History of Global Arms Transfer, 18 (2024), pp. 1-18

Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
By MAHITO TAKEUCHI*
This paper analyzes the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept in order
to examine the nature of interstate cooperation in the post-global era. Specifically,
it examines the following historical backgrounds: the Greater Britain Initiative inthe late 19th century, Joseph Chamberlain’s tariff reform movement and theRound Table movement in the early 20th century, Winston Churchill’s
international order concept after World War I, Anglobalization after the end of theCold War, the writings of Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett, and Brexit and
the Global Britain Initiative. In order for the Anglosphere to strengthen thespecial relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States and tobuild good relations with Asian and African democracies in the Indo-Pacificregion in the future, the core countries of the Anglosphere, consisting of theUnited Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States ofAmerica, should cooperate with “like-minded countries” such as Japan and mustovercome the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept and the negative legacyof imperialism.

Introduction
Since the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union (“Brexit”), based on areferendum on June 23, 2016, the concept of the Anglosphere has gained international
attention. The Anglosphere is widely understood to consist of five countries: the CANZUK
countries, consisting of the United Kingdom and the former Dominion countries of Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand, and the United States, which currently has an intelligence andsecurity alliance with the CANZUK countries called Five Eyes. However, the boundariesof the Anglosphere are geographically elastic and ambiguous, which is one of its politicalattractions, and more recently it has been expanded to include India, Singapore, and Hong
Kong, which were once part of the British Empire. In addition, English-speaking countries
in Africa and the West Indies and Ireland are also included in the Anglosphere, although
this is controversial (Bennett, 2016; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 1; Kenny and Pearce,
2018, pp. 2, 5; Vucetic, 2011, p. 3).
In this paper, the five core countries of the Anglosphere are the United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. It is crucial to determine the character andcharacteristics of these core Anglosphere countries from a historical perspective to predict
future relations with non-white countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Accordingly, this paper
examines the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept to investigate the nature ofinter-state cooperation in the post-global era, seeking to clarify future issues from theperspective of Japan. In Chapter 2, the nature and characteristics of the Anglosphere are* Professor, Nihon University College of Commerce

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
discussed. Chapter 3 presents the historical origins of the Anglosphere concept, including
the Greater Britain concept of the late 19th century, the tariff reform movement and Round
Table movement of the early 20th century, and Winston Churchill’s concept of aninternational order after World War I. Chapter 4 examines Anglobalization after the end of
the Cold War, the writings of Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett, and Brexit and the
Global Britain concept to understand the present state of the Anglosphere concept.

1. What is the Anglosphere?
First, it is important to understand the character and characteristics of the Anglosphere.
Anglosphere is a relatively newly coined term first used by science fiction author Neal
Stephenson in his 1995 novel The Diamond Age (Stephenson, 1995). However, over the
past 28 years, it has also come to represent a political discourse that refers to Englishspeaking countries that share certain characteristics, such as liberal market economies,
common law, representative democracies, and a history of Protestantism (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, p. 2). While Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative” emphasizes
ensuring a rules-based international order that includes freedom, democracy, rule of law,and respect for fundamental human rights (Cannon and Hakata, 2022), the concept of theAnglosphere is a broad. It is sometimes used to refer to a broad but ill-defined group ofEnglish-speaking countries that support the idea of freedom and the post-World War II
rule-based international order. However, the Anglosphere has also been criticized andresisted at times because of the imperialistic, Anglo-Saxon racial lineage of its core
countries (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 1).
Proponents of the Anglosphere often praise the development of representative democracy
in England and the United States, citing the Magna Carta of 1215 as a common historicalorigin. However, there is little scholarly evidence to trace the origins of the Anglosphereback to 13th century England. Rather, its origins are more appropriately sought in the riseand fall of the British Empire (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 5-7). For example, Michael
Kenny and Nick Pearce examined the liberal, democratic, free-market, Protestant, Englishspeaking political culture of the Anglosphere in relation to past Anglo-American imperial
discourses (Kenny and Pearce, 2018).
Particularly since Brexit, at least in political circles, these Anglo blocs have come to be
seen as a better political, economic, and cultural fit for the United Kingdom than theEuropean Union (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 2). This cordon is known as the “global
bloc”. Moreover, these ties are emphasized as a precondition, so to speak, in the new postBrexit British foreign policy of “Global Britain” (Akimoto, 2021, pp. 84-90), which has
been criticized as a return to imperialism, that is, “Empire 2.0” (Utsugi, 2021).
This criticism is rooted in a wariness of the Anglosphere’s imperialist past, especially its
racist origins. As international relations expert Srdjan Vucetic pointed out, the legacy of
empire still haunts the Anglosphere, and it continues to be defined by its racist origins(Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 8). In this sense, it reflects nostalgic notions about
imperialism, as post-colonial critics, led by Edward Said, have criticized (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 4-5). Vucetic defined “race” as a “racialized identity,” a social kind thatexists only because people believe in its existence, or an “imagined community,” which is
not real in the biological sense (Anderson, 1983). The Anglosphere’s origins were racist,and the friendship between the expanding United States and the declining United Kingdom

2Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
was driven by an identity discourse that implied the blood-borne unity and moral
superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race. As the Cold War dragged on and then faded away, theAnglosphere was positioned as the supreme symbol of “liberal internationalism” and the“human rights revolution.” First centered in London and then later in Washington, D.C., theAnglosphere has dominated world international politics for the past 200 years or more. Its
agents, imperialist states, companies, and peoples have colonized and industrialized large
parts of the globe, displacing millions of people by force. As a result, the world is now
globalized, or Anglobalized, by the Anglo-Saxon peoples. The Anglo-American special
relationship, which began with the violent secession of the United States from Great Britain
through the American Revolution in the 18th century, has been all but forgotten andreplaced by a remarkably enduring alliance and close friendship. Canada, Australia, and
New Zealand have gradually established special relationships with the United States as
they have acquired more sovereignty from Great Britain. Through these special
relationships, the “core” of what is now called the Anglosphere, the imperial and civilized
presence in global society, has been formed. Since the early 20th century, leaders of the oldand new Anglo empires have jointly proclaimed moral superiority in the international
community. The Anglosphere is a product of its racist past, a past that may not go away inthe future (Vucetic, 2011, pp. 2, 3-4, 7).
The Anglosphere is similar to the concept of the British world in a broad sense, or the
Anglo-world or English-speaking world, as James Belich and Gary Magee and Andrew
Thompson argued. Indeed, the two concepts are similar.
Belich emphasized the identity of the Anglo-world, or English-speaking world, consistingof the United Kingdom, the former Dominion countries (Canada, Australia, New Zealand,etc.), and the United States of America, and described the process by which the Angloworld was formed. He stated that there was a parallel migration from “Old Britain,” theBritish homeland, to the “British West,” the Dominion countries, and from “Old America”,
the Atlantic coastal region of the United States, to the “American West,” the western UnitedStates. Belich noted that, unlike immigration from other imperialist countries, “the Anglo
diaspora began earlier, was more permanent, and its migrants went to reproductions of theirown society” (Belich, 2009, p. 126). Not only famine and deprivation, but also land grants,
assisted passage, charitable endeavor and government campaigns played a role inpromoting immigration. In the 19th century, the Anglo-world experienced explosive
population growth, more so than any other region of the world. Between 1790 and 1930,
the number of English-speaking people increased nearly sixteen-fold, from 12 million to
200 million, and this rapid growth was supported by mass migration from Great Britain to
the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. The United States was particularly
popular with Irish immigrants, attracting two-thirds of all immigrants from Britain.
Australia, like New Zealand in the 1880s, became a favorite destination for British
immigrants after the discovery of gold in the 1850s and 1860s. Canada, on the other hand,became the main destination for British immigrants in the early 20th century, who weredrawn by the rapid economic growth of prairie towns. Migration to South Africa remained
limited despite the discovery of gold and mineral resources in the late 19th century(Takeuchi, 2019, p. 4; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 14-15).
Such large-scale migration was made possible by the transportation and communication
revolution that took place during the Victorian era. The increased power and speed ofsteamships dramatically reduced the time and financial costs of long-distance travel.
Merchant shipping was monopolized by Britain, which by the end of the 19th century was3

MAHITO TAKEUCHI
responsible for half of the world’s shipping. The construction of the railroad network in
Great Britain began in the 1830s and was the most developed in the Anglo-world. The top
five countries in terms of per capita mileage traveled by rail in 1875 were the UnitedStates, New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Great Britain, opening their vast land areas toimmigration and trade. Meanwhile, the invention of the telegraph shortened time andspatial distances, and telegraph cables laid over land and on the ocean floor enabled almost
instantaneous communication in the Anglo-world (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 15).
Once established, settler societies became embedded in complex transportation andcommunication networks to and from these homelands. Money, people, goods, and services
all moved along these networks, creating strong political, economic, and cultural bonds,
with distinctive patterns of Scottish, Welsh, Irish, and English immigration. Magee andThompson emphasized the importance of British migration to the United States and theDominion countries and the economic networks they formed, as well as the impact of thecultural identity of Britishness on the economic integration of the Anglo-world, using theconcept of a “cultural economy.” They argued that globalization progressed most in thisAnglo-world. Mass consumption expanded in the English-speaking world after 1850, andBritish tastes developed in the colonial markets, facilitating trade with Britain. A sharedsense of Britishness, although exclusionary and white-preferential, not only created trustand interdependence between mother country and settler societies but also helped shapeconsumption preferences. Strong personal ties and attachments increased the consumptionof British products in settler societies. White intra-imperial trade was supported by acommon currency, a common language, and preferential agreements, and cultural ties
generated economic growth in the Anglo-world. It was also a time of deep integration
between the Anglo-American economies. Capital investment flowed freely across the
Atlantic from the City of London, providing funds for expansion and growth. Between
1865 and 1914, over 800 million pounds of British capital was exported to the UnitedStates, representing one-fifth of the world’s capital exports. In return, United States
agriculture enriched the British market, and grain, meat, and cheese were exported in large
quantities to Britain, with a quarter of British meat imported from the United States in 1890
and 70% of British grain imported from the United States by 1900. The economic vitalityof the United States was now undeniable, and massive capital investment, rapid
development of science, technology, and infrastructure, and a growing urban population
fueled the country’s economic growth. Between 1860 and 1900, manufacturing grew
dramatically in the industrial Northeast, its output quadrupled, and the United States
showed the world a new model of capitalism (Takeuchi, 2019, p. 4; Magee and Thompson,
2010, p. 173; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 15-16, 20).
However, it is appropriate to consider such an Anglo-world as related to, but clearly
distinct from, the global political and economic system centered on the United Kingdom,
collectively called the British world-system, or the British world in the broadest sense, asJohn Darwin argued. Darwin saw the Dominion countries as the bridgeheads of the British
world and further emphasized the existence of the British world-system, including thedependencies of the British Empire (India and Asian and African colonies) and the“informal empires” (China and Argentina). However, unlike the Anglo-world, it excluded
the United States (Takeuchi, 2019, pp. 4-5; Darwin, 2009; Kenny and Pearce 2018, p. 14).
In the next chapter, we will examine how the Anglosphere concept, based on the“racialized identity” of the Anglo-Saxon nation revealed above, has been shaped in British
political discourse since the 1860s.

4Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere

2. Origins of the Anglosphere Initiative:
From the Greater Britain Initiative to Churchill(1) The Greater Britain Initiative – Charles Dilke and John Seeley
A small number of specialized studies have sought to understand the intellectual origins of
the Anglosphere concept in Victorian Britain. Duncan Bell, in particular, presented asophisticated discussion of the various imperial federal movements. According to Bell, theorigins of the modern Anglosphere concept, which did not include the United States, can betraced back to discussions on the imperial federation under the Greater Britain initiative
after the late 1860s (Bell, 2007; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 4, 17; Mycock and Wellings,
2019, p. 7). The leading exponents of this theory were the British Liberal politician Charles
Dilke and the Cambridge University historian John Seeley.
Charles Dilke popularized the concept of Greater Britain in 1868 with the publication of
his travel book entitled Greater Britain. He traveled not only to the United States, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand but also to India and the Pacific Islands, each of which heargued was a territory of the Anglo-Saxon peoples, although each country had different
national characteristics based on differences in geography and social conditions. He wrote
the following in the preface to Greater Britain:
In 1866 and 1867, I followed England round the world: everywhere I was in Englishspeaking, or in English-governed lands. If I remarked that climate, soil, manners of life,that mixture with other peoples had modified the blood, I saw, too, that in essentials therace was always one.
The idea which in all the length of my travels has been at once my fellow and myguide – a key wherewith to unlock the hidden things of strange new lands – is aconception, however imperfect, of the grandeur of our race, already girdling the earth,which it is destined, perhaps, eventually to overspread (Dilke, 2009a, p. vii).
Late Victorian thinkers like Dilke were influenced by a virulent type of “scientificracism” focused on social evolution that tended to justify the violent oppression of nonwhite indigenous peoples, as highlighted in recent studies on settler colonialism (Veracini,
2010; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 19). Hence, in Greater Britain, Dilke initially used theconcept of Greater Britain as a synonym for the entire British Empire, but in the latter partof his book, he argued that the concept of Greater Britain should be limited to “Englishspeaking, white-inhabited, and self-governed lands” (Dilke, 2009b, p. 149). Dilke thenargued that “that which raises us above the provincialism of citizenship of little England is
our citizenship of the greater Saxondom which includes all that is best and wisest in theworld” (Dilke, 2009b, pp. 155-156).
On the other hand, historian John Seeley published The Expansion of England in 1883, in
which he used the concept of Greater Britain. Seeley also defined the concept very broadly,
including four large groups of territories outside of England that were settled primarily by
Englishmen and subject to the Queen’s sovereignty [that is, (1) Canada, (2) the West Indies,(3) South Africa, and (4) Australia and New Zealand] and India (also subject to the Queen’s
sovereignty and governed by Englishmen, but entirely settled by different peoples) (Seeley,
2005, p. 10). Like Dilke, however, Seeley’s definition of Greater Britain underwent several
changes in the same book. At one point, he argued that Greater Britain was raciallyhomogeneous (with a few exceptions) and thus could not incorporate India, but later he

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
argued that there were actually two Greater Britains, one the colonial empire settled
primarily by Englishmen, as mentioned above, and the other India, which he called thedependency. He argued that in important respects they were opposites. Nevertheless,throughout his book, Seeley was keen to emphasize the fundamental differences between
the colonial empire and India and to emphasize the importance of the former (Bell, 2007, p.
8). In fact, Seely stated the following:
Our [British] colonial Empire stands on quite a different footing; it has some of thefundamental conditions of stability. There are in general three ties by which states areheld together, community of race, community of religion, community of interest. By the
first two our colonies [referring to the colonial empire] are evidently bound to us, andthis fact by itself makes the connexion strong. It will grow indissolubly firm if we cometo recognise also that interest bids us maintain the connexion, and this conviction seems
to gain ground. When we inquire then into the Greater Britain of the future we ought tothink much more of our Colonial than of our Indian Empire (Seeley, 2005, p. 11).
Further, Seeley considered the colonial empire as Greater Britain and emphasized thestrength of its ties:
Greater Britain [......] is united by blood and religion, and though circumstances may
be imagined in which these ties might snap, yet they are strong ties, and will only give
way before some violent dissolving force (Seeley, 2005, pp. 50-51).
As one of the standard bearers of the Imperial Federation League (1884–1893), Seeley
envisioned the establishment of a Greater Britain federal government that would unite
England and the colonial empires (Baji, 2019, p. 210). This was because, already in theearly 1870s, the German Empire was rising in Europe and Russia in Asia, and in order tocompete with these countries, England felt the need to federate with its colonial empires,
following the example of the federalization of the United States of America. Seeley statedthat there were two options for the way forward for Greater Britain: One option is for eachof the colonial empires to become independent. In this case, one would have to consider
whether Canada and the West Indies would be better off as U.S. possessions, but in any
case, English name and institutions would prevail, and the mother country would always
continue to be regarded with friendly sentiment, even if secession were to be declared.
Another option would be for England to bring together her very separate colonial empires
into a federal state, as the United States had so easily accomplished. In that case, England
would be a first-class country in terms of both population and area, on par with the UnitedStates and Russia, and would surpass the continental powers. Of course, size is notnecessarily the same as greatness, and mere material size may be sacrificed if it is morally
and intellectually possible to maintain first-class status. However, it is advisable to make adecision on federalization after due consideration (Seeley, 2005, pp. 15-16).
Seeley’s drive for such a federal state was motivated by the belief that science andtechnology (steam engines and the telegraph) had shortened time and spatial distance, justas modern-day enthusiasts of the Anglosphere concept point to Internet technology as an
example:In the last century [the 18th century] there could be no Greater Britain in the true6

Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglospheresense of the word, because of the distance between the mother-country and its colonies
and between the colonies themselves. This impediment exists no longer. Science has
given to the political organism a new circulation, which is steam, and a new nervous
system, which is electricity (Seeley, 2005, pp. 73-74).
Seeley emphasized “liberty” and “democracy” as the political ideology of a Greater
Britain united by such science and technology (Seeley, 2005, p. 7). In this, too, Seeley issimilar to contemporary Anglosphere enthusiasts.
However, in contrast to Greater Britain, which consisted of colonial empires, Seeley, inthe latter part of The Expansion of England, referred to India as an entity that could not be
assimilated into Greater Britain:
England’s connexion with India seems at first sight at least to be in the highest degree
unnatural. There is no natural tie whatever between the two countries. No communityof blood; no community of religion, for we come as Christians into a population divided
between Brahminism and Mohammedanism (Seeley, 2005, p. 185).
The English State is powerful there [India], but the English nation is but animperceptible drop in the ocean of an Asiatic population. And when a nation extends
itself into other territories the chances are that it will there meet with other nationalities
which it cannot destroy or completely drive out, even if it succeeds in conquering them.
When this happens, it has a great and permanent difficulty to contend with. The subject
or rival nationalities cannot be perfectly assimilated, and remain as a permanent causeof weakness and danger (Seeley, 2005, p. 46).
Seeley argued that such dangers could have been avoided in the colonial empires ofGreater Britain. Like Dilke, he justified the violent oppression of non-white indigenous
people, believing that England had occupied “parts of the globe which were so empty”.
There was land for every emigrant who chose to come, and the native races were not in
a condition sufficiently advanced to withstand even the peaceful competition, much lessthe power, of the immigrants (Seeley, 2005, p. 46).
Hence, Seeley made a clear distinction between Greater Britain, which consisted of thecolonial empires, and India, arguing that possession of India would surely increase thedanger to England and make it a serious liability (Seeley, 2005, p. 11). In this sense, Seeley
could be said to have anticipated the late 19th century perspective that emphasized the“global colour line” separating the white and non-white worlds (Lake and Reynolds, 2011).
(2) Joseph Chamberlain’s Tariff Reform Movement and the Round Table Movement
Seeley’s The Expansion of England strongly influenced Joseph Chamberlain, who
promoted the tariff reform movement between 1903 and 1906. Chamberlain was obsessedwith Seeley’s Imperial Federalist movement and not only enrolled his eldest son, Austen
Chamberlain, at Cambridge University, where Seeley was a professor, but also shared
Seeley’s admiration for the United States (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 26-27). The tariffreform movement was initiated by Joseph Chamberlain, beginning with his Birmingham
speech on May 15, 1903. However, his imperial preferential tariff concept did not apply to
Indians and other alien imperial subjects, but only to “our own kinsfolk” or the “white

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
population that constitutes the majority in all the great self-governing Colonies of the[British] Empire.” In response to criticism that free trade with other countries was
outpacing trade within the British Empire, he responded that trade with the colonies was
growing faster and was more valuable to Britain. This answer was repeated in modern
times by Eurosceptic advocates who emphasized trade with the Anglosphere to counter
trade with the European Union (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 27-28).
Joseph Chamberlain’s campaign for tariff reform was ultimately frustrated by the hostilityof the free traders, who dominated the British political economy, and the working class.
The commercial, financial, and shipping interests centered in the City of London, alongwith the cotton, coal, and shipbuilding businesses, opposed the tariff reform movement, as
did the working class, because they believed that such reform would increase food prices(Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 28).
However, Imperial Federalist movement was later succeeded by Alfred Milner, Joseph
Chamberlain’s ally and commissioner to South Africa, and Milner’s kindergarten,
consisting of young men from Oxford University whom Milner had recruited. Milner’skindergarten was a tight-knit political society organized to serve Milner and his successor,
Lord Selborne, and included Lionel Curtis, a writer and fellow at All Souls College,
Oxford; Leo Amery, the Conservative MP and future colonial secretary; and Philip Kerr,
the future Lord Lothian, who later served as Lloyd George’s private secretary, undersecretary of state to India and British ambassador to Washington (Kenny and Pearce, 2018,
pp. 29-30).
Led by Lionel Curtis, the Millner kindergarten drafted the Selbourne Memorandum of
1907, which proposed uniting South Africa under a new federation, but also advocated for
unification through federation of the entire British Empire. The Round Table movement
was launched as a means to realize these ambitions. Curtis organized a network of Round
Table societies in the Dominions, and Philip Kerr edited the Round Table journals. The first
product of the Round Table movement was the Green memorandum, drafted by Curtis andpublished in 1910. In it, he argued, like the imperial federalists before him, that the British
Empire was now in a struggle for survival. It was particularly vulnerable to German naval
expansion and could only be secured by joint investment in imperial defense and security,especially sea power. He stated that Greater Britain must “federate or disintegrate”. Like
his predecessors, however, his plan was criticized as pessimistic, hasty, and unrealistic. The
Dominion states were not ready for federation, for it was believed that the British
Parliament would not cede its sovereignty to a higher political body. The exclusion of India
and the other dependencies from the federalization concept also annoyed and divided
Curtis’s readers (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 30-32).
The period between the end of the 19th century and the two World Wars was a time ofintensified racial discrimination, as Dominion countries took measures to tighten
restrictions on non-white immigrants. The British government maintained the principle of“imperial citizenship,” or the equal treatment of British subjects throughout the British
Empire, but it also recognized the right of the self-governing colonies to enforce their own
immigration laws. In particular, Indians were still deprived of their self-governing status
and faced racial discrimination in the Dominion countries. At the Imperial Conferences of1921 and 1923, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were persuaded to rescind their racist
laws against Indians (South Africa refused and became isolated), but the tension between
imperial citizenship and the autonomy of the Dominion countries was too great to becontained any longer (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 33-34).

