Research Briefing
22 August 2024
By Claire Mills
Esme Kirk-Wade

The cost of the UK's strategic
nuclear deterrent

Summary
1
Background
2 Historical costs
3 Cost of procuring and operating the existing nuclear deterrent
4 Cost of the replacing the nuclear deterrent

commonslibrary.parliament.uk

Number 8166

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

Image Credits
HMS Vanguard by Defence Imagery, Licensed under CC BY-NC-ND-2.0.
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Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

Contents
Summary

4

1

Background7

2

Historical costs

9

2.1

V-Bomber Force9

2.2

Polaris10

3

Cost of procuring and operating the existing nuclear deterrent

12

3.1

Acquisition costs

12

3.2

Annual maintenance and running costs

13

Amalgamation of spending under the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE)
14
4

Cost of the replacing the nuclear deterrent

16

4.1

The Dreadnought SSBN programme

16

Overall acquisition costs

16

What has been spent on Dreadnought so far?

17

Projection of in-service costs

18

Replacement warhead programme

19

Consideration at the next spending review

20

4.3

Wider costs associated with the nuclear deterrent

21

4.4

Alternative cost estimates

22

4.5

Who will pay for it?

23

The longstanding debate over budgetary responsibility

23

2023 - a ringfenced budget

28

The next spending review

28

Comparison to other areas of government spending

28

4.2

4.6

3

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

Summary
Since the acquisition of the UK’s first strategic nuclear deterrent in the 1950s,
the cost of procuring and maintaining it, and which Government department
should finance it, has always been a matter of debate.
Ascertaining precise costs for the nuclear deterrent can be difficult, as thisinformation is not easily available from public sources. The nuclear deterrent
is also supported by an overarching, and complex, network of programmes,
infrastructure, equipment and people, which is referred to as the Defence
Nuclear Enterprise (DNE). Separating out individual costs for the nuclear
deterrent from within that structure is not straightforward, particularly since2023 when the government started reporting all nuclear-related spending asa single line (the DNE) in its departmental estimates.
Synergies between the civilian nuclear sector and the defence nuclear
enterprise complicate that picture further.

Cost of the current nuclear deterrent
The UK’s current nuclear deterrent is provided by four Vanguard-classballistic missile submarines (SSBN) which house the Trident II D5A missile andassociated Mk4A/Holbrook warhead. The decision to procure Trident, as it ismore commonly referred, was taken in the early 1980s. Spending on the
programme was largely complete by the time of the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review. Total acquisition expenditure on the programme was £12.52 billion,
which equates to approximately £23 billion in 2023/24 prices.
Prior to 2023, annual in-service costs, which also included the costs of theAtomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the Nuclear Warhead Sustainment
Capability Programme, basing, decommissioning and disposals, were
estimated at 6% of the defence budget (£3 billion for 2022/23). In 2023 thedecision was taken to bring all nuclear-related programmes and expenditure,including in-service running costs of the deterrent, under one heading: theDefence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), and to ringfence it within the MOD budget.
In doing so, direct comparisons of in-service costs are no longer possible.

Replacing the nuclear deterrent
A programme is currently underway to replace the Vanguard-classsubmarines from the early 2030s.

4Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

The estimated cost of the design and manufacture of a new Dreadnoughtclass of four SSBN is £31 billion, including inflation over the life of the
programme. A £10 billion contingency has also been set aside, making a
potential of £41 billion for the Dreadnought programme. As of March 2023,
20% of the contingency had been accessed so far.
In 2016 the goverment said that it expected in-service costs for the nucleardeterrent, once the new Dreadnought SSBN entered service, to continue atapproximately 6% of the defence budget. Following the decision in 2023 toamalgamate all nuclear-related spend under a single DNE budget, however,
the government said that an “equivalent comparison” for future in-service
costs was no longer possible.
A programme to replace the UK’s nuclear warhead was also confirmed in
February 2020. The programme is in its early stages and the MOD has not yet
assigned an estimated total cost. Work to agree future funding arrangements
is currently underway.

Wider costs
The decision to amalgamate nuclear spending under one budget heading: theDefence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), reflects the increasing interdependence
between the nuclear deterrent and the Royal Navy’s other conventional
nuclear-powered submarine programmes, including the new AUKUS-SSN
being developed in conjunction with the US and Australia. This is particularly
relevant to the costs associated with basing, infrastructure and nuclear
propulsion.
There are various costs associated with the nuclear deterrent and its
replacement that are not part of the £31 billion capital costs of theDreadnought programme but fall within wider spending on the defence
nuclear enterprise. Those costs include the UK’s participation in the US-led
Trident Service-Life Extension programme, extension of the service-life of thecurrent Vanguard-class SSBN, and various basing and nuclear infrastructure
projects.
Spending on nuclear programmes across of the whole Defence Equipment
Plan over the next ten years (2023-2033) is forecast at £117.8 billion, of which£109.8 billion has been budgeted for, currently leaving a deficit of £7.9 billion.
The MOD has said that deficit is “manageable”, although the Public Accounts
Committee has expressed concern.

Who will pay for it?
In line with convention, the Dreadnought programme will be funded from the
MOD’s budget.

5

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

There has been a longstanding debate over budgetary responsibility for the
nuclear deterrent, with frequent calls made for the capital costs of thereplacement programme to be removed from the Ministry of Defence’s
budget.
In 2023 the decision was taken to bring all nuclear-related programmes andexpenditure, including in-service running costs of the deterrent, under one
heading: the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), and to ringfence it within the
MOD budget. The intention is to provide greater flexibility within the nuclear
programme and to insulate the rest of the conventional equipment plan fromany changes in nuclear spending.

