Memorandum
Securitization After Dodd-Frank:
A Summary of the Final Credit Risk Retention Rules
November 18, 2014

On October 21, 2014, five federal banking and housing agencies 1 and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (collectively, the “Agencies”) adopted a final rule implementing the credit risk retention
requirement mandated by Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
for certain securitization transactions. Specifically, Section 941 of the Dodd-Frank Act added new Section
15G to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that directed the Agencies to adopt rules requiring sponsors ofasset-backed securities to retain at least 5% of the credit risk relating to the assets that underlie such assetbacked securities. This so-called “skin in the game” requirement is intended to provide sponsors with ameaningful incentive to monitor and control the quality of securitized assets and align the interests of thesponsor with those of investors.
The risk retention requirement will become effective one year after the date on which the final rules are
published in the Federal Register for securitization transactions collateralized by residential mortgages, andtwo years after the date on which the final rules are published in the Federal Register for any othersecuritization transaction. Securitizations created before the applicable effective date do not need to comply
with the risk retention requirement.

BackgroundIn adopting Section 15G of the Exchange Act, Congress sought to address certain aspects of the securitization
process that it believed masked credit risks and complicated actions to mitigate losses and reduce loan
1

The five federal banking and housing agencies are the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board ofGovernors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency and the Department of Housing and Urban Development.
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defaults. In particular, Congress cited an “originate to distribute” model, in which loans were made for the
purpose of selling them into securitization pools without the originator retaining any risk on the assets, as
leading to lax credit and loan underwriting standards, as well as to practices that rewarded volume over asset
quality. Congress identified such abuses in the securitization process as a “major contributing factor” to therecent financial crisis, 2 and it adopted the credit risk retention requirement to better align the economic
interests of securitizers with those of investors in asset-backed securities.
The Agencies had originally proposed rules to implement Section 941 in March 2011, and later revised andre-issued proposed rules in September 2013. The final rules generally retain the framework of the September
2013 re-proposed rules, applying the standard 5% risk retention requirement to most asset-backed securities,
whether publicly or privately issued and regardless of whether they are issued or sponsored by a regulated
financial institution, unless an exemption applies.
The final rules also retain the re-proposed rules’ exemptions from the credit risk retention requirement for
securities backed by “qualified residential mortgages”(“QRMs”), qualifying commercial loans (“QCLs”),
qualifying commercial real estate (“CRE”) loans and qualifying automobile loans (“QALs”), and further add
an exemption for certain types of community-focused residential mortgages that are not eligible for QRM
status and are exempt from the ability-to-pay rules under the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”). While mostforms of third-party credit support will not satisfy the risk retention requirement under the final rules,
guarantees by the Federal National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”) will fulfill the sponsor’s risk retention requirement for so long as
these government-sponsored enterprises continue to operate under the conservatorship of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency with capital support from the United States.

The General 5% Credit Risk Retention Requirement
Under the final rules, a sponsor of “asset-backed securities” (or its majority-owned affiliate) is generally
required to retain at least 5% of the credit risk relating to the underlying assets (in addition to any other riskthat may be retained to satisfy contractual requirements between the parties). The sponsor is generally not
permitted to hedge or transfer the credit risk that it is required to retain. The term “sponsor” is defined tomean “a person who organizes and initiates a securitization transaction by selling or transferring assets,
either directly or indirectly, including through an affiliate, to the issuing entity.” The term “asset-backed
security” is defined by incorporating the definition of that term in Section 3(a)(79) of the Exchange Act,
where it is generally defined to mean “a fixed income or other security collateralized by any type of selfliquidating financial asset (including a loan, lease, mortgage, or other secured or unsecured receivable) thatallows the holder of the security to receive payments that depend primarily on cash flow from the asset.”2

See S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 128 (2010).
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The final rules allow a sponsor to allocate a portion of its risk retention to any originator of the securitized
assets that originated at least 20% of the underlying assets. An originator may not be allocated a greater
portion of the risk retention than the percentage of the securitized assets that it originated, and must acquirefrom the sponsor eligible horizontal and vertical interests in the same proportion as the sponsor retains. The
sponsor will be responsible for the originator’s compliance with, among other things, the prohibition on an
originator hedging or transferring the risk it retains.

