History of Global Arms Transfer, 4 (2017), pp. 25-39

Institutional Dynamics, Civil-Military
Relations and Japan’s 1936 Withdrawal
from the Washington System1
By LIONEL P. FATTONThe Imperial Japanese Navy asked in 1934 for a drastic revision of the
Washington system of naval arms control, eventually leading Japan to withdraw
from the system in late 1936. Given the arms race and the tensions that ensued
with the United States, the rejection of arms control was a decisive step on
Japan’s road to the Pacific War. Why did the Japanese government embrace thenavy’s strategic requirements and take such a risky decision? The present article
first shows that to disengage from arms control was strategically rational for thenavy as an institution. It was its duty to oppose arms control if the latter
jeopardized national security, which was the case in the mid-1930s. If the navy
perfectly played its role, it should not have been able to impose its view aboutarms control on the government. Japanese leaders should have prioritized
diplomacy, not power politics. This undue political influence of the navy camefrom dysfunctions in civil-military relations dating back to the early Meiji era.
In June 1934, the Imperial Japanese Navy asked for parity with the US Navy and for adrastic revision of the Washington system of naval arms control, eventually leading Japanto withdraw from the system in late 1936. This destroyed the last institutionalizedcooperative structure Japan maintained with the United States, triggered a costly arms race,and heightened tensions and mutual suspicion between the two countries. The rejection ofarms control by Japan was a decisive step in a chain of events that led to the attack on Pearl
Harbor and to the ruin of the country. The dramatic consequences of Japan’s withdrawal
raise a meaningful question: Why did the Japanese government embrace the navy’s
strategic requirements and prioritize power politics over diplomacy?
This question is important for two reasons. First, studies about Japan’s road to the Pacific
War have often emphasized the key role played by the two military services, the navy andthe army. They were the source of Japan’s dangerously provocative behavior on theinternational scene. To explain why the navy opposed the Washington system is essential tounderstand the Japanese foreign policy in the 1930s. Second, addressing this question sheds
light on the centrality of civil-military relations when it comes to arms control. It also
highlights the shortcomings of a tendency to blame certain persons or entities for tragic
historical events. It is simpler, and sometimes more convenient, to name culprits than todissect a decision-making process.
The present article first shows that to disengage from arms control was strategicallyrational for the Japanese navy as an institution. It was its duty to oppose arms control if thelatter jeopardized national security. By making Japan’s participation in the Washington
1 The author is grateful to Chikako Ueki Kawakatsu (Waseda University) and Katsuya Tsukamoto (TheNational Institute for Defense Studies) for their support during his research in Japan.

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LIONEL P. FATTON
system conditional on naval parity with the United States, the navy sought to escape from asituation where it was gradually losing the ability to protect the country against atranspacific offensive of the US Pacific Fleet. In this perspective, the growing influence ofa group of naval officers opposed to arms control was the symptom, and not the cause, of
an institutional dynamics triggered by strategic considerations.
This does not explain why the Japanese government embraced the navy’s strategic
requirements despite the foreseeable diplomatic, financial, and economic consequences ofleaving the Washington system. The navy should not have been able to impose its view
about arms control on the government. The source of the navy’s undue political influence
was dysfunctions in civil-military relations dating back to the early Meiji era. If one had toname and shame in the Japanese case, the culprit would be a defective decision-making
process rather than a particular institution.
The article is divided into five parts. The first provides a theoretical discussion on civilmilitary relations. It argues among other things that the stance of the military institution
toward arms control is determined primarily by strategic considerations. The second part
analyses the position of the Imperial Navy on the arms control policy of the Japanese
government during the 1920s and 1930s. It explains why the stance of the navy evolved
from support to outright opposition in about a decade. The third part demonstrates that thedecision to withdraw from the Washington system was strategically rational for the navy.
The fourth part examines the structure of Japanese civil-military relations and argues thatits defects were the root of Japan’s withdrawal from the naval arms control framework. The
fifth part concludes by extracting lessons from the Japanese case study.

I
This part contains a theoretical discussion on civil-military relations. It explains how themilitary institution positions itself toward arms control, guided by strategic considerations.
It also shows that it is the duty of the military to warn and even oppose the government
when arms control policy jeopardizes national security.
The military institution is different from other domestic entities because of its specificfunctions inside the state apparatus. The military is the only entity tasked with defending
the country and its national interests through the use of armed forces.2 This functional
approach highlights the more limited sphere of responsibility of the military compared to
the government. At the individual level, Risa Brooks notes that people ‘who occupy thechief executive office in the state ( … ) are in charge of the broad panoply of economic,
social, and foreign policies. Military leaders are the individuals who run the military on adaily basis’.3
Because of the comprehensive needs of the government and the specialized expertise of
the military, their relationship is structured by an agreed-upon distribution of
responsibilities. The shape of the military and government spheres of responsibility differs
between countries and over time, depending on domestic and international circumstances.
Douglas Bland argues that this division of responsibilities constitutes a regime in the sense
Stephen Krasner defines it at the international level. The concept of ‘national defense
2 Guy Siebold defines the military as ‘a formally organized entity or set of entities responsive to thegovernmental leaders heading a national state (or equivalent government) and whose functions concern the use ofarms to defend that national state or to further its policies in its relations with other nation states or large
collective entities’. Siebold, ‘Core issues and theory’, p. 140.
3 Brooks, Shaping strategy, p. 3.

