J. L. AUSTINHOW TO DO THINGSWITH WORDS
The William James Lecturesdelivered at Harvard University

OXFORDA T T H E CLARENDON PRESS
1962

Oxford University Press, Amen House, London, E .C .q
GLASGOW NEW YO=TORONTO MELBOUEtVE IVU,LINC'TOL"4BOMBAY CALCUTTA MADRAS KARACHI W O R E DACCA

CAPE TOWN SALISBURY NAIROBI IBADAN ACCRAKUAU L W U R HONG KONG

0 Oxford University Press 1962
PRINTED I N GREAT BRITAINEDITOR'S PREFACET

H E lectures here printed were delivered by Austin
as the William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1955. In a short note, Austin says of theviews which underlie these lectures that they 'were
formed in 1939. I made use of them in an article on"Other Minds" published in the Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XX ( Ig46), pages
173 K , and I surfaced rather more of this iceberg shortly
afterwards to several societies. . ' In each of the years
1952-4 Austin delivered lectures at Oxford under thetitle 'Words and Deeds', each year from a partially rewritten set of notes, each of which covers approximately
the same ground as the William James Lectures. For
the William James Lectures a new set of notes was again
prepared, though sheets of older notes were incorporated
here and there; these remain the most recent notes by
Austin on the topics covered, though he continued tolecture on 'Words and Deeds' at Oxford from these notes,
and while doing so made minor corrections and a numberof marginal additions.
The content of these lectures is here reproduced inprint as exactly as possible and with the lightest editing.
If Austin had published them himself he would certainly
have recast them in a form more appropriate to print; hewould surely have reduced the recapitulations of previous

Editor's Preface
lectures which occur at the beginning of the secondand subsequent lectures; it is equally certain that Austin
as a matter of course elaborated on the bare text of hisnotes when lecturing. But most readers will prefer tohave a close approximation to what he is known to havewritten down rather than what it might be judged that hewould have printed or thought that he probably said in
lectures; they will not therefore begrudge the price to be
paid in minor imperfections of furm and style and inconsistencies of vocabulary.
But these lectures as printed do not exactly reproduce
Austin's written notes. The reason for this is that while
for the most part, and particularly in the earlier part ofeach lecture, the notes were very full and written as
sentences, with only minor omissions such as particles
and articles, often at the end of the lecture they becamemuch more fragmentary, while the marginal additions
were often very abbreviated. At these points the notes
were interpreted and supplemented in the light of remaining portions of the 1952-4 notes already mentioned.
A further check was then possible by comparison with
notes taken both in America and in England by those
who attended the lectures, with the B.B.C. lecture on'Performative Utterances' and a tape-recording of alecture entitled 'Performatives' delivered at Gothenberg
in October 1959. More thorough indications of the useof these aids are given in an appendix. While it seems
possible that in this process of interpretation an occasional
sentence may have crept into the text which Austin

Editor's Prefacevii

would have repudiated, it seems very unlikely that at
any point the main lines of Austin's thought have been
misrepresented.
The editor is grateful to all those who gave assistanceby the loan of their notes, and for the gift of the taperecording. He is especially indebted to Mr. G. J.Warnock,
who went through the whole text most thoroughly andsaved the editor from numerous mistakes; as a resultof this aid the reader has a much improved text.
J. 0. URMSONLECTURE Iw

H A T I shall have to say here is neither difficult nor contentious; the only merit I shouldlike to claim for it is that of being true, atleast in parts. The phenomenon to be discussed is very
widespread and obvious, and it cannot fail to have been
already noticed, at least here and there, by others. Yet I
have not found attention paid to it specifically.
It was for too long the assumption of philosophers thatthe business of a 'statement' can only be to 'describe'
some state of affairs, or to 'state some fact', which it must
do either truly or falsely. Grammarians, indeed, haveregularly pointed out that not all 'sentences' are (usedin making) statements :I there are, traditionally, besides(grammarians') statements, also questions and exclamations, and sentences expressing commands or wishes orconcessions. And doubtless philosophers have not intended to deny this, despite some loose use of 'sentence'for 'statement'. Doubtless, too, both grammarians andphilosophers have been aware that it is by no means easy
to distinguish even questions, commands, and so on fromstatements by means of the few and jejune grammaticalmarks available, such as word order, mood, and the like :It is, of course, not reaw correct that a sentence ever is a statement:
rather, it is used in making a s m m t , and the statement itself' is a'logical construction' out of the d i n g s of satements.

How t o do things with Words
though perhaps it has not been usual to dwell on the
difficulties which this fact obviously raises. For how do
we decide which is which? What are the limits anddefinitions of each ?
But now in recent years, many things which would
once have been accepted without question as 'statements'
by both philosophers and grammarians have been scrutinized with new care. This scrutiny arose somewhat indirectly-at least in philosophy. First came the view, notalways formulated without unfortunate dogmatism, thata statement (of fact) ought to be 'verifiable', and this led
to the view that many 'statements' are only what may
be called pseudo-statements. First and most obviously,
many 'statements' were shown to be, as KANT perhaps
first argued systematically, strictly nonsense, despite an
unexceptionable grammatical form : and the continual
discovery of fresh types of nonsense, unsystematic though
their classification and mysterious though their explanation is too often allowed to remain, has done on the wholenothing but good. Yet we, that is, even philosophers, setsome limits to the amount of nonsense that we are prepared to admit we talk: so that it was natural to go on toask, as a second stage, whether many apparent pseudostatements really set out to be 'statements' at all. It hascome to be commonly held that many utterances whichlook like statements are either not intended at all, or only
intended in part, to record or impart straigl~tforward
information about the facts: for example, 'ethical propositions' are perhaps intended, solely or partly, to evinceHow to do things with Words

3

emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in
special ways. Here too KANTwas among the pioneers. Wevery often also use utterances in ways beyond the scopeat least of traditional grammar. It has come to be seenthat many specially perplexing words embedded inapparently descriptive statements do not serve to indicate some specially odd additional feature in the reality
reported, but to indicate (not to report) the circumstancesin which the statement is made or reservations to which
it is subject or the way in which it is to be taken andthe like. T o overlook these possibilities in the way once
common is called the 'descriptive' fallacy; but perhaps
this is not a good name, as 'descriptive' itself is special.
Not all true or false statements are descriptions, and forthis reason I prefer to use the word 'Constative'. Alongthese lines it has by now been shown piecemeal, or atleast made to look likely, that many traditional philosophical perplexities have arisen through a mistake-themistake of taking as straightforward statements of factutterances which are either (in interesting non-grammatical ways) nonsensical or else intended as something quite
different.
Whatever we may think of any particular one of theseviews and suggestions, and however much we may deplore
the initial confusion into which philosophical doctrine
and method have been plunged, it cannot be doubted
that they are producing a revolution in philosophy. If
anyone wishes to call it the greatest and most salutary
in its history, this is not, if you come to think of it, aHow to do things with Words
large claim, It is not surprising that beginnings have been
4

piecemeal, with parti pris, and for extraneous aims; thisis common with revolutions.
PRELIMINARY ISOLATION OF
THE PERFORMATIVE'

The type of utterance we are to consider here isnot, of course, in general a type of nonsense; thoughmisuse of it can, as we shall see, engender rather special
varieties of 'nonsense'. Rather, it is one of our secondclass-the masqueraders. But it does not by any means
necessarily masquerade as a statement of fact, descriptive or constative. Yet it does quite commonly do so, andthat, oddly enough, when it assumes its most explicit
form. Grammarians have not, I believe, seen throughthis 'disguise', and philosophers only at best incidentally.=
It will be convenient, therefore, to study it first in thismisleading form, in order to bring out its characteristics
by contrasting them with those of the statement of factwhich it apes.
We shall take, then, for our first examples some utterances which can fall into no hitherto recognized grammatical category save that of 'statement', which are notnonsense, and which contain none of those verbal dangersignals which philosophers have by now detected or think
Everything said in these sections is provisional, and subject to revision in the light of later sections.
Of all people, jurists should be best aware of the m e state of affairs.
Perhaps some now are. Yet they will succumb to their own timorous
fiction, that a statement of 'the law' is a statemknt of fact.
IHow to do things with Words
they have detected (curious words like 'good' or 'all',suspect auxiliaries like 'ought' or 'can', and dubious
constructions like the hypothetical): all will have, as it
happens, humdrum verbs in the first person singularpresent indicative active.' Utterances can be found, satisfying these conditions, yet such that
A. they do not 'describe' or 'report' or constate anything at all, are not 'true or false'; andB. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, thedoing of an action, which again would not normally
be described as saying something.
This is far from being as paradoxical as it may soundor as I have meanly been trying to make it sound: indeed, the examples now to be given will be disappointing.
Examples :(E. a) 'I do (sc. take this woman to be my lawful
wedded wife)'-as uttered in the course of themarriage cerem~ny.~(E*b) 'I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth'--asuttered when smashing the bottle against thestem.
(E. c) 'I give and bequeath my watch to my brother'a s occurring in a will.
(E. d) 'I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.'
Not without design: they are all 'explicit' performatives, and of that
prepotent class later called 'exercitives'.
" [Austin realized that the expression 'I do' is not used in the marriage
ceremony too late to correct his mistake. We have let it remain in the
text as it is philosophically unimportant that it is a mistake. J. 0.U.]

How t o do things with Words
In these examples it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the appropriate circumstances) is not
to describe my doing of what I should be said in souttering to be doing1 or to state that I am doing it: it is
to do it. None of the utterances cited is either true or
false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. It
needs argument no more than that 'damn' is not trueor false: it may be that the utterance 'serves to informyou'-but that is quite different. T o name the ship is
to say (in the appropriate circumstances) the words 'I
name, &c.'. When I say, before the registrar or altar, &c.,
'I do', I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging
in it.
What are we to call a sentence or an utterance of thistype?2 I propose to call it a perfornative sentence or aperformative utterance, or, for short, 'a performative'.
The term 'performative' will be used in a variety of cognate ways and constructions, much as the term 'imperative' i s 3 The name is derived, of course, from 'perform',
the usual verb with the noun 'action': it indicates thatthe issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action
Still less anything that I have already done or have yet to do.
'Sentences' form a class of 'utterances', which class is to be defined,
so far as I am concerned, grammatically, though I doubt if the definition
has yet been given satisfactorily. With performative utterances are contrasted, for example and essentially, 'constative' utterances : to issue aconstative utterance (Leoto utter it with a historical reference) is to makea statement. To issue a performative utterance is, for example, to makea bet. See f d e r below on 'illocutions'.
Formerly I used 'performatory' :but 'performative' is to be preferred
as shorter, less ugly, more tractable, and more traditional in fmmation.

How t o do things with Words

7-it is not normally thought of as just saying something.
A number of other terms may suggest themselves, eachof which would suitably cover this or that wider or
narrower class of performatives: for example, many performatives are contractual ('I bet') or declaratory ('Ideclare war') utterances. But no term in current use that
I know of is nearly wide enough to cover them all. One
technical term that comes nearest to what we need isperhaps 'operative', as it is used strictly by lawyers inreferring to that part, i.e. those clauses, of an instrument
which serves to effect the transaction (conveyance orwhat not) which is its main object, whereas the rest of
the document merely 'recites' the circumstances in which
the transaction is to be effected.' But 'operative' hasother meanings, and indeed is often used nowadays tomean little more than 'important'. I have preferred a newword, to which, though its etymology is not irrelevant,
we shall perhaps not be so ready to attach some preconceived meaning.
CAN S A Y I N G MAKE I T S O ?

Are we then to say things like this:'To marry is to say a few words', or'Betting is simply saying something' ?
Such a doctrine sounds odd or even flippant at first, butwith sufficient safeguards it may become not odd at all.
I owe this observation to Professor H. L. A. Hart,

How to do things with Words
A sound initial objection to them may be this; and it
is not without some importance. In very many cases it ispossible to perform an act of exactly the same kind not byuttering words, whether written or spoken, but in someother way. For example, I may in some places effectmarriage by cohabiting, or I may bet with a totalisator
machine by putting a coin in a slot. We should then,perhaps, convert the propositions above, and put it thatt
to say a few certain words is to many' or 'to marry is,in some cases, simply to say a few words' or 'simply to
say a certain something is to bet'.
But probably the real reason why such remarks sounddangerous lies in another obvious fact, to which we shallhave to revert in detail later, which is this. The utteringof the words is, indeed, usually a, or even the, leading
incident in the performance of the act (of betting or whatnot), the performance of which is also the object of theutterance, but it is far from being usually, even if it isever, the sole thing necessary if the act is to be deemed
to have been performed. Speaking generally, it is always
necessary that the tircumstantes in which the words areuttered should be in some way, or ways, appropriate, and
it is very commonly necessary that either the speakerhimself or other persons should also perform certain
other actions, whether 'physical' or 'mental' actions oreven acts of uttering further words. Thus, for naming
the ship, it is essential that I should be the person
appointed to name her, for (Christian) marrying, it isessential that I should not be already married with a wife

How to do things with Words
living, sane and undivorced, and so on: for a bet to havebeen made, it is generally necessary for the offer of the
bet to have been accepted by a taker (who must havedone something, such as to say 'Done'), and it is hardly
a gift if I say 'I give it you' but never hand it over.
So far, well and good. The action may be performedin ways other than by a performative utterance, and inany case the circumstances, including other actions, must
be appropriate. But we may, in objecting, have something
totally different, and this time quite mistaken, in mind,
especially when we think of some of the more aweinspiring performatives such as 'I promise to . . . 3 .'Surely the words must be spoken 'seriously' and so as tobe taken 'seriously' ? This is, though vague, true enoughin general-it is an important commonplace in discussing
the purport of any utterance whatsoever. I must not be
joking, for example, nor writing a poem. But we are apt
to have a feeling that their being serious consists in their
being uttered as (merely) the outward and visible sign,for convenience or other record or for information, of an
inward and spiritual act: from which it is but a shortstep to go on to believe or to assume without realizingthat for many purposes the outward utterance is a
description, true orfalse, of the occurrence of the inward
performance. The classic expression of this idea is to befound in the Hippolytus (1. 612), where Hippolytus saysi.e. 'my tongue swore to, but my heart (or mind or other

How t o do things with Words
backstage artiste) did not'.' Thus 'I promise to . . .

9\obliges me-puts on record my spiritual assumption ofa spiritual shackle.
It is gratifying to observe in this very example how
excess of profundity, or rather solemnity, at once paves
the way for immodality. For one who says 'promising is
not merely a matter of uttering words! It is an inward
and spiritual act!' is apt to appear as a solid moralist
standing out against a generation of superficial theorizers :we see him as he sees himself, surveying the invisible
depths of ethical space, with all the distinction of a
specialist in the s2ti generis. Yet he provides Hippolytus
with a let-out, the bigamist with an excuse for his 'I do'
and the welsher with a defence for his 'I bet'. Accuracy
and morality alike are on the side of the plain sayingthat our word is our bond.
If we exclude such fictitious inward acts as this, can we
suppose that any of the other things which certainly arenormally required to accompany an utterance such as 'I
promise that . . .' or 'I do (take this woman . . .)' are infact described by it, and consequently do by their presence make it true or by their absence make it false?
Well, taking the latter first, we shall next consider what
we actually do say about the utterance concerned when
one or another of its normal concomitants is absent. In nocase do we say that the utterance was false but rather
But I do not mean to rule out all the offstage perfomers-the lights
men, the stage manager, even the prompter; I am objecting only to
areain officious understudies.
IHow to do things with Words
that the utterance-or rather the act,' e.g. the promisewas void, or given in bad faith, or not implemented, or
the like. In the particular case of promising, as with manyother performatives, it is appropriate that the person
uttering the promise should have a certain intention, viz.
here to keep his word : and perhaps of all concomitants
this looks the most suitable to be that which 'I promise'does describe or record. Do we not actually, when suchintention is absent, speak of a 'false' promise? Yet so to
speak is not to say that the utterance 'I promise that . . .
is false, in the sense that though he states that he does,
he doesn't, or that though he describes he misdescribesmisreports. For he does promise: the promise here is noteven void, though it is given in bad faith. His utterance
is perhaps misleading, probably deceitful and doubtlesswrong, but it is not a lie or a misstatement. At most wemight make out a case for saying that it implies orinsinuates a falsehood or a misstatement (to the effectthat he does intend to do something): but that is a very
different matter. Moreover, we do not speak of a false
bet or a false christening; and that we do speak of a
false promise need commit us no more than the fact thatwe speak of a false move. 'False' is not necessarily used ofstatements only.

I

We shall avoid distinguishing these precisely bemuse the distinction
is not in point.
I

LECTURE I1w

E were to consider, you will remember, somecases and senses (only some, Heaven help us!)in which to say something is to do something; or in which by saying or in saying something weare doing something. This topic is one developmentthere are many others-in the recent movement towards
questioning an age-old assumption in philosophy-theassumption that to say something, at least in all cases
worth considering, i.e. all cases considered, is always andsimply to state something. This assumption is no doubt
unconscious, no doubt is wrong, but it is wholly naturalin philosophy apparently. We must learn to run before
we can walk. If we never made mistakes how should we
correct them ?
I began by drawing your attention, by way of example,
to a few simple utterances of the kind known as performatories or performatives. These have on the face ofthem the look-r
at least the grammatical make-upof 'statements'; but nevertheless they are seen, when moreclosely inspected, to be, quite plainly, not utterances
which could be 'true' or 'false'. Yet to be 'true' or 'false'
is traditionally the characteristic mark of a statement.
One of our examples was, for instance, the utterance 'I
do' (take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife), asHow to do things with Words

13

uttered in the course of a marriage ceremony. Here weshould say that in saying-thesewords we are doing something-namely, marrying, rat her than reporting something, namely that we are marrying. And the act ofmarrying, like, say, the act of betting, is at least preferably(though still not accurately) to be described as saying
certain words, rather than as performing a different, inward and spiritual, action of which these words are merely
the outward and audible sign. That this is SO can perhaps
hardly be proved, but it is, I should claim, a fact.
It is worthy of note that, as I am told, in the American
law of evidence, a report of what someone else said isadmitted as evidence if what he said is an utterance ofour performative kind: because this is regarded as areport not so much of something he said, as which it
would be hear-say and not admissible as evidence, butrather as something he did, an action of his. This coincides
very well with our initial feelings about per formatives.
So far then we have merely felt the firm ground of
prejudice slide away beneath our feet. But now how, as
philosophers, are we to proceed ? One thing we might go
on to do, of course, is to take it all back: another would
be to bog, by logical stages, down. But all this must taketime. Let us first at least concentrate attention on thelittle matter already mentioned in passing-this matterof 'the appropriate circumstances'. T o bet is not, as I
pointed out in passing, merely to utter the words 'I bet,&c.' : someone might do that all right, and yet we might
still not agree that he had in fact, or at least entirely,Hotrto do things with Words
14
succeeded in betting. T o satisf) ourselves of this, wehave only, for example, to announce our bet after therace is over. Besides the uttering of the words of the socalled performative, a good many other things have as a
general rule to be right and to go right if we are to besaid to have happily brought off our action. What these
are we may hope to discover by looking at and classifying
types of case in which something goes wrong and the act-marrying, betting, bequeathing, christening, or what
not-is therefore at least to some extent a failure: theutterance is then, we may say, not indeed false but ingeneral unhappy. And for this reason we call the doctrineof the things that can be and go wrong on the occasion ofsuch utterances, the doctrine of the Infelicities.
Suppose we try first to state schematically-and I do
not wish to claim any sort of finality for this schemesome at least of the things which are necessary for thesmooth or 'happy' functioning of a performative (or atleast of a highly developed explicit performative, such as
we have hitherto been alone concerned with), and thengive examples of infelicities and their effects. I fear, but
at the same time of course hope, that these necessary
conditions to be satisfied will strike you as obvious.
%(A. I) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect, thatprocedure to include the uttering of certain words
by certain persons in certain circumstances, andfurther,

How to do things S t h Words'5(A. 2 ) the particular persons and circumstances in agiven case must be appr~priatefor the invocationof the particular procedure invoked.
(B. I) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly and(B. 2) completely.
( r =I ) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use
by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, orfor the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person
participating in and so invoking the proceduremust in fact have those thoughts or feelings, andthe participants must intend so to conduct themselves,= and further(r.2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently.
Now if we sin against any one (or more) of these six
rules, our performative utterance will be (in one way or
another) unhappy. But, of course, there are considerable
differences between these 'ways' of being unhappyways which are intended to be brought out by the letternumerals selected for each heading.
The first big distinction is between all the four rules
A and B taken together, as opposed to the two rules r(hence the use of Roman as opposed to Greek letters). If
we offend against any of the former rules (A's or B's)
-that is if we, say, utter the formula incorrectly, or if,
It will be explained later why the having of these thoughts, feelings,
and intentions is not included as just one among the other %irmmstances'already dealt with in (A).

16

HODt o do things ~ i t hWords

say, we are not in a position to do the act because we are,say, married already, or it is the purser and not thecaptain who is conducting the ceremony, then the act inquestion, e.g. marrying, is not successfully performed atall, does not come off, is not achieved. Whereas in thetwo r cases the act is achieved, although to achieve it insuch circumstances, as when we are, say, insincere, is an
abuse of the procedure. Thus, when I say 'I promise' andhave no intention of keeping it, I have promised but. . . .
We need names for referring to this general distinction,so we shall call in general those infelicities A. I-B. z
which are such that the act for the performing of which,and in the performing of which, the verbal formula inquestion is designed, is not achieved, by the nameMISFIRES: and on the other hand we may christen thoseinfelicities where the act is achieved A~USES(do not stressthe normal connotations of these names!) When theutterance is a misfire, the procedure which we purport toinvoke is disallowed or is botched: and our act (marrying, &c.) is void or without effect, &c. We speak of ouract as a purported act, or perhaps an attempt-or we use
such an expression as 'went through a form of marriage'by contrast with 'married'. On the other hand, in the rcases, we speak of our infelicitous act as 'professed' or'hollow' rather than 'purported' or 'empty', and as not
implemented, or not consummated, rather than as voidor without effect. But let me hasten to add that these
distinctions are not hard and fast, and more especiallythat such words as 'purported' and 'professed' will notHow to do things mith Words

7
bear very much stressing. Two final words about being
void or without effect. This does not mean, of course, tosay that we won't have done anything: lots of things will
have been done-we shall most interestingly have committed the act of bigamy-but we shall not have done thepurported act, viz. marrying. Because despite the name,you do not when biganrummarry twice. (In short, thealgebra of marriage is BOOLEAN.) Further, 'without effect'
does not here mean 'without consequences, results,
effects'.
Next, we must try to make clear the general distinction
between the A cases and the B cases, among the misfires. In both of the cases labelled A there is misinvo~ationof a procedure-either because there is, speaking vaguely,
no such procedure, or because the procedure in question
cannot be made to apply in the way attempted. Hence
infelicities of this kind A may be called Misinvocations.
Among them, we may reasonably christen the second
sort-where the procedure does exist all right but can't
be applied as purported-Misapplications. But I have notsucceeded in finding a good name for the other, former,
class. By contrast with the A cases, the notion of theB cases is rather that the procedure is all right, and it
does apply all right, but we muff the execution of theritual with more or less dire consequences: so B cases
as opposed to A cases will be called Misexecutions as
opposed to Misinvocations: the purported act is vitiatedby a flaw or hitch in the conduct of the ceremony. The
Class B. I is that of Flaws, the Class B. 2 that of Hitches.
IHOWto do things with Words
We get then the following scheme:'
Infecitr'esrAB
lMisfires
Act purported but void/'A
Misinvocations
Act disallowed\
B'

Misexecutions
Act vitiated? Misapplica- Flaws
tions

Abuses
Act professed but hollow
/'
\

r. I

Insincerities

r. 2
7

Hitches

I expect some doubts will be entertained about A. I andr. 2; but we will postpone them for detailed consideration shortly.
But before p i n g on to details, let me make some
general remarks about these infelicities. We may ask:
(I) To what variety of 'act' does the notion of infelicity apply ?
(2) How complete is this classification of infelicity?
(3) Are these classes of infelicity mutually exclusive?
Let us take these questions in (that) order.
(I) How widespread is infelicity?
Well, it seems clear in the first place that, although it
has excited us (or failed to excite us) in connexion withcertain acts which are or are in part acts of uttering words,
infelicity is an ill to which all acts are heir which have[Austin from time to time used other names for the different infelicities. For interest some are here given: A. r, Non-plays; A. 2, Misplays;
B, Miscarriages; B. I, Misexmtions; B. 2, Non-exemtions; r, Disrespects ;r.I, Dissimulations;r.2, Non-fulfilments, Disloyalties, Infractions, Indisciplines, Breaches. J. 0.U.]

