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Chinese Transnational Policing Gone Wild
Introduction										3Background: Persuasion to return and China’s Involuntary 			Returns campaign									4Local Beginnings									5Going Global: “Catch them within and outside the borders”		

6

Nine forbidden countries								8Attacking non-suspects abroad							10“110 Overseas”: Widening the net?						10“Extending the prosecutor's service tentacles overseas”			

15

Conclusion: Worrying Growth of China’s Transnational Repression

18

References										20110 is the Chinese emergency phone number for the Police.
© 2022 Safeguard Defenders
Design by Safeguard Defenders
All rights reserved.
This document may not be reproduced, transmitted, or stored in whole or in part by any means
including graphic, electronic, or mechanical without expressed written consent of the publisher/
author except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
Keywords: China, human rights, criminal justice, transnational repression, long-arm policing

First published September 2022

A revised version of this report was released October 29.
Two changes, marked in color, appear on page 6, while a case example on page 15 (Yang Moudong) has been removed. Page 6
revisions concern a factual error regarding a Yunnan taskforce set up to manage illegal border crossings to northern Myanmar, herechanged to indicate it operates in Yunnan province, not across the border. Likewise, a 10-province pilot project announced does not
explicitly mention the use of overseas police service centers. Both errors were spotted courtesy of Jeremy Daum. In addition, several
new sources were added to the end notes, with some minor changes. Previous version of investigation available on request.

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Introduction
As part of a massive nationwide campaign
to combat the growing issue of fraud andtelecommunication fraud by Chinese nationals
living abroad, Chinese authorities claim thatfrom April 2021 to July 2022, 230,000 nationals
had been “persuaded to return” to face criminal
proceedings in China.
This campaign, which started on a humble scale in2018, has developed alongside the establishmentof overseas Chinese police “service stations”,
sometimes called “110 Overseas” after the national

police emergency phone number, now found indozens of countries across five continents. This
investigation looks into these two related andrecent developments, especially in view of the
expansion of other forms of long-arm policing andtransnational repression by the PRC.
This investigation follows the release of new
Chinese governmental data and is part ofSafeguard Defenders’ ongoing monitoring ofChina’s growing global transnational repression.

Summary of key points
 Faced with a growing issue of fraud andtelecommunication fraud by Chinese
nationals living abroad, China claims
230,000 suspects of fraud and telecom
fraud were successfully “persuaded toreturn” to China from April 2021 to July2022.
 Official statements detail use of depriving
suspects’ children the right to educationback in China, as well as other actions
against relatives and family members, in afull-on “guilt by association” campaign.
 China has designated nine countries as
having serious fraud, telecom fraud andweb crimes, and Chinese nationals are nolonger allowed to stay in those countries
without “good reason”.
 Rapidly emerging evidence points toextensive online campaigns and the use of“Overseas Police Service Stations” being
used in these operations on five continents,
often using local “Chinese Overseas Home
Associations” linked to the CCP’s United
Front Work.
 These operations eschew official bilateralpolice and judicial cooperation and violate
the international rule of law, and may
violate the territorial integrity of third
countries involved in setting up a parallel
policing mechanism using illegal methods.

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Background
Persuasion to return and China’s
Involuntary Returns campaign“Persuasion to return” is a key method within
China’s larger Involuntary Return operations (IR).
Classified as primarilyType 1 (and occasionallyType 2) actions in Safeguard Defenders’ Involuntary
Returns report on the subject, overseas targets
and/or their families back in China are approacheddirectly to “encourage” the return of the target to
China to face justice, “or else”.
In many cases identified in the Involuntary Returns
report, methods used under IRType 1 andType 2
actions include:(1) The tracking down of the target’s family in
China in order to pressure them throughmeans of intimidation, harassment, detention
or imprisonment into persuading their family
members to return “voluntarily”;(2) Direct approach of the target throughonline means or the deployment of – often
undercover - agents and/or proxies abroad tothreated and harass the target into returning“voluntarily”.
The final Involuntary Returns category -Type 3 involves direct kidnappings on foreign soil. As far
as known at the time of reporting, this method has
not been used in the operation described in thisinvestigation.
“Persuasion to return” methods plays an integral
part of China’s Fox Hunt operation – run by the
Chinese Ministry of Public Security (MPS) – which
is one of several components of the wider Sky Net
operation overseen by the National Supervision
Commission (NSC).The Fox Hunt / Sky Net
operations pursue higher value targets. Despite
its global scale and an official claim of ensuring
the return of at least 10,000 targets since the startof operations, it is much more modest in scalethan the campaign described here. However, as
an example cited in this investigation shows, thenetworks set up to conduct the latter can and arebeing used within the Fox Hunt ambit as well.
These methods allow the CCP and their security
organs to circumvent normal bilateral mechanismsof police and judicial cooperation, thereby severely
undermining the international rule of law andterritorial integrity of the third countries involved.
In eschewing regular cooperation mechanisms, the
CCP manages to avoid the growing scrutiny of its
human rights record and the ensuing difficulties
faced in obtaining the return of “fugitives” throughlegal proceedings such as formal extradition
requests. It leaves legal Chinese residents abroad
fully exposed to extra-legal targeting by the
Chinese police, with little to none of the protection
theoretically ensured under both national andinternational law.
Online fraud is, or has been, considered an
endemic problem. News reporting in both China
and Taiwan indicates that during the pandemic
telecommunication fraud became even morewidespread, with an increasing number of reports
surfacing on the luring and trafficking of individuals
from the Mainland, Hong Kong andTaiwan tooperate in such illegal “industries”. However, theChinese police recently claimed their campaign
launched in 2018 had been so successful that online
fraud had been contained.
While establishing these operations to hunt down
those accused of fraud and telecommunications
fraud, China identified nine countries particularly
prone to hosting Chinese nationals engaging
in such criminal activities, the “nine forbidden
countries”. However, the setting up of overseas
police “service stations” is a worldwide

