DECEMBER 2019

Navigating Crisis and Opportunity:
The Peacekeeping Transition in Darfur

DANIEL FORTI

Cover Photo: UNAMID officially hands
over its team site in Tine, North Darfur,
to the government of Sudan, October
19, 2017. Mohamad Almahady/UNAMID.
Disclaimer: The views expressed in thispaper represent those of the author
and not necessarily those of theInternational Peace Institute. IPI
welcomes consideration of a wide
range of perspectives in the pursuit ofa well-informed debate on criticalpolicies and issues in international
affairs.
IPI Publications
Adam Lupel, Vice President
Albert Trithart, Editor
Meredith Harris, Editorial Intern
Suggested Citation:
Daniel Forti, “Navigating Crisis andOpportunity: The Peacekeeping
Transition in Darfur,” International
Peace Institute, December 2019.
© by International Peace Institute, 2019
All Rights Reserved
www.ipinst.org

ABOUT THE AUTHORDANIEL FORTI is a Policy Analyst at the International
Peace Institute.
Email: forti@ipinst.org

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
IPI owes a debt of gratitude to their many donors for theirgenerous support. This publication is part of an IPI project
entitled "Planning for United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations Transitions," funded by the government ofGermany.
The author would like to thank the many individuals whoshared their insights and perspectives during the researchinterviews. The author is grateful to the individuals who
provided feedback on earlier drafts of this report, including
Jake Sherman, Namie Di Razza, Adam Day, as well as
colleagues from the United Nations. The author owes aparticular debt of gratitude to Gabriel Delsol, who provided
invaluable support throughout the lifecycle of this study.
The author also appreciates the dedicated efforts of Albert
Trithart and Meredith Harris during the revision phases, andthanks Thong Nguyen for his work on the graphics
contained in this report. Any errors of fact or judgment are
the sole responsibility of the author.

CONTENTS

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Context of UNAMID’s Transition. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
UNAMID’S UNIQUE CONFIGURATIONCHALLENGES OF PEACEKEEPING IN DARFUR

Laying the Transition’s Groundwork . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
AN EXIT STRATEGY PROMPTED BY THE
LIMITS OF PEACEKEEPING
UNAMID’S DRAWDOWN AND“WHOLE-OF-SYSTEM” TRANSITION CONCEPTS

Implementing the Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
INTEGRATING STRUCTURES AND PLANNING
JUMP-STARTING PEACEBUILDING WORKTHROUGH THE STATE LIAISON FUNCTIONSPROTECTING CIVILIANS AND MONITORINGHUMAN RIGHTS
MOBILIZING POLITICAL SUPPORT AMID A
DEADLOCKED PEACE PROCESSTransitioning through Crisis: UNAMID
and Sudan’s Governance Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
KEY DEVELOPMENTS DURING SUDAN’SGOVERNANCE TRANSITION (APRIL–AUGUST 2019)
UNAMID’S MANDATE RENEWALS AND THE
DRAWDOWN’S TEMPORARY PAUSE
CHANGING SECURITY DYNAMICS IN DARFURSIGNS OF LIFE FOR THE PEACE PROCESS

Priorities for the Transition’s Final Stages . . . . . . . . 22
STRENGTHENING POLITICAL ENGAGEMENTBETWEEN THE TWO COUNCILSTRANSLATING THE JOINT POLITICAL STRATEGY
INTO AN EFFECTIVE FOLLOW-ON PRESENCE
REINFORCING THE TRANSITION CONCEPTINTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND PROTECTION
INTO ALL AREAS OF WORKSUSTAINING FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND
INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Annex: UNSC Benchmarks for UNAMID . . . . . . . . . . 31

iii

Abbreviations

A3

Three African members of the UN Security Council

AU

African Union

AUHIP

AU High-Level Implementation Panel

AUPSC

AU Peace and Security Council

CEWARN

Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

FFC

Forces of Freedom and Change

IDP

Internally displaced person

OHCHR

Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights

PBC

UN Peacebuilding Commission

RSF

Rapid Support Forces

SLF

State liaison function

SRF

Sudan Revolutionary Front

SRSG

Special representative of the secretary-general

TMC

Transitional Military Council

UNAMID

African Union–United Nations Mission in Darfur

UNCT

UN country team

UNDP

UN Development Programme

UNSC

UN Security Council

1

Executive Summary
In the face of evolving security dynamics andgeopolitical pressures, the African Union (AU)Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the UN
Security Council initiated the withdrawal of the
AU-UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) in 2017.
This transition is a uniquely complex undertaking.
This is in part because UNAMID is a hybrid
peacekeeping operation, is not integrated with the
UN country team (UNCT) headquartered in
Khartoum, and has historically had weak support
from the government. The transition also
confronts difficult humanitarian, security, andeconomic conditions in Darfur, where violence isongoing and many underlying drivers of conflictremain unaddressed. Because of these conditions,the transition began before a comprehensive peaceagreement—the central pillar of the mission’s exit
strategy—could be achieved.
To mitigate these difficult circumstances, the UN
and AU’s initial concept for the transition focusedon a “whole-of-system” approach. This concept
placed peacebuilding at its center and prioritizedcollaboration between the mission and UNCT on
planning and decision making. Central to thiscollaboration were the state liaison functions, aninnovative model whereby UNAMID officials
collocate in the offices of various UN agencies toundertake joint programming. As UNAMID
reduced its footprint in Darfur, the mission and
UNCT also pursued new avenues to protect
civilians and monitor human rights. These largely
programmatic efforts progressed further than thepolitical and security aspects of the transition.
On top of an already complex transition process,a nationwide political crisis erupted in Sudan
following protests beginning in December 2018
and the ouster of President Omar al-Bashir several
months later. This tested the UN and AU’s ability
to adapt the transition to changing conditions andled to a temporary pause in the mission’s
drawdown. Following months of uncertainty, theSudanese adopted a new constitutional declarationand inaugurated a three-year power-sharing
government in August 2019. These momentous
changes present a unique opportunity for the
Sudanese people to pursue a comprehensive peaceagreement.
As Sudan embarks into this new transitional

period with a sense of cautious optimism, so too do
the UN and AU enter a new stage of thepeacekeeping transition. Darfur’s deep structural
challenges—especially those related to protecting
civilians, respecting human rights, and providing
basic services—will persist well beyond themission’s exit. While the AU and the UN can help
address these challenges, they should not lose sightof the significant investments needed to adapt thetransition to the new political reality while
ensuring it is effective and sustainable. To this end,
their efforts should focus on five broad priorities:• Strengthening political engagement between
the UNSC and AUPSC: The two councils’
political engagement in Sudan is imperative forthe success both of the peacekeeping transitionand of Sudan’s governance transition. To sustain
this engagement, the councils need internal
political unity as well as aligned strategies.
• Translating the joint political strategy into aneffective follow-on presence: The AU and UN
need to ensure the primacy of any follow-on
presence’s political mandate, which should be
reinforced by all other aspects of its work. In
designing a new presence, they will need toconsider whether to maintain a Security
Council–authorized mission, whether to expand
its focus beyond Darfur, and how to divide up thework.
• Reinforcing the transition concept: The mission
and UNCT should reinforce joint planning
efforts and strengthen national ownership over
the transition process. They should also scale up
peacebuilding work, identify opportunities for
new actors to complement ongoing initiatives,and focus on questions of long-term sustainability.
• Integrating human rights and protection into
all areas of work: The UN and AU should
integrate protection and human rights into theirpolitical engagement at the national andsubnational levels, continue prioritizing efforts tostrengthen justice and the rule of law, explore
new approaches to early warning, and accelerate
planning for the security transition.
• Sustaining international attention and financial
support: To avoid a financial cliff after the
mission leaves, the UN and AU should consider
how they can make funding more predictable2

Daniel Forti

and streamlined. The international community
also needs to sustain political engagement on the
mission’s transition and in Darfur moregenerally.
UNAMID’s drawdown and reconfiguration are
the first of many complex peacekeeping transitions
the international community will need to manage
over the coming years. UNAMID’s exit strategy,
drawdown, and reconfiguration may offer lessons
these future transitions could learn from.

Introduction
The ongoing transition of the African Union–
United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is auniquely complex undertaking. Since the mission’s
deployment in 2007, the UN and the African
Union (AU) have grappled with the absence of acomprehensive political settlement, persistent
threats to civilians from state and non-state actors,
and deep-seated structural drivers of conflict.
While peacekeeping was necessary to prevent mass
atrocities, it was inherently limited in what it could
achieve. Evolving security dynamics and geopolitical pressures led the AU Peace and Security
Council (AUPSC) and the UN Security Council(UNSC) to reconsider the mission’s long-term
viability in 2013; they initiated its transition in June
2017.
The UN’s transition in Darfur was initially basedon a rapid security drawdown and a reconfiguration to an expanded UN country team (UNCT).
Although there was progress in some areas of thetransition, its trajectory was upended following
Sudan’s political revolution in April 2019. In
response, the UN and AU had to rapidly adapt
their support to the country. Following theformation of a power-sharing government inAugust 2019, the transition now faces a fundamentally different context from that for which it was
designed. Underpinned by a reinvigorated national
peace process, the AU and UN now have an
opportunity to sustainably transition to a follow-on
presence that can provide comprehensive, longterm support to the Sudanese people.
Peacekeeping transitions are intended to shift the

UN’s presence in a country and establish newmodalities of support to national priorities in orderto build resilience and prevent relapse into conflict.
These efforts require sustained political collaboration among member states and between the UN
and national actors, integration across different
pillars of the UN system, and coherence between
the UN and external partners. Transitions also
require flexibility and adaptability, especially as
host countries begin strengthening their ownershipover a range of peace, governance, and development initiatives. UNAMID’s peacekeeping transition has put all of these principles to the test.
This paper examines the dynamics of theongoing peacekeeping transition in Darfur,
focusing on UNAMID’s drawdown and reconfiguration, as well as the UN’s efforts to build thecapacity of other actors to sustain peace following
the mission’s exit.1 The research focuses on the
period up to October 2019, when the AU and UN
issued a joint special report on UNAMID’s transition and both the AUPSC and UNSC began reevaluating its trajectory. It pays particular attention to
the period beginning in July 2018 when the UN
strived to implement the “whole-of-system”
approach to the transition endorsed by the UNSC
one month earlier. The paper subsequently
evaluates the political and operational dynamics
that impacted different stages of the transition’splanning and execution. It also contextualizes the
UN transition within Sudan’s national politicalrevolution and governance transition from April toAugust 2019. The report concludes by articulating
priorities for the AU and UN during the final stagesof the mission’s transition and to guide thereconfiguration of international support to Darfur
and Sudan.

The Context of UNAMID’s
Transition
UNSC Resolution 1769 (2007) established
UNAMID and mandated it to protect civilians,
facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance,and support the political process in Darfur. At its
inception, UNAMID was the largest peacekeeping

1 This research is grounded in an extensive desktop review, participation in closed-door events related to Darfur and UNAMID’s transition, and over forty
interviews conducted from July to September 2019. Interviews with UN and AU officials, member-state representatives, and independent experts took place eitherin person in New York City or by phone with individuals located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as well as in Khartoum and Zalingei, Sudan. This paper is part of alarger IPI project on UN transitions and is complemented by similar case studies on UN peacekeeping transitions in Côte d’Ivoire, Haiti, and Liberia.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

mission ever deployed: it was authorized to have
25,987 uniformed personnel, which was gradually
reduced to 19,248 by 2016, and then rapidly
contracted to 6,550 by June 2018 (see Figures 1 and
2). While UN peacekeeping transitions are
inherently complex processes, UNAMID’s transition is unique because of the mission’s design andits complex operating environment.

3

UNAMID’S UNIQUE CONFIGURATIONUNAMID was authorized in 2007 as the first (andso far only) hybrid peacekeeping operation. The
AU first deployed the African Mission in Sudan(AMIS) in 2004 as an observer mission to oversee
implementation of a humanitarian cease-fireagreement as a stopgap following the outbreak of adevastating conflict in 2003.2 The conflict in Darfur

Figure 1. Authorized and actual levels of uniformed personnel (2007–2019)

Figure 2. Authorized force levels disaggregated by troops and police (2008–March 2020)

2 AMIS was tasked with monitoring cease-fire compliance, assisting with confidence building, and facilitating humanitarian assistance. AU Peace and Security
Council, Communiqué of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(XIII), July 27, 2004.