How t o do things with Words

19

the general character of ritual or ceremonial, ail conventional acts: ,not indeed that every ritual is liable toevery form of infelicity (but then nor is every performative utterance). This is clear if only from the mere factthat many conventional acts, such as betting or conveyance of property, can be performed in non-verbal ways.
The same sorts of rule must be observed in all such conventional procedures-we have only to omit the specialreference to verbal utterance in our A. This much is
obvious.
..
But, furthermore, it is worth pointing out-reminding
you-how many of the 'acts' which concern the jurist
are or include the utterance of performatives, or at any
rate are or include the performance of some conventional procedures. And of course you will appreciatethat in this way and that writers on jurisprudence haveconstantly shown themselves aware of the varieties ofinfelicity and even at times of the peculiarities of theperformative utterance. Only the still widespread obsession that the utterances of the law, and utterances usedin, say, 'acts in the law', must somehow be statements
true or false, has prevented many lawyers from getting
this whole matter much straighter than we are likely toand I would not even claim to know whether some ofthem have not already done so. Of more direct concern
to us, however, is to realize that, by the same token, agreat many of the acts which fall within the province of
Ethics are not, as philosophers are too prone -to assume,
simply in the last resort physical movements: very many

Horn t o do things ~ i l hWordsof them have the general character, in whole or part, of
conventional or ritual acts, and are therefore, among
other things, exposed to infelicity.
Lastly we may ask-and here I must let some of mycats on the table-does the nation of infelicity apply toutterances which are statements ? So far we have produced
the infelicity as characteristic of the performative utterance, which was 'defined' (if we can call it so much)mainly by contrast with the supposedly familiar 'statement'. Yet I will content myself here with pointing outthat one of the things that has been happening lately inphilosophy is that close attention has been given evento 'statements' which, though not false exactly nor yeticontradictory', are yet outrageous. For instance, statements which refer to something which does not exist as,
for example, 'The present King of France is bald'. Theremight be a temptation to assimilate this to purporting tobequeath something which you do not own. Is there nota presupposition of existence in each ? Is not a statement
which refers to something which does not exist not somuch false as void ? And the more we consider a statement
not as a sentence (or proposition) but as an act of speech(out of which the others are logical constructions) the
more we are studying the whole thing as an act. Or again,
there are obvious similarities between a lie and a false
promise. We shall have to return to this matter later.'(2) Our second question was: How complete is thisclassification ?
[See pp. 47 ff. J. 0.U.]

Hoa, to do things &th Words(i) Well, the first thing to remember is that, sincein uttering our performatives we are undoubtedly in asound enough sense 'performing actions', then, as actions,these will be subject to certain whole dimensions of
unsatisfactoriness to which all actions are subject but
which are distinct-or distinguishable-from what wehave chosen to discuss as infelicities. I mean that actions
in general (not all) are liable, for example, to be done
under duress, or by accident, or owing to this or thatvariety of mistake, say, or otherwise unintentionally. In
many such cases we are certainly unwilling to say ofsome such act simply that it was done or that he did it.
I am not going into the general doctrine here: in manysuch cases we may even say the act was 'void' (or voidable for duress or undue influence) and so forth. Now
I suppose some very general high-level doctrine mightembrace both what we have called infelicities and theseother 'unhappy' features of the doing of actions-in our..
case actions contamng a performative utterance-in asingle doctrine: but we are not including this kind of
unhappiness-we must just remember, though, thatfeatures of this sort can and do constantly obtrude into
any case we are discussing. Features of this sort would
normally mme under the heading of 'extenuating circumstances' or of 'factors reducing or abrogating theagent's responsibility', and so on.
(ii)- Secondly, as utterances our performatives are also
heir to Grtain other-kinds of ill which infect all utterances. And these likewise, though again they might be-IHow to do things with Words
brought into a more general account, we are deliberately
at present excluding. I mean, for example, the following:a performative utterance will, for example, be in apeculiar way hollow or void if said by an actor on thestage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy.
This applies in a similar manner to any and every uttera n c e a sea-change in special circumstances. Language
in such circumstances is in special ways-intelligiblyused not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal
use-ways which fall under the doctrine of the etiolationsof language. All this we are excluding from consideration.
Our performative utterances, felicitous or not, are to beunderstood as issued in ordinary circumstances.
(iii) It is partly in order to keep this sort of consideration at least for the present out of it, that I have nothere introduced a sort of 'infelicity'-it might really becalled such-arising out of 'misunderstanding'. It is
obviously necessary that to have promised I must normally(A) have been heard by someone, perhaps the promisee ;(B) have been understood by him as promising.
If one or another of these conditions is not satisfied,
doubts arise as to whether I have really promised, and it
might be held that my act was only attempted or was
void. Special precautions are taken in law to avoid thisand other infelicities, e.g. in the serving of writs orsummonses. This particular very important considera-

How t o do things with Words

23

tion we shall have to return to later in another connexion.

(3) Are these cases of infelicity mutually exclusive? The
answer to this is obvious. .
(a) No, in the sense that we can go wrong in two ways
at once (we can insincerely promise a donkey to give it
a carrot).
(b) No, more importantly, in the sense that the waysof going wrong 'shade into one another' and 'overlap',
and the decision between them is 'arbitrary' in various
ways.
Suppose, for example, I see a vessel on the stocks, walkup and smash the bottle hung at the stem, proclaim 'I
name this ship the Mr. Stalin' and for good measurekick away the chocks: but the trouble is, I was not theperson chosen to name it (whether or not-an additional
complication-Mr. Stalin was the destined name ; perhaps in a way it is even more of a shame if it was). We
can all agree( I ) that the ship was not thereby named;=(2) that it is an infernal shame.
One could say that I 'went through a form of' naming
the vessel but that my 'action' was 'void' or 'without
effect', because I was not a proper person, had not
the 'capacity', to perform it: but one might also andNaming babies is even more d&cult; we might have the wrong
name and the wrong cleric-that is, someone entided to name babies
but not intended to name this one.
IHow to do things with Words
alternatively say that, where there is not even a pretenceof capacity or a colourable claim to it, then there is noaccepted conventional procedure; it is a-mockery, likea marriage with a monkey. Or again one could say thatpart of the procedure is getting oneself appointed. Whenthe saint baptized the penguins, was this void because
the procedure of baptizing is inappropriate to be applied
to penguins, or because there is no accepted procedureof baptizing anything except humans ? Z do not thinkthat these uncertainties matter in theory, though it ispleasant to investigate them and in practice convenient
to be ready, as jurists are, with a terminology to copewith them.

LECTURE I11

I

N our first lecture we isolated in a preliminary way
the performative utterance as not, or not merely,
saying something but doing something, as not a trueor false report of something. In the second, we pointed
out that though it was not ever true or false it still was
subject to criticism--could be unhappy, and we listed
six of these types of infelicity. Of these, four were suchas to make the utterance Misfire, and the act purported
to be done null and void, so that it does not take effect;
while two, on the contrary, only made the professed act
an abuse of the procedure. So then we may seem to havearmed ourselves with two shiny new concepts with whichto crack the crib of Reality, or as it may be, of Confusion-two new keys in our hands, and of course, simultaneously two new skids under our feet. In philosophy,
forearmed should be forewarned. I then stalled aroundfor some time by discussing some general questions about
the concept of the Infelicity, and set it in its generalplace in a new map of the field. I claimed (I) that it
applied to all ceremonial acts, not merely verbal ones,
and that these are more common than is appreciated;
I admitted (2) that our list was not complete, and that
there are indeed other whole dimensions of what might
be reasonably called 'unhappiness' affecting ceremonial

How t o do things with Words
performances in general and utterances in general, dimensions which are certainly the concern of philosophers; and(3) that, of course, different infelicities can be combinedor can overlap and that it can be more or less an optional
matter how we classify some given particular example.
We were next to take some examples of infelicitiesof the inftingement of our six rules. Let me first remind
you of rule A. I, that there must exist an accepted conventionaI procedure having a certain conventional effect,that procedure to include the uttering of certain words
by certain persons in certain circumstances; and rule
A. 2 of course, completing it, was that the particularpersons and circumstances in a given case must be
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure
invoked.
There must exist an accepted conventional procedure
having a certain conventional efect, the procedure to include the uttering of certain words by certain persons incertain circumstances.

The latter part, of course, is simply designed to restrict
the rule to cases of utterances, and is not important in
Our formulation of this rule contains the two words'exist' and 'accepted' but we may reasonably ask whether
there can be any sense to 'exist' except 'to be accepted',
and whether 'be in (general) use' should not be preferred
to both. Hence we must not say '(I) exist, (2) be accepted'

Horn to do things with Words

27

at any rate. Well, in deference to this reasonable query,

let us take just 'accepted'jrst.
If somebody issues a performative utterance, and theutterance is classed as a misfire because the procedure
invoked is not accepted, it is presumably persons otherthan the speaker who do not accept it (at least if the
speaker is speaking seriously). What would be an example? Consider 'I divorce you', said to a wife by herhusband in a Christian country, and both being Christians rather than Mohammedans. In this case it might
be said, 'nevertheless he has not (successfully) divorced
her: we admit only some other verbal or nowverbal procedure'; or even possibly 'we (we) do not admit any
procedure at all for effecting divorce-marriage is indissoluble'. This may be carried so far that we reject what
may be called a whole code of procedure, e.g. the code ofhonour involving duelling : for example, a challenge may
be issued by 'my seconds will call on you', which isequivalent to 'I challenge you', and we merely shrug it off.
The general position is exploited in the unhappy story of
Don Quixote.
Of course, it will be evident that it is comparatively
simple if we never admit any 'such' procedure at allthat is, any procedure at all for doing that sort of thing,or that procedure anyway for doing that particular thing.
But equally possible are the cases where we do sometimes-in certain circumstances or at certain hands-accept
a procedure, but not in any other circumstances or atother hands. And here we may often be in doubt (as inHow t o do things with Words
the naming example above) whether an infelicity should
be brought into our present class A. I or rather into
A. 2 (or even B. I or B. 2). For example, at a party, yousay, when picking sides, 'I pick George': George grunts'I'm not playing.' Has George been picked? Undoubtedly, the situation is an unhappy one. Well, we
may say, you have not picked George, whether because
there is no convention that you can pick people who
aren't playing or because George in the circumstances is
an inappropriate object for the procedure of picking. Or
on a desert island you may say to me 'Go and pick up
wood'; and I may say 'I don't take orders from you' or'you're not entitled to give me orders9-I do not takeorders from you when you try to 'assert your authority'(which I might fall in with but may not) on a desert
island, as opposed to the case when you are the captainon a ship and therefore genuinely have authority.
Now we could say, bringing the case under A. 2
(Misapplication): the procedure-uttering certain words,&c.-was O.K. and accepted, but the circumstances inwhich it was invoked or the persons who invoked it were
wrong: 'I pick' is only in order when the object of theverb is 'a player', and a command is in order only when
the subject of the verb is 'a commander' or 'an authority'.
Or again we could say, bringing the case under rule
B.2 (and perhaps we should reduce the former suggestion
to this): the procedure has not been completely executed;
because it is a necessary part of it that, say, the person
to be the object of the verb 'I order to . . .' must, byHOWt o do things with Words

29

some previous procedure, tacit or verbal, have first constituted the person who is to do the ordering an authority,e.g. by saying 'I promise to do what you order me to do.'This is, of course, one of the uncertainties-and a purely
general one really-which underlie the debate when we
discuss in political theory whether there is or is not orshould be a social contract.
It appears to me that it does not matter in principle
at all how we decide in particular cases-though we may
agree, either on the facts or by introducing further definitions, to prefer one solution rather than another-butthat it is important in principle to be clear:(I) asagainst B. 2 that however much we take into the prw
cedure it would still be possible for someone to reject it all;(2) that for a procedure to be accepted involves morethan for it merely to be the case that it is infact generally
ztsed, even actually by the persons now concerned; andthat it must remain in principle open for anyone toreject any procedure-or code of procedures-even one
that he has already hitherto accepted-as may happen
with, for example, the code of honour. One who does
so is, of course, liable to sanctions; others refuse to playwith him or say that he is not a man of honour. Above all
all must not be put into flat factual circumstances; forthis is subject to the old objection to deriving an 'ought'from an 'is'. (Being accepted is not a circumstance in theright sense.) With many procedures, for example playing games, however appropriate the circumstances may
be I may still not be playing, and, further, we should

30

How to do things with Words

contend that in the last resort it is doubtful if 'being
accepted' is definable as being 'usual1y' employed. But
this is a more difficult matter.
Now secondly, what could be meant by the suggestionthat sometimes a procedure may not even exist-as distinct from the question whether it is accepted, and by
this or that group, or not ?I(i) We have the case of procedures which 'no longer exist'
merely in the sense that though once generally accepted,
they are no longer generally accepted, or even acceptedby anybody; for example the case of challenging; and(ii) we have even the case of procedures which someone is initiating. Sometimes he may 'get away with it'
like, in football, the man who first picked up the balland ran. Getting away with things is essential, despite
the suspicious terminology. Consider a possible case: tosay 'you were cowardly' may be to reprimand you or toinsult you: and I can make my performance explicit bysaying 'I reprimand you', but I cannot do so by saying'I insult you'-the reasons for this do not matter here.=If we object here to saying that there is doubt whether it 'existspas well we may, for the word gives us currently fashionable creeps which
are in general undoubtedly legitimate, we might say that the doubt israther as to the precise nature or dehition or comprehension of theprocedure which undoubtedly does exist and is accepted.
a Many such possible procedures and formulas would be disadvantageous if mgnized; for example, perhaps we ought not to allow theformula 'I promise you that I'll t h h you'. But I am told that in theheyday of student duelling in Germany it was the custom for membersof one club to march past members of a rival club, each drawn up mfile, and then for each to say to his chosen opponent as he passed, quite
politely, 'Bcleidigung', which means 'I insult you'.

How t o do things mith Words

31

All that does matter is that a special variety of non-play1
can arise if someone does say 'I insult you': for whileinsulting is a conventional procedure, and indeed primarily a verbal one, so that in a way we cannot help
understanding the procedure that someone who says 'I
insult you' is purporting to invoke, yet we are bound to
non-play him, not merely because the convention is not
accepted, but because we vaguely feel the presence ofsome bar, the nature of which is not immediately clear,against its ever being accepted.
Much more common, however, will be cases where it isuncertain how far a procedure extends-which cases it
covers or which varieties it could be made to cover. It
is inherent in the nature of any procedure that the limitsof its applicability, and therewith, of course, the 'precise'definition of the procedure, will remain vague. There will
always occur difficult or marginal cases where nothing
in the previous history of a conventional procedure will
decide conclusively whether such a procedure is or is
not correctly applied to such a case. Can I baptize adog, if it is admittedly rational? Or should I be nonplayed? The law abounds in such difficult decisionsin which, of course, it becomes more or less arbitrary
whether we regard ourselves as deciding (A. I) thata convention does not exist or as deciding (A. 2) that thecircumstances are not appropriate for the invocation of['Non-play' was at one time Austin's name for the category A. I of
infelicities. He later rejected it but it remains in his notes at this point.

J. 0.U.]

How t o do things with Words
a convention which undoubtedly does exist: either way,
we shall tend to be bound by the 'precedent' we set.
Lawyers usually prefer the latter course, as being toapply rather than to make law.
There is, however, a further type of case which may
arise, which might be classified in many ways, but which
deserves a special mention.
The performative utterances I have taken as examples
are all of them highly developed affairs, of the kind that
we shall later call explicit performatives, by contrast withmerely implicit performatives. That is to say, they (all)begin with or include some highly significant and unambiguous expression such as 'I bet', 'I promise', 'I
bequeath'-an expression very commonly also used innaming the act which, in making such an utterance, I am
performing-for example betting, promising, bequeathing, &c. But, of course, it is both obvious and importantthat we can on occasion use the utterance 'go' to achievepractically the same as we achieve by the utterance 'I
order you to go' : and we should say cheerfully in either
case, describing subsequently what someone did, that heordered me to go. It may, however, be uncertain in fact,and, so far as the mere utterance is concerned, is always
left uncertain when we use so inexplicit a formula as themere imperative 'go', whether the utterer is ordering(or is purporting to order) me to go or merely advising,entreating, or what not me to go. Similarly 'There is abull in the field' may or may not be a warning, for I

How t o do things with Words
might just be describing the scenery and 'I shall be there'
may or may not be a promise. Here we have primitive
as distinct from explicit performatives; and there may
be nothing in the circumstances by which we can decide
whether or not the utterance is performative at all. Anyway, in a given situation it can be open to me to take it
as either one or the other. It was a performative formulaperhaps-but the procedure in question was not sufficiently explicitly invoked. Perhaps I did not take it as anorder or was not anyway bound to take it as an order.
The person did not take it as a promise: i.e. in theparticular circumstance he did not accept the procedure,on the ground that the ritual was incompletely carriedout by the original speaker.
We could assimilate this to a faulty or incomplete performance (B. I or B. 2) : except that it is complete really,
though not unambiguous. (In the law, of course, thiskind of inexplicit performative will normally be brought
under B. I or B. 2-it is made a rule that to bequeath
inexplicitly, for instance, is either an incorrect or an
incomplete performance; but in ordinary life there is nosuch rigidity.) We could also assimilate it to Misunderstandings (which we are not yet considering): but itwould be a special kind, concerning the force of theutterance as opposed to its meaning. And the point is
not here just that the audience did not understand butthat it did not have to understand, e.g. to take it as anorder.
We might indeed even assimilate it to A. 2 by saying
824181D

34

HOWto do thilzgs with Words

that the procedure is not designed for use where it is
not clear that it is being used-which use makes it
altogether void. We might claim that it is only to be
used in circumstances which make it unambiguously
clear that it is being used. But this is a counsel of perfection.

A. 2. The particular persons and circumstances in a given
case must be appropriate for the invocation of theparticular procedure invoked.
We turn next to infringements of A. 2, the type ofinfelicity which we have called Misapplications. Examples
here are legion. 'I appoint you', said when you havealready been appointed, or when someone else has been
appointed, or when I am not entitled to appoint, or
when you are a horse: 'I do', said when you are in theprohibited degrees of relationship, or before a ship's
captain not at sea: 'I give', said when it is not mine togive or when it is a pound of my living and non-detachedflesh. We have various special terms for use in different
types of case-'ultra vires', c incapacity', 'not a fit orproper object (or person, &c.)Y ,'not entitled', and so on,
The boundary between 'inappropriate persons' and'inappropriate circumstances' will necessarily not be avery hard and fast one. Indeed 'circumstances' canclearly be extended to cover in general 'the natures' of
all persons participating. But we must distinguish between
cases where the inappropriateness of persons, objects,
names, &c., is a matter of 'incapacity' and simpler cases

How to do things with Words
where the object or 'performer' is of the wrong kind or
type. This again is a roughish and vanishing distinction,
yet not without importance (in, say, the law). Thus wemust distinguish the cases of a clergyman baptizing thewrong baby with the right name or baptizing a baby
'Albert' instead of 'Alfred', from those of saying 'I
baptize this infant 2704' or 'I promise I will bash yourface in' or appointing a horse as Consul. In the latter
cases there is something of the wrong kind or typeincluded, whereas in the others the inappropriatenessis only a matter of incapacity.
Some overlaps of A. 2 with A. I and B. I have alreadybeen mentioned: perhaps we are more likely to call it amisinvocation (A. I) if the person as such is inappropriate
than if it is just because it is not the duly appointed oneif nothing-antecedent procedure or appointment, &c.
- c o u l d have put the matter in order. On the other hand,
if we take the question of appointment literally (position
as opposed to status) we might class the infelicity as amatter of wrongly executed rather than as misapplied
procedure-for example, if we vote for a candidate
before he has been nominated. The question here is how
far we are to go back in the 'procedure'.
Next we have examples of B (already, of course,
trenched upon) called Misexecutions.

B. I . The procedure must be executed by all participants
correctly.
These are flaws. They consist in the use of, for example,

How to do thifigs pith Words
wrong formulas-there is a procedure which is appropriate to the persons and the circumstances, but it is
not gone through correctly. Examples are more easily
seen in the law; they are naturally not so definite inordinary life, where allowances are made. The use of
inexplicit formulas might be put under this heading.
Also under this heading falls the use of vague formulas
and uncertain references, for example if I say 'my house'
when I have two, or if I say 'I bet you the race won't
be run today' when more than one race was arranged.
This is a different question from that of misunderstanding or slow up-take by the audience; a flaw in theritual is involved, however the audience took it. One of
the things that cause particular difficulty is the question
whether when two parties are involved 'consensus adidem' is necessary. Is it essential for me to secure correctunderstanding as well as everything else? In any case thisis clearly a matter falling under the B rules and not underthe I' rules.

B. 2 . The procedure must be executed by all participants
completely.

These are hitches; we attempt to carry out the procedure but the act is abortive. For example : my attempt
to make a bet by saying 'I bet you sixpence' is abortive
unless you say 'I take you on' or words to that effect;
my attempt to marry by saying 'I will' is abortive if thewoman says 'I will not'; my attempt to challenge you
is abortive if I say 'I challenge you' but I fail to sendHow to do things with Words
round my seconds; my attempt ceremonially to open alibrary is abortive if I say 'I open this library' but the
key snaps in the lock; conversely the christening of aship is abortive if I kick away the chocks before I havesaid 'I launch this ship'. Here again, in ordinary life, acertain laxness in procedure is permitted-therwisenouniversity business would ever get done!
Naturally sometimes uncertainties about whether anything further is required or not will arise. For example,
are you required to accept the gift if I am to give you
something? Certainly in formal business acceptance isrequired, but is this ordinarily so ? Similar uncertainty
arises if an appointment is made without the consent of
the person appointed. The question here is how far canacts be unilateral ? Similarly the question arises as to when
the act is at an end, what counts as its ~ompletion?~
In all this I would remind you that we were not invoking such further dimensions of unhappiness as may arise
from, say, the performer making a simple mistake of fact
or from disagreements over matters of fact, let alone
disagreements of opinion; for example, there is no convention that I can promise you to do something to yourdetriment, thus putting myself under an obligation to
you to do it; but suppose I say 'I promise to send you
to a nunnery'-when I think, but you do not, that thiswill be for your good, or again when you think it will
but I do not, or even when we both think it will, but in
It might thus be doubted whether failure to hand a gift over is a
failure to complete the gift or an infelicity of rype r.
IHorn to do things tpith Words
fact, as may transpire, it will not ? Have I invoked anon-existent convention in inappropriate circumstances ?
Needless to say, and as a matter of general principle,
there can be no satisfactory choice between these alternatives, which are too unsubtle to fit subtle cases. Thereis no short cut to expounding simply the full complexityof the situation which does not exactlv fit anv common

It may appear in all this that we have merely been
taking back our rules. But this is not the case. Clearly
there are these six possibilities of infelicity even if it issometimes uncertain which is involved in a particularcase : and we might define them, a t least for given cases, if
we wished. And we must at all costs avoid over-simplification, which one might be tempted to call the occupational
disease of philosophers if it were not their occupation.

LECTURE I V
T AS T time we were considering cases of Infelicities:

Land we dealt with cases where there was no procedure or no accepted procedure: where the procedure was invoked in inappropriate circumstances; andwhere the procedure was faultily executed or incompletely
executed. And we pointed out that in particular cases
these can be made to overlap; and that they generally
overlap with Misunderstandings, a type of infelicity towhich all utterances are probably liable, and Mistakes.
The last type of case is that of r. I and r.2, insincerities and infractions or breaches.' Here, we say, the performance is not void, although it is still unhappy.
Let me repeat the definitions :r. I : where, as often, the procedure is designed foruse by persons having certain thoughts, feelings, or intentions, or for the inauguration of certain consequential
conduct on the part of any participant, then a person
participating in and so invoking the procedure must infact have those thoughts, feelings, or intentions, and theparticipants must intend so to conduct themselves;r.2 :and the participants must so conduct themselves

subsequently .