6

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

1

Background

Since the acquisition of the UK’s first strategic nuclear deterrent in the 1950s,
the cost of procuring and maintaining it, and which Government department
should finance it, has always been a matter of debate.
Ascertaining historical costs for the nuclear deterrent is difficult and complex,
as this information is not easily available from public sources. Many records
no longer exist, while others were classified. In the past successive
Governments have often not discussed costs on the grounds of operational
security. Historical information has also been presented in many different
forms (i.e. current prices, constant prices, as a percentage of the defence
budget) therefore making it difficult to provide an annual cost that is
calculated in a consistent manner. 1 A cost set out in the early 1960s, forexample, could not be directly compared to costs set out in the 1980s or thepresent day unless they were uprated to take inflation into account.
The decision in 2023 to report all nuclear-related spending (the Defence
Nuclear Enterprise) as a single line in the MOD’s departmental estimates 2 has
also made it difficult to extrapolate costings for individual elements of thenuclear deterrent or to make direct comparisons with previous years. This isparticularly relevant to comparisons of ongoing annual in-service costs.
There are also interdependencies between the Defence Nuclear Enterpriseand the civilian nuclear industry which are not easily identified or costed. 3

1 Related Library briefing papers

1

2

3

7

•

CBP8010, Replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent: Progress of theDreadnought class•

CBP9777, Replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent: The warhead programme

Current prices reflect the value of money at the time costs or benefits are realised, so changes overtime shown in current prices include the effect of inflation. Constant prices adjust for the effect ofinflation and show costs or benefits in money that has the same value over time (i.e. the value ofmoney is held constant for a given base year). Further information is available in the House ofCommons Library Statistical Literacy Guide How to adjust for inflation.
Ministry of Defence, Letter to the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Equipment Plan 20232033: Update on affordability, 4 December 2023 and National Audit Office, The equipment plan
2023-2033 (PDF), HC315, December 2023
These synergies were examined in a March 2024 command paper Delivering the UK’s nuclear
deterrent as a national endeavour, CP1058

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent•

CBP7353, Replacing the UK’s ‘Trident’ nuclear deterrent, July 2016

Further library briefings papers on nuclear weapons, including the UK’s
position on nuclear disarmament, can be found in the World Affairs section of
the House of Commons Library website.

8

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

2

Historical costs

2.1

V-Bomber ForceThe UK’s strategic nuclear deterrent was initially provided by the RAF’s VBomber force. George Ward, the Secretary of State for Air, said in 1957:
It has been said that we are devoting too much of our defence expenditure to
the deterrent, but I can assure the Committee that we are neither starving ourforces in other spheres to produce a British deterrent nor are we devoting thegreater part of our research and development effort to it. In fact, of the wholeof the defence budget, the V-bomber force will this year absorb only about
one-tenth. 4

In March 1958 the government of the time went on to state:
In our present Defence Budget we are spending about one-tenth of our moneyon the nuclear deterrent—our strategic bomber force, its nuclear bombs andthe research and development that go with them, including work on ballistic
missiles. We plan over the next five years to spend roughly the same amountas this year. We are also spending roughly another 10 per cent. on the defence
by conventional forces of our deterrent bases at home. This figure includes thefighter force, the control and warning system, our defensive guided missiles,
and the research and development related to them all. The total of these adds
up only to about one-fifth of our Defence Budget.

Harold Watkinson, then Minister of Defence, reiterated the 10% figure in 1960:
In the defence debate on 20th July, I explained to the House the Government's
plans for an independent British contribution to the nuclear deterrent of theWest, based in the main on the V-bomber element of Bomber Command. This
force is of the highest quality and has a formidable supply of nuclear weapons
available to it. The cost of the strategic nuclear deterrent is expected to run atabout 10% of the defence budget. 5

The nuclear role of the V-force was withdrawn in 1969.

4
5

9

HC Deb 09 May 1957, vol 569 cc1187
HC Deb 26 October 1960, vol 627 c273W

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

2.2

PolarisIn 1962 the UK purchased the submarine-based Polaris system from the UnitedStates, under the Polaris Sales Agreement. In 1968 Polaris entered service andbecame the UK’s main nuclear force.
In March 1981 the MOD put the cost of the Polaris procurement at £330 million,
over a period of nine years (1963-1972). This was roughly equivalent to £2billion in 1980 prices, when the Trident programme began (see below). This
figure did not, however, include the Chevaline modification to Polaris, which
was estimated at a further £1 billion. 6
Discussing how Polaris would be paid for, the Civil Lord of the Admiralty, John
Hay, stated on 2 March 1964:
It has always been the Government's view that the Polaris submarine
programme Polaris being the carrier of the nuclear deterrent, should be takenon the defence budget as a whole; that is to say, it should not fall entirely on
the Navy. For that reason, the defence budget includes a Polaris element. The
extra money that we receive for Polaris is made up partly from additional cashfrom the Treasury and partly from a contribution from each of the Services. 7

In terms of running costs, in 1993 8 and again in 1997 9 the MOD, responding totabled questions, cited disproportionate costs as a reason for not disclosing
the full costs of maintaining the Polaris fleet from 1968 onwards. However, inthe 1997 answer it did set out expenditure on Polaris for the years 1980/81 to
1996/97 (in cash prices). The chart below shows the stated expenditure in realterms at 2023/24 prices:

6

7
8
9

10

HL Deb 24 March 1981, c1155WA and HC Deb 1 March 1983, c113W. Chevaline was a secretive
programme begun by the UK Government in the 1970s to improve the penetrability of the warheads
used by the Polaris missile system. It was only revealed in 1980 shortly before the decision to
procure the current Trident missile system from the US.
HC Deb 2 March 1964, c1080
HC Deb 17 May 1993, c79W
HC Deb 24 June 1997, c425W

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

Source: HC Deb 24 June 1997 c425W; HM Treasury, GDP deflators at market prices, June 2024 (Quarterly
National Accounts)

When asked about the costs of the Chevaline modification in 1990, the MOD
said “It would not be in the national interest to reveal such information”. 10
The Polaris fleet began to leave service in 1994.

10

11

HC Deb 20 March 1990, c524W

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

3

Cost of procuring and operating theexisting nuclear deterrent

In July 1980 the Government decided to replace the Polaris nuclear deterrent
system with Trident, under the terms of the Polaris sales agreement 1963, as
amended for Trident (Treaty Series 086/1980) and (Treaty Series 008/1983).

3.1
Total acquisition
expenditure on the
Trident programmewas £12.52 billion,
which equates toapproximately £23
billion in 2023/24
prices.