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phenomenon, with the majority of such being
in western democratic nations, with a particularfocus on Europe, and not in the “nine forbidden
countries”.As documents identified by Safeguard
Defenders show, such overseas police “service
stations” have been used by police back in China tocarry out such “persuasion to return” operations on
foreign soil, including in Europe.

Abandoning any pretext of due process or theconsideration of suspects’ innocence until provenguilty, targeting suspects’ children and relatives
in China as “guilty by association” or “collateral
damage”, and using threats and intimidation totarget suspects abroad, is now itself becoming an
endemic problem.

Local Beginnings
After being listed by the inter-ministerial joint
meeting of China’s State Council as a "Key
Rectification Area of the Origins of Criminals
Going Overseas for Fraud", on 18 September
2018, the government of Anxi County, Fujian, held
a “thousand person” conference and launched
operation “Fighting Gangsters and Scammers Going
Overseas from the Area WhereThey Come From”(扫黑除恶专项斗争暨赴境外诈骗流出地专项整治)
to combat transnational telecom fraud.1
Under the campaign, Anxi country departments at
all levels were instructed to carry out five measuresagainst fraud suspects, actions to be taken before
any suspect was taken before a court of law:(1) Demolish property built using illicit money
and recover any illicit money;(2) Ban the children of suspects from studying inpublic schools;(3) Suspend all medical insurance subsidies andconfiscate passports;(4) Ban “dishonest persons” from taking
high-speed rail and planes or being
accommodated in hotels;(5) Stop all applications for policy subsidies at thecounty level or above.
Additionally, the Anxi county government also
required that local leaders in villages where
there were more than two fraudsters should be“dismissed or mandated to resign” and that if
one person were to be arrested for the crime oftelecommunications fraud, the officials of the village
should be “notified and criticized”.2

Anxi "Thousand Person Conference"3

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The Anxi County government’s campaign launch
was not without controversy. Since the targets are
merely suspects, and the five punishments are all
carried out before any guilt has been established,
Xinhua Net in an article that same month opposed
the measure of banning suspects’ children’saccess to school, equating such action as guilt by
association. While it stated that such actions were
unfit for a modern society, it endorsed all otheraspects of the campaign.4
Multiple domestic media reports of the meetinglauded the conference’s launch of the “hundred-day
battle” from 1 September to 31 December (2021).
Later, a pilot project to tackle organized crime waslaunched, part of which focused on telecom fraud,with some local governments launching actions
aimed at overseas fraud operations. The basis forthis was the “National Supervision Work Plan for theSpecial Fight against Organized Crime” issued by
the General Office of the Communist Party of China
and the General Office of the State Council.5 Thesepilot projects were supervised by the Provinciallevel Commissions for Discipline Inspection (CDI’s)
and was applauded for its success by the Supreme
People’s Court on 31 January 2019.6

As language from the Anxi county “thousandperson conference” demonstrates however, thebattle did not stop at home but needed to betaken overseas. According to cited reports of themeeting, it was all hands on deck: a “commandoteam” composed by the Public Security Bureau andassisted by propaganda, procuratorial and local
cadres, public security bodies were tasked withtaking the lead in setting up “anti-fraud” assaults
abroad. An overseas “strike headquarters” was set
up inYunnan to carry out “crackdown, persuasion,
dispersion, control and publicity work”, andreportedly a taskforce of 70 people was establishedto target people overseas involved in fraud andillegal cross border travel.7
There was no mincing of words on the methods tobe employed either: “A group of immediate family
members of the Party members and cadres shouldbe persuaded to return in an all-around way.”Thoserefusing or unable to cooperate in persuadingsuspects to return home would themselves
be handed over to the County Commission
for Discipline Inspection and the Supervisory
Commission for investigation and punishment.8