See p. 18 and footnote.

Hop to do things ~ i t hWords
I . Feelings

Examples of not having the requisite feelings are:
'I congratulate you', said when I did not feel at allpleased, perhaps even was annoyed.
'I condole with you', said when I did not really
sympathize with you.
The circumstances here are in order and the act is performed, not void, but it is actually insincere; I had nobusiness to congratulate you or to condole with you,feeling as I did.
Examples of not having the requisite thoughts are:'I advise you to', said when I do not think it would be
the course most expedient for you.
'I find him not quilty-I acquit', said when I do
believe that he was guilty.
These acts are not void. I do advise and bring a verdict,though insincerely. Here there is an obvious parallelwith one element in lying, in performing a speech-act
of an assertive kind.

3. Intentions
Examples of not having the requisite intentions are:'I promise', said when I do not intend to do what I
promise.
'I bet', said when I do not intend to pay.
'I declare war', said when I do not intend to fight.

HOWt o do things with Words

41

I am not using the terms 'feelings', 'thoughts', and'intentions' in a technical as opposed to a loose way.
But some comments are necessary:(I) The distinctions are so loose that the cases are notnecessarily easily distinguishable: and anyway, of course,
the cases can be combined and usually are combined.
For example, if I say 'I congratulate you', must we reallyhave a feeling or rather a thought that you have doneor deserved well? Have I a thought or a feeling that it
was highly creditable ? Or again in the case of promising
I must certainly intend: but I must also think what I
promise feasible and think perhaps that the promisee
thinks it to be to his advantage, or think that it is to hisadvantage.
(2) We must distinguish really thinking it to be sofor example that he was guilty, that the deed was done
by him, or that the credit was his, the feat was performedby him-from what we think to be so really being so,
the thought being correct as opposed to mistaken. (Similarly, we can distinguish really feeling so from what we
feel being justified, and really intending to from what we
intend being feasible.) But thoughts are a most interesting, i.e. a confusing, case: there is insincerity here which
is an essential element in lying as distinct from merely
saying what is in fact false. Examples are thinking when
I say 'not guilty' that the deed was done by him, or
thinking when I say 'I congratulate' that the feat was
not performed by him. But I may in fact be mistaken inso thinking.

Hotp t o do things pith Words
If some at least of our thoughts are incorrect (asopposed to insincere), this may result in an infelicity ofcourse of a different kind:(a) I may give something which is not in fact (though
I think it is) mine to give. We might say that this is'Misapplication', that the circumstances, objects, persons, &c., are not appropriate for the procedure of giving.
But we must remember that we said that we would ruleout the whole dimension of what might well be called
Infelicity but which arose from mistake and misunderstanding. It should be noted that mistake will not ingeneral make an act void, though it may make it exc~sable.
(b) 'I advise you to do X' is a performative utterance;
consider the case of my advising you to do somethingwhich is not in fact at all in your interest, though I
think it is. This case is quite different from (1)' in that
here there is no temptation at all to think that the actof advising might be perhaps void or voidable, and likewise there is no temptation to think it insincere. Rather..
we here introduce an entirely new dimension of c r ~ t ~ a s magain; we would criticize this as bad advice. That an act
is happy or felicitous in all our ways does not exempt itfrom all criticism. We shall come back to this.
(3) More difficult than either of these cases is one towhich we shall also return later. There is a class of performatives which I call verdictives: for example, when
we say 'I find the accused guilty' or merely 'wilty', or
4[This presumably refers to the examples at the top of p. 4 4 noton p. 41. The manuscript gives no guidance. J. 0.U.]

Horn to do things toith Wwds

43

when the umpire says 'out'. When we say 'guilty', thisis happy in a way if we sincerely think on the evidence
that he did it. But, of course, the whole point of theprocedure in a way is to be correct; it may even be
scarcely a matter of opinion, as above. Thus when theumpire says 'over', this terminates the over. But again
we may have a 'bad' verdict: it may either be unjustifed(jury) or even incorrect (umpire). So here we have a very
unhappy situation. But still it is not infelicitous in anyof our senses: it is not void (if the umpire says 'out', thebatsman is out; the umpire's decision is final) and notinsincere. However, we are not concerned now with these
impending troubles but only to distinguish insincerity.
(4) In the case of intention too there are certain special
awkwardnesses:(a) We have already noticed the dubiety about what
constitutes a subsequent action and what is merely thecompletion or consummation of the one, single, total
action: for example, it is hard to determine the relation
between'I give' and surrendering possession,'I do' (take this woman &c.) and consummation.
'I sell' and completion of sale :though the distinction is easy in the case of promising.
So there are similar possibilities of drawing distinctions
in different ways over what is the requisite intention of
performing a subsequent action and what is the requisite
intention to complete the present action. This does notHow to do things tpith Words
raise any trouble in principle, however, about the concept of insincerity.
(b) We have distinguished roughly cases where you
must have certain intentions from more particular cases
where you must intend to carry out a certain further
course of action, where use of the given procedure
was precisely designed to inaugurate it (whether making
it obligatory or permissive). Instances of this more
specialized procedure are undertaking to perform anaction, of course, and probably also christening. The
whole point of having such a procedure is precisely tomake certain subsequent conduct in order and other conduct out of order: and of course for many purposes, with,for example, legal formulas, this goal is more and morenearly approached. But other cases are not so easy: I may,for example, express my intention simply by saying 'I
shall. . .'. I must, of course, have the intention, if I am
not to be insincere, at the time of my utterance: butwhat exactly is the degree or mode of the infelicity if I
do not afterwards do it ? Or again, in 'I bid you welcome',to say which is to welcome, intentions of a kind arepresumably vaguely necessary : but what if one then behaves churlishly ? Or again, I give you advice and you
accept it, but then I round on you: how far is it obligatory
on me not to do so ? Or am I just 'not expected' to do so ? :or is part of asking-and-taking advice definitely to makesuch subsequent conduct out of order ? Or similarly, I
entreat you to do something, you accede, and then I
protest-am I out of order? Probably yes. But there is a

How to do thiflgs with Words
constant tendency to make this sort of thing clearer, as
for example, when we move from 'I forgive' to 'I
pardon' or from 'I will' either to 'I intend' or to 'I
promise'.
So much then for ways in which performative utterances can be unhappy, with the result that the 'act' concerned is merely purported or professed, &c. Now in
general this amounted to saying, if you prefer jargon,that certain conditions have to be satisfied if the utterance is to be happy--certain things have to be so. And
this, it seems clear, commits us to saying that for acertain performative utterance to be happy, certain statements have to be true. This in itself is no doubt a very
trivial result of our investigations. Well, to avoid at least
the infelicities that we have considered,(I) what are these statements that have to be true ? and(2) can we say anything exciting about the relation of
the performative utterance to them?
Remember that we said in the first Lecture that we might
in some sense or way impdy lots of things to be so when
we say 'I promise', but this is completely different fromsaying that the utterance, 'I promise', is a statement, trueor false, that these things are so. I shall take some important things which must be true if the performance is tobe happy (not all-but even these will now seem boring
and trivial enough: I hope so, for that will mean 'obvious'by now).
Now if when, for example, I say 'I apologize' 1-do

46

How to do things with Words

apologize, so that we can now say, I or he did definitely
apologize, then(I) it is true and not false that I am doing (have done)
something-actually numerous things, but in particular that I am apologizing (have apologized);( 2 ) it is true and not false that certain conditions do
obtain, in particular those of the kind specified in
our Rules A. I and A. 2;(3) it is true and not false that certain other conditions
obtain of our kind r,in particular that I am thinking something; and(4) it is true and not false that I am committed todoing something subsequently.
Now strictly speaking and importantly, the sense inwhich 'I apologize' implies the truth of each one ofthese has already been explained-we have been explaining this very thing. But what is of interest is to compare
these 'implications' of p erformative utterances with certain discoveries made comparatively recently about the'implications' of the contrasted and preferred type ofutterance, the statement or constative utterance, whichitself, unlike the performative, is true or false.
First to take (I): what is the relation between theutterance, 'I apologize', and the fact that I am apologizing? It is important to see that this is different from therelation between 'I am running' and the fact that I am
running (or in case that is not a genuine 'mere' reportbetween 'he is running' and the fact that he is running).

How t o do things with Words
This difference is marked in English by the use of the
non-continuous present in performative formulas : it isnot, however, necessarily marked in all languages-which
may lack a continuous present-or even always in English.
We might say: in ordinary cases, for example running,
it is the fact that he is running which makes the statement that he is running true; or again, that the truthof the constative utterance 'he is running' depends on
his being running. Whereas in our case it is the happinessof the performative 'I apologize' which makes it the factthat I am apologizing: and my success in apologizing
depends on the happiness of the performative utterance'I apologize'. This is one way in which we might justifl
the 'per formative-constative' distinction-the distinction between doing and saying.
We shall next consider three of the many ways inwhich a statement implies the truth of certain otherstatements. One of those that I shall mention has beenlong known. The others have been discovered quite
recently. We shall not put the matter too technically,
though this can be done. I refer to the discovery that theways we can do wrong, speak outrageously, in uttering
conjunctions of 'factual' statements, are more numerous than merely by contradiction (which anyway is acomplicated relation which requires both definition andexplanation).
I.

Entails'All men blush' entails 'some men blush'. We cannot

48

How t o do things with Words

say 'All men blush but not any men blush', or 'the cat
is under the mat and the cat is on top of the mat' or'the cat is on the mat and the cat is not on the mat',since in each case the first clause entails the contradictory of the second.

My saying 'the cat is on the mat' implies that I believe
it is, in a sense of 'implies' just noticed by G. E. Moore.
We cannot say 'the cat is on the mat but I do not believe
it is'. (This is actually not the ordinary use of 'implies':'implies' is really weaker: as when we say 'He impliedthat I did not know it' or 'You implied you knew it (asdistinct from believing it)'.)3. Presupposes'All Jack's children are bald' presupposes that Jack
has some children. We cannot say 'All Jack's children arebald but Jack has no children', or 'Jack has no children
and all his children are bald'.
There is a common feeling of outrage in all thesecases. But we must not use some blanket term, 'implies'
or 'contradiction', because there are very great differences. There are more ways of killing a cat than drowning it in butter; but this is the sort of thing (as theproverb indicates) we overlook: there are more ways ofoutraging speech than contradiction merely. The major
questions are: how many ways, and why they outrage
speech, and wherein the outrage lies ?

How to do things with Words
Let us contrast the three cases in familiar ways:
I . Entails

If p entails q then -4 entails -p : if 'the cat is on
the mat' entails 'the mat is under the cat' then 'the
mat is not under the cat' entails 'the cat is not on themat'. Here the truth of a proposition entails the truthof a further proposition or the truth of one is inconsistent
with the truth of another.
2. Implies

This is different: if my saying that the cat is on themat implies that I believe it to be so, it is not the casethat my not believing that the cat is on the mat implies
that the cat is not on the mat (in ordinary English). Andagain, we are not concerned here with the inconsistencyof propositions: they are perfectly compatible: it may
be the case at once that the cat is on the mat but I do
not believe that it is. But we cannot in the other casesay 'it may be the case at once that the cat is on the mat
but the mat is not under the cat'. Or again, here it issaying that 'the cat is on the mat', which is not possible
along with saying 'I do not believe that it is'; the assertion implies a belief.
3. Presupposes
This again is unlike entailment: if 'John's children are
bald' presupposes that John has children, it is not truethat John's having no children presupposes that John'sHow to do things with Words
50
children are not bald. Moreover again, both 'John'schildren are bald' and 'John's children are not bald'alike presuppose that John has children: but it is not thecase that both 'the cat is on the mat' and 'the cat is noton the mat' alike entail that the cat is below the mat.
Let us consider first 'implies' and then 'presupposes'

over again :Implies
Suppose I did say 'the cat is on the mat' when it is
not the case that I believe that the cat is on the mat,what should we say ? Clearly it is a case of insincerity. In
other words: the unhappiness here is, though affecting
a statement, exactly the same as the unhappiness infecting'I promise . . .' when I do not intend, do not believe, &c.
The insincerity of an assertion is the same as the insincerity of a promise. 'I promise but do not intend' isparallel to 'it is the case but I do not believe it'; to say'I promise', without intending, is parallel to saying 'itis the case' without believing.

Presupposition
Next let us consider presupposition: what is to besaid of the statement that 'John's children are all bald'if made when John has no children? It is usual now to
say that it is not false because it is devoid of reference;reference is necessary for either truth or falsehood. (Is itthen meaningless? It is not so in every sense: it is not,like a 'meaningless sentence', ungrammatical, incom-

How t o do things with Words

51

plete, mumbo-jumbo, &c.) People say 'the question does
not arise'. Here I shall say 'the utterance is void'.
Compare this with our infelicity when we say 'I
name . . .',but some of the conditions (A. I) and (A. 2)
are not satisfied (specially A. 2 perhaps, but reallyequally-a parallel presupposition to A. I exists withstatements also!). Here we might have used the 'presuppose' formula: we might say that the formula 'I do'
presupposes lots of things : if these are not satisfied theformula is unhappy, void: it does not succeed in being
a contract when the reference fails (or even when it isambiguous) any more than the other succeeds in being astatement. Similarly the question of goodness or badnessof advice does not arise if you are not in a position toadvise me about that matter.
Lastly, it might be that the way in which in entailment one proposition entails another is not unlike theway 'I promise' entails 'I ought': it is not the same, but
it is parallel: 'I promise but I ought not' is parallel to'it is and it is not'; to say 'I promise' but not to performthe act is parallel to saying both 'it is' and 'it is not'.
Just as the purpose of assertion is defeated by an internal
contradiction (in which we assimilate and contrast atonce and so stultify the whole procedure), the purpose of
a contract is defeated if we say 'I promise and I ought
not'. This commits you to it and refuses to commit you
to it. It is a self-stultifying procedure. One assertion
commits us to another assertion, one performance toanother performance. Moreover, just as if p entails q

How to do things with Words
then -4 entails -p, SO 'I ought not' entails 'I do not
52

promise'.
In conclusion, we see that in order to explain what cango wrong with statements we cannot just concentrate on
the proposition involved (whatever that is) as has been
done traditionally. We must consider the total situationin which the utterance is issued-the total speech-actif we are to see the parallel between statements andperformative utterances, and how each can go wrong.
Perhaps indeed there is no great distinction between
statements and performative utterances.

LECTURE V
T the end of the previous lecture we were reconsidering the question of the relations between
the performative utterance and statements ofvarious kinds which certainly are true or false. We mentioned as specially notable four such connexions:(I) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is happy,
then the statement that I am apologizing is true.
(2) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be
happy, then the statement that certain conditions obtain-those notably in Rules A. r and A. 2-must be true.
(3) If the performative utterance 'I apologize' is to be
happy, then the statement that certain other conditions
obtain-those notably in our rule r. I-must be true.
(4) If performative utterances of at least some kinds
are happy, for example contractual ones, then statementsof the form that I ought or ought not subsequently to dosome particular thing are true.
I was saying that there seemed to be some similarity,and perhaps even an identity, between the second of theseconnexions and the phenomenon which has been called,in the case of statements as opposed to performatives,'presupposition' : and likewise between the third of theseconnexions and the phenomenon called (sometimes andnot, to my mind, correctly) in the case of statements,

A54

How t o do things with Words'implication'; these, presupposition and implication,
being two ways in which the ~ u t ofh a statement may beconnected importantly with the truth of another without
it being the case that the one entails the other in the sole
sort of sense preferred by obsessional logicians. Only the
fourth and last of the above connexions could be madeout-I do not say how satisfactorily-to resemble entailment between statements. 'I promise to do X but I am
under no obligation to do it' may certainly look more
like a self-contradiction-whatever that is-than 'I
promise to do X but I do not intend to do it': also 'I am
under no obligation to do p' might be held to entail 'I
did not promise to do p', and one might think that theway in which a certain p commits me to a certain q is notunlike the way in which promising to do X commits me
to doing X. But I do not want to say that there is or is not
any parallel here; only that at least there is a very close
parallel in the other two cases; which suggest that atleast in some ways there is danger of our initial andtentative distinction between constative and performativeutterances breaking down.
We may, however, fortify ourselves in the convictionthat the distinction is a final one by reverting to the oldidea that the constative utterance is true or false and theperformative is happy or unhappy. Contrast the fact that
I am apologizing, which depends on the performative 'I
apologize' being happy, with the case of the statement'John is running', which depends for its truth on its
being the fact or case that John is running. But perhaps

How to do things with Words
this contrast is not so sound either: for, to take statements
first, connected with the utterance (constative) 'John isrunning' is the statement 'I am stating that John isrunning': and this may depend for its truth on thehappiness of 'John is running', just as the truth of 'I amapologizing' depends on the happiness of 'I apologize'.
And, to take performatives second : connected with theperformative ( I presume it is one) 'I warn you that thebull is about to charge' is the fact, if it is one, that the bull
is about to charge: if the bull is not, then indeed theutterance 'I warn you that the bull is about to charge'is open to criticism-but not in any of the ways we have
hitherto characterized as varieties of unhappiness. We
should not in this case say the warning was void-i.e.
that he did not warn but only went through a form of
warning-nor that it was insincere: we should feel much
more inclined to say the warning was false or (better)mistaken, as with a statement. So that considerations of
the happiness and unhappiness type may infect statements (or some statements) and considerations of thetype of truth and falsity may infect performatives (orsome performatives).
We have then to take a further step out into the desertof comparative precision. We must ask: is there some
precise way in which we can definitely distinguish theperformative from the constative utterance? And inparticular we should naturally ask first whether there issome grammatical (or lexicographical) criterion for distinguishing the performative utterance.

How t o do things with Words
So far we have considered only a small number ofclassic examples of performatives, all with verbs in thefirst person singular present indicative active. We shallsee very shortly that there were good reasons for thispiece of slyness. Examples are 'I name', 'I do9 , 4 I bet','I give'. There are fairly obvious reasons, with which I
shall nevertheless shortly deal, why this is the commonest
type of explicit performative. Note that 'present' and'indicative' are, of course, both misnomers (not to mention
the misleading implications of 'active3)-I am only using
them in the well-known grammatical way. For example
the 'present', as distinct from 'continous present', isnormally nothing to do with describing (or even indicating) what I am doing at present. 'I drink beer', as distinct
from 'I am drinking beer', is not analogous to a future
and a past tense describing what I shall do in the futureor have done in the past. It is really more commonly the
habitual indicative, when it is 'indicative' at all. And
where it is not habitual but in a way 'present' genuinely,
as in a way it is in performatives, if you like, such as 'I
name', then it is certainly not 'indicative' in the sense
grammarians intend, that is reporting, describing, orinforming about an actual state of affairs or occurrent
event: because, as we have seen, it does not describe or
inform at all, but is used for, or in, the doing of something.
So we use 'present indicative' merely to mean the English
grammatical form 'I name', 'I run', &c. (This mistake interminology is due to assimilating, for example, 'I run'to the Latin curro, which should really generally beHODt o do things with Words
translated 'I am running'; Latin does not have two tenses
where we do.)Well, is the use of the first person singular and of thepresent indicative active, so called, essential to a performative utterance ? We need not waste our time on theobvious exception of the first person plural, 'toe promise. . .', 'we consent', &c. There are more important andobvious exceptions all over the place (some of whichhave already been alluded to in passing).
A very common and important type of, one would
think, indubitable performative has the verb in thesecond or third person (singular or plural) and the verb in
the passive voice: so person and voice anyway are notessential. Some examples of this type are :(I) You are hereby authorized to pay . . . .
(2) Passengers are warned to cross the track by thebridge only.
Indeed the verb may be 'impersonal' in such caseswith the passive, for example:(3) Notice is hereby given that trespassers will be
prosecuted.
This type is usually found on formal or legal occasions;and it is characteristic of it that, in writing at least, theword 'hereby' is often and perhaps can always be inserted;
this serves to indicate that the utterance (in writing) of
the sentence is, as it is said, the instrument effecting theact of warning, authorizing, &c. 'Hereby' is a useful
criterion that the utterance is performative. If it is notHow to do things with Words
put in, 'passengers are warned to cross the track by thebridge only' may be used for the description of what
usually happens : 'on nearing the tunnel, passengers arewarned to duck their heads, &c.'
However, if we turn away from these highly formalized
and explicit performative utterances, we have to recognizethat mood and tense (hitherto retained as opposed toperson and voice) break down as absolute criteria.
Mood will not do, for I may order you to turn right bysaying, not 'I order you to turn right', but simply 'Turnright'; I may give you permission to go by saying simply'You may go' ;and instead of 'I advise [or "recommend"]
you to turn right' I may say 'I should turn to the right if
I were you'. Tense will not do either, for in giving (orcalling) you off-side I maysay,instead of 'I give [or "call"]you off-side', simply 'You were off-side'; and similarly,
instead of saying 'I find you guilty' I may just say 'You
did it'. Not to mention cases where we have only atruncated sentence, as when I accept a bet by saying
simply 'Done', and even cases where there is no explicit
verb at all, as when I say simply 'Guilty' in finding aperson guilty, or 'Out' to give someone out.
Par ticularly with some special performative-looking
words, for example 'off-dide', 'liable', &c., we seem'able
to refute even the rule governing the use of the active or
passive which we gave above. Instead of 'I pronounce
you off-side' I might say 'You are off-side' and I might
say 'I am (hereby rendered) liable' instead of 'I undertake - . .'. So we might think certain words might doHODto do things ~ i t hWords
as a test of the performative utterance, that we could
do it by means of vocaklury as distinct from grammar.
Such words might be 'off-side', 'authorized 9 , L promise','dangerous', &c. But this will not do, for:I. We may get the performative without the operative
words thus:(I) In place of 'dangerous corner' we may have'corner', and in place of 'dangerous bull' we may write. . .', we may have'you will', and in place of 'I promise to . . .' we may have(2) In place of 'you are ordered to'I shall'.
11. We may get the operative word without the utterance
being performative, thus :(I) In cricket a spectator may say 'it was over (really)'.
Similarly I may say 'you were guilty' or 'you were offside' or even 'you are guilty (off-side)' when I have noright to pronounce you guilty or off-side.
'(2) In such locutions as 'you promised , you authorize'&c., the word occurs in a non-performative use.
9This reduces us to an impasse over any single simple
criterion of grammar or vocabulary. But maybe it is not
impossible to produce a complex criterion, or at leasta set of criteria, simple or complex, involving both
grammar and vocabulary. For example, one of thecriteria might be that everything with the verb in theimperative mood is performative (this leads, however, toHow t o do things with Words
many troubles over, for example, when a verb is in theimperative mood and when it is not, into which I do notpropose to go).
I would rather go back a minute and consider whether
there was not some good reason behind our initial favouritism for verbs in the so-called 'present indicative active'.
We said that the idea of a performative utterance wasthat it was to be (or to be included as a part of) the performance of an action. Actions can only be performed bypersons, and obviously in our cases the utterer must be
the performer: hence our justifiable feeling-which wewrongly cast into purely grammatical mould-in favourof the 'first person', who must come in, being mentionedor referred to ;moreover, if the utterer is acting, he must
be doing something-hence our perhaps ill-expressedfavouring of the grammatical present and grammaticalactive of the verb. There is something which is at the
moment of attering being done by the person uttering.
Where there is not, in the verbal formula of the utterance, a reference to the person doing the uttering, and so
the acting, by means ofthe pronoun 'I' (or by his personalname), then in fact he will be 'referred to' in one of two
ways :(a) In verbal utterances, by his being theperson taho does
the uttering-what we may call the utterance-origin
which is used generally in any system of verbal referenceco-ordinates.
(6) In written utterances (or 'inscriptions), by his
appending his signature (this has to be done because, ofHow t o do things with Words
course, written utterances are not tethered to their origin
in the way spoken ones are).
The 'I' who is doing the action does thus comeessentially into the picture. An advantage of the original
first person singular present indicative active form-or
likewise of the second and third and impersonal passive
forms with signature appended-is that this implicit
feature of the speech-situation is made explicit. Moreover, the verbs which seem, on grounds of vocabulary,
to be specially performative verbs serve the special
purpose of making explicit (which is not the same asstating or describing) what precise action it is that isbeing performed by the issuing of the utterance : otherwords which seem to have a special performative function(and indeed have it), such as 'guilty 9 , 'off-side', &c., doso because, in so far as and when they are linked in'origin' with these special explicit performative verbs like6 promise', pronounce', 'find', &c.
The 'hereby' formula is a useful alternative; but it israther too formal for ordinary purposes, and further, we
may say 'I hereby state . . .' or 'I hereby question . . .9 ,whereas we were hoping to find a criterion to distinguishstatements from performatives. (I must explain againthat we are floundering here. T o feel the firm ground of
prejudice slipping away is exhilarating, but brings its
revenges.)
Thus what we should feel tempted to say is that any
utterance which is in fact a performative should be
reducible, or expandible, or analysable into a form with

