UKRAINE
Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment(RDNA3)February 2022 – December 2023

© February 2024, the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Union, the United Nations.
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Table of Contents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................................................ 9
FOREWORD ......................................................................................................................................................... 10
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................................................... 12
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................................... 222022 INVASION AND WAR TRAJECTORY ........................................................................................................................... 22
EMERGENCY AND HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE .................................................................................................................... 23
RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS ...................................................................................................................... 24
RDNA3 OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................................ 28
SUMMARY OF IMPACTS AND NEEDS ................................................................................................................... 32
RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION PRIORITIES AND PRINCIPLES ........................................................................ 42
RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION PRIORITIES ................................................................................................................... 42
PRINCIPLES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION ................................................................................ 50
MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS ............................................................................................................................... 56
HUMAN IMPACT ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................................ 60
DISPLACED PERSONS AND RETURNEES .............................................................................................................................. 60
YOUTH (AGED 14 – 35) AND CHILD PROTECTION AND RIGHTS ............................................................................................. 63
ELDERLY PERSONS ........................................................................................................................................................ 67
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES ........................................................................................................................................... 69
VETERANS AND THEIR FAMILIES ....................................................................................................................................... 73
GENDER SPECIFIC IMPACTS ............................................................................................................................................ 76
SOCIAL SECTORS .................................................................................................................................................. 81
HOUSING.................................................................................................................................................................... 81
EDUCATION AND SCIENCE .............................................................................................................................................. 87
HEALTH ...................................................................................................................................................................... 92
SOCIAL PROTECTION AND LIVELIHOODS ............................................................................................................................ 97
CULTURE AND TOURISM .............................................................................................................................................. 104
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS ....................................................................................................................................... 110
AGRICULTURE ............................................................................................................................................................ 110
IRRIGATION AND WATER RESOURCES ............................................................................................................................. 115
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY .......................................................................................................................................... 122
FINANCE AND BANKING ............................................................................................................................................... 131
INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS ............................................................................................................................... 135
ENERGY AND EXTRACTIVES ........................................................................................................................................... 135
TRANSPORT............................................................................................................................................................... 142
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DIGITAL............................................................................................................................. 149
WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION .................................................................................................................................. 153
MUNICIPAL SERVICES .................................................................................................................................................. 159
CROSS-CUTTING AREAS ..................................................................................................................................... 167
ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, AND FORESTRY .................................................................................. 167
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CIVIL PROTECTION ............................................................................................................... 174
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION ........................................................................................................................... 178
EXPLOSIVE HAZARDS MANAGEMENT.............................................................................................................................. 182

3ANNEX 1. RDNA3 TEAM ..................................................................................................................................... 187

List of Tables
Table 1. Total damage, loss, and needs by sector (US$ billion) .................................................................. 39
Table 2. RDNA3 Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ billion) .............................................................. 40
Table 3. RDNA1, RDNA2, and RDNA3 damage, loss, needs by sector (US$ billion).................................... 40
Table 4. Summary of assessed recovery and reconstruction priorities for 2024 financing - estimatedcontribution by sector and type of expenditure (US$ million) ................................................................... 48
Table 5. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million).......................................................................... 85
Table 6. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 ...................... 86
Table 7. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) .......................................... 86
Table 8. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million).......................................................................... 90
Table 9. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 ...................... 91
Table 10. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ........................................ 91
Table 11. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)........................................................................ 94
Table 12. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................... 95
Table 13. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ........................................ 96
Table 14. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 101
Table 15. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 102
Table 16. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 102
Table 17. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 108
Table 18. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 109
Table 19. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 109
Table 20. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 113
Table 21. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 113
Table 22. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 114
Table 23. Actual donor support (US$ million)........................................................................................... 114
Table 24. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 119
Table 25. Damage per category (US$ million) .......................................................................................... 119
Table 26. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 120
Table 27. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)...................................... 121
Table 28. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 128
Table 29. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 129
Table 30. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)...................................... 129
Table 31. Estimated public sector (GoU, IFIs, and donors) contribution to 2024 priorities (US$ million) 129
Table 32. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 133
Table 33. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 134
Table 34. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 134
Table 35. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 140
Table 36. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 141
Table 37. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)...................................... 141
Table 38. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 146
Table 39. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 147
Table 40. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 148
Table 41. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 151
Table 42. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 152
4

Table 43. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)...................................... 152
Table 44. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 157
Table 45. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 157
Table 46. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 158
Table 47. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 165
Table 48. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 166
Table 49. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 166
Table 50. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 171
Table 51. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 172
Table 52. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) a .................................... 172
Table 53. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 176
Table 54. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 177
Table 55. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 177
Table 56. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)...................................................................... 180
Table 57. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 181
Table 58. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 181
Table 59. Explosive ordnance contamination and estimated clearance cost (US$ million) ..................... 185
Table 60. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023 .................. 185
Table 61. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) ...................................... 186
Table 62. RDNA3 Team ............................................................................................................................. 187

List of Figures
Figure 1. Spatial evolution of the war until December 31, 2023, and Ukraine RDNAs .............................. 14
Figure 2. Extent of damage by region as of February 2023 (left) and December 31, 2023 (right) ............. 15
Figure 3. Comparison of damage in RDNA2 and RDNA3 (billion US$) ........................................................ 16
Figure 4. Comparison of needs in RDNA2 and RDNA3 (billion US$) ........................................................... 17
Figure 5. Summary of RDNA3 recovery and reconstruction priorities and funding needs for 2024 as
identified by Ukrainian authorities ............................................................................................................. 19
Figure 6. RDNA3 key results: damage, needs, and 2024 financing priorities ............................................. 21
Figure 7. Comparison of damage and needs in RDNA3 and RDNA2 (billion US$) ...................................... 21
Figure 8. Spatial evolution of the war until December 31, 2023, and Ukraine RDNAs .............................. 23
Figure 9. Schematic illustration of national and local level institutions engaged in recovery andreconstruction ............................................................................................................................................. 26
Figure 10. Total damage (US$ billion): US$152 billion................................................................................ 32
Figure 11. Comparison of damage in RDNA1, RDNA2, RDNA3 (billion US$) .............................................. 33
Figure 12. Total loss (US$ billion): US$499 billion ...................................................................................... 34
Figure 13. Comparison of losses in RDNA1, RDNA2, RDNA3 (billion US$).................................................. 36
Figure 14. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US486 billion) ......................................................... 37
Figure 15. Comparison of needs in RDNA1, RDNA2, and RDNA3 (in billion US$)....................................... 38
Figure 16. Comparison of damage, loss, and needs for sector clusters in RDNA2 and RDNA3 (billion US$).................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Figure 17. Estimated distribution of RDNA3 priorities by expenditure type (US$ million) ........................ 44
Figure 18. Distribution of RDNA3 priority public expenditures by broad sector (US$ million) .................. 44
Figure 19. RDNA3 priority public expenditures by broad sector (US$ million) compared with RDNA2 .... 45
Figure 20. Execution on RDNA2 priorities by sector and funding during 2023 (US$ million)..................... 46
Figure 21. Summary of RDNA3 recovery and reconstruction priorities and funding needs for 2024 as
identified by Ukrainian authorities ............................................................................................................. 47
Figure 22. Ukraine real GDP growth, year-on-year (YoY) ........................................................................... 58
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Figure 23. Yield by Commodity ................................................................................................................... 59
Figure 24. Number Of Registered IDPS In Ukraine (Million), March 25, 2022–December 31, 2023 .......... 60
Figure 25. Number of hours spent on unpaid domestic work (housekeeping, care for family members)
per week ..................................................................................................................................................... 77
Figure 26. Reference map and areas exposed to war used as baseline ................................................... 186

List of Boxes
Box 1. First and Second Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment ................................................... 13
Box 2. RDNA3 key definitions ..................................................................................................................... 14
Box 3. Summary of the assessment of the Kakhovka Dam breach............................................................. 23
Box 4. Ongoing World Bank–supported projects ....................................................................................... 27
Box 5. First and Second Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA1 and RDNA2) ................. 28
Box 6. RDNA3 definitions ............................................................................................................................ 30

Abbreviations and Acronyms
ACLED
BBB
BCP
CBRN
CCI
CHA
CHPP
CRSV
DALY
DGF
DTM
EBRD
EC
ENTSO-E
ERW
EU
GBV
GDP
GHG
GIS
GIZ
GMI
GoU
ha
HPP
HUS
ICF
ICH
I&D
IDP
IFC
IFI
ILO

Armed Conflict Location and Event Databuild(ing) back better
border crossing point
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
cultural and creative industries
Confirmed Hazardous Areas
combined heat and power plant
conflict-related sexual violence
disability-adjusted life year
Deposit Guarantee Fund
Displacement Tracking Matrix
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
European Commission
European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity
explosive remnants of war
European Union
gender-based violencegross domestic productgreenhouse gas
geographic information system
German Agency for International Cooperation
Guaranteed Minimum Income
Government of Ukraine
hectarehydropower plant/hydroelectric power plan
Housing Utility Subsidy
International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health
Intangible Cultural Heritage
irrigation and drainage
internally displaced person
International Finance Corporationinternational financial institution
International Labour Organization

6

IMF
IOM
IT
kWh
LGBTIQ+
MCTID
MFB
MMC
MoES
MoH
MoVA
MRII - МРІЇ
MSEC
NBFI
NBU
NGO
NMAA
NPL
NTS
OHCHR
PDNA
PHC
PIM
PISA
PPP
RDNA
RDO
SAWR
SCS
SESU
SFH
SHA
SMEs
SOB
SOE
SSSU
SWM
TS
TSO
UCPM
UN
UNDP
UNESCOUNFPA
UNHCR
UNICEF
UN Women
URTF

International Monetary FundInternational Organization for Migration
information technology
kilowatt-hour
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex, queer, and other minority gender identities
Ministry For Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development
multifamily building
Military Medical Commission
Ministry of Education and Science
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Veterans Affairs
Multi-Donor Resources for Institutions and Infrastructure
Medical and Social Expert Commission
nonbank financial institution
National Bank of Ukraine
nongovernmental organization
National Mine Action Authority of Ukraine
nonperforming loan
nontechnical survey
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
Post-Disaster Needs Assessment
primary health care
Public Investment Management
Program for International Student Assessment
public-private partnership
Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
Reforms Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
State Agency of Water ResourcesState Customs Service
State Emergency Service of Ukraine
single-family house
Suspected Hazardous Areas
small and medium enterprises
state-owned bankstate-owned enterpriseState Statistics Service of Ukraine
solid waste management
technical survey
transmission system operator
Union Civil Protection Mechanism
United Nations
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Population Fund
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations International Children’s Fund
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund

7

UVF
VAT
WSS
WUO

Ukrainian Veterans Foundation
value added tax
water supply and sanitation
Water User Organization

8

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Third Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3), covering period between February
24, 2022, and December 31, 2023, was jointly prepared by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine(GoU), the European Union (EU) services, and the United Nations (UN) in coordination with humanitarianand development partners, academia, civil society organizations, and the private sector.
On the part of the GoU, the RDNA3 was led by the Ministry for Communities, Territories andInfrastructure Development of Ukraine (MCTID), with support from the ProSteer Office under MCTID, theReforms Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (RDO), and the Kyiv School of Economics(KSE). All relevant line ministries have participated in the assessment.
The European Commission services' contribution was led by the Directorate-General for Neighbourhoodand Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) in coordination with the Delegation of the EU to Ukraine, theService for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), and other services.
From the UN, the report benefited from support and inputs from the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Office for Project
Services (UNOPS), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO), International Labour Organization (ILO), United Nations Human Settlements
Programme (UN-Habitat), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the
Empowerment of Women (UN Women), United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE),
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),
World Food Programme (WFP), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), and International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO).
The World Bank Group’s technical assistance was provided by the World Bank’s Eastern Europe Country
Management Unit, Global Practices and Cross-Cutting areas, as well as the International FinanceCorporation (IFC), coordinated by the Europe and Central Asia Region.
Annex 1 includes a list of main contributors. The RDNA team would like to express its deep appreciation
to all individuals and organizations who contributed to this assessment.
This report benefited from the generous financial support of the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction andRecovery (GFDRR) and the Swiss Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO).

9

FOREWORDOn February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine, resulting in vast impacts that will be felt
over generations. This third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3)—undertaken jointly by theWorld Bank, the Government of Ukraine, the European Commission, and the United Nations andsupported by other partners—takes stock of almost two years of the ongoing war, estimating damage andlosses along with recovery and reconstruction needs for 10 years. Beyond physical and financial impacts
that are more readily quantified, the RDNA3 provides a qualitative description of how people’s lives havebeen dramatically altered since the invasion. RDNA3 builds on the previous two Rapid Damage and Needs
Assessments (RDNA1 and RDNA2), which respectively covered the initial 3 and 12 months of the war.
Considering almost two years of the war, as of December 31, 2023, direct damage has reached almost
US$152 billion, with housing, transport, commerce and industry, agriculture, and energy the mostaffected sectors. Damage continued to be concentrated in Donetska, Kharkivska, Luhanska, Zaporizka,
Khersonska, and Kyivska oblasts. Disruptions to economic flows and production, as well as additional costs
associated with war (such as debris management), are collectively measured as economic loss amounting
to over US$499 billion.
As of December 31, 2023, recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at almost US$486 billion
considering an (ambitious) 10-year period to meet them. These needs include critical steps for short-term
recovery as well as medium-term reconstruction that builds back better to modern, low-carbon, andclimate-resilient standards, and that—where relevant and possible—excludes needs already met throughthe Ukraine state budget or through partners and international support.
The report also highlights, from Ukrainian authorities, a US$9.5 billion financing gap for addressing
immediate recovery and reconstruction priorities that need funding in 2024. Ukrainian line ministries haveidentified US$15 billion in priorities for 2024, with particular focus on the industry and services sector(nearly US$3.6 billion), housing and utilities (US$3.1 billion), energy (US$2.7 billion), social infrastructureand services (US$2.4 billion), and transport (US$2.3 billion), as well as US$1.2 billion needed to address
cross-sectoral priorities. While delivering these priorities will require more than US$8 billion in public andstate-owned company investments, along with nearly US$7 billion in other public expenditures, asignificant share of financing needs have been met through the state budget and donor support. Thispublic expenditure can catalyze up to US$5.5 billion in private investment, underscoring the criticalimportance of the private sector in supporting recovery and reconstruction. The report underlines theimportance of Ukraine’s authorities and international partners continuing to build up capacities for
implementation, given the challenges of absorbing large volumes of funding in the current circumstances.
While the RDNA3 focuses primarily on war-related impacts and recovery and reconstruction, theprinciples of building back better are aligned with the vision, reforms, and investments to be set by theGovernment’s Ukraine Plan and the European Union (EU) Ukraine Facility, both under preparation andthe long-term development vision of Agenda 2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals as safeguards
of inclusive and equitable human development. The findings in the RDNA3 complement the forthcoming
Ukraine Plan and the Ukraine Facility – and the reform and investment agenda that comes with these10

instruments in the next four years. The Plan will bring about reforms and approaches to help scale upabsorptive and institutional capacity of national and subnational authorities in Ukraine in parallel withidentifying investment priorities and providing financing availability.
Global experience shows that a phased approach to recovery, reconstruction, and development of humancapital, underpinned by strategic prioritization across sectors, is critical given the substantial overallneeds. Planning should consider approaches to scale up Ukraine’s absorptive capacity so they can manage
and utilize the financing available, ensure continuous improvement of systems and processes, andincrease institutional and technical capacities to promote efficient and effective investment project
preparation, implementation, and monitoring—all focused on the benefits for the population. Targeting
public financing to maximize private investment and to meet urgent community needs further contributes
to a comprehensive financial and operational strategy and plan for Ukraine’s early recovery and long-termreconstruction, to which we are strongly committed.

The
World Bank Group

Government of Ukraine

Directorate General for
Neighbourhood Policy and
Enlargement Negotiations

UnitedNations

11

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since the Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the war continues to cause
civilian casualties and hardship, damage to infrastructure and productive assets, and disruption to theeconomy. As of December 2023, an estimated 5.9 million people were recorded as refugees acrossEurope;1 3.7 million people were reported as internally displaced persons (IDPs) as of October 2023.2
Since the invasion, over 10,000 civilians have lost their lives, thousands have been injured, and millions
have lost their homes.3 Poverty and food insecurity have increased: according to initial estimates from amonthly phone survey conducted by the World Bank since April 2023, 9 percent of households reported
having run out of food at some point in a 30-day period in November 2023.4 The impacts of war are
uneven, and the greatest effects are felt by women, persons with disabilities, children and youth, IDPs,
and the elderly. The war has caused significant loss of jobs and income in the private sector, as well as
loss of purchasing power and loss of assets among Ukrainians, particularly the most vulnerable. The
estimated gross domestic product (GDP) for 2023 is 74 percent of 2021 GDP in real terms. Overall, there
have been dramatic setbacks in the country’s development and in its progress toward many of the
Sustainable Development Goals.
Over the almost two years of ongoing war, the war intensity has shifted across different spatial areasof Ukraine (Figure 1). The initial three months brought widespread destruction, with direct damage
quickly reaching US$97 billion. 5 During the latter half of 2022, the Government of Ukraine (GoU) regained
control in embattled areas and limited its loss of control in other areas, and by reducing advances of
Russian forces minimized the rapid escalation in damages. However, attacks on critical infrastructure in
the fall and winter 2022 resulted in a rapid increase in energy sector damage. By February 2023, damage
had reached US$135 billion.6 Regular intense attacks on infrastructure continued throughout 2023, with
unpredictable air and drone attacks extending beyond established and largely unshifting battle zones,
and impacting cities like Kyiv, Odesa, and Lviv. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam and the hydropower
plant (HPP) in June 2023 has resulted in incalculable impacts to the environment and exacerbatedchallenges already faced by people struggling to access housing, water, food, and health services, among
others.7 There have also been serious attacks of ports, including in Odeska and Mykolaivska regions andalongside the Danube River, as well as cyberattacks and intensification of drone and air attacks in the lastmonths of 2023.

1 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Operational Data Portal, Link.
2 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Ukraine: Internal Displacement Report—General Population Survey Round 14(September–October 2023),” Link.
3 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), “Russia ‘Should Immediately Cease Its Use of Force against Ukraine,’
Türk Declares,” Statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, December 19, 2023, Link. The actual figures arecertainly even higher; however, the receipt of information and reports from locations experiencing war and intense
hostilities is a challenge, and many are still pending verification.
4 World Bank, Listening to Ukraine phone surveys (report forthcoming).
5 World Bank, Government of Ukraine (GoU), and European Commission (EC), “Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment,”
2022, Link.
6 World Bank, GoU, EC, and United Nations (UN), “Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022–February 2023,”
March 2023, Link.
7 GoU and UN, “Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine,” 2023, Link.

12

Despite the ongoing war, the GoU has, with support from partners, been leading early recovery andrestoration efforts alongside an ambitious reform and modernization agenda, in line with Ukraine’s
European Union (EU) integration efforts. In 2023, some US$7.2 billion was disbursed by the GoU tofinance urgent recovery projects in energy, critical and social infrastructure, housing, humanitarian
demining as well as for the public sector support.8 For example, in 2023 restoration works werecompleted for 3,836 multifamily apartment buildings and 19,091 single-family houses; for 448 schools,
237 kindergartens, and 390 medical facilities and social protection institutions; and for 9,200 criticalinfrastructure facilities, 449 heating supply facilities, and 221 water supply and sanitation facilities. In
addition, emergency repairs were conducted on over 2,000 km of motorways, highways, and othernational roads, while 115 road bridges and about 26 km of rail infrastructure and 46 rail bridges were
restored. The GoU has established institutional arrangements and introduced reforms to improveplanning and implementation of the recovery and reconstruction efforts. Ukraine, on its path toward
accession to the EU, is preparing an ambitious set of reforms under its Ukraine Plan, which is linked to
the Ukraine Facility planned by the European Commission (EC).9
The Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) presents a consistent, validated, andtransparent assessment of almost two years of war impacts. Jointly developed by the World Bank, theGoU, the EC, and the United Nations (UN), it presents the impacts as of December 31, 2023, in line witha globally accepted methodology. RDNA3 updates the second RDNA (RDNA2), which covered the first 12
months of the war and built on the RDNA1, which covered the first three months of the war (Box 1). The
RDNA3 presents an assessment of the physical damage to infrastructure and buildings, quantifies indirect
losses for 40 months (both actual and projected), and estimates financial needs for recovery andreconstruction (see Box 2 with key definitions). To support immediate recovery and reconstruction
planning, RDNA3 also includes short-term priorities identified by Ukrainian line ministries that needfinancing in 2024.
Consistent with previous RDNAs, the RDNA3 integrates the most recent data and estimations, avoids
double-counting, and deducts already met recovery and reconstruction needs, based on available
information. However, the assessment is subject to inherent and documented data limitations andmakes certain assumptions due to the ongoing war. A further important limitation is that total needs andpriorities are presented at sector level and do not consider the strategic prioritization across sectors.
Box 1. First and Second Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
RDNA1 estimated US$97.4 billion in direct damage (between February 24 and June 1, 2022), US$252 billion in losses(comprising 3 months of actual losses and 18 months of projected losses), and US$348.5 billion in recovery andreconstruction needs (over 10 years).
RDNA2 estimated US$134.7 billion in direct damage (between February 24, 2022, and February 24, 2023), US$289
billion in losses (comprising 12 months of actual losses and 18 months of projected losses), and US$410.6 billion in

8 According to the GoU data, Ukraine has mobilized nearly US$11.2 billion to finance its urgent recovery needs (including US$3.7

billion of state budget funding), of which approximately US$7.2 billion was disbursed to finance projects in energy, critical andsocial infrastructure, housing, and humanitarian demining as well as for public sector support in 2023.
9 Government Portal, “European Parliament Approves the Launch of the Ukraine Facility Program Worth EUR 50 Billion over
2024–2027,” October 17, 2023, Link.

13

recovery and reconstruction needs (over 10 years). A sum of US$14 billion was estimated to address 2023
implementation priorities.
Sources: World Bank, GoU, and EC, “Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment,” 2022, Link; World Bank, GoU, EC, and UN,“Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022–February 2023,” March 2023, Link.

Box 2. RDNA3 key definitions
Damage: Direct costs of destroyed or damaged physical assets and infrastructure, valued in monetary terms. Costs
are estimated considering the replacement price prevailing before the invasion.
Loss: Changes in economic flows resulting from the war, valued in monetary terms. Examples include disrupted
services, increased operating costs, loss of revenue for authorities/private sector, and debris removal.
Needs: Costs for repair, restoration, and reconstruction, considering a build back better premium, such as
improvements for energy efficiency (EE), modernization, and sustainability standards, as well as factors such as
inflation, surge pricing due to volume of construction, higher insurance, and so forth. Needs are expressed inmonetary terms according to market prices prevailing as of December 31, 2023. Needs do not equal the sum ofdamage and losses.

Figure 1. Spatial evolution of the war until December 31, 2023, and Ukraine RDNAs

Source: Assessment team. Note: Map is based on Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), considering
average monthly conflict events. For ACLED, see Clionadh Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED: Armed Conflict Locationand Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–60, Link. Conflict events includes battles andexplosions/remote violence as classified per ACLED methodology. RDNA = rapid damage and needs assessment.

Summary of Damage and Needs
The RDNA3 estimates that up to US$152 billion (€138 billion)10 in direct damage to buildings andinfrastructure has resulted from nearly two years of war. The most affected sectors have been housing(almost US$56 billion, or 37 percent of total damage), transport (almost US$34 billion, or 22 percent),
commerce and industry (almost US$16 billion, or 10 percent), energy (almost US$11 billion, or 7 percent),
and agriculture (US$10 billion, or 7 percent). In the transport sector, damaged or destroyed assets
include 8,400 km of motorways, highways, and other national roads; over 140 bridges on the nationalroad network and 150 bridges on the oblast and village roads; and more than 50km of railways lines, 83
10 US$ to € exchange rate: 0.906 as of December 31, 2023.

14

railways bridges, and over 1,400km of railways catenary lines have been damaged or destroyed. Acrosssectors, Donetska, Kharkivska, Luhanska, Zaporizka, Khersonska, and Kyivska oblasts have sustained thegreatest damage (Figure 2).
Direct damage has not escalated substantially since the second assessment (Figure 3), when it totaled
US$135 billion11 (€126 billion) – due to limited shifts in the front line of war; however, the impacts on
Ukraine remain immense. According to the current assessment, 10 percent of the total housing stock of
Ukraine has been either damaged or destroyed. As a result, millions of people have lost their homes andneed to secure shelter from an increasingly limited pool of homes. There has also been a stark increase
in damage in several other sectors: environment, natural resources, and forestry; irrigation and water
resource management; water supply and sanitation; municipal services; emergency response and civil
protection; commerce and industry; and culture and tourism. In part, this escalation of damage is due to
the June 2023 destruction of the Kakhovka Dam and HPP, which resulted in a threefold increase indamage to the aquaculture and fishery industries. Increased attacks on cultural heritage sites in areas
protected under the World Heritage Convention – such as Lviv and Odesa cities – are reflected in analmost 33 percent increase in damage in the culture sector. Some estimates have increased (e.g., for the
emergency response and civil protection sector) or decreased (e.g., for the health sector) due to new andimproved data,12 changes in subsector classification,13 or adjustments in methodology andassumptions.14
Figure 2. Extent of damage by region as of February 2023 (left) and December 31, 2023 (right)

Source: Assessment team. Note: The maps draw on damage data as collected and assessed under the RDNA2 (left)
and RDNA3 (right) respectively. There were data limitations for certain regions.

11 RDNA3 uses the same exchange rate as RDNA2, while RDNA1 used a different exchange rate. Damage reported under RDNA1

and RDNA2 is not double counted under RDNA3.
12 Sectors that used new or more precise data include agriculture, culture and tourism, commerce and industry, and emergency
response and civil protection. In the health sector, baseline data were updated, leading to a decrease in damage.
13 The RDNA1 and RDNA2 included district heating under the energy sector, whereas RDNA3 includes it under the municipal
sector.
14 In the transport sector, some cost assumptions were updated, while in the commerce and industry sector, new data allowed
new calculation and an adjusted methodology.

15

Figure 3. Comparison of damage in RDNA2 and RDNA3 (billion US$)

Source: Assessment team. Note: x axis = US$ billion, y axis = sectors under RDNA2 and RDNA3. RDNA2 damage covers
the period February 24, 2022, to February 24, 2023, while RDNA3 damage covers the period February 24, 2022, toDecember 31, 2023.

As of end-December 2023, recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$486 billion (€440
billion), which is approximately 2.8 times the estimated nominal GDP of Ukraine for 2023. These
considerable needs arise from a war that has spanned a large geographical area (including urban areas)
for an extended period of time. The costs — estimated within a period of 10 years — include measuresrequired for lower energy intensity and more resilient, inclusive, and modern standards, as well as surge
pricing (commonly observed when large spatial areas are reconstructed), global inflationary pressures,and higher insurance premiums.
Housing needs are the highest (over US$80 billion, or 17 percent of the total), followed by transport(almost US$74 billion, or 15 percent), commerce and industry (US$67.5 billion, or 14 percent), agriculture(US$56 billion, or 12 percent), energy (US$47 billion, or 10 percent), social protection and livelihoods(US$44 billion, or 9 percent), and explosive hazard management (almost 35 billion, or 7 percent). Acrossall sectors, the cost of debris clearance and management alone reaches almost US$11 billion. Regionswith the greatest net change in needs since February 2023 include Kyivska, Dnipropetrovska, Donetska,
Khersonska, Kharkivska, Zaporizka, and Odeska.
Needs that have already been met by the GoU with the support of its partners have been deductedfrom current needs. For example, according to the GoU data, in 2023, US$1 billion was disbursed fromstate budget and donor funds for housing sector recovery, with most being dedicated to the repair andreconstruction of damaged assets. In the education sector, some 500 educational institutions wererebuilt, and since January 2023, the share of educational institutions with shelters has increased from 68
percent to 80 percent. In the transport sector, basic road and rail connectivity has been restored in areas
where the GoU regained control; the largest efforts focused on Kharkivska, Chernihivska, Kyivska, andSumska oblasts, where over 2,000 km of emergency road repairs were made, 115 road bridges were
replaced with temporary structures, and more than In the transport sector, basic road and rail
16

connectivity has been restored in areas where the GoU regained control; the largest efforts focused on
Kharkivska, Chernihivska, Kyivska, and Sumska oblasts, where over 2,000 km of emergency road repairs
were made, 115 road bridges were replaced with temporary structures, and more than 25 km of railways
lines, and 46 rail bridges were repaired or rebuilt. The Shandor gate of the Kazarovytska Dam was
repaired, and the Slovyansk water monitoring laboratory (Donetska oblast) was again made operational
reducing current needs in the irrigation sector.
The increase in needs compared with RDNA2 (US$411 billion/€372 billion) is overall commensuratewith the increase in observed damage and proportionate to RDNA2 (see Figure 4). For example,
increases in damage to commerce and industry, agriculture, and water supply and sanitation translate
into increased needs. However, successful efforts across sectors to collect data, update cost estimatesand further prioritize needs also reduced overall costs in some cases. For example, in the transport
sector, a greater focus on recovery and reconstruction of core services and completed repairs contributeto a 20 percent reduction in needs. In the finance and banking sector, war-related credit losses
decreased. The continued decrease in costs associated with explosive hazard management is a testament
to ongoing efforts to assess areas for potential explosive contamination.
Figure 4. Comparison of needs in RDNA2 and RDNA3 (billion US$)

Source: Assessment team. Note: y axis = US$ billion; x axis = sectors under RDNA2 and RDNA3. Needs in both RDNA
reports cover the period up to 2033.

Recovery and Reconstruction Principles and Priorities for 2024 financing
Meeting the specified needs is critical for long-term recovery and restoration of development progress,
but this will take time. Key factors driving this time frame are the war trajectory and financing
availability. But absorptive capacity of the state budget is also relevant, as is the implementation capacityof, and coordination among, line ministries, subnational authorities, civil society, community-based17

organizations, and implementing agencies. Restoring Ukraine’s productive capacity and reversing thedestructive impact of the war will require significant public intervention. This includes rebuilding andimproved planning of essential infrastructure, encouraging financing of promising businesses, andsupporting the financial sector as the full financial cost of the war is revealed. The readiness of the private
sector to implement capital investments and the availability of materials and labor are also significant
factors. To ensure the buy in of the private sector, targeted policies and reforms are critical to create an
operating environment conducive to donor support, private sector investment, and return of people.
However, there will be a tremendous social and economic cost if the most urgent needs are not met in
the shortest possible time frame—and this cost will be borne especially by the poorest and mostvulnerable.
Given the magnitude and complexity of the needs, the GoU has taken an organized, sector-levelapproach to recovery and reconstruction planning. Coordinated through the MCTID, the Ministry of
Economy, and the Reforms Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, line ministries worked
across 20 sectors to identify project-level priorities, determine financing needs, and monitor funding,
implementation, and disbursement. This process was supported by workshops and consultations withexperts from the RDNA sectoral teams, with discussions focused on technical, economic, and social
impacts of different project priorities and their implementation feasibility and timeframes.
This process identified US$9.5 billion (€8.6 billion) needed in 2024 to address unmet funding for themost urgent repair, recovery and reconstruction priorities. Overall, the most urgent priorities identified
by line ministries require more than US$15 billion (€13.6 billion) in public funding; at least US$5.5 billion(€5 billion) in funding for these priorities is already met through the state budget and donor support, in
addition to the US$3.6 billion budgeted to support social protection (Figure 5). Among the six priority
sectors defined by the GoU ministries, the largest share of public expenditures is for the industry andservices sector (nearly US$3.6 billion), followed by housing and utilities (US$3.1 billion). Energy, social
infrastructure and services (mainly education and health) and transport account for US$2.7 billion,
US$2.4 billion and US$2.3 billion of priorities, respectively, with another US$1.2 billion needed for crosssectoral priorities.15 Some additional urgent strategic priorities fall outside the RDNA3 (Box 2).
Box 2. Additional urgent strategic priorities
Beyond the RDNA3 recovery and reconstruction projects identified above, the GoU has identified around US$3
billion in additional strategic 2024 priorities16 as part of multiannual projects to support economic growth andsecurity. These include: US$2 billion for nuclear power plants (out of a total estimate of US$8.9 billion for several
nuclear projects); US$700 million for additional high-level protection for substations (total project cost is US$2.1
billion); and around US$280 million for reconstruction of key refineries (total project cost is US$2.5 billion).

15 Using Government of Ukraine sectoral definitions, industry and services includes agribusiness, industry and commerce, andirrigation; housing and utilities includes: housing, central heating, energy efficiency, municipal services, waste management, andwater supply and sanitation; transport includes transport and postal services; social infrastructure and services includes culture,
education, health, and social protection; and cross-sectoral includes: demining, emergency response and civil protection,
democracy, justice and human rights, and telecom, digital, and cybersecurity.
16 Due to confidentiality reasons and the innovative nature of some of these projects. the Bank cannot fully validated validate thecost estimates for this projects.

18

Public investments have the potential to catalyze up to US$5.5 billion in private investment forrecovery and reconstruction in 2024.17 Meeting the priorities identified by line ministries for 2024 acrosssectors would require more than US$8 billion in public and state-owned enterprise (SOE) investments,
along with close to US$5 billion in transfers, subsidies, and guarantees to de-risk financing and overcome
constraints to private investment and nearly US$2 billion in other expenditures. These instruments canhelp catalyze up to US$5.5 billion in private investment, while also facilitating a similar volume of working
capital (through programs such as 5-7-9 for firms and preferential mortgages for consumers) to maintainthe functioning of firms and supply chains and stimulate consumer investment in the housing market.
This level of private sector contribution, and its concentration in industry, commerce, agriculture, andhousing in the near term, is in line with the estimations from the International Finance Corporation (IFC)that between one-sixth and one-third of the needs identified in the RDNA2 could be financed by theprivate sector, depending on reforms and public interventions.18
Figure 5. Summary of RDNA3 recovery and reconstruction priorities and funding needs for 2024 as
identified by Ukrainian authorities

Source: Assessment team, based on data in sector templates prepared by GoU line ministries and coordinated by
the MCTID.
a. Private sector includes firms and households; figures are estimated based on assumptions of investment andlending multipliers of various public support instruments; note that private sector investments not estimated in
RDNA2.
b. Includes expenditures and investments from Government and SOEs as well from donors and international financial
institutions.
c. Social transfers are part of RDNA-defined needs but are not included in GoU RDNA priorities, as they are
considered an ongoing core responsibility covered by the state budget. Figure excludes non-RDNA-related pensions.
d. Including through state and local budgets; loans and grants from international financial institutions and donors;
and SOE own funds; includes funding under negotiation but not finalized.

17 Private sector contributions are estimated using assumptions on investment multipliers for the proposed programs identified

by line ministries.
18 IFC, “Private Sector Opportunities for a Green and Resilient Reconstruction in Ukraine,” 2023, Link.

19

While RDNA3 priorities defined by line ministries represent an increase over RDNA2 priorities (US$15.3
billion compared to US14.1 billion) and 2023 execution, implementation will be a multi-year process.
Public expenditures required to address identified RDNA3 priorities are 8.5 percent higher than those
identified for RDNA2, which is less than half the growth of needs during this period. Moreover, despite
relatively good performance in executing on mobilized commitments in 2023, RDNA3 priorities are morethan twice the level of execution in 2023 (US$7.2 billion). Increased priorities in RDNA3 reflects growing
needs but also a recognition of the importance of planning and financing across multi-year investment
program cycles, especially for large infrastructure projects that may have long procurement lead times
and requirements for funding in advance of procurement. Thus, funding commitments may be needed in
2024, even if actual expenditure takes place over more than one year. Planning and financing across multiyear investments will become more critical as Ukraine moves from recovery to full-scale reconstruction.
Moving forward on recovery and reconstruction in the context of resource and implementation
constraints will require further strategic prioritization, supported by timely and predictable funding. In
the context of the likely challenges in mobilizing an additional US$9.5 billion beyond existing budget
financing in 2024, the GoU is discussing processes to carry out strategic prioritization across sectors toensure that the most critical needs are met, considering among others implementation capacity ofdifferent sectors, priorities related to different geographic areas, needs of communities and vulnerable
groups, and financing availability. At the same time, securing medium-term, predictable funding
commitments from donors is critical for enabling implementing agencies to plan and manage long andcomplex procurement. Meeting this requirement would be facilitated by better integrating priority setting
and project planning into the medium-term budget planning process as well as by implementing othersteps envisaged by the Public Investment Management (PIM) Reform Roadmap, adopted by the GoU,
including establishment of a Strategic Investment Council.
Beyond strategic prioritization, several key actions in the short term can improve the effectiveness ofrecovery and reconstruction:• Accelerate the reform agenda, including the framework of the Government’s Ukraine Plan underpreparation. This will help foster economic growth, modernize the economy and institutions, andpromote strengthening of public sector capacity at the local level, in alignment with the standards
and policies of the EU.
•

Strengthen public sector capacity to plan, prepare, and deliver recovery and reconstruction
activities, through continuous improvements in systems for public finance management,
procurement, and strategic and medium-term budget planning. In addition, strengthen theinstitutional and technical capacities of authorities and relevant stakeholders alongside crossinstitutional coordination and cross-sectoral prioritization. The Government’s adoption andimplementation of the PIM reform roadmap will play a key role in this respect.

•

Leverage opportunities for private investment, including through an accelerated agenda of procompetition reforms and deeper integration with the EU and international markets. Reforms andpublic interventions that can boost private sector investment and enable the private sector toplay a greater role in reconstruction include liberalization of energy prices; privatization of (or20private participation in) the transport and banking sectors; public investments in irrigation, andpublic-private partnerships (PPPs) in a variety of sectors.
•

Strengthen the capacity of local authorities in strategic planning, project management,
procurement, execution of investments, and stakeholder engagement as well as relevant
technical skills to build modern, inclusive, and resilient communities that will thrive.
Figure 6. RDNA3 key results: damage, needs, and 2024 financing priorities

Source: Assessment team. Note: US$15 billion reflects sectoral assessment and does not consider social protectionneeds already included in the budget.

Figure 7. Comparison of damage and needs in RDNA3 and RDNA2 (billion US$)

Source: Assessment team. Note: y axis = US$ billion; x axis = sectors under RDNA2 and RDNA3. RDNA2 damage
covers the period February 24, 2022, to February 24, 2023, while RDNA3 damage covers the period February 24,
2022, to December 31, 2023. Needs are counted within a period of 10 years.

21

INTRODUCTION
2022 Invasion and War Trajectory
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the war has entered varying phases of intensity, as
depicted in

Figure 8. The early months brought destruction in several cities, municipalities and regions, especiallywhere the Government of Ukraine (GoU) temporarily lost control. Instances of destruction and disruption
correlate strongly with areas where activity relating to the conduct of war was frequent and intense. From
April 2022 onwards, the GoU has brought more than half of this territory back under its control, andbroadly from summer 2022 until presently, the main line of hostilities has not changed significantly.
Missile and combat drone attacks on Ukrainian critical infrastructure, especially on energy infrastructureand housing, escalated in early October 2022 and continued through the autumn and winter of2022/2023. Attacks were sustained across major cities and at least 16 Ukrainian regions, leaving millions
of people without electricity, water, and/or heating.19
During 2023, there were regular intense attacks on infrastructure mainly in the southeast, spanningmany regions. In the second year of the war, Russia focused its offensive on the East of Ukraine. The
Kakhovka Dam breach and destruction of the hydroelectric power plants (HPP) in June 2023 led toextensive flooding that impacted 80 settlements across four oblasts: Khersonska, Mykolaivska,
Dnipropetrovska, and Zaporizka. Approximately 100,000 residents were directly affected by the resulting
deluge.20 More information about the impacts of the dam breach is in Box 3. During the last months of2023, severe attacks were carried out on ports, including in Odeska and Mykolaivska oblasts and along
the Danube River, and attacks on infrastructure increased in intensity, particularly in the southeast.
Unpredictable air and combat drone attacks, as well as artillery assaults, extended beyond establishedbattle zones, continue to impact cities like Kyiv.
In 2023, the hostilities hotspots shifted toward Donetska and Zaporizka oblasts, where intense clashes
occurred as Ukraine sought to gain control over territories temporarily not under government control.
Counteroffensive operations in spring 2023 expanded battlefields to Zaporizka and Khersonska oblasts.
Notably, Zaporizka oblast faced heavy artillery, missile attacks, and combat air/drone strikes during
Ukraine’s attempts to regain control during summer. The civilian toll has been heavy throughout the war;
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights reported in December 2023 over 10,000 civilian deaths and18,500 injuries since February 2022.21 According to statistics from the Children of War GoU portal, as ofDecember 9, 2023, 19,546 Ukrainian children had been deported and/or forcibly displaced to Russia.22
19 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Ukraine Situation: Flash Update #35,” November 18, 2022, Link.
20 According to the PDNA, up to a million people lost access to drinking water, and 140,000 were deprived of electricity. See GoU

and UN, “Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine,” 2023, Link.
21 OHCHR. 2023. Statement of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 19 December 2023, Link.
22 GoU’s Children of War website, Link.

22

Figure 8. Spatial evolution of the war until December 31, 2023, and Ukraine RDNAs

Source: Assessment team. Note: Map is based on on Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED), considering
average monthly conflict events. For ACLED, see Clionadh Raleigh et al., “Introducing ACLED: Armed Conflict
Location and Event Data,” Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 5 (2010): 651–60, Link. Conflict events includes battles
and explosions/remote violence as classified per ACLED methodology. RDNA = rapid damage and needs
assessment.

Box 3. Summary of the assessment of the Kakhovka Dam breach
The Government of Ukraine and the United Nations carried out a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) toevaluate the extent of the damage and losses incurred due to the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam.
The PDNA estimated approximately US$2.79 billion in direct damage to infrastructure and assets as a result of theevent and losses exceeding US$11 billion. The impact on the environment is expected to be particularly long-lasting.
The energy and housing sectors were hit the hardest in terms of direct damage; the energy sector suffered US$1.26
billion in damage, and housing damage amounted to over US$1.1 billion. The environmental and energy sectors
recorded the highest losses, which have the potential to undermine long-term stability and recovery.
Based on a build back better approach, the PDNA estimates the total recovery and reconstruction needs to beapproximately US$5.04 billion, with US$1.82 billion required in the immediate/short term. The report puts forthsuggestions for addressing short-term needs in 2023–2024, and for tailoring the response to meet recovery andreconstruction needs over the medium and long term, spanning the next 10 years (until 2033).
Source: GoU and UN, “Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine,” 2023, Link.

Emergency and Humanitarian Response
Since February 2022, the GoU has continued to provide and coordinate humanitarian support to waraffected regions and populations. Online humanitarian support platforms have been established toprovide services, coordination, and support to Ukraine; these are operated by state authorities andvolunteers and include cash assistance and housing allowances for IDPs and are an important source ofsustenance.
23

As of February 2024, the EU, its member states, and European financial institutions had madeapproximately €88 billion available to support Ukraine.23 This includes humanitarian, economic, andmilitary support as well as funding for Ukrainian refugees in the EU. Through the Union Civil Protection
Mechanism (UCPM), the EU has delivered 97,484 tons of assistance to Ukraine, including items andequipment related to CBRN, shelter and shelter-related items (such as appliances, kitchen supplies, andbedding), and over 900 vehicles, including ambulances and fire trucks. The EU has deployed a range ofrescEU assets, including power generators, medical equipment, temporary shelter units, and otherspecialized equipment, and it has coordinated the medical evacuation of over 1,700 Ukrainian patients inurgent need of treatment. The total financial value of the assistance is estimated at €796 million. The
UCPM logistic hubs in Poland, Romania, and Slovakia have played a crucial role in facilitating the deliveryof support.
In response to the war, the United Nations in partnership with the humanitarian community have scaledup their presence in Ukraine and supported 16 million people in 2022 through US$3.4 billion worth ofassistance, including cash, emergency shelter and house repairs, food, medicine, generators, protection
services and winter supplies. In 2023 the Humanitarian Country Team further reached 11 million people
with life-saving assistance,24 particularly within front line areas, through approximately US$2.69 billion
worth of humanitarian funding from more 38 UN member states and many other private donors.25 The
UN development system has implemented over US$1 billion in 2022-2023 in support to the government’s
early recovery efforts focusing on community recovery investments in housing, energy, social
infrastructure, humanitarian demining, local economic development, mental health and psychologicalsupport as well as strengthening the capacity of national systems and community mobilization.26
Since February 2022, the World Bank Group has mobilized over US$39 billion in emergency financing in
support of the people of Ukraine to help blunt the war’s widespread human and economic impacts.
About 94 percent of this mobilized capital comes from donor countries. The World Bank’s flagshipfinancing instrument for Ukraine, the Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity Endurance (PEACE)
Project, enables international donors to provide support27 and is helping to sustain essential public service
delivery, pensions for the elderly, and social programs for the vulnerable. The World Bank also supports
preparation and implementation of framework projects that reflect Ukraine’s emergency relief needs, arealigned with the RDNA approach, and are designed to be scalable to absorb additional financing as it
becomes available.

Recovery and Reconstruction Efforts
While the war is ongoing, the GoU is leading recovery and reconstruction efforts in relevant areas,
having set up relevant institutional structures (see Figure 9). The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
determines the priority areas for the recovery of Ukraine on an annual basis, mobilizes appropriate
financial resources, and ensures the involvement of international partners in the recovery process. In
23 EU assistance to Ukraine - European Commission (europa.eu).
24 Humanitarian partner reporting under the 2023 HRP, January 2024. Ukraine OCHA, Link.
25 Financial Tracking System, January 2024. Link.
26 UN Recovery Programming in Ukraine, November 2023, Link.
27 World Bank, “Supporting Ukraine through the War,” Link.

24

2022, the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the War was established, co-chaired by theprime minister and the Office of the President.28 This council is charged with developing proposals forpriority reforms and the plan for postwar recovery and development. The Government Office for the
Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of
Ukraine is responsible for coordinating the process of approximation to the EU in close cooperation withpublic authorities.
Also, in 2023, the GoU, jointly with the G7 countries and the EU, set up the Multi-Donor Coordination
Platform for Ukraine to support Ukraine's repair, recovery, and reconstruction process and to help
bridge the gap between needs and resources.29 The Platform is co-chaired by representatives of Ukraine,
the EU, and USA. A number of international institutions, including Council of Europe Development Bank,
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, European Investment Bank, International Monetary
Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, and the World Bank, actively contributeto the coordination efforts of the platform. The platform meets regularly to coordinate the support for
Ukraine’s financing needs and future economic recovery and reconstruction.
The GoU is developing a Ukraine Plan linked to the planned Ukraine Facility by the EC (see below).30 The
Ukraine Plan is planned as a program of actions and reforms for the period 2024-2027, which will include
macro-financial scenarios for recovery, major sectoral reforms, with the view of priority sectors fordevelopment, increasing the capacity to absorb investment, and cross-cutting issues such as European
integration, digital transformation, green transition, environmental protection, as well as human capital.31
The plan’s development by the GoU is coordinated by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine (MoE), in
cooperation with representatives of regional and local authorities, private sector, experts, and think tanks.
The GoU is also advancing several reforms related to the construction sector, decentralization reform,
energy efficiency, as well as a reform of Public Investment Management (PIM). In December 2023, the
GoU has adopted a roadmap for the PIM reform, incorporating recommendations from the IMF and theWorld Bank. The roadmap introduced the target PIM model that will streamline and adapt decision
making process to the new challenges. It will focus on prioritization, financial sustainability, effectivenessand efficiency, timeliness, environmental sustainability, inclusiveness and accessibility, transparency andaccountability. The GoU is currently developing a detailed action plan for the implementation of the PIM
reform.
Several institutional and policy reforms have been implemented to support the recovery andreconstruction process. The Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development(MCTID or Ministry of Recovery) facilitates coordination and efficient reconstruction of war-affected
regions.32 To support a more systematic approach to planning the restoration of Ukraine, the position of
28 Government Portal, “About the National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from the War,” Link.
29 European Commission, “Ukraine: Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform for Ukraine Kick-starts Work,” January 26, 2023,

Link.
30 Government of Ukraine Portal, European Parliament approves the launch of the Ukraine Facility program worth EUR 50 billion
over 2024-2027, October 2023. Link.
31 ibid. Decentralization and regional policy are considered part of sectoral reforms.
32 Government Portal, “Oleksandr Kubrakov Appointed Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine–Minister forCommunities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine,” December 1, 2022, Link.

25

deputy prime minister for restoration of Ukraine was established; the minister in parallel heads the
MCTID. The State Agency for Infrastructure Restoration and Development of Ukraine (the Agency for
Restoration), through its territorial offices, is responsible for the largest infrastructure projects at thenational level, support and implementation of regional and local recovery projects based on the requestsof the relevant project customers. The activities of the Agency for Restoration are coordinated by MCTID.
Territorial communities are responsible for developing planning documents, establishingcommunication with international partners, and implementing restoration projects in the respective
territories. This should be done in an inclusive manner engaging and consulting with local civil society.
Regional state (military) administrations (RSA/RMA) can be authorized to implement recovery projects onbehalf of territorial communities.
Figure 9. Schematic illustration of national and local level institutions engaged in recovery andreconstruction

Source: Assessment team.

The EU has committed to playing a strong role in Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, which is linked
to the implementation of reforms consistent with Ukraine’s European path. In keeping with this role,
the EC has proposed a multi-annual instrument to support Ukraine between 2024 and 2027. This is the
Ukraine Facility, which aims at supporting the state’s basic needs as well as Ukraine’s recovery,
reconstruction, and modernization, in part through catalyzing of private sector investment tied closely to
Ukraine’s EU path. 33 The European Council confirmed in February 2023 that the overall resources madeavailable for the Ukraine Facility will be €50 billion. In December 2023, the European Council, in line with
the EC’s recommendations in November 2023, agreed to open accession negotiations with Ukraine. This
33 European Commission, “Questions and Answers—A New Ukraine Facility,” June 20, 2023, Link.

26

agreement marks a historical step in the EU enlargement, and the explanatory presentation of the acquis
have started.
The UN in Ukraine leverages its large operational footprint (24 agencies, 3,000 personnel) in
communities across the country to support communities to implement recovery and reconstruction
initiatives. These communities are mobilizing, articulating their needs, and building their capacity to drive
their own recovery. The UN has a strong focus on supporting the inclusion of marginalized groups andseeks to ensure that the recovery process benefits those farthest behind, reduces inequalities, andpromotes social cohesion and livelihoods. In collaboration with the GoU and MCTID, the UN in Ukraine
has established a flexible Ukraine Community Recovery Fund.34 The fund supports communities that are
driving their own recovery efforts in targeted communities to reduce current and prevent future
humanitarian needs; to rebuild the social and economic fabric; and to provide the conditions for people
to voluntarily return to their homes and rebuild their lives. These community-focused early recovery
efforts sit in the nexus of humanitarian, recovery, and social cohesion interventions.
In December 2022, the Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF)35 was
set up by the World Bank to channel donor support.36 The URTF provides a coordinated financing andsupport mechanism that helps the GoU sustain its administrative and service delivery capacity, conduct
relief efforts, and plan and implement Ukraine’s reconstruction and reform agenda. The URTF is financing
projects with a focus on repairing damaged infrastructure, restoring public services, and sustaining
economic activities in the areas of health care, energy, logistics, agriculture, and housing. As of January2024, URTF has over US$1.5 billion in contributions from 14 donor countries, making grants to support
early recovery and administrative capacity of the government. The URTF operates under the overarching
World Bank Multi-Donor Resources for Institutions and Infrastructure (MRII - МРІЇ) for Ukraine Facility,
which is part of broader international support to Ukraine. MRII - МРІЇ takes a phased and multipronged
approach to mobilizing financing, using guarantees, co-financing, parallel financing, and other financial
instruments to help Ukraine. The multisectoral support provided by the World Bank during the war builds
on a decades-long development partnership and sets the stage for resilient reconstruction when peace
returns.37 A list of ongoing World Bank–supported projects is in Box 4. Through the Economic Resilience
Action Program, the International Finance Corporation (IFC) is providing for the immediate needs of
Ukraine's private sector with a US$2 billion package to help build private sector resilience and support
livelihoods.38
Box 4. Ongoing World Bank–supported projects
The Health Enhancement and Lifesaving Ukraine Project (HEAL), approved in December 2022, is helping restore
and improve access to health care and address new and urgent needs for health services due to the war.

34 United Nations, “Ukraine Community Recovery Fund,” Concept note "Ukraine Community Recovery Fund'. Link.
35 World Bank. 2024. Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF). Link.
36 World Bank, “Ukraine Relief, Recovery, Reconstruction and Reform Trust Fund (URTF),” December 16, 2022, Link.
37 World Bank, “The World Bank and Ukraine: Laying the Groundwork for Reconstruction in the Midst of War,” November 30,

2023, Link.
38 IFC, “IFC Launches $2 Billion Response Package to Support Ukrainian Private Sector,” December 15, 2022, Link.

27

The Repairing Essential Logistics and Network Connectivity Project (RELINC), approved in February 2023, is helping
repair damaged critical road and rail networks; the goal is to reconnect communities and improve westward
transport linkages that mitigate impacts of Black Sea disruption.
The Restoration Project of Winterization and Energy Resources, approved in April 2023, is helping restore essential
energy services by financing emergency repairs to the power transmission and heating infrastructure.
The Housing Repair for People’s Empowerment (HOPE) Project, approved in August 2023, is helping more than
100,000 families in Ukraine make urgent repairs to homes damaged by the war.
The Ukraine Agriculture Recovery Inclusive Support Emergency (ARISE) Project, approved in October 2023, targets
the agriculture sector, which was negatively impacted by the war, with further ramifications for food and nutrition
security globally. The ARISE Project will help more than 90,000 farmers access affordable loans and receive grants
for agricultural production.
The Investing in Social Protection for Inclusion, Resilience, and Efficiency (INSPIRE) Project, approved in November
2023, will provide additional support to 29 social assistance programs targeting the most vulnerable war-affected
people in Ukraine. The poorest households need adequate support to mitigate the impacts of the ongoing war andavoid slipping further into poverty.
The Ukraine Relief and Recovery Development Policy Loan (DPL), approved in June 2023, is designed to address
the needs of the newly poor and displaced by providing relief to households; to enhance the transparency andaccountability of public resource expenditures; and to help markets function better during and after the war.
Source: The World Bank in Ukraine website. Link.

RDNA3 Objectives and Methodology
The Third Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA3) considers social, infrastructure, andproductive sectors as well as cross-cutting sectors and issues. The RDNA3 assesses the impact during theperiod February 24, 2022, to December 31, 2023—almost two years of the war. In doing so, it builds onthe foundations and analytics of RDNA1, which covered the period between February 24 and June 1, 2022;
the RDNA2, which covered the period between February 24, 2022, and February 24, 2023. The RDNA3
takes also into account important assessments, including the 2023 Kakhovka Dam Post-Disaster Needs
Assessment (PDNA) and several other analytics.39
Box 5. First and Second Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA1 and RDNA2)
RDNA1: Focused on the first three months of the war. It estimated US$97.4 billion in direct damage (covering theperiod between February 24 and June 1, 2022), US$252 billion in losses (which considered in 21 months in total
comprising 3 months of actual and 18 months of projected losses), and US$348.5 billion in recovery andreconstruction needs (10 years). The most damage-affected sectors were housing (40 percent of total damage),

39 GoU and UN, “Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine,” 2023, Link. Other assessments include

International Finance Corporation (IFC), “Private Sector Opportunities for a Green and Resilient Reconstruction in Ukraine,” 2023,
Link; Kyiv School of Economics (KSE), “Report on Damages to Infrastructure Caused by Russia's War against Ukraine One Yearafter the Start of the Full-Scale Invasion,” Link; UN Environment Programme (UNEP), “The Environmental Impact of the Conflictin Ukraine: A Preliminary Review,” 2022, Link; United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Ukraine: Human Impact
Assessment,” June 2023, Link; UNESCO, “In the Face of War, UNESCO's Action in Ukraine,” 2023, Link; UNDP, “Towards a Green
Transition of the Energy Sector in Ukraine,” 2023, Link; UN, World Bank, and Government of Ukraine, “Ukraine Energy Damage
Assessment,” 2023, Link; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), “Ukraine: Impact of the War on
Agricultural Enterprises,” 2023, Link.

28

transport (31 percent), and commerce and industry (10 percent). The most affected oblasts in terms of direct
damage were Donetska, Luhanska, and Kharkivska, followed by Kyivska, Chernihivska, and Zaporizka.
RDNA2: Focused on the first year of the war. It estimated US$134.7 billion in direct damage (covering the period
between February 24 and February 24, 2023), US$289 billion in losses (which considered in 30 months in total
comprising 12 months of actual loss and 18 months of projected losses), and US$410.6 billion in recovery andreconstruction needs (10 years). The RDNA2 estimated implementation priorities for 2023 at around US$14 billion,
or close to 3.5 percent of total needs identified. The most affected sectors were housing (38 percent), transport (26percent), energy (8 percent), commerce and industry (8 percent), and agriculture (6 percent). Donetska, Kharkivska,
Luhanska, Zaporizka, Kyivska, and Khersonska oblasts have sustained the greatest direct damage.
Sources: World Bank, GoU, and EC. Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment,” Link; World Bank, GoU, EC, and
UN. Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022–February 2023,” March 2023, Link.

