Original Article

The South China Sea Dispute and
War/Peace Journalism: A
Framing Analysis of a Malaysian
Newspaper

KOME − An International Journal of Pure
Communication Inquiry
Volume 7 Issue 2, p. 17-36.
© The Author(s) 2019
Reprints and Permission:
kome@komejournal.com
Published by the Hungarian Communication
Studies Association
DOI: 10.17646/KOME.75672.32

Yang Lai Fong1 and Jenny Heng Gek Koon2
1
2

Department of Journalism, Xiamen University Malaysia, MALAYSIA
School of Media and Communication, Taylor’s University, MALAYSIA

Abstract: News coverage of crises, conflicts, and wars is grounded in the notion of news value.
Conflict reporting is often sensational and used as a device to boost circulation and ratings.
Therefore, Norwegian Professor of Peace Studies Johan Galtung proposed peace journalism as
a self-conscious working concept for journalists covering wars and conflicts. In recent years,
tension has steadily increased over the South China Sea dispute. There are fears that theoverlapping claims in the South China Sea will turn the region into an area of conflict, withpotentially serious global consequences. This study aimed to examine the reporting of the South
China Sea dispute by The Star, the English daily newspaper with the largest circulation in
Malaysia. War/peace journalism and framing were employed as the theoretical framework,
while content analysis was used as the research method to analyze the news coverage of theSouth China Sea dispute by The Star from 2014-2016. The findings showed that coverage in
The Star was dominated by the war journalism frame but carried a neutral valence towards
China. Implications of the findings to the understanding of war/peace journalism, conflict
reporting, and news value studies were discussed.
Keywords: South China Sea dispute, war/peace journalism, framing, conflict reporting, crisis
communication

Introduction
In recent years, tension has steadily increased over the South China Sea dispute. It involves
both island and maritime claims among several sovereign states within the region. While China
claims almost the entire South China Sea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Brunei,
Vietnam, and Taiwan have also made claims over it. The seabed of the South China Sea
contains oil, gas, minerals, and fisheries, which would bring great benefits to any country thatcan establish their claims to the region’s waters. More importantly, the sea’s key value isstrategic—shipping lanes vital to about 5 trillion US dollars’ worth of world trade pass throughit every year (Kwan, 2018).
Address for Correspondence: Yang Lai Fong, email: nicoleyanglaifong[at]gmail.com
Article received on the 29th March, 2019. Article accepted on the 5th September, 2019.
Conflict of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interests.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

18

China has become a major global power with its multidimensional growth ranging from
economic, military, education, scientific to technological. Intellectuals from a variety ofbackgrounds emphasize that the rise of China will inevitably change the structure of worldpolitics and the global economy (Bing, 2025; Li, 2016). It was also pointed out that Chinese
assertiveness in the South China Sea reflects China’s effort to dislodge the US as the hegemonic
power in the East Asian region and establish a Chinese sphere of influence instead (Cotillon,
2017; Golan & Lukito, 2015). Nevertheless, there are fears that the overlapping claims in theSouth China Sea will turn the region into an area of conflict, with potentially serious global
consequences (Guo, Mays, & Wang, 2019).
The rise of China is especially relevant to Malaysia—China is Malaysia’s biggest
trading partner. Malaysia, on the other hand, is China’s third-biggest trading partner in Asiaand the biggest trading partner among member countries that make up the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In addition, the bilateral ties between Malaysia and China
have also been shaped by long historical links (tracing back to the Malacca Sultanate andChina’s Ming dynasty in the 15th century), geographical proximity, and demographic structure(about 25% of Malaysia’s population is ethnic Chinese) (Kuik, 2016). In fact, Malaysia was
the first ASEAN member to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1974, thereby
subsequently setting a model relationship for the region (Bower & Nguyen, 2015). Kuik (2015)
pointed out that China is the key point of reference for Malaysia’s foreign policymakers. It isalso important to note that bilateral relations between Malaysia and China remain on good terms
despite a significant political change in May 2018, when the new government of Mahathir
Mohamad announced a change in its relations with China (Hruby & Petru, 2019; Yeoh, 2019).
China’s assertiveness towards its neighbors in the South China Sea has been a muchdebated topic in the international media and academic literature. However, Kreuzer (2016)
addressed that the vast majority of academic studies focused almost exclusively on the SinoVietnamese and Sino-Philippine conflicts. It is important to note that China demonstrated much
more restraint towards Malaysia, and Kreuzer (2016) argued that it is due to Malaysia’s
approach for establishing its overall bilateral relationships with China. Specifically, the author
observed that China possesses a higher level of tolerance towards its opponent in the South
China Sea dispute when the opponent displays recognition and respect for China’s national
self-rule1 and world order conceptions. This is because the recognition “allows the Chinese
elites to portray China (and by extension themselves) as a highly respected international actor
and thereby enhance their domestic legitimacy” (Kreuzer, 2016, p. 240).
In addition, scholars (e.g., Loyn, 2007; Shaw, Lynch, & Hackett, 2011; Zillich et al.,2011) recognized that a range of theoretical approaches has been developed to explain the
media’s role and function in conflict reporting and crisis communication. The normative
approach of peace journalism postulates a media coverage that aims for the solution and deescalation of conflicts. Peace journalism can be considered a special mode of socially
responsible journalism, which aims to translate theoretical notions into practical advice forjournalists.
The following sections of the paper will offer a synthesis of the literature on war andpeace journalism, focusing on the connection between journalism type and journalistic framing.
Considering the potential consequences of the South China Sea dispute, the bilateral relations
between Malaysia and China, and the role of media in conflict reporting, this is followed by acontent analysis of news articles from The Star, the largest circulation English daily newspaperin Malaysia. Analyzing the coverage of the South China Sea dispute between 1 January 20141

National self-role conception includes three elements: a description of national mission in the world, specificnotions of interstate relationships, and stability over time (Shih & Yin, 2013).

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

19

and 31 December 2016, the findings offer new insights into the dominant frames and framing
approaches used by this media as well as its valence toward China in general.

