History of Global Arms Transfer, 5 (2018), pp. 3-18

British Tank Production and the War
Economy, 1934–1945:
Important Considerations for Industry†
By BENJAMIN COOMBS
Abstract
This article illustrates that the production of tanks by British industry during theSecond World War provides important considerations for peacetime industry to
produce heavy and complex machines on a commercially successful andsustainable basis. Notably, delays and shortages in material components must be
minimized to avoid interrupting the rate of output. Spare parts have to beavailable in sufficient quantities to ensure continued performance once theequipment has left the factory and similarly the inspection regime on theassembly line has to be adequate to maintain the highest level of build quality.
The continued production of older equipment may be necessary to avoid inactive
workers and every effort should be made to ensure that the production process
benefits from as much standardization, specialization and simplification as
possible. Finally, there are significant risks of becoming too reliant upon
production from overseas sources. This article discusses these considerations withcase examples from the wartime period by using untapped information held
within the archives of industry alongside the more traditional sources available innational repositories. Overall this analysis shows that the British process ofmanufacturing tanks under wartime conditions was not that different from theexperiences of other Western Allies.

Introduction
The involvement of British industry in the production of tanks during the Second WorldWar has been ignored by historians. There is a sizeable amount of evidence available within
the archives of industry to highlight the experience of the different firms involved in thedesign and production of these very complex and heavy pieces of military equipment. To
illustrate the importance of why the tank industry during this conflict should be examinedis shown in Table 1 for the comparative output between Great Britain, Germany and theUnited States. It is clear from the sizable number of tanks delivered by each combatant that
production would have required a great deal of centralized organization, industrial
planning, labour and material resources.

† A version of this paper was given to members of the Research Institute for the History of Global Arms
Transfer, Meiji University, Tokyo, 8 March 2017. Coombs, British Tank Production.

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BENJAMIN COOMBS
Table 1. Tank output in Britain, Germany and the United States, 1940 to 1945
Year

BritainGermany

USA

1940

1,379

1,139

331

1941

4,837

2,373

4,052

1942

8,622

2,159

24,997

1943

7,217

7,552

29,497

1944

4,000

7,903

17,565

1945

964

924

11,968

Total

27,01922,05088,410Sources: TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries of Infantry and Cruiser Tanks by Firms, 1939–1943’, draft
official history narrative by D. Hay, after 1950, pp. 269–71; CAB 120/355, ‘A.F.V. Production’, 1943; CAB
120/356, ‘A.F.V. Production’, 1944–5; Thomson and Mayo, United States Army, p. 263; Ness, Jane’ s WorldWar II Tanks, pp. 86–8 & 187.

It has been well established that British tanks during much of the war were troubled byissues of being unreliable or having inadequate firepower and being unsuitable for‘Blitzkrieg’ style warfare. Many of these published arguments have come from a generally
negative attitude towards the British experience in producing tanks and based upon limited
research carried out in The National Archives in Kew and the Tank Museum in Bovington.1
Academics have provided a more positive account of the British tank programme byidentifying that British tank designs became more reliable and effective later in the war.2
There is still the need however to highlight how this was achieved from an industrial
perspective within the context of political and strategic pressures together and international
comparisons.
The issues of tank design since their inception just over 100 years ago to modern day
have needed to find the required balance between the three key areas of firepower, armour
protection and mobility. First, the level of firepower from the main gun is limited by thesize of the tank. Second, the size of the tank affects the amount of armour protection as thiswill impact upon the maximum weight of the tank. Third, the weight of the tank determines
the mobility and speed of the tank from the most powerful engine available at the time.
Essentially, British industry had to overcome the issues of design, development andproduction to meet the objectives of the military which adapted to the changing strategic
situation to demand greater mobility for fast moving offensive action overseas. The
experience of British industry during the war has identified a number of key considerations
which arguably remain just as important during peacetime when dealing with the
production of complicated machines on a mass produced basis. These considerations canbe illustrated by a number of examples drawn from the experience of the British tank firms
for each case, together with important comparisons from the industries of the United States
and Canada.

1 Fletcher, Great Tank Scandal; Fletcher, Universal Tank; Beale, Death by Design.
2 Buckley, British Armour; Peden, Arms.

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British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945

I
The first such consideration is how the ability of industry to commence production andthen maintain the required rate of output will be affected by delays and shortages in the
supply of labour and material components used on the assembly line.
By means of an example, during September 1939 commercial vehicle firm Leyland
Motors received an order to produce 151 new Covenanter tanks which was later increasedin June 1940 to 251 tanks. The schedule for this order expected the first tank to becompleted in July 1940 and final tank would be delivered 12 months later during July
1941.3 The Covenanter was not a successful tank and despite a total of 1,770 rolling off theassembly line, they were deemed unbattleworthy and not sent to the front line.4 For Leyland
Motors, the combination of delays in the construction of the new factory, problems with the
supply of labour and components such as armour plate, and the effects of German bombing
meant that delivery of the first tank was five months late in December 1940. The continuing
irregular interruptions in the supply of assembly components meant that tank number 251
was not delivered until February 1942 and now seven months after the July 1941 due date.5
By comparison, early tank production by the Montreal Locomotive Works in Canada wasdelayed for two months from June to August 1941 due shortages in the supply oftransmissions. 6 The start of Valentine production by the Canadian Pacific Railway
Company was similarly delayed by three months from February to May 1941 due toshortages in components, labour and time consuming production techniques with handtools and paint brushes.7 As a result of these on-going assembly delays the total number ofcompleted Valentine tanks in Canada was limited to just 30 from an expected 105 tanks
between May and September 1941.8
One way in which the problems of labour supply were overcome was by the transfer ofworkers from one firm to another. This occurred during a slowdown in production whenolder tanks were being phased out to make way for the latest design. As shown in Figure 1
this was demonstrated to good effect from December 1942 when Ruston & Hornsby
transferred workers at the end of their Matilda production to help increase the productionof Crusader tanks at Ruston–Bucyrus. The loaned workers were returned to Ruston &Hornsby in February 1943 to start production on the new Cavalier tank.9