How to do things with Words
a verb in the first person singular present indicative

active (grammatical). This is the sort of test we were infact using above. Thus :'Out' is equivalent to 'I declare, pronounce, give, orcall you out' (when it is a performative: it need not be,for example, if you are called out by someone not theumpire or recorded as 'out' by the scorer).
'Guilty' is equivalent to 'I find, pronounce, deem you
to be guilty.''You are warned that the bull is dangerous' is equivalent to 'I, John Jones, warn you that the bull is dangerous' orThis bull is dangerous.
(Signed) John Jones.
This sort of expansion makes explicit both that the utterance is performative, and which act it is that is being
performed. Unless the performative utterance is reduced
to such an explicit form, it will regularly be possible totake it in a non-performative way: for example, 'it isyours' may be taken as equivalent to either 'I give it you'or 'it (already) belongs to you'. In fact there is rather aplay on the performative and non-performative uses in
the road sign 'You have been warned'.
However, though we might make progress along theselines (there are snags)' we must notice that this first
For example, which are the verbs with which we can do this? If
the performative is expanded, what is the test whether the first person
singular present indicative active is on this occasion performative granted
that d others have to be reducible (save the mark!) to this formal form 7

How to do things with Words

63

person singular present indicative active, so called, is a
peczxliar and special use. In particular we must notice that
there is an asymmetry of a systematic kind between it andother persons and tenses of the very same verb. The factthat there is this asymmetry is precisely the mark of theperformative verb (and the nearest thing to a grammatical
criterion in connexion with performatives).
Let us take an example: the uses of 'I bet' as opposedto the use of that verb in another tense or in anotherperson. 'I betted' and 'he bets' are not performatives but
describe actions on my and his part respectively-actions
each consisting in the utterance of the performative 'I
bet'. If I utter the words 'I bet . . .', I do not state that I
utter the words 'I bet', or any other words, but I performthe act of betting; and similarly, if he says he bets, i.e.
says the words 'I bet', he bets. But if I utter the words 'hebets', I only state that he utters (or rather has uttered)
the words 'I bet': I do not perform his act of betting,which only he can perform : I describe his performancesof the act of betting, but I do my own betting, and he must
do his own. Similarly an anxious parent when his childhas been asked to do something may say 'he promises,
don't you Willy ?' but little Willy must still himself say'I promise' if he is really to have promised. Now this sortof asymmetry does not arise at all in general with verbs
that are not used as explicit performatives. For example,
there is no such asymmetry between 'I run' and 'He
runs'.
Still, it is doubtful whether this is a 'grammatical'

How to do things with Words
criterion exactly (what is?), and anyway it is not very
exact because :(I) The first person singular present indicative
active may be used to describe how I habitually behave:'I bet him (every morning) sixpence that it will rain'
or 'I promise only when I intend to keep myword'.
(2) The first person singular present indicative active
may be used in a way similar to the 'historic' present. It
may be used to describe my own performances elsewhereand elsewhen : 'on page 49 I protest against the verdict'.
We might back this up by saying that performative verbs
are not used in the present continuous tense (in the first
person singular active): we do not say 'I am promising',and 'I am protesting'. But even this is not entirely true,
because I can say 'Don't bother me at the moment ;I will
see you later; I am marrying' at any moment during theceremony when I am not having to say other words suchas 'I do'; here the utterance of the performative is not thewhole of the performance, which is protracted and contains diverse elements. Or I can say 'I am protesting'when performing the act by, in this case, means otherthan saying 'I protest', for example by chaining myself
to park railings. Or I can even say 'I am ordering' whilewriting the words 'I order'.
(3) Some verbs may be used in the first person singularpresent indicative active simultaneously in two ways. An
example is 'I call', as when I say 'I call inflation too muchmoney chasing too few goods' which embraces both aIHow t o do things with Words

65
performative utterance and a description of a naturally
consequent performance.
(4) We shall be in apparent danger of bringing in many
formulas which we might not like to class as performatives; for example 'I state that' (to utter which is to state)
as well as 'I bet thatY.
(5) We have cases of suiting the action to the word:
thus I may say 'I spit me of you' or j'adoube said when I
give check, or 'I quote' followed by actually quoting. If
I define by saying 'I define x as follows: x is y', this is acase of suiting the action (here giving a definition) to theword; when we use the formula 'I define x as y' we havea transition to a preformative utterance from suiting theaction to the word. We might add, too, that there is likewise a transition from the use of words as what we may
call markers, to performatives. There is a transition fromthe word END at the end of a novel to the expression'message ends' at the end of a signal message, to theexpression 'with that I conclude my case' as said byCounsel in a law court. These, we may say, are cases ofmarking the action by the word, where eventually theuse of the word comes to be the action of 'ending' (adifficult act to perform, being the cessation of acting, or
to make explicit in other ways, of course).
(6) Is it always the case that we must have a performative verb for making explicit something we are undoubtedly doing by saying something? For example, I
may insult you by saying something, but we have not theformula 'I insult you7.
824181FHow t o do things with Words(7) Is it really the case that we can always put a performative into the normal form without loss? 'I shall . . .3
can be meant in different ways; perhaps we trade on this.
Or again we say 'I am sorry'; is this really exactly like theexplicit 'I apologize' ?
We shall have to revert to the notion of the explicit
performative, and we must discuss historically at least
how some of these perhaps not ultimately serious perplexities arise.

LECTURE V I

BE CAU SE we suggested that the performative is

not altogether so obviously distinct from theconstative-the former happy or unhappy, thelatter true or false-we were considering how to define
the performative more clearly. The first suggestion wasa criterion or criteria of grammar or of vocabulary or of
both. We pointed out that there was certainly no one
absolute criterion of this kind :and that very probably it is
not possible to lay down even a list of all possible criteria;moreover, they certainly would not distinguish performatives from constatives, as very commonly the samesentence is used on different occasions of utterance inboth ways, performative and constative. The thing seems
hopeless from the start, if we are to leave utterances as
they stand and seek for a criterion.
But nevertheless the type of performative upon which
we drew for our first examples, which has a verb in thefirst person singular present indicative active, seems todeserve our favour: at least, if issuing the utterance isdoing something, the 'I' and the 'active' and the 'present'
seem appropriate. Though indeed performatives are notreally like the remainder of the verbs in this 'tense' at all;there is an essential asymmetry with these verbs. Thisasymmetry is just the characteristic of a long list ofHow t o do things with Words
performative-looking verbs. The suggestion is, then,that we might(I) make a list of all verbs with this peculiarity;(2) suppose that all performative utterances which are
not in fact in this preferred form-beginning 'I x
that,3 4 I x to', or 'I x'-could be 'reduced' to thisform and so rendered what we may call explicit
performatives.
We are now asking: just how easy-even possible-is
this going to be? It is fairly easy to make allowances forcertain normal enough but different uses of the first
person of the present indicative active even with theseverbs, which may well be constative or descriptive, thatis, the habitual present, the 'historic' (quasi-) present,
and the continuous present. But then, as I was hastily
mentioning, in conclusion, there are still further difficulties: we mentioned three as typical.
(I) 'I class' or perhaps 'I hold' seems in a way one, ina way the other. Which is it, or is it both?
(2) 'I state that' seems to conform to our grammaticalor quasi-grammatical requirements: but do we want it
in ? Our criterion, such as it is, seems in danger of letting
in non-performatives.
(3) Sometimes saying something seems to be characteristically doing something-for example insulting somebody, like reprimanding somebody: yet there is no
performative 'I insult youY.Our criterion will not getin all cases of the issuing of an utterance being the,How t o do things with Words
doing of something, because the 'reduction' to an explicit
performative does not seem always possible.
Let us pause then to dwell a little more on the expression 'explicit per formative', which we have introduced rather surreptitiously. I shall oppose it to 'primaryperformative' (rather than to inexplicit or implicit
performative). We gave as an example :(I) primary utterance: 'I shall be there',(2) explicit performative: 'I promise that I shall be
thereY,and we said that the latter formula made explicit
what action it is that is being performed in issuing theutterance: i.e. 'I shall be there'. If someone says 'I shallbe there9, we might ask: 'Is that a promise?' We may
receive the answer 'Yes', or 'Yes, I promise it' (or 'that.. .9 or 'to ..;'), whereas the answer might have been only :'No, but I do intend to be' (expressing or announcing
an intention), or 'No, but I can foresee that, knowing
my weaknesses, I (probably) shall be there'.
Now we must enter two caveats: 'making explicit' is
not the same as describing or stating (at least in philosophers' preferred senses of these words) what I am
doing. If 'making explicit' conveys this, then pro tanto it
is a bad term. The situation in the case of actions which
are non-linguistic but similar to performative utterancesin that they are the performance of a conventional action(here ritual or ceremonial) is rather like this: suppose I
bow deeply before p u ; it might not be clear whether I
am doing obeisance to you or, say, stooping to observe
the flora or to ease my indigestion. Generally speaking,How t o do things with Words
70
then, to make clear both that it is a conventional ceremonial act, and which act it is, the act (for example ofdoing obeisance) will as a rule include some special
further feature, for example raising my hat, tapping myhead on the ground, sweeping my other hand to myheart, or even very likely uttering some noise or word, forexample 'Salaam'. Now uttering 'Salaam' is no more
describing my performance, stating that I am performing
an act of obeisance, than is taking off my hat: and by thesame token (though we shall come back to this) saying'I salute you' is no more describing my performance
than is saying 'Salaam'. To do or to say these things is tomake plain how the action is to be taken or understood,
what action it is. And so it is with putting in the expression'I promise that'. It is not a description, because ( I ) it
could not be true or false; ( 2 ) saying 'I promise that' (ifhappy, of course) makes it a promise, and unambiguously
a promise. Now we can say that such a performative
formula as 'I promise' makes it clear how what is said is
to be understood and even conceivably that the formula'states that' a promise has been made; but we cannot saythat such utterances are true or false, nor that they aredescriptions or reports.
Secondly, a minor caution: notice that, although wehave in this type of utterance a 'that-' clause following averb, for example 'promise', or 'find', or 'pronounce' (orperhaps such verbs as 'estimate'), we must not allude tothis as 'indirect speech'. 'That'-clauses in indirect speechor oratio oblzqua are of course cases where I report what

How t o do things with Words
someone else or myself elsewhen or elsewhere did say:for example, typically, 'he said that . . .', but also possibly'he promised that . . .' (or is this a double use of 'that' ?),or 'on page 456 I declared that . . .'. If this is a clear
notion1 we see that the 'that' of oratio obliqna is not in all
ways similar to the 'that' in our explicit performative
formulas: here I am not reporting my own speech in thefirst person singular present indicative active. Incidentally, of course, it is not in the least necessary that an
explicit performative verb should be followed by 'that' :in important classes of cases it is followed by 'to . . .3 ornothing, for example, 'I apologize (for . . .)', 'I saluteyou,.
Now, one thing that seems at least a fair guess, evenfrom the elaboration of the linguistic construction, as
also from its nature in the explicit performative is this :that historically, from the point of view of the evolutionof language, the explicit performative must be a later
development than certain more primary utterances,many of which at least are already implicit performatives,
which are included in most or many explicit performatives
as parts of a whole. For example, 'I will . . .' is earlier than
'I promise that I will . . .'. The plausible view (I do notknow exactly how it would be established) would bethat in primitive languages it would not yet be clear, it
would not yet be possible to distinguish, which of various
things that (using later distinctions) we might be doing
My explanation is very obscure, like those of all grammar books on'that' clauses : compare their even worse explanation of 'what' clauses.

How to do things taith Words
we were in fact doing. For example 'Bull' or 'Thunder'
in a primitive language of one-word utterances1 could bea warning, information, a prediction, &c. It is also aplausible view that explicitly distinguishing the different
forces that this utterance might have is a later achievement of language, and a considerable one; primitive or
primary forms of utterance will preserve the 'ambiguity'or 'equivocation' or 'vagueness' of primitive language inthis respect; they will not make explicit the precise forceof the utterance. This may have its uses: but sophistication and development of social forms and procedures
will necessitate clarification. But note that this clarification is as much a creative act as a discovery or description!
It is as much a matter of making clear distinctions as ofmaking already existent distinctions clear.
One thing, however, that it will be most dangerous todo, and that we are very prone to do, is to take it that
we somehow know that the primary or primitive use of
sentences must be, because it ought to be, statemental orconstative, in the philosophers' preferred sense of simply
uttering something whose sole pretension is to be trueor false and which is not liable to criticism in any otherdimension. We certainly do not know that this is so, any
more, for example, than, to take an alternative, that allutterances must have first begun as swear-words-and it
seems much more likely that the 'pure' statement is agoal, an ideal, towards which the gradual development ofscience has given the impetus, as it has likewise also
As in fact primitive languages probably were, cf. Jespersen.

How t o do things with Words
towards the goal of precision. Language as such and in its
primitive stages is not precise, and it is also not, in oursense, explicit: precision in language makes it clearer
what is being said-its meaning: explicitness, in oursense, makes clearer the force of the utterances, or 'how(in one sense; see below) it is to be taken'.
The explicit performative formula, moreover, is only
the last and 'most successful' of numerous speechdevices which have always been used with greater or lesssuccess to perform the same function (just as measurement or standardization was the most successful device
ever invented for developing precision of speech).
Consider for a moment some of these other more primitive devices in speech, some of the roles which can (though,of course, not without change or loss, as we shall see) betaken over by the device of the explicit performative.
I . Mood

We have already mentioned the exceedingly common
device of using the imperative mood. This makes theutterance a 'command' (or an exhortation or permission
or concession or what not !) Thus I may say 'shut it' inmany contexts :'Shut it, do' resembles the performative 'I order you
to shut it3.
'Shut it-I should' resembles the performative 'I advise
you to shut it'.
'Shut it, if you like' resembles the performative 'I
permit you to shut it'.

How to do things with Words'Very well then, shut it' resembles the performative 'I
consent to your shutting it'.
'Shut it if you dare' resembles the performative 'I dare
you to shut it'. Or again we may use auxiliaries:'You may shut it' resembles the performative 'I give
permission, I consent, to your shutting it'.
'You must shut it' resembles the performative 'I order
you, I advise you, to shut it'.
'You ought to shut it' resembles 'I advise you to shut it'.
2. Tone ofvoice, cadence, emphasis(Similar to this is the sophisticated device of using
stage directions; for example, 'threateningly', &c.) Examples of this are:It's going to charge! (a warning);
It's going to charge ? (a question);
It's going to charge! ? (a protest).
These features of spoken language are not reproducible
readily in written language. For example we have tried
to convey the tone of voice, cadence and emphasis of aprotest by the use of an exclamation mark and a question
mark (but this is very jejune). Punctuation, italics, andword order may help, but they are rather crude.

3. Adverbs and adverbial phrases
But in written language-and even, to some extent, in
spoken language, though there they are not so necessaryHow to do things with Words

75-we rely on adverbs, adverbial phrases, or turns ofphrase. Thus we can qualify the force of 'I shall' by
adding 'probably' or-in an opposite sense-by adding'without fail'; we can give emphasis (to a reminder orwhatever it may be) by writing 'You would do well neverto forget that . . .'. Much could be said about the connexions here with the phenomena of evincing, intimating,insinuation, innuendo, giving to understand, enabling toinfer, conveying, 'expressing' (odious word) all of whichare, however, essentially different, though they involvethe employment of very often the same or similar verbal
devices and circumlocutions. We shall revert to theimportant and different distinction between these phenomena in the latter half of our lectures.
4. Connecting particles
At a more sophisticated level, perhaps, comes the useof the special verbal device of the connecting particle;
thus we may use the particle 'still' with the force of 'I
insist that'; we use 'therefore' with the force of 'I conclude that'; we use 'although' with the force of 'I concede
that'. Note also the uses of 'whereas' and 'hereby' andcmoreover'.I A very similar purpose is served by the useof titles such as Manifesto, Act, Proclamation, or the subheading 'A Novel . .
Turning from what we say and the manner of speaking
9

But some of these examples raise the old question whether 'I concede
that' and 'I conclude that' are performatives or not.

How to do things with Words
it, there are other essential devices by which the force of
the utterance is to some extent got across :5. Accompaniments of the utterance
We may accompany the utterance of the words by
gestures (winks, pointings, shruggings, frowns, &c.) orby ceremonial non-verbal actions. These may sometimes
serve without the utterance of any words, and theirimportance is very obvious.

6. The cir~umstancesof the utterance
An exceedingly important aid is the circumstances of
the utterance. Thus we may say 'coming from him, I
took it as an order, not as a request'; similarly the context
of the words 'I shall die some day', 'I shall leave you mywatch', in particular the health of the speaker, make adifference how we shall understand them.
But in a way these resources are over-rich: they lendthemselves to equivocation and inadequate discrimination; and moreover, we use them for other purposes, e.g.
insinuation. The explicit performative rules out equivocation and keeps the performance fixed, relatively.
The trouble about all these devices has been principally
their vagueness of meaning and uncertainty of sure
reception, but there is also probably some positive
inadequacy in them for dealing with anything like thecomplexity of the field of actions which we perform withwords. An 'imperative' may be an order, a permission, ademand, a request, an entreaty, a suggestion, a recom-

How to do things with Words
mendation, a warning ('go and you will see'), or may
express a condition or concession or a definition ('Letit . . .'), &c. T o hand something over to someone may be,when we say 'Take it9, the giving it or lending it orleasing it or entrusting it. T o say 'I shall' may be topromise, or to express an intention, or to forecast my
future. And so on. No doubt a combination of some or
all the devices mentioned above (and very likely there areothers) will usually, if not in the end, suffice. Thus when
we say 'I shall' we can make it clear that we are forecasting by adding the adverbs 'undoubtedly' or 'probably',that we are expressing an intention by adding the adverbs'certainly' or 'definitely', or that we are promising byadding the adverbial phrase 'without fail', or saying 'I
shall do my best to'.
It should be noted that when performative verbs exist
we can use them not onky in 'that . . .' or 'to . . .' formulas,but also in stage directions ('welcomes'), titles ('warning!'), and parentheses (this is almost as good a test of aperformative as our normal forms); and we must notforget the use of special words such as 'Out', &c., whichhave no normal form.
However, the existence and even the use of explicit
performatives does not remove all our troubles.
( I ) In philosophy, we can even raise the trouble of theliability of performatives to be mistaken for descriptives
or constatives.
( I U ) Nor, of course, is it merely that the performative
does not preserve the often congenial equivocation ofHow to do things with Wovds
primary utterances; we must also in passing consider
cases where it is doubtful whether the expression is an
explicit performative or not and cases very similar to
performatives but not performatives.
(2) There seem to be clear cases where the very same
formula seems sometimes to be an explicit performativeand sometimes to be a descriptive, and may even trade on
this ambivalence : for example, 'I approve' and 'I agree'.
Thus 'I approve' may have the performative force ofgiving approval or it may have a descriptive meaning: 'I
favour this'.
We shall consider two classic sorts of case in which
this will arise. They exhibit some of the phenomena
incidental to the development of explicit performative
formulas.
There are numerous cases in human life where thefeeling of a certain 'emotion' (save the word!) or 'wish'
or the adoption of an attitude is conventionally considered
an appropriate or fitting response or reaction to a certain
state of affairs, including the performance by someoneof a certain act, cases where such a response is natural (orwe should like to think so!) In such cases it is, of course,
possible and usual actually to feel the emotion or wishin question; and since our emotions or wishes are notreadily detectable by others, it is common to wish to
inform others that we have them. Understandably,
though for slightly different and perhaps less estimablereasons in different cases, it becomes de rigueur to 'express' these feelings if we have them, and further even toIlow to do things with Words

79

express them when they are felt fitting, regardless ofwhether we really feel anything at all which we arereporting. Examples of expressions so used are:I thank
I am grateful
I apologize
I am sorry
I criticize
I blame
I censureI approve
I approve ofI bid you welcome I welcome
I congratulate
I am glad aboutI

I feel gratefulI repent
I am shocked by
I am revolted by
I feel approval

In these lists, the first column contains performativeutterances; those in the second are not pure but half
descriptive, and in the third are merely reports. There
are then here numerous expressions, among them many
important ones, which suffer from or profit by a sort ofdeliberate ambivalence, and this is fought by the constantintroduction of deliberately pure performative phrases.
Can we suggest any tests for deciding whether 'I approveof' or 'I am sorry' is being used (or even is always used) in
the one way or the other ?
One test would be whether it makes sense to say 'Does
he really?' For example, when someone says 'I welcome
you' or 'I bid you welcome', we may say 'I wonder if hereally did welcome him ?' though we could not say in thesame way 'I wonder whether he really does bid him
welcome ?' Another test would be whether one could reallybe doing it without actually saying anything, for example
in the case of being sorry as distinct from apologizing, in

80

How to do things with Words

being grateful as distinct from thanking, in blaming as
distinct from censuring.' Yet a third test would be, atleast in some cases, to ask whether we could insert before
the supposed performative verb some such adverb as'deliberately' or such an expression as 'I am willing to':because (possibly) if the utterance is the doing of anaction, then it is surely something we ought to be able(on occasion) to do deliberately or to be willing to do.
Thus we may say: 'I deliberately bade him welcome','I deliberately approved his action', 'I deliberately
apologized', and we can say 'I am willing to apologize'.
But we cannot say 'I deliberately approved of his action'
or 'I am willing to be sorry' (as distinct from 'I am willingto say I am sorry').
A fourth test would be to ask whether what one says
could be literally false, as sometimes when I say 'I amsorry', or could only involve insincerity (unhappiness) as
sometimes when I say 'I apologize' : these phrases blurthe distinction between insincerity and falsehood.2
But there is here a certain distinction to be drawn inpassing of the exact nature of which I am uncertain: wehave related 'I apologize' to 'I am sorry' as above; but
now there are also very numerous conventional expressions of feeling, very similar in some ways, which are
There are classic doubts about the possibility of tacit consent; here
non-verbal performance occurs in an alternative form of performative
act: this casts doubt on this second test!
There are parallel phenomena to these in other cases: for example
a specially confusing one arises over what we may call dictional or expositive perfomtives.

How to do things with Words

81

certainly nothing to do with performatives : for example :'I have pleasure in calling upon the next speaker'.
'I am sorry to have to say . . . .
'I am gratified to be in a position to announce . . .'.I3

We may call these polite phrases, like ' I have the honour
to . . .'. It is conventional enough to formulate them inthis way: but it is not the case that to say you havepleasure in is to have pleasure in doing something.
Unfortunatelv. T o be a performative utterance, even inthese cases connected with feelings and attitudes which I
christen 'BEHABITIVES', is not merely to be a conventional
expression of feeling or attitude.
Also to be distinguished are cases of suiting the action
to the ~ord-a special type of case which may generate
performatives but which is not in itself a case of theperformative utterance. A typical case is : 'I slam the door
thus' (he slams the door). But this sort of case leads to 'I
salute you' (he salutes); here 'I salute you' may becomea substitute for the salute and thus a pure performativeutterance. T o say 'I salute you' now is to salute you.
Compare the expression 'I salute the memory . . .I .
But there are many transitional stages between suiting
the action to the word and the pure performative:'Snap.' To say this is to snap (in appropriate circumstances); but it is not a snap if 'snap' is not said.
.r[Marginal note in manuscript : 'Further classification needed here:
just note it in passing.']I824181GHow to do things with Words'Check.' T o say it is to check in appropriate circumstances. But would it not still be a check if 'check' were
not said ?
'J'adoube.' Is this suiting the action to the word or isit part of the act of straightening the piece as opposed tomoving it ?
Perhaps these distinctions are not important: but there
are similar transitions in the case of performatives, as forexample :'I quote': he quotes.
'I define' : he defines (e.g. x is y).
'I define x as y'.
In these cases the utterance operates like a title: is it avariety of performative ? It essentially operates where theaction suited to the word is itself a verbal performance.