War/Peace Journalism
Norwegian Professor of Peace Studies Johan Galtung proposed peace journalism as a selfconscious working concept for journalists covering wars and conflicts. The proposal of theconcept was triggered by the Gulf War of 1991, and it penetrated the field of masscommunication in the early 1990s. Galtung (2003) observed that traditional war journalism ismodeled after sports journalism, with a focus on winning in a zero-sum game. In Galtung’svision, peace journalism approximates health journalism. A good health reporter describes apatient’s battle against cancer and yet informs readers about the cancer’s causes as well as thefull range of cures and preventive measures. In his advocacy of peace journalism, Tehranian(2002) called it “a system of global media ethics” (p. 58),
War journalism is elite-oriented in its news sourcing practice, whereby leaders andelites are often given the privilege to define and interpret an event or issue in news stories. War
journalism also focuses on here and now; it only reports about the what, who, where and whenof a conflict, while neglecting the factors contributing to the problem. This mode of journalism
plays up conflict as an arena where participants are grouped starkly into two opposing sides(‘them vs. us’). It advocates the fate of “our side”, and only exposes the untruths andperpetrators of atrocities of the “other side”. Meanwhile, the lies and cover-up attempts of “ourside” will be supported (Tehranian, 2002).
In addition, war journalism stressed on visible effects of war such as casualties anddamage to property (Lee and Maslog, 2005). Given its strong victory orientation, war
journalism disapproves of covering peace initiatives – at least as long as it was not yet clear
who would win the war. At the conclusion of hostilities, war journalism turns its attention to
the next “hot” conflict arena and may return if the old conflict flickers up again (Shaw, Lynchand Hackett, 2011).
In contrast, peace journalism is a broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing
stories, drawing on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation (Galtung and Fischer,2013). It is people-oriented in its news sourcing practice, whereby common people are reported
as actors and sources of information in news stories. By taking an advocative and interpretative
approach, peace journalists concentrate on stories that highlight peace initiatives, tone down
ethnic and religious differences and prevent further conflict (Tehranian, 2002). Peacejournalism also reveals the sufferings of all the parties within the conflict, while presenting theinvisible effects of violence such as emotional trauma and damage to social structure (Terzis,
2002; Lynch & Galtung, 2010). In addition, it also exposes lies, cover-up attempts and culpritson all sides (Tehranian, 2002).
Lynch and McGoldrick (2007) asserted that peace journalism provides necessarycontext, which includes the structural and cultural processes involved in the formation anddevelopment of conflicts. This would also help to make the issue transparent to the audience.
Furthermore, the authors stated that space could be created to identify all parties involved aswell as their goals, needs and interests. Due to its orientation towards solutions, this mode ofjournalism also dedicates particular attention to post-war developments (Lee and Maslog,2005).
Despite its popularity within peace research, the concept of peace journalism has been
widely criticized by communication researchers and practitioners for attributing political andmilitary responsibility to the media (Hanitzsch, 2004). For example, Fawcett (2002) explainedthat the function of journalism lies in reporting issues for public communication from a system-

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

20

theoretical perspective. Therefore, journalism cannot fulfil the roles of other public systems,
such as politics, law or the military, to engage in the peaceful settlement of a conflict.
Lynch and McGoldrick (2007) defined peace journalism as an approach undertaken byeditors and reporters in making choices about what to report and how to report in order toencourage non-violent responses to conflicts. However, scholars (e.g. Iggers, 1998; Loyn,2007) criticized that it is against journalistic principle of objectivity because it expects selfconscious intervention by journalists.
Wolfsfeld (1997) also pointed out the structural incompatibility between the needs of apeace process and journalistic imperatives. It was mentioned that many of the significant
developments within a peace process take place in closed doors, which consequently exclude
journalists who demand for information. The author also argued that a peace process iscomplicated, however, journalists demand simplicity for news presentation purpose.
Furthermore, most of the peace processes are marked by dull and tedious negotiations, whereas
journalists require drama and conflict to enhance the news value of their stories.
In addition, Hanitzsch (2007) also argued that the peace journalism advocates
underestimated the material conditions for modern news reporting and overestimated thepossibilities for journalists to contextualize their stories. The author found that a complex model
like Galtung’s is not suitable for the highly standardized narrative schemes of modern news
production.
Scholars (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2007; Seow and Maslog, 2005) found that war/peace
journalism is supported theoretically by the framing theory. Entman (1993, p. 52) defined
framing as the process “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them moresalient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item
described”. In addition, Lynch and McGoldrick (2007, p. 258) stated that framing refers to the“construct of a communication – its language, visual and messengers – and the way it signals
to the listener or observer how to interpret and classify new information”. It was also mentionedthat framing means “how messages are encoded with meaning so that they can be efficiently
interpreted in relationship to existing beliefs or ideas” (p. 258).
Manheim (1994) mentioned that news framing analyses usually cover three aspects:
visibility, valence and frame genres. Visibility refers to both the amount of coverage and theprominence level of an event/issue or a nation receives in the news coverage. Prominence isusually demonstrated by certain typical elements such as the article’s placement in thenewspaper or web sites, the headline, the visual tools associating with the text, the mention on
the evening television news etc. Valence or slant is the tone of a news story or comment
regarding certain frames. It is believed to have the potential to generate behavioural effects. By
indicating discourse valuations or carrying positive and/or negative elements, valenced news
frames present the extent to which the coverage reflects favourably or unfavourably on theevent/issue. Entman (2007) also stressed that agenda setting, priming and framing fit together
as tools of power, and he connected them to explicit definitions of news slant and bias.
Reviewing the literature on frames and framing, Carter (2013) asserted that one aspect
to how the media construct reality concerns the distortion of events. This is because reportingof events requires interpretation, and interpretation can lead to misrepresentations of reality due
to subjective opinions of the witnesses or sources. In addition, the author emphasized that time
or immediacy is also an important aspect to understanding how news media construct reality.
Media outlets work in a temporal setting in which deadlines are common. Therefore, the typesof stories and the way in which they are presented are dependent on the readiness of sources,
reporters, editors and others to produce stories. Carter (2013) also stressed that social
construction of reality deals with media and historical context. Due to time constraints, space
limitations and other institutionalized boundaries specific to media, events cannot always be

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

21

contextualized sequentially. Therefore, stories are framed apart from their whole, making
certain aspects more salient than others.
Similarly, many scholars (e.g. De Vreese, 2014; Holton, Lee & Coleman, 2014; Kim,
2015) have discussed the issue of “episodic framing” as compared to “thematic framing”.
“Episodic” frames focus on individual cases and encourage an audience to make internal
attributions for events (Iyengar, 1996, p. 62). On the contrary, “thematic” frames focus moreon broader social issues, such as social, political, and economic forces; these frames encourage
viewers to make external attributions (Iyengar, 1996, p. 62). Furthermore, episodic framing
describes concrete events that illustrates issues, while thematic framing presents collective or
general evidence.
The concept of “focuses on here and now” in war journalism fits into the notion of
episodic framing because it only reports about the what, who, where and when of an event. It
does not report on the factors contributing to the conflict nor the consequences of it. In contrast,
peace journalism emphasizes on “reporting causes and consequences”, in which news reports
about the factors contributing to the conflict as well as the consequences of it, and the idea isconsistent with “thematic framing”.
Specifically, this study asked the following questions:
RQ1: What was the visibility of the South China Sea dispute in The Star’s coverage?
RQ2: What was the dominant frame – war or peace journalism – in The Star’s coverage on theSouth China Sea dispute?
RQ3: What were the salient indicators supporting the war/peace journalism frame in The Star’s
coverage on the South China Sea dispute?
RQ4: What was the valence towards China in The Star’s coverage on the South China Sea
dispute?

