宮城教育大学 環境教育研究紀要

第 16 巻 (2014)

Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Assessment:
Reflecting on the Japanese Experience
Paul OFEI-MANU*,** and Satoshi SHIMANO*

Abstract: Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) is an increasingly important issue on the global agenda
with great effort being made through policy and science to minimize its impacts on humans and theenvironment. The paper discusses some components of capacity assessment that are relevant tostrengthening DRR capacity and reference is made to the Great East Japan Earthquake (earthquake,tsunami and nuclear accident) on the lessons learned, particularly from the Fukushima nuclear disaster.
Keywords: disaster risk reduction, capacity development, capacity assessment, Japan, Triple
Disaster

1. Introductionin addition to climate change and biodiversity as points ofDisasters are a fundamental threat to human development

entry for promoting sustainable development practices

because what takes several years or even decades tothrough education and learning.

develop could be wiped away within a short moment

L aunched in 2005 in Kobe in Hyogo Prefecture,t h e re b y w o r s e n i n g p o v e r t y b e c a u s e a s s e t s a n dJapan af ter approval by 168 countries at the 1st

livelihoods are destroyed in the process. The frequency

World Conference for Disaster Reduction, the Hyogo

of occurrence and intensity of disasters is increasing

Framework for Action (HFA) has become the platform

against the backdrop of increasing evidence of human-for global commitment to reduce disaster losses andinduced climate change. As a result, reducing its often

encourage a more systematic and preventative approachdevastating impact on human civilization has become ato managing disaster risk. A UN-mandated 3rd World

top issue on the global agenda featuring in major policy

Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction will take place

processes and summits and scientific conferences.

in Sendai City, Japan from 14 to 18 March 2015 and isDisaster risk reduction (DRR) is hence highlighted

expected to set the stage for a new global agreement

in several international documents, particularly UN-

on reducing the impact of both natural and man-maderelated summits’ outcome documents and resolutions.

disasters. It will also review the 10-year implementation

For example, the importance of DRR is highlighted inof the HFA and look for its successor to be referred toparagraphs 187-189 of the Rio+20 Summit Outcome

as Hyogo Framework of Action 2 (HFA2). Capacity is

Document,‘The Future We Want’. DRR’s importanceconsidered to be at the heart of reducing risk because

is further reiterated by UNESCO, the lead agency for thea strong relationship exists between capacity and a

UN Decade of Education for Sustainable Development

country’s DRR. The need for DRR capacity development(DESD, 2005-2014) as one of the top three thematicand assessment can be viewed from the perspective

areas it is currently coordinating global efforts to addressof the experiences of recent major disasters a greater*Shimano Laboratory, Research Centre of Environmental Education, Miyagi University of Education, Sendai, Japan **Institute for Global Environmental
Strategies (IGES), Hayama, Japan－ 53 －

Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Assessment: Reflecting on the Japanese Experience

number of which has happened in Asia, particularly

disaster risk reduction into national development policies

earthquakes, tsunamis and flooding. Given the enormousand programmes over a decade. It also underscores thematerial and human catastrophe that Japan suffered

relationship between reducing disaster risk and achieving

during the Great East Japan Earthquake on 11 Marchbroader development goals and consequently mobilises

2011, the choice of the conference venue could not be

stakeholders at local, national and international level tomore appropriate.

pay increasing attention to DRR as part of their wider

This paper discusses some aspects of capacity

development agendas (CADRI, 2010).

assessment especially leadership, institutional

Furthermore, the HFA identifies five priority areas ofarrangements, knowledge and accountability considered

action namely: 1) ensuring that disaster risk reduction

as relevant to DRR capacity development. References

is a national and local priority and is established within

are made to the Japanese situation regarding theboth national and local institutions, 2) disaster risk

lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake

identification, assessment and monitoring are conducted(comprising an earthquake, a tsunami and a nuclear

in addition to enhancing early warning measures, 3) use

accident and will be referred to from hence as the Tripleof education, knowledge and renewed mindset to build a

Disaster), particularly the Fukushima nuclear meltdown

culture of safety and resilience at all levels, 4) reducing

with the hope of developing a comprehensive, systematic

underlying risk factors, through incorporating activities

DRR capacity assessment framework in the near future.

into appropriate development sectors and programme

Part 2 provides a brief description of DRR and capacity

areas, and 5) a strengthened disaster preparedness forbuilding/development. Part 3 presents a summary of aeffective response at all levels (CADRI, 2010). Further

few capacity assessment approaches/frameworks andbuttressing the importance of DRR at the global level,components and focuses on that of the United Nations‘The Future We Want’recommends the integration

Development Programme (UNDP). Part 4 discussesof early warning systems 1)“…into their nationalsome aspects of the Triple Disaster particularly thedisaster risk reduction strategies and plans”, …. 2)“…

lessons generated by the Fukushima nuclear disaster inknowledge and information sharing…”and the need tothe context of capacity assessment.

