Proceedings
The

C oast Guard Journal of Safety & Security at Sea

Spring 2020of the Marine Safety & Security Council

ationalSecurity

Defending theHomelandWe’re In This Together
The Coast Guard responds to the COVID-19 crisis

See full photo captions on inside back cover
In response to the COVID‑19 crisis in the United States, the Coast Guard is living its motto: Semper Paratus—Always
Ready. The service has maintained day-to-day operations, providing a security escort for USNS hospital ships Comfort
and Mercy, delivering supplies, and overseeing the disembarkment of more than 250,000 from cruise ships, but its
members are going above and beyond to do their part for the communities they serve. Aviation survival techniciansfrom Coast Guard Sector North Bend, Oregon, are sewing face masks for local first responders. Similarly, Chief Petty
Officer Bob McCormick, operations chief of Coast Guard Cutter Joseph Gerczak, has made and distributed about 100 faceshields for health care professionals from his Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, home. Nearby, Coast Guardsmen
from District 14 assisted the Hawaii FoodBank in packaging food for those who could not shop for themselves, andacross the nation, Coast Guardsmen are donating blood. During this unprecedented crisis, the Coast Guard has certainly
proven itself not only ready and relevant, but extremely responsive.

Spring 2020

PROC E E DI NGSVol. 77, Number 1

Strategic
Environment

6
11

	U.S. Coast Guard and theEmerging Criticality of
Maritime Governancein Oceania
by CDR Jeremy Obenchain
and LCDR Leah Cole	U.S. Coast Guard
Intelligence | Unparalleledplacement and access for thehomeland security enterpriseby LT Gianfranco D. Palomba

20
24	Playing the Away Game |Securing the homelandfrom afar
by CAPT Mark Gordon
and Petty Officer 2nd Class
Erica Thurman	T he Coast Guard’s
Challenges in the Arctic |Protecting the Northby LT Amy Gayman

Strategic
Partnerships

30
36	Foreign Governments andSecuring the Maritime
Transportation System
by CDR Steve Barryand LCDR Scott Barton	A Marriage of
Two Communities | Pairing
capabilities to improve
maritime security
by CAPT Jeffrey Randall

40
43

	Playing to Our Strengths |Support of Title 10 missions in
the Arabian Gulf and beyond
by LT John J. Kearney	A Home for the Interceptors |The Coast Guard’s unique airintercept mission may finally
get a proper homeby CDR Michael R. Darrah

Anthony Hensen, a ScanEagle operator, prepares to launch the device from Coast
Guard Cutter Stratton in the West Pacific Ocean. ScanEagle is a small unmanned
aircraft system has a maximum speed of 60 knots and can fly more than 16 hours.
Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class Jasmine Mieszala

Mission Excellence
Anytime, Anywhere49	Sustaining the Standard of
Excellence | A reflection on
national security cutter
maintenance and support
strategies
by LCDR Andrew Pritchett54
59

	T he First Line of Defense
at Sea | Cutter crews
intercepting migrants
have complex roles
by LT Nicholas Spence and
CDR Patrick Culver	Rescuers and Risk |Managing risk while
maintaining a bias for action
by CDR Kevin Saunders
and LCDR Matthew Brinkley

Editorial Team
Samantha L. Quigley
Executive Editor
Antonio E. BalzaManaging Editor
Leslie C. Goodwin
Graphic Designer64	T he Ultimate Multi-Tool |The National Strike Force’s
history of support to the
Department of Defense
by CDR JoAnne Hanson

67	National Security
Cutter Conducts
National Defense
Missionby CAPT John J. Driscoll

72 Chemical of the Quarter

The ar ticles contained in Proceedings
are submitted by diverse public and pri­vate interests in the maritime community
as a means to promote maritime safety
and security. The views expressed by theauthors do not necessarily represent thoseof the U.S. Coast Guard or the Depart­
ment of Homeland Security or represent
official policy.

		Nautical Queries

Graphics provided by the Coast Guard and its
licensors, unless otherwise indicated.

On Deck

4

	Assistant Commandant’s
Perspective
by Rear Admiral
Douglas M. Fears

4
Historical Snapshot70
			Champion’s Point of View
by Captain Clinton S. Carlson

 he Flying SantaT
by William H. Thiesen, Ph.D.

Proceedings is published three times a year in
the interest of safety at sea under the auspicesof the Marine Safety & Security Council.
Special permission for republication, either
in whole or in part, except for copyrighted
material, is not required, provided credit isgiven to Proceedings.

		Understanding
Hydrogen		 by Cynthia Znati, Ph.D.

73
75

Engineering

Editorial Contact
Email:	HQS-DG-NMCProceedings@uscg.mil

Deck

Mail	Commandant (CG-5PS)
ATTN: Editor, Proceedings Magazine
U.S. Coast Guard Stop 7318
2703 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. S.E.
Washington, DC 20593-7318

On the Cover: National security isan ever-changing reality challenging
the daily mission of defending thehomeland. The Coast Guard is
responsible for overseeing a dynamic
maritime security environment
and this requires always being
ready–Semper Paratus. Training
is constantly underway in order tomove in an upward direction towards
nationwide security while mitigatingrisk. Fostering working relationships
throughout the world helps advancesecurity standards and policies
between nations.

Web: w ww.dco.uscg.mil/proceedings
Phone: (202) 372-2316

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Sid10 | Bigstock.com

AssistantCommandant’s
Perspective

Admiral Karl L. Schultz
Commandant
U.S. Coast Guard
The Marine Safety& Security Councilof theUnited States Coast Guard

by Rear Admiral Douglas M. Fears
Assistant Commandant for Response Policy
U.S. Coast Guard

Rear Admiral Steven J. Andersen
Judge Advocate General& Chief Counsel
Chairman
Rear Admiral Melissa Bert
Director of Governmental
and Public Affairs
MemberRear Admiral Thomas G. Allan
Assistant Commandant for
Resources, Chief Financial Officer
MemberOver the past two centuries, the manmade and natural threats to our nation
have evolved in both frequency, complexity, and severity. The risk to thehomeland and our global allies and partners are numerous. In some instances,
threats have taken revolutionary steps

that challenge the very core of our country. From protecting the sovereign interests of the United States to combating
exploitation of natural resources suchas illegal, unreported, and unregulated
fishing, and safeguarding critical cyber
infrastructure, and using cyber effects

Rear Admiral Richard V. Timme
Assistant Commandant
for Prevention Policy
Member
Captain David C. Barata
Director of Inspections
and Compliance
MemberChampion’s
Point of View

Mr. Jeffrey G. Lantz
Director of Commercial
Regulations and Standards
Memberby Captain Clinton S. Carlson
Director of Law Enforcement, Maritime Security,
and Defense Operations Policy
U.S. Coast Guard

Mr. Michael D. Emerson
Director of Marine
Transportation Systems
MemberRear Admiral Douglas M. Fears
Assistant Commandantfor Response Policy
Member
Ms. Dana S. Tulis
Director of Incident Management
and Preparedness Policy
MemberMr. William R. Grawe
Director of National Pollution
Funds Center
Member

It has been a true honor and pleasure tochampion this edition of Proceedings. As
you read the articles you will no doubt
be struck by the variety of Coast Guard
operational communities they span. That
was a conscious decision on our part, as
the theme of this edition is “Coast Guard,
Defending the Homeland.” Under thatumbrella it’s hard to imagine a time inour history where each one of our 11

Ms. Rebecca D. Orban
Executive Secretary

4

Proceedings     Spring 2020

statutory missions is as equally relevant
as they are now. Each community provides another thread in the tapestry
illustrating how we as an instrument of
national power work together internally,
as well as externally with one singularand very specific goal in sight—to keep
the citizens of our nation safe.
That goal of protecting our citizens
has assumed a renewed sense of urgency

to accomplish our mission, our challenges are great.
However, our Coast Guard is evolving with these threats
in relentless pursuit of mission readiness.
The emerging uncertainty and opportunities associated with the ubiquity of cyber connectivity and the“internet of things” keep our personnel persistently
challenged to assure the Coast Guard’s ability to operate effectively in all domains, at all times. In addition
to the capability and capacity to operate in all domains,at all times, we are enabled by a broad suite of authorities under U.S. Code Titles 10, 14, and 50, in addition toothers. We will continue to challenge our nation’s best
workforce to apply these authorities in this complex
and ever-changing environment with the Coast Guard’s
evolving capability and capacity. We will continue tooperate with our global allies as well as our state, local,
tribal, and territorial partners to ensure maximum effectand relevance.
As stated in the Coast Guard’s Strategic Plan, “themagnitude and complexity of our global operations andmission support activities … necessitates a workforce
possessing diverse backgrounds, different perspectives,
unique experiences, and original ideas.” Our people
truly are our greatest asset. It is their knowledge, continual training, education, expertise, resiliency, and partnerships that keep the Coast Guard relevant in today’s
ever-changing global environment. We have the ability
to deliver Coast Guard personnel worldwide, in support of our national objectives, as part of a globally integrated force. The Coast Guard‘s success is predicated ona highly trained, highly adaptive workforce. It is essential that we have the most capable people with modern
technology and tools in order to stay competitive andrise above today’s modernized threats.
As a renowned maritime leader, it is the sum of
our unique authorities, capabilities, and capacities that
distinguishes the Coast Guard as a globally relevant
force. This edition, and the articles within, highlight theuniqueness of the Coast Guard from the perspectives ofour people.

over past decades as the relative stability of a monopolar post-Cold War world view has been fractured. The
rise of transnational criminal organizations, violent
extremist organizations, and a seemingly limitless hostof other non-government entities, as well as the return ofa great power competition not seen since the mid-1980s,
have all contributed to this fracture. Fractured as wellwith the return of a great power competition not seen
since the mid-1980s. Gone are the days when we could
simply focus on saving lives, stopping bad guys, or protecting the environment. Now our leaders talk about“competitors, adversaries, and enemies.” They use thelanguage of strategies, campaign plans, and lines ofeffort. Subtle distinctions and nuances to be sure, but
in an age where the National Defense Strategy clearlystates, “It is now undeniable that the homeland is no longer a sanctuary.” These are the distinctions that will help
the service prioritize efforts within our 11 statutory missions to protect, defend, and “guard”, if you will, thehomeland.
When soliciting articles for this edition, we first had
to decide just what “Defending the Homeland” actuallymeans, and how the Coast Guard as a whole struggles

to do so. In an attempt to answer those two critical questions we turned to the National Defense Strategy and the
National Security Strategy for guidance. The four pillarsof the National Security Strategy are:
• Protect the American people, the homeland,
and the American way of life
• Promote American prosperity• Preserve peace through strength• Advance American influence
These pillars are embedded in our service culture andhow we work within them define us as an organization.
They are found in the tasks each and every “Coastie”
accomplishes with every sortie, patrol, or inspection.
These four pillars are not a new strategy for us, but rather
describe what we have been doing since 1790. The articles chosen for this edition illustrate the ways our missions support those pillars, enhancing them and making
them stronger.
Again, it is our hope that as you read through thisedition you come to the same conclusion that we have.
Whether executing a Titles 6, 10, 14, 33, 50, or any of themany other authority roles, every day our service is
Defending the Homeland.

Spring 2020     Proceedings

5Strategic Environment

U.S. Coast Guard andthe Emerging Criticality of
Maritime Governance in Oceania

by CDR Jeremy Obenchain
U.S. Coast Guard Liaison Officer
Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs

T

he Indo-Pacific remains the most consequential
region for America’s future. 1 The U.S. National
Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy,
and the Indo-Pacific Strategy underscore the importanceof this region to America’s continued stability, security, and prosperity. While most of the attention on thelong-term strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific has
focused on the South China Sea, China is also competing
to replace the United States and its allies as the partner ofchoice throughout the Pacific. The United States is redoubling its commitments to allies and partners throughout Oceania to preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific in
which all nations, regardless of size, are able to exercise
their sovereignty and reinforce the rules-based international order.
The Indo-Pacific Strategy provides a framework to
enable the whole of government to sharpen its focus on
the three key pillars of economics, governance, and security. 2 U.S. relationships with its Oce­a­nia partners are
unfolding against the backdrop of a shifting strategic environment where emerging powers seek to exert a greater
influence in the Pacific region through development andeconomic aid, people-to-people contacts, and security
cooperation. 3 The effective implementation of the U.S.
Indo-Pacific Strategy in Oceania requires increased Coast
Guard presence. The Coast Guard is optimized to operate below the threshold of military conflict and executestatutory missions closely aligned with the Pacific Island
partner priorities. However, this increase will requireinteragency commitment and support to adequately resource a service stretched by current commitments.
Coast Guard operations within Oceania have remained steady over the past half century yet its relevance continues to grow. There is a pressing need formore Coast Guard presence in the Indo-Pacific, specifically in Oceania. Under Admiral Karl L. Schultz, theCoast Guard has made significant new and renewed
commitments to Oceania. The Coast Guard is uniquely
positioned to respond to the emerging policy imperative

6

Proceedings     Spring 2020

LCDR Leah ColeU.S. Coast Guard Military Fellow
Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
to reaffirm U.S. commitment to the Pacific Islands with
operational presence, focused security sector assistance,and strategic partnering. However, the Coast Guard
must have additional resources to improve and sustain
our readiness in this vital region.

Importance of Oceania

Oceania connects the United States to the Indo-Pacificregion culturally, historically, and geographically. Its
strategic lines of communication are vital to securing
a free and open Indo-Pacific, home to the first, second,
and third island chains, bridging the geographic gap
between Asia and the Americas. The island chain strategy, first discussed by Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles, depicted U.S. security arrangements at the time. 4
The first island chain stretches from Japan past Taiwan
along the northwest of the Philippines and Borneo andcurls up to the southern tip of Vietnam. The second
island chain stretches from Japan through the Marianas
Islands to the Federated States of Micronesia. The third
chain stretches from the U.S. Aleutian islands throughthe Hawaiian Islands to the northern tip of New Zealand.
Oceania includes the U.S. state of Hawaii, the territories of Guam and American Samoa, the commonwealthof the Northern Mariana Islands comprised of Saipan,
Tinian, and Rota, and three Compact of Free Association(COFA) 5 countries. COFA is an international agreementthat established and governs the relationships of freeassociation between the United States and the Federated
States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Palau. Under
the compact, the U.S. provides full international defense
authority and responsibilities.
These U.S. Pacific states, territories, and commonwealths are the homeland and have direct connection to
U.S. banking, education, and health systems. Although
under many U.S. protections on paper, the region has
explicitly asked for more U.S. presence, specifically tobolster areas of vulnerabilities and limit the potential for
exploitation in the region.

Today, militarized outpost s a nd ma n-made i s lands in the South China
Sea dominate news coverage and necessitate freedomof navigation operations inhighly contested maritime
areas and sea lanes acrossNortheast Asia. Meanwhile,
many natural islands, strategically located with deep water access that connect Asia to
America’s doorstep, present a
quieter, but equally troublingprospect. No one has to build
them. That is Oceania.
World War II history of the
Pacific clearly demonstrated
how Oceania island chains
could be used to arrive at
the mainland of the United Members from American Samoa Marine Police and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Fisheries
States and Australia, one board a fishing vessel in the American Samoa exclusive economic zone to inspect the ship and crew for compliancewith safety, local, and federal regulations on August 9, 2019. A boat crew from the Coast Guard Cutter Josephof America’s closest allies. Gerczak transported the law enforcement members in a partnership to support resource security and maritime
Today, China is a strate- sovereignty. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Scott Sabatini
gic competitor and seeks toreplace the West as the economic and security partner
these waters are under U.S. flag, and 11 Oceania partof choice in the Indo-Pacific region in order to advancener nations have signed a bilateral shiprider agreement
the strategic objectives of its Belt and Road Initiative. 6
with the United States. U.S. maritime law enforcement
The evolving security and economic architecture inpresence to conduct operations and build sustainable
Oceania has ushered in an increasing strategic anxiety.
commitments and relationships in the region must be
This is due to a set of seemingly unrelated convergenplanned for in the coming fiscal years. Since millions ofces, including environmental concerns, political uncerthe gross domestic product of Oceania’s nations comes
tainty, increased investment by non-traditional partners,
from tuna fisheries, building and sustaining effective
pending expiration of economic assistance agreements
maritime governance and domain awareness in thisunder COFA in 2023–2024, and strategic competition inregion ensures the stability of these regional economies.
Oceania. While Pacific Island nations boast legitimate
It also ensures that the United States remains a strategic
claims to enormous exclusive economic zones (EEZ),
partner of choice.
these zones are difficult to effectively govern. This proxSimilarly, Coast Guard search and rescue (SAR)
responsibilities cover 30 per­cent of the region. It is theimity to United States access, interests, and entry points,
as well as law enforcement responsibilities, coupledlargest single U.S. SAR system at 12.2 million squarewith the maritime born vulnerabilities and jurisdictions
miles, abutted by partner nations French Polynesiathat make up Oceania, command attention and demand(France), New Zealand, and Australia. 7 As regional partaction by the Coast Guard to preserve a free and open
ners and SAR operators, our four nations also provide
aerial surveillance, mass rescue operations and continIndo-Pacific.
gency planning, cyclone season response, and Illegal,
Maritime Governance is
Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fisheries enforcement capacity in partnership with the Pacific Island
Regional Governance in Oceania
Oceania contains 43 percent, or about 1.3 million squarenations that make up Oceania.
miles, of the United States’ EEZ, making regional governance maritime governance, in this important region.
Strategic Partnerships and Regional Initiatives:
Look at a chart of the Pacific (previous page). Application
The Path to Successof international maritime law, coupled with the geoAs the United States announces its commitment to agraphic composition of these nations, has created somefree and open Indo-Pacific, the Coast Guard must alsoof the world’s largest EEZs and territorial seas. Many ofstrengthen its partnerships with key regional allies in
Spring 2020     Proceedings

7

Oceania map courtesy of the U.S. Department of State, 2017

the Coast Guard District 14 commander. Frequent, positive interactions by Coast Guard senior leadership withsenior State Department and Pacific Island Forum leaders, who form both national and regional governancepolicies, would further strengthen Coast Guard partnerships, inform long-term resource decisions, and broaden
areas of cooperation. The Boe Declaration, 10 issued in
September 2018 at the 49th Forum Leaders meeting in
Nauru, committed to a strengthening of their national
security approaches to more effectively address the complex emerging challenges of the 21st Century. PacificIsland economies, border security, existential climate
crisis, and related infrastructure security, as well as theability to combat transnational organized crime were
all stated as highest priorities for the region. Sustained
U.S. presence, information sharing, and partnership in
the region can assist in addressing theseissues especially in the maritime domain,
due to the maritime nature of tourism andfisheries-based economies of Pacific Island
nations.
Partnering with Australian efforts in
Oceania also makes good sense. Australia
has committed and fully funded 11 an additional $2 billion Australian to their Pacific
Maritime Security Program (PMSP). The
PMSP consists of three components:• Pacific patrol boat replacement• regional aerial surveillance•	efforts to strengthen regional
coordination
Australia is gifting 21 highly capable
Guardian Class patrol boats to 13 PacificIsland countries between late 2018 and2023. 12 These will replace 18 aging Pacificclass patrol boats from the Pacific Patrol Boat
Program, the PMSP’s predecessor. These vessels are packaged with long-term Australiansustainment, training, infrastructure, andadvisory support. The Coast Guard should
complement this important investment by
providing and sustaining basic seamanshiptraining, boarding team training and equipment, and information sharing.
Domestically, Australia has recently
enacted four national security objectives that
directly impact and improve the U.S. Coast
Guard’s ability to form an updated, powerful partnership. First, Australia passed the
Maritime Powers Act 13 and then formed
and resourced its new Maritime Border
Coast Guard Cutter Washington, homeported in Santa Rita, Guam, returns from a two-week
Command, which has now reached fulljoint law enforcement patrol with the Republic of Palau and Australia under Operation
operating capability. 14 It also has stood up
Kaukledm in early 2017. Photo courtesy of LCDR Ben Fennell, Royal Australian Navy, Australia
its
Department of Home Affairs, creating a
Ministry of Defence
Oceania, including Australia, New Zealand, France,
and Japan. Leveraging existing, effective regional organizations across the Pacific Island nations will be thepath to sustainable impact in Oceania. The Coast Guard
should continue to strengthen its contributions to the
Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency 8 to patrol thevast island nation EEZs more effectively. Similarly, theCoast Guard should grow its partnership with the Pacific
Transnational Crime Network 9 to provide meaningful
contributions through increased information sharing.
Specifically, post-boarding reports and reporting suspicious activity obtained by assets deployed in the region
would be valuable.
The United States delegation attends the Pacific Islands Forum, the leaders’ level policy body in the Southwest Pacific, in observer status and typically includes

10

Proceedings     Spring 2020

Petty Officers 2nd Class Mandi Stevens and Chris Parmenter, aviation maintenance technicians from Coast Guard Air Station Barbers Point, Kapolei, Hawaii, siton the ramp of an HC-130 Hercules airplane to deploy a long range deployable drop kit to a disabled vessel approximately 80 miles off Tonga in May 2017. The
air crew was returning from a search and rescue conference in New Zealand and spotted the vessel after being diverted. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer
3rd Class Amanda Levasseur

domestic joint, inter-agency, maritime governance modelthat has allowed for significant growth in its maritime
governance abilities, pushing their borders further offshore. Finally, Vice President Michael Pence announced
in Papua New Guinea in November 2018 that the UnitedStates will partner with Australia and the island nation
to develop a joint naval base on Papua New Guinea’s
Manus Island. A naval base in Papua New Guinea, supported by Australia and the United States, will serve asa much needed logistics hub to sustain future deployments across Oceania, and more broadly, the Indo-Pacificregion.
For many outside of the region, France may not
be an obvious Pacific power, but France has the largest EEZ and is a key ally. Strategically located, French
Polynesia is the first stop sailboats must make in theirPacific transit west due to the directional nature of the
trade winds. Similarly, the islands of New Caledonia(French) are typically the last stop in Oceania before
the final leg to Australia or New Zealand. The Frenchnavy is a strong and collaborative partner and regularly
conducts highly successful international exercises, IUU
fishing, and counter-narcotic patrols in the region. Tahiti
boasts the French naval headquarters for the Pacific, andFrance’s new naval acquisitions, multi-mission vessels,
including the offshore patrol vessels Bougainville in Tahiti

and D’Entrecasteaux in New Caledonia. 15 Moreover, asa permanent member of the United Nations Security
Council, France patrols the South China Sea, conducts
freedom of navigation operations, and enforces international laws and norms. Investing in relationships with
the French navy is investing in the long term. It has not
only re-homeported new ships to the area, but in 2017
also rebuilt its entire pacific naval headquarters facility
to boast a modern, new command and control suite.
Partnering with New Zealand is central to relationships, information, and patrol efforts as the country
maintains many direct and cultural ties to the Cook
Islands, Niue, Tonga, and Samoa through industry, economic, and government. Also, New Zealand is a key
partner for Antarctic exploration and regional maritime
issues in the Southern Ocean.
New Zealand’s 2016 defense white paper outlines
significant maritime and defense investments and acquisitions over the next two decades. The New Zealand
Defense Forces have also deployed, for the first time,
their offshore patrol vessel for near continuous Oceania
patrols, specifically in partnership with the Fijian defense forces, which has achieved favorable outcomes.
New Zealand has hosted Coast Guard polar ice breakers
and been a partner in Operation Deep Freeze, furtheringcommitments in both Oceania and Antarctic operations.
Spring 2020     Proceedings

11Fijian sub-Lt. Opeti Enesi, a navigation officer, and an Air Station Barbers Point HC-130 Hercules aircrew fly over the Fijian islands in December 2018. Enesi wasacting as a shiprider for the Fiji government during a joint law enforcement operation. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Matthew West

Despite New Zealand’s smaller size, it brings outsized
contributions, credibility, and value to the Pacific Island
countries. Their National Maritime Coordination Centeris embedded in its Headquarters Joint Forces New
Zealand, where all branches of their military work together while simultaneously coordinating with theirpolice, customs, and intelligence arms. This level ofinteragency partnership has allowed for consistent, reliable, and meaningful informational and operational
exchanges with their Pacific Island neighbors.
Partnering with Japan is critical in Micronesia.
Here, Japan has donated patrol boats, small boats, andshoreside infrastructure for new vessel berthing, as wellas other maritime domain initiatives under its Project for
Improvement of Coast Guard Capabilities of the Three
Micronesian States. The total granted for the project is$44 million. Three countries in Micronesia—Palau, theFederated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands,
all have tiny populations and large EEZs to patrol. They
have been working with the Nippon Foundation, theJapan Coast Guard, and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation
to improve their maritime policing capabilities.

12

Proceedings     Spring 2020

Micronesia continues to be a sub-region within Oceania
where Australia and New Zealand look to the UnitedStates to lead. Coast Guard Sector Guam conducts many
international engagements and operations here, but mostare unknown outside of the immediate area. With morecapability, Sector Guam could deliver more to achieve
U.S. strategic military and diplomatic objectives.
Innovation in the face of limited assets, criticalityof partner collaboration, deconfliction of efforts in theregion, and increasing demand for Coast Guard presence
and security cooperation resulted in the creation of two
key initiatives. The Oceania Maritime Security Initiative(OMSI) dually enables the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command(INDOPACOM) to leverage U.S. Navy ships transiting
Oceania for maritime law enforcement by embarking a
Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment, and allows
the Coast Guard to leverage Navy vessels for surface
coverage and law enforcement platforms. These OMSI
deployments also offer opportunities to exercise theCoast Guard’s bilateral shiprider agreements to counter
IUU fishing.
Through the Pacific Quadrilateral Defense Coordi-

nating Group (Pacific-QUAD), the Coast Guard’s experience in multilateral operations is a model for engagement
within the Indo-Pacific and a key strategic advantage
when competing with revisionist powers. At the September 2018 Pacific-QUAD principals meeting, it wasagreed the scope of engagement beyond IUU fishing,
to include transnational threats, resource security, andother security areas described in the Boe Declaration,
would expand. More recently, at the April 2019 PacificQUAD meeting, a framework of action and a road map
to success were developed. The Coast Guard would benefit from increased staffing at District 14, Pacific Area,
and the Office of International Affairs to support thisexpanding international engagement.