3 British Commercial Vehicle Museum (hereafter BCVM), Leyland Motors, M639 143/11, General Manager’s
Meetings, 1938–40 ‘Summary Report’, September 1939 to June 1940.
4 TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries’, pp. 266­–71; CAB 120/355, ‘A.F.V. Production’, 1943.
5 TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries’, pp. 269–70; BCVM, M639 143/11, ‘Production Issues’, August
1940; Leyland Motors, M632 143/5, ‘Mark V’, January 1941.
6 Churchill College Archives, First Viscount Weir, WEIR 20/9, Report on visit to Montreal Locomotive Worksby Hoare, 21 April 1941.
7 Library and Archives Canada (hereafter LAC), vol. 2596, HQS-3352–4, tank meeting in Washington, 20
September 1940; HQS-3352–3, vol. 1, Eighth meeting of the Joint Committee, 18 February 1941; Eleventhmeeting of the Joint Committee, 1 May 1941; Fourteenth meeting of the Joint Committee, 29 May 1941.
8 LAC, HQS-3352–3, vol. 1, Ministry of Munitions and Supply to Master-General of the Ordnance, 4 February
1941; Historical Section, ‘Tank Production in Canada’, pp. 3–5.
9 Heritage Motor Centre (hereafter HMC), Sir Miles Thomas, 80/20/1/7 & 8/7, Ruston-Bucyrus to Ministry ofSupply, 1 March 1943; TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries’, p. 271.

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BENJAMIN COOMBS

Figure 1 – Tank output by Ruston-Bucyrus and Ruston & Hornsby, April 1942 to June 1943.
45

Ruston-Bucyrus

Ruston & Hornsby

40

Crusader35
30
25

Cavalier

20
15
10

Jun-43May-43Apr-43Mar-43

Feb-43Jan-43

Nov-42Oct-42

Sep-42Aug-42

Jul-42Jun-42

May-42

Apr-420

Dec-42Matilda5

AVIAby46/188,‘Monthly Deliveries’,
p. 271.
Figure 1. Source:
Tank TNA,
outputRuston-Bucyrus
andRuston & Hornsby, April 1942 to June 1943.

Source: TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries’, p. 271.

The problems of shortages of assembly components were overcome by the improved tankdesigns and production techniques of the later models. As shown in Figure 2 this wasdemonstrated by the transfer of production at Leyland Motors from the Centaur tank at theend of 1943 to the new Cromwell tank and then later to the Comet tank at the end of 1944and into 1945. With each transfer Leyland Motors was able to expand production at a fasterand greater rate of output over a shorter period of time despite experiencing similar delays

Figure 2 – Tank output by Leyland Motors, December 1940 to May 1945
Cromwell
735

250
200
Overall Output

Centaur
433

150
100

Comet
359

Covenanter
501

2
50
0

Churchill
654
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
1
2
Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr Qtr
40 41 41 41 41 42 42 42 42 43 43 43 43 44 44 44 44 45 45

Figure 2. Tank output by Leyland Motors, December 1940 to May 1945

Sources: TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries’, pp. 269–71; BCVM, M632 143/5, General Manager’s

Meetings,
1941–3;
M631 143/5,
GeneralDeliveries’,Manager’s Meetings,
1944–5. BCVM, M632 143/5, General Manager’s
Sources: TNA,
AVIA
46/188,‘Monthlypp. 269–71;
Meetings, 1941–3; M631 143/5, General Manager’s Meetings, 1944–5.

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British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945
in material shortages.10 The advantages for front line units were two-fold. Firstly, whencompared to the output of the Covenanter and Centaur tanks, both the Cromwell and Comettanks were immediately battleworthy. Secondly, the sustainably high rate of output
achieved with these later tanks meant that battlefield losses could be replaced quickly.
These benefits will be examined in more detail later with the sixth consideration ofindustry.