The RDNA3 follows a globally established and recognized PDNA methodology jointly developed by theWorld Bank, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations. This approach has been applied globallyin post-disaster and war contexts to inform recovery and reconstruction planning. The report uses
standard terminology; key terms are highlighted in Box 6. The use of the global approach and standard
terminology facilitates any future assessments. An integral part of the assessment across all sectors is theunderstanding of the direct and indirect damage and loss and human impacts; application of the build
back better (BBB) approach; and use of principles of green, resilient, inclusive, and sustainable recovery
and reconstruction in estimating needs. Where information was available, recovery and reconstructionneeds already met were deducted from the needs estimates. In line with the exchange rate used in
RDNA2, the RDNA3 uses the rate of US$1 = UAH 36.5686.40 Regions are organized according to groupings
presented by the GoU in 2022, updated based on the current situation. Frontline regions are those areas
temporarily not under government control and/or areas of active war; support regions are those providing
logistics for defense and humanitarian cargo, backline regions are those protecting export/import logistics
hubs and evacuated enterprises, and regions where the government has regained control are areas
recovering from sustained damage.
While much of this report focuses on areas where the impact of the war can be financially quantified,it also provides a qualitative description of how people’s lives have been altered. This analysis follows
the specific groups/topics identified. In addition to the four groups/topics covered in RDNA2 (displaced
persons and returnees, persons with disabilities, veterans and their families, and gender-specific impacts),
RDNA3 includes two more: (i) youth and child protection and rights; and (ii) elderly. The human impacts
chapter also describes a broader set of needs and priorities that cut across sectors and that can improve
people’s lives as the war continues. Addressing this set of needs and priorities will also contribute toward
more socially inclusive development for Ukraine beyond the immediate response. It should be noted thatin addition to the group-specific issues assessed, there are population-wide human impacts felt by
everyone in Ukraine, as mentioned across sectoral chapters in the report.
While focusing on war-related impacts and needs, the RDNA3 contributes to and complements otherongoing efforts related to Ukraine’s reconstruction, modernization, and integration into the European
community. The principles of building back better are aligned with the vision and investments to be set
by the Government’s Ukraine Plan and the EU Ukraine Facility, both under preparation, that will support
40 For conversions from US$ to €, the exchange rate: 0.906 as of the end December 2023 was used.

29

Ukraine’s reform agenda to become a modern country, aligned with EU policies and ready to join the EU.
Results of the RDNA3 can also inform and complement other sector-specific analytics as well as ongoing
efforts by the GoU and partners to identify key reforms, medium-term economic growth opportunities,
and opportunities for private sector engagement.
Building on the analysis of 2023 priorities in RDNA2 and complementary to the needs’ estimation, theRDNA3 also includes short-term priorities identified by Ukrainian line ministries that need financing in
2024. These priorities have been defined by line ministries through an ongoing process of project
development and monitoring and involving extensive consultations with development partners. Sectoralpriorities, to be monitored and refined over time, are intended to inform investment planning,mobilization of resources, and implementation. The RDNA3 also includes an overview of key requirements
to facilitate more effective and efficient recovery and reconstruction planning and implementation.
The RDNA3 faced several constraints and relied on several specific assumptions. The sector assessments
were produced in a short timeframe with sometimes significant limitations related to data availability(such as for data related to the private sector, certain geographic areas, or comprehensive information on
recovery and reconstruction needs met) and data sensitivity (such as for critical energy infrastructure).
Field verification was not possible due to the ongoing war. To ensure the relevance of the estimations,substantial efforts have been made to improve the accuracy of the information that was collected,
analyzed, and verified. The RDNA3 does not provide asset-level information and instead provides portfolio
level information at the level of oblast. Damage to asset types considers three levels: fully destroyed,
damaged, and no/minor damage. Since loss is typically measured until “normality” is restored, thecalculation includes in total 40 months, which included 22 months between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023, as well as an additional 18 months. The geographic scope includes all areas under
government control on February 1, 2022. An important limitation is that the total needs and priorities arepresented at sector level and do not consider balancing of one sector’s needs against those of anothersector. The RDNA3 is not intended for legal or compensatory claims. While the assessment considers
human impacts of the war, there continue to be gaps, and the report can serve as the basis for further
analysis. Future analyses may also focus more in depth on the reform and growth agenda – including
different types of reforms depending on war trajectory, priorities and expected outcomes, as well as thedeterioration of infrastructure and services in areas with limited or no fighting due to reduced investment
during the war and therefore increased investment needs.
Box 6. RDNA3 definitions
Damage: Direct costs of destroyed or damaged physical assets and infrastructure, valued in monetary terms. Costs
are estimated based on replacing or repairing physical assets and infrastructure, considering the replacement priceprevailing before the war. The data cut-off for RDNA3 was December 31, 2023.
Loss: Changes in economic flows resulting from the war, valued in monetary terms. Examples include increased
operating costs and loss of revenue for authorities/private sector.
Needs: Value associated with the resumption of prewar normality through activities such as repair and restoration,
including a premium linked to build back better principles—e.g., improved energy efficiency, modernization efforts,and sustainability standards—as well as factors such as global inflation, surge pricing due to volume of construction,higher insurance, and so forth. Needs are expressed in monetary terms according to market prices prevailing as ofDecember 31, 2023. Needs do not equal the sum of damage and losses. Needs met were discounted as relevant.

30

Build back better: Relates to improvements integrated into rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged assets,
including improved functionality, energy efficiency, universal access, disaster and climate resilience (greening,
decarbonization), and critical modernization measures, such as right-sizing and right-siting of infrastructure andservices. This costing is added in the needs calculation, and each sector uses appropriate standards and costing
assumptions.
Recovery and reconstruction financing priorities for 2024: Priorities refer to recovery and reconstruction needs
identified by GoU line ministries, that are considered highest priority for urgent delivery and require funding in 2024.
Investment priorities account for both capital and current expenditures and consider expenditures that would bemade by central and local governments, by state-owned enterprises (SOEs), by the private sector (including
households), or by other actors (e.g., development partners).

31

SUMMARY OF IMPACTS AND NEEDS
Summary of Damage
The total direct damage to buildings and infrastructure across sectors is estimated at approximately
US$152 billion (Table 1). The most affected sectors have been housing (almost US$56 billion, or 37
percent of total damage), transport (almost US$34 billion, or 22 percent), commerce and industry (almost
US$16 billion, or 10 percent), energy (almost US$11 billion, or 7 percent) and agriculture (US$10 billion,or 7 percent). Across sectors, Donetska, Kharkivska, Luhanska, Zaporizka, Khersonska, and Kyivska oblasts
have sustained the greatest damage (Table 2).
Figure 10. Total damage (US$ billion): US$152 billion
Environment andForesty $3
Commerce andIndustry $16

Housing $56
Education $6
Health $1

Agriculture $10
Municipal Services $5
Water Supply andSanitation $4
Telecommunications
and Digital $2

Culture and Tourism $3

Transport $34

Energy and Extractives $11

Source: Assessment team. Note: Values are for the period between February 24, 2022, and December 31, 2023.

On average, across assessed sectors, the direct damage has not escalated substantially due to limited
shifts in the front line of war since the second assessment (US$135 billion)41 (Figure 8), but the impacts
on Ukraine remain immense. For example, 10 percent of the total housing stock of Ukraine has been
either damaged or destroyed, impacting more than 2 million housing units across the country. There is
US$4.8 billion in damage in the municipal sector of which 42 percent is in district heating. In transport,
this includes 8,400 km of motorways, highways, and other national roads, over 140 bridges on thenational road network and 150 bridges on the oblast and village roads, more than In transport, thisincludes 8,400 km of motorways, highways, and other national roads, over 140 bridges on the nationalroad network and 150 bridges on the oblast and village roads, more than 50 km of railways and 83 railway
bridges damaged or destroyed.
RDNA3 records changes in damage for some sectors for several reason since the RDNA2. For example,
there has been stark increase in emergency response and civil protection (almost 115 percent)environment, natural resources, and forestry sector (112 percent), irrigation and water resource
management sector (almost 95 percent), water supply and sanitation sector (82 percent). For example,
41 RDNA3 uses the same exchange rate as RDNA2, while RDNA1 used a different exchange rate. Damage reported under RDNA1

and RDNA2 is not double counted under RDNA3.

32

207 water treatment facilities and pumping stations, and 234 sewage treatment plants and pumping
stations have been destroyed or damaged as of December 31, 2023.
The Kakhovka Dam breach contributed to considerable increase in damage across several sectors. For
example, in the agriculture sector, the dam break resulted in a threefold increase in damage to theaquaculture and fishery industries. In the housing sector, of the 11 percent increase in the cost of damage
since RDNA2, approximately a fifth can be attributed to the damage caused by the breakage of the
Kakhovka Dam and the subsequent flooding (primarily in the Khersonska oblast).42 Increased attacks on
cultural heritage sites in areas protected under the World Heritage Convention such as Lviv and Odesa
cities, including, among others, damages to the Transfiguration Cathedral, the first and foremost
Orthodox church in Odesa founded in 1794, are reflected in an almost 33 percent increase in the culture
sector. In the culture sector, it is estimated that in total 4,779 cultural and tourism assets destroyed ordamaged as of December 31, 2023.
It is important to note that some changes in damage (increase or decrease) is linked to the inclusion of
new or improved data, changes in subsector classification, or adjustments in methodology andassumptions. For example, sectors that used new or more precise data include agriculture, culture andtourism, commerce and industry, and emergency response and civil protection. In the health sector,
baseline and damage data was updated contributing to a 40 percent decrease in damage. In the transport
sector, some cost assumptions were updated, contributing to an almost 6 percent decrease in damage,while in the commerce and industry sector, new data allowed the use of new calculation and adjusted
methodology, contributing an almost 43 percent increase in damage compared to RDNA2. Damage inmunicipal services sector increased over 103 percent, in large part due to the inclusion of district heating
under which was previously included under the energy sector in RDNA2 and RDNA1, and this change also
contributes to explaining only a slight increase in damage in the energy sector compared with RDNA2.
Figure 11. Comparison of damage in RDNA1, RDNA2, RDNA3 (billion US$)

42 European Union et al., “Analysis of the Impact of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station Explosion on the Populated Areasof Kherson and Mykolaiv Regions,” 2023, Link.

33

Source: Assessment team. Note: y axis = US$ billion; x axis = = sectors under RDNA1, RDNA2 and RDNA3. RDNA1
damage covers the period between February 24, 202,2 and June 1, 2022. RDNA2 damage covers the period
between February 24, 2022, and February 24, 2023, while RDNA3 damage covers the period between February 24,
2022, and December 31, 2023.

Summary of Loss
Aggregate economic, social, and other monetary losses total almost US$499 billion (Table 1). Loss isdominated by commerce and industry (over US$173 billion, or 35 percent of the total loss), and in a lesser
degree by agriculture (almost US$70 billion, or 14 percent), energy and extractives (US$54 billion, or 11
percent), transport (almost US$41 billion, 8 percent), and explosive hazards management (almost US$35
billion, or 7 percent). Five percent of total loss is attributed to the environment, natural resource
management, and forestry sector, in large part linked to the Kakhovka Dam breach and inclusion of new
types of losses (such as assessment of ecosystem service losses). In the banking and finance sector, there
are US$5.7 billion estimated in credit. It should be noted that losses in one sector can flow into andintersect with those in other sectors, though careful efforts are made to avoid double-counting. For
example, reduction in agricultural production affects transportation needs, and loss of electricity affects
commerce and industry in areas that are otherwise unaffected by the war. The total loss figures do notinclude household income loss—estimated under the social protection and livelihoods sector and valued
at over US$60 billion—to avoid potential double-counting in relation to other sectors.
Figure 12. Total loss (US$ billion): US$499 billion

34

Management of Explosive Hazards$35

Housing $17

Education $7

Health $18
Social Protection andLivelihoods $10

Finance and Banking$6

Culture and Tourism $20
Energy and Extractives$54

Commerce andIndustry $173

Transport $41
Telecommunications andDigital $2

Agriculture $70
Municipal Services $7

Water Supply andSanitation $12

Source: Assessment team. Note: Loss includes an additional 18 months beyond the 12 months between February
24, 2022, and December 31, 2023. Loss in social protection does not include loss of household income to avoid
potential double-counting.

On average and across all sectors assessed, compared with RDNA2 loss results (US$290 billion), RDNA3
loss results show a considerable increase. As was the case for damage, the increased loss in some sectors
is linked to specific events such as the Kakhovka Dam break (which affected the energy, irrigation andwater resource management, and environment sectors), or to cyberattacks and increased costs ofgenerators (which affected the telecommunications and digital sector). The most pronounced increasein losses compared with RDNA2 is in Kyivska, Dnipropetrovska, Zaporizka, Khersonska, Kyiv City, andOdeska oblasts.
In the case of losses, much of the increase has to do with new and improved data and new estimations.
In the education sector and environment sectors, the inclusion of new types of losses, specificallylearning loss in the case of education (not assessed under RDNA1 or RDNA2) and loss of ecosystemservices in the environment sector (RDNA2 estimated only losses from reduced forest carbon
sequestration and a limited range of forest ecosystem services) contribute to the steep increase in losses.
In the agriculture sector, which saw increase over 120 percent of losses, the RDNA3 estimates include
crop losses for the entire year of 2023 (while the RDNA2 considered only production in 2022 and winter2023) as well as projected crop production losses for all of 2024, with similar principle for livestock
production. The commerce and industry sector recorded an increase of 100 percent, based on updated
methodology which used actual sales data for industry and commerce that have become available andupdated assumptions.
As loss comprises several categories including disruption of the production of goods/services andaccess to goods/services, disruption to governance, and increased risks/vulnerabilities, loss is notproportionately linked to damage. For example, in agriculture, damage in farm equipment can be
relatively low, while loss to crops can be still high; in commerce, damage to commercial/industry
buildings can be low but sales drop can be still significant. For example, Dnipro was a major industrial
35

center contributing to 14.7 percent of national sales before the war and hence damages
disproportionately affected sales, and losses in turn. In the social protection sector, while damage isrelatively small, losses are considerable – for example US$3.3 billion in additional social protection
expenditure for internally displaced persons as of December 2023.
Figure 13. Comparison of losses in RDNA1, RDNA2, RDNA3 (billion US$)

Source: Assessment team. Note: Loss in RDNA1 considers 21 months in total - 3 months between March and June
2022, and additional 18 months. Loss in RDNA2 considers 30 months in total - 12 months between February 24,
2022, and February 24, 2023, and additional 18 months. Loss in RDNA3 considers 40 months in total - 22 months
between February 24, 2022, and December 31, 2023, and additional 18 months.

Summary of Macroeconomic and Social impacts
Human development impacts of the war continue to be deep and wide-ranging. Between February
2022 and July 2023, almost 10,000 civilian deaths and 18,500 injuries were reported.43 At the start of thewar, 13.5 million people—approximately one-third of Ukraine’s population—were forcibly displaced. As
of December 2023, an estimated 5.9 million people44 remain recorded as refugees across Europe and 3.7
million as IDPs, as of October 2023.45 The war has brought hardship as livelihoods have been lost andaccess to basic services has been severely disrupted and resulted in decrease of living standards.
Different societal groups face unique sets of challenges. For example, youth have suffered learning loss
and increased mental health issues, additional to those already accumulated during the COVID-19
pandemic. The elderly have been disproportionally impacted with many impoverished and unable to
43 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Repo rt on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 February

to 31 July 2023, Link.
44 UNHCR. Ukraine Refugee Situation, website, accessed December 2023. Link.
45 International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Ukraine: Internal Displacement Report—General Population Survey Round 14(September – October 2023),” Link. This compares to 5.4 million people in the Ukraine RDNA2 report.

36

meet basic needs, especially if they live close to frontlines, support adults and children who became IDPs
and refugees, lost their social networks or access to coping mechanisms such as kitchen gardens to
supplement food supply. The invasion has resulted in increased cases of trauma and serious injuries,
leading to a rapid rise in the number of people with disabilities. IDPs and returnees face many challenges
linked to their socio-economic existence facing employment challenges, scarcity and geographicalmismatches of vacancies and reduced wages, and barriers in the labor market, particularly for womenand vulnerable subgroups such as, young people and persons with disabilities. Demobilization,
reintegration, and socio-economic support are needed to address the needs of veterans and theirfamilies. Risks of gender-based violence, including war-related sexual violence, human trafficking andpartner violence, have increased since February 2022.46
The invasion has caused economic disruption, job loss, and low investor confidence, affecting public
and private financing. However, after a significant Gross Domestic Product (GDP) contraction in 2022,
Ukraine’s economy has demonstrated resilience and returned to growth in 2023. More reliable electricity
supply, an exceptional wheat harvest, and regular inflows of external assistance have allowed for a
growth recovery in 2023. Yearly growth for 2023 is estimated at 4.8 percent (compared with a 29.1
percent contraction in 2022), though growth in 2024 is expected to be slower than in 2023. As of
December 31, 2023, Ukraine has yet to secure firm commitments for sufficient support receipts tofinance its budget deficit. The 2024 budget plans for the receipt of US$37.3 billion in external loan andgrant to meet Ukraine’s fiscal needs. The receipt of this is, however, highly uncertain, as no firm
commitments of this magnitude have been received to date. Given the budget financing shortfalls,
Ukraine needs to prioritize any external assistance to meet its budgetary needs, and thus to pay for social
assistance, pensions and salaries, among others.
Summary of Needs
The total estimated recovery and reconstruction needs is almost US$486 billion (Table 1). These costs— estimated within a period of 10 years — consider building back better principles, including shift toward
lower energy intensity, modern standards including climate resilience and inclusive design, as well as
inflation, market conditions, surge pricing in construction commonly seen in areas of major construction,and higher insurance premiums. The highest estimated needs are in housing (over US$80 billion, or 17
percent of the total), followed by transport (almost US$74 billion, or 15 percent), commerce and industry(US$67.5 billion, or 14 percent), agriculture (US$56 billion, or 12 percent), energy (US$47 billion, or 10
percent), social protection and livelihoods (US$44.3 billion, or 9 percent), and explosive hazard
management (almost 35 billion, or 7 percent). Across all sectors, the cost of debris clearance andmanagement (and demolition where needed) reaches almost US$11 billion. The health sector (overUS$14 billion) and education sector (almost US$14 billion) each represent 3 percent of the total needs.
Figure 14. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US486 billion)

46 Regional Gender Task Force, “Making the Invisible Visible: An evidence-based analysis of gender in the regional response to

the war in Ukraine”, October 2022, Link.

37

Finance and Banking $2
Irrigation and Water Resource
Management $11

Management of Explosive Hazards $35
Housing $80
Education $14

Commerce andIndustry $68

Health $14

Agriculture $56

Social Protection andLivelihoods $45

Municipal Services $11
Water Supply andSanitation $11
Transport $74

Culture and Tourism $9
Energy and Extractives $47
Telecommunications and Digital $5

Source: Assessment team. Note: Needs relate to total estimated needs covering the period 2024–2033. Where data
was available, needs met were deducted.

On average, across assessed sectors, the increase in needs in RDNA3 compared to RDNA2 (US$411
billion, see Figure 7) is moderate and proportionate to the impacts sustained (Figure 4). Sectors withthe highest increase in needs include those that have seen an increase in damage, specifically commerce
and industry, agriculture, and water supply and sanitation. However, new or improved data, changes insubsector classification, adjustments in methodology and assumptions, as well as and deduction of needs
met, contributed to changes for specific sectors between RDNA3 and RDNA2 sector needs. An updated
baseline and damage data led to a decrease in needs in the health sector. In the transport sector,
adjustment of cost assumptions and a greater focus on recovery and reconstruction of core services
contributed to a 20 percent decline compared with RDNA2. This sector has recorded also several needs
met. In the finance and banking sector, decrease in needs reflects results of the 2023 resilienceassessment, and decrease of war-related credit losses. A decrease of 8 percent for management of
explosive hazards is linked to improved accuracy of data due to ongoing and increased data collection,
estimating 174, 000 km2 of area contaminated with explosive ordnance. The regions with the greatest
net change in needs include Kyivska, Dnipropetrovska, Donetska, Khersonska, Kharkivska, Zaporizka, andOdeska.
Meeting the overall estimated needs will be critical for the long-term recovery from the war, but allneeds cannot be met immediately. The timeframe for covering these needs will depend on theavailability of financing, but also on several other factors: the absorptive capacity of the Ukrainianbudget; the implementation capacity of and coordination among line ministries, subnational authorities,
civil society, community-based organizations, and implementing agencies; the readiness of the private
sector to support capital investments; and the trajectory of the war. The critical role of private sector
investments in meeting needs should be noted; further information is provided in the final chapter. An
estimation of recovery and reconstruction priorities for 2024 is discussed in the next section.
Figure 15. Comparison of needs in RDNA1, RDNA2, and RDNA3 (in billion US$)38

Source: Assessment team. Note: y axis = US$ billion; x axis = sectors under RDNA1, RDNA2 and RDNA3. Needs arecounted within a period of 10 years.

Table 1. Total damage, loss, and needs by sector (US$ billion)
SectorSocial sectors
Housing
Education and science
HealthSocial protection and livelihoodsa
Culture and tourism
Infrastructure sectors
Energy and extractives
Transport
Telecommunications and digital
Water supply and sanitation
Municipal services
Productive sectors
Agriculture
Commerce and industry
Irrigation and water resource management
Finance and banking
Cross-cutting sectors
Environment, natural resource management, and forestry
Emergency response and civil protection
Justice and public administration
Explosive hazard management
Total

Damage

Loss

Needs

55.9
5.6
1.4
0.2
3.5

17.4
6.9
17.8
9.5a
19.6

80.3
13.9
14.2
44.5
8.9

10.6
33.6
2.1
4.0
4.9

54.0
40.7
2.3
11.6
6.8

47.1
73.7
4.7
11.1
11.4

10.3
15.6
0.7
0.0

69.8
173.2
0.7
5.7

56.1
67.5
10.7
2.3

3.3
0.4
0.3
152.5

26.5
0.5
1.7
34.6
499.3

2.3
2.3
0.7
34.6
486.2

39

Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not relevant. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033. a.
Under social protection, household income loss valued at US$60 billion is not included to avoid potential doublecounting in relation to other sectors.

Table 2. RDNA3 Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ billion)
OblastDamageLoss
Needs
Frontline regions, subtotal
116.0
157.6
250.5
Donetska
38.7
39.0
73.9
Zaporizka
13.5
30.4
33.6
Luhanska
17.8
19.1
39.0
Mykolaivska
5.6
11.1
14.2
Kharkivska
27.8
32.3
54.9
Khersonska
12.6
25.7
35.0
Support regions, subtotal
5.3
81.3
36.3
Vinnytska
0.2
9.3
4.7
Dnipropetrovska
2.9
39.3
16.4
Kirovohradska
0.2
5.7
2.7
Odeska1.3
15.2
7.2
Poltavska
0.8
12.0
5.3
Backline regions, subtotal
1.2
47.5
19.1
Volynska
0.1
4.6
1.7
Zakarpatska
0.3
2.9
1.4
Ivano-Frankivska
0.1
5.6
1.9
Lvivska
0.3
11.3
3.3
Rivnenska
0.1
3.5
1.6
Ternopilska
0.0
3.9
1.7
Khmelnytska
0.2
6.9
3.6
Chernivetska
0.0
1.6
0.7
Cherkaska
0.2
7.2
3.2
Regions where government has regained control, subtotal
22.9
135.7
80.8
Kyiv City
2.2
27.4
8.2
Zhytomyrska
1.1
6.2
4.7
Kyivska
11.2
82.7
42.5
Sumska3.0
8.8
10.4
Chernihivska
5.5
10.6
15.0
Not specified—nationwide, subtotal
7.1
77.2
99.5
Source: Assessment team. Note: Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033. The regions follow
categorization as presented by the GoU at the July 2022 Lugano conference, with some updates. As of December
2023, there were hostilities in Mykolaivska, even though most clashes had moved to the Khersonska region.

Table 3. RDNA1, RDNA2, and RDNA3 damage, loss, needs by sector (US$ billion)
SectorSocial sectors
Housing
Education

DamageRDNA 3 RDNA 2
55.9
5.6

50.4
4.4

Loss
RDNA1 RDNA 3 RDNA 2
39.2
3.4

17.4
6.9

17.2
0.8

Needs
RDNA1 RDNA 3 RDNA 2
13.3
0.5

80.3
13.9

68.6
10.7

RDNA1
69.0
9.2

40

Health
1.4
2.5
1.4
17.8
Social protection
0.2
0.2
0.2
9.4
Culture and tourism
3.5
2.6
1.1
19.6
Infrastructure sectors
Energy and extractives
10.6
10.6
3.1
54.0
Transport
33.6
35.7
29.9
40.7
Telecommunications
and digital
2.1
1.6
0.7
2.3
Water supply andsanitation
4.0
2.2
1.3
11.6
Municipal services
4.9
2.4
2.3
6.8
Productive sectors
Agriculture
10.3
8.7
2.2
69.8
Commerce and industry
15.6
10.9
9.7
173.2
Irrigation and water
resource management
0.7
0.4
0.2
0.7
Finance and banking
0.0
0.0
0.0
5.7
Cross cutting sectors
Environment, natural
resources, forestry
3.3
1.5
2.5
6.5
Emergency response
and civil protection
0.4
0.2
0.1
0.5
Justice and public
administration
0.3
0.3
0.1
1.7
Management of
explosive hazards
34.6
Total
152.5
134.7
97.4
499.3
Source: Assessment team. Data per RDNA1, RDNA2 and RDNA3.

16.5
4.2
15.2

6.4
4.5
19.3

14.2
44.5
8.9

16.4
41.8
6.9

15.1
20.6
5.2

27.2
31.6

12.0
26.1

47.1
73.7

47.0
92.1

10.7
73.8

1.6

0.6

4.7

4.5

3.3

7.5
3.0

6.8
4.3

11.1
11.4

7.1
5.7

5.4
5.7

31.5
85.8

28.3
47.5

56.1
67.5

29.7
23.2

18.7
20.8

0.3
6.8

0.1
8.1

10.7
2.3

8.9
6.8

7.5
8.0

0.5

0.7

2.3

1.5

1.2

0.5

0.2

2.3

1.5

0.7

1.4

0.0

0.7

0.6

0.2

37.6
289.1

73.2
252.0

34.6
486.2

37.6
410.6

73.2
348.5

Figure 16. Comparison of damage, loss, and needs for sector clusters in RDNA2 and RDNA3 (billion US$)

Source: Assessment team. Note: y axis = US$ billion; x axis = sectors under RDNA2 and RDNA3.

41

RECOVERY and RECONSTRUCTION PRIORITIES and PRINCIPLES
Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
As needs continue to grow, it will be increasingly important to establish clear priorities for recovery andreconstruction, to mobilize and leverage financing effectively, and to ensure organized and efficient
implementation. This chapter summarizes the implementation priorities identified by the GoU line
ministries, assesses the implications of these priorities from a financing and implementation perspective,
and sets out some recommendations for ensuring effective and efficient recovery and reconstruction
efforts over the medium term.47
Given the magnitude and complexity of the needs, the GoU has taken an organized, sector-levelapproach to recovery and reconstruction planning. Coordinated through the MCTID, the MOE, and theRDO, line ministries worked across 20 sectors to identify project-level priorities, determine financing
needs, and monitor funding, implementation, and disbursement. Along with a detailed data collection
and monitoring effort, a series of workshops and consultations was organized in June and November 2023
with line ministries and development partners to review progress on implementation, outline priorities
and expected impacts, discuss implementation feasibility and timelines, and assess funding needs. This
process has enabled individual ministries to determine existing 2023 priorities that will require continued
implementation in 2024, confirm new priorities to be mobilized in 2024, and, in coordination with theestablished state budgeting and donor coordination processes, identify funding sources.
While the GoU has not established an overall financial envelope under which to prioritize recovery andreconstruction needs, some broad priorities have been defined, in line with RDNA2. As described above,
determination of 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities has been made bottom-up by line ministries
and has not been prioritized across sectors in line with an overall resource envelope. However, the GoU
has organized discussions of needs around six broad priorities, as listed below.48 These are mainly in linewith RDNA2, with some small additions and reorganization.
1. Energy, including restoration and repair of transmission and distribution lines and restoration anddecentralization of generation capacity, such as through the development of renewables andprotection of the power grid
2. Transport, with a strong focus on internal and cross-border connectivity, including repair andreconstruction of road, rail, bridges, ports, border crossings, and postal services49

47 Figures presented in this chapter are based on priorities as defined by line ministries through a process coordinated by the

Ministry of Restoration. They reflect line ministry priorities.
48 It should be noted that the GoU’s first and foremost priority is to ensure its ability under the state budget to finance its corefunctions and deliver services to its citizens. Reconstruction and recovery needs come as the next priority.
49 Postal services are included under telecommunications and digital in the RDNA nomenclature.

42

3. Housing and utilities, including routine repair and capital reconstruction of housing; as well asreconstruction and service restoration of central heating,50 energy efficiency,51 water supply andsanitation services, and waste management services52
4. Social infrastructure and services, including repair, reconstruction, and service restoration ofschools and health facilities, as well as social and cultural infrastructure and services53
5. Industry and services, encompassing the main support to the private sector, including industry
and commerce, agribusiness, and irrigation,54 with a focus on de-risking investment and trade
6. Cross-sectoral priorities, including demining,55 telecommunications, digital and cybersecurity,56
emergency response and civil protection, and democracy, justice, and human rights.57
Recovery and reconstruction priorities in 2024 identified by line ministries total US$15.3 billion in publicfunding58, while the private sector (including firms and households) could contribute up to another
US$11 billion to meeting the most urgent needs. Total public and private spending accounts for around
6 percent of overall RDNA needs over the span of 10 years. Meeting the priorities identified by line
ministries for 2024 across sectors would require US$8.2 billion in public and SOE investments, along with
US$4.7 billion in grants, subsidies, and guarantees to de-risk financing and overcome constraints to private
investment (Figure 17). This would be complemented by US$2.3 billion in other government current
expenditures.59 Public support to de-risk and facilitate financing has the potential to catalyze up to US$5.5
billion in private investment, while also facilitating a similar volume in working capital (through programs
such as 5-7-9 for firms and preferential mortgages for consumers) to maintain the functioning of firms
and supply chains and stimulate consumer investment in the housing market.60
Support for the private sector accounts for the largest share of 2024 priorities. Based on priorities
defined by line ministries, the largest share of recovery and reconstruction expenditures are in theindustry and services sector (nearly US$3.6 billion, or 23.5 percent of total public expenditures) followedby housing and utilities (US$3.1 billion). Energy, social infrastructure and services (mainly education and

50 Central heating is covered under energy in the RDNA nomenclature, while district heating is covered under municipal services.
51 Energy efficiency is not covered in the RDNA nomenclature as a separate sector but considered in a cross-cutting manner.
52 Waste management is covered under municipal services in the RDNA3 nomenclature.
53 These are municipal services, social protection, and culture and tourism, respectively, in the RDNA3 nomenclature.
54 These are commerce and industry, agriculture, and irrigation and water resource management, respectively, in the RDNA3

nomenclature.
55 This is explosive hazards management in the RDNA nomenclature.
56 This is telecommunications and digital in the RDNA nomenclature; cybersecurity is not covered in the RDNA nomenclature.
57 This is justice and public administration in the RDNA nomenclature.
58 Note that public funding is based on priority sectors/programs as identified by the GoU and does not include an additional
US$3.6 billion in RDNA-related social transfers that are an established part of the state budget, or possible transfers to support
liquidity needs of the district heating sector.
59 A significant share of this expenditure is accounted for by a provision of US$740 million in gas and electricity purchases.
60 Private sector contributions are estimated using assumptions on investment multipliers for the proposed programs identified
by line ministries. In the case of the industry and services sector this includes programs like 5-7-9 that primarily facilitate working
capital loans and grants, credit facilities, risk mitigation facilities, and direct investments. In the housing sector this includes
various mortgage assistance programs as well as direct transfers (compensation) that stimulate investments in the housing
market; for purposes of assessing investment impacts, the analysis uses the pre-war market dynamics whereby 10 percent of
housing lending supports purchases of new facilities in the primary market while 90 percent supports purchases of existing units
in the secondary market (as per IFC, 2023)

43

health)61 and transport account for US$2.7 billion, US$2.4 billion and US$2.3 billion of priorities,
respectively), with another US$1.2 billion needed to address cross-sectoral priorities, including demining,
emergency response, telecommunications and digital, and the justice sector (Figure 18). Private
expenditures and investments are expected to be concentrated in the industry and commerce,
agribusiness, and housing sectors in 2024 (Table 4), although there are opportunities for private
investment in other sectors, including energy and transport.
Figure 17. Estimated distribution of RDNA3priorities by expenditure type (US$ million)

Figure 18. Distribution of RDNA3 priority public
expenditures by broad sector (US$ million)
Crosssectoral
1,186 8% Energy 2,656
17%

Public and SOE
investment
8,221

Private working
capital/financing(estimated) 5,884

Industry andservices
3,593 24%

Privateinvestments(estimated) 5,201
Other public
expenditure 2,332

Grants, subsidies,and otherfinancial support
4,733

Socialinfrastructur
e andservices
2,440 16%

Transport
2,334 15%

Housing andutilities 3,078
20%

Source: Assessment team, based on data in sector templates prepared by GoU line ministries and coordinated by
the MCTID. Note: SOE = state-owned enterprise.

Priorities identified by line ministries for RDNA3 have increased modestly over those in RDNA2 (for2023). Estimated at US$15.3 billion, public expenditures required to address RDNA3 priorities are 8.5
percent higher than in RDNA2 (US$14.1 billion). This increase in urgent priorities is less than half theoverall increase in needs in RDNA3. As shown in Figure 19, the increase is explained by sharply risingpriorities in the social infrastructure and services sector (increased more than 50 percent compared to
RDNA2) as well as the industry and services and the housing and utilities sectors (increases of around 30
percent each), though these are partly offset by a decline of estimated urgent priorities in transport (onethird lower than RDNA2) and energy (20 percent lower). This relative shift in concentration of urgent
priorities reflects in part an increased strategic focus on the private and social sectors of the economy,
and also reflects successful planning, prioritization, and execution in key infrastructure sectors. On theother hand, it is important to recognize that needs in sectors like transport and energy remain huge andthese sectors remain exposed to significant risks that could require urgent investments.

61 Note that while (nonpension) social transfers—around US$3.6 billion in 2024—are considered part of RDNA3 needs, they are

fully covered in the state budget and not considered part of the RDNA3 priorities defined by GoU line ministries. This is in linewith the approach taken in RDNA2.

44

Figure 19. RDNA3 priority public expenditures by broad sector (US$ million) compared with RDNA2
1,000

755

851

824

500
0
-30
-500
-644
-1,000-1,141-1,500
EnergyTransport

Housing andSocialIndustry and Cross-sectoralutilities
infrastructure services
and services

Source: Assessment team, based on data in sector templates prepared by GoU line ministries and coordinated by
the MCTID.

While all the funding identified as priorities by line ministries is unlikely to be fully disbursed in 2024,
mobilizing funding commitments will be important to facilitate implementation. Monitoring ofexecution on RDNA2 priorities shows that more than US$7.2 billion was disbursed in 2023, which wasaround 61 percent of available funding mobilized through the state budget and donors.62 The
disbursement ratio63 was highest in the Housing and utilities sector (70 percent)64, and was above 60
percent in all sectors (Figure 20); committed funding was highest in the infrastructure sectors and laggedin the private and social sectors. While 84 percent of public funds (mainly from the state budget) were
disbursed during the year, indicating relatively strong execution of budget funds, execution was much
lower for loans and grants, which may be a function of more complex disbursement procedures but may
also be explained by funding from donors coming available, on average, later in the year. Looking ahead
to 2024, absolute levels of disbursement would need to more than double to fully execute the RDNA3priorities within a year. Despite relatively positive performance in 2023, such an increase in 2024 is highly
unlikely. At the same time, one of the main barriers to disbursement is lack of timely availability of funds
that enable development of multi-year investment programs. Moreover, for infrastructure projects, longlead times mean that delays of a year or more can occur between procurement and disbursement, andfunding is typically required in advance of procurement. Thus, while the priorities identified by line
ministries may not all require full funding on the ground in 2024, implementation will depend crucially on
securing funding commitments.

62 Commitments were achieved on around 84 percent of identified RDNA2 priorities.
63 Disbursement as a share of available funds
64 The disbursement ratio was 100 percent in the Cross-cutting sector, but that accounted only for small funding in demining andtelecommunications.

45

Figure 20. Execution on RDNA2 priorities by sector and funding during 2023 (US$ million)

Source: Assessment team, based on ‘2023 Monitoring report’ (dated February 1, 2024) provided by GoU; report isbased on a combination of actual data verified by Ministry of Finance and self-reported data from line ministries.
Note: Figure above presents results using RDNA3 sector definitions; Cross-cutting sector here includes only demining
and telecommunications and digital; Disbursement ratio equals funds disbursed as a share of funds available.

Significant funding has already been secured to meet recovery and reconstruction priorities in 2024, butaround US$9.5 billion in additional funding would be needed in 2024 to support all priorities identified
by the line ministries. As of January 2024, around US$5.5 billion in funding had already been secured tomeet the public expenditure priorities for recovery and reconstruction, in addition to the US$3.6 billion
budgeted to support war-related social protection. Secured funding includes expenditure allocation fromthe state budget and complementary spending through local budgets, which are underpinned by support
through loans and grants from international financial institutions (IFIs) and other donor (these accountfor around two-thirds of existing funding). Yet more than 60 percent (around US$9.5 billion) in fundingneeds are still unmet (Figure 21). Unmet funding needs are particularly high, in both nominal andpercentage terms, in the energy and industry and services sector. An estimated US$3.5 billion of unmet
funding needs relates to programs and instruments designed to catalyze private investment (in industry
and services and in housing); failure to secure this would have negative spillovers on the private sector’s
contribution to meeting recovery and reconstruction priorities.

46

Figure 21. Summary of RDNA3 recovery and reconstruction priorities and funding needs for 2024 as

identified by Ukrainian authorities

Source: Assessment team, based on data in sector templates prepared by GoU line ministries and coordinated by
the MCTID.
a. Private sector includes firms and households; figures estimated based on assumptions of investment and lending
multipliers of various public support instruments; note private sector investments not assessed in RDNA2.
b. Includes expenditures and investments from Government and SOEs as well from donors and international financial
institutions.
c. Social transfers are part of RDNA-defined needs but are not included in GoU RDNA priorities, as they are
considered an ongoing core responsibility covered by the state budget. Figure excludes non-RDNA-related pensions.
d. Including through state and local budgets; loans and grants from international financial institutions and donors;
and SOE own funds; includes funding under negotiation but not finalized.

Moving forward on recovery and reconstruction in the context of resource and implementation
constraints will require further strategic prioritization, supported by timely and predictable funding.
Given the likely challenges in mobilizing an additional US$9.5 billion beyond existing budget financing (andadditional funding already secured) in 2024, it will be important for the government to carry out strategic
prioritization across sectors to ensure that the most critical needs are met. At the same time, securing
medium-term, predictable funding commitments from donors is critical for enabling implementing
agencies to plan and manage long and complex procurement. Meeting this requirement can be facilitatedby better integrating priority setting and project planning into the medium-term budget planning process
as well as by implementing other steps envisaged by the adopted PIM Reform Roadmap.
Beyond this, several key actions will accelerate disbursement against priorities and maximize theeffectiveness and efficiency of recovery and reconstruction investments:•

Accelerating the reform agenda, including the framework of the Government’s Ukraine Plan
under preparation. This action will help foster economic growth and modernization of theeconomy and institutions and promote strengthening of public sector capacity at the local level,in alignment with the standards and policies of the EU.

47

•Strengthening public sector capacity. Alongside increasing the role of the private sector,
continued strengthening of public sector capacity to plan and deliver recovery and reconstruction
projects will be critical to ensure effective and efficient implementation. The Government’s
adoption and implementation of the PIM reform roadmap will play a key role in this respect, inpart by bringing public investments within the framework of strategic and medium-term budget
planning, and by developing a single project pipeline, by strengthening institutional and technicalcapacities of authorities and relevant stakeholders, and by fostering cross-institutional
coordination and cross-sectoral prioritization, including through establishment of the Strategic
Investment Council.

•

Leveraging opportunities for private investment. As the figures presented in this report show,
the private sector will play a critical role in meeting recovery and reconstruction needs. As market
conditions evolve, and with commitment to reforms, the sectoral scope and depth of private
investment can increase substantially. This growth will help accelerate implementation while
reducing fiscal burdens.

•

Strengthening the competencies of local authorities and community representatives. Stronger
strategic planning, project management, investment activities, coordination with different
stakeholders, and relevant technical capacities will promote modern, inclusive, resilient, andthriving communities.

Table 4. Summary of assessed recovery and reconstruction priorities for 2024 financing - estimatedcontribution by sector and type of expenditure (US$ million)
Public funds – estimated distribution across types of
expenditure
Subsidies,
Public andguarantees,
Other public
Total
SOE
and other
expenditurecainvestment
financialsupportb

EnergyTransport
Housing and utilities
Housing
Central heating
Municipal services
Energy efficiency
Waste management
Water supply andsanitation
Social infrastructureand services
Education
Healthcare
CultureSocial protectionf
Industry and services
Industry and commerce
Agribusiness
Irrigation
Cross-sectoral

Private funds – estimated additional
contribution to meeting priorities
Estimated
Total
Estimatedprivateprivateprivateworking
sectorinvestmentd
capital /financinge

2,656
2,334
3,078
2,116
159
247
258
56
242

1,874
2,334
1,494
533
159
247
258
56
242

1,214
1,214
-

782
370
370
-

2,500
2,500
-

-g
500
500
-

2,000
2,000
-

2,440

1,869

-

571

-

-

-

1,193
873
6
369
3,593
3,114
435
44
1,186

743
816
6
305
44
44
606

3,519
3,104
415
-

450
57
64
30
10
20
580

8,000
6,000
2,000
300

4,500
4,000h
500
300i

3,500
2,000h1,500-

48

Public funds – estimated distribution across types of
expenditure
Subsidies,
Public andguarantees,
Other public
Total
SOE
and other
expenditurecainvestment
financialsupportb

Demining
Emergency response
and civil protection
Democracy, justice, andhuman rights
Telecom and digital
Total

Private funds – estimated additional
contribution to meeting priorities
Estimated
Total
Estimatedprivateprivateprivateworking
sectorinvestmentd
capital /financinge

492
272

272

-

492
-

-

-

-

22

22

-

-

-

-

-

400
15,287

312
8,241

5,014

87
2,031

300
11,000300~5,300~ 5,500

up to

Source: Assessment team, based on data in sector templates prepared by GoU line ministries and coordinated by
the Ministry of Restoration. Note that the analysis of distribution across expenditure types and private sector
potential contribution is made by the World Bank team based on analysis of GoU monitoring data and other sources
and is intended as an estimate to provide perspective on the nature of expenditure needs and contributions. Figures
shown here are assessed priorities for 2024 and do not indicate the funding commitments mobilized to meet thesepriorities. Sectoral definitions used in this table are aligned with priority sectors as defined by GoU and do not matchexactly with the structure and nomenclature of the RDNA3.
a. Public investment includes investment from central and local governments and SOEs as well as from international
financial institutions and other donors and development partners.
b. Instruments include subsidies, grants, and other transfers to firms and households that are intended to enableprivate investment, including by reducing risks to credit provision and risks and costs of investment. This includes inagriculture: all projects other than technical assistance support (US$20 million); in housing: e-recovery, voucher
compensation, preferential loans to rural developers, and various preferential mortgage programs; in industry andservices: all projects other than technical assistance (US$10 million).
c. Other public expenditure includes non-capital expenditures by the state, excluding grants, subsidies, and otherexpenditures covered in the previous column.
d. Private investment includes investments by private firms and households, which are facilitated by the publicfinancial support instruments (grants, loans, guarantees, etc.). Figures are estimates from the World Bank
assessment team and calculated based on assumed multipliers on private capital mobilization from different support
instruments.
e. Private working capital/financing includes expenditures made by firms for reconstruction and recovery needs aswell as expenditures made by private households in the housing market. which are financed by private capital
mobilized through instruments of public financial support (e.g., subsidized or guaranteed lending). Figures are
estimates from the World Bank assessment team and calculated based on assumed multipliers on private capital
mobilization from different support instruments.
f. Excludes US$3.56 billion in RDNA-related social transfers not included in GoU-identified sectoral priorities because
they are established as an ongoing commitment in the state budget.
g. There are expected to be opportunities for private investment in the energy sector as part of recovery andreconstruction, although these are not captured in the analysis presented here as it is linked to sector-specificinstruments (note: some programs under Industry and services sector could facilitate private investment in energy.
h. Investments and working capital facilitated through programs from the Ministry of Economy will not be restricted
to the industry and services sector and the agribusiness sector and may also support infrastructure sectors likeenergy, transport, and construction.
i. Reflects expected investments by private telecommunications operators.

49

Principles and Opportunities for Recovery and Reconstruction
Guiding Principles
Guiding principles have already been adopted by the GoU and the international community.65 These
include partnership, reform focus, transparency, accountability, and rule of law; democratic participation;
multi-stakeholder engagement; gender equality and inclusion; and sustainability. The key guiding
principles of the government’s recovery efforts so far have been to start immediately and ramp up
gradually; grow prosperity in an equitable way; integrate into the EU and be consistent with andsupportive of the accession path; build back better (for the future); and enable private investment andentrepreneurship.66
Challenges in post-war settings include limited resources, security concerns, political complexities, andsocial divisions and trauma. Securing adequate funding and resources is crucial for effective
reconstruction, as is ensuring a safe and secure environment. Overcoming political challenges andensuring inclusive decision-making processes are crucial as well. A successful recovery will requirerebuilding trust, promoting social cohesion, and addressing the psychological needs of the affected
population.
The previous assessments proposed a set of complementary recommendations based on international
experience with post-war and post-disaster recovery and reconstruction efforts. The following points
remain relevant for the RDNA3 (with more details available in RDNA2):
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Leadership and coordination by the government and partners
Balancing of urgent needs and medium- to long-term goals
Differentiated approaches that prioritize impact and needs and advance decentralization
Building back better for a more sustainable future and strengthening disaster and climate
resilience, including through mitigation and adaptation efforts67
Engagement and building capacity
Inclusivity and equity
Continuous data collection as well as monitoring and evaluation processes

The remainder of this chapter highlights areas of particular focus in the short-term. They include
accelerating broad reforms; maximizing private financing for reconstruction; and building back inclusively.
Accelerating Broad Reforms
Ukraine’s ambitious reform and EU integration agenda, coupled with financial and technical assistancefrom partners, requires a strong government-led coordination architecture at political, strategic, andtechnical levels. This coordination architecture would facilitate dialogue between the GoU, partners, local
authorities, private sector, and civil society on lessons learned, successes, challenges and solutions. It
would also promote transparency and mutual accountability for measuring results by ensuring the
65 URC2022, “Lugano Declaration,” 2022, Link. The 2022 Lugano Declaration for the Reconstruction of Ukraine outlines several

guiding principles for recovery and reconstruction.
66 See Government of Ukraine, “Plan for the Recovery of Ukraine (ПЛАН ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ),” 2022, Link.
67 Please refer to sectoral chapters for specific principles highlighted, such as greening and decarbonization, and alignment with
the EU laow, standards and acquis communautaire.

50efficient collection of data for monitoring and reporting and by creating an evidence base for prioritizationand investments.
Successful recovery and reconstruction, and progress toward EU standards, will require significant
institutional reforms that both strengthen public sector capacity and facilitate a competitive private
sector. Implementation of extensive reforms—both prior to the invasion and during the past two years—
has played a major role in enabling the government to deliver on its core functions and initiate recovery.
But further changes are needed. Experience from other post-war situations highlights the central role ofgovernment in managing resource allocation and ensuring coordination during the reconstruction
process. Moreover, given the scale of financing needs and the capacity of the Ukrainian private sector,
there is a significant opportunity and need to take full advantage of the potential for the private sector tofinance and execute recovery and reconstruction investments. In this context, the Ukraine Plan —which
will include economy-wide and sectoral reforms, increasing the capacity to absorb investment, and crosscutting issues such as European integration, digital transformation, green transition, environmental
protection, as well as human capital68— will play a critical role over the coming years. Programs under the
Ukraine Plan include actions and reforms for the period 2024–2027, among them macro-financial
scenarios for recovery and major sectoral reforms, with the view of priority sectors for development.
Reconstruction is an opportunity for, but also dependent on, strengthening of public sector capacity. In
particular, reforms to strengthen the efficiency of public investment management, project
implementation, and financial management will be critical to ensure effective implementation and makeefficient use of budget and donor resources. To this end, the government’s adoption of the Draft Roadmap
for Reforming the PIM System as a crucial component of a sustainable and efficient public financemanagement system. Building effective investments is an important step in setting out both theframework for a public investment management system in which investment projects are planned basedon strategic priorities (single, prioritized pipeline of projects), and a medium-term budgetary framework,in which projects are selected following with unified and transparent procedures and clear criteria andimplemented within the planned timeframe and funding. Complementary reforms will also be needed tostrengthen public procurement and public financial management. Moreover, institutional strengthening
will need to cascade across both central and local governments.
Reforms to increase absorption capacity and speed up procurement processes are needed. There arebottlenecks that slow down receipt of necessary financing from IFIs and other financial parties, whichhave slowed down procurement even for urgent needs. In general, the following improvements could beconsidered, including (i) removing barriers to advanced procurement and simplify the procurement
process to ensure procurement before loans are signed, to speed up implementation, (ii) simplifying
further the authorization process and ensure clear procedures for grants, as currently there is no clear
grant registration procedure, and (iii) implementation of electronic tools to track approvals andsignatures, as well as introduction of signature delegation to avoid delays caused by business travel.

68 Government Portal, “European Parliament Approves the Launch of the Ukraine Facility Program Worth EUR 50 Billion over

2024–2027,” October 17, 2023, Link. Decentralization and regional policy are considered part of sectoral reforms.

51

Private sector and growth-oriented reforms are at the heart of recovery and reconstruction. As
discussed in the previous subsection, the private sector will be an essential component in financing andexecuting Ukraine’s recovery. Beyond that, however, recovery is dependent on accelerated and sustained
private sector growth. Again, catalyzing the private sector is central to the Ukraine Plan and the associatedUkraine Facility, and will require implementation of a wide range of economywide, sectoral, and financial
reforms.
Maximizing Private Financing for Reconstruction69
Recent analysis by IFC highlights the potential of the private sector to finance recovery andreconstruction investments, particularly if sufficient reforms and public measures are put in place toprovide a supportive policy environment. IFC estimates that the private sector could finance between
one-sixth and one-third of the needs identified in the RDNA2, depending on reforms and public
interventions. The IFC assessment concludes that private investment will be more easily attracted tocommercial sectors (agriculture, commerce and industry, banking) and housing in the current policy
environment. However, an accelerated agenda of pro-competition reforms and deeper integration with
the EU and international markets could significantly increase the private sector’s role in reconstruction,
especially in infrastructure sectors, while also creating additional investment opportunities beyond theneeds outlined in the RDNA2. Reforms and public interventions that can boost private sector investment
include the liberalization of energy prices; privatization or private participation in the ownership and/or
management of state-owned assets in the transport and banking sectors; public investment in irrigation,and public-private partnerships (PPPs) in a variety of sectors, including traditionally state-dominatedsocial sectors (water and sanitation, health, education). Beyond the needs identified in the RDNA2, anddepending on which reforms and interventions are implemented, IFC identifies private investment
opportunities between 2023 and 2033— supporting Ukraine’s economic growth but not directly related
to reconstruction—in the range of US$99 and US$282 billion (in constant 2023 prices).
The GoU has continued introducing financial incentives, structural reforms, and policies to maintainfinancial stability and strengthen the private sector during the war. For example, in the last two years,
the GoU accelerated energy sector reforms by (i) approving its Energy Strategy 2050, which sets clear
decarbonization targets and aligns with the EU Clean Energy Package; (ii) increasing maximum price caps
in the wholesale electricity market; (iii) improving market liquidity and supporting investments inrenewable energy (notably wind); and (iv) implementation by Ukrenergo of the key technicalrequirements to enable permanent interconnection with the European Network of Transmission System
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), which is an important step in integrating Ukraine’s united energy
system into both the regional electricity market and the EU internal market. Beyond the energy sector, an
important reform supporting delivery of PPPs was enacted. The Law on Amendments to the Budget Codeof Ukraine on the Regulation of Budgetary Relations in the Implementation of Contracts Concluded within
the Framework of Public Private Partnerships specifies the conditions for increasing investment ininfrastructure and facilitates provision of high-quality public services. In July 2021, the GoU removed its
moratorium on domestic transactions involving small land plots by individuals, the first stage of land
reform. Since January 1, 2024, the second phase of land reform has been underway; it will eventually
69 This section draws on the IFC. “Private Sector Opportunities for a Green and Resilient Reconstruction in Ukraine,” 2023, Link.

52

allow Ukrainian businesses to buy land, thus expanding opportunities for investment in agriculture.
Interventions supporting private sector resilience include risk mitigation programs such as thegovernment’s “Affordable Loans 5-7-9” program, through which the GoU partially compensates theinterest on loans to Ukrainian SMEs. Through this program, businesses received 78,303 loans from bothprivate and state-owned banks for a total of UAH 263.1 billion as of December 25, 2023.70 These are justa few examples of recent GoU policy changes that have created positive momentum to unlock private
sector opportunities.
IFC notes that economic reforms will not be sufficient to attract private investment and may need to be
combined with risk mitigation instruments. Government-backed incentives, subsidies, and/or
infrastructure development can lower barriers to entry and reduce otherwise risk for businesses, while
accelerating the adoption of climate-smart technologies. Public support is required to de-risk private
investment in selected sectors. For example, infrastructure projects typically face uncertainty that extends
over a long payback period, making them less attractive to private investors without publicly financed risk
mitigation. Such interventions must be judiciously designed to avoid crowding out private finance but
rather to mitigate enough of the risk to maximize private sector financing.
Building Back Inclusively
While large capital investments in infrastructure at national level are critical for Ukraine’s overall
recovery and economic growth, it will be small-scale recovery and reconstruction of infrastructure andhousing in communities around the country that allows people to rebuild their lives and return to theirhomes. The RDNA3 investment priorities in housing reconstruction, energy, social infrastructure,humanitarian demining, and support to livelihoods and local economic development reflect thiscommunity approach. These interventions have to be combined with targeted capacity strengthening of
local authorities for essential service provision, and with community mobilization to create the conditions
that allow people to recover from the impacts of the war. Strengthening of local systems for managing
and coordinating data and projects, along with efforts to promote community engagement andparticipation, is critically important to the recovery. Numerous partners support the GoU with communitylevel investments, and community-level recovery initiatives in 2023 have offered tangible improvementsfor Ukrainians in affected communities. The GoU has worked with partners to map the needs andresources of affected hromadas, launch local recovery planning, and develop local recovery coordination
mechanisms. These efforts must be expanded in 2024 with rapid, focused, and efficient area-based earlyrecovery support for people in communities affected by the war. Similarly, it will be important to provide
comprehensive assistance and incentives to the local private sector to stimulate economic recovery andcreate job opportunities. Such efforts can empower communities, enhance resilience, and pave the way
for long-term prosperity.
Effectively scaled up and accessible social protection programs are at the core of GoU’s recovery
agenda, which pays particular attention to vulnerable groups and their needs. Social services, including
employment-related measures with underlying budgeting and estimated implementation priorities, are

70 Government Portal. “Ministry of Finance: About 43,500 soft loans amounting to UAH 173.5 billion issued under Affordable

Loans at 5-7-9% State Programme.” December 25, 2023. Link.