Going Global: “Catch them within
and outside the borders”
On 14 April 2022, Vice-Minister of Public Security
Du Hangwei revealed last year’s nationwide
achievements of crackdown on telecom fraud in apress conference, stating:“We persuaded 210,000 people to return in
the last year [2021]…”9 Additionally, on 17
August 2022, the Ministry of Public Security
announced the total tally of those persuaded
to return under this campaign alone from
April 2021 to July 2022 stood at 230,000
individuals: “The number of cross-bordertelecom fraud cases targeting Chinese
residents has been significantly decreased in
China, with 230,000 telecom fraud suspects
being educated and persuaded to return toChina from overseas to confess crimes from
April 2021 to July 2022 […]”10

This followed earlier actions to expand thecampaign. One year before, on 26 January
2021, the Supreme People’s Court, Supreme
People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public
Security issued a document, “Bulletin of theSupreme People's Court, the Supreme People's
Procuratorate, and the Ministry of Public Security
Regarding Urging Criminal Suspects Involved in
Cross-Border Gambling to Voluntarily Surrender
Themselves” (最高人民法院最高人民检察院公安部
关于敦促跨境赌博相关犯罪嫌疑人投案自首的通告),
calling on the suspects of cross-border gambling
to return to surrender in exchange for lighter
punishments.The deadline given was 30 April
2021.The same notice also asked judicial organs toencourage individuals or organizations to persuadesuspects to return.11

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The Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law (ATOFL)12, passed 2 September 2022 and coming
into effect 1 December includes extraterritoriality provisions for Chinese citizens. It states inarticle 3 that:
The Law shall apply to fighting the telecom and online fraud in China’s territory, or
telecom and online fraud overseas committed by Chinese citizens. It also stipulates
that overseas organizations or individuals engaging in or assisting in telecom andonline fraud against people in China’s territory shall be held accountable.
The law also strengthen government regulation in fighting fraud, with article 6 empowering
the State Council to establish an anti-telecom and online fraud work mechanism tocoordinate the work. Local governments at all levels shall organize and lead the antitelecom and online fraud work within their respective region. Article 25, which outlines
the work to be undertaken against fraud, and activities to be considered criminal, includes
an un-defined “other acts of providing support or assistance to telecom and online fraud
activities”.

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Nine forbidden countries
Shortly following the 26 January bulletin, on 4 April
2021, an annual session on combating telecomrelated crimes was held (国打击治理电信网络新型
违法犯罪工作会议), after which local governments
all over the country, mainly on county but also
on township and village levels issued various“return persuasion” announcements. According
to an estime by outlet Southern Weekend13, over
110 announcements were issued, with manyfrom Hunan, Fujian and Sichuan.The majorityof identified targets were located in northern
Myanmar.
According to Wang Bo (pseudonym), a Hunan
police official working on telecom fraud cited inSouthern Weekend’s coverage, it was the first timea nationwide “persuasion to return” campaign had
been initiated against telecom fraud suspects. Someof the policies employed were based on the Anxi
government's “hundred-day” pilot campaign in 2018.
Wang Bo told Southern Weekend that although not
all (Chinese) citizens staying in northern Myanmar
were engaged in criminal activities, they would still
be regarded as targets for persuasion because mostof them exited the country to Myanmar illegally.
Wang admitted that some suspects persuaded toreturn would only be imposed a fine for crossing
border illegally as the police held no evidence ofcrimes.14
On 17 September 2021, Director of the Criminal
Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Public
Security Liu Zhongyi (刘忠义) disclosed that a totalof 54,000 fraud suspects had been persuaded toreturn solely from northern Myanmar since thebeginning of the year.15 If the rate held steady forthe full year of 2021, as many as 81,000 or more
Chinese nationals may have been persuaded toreturn from northern Myanmar alone.
Solely in Wanding (畹町), a river port bordering
Myanmar in Ruili city,Yunnan province, over 960
suspects of telecom fraud and over 100 suspectsof cross-border gambling returned to China tosurrender between January and October 2021.16
In July 2022, the government of Wenchang City,
Hainan province, issued a notice to disclose thenames and pictures of those from Wenchang“illegally staying in northern Myanmar” andwarned them to return. If they did not contact theirlocal police stations by 10 August 2022:(1) Their spouses, parents and children would
all be suspended from getting subsidies
such as severe illness insurance and medical
insurance subsidies;(2) Their children would be disqualified to enterurban schools once the parents failed to show
up together in the interviews for registrations
or to apply for the admission jointly;(3) Their immediate family would be blocked
in principle from joining the Party and themilitary, and from taking the exams forbecoming public servants or employees ofstate-owned companies;(4) Real estate purchased with their illicit money
would be vacated and auctioned, any
personnel settled in the property would be
forcibly driven out, and houses built withstolen money would be demolished.17
Even though none of those targeted had been
convicted of any crime and, notwithstanding
Xinhua’s prior warnings that such actions would
paint relatives, children and family members
as guilty by association, collateral punishment
continued to remain a key part of the “persuasion to
return” operation.18
Similar notices giving deadlines for suspects
to return “voluntarily” or else face a variety ofpunishments against their children or family
members continued to pop up in various cities
during 2021 and 2022.