II
The second consideration is that industry must supply enough spare parts to support thedeliveries of finished products or risk having the customer being unable to use theequipment in event of mechanical breakdown.
For Britain the demand for greater tank output during the first half of the war meant thatthe production of spare parts was directed to completing the final assembly in the factories
instead of being received by tank units in training at home or front line action overseas.11
The affect of this policy was illustrated during the battles in North Africa during 1941
when more spare parts than that supplied were needed to repair damaged tanks in the fieldso that they could be returned to operational status.12
By comparison the aircraft industry during the Battle of Britain reduced spare parts
production in order to concentrate upon delivering more fighters to the front line
squadrons.13 Similar to the British tank industry, the performance of American tanks usedby British units in North Africa during 1942, such as the Grant Tank, was also affected byshortages in the supply of spare parts coming from the United States.14
To illustrate the British situation in more detail, during July 1941 the number of Britishtanks in workshops or with the units that were considered “unfit for action” was 26 per centwith the lack of spare parts being a major reason.15 The proportion of “unfit” tanks had
deteriorated to 28 per cent by September 1941 before falling to 18 per cent by November
1942.16 However it should be noted that the number of “unfit” tanks deemed acceptable byPrime Minister Winston Churchill back in July 1941 was limited to just 10 per cent.17
The tank authority under the Armoured Fighting Vehicle Liaison Committee in October
1942 reacted to improve the situation for front line units with the decision to ensure thatindustry supplied tank spares at the same time as new tank output.18 However this took timeto achieve with tank firm Mechanization & Aero recording the production of spares in 1942
at 22 per cent of total output which also excluded tanks, engines and gearboxes. Thisbalance had improved to 37 per cent in 1943 and increased to 45 per cent in 1944.19
10 BCVM, Leyland Motors, M631 143/5, ‘Ministry of Supply Contracts’, Cromwell material shortages:
January to April, June, August, November and December 1944; Comet material shortages: September andOctober 1944 and April 1945.
11 TNA, CAB 98/20, Second meeting of the Tank Parliament, 13 May 1941.
12 TNA, WO 185/8, Eighteenth meeting of the Tank Board, 11 July 1941.
13 Ritchie, ‘New Audit of War’, pp. 128–9.
14 Nuffield College Library (hereafter NCL), Lord Cherwell, CSAC 80.4.81/G.367/19–22, Harriman to Under
Secretary of War, R. P. Patterson, 13 July 1942.
15 TNA, PREM 3/426/16, ‘Tank Return for the United Kingdom’, 27 June 1941.
16 TNA, PREM 3/426/16, ‘Tank Return for the United Kingdom’, 21 September 1941; CAB 120/355, ‘State of
Readiness of Operational Tanks’, 17 September and 26 November 1942.
17 TNA, PREM 3/426/4, Churchill to Margesson and Beaverbrook, 11 July 1941; CAB 120/355, ‘Summary of
Tank State of Readiness’, 25 March 1943.
18 TNA, WO 185/7, Second meeting of the A.F.V. Liaison Committee, 27 October 1942.
19 Modern Records Centre, Mechanization & Aero, MSS.226/NM/2/1/5–10, ‘Trading Account’, 1939–44.

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BENJAMIN COOMBS
The standardization of tank components eventually improved with those firms delivering
the Cromwell tank from December 1942 and the Comet tank from September 1944,
especially as these tanks both used of the Meteor tank engine. The Meteor was a 600 hp
engine which had been converted for tank use from the original Merlin aero-engine used in
the Spitfire.20 The Meteor provided British tanks with greater reliability, increased armour
protection and simplicity in the provision of spare parts. This situation was a vast
improvement on the 340 to 385 hp Liberty tank engines used in Crusader tank until
production ceased in October 1943 and in the Cavalier and Centaur tanks until productionof these unbattleworthy tanks both ended in April 1944.21

III
The third consideration is that industry must ensure that enough quality control inspectors
are employed to identify problems on the assembly line and react to increases in output or
risk delivering faulty equipment to customers.
Within the British tank industry the method of official inspection adopted by the Ministryof Supply could only carry out a final inspection of the tank once fully assembled. This
practice continued until at least 1944 and meant that meant that faults on the production
line were overlooked. 22 By comparison, the aircraft industry in Britain carried out aninspection of the work in progress at each stage of production prior to the final assembly.23
Similar to the situation found in the British tank industry, the mechanical problems foundwith American tanks received by British units in North Africa were caused by assembling
the tanks too quickly and having an inadequate inspection programme in the factories.24
In addition to only reviewing the fully assembled tank, the problems with the official
system of inspection within the British tank industry were due to a shortage of inspectors
available to carry out the necessary checks. The situation deteriorated even further when
the demand for greater tank output from 1940 to 1942 meant that there were more tanks
leaving the assembly line than could be properly inspected at completion. As shown in
Figure 3 although more official inspectors were employed after June 1942, the proportionof inspectors at the Tank Department fell from 75 per cent of the total number employed in
December 1940 to 58 per cent in June 1943. This was caused by the increased emphasis on
increasing the tank design section which doubled from 13 per cent to 26 per cent over thesame period.25

20 TNA, WO 185/8, Ninth meeting of the Tank Board (Reconstituted), 8 January 1942; BCVM, M631 143/5,‘Comet Production’, September 1944.
21 TNA, CAB 102/851, ‘Brief Particulars of British, American, Russian and German Tanks’, October 1944;
CAB 120/355, ‘A.F.V. Production’, 1943; CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V. Production’, 1944–5.
22 HMC, 80/20/1/7 & 8/15, Thomas to Director-General of Armoured Fighting Vehicles, C. Gibb, 10 March
1944.
23 Ritchie, ‘New Audit of War, p. 135.
24 NCL, CSAC 80.4.81/G.368/5, Special Supplement, ‘Grant and Sherman’, 6 February 1943; CSAC 80.4.81/
G.368/8, Special Supplement, ‘American Tanks: Defects on Arrival’, 2 February 1943; CSAC 80.4.81/G.368/9–
10, Special Supplement, Technician to GMC, 20 January 1943.
25 TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Numerical Strength of Tank Department’, p. 114.