53

indicated under the social protection and livelihoods sector. Health, well-being, and mental healthservices for the population, particularly for veterans and victims of gender-based violence (GBV), areaccounted for under the health sector. To respond to the need of IDPs, the elderly, and people withdisabilities and to address child-care issues, accessible and inclusive infrastructure aspects need to bereflected in temporary housing, emergency support options, affordable mortgages, compensations forhousing repair and reconstruction, safety designs (including barrier-free parameters), construction ofbomb shelters, and so on. Specific assistance for veterans is envisaged under the 2024 state budget
allocations for the Ministry of Veterans Affairs; it focuses on the transition to civilian life (UAH 3.8 billion,
or about US$100 million) and mental, physical, and psychological rehabilitation and professional
adaptation (UAH 2.5 billion, or about US$66 million). Ministry of Social Policy programs with 2024 budget
allocations include support for persons who have suffered from GBV (UAH 200 million, or about US$5.3
million) and provision of small group homes and housing for children (UAH 575 million, or about US$15
million). Civic and economic initiatives for youth that focus on physical culture and sports are essential for
attracting youth to return to and grow in the country. The Ministry of Youth and Sports has a 2024 budget
of UAH 94 million (US$2.5 million) for youth economic activities and a budget totaling UAH 5 billion(US$132 million) for physical culture and sports. The Ukraine Youth Fund and the Ukrainian VeteransFoundation have been established to attract and coordinate support to youth and veterans as alternative
off-budget financing tools.
Displaced persons and returnees. There is a need to invest in housing, basic services, social protection,and livelihoods, all of which are regularly cited by refugees and IDPs as enablers of return, integration of
IDPs and their durable solutions.71 Partnerships between central- and local-level authorities, civil society,academia, and the private sector can help to design and deliver solutions that meet these needs with
tailor-made packages to support communities. These support packages could also offer mental health andpsychosocial support, assistance with livelihoods and business financing, and technical assistance tofacilitate return and integration of refugees and IDPs.
Persons with disabilities. The rising number of persons with disabilities caused directly by the war
highlights the importance of deinstitutionalization and community-based living for disabled persons in
Ukraine. Socialization and adaptation should be at the core of any measures taken, with due consideration
for creating accessible rehabilitation spaces; the primary aim is the return of such persons to active
socioeconomic participation in their community. Establishing accessible and barrier-free environment forthe persons with different impairments helps persons with disabilities maintain mobility and autonomous
care skills, increases their motivation to maintain social contacts, and promotes their participation in thelabor market, allowing them to contribute to economic growth and active decision-making in thecommunity. Housing and workplace arrangement services should be introduced to facilitate rehabilitationand enable effective social and labor adaptation for persons with disabilities. The priority is to strengthencommunity-level facilitation by meeting the needs of those returning to their communities so they canlive as independently as possible.

71 UNHCR, Lives on hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees and IDPs from Ukraine #4, Link.

54

Veterans and their families. Guaranteed access to housing and health services, rehabilitation, prostheses,
essential drugs, employment opportunities, education/retraining options and prior consideration of theneeds of the specified categories and personal life circumstances should underline any community
support for veterans. Demobilization efforts and effective social and economic reintegration should take
into account the changing demographic profile; moreover, the implementation of the transition strategy
from armed service to civilian life must include psychological and legal assistance; social, professional, andskill development; and cultural adaptation and life planning support—not just for members of the military
and war veterans, but also for their family members, and family members of fallen soldiers.
Gender-specific impacts. Gender equality and nondiscrimination reforms need to be an integral part ofrecovery and reconstruction planning, with civil society organizations and advocacy groups that represent
women and LGBTIQ+ individuals participating fully and equally in state and local planning processes.
Gender equality and a women’s empowerment agenda—including women’s expanded access to andinclusion in the labor market and business in order to build short- and long-term economic security—arepriorities to ensure that building back better in Ukraine proceeds in a gender-responsive and inclusive
way. Within the recovery process, it will be important for women to be engaged in decision-making at alllevels where gender-responsive planning, budgeting, and monitoring tools are applied. Among the mosturgent issues is how to prevent and respond to GBV that is a direct result of the war or indirectly due tothe stressors of war.
Youth and children. High-quality in-person education with reliable security conditions allows children tosocialize with peers and lays a foundation for the large-scale return of children and young people to thecountry and for their future productivity and employment. The functions of the community-based youth
infrastructure should be strengthened through counseling and support groups to address mental healthissues, social and physical activities for displaced and idle youth, and training and guidance to promote
youth employment. These measures will contribute to the growth agenda and ensure a future-oriented
Ukraine by drawing the country’s young people into both national and local-level recovery planning andreconstruction. At the community level, the system of childcare and child rearing must be transformed sothat it meets the country’s economic development needs; contributes to the development of social,educational, medical, and other services at the local level; and protects the right of children to grow up ina family.
Elderly. A combination of community-based social services, employment assistance programs, andinvestment in inclusive infrastructure with barrier-free public transportation will meet the elderly
populations’ critical needs and ensure attainment of the long-term goal of deinstitutionalization. Efforts
to strengthen cooperation among neighboring communities, or indeed to establish redistribution
mechanisms between communities, will ensure equitable access to service provision.

55

MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS
Economic and Poverty Update
Despite Russia’s on-going invasion of Ukraine, economic growth in 2023 exceeded expectations. In
2022, the widespread destruction of infrastructure, internal and external displacement, and attacks on
the energy infrastructure had led to a 29.1 percent GDP contraction; but Ukraine’s economy has sinceshown signs of recovery and resilience. More reliable electricity supply, an exceptional wheat harvest, andthe steadier receipt of external assistance have allowed for gradual growth recovery in 2023, with GDP
expanding by 19.5 percent and 9.3 percent in Q2 and Q3, respectively (Figure 22). Yearly growth for 2023
is estimated at 4.8 percent, with potential to the upside. This constitutes a significant upward revisionfrom the 2 percent growth rate projected in mid-2023. On the demand side, growth was driven bycontinued strong public consumption and a modest expansion of exports; the supply side was helped bybetter-than-expected agricultural output (Figure 23) and continued growth in sectors supporting the war economy. Growth in 2024 is expected tobe slower than in 2023: base effects and one-off factors, including the agricultural harvest, will subside,
whereas key growth constraints related to the invasion, low investment, constrained exports, and theneed for a restrictive monetary policy, will remain.
Monetary policy has remained restrictive throughout 2023, which has contributed to a substantial
decline in inflation and facilitated the transition to a slightly more flexible exchange rate regime. The
National Bank of Ukraine entered 2023 with an exchange rate pegged to the US dollar and a key policy
rate of 25 percent. This policy stance helped to anchor inflation expectations, attract bank deposits, andincrease private savings, thereby contributing to a gradual decline in inflation throughout 2023. At theend of 2023, inflation was estimated at only 5.1 percent, compared with 26.6 percent at the end of 2022.
The decline in inflation was also aided by conducive supply-side factors, as high agricultural yields andexport bottlenecks boosted excess domestic food supply. With the decline of inflation exceeding
expectations (mid-year World Bank projections had end-of-year inflation rates at 14 percent), the National
Bank of Ukraine has taken steps to adjust its monetary policy, gradually lowering the nominal policy rate
to 15 percent and transitioning to an exchange rate regime of managed flexibility. Following theimplementation of this system, the exchange rate temporarily appreciated, dropping below UAH 36 per
US$1 from the pegged rate of UAH 36.57 per US$1; but it has been depreciating since late November
2023. Ukraine’s cash exchange rate—the rate at which households can sell foreign currency—has diverged
from the official rate since February 2022, but the difference has narrowed since the transition to a more
flexible regime; in early January 2024, average cash selling and buying rates differed from the official rateby 1.3 percent and 2.3 percent, respectively.
After recording a surplus in 2022, Ukraine’s current account turned into a deficit in 2023. By November
2023 Ukraine’s trade deficit had reached US$34 billion, which exceeded the deficit during all of 2022 by
US$9 billion. The increase in the trade deficit was driven by a US$6 billion reduction in merchandise56

exports, partially resulting from continued export bottlenecks, including the discontinuation of the BlackSea Grain Initiative, blockades of Ukrainian agricultural exports by some neighboring countries, attacks on
the trade infrastructure, and a continued increase in imports. While Ukraine was able to open new
shipping routes through the Black Sea, these were unable to compensate for the loss of volume causedby the other shocks to export logistics. At the same time, Ukraine received US$20.6 billion in secondary
income, almost US$1 billion less than in the same period in 2022. Foreign aid through loans was sufficient
to finance the current account deficit while accumulating over US$10 billion in reserves, which reached ahistoric peak of US$41.7 billion in July 2023 before decreasing modestly to US$40.5 billion by January 1,
2024.
Greater needs for defense expenditure necessitated a significant revision of the 2023 budget and an
expansion of the fiscal deficit. Nominal expenditure in 2023 reached UAH 4.4 trillion, 46 percent higher
than in 2022. This increase was driven by higher spending on goods and services, primarily for defense
needs, which reached UAH 1.7 trillion, 97 percent more than in 2022. Capital expenditures and interest
payments also increased, albeit from a significantly lower base. Total revenue (excluding grants) reachedUAH 2.7 trillion (56 percent more than in 2022). Most of the increase is accounted for by UAH 840 billion
in profit transfers from budgetary institutions, including the National Bank of Ukraine. Tax revenues
broadly increased in line with inflation and were aided by a return to prewar excise duty and VAT rates
for motor fuels starting July 1. The high expenditure outturn necessitated a budget revision for 2023,
enacted in October, which targets a general government fiscal deficit (excluding grants) of 27 percent of
estimated GDP.
External aid through grants and loans was the main mechanism used to finance the budget deficit. In
2023, international partners provided Ukraine with the equivalent of US$11.9 billion (6.7 percent of GDP)in grants and US$29.7 billion (16.8 percent of GDP) in loans, which in addition to financing the deficit
covered 1.1 percent of GDP in external debt amortization. Domestic borrowing in local and foreign
currency provided 3.7 percent of GDP in financing net of amortization.
Macroeconomic Risks Overview and Policy Recommendations
The 2024 state budget reflects the current outlook of continued hostilities throughout the year. The
invasion has generated elevated expenditure needs for defense, amounting to UAH 1,692.6 billion(US$46.3 billion), or a forecasted 22.1 percent of GDP. This is less than the UAH 1,973 billion (US$54
billion) that was budgeted for 2023, but it remains the main expenditure item. Social protection
expenditure is critical for restraining the rising poverty and dampening the negative effects of
unemployment, which erode the social contract. Accordingly, the 2024 budget has allocated UAH 469.4
billion (US$12.8 billion) to social protection, an amount similar to the UAH 469.3 billion (US$12.83 billion)
spent in 2023. Interest payments are budgeted to increase from UAH 253.9 billion (US$6.9 billion) in 2023
to UAH 422 billion (US$11.5 billion) in 2024, putting additional pressure on the government budget. In
addition, Ukraine’s moratorium on external commercial debt payments is set to expire in August 2024,
and Ukraine will be liable to resume significant debt service payments unless it reaches an agreementwith creditors on a debt treatment or an extension of the moratorium. The pressures on the budget arereflected in the fiscal deficit (excluding grants), which the 2024 state budget expects to be 20.5 percent
of GDP, compared to the targeted 27 percent of GDP in the October revision of the 2023 budget. Similar57

to the share in the 2023 budget, 95.1 percent of the 2024 budget is channeled to current expenditure,and only the remaining UAH 176.8 billion (US$4.8 billion) is budgeted for capital expenditure.
The 2024 budget plans for the receipt of US$37.3 billion in external aid (loans and grants) to finance thedeficit, but these resources have not been committed yet. Specifically, critical external financing sourcesfrom the United States and the European Union remain uncertain at the time of writing and it is unclear
if Ukraine will receive sufficient aid in 2024 to meet its budgetary needs. Should aid subside, the Ukrainian
authorities could partially meet the increased needs from domestic sources. For example, in 2023, a
redistribution of income tax revenue from local budgets to the state budget added US$0.7 billion in staterevenue. Yet such sources cannot compensate for all external financing. Therefore, where available,
external financing needs to be prioritized for meeting budget needs before being allocated to additional
reconstruction and capital expenditure. In addition, the Ukrainian authorities will need to mobilize
additional revenue. The implementation of the initial steps in the National Revenue Strategy contributes
toward this goal by broadening the excise base and collecting revenue from additional taxes on thebanking sector.
The public sector has an instrumental role to play in the reconstruction of Ukraine once hostilities end.
Restoring Ukraine’s productive capacity and reversing the destructive impact of the invasion will requiresignificant public intervention, such as rebuilding essential infrastructure, encouraging financing ofpromising businesses, and supporting the financial sector as the full financial cost of the invasion isrevealed. Recognizing the limited fiscal space while hostilities continue, Ukrainian authorities canprioritize less fiscally demanding policies that create an environment conducive to donor support andprivate sector participation in reconstruction. Such policies, coupled with domestic revenue mobilization,
will enable the eventual successful reconstruction of Ukraine.
Figure 22. Ukraine real GDP growth, year-on-year (YoY)
30
19.5%

20

Percent

0

9.3%

6.3%

6.2%

10

2.9%
-2.3%

1Q21

2Q21

3Q21

4Q21

-10

1Q22

2Q22

3Q22

4Q22

1Q23

2Q23

3Q23

4Q23

-10.5%-14.9%-20-30.6%-30-40-31.4%-36.9%

Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine.

58

Figure 23. Yield by Commodity
9

Metric ton per hectare

8

Corn

7
6
5

Wheat
BarleyOilseed (sunflower seed)
Oilseed (rapeseed)

4
3
2
1
0
2015

2016

2017

2018 2019 2020
Market year

2021

2022

2023

Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agricultural Service.

59

HUMAN IMPACT ASSESSMENT
Displaced Persons and Returnees
Summary
At the start of the war, 13.5 million people—approximately one-third of Ukraine’s population—weredisplaced. Some have since returned to their places of origin. As of December 2023, an estimated 5.9
million people were recorded as refugees across Europe,72 compared with the 8.1 million reported in
RDNA2 as of February 2023. As of October 2023, IOM estimated 3.7 million internally displaced persons(IDPs), compared to 5.4 million people in the RDNA2 report.73 The number of individuals officiallyregistered as IDPs with the Ministry of Social Policy has been increasing since February 2022, peaking justunder 4.9 million in December 2022; fluctuating, and reaching 4.9 as of December 2023 (Figure 24).
Figure 24. Number Of Registered IDPS In Ukraine (Million), March 25, 2022–December 31, 2023
4.162

4.579

4.873
3.525
2.850

4.846

4.843

3.511
2.737

3.509
2.731

March 25, June 1, 2022 September 1, December 1, February 24,
2022
2022
2022
2023

March 1,
2023

2.776
2.496

3.217
2.693

4.869
3.549
2.703

4.913

3.606
2.702

4.903
3.605
2.654

1.538
0.063
0.062

Registered IDPs, total

June 1, 2023 September 1, December
2023
31, 2023

IDPs displaced after February 24, 2022

Registered for the first time since February 24, 2022

Source: Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, “Dynamics of Key Indicators That Characterize the State of Registration,
Re-registration and Record Keeping of Internally Displaced Persons for the Period of Martial Law.”

Both external and domestic factors have driven the return of displaced persons to their places of origin.
The IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) identifies five drivers for returns: livelihoods; utilities andservices; residential destruction; safety and security; and public life (social tensions).74 The proximity of
hostilities is the dominant factor in refugees’ decision about whether to return to Ukraine.75 UNHCR’s
periodic intention surveys find that 76 percent of refugees from Ukraine and 82 percent of internallydisplaced persons hope and intend to ultimately return to their home in Ukraine, and that the key enablersof sustainable return – apart from security and safety which is cited by 95 percent - are access to housing,basic services and jobs.76 Refugees who have undertaken short visits to Ukraine, to visit family members
and their community, are more likely to express an intention to return compared to those who have notbeen back to Ukraine since they fled.77 Decisions may also be affected by the difficulty of returning to hostcountries after visits to Ukraine. Among people who returned to host countries following visits to Ukraine,
72 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Operational Data Portal, Link.
73 IOM, ”Ukraine—Returns Report—General Population Survey Round 14 (September–October 2023),” November 10, 2023, Link,
74 IOM, “Ukraine: Conditions of Return Assessment Factsheet—Round 3 (June 2023),” Link.
75 Other factors include integration into host countries, education and employment opportunities in host countries, and reunionwith family members in Ukraine.
76 UNHCR, Lives on hold: Intentions and Perspectives of Refugees and IDPs from Ukraine #4 , Link.
77 Ibid.

60

the share reporting challenges tripled between Q4 2022 and Q3 2023, from 6 percent to 18 percent. These
challenges included revocation of legal status, suspension of social protection benefits, and obstacles
when reentering host countries.78
Observed Impacts
To receive IDP assistant, IDPs must be registered and have an IDP certificate. IDPs had been eligible fora monthly allowance and housing support, but in 2023, the GoU changed the criteria for aid eligibility,
namely revising the residency criteria, including an assessment of financial and property status, limiting
the payment term to a six-month period (under certain conditions, this term may be extended), and also
introducing current and preventive verification mechanisms. The aim is to reduce the expected numberof IDP beneficiaries in 2024 to 170,000, down from 2.6 million in 2023 (according to the ombudsman forhuman rights).
IDPs were experiencing employment challenges before February 2022. In 2020, 60 percent of IDPs ages
20–64 were employed, compared to 69 percent of peers in the general population. This discrepancy
represents an improvement in IDP employment from prior years.79
The average IDP household size is 3.3 individuals; 43.6 percent of IDPs are of working age; 21.2 percent
are children; and 26 percent are elderly.80 This indicates that these households tend to be larger
compared to the average household size in Ukraine before the invasion (2.58 persons).81
The state provides all displaced persons with monetary assistance. Disabled persons and children under
18 receive UAH 3,000 (US$83) monthly, while adults receive UAH 2,000 (US$55) monthly for the durationof displacement.82 However, the cash transfers are insufficient to meet essential needs.
The program supporting IDPs has become fiscally unsustainable. In 2022, IDP cash transfers totaled UAH
53.5 billion (US$1.5 billion), half of which was funded through external aid. Monitoring and verification of
IDPs was also inadequate, and some who moved continued receiving cash transfers.83 Enhanced targeting
since July 2023, however, has improved the program’s efficiency and increased its fiscal sustainability.
Affordable and accessible housing is a challenge for IDPs, especially the most vulnerable. Most IDPs
temporarily relocate to reside with family and friends or find rental or other long-term accommodations.
However, approximately 120,000 remain in collective sites on a permanent basis. These individuals tend
to be the most vulnerable: the elderly, solitary persons, and sick and/or disabled persons.84 Few IDP
households can afford to purchase a home, and rental housing is both scarce and expensive in areas of

78 UNHCR Operational Data Portal, “Displacement Patterns, Protection Risks and Needs of Refugees from Ukraine: Regional

Protection Analysis #3,” November 2023, Link.
79 IOM, “National Monitoring System on the Situation with IDPs: Summary of Key Findings,” Link.
80 IOM DTM. 2023. Ukraine — Snapshot report: Population Figures and Geographic Distribution — General Population Survey
Round 13 (11–23 May), Link.
81 State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 2022. Sex and age population structure, Link.
82 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. March 2022. Decree 332 “Some issues of payment of accommodation allowance to internallydisplaced persons”, Link.
83 Law and Business, “Uncontrolled Payments to IDPs Deplete the State Budget,” July 5, 2023, Link.
84 IMPACT REACH Initiative. April 2023. Collective Site Monitoring Round 7, Link.

61

high IDP concentration. The most vulnerable IDPs struggle to find affordable rental housing that meetsthe needs of the elderly, those with disabilities, or others with limited mobility.
Unemployment and underemployment are more extreme among IDPs. As of January 2023, only 30
percent of IDP households had a salary as their primary source of income,85 and 24 percent relied on
government transfers for income. Many employers are reluctant to hire IDPs, seeing them as transient.
IDPs also often lack necessary documentation for formal employment, such as proper termination fromprevious places of work in their home regions. To mitigate this challenge, in 2022 the government
introduced an employer subsidy—UAH 6,500 (US$178) per month for two months—for hiring IDPs.
For households with children, employment difficulties are exacerbated by schooling issues. Hostcommunities in the east of the country rely on online schooling, and preschools in the country’s center
and west lack the capacity to absorb IDP children. Beyond slowing integration and learning among theyoungest IDPs, this creates a barrier to employment for IDP caregivers, who are mostly mothers.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
Evaluate the effectiveness of the IDP cash assistance program, the adequacy of cash transfers to meet
the basic needs of low-income IDPs, and the fiscal sustainability of the program. Through Resolution of
the Cabinet of Ministers No. 709, dated July 11, 2023, the GoU has enhance targeted support to IDPs. It
should also increase the focus on housing rental support, since the program does not currently accountfor geographic variations in rents; and it should offer additional childcare options, so parents haveopportunities for employment and the associated income.
Construct or renovate kindergartens and schools in overstretched IDP host communities and expand
access to home-based care. IDP families—mostly women and children—are clustered in hostcommunities with inadequate capacity for childcare, preschool, and secondary education. Local
governments should be supported in building more kindergartens and bomb shelters to meet security
requirements; in expanding the Municipal Nanny program to cover the cost of a nanny for children six andunder (it currently applies to children three and under); and in facilitating the aggregation of home carebeyond individual caregivers.
Provide IDPs with vocational training for re-qualification and with microfinance for entrepreneurship.
NGOs and voluntary organizations that have been aiding IDPs should move beyond humanitarian relief topromote livelihoods by training IDPs for re-qualification and providing microfinance for small-scale
entrepreneurial activities. Technical and vocational education training (TVET) institutions should also be
utilized.
Prepare a time-bound strategy to relocate individuals residing in collective sites. Most IDP households
stay temporarily at collective sites and then relocate to family and friends, rental housing, or other longerterm accommodations. The estimated 100,000-plus individuals who remain at these sites are among themost vulnerable and include the elderly, solitary persons, disabled persons, and those unable to afford

85 It should be noted that only 45 percent of non-IDP households had a salary as their primary source of income; this figure speaks

to the widespread unemployment and underemployment in Ukraine during the war. IOM DTM. 2023. Ukraine — Internal
Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 12 (16–23 January 2023). Link.

62housing at market rates. A time-bound action plan is needed to relocate these individuals to affordable
and accessible housing and/or to convert collective site buildings into appropriate long-term housing.
Instruments for subsidizing rent for IDPs and other vulnerable persons should be developed as one of thetools for providing social housing.

Youth (Aged 14 – 35) and Child Protection and Rights
SummaryThis section focuses on the youth demographic as defined by the United Nations—i.e., individuals ages
15 to 24; but it also includes information on those 14 to 35, which is the definition of youth in Ukraine.86
This age bracket represents a crucial phase of transitioning from childhood to adulthood, marked by
selection of educational paths, entry into the workforce, and career-related decision-making.
Before February 2022, Ukraine’s network of youth centers provided educational and career guidance
and legal aid for vulnerable youth. Ukraine had also moved toward inclusive classrooms for children withdisabilities, though inaccessible infrastructure and transport and lack of adapted materials remained
problems.
Before February 2022, Ukraine was home to 3,893,000 young people ages 15 to 24 (representing 9.5
percent of the population) and to 10.5 million people ages 14 to 35 (representing about one-quarter ofthe population).87 Two-thirds (67 percent) of young people lived in cities. The share of males in this age
group slightly exceeded the share of females at 51.5 percent.88 Following the decade-long decrease inbirthrate,89 since aggravated by the war,90 the number and share of youth is expected to gradually
decrease in the future.
In 2022, 58,630 children were in institutions with 24-hour stay, among them 5,626 orphans (children
deprived of parental care). Of this number, 4,909 children were under full state support in institutions.
As of August 2023, 5,083 children were under full state care in institutions (including 1,309 children withdisabilities) and need placement in noninstitutional educational settings.91
Observed Impacts
Since February 2022, children and youth have been heavily impacted by displacement. Some 37 percent
youth have experienced internal displacement; this share consists of 20 percent who have returned totheir places of origin, 11 percent who intend to return, and 6 percent who do not intend to return.
According to the Ministry of Social Policy, as of December 2023, 1.04 million children under the age of 18
were registered as IDPs. UNHCR data shows that 36 percent of the refugee population are children.92
86 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), “Definition of Youth,” Link.
87 Data on population are from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU) and are as of January 1, 2022.
88 SSSU provides population data, including age and regional distribution, that are estimations based on data from the last general

census, conducted in 2001. Thus the real number of young people and their distribution may differ from SSSU estimates. Afterthe war began, SSSU stopped assessing the size of the population and surveying households, so there is no information on thenumber of young people after March 1, 2022.
89 SSSU, 2022 data.
90 Opendatabot, “The Birth Rate in Ukraine Has Decreased by 28% Since the Beginning of the Full-Scale War,” July 31, 2023,
Link.
91 Data are from the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine
92 UNHCR, Ukraine Situation Regional Refugee Response Plan (January-December 2024), Link.

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According to the Ministry of Youth and Sports, about 2 million youth ages 14 to 35 are still abroad, whichis around 20 percent of this age group. In addition, an unknown number of youth up to the age of 35 arein military service, including those conscripted to temporary service in 2020–2021 and those who
volunteered or were conscripted after February 2022.93
Children and youth have suffered learning losses and increased mental health challenges. Data from the2022 iteration of the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) found that learning levels
decreased compared to 2018—in math by 12 points, in science by 19 points, and in reading by 38 points.94
Parents and teachers perceive deteriorating mental health and significant learning losses owing to the
COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent invasion. Eighty-five percent of surveyed parents agreed that the
pandemic- and war-related knowledge and skills gap would have an impact on their child’s education andfuture.95 Nearly two-thirds of parents (61 percent) believe their children have signs of stress and poor
sleep; 24 percent of young people ages 14–24 believe their psychological state has deteriorated; and 11
percent believe they need psychological help.96
Reintegration of displaced youth into secondary, vocational, and higher education systems will be
critical for long-term employment, productivity, and earnings. The government is developing plans andtools for addressing war-related learning losses. Ukraine’s 2019 Strategy for Development of Educational
Assessments in Secondary Schools by 2030, not yet implemented, is being updated for rollout.97 A learningassessment toolkit for grades 6–8 has also been developed.
In-person learning remains disrupted by a lack of equipped and accessible bomb shelters with enoughspace for all students. Students can access in-person classes only if educational institutions are equippedwith bomb shelters – and if these shelters are too small to accommodate all students and school staff,
education takes place in shifts. As a result, the GoU and local governments have prioritized theestablishment of bomb shelters in educational institutions across the country: as of December 2023, 80
percent of educational institutions in Ukraine were equipped with bomb shelters, compared to 68 percent
in December 2022. However, many of these shelters are established in the basement of the institution
and lack adequate equipment for the well-being of students. Many shelters are not guaranteed to be
secure, as their construction has not been systematically assessed against the standards set by authorities.
In addition, important geographical disparities remain: as of May 2023, only 54 percent of schools in
Odeska, 41 percent in Dnipropetrovska, 23 percent in Mykolaivska, and 5 percent in Kharkivska had
shelters, per Ministry of Education and Science data. Therefore, online learning remains a defining featureof the Ukrainian education system. According to the Ministry of Education and Science, as of September
2023, nearly two million children, more than 50 percent of the 3.837 million children enrolled in Ukrainian
schools, remain reliant on online or blended education, with 2,321 schools across the frontlines closed forsafety reasons. Yet, virtual learning infrastructure is underdeveloped, leaving few learning opportunities

93 Access to data on the general mobilization and those who volunteered for the military is restricted.
94 UNICEF, “Education Survey Reveals Impact of War on Ukraine’s Students,” December 5, 2023, Link.
95 Cedos, “War and Education: How a Year of the Full-Scale Invasion Influenced Ukrainian Schools,” March 21, 2023, Link.
96 United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), “Impact of the War on the Youth in Ukraine,” 2023, Link.
97 Ukrainian Center for Educational Quality Assessment, “Strategy of Educational Assessments in Ukraine until 2030,” July 11,

2019, Link.

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for students without access to bomb shelters or undamaged, well-staffed schools, for internally displaced
students, for those with disabilities, or for those in areas not under government control.
Existing legislation establishes broad categories of youth eligible for post-secondary financial support,such as orphans, those in active combat areas, those with war-related disabilities, and others. But
current levels of support are below the subsistence minimum and inadequate to cover expenses.98
Educational continuity poses an additional challenge for refugee children and youth. In European
countries, in-person participation in the national secondary education system is usually compulsory.
Students may continue with their Ukrainian education while engaging in the host country’s school system,
though participation in two educational programs increases the pressure and stress for students and theirparents. Those who continue with the Ukrainian education system may choose online learning,homeschooling,99 or an external education approach.100 According to UNHCR’s study, only about half of
Ukrainian refugee children across Europe were enrolled in schools in host countries for the 2022-2023
academic year.101 As of May 2023, approximately 780,000 Ukrainian refugee students had been integrated
into other EU school systems. There is a significant risk, however, that such students will enroll in foreign
universities and not return to Ukraine. This trend would worsen the demographic and human capitalsituation in Ukraine. In turn, this would impede Ukraine’s potential to recover from the consequences of
the war. No data exist on the number of Ukrainian students who continue to participate in the Ukrainian
education system from abroad.
Financial and human resources to support vulnerable youth have been diminished, for example, forcoordinating volunteers and delivering humanitarian aid, and youth center buildings have beendamaged, destroyed, or repurposed. Of 300-plus youth centers, 14 have been destroyed and 24
damaged, while 64 are located in territories temporarily not under government control. Local government
financing for youth policy and programs was also cut by 36 percent in 2022. As of 2023, more than 120
youth centers and more than 140 youth spaces continue to operate and have almost fully resumed theirwork.102
Despite the challenges, many young people have played a role in emergency response as volunteers,
helping to distribute humanitarian aid and supporting vulnerable populations. Since February 2022, the98 Subsistence minumum is UAH 2684 per month whereas the unversity social stipend is UAH 540 - 1180 per month and theacademic scholarship UAH 1,250 - 2,000 per month depending on education level.
99 Homeschooling involves the independent mastering of the school curriculum by a student under the guidance of parents or
guardians, while being affiliated with a school. Parents or guardians teach the educational material, while teachers draw up an
individual curriculum and provide consultations. Assessment of academic achievement takes place at least four times a year, andif students receive an unsatisfactory grade, they must return to school.
100 The external education approach involves independent study of the school curriculum without school affiliation. Students taketests once a year and consult with their teachers. According to Ukrainian law, only children who belong to certain categories are
eligible for this approach.
101 UNHCR: “Education on Hold: Addressing barriers to learning among refugee children and youth from Ukraine – challenges andrecommendations”, Link. UNHCR: Education on hold: Education Policy Brief (September 2023), Link.
102 Ukrinform, “Maryna Popatenko, Deputy Minister of Youth and Sports: Young People Are Interested in the Reconstruction of
Ukraine, so We Must Create Such Conditions for Them to Return,” February 27, 2023, Link.

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number of young people serving as volunteers has increased substantially: one survey shows that 30
percent of young volunteers volunteered for the first time in 2022, compared with 6 percent in 2021.103
Most children have witnessed traumatic events or suffered losses, mistreatment, or violence as a resultof the war. UNICEF analysis suggests the percentage of children living in poverty has almost doubled from
43 percent in 2021 to 82 percent.104 The UN's independent international commission of inquiry into
Ukraine has documented legal and political measures against Ukrainian children deported to the RussianFederation. According to Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, illegal
deportation or transfer or illegal deprivation of liberty is a war crime; according to Article 6, forcible
transfer of children from one ethnic, religious, racial, or national group to another constitutes genocide.105
The government is taking all necessary measures to ensure the return of children who were taken to
Russia or Belarus. As of December 2023, 19,546 children had been deported and 387 returned;106 21,074
children had disappeared and 2,237 found;107 and 1,152 children had been injured and 511 killed.108
Taking into account the need to approximate EU standards and align to the requirements for EU
accession in social support for children in Ukraine, the Ministry of Social Policy is implementing acomprehensive policy aimed at placing children who are evacuated in family-type settings rather thaninstitutions. One of the critical factors in this regard is the availability of appropriate housing; the lack of
housing with a sufficient area for large numbers of children is a key impediment to such arrangements.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
Strengthen support for online education in zones of recent or ongoing hostilities and expand
opportunities for distance learning and access to technology and devices. In areas where schools havebeen damaged and staff depleted, digital education centers could provide reliable and secure access toonline education. Students from vulnerable groups, such as IDPs, those with disabilities, and those livingin areas temporarily not under government control, would also benefit from online learning opportunities
and distribution of laptops.
Strengthen the existing youth infrastructure by supporting cooperation between authorities and theNGO youth sector, and by working to involve young people in decision-making about the recovery process.
Assess the needs of children and youth at the local level and involve youth organizations in planning.
Hromadas should introduce feedback mechanisms to monitor the evolving needs of young people,
particularly the most vulnerable; and both national and local youth organizations should be included inplanning for recovery and reconstruction.
Repair and reconstruct multipurpose youth centers. During the war, many youth centers have beendamaged or repurposed for broader humanitarian response efforts, with youth-oriented services largely
103 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Impact of War on Youth in Ukraine: Findings and Recommendations,” 2023,

Link.
104 UNICEF: “War in Ukraine pushes generation of children to the brink, warns UNICEF”, 21 February 2023, Link.
105 United Nations, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” 1998, Link.
106 National Information Bureau data.
107 National Police of Ukraine data.
108 Office of the Prosecutor General data. Exact data on the number of injured are not available, given ongoing fighting and the
GoU’s temporary loss of control over some territories.

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discontinued. A priority investment program to repair and reconstruct these centers to better serveongoing humanitarian efforts and restore youth services is recommended.
Implement youth economic empowerment programs through training in entrepreneurship and job
acquisition. As a result of massive displacement within and outside of the country, there is a large andgrowing gap between labor market supply and demand. One way to bridge this gap is to improve
competencies for youth employment and entrepreneurship, in part by building partnerships with thebusiness sector and offering high-quality internship programs.
Revise legislation on financial support for post-secondary education of vulnerable youth. Existinglegislation establishes broad categories of youth eligible for post-secondary financial support, but current
levels of support are below the subsistence minimum and inadequate to cover expenses. Low-income
students within these categories should be targeted with more effective coverage.
Pursue deinstitutionalization of children. This should be done for human rights reasons, as part ofUkraine’s candidacy for EU accession, to save the GoU money (the average cost of a child's stay in a social
protection institution is approximately US$409.8/month, compared to US$276 a month in a family-typechildren’s home), and to meet the needs of the labor market.109
Develop housing for family-type children’s homes. This is a priority of the Ministry of Social Policy. The
goal is for children in institutions in Ukraine or returning from evacuation abroad to be housed in suchsettings.

Elderly Persons
Summary
A significant proportion of the elderly (individuals ages 60 and above) are impoverished and unable tomeet basic needs. Compared to the general population, they are less able to purchase winter outerwear
and footwear once in five years, consume a protein every other day, or adequately heat their homes.110
Existing social benefits are insufficient to resolve this issue.
The elderly have been disproportionally impacted by the war. They constitute 25 percent of Ukraine’s
population yet account for 35 percent of the civilians killed in the first year of fighting. 111 They are now
the largest share of the population in areas affected by war, close to the front lines, or temporarily notunder government control. According to HelpAge International, Ukraine has the largest percentage ofolder people impacted by ongoing war in the world.112
Observed Impacts
The elderly in war zones face severe hardships and high risk; many have been unable or unwilling toevacuate, given logistical challenges and displacement uncertainties. Those living in active combat
zones, on the shifting front lines, or in territories temporarily not under government control face
109 Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine data.
110 SSSU, “Resident Population of Ukraine by Sex and Age, as of January 1, 2022,” Link.
111 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “The Human Rights Situation of Older Persons in Ukraine in the Context of

the Armed Attack by the Russian Federation,” May 2023, Link.
112 HelpAge International, “Ignoring the Rapidly Ageing Population Will Jeopardize Ukraine’s Recovery,” June 20, 2023, Link.

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challenges with housing, with access to food, medicine, and health services, and with feelings of lonelinessand isolation.
The war has exacerbated poverty among the elderly. A survey conducted in December 2022/January2023 found that 61 percent of elderly women and 46 percent of elderly men could not afford to meetbasic needs.113 Accessible housing is typically unavailable, and affordable rental housing is scarce for thoseon pensions below the poverty line. About a quarter of elderly-headed households face unmet foodsecurity needs.114
Housing and transport infrastructure is unaffordable and/or inaccessible for the elderly. Many elderly
face mobility issues that render IDP transport and housing options inaccessible and unaffordable. Lack ofaffordable transport has been a barrier to health care for the elderly, especially as staff shortages haveconcentrated care in larger urban areas. Elderly displaced without family tend to remain for long periodsin the “temporary” collective sites used for IDP transit.
The elderly face discrimination and other difficulties in the labor market. Many elderly adults seek work
to supplement meager pensions, but face discrimination based on age, health status, and disabilities.
Many who do work are in low-skill jobs that are informal and insecure. Enhanced digital literacy andprofessional retraining might help older workers, but data on the use of relevant State Employment
Service programs are not disaggregated by sociodemographic characteristics, making it difficult to analyze
programs’ effectiveness. The pension system needs to be adapted to facilitate prolonged working lives in
the formal sector.
The elderly often lack access to important information. Information about evacuation procedures,
temporary accommodations, and long-term services for the elderly in new locations is either not available
or difficult for the elderly to access digitally. Procedures to apply for social benefits, such as IDP cashtransfers, are not well tailored to those with limited mobility or digital skills.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
Conduct a communications campaign on entitlements targeted to the elderly. The elderly should bebetter informed about changes in the Pension Fund and in application procedures for housing and utility
benefits, as well as other benefits for IDPs and people with disabilities to which they may be entitled.
Revise systems of social support for the elderly (both pension legislation and social assistanceprograms) to better cover their actual expenditures on basic needs. Along with ongoing reforms to bettertarget and limit the duration of cash assistance, policy makers should provide a more adequate level ofassistance to the elderly to cover basic needs. The statutory subsistence minimum should remain the basis
for calculating means-tested social assistance benefits while decoupling it from unrelated payments, fees,
and fines.
Allow elderly people to participate in employment assistance programs and adapt programs to meettheir needs. Barriers to employment among the elderly and those drawing pensions should be eliminated.

113 HelpAge International, “Older People on the Edge of Survival in Eastern Ukraine,” March 4, 2022, Link.
114 REACH, “Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) 2023: Food Security Preliminary Findings,” October 2023, Link.

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The elderly should be eligible for employment services adapted to their needs, such as strengthening ofdigital literacy. Elderly IDPs who have reached statutory retirement age should be placed in temporary
programs supporting employment and entrepreneurship among IDPs.
Strengthen existing community-based social service provision. To ensure that the elderly are able toreceive social services in their communities, improve these services’ financial and administrative
capacities. For example, the state could co-finance services, neighboring hromadas could work
cooperatively, or hromadas could establish a redistribution mechanism to ensure equitable access toservices.
Invest in barrier-free public transportation for the elderly and others with limited mobility.
Reconstruction of public transport systems should incorporate barrier-free infrastructure, and public
transport and “social taxi” services should be available in rural hromadas. Affordability should be ensured
through appropriate tariff policies.
Develop rapid response systems at the local level to protect the elderly. Local self-governments need
the capacity and resources to monitor the elderly and other vulnerable groups in their communities, andto take emergency action as needed. Preventing malnutrition and hypothermia and treating chronic
diseases are most critical for these groups.

Persons with Disabilities
Summary
In Ukraine, the Medical and Social Expert Commission (MSEC) grants individuals’ disability status anddetermines their needs. Ukraine became a state party to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2006, framing disability both as a human rights issue and a development issue.
Ukraine’s Law on Social Protection of Persons with Disabilities grants material, social, household, andmedical support. However, individuals often do not receive social support—primarily care services—until
they have a formal status as a person with disabilities. Currently, care services are not designed toeffectively meet the needs of people with disabilities—for example, People with disabilities areunnecessarily directed to special institutions.
The war has resulted in increased cases of trauma and serious injuries, leading to a rapid rise in thenumber of people with disabilities. This includes civilians as well as active and ex-combatants. In the year
and a half after February 2022, the number of people with disabilities increased by 300,000.115 The
Ministry of Veterans Affairs provides for an increase in the number of people with disabilities. In 2022, atleast 145,000 individuals underwent the MSEC assessment to register officially as persons with disabilities:some but not all of these suffered disability as a result of the war. The complexity and long duration of
the assessment procedure create a number of risks for Ukraine’s socioeconomic development, as delays
in supporting people with disabilities may cause some to drop out of the labor market and become
permanently dependent on the state’s financial support. Integration measures should be accompanied bywork-based psycho-social support.

115 Ministry of Social Policy data; cited in Ukrinform, “There Are 3 Million People with Disabilities in Ukraine—Zholnovych,”

September 19, 2023, Link.

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The percentage of IDP families caring for persons with disabilities has risen slightly. RDNA2 indicatedthat 25 percent of IDP households had one or more household members with a disability.116 This number
rose slightly, to 29 percent, in October 2023.117
Observed Impacts
Bomb shelters are often inaccessible to people with disabilities. Residential care facilities may lackaccessible bomb shelters, well-defined security protocols, or sufficient space to accommodate allresidents and personnel; or people with disabilities may be forced to reach or remain in bomb shelters
unaccompanied by staff. Larger cities publish maps of available shelters, but these rarely contain
information on accessibility.
Evacuation of people with disabilities118 from areas where hostilities are ongoing has been challenging.
This is partly due to the legal ambiguity concerning the responsibility for decision-making, implementationof the evacuation, and access to information. The challenge is particularly great where facilities serve as
guardians for people with disabilities who have been declared legally incompetent. The evacuation
protocols in many facilities are too general and difficult to apply.119 Information on accessible andaffordable transportation and on accompanying attendants is lacking, contributing to a situation in whichpeople with disabilities are caught in territories temporarily not under government control. Local
administrative service providers do not provide information on whether IDP centers are architecturally
accessible. Air raid sirens are inaccessible for the deaf, while written warnings are inaccessible for theblind. Displaced people with disabilities have also lacked sufficient information to connect them withsocial services and assistance programs in their new surroundings.
Humanitarian needs are consistently higher among households that include a people with disabilities
than among other households. Nearly a third of households that include a people with disabilities face
food security gaps. Over half—58 percent—have severe or worse multisectoral needs, which is a higher
share than for both IDPs and returnees.120 For these households, accessible notification and alerts duringcrises and afterward are crucial.121
The war has affected efforts to reform historic institutionalization of people with disabilities. In keepingwith global and European Union norms, Ukraine has sought deinstitutionalization of people withdisabilities in favor of community-based housing and support. Progress before February 2022 was limited,
however, and it has since reversed. Residential care facilities are often the only available and affordable
housing for people with disabilities fleeing hostilities, in part because shortly after February 2022, the GoU
simplified the procedures for admitting people with disabilities and the elderly into residential care

116 IOM, “Ukraine—Internal Displacement Report—General Population Survey Round 12 (16–23 January 2023),” Link.
117 IOM, “Ukraine—Internal Displacement Report—General Population Survey Round 14 (September–October 2023),” Link.
118 As of January 2023, 25 percent of IDPs were persons with disabilities. IOM, “Ukraine—Internal Displacement Report—General

Population Survey Round 12 (16–23 January 2023),” Link.
119 UNDP Ukraine, “Rapid Assessment of the Experience of Evacuating People with Disabilities in Ukraine Due to Armed Hostilities:
Study Report,” 2022, Link.
120 REACH, “2023 MSNA Bulletin: Ukraine,” Link.
121 UNDP, “Assessment of Accessibility of Information and Notification during Crises and Humanitarian Response,” 2022, Link.

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facilities.122 According to Amnesty International, which analyzed requests to regional administrations in
17 regions that provided data, 3,585 admissions were made into residential care facilities from February
24, 2022, to July 1, 2022, compared to only 998 admissions during a comparable period in 2021.123
The system of social support for people with disabilities is being reformed in order to provide injured
persons with comprehensive rehabilitation and psychosocial support. In this approach, the space inwhich a person lives is adapted to the disability so the people with disabilities can maintain mobility, form
self-care skills, and increase motivation to maintain social contacts and employment. This approachrequires multidisciplinary teams of specialists and uses the International Classification of Functioning, Life
Limitations and Health (ICF) to assess needs. The ultimate goal is to allow people with disabilities to returnto the labor market, and thus reduce the need for financial support from the state.
By law, employers are subject to a 4 percent hiring quota for people with disabilities, but they typically
prefer to pay a fine rather than hire people with disabilities. Employers rarely apply for financial
assistance to modify workplaces to accommodate people with disabilities, as they consider the application
process too complicated.124 According to the Pension Fund of Ukraine, only 17 percent of people withdisabilities are officially employed.
An updated mechanism for calculating administrative and economic sanctions was introduced in
November 2022. This provides for an automated regime that uses data from the State Register of
Mandatory State Social Insurance and the Centralized Data Bank on Disability Problems to identify
enterprises, institutions, and organizations that did not ensure compliance with the previous year
workplace standards. In its first months of operation, this mechanism showed high levels of
noncompliance related to employment of people with disabilities. At the same time, use of themechanism led to fines that were three times the amount expected.
Inclusion of people with disabilities requires an accessible living environment and the absence ofbarriers to services (administrative, social, health care, transport, etc.). New State Construction
Regulations on “inclusiveness of buildings and structures”125 came into force on April 1, 2019, but do not
require developers to implement appropriate changes if reconstruction or restoration of an existing
inaccessible building is planned. Application of the regulations would require the use of universal designprinciples for new public and residential buildings. However, these regulations are mandatory only for
new construction and not for the reconstruction, restoration, or capital repair of buildings and structures.
This exception means that reconstruction efforts may not improve general accessibility or create barrierfree spaces.126

122 The previous procedure required an assessment by the MSEC. The simplified procedure allows people with disabilities and theelderly to be placed in a residential care facility based solely on request, without submitting documentation (including
identification).
123 Amnesty International, “Ukraine: ‘I Used to Have a Home’: Older People’s Experience of War, Displacement, and Access to
Housing in Ukraine,” December 6, 2022, Link.
124 According to data provided by the State Employment Service, employers claimed reimbursement for creating reasonableadjustments for people with disabilities only 332 times in 2019.
125 Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine, “Inclusiveness of Buildings and Structures,” Link.
126 Fight for Right, “Alternative Report on Ukraine's Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities,”
Link.

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Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
Develop warning systems for hearing- and vision-impaired individuals and persons with physical,
mental, and intellectual impairments. All individuals need accessible information about safety,
evacuation, handling of explosives, and avoidance of landmines. Adapted materials and systems areneeded for persons with different impairments. Laws should be enacted that specify how people withdisabilities should be alerted to emergency situations depending on the type of impairment.
Reform legal competency legislation for persons with disabilities by implementing a decision support
mechanism. Reform is necessary to ensure that every person with mental or intellectual disabilities hasaccess to mechanisms for supported decision-making. This is particularly important because the war has
disrupted long-standing institutional arrangements, creating precarious evacuation and housing
situations for many people with disabilities.
Adopt a rights-oriented disability model and services based on individual needs. Ukraine needs legal
changes consistent with the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Rather than
immediately provide cash benefits, the state should assess individual needs of people with disabilities andprovide tailored social services. The capacity of local authorities to provide social services should be
strengthened; the state can ensure the provision of those services that are financially and organizationallydifficult to provide in the territorial community.
As part of Ukraine’s integration into Europe, implement the transition from the medical model ofdisability to the biopsychosocial one. Such a model assesses a person's health care, social, educational,
and employment needs; establishes the individual's state of functioning and limitations; and offers
supports that meet the individual's needs. Assessment should use an internationally recognized tool likethe ICF.
Develop a cross-cutting strategy and roadmap for deinstitutionalization and social service reform forpeople with disabilities. This effort will require central and local executive authorities and stakeholders
to work jointly. It will entail review of the legislative framework aimed at strengthening the system ofsocial services, a medium-term action for gradual deinstitutionalization, and long-term institutional
closure in keeping with EU and international policy standards.
Reform medical and rehabilitation services for people with disabilities. Reform of the MSEC should beaccelerated by adopting the World Health Organization’s ICF as the basis for disability evaluation. Accessto timely medical services, rehabilitation, prostheses, and personal assistance devices should be
immediate and not contingent on disability status. Housing and workplace services will help to achieve
the goals of rehabilitation and effective social and labor adaptation for people with disabilities.
Scale up piloting of community-supported housing alternatives for people with disabilities andeliminate community-level barriers to deinstitutionalization. Instead of reconstructing residential carefacilities, community-based housing should be considered in accordance with the UN Committee on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ Guidelines on Deinstitutionalization, including in Emergencies.127
127 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “CRPD/C/5: Guidelines on Deinstitutionalization, Including in Emergencies(2022),” September 9, 2022, Link.

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Strengthening capacity at the community level will help meet the needs of people with disabilities exiting
institutional care.

Veterans and their Families
Summary
The number of veterans has increased rapidly since 2014. The Ministry of Veterans Affairs (MoVA)
reports that 908,832 individuals qualified as veterans before February 2022.128 Information on the number
and sociodemographic characteristics of military members is not publicly available, making it difficult topredict future numbers of veterans and their likely needs. Nonetheless, according to MoVA, numbers may
rise to an estimated 4 million to 5 million veterans in the future, and the share of veterans in Ukrainiansociety is likely to rise to 10–15 percent of the population (compared to around 1–2 percent of the
population before 2022).
The current legislation for war veterans was not designed for active hostilities within the country. War
veterans include both active service members who have the status of combatants, as well as demobilized
persons, people with disabilities as a result of the war, and war participants. By law, all these groups
receive nearly equal social support without regard to the different groups’ needs or circumstances. Thisapproach is ineffective.
Active fighting within the country poses daunting challenges for veterans’ demobilization,
reintegration, and social and economic support, especially given the comparative youth of many
veterans. Nonrepresentative surveys conducted among veterans found that two-thirds were ages 40 oryounger (35 percent were 31–40 and 31 percent were 19–30).129 This age profile puts a premium on
offering able-bodied veterans educational and employment support for lifetime livelihoods, rather thanlong-term social assistance.
Ukraine’s legal framework guarantees veterans a wide array of benefits, including cash transfers,
reduced housing and utility fees, free public transport, and preferences for employment and education.
However, the framework has logistical challenges and is becoming increasingly costly as the number ofveterans rises. Some social support tools are outdated and ineffective, for example, benefits for the
installation of a landline telephone. MoVA was established in 2018 to coordinate policy making and public
program delivery for ex-combatants and their families.
The government has launched a project (to run through 2032) for veterans’ transition from military
service to civilian life. The transition system will include psychological and legal assistance and will
support the social, professional, and cultural adaptation of service members, war veterans, veterans’family members, and family members of fallen soldiers to ensure their smooth social and economic
reintegration. In 2023, the veteran's assistant institute was introduced, a pilot program focusing on the

128 Unified State Register of War Veterans data.
129 Ukrainian Veterans Foundation, “Portrait of a Veteran: Russian-Ukrainian War 2014–2022,” July–August 2022, Link.

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transition from military service to civilian life. In 2024, the veteran's assistant institute will be expanded
to the whole of Ukraine.130
Observed Impacts
Many veterans and their families have suffered from displacement and have lost prewar employment
and income sources. Veterans have identified the following as top priorities: housing acquisition andrepair (63 percent); health care (54 percent); livelihoods (51 percent, comprising 31 percent income
support and 20 percent employment assistance); and access to education (25 percent).131
Massive damage to housing stock, combined with large-scale displacement, has limited the supply of
housing, particularly in areas where displaced people are concentrated. Housing programs for veterans
are oriented toward home ownership. They are poorly adapted to meet shorter-term needs for rental
housing, especially for veterans hoping to return to their oblasts of origin. Affordable rental housing,subsidized public housing, and disability-accessible housing are scarce for those with financial andaccessibility constraints.
The number of veterans who will require state employment and education support is large. As of mid2022, 60 percent of those who were veterans before February 2022 were engaged in fighting the current
war.132 This group, largely of working age, will swell the ranks of veterans seeking livelihood support andlong-term employment when they demobilize. Furthermore, multiple surveys emphasize that veteransprimarily need education and employment.133 A quarter of respondents (25 percent) prioritize access to
education and 20 percent to employment assistance. Nonetheless, there are not enough retraining
courses or short-term skill courses. Alarmingly, 52 percent of the interviewed veterans and service men
anticipate losing their previous qualifications upon demobilization, highlighting the need for further
training and skill development.
One-third of surveyed veterans listed financial support among their priority needs. Disabled veterans
receive one-time cash transfers of UAH 173,000–990,000 (US$4,806–27,500), depending on theirdisability category. Most veterans receive a small annual cash transfer, which in 2021 ranged from UAH
600 to UAH 4,000 (US$17–111).134 Veterans are legally entitled to free public transportation andpreferential employment, although veterans report difficulties in obtaining these benefits. In the2021/2022 academic year, 10,470 veterans and approximately 11,000 children of veterans received state
support for professional (vocational and technical) or higher education.135
In 2022, the Ukrainian Veterans Foundation (UVF) was established as a budgetary institution to protect
the rights of veterans, promote their reintegration, and support their entrepreneurship andemployment. During 2023, 136 projects became winners within the framework of the UVF's competitive

130 Government Portal, “State Budget for 2024: A Maximum of 14 Billion UAH Has Been Transferred to Support Veterans andTheir Families,” November 10, 2023, Link.
131 Ukrainian Veterans Foundation, “Needs of Veterans,” Link. Data reflect research conducted in January–April 2023.
132 Ukrainian Veterans Foundation, “Portrait of a Veteran: Russian-Ukrainian War 2014–2022,” July–August 2022, Link.
133 Ukrainian Veterans Foundation Analytics. “Needs and obstacles of veterans in employment”. Sociological research conductedduring June-July 2023, Link.
134 Legal Hundred, “Analysis of the System of Social Protection of Veterans and Military Personnel,” 2022, Link.
135 Ibid.

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programs, in total, financial support was provided in the amount of over UAH 201 million (US$5.5 million).
As part of microfinancing grants (US$555 each), support was provided to 212 businesses for a total
amount of over UAH 4.1 million (US$115 thousand).
Veterans must be assessed by the Military Medical Commission (MMC) to ascertain fitness for further
military service, and by the civilian MSEC to qualify for disability benefits and services. But navigatingthese processes is difficult. Over two-thirds (68 percent) of surveyed veterans cited challenges completing
the MMC evaluation, such as unclear instructions and long waits to see specialized physicians.136 To easeprocessing, the government has opened MMCs in civilian hospitals, but veterans have noted difficulties
coordinating between military and civilian facilities as well as a lack of digitized document management.137
Evaluations are often considered subjective, and information is lacking on the appeals process. Annual
reapplication to MSEC is mandatory even when patently unnecessary (e.g., loss of a limb).
Veterans experience problems accessing medications, rehabilitation services, and prosthetics, which by
law they should receive free of charge.138 According to a 2016 survey, 39 percent of respondents faced
challenges with access to free medications,139 and the situation has worsened since February 2022 withthe closing of pharmacies and shortages of essential drugs. Veterans also noted that the approved list of
free drugs does not include treatment for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) or post-concussion
syndrome, common ailments among veterans. Ukraine’s 423 rehabilitation facilities are also inadequate
for the rising number of veterans.140 Rehabilitation capacity is planned to expand to 6,000 beds, though
the Ministry of Health estimates a need for 7,800 beds.141 Complex administrative procedures often
prevent veterans from obtaining prostheses during the treatment and rehabilitation period. To resolve
this, the government is piloting a program for making prostheses available prior to disability certification.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better•

Ensure revision of legislation on social support for war veterans. Legislation should focus on
demobilized persons with combat experience, not civilians; should distinguish between active service
members and demobilized; and should target social support to personal needs and circumstances.

•

Eliminate untargeted cash transfers in favor of targeted transfers to low-income veterans and thosecertified as disabled. Cash transfers should target those most in need, whether due to poverty or
disability or both. Training and qualification programs and job matching for long-term employment ofveterans should de-emphasize cash transfers.

136 “The Path of the Injured: Needs, Challenges and Future Visions,” Link. The survey was conducted in February–May 2023.
137 Ibid; see also Julia Slabinska, “‘It Can't Be Called a Reform Yet’: Human Rights Activist Lyubov Galan on What Has AlreadyChanged in the Work of the MPC and MSEC,” June 15, 2023, Link.
138 The Law on the Status of War Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection, Link.
139 The Legal Hundred, “White paper: analysis of the state support system for veterans and their families in Ukraine”, Annex 1:“Study of the System of Social Protection of Combatants and Family Members of Those Killed in the Anti-terrorist Operation,”
2016, Link.
140 Ustinov, O.V., Ukrainian Medical Journal, Comment by the Minister of Health of Ukraine; see “The Maximum Number of
Rehabilitation Cycles in Two or More Areas Has Been Increased,” June 19, 2023, Link.
141 Ukrinform, “Ukraine Needs 7800 Rehabilitation Beds—Ministry of Health,” July 19, 2023, Link

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•

Accelerate process reform for veterans’ medical assessments (MMC and MSEC). Planned reforms
need to be accelerated to offer better information, simpler processes, digital queuing, digital records
management, one-stop assistance, and better collaboration between military and civilian facilities.
Process reengineering and legal enforcement are also needed to improve timely access to guaranteed
drugs, rehabilitation services, and prostheses. Order 402 of the Ministry of Defense needs to beamended to promote broader diagnoses and a comprehensive and holistic assessment of veterans’
physical and psychological health.

•

Organize information and adapt housing programs to the needs of today’s veterans. A digital
clearinghouse should be set up with information on housing needs among veterans and the various
housing programs to support them. Programs should support obtaining housing at prices that are
affordable for veterans through mortgage lending, preferential long-term state credit, etc.