4

was sparked by multiple armed rebellions against
the Sudanese government following decades ofrepression of Sudan’s peripheries by political elites
in the center of the country. Conditions on the
ground required AMIS to assume significant
responsibility for the protection of civilians, whichquickly exhausted the AU’s limited operational andfinancial resources. Despite subsequent agreements
by the AUPSC and UNSC to reconfigure AMIS
into a UN peacekeeping mission in 2006, theSudanese government refused to consent to its
deployment; subsequent negotiations led to acompromise that AMIS would be reconfigured intoa hybrid AU-UN mission.3
This hybrid structure has political andoperational implications for the transition process.
While the mission is administratively backstopped,
financed, and maintained by the UN, it is authorized through annual mandates from both the
AUPSC and the UNSC, and its special representative and force commander are chosen jointly by the
AU Commission chairperson and the UN
secretary-general. The AUPSC and AU
Commission therefore play an integral role indetermining how the mission engages in Darfur.
Cooperation between the two councils on
UNAMID has not always been easy, with early
differences over political leadership, mission
leadership, mandated activities, and approaches forengaging the Sudanese government.4 However,recent improvements in how the two organizations
work together on conflict prevention and crisis
management have helped them jointly navigate thetransition process.5
Unlike other contemporary multidimensional
UN peacekeeping missions, UNAMID is not
integrated with the UNCT in Sudan, and theresident and humanitarian coordinator is not partof the mission’s structure. This is because the twoentities have different areas of responsibility:

Daniel Forti

UNAMID focuses exclusively on Darfur, while the
UNCT focuses on the whole country. Thisfunctional separation complicates planning andcoordination. The mission and UNCT’s different
areas of responsibility and nonintegrated structures
have led UN agencies, funds, and programs tomaintain light footprints in Darfur and heavily rely
on UNAMID’s activities and logistics. As a result,preparing for UNAMID’s exit has required
investing in the UNCT and aligning its work withthat of the mission.
CHALLENGES OF PEACEKEEPING INDARFUR
The transition has also been impacted by a numberof challenges related to the ongoing conflicts in
Darfur and Sudan’s broader political and economic
dynamics. UNAMID’s joint special representative
is mandated to serve as the chief mediator between
the government and armed groups in Darfur,
working within the framework of the AU HighLevel Implementation Panel (AUHIP). Continuous
efforts to broker a peace agreement between the
Sudanese government and these armed groups(along with those in Blue Nile and South Kordofan)
have failed to result in a comprehensive, sustainable peace. Since 2003, the role of formal orinformal facilitator has oscillated between Chad,
Ethiopia, France, Germany, and Qatar, as well as
the UN and AU, both separately and jointly, eachwith varying degrees of success. The signing of the
Doha Document for Peace in Darfur in May 2011
was a political turning point, as the Sudanese
government, UN, and AU used it as a frameworkfor subsequent political processes even though it
did not have the support of all armed groups.
Mediators have attempted to reconcile the interestsof Darfur’s armed groups within the Dohaagreement’s framework, but with little success.6
One of the reasons a political settlement has been
so difficult to reach in Darfur is that “several

3 AU Peace and Security Council, Communiqué of the Fifty First Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, AU Doc. PSC/MIN/Comm/1(LI), May 15, 2006; UN
Security Council Resolution 1679 (May 16, 2006), UN Doc. S/RES/1679. For more information, see: UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General and the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission on the Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2007/307/Rev.1, June 5, 2007.
4 Heiko Nitzschke, “Sudan,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, Sebastian von Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte, eds. (Boulder, CO:
Lynne Rienner, 2016); Security Council Report, “Adoption of Resolution on AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur,” What’s In Blue, April 2, 2014; UN Security
Council Resolution 2148 (April 3, 2014), UN Doc. S/RES/2148.
5 For more information, see: Daniel Forti and Priyal Singh, “Toward a More Effective UN-AU Partnership on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management,”
International Peace Institute and Institute for Security Studies, October 2019.
6 International Crisis Group, “Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (III): The Limits of Darfur’s Peace Process,” January 27, 2014; AU Peace and Security Council, Report of
the African Union High-Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), AU Doc. PSC/AHG/2(CCVII), October 29, 2009; David Hoile, Darfur: The Road to Peace (London:
European-Sudanese Public Affairs Council, 2008), Chapter 2.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

conflict drivers and grievances have yet to beaddressed.”7 The historical marginalization of
Darfur vis-à-vis Khartoum has produced structuralpolitical, governance, economic and socioculturalinequalities. These have also amplified intercommunal conflict over land tenure and the management of natural resources. Although the extreme
levels of violence that characterized the region from2003 to 2007 have subsided, Darfur still faces acomplex humanitarian emergency (see Table 1)
and persistent threats to civilians from both stateand non-state actors, including frequent incidentsof conflict-related sexual and gender-based
violence.
Darfur’s conflicts are also inseparable frombroader regional dynamics. While South Sudan
seceded in 2011, the two countries remainintertwined through political, security, socioeconomic, and cultural ties. Porous borders and weakstate institutions in Sudan, South Sudan, Chad, theCentral African Republic, and Libya allow for the
spillover of violence into Darfur; for example, someof Darfur’s non-signatory armed groups operate as
mercenaries in neighboring countries, driving theflow of illicit small arms and increasing the risk of
relapse into conflict. Outside of the immediateneighborhood, the Gulf countries have deepened
their ties with Sudan, making them influential
external actors.8

5

Sudan’s severe economic crisis adds anotherlayer of complexity to the transition. Despite being
one of the top ten largest African economies
measured by gross domestic product, Sudan has
high levels of poverty, youth unemployment, andsocioeconomic inequality, especially in Darfur.
Comprehensive sanctions imposed by the UnitedStates from 1997 to 2017 restricted economic
growth and investment, the country is still
designated by the US as a state sponsor of
terrorism, and it remains in arrears with theInternational Monetary Fund, restricting access toconcessional financing. Rapid exchange-rate
depreciation, rising inflation, massive government
expenditure on its security sector, and unsustainable subsidies for food and energy all contributed
to the economic crisis that fueled the 2018–2019
popular uprising.9
Finally, peacekeeping efforts have beenhampered by weak host-state consent, as thegovernment of former Sudanese President Omar
al-Bashir viewed the mission with suspicion. At thestrategic level, the government used the Tripartite
Coordination Mechanism—a formal body for theUN, AU, and government of Sudan to discuss
UNAMID—to negotiate limitations on the
mission’s mandated activities, at times pitting the
AU and UN against one another.10 At theoperational level, reports from the UN and AU

Table 1. Humanitarian indicators for Darfur11
Indicator
Number in need of humanitarian assistance (2018)

3,140,000

Number in protracted displacement (2018)

1,760,000

Number of internally displaced (2019)
Number of returnees (2019)

7

Number of people affected

1,640,419 in 60 camps
315,397

UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic
Assessment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/445, May 30, 2019, para. 59.
8 On these regional dynamics, see: UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005), UN
Doc. S/2019/34, January 10, 2019; International Crisis Group, “Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts,” January 29, 2015; Andrews Atta-Asamoah and Omar
S. Mahmood, “Sudan after Bashir: Regional Opportunities and Challenges,” Institute for Security Studies, August 2019, p. 5.
9 On Sudan’s economic crisis, see: African Development Bank, “African Economic Outlook 2019,” 2019, p. 178; World Bank, “The World Bank in Sudan,” April 2,
2019, available at www.worldbank.org/en/country/sudan/overview ; ACAPS, “Sudan: Economic Crisis,” February 13, 2019; Elfatih Ali Siddig and Elmoiz Ismail,“Primary Development Finance Assessment,” UN Development Programme, April 2018; and African Development Bank, “After Two Decades of ‘Solitude’:Targeted Strategies for Quick Economic Wins,” September 2019.
10 Interview with independent expert, July 2019; Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019.
11 UN Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs, “Sudan: Darfur Humanitarian Overview,” October 2018; “Humanitarian Response Strategy: January–
December 2019 Humanitarian Response Plan,” December 2018.

6

have routinely highlighted three sets of issues
related to host-state cooperation: delays in or the
non-issuance of visas for mission staff, delays incustoms clearances, and restrictions on in-country
flights and access by mission patrols and humanitarian actors to locations where security incidents
or human rights violations were reported.12 These
delays have often reflected the Sudanese government’s frustration with some of the mission’s
mandated tasks; for example, the non-issuance ofvisas has disproportionately impacted staff
working on human rights issues or in police
contingents.13

Laying the Transition’s
Groundwork
UNAMID’s exit strategy and the peacekeeping
transition in Darfur grew out of political andoperational pressures that undermined themission’s effectiveness and relevance. The AU and
UN tried to mitigate these difficult circumstances;
however, the Sudanese government’s successive
military victories against armed groups in Darfur
beginning in 2013 and the lack of progress on an
inclusive peace process prompted the organizations
to rethink UNAMID’s long-term viability.
Conducted over multiple phases and spearheadedby the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF),
the Sudanese government’s Operation Decisive
Summer strengthened state control over the region
and led to numerous human rights violations
against civilians. While open clashes largely
subsided across Darfur, except in the Jebel Marraregion, bursts of political momentum failed totranslate into a comprehensive agreement. These
dynamics informed successive decisions by the UN
and AU between 2013 and 2016 that prepared theDaniel Forti

groundwork for the transition, as set forward in
UNSC Resolutions 2368 (2017) and 2429 (2018).
AN EXIT STRATEGY PROMPTED BY THE
LIMITS OF PEACEKEEPING
UNAMID’s exit strategy was first considered in ajoint AU-UN strategic review in 2014, mandated by
UNSC Resolution 2113 (2013). The review painted
a pessimistic picture of UNAMID’s future andhighlighted transition-related issues that would
need to be addressed in the years to come. Amongother issues, it stressed the need for the AUPSC andthe UNSC to re-articulate the mission’s strategic
priorities to give it a more active role in supporting
the peace process and local conflict-resolution
efforts.14 It also exposed shortcomings in the
mission’s structures for coordinating and planningwith the UNCT, noting the importance ofimproving “joint decision-making on joint
operational planning, the shared delivery of results
and the evaluation of activities and common
interests,” an unsurprising challenge given the
mission’s structure.15
The strategic review was so impactful that bothcouncils swiftly endorsed its findings outside of theannual mandate-renewal cycle and without theusual tense negotiations.16 It was also a turning
point, as for the first time, the AUPSC’s
communiqué focused not only on the politics but
also on the details of UNAMID’s drawdown andreconfiguration. The UNSC’s next mandate for
UNAMID, in 2014, was the first to mention an exit
strategy: the UNSC requested an analysis of theimplementation of the mission’s mandate, a list of
the tasks that could be handed over to the UNCT,and “recommendations for the future mandate,composition, configuration and exit strategy.”17
Subsequent updates from the UN and AU in 2015

12 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan, UN Doc. S/2010/681, December 31, 2010; UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on
the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2013/607, October 14, 2013; and UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2016/812, September 27, 2016; UN Security Council, Special Report of the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Assessment of the African Union–United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/445, May 30, 2019.
13 UN Security Council, Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of Phase One of the Reconfiguration of the African
Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/12, January 4, 2018, para. 59.
14 The three revised priorities proposed included: “(1) mediation between the Government and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha
Document for Peace in Darfur, while taking into account ongoing transformation at the national level; (2) the protection of civilians, the facilitation of thedelivery of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security of humanitarian personnel; and (3) the provision of support, in conjunction with the United
Nations country team, to the mediation of community conflict, including through measures to address its root causes.” UN Security Council, Special Report of theSecretary-General on the Review of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2014/138, February 25, 2014, para. 40.
15 Ibid., para. 37.
16 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué CDXXV (March 24, 2014), AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(CDXXV); Security Council Report, “Adoption of Resolution
on AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur”; UN Security Council Resolution 2148 (April 3, 2014), UN Doc. S/RES/2148.
17 UN Security Council Resolution 2173 (August 27, 2014), UN Doc. S/RES/2173, para. 7.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

highlighted the creation of a UNAMID-UNCT
matrix for the long-term handover of tasks(accompanied by a planned capacity-assessment
exercise) as well as preliminary conversations
between the Sudanese government, UN, and AU
on an exit strategy, troop-repatriation schedules,
and the gradual handover of responsibilities andassets.18
UNAMID’s early transition planning unfolded
alongside broader political pressures on the
mission. The US campaign to reduce UN peacekeeping budgets disproportionately impacted
UNAMID, which was framed as the poster child ofa mission that was no longer cost-effective.19 The
government of Sudan also undertook a publiccampaign to demonstrate its full control overDarfur and to assert its national sovereignty. This
campaign sought to convince member states that
the AUPSC and the UNSC should endorse themission’s swift exit. It also aimed to help Sudan
normalize diplomatic relations with Westerncountries and secure its removal from the US list of
state sponsors of terrorism.
These dynamics, which defined the mission’s
drawdown and exit strategy until the next significant revision to its mandate in 2017, offer two
insights into early transition planning. First, theUN and AU dedicated attention to improving
collaboration between the mission and UNCT.
Multiple references in joint AU-UN reports and in
UNSC mandates provided impetus for developing
collaborative processes and structures. A
shortcoming, however, was that the UN framed its
underlying goal as “handing over tasks” from themission to the UNCT. This framing presupposedthat missions and UNCTs have enough overlap intheir mandates, frameworks, and resources toseamlessly transfer substantive responsibilities. It
also assumed that the UN’s comparatively limited
security and peacebuilding efforts in Darfur were
sufficient for meeting the region’s needs. Although

7

this framing was in line with how the UN transitioned peacekeeping missions at the time, lessons
from recent transitions have led to a shift inapproach.20
Second, even though the transition was notinitially conceived as a phased security drawdown,
rapid changes on the ground afforded the Sudanese
government greater leverage over its trajectory.
With fewer open clashes in Darfur and greater
external pressures on UN peacekeeping, theSudanese government successfully lobbied AU and
UN member states to accelerate troop withdrawals(see Figures 1 and 2) even though humanitarianand protection concerns persisted and progress
toward mission benchmarks was limited.21 The
organizations readily acknowledged, on multiple
occasions, that an inclusive political settlement was
not only imperative for sustainable peace in Darfur
but also the premise for the mission’s long-term
exit strategy.22 Nonetheless, the mission’s transition
quickly became a political and operational priority
in 2017, even as this goal remained far from achievable.
UNAMID’S DRAWDOWN AND “WHOLEOF-SYSTEM” TRANSITION CONCEPTS
UNSC Resolutions 2363 (2017) and 2429 (2018)
are the cornerstones of UNAMID’s transition
concept. Read together, these two resolutions
highlighted the organizations and member states’
efforts to reconfigure a long-standing mission
under difficult circumstances. They also
demonstrated the limits of peacekeeping transitions absent sustainable political solutions andamid ongoing threats to civilians.
Resolution 2363 (2017) established the parameters for UNAMID’s drawdown and operational
reconfiguration. It first outlined a two-pronged
concept of operations: traditional peacekeeping
activities would focus on the Jebel Marra region,
while the mission would undertake stabilization

18 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2015/378, May 26, 2015,
paras. 74-76; UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2015/163,
March 6, 2015, paras. 74–77; UNAMID, “Talks in Khartoum on UNAMID’s Exit Strategy,” February 15, 2015; UNAMID “Working Group for UNAMID’s Exit
Strategy Convenes,” March 17, 2015.
19 Interviews with UN and AU officials, July–August 2019; “UN Agrees to Cut Down Darfur Peacekeeping Force,” Al Jazeera, June 29, 2017.
20 Daniel Forti and Lesley Connolly, “Pivoting from Crisis to Development: Preparing for the Next Wave of UN Peace Operations Transitions,” International Peace
Institute, July 16, 2019.
21 International Refugee Rights Initiative, “The Challenges of Peacekeeping in Darfur,” June 2016, pp. 27–28
22 See: UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2015/378, May 26, 2015,
para. 84; and UN Security Council Resolution 2228 (June 29, 2015), UN Doc. S/RES/2228, para. 26.