LECTURE VIIL

AST time we considered the Explicit in contrast

with the Primary Performative, claiming that theformer would be naturally evolved from the latteras language and society develop. We said, however, that
this would not remove all our troubles in our search for alist of explicit performative verbs. We gave some examples
which incidentally illustrated how the explicit performative develops from the primary.
We took examples from the sphere of what may becalled behabitives, a kind of performative concernedroughly with reactions to behaviour and with behaviour
towards others and designed to exhibit attitudes andfeelings.
Contrast :Explicit
Peuformative
I apologize

Nut Pure(half descriptive) Descriptive
I am sorry
I repentI

I blameI am disgusted by
I criticize
censureI approve
I approve ofI feel approval of
I bid you welcome I welcome you
We suggested tests of the pure explicit performative:(I) Does it make sense (or the same sense) to ask 'But

84

Hoto t o do things with Words

did he really ?' ? We callnot ask 'Did he really bid him
welcome?' in the same sense as we ask 'Did he reallywelcome him?' or 'Did he really criticize him?' in thesame sense as we ask 'Did he really blame him ?' This is
not a very good test because, for example, of the possibilityof infelicities. We may ask 'Did he really marry?' when hesaid 'I do', because there may have been infelicities which
made the marriage problematical.
(2) Could he be doing the action without uttering theperformative ?
(3) Could he do it deliberately?; could he be willing to
do it?
(4) Could it be literally false that, for example, I
criticize (as distinct from blame) when I have said that..
I cntraze? (It could, of course, be insincere always.)
Sometimes the test of a different word, sometimes of adifferent construction of the formula, is available. Thusin an explicit performative we say 'I approve' rather than'I approve of'. Compare the distinction between 'I wish .
you were at the bottom of the sea' and 'I wish you at thebottom of the sea', or between 'I wish you were enjoying
yourself' and 'I wish you joy', &c.
In conclusion, we distinguished our performatives
from :(I) Purely polite conventional ritual phrases such as'I have pleasure in . .'.These are quite different, in that,
although ritual and not called upon to be sincere, they
are according to all the four tests above not performatives. They seem to be a limited class, limited perhaps to.

IHOPt o do things with Words
professions of feeling and even to professions of feelingat saying or hearing something.
(2) Suiting the action to the word, of which a typicalexample would be Counsel, at the end of his case saying'I end my case'. These phrases are especially liable to passover into pure performatives where the action which issuited to the word is itself a purely ritual action, the nonverbal action of bowing ('I salute you') or the verbal
ritual of saying 'Huzza 3 ('I applaud').
A second very important class of words in which thesame phenomenon of a shift from descriptive to performative utterance and wavering between them is, as withbehabitives, peculiarly rampant, is the class of what I call
expositives, or expositional performatives. Here the main
body of the utterance has generally or often the straightforward form of a 'statement', but there is an explicit
performative verb at its head which shows how the 'statement' is to be fitted into the context of conversation,interlocution, dialogue, or in general of exposition. Hereare some examples :'I argue (or urge) that there is no backside to themoon.''I conclude (or infer) that there is no backside to themoon.''I testify that there is no backside to the moon.''I admit (or concede) that there is no backside to themoon.''I prophesy (or predict) that there is no backside to themoon. '

86

How to do things with Words

T o say such things as these is to argue, conclude, testify,
reply, predict, &c.
Now many of these verbs appear to be quite satisfactory pure performatives. (Irritating though it is tohave them as such, linked with clauses that look like'statements', true or false, we have mentioned this before and will return to it again.) For example, when I say'I prophesy that. . .', 'I concede that. . .', 'I postulatethat . . .', the clause following will normally look justlike a statement, but the verbs themselves seem to be
pure performatives.
T o take our four tests that we have used with the behabitives: when he says 'I postulate that . . .' then(I) we cannot ask 'But was he really postulating . . . ?'( 2 ) he cannot be postulating without saying so;(3) one can say 'I deliberately postulated . . .' or 'I amwilling to postulate . . .3 y(4) it cannot be literally false to say 'I postulate' (except
in the sense already noted: 'on page 265 I postulate . . .').
In all these respects 'I postulate' is like 'I apologize
for . . .', 'I criticize him for . . .'. Of course, these utterances can be unhappy-he can predict when he has noright to predict, or say 'I confess you did it', or beinsincere by saying 'I confess I did' when he did not.
Yet there are numerous verbs which look very similar,
and seem to fall into the same class, which would not sosatisfactorily pass these tests: as, for example, 'I assume
that' as distinct from 'I postulate that'. I should'

How t o do things with Words
cheerfully say 'I was assuming that . . .' when I did not
realize that I was assuming it and without having said
anything to that effect. And I may be assuming something, though I don't realize it or say so, in the important
descriptive sense. I may, of course, be asserting or denying something, for instance, without saying anything tothat effect, where 'I assert' and 'I deny' are pure explicit
performatives in some senses which are not here relevant;
I may nod or shake my head, or assert or deny it byimplication in saying something else. But with 'I was
assuming that' I could have been assuming something
without saying anything, not by implication by saying
something else, but just by quietly sitting in my corner ina way in which I could not be just quietly sitting in mycorner denying it.
In other words 'I assume that.. .' and perhaps 'I suppose that . .' operate in the ambivalent way that 'I amsorry for . . .' operates : this sometimes is equivalent to'I apologize', sometimes describes my feelings, sometimes does both at once; so 'I assume' sometimes is
equivalent to 'I postulate . .' and sometimes is not.
Or again 'I agree that . . .' sometimes operates like 'I
approve his conduct', sometimes more like 'I approveof his conduct', where at least in part it describes myattitude, frame of mind, state of belief. Here again slightchanges of phrase may be important, for example thedifference between 'I agree to . . .' and 'I agree with. . .3 .
but this is not a cast-iron test.
The same general phenomenon occurs with this classHow t o do things with Words
as with behabitives. Just as we have 'I premise that (Ipostulate that)' as a pure explicit performative where'I assume that' is not, so we have:'I forecast (predict) that' as a pure explicit performative
where 'I foresee (expect, anticipate) that' is not;'I endorse (I assent to) that opinion' as a pure explicit
performative where 'I agree with that opinion' isnot;'I question whether it is so' as a pure explicit performative where 'I wonder (doubt) whether it is so' is not.
Here 'postulate', 'predict', 'endorse', 'question', &c.
will pass all our tests of the pure explicit performative,
whereas the others will not, or will not always.
Now one point in passing: not all the things we do inthis sort of line in fitting our particular utterance, say,into its context of discourse can be things that we can doby an explicit performative. For example, we cannot say'I imply that', 'I insinuate', &c.
Behabitives and expositives are two very criticalclasses in which this phenomenon occurs: but it isalso found in other classes, for example in what I callverdictives. Examples of verdictives are 'I pronounce
that. . .'9 'I hold that. . .'9 'Imakeit ..., 'Idateit ...'.
Thus if you are a judge and say 'I hold that . . ' then to
say you hold is to hold; with less official persons it is not
so clearly so : it may be merely descriptive of a state ofmind. This difficulty may be avoided in the usual mannerby the invention of a special word such as 'verdict', 'I

HOWto do things with Words
89
find in favour o f . . .', 'I pronounce . . .'; otherwise theperformative nature of the utterance still depends partly
on the context of the utterance, such as the judge beinga judge and in robes on a bench, &c.
Somewhat similar to this would be the case of 'I classx's as y's', where we saw there was a double use: thepure explicit performative and then the description of
my habitually performing acts of that kind. We may say'He does not really class .. .' or 'He is classing . . ' and hemay be classing without saying anything. We must
distinguish this case from those in which we are committed by the performance of the single act: for example'I define x as y' does not state that he regularly does so
but commits him to certain regular acts of using one
expression as equivalent to another. In this context it isinstructive to compare 'I intend' with 'I promise'.
So much for this sort of problem, whether an apparent
or suggested explicit performative verb itself operates,or operates sometimes or in part, as a description, true or
false, of feelings, states of mind, frames of mind, &c. But
this type of case suggests again the wider phenomenon
to which attention has been drawn, where the wholeutterance seems essentially meant to be true or false
despite its performa tive characteristics. Even if we takeas half-way houses, say, 'I hold that . . .' as said by a nonjuryman, or 'I expect that. . .',it seems absurd to supposethat all they describe or state, so far as they do this orwhen they do, is something about the speaker's beliefs
or expectations. To suppose this is rather the son ofHow to do things with Words
Alice-in-Wonderland over-sharpness of taking 'I thinkthat p' as a statement about yourself which could beanswered: 'That is just a fact about you'. ('I don't
think . . .' began Alice: 'then you should not talk' said
the Caterpillar or whoever it was). And when we come topure explicit performatives such as 'state' or 'maintain',surely the whole thing is true or false even though theuttering of it is the performing of the action of stating ormaintaining. And we have repeatedly pointed out thatsome things that are quite clearly classic performatives
like 'Over' bear a very close relation to describing facts,
even if others like 'Play' do not.
This, however, is not so bad: we could distinguish theperformative opening part (I state that) which makes
clear how the utterance is to be taken, that it is a statement (as distinct from a prediction, &c.), from the bit in
the that-clause which is required to be true or false. However, there are many cases which, as language stands atpresent, we are not able to split into two parts in this way,even though the utterance seems to have a sort of explicit
performative in it: thus 'I liken x toy', 'I analyse x as y'.
Here we both do the likening and assert that there is alikeness by means of one compendious phrase of at least
a quasi-performative character. Just to spur us on ourway: we may also mention 'I know that', 'I believe
that', &c. How complicated are these examples? Wecannot assume that they are purely descriptive.
Now let us consider where we stand for a moment: beginning with the supposed contrast between performative

How to do things pith Wordsg*and constative utterances, we found sufficient indications
that unhappiness nevertheless seems to characterize bothkinds of utterance, not merely the performative; and thatthe requirement of conforming or bearing some relation
to the facts, different in different cases, seems to characterize performatives, in addition to the requirementthat they should be happy, similarly to the way which ischaracteristic of supposed constatives.
Now we failed to find a grammatical criterion for
performatives, but we thought that perhaps we could
insist that every performative could be in principle put
into the form of an explicit performative, and then we
could make a list of performative verbs. Since then we
have found, however, that it is often not easy to be surethat, even when it is apparently in explicit form, anutterance is performative or that it is not; and typicallyanyway, we still have utterances beginning 'I state that. ..
which seem to satisfl the requirements of being performative, yet which surely are the making of statements, andsurely are essentially true or false.
It is time then to make a fresh start on the problem. We
want to reconsider more generally the senses in which
to say something may be to do something, or in saying
something we do something (and also perhaps to consider
the different case in which by saying something we dosomething). Perhaps some clarification and definition
here may help us out of our tangle. For after all, 'doing
something' is a very vague expression. When we issue anyutterance whatsoever, are we not 'doing something' ?
9HOWt o do things with Words
Certainly the ways in which we talk about 'action' areliable here, as elsewhere, to be confusing. For example,
we may contrast men of words with men of action, we
may say they did nothing, only talked or said things: yetagain, we may contrast only tl~inkingsomething withactually saying it (out loud), in which context saying it
is doing something.
It is time to refine upon the circumstances of 'issuing
an utterance'.' T o begin with, there is a whole group ofsenses, which I shall label (A), in which to say anything
must always be to do something, the group of senses
which together add up to 'saying' something, in the full
sense of 'say'. We may agree, without insisting on
formulations or refinements, that to say anything is(A. a ) always to perform the act of uttering certain noises(a 'phonetic' act), and the utterance is a phone;(A. b) always to perform the act of uttering certain
vocables or words, i.e. noises of certain types belonging to and as belonging to a certain vocabulary, in acertain construction, i.e. conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar, with a certain intonation, &c. This act we may call a 'phatic' act, and theutterance which it is the act of uttering a 'pheme' (asdistinct from the phememe of linguistic theory);
and(A. c) generally to perform the act of using that pheme or-

We shall not always mention but must bear in mind the possibilityof 'etiolation' as it occurs when we use speech in acting, fiction and poetry,quotation and recitation.

Hoa7 to do things with Words

its constituents with a certain more or less definite'sense' and a more or Iess definite 'reference' (which
together are equivalent to 'meaning'). This act we may
call a 'rhetic' act, and the utterance which it is the act
of uttering a 'rheme'.

LECTURE VIIII

N embarking on a programme of finding a list of
explicit performative verbs, it seemed that we weregoing to find it not always easy to distinguish performative utterances from constative, and it therefore
seemed expedient to go farther back for a while to fundamentals-to consider from the ground up how many
senses there are in which to say something is to do something, or irt saying something we do something, and evenby saying something we do something. And we began by
distinguishing a whole group of senses of 'doing something' which are all included together when we say, what
is obvious, that to say something is in the full normal
sense to do something-which includes the utterance of
certain noises, the utterance of certain words in a certain
construction, and the utterance of them with a certain'meaning' in the favourite philosophical sense of that
word, i.e. with a certain sense and with a certain reference.
The act of 'saying something' in this full normal sense
I call, i.e. dub, the performance of a locutionary act, andthe study of utterances thus far and in these respects thestudy of locutions, or of the full units of speech. Ourinterest in the locutionary act is, of course, principally tomake quite plain what it is, in order to distinguish itfrom other acts with which we are going to be primarily

How to do things with Words

95

concerned. Let me add merely that, of course, a great
many further refinements would be possible and necessary if we were to discuss it for its own sake-refinementsof very great importance not merely to philosophers but
to, say, grammarians and phoneticians.
We had made three rough distinctions between thephonetic act, the phatic act, and the rhetic act. The phonetic act is merely the act of uttering certain noises. The
phatic act is the uttering of certain vocables or words,
i.e. noises of certain types, belonging to and as belonging
to, a certain vocabulary, conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar. The rhetic act is the performance of an act of using those vocables with a certain
more-or-less definite sense and reference. Thus 'He said
"The cat is on the mat" ',reports a phatic act, whereas 'He
said that the cat was on the mat' reports a rhetic act. A
similar contrast is illustrated by the pairs:'He said "I shall be there" ', 'He said he would bethere7;'He said "Get out" ', 'He told me to get out';'He said "Is it in Oxford or Cambridge ?" ';'He asked
whether it was in Oxford or Cambridge'.
To pursue this for its own sake beyond our immediate
requirements, I shall mention some general points worth
remembering :(I) Obviously, to perform a phatic I must perform aphonetic act, or, if you like, in performing one I am
performing the other (not, however, that phatic acts areHow to do things with Words
a sub-class of phonetic acts-as belonging to): but theconverse is not true, for if a monkey makes a noise
indistinguishable from 'go' it is still not a phatic act.
(2) Obviously in the definition of the phatic act two
things were lumped together : vocabulary and grammar.
So we have not assigned a special name to the person
who utters, for example, 'cat thoroughly the i f or 'theslithy toves did gyre'. Yet a further point arising is theintonation as well as grammar and vocabulary.
(3) The phatic act, however, like the phonetic, isessentially mimicable, reproducible (including intonation, winks, gestures, &c.). One can mimic not merely
the statement in quotation marks 'She has lovely hair',
but also the more complex fact that he said it like this :'She
has lovely hair' (shrugs).
This is the 'inverted commas' use of 'said' as we getit in novels : every utterance can be just reproduced ininverted commas, or in inverted commas with 'said he' or,more often, 'said she', &c., after it.
But the rhetic act is the one we report, in the case of
assertions, by saying 'He said that the cat was on the mat','He said he would go', 'He said I was to go' (his words were'You are to go'). This is the so-called 'indirect speech'.
If the sense or reference is not being taken as clear,then the whole or part is to be in quotation marks. Thus
I might say: 'He said I was to go to the "minister", but he
did not say which minister' or 'I said that he was behaving badly and he replied that "the higher you get the
fewer" '. We cannot, however, always use 'said that'Hotp to do thiizgs with Words
easily: we would say 'told t o9, 4 advise to', &c., if he used
the imperative mood, or such equivalent phrases as 'said
I was to', 'said I should', &c. Compare such phrases as'bade me welcome' and 'extended his apologies'.
I add one further point about the rhetic act: of course
sense and reference (naming and referring) themselves
are here ancillary acts performed in performing the rhetic
act. Thus we may say 'I meant by "bank". . .' and we
say 'by "he" I was referring t o . . .7 . Can we performa rhetic act without referring or without naming? In
general it would seem that the answer is that we cannot,
but there are puzzling cases. What is the reference in 'all
triangles have three sides'? Correspondingly, it is clearthat we can perform a phatic act which is not a rhetic act,
though not conversely. Thus we may repeat someone
else's remark or mumble over some sentence, or we mayread a Latin sentence without knowing the meaning of
the words.
The question when one pheme or one rheme is thesame as another, whether in the 'type' or 'token' sense,
and the question what is one single pheme or rheme, do
not so much matter here. But, of course, it is importantto remember that the same pheme (token of the sametype) may be used on different occasions of utterancewith a different sense or reference, and so be a different
rheme. When different phemes are used with the same
sense and reference, we might speak of rhetically equivalent acts ('the same statement' in one sense) but notof the same rheme or rhetic acts (which are the same

How to do thiegs with Words
statement in another sense which involves using the samewords).
The pheme is a unit of language: its typical fault is
to be nonsense-meaningless. But the rheme is a unitof speech; its typical fault is to be vague or void or
obscure, &c.
But though these matters are of much interest, they do
not so far throw any light at all on our problem of theconstative as opposed to the performative utterance. For
example, it might be perfectly possible, with regard toan utterance, say 'It is going to charge', to make entirely
plain 'what we were saying' in issuing the utterance, inall the senses so far distinguished, and yet not at all tohave cleared up whether or not in issuing the utterance I
was performing the act of warning or not. It may be
perfectly clear what I mean by 'It is going to charge' or'Shut the door', but not clear whether it is meant as astatement or warning, &c.
T o perform a locutionary act is in general, we may
say, also and eo ipso to perform an illocutionary act, as I
propose to call it. T o determine what illocutionary act isso performed we must determine in what way we areusing the locution:
asking or answering a question,
giving some information or an assurance or a warning,announcing a verdict or an intention,
pronouncing sentence,
making an appointment or an appeal or a criticism,making an identification or giving a description,

How to do things with Words
and the numerous like. (I am not suggesting that this isa clearly defined class by any means.) There is nothing
mysterious about our eo ipso here. The trouble rather isthe number of different senses of so vague an expression
as 'in what way are we using it'-this may refer even toa locutionary act, and further to perlocutionary acts towhich we shall come in a minute. When we perform alocutionary act, we use speech :but in what way precisely
are we using it on this occasion? For there are very
numerous functions of or ways in which we use speech,
and it makes a great difference to our act in some sensesense (B)=-in which way and which sense we were on
this occasion 'using' it. It makes a great difference
whether we were advising, or merely suggesting, or
actually ordering, whether we were strictly promising or
only announcing a vague intention, and so forth. Theseissues penetrate a little but not without confusion intogrammar (see above), but we constantly do debate them,in such terms as whether certain words (a certain locution) had the force of a question, or ought to have beentaken as an estimate and so on.
I explained the performance of an act in this new andsecond sense as the performance of an 'illocutionary' act,
i.e. performance of an act in saying something as opposedto performance of an act of saying something; and I shallrefer to the doctrine of the different types of function of
language here in question as the doctrine of 'illocutionary
forces'.
See below, p. 1.01.

xoo

How t o do things with Words

It may be said that for too long philosophers haveneglected this study, treating all problems as problemsof 'locu tionary usage', and indeed that the 'descriptive
fallacy' mentioned in Lecture I commonly arises throughmistaking a problem of the former kind for a problem of
the latter kind. True, we are now getting out of this; forsome years we have been realizing more and more clearly
that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, andthat the words used are to some extent to be 'explained'by the 'context' in which they are designed to be or haveactually been spoken in a linguistic interchange. Yet still
perhaps we are too prone to give these explanations interms of 'the meanings of words'. Admittedly we canuse 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force'He meant it as an order', &c. But I want to distinguishforce and meaning in the sense in which meaning isequivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense and reference withinmeaning.
Moreover, we have here an illustration of the different
uses of the expression, uses of language', or 'use of asentence', &c.-'use' is a hopelessly ambiguous or wide
word, just as is the word 'meaning', which it has become
customary to deride. But 'use', its supplanter, is not inmuch better case. We may entirely clear up the 'use ofa sentence' on a particular occasion, in the sense of the
locutionary act, without yet touching upon its use in thesense of an illocutionary act.
Before refining any further on this notion of theCHow to do things with Words
illocutionary act, let us contrast both the locutionary
and the illocutionary act with yet a third kind of act.
There is yet a further sense (C) in which to perform
a locutionary act, and therein an illocutionary act, mayalso be to perform an act of another kind. Saying something will often, or even normally, produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts, or actionsof the audience, or of the speaker, or of other persons:and it may be done with the design, intention, or purposeof producing them; and we may then say, thinking of
this, that the speaker has performed an act in the nomenclature of which reference is made either (C. a), only
obliquely, or even (C. b), not at all, to the performanceof the locutionary or illocutionary act. We shall call theperformance of an act of this kind the performance of aperlocutionary act or perlocution. Let us not yet define
this idea any more carefully-of course it needs it-but
simply give examples :Act (A) or Locution
He said to me 'Shoot her !' meaning by 'shoot' shootand referring by 'her' to her.
Act (B) or Illocution
Heurged (or advised, ordered, &c.) me to shoot her.
Act (C. a) or Perlocution
He persuaded me to shoot her.

102

How to do things with Words

Act (C. b)
He got me to (or made me, &c.) shoot her.

(E*2 )Act (A) or Locution
He said to me, 'You can't do that'.
Act (B) or Illocution
He protested against my doing it.
Act (C. a) or Perlocution
He pulled me up, checked me.
Act (C. b)
He stopped me, he brought me to my senses, &c.
He annoyed me.
We can similarly distinguish the locutionary act 'hesaid that . ..' from the illocutionary act 'he argued that. ..3and the perlocutionary act 'he convinced me that . . .7 .
It will be seen that the consequential effects of perlocutions are really consequences, which do not include such
conventional effects as, for example, the speaker's beingcommitted by his promise (which comes into the illocutionary act). Perhaps distinctions need drawing, as thereis clearly a difference between what we feel to be the real
production of real effects and what we regard as mere
conventional consequences ; we shall in any case return
later to this.
We have here then roughly distinguished three kinds

How to do things-with Words

103

of acts-the locutionary, the illocutionary, and the perlocutionary.' Let us make some general comments onthese three classes, leaving them still fairly rough. The
first three points will be about 'the use of language'
again.
(I) Our interest in these lectures is essentially tofasten on the second, illocutionary act and contrast it
with the other two. There is a constant tendency inphilosophy to elide this in favour of one or other of theother two. Yet it is distinct from both. We have alreadyseen how the expressions 'meaning' and 'use of sentence'
can blur the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary acts. We now notice that to speak of the 'use' oflanguage can likewise blur the distinction between theillocutionary and perlocutionary act-so we will distinguish them more carefully in a minute. Speaking of the'use of "language" for arguing or warning' looks just likespeaking of 'the use of "language" for persuading, rousing, alarming'; yet the former may, for rough contrast,
be said to be conventional, in the sense that at least it
could be made explicit by the performative formula; but
the latter could not. Thus we can say 'I argue that' or 'I
warn you that' but we cannot say 'I convince you that' or'I alarm you that'. Further, we may entirely clear up
whether someone was arguing or not without touchingon the question whether he was convincing anyone or not.
m e occurs in the manuscript a note made in 1958 which says:'(I) AU this is not dear (2) and in all senses relevant ((A) and (B) os
distinct from (C)) won't d utterances be performative ?'I

How to do things with Words

104(2) T o take this farther, let us be quite clear that theexpression 'use of language' can cover other matters evenmore diverse than the illocutionary and perlocutionary
acts. For example, we may speak of the 'use of language'
for something, e.g. for joking; and we may use 'in' in away different from the illocutionary 'in', as when we sayCin saying p I' I was joking' or 'acting a part' or 'writing
poetry'; or again we may speak of 'a poetical use oflanguage' as distinct from 'the use of language in poetry'.
These references to 'use of language' have nothing to dowith the illocutionary act. For example, if I say 'Go andcatch a falling star', it may be quite clear what both themeaning and the force of my utterance is, but still wholly
unresolved which of these other kinds of things I may be
doing. There are parasitic uses of language, which are'not serious', not the 'full normal use'. The normal conditions of reference may be suspended, or no attempt madeat a standard perlocutionary act, no attempt to make you 'do anything, as Walt Whitman does not seriously incite
the eagle of liberty to soar.
(3) Furthermore, there may be some things we 'do' insome connexion with saying something which do notseem to fall, intuitively at least, exactly into any of theseroughly defined classes, or else seem to fall vaguely into
more than one; but any way we do not at the outset feelso clear that they are as remote from our three acts aswould be joking or writing poetry. For example, insinrcating, as when we insinuate something in or by issuing
some utterance, seems to involve some convention, as inCC'How to do things with Words

105

the illocutionary act; but we cannot say 'I insinuate . . .5 ,and it seems like implying to be a clever effect rather thana mere act. A further example is evincing emotion. We
may evince emotion in or by issuing an utterance, as
when we swear; but once again we have no use here for
performative formulas and the other devices of illocutionary acts. We might say that we use swearing1 forrelieving our feelings. We must notice that the illocutionary act is a conventional act: an act done as conforming to a convention.
(4) Acts of all our three kinds necessitate, since they
are the performing of actions, allowance being made forthe ills that all action is heir to. We must systematicallybe prepared to distinguish between 'the act of doing x',i.e. achieving x, and 'the act of attempting to do x': forexample, we must distinguish between warning andattempting to warn. We must expect infelicities here.
The next three points that arise do so importantly
because our acts are acts.
(5) Since our acts are acts, we must always remember
the distinction between producing effects or consequences
which are intended or unintended; and (i) when the
speaker intends to produce an effect it may neverthelessnot occur, and (ii) when he does not intend to produce it
or intends not to produce it it may nevertheless occur.
T o cope with complication (i) we invoke as before thedistinction between attempt and achievement; to cope
'Swearing' is ambiguous: 'I swear by Our Lady' is to swear by Our
Lady: but 'Bloody' is not to swear by Our Lady.