Research Method
This study was based on a content analysis of news articles from The Star, the English daily
newspaper with the largest circulation in Malaysia. According to the Audit Bureau of
Circulations Malaysia, the 2018 average daily circulation of The Star was 175,986(www.abcm.org.my). The Star has a national circulation, albeit predominantly within
Peninsular Malaysia (Selva, 2018).
Sampling and Coding Procedure
The study investigated the coverage of the South China Sea dispute over three years, that is,from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2016. There were several important events that took place
during this timeframe. The year 2014 was designated as “Malaysia-China Friendship Year” tocommemorate the 40th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two countries.
Nonetheless, diplomatic ties between the two countries were tested in 2015 when the Chinese
ambassador to Malaysia visited China Town in the capital Kuala Lumpur before a pro-Malay
rally, and warned that Beijing would not fear voicing out against incidents which threaten theinterests of China (Sipalan, 1 June 2016). In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA),Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

22

an arbitral tribunal under the United Nations ruled against China, mentioning that China has no
historic title over the waters of the South China Sea. Specifically, the PCA ruled that the 1982
UNCLOS supersedes China’s nine-dash line (The Star, 12 July 2016b).
The articles were collected from The Star’s library, where they were kept as digitalarchive and could be accessed by indicating the search term. This study used “South China
Sea” as the search term because it is predominantly used in Malaysia as well as other Southeast
Asia’s regional English-language newspapers – with the exception of Vietnam’s andPhilippine’s press, where “East Sea” and “West Philippine Sea” is preferred by the respective
countries (Freeman, 2017). The sample consisted of 384 articles derived from The Star’s library
online database. The unit of analysis was the article, which included straight news, editorial,
opinion columns and letters to the editors.
As mentioned earlier, visibility of coverage refers to the amount of coverage and theprominence level that an event/issue or a nation receives in the news coverage. For the current
study, visibility was investigated from two angles: 1) number of news articles, and 2) types ofnews articles. In addition, this study adopted and modified the war/peace journalismclassification suggested by Galtung (1998). This study established eight indicators for each war
and peace journalism frame as shown in Table 1.

Table 1: Coding Categories for Frames
War Journalism
Peace Journalism
1.
Elite-oriented
1.
People-oriented–
Focuses on leaders and elites as –Focuses on the common people as actors
actors and sources of information.
and sources of information.
2.
Differences-oriented
2.
Reports areas of agreement–
Reports on areas of differences that –Reports on areas that might lead to amight lead to the worsening of the conflict. solution to the conflict.
3.
Focuses on here and now
3.
Reports causes and consequences–
Does not report on the factors –Reports on the factors contributing to thecontributing to the conflict nor the conflict as well as the consequences of it.
consequences of it. Only reports about thewhat, who, where and when of an event.
4.
Dichotomizes the good and the bad 4.
Avoids labeling of good guys and bad– Points finger at other quarters as parties guys
responsible for the issue.
– Does not point finger at other quarters as
parties responsible for the issue.
5.
–

Two-party orientation
One party wins, one party loses.

5.
Multiparty orientation– Gives voice to the various parties involved in
the conflict.

6.
Partisan
6.
–
Biased towards one side in the –conflict.

Nonpartisan
Neutral and not taking sides.

7.

Win-win orientation

Zero-sum orientation

7.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.
–

One goal: to win.

8.
Uses victimizing/ demonizing/emotive language–
Reports what has been done to thepeople or the environment. Some examples
include engendered fear for the rest of theworld; eroded trust and confidence;increased regional tension; China criticized
the Philippines as “cute little submissive”;
exploited natural resources and fish in thesea; permanent loss of coral reef areas inhuman history; etc.

23–

Many goals and issues; solution-oriented.

8.
Avoidsvictimizing/
demonizing/emotive language–
Reports what has been done and could bedone by the people, and how they are coping.

–
Uses language to paint the enemy’s –Uses more precise descriptions, titles orimage as wicked or threatening. Some names that the people give themselves.
examples include bullying; hostility;
dangerous; reckless; antagonize; show off;troublemaker; aggressiveness; deliberate
blatant provocation; flexing its muscle;
undermining peace; security and stability;
acting outside of global norms; violations ofrights; unabashed nationalism; China liken to
Nazi Germany; etc.
–
Uses language to evoke readers’negative emotional reaction towards theenemy.
Some
examplesinclude –Reserves strongest language only for theunhappiness; outraged; bitter maritime gravest situation; does not exaggerate.
dispute; ugly territorial spat; etc.

Valence of the articles refers to the attitude expressed towards any individual, group, party or
institution by its author (Baumgartner and Wirth, 2012). This study used the categories of
supportive, critical and neutral for the analysis of attitude expressed towards China in regard toits stance in the South China Sea dispute:1.

Supportive – conveyed a positive or favorable impression towards China’s claims,
arguments, policy, actions, etc. on the South China Sea dispute.

2.

Critical – conveyed a negative or unfavorable impression towards China’s claims,
arguments, policy, actions, etc. on the South China Sea dispute.

3.

Neutral – neither favorably nor unfavorably portrayed China’s claims, arguments,
policy, actions, etc.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

24

Data Analysis and Inter-Coder Reliability
The 384 articles collected from The Star’s were analyzed by the first author using descriptive
statistics such as frequencies and percentage. To ensure the reliability of this study, the second
author was also trained as the second coder. During the training session, the first author (whowas also the first coder) and the second coder coded 50 articles that were chosen randomly
from the sample of this study. Disagreements were analyzed and some additional explanations
were included to the coding instruction in the code book.
The inter-coder reliability for this study was established by randomly selecting 10% of
the news items, which was equivalent to 38 articles. Using Holsti’s formula (cited in Wimmer& Dominick, 2006), it was found that the inter-coder reliability for number of articles ad typesof articles was 1.0. In addition, news frames scored 0.95 for inter-coder reliability, while salient
indicators for war/peace journalism was recorded as 0.92, and valence obtained 0.99 as intercoder reliability.

Results
Intensity of Coverage
This study collected 384 news articles published within three years (2014-2016). Table 2 shows
the breakdown of the number of articles for each year. The Star published the greatest numberof articles on the South China Sea dispute in 2016, which amounted to 52.60% of the sample
size. This was most probably because in 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an
arbitral tribunal under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), issued
its ruling on the arbitration case filed by the then Philippines President Benigno Aquino (TheStar, 12 July 2016a).
In 2013, the then President Aquino of the Philippines brought the case before thetribunal to dispute China’s claim of “indisputable sovereignty” over almost the entire South
China Sea through its “nine-dash line” claim (The Star, 12 July 2016a). On July 12, 2016, the
PCA in The Hague, Netherlands finally ruled that the 1982 UNCLOS supersedes China’s“nine-dash line”. Therefore, this judgement means that China has interfered with the fishingrights of the Philippines. However, China denounced the tribunal ruling as “null and void andhas no binding force” (The Star, 12 July 2016b).

