日本版総合的社会調査共同研究拠点 研究論文集[18] JGSS Research Series No.15

Family Changes and Family Values in Asian Societies:

Exploring Similarities and Differences Based on EASS 2006/2016 and CAFS
Hachiro Iwai
Graduate School of Education
Kyoto University
The last 40 years witnessed dramatic family changes in Asian societies. Demographic transitions are quite
evident. Asian societies have faced a rapid fertility decline and are moving toward a small family form.

Are

Asian family values and practices converging? Asian societies also have experienced a rapid growth in women’s
educational opportunities. What effects does the expansion have on gender values and practices in Asian societies?
Based on EASS 2006 and CAFS (Comparative Asian Family Survey), this paper firstly attempts to clarify thesimilarities and differences in gender-role attitudes and the gender division of household chores in Japan, South
Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey.

Using EASS 2006 and 2016, this paper

secondly explores what changes in gender-role attitudes and the gendered division of domestic chores occurs inJapan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

The analysis indicates that better-educated men and women in Korea andTaiwan are more likely to accept egalitarian gender role in 2016. Based on these results, this paper discusses about
recent social changes and gender relation in Asian societies.
Key Words: Gender-role, East Asian Social Survey (EASS), Comparative Asian Family Survey (CAFS)

アジアにおける家族変動と家族意識の多様性と共通性
ー東アジア社会調査 2006/2016 とアジア比較家族調査の分析からー
岩井 八郎
京都大学大学院教育学研究科
アジア諸国・地域は、現在急速な少子化と高齢化を経験し、女性の地位向上や権利拡大といった文脈の中で旧来の男性優位も崩れ、家族は大きな変化に直面している。共通する社会変化として女性の高等教育機会の拡大があるが、女性の高学歴化は家族意識や実践にどのような影響を及ぼしているのか。
本稿はまず、日韓中台の家族意識を調べた 2006 年東アジア社会調査ならびに同じ調査票を用いて、タイ、ベトナム、マレーシア、トルコを調査したアジア比較家族調査のデータを分析して、性別役割分業
意識と家事参加の共通性と差異を明らかにする。高学歴女性は、性別役割の平等を志向する点では共通しているが、家事参加との関連は国・地域によって異なる。さらに本稿は 2016 年東アジア家族調査
を用いて、日韓台について 2006 年から 10 年間の変化を検討する。分析結果によれば、韓国と台湾の高学歴男性ならびに女性において性別役割意識の平等志向が強くなっている。
キーワード：性別役割、東アジア社会調査（EASS）、アジア比較家族調査（CAFS）

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1. Introduction
The last 40 years witnessed dramatic family changes in Asian societies. Demographic transitions
are quite evident. Asian societies have faced a rapid fertility decline and are moving toward a smallfamily form. Are Asian family values and practices converging? Asian societies also have experienced
a rapid growth in women’s educational opportunities. What effects does the expansion have on family
values and practices in Asian societies? Based on EASS 2006 and CAFS (Comparative Asian Family
Survey), this paper firstly attempts to clarify the similarities and differences in gender-role attitudes andthe gender divisions of household chores in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, China, Vietnam, Malaysia,
Thailand and Turkey. Secondly, using EASS 2006 and 2016, this paper explores what changes ingender-role attitudes and the gendered divisions of domestic chores occur in Japan, South Korea, andTaiwan.
The first results of analysis show that the rapid expansion of women’s higher education leads tochanges in the attitudes toward gender roles in those Asian societies. However, it is evident thatchanges in attitudes do not correspond to everyday domestic practices in these societies. The Thai caseis quite intriguing: while Thai people support gendered family values, Thai domestic practices are moreegalitarian than those in the other societies.
The second results of analysis show that men and women in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are more
likely to accept egalitarian gender role in 2016. Changes that occur among well-educated women in
Korea and Taiwan are more evident. Participation in domestic chores among men is slightly improving
in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; even among Japanese well-educated men. Participation rate among welleducated women in Taiwan declines sharply.
Before presenting the results of analyses, this paper briefly explain the comparative perspective
on family change and family values in Asian societies.
2. Seeing Family Changes in Asian Societies
Fig 1 shows the trends of Total Fertility Rates in Asian Societies after 1970s. Each Asian except
Japan society has experienced a dramatic fertility decline. Vietnamese change is more rapid than other
Asian societies: the rate sharply declines from 6.33 to 1.89. Japanese change is gradual: the rate
declines from 2.13 to 1.34. It is evident that Asian societies tend to converge on low fertility. However,
the routes to low fertility are different. In order to see family changes, it is important to comparechanging patterns of age-specific fertility rates among societies.
7.00