8

and peacebuilding activities in the rest of Darfur.23
It established a two-phase uniformed drawdown
that would reduce the number of authorized
military personnel by 44 percent and of police
personnel by 30 percent over the course of a year
(see Figure 2). Phase one would take six months,
and phase two would begin automatically in theseventh month “unless the UNSC decides… toadjust the scope and pace of the reduction.”24 It
reaffirmed the mission’s strategic priorities
established in the previous mandate and encouraged greater cooperation between the mission and
UNCT in the implementation of mission-wide
protection and humanitarian strategies.25 It also
underscored that the exit strategy and long-termtransition planning should be based on progress
toward the mission’s benchmarks, especially an
inclusive and sustainable peace process.26
Resolution 2429 (2018) expanded on this twopronged concept of operations and laid out thetransition’s “whole-of-system” approach. Thisapproach centered on the collocation of UNAMID
and the UNCT and joint analysis and programming under the framework of the state liaison
functions (SLF) in four areas: the rule of law,human rights, resilience and livelihoods, andimmediate service delivery for internally displaced
persons (IDPs).27 The resolution also redefined themission’s strategic priorities to reflect this integration between the mission and UNCT.28 The UNSC
further reduced the number of authorized troops
by 53 percent over the ensuing twelve months
while freezing the number of authorized police (seeFigure 2). The resolution “took note” of the twoyear time frame proposed by the UN and AU forthe mission’s closure, including a June 2020
deadline for its exit and a December 2020 deadline
for its liquidation. The UNSC also requested that

Daniel Forti

the Sudanese government begin discussions with
the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights (OHCHR) on the establishment of astand-alone office in Sudan.
As for the mission’s operational reconfiguration,
Resolution 2429 provided for the establishment of
a new mission headquarters in Zalingei to bringleadership closer to the Jebel Marra region. It also
relocated the joint special representative to
Khartoum and mandated the deputy joint special
representative, from the base in Zalginei, to oversee
both the mission’s day-to-day operations and thetransition. With the UNCT’s headquarters in
Khartoum, much of the collaboration between the
mission and UNCT was set to take place in UN
agencies’ field offices in Darfur.
Four aspects of the UN’s transition concept in
Darfur are noteworthy. First, the drawdown andtransition were initiated before many of the core
indicators of the mission’s success were achieved.
No peace agreement had been finalized or
implemented, active fighting continued in parts ofthe mission’s area of operations, and over 1.7
million people remained displaced. In addition, theSudanese government did not engage on the designof the transition strategy, as it was predominantly
concerned with the mission’s expedited
withdrawal.
Second, UNAMID’s phased security drawdown
was different from that of previous missions
because it involved shorter time frames, therepatriation of larger numbers of troops and police,
and multi-phase reductions during a single
mandate-renewal cycle. UNAMID’s authorized
number of troops decreased from 15,845 to 4,050
over a two-year period, a significant reduction
under any circumstances. This rapid drawdown
limited the flexibility of repatriation schedules, and

23 The resolution defined “traditional peacekeeping activities” as military protection, clearance of explosive remnants of war, and emergency relief. This was arecommendation from the UN Security Council: Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United
Nations on the Strategic Review of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2017/437, May 18, 2017, para. 49; and Resolution
2063 (July 31, 2012), UN Doc. S/RES/2063, para. 2.
24 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Review of
the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/530, June 1, 2018, paras. 5, 7.
25 These include the protection of civilians and facilitation of humanitarian access; mediation between the Sudanese government and non-signatory armed groups
on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur; and support for the meditation of intercommunal conflict. UN Security Council Resolution 2363 (June29, 2017), UN Doc. S/RES/2363, para. 10.
26 Ibid., para. 39.
27 Ibid., paras. 51–55; UN Security Council Resolution 2429 (July 13, 2018), UN Doc. S/RES/2429, para. 18.
28 These include: “(a) the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and reporting, the facilitation of humanitarian assistance and the safety and security ofhumanitarian personnel; (b) mediation between the Government of the Sudan and non-signatory armed movements on the basis of the Doha Document for
Peace in Darfur; and (c) mediation at the local level to address intercommunal or other local conflict that could undermine the security situation in the area of
operations.” See: UN Security Council Resolution 2429 (July 13, 2018), UN Doc. S/RES/2429, para. 11.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

delays in repatriating some contingents reverberated across other parts of the mission.29 On a
positive note, the multi-phase drawdown during asingle mandate cycle provided the UNSC and
AUPSC with more direct oversight and helped
them demonstrate a level of flexibility that would
prove necessary two years later.30 While the rapid
drawdown stretched the mission’s limited
operational capacity, it also sent positive signals
within the UN about the mission’s civilian
character and the growing importance of its
peacebuilding work.
Third, the concept demonstrated how the UNSC
could better integrate mission-led peacebuilding
efforts into transitions. While the transitions in
Liberia and Haiti also addressed peacebuilding
work, the SLFs in Darfur were an innovation. The
UN and AU recognized that unresolved conflict
drivers required additional attention to prevent
intercommunal violence from spiraling.31 At theoperational level, they concluded that “handingover” the mission’s tasks to the UNCT was “unrealistic” because of the massive discrepancy incapacity and resources and their different
programmatic approaches.32 Moreover, despite
early efforts to improve integration between the
mission and UNCT, the AU and UN’s 2018 special
report noted that “insufficient emphasis was put oncommunication and cooperation with the [UNCT]
with regard to joint planning, programming andimplementation,” and the mission’s limited
peacebuilding activities continued “without any
coherent overarching guidance or strategy insupport of the UNCT or the local governments.”33
The SLFs were an attempt to tackle these challenges
head on.
Finally, the deadlines both helped and hurt thetransition process. The UN and AU included
caveats in the transition schedule, noting that theJune and December 2020 deadlines would be met

9“provided that there will be no significant change
in the security situation in Darfur and key indicators are fulfilled.”34 This caveat was reflected wordfor-word in Resolution 2429.35 Even though thiswas not the first time the UNSC projected an exit
date two years in advance, it led some member
states to focus disproportionately on the mission’s
end date instead of on the conditions on the
ground. Rigid adherence to the June 2020 deadline
would lead to heightened political tensions within
the UNSC, limiting the body’s flexibility to adapt
the mission to changing conditions in Darfur andSudan. On the other hand, the articulation of clear
deadlines underpinned the urgency of acceleratingtransition planning within the mission and UNCT.

Implementing the Transition
From July 2018 onward, the mission’s focus quickly
shifted to reconfiguring its engagement in Darfur.
These efforts accelerated at the same time as theUN was refining its broader approach to mission
transitions (see Box 1). Most visibly, this reconfiguration included the rollout of the SLFs and thetransition of programming. But while starting up
the SLFs presented the most day-to-day
operational challenges, it was relatively straightforward compared with the uncertainties confronting
the transition on the political and security fronts.
INTEGRATING STRUCTURES AND
PLANNING
Strengthening collaboration between the senior
and working levels of the mission and the UNCT isnecessary for any transition process; this was evenmore urgent in UNAMID since the mission is not
integrated. As transition planning accelerated,
UNAMID and the UNCT aimed to strengthen
both the frequency and the effectiveness of theircollaboration on planning and decision making.
UNAMID’s transition planning is informed by

29 UN Security Council, Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of Phase One of the Reconfiguration of the African
Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/12, January 4, 2018, para. 36.
30 Security Council Report, “AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur Mandate Renewal,” What’s In Blue, June 28, 2017.
31 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Review of
the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/530, June 1, 2018, para. 48.
32 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Review of
the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2017/437, May 18, 2017, para. 43–44.
33 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Review of
the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/530, June 1, 2018, para. 28.
34 Ibid., para. 62.
35 UN Security Council Resolution 2429 (July 31, 2018), UN Doc. S/RES/2429, para. 76 (ii).

10Daniel Forti

Box 1. The UN secretary-general’s planning directive on transitions
The secretary-general’s planning directive on transitions, endorsed in February 2019, puts forward institutional guidance for the planning and management of transitions in UN missions.36 It builds on the 2013
Policy on UN Transitions in the Context of Mission Drawdown or Withdrawal, as well as the UN Policy on
Integrated Assessment and Planning. Transitions have been a recurrent item on the agenda of the UN’s
Executive Committee dating back to January 2017.
The directive covers four main areas: leadership, early joint planning and financing, operational support,
and staffing. On leadership, it acknowledges that transition planning is the responsibility of the entire seniorleadership team led by the special representative of the secretary-general (SRSG). It requests that the deputy
SRSG/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator (in integrated mission contexts), or another seniorleader appointed by the head of mission, assume overall responsibility for operational planning, with a view
to sustaining meaningful engagement on peacebuilding priorities. It also encourages both the SRSG and
deputy SRSG to engage political leaders in the host country “as early as possible” to seek a joint approach toa transition. The directive requests that all strategic assessment missions and mission reviews examine issues
related to a transition.
On early joint planning and financing, the directive requests all multidimensional missions and UNCTs tojointly develop integrated transition calendars following the completion of a mission’s start-up phase. These
tools should be understood as succinct roadmaps that forecast timelines and milestones for the transition,with the ultimate goal of articulating a detailed transition plan “at least 24 months prior to the withdrawal
or reconfiguration” of a UN mission.
On operational support and staffing, the directive requests UNCTs working in mission contexts to assess
their reliance on a mission’s logistical capacity and outline all joint modalities. It also requests the UN
Secretariat and other UN agencies to streamline staffing arrangements and make them more flexible so they
can more easily place mission staff in UNCTs. The directive makes provisions to support national staff
following mission transitions and requests a transition-specific review of the UN’s human resources
framework and UN downsizing policy.

the UN secretary-general’s planning directive on
the Darfur transition, which aims to coordinate
UN efforts. In line with this and the UN secretarygeneral’s planning directive on transitions (see Box1), the deputy joint special representative is theoverall manager of the transition, working
alongside the UN resident and humanitarian
coordinator in Sudan, who is responsible for the
UNCT side of the transition.
UNAMID and the UNCT put in place a range of
coordination and decision-making structures to
execute the transition.37 These structures arebackstopped by regular meetings of the headquarters-based Darfur Integrated Task Force, chairedby the Sudan Integrated Operational Team in the
UN Departments of Political and Peacebuilding
Affairs and Peace Operations. In addition, theIntegrated Operational Team and UN Development Programme (UNDP) co-chair a working
group dedicated to transition activities that
includes staff based in New York, Khartoum, andZalingei.38
Day-to-day work is guided by a transition action
plan, endorsed by UNAMID and the UNCT in

36 UN Secretary General, Secretary-General’s Planning Directive for the Development of Consistent and Coherent UN Transition Processes, In Line with Executive
Committee Decision 2018/38, February 25, 2019 (internal document).
37 UNAMID and the UNCT convene a bimonthly Senior Leadership Forum involving chiefs of UNAMID sections and the heads of UN agencies. The UN alsoestablished an interim transition mechanism comprising working-level officials from both the mission and the UNCT, mandated to oversee both substantive andoperational elements of the transition. This mechanism was replaced by a Joint Transition Cell on September 1, 2019.
38 Interview with UN official, August 2019.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

March 2019.39 Personnel working on the transition
intentionally chose to develop an action plan over acomprehensive strategy document so it would be a“living document” that can evolve according topolitical and security developments.40 It is built
around six work streams that align with the pillarsof the transitions directive and a matrix withdeliverables, implementing parties, time frames,
and monitoring requirements.41 Even though theaction plan is succinct, overseeing its implementation is a heavy burden, particularly for sections of
UNAMID that report both to the resident andhumanitarian coordinator and to the joint special
representative and deputy joint special representative.
Furthermore, day-to-day work on the transition
was not accompanied by a joint transition plan
between the Sudanese government and the UN in
the vein of the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan.42
Intermittent meetings of the Tripartite Coordination Mechanism from 2017 onward focusedmore on the consolidation of UNAMID’s teamsites than on the articulation of a shared vision for
the transition.43 This was largely because of thegovernment’s confrontational posture toward
UNAMID and its limited interest in the transition’s
substantive components. The process of outlining
such a vision only began in September 2019, after
Sudan’s transitional government was put into
place. Nonetheless, agreements on specific projects
between state administrations in Darfur and the
SLFs reflect some level of joint engagement at the
local level.
Some UNAMID and UNCT personnel reflected
positively on the operationalization of the transition structures. They highlighted the positivecommitments, strategic thinking, and overall

11

flexibility demonstrated by the UN’s senior leadership during a complex transition. Most
importantly, senior leaders in the mission and
UNCT worked together to articulate a joint transition narrative, which gave them stronger footing
for engaging their UN colleagues and Sudanesecounterparts. Strong leadership also facilitatedregular coordination between Zalingei, Khartoum,
New York, and Addis Ababa.44
The transition structures also encounteredchallenges, however. One challenge was that themission focused on technical and political preparations for the transition rather than dynamics within
the mission. As with other recent peacekeeping
transitions, the mission struggled to set expectations, oversee the day-to-day management of thetransition, and provide psychosocial and humanresources support to staff.45 These challenges werecompounded by the strenuous working conditions
in Darfur. The speed with which the mission and
UNCT had to change their way of working
following the adoption of Resolution 2429 likely
put additional pressure on staff. UNAMID’snonintegrated structure, exemplified by its leadership’s geographic separation, made it difficult toimplement coherent programs. In addition, somepersonnel were perceived to disagree with thetransition timeline due to concerns that themission would exit Darfur without a sustainable
peace agreement or serious advances toward
resolving the conflict’s structural causes: “It’s notclear that the entire mission has truly embraced thetransition,” one official surmised.46 Combined,
these challenges have fostered internal resistance tochange and highlight how missions in transition
are forced to balance political and operational
considerations.

39 The action plan was developed with support from the UN’s Joint Transitions Project. Jointly managed by UNDP, the Department of Peace Operations, and theDepartment of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the project has provided integrated support to UN transitions since 2014 through the long-term deployment oftransition specialist and short-term deployment of a core team. UNAMID, “UN State Liaison Functions (SLFs) in Darfur,” accessed December 5, 2019, available athttps://unamid.unmissions.org/un-state-liaison-functions-slfs-darfur .
40 Interviews with UN officials, August 2019.
41 The six work streams are political work, peacekeeping and mission issues, SLF/integrated programs, other programs, operations, and communications (the latter
two are crosscutting).
42 On the Liberia Peacebuilding Plan, see: Daniel Forti and Lesley Connolly, “The Mission Is Gone, but the UN Is Staying: Liberia’s Peacekeeping Transition,”International Peace Institute, December 18, 2018.
43 “Coordination Mechanism on UNAMID: ‘Situation in Darfur Improved Significantly,’” Radio Dabanga, April 9, 2018; UN Security Council, Special Report of the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Assessment of the African Union–United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/445, May 30, 2019, para. 52.
44 Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019.
45 On similar challenges during the peacekeeping transition in Haiti, see: Namie Di Razza, “Mission in Transition: Planning for the End of UN Peacekeeping in
Haiti,” International Peace Institute, December 26, 2018.
46 Interviews with UN official, August 2019.