Table 2: Number of Articles Covering the South China Sea DisputeYear
Number of News Articles
Percentage
2014
2015
2016
Total

89
93
202
384

23.18
24.22
52.60
100.00As demonstrated in Table 3, most articles were published in the form of straight news
(83.46%), followed by opinion columns (15.77%), editorials (0.38%) and letters to the editors(0.38%).

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

25

Table 3: Types of Articles Covering the South China Sea Dispute (in percentage)
Type of Articles
Percentage (n = 384)
Straight news

86.72

Opinion Columns

12.76

Editorials

0.26

Letters to the editors

0.26

War Journalism as the Salient Frame
The findings of this study reflected that the indicators of war journalism (n = 1216) were almost
40% more than the indicators of peace journalism (n = 733) in The Star’s coverage of the South
China Sea dispute. Most of the news articles reflected more than one indicator of war
journalism (see Table 4). The three strongest indicators of war journalism were elite-oriented(20.72%), differences-oriented (16.53%) and focuses on here and now (15.13%).

Table 4: Indicators of War Journalism in Covering the South China Sea Dispute(in percentage)
Indicators of War Journalism
Percentage (n = 1216)
Elite-oriented

20.72

Differences-oriented

16.53

Focuses on here and now

15.13

Dichotomizes the good and bad

12.01

Two-party orientation

7.40

Partisan

12.83

Zero-sum orientation

7.24

Uses victimizing/demonizing/emotive language

8.14

The news sourcing practice was elite-oriented as the frequently cited news sources were
the Chinese President, the Chinese Premier, Chinese foreign affairs, defense or military
officials, the US President, US foreign affairs, defense or military officials, the MalaysianPrime Minister, foreign affairs or defense officials, experts and professionals in politics andofficials from other countries.
In its differences-oriented coverage (16.53%), The Star reported that President Aquino,then president of the Philippines, warned that China’s efforts to claim disputed territories werelike Nazi Germany’s actions before the World War II, drawing a fierce Chinese responseYang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

26

branding him ignorant and amateurish (The Star, 6 February 2014). In January 2016, Vietnam
accused China of threatening peace after more Chinese aircraft landed on a contested reef in
the South China Sea (The Star, 9 January 2016). In addition, the US has called for an immediate
end to China’s intensifying reclamation works in the South China Sea and has vowed to keep
sending military aircrafts and ships to the region. The then US Defense Secretary Ashton Carter
was reported as accusing China to be threatening freedom of navigation while saying that“turning an underwater rock into an airfield simply does not afford the rights of sovereignty[for China] or permit restrictions on international air or maritime transit… There should be no
mistake: the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as US
forces do all around the world” (The Star, 31 May 2015a).
In response, China warned that Washington’s actions will only make the region lessstable. The Star reported that the Chinese Ambassador to US Cui Tiankai alerted that the US
overreaction to China’s moves in the South China Sea is escalating the situation and will makethe region less stable (The Star, 31 May 2015b). Furthermore, The Star also reported that China
would pressure Washington over maritime issues during the annual Strategic and Economic
Dialogue as the United States’ increasing military presence in the South China Sea is among
China’s major concerns (The Star, 1 June 2016). Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi was also
quoted as arguing that Beijing’s control over the disputed water was justified because China
was the first to discover the Sea (The Star, 9 March 2016).
It is also noteworthy that The Star published a column article, which was written by thethen China Ambassador to Malaysia, Huang Huikang in June 2016. In the article, Huang called
for the South China Sea dispute be solved through negotiation and consultation by parties
directly concerned. He regretted that the approach of non-conflicting and friendly consultation
has been overshadowed by “noise and chaos”. He also mentioned thatAs China’s close neighbors, Malaysia and the Philippines have enjoyedtraditional friendship with China. Both were the first countries to establisheddiplomatic relations with China among ASEAN states. However, while the
Malaysia-China relationship is at its best in history and on the path to a new eraof Diamond 40 Years, the Philippines-China relationship is experiencing severe
difficulties. The reason behind such a striking contrast lies in the different ways
the two claimants chose to deal with the dispute with China. While Malaysia
has consistently been committed to maintaining friendly relationship, properly
handling dispute, strengthening cooperation and enhancing comprehensive
strategic partnership with China, the Philippines President Benigno Aquino III,on the contrary, misjudged the international situation, acted as a pawn of an
outsider’s geopolitical strategy, and chose to confront China (The Star, 13 June2016).
The Star also reported that ASEAN had criticized China’s actions in the South China Sea
maritime dispute, with the regional body adopting its strongest terms yet in expressing its
unhappiness in the 48th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Joint Communique. The joint statement
said land reclamation activities being carried out in the disputed area could undermine thepeace, security and stability in the area (The Star, 7 August 2015). Nonetheless, The Star
reported in 2016 that the 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting faced a deadlock as Cambodia
had refused to form a consensus in fear of China. Although Indonesia insisted that ASEAN
should continue to push for the issuance of a statement on the South China Sea acceptable toall of its member states, Cambodia blocked the statement on how to counter China’s territorial
expansion in the region. It was also reported that Cambodia did not want China to be criticized,
while a diplomat who attended the closed-door meetings was quoted by the Associated Press

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

27

as describing Cambodia as “a loyalist of the big country C”, referring to China (The Star, 25
July 2016).
Through focuses on here and now (15.13%), The Star reported that Japanese education
chiefs instructed schools to teach children that islands at the center of dispute with China andSouth Korea respectively belong unequivocally to Tokyo. A revised teachers’ manual for juniorand senior high schools describes both Takeshima and Senkaku islands as integral parts ofJapanese territories (The Star, 29 January 2014). Furthermore, The Star reported that China’s
use of dredged sand and corals to build artificial islands on seven reefs has done severe harmto one of the most important coral reef systems in South-East Asia (The Star, 27 June 2015).
These two news stories were reported as episodic events, whereby no historical references were
provided to help the readers to understand better about the context of the South China Sea
conflict.
Peace Journalism
The top three strongest indicators of peace journalism found in The Star’s coverage of the South
China Sea dispute were avoids; victimizing/demonizing/emotive language (20.87%),
multiparty orientation (15.83%), and avoids labeling of good guys and bad guys (14.73%).