Acceptable Forms of Credit Risk Retention
Sponsors may retain credit risk in a number of ways. The final rules are designed to be flexible in light of theheterogeneity of securitization markets and practices, the fact that different forms of risk retention may havedifferent accounting implications for sponsors and the need to reduce the potential for any negative effect on
the availability and costs of credit. Accordingly, sponsors can select from a “menu of options” to comply withthe 5% risk requirement.
Notably, however, third-party credit support, such as insurance policies, guarantees, liquidity facilities orstandby letters of credit, will not fulfill a sponsor’s risk retention obligations for a securitization transaction,
since such forms of credit support generally are not funded at the closing of the transaction and therefore
may not be available to absorb losses at the time they occur.
The following summarizes the acceptable forms of credit risk retention under the final rules:
1) Standard Risk Retention Option
Under the standard option, a sponsor may retain an “eligible vertical interest” in a percentage at least equal
to 5%, an “eligible horizontal residual interest” in an amount at least equal to 5% of the fair value of all ABS
interests in the issuing entity or any combination of the two, as long as the percentage of the eligible verticalinterest retained and the percentage of the fair value of all ABS interests of the eligible horizontal interest
retained total at least 5%. An eligible vertical interest is a single vertical “slice” or an interest in each class of
ABS interests in the issuing entity consisting of the same proportion of each such class. An eligible horizontal
residual interest is a “first-loss” interest in the issuing entity that has the most subordinate claim to
payments of both principal and interest and that will bear the risk of any shortfalls in interest or principal
payments due to insufficient funds on any payment date before any other ABS interests. The final rules
clarify that a sponsor’s requisite risk retention percentage must be determined as of the closing date of the
securitization transaction, but does not mandate a minimum or specific percentage of horizontal or verticalinterest that sponsors must hold when they choose to satisfy their risk retention obligation by holding a
combination of vertical and horizontal interests.
In lieu of holding all or part of its risk retention in the form of an eligible horizontal residual interest, theSimpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP

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final rules allow a sponsor to establish and fund an eligible horizontal cash reserve account in an equivalentamount, at closing, to be held by a trustee for the benefit of the issuing entity and invested in cash and cash
equivalents. The final rules include several restrictions and limitations on uses of funds in the account,intended to ensure that amounts in the account would be available to absorb losses to the same extent as aneligible horizontal residual interest. Nevertheless, the Agencies noted in the preamble to the final rules thatthe trust’s payment of critical expenses unrelated to credit risk, such as litigation expenses or trustee orservicer expenses, would be permitted as long as those expenses would otherwise be paid prior to any
payments to the holders of the ABS interests and would not be paid to parties affiliated with the sponsor.
As was required under the re-proposed rules, the final rules require sponsors retaining credit risk in the formof an eligible horizontal residual interest to provide certain fair value disclosures to investors a reasonable
period of time prior to, and after, the sale of an asset-backed security. Because any pre-closing valuation
information would be preliminary in nature, the final rules revise the re-proposal’s disclosure requirement toallow a sponsor to provide its bona fide determination of a range of fair values for the eligible horizontal
residual interest that the sponsor expects to retain at the close of the securitization transaction based on a
range of specified prices, sizes and rates of interests on each tranche of the ABS interests to be issued. For
post-closing disclosure requirements, however, the sponsor must provide an actual fair value measurementof the ABS interests and the eligible horizontal residual interest retained by the sponsor based on actual saleprices and finalized tranche sizes and corresponding interest rates at the closing of the securitizationtransaction.
2) Revolving Pool Securitizations
In securitizations collateralized by assets held in a revolving pool of collateral, such as credit card accounts or
dealer floorplan loans, a sponsor typically retains a “seller’s interest,” which is akin to a pari passu
participation interest in the underlying assets. Under the final rule, a sponsor of asset-backed securities
issued by an issuing entity that is established to issue ABS interests on multiple issuance dates collateralized
by a common pool of assets that change over time may satisfy the risk retention requirement by retaining
directly or through a wholly-owned affiliate a seller’s interest of at least 5% of the aggregate unpaid principalbalance of all outstanding ABS investor interests issued by the issuing entity. To qualify as a seller’s interestfor purposes of satisfying the risk retention requirement, the interest must be collateralized by the
securitized assets and servicing assets owned or held by the issuing entity (other than ineligible assets or
those servicing assets allocated as collateral for a particular series). 3 Additionally, the interest must rank paripassu with each series of investor interests issued, or be partially or fully subordinated to one or more series
3Servicing assets are any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing, timely payment, or timely
distribution of proceeds to security holders, or assets related to acquiring and holding the issuing entity’ssecuritized assets. These may include cash and cash equivalents, contract rights, derivative agreements of
the issuing entity used to hedge interest rate and foreign currency risks, or the collateral underlying thesecuritized assets.
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Memorandum – November 18, 20145with respect to the allocation of all distributions and losses on the securitized assets prior to early
amortization.
This 5% test must be determined and satisfied at the closing of every issuance of securities by the issuingentity and at least monthly at a seller’s interest measurement date specified under the securitizationtransaction documents. In calculating the seller’s interest percentage, the final rules permit sponsors todeduct from the aggregate unpaid principal balance of outstanding investor interests (i.e., the seller’s interest
denominator) an amount equal to the funds held in a segregated principal accumulation account for the
repayment of outstanding investor interests.
A sponsor may combine the seller’s interest with an eligible horizontal residual interest and/or a residual
ABS interest in excess interest and fees relating to individual series of ABS interests for purposes of meetingthe 5% risk retention requirement by retaining an eligible horizontal interest in every series issued by theissuing entity and/or an eligible residual ABS interest in excess interest and fees relating to every series
issued by the issuing entity and reducing its seller’s interest by a corresponding percentage. The final rules
also offer relief to a sponsor that suffers a decline of its seller’s interest below the 5% minimum due to an
early amortization of investors’ interests under the terms of the revolving pool securitization, provided thatthe sponsor had been in full compliance with the risk retention requirements before the early amortization
event and the issuing entity issues no additional interests other than to the sponsor.
3) Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Conduits
The final rules include a special risk retention option for asset-backed commercial paper (“ABCP”) conduitsthat issue commercial paper with maturities not exceeding 397-days and that satisfy certain otherrequirements. This option contemplates a securitization structure in which originators of financial assets
sell the assets to special purpose vehicles (“SPVs”) that are either wholly-owned affiliates of the sponsor or“orphan” SPVs. The credit risk of the financial assets transferred to the intermediate SPV is typicallyseparated into a senior interest acquired by the ABCP conduit, and a residual “first-loss” interest retained by
the originator-seller. The ABCP conduit sponsor, often a bank or other regulated financial institution,
typically provides or arranges for full liquidity coverage on the ABCP issued by the ABCP conduit.
Under the final rules, the ABCP conduit sponsor’s risk retention requirement would be satisfied with respect
to the issuance of ABCP if, among other things, (i) the originator-seller retains credit risk to the financial
assets transferred to the intermediate SPV in an amount and manner as would be required under either the
standard or revolving pool securitization risk retention options described above, including the respective 5%retention requirements; and (ii) the ABCP conduit sponsor approves each originator-seller and intermediate
SPV, establishes criteria governing the securitized interests, and administers the ABCP conduit, including bymonitoring the securitized interests and the assets supporting those interests.