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Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
It was also during this period that the path to Dominion countries’ exercising the right toself-determination became clear. The Imperial Conference of 1926 issued the Balfour
Declaration, defining the status of Dominion countries as “autonomous Communities
within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any
aspect of their domestic or external affairs, through united by a common allegiance to the
Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations”. This
carefully crafted principle was codified in the 1931 Statute of Westminster, which
established the independence of the legislatures of the Dominion countries, including the
Irish Free State. Paradoxically, the independence of the Dominion countries led to a brief
revival of the tariff reform movement. By the 1930s, the economic depression, the collapseof the gold standard, and the rise of protectionism strengthened the political argument for
an imperial preferential tariff, and when Britain left the gold standard in 1931, theDominion countries also devalued with it and created a sterling area. At the Ottawa
Conference of 1932, Neville Chamberlain, son of Joseph Chamberlain, negotiated anagreement with the empire countries to grant preferential tariffs on each other’s products,
and although Britain gained relatively little form this agreement, an imperial preferential
tariff system was established. Between 1929 and 1938, British imports from Australia andCanada more than doubled, while imports from Argentina fell by almost half (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 34-35).
Although the imperial federalists could not create a single political organization thatwould unite the “imagined community” of Greater Britain, the political, economic, andcultural ties between Britain and the Dominion countries nevertheless remained real andstrong.
(3) Winston Churchill’s vision of international orderHistorian Andrew Roberts, who wrote A History of the English-Speaking Peoples Since
1900 (2006), a sequel to Winston Churchill’s A History of the English-Speaking Peoples(1956-58), points to the origins of the Anglosphere concept, including the United States, inWorld War I, particularly Winston Churchill’s inaugural speech of the English-Speaking
Union on July 4, 1917 (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 6; Churchill, 2015; Roberts, 2008).
However, it was not until the decisive decline of the British Empire after World War II that
the Anglo-American core of the Anglosphere, “Anglo-America,” was clearly formed. When
World War II began, the Dominion countries sent troops to support Britain, but the heavy
defeats from 1940 to 1942 dispelled any notion that the mother country could guarantee thesecurity of the Dominion countries. Canada, Australia, and New Zealand came to rely on
the United States as the guarantor of their security, Ireland became a republic, and India
gained its independence (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 14, 36).
While Churchill did not use the concept of the Anglosphere in his History of the EnglishSpeaking Peoples, he praised the political and cultural achievements of the Englishspeaking Anglo-Saxon peoples. He noted that the Anglo-Saxon peoples constantly won
wars, expanded trade, and promoted freedom, security, and welfare, all because of theirliberal political culture and institutions. He held to Victorian beliefs about racial hierarchies
and believed in the cultural superiority of the Anglo-Saxon race, but he also held a liberal
belief in the obligation to act humanely toward other peoples. Hence, he was sharply
critical of Nazi Germany’s racial exploitation and violence and declared that Britain and
the British Empire would fight to the end against Hitler (Churchill, 2015; Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 39, 40-41; Legrand, 2019, p. 64; Vucetic, 2011, p. 2).

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
When World War II broke out, Churchill, as British Prime Minister, persuaded the UnitedStates to join the European front, and the financial support provided by the United States to
Britain after 1941, mainly through the Lend-Lease scheme, was considered necessary tosupport the British war effort. It was also considered necessary to promote the formation ofa liberal international order and to make the European imperialist powers, especially
Britain, respect the principle of self-determination as expressed in the Atlantic Charter of1941. Churchill, under considerable pressure by the United States to abandon Britain’s
imperialist ambitions, repeatedly made rhetorical references to the common history andfuture unity of English-speaking peoples to resolve such Anglo-American differences of
opinion. For Churchill, the deep historical relationship between Britain and the UnitedStates was the basis for shaping a new international order that would protect the interests of
the British Empire while respecting the ambitions of the United States, safeguarding thesecurity and prosperity of Western nations, and helping to build a new era of liberal
civilization (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 46-47, 49-50).
Churchill’s first public statement regarding the special relationship between Britain andthe United States was the “Iron Curtain” speech that he delivered at Westminster College inFulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946. In his speech, Churchill used grand rhetoric, statingthat Britain and the United States were bound together by an English tradition of
governance, a common heritage of representative democracy and freedom that had evolved
over the centuries and had been carried far by previous generations of immigrants (Kennyand Pearce, 2018, pp. 50-51; Vucetic, 2011, p. 2):
Neither the sure prevention of war, nor the continuous rise of world organisation will be
gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking
peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth andEmpire and the United States. [......] The United States has already a Permanent
Defence Agreement with the Dominion of Canada, which is so devotedly attached to
the British Commonwealth and Empire. This Agreement is more effective than many of
those which have often been made under formal alliances. This principle should be
extended to all British Commonwealths with full reciprocity. Thus, whatever happens,
and thus only, shall we be secure ourselves and able to work together for the high andsimple causes that are dear to us and bode no ill to any. Eventually there may come - I
feel eventually there will come-the principle of common citizenship (Churchill, 1946).
[......] we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom
and the rights of man which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world andwhich through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, trial by jury, andthe English common law find their most famous expression in the American Declarationof Independence (Churchill, 1946).
Churchill’s theory of history still has many adherents, many of whom believe that
Churchill was right. In fact, it seems Churchill was right because although decolonization
destroyed the British Empire, it left behind a distinct but loosely knit community deeplycommitted to freedom, democracy, the rule of law, and English as the lingua franca. The“Iron Curtain” speech was delivered precisely as the English-speaking peoples weretriumphing over the fascist axis of Nazi Germany and as they embarked on another war
against Soviet communism (Vucetic, 2011, pp. 2-3). He spoke gravely about these events:

10Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody
knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organisation intends to doin the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive andproselytising tendencies. [......] From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, aniron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of
the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna,
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations
around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject in one form or
another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing
measure of control from Moscow. [......] The Communist parties, which were very small
in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far
beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control. Police
governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia,
there is no true democracy. [......] Except in the British Commonwealth and in the
United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth
columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilisation. These aresombre facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so muchsplendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy (Churchill,1946).
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the core countries of the Anglosphere have moved
forward in close cooperation, and their partnership has been shaped by agreements on
defense and intelligence. While on its face this was a matter of collective security against
the Soviet Union, which was building up its armed forces (Legrand, 2019, p. 56), the senseof ethnic community it evoked was undoubtedly rooted in the racial thinking about the statethat Churchill had acquired in his youth (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 53).
At a meeting of the British Conservative Party in 1948, Churchill pointed out that theUnited Kingdom was located at the intersection of “three majestic circles” in international
relations. The first circle was the British Commonwealth and Empire, the second was the
English-speaking world in which the Dominion countries and the United States played an
important role, and the third was United Europe, which he argued Britain was at theintersection of. For Churchill, however, involvement in United Europe was secondary to
his concern for British security and the Anglo-American alliance. This was an issue hebecame particularly interested in during the 1940s because of growing concerns about
whether the United States would continue to provide defensive assistance to Western
Europe in the face of a possible Soviet invasion. By the 1960s, Commonwealth markets
was no longer economically profitable for Britain, and there was a growing desire for
Britain to start over as part of European Communities. The imperialist lineage that
Churchill had so strongly supported appeared to have become obsolete. However, as we
will examine in the next chapter, the Anglosphere concept would not disappear and wouldin fact be revived after the end of the Cold War (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 55-58;
Dilley, 2018).

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3. The Anglosphere Initiative Today(1) Anglobalization
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the Anglosphere wasresurrected and became a potent way of imagining Britain’s future as a globally deregulated
and privatized economy outside the European Union. This understanding of theinternational order, combined with a political discourse predicting the triumph of“Anglobalization” in the 21st century, came to be seen by the Anglosphere advocates as acelebration of neoconservative liberal imperialism and economic neoliberalism (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 4, 140; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 9).
Understood as having special ties, the five core Anglosphere countries (the United States,
the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) share a common international
language (English) and a common law-based legal system, maintain strong civil societies
born of liberal democratic traditions, promote free trade principles, and have cooperative
military and intelligence services (Legrand, 2019, pp. 56-57; Mycock and Wellings, 2019,p. 9). In this post-Cold War era of “Anglobalization,” new threats to U.S. hegemony havealso emerged. China began its remarkable rise in Asia, and new conflicts erupted in the
Middle East, including the Gulf War. The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the
United States led to a war on terrorism, with fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, p. 132).
In the war on terror, several core Anglosphere countries responded to the military call of
the United States, but political conflicts also arose, especially in the war in Iraq. AustralianPrime Minister John Howard (term 1996–2007), a monarchist who ardently supported theBritish legacy, immediately invoked the ANZUS Treaty after the terrorist attacks in the
United States and sent Australian troops first to the war in Afghanistan and later to the war
in Iraq. However, Australian military involvement in the Iraq War was limited. Canada
refused to contribute supplies to the war in Iraq, and New Zealand decided not to invade
Iraq because of the lack of United Nations authorization for the use of military force. The
Labour government of Tony Blair in the United Kingdom, which came to power in 1997,
invaded Iraq but attempted to get the United States to obtain multilateral support and UN
authorization for the invasion, while using the special relationship between the United
Kingdom and the United States to bridge the gap between the United States and theEuropean Union and seeking to revitalize the Middle East peace process. Unfortunately, allof these efforts failed.
However, the Eurosceptic enthusiasts who supported the Iraq war gained vitality from thedivisions it created. The alliance between the United Kingdom and the United States andthe refusal of major governments in the European Union, led by France and Germany, tojoin the Iraq war were seen as confirmation of the fundamental unity of the United
Kingdom and the United States and of the irreconcilable differences between the United
Kingdom and the European Union. In particular, Canadian Conservative Prime Minister
Stephen Harper (term 2006–2015) shared many of John Howard’s ideological leanings,
was skeptical of the United Nations and other multilateral institutions, and reoriented
Canadian foreign policy toward a neoconservative position. He also promoted policies thatsymbolized Canada’s loyalty to the Crown, such as restoring royal titles to the Canadian
Air Force and Navy and ordering Queen Elizabeth II’s portrait to be displayed in diplomatic
missions abroad. Early in his premiership, Harper delivered a Churchillian speech,
declaring that the “little island [Britain]” and the “great Dominion [Canada]” were forever