Table 5: Indicators of Peace Journalism in Covering the South China Sea Dispute(in percentage)
Indicators of Peace Journalism
Percentage (n = 733)
People-oriented

0.82

Reports the areas of agreement

10.64

Reports causes and consequences

9.96

Avoids labeling of good guys and bad guys

14.73

Multiparty orientation

15.83

Nonpartisan

13.64

Win-win orientation

13.51

Avoids victimizing/demonizing/emotive language

20.87

Through avoiding victimizing/ demonizing /emotive language (20.87%), The Star
reported that the then Malaysian Foreign Minister Anifah Aman mentioned that ASEAN would
not be confrontational in dealing with China on the South China Sea territorial claims and willcontinue to explore every avenue to find a solution that will benefit all parties (The Star, 27
April 2016). The Star also reported that Malaysia’s non-confrontational approach towards
China demonstrated Kuala Lumpur’s own faith in championing China’s “peaceful rise” andwas needed to reassure other ASEAN states that China’s future behavior could be shaped. For
Malaysia, it was far better to welcome China as a full participant in ASEAN-led forums to“socialize” the rising power than to prematurely pursue a counter-productive policy ofYang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

28

diplomatic isolation. It was also reported that Kuala Lumpur’s approach has met with somesuccess. China has emerged as Malaysia’s largest trade partner, even if some elements of both
economies such as export-manufacturing in the electronics sectors are in competition as wellas complementary (The Star, 2 February 2014).
Furthermore, The Star also reported that Beijing would not sit by and let the South
China Sea issue descend into chaos. Chinese Admiral Sun Jianguo said he believed that parties
involved in the dispute have wisdom and patience – like China – in charting a path of peacefulnegotiation. He also stressed that the world is undergoing historic changes as never before andthe Asia-Pacific countries share good times and bad times together (The Star, 2 June 2016).
Through its multiparty orientation (15.83%) coverage, The Star reported that the then
Malaysian Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein stated that ASEAN must prioritize thesecurity of its region in its entirety and not merely think along sovereign lines. He added that
ASEAN must stand united on several key defense issues and not be pulled in different
directions. In addition, he asserted that ASEAN nations need to establish clear communication
channels and intensify policymaking as a group. Nonetheless, Hishammuddin pointed out that
it was unnecessary to adopt a one-size-fits-all defense policy for ASEAN. Instead, they should
work together towards establishing a common policy position on important issues such as
maritime security and ASEAN relations with major world powers (The Star, 1 June 2014).
In 2016, The Star reported that China and ASEAN have agreed to explore Singapore’s
proposal of an expanded Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (Cues) that includes coast
guard ships to prevent untoward clashes in the South China Sea. It was also reported that theSingapore Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan stated that Singapore was not a claimant of
the Sea, and hence it allows the country to play a neutral role in peace negotiation. It was addedthat Singapore did not want to make any judgement as to the merits of competing arguments
but to promote peace and stability in the region. Singapore aimed to focus on peacefulresolution of differences or conflicts, and to be an honest broker (The Star, 3 March 2016).
It was also reported that Vietnam Deputy Minister of National Defense, Nguyen Chi
Vinh, said his country warmly welcome Chinese warships to visit one of its harbors and was
ready to boost cooperation between the two countries’ coast guards. Nguyen also mentionedthat Chinese vessels were welcome to conduct joint drills with the Vietnamese Navy inhumanitarian relief and maritime search and rescue programs. The Star reported that experts
said the move would improve interaction for regional security and help ease tensions (The Star,
5 June 2016).
In its coverage that avoided the labeling of good guys and bad guys (14.73%), The Star
reported that Professor Dr David Arase from the John Hopkins University-Nanjing UniversityCentre for Chinese and American Studies said that Malaysia can play a role in easing regional
tensions in the South China Sea dispute. In an interview with The Star, Professor Arase statedthat nobody wanted war, and hence to minimize the risk, as the 2015 chairman of ASEAN,
Malaysia should negotiate for a maritime code of conduct (COC) agreement with China (TheStar, 22 June 2014). In addition, The Star also reported that the then Malaysian Foreign
Minister Anifah stressed that ASEAN and China have stood together through challenging
times. He also emphasized that ASEAN’s and China’s fates were inextricably intertwined andthat prosperity for one was prosperity for the other (The Star, 23 April 2015). In 2016, after thetribunal ruling, The Star reported that the Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte’s
administration hoped to quickly begin direct talks with China following the verdict. It was
hoped that the negotiation would cover the joint exploitation of the natural gas reserves andfishing grounds within the Philippines’ exclusive economic zone (The Star, 9 July 2016).

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

29

Valence
In its reporting on the South China Sea dispute between 2014-2016, 42.97% of the coverage by
The Star carried a neutral valence towards China. Nonetheless, the coverage that portrayed acritical valence (35.42%) towards China was more than that of the supportive valence(21.61%).
Table 6: Valence of Articles Covering the South China Sea Dispute (in percentage)
Valence of Articles
Percentage (n = 384)
Supportive towards China

21.61

Critical towards China

35.42

Neutral

42.97

Discussion
Drawing upon War/Peace Journalism and framing theory, this study examined the reporting of
the South China Sea dispute by The Star, a national English-language daily newspaper with thelargest circulation in Malaysia. First, the study examined visibility of the South China Sea
dispute in The Star’s coverage, where it was investigated from two angles: 1) number of news
articles, and 2) types of news articles. The number of articles increased gradually from 2014 to2015, but it raised more than double from 2015 to 2016. This was most probably because in2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), an arbitral tribunal under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), issued its ruling on the arbitration case filed by
the then Philippines President Benigno Aquino against China’s nine-dash line claim.
Another element of visibility—type of articles—plays an important role too in shaping
readers’ awareness, perception, and evaluation of an issue. It may even have an effect on
governments policies (Zhang, 2019). This is because straight news articles give facts or quote
references on general information like who, what, when, where, why, and how, which Palvik
and McIntosh (2004) called the “surveillance function of journalism.” On the other hand,
editorials are opinion pieces that often identify, define, articulate, and address current events or
public controversies. Written by members of the editorial board, editorials reflect the stance ofthe respective newspapers. Palvik and McIntosh (2004) called this type of journalism function“correlation.” While editorials reflect the newspaper’s official stance on issues, opinion
columns are written by members of the editorial staff and typically reflect a more personal pointof view than the editorials. Other than these, newspaper opinion pages like letters to the editors
provide a ready-made public forum for readers to share information. By devoting most of theircoverage to straight news, The Star mostly performed surveillance instead of the correlation
function.
Furthermore, this study found that The Star presented the South China Sea dispute
mostly in war journalism framework, which is through “focuses on here and now.” Thisrevealed that the episodic framing approach was most frequently used, and little
contextualization was offered. Van Dijk (2013) remarked that when straight news dominatedthe coverage, it left little room for the creativeness of journalists, resulting in a top-down
communication format, and this is consistent with the fact that The Star relied mostly on elites
as its news sources in its straight news reporting.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