Vietnam

6.00

Turkey5.00

Thailand

Malaysia

Total Fertility Rate

4.00

3.00

Taiwan
2.00

Japan

1.00

Korea
China

0

1970

1975

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2005

periodFig. 1: Trends of Total Fertility Rates in Asian Societies after 197030

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Age-specific fertility rate is the annual number of births to women in a particular age group per1000 women in that age group. Sum of age-specific fertility rates means Total Fertility Rate. Using
the data obtained from World Fertility Report 2009 United Nations, graphs of Fig.2 indicate how agerelated patterns of childbirths have changed over 40 years in Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan,
Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia and Turkey. In addition, Denmark, Italy and US are also shown.
Comparing the shapes of graphs over years and among societies tells us about what changes happenedin family formation in the societies.
The Japanese case is a good example that shows how to interpret changing patterns of agespecific fertility rates. The graph of the 1950 looks like a big mountain, meaning that women gavebirth at each age at higher rates than in other times, though the top of the mountain is around the late
20s. Next, the graphs of the 1970 and 1975 look like sharp mountains, showing that the ages ofwomen’s childbirth concentrate on the late 20s. It means that large number of women gave birth at thelate 20s and that the numbers of childbirths after that age decline sharply. The graphs of the 1970
and 75 indicate the standardized patterns of Japanese women’s life course; after graduating school,large number of Japanese women work until they got married around the 25 years of age, gave birth
until the 30 years of age and do not have more. Since then, the mountains are getting smaller andsmaller, meaning that birth rates continue to decline in Japan.

Fig 2. Comparing Changes in Age-Specific Fertility Rates: Japan31

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VietnamThailand

Malaysia

TurkeySouth Korea

TaiwanChina

USA

Fig 2. Comparing Changes in Age-Specific Fertility Rates (Continued)

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Denmark
Italy
Fig 2. Comparing Changes in Age-Specific Fertility Rates (Continued)
Vietnam case of Fig 2 is quite different from the Japanese one. Greater changes from the big
mountain of the early 1970s toward smaller ones can be seen (Hirschman & Minh 2002). There is nothe sharp mountain we saw in the Japanese case. The numbers of children born at each age became
fewer and fewer. The similar pattern is found in Thailand case, although the change is not as large as
in Vietnam. The graph of Malaysia show slower changes toward a small mountain of the 2000s.
The graphs of South Korea and Taiwan are somewhat similar to the Japanese case. The age ofchildbirth reaches the peak at the late-20s of age in 1980s and 90s. As the mountains become smaller,
the peak moves to the later age in 2000s. China and Turkey show a little different pattern of moving
toward small mountains.
On the other hand, as shown in the graphs of US, Denmark and Italy, Western societies havenot experienced a big demographic change from 1970s to 2000s. The mountains of childbirth by age
are small and very stable. Comparing the mountains of the 2000s in both Asian and Western societies
shows that each society now has a similar age-related pattern. However, routes to small mountains arediverse.
Based on the Japanese case, this paper could develop the comparative perspective on explaining
the similarities and differences in family changes and family values in Asian societies. The patternfound in the 1970s has been quite influential on family formation and gender relation in Japanesesociety. It is well known that Japanese women’s labor force participation by age shows the Mshaped pattern, indicating that large number of women start to work after graduating school, then stop
working upon marriage or childbirth at the late-20s of age and start to work again after children growup. The ages of exiting the labor market correspond to the peak of a sharp mountain. This meansthat a large number of women followed the life pattern since the 1970s (Iwai 2010). The
employment and welfare systems have supported the gendered patterns of work and family relations(Esping-Andersen 1999). Although women’s higher education has expanded since the 1980s andgender equality of employment has been promoted, the gendered patters have been embedded ineveryday practices of families and workplaces. From the 1970s to the 1990s, egalitarian values ofgender relation generally have permeated in Japanese society. However, changed values tend to
make little effects on everyday practices, so that value changes are loosely coupled with changes inpractices (Iwai 2014).
Using the Japanese patterns of changes in family values and practices as a reference, this paper
aims to explore the similarities and differences among Asian societies. The data of China, Japan, South
Korea and Taiwan come from EASS 2006 and EASS 2016. In addition, this paper analyzes the data of33