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Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglospherelinked by language, culture, economy, and values (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 5, 133-136,
141-142).
(2) Robert Conquest and James C. Bennett
The Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank in the United States, held conferences on
the Anglosphere in Washington, D.C., and Berkshire in 1999 and 2000. Its leading
participants included Margaret Thatcher, David Davis, Conrad Black, Francis Fukuyama,
James C. Bennett, John O’Sullivan, Robert Conquest, Owen Harries, and Kenneth Minogue(Mycock and Wellings, 2019, p. 5). Here, we focus on the writings of Robert Conquest andJames C. Bennett, two of the most influential advocates of the Anglosphere.
In his Reflections on a Ravaged Century (2000), Conquest, an authoritative scholar ofSoviet Union history, concluded that the political system in the West was flawed andargued that the European Union had not been the element of strength that some had hopedfor. He called instead for a more fruitful union of the core countries of the Anglosphere.
Conquest himself believed that Britain should remain in the European Union and join the
new association of nations, the Anglosphere, and become a bridge between the two. It was
far more attractive for Britain to maintain historical relations with the core nations of theAnglosphere, built on cultural ties, a common history, and similar political institutions,than to fight to preserve its own sovereignty within the bureaucratic and heterogeneousmodel of the European Union. In Dragons of Expectation (2005), Conquest described how
an alliance of the core countries of the Anglosphere would be organized, claiming that thepresidents of this alliance would be the President of the United States and the Queen ofEngland. This idea gained support from many intellectuals and politicians. Margaret
Thatcher supported Conquest’s idea of contrasting the Anglosphere with the European
Union, saying that an alliance of the core countries of the Anglosphere would redefine thepolitical landscape. This attracted the attention of conservative politicians andcommentators, including Lord Howell, who served as Minister of State for International
Energy Policy at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Conquest, 2001, pp. 267288; Conquest, 2006, pp. 229-230; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 125-128; Howell, 2014).
Meanwhile, James C. Bennett, a technology entrepreneur, wrote The Anglosphere
Challenge (2004), arguing that in the 21st century, the core Anglosphere countries, which
are English-speaking countries, would be likely to cooperate and dominate international
relations. This is because, as a result of the rapid development of global network due to theadvent of Internet technology, English, the lingua franca, has become even more important,and a common English-derived culture characterized by freedom, democracy, the rule oflaw, and basic human rights has become important as a basis for economic cooperation andpolitical and military allegiance within the Anglosphere. At the core of that common
culture was the English tradition of individualism. Bennett noted that advances in digitaland other technologies were breaking down geographic barriers and creating newopportunities for trade with remote areas, and that increased economic cooperation among
the core countries of the Anglosphere foreshadowed the emergence of a loose coalition
with other “like-minded countries.” He also praised the existence of “English-speaking
networks” that unite English-speaking countries and the intelligence-sharing mechanism
known as Five Eyes. Bennett cautioned against the pursuit of multiculturalism in the core
Anglosphere countries and the loss of the “national cohesion” that had enabled the
reproduction of such values, but he stressed that the organic cooperation that characterized
the Anglosphere was far superior to the bureaucratic and artificial projects of the European

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Union (Bennett, 2004; Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 128-130; Mycock and Wellings, 2019,p. 6).
(3) Brexit, Global Britain, and the Indo-PacificInfluenced by these writings emphasizing the importance of the Anglosphere, theEurosceptics in the British Conservative Party and the think tanks, political magazines,
lobbying groups, and intellectuals surrounding it began to seriously consider the possibilityof an Anglosphere outside the European Union. This trend was further reinforced when the2010 British general election ended the long reign of the Labour Party and a coalition
government of the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats was formed (Kenny and
Pearce, 2018, pp. 144-145).
This increased political interest in the Anglosphere was also motivated by the growing
support for the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which won large numbers of votes in the2004 and 2009 European Parliament elections, and the prospect of a British exit from theEuropean Union became increasingly real. When Poland and other Eastern European
countries joined the European Union in 2004 and the number of Eastern European
immigrants to the United Kingdom increased, Nigel Farage, the leader of the UKIP, said
that remaining in the European Union would make it impossible for the United Kingdom tocontrol the flow of immigrants. He stoked the fears of the British public about immigrationand established the UKIP as a radical right-wing populist party. In the 2014 European
Parliament elections, the UKIP came out on top, winning more than a quarter of the vote.
The party’s breakthrough was one of the most important factors behind Prime Minister
David Cameron’s pledge to hold a referendum on Britain’s exit from the European Union
during the 2015 British general election campaign (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, pp. 145, 154).
The UKIP’s manifesto during this period emphasized the history and ties between the UK
and the Commonwealth, arguing that they had been betrayed and ignored by previous
governments. In the 2010 general election, the UKIP positioned itself as the “party of theCommonwealth” and argued for a Commonwealth Free Trade Area. In the 2015 generalelection, it made explicit reference to an Anglosphere. The United Kingdom is not justanother European country but part of the Anglosphere, a global community. Beyond theEuropean Union and the Commonwealth, there is a network of Anglosphere countries thatshare English as the lingua franca, common law, the democratic tradition, and the benefitsof global trade. The UKIP stated that it wanted to foster close ties with these Anglospherecountries, from India to the United States and from New Zealand to the Caribbean. In
addition, after the 2010 general election in the United Kingdom, William Hague, Boris
Johnson, David Davis, Michael Gove, and Daniel Hannan, all major figures in the British
Conservative Party, began to publicly declare the Anglosphere’s potential as acounterweight to the European Union. They sought closer ties with conservative
governments in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand and increased engagement with theCommonwealth and Anglosphere countries. David Davis said, “We share history, culture
and language. We have family ties. We even share similar legal systems. The usual barriers
to trade are largely absent” (Kenny and Pearce, 2018, p. 145; Mycock and Wellings, 2019,
pp. 10, 15).
The decision to leave the European Union, formalized in a referendum on June 23, 2016,
led the British government to officially declare its Global Britain initiative based on the
Anglosphere. Boris Johnson, a politician strongly influenced by Churchill’s achievements,
as Foreign Secretary in Theresa May’s cabinet revived the idea of a British military14

Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglospherepresence east of Suez, an idea that had been abandoned since the late 1960s. In a speech in
Bahrain in December 2016, Johnson stated that the UK would open a naval support facility
there, create a resident force in Oman, and establish new defense staff centers in Dubai andSingapore. Also in March 2018, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office submitted amemorandum titled “The Government’s Vision of Global Britain and the Role of theForeign and Commonwealth Office in Supporting and Enabling Government Departments
to Deliver This Vision” to the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs SelectCommittee. While placing top priority on the alliance with the United States, thememorandum declared that the United Kingdom would place emphasis on the Indo-Pacificregion, which would become the center of global economic growth. On September 4, 2021,
after Johnson became Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, a fleet including Britain’s
new aircraft carrier, the HMS Queen Elizabeth, arrived in Yokosuka, Japan. It was a
symbolic event that signaled Britain’s increasing focus on the Indo-Pacific region incooperation with Anglosphere countries (Johnson, 2014; Akimoto, 2021, pp. 84-90; Kennyand Pearce, 2018, pp. 146, 160; Akimoto, 2022, pp. 312-315).

Conclusion
This paper has traced the historical genealogy of the Anglosphere concept from the Greater
Britain concept of the late 19th century to the Global Britain concept after Brexit. In
concluding this paper, I must emphasize the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept. The
legacy of empire still looms over the Anglosphere, and some have criticized its racist
origins, calling it “Empire 2.0.” Its central theme is that defenders of the Anglosphere
everywhere seem to take an overly positive and uncritical view of the legacy of the British
imperial past and express nostalgia for the empire.
The Anglosphere concept appears to be dominated by ideology rather than by economic
interests. Indeed, in the Indo-Pacific region, there are free trade agreements that involve thecore countries of the Anglosphere (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand), such as theTrans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and the Comprehensive and Progressive
Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In addition, the United States President
Joe Biden has called for an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF).
However, the argument presented as the basis for the claim that the Anglosphere countries
are potentially important trading partners for the UK—that UK exports to the
Commonwealth countries have increased much faster than those to the European Union
over the past decade—is questionable. This is because, in aggregate terms, theCommonwealth countries have accounted for a relatively small share of UK exports (6–8%) over the past two decades, whereas the European Union has accounted for almost halfof all UK exports. The relative decline of the European Union as a trading partner is theresult of the rise of China rather than the growing importance of the Commonwealth.
Although Britain hopes to revitalize the Commonwealth through the development of tradewith India, there is still no agreement on the status of countries outside the core
Anglosphere, especially English-speaking countries like India, Singapore, South Africa,and Ireland. It appears to be difficult to actualize the Anglosphere beyond cooperation in
the security field, such as Five Eyes, the Trilateral Security Partnership between Australia,
the United Kingdom and the United States (AUKUS), and the Quadrilateral Security
Dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India (QUAD) (Kenny and

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MAHITO TAKEUCHI
Pearce, 2018, p. 160; Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 17-18).
Moreover, the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States
has not always been rock solid. In fact, successive political leaders of the United States
have understood British membership in the European Union as a solution to the decline anddismantling of the British Empire. In fact, President Obama opposed Brexit from thisperspective, inviting considerable criticism from those in favor of Britain leaving theEuropean Union. The Trump presidency also exposed the fragility of the Anglo-American
unity and its special relationship (Mycock and Wellings, 2019, pp. 10, 12).
The future challenge for the core countries of the Anglosphere will be how to overcome
the racist origins of the Anglosphere concept and the negative legacy of imperialism towork with the Asian and African democracies in the Indo-Pacific region while maintaining
the Anglo-American special relationship. Japan, as a “like-minded” Asian democracy withsimilarities to the core countries of the Anglosphere, could play a role in bringing thespecial Anglo-American relationship closer together and acting as a bridge between thecore countries of the Anglosphere and the democracies of Asia and Africa. However, forJapan to fulfill this role, it must, like the core countries of the Anglosphere, reflect on andstrive to overcome the negative legacy of past imperialism.
This paper is an English translation of a previously published paper in Japanese (Mahito
Takeuchi, “Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere”, Nihon University College ofCommerce, The Study of Business and Industry, No. 39, 2023). It is part of the research
results of the research project entitled “Research on Alignment among Nations: the Case of
the Commonwealth,” funded by the Nihon University College of Commerce (joint
research) for the 2019–2021 academic years (under the jurisdiction of the ResearchInstitute of Commerce).

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Genealogy of the Idea of the Anglosphere
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