12

Delays in establishing and operationalizing the
Joint Transition Cell also had an impact. The cell
was first conceptualized during the 2018 AU-UN
strategic review based on lessons learned fromprevious transitions, which did not have crossdisciplinary teams to oversee daily transition activities.47 The UN team overseeing the initial strategicplanning was reconstituted as an interim transition
mechanism immediately following the strategic
review.48 The interim mechanism focused almost
exclusively on the SLFs, which some perceived as
the only transition issue. It also struggled with
communication and reporting, as team members
from UNAMID were based in Zalingei while their
UNCT counterparts remained in Khartoum. It
proved difficult, however, to agree on the terms ofreference and working modalities for a joint
structure that could operate between Khartoum
and Zalingei and fit within both the mission and
UNCT’s bureaucratic structures. This delayed thetransition from the interim mechanism to the Joint
Transition Cell, which did not formally start up
until September 2019.49
JUMP-STARTING PEACEBUILDINGWORK THROUGH THE STATE LIAISONFUNCTIONS
Accelerating the UN’s ability to deliver onpeacebuilding work in Darfur is central to themission’s transition. Continuation of this work canhelp the UN sustain its presence in the region,
maintain relationships with Sudanese actors, andbuild on investments made by the mission. Before
the passage of Resolution 2429, UNAMID had

Daniel Forti

limited capacity or resources to undertake
peacebuilding work.50 This has changed with thecreation of the state liaison functions (SLFs), which
the UN is using as an anchor for its long-term
engagement in Darfur.
As of October 2019, approximately sixty
UNAMID officials were physically collocated in theoffices of ten UN agencies, funds, or programs tojointly undertake SLF projects in four of Darfur’s
five states (including pilot projects in the Jebel
Marra region); the UN hopes to establish SLFs inCentral Darfur state in early 2020 as part of phase
III of their rollout.51 A three-person mobile humanrights team also operates out of El Fasher under the
SLF framework, and forty individual police officers
are deployed to work alongside the SLFs.52
Financed with programmatic funding from
UNAMID’s assessed budget, the SLFs received
approximately $15 million for phase I (January–
June 2019), with an additional $17.2 million
allocated for phase II (July–December 2019); an
additional $17.2 million is expected to be allocatedfor phase III (January–June 2020).53 While UNDP
received the majority of SLF funding during phase
I (owing to its comparative advantage inpeacebuilding and grant management), other UN
agencies have also benefitted.54 This funding isframed as “seed money” for the UN to demonstrate
gains and advocate for long-term financial
commitments from donors.
Although it is too early to assess the long-term
impact of the SLFs, their broad scope of work andstrong financial support are a step forward in how

47 The transition cell also received surge support from a transition specialist deployed to Khartoum at the end of 2018. This official was sponsored by the UN’s Joint
Transition Project.
48 UN transitions workshop, June 2019.
49 Interviews with UN officials, August 2019; UNAMID, “UN State Liaison Functions (SLFs) in Darfur.”
50 UNAMID only had approximately $5.5 million allocated to quick-impact and community-level-impact projects from 2014 to 2018. UN Office of Internal
Oversight Services, “Evaluation of the Relevance, Effectiveness and Efficiency of UNAMID in Supporting Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding in
Darfur in Collaboration with UNCT,” May 2019, para. 24 (internal document).
51 The SLFs are designated according to Darfur’s administrative boundaries. As of October 2019 there are SLFs in East, North, South, and West Darfur states. The
participating agencies, which were selected based on assessments of their respective comparative advantages in terms of their mandates, programmatic experience,and operational capabilities in Darfur, include: the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Organization for Migration, UNDP, the UN Population
Fund, UN Habitat, the UN Refugee Agency, UNICEF, UN Women, the World Food Programme, and the World Health Organization. UNAMID, “UN State
Liaison Functions (SLFs) in Darfur.”
52 UNAMID, “Concept Note: UNAMID Transitional Presence and Coordination with UNCT in Four Darfur States,” February 2019 (internal document)
53 These resources are significant compared to earlier years. For example, UNAMID received $2.9 million in the 2017–2018 period for programmatic activities
outside of mine action. UN General Assembly, Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1
July 2015 to 30 June 2016 and Budget for the Period from 1 July 2017 to 30 June 2018—Report of the Secretary General, UN Doc. A/71/809, February 22, 2017,
Table 16; UNAMID, “UN State Liaison Functions (SLFs) in Darfur”; UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and
the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/816, October 17, 2019, para. 27.
54 UNDP received approximately 40 percent of the $14 million programmatic funding allocated in Phase I; the second highest allocation went to the World Food
Programme, which received approximately 15 percent of the total. UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, “Evaluation of the Relevance, Effectiveness andEfficiency of UNAMID in Supporting Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding in Darfur in Collaboration with UNCT.”NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

the UN transitions.55 The peacebuilding andconflict-analysis skills brought by UNAMID staff
with years of experience in the region have helped
the UNCT gradually reorient its work frompredominantly humanitarian activities to peacebuilding.56 The SLFs have also helped the UNCT
change its approach to the protection of civilians inareas where UNAMID is no longer conducting
patrols, with greater focus on rule of law andhuman rights programming. This joint programming has fostered collaboration and integration
within the UN system.
In addition, by ensuring that projects align withthe priorities of community-level actors and stateauthorities, SLFs are gradually shifting ownershipaway from the UN and increasing the inclusion ofnational actors. Cooperation with the Sudanese
authorities throughout the design and implementation of these projects has improved the capacity ofauthorities, accelerated infrastructure development, and enabled the UN to raise politicallysensitive issues with the government—including
on human rights and justice—in a constructive
way.57 As one UNAMID official described, thisproject-based engagement on political issues
complements the track-I political dialogue led by
UNAMID’s joint special representative.58
Compared to the relatively straightforward
process of determining the programmatic directionof the SLFs, the administrative process of setting up
this new mechanism proved difficult. Phase I had ashort time frame, the mission and UNCT had
different project-management modalities, and themission had limited project-management skills(including a limited understanding of theories ofchange and results frameworks).59 Moreover,13

separate memoranda of understanding between
UNAMID and the ten participating UN agencies
are required for each phase, leading to continuous
negotiations that delay implementation. While
recent negotiations have benefitted from improved
understanding of staff collocation and reporting
structures, one official lamented, “We didn’t get tofocus on the big picture stuff because of haggling
over comparatively smaller details.”60
Navigating UNAMID and UN agencies’ different
financial arrangements similarly overwhelmed thestart-up process. Questions arose over how toallocate indirect costs and manage the dual
reporting lines between the UN Economic andSocial Council (ECOSOC) and the UN General
Assembly’s Fifth Committee.61 Even though SLF
projects were expected to begin in January 2019,
funding for phase I was only disbursed in March
2019, leading to a rush to spend money without
finalizing the joint analysis or the planning andvetting of projects.62 Some challenges werestructural in nature, including different budgetaryand human resources policies, unclear recruitment
practices for hiring managers and collocated staff,
varying project-management skills, and different
bureaucratic work flows. Others were moreadministrative, including how some collocatedstaff initially lacked identification badges and were
not included on the appropriate mailing lists.63
In addition, headquarters and operational staff
initially lacked a common understanding of the
SLFs’ objectives and working methods.64 Thisrequired senior leaders in UNAMID and the
UNCT to expend significant effort fostering collaboration. According to some involved, the visit ofthree UN assistant secretaries-general in February

55 Joint programs implemented during previous peacekeeping transitions have largely focused on justice and the rule of law. See: Forti and Connolly, “The Mission
Is Gone, but the UN Is Staying”; and Di Razza, “Mission in Transition.”
56 Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019.
57 These are especially important as the SLFs work with state ministries, police, and intelligence officials in Darfur. Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019.
58 Interview with UN official, July 2019.
59 Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019.
60 UN transitions workshop, June 201961 Missions’ programmatic funds are not allowed to cover UN agencies’ indirect overhead costs for the SLF projects. UNAMID allocated $1 million (of Phase I’s $15
million) to cover the general operating expenses for the collocation of staff to implement joint SLF activities. Interviews with UN officials, August 2019; UNtransitions workshop, June 2019. ECOSOC oversees financial reporting for UN agencies, funds, and programs; the UN General Assembly’s Fifth Committee (andits Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions) oversees financial reporting for UN peacekeeping operations.
62 UN transitions workshop, June 2019.
63 Interviews with UN officials, August 2019.
64 Common misperceptions include that the assessed funding would be distributed evenly among UN agencies in the SLFs, that the agencies would get to hire theirown new staff instead of accepting collocated staff from UNAMID, and that the SLFs were an exclusively peacekeeping project that had little relevance or space
for the work of staff from the UNCT. Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019.

14

2019 and the visit of the joint AU-UN strategic
review a few weeks later provided an opportunity
to promote a common narrative and underscorethe SLFs’ value to UNAMID’s transition.65
PROTECTING CIVILIANS AND
MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS
Protecting civilians and monitoring human rights
violations have long been central components of
UNAMID’s mandate. Even as large-scale clashes
have decreased considerably since 2016, themission has struggled to fully realize theseobjectives. This has become even more challenging
as the mission closes team sites, reduces armed
patrols, and downsizes civilian staff. Open conflictin the Jebel Marra region increased in 2018, as didintercommunal violence and criminality acrossDarfur.66 Human rights violations also increased infrequency throughout the first half of 2019, while
conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence
remains prevalent.67
The mission’s already limited capacity tomonitor and provide early warning of humanrights violations has decreased as it has reduced its
presence, a dilemma inherent to peacekeeping
transitions. UNAMID’s reconfiguration led to theclosure of twenty team sites between June 2017 andJune 2019, most of them outside of the Jebel Marraregion (see Figure 3).68 Recognizing the potential
impact the drawdown would have on the mission’s
early-warning capabilities and on the communities
adjacent to the team sites, Resolution 2429
mandated the mission to assess the impact of its
withdrawal on the area surrounding each closed
site.
Assessing the impact of the closure of these sites
has been difficult, however, as the Sudanese
government has often restricted the mission from

Daniel Forti

returning to them. Initial AU-UN reports indicatedthat the closure of team sites “has created a gap inearly warning mechanisms, and access of humanrights teams to those locations.”69 In March 2019,
while UNAMID concluded that the withdrawal
had not significantly altered civilians’ freedom of
movement or the security situation inside nearby
IDP camps, it noted reports that the RSF had
become more visible in these areas. It also noted the
RSF’s “alleged ‘occupation’ of a significant numberof former UNAMID Team sites, used in some cases
as recruitment or training centers,” a dynamic
exacerbated by the ensuing national politicaltransition.70 In addition, the report highlighted “theabsence or an adequate presence of protective
mechanisms and the inability of the Government of
Sudan to ensure its protection function.”71
UN officials indicated that protection challenges
have arisen in part because while transition
planning for programmatic activities has advanced,
there has not been comparable progress onplanning for security issues (including the protection of IDP sites). Moreover, the SLFs and OHCHR
cannot on their own fill the gap in human rights
monitoring left by UNAMID’s departure. Multiple
UN officials also observed that a decrease inreported human rights violations in recent years
does not definitively reflect an improved situation,
as decreased monitoring and reporting could limit
the availability of data.72
To compensate for the mission’s downsizing,
UNAMID and the UNCT have attempted tomonitor human rights through other avenues. At
the political level, UNAMID’s joint special
representative and deputy joint special representative have navigated the narrow political space toengage senior Sudanese officials in Khartoum andDarfur on these issues. At the operational level,

65 Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019.
66 Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019; UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591
(2005), UN Doc. S/2019/34, January 10, 2019, para. 44; Amnesty International, “Sudan: Fresh Evidence of Government-Sponsored Crimes in Darfur Shows
Drawdown of Peacekeepers Premature and Reckless,” June 11, 2019.
67 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary General: Conflict-Related Sexual Violence, UN Doc. S/2019/280, March 29, 2019, paras. 84–90; Special Report of the
Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Assessment of the African Union–United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/445, May 30, 2019, para. 22.
68 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic
Assessment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/445, May 30, 2019, paras. 48–51.
69 UN Security Council, Assessment by the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of Phase One of the Reconfiguration of the African
Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/12, January 4, 2018, para. 52.
70 UNAMID, “Assessment of the Situation in the 10 Team Sites from Which UNAMID Withdrew since July 2018: Briefing for the Strategic Review,” March 2019,para. 16 (internal document).
71 Ibid.
72 Interviews with UN officials, July–August 2019.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

Figure 3. UNAMID team site closures (December 2017–October 2019)

15

16

UNAMID’s military and police continued routine
patrols in the Jebel Marra region, and its integrated
protection teams have undertaken frequentmonitoring visits to IDP sites.73 The mission’s
human rights component has similarly continued
carrying out situational analyses and monitoring.
These efforts have complemented the SLFs’ workon the rule of law and human rights, which is anentry point for the UNCT to engage on these issues.
In particular, the mobile human rights monitoringteam can help “[assess] human rights priorities andopportunities for engagement, and… strengthen
human rights protection and promotion.”74
The UN also explored creating a stand-alone
office for OHCHR with a national mandate. The
Human Rights Council used the prospect of ending
the mandate of the UN independent expert on thesituation of human rights in Sudan—a position thathas frustrated the Sudanese government—to createa political opening for the establishment of such an
office. The council’s September 2018 decision on
Sudan tied the end of the expert’s mandate to theestablishment of a fully functional OHCHR
country office.75 Three months later, OHCHR
undertook a working visit to Khartoum to begin
consultations with the government, though thesewere paused following the April 2019 political
upheaval.76 One month after the signing of theconstitutional declaration in August 2019,
OHCHR and the government of Sudan signed anagreement to open a UN Human Rights Office in
Khartoum with field offices in Darfur, Blue Nile,
Southern Kordofan, and Eastern Sudan.77
Confronted with these dynamics, member states
have implicitly accepted that the transition will
unfold even as civilians remain vulnerable.
Progress on the overall protection and humanrights environment in Darfur has plateaued,especially when evaluated against UNSC

Daniel Fortibenchmarks.78 While conditions seem to havebecome more conducive to protection since August
2019, the mission will continue to confront thedilemma of monitoring human rights andprotecting civilians while reducing its presence.
MOBILIZING POLITICAL SUPPORT AMIDA DEADLOCKED PEACE PROCESS
Given the inherently political dimensions ofpeacekeeping transitions, the absence of a comprehensive peace agreement has shaped the transition
in Darfur; without tangible progress toward anagreement, it is unlikely that the long-term
conditions for protection, peacebuilding, humanrights, and development will materialize.
Political engagement on Darfur has proceededalong separate but interrelated tracks at the
subnational, national, bilateral, regional, andmultilateral levels.79 The AU and UN’s approach
was to seek a comprehensive peace agreement andthe implementation of the Doha Document for
Peace in Darfur. Progress on this front had stalledsince the government and Sudan Call alliancesigned the AU High-Level Implementation Panel’s(AUHIP) national roadmap for resolving theconflict in Darfur, as well as in Sudan’s Blue Nileand South Kordofan states, in August 2016.80
Months of preliminary talks between the Sudanese
government and two Darfuri armed groups facilitated by the AU culminated in a pre-negotiationagreement in December 2018. However, this brief
agreement dissolved within days of its adoption, as
both groups withdrew in solidarity with Sudaneseprotesters. The AUHIP’s concurrent consultations
with the Sudan Call alliance on advancing theroadmap also broke down around that period.
Absent progress in the peace talks, the UNSC
focused on benchmarks for the mission’s
drawdown and exit. Benchmarks help set expecta-

73 UNAMID, “JPG Guidelines for Monitoring of Protection Situation at Priority IDP Camps in ‘the Rest of Darfur,’” (internal document).
74 UNAMID, “Concept Note: UNAMID Transitional Presence and Coordination with UNCT in Four Darfur States,” para. 67.
75 UN General Assembly, Technical Assistance and Capacity-Building to Improve Human Rights in the Sudan, UN Doc. A/HRC/39/L.24/Rev.1, September 27, 2018,
para. 19.
76 UN Security Council, African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/44, January 14, 2019, para. 42.
77 OHCHR, “Bachelet Signs ‘Milestone Agreement’ to Open UN Human Rights Office in Sudan,” September 25, 2019.
78 See the human rights benchmarks in: UN Security Council, African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/912, October 12, 2018,
Annex 1.
79 For more information, see: UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Sudan Established Pursuant to Resolution 1591 (2005), UN Doc.
S/2019/34, January 10, 2019, paras. 7–21.
80 The Sudan Call alliance of opposition forces and movements includes the National Consensus Forces, the Sudan Revolutionary Front, the National Umma Party,
and the Civil Society Initiative. Roadmap Agreement, Addis Ababa, March 21, 2016, available at
http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auhip-roadmap-signed-080816.pdf .