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The final rules require that all ABS interests acquired by an ABCP conduit be any of (i) ABS interests
collateralized solely by assets originated by an originator-seller and by servicing assets, (ii) special units ofbeneficial interest (or “SUBIs”) or similar interests in a trust or SPV that retains legal title to leased property
underlying leases originated by an originator-seller that were transferred to an intermediate SPV inconnection with a securitization collateralized solely by such leases and by servicing assets, (iii) ABS interests
in a revolving pool securitization collateralized solely by assets originated by an originator-seller and byservicing assets, or (iv) ABS interests that are collateralized, in whole or in part, by assets acquired by an
originator-seller in a business combination that qualifies for business combination accounting under GAAP,
and, if collateralized in part, the remainder of such assets meet the criteria in items (i) through (iii) and thatthose ABS interests be acquired in an initial issuance by or on behalf of the intermediate SPV or fromanother eligible ABCP conduit with the same regulated liquidity provider.
The issued ABCP must have 100% liquidity coverage (in the form of a lending facility, an asset purchaseagreement, a repurchase agreement or similar arrangement) from a single regulated liquidity provider.
While the re-proposed rules required the issued ABCP to have a maturity of nine months or less, the final
rules extend the maximum maturity for ABCP to 397 days, exclusive of grace periods and limited renewals,
in recognition of the likelihood that many conduits will need to issue ABCP with longer maturities in order toaccommodate the future needs of regulated institutions subject to new liquidity requirements, including therecently adopted liquidity coverage ratio and the proposed net stable funding ratio. 4
Like other risk retention options, the ABCP conduit option requires certain disclosures to investors
regarding each originator-seller’s risk retention interest. However, the final rules simplify the disclosure
requirements for the ABCP conduit option as compared to the re-proposed rules, requiring originator-sellers
to disclose before or contemporaneously with the first sale of ABCP and at least monthly thereafter (i) the
ABCP conduit’s liquidity coverage arrangement, including the provider and material terms of such liquidity
coverage, (iii) the asset class of the underlying securitized assets, and (iv) the originator-seller’s risk
retention, including the percentage amount and form (i.e., horizontal residual interest, vertical interest, or
revolving pool securitization seller’s interest).
The use of this ABCP risk retention option by an ABCP conduit sponsor does not relieve the originator-seller
from its independent obligation to comply with its own risk retention requirements. The ABCP originatorseller will be the sponsor of the ABS interests issued by the intermediate SPV, and will therefore be required
under the final rules to hold an economic interest in the credit risk of the assets collateralizing those ABS
interests.