30

Second, this study looked at the dominant frame in The Star’s coverage of the South
China Sea dispute. As mentioned in the findings, this study found that the indicators of war
journalism were almost 40% more than the indicators of peace journalism. This finding iscomparable to previous studies on war and peace journalism, such as Lee and Maslog (2005),
who found that the coverage of four Asian conflicts was dominated by war journalism. Siraj(2008) also stated that US elite newspapers employed war journalism frames in their coverageof Pakistan-India conflict. Furthermore, Wolfsfeld (2004) argued that the default mode ofoperation for the press is to cover tension, conflict, and violence. Shinar (2004) also recordedthat the media preferred to use war frames even while covering peace negotiation. Similarly,
Fawcett (2002) mentioned that the Irish media found conflict frames more attractive thanconciliation frames.
Third, this study investigated the salient indicators supporting the war/peace journalism
frame in The Star’s coverage on the South China Sea dispute. This study found that the threestrongest indicators of war journalism were “elite-oriented,” “differences-oriented,” and“focuses on here and now.” Previous studies confirmed that sources from the government
tended to dominate news coverage of wars or conflicts. For example, Ibrahim et al. (2011)
found that an official spokesperson was usually quoted by Malaysian journalists in war
reporting. It was explained that news media favor sources who occupy places highest in thehierarchy as they are deemed more credible by journalists. In addition, Curran (2005) pointed
out that the convention of quoting elite sources can lead to an emphasis on the elite or
established point of view at the expense of more diverse viewpoints. In addition, Melkote(2009) stressed that the use of sources in news narratives is an extremely important part of not
only the story’s construction but also of its orientation and, ultimately, the point of view being
supported or legitimated in a story. Ross (2007, p. 451) even argued that “if news reports are
based on a selective articulation of certain voices about a given topic, then the journalist’s
power in inviting (or preventing) these voices is considerable.”In their study on news sources used in war reporting, Ibrahim et al. (2011) remindedthat one way to provide objective and balanced news is by using balanced facts provided bymultilevel sources. The use of multilevel sources enables journalists to assemble various
opinions from a multiplicity of perspectives in a single story. Gans (cited in Ibrahim et al.,2011) identified two types of news sources—the knowns and the unknowns. The knowns are
the elites and official sources, namely heads of government, ministers and deputy ministers;
official spokespersons, usually the public relations practitioners; leaders of NGOs; experts;
celebrities and the like. While the unknowns are not persons at the higher hierarchy, but rather
ordinary people or non-elites who become relevant sources because of their connections withcertain news events as eyewitnesses, victims, and families of victims. It was stated that news
sources quoted by the media are primarily those at or near the top of the power hierarchies andon those low in the hierarchies who threaten the top.
According to Francis (2002), when editors and reporters inform readers and audiences
about “who, what, when, where, why and how” relating to conflicts or wars, the media
practitioners are also corresponding to what peace researchers called “conflict dynamics” (p.
28). The author emphasized that any statement of the dynamics of a conflict must identify “itshistory, recent causes, and internal composition—the different parties, the nature of theirinvolvement, their perspectives, positions and motivations, and the different relationships
between them in terms of power, allegiance and interests” (p. 28). The three strongest indicatorsof peace journalism found in The Star’s coverage of the South China Sea dispute were “avoids
victimizing/demonizing/emotive language,” “multiparty orientation” and “avoids labeling of
good guys and bad guys,” while “reports causes and consequences” was the weakest indicator.
This is an area the newspaper could look into and improve in its future reporting of the dispute.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

31

Significantly, Rodrigues (2014) observes that peace journalism is when editors andreporters make choices—of what stories to report and about how to report them—that create
opportunities at large to consider and value nonviolent responses to conflicts. It was stressedthat peace journalism should use the insights of conflict analysis and transformation to update
the concepts of balance, fairness, and accuracy in reporting. Editors and reporters should also
provide a new route map tracing the connections between media practitioners, their sources,
the news stories and the consequences of their journalism, which Lynch and McGoldrick (2007,
p. 256) called the “ethics of journalistic intervention.”
Fourth, this study examined the valence towards China in The Star’s coverage on theSouth China Sea dispute. A closer examination of war journalism coverage in The Star revealed
that the framing of the South China Sea dispute was mostly dominated by a neutral valence
towards China. Given the fact that China has emerged as the largest trade partner of Malaysia
since 2009, while Malaysia is the largest trade partner to China among ASEAN countries, it is
only natural that The Star devoted more coverage that undertook a neutral valence towards
China. In addition, these findings are consistent with previous studies, in which scholars(Balakrishnan, 2006; Chinvanno, 2015; Finkbeiner, 2013; Lim 2009, Liu & Lim, 2019)
remarked that Malaysia has been adopting a “playing it safe” approach in the South China Sea
dispute. This means that Malaysia is pursuing a combination of diplomatic, legal, economic,
and security initiatives that can secure its interests as a claimant state while being careful not
to disrupt its vital bilateral relationship with China. Kreuzer (2016) succinctly pointed out thatthe fundamental aim of such a bilateral relation between Malaysia and China is to achieve a
reciprocal relationship resulting in long-term stability. Significantly, scholars (e.g., Johnston,
2013; Li & Guo, 2018) also argued that China, preoccupied with upholding stable relationships
and minimizing future uncertainty, is willing to make compromises even with weakeropponents and to negotiate short-term interests for the sake of long-term benefits.
This study also found that Malaysian officials often highlighted to other ASEAN
nations that there is no need to undertake a confrontational approach in dealing with the South
China Sea dispute. It is interesting to note that in 2013, the then Chinese Ambassador to
Malaysia, Chai Xi, proclaimed that “Sino-Malaysia relations have embarked on a track ofcomprehensive, steady and fast development in recent years,” and that the bilateral relationshipwas a “role model for other ASEAN countries” The latter sentiment was repeated by Chinese
President Xi Jinping when he visited Malaysia in the same year. During his meeting with thethen Malaysian Prime Minister Najib, President Xi stated that the Sino-Malaysia relationshipserved as “a fine example in the region” (Lee, 2014, p. 67).
In his study to compare Malaysian and Philippine response to China in the South China
Sea dispute, Kreuzer (2016) recorded the differences of media coverage in both countries. The
author found that the Malaysian strategy of toning down the South China Sea dispute rested onwithholding information. In sharp contrast, the Philippine government was giving uttermost
publicity to acts of Chinese assertiveness. In addition, it was found that the restraint undertakenby the Malaysian media is inconceivable in the Philippines, where the conflict was widelyreported and commented on. The author further explained that regime type might play a certain
role in determining the options open to government, with non- or semi-democratic regimes
having a higher ability to spin-doctor information.