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In February 2022, the government of Laiyang city,
Yantai, Shandong province, issued a notice to ask
those from Laiyang “illegally staying” in northern
Myanmar to return by 31 March 2022. If they did
not follow the notice, the bank accounts of their
immediate family members and friends who
engaged in financial transactions with the suspects
would be controlled, restricted or even cancelled.
The suspect’s children would also be moved backto their hometown for school. Moreover, if family
members refused to cooperate with the authorities
in persuading the suspects to return, they would
see their policy benefits and subsidies suspended
or cancelled.19
Local governments are not left to their own
devices in setting out these operations, nor doannouncements issued by local government
authorities target only Myanmar. In addition
to “persuasion to return” operations by local
governments, the central Ministry of Public Security(MPS) sent multiple working groups to Cambodia,
the UAE, northern Myanmar and other key
countries and regions to carry out international law
enforcement operations during 2021.20
Cambodia has become so popular for Chinese

anti-fraud operations that in 2019 Chinese police
moved to set up a joint law enforcement officewith its Cambodian counterparts in the capital ofPhnom Penh. In 2021, at least 610 Chinese nationals
suspected of online fraud were repatriated to China:
none of them via formal extradition procedures,
but simply deported with the direct cooperationfrom the Cambodian authorities. As of July 2022,
one report notes that four mass deportations had
occurred over the last year.21 Cambodia is one ofmany countries around Asia with a ratified bilateralextradition treaty with the PRC, but these are rarely– or in some cases, never – used as authorities
instead rely on the faster, smoother and easier
method of having people deported – thus depriving
them of any chance of due process to fightaccusations of criminal behavior.
Similar stories of often young people being lured
to other countries only to be held hostage andforced to engage in online scams are not limited
to Cambodia. One report identifies Myanmar as
another hotpot for such actions, where people areoften promised well paid positions to lure them,while others end up being forced into prostitution.22
Another report from Phoenix Weekly cited a police

The nine fraud-related countries

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investigations
and briefings seriessource stating that over 100,000 Chinese people in
Myanmar alone were engaged in telecom fraud.
In Yunnan province, some 13,380 people weredetained for illegal border crossings in 2020, a
major increase from the year before.23
Reports cited above indicates that among suspectedcriminals there are also entirely innocent people
simply living in the wrong country, as well as victims
themselves who have beem forced into such illegal
acts through threats, smuggling and intimidation.

Since the end of November 2021, several more
notices have been issued to warn the Chinese
public not to travel to nine countries with serious
telecom and web crimes: Cambodia, the UAE, thePhilippines,Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Malaysia,
Turkey and Indonesia. People who have no "strict
necessity" or "emergency reason" to travel to or
stay in those countries are required to return toChina as soon as possible.24

Attacking non-suspects abroad
On 11 March 2022, Li Qingqing (pseudonym), a
woman fromYuanzhuang township, Xianyou
County, Fujian province, who currently runs a
restaurant in Phnom Penh, was asked by the
Yuanzhuang police to return. She argued that she
is not a suspect of any crime and is just doing
business in Cambodia.The police told her that
according to China’s policy, Chinese citizens staying in
the nine fraud-related countries are required to return
unconditionally. After that, she continually received
messages from the local police asking her to return.
On 5 May, police informed her she had been put on
the telecom suspect list and warned her that her

mother’s house would be cut off from power andwater supplies. Her mother’s house was later spraypainted with the words "House of Telecom Fraud"
and a policy notice was posted next to the spraypainting. Her mother was then called to the village
committee and asked to persuade her daughter toreturn by 31 May.25 Li’s current fate and whether she
has or has not returned is unknown.
Li’s is not the only case. As early as 2021, Chinese
media reported on how local police went around to
fraud suspects’ hometowns and sprayed “shamefulfraud” on a relative’s house and cut off power supply.26“110 Overseas”: Widening the net?
“Strikes against Chinese overseas suspects” arenot limited to the nine forbidden countries as the
Fujian pilot origins demonstrate. While many ofthe publicly reported operations appear to havebeen conducted mainly through online means,on 22 January 2022, Liu Rongyan, Director of
the Overseas Chinese Police Office of the Public

Security Bureau in Fuzhou City, Fujian Province,
announced that the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau
had opened its “first batch” of 30 overseas police
service stations in 25 cities in 21 countries.The
combination of the overseas stations and an
online platform used for services such as receiving
reporting is together called ‘110 Overseas’.