4

For more information regarding the recently adopted liquidity coverage ratio, please see our memorandum“Federal Banking Agencies Adopt Final Liquidity Coverage Ratio Regulations,” dated September 24, 2014,
available at http://www.stblaw.com/about-us/publications/details?id=c706d80e-743d-6a02-aaf8ff0000765f2c.
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Memorandum – November 18, 201474) Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
In the market for commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) it is common for a third party which is
not the sponsor to acquire a “first-loss” position in the form of a “B-piece.” To manage its risk exposure, theB-piece buyer is involved in the selection of pool assets, performs diligence on those assets, and is affiliatedwith the special servicer that services loans in default or having other non-payment issues. In light of thishistoric market practice, the final rules permit a sponsor of asset-backed securities that are collateralized
solely by CRE loans and servicing assets to satisfy some or all of its risk retention requirements if, among
other requirements, a third-party purchaser acquires an eligible horizontal residual interest in the issuingentity in the same form, amount and manner as would be required of the sponsor under the standard risk
retention option (discussed above).
The final rules allow up to two B-piece buyers to share the retained risk, provided that each buyer’s interestis pari passu with the other’s interest and each buyer conducts an independent review of the credit risk ofeach asset in the pool. Each B-piece buyer must pay for the acquired first-loss position in cash at the closingof the securitization, without financing, and must perform a detailed review of the credit risk of each asset in
the pool prior to the sale of the asset-back securities by examining, at a minimum, the underwriting
standards, collateral and expected cash flows of each CRE loan in the pool. B-piece buyers may not be
affiliated with any party to the securitization transaction other than the special servicer, investors, ororiginators of less than 10% of the unpaid principal balance of the securitized assets included in thetransaction.
Generally, a B-piece buyer must comply with the final rules’ restrictions relating to the hedging of retainedinterests, and may not transfer its interest for five years following closing, and, even after five years, may
only transfer its interest to a different B-piece buyer satisfying the criteria applicable to initial B-piecebuyers. Any subsequent B-piece buyer may similarly only transfer the interest to other B-piece buyers
satisfying the criteria applicable to initial B-piece buyers. Additionally, the final rules revise the re-proposed
rules to allow the risk retention obligation to terminate once all of the CRE loans in a CMBS transaction are
fully defeased (i.e., once cash or cash equivalents have been pledged to the issuing entity as collateral for the
CRE loans sufficient to make all remaining debt service payments due on such loans, and the issuing entity
has an obligation to release its lien on the loans).
In order for B-piece buyers to be able to satisfy the risk retention requirement under the final rules, theunderlying transaction documents must provide for the appointment of an independent operating advisor
that is not affiliated with other parties to the transaction, has no financial interest in the transaction otherthan its fees and is required to act in the best interest of investors as a whole. The operating advisor must
have, on behalf of the investors as a whole, the ability to recommend replacement of the special servicer
under certain circumstances and, if the principal balance of the B-piece declines to 25% or less of its initial
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Memorandum – November 18, 20148balance (by principal payments, realized losses or appraisal reduction amounts), consultative rights overmajor decisions of the special servicer. The Agencies declined to specify necessary criteria for operating
advisors in the final rules, allowing CMBS transaction parties the flexibility to establish appropriate
standards for the operating advisor in each transaction.
As with other risk retention options under the final rules, sponsors using the CMBS risk retention option
must make certain required disclosures to potential investors regarding the B-piece buyer and operating
advisor (e.g., identifying information, description of the buyer’s experience in CMBS transactions, anddescription of any conflicts of interest involving the operating advisor), the fair value (expressed as apercentage of the fair value of all of the ABS interests issued) and the dollar amount of the ABS interest to beacquired by each B-piece buyer, the purchase price paid for that ABS interest and other material informationon the transaction.
4) Open Market Collateralized Loan Obligations
In prevailing market practice, there are CLOs involving the securitization of loans already held by a single
institution or its affiliates in portfolio and CLOs involving the securitization of loans that are purchased in
the secondary market, and originated and syndicated by third parties. In the case of the latter, so-called“open market CLOs,” a CLO manager generally acts as the sponsor by selecting the commercial loans to bepurchased by the CLO issuing entity and managing the securitized assets once transferred to the issuingentity. However, many of these CLO managers lack the balance sheet capacity to fund 5% risk retention of
the CLO, and the Agencies recognized that imposing the standard risk retention option on open market CLO
managers could cause significant disruption to the CLO market and consolidation among CLO managers.
Accordingly, the final rules permit the sponsor of an open market CLO transaction to satisfy the risk
retention requirement if the open market CLO does not acquire or hold any assets other than CLO-eligible
loan tranches and servicing assets, the open market CLO does not invest in asset-backed securities or in
credit derivatives (other than transactions to hedge risks of the open market CLO) and the CLO manager is
not entitled to receive any management fee or gain on sale at the time the open market CLO issues its ABS
interests. In addition, all purchases of the CLO-eligible loan tranches by the CLO issuing entity are required
to be open market transactions on an arm’s length basis.
To qualify as a CLO-eligible loan tranche, the loan must be a senior secured syndicated loan and the leadarranger of the syndication must (i) retain at least 5% of the face amount of the CLO-eligible tranche until
the repayment, maturity, involuntary and unscheduled acceleration, payment default or bankruptcy defaultof the loan, and (ii) take an initial allocation of at least the greater of 20% of the funded portion of thebroader syndicated credit facility and the largest allocation taken by any other member of the syndicate.
Holders of the CLO-eligible tranche must be given consent rights with respect to any material waivers or
amendments under the loan documents, and security provisions associated with the CLO-eligible tranche
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must be at least as advantageous to the holders of the CLO-eligible tranche as the terms applicable to othertranches of comparable seniority in the syndicated facility.
Unlike the re-proposed rules, the final rules do not require CLO managers to certify to investors as to theadequacy of the collateral and the attributes of the borrowers of the loans that they purchase. Instead, CLO
managers must certify that they have policies and procedures to evaluate the likelihood of repayment under
the purchased loans and that they have followed such policies and procedures in evaluating each CLOeligible loan tranche.
Sponsors of CLOs securitizing loans already held by a single institution in portfolio — so-called “balance
sheet CLOs” — remain subject to the standard risk retention option.
5) Municipal Bond “Repackaging” Securitizations (Tender Option Bonds)
The final rules include alternative risk retention options for certain municipal bond repackaging
securitizations, known as tender option bonds (“TOBs”). A TOB typically consists of the deposit of a single
issue of highly rated, long-term municipal bonds in a trust and the issuance by the trust of two classes of
securities: a floating rate, puttable security known as the “floater,” and an inverse floating rate security
known as the “residual.” Floaters, typically held by money market mutual funds, are short-term securities
that are typically puttable at par on a daily or weekly basis. Highly rated institutions provide a liquidity
facility to support this put right.
A sponsor of a qualified TOB may use two alternative risk retention options to satisfy its obligations under
the final rules, in addition to any other available risk retention option. First, the sponsor may hold municipal
securities from the same issuance deposited in the qualified TOB, the face value of which is 5% of the facevalue of the municipal securities deposited in the qualified TOB. Second, the sponsor may retain an interest
that upon issuance meets the requirements of an eligible horizontal residual interest but upon theoccurrence of certain events including bankruptcy, default or credit downgrade, will meet the requirementsof an eligible vertical interest.
To be eligible for these two alternative risk retention options, the TOB may be collateralized solely byservicing assets and municipal securities, as defined in Section 3(a)(29) of the Exchange Act, all of whichhave the same municipal issuer and obligor. The TOB issuing entity may issue only two classes of securities,
a floater and a residual, and must have 100% liquidity coverage from a regulated liquidity provider. The TOB
security must entitle holders of the floater to tender their interest to the issuer at any time for a purchaseprice equal to the approximate amortized cost of the security, plus any accrued interest, with a notice periodof up to 397 days. The final rules extend the permissible notice period from 30 days permitted in the reproposed rules to correspond to the maximum remaining maturity of securities allowed to be purchased bymoney market funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
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Unlike the re-proposed rules, the final rules do not require the issued TOBs to be eligible for purchase bymoney market mutual funds under Rule 2a-7 of the Investment Company Act. The Agencies recognizedconcerns that analyzing compliance with such a requirement would involve an assessment of informationthat might not be available to sponsors.