Acquisition costs
The then Defence Secretary, Francis Pym, made a statement to the House on
the replacement of the UK’s Polaris strategic nuclear deterrent system with
Trident. In that statement he confirmed that the capital cost of procuring
Trident would be taken out of the existing defence budget, in line withconvention. He commented:
We estimate the capital cost of a four-boat force, at today's prices, as up to £5billion, spread over 15 years. We expect rather over half of the expenditure to
fall in the 1980s. We intend to accommodate this within the defence budget in
the normal way, alongside our other major force improvements […]Of course there will be an effect on other weapons systems, but that is true of
any weapons system. For instance, even the Tornado system—more expensive
than the Polaris successor system that I have just announced—has its effect onother weapons systems. They all interact. But the provision of the strategic
deterrent has always been part of normal defence budgeting. It is a weaponssystem, like any other weapons system – ships, tanks, or whatever it may be.
Within the defence budget this can and will be accommodated in the same
way as Polaris was accommodated 10 to 20 years ago...
Overall this expensive weapons system will take between 3 per cent and 4 percent over the 15-year period, but at its peak years it will be about 5 per cent of
the whole defence budget and 8 per cent of the equipment part of the budget. 11

Further questions about the cost were raised during the debate on procuring
Trident in March 1981. Then Defence Secretary, John Nott, reiterated in thatdebate:The strategic deterrent has been an integral part of the British defence budget
under all Governments up to now. Trident is not an addition to that budget. 12

11
12

12

HC Deb 15 July 1980, c1236- 1251
HC Deb 03 March 1981, c216

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The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

In 1982 and following on from a decision to procure the Trident II D5 missile
instead of the Trident I C4 variant, the capital costs of procuring andmaintaining Trident were £7.5 billion (1981 prices). 13
By the time of the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) the majority of costs
associated with procuring Trident had been spent. The SDR subsequently put
total acquisition expenditure on the Trident programme at £12.52 billion. 14
However, it should be noted that this did not represent a doubling of costs on
the Trident programme. Once inflation over the period 1980-1998 isaccounted for, according to the Treasury’s GDP deflator, £5 billion in 1980 was
worth approximately £12 billion in 1998.
£12.52 billion in 1998 equates to approximately £23 billion in 2023/24 prices. 15
The programme was delivered well within budget, a point that the Defence
Select Committee made in its final report on the Trident acquisition
programme in 1994, and was acknowledged by the Government in its
response to that report:
The Government welcomes the Committee’s recognition that the trident
programme continues to make good progress, with total estimated costs
falling again this year and the submarine programme as a whole remaining
well within budget (paragraph 2). 16

3.2

Annual maintenance and running costs
After Trident became operational in 1994, annual expenditure for capital andrunning costs, including the costs for the Atomic Weapons Establishment,
ranged between 3% and 4.5% of the annual defence budget. 17

13
14
15

16

17

13

HC Deb 11 March 1982, c976
Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review Supporting Essays, July 1998
HoC Library calculation using HM Treasury, GDP deflators at market prices, June 2024 (Quarterly
National Accounts)
Defence Committee, Government replies to the sixth, seventh and eighth reports from the Defence
Committee Session 1994-1995, HC802, 25 October 1995
HC Deb 3 July 2006 c713w

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

Annual in-service
costs had been
estimated at around
6% of the defence
budget (amounting
to around £3 billion
per year in realterms up to2022/23). Since
2023, however, allnuclear-related
spend, including inservice costs, hasbeen reported aspart of the Defence
Nuclear Enterprise.

In 2005-06, those in-service costs rose to approximately 5% – 6% of the
defence budget. 18 That increase in maintenance costs was due primarily tothe programme of additional investment in sustaining key skills and facilities
at the Atomic Weapons Establishment, as announced by the Defence
Secretary in July 2005. 19
In 2016 the goverment said that in-service costs, including the costs of AWE,
basing and disposals remained at 6% of the defence budget and were
expected to continue at this level beyond the introduction of the Dreadnought
programme in the early 2030s. 20 6% of the total defence budget equated toapproximately £3 billion in 2022/23. In 2023, however, changes to the fundingof the nuclear deterrent were made (see below).
Under the Polaris Sales Agreement, as amended, the UK also pays the US
Department of Defense an annual contribution towards the overall cost of theStrategic Weapons Facility at Kings Bay. This contribution, which includes
maintenance work, is based on the UK’s share of the overall Trident II D5
missile inventory and in 2015 the government said that contribution
historically equated to £12 million per annum (in 2015 prices). 21

Amalgamation of spending under the Defence Nuclear
Enterprise (DNE)
In 2023 changes were made to the funding arrangements for the nuclear
deterrent. All nuclear programmes and expenditure across the MOD,
including annual in-service costs, have now been brought under one heading:the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), and ringfenced within thedepartmental budget, reflecting the increasing interdependence between the
nuclear deterrent and the Royal Navy’s other conventional nuclear-powered
submarine programmes, including the new AUKUS-SSN being developed inconjunction with the US and Australia. 22 This is particularly relevant to costs
associated with basing, infrastructure and nuclear propulsion. DNE spend
now appears as a single line in the departmental estimates.

18

19

20
21
22

14

HC Deb 19 July 2005, c59WS; HM Government, The future of the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent(PDF), Cm6994, December 2006, p.27
For more information on the Nuclear Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme see House ofCommons Library, Replacing the UK’s Nuclear Deterrent: The warhead programme
PQHL238, 6 June 2016
PQ 227194, Trident Missiles, 19 March 2015
Ministry of Defence, Letter to the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Equipment Plan 20232033: Update on affordability, 4 December 2023 and National Audit Office, The equipment plan
2023-2033 (PDF), HC315, December 2023

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent“The Defence
Nuclear Enterpriseis the partnership oforganisations that
operate, maintain,
renew and sustain
the UK’s nuclear
deterrent andsubmarine forces”.
Ministry of Defence,
March 2024

In making this change, the MOD said it would provide greater flexibility in the
Dreadnought programme (see below) and allow the department to “deliver
programmes related to the nuclear deterrent on schedule”. 23 Ringfencing thenuclear budget would also allow the Department to “insulate” the rest of the
defence equipment plan from any changes in the profile of nuclear spending(see Wider costs associated with the nuclear deterrent). 24
Amalgamating expenditure in this way does make it difficult, however, todetermine the individual costs of the various elements of the nuclear
deterrent, and specifically the annual in-service costs. In parliamentaryquestions the MOD has referred to the “interdependence” of the programmes
to support, maintain and renew the nuclear deterrent and that expected
costs would relate to “the combined nuclear enterprise”. 25