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Institutional Dynamics, Civil-Military Relations and Japan’s 1936 Withdrawal from the Washington System
regime’ implies that ‘the relationship and arrangement of responsibilities are conditioned
by a nationally evolved regime of “principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures
around which actor expectations converge” in matters of civil-military relations’.4 The
regime enables the government and the military to cooperate efficiently on issues related tonational security and to preserve a certain degree of autonomy from each other.
The national defense regime does not mean that the military and government spheres arestrictly separated. In-between stands a key actor in civil-military relations, the hybrid
officer. 5 These members of the military institution, uniformed or not, possess twoparticularities that differentiate them from others: their role as a link between the military
institution and other domestic entities, and their relative resistance to institutional biases.
The main role of hybrid officers is to act as a bridge between their institution and nonmilitary entities, most importantly the government. 6 They constitute a channel ofcommunication that allows the government to receive advice and demands from themilitary. On the other hand, hybrid officers represent the authority by which government
orders are passed down to military personnel of lower ranks. They are the entry point forgovernment penetration of the military institution. This has important consequences on theway institutional pressure affects the stance of hybrid officers. Standing between the
military and the government, they must avoid being partial and resist institutional biases
that could lead them to confront the latter. These biases include the military tendency toadopt worst-case analyses, distrust of the present and future intentions of other countries,
and an exclusive focus on military assets to guarantee national security.7 The relative
resistance to these biases is the second particularity of hybrid officers.8
Arms control is a diplomatic tool used by governments to achieve certain objectives inrelation to other countries. Domestically, this implies the imposition of the terms of aninternational treaty to the military. Depending on the shape of the national defense regime,
military perception that the government infringes upon its sphere of responsibility can
trigger opposition to arms control.
Moreover, because of its functions and expertise, it is the duty of the military to warn
government leaders when the arms control policy jeopardizes national security. It can evenbe said that it is among its prerogatives to oppose arms control in such circumstances. Whatcan be called strategic stimulus refers to the reaction of the military in case its ability tofulfill institutional missions is negatively affected by government policy. These missions
vary by country, though the most important and common remains the defense of territorial
integrity and political sovereignty. The paradox behind the strategic stimulus is the fact thatthe government assigns missions to the military, but then impedes the fulfillment of thesevery missions through arms control measures. Military officers may have great difficulties
understanding the rationale behind government decisions and oppose them.
The military and the government hold different perspectives on the way to guarantee
national security. While both concur on the necessity to protect their country and its
4 Bland, ‘A unified theory’, pp. 9-10.
5 Other concepts similar to the hybrid officer are the ‘officer corps’ of Samuel Huntington and the ‘first tier’ of

Sam Sarkesian and Robert Connor. Huntington, The soldier and the state, p. 73; Sarkesian and Connor, The US
military profession, p. 29.
6 General Colin Powell said these officers are tasked with ‘connecting the military forces to the politicalsystem and the political system back to the forces’. Woodward, The commanders, p. 154.
7 These biases are natural and somehow necessary features of the military. It is its duty to be prepared for allcontingencies in case the government fails to peacefully settle international disputes.
8 The findings of Richard Betts confirm this point. He demonstrates that the closer to the government membersof the military institution stand, the least they are influenced by military biases. Betts, Soldiers, p. 40.

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LIONEL P. FATTON
interests from external threats, they sometimes disagree over the means for doing so. Thisis because of the different roles they play inside the state apparatus and the different tools
they have at their disposal.9 The military tries to guarantee national security by militarymeans. This is not always the case for the government. The latter has a wider range of
instruments at its disposal and the duty to take into account the stance of other domestic
entities that may be putting alternatives on the table. The maintenance through arms controlof healthy relations with other countries can be one of these alternatives. These differences
can put governments and military institutions in direct confrontation over the question ofwhether a given arms control policy is relevant to guarantee the security of their country.

II
The Washington system was established during the Washington Conference of 1921-2. The
Five-Power Treaty approved at that time set quantitative and qualitative limits on capital
ships, namely battleships and aircraft carriers. The United States, Japan, Great Britain,
France and Italy joined the treaty. The arms control framework was reinforced by the
London Treaty in 1930, with new restrictions enacted on almost all categories of auxiliary
vessels.10 The stance of the Imperial Navy toward the arms control policy of the Japanese
government evolved from support to outright opposition in about a decade. Naval
opposition eventually pushed Japan out of arms control by the end of 1936. The theoretical
discussion pursued above helps understand the navy’s institutional dynamics and theevolution of its position.
The main institutional mission of the Imperial Navy during the period covered by thisanalysis was to retain naval supremacy in the Western Pacific.11 Based on an adapted
version of the argument of American strategist Alfred Mahan, Japanese naval planners
asserted that to command the sea in the Western Pacific would provide the highest level ofnational security. If the navy was able to defeat any other fleets entering the region, theJapanese homeland would be protected upstream against naval threats and invasions.12 In
order to fulfill this mission, a series of strategic assumptions and related considerations
were laid down in naval studies.
When discussions about the possibility of holding a naval arms control conference beganin diplomatic circles, Navy Minister Katō Tomosaburō established a committee to study thequestion of arms control and its consequences on naval strategy. The committee released an
important report in September 1921 on which the naval institution based its position during
the Washington Conference of 1921-2. 13 The report called on the delegation to theconference to limit as much as possible the disparity in naval strength between Japan andthe United States and to avoid falling below 70 per cent of the American naval power. The
70 per cent ratio was regarded as a minimum for retaining the command of the sea in theWestern Pacific. The report also asked for preventing the construction of new military
9 Feaver, Armed servants, p. 60.
10 France and Italy rejected the quantitative limitations of the London Treaty.
11 Iriye, Nihon no gaikō, p. 87.
12 Tasked with adapting the macro-theory of Mahan to Japan’s specificities, naval planner Satō Tetsutarō