How to do things with Words
with complication (ii) we invoke the normal linguistic
devices of disclaiming (adverbs like 'unintentionally' and'so on') which we hold ready for personal use in all casesof doing actions.
(6) Furthermore, we must, of course, allow that asacts they may be things that we do not exactly do, in thesense that we did them, say, under duress or in any othersuch way. Other ways besides in which we may not fully
do the action are given in (2) above.
(7) Finally we must meet the objection about ourillocutionary and perlocutionary acts-namely that thenotion of an act is unclear-by a general doctrine about
action. We have the idea of an 'act' as a fixed physicalthing that we do, as distinguished from conventions
and as distinguished from consequences. But(a) the illocutionary act and even the locutionary act
too may involve conventions : consider the example ofdoing obeisance. It is obeisance only because it is conventional and it is done only because it is conventional.
Compare the distinction between kicking a wall andkicking a goal ;(b) the perlocutionary act may include what in a way areconsequences, as when we say 'By doing x I was doing y' :we do bring in a greater or less stretch of 'consequences'always, some of which may be 'unintentional'. Thereis no restriction to the minimum physical act at all.
That we can import an indefinitely long stretch of whatmight also be called the 'consequences' of our act into theact itself is, or should be, a fundamental commonplace ofHODto do things with Words107

the theory of our language about all 'action' in general.
Thus if asked 'What did he do?', we may reply either'He shot the donkey' or 'He fired a gun' or 'He pulled
the trigger' or 'He moved his trigger finger', and all may
be correct. So, to shorten the nursery story of the endeavours of the old woman to drive her pig home in timeto get her old man's supper, we may in the last resort saythat the cat drove or got the pig, or made the pig get,over the stile. If in such cases we mention both a B act(illocution) and a C act (perlocution) we shall say 'by
B-ing he C-ed' rather than 'in B-ing . . .'. This is thereason for calling C a perlocutionary act as distinct froman illocutionary act.
Next time we shall revert to the distinction between
our three kinds of act, and to the expressions 'in' and 'by
doing x I am doing y', with a view to getting the threeclasses and their members and non-members somewhat
clearer. We shall see that just as the locutionary act
embraces doing many things at once to be complete, so
may the illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.

LECTURE IXw

H E N it was suggested that we embark on a
programme of making a list of explicit performative verbs, we ran into some difficulties
over the matter of determining whether some utterance
was or was not performative, or anyway, purely performative. It seemed expedient, therefore, to go backto fundamentals and consider how many senses there
may be in which to say something is to do something,or in saying something we do something, or even bysaying something we do something.
We first distinguished a group of things we do insaying something, which together we summed up by
saying we perform a locutionary act, which is roughly
equivalent to uttering a certain sentence with a certain
sense and reference, which again is roughly equivalent
to 'meaning' in the traditional sense. Second, we said
that we also perform illocutionary acts such as informing,ordering, warning, undertaking, &c., i.e. utterances whichhave a certain (conventional) force. Thirdly, we may also
perform perlocutionary acts: what we bring about or
achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading. Here we have three, if not more, different senses ordimensions of the 'use of a sentence' or of 'the use ofHow t o do things with Words
language' (and, of course, there are others also). All thesethree kinds of 'actions' are, simply of course as actions,subject to the usual troubles and reservations aboutattempt as distinct from achievement, being intentional
as distinct from being unintentional, and the like. We
then said that we must consider these three kinds of act
in greater detail.
We must distinguish the illocutionary from the perlocutionary act : for example we must distinguish 'in
saying it I was warning him' from 'by saying it I convinced him, or surprised him, or got him to stop'.

It is the distinction between illocutions and perlocutions which seems likeliest to give trouble, and it is uponthis that we shall now embark, taking in the distinction
between illocutions and locutions by the way. It is certain that the perlocutionary sense of 'doing an action'must somehow be ruled out as irrelevant to the sense inwhich an utterance, if the issuing of it is the 'doing ofan action', is a performative, at least if that is to be
distinct from a constative. For clearly any, or almost any,
perlocutionary act is liable to be brought off, in sufficiently special circumstances, by the issuing, with orwithout calculation, of any utterance whatsoever, and inparticular by a straightforward constative utterance (ifthere is such an animal). You may, for example, deter me(C. b)' from doing something by informing me, perhaps
See p. ~ o forz the significance of these references.

HOWt o do things with Words
guilelessly yet opportunely, what the consequences ofdoing it would in fact be: and this applies even to(C. a)' for you may convince me (C. a)' that she is an
adulteress by asking her whether it was not her handkerchief which was in X's bedroom: or by stating that
it was hers.
We have then to draw the line between an action we do(here an illocution) and its consequence. Now in general,and if the action is not one of saying something but anon-conventional 'physical' action, this is an intricate
matter. As we have seen, we can, or may like to think wecan, class, by stages, more and more of what is initiallyand ordinarily included or possibly might be included
under the name given to 'our act' itself3 as really only
consequences, however little remote and however naturally
See p. 102 for the significance of these references.
That the giving of straighdbrward information produces, almost
always, consequential effects upon action, is no more surprising than theconverse, that the doing of any action (including the uttering of a performative) has regularly the consequence of making ourselves and others
aware of facts. To do any act in a perceptible or detectable way is toafford ourselves and generally others also the opportunity of coming to
h o w both (a) that we did it, and f d e r (b) many other facts as to our
motives, our character or what not which may be inferred fiom ourhaving done it. If you hurl a tomato at a political meeting (or bawl
'I protest' when someone else does-if that is performing an action) the
consequence will probably be to make others aware that you object, andto make them think that you hold certain political beliefs : but this will
not make either the throw or the shout true or false (though they may be,even deliberately, misleading). And by the same token, the productionof any number of consequential effects will not prevent a constativeutterance from being true or false.
1do not here go into the question how far consequences may extend.
The usual errors on this topic may be found in, for example, Moore's
Pn'tl~t$iaEthiea.

How t o do things with Words

1x1

to be anticipated, of our actual action in the supposed
minimum physical sense, which will then transpire to be
the making of some movement or movements with partsof our body (e.g. crooking our finger, which produced amovement of the trigger, which produced . . . which
produced the death of the donkey). There is, of course,much to be said about this which need not concern us
here. But at least in the case of acts of saying something,( I ) nomenclatzlre affords us an assistance which it
generally withholds in the case of 'physical' actions. Forwith physical actions we nearly always naturally namethe action not in terms of what we are here calling theminlmum physical act, but in terms which embrace agreater or less but indefinitely extensive range of whatmight be called its natural consequences (or, looking at
it another way, the intention with which it was done).
We not merely do not use the notion of a minimum
physical act (which is in any case doubtful) but we donot seem to have any class of names which distinguishphysical acts from consequences: whereas with acts ofsaying something, the vocabulary of names for acts (B)seems expressly designed to mark a break at a certain
regular point between the act (our saying something) andits consequences (which are usually not the saying ofanything), or at any rate a great many of them.=
1

Note that if we suppose the minimum physical act to be movementof the body when we say 'I moved my finger', the fact that the object
moved is part of my body does in fact introduce a new sense of 'moved'.
Thus I may be able to waggle my ears as a schoolboy does, or by graspingthem between my finger and thumb, or move my foot either in theIHow to do things with Words(2) Furthermore, we seem to derive some assistancefrom the special nature of acts of saying something bycontrast with ordinary physical actions: for with theselatter even the minimum physical action, which we are
seeking to detach from its consequences, is, being abodily movement, in pari materia1 with at least many of its
immediate and natural consequences, whereas, whatever
the immediate and natural consequences of an act ofsaying something may be, they are at least not normallyother further acts of saying something, whether moreparticularly on the speaker's own part or even on thepart of other^.^ So that we have here a sort of regularnatural break in the chain, which is wanting in the caseof physical actions, and which is associated with thespecial class of names for illocutions.
But, it may be asked at this point, are not the consequences imported with the nomenclature of perlocutions-

ordinary way or by manipulating with my hand when I have pins andneedles. The ordinary use of 'move' in such examples as 'I moved myfinger' is ultimate. We must not seek to go back behind it to 'pulling on
my muscles' and the like.
This in pan' mataia could be misleading to you. I do not mean, as
was pointed out in the previous footnote, that my 'moving my finger' is,metaphysically, in the least like 'the trigger moving' which is its consequence, or like 'my finger's moving the trigger'. But 'a movement of a
trigger finger' is in pan' muteria with 'a movement of a trigger'.
Or we could put the matter in a must important other way by sayingthat the sense in which saying something produces effects on otherpersons, or c a w s things, is a fundamentally different sense of cause fromthat used in physical causation by pressure, kc. It has to operate throughthe conventions of language and is a matter of influence exerted by one
person on another: this is probably the original sense of 'cause'.
a See below.

.

How t o do things with Words

113

really consequences of the acts (A), the locutions ? Ought
we not, in seeking to detach 'all' consequences, to go
right back beyond the illocution to the locution-andindeed to the act (A. a), the uttering of noises, which is aphysical movement?' It has, of course, been admitted
that to perform an illocutionary act is necessarily to perform a locutionary act: that, for example, to congratulate
is necessarily to say certain words; and to say certain
words is necessarily, at least in part, to make certain moreor less indescribable movements with the vocal organ^.^So that the divorce between 'physical' actions and actsof saying something is not in all ways complete-there issome connexion. But (i) while this may be importantin some connexions and contexts, it does not seem toprevent the drawing of a line for our present purposes
where we want one, that is, between the completion of
the illocutionary act and all consequences thereafter. And
further (ii), much more important, we must avoid theidea, suggested above though not stated, that the illocutionary act is a consequence of the locutionary act, andeven the idea that what is imported by the nomenclatureof illocutions is an additional reference to some of theconsequences of the locutions,3 i.e. that to say 'he urged
me to' is to say that he said certain words and in addition
that his saying them had or perhaps was intended to have
Or is it? We have already noted that gproductionof noises' is itself
really a consequence of the minimum physical act of moving one's vocal
organs.
Still confining ourselves, for simplicity, to sfloken utterance.
Though see below.

How to do tlzings with Words
certain consequences ( ?an effect upon me). We should
not, if we were to insist for some reason and in somesense on 'going back' from the illocution to the phonetic
act (A. a), be going back to a minimum physical action
via the chain of its consequences, in the way that we
supposedly go back from the death of the rabbit to the
movement of the trigger finger. The uttering of noises
may be a consequence (physical) of the movement of the
vocal organs, the breath, &c. : but the uttering of a word
is not a consequence of the uttering of a noise, whether
physical or otherwise. Nor is the uttering of words witha certain meaning a consequence of uttering the words,
whether physical or otherwise. For that matter, evenphatic (A. b) and rhetic (A. c) acts are not consequences,
let alone physical consequences, of phonetic acts (A. a).
What we do import by the use of the nomenclature of
illocution is a reference, not to the consequences (atleast in any ordinary sense) of the locution, but to theconventions of illocutionary force as bearing on thespecial circumstances of the occasion of the issuing of
the utterance. We shall shortly return to the senses inwhich the successful or consummated performance of an
illocutionary act does bring in 'consequences' or 'effects'
in certain senses.'
We may still feel tempted to ascribe some 'primacy' to the locution
as against the illocution, seeing that, given some individual rhetic act(A. c), there may yet be room for doubt as to how it should be describedin the nomenclature of illocutions. Why after all should we label one A
the other B? We may agree on the actual words that were uttcrkd, andeven also on the senses in which they were being used and on the realities

How to do things with Words"5

I have so far argued, then, that we can have hopes ofisolating the illocutionary act from the perlocu tionary as
producing consequences, and that it is not itself a 'consequence' of the locutionary act. Now, however, I must
point out that the illocutionary act as distinct from theperlocutionaryis connected with the production of effects
in certain senses :(I) Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary
act will not have been happily, successfully performed.
This is to be distinguished from saying that the illocutionary act is the achieving of a certain effect. I cannot
be said to have warned an audience unless it hears what
I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effectmust be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act
to which they were being used to refer, and yet still disagree as to whether,in the circumsmces, they amounted to an order or a threat or merely
to advice or a warning. Yet after all, there is ample room, equally, fordisagreement in individual cases as to how the rhetic act (A. c) should
be described in the nomenclature of locutions (What did he really mean?
To what person, time, or what not was he a c W y referring ?): andindeed, we may often agree that his act was definitely one say, of ordering(illocution), while yet uncertain what it was he was meaning to order(locution). It is plausible to suppose that the act is at least as much'bound' to be describable as some more or less dejfiite type of illocution
as it is to be describable as some more or less definite locutionary act (A).
Difficulties about conventions and intentions must arise in deciding upon
the correct description whether of a locution or of an illocution: deliberate, or unintentional, ambiguitg of meaning or reference is perhaps ascommon as deliberate or unintentional Mure to make plain 'how ourwords are to be taken' (in the illocutionary sense). Moreover, the wholeapparatus of 'explicit perforrnatives' (see above) serves to obviate disagreements as to the description of illocutionary acts. It is much harderin fact to obviate disagreements as to the description of 'locutionary
acts'. Each, however, is conventional and liable to need to have a 'construction' put on it by judges.

How t o do things with Words
is to be carried out. How should we best put it here?
And how can we limit it ? Generally the effect amounts
to bringing about the understanding of the meaning andof the force of the locution. So the performance of an
illocutionary act involves the securing of ~cptakc.
(2) The illocutionary act 'takes effect' in certain ways,
as distinguished from producing consequences in thesense of bringing about states of affairs in the 'normal'
way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events. Thus
'I name this ship the Qaeen Elizabeth' has the effect ofnaming or christening the ship ; then certain subsequentacts such as referring to it as the Generalissimo Stalin
will be out of order.
(3) We have said that many illocutionary acts invite byconvention a response or sequel, which may be 'oneway' or 'two-way': thus we may distinguish arguing,ordering, promising, suggesting, and asking to, fromoffering, asking whether you will and asking 'Yes or no ?'If this response is accorded, or the sequel implemented,
that requires a second act by the speaker or anotherperson; and it is a commonplace of the consequencelanguage that this cannot be included under the initialstretch of action.
Generally we can, however, always say 'I got him to'with such a word. This does make the act one ascribed
to me and it is, when words are or maybe employed, aperlocutionary act. Thus we must distinguish 'I ordered
him and he obeyed' from 'I got him to obey'. The
general implication of the latter is that other additional

How to do things with Words
means were employed to produce this consequence asascribable to me, inducements, and even very often personal influence amounting to duress; there is even very
often an illocutionary act distinct from merely ordering,as when I say 'I got him to do it by stating x'.
So here are three ways in which illocutionary acts arebound up with effects; and these are all distinct fromthe producing of effects which is characteristic of theperlocutionary act.
We must distinguish actions which have a perlocutionary object (convince, persuade) from those whichmerely produce a perlocutionary sequel. Thus we may
say 'I tried to warn him but only succeeded in alarminghim'. What is the perlocutionary object of one illocution
may be a sequel of another: for example, the perlocutionary object of warning, to alert someone, may be asequel of a perlocutionary act which alarms someone.
Again, deterrence may be the sequel of an illocution
instead of the object of saying 'Do not do it'. Some
perlocutionary acts always have sequels rather thanobjects, namely those where there is no illocutionary
formula: thus I may surprise you or upset you or humiliate you by a locution, though there is no illocutionary
formula 'I surprise you by . . . 'I upset you by . . 9 ,'I humiliate you by . . .,.
It is characteristic of perlocutionary acts that the
response achieved, or the sequel, can be achieved additionally or entirely by non-locutionary means: thus intimidation may be achieved by waving a stick or pointing

How t o do things with Words
a gun. Even in the cases of convincing, persuading,getting to obey and getting to believe, we may achieve
the response non-verbally. However, this alone is notenough to distinguish illocutionary acts, since we canfor example warn or order or appoint or give or protest
or apologize by non-verbal means and these are illucutionary acts. Thus we may cock a snook or hurl a tomato
by way of protest.
More important is the question whether perlocutionary acts may always achieve their response or sequel
by non-conventional means. Certainly we can achievesome sequels of perlocutionary acts by entirely nonconventional means (or as we say 'unconventional'means), by acts which are not conventional at all, or not
for that purpose; thus I may persuade some one bygently swinging a big stick or gently mentioning that his
aged parents are still in the Third Reich. Strictly speaking, there cannot be an illocutionary act unless the means
employed are conventional, and so the means for achieving its ends non-verbally must be conventional. But it isdifficult to say where conventions begin and end; thus
I may warn him by swinging a stick or I may give him
something by merely handing it to him. But if I warn
him by swinging a stick, then swinging my stick is awarning: he would know very well what I meant: it may
seem an unmistakable threatening gesture. Similar difficulties arise over giving tacit consent to some arrangement, or promising tacitly, or voting by a show of hands.
But the fact remains that many illocutionary acts cannot

How t o do things with Words

I19

be performed except by saying something. This is trueof stating, informing (as distinct from showing), arguing,
giving estimates, reckoning, and finding (in the legal
sense); it is true of the great majority of verdictives andexpositives as opposed to many exercitives and commissives.'[For the definition of vadictives, expositives, exacitives, and cornmissives see Lecture XI1.-J.O.U.],LECTURE X
OR G E T T I N G for the time the initial distinction between performatives and constatives and the
I programme of finding a list of explicit performative
words, notably verbs, we made a fresh start by considering the senses in which to say something is to do something. Thus we distinguished the locutionary act (andwithin it the phonetic, the phatic, and the rhetic acts)
which has a meaning; the illocutionary act which has acertain force in saying something; the perlocutionary
act which is the achieving of certain efects by saying
something.
We distinguished in the last lecture some senses ofconsequences and effects in these connexions, especiallythree senses in which effects can come in even with
illocutionary acts, namely, securing uptake, taking effect,
and inviting responses. In the case of the perlocutionary
act we made a rough distinction between achieving an
object and producing a sequel. Illocutionary acts areconventional acts: perlocutionary acts are not conventional. Acts of both kinds can be performed-or, moreaccurately, acts called by the same name (for example,
acts equivalent to the illocutionary act of warning or the
perlocutionary act of convincing)--can be brought off
non-verbally; but even then to deserve the name of an
illocutionary act, for example a warning, it must be aHow t o do things with Words
conventional non-verbal act: but perlocutionary acts are
not conventional, though conventional acts may be madeuse of in order to bring off the perlocutionary act. A
judge should be able to decide, by hearing what was
said, what locutionary and illocutionary acts were performed, but not what perlocutionary acts were achieved.
Finally, we have said there is another whole range ofquestions about 'how we are using language' or 'what
we are doing in saying something' which we have said
may be, and intuitively seem to be, entirely differentfurther matters which we are not trenching upon. For
example, there are insinuating (and other non-literal usesof language), joking (and other non-serious uses of language), and swearing and showing off (which are perhaps
expressive uses of language). We can say 'In saying x I
was joking' (insinuating . ..,expressing my feelings, &c.).
We have now to make some final remarks on theformulas :'In saying x I was doing y' or 'I did y','By saying x I did y' or 'I was doing y'.
For it was because of the availability of these formulas
which seem specially suitable, the former (in) for picking
out verbs which are names for illocutionary acts, and thelatter (by) for picking out verbs which are names for
perlocutionary acts, that we chose in fact the names
illocutionary and perlocutionary. Thus, for example :'In saying I would shoot him I was threatening him'.
'By saying I would shoot him I alarmed him7.

How to do things with Words
Will these linguistic formulas provide us with a testfor distinguishing illocutionary from perlocutionary acts ?
They will not. Before I deal with this, though, let me
make one general observation or confession. Many ofyou will be getting impatient at this approach-and tosome extent quite justifiably. You will say 'Why not cut
the cackle? Why go on about lists available in ordinary
talk of names for things we do that have relations tosaying, and about formulas like the "in" and "by" formulas ? Why not get down to discussing the thing bang
off in terms of linguistics and psychology in a straightforward fashion? Why be so devious?' Well, of course,
I agree that this will have to be done--only I say after,
not before, seeing what we can screw out of ordinary
language even if in what comes out there is a strong
element of the undeniable. Otherwise we shall overlook
things and go too fast.
'In' and 'by' are anyway worth investigation ;for thatmatter, so are 'when', 'while', &c. The importance of
these investigations is obvious in the general questionof how the various possible descriptions of 'what I do'
are interrelated, as we have seen in the matter of
C consequences'.
We turn, then, to the 'in' and 'by'formulas, and after that shall turn back again to our
initial distinction of the performative and constative,
to see how it fares in this newly provided framework.
We will take first the formula: 'In saying x I wasdoing y' (or 'I did y').

How to do things with Words

I
23(I) Its use is not confined to illocutionary acts; it will
apply (a) with locutionary acts and (b) with acts which
seem to fall outside our classification altogether. It
certainly is not the case that if we can say 'in saying
x you were y-ing', then 'to y' is necessarily to perform
an illocutionary act. At most it might be claimed thatthe formula will not suit the perlocutionary act, while
the 'by' formula will not suit the illocutionary act. In
particular ( a ) we use the same formula where 'to y' isto perform an incidental part of a locutionary act: forexample, 'In saying I detested Catholics, I was referring
only to the present day', or, 'I was meaning or thinking of
Roman Catholics'. Though in this case we would perhaps
more commonly use the formula 'in speaking of'. Another example of this kind is: 'In saying "Iced ink'' I
was uttering the noises "I stink".' But besides this
there are (b) other apparently miscellaneous cases, suchas 'In saying x you were making a mistake' or 'failing toobserve a necessary distinction' or 'breaking the law',or 'running a risk', or 'forgetting' : to make a mistakeor to run a risk is certainly not to perform an illocutionaryact, nor even a locutionary one.
We may attempt to get out of (a), the fact that it is
not confined to illocutionary acts, by arguing that 'saying' is ambiguous. Where the use is not illocutionary'saying' could be replaced by 'speaking of', or 'using
the expression', or instead of 'in saying x' we could say'by the word x' or 'in using the word x'. This is thesense of 'saying' in which it is followed by inverted

How t o do things d h Words
commas, and in such cases we refer to the phatic andnot the rhetic act.
The case (b), of miscellaneous acts falling outside ourclassification, is more difficult. A possible test would be
the following : where we can put the y-verb1 into a noncontinuous tense (preterite or present) instead of thecontinuous tense, or equally where we can change the'in' into 'by' while keeping the continuous tense, thenthe y-verb is not the name for an illocution. Thus, for'In saying that he was making a mistake', we could put,
without change of sense, either 'In saying that he madea mistake' or 'By saying that he was making a mistake' :but we do not say 'In saying that I protested' nor 'By
saying that I was protesting'.
(2) But on the whole we might claim that the formula
does not go with perlocutionary verbs like 'convinced','persuaded 9 ,c deterred'. But we must qualify this a little.
First, exceptions arise through the incorrect use oflanguage. Thus people say 'Are you intimidating me ?'instead of 'threatening', and thus might say 'In saying x,
he was intimidating me'. Second, the same word may
genuinely be used in both illocutionary and perlocutionary ways. For example, 'tempting' is a verb which
may easily be used in either way. We don't have 'I
tempt you to' but we do have 'Let me tempt you to',and exchanges like 'Do have another whack of icecream'-' Are you tempting me ?'. The last question[That is, the verb substituted for 'y' in 'In saying x I was y-ing'.
J.O.U.]