23

24
25

15

Ministry of Defence, Letter to the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Equipment Plan 20232033: Update on affordability, 4 December 2023
As above
HC Deb 20 November 2023, Trident nuclear programme, c9. See also PQ187155, Trident submarines:
procurement, 12 June 2023

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

4

Cost of the replacing the nuclear
deterrent

A decision to replace the UK’s current nuclear deterrent was taken in 2006
and approved by two votes in Parliament in March 2007 and July 2016. 26
After almost a decade of work on the project, the vote in 2016 enabled theprogramme to move forward into its manufacturing phase, which will see theconstruction of four new Dreadnought class ballistic missile submarines(SSBN) over a 15-20 year period. The first submarine, HMS Dreadnought, isscheduled to enter service in the early 2030s.
Replacement of the Trident II D5 missile itself is not part of the Dreadnought
programme. The UK is, however, participating in the US’ current service-life
extension programme for the Trident II D5 missile. In February 2020 theGovernment also confirmed that a replacement warhead programme wasunderway. 27

4.1
The estimated costof the design andmanufacture of aclass of four SSBN is£31 billion, including
inflation over the 35year life of the
programme.

The Dreadnought SSBN programme
Overall acquisition costs
The 2015 SDSR confirmed that the costs of design and manufacture of a classof four submarines will be £31 billion, an increase of £6 billion on estimates set
down in the programme’s Initial Gate report in 2011 (at outturn prices).
This cost estimate includes all costs associated with acquisition including
feasibility studies, design, assessment, demonstration and manufacture(including the US-UK Common Missile Compartment project). 28 It also

A £10 billion
contingency has
also been set aside.

26

27
28

16

HM Government, The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (PDF), December 2006; HC
Deb 14 March 2007 and Division 46, 18 July 2016
HCWS125, Nuclear Deterrent, 25 February 2020
HC Deb 4 June 2009, c627W

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The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

accounts for expected defence inflation over the life of the programme 29 andinvestment in new facilities at BAE Systems in Barrow, which in 2013 the MOD
suggested would be “limited to the modification of existing infrastructure toaccommodate the differences between the Vanguard and Successor
designs”. 30
A contingency of £10 billion has also been set aside by HM Treasury. This
contingency represents approximately 35% of the submarine cost tocompletion and according to the MOD “is a prudent estimate based on pastexperience of large, complex projects, such as the 2012 Olympics”. 31 However
there is no guarantee that all this money will be spent. If it were then it would
provide an upper end acquisition estimate of £41 billion.
The MOD has stated that “the revised cost and schedule reflect the greater
understanding we now have about the detailed design of the submarines andtheir manufacture”. 32
The years of peak expenditure are expected to be principally 2018 through tothe mid/late 2030s, as the programme is in full production.
Basing and infrastructure projects, the Trident II D5 Service-life Extension
programme and work on the options for replacing the nuclear warhead are
not part of the Dreadnought programme spend but fall within wider spendingon the defence nuclear enterprise (see Wider costs associated with thenuclear deterrent).

What has been spent on Dreadnought so far?
In its 2022 Update to Parliament the MOD confirmed that the programme
remained within overall budget and, as of 31 March 2022, £12.5 billion had
been spent so far on the concept, assessment and early delivery phases of the
project.
At the time of writing, the 2023 update to Parliament setting out revised costs
is yet to be published. In answer to a parliamentary question in January 2024
the MOD said that, as of 31 March 2023, £14.7 billion had been spent on theconcept, assessment, and early phases of the programme so far. 33

29

30

31
32

33

17

Defence inflation is often one of the largest sources of additional costs on a procurement
programme.
The Department is building new facilities at Barrow which will allow a modular build approach for
the Dreadnought submarines, which are larger than the Astute or Vanguard class. The Primarybuild facility programme had a forecast cost of £240 million and was expected to be completed in
2022. The NAO also examines this programme in Managing infrastructure projects on nuclearregulated sites
PQ24652, Trident Submarines: Finance, 2 February 2016
HM Government, National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015,
Cm9161, November 2015, p.34
PQ10942, Trident submarines: procurement, 29 January 2024

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

Between 2018 and 2020 the MOD made several announcements of money
being brought forward into the earlier years of the programme to drive out
cost and risk and keep the project on track. 34 This re-profiling included accessto the Dreadnought contingency fund, which is provided for in the Treasury
Reserve. In December 2020 the MOD confirmed that £1 billion of the fund had
been made available to the Department up to that point, 35 while the 2020
Spending Review made provision for a further £1.3 billion of contingency funds
to be made available through to 2024-25, should it be required. 36 As of March
2023, the MOD had accessed £2 billion of the contingency fund (20% of its
total). 37
On the issue of re-profiling, in February 2018 the then Secretary of State
commented:
What is important to emphasise is that we are not talking about the whole costof Dreadnought changing. What we are talking about is that it is important to
get the profile correct for when the money flows into the system and when it isneeded. At the moment it is not as we would wish it to be. 38

In a report on the MOD’s equipment plan in April 2022, the Public Accounts
Committee expressed concern over the stability of the plan and the ability ofthe department to control costs in its largest programmes, including
Dreadnought. It suggested, with concern, that the MOD views the contingency
fund “as a blank cheque, freeing it from the need to control costs”. 39 It
recommended that the department write to the committee, within threemonths, with detail of the current cost of the Dreadnought programme andthe replacement warhead programme.40
A more detailed breakdown of what has been spent so far on the
Dreadnought programme, is available in Library briefing paper CBP-8010,
Replacing the UK’s nuclear deterrent: progress of the Dreadnought class.