Restrictions on Hedging or Transferring Retained Credit Risk
As a general matter, a sponsor may not transfer any interest or assets that it is required to retain to satisfy its
risk retention requirements to any person other than an affiliate that majority controls, is majority
controlled by, or is under common majority control with, the sponsor. A sponsor and its affiliates are also
generally restricted from hedging the credit risk that the sponsor is required to retain, and may not enter
into an agreement (including an insurance contract), derivative or other position if payments thereunder arematerially related to the credit risk of the ABS interests that the sponsor is required to retain and theagreement, derivative or other position reduces or limits the financial exposure of the sponsor (or any of its
majority-owned affiliates) to the credit risk of those ABS interests. Furthermore, the final rules restrict asponsor and its affiliates from pledging its retained interests as collateral for any obligation, unless theobligation is with full recourse to the sponsor or such affiliate. In the preamble to the final rules, theAgencies advise that a sponsor would not be in compliance with the rules if it were to engage in a series oftransactions designed to add credit enhancement to the securitized assets in a manner that indirectly
achieved a prohibited transfer or hedge of the sponsor’s retained credit risk.
As discussed above, however, the final rules allow for B-piece interests in CMBS to be transferred by the
initial B-piece buyers to eligible purchasers after five years, and terminates the transfer and hedging
restrictions once all of the CRE loans in a CMBS transaction are fully defeased. Additionally, limited
exceptions to the hedging restrictions exist for certain risks that are not materially related to the credit riskof the sponsor’s retained interest or of the particular assets that underlie the securitization transaction.
Permitted hedges include positions related to interest rate or foreign exchange risk arising from the retainedinterests or the underlying securitized assets; or the overall value of a particular broad category or index ofasset-backed securities (such as home prices), subject to limitations on the portion of the index that may be
represented by the specific securitization transaction or applicable issuing entities. Hedges based on
securities that are backed by similar assets originated and securitized by other sponsors also are permitted.
The final rules include a “sunset” on the transfer and hedging restrictions, with separate maximum durations
for the transfer and hedging restrictions applicable to residential mortgage backed securities (“RMBS”) andother asset-backed security interests. Retained interests of asset-backed securities other than RMBS may betransferred or hedged after the latest of (i) the date on which the total unpaid principal balance of thecollateral is reduced to 33% of the unpaid principal balance at closing, (ii) the date on which the unpaid
principal balance of the ABS interests issued in the securitization is reduced to 33% of the unpaid principal
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balance at closing, or (iii) two years after closing. Because residential mortgages typically have a longer
duration than other assets and weaknesses in underwriting may take longer to manifest, retained interests in
RMBS may be transferred or hedged after the later of (i) the date on which the unpaid principal balance ofthe residential mortgage collateral is reduced to 25% of the unpaid principal balance at closing, or (ii) five
years after closing. In any event, however, the transfer and hedging restrictions applicable to retainedinterests in RMBS expire no later than seven years after the securitization’s closing.
Importantly, an originator, originator-seller or a third party purchaser that retains credit risk in accordancewith the final rules must comply with these restrictions to the same extent as the sponsor.

