History of Global Arms Transfer, 7 (2019), pp. 3-19

The Decolonization of the Arms Trade:
Britain and the Regulation of Exports to
the Middle East
By DANIEL STAHL*
During the two decades following World War I, the regulation of the arms tradeby international law was a major issue in international relations. After 1945,
nothing was done to reactivate the efforts of the interwar period. Instead, thearms-producing powers turned to informal, legally non-binding agreements. The
article asks how this shift away from international law towards informal methodsof coordination can be explained by focusing on Britain as one of the mostimportant arms suppliers, and on the Middle East as a recipient, from the interwar
period until the end of the 1960s. The article argues that the process of
decolonization was a crucial development leading to the decline of arms trade
limitations.
During the two decades following World War I, the regulation of the international arms
trade was a major issue in international relations. The British and American governments
pushed successfully to place arms transfer restrictions on the agenda of peace negotiationsin Paris. Between 1919 and 1936, the international arms trade was the subject of threeconferences, and two conventions were signed. The General Secretariat of the newly
created League of Nations, with its Disarmament Section, became a driving force behind
attempts to regulate and restrict the global transfer of weapons. Britain and France, two of
the main arms-producing countries, showed a strong interest in these negotiations. Even
when the Disarmament Conference failed to produce results in 1934, the delegates and the
League’s Secretariat were confident that they would be able to find a solution at least to the
problem of the arms trade. But before the negotiated arms trade convention could enter into
force, the rise of fascism and the outbreak of the Second World War brought this effort toan end.
After 1945, nothing was done to reactivate the efforts of the interwar period. The
Disarmament Section of the UN did not place the arms trade issue on its agenda, while thearms-producing powers turned to informal, legally non-binding agreements. At theinitiative of the US, the Western powers formed two bodies to control the internationalarms trade: the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) in 1949,
and the Near East Arms Coordinating Committee in 1952. While the aim of CoCom was torestrict technological transfers to states under Soviet influence, the task of the Near East
Committee was to coordinate arms sales to this region. Both committees had only anadvisory character, i.e., their recommendations were not legally binding.1* Author’s Affiliation: Dr. Daniel Stahl is Research Associate at the Friedrich Schiller University of Jena
(Germany).
1 For a general overview on arms trade regulations, see Harkavy, Arms trade, pp. 211-39; Bromley, Cooper,

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DANIEL STAHL
How can this shift away from international law towards informal methods of coordination
be explained? Why did international law lose its importance as an instrument to regulate
the arms trade? What effects did this shift have on the international arms trade? These
questions will be addressed by focusing on Britain as one of the most important arms
suppliers, and on the Middle East as a recipient, from the interwar period until the end of
the 1960s. During the years following World War I, Britain was one of the driving forces
pushing for an international convention as well as one of the main arms-producing
countries. Therefore, London’s arms export policies are key to understanding why efforts
to establish legally binding norms by international law were not continued after 1945. On
the other hand, the Middle East played a central role in debates about the international arms
trade throughout the time period under consideration – first, as a region across which someof the most important arms trade routes flowed; later, as a region in which the great powers
had multiple, often contradictory interests.
Scholars have argued that the Cold War, with its nuclear threat and the confrontation of
the two blocs, was the main reason for burying all efforts to negotiate an international arms
trade convention.2 There is much to support this explanation. However, it only captures partof the whole picture. This article argues that the process of decolonization was a crucial
development that led to the decline of arms trade limitations. More recently, scholarshiphas taken a closer look at the strongly interwoven history of colonialism and internationallaw. 3 Antony Anghie, in his thought-provoking study, ‘Imperialism and Sovereignty’,argued that ‘colonialism was central to the constitution of international law in that many ofthe basic doctrines of international law [...] were forged out of the attempt to create a legal
system that could account for relations between the European and non-European worlds inthe colonial confrontation’.4 If this is true and colonialism was a driving force behind thecodification of international law, then the process of decolonization must have slowed thedevelopment of international law. As I will show, this is exactly what we see in the case ofinternational law regarding the arms trade.

I
The Great War was far from over when, in January 1917, British officials from different
governmental departments held several meetings at Whitehall to discuss the question ofarms traffic. There was a strong consensus that as soon as peace was reached, a new threat
would emerge: At the end of the war, the ‘world’s total stocks of destructive weapons willin fact be infinitely greater than at any previous period in history; and the difficulty of
preventing these weapons from reaching undesirable hands will be proportionately
increased’.5 In their deliberations on how to handle this situation, British officials payedclose attention to a memorandum prepared by Sir Mark Sykes, in which he analysed how
these changes would affect the British Empire. Sykes was a conservative MP and a
and Holtom, ‘The UN Arms Trade Treaty’; Enomoto, ‘Controlling arms transfers’. For an overview of theinterwar period, see Ball, 'Britain and the Decline'; Stone, ‘Imperialism and sovereignty’; Webster, ‘Making
disarmament work’, Webster, ‘From Versailles to Geneva’. On the postwar period, see Pierre, Global politics ofarms sales, pp. 273-311; Mastanduno, Economic containment, pp. 64-106; Cain, ‘Exporting the Cold War’;Engel, ‘We are not concerned’; Yasuhara, ‘Myth of free trade’.
2 Harkavy, Arms trade, p. 216.
3 Pedersen, Guardians; Becker Lorca, ‘Universal international law’; Gassama, ‘International law’,4 Anghie, Imperialism, p. 3.
5 Committee of Imperial Defence: Report of Sub-Committee on Arms Traffic, 10 Mar. 1917, in The National
Archives (TNA), CAB 29/1.