Increased Coast Guard Presence andSecurity Cooperation in Oceania

This year, in response to increased strategic demand
signals, the Coast Guard demonstrated its commitment
to Oceania. The Coast Guard replaced four aging cutters with new national security cutter (NSC) and fast
response cutters (FRC) in the port of Honolulu. In the
2020s the port of Apra Harbor, Guam, will also receive
three new FRCs. This significant investment in newer,
faster, and more capable assets in the Pacific Islands will
decrease response times to major events while increasing
opportunities for the Coast Guard to meet its partners

where they are. The Coast Guard, answering a request
for forces from INDOPACOM, also provided criticalwaterside security for the 2018 Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation Summit in Papua, New Guinea. In 2019, theCoast Guard covered a Pacific Island partner patrol boat
gap between the decommissioning of an Australiandonated Pacific Forum class boat and delivery of the newAustralia Pacific Maritime Security Guard class patrol
boat. The Coast Guard remains uniquely positioned tosupport the whole-of-government effort to reaffirm U.S.
commitments and partnerships in Oceania.
In the near term, with modest investment by interagency partners, the Coast Guard is postured to provide
increased operational support and security assistance.
This includes:• aids to navigation assistance in the compact states• host regional subject matter expert workshops• deploying these experts to regional collectives insupport of focused operations• enhance information sharing• dispatch senior leaders to engage with theirregional counterparts• promote opportunities for qualified regional
candidates to attend the Coast Guard Academy• partner with regional forums and theInternational Maritime Organization on port
security capacity building

Coast Guard graphic

Spring 2020     Proceedings

13Moreover, for lasting, substantive, and meaningful
effect, the Coast Guard should enable consultative maritime legal framework dialogues to identify the jurisdictional and legislative gaps and shortcomings. This is inaddition to closing loopholes in the conservation management measures, binding decisions made by a Pacificfisheries commission, to enable prosecutorial effectacross the region to counter transnational organizedcrime and IUU fishing across the region.
In the long-term, with a more substantial investment of resources, the Coast Guard could explore andimplement operational and security assistance models
that have successfully provided presence and delivered
capability in other regions of the world. Operationally,a Patrol Forces Oceania with two to three FRCs operating from forward locations with a shoreside support element, and a multi-rate subject matter expert
engagement team would provide significant presence
and engagement capacity. The Coast Guard could also
consider an Oceania support tender program, using a
dedicated Coast Guard cutter that conducts regional
engagement, with a combined crew from like-minded
partners focused on training regional personnel at sea.
A permanent liaison or maritime advisor to the compact states, a rotational presence at the pending PacificFusion Center, 16 and a regionally based technical assistance team, designed to assist regional partners withmaintenance and logistics would support key lines ofeffort. Lastly, the Coast Guard would need to increase
security cooperation expertise and capacity.
However, increased Coast Guard presence andsupport for partner capacity-building in Oceania will
be a trade-off, and cannot result in decreased Coast
Guard presence and focus in the Western Hemisphere.
Therefore, the Department of Defense must advocate on
behalf of, and if required provide resources to support,
the Coast Guard’s increased presence in Oceania. The
Department of Defense could start with increasing theCoast Guard’s defense readiness funding, which has
been completely left out of the current investment torestore U.S. military readiness. INDOPACOM, formerly
U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Commandshould advocate in the Global Forces Management
process for the U.S. Navy to deploy ships in supportof the Joint Interagency Task Force South thereby freeing up Coast Guard assets to deploy to the Southwest
Pacific. INDOPACOM should transition OMSI from a
notion of transiting ships with embarked shipriders to afunded operational authority like the Maritime Security
Initiative. Additionally, the Coast Guard, with support
from the U.S. interagency, could explore increasing
its presence through liaisons, attachés, or advisors in
key locations such as the Compact of Free Association
States or a regional liaison in Canberra, Australia, or

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

Wellington, New Zealand.
The Coast Guard is an essential instrument of U.S.
policy in Oceania, which continues to emerge as a center of gravity in the ongoing great power competition. To
be an effective instrument, however, the United States
must invest accordingly in Coast Guard capabilities and­readiness.
About the authors:
CDR Jeremy Obenchain focuses on security forces capacity building in
the Indo-Pacific, in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of
Global Program and Initiatives. He has served at U.S. Embassy Manila,
Philippines; U.S. Naval Forces Central Command; Coast Guard Patrol
Forces Southwest Asia; Coast Guard Activities Europe; the U.S. Houseof Representatives Committee on Homeland Security; and Coast Guard
Tactical Law Enforcement Team South. He is a graduate of the Virginia
Military Institute.
LCDR Leah Cole focuses on strategic policy for maritime security, crisis
management and security cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region
at Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. She hasserved aboard four cutters conducting a broad range of maritime law
enforcement and lifesaving missions. She has also served with Joint
Interagency Task Force West, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; and the
Coast Guard’s Leadership Development Center, as well as executive
assistant to the commander of Coast Guard Atlantic Area. She earned abachelor’s degree from the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, a master’s from
Florida State University, and has completed Joint Professional Military
Education at the U.S. Naval War College.
Endnotes:
1.	PACOM Commander Remarks at Defense One Summit, 2016
2.	Department of State, 2018

3.	U.S. Policy in the Pacific: The Struggle to Maintain Influence: Hearings before

the Foreign Affairs Committee, House of Representatives, 114th Cong. 5(2016) (Testimony of Matthew J. Matthews)

4.	D ulles, J. F. (1952). Security in the Pacific. Foreign Affairs, 30(2). www.

foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1952-01-01/security-pacific

5.	Retrieved from www.uscompact.org

6.	C hina’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative, Council on Foreign Relations,

May 21, 2019.

7.	Lunday, K. District 14 Strategic Plan, 2019

8.	FFA is based in the Solomon Islands and serves as a central command center

for all of the Pacific Patrol Boats to give and receive information on suspected
IUU vessels

9.	PTCN is based in Samoa and is the central hub to Transnational Crime Units(TCU) on nearly all of the Pacific Islands and boasts an electronic information
sharing system across the Pacific to target transnational organized crime

10.	Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, Boe Declaration on Regional Security

www.forumsec.org/category/declarations/11.	Australia Defense Annual Report, 2017-2018. Pacific Maritime Security

Program www.defence.gov.au/annualreports/17-18/Features/Maritime.asp

12.	Austal Limited. “Austal Delivers First Guardian Class Patrol Boat” 2018.

https://austal.com/news/austal-delivers-first-guardian-class-patrol-boat

13.	Australia Federal Registrar of Legislation, 2016. www.legislation.gov.au/

Details/C2013A00015

14.	Department of Home Affairs, 2018. www.directory.gov.au/portfolios/home-affairs/department-home-affairs/australian-border-force-0/central-office/operations-group/maritime-border-command

15.	Navy Recognition, Defense News, September 2016. www.navyrecognition.

com/index.php/news/defence-news/2016/september-2016-navy-navalforces-defense-industry-technology-maritime-security-global-news/4386french-navy-received-the-qbougainvilleq-second-of-four-b2m-multimission-vessels.html

16.	https://navaltoday.com/2018/09/05/australia-to-establish-pacific-security-

center/ November 2018

U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence
Unparalleled placement and accessfor the homeland security enterpriseby LT Gianfranco D. Palomba
Intelligence Officer
USCG Sector Upper Mississippi RiverAs our nation’s lead maritime first responder andhomeland security agency, the U.S. Coast Guard
is in a unique legal and operational position toeffectively counter emerging threats in the maritime
environment. The Coast Guard also plays a critical role inthe collection, analysis, exploitation, and disseminationof intelligence, leveraging both national and law enforcement authorities to do so. Although intelligence-driven
operations have very much been a familiar Coast Guard
concept since the creation of the Revenue Cutter Service
in 1790, a 2002 amendment to the National Security Act
of 1947 formally welcomed the Coast Guard into the
17-member U.S. Intelligence Community (IC). Unlike
other IC members, however, the Coast Guard occupies a
unique armed service and law enforcement space within
the national security enterprise of the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS). Generally unknown, the legal
framework of Titles 10 and 50 of the U.S. Code grant the
Coast Guard authority to gain unrivaled placement andaccess to particularly sensitive intelligence collection
opportunities. 1,2 After all, the Coast Guard is known for
executing many of the stability and disaster response
operations associated with its 11 statutory missions,rather than acting as a unique arm of the IC. Arguably,
this allows Coast Guard Intelligence (CGI) professionals to provide the U.S. homeland security enterprise its
greatest return on investment. CGI members pair both
requisite authorities and honed interagency relationships
to specialize in every modern intelligence discipline.

Human Intelligence

In order to meet the executive branch’s most pressing
national security priorities, the IC charges its members with aligning their mission with overall collection requirements. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is
one arena in which Coast Guard professionals leverage
unique advantages relative to fellow IC agencies and collectors. The most storied and well-practiced of all of theintelligence disciplines, HUMINT relies heavily upon
common relationship building and interpersonal communication in order to spot, assess, and recruit human

intelligence sources. This may sound like skills all Coast
Guard personnel intuitively employ on a daily basis,
whether in the local community, the workplace, or evenat home with family and friends, and this is absolutely
true. As intuitive as HUMINT may seem, collector
capabilities require exhaustive training and disciplined
practice. A good “HUMINTer” understands the role thatassumptions and cognitive biases play in decision-making. They often speak multiple languages, have an ability
to be both the center of attention and blend into a crowd,
and rarely allow emotion to override logic. In essence,
HUMINT professionals function well in dynamic andunpredictable situations, maintaining an even keel andfocus on collection requirements.

White-hull diplomacy refers to whitehulled ships, like those of the Coast
Guard, representing a less defensive,
more accommodating posture thanthat of grey-hulled war ships.
Because of its diverse mission set, the Coast Guard
has routine access to foreign ports and interactions withforeign maritime professionals, making it uniquely positioned to report on said interactions as an asset for the
IC. Practicing “white hull diplomacy” during foreign
engagements allows Coast Guard HUMINT professionals unparalleled placement and access to valuable information ripe for intelligence exploitation. Unlike other
IC members, however, intelligence authorities restrict
the Coast Guard to overt HUMINT collection. Contrary
to clandestine and even covert intelligence collection,
overt methods include custodial interviews, consensual
information exchanges, and overt imagery collection in
the performance of duty. Even counterintelligence professionals in the Coast Guard, whom execute particularly sensitive investigations on invasive foreign-actor
Spring 2020     Proceedings15

intelligence collection attempts, do so without the protection of plausible deniability or the shield of cover stories. To hone its HUMINT collectors’ skills, the Coast
Guard routinely sends its members to the Departmentof Defense’s Defense Strategic Debriefing Course at Fort
Huachuca, Arizona, as well as several other interagency
HUMINT training courses in the national capital region.
With their overt surveillance best practices and learned
HUMINT tactical strategies, Coast Guard collectors are
adaptable in military and law enforcement settings athome and abroad. IC analysts across the 17-member community stress that routine HUMINT collection and theaggregation of overt and voluntarily-provided information is what often provides the greatest insight to bothallied and adversarial intentions. Focusing on consensually provided information from foreign attaché officers,
vessel captains, international military and law enforcement professionals, and even foreign corporate and thinktank leaders allows Coast Guard HUMINTers to play an
exclusive role in meeting national security priorities andintelligence requirements.

signals. Given the access that Coast Guard cutters andpersonnel routinely enjoy, IC signals intelligence practitioners train Coast Guard Intelligence Specialists inforeign SIGINT operations. To augment the National
Security Agency’s overall foreign SIGINT efforts, theCoast Guard Cryptologic Group boasts a healthy number of Coast Guard Cryptologic Units at various interagency centers across the United States. These units’“SIGINTers” employ specialized equipment and methodologies to provide raw, unevaluated SIGINT information to both Coast Guard operational decision makers aswell as fellow IC and military components. With strict
U.S. legal authorities limiting collection on U.S. persons,the Coast Guard SIGINT mission focuses externallyon foreign communications. Accordingly, Coast Guard
SIGINT members often work beyond domestic Coast
Guard mission sets to address larger strategic intelligence priorities in direct support of the U.S. National
Security Strategy, the U.S. Defense Strategy, and the U.S.
Counterterrorism Strategy. 3
Beyond traditional SIGINT concerns are offensive
and defensive cyber warfare issues. As part of U.S. Cyber
Signals Intelligence
Command’s growing role in the IC and the U.S. national
CGI professionals are also heavily entrenched in the colsecurity apparatus, the Coast Guard established Coast
lection, analysis, and exploitation of foreign communicaGuard Cyber Command (CGCYBER) in July 2013, forthe purpose of addressing internal and external cybertions. Known formally as signals intelligence (SIGINT),
threats. Although maintaining a much smaller footthis national intelligence element discipline involves thereal-time surveillance and interception of foreign radio,
print than Defense Department services and IC agency
satellite, and other modern digital communications
cyber components, CGCYBER is becoming well-practiced in more than routine
in format ion assurance
and cyber security lessons learned. It collaborates extensively with the
Defense Department’s military cyber warfare operations and exercises while
keeping eyes on domestic
cyber threats in conjunction with DHS’ Office of
Science and Technology,
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, and the
National Protection andProg ra ms Di rec torate.
The mission focus of theseagencies extends beyond
foreign-deployed military
assets and infrastructure.
Instead, it ensures thehardened cyber security
posture of vulnerable critiAir Force Staff Sgt. Amber Gagnon, 316th Training Squadron (TRS) military training leader, works at her computer on
cal infrastructure and key
Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas, in June 2016. The 316th TRS conducts Air Force, Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Coast
resources against state andGuard cryptologic, human intelligence, and military training. U.S. Air Force photo by Airman 1st Class Randall Moose

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

Chief Master Sergeant Michael Ditore, command chief of the 432nd Wing, 432nd Air Expeditionary Wing listens as a 22nd Reconnaissance Squadron mission
support analyst explains how he uses maps to collect information for preflight briefings. Ditore met with a sensor operator, geospatial intelligence targeteer,
mission support analysts, and a squadron aviation resource manager at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, in April 2016. Air Force photo by Senior Airman
Christian Clausen

non-state rogue cyber actors. With critical Coast Guard
leadership roles in U.S. maritime ports of entry, including
overall captain of the port authority and responsibilities,
CGCYBER professionals work with regional and local
partners to advance effective cyber security for major
U.S. ports on behalf of government and industry stakeholders. This commitment to preserving economic security, maritime commerce, and cyber threat vulnerability
mitigation catapult CGCYBER into a very distinct andinvaluable position in the homeland security enterprise.

Geospatial Intelligence

The IC’s functional manager for all imagery andgeospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), one of the most
crucially important IC components. Known as theIntelligence Coordination Center’s GEOINT department,
this relatively small contingent leverages the strategic
initiatives and robust resources of IC imagery intelligence and GEOINT capabilities to address all 11 of the
Coast Guard’s statutory missions.
The relevance of timely and accurate imagery often

speaks for itself, but what about less-publicized spaceborne reconnaissance and imagery? These types ofimages allow the Coast Guard to cue operational assets
during narcotics and migrant interdictions, map foreign
ports for visiting cutters, track ice flows across vital shipping channels, and provide ground-level developments
during natural disaster responses. This doesn’t meanthat the Coast Guard’s dependence on crucial GEOINT
products should come across as all take and no give.
To bolster NGA’s collection efforts for the IC as awhole, these same Coast Guard operational assets—
cutters, aircraft, and Coast Guard personnel—gain theaccess necessary to forego more expensive and intrusive
GEOINT collection efforts.
For example, rather than reallocating surveillancecapabilities away from high priority national security
and defense priorities, Coast Guard operational assets
can collect and disseminate valuable imagery andgeospatial information with routine sensor and humanbased methodologies. Given the unique access Coast
Guard personnel and cutters often enjoy globally, it isable to execute many IC GEOINT priorities during theSpring 2020     Proceedings

17

course of other formal duties and responsibilities. It is
within this wide mission scope that the Coast Guard’s
GEOINT utility proves instrumental to both intelligence
consumers as well as producers.

Open Source Intelligence

The digital age has ushered in one of the newest intelligence disciplines. Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)
leverages electronic and internet-based media and social
media sources while respecting the importance of moreclassic paper literature and audio/video communication
methods. Although important to the IC prior to 2011, theArab Spring that occurred across the Middle East andNorth Africa is a perfect case study, demonstrating theoverwhelming influence crowd-sourced collaboration
can have on societal changes. 4,5,6 Common OSINT practices capture publicly available open source information
via overt and clandestine means. Although CGI members do not engage in the latter, the organization absolutely incorporates the insights gained through crowd
sourcing and social media to their advantage in decisionmaking. In concert with larger intelligence community
efforts, Coast Guard intelligence professionals engage
in completely overt OSINT collection and analysis withthe use of advanced digital technology and methods,
including social media aggregator software. Commercial

off-the-shelf social media aggregators allow analysts to
geo-reference social network posts, employ keyword
searches to filter for threatening language and imagery,and translate foreign language social network videos orimagery in real-time to best position resources efficiently.
A Coast Guard sector commander with limited operational assets to cover large geographic areas would
appreciate the ability to best position small boats andcutters based on real-time information. Similarly, a Coast
Guard helicopter or aircraft could respond more quickly
to a tweet emanating from a disabled sailboat adrift offshore if it could be geo-referenced.
With assistance from interagency partners, and technology from the Coast Guard Research and Development
Center, Coast Guard Investigative Service has carriedout specific evidence collection and criminal prosecution with the assistance of more nuanced OSINT collection. This includes voice and audio forensics. Althoughstill rapidly-developing and often subject to “fake news”
denial and deception tactics, OSINT’s power and relevance as an intelligence discipline has not gone unnoticed or unpracticed by CGI and operational decision
makers.

Future Challenges

Senior Coast Guard and IC leadership continually stress

Coast Guard Research and Development Center and Carnegie Mellon University cooperate on voice and audio forensics to create an audio “fingerprint” ofcallers on suspicious maritime search and rescue emergency calls. Coast Guard Research and Development Center graphic

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

the importance of joint, intelligence-driven operations
as critical to separating us from our adversaries. It is
this integration and the ability to employ domestic law
enforcement authorities, and foreign intelligence collection capabilities that enables CGI to assume a critical role
among the 17 members of the IC. Executing 11 statutory
missions often requires reliance on intelligence collec-

with current and future major acquisitions like theOffshore Patrol Cutter. Intelligence Coordination Center
analysts and research and development scientists havecontinued to partner with both government and private
industry big data analytics representatives to assess machine learning, artificial intelligence, and perhaps future quantum computing advantages for Coast Guard
mission use. The Coast
Guard boasts a team thathas paired with DHS
science and technology
to launch tiny cube satellites, or “cube sats,”
and bolster the Coast
Guard’s i ntelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance options in the
future. With a renewed
focus on “intelligencedr iven operat ion s”
and cont inued fiscal
constraints, CGI must
continue to foster interagency relationships, develop its human capital,
and maintain analytical focus on emerging
homeland threats to theAmerican public.

About the author:
LT Gianfranco D. Palomba iscurrently an intelligence officer
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Research Associate Brian Wood (left) and Marine Corps Captain Clayton Jarolimek
at Sector Upper Mississippi
inside NPS’ Mobile CubeSat Command and Control center in 2013. Naval Postgraduate photo by Javier Chagoya
River and recent graduate of
the National Intelligence University’s Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence program. Previous
tion, analysis, exploitation, and dissemination beyond
assignments include intelligence officer, Patrol Forces Southwest Asia,
what the service can organically produce. What the
project manager, Coast Guard Research and Development Center, two
Coast Guard brings to the IC in return for this tactical,
Tactical Intelligence Element, Pacific Joint Interagency Task Force South
operational, and strategic IC support is the unique accesspatrols in the Eastern Pacific theater, and direct analyst support to theafforded to the Coast Guard as not only a maritime first
Coast Guard military and police attaché at the U.S. embassy in Bogota,
Colombia.
responder but a military service. Although paling in staff

numbers when compared to larger IC agencies, CGI professionals are extremely well-trained, highly adaptable,
and carry a unique number of authorities and access.
They also understand the intimate connection between
analyst and operator necessary to execute missions.
This is important, as emerging technological advancements employed by both state and non-state actors isfundamentally changing the threat landscape. The CGI
is evolving and even leading the charge for DHS agencies attempting to address non-traditional homelandthreats. Coast Guard acquisition professionals are working closely with CGI to mitigate the corporate espionage,technology theft, and cyber vulnerabilities associatedEndnotes:

1.	Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). Department of Defense

Title 10 Authorities. Intelligence Community Legal Reference Book. Office ofGeneral Counsel. December 2016

2.	United States Code. 50 U.S.C. Title 50—War and National Defense. Chapter

15—National Security, Sec. 401—Congressional declaration of purpose. U.S.
Government Publishing Office. 2011

3.	Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). National Intelligence

Strategy of the United States of America 2019

4.	A nderson, Lisa. “Demystifying the Arab Spring.” Foreign Affairs. May/June

2011. Accessed on March 28, 2019

5.	Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). “The Arab Uprisings: How Did We Get

Here?” Council on Foreign Relations. March 30, 2012. Accessed on March 28,
20196.	National Public Radio (NPR). “The Arab Spring: A Year of Revolution.”

NPR—All Things Considered. December 17, 2011. Accessed on March 28, 2019

Spring 2020     Proceedings

19Playing the Away Game
Securing the homeland from afar
by CAPT Mark Gordon
Chief of Operations
U.S. Coast Guard Atlantic AreaAs this article was being written, Coast Guard
Cutter Hamilton was thousands of miles fromits Charleston, South Carolina, home. Her
148-­person crew, three pursuit boats, and airborne useof-force capable helicopter were on patrol in the Eastern
Pacific Ocean, roughly more than 2,000 miles from ournearest land border
Hamilton, commissioned in December 2014, is oneof the newest 418-foot national security cutters. The
national security cutters replace the 1960s-era 378-footTreasury Class high endurance cutters and offer an exponential increase in capabilities. The cutter is currently
part of a joint force consisting of cutters, Navy ships,
allied warships, and aircraft dedicated to securing thehomeland by combating transnational criminal organizations where they are most vulnerable, at sea far fromour borders.
In a span of 16 days during Hamilton’s winter 2018
patrol, she averaged an interdiction every three days,

Petty Officer 2nd Class Erica Thurman
Operations Specialist and CIC Team Leader
U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton

detained 21 suspected smugglers, and seized 4.7 tonsof cocaine. This tempo is not uncommon for any cutter or ship operating in the Eastern Pacific. More important than the amount of drugs seized, however, is thatcriminal organizations never received the proceeds fromthe sale of their illicit goods. Those proceeds are often
used to sow further violence and corruption along thepath they travel from their South and Central American
origins to our southwest border. In addition to denying
these criminals resources and influence, each interdiction also destabilizes these illicit networks, and provides
information used to identify additional targets and criminals higher in the organization.
The adversary is networked, ingenious, and ruthless, but they are most vulnerable where the U.S. Coast
Guard is the most effective. The Coast Guard’s uniqueand broad law enforcement authority on the high seas,
and in some cases, under a bilateral agreement, within
another nations’ territorial seas make it highly effectiveat countering threats to the homeland far from our shores. This also
makes the Coast Guard a sought
out and highly effective partnerwith many nations, not just in ourhemisphere, but throughout theworld.
The United Nations Officeon Drugs and Crime estimatesthat illegal narcotics constitutethe number one money making enterprise for transnational
crime. 1 Through these illicit proceeds Transnational Criminal
Organizations (TCO) are able tocorrupt officials, dominate communities, and control their operating environment especially in
Caribbean and Central Americancountries. 2 Corruption is surely
the single most concerning destaAdmiral Karl L. Schultz, then-Coast Guard Atlantic Area commander, speaks at a press event in December
bilizing factor. Felipe Calderon,2016, at Port Everglades Cruiseport in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The crew of the Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton
former President of Mexico,
offloaded approximately 26.5 tons of cocaine worth an estimated $715 million. Coast Guard photo by Petty
attributed the pervasive problems
Officer 3rd Class Eric Woodall

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

of Mexico and in other developing
nations to low institutional strengththat “… allows criminals to dominate law enforcement agencies anduse them to fight against othergroups, leaving thousands of victims. Institutional weakness leads
to impunity, and impunity is exacerbated as the size of the problem
grows. The vicious circle creates anunbelievable spiral of violence …” 3
Additionally, the increasingly complex pathways, routes, and networks
developed to infiltrate our borders
and gain access to our communities
allow traffickers to smuggle otherthings as they become profitable.
These illicit pathways are clearlysomething very concerning to thesafety and security of the United A member of Costa Rica’s Policia Control de Druga shakes hands with CAPT Mark Gordon, commanding
officer of the Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton, following the crew’s successful interdiction of a Costa RicanStates and the integrity of the mari- flagged fishing vessel. Coast Guard photo by LTJG Kiana Kekoatime transportation network. The
Mexican cartels have shown these pathways to be very
team working far from home. On November 14, 2018,
profitable, employing extortion or kidnapping to furthera Maritime Patrol Aircraft sighted a suspicious fisherode society and take advantage of the flood of people
ing vessel operating in a known drug trafficking area.
attempting to flee Central America to the United States. 4
Hamilton launched its MH-65 Dolphin Helicopter andEach interdiction or case is different but shares one
a 35-foot long range interceptor boat to relocate the F/V
common factor: It is not easy finding these smugglers
Miriam, which was claiming the Costa Rican flag. During
on a vast ocean. The areas of the Eastern Pacific andthe right of approach questioning, there was reason to
the Caribbean are huge, and even with the increased
suspect this vessel of illicit activity. Hamilton shifted its
capability of Hamilton, her sister ships, patrol aircraft,tactical control from Joint Interagency Task Force South,
unmanned aerial systems, and other assets, the chalresponsible for detection and monitoring, to Coast Guard
lenge has been likened to patrolling the entire state ofDistrict 11, responsible for interdiction and apprehenCalifornia or, in some cases, half of the United Statession, in order to conduct a potential law enforcementwith just a few patrol cars. In addition to the immense
action. District 11 enacted the bilateral agreement with
Costa Rica, entered into many years ago under provigeography of the oceans, TCOs are experts in stealth,hiding in plain sight by blending into legitimate trafsions recommended within Article 17 of the 1988 United
Nations’ Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics
fic or commerce, using hidden compartments that cantake weeks to locate, or all of the above. Despite this,and Psychotropic Substances. It was under those proviin an average year, the Coast Guard seizes three times
sions a full law enforcement boarding was authorized onbehalf of the Costa Rican government.
more cocaine at sea than all other U.S. agencies comAfter 36 hours of thoroughly searching the vessel anbined. Despite record seizures for the last few years, theavailability of cocaine and cocaine related deaths in theingeniously concealed compartment was discovered and1,700 kilos of cocaine removed. On behalf of the Costa
United States are increasing. 5 While we will never beable to completely eliminate the supply of illicit prodRican government, the four crew were detained alongucts, more resources like cutters, aircraft, agents, andwith all related evidence. The crew, a thorough caseships, deployed where they can be the most effective may
package, and non-drug evidence were turned over tohelp to stabilize or begin to reverse this trend. Reducing
the Costa Rican authorities during a port call to Golfito,
the pressure on our borders and our neighbors in Latin
Costa Rica. In conjunction with the turnover of the caseAmerica is likely an added bonus.
package, an engagement was held onboard with several
Two recent Hamilton cases highlight how not only
key members of the government of Costa Rica, to discuss
the United States, but our partners in Central America
expanding opportunities for further cooperative success.
The F/V Miriam case highlights the importance ofand the Caribbean, are more secure through theactions of the dedicated interagency and international
our partners and how the efforts of cutters like Hamilton
Spring 2020     Proceedings21

can bolster such relationships. Using Costa Rica as justone example, in fiscal year 2018 Coast Guard District 11
enacted the bilateral agreement between the UnitedStates and Costa Rica 33 times, resulting in the seizureof more than 7.9 metric tons of cocaine, 10,000 pounds ofmarijuana, and 13 vessels. In addition, Costa Rica provided support for U.S. counter criminal network efforts
with 90 aircraft based out of various sites throughout
the country and 45 Coast Guard port calls. With the
Miriam’s 1.7 tons of cocaine, Costa Rica surpassed its
previous national record of 30.1 metric tons of cocaine
seized in a year. Also, a valuable partner on the water,
the country’s Guardacostas conducted numerous druginterdictions after receiving Libertadors, 110-foot cutters previously belonging to the Coast Guard. For example, on November 10, 2018, a Libertador crew detected
and intercepted two suspicious vessels, seizing 1 ton of
cocaine and six smugglers. That case was one of five in apatrol of less than 2 months that culminated in the seizure of an estimated 9,460 pounds of cocaine ultimately
destined for American soil.
Our work with Costa Rica is just one example of how
powerful this cooperation can be. The United States
has established 34 different bilateral agreements with
Caribbean, South American, and Central American
nations. These agreements have allowed the Coast Guard
to exercise its broad authorities to stop, board, and searchon the high seas and, in some cases, on the territorial seasof those nations participating in a bilateral agreement
when reasonable suspicion exists. No other U.S. agency
has comparable authority.