How to do things with Words
would be absurd in a perlocutionary sense, since itwould be one for the speaker to answer, if anyone. If
I say 'Oh, why not ?' it seems that I am tempting him,
but he may not really be tempted. Third, there is theproleptic use of verbs such as, for example, 'seducing'or 'pacifying'. In this case 'trying to' seems always apossible addition with a perlocutionary verb. But wecannot say that the illocutionary verb is always equivalent to trying to do something which might be expressedby a perlocutionary verb, as for example that 'argue' isequivalent to 'try to convince', or 'warn' is equivalent
to 'try to alarm' or 'alert'. For firstly, the distinction
between doing and trying to do is already there in theillocutionary verb as well as in the perlocutionary verb;
we distinguish arguing from trying to argue as well as
convincing from trying to convince. Further , many
illocutionary acts are not cases of trying to do any perlocutionary act; for example, to promise is not to try to
do anything.
But we may still ask whether we may possibly use 'in'with the perlocutionary act; this is tempting when theact is not intentionally achieved. But even here it isprobably incorrect, and we should use 'by'. Or at any
rate, if I say, for example, 'In saying x I was convincing
him', I am here accounting not for how I came to besaying x but for how I came to be convincing him; thisis the other way round from the use of the formula in
explaining what we meant by a phrase when we usedthe'in saying' formula, and involves another sense ('in the

126

How to do things with Words

process' or 'in the course of' as distinct from 'a criterion')from its use with illocutionary verbs.
Let us now consider the general meaning of the 'in'formula. If I say 'In doing A I was doing B', I may mean
either that A involves B ( A accounts for B) or that B
involves A (B accounts for A). This distinction may bebrought out by contrasting (a I) 'In the course or processof doing A, I was doing B' (in building a house, I wasbuilding a wall) and (a 2) 'In doing A, I was in the course
or process of doing B' (in building a wall I was building
a house). Or again, contrast (a I): 'In uttering the noises
N I was saying S' and (a 2): 'In saying S I was uttering
the noises N' ;in (a I) I account for A (here, my uttering
the noises) and state my purpose in uttering the noises,
whereas in (a 2) I account for B (my uttering the noises)
and thus state the effect of my uttering the noises. The
formula is often used to account for my doing somethingin answer to the question: 'How come you were doing
so-and-so?' Of the two different emphases, the Dictionary prefers the former case (a I), in which we accountfor B, but we equally often use it as in case (a z), toaccount for A.
If we now consider the example:
In saying . . . I was forgetting . . .,we find that B (forgetting) explains how we came to say
it, i.e. it accounts for A. Similarly
In buzzing I was thinking that butterflies buzzed
accounts for my buzzing (A).This seems to be the use ofHow t o do things with Words

127

the 'in saying' formula when used with locutionary
verbs; it accounts for my saying what I did (and not
for my meaning).
But if we consider the examples :(a 3) In buzzing, I was pretending to be a bee,
In buzzing I was behaving like a buffoon,
we find here that saying what one did (buzzing) inintention or in fact constituted my saying so-and-so, an
act of a certain kind, and made it callable by a different
name. The illocutionary example :In saying so-and-so I was warningLnot of either of the 'in the course of'
is of this kind: iiis
kinds (a I) and (a 2) (where A accounts for B or viceversa). But it is different from the locutionary examples,in that the act is constituted not by intention or by fact,essentially but by convention (which is, of course, afact). These features serve to pick out illocutionary acts
most satisfactorily.
When the 'in saying' formula is used with perlocutionary verbs, on the other hand, it is used in an 'in
the process of' sense (a I), but it accounts for B, whereas the locutionary verb case accounts for A. So it isdifferent from both the locutionary and the illocutionary
cases.

But suppose there is a quack dentist. We can say 'In inserting theplate he was practicising dentistry.' There is a convention here just as in
the warning case-a judge could decide.
IHow to do things with Words
The question 'How come ?'is not confined to questions of means and ends, we may observe. Thus in theexample :In saying A . . . I was forgetting B
we account for A, but in a new sense of 'accounts for'or 'involves', which is not that of means and end.
Again, in the example:
In saying . . . I was convincing . . . (was humiliating. ..),
we account for B (my convincing or humiliating him)
which is indeed a consequence but is not a consequenceof a means.
The 'by' formula is likewise not confined to perlocutionary verbs. There is the locutionary use (by saying . . .
I meant . . .), the illocutionary use (by saying . . . I was
thereby warning . . .) and a variety of miscellaneoususes (by saying . . , I put myself in the wrong). The usesof 'by' are at least two in general:(a) By hitting the nail on the head I was driving it
into the wall,(6) By inserting a plate, I was practising dentistry.
In (a) 'by' indicates the means by which, the manner inwhich or the method by which I was bringing off theaction; in (6) 'by' indicates a criterion, that about what I
did which enables my action to be classified as practisingdentistry. There seems little difference between the twocases except that the use to indicate a criterion seems
more external. This second sense of 'by'-the criterion

How to do things with Words

129

sense-is, it seems, also very close to 'in' in one of its
senses: 'In saying that I was breaking the law (broke thelaw)'; and in this way 'by' can certainly be used with
illocutionary verbs in the 'by saying' formula. Thus wemay say 'By saying . I was warning him (I warnedhim)'. But 'by', in this sense, is not used with perlocutionary verbs. If I say 'By saying . . . I convinced (persuaded) him', 'by' will here have the means-to-end
sense, or anyway signify the manner in which or methodby which I did it. Is the 'by'-formula ever used in'means-to-end sense' with an illocutionary verb ? It
would seem that it is in at least two kinds of cases:(a) When we adopt a verbal means of doing something
instead of a non-verbal means, when we talk instead ofusing a stick. Thus in the example: 'By saying "I do"
I was marrying her', the performative 'I do' is a means
to the end of marriage. Here 'saying' is used in thesense in which it takes inverted commas and is using
words or language, a phatic and not a rhetic act.
(6) When one performative utterance is used as anindirect means to perform another act. Thus in theexample: 'By saying "I bid three clubs" I informed
him that I had no diamonds', I use the performative'I bid three clubs' as an indirect means to informinghim (which is also an illocutionary act).
In sum: to use the 'by saying' formula as a test of anact being perlocutionary, we must first be sure:(I) that 'by' is being used in an instrumental as distinct from a criterion sense;

How t o do things with Words
that 'saying' is being used
( a ) in the full sense of a locutionary act and not apartial sense, for example of a phatic act;(b) not in the double-convention way as in theexample from bridge above.

(2)

There are two other subsidiary linguistic tests of theillocutionary act to distinguish it from the perlocutionary :(I) It seems that in the case of illocutionary verbs wecan often say 'To say x was to do y'. One cannot say'To hammer the nail was to drive it in' instead of 'By
hammering the nail he drove it in'. But this formula will
not give us a watertight test, for we can say many things
with it; thus we can say 'To say that was to convince
him' (a proleptic use ?)although 'convince' is a perlocutionary verb.
(2) The verbs that we have classified (intuitivelyfor that is all we have done so far) as names of illocutionary acts seem to be pretty close to explicitperfrrmative
verbs, for we can say 'I warn you that' and 'I order
you to' as explicit performatives; but warning and ordering are illocutionary acts. We can use the performative'I warn you that' but not 'I convince you that', and canuse the performative 'I threaten you with' but not 'I
intimidate you by'; convincing and intimidating are
perlocutionary acts.
The general conclusion must be, however, that theseformulas are at best very slippery tests for deciding
whether an expression is an illocution as distinct fromHow to do things with Words

131

a perlocution ar neither. But none the less, 'by' and 'in'deserve scrutiny every bit as much as, say, the nowbecoming-notorious 'how'.
But what then is the relation between performatives
and these illocutionary acts ? It seems as though when we
have an explicit performative we also have an illocutionary act; let us see, then, what the relationship is
between ( I ) the distinctions made in the earlier lectures
regarding performatives and (2) these different kinds ofact.

LECTURE X IW

H E N we originally contrasted the performative with the constative utterance we said
that(I) the performative should be doing something as
opposed to just saying something; and(2) the performative is happy or unhappy as opposedto true or false.

Were these distinctions really sound ? Our subsequentdiscussion of doing and saying certainly seems to pointro the conclusion that whenever I 'say' anything (except
perhaps a mere exclamation like 'damn' or 'ouch') I
shall be performing both locutionary and illocutionaryacts, and these two kinds of acts seem to be the very things
which we tried to use as a means of distinguishing, under
the names of 'doing' and 'saying', performatives fromconstatives. If we are in general always doing both things,
how can our distinction survive ?
Let us first reconsider the contrast from the side of
constative utterances : Of these, we were content to referto 'statements' as the typical or paradigm case, Would
it be correct to say that when we state something(I) we are doing something as well as and distinct
from just saying something, andHow t o do things with Words

133(2) our utterance is liable to be happy or unhappy (aswell as, if you will, true or false) ?
(I) Surely to state is every bit as much to perform an
illocutionary act as, say, to warn or to pronounce. Of
course it is not to perform an act in some specially
physical way, other than in so far as it involves, whenverbal, the making of movements of vocal organs; butthen nor, as we have seen, is to warn, to protest, topromise or to name. 'Stating' seems to meet all thecriteria we had for distinguishing the illocutionary act.
Consider such an unexceptionable remark as the following:
In saying that it was raining, I was not betting or
arguing or warning: I was simply stating it as a fact.
Here 'stating' is put absolutely on a level with arguing,
betting, and warning. Or again:
In saying that it was leading to unemployment, I was
not warning or protesting: I was simply stating thefacts.
Or to take a different type of test also used earlier,surelyI state that he did not do it

is exactly on a level withI argue that he did not do it,
I suggest that he did not do it,
I bet that he did not do it, &c.

How to do things mith Words
If I simply use the primary or non-explicit form ofutterance :He did not do it
we may make explicit what we were doing in saying this,or specify the illocutionary force of the utterance, equallyby saying any of the above three (or more) things.
Moreover, although the utterance 'He did not do it' isoften issued as a statement, and is then undoubtedly trueor false (this is if anything is), it does not seem possible
to say that it differs from 'I state that he did not do it'in this respect. If someone says 'I state that he did not
do it', we investigate the truth of his statement in justthe same way as if he had said 'He did not do it' simpliciter, when we took that to be, as we naturally often
should, a statement. That is, to say 'I state that he did
not' is to make the very same statement as to say 'He
did not': it is not to make a different statement about
what 'I' state (except in exceptional cases: the historicand habitual present, &c.). As notoriously, when I say
even 'I think he did it' someone is being rude if he says
'That's a statement about you': and this might conceivably be about myself, whereas the statement could
not. So that there is no necessary conflict between(a) our issuing the utterance being the doing of something,(6) our utterance being true or false.
For that matter compare, for example, 'I warn you that
it is going to charge', where likewise it is both a warning

How t o do things with Words

135

and true or false that it is going to charge; and thatcomes in in appraising the warning just as much as,
though not quite in the same way as, in appraising thestatement.
On mere inspection, 'I state that' does not appear todiffer in any essential way from 'I maintain that' (to saywhich is to maintain that), 'I inform you that', 'I testify
that', &c. Possibly some 'essential' differences may yet
be established between such verbs : but nothing has been
done towards this yet.
(2) Moreover, if we think of the second alleged contrast, according to which performatives are happy or unhappy and statements true or false, again from the sideof supposed constative utterances, notably statements, wefind that statements are liable to every kind of infelicity
to which performatives are liable. Let us look back again
and consider whether statements are not liable to precisely the same disabilities as, say, warnings by way ofwhat we called 'infelicities'-that is various disabilities
which make an utterance unhappy without, however,making it true or false.
We have already noted that sense in which saying or
stating 'The cat is on the mat' implies that I believe thatthe cat is on the mat. This is parallel to the s e n s e i s
the same sense-as that in which 'I promise to be there'
implies that I intend to be there and that I believe I shallbe able to be there. So the statement is liable to theinsincerity form of infelicity; and even to the breach formof infelicity in this sense, that saying or stating that the

136

How t o do things with Words

cat is on the mat commits me to saying or stating 'The
mat is underneath the cat' just as much as the performative 'I define X as Y' (in the j a t sense say) commits me
to using those terms in special ways in future discourse,
and we can see how this is connected with such acts aspromising. This means that statements can give rise to
infelicities of our two r kinds.
Now what about infelicities of the A and B kinds,
which rendered the act-warning, undertaking, &c.null and void ? : can a thing that looks like a statement be
nu11 and void just as much as a putative contract? The
answer seems to be Yes, importantly. The first cases are
A. I and A. 2, where there is no convention (or not an
accepted convention) or where the circumstances are
not appropriate for its invocation by the speaker. Many
infelicities of just this type do infect statements.
We have aIready noticed the case of a putative statement presupposing (as it is called) the existence of thatwhich it refers to; if no such thing exists, 'the statement'
is not about anything. Now some say that in these circumstances, if, for example, someone asserts that thepresent King of France is bald, 'the question whether
he is bald does not arise'; but it is better to say that theputative statement is null and void, exactly as when I
say that I sell you something but it is not mine or (having been burnt) is not any longer in existence. Contracts
often are void because the objects they are about do notexist, which involves a breakdown of reference (total
ambiguity).

How t o do things with Words
But it is important to notice also that 'statements' too
are liable to infelicity of this kind in other ways also
parallel to contracts, promises, warnings, &c. Just as we
often say, for example, 'You cannot order me', in thesense 'You have not the right to order me', which isequivalent to saying that you are not in the appropriate
position to do so: so often there are things you cannot
state-have no right to s t a t e a r e not in a position tostate. You cannot now state how many people there arein the next room; if you say 'There are fifty people in
the next room', I can only regard you as guessing or
conjecturing (just as sometimes you are not ordering me,which would be inconceivable, but possibly asking me
to rather impolitely, so here you are 'hazarding a guess'rather oddly). Here there is something you might, in'other circumstances, be in a position to state; but what
about statements about other persons' feelings or about
the future? Is a forecast or even a re diction about, say,persons' behaviour really a statement? It is importantto take the speech-situation as a whole.
Just as sometimes we cannot appoint but only confirm
an appointment already made, so sometimes we cannot
state but only confirm a statement already made.
Putative statements are also liable to infelicities oftype B, flaws, and hitches. Somebody 'says something he
did not really mean'-uses the wrong word-says 'thecat is on the mat' when he meant to say 'bat'. Other
similar trivialities arise-or rather not entirely trivialities; because it is possible to discuss such utterances

How to do things with Words
entirely in terms of meaning or sense and reference andso get confused about them, though they are really easy
to understand.
Once we realize that what we have to study is not thesentence but the issuing of an utterance in a speechsituation, there can hardly be any longer a possibility of
not seeing that stating is performing an act. Moreover,comparing stating to what we have said about the illocutionary act, it is an act to which, just as much as to otherillocutionary acts, it is essential to 'secure uptake': thedoubt about whether I stated something if it was notheard or understood is just the same as the doubt about
whether I warned sotto vote or protested if someone did
not take it as a protest, &c. And statements do 'takeeffect' just as much as 'namings', say: if I have statedsomething, then that commits me to other statements:
other statements made by me will be in order or out oforder. Also some statements or remarks made by you
will be henceforward contradicting me or not contradicting me, rebutting me or not rebutting me, and soforth. If perhaps a statement does not invite a response,that is not essential to all illocutionary acts anyway.
And certainly in stating we are or may be performing
perlocutionary acts of all kinds.
The most that might be argued, and with some plausibility, is that there is no perlocutionary object specifically associated with stating, as there is with informing,arguing, &c.; and this comparative purity may be
one reason why we give 'statements' a certain special

How to do things with Words
position. But this certainly would not justify giving, say,'descriptions', if properly used, a similar priority, and
it is in any case true of many illocutionary acts.
However, looking at the matter from the side of performatives, we may still feel that they lack somethingwhich statements have, even if, as we have shown, theconverse is not so. Performatives are, of course, incidentally saying something as well as doing something, but wemay feel that they are not essentially true or false asstatements are. We may feel that there is here a dimension in which we judge, assess, or appraise the constativeutterance (granting as a preliminary that it is felicitous)
which does not arise with non-constative or performativeutterances. Let us agree that all these circumstances ofsituation have to be in order for me to have succeededin stating something, yet when I have, the question arises,
was what I stated true or false ? And this we feel, speaking in popular terms, is now the question of whether thestatement 'corresponds with the facts'. With this I
agree : attempts to say that the use of the expression 'is
true' is equivalent to endorsing or the like are no good.
So we have here a new dimension of criticism of theaccomplished statement.
But now(I) doesn't just such a similar objective assessment of
the accomplished utterance arise, at least in manycases, with other utterances which seem typically
performative; andHow t o do things with Words(2) is notthis account of statements a little over-First, there is an obvious slide towards truth or falsity
in the case of, for example, verdictives, such as estimating, finding, and pronouncing. Thus we may:for example, that it is half
estimaterightly or
wrongly
past two,correctly or for example, that he isfindincorrectly
guilty,pronounce correctly or for example, that the batsincorrectly
man is out.
We shall not say 'truly' in the case of verdictives, but
we shall certainly address ourselves to the same question;and such adverbs as 'rightly 9 , L wrongly 9 ,C correctly', and'incorrectly' are used with statements too.
Or again there is a parallel between inferring andarguing soundly or validly and stating truly. It is not justa question of whether he did argue or infer but also ofwhether he had a right to, and did he succeed. Warningand advising may be done correctly or incorrectly, well orbadly. Similar considerations arise about praise, blame,and congratulation. Blame is not in order, if, say, youhave done the same thing yourself; and the question
always arises whether the praise, blame, or congratulation
was merited or unmerited: it is not enough to say thatyou have blamed him and there's an end on't--still one
act is, with reason, preferred to another. The question
whether praise and blame are merited is quite different

How to do things with Words
from the question whether they are opportune, and thesame distinction can be made in the case of advice. It isa different thing to say that advice is good or bad fromsaying that it is opportune or inopportune, though thetiming of advice is more important to its goodness than
the timing of blame is to its being merited.
Can we be sure that stating truly is a different classof assessment from arguing soundly, advising well,
judging fairly, and blaming justifiably? Do these nothave something to do in complicated ways with facts?
The same is true also of exercitives such as naming,
appointing, bequeathing, and betting. Facts come in as
well as our knowledge or opinion about facts.
Well, of course, attempts are constantly made to effectthis distinction. The soundness of arguments (if they are
not deductive arguments which are 'valid') and themeritedness of blame are not objective matters, it isalleged; or in warning, we are told, we should distinguishthe 'statement' that the bull is about to charge from thewarning itself. But consider also for a moment whether
the question of truth or falsity is so very objective. We
ask: 'Is it a fair statement?', and are the good reasonsand good evidence for stating and saying so very different
from the good reasons and evidence for performativeacts like arguing, warning, and judging ? Is the constative,
then, always true or false? When a constative is confronted with the facts, we in fact appraise it in ways
involving the employment of a vast array of terms
which overlap with those that we use in the appraisal ofI42

How t o do things with Words

performatives. In real life, as opposed to the simple
situations envisaged in logical theory, one cannot always
answer in a simple manner whether it is true or false.
Suppose that we confront 'France is hexagonal' withthe facts, in this case, I suppose, with France, is it trueor false ? Well, if you like, up to a point; of course I can
see what you mean by saying that it is true for certain
intents and purposes. It is good enough for a top-ranking
general, perhaps, but not for a geographer. 'Naturally it
is pretty rough', we should say, 'and pretty good as apretty rough statement'. But then someone says: 'But is
it true or is it false ? I don't mind whether it is rough ornot; of course it's rough, but it has to be true or falseit's a statement, isn't it?' How can one answer thisquestion, whether it is true or false that France is hexagonal? It is just rough, and that is the right and final
answer to the question of the relation of 'France ishexagonal' to France. It is a rough description; it is nota true or a false one.
Again, in the case of stating truly or falsely, just as
much as in the case of advising well or badly, the intents
and purposes of the utterance and its context are important; what is judged true in a school book may not be sojudged in a work of historical research. Consider theconstative, 'Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma',
remembering that Alma was a soldier's battle if everthere was one and that Lord Raglan's orders were nevertransmitted to some of his subordinates. Did Lord
Raglan then win the battle of Alma or did he not? Of

How t o do things with W O Y ~ S

143

course in some contexts, perhaps in a school book, it isperfectly justifiable to say so--it is something of an
exaggeration, maybe, and there would be no question ofgiving Raglan a medal for it. As 'France is hexagonal' isrough, so 'Lord Raglan won the battle of Alma' isexaggerated and suitable to some contexts and not toothers; it would be pointless to insist on its truth or
falsity.
Thirdly, let us consider the question whether it is truethat all snow geese migrate to Labrador, given that perhaps one maimed one sometimes fails when migrating
to get quite the whole way. Faced with such problems,many have claimed, with much justice, that utterancessuch as those beginning 'All . . .' are prescriptive definitions or advice to adopt a rule. But what rule ? This idea
arises partly through not understanding the referenceof such statements, which is limited to the known; wecannot quite make the simple statement that the truth ofstatements depends on facts as distinct from knowledgeof facts. Suppose that before Australia is discovered X
says 'All swans are white'. If you later find a black swanin Australia, is X refuted ? Is his statement false now ?
Not necessarily: he will take it back but he could say'I wasn't talking about swans absolutely everywhere; forexample, I was not making a statement about possible
swans on Mars'. Reference depends on knowledge at
the time of utterance.
The truth or falsity of statements is affected by what
they leave out or put in and by their being misleading,How t o do things with Words
and so on. Thus, for example, descriptions, which aresaid to be true or false or, if you like, are 'statements',
are surely liable to these criticisms, since they are selective and uttered for a purpose. It is essential to realizethat 'true' and 'false', like 'free' and 'unfree', do notstand for anything simple at all; but only for a generaldimension of being a right or proper thing to say as
opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, tothis audience, for these purposes and with these intentions.
In general we may say this : with both statements (and,for example, descriptions) and warnings, &c., the question of whether, granting that you did warn and had theright to warn, did state, or did advise, you were right tostate or warn or advise, can arise-not in the sense ofwhether it was opportune or expedient, but whether, on
the facts and your knowledge of the facts and the purposes for which you were speaking, and so on, this was
the proper thing to say.
This doctrine is quite different from much that thepragmatists have said, to the effect that the true is whatworks, &c. The truth or falsity of a statement depends
not merely on the meanings of words but on what act
you were performing in what circumstances.
What then finally is left of the distinction of the performative and constative utterance ? Really we may saythat what we had in mind here was this:(a) With the constative utterance, we abstract fromthe illocutionary (let alone the perlocutionary) aspects ofHow t o do things with Words145

the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary:
moreover, we use an over-simplified notion of correspondence with the facts-over-simplified because essentially it brings in the illocutionary aspect. We aim at theideal of what would be right to say in all circumstances,
for any purpose, to any audience, &c. Perhaps this issometimes realized.
(6) With the performative utterance, we attend asmuch as possible to the illocutionary force of the utterance, and abstract from the dimension of correspondencewith facts.
Perhaps neither of these abstractions is so very expedient: perhaps we have here not really two poles, butrather an historical development. Now in certain cases,
perhaps with mathematical formulas in physics books as
examples of constatives, or with the issuing of simple
executive orders or the giving of simple names, say, as
examples of performatives, we approximate in real life tofinding such things. It was examples of this kind, like'I apologize', and 'The cat is on the mat', said for noconceivable reason, extreme marginal cases, that gave
rise to the idea of two distinct utterances. But the realconclusion must surely be that we need (a) to distinguishbetween locutionary and illocutionary acts, and (b) specially and critically to establish with respect to each kindof illocutionary act-warnings, estimates, verdicts, statements, and descriptions-what if any is the specific way
in which they are intended, first to be in order or not inorder, and second, to be 'right' or 'wrong'; what terms

Hum to do things tvith Wordsof appraisal and disappraisal are used for each and what
they mean. This is a wide field and certainly will notlead to a simple distinction of 'true' and 'false'; nor will
it lead to a distinction of statements from the rest, forstating is only one among very numerous speech acts of
the illocutionary class.
Furthermore, in general the locutionary act as muchas the illocutionary is an abstraction only : every genuine
speech act is both. (This is similar to the way in which
the phatic act, the rhetic act, &c., are mere abstractions.)
But, of course, typically we distinguish different abstracted 'acts' by means of the possible slips between
cup and lip, that is, in this case, the different types ofnonsense which may be engendered in performing them.
We may compare with this point what was said in
the opening lecture about the classification of kinds ofnonsense.

