2021-23
取締役の人的特性が税負担削減行動に及ぼす影響

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/:'K^ /K9<E+SË[%R o· ·d u2 /qj$=\%ÌdyÈLµ0/(Richardson et al. 2016)

7

·Ð_¦Çc#Û2g' µm0 /}~(2018)%Armstrong et al. (2015)2MÃ#ÌdJ·dhÖfII %\Ôg·Ð_¦Çc$Ø<2Ì[ §Un[$¿ÌdJ·dhÖfg ¶_hÁ %·Ð2Ó¦/ #,/R TV$kLÀ§-%4@>I9 Å "  µm0 7Ç$iB
hÖ°²Î2hÁ %R $·d¥y#Û2g'0!*0%·d
1-±2-0/, "¡d"·Ð_¦Çc2^-)"+IQ* /qj#%"·Ð_¦Çc2Ç  µm0 /(Armstrong et al. 2015)
HR 2[{Ë qjhÖ°²Î2hÁ %R $·Ð_¦Ç
c2^/¿µ0 /(}~ 2018)Abernathy et al. (2016)%R $hÁ $1 P /8Ý$Ïr R #=@9/ ·ÐÓ¦/µm0 /0!*}~ (2018)%hÖ°²Î2hÁ #ÏrP(0" $7Ç2®/

7Ç 1ZÍSËr·«rN%ÏrÒÄ2hÁ S#/R %·Ð_¦Çc0/

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O¾Ý$ / CEO %·Ö2/)#,.¸¡°"·Ð_¦Çc2Ç «°"Ã /iÅ /(Law and Mills 2017)³¹%o·

g o·1$nd¾Ý$ /hÁ *o#{/<x:2 / Ã $7
Ç2®/

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(McLeod-Hemingway 2007)

,.=\#[ ¥y2Ç =k# /,.b")"+I2Ç uhÁ%¶_hÁ

O¢#·Ð_¦Çc2^/iÅÞuhÁ

8

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7Ç 3uhÁ 2/R %·Ð_¦Çc^0/


+7K!I

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3 6&SËzb·¢17#,fy/SËzb·¢g zb·¢%0-$V0!hÁ R $·Ð2Ó

¦ 2È [)!F ³¹%Law and Mills (2017)$)!F2MÃ#$(1)q2 OLS #,Ì/
(1)q#/i %R t %¥f2È

ETRi,tβ0 + β1Expert i,t-1 + β2NTAi,t-1+ β3Femalei,t-1 + β4PctIndepi,t-1 + β5SOi+ β6SIZEi,t-1 + β7PPEi,t+ β8EQUINGi,t + β9INTANi,t + β10R&Di,t + β11ROAi,t + β12LEVi,t+ β13FIi,t + β14FRGNi,t+ β15NOLi,t-1+ β16NOLi,t + Year + Industry +ε 14           (1)S$P°© ·Ð_¦Çc$Ø<2Ì³¹zb·¢2D­ $%Dyreng etal. 2010Lanis and Richardon 2018Law and Mills 2017Minnick and Noga 2010 "!-0/
15
S$P°© ·Ð_¦Çc$Ø<2Ì³¹SËzb·¢2D­ $%Armstrong
et al. 2015Dyreng et al. 2010Minnick and Noga 2010Law and Mills 2017 "!-0/
16
3 6&P· ·g O ·2 3 6&·Ö°ÉGhDªfy/
17
3 6&P· ·g O · P·°ÉÛ2jËÛ2 3 6&·Ö°ÉGhDª
fy/9ºÇ^%3.1  .3 6&SËzb·¢g/"3 6&SËzb·¢g

3 6&zb·¢

3 6&zb·¢%0 - 1 $g%#(/,É /È 1 ^$y¶

^

y¶

e!