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Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Turkey from CAFS (Comparative Asian Family Surveys). EASS2006 and 2016, conducted by a research team in each society, have a nationally representative sample,
although the sample size is different in each country. The project has run the nation-wide survey ineach society using the same questionnaire every other year since 2006. The EASS 2006 project
attempted to conduct a comparative research on family values and family activities among four East
Asian societies. The data include rich information on gender-role attitudes, marital relations,intergenerational supports, child rearing, domestic activities and so on. The EASS 2016 uses thesame questionnaire developed for the EASS 2006. This is the first time that the changes of family
values and practices between 2006 and 2016 can be explored. However, the China data is notavailable this time.
In 2010, the GCOE (Global Center of Excellence) team of Kyoto University started the CAFS
project to conduct the replicated surveys of EASS 2006 in Bangkok and Hanoi. Since then, thereplicated surveys have been conducted in Malaysia, Qatar, India and Turkey. CAFS use the areasampling & quota sampling in the targeted cities, not have a nationally representative sample. CAFS
used the same module of questions about family to obtain the data for comparative research in Asiansocieties. Table 1 shows the general characteristics of CAFS. The Qatar and India data are notavailable now because the coding and data cleaning were not yet finished. The following analyses use
the information on gender-role attitudes and the division of domestic chores by gender.
Table 1. Comparative Asian Family Surveys (CAFS)

3. Results of Analysis (1): Gender Role Attitude
EASS 2006 and CAFS include various questions about gender role attitudes. Among them, themost relevant question is one on the gendered division of labor. Respondents are asked, “Do you agree
or disagree with the following statement: ‘A husband’s job is to earn money; a wife’s job is to look after
the home and family’?” Respondents are required to choose the answer among seven items: “strongly
agree” to “strongly disagree.” We assigned the score 7 to “strongly agree” and the score 1 to “strongly
disagree” and calculated an average of respondents’ scores for each societies. Table 2 is the result of
our analysis concerning this gender role attitude.
The results in Table 2 are very clear: Malaysia and Thai respondents are more likely to agree withthe statement than those in the five other Asian societies. Chinese and Taiwanese respondents also
demonstrate a positive attitude toward such a gendered division of labor. The tendency of Vietnamese
respondents to support the gendered division of labor is similar to the Chinese one. On the other hand,34日本版総合的社会調査共同研究拠点 研究論文集[18] JGSS Research Series No.15

Korean and Japanese respondents are not as likely to be positive; the average score is about 4. Notethat Japanese respondents tend to choose the middle response (“neither agree nor disagree”). Under
the current ideological environment that promotes gender equality, it could be said that Thai people are
more conservative and that Koreans are more liberal(1).
Table 2. Comparison of the Gender Role Attitude: EASS 2006 & CAFS

