国際武器移転史 第 6 号 2018 年 7 月＜目 次＞『国際武器移転史』第 6 号の刊行によせて ‥‥‥国際武器移転史研究所長 横井 勝彦（1）

論説
The Availability Puzzle: Considering the Relationship between Arms and Violence Taking Placewithin States ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ NICHOLAS MARSH（3）Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories of Gun Acquisition and State Violence‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ ITSUHIRO HAZAMA（23）Arms Availability and Violence in the Ethiopia-Kenya-South Sudan Borderland‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥TORU SAGAWA（39）Giving Up the Gun? Overcoming Myths about Japanese Sword-Hunting and Firearms Control‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ TAMARA ENOMOTO（45）Total War and Japan: Reality and Limitations of the Establishment of the Japanese Total War
System ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ ATSUSHI KOKETSU（61）オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶―「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」論の視点から― ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ 津田 博司（73）1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転―ハインケル社と日本海軍との関係を中心に― ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ 西尾 隆志（93）

書評
榎本珠良編著『国際政治史における軍縮と軍備管理――19 世紀から現代まで』
日本経済評論社、2016 年、284 頁 ‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥‥ 後藤 春美（119）千田武志著『呉海軍工廠の形成』錦正社、2018 年、804 頁 ‥‥‥‥‥‥ 奈倉 文二（123）

明治大学国際武器移転史研究所編

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号の刊行によせて
横井 勝彦
国際武器移転史研究所長『国際武器移転史』第 6 号をお届け致します。
本号には論文 7 本、書評 2 本を掲載することができました。冒頭の英語論文 4 本は、今年 3 月に本研究所が主催した国際セミナーでの 4 報告を基に、そこでの議論を踏まえて各報告者が新たに書き下ろした論文です。マーシュ論文は世界的な武器の拡散と暴力との関係性を詳細に追求し、同じテーマを波佐間論文と佐川論文は東アフリカの牧畜民社会に関する人類学的研究の領域から検討して、最後に榎本論文が日本における銃規制の実態を16 世紀末から現代まで通観しております。この 4 論文は、いずれも「武器の入手可能性と暴力との関係性」をめぐる従来の先行研究や政策論議が、今日いかなる修正を求められているかという問題関心を共有しております。
第 6 号ではその他にも、次の 3 本の論文を掲載しております。
纐纈論文は、第一次世界大戦における日本の総力戦体制に関して、最近の議論を視野に入れ、かつ著者自身の積年の研究成果を踏まえて、世界史的な視点より再考を加えております。日本史研究の最新成果を海外に発信することが強く意識された意欲的論考です。
津田論文は、イギリス帝国の一員として第一次世界大戦を戦ったオーストラリアにおいて、
その後ナショナリズムがどのように変遷を遂げたのかを「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」論という最新の研究動向を踏まえて検証しております。西尾論文は、日本航空機工業の「自立時代」におけるドイツからの航空技術移転に注目して、本研究所の主要テーマである武器移転の問題を、これまではあまり踏み込んで議論されてこなかった国際的な多層構造も視点に入れて考察しております。
さらに本号では、後藤春美氏と奈倉文二氏による書評を紹介しております。書評をお願いした 2 冊の著書は、いずれも本研究所の共同研究と関連しており、お二人の評者によるバランスの取れた内容紹介と問題点の指摘は、今後の研究の新たな展開に貴重な示唆を与えてくれることと思います。
本誌は第 1 号（2016 年 1 月創刊）から今回の第 6 号までで、論文 36 本（うち英語論文
15 本）、研究ノート 3 本、書評 9 本を掲載してきました（すべての内容を研究所のウェブサイトでも公開しております）。編集委員会はいぜんとして試行錯誤の連続ですが、これからも研究所の成果の発信媒体として本誌の一層の充実に努めてまいります。