110 is the emergency phone number in China, much like 911 and 112 in the US and EU
respectively. The Fuzhou city police operation out of Fujian province uses the name “110Overseas” for its campaign, while other police jurisdictions uses different names.

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The list of thirty initial Fuzhou “110 Overseas”
offices is clearly expanding rapidly, as anannouncement on the joint launch with the Fuzhou
Public Security Bureau from the Fujian Overseas
Chinese Hometown Association in Prato, Italy,
from 30 March demonstrates27, with the reported
tally on 21 June standing at 38 stations across fivecontinents.28
There is no complete list of such “110 Overseas”
police service stations available, but the initial list,
along with further stations identified by Safeguard
Defenders via government announcement,
provides a clue to how it looks worldwide, eventhough the number is undoubtable larger andsuch stations more widespread.The list hereinpresented are the service stations run by Fuzhou
city and Qingtian city police, while a government
announcement earlier29 stated that such work had
begun in ten provinces, and hence one can assume
the list of such stations goes far beyond what canbe presented here.
While not the object of this investigation, at firstglance at least some of the associations abroad
are tied to the United Front system, such as the
French Fujian Federation of Industry and Commerce
and the Shiyi Hometown Association in Fuzhou,
France30, cited among the first overseas service
stations for Fuzhou police overseas Chinese affairs
established by the Fuzhou Public Security Bureau.31

List of the “first batch of Fuzhou county overseas
police service stations”32

The United Front system (United Front Work) is the work of Chinese Communist Party agencies
seeking to co-opt and influence ‘representative figures’ and groups inside and outside China,
with a particular focus on religious, ethnic minority and diaspora communities.

Overseas hometown associations, while often
providing genuine services to the community, haveby now become overwhelmingly co-opted by the
CCP’s United Front organizations, which seek toincreasingly control the Chinese diaspora. Leadersof hometown associations are frequently rewarded
with meetings with CCP officials, participation in
party-organised events and symbolic appointments
to party-controlled bodies in China. In return, they
are expected to assist the party in its propaganda
and political influence activities, such as promoting
China’s invasion (under the propaganda guiseof “peaceful reunification”) of Taiwan.33 This has

become an even more emphatic feature following
Xi Jinping’s latest assertions on the importance of
the United Front Work in the summer of 2022:“Xi said that as China is striving to build itself
into a modern socialist country and realize
national rejuvenation, the United Front plays
a more important role in gathering broad
support to concentrate on the central tasks
and serve the overall interests of the country.
[…] He also underlined the need to foster
overseas patriotic elements and enhance
United Front work online.”34

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Fuzhou public security overseas police service station, Prato, Italy35
Openly labeled as overseas police service stations
to accommodate the growing administrativeneeds of Fuzhou residents abroad – for example inrenewing Chinese driver’s licenses remotely andother tasks traditionally considered of a consularnature – the “110 Overseas stations”, both in their
online and physical overseas form, also serve amore sinister goal as they contribute to “resolutely
cracking down on all kinds of illegal and criminal
activities involving overseas Chinese”.36
In one account provided by the authorities
themselves, we find direct evidence of their rolein the "persuade to return" method abroad: On
April 11, 2022, an “110 Overseas” notice wasreceived from Mozambique by theYangxia Police
Station, with a businessman reporting that one ofhis employees had stolen a large amount of cashfrom the company before fleeing back to China in
2020. Upon receiving the notice, the police station
immediately took to investigate and arrested thesuspect on 18 May. When the suspect confessedto the existence of an accomplice, "Yu", the “police
quickly identified Yu and immediately mobilized topersuade him (to return) after confirming that hewas still in Mozambique. After being persuaded
to return, [Yu] decided to cooperate with thepolice and fly back to China from Mozambique.”37
According to a Party-owned media’s report on
this case, the local police “contacted Yu’s relatives
back in China and urged them to persuadeYu tosurrender as soon as possible” and meanwhile“directly got in touch with Yu and told him relevantlaws and policies”, making Yu give in.38

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FUZHOU-RUN OVERSEAS POLICE"SERVICE STATIONS"Country