To clarify how the better-educated women respond to this question, this study divided the scoresby educational level and by gender. The EASS 2006 includes a variable of “highest education level”
that classifies respondent’s education levels into six categories: “no formal qualification”, “lowest
formal education,” “above lowest formal education,” “higher secondary completed,” “above higher
secondary level,” and “university degree completed.” Because of the limitations in sample size, we
divided the respondents into two groups: “high education level” (combining “above higher secondary
level” and “university degree completed”) and “low education level” (combining “no formal
qualification,” “lowest formal education,” “above lowest formal education,” and “higher secondary
completed”). The level of education in CAFS is measured differently. This study divided respondentsof Thai and Malaysia surveys into “high education level” (bachelor’s degree or higher) and “loweducation level” (below bachelor’s degree). For Vietnamese data, respondents who completed college
or university education are included in “high education level,” and the respondents with secondary
education level or below are classified as “low education level.” The results of the analysis are shownin Table 3.
Table 3. A Comparison of the Gender Role Attitude by Gender and by Education:
EASS 2006 & CAFS

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Table 3 indicates the following(2). First, in each of the six societies except Malaysia, bettereducated women tend to have a negative attitude toward the gendered division of labor in each society.
Better-educated men also show the same tendency, although the difference between men with a higheducation level and those with a low education level is smaller than that for women. Malaysia is avery unique case, indicating that a very positive attitude toward the gendered division of labor prevailed
into the society.
Second, Taiwanese and Korean women with a high education level have a very negative attitude
toward the gendered division of labor in societies, and the difference between Taiwanese women with ahigh education level and those with a low education level is greater than that of women in any of theother societies. The average score of this attitude for better-educated Taiwanese women is 3.08, while
the score for women with low education level is 4.83. A similar tendency is also found in Thailand
and Vietnam.
In Japan, the difference in the women’s score between high and low education is notas large as in other societies, while better educated Japanese women are also likely to be negative.
Third, comparing men with a high level of education among the six societies except Malaysia
shows that Thai men are more likely to show a positive attitude toward the gendered division of labor;
their score is 4.30, which is highest among the better-educated male groups. In addition, Taiwanese
men with a high education level tend to have a negative view on the gendered division of labor. Indeed,
the greatest difference in the attitude held by men with high and low education levels in all sevensocieties appears in Taiwan.
Taiwan and South Korea have experienced the rapid growth of women’s educational attainment inrecent years. Better-educated young women in Taiwan and Korea might be eager to accept theegalitarian model of life. As a result, the difference within women increases. It suggests that
expanding women’s higher education in Taiwan and Korea has strongly influenced the changes in family
values in those societies. The same influence might also exist in Thailand and Vietnam.
Table 4. A Comparison of the Gender Role Attitude by Gender and by Education:
EASS 2016

Table 4 shows the gender role attitude by education level and by gender in Japan, South Korea andTaiwan in 2016(3). Comparing each score between 2006 and 2016, it is clear that men and women in
Japan, Korea, and Taiwan are more likely to accept egalitarian gender role in 2016. Changes that occur
among well-educated women in Korea and Taiwan are more evident. The difference between Educ. H
and Educ. L are larger in Korea and Taiwan than in Japan: largest among Taiwanese women. Changes
in Japan are gradual or slower.
Table 5a & 5b, using EASS 2006 and CAFS, show the results of multiple regression analyses inwhich the dependent variable is the above gender attitude and the independent variables are respondents’
education level (5 levels) and age (5 levels) for women and men in each society(4). Table 5a indicatesthat his simple model using two independent variables fits well for Taiwanese and South Korean women(the adjusted R2 are .316 and .229). As expected, both education and age affect the gender role attitude36

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in each society: better educated women tend to support the egalitarian role; and younger ones tend tosupport it. In particular, the effect of education is strongest for Taiwanese women, while both age andeducation strongly influence the attitude of South Korean women. This suggests that rapid expansion of
women’s higher education is causing a marked difference in gender role attitudes in Taiwan, and thatthe generational difference in South Korea reflects an impact of rapid social change on one’s attitudes.
Table 5a. The Results of Multiple Regressions:
Effects of Education and Age on the Gender Role Attitude, Women, EASS 2006 & CAFS

The same tendency is found among Japanese women, although the effects are small and the fit of
the model for Japanese women is not as good, partly because Japanese respondents tend to choose themiddle response (“neither agree nor disagree”). However, it seems that woman’s situations of
Taiwanese and South Korean societies are changing more rapidly. The effects of age are not strong in
China, Thailand and Vietnam, implying that the generational changes in those societies are slow. Thismodel does not fit the Malaysia data well, suggesting that there are little variations in gender values
among women in the society.
Table 5b. The Results of Multiple Regressions:
Effects of Education and Age on the Gender Role Attitude, Men, EASS 2006 & CAFS