1

みなさまのご支援・ご指導を何卒よろしくお願い致します。

2018 年 7 月 23 日

本誌は「文部科学省私立大学戦略的研究基盤形成支援事業（平成 27 年〜平成 31 年）
」に依拠し
ています。

2

History of Global Arms Transfer, 6 (2018), pp. 3-21

The Availability Puzzle:
Considering the Relationship between
Arms and Violence Taking Place withinStates†By NICHOLAS MARSH*
Weapons have an intimate relationship with violence – they are tools which
multiply human capacity to cause injury. However, the global distribution of
weapons does not help to explain the global distribution of violence. High levelsof civilian armament are found in some of the most peaceful countries, andconflict initiation occurs in contexts where arms are comparatively scarce. A
solution to this apparent paradox can be found by examining weapons acquisitionby armed groups operating in the world’s most violent areas; and looking at
whether a lack of arms inhibits their capability to carry out their objectives.
Armed groups have many potential sources of arms such as trafficking, theft fromthe state, or donations and so arms may be easily acquired even if arecomparatively scarce in the population at large. Arms present in society may not
be used to kill, injure, or intimidate if their possessors are not motivated tocommit acts of violence.
This paper presents an inquiry into the relationship between weapons and armed violence
taking place within states (specifically homicide and civil conflict). It focuses upon nonstate actors, their possession of weapons and acts of violence they perpetrate. It analyses
the published literature on weapons and both civil conflict and crime. The first part of thepaper presents a puzzle concerning the nature of the relationship between arms andviolence. It highlights the intimate relationship between weapons and violence, and thendiscusses two themes from published research. The ‘amorphous image’ wrongly asserts that
illicit arms can easily be obtained by people across the globe. In fact, research has shownthat access to weapons is highly variable and illicit markets are local in character. A second
part of the puzzle concerns research on domestic arms availability and homicide.
Publications have hypothesized that higher levels of firearms ownership lead to higher
levels of homicide. There is some good evidence from individual countries (especially theUnited States [US]) that there is a correlation between levels of ownership and homicide.
However, cross-national research shows that the states with the highest levels of homicide* Author’s Affiliation: Nicholas Marsh, Research Fellow, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
† A previous version of this article was presented at an international seminar entitled Relationships between

Arms Availability and Violence on 28 March 2018 at Meiji University, Tokyo. The author would like to thankTamara Enomoto and Ishtiaq Khan for their assistance in completing the draft. This work is partially funded by
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology’s (MEXT)- Program for the Strategic
Research Foundation at Private Universities, 2015-19, JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP16K17075 and
JP16KT0040.

3

NICHOLAS MARSH
also have comparatively low levels of firearms ownership (and many states with high levelsof firearms ownership also have low levels of homicide). Similarly, a large proportion ofrecent cases of conflict initiation have occurred in states with comparatively low levels ofcivilian arms availability. This leads to the puzzle – if weapons are so closely connected toviolence, but more arms do not equal more violent deaths, then what is the relationshipbetween arms and violence?
The second part of this paper provides an answer to this puzzle. It highlights researchwhich suggests that high levels of homicide are associated with the activities of gangs andorganized groups. Endemic homicide is therefore similar, in some ways, in character toarmed conflict. In both, the key armed actors are armed groups (be they gangs or rebels)
and the key factor explaining the relationship between arms and violence is the ease ordifficulty by which those armed groups can obtain weapons. Arms acquired lawfully or notby the civilian population are just one source of weapons for armed groups (and perhaps
not the most useful source). Other sources, that may provide more, or more powerful,
weapons are illicit trafficking, theft, or corrupt purchase from government stocks, or
donations from other parties.
The article concludes with a suggested answer to the puzzle. Is likely to be that withindeveloped countries such as Finland that paradoxically have high levels of civilian
possession and low levels of violence, governments are able to limit illicit arms acquisition(e.g. losses from state arms stockpiles and donations of weapons to armed groups).
Governments of such developed countries are therefore able to govern the remaining sourceof weapons for armed groups – lawful possession and civilian ownership of firearms – via
enacting and implementing laws and regulations. Within that group of states, differences inlaws concerning civilian possession and actual levels of ownership are likely to affectlevels of homicide. In contrast, in developing countries where high levels of violence takeplace, many governments are unable to prevent significant flows of weapons to armed
groups via one or more of illicit trafficking, losses from state arsenals or donations.
A fruitful area of research will be to focus upon weapons acquisition by armed groups(and nascent groups prior to their obtaining weapons) and to examine the extent to whichthose armed groups’ activities are curtailed by an inability to obtain adequate weapons. For
the armed group, weapons owned by the civilian population or lawful acquisition, are justtwo sources – as important are obtaining arms via illicit trafficking, or from state stocks or
donations. States, with low levels of arms ownership in the general population (e.g. because
they are expensive or people fear punishment for unlawful possession), may still face asevere armed violence problem if armed groups can easily obtain arms through othermethods.