published in 1908 a book titled Teikoku kokubō shi ron (On the History of Imperial Defense) in which hedifferentiated between passive and proactive defense. The former was land-based and the latter sea-based. He
asserted that proactive defense was preferable because to destroy enemies at sea would prevent having to fight incoastal areas and Japanese territory. The command of the sea in the Western Pacific was essential to establish astrong first line of defense.
13 Gow, Military intervention, pp. 83-6.

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Institutional Dynamics, Civil-Military Relations and Japan’s 1936 Withdrawal from the Washington Systemfacilities in the Pacific region, particularly in Guam and the Philippines.
The Japanese delegation to the Washington Conference failed to respect all the strategic
requirements of the navy. The Five-Power Treaty of February 1922 provided Japan with
315,000 tons of battleships against 525,000 tons for the United States and Great Britain.
This meant a 60 per cent ratio in this key category. A similar ratio was approved in theminor category of aircraft carriers. Japan nonetheless obtained the status quo of military
fortifications in most of the Pacific region, including in Guam and the Philippines.
Though Japan had to accept a ratio of 60 per cent in capital ships, the status quo of Pacificfortifications left the Imperial Navy by far dominant in the Western Pacific. 14 With the
exception of Pearl Harbor, American naval bases were at that time unfitted to accommodatea large fleet, and the cruising range of warships was limited.15 This meant that the power of
the US Pacific Fleet would decay extensively during its journey from Hawaii.16 The fleet
would encounter important logistic issues for reaching the Western Pacific with enoughstrength to challenge the Japanese navy. The problem was particularly acute in regard to
the refueling and fixing of ships.
The strategic position of the Japanese navy improved as a result of the Five-Power Treaty.
Its ability to defeat other fleets in the Western Pacific increased. The strategic benefits ofarms control were recognized by a vast majority inside the naval institution. 17
Consequently, the strength of the strategic stimulus was insignificant and its influence on
the stance of the navy toward the arms control policy of the Japanese government was
minimal at best.
A group of officers opposed to arms control nonetheless emerged inside the Imperial
Navy. Vice Admiral Katō Kanji, vice chief of general staff and chief naval adviser at the
Washington Conference, was a prominent figure of the group. The latter was initiallyconcentrated in the General Staff. Called ‘Kantai-ha’ by Asada Sadao, it was opposed byanother faction named ‘Jōyaku-ha’.18 The Jōyaku-ha was led by Admiral Katō Tomosaburō,navy minister and plenipotentiary in Washington. His followers, mainly members of theNavy Ministry, backed the arms control policy of the Japanese government.
Katō Kanji and the Kantai-ha were upset by the institutional consequences of arms
control, regarded as an unfair burden imposed on the navy by politicians eager to satisfy
the growing pacifism of the Japanese population.19 Naval budget shrank by more than 200
million yen between 1921 and 1923, or almost half, from 484 to 275 million yen.20 The
cruisers Atago and Takao as well as the battleships Kii and Owari under construction at thattime were scrapped. The cruiser Akagi and the battleship Kaga were converted into aircraft
14 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 197.
15 Most of them still used either coal or a process of mixed firing by which burning coal was sprayed with oil

to increase its thermal content. Propulsion systems were primarily made of steam engines, providing a relatively
inefficient fuel combustion process.
16 According to Japanese and American planners, including Mahan, naval power decayed by 10% for each
1,000 nautical miles a fleet had to sail without naval bases on its way. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p.
48.
17 Even the most contested aspect of the Five-Power Treaty, the 60% ratio in capital ships, was not considered
as utterly negative by prominent naval officers. Fleet Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō defended the treaty by saying that‘a margin of 10% or so should not concern us much’. Admiral Abo Kiyokazu, chairman of the navy committee
on arms control prior to the Washington Conference, asserted that the 60% ratio was highly advantageous.
Accepting the ratio had allowed Japan to neutralize the cornerstone of the American transpacific strategy, namely
Guam and the Philippines. Ibid., p. 80; Abo, Tōgūgo gakumonsho heisho, p. 104.
18 Asada, ‘The Japanese navy’, pp. 226-7.
19 Schencking, Making waves, p. 220.
20 Naval budget continued to fall afterward, reaching 229 million yen in 1925. Kaigun Rekishi Hozonkai,
Nihon kaigun shi, p. 117.