LECTURE XI1

w

E have left numerous loose ends, but aftera brief rtsum6 we must plough ahead. How
did the 'constatives'-'performatives' distinction look in the light of our later theory? In generaland for all utterances that we have considered (except
perhaps for swearing), we have found :(I) Happinesslunhappiness dimension,(la) An illocutionary force,(2) Truth/falsehood dimension,(za) A locutionary meaning (sense and reference).
The doctrine of the performativelconstative distinction
stands to the doctrine of locutionary and illocutionary
acts in the total speech act as the special theory to thegeneral theory. And the need for the general theory arises
simply because the traditional 'statement' is an abstraction, an ideal, and so is its traditional truth or falsity.
But on this point I could do no more than explode a few
hopeful fireworks. In particular, the following morals
are among those I wanted to suggest:(A) The total speech act in the total speech situationis the only actual phenomenon which, in the last resort,
we are engaged in elucidating.
(B) Stating, describing, &c., arejust two names among

Horn to do things rnith Words
a very great many others for illocutionary acts; they haveno unique position.
(C) In particular, they have no unique position overthe matter of being related to facts in a unique way
called being true or false, because truth and falsity are(except by an artificial abstraction which is always possible and legitimate for certain purposes) not names for
relations, qualities, or what not, but for a dimension ofassessment-how the words stand in respect of satisfactoriness to the facts, events, situations, &c., to which
they refer.
(D) By the same token, the familiar contrast of'normative or evaluative' as opposed to the factual isin need, like so many dichotomies, of elimination.
(E) We may well suspect that the theory of 'meaning'
as equivalent to 'sense and reference' will certainly
require some weeding-out and reformulating in termsof the distinction between locutionary and illocutionary
acts (if this distinction is sound: it is only adumbratedhere). I admit that not enough has been done here: I
have taken the old 'sense and reference' on the strengthof current views; I would also stress that I have omitted
any direct consideration of the illocutionary force ofstatements.
Now we said that there was one further thing obviously
requiring to be done, which is a matter of prolonged
fieldwork. We said long ago that we needed a list of'explicit performative verbs'; but in the light of the moregeneral theory we now see that what we need is a list ofHow to do things with Words
illowtionary forces of an utterance. The old distinction,
however, between primary and explicit performatives willsurvive the sea-change from the performative/constative
distinction to the theory of speech-acts quite successfully. For we have since seen reason to suppose that thesorts of test suggested for the explicit performative verbs' &c.) will do, and in fact do better('to say . . . i s t o . ..,for sorting out those verbs which make explicit, as weshall now say, the illocutionary force of an utterance, or
what illocutionary act it is that we are performing in
issuing that utterance. What will not survive the transition, unless perhaps as a marginal limiting case, andhardly surprisingly because it gave trouble from thestart, is the notion of the purity of performatives: thiswas essentially based upon a belief in the dichotomy ofperformatives and constatives, which we see has to beabandoned in favour of more general families of related
and overlapping speech acts, which are just what wehave now to attempt to classify.
Using then the simple test (with caution) of the first
person singular present indicative active form, andgoing through the dictionary (a concise one should do)in a liberal spirit, we get a list of verbs of the orderof the third power of 10.' I said I would attempt some
general preliminary classification and make some remarks on these proposed classes. Well, here we go. I
Why use this expression instead of 1,000 ? First, it looks impressive
and scientific; second, because it goes from 1,000 to 9,999good
margin-whereas the other might be taken to mean 'about r,ooo9-too
narrow a margin.

How to do things with Words
shall only give you a run around, or rather a flounderaround.
I distinguish five more general classes: but I am
far from equally happy about all of them. They are,however, quite enough to play Old Harry with two fetishes
which I admit to an inclination to play Old Harry with,viz. (I) the truelfalse fetish, (2) the value/fact fetish. I
call then these classes of utterance, classified according totheir illocutionary force, by the following more-or-lessrebarbative names :(I) Verdictives.

(2) Exercitives.
(3) Commissives.
(4) Behabitives (a shocker this).
(5) Expositives.

We shall take them in order, but first I will give a roughidea of each.
The first, verdictives, are typified by the giving ofa verdict, as the name implies, by a jury, arbitrator, or
umpire. But they need not be final; they may be, forexample, an estimate, reckoning, or appraisal. It is essentially giving a finding as to something-fact, or valuewhich is for different reasons hard to be certain about.
The second, exercitives, are the exercising of powers,
rights, or influence. Examples are appointing, voting,ordering, urging, advising, warning, &c.
The third, commissives, are typified by promisingor otherwise undertaking; they commit you to doing

Hum to do things ~ i t hWords

151

something, but include also declarations or announcements of intention, which are not promises, and also rather
vague things which we may call espousals, as for example,
siding with. They have obvious connexions with verdictives and exercitives.
The fourth, behabitives, are a very miscellaneousgroup, and have to do with attitudes and social behaviow.
Examples are apologizing, congratulating, commending,
condoling, cursing, and challenging.
The fifth, expositives, are difficult to define. They
make plain how our utterances fit into the course of anargument or conversation, how we are using words, or,in general, are expository. Examples are 'I reply', 'I
argue', 'I concede', 'I illustrate', 'I assume', 'I postulate'. We should be clear from the start that there arestill wide possibilities of marginal or awkward cases, orof overlaps.
The last two classes are those which I find mosttroublesome, and it could well be that they are not clear
or are cross-classified, or even that some fresh classification altogether is needed. I am not putting any of thisforward as in the very least definitive. Behabitives aretroublesome because they seem too miscellaneous altogether : and expositives because they are enormously
numerous and important, and seem both to be includedin the other classes and at the same time to be uniquein a way that I have not succeeded in making clear
even to myself. It could well be said that all aspects arepresent in all my classes.

Horn t o do things with Words
Examples are :acquitconvict

find (as a matter offact)
hold (as a matter interpret as understandof law)
read it asrulecalculate
reckonestimate
locatedatemeasureplace
take itmake itput it at
rate
rank
grade
value
describe
assessanalysediagnosecharacterize
Further examples are found in appraisals or assessmentsof character, such as 'I should call him industrious'.
Verdictives consist in the delivering of a finding,
official or unofficial, upon evidence or reasons as to value
or fact, so far as these are distinguishable. A verdictive
is a judicial act as distinct from legislative or executive
acts, which are both exercitives. But some judicial acts,in the wider sense that they are done by judges insteadof for example, juries, really are exercitive. Verdictives
have obvious connexions with truth and falsity as regards soundness and unsoundness or fairness and unfairness. That the content of a verdict is true or false isshown, for example, in a dispute over an umpire's calling 'Out', 'Three strikes', or 'Four balls'.

How to do things with Words

153

Contparison with exercitives
As official acts, a judge's ruling makes law; a jury's
finding makes a convicted felon; an umpire's giving thebatsman out, or calling a fault or a no-ball, makes thebatsman out, the service a fault, or the ball a no-ball.
It is done in virtue of an official position: but it still
purports to be correct or incorrect, right or wrong,justifiable or unjustifiable on the evidence. It is not madeas a decision in favour or against. The judicial act is, if
you like, executive, but we must distinguish the executive
utterance, 'You shall have it9, from the verdict, 'It isyours', and must similarly distinguish the assessing fromthe awarding of damages.
Comparison with cornmissives
Verdictives have an effect, in the law, on ourselves andon others. The giving of a verdict or an estimate does,for example, commit us to certain future conduct, in thesense that any speech-act does and perhaps more so, atleast to consistency, and maybe we know to what it willcommit us. Thus to give a certain verdict will commit
US or, as we say, commits us, to awarding damages.
Also, by an interpretation of the facts we may commit
ourselves to a certain verdict or estimate. T o give a verdict may very well be to espouse also; it may commit us
to standing up for someone, defending him, &c.
Comparison with behabitives
T o congratulate may imply a verdict about value orHow to do things with Words
character. Again, in one sense of 'blame' which is equivalent to 'hold responsible', to blame is a verdictive, but
in another sense it is to adopt an attitude towards a
person and is thus a behabitive.
Comparison with expositives
When I say 'I interpret', 'I analyse', 'I describe',
4 I characterize', this, in a way, is to give a verdict, but

is essentially connected with verbal matters and clarifying
our exposition. 'I call you out' must be distinguishedfrom 'I call that "out" ' ;the first is a verdict given theuse of words, like 'I should describe that as cowardly';
the second is a verdict about the use of words, as 'I
should describe that as "cowardly" '.
2. EXERCITIVES

An exercitive is the giving of a decision in favour of oragainst a certain course of action, or advocacy of it. It isa decision that something is to be so, as distinct from ajudgement that it is so: it is advocacy that it should be
so, as opposed to an estimate that it is so; it is an award
as opposed to an assessment; it is a sentence as opposed
to a verdict. Arbitrators and judges make use of exercitives as well as issuing verdictives. Its consequences may
be that others are 'compelled' or 'allowed' or 'notallowed' to do certain acts.
It is a very wide class; examples are :demotedegradeexcommunicate namedismiss

How to do thzngs with Words
order
sentencelevy
choosebequeath
warn
Pray
urge
proclaim
countermand
enact
dedicate

commandfinevote forclaim
pardonadviseentreatpress
announceannul
reprievedeclare closed

directgrant
nominategive
resignplead
recommend
quash
repealveto
declare open

Comparison with verdictives'I hold 9 , L I interpret', and the like, may, if official,
be exercitive acts. Furthermore, 'I award' and 'I absolve' are exercitives, which will be based on verdicts.
Comparison with commissives
Many exercitives such as permit, authorize, depute,offer, concede, give, sanction, stake, and consent do in factcommit one to a course of action. If I say 'I declare war'or 'I disown', the whole purpose of my act is to commit
me personally to a certain course of action. The connexion between an exercitive and committing oneself is
as close as that between meaning and implication. It is
obvious that appointing and naming do commit us, but
we would rather say that they confer powers, rights,
names, &c., or change or eliminate them.

H o w to do things d h Words
Comparison with behabitives
Such exercitives as 'I challenge', 'I protest', 'I
approve', are closely connected with behabitives. Challenging, protesting, approving, commending, and recommending, may be the taking up of an attitude or the
performing of an act.
Comparison with expositives
Such exercitives as 'I withdraw', 'I demur', and 'I
object', in the context of argument or conversation, havemuch the same force as expositives.
Typical contexts in which exercitives are used are in:(I) filling offices and appointments, candidatures, elections, admissions, resignations, dismissals, andapplications,(2) advice, exhortation, and petition,(3) enablements, orders, sentences, and annulments,(4) the conduct of meetings and business,(5) rights, claims, accusations, &c.

The whole point of a commissive is to commit the
speaker to a certain course of action. Examples are:promisecovenant
contract
undertakebind myself
give my word
am determined to intend
declareintentionplan
purposemean toHow to do things with Words
propose toenvisageguarantee
vow
dedicate myself to
adopt
espouseshallengagepledge myself
agree
declare forchampion
oppose157

contemplate
swear
bet
consent
side withembracefavour

Declarations of intention differ from undertakings, andit might be questioned whether they should be classed
together. As we have a distinction between urging andordering, so we have a distinction between intending andpromising. But both are covered by the primary performative 'shall'; thus we have the locutions 'shallprobably', 'shall do my best to', 'shall very likely', and'promise that I shall probably'.
There is also a slide towards 'descriptives'. At the
one extreme I mayjust state that I have an intention, but
I may also declare or express or announce my intention
or determination. 'I declare my intention' undoubtedly
does commit me; and to say 'I intend' is generally todeclare or announce. The same thing happens withespousals, as, for example, in 'I dedicate my life to . . .9 .
In the case of comrnissives like 'favour 9 ,'oppose', 'adopt
the view', 'take the view', and 'embrace', you cannot
state that you favour, oppose, &c., generally, without
announcing that you do so. T o say 'I favour X' may,according to context, be to vote for X, to espouse X, or
to applaud X.

How t o do things with Words
Comparison with verdictives
Verdictives commit us to actions in two ways :(a) to those necessary for consistency with and support of our verdict,(b) to those that may be, or may be involved in, theconsequences of a verdict.
Comparison with exercitives
Exercitives commit us to the consequences of an act,
for example of naming. In the special case of permissives
we might ask whether they should be classified as exercitives or as commissives.
Comparison with behabitives
Reactions such as resenting, applauding, and commending do involve espousing and committing ourselvesin the way that advice and choice do. But behabitives
commit us to Iike conduct, by implication, and not tothat actual conduct. Thus if I blame, I adopt an attitude
to someone else's past conduct, but can commit myself
only to avoiding like conduct.
Comparison with expositives
Swearing, promising, and guaranteeing that somethingis the case work like expositives. Calling, defining,
analysing, and assuming form one group, and supporting, agreeing, disagreeing, maintaining, and defending
form another group of illocutions which seem to be both
expositive and commissive.

How t o do things with Words

I
59

Behabitives include the notion of reaction to otherpeople's behaviour and fortunes and of attitudes andexpressions of attitudes to someone else's past conduct orimminent conduct. There are obvious connexions withboth stating or describing what our feelings are andexpressing, in the sense of venting our feelings, thoughbehabitives are distinct from both of these.
Examples are :I. For apologies we have 'apologize'.
2. For thanks we have 'thank'.
3. For sympathy we have 'deplore', C commiserate','compliment', 'condole ', ccongratulate', 'felicitate','sympathize'.
4. For attitudes we have 'resent', 'don't mind', 'paytribute , 4 criticize', 'grumble about', 'complain of','applaud', 'overlook', 'commend', 'deprecate', andthe non-exercitive uses of 'blame', 'approve', and'favour'.
5. For greetings we have 'welcome', 'bid you farewell'.
6. For wishes we have 'bless', 'curse', 'toast ,C drink
to', and 'wish' (in its strict performative use).
7. For challenges we have 'dare', 'defy', 'protest','challenge'.
3

9In the field of behabitives, besides the usual liability to
infelicities, there is a special scope for insincerity.

I 60

How to do things ~ i t hWords

There are obvious connexions with commissives, forto commend or to support is both to react to behaviour
and to commit oneself to a line of conduct. There is also
a close connexion with exercitives, for to approve may
be an exercise of authority or a reaction to behaviour.
Other border line examples are 'recommend', 'overlook','protest 1, 'entreat', and 'challenge'.

5. EXPOSITIVES
Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving
the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments,
and the clarifying of usages and of references. We havesaid repeatedly that we may dispute as to whether these
are not verdictive, exercitive, behabitive, or commissive
acts as, well; we may also dispute whether they are notstraight descriptions of our feelings, practice, kc., especially sometimes over matters of suiting the action to thewords, as when I say 'I turn next to7, 'I quote', 'I cite','I recapitulate', 'I repeat that', 'I mention that'.
Examples which may well be taken as verdictive are:'analyse 9 , 'class', 'interpret', which involve exercise of
judgment. Examples which may well be taken as exer'
citive are : 'concede', 'urge', 'argue', < insist',
which
involve exertion of influence or exercise of powers.
Examples which may well be taken as commissive are:'define', 'agree 9 , 'accept', 6maintain', 'support', 'testify',
cswear', which involve assuming an obligation. Examples
which may well be taken as behabitive are: 'demur',How t o do things with Words'boggle at', which involve adopting an attitude or expressing a feeling.
For good value, I shall give you some lists to indicate
the extent of the field. Most central are such examples
as 'state', 'affirm', 'deny', 'emphasize', 'illustrate',ianswer'. An enormous number, such as 'question',ask', 'deny', kc., seem naturally to refer to conversational interchange: but this is no longer necessarily so,
and all, of course, have reference to the communicationalsituation.
C

Here then is a list of expositives :I
I.

affirmdeny
state
describeclass
identify

2.

remarkmention? interpose

3. inform
apprisetellanswerrejoin3a. ask

4. testify

reportswear
conjecture? doubt? know? believe

5. accept
concedewithdraw
agree
demur toobject toadhere torecognize
repudiate
ga* correct
reviseAustin's layout and numbering is retained here. The general significanceof the grouping is obvious but there is no definite key to it in theextant papers. The queries are Austin's. J. 0.U.

How t o do things with Words
6. postulate
deduceargue
neglect

analysedefine76. illustrateexplainformulate

7. begin by
turn toconclude by
70. interpret

7c. meanrefer
callunderstandregard as

distinguish
T o sum up, we may say that the verdictive is an
exercise of judgment, the exercitive is an assertion of
influence or exercising of power, the commissive is an
assuming of an obligation or declaring of an intention,
the behabitive is the adopting of an attitude, and theexpositive is the clarifying of reasons, arguments, andcommunications.
I have as usual failed to leave enough time in which to
say why what I have said is interesting. Just one example
then. Philosophers have long been interested in the word
'good' and, quite recently, have begun to take the lineof considering how we use it, what we use it to do. It
has been suggested, for example, that we use it for
expressing approval, for commending, or for grading. But
we shall not get really clear about this word 'good' andwhat we use it to do until, ideally, we have a complete
list of those illocutionary acts of which commending,
grading, &c., are isolated specimens-until we know how
many such acts there are and what are their relationships
and inter-connexions. Here, then, is an instance of one

How t o do things with Words

163

possible application of the kind of general theory we havebeen considering; no doubt there are many others. I have
purposely not embroiled the general theory with philosophical problems (some of which are complex enoughalmost to merit their celebrity); this should not be taken
to mean that I am unaware of them. Of course, this isbound to be a little boring and dry to listen to and digest;
not nearly so much so as to think and write. The real
fun comes when we begin to apply it to philosophy.
In these lectures, then, I have been doing two things
which I do not altogether like doing. These are:( I ) producing a programme, that is, saying what
ought to be done rather than doing something;(2) lecturing.
However, as against (I), I should very much like tothink that I have been sorting out a bit the way things
have already begun to go and are going with increasing
momentum in some parts of philosophy, rather thanproclaiming an individual manifesto. And as against (z),I should certainly like to say that nowhere could, to me,
be a nicer place to lecture in than Harvard.

APPENDIX
THEmain use of the sets of hearers' lecture notes, the B.B.C.
talk on Performatives printed in the Collected Papers, thepaper delivered at Royaumont under the title 'PerformatifConstatif', and the tape of the lecture given at Gothenberg in
October 1959, has been to check the reconstruction of thetext initially made independently from Austin's own files ofnotes. Austin's own notes were found at almost all points
to need little supplementation from the secondary sources,
being much fuller than any of them. Some characteristic
examples have been added from these sources, and also somecharacteristic phrases at points where Austin's own notes
were not in literary form. The main value of the secondary
sources has been as a check on order and interpretation atpoints where the notes are fragmentary.
A list of the more important places at which additions to,and reconstructions of, Austin's text have been made isappended.

Page 28. The example about George is incomplete in thenotes. The text is based mainly on the B.B.C. version.
Page 32. 2 lines from the foot to the end of the paragraph on
page 33, is an editorial expansion of very succinct notes.
Page 35. All from the top of the page until, but exclusive of,the final paragraph of the lecture is a composite version
from various incomplete versions in notes of differing
dates made by Austin.
Page 52. The final paragraph is an expansion of Austin's
notes based mainly on those of Mr. George Pitcher.

Appendix

165

Page 64. From this point to the end of the lecture the text
is conflated from two sets of notes by Austin made prior
to 1955. The 1955 notes are fragmentary at this point.
Page 70. 'Now we can say' to the end of the paragraph is aconjectural expansion of Austin's notes, which read :'Now we use "how it is to be understood" and "making
clear" (and even, conceivably, "state that ") : but nottrue or false, not description or report.'
Page 93. In Austin's notes Lecture VII ends here. It appears
from Harvard notes that there the earlier part of Lecture
VIII was included in Lecture VII.
Page 105. At line 2 'like implying' is based on Pitcher's notes.
Austin has 'Or "imply", is it the same?'
Page 105. Paragraph (5) is expanded on the basis of hearers'
notes. The first 2i lines only are in Austin's notes.
Page 107. Line 2 to the end of the paragraph is added on thebasis of secondary sources. It is not in Austin's notes.
Pages 115 and 116. The illustrations to (I) and (2) are addedfrom Pitcher's notes.
Page 117. The paragraph beginning 'So here are . . .' 1- s
added from Pitcher's notes.
Page 121. Line 3 'A judge . . .' to the end of the paragraphis added from Pitcher's notes.
Page 123. The 'iced ink' example, though famous among
Austin's pupils, is not in the notes. It is added frommany secondary sources.
Page 124. Lines 1-4 are not in Austin's notes; the sentence
is based mainly on Pitcher.
Page 129. ( a ) and (b) are an expansion of very succinct notes
based on secondary sources.

166

Appendix

Pages 142 and 143. The paragraph beginning 'Third . . .9
has been expanded on the basis of Messrs. Pitcher's and
Demos's notes.
Page 162. 'I have as usual failed. . .' to the end is an expansionof Austin's notes based partly on a separate short manuscript note by Austin and confirmed by hearers' notes.
J. 0. U.

INDEX
Abuses, 16, 18.
Behabitives, 81, 83, 85, 88, 150,
151-61.
Boolean algebra, I 7.
Breaches, 18 n., 135.

Misapplications, 17, 18,28,34-35,
42Misexecutions, 17, I 8, 35-38.
Misfires, 16, I 8, 24.
Misinvocations, 17, I 8, 26-34.
Misunderstandings, 33, 36, 39.
Moore, G. E., 48, I 10.

Commissives, I 19, 150-61.
Constatives, 3,6 n*, 47, 54, 55,67, Normative, I 48.
72, 90-91, 94, 109, =Ion=,
Performative, passin.
132-50.
Perlocution, gr, 99, 10131, 138,
Demos, R., Appendix.
144Phatic @heme), 92,957 96, 97398,
114,120, 124, 129-30,146Entailment, 47-54.
Phonetic (phone), 92, g5,96, 1x4,
Evaluative, I 48.
Exercitives, I 19, 141, 150-61.
120.
Explicit performatives, 32, 33, 56- Pitcher, G.,Appendix.
65, 68-90, 94, 108, 115, 130, Pragmatists, I 44.
Presupposition, 20, 48-53, 136.
148-50.
Primary utterance, 32, 56-65, 69,
Expositives, 80, 85, 88, 150-61.
71-84.
Flaws,
Rhetic (rheme), 93-98, I 14, I 15 n.,
Harvard, v, 163.
124, 129, 130.
Hitches, 17, 18, 36-38, 137.
Sentence, I, 6 n.
Illocution, gr, g8,gg-131,144-50.
Implication, 48-54, I 35.
Truth, 139-48.
Infelicities, 14-45,s 1,84, I 35-61 .
Insincerities, 18,38-44, 50, 55, 80, Unhappy (unhappiness), see Infelicities.
135-50,159*
Kant, I., 2, 3.

Verdictives, 88, 140, 150-61.

Locutionary act, gq, 99-109, 11316, 120, 145-6, 148.

Warnock, G. J., vii.
Whitman, W., 104.

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