4

The Decolonization of the Arms Tradedetermined supporter of imperialism. His analysis would become central to how the British
government approached the problem of the arms trade during the interwar period.
Sykes’ focus was on the British colonies. He was convinced that a large number of
weapons would find its way to the ‘savage tribesmen’, as they were living in Britishcolonies in East Africa. However, he did not consider this a serious threat. Planes andmachine guns would enable British troops to quell any rebellion without serious damage.
Besides, Sykes was more concerned about a far more dangerous threat: ‘When the war isover we shall, in Asia at all events, suffer from a great deal of social and political unrest.
[...] I suggest that the disaffected intellectuals of Cairo and the Indian towns will be a far
greater danger than will tribes armed with modern rifles’.6 This fear of revolution was
clearly shaped and enforced by events in Russia, where a revolution was underway, and by
uprisings in Ireland. It was reasonable to assume that something similar could happen in
Asia or Egypt. In India and in Arabic countries, the nationalist movement was gettingstronger, and political unrest was growing.
Against this backdrop, the India Office, the Foreign Office and the War Office proposedto the cabinet to negotiate ‘without any delay’ an international convention to regulate arms
traffic ‘in those parts of Asia and Africa in which it is of special importance to prevent
modern arms and ammunition from reaching the hands of indigenous races’.7 There were
three main hotspots that needed to remain under control. The first was the eastern coast of
Africa. From here, arms arriving from the Arabic Peninsula were distributed on thecontinent. Still more important was control of the Arabic Peninsula and Persia. From here,
ships went to and from India – the crown jewel of the British empire. It was therefore ofutmost strategic importance to control these zones in order to prevent arms from beingtransferred to India.8
It was not a new idea to control the transfer of arms to colonies by international law. In
1890, the Brussels Conference Act had been signed with exactly the same objective. But
France, Italy and the German Empire – all signatories of the act – had always been reluctant
to apply its norms in the way Britain expected them to.9 However, things changed after thewar. Germany lost its colonies, while France and Britain were entrusted by the newly
founded League of Nations to administer territories which formerly had pertained toGermany or the Ottoman Empire. With new territories under its control, France became
more interested in controlling the arms trade.10 French support was central to the British
initiative to push for an international arms trade convention. Not only was France an
influential power and arms producer, but its interest in the convention were quite similar:
Both of them needed an instrument by which to control its vast territories outside Europe.
Therefore, with French support, London was more likely to negotiate a treaty that would
conform to its policies.
Indeed, Britain managed to introduce the issue at the international level. Duringnegotiations of the League of Nations' covenant in Paris, Britain inserted a clause thatstated that the League would be entrusted ‘with the general supervision of the trade in arms
and ammunition with the countries in which the control of this traffic is necessary in thecommon interest’ (Art. 23 d). Certainly, this was a rather obscure way to talk about the
6 Memorandum by Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Mark Sikes, Bart, M.P., 12 Jan. 1917, in ibid.
7 Report of Sub-Committee on Arms Traffic, 10 Mar. 1917, in ibid. On the importance of the Committee for

British arms trade policies see Ball, 'Britain and the Decline', pp. 819-823.
8 Ibid.
9 Grant, Rulers, guns, and money, pp. 37-77; Beachey, ‘Arms trade’.
10 Report of Sub-Committee on Arms Traffic, 10 Mar. 1917, in TNA, CAB 29/1.

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DANIEL STAHL
colonies, but that was exactly what the clause was intended to be. Simultaneously and on
the basis of the Covenant’s clause, the British delegation in Paris initiated negotiations foran arms trade convention.11 Its initiative was not incompatible with the interests of otherstates. Washington had a strong interest in more stability in Latin America – the so-called‘backyard’ of the US. Therefore, controlling the arms trade to Latin American states would
serve to help achieve the goal of stability and thereby improve the socio-politicalenvironment for US enterprises doing business in the region. Latin American countries, on
the other hand, were eager to take control of the influx of arms into their states. For thesame reason, China was interested in regulating the international arms trade. To addressthese concerns, the treaty allowed the trading of arms only if it occurred under
governmental control (Art. 1).
Yet, there was another reason why states dependent on arms imports were especiallyeager to become party to the treaty. In the course of negotiations, a clause was agreed uponwhich stated that arms could only be exported to states which adhered to the convention(Art. 1). States that did not sign the contract would have been cut off from the supply ofarms by the signatories. For the great powers, this clause had the advantage of forcing
states like Belgium to become party to the convention. Such states produced and exported
small arms and were therefore potential suppliers of weapons to the colonies. In order tomaintain high production rates, they were always looking for export opportunities.12 On theother hand, they were dependent on imports of larger weapons and weapons systems, suchas cannons and tanks. Consequently, they were keenly interested in receiving arms from
France or Britain and therefore adhered to the convention. The text of the convention
therefore contained enough incentives to gain the support of states without any specificinterest in the colonies. However, the major part of the convention was devoted torestricting the transfer of arms to the so-called prohibited zones according to the interestsof the two main colonial powers, Britain and France. These zones included not onlycolonial territories but also sovereign or semi-sovereign states through which some of themost important trade routes towards the colonies flowed. In essence, the convention was an
instrument to strengthen colonial rule.
The convention was signed in September 1919 in Saint Germain. However, the US stayedoutside the League of Nations and did not ratify treaties under its jurisdiction, such as theConvention of Saint-Germain. The American reluctance to adhere to the convention
brought the other signatory powers into a problematic situation, as the British case shows.
For London, the convention had never been an instrument to curb the arms trade generally.
On the contrary, officials in London were eager to protect the British armament industry
from any negative effects caused by the convention.13
In 1920, as it became clear that the US had restrained itself from signing the arms trade
convention, European arms-producing states feared they would be at a serious disadvantage
compared with companies in the US. The convention prohibited the export of arms to nonsignatory states, among which were Argentina and Spain, both important recipients ofwarships and cannons produced in Europe. Even though the convention was not yet inforce, its provisions could not simply be ignored. The signatories had agreed to a protocol
which stated that once it was in force, they would not adopt any measure contrary to theconvention. This gave its provisions a certain degree of authority even without ratification.
The protocol had resulted from London’s fear that surplus weapons from the Great War
11 Stone, ‘Imperialism’, pp. 217 f.
12 Hilbert, ‘Waffenexport’.
13 Memorandum of Department of Overseas Trade to FO, 14 May 1920, in TNA, FO 371/4419.