It is estimated that 90 percent of the cocaine boundfor the United States is still moved via non-commercial
means like the Miriam. However, among those meansthat include fishing boats; sailboats; self-propelled, semisubmerged vessels; and low profile vessels, the use of
go-fasts is still the preferred conveyance for TCOs.
Typically 35 feet or less in length, they are painted toblend into the seas, made of fiberglass, have poor radarcross ­sections/returns, and are extremely difficult to spot
on the high seas.
During a recent patrol, USCGC Hamilton interdicted
two go-fasts traveling together. They were located with
an embarked interdiction squadron helicopter while flying a search pattern in a common smuggling route. Upon
detection and determination that these were stateless gofast vessels with contraband on board, they were stopped
with airborne use of force. Following closely behindthe helicopter, Hamilton’s boarding teams were able toquickly gain positive control of each vessel, while a third
small boat and boarding team from Hamilton began tocollect contraband that was jettisoned during the shortchases. It was later determined that these smugglers
were associated with a known TCO. Evidence, as well as
information gathered, will support future legal action,
whether that is more interdictions or the developmentof extradition warrants as the appropriate U.S. agencies’
investigators build cases against the organizers. As was
revealed during the El Chapo trial, Coast Guard interdictions often provide significant pieces of evidence used
to further develop criminal cases and convict criminals.
The Coast Guard’s unique ability to enforce U.S.
laws on the high seas, the increased capability of its newest platforms, and the Coast
Guard’s proven relationships
with domestic and foreign
partners are bringing tremendous capability to bearagainst the growing threatof transnational criminal organizations. While we will
never have enough resources
to completely stop the supplyof illicit contraband, the dedicated men and women of the
Defense and Justice departments and the Departmentof Homeland Security, with
the interagency cooperation,
are making their efforts countfar from our borders. The
Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton transits the Delaware River en route to Philadelphia in May 2016. The Hamilton’scases discussed here are justprimary missions include law enforcement, migrant interdiction operations, counternarcotics, living marine
a few examples of how playresources, search and rescue, defense operations, and homeland security. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer
ing the away game allows
3rd Class David Micallef

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

Then-acting Secretary of Homeland Security Kevin McAleenan, RADM Peter Brown, and Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton crew stand on the flight deck in Port
Everglades, Florida on June 6, 2019. In front of them sits 26,000 pounds of interdicted cocaine and 1,500 pounds of interdicted marijuana. Coast Guard Photoby Petty Officer 3rd Class Brandon Murraysecurity, increasing their ability to address their own
security concerns, and ultimately reducing problems on
our own borders.
About the authors:
A career cutterman, CAPT Mark Gordon served aboard five cutters andone Navy destroyer. His most recent staff assignment was as chief of law
enforcement for the Coast Guard District. He is currently the commanding officer of USCGC Hamilton.

Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton’s crew rehearses for the upcoming
commissioning ceremony at Union Pier in Charleston, South Carolina, in
December 2014. Coast Guard photo by Senior Chief Petty Officer Sarah B.
Fosterfor targeting these criminal organizations at their mostvulnerable points, where their illicit goods are most concentrated, and where their losses will have the biggest
impact. Securing our homeland far from our borders
also has the added benefit of improving our neighbors’

Petty Officer 2nd Class Erika C. Thurman has served aboard three cutters including the previous USCGC Hamilton (WHEC 715) and thecurrent USCGC Hamilton, completing eight deployments from theBering Sea to the Caribbean Sea and everything in between. She has been
nominated for Women In Defense Military Woman of the Year Award,
but finds the greatest joy in the relationships gained while in uniform.
Endnotes:

1.	U NODC. “World Drug Report 2014.” United Nations publication, Sales

No. E.14.XI.7. 2014

2.	S anchez-Moreno, Maria McFarland. “Winding Down the War on Drugs;

Reevaluating Global Drug Policy.” Harvard International Review. Summer
2015.

3.	Calderon, Felipe. “Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime; Connected but

Different.” Harvard International Review. Summer 2015.

4.	Martinez, Oscar. The Beast. Verso, London. 2010

5.	DEA. “2018 National Drug Threat Assessment.”

Spring 2020     Proceedings

23

The Coast Guard’s
Challenges in the Arctic
Protecting the Northby LT Amy Gayman
Marine Inspector
U.S. Coast GuardT

he Arctic is a desolate, pristine region of formidable ice, freezing temperatures, and an abundanceof untapped natural resources. For centuries, thisarea was impenetrable and largely unnavigable by commercial traffic, but in the last decade, an unprecedented
seasonal retreat of sea ice has opened water channels.
Still, few ice-capable tank and cargo ships are conducting cargo operations in the Arctic without the assistanceof vessels known as ‘icebreakers,’ ships which use theirown bulk and hull design to break ice several feet thick.
Yet these new passages present important access opportunities to transit the Arctic. As an Arctic state, the UnitedStates is dedicated to structuring and ­implementing theArctic States
Arctic States—the United States, Russia, Canada,
Norway, Finland, Sweden, Iceland, and Denmark—arepermanent members of the Arctic Council, claiming
territory north of the Arctic Circle, and representing
competitive interests in the Arctic’s natural resources.

2013 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR)
through a variety of government agencies and militarybranches for improved domestic and foreign partnerships. However, the United States maintains only two
icebreakers capable of Arctic operation, which are operated by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard coordinates
missions to the Arctic with these critical assets on behalfof the United States, and develops its own Arctic strategy to support national objectives. The Coast Guard’spresence is therefore paramount in the Arctic to reduce
operational risk, enforce vessel safety, and uphold U.S.
sovereignty and national interests, including the Arctic
territorial seas and exclusive economic zone (EEZ).

Analysis of USCG Icebreaker Capabilities

The Coast Guard maintains more than 100 cutters for a

24

Proceedings     Spring 2020

variety of missions within U.S. jurisdictions and internationally, including a fleet of seagoing buoy tenders,
icebreaking tugs, and a seagoing buoy tender breakercapable of domestic icebreaking operations. However,the service currently only operates two vessels capable of operations in significant Arctic sea ice, Coast
Guard Cutters Healy and Polar Star. These cutters, both
homeported in Seattle, assist in Coast Guard missions
and are highly committed to operations in the Arctic andAntarctic regions. Commissioned in 2000, Healy is thelargest Coast Guard cutter. At 420 feet long and 16,000
tons, Healy can continuously break ice up to four anda half feet thick at 3 knots, or up to 10 feet of ice whenramming or backing. Commissioned in 1976, Polar Staris the Coast Guard’s only heavy icebreaker. At 399 feetin length, Polar Star uses its 13,000-ton bulk to break up
to six feet of ice at 3 knots, or up to 21 feet of ice whenramming or backing. Although this capable cutter is avaluable asset in a heavy ice environment, it is more than
10 years past its intended 30-year service life. 1
While the Healy assists researchers in the Arctic every
winter, Polar Star is otherwise occupied in the Antarctic
region. Antarctica’s primary U.S. research facility,
McMurdo Station, is completely dependent on annual
supply runs to remain operational. However, commercial resupply ships cannot break through the sea ice surrounding the station without the assistance of Polar Star’s
icebreaking capabilities. This assistance is incorporated
into the recurring annual Operation Deep Freeze, whichis essential to keeping McMurdo Station open yearround. Deep Freeze is part of a joint military missionthat has supported the National Science Foundation forthe last 63 years. 2
Healy and Polar Star perform a multitude of othernational statutory missions within the Coast Guard.
In addition to icebreaking, they perform search andrescue, marine safety, aids to navigation, fisheries law
enforcement, marine environmental protection, ports,
waterways and coastal security, defense readiness, andother law enforcement. 3 With these two icebreakers’A group of scientists and engineers from Coast Guard Cutter Healy deploy an ice tethered profiler on the Arctic ice about 350 miles northeast of Barrow, Alaska,
in September 2018. The profiler is a device that moves up and down a cable below the ice surface and measures temperature, salinity, depth and current. Coast
Guard photo by Senior Chief Petty Officer NyxoLyno Cangemi

operational reliability declining in their remaining service life, a newer generation of ice-capable surface assets
is necessary, not only to cover the required mission sets,
but to represent the U.S. national security interests in the
Arctic. From the Coast Guard’s perspective, U.S. national
security in the Arctic is enabled by asset presence andmade up of a combination of safety, stewardship, andsovereignty interests. These interests stem from the samenational statutory missions, and ensure the physical protection of mariners, enforcement of domestic and international laws, and economic security on the waterways.

USCG Arctic Operations

The Coast Guard has committed cutters, aircraft, and personnel in support of Operation Arctic Shield since 2009.
A year-round Coast Guard operation based in Juneau,
Alaska, Arctic Shield is designed to improve maritime
domain awareness, increase vessel safety, enhance
preparedness, prevention, and response capabilities,
as well as educate communities. This initiative experiences an operational surge between May and October.
Assets deploy to Forward Operating Location Kotzebue,
Alaska, a critical location that allows units to provide
vital search and rescue operations in and offshore of
Alaska’s North Slope region. Coast Guard personnel

are also instrumental in presenting information on thestate-driven program “Kids Don’t Float,” which seeks to
reduce the high rate of drownings amongst children byproviding critical life jacket safety and donning demonstrations. 4
The Coast Guard uses Healy as a platform for scientists to collect vital Arctic data—a separate initiativefrom Arctic Shield—boasting five laboratories in over
4,200 square feet with room on board for up to 50 scientists. On its 2018 patrol to the Arctic, Healy crew members
assisted scientists from the Applied Physics Laboratory
at the University of Washington (Seattle) to deploy andretrieve research equipment on behalf of the Officeof Naval Research’s Stratified Ocean Dynamics in the
Arctic initiative. These weather buoys and autonomous
underwater vehicles transmit bathymetric data over a
year-long period, which is used to predict future ice
coverage in the Arctic. 5 These annual research expeditions are critical to forecasting future Arctic conditions
and would not be possible without Healy’s icebreaking
capabilities.

Future Arctic Routes

For several months during the year, retreating ice in the
Arctic presents new trade routes for commercial shipping
Spring 2020     Proceedings

25

open for public comment in the Federal Register
until September 2019. This study aimed tounderstand the requirements for Arctic waterways to remain passable and safe by analyzing current and recommended vessel patterns
and routes for new Arctic passages. The outcome of this study will likely result in futurerulemaking or international regulatory action
as the waterways are outlined and charted.
As waterway traffic increases, the possibilityof traffic separation schemes or other routing
measures, to ensure safe waterway navigation, similarly increases. Although consistent
travel through Arctic passages may not likely
be well-established for many years, it will be
prudent to identify all waterway requirements
for implementation well ahead of expectedshipping traffic. 7
Coast Guard Petty Officer 3rd Class Shannon Eubanks loads a shotgun about 715 miles
north of Barrow, Alaska, in October 2018. Eubanks was stationed aboard Coast Guard
Cutter Healy as a member of the ice rescue team and used a shotgun while standing polar
bear watch on the ice. Coast Guard photo by Senior Chief Petty Officer NyxoLyno Cangemi

USCG Arctic Strategy

In May 2013, the Coast Guard released its
Arctic Strategy to lay the groundwork for the
next decade of work in the region and subsequently issued the Arctic Strategic Outlook
in April 2019, four years earlier than planned.
The 2019 Arctic Strategic Outlook expands on
objectives identified in the Coast Guard’s 2013
Arctic Strategy and addresses recent environmental, economic, and competitive trends inthe region. Despite projected outcomes anda “sky is falling” mentality amongst competing Arctic States, the Coast Guard is instead
focusing on what the service can and should
do to support the NSAR in the coming years.
Recapitalized ice-capable surface and aviation
assets are critical requirements to promote
safety, security, and stewardship in the Arctic,
and Congress recently appropriated $655M tofund one new polar security cutter with heavy
icebreaking capabilities. This funding developCoast Guard graphic
ment will provide the Coast Guard, and thecompanies and Arctic states. This seasonal change, witnation, a greater opportunity for achieving its Arctic
nessed over the last decade, has major implications in
mission. 8 Concurrently, Coast Guard leadership looks
the shipping world. Open Arctic passages can provide
to the next step of its Arctic Strategy implementation:
faster and cheaper routes between the Atlantic andDiscussion of the future in the Arctic with foreign andPacific Oceans via the Northwest Passage or Northerndomestic partnerships. 9,10
Sea Route instead of using traditional travel methods
The 2019 United States Coast Guard Arctic Strategic
through the heavily trafficked Panama or Suez Canals. 6
Outlook presents three key lines of effort for future
However, these new Arctic routes remain precarious to
Arctic development:
transit, fraught with ice hazards, and require routine• Enhance capability to operate effectively in a
dynamic Arctic
icebreaking for the safe passage of large, unreinforced
vessels.
• Strengthen the rules-based order
In December 2018, the Coast Guard announced a port
• Innovate and adapt to promote resilience andaccess route study for the Alaskan Arctic Coast that wasprosperity

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

the Secretary of the Navy emphasized the necessity to
These lines of effort provide the means by which
understand environmental conditions north of the Arctic
the Coast Guard will make progress in the Arctic. The
Circle to better prepare for future deployments. In 2018,
first objective speaks to the need for investments in icecapable assets and high-latitude communications, while
the Navy sent the USS Harry S. Truman Strike Group toestablishing awareness and understanding of the Arctic
the Norwegian Sea in support of NATO Exercise Trident
domain. The second objective underscores the need to proJuncture to experience challenging weather conditions
vide leadership in the Arctic domain
across multiple forums including
domestic, public, and private sectors; international organizations likethe Arctic Council, International
Maritime Organization (IMO), andArctic Coast Guard Forum; and state,federal, and tribal partnerships. Thisessential networking will support thenation’s Arctic priorities to upholdglobal sovereignty while offsetting
threats from competitors. The third
objective requires the Coast Guard tointeract with stakeholders to identify
the capabilities necessary to manage
risk and safeguard American villages
and seasonal workers in the Arctic. 11
The Arctic Strategic Outlook is
also aligned with the NSAR’s supporting objectives. These three lines Peter Koski connects a cable to a buoy on the ice about 715 miles north of Barrow, Alaska, in October,of effort demonstrate national intent 2018. Koski was an engineer aboard Coast Guard Cutter Healy in the Arctic deploying sensors andautonomous submarines to study stratified ocean dynamics and how environmental factors affect theto advance U.S. security interests, water below the ice surface for the Office of Naval Research. Coast Guard photo by Senior Chief Petty
pursue responsible Arctic region Officer NyxoLyno Cangemi
stewardship, and strengthen interand ice hazards. Additionally, the Navy plans to reopen
national cooperation. 12 Additionally, the outlook articua naval air facility in Adak, Alaska, to oversee operalates the need to support Arctic allies and partners totions in the vicinity of the Aleutian Chain, while the Air
ensure/facilitate continued peaceful operations andForce is upgrading it’s northern most U.S. base in Thule,mutual respect for the Arctic region. From the mindset
Greenland. 14,15,16
of enforcement, the Coast Guard looks to be a leader inestablishing a rules-based international order to help
keep the Arctic conflict-free, while enforcing internaCompeting Arctic States
tional laws and shipping regulations. Similarly, the IMO
The Coast Guard requires a drastic upgrade in its iceadopted the Polar Code in 2014, which dictates safety
breaker fleet to maintain a capable U.S. presence amongst
regulatory requirements for vessel operations within
the many international icebreakers from the seven otherArctic waters. Meanwhile, the Air Force and Navy are
Arctic States all with competitive interests in the Arctic’s
also seeking ways to expand on opportunities to connatural resources. There are mining opportunities fortribute to the nation’s Arctic vision and are developing
gas, oil, and minerals, in addition to using shipping
their own strategies.
passages that reduce transit times and fuel costs. When
U.S. military services are supporting the NSAR andcompared with Russia’s more than 60 icebreaking vesgenerating interest and future investments to protect
sels, Norway’s 11, and China matching the U.S.’s two
U.S. rights in the Arctic. Navy submarine forces haveicebreakers, America’s dire icebreaking capability gap
conducted under-ice operations in the Arctic for morecomes into focus. It is therefore paramount the Coast
than 70 years “in support of inter-fleet transit, training,
Guard build new ice-capable surface assets or risk notcooperative allied engagements, and routine operameeting statutory and national requirements.
tions,” and to increase environmental familiarization
The Coast Guard statutory mission set is vital to thethrough its five-week biennial ice exercise. 13 However,safety, security, and stewardship of the United States’
Navy surface forces are ill-suited to withstand the chalterritorial seas and EEZ. Emphasizing the Coast Guard’s
lenging Arctic conditions. Despite this shortcoming,need for new assets with these capabilities, Commandant
Spring 2020     Proceedings27

of the Coast Guard, ADM Karl Schultz, officially reclassified the new icebreakers as “polar security cutters.”
This new title stresses the need for vessels that cover
all mission sets, but most importantly represent U.S.
national security interests in the Arctic. 17 ADM Schultz
aspires to build six new polar security cutters by 2029,
but for now, only one construction project is contracted
for build. This new polar security cutter plan is justified
not only to safeguard the nation’s Arctic interests, but touphold U.S. sovereign rights and support Coast Guard
missions. 18,19,20 Should the Coast Guard not be able tofulfill its statutory requirements, a foreign country could
claim responsibility for maintenance of new trade routes
and search and rescue operations and threaten U.S. sovereignty in the region.
Of principle concern to the United States in the
Arctic region is Russia. Russia poses a major concern
from an economic and political standpoint with thelargest fleet of icebreakers and approximately 50 percent of the Arctic coastline. Russia operates 27 militarybases north of the Arctic Circle and recently outfitted its
newest military outpost, the Kotelny base, with defense
missile systems capable of operating in temperatures of-50 degrees Celsius. The Northern Sea Route falls within
Russia’s EEZ and is one of only two trade routes to transit
through the Arctic; a route already being used by foreign
shipping companies. However, Russia now requires a
45 day notice for foreign transits, a Russian pilot to navi-

Coast Guard Petty Officer 1st Class Lisa Densmore stands guard about
350 miles northeast of Barrow, Alaska, in September 2018. Densmore wasa crew member aboard the Coast Guard Cutter Healy and was armed witha rifle to protect crew members and scientists on the ice from polar bears.
Coast Guard photo by Senior Chief Petty Officer NyxoLyno Cangemi

gate ships, and an increased transit toll. These considerable economic pressures stemming from Russia have thepotential for increasing the country’s overall grip of the
Arctic. 21

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

China will be another emerging Arctic competitor. Although this non-Arctic State does not have any
Arctic territory, environmental and economic reasons
prompted the country to proclaim the region a strategic priority. After building its first research base on
the Norwegian island of Spitsbergen in 2004, China’s
Arctic Yellow River Station oversaw eight scientific missions in the Arctic Sea through 2017. From recent Arctic
expeditions, China is taking measured steps to gather
climate and resource data and leverage it for politicaland economic advantage. After a failed attempt to purchase an abandoned naval base in Greenland in 2016,
China is also seeking investments in oil, gas, and mineralindustries in the Arctic to better diversify their energy
sources while developing Arctic ports for future use.
Also troubling is China’s goal to establish the “Polar
Silk Road” for Chinese commercial ships using Arctic
routes, like the Northern Sea Route, in order to transport
their cargo. This route from Europe to Asia cuts shipping
times by 40 percent compared to using the Suez Canal.
It also reduces the country’s necessity to use routes in
the South China Sea, including the Strait of Malacca,with considerable U.S. naval presence. With extensive
scientific research, funding for building new icebreakers,
and its interest in Arctic resources, China is posturing tobecome a major player in the Arctic region. 22,23,24

Conclusion

The Arctic is a challenging environment: physically, economically, and politically. Despite the significant retreatof seasonal ice throughout the last decade, commercial
ships attempting to transit through new trade routes in
the Arctic will continue to require icebreaking services
for the foreseeable future. Additionally, competitive
Arctic and non-Arctic states are moving into the Arctic
region to exploit natural resources for economic gain.
Therefore, the Coast Guard continues to engage national
and international partnerships to address challenges in
the region. However, the Coast Guard must replace its
venerable icebreakers with new polar security cuttersif the service is to continue supporting national Arctic
objectives and protect U.S. sovereignty amidst growinginternational competition.
In implementing its Arctic Strategy, the Coast Guard
is working on behalf of the United States to prioritize theservices’ Arctic mission set. This will support its primary
missions of safety, security, and stewardship within the
Arctic and enhance cooperation with Arctic States. The
long-term goal is a safe, secure Arctic that is in political,
economic, and environmental balance.
About the author:
LT Amy Gayman spent the last six years within the prevention community, including one year with maritime industry, as part of the USCGCrew members of Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star participate in various activities on the ice about 13 miles from McMurdo Station, Antarctica, in January 2018.
Coast Guard photo by Fireman John Pelzel

Merchant Marine Industry Training Program. She holds a Bachelor of
Science in marine and environmental science from the U.S. Coast Guard
Academy and a Master of Science in international transportation management from SUNY Maritime College. She is currently assigned to Sector San Francisco as a marine inspector.
Endnotes:

1.	O’Rourke, R. (2019, March 1). Coast Guard polar security cutter (polar ice-

breaker) program: Background and issues for Congress. Congressional
Research Center. RL34391. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL34391.pdf

2.	Coast Guard News. (2019, January 17). Coast Guard’s only heavy icebreakerarrives at Antarctica, https://coastguardnews.com/coast-guards-only-heavyicebreaker-arrives-at-antarctica/2019/01/17

3.	O ’Rourke. Coast Guard polar security cutter (polar icebreaker) program:

Background and issues for Congress

4.	Rosen, Y. (2018, July 7). U.S. Coast Guard settles into Kotzebue for the sum-11.	USCG Arctic strategic outlook

12.	T he White House (2013, May). National strategy for the Arctic region.

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/nat_arctic_strategy.pdf

13.	U.S. Navy. (2018, March 7). Navy kicks of ICEX 2018. Navy.mil. www.navy.

mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=104633

14.	Mcleary, P. (2018, December 14). Navy looking to fly P-8s from Cold War-era base in Alaska. Breaking Defense. https://breakingdefense.com/2018/12/
navy-looking-to-fly-p-8s-from-cold-war-era-base-in-alaska/

15.	Wilson, H and Goldfein, D. (2019, January 9). Air power and the Arctic: The

importance of projecting strength in the north. Defense News. www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2019/01/09/air-power-and-the-arctic-theimportance-of-projecting-strength-in-the-north/16.	Trevithick, J. (2019, January 9). U.S. Navy plans to send more ships into the

Arctic as it looks to establish new polar port. The Drive. www.thedrive.com/
the-war-zone/25875/us-navy-plans-to-send-more-ships-into-the-arctic-as-itlooks-to-establish-new-polar-port

mer. Arctic Today. www.arctictoday.com/us-coast-guard-settles-kotzebuesummer/

17.	LaGrone, S. and Werner, B. (2018, September 27). Coast Guard renames new

ond 2018 Arctic mission. Coast Guard Compass. https://coastguard.dodlive.
mil/2018/10/coast-guard-icebreaker-crew-completes-second-2018-arcticmission/

18.	Shea, N. (2018, October 25). New Cold War brews as Arctic ice melts. National

5.	Sherbs, D. (2018, October 19). Coast Guard icebreaker crew completes sec-

6.	Durkin, A. and Lepczyk, A. (2018, July 19). A breakthrough in Arctic traderoutes. Trade Vistas. https://tradevistas.org/breakthrough-arctic-traderoutes/

7.	USCG. (2018, December 21). Port access route study: Alaskan Arctic Coast.

Federal Register. Pages 65701–65703. Agency/Docket Number: USCG-20181058, Document Number: 2018-27604. www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/12/21/2018-27604/port-access-route-study-alaskan-arctic-coast

8.	M aritime Executive. (2019, February 15). U.S. Coast Guard receives funding

for new heavy icebreaker. www.maritime-executive.com/article/u-s-coastguard-receives-funding-for-new-heavy-icebreaker