I
The relationship between arms and violence has been the focus of a long and politicallycharged debate focused upon firearm regulations in the US. Latour summarised the debate
over 20 years ago, and the contours of the two positions have not changed significantly
since. He argues that:‘Guns kill people’ is a slogan of those who try to control the unrestricted sale of guns.
To which the National Rifle Association replies with another slogan, ‘People killpeople, not guns.’ The first slogan is materialist: the gun acts by virtue of material

4

The Availability Puzzle
components irreducible to the social qualities of the gunman. On account of the gun, agood guy, the law abiding citizen, becomes dangerous. The NRA, on the other hand,offers (amusingly enough, given their political views) a sociological version more
often associated with the Left: for the NRA, the gun does nothing in itself or by virtue
of its material components. The gun is a tool, a medium, a neutral carrier of will.1
Latour’s summary points to a debate on the role of weapons in violence. The ‘people killpeople’ argument is entirely concerned with intentions and motivations. It assumes thatsomeone who wants to kill (or injure and intimidate) will be able to do so, and finding themeans is a trivial task. Conversely, a materialist view of the role of weapons ignores therole of intentions or motivations – and while not as explicit, the ‘amorphous image’ of therelationship between arms and violence (which is described below) is implicitly based upona presumption that widespread availability of arms causes widespread violence.
Different sides of the debate in the US and some other countries such as Australia, Brazil,
or Canada have used research to variously argue for: the existence, or not, of correlations
between levels of homicide and crime and the level of civilian ownership of arms or
stricter; the effect, or not, of changes in firearms regulations on homicide or crime rates;
and whether or not carrying firearms reduces violence.2
Latour finds both the ‘materialist’ and ‘sociological’ views to be unsatisfactory andinstead offers a synthesis between such strictly materialist or sociological interpretations of
the relationship between weapons and violence.3 He states that:
If I define you by what you have (the gun), and by the series of associations that you
enter into when you use what you have (when you fire the gun), then you are modified
by the gun – more or less so depending upon the weight of the other associations thatyou carry. This translation is wholly symmetrical. You are different with a gun in
hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You are another subject because you
hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has entered into a relationship withyou. The gun is no longer the gun-in-the-armory or the gun-in-the-drawer or the gunin-the-pocket, but the gun-in your-hand aimed at someone who is screaming. What istrue of the subject, of the gunman, is as true of the object, of the gun that is held. A
good citizen becomes a criminal, a bad guy becomes a worse guy; a silent gun
becomes a fired gun, a new gun becomes a used gun, a sporting gun becomes aweapon.4
For Latour, together the gun and the person form a hybrid, the person has been changedby their acquisition of the weapon. Or as Bowyer Bell writing about insurgency states ‘[t]he very word gunman is a meld that makes the armed struggle work’.5
Latour’s synthesis is preferable, but consequence of taking account of both intentions andcapabilities is that the relationship between arms and violence must be complex. Weapons
increase the capacity of someone to commit acts of violence; but even if weapons arepresent, acts of violence will not take place if people are not motivated to do so.
1 Latour, ‘On technical mediation’, pp. 30-1.
2 For summaries of the debate see Jackson and Marsh, ‘Guns and deaths’; Squires, Gun crime, pp. 129-94;

Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie, Firearms and violence.
3 Latour, ‘On technical mediation’, pp. 31-4.
4 Ibid., p. 34.
5 Bell, The Dynamics of the armed struggle, p. 138.