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LIONEL P. FATTON
carriers, then regarded as an inefficient vessel. The construction of four cruisers wascancelled.21 Close to 10 thousand sailors were discharged in 1922 out of a total of 80
thousand.22 Nine on 10 admirals were subsequently pushed to retirement. On the other
hand, the number of students who entered the Naval Academy in 1922 amounted to lessthan a fifth of the previous year.23
The institutional consequences of arms control pushed the Kantai-ha to act. Aware thatthe government had used the navy minister to interfere into what it considered as the naval
sphere of responsibility, it tried to reform internal regulations related to the prerogatives of
the General Staff and of the Ministry.24 The group aimed at closing the entry point throughwhich the government had penetrated the naval institution during and after the Washington
Conference. In order to do so, the power of the Ministry as hybrid institution had to beundermined. The Kantai-ha lacked the necessary support inside the navy, however. Its
initiative failed when in February 1924 Navy Minister Murakami Kakuichi rejected the
proposal for revision of naval regulations.
This state of facts changed during the 1920s, a strategic stimulus spreading inside theImperial Navy. Tremendous improvements in naval technology, especially those related tothe propulsion of vessels, increased their cruising range and power. Major innovations
included the conversion of naval fuel from coal to oil and the development of turbines,
which replaced steam engines. The cruising radius of American warships doubled between
1922 and 1934. 25 The strategic distance in the Pacific shrank dramatically. As naval
technology evolved, the importance of naval bases for the US Pacific Fleet to arrive withenough strength in the Western Pacific declined. This threatened the strategic position of
the Japanese navy. The latter’s ability to retain naval supremacy in the Western Pacific wasjeopardized and the advantage of the status quo of Pacific fortifications graduallydisappeared.26
The naval institution had to find a way to prevent the United Stated from bringing its
superiority in capital ships, enshrined in the Five-Power Treaty, to the Western Pacific. The
solution for naval planners was a strategy of attrition (zengen sakusen) using light ships
and submarines and dedicated to wear down the strength of the US Pacific Fleet during its
transpacific journey.27 In 1923 already, the strategy was included in the part of the Imperial
Defense Policy dedicated to war operations.28 Japan’s naval expansion programs during the
21 The cumulated tonnage of ships composing the Japanese fleet fell from more than one million tons in 1922
to 854,085 in 1923. Ibid., pp. 148-51.
22 Ibid., p. 57.
23 Asada, ‘The revolt against the Washington treaty’, p. 89.
24 Takagi, Gunreibu reikaisei, p. 6.
25 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, pp. 199-200.
26 A report released in Dec. 1929 by the Operation Division of the Navy General Staff warned that American
heavy cruisers now had the ability to ‘sail in all directions’ in the Pacific without refueling. A ‘chain ofencirclement extending to the almost entire Pacific Ocean’ could be established by these warships, linking
American forward naval bases in the Philippines and Guam to Hawaii in the center, the Aleutians in the north,and Samoa in the south. The Pacific was being reduced to an ‘American lake’ by technological innovations.
Operation Division, Ichiman ton junyōkan, pp. 3-4.
27 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 129. The strategy of attrition is sometimes confused with the ambush strategy(yōgeki sakusen). The latter included a tactical phase of attrition dedicated to weaken the opponent shortly before
the decisive battle. The ambush strategy was first formulated by Akiyama Saneyuki after the Russo-Japanese Warof 1904-5, based on the lessons he extracted from the Battle of Tsushima. The evolution of naval technology
during the 1920s and the strategic consequences of the Five-Power Treaty led the navy to upgrade the first phaseof the battle plan from limited attrition to a full-fledged strategy of attrition extending deep into the Pacific.
The terms ‘strategy of attrition’ and ‘attrition strategy’ are widely used in the English literature. ‘Operation ofinterception-attrition’ might better reflect the original meaning of zengen sakusen, however.
28 Shimanuki, ‘Dai ichi ji sekai taisen igo’, p. 69.

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Institutional Dynamics, Civil-Military Relations and Japan’s 1936 Withdrawal from the Washington System
1920s consequently focused on building a large number of auxiliary vessels essential forthe attrition strategy.
Expansion in auxiliary categories was supported by the entire naval institution. The
reinforcement and enlargement of the fleet was a good thing for sailors. This did not meanthat all of them saw from the start the auxiliary programs as a necessity for the navy tofulfill its institutional missions and guarantee the security of Japan. During the first half ofthe 1920s, government funding of naval expansion in auxiliaries was generally regarded asa normal compensation for the limitation of capital ships. Inversely, officers related to the
Kantai-ha considered very early the auxiliary programs as a vital undertaking to mitigate
the adverse consequences the Five-Power Treaty and technological innovations had on
Japan’s national security.
As the 1920s passed by and the effects of the shrinking strategic distance in the Pacificwere increasingly felt, the strategic stimulus spread and a growing number of officers
adhered to the Kantai-ha. Prominent naval figures such as Fleet Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō
and Vice Admiral Ogasawara Naganari joined the group. They provided the latter withprestige and credibility and brought with them a bunch of high-ranking followers thatfurther reinforced it.29 The expanding influence of the Kantai-ha was reflected by tensions
between different elements of the Imperial Navy ahead and during the Geneva Conferenceof 1927, dedicated to extend naval limitations to auxiliary categories. Representatives of
the Kantai-ha, serving mainly in the General Staff, became more involved in politics andvoiced more forcefully their strategic concerns and their opposition to the stance adopted
by the Navy Ministry on arms control.30
During the conference, Vice Admirals Frederick Field from the United States andKobayashi Seizō from Japan worked out a compromise that provided each of the two
Anglo-Saxon powers with 500,000 tons of surface auxiliaries and Japan with 325,000 tons.
All three countries were granted 60,000 tons of submarines. This represented a 65 per centratio for Japan in surface auxiliaries and a ratio of almost 69 per cent if submarines wereadded to the equation. This was below the strategic requirement of 70 per cent but above
the 60 per cent ratio in capital ships obtained during the Washington Conference. According
to the testimony of Admiral Takarabe Takeshi, who had been navy minister until twomonths before the opening of the conference, the Field-Kobayashi compromise triggered‘tumultuous controversies’ inside the naval institution.31
These controversies emerged because the influence of the Kantai-ha was growing. The
discussions in Geneva worried several naval officers that their strategic requirements might
once again fail to be met in international arms control negotiations. Given the evolving
naval technology and the deteriorating strategic position of the navy, this would have graveconsequences on national security. On the other hand, Navy Minister Okada Keisuke andother members of the Jōyaku-ha supported the stance of Admiral Saitō Makoto, theplenipotentiary in Geneva. Saitō backed the compromise and was even willing to go below
the 65 per cent ratio in surface auxiliaries in order to reach an agreement.32 The conference
broke down due to disagreements between the United States and Great Britain over the
allocation of cruisers. This prevented a serious destabilization of the Japanese navy, andpossibly of civil-military relations.
During the second half of the 1920s, the perception spread among naval officers that the
29 Bix, Hirohito, p. 101.
30 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p. 112.
31 Asada, ‘From Washington to London’, p. 168.
32 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p. 120.