9.	USCG. (2013, May). USCG Arctic strategy. www.uscg.mil/Portals/0/Strategy/

cg_arctic_strategy.pdf

10.	USCG. (2019, April). USCG Arctic strategic outlook. https://assets.document-

cloud.org/documents/5973939/Arctic-Strategic-Outlook-APR-2019.pdf

icebreaker program ‘polar security cutter.’ USNI News. https://news.usni.
org/2018/09/27/36846

Geographic. www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2018/10/new-coldwar-brews-as-arctic-ice-melts/

19.	The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2018,

January 26). China’s Arctic policy. http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_
paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm

20.	Humpert, M. (2018, September 12). China launches its first domestically built

icebreaker. Arctic Today. www.arctictoday.com/china-launches-first-domestically-built-icebreaker/

21.	I lyushina, M. and Pleitgen, F. (2019, April 5). Inside the military base at theheart of Putin’s Arctic ambitions. CNN. www.cnn.com/2019/04/04/europe/
russia-arctic-kotelny-island-military-base/index.html

22.	Shea. New Cold War brews as Arctic ice melts

23.	Durkin and Lepczyk. A breakthrough in Arctic trade routes

24.	I lyushina and Pleitgen. Inside the military base at the heart of Putin’s Arctic

ambitions

Spring 2020     Proceedings

29

Strategic Partnerships

Foreign Governments
and Securing the Maritime
Transportation System

by LCDR Steve Barry
International Port Security Liaison Officer
U.S. Coast Guard Activities EuropeIn 2002, Congress passed the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA) in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This comprehensive security legislation,
intended to protect the U.S. and the global maritime
transportation system, also directed the Department ofHomeland Security (DHS) to assess anti-terrorism measures at foreign ports. DHS delegated responsibility forthis mandate to the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard’s transition from the Departmentof Transportation to DHS also impacted other parts ofNigeria’s Transportation Minister Rotimi Amaetchi wears a mustang suitprior to boarding a Coast Guard response boat-medium to perform a harbor
tour at Sector Long Island Sound during a reciprocal engagement. Coast
Guard photo by LCDR Steven Barry

30

Proceedings     Spring 2020

LCDR Scott Barton
International Port Security Coordinator
Coast Guard Activities Far East
the mission. The Port and Waterways Coastal Security
mission became a larger priority, and it needed a means
to perform risk-based targeting for more than 60,000
annual vessel arrivals from abroad. Methods to target a
vessel based on its history of safety and environmental
risk existed, but there was no such tool to assess the security risk posed by vessels arriving from abroad.
To address these issues the Coast Guard establishedthe International Port Security (IPS) Program in 2004.
Through this program, bilateral discussions, and sharing port security best practices, the Coast Guard’s IPS
Program seeks to reduce world-wide risks to maritime
interests and facilitate secure global trade. Previously,
there was no single entity assessing the risk to vessels
posed by foreign ports, but the IPS Program filled thiscritical void.
The IPS Program developed a uniform method forverifying the security conditions in foreign countries
and their ports. The program sought to quantify resultsfrom assessments that often left program assessors asking questions like, “How does a lagoon full of alligators compare to a barbed wire fence with movement
detection? Is one more effective than another given thelocale?” “Is facial recognition by a guard a reasonable
alternative to requiring ID badges issued by a competentauthority?”
The next challenge was to determine how the IPS
Program would engage foreign countries without
appearing to encroach on their national sovereignty. The
Coast Guard believes diplomacy and personal interaction, backed by official action, is the best way to improveand uphold international port security standards. The
IPS Program has personnel based in Atlantic Area,
Activities Europe, Activities Far East, and detached staff
in Alameda, California, representing the IPS Program
to all maritime trading nations. There are liaison officers, officially referred to as International Port Security
Liaison Officers (IPSLOs), full time assessment personnel, capacity building personnel, and support staff. IPS

Program members maintainregular communication withembassies and local maritime
professionals, including governmental authorities and port
officials responsible for maritime and port security. They
foster relationships and coordinate regular visits to foreign
ports to observe port security
measures in place, share new
security related information,offer recommendations, andmonitor improvement progress. These visits help ensure
the secure movement of people
and goods through ports andthe global maritime transportsystem.
Using the International Shipand Port Facility Security (ISPS)
Code as a benchmark, these
Coast Guard officers evaluate a LCDR George Cottrell and Steve Boyle discuss access control procedures with the port security officer at thecountry’s port security posture Port of Maputo, Mozambique. Coast Guard photo by LCDR Steven Barryat both the national and port
decreased traffic to that port due to increased costs forfacility level. They identify where port security is effecsecurity or insurance.
tive and/or where it needs improvement. Through facilCountries that do not, or cannot, maintain effecity visits, officers observe operations in port security,
tive anti-terrorism measures are listed in a public Port
including:Security Advisory (PSA), published on the Coast Guard’s• access control• cargo/ship store inspections and monitoring
Homeport website. At the same time, vessels arriving• communicationsin the United States from foreign ports with adequate• drills, exercises, and training
security measures are less likely to be targeted for port
• roles and responsibilities
state control action. This reduces potential delays andThis information is analyzed to determine whether
facilitates safe and secure maritime trade. Since 2004,
a country is substantially implementing the ISPS Code.
the IPS Program has observed that the majority of U.S.
The IPS Program’s experience over the past 15 years
trading partners are now in substantial compliance withjustifies the MTSA mandate to periodically reassess thethe ISPS Code. To highlight some of the challenges andport security performance of U.S. trading partners to
successes that the IPS Program has achieved, the followensure they continue to implement effective anti-terroring are examples of work performed in three different
ism measures. Although many countries demonstrate
countries. These examples highlight the need for continthat they consistently maintain or improve their port
ued engagement and the need for continuing assessment
security performance over time, others have unfortuand technical assistance.
nately declined in performance. Causes can be a major
The IPS Program has been engaging with a certainchange in government, a national crisis, or the loss orcountry since 2005. The country is relatively poor and histransfer of a key individual. In certain cases where
torically hasn’t had the financial or personnel resources
nations do not improve port security or are unable or
to manage its many competing priorities. When the ISPS
unwilling, the Coast Guard takes action to reduce the risk
Code entered into force in 2004, the country adopted its
to the U.S. by making public the country’s lack of effectext by reference. The code is not prescriptive and does
tive security measures. In turn, the Coast Guard imposes
not detail which agencies are responsible for administerconditions of entry on vessels sailing to the U.S. froming its provisions or compliance verification, nor does it
those countries. These conditions of entry could resultcontain measures for conducting enforcement actions orin additional costs for the vessels while in U.S. ports,
administering penalties for non-compliance. As a result,delays in transit times due to security requirements, orthe country’s agency for ensuring compliance was not
Spring 2020     Proceedings

31

provided with the necessary jurisdictional authorities toenforce the code, nor could it provide clear guidance toport users and operators on how to comply.
Initial engagements with the government showedthat facilities were effectively securing cargo and preventing unauthorized access, but also documented thatgovernment oversight was minimal. Though good access
control and monitoring are important factors in securing
ships and cargo, most facilities were not performing theother necessary requirements of the code and the government was not performing annual verifications of its
facilities as required.
The IPS Program recommended the country overhaul
its legislation as a first step and offered to assist by performing legal capacity building. The country accepted
the offer and in 2012, the IPS Program legal team provided capacity building to assist the maritime administration’s two attorneys with drafting a new maritime
code. Over the course of several engagements and teleconferences, IPS legal provided guidance and recommendations on how to draft the legislation and followed
its progress.
Unfortunately, the legislative drafting stalled andthe country directed its limited resources toward otherprojects. Through continued IPS Program engagements
to the country it became clear that the maritime administration was not meeting its requirements to oversee
the ports and facilities under its authority per the ISPS
Code. During a 2016 assessment the IPS Program teamrecommended placing the country on the PSA. The decision was not taken lightly and received close scrutiny
throughout the review process. A determination wasmade to issue a démarche to the country explaining that

it would be placed on the PSA if it did not correct previous issues observed by the IPS Program team.
The country was provided ample time to make corrections, and throughout the démarche process the IPSLOs
remained in constant contact with the U.S. embassy incountry, and the affected government agencies. The
ambassador and deputy chief of mission took note andexpressed their concerns to the ministry of transportation, then asked the IPSLOs how the embassy could
assist with bringing the country into compliance.
The first order of business was to fix the maritime
regulations and repeal the law that adopted the ISPS
Code by reference. The legislative drafting had been
completed years earlier so it was simply a matter of performing a final review and getting the text approvedby the council of ministers. With support from the U.S.
embassy and an effort from the minister of transport,
the maritime code was passed less than three months
after the démarche was delivered. The country’s maritime authority was given broader powers for enforcing
the newly enacted laws and their staff was increased insize to account for an additional workload imposed byannual facility verification.
With legislation passed, the IPSLOs focused on
assisting with training and awareness among administration officials, but mostly among other port partners
and operators throughout the country. The IPS Program
worked with the maritime authority to provide technical assistance and capacity building to managementfrom the national police, immigrations, customs, port
managers, and port operators at the country’s largest ports. While this was happening, the IPSLOs also
engaged the U.S. embassy’s regional security office, which
had an expert in maritime security
on staff. This office developed a training program for the largest port in thecapital based on input from the IPSLOs,
and assisted the port with developing
a new traffic management scheme andupdating all of the port’s access control
procedures.
The efforts of the IPS Program andembassy engagement resulted in drastic nationwide changes in a matter ofmonths. It would have been very difficult for the maritime authority, or eventhe ministry of transport to achieve
such a fast turnaround without externalpressure from the IPSLOs and the U.S.
embassy. Making sweeping changes ina short amount of time can be incredibly difficult in the maritime sector.
LCDR Steve Barry and Cellou Diallo, director general of the Guinean Merchant Marine Administration,
Maritime administrations generally
prepare to view a live display of recently acquired firefighting equipment in the Port of Conakry,
Guinea. Coast Guard photo by LCDR Steven Barryface significant resistance from worker’s

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

LCDRs Mary Dwyer and Tony Mercado perform an inspection of the perimeter of the Port of Bissau to assess its integrity and the challenges posed by a small
market that encroaches on the security zone, in Bissau, the capital of Guinea-Bissau. Coast Guard photo by LCDR Steven Barry

unions, government agencies who previously profited
from loose controls, as well as port operators, who initially experience increased delays at checkpoints during
the transition.
Within a year, the country passed an extensive maritime code, and the country’s three largest ports madesignificant changes to its security procedures, upgrading
many physical security aspects. Although the work is far
from complete, the country’s maritime authority is now
working to bring other terminals into compliance. The
efforts of the IPS Program, working in conjunction with
the U.S. embassy, significantly increased the security ofa country in an area of the world otherwise plagued by
security challenges.
The Republic of Iraq is another country where the
IPS Program has had significant involvement since theinception of the ISPS Code. The Iraqi transitional government faced many significant challenges in addition to
implementing port security. The IPS Program worked inconcert with other Coast Guard offices and DHS agencies

to assist the Iraqi transitional government with bringing
their ports into compliance between 2004 and 2007.
After the initial assistance period, the IPS Program
performed the first country assessment in 2008 to
observe the country’s port security performance. The
country was found to be lacking effective anti-terrorism measures. Considering the challenges facing Iraq,
IPSLOs continued working with the Iraqi government
and the U.S. embassy. Between 2012 and 2014, the IPSLOs
leveraged embassy contacts from the U.S. Department ofTransportation liaison in Baghdad and coordinated several capacity building engagements in the ports of Basraand Umm Qasr. The IPSLOs stressed the importance of
language and requested the support of an Arabic linguist
who had received Arabic language training from the
IPS Program. The linguist traveled to Iraq twice for two
engagements and spent enough time in its ports to assess
the challenges, and to provide direction to the port operators and Iraqi government on how to address the problem. At the same time, a new director was appointed toSpring 2020     Proceedings

33

Crimea. All visits to the country in 2014 were cancelled
due to the ensuing conflict and a restructuring of some of
Ukraine’s government agencies. The IPSLO reached out
to U.S. Embassy Kiev and secured a visit with the State
Service of Ukraine and the Ukrainian State Agency ofPorts in November 2015. A country visit was performed
in 2016 and the Ukrainian port authorities showed thatthey were meeting international security standards, but
had lost much of the previous institutional knowledge asa result of continued shake-ups within Ukrainian government agencies.
The IPSLO recognized this as an avenue to support
the Ukrainian government during their difficult transition and also an opportunity for the U.S. embassy to
become more involved with promoting the development of transparent state agencies supported by a strong
legal framework. The IPSLO worked closely with U.S.
Embassy Kiev, and Ukrainian agencies involved in maritime port security to develop an ambitious multi-yearplan to strengthen Ukraine’s nascent maritime port security program.
The plan involved three facets:• assist Ukraine in developing a legal framework to
adopt the ISPS Code• provide Ukraine’s regulators with the necessary
legal backing to perform mandated functions• develop the practical knowledge and skills of
local port authorities and operators in Ukraine
through capacity building• continue to visit Ukrainian ports, identify
potential security vulnerabilities, and provide
timely feedback
Ukraine met the IPS Program criteria for qualifying
to receive capacity building so the program developed aplan and schedule. Ukraine had long had effective
maritime port security, but had not applied someof the more administrative aspects of the ISPS
Code. Between 2016 and 2018, the IPS Program performed six engagements to increase the capacityof the Ukrainian government. The results of theseengagements have begun to bear fruit. Membersof Ukraine’s maritime authority and port authorities have established new policies and procedures,
and are conducting training and exercises within
their ports. In a short amount of time the Ukraine
Port Authorities have continued to improve thesecurity within their ports and the capacity of
their administrators. The relationship between the
Ukraine and the Coast Guard has strengthened asa result of the continued engagements.
In the Pacific, the IPS Program has partneredwith many international agencies to further mutual
goals to improve maritime port security and proCDR Eric May and RADM Paul Thomas observe pier side security procedures intect the international maritime transportation
Salvador, Brazil. Coast Guard photo by LCDR Steven Barry
Iraq’s maritime authority who had the connections andpolitical capital to address the issues brought up by the
IPS Program.
During the assessment in 2014, it was clear the country had turned the corner on port security and had madesignificant progress toward compliance. Unfortunately,
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant began its invasion of Iraq while the IPS Program team was in country, and prompted its early departure when the security
situation began deteriorating. Although the results ofthe visit were positive, they were short-lived. The IPS
Program was not able to return to the country until 2016,at which time it was discovered that most of the progress
made in 2014 had been lost. Despite multiple efforts toprevent placing Iraq on the PSA, it was clear that it was
the most appropriate course of action.
The IPSLOs’ engagement with the Iraqi government
and the U.S. embassy in Baghdad to find a solution limiting restrictions on vessels calling from certain Iraqi ports
continued. This effort was made because, although Iraq
was not meeting security requirements as a whole, somefacilities were performing extremely well and posed
limited threat to the maritime transportation system.
Taking this into consideration, the IPS Program was able
to exempt the Al-Basrah Oil Terminal, Khawr Al Amaya
Oil Terminal, and Maqal Port after performing assessments. Combined, these terminals account for more than
80 percent of Iraq’s gross domestic product. The IPSLOs
continue to visit the exempted terminals to monitor theireffectiveness and the government’s engagement.
A different set of circumstances led to increased IPS
Program involvement in Ukraine in Eastern Europe. The
IPS Program took a greater interest in maritime port
security in Ukraine following Russia’s annexation of

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

LCDR Kirsten Sullivan observes a truck entrance in San-Pédro, Côte d’Ivoire, the largest cocoa bean exporter to the United States. Coast Guard photo by LCDR
Steven Barrysystem. The IPS Program works with the Secretariat of
the Pacific Community, Maritime New Zealand (MNZ),
Australia’s Office of Transport Security, and the United
Kingdom’s Department for Transport in a variety ofcountries to promote port security.
Recently, these teams collaborated to provide port
security capacity building in Papua New Guinea in preparation for the 2018 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
summit. Australian, British, and American teams worked
together in Indonesia with a focus on cruise ship port
security. Coast Guard IPSLOs also worked with MNZ,
specifically in Fiji and the Cook Islands, on joint capacity
building initiatives.
With a staff of only 60 people, the IPS Program
engages in more than 140 countries. The results of thisrelatively small operation save the Coast Guard millionsof dollars every year in equipment costs and thousandsof personnel hours by allowing operational units to
identify and focus their efforts on vessels that pose thehighest risk to the maritime transportation system. By
assisting other countries that are motivated to improve,
the IPS Program strengthens foreign borders and lowers
the burden on Coast Guard operational units. As new
global threats emerge and more countries increase vessel
traffic to the United States, the IPS Program mission will
become even more critical to reducing the risks posed byvessels, their crews, and cargoes from abroad.
About the authors:
LCDR Steve Barry is currently an international port security liaison
officer stationed at U.S. Coast Guard Activities Europe. Previously, heserved as an IPS Program capacity building specialist in Atlantic Area,and has served in positions in prevention, response, and afloat. He is fluent in French and received Portuguese language training at the Department of State Foreign Service Institute.
LCDR Scott Barton is currently serving at Coast Guard Far East Activities in Japan as the international port security coordinator for the Pacificregion. He has served with the IPS Program for the last six years. Aviation is his primary career path.

Spring 2020     Proceedings

35

A Marriage of Two Communities
Pairing capabilities to improve maritime security
by CAPT Jeffrey Randall
Commanding Officer
U.S. Coast Guard Cutter JamesT

his article may result in my formal ex-communication from the afloat community—or at least
label me a heretic. Previous authors in this publication have written about the diminished stature of
the afloat community and questioned the relevance andvalue of the deployable specialized forces (DSF) community. Proponents of the DSF community have touted
its importance and contributions to our overall national
security objectives. Behind closed doors and amongst
themselves, members of both communities have questioned the value and contributions of the other. This article does not seek to pick scabs off of these old wounds,
nor does it seek to promote the merits of one community
over another. Instead, the purpose is to highlight thesynergy and opportunity that successfully pairing thecapabilities of the afloat and DSF communities provides
our daily operations, as well as our broader Coast Guardand national security objectives. More specifically, it
looks at the recent effort to pair two of the Coast Guard’s
high-end capabilities. Combining the National Security
Cutter and the Maritime Security Response Team into acomplementary and scalable force package that is globally deployable, enables the Coast Guard to push out ourborders to meet the demands of our rapidly changing
global security environment.
The sea services have routinely paired distinct
capabilities to produce more lethal and adaptive force
packages. The Navy and Marine Corps regularly team
together to create amphibious readiness groups that canoperate collectively, or as independent units, to project
power and effectively distribute targeted lethality. For
decades, the sea services have also paired aviation andafloat capabilities to accomplish similar objectives. Thispairing of aviation and afloat capabilities has served
the Coast Guard well. Originally used to extend cutter surveillance capabilities, and for search and rescue,
the pairing of Coast Guard cutters and aviation detachments with airborne force capability has been an essential ingredient in the Coast Guard’s recipe for success in
its counternarcotics mission. These pairings successfully
stop the flow of illicit narcotics, primarily cocaine, fromsource regions in Mexico and Central America before
it gets into the United States.
The marriage between the
DSF and cutter communities
is beginning to follow a similar path.
From my seat overseeing
units in the DSF and cutter
communities, initial efforts
to merge their capabilities
encountered significant resistance and substantial growing pains. Unlike the movie
characters Forrest Gump andJenny, these two communities did not get along likepeas and carrots. From thecutter side, integrating DSF
personnel into cutter operations, particularly during at
sea law enforcement operations, was viewed as a major
A landing signals officer from Coast Guard Cutter James braces himself as a 160th SOAR Blackhawk lifts off theencroachment into the cutter
flight deck. Coast Guard photo by LTJG Luke Dewhirst

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

community’s world of work. Thisprevailing attitude was certainly
understandable as the cutter community has long prided itself inhaving the organic capability to
conduct this mission. On the other
hand, the DSF community had difficulty recognizing it could provide specialized capabilities andunique skill sets to complement
a cutter’s capabilities and operations. More specifically, there wasresistance to disaggregating thetypical law enforcement detachment that normally deploys as ateam aboard Navy vessels supporting counterdrug operations.
As the demands on the Navy
have changed and the Navy’s
frigates have all been decommissioned, the number of U.S. naval A Maritime Security Response Team team fast ropes onto the deck of CGC James from a 160th SOAR
assets supporting ­c ounterdrug Blackhawk during a nighttime insertion exercise. Coast Guard photo by LTJG Luke Dewhirst
operations is extremely limited,necessitating a need to look again at the employment
U.S. Navy patrol craft and TACLETs for counterdrugof the Coast Guard’s Tactical Law Enforcement Teams
operations provides pursuit and surface use-of-force(TACLET). This began the marriage of the distinct andcapability to an otherwise non-pursuit capable platform.
unique capabilities provided by these two different operThis has increased overall effectiveness and viability forational communities to create more effective and adap­counterdrug operations.
tive force packages to address the ever-changing tactics
Widening the aperture beyond the Coast Guard’s
the Coast Guard faces in its counterdrug mission.
counterdrug operations, the service contributes toWith a steady vision and extensive communication
national and border security through a layered security
with all stakeholders, significant strides were made in
strategy using programs, partnerships, and a strategic
the marriage between these two communities. Despite
dispersal of available assets around the nation and in
the initial resistance described above, members of Coast
potential threat vectors to protect the homeland by preGuard TACLETs now routinely deploy with major cutventing threats delivered from the sea. The Coast Guard
ters to augment boarding teams and provide additional
uses a layered security strategy that begins with capaclaw enforcement expertise. This not only provides
ity-building activities in foreign countries to improve
TACLET personnel with opportunities to remain curindividual vessel and port facility security to prevent
rent on drug trafficking trends, it serves as a force multithreats, including potential weapons of mass destruction,plier for boarding teams to have dedicated personnel forfrom being introduced to vessels and cargoes that may
counterdrug boardings, detainee management, and law
ultimately be bound for the United States. Additionally,
enforcement case package development. TACLET perthrough available assets, major cutters deploy to intersonnel who have extensive training in law enforcement
cept potential threats, using advance notice of arrival
case package development assist cutter boarding teamand vessel boarding programs to prevent threats frompersonnel with their cases. This has resulted in more
impacting key ports and critical infrastructure that are
successful prosecutions and positive feedback from fedvital to the economy and maritime commerce.
eral agents involved in the ongoing Operations Panama
The 2018 National Defense Strategy discusses the fact
Express and Operation Martillo, operations aimed at disthat “we are facing increased global disorder … creating
mantling major drug trafficking networks. In additiona security environment more complex and volatile than
to the positive operational impacts, this pairing of capaany we have experienced in recent memory.” 1 While thebilities has also resulted in upgrades and improvements
threat of terrorism remains persistent, strategic competito gear and equipment used by pursuit crews Coasttion from Russia, China, and rogue regimes, require our
Guard-wide. Similarly, equipping Maritime Safety andnation and Coast Guard to be responsive and ready toaddress these changing priorities and emerging threats.
Security Teams with cutter boats when deployed withSpring 2020     Proceedings37

powerfully adaptive force package.
Using a crawl, walk, run approach, this pairing began with the
MSRT conducting CBR decontamination familiarization aboard the
NSC, as well as boat familiarization
with the cutter’s long range interceptor boat platform, to test its viability
for MSRT boarding operations. In
addition, the MSRT and NSC crews
and Atlantic Area planners conducted tabletop exercises to iron out
command and control relationships,
as well as supported and supporting commander relationships foran actual boarding evolution. Using
the lessons learned from these initial efforts, an at sea exercise to test
the pairing was scheduled. This first
iteration exercise was conducted in
A member from Coast Guard Cutter James assists a Marine Security Response Team member in cutting off
2018 and involved MSRT East, Coasthis mission oriented protective posture suit in the first stage of the decontamination locker. Coast Guard
Guard Cutter Hamilton, and an Air
photo by LTJG Luke Dewhirst
Station Clearwater MH-60 Jayhawk
Defense Department strategies routinely discuss the needhelicopter.
for national sea power projection to defend the homeWhile successful, it was clear that additional exercises
land and support our national security objectives. Morewere needed to further refine the concept. Occurring inspecifically, the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
February 2019, the second full-scale exercise involved the
Seapower discusses the in-depth role of self-sustainsame components as the first with added fast rope insering naval forces “to protect the homeland far from ourtion capability provided by the Army’s 160th Special
shores … .” 2 Here, there is strategic opportunity for the
Operations Air Regiment.
Coast Guard to pair additional cutter and DSF capabilities to fill a unique niche in our nation’s homeland security toolkit and reaffirm the Coast Guard’s contributions
as a unique instrument of the nation’s sea power.
There remains a persistent and underlying threatof global terrorism, and rogue regimes remain firm intheir resolve to develop, build, and distribute weaponsof mass destruction. To counter this threat, the Coast
Guard’s Atlantic Area headquarters, in cooperation
with the offices of Defense Operations and Specialized
Capabilities, paired the capabilities of the Coast Guard’s
Legend Class National Security Cutter (NSC) and the
DSF’s Maritime Security Response Teams (MSRT). Thispairing fully leverages the capabilities of both assets forcounter response to a weapon of mass destruction (WMD)
threat. The vision was to increase the Coast Guard’s capability to conduct counter WMD operations for near coastal
operations and around the globe. The combination of the
MSRT’s ability to conduct opposed boardings in a chemical, biological, or radiological (CBR) environment and the
NSC’s Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
Marine Security Response Team member awaits final instructions fromIntelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
the medical officer before removing his mask in the final stage of theresources, ability to operate in a CBR environment,
decontamination locker onboard Coast Guard Cutter James. Coast Guardand extensive CBR decontamination capabilities is aphoto by LTJG Luke Dewhirst