5

NICHOLAS MARSH

II
Research upon weapons and violence presents a puzzle. There is clearly an intimate
relationship between the tools of violence and the act itself. Nevertheless, two popularconceptualizations of the relationship between arms and violence do not explain therelationship in the developing countries which are most violent. As will be shown below,
there is not a ‘amorphous’ global black market that supplies arms to all that want them, andthe highest levels of homicide actually occur in areas with comparatively low levels ofcivilian ownership of firearms.
It is important to note here that it has long been recognized that contemporary armed
conflict and high levels of homicide are almost all located in low and middle income
countries.8 The World Bank’s World Development Report summarizes that ‘[l]ower GDP
per capita is robustly associated with both large-scale political conflict and high rates ofhomicide’.9 Such an uneven distribution of violent death has been found over a long period,for example, a World Health Organization report published earlier similarly states thatconcerning all forms of violence ‘[t]he vast majority of these deaths occurred in low- to
middle-income countries. Less than 10 % of all violence-related deaths occurred in highincome countries’.10
6

7

III
Weapons or arms are specialized tools whose purpose and effect is to multiply or transcendhuman strength. The destructive potential of an individual or group is enhanced through theacquisition of a weapon, such as a pistol; and it can further be enhanced by acquiring amore destructive weapon (such as a machinegun). Weapons make it possible for individuals
or small groups of people to coerce larger numbers.11 As mentioned by Latour (above) ahuman is modified by the acquisition of a weapon – they now possess a greatly enhanced
capacity to injure or kill another.
Weapons can therefore be examined within the framework of opportunity and willingness
suggested by Most and Starr and used concerning arms by Sislin and Pearson who
presumably build upon Most and Starr. 12 Arms directly affect ‘opportunity’, which is
described by Most and Starr as concerning the possibilities for action afforded by theenvironment in which actors operate. Opportunity is closely linked to the capabilities ofparties, and Most and Starr describe how the existence and distribution of technology, and6 In this paper the terms ‘weapons’ and ‘arms’ will be used interchangeably. Weapons or arms are defined as
any specialized instrument which has been designed with the primary purpose of inflicting non-consensual injury.
A weapon can be made in a factory or by produced by artisans; and a new weapon can be produced by combining
or adapting existing items (such as by making a bomb by combining ammonium nitrate fertilizer, diesel fuel, anda detonator). In some cases people have used non-specialized items – for example by brandishing kitchen knives
or by throwing rocks – they are defined as being ‘improvised weapons’.
7 There is a long running discussion concerning the definition of violence which ranges from physical force
through to concepts of structural, institutional, or cultural violence that impede people’s potential fordevelopment and self-actualization (for a summary see Imbusch, ‘The concept of violence’). Here, a ‘brute force’
definition is used. Violence is defined as being: the actual or threatened use of non-consensual physical force thatcauses injury to another person or damage to an object. Such a narrow definition lies at the centre of other wider
understandings of violence. See Imbusch, ‘The concept of violence’, p. 23.
8 For example Collier et al., Breaking the conflict trap, p. x.
9 World Bank, World development report 2011, p. 6.
10 Krug et al., World report on violence.
11 For longer descriptions see Arendt, On violence, pp. 41-56; Clausewitz, On war, pp. 127-8.
12 Most and Starr, Inquiry, logic and international politics, pp. 23-46; Sislin and Pearson, Arms and ethnic
conflict, pp. 63-88; idem, ‘Arms and escalation’, pp. 140-1.

6

The Availability Puzzle
especially weapons, is a key element of those capabilities.13
Globally, firearms are the most common weapon used in homicide. Places with higher
levels of homicide are characterized by a much larger proportion of murders being carriedout using specialized weapons. A United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
report on global homicide states that ‘[n]ot all homicides involve them, but weapons do
play a significant role in homicide. With their high level of lethality, firearms are the mostwidely used weapons, accounting for 4 out of every 10 homicides at the global level’. 14
Furthermore, in the Americas, the region with the highest level of homicide, ‘firearms are
the most prevalent killing mechanism’ while in Oceania, the region with the lowest level ofhomicide, sharp objects are the most widely used weapons in homicides.15 Nowak similarly
highlights that at a global level there appears to be a threshold effect, in which the highest
national levels of homicide are most often associated with high levels of use of firearms.16
Among 23 states with 20 or over homicides per 100,000, in 13 states firearms were used in
70 per cent or more of homicides, and in a further five states firearms were used in over 40
per cent of homicides. Nevertheless, the picture is much more complex with lower levels ofhomicide, in which there are found both high and low proportions of firearms used.17