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The results of analyses for men in Table 5b also show the same tendencies as for women: better
educated men tend to support the egalitarian role; and younger ones tend to support it. However, thefit of the model for men in each society is not as good as for women since men tend to support thegendered role and the variation of response is smaller than women’s one. Expanding men’s higher
education leads to egalitarian attitude in each society, although the effect is small for Japanese men. In
Japanese case, higher education for men expanded in 1960s and 70s before the egalitarian ideology
diffused. However, younger generation of Japanese men is likely to be influenced by the current
ideological environment. The effect of education is strongest for Taiwanese men and both education
and age affects Korean men strongly. Those evidences suggest than men may well correspond to
women’s change in attitudes in both societies. This model does not fit the Malaysia data at all, suggestingthat there are no variations in gender values among men in the society.
Table 6 shows the results of analyzing EASS 2016 with the same multiple regression models for
women and men. The tendencies are found: education level has a negative effect and age group has apositive effect in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The fits of the models are declining in three societies,
indicating that the variations in gender role attitudes become smaller in each society.
Table 6. The Results of Multiple Regressions:
Effects of Education and Age on the Gender Role Attitude, EASS 2016

4. Results of Analysis (II): Domestic Chores
If this study compares everyday housework activities in the eight Asian societies, is it possible tofind the same differences between education groups? The EASS-2006 and CAFS include various
questions about domestic activities. Among them, the most relevant questions are about frequencies
of doing housework. For example, respondents are asked, “How often do you prepare the evening
meal?” to which they were required to choose an answer from seven options: “almost every day,”“several times a week,” “about once a week,” “about once a month,” “several time a year,” “about
once a year and “never.” We assigned a score to each answer where “almost every day” was given a
value of 7 and “about once a week” was given a value of 1.
Table 7 shows the average scores of doing three housework activities by society and gender. The
samples are restricted to the men and women aged 20 to 49 years. A score of 1 indicates that the
respondent performs the work once a week and a score of 7 indicates that they perform the work everyday. The results in Table 7 are very interesting. They indicate that Thai men perform the housework38

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more often than do men in the other Asian societies examined here. On average, Thai men prepare
the evening meal three times a week, do the laundry twice or three times a week, and clean the housethree times a week. Japanese men perform such jobs less than once a week. Korean and Taiwanesemen do less than twice a week, and Chinese men perform the job more frequently than do Korean andTaiwanese men. The frequencies of Vietnamese men are similar to the Chinese ones.
Table 7. A Comparison of Doing Household Chores:
Man & Women, Aged 20-49, EASS 2006 & CAFS

On the other hand, women do the housework almost every day, except the Taiwanese case.
Taiwanese women do the housework three or four times a week, a figure that is lower than those in theother five societies. Malaysia and Turkey are also similar to China and Vietnam. It is interesting tonote that the performance of domestic activities as reported by the Thai respondents indicates that interms of sharing housework, Thai men and women are more egalitarian than are men and women in theother East Asian societies, while at the same time it seems that the former group are the most supportiveof a gendered division of labor.
When the respondents are restricted to married men and women aged 20-49 years, the results, notshown in the table, are similar to those of Table 7, which includes all men and women aged 20-49 years.
Married Thai men with high education prepare evening meals and clean the house three times a week.
They also do the laundry more than twice a week. On the other hand, Married Japanese men do this lessthan once a week. The frequencies are lower than those in Table 7, suggesting that Japanese men are not
likely to do housework once they are married. Korean men show the similar tendency. After
Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese women married, they do the housework more often than they did before.
As a result, the gender difference in the frequencies of doing the housework is greater in the marriedsamples.
Furthermore, this study attempts to clarify the differences in doing housework by education level.
Table 8 shows the frequencies of doing the housework divided by society, gender, and education level.
Thai men with a high level of education do the housework lightly more than do those with a low levelof education, although the simple size of well-educated Thai men aged 20-49 is small. Since bettereducated Thai women do the housework less often than the others, the gender gap in doing domestic
chores is the smallest among college-educated Thai people. It could be said that better-educated Thaimen and women are more egalitarian when it comes to performing domestic chores.
The Taiwanese case is unique in that better-educated married women tend to do the housework
1.5 times a week less than do other women. As a result, the gendered gap between better-educatedmen and women is narrow, while the gap between those with a high level and those with a low level islarger. Better-educated married women in Japan, South Korea, China and Vietnam do the housework39