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

Using Coast Guard Cutter Willow as
the target vessel, MSRT East and Coast
Guard Cutter James finalized, and successfully tested, a command and control relationship that fully leveraged
the C4ISR capabilities of the cutter’s
platform. The test included detection,
stalking, and putting rotary wing andboat assets in position to successfullyinterdict a target of interest suspectedof carrying CBR material. These exercises went one step further, simulating the MSRT’s personnel exposure toa chemical agent, and then returning
those personnel to the NSC platform forfull decontamination. This exercise not
only provided the MSRT mission commander with the full suite of the cutter’s
C4ISR capabilities to help plan and execute boarding operations, but the NSC Marine Security Response Team East personnel practice boarding techniques on Coast Guardcrews had opportunity to learn from the Cutter Willow using the NSC’s long range interceptor boat. Coast Guard phototeam’s CBR experts.
While some may argue that expending efforts to exerrealized from this merger. It allows capabilities to betcise this capability to prepare for a low-probability event
ter secure our nation’s waterborne approaches and buys
is unwarranted, the consequences of such an event could
time and decision space for the Department of Homeland
be catastrophic. Across the Departments of Homeland
Security and our national decision-makers to deal with
Security and Defense, we have many contingency andemerging threats and foreign political crises. By advocatoperational plans developed and exercised exactly foring this approach, from my current seat as a commandthis type of low-probability, high-consequence event.
ing officer of a national security cutter, some may label
Efforts to improve our counter WMD interdiction andme a heretic. However, as I watch my crew prepare toconsequence management should be no different. During
launch with a cutter boarding team, TACLET, and ana crisis there is no time to test and exercise working relaembarked MH-65 helicopter to interdict a drug-ladentionships. This is why pairing the NSC’s and MSRT’s
vessel, it is clear that this force package is effective andcapabilities makes for a truly capable force package forsupports national security. As we continue to optimallyshort-notice maritime response operations. Additionally,
staff our cutters, leveraging the capabilities and added
extending the reach of the Coast Guard’s short-notice
capacity provided by other operational communities tomaritime response capability by using the NSC as a stagincrease our mission effectiveness and meet our homeing platform for MSRT boarding operations achieves theland security objectives will remain a necessity. If we
objective envisioned in the operational requirements forare truly striving to be relevant and responsive to our
the NSC and MSRT assets, as well as the overarchingnation’s needs, two of our current commandant’s guidstrategic objective in Cooperative Strategy for the 21sting principles, we must continue to seek and maximize
Century by providing national decision makers with
opportunities to pair the specialized capabilities of thetime and decision space to deal with these types of
DSF and other communities with those of the afloat comthreats.
munity, because they can actually go together like peas
Fully leveraging this capability pairing for theand carrots.
above missions is certainly possible but will require theappropriate strategic leadership decisions and a corAbout the author:
CAPT Jeff Randall is a career afloat officer with more than 25 years of
responding commitment of resources to make it hapservice in the U.S. Coast Guard. He previously served as chief of Operapen. Nonetheless, the effective pairing of these uniquetional Forces for Atlantic Area where he oversaw major cutter and DSF
capabilities is a strategic imperative that better positions
units, as well as aviation and boat forces.
the Coast Guard for the variety of current and projected
operational realities.
Endnotes:
As a former skeptic of the DSF community, I came
1.	National Defense Strategy, 2018
2.	A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, March 2015
to appreciate the value and operational effectivenessSpring 2020     Proceedings

39Playing to Our Strengths

Support of Title 10 missions in the Arabian Gulf and beyond
by LT John J. Kearney
Student, George Mason University
U.S. Coast Guard

S

ince March 9, 2003, days before the invasion of
Iraq, Coast Guard cutters have supported the
U.S. Navy’s 5th Fleet and United States Central
Command (CENTCOM). 1 While the nature of operations
has changed significantly, the Coast Guard’s excellence
while supporting the Department of Defense (DoD)
has not. The scope of operations has broadened significantly, expanding from oil platform security in the
Northern Arabian Gulf to a combination of missions that
include:• layered defense of coalition assets• maritime security operations to counter illicit
maritime traffic• theater security cooperation exercises to build
partner capacity
These operations occur in varying density throughout the Arabian Gulf and Gulf of Oman offering excellent
opportunities for Coast Guard personnel to learn from
our DoD peers and participate in the sustainment of strategic regional partnerships. While these missions may

receive less press than Coast Guard search and rescue orcounternar­cotics operations, they are of critical relevanceto the U.S. national security strategy. They serve to blunt
Iran’s threats to maritime commerce and deter its effort
to sow further discord in the region. 2

Continued Operations Despite
the End of Open Hostilities

The Coast Guard’s contributions to last century’s wars
and conflicts are well known, but they did not exceed
the length of the conflict, usually ceasing in conjunction
with the end of hostilities. 3 In light of this, the length ofPatrol Forces Southwest Asia’s (PATFORSWA) expeditionary service is historically unique. For at least 10 years,
there has been a notion that this command’s days were
numbered. Given DoD’s standard historical use of Coast
Guard forces, and a culture rooted in a binary understanding of armed conflict, either war or peace, thiswas a reasonable expectation. 4 The often romanticizedand costly great power conflicts of the 20th Century are
unlikely to occur in the 21st
due to the ostensible cost ofa peer-to-peer conflict. This
reality has given rise to “GrayZones” of warfare. A U.S.
Special Operations Command
white paper defines them as:… competitive interactions among and withinstate and non-state actorsthat fall between the traditional peace and war duality. They are characterized
by ambiguity about thenature of the conf lict,
opacity of the parties
involved, or uncertainty
about the relevant policy
and legal frameworks. 5
The Arabian Gulf andGulf of Oman fit this definition and, as CDR Craig Allen
LTJG James Rizzo, left, and Petty Officer 1st Class Martin Williams navigate their small boat during maritime
noted in 2016, the operating
security operations. Army photo by Staff Sergeant Cortez Mastin

40

Proceedings     Spring 2020

Seaman Apprentice Brett O. Davidson, works a line onboard Coast Guard Cutter Adak, as the Polish naval ship Kontradmiral X Czernicki passes by in the North
Arabian Gulf off the coast of Iraq in April 2003. At the time, Adak was one of four 110-foot patrol boats in the Gulf region in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
It was the first time Coast Guard patrol boats had been deployed to a theater of war since Vietnam. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Tom Sperduto

challenges gray zones present fit well with the Coast
Guard’s strengths. 6 While PATFORSWA cutters continue
to support operations in the 5th Fleet area of responsibility, China 7 and Russia 8 are working towards greater
global influence. Their challenge of international norms
comes at the expense of the United States and the liberal
world order that has dominated political and economic
events since the end of the Cold War. 9

Making a Home In the Gray Zone

In the absence of kinetic engagement with adversaries,
the Coast Guard’s ability to build the capacity of ourallies, while maintaining austerity in the presence ofantagonistic competitors is invaluable to the strategic
goals of the Coast Guard and the United States. In theWestern Hemisphere Strategy (WHS), our executives
articulated a layered defense model using the national
security cutter as the primary means to project soft power
far from the conventional U.S. border. 10 The WHS’ goalsof “Ensuring a Secure Nation, Prosperous Markets, andThriving Oceans” is being challenged by Chinese andRussian activity in East Asia and Europe, respectively.
Our near-peer competitors are building their capacity
to challenge international norms using the ambiguity ofgray zones, and exploiting the U.S. Navy’s relative lackof soft power projection—many nations feel grey-hulledships are threatening. 11

Conclusion

Suspiciously well-equipped and organized Chinese maritime militias have asserted illegitimate maritime claims
and seized Philippine islands and fishing grounds. 12
Russia has been a barrier for merchant and military vessel traffic seeking access to the Sea of Azov. 13 The list ofrecent maritime sovereignty violations goes on and it willcontinue, possibly escalating, without the Coast Guard
providing the necessary assistance to our current andpotential allies. While the national security cutter is an
excellent addition to any combatant commander’s force
package, it cannot be the exclusive means through which
our service supports defense operations and strengthens military alliances. The size of the national security
cutter fleet and location of homeports will make it difficult to maintain the presence needed to deter, prevent,and respond to actions that disrupt critical sea lanes andmaritime commerce. Forward deployed Sentinel classcutters could be a large part of a comprehensive solution
to the problems facing the maritime industry and coastal
nations in Europe and Asia. Potential homeports include
Rota, Spain, or Naples, Italy, for European operations,
Spring 2020     Proceedings

41

Aviation Warfare Specialist 1st Class Jim Dudgeon, assigned to Helicopter Sea Combat Squadron 26, prepares to lower supplies to Coast Guard Cutter Baranof
during a vertical onboard delivery exercise in the Arabian Gulf in February 2014. Baranof was supporting operations in the 5th Fleet’s area of operations. Navy
photo by Petty Officer 1st Class Martin Cuaron

and Okinawa or Sasebo, Japan, for the Western Pacific.
While these overseas duty stations are a rarity for the
Coast Guard, freedom of navigation operations and partner capacity building exercises are not. Additionally,
the Navy’s small surface combatant fleet consists of
13 Cyclone class patrol craft and another 11 Avenger classmine countermeasures ships, in total, 24 of the almost
290 deployable ships, roughly eight percent, used by the
Navy. Conversely, Coast Guard patrol boats, the Sentinel,
Island, and Marine Protector class, represent just over
50 percent of a 243 ship force. 14 As a service, we mustleverage our strengths in both littoral patrol boat operations and non-kinetic adversary engagement to stem thegrowing influence of our near-peer competitors.
About the author:
LT John J. Kearney is a student at George Mason University’s Antonin
Scalia Law School and a 2011 graduate of the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. Prior to law school, he served in the Coast Guard as a cuttermanwith more than seven years of sea time. His last duty station was in
Manama, Bahrain, where he served as the Coast Guard Cutter Baranof’scommanding officer from May 2018 to May 2019.

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

Endnotes:
1.	Thiesen, William H., “Guardians of the Gulf: A History of Coast Guard
Combat Operations in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2002-2004”
https://media.defense.gov/2017/Jul/02/2001772360/-1/-1/0/USCGINOIF.
PDF
2.	Mabus, Dunford, Greenert, Zukunft “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century
Sea Power” pg. 6 March 20153.	w ww.history.uscg.mil/research/chronology/
4.	Murphy, M, Schaub, G. ““Sea of Peace” or Sea of War, Russian Maritime
Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic Sea”
5.	
U.S. Special Operations Command, White Paper: “The Gray Zone,”
9 September 2015.
6.	
W hite Hulls Must Prepare for Gray Zone Challenges, Craig Allen Jr.
November 2016
7.	Martinson, Ryan D., “Echelon Defense: The Role of Sea Power in Chinese
Maritime Dispute Strategy” (2018) CMSI Red Books. 15. https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/15
8.	U.S. Bulks Up Ukraine’s Navy to Thwart Russia, James Marson, Wall Street
Journal, March 11, 20199.	Summary of the National Defense Strategy, pg. 1, 201810.	United States Coast Guard Western Hemisphere Strategy, September 201411.	Naval War College Newport Papers 41, part 1, ch. 2 “The Navy’s Changing
Force Paradigm”, pg 24
12.	C hina’s Fishing Militia Swarms Philippine Island, Seeking Edge in Sea
Dispute, Niharika Mandhana, Wall Street Journal, April 4, 201913.	Ibid 8
14.	Status of the Navy, www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146; The
cutters, boats, and aircraft of the U.S. Coast Guard, www.uscg.milA Home for the Interceptors
The Coast Guard’s unique air intercept mission
may finally get a proper homeby CDR Michael R. Darrah
Office of Counterterrorism and Defense Operations
U.S. Coast GuardI

t’s difficult now to remember the complete shock on
the morning of September 11, 2001, but Air National
Guard’s Major Heather “Lucky” Penney, then arookie captain with the D.C. Air National Guard’s 121stFighter Squadron, will never forget. She and her operations director, then-Lieutenant Colonel Marc Sasseville,rushed to their F-16s on Andrews Air Force Base, knowing only that New York and the Pentagon had been hit
and that another airliner might be inbound. Their job
was to stop it.

A Different Time

world had changed, and the United States needed a new
approach to airspace security.

A New WorldThe country was just beginning to grasp with the magnitude of the attacks when the National Airspace Systemreopened a few days later. Over time, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), NORAD, and the Secret Service
instituted a layered system of restricted airspace aroundthe capital. This eventually evolved into the roughly
15 nautical mile Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ) surrounding Washington, and a Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA),
per FAA, of 30 nautical miles in place today. Flights in
the SFRA must follow strict “talk and squawk” rules tomaintain contact with air traffic control, while access to
the FRZ is limited to commercial airliners and approved
military, law enforcement, and emergency medical service aircraft.
Defending that airspace is a unique integrated air
defense system. This system incorporates not only the
F-16s at Andrews, but a network of Army missile sites,
advanced radars, a laser-based visual warning system,

As hard as it is to believe now, North American Aerospace
Defense Command’s (NORAD) air defense structure
was focused on threats coming from abroad, and private aircraft were free to fly to within just a few blocksof the White House. There also were no alert fighters on
standby in the nation’s capital. Even if there had been,
Penney had never scramble-started an F-16, but the pilots
had a bigger problem. Their jets carried no missiles orlive ammunition.
In what the 9/11 Commission would later term a“Failure of Imagination,” the country
was simply not prepared for an aerial
attack from within.
With no time to wait for missiles,
the only way Penney and Sassevillecould down a hijacked airliner onthat bright Tuesday morning was toram it. So that was the plan.
“I’m going to go for the cockpit,”
Sasseville said as they struggled into
their flight gear.
“I’ll take the tail,” Penney replied.
It was going to be a suicide mission to stop a suicide attack the likesof which the world had never seen.
In the end the brave passengers
aboard United Flight 93 beat Penney
A helicopter crew from the Coast Guard’s National Capitol Region Air Defense Facility flies over theand Sasseville to the punch, ending capital during trainings, familiarization flights, and responses. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer
it all in a Pennsylvania field. But the 2nd Class David R. Marin
Spring 2020     Proceedings

43specialized cameras, and, in a key role that remains
unbeknownst to many, the United States Coast Guard.

the stall speed of a fighter jet, it would be difficult for
an F-16 to maintain visual contact with the cockpit of asmall Cessna or helicopter, establish communications,
The Road Gameand ascertain the pilot’s intentions. With no way to deterThe Coast Guard’s air defense role didn’t start inmine whether an inbound aircraft was a genuine terror
attack, the Secret Service might be forced to evacuate theWashington, but in southern Georgia. In 2004, with the
G-8 Summit bringing world leadership to a tiny island
senior leadership of the world’s most powerful countries
in the middle of a global summit. Worse, NORAD might
60 miles south of Savannah, the Secret Service was worried about airspace. Air Force fighter jets could defend
have to make the difficult decision whether or not toengage an inbound aircraft without passenger confirmaagainst another hijacked airliner, but general aviation
tion. A new capability was needed.
aircraft were different. Flying at low altitudes and below
With no air assets of its own, theSecret Service had long looked to the
Coast Guard for ad hoc air support
when local police didn’t have aircraft available. Surveilling proposed
travel routes and scouting ahead ofthe motorcade were common tasks,
and the Coast Guard’s culture of flexibility, interagency cooperation, andquick response fit well with the service’s needs. With discussions getting
serious in January 2004, Coast Guard
Headquarters ordered Alabama’s
Aviation Training Center Mobile toquickly develop an air intercept capability. In April, then-Secret Service
Director Ralph Basham made the formal request to Coast Guard Admiral
Tom Collins, asking the Coast Guard
MH-65 Dolphin helicopters from Coast Guard Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey, fly over Washington
to provide protection not just to the G-8
in April 2015. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class David Micallef
summit, but for all future national special security events, as well. From thisrequest, the Rotary Wing Air Intercept(RWAI) program was born.

The Mission

A lighted sign in the window of a Coast Guard helicopter reads “Warning.” Light boards andInternational Civil Aviation Organization signals are used to communicate with aircraft interceptedby the Coast Guard as part of the National Capital Region air defense mission. Coast Guard photo by
PA1 John Edwards

44

Proceedings     Spring 2020

The concept is simple, but the execution
is complex. When an aircraft violates
restricted airspace around Washington,
or another protected area, someone
has to intercept it, identify it, and get
close enough to look at the pilots andestablish communication. The goal is
to assess the threat and get the aircraft
turned around quickly, before NORAD
is forced to take action. The Air Forcedoes this with jets for anything highor fast, such as a lost business jet. The
Coast Guard does this with helicopters,
specifically the MH-65 Dolphin.
Coast Guard RWAI crews are specially trained to launch quickly andfly directly at an incoming aircraft,

A Coast Guard MH-65 Dolphin helicopter from Coast Guard Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey, flies over Atlantic City on a training flight in March 2015.
Aircrews from Coast Guard Air Station Atlantic City train to stay proficient for the Rotary Wing Air Intercept mission over the nation’s capital and other criticalareas throughout the country. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class David Micallef

receiving intercept vectors from NORAD radar controllers. After spotting the track of interest (TOI), the helicopter executes challenging intercept maneuvers to pull
up beside the suspect aircraft, get the pilot’s attention,and determine what has gone wrong. They are equippedwith flashing blue lights and an electronic signboard thatcan display urgent messages telling the intruder to turnto a certain heading or tune to a specific radio frequency.
It’s a unique skill set requiring significant training andproficiency to master under high pressure conditions,but one at which Coast Guard RWAI crews have become
adept.
While no bogeys ultimately tested the new procedures at that 2004 G-8 Summit, President Ronald Reagan
had passed away just days before. At the Secret Service’s
request, the Coast Guard quickly redeployed the team to
California to protect the June 11 memorial service. There,a news helicopter attempted to violate the restricted airspace and became the first TOI successfully interceptedand diverted by Coast Guard RWAI forces.

The Home Game

In Washington at the time, Customs and Border
Protection was flying H-60’s out of Ronald Reagan
Washington National Airport’s Hangar 7 to support air
security in a law-enforcement capacity. But on May 11,2005, after a lost instructor and student flew their Cessna
to within 3 miles of the White House, triggering chaotic

evacuations and nearly being shot down by Air Forcefighters, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
Department of Defense (DoD) reevaluated the air defense
posture. Given NORAD’s airspace control mission and
the Coast Guard’s dual role as both an armed service andlaw enforcement agency, then-DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff decided to transfer the intercept mission to theagency’s only military service. After hurricanes Katrina
and Ike delayed the handoff, the Coast Guard began
standing the watch from Hangar 7 on September 25,
2006. The newly designated National Capital Region Air
Defense was a detachment supported and commanded
by Air Station Atlantic City, the nearest operational unit,
so the new call sign was an easy choice—BLACKJACK.

Capital Watch

While Hollywood would have viewers believe that rescue missions begin with crews sprinting to their aircraft
and immediately launching into the stormy skies, thereality is more deliberate. Search and Rescue (SAR) sorties are quickly but carefully planned, with crews allotted up to 30 minutes to evaluate the case and prepare
before taking off into the proverbial storm.
The air intercept mission, on the other hand, requires
exactly the response a movie director would love. Timeequals distance over speed, and with only a 30 mile buffer
around Washington, the entire enterprise may have lessthan 15 minutes to intercept and stop a legitimate threat,
Spring 2020     Proceedings45

or much more likely, identify and divert a pilot who may
not even realize they have stumbled into harm’s way. In
the ready-rooms where Coast Guard air intercept crews
await the scramble klaxon, there are speakerphones constantly dialed in to the Domestic Events Network, a nonstop, FAA-hosted conference call that keeps the country’s
air security players informed of developing events inreal time. Most of the calls received on this network areroutine; a radar outage due to maintenance or an airliner
diverting for a medical situation.
But as soon as anyone hears the magic words, “Capital
Watch …” conversation stops and earplugs get pulled
out of pockets. The crews listen intently as the FAA, Air
Force, and others trade information and try to determine
whether this blip on the radar is a flock of birds or athreat. If and when the scramble alarm sounds, all bets
are off; chairs go flying, doors burst open, and crews
outright sprint to their aircraft. Using special scramble
procedures and an abbreviated checklist, they spin up
the helicopters and launch towards the suspect track as
fast as physics allows. The aircrews take pride in meeting their very short launch window and get to practice it. In the past five years, BLACKJACK crews have
responded to 765 alert events, or one every other day.
Thanks to the number of low, slow aircraft that stumble
into restricted airspace, the National Capitol Region Air
Defense Facility (NCRADF) is, and remains, the busiest

alert site in NORAD’s Aerospace Control Alert (ACA)
arsenal, being named unit of the year in 2014 over all its
DoD brethren. As of 2019, they have never missed theirlaunch window.

You Are 237 Yards Away

When the Coast Guard took over the National Capital
Region mission in 2006, it naturally occupied the spaces
previously used by Customs and Border Protection. But
Hangar 7 was less than ideal as an alert facility. The pilot
and crew ready-rooms and operations center were scattered in old offices on the second deck. Moreover, thehangar itself was shared, with only limited deck andramp space carved out for the three MH-65s maintained
there at all times.
Given the suboptimal layout, it could be a long run to
the ready aircraft in the event of a scramble. Small signs
were placed around the facility to keep pilots and crews
on their toes. At the entrance to the ready-rooms, stuck to
the top of computer monitors, and even above the urinals
placards warned: “REMEMBER: You are 237 yards from
BLACKJACK 1.”
Upon hearing the alarm, a pilot had to levitate out of
their chair, accelerate out the door trying not to trip overtheir shipmates doing the same, make a left turn down
a long narrow hallway, make another left through a firedoor, spiral down two flights of industrial concrete stairs

A Coast Guard MH-65 Dolphin helicopter crew from Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey, flies over the streets of Washington during a 2017 patrol. Crews fromAir Station Atlantic City support the National Capital Region Air Defense Facility. Coast Guard photo by Auxiliarist David Lau

46

Proceedings     Spring 2020

Petty Officer 1st Class Travis Burlew, a crew member at Coast Guard Guard Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey, inspects a helicopter after a 2015 training flight.
Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class David Micallef

while trying not to trample or be trampled, burst throughanother fire door into the hangar, and then sprint out the
hangar and across the ramp to the aircraft.
This chaos generated some challenges, exemplified bya true story about a beloved pilot known as “the Bison.”In the early days at Hangar 7, the Bison took a nasty spill
down those stairs during a scramble, and yet, propelledby adrenaline and determination not to be ‘that guy,’
still launched inside the time window. It was only after
the sortie when he caught his breath and tried to climb
out of the helicopter that he realized his leg was broken
from the fall.

A Box Inside a Box

In 2012, after years of planning and work, the National
Capital Region Air Defense Facility (NCRADF), got amuch needed move two doors down to Hangar 5 where
the Coast Guard could lease the entire space. The upper
floors were renovated to provide offices and a new command post, but the ready-rooms and maintenance shops
were built in a two-story prefab building inside the hangar itself. The ‘box within a box’ concept allows today’screws to be just a few short yards from their aircraft at all
times, and keeps office spaces, kitchenettes, and maintenance control in close proximity. As an alert facility, itoffers security, quick access to aircraft, and perhaps mostimportantly, is very close to downtown Washington. The
pilot ready-room has a plaque on the wall designating
it “The Bison Pen. In dedication to all those who haverisked life and limb in defense of the nation.”

27 Years of Temporary Active Duty

Hangar 5 is a proper alert facility, but is far from a selfsufficient unit. Since 2006, the National Capital Region
mission has been managed as a permanent forward
detachment, owned by Air Station Atlantic City andmanned by a never-ending stream of temporary duty
(TDY) pilots and aircrews. While there is a small footprint of ‘permanent party’ officers and command post
watchstanders, almost all of the 25 pilots and aircrew
required to stand alert duty every day are there on TDY
orders, most from Air Station Atlantic City, and somefrom three satellite RWAI units: Air Stations Detroit,
Savannah, and New Orleans. A new crew of two pilots
and three aircrew/maintainers arrives in Washington
every three days for a 17-day rotation. They’ll spend a
week on day watch, a week on nights, and half a week
on the mid-watch before departing back to their unit.
Depending on the unit’s bench strength and the pace of
deployable operations, which are drawn from the samepool of aviators, they may be back in just a few weeks to
do it again.
This arrangement has been effective, but inefficient.
All told the Coast Guard incurs roughly 10,000 temporary duty days per year staffing the NCRADF, or just over
27 years per year. The temporary duty model, with aircraft and personnel primarily sourced from Air Station
Atlantic City, was only intended for initial operating
Spring 2020     Proceedings

47

Coast Guard National Capital Region Air Defense Facility (NCRADF) receives
the 2014 Continental North American Region Aerospace Control Alert Unitof the Year award in February 2015. Canadian Forces Brig. Gen. Alain Pelletier(center), the deputy commander of the North American Aerospace Defense
Command region, presented the award to NCRADF Operations Officer
LCDR Zac Mathews (left) and CAPT Peter Mingo (right), the commanding
officer of Coast Guard Air Station Atlantic City, New Jersey. Coast Guard
photo by Petty Officer 2nd Class David Marincapability. Thirteen years later, the Coast Guard may
finally find a proper home for the interceptors.

Full Operational Capability

Until recent years, almost every RWAI pilot in the Coast
Guard was also a search and rescue pilot, but neither ofthese missions is what one would consider a side gig.
Maintaining proficiency in both was a growing challenge
as the Coast Guard, like every other branch, struggled toretain experienced aviators in light of the airline boom.
In 2015, an initiative to finally move beyond initial
operating capability and match proper resources to themission began. An early proposal to reduce the readinessto match current resources was killed when senior leadership saw the risk it posed to meeting the launch window. Another proposal to place a large cadre of pilots inWashington without expanding the facility would havestruggled to provide individual pilots with enough flight
hours. A consensus emerged on what full operational
capability would look like—a dedicated RWAI unit in
the metropolitan Washington area.