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

tions and measure progress so the council canbetter understand the transition environment.81
While benchmarks have long featured in the
council’s discussions on UNAMID (see Annex),
Resolution 2429 requested that existing
benchmarks on progress toward the mission’s
strategic priorities be complemented by anadditional set of benchmarks and indicators
focused on the mission’s exit strategy. The new
benchmarks were meant to be centered on thegovernment of Sudan, measurable, based on theimplementation of the Doha agreement, andaccompanied by clear time frames.82
However, subsequent negotiations over the
UNSC presidential statement that acknowledged—
but did not endorse—these benchmarks reflected
their inherent limitations.83 Multiple council
members expressed dissatisfaction with thebenchmarks and did not see them as valuable.84
Debates emerged over whether the benchmarks
should be prerequisites for the exit or indicators of
where to focus, which benchmarks and indicators
should be prioritized and according to what timeframes, and whether the benchmarks would
actually impact how member states viewed thetransition’s trajectory.85 Continuous adjustments tothe benchmarks also concerned the Sudanese
government, which perceived the council to be
shifting the goal posts. These political debates
about the benchmarks themselves took the place of
conversations about the lack of progress inachieving them and the implications for the transition.
In addition to focusing on benchmarks, the UN
sought to mobilize financial and institutional
support for the transition. A high-level event on thesidelines of the UN General Assembly in
September 2018 aimed to build a common
understanding of the transition among member
states and urge them to increase their political and17

financial contributions to Sudan after UNAMID’s
departure.86 In addition, a visit by three UN
assistant secretaries-general to Darfur in February
2019 was intended to accelerate high-level UN
engagement with national stakeholders.87

Transitioning through Crisis:
UNAMID and Sudan’s
Governance Transition
UNAMID’s transition took place during seismic
shifts in Sudan’s political landscape that tested the
AU and UN’s ability to adapt while undertaking amajor reconfiguration. Public demonstrations thatbegan in December 2018 over the high cost ofliving launched Sudan into a period of uncertainty
that culminated in the signing of a constitutional
declaration on August 17, 2019, and the beginningof a three-year transitional period under a powersharing government.
KEY DEVELOPMENTS DURING SUDAN’SGOVERNANCE TRANSITION(APRIL–AUGUST 2019)
Sudan’s popular revolution transformed thecountry’s governance institutions and began
reshaping its social contract. Protests over theremoval of bread subsidies began on December 19,
2018, and quickly spread across the country asprotesters mobilized around “freedom, peace, andjustice.” Following the imposition of a state of
emergency and despite marginal political concessions, the protests culminated in senior military
officers removing President Bashir from office on
April 11th.
After taking power, the officers reconstituted
themselves as a Transitional Military Council(TMC) and signaled their willingness to begin
political negotiations with the Forces of Freedom
and Change (FFC), an umbrella coalition of civil

81 See Forti and Connolly, “Pivoting from Crisis to Development,” p. 3.
82 UN Security Council, African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/912, October 12, 2018, para. 57 and Annex 1.
83 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2018/19, December 11, 2018.
84 Security Council Report, “AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID): Presidential Statement,” What’s In Blue, December 10, 2018; Interviews with UN
diplomats, July–August 2019.
85 Interviews with UN diplomats and officials, July–August 2019; Interview with independent expert, August 2019.
86 UN Secretary-General, “Note to Correspondents: Chair’s Summary of High-Level Event on the Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding and Developmentin Darfur,” September 28, 2018; “Deputy Secretary-General’s Opening Remarks at General Assembly Side Event on the Transition from Peacekeeping toPeacebuilding and Development in Darfur,” September 28, 2018.
87 The three officials were Bintou Keita, Mourad Wahba, and Oscar Fernandez-Taranco. UN Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan andSouth Sudan, UN Doc. S/PV.8468, February 25, 2019.

18

society and opposition groups. The TMC
represented a complex mosaic of security institutions with diverse political, security, and financial
interests.88 Most notably, its deputy was Mohamed
Hamdan Dagalo (Hemeti), the head of the Rapid
Support Forces (RSF), formed in 2013 fromremnants of the Janjaweed militias that had
committed atrocities throughout Darfur, Blue Nile,and South Kordofan since 2003.89 Hemeti’s rise
coincided with the RSF’s rapid deployment
throughout the country.90 Limited progress innegotiations with the FFC and increasing tensions
on the ground precipitated the RSF to violently
disperse a Khartoum sit-in on June 3rd, leading to
the massacre of at least 128 individuals andwidespread sexual violence against protesters.
The June 3rd attack was a turning point in Sudan’s
political transition. The AUPSC suspended theSudanese government from all AU-led proceedings
three days later, and widespread internationalcondemnation of the TMC shifted the momentum
back toward political negotiations. A mediation
process facilitated jointly by the AU and theDaniel Forti

Ethiopian government that began in April led to apreliminary power-sharing agreement on July 5th,
followed by the signing of a constitutional declaration on August 17th (see Box 2).91
It is against this backdrop that the peacekeeping
transition entered a delicate stage, especiallyconsidering that UNAMID’s mandate (as set out in
Resolution 2429) was scheduled to expire on June30, 2019. This moment provided the AUPSC andUNSC opportunities both to constructively
influence Sudan’s political transition and to
identify how it would impact the drawdown andreconfiguration.
UNAMID’S MANDATE RENEWALS AND
THE DRAWDOWN’S TEMPORARY
PAUSE
Negotiations over UNAMID’s mandate renewal inJune 2019 were an important moment both for thepeacekeeping transition and for international
engagement in Sudan. Based on the AU and UN’s
historical division of labor on Sudan, the AUPSC
led on the national political transition while the
UNSC led on the operational details of the transi-

Box 2. Sudan’s constitutional declaration and transitional government
The August 2019 constitutional declaration established a transitional, power-sharing government for athirty-nine-month period, culminating in nationwide elections.92 The Sovereign Council is an elevenmember, collective head of state that includes five members nominated by the Transitional Military Council(TMC), five by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), and one civilian jointly appointed by both.
General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, former chair of the TMC, is chairing the council for the first twenty-one
months, and a civilian nominated by the FFC will chair it for the final eighteen months. The council is
responsible for confirming appointments to other branches and commands the armed forces.
Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok serves as head of government and chairs a cabinet of twenty ministers, allcivilians except for the two security portfolios. The Transitional Legislative Council will have a membershipof less than 300, with 67 percent nominated by the FFC and the remainder nominated by other groups(excluding Bashir’s National Congress Party and members of the TMC). At least 40 percent of the members
must be women. The declaration also provides for the creation of several commissions to deal with priority
reforms, a Supreme Judicial Council, and a structure for the armed forces that formalizes the RSF as a
distinct branch.

88 For a good summary of these dynamics, see: Lauren Ploch Blanchard, “Sudan’s Uncertain Transition,” Congressional Research Service, June 28, 2019, pp. 4–6; andInternational Crisis Group, “Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution,” October 21, 2019.
89 Alex de Waal, “General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo ‘Hemedti,’” World Peace Foundation, July 1, 2019; “Remote-control breakdown: Sudanese paramilitary forces
and pro-government militias,” Small Arms Survey HSBA Issue Brief No. 27, April 2017; Jérôme Tubiana, “The Man Who Terrorized Darfur Is Leading Sudan’sSupposed Transition,” Foreign Policy, May 14, 2019.
90 Hilary Matfess, “The Rapid Support Forces and the Escalation of Violence in Sudan,” ACLED, July 2, 2019.
91 For more information about the roles of the AU and Ethiopia in the mediation process, see: Atta-Asamoah and Mahmood, “Sudan after Bashir,” pp. 9–10.
92 Draft Constitutional Charter for the 2019 Transitional Period, August 4, 2019, available at
http://constitutionnet.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/Sudan%20Constitutional%20Declaration%20%28English%29.pdf .

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

tion in the mandate renewal.93 The AU
Commission deployed an envoy to begin
mediation almost immediately after the removal of
President Bashir on April 11th. On April 15th, the
AUPSC issued a communiqué that threatened to
impose sanctions and urged the formation of acivilian-led government within fifteen days.94 Two
weeks later, the AUPSC reemphasized thiscommitment but extended the deadline by anadditional sixty days, in part reflecting theoutcomes of the consultative summit of Sudan’s
regional partners.95
Discussions on UNAMID’s mandate renewal
picked up shortly after the release of the joint AUUN strategic review on May 30th. The report
expressed concern over how Sudan’s political
dynamics might impact Darfur and UNAMID, but
it largely suggested the transition continue as
outlined in Resolution 2429.96 The strategic review
was published at a time of division among UNSC
members on UNAMID’s next mandate. Somecountries wanted to take a cautious approach,using the mandate renewal as an opportunity toconsider pausing the drawdown in light of national
developments. These countries included Germany
and the UK (co-penholders on Sudan), Poland(chair of the sanctions committee on Sudan),Belgium, and France. China, Indonesia, Kuwait,
and Russia insisted that the drawdown and transition should continue according to the schedule
outlined in Resolution 2429. The three African
members of the UNSC (A3)—Côte d'Ivoire,
Equatorial Guinea, and South Africa—and theUnited States did not stake out strong positions at
the outset. These positions were informed by

19

council members' differing perspectives on core
political questions regarding UNAMID’s transition.97
The June 3rd massacre and the AUPSC’s suspension of Sudan marked a turning point in the negotiations.98 The A3, alongside the AU Permanent
Observer Mission to the UN, convened an
emergency press stakeout on June 6th to urge UNSC
members “to support AU and [Intergovernmental
Authority on Development] efforts and refrainfrom any action that could undermine African-led
initiatives.”99 Backed by the AUPSC, the A3strongly advocated for protecting the primacy ofAfrican-led political dialogue and mediation.100
While opinions within the UNSC began to evolve,
some members remained reluctant to comment on
Sudan’s political situation, as evidenced by the
protracted negotiations over a press statement
denouncing the June 3rd massacre.101
The AUPSC’s renewal of UNAMID’s mandate inJune 2019 provided another marker for the UNSC
negotiations. The communiqué extended themission’s mandate for twelve months, endorsed theclosure of eight inactive team sites, urged therelocation of troops to identified security hot spots,
and requested a review of civilian staffing levels. It
also articulated the implications of national
security and political developments for Darfur.102
However, UNSC members diverged in theirinterpretation of the communiqué’s implications,
forcing the A3 and AU Permanent Observer
Mission to confer with the AUPSC; the A3
subsequently conveyed the AUPSC’s desire for a
temporary pause to the drawdown.103 They also
urged the UNSC to ensure the mandate renewal

93 Both Darfur/UNAMID and Sudan are on the agenda of the AUPSC. While the UNSC’s formal agenda item is “Reports of Secretary-General on Sudan and South
Sudan,” debate within the UNSC has almost exclusively focused on Darfur.
94 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué DCCCXL (April 15, 2019), AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(DCCCXL).
95 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué DCCCXLIV (June 6, 2019), AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(DCCCXLIV); “Communiqué of the Consultative Summit of
the Regional Partners of the Sudan,” April 23, 2019 (internal document).
96 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic
Assessment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/445, May 30, 2019, para. 40.
97 These included debates about the effectiveness of peacekeeping in Darfur, whether the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, politicallinkages between developments in Khartoum and Darfur, interpretations of the mandate’s language on the transition’s deadlines, and deference to the hostgovernment. Interviews with UN diplomats, July–August 2019; UN Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, UN Doc.
S/PV.8549, June 14, 2019.
98 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué DCCCXLIV (June 6, 2019), AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(DCCCXLIV).
99 Permanent Mission of South Africa to the United Nations, “Press Conference by the African Members (A3) of the United Nations Security Council (Côted’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea & South Africa) on the Situation in Sudan at the UNSC Press Stakeout, UN Headquarters, New York,” June 6, 2019.
100 Interviews with UN diplomats, July–August 2019.
101 UN Security Council, “Security Council Press Statement on Sudan,” UN Doc. SC/13836, June 11, 2019.
102 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué DCCCXLVI (June 13, 2019), AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(DCCCXLVI), paras. 1, 10.
103 See the South African statement in: UN Security Council, Reports of the Secretary General on the Sudan and South Sudan, UN Doc. S/PV.8566, June 27, 2019;
Interviews with UN diplomats, July–August 2019.

20

Daniel Forti

did not jeopardize the mission’s ability to protect
civilians during this volatile period.104

exposed shortcomings in the handover of
UNAMID bases to the Sudanese government.