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slightly less than the others. However, the gender gaps are large. Table 8 indicates no significant effectof women’s higher education on domestic practices in Japan and Korea.
Table 8. A Comparison of Doing Household Chores: Married Man & Women,
Aged 20-49, by Education, EASS 2006 & CAFSThe Taiwanese case is unique in that better-educated married women tend to do the housework
1.5 times a week less than do other women. As a result, the gendered gap between better-educatedmen and women is narrow, while the gap between those with a high level and those with a low level islarger. Better-educated married women in Japan, South Korea, China and Vietnam do the houseworkslightly less than the others. However, the gender gaps are large. Table 8 indicates no significant effectof women’s higher education on domestic practices in Japan and Korea.
Table 9 shows the scores of doing three housework activities by education level and by gender inJapan, South Korea and Taiwan in 2016. Compared the scores between 2006 and 2016, it is evident
that participation levels in domestic chores among men are slightly improving in Japan, Korea, andTaiwan; even among Japanese well-educated men. It is also interesting that participation levels amongwell-educated women in Taiwan decline sharply. Education level has a strong negative effect on thewomen’s participation. It is also clear that gendered division of work is still significant among Japanesemen & women.
Table 9. A Comparison of Doing Household Chores: Married Man & Women,
Aged 20-49, by Education, EASS 201640

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Next, this study examines the effects of higher education and gender role attitude on doing
domestic chores among married women and men. In this analysis, this study combines three measuresof domestic chores into a single dependent variable: the frequencies of three domestic chores areadded and divided by three. Educational level is a dummy variable that has score 1 if respondents
finished higher education level. In order to control respondents’ age, this analyses also use a dummy
variable that has score 1 if respondents are older than 50 years old. The gender value is measured by
the question of “Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘A husband’s job is to earnmoney; a wife’s job is to look after the home and family’?” The results of multiple regression analyses
are shown in Table 10a & 10b. In general, three independent variables are not enough to explain thevariation of doing housework for women and men in eight Asian societies. In order to analyze theinfluences of living conditions, more complex models would be necessary, including working
conditions, income level and family structures.
According to the results of Table 10a, women with higher education level do housework less thanthose with lower education level in Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, China, Malaysia and Turkey.
Living conditions related to better education level tend to reduce the burdens of housework in thesesocieties. It is also evident that the more supportive women are of gendered role, the more they dohousework in societies, except Malaysia & Turkey. The model using these three independent variables
fits relatively well for Taiwanese women. The same tendency is found for Thai women.
Table 10a. Results of Multiple Regressions: Effects of Age, Education and Gender ValueOn Doing Housework, Married Women, EASS 2006 & CAFS

Table 10b indicates that this model does not fit well for men in each society. Korean men who
are supportive of egalitarian value tend to do housework more. Japanese men show the same tendency.
This implies that ideological environment promoting gender equality influences part of Korean andJapanese men. It should be interesting to see that Japanese men with higher education level are not
likely to do housework. In Thai case, this model does not fit at all. This evidence suggests that highparticipation of Thai men in domestic chores are traditionally embedded in their socio-cultural
conditions. It is also clear that this model does not fit at all in Malaysia and Turkey.
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Table 10b. Results of Multiple Regressions: Effects of Age, Education and Gender ValueOn Doing Housework, Married Men, EASS 2006 & CAFS