Projection of in-service costs
In 2016, the government said that the annual in-service costs of the nuclear
deterrent, once the Dreadnought SSBN enters service, were expected to

34

35

36
37
38
39

40

18

This is discussed extensively in the Secretary of State’s evidence to the Defence Committee on 21
February 2018 (Defence Committee, Oral evidence: departmental priorities, HC814, 21 February
2018. Q.78); HM Treasury, Autumn Statement 2018; HM Treasury, Spending Round 2019, Table 2.7:
Ministry of Defence and PQ290758, Armed Forces: Finance, 1 October 2019 and HM Treasury,
Spending Review 2020
Defence Committee, Oral evidence: MOD Annual Report and Accounts, 2019-2020 (PDF), HC1051, 8
December 2020, Q.23
HM Treasury, Spending Review 2020, Table 6.11
PQ168002, Trident submarines, 22 March 2023
Defence Committee, Oral evidence: departmental priorities, HC814, 21 February 2018. Q.78
Public Accounts Committee, Ministry of Defence Equipment Plan 2021-2031 (PDF), HC1164, April 2022,
p.5
Public Accounts Committee, Ministry of Defence Equipment Plan 2021-2031 (PDF), HC1164, April 2022,
p.5

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The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

continue at approximately 6% of the defence budget (amounting to around£3 billion per year in real terms up to 2022/23). 41
As outlined above, in 2023 the government brought all nuclear programmes
and expenditure across the MOD, including annual in-service costs for thedeterrent, under one heading in the departmental estimates: the Defence
Nuclear Enterprise (DNE), and ringfenced DNE spending within thedepartmental budget. Following this change it is no longer possible to identify
potential annual in-service costs for the Dreadnought SSBN when it entersservice. In answer to a parliamentary question in June 2023 as to whether thein-service costs of Dreadnought could be expected to remain at 6%, the MOD
confirmed:
The six percent figure was calculated for the Defence White Paper “The Futureof the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent” in December 2006.
Due to restructuring of both the Submarine Enterprise and the Defence Nuclear
Enterprise, an equivalent comparison is not available. 42

4.2

Replacement warhead programme
In February 2020 the Government confirmed that a replacement warhead
programme was underway. Options for replacing the warhead have beenstudied since 2006 as part of the Nuclear Warhead capability Sustainment
Programme (NWCSP). The expectation is, however, that the replacement
warhead programme going forward will have a budget independent of the
NWCSP. 43
Given that the Replacement Warhead Programme is still in its early stages,
the MOD has not yet identified a total cost of the replacement programme. 44
In March 2023 it said that “it is too early to provide cost estimates… as much
will depend on the eventual design requirements”. 45 In evidence to the
Defence Select Committee in December 2020, MOD officials indicated that thecomplexity of the programme, any commercial arrangements, and the levelof collaboration with the United States and its W93 programme would havean impact on any long-term cost estimate.46

41
42
43
44

45
46

19

HL328, Trident submarines, 6 June 2016
PQ190891, Nuclear submarines, 27 June 2023
PQ165426, Trident submarines: Finance, 17 March 2023
In the 2006 White Paper the MOD had estimated that a new nuclear warhead may cost in the regionof £2-3 billion (2006 prices). This equates to £2.8-£4.3 billion in 2022/23 prices.
PQ165426, Trident submarines: Finance, 17 March 2023
Defence Select Committee, Oral evidence: MOD annual report and accounts (PDF), HC1051, 8
December 2020, Q.29

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The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

In June 2023, the MOD confirmed that £127 million had been spent on
preliminary work, to March 2021. 47

Consideration at the next spending review
In evidence to the Public Accounts Committee in February 2022, the MOD said
that “a refinement of costs was needed at the next Spending Review” and thatthe programme would benefit from similar contingency funding arrangementsthat exist in the Dreadnought programme. 48 In March 2023 the MOD confirmedthat work is currently underway to agree cost estimates and funding
arrangements. 49
The previous Conservative government said that future funding arrangements
would be considered at the next spending review. 50 On 29 July 2024 the newLabour government said that a multi-year spending review would conclude in
Spring 2025.51 The new government is also conducting a new strategic defence
review which it has said will “consider the efficiency and effectiveness of thenuclear programme”. That review is also due to report in the first half of2025. 52

47
48

49
50
51
52

20

PQ191139, Nuclear weapons: procurement, 29 June 2023
Public Accounts Committee, Ministry of Defence Equipment Plan 2021-2031 (PDF), HC1164, April 2022,
p.12
PQ165426, Trident submarines: Finance, 17 March 2023
PQ186133, Nuclear weapons: procurement, 25 May 2023
HM Treasury, Press release, 29 July 2024
Ministry of Defence, Press release, 9 July 2024 and Strategic Defence Review 2024-2025: Terms ofreference

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

4.3

Wider costs associated with the nuclear
deterrent
The following costs associated with the nuclear deterrent and its replacement

Between 2023 andare not part of the £31 billion capital costs of the Dreadnought programme
2033 the Defence
but fall within wider spending on the defence nuclear enterprise.
Nuclear•Investment in HM Naval Base Clyde (£1.8 billion in total). 53
Organisation has
budgeted to spend•
Trident II D5 Service-life Extension programme, which in June 2023 wasestimated at £821.5 million. 54£109.8 billion acrossthe Defence Nuclear•
Infrastructure projects related to AWE. 55 There are two main
Enterprise, resulting
infrastructure projects underway at AWE under the remit of the Nuclear
in a £7.9 billion
Warhead Capability Sustainment Programme (NWCSP): Project MENSA,
a new nuclear warhead assembly and disassembly facility at the AWE
deficit on forecast
site in Burghfield (currently estimated at £2.16 billion in total) 56 andcosts.
Ministry of Defence, The
defence equipment
plan 2023:
Supplementary datatables, February 2024

Project Pegasus, a new enriched uranium storage and manufacturing
facility at the AWE site in Aldermaston (current estimate £1.7 billion). 57 A
third project to deliver a new plutonium manufacturing facility at AWE
Aldermaston, Project Aurora, was removed from the NWCSP andestablished as an independent project in 2022 and is currently forecast to
cost £2.3 billion in total. 58•

Core Production Capability facilities at Rolls Royce, that will build thelatest nuclear reactor core designs benefitting both the Dreadnought
programme and the Royal Navy’s conventional nuclear-powered
submarine programmes, including AUKUS (estimated at £3.77 billion). 59