3)“…undertake and strengthen in a timely manner risk
assessment and disaster risk reduction instruments”,

2. Disaster Risk Reduction and Capacity

the importance of 4)“stronger inter-linkages among

Building/Development

disaster risk reduction, recovery and long-term development

2.1. Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR):

planning, ….. more coordinated and comprehensive

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is defined as“the concept

strategies that integrate disaster risk reduction and climate

and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematicchange adaptation…”and participation of a broad range ofefforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters

stakeholders (UNGA, 2012: 36).

including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened
vulnerability of people and property, wise management of

2.2. Capacity building/Capacity development

land and the environment, and improved preparedness for

Although often used interchangeably, basic conceptual

adverse events”(UNISDR, 2009: 4). Considered as thedifferences exist between capacity building (CB) andflagship document of DRR, HFA is seen as a response

capacity development (CD). For example, in terms ofto the importance of implementing DRR measures in ascope CD is generally viewed as being about change andcomprehensive, integrated and multi-disciplinary manner.

transformation from within and is more comprehensive

The framework presents a detailed strategy to integrate

while CB is more linked with mechanical processes－ 54 －

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第 16 巻 (2014)

and with technical cooperation suggesting that capacity

diversity and coherence (Baser and Morgan in Babu

is non-existent and has to be built from the scratch.

and Kolavalli, 2013).

Capacity development is defined by UNISDR (one of•Managing for Development Results CAP-Scanseveral definitions available) as“the process by which

Diagnostic Review scores governments’ attempts topeople, organisations and society systematically stimulate

develop public sector capacity through conduction

their capacities over time to achieve social, and economicof assessments that identifies the strengths andgoals, including through improvements of knowledge,

capacity gaps. This is done in four capacity building

skills, systems and institutions”(CADRI, 2010:9). Allstages namely awareness, experimentation,

stakeholders are presented with a challenge by the HFAtransition, and sustainable implementation. This

to focus on CD for DRR and in fact, the five priorities foris done in the context of five pillars: leadership,

action can only be achieved if CD issues and measures

accountability and partnerships, monitoring andare integrated into the action agenda (CADRI, 2010).

evaluation, planning and budgeting and statistics

An effective CB/CD programme or strategy should(MfDR 2009).

have a well-developed stakeholder analysis and needs•

The United Nations Development Programme’s

assessment methodology. Furthermore, to strengthen(UNDP) has formulated a capacity assessment

the existing capacity in a disaster risk management

framework that is premised on its refined capacity

system, it is important to identify and understand thedevelopment approach and is structured aroundcapacity gaps of past disasters. Formulation of a generic,five steps namely 1) engagement of stakeholders

systematic capacity assessment framework shouldon capacity development, 2) assessment of capacity

incorporate those identified gaps and also policy, science,

assets and needs, 3) for mulation of capacity

education, research and practice aspects of DRR coupleddevelopment response, 4) implementation ofwith set criteria that can be monitored and evaluated.

the response, and 5) evaluation of the capacity
development (UNDP, 2010). UNDP uses three

3. Capacity Assessment and DRR

dimensions from which it assesses capacity needs/

Several capacity assessment frameworks and approaches

gaps. They are: 1) points of entry referring toexist. They include the following:

the level (individual, organization, or enabling•

The 5-C approach was developed by the European

environment)1 from which assessment can beCentre for Development Policy Management. It

started; 2) the core issues which define the scopeassesses individual and system-level capacitiesof the assessment and may include: leadership,in the context of the organization and describes

policy and legal framework, mutual accountability

capacity as the meeting point of five central

mechanisms, public engagement, and resources

capabilities of organizations. They are the capability(human, financial, physical, and environmental);to a) commitment and engagement, b) carrying

and 3a) five functional capacities: engage in multi-

out tasks, c) relating and attracting resources andstakeholder engagement/dialogue, situation analysis

support, d) adapting and self-renew, and e) balanceand vision creation, policy and strategy formulation,

o
o
o

1

The individual dimension relates to a variety of abilities, with an emphasis on aspects including inter-disciplinarity and process skills with influences fromsuch as attitude, perception, cultural orientation and intuitive faculty as subjective determinantsInstitutional capacity requirements emphasises collective learning and institutional change, i.e., understanding and dealing with multiple perceptions orworld-views in addition to skills.
The systemic dimension closely associated with the‘enabling environment’, that is, appropriate policy and legal frameworks, a clear definition of
institutional roles and mandates, widespread access to information, vertical linkages, etc.