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The Decolonization of the Arms Trade
would reach the colonies in great quantities immediately after the war. To prevent this, theForeign Office had been pressured to enforce restrictions on the arms trade as soon as
possible.14
Italy was the first state to address the problem caused by the protocol and US refusal tosign the convention. In a letter from April 1920 to the other arms-exporting European
states, Italy demanded that action be taken.15 The British Foreign Office agreed: ‘If we
continue as at present, the United States firms (...) will go on taking trade away from us’.16
The British armament industry did its best to foster these fears. Repeatedly, representativesof Vickers and Armstrong, the main armament companies, approached British authorities
complaining about the convention’s effects on their business.17 The Department of Overseas
Trade was alarmed: ‘Vickers Limited have also recently experienced difficulties inexporting war material from this country to Spain (...). This Department can only view thepresent position with the gravest apprehension for the future of a trade which has, in thepast, been very profitable in times of peace and of the highest importance to the country intimes of war’.18
Despite these problems, the colonial powers had no option to follow the example of the
US and abandon the convention – especially not Britain. The advantages of having an
instrument to reduce and control the influx of arms into the colonies outweighed thedisadvantages.19 Therefore, it was decided to contact the other remaining arms-producing
powers – France, Belgium, Japan and Italy – to find a suitable solution that would enable
them to limit exports to the colonies while at the same time averting damages to their own
arms exports. It is noteworthy that all these states were, at the same time, colonial powers.
This circumstance facilitated an agreement between them. In May 1920, they decided toapply the provisions of the convention only to the so-called ‘prohibited zones’ – in otherwords, to the colonies and some adjacent states.20
The process that led to this multilateral agreement shows very clearly that efforts torestrict the arms trade by international law and to enforce the application of such norms –even without a legally binding convention – were not driven by the desire to limit theinternational arms trade generally. Rather, the aim was to control the colonies and toprevent the anti-colonial movement from arming itself. That said, to understand the issue
of arms trade regulations during the interwar period, it is necessary to not only ask how andwhy conventions and agreements were negotiated, but also to consider the actual practiceof regulating the arms trade: How did the colonial powers make use of their multilateralagreement? Again, the case of Britain is especially helpful for answering this question.
It was the arms trade with small weapons and ammunition which was considered by
London as the main problem. Most of the weapons were produced in Europe. Merchantsbrought them over Syria and the Arabic Peninsula to the coasts of the Persian Gulf, from
where they could reach India.21 British authorities made use of the agreement to restrict theapplication of the convention’s provision to the colonies in two ways. First, it was used as
an instrument to discipline sovereign states and protectorates within the prohibited zones,
14 Committee of Imperial Defence: Report of Sub-Committee on Arms Traffic, 10 Mar. 1917, in ibid., CAB
29/1.
15 Italian Foreign Ministry to British Foreign Office, 1 Apr. 1920, in ibid., FO 371/4419.
16 Lockhart: The proposed modifications in the arms traffic convention, 17 May 1920, in ibid.
17 See exchange of letters in ibid., FO 371/4422.
18 The Department of Overseas Trade to FO, 14 May 1920, in ibid., 371/4419.
19 The proposed changes in the arms traffic convention, 20 May 1920, in ibid.
20 The proposed modifications in the arms traffic convention, 17 May 1920, in ibid.
21 Report of Committee on the Arms Traffic in the Persian Gulf, in ibid., FO 371/5530.

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DANIEL STAHL
mainly Persia, Kuwait and Oman. For Britain, it was crucial to control the traffic in thesestates, because it was from there that arms reached India. Therefore, the Arabic Peninsula
and the Gulf states, or at least parts of their territories, were included to the prohibitedzones throughout the interwar period, even when the territories’ governments protested
strongly against such treatment. 22 On the basis of the convention, British naval forces
patrolled the Persian Gulf and searched ships for guns. They also forced the sheiks of‘prohibited areas’ to exercise stricter control on guns.23
Second, the convention served as an instrument to exercise pressure on the othersignatories. When British authorities received information in 1920 that France was about todeliver large quantities of arms to Abyssinia, they immediately contacted their Frenchcounterparts to inform them that Abyssinia was part of the prohibited zone.24 One year
later, the British discovered evidence that Syria, which was under the mandate of France,
had become a transfer zone for weapons. Again, French authorities were pressured on thebasis of the convention to take appropriate steps to control the arms traffic in theirmandated territories. 25 The same thing happened to Italian authorities when Britain
discovered an arms-smuggling network operating between Trieste and Palestine.26
These examples show that despite not coming into force, the convention was not a mere
scrap of paper. Instead, it served to legitimize the curtailment of the sovereignty of nonEuropean states and to harmonize the arms export policies of the European colonial
powers. When colonial officers met in August 1921 in Karachi to evaluate their measuresagainst the arms trade, they came to very satisfying conclusions. According to theirestimations, only around 700 rifles and 100.000 rounds of ammunition had been traded in
the territories surrounding the Persian Gulf.27 It is no wonder that British authorities were
full of praise for the convention. Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon stated: ‘The application of
the convention to these [prohibited] areas fulfils a useful object, and enables the parties tothe convention to control to some extent a trade which should, for humanitarian reasons, bemost strictly regulated’.28
Due to US refusal to sign the Convention of Saint-Germain, the Disarmament Section of
the League of Nation’s Secretariat started planning a second arms trade conference.29 The
British Foreign Office was all but delighted with this development. In a memorandum
prepared for the British delegate in Geneva, Whitehall officials instructed him to voteagainst a new conference: ‘Not only would such labours be a waste of time, but they would
also tend to weaken the authority of the Convention of Saint-Germain by calling attention
to the informality of the arrangements on which its present enforcement is based. The
convention may not be perfect, but it does at least check the supply of arms to turbulent
races in Africa and the Middle East, and this was precisely the object which His Majesty’s
Government had in view when they initiated the negotiations leading up to theconvention’.30 Britain did not succeed in blocking the conference. Therefore, the Foreign
Office changed its strategy. During the conference that took place in mid-1925, the British
22 Prince Arfa ed Dowleh to the President of the TMC, 7 Jul. 1924, in League of Nations Archives (LNA), R
231, Dossier 32639.
23 India Office to FO, 7 Sep. 1921, in TNA, FO 371/5530.
24 See exchange of letters in ibid., FO 371/4421.
25 See exchange of letters in ibid., FO 371/5527.
26 See exchange of letters in ibid., FO 371/7178.
27 Report of Committee on the Arms Traffic in the Persian Gulf, in ibid., FO 371/5530.
28 Curzon to Sir A. Geddes (Washington), 6 Jun. 1921, in ibid., FO 371/5529.
29 Stone, ‘Imperialism’, pp. 220-30.
30 Memorandum for Lord Robert Cecil, 30 Nov. 1923, in ibid., FO 371/8422.

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The Decolonization of the Arms Tradedelegation worked hard to introduce as many provisions as possible regarding theprohibited zones – now labeled special zones – into the text of the new convention. It
succeeded: Like the Convention of Saint-Germain, the Geneva Convention was designed to
become an instrument of colonial rule.