•

Enhance professional reorientation programs to focus on short-term qualification training and small
business development support. New short courses should respond to current labor market demand.
Mentoring, coaching, and employment and business start-up support will be needed to complement
technical training.

•

Adapt service system to respond to the needs of veterans. This includes providing counseling andliaison services to access affordable housing, skill development, higher education, disability support,
medical services, financial and life planning support, and other public services.

Gender Specific Impacts
Summary
The war has had profound impacts on women, girls, and LGBTIQ+ persons who have been affecteddifferently than men and who have specific needs and priorities for recovery. Women account for morethan half of IDPs and for the large majority of people seeking to return to Ukraine. As of October 2023, 56
percent of the 3.7 million estimated IDPs were women, and women made up 93 percent of the 4.6 million
people returning to their places of habitual residence.142 Out of the 14.6 million people who will needhumanitarian assistance in 2024, 56 percent are women and girls.143 In recent years Ukraine has madenotable progress toward greater gender equality, but gaps persist. Women earn 18.6 percent less thanmen for work of equal value, and their labor force participation rate is 15.1 percent lower than men’s.
Lack of employment is especially pronounced for women ages 25–44.144 Other challenges to a genderresponsive national recovery include an increase in women’s unpaid care work, heightened risks ofgender-based violence, and a decrease in women’s formal decision-making.
Observed Impacts
As of April 2023, 72 percent of people registered as unemployed were women,145 and of the IDPs
employed before the invasion, 45 percent of women—as compared to 27 percent of men—still did not
142 IOM, ”Ukraine—Returns Report—General Population Survey Round 14 (September–October 2023),” November 10, 2023, Link.
143 UN OCHA, “2024 Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan,” forthcoming.
144 ILO, “Prospects for Achieving Ukraine’s 2032 GDP Target: A Labour Market Perspective,” September 2023, Link.
145 State Employment Service, April 2023 data.

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have a job.146 More women than men depend on social assistance, especially among those ages 60–80.
In 2023, the total income per capita in male-headed households was on average 20 percent higher thanin female-headed households,147 highlighting the impact of increased unpaid care work andunemployment on women and their families. A larger share of female-headed households rely on
unstable income sources compared to male-headed households (58 percent vs. 45 percent).148 Femaleheaded households are also more likely to rate their needs as “Extreme” or “Extreme+” in at least one
sector (41 percent) compared to male-headed households (37 percent).149
As estimated by the UN Women experts, women spend over 16 hours per week more than men on
unpaid domestic work (Figure 25),150 and the potential cost implications of women’s increased unpaid
childcare work since February 2022 is US$72.5 billion.151 While men’s unpaid work has more thandoubled since the start of the war and there has been a noticeable increase in fathers’ participation inchildcare,152 women still have the primary responsibility for domestic and care work. This has significant
implications for their labor market participation and income generation.
Figure 25. Number of hours spent on unpaid domestic work (housekeeping, care for family members)
per week

Source: UN Women Ukraine, 2023 (data from State Statistics of Ukraine and the Human Impact Assessment, 2023).

Risks of gender-based violence (GBV), including war-related sexual violence (CRSV), human trafficking,and intimate partner violence, have been heightened since February 2022.153 As of 1 February 2024, theUN Human Rights Monitoring Mission (HRMMU) documented 220 cases of CRSV (137 men, 77 women, 4
girls, 2 boys)154, and the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine recorded 270 cases of CRSV (96 men,
161 women, 12 girls, and 1 boy).155 While complaints of domestic violence recorded by the National Police

146 European Training Foundation (ETF), “The Invasion of Ukraine: The Impact, in Numbers,” December 1, 2023, Link.
147 REACH, “Multi-sector Needs Assessment,” 2023, Link.
148 Ibid; see also REACH, “2022 MSNA Gender Focus Snapshot,” February 2023, Link.
149 REACH, “Multi-sector Needs Assessment,” 2023, Link. “Extreme” and “Extreme+” represent the most severe needs.
150 Calculations are based on data from UNDP, “Ukraine: Human Impact Assessment,” June 2023, Link.
151 Calculations are based on 2021 data from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and on UNDP, “Ukraine: Human Impact

Assessment,” June 2023, Link. The calculations are based on the following formula: number of hours of additional unpaid work
per week x hourly rate (using compensation rate for foster carers in Ukraine) x number of weeks since the start of the war x
number of affected people = potential cost implications due to increase in unpaid work.
152 UNFPA, “The Role of Men in Parenthood During the Full-Scale War,” August 2023, Link.
153 Regional Gender Task Force, “Making the Invisible Visible: An Evidence-Based Analysis of Gender in the Regional Response to
the War in Ukraine,” October 2022, Link.
154 OHCHR, Situation of human rights in Ukraine: 1 August to 30 November 2023, Link
155 Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, Statistics on CRSV cases. Link

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initially decreased in 2022, they rose again in 2023 to 243,980 cases by November.156 Reports from local
NGOs and international organizations confirm that the invasion exacerbated existing inequality anddiscrimination of LGBTIQ+ people and caused an increase in homo- and transphobic violence.157 Local civilsociety organizations believe that GBV has increased but is significantly underreported due to stigma, aculture of silence, and a lack of services and police capacity made worse by the war.158 The risk of
trafficking is also rising.159
Lack of GBV response services appear to be a problem in Ukraine. In 2023, 19 percent of households
reported that GBV response services were not available where they lived; the share was 32 percent inrural areas (compared to 10 percent in urban areas).160 Out of the 714 specialized services for domestic
violence survivors that existed before February 2022, 67 had ceased to function sometime in 2023. 161
However, 228 new services have been launched, and 875 specialized GBV services now operate across
Ukraine, including shelters, crisis rooms, day centers, counseling services, mobile teams, and hotlines.
Staffing of specialized GBV services remains an issue; there is a 23 percent deficit in staffing of service
managers, psychologists, social workers, and other administrative and legal staff.162
Women are playing a key role in the humanitarian response and recovery efforts but are not equally
involved in planning and decision-making. Women continue to be underrepresented in decision-making
positions, including at the highest level; there are 4 women in the 22-member Cabinet, and women makeup only 21 percent of Parliament. Only 1 out of 24 regional administrations is headed by a woman,163 andafter local elections in 2020, the shares of women on regional, city, district, and village councils were
between 33 percent and 43 percent, but these numbers have dropped since 2022. Only 9 percent ofmayors and only 16–21percent of village heads were women.164 Women’s rights, gender equality, andother social issues are sometimes sidelined as a result.165
The intersection between gender and factors such as age, disability, and displacement status heightens
vulnerability. Older women and women with disabilities have significantly higher levels of need than malecounterparts and are more vulnerable economically.166 For example, households led by women ages 60
or above make up the largest share of food-insecure households (31 percent).167
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
156 Complaints numbered 325,599 in 2021; 244,381 in 2022; and 243,980 as of November 28, 2023. See National Police of Ukraine,“The National Police Has 54 Specialized Units for Countering Domestic Violence—Ivan Vyhivskyi,” November 29, 2023, Link.
157 Nash Svit, “The battle for freedom. LGBTQ situation in Ukraine in 2022,” February 2023, Link.
158 Care, “Rapid Gender Analysis Ukraine,” October 2023, Link
159 Christopher H. Smith, “Report on Human Trafficking Issues to the Standing Committee of the 2023 Winter Meeting of the OSCE
Parliamentary Assembly,” Vienna, February 23–24, 2023, Link.
160 REACH, “Multi-sector Needs Assessment,” 2023, Link.
161 Ministry of Social Policy data.
162 Estimations are based on Ministry of Social Policy data, November 2023.
163 Official website of the President of Ukraine, December 2023, Link.
164 Electoral Commission of Ukraine, November 2023. Women make up 36 percent of representatives in regional councils, 33
percent in city councils, 43 percent in district councils, and 37 –41 percent in village councils.
165 UNDP, “Ukraine Human Impact Assessment,” 2023; EU4GenderEquality Reform Helpdesk, “Country Gender Profile: Ukraine,”
July 2023, Link.
166 REACH, “2022 MSNA Gender Focus Snapshot,” February 2023, Link.
167 World Food Program, “2023 Ukraine Needs Assessment: Food Security and Essential Needs,” June 2023, Link.

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To ensure a gender-responsive and -inclusive approach to building back better in Ukraine, the following
areas should be prioritized in 2024:•

Targeted interventions to expand women’s access to and inclusion in the labor market and business.
Women should have opportunities to develop required competencies, including in sectors
traditionally occupied by men, and unemployed women should be matched with available jobs, partly
as a way to attract female refugees back to Ukraine. Interventions should support both short- andlong-term economic security for women—including female heads of households, internally displaced
women, returnee women, GBV survivors, and women from groups facing multiple forms of
discrimination such as Roma women and rural women. Improving working conditions, particularly
through social dialogue and collective bargaining, will help to increase the attractiveness of the labormarket to women.

•

Dedicated initiatives to reduce women’s unpaid care work. Interventions should prioritizereconstructing and opening easily accessible childcare facilities, schools (including bomb shelters forkindergartens), and services for people with disabilities and older people. Advocacy for men’s
engagement in unpaid childcare and domestic work is important, as are employer-based childcare
and private service provision to expand good-quality, affordable services.168•

Expanded GBV prevention and response efforts. This includes further development of GBV
protection mechanisms, such as additional GBV-related services, strengthened referral pathways, andgender-sensitive police practices. Special attention is needed to ensure GBV prevention and response
efforts reach IDPs, people living in rural and remote communities, those at risk of trafficking, andveterans.

•

Engagement with women as active leaders and decision-makers in recovery processes at all levels
where gender-responsive planning, budgeting, and monitoring tools are applied. This involves theuse of effective quotas/temporary special measures in elections and appointments, systematicconsultations with people of all genders, and expansion of leadership opportunities for women at
hromada, oblast, and national levels. Improved use of gender targets and markers is also needed to
track financing for gender-responsive recovery.

•

Strengthened collection, analysis, and dissemination of data on the gender-specific impacts of thewar, especially on the intersection of gender and groups facing multiple forms of discrimination.
Sex-disaggregated data should be collected, analyzed, and used to ensure evidence-based decisionmaking on the needs and priorities of different groups of women and men.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments of Impacts on Specific Groups
One important cross-cutting priority for responding to the needs of specific groups is to invest in datacollection systems to aid recovery. The highest priorities for improved data availability include (i)monitoring and verification of IDP status; (ii) sex-disaggregated data related to gender impacts in theinfrastructure, social services, health, and employment/livelihoods sectors; (iii) socially disaggregateddata on employment and pension provision; (iv) digitized registry of veterans and their needs; and (v) dataon number and legal status of elderly individuals and people with disabilities living in residential care
168 International Labour Organization, “Care Policy Investment Simulator,” 2023, Link.

79

facilities. Equally important is aligning statistical and administrative data collection and dissemination with
Ukraine’s decentralization reform so that communities have access to socially disaggregated data neededfor operational and strategic planning.

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SOCIAL SECTORS
Housing
Context
With over 10 percent of the total housing stock either damaged or destroyed and close to 2 million
households affected, housing continues to be one of the most impacted sectors.169 The total damage tothe housing stock has increased by 11 percent since February 2023. Before February 2022, the housing
stock comprised of an estimated 20 million units distributed across multifamily buildings (MFBs),
dormitories, and various types of single-family houses (SFHs). MFBs are predominant in urban areas andcater to nearly 67 percent of the urban population. In larger cities, this share increases to 79 percent. On
the other hand, SFHs, including individual homes, dachas, garden houses, and country houses, and areprimarily located in rural areas. The asset typology used in this housing sector assessment remains
unchanged from the first RDNA. Units in MFBs are divided by age: in one group are the Soviet-era
apartment buildings (pre-1991), which are estimated to constitute 88 percent of the apartment building
stock; and in the other group are the more recent (post-1991) multifamily apartments, which are
estimated to account for 12 percent of the apartment buildings in the country. Almost 94 percent of the
housing is privately owned,170 and as of 2013, only about 3.4 percent of households were officiallyconsidered renters, although an additional 10–15 percent likely rent informally.171 Since February 2022,
rental rates reportedly have increased, particularly in the western regions of the country. 172
Given the sheer volume of damage to the housing sector and the resulting needs and negative impact
on prolonged displacement, the GoU, including local authorities, as well as international partners anddonors have prioritized housing recovery and building back better since the onset of the war. The GoU
established the Register of Damaged and Destroyed Property (RDDP), which mandates the verification
and registration of damaged assets by territorial hromadas,173 and allows for monitoring the extent,
nature, and location of damaged assets and progress on their repair and reconstruction. This damage
inventory is managed by the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development(MCTID) and was estimated to include about 60 percent of damaged assets as of December 2023. The
GoU has also launched different programs for affected homeowners including, among others, theeRecovery repair program, which caters to residential property owners with damaged or destroyed
units.174 The GoU, multilateral organizations, and donors have since 2022 continued to invest in muchneeded energy-efficient restoration of MFBs and have sought modernization of housing policy, renewalof property rights regulations, the building regulatory framework, and urban development in a mannerthat is oriented toward EU regulations. The interagency Shelter/Non-Food Item Cluster of the
169 The housing sector concentrated 40 percent of the total damage in RDNA1 and 38 percent in RDNA2. In RDNA 1, 20 percentof the proposed needs focused on housing; the share is 17 percent in RDNA2.
170 Ownership rights are in the process of being systematically included in the State Registry of Rights for Real Estate (eRegistry),
which was established in 2015, only after privatization had been largely completed.
171 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 2013. Link
172 Datskevych, N.”Rental prices soar in western Ukraine amid influx of refugees.” March 18, 2022. The Kyiv Independent. Link.
173 Ukraine has three levels of constitutionally guaranteed subnational government: (i) oblasts, or regions; (ii) rayons, or districts;and (iii) hromadas, or local self-government units that range from cities to villages and rural hamlets.
174 The eRecovery program provides compensations to owners for undertaking repairs in case the unit is partially damaged andin the case of destroyed units, owners are supported through the provision of housing vouchers, etc. Link.

81

humanitarian coordination system has also developed a Shelter Information Damage Assessment andResponse Database (SIDAR) and is working on its inter-operability with the RDDP system. Yet theseadvancements cannot keep pace with the needs, which increased by 16 percent between RDNA2 and
RDNA3. To accelerate recovery, it is necessary to rapidly enhance implementation and technical capacities
at the national level and (to a larger extent) at the local level, as well as address persisting sectoral
challenges pertaining to ownership, outdated and complex regulatory framework, incomplete
decentralization. Uncertainties posed by the ongoing war and resulting macro-fiscal challenges willcontinue to determine the speed of the housing sector recovery.
Damage and Loss Assessment
As of December 31, 2023, the total cost of damage to the housing sector is estimated to be US$55.9
billion (Table 5).175 Of the 11 percent increase in the cost of damage since February 24, 2023, roughly afifth can be attributed to the damage caused by the breakage of the Kakhovka Dam and the subsequent
flooding (primarily in the Khersonska oblast).176 Units in MFBs continue to represent the largest share ofboth damaged units and damage costs, both at 86 percent. An estimated 220,315 SFHs have beendamaged as well, and account for around 10 percent of the total affected assets. The number of damaged
dormitory units stands at 67,206 as of the end of 2023. Concerning geographic distribution, over 75
percent of the damage cost is concentrated in four oblasts: Donetska (30 percent), Kharkivska (27percent), Luhanska (12 percent), and Kyivska (8 percent); an additional 18 percent is estimated in
Mykolaivska (4 percent), Chernihivska (4 percent), Khersonska (4 percent), Zaporizka (3 percent), andDnipropetrovska (3 percent). Over one-fourth of the damaged units are destroyed (547,010 units), andthe other three-fourths are partially damaged.177. Of these, 880,528 units have minor damage (damage ofup to 10 percent), and 679,382 units have medium damage (damage of 10–40 percent). The impacted
units reported across all three damage levels (destroyed, minor damage, medium damage) have increased
since the previous assessment (RDNA2), but there has been a notable 200 percent increase in the units
that sustained minor damage. This significant increase in units with minor damage can likely be explainedby the GoU’s gradual adoption of more rigorous data collection methods and processes, together with
the implementation of housing repair programs that are prioritizing the inspection and recovery ofpartially damaged units, starting with those that have minor damage.
Thus far, the housing sector has incurred an estimated US$17.4 billion in losses (Table 5). The loss
assessment reflects estimated cost of demolition, debris removal, rental and bank loss, and costs
associated with the provision of emergency housing support and temporary housing. Rental losses are

175 This is likely an underestimation given the lack of access to damage data in the frontline oblasts and areas temporarily notunder GoU control.
176 European Union, KSE Institute, Vox Ukraine, UNDP, et al., “Analysis of the Impact of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Station
Explosion on the Populated Areas of Kherson and Mykolaiv Regions,” 2023, Link.
177 Damaged assets were categorized into three damage levels in agreement with the MCTID: damage below 10 percent(considered minor damage), damage between 10 percent and 40 percent (considered medium or moderate damage), anddamage above 40 percent (considered destroyed). All units that had damage of 40 percent or less are considered partiallydamaged and repairable in the short to medium term.

82estimated at US$10.2 billion,178 while bank losses related to mortgages linked to destroyed assets are
estimated at US$1.2 billion. The total estimated cost of demolition and removal of debris is a notable
US$5.6 billion. Critical housing support—including emergency shelters, operation and maintenance ofcollective centers, and basic housing refurbishment for winterization during the previous 22 month—amounts to an estimated US$104 million. In addition, the GoU, together with donors, has provided
homeowners and utilities with around US$141 million as compensation for temporary housing and basic
service delivery for internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Human impact. The scale of damage in this sector is exacerbating the already existing shortage ofadequate, affordable, and safe housing in Ukraine—an especially severe challenge for IDPs. As compared
to 13 percent nationally, 28 percent of households residing in the Southeast macro region, reported theiraccommodation was directly affected by the war; more damage was reported by households in urban
areas compared to rural areas.179 Affected households were likely to have sold or lost durable goods due
to displacement, destruction, or looting. A survey report by the International Organization for Migration
indicated that 47 percent of IDPs owned a house or apartment unit that was damaged or destroyed; that
31 percent faced a shortage of adequate accommodation in their current location; and that elderly IDPs
struggled to find housing.180 Displaced households belonging to lower-and middle-income groups, alongwith the IDPs who have been twice displaced, are particularly vulnerable; their limited financial resources
and limited access to documentation can prevent them from repairing their own homes, seeking adequate
temporary housing, or accessing monetary support programs. Although the number of IDPs has been
gradually declining over the past months, as of December 2023 there were over 3,522,045 registered IDPs
in Ukraine.181
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The needs for the housing sector are estimated at US$80.3 billion across the long term (2024–2033)(Table 6). Of the long-term total, US$72.1 billion is for repair and reconstruction of housing assets underthe build back better approach. MFBs, which sustained 86 percent of the overall damage, were mostly
built during the Soviet period and had exceeded their design lifespan; they are also energy inefficient andsuffer from deferred maintenance and repairs. Thus, the restoration needs for MFBs will entail
improvements such as climate- and disaster-proofing, as well as compliance with Eurocodes, EU laws, andspecifically priorities like energy efficiency and inclusion. But the restoration of housing assets also entails
a host of other vital activities, including debris removal and demolition, inspections, technical designs andstudies, and complex implementation processes and associated capacity, all of which are also accounted
for in the total needs. In the first four years of the sector recovery, the primary focus is on rapid repairs
and recovery of the partially damaged assets, supporting owners with destroyed housing, provision of
178 Due to the prevalence of informality in the rental market, lack of verified data and access to reliable rental market data,

estimations may not provide a clear indication of associated nuances and costs. Rental losses have been estimated accounting
for the following variables (i) Average rent per month reported by the GoU that has been adjusted to reflect other sources (ii)
Rental market share-assumed at 13 percent and (ii) Estimated number of IDP and registered households for the 22 months of the
war and the following 18 months.
179 UNDP, et al. “Human Impact Assessment,” June 2023, Link.
180 IOM, “DTM Ukraine—Internal Displacement Report—General Population Survey Round 14 (September–October 2023),”
November 6, 2023, Link.
181 IOM, “DTM Ukraine—Area Baseline Assessment (Raion Level)—Round 31 (December 2023),” January 16, 2024, Link.

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temporary housing and emergency support, and planning, organization, and coordination between
national and local levels for ensuing phases of the recovery. Critical preparatory activities, necessary
policies and plans, and adequate capacity and implementation arrangements needs to be in place for theongoing and subsequent large-scale repair and recovery works.
Although significant funding is being directed toward the housing sector recovery, it is not possible togauge the overall needs met at this stage. According to the GoU data, in 2023, US$ 1 billion was disbursed
toward housing sector recovery and included both, disbursements verified by the Ministry of Finance aswell as that reported by line Ministries. These were channeled through the state or municipal budgets or
by loans and grants provided by donors and international finance institutions, with most being dedicatedto the repair and reconstruction of damaged assets, and overall representing about 52 percent of thesectoral priority needs identified in RDNA2. Although, according to preliminary estimation based on data
provided by regional state administrations, at least 2,601 MFBs and 10,017 SFHs are reported, by the GoU
to have been repaired by the end of 2023, it appears that the method for tracking recovered assets is not
uniformly employed across regions and hromadas. In addition, there is a considerable lag between the
disbursement of funds and completion of works. For example, in 2023, 29,600 households were provided
compensation for the repair of their partially damaged buildings, but the completion of repairs is yet tobe verified by the local authorities and could take up to 12 months after the receipt of compensation.182
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
Recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 in the housing sector are estimated at
US$2.1 billion (Table 7). In line with the phased approach for housing recovery, the estimate emphasizes
the need to focus on rapid light and medium repairs in the short term as the fastest way to increaseadequate housing in the housing market, thus encouraging safe shelter for all, including IDPs and the needto support households with destroyed housing. Current and major repairs of MFBs and SFHs are expected
to cost around US$500 million in 2024. Costs related to provision of emergency housing support andtemporary housing account for US$248 million. Demolition and debris removal is estimated at US$119
million and is vital for initiating substantial and large-scale works in the housing sector. The proposed
priority needs also assign a notable US$68 million for technical inspections that ascertain habitability of
housing units and for the preparation of studies and project documentation; these pave the way for actual
repairs of MFBs in the subsequent years and create a viable project pipeline. Organizational arrangements
and design of policies and strategies are expected to cost US$11 million and would lay a solid foundation
for faster and more efficient housing sector recovery in coming years. Components within this category
could include, among others, training and staffing of relevant personnel at the local level, updating of
spatial plans, procurement of software and hardware, and design and implementation of soundmonitoring and reporting systems. Investing in capacity and in policy and regulatory improvements at theoutset would mitigate implementation risks at later stages.
The extensive recovery needs in the sector, coupled with the limited resources necessitates acomprehensive sector reform and development of a housing strategy and associated operational andaction plans, right at the outset. These would allow for adopting a programmatic approach, to determine

182 Data reported by the GoU.

84

investments over time, that is based on a shared vision for housing recovery and prioritization criteria.
Without an agreed strategy, a multitude of ad hoc solutions that lack coordination may be pursued. To
this end, the GoU is in the process of adopting the “Basic Principles of Housing Policy law”, (currently indraft) in 2024. Such a vital yet enormous undertaking would require keen attention at elevating not only
organizational arrangements and capacity at all levels of the government, but also, at developing robust
institutional and regulatory processes, plans and strategies. At present, for 2024, funding commitments(which are at various stages of approval) to meeting housing needs are mostly dedicated to current andmajor repairs of MFBs and various compensation programs. Items related to organizational arrangements
and technical studies are less salient, but they remain critical determinants of the sector’s absorption
capacity and the success of the overall reform agenda.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
Access to reliable data continues to be a key challenge for accurately assessing the level of damage inthe housing sector. The war itself severely hampers access to reliable and detailed information, making it
increasingly challenging to accurately assess the impacts and associated costs for rebuilding. This isparticularly true in territories that are not under GoU control. Moreover, costing data linked to the needs
estimations as well as the data required to make valid assumptions increasingly lack reliability and validity
as the war continues. This makes it more difficult to correctly assess the impacts and needs in the sector.
Changes in data collection methods and tools prevent meaningful comparisons of results over time. It
is important to acknowledge that the government has made efforts to improve data collection tools andmechanisms since the beginning of the war; its introduction of the Register of Damaged and Destroyed
Property is a notable example. However, because data collection processes are now different from thoseused in previous assessments, direct comparisons become difficult. For instance, although RDNA3
provides a cumulative assessment, it found slight reductions in damage in few regions.
Moving forward, it would be worthwhile to design and implement a methodology for systematicallyand uniformly tracking recovered assets and various categories of needs met, as well as the associatedprojects and sources of funding. Such a system would allow for improved needs determination andtargeted identification of specific housing sector needs across regions. In addition, given that the war is
ongoing, tracking of recovered assets and needs met could also potentially show if a repaired asset had
been subject to further damage.
Table 5. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska

DamageLoss
82.9
2,121.4
0.0
1,471.1
16,937.8
0.1
15,120.0
2,357.7
30.1
10.7

Needs
25.6
499.3
6.9
553.6
4,464.4
8.93915.71024.9
12.3
13.9

143.7
2,916.3
19.5
2,039.6
25,032.6
29.6
21,176.1
3,273.2
54.7
36.9

85

Kyiv (City)
957.5
1,306.6
1,285.0
Kyivska
4,708.1
1,426.3
6,829.1
Luhanska
6,782.5
1,509.6
9,888.5
Lvivska
41.7
15.2
103.6
Mykolaivska
2,063.0803.8
2,829.0
Odeska
276.3
214.9
415.1
Poltavska
97.9
18.3
163.8
Rivnenska
6.1
6.6
21.1
Sumska752.8
375.1
1,038.1
Ternopilska
9.1
6.7
31.4
Vinnytska
80.0
21.0
138.0
Volynska
0.1
11.4
13.0
Zakarpatska
3.4
8.8
35.9
Zaporizka
1,723.4
990.9
2,342.5
Zhytomyrska
312.7
175.5
435.3
Total
55,946.3
17,416.2
80,291.5
Source: Assessment team. Note: Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; total estimated needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 6. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category
ReconstructionneedsComponent
Repair and reconstruction
Demolition and debris removalTechnical inspections, designs, documentation, and studies
Organizational arrangements
Service delivery
restoration
Regulatory and technical processes, plans, and strategies
needs
Provision for temporary housing and emergency support
Total
Source: Assessment team.

Total needs (2024–2033)
72,119.7
5,676.1
1,685.5
37.5
12.5
760.1
80,291.5

Table 7. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Repair and reconstruction through owner-driven mechanisms, including compensation,vouchers, etc.
Repair and reconstruction through current and major repairs of multifamily buildings andsingle-family houses through cluster approach
Improving access to housing through housing finance mechanisms
Demolition and debris removal
Design and documentation
Organizational arrangements
Regulatory and technical processes, plans, and strategies
Provision of temporary housing and emergency support to IDPs
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
869.0
499.9
297.0
119.0
68.4
11.3
3.1
248.4
2,116.1

86

Education and Science
Context
The war continues to pose challenges to the education sector's performance, primarily affecting inperson education and learning outcomes. Before February 2022, Ukraine’s education sector faredcomparatively well, with high enrollments at all levels and student performance above expectations for
its level of development. Since 2014, the GoU has followed a comprehensive reform agenda driven by the
New Ukrainian School, aimed at tackling disparities in learning outcomes and improving the effectivenessof the education and science systems. However, since February 2022, providing in-person education has
been extremely challenging, and opportunities to learn—at all levels, from preschool to higher
education—have been affected. Since educational institutions can resume regular operations only if
equipped with bomb shelters capable of accommodating students and staff during air alarms, large sharesof students still rely on online learning. Moreover, displacement of populations within and outside of
Ukraine continues to disrupt the education process and to create education staff shortages.
Faced with the growing impact of the war, the authorities and partners are prioritizing reconstruction
and restoration of access to in-person education. As the impact on the education and science sectors
increases, students and scientists miss opportunities to learn, research, and innovate. Despite continued
investments in education in 2023, the total needs increased by 30 percent between RDNA2 and RDNA3.
Moreover, damage to education infrastructure increased by 26 percent over the same period.
Nevertheless, local governments are actively reconstructing schools, preschools, and other educational
facilities. Since January 2023, the share of educational institutions with shelters has increased from 68
percent to 80 percent, while the share of schools offering fully in-person education has increased from 25
percent to 57 percent. The Ukrainian science sector is also progressively integrating into the European
research ecosystem, a step that provides greater collaboration opportunities for Ukrainian scientists andfacilitates exchanges of knowledge, but also will help steer a smooth transition towards a digital andsustainable economy and society.
Damage and Loss Assessment
Between February 2022 and December 31, 2023, 13 percent of the education infrastructure wasdamaged or destroyed by the war, representing an estimated damage of US$5.6 billion (Table 8). The
13 percent share includes damage to 3,583 educational institutions and destruction of 394. While schools
account for most of the damage, with 1,888 institutions affected, tertiary and research institutions facehigher damage rates, with respectively 21 percent183 and 31 percent of the total number of institutions
damaged or destroyed. Moreover, although damaged educational institutions generally continue tooperate online, the destruction of preschools often leads to the discontinuation of early childhood
services, increasing pressure on caregivers and limiting their labor market participation. The destructionof educational assets is concentrated in eastern and southern oblasts: between 35 percent and 69 percent
of all educational institutions in Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Luhanska oblasts have been either
damaged or destroyed. These estimates do not account for the destruction of educational equipment

183 This figure covers vocational education and training institutions, professional pre-higher education institutions, and higher

education institutions.

87

(i.e., school furniture, textbooks, computers, etc.), suggesting that the actual cost of damage is likely
higher.
The invasion is causing economic, learning, and research losses in the sector, which are estimated to be
US$6.9 billion (Table 8). The combination of online learning, stress, and trauma is leading to substantial
learning losses for Ukrainian students. Comparing PISA 2022 and PISA 2018 results shows a clear
deterioration in the proficiency of 15-year-olds in mathematics, reading, and science, equivalent to two
years of schooling.184 The accumulation of learning losses since February 2022 amounts to US$5.5 billion.
Still, this figure will grow over the working life of today’s students, negatively impacting their income
potential and leading to additional billions in losses beyond the RDNA time frame. The war has also led toresearch capacity losses, characterized by smaller investments in research and a decline in the number ofpublications from Ukrainian scientists, which hint at the difficulties faced by the science sector in thecurrent context. Finally, losses include items such as reduced private sector turnover, decreased tuitioncollection, additional costs for education institutions that are used as IDP shelters or community centers,
and additional expenses for demolition and debris removal of damaged education facilities.
Human impact. The impacts in this sector are disproportionately affecting girls, students from the poorest
families, and those living in rural areas. While important disparities were present before February 2022,
the war has heightened inequalities between students, as demonstrated by PISA 2022 results.185 Girls’
scores in reading have declined more rapidly than boys’, and students with lower socioeconomic status
were found to be significantly less likely to attain basic mathematics proficiency than their peers.
Moreover, the rural-urban gap across subjects has substantially widened—it amounts now to more thanfour years and a half of learning (92 PISA points on average), indicating entrenched inequalities between
cities and rural areas. This uneven accumulation of learning losses since 2020 is putting Ukraine’s
reconstruction in jeopardy, as human capital is expected to be a key driver of the country’s recovery.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The needs related to infrastructure reconstruction and restoration of high-quality in-person education
are estimated at US$13.9 billion for the period 2024–2033 (Table 9). The reconstruction of educational
institutions is expected to cost US$9.8 billion over 10 years. This process must comply with the latest
safety, green, and quality standards established by the GoU, including innovative approaches to teaching
and learning, while also reflecting demographic patterns to ensure the sustainability of the education
network. Meanwhile, the costs of restoring education service delivery are estimated at US$4.1 billion. A
large share of needs is dedicated to the construction of bomb shelters and interim measures to provide
access to in-person education (such as school transportation and digital learning centers). In addition,
flexible catch-up programs and psychosocial support are necessary to mitigate learning losses and toensure that students have the tools to recover from missed instruction and trauma. Finally, authorities
must prioritize the provision of high-quality education and the resumption of prewar reforms at all
education levels, from preschool to university, to build back better in the education sector and respond

184 Ukrainian Center for Educational Quality Assessment, “National Report on the PISA 2022 Results.” Link.
185 Ibid.

88

to the needs of the postwar economy. It is important to note that these estimates assume that thesituation does not deteriorate further.
Different levels of government and various partners are supporting students and teachers in the mostaffected areas, but the needs far exceed what is being supported. The highest needs are recorded in
Donetska, Kharkivska, and Khersonska oblasts, where the rate of destruction has been high, and where
many children have been studying online since 2020. Accordingly, partners are supporting students andteachers from these areas and providing them with educational materials, mental health support, andopportunities for catch-up learning. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) is guiding
the overall recovery of the education sector and providing financial support to local governments formeeting essential needs, such as the establishment of bomb shelters and the purchase of school buses.
Finally, local authorities are key drivers of the recovery process. However, the needs of the education andscience systems exceed by far what is currently being supported.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The total recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$1.2 billion(Table 10). These priorities reflect the continued importance of providing access to in-person education
to mitigate learning losses and improve the quality of instruction. Four priorities have been identified for2024, to be implemented jointly by the MoES, local governments, and partners:•

Reconstructing damaged education assets, in line with demographic projections•

Providing access to education, with the construction and rehabilitation of bomb shelters, theorganization of school transportation, and the provision of online learning•

Ensuring the provision of high-quality education and the continuation of the reforms acrosseducation levels, including investments for the rollout of the New Ukrainian School•

Tackling the accumulation of learning losses and trauma, especially for vulnerable children,
through the organization of catch-up classes and mental health support services

Combining both humanitarian activities and reconstruction efforts in 2024 is essential to the resilienceof the Ukrainian education system. Education has a critical role to play in the wider reconstruction efforts,from building social cohesion to facilitating economic recovery and putting Ukraine onto an accelerated
development path. Thus, even when integrated into a humanitarian response, education policy shouldfrom the onset not only address immediate needs but also adopt a developmental perspective toeffectively reverse the long-term impact of the war. By supporting education, Ukraine invests in the wellbeing and development of its future generations, equipping them with the knowledge, skills, andnurturing environments they need to rebuild from the war. Therefore, the 2024 investment priorities not
only aim to mitigate the immediate impact of the war but also contribute to the long-term resilience andprosperity of the country.
A total of US$280.3 million has been committed in the 2024 state budget to address these priorities.
Municipalities have also dedicated important resources to address these challenges, reflecting thedecentralized nature of the education system and the continued relevance of investing in students,
teachers, and researchers. Moreover, continued partnerships with international organizations, donor
countries, and civil society groups are essential for mobilizing resources, sharing expertise, and89

implementing effective interventions. However, further support is urgently needed to ensure the return
to in-person classes and limit the long-term impact of the war on education and science.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
This assessment was conducted with available data from the MoES, the Kyiv School of Economics, andpartners, but further analysis is needed. By relying on a variety of data sources, this assessment offers acomprehensive view of the state of the education and science sectors after close to two years of war.
Future assessments could include the following:
•

•

•

•

•

Assessment of the impact of the war on early childhood development and caregivers’ labormarket integration, with recommendations to build back better the current preschool system andprovide alternative forms of early childhood education and care
Analysis of the network of education infrastructure to collect data on reconstruction initiatives
and identify the needs for priority reconstruction and optimization, considering access to
education and demographic trends
Analysis of the labor market needs at the oblast level, in cooperation with social partners, tomodernize the curriculum of selected vocational and higher education specialties and identify
avenues for adult education and recognition of qualifications
Comprehensive assessment of the science system during the war, including losses in research
capacity, and potential for postwar recovery and smart specialization to rebuild a more resilientinnovation ecosystem
Assessment of the long-term impacts of displacement outside of Ukraine on human capital,
demography, and growth, and identification of strategies to promote brain circulation.
Table 8. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)

OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
KyivskaLuhanska
Lvivska
Mykolaivska
OdeskaPoltavska
Rivnenska
SumskaTernopilska

Damage

Loss
9.6
175.1
0
417.3
1,243.5
0
992.6
501.8
117.5
22.9
202.8
280.2
343.3
24.2
361.6
136.3
27.2
2.3
212.8
3.4

Needs
178.1
153.0
162.9
493.6
355.0
234.7
435.6
194.2
208.8
148.2
763.0
405.6
107.4
413.2
200.3
448.0
201.5
241.3
160.2
165.9

87.5
455.6
69.0
1,101.9
2,455.5
55.4
2,224.6
1,109.4
274.6
124.4
524.1
592.2
790.0
193.3
881.1
407.3
163.0
85.3
577.8
62.7

90

Vinnytska
8.5
236.7
204.8
Volynska
0
211.4
70.6
Zakarpatska
0
242.8
55.4
Zaporizka
306.9
262.9
834.2
Zhytomyrska
167.9
206.5
407.1
Nationwide (no specific region)
0
37.0
116.9
Total
5,557.8
6,867.8
13,923.9
Source: Assessment team. Note: Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; total estimated needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 9. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Reconstruction needs

Service delivery
restoration needs

Types of activities/investments
Preschool education
School education
Extracurricular education
Vocational education and training
Professional pre-higher education
Higher education
Specialized education
Special education
Adult education
Research infrastructure
Total reconstruction
Ensuring safe access to education for all
Tackling learning losses and trauma
Providing high-quality education at all levels
Total service delivery restoration
Total

Total needs (2024–2033)
1,441.4
4,597.0
456.5
1,146.8
448.2
641.5
48.2
70.1
10.8
910.0
9,770.5
2,377.8
579.9
1,195.7
4,153.4
13,923.9

Source: Assessment team.

Table 10. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Reconstructing damaged education assets
Providing access to education
Ensuring high-quality education across education levels
Tackling learning losses and trauma
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministry.

Estimated cost
112.0
722.0
309.5
49.5
1,192.991

HealthContext
Since February 2022, the health sector in Ukraine has experienced war-related disruption and damage
to infrastructure and service delivery. The number of damaged or destroyed health care facilities, andpharmacies, has increased by 27.0 percent and 32.0 percent, respectively, compared to the RDNA2 (dated
February 2023),186 while losses in the health sector have increased by approximately 8.3 percent. The
collapse of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023 had very substantial impacts on the health sector, disrupting
delivery of essential health care and public health services.187 Compared to RDNA2, the estimatedrecovery and reconstruction needs have decreased by 13.5 percent for the next 10 years, however,immediate reconstruction and service delivery restoration needs for the year remain high. Over the lastyear, GoU has continued its efforts to sustain the most essential and critical health services, which aredesperately needed by the population. There has been a significant shift in the demand for health services
in order to addressing the mental and physical traumas of the war. GoU has remained committed to theongoing health sector reform (begun in 2017), with the aim of improving health outcomes, systemefficiency, and the financial protection of the population. The reforms established the National HealthService of Ukraine (NHSU) as strategic purchaser of services from the public and private sectors; they havealso sought to define health entitlements in the Program of Medical Guarantees (PMG), consolidate
financing sources, digitalize medical records, and introduce output-based financing. Given the currently
limited capacity of the country, however, there is a pressing need to be addressed with external assistanceto close capacity gaps. The reforms provide a foundation for enhanced access to high-quality care and toservice delivery that is more transparent and accountable. But without additional recovery efforts,
interventions, and prioritized investments, applying systems thinking in both the human andinfrastructural capacity, the invasion will continue to have serious negative consequences for the healthand well-being of the country.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The war has caused approximately US$1.4 billion in damage to the health sector in Ukraine (Table 11).
According to the data provided by the Ministry of Health, there were 9,925 public facilities in the healthsector prewar. Of those, 1,242 (12.5 percent of all facilities) had been partially or fully damaged as of thecurrent assessment. Compared to RDNA2, the number of damaged facilities increased by 27.0 percent.
The largest share of damage in terms of number of affected assets is recorded in primary health care (PHC)
centers (51.9 percent) and hospitals (26.2 percent), while the largest share of damage in terms of cost isobserved in Donetska (33.9 percent), Kharkivska (18.2 percent), and Luhanska (15.6 percent) oblasts,
where the level of war intensity is severe. Additionally, there were also 787 pharmacies damaged or
destroyed. Recent data were not available for ambulances, so the current analysis assumes the samedamage as in the RDNA2.
The losses in this sector are estimated to be US$17.8 billion. This figure includes the removal of debris,
demolition of the destroyed facilities, losses from the financing of facilities, and additional losses to the
186 World Bank, “Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment: February 2022–February 2023,” Link.
187 For the impact of the dam collapse on the health system, see Government of Ukraine and United Nations, “Post-disaster Needs

Assessment: 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine,” 2023, Link.

92

population’s health due to forgone care and increased public health threats (Table 1). Assumptions forthe removal of debris and demolition of buildings remain the same as in RDNA1 and RDNA2.188 The RDNA3
includes losses associated with the needed strengthening of the core essential public health functions toaddress country preparedness and response capacities to manage public health emergencies. As in theprevious RDNAs, the losses in population health were estimated using disability-adjusted life years(DALYs) attributable to select conditions relevant to the ongoing war, such as increased communicablediseases, neonatal and maternal mortality, and mental health issues.189 The RDNA3 estimated a loss of
US$14.3 billion in DALYs for the 22 months since February 2022 and additional 18 months following. Thisis an increase of 8.3 percent compared to RDNA2, reflecting the increasing disability and loss of life dueto the war.
The human impact of the war on the population’s health and well-being is accounted for in thisassessment. The war has impacted the provision of and access to healthcare because of added pressure
on facilities and staff, and limited economic resources driven by inflation, further compounded with lossesof livelihoods.190 Before February 2022, the state of the populations’ mental health was already a concern
in Ukraine. The lasting war, internal displacement, and uncertainty about for the future all add barriers toaccessing already limited mental health care for both adults and children.191 In addition, Ministry of Health(MoH) data suggest that there has been a decline in access to high-quality sexual and reproductive healthservices for girls and women since the war started.192 There is a need for a comprehensive strategy toprovide the health-related support and services that are needed by the population.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated to be US$14.2 billion over 10 years (Table
11 and Table 12). The estimates of needs for reconstruction of health facilities are based on improved
designs and service delivery models (under the build back better framework) and were adjusted to reflect
the MoH’s updated estimates of destroyed and damaged health facilities. An estimated US$8.2 billion isrequired for reconstruction and refurbishment of damaged health facilities to address increased healthneeds resulting from the war. A general profile hospital may be reconstructed as a more efficient facility
able to serve up to 300,000 individuals; or in specific situations it may be redesigned as a specialized
hospital with the capacity to serve up to 750,000 individuals. Similarly, the rebuilding of PHC centers withenhanced functionality, also known as PHC+, involves transforming them into comprehensive PHC
centers.193 These upgraded centers offer not only multidisciplinary care but also extended diagnostic

188 For destroyed assets, 14.1 percent of the full cost is added for demolition, and 1.875 percent of the cost is added for theremoval of debris. For partially damaged assets, 1.25 percent of the cost is added for debris removal, with the understanding that
there will be no cost associated with demolition.
189 DALYs assess overall disease burden, expressed as the number of years lost due to mortality and morbidity. One DALY
represents the loss of the equivalent of one year of full health.
190 UN Human Impact Assessment. June 2023. Link.
191 Violetta Seleznova et al., “The Battle for Mental Well-Being in Ukraine: Mental Health Crisis and Economic Aspects of Mental
Health Services in Wartime,” International Journal of Mental Health Systems 17, article 28 (2023), Link. See also Elvevåg, Brita,and Lynn E. DeLisi. “The Mental Health Consequences on Children of the War in Ukraine: A Commentary.” Psychiatry Research
317 (November 1, 2022): 114798. Link.
192 Internal analysis by United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) of the 2022 sexual and reproductive health statistics from theMoH.
193 World Bank, “Reshaping Ukraine’s Health Service Delivery,” 2023, Link.

93

capabilities and emergency services. For the restoration of service delivery, an estimated US$6 billion isneeded. This includes adaptation of PHC, which is critical for addressing changes in health care needs, themovement of populations, and the disruption of health services caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The
consequences of damage, internal displacement, and continued insecurity also mean that essential
preventive care services may be foregone. World Bank–financed projects are providing resources tosupport recovery and reconstruction and to improve the population’s utilization of care.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The urgent and implementable needs for 2024 are estimated to be US$872.6 million (Table 13). The
immediate priorities include strengthening of PHC as the foundation for people-centered services, alongwith smaller-scale repairs to restore health facilities’ functionality. These investments aim to expedite therenovation of damaged facilities, reconstruct outdated facilities to better support rehabilitation andmental health services, and upgrade infrastructure of critical importance to the overall health system. The
allocated funds also support preparatory work and planning investments for major reconstruction andconstruction projects; increased financing for mental health services, particularly for veterans andsurvivors of gender-based violence; and expansion of rehabilitation services, assistive technologies, andinitiatives addressing missed screenings for noncommunicable diseases. Priority needs also include themonitoring and follow-up of individuals with chronic conditions, along with scale-up of both child andadult vaccinations. Given the public health risks faced during this period and the needs for application of
the International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005) requirements and EU health security frameworks,
investments were considered to emphasize multi-hazard surveillance, preparedness, and response
mechanisms.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
The availability of reliable data continues to be limited. The data underlying this analysis come from theDamage Registry maintained by the Ministry of Health, which is the most comprehensive data source
available. The quality of the data contained in the Damage Registry has improved over time. In RDNA3,
the methodological approach has been calibrated for data analysis and allows more precise figures on the
total damage costs. From this perspective, RDNA 2 appears to have overestimated the total damaged area
and the total damage cost. In any future assessment, data may need to be further triangulated at thefacility level by other sources, such as the national e-Health system and Health Resources and Services
Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS).194 The recovery planning further needs estimates for the publichealth services to address the International Health Regulation Joint External Evaluation recommendations(2021), considering implications of the war. A detailed costed National Action Plan for Health Security
needs to be elaborated to facilitate the process in the future.
Table 11. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska

Damage

Loss
1.9
109.6
15.1

Needs
503.0
481.6
333.5
1,161.0

386.6
355.2
296.3
1,034.8

194 World Health Organization, “Health Resources and Services Availability Monitoring System (HeRAMS),” Link.

94

Donetska
484.9
1,919.4
1,511.3
Ivano-Frankivska
506.2
449.6
Kharkivska
260.9
1,109.0
950.9
Khersonska
88.3
385.0
362.3
Khmelnytska
1.2
460.2
409.0
Kirovohradska
383.5
300.4
Kyiv (City)
34.2
1,811.2
993.7
Kyivska
34.6
859.3
609.3
Luhanska
222.1
994.7
773.3
Lvivska
928.0
824.4
Mykolaivska
54.5
414.9
381.1
Odeska3.5
1,039.7
783.5
Poltavska
0.3
580.1
449.7
Rivnenska
1.5
427.8
380.3
Sumska
19.3
523.0
350.8
Ternopilska
382.6
339.9
Vinnytska
4.5
565.6
503.5
Volynska
382.6
339.8
Zakarpatska
466.1
414.1
Zaporizka
57.4
708.3
563.8
Zhytomyrska
7.3
442.2
394.5
Nationwide (no specific region)
30.3
69.1
10.1
Total
1,431.3
17,837.3
14,168.1
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 12. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

ReconstructionneedsService delivery
restoration
needs

Component
Demolition cost and debris removal
Construction of new secondary care facilities
Construction of new secondary care facilities—centers of
excellence
Reconstruction of damaged secondary facilities
Refurbishment and equipping of ambulance stations
Construction of new primary care facilities
Reconstruction of damaged primary care facilities
Construction of new rehabilitation centers
Reconstruction of rehabilitation centers
Mental health centers
Rebuilding of dental clinics
Reconstruction of dental clinics
Rebuilding of pharmacies
Reconstruction of pharmacies
Replacement of destroyed and damaged ambulances
Rebuilding and reconstruction of other institutions
Additional primary health care services and medicines
Health emergency preparedness and response
Additional mental health services
Additional rehabilitation services

Total needs (2024–2033)
163.5
3,714.9
1,848.3
174.6
7.4
158.7
17.2
495.0
848.1
642.3
2.2
2.6
13.9
0.4
46.8
45.9
3,968.8
512.0
553.2
522.4

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Education services
Digitalization and telemedicine
Emergency care equipment
Total
Source: Assessment team.

109.9
200.0
120.0
14,168.1

Table 13. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Investments to build new secondary care facilities
Investments to build new centers of excellence secondary care facilities
Investments to reconstruct damaged secondary facilities
Investments to refurbish and equip ambulance stations
Investments to build new primary care facilities
Investments to reconstruct damaged primary care
Investments rehabilitation centers new
Investments rehabilitation centers reconstruction
Investments mental health centers
Additional primary health care services and medicines
Health emergency preparedness and response
Additional mental health needs
Education needs
Digitalization and telemedicine
Investments in emergency care equipment
Other
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
376.0
43.3
133.0
2.0
73.3
4.2
13.1
48.2
2.9
6.0
36.9
24.3
0.7
0.8
107.0
1.0
872.6

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Social Protection and Livelihoods
Context
As Ukraine is responding to the conditions since the invasion, the needs related to social protection andaddressing impacts on livelihoods mount. The estimated number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is
3.7 million (a decrease from 5.4 million at the time of RDNA2), while the number of returnees is 4.6 million
as of September 2023.195 Nevertheless, millions of people are pushed into poverty and the labor market
situation remains highly uncertain. While the estimation of the number of jobs lost largely remains thesame as in the RDNA2, compared to pre-war levels, employment has fallen by 15.5 percent (or 2.4 millionjobs) and output per person has decreased by 13 percent).196 Employment-related needs should also
include people engaged in defense (which may exceed 1 million) and the needs for future recovery growevery month.
In 2023, expenditures on social assistance amounted to over UAH 179 billion (US$4.9 billion).197 This
includes spending on the Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI), Housing Utility Subsidy (HUS), child andfamily benefits, disability and care benefits, and benefits to IDPs. A social assistance program for IDPs tocover living expenses introduced in March 2022 provides monthly support to around 2.5 million
beneficiaries (as of January 2024). Total spending on social assistance for IDPs in 2023 amounted to UAH
73.3 billion (US$2 billion). Going forward, these expenditures are expected to decrease due to a review of
the IDP support criteria and the introduction of means testing. HUS spending reached UAH 36 billion (US$1billion) to finance energy subsidies for 3.6 million beneficiaries, while expenditures under the GMI
program reached UAH 11.5 billion (US$0.31 billion) and covered 236,000 beneficiaries. A wage subsidy
program aimed at encouraging employers to hire IDPs was introduced in March 2022. In 2022, 16,000
IDPs were hired under this program and employers received over UAH 200 million (US$5.5 million). With
the support of this program, the number of employed IDPs amounted to 14,400 in 2023; the spending on
the program was UAH 181 million (US$5 million).198 Significant additional expenditures will be needed tofacilitate the creation of jobs for IDPs who remain unemployed, as well as for people currently engaged indefense.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The total cost of damage to the sector is estimated to be US$0.2 billion (Table 14). Damage in the social
protection area mostly consists of destroyed or damaged infrastructure, such as residential care units,
sanatoriums, or social service delivery centers. As of December 2023, damage to facilities providing social
services increased further with 161 social protection infrastructure assets damaged or destroyed. The
total amount of damage is about US$220 million.199 The greatest damage is sustained by Odeska (US$42.3
million) and Donetska (US$41.4 million) oblasts and the city of Kyiv (US$35.8 million).

195 IOM, “Ukraine—Internal Displacement Report—General Population Survey Round 14 (September–October 2023),” November

6, 2023, Link.
196 International Labour Organization (ILO), “Multiple Crises Threaten the Global Labour Market Recovery,” ILO Monitor on theWorld of Work, 10th ed., October 31, 2022, Link.
197 Government Portal, “Ministry of Finance: In 2023, Social Benefits Worth UAH 450.1 Billion Were Fully Funded,” January 15,2024, Link.
198 Government Portal, “In 2023, the State Compensated Entrepreneurs with UAH 181 Million for the Employment of More than
14,000 IDPs,” January 8, 2024, Link.
199 For RDNA2, these numbers were 158 infrastructure assets and US$241 million of damage.

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The losses in the sector are estimated to be US$60.8 billion (Table 14). These very large losses stemfrom the nationwide loss of jobs and household income from wages, as well as from higher poverty,
related increased expenditures under existing means-tested social protection programs (which did notincorporate sufficient adjustment to inflation due to rising poverty and reduced fiscal space), andadditional needs for programs such as survivor’s benefits, or payments and services to people withdisabilities.
The largest share of losses comes from the permanent loss of jobs and workers. National polls reportthat 44 percent of individuals who were employed before the war are working at their regular
workplaces, 14 percent are working partially or remotely, and 15 percent have found new jobs. While
there has been a reduction in the overall unemployment rate, over a quarter of respondents are still
unemployed.200 Losses stemming from social protection programs are estimated at US$9.5 billion. The
calculation of losses used the average monthly salary in Ukraine before the war (as of January 2022)—
US$534—and assessed the losses for 22 months of the ongoing invasion and 18 months going forward.
Human impact. The human impact has been substantial. Loss of private sector jobs and income, highinflation, and asset loss brought on by the war have reversed 15 years of poverty reduction, especiallyfor households with children, which is estimated to grow from 43.2 percent in 2021 to 65.6 percent in
2023.201 According to initial estimates from a monthly phone survey conducted by the World Bank sinceApril 2023, respectively 9 percent and 27 percent of households reported having ran out of food and eat
fewer kinds of foods because lacking money at some point over a 30-day period in November 2023. Inthat period, 14 percent of respondents reported they had to borrow to cover basic needs while another12 percent could not pay utilities.202 The number of persons with disabilities is expected to increase, as
the injuries sustained by members of the military as well as civilians can lead to devastating and longlasting physical and psychological complications and disability. Between 2015 and 2021, the number of
persons with certified disabilities in Ukraine gradually increased from 2.57 million to 2.73 million people(from 6.2 to 6.7 percent of the prewar population), including around 1 million women. Over a span of 18
months during the war, the number of persons with disabilities increased to 7.4 percent of the population(by 300,000 persons).203 Actual numbers are likely to be close to the international disability prevalence
rate of 16 percent.204 Around 58 percent persons with disabilities report the need for financial assistance,and 20 percent report the need for employment services.205
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better

200 Calculation of losses uses average income in the economy before the invasion for those who remain unemployed; for thoseworking part-time, assumed income is 50 percent of prewar income. See Rating Sociological Group, “The Twenty-Fourth
Nationwide Survey ‘Ukraine in Times of War’ Public Sentiment and Economic Situation of the Population (September 5–7, 2023),”
September 28, 2023, Link.
201 UNICEF. 2023. Child Poverty: Impact of the War on the Situation of Households with Children. Link
202 World Bank, Listening to Ukraine phone surveys. Forthcoming.
203 Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories, “There Are Three Million Individuals with Disabilities in Ukraine,”
September 25, 2023, Link.
204 World Health Organization, “Roundtable Dialogue on Humanitarian Support for Persons with Disabilities in Ukraine,” May 23,
2023, Link.
205 Rating Sociological Group, “How Does Ukrainian Society Truly Perceive People with Disabilities?” November 15, 2023, Link.

98

The estimated needs in this sector amount to US$44.5 billion over 10 years (Table 15). It is important
to note the following:
Restoration of jobs remains the key priority for recovery. Recovery efforts and restoration of thecountry’s economic potential will require restoring both the output level per person (which is expected
to happen with broad recovery across sectors) and the workforce potential. The latter poses significant
challenges and drives large needs. According to a Centre for Economic Strategy, an increasing number of
Ukrainian refugees are unlikely to return to Ukraine due to the ongoing invasion of Ukraine and theiradaptation to life abroad.206 Estimates of this group range from 1.3 million to 3.3 million people.207 This
contrasts with the increase in employment needed for Ukraine to return to its pre-invasion GDP
trajectory. According to the International Labour Organization (ILO), even if labor productivity returns to
pre-war levels, Ukraine would require employment to grow by 37 percent compared to 2021 numbers
to achieve this goal. This means not only that the return of the refugee population is critical, but also that
additional measures—impacting needs - would be needed to increase the participation of in the labor
force (especially for women), both in terms of activation measures and through improvements in working
conditions to render return more attractive.
The RDNA3 estimates that restoring the workforce potential would require measures aimed atincreasing the labor force participation rates to add about 2.3 million workers. This is a midpoint valueof the low and high estimates of the number of refugees who will remain abroad. According to ILO’s
calculations, adding to the remaining workforce by 2.3 million workers would require increasing
employment-to-population ratio from 47.4 percent to 56.1 percent (8.7 pp change), and specificallyincrease in female employment-to-population ratio from 39.1 percent to 47.5 percent (8.3 pp change).
This would require additional efforts and costs (through mobility grants, skilling programs, settling-in
grants, or wage subsidies, and through return migration and immigration schemes to ensure access toneeded skills, as well as ensuring availability of care services to support increased participation of womenin the labor force). In addition, special programs are needed to bridge gaps created by geographicalmismatches and changes in labor market needs due to structural adjustments.
The focus should be on the rehabilitation of war-affected groups, such as children (i.e., displacedchildren, orphans), IDPs, and persons with disabilities. This approach is critical for the reintegration of
war veterans into society and could efficiently respond to the multidimensional challenges faced bysurvivors. It could include the restructuring and modernization of relevant benefits, as well as services toreintegrate veterans into civil life (e.g., psychological support, physical rehabilitation to improvefunctionality, social rehabilitation to ensure inclusion in the community). To support IDPs’ and returnees’
integration into the local labor market, there must be support for efforts to relocate businesses, build
capacity of private and public employment services, including on the assessment of labor market
imbalances, and provide skills training for IDPs (particularly on entrepreneurship). The budget for social
protection of persons with disabilities, including rehabilitation and assistive technologies, increased from
US$51 million in 2022 to US$94 million in 2023. The government expedited the adoption of the World
206 Centre for Economic Strategy, “Ukrainian Refugees: How Many Are There, Their Intentions & Return Prospects,” August 29,

2023, Link.
207 Centre for Economic Strategy. 2023. Link.