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Figure 3 – Index of the number of Tank Department design and inspection employees
British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945
compared to the expansion of tank output from December 1940 to June 1943
600
Tank Output
500
Design

400
300
200

Inspection
1000Dec-40Jun-41

Dec-41

Jun-42

Dec-42Jun-43

CABnumber
120/356, ‘A.F.V
Production’January to December
87/137, ‘Assignments
from
Figure 3.Sources:I ndexTNA,of theof TankDepartment
design1944;
andBTinspection
employees
U.S. War Department’, by P. J. Grigg, 15 December 1944.
compared to the expansion of tank output from December 1940 to June 1943

Sources: TNA, CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V Production’ January to December 1944; BT 87/137, ‘Assignmentsfrom U.S. War Department’, by P. J. Grigg, 15 December 1944.

The system of tank factory controlled inspection was also inadequate for too long. Parent
firms were responsible for the co-ordination of inspection carried by the tank firms in the
production group, such as with Leyland Motors for the Centaur, Cromwell and Comet tankprogrammes.26 This problem was highlighted by the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General
Staff, Lieutenant-General Ronald Weeks when he stated during July 1942 to Sir Miles
Thomas of Mechanization & Aero that tank firms were responsible for improving thesystem of factory inspection.27 In response, Thomas contacted the firms within Crusader
production group firms to stress that every completed tank must be capable of meeting theoperational requirements of the army. 28 However these efforts still produced completedtanks that needed corrective action by fighting units upon being received in the theatre ofoperations.
To illustrate the problems in both the level and capability of official and factory based
standard of inspection, 30 out of 41 Crusader tanks inspected in North Africa during
February 1943 needed up to 300 man-hours to correct production faults. The remaining 11
tanks needed between 300 and 500 man-hours to make them battleworthy.29 To put this4
additional time into context, Crusader manufacturer
Mechanization & Aero took 6,050
man-hours to assemble each tank in 1943.30 As a result, the time needed to rectify original
production problems by workshop mechanics in the field represented about five per cent of
total assembly man-hours and therefore should not be overestimated.
26 BCVM, M632 143/5, General Manager’s Meetings, 1941–3, ‘General’, April 1943.
27 HMC, 80/20/1/7 & 8/19, Weeks to Thomas, 20 July 1942.
28 HMC, Thomas, 80/20/1/1 & 2/1, Thomas to West’s Gas; Thomas, 80/20/1/5 & 6/7, Thomas to Fodens;

80/20/1/7 & 8/7, Thomas to Ruston-Bucyrus, all 10 August 1942.
29 NCL, CSAC 80.4.81/G.368/5, Special Supplement, ‘Crusader’, 6 February 1943.
30 HMC, 80/20/1/1 & 2/8, Mechanization & Aero to Thomas, ‘Assembly and Machining Time in Man Hours’,
3 January 1944.

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BENJAMIN COOMBSIVThe fourth consideration for industry is that production of obsolete equipment may have to
be continued to meet the political decision to help a friend in trouble and to show
something tangible was being done to maintain and strengthen public opinion.
Following the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 the Western Allies
provided munitions, equipment and raw materials to their new ally fighting on the Eastern
Front from late 1941 until the end of the war.31 The show the British public and specificallyindustry that this programme was both becoming a reality and of vital importance for the
British war effort, the Minister of Supply Lord Beaverbrook launched his “Tanks for
Russia” week in September 1941. This particular initiative was designed to encourage the
British tank industry to increase output so these tanks could be sent to the Soviet Red
Army.32
The information recorded by the Mass Observation surveys identified that British opinion
supported the idea of sending British fighting equipment to meet the requirements of theSoviet Union. Essentially, there was a realization that the Soviet war effort took priority
over British needs because if the Soviet Union surrendered Britain would again bevulnerable to German attach.33 There was a consensus among British industry towards theimportance of “Tanks for Russia” week and the programme produced an example of goodindustrial relations between the government, the factory employers, the trade unions andworkers themselves.34
To help towards meeting British obligations under the protocols to provide equipment to
the Soviet Union, Britain ordered 1,420 Valentine tanks from Canadian industry and all but
32 of these completed vehicles were supplied directly to the Red Army.35 The Valentine
tank continued in production until May 1944 and long after the tank was effectively
obsolete. This was because the Valentine tank met the demands of the Soviet Union for thisparticular tank instead of the more recent tank designs now being produced by British
industry or from the United States.36 Despite being obsolete, the Soviet Union liked thereliability of the Valentine tank; that it was small and low to the ground which meant it wasless of a target on the battlefield; that it ran on a diesel engine in keeping with Soviet tanks
for greater simplicity in the supply of fuel; and that there was a greater supply of spareparts for supporting continuous operations.37 To illustrate the impact of continued Valentine
production, the number of front line tanks delivered by British industry during 1944
consisted of 2,223 tanks powered by the Meteor engine, 1,062 Churchill tanks and still 280
Valentine tanks to meet the remaining Soviet requirements under the aid programme.38

31 See Beaumont, Comrades in Arms.
32 NCL, CSAC 80.4.81/G.368/48–52, Harriman to Churchill, 25May 1943.
33 Mass Observation Archive, file 885, ‘Seventeenth Weekly Report (New Series)’, 29 September 1941, pp.

2–3.

34 The Times, 23 September 1941; The Times, 24 September 1941; TNA, AVIA 11/46, Macmillan to
Birmingham Railway; Macmillan to Metropolitan-Cammell, 27 September 1941.
35 Historical Section, ‘Tank Production’, pp. 3–5; Hansard (Commons), 5th ser., CDXXI, 16 Apr. 1946, cols
2516–19.
36 TNA, WO 32/10521, ‘Supply of Tanks to U.S.S.R.’, 10 March 1942; CAB 120/357, ‘Notes of Points Madein Discussion between Prime Minister and Sir Andrew Duncan’, 23 July 1943; CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V.
Production’, May 1944.
37 TNA, WO 185/6, Military Mission Moscow, 7 August 1942; Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, p.
362.
38 TNA, CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V. Production’, January to December 1944.

