA G E
Before entering into a contract to supply a nuclear
power plant to a Customer, the Vendor will independently make a reasonable judgment that theCustomer State has in force, or will have in force
before fuel is delivered in the Customer State’s
territory, a legal regime providing adequate andprompt compensation for the public in the unlikely
event of an accident, with protection in effectequivalent to one or more of the following
best practices:
4.1

A legal regime for compensation and nuclear
liability that, inter alia:

4.1.1

Contains adequate liability limits andfinancial protection consistent withcurrent international standards;

4.1.2

Is backed by Customer State guarantees;

4.1.3

Ensures that claims for compensation bypossible victims will be channeled to theoperator of the nuclear power plant(s)that would be strictly and exclusively

PRINCIPLE 5: NONPROLIFERA T I O N
AND SAFEGUARDSThe Vendors are committed to the peaceful use of
nuclear energy.
Each Vendor recognizes that its Vendor State iscommitted to a policy that nuclear power plants

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND REACTOR EXPORTERS’ PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT

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7and related materials, equipment, and technology 10
shall be provided to and used by Customer States
exclusively for peaceful purposes, consistent with
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, and in conformity with Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines and pertinent United
Nations Security Council Resolutions.
Each Vendor further recognizes that its Vendor
State has enacted export laws and/or regulations
intended to implement that policy, declaresthat it is bound by and fully committed to implementing that policy, and supports a strong nonproliferation regime.



5.4

Inform in a timely manner the appropriate
authority of the Vendor State and, as
appropriate, other Vendors adhering to these
Principles, of any serious nonproliferation con
cerns related to the equipment, materials, andtechnology provided by the Vendor to the 		
Customer; and5.5

Consult closely with the Vendor State andact in accordance with its instructions upon
being informed by the Vendor State or becoming directly aware of actions or events
that would raise serious concerns aboutcompliance with the global nonproliferation regime.11

Accordingly, each Vendor exports nuclear power
plants and related materials, equipment, and technology solely in accordance with relevant national
export laws and/or regulations, which implement
the foregoing.
As a manifestation of their strong commitment topeaceful uses of nuclear energy and nonproliferation, Vendors undertake to:

5.1

5.2

5.3

Pay special attention to and promote
proliferation-resistant designs and take
IAEA safeguards requirements into
account in design;
Pay special attention to the exclusively
peaceful use of trigger list and sensitive
dual use items delivered by the Vendor,
including the requirements, as applicable
to Vendors, in bilateral agreements between
Vendor State and Customer State, Nuclear
Suppliers Group guidelines, pertinent
United Nations Security Council
Resolutions, and Vendor contracts;
Seek to obtain a commitment from theCustomer to implement in a timely mannerat the facility a System of Accounting for andControl of Nuclear Materials and a safeguards
approach consistent with its IAEA obligations;

In addition to the above-mentioned provisions,
Vendors welcome the inclusion by Vendor Statesof provisions in bilateral agreements requiring
a Customer State to implement effective
nuclear export controls and to have an
IAEA Additional Protocol in force.

PRINCIPLE 6: ETHICS
To enhance confidence in nuclear power, vendors
undertake to:
6.1

Comply with the highest ethical standards in 		
their interactions with Regulators and Customers;

6.2

Communicate with good faith, and in thespirit of transparency, about these principles;

10 As defined in the latest revision of IAEA INFCIRC/254/Part 1.
11 Examples of such actions or events are given in the Appendix A.

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NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND REACTOR EXPORTERS’ PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT

6.3

Promote worker safety and protect publichealth and the environment;

6.4

Take into account the principle ofsustainable development, including theeffects of projects on the environmentand society;6.5

Proactively cooperate with Customers to
inform and consult in a participatory
manner with nearby communities regarding
public information about planned project
activities and their potential social andenvironmental effects;

6.6

Have in place internal programs todiscourage corruption and conflicts ofinterest and to encourage compliance with
anticorruption laws, such as those implementing the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption and/or the OECD
Convention on Combating Bribery of 		Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, and seek to obtaina reciprocal commitment from Customers;

6.7

Respect through word and deed fundamentallabor rights, including the prohibitions onchild and forced labor, non-discrimination in
employment, and the rights to freedom of
association and collective bargaining;

6.8

6.9

Respect human rights pursuant to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
recognizing that States bear responsibility
for protecting human rights; andEncourage their suppliers, subcontractors,
and other participants in the nuclear power
plant industry to demonstrate the same
respect for these ethical commitments.