Risk Retention Exemption for “Qualified Residential Mortgages”
Section 15G of the Exchange Act provides that a securitizer shall not be required to retain any part of thecredit risk for an asset that is transferred or sold through the issuance of asset-backed securities by the
securitizer if all of the assets that collateralize such securities are “qualified residential mortgages.” Section
15G requires that the definition of a QRM be “no broader than” the definition of a qualified mortgage(sometimes referred to herein as a “QM”) under Section 129C of TILA, 5 but otherwise left it to the Agencies
to define what constitutes a qualified residential mortgage.
Like the re-proposed rules, the final rules define a qualified residential mortgage as a qualified mortgage as
defined by the CFPB under TILA. 6 As discussed in further detail below, the CFPB’s final QM rule isconcerned primarily with product features and a borrower’s debt repayment capacity. The final rules include
a provision, however, that will require the Agencies to periodically review the definition of QRM and its
effect on the mortgage and securitization markets.
1) General Definition of Qualified Mortgages
The CFPB’s final QM rule, which became effective on January 10, 2014, provides several definitions ofqualified mortgages. The final rules allow a loan meeting any of these definitions to be a QRM.
5The Dodd-Frank Act amended the TILA to require originators of residential mortgages to make areasonable and good faith determination, based on verified and documented information, that theborrower has a reasonable ability to repay the loan according to its terms. To meet this standard, theDodd-Frank Act established a rebuttable presumption and a safe harbor for loans that are qualified
mortgages.