Conclusion and Suggestion for Future Studies
This study extended war/peace journalism to an international scope while combining theapproach with framing theory. In addition to the specific findings for South China Sea dispute,
this study contributed to bilateral and power relations literature between Malaysia and China.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

32

A detailed analysis of The Star revealed that the coverage of the South China Sea dispute wasdominated by a war journalism frame. The top three strongest indicators of war journalism
found in The Star’s coverage were “elite-oriented,” “differences-oriented” and “focuses on here
and now.” It was also found that episodic framing approach was most frequently used, and little
contextualization was offered by The Star.
In addition, the top three strongest indicators of peace journalism were “avoids
victimizing/demonizing/emotive language,” “multiparty orientation,” and “avoids labeling of
good guys and bad guys.” A closer examination of The Star revealed that the framing of theSouth China Sea dispute was mostly dominated by a neutral valence towards China. It revealed
that Malaysia is being careful not to disrupt its vital bilateral relationship with China. The
English-language daily also reported about Kuala Lumpur’s faith in championing China’s
peaceful rise. Significantly, this study also found that Malaysian officials often highlighted toother ASEAN nations that there is no need to undertake a confrontational approach in dealing
with the South China Sea dispute, while Chinese officials stated that the Sino-Malaysia
relationship served as an example in the region.
This paper suggests some important questions to be investigated by means of further
research, specifically those that are focusing on war/peace framing, conflict reporting, and news
value studies.
First, a micro-level analysis that deals with journalists as individuals should be
conducted. It is essential to discover the professional views of journalists, especially those whowrite about crises, conflicts or wars. Future studies could look into journalists’ perception of
their role in modern society and how they define their communication goals. In addition, futurestudies could also examine how journalists deal with the structural constraints under which they
have to operate.
Second, a meso-level analysis, which investigates journalism as a process of organizednews production, should be carried out. Researchers may look into how the structures ofeditorial work, such as decision-making hierarchy and quality control, influence war/peaceframing or conflicts reporting. It is also important to examine how the availability of resources(staff, time, budget, etc.) affect crises, conflicts or wars reporting.
Third, a macro-level analysis, which examines the social function of journalism and theinterrelation between journalism and its environment, future studies need to investigate the roleof war/peace journalism and its functional contribution to modern society from a non-normative
perspective. On this level of analysis, researchers ought to look deeper into the interplay
between journalism and other public systems, for example, economy, military, or politics.
Finally, a public opinion survey, which studies how, why, and to what extent does
war/peace journalism have an impact on the audience should be carried out. On the one hand,
Carter (2013) argued that propaganda is an exercise in framing, which is intended to bring about
short-term shifts in public opinion. On another hand, Choi, Watt, and Lynch (2006) believedthat media only reinforce existing attitude. Therefore, it is essential for future studies to look
into how do media frame influence individual’s perception? And how do audiences react tocompeting frames?

References
Audit Bureau Circulations Malaysia. (2016). June-December circulation figures, newspapers –West Malaysia publication. Retrieved from http://abcm.org.com
Balakrishnan, K. S. (2006). Malaysia-China relations: The political challenges. Institute of
China Studies Working Paper No. 2006-4. Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

33

Baumgartner, S. E., & Wirth, W. (2012). Affective priming during the processing of news
articles. Media Psychology, 15(1), 1-18. CrossRef
Bing, N. C. (2015). Comprehensive strategic partners but prosaic military ties: The
development of Malaysia–China defense relations 1991–2015. Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 37(1), 269-304.
Bower, E. Z., & Nguyen, P. (2015, Feb 18). Will China-Malaysia relations remain a model for
Asia? Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved fromhttp://cogitasia.com/will-chinamalaysia-relations-remain-a-model-for-asia/.
Carter, M. J. (2013). The hermeneutics of frames and framing: An examination of the media’s
construction of reality. SAGE Open, 5(2), 1-12. CrossRef
Chinvanno, A. (2015). ASEAN-China relations: Prospects and challenges. Rangsit Journal ofSocial Sciences and Humanities, 2(1), 9-14.
Choi, J. H., Watt, J. H., & Lynch, M. (2006). Perceptions of news credibility about the war in
Iraq: Why war opponents perceived the Internet as the most credible medium? Journalof Computer Mediated Communication, 12(3), 209-229. CrossRef
Cotillon, H. (2017). Territorial disputes and nationalism: A comparative case study of China
and Vietnam. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 36(1), 51-88. CrossRef
Curran, J. (2005). What democracy requires of the media. In G. Overholser & K. Hall Jamieson(Eds.), The press (pp. 120-140). New York: Oxford University Press.
De Vreese, C. H. (2014). Mediatization of news: The role of journalistic framing.
In Mediatization of politics (pp. 137-155). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal ofCommunication, 43(4), 51-58.
Entman, R. M. (2007). Framing bias: Media in the distribution of power. Journal ofCommunication, 57(1), 163-173. CrossRef
Fawcett, L. (2002). Why peace journalism isn't news. Journalism Studies, 3(2), 213-223.
CrossRef
Finkbeiner, J. M. (2013). Malaysia’s great power balance and the South China Sea disputes.
United States Army War College Strategy Research Project. Philadelphia: United States
Army War College.
Francis, D. (2002). People, peace and power. London: Pluto.
Freeman, B. C. (2017). South China, East Vietnam or West Philippine? Comparative Framing
Analysis of Regional News Coverage of Southeast Asian Sea Disputes. In SHS Web ofConferences (Vol. 33, p. 00020). EDP Sciences. CrossRef
Galtung, J. (1998). Peace journalism: What, why, who, how, when, where. Paper presented in
What are Journalists For? Workshop, 3-6 September 1998. TRANSCEND, Taplow
Court, UK.
Galtung, J. (2003). Peace journalism. Media Asia, 30(3), 177-180. CrossRef
Galtung, J., & Fischer, D. (2013). High road, low road: Charting the course for peace
journalism. In Johan Galtung (pp. 95-102). Berlin: Heidelberg.
Golan, G. J., & Lukito, J. (2015). The rise of the dragon? Framing China’s global leadership inelite American newspapers. International Communication Gazette, 77(8), 754-772.
CrossRef
Guo, L., Mays, K., & Wang, J. (2019). Whose Story Wins on Twitter? Visualizing the South
China Sea dispute. Journalism Studies, 20(4), 563-584. CrossRef
Hanitzsch, T. (2004). Journalists as peacekeeping force? Peace journalism and masscommunication theory. Journalism Studies, 5(4), 483-495. CrossRef