APPENDIX A: APPENDIX TO
PRINCIPLE 5: NONPROLIFERA T I O N
AND SAFEGUARDS
Examples of actions and events that would constitute serious concerns about compliance with theglobal nonproliferation regime:
A.1

A State issues a withdrawal notificationfrom the Treaty on the Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons or has unilaterally
terminated or suspended the implementation of a safeguards agreement with
the IAEA;

A.2

The IAEA finds, with respect to a State’s
activities, that the IAEA is no longer able,
because of the obstruction by or lack oftransparency and cooperation from a State,
to fully implement the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement or the
IAEA Additional Protocol, or verify that
there has been no diversion of nuclear
material required to be safeguarded;

A.3

A State is found by the IAEA to be in
non-compliance with its safeguards
agreement(s) under Article XII.C of the
IAEA Statute; and/or

A.4

A State proceeds with the test of a
nuclear explosive device.

Upon being informed by the Vendor State or becoming directly aware of any such case the Vendor
will consult and act in accordance with instructions
from the appropriate authorities of the Vendor
State. Vendor State responses may include, among
others, those indicated in UN Security Council
Resolution 1887, in the Final Document of the2010 NPT Review Conference, and consistent
with Article XII.C of the IAEA Statute.

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9A P P ENDIX B: REFEREN CESINTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
United Nations Convention Against Corruption—Adopted by the UN General Assembly inresolution A/RES/58/4, October 31, 2003.
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery ofForeign Public Officials in International Business Transactions—Adopted by the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development,
signed December 17, 1997.
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a
Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency,
Reproduced in IAEA INFCIRC/336, adopted
September 26, 1986.
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident, Reproduced in IAEA INFCIRC/335,
adopted September 26, 1986.
Convention on Nuclear Safety—“Convention on
Nuclear Safety,” IAEA INFCIRC/449, adopted June
17, 1994.
Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material (CPPNM)—Reproduced in
IAEA INFCIRC/274/Rev.1, May 1980, and including
its amendment, reproduced in GOV/INF/2005/10GC(49)/INF/6, September 6, 2005.
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent FuelManagement and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management—“Joint Convention on the
Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safetyof Radioactive Waste Management,” Reproduced in
IAEA INFCIRC/546, adopted December 1997.
Convention on Supplementary Compensation
for Nuclear Damage (CSC)—“Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage,”
IAEA INFCIRC/567, adopted September 12, 1997.

10

International Convention for the Suppressionof Acts of Nuclear Terrorism—Adopted by the
UN General Assembly in resolution A/RES/59/290,
April 2005.
Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in
the Field of Nuclear Energy—Adopted by theOrganisation for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment, February 12, 2004.
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage, Reproduced in IAEA INFCIRC/566,
adopted September 12, 1997.
IAEA DOCUMENTS“Considerations to Launch a Nuclear Power
Programme”—“Considerations to Launch a
Nuclear Power Programme,” International Atomic
Energy Agency, Reproduced in IAEA GOV/INF/2007.
“IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety”—
Approved by the Board of Governors on 13
September 2011.
IAEA SAFETY STANDARDSStandards of safety issued pursuant to Article III(A)(6)10 of the IAEA Statute. Safety standards issued
since 1997 in the IAEA Safety Standards Series aredesignated as Safety Fundamentals, Safety
Requirements or Safety Guides.
“Establishing the Safety Infrastructure fora Nuclear Power Programme”—“Establishing
the Safety Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power
Programme,” Specific Safety Guides, IAEA Safety
Standards Series, No. SSG-16, 2012.
IAEA Fundamental Safety Principles—“Fundamental Safety Principles,” Safety
Fundamentals, IAEA Safety Standards Series
No. SF-1, 2006.
IAEA Safety Requirements—Refers to “Safetyof Nuclear Power Plants: Design,” Specific Safety
Requirements, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SSR
21, 2012.