ExpertDAccountant
DTaxAccountant
DLawyerNTA

hÁ S#/ZÍSËrÒUÄ/hÁ khÁ S#/·«rÒUÄ/hÁ khÁ S#/ÏrÒUÄ/hÁ khÁ S# o·N%o·1fd¾Ý$ /·«rÒ




+

UÄ/hÁ k
FemalePctIndep
SO
SIZE
PPE
EQUINGINTANT
R&D
ROA
LEV
FI
FRGN
NOL
NOL

hÁ S#/u$P/hÁ k¶_hÁ P/hÁ k9<;AI2i? 0& 106_% 0GPkÒ¥$¸Y{uWyÒ¥/GPkÒ¥[#,/|ÒGª/GPkÒ¥XuWyÒ¥/GPkÒ¥³¹¯}/GPkÒ¥·Ö°ÉGhDª/GPkÒ¥×WyÐ/GPkÒ¥_o(LÞ/GPkÒ¥P_oP°$UU¢(TÌE\lMt&K9)
GP#lQGÖ2\l 0& 106_% 0lQGÖ$^JÛ/GPkÒ¥

+







+






 È 1 %^$y¶2µ*$ /Ç^%ExpertNTAFemale  /Expert%hÁ $hÖ2µ^ / °#%hÁ S#/ZÍSËrÒUÄ2hÁ kU¢(DAccountant)hÁ S#/·«rÒUÄ2hÁkU¢(DTaxAccountant)hÁ S#/ÏrÒUÄ2hÁ kU¢(DLawyer)200ÃyNTA %hÁ S#/o·N%o·1fd¾Ý$ /·«rÒUÄ2hÁ kU¢ /Female %hÁ S#
/u$P2hÁ kU¢ /"hÁ S#/P°=\%
TÌE\lM$ S$ZV-?A S$ZV#%¥f$yK1kS
ÕQ0hÁ 2P )[{Ë#ØM " SP(0/ 2)#[×$GP$hÁ S$=\2­ 

10

06_%6I<,KF^ /R $·Ð_¦Çc%4@>I9#,/Û2
/ -¶_hÁ U¢(PctIndep)g _oP°$UU¢(FRGN)2Ãy/¾T
Ä $II %#,/Û2/ -9<;AI2i? 0&
106_2 0

/:'K^(SO)2Ãy/SË ·d$^L$Ò #,/Û2

6I<,KF/)#uWyÒ¥U¢(PPE)[#,/|ÒGª¢(EQUING)X
uWyÒ¥U¢(INTANT)³¹¯}U¢(R&D)2Ãy/R ¾O cg ª$Ò #,/Û26I<,KF/)#GPkÒ¥$¸Y{(SIZE)·Ö°É
GhDª¢(ROA)G@G;8(LEV)_o(LÞU¢(FI)GP#lQGÖ2\l

0& 106_2 0

/:'K^(NOL)G-$lQGÖ$^J[(NOL)2Ãy/ 7IAF t ´Ë
 È 2 %7IAFGI2µ*$ /[#xÉ"!K%H¾ NEEDSFinancialQuestH¾ NEEDS-Cgesg eol-?A7IAF%3 ¥f$
R #Ùy2016  3 ¥f- 2018  2 ¥f($@LqR 2}B$¿%6,343 R J -ÇÌEg U$ c#2 /R2

6,322 R J #¥f 12  /7IAF2}B/)#[{Ë×N#¥f$^L$ R 2 6,300 R J #·Ö°ÉGhDª 0 6.$R 2
w-0" R 2

5,717 R J[#xÉ"!K

5,090 R J #,SS°ÃmS¶25,035

R J "È 2 7IAFGI
7IAF%2016  3 - 2018  2 (2{Ë  /@!K%H¾ NEEDSFinancial Quest2.0H¾ NEESD-Cgesg eol-?A

2016  3 - 2018  2 ¥f$@LqRÇÌEg U$ c#2/¥f 12 "
·Ö°ÉGhDª 0 6. /Ëf#xÉ"!K/Å
,SS°ÃmS¶ /

R J
6,434
(112)
(22)
(583)
(627)
(55)
5,035

È 3 %(1)q­ /^$t ´Ë2µ /""^$V%L. 1%$

11

_0V2mF/«2Ç
34.2%(33.9%)g/Current ETR3 g

GAAP ETR3 $6&V(N)V)%

34.8%(35.1%) /yzb·¢%2014 +O % 35.42%

Þ2014  10  1 H6+/O # % 35.43%ß
2015 +O %32.87%2016 g2017 +O % 30.74%2018 +O % 30.50%