IV
Discussion on arms and violence includes two widespread but incomplete views. The firstis an assumption that there is a vast stock of illicit weapons freely available around theworld, which contributes to similarly large numbers of deaths every year. This view ignores
the great variability of arms availability around the world. The second view takes suchvariability into account, but assumes that there is a linear relationship between weapons
dispersed in society and the level of violence. Such a relationship may well be present insome cases. But again one cannot generalize across all conflicts and violent situations –wars are reputed to have been started with a single gun, and some of the most violent
places in the world have apparently low levels of firearm possession.
Numerous examples of scholarship and activism have advanced what Bourne referred toas the ‘amorphous image’.18 This image is best summed up by the numerous tales of a
Kalashnikov being available for the price of a chicken,19 and it assumes that the world (andespecially developing countries) have been flooded with illicit small arms and light
weapons and those freely available weapons cause an enormous death toll.20 In particular,
several scholars studying ‘New Wars’ have stated that a novel characteristic of civil war
after 1990 has been very large illicit arms flows to non-state groups.21 Bourne states that
due to concerns about small arms and light weapons (SALW) flows to conflict:
A dominant image of arms flows to conflict actors, particularly to rebel groups, hasbeen superimposed against a backdrop of amorphous complexity. This image construes
arms flows to conflicts as being a function of:
13 Most and Starr, Inquiry, logic and international politics, pp. 31-3.
14 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global study on homicide 2013, p. 15.
15 Ibid., p. 65.
16 Nowak, ‘Lethal violence update’, pp. 72-80.
17 Nowak, ‘Lethal violence update’, pp. 78-80.
18 Bourne, Arming conflict; idem, ‘SALW spread and conflict’.
19 For example see Kahaner, AK-47: The Weapon that changed the face of war, p. 2.
20 For a summary see Bourne, Arming conflict; idem, ‘Small arms and light weapons spread and conflict’.
21 For a summary see Marsh, ‘Tools of insurgency’, pp. 23-4; Jackson, ‘From under their noses’.

7

NICHOLAS MARSH• A vast global stock of SALW;• A vibrant globalized illicit trade; and• A shadowy array of nefarious arms brokers.
This focus articulates implicit explanation and analysis that reinforces the view ofamorphous, uncontrollable, open access to arms for anyone with the money to pay forthem.22
This ‘amorphous image’ has been challenged by researchers who have examined the
dynamics of arms proliferation.23 As Bourne points out, there are two problems with theamorphous image. First, it inevitably limits analysis of the relationship between
governance, arms and violence – if weapons are everywhere people want them thenacquiring weapons is just a matter of motivation. Such a limiting of inquiry is compoundedby the second problem – that it is incorrect. As is shown below the ease by which arms canbe acquired is highly variable and the number of deaths they cause has been exaggerated.
Research that examines illicit trafficking finds that there is not an amorphous global illicit
market, and instead illicit arms flows and presence are highly variable and localized; andembedded into regional patterns of conflict or illicit activity. 24 Similarly, research on
injuries caused by weapons shows that some often quoted estimates of the number ofcasualties have been imprecise or inaccurate, and more importantly that there is great
variation in the type of weapon used to cause injury in conflict.25 Such variation similarly
suggests that arms availability is highly localized.
So sum up, while it has considerable rhetorical salience the amorphous image describedby Bourne is not reflected in research on arms trafficking or conflict deaths. Instead of avast global illicit arms market and consequent casualties, there is considerable variation in
illicit arms trafficking and in the injuries caused by weapons.
The existence of variation in both the availability of arms and of casualties caused byweapons frequently lends its self to assumptions that the relationship between the presenceof arms in society and violence is basically linear, that as asserted by Cukier and Sidel‘more guns equal more deaths’. 26 Research has consistently found such a relationshipbetween civilian arms availability and suicide, to the extent that suicide by firearm serves
as a useful proxy for levels of firearm ownership.27
The relationship between firearms availability and homicide, conflict and other forms ofviolence is much more complex. By far the greatest part of research has been on the US
and to a lesser extent on other developed countries.28 Some findings do show a correlation
between the level of firearms ownership and of homicide.29 However, the relationshipbetween ownership and homicide is not apparent in cross-national studies that include thecountries with the highest levels of violence.
Several authors have found a positive relationship between firearms availability and
22 Bourne, Arming conflict, p. 34.
23 Bourne, Arming conflict; idem, ‘Small arms and light weapons spread and conflict’; Jackson, ‘From under