53

The announcement on 31 August 2015 of £500 million of investment for HM Naval Base Clyde, over aten-year period, was part of the MOD’s ongoing programme of work to establish a submarine centreof excellence at HM Naval Base Clyde once the entire Royal Navy submarine fleet is based there
from 2020. In February 2017 a further £1.3 billion was announced for upgrades at HM Naval Base
Clyde, including the waterfront, engineering support, accommodation and physical security.
PQ112914 of 21 November 2017 confirmed the separate funding arrangements.
PQ191140, Trident missiles, 29 June 2023
All of these programmes are examined in greater detail in Library research briefing, Replacing the
UK’s nuclear deterrent: The warhead programme
DEP2023-0830 (PDF), October 2023 and Ministry of Defence, MOD Government major projects
portfolio data March 2023, July 2023
Ministry of Defence, MOD Government major projects portfolio data March 2023, July 2023
Ministry of Defence, MOD Government major projects portfolio data March 2023, July 2023.
Ministry of Defence, MOD Government major projects portfolio data March 2023, July 2023. The MOD
is funding the construction of facilities for the manufacture and testing of new nuclear reactors
cores to be used across the nuclear fleet. The project has been revised several times toaccommodate the re-fuel of HMS Vanguard and the requirements of the new AUKUS programme,
resulting in significant cost increases (Ministry of Defence, Letter to John Healey MP, DepositedPaper 2023/0830 (PDF), October 2023)

54
55

56

57
58
59

21

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent•

The costs associated with extending the life of the current Vanguard
class SSBN. 60•

Nuclear and naval base infrastructure projects announced following
additional investment in the defence nuclear enterprise at the Springbudget in March 2023, and in March 2024 as part of the ‘Delivering the
UK’s nuclear deterrent as a national endeavour’ command paper (PDF),
including investment in Derby, Devonport and Barrow. 61

In 2023/24, spending on the DNE totalled £9.4 billion. 62 Spending plans set out
in the MOD Main Estimate indicate that this is set to increase to £10.8 billion in
2024/25 in cash terms, although these plans may be revised at theSupplementary Estimates towards the end of the financial year. 63
Spending on nuclear programmes across of the whole Defence Equipment
Plan over the next ten years (2023-2033) is forecast at £117.8 billion, of which£109.8 billion has been budgeted for, leaving a £7.9 billion deficit.64 In
response to what the MOD has called a “notional gap”, it said that the
department is “not complacent and will act in successive planning rounds toensure that costs are realistic, and projects are deliverable”. 65 The
department has acknowledged that it “cannot rule out asking HM Treasury
for more money for nuclear programmes in future planning rounds”. 66
The Public Accounts Committee has, however, expressed concern thatmanaging the resulting deficit “requires significant work and is a hugechallenge” that will be “difficult to deliver”. 67

4.4

Alternative cost estimates
An April 2019 study by the Nuclear Information Service (PDF) suggested that
the MOD’s cost analysis for the replacement programme is vastly underestimated and that the total cost of the UK’s nuclear weapons programme, to

60

61

62
63
64
65

66
67

22

In 2015 the MOD confirmed that the marginal repair and maintenance costs of a further extension to
the life of the Vanguard class, into the early 2030s, “would be contained within the existing runningcost of the deterrent” (PQ17622, Trident submarines, 30 November 2015 and PQ80908, Trident
submarines: repairs and maintenance, 29 November 2021). See also, Ministry of Defence, Press
release, 1 March 2024 and “Vanguard, Dreadnought and Holbrook: the UK’s nuclear upgrade triad”,
Global Defence Technology, April 2024.
Ministry of Defence, Press release, 25 March 2024; Prime Minister’s Office, Press release, 24 March2024 and Ministry of Defence, Delivering the UK’s nuclear deterrent as a national endeavour,
CP1058, March 2024, p.8 and p.18; Babcock International, Press release, 10 November 2023
Ministry of Defence, Annual report and accounts 2023-2024 (PDF), HC65, July 2024, Annex C
HM Treasury, Main Supply Estimates 2024 to 2025, July 2024, p149
Ministry of Defence, The defence equipment plan 2023: Supplementary Data Tables, February 2024
Ministry of Defence, Letter to the Chair of the Public Accounts Committee, Equipment Plan 20232033: Update on affordability, 4 December 2023
Public Accounts Committee, MOD Equipment Plan 2023-2033 (PDF), HC451, 8 March 2024, p.11
Public Accounts Committee, MOD Equipment Plan 2023-2033 (PDF), HC451, 8 March 2024.

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

2070, is in the region of £172 billion. 68 A similar assessment by the Campaign
for Nuclear Disarmament suggests that the real cost will be more in theregion of £205 billion. 69
However, both these estimates consider in-service costs (at 6% of the
defence budget) over the 30-year life of the Dreadnought SSBN, and the costof additional factors such as infrastructure investment, the Trident service life
extension programme, warhead replacement and decommissioning, among
other things.

4.5

Who will pay for it?
In line with convention, the costs of the nuclear deterrent are funded from the
MOD’s core budget.
This has been reiterated by the MOD many times in the last few years. 70 In
response to suggestions that the 2021 Integrated Review should separate theDreadnought programme from the rest of the defence budget, in earlyFebruary 2021 the MOD confirmed:
There have been no discussions on removing the capital costs of theDreadnought submarine build programme from the defence budget. The
Dreadnought programme is rightly funded as part of the Ministry of Defence’s
budget, as it has always been. 71

Calls continue to be made, however, for the nuclear deterrent to be funded
separately. In a debate on the King’s Speech on 25 July 2024, Lord Lancasterof Kimbolton once again expressed concern over the cost of the nuclear
programme and suggested that “the time has come when nuclear needs to beheld outside the defence budget”. 72

The longstanding debate over budgetary responsibility
In 2007 a disagreement erupted between the MOD and the Treasury over thefunding of the capital costs of the replacement programme. The MOD
suggested that the capital costs of procuring the nuclear deterrent had, inthe past, been borne by the Treasury, a position which the Treasury refuted.
The argument centred round an increase to the defence budget which wasannounced as part of the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review. The CSR
outlined that:

68

69
70

71
72

23

Nuclear Information Service, Trouble Ahead: Risks and rising costs in the UK nuclear weapons
programme (PDF), April 2019
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, £205 billion: The cost of Trident
For example: PQ HL2751, Procurement: Trident submarines, 14 November 2017; HCWS328,
Correction, 7 December 2017; and PQ116056, Trident, 11 December 2017
HL12682, Nuclear submarines, 10 February 2021
HL Deb 25 July 2024, King’s Speech, c651