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British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945

V
The fifth consideration is that industry may need continuation orders for obsolete or
unreliable equipment because an enforced cancellation would mean an unacceptable loss of
output and disruption of labour resources during the change-over of production. Effectively,
the decision had to balance the loss in output by interrupting the existing production run,against the anticipated increase in quality with the introduction of a new model.
The British tank industry experienced this situation with a number of tank programmes
throughout the war. The fighting in France in 1940 justified the continuation orders for the
Matilda tank, in keeping with the then General Staff emphasis upon heavy armour andarmour piercing firepower with the two-pounder gun. However the performance of the
Matilda tank was affected mechanical unreliability.39
The continuation orders received by English Electric and Leyland Motors during 1940
and 1941 for the unbattleworthy Covenanter tank ensured that these firms incurred ‘no gap
in production’ before transferring production to new designs expected during 1943. 40
Therefore the unreliable Covenanter tank remained in production until January 1943 andthe now obsolete Matilda tank was produced until August 1943. 41 The reason why
production of these out-of-date designs extended far beyond battlefield usefulness was
because the tank programme as a whole could only change very slowly. This had the effectof delaying the transfer to a later tank design or other essential war work, like theproduction of locomotives. 42 The benefits of redirecting the locomotive tank firms toresume production of their core industry was to avoid importing these bulky machines fromthe United States and consuming valuable Lend-Lease shipping space.43
An important reason for avoiding inactive production was the retention of labour rather
than having workers sent to another firm that required the same manpower. This problem
was experienced by the tank industry during the change-over from Crusader programme tothe production of the Cavalier or Centaur tanks. For example, while the skilled workers
within the Mechanization & Aero production group became inactive at the end of Crusader
tank production they were still needed to prepare the transfer to the new tools and jigs
required for the machining and assembly of the new Cavalier tank. The unacceptable
alternative was to have these workers transferred to the Leyland Motors production groupproducing the new Centaur tank.44
A similar example was experienced within the Churchill tank programme. During 1942
the Churchill contract was extended from 3,000 to 3,500 tanks to avoid a break inproduction before Vauxhall Motors would start production on the new Cromwell tank.45
However production of the Cromwell tank was not ready for mass production until
beginning 1944 so an order of 500 additional Churchill tanks of the latest design wasagreed for 4,000 tanks in total. As it transpired Vauxhall Motors never transferred to the
39 Bodleian Library Oxford (hereafter BLO), Vulcan Foundry, MS. Marconi 2739, Board Minutes, 1934–40,‘A.12 Tanks’, 11 June 1940; TNA, WO 185/8, First meeting of the Tank Board, 24 June 1940.
40 BLO, English Electric, MS. Marconi 2724, ‘War Diary of the English Electric Company Ltd. March 1938 –August 1945’, 10 December 1940 and 21 March 1941; BCVM, M632 143/5, ‘Comparative Statement of Orders
Received’, April 1941; TNA, WO 185/8, Sixteenth meeting of the Tank Board, 23 May 1941.
41 TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries’, p. 271; CAB 120/355, ‘A.F.V. Production’, weeks ending 12 June
to 7 August 1943.
42 TNA, WO 185/8, Third meeting of the Tank Board (Reconstituted), 9 September 1941.
43 TNA, PREM 3/426/15, Lyttelton to Churchill, 28 August 1942; Lyttelton to Churchill, 8 September 1942;
Churchill to Lyttelton, 13 September 1942.
44 HMC, Thomas, 80/20/6/38 & 39/16, Thomas to Ministry of Labour, 26 August 1942.
45 TNA, WO 185/8, Tenth meeting of the Tank Board (Reconstituted), 20 January 1942; Twelfth meeting of theTank Board (Reconstituted), 17 February 1942; Thirteenth meeting of the Tank Board, 7 May 1942.

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BENJAMIN COOMBS
production of the Cromwell tank and continued to produce the Churchill and later Heavy
Churchill tank until the end of the war.46
The change-over from one tank design to another produced another effect in relation to
the supply of the material components for both programmes. Both English Electric andLeyland Motors should have finished their Covenanter tank contract in November 1942
and then move production to the new Centaur tank. However the completion of Covenanter
production by these firms and the subsequent transfer to the Centaur tank was delayed until
January 1943. This was because the component suppliers shifted their focus to provide
equipment to start assembly of the new Centaur tank instead of providing the materials
necessary to finish the Covenanter programme first.47