their noses’; Jackson and Marsh, ‘Guns and Deaths a Critical Review’; Marsh, ‘Firearms seizures andtrafficking’.
24 See Bourne, Arming conflict; Marsh, ‘Conflict specific capital’; idem, ‘Firearms seizures and trafficking’.
25 Kreutz and Marsh, ‘Lethal instruments’.
26 ‘More guns equal more deaths’ is the title of chapter 3 in Cukier and Sidel, The global gun epidemic.
27 See for example the review by Jackson and Marsh, ‘Guns and deaths’.
28 Greene and Marsh, eds., Small arms, crime and conflict, pp. 79-104.
29 For example in the US see Hepburn and Hemenway, ‘Firearm availability’; Miller, Azrael, and Hemenway,‘State-level homicide’; and in Australia Chapman, Alpers, and Jones, ‘Association between gun law reforms’.

8The Availability Puzzle
absolute levels of homicide in groups of between 14 and 36 developed sates;30 other studies
of developed countries only find a relationship with female deaths (an explanation beingthat the presence of firearms in a household affects the lethality of domestic violence); 31
and one study did not find a relationship in a sample of 14 developed countries.32 Evenamong relatively small samples of developed states the cross-national relationship is notclear. When one examines much larger samples (of 168 or 169 states) which include thevery developing countries which have, by far, the highest levels of violence, then therelationship becomes negative – higher firearm ownership is associated with lower levelsof homicide.33 The negative cross-national relationship is shown in Figure 1.
Firearms availability may explain some of the variation in homicide within a group of
fairly homogeneous developed states (that also have quite similar homicide rates), though
not consistently in all studies. The few studies to look at firearms availability in a large
sample of developing and developed states, with much larger variations in levels ofhomicide, and which also include control variables, do not find a statistically significant
relationship between firearms availability and the national homicide rate. Nowak similarly
notes that ‘attempts to identify relationships between firearm violence and firearm
possession through cross-national comparisons have yielded inconclusive results’.34 Nowak
also notes the ‘comparatively low’ civilian possession in Central America, South America
and the Caribbean (the regions with the highest homicide levels) and ‘much higher’possession in Western Europe (which has low homicide rates).35 Wolf, Gray, and Fazel
provide an explanation for the finding that there is a negative relationship between
homicide and firearms possession when they state that ‘gun ownership was associated withhigher income, which itself was associated with lower homicide levels’. 36 The mostdeveloped countries have both low levels of homicide and affluent populations that canafford to buy lots of firearms (purchased for hunting, sport, and recreation).
The relationship between estimates of the number of firearms in civilian possession in acountry and the level of homicide is shown in Figure 1.
Arms used in conflict also presents a puzzle. Collier et al., for example, refer to arms as
being essential ‘conflict specific capital’ that is usually very difficult to obtain.37 They
make the plausible suggestion that the often observed frequent reoccurrence of warfare
after it has subsided (e.g. during a peace process) is partly explained by the presence oflarge stocks of arms available to non-state groups in conflict-affected countries. Killicoat
provides some support for this view with his finding that comparatively low prices for
Kalashnikovs (which are assumed to be an indicator for availability) are a risk factor for
conflict onset.38
However, relatively high levels of arms possessed outside of state institutions are clearly
not a necessary condition for conflict onset. Unfortunately, Karp’s 2007 estimates of
30 Altheimer and Boswell, ‘Reassessing the association’; Killias, ‘International correlations’; Hemenway andMiller, ‘Firearm availability’; Hoskin, ‘Armed Americans’.
31 Killias, Kesteren, and Rindlisbacher, ‘Guns, violent crime and suicide’; Hemenway, Shinoda-Tagawa, andMiller, ‘Firearm availability and female homicide’.
32 Smith and Stevens, ‘A cross-national investigation’.
33 See Kontya and Schaeferb, ‘Small arms mortality’ and Wolf, Gray, and Fazel, ‘Violence as a public healthproblem’ who respectively examine 168 and 169 countries; and Altheimer and Boswell, ‘Reassessing theassociation’ who examine 46 developed and middle-income countries.
34 Nowak, ‘Lethal violence update’, p. 80.
35 Ibid.
36 Wolf, Gray, and Fazel, ‘Violence as a public health problem’, pp. 225-6.
37 Collier et al., Breaking the conflict trap, pp. 70, 88.
38 Killicoat, ‘What price the Kalashnikov’.