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

34

Holton, A., Lee, N., & Coleman, R. (2014). Commenting on health: A framing analysis of usercomments in response to health articles online. Journal of HealthCommunication, 19(7), 825-837. CrossRef
Hruby, J., & Petru, T. (2019). China’s cultural diplomacy in Malaysia during Najib Razak’s
premiership. Austrian Journal of South-East Asian Studies, 12(1), 111-129. CrossRef
Ibrahim, F., Pawanteh, L., Chang, P. K, Basri, F. K. H., Hassan, B. R. A., & Amizah, W. W.
(2011). Journalists and news sources: Implications of professionalism in war
reporting. The Innovation Journal-The Public Sector Innovation Journal, 7(2), 56-70.
Iggers, J. (1998). Good news, bad news: Journalism ethics and the public interest Boulder:
Westview Press.
Iyengar, S. (1996). Framing responsibility for political issues. The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science, 546(1), 59-70.
Johnston, A. I. (2013). How new and assertive is China's new assertiveness? International
Security, 37(4), 7-48.
Kim, S. H. (2015). Who is responsible for a social problem? News framing and attribution of
responsibility. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 92(3), 554-558.
CrossRef
Kreuzer, P. (2016). A comparison of Malaysian and Philippine response to China in the South
China Sea. The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 9(3), 239-276. CrossRef
Kuik, C. C. (2015). Malaysia-China relations: Three enduring themes. In M. L. Weiss (Ed.).
Routledge handbook of contemporary Malaysia. (pp. 417-427). New York: Routledge.
Kuik, C. C. (2016). How do weaker states hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’ alignment
behavior towards China. Journal of Contemporary China, 25(100), 500-514. CrossRef
Kwan, C. H. (2018). Issues facing Renminbi internationalization: Observations from Chinese,
regional and global perspectives. Public Policy Review, 14(5), 871-900.
Lee, J. (2014). Trends in Southeast Asia: China’s economic engagement with Southeast Asia:
Malaysia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Lee, S. T., & Maslog, C. C. (2005). War or peace journalism? Asian newspaper coverage ofconflicts. Journal of Communication, 55(2), 311-329.
Lim, T. S. (2009). Renewing 35 Years of Malaysia-China relations: Najib's visit to China.
Singapore: East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore.
Liu, H., & Lim, G. (2019). The political economy of a rising China in Southeast Asia:
Malaysia’s response to the Belt and Road Initiative. Journal of Contemporary
China, 28(116), 216-231. CrossRef
Li, X. (2016). Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese
diplomacy toward the neighboring states. International Relations of the AsiaPacific, 16(2), 241-271. CrossRef
Li, X. Q., & Guo, L. (2018). Exposure to news about the South China Sea, nationalism, andgovernment evaluation: Examining the mediation roles of third-person effects andonline discussion. Chinese Journal of Communication, 11(4), 455-472. CrossRef
Loyn, D. (2007). Good journalism or peace journalism? Conflict & Communication, 6(2), 6679.
Lynch, J., & Galtung, J. (2010). Reporting conflict: New directions in peace journalism. St
Lucia: University of Queensland Press.
Lynch, J., & McGoldrick, A. (2007). Peace journalism. In Handbook of peace and conflictstudies (pp. 248). New York: Routledge.
Manheim, J. B. (1994). Strategic public diplomacy and American foreign policy: The evolutionof influence. New York: Oxford University Press.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

35

Melkote, S. R. (2009). News framing during a time of impending war: An examination ofcoverage in The New York Times prior to the 2003 Iraq War. The International
Communication Gazette, 71(7), 547-559. CrossRef
Palvik, J. K. & McIntosh, S. (2004). Converging media: An introduction to masscommunication. Boston: Pearson Education, Inc.
Rodrigues, R. (2014). The dilemmas of pacification: News of war and peace in the ‘marvelous
city’. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 3(1), 155-169.
CrossRef
Ross, K. (2007). The journalist, the housewife, the citizen and the press: Women and men as
sources in local news narratives. Journalism, 8(4), 449-473. CrossRef
Selva, J. (2018). Media planning guide Malaysia 2018. Kuala Lumpur: Perception Media Sdn
Bhd.
Seow, T. L., & Maslog, C. C. (2005). War or Peace Journalism? Asian Newspaper Coverageof Conflicts. Journal of Communication, 55(2), 311-329.
Shaw, I. S., Lynch, J., & Hackett, R. A. (Eds.). (2011). Expanding peace journalism:
Comparative and critical approaches. Sydney: Sydney University Press.
Shih, C. Y., & Yin, J. (2013). Between core national interest and a harmonious world:
Reconciling self-role conceptions in Chinese foreign policy. Chinese Journal ofInternational Politics, 6(1), 59-84. CrossRef
Shinar, D. (2004). Media peace discourse: Constraints, concepts and building blocks. Conflict& Communication, 3(1), 65-79.
Sipalan, J. (2016, June 1). As Beijing flexes muscles in South China Sea, Malaysia eyes harder
response. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-malaysiaidUSKCN0YM2SV
Siraj, S. A. (2008). War or peace journalism in elite US newspapers: Exploring news framingin Pakistan-India conflict. In Annual Meeting of the International Communication
Association, Montreal, Quebec.
Tehranian, M. (2002). Peace journalism: Negotiating global media ethics. Harvard
International Journal of Press/Politics, 7(2), 58-83.
Terzis, G. (2002). Media and ethno-political conflict. In J. Servaes (Ed.). Approaches todevelopment communication. (pp. 501-526). Paris: UNESCO.
The Star. (2014, January 29). Japan teachers get new instructions on disputed islands.
The Star. (2014, February 2). KL’s soft diplomacy.
The Star. (2014, February 6). Aquino likens China to Nazi Germany.
The Star. (2014, June 1). ASEAN must be united on defense issues.
The Star. (2014, June 22). Malaysia can play key role in easing regional tensions.
The Star. (2015, April 23). Fast-track talks on sea code.
The Star. (2015, May 31a). US slams China’s sea claim.
The Star. (2015, May 31b). “US is escalating situation”.
The Star. (2015, June 27). Scientists ring alarm bells.
The Star. (2015, August 7). ASEAN slams China’s actions.
The Star. (2016, January 9). China given second warning.
The Star. (2016, March 3). Taking the cue from S’pore.
The Star. (2016, March 9). South China Sea “freest and safest”.
The Star. (2016, April 27). Anifah: No need for confrontation.
The Star. (2016, June 1). China to press US on maritime issues during annual dialogue.
The Star. (2016, June 2). Beijing won’t let sea descend into chaos.
The Star. (2016, June 5). “Negotiations must prevail”.
The Star. (2016, June 13). The way of amicable consultations.
The Star. (2016, July 9). Manila willing to share South China Sea.

Yang, L.F. & Heng, G.K.J.

36

The Star. (2016, July 12a). How will verdict on South China Sea dispute be delivered.
The Star. (2016, July 12b). Factbox – Hague tribunal says no legal basis for China claims inSouth China Sea.
The Star. (2016, July 25). ASEAN unity at risk.
Van Dijk, T. A. (2013). News as discourse. New York: Routledge.
Wimmer, R. D., & Dominick, J. R. (2006). Mass communication research: An
introduction. Belmont: Wadsworth.
Wolfsfeld, G. (1997). Promoting peace through the news media: Some initial lessons from theOslo peace process. Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 2(4), 52-70.
Wolfsfeld, G. (2004). Media and the Path to Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Yeoh, E. K. K. (2019). Malaysia: Perception of contemporary China and its economic, politicaland societal determinants. The Pacific Review, 32(3), 395-418. CrossRef
Zhang, D. (2019). A Comparative Study of Competing Discursive Construction of South China
Sea Disputes in the Chinese and US English-Language Newspapers. English Language
and Literature Studies, 9(2), 46-56. CrossRef
Zillich, A., Gobbel, R., Stengel, K., Maier, M., & Ruhmann, G. (2011). Proactive crisis
communication? News coverage of international conflicts in German print andbroadcasting media. Media, War & Conflict, 4(3), 251-267. CrossRef