－ 55 －

Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Assessment: Reflecting on the Japanese Experiencebudget, management and implementation, monitoring andin all educational settings. Developing knowledge

evaluation, and 3b) technical capacities (UNDP 2008).

through improvement in expertise and organisational

Some of the core issues will provide the main context

learning strategies occurs at organisational level.

for the discussion in this paper namely 1) institutional

Professional training, experience sharing and knowledge

arrangements, 2) leadership, 3) knowledge, and 4)

management systems in the organisations are some ofaccountability.

the approaches to strengthen knowledge capacity at thislevel. Knowledge capacity at a societal level is often best

Institutional arrangements is a core issue relevant

addressed through reforming formal education systems

across most aspects of governance, public sector

to ensure that younger generations will have the skills

management and development activities. It addresses

and know-how to deal with current and emerging risks.

the policies, procedures, systems and processes that

Stimulation of actionable knowledge can also be effected

countries have in place to functionalise their politicalthrough organisational networks, communities of practicemandates, development policies and objectives as aand multi-agency information and learning platforms thatway to promote good governance. Because optimal

assembles together entities of the non-formal education

procedural structures in terms of efficiency and impact

sector including civil society organizations, government

are often unacknowledged, inefficiencies in institutionaland donor agencies (CADRI, 2010; UNDP, 2008 andar rangements are only identified during capacity

UNDP, 2010).

assessments. The reason is because new procedures andprogrammes are often developed without incorporation

Accountability as an important lever of change lies in

into previously existing ones and this is commonly foundits provision of oversight, monitoring and evaluation to

in intra-ministerial and multi-agency work (UNDP, 2008;

guarantee that processes and programmes are leading

UNDP, 2010).

to the expected objectives, and providing mechanisms
to overcome obstacles and identify shortcomings when

Leadership expresses itself at multiple ways and levels

necessary. Additionally, through the establishment of(individual or organisation) and has the elements ofsystems for public accountability and transparency,

vision, competence and integrity at its core. Effective

governments’ responsibilities to reach the needs ofleadership can transcend individual-to-individual capacity

their citizens are also ensured and can provide anlevel to organisational capacity level and thus help

added benefit of encouraging mutual engagement

to advance a strategic planning and an agenda that isin development activities. Other aspects that canvision-driven. Leadership capacities can be enhanced

improve accountability capacities include strengthening

through strategies like strengthening the abilities ofthe feedback mechanisms such as open access tothe organisation regarding vision setting, transparency,

information, encouraging people to voice their opinion,a sense of readiness, systems thinking, assessment of

ensuring robust monitoring and evaluation systems,

potential risks and managing them through establishingand integrating knowledge and experiences into futurecollective management systems that encourage learning

programmes (UNDP, 2008; UNDP, 2010).

(UNDP, 2008 and UNDP, 2010).
The UNDP capacity assessment approach is being
Knowledge is considered as the foundation of capacity

embraced and used in several sectors and fields

and it includes measures for creating and enhancing

including the DRR community due to aspects including

knowledge using different teaching approaches andthe following: 1) its flexibility allows one to adapt it to－ 56 －

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第 16 巻 (2014)

several CD situations, 2) it is able to link the three points

Japan has had more than its share of natural disasters

of entry and hence promote a holistic approach acrossin comparison to its land size. These include multiple

the three, 3) it emphasises systematisation for example

active volcanoes, being prone to flooding annually andof a nation’s assets, plans and strategies and expertise as

experiencing several typhoons every summer. It is also

well as measures capacity development systematically, 4)a country that sits on multiple active faults. Japan canit discourages the use of rigid blueprints and emphasises

therefore hardly survive without having a relatively

adaptation to local conditions (UNDP, 2008). Additionally,

comprehensive disaster mitigation and response

paragraphs 21-23 of the UNISDR’s‘Towards a Post-2015

planning and infrastructure in place. Consequent to thisFramework for Disaster Risk Reduction’describe thecareful planning, it is viewed as a model for disaster

importance of institutional arrangements, legislation andpreparedness (Des Marais et al., 2012).