QINGTIAN-RUN OVERSEAS POLICE"SERVICE STATIONS"CityCountryCity

The Netherlands

Amsterdam

EUROPE
IrelandDublinThe Netherlands

Rotterdam

Portugal

Porto

Portugal

MadeiraPortugal

LisbonCzech Republic

PragueCzech Republic

PragueHungary

Budapest

Hungary

Budapest

Slovakia

Bratislava

GermanyFrankfurt

Italy

Rome

Italy

Milan

Italy

Florence

Italy

Prato

FranceParis (x2)France

Paris

Spain

Madrid (x2)SpainMadridSpain

Barcelona (x2)

Spain

Barcelona

Spain

Valencia

Spain

Santiago de Compostela

Spain

Valencia

SwedenStockholm

Austria

ViennaUkraineOdessaSerbiaBelgrade

BrazilRio de Janeiro

EcuadorGuayaquil

Cambodia

Phnom Penh

Tanzania

Dar es SalaamUK

London (x2)UK

Glasgow

GreeceAthensAMERICAS
CanadaToronto (x3)U.S.

New York

Brazil

Sao Paulo

Argentina

Buenos Aires

Chile

Viña del Mar

Ecuador

Quito
ASIA

Uzbekistan

SirdaryoMongolia

Ulaanbaatar

Brune

Seri Begawan

Japan

Tokyo
AFRICA

Nigeria

Benin City

Lesotho

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Map of publicly documented Overseas Police Service Centers from Fuzhou
County and Qingtian County39

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Fuzhou public security "110 Overseas" opens Nigeria,
Benin City service station

Extending the prosecutor's service
tentacles overseas“The procuratorial work involving overseas
Chinese is long-term.The procuratorial andoverseas Chinese should cooperate closely
and strengthen interaction to normalize themechanisms such as information exchange,
legal publicity, joint visits and joint meetings.
They should give full play to the 'four major
procuratorial' functions of the procuratorialorgans in criminal, civil, administrative andpublic interest litigation […]”
Li Riqin, Minqing County Procuratorate, Fujian42
Whereas the Fujian “overseas police service station”
presents direct links with the local Public Security
Bureau, additional close ties appear between theprosecutorial work by the Fujian Provincial People’s
Procuratorate and “procuratorates and overseas
Chinese communication stations” (检侨联络站)”, oras one article puts it: “extending the prosecutor's

service tentacles to overseas Chinese-related andTaiwan-related procuratorial work”43, in which"cooperation between procuratorates and overseas
Chinese (检侨合作)" is gradually being rolled out
in various places, with “overseas contact points
in Italy, Germany and other countries to carry out
overseas Chinese-related prosecution work suchas transoceanic mediation, cross-border inquiries,
video reports and complaints”.44
According to a July 202245 People’s Daily report, ,the Fujian Provincial People's Procuratorate and
the Provincial Overseas Chinese Federation in April
jointly issued their "Opinions on Strengthening theProcuratorial Work of Overseas Chinese Involvedin the New Era to Protect the Legitimate Rights
and Interests of Returned Overseas Chinese andOverseas Chinese in Accordance with the Law".
While Safeguard Defenders was unable to retrieve

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the cited "Opinions", an article explaining thecontent of a similar opinion issued by Zhejiang
Province and the Provincial Overseas Chinese
Federation provides further confirmation of thestrong links between the prosecutorial functions
and overseas stations:“According to the 'Opinions', the provincial
procuratorate will set up a special department
dedicated to guiding and coordinating
the procuratorial work related to overseas
Chinese […] the provincial procuratorialorgan will strengthen communication andcooperation with the overseas Chinese work
department, and establish mechanisms suchas joint meetings, work reports, supervisionand case handling.”46
It must be noted that the wording used in the
document – “Qiao (侨)” – is used to refer to both
Chinese currently overseas as well as ethnic
Chinese who have returned from overseas. In somecases therefore, the overseas related tasks of thepolice and/or procuratorate actually refer to thedomestic affairs of Chinese currently living inside
China following their return from abroad.
It is not immediately clear whether the beforecited “overseas service stations” tied to the Public
Security Bureau and the “procuratorates andoverseas Chinese communication stations” linked
to the Procuratorates overlap completely.Yet boththe methods employed and the use of “hometown
associations” abroad appear identical.The Zhejiang
Province example provides further direct evidence
from one of its counties, Qingtian:

Qingtian County Public Security Bureau sets up
Overseas Police Service centers.47