Lastly, Table 11 shows the results of analyzing EASS 2016 with the same multiple regression
models for women and men concerning the participation rates in domestic chores. The gender value hasa significant effect on participation level for Japanese married man and women: The more supportive
men are of gendered division, the less they are likely to participate, while the more supportive womenare of gendered division, the more they are likely to participate. It is also interesting that in Taiwan
education level has a negative effect on women’s participation, while it has a positive effect on men
participation, indicating that Taiwanese men with higher level of education are more likely to participate
than men with lower level of education, while Taiwanese women with higher level of education are lesslikely to participate than women with lower level of education.
Table 11. Results of Multiple Regressions: Effects of Age, Education and Gender ValueOn Doing Housework, Married Women & Men, EASS 201642

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5. Tentative Conclusion
This study intends to clarify the similarity and differences in gender-role attitudes and thegendered division of domestic chores among men and women in Japan, South Korea, China, Taiwan,
Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Turkey, using the EASS 2006/2016 and CAFS. In particular, theeffects of expanding women’s education on gender role attitudes and domestic activities are explored.
The rapid expansion of women’s higher education has resulted in changes in the attitude towardtraditional gender role in Taiwan and South Korea (Haruki 2006, Chang 2010, Yu 2009). Bettereducated women in Taiwan and Korea strongly support the egalitarian family values. This tendency
is strengthen in 2016. It seems that Taiwan and Korean societies experienced rapid change in gender
values. It is also evident that better-educated women in Japan, China, Thailand and Vietnam also
support such values. However, the change is gradual in Japan.
It seems from the survey data that changes in attitudes do not correspond well to everyday
domestic practices in these societies under study. Although the results of analyses show that bettereducated women have living conditions that could reduce the burdens of domestic chores and thatwomen who support gendered value tend to do housework more in Japan, the simple model used in thisstudy do not explain the variance of doing housework well. More complicated conditions of everyday
life are necessary to examine. Men’s participation in domestic chores is not explained well in thismodel (See Teerawichitchaian et al. 2010 for Vietnamese case).
The Thai case is quite intriguing. In general, Thai people support gendered family values morestrongly than men and women in the other Asian societies. At the same time, however, Thai domestic
practices are more egalitarian than those in the other societies. In terms of gender equality, it seems that
their attitudes are still traditional, while their practices are modern. This evidence of these two trends
is not in itself contradictory. Changes in attitudes might not permeate into everyday practices
immediately. In the case of Thailand, it seems that an opposite path is being followed; traditionaldomestic activities are relatively egalitarian in the advance of attitudinal changes. It is possible that
Thai traditions (such as the custom of a young couple living with the wife’s family after marriage andthe existence of equal rights of inheritance for women) could contribute to this situation (Akagi 1989).
From these findings, this paper would like to conclude that if better-educated young people in Thailand
come to support the modern ideology of gender equality, a more egalitarian society would be realizedin Thailand.
In the other societies, it appears that gendered practices on the home front are slow to change,even if the notion of gender equality, as is seen in Japan and South Korea, has become increasingly
supported. Japanese men who accept the egalitarian value tend to participate in domestic chores morein 2016, although the effect is not large. This could be a current phenomenon.
Equalizing the chances of men and women in society is presently one of the major policy goals
over the world. Better-educated young women in each society are expected to function as carriers of theideas on gender equality. The model of life, stressing that women with higher levels of education should
actively participate in labor force activities, now diffuses worldwide. However, this study indicatesthe effects of educational expansion in any particular society can vary.
The family-oriented welfare regime has been added as a fourth type to Esping-Andersen’s well-known
typology of welfare regimes. Japan has been classified as following this regime in that Japanese life
patterns are strongly characterized by the gender division of labor (Esping-Andersen 1999). This
type of regime embodies the conventional idea that one’s welfare is generated within family relations.
Such a family-oriented regime works to reproduce interdependency among family members rather
than to promote family formation or childbirth. As a result, in this tradition, married women are
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expected to stay at home and care for children and the elderly.
Under the family-oriented regime, it is pointed out that the improvement of women’s educationaland occupational opportunities is incompatible with family formation. Women are generally forced tochoose between staying home to take care of their children or their parents, and postponing family
formation to continue to work. The opportunity cost to them not staying in the workforce is high when
the service economy is well developed and when women’s work careers are extended as women’s
educational standard rises. As a result, women tend to marry later and have fewer children. Similar to
Japan, southern European countries with birthrates that are the lowest among advanced countries (suchas Italy and Spain) are also categorized as having the family-oriented regime. This argument is somehow
applicable to South Korean and Taiwanese cases; both societies share the same Confucian tradition.
Japan, Korea and Taiwan are now facing a sharp decline in their birth rates. Under the conditions of
those societies, could better-educated young men and women initiate societal changes from the familyoriented regime to a new Asian type of an egalitarian regime?
For students of quantitative comparative sociology, large-scale data sets of representative samples
such as World Value Surveys are now available. It is also not difficult to use the advanced statisticalmethods of testing general hypotheses such as multilevel analysis. Analyzing the data set by thestatistical method might enable one to test the general hypothesis that expansion of higher education
leads to gender value change over this world. This study used the data sets from only eight societies
so that it is not possible to apply the rigorous quantitative methods to the data. However, it is importantto analyze the data of each society descriptively. The descriptive analyses of comparing among a few
societies might lead to both interesting and useful results that could contribute to the future design of
public policy. Using EASS and CAFS, more detailed comparative analyses of better-educated young
men and women about work and family conditions are very much expected.