6

See 78 Fed. Reg. 6407 (Jan. 30, 2013) as amended by 78 Fed. Reg. 35429 (June 12, 2013) and 78 Fed. Reg.
44686 (July 24, 2013). The Dodd-Frank Act delegated initial rulemaking authority to define qualified
mortgages to the Federal Reserve Board, and provided for the transfer of this authority to the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau on July 21, 2011. For more information regarding the CFPB’s definition ofqualified mortgage, please see our memorandum “Mortgage Reform Update: CFPB Issues Final Rule on
Residential Mortgage Lending Requirements,” dated January 29, 2013, available at
http://www.stblaw.com/about-us/news/details?id=8d2e5d51-041b-40fd-a828-5f6bc23f5286.
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Below are the general requirements that must be met for a residential mortgage loan to be considered a“qualified mortgage”:• Regular Payments—The loan must have regular periodic payments that are substantially equal.
• Elimination of Nontraditional Loan Features—The loan generally cannot have features such as negative
amortization (where the principal amount increases), interest-only payments (where a borrower only pays
the interest for a specified period of time so the principal does not decrease with payments), or balloon
payments (where the payment is more than two times a regular periodic payment).
• Maximum Loan Term—The loan cannot have a term exceeding 30 years.
• Limits on Points and Fees—If the loan is for $100,000 or more, it cannot have points or fees greater than
3% of the total loan amount. Stricter limits apply for smaller loans.
• Income Verification and Monthly Debt-to-Income Ratio Cap—Creditors must satisfy general
underwriting criteria for the loan, including by verifying a potential borrower’s current or reasonably
expected income or assets (other than the value of the home securing the loan). The final QM rule also
generally requires that monthly payments be calculated based on the highest payment that will apply inthe first five years of the loan and that the borrower have a total “back-end” debt-to-income ratio nogreater than 43%.
The final QM rule does not draw a distinction between higher-priced (subprime) QMs, which receive arebuttable presumption of compliance with TILA, and QMs that are lower-priced (prime) loans, which
receive a legal safe harbor for compliance. For purposes of the final risk retention rules, both higher-priced
and non-higher-priced QMs are eligible as QRMs and can be pooled together in the same securitization.
2) Temporary Second Qualified Mortgage Definition
The final QM rule provides for an temporary second QM definition, which is similar to the general QM
definition, but does not independently require for creditors to verify income nor require a specified debt-toincome ratio. Loans are eligible for this definition if they are eligible for purchase, guarantee or insurance by
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (including the Federal
Housing Administration, or FHA), the Veterans Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture or Rural
Housing Service.
The temporary second definition will expire as to any loan eligible for purchase or guarantee by Fannie Maeor Freddie Mac once that institution exits conservatorship, and will expire as to any loan eligible to be
insured or guaranteed by the FHA, the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, the U.S. Department ofAgriculture, and the Rural Housing Service once the relevant agency issues its own QM rule.
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Memorandum – November 18, 2014133) Small Creditors
The final QM rule provides additional QM definitions for small creditors, i.e., lenders originating 500 or
fewer first-lien residential mortgage loans in the preceding calendar year with assets under $2 billion. For
example, small creditors operating predominantly in rural or undeserved areas may originate balloonpayment loans, but these loans must have a term of at least five years, a fixed-interest rate, and meet certain
basic underwriting standards. Other small creditors may originate balloon loans for a two year grace period.
However, QMs under these definitions are required to be held by lenders for three years, and thus would not
be eligible for securitization during that time.
4) Alternative Approach Rejected
In the re-proposed rules, the Agencies sought comment on an alternative approach to defining QRMs, which
would have added additional requirements to the CFPB’s QM definition such as requirements that that theloan be for a principal dwelling, be a first-lien mortgage and have a loan to value ratio of no more than 70%.
In the final rules, however, the Agencies declined to adopt this alternative QM approach, noting that these
additional credit overlays may have ramifications for the availability of credit that would not be outweighedby any corresponding reductions in the likelihood of default.

Risk Retention Exception for Other Qualified Asset Classes
In addition to the general exemption for qualified residential mortgages, the final rules provide special
treatment for qualified loans in certain other asset classes. Asset-backed securities may be exempt from therisk retention requirement if they are collateralized exclusively by (i) qualifying commercial loans (“QCLs”),(ii) qualifying CRE loans (“QCREs”), (iii) qualifying automobile loans (“QALs”), or (iv) certain communityfocused residential mortgages that are not eligible for QRM status and are exempt from the ability-to-pay
rules under TILA, provided that these underlying loans meet conservative underwriting standards that
ensure they are of very low credit risk. Such underwriting standards, summarized below for each qualifying
asset class, are more stringent than those required under the federal banking regulators’ existing supervisory
guidelines.
• Commercial Loan Asset Class—The underwriting standards for QCLs require an originator to conduct ananalysis of the borrower’s ability to service all outstanding debt over the next two years and to determine
that, following origination, the borrower will have a total liabilities to total tangible assets ratio of 50% or
less, a leverage ratio of 3.0 or less and a debt service coverage (“DSC”) ratio of no less than 1.5. The loan
payment amount must be determined based on level payments of principal and interest that amortize thedebt over a term no greater than five years from origination, and the primary repayment source for theloan must consist of business revenue of the borrower. Loan documentation must include covenants that
restrict the borrower’s ability to incur additional debt or transfer or pledge its assets. There must also be
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Memorandum – November 18, 201414