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Health Organization’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability, and Health (ICF). In April
2022, the Ministry of Economy approved the ICF as a national classification (NC 030:2022) for crosssectoral use in disability-related programming, policy making, and management information systems.
This should allow the government to better assess the individual needs of beneficiaries and plan the
rehabilitation interventions and expenditures needed to restore their ability to function and work.
Further efforts are needed to ensure that vulnerable groups can fully realize their rights. These should
include developing a long-term strategy for a complex deinstitutionalization reform involving all types ofresidential care institutions (for adults and children with disabilities and mental disorders, the elderly,
palliative patients, etc.), reviewing and updating the National Strategy for Reforming the Institutional
Care for Children and associated Action Plan to address new challenges and emerging needs, andenhancing the development of the family-based and home-based types of care as an alternative toresidential care.
In this recovery phase, the utilization of new technologies, including cloud-based and online solutions,should be expanded to strengthen the adaptability of the overall system. Ukraine has alreadyappreciably invested in digital solutions such as the Diia platform, the Pension Fund digital platform, andthe Unified Information System of the Social Sphere, which allowed digitization of social benefits andservices. However, new solutions—such as skill-based job matching at scale—are needed. The Diia, withalmost 20 million users as of November 2023,208 allows online enrollment through a web-based portal insix types of social assistance benefits, namely, HUS, birth and adoption grants, benefits for children withlong-term adverse health conditions, benefits to persons with disabilities since childhood, and children
with disabilities, and benefits for single parents. Enrollment in assistance for IDPs is available through theDiia mobile application. In 2024, the government will launch online enrollment in 10 additional social
assistance programs to enhance access to benefits during the war. The Professional Education Online
Platform, launched in 2022, has been a welcome addition to online training in technical and vocational
skills. The platform, which includes virtual reality modules to partially bridge the practical learning gap
arising from war-related disruptions in schools and firms, already covers 29 occupations and will be
expanded by an additional 60.209
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The total recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$3.9 billion(Table 7). In the medium term, there is a need to finance social protection expenditures that will protect
poor and vulnerable households and individuals from additional long-term harm. For example, suchprograms help prevent mentioned groups from resorting to adverse coping strategies. These
expenditures include support through a GMI-type program that provides low-income families with theincome to cover basic needs, and through housing and utility subsidies that aim to prevent energy
poverty, especially during the heating season. Costs associated with these and other social protection
programs (such as benefits to IDPs and restoration of social services) are expected to reach over US$2.9
billion. However, this cost may grow based on the territory under government control, resumption of
208 Anastasia Nesenyuk, “The Diia App Is Already Used by Almost 20 Million Ukrainians. What New Services is the Ministry of

Digital Transformation Working On?” Forbes, November 23, 2023, Link.
209 ILO, “‘Professional Education Online’—A New and Innovative Digital Platform to Sustain TVET Education in Ukraine,” February
21, 2023, Link.

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welfare office operations, return of refugees from abroad, and/or lift of the freeze on tariffs. Adjusting
tariffs alone could increase the needs for 2024 by about US$750 million.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
This assessment does not incorporate the expected results of likely changes to social protection
policies in the future aimed at higher efficiency of public funds use. The Ministry of Social Policy
prepared a concept note that identified key problems in social protection and suggested relevant reform
priorities (listed below), noting that addressing the problems would impact the social protection needsin the future:• Social insurance (pensions). Unify and simplify the different pension guarantees, revise criteria
for disability, and prepare for the introduction of a funded pension scheme to respond to declining
pension benefit adequacy.
•Social assistance. Transform the subsistence minimum into an anti-poverty tool (de-linking it fromfees, fines, and penalties, as well as salaries in the budget sector); optimize the number of andalgorithms for social assistance benefits; separate social assistance payments from pensions; andstrengthen labor incentives in social assistance programs to respond to insufficient targeting,weak behavioral incentives, and less adequate support. A better-designed GMI-type program
could integrate several less effective benefits into the current Social Assistance to Low-Income
Families. However, the government should continue to invest in the modernization of the benefits
administration to address exclusion errors and non-take-up.

•

Social services. Expand the use of complentary social services to help beneficiaries overcome
difficult life circumstances; expand family-based and community-based modes of providing social
services to respond to the underdevelopment of the social services system in Ukraine. Despite
the progress Ukraine has made on its social service reform agenda, more efforts are still needed
to improve the coverage of the poor and vulnerable population with social services. The capacities
and budgets of the communities (which are, according to national legislation, responsible forsocial service financing and delivery) are stretched to the limit. To address these constraints, thegovernment will temporarily co-finance some types of services that communities cannot affordfrom the state budget to ensure sufficient quantity and/or quality. As the first step, thegovernment launched a pilot on the centralized financing of the “social services for resilience”
with a focus on psycho-social services. Based on the results of the pilot, financing social services
from the state budget is expected to scale up to include other types of services and linkages tojob opportunities.

For social protection programs that depend on changes in incomes and the cost of basic needs, there
is high uncertainty beyond the immediate/short term. Expenditures for means-tested programs maychange significantly depending on the change in household incomes and their relation to the cost of basic
needs, expressed by the legislatively set income threshold.
Table 14. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska

Damage

Loss
0.0
2.1

Needs
0.0
0.3

0.0
3.1

101

Chernivetska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Dnipropetrovska
10.7
1.5
15.9
Donetska
41.4
4.8
60.7
Ivano-Frankivska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Kharkivska
6.6
0.5
9.4
Khersonska
6.8
1.0
10.1
Khmelnytska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Kirovohradska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Kyiv (City)
35.8
0.8
49.1
Kyivska
8.3
0.1
11.3
Luhanska
19.9
0.5
27.3
Lvivska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Mykolaivska
10.3
1.0
14.9
Odeska
42.3
0.5
57.6
Poltavska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Rivnenska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Sumska6.8
0.3
9.5
Ternopilska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Vinnytska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Volynska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Zakarpatska
0.1
0.0
0.1
Zaporizka
28.6
4.0
42.6
Zhytomyrska
0.2
0.0
0.3
Nationwide (no specific region)
60,571.2
44,230.4
Total
220.1
60,766.3
45,542.6
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months until June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 15. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category
Reconstruction
needs

Types of activities/investments
Demolition and debris removal
Repair and reconstruction cost
Employment-related measures
ServiceMeans-tested benefits
delivery
Benefits to IDPs
restoration
Restoration of social services
needs
Military pensions and other long-term benefits related to the war
Total
Source: Assessment team.

Total needs (2024–2033)
15.1
297.1
14,738.4
21,371.9
2,760.1
1,149.2
4,210.8
44,542.6

Table 16. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Repair and reconstruction cost
Restoration of social services
Subtotal- reconstruction and recovery
Employment-related measures
Means-tested benefits
Benefits to IDPs

Estimated cost
91.8
277.4
369.2
250.0
1,352.6
1,576.5

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Military pensions and other long-term benefits related to the war
Subtotal- social transfers and employment support
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

382.8
3,561.9
3,931.1

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Culture and Tourism
Context
The war continues to have a significantly negative impact on the diversity and richness of culture andcultural heritage in Ukraine. It has damaged historic cities, cultural sites, built heritage, cultural
institutions, and cultural collections; it has caused a loss of livelihood for cultural bearers, cultural creatorsand others employed in the creative sector; it has further impeded the practice and transmission of living
heritage and has reduced access to culture and interfered with the enjoyment of cultural rights, especiallyamong more vulnerable communities. Risk management remains critical as historic cities, built heritage,
and monuments remain under daily threat of bombing. Physical damage to museums and their looting
continues highlighting the urgent need for thorough inventory and improved collection management.
Increased attacks on cultural heritage have been documented since summer 2023, including—for the
first time since February 2022—sites protected under the World Heritage Convention. On July 6, 2023,
a missile hit the historic residential complex for teachers of the L'viv Polytechnic, located in the bufferzone of the World Heritage property of L'viv – the Ensemble of the Historic Centre. Since July 2023, attacks
on Odesa have destroyed many cultural and religious establishments and endangered the city's cultural
heritage, including those protected under the World Heritage Convention. Repeated strikes have madehistoric buildings more vulnerable to future damage caused by blast shock and vibration, even if they were
not directly hit. The destruction of the Kakhovka Dam in southern Ukraine exposed cultural heritage tothe dual threat of flooding and artillery shelling.210 Khersonska is the most affected oblast, accounting forover 72 percent of the estimated damage. Still, the most critical losses include revenue losses fromtourism in Odeska oblast. It is still necessary to assess the state of the archaeological sites exposed by thedraining of the Kakhovka reservoir.
Cultural heritage close to or within areas of active hostilities remains under ongoing threat. Conditionsof several cultural sites of national importance damaged in 2022 have worsened, making these sites
particularly vulnerable to the direct or indirect effects of future attacks. For example, the Skovoroda
Museum in the Kharkivska region has entered its second winter without protective measures. Some assets
have also been repeatedly shelled, in some cases after repairs and urgent interventions werecompleted.211 In addition to the Historic City of Odesa (inscribed in January 2023), in light of these threats,
in September 2023 the World Heritage Committee added two Ukrainian sites to the List of World Heritage
in Danger : (i) Kyiv: Saint Sophia Cathedral and Related Monastic Buildings, Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra; and (ii)
L'viv – the Ensemble of the Historic Centre. The committee considered that protection of the Outstanding
Universal Value of these properties could not be guaranteed due to the war. Twenty-five sites across
Ukraine are now also registered under the enhanced protection regime under the Second Protocol of the
UNESCO 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

210 Total damage to identified cultural assets in the oblasts interested by the Kakhovka dam destruction was estimated at

US$156.8 million, the majority of which (US$150.8 million) concerns sites and buildings with recognized cultural/social value. See
GoU and UN, “Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine” 2023, Link.
211 For instance, the Kherson Regional Universal Scientific Library was damaged in August 2022 and again in November 2023.
Similarly, the Church of the Intercession in Klishchiivka (Donetska region) has been damaged in March and September 2023. The
Odesa Fine Arts Museum was damaged by a missile attack on the Port of Odesa in July 2022; it was repaired with support from
UNESCO's Heritage Emergency Fund and then further damaged in November 2023 by a missile that hit in its proximity.

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The destruction and forced massive displacement of populations have also severely affected the abilityof bearers and communities to practice and transmit their intangible cultural heritage (ICH). While living
heritage provides a foundation for the identity and well-being of all communities, it also provides
livelihoods for many of its bearers and practitioners and their families. The destruction from the war has
affected the workshops of intangible cultural heritage bearers and their access to raw materials and theplaces and spaces needed to practice their intangible cultural heritage, such as traditional markets, which
are today non-existent or radically diminished.
Several key recovery efforts have been undertaken since February 2022. These include support fordamage assessment and monitoring, both satellite imagery–based and on-site verification; training andcapacity building in emergency documentation; risk prevention and management; in situ preventive
works; winterization of damaged cultural and historic assets; stabilizations and urgent inventories;
provision of energy and relevant supplies for collections; recovery and reconstruction of cultural heritageof Ukraine; support for the livelihoods of artists, especially female artists in country and abroad; andsupport for development of emergency cultural projects across the country, as well as for the integrationof ICH into school-based education.
Damage and Loss Assessment
As of December 31, 2023, the total cost of damage in the sector was estimated at US$3.5 billion (Table
17). Damage concerns (i) buildings, historic cities, and sites imbued with recognized cultural/social values(US$2.41 billion); (ii) moveable cultural properties, collections, and repositories of culture (US$161
million); (iii) buildings/workshops/ateliers dedicated to cultural and creative industries (CCIs) (US$262
million); and (iv) tourism facilities (US$650 million). The most impacted oblast is Kharkivska, which
accounts for more than 25 percent of the damage, followed by Donetska at about 14 percent and Odeska
at 7 percent.
Between RDNA2 and RDNA3, 1,402 new damaged assets were detected, increasing the total number
from 3,377 to 4,779. RDNA3 also achieved more accurate data derived from verified data for CCIs, whichrefers now to a baseline of 63,116 estimated entities engaged in cultural and creative practices, identified
through focus surveys.212 RDNA3 also provides more accurate damage calculations for museum
collections, and new data have allowed damage calculation for privately owned/residential historicbuildings; at this stage, they constitute 7.1 percent of the total cost of damage.
The losses in the sector—including revenue losses from tourism, art, entertainment, and recreation,
CCIs, cultural education, debris removal, and valued asset protection—are estimated at US$19.6 billion(Table 17), representing an increase of 30 percent since RDNA2. The increase in losses since RDNA2 canbe attributed to the increased number of damaged sites, ongoing attacks, and continuous deteriorationof cultural assets and infrastructure, further compounding the sector's vulnerabilities and financial strain.
The most significant losses are in tourism (US$9.9 billion) and CCIs (US$7.3 billion). Unlike damage,revenue losses remain highly concentrated in the capital; at US$10.64 billion, these losses amount to morethan half of the total loss. Another US$2.2 billion is due to nationwide losses (not specific to a region).

212 UNESCO, “Focus Study on War Impact on CCIs,” July 2023.

105

The human impact within the culture and tourism sector has been significant. Culture is a powerful driving
force in a country's emergency response, recovery, and post-war reconstruction. It is an essential peoplecentred tool for fostering and preserving community resilience, collective memory, social cohesion, andcollective and individual well-being. Developing the conditions that allow cultural institutions andcommunities to resume activities is paramount. Professionals' technical and management skills must be
enhanced to enable them to cope with emerging urgent challenges and adequately respond. By affecting
efforts to safeguard Intangible Cultural Heritage (ICH), the war has also affected the social fabric and thedaily practices and livelihoods of living heritage practitioners, producers, community members, culturalprofessionals, and artists. Many practitioners have left the country in the early stages and found refuge in
the neighbouring countries, where they could find support to continue their practice. Most ceremonies,
festivals, performances, markets, and fairs, many of which were organized regularly and provided
livelihoods for those involved and their families, had to be put on hold. Furthermore, many craftspeople
lost their workshops, along with their tools and materials, due to the shelling. Some raw materials are nolonger available or not of sufficient quality, and only some ICH-related professions could replace the inperson markets with online sales possibilities. The National Registry of Intangible Cultural Heritage of
Ukraine was completed after the beginning of the war and contains 77 elements today, the viability ofwhich might become at risk and require urgent safeguarding measures.213 The 'Culture of Ukrainianborscht cooking' was inscribed in July 2022 on the UNESCO List of Intangible Cultural Heritage in Need ofUrgent Safeguarding.
In 2022, the GoU estimated that about 37 percent of workers employed in the creative industries had
lost their jobs and that over 20 percent of creative industry professionals had left the country. Most CCI
categories experienced an average decline of 20 percent in their employee numbers. Approximately 60
percent of cultural workers were female before February 2022, and this proportion has remained
substantial, at around 53 percent. Interviews and data analysis highlight a gender pay gap across sectors
and categories: on average, women in CCIs earn approximately 22 percent less than their malecounterparts, even when holding the same positions. Additionally, according to Resolution No. 245 of the
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, dated March 10, 2022, most expenditures for the sector were directed tothe state budget reserve fund, and expenditures for culture and art from local budgets were also reduced.
These reductions represent a departure from the trend three years before 2022, registered when local
budgets increased cultural spending by 3 percent.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
Over the next 10 years (2024–2033), the total needs for recovery and reconstruction, including service
delivery restoration, amount to US$8.9 billion (Table 18). This represents an increase of 30 percent since
RDNA2. This increase is mainly due to the escalating scale of destruction and the expanding scope ofrecovery efforts required, which now include more comprehensive reconstruction, service delivery
restoration, and long-term rehabilitation of the affected areas. The recent increase in scale, intensity, andmagnitude of attacks on cultural sites, including sites inscribed on the UNESCO World Heritage List, are

213 Government of Ukraine, “Intangible Cultural Heritage of Ukraine [Нематеріальна культурна спадщина України],”Link.

106

particularly relevant. The oblast with the largest share of needs is Kharkivska, which accounts for morethan 27 percent of total needs, followed by Donetska at about 14 percent and Odeska at 7 percent.
The needs prioritized in RDNA2 remain valid. In the first step, needs include damage assessment anddocumentation, as well as emergency and risk preparedness measures for immovable and moveable
cultural properties; restoration and reconstruction; further safeguarding of CCIs and ICH; and operationalcosts associated with the rebuilding. Satellite-imagery-based verification of direct and indirect damage tocultural property—carried out by UNESCO in cooperation with the United Nations Satellite Centre(UNOSAT)—remains crucial to produce a verified, evidence-based database as well as a tool for prioritizing
interventions at the community level.
It is highly recommended to increase the protection of cultural heritage and preventive conservation ofsites and assets at risk of further damage or destruction. Assessment and documentation of cultural
assets in need of protection remain a priority that designated authorities shall address through a more
systematic approach and management structure.
Coordination among actors and partners remains crucial. The regular updating of the Action Plan for
Safeguarding of Culture—finalized by international and national partners as a follow-up to the fourthinternational coordination meeting convened by the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraineand UNESCO and the sessions of the six thematic working groups carried out from April to May 2023—
remains an essential tool for international and national coordination. Integrating all dimensions of cultureis critical to the recovery and reconstruction plans, city master plans, and territorial plans, especially forthe 401 historic cities listed in the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy register.
Investing in the culture sector is now more essential than ever. A comprehensive recovery plan is stillneeded to rebuild the industry. This plan should include alignment with international standards, enhanced
legal protection and governance, and protocols and guidelines for protecting and recovering cultural
heritage. Revisions to state policies are necessary to support cultural heritage preservation, institutional
capacity, and regulations, mainly to protect heritage from urban development pressures. Ensuring thequality of interventions and harmonization of practices also remains essential. Infrastructure and assets
must be restored to pre-disaster levels with inclusive BBB to reduce risks and vulnerabilities to futuredisasters. All these priorities must be accompanied by a substantial inclusive capacity-building programme
for the sector to sustain the results achieved. The recovery plan will require significant funding, including
increased cultural expenditures from local budgets.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
Public investment priorities for recovery and reconstruction in 2024 are estimated at US$5.7 million(Table 19). In practical terms, this means that in 2024, line ministries will prioritize projects for activities
related to (i) emergency and urgent conservation measures; (ii) reactivation of functions damaged assets
and facilities; (iii) urgent repairs of key assets; and (iv) construction of shelters for key cultural facilities.
While the Government's immediate priorities are focused on funding physical infrastructure, the key
urgent actions that have been identified to amount to US$197 million and include (i) damage assessment,
monitoring, detailed documentation, and harmonized digitalization; emergency measures, including
debris removal (US$85.7 million); (ii) repair of assets as feasible to restore function; preservation of built
107heritage, historic cities, and cultural infrastructures to prevent/mitigate demolition of sites/buildings ofcultural significance (US$52 million) ; (iii) reinforcement of professionals’ capacities (US$32 million); (iv)strengthening of legal protection of the cultural sector and normative frameworks during and after thewar, including master plans (US$0.8 million); (v) Support for the restoration of the creative industry andsafeguarding of intangible cultural heritage (US$26.5 million).
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
Monitoring cultural properties in inaccessible areas, especially smaller-scale properties with local
significance, remains challenging. Assessing damage to underwater heritage remains difficult for Ukraine,with its 2,700 km coastline. Without initial baselines and data, identifying damage and losses for ICH is
ongoing and will require further in-depth surveys and studies. Quantitative data on human resources inthe sector is also generally unavailable. In particular, more investment is needed in gathering quality data
and defying disaggregated data, including data on people with disabilities.
Table 17. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastDamageLoss
Needs
Cherkaska
6.7
80.8
13.1
Chernihivska
136.0
340.1
367.2
Chernivetska
2.4
19.8
4.7
Dnipropetrovska
90.4
262.4
212.0
Donetska
515.1
173.0
1,304.4
Ivano-Frankivska
3.0
63.5
5.8
Kharkivska
906.1
1,247.7
2,490.7
Khersonska
249.5
107.3
571.9
Khmelnytska
33.5
37.8
90.9
Kirovohradska
5.4
188.6
14.4
Kyiv (City)
195.1
10,643.4
460.4
Kyivska
133.5
517.0
374.0
Luhanska
264.6
81.1
637.1
Lvivska
58.6
1,966.6
123.0
Mykolaivska
221.7
152.6
623.3
Odeska
267.5
918.9
666.8
Poltavska
8.8
679.1
18.7
Rivnenska
2.3
27.0
4.5
Sumska
105.8
85.6
274.6
Ternopilska
2.1
72.9
4.2
Vinnytska
24.3
7.2
63.9
Volynska
3.6
68.2
7.7
Zakarpatska
2.2
318.7
5.0
Zaporizka
219.4
1,476.4
513.1
Zhytomyrska
27.3
111.7
66.0
Nationwide (no specific region)
5.0
2.2
19.6
Total
3,490.0
19,649.6
8,936.9
Source: Assessment team. Note: Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

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Table 18. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Types of activities/investments
Total needs (2024–2033)
Damage assessment, monitoring, detailed documentation, and305.2
harmonized digitalization
Emergency measures for immovable cultural properties (shoring,
1,013.2
propping, structural reinforcements, sheltering, and protection
measures, including debris removal and demolition) and moveable
Reconstruction
properties (inventories, preparedness plans, storage management,
needs
etc.)
Repair of assets as feasible to restore function; preservation of built
675.5
heritage, historic cities, and cultural infrastructures toprevent/mitigate demolition of sites/buildings of cultural significance
Reconstruction/restoration of assets
4,880.7
Strengthening of legal protection of the cultural sector and normative
50.9
frameworks during and after the war
Service delivery
Reinforcement of professionals’ capacities
525.9
restoration
Supportfortherestorationofthecreativeindustryandsafeguarding
823.6
needs
of intangible cultural heritage
Operational costs
662.0
Total
8,936.9
Source: Assessment team.

Table 19. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Emergency measures
Reactivation of functions of damaged assets/facilities
Urgent repairs of assets
Shelter construction
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
0.9
0.5
1.5
2.8
5.7

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PRODUCTIVE SECTORS
Agriculture214
Context
Since February 2022, the war has had severe impacts on Ukraine’s agriculture sector. Before the war,
the sector played a significant role in the country's economy. It contributed 10 percent to GDP, employed
14 percent of the labor force, and accounted for 41 percent of total exports.215 But the war, which began
just before the start of the 2022 spring planting campaign, has had a very significant impact on the
agriculture sector. The total planting area in 2022 decreased by 20 percent compared to 2021, and 15
percent of agricultural capital stock was already damaged within the first three months of the war. The
grain and oilseed production in 2022 fell to 73 million tons, a decrease of 30 percent compared to theprevious year.216 The lower agricultural production, coupled with rising prices of inputs (particularly
fertilizers and diesel), significantly reduced farm incomes. The blockade of the Black Sea during the earlymonths of the war led to a sharp drop in agricultural exports, which primarily relied on Black Sea ports.
Although alternative routes helped increase grain and oilseed exports in subsequent months, volumes
were still below prewar levels. As a result, domestic farm gate prices for wheat and corn declined by 45
percent between January and June 2022, while global prices increased by 15 percent. The Black Sea Grain
Initiative, launched in July 2022, increased exports; but the logistical costs remained high, putting pressure
on farm gate output prices. Favorable weather conditions in 2023 led to the recovery of grain and oilseed
production (79 million tons), but it remained much below the 2021 level (105 million tons).217 In June
2023, the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam resulted in a threefold increase in damage to the aquaculture
and fishery industries. Following the termination of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in August 2023, export
volumes and farm gate prices fell. The low profitability of agriculture and uncertainty over export
prospects will continue to affect production decisions, trade, and farm gate prices in 2024.218
Damage and Loss Assessment
The damage and losses suffered by Ukrainian agriculture are estimated to amount to US$80.1 billion,
with losses accounting for 87 percent of the total (Table 20).
Total damage in the agriculture sector amounts to US$10.3 billion, while losses amount to US$69.8
billion; these figures include damage and losses related to destruction of the Kakhovka Dam. The
damage includes the partial or complete destruction of storage facilities, fisheries and aquaculture, andperennial crops, as well as the forced slaughter of livestock. It also encompasses the destruction and theftof machinery and equipment and the theft of inputs and outputs. Machinery and equipment damage
account for the largest share of total damage (57 percent), followed by stolen inputs and outputs (18percent) and damaged storage facilities (18 percent). As of December 2023, the damage in the sector

214 The agriculture sector includes crops, livestock, and fisheries/aquaculture. It excludes irrigation and forestry as well as thefood industry and agro-logistics, which are included in other parts of the RDNA.
215 Data from State Statistics Service of Ukraine, State Employment Center.
216 Data from United States Department of Agriculture (USDA).
217 Data from USDA.
218 Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine, “The Profitability of Grain and Oil crop Production Is Still Decreasing, While
Exports by Sea are Slowly Recovering,” December 11, 2023, Link.

110

increased by only 18 percent compared to February 2023, as most assets located in active war zones had
already been damaged during the first year of the war. The highest damage values were recorded in
Luhanska, Zaporizka, and Khersonska oblasts, collectively representing 65 percent of the total damage.
In contrast to RDNA2, which had to project damage values for livestock and perennial crops, RDNA3
based its estimates on published data. Specifically, it used State Statistics Service of Ukraine data
available as of January 1, 2023, on changes in the number of animals and area under perennial crops. The
use of actual figures to estimate damage leads to a minor decrease in damage in the livestock andperennial crop sectors and reduces the overall damage in the Kyivska, Sumska, and Chernihivska regions.
The almost threefold increase in damage in the aquaculture and fisheries sector between RDNA2 and
RDNA3 was a result of the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam.
The losses amount to US$69.8 billion. The war-induced losses include the following: loss of farm income(due to lower or forgone production); lower farm gate prices (due to export logistic disruptions); higher
farm production costs (due to higher prices of fertilizers and fuel); the cost of land recultivation aftermine-related surveying, clearance, and land release operations;219 and the halt of fishing operations. The
largest loss, accounting for 49 percent of the total losses, is attributed to the decrease in annual crop
production. The loss caused by the decrease in farm gate prices of export-oriented commodities, such as
wheat, barley, corn, and oilseeds, is the next largest, accounting for 35 percent of losses. Other significant
losses include lower livestock production (8 percent), higher input costs (6 percent), lower perennial crop
production (1 percent), and land recultivation–related losses as well as fisheries and aquaculture losses(1 percent combined). Compared to the February 2023 estimates, the losses have more than doubled.
Kharkivska, Khersonska, Vinnytska, and Zaporizka oblasts experienced the largest losses. Losses inVinnytska oblast stand out because the region plays a significant role in national agricultural production,
though it has not been directly affected by ground battles.
Several factors contribute to the increase in losses. Unlike the February 2023 loss estimates, which
considered only production in 2022 and winter 2023, the RDNA3 estimates include losses for the entire
year of 2023. Considering that the war may not end before the 2024 planting season, the estimates also
include projected crop production losses for all of 2024. The same applies to estimates of livestock
production losses, which now cover three years of decreased production, compared to the one year
covered in the February 2023 estimates. The estimated losses have also changed due to lower prices forexport-oriented commodities. The February 2023 estimates assumed that only the 2021 ending stock andthe 2022 harvest would be affected by lower prices. The RDNA3 estimates also include losses due to lower
prices for export-oriented commodities from the 2023 harvest. Furthermore, RDNA3 uses more accurate
price data that recently became available to estimate losses due to higher input costs in 2022. As input
prices remain above the prewar level, the presented estimates as of February 2024 include losses due tohigher input prices in 2023 as well.
Human impact. The invasion of Ukraine has also had a large human impact. A significant drop in the
profitability of agricultural production has reduced farmers’ incomes and the wages of millions of rural
219 Note that the losses from mines on agricultural land and the need for the survey, clearance, and release of agricultural land

are not included in the agriculture sector estimates. They are presented separately in the section on cross-cutting sectors.

111

Ukrainians. As a result of the 20 percent decrease in planting area and 10 percent decrease in livestock
herds, the direct employment in the sector is estimated to drop by 18 percent. 3.4 million people aretargeted in need of food security and livelihoods support.220 The indirect impact is much higher, as theabovementioned collapse in agricultural profitability is reducing the demand for labor and reducing wages
paid to farm workers.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total recovery and reconstruction needs in the public sector are estimated at US$56.1 billion over
10 years (Table 20, Table 21), including US$435 million in 2024 (Table 22).221 To ensure that theagricultural sector recovers, drives the overall economic recovery, serves as a decent income source forfarmers, and provides food for the Ukrainian population, several investments are especially important.
These include addressing liquidity constraints, investing in resilience to disasters and climate change,
investing in integrated food-energy systems, and strengthening the agricultural public institutions toeffectively support recovery and reconstruction as well as EU accession. The near doubling of total
recovery and reconstruction needs between RDNA2 and RDNA3—the increase is 89 percent—derives
from the increase in total damage and losses during the same period.
Needs are concentrated in the following areas:• Completing reconstruction or replacement of war-damaged assets while accommodating thebuild back better principle.
•

Supporting a longer-term recovery in the sector to increase its diversification, inclusiveness,climate resilience, food-energy integration, and environmental and social sustainability in linewith the European Green Deal requirements.

•

Scaling up investment in agricultural public institutions for delivery of evidence-based agriculture
and rural development policy making, which includes agricultural services (sanitary andphytosanitary measures, food safety, land monitoring and registration, soil testing for precision
agriculture, agricultural research and extension services, training and retraining of farmers andstaff of agribusinesses, etc.) so the institutions can better support the sector’s climate-resilient
recovery.

2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The principal recovery and reconstruction focus for the year 2024 includes the following measures,
which consider the implementation/absorption capacity of the government:
1. Provision of direct support to farmers through the public programs that were successfully inprevious years. To relaunch agricultural production, this support combines grants and inputs forsmall farms, interest rate compensation for agricultural production loans, and matchinginvestment grants for horticulture production.
2. Clearing of mines (estimated separately; not included in Table 20 or Table 21).

220 OCHA. 2024. Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024. December 2023. Link
221 The estimate of the needs is based on recent Government of Ukraine’s documents, including the 2022 National Recovery Plan

and the 2023 Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Agriculture.

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Donors have already made US$488 million—or 112 percent of the 2024 needs—available for therecovery of Ukrainian agriculture (Table 23). The donor financing focuses on addressing immediate needsof farmers, mainly access to affordable finance, especially for small farmers. Donors also prioritize
investments in capacity building and provision of public services, including technical assistance for the EU
accession.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
While most of the damage was assessed using the results of farm and fishery/aquaculture surveys
conducted in 2022, some damage, including stolen inputs and outputs, was estimated indirectly. It will
be important to reassess these data in the future to ensure accuracy. Additionally, including estimates for
irrigation, food processing, and agro-logistics as well as agricultural land survey, demining, and land
release operations (all presented in other parts of the RDNA) will provide a more comprehensive
understanding of the losses and needs in the agrifood sector.
Table 20. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastDamageLoss
Needs
Cherkaska
1
3,131
1,819
Chernihivska
234
3,785
2,484
Chernivetska
0
377
219
Dnipropetrovska
1
3,720
2,161
Donetska
912
3,700
3,752
Ivano-Frankivska
667
387
Kharkivska
1,360
6,000
5,366
Khersonska
2,050
5,660
6,649
Khmelnytska
4,063
2,359
Kirovohradska
1
2,900
1,686
Kyivska
456
3,206
2,458
Luhanska
1,747
2,799
4,682
Lvivska
1,072
623
Mykolaivska
476
3,385
2,583
Odeska
1
2,534
1,473
Poltavska
0
3,818
2,218
Rivnenska
1,008
585
Sumska
119
3,402
2,137
Ternopilska
1,782
1,035
Vinnytska
4,768
2,768
Volynska
1,013
588
Zakarpatska
316
183
Zaporizka
2,929
4,656
6,680
Zhytomyrska
0
2,003
1,163
Total
10,28869,76356,057
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022,
and December 31, 2023; losses cover a total of 40 months, including 22 months between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 21. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Type of activities/investments

Total needs (2024–2033)

113

Reconstruction needs
Service delivery
restoration needs

Support for reconstruction
Support for immediate agriculture production recovery
Support for longer-term recovery of the agriculture sector
Support for agricultural public institutions and programs,
including for EU accession
Total

9,402
6,122
35,5135,020
56,057

Source: Assessment team.

Table 22. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities
Support for immediate agriculture production recovery
Interest rate compensation (portion of 5-7-9 program)Grants and inputs for agricultural production by small farms
Partial credit guarantees for agriculture
Support for longer-term recovery of the agriculture sector
Investment grants for investing in horticulture (portion of e-Robota program)
Support for agricultural public institutions and programs, including for EU accession
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
402
320
71
11
13
13
20
435

Table 23. Actual donor support (US$ million)
Types of activities/investments
2023
Support for immediate agriculture production recovery
273.8
Interest rate compensation (5-7-9 credit program)
180.0
Partial credit guarantee for agriculture
21.8
Additional liquidity for agricultural financing
3.5
Grants for production by small farms
Inputs and cash transfers for small farms
51.6
Storage bags and other storage equipment distributed to farms
2.3
Procurement of equipment
14.5
Support for longer-term recovery of the agriculture sector
46.7
Development of storage infrastructure
4.7
Investment grants for value chains
3.2
Investment grants for horticulture
30.0
Support for water use associations and restoration of irrigation systems
10.7
Financing of medium to long-term investments
2.8
Support for agricultural public institutions, including for accelerating
22.1
the EU accession
Support for MAPF (including State Agrarian Registry maintenance)
3.2
Support for food safety
2.1
Support for agricultural research and education institutions
5.2
Support for policy dialogue and strengthening of the technical capacityof Ukrainian institutions
11.6
Total
342.6
Source: Assessment team. Note: MAPF = Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food.

2024
448.2
250.0
6.8
3.5
173.2
11.2
2.3
1.2
21.9
4.7
6.4
2.0
10.7
2.8

2025
134.9
70.0
0.8
3.5
50.0
8.3
2.3
15.8
14.7
6.0
2.0
5.0
2.8

Total
856.9
500.0
29.4
10.5
223.2
71.1
7.0
15.7
76.0
44.0
15.6
34.0
26.4
8.4

18.3

14.2

39.5

4.3
1.2
5.2

3.3
1.2
4.7

10.8
4.5
15.1

7.6
488.3

5.1
164.9

24.2
972.4

114

Irrigation and Water Resources
Context
The irrigation and water resources sector has been affected deeply by the war. With 41 million hectares(of which 33 million are under cultivation), agriculture plays a crucial role in the country’s economy,
contributing to 10 percent of the GDP, 41 percent to exports, and 14 percent to employment. Whileirrigation is used on only 1 percent of all agricultural land, it is vital for specific crops like potatoes (15percent), tomatoes, and rice (almost all), and certain regions such as Khersonska Oblast (14 percent).
Drainage systems, covering around 10 percent of the agricultural land, predominantly in the north andnorthwest, significantly enhance Ukraine’s production capabilities, particularly in cereal and beef
production, by providing usable pastures and forage land.
However, the irrigation and drainage (I&D) sector and flood protection and water resource
management (WRM) faced persistent challenges even before the war. The I&D systems, developed
initially for state-run farms during the Soviet era, were broken up during the economic and politicaltransition after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The breakdown of large state structures led to a vacuumin ownership and funding, causing widespread deterioration and a dramatic decrease in irrigated areas.
Prior to the invasion, out of 2.2 million hectares equipped for irrigation, only 738,000 hectares (33percent) are operational without additional investment, and this number has further significantly
decreased due to war-related impacts. This underutilization, coupled with poor maintenance, inadequate
drainage, and rising energy costs, has substantially dropped sector productivity. In response, the Ukrainian
government, with support from the World Bank, has been implementing a strategy since 2017 to improve
the I&D sector. This includes reforms in national institutions and the creation of Water User Organizations(WUOs), alongside establishing a new agency within the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food to take overirrigation and fisheries management. As of January 2024, there are 32 established WUOs.222 State support
for WUOs is provided through the State Agrarian Register. Resolution No. 1110 (dated 20/09/23)
amended the procedure for the use of funds provided for in the state budget for providing state support
to agricultural producers who use reclaimed land and water user organizations. Budget subsidies will be
provided for the reconstruction of existing and/or construction of new reclamation systems using
sprinkler or drip irrigation, as well as for the rehabilitation of pumping stations.223
These steps are crucial for Ukraine to manage its water resources effectively in line with the EU Water
Framework Directive, which emphasizes integrated water resources management and river basin
management. Since February 2022, the I&D infrastructure has been severely damaged by the ongoing
war, with targeted attacks on reservoirs, irrigation systems, dams (such as the Kakhovka Dam on June 6,2023), and critical agency buildings. Other damage has occurred due to intense fighting around the water
systems, vandalization of structures while the areas were temporarily not under government control,
construction of barricades with material from the water systems, defensive inundations, and the

222 Only one of them has been given wonership of the meliation system, while others are pending.
223 Government of Ukraine. 2023. Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Decree dated October 20, 2023 No. 1110 Kyiv On making

changes to the Procedure for the use of funds provided in the state budget for providing state support to agricultural producers
who use reclaimed land and water user organizations. Link.

115

placement of mines around vital infrastructure. All of these further complicate the path to recovery andeffective water management.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The estimated damage to Ukraine's irrigation and water resource sector is US$740.2 million (Table 24).
This is considered as minimum/subject to further data as per the limitations section. This includes damage
to movable assets, buildings, and agency premises from both the State Agency of Melioration and Fishery(SAMF) and the State Agency of Water Resources (SAWR), totaling US$15.6 million. Additional damages
include on-farm infrastructure damage (48.5 percent), US$10 million damage to the Karachunivske andOskilske reservoirs, and damage to the Kakhovka dam (48 percent) (Table 25). This estimate excludes
damages to occupied real estate as these damages cannot be assessed yet. The most affected regions are
Chernihivska (US$90.2 million), Zhytomyrska (US$63.9 million), Volynska (US$62.5 million), Rivenska(US$58.7 million), Kyivska (US$54.6 million), as well as Khersonska (US$363.2 million). It is expected that
Dnipropetrovska and Zaporizka, for which the assessment was not completed, have also sustained major
damage.
As of February 2023, the damage to the irrigation and water resource sector in Ukraine has escalated
dramatically, showing a 95 percent increase. This substantial rise is primarily attributed to the destructionof the Kakhovka Dam in the Khersonska oblast, a consequence of the attack on June 6, 2023, with anestimated damage of US$359.3 million. Due to ongoing hostilities and occupation the losses as a result ofdestruction of the Kakhovka Dam have not yet been assessed. However, lower water levels in the
Kakhovka reservoir will disconnect irrigation channels. It is estimated that a total of 350 irrigation pumping
stations and 1.1 thousand kilometer of irrigation canals are not in use.
The losses in the sector are estimated to be US$716.8 million (Table 24). These are also consideredminimal, as per noted limitations. As the war persists, the losses have surged, marking a staggering 233
percent increase compared to the earlier RDNA. The losses include operational losses based on lost profit
as reported by the different operational state entities. A major factor is that in many areas, payment forwater services by water users is hampered. The war resulted in a fast reduction of direct payment of water
use rent to the state budget by industries and other water services. These operational losses also reflect
the damage to government and management of the water systems, as the financial basis is having aserious setback.
These operational losses are the result of multiple factors, depending on the region in the oblasts. Dataon farm level and evaluation of losses categories for the I&D systems use were obtained by the Instituteof Water Problems and Land Reclamation and the NGO Primavera. Losses in profit for irrigated areas areaccounted for in the agricultural sector’s overall loss assessment. This section accounts for losses inpayment for water services due to factors such as flooding (53 percent) —with river basins in Ukraine's
northern regions inundated to fend off invasion—mining (35 percent) in border areas for defense, anddeterioration of farm systems (12 percent) due to lack of maintenance, operational staff, inputs, and raw
materials. The most significant losses are recorded in Zhytomyrska Oblast, amounting to US$132 million,
followed by Volynska Oblast at US$129 million, and Sumska Oblast at US$121 million. The operational
losses of farmers in the Khersonska, Dnipropetrovska, and Zaporizka regions due to the destruction of the116Kakhovka Dam and loss of irrigation sources have yet to be assessed, which could lead to changes in theoverall estimate.
Human impact. The destruction of vital infrastructure such as the Kakhovka dam, irrigation canals, pumps,
and reservoirs has severely disrupted water availability for agricultural and domestic purposes,
significantly affecting communities reliant on these systems. This deterioration not only undermines local
economies, especially in rural areas, but also elevates environmental and public health risks due topotential pollution and inadequate water treatment. Furthermore, the loss of governance in water
resource management hampers restoration efforts, leading to extended service disruptions andchallenges in recovery.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The estimated total recovery and reconstruction needs for a building back better approach in irrigation,
drainage, and flood protection assets stand US$10.7 billion over the next decade (Table 26). Investments
not only encompasses the repair of damaged systems where feasible but also includes compensatory
programs. These programs aim to maintain and enhance production levels through improved drainage
and expanded irrigation in regions that have remained under government control. Priority should be given
to safe regions where restoration can begin swiftly. The oblasts with the highest needs, according tocurrent data, are Kyivska (US$3,944 million) and Khersonska (US$1,898 million). The latter is the result of
the estimated needs of US$1,498 million to repair the Kakhovka dam construction and the damage to thepumping station for the command area of 780,000 hectares.
The significantly delay of institutional reforms, including the development and operationalization of
WUOs, is adversely affecting the management of water resources. To fully understand the implications oftransferring infrastructure to WUOs and to address their ongoing needs, a comprehensive assessment isimperative. The priority focus for modernizing I&D systems should be on operational systems, located inareas under government’s control. This will make it possible soon to increase the area of irrigated land
and agricultural productivity, without waiting for the moment when it becomes possible to implement
such strategic projects as the restoration of the Kakhovka Dam. This modernization involves not just
repairing damage but also updating and enhancing operational yet outdated infrastructure.
Investing in operational, undamaged infrastructure is essential for a rapid economic rebound and tocompensate for losses due to direct physical damage. This strategy should simultaneously concentrateon modernizing operational irrigation systems for WUOs and restoring damaged infrastructure in warimpacted areas. Additionally, priority should be given to upgrading multi-functional drainage systems,
which will broaden irrigation options during dry periods and bolster forest and natural area protections.
Furthermore, farm rehabilitation is another crucial aspect in restoring productivity and should beprioritized in safe areas. Enhancing water quality is also a key focus, necessitating the installation or repairof monitoring stations and the implementation of advanced water treatment solutions.
Significant recovery efforts since the war’s onset include SAWR’s successful repair of the Shandor gate
in the Kazarovytska Dam and the renovation and reactivation of the water monitoring laboratory in the
Donetska oblast, after return under government control. These actions have already met some of the warrelated needs identified in the previous RDNAs.
117

Moreover, broader sector reforms are imperative for the systematic improvement of management ofhydro-technical melioration systems, including facilitating investment access, improving management
efficiency, ensuring transparent tariff structures, and completing the transfer of melioration systems torelevant agencies and WUOs, crucial for modernization and expansion.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The total recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$43.6 million(Table 27). The most pressing investments involve restoration of damaged hydraulic facilities and water
management systems and buildings, and the replacement of moveable assets in areas that were recently
brought back under government control and areas that did not face hostilities. A feasibility study andinventory for this restoration and modernization (US$10 million) is a 2024 investment priority for Kyivska,
Chernihivska, Sumy, Zhytomyrska, Rivenska, and Volynska. This is to help the irrigation and water resource
sector rebound and address the lack of water supply and irrigation services to farmers.
Another priority for 2024 is starting with the restoration and building back better of on-farm irrigation
technology and equipment support to the established WUOs (US$33.6 million) in the areas of Kyivska,
Cherkaska, Poltavska, Vinnytska, Dnipropetrovska, Mykolaivska, and Odeska. A prior focus is required fortechnical infrastructure inventory and design of modernization projects, equipment for water
management planning, accounting, and irrigation monitoring including training of the WUOs.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments•

Findings of this assessment are preliminary, have yet to be verified, and are based on limited datacollection.

•

Regional data for some oblasts that likely suffered from the war were unavailable and is therefore
not included in this assessments, resulting in an unrepresentable distribution of damages, losses, andneeds among oblasts•

Differentation per asset (i.e., canals, pumps etc.) class was not possible, instead this assessment
differentiated by regional water management organisation including a mix of assets.

•

In subsequent assessments, clearly delineate damage and restoration needs for reclamation systems
and water management.

•

Financing priorities allocated for 2024 are provisional and can only be utilized by the Ministry once
VAT/tax code challenges are resolved. The World Bank and the MAPF are working closely together toresolve this issue to facilitate support and establishment steps for WUOs.

Future assessments are recommended to include losses stemming from reduced or absent governancefunctions, such as the destruction of monitoring infrastructure and challenges in establishing regimes for
special water use management in inaccessible territories. Additionally, the impact of reduced water
resources, potentially caused by the destruction of hydrological facilities at major reservoirs and main
irrigation canals, should be considered.
Areas where active hostilities are taking place or areas not under government control are not includedin this assessment, the inventory reporting is therefore incomplete as there is no (reliable)communication with the operation agencies. Recommendations for future assessments include:

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•

•

•

Enhanced Water Quality Monitoring: A significant decline in water quality necessitatescomprehensive analysis and continuous monitoring, particularly in the aftermath of the Kakhovka
incident, to address decline in water availability in the water bodies.
Expanded local field surveys: To gain a more accurate understanding of the damages and losses,
conducting additional local field surveys is recommended, focusing on both direct and indirect
impacts on water resource management.
Make monetary estimates of damage, losses, and needs for water resource management,
specifically in relation to governance functions and loss of water resources.
Table 24. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)

OblastDamageLoss
Needs
Cherkaska
0.0
49.0
Chernihivska
90.2
0.0
184.9
Dnipropetrovska
0.5
0.0
339.7
Donetska
0.5
51.7
Kharkivska
5.7
0.0
52,8
Khersonska
363.2
1,897.7
Khmelnytska
0.0
52.0
0.0
Kirovohradska
0.0
0.0
0.0
Kyiv (City)
0.0
0.0
0.0
Kyivska
54.6
50.0
3,943.6
Luhanska
0.5
50.6
Lvivska
0.0
0.0
22.9
Mykolaivska
7.6
0.0
590.9
Odeska
0.0
52.9
364.2
Poltavska
0.0
27.3
Rivnenska
58.7
0.0
184.9
Sumska
32.0
121.0
184.9
Ternopilska
0.0
33.0
0.0
Vinnytska
0.0
1.7Volynska
62.5
129.1
184.9
Zakarpatska
0.0
0.0
Zaporizka
52.9
63.4
Zhytomyrska
63.9
131.9
203.6
Nationwide (no specific region)
0.3
93.0
2,335.1
Total
740.2
716.8
10,734.0
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and
31 December 2023; Loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022 andDecember 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months until June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 25. Damage per category (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Dnipropetrovska

Property
damage of
SAWR
0.24
0.53

Property
damage of
SAMF-

DamageOn farm
infrastructuredamage90.00-

Reservoir
damageKakhovka
dam damage

119Donetska
0.45
Kharkivska
0.65
5.00
Khersonska
3.73
0.19
359.31
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
0.01
Kyiv (City)
Kyivska
1.20
48.42
5.00
Luhanska
0.45
Lvivska
0.01
Mykolaivska
7.57
0.01
Odeska0.01
0.01
Poltavska
Rivnenska
0.03
0.15
58.56
Sumska0.03
31.98
Ternopilska
0.002
Vinnytska
Volynska
0.06
62.49
Zakarpatska
Zaporizka
0.01
Zhytomyrska
0.05
63.81
Nationwide (no specific region)
0.25
Total
15.26
0.37
355.2610.00
359.31
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023.

Table 26. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Types of activities/investments

Reconstruction, overhaul and modernization of state irrigation
infrastructure
Reconstruction Reconstruction of hydraulic structures of protective arrays ofneeds
Dnipro reservoirs
Irrigation system upgrading and expansion in four priority systems:
Kakhovska, Pivnichno-Rogachinska, Sirogozska and Priazovska
Restoration and modernization of water management
infrastructure
Restoration of the functioning of the state water monitoring
systemService delivery Restoration and construction of centralized water supply of rural
restoration
settlements using imported waterneeds
Restoration of drainage systems
Flood risk management measures
Protection of floodplains of the Irpin River
On-farm irrigation technology/equipment support to WUOs
Total
Source: Assessment team.

Responsible
agency
SAMF
SAWR
SAMF
SAWR
SAWR
SAWR
SAMF
SAWR
SAWR
SAMF

Total needs(2024–2033)
2752.577.0
1,254.7
1,408.2
1.5
91.6
1,080.0
0.0
3,742.3
321.1
10,734.0120

Table 27. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Feasibility study and inventory for restoration and modernization of specific systems
Technical infrastructure inventory and design of modernization projects, equipment for water
management planning, accounting, and irrigation monitoring including WUOs training
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministry.

Estimated cost
10.0
33.6
43.6

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Commerce and Industry224
Context
Commerce and industry stand as the backbone of the economy, contributing roughly one-third to
Ukraine's GDP and supporting approximately 6.0 million jobs in the prewar period.225 Between
February 2022 and end-2022, the number of active enterprises fell by 15 percent, to about 760,000
entities; most (86 percent) were micro or small enterprises, with fewer than 50 employees.226 Based on
the 2021 Labor Force Survey, wholesale and retail trade employed the largest share of workers, with
agriculture and industry as runners-up.227 Evidence shows that the war impacted Ukraine’s private sectorin two main ways: first, through demand shocks, which were driven by reduction in consumer spending
and access to crucial export markets; and, second, through heightened uncertainty about sales outlook
and through supply shocks, which encompassed damage and asset theft, input shortages, logistical
disruptions, and limited access to financing.228 Some firms have been relocating from the war-affected
regions; firms in the commerce sector (wholesale trade) account for 44 percent of relocated firms.229
Damage and Loss Assessment
Total damage to the commerce and industry facilities between February 2022 and December 31, 2023,
is estimated at US$15.6 billion (Table 28), a 43 percent increase above the estimate of US$10.9 billion
reported in RDNA2 as of February 24, 2023.230 Most of the damage (83.6 percent) was to industry, withthe rest to commerce. About half of the damage (56.0 percent) occurred to large and medium-size
enterprises, both public and private (US$8.8 billion). Roughly half of the damage estimate for those firms(US$4.2 billion) was due to the destruction of two steel plants in Donetska oblast, the Azov Steel Plant
and the Ilyich Iron and Steel Works in Mariupol. According to a recent survey,231 21 percent of firms incommerce and industry have reported war-related damage, and there has been an average 53 percent
drop in sales across firms of all sizes. Almost half of firms in eastern Ukraine and slightly less than a thirdin southern Ukraine reported war damage; these firms also experienced the largest drop in sales (70percent in the east and 63 percent in the south). By contrast, the west saw only a 39 percent drop. The
largest shares of damage were reported in Donetska, Kharkivska, and Kyivska oblasts, where there is
military activity and a high concentration of manufacturing firms.

224 Industry, as defined by this chapter, covers manufacturing (including agro-processing) and services not covered elsewhere in

the report. Services related to culture, tourism, finance, and creative industries, such as hotels, tour operators, and advertisers,
are excluded. Restaurant and food services are included under commerce and industry. Commerce covers wholesale and retailtrade and warehousing.
225 State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSSU), 2021 data.
226 SSSU data. Of the 763,000 firms, almost half were not classified by size in the data, but most are likely individual entrepreneursor small firms.
227 SSSU, “Labor Force of Ukraine 2021: Statistical Publication,” 2022, Link.
228 World Bank, “Ukraine: Firms through the War,” November 2023, Link.
229 Opendatabot, “7820 Companies Have Moved across Ukraine Since the Beginning of the Full-Scale Invasion,” November 30,
2023, Link. About 10 percent of relocations were financed by the government relocation program; see Prozorro, Link.
230 Data for damage and losses were primarily provided by the Kyiv School of Economics. For RDNA3, damage estimates rely oncomprehensive regional data coverage, while only 14 out of 25 regions were covered in RDNA2.
231 World Bank, “Ukraine: Firms through the War,” November 2023, Link.

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Total losses across commerce and industry reached about US$173.2 billion (Table 28), estimated for
40 months ending June 30, 2025. Losses were calculated using an updated methodology;232 as firms’
financial reports and official statistics for 2022 became available, the analysis was recalibrated using
actual data covering the first 10 months of the war. Actual sales data for 2022 for commerce and industry
were used to calculate revenue losses and adjusted using the difference in IMF’s growth scenarios for
Ukraine with and without the war. Prewar intermediate consumption coefficients were used to estimate
value added and net out inter-industry gross sales double-counting. Losses also include agreed estimatesfor demolition and debris removal, calculated based on the damage. Total losses are about US$116.9
billion for industry and about US$59.2 billion for commerce. Enterprises in the Kyivska, Dnipropetrovska,
and Donetska oblasts (hosting large numbers of industrial enterprises and commerce entities)
experienced the largest losses (accounting cumulatively for more than 60 percent of the aggregate losses
for the sector). Missile attacks targeting Ukraine's power grid caused daily electricity blackouts, which
had significant economic impacts,233 particularly hurt sales in the sector. Around 15 percent of all firms
and up to 20 percent of manufacturing firms experienced power outages.234
The human impact in the sector relates to loss of income and jobs, displacement of people, worker
shortages, and service in the military. According to the International Labour Organization,235 2.4 million
jobs, or 15.5 percent of the total, were lost in 2022. Firms in construction, manufacturing, and commerce
saw the most significant drops in employment levels (reductions of 36 percent, 23 percent, and 21
percent respectively). Unemployment caused by war-induced displacement and damage hit internallydisplaced women the most; less than a third of such women remained employed or secured a new job.236
Overall, enterprises in commerce and industry experienced labor shortages, with 46 percent of industrial
enterprises mentioning labor shortages among their main challenges.237
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
Total recovery and reconstruction needs for the commerce and industry sector are US$67.5 billion,
estimated until 2034 (Table 29).238 Reconstruction needs for infrastructure and assets under a build backbetter approach are estimated in total at US$20.7 billion (Table 29). This means that 31 percent of theestimated needs for this sector are for rebuilding and modernizing buildings, equipment, and inventory.
232 The updated methodology, which partly explains the increase in losses since RDNA2, allowed for much more comprehensive

and granular geographical coverage of data than RDNA2, and it used firms’ actual financial statements instead of estimated ones.
Using firms’ financial reports and official statistics for 2022, revenue losses in the sector were recalculated for the first 10 monthsof the war, and the results were adjusted using the difference in IMF’s growth scenarios for Ukraine with and without the war.
The estimates for the two different growth trajectories were based on the economic growth forecasts by the IMF before the war(the World Economic Outlook of October 2021) and on the updated growth trajectories (World Economic Outlook of October2023). The commerce and industry income growth for both scenarios were estimated, and then the difference between the twofor the period of 40 months (ongoing war plus next 18 months) was adjusted to net out inter-industry double-counting and focus
on value added based on prewar intermediate consumption coefficients.
233 O. Blinov and S. Djankov, “The Economic Toll of Attacks on Ukraine’s Power Grid,” Vox.EU, December 21, 2022, Link.
234 World Bank, “Ukraine: Firms through the War,” November 2023, Link.
235 International Labour Organization “Care at Work in Ukraine” Brief, November 2023.
236 InfoSapiens, “Research on the Economic Activity of IDP Women and Their Strategies Regarding the Restoration of the Sourceof Income,” June 16, 2023, Link.
237 Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting “Ukrainian Business Throughout the War (December 2023) 20th Monthly
Survey of Ukrainian enterprises”, Link
238 Needs estimates for RDNA3 are a function of damages and losses estimates, and rely on the improved data coverage (for bothdamages and losses) and updated methodology (for losses).