Hangar 14

Immediately a problem emerged: Where?
Ronald Reagan Washington National has no room for
expansion, but the alert site must remain there for quick
response against threats coming from any direction.
What is needed is a Mission Support Facility, a home basethat supports the training, maintenance, and administration needs of both the NCRADF and the frequent deployable missions to support the Secret Service. It also had tobe large enough to provide maintenance and support for
up to 10 aircraft, close enough to easily drive to and from,48

Proceedings     Spring 2020

and at an airport that can support military operations
24/7. Enter Joint Base Andrews’ Hangar 14.
Located on the Navy quarter of the airfield, Hangar 14
has been mostly empty for several years and presents a
prime opportunity to both enhance the RWAI mission
and save significant taxpayer dollars.
While not in bad shape, the hangar would need significant renovations to accommodate this new unit, notionally referred to as the Helicopter Air Intercept Wing, or
HAIWING. Maintenance spaces and equipment, groundsupport equipment, and office and administrative spaces
would all need to be overhauled, and the Coast Guardis already engaging with the budget process, the DHS,
DoD, and congressional leadership to line up support
for the expenses.
But the anticipated cost pales in comparison tobuilding a new facility. Thurgood Marshall BaltimoreWashington International and Dulles International are
the only other airfields nearby that can support the airlift needed to move the helicopters cross country forlong-distance, short-notice missions. Neither of them
are advertising hangar space, and even if the footprint
for a new unit was there, the cost of building on a nonmilitary facility and meeting security and support needs
would be tremendous.
On the other hand, Hangar 14 provides all the synergy of co-locating with other military units, including
security, medical, fuel, facilities, and air traffic support. NORAD has expressed strong support, and Coast
Guard Headquarters has already submitted a basing
action request to the Secretary of the Air Force. As ofspring 2019, the capabilities and civil engineering offices
involved are working quickly through the studies andreports necessary to validate this as the right move forboth services. The Navy and Air Force management
aboard Joint Base Andrews are on board and look forward to putting Hangar 14 back to good use.
Moreover, it would put the Coast Guard HAIWING,
focused solely on defense of our nation and capital, just a
few hundred yards down the flight line from their long-time
partners, the 121st Fighter Squadron. The squadron thathas continued to stand the alert watch ever since Penney
and Sasseville roared into the sky on September 11. The
Rotary Wing Air Intercept Program may be a specialized
mission within Coast Guard aviation, but it couldn’t fit
better with the service’s motto of Semper Paratus: Always
Ready.
About the author:
CDR Michael Darrah is the Aviation Special Missions officer in the
Office of Counterterrorism and Defense Operations, where he helps
manage the Rotary Wing Air Intercept program and coordinates withpartners at U.S. Secret Service and NORAD. He is a career aviatorwith nearly 3,000 hours in the MH-65, and has been a flight examiner/
instructor pilot for both legacy and air intercept missions.

Mission Excellence Anytime, Anywhere

Sustaining theStandard of Excellence
A reflection on national security cutter
maintenance and support strategies

by LCDR Andrew PritchettEngineer Officer
U.S. Coast Guard Cutter HamiltonInearly all of the Coast Guard’s 11 statutory missions witht’s a warm, still morning in the Eastern Pacific as thethe obvious exception of icebreaking. In fact, Hamiltoncrew of Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton eagerly awaits
seized enough illicit drugs in its first two full patrols
a target of interest they’ve tracked and are positioned
to nearly cover the cost of its construction. The cuttersto intercept. Through a carefully choreographed coopare outfitted with three small boats, multi-frequency
erative effort, funneled via Joint Interagency Task Force
communications, long-range sensing equipment, and(JIATF) South and shipboard “state of the art” monitorthe ability to launch and recover two helicopters or
ing and sensing equipment, the target’s track plotted
unmanned aerial systems.
unknowingly towards the most capable surface asset in
The original concept for the NSC emerged in the late
the Coast Guard’s fleet. Shortly after an operations brief,
1990s as the fleet of Vietnam era high endurance cuttersa helicopter is launched and small boats are underway.
(WHEC) were nearing their life expectancy and some
There is also coordination with a maritime patrol aircraft
were deteriorating rapidly, leading to decreased reliabiland sensors are honed in on the suspected smuggler for
ity and increased maintenance costs. The requirements
vectored interdiction. Over the calm, but hectic din of
spectrum included an offshore command and control
activity in the Combat Information Center, you can hearplatform that would be able to complete the WHEC
the operations officer exclaim, “We got another one!”
Apprehending suspected smugglers is one of many capabilities the national security cutter(NSC) brings to its role in keeping our homeland secure.
The NSC is the largest cutter acquisition program everundertaken by the Coast Guard.
A product of the now defunctIntegrated Coast Guard Systems,
or Deepwater, the program initially suffered a rocky start as a“system of systems” acquisition.
Improved processes and a shift
to a Coast Guard-led acquisition
approach resulted in the mostcapable cutter in the fleet whilesetting a solid foundation for theoffshore patrol cutter acquisition
with an expected delivery of thefirst of its class in 2020. The NSC
is more than proving its worth in Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton completes an interdiction/boarding of a low profile vessel. Coast Guard photo
Spring 2020     Proceedings49

mission while also bridging technological and communication gaps employed by navies around the world.
The original program of record called for eight NSCs
to replace the 12 high endurance cutters. The decisionfocused on the operability of the vessel with installed
computer control systems and minimal organizational
maintenance while deployed. After multiple design iterations, the general characteristics were developed, as
provided in the table below.

illicit good, including people or other things, whatever
will make the most money. In addition, NSCs are now
being deployed in support of Department of Defense’s
combatant commanders. In general, the capabilities of
the NSCs far outweigh those of its older sister cutters,
most notably the medium endurance cutter fleet of aging
210-foot and 270-foot cutters, based on their sea keeping, maneuverability, and ability to detect, engage, andinterdict.
From an engineering perspective, fundamental to theLength (Overall)
418 ftBeam
54 ft
design of the cutter is redundancy. The NSC is equippedwith a robust propulsion system that includes two main
Draft
24 ft
Height138 ftpropulsion diesel engines (MPDE) and a main gas turDisplacement
4500 LTMax Speed
28–30 knotsbine, which can operate independently or collectively via
One Long Range Interceptor
Two Over-The-Horizona cross connect gear and two reduction gears. Further,
Small Boats
35' boat
26' boats
an integrated machinery control and monitoring sys57mm computer
20mm close intem (MCMS) uses programmed logic that allows for
Deck Weapons
controlled deck gun
weapons system
multiple propulsion configurations depending on mission requirement. Separate from propulsion, the ship
Endurance
7800 NM @ 15 knot 6300 NM @ 18 knots 3400 NM @ 25 knots
includes redundancy in the auxiliary systems, like air
conditioning, refrigeration, and potable water makers.
Since its commissioning, Hamilton has mostly been
Finally, a key component of the engineering system
employed to counter the flow of illicit narcotics andis the electrical generation. The configuration is comhuman smuggling in the JIATF South area of responsiprised of three same-characteristic ship’s service diesel
bility, most notably the greater Caribbean area and equagenerators (SSDG), each of which can provide enoughtorial Eastern Pacific. These are prime transit routes used
power for most missions. Additional programming inby transnational criminal organizations for smuggling
the MCMS architecture includes logic that allows for an
illegal narcotics, primarily cocaine and marijuana. While
offline SSDG to start and parallel to the electrical bussthese networks currently move drugs, their established
if there is an indicator that the electrical load is becompathways and logistics cells are capable of moving any
ing too much for one to handle.
This arrangement makes it lesslikely that a loss of power would
occur, ensuring continuity ofoperations.
These are fantastic capabilities that are more than proving their worth. To maintainthem and keep them current,
the Coast Guard will need toaddress the challenges of lifecycle sustainment on a complex
platform that must maintain its
technological edge far into the
21st Century. The shift fromall-organic, Coast Guard engineering expertise and wrenchturners to a contracted out
maintenance and repair model
must be addressed to keep theseplatforms performing at peak
performance. The Coast Guard
business model employed for
mission support encompasses
The burning remains of a vessel used to traffic illegal narcotics is monitored. Coast Guard photo by CAPT Mark
Gordonmultiple logistics centers that are50

Proceedings     Spring 2020

Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton was positioned off the coast of Wilmington, North Carolina, to serve as the command and control platform during Hurricane
Florence in fall 2018. Coast Guard photofurther organized into fleet-centric product lines. Froman engineering perspective, the Coast Guard’s technical authority resides with the Surface Forces Logistics
Center (SFLC). The primary SFLC product line supporting the NSC are the Long Range Enforcer (SFLC-LRE)and secondary small boats. From a combat systems perspective, the primary support stems from the Command,
Control, Communications, Computers, Information,
and Technology Service Center. Collectively, these organizations are responsible for ensuring planned andunplanned organizational and depot level functions
occur to meet the cutter’s sustainment needs, including
identification and development of replacement systems
throughout its life cycle.
There are additional tenets that factor into the support
for the NSC, including configuration management, bilevel maintenance, and total asset visibility. Adherence
to a standard build-out or configuration is a common
challenge with centralized support. Far too often, crews
take the initiative to improve or alter installed systems
for expeditious casualty repair or general bettermentof habitability or maintainability. As a result, the costto sustain increases as differing configurations may
require multiple, similar components from different
vendors, in addition to unplanned costs necessary to
restore configuration. From a maintenance perspective,

the Coast Guard focuses on a bi-level system—organizational and depot. Organizational relates to the maintenance performed by the unit crew, while depot may
be other organic resources with additional skills andtraining or contracted out. Finally, total asset visibility
is a term related to the use of modern information systems that provide snapshots of an asset’s capability andmaintenance needs, viewable by essentially any element
within the Coast Guard, most notably the operationalcommander and support elements.
Ensuring long term sustainment of mission excellence is not an easy task and competing demands include
diverse operational and maintenance requirements, calculated reliability as systems and components age, andunknown external factors including budget climate andpolitical realities. One of the more challenging aspects ofoperating a NSC relates to the expectations for the billeted crew. The current position assignment list includes
manpower gaps among all technical rates further challenging the ability to complete needed organizational
level maintenance. This triggers more reliance on contracted out maintenance to complete various tasks ranging from topside preservation to in-depth equipment
troubleshooting and repair. From a fiscal perspective,
the maintenance cost per operating hour (MCpOH) isused to track maintenance expenses, and is defined as
Spring 2020     Proceedings51the actual maintenance expenses for an asset, including
the user to take action prior to the casualty. SFLC-LRE
direct and indirect maintenance costs as well as depot
uses this philosophy with respect to the national seculevel labor and installed repairable parts. By comparirity cutter’s MDPE, a critical system necessary for theson, the FY18 MCpOH for a WHEC with more personnel
NSC to carry out its missions. During each inport, anand stable support conSFLC-LRE engineer pulls a
tracts was $2,509 whiledata extract from the MPDE
the NSC required $4,226,
data log and evaluates theTechnical rates include boatswain’s
highlighting the chalengine’s operation and funcmate, electrician’s mate, electronics
lenges and expense oftion. In addition, quarterly
maintaining a NSC. It isoil samples are tested,technician, and machinery technician. lube
noted that there are moreusing standard industrial
NSCs now than there are
criteria, for how the internal
WHECs in service, but
components of the MPDE are
the MCpOH for a WHEC, in general, remained the samewearing. In response, the original equipment manufacfrom FY13 to FY18 prior to their decommissioning.
turer conducts a diesel engine inspection to return the
A primary driver for this difference in cost stems
MPDE to near-original build as well as conduct addifrom a need for the NSC to conduct a major dockside
tional repairs based on the aforementioned inspections.
availability each inport, normally contracted out to a
Finally, in conjunction with the original equipment mancommercial entity. This is a product of the extensive
ufacturer, engine overhauls and maintenance are incorrecurring depot level maintenance necessary for the
porated into NSC inport maintenance projects, typicallyvarious systems, structure, and ongoing improvements.
concurrent with diesel engine inspections. Because of
While hiring a single contracted integrator saves sigthis, the NSC fleet MPDEs are continuing to perform
nificant contracting capacity, there is a potential costwell, with few exceptions.
savings, as well as additional technical expertise, if
Support for new designs, technology, and techniques
individual work items are completed by Coast Guard
requires careful planning. Integration of new sysmaintenance or Coast Guard industrial enterprise teams.
tems into an original design is not a quick process andSeparate from planned maintenance, a significant level
requires multiple levels of coordination. As a result, theof discrepancy repair requires contracted technicians,
power plant can meet operational need, logistics mechatypically from the original equipment manufacturer, tonisms are in place, the personnel operating or maintainperform the necessary work to restore the system. Thereing are trained, the physical structure can withstand thewill always be system nuances, or increasing reliance on
operational environment, and funding is available. There
proprietary software that may require this level of supare many new concepts under consideration, and othport. However, an investment in the training, skill, anders being implemented. One in particular is the small
technical knowledge of our cutter and shoreside support
unmanned aerial system (sUAS). This emerging technolworkforce is paramount in gaining organic experienceogy will allow for surveillance of suspected targets ofand achieving long-term cost savings.
interest and reduce reliance on maritime patrol aircraft.
As the Coast Guard evolves and systems mature, it
A launching platform will be installed on each NSC withis prudent to evaluate these systems to ensure correct
at least one sUAS. Already in use for limited operational
functionality. Follow-up operational testing and evaluatest and evaluation, the initial response is an incredible
tion is highly recommended when upgrades are impleforce multiplier that greatly improves real-time visualmented. There are means of thoroughly investigating theaccountability of suspected vessels.
fault or failure of a system, often accomplished throughAdditional improvements include expanded undera root cause for failure analysis or failure mode, effects,
way connectivity to allow for improved command andand critical analysis. These investigation techniques arecontrol with shoreside tactical and operational comuseful in understanding the nature of the failure, what
manders allowing for expedited interdiction. While thisis necessary to restore functionality, and highlight how
is one example of improved capability, it is imperative
this can be a detriment to the NSC success.
that continuous identification of life-cycle upgrades for
Reliability-centered maintenance is a proven philosothe cutter as a whole continue, many of which are identiphy for how to best integrate maintenance and repair
fied by the operators and offered to the acquisition andefforts for a system while ensuring operational requiresustainment organizations for development and implements are met. This is a concept that enables the identificamentation.
tion of maintenance needs prior to a forecasted milestone
The NSC continues to provide robust offshore covby using metrics like time or operational hours. It alsoerage and will continue to prove its worth in the years
predicts if, or when, a failure may occur thus enabling
to come. To date, eight NSCs have been delivered and52

Proceedings     Spring 2020

Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton’s crew completes an abandon ship drill. Coast Guard photo by CAPT Mark Gordon

another three are expected. We must continue to highlight the benefits these vessels offer, especially theincreased operational effectiveness, regardless of themission. A concern with the number of NSCs is that theoriginal program of record called for eight. The latest
projections for 11 indicate potential resource gaps, specifically with regards to personnel, funding, and necessary shore infrastructure for their berths and support.
We must also recognize and accept that the first National
Security Cutter, Bertholf, is nearly 11 years old and thefleet is aging.
However, with the advancements of these vessels,
we must be ready to support, and continue to improve,
their abilities. We must forecast NSC sustainment needs
and ensure that the maintenance availabilities we are
executing are developed to effectively address pressing
needs and to maximize the use of contractors for workthat is best completed commercially. However, surging
our organic workforce elements to handle more maintenance needs will result in a decreased capital cost while
also improving internal Coast Guard response capabilities. This includes having a ready supply of spare parts,
logistics support contracts in place, and crews trained toproperly complete the work. Finally, the design, capabilities, and lessons learned from this fleet must be
documented and understood for future acquisitions,
including the offshore patrol cutter, and the fleet thatwill one day replace the NSCs.
About the Author:
LCDR Andrew Pritchett is a seasoned naval engineer, a permanent
cutterman, and certified acquisitions program manager. An early career
assignment to the National Security Cutter Project Resident Officeinstilled a desire to one day be assigned to a national security cutter andexperience its engineering and operational capabilities.
References:
Benjamin S. Blanchard & Wolter J. Fabrycky, “Systems Engineering andAnalysis,” Prentice Hall, 2011
CAPT Mark Gordon, “U. S. Coast Guard Supply Chain Management: Logistics
Transformation in an Austere Budget Climate,” Maritime Supply Chain
Management (MSCM/PORT 610), 2013
LCDR Andrew D. Pritchett, “A Systematic Approach to Reliability-Centered
Maintenance,” Naval Postgraduate School, 2018
USCG Acquisition Directorate: National Security Cutter Information website, www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-forAcquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Surface-Programs/National-Security-Cutter/
U.S. Coast Guard (2014), “Cutter Information Book for USCGC Hamilton (WMSL
753)”
U.S. Coast Guard (2018), “Surface Forces Logistics Center 2018 Annual Report”

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53

The First Line of Defense at Sea
Cutter crews intercepting migrants have complex roles
by LT Nicholas Spence
Office of Maritime Law Enforcement
U.S. Coast GuardT

he bioluminescent plankton glows through thewake of the Coast Guard small boat, as the boarding team carefully approaches a dimly lit vesselin the Mona Passage between Hispaniola and PuertoRico. As the small boat closes the distance, it becomesapparent that it is a yola, a small outboard-propelled vessel used by Dominican fisherman, but also a common
conveyance used to carry migrants or smugglers fromthe Dominican Republic to the island of Puerto Rico.
The yola in question seems to carry about 30 people
waving their arms as if they need assistance. Operating
under customary international law, 1 the Coast Guard isafforded the right to approach and verify the nationalityof vessels in international waters. As such, it conducts
right of approach questioning to determine the nationality of the vessel. There are three methods to accomplish this:• observe the vessel flying a flag of a nation• hear the master or person in charge make a verbal
claim• the vessel’s master or person in charge producing
documentation

CDR Patrick Culver
Office of Maritime Law Enforcement
U.S. Coast Guard

If the vessel is unable or unwilling to provide suchinformation, a warship (the Coast Guard small boat) may
send a team to conduct a right of visit boarding to gather
and confirm the information obtained during the initialquestioning. If the vessel does not make a claim throughone of the three right of approach methods, the warshipthat has been authorized to conduct such operations cantreat the vessel as though it has no national affiliation. If
this is determined to be the case, the vessel is subject tothe jurisdiction of any nation. In these cases the government conducting the boarding can assert their own jurisdictional authorities over the vessel. In cases of safetyof life at sea, vessels are obligated to render assistanceunder the same convention governing the right to board
a vessel to confirm nationality. 2 Oftentimes, vessels may
be dangerously overloaded, creating an imminent threat
to the passenger’s safety. In the case of the persons in theyola, the Coast Guard is exercising their international
obligation to provide assistance 3 and attempts to get thepassengers to voluntarily leave the vessel. In these cases,
the safety of the migrants is always paramount to establishing jurisdiction and enforcing immigration laws.
As the coxswain formulates the approach, careful consideration is given to
the stability of the migrant vessel as well
the orientation and position of the people
onboard. If the coxswain approaches thevessel on either the port or starboard side
without analyzing the reactions of the people, their actions could jeopardize the yola’s
stability causing it to capsize. This reaction
could make an already dangerous situation
turn deadly.
Due to a nation’s sovereign right to protect its border, the Coast Guard is one of the
U.S. agencies charged with enforcing immigration laws out on the sea. Obligations toprevent illegal immigration by sea are outlined in a series of presidential directives
issued since 1981. 4
As they approach the yola, the original
Coast Guard Cutter Tahoma small boat crew transfers Haitian migrants from a 50-foot sailestimateof 30 people triples, and initial
freighter 33 miles east of Great Inagua, Bahamas in March 2018. Coast Guard photo by Petty
contactmakes
it evident the situation is
Officer 3rd Class Brandon Murray

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A boat crew from Coast Guard Cutter Tahoma participates in boat tactics training off the coast of Massachusetts in July 2016. Coast Guard photo by Petty
Officer 3rd Class Nicole J. Grolla migration scenario. The yola is severely overloaded
and vulnerable to capsizing at any moment. The crewtells the migrants not to move and carefully hands overlifejackets. The coxswain reports this to the cutter’s commanding officer, recommending immediate debarkationfrom the yola to ensure the safety of the migrants andreceives authorization to do so. In turn, the commanding
officer reports this information to the cognizant command center at Coast Guard District 7 in Miami, Florida.
With the small boat crew’s encouragement, all 90 migrants disembark the yola in groups of five to be transported to the nearby cutter to begin their in-processing.
With the first load of migrants in the small boat,
the coxswain requests permission to come alongside
the 154‑foot patrol cutter, which is actively preparing
to receive the migrants on deck. As they make theirapproach to the cutter, the well-trained and preparedcrew is tense but fluid as they try to keep themselves balanced in the choppy seas. After the small boat is secured
alongside the cutter, each migrant climbs up the 6-footladder onto the deck where two more crew members
greet the migrant to formally begin their in-processing.
A basic medical evaluation is conducted by qualified
medical personnel and their biographical and biometricdata are collected by a crew member operating portablebiometrics equipment.

The Coast Guard collects biometrics in accordancewith a nationally approved biometrics collection program that allows information gathering on any personthat has crossed, or is attempting to cross, the maritime
domain’s equivalent of the border. This data is sent toa fusion center where it is processed through threenational databases that check for prior criminal activity and terrorist affiliations. Once processed, the data
informs the crew whether migrants should be detained
for their safety and potential interagency investigation,or prosecution. The cutter’s operation officer analyzes
the data and reports this information to the cognizant
command center for dissemination to interagency partners for consideration. Through an interagency decision-making process, migrants interdicted at sea canbe brought ashore for a multitude of reasons including
further investigation into immigration-related offenses,
prosecution for immigration-related offenses, witness
purposes, and expedited removal proceedings.
In this case, none of the migrants have outstanding
information in law enforcement databases. Since the datais shared among these databases, the United States government can catalogue the encounter with these 90 individuals, allowing for future identification if the migrants
are ever stopped again attempting to cross the borderillegally.
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55

The migrants are given new, disposable coveralls that
protect them from the elements and gets them out of
their saltwater and gasoline saturated clothing. They also
receive new footwear and blankets before being moved
to an area of the cutter protected from the elements andsafe from normal crew operations before being given
food and water. The next step in the processing phase isto determine the disposition of the migrants. The cognizant command conducts disposition planning according
to the applicable bilateral agreement.
The Department of State 5 has authorized the Coast
Guard to negotiate, and enter into bilateral agreements,
pertaining to interdiction at sea, specifically drug andmigrant interdictions. The agreements are different,
but generally cover several topics including shipboarding, shipriding, pursuit, entry to investigate, overflight,
relay order to land, international maritime interdiction support, technical assistance, repatriation, thirdparty platform, and operations in each other’s territorial
seas. Under the current case, the District 7 CommandCenter would implement the repatriation provision of
the United States and the Dominican Republic bilateralagreement. 6
This agreement allows the Coast Guard to repatriate
nationals of Dominican Republic and other nationalities
that last departed the Dominican Republic. These international agreements are available for public access. 7
Waiting for disposition instructions, the small crew,
already spread thin, is now required to stand security
watches in addition to normal navigational and engineering duties, as they sail to one of the designated repatriation ports in the Dominican Republic. As they make way

across the Mona Passage, the security watch notices thata female migrant is becoming visibly nervous and starts
crying. The crew member, recalling training in how to
identify and report verbal and non-verbal cues of fear,
notifies the commanding officer who decides to gather
more information. The cutter’s operations officer, withassistance from the onboard interpreter, sits down withthe female migrant to ask about her distraught appearance and behavior. She explains she is afraid to return to
the Dominican Republic because she was threatened byher previous boyfriend who said he would kill her. The
crew immediately reports this to the District 7 CommandCenter, who relays the information to the Coast Guard’s
Office of Maritime Law Enforcement in Washington.
The Coast Guard does not make a qualitative assessment of claims of fear made at sea, they rely on the expertise of the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services’ Refugee Affairs Division for this determi­nation.
The United States’ obligations are provided under the1967 protocols to the 1951 United Nations Convention
on the Status of Refugees 8 or the Refugee Convention,
the United Nations Convention against Torture andOther Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, or the Convention against Torture. 9 The
Refugee Convention is a 149-nation treaty that urges
governments to take the actions necessary to protect
individuals who have a well-founded fear of persecution in their country of origin. Under the Convention
against Torture, the 83-nation human rights treaty aims
to prevent torture and others acts of cruel and inhumantreatment against someone to gain information or a confession by a governmental official or those authorized
by such persons. The United States’
obligation under these treaties was
fulfilled by the establishment of legislation and policy to address claimsof asylum, with specific proceduresfor claims at sea. Under asylum law, 10
any alien that is physically present in
the United States may claim asylum if
the fear of persecution is due to theirrace, nationality, religion, politicalviews, and/or social group. They canalso claim asylum if they can demonstrate it is more than likely the individual will be tortured, or has been
tortured, by an agent of the government of the nation to which they are to
be returned. Additionally, the UnitedStates adheres to its international obligation to the Refugee Convention to
not return individuals to a place where
Coast Guard Cutter Tahoma small boat crew approaches a 50-foot sail freighter to interdict thethey have a credible fear of persecu115 Haitian migrants aboard in March 2018. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Brandon
Murraytion or torture. This practice is referred

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

Coast Guard Cutter Tahoma crew embarks a Haitian migrant onto the cutter in March 2018. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Brandon Murrayto as non-refoulement. 11
If immigration officials determine a claim is legitimate, those asylum seekers are provided protection andpermitted to remain in the United States. In the case of
migrants interdicted at sea, the protection is afforded,
but since the migrants are not present in the UnitedStates, alternate policies are applied. Under United States
policy, 12 the Department of Homeland Security secretaryprovides asylum request procedures to those individuals interdicted at sea. When migrants’ claim asylum atsea, it is referred to as a manifestation of fear. The same
application of the asylum law is applied with the absenceof the provision permitting the migrant to be protectedin the United States. The United States and various othergovernments have agreed to protect individuals where
measures for determining refugee status is present.
Coast Guard crews are trained to identify these subtle cues and how to report the observations through theirchain of command. Reports received through the chainof command are referred to United States Citizenshipand Immigration Services for further review. This agency’s protective screening officers conduct at-sea screenings that determine whether the manifestation of fear iscredible. This credible fear screening is a basic inquiry

into their claim for consideration of further adjudication.
If the interview indicates the migrant will require further screening, the person is protected and referred fora well-founded fear interview. These cases are carefully
considered before a migrant is brought ashore for thisinterview because of the extensive time and resources
required.
The process for determining the location to which the
migrant will be taken, is adjudicated through an interagency decision-making process known as Maritime
Operational Threat Response (MOTR), and is facilitatedby the Global MOTR Coordination Center. This is a
result of Presidential Policy Directive 18, which directs
the United States to develop a systematic approach toaddressing a multitude of national security threats. 13
The Global MOTR Coordination Center is a DHS entity
within the United States Coast Guard charged withcoordinating MOTR activities according to the national
approved MOTR Plan, 14 and is accountable to the
National Security Council.
A protective screening officer is deployed to thecutter to conduct an at-sea screening to interview the
migrant to ascertain if the fear is due to a fear of persecution or torture if returned to their country or the country
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57For many, the scenario describedabove will be very familiar and takes
place in one of the many areas where theCoast Guard interdicts migrants attempting to illegally enter the United States bysea. From the Caribbean to Pacific, East
Coast to West, the Coast Guard accounts
for the majority of the total flow of
migrants interdicted while attempting toillegally enter the United States throughthe maritime domain. The remaining
migrants are interdicted or deterred bypartner nations or other United States
government and local agencies nearshore or on land. Through effective
interagency coordination and international partnership, the Coast Guard isequipped to carry out this important
humanitarian and border security misPetty Officer 3rd Class Jeffery Evans passes out water to Haitian migrants aboard the Coast Guard
Cutter Seneca in August 2017. Coast Guard photo by LCDR Krystyn Pecorasion. The Coast Guard stands ready topreserve the safety of all life at sea andto which they are to be repatriated.
the sovereign right to protect the United States’ border
The officer determines the woman’s claim is valid
from all maritime threats.
and requires a well-founded fear interview. The officer
About the authors:
reports the results of this interview to the Coast Guard’s
LT Nicholas Spence has served in the Coast Guard for more than
Office of Maritime Law Enforcement, which begins
17 years, including assignments at various law enforcement and searchcoordinating with the Global MOTR to chart a course of
and rescue units. He is currently assigned to the Office of Maritime Law
action to transfer the migrant to immigration officials on
Enforcement and advises on migrant interdiction and human trafficking
related policy.
Naval Station Guantanamo Bay for the interview. Afterextensive coordination, the migrant is transferred for her
CDR Patrick Culver is a career Coast Guard officer and is currently
well-founded fear interview. The remaining 89 migrants
serving as chief of the Interdiction Division of the Coast Guard’s Officeof Maritime Law Enforcement Interdiction Division. He has more thanare transferred to Dominican officials in the Dominican
three decades of service centered on drug and migrant interdictions at
Republic.
sea, search and rescue, and defense operations.
As a matter of national policy, asylum protection
is afforded at sea but the person is not granted accessEndnotes:
1.	The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982,
into the United States, as immigration laws do not apply
Article 110
extraterritorial. For this, cases requiring a well-founded
2.	The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982,
Article 98
fear interview occur at appropriate facilities on Naval
3.	The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982,
Station Guantanamo Bay. To bring migrants interdicted
Article 98 Title 46 USC 2304, Duty to provide assistance at sea, 1983
at sea ashore anywhere in the United States, or its ter4.	EO 12807, EO 13276, Proclamation 4865, Presidential Decision Directive 9,
Alien Smuggling, 18 June 1993
ritories, requires consultation with interagency partners
5.	11 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 721, Circular 175 Procedurethrough the MOTR process.
6.	United States Dominican Republic Bilateral Agreement, 20 May 2003
After being transferred ashore to Naval Station
7.	11 FAM 727 Transmission of International Agreements other than Treaties to
Guantanamo Bay, and following an initial rest period, theCongress: Compliance with the Case-Zablocki Act
8.	Resolution 2198, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and thewoman is interviewed by United States Citizenship and1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
Immigration Services who determine whether her fear
9.	Resolution 39/46, 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumanis legitimate and requires protection. It is determinedor Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 10 December 1984
10.	8 USC 1158, Asylum
that she meets requirements for asylum and the United
11.	Resolution 2198, 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and theStates is obligated under non-refoulement practices not
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 33
to return the individual to the country where they fear
12.	EO 13276 Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented AliensInterdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region, 19 November 2002
for their safety. Per national policy, 15 the Department
13.	Presidential Policy Directive 18, National Strategy for Maritime Security, 2012of State is required to work with international partners
14.	MOTR Plan
to accept refugees for permanent resettlement through15.	EO 13276 Delegation of Responsibilities Concerning Undocumented AliensInterdicted or Intercepted in the Caribbean Region, 19 November 2002
third country resettlement agreements.