II
After World War II, the colonial landscape changed dramatically, especially in Asia.
Already in 1932, Britain had conceded independence to Iraq. In 1946, the former Frenchmandate of Syria became independent, as did Jordan, which had formed part of the British
mandate over Palestine. In 1948, Britain withdrew from the rest of Palestine. But mostimportant was the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947. Suddenly, there were only afew small British territories and military bases left in the Middle East and South Asia. With
the decolonization of these regions, the central motive of Britain and France to control thearms trade faded. At the same time, it was clear that neither the Soviet Union nor the US
would back any attempt to negotiate treaties to enforce colonial rule. Washington was very
explicit about its aversion to colonialism, although it had supported the suppression of
those liberation movements being denounced by the colonial powers as communist. The
US government feared that maintaining colonialism would force colonized nations into thearms of the Soviet Union.31 Against this backdrop, it is understandable that Britain did noteven consider taking up its policies of the interwar period or pushing for a new convention
to restrict the arms trade in its remaining colonies.
This did not mean that interest in arms trade limitations disappeared completely. The new
driving force behind attempts to limit the transfer of arms was anti-communism. Even
without negotiations, the most important arms producers of the Western bloc implemented
national measures to prevent arms from being exported to the Eastern bloc. However, theSoviet Union and its allies were in the middle of the process of developing a strong
domestic armament industry. Therefore, it was not enough to impede the export of arms. To
prevent the Eastern bloc from building too many weapons, it was necessary to also limit
the export of certain materials and machines. In order to harmonize its exports to the East
bloc and reach an agreement on which products should not be exported, NATO members
and Japan established the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls(CoCom). It is worth noting that the CoCom was not based on international law. It
possessed only a consultative character, and member states were not obliged to comply
with its recommendations. Instead, the enforcement of its recommendations depended
strongly on the ability of the US to impose economic sanctions against companies which
did not comply.32
At the same time, with regard to other areas, anti-communism fostered arms exports. Thiswas especially true in the former colonies. British exports to the Middle East clearly
demonstrate this. After decolonization, Britain was eager to secure access to oil in theregion. At the same time, the Cold War was stoking fears of ‘Soviet penetration’. London
hoped to confront the perceived Soviet threat and secure its economic interests bydeveloping close ties with the newly established Arab League. Therefore, at the beginningof the 1950s, the Foreign Office pursued a plan to make the armies of the Arab countries an
31 Westad, Global Cold War, pp. 110-57.
32 Mastanduno, Economic containment, pp. 64-106; Cain, ‘Exporting the Cold War’; Engel, ‘We are notconcerned’; Yasuhara, ‘Myth of free trade’.

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DANIEL STAHL
integral part of its own army in case of war. 33 Arms exports played a key role in thisstrategy. First, the arms were meant to strengthen the Arab states’ ability to resist the Soviet
threat in such a way that they did not put too much strain on the British budget. Second, thearms helped to avoid a trade deficit with oil-exporting states. Third, to facilitate theintegration of Arab armies into its own, Britain pursued the standardization of weapons andweapons systems on the basis of British models.34
During the first half of the 1950s, London’s arms trade policies in the Middle East were a
success. Leaving NATO member Turkey aside, with a share of nearly 60 percent, Britain
became the most important arms supplier in the Middle East, e.g., 95 percent of all military
airplanes sold to the Middle East were produced by Britain.35 However, this success was
not so much the result of clever marketing strategies but rather due to economic andpolitical circumstances. The Middle East was not yet the competitive market it would later
become. Only 5 to 6 percent of Britain’s annual 90 million pounds of arms exports went tothese countries; NATO members and Commonwealth states were the main recipients.36 The
US had very little interest in arming the Arab states. Against the backdrop of the Korean
War, Washington was much more concerned with arming its allies in East Asia, especially
the South Korean regime.37 At the same time, the Truman administration had no desire to
invoke public criticism by arming Israel’s neighbours.38 Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was
still engaged in the build-up of its armament industry at the capacities required to satisfy
the needs of Eastern European countries.39 Likewise, France’s armament industry had not
yet recovered from the devastation of the war.40
But even though the volume of arms exported to the Middle East was marginal comparedwith other regions, the Western countries began discussing restrictions. Since thefoundation of Israel, Britain and the US had been caught in a dilemma. On the one hand,
they wished to strengthen ties with the governments of Egypt, Persia and Iraq and integratethem into an anti-communist alliance. On the other hand, Washington and London were
facing public pressure not to arm the enemies of Israel. Especially in the US, a pro-Israel
lobby was actively attempting to reduce arms exports to Israel’s neighbours. President
Truman himself proved to be very receptive to these demands. In 1947, the State
Department began pressing Britain to endorse a common arms exports policy towards theMiddle East in order to maintain the ‘balance of power’ in the region and prevent an arms
race.41
Britain was more than willing to discuss the matter. First, it agreed that an arms race
between Israel and the Arab states was not in the interest of the Western powers. Yet, there
were other reasons why Britain was so interested in coordinating arms exports to theMiddle East. The Foreign Office hoped that such an agreement could help ‘keep UnitedStates exports to the areas from swamping our own, with consequent detriment to our
33 Devereaux, Schrecker, Formulation of British defense policy, pp. 43-74; Levey, ‘Britain’s Middle East
strategy’.
34 United States Arms Aid to Middle East Countries, note by the War Office, 6 Feb. 1952, in TNA, DEFE
7/2097.
35 SIPRI: Arms trade registers, p. 162; Sutton, Kemp, Arms to developing countries, esp. p. 9.
36 Based on the numbers in Review of World Trade in Arms by the British Foreign Office, 1955, in TNA,
DEFE 7/2097.
37 Hovey, United States military assistance, pp. 17-48.
38 Jabber, Not by war, pp. 80-8.
39 Krause, Arms and the state, pp. 115 f.
40 SIPRI, Arms trade registers, pp. 150 f.
41 Here and on the following, see Jabber, Not by war, pp. 63-127.