9NICHOLAS MARSH
Figure 1 Firearms Homicide and Civilian Firearms Possession
90.0
80.0

Honduras

Homicides per 100 000

70.0
60.0

Jamaica

50.0
40.0
30.0

South Africa

20.0

Finland

10.0

USA
0.0
0

10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,000100,000

Firearms per 100 000

Figure 21.
Firearms
Possessionin Countries
With Conﬂict
Onset
During or39A�er 2007
FigureFirearms
Homicideand Civilian
Firearms
Possession

Firearms per 100 000

25,000Sources:Karp, ‘Completing the count’; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global study on
homicide 2011.
20,000civilianfirearms ownership are the only available comprehensive measure. The conflicts
15,000initiated during and after 2007 are examined in Figure 2, and two points are apparent.40
First, none
10,000 of the cases had exceptionally high levels of firearm possession. Lebanon is thehighest, perhaps due to a legacy of prior conflicts, but it is only ranked 28th highest for
firearms possession. Second, seven of the 12 countries included in Figure 2 had
5,000
exceptionally low levels of estimated firearm possession at below 5000 per 100,000. Egypt
and Syria were ranked, respectively, at 115 and 112 in the world. For comparison, Karp
estimates0 civilian firearm possession at 88,200 per 100,000 in the US, 45,700 in
Switzerland and 31,600 in Sweden.41
To sum up this part of the paper, both the amorphous image and the linear relationshippresent what are materialist conceptions of the relationship between weapons and violence.
Violence is caused by there being more weapons – either because the world is assumed tobefloodedwith Sources
them; orofbecause
places with more arms in civilian possession are assumed
Figure3 Poten�alArms Acquisi�on
to experience more homicide, conflict, and crime. However, such a materialist conception
ignores the role of Civilian
intention. For a linear relationshipto exist in general, the intent toThe� from
LawfulIllicit to remain relatively constantDona�oncommit acts of violence would needand then the arms
government
popula�onpurchasetraﬃckingavailability variable would affect the lethality of stocks
violence. An explanation for the above
cross-national findings is that among largely similar developed states intentions to commit
Group
39 Data on firearms possession from acquiringKarp, ‘Completing the count’ and on homicide from United Nations

Office on Drugs and Crime, Global studyarms
on homicide 2011.
40 Data on conflict onset drawn from Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Updated UCDP/PRIO armed conflictdataset codebook.
41 Karp, ‘Completing the count’.

10

USA
0.0
0

10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,000Firearms per 100 000

The Availability Puzzle
Figure 2 Firearms Possession in Countries With Conﬂict Onset During or A�er 2007

Firearms per 100 000

25,00020,00015,00010,0005,000
0Figure2. Firearms
Possession
With Conflict Onset During or After 2007
Figure3 Poten�al
Sources inof Countries
Arms Acquisi�on
Source: Karp, ‘Completing the count’.