Subsequent UNSC negotiations gravitatedtoward a temporary pause of UNAMID’s
drawdown. Some council members initially
proposed a six-month pause, while others favored aone-month pause; as a compromise, they agreed toa four-month pause and to freeze the handover ofthirteen team sites and the Nyala super camp.105
Some were more willing to agree to this compromise following a briefing from senior UN officials
who noted that a temporary pause would not haveto prevent the mission from meeting its June andDecember 2020 exit deadlines.106 Council members
also endorsed the UN and AU’s proposal todevelop a joint political strategy and options for afollow-on configuration. UNSC Resolution 2479,
adopted unanimously on June 27th, provided the
AU with sufficient political space to continue
mediating and enabled UNAMID to “see how thecards fell” before accelerating the transition.107 By
agreeing to pause the drawdown, the UNSC
demonstrated flexibility and political coherencewith the AUPSC. It also demonstrated that council
members could use mandate discussions to politically support a transition without having to renegotiate the end date.

Intercommunal conflicts also intensified after theouster of Bashir. Sudan’s political transition
coincided with the beginning of the summer
farming season (late May–early June), a period thathas historically seen heightened tensions between
pastoral and farming communities. Even thoughthese conflicts are common in Darfur, UN officials
expressed concern over their increasing intensity.
They cited Hemeti’s ascension as a possible
contributing factor, considering his origins in thenomadic Mahariya Rizeigat Arab tribe; they also
observed increased RSF recruitment from Darfur’s
nomadic communities and increasingly hardline
stances taken by herders.110 The removal of civilian
government employees and the redeployment of
security forces (including the RSF) from Darfur to
Khartoum also “created administrative andsecurity gaps.”111 As a result, Darfuri civilians
continued to suffer human rights violations. As
summarized by Andrew Gilmour, UN assistantsecretary-general for human rights,

CHANGING SECURITY DYNAMICS INDARFUR
While the initial protests did not fundamentally
alter Darfur’s security environment, Bashir’s
downfall had a direct impact. Political protests andpublic demonstrations in urban areas and IDP
camps increased in both frequency and magnitude,
culminating in mass marches across Darfur on
April 25th.108 As one UN official described, after
Bashir’s overthrow “you could feel the electricity inthe environment.”109 The reverberations of these
protests amplified existing conflict drivers and

The human rights component of [UNAMID]
documented the killing of 47 and the injury of 186
civilians in various regions of Darfur between 11 April
to 12 June.… We believe that many cases in Darfur
remain invisible and underreported due to lack ofaccess to some parts of the region. In some areas ofJebel Marra, the sole representatives of Government
present are the security forces, but they are reported tobe the main perpetrators of violations against thecivilian population—that is, the people they are there
to protect.112

Some of the most prominent incidents included
attacks on the Kalma IDP camp, intercommunal
violence in Deleij, the looting of UNAMID’s El
Geneina super camp, and the looting of shared
World Food Programme–World Vision premisesin Graida. Because of these incidents, both the

104 Interviews with UN diplomats, July–August 2019.
105 Security Council, Report, “UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) Mandate Renewal,” What’s in Blue, June 26, 2019; Interviews with UN diplomats,
July–August 2019.
106 Interviews with UN diplomats, July–August 2019.
107 Interviews with UN diplomats and officials, July–August 2019.
108 Hilary Matfess “The First Step on a Long Road: Public Demonstrations and Political Reform in Sudan,” ACLED, May 2, 2019, Radio Dabanga, “Sudan Uprising:
Mass Marches across Darfur,” April 26, 2019.
109 Interview with UN official, August 2019.
110 Interviews with UN officials, August 2019.
111 UN Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, UN Doc. S/PV.8603, August 26, 2019.
112 Ibid.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

AUPSC and UNSC’s mandate renewals in June2019 requested that the mission ensure it could
protect itself.113
Additional security challenges resulted from thehandover of UNAMID team sites to Sudanese
authorities. These concerns originated as early as
2017, with the UN uncertain as to whether thegovernment was adhering to its “commitment to
use these facilities for non-military civilian
purposes that benefit communities, as stated in the[memoranda of understanding] and hand-overdocuments signed by both parties.”114 Despite
multiple allegations that RSF soldiers were
occupying the bases shortly after they were handed
over, the UN secretary-general’s January 2019
report considered the handovers in the latter half of2018 to have been in compliance with the UN’s
Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.115
Concerns over the handovers only received
significant attention after the TMC decreed on May
13th that all UNAMID bases should be handed overto the RSF. Over the course of the following month,
the AU-UN strategic review directly referenced
these concerns, an article on the issue in Foreign
Policy magazine received widespread attention, and
the AUPSC rejected the decree in its mandate
renewal.116 The TMC quickly capitulated following
this external pressure, issuing a follow-up decree
toward the end of June annulling its earlier
decision.117 However, the mission could not
independently verify the new decree’s implementation as of the end of August, and the RSF’s presence
across Darfur remains a concern for the sustainability of UNAMID’s transition.118

21

SIGNS OF LIFE FOR THE PEACEPROCESSNew political space for the peace process opened
up almost immediately after the TMC assumed
power. While the Sudan Revolutionary Front(SRF)—a coalition of armed groups in Darfur,
South Kordofan, and Blue Nile—was nominallylinked to the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC)
through its affiliation with the Sudan Call alliance,
it took a cautious approach to engagement with the
TMC. Nonetheless, the armed groups did engage
directly with the TMC, most notably in a June 27th
meeting between the TMC and two Darfuri armed
groups facilitated by Chadian President Idriss
Déby. The agreement emerging from this meeting
committed all parties to upholding existing ceasefire agreements in Darfur and ensuring that a newtransitional government would prioritize an
inclusive, national peace process.119 Although the
SRF rejected the July 5th political agreement
between the TMC and FFC, it continued negotiating with both groups bilaterally. Following
consultations in Addis Ababa, the SRF and FFC
agreed on an eleven-point document addressing
the eventual transitional authority, the prioritization of a nationwide peace process, and thecontents of the constitutional declaration.120
After the creation of the Sovereign Council,
dialogue between the SRF and the transitional
government led to the signing of the Juba
Declaration on September 10th, a landmark meeting
between Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla
Hamdok and rebel leader Abdul Wahid in Paris on
September 30th, the start of preliminary negotia-

113 UN Security Council Resolution 2479 (June 27, 2019), UN Doc. S/RES/2479; AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué DCCCXLVI (June 13, 2019), AU
Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(DCCCXLVI), para. 10.
114 UN Peacekeeping, “UNAMID Completes Handover of Team Sites to the Government of Sudan,” December 20, 2018.
115 UN Peacekeeping, “UNAMID Expresses Concern over Allegations of Improper Team Site Handovers,” September 11, 2017; “UNAMID Denies ‘Improper
Handover” of Bases in North Darfur,” Sudan Tribune, September 12, 2017; UN Security Council, African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur:
Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2019/44, January 14, 2019, para. 53.
116 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic
Assessment of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/445, May 30, 2019, para. 31, 51; Colum Lynch, “Document of The
Week: Sudan’s Paramilitaries Are Seizing Abandoned U.N. Outposts in Darfur,” Foreign Policy, June 7, 2019; AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué(June 13, 2019), AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(DCCCXLVI), para. 4.
117 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 17 June 2019 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, UN Doc. S/2019/517, June 26, 2019.
118 Jean-Pierre LaCroix, in: UN Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, UN Doc. S/PV.8603, August 26, 2019.
119 “Sudan’s TMC, Two Armed Groups Agree to Uphold Ceasefire in Darfur,” Sudan Tribune, June 28, 2019.
120 “Sudan Opposition, Armed Movements Reach Agreement in Addis Ababa,” Radio Dabanga, July 26, 2019.

22

tions on October 14th, and the signing of a prenegotiation agreement between the government
and the SRF on October 21st.121 As part of the Juba
Declaration, the Sudanese parties agreed to sign afinal peace agreement by December 14, 2019, tosustain the transition’s momentum and demonstrate their commitment to peace.
Taken together, these efforts are early signs ofprogress for the Darfur peace process. The shift
from an internationally facilitated process toward
one that is nationally owned and led represents the
new government’s stronger commitment to acomprehensive and inclusive agreement. This
reflects broader changes in Sudan’s politicalclimate that open a window of opportunity for
Sudan and, by extension, the AU, the UN, and
UNAMID.

Priorities for the Transition’s
Final Stages
As Sudan embarks into a new transitional periodwith a sense of cautious optimism, so too does
UNAMID enter the next stages of its own transition. Darfur’s deep structural challenges—
especially those related to protecting civilians,
respecting human rights, and providing basic
services—will persist well beyond the mission’s
exit. While early progress toward a national peace
process is encouraging, history demonstrates thatsuch progress can be fleeting and subject to rapid
reversals. And even if the Sudanese government
can provide security across the Jebel Marra region,
Darfur is still situated in a volatile neighborhood
where the unpredictable spillover of other conflicts
could alter dynamics on the ground.
The ultimate goals of any peacekeeping transition are to prevent a relapse into violent conflict
and to reconfigure international support tonational actors as they reassume ownership overdevelopment and security. Until April 2019, thepeacekeeping transition was making headway on
preparing for the transition, even as there was little
progress on resolving the core political questions ofDaniel Forti

achieving peace in Darfur. The significant changes
across Sudan now present a unique opportunity for
the Sudanese people to pursue a comprehensive
peace agreement. While the AU and UN canprovide meaningful support to these efforts, theyshould not lose sight of the political, security, andoperational dimensions of the peacekeeping transition. Achieving progress in these areas and, byextension, protecting the viability of UNAMID’speacekeeping transition require the UN and AU to
focus on coherence, adaptability, and sustainability.
The AU and UN began considering the next steps
for UNAMID’s transition in October 2019. The
AUPSC’s October 24th communiqué encouraged
the mission to “deploy all necessary efforts aimed atensuring its smooth transition from a peacekeeping
mission to a peacebuilding mission.” It also
requested that “the UNSC considers extending the
UNAMID mandate, in line with the [June 13th
communiqué].”122 In its renewal of UNAMID’s
mandate one week later, the UNSC kept the
drawdown on hold, extending the mission’s
mandate for twelve months and requesting it tocontinue implementing existing priorities; it also
maintained uniformed personnel ceilings at thesame level for six months and authorized theclosure of only one team site. The UNSC requested
a new special report on the transition by the end ofJanuary 2020 and affirmed that, by March 31, 2020,
it would decide on a course of action for the
mission’s “responsible drawdown and exit” and“adopt a new resolution… establishing a follow-on
presence to UNAMID.”123
These efforts will require the UN and AU tohandle many moving parts, each with political,
security, peacebuilding, and financial implications.
This section discusses five broad priorities for the
final stages of UNAMID’s transition: (1) strengthening political engagement between the UNSC andthe AUPSC; (2) translating the joint politicalstrategy into an effective follow-on presence; (3)reinforcing the transition concept; (4) integrating
human rights and protection into all areas of work;

121 “Sudan Armed Movements: Juba Declaration Is a Major Step Forward,” Radio Dabanga, September 13, 2019; “Soudan: Rencontre à Paris entre le Premierministre Abdallah Hamdok et l’un des chefs rebelles du Darfour,” Jeune Afrique, September 30, 2019; “SRF rebels, Sudan Govt Sign Agreement in Juba,” Radio
Dabanga, October 21, 2019.
122 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué (October 24, 2019), AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(DCCCLXXXIX), para. 10.
123 UN Security Council Resolution 2495 (October 30, 2019), UN Doc. S/RES/2495.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

and (5) sustaining international attention andfinancial support. While this paper does not aim toprovide definitive answers to all of the issues raised
below, it offers sign posts for monitoring the AU’s
and the UN’s reconfiguration in Darfur and Sudan.
STRENGTHENING POLITICAL
ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO
COUNCILSThe UNSC and AUPSC’s political engagement in
Sudan is imperative for the success both of thepeacekeeping transition and of Sudan’s governancetransition. This engagement should beunderpinned by the joint AU-UN political strategy
for Sudan (see Box 3). To sustain their politicalengagement, the councils need to have internal
political unity and ensure that their approaches arecoherent.124 Such coherence was evident as the two
councils responded to Sudan’s political uprising in
June 2019, but it should not be taken for granted.
With its mandate to consider both Darfur-centric
and national issues, the AUPSC is primed tocontinue leading support to Sudan’s governancetransition. The UNSC should continue to complement and reinforce the AUPSC’s political engagement while leading on the peacekeeping transition.
To ensure coherence between the UNSC and

23

AUPSC, the A3 should make Sudan a priority intheir role as a bridge between the two councils.125
This could entail more frequently consulting with
the AUPSC on Sudan and continuing to issue jointstatements that reflect the AUPSC’s positions
during formal and informal deliberations in the
UNSC. In addition, the A3, the UNSC copenholders on Sudan, and Sudanese officials
should more regularly discuss both UNAMID’stransition and political developments throughout
the country.
Member states on the two councils should also
request more briefings and informal consultations
on Sudan. While these usually occur in advance ofthe renewal of the mission’s mandate, thegovernance transition, national peace process, andpeacekeeping transition all underscore the urgency
of more consistent engagement. The two councils
should be prepared to leverage their diplomatic
capacity in national capitals, New York, and Addis
Ababa to engage the broader UN and AU memberships on developments in Sudan. These efforts
would help the councils navigate sensitive politicaldebates by building common understandings andidentifying divergent interests in advance ofimportant policy decisions. While the working

Box 3. The joint AU-UN political strategy for Sudan126
The joint AU-UN political strategy for Sudan, which is rooted in the priorities of the Sudanese government,
positions the organizations to provide wide-ranging support throughout the national peace process andtransition period. Ensuring that any follow-on presence can effectively implement this strategy through aflexible, integrated, and inclusive approach will be critical to the peacekeeping transition’s long-termsustainability.
The joint strategy envisions the AU and UN providing political support in four areas during Sudan’s thirtynine-month transition period: (a) an inclusive peace process with armed groups in Darfur, South Kordofan,and Blue Nile; (b) peacebuilding processes within local communities; (c) regional and cross-border initiatives; and (d) the constitutional and electoral processes. A focus on gender equality, empowerment of
women and youth, and human rights cuts across all areas of engagement.127 This inclusive approach is
integral to the strategy, as communities across Darfur have felt excluded by previous political processes, andthe opening of political space has raised their expectations to be included.128

124 Forti and Singh, “Toward a More Effective UN-AU Partnership on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management,” pp. 3–6.
125 Ibid., pp. 6–9.
126 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African
Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/816, October 17, 2019, paras. 38-44.
127 Ibid., paras. 40-42.
128 Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative, “Sudan: Darfur (2009–2017),” Case Study Series on Women in Peace and Transition Processes, September 2018; Darfur
Women Action Group, “Strategic Framework for Sustainable Change in the Republic of Sudan,” September 2019.