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Rescuers and Risk

Managing risk while maintaining a bias for action
by CDR Kevin Saunders
Office of Maritime Security Response Policy
U.S. Coast Guard

LCDR Matthew Brinkley
Office of Counterterrorism and Defense Operations Policy
U.S. Coast GuardO

overcoming irregular and emerging threats, in order torganizations must learn to effectively navigate
empower responders to act and insulate them from therisk to survive, and the Coast Guard is no difparalysis of needing a perfect plan.
ferent. Leaders must understand, evaluate,
and mitigate risk to fully support stakeholders—the
American public—while ensuring mission success. OverRescuer Personality
a century ago, the modern day Coast Guard was formed
You have to go out … but you don’t have to come back.
Between World War II and the events of 9/11, thisby the combination of five organizations which, at theunofficial slogan of the Coast Guard defined the identitime, exposed the need for better regulation and standards to reduce the inherent risk associated with its misties of the brave men and women who chose to serve inthe organization. This motto, and the stories that broughtsions. Today, the service secures ports, waterways, andthese words to life, inspires thousands of high school
coastal infrastructure, while assisting thousands of people with search and rescue and law enforcement actions.
students searching for purpose in something bigger thanthemselves.
While these missions are carried out daily, familiarity
alone does not make this job any less dangerous. The
The Coast Guard attracts men and women who are
Coast Guard has always struggled to balance risk while
physically and physiologically equipped to accept selfrisk to help others. People in these types of rescuer
maintaining the high level of protection and regulation
careers usually possess similar traits or characteristhat the nation has come to expect of the service in the
post-9/11 era.
tics. When a group of people with similar values work
Members at all levels of the Coast
Guard may be predisposed to unconsciously interpret risk with an internalbias that manifests differently at various levels of the organization. As leaders balance risk, they must avoid falling
into the trap of letting personal bias
drive them to avoid risk or take excessive
risk. Just as operators continuously train
for greater challenges, second and thirdlevel supervisors must develop theirown risk-reduction mentality to view,accept, and mitigate risk. Leaders witha bias towards risk avoidance should
teach their people to evaluate and mitigate personal risk instead of sheltering
them from all risk and becoming risk
averse. This is the challenge of every
leader who truly cares for the men andwomen with whom they serve. The very
nature of the Coast Guard forces every
member of the organization to makedecisions with uncertain outcomes. It A Coast Guard helicopter lands on the capsized M/V Golden Ray in St. Simons Sound, off the coastof Brunswick, Georgia, to assist four crew members trapped inside the ship. The risk associated withis essential that leaders work to har- landing on the side of the M/V Golden Ray falls directly on the shoulders of the aircraft commander.
ness their bias and effectively lead in Photo taken by Bobby Haven/The Brunswick News
Spring 2020     Proceedings

59together, over time their views become institutionalized within the organization. Once this happens, they
can be exported back into an individual’s way of life,
shaping everything he or she does. For example, while
the phrase, “So that others may live,” may have been an
unofficial motto, these words were institutionalized as
the creed of the aviation rescue swimmer community
in 2014. This is an example of how the views of someindividuals within a community shaped the views ofcurrent and future members of the community. Once
ingrained into the organization, separating individuals’
values from the way they approach their role in the Coast
Guard is almost impossible. This is compounded if theindividual already possesses a rescuer personality or
the need to be needed. 1 Rescuer personality traits drive
an individual to discount risk to themselves when facedwith an opportunity to help or rescue an individual inneed. For people with this personality, helping others is
the primary purpose for living, outweighing the instinct
for self-preservation.
The desire to help and rescue others manifests
itself differently at various levels of the organization.
Individuals with a rescuer personality at the tacticallevels where service members are carrying out dangerous operations directly, will freely and enthusiastically

Coast Guard Station Seattle 45-foot response boat-medium conducts a highcapacity passenger vessel escort of a Washington State ferry. Escorts likethese deter and defeat vessels attempting to carry explosives to attack themaritime transportation system. Coast Guard photo

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

accept great risk to save lives and protect others.
Members with this personality at the strategic levels of
the organization, charged with overseeing operations
indirectly, may attempt to protect or shelter responders from harm. In an extreme instance, leaders withthe rescuer personality may prioritize the lives of thepersonnel in their command, and discount the need toprovide assistance to persons in peril. An organizationalrisk model that only looks at risks and risk mitigation
without evaluating the reward aspect of taking action
will discount the importance of the mission for safety. If
the importance of mission success is not properly evaluated, a well-intended rescuer at the strategic level of theorganization may make risk averse decisions in order toprotect subordinates, even if the subordinate does notobserve significant risk.
Rescuers at the strategic level of the organization canbecome fixated on decisions that occur in operations,
including outlining the flaws in a plan, or armchair
quarterbacking the decisions made by those in the field.
As a result, those directly engaged in operations may
begin to feel micromanaged and unsupported. People
with rescuer personality “develop a sense of morality
which defines ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ decisions that are
made. Then the rescuer attempts to stop every wrong
decision they can, believing that this method of micromanagement helps the other person learn healthier life
habits.” 2 However, the strategic-level rescuer that micromanages, projects their own perceptions on others in aneffort to correct behaviors that may not necessarily needcorrecting. One unintended consequence of this type of
micromanagement is the rescuer at the tactical end of
the mission developing a feeling of regret or guilt in not
being able to complete an operation in a way they findacceptable. In addition, restricting a tactical rescuer fromtaking action jeopardizes their feeling of self-worth, confidence, and contentment within the organization, negatively impacting future missions.
In times of immense need, the pull of the rescuer
personality at the tactical level will override personalsafety, laws, regulations, and the pleas of loved ones tobe more cautious. After the 9/11 attacks on New York
City, dozens of boats from the New York and New Jersey
area aided in the evacuation of victims. Many of these
responders believed another plane attack would occur.
Vincent Ardolino, captain of the commercial fishing vessel Amberjack V, described his decision-making process to
respond by stating “I have to go do something … I haveto do what I have to do and no one can stop me, even if
I save one person, that’s one person less that will suffer
and die.” 3 He viewed the decision to take action as ethical. “You forget all about what you are supposed to do,morally this is the right way to go and deep down this iswhat I am gonna do,” he said. 4 He is a textbook example

A Coast Guard crew approaches a cocaine-laden vessel destined for the United States. The Coast Guard works with interagency and international partners topatrol known transit zones to deter and disrupt trafficking of illegal drugs, dismantle transnational criminal organizations, and prevent transnational threats
from reaching the United States. Coast Guard photoof how the rescuer personality manifests in the mind of
a first responder. No amount of micromanagement or
supervisory intervention would deter him from taking
actions he thought would save lives even at great risk
to himself. Even more profound is that he was underno public obligation to assist as a commercial fisherman. Ardolino’s need to help was internally driven. In
an organization like the Coast Guard where there is astrong public expectation of action, a responder with amild rescuer personality could still easily ignore ordersof the chain of command to do what he or she thought
was right.

Aversion Effect

Averse means a strong feeling of dislike. In the caseof a senior member of an organization with a rescuer
personality, risking the lives of subordinates brings astrong feeling of dislike. Risk aversion can drive a feeling of uncertainty, cause hesitation, and generate a lesspredictable outcome to a response. Having an aversion
to something drives a lower expected outcome to theresult, and therefore makes an individual less likely toparticipate in action.
The idea of aversion has tilted the risk versus reward
debate of public servants. After the shooting in Parkland,
Florida, the on-scene commander told Broward County
Sheriff deputies not to enter Marjory Stoneman Douglas
High School while an active shooter was inside. 5 In
another example, first responders were directed by theirpolice inspector not to intervene to save a drowning
man because of lack of ‘significant training’ and lack offormal record proving their qualification to act in thisspecific scenario. “In cases where patrol officers did takeinitiative and resolved or attempted to resolve a situation prior to SWAT arrival, they were often chastised
and administratively punished for stepping outside
their role and training.” 6 Rescuers gain personal value
in the need to help others. That need to act far outweighs
the fear of litigation or worry of command disapproval.
“Under the current ethos, the natural human response—
to want to save a life—is being trumped by bureaucratic,
safety-obsessed procedures and box-ticking,” Universityof Kent sociology professor Frank Furedi writes in a
December 2018 Spiked-Online article. 7 Leaders of anorganization are increasingly forced to weigh politicaland organizational risk as well as the risk to responders. Furedi writes in that same article that, “society cannot expect its first responders to automatically intervenein every dangerous situation that confronts them. We
expect them to temper their sense of duty with professional judgement. But, regrettably, duty is increasingly
seen as an old-fashioned concept that needs to give way
to the technical ethos of risk-management.”
While these examples may seem exceptional, imagine encouraging a child to play his or her hardest on the
sports field, while at the same time chastising that samechild for every bruise or broken bone sustained in the
pursuit of a sports victory. While a parent may choose
to ignore the benefits of sports in order to avoid injury,
overly sheltering the child from danger may have otheradverse effects such as loss of confidence and sending amixed message. A person that has aversion will prefer
Spring 2020     Proceedings

61inaction to completing a task when significant risks exist.
Unfortunately, scenarios like this happen regularly, bothin parenting and directing Coast Guard missions. Evenin routine Coast Guard operations, there is anecdotal
evidence that some choose to ignore Coast Guard policy
and not conduct a security activity with mounted automatic weapons in the proper loading conditions. If thispractice is taking place, one logical justification a rescuer
personality would use is that carrying unloaded weapons protects responders from enduring the fallout of anegligent discharge. This discounts the risk to that boatcrew engaged in the security activity should the need torespond to a threat occur and there is no weapon available to disable that threat.
Risk aversion is not new. Recently, it has migrated
towards an idea that high consequence and low probability events are so unlikely that mitigating risk by abandoning mental and physical preparation for a responseis reasonable. In essence, risk mitigation is replaced withrisk avoidance. The success of risk avoidance is groundedin the hope that rescuers will never be required torespond to a real threat involving real risk. Instead ofbeing prepared to confidently say, “Not on my watch,”some rescuers choose to adopt the ethos, “Hopefully not
on my watch.” Hope is not an action.

merged to form the Coast Guard, recognized this when
he overhauled the “Revenue Marine and the hodgepodge system of lifesaving stations along the nation’s
coast.” 8 He created policies and regulations that standardized how stations would operate, including requiring drills and exercises still practiced today. While hedeliberately created a series of standards to reduce risk
during rescues, Kimball also proved he was not risk
averse by embracing the dramatic exploits of the LifeSaving Service. He hired a professional author to develop
annual reports to Congress that were captivating enoughto loosen purse strings. These finances created investments to the Life-Saving Service’s infrastructure which,in turn, provided for a better equipped, more capable,
and safer service.
Kimball was motivated to safely execute the missionsof the Revenue Marine Division and turn it into today’s
Coast Guard. He did this, not by avoiding risk, but byembracing risk and analyzing where response could bemade safer through training and standardization. It issafe to suspect he was, at least in part, influenced by theneedless loss of life that impacted everyone who lived
during the Civil War. Kimball had no desire to be a hero,but recognized that some situations called for men andwomen to take risk in the execution of missions thatmatter.
With the exception of political and personal risk,
Risk Management
There is a distinct difference between risk aversion andleaders at the strategic level of the organization, haverisk reduction. In order to mitigate risk, it must first be
probably lost their ability to accurately evaluate theembraced. Risk reduction thrives under a system of stanrisk responders in the field are oriented to navigate.
Instead, leadership is much better equipped to evaludardization. Sumner Kimball, the father of the United
ate the risk involved with their own performance, usuStates Life-Saving Service, one of the organizations thatally managing the event, rather
than the performance of theirsubordinates directly focusedon the operation. An analysis
of financial risk shows that it
is not “sufficient to have lived
in a different state of wealth in
the past, since the feeling thatthe previous conditions produced will be remembered so
imperfectly that it would not be
possible to develop the corresponding level of risk-aversion,even if the person wished to
do so.” 9 Assuming the process
for evaluating financial risk issimilar to that of evaluatingrisk of injury, it can be extrapolated that even if a supervisor
had experience conducting the
A crew member from Coast Guard Sector Boston patrols on a 45-foot response boat-medium in Boston Harbor
exact operation in the past, he orbehind a mounted automatic weapon. The tactical boat crews undergo training to reduce collateral damage ina confined waterway should they need to defeat a threat to the port. Coast Guard photoshe is still not truly equipped to62

Proceedings     Spring 2020

fully analyze the risk of a mission. Instead, leaders at the strategic levels of the organization
should focus on emphasizing
the strategic goals of the service, to save lives and stop thethreat. They should focus on
ways to ensure first responders
are “empowered through training, policy, and procedure.” 10
The operational level of theorganization is best suited todevelop the parameters on how
these goals are achieved. The
tactical level is best suited forevaluating, orienting, deciding
how to mitigate and assume
risk, and acting to accomplish Members from a Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment board a semi-submersible loaded with drugs in
the Caribbean Sea. Law enforcement teams balanced risk versus reward while attempting to stop the flow of
the mission as long as they illegal drugs into the United States. Vessels like this are sometimes scuttled by smugglers upon interdiction.
have learned to recognize and, Coast Guard photo
if necessary, restrain their biasthat are common and predictable for people with the rescuer personality.
to take unnecessary risk. Left to do what each level of
The aim of this article is to help readers recognize their potential bias so
the organization does best, the values of the service will
they will be more equipped to employ informed critical thinking of theirflourish.
personal decision-making process. This article may be controversial forConclusion

The traits associated with the rescuer personality exist at
all levels of the Coast Guard. If a supervisor does not recognize his or her bias to shelter subordinates from risk
by being overly risk averse, responders will not operate
at their highest potential. Tragically, that supervisor has
now allowed that responder to feel the regret of not rendering assistance to a person in need. Given the latitude,service members with the rescuer personality will go
above and beyond to help those in need. If a supervisor
has the rescuer personality, they can learn a lesson from
Sumner Kimball. First, they must be in the best position
to evaluate mission risk, regardless of their experience.
Second, they may recognize and possibly temper biasthat manifests as risk aversion or micromanagement.
Instead, they should focus on reducing risk before theincident occurs in order to avoid creating a climate ofcrisis paralysis at the tactical level of the response. Third,
they will best serve the public and their subordinates by
setting up strategic goals and permitting tactical levelsof the organization to operate with the full support ofthe chain of command. Lastly, in every situation theymust facilitate other members of the organization to dowhat they are naturally ingrained to do which is to help
themselves and the organization by helping others.
Note from the authors:
This article does not begin to examine all of the factors involved inrisk‑informed decision-making. Instead, it focuses specifically on biases

some readers but the intent was to spur internal reflection and group
discussion. Both writers recognize the irony of avoiding discussions
regarding this topic for risk of offending others.

About the Authors:
CDR Kevin Saunders currently serves as deputy of Maritime Security
and Response at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
LCDR Matthew Brinkley currently serves in Counterterrorism andIrregular Warfare Strategy and Policy division at Coast Guard Headquarters in Washington, D.C. He is a permanent Cutterman and a 2017
graduate of the U.S. Naval War College.
Endnotes:
1.	M athews, Andrea. The Rescuer Identity: Who is Really Saving Who?,
Psychology Today 21 April 2011, Accessed 7 May 2019. www.psychologytoday.
com/us/blog/traversing-the-inner-terrain/201104/the-rescuer-identity
2.	Lombardo, Crystal, Future of Working: The Leadership and Career Blog (blog).

Accessed 02 May 2019. https://futureofworking.com/explanation-of-therescuer-personality-type-and-disorder/

3.	Tom Hanks, Boatlift: An Untold Take of 9/11 Resilience, Documentary,

directed by Eddie Rosenstein (2011; New York: Eyepop Productions), Film

4. Ibid5.	Megan O’Matz, Tonya Alanez, and Stephen Hobbs, ‘Don’t go in,’ deputy

told cop responding to Parkland massacre.“ South Florida Sun Sentinel.
19 December 2018. Accessed 02 May 2019. www.sun-sentinel.com/local/broward/parkland/florida-school-shooting/fl-ne-police-statements-parkland20181219-story.html

6.	Blair, J. Pete, T. Nichols, D. Burns, J. Curnutt, Active Shooter Events andResponse. CRC Press. Boca Raton, FL, 2013, pg 7.

7.	F uredi,Frank, The Dangers of Safety-First Policing. Spiked- Online.
03 December 2018. Accessed 02 May 2019. w w w.spi ked- on l i ne.
com/2018/12/03/the-dangers-of-safety-first-policing/

8.	Dennis Noble, That Others Might Live: The U.S. Life-Saving Service, 1878–

1915 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1994

9. Ibid10.	Blair, J. Pete, T. Nichols, D. Burns, J. Curnutt, Active Shooter Events andResponse. CRC Press. Boca Raton, FL, 2013, pg 14.

Spring 2020     Proceedings

63

The Ultimate Multi-Tool
The National Strike Force’s history of
support to the Department of Defense
by CDR JoAnne Hanson
Interagency Coordination
Office of Marine Environmental Response Policy
U.S. Coast GuardA

nthrax and ricin and sarin, oh my! The National
Strike Force has responded to them all and manyother unique incidents. Working for and with avariety of Department of Defense entities, the National
Strike Force has a long, varied history of protecting thecitizens of the United States and the environment fromexposure to oil, chemical and biological agents, and hazardous materials.
The National Strike Force is comprised of approximately 140 active duty, 105 reserve, and 25 civilian
personnel. There are five operational elements of the
National Strike Force including three strike teams,
the Public Information Assist Team, and the IncidentManagement Assist Team. The command element, theNational Strike Force Coordination Center, is based in
Elizabeth City, North Carolina, which also has an important preparedness role as part of the larger, intergovernmental National Response System.

The Five Operational Elementsof the National Strike Force
Strike Teams• Atlantic Strike Team
• Gulf Strike Team• Pacific Strike Team

Fort Dix, New Jersey
Mobile, Alabama
Novato, California

Public Information
Assist Team

Elizabeth City, North Carolina

Incident Management
Assist Team

Norfolk, VA

A special team under the National Contingency Plan,
40 C.F.R.§ 300, the National Strike Force is one of the Coast
Guard’s deployable specialized forces. It was created in1973 by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, or the
Clean Water Act, to respond to large scale environmental threats from oil and hazardous substance incidents.

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

This special team is available to assist Coast Guard, Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department of
Defense on-scene coordinators in executing authorities
for spill preparedness and response, incident management, spill stabilization and containment, and contractor
monitoring and oversight during response operations.
With such a broad scope for response activities, theNational Strike Force supports on-scene coordinatorsand operational commanders responding to environmental threats anywhere.
Let’s start with an oil spill response, a traditional
Coast Guard mission. One of 11 statutory missions for
the Coast Guard, oil spill response is part of the marine
environmental protection mission. During the 2003
Operation Iraqi Freedom engagement, the Department of
Defense requested the National Strike Force pre-stage in
the Persian Gulf in preparation for military engagement.
Assigned to a Navy ship as subject matter experts toassist in oil spill response should Saddam Hussein blowup oil wells as he had during the first Persian Gulf War, adozen National Strike Force members coordinated with
the Navy supervisor of salvage in response preparations.
While there was no significant or deliberate discharge ofoil during this short conflict, the lessons learned fromthe first Persian Gulf War allowed for appropriate technical resources to be locally available to respond quickly.
In 2004, the National Strike Force responded to thericin incident on Capitol Hill. Quickly following the2001 anthrax incident, numerous protective actions
had been implemented that prevented wide-spreadcontamination of the ricin powder delivered via a letter to the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Working with
the Environmental Protection Agency and the Marine
Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force, theNational Strike Force completed widespread collectionof potentially contaminated materials from the building
and the technical decontamination of the affected offices.
The efficiency of the integrated response team ensured
that normal business operations resumed at the building
within one week of the reported contamination.

Does anyone recall the disabled spy
satellite that was inbound for collision
with Earth in early 2008? Operating
under the mission name Burnt Frost, theDepartment of Defense and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency coordinated on a robust response to thepredicted impact from the satellitethat was expected to scatter debris
over several hundred miles. Contained
within that debris was 1,000 pounds ofthe highly toxic fuel, hydrazine. The
National Strike Force worked closelywith Department of Defense counterparts to develop response plans andoutfit joint emergency response teams
in preparation to deploy wherever thesatellite fuel tank landed. This was a
massive planning effort as the locaMembers of the Atlantic Strike Team and the 1st Civil Support Team conduct an operations brieftion of the satellite’s potential landfall
aboard the ESS Pursuit, near New Bedford, Massachusetts, in June 2010. Coast Guard photo by Petty
was difficult to predict so multiple loca- Officer 2nd Class Lauren Jorgenson
tions were identified as staging areas.
International diplomacy was initiated to lay
the foundation for U.S. military personnel toenter foreign countries. The focus of the mission included both the minimization of publichealth and environmental impacts, but also
the retrieval of any parts of the satellite technology. Ultimately, none of the joint response
teams deployed as the Navy’s USS Lake Erie
used a missile to destroy the satellite and its
fuel tanks, ensuring that any pieces making
entry into the Earth’s atmosphere would be
too small to cause significant damage.
When the 2010 earthquake devastatedHaiti, the National Strike Force was called
upon to assist the Marine Transportation
System Recovery Unit in port assessmentsfor oil discharges and hazardous materi- Chief Petty Officer Bridgette Brown in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, during response to the Haiti
als releases. Embedding in support of the earthquake, in January 2010. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Brandon Blackwell
Department of Defense Southern Command
Joint Task Force-Haiti operation, members of the National Sector Honolulu learned the USS Chehalis, a sunken
Strike applied their technical expertise to assess all the
Navy Patapsco class gasoline tanker, was leaking small
major ports and facilities for pollution impacts, as wellquantities of oil, they relied on the National Strike Forceas reporting on infrastructure damage and supervisto provide technical expertise for the product offload ofing pipeline repairs. Furthermore, with resources being
the relic vessel. Chehalis suffered a catastrophic explodelivered to support relief efforts, National Strike Forcesion while off-loading gasoline at Pago Pago Harbor on
personnel provided safety oversight for the offload of the Island of Tutuila, American Samoa, in 1949. Whenessential petroleum cargo, including liquid petroleum
fire containment attempts failed, the ship was eventugas and jet fuel.
ally towed away from the fuel terminal and scuttled.
Aside from responding to oil spills and hazardous
After decades of sitting on the ocean floor, Associatedmaterials releases, the National Strike Force also has Underwater Services divers reported that Chehalis wascapabilities to conduct salvage operations in conjunction
leaking small quantities of oil. Observations of Chehalis’with mitigating pollution threats. When Coast Guard
cargo tanks revealed empty tanks with an absence ofSpring 2020     Proceedings65

of both Coast Guard and Department of
Defense response entities.
The most recent and complex operation the National Strike Force supported
was the 2014 United Nations Security
Council Resolution 2118 calling for the
expeditious destruction of the chemical
weapons program in the Syrian Arab
Republic. The strike force was requested
to deploy internationally in support of
U.S. Naval Forces Europe Command andin coordination with the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
and the United Nation’s Joint Mission.
The National Strike Force’s role was toprovide a contingency hazardous materials response capability during the transCoast Guard National Strike Force members, with support from Coast Guard Cutter Healy deckload of chemical warfare agents from thecrew members, hoist a self-propelled Arctic oil skimmer after an initial test in the Bering Sea.
Danish vessel M/V Ark Futura to the U.S.
Coast Guard photo by Senior Chief Petty Officer Rachel Polish
Maritime Administration vessel M/VCape Ray at the Port of Gioia Tauro, Italy. During themarine growth on the tank walls. This was a strong indiat-sea neutralization of chemical agents, the team thencator that fuel was present in the tanks well after Chehalis
moved from Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy, to Navalsank, but that it eventually leaked from the tanks into the
Air Station Souda Bay, Greece. This operation spanned
harbor environment. It is estimated that up to 100,000
six months, involved months of planning and coordinagallons of fuel had leaked from Chehalis in years leadtion to integrate into the Department of Defense mission,ing up to this 2010 response. Working with Navy divers,and established logistics reach-back for such a prolonged
the National Strike Force recovered approximately 1,000
overseas operation. The lessons learned from planninggallons of diesel fuel and more than 55,000 gallons of
the response evolutions necessary to transport people
aviation gasoline, minimizing the potential for futureand equipment to the M/V Cape Ray helped bolster
marine environment contamination from this historic
National Strike Force policy and operational doctrine
vessel.
for response to offshore threats in U.S. waters.
In a rather unique incident, the National Strike ForceThe National Strike Force is truly a multi-tool in thereceived a request from Coast Guard Sector Southeastern
giant federal response capabilities toolbox. Its personnel
New England for assistance with the clam fishing vessel
are trained and equipped to serve as technical advisors
ESS Pursuit. The vessel had hauled in several militaryor responders to a wide spectrum of threats against themunitions containing mustard gas mixed in with its
homeland. While the legacy of the National Strike Forcecatch off the coast of Long Island. One of these munirests in its marine environmental response mission, ittions released its contents on the deck, contaminating
has evolved over the last four decades to address an ever
one deck hand and 500,000 pounds of freshly caughtchanging landscape of potential threats to the environclams. In conjunction with the 1st Civil Support Team,ment and our nation’s citizens. This short summary of
a National Guard weapons of mass destruction special
cases related only to their work in conjunction with theteam, the National Strike Force conducted decontaminaDepartment of Defense highlights the operational divertion procedures, air monitoring, and safety oversight forsity of this small element of the Coast Guard’s marine
the recovery and packaging of the munitions.
environmental response mission. It’s reinforced by the
The National Strike Force has frequently responded
National Strike Force motto: Any Time, Any Place, Any
and trained with the 55 civil support teams across theHazard.
nation to enhance interoperability and mission effectiveness. These exercises are often complex, multiagency
evolutions involving other federal agencies, like the
About the Author:
Federal Bureau of Investigation and Customs and Border
CDR JoAnne Hanson was privileged to serve 16 years with the National
Protection. Whether exercising capabilities to mitigate
Strike Force (NSF). She has served at all three strike teams and in thethreats from a radiological device in a shipping container
NSF Coordination Center as operations officer, executive officer, andor containing a potential bioweapon in a railcar, these
deputy commander of the NSF. Her experience culminated with her serscenarios test the responsiveness and interoperability
vice as commanding officer of the Gulf Strike Team.