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In line with the damage and losses, the largest needs are in Kyivska, Donetska, and Dnipropetrovska
oblasts. Some firms were able to recover by adapting their processes to the more challenging businessenvironment—specifically by using digital tools, embracing supply chain optimization techniques, andtargeting new clients. In the commerce and manufacturing sectors, around 17 percent and 15 percent offirms, respectively, incorporated new technology and processes into their supply chain management
techniques and operations. Some shops and retail stores have recovered to higher levels of sales,
although not necessarily to prewar levels; lack of reliable data, however, makes it impossible to quantify
the extent to which sales recovery has contributed to repair and rebuilding efforts. Therefore, the build
back better coefficient for commerce is slightly lower than for industry, 1.2 versus 1.3, as the outdated
industrial assets that were damaged or destroyed need to be rebuilt according to the latest technologies
and green standards. Needs to restore service delivery and to build back better have increased in linewith the losses; they total US$46.8 billion—US$16.4 billion in the short term and US$30.4 in the longterm—and include demolition and debris removal costs. The more comprehensive damage data in
RDNA3 and the revised methodology for estimating losses (see footnote 8) help to explain the increased
needs estimates in RDNA3.
Overall, the war has had diverse negative effects on businesses and Ukraine’s private sector. These
effects are due to several factors: disruptions in accessing domestic and international markets, curtailed
access to finance, interruptions in the supply of essential resources, inadequate demand, and increased
uncertainty. The extent of these impacts varies depending on firms’ sector, location, market presence,and size. Firms in the main active war zones in the east and south experienced the most significant
damage. Financial difficulties affected approximately 84 percent of firms, hampering sales, investment,
and jobs. The collapse of Ukrainian exports was related to the closure of the Russian market and to
disruptions in critical trade and logistics hubs. Three-quarters (75 percent) of exporters experienced
supply chain disruptions. Approximately 43 percent of firms that closed temporarily or permanently citedinsufficient demand as the main reason. Increased uncertainty linked to the war further dampened
employment (-25 percent) and investment. Overall, throughout 2023, two-thirds of industrial enterprises
have been operating at 75 percent of capacity or higher (including 12 percent operating at full capacity)in the territories remaining under government control.239
At the same time, Ukrainian firms that continued operation after the invasion have adapted theirbusiness strategies proactively and resiliently. They have sought new customers and markets (34percent), leveraged digital tools (41 percent), changed their product/services mix (17 percent), andadopted supply chain optimization techniques (12 percent).240 Although firms have been resilient,effective and efficient private sector support policies and programs will remain crucial drivers of therecovery. These will need to focus on access to finance and business advisory on market access,sustainable firm capabilities upgrading, and productivity increases through digitalization. Firms identified
three primary areas requiring increased public support: financial assistance, regulatory improvements,

239 Based on a survey of 535 enterprises in industry and retail sector; see Institute for Economic Research and Policy Consulting(IER), “The Economic Trends and Expectations in December 2023,” 20th Monthly Enterprise Survey, January 2024, Link.
240 World Bank, “Ukraine: Firms through the War,” November 2023, Link.

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and market access. Larger firms expressed a greater need for credit and grants to rebuild their damaged
assets.
Revitalizing the commerce and industry sector is a priority, given that millions depend on this sector for
their livelihoods, and given its contribution to critical needs during reconstruction, such as construction,
food industry businesses, and key manufacturing. Ukraine's economic recovery is dependent on
harnessing the dynamism of the private sector, and its multiplier effect, to sustain an export-led growth,
contribute to job creation, innovation, and overall sustainable development. On average, 31 percent offirms would like to receive access to new credit for investments or working capital. Grants to rebuild
destroyed assets are requested by 17 percent of large firms as opposed to only 9 percent of small firms.
Assistance to access new markets, on the other hand, is more relevant to small and medium enterprises(SMEs) than to large firms (31 percent and 33 percent vs. 26 percent). Tax exemptions are a priority for
67 percent of firms in hospitality, while access to new credit is a priority for businesses active incommerce (42 percent). Grants to rebuild destroyed assets are a top priority for firms in the east (27percent) and less relevant elsewhere (12 percent or below in other regions).
The following are priority recommendations to support commerce and industry in the short term:241•

Provide financial support to firms in the form of loans, grants, and guarantees to allow viablefirms to survive, relocate if needed, and reconstruct and modernize assets; and to allow the
emergence of new entrants, in particular small businesses owned women, displaced persons andveterans.

•

Provide financial support to high-value manufacturing and agroindustry, and export-oriented
enterprises in the form of loans, grants, and guarantees.

•

Devise and deploy de-risking instruments and financial support to improve interest rates
affordability across all sectors.

•

Promote project finance and development finance (both for capital expenditure and working
capital), as a way to catalyze equity investments as well.

•Enhance the financial and institutional capacity of public institutions to mobilize private
investments (through PPPs, industrial parks, larger strategic investments, and others).

•

Boost war-risk insurance and increase risk coverage for new investments.

•

Support the retraining and upskilling of labor to address skills required by businesses to accessnew markets.

•

Update eligibility criteria, in line with good international practice, for co-financing of capitalintensive projects.

•

Enhance the financial and institutional capacity of public institutions to generate a pipeline ofinvestment projects and new business opportunities through technical assistance and feasibility
studies.

241 While the recommendations provided in the main text represent equally important short-term priorities, it would be crucial

to institutionalize a policy prioritization mechanism based on consensual and clear criteria. To this end, preliminary guidelines
and prioritization criteria are provided in the report of the World Bank “Ukraine: Firms through the War,” November 2023, Link.

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•

Help firms access new markets with tools to meet standards in international markets, easecustoms constraints, facilitate international partnerships and learning, and expand theavailability of trade finance and insurance instruments.

•

Rebuild the logistics infrastructure needed for access to inputs and markets.

•

Streamline business regulations and tax requirements to make it easier to start and restartbusinesses and to enter into new product lines and delivery models.

•

Facilitate domestic and foreign investment to rebuild key industries.

•

Build technical assistance capacity to identify projects with high private capital mobilization
potential, and with significant multiplier effects beyond initial investment.

•

Ensure private sector participation in reconstruction efforts and promote linkages with SMEs inpriority sectors for recovery and investment, such as construction, transport, and logistics.

•

Design market-enhancing programs to boost domestic demand for local goods and services.

Investments should seek to build back better, emphasizing green and digital technologies to build
resilient businesses with products and processes aligned to EU standards. Financial support to firms,
including efforts to facilitate access to credit, should also continue. While support to SMEs remains vitalas they constitute the backbone of the economy, larger more capital-intensive investments in key
industries (such as green metallurgy, machine building, pharmaceuticals, etc.) should also be encouraged
through de-risking instruments and co-financing facilities with donors backing. Addressing business,investment, and trade climate obstacles that were present before the war—related to tradeharmonization with the EU, competition issues, and state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform—should be apriority. Direct technical assistance, potentially focused on sectors critical to growth like agribusiness,metallurgy, machine building, and IT, could help firms enter new markets, move into higher-value-added
products, and adapt more sustainable practices. Firms owned and managed by women could be targeted
for financial and nonfinancial support.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
Priority recovery and reconstruction needs in 2024 for firms in the industry and commerce sector are
estimated at US$5.8 billion (Table 30).242 Priority recovery and reconstruction needs include financing
for investments in new equipment, improved processes, repair of buildings, creation of new businesses
to stimulate job creation, as well as working capital. Most firms, even those that suffered no physicaldamage, have seen revenue fall due to disrupted infrastructure and electricity blackouts, contracting
domestic markets due to emigration, and broken supply chains. The private sector has also incurred costs
for service delivery restoration via introduction of new business strategies and processes (e.g.,
digitalization), asset relocation and other working capital needs, training and reskilling of employees, andinvestments in quality standards and certifications to access new markets, including efforts to meet EU
and other international standards. Some firms, particularly in active areas of hostilities, may be trying tostay afloat and require only working capital, either because they have lost their workforce or are facing
huge uncertainty. Although firms will bear the cost of most investments, public sector support is vital tohelp firms survive and make the investments needed to adjust to the new realities as the war continues.
242 Data sources and methodology for estimates are listed in the note to Table 30.

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Working capital financing will also be a critical area of support to enable firms stay afloat, as increased
risks will continue to constrain access to bank credit and dry up trade finance and supply chain credit.
Around US$3.1 billion of public support will be needed to close the private sector financing gap in theindustry and commerce sector in 2024. This support will help mobilize domestic financing, stimulate
direct firm investments, and underpin trade. The GoU has already committed more than US$750 million
from the state budget to support these financing needs; donor and multilateral sources of financing aresought for the remaining needs. The instruments identified in Table 31 are aligned with government
priorities, but the majority of funding has yet to be secured. Firm support programs deployed by the GoU
immediately after the invasion proved beneficial and could be revamped and rationalized. Only 8 percent
of all firms and 6 percent of SMEs participated in these programs, but participating firms performed
better than nonparticipants in terms of sales and employee retention, showing the potential benefits ofrevamped SME support programs and of accelerating the adoption of climate and environmental
standards to access the EU market. Firms also need support to address their constrained access tofinance. Bank lending has been subdued as a result of the war—performing corporate loans in UAH havedeclined by 20 percent compared to prewar levels243—but demand for financing remains high. Some 84
percent of firms face constraints in accessing finance, in part because of high interest rates. The priority
instruments to expand coverage include grants and matching grants, the e-Robota program, subsidized
lending through the 5-7-9 program244, lines of credit and other support from multilateral donors, andguarantees, reinsurance, and export support programs through the Export Credit Agency and donor
programs. Technical assistance will also be essential to support the implementation of firm support
programs and ensure that public-private partnership projects are ready for investment.
Alongside meeting urgent needs, it will be important to build program and institutional capacity andraise financing to enable successful programs to scale up quickly should conditions enable an increasein demand for private sector investment. Indicated financing needs for support programs presented inTable 31 reflect anticipated private sector demand for financing in 2024 alone. Should conditions on the
ground evolve to allow for increased private investment, it will be important that financing is available
to respond. Early engagement with donors to secure funding commitments for 2025 should be part of aforward-looking financial planning strategy to maintain momentum in the implementation of the
programs launched in 2024. Among the various instruments, the subsidized credit and insurance support
programs may be scaled up to meet the private sector demand, and the GoU has identified up to US$ 4
billion in potential opportunities for lines of credit to support investments in the short term. Technicalassistance to strengthen program institutional capacity will also be critical to facilitate disbursement andenable scale-up.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
The definitions and assumptions used for the commerce and industry sector are the same as thoseused in RDNA2. Industry, as defined by this chapter, covers manufacturing (including agro-processing)

243 National Bank of Ukraine, “Financial Stability Report,” December 2023, Link.
244 Total needs for the 5-7-9 program are estimated at US$670 million for 2024, out of which approximately US$350 million will

support firms in commerce and industry, and USD$320 million will support firms in agribusiness (reported under the agriculture
chapter of the report).

127

and services not covered elsewhere in the report. Services related to culture, tourism, finance, andcreative industries, such as hotels, tour operators, and advertisers, are excluded. Restaurant and foodservices are included under commerce and industry. Commerce covers wholesale and retail trade andwarehousing. This chapter includes impacts on both public and private firms.
This analysis faced the following limitations, which hopefully can be addressed in subsequent analyses:• A key recommendation is to establish an electronic system for registering damage, repairs, andlosses. The system would ensure a transparent and verified method for reporting damage andassist the government and donors in aiding those in need, including businesses.
• Regional data were unavailable for some oblasts that likely suffered from the war.
• For commerce, no regional breakdowns of the data were available. An indirect method (primarily
based on housing damage estimates) was used to assign damage and loss proportions based on
the impacts on small firms, since most commerce firms are small.
• Damaged assets and values were not available for most firms, especially smaller ones. The
assumptions used were based on financial reporting and led to best estimates.
• Losses were calculated based on sales losses. For large and state-owned enterprises, the sales
losses likely did not cover the full scope of losses, since firms that did not suffer any physicaldamage likely still suffered economic losses (e.g., from business disruptions due to electricity
blackouts and missile attack warnings). Ideally, data for estimating losses in productivity and otherindirect costs, like rental fees, could be collected for subsequent analyses.
• Sector breakdowns of small firms were not available and could not be indirectly estimated.
• Needs calculations were based on calculated damage to the sector. Given the immense
nationwide losses faced by this sector, these calculations may be underestimated.
Table 28. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
KyivskaLuhanska
Lvivska
Mykolaivska
OdeskaPoltavska
Rivnenska
SumskaDamage

Loss
6.5
131.7
0.0
294.2
6,172.5
0.0
2,455.7
182.5
18.3
8.3
445.7
2,588.7
662.3
26.5
755.6
199.2
425.7
0.4
133.4

Needs
2,144.0
1,140.9
210.0
28,689.5
15,515.0
3,210.6
8,466.2
358.6
1,167.8
1,282.3
9,145.7
61,858.3
462.3
4,593.3
3,506.5
7,569.0
4,766.9
1,076.7
1,734.0

560.3
464.9
38.6
8,060.9
12,834.1
803.7
5,573.9
345.3
329.6
351.1
3,189.0
19,968.0
1,026.1
1,235.7
2,052.8
2,192.4
1,794.2
276.5
655.1

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Ternopilska
0.5
851.7
220.5
Vinnytska
5.3
2,334.1
629.5
Volynska
0.0
1,868.5
475.8
Zakarpatska
0.2
925.1
225.9
Zaporizka
981.4
9,022.3
3,683.9
Zhytomyrska
106.2
1,275.7
480.2
Nationwide (no specific region)
41.4
6.6
62.5
Total
15,642.2
173,181.8
67,530.2
Source: Assessment team. Note: Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 29. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category
Reconstruction needs
Service delivery restoration needs

Types of activities/investments
Industry
Commerce
Industry
Commerce
Total

Total needs (2024–2033)
17,656.2
3,076.3
29,020.5
17,777.3
67,530.2

Source: Assessment team.

Table 30. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)245
Types of priority activities/investments

Estimated cost
4,208
Investment
Working Capital
1,602
Total
5,810
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries. Note: a includes debris removal anddemolition costs.
aTable 31. Estimated public sector (GoU, IFIs, and donors) contribution to 2024 priorities (US$ million)
Types of instruments
Grants and matching grants for business repair, modernization, etc. a
Subsidized lending through 5-7-9 programb (industry and commerce portion only)
Lines of credit/investment projects pipelinec
Support to exporting enterprises d
War risk insurance e
Technical assistance f
Other support programs (industrial parks, PPP facilities, local development programs,
investment nannies, etc.) g

Estimated total cost
424
350
1,645
110
400
10
175

245 Estimates of the short-term investment and working capital needs of the private sector for 2024 are based on the analysis ofmultiple data: (i) World Bank survey data on investment plans by firms (“Ukraine: Firms through the War,” November 2023, Link),(ii) official database with financial reports of 330,000 companies in 2021-2022 available at the government open data portal
processed by the Kyiv School of Economics, (iii) GoU statistics reflecting demand trends for public programs supporting small andmedium enterprises, (iv) pipeline of priority investment projects ready for implementation in 2024 compiled by Kyiv School of
Economics within the Project “Potential Investment Opportunities and Funding Mechanisms in Ukraine”, and (v) other available
sources. Capital investment needs were estimated by merging the 2023 World Bank survey data on firms’ investment plans forthe following 12 months, extrapolating results to the entire population of firms included in the official database with financial
indicators of active companies in 2022, and then adjusting for the actual share of firms that invested in 2022. Working capitalneeds were estimated using the financial indicators included in the official database of active companies in 2022.

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Total3,114
Source: Assessment team in consultation with the Government of Ukraine.
a. Based on the estimates of the Ministry of Economy (excluding US$13 million for horticulture, accounted under
the agriculture chapter), adjusted for the 70 percent disbursement rate in 2023.
b. Based on the estimates of the Ministry of Economy (excluding US$320 million for agriculture, accounted under
the agriculture chapter), adjusted for the 98 percent disbursement rate in 2023.
c. Based on two components: (i) the estimation of total demand for capital investment by firms, divided by themultiplier of the 5-7-9 credit program (based on the data of the World Bank project financing the program) to derive
the needed public sector contribution to meet the overall demand for capital investments by firms; and (ii) the
estimation of capital investment needs according to the pipeline of priority investments ready for implementationin 2024 (based on data from the Ministry of Economy).
d. Based on estimates by the Ministry of Economy, adjusted for an expected 30 percent disbursement rate in 2024.
e. Based on estimates by the Ministry of Economy, adjusted for an expected 50 percent disbursement rate in 2024.
f. Based on estimates by the Ministry of Economy for technical assistance, including a PPP facility, with an estimatedaverage preparation cost of US$500,000 per project for the pipeline of PPP projects for 2024.
g. Based on estimates by the Ministry of Economy of the investment needs for industrial parks, PPPs, local
development programs, and “investment nanny” projects, adjusted for an expected 20 percent implementation rate
in 2024.

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Finance and Banking
Context
The Ukrainian financial sector has been significantly impacted by the war. Since February 2022, thebanking sector has accounted for US$2.9 billion of loan loss provisions for expected war-related credit
losses,246 while the nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio has risen from 27 to 37 (as of November 2023). About
82 percent of the sector's NPLs are concentrated in state-owned banks (SOBs). At the same time, thefinancial sector remains stable, operational, profitable, and liquid, helped by emergency measures andbroader policies that have generated substantial interest earnings and a rising deposit base. In Q4 2023,
the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) successfully transitioned from an exchange rate peg to a managed
exchange rate regime. As a result, most banks continue to be well capitalized; the capital adequacy ratiorose from 18 percent prewar to 21 percent as of end-2023.247 The NBU’s 2023 resilience assessment of
the 20 largest banks (accounting for over 90 percent of banking system assets) shows that most banks
adequately assessed potential credit losses and provisioned accordingly, though continued vigilance iswarranted given that the banking system’s true health remains opaque and that further shocks, includingbank nationalizations, remain a risk. While a newly introduced windfall tax on bank profits is not likely tohave immediate negative impacts on financial stability, it will potentially impact banks’ ability to absorb
losses if the situation deteriorates. The nonbank financial institution (NBFI) sector is also likely to besuffering significant losses as a result of the war (on top of prewar vulnerabilities), but data remain very
limited. Given its small size, the NBFI sector is not expected to have systemic impacts on the overall
financial system. Since RDNA2, updated information shows that damage has increased slightly, while loss
estimations have been reduced amid the results of NBU's resilience assessment.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The total cost of damage to the banking sector is estimated to be US$20.8 million (Table 32). Damage
was estimated using data on banks’ fixed assets (in particular, bank premises and equipment), as well as
NBU’s bank survey on damage.248 Khersonska, Donetska, Kharkivska, Luhanska, and Zaporizka oblasts,
where active combat still continues, account for the largest amounts of damage. SOBs, which comprise
54 percent of net banking system assets as of November 2023, account for 55 percent of damage.
The losses in the banking sector are estimated to be US$5.7 billion (Table 32). Credit losses were
estimated at 25 percent of the prewar net loan portfolio, which is the midpoint of the upper and lower
range estimates outlined in NBU’s Financial Stability Report (FSR) for the second half of 2022.249 The
estimate was lowered by 5 percentage points compared to RDNA2 based on the results of NBU’s 2023
resilience assessment, which showed that most banks adequately assessed potential credit losses andprovisioned accordingly. At the same time, additional provisions may be needed as regulatory forbearance

246 This amounts to around 13 percent of the net loan portfolio the banks held at the end of February 2022, while the National

Bank of Ukraine’s financial stability report for the first half of 2023 indicates that losses might reach 30 percent.
247 Since February 2022, seven banks have been declared insolvent, including two subsidiaries of Russian SOBs and five small
private banks, together accounting for around 3.3 percent of banking sector assets. One systemic bank accounting for 3.1 percent
of banking sector assets was nationalized on grounds of sanctions.
248 Data are from a bank survey conducted by NBU and are as of July 2023.
249 NBU, “Financial Stability Report,” June 2022, Link.

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measures are phased out and (once conditions allow) the independent asset quality review (AQR) is
conducted. About 40 percent of credit losses are attributed to SOBs, and 45 percent of losses are
attributed to the Kyiv city region (due to the specifics of registering enterprises in Kyiv). A third of credit
losses were caused by direct destruction of borrowers’ assets, while the remainder are attributed to theeconomic impacts of the war. The quantification of losses does not recognize the inherent risks posed torecent gains arising from reforms to the financial sector, which include emergency measures to addressrisks stemming from the war as well as the SOB strategic framework; nor does it recognize the potential
delays to further legislative reforms, which could occur given the need to address postwar problems first.
Human impact. Despite a series of cyberattacks and a period of deposit withdrawal in anticipation of theinvasion, the majority of bank branches have remained operational; online banking services are fully
available to all clients with internet connectivity; the noncash payment system is functioning normally;and liquidity has recovered for most banks. To ensure the continuity of the banking network, in late 2022
NBU joined with banks to introduce so-called Power Banking,250 a network of over 2,000 bank branches
across the country that can provide banking services even during prolonged blackouts. However, accessto credit has contracted due to banks’ tightened lending standards and the high interest rate environment.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The financial sector’s total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$2.3 billion over 10
years (Table 33). A total of US$2.9 billion in war-related credit losses was already provisioned for in 2022
and 2023 and has been discounted from the overall needs. In addition, due to the outcomes of the 2023
resilience assessment, the estimated percentage of overall war-related credit losses has been reduced
from 30 percent to 25 percent (compared to RDNA2) — the midpoint between NBU’s baseline and adverse
scenarios. Actual recapitalization needs can be determined only after the independent AQR has been
conducted.
For the financial sector to recover and drive the overall economic recovery, a series of measures needs
to be taken in different time frames. Financial sector policy reforms should focus on (i) preserving
financial stability and maintaining public confidence (in the short to medium term), (ii) strengthening
readiness for resolution (short term), (iii) safeguarding and strengthening institutional frameworks as wellas capacity of the financial market regulators (short to medium term), (iv) enhancing the financial sector’s
contribution to addressing fiscal and private sector needs (short to medium term), and (v) aligning
financial sector legislation with EU acquis (short to medium term). To ensure financial stability during the
war and in the recovery/reconstruction phase, there is a need for coordinated efforts by all financial
market players—financial institutions, the NBU, the National Securities and Stock Market Commission(NSSMC), and the Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF)—and for effective support of public authorities, inparticular, the Ministry of Finance.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
Recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$3.1 million (Table 34).
The reconstruction needs for 2024 relate to restoration of banking service infrastructure in the territories
250 NBU, “Power Banking: NBU-Initiated Joint Banking Network Power Banking Has Been Created, Will Even Work in Blackouts,”

December 26, 2022, Link.

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brought back under government control (Chernihivska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, Kyivska, and Sumska
oblasts) as well as additional provisions for credit losses. In parallel to the investments listed in (Table 34),
the principal recovery and reconstruction focus for 2024 includes the following activities:•

Analyze the impact of the war on the financial sector (asset quality reviews). NBU will implement
its resilience assessment of the 20 largest banks followed by independent valuation of banks’
assets when conditions allow.

•

Ensure the financial sustainability of the DGF. The DGF should have sufficient funds to cover
insured deposits at banks with the highest likelihood of becoming insolvent.

•

Develop an NPL resolution action plan aimed at reforming NPL resolution mechanisms and create
markets/mechanisms for distressed assets.

•

Enhance efficiency in the banking sector, in part by strengthening the SOB governanceframework with its majority-independent supervisory boards, initiating preparations to revert toa prewar SOB strategy, and reforming the underlying legal framework for SOB privatization.

•

Strengthen the design of time-bound financial support programs that target affected borrowers
and sectors using transparent rules and governance mechanisms. Policy responses will need tominimize opportunities for moral hazard and rent seeking and to adhere to sound credit risk
management practices and independent governance arrangements at SOBs, while also facilitating
the effective allocation of new credit. A special war insurance pool should be developed and thePartial Credit Guarantee Fund for small farmers operationalized.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
This financial sector needs assessment is based on a wide range of inputs and data from such sources
as NBU and surveys of financial sector institutions. The assessment also uses expert opinions andsecondary data where possible. As in RDNA1 and RDNA2, the estimates are based on currently available
information. More accurate estimates will be available once financial sector health diagnostics arecompleted. Moreover, as indicated above, the quantification of losses does not recognize the inherent
risks posed to the recent gains arising from reforms to the financial sector, such as temporarily applied
relaxation of prudential rules and changes to the SOB strategic framework; nor does it recognize thepotential delays to further reforms as a result of the need to address postwar problems first.
Table 32. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernivetska
Chernihivska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)

Damage

Loss
0.4
4.5
3.4
5.8
-

Needs
45.0
15.0
24.5
226.1
191.3
50.2
933.9
201.6
47.4
30.7
2,547.2

18.0
6.5
9.8
90.4
83.2
20.1
377.6
87.4
19.0
12.3
1,018.9

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Kyivska
0.6
40.0
16.7
Luhanska
2.9
33.9
17.7
Lvivska
183.2
73.3
Mykolaivska
0.4
101.6
41.2
Odeska226.8
90.7
Poltavska
58.6
23.4
Rivnenska
27.8
11.1
Sumska
0.3
41.7
17.0
Ternopilska
30.2
12.1
Vinnytska
48.9
19.6
Volynska
20.2
8.1
Zakarpatska
22.0
8.8
Zaporizka
2.5
457.5
186.7
Zhytomyrska
28.6
11.5
Nationwide (no specific region)
74.9
Total
20.8
5,708.8
2,280.8
Source: Assessment team. Note: Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and 31 December
2023; Loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023, and an additional 18 months until June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 33. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category
Reconstruction needs
Service delivery restoration
needs

Types of activities/investments
Stated-owned banks
Private banks (domestic and foreign banks)Stated-owned banks
Private banks (domestic and foreign banks)
Total

Total needs (2024–2033)
15.6
12.4
825.5
1,427.2
2,280.8

Source: Assessment team.

Table 34. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Estimated cost
Restoration of banking service
Stated-owned banks
1.5
infrastructure in territories broughtback under government control
Private banks (domestic and foreign banks)
1.6
Additional recapitalization needs
Stated-owned banks
TBD a
Private banks (domestic and foreign banks)
TBD a
Total
3.1
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries. Notes: a. NBU’s 2023 resilience assessment
found that most banks adequately assessed potential credit losses and provisioned accordingly. Banks were able tooffset losses mainly with operational profits. At the same time, there may be additional provisions and related
recapitalization needs stemming from a possible deterioration of the macroeconomic situation as well as theupcoming independent AQR.

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INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS
Energy and Extractives251
Context
Since February 2023, the energy sector has sustained continued attacks on its infrastructure. In the
period covered by the RDNA1, the energy sector suffered war-related (though mostly collateral)
damage; however, intensified attacks on energy infrastructure beginning in early October 2022 caused
extensive damage across the country, as recorded in the RDNA2. Since then, Ukraine’s energy
infrastructure has suffered multiple attacks, and energy companies have suffered cyberattacks. The
attacks have resulted in significant damage to Ukraine’s integrated energy system, including power
generation and transmission infrastructure. During the period covered by RDNA3, the destruction of the
Kakhovka hydroelectric power plant (HPP) dam also had severe effects, causing substantial harm to theenergy sector and the Khersonska region in particular.252 The report by the GoU and the United Nations
provides more specific details on the destruction of the Kakhovka HPP dam, including quantification of thedamage.253 Throughout 2023, regular intense attacks on infrastructure occurred across all of Ukraine.
Eastern and southern regions were more affected due to their proximity to the frontline, which runs from
Kharkiv to Kramatorsk, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kryvyi Rih, Kherson, Mykolaiv, Odesa, and Izmail. During thesummer months of 2023, the attacks across other Ukrainian regions were fewer. Attacks renewed during
the 2023–2024 heating season. These factors are reflected in the changes in the damage and losses,
especially between March and December 2023.
Before February 2022, the energy sector played a key role in Ukraine’s economic growth as well as its
national security, and increasingly supported the government’s goal of modernizing the economy. Theenergy supply sector represented 7–8 percent of GDP,254 with gas transit fees from Russia representing
about 0.3 percent of GDP.255 The entire population had access to electricity, and 94.9 percent had accessto clean fuels for cooking.256 Central heating had high penetration (about 47 percent), particularly in the

251 In RDNA3, the energy sector assessment does not include district heating, which is considered under the municipal assessment.

Where the current chapter cites energy sector figures from RDNA2 and RDNA1, these figures include district heating. Also notethat under RDNA3, not all damage is recorded and assessed. Please refer to the limitations section below. Extractives refers toenergy-related industries, noting limitations in data collection and assessment as noted in the chapter.
252 The values of the damages and the needs related to Kakhovka HPP are included in the RDNA3 report based on the values
provided by the Ministry of Energy and Ukrhydroenergo. This is an indicative level required to restore the power capacity as awhole, and not an endorsement of the decision on Kakhovka's dam restoration. This decision is very sensitive and requires anenvironmental impact assessment to address environmental concerns, a better understanding of its potential impacts on theenvironment, and an assessment of alternatives for rebuilding the power generation capacity.
253 See GoU and UN, “Post-Disaster Needs Assessment: 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine,” 2023, Link.
254 National Institute for Strategic Studies under the Office of the President of Ukraine, “Determination of the Level of Energy
Security of Ukraine,” 2023, 35, Link.
255 Gas transit via the territory of Ukraine has undergone substantial changes since independence. The construction of pipelines(Blue Stream in 2003, Nord Stream 1 in 2011, and TurkStream in 2020), gas disputes between Ukraine and Russia, and thedevelopment of the liquefied natural gas market have all served to reduce gas transit through Ukraine over the last few years.
256 World Health Organization, “Proportion of Population with Primary Reliance on Clean Fuels and Technologies for Cooking (%),”
Link.

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bigger cities. The gas distribution network covered 74 percent of the population,257 and 89 percent of the
population had access to clean water, thanks to pumped water distribution systems.
Damage and Loss Assessment
Damage as of December 31, 2023, is estimated at US$10.6 billion (Table 35); this excludes damage tothe district heating sector, which is estimated at almost US$2.1 billion.258 In comparison, as of February
24, 2023 (under RDNA2), the total was estimated at above US$10 billion (including estimated damage tothe district heating sector of about US$1.2 billion); as of June 1, 2022 (under RDNA1), damage wasestimated at US$2 billion. The majority of the damage reported in RDNA3 occurred during the period
covered by RDNA2. However, the continuing attacks have increased both damage and losses. Significant
damage was caused by destruction of the Kakhovka HPP and its dam. New information has also beencollected that specifies damage incurred in the energy sector in the preceding periods covered by RDNA1
and RDNA2.
The largest share of damage is in the power sector: US$7.5 billion (versus US$6.5 billion in RDNA2).
Within the power sector, the largest contributor to damage is the generation segment at US$4.9 billion(versus US$3.9 billion in RDNA2), followed by the transmission segment (US$2.15 billion versus about
US$1.9 billion in RDNA2). Damage to the power distribution sector is estimated at about US$430 million(versus about US$404 million in RDNA2), though this does not include assets in territories temporarily notunder GoU control. Estimates of damage to the gas sector are at US$1.3 billion (versus US$1.2 billion
estimated in RDNA2). Damage to the oil sector, including oil refinery facilities, fuel depots, and fuelstations, is estimated at around US$1.7 billion (the same level as for RDNA2). Damage to the coal andmining sector could not be newly estimated because there is a lack of information from the mines locatedin territories temporarily not under GoU control; RDNA1 figures are used for this sector.
Estimated war-related revenue losses in the power, gas production, gas transit, coal mining, and fueloil sectors exceed US$54 billion (Table 35), compared to US$27 billion estimated by RDNA2.259 The
revenue losses are linked to regular attacks on energy infrastructure, displacement of a significant part of
the Ukrainian population, economic contraction, and poverty increase. These losses are also combinedwith the decrease in collection rates (mainly in the regions close to the front line 260). The losses (partly
quantified so far) include the losses from the following sectors: the power sector (US$31.97 billion), thegas sector (US$8.11 billion), the fuel oil sector (US$7.74 billion), and the coal sector (US$6.09 billion). The
remaining amount is the cost for debris removal/demolition (US$0.136 billion).
Human impact. Concerning human impact in the sector, the attacks on Ukraine’s energy system haveresulted in civilian suffering and general economic attrition.261 The deprivations caused by unreliable

257 State Statistics Service of Ukraine data.
258 In RDNA3, the energy sector assessment does not include district heating, which is considered under the municipal assessment.
259 The losses were estimated by comparing the level of production and revenues in 2021 and 2022 and taking into account the

production decreases caused by the war.
260 UA Energy, “The Communal Debts of Ukrainians Are Growing: What Should the Heating Workers Do? [Комунальні борги
українців зростають: що робити тепловикам],” March 17, 2023, Link.
261 J. Yaffa, “The Impact of Russian Missile Strikes on Ukraine’s Power Grid,” The New Yorker, February 20, 2023, Link.

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access to electricity are highly disruptive to civilian life.262 For some households and businesses, private
investments in distributed power generation, mainly from small diesel generators, have offered partial
short-term relief.263 Attacks on energy infrastructure affect civilian life across the country and can wreak
regionally concentrated civilian suffering. For example, the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam necessitatedthe evacuation of thousands of civilians.264
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$47.1 billion over 10 years (Table 36).
This amount includes US$40.4 billion necessary to rebuild the power generation sector, based on green
transition principles and following the agreements with the EU, once the war ends. The regions with thelargest estimated needs are Zaporizka, Kharkivska, and Donetska oblasts. The overall geographicaldistribution of the needs is presented in Table 35.
Some needs have already been met. The total amount of the met needs is US$1.73 billion in disbursed
amounts and US$3.19 billion in the commitments received. Examples of the needs that have been met
include repairing and replacing damaged power transmission equipment, constructing protective
infrastructure (such as building protection against drones and missiles) to safeguard energy infrastructure,building transmission connections, installing STATCOMs (devices that help regulate voltage) required inline with the measures determined by ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System Operators forElectricity), repairing hydropower plants, installing distributed generation facilities, financing
procurement for the heating season, and more.
Given the necessity of balancing short-term needs with long-term goals, Ukraine must focus first on
policies that minimize fiscal liabilities in the sector, catalyze external financing, and enhance transparency
and internal implementation capacity. It must not allow short-term emergency and recovery actions toimpede progress on long-term international climate commitments and EU accession requirements.
Balancing short-term energy needs with long-term goals is very difficult in a context of high uncertainty.
In the recovery phase, basic energy and utility services must be restored as quickly as possible, enabling
the return of internally displaced persons—even if Ukraine’s population and its spatial distribution will
differ from what they were prewar. However, energy policy decisions made during recovery could impact
long-term economic, energy security, and climate objectives. The postwar context will present an
opportunity to rethink energy sector priorities in Ukraine, while also balancing the need for fast provisionof enabling services with the need to build back better. The latter should also be aligned with systematic
implementation of energy efficiency measures as part of the large-scale reconstruction that will occur
across all sectors, public and private, including households. Careful planning will be required to ensure
no-regret investments, and institutional processes will need to be simplified to attract financing flows

262 J. Horncastle, “Russia Is Using Drones to Target Ukrainian Electricity and Erode Morale,” The Conversation, January 16, 2023,

Link.
263 R. Olearchyk, “Ukraine Braced for Attacks on Its Power Grid as Winter Draws In,” Financial Times, November 2, 2023, Link.
264 A. Binley and P. Adams, “Ukraine Dam: Thousands Flee Floods after Dam Collapse Near Nova Kakhovka,” BBC, June 7, 2023,
Link.

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from different public and private sources. Any planning advanced during the war period will likely require
adjustments and reconsideration during the recovery phase.
During the reconstruction phase, Ukraine will need to adopt a build back better approach with policies
that align its energy model with the EU energy policy and move toward a decarbonized economy.
Decarbonization efforts are critical to meet the requirements under the EU accession and to increaseenergy security. Critical reforms will include the transposition of the Clean Energy Package, correction of
institutional and market-related breaches, and the adoption of the REPowerEU approach to increaseenergy security. To meet this last goal, Ukraine should focus on (i) diversifying gas supply and promoting
green gases and electrification when economically feasible; (ii) accelerating decarbonization of the power
sector and implementing a just transition roadmap toward renewable energy generation; and (iii)boosting energy efficiency in demand sectors (housing, industrial, transport). Building on advances indigital development before and during the war, the reconstruction should take advantage of opportunities
and synergies to decarbonize and digitalize the energy sector, thereby increasing its resilience tocyberattacks and natural hazards. These policies will also help attract support from donors, financiers, andinvestors to accelerate the restoration and reconstruction.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The RDNA2 identified priority needs totaling US$3 billion for the year 2023. In 2023, the GoU secured
financing and initiated implementation of projects across multiple areas. The identified commitments for2023 totaled US$3.2 billion. As of the same period, US$1.8 billion had been disbursed, which is equivalent
to 54 percent of the identified 2023 priorities. The gap in disbursement can be explained mainly by thetime necessary (and lags) between funding mobilization, procurement, and implementation works,
resulting in later payments and disbursement rate smaller than planned. Concerning amounts committed
and disbursed, the energy sector has seen the most significant recovery efforts in the following areas: (i)developing protection structures for key power grid infrastructure; (ii) arranging restoration andemergency supply of equipment for the power transmission sector operator (TSO); (iii) securing gas
purchasing for the heating season; and (iv) constructing new small-scale/distributed generation. Other
areas for which commitments were received and implementation work started include the installation of
STATCOMs to enhance import-export operations of electricity and restoration of large HPPs, among
others.
Recovery and reconstruction priorities for 2024 are estimated at about US$2.7 billion (Table 37). This
amount takes into account the priority needs, absorption capacity from the previous year, disbursement
rate of the committed amounts, fundraising circumstances, and other related factors. Overall, 2024
recovery and reconstruction investment priorities include US$1.24 billion for the power sector, US$0.68
billion for the gas and oil sector, and US$0.74 billion for liquidity needs related to gas purchasing andelectricity import.

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Beyond the RDNA recovery and reconstruction projects identified above, the government has identified
around US$3 billion in additional 2024 priorities265 to support economic growth and modernization:•

To ensure sufficient generation capacities for economic development, the government plans tocomplete the construction works on one of Energoatom's units and start new construction underpreviously agreed contracts. The total cost for this work is US$8.89 billion, while the estimatedcost for 2024 is US$2 billion.

•

To achieve comprehensive modernization of Ukraine oil refinery production, a project led by the
Naftogaz Group is planned. The total cost of this project is US$2.5 billion, with an estimated
US$281 million needed for 2024.

•

Finally, regarding the construction of high-level protection for substations, the GoU has estimatedtotal need of around US$2.1 billion to be implemented in the short to medium term. US$300
million is included in the priority needs for 2024 since this funding is expected to be secured anddisbursed; an additional US$700 million could be committed during 2024.

Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
The main shortcoming of the current analysis is that it is based on limited information of somesubsectors and regions:
•

•
•
•
•

Power sector damage estimates in areas not controlled by the GoU are inaccurate. In areas
partially controlled by the government, the accuracy of estimates varies. Full estimation of power
sector damage in areas not fully controlled by Ukraine should be done at a later stage.
The power TSO data are aggregated at the country level due to the extra sensitivity of theinformation.
The gas sector does not include damage in the gas production sector. If the GoU provides data on
this category, damage could be quantified.
The coal mining sector was not quantified in detail due to the lack of data.
Capture of energy extractives data requires setting up a nodal agency to collect data from theprivate and public, sector to triangulate and carry out the validation of the data as an ongoingprocess throughout the year. In addition, there is a need for a mechanism to ascertain and capture
data for damage and losses in temporarily occupied territories and in territories very near to thebattle zone.

The assessment includes a range of assumptions in addition to the general RDNA assumptions ofgeographic scope and timeline:•

Damage includes damage in territories fully or partially controlled by the GoU and in territories
temporarily not under government control. Damage for distribution system operators is provided
only for territories controlled by the GoU. Damage in territories temporarily not under
government control is estimated if possible and based on information from the government andother sources on actual damage to facilities. Assets in territories temporarily not under

265 Due to confidentiality reasons and the innovative nature of some of these projects the Bank cannot fully validated validate

the cost estimates for this projects nor its implementation plan.

139

•
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

government control are not considered as definitely lost unless there is certainty that they havebeen completely destroyed.
Damage quantification in the power sector is estimated as replacement cost (with similarequipment quality).
Power generation damage is based on conservative assumptions and fragmented information—
damage to thermal power plants may be larger than estimates. Some assets have been damaged
and repaired multiple times.
The transmission damage is calculated based on estimates from Ukrenergo that combine
preliminary and actual estimates. The former apply until the end of hostilities and are based on
available information from technical personnel (witnesses) on the asset’s condition, degree ofdamage, and possibility of recovery. The latter are based on actual inspection, technicalinspection, and full inventory in areas controlled by Ukraine where inspections are feasible.
Ukrenergo has operational data on damage to the network and inspects and repairs damaged
assets.
Given the limitations on data sharing, direct detailed information on damage to most of the power
distribution networks could not be obtained. In the future, the actual extent of damage will haveto be assessed, and a power sector model will be needed to refine the needs estimates.
Damage in the gas transmission sector is estimated using the book value provided by the gas TSO
and adjustments to derive indicative market-based replacement costs. The values are preliminary
and will need to be specified after the war ends or when the security situation allows.
The quantification of the fuel oil sector is based on estimations provided by the Kyiv School of
Economics, complemented by additional modeling by the World Bank. With additional data, theseestimates should be refined and verified at a later stage.
Where possible, damage to assets in areas temporarily not under government control has been
estimated assuming partial damage instead of 100 percent damage. The degree of damage should
be better quantified at a later stage.
It is important to note that the indicated total needs are preliminary and that after the war ends
more detailed studies and quantification will be required, in particular for the regions close to thefront line or currently not under government control.
Table 35. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)

OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
Kyivska

Damage

Loss
0.0
30.3
0.0
150.2
811.8
0.1
221.1
303.0
5.0
12.2
34.5
111.1

Needs
-

0.0
58.0
135.8
332.8
0.1
403.1
48.8
0.1
77.9
149.7

140

Luhanska
322.0
113.4
Lvivska
48.9
46.1
Mykolaivska
108.3
175.2
Odeska22.7
22.8
Poltavska
32.5
52.5
Rivnenska
13.2
Sumska77.4
130.3
Ternopilska
Vinnytska
17.5
24.4
Volynska
6.5
0.6
Zakarpatska
179.5
322.1
Zaporizka
1,132.9
765.2
Zhytomyrska
14.6
4.1
Nationwide (no specific region)
6,947.7
54,040.3
44,212.9
Total
10,603.0
54,040.3
47,076.0
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022,
and December 31, 2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022,
and December 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 36. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Types of activities/investment
Total needs (2024–2033)
Power sector reconstruction, including transmission system
operator, distribution system operators, power generation
40,410.6a
facilities
Gas transportation system reconstruction, including gas
transmission system operator and distribution system
2,950.6
Reconstruction
operators
Needs
Fuel oil sector reconstruction, including oil refinery facilities
3,394.8
and distribution networks
Coal mining sector (urgent closure works on flooded mines,
320.0
currently not under government control)
Electricity import liquidity needs
Service Delivery
Restoration Needs Gas purchasing liquidity needs
Total
47,076.0aSource: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Renewable energy will require 74 percent of the total amount,which is approximately $29.8 billion for hydro, wind, and solar sectors.

Table 37. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Power sector
Gas sector
Oil sector
Gas purchasing
Electricity import
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
1,240
241
435
540
200
2,656

141

Transport
Context
Since the completion of RDNA2 in February 2023, the context for transport sector damage in Ukraine
has remained relatively stable, as the intensive military operations have been mostly contained along
the steady front line in the east and south of the country. Although no significant territories werereturned to government control during 2023, transport networks have been continuously exposed to
movements of heavy weaponry and supply vehicles. In addition, transport infrastructure has continued
deteriorating due to very limited maintenance beyond repair of damage.
Several major disruptions to the transport sector have occurred since February 2023: (i) the shutdownof the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI) in July 2023; (ii) the continuous intensive aerial strikes on port
infrastructure in the Odeska and Mykolaivska oblasts, including on Danube River ports; and (iii) limitations
to the Solidarity Lanes Initiative caused by blockade of the Ukrainian-Polish border by Polish truckers from
November 2023 till January 2024. The BSGI allowed approximately 33 million tons of Ukrainian grain to
be exported via Ukraine’s ports from August 2022 to July 2023, but after the BSGI shutdown, grain exports
continued with the support of Romania and Bulgaria through the Ukrainian export corridor, allowing
shipment of about 15 million tons of products from August 2023 to December 2023. Continued attacks
have damaged 184 port facilities in Odeska and Mykolaivska, but numerous measures were taken to
upscale the Danube ports’ capacity, leading to a record transshipment of about 3.5 million tons a month.
The Solidarity Lanes Initiative has helped to scale transport via logistics chains that run through the EU,
and it remains critical for export of goods other than grain (e.g., steel, manufactured products, ore) andfor import of critical needs (e.g., fuel, humanitarian aid). Between May 2022 and the end of September
2023, the total value of trade via the Solidarity Lanes is estimated at around €108 billion.266 Over twomonths of blockade of some Ukrainian-Polish road border crossing points (BCPs)—at one point more than
3,000 trucks queued on the four border crossings in the direction to Ukraine— has caused significant
delays and losses.267
Almost two years after the invasion of Ukraine, Ukraine’s transport sector institutions aredemonstrating a high degree of resilience, specifically in maintaining and repairing transport
infrastructure. Key recovery efforts since the start of the war were aimed at restoring the basic road andrail connectivity in the territories returned to government control, with the largest concentrations ofrecovery efforts in Kharkivska, Chernihivska, Kyivska, and Sumska oblasts. Most road repairs consisted ofurgent measures to ensure connectivity; over 2,000 km of emergency repairs were made on motorways,
highways, and other national roads. In addition, road and rail bridges were fully reconstructed: (i) 115
road bridges were restored with temporary structures, including 29 modular bridges donated by country
partners; (ii) 46 road bridges were repaired or newly constructed; and (iii) about 25 km of railways lines
were rebuilt (out of more than 50 km destroyed) and 769 km of overhead catenary lines were restored(over 1,413km damaged and destroyed).

266 European Commission, “Factsheet on EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes Joint Coordination Platform,” September 1, 2023, Link.
267 Y. Grigorenko, “The Blockade of Road Crossings Will Cost the Ukrainian Economy at Least $1 Billion,” GMK Center, December

6, 2023, Link.

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Damage and Loss Assessment
The total cost of damage to the sector is estimated to be US$33.6 billion (Table 28). The largest
concentrations of damage are (i) local oblast, village, and communal roads combined (26 percent); (ii)railway infrastructure, rolling stock, equipment, and other assets combined (24 percent); and (iii)
motorways, highways, and other national roads (23 percent). Overall, no substantial shift in damage totransport infrastructure has been observed, mainly because the front line was steady in 2023; mostadditional damage in 2023 was to Ukraine’s ports. Damage distribution by oblast remains similar to what
was reported in RDNA2: Donetska, Khersonska, Zaporizka, and Luhanska oblasts together account for over
70 percent of damage.
This estimate is slightly lower than that in RDNA2 (US$35.7 billion), this decrease results from upsideand downside factors. On the upside, damage to Ukraine’s port infrastructure has doubled since RDNA2,
while there has been a 20 percent increase in damage to the railway network, urban public transport, andcombined local oblast, village, and communal bridges. Increased port and rail infrastructure damagereflects increased attacks on the critical logistics infrastructure for Ukrainian export, while the increase indamage to urban public transport and local oblast, village, and communal bridges combined should be
attributed to improved and more-available data at the local level. On the downside, a better
understanding of the road infrastructure’s prewar baseline condition led to a 34 percent reduction in thedamage estimate for local oblast and village roads, and to a 16 percent reduction for communal roads.
Almost all damage, except damage to private vehicles, relates to public sector assets.
Before the invasion of Ukraine, road networks in Ukraine were not in perfect condition. In 2016, anassessment of the Ukrainian core road network268 (20,760 km of international, national, and regionalroads) found 46 percent in good condition, 38 percent in fair condition, and 17 percent in poor condition.
The launch of the Road Fund in 2018 and the State Road Rehabilitation Program in 2020 led to a dramaticincrease in road expenditures—US$4.5 billion in 2020 and US$5.0 billion in 2021. This funding enabled
the rehabilitation of the key transport corridors and slowed down the overall network deterioration; but
it has not returned the whole network to an overall state of good repair.
The losses in this sector are estimated to be US$40.7 billion (Table 38). The largest concentrations oflosses are attributable to (i) disrupted Black Sea port access (65 percent), which severely hampered
Ukraine’s trade despite the BSGI (operating until July 2023) and despite the Ukraine maritime corridor(operating since September 2023); (ii) closure of Ukraine’s aviation industry and loss of overflightrevenues (23 percent combined); (iii) disruption to road transport (7 percent); (iv) disruption to railtransport (4 percent); and (v) disruption to public transportation due to fleet damage and service
interruption (1.4 percent). The share of the private losses is estimated to be about 80 percent of the total,largely driven by the disrupted access to Black Sea ports.
This assessment considers the positive impact of the BSGI and the Ukrainian export corridor. These
helped unlock maritime transport routes for approximately 45 million tons of Ukrainian exports, including
about 40 million tons of agriculture products between August 2022 and December 2023. Over this period,
268 World Bank Group, “Strategy for prioritization of investments, funding and modernization of Ukraine’s road sector”, June 1,

2018, Link.

143

these two initiatives mitigated about US$7 billion in losses by providing maritime transport access. The
EU’s Solidarity Lanes Initiative has also been critical for facilitating alternative trade routes, although thisassessment has not separately calculated the impact attributable to the Solidarity Lanes.
The human impact of disrupted transport services is deemed to be significant but could not be quantified
at this point. Qualitatively, this is about reduced access and time lost by people seeking to reach hospitals,
schools, markets and shops, and jobs, particularly in the frontline oblasts. As air space remains closed,
travelers—mostly women and children—experience significant delays on the western road BCPs, where
waiting times can reach up to 12 hours in busy periods. In addition, transport operators face serious issues
with the safety of their employees: as of December 2023, 1,427 railway staff had been injured and 555
killed, and there have likewise been reports of casualties and injuries of people involved in port
operations.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$73.7 billion over 10 years (Table 39).
The largest concentration of reconstruction needs remains the same as in RDNA2; decarbonization,transport efficiency and multimodality are important drivers of the transportation sector Build-BackBetter perspective. Needs includes (i) motorways, highways, and other national roads (29 percent); (ii)railways infrastructure, rolling stock, equipment, and other assets combined (24 percent); and (iii) local
oblast, village, and communal roads combined (17 percent). Donetska, Khersonska, Zaporizka, Kharkivska,
and Luhanska oblasts together account for 73 percent of recovery and reconstruction needs.
This assessment finds that the total needs amount has decreased by about 20 percent compared to
RDNA2. This reduction results from refining the estimation methodology, which now differentiates coreand noncore railway networks with different standards for building back better—that is, reduces thestandard for noncore networks. The overall principle is that most investment and upgrade should focus
on core networks; noncore networks still factor in BBB reconstruction, but to a lower standard than in
RDNA2. For railways, within RDNA3, 40 percent of the Ukrainian rail network is considered core andtherefore eligible for the higher BBB standards (which typically feature higher design speed, higher
capacity, and in some cases electrification). Conversely, needs for noncore railways lines do not drasticallymodify current functional features. A similar approach has been applied to roads: while the core
network— “M” roads—has EU-level motorway standards, the main functional features of the noncore
road network are assumed to remain the same. The same as for railways, noncore roads still include BBB
elements—safety, climate resilience, and in some cases capacity increase. This approach is based on theunderstanding that the network of international highways in Ukraine (M roads) will continue to be thecore transport network, while the national road network will function primarily to distribute vehiculartraffic flows.
In addition, the needs estimates were discounted by US$2.1 billion, corresponding to the reported 2023
expenditures to the transport sector. While some repairs are “quick fixes” aiming to restore the basic
operational capabilities of the infrastructure, several assets have been repaired permanently (althoughprobably to a standard below the full BBB standard). Repair works to restore connectivity depend on thetype of asset, its prewar condition, and the type and severity of damage. Linear infrastructure (such as
144

streets, roads, and railway lines) represents a significant share of the damage database and is usually
damaged at specific points, requiring spot measures to restore connectivity. Such measures are
considered quick fixes that do not improve the quality of the link and cannot be associated with the build
back better approach; for these measures, needs are not considered met, despite repairs. Due to theseverity of their damage, however, some road and rail bridges were either replaced with temporary
bridges or rebuilt permanently.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
During 2024, transport assets call for a US$2.24 billion investment, supplemented by just under US$0.1
billion to restore postal services (Table 40). Overall, priority projects for 2024 aim at increasing Ukrainian
export capacity, strengthening lifeline connectivity, and restoring services. These estimates factor in thereadiness of projects. About 150 transport projects at different stages are planned for 2024; of these,
national road and bridge temporary repair makes up 28 percent, local road and bridge temporary repair
18 percent, railway infrastructure emergency repair 12 percent, BCP expansion 11 percent, urban
transport rolling stock 9 percent, railway rolling stock and equipment 7 percent, and inland waterways
infrastructure repair and Danube River port expansion 2 percent. In addition, three major projects areplanned rural post office development as well as restoration of the Ukrposhta postal network.
RDNA2 envisaged US$3.4 billion for 2023 recovery and reconstruction priorities in the transport sector.
But reported expenditures at the end of 2023 amounted to about US$2.1 billion. During 2023, efforts
aimed to address immediate needs. The effort to restore basic connectivity secured access to over 130
road and rail bridges; the effort to expand westward logistics chains transferred 29 road BCPs to the State
Agency for Restoration and Development of Infrastructure of Ukraine, allowing further upgrade; upscaledrail BCP capacity; and reconstructed rail tracks to BCPs. Finally, the effort to address port operations led
to the development of the Ukrainian export corridor and Danube ports, modernization and repair of port
infrastructure, 23 new transshipment terminals, an increased fleet, and other improvements.
While key priorities during 2024 remain similar to those in 2023, there is currently an urgent need to (i)prioritize the reconstruction projects, (ii) mobilize project preparation for reconstruction and prepare
teams for delivery, and (iii) continue the work on institutional reforms to accelerate future rebuilding.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
RDNA3 considers roads, railways, bridges, aviation assets, ports, inland waterways, and urban public
transport as part of the transport sector assessment. Specific limitations in the approach include thefollowing:•

Data sets and completeness. Like RDNA1 and RDNA2, RDNA3 calculates damage to road, rail,
aviation, and urban transport assets using data provided by Ukraine’s Ministry for Communities,
Territories and Infrastructure Development, Ukrainian Railways, the State Agency for Restoration andDevelopment of Infrastructure of Ukraine, oblast administrations, and municipal authorities. The
accuracy of these data varies according to the security situation—that is, according to whether
government representatives can access sites and validate (at least approximately) locations andactual levels of damage. Precise data on damaged assets in areas not currently under government
control remain unavailable. Hence the resulting analysis of damage and needs is inherently uncertain.
145

•

Assumptions regarding extent of damage. As with RDNA1 and RDNA2, the assessment of damage
does not include detailed engineering work or testing. Definitive assessment of damage levels isneeded to determine appropriate mitigation strategies; for example, some assets assumed to be fully
damaged might turn out not to require full replacement/rehabilitation. Remaining security threats
and budgetary constraints have prevented detailed engineering assessments in most instances.

•

Cost estimates. Estimates for reconstruction needs use unit costs or approximations for specificassets rather than detailed engineering assessments; actual costs will vary by the extent of damage,location within Ukraine, and market factors that may affect pricing of works at the time ofreconstruction. Unit costs also reflect assumptions regarding the nature of works required forreconstruction, and actual technical solutions may differ from those assumed. The detailed site-bysite engineering analysis that would substantially reduce uncertainty may not take place in the near
future, given wartime constraints on budgets and capacity.

•

Continuation of airspace closure and limited access to the Black Sea ports. Calculation of losses in
RDNA3 reflects the partial restoration of transportation through Black Sea corridors under the BSGIand Ukrainian corridor. However, the future of the Ukrainian corridor remains uncertain, and RDNA3
therefore makes no assumption on the future volumes that could be transported through the BlackSea after 2023. RDNA3 continues to assume that Ukraine’s airspace will remain fully closed during
this time. These assumptions are inherently linked to Ukraine’s military gains or the effectiveness ofinternational diplomacy efforts, both of which are outside the scope of RDNA3 analysis. Projected
losses incurred or avoided are accordingly subject to high levels of uncertainty.