[Notes](1) Since sampling methods of surveys are different among those societies, statistical significant testsof means might not be reliable. However, reporting results of the t-test of two means forindependent samples would be informative. The difference between Malaysia and Thailand issignificant at 1% level; the difference between Thailand and Vietnam is significant at 10% level;
the difference between Vietnam and China is not significant; the difference between China andTaiwan is significant at 1% level; the difference between Taiwan and Japan is significant at 1%
level; and the difference between Japan and Korea is not significant.
(2) T-tests of the male and female means are significant in Japan, Korea and Taiwan and are notsignificant in China, Thailand, Vietnam and Malaysia. In Malaysia, the difference between
Education High and Education Low is not statistically significant for male and female respectively.
In other societies, the difference between Education High and Education Low is statisticallysignificant for male and female respectively.
(3) Japan’s mean of 2016 is 3.50. Korea’s one is 3.41 and Taiwan’s one is 3.51. T-test of means forindependent samples are not significant between Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The male and female
differences are significant in each of three societies. In each society, better-educated respondents
are more likely to support the egalitarian value significantly.
(4) This paper is in particular interested in how much the variations of gender role attitudes are
explained by simple regression models for Korean and Taiwan women data. In addition, later
analyses of household chores are run for men and women separately. This paper does not intend
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to explain how much the models of analyzing men and women together fit the data in each society.
Furthermore, because the analyses of household chores use gender role attitude as independent
variable for men and women samples separately, it is thought that this paper does not have topresent the results of analyses for combined data.
[Acknowledgement]
1. The East Asian Social Survey (EASS) is based on the Chinese General Survey (CGSS), theJapanese General Social Survey (KGSS), and Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS), and is
distributed by the East Asian Social Survey Data Archive.
2. Comparative Asian Family Survey (CAFS) was launched as a joint endeavor of Kyoto
University Global COE “Reconstruction of the Intimate and Public Spheres in 21st Century Asia
(PI: OCHIAI Emiko) and Seoul National University (PI: EUN Ki-Soo), succeeded by Kyoto
University Asian Studies Unit (KUASU) and Asian Research Center for the Intimate and Public
Spheres (ARCIP) at Kyoto University, with funding from Japan Society for the Promotion of
Science (JSPS), Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, Japan, andQatar Foundation. The CAFS have incorporated the questionnaire of the EASS 2006 family
module created by the East Asian Social Survey (EASS) Consortium, a collaborative work of
Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS), Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), Korean
General Social Survey (KGSS) and Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS), with modifications tosuit local contexts. CAFS sincerely appreciates EASS for its significant contribution. To avoid
any confusion, it is made clear that CAFS and EASS are completely independent from eachother.
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