policy, coordinated and coherent action, accountability

The Central Disaster Management Council (CDMC) is atmeasures both in scale and range to guide government

the helm of Japan’s disaster management infrastructure

and public awareness of and access to information on

and is the major policy engine for the management ofdisaster risks and support for DRR (UNISDR, 2012).

disaster in Japan. It comprises the Prime Minister andthe entire Cabinet, local leaders, and experts in the

4. The Japan Experience and DRR Capacity
Assessment

field (Government of Japan, 2005). Established by theDisaster Countermeasures Basic Act of 1961 to“ensure

This section discusses aspects of the Triple Disasterthe comprehensiveness of disaster risk management(particularly the Fukushima nuclear disaster), theand to discuss matters of importance with regard tocapacity gaps identified and lessons generated in thedisaster management”, it is responsible for design andcontext of DRR capacity assessment.

implementation of national risk management strategies

Japan is well advanced in disaster preparedness and risk

with regard to issues related to safety, mitigation, andreduction and yet was rattled on March 11, 2011 by its

risk reduction (Government of Japan, 2005: 1). The

largest earthquake on record and the fourth largest ever

government formulates strategies and engages inrecorded in the world. This giant temblor generated a 10-

different kinds of knowledge construction, information

15 story tsunami that triggered a nuclear accident anddissemination, and capacity building investments throughhas been rated as equal in severity to the 1986 accident

the CDMC. Early warning and monitoring systems

at Chernobyl, the worst nuclear disaster on record

covering the nation are in place following a countrywide

according to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

risk assessment involving public, private, research andThis complex catastrophe comprising an earthquake,academic partners. Furthermore, information materials

tsunami and nuclear meltdown killed nearly 20,000

geared towards educating and training a variety of fields

people. Hundreds of thousands (about 500,000) of people

and sectors as well as education settings have been

were displaced and a large area of beautiful countrysidedeveloped and are buttressed by a complex of national-

was contaminated and some areas will remain so for

local and public-private partnerships (Des Marais et al.,several decades. Nearly three years later, the affected2012).

communities are struggling to recover and more thanUsing the lessons learned from the previous big crisis

140,000 people are still living in shelters. Significant

namely the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake, Japan had

distrust of industry, government and even of researchers

diligently been preparing for future disasters. However

remains due to the emergence of several challenges

problems emerged partly due to the enormity andduring and after the accident (FGCP, 2014; IGEL, 2013).

complexity of the Triple Disaster which stretched the－ 57 －

Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Assessment: Reflecting on the Japanese Experience

effectiveness of the Japanese disaster risk management

Tokyo Electric Power Company Limited (TEPCO), thesystem to its limit and partly due to human shortcomings.

nuclear plant operator. There was also mismatch of

The report commissioned by the National Diet of Japan

administrative boundaries and activities at that level tosums it all up:“The government, the regulators, TEPCO

the point that once the Prime Minister had to visit the

management, and the Kantei lacked the preparation andplant to ascertain things himself. Also, soon after thethe mindset to efficiently operate an emergency response todisaster there was a shortage of essential items suchan accident of this scope. None, therefore, were effective inas food, water and particularly gasoline in the affectedpreventing or limiting the consequential damage.”(IGEL,

region and this was partly attributed to the fear of truck

2013:3).

drivers to drive to the Tohoku region because of allegedhigh level of radioactive contamination. Nuclear experts

Leadership and knowledge capacities gaps

directly linked to the CDMC failed to participate and be

A l t h o u g h t h e s c a l e o f t h e Tr i p l e D i s a s t e r w a s

visible during the government’s public relations efforts

unprecedented in living memory, however, according

to provide scientific information at least in approximate

to several post-Fukushima reports the disaster shouldterms rather than leaving it to the politicians and thehave been anticipated (IGEL, 2013). The judgments

plant operator. This contributed to the distrust of themade and the actions taken by government and leaders

information that was being put out by the governmentof industry were later found to be inadequate and in

and TEPCO. From partial briefings, provision of vague

some instances compounded the problems. For example,

answers or refusing to answer questions during press

the tsunami and the destruction of the Daiichi nuclear

conferences, to delayed information, etc., TEPCO’sreactors was entirely predictable because it had been

performance has been seen as troubling virtually acrossrecorded in the literature that earthquakes of similar

the board with the exception of the brave workers

magnitude have struck that part of Japan, once every

who sacrificed their future lives to somewhat save the

100 years on average – a pattern well known sincesituation (Kaufmann and Penciakova, 2011).