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LIONEL P. FATTON
Imperial Navy was losing its ability to defend Japan. In view of the expanding cruisingradius of American warships, buildup programs in auxiliaries undertaken to nurture theattrition strategy were the only means by which the Japanese navy could remain capable ofdefeating the US Pacific Fleet in the Western Pacific. To maintain an adequate amount ofauxiliary vessels became perceived as vital. These expansion programs helped mitigate thestrength of the strategic stimulus. Consequently, the Jōyaku-ha continued to dominate thenaval institution until the early 1930s, though it was increasingly challenged by the Kantaiha.
The First London Conference of 1930 marked a turning point in the history of the Imperial
Navy. It led to the destruction of the institution’s internal unity by bringing the Kantai-ha
and the Jōyaku-ha into direct confrontation. The treaty agreed at that time also crystalized
the naval opposition to the arms control policy of the Japanese government. Prime Minister
Hamaguchi Osachi ignored naval advice and approved naval restrictions that triggered astrong strategic stimulus. Auxiliary vessels were the means by which the Japanese navy had
managed to mitigate the adverse consequences of the unfavorable ratio in capital ships andthe expanding cruising radius of American warships. They were now also limited, and forsome of them in a disadvantageous way.
The restrictions imposed by the London Treaty jeopardized the naval strategy developed
during the 1920s to face the American threat. The attrition phase of the strategy wasparticularly affected. First, the 52,700 tons of submarines left the Japanese navy 25,300
tons and 16 boats short of what naval planners considered as the strict minimum.33 Second,
the ratio of heavy cruisers was deemed insufficient for both the attrition strategy and thefinal battle, during which they were expected to play a key role as quasi-battleships. 34
Though Japan obtained the desired ratio in the light cruiser category, the vessel was
considered too small and not powerful enough to efficiently replace the heavy cruiser. 35
Third, and maybe more important, the London Treaty almost completely closed theloophole of the Five-Power Treaty in auxiliaries and destroyed the strategic flexibility of
the naval institution. The near totality of the naval assets that could have allowed the navy
to modify its strategy against the United States, in order to adapt to new arms control
measures and the evolving naval technology, were limited by the treaty.36
In addition to the strategic consequences of the London Treaty, the attitude of the Japanese
government during the closing weeks of the conference upset the Kantai-ha. The
Hamaguchi cabinet ignored the stance of the General Staff and approved the naval
restrictions against the will of Katō Kanji, then chief of staff. In doing so, the Kantai-ha
argued, the government had violated the right of supreme command (tōsuiken) thatprovided the Staff with a say on decisions related to the level of armament. This also wascontrary to past naval practices according to which the navy minister took into account theposition of the chief of staff when deciding on the level of armament.37 This was a clear
infringement by the government upon the naval sphere of responsibility.
The First London Conference provoked a frontal clash in civil-military relations. Though
33 Gow, Military intervention, p. 205.
34 The completion of the last three heavy cruisers allotted to the United States, out of a total of 18 (180,000

tons), was postponed until after 1935. Japan, with 12 vessels (108,400 tons), was de facto provided with a ratio of
72% until 1935, 68% in 1936, 64% in 1937, and 60% from 1938 onward. Japan’s Ministry of Defense, Kaigun
gunsenbi, pp. 378-9.
35 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 237.
36 Only naval aviation, vessels below 600 tons and, under certain conditions, between 600 and 2,000 tons were
free from restrictions.
37 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, pp. 74-5.