VI
The sixth consideration is that to ensure quality output in sustainably high numbers
industry should focus on the standardization, specialization and simplification of the
production process. Standardization is the production of fewer designs; specialization
concentrates production among fewer firms or factories; and simplification involves fewer
man-hours to assemble each product. The British tank industry achieved this ability during
the second half of the war under a programme that demanded reliable tanks to carry out amobile role for offensive operations overseas.
The standardization of the British tank programme was achieved from 1943 with thetransfer to quality production with the decision to concentrate production among the latest
Churchill, Cromwell and Comet tanks. The United States and the Soviet Union
demonstrated how the standardization of war production was successfully applied on amuch larger scale with the output of vast numbers of Medium tanks.48 These two muchlarger nations also benefited from their industrial centres being located, or relocated in thecase of the Soviet Union, safely away from the risk of enemy bombing attack.49
For British and Commonwealth tank units fighting on the front line, the standardizationof production among fewer designs brought about advantages of mechanical reliability
which could not always be relied upon during the first half of the war. For example inNorth Africa during 1943, Churchill tanks had completed 400 to 700 miles without thesame mechanical problems experienced with earlier production models.50 This increased
performance did not go unnoticed with Lieutenant-General Weeks giving production parent
Vauxhall Motors particular praise for the greater quality of factory workmanship.51 The
reliable quality of the Cromwell tank was demonstrated during and after the Normandy
campaign in late 1944, when despite being in continuous action for three weeks and withlittle chance for maintenance, the rate of mechanical failure among these tanks was
extremely low.52 In additional to the reduced requirement for crew maintenance in the field,
46 TNA, CAB 121/261, ‘Tank Production by Vauxhall Group’, by Grigg and Duncan, 20 January 1943; CAB
65/33/12, War Cabinet, ‘Tank Production’, 20 January 1943.
47 BCVM, M632 143/5, ‘Covenanter Tank’, August and November 1942, TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly
Deliveries’, p. 271.
48 Murray and Millett, War To Be Won, pp. 240, 257, 590 & 598.
49 Tooze, Wages of Destruction, p. 578; Harrison, ‘The Soviet Union: The Defeated Victor’, in Harrison (ed.),Economics of World War II, p. 295.
50 LAC, vol. 2626, file HQS-3352–37–6-1, ‘North African Theatre of Operations – A.F.V. Technical Report
No. 1’, 26 March 1943; TNA, AVIA 11/30, ‘A.F.V. Technical Report No. 15’, Appendix E, 2 August 1943.
51 HMC, Thomas, 80/20/5/37/1, Weeks to C. J. Bartlett, Vauxhall Motors, 18 June 1943.
52 Staffordshire Record Office, Birmingham Railway Carriage & Wagon Company, D831/1/6/2/M, Routine
Correspondence and Letters, Verney to Briggs, 6 September 1944.

－ 12 －

British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945
the standardized nature of British tank production meant that tank crews had a greaterfamiliarity with the equipment overall.53
For the specialization of the British tank programme, rather than introducing any new
firms to tank assembly, the experience and techniques within the existing productiongroups were concentrated among fewer tank firms to specialize in carrying out the final
assembly. These changes further improved the quality of workmanship in the British tankindustry to complement the standardization of production among the battleworthy
Churchill, Cromwell and Comet tanks. As a result, between 1943 and 1945 the number oftank firms fell from 27 to 19 following the cancellation of the Matilda and Crusader
programmes. This was later reduced again to just 11 core tank firms to focus thestandardized production. The other firms returned to their pre-war industrial production of
locomotives or wheeled vehicles and others were used for tank conversions, such as the
17-pounder gun Firefly or Duplex-Drive swimming tanks.54
The simplification of the tank manufacturing process was achieved with the fewer manhours necessary to complete the assembly of the standardized designs by the smaller
number of specialist tank firms during the second half of the war. To illustrate, at Leyland
Motors the Covenanter tank required 6,900 man-hours to complete and Mechanization &Aero recorded that 6,050 man-hours were necessary for each Crusader tank. In contrast to
the 18 ton Covenanter and 20 ton Crusader, Leyland Motors reported that the later 28 ton
Cromwell tank needed a much reduced 5,640 man-hours to assemble this immediately
battleworthy tank. 55 As a result of the British tank industry producing operationallyeffective Cromwell tanks in large numbers, they were able to suddenly increase output in
response to the front line demands to replace the heavy losses sustained in Normandy
during July and August 1944.56 This is shown in Figure 4 together with the consequence ofdelaying the start and rate of output expected from the Comet tank programme designed toreplace the Cromwell.

VII
The seventh and final consideration is that industry should avoid becoming over reliant
upon the supply of equipment from an overseas source to replace production at home as
there is a risk that the amount received could be less than expected or stops altogether.
Right from the onset of war Britain decided to take advantage of the production potential
and strategic remoteness of North American industry to supplement manufacturing at
home.57 Early British orders for American tanks were purchased using cash reserves andgold until superseded by the supply under Lend-Lease.58 To illustrate the positive effectthat Lend-Lease has upon the supply of equipment to British fighting units, of the 951
tanks shipped to British forces by the end of 1941, only 165 were sent under British cash
53 LAC, vol. 9377, 38/TECH LIA/2/3, ‘21 Army Group: AFV Technical Report and Reply, No. 17’, para. 24,
15 November 1944.
54 TNA, AVIA 22/454, ‘Centaur/Cromwell Planning’, 9 November 1943; ‘Tank Capacity’, 28 October 1944.
55 BCVM, M632 143/5, ‘B/X Factory’, July 1942; HMC, 80/20/1/1 & 2/8, Mechanization & Aero to Thomas,‘Assembly and Machining Time in Man Hours’, 3 January 1944.
56 BCVM, M631 143/5, ‘General’, July 1944; ‘General’, August 1944; CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V. Production’,
March 1944 to April 1945.
57 Hancock and Gowing, British War Economy, pp. 105, 195n, 229 & 382; Stacey, Arms, pp. 490–1.
58 TNA, AVIA 38/42, ‘Launching of the Tank Programme’, Appendix V (A): Principal tank contracts placed by
British Supply Mission, dated after 1945.