On 23 May 2019, People's Public Security News
published the article《探索爱侨护侨助侨机制，设立警侨驿站海外服务中心 青田警方积极打造“枫桥经验”
海外版》48 on the Qingtian County Public Security
Bureau’s “innovative set up of Overseas Police
Service Centers” providing “convenient services forthe vast number of overseas Chinese” in a cited 21
cities in 15 countries, including Rome, Milan, Paris,
Vienna, Austria, etc., “hiring 135 Qingtian-bornoverseas Chinese leaders and leaders of overseas
Chinese groups” and “establishing a team of
more than 1,000 overseas grid service information
personnel”, coordinated by a “domestic liaison
center”.
Beyond listing the performance of objectively usefulservices to the Qingtian overseas community of acited 330,000 individuals in over 120 countries suchas the renewal of passports, the article expresslyreferences the overseas centers’ role in the“collection of overseas Chinese sentiments, public
opinions and policy information push”, as well as its
global policing efforts under Operation Fox Hunt49:"Through the establishment of overseas
service centers, Qingtian County Police has
made breakthroughs in its overseas pursuit offugitives. Since 2018, the Qingtian police havedetected and solved six criminal cases related
to overseas Chinese, successfully arrested
a red notice fugitive, and persuaded twosuspects to surrender under the assistancefrom the Overseas centers.”50
The article goes on to provide a case example of theoverseas center’s role in the successful “persuade
to return” of Fox Hunt target Xia, who was accusedof theft and fled to Serbia. "Through lots of efforts
on investigation, the police found the location
where Xia was hiding in Belgrade. After successfully
getting in touch with Xia through the overseas
service center, the Qingtian police worked jointlywith the staff members of the overseas service
center to carry out the persuation to return through
WeChat audio and video communication."51
In another reported example from 2020 of asuspect wanted for environmental pollution in
China, the County Procuratorate in Qingtian,Zhejiang Province, joined efforts with the Qingtian
Hometown Association of Spain - through theCounty Overseas Chinese Federation -, following an

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investigation by the Qingtian County Public Security
Bureau and an “online chase” of the suspect that
had failed to yield the desired result. In the end,
“with the efforts of all parties, Liu began to havethe idea of returning to China to surrender […]”
and according to the report shortly thereafter did
surrender in Qingtian. Following the success ofthe operation, JiYongjun, a full-time member of
the Procuratorate Committee of Qingtian County
Procuratorate and chairman of the Overseas
Chinese Federation was quoted to have said that“the procuratorate will launch a quick mechanism
for handling cases involving overseas Chinese".52“From Madrid, Spain, to Qingtian's 'Homefor Overseas Chinese
Inspection': Fugitive persuaded to return.”53

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Conclusion
Worrying Growth of China’s
Transnational Repression
The scourge of fraud and online fraud has become
endemic in China, both within its borders andoutside. Police reported in April 2022 that they
had resolved 394,000 cases and arrested 634,000
suspects in 2021 – an increase of 28.5% and 76.6%
respectively – while also stating that the successful
campaign had effectively curbed the growth of
online fraud crimes.54 A big part of this campaign
has been to effectively target those suspected offraud, as well as related cases of human trafficking,abroad. Vice-Minister Du of the Ministry of Public
Security indicated that the focus on fraudsters
abroad has been an important part of the campaign,and China Daily reported “the number of people
who committed crimes against Chinese people
from abroad has significantly decreased”55.
However, nothing indicates this campaign isabout to slow down. Liu Zhongyi, head of thecriminal investigation bureau of the Ministry of
Public Security, said: “The rapid rise in cases has
been effectively curbed, but the telecom fraud
crime situation remains grim and complex, andthe intensified crackdown and comprehensive
governance should remain.”56
Moreover, the transnational mechanisms set up
under this campaign may well serve other overseas
policing purposes as well, as some cited examples
already indicate. Much of the information containedin this brief investigation is very recent, making it
difficult to fully capture the picture of how thesemechanisms interact and/or overlap. China’s
growing campaign to police Chinese nationals
abroad has gone hand in hand with its expanded“anti-corruption” campaign domestically, but it israre to get insight into the true scope of its action.
While it was known that lower value targets areoften pursued via “persuaded to return” tactics, thedata presented in this brief are the first to provide
some insight into the scope and methodology ofthis specific campaign... one among many.
Safeguard Defenders research into the methodsof Involuntary Returns showed that the Sky Net
campaign – which includes operation Fox Hunttargeting higher value suspects – surpassed 10,000
successful returns by Christmas 2021, from 120
different countries. Our deep-dive into individual
cases also demonstrated how only about 50% of
those reported were successful, and how mostinvolved dissidents or individuals that had fled
religious and/or ethnic persecution. As announced
in March 2022, Sky Net and Fox Hunt are set to
expand. Another report showed how China, tied to
Xi Jinping’s signature “anti-corruption” campaign,
have significantly expanded its use of INTERPOL.
Whether the targets are dissidents, corrupt officials
or low-level criminals, the problem remains
the same:The use of irregular methods – often
combining carrots with sticks – against the targetedindividual or their family members in China
undermines any due process and the most basic
rights of suspects.The described treatment oftargets, their families and even wider community
as suspected criminals – in some cases even in theabsence of any factual accusation as emerges fromthe “nine forbidden countries” – further deprives
them of the right to be considered innocent until
proven otherwise and the right to a fair trial, andalso institutes a far-reaching “guilt by association”
paradigm.
Furthermore, the disregard for the use of proper
channels and processes in international relations
is blatant. Despite China’s insistence on theestablishment of bilateral extradition treaties