•

The foremost recommendations for future assessment are as follows: (i) once security conditions
allow, intensify field-level investigations and engineering work needed to identify and classify
damage; and (ii) in parallel with field validation of data, expand consideration of losses, which will
require more complex calculation methodologies.
Table 38. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)

OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
KyivskaLuhanska
Lvivska
Mykolaivska
OdeskaPoltavska

DamageLoss
27.7
1,568.7
7.1
257.4
8,758.6
5.0
3,596.9
5,159.4
3.1
49.0
1,811.6
4,244.1
27.2
1,135.0
218.8
8.0

Needs
975.5
1,174.5
371.1
3,653.1
2,551.0
816.3
2,942.8
945.6
779.2
668.0
11,203.4
620.8
2,003.9
1,047.3
1,883.2
1,744.0

43.4
4,393.6
21.3
784.8
16,510.4
10.0
8,577.9
10,444.6
7.3
96.1
4,537.8
7,582.1
44.0
2,971.2
497.8
26.7

146

Rivnenska
5.1
630.8
8.2
Sumska1,327.5936.6
3,413.3
Ternopilska
519.5
Vinnytska
48.6
1,224.5
276.6
Volynska
2.0
708.6
1.9
Zakarpatska
2.7
556.6
3.5
Zaporizka
5,116.8
1,850.1
10,265.1
Zhytomyrska
243.0
871.7
927.5
Nationwide (no specific region)
2,239.7
Total
33,623.3
40,678.0
73,684.9
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022,
and December 31, 2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022,
and December 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 39. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Component
Road bridges (national roads)
Road bridges (local roads)
Motorways, highways, and other national roads
Oblast and village roads
Communal roads
Airports
Reconstruction Railway tracks, bridges, stations, and electricalneeds
Railway rolling stock
Railway equipment and other assets
Private vehicles
Ports and inland waterways infrastructure
Urban public transport (rolling stock, infrastructure, depots,
maintenance vehicles)
Debris removal
National road and bridge repair
Local road and bridge repair
Communal road and bridge repair
Equipment for repair and maintenance of national and regionalroads and bridges
Service
Railway infrastructure repair
delivery
Railway rolling stock and equipment
restoration
Urban transport infrastructure repair
needs
Urban transport rolling stock and equipment
Border crossing point expansion
Inland waterways infrastructure repair and Danube River port
expansion
Aviation
Total
Source: Assessment team.

Total needs (2024–2033)
7,270.6
898.0
21,526.8
5,091.5
7,065.0
1,677.5
13,637.9
2,522.4
1,430.7
4,205.4
688.8
5,241.4
189.1
624.2
413.9
201.1
0.8
272.2
148.2
72.1
197.8
255.4
52.5
1.5
73,684.9

147

Table 40. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
National road and bridge repair
Local road and bridge repair
Communal road and bridge repair
Railway infrastructure repair
Railway rolling stock and equipment
Urban transport infrastructure repair
Urban transport rolling stock and equipment
Border crossing point expansion
Inland waterways infrastructure repair and Danube River port expansion
Equipment for repair and maintenance of national and regional roads and bridges
Aviation
Postal service
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
624.2
413.9
201.1
272.2
148.2
72.1
197.8
255.4
52.5
0.8
1.5
94.3
2,333.9148

Telecommunications and DigitalContext
Since the war began in February 2022, the telecommunications and digital sector has been significantly
impacted. Another wave of significant cyberattacks was carried out at the end of 2023 against theproviders of critical services and infrastructure including Ukraine’s leading mobile operator (serving over
50 percent of the country’s population) and the largest national oil and gas company of Ukraine. This has
resulted in widespread service disruptions and damage to information technology (IT) infrastructure. The
attacks have underscored the vulnerability of telecommunications services in a war context andhighlighted the continued need for investments in cybersecurity. The overall impact of war on thetelecommunications and digital sector as of December 31, 2023, is estimated at over US$2 billion indamage, US$2.27 billion in losses, and US$4.67 billion in needs. The damage estimates in RDNA3 are 29
percent higher than those in RDNA2, and losses are 47 percent higher due to the ongoing attacks on anddestruction of infrastructure. Needs estimates increased by 3 percent. The recovery efforts by mobile andfixed internet service providers and by postal service providers have been ongoing and have resulted incontinued service provision to the population. For example, mobile operators had restored 45 percent ofdamaged mobile towers as of February 24, 2023, and 54 percent as of June 2023.269
Damage and Loss Assessment
The total cost of damage to the sector is estimated to be US$2.1 billion (Table 41).270 This figure includes
damage of US$950 million among fixed broadband operators, US$899 million among mobile operators,
US$192 million among postal providers, and US$51 million in the broadcasting sector.271 The largest shareof damage is incurred by fixed broadband operators (45.4 percent), followed by mobile operators (43.0
percent), postal service providers (9.2 percent), and broadcasters (2.5 percent). Concerning thegeographic distribution of damage, the following regions have sustained the largest shares of damage:
Donetska oblast (17 percent of damage), Kharkivska oblast (17 percent), Zaporizka oblast (13 percent),
Khersonska oblast (13 percent), and Kyivska oblast (11 percent). Public assets account for 100 percent of
the assets damaged in the broadcasting sector and 5 percent of those damaged in the postal sector; theremaining damage has been incurred by private companies.
The losses in the sector are estimated to be US$2.3 billion (Table 41). This figure includes revenue losses
due to disruptions of postal services and mobile and fixed internet services, as well as increased costs ofthe backup electricity generators needed for uninterrupted internet service provision. The mostsignificant losses in the sector have been incurred by postal service providers (65 percent), followed bymobile operators (30 percent), fixed operators (3.2 percent), and broadcasters (1.6 percent). Concerning
the geographic distribution of losses, 30 percent of losses have been incurred in Kyivska oblast, 16 percent
in Donetska oblast, 16 percent in Kharkivska oblast, and 10 percent in Zaporizka oblast; these figures

269 Data on restored assets are not available for December 2023.
270 Damage is the estimated monetary value of destroyed or damaged physical assets, valued at prewar prices. Losses are achange in economic flows resulting from the war (e.g., decline in revenues of internet operators, increase in operational costs,etc.).
271 The data for broadcasting sector is based on 49 broadcasting stations that were damaged or destroyed. We thank theInternational Telecommunication Union (the ITU) for sharing their assessment of rehabilitation costs of five broadcasting stations
in Ukraine.

149

highlight the impact of lost revenue and greater costs in those regions. Most of these losses accrue toprivate providers.
Human impact. By affecting communication, the war has had a significant human impact. Communication
is vital for both the Ukrainian war effort and the maintenance of economic activities. The war’s impact on
civilians has been considerable; approximately 12.2 percent of households have lost mobile service
connections, and there has been an 11 percent reduction in the functioning of mobile operator basestations.272 This disruption in communication services affects not only personal communication but also
critical services and economic activities. In response to these challenges, foreign companies like SpaceX(which operates Starlink) have played a crucial role in maintaining connectivity, particularly forhumanitarian purposes and essential services like those of grocery stores, banks, and hospitals.
Other adverse effects of the communication disruptions include effects on vulnerable populations,education, and gender equality. In particular, inequality is likely to increase, as the least protected partsof the population are more likely to stay behind in areas with destroyed infrastructure (broadband, etc.),
and to suffer from adverse effects of having no internet access and hence no access to government
services provided via internet. The adverse educational effects for students forced to study online are also
more likely to be felt by those who remain in territories temporarily not under government control or inareas of active fighting. Finally, any opportunities that previously existed for vulnerable populations andwomen, due to easy internet access (e.g., social protection, online work) are also less likely to materialize
for those remaining in territories with damaged or destroyed digital assets.
Despite the impacts on communication and broadcasting infrastructure, Ukrainian media outlets andjournalists have continued their operations, providing access to information amidst financial pressures,
particularly for local media due to decreased advertising revenue. The war has presented considerable
difficulties for the media sector, affecting the right to seek, receive, and impart information, with UNESCO
recording 14 journalist deaths since the invasion's escalation.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total recovery and reconstruction needs in the sector are estimated at US$4.7 billion over 10 years(Table 42). The needs reflect the vital role of telecommunications for the maintenance of socioeconomic
activity in the country. Reconstruction needs account for 43 percent of total needs, and restoration ofservice delivery for 57 percent. This split reflects the specifics of the sector, which relies heavily on
infrastructure but also has significant costs associated with service disruptions (reduced revenue andincreased costs of mobile operators; opportunity costs of lost economic activity). The associatedinterventions would therefore require both hard investments in infrastructure (e.g., for fixed and mobileinternet providers) and capacity building in cybersecurity and other areas.
Most needs are concentrated in Kyivska oblast (28 percent of total needs), Kharkivska oblast (16percent), and Donetska oblast (16 percent). Some of these needs have been met by private mobile
operators. For example, of 3,285 mobile towers damaged as of February 24, 2023, 1,796 had been

272 Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), “Rebuilding and Modernizing Ukraine’s ICT Infrastructure Will Be Essential to

Attract Private Investment,” October 2, 2023, Link.

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restored by private operators as of June 2023. Private providers undertake these recovery efforts on an
ongoing basis. However, continued strikes on infrastructure mean many of these assets will likely bedamaged again; accordingly, the restored assets were not deducted from total needs.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The total recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$399.5 million(Table 43). The recovery and reconstruction priorities highlighted by the GoU include (i) Social Assistanceto restore access to the Internet in the de-occupied territories, (ii) Increasing the resilience ofcommunication in Ukraine by local communities, (iii) Restoration of access to online education, medicine,
culture and social services in settlements without communication in the de-occupied, front-line andborder territories. Other priorities include upgrades of the digital infrastructure resilience, such as
uninterrupted operation of critical information systems of Centers for the Provision of Administrative
Services (CPAS), and development of a confidential communication system for emergency services –meeting the urgent needs of telecommunications and operators, as well as restoring the broadcasting
infrastructure. To provide the estimates by type of investment, the assessment relied on the estimatedshares of investment types in the RDNA2.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
The key data used for these estimations are from the GoU (sourced from postal service providers, publicbroadcasters, and internet service providers) and from the Kyiv School of Economics. The figures for theperiod June 1, 2022, to December 31, 2023, rely on extrapolations in case of the postal sector,273 while
figures for broadcasting are available from the government. The figures for the sector are partiallyavailable from operators, and partially extrapolated from prior RDNA assessments,274 using the data on
war intensity by oblast.275 There are two key recommendations for further assessments: (i) hold direct
consultations with the private sector and provide direct funding for recovery projects, particularly thoseoriginating on the ground in Ukraine; and (ii) have the GoU develop a list of specific cybersecurity
interventions that could be funded in 2024.
Table 41. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska

DamagePublic
0.0
2.4
0.0
0.0
6.6
0.0
7.5

Loss
Private
13.9
107.8
3.2
89.6
351.0
55.9
319.1

Public
0.0
2.1
0.0
0.0
7.0
0.0
7.8

Needs
Private
1.6
105.1
2.1
52.6
354.8
3.0
346.6

Public
0.0
7.76
0.00
0.00
25.39
0.00
27.94

Private
22.4
203.8
6.4
132.7
738.6
82.8
737.1

273 Damage and losses in the postal sector were estimated by computing the increase in damage suffered by mobile operators

between RDNA2 and RDNA3 (6 percent) and applying this increase to project damage and losses by oblast in the postal sector.
274 Where data for the fixed broadband operators were not available, the assessment relied on extrapolations by computing theincrease in damage suffered by mobile operators between RDNA2 and RDNA3 (6 percent) and using this increase and the relative
proportions of damage and losses by oblast to project damage and losses for the fixed operators.
275 The Telecom sector's assessment did not include media-related damages and there is a need for more detailed research todetermine the full scope of the Ukrainian media sector's damages, losses, and needs.

151Khersonska
7.2
267.7
3.2
173.5
14.6
313.9
Khmelnytska
0.0
0.3
0.0
1.2
0.0
2.2
Kirovohradska
0.0
12.0
0.0
1.4
0.0
18.9
Kyivska
3.3
223.5
26.9
646.0
55.2
1273.4Luhanska
17.3
141.6
7.8
124.0
35.1
224.3
Lvivska
0.0
15.7
0.0
3.7
0.0
27.5
Mykolaivska
3.6
52.7
2.7
89.1
10.5
165.5
Odeska
0.0
29.7
0.0
15.8
0.0
40.1
Poltavska
0.0
0.3
0.0
2.3
0.0
4.4
Rivnenska
0.0
15.0
0.0
2.7
0.0
23.4
Sumska
1.8
29.8
0.7
53.0
3.4
49.3
Ternopilska
0.0
0.3
0.0
1.4
0.0
2.7
Vinnytska
0.0
2.3
0.0
3.4
0.0
6.7
Volynska
0.0
0.3
0.0
1.9
0.0
3.5
Zakarpatska
0.0
34.3
0.0
3.1
0.0
51.9
Zaporizka
10.8
266.2
4.9
225.9
21.8
335.7
Zhytomyrska
0.0
0.7
0.0
1.8
0.0
3.3
Total
60.6
2,032.9
63.1
2,215.2
201.8
4,469.9
Source: Assessment team. Note: Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and December 31, 2023;
loss covers a total of 40 months, including 22 months between February 24, 2022, and December 31, 2023, and an
additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 42. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Component
Telecom
Post
Broadcasting
Telecom
Post
Broadcasting

Reconstruction needs
Service delivery
restoration needs
Total
Source: Assessment team.

Total needs (2024–2033)
PublicPrivate0.0
1,652.9
12.4
252.5
72.2
0.00
0.00
726.6
90.1
1,837.9
27.1
201.8

0.0
4,469.9

Table 43. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Telecom
Broadcasting
Digital and cybersecurity
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
333.3
15.3
50.9
399.5

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Water Supply and Sanitation
Context
Since the onset of the war, the water supply and sanitation (WSS) sector has experienced damage andlosses and has struggled to provide services in difficult circumstances. The ongoing fighting and attacks
on critical civil infrastructure during 2022 and 2023 have significantly affected WSS service provision. WSS
infrastructure was damaged both in territories under government control and in those not under
government control, but most significantly along the shifting front lines. In those areas, water services
provision is operating in emergency mode with the aim of preventing disruption or restoration of basic
services to affected populations. In addition, the power outages and problems with electricity supply havesignificantly affected service delivery throughout the country. Two years after the start of the war, millions
of Ukrainians continue to receive intermittent WSS services or services that do not satisfy required
standards—and this despite the ongoing efforts of emergency and communal service providers.
Compared with the situation assessment completed in February 2023 (RDNA2), the current assessmentshows a further significant increase in damage and losses primarily due to the ongoing war. This highlights
the increasing risk of service deterioration, given the difficult financial situation of the water utility sector
that is particularly affecting the resilience of service providers in the frontline areas exposed to continuous
attacks. Additionally, no significant priority reforms to WSS provision or sector management could beachieved, as the activities undertaken during 2023 have mostly been focused on ensuring basic WSS
services, replacing destroyed equipment, completion of previous investments, as well as emergency
investments needed to restore mainly water supply services provision.
Access to centralized piped water supply in Ukraine before the war was estimated to be at 70 percent,and access to centralized wastewater collection and treatment services at around 50 percent; 10 million
people lacked access to safely managed water services. There is significant inequality between urban
and rural areas in piped water access (80 percent in urban areas versus 34 percent in rural areas), flush
toilet access (86 percent versus 26 percent), and sewer connections (75 percent versus just 2 percent).
For a country like Ukraine that seeks to align the WSS sector requirements with the key requirements ofthe European Union Water Directives,276 this level of WSS services is still relatively low. However, thosenumbers are close to the average for the region, and the prewar level of service provision in Ukraine did
not deviate much from that in neighboring countries. The situation has significantly deteriorated since
February 2022, as a good deal of water infrastructure maintenance has been deferred. This situation will
create significant challenges for ensuring long term sustainable WSS services and will need to beaddressed in planning for the sectoral reconstruction efforts. Some of the key challenges identified include
low cost-recovery, poor quality of drinking water and effluents released into the environment, coupledwith the lack of adequate water quality monitoring systems, the capacity of service providers to graduallyreach EU standards.
The WSS sector governance framework is highly fragmented, with administrative and legislative
shortcomings that limit coordination between national and local administrations and hamper

276 These include the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC, Urban Wastewater Directive 91/271/EEC, and Drinking Water

Directive 2020/2184.

153

efficiency. At the national level, the government is responsible for developing countrywide WSS policies
that improve and increase the sustainability of WSS services. However, municipalities are in charge of WSS
service provision (through their own WSS utilities) at local or regional level. A national economic regulator
oversees prices for WSS services for utilities serving more than 100,000 people, but its influence is limited,
and the sector is in general insufficiently funded; it relies on water tariffs that often do not meet cost
recovery needs. This situation had been significantly aggravated since February 2022: the WSS tariffs are
effectively frozen and have not followed the increase in costs for delivering WSS services, which, coupledwith massive revenue losses, leads to significant financial difficulties for water utilities, which are unable
to cover operating costs. Overall, there is a strong need to optimize operation and service provision ofexisting WSS systems and facilities (developed before the war) in order to gradually improve
performances to meet required national and EU standards and achieve sustainability and climate change
resilience.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The total cost of damage to the sector is estimated to be almost US$4 billion (Table 44). Out this amount,around US$1.8 billion was due to damage between February 24 and December 31, 2023. This increase isa consequence of war-associated destruction during 2023, mostly from artillery shelling and rocket/drone
attacks but also from direct destruction as in the case of the Kakhovka Dam in June 2023. Given the various
challenges in data collection (especially in oblasts with ongoing military actions and those that are notcurrently under government control), this is a conservative figure and could underestimate actual damage
by up to 30 percent; however, it provides a fair assessment of the magnitude of WSS infrastructuredamage up to this point. Based on the received data, the most affected oblasts are Kharkivska, Luhanska,
Khersonska, Zaporizka, and Donetska. It can be expected that much more damage will be found in
Luhanska and Donetska oblasts once they are accessible to the government and damage can be safely
reassessed. In terms of infrastructure, the greatest damage has been observed in large surface
infrastructure, primarily wastewater treatment plants (26 percent of total damage) and wastewatercollection networks (26 percent of total damage). Drinking water networks, mostly located underground,have also suffered significantly (accounting for 25 percent of total damage). The damage to this type of
WSS infrastructure is mainly due to its length and wide distribution across urban and rural areas.
The losses in the sector are estimated to be US$11.6 billion, which is a 53 percent increase (US$4 billion)
compared to February 2023. It should be noted that collection of reliable data for losses represents aneven bigger challenge for this assessment, which reminds of the need to prioritize the establishment datasystem in order to inform sector programing in a reliable manner. Around 40 percent of the total losses
stem from the lost revenues from WSS services provision. The war has significantly reduced water
consumption, particularly in the industrial sector, because many industrial activities have stopped or been
reduced. In addition, the collection rate and the number of consumers fell significantly (especially in waraffected oblasts) and is hardly recovering over time. The next biggest loss category is additional costs for
WSS service provision due to increased energy and fuel costs;277 energy is the second biggest cost
277 As per the 2024 Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, the costs of key WSS sector inputs, such as treatment

chemicals, and energy, and other inputs have increased significantly – by 200 per cent on average – while both demand and thecustomers’ ability to pay have decreased substantially from 12 per cent to 95 per cent, depending on the intensity of hostilities
in different locations and/or the concentration of displaced or vulnerable people.

154

component (at around 30 percent) for Ukrainian WSS utilities. The rest of the economic losses areassociated with increased prices of materials and equipment, lack of maintenance, water losses, andrequired demolition and debris management. As noted above, the WSS tariffs remain effectively frozen
since the beginning of the war, which is increasing the gap between service provision costs and revenue
even further. Geographical distribution of losses mostly corresponds to the geographical distribution ofdamage. Based on the received data, the most affected oblasts are Kharkivska, Luhanska, Chernihivska,
Khersonska, and Donetska, with only Kyivska oblast having proportionately less in losses then in damage.
Some areas, like the area affected by the Kakhovka Dam collapse (part of Khersonska oblast), havesuffered almost complete destruction of WSS infrastructure.
Human impact. In terms of impacts on populations, the war has left millions of Ukrainians withinterrupted, limited, or no access to safe water and sanitation services. The WASH Cluster estimated that
9.6 million people in need for essential WSS services for 2024 alone. Local WSS utilities are doing theirbest to address the problems, but with decreasing revenues and increasing costs, they lack sufficient
resources; they are often limited to implementing emergency solutions aimed at restoring basic services
or completing ongoing investments. This is particularly true in the oblasts in the east of the country, where
damage and losses are the largest.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total reconstruction and recovery needs are estimated at US$11.1 billion for the 10 years from
2024–2033 (Table 45). These estimated needs factor in costs associated with inflation and building backbetter in alignment with Ukraine’s reconstruction strategy, which prioritizes decarbonization as well asreforms and institutional capacity building to meet European Union accession criteria. The short-term
needs emphasize maintaining service delivery and strengthening local technical and operational capacity
to allow for subsequent reconstruction. The most pressing needs in the short term therefore relate to (i)the upkeep of service delivery, which could also include repair and reconstruction of critical assets; and(ii) formulation of local reconstruction and recovery strategies and action plans. The projection of longterm needs primarily focuses on (i) reconstruction of water supply and wastewater infrastructure (thelargest investments are needed in reconstruction of wastewater treatment plants, and sewerage andwater supply networks); and (ii) associated facility operational costs. Initiating recovery andreconstruction also hinges on the explicit prioritization and sequencing of investments based on technicalassessments and data collection at the local level, and on an enabling institutional and legal environment
for implementing plans. Looking at geographical distribution, the oblasts with larger needs include somethat are most affected by war activities, plus some with below-average service level before the war, andinclude Luhanska, Khersonska, Kyivska, Zaporizka, Mykolaivska, and Donetska oblasts.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The total recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$241.9 million(Table 46). While efforts in 2024 should focus on infrastructure recovery and ensuring WSS service
provision, there should also be efforts to prepare a project pipeline for the required future investments,aligned to the recommended phased approach. Considering the current situation in the country, thepriority reconstruction needs include provision and improvement of water supply (including water intake,treatment, storage, and distribution) in order to provide the population with an adequate quantity of155

drinking water. This need represents 64 percent of the total value of 2024 priorities, with the largest partbeing allocated to recovery and reconstruction of water supply networks (52 percent). The structure ofidentified recovery and reconstruction needs mostly reflects the need to (i) restore service provision byreconstruction of damaged infrastructure; and (ii) complete previously planned WSS development
schemes. Priority needs for 2024 include preparation of project documentation and construction works
as well as equipment purchase; they also consider costs for establishing the foundational architecture andgroundwork to commence recovery and reconstruction and include essential activities such as technicaland engineering studies, updating of spatial plans, and recovery planning and prioritization at the local
level. Service delivery restoration needs also represent an important part of total needs and mostly
include demolition and debris management and facility operational costs. Recovery and reconstruction
efforts should make use of the build back better approach to deliver better results and ensuresustainability of WSS assets and services. This also shows the technological priorities for the WSS sector
recovery, notably the need to decentralize the WSS facilities, and to favor low-cost and easy to maintaininfrastructure relevant for Ukraine, learning from the global experience, notably in neighboring and EU
countries.
A key priority for 2024 should also be equipping the relevant government and municipal departments,that deal with WSS services, with the adequate human resources and capacity to develop a mediumterm sector recovery roadmap in consultation with other line ministries and key local and international
partners. This roadmap requires careful planning and sequencing of priorities to remain accountable forproviding basic services in war-affected areas while working toward the gradual achievement of EU
standards in a structured and constructive recovery process.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
The damage and losses presented here were to a large extent extrapolated from analyzing the severityof the war across regions and were based on informed assumptions and information from multiple
sources. The estimated numbers are indicative and not to be taken as precise values. Future datacollection efforts and assessments would benefit from segregating infrastructure assets into urban andrural, and from collecting and aggregating verified data at the national level. Categorizing data by the
degree of urbanization would yield a better understanding of context-specific policy and financing
requirements. Strengthening collection of data on locally maintained and owned assets for periodic
aggregation at the national level could also be beneficial.
To develop and improve WSS service delivery and meet EU requirements, the WSS sector needs to bereformed. The difficulty in obtaining data for the RDNA3 demonstrates sectoral challenges and suggeststhat the sector is not receiving the required level of attention and support. Currently, the WSS sector’s
responsibilities are transferred to the local level but without sufficient financial resources, which is not an
ideal approach for a country as big and diverse as Ukraine. In 2021, the World Bank developed a WSS
sector Policy Note that recommended reform efforts to tackle three key sector issues simultaneously: (i)improving governance to increase access, transparency, and accountability; (ii) enhancing regulation to
improve performance and service quality; and (iii) reforming the funding approach to ensure cost recovery

156

and sustainability, as well as to diversify funding options.278 These WSS reforms remain relevant, and theyshould be combined with the postwar build back better approach to deliver significant improvements inservice quality and sustainability.
In addition, it is recommended to explore and collect data which is currently not available on theimpacts of the deterioration of the local water quality due to the disruption to service and/or inadequate
protection, including data on health of affected population and the negative impact on the environment
due to disruption in wastewater collection and treatment (surface and ground waters). This data may be
used to fully assess the impact of the war and design the reconstruction and recovery measures in the
future.
Table 44. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastDamageLoss
Needs
Cherkaska
0.6
0.1
1.1
Chernihivska
320.4
49.8
602.4
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
47.1
1.4
82.5
Donetska
475.7
43.3
863.8
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
769.6
93.7
1,421.2
Khersonska
262.9
35.2
488.8
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
Kyivska
167.5
17.0
306.0
Luhanska
1,547.9247.3
2,917.3
Lvivska
Mykolaivska
76.1
6.1
137.4
Odeska
31.3
0.4
54.4
Poltavska
14.8
0.2
25.7
Rivnenska
0.0
0.0
0.1
Sumska
16.3
0.4
28.6
Ternopilska
Vinnytska
Volynska
Zakarpatska
Zaporizka
239.6
32.2
445.6
Zhytomyrska
2.0
0.0
3.5
Nationwide (no specific region)
11,034.6
3,692.3
Total
3,971.8
11,561.6
11,070.8
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022,
and 31 December 2023; Loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022,
and December 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months until June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 45. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Component

Total needs (2024–2033)

278 World Bank, “Ukraine Water Supply and Sanitation Policy Note: Toward Improved, Inclusive, and Sustainable Water Supply

and Sanitation Services,” World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021, Link.

157

Water treatment facilities
Sewage treatment plants
Water pumping stations
Sewage pumping stations
Water supply networks
Reconstruction
Needs
Sewer networks
Wells
Laboratories
Clean water tanks
Water towers
Demolition and debris management
Service Delivery
Restoration
Facility Operational costs
Needs
Increased energy/fuel consumption support
Total
Source: Assessment team.

532.5
1,539.0362.8
499.5
1,460.3
1,311.4
23.9
2.2
51.9
174.3
527.1
893.7
3,692.3
11,070.8

Table 46. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Sewer networks
Sewage treatment plants
Water pumping stations
Water supply networks
Water treatment facilities
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
37.9
20.5
4.9
144.8
33.7
241.8

158

Municipal Services
Context
Continued damage to communal infrastructure has widened gaps in service delivery and has further
strained the capacity of local governments. Prior to the war, service provision of utilities andinfrastructure across all regions was irregular and had low coverage rates. The solid waste management(SWM) sector was especially in need of urgent investment and reforms, with an estimated coverage of
only 79 percent.279 The gaps in infrastructure and service delivery can also be seen in commonly delayed
repairs to local roads,280 the low (50 percent) maintenance rate of public green spaces,281 a significant gapof 500 cemeteries in urban areas,282 and the need for better coverage of street lighting and bettersidewalks. Central heating systems, however, had high penetration (about 47 percent), particularly in
Ukraine’s larger cities. The gas distribution network covered 74 percent of the population,283 while 89
percent of the population had access to clean water, thanks to pumped water distribution systems. Local
governments in Ukraine, responsible for delivering a wide range of services and infrastructure, facenumerous capacity constraints.284 Overall regulatory functions are at the local level in Ukraine, andprovision of communal infrastructure and services directly impacts citizens’ quality of life, local economic
development, and sustainability. Since the war began, the burden on local governments has grownexponentially, as they are expected to implement emergency recovery works, ensure continued service
delivery to residents, create conditions for resilience, and develop urban recovery plans for coordinatedrecovery at the local level.
In contrast with the previous assessments, RDNA3 includes district heating in the municipal service
sectoral assessment. However, considering the distinct nature of its service delivery network andinfrastructure and its relation to the energy sector, district heating285 is separated out from the othersector assets and is further discussed under a separate subheading. In addition to district heating, thesectoral assessment continues to cover mainly five categories of assets: SWM, public infrastructure andfacilities, local administrative buildings, sports facilities, and local mobility assets.286 Within each asset
category, not all asset types are included, given data limitations; but the categories do reflect the diverse
range of infrastructure and services that fall under the remit of local governments.
So far, within the sector, the GoU has prioritized recovery of critical infrastructure and emergency
repairs and investments to ensure continued service delivery, yet absorption of funds has been low.
Efforts were focused on the reconstruction of heating infrastructure, including heat-only boiler houses,
heating points, and combined heat and power plants (CHPPs), as well as on the emergency equipment for279 Ministry of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine (MCTID), “State of the Field of Household

Waste Management in Ukraine for 2021,” As reported during RDNA1.
280 MCTID, “Analysis of the State of the Road and Bridge Industry in 2021”. As reported during RDNA1.
281 MCTID, “State of the Field of the Green Economy for 2021,” As reported during RDNA1.
282 MCTID, “State of the Burial Industry in Ukraine in 2020,” As reported during RDNA1.
283 State Statistics Service of Ukraine data.
284 Local governments deliver “hard” municipal services (like local roads, solid waste management, utilities, public facilities, andurban amenities) along with social services, while also fulfilling their civil and environmental protection duties.
285 The district heating infrastructure in Ukraine sustained major damage, particularly the combined heat and power plants(CHPPs). Since early October 2022, when attacks intensified on the energy infrastructure, damage to the district heating sector
was also incurred indirectly through damage to the power sector and power grid.
286 All other utilities and housing are covered by infrastructure and housing sectoral assessments respectively.

159

heating infrastructure and solid waste management. However, only part of the funding made available
for these activities was actually disbursed, and even the disbursed amounts were not fully utilized, as
commitments were made late in the year. The slow implementation can be attributed to shortcomings incoordination mechanisms and organizational arrangements, significant delays in procurement processes,
and more importantly the overarching capacity constraints at the local level.
Notwithstanding the limitations on capacity, municipalities have demonstrated a dedication tocontinued service provision. Local budgets have had an average increase of 50 percent in expenditures
related to housing and communal services since February 2022. This increase in expenditure indicatesthat municipalities are consistently directing resources toward additional services (including temporary
housing) for IDPs and other groups; and that they are undertaking necessary repairs and operations toensure continued delivery of services to residents.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The total damage to the municipal services sector is estimated at US$4.9 billion (Table 47). The damage
estimate has more than doubled since the RDNA2 due to the inclusion of district heating in the current
assessment. Damage to district heating amounts to almost US$2.1 billion and represents the largest shareof overall sector damage at 42 percent of the total. Among the district heating assets, CHPPs were subject
to the most damage (estimated at US$1 billion),287 followed by damage to the heating network (US$770
million), boiler houses (US$174.7 million), and central heating points (US$27.4 million). The local mobility
category, estimated at US$930 million, has the second largest share of damage at 19.2 percent andincludes damage to sidewalks and street lighting. The category of public spaces and facilities, which
includes municipal assets like recreation centers, libraries, cemeteries, urban parks, and public squares,
accounted for 17 percent of the total damage to the municipal sector. Sports facility assets, such as sports
schools, stadiums, swimming pools, sports halls, and ice rinks, suffered damage valued at US$561.1
million.288 Local administrative buildings and service centers that house municipal service functions andoperations faced US$320 million in damage. Finally, the cost of damage in the SWM subsector continued
to escalate and reached US$126.8 million as of the end of December 2023. However, it is worth notingthat the GoU has been dedicating resources to the recovery of SWM assets to ensure critical waste
management services continue to be delivered.
Damage is concentrated in the frontline regions. The most damaged oblasts are Donetska, Luhanska,
Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Zaporizka (Table 47). Together they account for over 70 percent of the total
cost of damage in the municipal services sector. In the district heating subsector, three oblasts together
287 The Ministries of Infrastructure and Energy provided information on damage to CHPPs. The total damage was estimated basedon the replacement value which is assumed to be 1 USD million per MW of installed capacity of the CHP. However, some of thereported damages may represent the book value of damaged assets or the cost of replacement or value of repairs already done.
If the damages described were light, estimates from the reporting authorities were taken instead of using the replacement costto estimate damages, to avoid overestimations. Damaged thermal power plants providing district heating are not included in thesection on district heating damages and needs but considered in the energy sector section. The list of damaged CHPPs also
includes two CHPPs that provide heating services for industrial consumers, not residential.
288 The level of damage reported for many asset types, and predominantly sports facility assets, changed between RDNA2 and
RDNA3. Specifically, many asset types reported as destroyed in RDNA2 are reported as damaged in RDNA3. This shift may indicate
verification of damage on the ground or better data collection for assets that were previously assessed as having more than 40
percent damage.

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represented 67.7 percent of the total damage incurred by district heating infrastructure across all regionsof Ukraine: Donetska, with damage estimated at US$559.6 million; Kharkivska, with damage of US$425.4
million, and Luhanska, with damage of US$408 million.
The losses in this services sector are estimated at US$6.8 billion (Table 47). Over one-third (35 percent)of the sectoral losses are from the district heating subsector; these losses are valued at US$2.3 billion andinclude revenue losses of domestic companies as well as costs associated with debris removal.289
However, the highest losses in the municipal services sector, as in RDNA2, relate to revenue losses borneby local governments, valued at US$3.2 billion and accounting for 47 percent of the total losses in the
sector. These losses are tied to the estimated loss of locally collected and retained revenues, including
local taxes, administrative fees, charges, and tariffs during the 22 months of the war and 18 months
thereafter.290 Estimations of revenue losses for local governments included both local shares of personal
income taxes (PIT)291 and own-source revenues (OSR)292. Debris removal (including in the district heating
subsector) and loss of revenue from waste collection are accounted for at US$375.6 million and US$68.1
million, respectively.293 Sectoral loss estimations relied on available local budget data and assumptions
derived from analysis of war intensity, the military budget code, and prewar baseline information on
household waste collection and disposal tariffs and volumes.
Human impact. Damage to local infrastructure and communal facilities has had significant impacts on thequality of life of residents. Reduced waste collection due to significant subsector damage offers a primeexample of impact on people’s lives. A reliable SWM system is fundamental for the safety and health ofresidents and IDPs in urban areas; it is also essential for debris removal in critical sites and for thecommencement of reconstruction activities. Many private waste collection companies have temporarily
ceased operations due to significant losses to capital and revenues, and local governments do not havesufficient capacities or infrastructure to fill this gap. Moreover, given limited waste pickup (and in manycases its complete absence), ad hoc open dump sites are being created for the disposal of damaged assets
and household waste. These may pose significant health risks to the community. Damage to local roads,
sidewalks, and streetlights have constrained mobility in cities and towns, which in turn has limited thetimely procurement of critical household goods and services and has also dampened employment
opportunities for IDPs. The damage to the heating infrastructure has made winters harsher for residents.
Ukraine experiences 105 frost days per year on average, and portions of the country require some formof heating for half the year.294 Thus damage to heating infrastructure entails hardships for the affected
289 The losses were estimated based on statistical information from the State Statistics Service of Ukraine on the total revenuesof domestic companies based on their core sector. Total revenues were available for both 2021 and 2022, allowing the estimationof expected revenues in a no-war scenario. The revenues for 2021 were paired with economic forecasts from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to estimate for further periods in the no-war scenario; in the war scenario, the revenues of 2022 werepaired with updated economic forecasts from IMF to estimate for further periods. The losses were estimated at nationwide level
without regional distribution.
290 The loss was estimated by comparing prewar monthly local revenues with those reported during the months of the war.
291 In some cases, personal income taxes registered an increase and as such registered no loss in PIT revenues. This increase canbe likely attributed to the increase in salaries in the defense and IT sectors and a corresponding increase in military enrollment.
292 Municipal own-source revenue is composed of local taxes (e.g., single tax, property tax and fees), non-utility user fees,
administrative fees, and any local capital revenue.
293 Loss of revenue from waste collection relates to both municipal and private entities.
294 R. Ruiz, E. Brown, and O. Fokaf, “Ukraine’s Home Heating Network Threatened by Russian Attacks,” Wall Street Journal,
October 22, 2022, Link.

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populations and poses risks to health and life.295 Loss of heating infrastructure can exact an especiallygrave toll on the health of vulnerable groups such as young children and the elderly.296 This situation isexacerbated by the fact that many households live in damaged houses that are yet to be repaired.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total reconstruction and recovery needs are estimated at US$11.4 billion over a period of 10 years.
It is crucial to acknowledge and prioritize the role of municipalities in the recovery process. Local
governments play a vital role in leading the recovery efforts and ensuring service delivery to communities,
including vulnerable residents. This role is particularly critical for big cities that serve as hubs for IDPs. To
address this situation effectively, a comprehensive, place-based strategy at the local level is needed. This
strategy should also include robust coordination among different levels of government, sectors, andmunicipalities. Careful planning will be required to ensure no-regret investments, and institutional
processes will need to be simplified to attract financing flows from different public and private sources.
Any planning advanced during the war period will likely require adjustments and reconsideration during
the recovery phase.
In the medium-term, it will be important to consider: (i) debris processing and disposal; (ii) technicalpreparation work; and (iii) reconstruction of assets. The restoration of service delivery encompasses themaintenance and deployment of services, repairs and stabilization of prioritized public and service
delivery infrastructure, debris removal, and operational costs for goods, equipment, and infrastructure.
The long-term needs consist of equivalent tasks, with a primary focus on the reconstruction of damaged
assets using the build back better approach. The highest needs are concentrated in Donetska, Luhanska,
and Kharkivska, which collectively account for 52 percent of the country’s overall needs. Althoughmunicipalities are allocating substantial funds toward asset repairs, only a very small portion of the total
needs has been met so far;297 however, this effort may be underestimated and could be tied to a
fragmented reporting system on the municipal sector assets.
The recovery across sectors, is closely linked to debris removal and waste management which istypically carried out by local governments, and it is crucial for GoU to prioritize reduction ofenvironmental impacts. Recovery projects should adhere to the principles of the Green Deal, such as
promoting a circular economy. The EU Waste Directive, which sets a target of 60 percent recycling formunicipal solid waste by 2030, should be considered in all future investments in the sector. It is essential
to prioritize waste sorting at the source, foster markets for recycled materials, and enhance publicawareness of recycling in national, regional, and municipal waste plans.
Finally, the role of local governments goes beyond just municipal assets and their centrality in theoverall recovery and reconstruction across all sectors needs to be acknowledged and supported. Local
governments are critical for the implementation, coordination, and planning of measures stipulated byindividual functional sectors and line ministries. This reality necessitates not just adopting an integrated
and place-based approach at the local level and ensuring the presence of strong coordination mechanisms
295 World Health Organization, “The Escalation of the Humanitarian Emergency Requires an Escalation of the Humanitarian

Response,” October 14, 2022, Link.
296 E. Ducke, “‘Ordinary Russians Want Us to Freeze to Death,’” New York Times, February 11, 2023, Link.
297 An estimated at 0.31 percent.

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but also continued support in terms of capacity and financing for the local governments. Considering thesignificant revenue losses and increased expenditures municipalities continue to face, it is necessary toensure that a functional and predictable financing and support mechanism for the implementation ofprojects is made consistently available to them. In addition, to overcome the likely challenges of resource
constraints and unstable cash flow during the recovery period, local governments will at the outset needto undertake evidence-based identification of prioritized needs and associated sequencing of recovery
and reconstruction measures.
In the district heating subsector, the total cost for reconstruction and recovery over the next 10 years(2024–2033) is estimated at US$4.7 billion (Table 48). This includes costs related the reconstruction of
district heating, including heat supply networks, heating points, heat-only boiler houses, and combined
heat and power generation facilities, as well as demolition and debris removal in the district heating
sector. In the medium-term, the Ministry of Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development(MCTID) has estimated that about US$790 million is needed to cover the district heating sector liquidity
needs caused by the war. The immediate focus will be on restoring and securing services and energy
security for the heating season, i.e., ensuring enough gas and electricity are available, and that the basic
infrastructure is rebuilt to ensure an adequate level of services to the residential and key infrastructure
sectors (hospitals, airports, schools, railway facilities, etc.) Addressing part of the losses can also be
considered as pressing for the sector’s short-term operations.
As indicated in the energy sector chapter, balancing short-term energy needs with long-term goals isvery difficult in a context of high uncertainty. This also is true for the district heating sector, where in therecovery phase, basic energy and utility services must be restored as quickly as possible to enable thereturn of internally displaced persons—even if Ukraine’s population and its spatial distribution will differ
from what they were prewar. In the meantime, the postwar context will present an opportunity to rethink
the sector priorities in Ukraine, while also balancing the need for fast provision of enabling services with
the need to build back better. The latter need should also be aligned with systematic implementation ofenergy efficiency measures as part of the large-scale reconstruction, which will occur across all sectors,
public and private, including households.
The heating sector will need to reduce dependency on gas to avoid gas imports in the short term whilesetting the pace for decarbonization in the long term. With proper energy efficiency and electrification
investments, primary energy demand could remain below prewar levels for decades, decoupled from
economic growth. On the supply side, biofuels (including biomass and biogases) and hydrogen will needto replace gas as a main fuel source in the industrial and heating sectors, even if the electrification ofindustry and heating contributes to the move away from gas.
The Ukrainian government policy for district heating needs to be aligned with EU policy, including a clear
focus on upgrading and a complete transition to green technology. The following are more specificrecommendations for the short-term needs in the district heating sector:•

Addressing clean heat and electricity cogeneration to support the government’s agenda ofdecentralized power generation for critical infrastructure like water treatment and sewage treatment
plants while supporting district heating.
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•Enacting new laws to ensure that use of new technology is more efficient and cost-effective withspecial focus on boiler houses, CHPPs.

•

Addressing upgrades to the district heating system across a range of assets including pumps, boilers,and control systems for individual heating systems to ensure energy efficiency in production,
distribution, and usage.

•

Increasing energy efficiency of district heating in terms of generation, distribution, and regulation. In
addition to the methodology developed by the GoU for cities and towns that have more than 20,000
people, the local municipalities and district heating companies should suggest ways to make district
heating more energy efficient, with a focus on reducing costs and increasing the optimization of
consumption.

•

Comprehensively reviewing the district heating system to ascertain the condition of the facilities forgeneration, transmission (main feeder pipelines), and distribution (branch pipelines) as well as
individual heating substations with the goal of reducing heat loss and enhancing heat control andtemperature management with clean technology.

2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The total recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$462 million
for the municipal services, including the district heating sector (Table 49). This amount is expected bothto cater to urgent needs and to prepare the necessary conditions for subsequent investments. It is also
crucial that local governments have the assets necessary to continue providing critical services including
waste management services.298 The investment in waste management assets is also vital for continued
debris removal efforts. These investments are particularly important in frontline regions, which also hostlarge share of IDPs: they require urgent debris removal on the one hand and have additional waste
management needs on the other. As indicated by the local government budget data, there has been an
increase in expenditures related to the provision of services. As such, priority needs in the estimatedamount of US$233 million would enable local authorities to, in the face of the ongoing invasion, continue
to repair and stabilize prioritized public and service delivery infrastructure for continued service provisionin their jurisdictions. Similarly, liquidity gaps in the district heating sector have been provisioned in theamount US$789 million to ensure continued district heating delivery. Reconstruction needs for theimmediate timeframe is in the estimated amount of US$48 million for the recovery of key assets such as
local service and administrative centers, municipal facilities, streetlighting and US$158.6 million for heat
supply infrastructure. At present, the 2024 state budget allocates US$ 429 million for investments in themunicipal services sectors (including district heating and waste management).
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
The key limitation is the lack of data on the assets covered by the sector and the limited access toreliable data, especially in frontline regions. The data collection gap can be attributed to bottom-up
asset-based reporting which is lacking for many of the asset categories in this sector and the absence of averification process. For this assessment, the data were in most cases either incomplete or not verified,suggesting that data reporting systems for communal assets could be improved. The damage and loss
298 These include collection trucks, container bins, and sanitary and safe dump sites and landfills.

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figures are therefore to a large extent extrapolated from analyzing the severity of the war across regions
and use informed assumptions and information from multiple sources. The estimated numbers areindicative and are not to be taken as precise values.
Regular data collection at the local level is necessary for better monitoring of local service delivery andinvestment prioritization at the national level. Documenting damage at the local level would facilitate
better monitoring of municipal assets and enable informed decision-making, project design, and recovery
planning under the supervision of the relevant local authority. Regular tracking of damage and needs dataat the local level would also ensure needs and damage are adequately reflected in and aligned with thecomprehensive recovery programs and spatial plans that hromadas are currently in the process of
formulating or updating.
Future data collection efforts and assessments would benefit from the segregation of infrastructure
asset data across urban and rural settlements. Infrastructure and service needs, delivery approaches,and costs in urban areas widely differ from those in rural areas. More importantly, local capacities aresubstantially different in cities as compared to smaller settlements or rural areas. Categorizing data acrossthe degree of urbanization would yield a better understanding of context-specific policy and financing
requirements. Overall, the data collection of locally maintained and owned assets remains weak, withirregular aggregation at the national level.
Table 47. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
KyivskaLuhanska
Lvivska
Mykolaivska
OdeskaPoltavska
Rivnenska
SumskaTernopilska
Vinnytska
Volynska
Zakarpatska
Zaporizka
Zhytomyrska

Damage

Loss
9.8
240.6
3.9
49.9
1,245.3
0.6
741.4
343.9
5.7
31.7
270.8
196.9
764.0
3.9
169.2
27.7
158.8
1.2
140.2
1.2
9.8
1.1
33.8
344.2
47.4

Needs
69.5
78.8
42.3
387.7
657.0
68.7
503.9
274.3
47.0
26.9
372.1
149.3
462.3
138.2
125.3
140.6
75.8
40.1
69.0
32.8
45.0
159.0
45.3
310.2
68.9

24.6
521.2
10.2
120.5
2,714.8
3.2
1,556.2
804.3
13.8
77.3
530.5
443.2
1,624.8
12.2
394.6
67.6
308.0
3.5
309.3
3.9
25.0
3.2
82.0
812.0
110.9

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Unknown
1.4
0.0
3.3
Nationwide (no specific region)
10.0
2,385.1
814.0
Total
4,854.4
6,775.0
11,394.3
Source: Assessment team. Note: Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023; Loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, and December 31,
2023, and an additional 18 months until June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 48. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Component
Reconstruction of municipal and communal assets including for
waste management, local mobility, public spaces, and otherfacilities
Reconstruction Debris processing and disposal of communal assets
needs
District heating reconstruction, including heat supply networks,
heating points and heat-only boiler houses, combined heat, andpower generation facilities
Demolition and debris removal of district heating sector assets
Technical works and policymaking including planning, assessments
and engineering and analytical studies
Service
Repair, and stabilization of prioritized public and service delivery
deliveryinfrastructure for continued service provision including in IDP hubs
restoration
needs
Operational costs and organizational arrangements
District heating sector liquidity needs
Total
Source: Assessment team. Note: IDP = internally displaced person.

Total needs (2024–2033)
4,377.7
336.6
3,923.6
39.0
187.6
1,302.1
437.8
789.8
11,394.3

Table 49. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Estimated cost
Repair, and stabilization of prioritized public and service delivery infrastructure for continued
233.3
service provision including increased service delivery in IDP hubs
Reconstruction of municipal and communal assets including solid waste management, local
48.4
mobility, public spaces and other facilities
Organizational arrangements and operational costs
1.5
Technical works and policymaking including planning, assessments and engineering and
20.2
analytical studies
Heat supply (including heat-only boiler houses, district heating network, heating points, CHPs)
157.1
Emergency equipment for the heating infrastructure (mobile units)
1.5
District heating liquidity needs
789.8aTotal
462.0
Total (incl. liquidity needs)
1,251.8
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries. Notes: CPH = combined heat and powerplans.
a. The GoU is proposing a budget amendment to make a provision to partly address liquidity needs in the district
heating sector through Naftogaz. These needs are not included in the total 2024 priorities presented elsewhere inthis report.

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CROSS-CUTTING AREAS
Environment, Natural Resource Management, and Forestry
Context
The war’s negative impact on all aspects of the environment continues to grow and accumulate.
Damage to infrastructure—including hazardous industrial facilities and energy installations (e.g., power
plants, oil storage depots, and refineries) along with residential and commercial buildings potentiallycontaining asbestos—all contributes to the war-related burden of environmental pollution to air, water,soil, and biota. Protected areas, agricultural lands, natural grasslands, forests, and aquatic and otherecosystems have been directly and indirectly impacted, including through the presence of minefields or
unexploded ordnance, water and air pollution, forest fires, and lack of access for monitoring andmanagement. In a country that already had environmental challenges prior to the war (including poor
urban air quality, poor waste management, and ineffective environmental controls),299 the long-term
impact of additional and incremental damage could be even more destructive than the immediate effects,
not only for the population's health, safety and economic prosperity, but also for ecosystems andbiodiversity, economic prosperity, and living standards. Since the beginning of the war, multiple
environmental damage assessments have been performed; an overview of the results can be found in thecomprehensive report by the informal inter-agency coordination group on environmental assessmentsfor Ukraine.300 Recovery needs assessments and rebuilding efforts must take into account the unknowns
concerning environmental impact, since they do not speak for themselves—unlike human or economic
suffering arising from the invasion. In addition, large parts of the environmental damage have taken placein areas close to the frontline, which makes an assessment challenging. Importantly, reconstruction efforts
will have to reflect the need for Ukraine to transform to a green and net-zero economy, harmonized with
EU environmental and climate goals.
Since RDNA2, the scope of analysis has broadened to additional environmental receptors. Since theprevious RDNA, and among the many environmental impacts of the war as a whole, the breach of the
Kakhovka Dam on June 6, 2023, stands out in terms of scale and devastation, as hundreds of square
kilometers were flooded, causing major pollution of water courses, and thousands of square kilometersof reservoir and important wetlands desiccated as well as many biodiversity-rich protected areas deeply
affected.301 Otherwise, fire continues to be the main source of impact to forests and natural landscapes,
although at a much-reduced level when compared to the previous 12 months. In addition to anassessment of ecosystem service losses due to the dam breach, RDNA3 includes the effects of fire on
natural landscapes in the assessment of losses, as well as the damage due to GHG releases from fires.
Damage and Loss Assessment
299 European Union, European Union Environment Agency, and Slovak Environment Agency, “Country Briefing on State of theEnvironment Information in Ukraine,” 2018, Link.
300 T. Grygaski, “Comprehensive Report on Ukraine Environmental Damage Assessments” [unpublished report], informal interagency coordination group on environmental assessments for Ukraine, 2023.
301 Including Ukrainian National Natural Parks and Regional Landscape Parks, the Black Sea UNESCO Biosphere Reserve, Wetlandsof International Importance protected under the Ramsar Convention, and Emerald Network areas protected under the Bern
Convention.

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The total cost of damage to the forest sector is estimated to be US$3.3 billion (Table 50). The cumulative
total of fire-damaged forests in war zone areas rose from 183,181 ha to 211,574 ha between RDNA2 and
RDNA3. Donetska, Khersonska, and Luhanska account for 68 percent of the forest damage, with damage
to forests in Khersonska much more extensive in RDNA3 than in RDNA2. For the first time, damage related
to GHG emissions is included in the assessment of damage (Table 50), totaling US$1,074 million for forests,“other natural landscapes,”302 agricultural land, and settlements. This was calculated using oblast-specificemission factors where possible303 and the 2023 World Bank shadow price of carbon at US$76/tCO2(average of low and high scenarios), and its accounts for 62 percent of the increase in damage between
RDNA2 and RDNA3. Another driver of the increase in the economic cost of damage is annual inflation,
which averaged about 14 percent annually in Ukraine in 2021–2023.
The total losses to the forest sector, including burned areas, air pollution, and Protected Areas damagedby the Kakhovka Dam breach, are estimated at US$26.5 billion. This is a very significant increase overthe RDNA2 estimate of US$523 million, which included only losses from reduced forest carbon
sequestration and a limited range of forest ecosystem services. The increase is due to an increase of 16
percent in the burned forest but also due to the addition of several significant new categories of loss.
These include air pollution losses (US$9.9 billion); lost ecosystem services from protected areas resulting
from the Kakhovka Dam breach (US$9.6 billion);304 and the loss of ecosystem services from “other naturallandscapes” (US$6.5 billion). Even though only seven months have elapsed since the Kakhovka Dam
breach, 36 percent of all losses originate in the damage to 333,041 ha in 12 Protected Areas located in the
Zaporizka, Mykolaivska, and Khersonska oblasts.305 When unit area values from the literature are applied
to the more than 543,000 ha affected, lost ecosystem services of burned natural landscapes are significant
at 25 percent of the total.306 Because these areas have not recovered, ecosystem service and carbon
sequestration losses are calculated on a cumulative monthly basis; the overall average elapsed time sinceburning of forests and natural landscapes is 17 months and 12 months, respectively. Losses due to air
pollution from fires are included in the calculation of losses for the first time and account for 37 percentof the total. Emission volumes are determined in accordance with the Technical Manual for the
Preparation of National Emission Inventories (EEP/EEA Guidelines),307 and are multiplied by coefficients
considering the hazard, environmental impact and scale of event, and a unit cost. The unit costcorresponds to the tax rate for emissions from stationary sources (Order 4/13/2022 No. 175308 and Article
143 of the tax code309).
302 Defined as open forest (15–70 percent tree canopy), shrubs, herbaceous vegetation, bare/sparse vegetation, herbaceous

wetland, and unknown vegetation under annual dynamic Copernicus Global Land Service Land Cover map at 100 m spatial
resolution (CGLS-LC100).
303 L. De Klerk et al., “Climate Damage Caused by Russia’s War in Ukraine,” December 1, 2023, Link.
304 While the Kakhovka dam breach had many other negative effects on environment, most notably water pollution, it was out of
scope of this assignment to assess these losses and damages.
305 The methodology used for calculating the effects of the Kakhovka Dam breach aligns with that used in GoU and UN, “PostDisaster Needs Assessment: 2023 Kakhovka Dam Disaster, Ukraine,” 2023, Link.
306 R. de Groot et al., “Global Estimates of the Value of Ecosystems and Their Services in Monetary Units,” Ecosystem Services 1,
no. 1 (2012): 50–61, Link.
307 European Environment Agency, “EMEP/EEA Air Pollutant Emission Inventory Guidebook 2019: Technical Guidance to Prepare
National Emission Inventories,” EEA Report No. 13/2019, 2019, Link.
308 The Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources Order is available at Link.
309 The tax code is available at Link.

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The human impact from forest and environmental damage is severe and profound. The Kakhovka
Reservoir played a crucial role in providing energy, drinking water, irrigation, and river transport to various
regions in southern Ukraine, as well as supplying water for industries. The dam breach directly affected
100,000 inhabitants, with up to 1 million losing access to drinking water. The flooding poses additional
long-term health risks due to discharge of hazardous chemicals from manufacturing plants locateddownstream. The floodwaters were also contaminated with biological hazards such as sewage
wastewater and dead wildlife, raising the risk of waterborne diseases, including cholera, diarrhea, andothers. Direct employment in the forest sector is estimated to drop 29 percent due to the 29 percent
decrease in the accessible area and the destruction or redeployment of equipment. Each direct forestry
job can be associated with 1.5–2.5 jobs in the wider economy, and so the effect on employment could bemuch greater.310 Over the short term, air pollution due to fires is estimated to have affected up to 1 million
people. Nonmarket services such as biodiversity, recreation, and services related to cultural and amenity
value are highly valued by the population, but they have now all ceased in the 750,000 ha of burned
forests and natural landscapes.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$681 million over the next four years
and US$2.3 billion over the next 10 years (Table 51). Recovery and reconstruction needs have been
updated for the forestry sector and estimated for capacity building in environmental governance. Nearly
half (49 percent) of needs are for the reforestation of burned areas and the construction of modern
nurseries to meet the demand for seedlings during this period. Reinstatement costs (with build backbetter provision)311 are also estimated for damaged roads, buildings, equipment, and vehicles. In addition,
modern harvesting equipment will be required to enable salvaging of harvests in burned areas. It isestimated that 2.8 million ha, or 30 percent of the forest land, is affected by mines or otherwise madeinaccessible.312 The oblasts with the highest degree of forest fire damage are also those where needs are
greatest (Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, and Khersonska). Forestry staff need capacity building in orderto understand the risk from mines, manage war-related forest fires, and maintain forest certification in
wartime.
Capacity-building activities for strengthening environmental governance will require an estimated
US$665 million, mostly for emergency containment and cleanup of environmental pollution. Capacitybuilding activities should focus on training Ukrainian personnel as a basis for (i) the reestablishment ofenvironmental monitoring networks and laboratory infrastructure to analyze key environmental media(air, surface water, groundwater, soils, etc.); (ii) prioritized environmental cleanup actions to remove
contamination sources and eliminate contaminant pathways for the sensitive receptors as well as mineclearance not causing greater environmental damage;313 (iii) the construction and commissioning of
310 C. T. S. Nair and Rebecca Rutt, “Creating Forestry Jobs to Boost the Economy and Build a Green Future,” 2009, Link.
311 For a definition of “build back better” please refer to Box 26 of this document. In terms of the environment, this also meanscompliance with key tenets of EU environmental and climate acquis.
312 Note that the cost of remediation is not included in this analysis, and that the need for the survey and clearance is not includedin the agriculture sector estimates. The RDNA presents them separately in the discussion of cross-cutting sectors.
313 The integration of environmental considerations across all mine clearance activities is critical as mechanical mining, strippingof topsoil, and onsite detonation of mines may remove mines more quickly but can result in significant and irreparable harm andthe release of additional pollutants.