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Institutional Dynamics, Civil-Military Relations and Japan’s 1936 Withdrawal from the Washington System
the Kantai-ha ultimately failed to prevent the ratification of the London Treaty, thestrategic stimulus increased its influence. The whole naval institution rapidly turned against
the Washington system and the government. The navy’s internal discipline was greatly
disrupted in the process. This marked the end of the so-called ‘controlled navy’ (tōsei aru
kaigun), established during the second half of the nineteenth century based on the British
model of predominance of the Navy Ministry. 38 This episode has been considered bycontemporary journalist Itō Masanori as ‘the greatest tragedy in Japanese naval history’.39
The lightning ascension of the Kantai-ha inside the institution was reflected in two ways.
The first was a profound revision of internal regulations regarding the prerogatives of theGeneral Staff and the Navy Ministry that entered into force in October 1933. Almost
similar to the one attempted by the Kantai-ha after the Washington Conference, the revision
weakened extensively the Ministry.40 The latter was perceived as having joined hands withthe government to impose the London Treaty to the navy. The second way was a purge in1933 and 1934 of the most moderate elements of the Imperial Navy: the members of the
Jōyaku-ha, heirs of a tradition of cooperation with the government.41 Having acquired astrong basis and representativeness inside the naval institution, the Kantai-ha removed
those who slowed down its ascension and prevented the establishment of its authority.
On the eve of the Second London Conference of 1935-6, the Imperial Navy had become
deeply involved in politics and had decisively turned against the arms control policy of thegovernment. In June 1934, naval authorities decided to request nothing less than parity
with the United States and Great Britain through a common upper limit settled at a low
level of naval power.42 For this demand to be efficiently made, the Five-Power Treaty
needed to be abrogated before the end of the year.43 The cabinet of Prime Minister Okada
Keisuke faced the inflexible stance of the navy and was aware of the danger of anotherclash in civil-military relations, now that the whole institution was united and that the roleof the Navy Ministry as hybrid institution had been destroyed. Because of a chronic lack ofcontrol over the navy, the government had few choices other than to abrogate the treaty inlate 1934, and to withdraw from the Second London Conference in January 1936 after thedemand for naval parity was rejected by the two Anglo-Saxon countries. Japan officiallyleft the Washington system in late 1936.

III
Other domestic and external factors, related to the sociopolitical environment in Japan andthe regional context, entered into the equation of Japan’s withdrawal from the Washington
system. Nevertheless, the forceful opposition of the Imperial Navy to the maintenance ofthe system as it stood after the First London Conference was the motor of the Japanesedisengagement from the naval arms control framework.44
38 Ibid., p. 67.
39 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p. 126.
40 According to Captain Inoue Shigeyoshi, then head of the First Section of the Ministry’s Naval Affairs

Bureau, the revision was dedicated to ‘reduce the authority of the navy minister to a minimum’. Its mostimportant implication regarding the topic of this article was the transfer from the Ministry to the Staff of theultimate responsibility for decisions related to the level of armament. Takagi, Gunreibu reikaisei, pp. 6-7.
41 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p. 173.
42 The decision was based on a plan drafted by Commander Ishikawa Shingo back in Oct. 1933. Kotani, ‘Dai
ni ji rondon kaigun gunshuku kaigi’, p. 78.
43 The abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty implied that a notice be issued two years ahead. Gow, Militaryintervention, p. 301.
44 The fact that the Okada cabinet resisted the abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty shows that the role played－ 33 －

LIONEL P. FATTON
Some scholars attribute the abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty to an irrational attraction
for naval expansion and the fact that inferior ratios in naval power were regarded as badgesof dishonor by naval officers. Others point out the irrationality of the naval institution
regarding the prospect of an arms race with the United States. Given the limited capacities
of Japanese shipyards, the lack of access to strategic materials such as steel, and thefinancial problems of the country, the navy should have sought to avoid a naval competition
with the Americans by preserving the Washington system. Lastly, some scholars similarlyinterpret the trust placed by naval officers in their ability to win a war with the UnitedStates in case Japan withdrew from the system.
Such arguments discard important factors by labelling irrational the stance of the Imperial
Navy. The naval status quo in 1934 was not considered as advantageous by Japanese
officers. The strategic position of the Japanese navy was deteriorating. Its ability tocommand the sea in the Western Pacific and protect Japan against an American offensive
was weakening.45 The capacity of the US Pacific Fleet to project its superior naval power
far into the Pacific was improving. In addition to this growing power projection capacity,
the Vinson-Trammell Act adopted by Congress in March 1934 aimed at bringing theAmerican navy to treaty limits within an eight-year period through the construction of 102
vessels and 1,184 airplanes.46 As the unfavorable ratios imposed by the Washington systemcame closer to be transposed to the battlefield, the Japanese navy approximated the needfor parity in naval strength in order to be able to defeat the Americans in the Western
Pacific. It was therefore strategically rational for the institution to abrogate the Five-Power
Treaty and seek more favorable ratios in naval power at the Second London Conference.
This had less to do with naval officers’ feeling of dishonor or enthusiasm for naval
expansion than with strategic considerations.
Scholars are correct in arguing that Japan had no chance of winning an arms race if theUnited States took the exercise seriously. On the other hand, the position of the Imperial
Navy was logical from an institutional perspective. It was struggling to make effective its
naval strategy against the US Pacific Fleet, not to win an arms race. This strategy had been
jeopardized by the restrictions on auxiliaries imposed by the 1930 London Treaty. By
recovering the ability to build freely in key categories, the institution regained the strategic
flexibility necessary to fulfill its missions. In other words, naval inferiority had never been
the real problem for the navy. The true issue was the negative consequences of arms control
on the implementation of a naval strategy dedicated to deal with a superior enemy. This
strategy, a vital part of which was dedicated to wear down the strength of the American
fleet during its transpacific journey, required the right amount of specific vessels to beeffective.47
Consequently, the assertion that naval officers were overconfident about their chance ofvictory in a war with the United States must be handled carefully. Even considering therelative decline in Japan’s naval power that followed the withdrawal from the Washington
system, it remains to be proven that the strategic position of the Imperial Navy was, on theeve of the Pacific War, worse than a decade earlier after the imposition of new limitations
by the 1930 London Treaty. By the early 1940s, the recovered flexibility in naval expansion
by the navy in Japan’s withdrawal was central. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kaigun gunshuku, pp. 3-4.
45 Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p. 187.
46 The fact that naval expansion under the act focused on building a ‘balanced fleet’ able to cross the Pacific
did not fail to raise concerns inside the Japanese navy. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 354.
47 Thanks to flexibility in naval expansion, the navy thought that building the necessary naval assets would not
require an increase in naval expenditure and even that money could be saved. Kotani, ‘Dai ni ji rondon kaigun
gunshuku kaigi’, p. 79.