－ 13 －

BENJAMIN COOMBS

Figure 4 – Cromwell and Comet tank forecasts and output, March 1944 to April 1945
300
250

Cromwell Forecast

Comet Forecast

200

Comet Output

150
100

Cromwell Output

50
0Mar- Apr- May- Jun- Jul- Aug- Sep- Oct- Nov- Dec- Jan- Feb- Mar- Apr- May44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
44
45
45
45
45
45
Sources: TNA,
AVIA
22/454,tank‘Centaur/Cromwell
Planning’,
9 November
CABto120/356,
Figure 4. Cromwell
and
Comet
forecasts andoutput,March1943;
1944
April ‘A.F.V.
1945
Production’, March 1944 to April 1945.

Sources: TNA, AVIA 22/454, ‘Centaur/Cromwell Planning’, 9 November 1943; CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V.
Production’, March 1944 to April 1945.

contracts.59
The supply of good quality Sherman tanks from the United States during 1943 meant that
Britain was able to concentrate upon developing the Cromwell tank to a high standard as
highlighted already. This meant that the Cromwell tank did not enter mass production
prematurely and avoided the problems experienced by the earlier Crusader and Churchill
programmes.60 To demonstrate the importance of American industry upon the British tankprogramme, Britain produced 16,712 battleworthy front line tanks from 1942 to 1944,
compared to 20,000 Grant and Sherman tanks received from the United States.61
Britain had clearly become over-reliant upon tanks supplied from the United States
during the final years of war. At the start of 1944, Britain reduced their tank programme tojust over 5,280 tanks with the expectation of 8,500 tanks from the United States.62 By
November 1944, the British tank programme was cut even further when the four firms
producing the Comet tank received reductions in their contracts under the expectation thatthe war in Europe would be finished by the end of March 1945.63 These reductions weremade on the understanding that Britain would receive nearly 8,961 Sherman tanks underLend-Lease during 1944.64
However, as shown in Figure 5 by October 1944 there was already a shortfall of 3,469
Sherman tanks under this arrangement with a totalof 5,492 deliveries against the expected
58,961.65 This situation deteriorated further when no Sherman tanks were received during
59 Stettinius, Lend-Lease, p. 94.
60 S. C. on National Expenditure (P.P. 1946), p. 50.
61 TNA, AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries’, p. 271; CAB 120/355, ‘A.F.V. Production’, 1943; CAB 120/356,‘A.F.V. Production’, 1944.
62 TNA, BT 87/137, ‘Tank Policy’, by Grigg and Duncan, 12 January 1944.
63 TNA, AVIA 22/454, ‘Curtailment of Production of Cromwell, Comet, Challenger & S.P.2’, 14 November
1944.
64 TNA, PREM 3/427/9, ‘Tank Production in 1945’, 6 October 1944.
65 TNA, CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V Production’ January to December 1944; BT 87/137, ‘Assignments from U.S.
War Department’, by P. J. Grigg, 15 December 1944.

－ 14 －

British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945
November or December. The reason for this shortfall was because of the understandable
reaction by the United States to give new production Sherman tanks directly to American
instead of to British tank units in order to replace the heavy losses sustained by both armies
during and after the Normandy campaign.66 As a result in January 1945, Britain reversed
the earlier reductions in the Comet tank programme to ensure that the enough tanks were67
provided to
Britishunits until
the ofendof war.
Figure5 – Monthly
deliveries
Shermanand British front line tanks during 1944, comparedto the expected delivery of Sherman tanks under Lend-Lease
1200

Sherman Tank Deliveries

British Tank Deliveries

1000
800
Monthly LendLease Expectations

600
400
200
0

Jan-44 Feb-44 Mar-44 Apr-44 May-44 Jun-44 Jul-44 Aug-44 Sep-44 Oct-44 Nov-44 Dec-44

TNA,
CAB 120/356,of‘A.F.V
Production’to December
1944; BT87/137,‘Assignments
Figure 5. Sources:M onthlydeliveries
ShermanandJanuary
Britishfront line
tanks
during1944,fromcompared
U.S. War Department’, by P. J. Grigg, 15 December 1944.
to the expected delivery of Sherman tanks under Lend-Lease

Sources: TNA, CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V Production’ January to December 1944; BT 87/137, ‘Assignmentsfrom U.S. War Department’, by P. J. Grigg, 15 December 1944.

Conclusion
By reviewing the experience of the British tank industry, the different governmental,
military, organizational and international considerations can be discovered within thecontext of the war economy. The pressures of war demanded the mass production ofequipment from all the countries involved. Britain encountered organizational problems
when changing industry from a position of peace to a war footing. A large number ofBritish civilian firms were quickly transferred to tank production. The British tank industry
took time to achieve the eventual mass production of quality tanks that gave front line units
with reliable and extremely mobile tanks that could carry out successful offensive
operations overseas
The eventual transition to quality production over the course of the war was achieved byovercoming a series of difficulties which can still apply during peacetime. To begin withthere were too many tanks deemed “unfit for action” for too long prompting thegovernment to increase the production of spare parts necessary for tank units to maintainbattleworthy vehicles in the field. There was a lack of official inspectors required to check6
66 TNA, BT 87/137, BAS and BSM to Ministry of Supply
and War Office, 6 December 1944.
67 TNA, AVIA 22/454, ‘Amendment’, Director-General of Armoured Fighting Vehicles, C. Gibb to Regional

Controllers, 15 December 1944.