financial reporting covenants, which provide a servicer with financial information on at least a quarterly
basis.
• CRE Loan Asset Class—The underwriting standards for QCRE loans focus principally on the borrower’s
ability to repay the loan (including a requirement that a borrower have a DSC ratio of at least 1.7 or greateror, in the case of certain types of properties with a demonstrated history of stable net operating income,
1.5 or greater or 1.25 or greater); the value of, and the originator’s security interest in, the collateral; an
LTV ratio of no more than 65% and combined LTV ratio of no more than 70%; and whether the applicableloan documentation includes appropriate collateral-protecting covenants.
• Automobile Loan Asset Class—The underwriting standards for QALs are generally comparable to industry
standards for unsecured lending, focusing principally on the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. At thetime of origination, the borrower’s debt-to-income ratio, including payments on the proposed loan, must
be no greater than 36% and the borrower’s credit history must be clear of any delinquency of 30 days ormore within the past 30 days, as well as of any bankruptcy, foreclosure or similar proceeding within theprevious 36 months. The borrower must also have 24 months of credit history, meet a 10% down
payment requirement and will be prohibited from deferring principal or interest under the loan
documents. These conservative underwriting standards are, in large measure, a reflection of the highly
depreciable nature of the collateral involved in automobile loans.
• Community-Focused Residential Mortgages—The final rules add an exemption for certain communityfocused residential mortgages that are not eligible for QRM status and are exempt from the ability-to-pay
rules under TILA. Generally, the Agencies concluded that the loans covered by this exemption help ensurehigh-quality underwriting standards for securitizers and serve the public interest because they are either
government-certified, or originated by government-administered programs or small non-profit programs
that have a specific community mission. More specifically, the final rules exempt asset-backed securities
collateralized by loans made (i) pursuant to a program administered by a Housing Finance Agency; (ii) by
a designated Community Development Financial Institution; (iii) by a HUD-designated Downpayment
Assistance through Secondary Financing Provider; (iv) by a HUD-designated Community Housing
Development Organization undertaking a project pursuant to HUD’s HOME Investment Partnership
Program; (v) by certain eligible non-profit organizations that extend credit only to low and moderate
income consumers; and (vi) pursuant to certain programs authorized by the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008.
When qualifying assets (qualifying commercial loans, CRE loans, automobile loans and community-focused
exempted loans) are pooled with non-qualifying assets securing the same asset-backed security, the final
rules permit a sponsor to reduce its required risk retention percentage by the ratio of the unpaid principalbalance of qualified assets to the total unpaid principal balance of all assets in the pool, up to a maximum
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Memorandum – November 18, 201415

reduction of 50% (i.e., to a minimum risk retention percentage of 2.5%). Sponsors using this risk retention
reduction for blended pools must disclose to investors, its primary Federal regulator and the SEC themanner in which it determined its aggregate risk retention requirement, and must retain records of suchdisclosures until three years after all securities backed by the blended pool are no longer outstanding. This
treatment is not available for securitization of loans from different asset classes (e.g., automobile andcommercial) that secure the same asset-backed security.

Treatment of Government-Sponsored Enterprises and Government Agencies
For so long as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue to operate under the conservatorship of the Federal
Housing Finance Agency and have the benefit of the Senior Preferred Stock Purchase Agreement with the
U.S. Treasury Department, the 100% guarantees they provide for mortgage-backed securities that they issue
will be deemed to satisfy the risk retention requirement. This treatment is significant because thesegovernment-sponsored enterprises, together with other government agencies (most notably, the FHA and
VA) whose guarantees will exempt a securitization transaction from the risk retention requirement (provided
that such transaction is collateralized solely by loans guaranteed by such agencies), continue to backstop a
significant portion of single-family conforming loans currently being issued in the residential mortgage loan
market.
Finally, the final rules exempt from the risk retention requirements securitization transactions that aresponsored by the FDIC acting as conservator or receiver under any provision of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act or its Orderly Liquidation Authority under the Dodd-Frank Act.

*

*

*

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Memorandum – November 18, 201416

For more information, please contact one of the following members of the Firm’s Financial Institutions or
Securitization practices listed below.
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONSSECURITIZATION

Lee Meyerson(212) 455-3675
lmeyerson@stblaw.com

Laura Palma(212) 455-7143
lpalma@stblaw.com

Mark Chorazak(212) 455-7613
mchorazak@stblaw.com

John Schueller(212) 455-3574
jschueller@stblaw.com

Spencer Sloan(212) 455-7821
spencer.sloan@stblaw.com

The contents of this publication are for informational purposes only. Neither this publication nor the lawyers who authoredit are rendering legal or other professional advice or opinions on specific facts or matters, nor does the distribution of thispublication to any person constitute the establishment of an attorney-client relationship. Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP
assumes no liability in connection with the use of this publication. Please contact your relationship partner if we can be ofassistance regarding these important developments. The names and office locations of all of our partners, as well as ourrecent memoranda, can be obtained from our website, www.simpsonthacher.com.
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Memorandum – October 23, 201417

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