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Institutional Dynamics, Civil-Military Relations and Japan’s 1936 Withdrawal from the Washington System
had allowed Japan to develop key naval assets for the attrition strategy and build superbattleships expected to be decisive during the final battle.48 A report released by the Navy
General Staff in mid-1941 noted that the navy had a chance of defeating the United States
as long as it retained more than 50 per cent of the latter’s naval power, which was the caseat the time.49 Because of the improved efficacy of Japan’s naval strategy, the 50 per centratio replaced as a strategic minimum the 70 per cent ratio of the Washington system era
and the request for parity of the Second London Conference.
Therefore, the decision to abrogate the Five-Power Treaty and risk pulling Japan out of
the arms control framework by requesting parity in naval power was strategically rationalfrom the point of view of the Japanese navy. At best, the demand for revision would be
accepted by the United States and Great Britain during the Second London Conference.
And if Japan had to leave the Washington system, the Imperial Navy would recover the
strategic flexibility essential to fulfill its institutional missions. To withdraw was at least
preferable to remaining passively constrained by unfavorable arms limitations. Under
evolving technological conditions, these limitations were putting the navy in an‘unbearable’ strategic situation.50
This is not to deny the spiritual dimension of statements made by Katō Kanji and several
other officers during this period.51 It is however important to emphasize that there was noprospect of armed conflict with the United States at that time. What happened in 1941
should not blind scholars to the fact that war across the Pacific was almost unthinkable inthe mid-1930s. Naval officers eager to get rid of arms restrictions did not run the risk ofbeing proven wrong by events in claiming that, partly due to superior spirit, the Japanesenavy was able to win a war against the United States whatever the circumstances.
Spiritualism was actually an effective tool to prevent other domestic actors from attacking
the argument of those ready to risk a breakdown of the Washington system.
The strategic stimulus comprehensively explains the institutional dynamics and theevolution of the Imperial Navy’s position toward the arms control policy of the Japanese
government. The analysis demonstrates that to withdraw from the Washington system inthe mid-1930s was strategically rational for the naval institution. Officers like Katō Kanji
were not blind warmongers. Maybe shortsighted, but above all naval experts decided to do
the job for which they had been trained.

IV
This does not explain why the Japanese government embraced the navy’s strategic
requirements and prioritized power politics over diplomacy. The navy focused on finding a
way to defeat the American fleet in the Western Pacific, inside or outside the naval arms
control framework. The negative diplomatic, economic, and financial consequences ofdisengaging from the Washington system were not taken into account by the naval
48 The construction of the first two super battleships, Yamato and Musashi, was approved by naval authorities
in 1936.
49 Nihon Kokusai Seiji Gakkai, Taiheiyō sensō he no michi, p. 324.
50 In the words of Asada Sadao, ‘by the spring of 1934 the Japanese navy had concluded that its strategic
situation had become unbearable’. Asada, From Mahan to Pearl Harbor, p. 187.
51 During a meeting of high-ranking officers in Aug. 1934, when the abrogation of the Five-Power Treaty wasapproved, Katō Kanji said: ‘If it is possible for us to decide our level of military power autonomously and to
expand and contract this according to the national economy, then our navy, on the basis of increase of morale andself-confidence, which will be produced by this, can expect victory no matter what percentage of national power
our potential enemy possesses’. Gow, Military intervention, p. 302.