/ -Current ETR3 g

GAAP ETR3 $6&V(N)V)%[×N$yzb·¢ Ob /DAccountant $6&V% 2.6%DTaxAccountant $6&V% 0.4%Dlawyer$6&V% 3.5%NTA $6&V% 0.3% / -hÁ S#/SËrg ÏrÒUÄ$`j·«rÒUÄg o·hÖc¾ÝÄ$`j,.*s  1
/Female $6&V% 2.8% .hÁ S#/u$`j%SËrÒUÄ
(DAccountant)g ÏrÒUÄ(Dlawyer)$`j Ob //È 3 t ´Ë

6&V

l

0V

0.342
0.348
0.026
0.004
0.035
0.003
0.028
0.232
0.289
10.631
0.283
0.001
0.032
0.011
0.072
0.490
0.143
0.045
0.699
0.089

0.154
0.162
0.060
0.023
0.062
0.019
0.063
0.117
0.454
1.610
0.192
0.004
0.060
0.020
0.061
0.211
0.250
0.092
0.459
0.456

0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
5.472
0.000
-0.067
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.047
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.024Current ETR3
GAAP ETR3
DAccountant
DTaxAccountant
Dlawyer
NTA
FemalePctIndep
SO
SIZE
PPE
EQUNG
INTAN
R&D
ROA
LEV
FI
FRGN
NOL
NOL

25%
0.274
0.294
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.154
0.000
9.553
0.139
0.000
0.005
0.000
0.033
0.329
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

50%
0.339
0.351
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.222
0.000
10.534
0.261
0.000
0.011
0.003
0.057
0.482
0.000
0.001
1.000
0.009

75%
0.394
0.400
0.000
0.000
0.083
0.000
0.000
0.286
1.000
11.600
0.393
0.000
0.031
0.015
0.092
0.630
0.221
0.037
1.000
0.050

tV
1.000
1.000
0.500
0.333
0.429
0.286
0.500
0.800
1.000
16.67
1.184
0.108
0.874
0.270
0.896
1.597
2.249
0.767
1.000
17.292

È 4 %Pearson $­Ø<2µ /"^$×#[#Û2g' !$­Ø%½-0"

12

()

(1)
1.000
0.034
0.047
-0.007
0.067
0.171
0.082
-0.157-0.064-0.0150.003-0.0170.053
0.017-0.049-0.065-0.031-0.0021.000-0.007-0.0120.052-0.0430.040-0.0850.021
0.027-0.013-0.046-0.0150.028-0.008-0.037
0.006
0.032

(2)

 

(1) DAccountant(2) DTaxAccountant(3) Dlawyer(4) DNTA(5) Female(6) PctIndep(7) SO(8) SIZE(9) PPE(10) EQUNG(11) INTAN(12) R&D
(13) ROA
(14) LEV
(15) FI(16) FRGN
(17) NOL
(18) NOL

 4  

1.000
0.007
0.071
0.188
0.000
0.013
-0.0290.029-0.0280.013
0.026-0.032-0.0080.000-0.021
0.041

(3)

1.000
0.002
0.034
-0.026-0.042-0.0340.022-0.001
0.009-0.0060.008
0.017-0.045
0.014
0.047

(4)

1.000
0.133
0.100
-0.0400.020-0.0230.131-0.0480.099
0.034-0.075-0.007-0.004
0.041

(5)

1.000
0.160
-0.027-0.052-0.011
0.160
0.035
0.070
0.016
0.020
-0.056
0.069
0.103

(6)

1.000
-0.113-0.143-0.041
0.183
0.025
0.249
0.025
0.021
0.032
0.044
0.053

(7)

13

1.000
0.251
0.093
-0.0270.089-0.177
0.063
0.216
0.352
0.122
-0.147

(8)

1.000
0.006
-0.184-0.089-0.2640.213-0.092-0.0060.034-0.029(9)1.000-0.0250.024
0.026-0.020
0.056
0.039
0.024
-0.023