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or other mechanisms of judicial cooperation –which serve both a specific propaganda purpose
in legitimizing the Chinese Communist Partycontrolled judicial system, as well as nurturing achilling effect for the rapidly growing number ofindividuals fleeing China – it rarely uses these legal
international procedures. Rather than cooperatingwith local authorities in the full respect of territorial
sovereignty, it prefers – as reiterated frequently
in the articles cited in this investigation – tocooperate with (United Front-linked) overseas“NGOs” or “civil society associations” across thefive continents, setting up an alternative policing
and judicial system within third countries, anddirectly implicating those organizations in the illegal
methods employed to pursue “fugitives”.
This methodology further allows them tocircumvent firmly-set international principles suchas the non-derogatory principle of non-refoulement

under the United Nations Convention Against
Torture and the UN Convention on the Protectionof Refugees, or the guarantees establishedunder international mechanisms such as the UN
Convention AgainstTransnational Organized Crimeand the ProtocolsThereto.57
As these operations continue to develop and newmechanisms are set up, it is evident that countries
governed by the standards set by universal
human rights and the rule of law urgently needto investigate these practices to identify the (local)
actors at work, mitigate the risks and effectively
protect the growing number of those targeted.
For a further set of recommended actions in and by
democratic countries, find Safeguard Defenders’factsheet on countering extraditions, report on
Involuntary Returns and manual on dealing withextraditions to China, Hide and Seek.

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See inter alia: https://dspace.cuni.cz/handle/20.500.11956/122925; https://jamestown.org/program/the-role-of-coopted-diaspora-groups-in-czech-and-european-united-front-work/;
https://www.aph.gov.au/DocumentStore.ashx?id=96afce1-c6ea-4052-b5e3-bcac4951bb0e&subId=562658; https://jamestown.org/program/how-beijing-is-shaping-politics-inwestern-australia/.

34

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202208/01/WS62e7065ea310fd2b29e6f60d.html.

35

https://ithome.altervista.org/archives/26463?doing_wp_cron=1660564335.8240940570831298828125.

36

http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c100049/2022-07/29/content_12654617.shtml and http://www.52hrtt.com/ng/n/w/info/G1642406376300.

37

http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c100049/2022-07/29/content_12654617.shtml.

38

https://archive.ph/b5gNy

39

Fuzhou: http://www.52hrtt.com/ng/n/w/info/G1642406376300; https://ithome.altervista.org/archives/26463?doing_wp_cron=1660564335.8240940570831298828125.

40

http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c100049/2022-07/29/content_12654617.shtml.

41

http://www.chinapeace.gov.cn/chinapeace/c100049/2022-07/29/content_12654617.shtml.

42

https://www.163.com/dy/article/HDUR7R630514H79Q.html

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https://c.m.163.com/news/a/H8DGEL8A0514CSI1.html.

44

http://www.chinaql.org/n1/2022/0711/c419651-32471558.html.

45

http://www.chinaql.org/n1/2022/0711/c419651-32471558.html.

46

http://www.gqb.gov.cn/news/2022/0324/53472.shtml.

47

http://i.cztv.com/view/13192197.html.

48

For more on China’s Operation Fox Hunt and use of Involuntary Returns methods, see: https://safeguarddefenders.com/sites/default/files/pdf/INvoluntary%20Returns.pdf.

49

http://i.cztv.com/view/13192197.html.

50

http://i.cztv.com/view/13192197.html.

51

https://web.archive.org/web/20220827025752/http:/i.cztv.com/view/13257962.html.

52

https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1656029336672446632&wfr=spider&for=pc.

53

http://www.0039italia.com/index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=16&id=1136

54

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/15/WS6258cd09a310fd2b29e57254.html.

55

https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/15/WS6258cd09a310fd2b29e57254.html

56https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202204/15/WS6258cd09a310fd2b29e57254.html

57

https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNTOC/Publications/TOC%20Convention/TOCebook-e.pdf

Qingtian: http://www.zgqt.zj.cn/qtzjjjhxq/8406150.html; http://www.zgqt.zj.cn/qtzjjjhxq/8485342.html; http://www.chinaqw.com/qx/2018/09-28/203602.shtml.

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