10

The Decolonization of the Arms Tradeprestige’.42 This short statement shows that Britain’s motives in coordinating arms exports
to the Middle East were very ambiguous. They aimed to both restrict the influx ofarmaments to the region and secure the region as a market for British arms exports. The
reference to ‘our prestige’ demonstrates that the purpose for securing these markets was topreserve Britain’s own influence over its former colonies. Therefore, Britain’s readiness to
discuss the arms trade with Washington can be interpreted as a continuation of its interwar
policies. Whereas before World War II, arms trade restrictions had been an instrument tocontrol the colonized territories, in the post-colonial setting, arms exports became thepreferred way to maintain a certain degree of control.
This shift points to some fundamental changes in the arms trade with the Middle East.
During the interwar period, mainly small arms had reached the Middle East. After 1945,
the process of decolonization and the rapid advances in defence technology resulting fromthe Second World War and Korean War led to an influx of arms systems of greater
complexity: tanks, airplanes and – since the 1960s – missiles. These weapons had a very
ambivalent nature. On the one hand, they were seen by newly independent states as
guarantors and symbols of independence. This was especially true for airplanes. Everynational army was eager to develop its own air force. At the same time, airplanes could not
be operated without the assistance and know-how of the exporting states. By providing
training in the use of weapons, assistance in their maintenance and a supply of spares, thearms-supplying states could exert a certain degree of control over how their products wereused by the recipients. Scholarship has always discussed, controversially so, the questionof to what extent arms suppliers were able to exert any real influence through exports. 43
However, what counts in this context is that Britain’s policy throughout the years was built
on the belief that arms exports gave them influence.
In 1950, the US, Britain and France signed the so-called Tripartite Declaration, in which
they both acknowledged the legitimate need for Near Eastern states to maintain a certain
level of armed strength and reaffirmed their opposition to the development of an arms race
between the Arab states and Israel. To coordinate their policies in this sense, the Near East
Arms Coordinating Committee was established. Its functions were to keep a record ofmilitary equipment supplied to the Middle East, to consider the programmes of its member
states, and to make recommendations about what actions should be taken with respect torequests for arms submitted by Near Eastern states. Like CoCom, the Near East Committee
had only an advisory character. The Tripartite Declaration was not legally binding, and the
Near East Committee had no authority to prevent any country from supplying arms.44
The non-binding character of the Near East Committee’s suggestions was very much to
the liking of the Foreign Office. When it came to questions of how to implement theagreement, British officials affirmed in their internal communications: ‘We are alive to thedanger of hindrance to our exports. We do not intend, however, to refer each individual
application to the Committee. Its provisions are vague enough, we hope, to let us out ofthis’.45 Thus, the lax provisions of the arms control system established by the Tripartite
Declaration were in part attributable to Britain’s interest in using the agreement to defend
its share of the Middle Eastern arms market.
42 Minute to Mr. Wheeler, 8 Jun. 1952, in TNA, DEFE 7/2097.
43 Albrecht, Handel mit Waffen, pp. 123-35; for an overview of the debate, see Kinsella, ‘Arms transfer

dependence’. From a historical point of view, see Grant, Rulers, guns and money, esp. pp. 232-43.
44 On the history of the Tripartite Declaration and the Near East Arms Coordination Committee, see Jabber,
Not by war.
45 Minute to Mr. Wheeler, 8 Jun. 1952, in TNA, DEFE 7/2097.

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DANIEL STAHL
However, the Near East Committee soon lost its limited relevance. By the mid-1950s, theFrench armament industry had recovered, but the French government did not want to bear
the financial burden of this effort alone. Accordingly, France began looking for export
markets, and Israel was a perfect match. Britain and the US were selling arms to Israel only
reluctantly out of fear that doing so would alienate their Arab allies. France, however, did
not consider the Tripartite Declaration as an obstacle to selling the products of its recoveredarmament industry. In 1954, France began exporting its newly developed Ouragon fighter
and Mystère bomber, as well as vast quantities of tanks, to Israel.46
The second blow to the Tripartite Declaration came as an aftermath of the Egyptian
revolution in 1952 and the abolishment of the monarchy. The revolution was carried out by
the so-called Free Officers Movement, which had a nationalist and anti-imperialist agenda.
Their aim, among others, was to end British occupation and increase their independence
from the former colonial powers. One important step in achieving this goal was to find newarms suppliers who could help ensure Egyptian independence. Until the coup, Britain had
been the only supplier. Soon after taking power, the new government began negotiating anarms deal with the Soviet Union – officially through Czechoslovakia. The arms deal of1955 was a strong anti-imperialist signal. Another one followed soon after: In 1956, thenationalization of the Suez Canal was announced. Despite desperate attempts by Britain
and France to maintain control over this strategically important passage by force and withthe help of Israel, they ultimately had to surrender this remnant of colonial rule.47
Egypt was the first recipient of Soviet weapons in the so-called ‘Third World’. Until then,it had been the policy of Britain and the US to avoid an arms race in the Middle East by
supplying only a limited number of weapons to states in the region. This policy wasshattered in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, as Israel and Egypt began stockpiling arms
against each other. Consequently, although the Near East Committee continued working
until 1967, the Tripartite Declaration was dead.48 It is no coincidence that the last effort tocontrol arms exports to the Middle East collapsed right at the moment, when the last former
colonial power lost its most important foothold in the region. Colonialism had been acentral motive for regulating the arms trade; it had also provided the means to enforce thiscontrol. As a consequence of decolonization, this project came to an end.
The Suez Crisis showed clearly that London’s Middle East strategy of winning the Arabstates as allies had failed. Pan-Arabism experienced a phase of broad public support
combined with a strong anti-colonial spirit, and not only in Egypt. Public protests against
the regional influence of the former colonial powers, Britain and France, took place inSyria and Lebanon, and the governments of these states started to distance themselves fromthe West more noticeably. The newly discovered capacity of the Soviet Union to deliver
weapons to former colonies provided them with the means to alienate themselves fromBritain. Decolonized states began viewing Soviet arms exports as a guarantor of their
independence. In the second half of the 1950s, the Soviets increased arms exports to theMiddle East considerably. Syria and Yemen also turned to Moscow. Britain’s hopes now
rested with Iraq, which, under the rule of the Hashemite dynasty, became a principal ally of
the West. In 1955, the Baghdad Pact was signed by Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey and Britain
as a treaty of mutual defence against Soviet influence. However, in 1958, a group of
officers led by Abd al-Karim Qasim overthrew the monarchy, which had been implemented
by Britain. Qasim criticised Britain’s hold on Iraqi oil, even though he feared sanctions too
46 SIPRI, Arms trade registers, pp. 52-5; Jabber, Not by war, pp. 104-7.
47 Roussillon, ‘Republican Egypt’, pp. 337-40; Westad, Global Cold War, pp. 123-6.
48 Jabber, Not by war, p. 115.