(10)

1.000
0.004
0.182
0.102
-0.015
0.033
0.069
0.016

(11)

1.000
0.031
-0.168
0.337
0.115
0.020
0.011

(12)

1.000
-0.159-0.0150.043-0.160
0.012

(13)

1.000
-0.023-0.084
0.176
0.052

(14)

1.000
0.159
0.130
0.003

(15)

1.000
0.025
-0.062

(16)

1.000
0.121

(17)

1.000

(18)



»®

 ¹5

(1)|s®0©(-¹ 5 =;B A 

Current ETR3=;

BB

GAAP ETR3 0«¿Y¸]yz£(1) +(4) ´(5)$´0²(1)|0 OLS s®0©-
=;B A `"=;B B  DAccountantDTaxAccountant `" DNTA

¯º¦Q

 =;B A `"=;B B  Dlawyer `" Female¯º¦

Q® b±~M {¾kÁO³ ­«µZ0¥L«¿0Â0©f ,Abernathy et al. (2016)®a
-Abernathy et al. (2016) 98>?;5@C9#ÐgÅL«¿Y¸]ÊN ». ,xÉv ªmb±~ÇK.-n/iL  ¤-«^¸] ©f.-² +.-%o b±~ÇK.-L «¿Y¸]

X. ,J¼

E·-®. Francis et al. (2014)`" Richardson et al. (2016)®e,oOr¦p_*-«^¸]#}Î0©f-

¹ 5 »®
=;B A Current ETR3

Constant
DAccountant(1)
0.396***(18.35)0.035(0.97)

DTaxAccountant(2)
0.397***(18.41)(3)
0.396***(18.43)0.053(0.57)

Dlawyer

0.082**(2.36)

DNTA
FemalePctIndep
SO
SIZE

(4)
0.398***(18.51)

0.092***(2.66)-0.040**(-2.09)0.014***(2.89)-0.001(-0.06)

0.092***(2.68)-0.037**(-1.98)0.014***(2.90)-0.001(-0.11)140.082**(2.56)-0.046**(-2.38)0.015***(2.97)-0.001(-0.19)-0.147(-1.31)
0.093***(2.71)-0.036*(-1.93)0.014***(2.86)-0.001(-0.20)(5)0.395***(18.29)0.033(0.91)
0.053(0.58)
0.082**(2.35)-0.143(-1.28)0.086**(2.49)-0.048**(-2.47)0.014***(2.87)-0.001(-0.09)

=;B A Current ETR3(° )

PPE
EQUNG
INTAN
R&D
ROA
LEV
FI
FRGN
NOL
NOL
Year
IndustryN
Adj. R2(1)-0.026*(-1.89)-2.27***(-4.62)0.125***(3.27)-0.305**(-2.28)-0.200***(-5.14)0.036***(3.18)-0.021**(-2.02)-0.015(-0.52)-0.030***(-6.21)-0.033***(-6.97)
YES
YES
4,306
0.073

(2)
-0.027*(-1.93)-2.283***(-4.63)0.124***(3.24)-0.302**(-2.26)-0.199***(-5.11)0.036***(3.20)-0.021**(-2.06)-0.015(-0.52)-0.030***(-6.23)-0.030***(-6.23)
YES
YES
4,306
0.077

(3)
-0.025*(-1.84)-2.297***(-4.67)0.128***(3.35)-0.300**(-2.25)-0.202***(-5.20)0.036***(3.24)-0.020**(-1.97)-0.016(-0.56)-0.030***(-6.17)-0.033***(-7.09)
YES
YES
4,306
0.078

(4)
-0.027*(-1.93)-2.254***(-4.58)0.1***(3.23)-0.301**(-2.25)-0.200***(-5.15)0.036***(3.20)-0.021**(-2.01)-0.016(-0.54)-0.030***(-6.21)-0.033***(-6.97)
YES
YES
4,306
0.077

(5)
-0.026*(-1.86)-2.295***(-4.66)0.130***(3.40)-0.295**(-2.20)-0.202***(-5.18)0.036***(3.19)-0.020*(-1.94)-0.017(-0.59)-0.030***(-6.13)-0.033***(-6.99)
YES
YES
4,306
0.078