24

modalities of joint council missions have yet to be
finalized, a joint UNSC-AUPSC mission to Sudan
would be a prime opportunity for delivering aunified message.129
The councils should also take seriously thechallenge of fostering political coherence among all
AU and UN entities working on Sudan. While
UNAMID remains an anchor for Darfur-centric
engagement, the AU High-Level Implementation
Panel (AUHIP), AU special envoy for Sudan, AU
Liaison Office in Sudan, UN secretary-general’s
special adviser for Sudan, and UN special envoy for
the Horn of Africa all operate in a similar politicalspace. Although each entity has a different
mandate, they should avoid unintended overlap,
duplication, and competition. Moreover, even if
the two councils view these entities as separate,
Sudanese stakeholders may perceive them to be thesame. It is therefore imperative that the two
councils align the political goals of these entities.
TRANSLATING THE JOINT POLITICALSTRATEGY INTO AN EFFECTIVE
FOLLOW-ON PRESENCE
While the AU and UN’s October 2019 special
report details a joint political strategy, it is lessprescriptive on proposals for a post-UNAMID
configuration. As the Sudanese government
requested additional time to articulate its own
position, a joint task force is expected to prepare
recommendations by December 2019.130 The AU,
UN, and Sudanese government agreed on six
principles to guide the design of any follow-on
configuration:(a) National ownership and support to this presence
is a pre-requisite to its success;(b) In line with the Declaration of Shared
Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations,the mandate should be “clear, focused,sequenced, prioritized and achievable”;(c) The nature of issues to be addressed and the
security conditions do not require the presence ofa military force component;

Daniel Forti(d) The assistance could be accommodated within
Chapter VI or VIII of the United Nations
Charter;(e) The deployment timeline should not exceed thetransition period; and(f) The mechanism should have a light presence andgeographical footprint.131

Beyond these principles, a follow-on presence
should not be based exclusively on politicalcompromises or on efforts to retrofit a predetermined configuration onto the joint strategy; itshould reflect council members’ assessments ofwhat is needed to successfully implement the joint
political strategy on the ground. Any follow-on
presence should also be driven by its politicalstrategy, with all other work reinforcing thispolitical focus.
The councils should delineate the tasks they
mandate to a follow-on presence for the full thirtynine-month timeline for Sudan’s transitional
government instead of focusing only on the oneyear mandate cycle. Such a long-term approach
could better equip any follow-on configuration
with the substantive expertise needed to implement
the political strategy (e.g., on disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration) and enable it toadjust its capacity and priorities over time. The
follow-on presence should also consider providing
advisory support to national actors rather thandirectly implementing programs.
There are various factors to consider indetermining whether a follow-on presence should
be a UNSC-mandated mission (under either
Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter), oran expanded UNCT. Conditions on the groundwould suggest that a UNSC-mandated special
political mission would best help the UN and AU
navigate the next stage of the peacekeeping transition. A Chapter VI mission would provide Darfur
with more direct attention from the UNSC, thereby
strengthening the political leverage of leaders on
the ground to engage their national counterparts.132

129 The AUPSC has already committed to undertaking a mission to Sudan in early 2020. AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué DCCCLXXXIX (October 24,2019), AU Doc. PSC/PR/Comm.(DCCCLXXXIX), para. 11. Security Council Report, “Dispatches from the Field: UN Security Council Visiting Mission to theAU,” What’s In Blue, October 22, 2019.
130 The Joint Task Force is a sub-committee of the UN-AU-government of Sudan Tripartite Coordination Mechanism.
131 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union–
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/816, October 17, 2019, para. 46.
132 Even when the UNSC ends a mandated operational presence in a country, the item technically remains on the council’s agenda for two years. Nonetheless, there
is a distinction between items that are regularly scheduled for discussion and those that are inactive agenda items.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

The predictable funding that would accompany
such a mission would also better position the AU
and UN to fulfill the political tasks outlined in the
joint strategy. Such a mission could take multiple
forms, ranging from a mission mandated tosupport ongoing peace processes (like the UN
Support Mission in Libya) to a peacebuildingcentric mission built around the state liaison
functions (like the UN Integrated Peacebuilding
Office in Guinea-Bissau). If there is only a UNCT
presence—which would more explicitly signal thatengagement is development-oriented—the UN
resident coordinator would require far moreresources and institutional support than currently
available in order for the UNCT to play a politicalrole.
While a new Chapter VII mission may not be
politically feasible, it is nonetheless important for
the UNSC and AUPSC to debate the tradeoffs ofsuch an arrangement and whether it would besuitable for current security dynamics in Darfur.
Recognizing the volatility of Darfur’s security
landscape and the structural drivers of conflict thatwill persist indefinitely, some form of light andmobile quick-reaction force may offer a last line ofdefense if the security situation rapidly deteriorates. A similar tool was employed during thepeacekeeping transitions in Côte d’Ivoire andLiberia, and those experiences may offer
guidance.133 However, such a configuration would
require political consensus on the councils andconsent from the Sudanese government. It would
also require agreement on operational details,
including where the force would be located, its sizeand composition, its area of operation, and its rulesof engagement. While a reserve capacity of one
battalion is expected to remain throughout
UNAMID’s drawdown for deployment in extremis,
it may be worthwhile for the UNSC, AUPSC, andSudanese government to discuss this option.
A UNSC-mandated police-centric mission,
similar to the UN Mission for Justice Support inHaiti, could also play a valuable role following
UNAMID’s departure. The fact that UNAMID’snumber of authorized uniformed police hasremained unchanged over the past three years is an25

implicit acknowledgement by the UNSC and
AUPSC of their role in maintaining security in
Darfur (see Figure 2). Such a follow-on mission
could also advise Sudanese police and bolster thejustice and rule of law activities already underway
through the SLFs. Nonetheless, this option would
similarly require an extraordinary politicalagreement with the Sudanese government under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
Any follow-on configuration should involve adefined but flexible division of labor between the
AU and the UN. Recent progress on the UN-AU
partnership suggests that the two organizations
could collaborate effectively either through a
hybrid political configuration or through separate
mandates working closely alongside one another.
The AU’s engagement on the political negotiations
provide it with a comparative advantage at thenational level, while the UN’s existing infrastructure in Darfur would position it as the leading
partner in the region. Irrespective of formal
modalities, the partners should also align theirefforts at the senior political level (through close
contact between special envoys) and at thetechnical level (through aligned programming on
peacebuilding, post-conflict reconstruction anddevelopment, rule of law, and security sector
reform). Regardless of the type of follow-on configuration, the two organizations could engage injoint conflict analysis, planning, programming, andmessaging. The UN and AU could draw on theexperiences of Guinea-Bissau, where the AU, UN
Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau,
and Economic Community of West African States
Mission in Guinea-Bissau closely aligned theirwork, and of Liberia, where the UN and AU haveworked toward shared political goals in a nonmission setting.134
The UNSC and AUPSC’s discussions on any
follow-on configuration should be framed bynational dynamics so that the reconfigured
presence is aligned with the needs of Sudanesethroughout the country. Given the new government’s openness to international engagement, theAU and UN could be asked to provide support toother regions of Sudan. A post-UNAMID presence

133 UN Department of Peace Operations, “Regional Quick Reaction Force (RQRF): Lessons Identified Study,” December 2016.
134 Forti and Connolly, “The Mission Is Gone, but the UN Is Staying,” pp. 22, 33–34.

26

could feasibly cover some combination of Darfur,
South Kordofan, Blue Nile, and Khartoum.
Engagement beyond Darfur would likely dependon the outcomes of the ongoing national peace
process as well as the scope of Sudanese authorities’
requests for support. Decisions about the area of
responsibility will need to balance the follow-on
presence’s objectives with available resources andgeographic priorities to ensure that attention is notturned away from Darfur altogether.
Regardless of the final decision about the followon presence, the UN and AU should be mindful ofthe burdens associated with significant and rapid
reconfigurations of missions. The transition from amultidimensional peacekeeping mission to asmaller mission in Haiti highlighted the substantive, organizational, and operational challenges ofclosing a mission and opening another one
simultaneously.135 While transitioning away from amultidimensional peacekeeping mission is an
opportunity to improve international support andsignal a “fresh start,” UNAMID personnel would
benefit from a reconfiguration that builds on
existing goals and processes by adjusting structures
where necessary but not designing the follow-on
presence as a new mission altogether.
REINFORCING THE TRANSITIONCONCEPT
Strengthened planning processes and accelerated
peacebuilding efforts are necessary for consolidating gains achieved in Darfur over recent months
and for ensuring the peacekeeping transition
provides a sustainable anchor for long-term
international engagement.
The Sudanese government should articulate a
joint transition compact with the UN and AU. The
compact should be considered a political commitment instead of a technical exercise and should
affirm the government’s vision for how the organizations can collectively support national priorities.136 It should cohere with existing policy

Daniel Fortiframeworks, particularly the constitutional
declaration and joint AU-UN political strategy.137 A
joint transition compact would be valuable fordemonstrating national ownership throughout thisprocess and clarifying how it will unfold. It would
also lay out substantive priorities that the UNCT
could use to anchor a capacity-mapping study. This
exercise would realistically assess each UN agency’s
operational footprint, capabilities, and limitations
to meet these priorities both in Darfur and acrossthe country.138
In strengthening national ownership over the
mission’s transition and reconfiguration, the UN
and AU should focus on building the capacity of
subnational government officials to engage in theprocess. The anticipated redeployment of civilian
personnel to government ministries in Darfur may
provide an opportunity for the UN to engage theseofficials on transition-related issues and ensure
their work is complementary.139
Peacebuilding is at the heart of UNAMID’stransition concept, and the state liaison functions(SLFs) are valuable conduits for this work. While
the SLFs were only planned to continue throughJune 2020, the UN now needs to assess their longterm future. Security conditions and the national
peace process will dictate whether full-fledged SLFs
can be established in Central Darfur state. There
are also questions about whether the SLFs could be
expanded beyond Darfur; while this approach may
be politically appealing, early challenges to theiroperationalization suggest that the UN and AU
should take a gradual and cautious approach
grounded in the findings of the capacity mapping.
Decisions about the follow-on presence will also
impact possible financing options for the SLFs.
Even though special political missions are fundedthrough the UN’s regular budget, there are
currently no provisions for this framework to coverprogrammatic activities. Financing the SLFs in a
non-peacekeeping setting would therefore require
extra-budgetary contributions.

135 Di Razza, “Mission in Transition,” pp. 28–34.
136 UN Security Council, Letter Dated 24 October 2019 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council, October 25, 2019, UN Doc.
S/2019/842, Annex 1, para. 146.
137 This transition plan could also incorporate the outcomes of any peace agreement, the Darfur Development Strategy, the SLFs’ priorities, the UN development
assistance framework for 2018–2021, or the humanitarian response plan for 2019
138 Forti and Connolly, “The Mission Is Gone, but the UN Is Staying,” pp. 8–10.
139 The UN’s Joint Project on Transitions is expected to focus on strengthening direct support to national governments in transition settings. See remarks by Rania
Dagash at the International Peace Institute: “Preparing for the Next Wave of UN Peace Operations Transitions,” New York, September 18, 2019.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

The UN Peacebuilding Commission’s (PBC)
potential role in the transition is still an open
question. The previous Sudanese government
requested inclusion on the PBC’s formal agenda,
and the AUPSC supported the government’s
request in its June 2018 renewal of UNAMID’s
mandate; however, the issue has not featured
prominently in recent months.140 The new
Sudanese government could benefit from
evaluating how best to engage the PBC and its
members. While a country-specific configurationfor Sudan would be the most high-profile andstructured form of collaboration, it is far from theonly way the PBC could support the transition. For
example, Darfur and Sudan could be an agenda
item during the annual meetings of the AUPSC and
PBC. The PBC could also provide a multistakeholder forum for the government, NGOs, and
UN to discuss government priorities, community
needs, and how they align with the UN’s transition
plans, as it did in Liberia.141
Finally, Darfur presents an opportunity for the
AU to accelerate its post-conflict reconstruction
and development initiatives in Sudan. More robust
AU efforts in this area could complement those of
UNAMID and the UN by prioritizing support tothe mission’s quick-impact projects, ensuring thatpeacebuilding work focuses on the local
dimensions of post-conflict recovery, andconvening dialogue among bilateral and multilateral partners to ensure policy coherence.142
Greater peacebuilding engagement in Darfur
should also be a priority for the planned AU Center
for Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development
in Cairo, especially considering the strong working
relations between Sudan and Egypt. Improved
cooperation on peacebuilding in Darfur would also
give the UN and AU an opportunity tooperationalize their 2017 memorandum of
understanding, which prioritizes “conflict prevention, political dialogue, national reconciliation,
democratic governance and human rights,” all of

27

which are valuable in Darfur.143
INTEGRATING HUMAN RIGHTS AND
PROTECTION INTO ALL AREAS OF
WORK
Protecting civilians and promoting human rights
will continue to be a challenge throughout thetransition. UNAMID’s consolidation has already
reduced the number of human rights and civil
affairs officers in Darfur, limiting community
engagement and the flow of early-warning
information and analysis. Removing peacekeepers
altogether will eliminate the UN and AU’s
strongest tool for preventing and countering
threats to civilians. Even with the creation of an
OHCHR satellite office in Darfur, any follow-on
presence will likely fall short of UNAMID’scapacity and resources in these areas. To counter
this challenge, human rights and protection issues
should feature prominently in all areas of the UN
and AU’s work moving forward.
The UN and AU should integrate protection andhuman rights into all their political engagement at
the national and subnational levels. Approachingthese issues exclusively from a security or
operational perspective minimizes opportunities toaddress structural drivers. Consistent dialogue on
protection issues with both civilian and militaryleaders could help anchor the UN and AU’s
political strategy in day-to-day work, in line with
the UN’s policies on the protection of civilians.144
Building on the diverse relationships forgedthrough the SLFs, the UN and AU could holdregular fora with government officials, police,
military and intelligence officers, civil society
organizations, and community representatives.
Such fora could help build relationships between
these constituencies, foster a shared understandingof threats to civilians in each community, andultimately help shift the responsibility for protection from the UN mission back to Sudanese
authorities. They could also link to existing

140 AU Peace and Security Council Communiqué DCCLXXVIII (June 11, 2018), AU Doc. PSC/PR/COMM.(DCCLXXVIII), para. 12.
141 UN Peacebuilding Commission, “Transition of UN Missions: What Role for the PBC?” December 2014; Forti and Connolly, “The Mission Is Gone, but the UN Is
Staying,” pp. 10–11, 20–21.
142 For an example of what this looks like in practice, see: Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Cairo International Center for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping,and Peacebuilding, and Egyptian Agency of Partnership for Development, “Operationalizing the African Union Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development
Policy in the Sahel Region: Charting the Way Forward,” October 2018.
143 United Nations, “Joint Communique on United Nations–African Union Memorandum of Understanding on Peacebuilding,” September 18, 2017.
144 See tier I (dialogue and engagement), in: UN Department of Peace Operations, Policy: The Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping, UN Doc. Ref
2019.17, November 1, 2019, pp. 10–12.