－ 15 －

BENJAMIN COOMBS
the quality of workmanship in the factories which only checked the fully assembled
vehicle. This was in contrast to the aircraft industry which inspected the work in progress,
so faults within the tank production process were overlooked. Furthermore, the government
had to issue continuation orders for tanks that were superfluous, obsolete or unbattleworthy
because the transfer to the latest design would have caused a break in production anddisrupted labour resources prior to the change-over.
From the strategic perspective, continuation orders were also necessary to supply theSoviet Union with the desired Valentine tank together with the assistance of Canadianproduction long after this tank was needed for British requirements. The supply of tanks
from the United States was very positive and meant that British industry transferred
production to the Cromwell tank without being rushed into service. However, Britain
became over reliant upon tanks from the United States and they cut back the tankprogramme by too much and too soon before the war ended.
In relation to the tank industry, the shortages of labour and materials meant that the
British tank firms could not achieve the desired rate of output during the first half of thewar. This was overcome by the successful transfer of British industry to quality tankproduction by the standardization, specialization and simplification of the tank programme.
To summarize, the experience of the British tank industry during the Second World War
had similarities in the industries of the United States and Canada. It can therefore be said
that the British experience of producing tanks was in no way unique and that peacetime
industry can benefit from this understanding to become more productive and commerciallysuccessful.

－ 16 －

British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945
Table 2. Tank Specifications
Tank
Britain
MatildaCovenanter
CrusaderMax.
Weight(Tons)

Main GunMax.
Armour
(mm)

Max.
Range
(Miles)

Total
OutputProduction
Dates

26.5
18
20

78
40
66

160
100
100

2,908
1,770
4,917

1939-43
1940-3
1940-3

65

90

7,041

1940-4

102

90

4,276

1941-4

76

165

1,774

1942-4

101

175

2,547

1942-5

76
152

165
90

497
917

1943-4
1943-5

75

125

693

1944

75
101

125
125

2,074
623

1944-5
1944-5

Valentine

18.5

Churchill

38

Centaur

28

Cromwell

28

Cavalier
Heavy Churchill

26.5
40

Sherman DD

32.5

Sherman Firefly
Comet
CanadaValentine
United States
Grant / Lee

35
35

2-pdr
2-pdr
2-pdr
6-pdr
2-pdr
6-pdr
75 mm
2-pdr
6-pdr
75 mm
95 mm
6-pdr
95 mm
6-pdr
75 mm
95 mm
6-pdr
75 mm
95 mm
75 mm
76 mm
17-pdr
77 mm

18.5

2-pdr

65

90

1,420

1941-329

37 mm &
75 mm
75 mm
76 mm

75

160

6,258

1941-275

150

44,3001942-5

Sherman

32.5

Note: Figures include the production of both standard gun tanks and those models converted to a supportingrole.
Sources: TNA, CAB 102/851, ‘Brief Particulars’, October 1944; AVIA 46/188, ‘Monthly Deliveries’, pp.
269-71; CAB 120/355, ‘A.F.V. Production’, 1943; CAB 120/356, ‘A.F.V. Production’, 1944 and 1945;
Historical Section, ‘Tank Production in Canada’, p. 2; Chamberlain and Ellis, British and American Tanks;
Ness, Jane’s World War II Tanks, pp. 86-8 & 187.

－ 17 －

BENJAMIN COOMBS
Footnote references
Beale, P., Death by Design: British Tank Development in the Second World War (Stroud, 1998).
Beaumont, J., Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Russia 1941 – 1945 (1980).
Buckley, J., British Armour in the Normandy Campaign 1944 (London and New York, 2006).
Chamberlain, P., and Ellis, C., British and American Tanks of World War Two: The Complete Illustrated
History of British, American and Commonwealth Tanks, 1939-1945, first published 1969 (Wigston,2004).
Coombs, B., British Tank Production and the War Economy, 1934–1945 (2013).
Fletcher, D., The Great Tank Scandal: British Armour in the Second World War, Part 1 (1989).
The Universal Tank: British Armour in the Second World War, Part 2 (1993).
Harrison, M. (ed.), The Economics of World War II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison(Cambridge, 2000).
Murray, W., and Millett, A. R., A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War (Cambridge, 2001).
Ness, L., Jane’s World War II Tanks and Fighting Vehicles: The Complete Guide (2002).
Peden, G. C., Arms, Economics and British Strategy: From Dreadnoughts to Hydrogen Bombs (Cambridge,2007).
Ritchie, S., ‘A New Audit of War: The Productivity of Britain’s Wartime Aircraft Industry Reconsidered’,
War & Society, Vol. 12, No. 1 (May 1994), pp. 125–47.
Stettinius, Jr, E. R., Lend-Lease: Weapon for Victory (New York, 1944).
Tooze, A., The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy (2006).
Official publications
Hancock, W. K., and Gowing, M. M., British War Economy (1949).
Hansard, House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates.
Historical Section, Army Headquarters, Report No. 38 (1950)
found in National Defence and the Canadian Forces at www.forces.gc.ca/site/home-accueil-eng.asp(accessed 30 Sep. 2010).
Select Committee on National Expenditure, War-Time Tank Production (1946).
Stacey, C. P., Arms, Men and Governments: The War Policies of Canada, 1939 – 1945 (Ottawa, 1970).
Thomson, H. C., and Mayo, L., United States Army in World War II, The Technical Services, The Ordnance
Department: Procurement and Supply (Washington, 1960), reprinted 1968.

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