NUCLEAR POWER PLANT AND REACTOR EXPORTERS’ PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCTIAEA INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY GROUP(INSAG) REPORTS“Key Practical Issues in Strengthening Safety
Culture”—“Key Practical Issues in Strengthening
Safety Culture,” Report by the IAEA International
Nuclear Safety Group, INSAG-15, 2002.
“The Interface between Safety and Security at
Nuclear Power Plants”—“The Interface between
Safety and Security at Nuclear Power Plants,” Reportby the IAEA International Nuclear Safety Group,
INSAG-24, 2010.
IAEA SECURITY STANDARDSIAEA Nuclear Security Fundamentals—“Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s
Nuclear Security Regime”, IAEA Nuclear Security
Series No. 20, 2013.
IAEA Nuclear Security Recommendations—“Nuclear Security Recommendations on PhysicalProtection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear
Facilities”,INFCIRC/225/Rev5, 2011.
IAEA SAFEGUARDS
IAEA Additional Protocol—“Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between State(s) and theInternational Atomic Energy Agency for the application of Safeguards,” International Atomic Energy
Agency, INFCIRC/540 (Corrected), September 1997.
IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement—“The Structure and Content of Agreements Between
the Agency and States Required in Connection with
the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons,” International Atomic Energy Agency,
INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), June 1972.
State System of Accounting for and Control of
Nuclear Materials—See “Systems of Accounting
for and Control of Nuclear Material,” IAEA Bulletin
vol. 17, no. 2, 1975.

Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference—NPT/CONF.2010/L.2, May 27, 2010.
Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines—Refers to1) “Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers,” Reproduced
in IAEA INFCIRC/254/Part 1, as amended November
7, 2007; and 2) “Guidelines for Transfers of NuclearRelated Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Softwareand Related Technology,” Reproduced as IAEA
INFCIRC/254/ Part 2, as amended March 20, 2006.
Pertinent United Nations Security Council
Resolutions—Refers to resolutions adopted by
the United Nations Security Council under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter that address issues relevant
to nuclear nonproliferation and illicit trafficking. It
includes UN Security Council resolutions S/RES/1540(2004), S/RES/1810 (2009), S/RES/1887 (2009) andstate-specific resolutions such as S/RES/1718 (2006)
and S/RES/1929 (2010).
Rio Declaration—Rio Declaration on Environmentand Development, A/CONF.151/26 (vol. I), adopted
June 14, 1992.
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT)—Reproduced in IAEA INFCIRC/140,
March 5, 1970.
United Nations Global Compact—“Ten Principlesof the United Nations Global Compact,” 2000.
UN Security Council Resolution 1887—Adopted
by the UN Security Council in S/RES/1887, September
24, 2009.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights—
Adopted by the UN General Assembly in resolution
A/RES/217(III) A, December 10, 1948.
WANO Principles “Traits of a Healthy Safety
Culture”—PL 2013-1, May 2013.

OTHER DOCUMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Charter of the World Association of Nuclear
Operators—February 1, 2010.

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A D OPTERSSUPPORTING EXPERTS
Omer F. Brown, II, Attorney-at-Law, Omer F. Brown, II Law Office
Jacques Bouchard, Adviser to the Chairman, CEA (Commissariat àl’énergie atomique); former Chairman, Generation IV International
Forum; Chairman, IAEA Standing Advisory Group for Nuclear
Energy (SAGNE)
Michael Gadbaw, Distinguished Senior Fellow and Adjunct
Professor, Institute for International Economic Law, Georgetown
University Law Center
Pierre Goldschmidt, Nonresident Senior Associate, Carnegie
Endowment; former Deputy Director General-Safeguards, IAEA
KunMo Chung, former Minister of Science and Technology, SouthKorea; co-founder of the International Risk Governance Council;
fellow of the American Nuclear Society and the Korean Academy of
Science and Technology; distinguished research Professor, George
Mason University and Ajou University
Jukka Laaksonen (until January 2012), Director General, STUK(Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority); Chairman, Western
European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA); Vice Chairman,
IAEA International Nuclear Safety Group (INSAG)
André-Claude Lacoste, former Chairman, Autorité de Sûreté
Nucléaire; former Chairman, Multinational Design Evaluation
Program Policy Group, OECD/NEA; Chairman of the Commission on
Safety Standards, IAEA; President of the 6th review meeting of theConvention on Nuclear Safety
Richard Meserve, President, Carnegie Institution of Science;
former Chairman, Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Commissioner,
U.S. Department of Energy Blue Ribbon Committee on America’s
Nuclear Future; Chairman, IAEA INSAG
Nathalie Horbach, Independent Nuclear Law Consultant,Dundee University
Irving Rotter, Partner, Sidley Austin, LLP
Frank Saunders, Vice President-Nuclear Oversight and Regulatory
Affairs, Bruce Power
Gare Smith, Partner, Foley Hoag LLP

The Principles of Conduct are intended to promote free and faircompetition in the market for nuclear power plants and to enhance
the likelihood that the global development of nuclear energy willproceed sustainably and beneficially.
Visit nuclearprinciples.org to learn more.
NUCLEAR POWER PLANT EXPORTERS’ PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT

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