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

National Security Cutter
Conducts National
Defense Mission
by CAPT John J. Driscoll
Commanding Officer, U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf
U.S. Coast GuardF

rom January to July 2019 Coast Guard Cutter
Bertholf deployed on a Western Pacific patrol
under operational control of the Navy’s Seventh
Fleet and tactical control of Task Force 70. As we prepared for the deployment, I frequently heard people say,“That’s not a Coast Guard mission,” or “How is that thecoast of the United States?” Those comments came fromthe public, from family members, and even members of
the Coast Guard—including cuttermen. The reality isthat our deployment was squarely a Coast Guard mission—defense readiness. While not sailing off the U.S.
coastline, we were most certainly conducting a national
defense mission that defended the United States and our
global national security interests, including maritime
security, while strengthening relationships.
Bertholf’s Western Pacific deployment had three main
objectives:• enforce sanctions imposed by United Nations
Security Council Resolution against the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North
Korea) limiting the importation of oil• work with regional navies and coast
guards to reinforce partnerships,
share our experiences, and assist
in developing and expanding coast
guards• demonstrate professional adherence
to international law and rules of
behavior in the face of great powercompetitors

circumvented the sanctions. We clearly demonstrated
the complementary relationship between the Navy andCoast Guard in conducting national defense missions.
Tactics used for decades by cuttermen to locate and interdict vessels involved in drug smuggling were put into
service as Bertholf provided surveillance and tracking of,as well as evidence collection from, vessels involved in illicit ship-to-ship transfers of oil destined for North Korea.
While any Coast Guard cutter could conduct someof these missions, National Security Cutters are ideally equipped to do so. Unlike other classes of cutters
equipped with SeaWatch, National Security Cutters(NSC) are equipped with the SeaCommander combat system which is very similar to the Navy’s AEGIS
Weapon System. SeaCommander allowed Bertholf tointegrate with the Navy and Air Force for maximum
effect while operating throughout the Western Pacific.
This was especially critical during enforcement operations in support of the United Nations Security Council
Resolutions against North Korea.

Enforcing Sanctions

Bertholf and our Navy counterparts sailed theEast China and Yellow seas alongside ships
from the navies and coast guards of Japan,
Korea, United Kingdom, Australia, andCanada. Our unique Coast Guard experience
conducting counter drug operations wasincredibly useful as the international community worked to eliminate networks that

CDR Robert Hill, left, executive officer of Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf, joins CAPT John J.
Driscoll, commanding officer, for evening colors during a reception for dignitaries, including
Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro L. Locsin, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Sung
Kim, and senior commanders of the Philippine Coast Guard, on the Bertholf flight deck in
Manila, Philippines on May 16, 2019. Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer John Masson

Spring 2020     Proceedings

67Building Connections

CAPT John J. Driscoll, foreground, commanding officer of Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf, conducts a tourof the ship’s bridge with senior Philippine and American officials, including Adm. Elson E. Hermogino,commandant of the Philippine Coast Guard, far left; Philippine Foreign Secretary Teodoro L. Locsin,Jr., center; and U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines Sung Kim, to Driscoll’s right, during a reception in
Manila, Philippines, on May 16, 2019. Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer John Masson

Bertholf conducted engagementswith the Republic of Korea (South
Korea) Navy and the coast guards ofJapan, Korea, and the Philippines. We
shared techniques and best practices
in the areas of search and rescue, law
enforcement, damage control, seamanship, small boat operations, andhelicopter rescues allowing Bertholf
to rekindle long-standing friendships
and professional relationships with
our partners. Upon arriving in Manila,
Philippines, Bertholf was greeted by anhonor formation of Philippine Coast
Guardsmen, standing at present arms,
while a Philippine military bandplayed Semper Paratus. Bertholf reinforced the techniques and procedures
Philippine Coast Guard personnel arebeing taught in Yorktown and at the
Coast Guard Academy, while learning
the challenges that the service faces
when enforcing sovereignty aroundthe Philippines.
Liberty was part of our crew’s mission during the deployment. Whilein Yokosuka and Sasebo, Japan, Jeju
and Busan, South Korea, Hong Kong,
Singapore, and Manila, the crew wasencouraged to disembark, explore,
and meet local populations while
the American flag flew proudly from
Bertholf’s flagstaff in the harbor. Whilecuttermen sometimes view port calls
solely through a logistics lens as places
to get food and fuel, showing the flagand demonstrating our core values tothe public is strategically important
to ensuring access to these foreign
ports. Our crew was up to the task andenjoyed meeting new people, shopping, and eating amazing food.

Modeling Professionalism

A crew member steps aboard Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf from the ship’s 26-foot Mark IV over-thehorizon boat as the ship gets underway to resume its Western Pacific patrol on May 7, 2019. Coast
Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer John Masson

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Proceedings     Spring 2020

One of the most important aspects ofour deployment was demonstrating
professionalism at sea. The East andSouth China Seas are filled with examples of territorial disputes between multiple countries. Wild interpretations ofinternational law frequently turn into
confrontations between regional andChinese coast guards. While regional

navies communicate using theCode for Unplanned Encounters at
Sea (CUES), adopted in 2014 by theWestern Pacific Naval Forum, coast
guards don’t have such an agreement and frequently risk escalation
when vessel actions are mistaken
or miscalculated. Unfortunately,
Bertholf experienced this on a daily
basis in dealing with Chinese coast
guard shadow vessels.
Luckily, Bertholf was in a uniqueposition as both a Coast Guard cutter and warship of the United States.
We were able to follow CUES when
dealing with ships of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army Navy andapply those same tenants with shipsof the China Coast Guard. By definition, in the Convention on the Law Philippine and U.S. Coast Guard members trained together on small boat tactics, damage control, andsearch and rescue skills, enhancing one of the most enduring partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region asof the Sea, warship means:
Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf continued its deployment under the tactical control of the Navy’s 7th Fleet.
… a ship belonging to the armed Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer John Masson
forces of a State bearing the external,
distinguishing marks of its nationality, under the command of an officer;
duly commissioned by the government of the State and whose nameappears in the appropriate service
list or its equivalent, and manned bya crew which is under regular armed
forces discipline.
By serving as both a Coast Guard
cutter and a warship, Bertholf wasable to bring the tenants of CUES toour communications with the China
Coast Guard—something regional
coast guards are frequently unable
to do.
On March 24, 2019, Bertholf and
USS Curtis Wilbur conducted a transit of the Taiwan Strait. The transit
was conducted entirely in inter- Members of Maritime Security Response Team West exercise with sidearms and rifles from the flight decknational waters despite claims by of Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf. Coast Guard photo by Chief Petty Officer John Masson
China that the area is Chinese territory. Our presence reemphasized that the United States
ensure maritime security. Bertholf was able to use thosewill fly, sail, and operate anywhere international law
relationships to enhance our strategic position in theallows.
Western Pacific in ways no naval ship could.
Could these missions have been conducted by a Navy
ship? Perhaps. But if so, only partially. As a national
About the author
CAPT John J. Driscoll has spent 12 years at sea and conductedsecurity cutter, Bertholf has capabilities that complement­counterdrug, fisheries, and migrant interdiction operations. He has also
the Navy. We can integrate seamlessly into naval anddeployed to the Arabian Gulf and Africa. This deployment on Bertholf
joint operations, but bring experience from years of conto the Western Pacific has been the most strategically significant of his
ducting other missions. Additionally, Coast Guard has
career, and made direct improvements to global maritime security andthe national security of the United States.
built relationships with coast guards around the globe toSpring 2020     Proceedings

69

Historical Snapshot
The Flying Santaby William H. Thiesen, Ph.D.
Historian, Atlantic Area
U.S. Coast Guard

T

hroughout the history of Coast Guard aviation,
helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft have beenused to aid members of the general public orother federal agencies during emergencies and in times of need. However, theholidays have provided a unique opportunity for private citizens to return thefavor. In 1929, the first year of the Great
Depression, aviation pioneer Captain
William Wincapaw began the tradition
of “The Flying Santa.” Also known as the“Santa of the Lighthouses,” Wincapaw
over­saw flying operations for the Curtiss
Flying Service at Rockland, Maine. He had
a great deal of admiration for lighthouse
keepers and their families, who served inisolated and inhospitable locations. On themorning of December 25, 1929, Wincapaw
loaded his aircraft with a dozen packagesof Christmas gifts and delivered them toa number of local lighthouses.
By 1933, the Flying Santa program wasso well received that Wincapaw expanded
it to include 91 lighthouses throughout
Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, andConnecticut. Wincapaw began to dress as

Edward Rowe Snow in 1939 during a Flying Santa flight.
Photo courtesy of Friends of Flying Santa70

Proceedings     Spring 2020

Santa and he enlisted his son, Bill Jr., to help pilot someof the flights. In the late 1930s, the program continued
to expand requiring the services of a third Santa, famed

Santa drops presents from a helicopter at Boston Light in 1946. Photo courtesy of Friends of
Flying Santa

New England maritime historian Edward Rowe Snow. Despite
sporadic deliveries during WorldWar II, the program expanded to
115 lighthouses requiring corporate sponsorship from locallybased Wiggins Airways. And, in
1946, the Flying Santa Program
also began to embrace the latest
technology using a helicopter toassist in lighthouse deliveries.
In 1947, founder Captain
Wincapaw suffered a heart attack during a summer flight outof Rockland. A memorial service
held in Rockland was attended
by numerous lighthouse keepers, their families, and representatives of the Coast Guard,
Army, and Navy. Edward Rowe
Snow took over the Flying Santa
Program after Wincapaw’s passing and, with the support of his
family and some dedicated pilots, he expanded it to include
nearly 180 lighthouses. In certain
years, the program even served
lighthouses on the West Coastand Sable Island off of Nova
Scotia.
Snow continued the tradition until 1981, when healthissues prevented him from participating in any further Flying
Santa missions. The mantle of
the Flying Santa was passed toanother pilot, despite the automation of lighthouses in 1987.
Ninety years since its founding
by Captain Wincapaw, the tradition continues with the supportof the non-profit organization
Friends of Flying Santa. Today,
the program delivers gifts toabout 1,200 Coast Guard kids at
more than 100 Coast Guard units Coast Guard members and their families attend a Friends of Flying Santa event at Warwick Lighthouse, Rhodewith the help of four Flying Santas: Island, in 2015. Coast Guard photo by Petty Officer 3rd Class Andrew Barresi
Retired CWO Guthlien, Retired
Program in Maritime History, and a Ph.D. from University of Delaware’s
Senior Chief Dave Considine, Chief Petty Officer Bill
Hagley Program in the History of Technology. His books include IndusDonahue, and CWO John Roberts.
About the author:
William Thiesen, Ph.D., is the Atlantic Area historian for the UnitedStates Coast Guard. He earned an M.A. from East Carolina University’s

trializing American Shipbuilding: The Transformation of Ship Design
and Construction, 1820–1920 and Cruise of the Dashing Wave: Rounding Cape Horn in 1860. His articles appear frequently in naval, maritime, and Coast Guard publications and the online history series, The
Long Blue Line, featured weekly on the Coast Guard Compass web site.

Spring 2020     Proceedings

71Chemical of the Quarter
Understanding Hydrogen
by Cynthia Znati, Ph.D.
Hazardous Materials Division
U.S. Coast Guard Office of Design and Engineering Standards

What is it?

Hydrogen, the first element of the periodic table, is thesmallest, lightest—almost 15 times lighter than air—and
most abundant element, comprising approximately 75 percent of the universe’s mass. It forms a stable, diatomic molecule (H2), which is a gas at ambient conditions, and has awide flammability range of 4 percent to 75 percent with a
low ignition energy. It also burns with a pale blue, almost
invisible, flame.
Hydrogen is widely used in industry. For example, inthe chemical process industry it is used in the productionof ammonia, pharmaceuticals, plastics, and intermediates
for other products. It is also used in refining petroleum
products and as a reducing agent for organic syntheses
and metallic ores. The glass and electronics industries use
it to manufacture flat glass sheets and in the productionof silicon chips, respectively. Even the food industry findshydrogen valuable, using it to hydrogenate oils into fats
like margarine.
Hydrogen has long been used as a rocket fuel, but it
is increasingly being used in fuel cells, which are electrochemical devices, similar to batteries, that produce energy
from a fuel and an oxidant. Unlike batteries, the fuel forfuel cells is external to the cell, so its lifespan is much longer
than batteries. They also cannot “die” like batteries. Most
fuel cells combine hydrogen fuel with oxygen from the
air to produce energy, with the only product being water.
They can provide power for nearly any application thatuses batteries, from cellular phones to generators, as wellas any place where electric power is required, including
backup power, portable power, material handling equipment, mobile lighting, and even vehicles. Fuel cells thatare used in electric vehicles have the advantage of refueling with hydrogen unlike batteries that need recharging
with electricity. Hydrogen fuel cells using liquid hydrogen(LH2) as the fuel have recently been proposed as a powersource for marine vessels.

Why should I care?

➤ Shipping Concerns:
At atmospheric pressure and temperature, hydrogen exists
as a gas. It can be liquefied to reduce its volume by a ratio of
800 to 1. In order to liquefy hydrogen, the temperature must
be reduced to -253°C (20 K). Hydrogen readily reacts withmany metallic surfaces in a phenomenon called hydrogen
embrittlement. This process results in the material becoming very brittle and prone to failure. The extreme low temperature of LH2 can exacerbate this situation and increase

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Proceedings     Spring 2020the likelihood of material failure. Additionally, because of
its small size, hydrogen is known to be difficult to containwithout leaks. Poor welds or fittings and cracks can provide
locations for hydrogen to escape. With its large flammability
range and low ignition energy, this is a concern when transporting LH2 as a fuel or cargo.
➤ Health and Environmental Concerns:
Hydrogen is non-toxic, colorless, and odorless, but still posesa significant safety concern because of its significant flammability range and low ignition energy. Special equipment andprecautions must be taken when handling or using hydrogen because it can displace oxygen, causing asphyxiation.
Specialized gloves and other personal protective equipment
must be worn when handling liquid hydrogen because directcontact with skin will cause frostbite.
Hydrogen is not a greenhouse gas and will not trap heatin the atmosphere. Since it is less dense than air, most hydrogen released will rise quickly and be lost to space. In fact, thiselement plays a role in reducing our fossil fuel dependence.
While much hydrogen today is generated from fossil fuels,
it can be generated from water through electrolysis using
renewable energy such as solar power.

What is the Coast Guard doing about it?

The Coast Guard Office of Design and Engineering Standards(CG-ENG) is responsible for the evaluation of hydrogen as acargo and fuel. It currently is designated as a cargo that is too
hazardous for bulk carriage, though it may be transported
in containers in accordance with the Hazardous Materials
Regulations in Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
Hydrogen is not an approved fuel for use in marine vessels,
but CG-ENG may give approval for specific designs on acase-by-case basis.
About the author:
Cynthia Znati, Ph.D., who has worked for the Coast Guard since 2011, is
the team lead for Liquefied Gases and Vapor Control Systems in the Hazardous Materials Division of the Office of Design and Engineering Standards
at U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters. She received her B.S. from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, her M.S. from Michigan State University, and her Ph.D. from Carnegie Mellon University, all in chemicalengineering. This office may be contacted at hazmatstandards@uscg.mil
References:
Royal Society of Chemistry. www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/1/hydrogen.
Visited 05 July 2019.
PubChem, U.S. National Library of Medicine. https://pubchem.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
compound/Hydrogen. Visited 05 July 2019.
Klebonoff, L.E., Pratt, J.W., LaFluer, C.B., International Journal of Hydrogen Energy,
42: 757–774, 2017

Nautical
NauticalEngineering
Engineering
Queries
QueriesQ

uestions

Prepared by NMC Engineering
Examination Team

1. What device can be used to check the calibration of a circuit breaker?
A. 500 volt megohmmeter
B. Portable low voltage, high current testing unit
C. Standard digital multimeter
D. Clamp-on voltmeter
2.	When a high pressure turbine is operating at sea speed, the pressure of the steam leaking through the shaft
gland may be slightly higher than the pressure setting of the gland seal regulator. In this situation, the excess.
steam at the regulator is directed to theA. gland exhaust condenser
B. excess steam condenser
C. main condenser
D. auxiliary exhaust system
3.	Biasing, in a pneumatic automated combustion control system, refers to a set amount of increase or decrease inthe.
A. control pressure
B. loading pressure
C. supply pressure
D. rate relay pressure
4. The hunting of a diesel engine may be caused by.

A. excessive speed droop
B. fluctuations in load
C. excessive governor control
D. poor quality fuelSpring 2020     Proceedings

73

A

Engineering
nswers1. A. 500 volt megohmmeter
B. Portable low voltage,high current testingunit
C. Standard digital
multimeter
D. Clamp-on voltmeter

Incorrect answer
Correct answer. “Portable self-contained breaker testing units complete with a highcurrent power source, ammeter, and timer are available and are very useful in maintenance programs.”
Incorrect answer
Incorrect answer

Reference: Operation, Testing and Preventative Maintenance of Electrical Power Apparatus, Hubert p 643

2. A. Gland exhaust
Incorrect answer
condenser
B. Excess steam condenser Incorrect answer
C. Main Condenser
Correct answer. “At approximately 20 knots, the pressure in the high pressure turbine
becomes high enough so that the forward gland no longer needs sealing steam. The
excess steam is then led to a header and helps to seal the low pressure glands. Any
excess team is led to the main condenser.”
D. Auxiliary exhaust
Incorrect answer
systemReference: MEBA, Vol. 1, Modern Marine Engineering, Dist. 1; page 65

3. A. Control pressure
B. Loading pressure

C. Supply pressure
D. Rate relay pressure

Incorrect answer
Correct answer. “When the station is set for manual control, the loading pressure
from the Signal Selector Relay is interrupted at the Transfer Valve, and a substituteloading pressure for the operation of the Control Valve, is established through manualadjustment of the handwheel of the Bias Amplifier (Relay Sender).”
Incorrect answer
Incorrect answer

Reference: NAVPERS 10537, Boilermaker 1 & C, page 391

4. A. Excessive speed droop
B. Fluctuations in load
C. Excessive governor
control
D. Poor quality fuelIncorrect answer
Incorrect answer
Correct answer. “Hunting is the continuous fluctuation (slowing down and speedingup) of engine speed from the desired speed. Hunting is caused by over control by thegovernor.”
Incorrect answer

Reference: NAVEDTRA 14331, Engineman 3, page 9–29

74

Proceedings     Spring 2020

Q

NauticalNautical

Deck
Deck
Queries
Queriesuestions

Prepared by NMC Engineering
Examination Team

1.	INTERNATIONAL ONLY: In a narrow channel, a vessel trying to overtake another on the other vessel’s portside, would sound which whistle signal?
A. One short blast
B. Two short blasts
C. Two prolonged blasts followed by one short blast
D. Two prolonged blasts followed by two short blasts
2.	Which is TRUE when “checking down” a barge using a check line?
A. Take one round turn and at least two figure eights around the timber heads
B. Take at least three figure eights around the timber heads
C. Put a clove hitch around one timber head
D. Take at least three round turns around one timber head
3. You must shore up the collision bulkhead due to solid flooding forward. The bulkhead approximates aninverted triangle. Where should the center of pressure of the shores on the bulkhead be located?
A. Evenly over the surface of the bulkhead
B. Approximately two-thirds of the way up the bulkhead
C. Approximately halfway up the bulkhead
D. At the bottom of the bulkhead
4.	Which type of cloud is among the most dependable for giving an indication of an approaching weather system?
A. Cumulus
B. Altostratus
C. Cumulostratus
D. Nimbus

Spring 2020     Proceedings

75

A

Deck
nswers1. A. One short blast
B. Two short blasts
C. Two prolonged blasts
followed by one short blast
D. Two prolonged blasts
followed by two short blasts

Incorrect answer
Incorrect answer
Incorrect answer
Correct answer. “… a vessel intending to overtake another shall, in compliancewith Rule 9(e)(i), indicate her intention by the following signals on her whistle:
two prolonged blasts followed by two short blasts to mean ‘I intend to overtakeyou on your port side.”

Reference: International Rule 9(e)(i) and 34(c)(i)2. A. Take one round turn andat least two figure eights
around the timber heads
B. Take at least threefigure eights aroundthe timber heads
C. Put a clove hitch around
one timber head
D. Take at least three roundturns around one timber
head

Reference: Deckhand Manual, Finefield

3. A. Evenly over the surface ofthe bulkhead
B. Approximately two-thirdsof the way up the bulkhead
C. Approximately halfway up
the bulkhead

D. At the bottom of thebulkhead

Incorrect answer
Incorrect answer
Incorrect answer
Correct answer. Taking at least three turns around one timber head gives enoughfriction to check the barge or slack away the line if needed without jamming(fouling).

Incorrect answer
Incorrect answer
Correct answer. Placement of the shoring is critical when the vessel is in a damaged condition. Calculations of the area’s pressure points are needed to properly place the shoring. For a triangular bulkhead the following formula can beutilized.
Whereas:H = Vertical height of compartment.
H/2 = Pressure Point (location of shoring)
Incorrect answer

Reference: Seamanship Techniques, D. House, Volume 2, 1st Ed.

4. A. Cumulus
B. Altostratus

C. Cumulostratus
D. Nimbus

Incorrect answer
Correct answer. “They are indicative of warm air flowing up over colder air and
impending rain or snow of the continuous type.” To the seafarer their appearance
means approaching rain or snow with poor visibility, large waves, and heavy
swell.
Incorrect answer
Incorrect answer

Reference: Weather for the Mariner, Kotsch, 3rd Ed

76

Proceedings     Spring 2020

We’re In This Together
More COVID-19 response

Inside front cover: Escorted by the Coast Guard and New York Police and Fire departments, the USNS Comfort arrives in New York Harbor on March 30,
2020. New York City’s Javits Center was transformed into a coordination hub, where Coast Guard Commanders Brett R. Workman and Rebecca Albert
served as liaisons transferring patients from hospitals to USNS Comfort. Page 1: At his home on Joint Base Perarl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii, Chief Petty
Officer Bob McCormick makes face shields for local first responders, while Coast Guardsman from District 14 assisted the Salvation Army on Ohahu
in bagging food provided by the Hawaii FoodBank. Bob Emami and Barry Redmayne, Coast Guard Auxiliary Air pilots transported COVID-19 supplies
from the Maui Airport Fire Station to personnel at Lanai Airport for use by airport staff. On Coast Guard Base Alameda, California, Coast Guradsmen
participated in a blood drive as a way to make a difference during the COVID-19 crisis. Above: As part of a joint effort with the Air Force and FEMA, a
Coast Guard Air Station Barbers Point HC-130 Hercules aircrew conducts a preflight brief April 1, 2020, before taking off from Oahu, Hawaii, to deliver
medical supplies to American Samoa. Across the top of all three pages: A transmission electron microscopic image of an isolate from the first U.S. caseof COVID-19. Coast Guard, Navy, CDC, and courtesy photos

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Official Business
Penalty for Private Use, $300

The crew of Coast Guard
Cutter Midgett man the rails
during a commissioning
ceremony for Midgett
and Coast Guard Cutter
Kimball at Coast Guard Base
Honolulu on August 24,
2019. Coast Guard photoby Petty Officer 3rd Class
Matthew West