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The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review builds on this investment and grows
planned defence expenditure by a further 1.5% a year over the CSR07 period,
rising to a total budget of £36.9 billion by 2010-11 - demonstrating theGovernment's strong commitment to defence at a time of acute operational
intensity.
The settlement allows the MOD to [...] make provision for the maintenance ofthe nuclear deterrent. As set out at the time of the Trident White Paper,provision for this will not be at the expense of the conventional capability ourArmed Forces need. Investment in conventional capability will continue togrow over this period, as it has done since 2000. 73

Some commentators considered this to effectively be a commitment to fundthe capital costs of the replacement programme outside the core defence
budget. However, when questioned on this issue by the Defence SelectCommittee in November 2007, the then Permanent Secretary to the MOD, Sir
Bill Jeffrey, confirmed that while additional funding had been provided to theMOD, spending on the Trident replacement would then take place within the
defence budget:
Q37 Mr Jenkin: Are you able to specify a budget line for Trident replacement
over the next three years and can you tell us how much is going to be spent?
Mr Jeffrey: As the White Paper said it is provided separately within the defence
budget. The figures in the existing baseline, as I recall, are of the order of £200
million, £300 million, £400 million in the three years of the spending review
period.
Mr Woolley: It is about a billion over the course of the CSR period.
Q38 Mr Jenkin: Does that actually come of the 1.5% overall increase?
Mr Jeffrey: It does, yes. 74

He went on to clarify:
Q42 Mr Hamilton: The minister said, when the nuclear deterrent was agreed
upon in the House of Commons, that it would not affect the defence budget inany way. You have just said that it will affect the defence budget; did I
understand that correctly?
Mr Jeffrey: What I said was that the undertaking in the White Paper about thecost being provided additionally and not impacting on conventional capability
has been met, but obviously once the money has been provided it takes its
place within the defence budget. I do not think I am saying anything different
from what was said in the White Paper or from what the minister said. 75

Liam Fox, then Defence Secretary, raised this issue again during an interview
on the Andrew Marr Show on 18 July 2010, ahead of the anticipated Strategic
Defence and Security Review (which was published in November 2010):

73
74
75

24

HM Treasury, Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review (PDF), CM7227, October 2007
Defence Committee, Minutes of evidence, 28 November 2007, Q.37
Defence Committee, Minutes of evidence, 28 November 2007, Q.42

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

There's always been an understanding that the budget for the nuclear
deterrent came from outside the defence budget, the core defence budget.
Running costs for the deterrent have always come from inside the defence
budget, although the capital costs were outside. 76

In a Daily Telegraph blog in July 2010, former Political Secretary to Tony Blair,John McTernan, argued:
Apparently the idea that the Ministry of Defence pays for Trident – a defence
capability – has come as a shock to some in the MOD... except they did [knowthat]. It’s no breach of the Official Secrets Act to reveal that during my brieftime in MOD it was clear what the implications of the Comprehensive Spending
review actually were. There was no special budget to pay for the upgrading of
Trident. 77

The then Chancellor, George Osborne, consistently argued that the full costsof replacing Trident must come from the defence budget. At the end of July
2010, he unequivocally stated that “Trident costs, I have made it absolutely
clear, are part of the defence budget. All budgets have pressure. I don’t think
there’s anything particularly unique about the Ministry of Defence”. 78 An
article in The Guardian also quoted one official as commenting that “the costsof Trident have always come out of the MOD budget. We know what Liam is up
to. But does he expect that the Department of Culture will pay for Trident?” 79
A number of commentators, including the former Secretary of State for
Defence, Bob Ainsworth, countered this debate, at the time, by pointing outthat who pays for the capital costs of Trident is “to some degree...academic
because it all comes from the same pot at the end of the day”. 80 The thenMinister for the Armed Forces, Nick Harvey, also agreed with this point,
acknowledging that “where precisely it is accounted is neither here nor there;
it is a completely semantic and academic point”. 81
Discussion from 2018 onwards
The question of budgetary responsibility resurfaced again in 2018 after anumber of MPs made the suggestion that the Dreadnought programmeshould be removed from the defence budget as part of the MOD’s 2018
Modernising Defence Programme. On 27 November 2017 Sir Hugo Swire MP
raised this point during oral defence questions:
In his ongoing and delicate discussions with the Treasury, will he remainaware, first, that there are those of us on this side of the House who believethat the defence budget has been pared back about as far as it can be, andsecondly, that when it comes to Trident renewal many of us on this side of theHouse do not believe it should be part of the defence budget? Indeed, it

76
77
78
79
80
81

25

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/andrew_marr_show/8832224.stm“Are Ministry of Defence sources having a laugh about Trident?”, Daily Telegraph Blog, 17 July 2010
“Cabinet clash on Trident”, The Financial Times, 30 July 2010
“George Osborne: Trident costs will be met by defence budget”, The Guardian, 30 July 2010
HC Deb 16 September 2010, c1047
HC Deb 16 September 2010, c1055

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The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

distorts the defence budget, and if that is part of his argument, he will haveconsiderably more support than perhaps he knows. 82

In response the then Defence Secretary, Gavin Williamson, replied:
Everything that my right hon. Friend has raised will be part of the review. He
has raised the important question of nuclear capability being part of the
defence budget. It has traditionally not sat as part of the defence budget; thatchanged only post-2010. It is vital to look at all options as part of the national
security and capability review, and I look forward to speaking to him andseeking his advice and thoughts on the issues that he has raised. 83

However, the Ministry of Defence issued a correction on 7 December 2017 in a
written statement:
I wish to inform the House that an error has been identified in the answer I
gave to the hon. Member for East Devon (Sir Hugo Swire) in Defence Oral
Questions on 27 November 2017, Official Report, column 21, on the subject offunding defence nuclear capabilities.
To clarify, the UK’s nuclear deterrent has always been funded from the Defence
budget. 84

On 11 December 2017 a Treasury Minister confirmed “The Government has noplans to transfer the costs of upgrading or replacing the UK’s nuclear
deterrent from the Ministry of Defence to another Government accounting
department at this time”.85
A discussion of the funding arrangements in 2007 and how they compare to
current funding of the programme was also discussed by the Secretary ofState in an evidence session with the Defence Committee on 23 February
2018. 862018 Budget allocation and the 2019 Spending RoundThe allocation of additional funding for the MOD in the Autumn 2018 budget
statement (£1 billion) and the 2019 Spending Round (£1.5 billion forcapabilities up to 2021), in part to fund the Dreadnought programme, once
again opened the argument about which Department should be funding thenuclear deterrent. In a similar vein to the disagreements which arose in 2007
and 2010, this allocation of additional funds was viewed by many as anindication of the Treasury’s role, and responsibility, in part-funding thecapital costs of the programme. In a Lords debate on the 2018 Autumn
budget Lord West commented:
If the two tranches of money from the Treasury into the Dreadnought
programme are an indicator that there is an acceptance that the capital costof the new deterrent submarines should be funded outside the defence budget,

82
83
84
85
86

26

HC Deb 27 November 2017, c21
HC Deb 27 November 2017 c21
HCWS328, 7 November 2017
PQ116056, Trident, 11 December 2017
Questions 59 to 75.