12

The Decolonization of the Arms Trademuch to nationalise the Iraqi Petroleum Company. The new regime denounced themonarchy as puppets of the former colonial powers, cut off relations with the West, andturned to the Soviet Union to – like Egypt – equip its army with Soviet models.49
This decision was not only meant to be a signal of independence, but also to confer
financial advantages. Britain depended on earnings from commercial exports for a numberof reasons, not least of which was its trade balance with the oil-exporting states and its
relatively small demand for armaments – at least when compared with the Soviet Unionand the US. In order to maintain its armament industry, Britain had to reduce its researchand production costs by enabling longer production runs and increasing profitability
through exports. Therefore, British military aid volume was considerably smaller than thatof the US.50 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, gave political considerations priority
over economic interests. Governments from Third World countries could buy Soviet
armaments for comparably low prices and on very good conditions. This enabled Middle
Eastern states to increase their number of armaments considerably.51
At the same time as the Soviet Union was stepping into the arms trade in the Middle East,
the US became more strongly involved, even though it did not place itself in directcompetition with Britain. Iran, which had not yet received a significant number of weapons,
played a key role. At the beginning of the 1950s, the Western powers had observed Iran’s
policies with suspicion. Between 1951 and 1953, Mohammad Mossadegh had been prime
minister. After taking office, he denounced the power of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company,
which held national oil concessions. Mossadegh viewed nationalization as the only way toachieve economic and political independence. Shortly thereafter, the Iranian congress
passed legislation that led to the nationalization of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. The
West therefore considered Mossadegh’s government to be socialist and thus a threat. In
1953, Mossadegh was arrested after a coup instigated by Britain and the US. The Shah,
who had left the country, returned.52
During subsequent years, the US built up the Shah as a close ally against the Soviet
threat. Because of its border with the Soviet Union, Iran was included together with
Taiwan, South Korea and Vietnam in the category of ‘forward defense areas’. States in thiscategory received around 70 percent of American military aid. US military aid was a major
factor in postwar arms transfers. During the 1950s, not even one-quarter of US arms
leaving the country were sold on a commercial basis. Three quarters of the transfers werepart of the military aid programme implemented in 1951 to construct an anti-communist
international security system. States which were considered helpful in confronting theSoviet threat received donations of arms or could purchase them on a non-profit basis.53
After 1955, Iran received large numbers of weapons from the US. Due to these transfers,
the American share of the Middle Eastern market grew considerably.54
After losing Egypt and Iraq to the Soviets, Britain’s exports dropped significantly, and it
lost its status as the main arms supplier of the Middle Eastern states. Competition, however,increased immensely. During the decade following the Soviet–Egypt arms deal, exports to
the Middle East quintupled compared with the early 1950s. Before 1955, the Middle
49 SIPRI, Arms trade with the Third World, pp. 201-20; SIPRI, Arms trade registers, pp. 41-66. Regarding the
Iraqi revolution, see Marr, Modern history of Iraq, pp. 81-112; Tripp, History of Iraq, pp. 148-67.
50 Albrecht, Handel mit Waffen, pp. 103-6.
51 Pierre, Global politics of arms sales, pp. 78-80; Boden, ‘Cold War economics’.
52 Westad, Global Cold War, pp. 119-23.
53 Review of World Trade in Arms by the British Foreign Office, 1955, in TNA, DEFE 7/2097; Hovey, UnitedStates military assistance, see esp. pp. 8-15; Albrecht, Handel mit Waffen, pp. 93-103.
54 Albrecht, Handel mit Waffen, p. 177; SIPRI, Arms trade registers, pp. 46-50.

13

DANIEL STAHL
Eastern arms market had been smaller than those of the Far East, South Asia and SouthAmerica. After, it became as important as the former two, in some years comprising onethird of all arms sales to the developing world. The conflict between Israel and Egypt
dominated the scenario, with both countries becoming main recipients of arms. The Soviet
Union was the top supplier, providing 40 to 56 percent of all major weapons between 1955
and 1965. The US and France each had a share between 15 to 20 percent, while Britain
provided only 7 to 9 percent of all major weapons.55 In sum, anti-colonialism, the Cold War
and the Arab–Israel conflict together prompted the growth of the arms market in the Middle
East, as did attempts by the former colonial powers and the world’s new superpowers, theUS and the Soviet Union, to maintain a certain degree of influence over these countries visa-vis the two great conflicts that shaped relations in the region.

III
This constellation of factors would structure the arms trade in the region throughout the
coming years. It would also impede the establishment of regulatory norms, as one frustrated
initiative by Britain’s Labour Party government following the Six-Day War shows. Initially,
the conditions seemed opportune. The administration of Harold Wilson, which had taken
power in 1964, had placed arms trade regulations back on the government agenda. The
Labour Party had been criticising the defense policies of the Tory government for years.
Among the issues were arms exports, especially to South Africa.56 The first task of the newprime minister in this area was to create the post of Minister of Disarmament within theForeign Office and give it to the Times’ defense correspondent, Alun Gwynne-Jones, astrong and well-known critic of British armament policies, who after his appointment
became Lord Chalfont.57
From the beginning, Chalfont pushed for more arms trade regulations. However, noForeign Office official was passionate about this priority of the newly appointed minister,
who had no experience as a politician. For two years, whenever Chalfont raised the issue,
he was met with extensive memoranda stating the impossibility of setting up an effective
multilateral or international agreement on arms limitation. The situation in the Middle East
was considered especially complicated and therefore hopeless. 58 However, when growing
tensions in the region erupted into the Six-Day War, Chalfont made another attempt. In
reaction to fierce debates at the UN, where arms exports to the Middle East had beendenounced by many delegates, Chalfont convinced Foreign Secretary George Brown to
instruct staff members to reconsider the question of arms exports to the region.59
However, Chalfont was confronted not only with reluctant subordinates but also with thepolitical priorities of the Labour Party, which stood in the way of more regulations,especially in the Middle East. In the post-colonial setting, it proved impossible for the
Labour government to reconcile its demand for arms trade controls for this region withother policy goals. First there was the problem of Britain’s balance of payments. Although
the economy was in good condition when Labour took office, the Wilson government
inherited an unresolved problem from the conservatives which had the potential to cause
55 SIPRI, Arms trade registers, pp. 46-50, 150 f., 162-4.
56 Phythian, Politics of British arms sales, pp. 5-8.
57 Chalfont, Shadow, pp. 85-97.
58 See documents in TNA, FO 371/187483 and FCO 10/142 and 143.
59 Draft of the note by the Foreign Secretary on the policy for the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab countries,

n.d. [Oct. 1967], in ibid., FCO 10/143.