28

community-based protection committees and help
Darfuri communities establish their own local
early-warning networks and response mechanisms.
The UN should also ensure that protection andhuman rights issues are addressed through awhole-of-system approach and not just delegatedto the follow-on configuration and the new
OHCHR office. A UN-wide approach to protection
could help guide a long-term shift from “protecting
through presence” to “creating an enabling
environment for protection.”145 UN agencies
operating in Darfur should continue integratingthese issues across their analysis and programming.146 These efforts would also complement
ongoing programs to strengthen the capacity ofstate-level authorities to adhere to international
human rights and humanitarian law.
Ongoing efforts to strengthen rule of law institutions—especially the criminal justice system andrural courts—should remain priorities.147
OHCHR’s new satellite office in Darfur will
undertake complementary work in this area andshould be positioned to coordinate system-wide
support and expertise. The UN Department of
Peace Operations and UNDP’s Global Focal Pointfor Rule of Law could also explore opportunities for
expanding the deployment of mobile monitoring
teams outside of Darfur’s state capitals.
Given the UN’s decreased presence throughout
Darfur, it should evolve and diversify existing
approaches to early warning. UNDP could
establish a crisis-risk dashboard for Sudan, whether
or not there is a follow-on mission.148 The AU’s
Continental Early Warning System and theIntergovernmental Authority on Development’s
Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

Daniel Forti(CEWARN) could be expanded into Darfur, as
they are well known and established platforms thatcan work with both state and non-state institutions.149 CEWARN’s focus on cross-border andpastoralist conflict would be especially valuable for
Darfur. Stronger engagement between these
institutions, the Sudanese government, the UN,
and Darfuri communities could make them more
effective without unduly placing the burden on one
institution.
Accelerated strategic planning for the security
transition between UNAMID’s military and police
components and their Sudanese counterparts
should be another focus. Multiple UN officials
lamented the comparatively limited progress onplanning prior to August 2019; the installation of
the new transitional government provides anopportunity for reengaging. This planning is
critical for ensuring long-term protection in
Darfur’s IDP camps and settlements, and future
updates to the two councils should prominently
feature assessments of progress in these areas.
Frequent evaluations of closed team sites by
UNAMID and the Sudanese government could
assess the drawdown’s impact on civilians andensure these sites are being repurposed exclusively
for civilian use.150 Concurrently, scaling up
community policing initiatives and increasing thenumber of police officers collocated in the SLFs
could provide tangible, immediate security gains.151
SUSTAINING FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND
INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION
Financial cliffs and waning international attention
routinely accompany peacekeeping transitions;
UNAMID’s transition will likely be no different.152
Despite years’ worth of international investment in

145 See tier III (establishment of a protective environment), in ibid., pp. 16-17
146 Alice Debarre and Namie Di Razza, “Pursuing Coordination and Integration for the Protection of Civilians,” International Peace Institute, February 2019, pp.
10–11.
147 UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union–
United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/816, October 17, 2018, para. 28
148 UNDP’s crisis-risk dashboards aggregate open-source data and reporting from UNDP colleagues to track conflict indicators, monitor patterns, and produce
visualizations. UNDP Tanzania’s crisis risk dashboard is a prominent example. See: UNDP Tanzania, “Early Warning and Response System: The UNDP
Tanzania Crisis Risk Dashboard,” March 2018.
149 Institute for Security Studies, “The Horn of Africa Should Improve Citizen Engagement,” May 15, 2019; Ejeviome Eloho Otobo, “Regional Economic
Communities and Conflict Prevention in Africa: An Overview of Capacity Gaps and Priority Needs,” UN Office of the Special Advisor on Africa, 2018, pp. 17–
19.
150 This could be done in line with the concept outlined in: UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and theSecretary-General of the United Nations on the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2019/816, October 17, 2019, paras. 23–24.
151 Marina Caparini, Festus Kofi Aubyn, Olivia Victoria Davies, Meressa K. Dessu, and Mateja Peter, “The Role of the Police in UNAMID,” Institute for Security
Studies, April 2015.
152 Forti and Connolly, “Pivoting from Crisis to Development.”

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

Darfur, UNAMID’s exit may cause some member
states to turn their attention to other urgent crises
around the world. Senior UN and AU officials havesounded such alarms since 2017, pleading formember states to continue engaging beyond
UNAMID’s closure.153 While some member states
have committed to avoiding such a cliff, the transition will now enter its final stages in a broader
environment of donor fatigue and competing
economic priorities for Sudan.154 A lack of funding
could limit the UN’s operational capabilities andinhibit the extent to which any reconfigured
presence can undertake the full range of programming.
The transitional government’s immediate priorities are to alleviate Sudan’s macroeconomic crisisand convince the US to remove Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. Although thisdesignation does not inhibit all forms of development cooperation with Sudan, it is currently
perceived as a significant symbolic roadblock.
Furthermore, until the US government lifts thisdesignation and the Sudanese government repays
arrears to international financial institutions(estimated at approximately $2.6 billion), theWorld Bank and International Monetary Fund will
not be able to provide concessional loans.155 While
there is growing political support for removing thedesignation, the necessary political and bureaucratic steps will take months, if not longer.156
While there are no straightforward ways to
immediately prevent a financial cliff following thepeacekeeping transition, continuously drawing
attention to it is an important first step. Beyond
this, addressing the challenge in both the short andlong term will depend on the follow-on configuration. A UNSC-mandated special political mission
would provide more predictable funding in the29

immediate future. If there is no follow-on mission,
member states should follow the UN secretarygeneral’s proposal for voluntary contributions
equivalent to 15 percent of a closing mission’sbudget to support programming for two years.157
For the UN, creating a single donor framework tocover all the financial needs for transition-related
support could help ensure coherence amongparallel funding streams. International donors
often become overwhelmed by separate funding
requests for similar work; ensuring cohesion
between frameworks such as the UN development
assistance framework, Peacebuilding Fund, andDarfur Development Strategy and presenting
funding needs through a single vehicle would help
combat donor fatigue and facilitate donor coordination. These efforts could go hand in hand with aninternational donor conference for Sudan bringing
together major bilateral donors, members of theParis Club of creditors, the World Bank, the EU,
the African Development Bank, and other regional
development banks.158 While such conferences are
not panaceas, this forum would allow the Sudanese
government to communicate its financial anddevelopment priorities and better understand thefunding priorities of partners.
Efforts to promote greater coherence in donor
support should also be accompanied by more
dedicated engagement with existing multilateralchannels. The Peacebuilding Fund can provide alifeline of support, especially as it is increasing its
focus on UN mission transitions; the UN secretarygeneral declared Sudan eligible for additional
funding from the fund in October 2019.159 The UN
Darfur Fund, the multi-partner trust fund used forfinancing projects under the Darfur Development
Strategy, could complement support from thePeacebuilding Fund. While some member states

153 See: UN Security Council, Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic
Review of the African Union–United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, UN Doc. S/2018/530, June 1, 2018, paras. 57–59; and UN Security Council Resolution
2429 (July 31, 2018), UN Doc. S/RES/2429.
154 UN Secretary-General, “Note to Correspondents: Chair’s Summary of High-Level Event on the Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding and Developmentin Darfur,” September 28, 2018; UN Security Council, Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan, UN Doc. S/PV.8513, April 17, 2019.
155 “Sudan: Finance Minister Announces Formation of Committee for Restoring Looted Money From Abroad,” Sudan News Agency, September 24, 2019.
156 US Department of State, “Friends of Sudan Supports the Planned Reforms of Sudan’s Economy,” October 22, 2019.
157 UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Peacebuilding and Sustaining Peace—Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/72/707–S/2018/43, January 18,
2018, para. 49 (C).
158 These could include delegations that attended the July 2019 meeting of the Friends of Sudan contact group: the AU, Egypt, Ethiopia, EU, France, Germany,
Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, UK, UN, and US. EU External Action, “EU Chairs Informal Coordination Meeting on Sudan,” July 22,
2019; International Crisis Group, “Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution.”
159 UN Peacebuilding, “Secretary-General Peacebuilding Fund: Strategic Plan 2017–2019,” p. 3.

30

prefer making bilateral contributions rather thancontributing to multi-partner trust funds, the UN
Darfur Fund is an established mechanism familiar
with the region’s needs and operating environment.
In preparing for this financial cliff, the UN
should also be frank in its assessments of how
much financial support it will receive. The UN
should prepare and evaluate different scenarios,
including those where funding levels fall below
even modest expectations. These worst-casesituations would require the mission and UNCT to
identify programming priorities, assessing whichareas could be scaled back and which could be
funded in part through other means.
Sustaining international political support for
Darfur throughout UNAMID’s transition may beeasier than navigating the financial cliff but is noless important. The popular uprising and thetransitional government’s efforts to normalize
Sudan’s diplomatic relations are fostering goodwill
with many countries; some of this goodwill could
be channeled to Darfur. In her speech to the
September 2018 high-level meeting on thetransition, Deputy Secretary-General Amina
Mohammed called for the creation of a Group of
Friends on the Transition in Darfur.160 Such an
informal grouping of member states, like a possible
Darfur-specific configuration in the Peacebuilding
Commission, could regularly bring together arange of Sudanese stakeholders to discuss thetransition. It could also coordinate with the Friendsof Sudan contact group, which has met regularly
since April 2019.

Daniel Forti

Conclusion
UNAMID’s peacekeeping transition is one of themost complex mission reconfigurations everundertaken by the UN. Over the past three years,
UNAMID has worked with the UNCT to prepare
for its eventual drawdown and exit while continuing
operations in a challenging environment. Limited
progress on central political issues and persistent
threats to civilians suggested that prior to April 2019,
UNAMID’s departure would have left behind aregion vulnerable to relapse into conflict.
However, Sudan’s momentous but fragile politicaltransition and the new government’s commitment
to a comprehensive, nationwide political solution
offer the AU, the UN, and their partners a newopportunity to help Sudan begin its journey towardsustainable peace. But with international attention
rightly gravitating toward the country’s new political
moment, a decade of engagement in Darfur should
not be left to fall by the wayside, and UNAMID’stransition should not get lost in the shuffle. The
UN’s ability to adapt this peacekeeping transition tothese monumental changes is a test of its capabilities.
UNAMID’s drawdown and reconfiguration are
the first of many complex peacekeeping transitions
the international community will need to manage
over the coming years. UNAMID’s exit strategy,
drawdown, and reconfiguration offer lessons forother transitions in challenging environmentscharacterized by fleeting political settlements andpersistent conflict drivers. With sustained support
from the Sudanese people and the international
community, UNAMID’s experiences may offer
models for future peacekeeping transitions.

160 UN Secretary-General, “Deputy Secretary-General’s Opening Remarks at General Assembly Side Event on the Transition from Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding
and Development in Darfur,” September 28, 2018.

NAVIGATING CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY: THE PEACEKEEPING TRANSITION IN DARFUR

31

Annex: UNSC Benchmarks for UNAMID

S/2009/592
November 16, 2009

S/2012/771
October 16, 2012

S/2014/279
April 15, 2014

Benchmarks: (1) A comprehensive political solution through the Darfur Peace
Agreement; (2) a secure and stable environment with reduced violence and a ceasefire; (3) enhanced rule of law, governance, and human rights; and (4) a stabilized
humanitarian situation.
Following the UNSC’s request (Resolution 1881), the secretary-general createdbenchmarks based on the four priority areas discussed in the UNAMID workplan.
While some relate to the broader situation in Darfur beyond the activities carriedout by UNAMID, the implementation of the mandate and achievement of thesebenchmarks are closely related.
Benchmarks: (1) A comprehensive and inclusive settlement through implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur with AU and UN support; (2) astable and secure environment with implementation of cease-fires; (3) enhanced
rule of law, governance, and human rights; and (4) a stabilized humanitariansituation with a focus on economic recovery.
The UNSC requested updated benchmarks (Resolution 2063) to reflect developments in the Darfur peace process and changed political, security, and humanitarian dynamics. UNAMID’s protection of civilians is a crosscutting goal reflectedacross all four benchmarks.
Benchmarks: (1) A comprehensive and inclusive political settlement supported bybroader dialogue with a focus on gender inclusion; (2) protection of civilians
through direct action and the creation of a protective environment while ensuring
full access for humanitarian personnel; and (3) prevention and mitigation ofintercommunal conflict through mediation and measures to address its root causes.
In response to an increase in localized conflict and a shift toward streamlining
UNAMID’s operations, the secretary-general refined existing benchmarks.

S/2018/530*
June 1, 2018

S/2018/912
October 12, 2018

Indicators: (1) Implementation of security sector reform and disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration programs for armed groups and communal
militias; (2) enhanced rule of law and creation of a transitional justice and reconciliation court and a special court; (3) durable solutions for resettlement witheconomic and legal components; (4) the immediate delivery of services to IDPs;
and (5) the protection of human rights.
* These indicators represent the provisions of the Doha Document that were used
to measure achievements throughout the proposed two-year time frame for thewithdrawal of UNAMID, in line with the letter from the secretary-general to thepresident of the Security Council (S/2017/747). They were used to assess thedrawdown in light of the two-phase reconfiguration of the mission (Resolution
2363).
Benchmarks: (1) The protection of civilians and monitoring of human rights
through durable solutions with full access for humanitarian actors; (2) support formediating intercommunal conflicts through measures to address the root causes;and (3) mediation between the government of Sudan and non-signatory armed
movements on the basis of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur.
Following the UNSC’s decision to begin drawing down the mission (Resolution
2363), the secretary-general rearranged the benchmarks to reflect the requirements
for a sustainable exit strategy.

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