ancient times – and each one generated a catastrophic
tsunami of similar magnitude. The previous tsunami in

There have been times when the relations between the

1933 was in fact, nearly as high as the one that struck in

local governments in the affected region and the central

2011. Furthermore, a monument dating back to the firstgovernment have not been very cordial with regard to

century still sits on a hill, high above the area devastatedimplementation of some post disaster policies due toby the 2011 tsunami, with the inscription:“Beware

different perspectives of understanding of the available

the great tsunami; do not build below this level”(IGEL,

information. Stronger linkages between national and local

2013 : 3). Three areas of capacity critical to leadership ingovernment/people based on transparency in relationa crisis that emerged from the Triple Disaster and needto the crisis is crucial for the rebuilding of trust. Thoseattention are emergency preparations, leadership stylein the position of responsibility need to give attention

and communications (IGEL, 2013).

to transferring risk information and the interpretationof the understanding of such risks to the recipients.

Institutional arrangements capacity gaps

More community participation in the decision-making

At the peak of the nuclear crisis, designation of roles

process and provision of relevant knowledge regarding

and responsibilities was inadequate and there were

the operations of such infrastructure with significant

coordination and information flow challenges between

underlying risks that are close to communities should be

the office of then Prime Minister (the Kantei) andensured.
－ 58 －

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第 16 巻 (2014)

Accountability capacity gaps

have also been reports of contracted workers of someSignificant political and economic power is alleged to

private companies sub-contracted by TEPCO to clean

back the nuclear industry in Japan. The management of

the contamination not being paid well. Granted that theTEPCO was said to have built the reactors on a known

Fukushima disaster is going to take a long time to fix,

fault line and then colluded with government regulatorspoor treatment of workers might lead to future shortageto avoid preparing for the inevitable (IGEL, 2013).

of such workers and hence hamper the decontamination

Furthermore, the government and the nuclear powera n d re c o n s t r u c t i o n p ro g r a m m e s . A p p o i n t i n g a n

industry had been warned by the US Atomic Energy

independent body or an ombudsman to protect the rights

Commission that reactors like those in Fukushimaof such contracted workers will be in order. Other gaps

Daiichi had not been built to withstand major earthquakes

to address include: 1) strengthening the independence ofjust like other nuclear reactors in Onagawa, Shika,

the NRA and giving it some level of power to effectively

Kushiwazaki, etc. (Kaufmann and Penciakova, 2011).

play its oversight role in the nuclear industry, 2)

There were also aspects of corporate practices that areevaluating the“moral hazard”that arises when potential

not only unique to the Japanese corporate community:

losses of a catastrophe far exceed the value of a company,

situations where private companies’ liabilities are capped3) need for“system chain/process chain”liability, i.e.,by the value of their net assets, the amount beyond

to hold accountable all actors involved with the nuclear

which the companies pay nothing. TEPCO, like any

power industry: manufacturers, regulators, operators,

other private company was then left with“no incentive

government, etc. for negligence when that is determined. Thisto limit damages beyond the value of those net assets”

in a disaster. Currently several joint lawsuits have been

resulted in TEPCO wildly underplaying the risk of a

filed against 1) three companies that manufactured

gigantic earthquake and tsunami,“but it did not underplay

reactors at Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant

it carelessly or negligently. It underplayed it rationally -for making a faulty product (Yamaguchi, 2014), andwildly, but rationally”(IGEL, 2013:3).

2) TEPCO separately or jointly with the Japanese

TEPCO’s overall performance in handling the nuclear

Government for failure to provide accurate information

crisis has been subpar. There have been recorded failureson the radioactive emissions or for negligence ofin the past regarding practice standards and several

responsibility, with more set to follow. IAEA should be

more after the disaster. Aspects like poor plant safety,

more proactive and intervene in a timely manner during

poor communication, lacking“basic understanding

a future nuclear crisis.

of measuring and handling radiation”, incorrect datareporting, etc. (several of which have been reported inSocio-cultural capacity gaps

the media) have been problematic to this day. Blame

Riding on the myth of“absolute safeness”of nuclear

sharing can go around. The regulatory agency, Nuclear

power as the then Prime Minister himself later admitted

and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), a department

in an interview, government and business had managed

under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

to place this into the cultural psyche of the people and(METI) was lax in its inspection (Saito, 2014; Kaufmann

therefore were not prepared nor did they leave room for

and Penciakova, 2011) although this has been recently

the worst-case scenario (IGEL, 2013; Corkill, 2013). Also,

rectified by replacing it with a more independent National

the prolonged period and high intensity of the seismic

Regulatory Authority (NRA). Even the global nuclear

activity (aftershocks) were equally devastating mentally.

watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency

Although many NGOs and individuals went to offer their(IAEA) was slow in getting involved in the crisis. There

support to the disaster victims (Shimano and Hirose,－ 59 －

Disaster Risk Reduction Capacity Assessment: Reflecting on the Japanese Experience2012), there was a shortfall of mental health care staff

assistance, food aid, and psychosocial support (Des(psycho-social workers, psychologists, psychiatrists, etc).