14

The Decolonization of the Arms Tradegreat harm to the country’s economy: Britain’s balance of trade deficit was growing.
Wilson rejected devaluation as a solution, fearing public uproar. The Arab countries andIran were key to solving this problem. Britain depended heavily on oil imports from thesecountries, which made up a substantial portion of its total imports. The importation of
crude oil by British oil companies was cheaper than the importation of petroleum products
and thus helped significantly reduce the balance of trade deficit. Therefore, their interests
were supported wherever possible.60 This policy had been implemented at the beginning of
the twentieth century, when Britain had secured exclusive concessions for its companies in
the Middle East.61 As this region was now home to sovereign states, Whitehall had to lookfor other means to ensure the safety of its companies and its access to cheap oil.
Arms exports came to the foreground in this regard. In a memorandum prepared for thecabinet at the request of Lord Chalfont, Foreign Office officials recognised that exports to
Israel’s neighbours were seen by the public with a critical eye. However, since ‘national
interests’ were concentrated in the Arab countries and Persian Gulf states, securing the‘stability of the area’ would be necessary. Thus, Britain was obliged ‘to supply reasonable
quantities of arms to enable [the Middle Eastern states] to deter external attacks andinternal subversion’.62 This policy was based on past experiences in Iran and Iraq, where
revolutions had endangered the business of British oil companies. Arms exports were thus
meant to avoid a historical repetition: ‘There is a clearly fair division in the Middle East
between the Arab states following an evolutionary policy and those following a
revolutionary policy. The former are normally more favourable to British interests and it istherefore to our advantage that they should be strong enough to stand up to the latter. The
moderates in the Arab world need to acquire arms from the West if they are to avoid being
drawn into a still closer relationship with the Soviet Union, and if they are to maintainsome degree of independence of action’.63 Although not stated explicitly, ‘independence ofaction’ meant safeguarding British interests.
Yet, arms exports to the Middle East also contributed in a more direct way to reducing
the balance of payments deficit. As a consequence of the growing demand for oil, imports
from the Middle East increased sharply in the late 1960s, with no sign that this trend would
slow down.64 Against this backdrop, arms exports became a decisive factor in maintainingbalanced trade. Britain’s arms exports to the Middle East had recovered from the backlash
between 1955 and 1958. Since 1962, they had been constantly growing. In 1966, theyreached the same level as that of the mid-1950s, comprising approximately one-third of
total arms exports to the Middle East,65 and future prospects looked even better. Extensive
deals had been concluded, two of which were worth more than £ 100 million.66 These deals
had the potential to turn the region into the most important recipient of British weapons
outside of NATO.
Besides the balance of trade, there was a second major political issue in the Labour
60 Kuiken, ‘Caught in transition’, pp. 275 f.; TNA, T 317/134.
61 Pedersen, Guardians, pp. 272-7.
62 Policy for the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab countries, note by the Foreign Secretary, 6 Nov. 1967, in

TNA, FCO 10/143.
63 Ibid.
64 Central Office of Information, Britain, pp. 378 f.
65 SIPRI, Arms trade registers, pp. 154 f.; Central Office of Information, Britain, p. 380. A comparison of thevalues given in these two statistics helps to estimate the share of the armament trade. It is, however, not possible
to relate the numbers in the SIPRI statistics directly to British trade statistics, as SIPRI uses a different method todefine the value of a product.
66 Draft of the note by the Foreign Secretary on the policy for the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab countries,
n.d. [Oct. 1967], in ibid., FCO 10/143.

15

DANIEL STAHL
government’s agenda which was closely connected to the arms trade issue: reducing
Britain’s defence spending.67 Arms exports to the Middle East could help achieve this aim
in two ways. First, they would reduce the costs of armaments by externalizing development
and research costs and ensuring longer production runs. Second, they would help absorb
some of the negative effects caused by cuts in defence spending. In 1966, one-third of all
British arms exports to developing countries were sent to the Middle East.68 In fact, anarms deal worth more than £ 140 million had been concluded with Saudi Arabia with thedeclared purpose of absorbing a portion of the negative effects caused by cuts in defence
spending.69 Therefore – and because of the balance of trade deficit – the Foreign Officewarned the cabinet to ‘ignore the considerable commercial advantages of our arms sales tothe area’.70
Another factor was that the stationing of British troops in the Middle East, especially in
the Gulf states, was costly and contributed to the deficit. After the Six-Day War, theconviction that these forces were ineffective when it came to influencing Middle Easternpolicies gained ground in the cabinet. Therefore, the Labour government announced in July
1967 that it was withdrawing its remaining troops from the Arabian Peninsula. Thisannouncement had the effect of not only encouraging small countries like Kuwait to beginbuilding up armies for the first time, but also compelling Iran to order tanks from Britain.71
It was in Britain’s own interest, as defined by Whitehall officials, to meet these demands.
Therefore, the Foreign Office suggested to the Secretary of State that he ‘continue towork for an effective arms limitation agreement covering all the main suppliers’. 72
However, it was also recommended that Britain ‘continue to supply arms to the Middle
East’ until such an agreement could be reached: ‘If we do not continue to supply arms, weshould lose not only profitable exports, but any political advantage which our position as asupplier might give us’.73 At the same time, staff members at the Foreign Office left no
doubt that they considered the prospects of an agreement to be very low. They admitted
that US President Lyndon B. Johnson had suggested that arms exports to the Middle East
be registered, but in the eyes of British officials, this was not ‘a practicable idea’.74 The
memorandum did not even contain a counterproposal.
Such pessimism was aligned with the Foreign Office’s postwar policy of thwarting
attempts to regulate the international arms trade. However, the Minister of State was
unhappy about the reluctance of his subordinates. Not only did he wish to uphold Labour’smore positive approach towards arms trade limitations, he also wished to adhere to thestrategy Labour had been following since Wilson took office of pursuing closer cooperation
with the Johnson administration.75 Both the Secretary of State and Chalfont insisted that theForeign Office enter into an exchange with the US State Department in order to develop
proposals for an arms control system in the Middle East.76
67 Edgerton, Warfare state, pp. 241-4.
68 SIPRI, Arms trade registers, pp. 154 f.
69 Phythian, Politics of British arms sales, pp. 14-6.
70 Policy for the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab countries, note by the Foreign Secretary, 6 Nov. 1967, in