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environmental pollution control infrastructure (for example, hazardous waste treatment facilities,
engineered recycling plants and – as a subsidiary option – landfills, wastewater treatment plants)
following the principle of build back better and using green technologies; (iv) the establishment of afollow-up environmental monitoring program to assess remediation effectiveness; and (v) environmental
training related to other cross-cutting sectors.
The establishment of a national environmental protection agency is essential to protect theenvironment and biodiversity in Ukraine. While Ukraine’s current environmental legislation is quite good
also from an EU perspective, implementation and follow-up of this legislation remains deficient. The
establishment of such an agency is included in the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources’ longterm plans but has not happened due to budgetary constraints. It will be essential for better
environmental protection, implementation of environmental legislation and also for ensuring buildingback better in environmental terms.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The total recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$34.5 million(Table 52), of which US$7.55 million relates directly to the forestry sector. In 2024, salvage of existing
equipment and its relocation to safer zones should continue to be prioritized. The Ukrainian State Forest
Management Planning Association (Ukrderzhlisproekt) should be reestablished or relocated; and its ability
to support centralized strategic forest planning, and hence to minimize the long-term impact of the war
on forest and ecosystem resources, should be strengthened. In coordination with strategic planning,
modern closed root nursery capacity should be reestablished or relocated as necessary; the focus should
be on achieving a balanced recovery, addressing the long-term needs of the wood-processing sector, andproviding other climate-resilient ecosystem services. The administrative functioning and mobility of staff
should be addressed, including through the repair and provision of offices, vehicles, and equipment.
The capacity-building investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$24.1 million. The following are
immediate priorities for a science policy–based green and resilient recovery program for Ukraine: (i)conducting assessment(s) of war-related environmental impacts in Ukraine to inform the immediate risk
reduction and medium- and long-term integrated green recovery and reconstruction; (ii) promoting andsupporting a systemic and coordinated approach for a green and resilient recovery; and (iii) implementing
and advocating appropriate risk reduction, remediation, and restoration actions with the potential to bescaled up, as applicable. These actions will include the following: (i) stakeholder consultations; (ii) policy
advice; (iii) information exchange; (iv) technical assistance in project preparation; (v) identification andimplementation of measures to reduce risks to human safety and the environment at selected sites; (vi)demonstration of remediation and restoration actions; and (vii) dissemination of results and lessons
learned.
The needs for 2024 identified by the Ukrainian State Environmental Inspectorate are estimated at
US$2.85 million and include measurement equipment and vehicles. The Inspectorate needs to update
the material and technical base to restore the environment in Ukraine, to record and calculate the damage
and losses arising from the war, and to measure contamination of priority pollutants.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
170

The capacity-building analysis is largely qualitative but provides some estimates for future needs.
Needs related to natural landscape fires can be assessed only after a detailed damage assessment.
Estimating the needs for reducing air pollution requires further evaluations for each sector or subsector(energy, transport, extractives, metallurgy, chemical, urban, etc.) based on the planned application ofbest practices and modern technologies.
The RDNA3 is hampered by gaps in the data on various aspects of war-related environmental impacts
in Ukraine. The data available are incomplete or lack validation of field data integrity. This means that itwas not possible to assess the damage and needs due to pollution of soil, water, and ecosystems,
including pollution of the marine environment (such as downstream effects of the Kakhovka Dam
breach), or the long-term consequences for climate change and biodiversity. It was also not yet possible
to assess actual health costs of pollution, including air pollution or asbestos pollution, since no data on
exposure are known. There are also limited baseline data on the timber-harvesting fleet prior to theinvasion. It is likely that a large number of machines and vehicles, including trucks, have beencommandeered, destroyed, or damaged.
Forests and natural ecosystems will take much longer than 18 months to recover their ecosystemservice capacity. The minimum recovery period for provisioning services in the fire-damaged forest areas
will be 20 years or more (longer for ecological services), and not the 18 months indicated here. New
nurseries alone will require at least four years to establish. The area of Emerald Network sites affectedby fire was not treated separately from other forest and natural sites under this analysis, an approachthat should be reviewed in future.314 Also in the future, establishing ecosystem service values for the
Ukraine context could avoid the need to utilize global or regional averages.
Table 50. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
KyivskaLuhanska
Lvivska
Mykolaivska
OdeskaPoltavska
Rivnenska

Damage

Loss
164.9
10.9
628.9
828.0
405.6
0.2
0.0
323.5
664.0
48.8
0.0
0.0
-

Needs
962.2
12.2
3,864.5
2,962.3
8,003.0
0.0
0.0
1,525.9
3,540.6
756.2
0.0
0.1
-

12.3
83.8
1.9
4.7
239.5
2.2
331.8
141.7
12.0
3.1
137.5
292.2
5.5
27.6
1.8
3.8
4.6

314 For information on the Emerald Network, see European Environment Agency, “Emerald Network Data—The Pan-European

Network of Protected Sites,” January 4, 2024, Link.

171

Sumska
8.7
101.3
17.7
Ternopilska
7.9
Vinnytska
5.9Volynska
12.4
Zakarpatska
10.7
Zaporizka
96.8
4,466.8
18.9
Zhytomyrska
86.2
337.7
39.9
Nationwide (no specific region)
844.1
Total
3,266.6
26,532.8
2,263.3
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months until June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 51. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Recovery and reconstructionneeds in the forestry sector

Recovery and reconstructionneeds for capacity building

Recovery and reconstructionneeds for State
Environmental Inspectorate

Types of activities/investments
Reforestation
Forest roads
Buildings
Buildings—debris removal
VehiclesEquipment
Office equipment
Harvesting equipment
Nurseries
Recovery needs for staffing and maintenance,
capacity building, forest information system
Assessment of contaminated sites
Assessment of impacted sites in Protected Areas
Environmental monitoring costs
Training
Environmental cleanup
Equipment supply component of capacity
building
Measurement equipment
VehiclesTotal needs (2024–2033)
1,002.49
28.65
4.66
0.19
58.23
30.67
17.66
172.80103.90176.00
71.00
9.00
15.00
5.25
500.00
65.00
1.35
1.50

Total

2,263.3

Source: Assessment team.

Table 52. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million) a
Types of priority activities/investments
Recovery and reconstruction needs in the
Reconstructing/relocating modern closed root
forestry sector for building two nurseries
nursery capacityand procuring harvesting equipment
Repairing/reconstructing offices, assets, andRecovery and reconstruction needs in thevehicles; reestablishing "Ukrderzhlisproekt"
forestry sector for service delivery
forest management planning association
Recovery and reconstruction needs for
Procuring measurement equipment/vehicles
State Environmental Inspectorate

Estimated cost
0.6

6.95

2.85

172

Assessing contaminated sites and protectedareas; building capacity of staff to address
24.1
environmental contamination; cleaning up a few
urgent sites; reestablishing environmental
monitoring programs
Total
34.5
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries. Note: Estimated costs for nurseries andservice delivery restoration based on RDNA2, with figures adjusted for inflation.
a. This sector is not included among the Government’s RDNA priority sectors, so the figures presented here are notincluded in the totals
b. Kakhovka Dam recovery estimates are not included; some environmental equipment supply might be included.
Recovery and reconstruction needs forcapacity building, environmental
assessments, and monitoringb173

Emergency Response and Civil Protection
Context
This sector has been at the forefront of meeting emergency response needs arising from the war.
Through the State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU),315 the National Police of Ukraine,316 and otherinstitutions and sector stakeholders, the GoU has provided essential and immediate support to affected
populations since February 2022. Within the sector, the war has caused damage to emergency responsebuildings and vehicles, affecting the capacity for response. Since February 2022, there has been asubstantial increase in the provision of emergency services, including fire rescue, specialized response,
and response to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. This situation strains theprovision of services and exacerbates prewar challenges facing the sector—for example, the stock ofemergency response–related buildings, vehicles, and specialized equipment was in need of updating prior
to February 2022. The war has also increased the risk of industrial and other accidents linked to damaged
infrastructure and has disrupted services. Since February 2022, some immediate sectoral needs have been
met through public, donor, and private means; however, these are limited compared to the needs forrecovery/reconstruction and broader modernization. Modernization needs are not considered in this
sectoral assessment beyond the BBB approach.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The total damage is estimated to be US$385.7 million (Table 53), a 114.6 percent increase from RDNA2.
This increase relates to the fact that damage data for the police are included in RDNA3 but were notincluded in RDNA2 and RDNA1. The majority of the total damage—79.8 percent—was recorded inbuildings; this share consists of 40.8 percent for police buildings and 39.0 percent for SESU buildings(including hydromet and rescue/response centers). The remaining 20.2 percent of damage was attributed
to vehicles that were destroyed or seized—11.7 percent applies to police vehicles and 8.5 percent to SESU
vehicles (including hydromet and response centers). The largest shares of damage were found in the
Luhanska (11.3 percent), Khersonska (14.4 percent), and Kharkivska (17.2 percent) regions.
Loss is estimated to be US$489.8 million (Table 53). Loss includes operational losses (US$473.3 million,
or 96.6 percent of the total loss) and debris removal (US$16.5 million, or 3.4 percent). Estimated loss ishighest in the Donetska (9.8 percent), Kharkivska (6.5 percent), and Dnipropetrovska (7.5 percent)regions. Kyiv (city) accounts for similar percentages of losses at 7 percent.
Human impact. This sector provides essential and immediate support to the affected populations andcontributed to the efforts to alleviate direct impacts. In 2023, SESU responded to 404,368 calls for help
and rescued 4,846 people. In comparison, in 2021, SESU responded to 356,561 calls for help and rescued

315 As part of SESU, 25 oblast-level bodies govern emergency response services, including firefighting, rescue units, andoperation-communication centers. The early warning system under SESU is supported by the Ukrainian HydrometeorologicalCenter and covers both hydrometeorological conditions and geophysical processes. SESU has a staff of 58,640, of whom 12,126(20.7 percent) are female and 46,512 (79.3 percent) are male.
316 The National Police employs 135,075 persons—including 36,727 women (27 percent) and 98,348 men (73 percent). The
police structure consists of 25 territorial bodies, which include district offices and police departments/divisions; interregional
territorial bodies with regional subdivisions; and several state institutions, including the National Police Service Center, theAviation Support Center, professional (vocational) education with specific training conditions, preschool educational institutions,children's health and recreation facilities, and dormitories.

174

1,779 people. Within the National Police, more than 7,100 police teams, including car patrols, wereinvolved in the protection of public safety and order every day (compared to 4,700 in 2021). Police
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) experts made more than 30,000 visits in specialized vehicles, comparedto 11,000 in 2021. Lastly, it is important to acknowledge the impact on the sector personnel, who
experience heightened levels of stress and trauma.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total recovery and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$2.3 billion over 10 years (Table 54).
The increase in the needs since RDNA2 derives from the inclusion of police data in RDNA3 and from theincreased demand for emergency response services. Police-related needs (linked to the damage tobuildings and vehicles) account for US$381 million. The largest shares of needs are in the Khersonska (9.1
percent), Luhanska (8.8 percent), and Zaporizka (7.9 percent) regions.
There are various considerations for recovery and reconstruction planning and investments within this
sector. First, in parallel with procuring vehicles—including specialized vehicles for CBRN—SESU should
consider the needs for specialized buildings for operational forces. These include training centers, logistic
hubs, platforms, hangars for helicopters, 112 centers, and shelters in civil protection facilities. Second,
investments should consider BBB by incorporating green, resilient, and inclusive recovery principles andby increasing institutional capacities. In line with this approach, RDNA3 calculates needs using damage
data from the field provided by SESU and the police (divided by asset type, level of damage, and oblasts),
and then applying a BBB coefficient to cover energy efficiency measures and needs for furniture andequipment. Third, reconstruction efforts should also be linked to multi-hazard considerations to enhancethe overall resilience of critical sector infrastructure. Fourth, because emergency services continue to beprovided in the vicinity of combat areas, there is a potential risk of additional damage to infrastructure
and vehicles/equipment. Fifth, short-term planning should consider that market limitations have inhibitedthe procurement of and access to specialized vehicles/technical equipment.
Some immediate needs within the sector have been addressed by the GoU as well as ongoing efforts
by partners (see also the chapter entitled “Toward Recovery and Reconstruction”). In 2023, 186
damaged buildings and structures were repaired at an estimated cost of US$5.2 million, including US$1.6
million paid by SESU and US$3.6 million by the police.317 Also in 2023, 182 units of fire rescue and special
equipment were procured, estimated to cost over US$103.9 million. In addition, the Ukrainian
Hydrometeorological Center procured vehicles, computers, and hydrometeorological equipment in theamount of US$0.3 million. In 2023, 976 vehicles, estimated to be worth US$35.5 million, were received as
donations.318 Since February 2022, the EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre has channeledvarious assistance, including items and equipment related to CBRN, shelter and shelter-related items, andover 900 vehicles, among them ambulances and fire trucks. All these efforts focus on immediate needs
rather than meeting recovery/reconstruction needs. UNDP is supporting first responders, including SESU,
the National Police, firefighting brigades, and volunteers, with a focus on local SESU departments in

317 Given that these needs accounted for less than 1 percent of overall reconstruction needs and were related to repairs without

considering emergency efficiency or build back better principles, these elements were not deducted from the overall needs.
318 Given that the data did not distinguish between vehicles and equipment, or clearly disaggregate estimated damage by oblast,
the value of the vehicles was not deducted from overall needs.

175selected oblasts. GIZ’s Special Assistance Programme, the UDU/U-LEAD with Europe II project, and“Strengthening of State and Municipal Emergency Management in Ukraine” project have supported the
procurement of emergency response equipment, including firefighting robots, mobile facilities fordisasters and emergencies, turntable ladders, working platforms/lifts, evacuation buses, and operational
clothing for women in the fire department.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$272.3 million (Table
55). In line with the sector’s highest priority—namely, to meet the safety and security needs of the
population—the focus in 2024 is on procuring vital equipment (vehicles) that will ensure continued
operationality, thereby helping affected areas and civilians in the context of the war. The 2024 priorities
also include US$25.1 million in service improvement for the 112 system in Odesa and Dnipro City
(Dnipropetrovska region) to increase the speed and quality of response due to the higher number ofrequests for emergency services.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
This assessment follows the same principles and assumptions as RDNA1 and RDNA2. RDNA3 includes
new baseline and damage data provided by the police. As in RDNA1 and RDNA2, there are many data
limitations. Additional challenges relate to the change of ownership from national to local level which also
may impact data. Given data limitations, no additional operational losses were assessed in relation to theincreased emergency response demand. It is noted that, in accordance with Resolution No. 168 of
February 28, 2022, SESU received a one-time financial benefit (UAH 720 million), which is not consideredin the loss calculation in keeping with the RDNA methodology.319 The extra monthly of payment of UAH
30,000 for military and police personnel ceased as of February 2023, so the payment is not included in the
RDNA3 needs.
Table 53. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
KyivskaLuhanska
Lvivska
Mykolaivska

Damage

Loss
0.2
36.2
0.0
34.5
34.4
0.1
66.3
55.7
11.9
0.0
5.2
28.2
43.7
0.9
10.9

Needs
13.4
12.4
10.3
36.6
47.9
15.6
31.9
13.4
14.3
10.4
34.4
22.2
28.8
28.6
12.7

3.2
150.3
2.1
99.3
131.0
2.0
132.0
210.2
25.9
2.2
13.9
76.8
204.0
3.9
44.7

319 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “The Issue of Certain Payments to Military Personnel, Rank and File Officers, Police Officers

and Their Families During Martial Law,” Resolution No. 168, February 28, 2022, Link.

176

Odeska
3.0
27.2
27.2
Poltavska
0.5
15.6
3.8
Rivnenska
0.1
13.2
3.2
Sumska
8.1
12.4
20.4
Ternopilska
11.8
2.0
Vinnytska
0.0
17.4
2.0
Volynska
0.0
11.8
2.0
Zakarpatska
0.1
14.4
2.8
Zaporizka
26.9
19.2
183.5
Nationwide (no specific region)
17.5
0.2
954.1
Total
385.7
489.8
2,305.9
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023; loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022, andDecember 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months through June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 54. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Types of activities/investments
Buildings
Reconstruction needs
Debris removal
Vehicles/equipment
Service delivery restoration needs
Service improvement
Total
Source: Assessment team.

Total needs (2024–2033)
615.7
16.5
1,479.0
194.7
2,305.9

Table 55. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Buildings
Debris removal
Vehicles/equipment
Service improvement (112 system in two regions)
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
24.6
0.7
221.9
25.1
272.3

177

Justice and Public Administration
Context
Since February 2022, the justice and public administration sector has been significantly impacted by thewar. Nonetheless, Ukraine’s courts, specialized anticorruption institutions, prosecution service, State
Customs Service (SCS), state bailiffs, notaries, and penitentiary staff have continued to operate,
maintaining law and order and providing essential public services. The war has caused considerable
damage to infrastructure. More than 900 sector buildings were seriously damaged or destroyed, many ofthem belonging to the penitentiary service, SCS, and courts. The penitentiary subsector, with stock ofpenitentiary facilities in need of renovation before the war, has suffered the most damage. Other entities
under the Ministry of Justice (state bailiffs, notaries, probation service) are less affected. The economic
cost of the war on the justice and public administration sector is estimated at over US$0.34 billion indamages and US$1.66 billion in losses, with reconstruction needs estimated at US$0.72 billion. Trade with
Russia and Belarus has ended, and Ukrainian markets are now fully reoriented toward Western markets.
Since RDNA2, damage has increased (by more than 15 percent) and the loss and needs estimations haverisen accordingly. Since February 2022, some immediate sectoral needs have been met, mostly throughpublic or donor means. However, these are very limited compared to the sector’s recovery andreconstruction needs and broader modernization needs.
Damage and Loss Assessment
The total value of the damage to the sector is estimated to be US$343.6 million (Table 56), a 15.6
percent increase from RDNA2. This figure includes US$140 million in damage to institutions under the
Ministry of Justice (of which US$128 million represents damage to the penitentiary subsector, including
probation institutions). It also includes US$119 million in damage to the judiciary (mostly to courts);
US$62.2 million in damage to SCS; and US$22.4 million in damage to the prosecution service. The
penitentiary subsector suffered the largest share of damage (37.4 percent). Most (95.0 percent) of thetotal damage is to buildings: 41.6 percent to Ministry of Justice buildings (mostly penitentiary entities),
36.2 percent to the judiciary (mostly courts), and 16.0 percent to SCS. The remaining 5.0 percent isdamage to vehicles (US$6.8 million) and to furniture, equipment, or other types of inventories (US$10.2
million). Damage includes partial damage, destruction, or theft by occupants. Damage is concentrated ineastern Ukraine: Kharkivska (30.2 percent), Donetska (14.9 percent), Luhanska (13.9 percent), Zaporizka(9.4 percent), and Khersonska (8.3 percent) oblasts.
The losses in the sector are estimated to be US$1.7 billion (Table 56). Loss of customs fees amounts toalmost US$1.63 billion, or 98.0 percent of all losses in the sector. The drop in customs revenues from the
supply of gas, petroleum products, and electricity alone amounts to about US$820 million. By region,
substantial losses of customs fees are greatest in Mykolaivska (US$254 million), Khersonska (US$178.5
million), and Zaporizka (US$102.4 million) oblasts. The remaining losses include almost US$11.0 million
for the judiciary, US$9.4 million for institutions under the Ministry of Justice (with US$6.3 million for
penitentiaries and probation institutions), and US$1.9 million for the prosecution service. Losses otherthan customs fees include: removal of debris and demolition of damaged and destroyed buildings (valued
at US$10.9 million in the judiciary, US$8.1 million in SCS, US$6.6 million in the Ministry of Justice, andUS$1.1 million in the prosecution service); loss of destroyed or damaged assets in the process of178

enforcement of court judgments (US$2.7 million in the Ministry of Justice); loss of destroyed or damaged
goods seized by the Customs Service in administrative proceedings with the aim of confiscation (US$0.8
million in CSC); and the cost of purchasing or renting vehicles, furniture, equipment, and other inventory
for repaired premises (US$0.6 million in the prosecution service).
Human impact. The human impact in this sector relates to the burden of investigating and prosecuting
war crimes on top of carrying out normal responsibilities. This sector is vital for ensuring the rule of law(through courts, prosecutors, free legal aid lawyers), providing administrative services to citizens(administrative services centres, notaries, bailiffs), contributing to budget revenue (customs), andincarceration of convicted felons in appropriate conditions (penitentiary service). War crime cases haveincreased the workload of the prosecutor’s office, the courts, and the system of free legal aid. It is also
important to acknowledge the heightened levels of stress and trauma experienced by the investigatorsand prosecutors working on these cases.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
The total reconstruction and recovery needs in the justice and public administration sector are
estimated at US$721.3 million over 10 years (Table 57). The overall needs for the Ministry of Justiceconstitute US$293.9 million (41 percent of total needs in the sector); of this amount, US$269.6 million isrelated to penitentiary institutions. Needs for the judiciary are US$249.8 million, or 34 percent of total
needs; for the SCS they are US$130.7 million, or 18 percent; and for the prosecution service they are
US$46.9 million, or 7 percent. Needs mostly relate to new construction or repairs and to purchase of newvehicles, furniture, equipment, or other inventory. The BBB approach includes the need to ensure security
and digitalization of newly built court houses. This increases the replacement cost to US$1.200 per square
meter. The geographic distribution of needs shows that most needs are concentrated in Kharkivska (30.2
percent), Donetska (14.8 percent), Luhanska (13.9 percent), and Zaporizka (9.4 percent) oblasts. It is
important to note that these estimates assume that the situation does not deteriorate further.
Some immediate needs within the sector have been addressed by the GoU as well as ongoing efforts
by partners. In 2023, buildings with minor damage that were located far away from the front lines were
repaired, mostly by the government or the institutions themselves. Given lack of funds in the state budget,
the government did not reconstruct destroyed buildings that required capital investments and significant
resources. In two oblasts, Donetska and Kharkivska, the prosecution service procured new vehicles (at acost of over US$200,000) and new furniture, equipment, or other inventory (over US$430,000).
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities
The total recovery and reconstruction investment priorities for 2024 are estimated at US$22.0 million(Table 58). The recovery and reconstruction priorities highlighted by GoU are related to reconstruction of
two detention centers and a penitentiary facility (US$19.1 million for 2024), and completion of theconstruction of another penitentiary facility (US$ 1.9 million for 2024). The total cost to finance priorities
in the penitentiary subsector in 2024 is US$22 million. 2024 priorities also include maintaining operation
at other key justice sector institutions. Based on the information from the State Judicial Administration,
more than 120 court buildings have been damaged, and some require only minor repairs like replacementof windows or doors to be functional. However, no funds have been committed in the 2024 state budget179to address any of these priorities. The 2024 priorities should also include an assessment of capacity needsof judicial staff with regard to war crimes.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
This assessment follows the same principles and assumptions as RDNA1 and RDNA2. RDNA3 includes
new baseline, damage, loss, and needs data from other entities under the Ministry of Justice, such as statebailiffs, notaries, and centers for administrative services, in addition to the data from penitentiary andprobation institutions. The data used in the assessment are from the GoU.
As in RDNA1 and RDNA2, there are still many data limitations. The lack of data on assets in territories
not under government control poses a great challenge to assessing damage and determining future
recovery needs. Even after border oblasts (e.g., Kharkivska, Sumska) were returned to government
control, it has been practically impossible to access customs facilities there for a thorough assessment ofdamage to buildings and movable property.
The key recommendations for further assessments include the following: (i) consult with GoU on how
to ensure more consistency in the information for analysis (e.g., through less turnover among the focal
points in each subsector); (ii) consult with private sector actors to get their view of recovery andreconstruction implementation priorities in the sector; and (iii) have GoU develop a list of specific priority
needs in the sector that could be funded in 2025.
Table 56. Damage, loss, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
OblastCherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
Kyiv (City)
KyivskaLuhanska
Lvivska
Mykolaivska
OdeskaPoltavska
Rivnenska
SumskaTernopilska
Vinnytska
Volynska
Zakarpatska
Zaporizka

Damage

Loss
11.4
3.6
51.1
0.6
103.8
28.4
0.9
5.3
21.3
47.8
3.3
16.9
2.4
2.7
9.0
0.5
32.2

Needs
9.5
0.1
4.9
0.1
11.9
179.8
820.1
3.2
50.0
0.1
255.2
88.4
0.1
61.9
103.1

23.8
7.5
107.1
1.2
218.0
59.6
2.0
11.2
44.8
100.3
7.0
35.4
5.1
5.7
19.0
1.0
67.6

180

Zhytomyrska
2.4
72.7
5.1
Nationwide (no specific region)
Total
343.6
1,661.1
721.3
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not assessed. Damage covers 22 months of war between February 24, 2022,
and 31 December 2023; Loss covers a total of 40 months, which includes 22 months between February 24, 2022,
and December 31, 2023, and an additional 18 months until June 30, 2025; needs cover the period 2024–2033.

Table 57. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Reconstruction Needs

Service Delivery
Reconstruction Needs

Component
Judiciary
Ministry of Justice
Prosecution
Customs
Judiciary
Ministry of Justice
Prosecution
Customs
Total

Total needs (2024–2033)
199.8
235.1
37.5
104.6
50.0
58.8
9.4
26.1
721.3

Source: Assessment team.

Table 58. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Ministry of Justice – restoration of the detention and prison capacity
Total
Source: Assessment team based on priorities defined by line ministries.

Estimated cost
22
22

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Explosive Hazards Management320
Context
Ukraine, affected by war since 2014, is one of the most heavily mined countries in the world. The
National Mine Action Authority (NMAA) estimates that more than a third of Ukrainian territory (174,000
km2) is potentially contaminated with explosive ordnance as a result of the invasion in 2022 (see Figure26).321 Satellite imagery, enhanced by artificial intelligence along with new nontechnical survey (NTS)
techniques, has revealed that large areas of the land suspected of contamination are free of mines.
However, even if only a small percentage of this territory is contaminated, it would still represent one ofEurope's most significant clearance challenges since the end of the Second World War. Contamination
patterns fall mainly into two categories: (i) large areas of land with potential/suspected contamination,
where the bulk of the area is not contaminated but some smaller areas show light contamination; and (ii)territories along the current front line and areas again under government control. The areas along thefront line are heavily contaminated, and clearance efforts there will be complex, costly, and timeconsuming, requiring application of the highest technical standards. In 2023, NTS resulted in thecomprehensive assessment of over 50,000 km2 of land over which the GoU had regained control (including
more than 21,000 km2 in Mykolaivska, Khersonska, and Kharkivska oblasts) and allowed for the further
definition of the nature and extent of contamination.322 Investments of close to US$20 million in NTS
throughout 2023323 allowed for the updating of the needs assumptions, which has resulted in a potential
cost reduction of US$3.0 billion for mine action needs.
Human impact. The clearance of explosive hazards (landmines, unexploded ordnance, and improvised
explosive devices) is a precondition for safe rebuilding, resumption of service provision, and return tonormality in Ukraine across all sectors of the economy and social life. Effective and efficient mine action
efforts, in particular NTS,324 technical survey (TS),325 and clearance,326 are essential to land release.327 In
addition to removing explosive hazards to allow for safe use of land, there is both a need to educate thepopulation on the dangers of tampering with explosive remnants of war (ERW) and a duty to support
surviving victims of explosive incidents. The OHCHR indicates that as of January 15, 2024, there were 339
320 In RDNA1, this sectoral assessment was labeled “Land Decontamination.”
321 Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, “Demining Ukraine in a Few Years, Not Decades, Is the Best Response to the Aggressor: Yuliia

Svyrydenko,” August 18, 2023, Link.
322 NMAA data.
323 Estimate provided by the United Nations Development Programme.
324 NTS is the starting point for identifying, accessing, collecting data on, reporting on, and using information to define wheremines/explosive remnants of war (ERW) are to be found, as well as where they are not. It also aids in identifying Suspected
Hazardous Areas (SHA) and Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA) where further investigation and/or clearance need to take place.
325 TS techniques and methods involve a physical intervention and use survey or clearance assets to enter a hazardous area to (i)confirm the presence, or absence, of mines/ERW and identify the type of hazards present; (ii) better define the boundaries of the
SHA or CHA that require clearance; and (iii) collect information to support land release decision-making. TS can be broadly
characterized as either targeted or systematic depending upon the information gathered about hazard and threat. TS assets must
provide a high probability (near certainty) that the presence of expected hazardous items will be indicated by the equipment andmethodology in use and that TS personnel are safe to conduct the activity.
326 The most familiar and visible part of mine action is the clearance of mines and ERW. It is also the most expensive. Clearance
refers to an intrusive information-gathering and threat-removal process that fully defines a hazardous area while removing
explosive hazards.
327 Land release describes the process of applying all reasonable efforts to identify, define, and remove all presence and suspicionof explosive ordnance.

182

civilian victims of mines and explosive remnants of war and 757 were injured.328 The costs of supporting
those injured, a responsibility that will extend across generations, are comprehensively addressed in thesocial protection and livelihoods chapter.
Recovery and Reconstruction Needs, including Build Back Better
Based on data collected and on prior land release in 2023, the current total costs for the clearance of
explosive ordnance across Ukraine are an estimated US$34.6 billion (Table 59). Based on the results ofa comprehensive survey in several hromadas in 2023, the share of land projected to require technicalsurvey and clearance was adjusted from the results in RDNA2. Specifically, there is a reduction of 1,179
km2 for TS and a reduction of 826 km2 for clearance, amounting to a reduction in cost of US$3.0 billion.
The cost projection includes significant investments needed for demining equipment, salaries, and thetraining necessary to ensure qualified staff to meet demand. Concerning land release, US$50–200 million
is needed for NTS,329 US$8.95 billion is needed for TS, and an estimated US$25.5 billion is needed forcomprehensive land clearance. Concerning geographic distribution of mine action needs, the oblasts mostaffected are those in the south and east, as well as oblasts in the north that were temporarily not under
GoU control. Indications are that most victims of explosive incidents are concentrated in the southern andeastern oblasts.330
To ensure that land clearance serves Ukraine’s most critical recovery and reconstruction needs,
prioritization of resources remains essential; the focus should be on large population centers andvulnerable exposed groups such as small-scale farmers, as well as critical infrastructure with a view torebuild the Ukrainian economy. The use of aerial technology and remote sensing can speed up the surveyof vast but lightly contaminated areas and will significantly lower costs. At the same time, it is expected
to result in release of large areas for productive use and to assist in defining with further precision whichareas are heavily contaminated and in need of advanced clearance efforts. Managing the risks arising from
ERW and landmine contamination on this scale will require more than just the resources for survey andclearance needs. It will also require resources for deliberate and organized buildup of Ukraine’s mine
action capacity, including a full suite of human, financial, and technical resources. Needs range fromtraining of trainers to acquisition of demining equipment; from arrangements for life-cycle support forsustainable equipment to identification and recruitment of deminers; and from the expansion of
information management capability to establishment of efficient certification procedures. All this andmore will be necessary to allow the Ukrainian authorities to expand their current demining capacity andmeet the demand. Clearing residential areas of mines is also crucial for the return of displaced
populations, the revitalization of communities as well as for implementing recovery and reconstruction.
2024 Recovery and Reconstruction Priorities

328 OHCHR. 2024. Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — December 2023. Link.
329 If applied on a large scale, the innovative integration of aerial surveys and AI analysis has the potential to significantly expedite

NTS processes, potentially reducing projected costs from US$200 million to US$50 million. Pilot activities have shown thisapproach is particularly effective in areas suspected of having low levels of contamination. However, it is not applicable fornonhumanitarian tasks or in areas within 20 km of the front line.
330 Victim numbers are classified in light of the ongoing invasion. Data collected by the UN contain civilian victims only and—inlight of the ongoing invasion and access challenges—are likely incomplete. Trends indicate that most incidents involving civilians
occurred in Kharkivska, Khersonska, and Mykolaivska.

183

In restoring access to areas previously contaminated by explosive ordnance, mine action is an enablerthat allows the delivery of humanitarian aid and recovery and reconstruction activities. Demand formine action services is therefore high, and provision of services will have to follow the priorities of the
Revised Ukraine Winter Response plan 2023–2024331 as well as the 2024 Humanitarian response plan.332
More importantly, the work in Ukraine will follow the NMAA’s first National Mine Action Strategy, to be
finalized within 2024 and likely to include three key priorities: returning the land to productive use;
protecting the people from explosive ordnance; and strengthening the Mine Action Management
System.333 Concerning methodology, the intent is to increase use of technology in NTS in 2024 in order toeliminate currently suspected land that has no evidence of contamination. The use of community liaisons
can be helpful in collecting reports of explosive ordnance from the communities affected. These Explosive
Ordnance Risk Education teams will also be important in communicating to populations that their land issafe for use if no evidence of explosive ordnance is found. In terms of most direct investment needs, the
GoU wants to prioritize training and equipping of relevant authorities to build the necessary capacity toaccomplish its priorities (Table 61). Additionally, the GoU has expressed its intention to increase thenumber of well-trained and well-equipped humanitarian deminers in order to meet the increasing
demand for TS and clearance as progress continues to be made in the area of NTS.
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Assessments
The operational costs—simplified for the purpose of the RDNA3—represent an average of the cost forclearance of current levels of explosive contamination in Ukraine. Under the phased approach to land
release, government units of the Ministry of Defense and SESU conduct emergency clearance—that is,
explosive ordnance disposal “spot tasks;” this is then followed by more systematic clearance inaccordance with international standards. In addition, though the area used in the calculation includes
both land and aquatic settings, no differentiation between terrestrial and underwater clearance is made,and the inclusion of the cost of aquatic equipment should be assumed. Of special concern is thedestruction of the Kakhovka Dam on June 6, 2023, which caused extensive flooding and may havedisplaced and/or submerged mines and ERW, and thus increased the risk of future injuries and death forthe surrounding population.334 Clearance efforts may damage the fragile ecosystems in the river delta,
while lack of demining will keep the river channel and surrounding delta difficult to use for years to come.
Costs associated with the removal of anchored and floating sea mines in the Black Sea are yet
unquantified. However, until clearance of the Black Sea and Ukrainian harbors is completed, the risk ofthis contamination will impact the price of shipping and affect Ukraine’s agricultural exports.
In the south and east, parts of Ukraine are temporarily not under the GoU’s control, with ongoingfighting. For this reason, comprehensive survey of those areas is not possible, while the most heavily
contaminated parts of Ukraine’s territory are adjacent to the front line and are still at risk of being re-

331 UN OCHA, “Revised Ukraine Winter Response Plan, October 2023–March 2024,” September 2023, Link.
332 UN OCHA, Humanitarian Country Team, and partners, “Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024,” January 3, 2024, Link.
333 Based on the work of the Workshop on Strategy Development, co-organized by the Ministry of Economy of Ukraine and

the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, October 3–5, 2023.
334 UN Environment Programme, Rapid Environmental Assessment of Kakhovka Dam Breach: Ukraine, 2023 (Nairobi: UNEP, 2023),
41, Link.

184

exposed to fighting and further contamination. Access for humanitarian mine action is not feasible or
expected in the short term. Rather it will be an ongoing effort lasting decades after the end of the war.
Table 59. Explosive ordnance contamination and estimated clearance cost (US$ million)

OblastKyiv (City)
Cherkaska
Chernihivska
Chernivetska
Dnipropetrovska
Donetska
Ivano-Frankivska
Kharkivska
Khersonska
Khmelnytska
Kirovohradska
KyivskaLuhanska
Lvivska
Mykolaivska
OdeskaPoltavska
Rivnenska
SumskaTernopilska
Vinnytska
Volynska
Zakarpatska
Zaporizka
Zhytomyrska

Km2
Land
Estimated area
exposed to Nontechnical TechnicalClearancewar (%)
surveysurvey836
000020,916000080
31,90325,481
764
382
8,096
0
0
0
0
31,923000026,517
16,964
64
1,696
1,272
13,927000031,41846
14,444
1,083
812
28,461
95
27,074
2,707
2,031
20,629000024,588000028,12137
10,404312
156
26,683100
26,6732,667
2,000
21,831000024,585
14
3,442
103
52
33,3140
0
0
0

Oblastarea

28,75020,051
23,832
13,824
26,492
20,144

0
0
70
0
0
0

0
0
16,677
0
0
0

0
0
500
0
0
0

0
0
250
0
0
0

12,753074
14

020,1050
1,910
188
11,932

0
1,432
94
8,482

27,18329,827
603,549

4,174
165,437

US$, million
Estimated cost for HMA
NontechnicalTechnical
Clearance
surveysurvey30.8
573.3
1,146.6
20.5
1,272.3
3,816.9
17.5
812.5
2,437.4
32.8
2,030.6
6,091.7
0
0
0
12.6
234.1
468.2
32.3
2,000.4
6,001.3
4.2
77.4
154.9

US$/km2

Total
1,750.8
5,109.7
3,267.4
8,155.00714.9
8,034.0
236.5

20.2
-

375.0
-

750.0
-

1,145.8
-

24.3
5.1
200.2
1,210

1,432.5
140.9
8,949.2
750,000

4,297.5
281.7
25,446.6
3,000,000

5,754.3
427.7
34,596

Sources: Oblast area: European Space Agency WorldCover 2020 Land Cover, Link. Area exposed to war: Information
Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) database, February 22, 2023. Estimated NTS cancellation of
hazardous area percentages and operational costs: Assessment team.
Note: HMA = humanitarian mine action; NTS = nontechnical survey; TS = technical survey. For Chernihivska, Kyivska,
Sumska, Zhytomyrska, and Mykolaivska, the determination was that 95 percent of land surveyed through NTS will
be cancelled, leaving 5 percent for TS; and then 50 percent of land surveyed through TS is foreseen for the actual
clearance. For other oblasts the determination was that 90 percent of land surveyed through NTS will be cancelled,leaving 10 percent for TS; and then 75 percent of land surveyed through TS is foreseen for the actual clearance. Due
to limited data on “reduced” area, this methodology has been maintained. However, based on a review informed byactual data from incomplete NTS, the TS numbers have been adjusted for Chernihivska, Kyivska, Sumska, andMykolaivska to 3 percent and for Kharkivska to 8 percent.
a. The total territory of Ukraine includes the regions of Crimea and Sevastopol, which are temporarily not under
government control. Although these regions were not included in the RDNA assessment, their areas are counted
toward the total territory of Ukraine.

Table 60. Total recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of December 31, 2023
Category

Types of activities/investments

Total needs (2024–2033)

185

Nontechnical survey
Service delivery restoration needs Technical survey
Mine clearance
Total
Source: Assessment team.

200.2
8,949.2
25,446.6
34,596.0

Table 61. Estimated 2024 recovery and reconstruction priorities (US$ million)
Types of priority activities/investments
Ministry of Defense: Machinery and equipment for humanitarian demining units; capacity
building for a demining equipment certification system
Ministry of Internal Affairs: Equipping of new and existing pyrotechnic units of SESU, NPU, andNGU with vehicles, demining machines, and equipment

Estimated cost
241.8
202.10Funding for nongovernmental mine action operators for NTSa
48.4
Total
492.3
Source: Coordinated by Ministry of Economy; data provided by Ministries of Defense and Internal Affairs. Note: NGU= National Guard of Ukraine; NPU = National Police of Ukraine; NTS = nontechnical survey; SESU = State Emergency
Service of Ukraine. a. The calculation represents the estimated cost of nontechnical surveys for 2024.
Nongovernmental mine action operators also conduct many other activities, such as mine risk education, victim
assistance, etc. The cost of these activities is not included; thus, the indicated number represents only a part ofoperators' needs.

Figure 26. Reference map and areas exposed to war used as baseline

Source: Ukrainian Mine Action Portal, “Implementation of Humanitarian Demining Activities: Interactive Map”
(accessed December 2023), Link. Note: ERW = explosive remnants of war; NTS = nontechnical survey.

186

Annex 1. RDNA3 TeamThe RDNA3 team would like to express its deep appreciation to all individuals and organizations who
contributed to this assessment (listed below and in Table 62).
From the Government of Ukraine, support was provided under the guidance of Oleksandr Kubrakov,
Deputy Prime Minister for Restoration of Ukraine and Minister for Communities, Territories andInfrastructure Development of Ukraine; Anna Yurchenko, Deputy Minister for Communities, Territories
and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine for European Integration; Nataliia Kozlovska, Deputy Minister
for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine, and Olga Zykova, Deputy
Minister for Ministry of Finance of Ukraine, with support from the ProSteer Office under the MCTID, andthe Reforms Delivery Office of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (RDO).
From the European Commission, support was provided under the guidance of Gert Jan Koopman
Director-General, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations,
European Commission.
From the United Nations, support was provided under the guidance of Denise Brown, the United Nations
Resident Coordinator in Ukraine, and Jaco Cilliers, Resident Representative of the United Nations
Development Programme in Ukraine.
From the World Bank, support was provided under the guidance of Arup Banerji, Regional Director,
Eastern Europe; Sameh Wahba, Regional Director for Sustainable Development; Michal Rutkowski,
Regional Director for Human Development; Charles Cormier, Regional Director for Infrastructure; Asad
Alam, Regional Director for Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions; Gevorg Sargsyan, Country
Manager for Ukraine; and Christoph Pusch, Practice Manager, Urban, Disaster Risk Management,
Resilience and Land.
Table 62. RDNA3 Team
Core level
Government: Anna Yurchenko, Iryna Kucheruk, Maya Yankovska, Oleksandr Petroshchuk, Kateryna Elishyieva,
Ruslan Kyrylenko, Roman Fil, Ihor Korkhovyi. Coordination with the Reform Delivery Office of the Cabinet of
Ministers of Ukraine: Tetyana Kovtun, Olena Yaroshchuk, Olena Osmolovska, Natalie Vyniarchuk
World Bank: Zuzana Stanton-Geddes, Thomas Farole, Oleksandra Shatyrko, Krunoslav Katic, Jae Kyun Kim, Soraya
Ridanovic, Debashree Poddar, Alanna Simpson, Gevorg Sargsyan, Sevara Melibaeva, Caryn Bredenkamp, Karlis
Smits, Nadia Kislova, Julia Samoslied, Dinara Muldabayeva, Ben Stewart, Min Jaegal, Spyridon Demetriou, Nicole
Frost, Amy Lynn Stilwell, Victor Zablotskyi, Maya Abi Karam, Christina Leb, Zoe Trohanis, Baher El-Hifnawi, Salim
Rouhana. International Finance Corporation: Johannes Herderschee, Victoria Tetyora
European Union: Julda Kielyte, Gabriel Blanc, Marta Sadel, Chloe Allio, Svitlana Didkivska, Claes Anderson, Jana
Mueller, Louise Hancock, Milica Saracevic, Mikolaj Bekasiak, Corinne Andre, Marta Skrzynska
United Nations: Ana Lukatela, Rita Missal, Ildar Gazizullin, Aliaksei Vavokhin, Yaroslava Babych
Macroeconomic Impact, Poverty
World Bank: Florian Blum, Antonis Tsiflis, Maryna Sidarenka, Obert Pimhidzai, Kristina Noelle Vaughan
European Union: Julda Kielyte, Marta Skrzynska, Fernando Fonseca
United Nations: Aliaksei Vavokhin, Hana Daoudi, Ildar Gazizullin, Yaroslava Babych
Human Impact Assessment (social sustainability and inclusion; displacement/fragility, conflict, and violence)187

Government: Darina Marchak, Andriy Chesnokov, Tetiana Borshchenko, Serhii Sobchuk, Olena Kolchyk, Anhelina
Oliynychenko, Ihor Kostrikov,Bohdan Dzyaman, Anastasia Kozhemyakina, Inna Ivanova, Mykola Boyarkin
World Bank: Erik Johnson, Oleksandra Shatyrko, Farwah Qasim, Charlotte Vuyiswa McClain-Nhlapo, Mirjahon
Turdiev
European Union: Martin Schroeder, Oyvind Opland, Mira Didukh, Tetiana Shulha
United Nations: Nynne Warring, Karen Whiting, Michael Newson, Federica Dispenza, Olena Ivanova, Noriko
Takahashi, Sabine Freizer, Yaroslava Babych, Julia Broussard, Tetyana Kudina, Clara Bastardes Tort, Tetiana
Grytsenko, Ruth Kirui, Theresa Chorbacher, Noushik Etyemezian, Felicia Dahlquist, Swirri Aboringong, Eliza Silvia
Galos, Valeriia Taran-Gaiduk, Anastasiia Kolomiiets, Liudmyla Shevtsova, Sofiia Kornieieva, Petra Wenitzky
Housing
Government: Natalia Kozlovska,Nadia Bihun, Svitlana Kashenets, Oleksandr Petroshchuk, Inna Vakhovych, Evhen
Plashchenko, Iryna Oleynikova, Yuliya Podyuk, Oleh Topiha, Roman Kropyvnytskyi, Serhii Pakholchuk, Olena
Nedyba, Kateryna Samsoniuk, Ihor Korkhovyi, Viktor Martsinyshyn, Olena Osmolovska
World Bank: Debashree Poddar, Pol Nadal, Tengiz Gogotishvili
European Union: Krzysztof Gierulski, Ulyana Rudnytska, Andriy Bandura, Christian Ben HellUnited Nations: Andrri Sphak, Marian Schilperoord, Leandro Jardon, Thamara Fortes, Simon Darke, Arun
Narayanan, Olga Liuta
Education and Science
Government: Yevhen Kudriavets, Oleksandra Azarkhina, Khystyna Faichak, Yurii Malashenko, Natalia Viniarchuk,
Andrii Bondarenko, Olena Prokopenko
World Bank: Enrique Alasino, James Gresham, Adrien Olszak-Olszewski, Nalin Jena
European Union: Vira Rybak, Fernando Fonseca, Janis Aizsalnieks, Marta Skrzynska
United Nations: Veera Mendonca, Emmanuelle Abrioux, Manan Kotak, Daniel Cuturic, Yayoi Segi-Vltchek, Paul
Cruickshank
HealthGovernment: Petro Yemets, Oleksii Iaremenko, Tetiana Gotsyenko Kateryna Samsoniuk, Natalia Viniarchuk, Inna
Harts, Natalia Makhynia, Maryna Petrovska
World Bank: Akiko Kitamura, Jakub Jan Kakietek, Oleksandr Zhynas, Khrystyna Pak, Arthur ten Have, Olena
Doroshenko
European Union: Rene Steiner, Mira Didukh, Fernando Fonseca
United Nations: Kateryna Fishchuk, Nataliia Piven, Guillaume Simonian, Aron Aregay, Ihor Perehinets, Kateryna
RyabchiySocial Protection and Livelihoods
Government: Dariia Marchak, Svitlana Kashenets, Olena Kulchytska, Nina Pidluzhna, Tatiana Borshchenko,
Bohdan Matviychuk, Oksana Sulima, Maria Sakuta, Olena Kolchyk, Serhii Sobchuk, Serhii Pakholchuk, Ruslan
Prykhodko, Ihor Kostrikov, Inna Hryhorenko, Natalia Viniarchuk, Antonina Mandrikina, Svitlana Afanasieva,
Tetiana Berezhna, Kateryna Samsonyuk
World Bank: Roman Zhukovskyi, Anna Baranova, Iryna Kalachova, Liudmyla Cherenko
European Union: Mira Didukh, Fernando Fonseca, Oyvind Opland
United Nations: Chrissey Mueller, Marian Schilperoord, Michael Newson, Noriko Takahashi, David Mosler, Steven
Kapsos, Sara Elder, Sergiy Savchuk, Paul von Kittlitz, Carlota Rego, Satinderjit Singh Toor, Frederic Wiesenbach
Culture and Tourism
Government: Taras Shevchenko,Nataliya Voytseshchuk,Kristina Yefimenko, Maryna Matviienko, Natalia
Viniarchuk,Kateryna Samsonyuk
World Bank: Jae Kyun Kim,
European Union: Tetiana Shulha
United Nations: Chiara Dezzi Bardeschi, Joe Kallas, Maïssa Acheuk-Youcef, Darya Levchenko
Agriculture
Government: Markiian Dmytrasevych, Oleksandr Krasnolutskyi, Oleksii Pinchuk, Iryna Olinkevych, Kateryna
Nazarenko
World Bank: Sergiy Zorya, Oleksandr Muliar, Roman Neyter

188

European Union: Christian Ben Hell, Philipp Max Lehne
United Nations: Anna Burka, Dragan Angelovski, Elyse Battistella, Kjell Sundin, Aleksa Mirkovic
Irrigation and Water Resources
Government: Markiian Dmytrasevych, Oleksandr Krasnolutskyi, Oleksii Pinchuk, Iryna Olinkevych, Kateryna
Nazarenko
World Bank: Ranu Sinha, Femke van Woesik, Frank van Steenbergen, Poolad Karimi, Ana Cecilia Escalera
Rodriguez
European Union: Christian Ben Hell, Olga Simak
United Nations: Nicolas Osbert, Anna Burka
Commerce and Industry
Government: Volodymyr Kuzio, Viacheslav Оvechkin, Serhii Hrom, Inna Hryhorenko
World Bank: Alberto Criscuolo, Iryna Piontkivska
European Union: Iryna Hubarets, Stanislav Toshkov, Panagiotis Stamoulis, Janis Aizsalnieks
United Nations: Nicola Cantore, Dorina Nati, Noriko Takahashi, Marco Matteini, Serhiy Porovskyy
Finance and Banking
Government: Nadia Bihun, Andrii Strashnyi, Dmytro Vasylyna, Pervin Dadashova, Inna Hryhorenko, Olena
Yaroshchuk
World Bank: Johanna Jaeger, Yevhen Hrebeniuk, Klym Naumenko
European Union: Vitaliya Mudruk, Agne Metelionyte, Marta Sadel
United Nations: n/a
Energy and Extractives
Government: Svitlana Hrynchuk, Nadia Bihun, Roman Andarak, Antonia Volska, Valerii Bezus, Yevhen Nazarenko,
Pavlo Tkachenko, Roman Kropyvnytskyi, Nika Cherneha, Yevhen Khovailo, Sofia Kakhnovets. Olexandr Petroschuk,
Anton Buiar, Andriy Vedmid, Oleg Pavlenko, Maria Bishko, ykhailo Kopach, Mykola Hevpa, rina Zdorovetska,
Lyudmila Prybytkova
World Bank: Silvia Martinez, Koji Nishida, Roman Novikov, Sandu Ghidirim, Wolfhart Pohl
European Union: Torsten Woellert, Ulyana Rudnytska, Andriy Bandura, Ingrid Sager, Krzysztof Gierulski, Marcus
Lippold, Janis Aizsalnieks
United Nations: Anna Piwowarska, Tetiana Tavlui, Joseph Busch, Prashant Kumar, Marco Matteini, SerhiyPorovskyy
Transport
Government: Anna Yurchenko, Serhii Derkach, Oleksandra Azarkhina, Oleksii Serheiev, Addrii Danyk, Mykola
Yavon, Sofia-Аnna Kakhnovets, Kateryna Shtauberg, Yuliana Sidliarova, Valentyna Poliakova, Dmytro Klets, Anna
Kopynets, Oleksii Okarsky, Yurii Vaskov, Oleksandr Pavlichenko, Volodymyr Shemaiev, Roman Melnychenko, Anna
Mazur, Oleksandr Lemeshkin, Maryna Babii, Yevhen Korniev, Ihor Blinov, Andrii Berbeka, Natalia Pervak, Mykola
Melnyk, Olena Starikova, Serhii Vasylyha, Dmytro Mikov, Yevhen Smuryhin, Olena Belska
World Bank: Gregoire F. Gauthier, Yevhen Bulakh, Anna Vazhnenko, Anton Hagen
European Union: Svitlana Didkivska, Daniel Jacques
United Nations: Nicolas Rallo, Mekki Lahlou, Sarantis Poulimenakos, George Paltakis, Elene Aglazde, Arun
Narayanan
Telecommunications and Digital
Government: Anatolii Komirnyi, Maksym Paliy, Maksym Polishchuk, Olha Zadorozhna, Nadia Martynova, Yuriy
Matsyk, Olena Osmolovska, Olena Yaroshchuk
World Bank: Maria Claudia Pachon, Thomas Chalumeau, Mykhailo Koltsov, Marta Khomyn
European Union: Svitlana Didkivska, Sergiy Ladnyy, Jenni Lundmark, Tanel Tang
United Nations: Tomoyoshi Koume, Volodymyr Brusilovskyi, Elind Sulmina
Water Supply and Sanitation
Government: Oleksandr Butenko, Iryna Perehinchuk, Oleksandr Petroshchuk, Oleksandr Shpytko, Olena
Osmolovska, Volodymyr Nahornyi, Oksana Nahorna, Anna Dmytrenko, Artem Ratiev, Olha Mikhailova, Sviatoslav
Chubarev, Marharyta Shumeiko, Dmytro Kovalchuk, Oleksandr Okhota
World Bank: Stjepan Gabric, Ivaylo Hristov Kolev

189

European Union: Olga Simak, Marjukka Porvari
United Nations: Mario Bianco, Nicolas Osbert
Municipal Services
Government: Oleksandr Butenko, Andrii Vedmid, Anton Buiar, Oleksandr Petroshchuk, Olena Osmolovska,
Volodymyr Nahornyi, Oksana Nahorna, Anna Dmytrenko, Artem Ratiev, Olha Mikhailova, Marharyta Shumeiko,
Dmytro Kovalchuk, Serhii Vlasenko, Natalia Kozlovska, Diana Novikova, Pavlo Krapyvnytskyy, Oleksandr Okhota,
Yevhenia Popovych, Oleksandr Horoshko, Anna Dmytrenko, Sviatoslav Chubarev, Marharyta Shumeiko, Dmytro
Kovalchuk, Oleksandr Shpytko, Ruslan Metil
World Bank: Debashree Poddar, Oleksandr Dovbnia, Roman Novikov
European Union: Krzysztof Gierulski, Natalia Starostenko, Tomasz Ostropolski
United Nations: Teshager Tefera, Olena Ruditch, Steffen Kaeser, Noriko Takahashi, Alexey Paschenko
Environment, Natural Resource Management, and Forestry
Government: Yevhenii Fedorenko, Olena Kramarenko, Victor Smal, Taras Lymar
World Bank: Arno Behrens, Susanna Dedring, Oksana Rakovych, Myles McDonagh
European Union: Christian Ben Hell, Olga Simak, Marjukka Porvari
United Nations: Mohammad Haris Sherzad, Br Ravishankar, Pier Carlo Sandei, Hassan Partow, Atila Uras
Emergency Response and Civil Protection
Government: Mykhailo Hryb, Ihor Sheliuk, Mykola Fedoseev, Yuliia Nemchenko, Kateryna Samsonyuk, Tetiana
Shkolnik, Lobko Anatoliy
World Bank: Zuzana Stanton-Geddes, Krunoslav Katic, Farah Soraya Ridanovic
European Union: Alejandro Eggenschwiler, Stanislav Topolnytskyy
United Nations: n/a
Justice and Public Administration
Government: Yurii Skakalskyi, Nataliia Panchuk, Irina Galivets, Nataliia Zalevska, Olena Kovalenko, Zurab
Adeishvili, Oleksii Boniuk, Nadiia Polishchuk, Olena Vysotska
World Bank: Laura Pop, Vitaliy Kasko, Daniela V. Felcman, David Bernstein
European Union: Panagiotis Stamoulis, Clemens Mueller, Manfredas Limantas, Ingrid Sager, Jenny Lundmark,Ekaterina Yakovleva
United Nations: Arezou Farivar, Vitalii Krysko, Kei Fukagawa, Olena Kulikovska
Explosive Hazard Management
Government: Oleksii Serheiev, Addrii Danyk, Ihor Bezkaravainyi, Yurii Koreva, Mykhailo Hryb, Dmytro Panshyn,
Nadia Martynova, Yevhenia Bodnia, Viktoria Khomenko, Vladyslava Vyshniakova, Andriy Kondor
World Bank: Zuzana Stanton-Geddes, Krunoslav Katic, Farah Soraya Ridanovic
European Union: n/a
United Nations: Paul Heslop, David McMahon, Stella Kaburis, Ejona Bakalli, Rory Logan, Olena Kryvova, Guy
RhodesCollaboration with Kyiv School of Economics (KSE)
Vladyslava Hrudova, Dmytro Goriunov, Yulia Danyshchuk, Dmytro Topolskov, Inna Studennikova, Yuliya Markuts,
Dmytro Andriyenko, Andrey Bezpyatov, Taras Marshalok, Dmytro Goriunov, Ihor Piddubnyi, Roman Neyter, Nazar
Moshnyaha, Dmytro Averin, Alla Bykovska, Tetiana Lutai, Yuriy Golynskyi, Valeriia Denysenko190191