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The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

I welcome it. That will make a dramatic difference to the MoD programme. Thisof course was the plan until changed by George Osborne in 2010. Can the
Minister tell us whether it is now the plan again? I hope that it is. 87

However, while the extra funding has been given to the MOD it has been madeclear that, as before, once within the MOD budget it is up to the Department
to determine how much is invested in the Dreadnought programme. Thereby
indicating the MOD’s budgetary responsibility for the nuclear deterrent. In
November 2018 HM Treasury stated:
The £1bn additional funding for MoD will be used to invest in a number of key
priority capabilities, one of which is Dreadnought. It is for MoD to decide howmuch of the additional funding is for Dreadnought, which they will do as partof their normal budgeting process. 88

Following the 2019 Spending Round, the MOD reiterated this point:
This additional funding will enable our world-class Armed Forces to begin tomodernise and meet the intensifying threats and risks we now face, including
prioritising investment in key capabilities such as shipbuilding, offensive cyberand the nuclear deterrent. We will decide on the allocation of this funding aspart of our normal financial planning and budgeting process.89

In March 2020 the then Chairman of the Defence Select Committee, Tobias
Ellwood, raised this issue in an evidence session of the Public Accounts
Committee, expressing his support for taking deterrent funding out of the
defence budget. 90 In response to questioning, Sir Stephen Lovegrove, then
Permanent Secretary at the MOD, raised the possibility of a ringfenced
nuclear budget:
I think there is a very good argument for applying some form of ring fence
around the biggest elements of nuclear. When the cost profiles move, which
they inevitably do, they do have the ability, just because of their sheer scale, toimpact the rest of Defence quite a lot.
The best example, again, is to look across to America. In America, the nuclear
component of the DOD’s budget is about 6% or 7%. When we are at the heightof the recapitalisation that I talked about earlier, the nuclear component of
the Ministry of Defence’s budget is going to be up at around 18% or 19%. It is avery, very big swing factor, and that is an active subject of conversation with
the Treasury. 91

These arguments were raised again within the context of the Integrated
Review. In answer to a question from Lord West in early February 2021, theMOD confirmed:

87
88
89
90

91

27

HL Deb 13 November 2018, c1819
PQ188745, Defence: Finance, 12 November 2018
PQ290758, Armed Forces: Finance, 1 October 2019
Public Accounts Committee, Oral evidence, Defence Nuclear Infrastructure, HC86, 11 March 2020,
Q.107
Public Accounts Committee, Oral evidence, Defence Nuclear Infrastructure, HC86, 11 March 2020,
Q.108

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The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

There have been no discussions on removing the capital costs of theDreadnought submarine build programme from the defence budget. The
Dreadnought programme is rightly funded as part of the Ministry of Defence’s
budget, as it has always been. 92

2023 - a ringfenced budget
As outlined above, however, in 2023 the decision was taken to ringfence
nuclear spending within the MOD budget as a way of introducing greater
flexibility into the funding arrangements for the nuclear deterrent and to
insulate the rest of the MOD’s defence equipment plan from any changes innuclear spending.

The next spending review
In evidence to the Public Accounts Committee in January 2024 the MOD said it
could not rule out asking the Treasury for additional money for the nuclear
deterrent in future spending rounds, although the current assessment wasthat the programme was in “a much healthier position than we have been in
for a number of years”. 93
The new Labour government has said that a multi-year spending review willconclude in Spring 2025. 94 The government is also conducting a new strategic
defence review which it has said will “consider the efficiency and effectivenessof the nuclear programme”. That review is also due to report in the first halfof 2025. 95

4.6

Comparison to other areas of government
spending
Assuming the entirety of the £10 billion contingency fund is spent, at a cost of
potentially £41 billion the Dreadnought programme is one of the mostexpensive Government projects underway. It is a project that has around
twice the budget of Crossrail, and three times the budget of the London
Olympics in 2012. 96
With respect to other areas of public spending, expenditure on the nuclear
deterrent is often compared to spending on the welfare bill or the NHS.

92
93

94
95

96

28

HL12682, Nuclear submarines, 10 February 2021
Public Accounts Committee, Oral evidence: Defence equipment plan 2023-33, HC 451, 22 January2024, Q.78
HM Treasury, Press release, 29 July 2024
Ministry of Defence, Press release, 9 July 2024 and Strategic Defence Review 2024-2025: Terms ofreference
Michael Fallon speech to a reception of the Keep Our Future Afloat Campaign, House of Commons,
21 October 2015

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

The cost of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent

Government expenditure comparisons
Selected areas of planned spending in 2024/25 (£ billions)
315.8

195.1
Of which

92.8

WelfareHealth & Social
benefits & tax
Carecredits

Education

56.4

10.8

Defence

Defence
NuclearEnterpriseNote: Expenditure on welfare benefits and tax credits is a forecast.

Source: Department for Work and Pensions, Benefit expenditure and caseload tables – Spring Budget
2024, UK welfare table; HM Treasury, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses 2024, Table 1.10; HM
Treasury, Main Supply Estimates 2024 to 2025, July 2024, p149

In 2024/25, total spending on the Defence Nuclear Enterprise is expected toamount to £10.8 billion. This equates to around 3% of forecast expenditure on
welfare benefits and tax credits, or 6% of planned spending by the
Department of Health and Social Care.
Overall, planned spending on the Defence Nuclear Enterprise equates toaround 19% of the total defence budget.

29

Commons Library Research Briefing, 22 August 2024

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