Marais et al., 2012).

It should also be acknowledged that due to attachment ofsocial stigma to mental problems in Japan, some affected

5. Conclusion

people would not go for consultation/treatment (Brumfiel,

Added to several other natural disasters that affect2013).

Japan, it is the only country to suffer both intended andAfter much preparation for decades based on priorunintended consequences of nuclear power: the dropping

disaster experiences, the Triple Disaster overwhelmedof atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki and theall that had been put in place partly because some

Fukushima nuclear disaster, respectively. Economically, itinstallations and structures had been prepared below

has experienced the top two most expensive disasters in

the threshold of the complex disaster that struck. For

the history of humanity with the estimated cost running

example, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear complex, wasinto several hundreds of billions of US dollars – the Great

prepared for only a magnitude 8 earthquake and levees

East Japan Earthquake is purported to cost between 235-

and flood barriers were not designed to withstand the

300 billions US dollars and the Great Hanshin Earthquake

category of tsunami that reached 40 meters tall andof Kobe was estimated to have cost 91 billion US dollars.

travelled inland nearly ten kilometres (Des Marais et al.,Although risk management (including DRR management)2012). Issues that need to be addressed regarding thehas been part of the Japanese planning and development

previous discussion include 1) strengthening knowledge

processes, yet sometimes there is the issue of what tocapacity for understanding the underlying dangers ofplan for against the backdrop of limited resources andrelevant risk-prone infrastructure and also the cascading

uncertainty of what threshold to adequately prepare

effects of one disaster turning into multiple disasters e.g.,for. Also, risk probability and mitigation cost must be

earthquake > tsunami > fire outbreak from installations/balanced against other societal needs. The need therefore

nuclear disaster, and 2) addressing the currently existing

to put in place protocols to increase human resilience tomental health care challenges in the affected areas andbe able adapt to such extreme although rare events isstrengthening capacity for future post-disaster mental

critical.

health care.

A recovery from the current disaster and future ones

But it was not all gloom: 1) the ability of most buildings

will depend largely on addressing the discussed gaps

i n c l u d i n g h o u s e s t o w i t h s t a n d t h i s v e r y s t ro n gfrom the Triple Disaster and from past experience inearthquake, 2) constant updates on the crisis accessible

the context of a couple of things. With reference to theon mobile phones and the prevention of derailment“hardware”capacity strengthening, opportunities existof high-speed trains due to improvement in the early

for implementing some disaster resistant measures

warning systems after the Great Hanshin Earthquake,particularly during the ongoing reconstruction ofand 3) the stoic nature of the people and their resilience

infrastructure. Additionally, formulating a genericthat became an envy of the world were some of the brightbut systemic DRR capacity assessment framework

spots. Furthermore, having shown generosity to many

comprising both“hardware”and“software”capacity

countries affected by disaster, Japan further showed thethat incorporates the HFA priority areas using‘enabled

way to international collaboration (a key component

environment’as the entry point and addressing all

in DRR) when the“politics of national sovereignty”

relevant DRR capacities including solutions to thosewas kept to a minimum but instead, the government

capacity gaps discussed in this paper will be appropriate.

reached out to several countries for help such as medical

Such a framework should ensure horizontal and vertical－ 60 －

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第 16 巻 (2014)

linkages of the constituent DRR capacities from national

Government of Japan. 2005. National report of Japanto local levels. Other frameworks developed for moreon disaster reduction. United Nations International

specific sectors or fields (e.g. the Education for Natural

Strategy for Disaster Reduction. World Conference on

Disaster Preparedness and Reduction framework for

Disaster Reduction. Available at: http://www.unisdr.

the lower and middle formal education sector (Goto andorg/2005/mdgs-drr/nationalreports/Japan-report.pdf

Okamoto, 2012) should be linked to this framework at

IGEL (Initiative for Global Environmental Leadership)
2013. Disasters, leadership and rebuilding – Toughthe appropriate leverage point(s).

lessons from Japan and the US. Special Report.

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