TNA, FCO 10/143.
71 Callaghan, Labour Party, pp. 270-3; SIPRI, Arms trade with the Third World, pp. 104 f.
72 Draft of the note by the Foreign Secretary on the policy for the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab countries,
n.d. [Oct. 1967], in TNA, FCO 10/143.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Callaghan, Labour Party, pp. 255-63.
76 Note by T.L. Crosthwait, 7 Nov. 1967, ibid. See also the changes in paragraph 5 between the draft and thefinal memorandum ‘Policy for the sale of arms to Israel and the Arab countries’, note by the Foreign Secretary, 616

The Decolonization of the Arms Trade
In response, Foreign Office officials did what they were accustomed to doing: They
started writing a memorandum, changing the initial focus by including other regions andeven excluding the Middle East, arguing that it seemed ‘hardly practical’77 to consider thisarea. When Chalfont insisted on a new initiative two years later, the Foreign Office held aseries of meetings, but the resulting arguments remained more or less the same as those put
forward in 1967.78 Chalfont grew increasingly frustrated with his staff. In a March 1970
letter to one of his high-ranking subordinates, he complained: ‘The official attitude to an
initiative on the Arms Trade is depressing. The Prime Minister has endorsed the idea ofsuch an initiative and in my view there are no insuperable difficulties. [...] I realise that
there are a number of problems, but that is all the more reason for urgency’.79 However,shortly thereafter, Labour lost the election, and Chalfont left office. Afterwards, the issue ofarms trade regulations for the Middle East was not taken up again by Britain. Whitehall
officials had managed to enforce their view of the arms trade on the Labour Party: That thenecessity to maintain influence over the former colonies in the face of trade deficits, oil
imports, the Arab–Israeli conflict and the Cold War stood in the way of any effective
agreement.

IV
Comparing the interwar- and postwar-period attempts to regulate the arms trade in the
Middle East, the absence of an international law approach after 1945 is remarkable. In
contrast, after World War I, the desire to regulate the influx of arms into the region had aglobal impact. It acted as a strong impulse to negotiate international law and led to both theinclusion of an arms traffic clause in the Covenant of the League of Nations and to thesigning of the Convention of Saint-Germain.
That said, there is one noteworthy similarity between how the problem of limiting thearms trade was handled before and after 1945. In both periods, the practice of arms transfer
control was not regulated by international law but rather by informal multilateralagreements concluded by arms-producing states: The agreement to comply with theprovisions of the Convention of Saint-Germain regarding the prohibited zones and the
Tripartite Declaration agreement. However, the latter was not as restrictive as the former.
The agreement for the interwar period consisted of clearly defined provisions regarding theprohibited zones and was used by Britain to demand full compliance. Any arms transfer notconsistent with the provisions was denounced. The Tripartite Declaration, on the other
hand, formulated only vague, general guidelines. None of the signatories made an attempt
to enforce full compliance.
One explanation for these differences can be found in the process of decolonization after
1945. It is no coincidence that the most comprehensive negotiations for limiting the arms
trade through international law and the implementation of the most effective measures tolimit the transfer of arms took place during the interwar period, when the colonial empires
reached their maximum extent. In order to control these vast territories, the colonial powers
were willing to strengthen international law and negotiate effective agreements. Once theyNov. 1967, in ibid.
77 Regional Agreements to limit the Introduction or further supply of sophisticated Weapons, August 1968, in
ibid, FCO 10/144.
78 Final record of a meeting held in the India Office Council Chamber on 9 Apr. 1970 to discuss a possible UK
initiative on regional arms limitation, in ibid., FCO 66/208.
79 Lord Chalfont to Thomas Brimelow, 9 Mar. 1970, in ibid.

17

DANIEL STAHL
began to lose their hold on territories in South Asia and the Middle East, however, they alsobegan to lose interest in regulating the arms trade through international law.
Decolonization not only brought down arms transfer regulations; it also transformed theeffects of arms trade regulations. The interests of the former colonial powers in the Middle
East had not disappeared, as this region provided a considerable share of the increasing
demand for oil. However, vis-a-vis sovereign states, the means of exerting influence had tochange. Anti-colonialism, Arab nationalism, the Cold War and the Arab–Israeli conflict put
the ability of the Western powers to secure their interests in the region to the test. This
constellation of factors transformed the Middle Eastern arms market from the ground up.
During the interwar period, the significance of the region for the global arms market lay inits function as a transfer site for mainly small weapons. From here, arms coming from
Europe were re-routed to South Asia, where Britain’s main interests lay. As the former
colonial powers and new superpowers tried to secure a certain degree of control over the
Middle East in the two decades following World War II, the Middle Eastern states became
recipients of highly sophisticated weapons. Because of their sophistication, these weapons
created new dependencies, which the former colonial powers hoped to exploit to influence
the policies of decolonized states. Arms trade regulations, on the contrary, wereincreasingly regarded as a hindrance to exerting influence.
Finally, decolonization created a new and substantial arms market for sophisticatedweapons, one which was large enough to have an impact on the national economy of theformer colonial powers. It was not just that the emergence of new states created newcustomers. Attempts by the Middle Eastern states to emancipate themselves from theinfluence of former colonial powers, together with the desire of hegemonic powers tomaintain or gain influence, had created by the mid-1950s a dynamic which led to a boom in
the Middle Eastern arms market. Hence, the economic cost of arms trade regulations grew
remarkably. As the example of Britain shows, it would be too simplistic to state thatWhitehall was eager to secure a profitable market for its armament industry. Because of its
volume, the Middle Eastern arms market had effects on different political issues: defence
spending, trade and currency policies. Therefore, British authorities had little interest inarms trade regulations.
From a contemporary viewpoint, the restriction of the arms trade as an instrument topursue imperial goals might seem like a paradox. Arms trade regulations are widelyinterpreted as a sign of humanitarization of international law, while colonialism is rightly
regarded as a system of repression that caused great harm to humankind. Nonetheless, it
was colonialism which created a singular window of opportunity to restrict the arms tradeduring the interwar period, whereas the process of decolonization contributed significantly
to closing this window.
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