()****** .. 1%5%10%¯º¦-0¹(GRs)

=;B B GAAP ETR3

Constant
DAccountant(1)
0.385***(17.00)0.043(1.13)

DTaxAccountant(2)0.386***(17.06)(3)
0.386***(17.10)0.086(0.88)

Dlawyer

0.071*(1.94)

DNTA
Female(4)0.387***(17.16)0.084**(2.31)

0.084**(2.32)

0.081**(2.24)

15-0.109(-0.93)0.085**(2.36)(5)
0.384***(16.92)0.041(1.08)
0.086(0.88)
0.070*(1.93)-0.105(-0.89)0.078**(2.15)

=;B B GAAP ETR3Ò° ÓYearIndustryN(1)-0.053***(-2.64)0.005(0.87)
0.004**(2.51)-0.058***(-4.01)-1.806***(-3.50)0.112***(2.80)-0.419***(-2.99)-0.242***(-5.93)0.031***(2.64)-0.031***(-2.90)-0.024(-0.79)-0.026***(-5.20)-0.043***(-8.69)
YES
YES
4,306

(2)
-0.050**(-2.52)0.005(0.88)
0.004**(2.46)-0.059***(-4.07)-1.822***(-3.52)0.111***(2.77)-0.415**(-2.96)-0.241***(-5.90)0.031***(2.66)-0.032***(-2.96)-0.024(-0.79)-0.027***(-5.23)-0.043***(-8.76)
YES
YES
4,306

(3)
-0.057***(-2.82)0.005(0.95)
0.004**(2.38)-0.057***(-3.98)-1.825***(-3.53)0.114***(2.84)-0.415***(-2.96)-0.244***(-5.98)0.032**(2.69)-0.031***(-2.87)-0.025(-0.81)-0.026***(-5.18)-0.044***(-8.81)
YES
YES
4,306

(4)
-0.049**(-2.47)0.005(0.87)
0.004**(2.37)-0.058***(-4.05)-1.790***(-3.46)0.110***(2.74)-0.416***(-2.96)-0.242***(-5.94)0.031***(2.67)-0.031***(-2.91)-0.024(-0.79)-0.026***(-5.22)-0.043***(-8.71)
YES
YES
4,306

(5)
-0.060***(-2.95)0.004(0.85)
0.004**(2.50)-0.058***(-4.00)-1.835***(-3.55)0.117***(2.91)-0.409***(-2.91)-0.243***(-5.95)0.031***(2.64)-0.031***(-2.85)-0.026(-0.85)-0.026***(-5.14)-0.043***(-8.72)
YES
YES
4,306

Adj. R2

0.079

0.079

0.080

0.079

0.080

PctIndep
SO
SIZE
PPE
EQUNG
INTAN
R&D
ROA
LEV
FI
FRGN
NOL
NOL


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17Controls
Year
IndustryN
Adj. R2

DNTA

Dlawyer

DTaxAccountant

DAccountant

Constant 6 

YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.119

0.439***(10.39)0.023(0.34)

(1)

YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.121

0.189
(1.19)

0.435***(10.33)

(2)

YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.119

-0.002(-0.03)0.441***(10.50)(3)

Current ETR3

-0.336(-1.45)
YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.121

0.442***(10.55)(4)180.436***(10.27)0.018(0.25)
0.182(1.15)-0.003(-0.04)-0.328(-1.41)
YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.120

(5)

YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.088

0.391***(8.94)
0.026(0.36)

(1)

YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.091

0.297*(1.81)

0.385***(8.82)

(2)

YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.088

0.025
(0.36)

0.393***(9.04)(3)

GAAP ETR3-0.300(-1.25)
YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.089

0.394***(9.08)(4)

0.385***(8.77)
0.021(0.29)
0.292*(1.78)
0.026(0.37)-0.284(-1.18)
YES
YES
YES
1,013
0.090

(5)



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Xy (_#%)qµ~
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[2021.7.14 1351]

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