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LIONEL P. FATTON
institution. It was not its role to do so. Inversely, these foreseeable consequences shouldhave been central for the government. They should have convinced Japanese leaders of thenecessity to keep cooperating with the United States on arms control. This was particularly
true as Japan maintained relatively stable relations with the Americans, and as the latterhad no intention to interfere in Asian affairs because focusing on domestic issues amidFranklin Roosevelt’s New Deal.52 Dysfunctions in civil-military relations explain why thiswas not the case.
The defects in the structure of civil-military relations dated back to the early Meiji era andthe creation of the modern military services. As the centralization of the military andpolitical apparatus was underway, leaders of the Meiji Restoration feared militaryintervention in politics led by statesmen and regional lords.53 They consequently enacted aseries of regulations dedicated to forestall such interventions. The path chosen was to makethe nascent military apolitical by strictly isolating it from the political world, based on theprinciple of separation between the military and the government (hei-sei bunri shugi).
Meiji leaders first enacted regulations to directly restrain the military. In 1878, the army
released the Admonition to Soldiers. Military personnel had to refrain from ‘questioning
imperial policies, expressing private opinions on important laws, or criticizing the
published regulations of the government’.54 Two years later, the government released theRegulations for Public Meetings and Associations. They prohibited soldiers on active duty
and those assigned to the first and second reserves to enter political groupings and toparticipate in political meetings. Lastly, in 1882, the emperor issued the Rescript to
Soldiers and Sailors. The document requested them to ‘neither be led astray by current
opinions nor meddle in politics’.55 Interventions in politics by military personnel were also
sanctioned by the army and navy penal laws.
In parallel, Meiji leaders extracted the power to command troops from the reach ofpoliticians and military administrators. The General Staff Bureau, operating under thesupervision of the Army Ministry, was abolished and replaced in 1878 by an autonomous
General Staff Headquarters responsible to the emperor.56 The chief of staff was appointed
by the latter and was independent from the army and prime ministers. His right to bypass
the two ministers and report directly to the emperor on matters under his responsibility(iaku jōsō) was codified in 1885 at the time of the reorganization of the cabinet system.
Finally, article 11 of the Meiji Constitution of 1889 stated that ‘the Emperor has thesupreme command of the Army and Navy’.57 The article was interpreted by constitutional
scholars as empowering the chief of staff with the right of supreme command (tōsuiken):
the ability to issue orders about military operations and strategies in the name of theemperor. The prime and service ministers had absolutely no authority on matters related tothe command of troops.58
Regarding the administration of the military, Meiji leaders established service ministers as
the main responsible persons. The reorganization of the cabinet system in 1885 granted
them authority on affairs related to budget, personnel, and the acquisition of military assets.
52 Bix, Hirohito, p. 272; Imai, ‘Cabinet, emperor, and senior statesmen’, p. 64.
53 The Saga Rebellion of 1874 led by Etō Shinpei and the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877 under the leadership ofSaigō Takamori were clear illustrations of the danger.
54 Hackett, ‘The military: Japan’, p. 344.
55 Ibid.
56 The navy did not possess an independent General Staff until 1893. It was lagging behind the army in termsof institutional development. Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, p. 49.
57 Japan’s National Diet Library, The Constitution.
58 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, p. 74.

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Institutional Dynamics, Civil-Military Relations and Japan’s 1936 Withdrawal from the Washington System
The ministers had to report to the prime minister in this regard. 59 Article 12 of theConstitution read: ‘The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the
Army and Navy’.60 The article was interpreted as providing the army and navy ministers
with the duty to assist the emperor in these tasks.61 The prime minister theoretically had acertain control over administrative affairs as service ministers belonged to his government.
However, this control was weakened by the fact that the latter were customarily nominatedby their services and chosen from the list of active officers. This implied that if the services
were dissatisfied, they could refrain from such nominations to block the establishment of
the government or withdraw their ministers to bring it down.62 This undermined the abilityof the prime minister to interfere in military affairs in a way that displeased the services.
Japanese civil-military relations were structured in order to separate strictly the spheres of
responsibility between the government and military services. Over the years, the principleof separation between the military and the government resulted in what has been called adual government (nijū seifu). The military sphere was extremely strong against government
interference. This was particularly the case for strategic and operational matters, protectedby the right of supreme command. On the other hand, military services often penetrated thegovernment sphere to advance their interests. The problem with the system of dual
government was that by over depoliticizing the military institution, Meiji leaders ended up
counting on its self-restrain regarding interventions in politics. They provided thegovernment with no effective instrument to keep control over the military and discipline it.
When the strategic consequences of arms control pushed the Imperial Navy into politics,
the government could not but bow under the pressure.

V
The root of the Japanese government’s ill-conceived decision to withdraw from the
Washington system was not the navy; it was dysfunctions in civil-military relations. The
navy perfectly played its role as a military institution, but it should not have been able toimpose its view about arms control on the government. What can be learned from theJapanese case regarding the stability of arms control regimes?
First, the structure of civil-military relations is central to prevent the military institution
from acquiring undue political influence. Civilian control must be strong enough todiscipline a potentially reluctant military in case the government wants to prioritize
diplomacy over power politics. Civilian control of the military provides the government
with proper flexibility in the formulation of foreign policy. This means that arms control
agreements involving military dictatorships and similar kinds of political regime areparticularly vulnerable to destabilizing military intervention in politics.
On the other side of the same coin, the government must beware not to unnecessarily
provoke the military in order to mitigate the risk of intervention in politics. This implies,
first, that the government must avoid being perceived as forcibly interfering into what the
military considers as its sphere of responsibility. As mentioned, arms control entails theimposition by politicians of the terms of an international treaty to the military. The wise useof hybrid officers, like Navy Minister Katō Tomosaburō at the time of the Washington
Conference, gives the impression that the military shares responsibility for the arms control
59 Drea, Japan’s Imperial Army, p. 64.
60 Japan’s National Diet Library, The Constitution.
61 Ikeda, Kaigun to Nihon, p. 74.
62 Hackett, ‘The military: Japan’, p. 346.

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LIONEL P. FATTON
policy. The government can also provide the military with financial and othercompensations in order to display arms control as a mutually beneficial enterprise.
Second, the government must be careful not to excessively jeopardize the military’s
ability to fulfill institutional missions. This entails that arms limitations must leave somestrategic flexibility to the military. In other words, the government must refrain fromclosing all loopholes and allow rechanneling in military buildup. Rechanneling acts as apressure valve on the strategic stimulus. Additionally, the arms control regime must be
revised regularly to adapt quantitative and qualitative restrictions to changing geostrategic
circumstances, taking into account the evolution of military technology.
The argument developed above points to the limits of arms control as an instrument
regulating military affairs. It must be understood, however, that arms control is above all a
diplomatic tool that helps countries maintain contact over sensible security issues. Arms
control must be used in a realistic manner. It cannot provide countries with perfect security,
but it can promote cooperation and trust between member states.
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