The� from
Civilian
LawfulIllicitDona�ongovernment
popula�onviolence dopurchasenot vary significantly (and so traﬃcking
variations in arms availability may have anstockseffect). When samples are enlarged they start to include much more different states which
experience very different forms of violence(e.g. with organized crime playing a muchGroupgreater role). Furthermore, it is possible forintentions
to act violently to change quickly –acquiringfor example as a result of talks which result in a truce (which can concern organized crimearms
and gangs as well as warring parties).
The lack of a linear relationship presents a puzzle – how should the relationship between
arms and violence be conceived? The next part of this article presents a solution.

V
This article presents a solution to the puzzle by focusing upon the groups that are
responsible for killings in high violence countries. Marsh points out that arms owned by
the civilian population may not be a useful source for an armed group engaged in warfare.42
The weapons are likely to be widely dispersed geographically, may be of types designed
for sport rather than combat, and could be possessed by parts of the population not
sympathetic to the group. Instead, Marsh suggests focusing upon groups that are motivated
to commit acts of violence and ‘the extent to which a group’s objectives are not constrainedby a lack of specific weapons and ammunition’.43 Such a focus upon groups may well be
self-evident concerning civil war – those groups are doing the fighting. The next section
argues that a focus upon armed groups is also a useful means to understand homicide.

42 Marsh, ‘Conflict specific capital’, pp. 60-2.
43 Ibid., p. 60.

11100,000

NICHOLAS MARSH

VI
The actions of groups have a central role in research into armed conflict. For example, theUCDP-PRIO conflict dataset defines a conflict as being between a state and any ‘nongovernmental group of people having announced a name for their group and using armed
force to influence the outcome of the stated incompatibility’.44 Sustained campaigns ofpolitical violence require that participants be organized, and the nature of that organization
has been the subject of much study by scholars.45
A focus upon the role of groups in homicide requires more explanation. The remainder ofthis section summarises the sometimes nascent research on the role of groups in explaining
why some areas experience much higher levels of violence than others. Eisner suggests
several differences between societies with high and low levels of homicide.46 In the latter,
the relatively few homicides that are committed are mostly related to personal animosity,
emotional crisis or are committed by people who commonly display high levels of
aggression and poor impulse control. They usually occur in private, and use those
instruments that were immediately to hand. The high proportion of domestic killings meansthat in countries with the lowest levels of homicide women usually constitute a closer
proportion of victims to men. In contrast, in societies with high levels of violence,
homicides are more likely to be instrumental (in that they are pre-meditated and carried out
as part of an organized group or as an act of revenge or retaliation, and in order to provide
the perpetrator with a social or economic advantage). Those instrumental murders, usually
involve men as both murderers and victims, are committed in the public sphere, andinvolve specially designed weapons.
An illustration of the role of instrumental violence in explaining high levels of homicide
can be found from decades of research from Criminology on gender differences andhomicide. In the early 20th Century Veli Verkko showed that in general ‘the proportion of
female homicide victims is higher when the homicide rate is low, and vice versa’.47 For
example, during 2010 or 2011 in Japan, Norway, and Germany the homicide rate was
below 1 per 100,000 and the proportion of female victims was, respectively 53 per cent,51.6 per cent, and 52 per cent; whereas in the countries with some of the highest levels ofviolence the proportion of female victims is 7 per cent in Honduras, 15 per cent in South
Africa, or 10.5 per cent in Jamaica.48 Countries with higher levels of homicide overall also
have higher levels of female victims, but they are outnumbered by a far higher level ofmale victims.
Moreover, in such high violence countries the male victims are concentrated among ages
15-44 (especially 15-29).49 In countries with low levels of homicide (and high proportionsof female victims), and where data is available, the majority of female victims were killed
by intimate partners or were victims of other forms of domestic violence.50 For example, inGermany during 2007-2012 about 67 per cent of female homicide victims were killed by an
intimate partner, whereas in Honduras only four per cent of female victims were killed byan intimate partner.51
44 Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Updated UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook.
45 For example see Staniland, ‘Armed politics’; Weinstein, Inside rebellion; and on the relationship between

arms and groups in conflict see Marsh, ‘Conflict specific capital’.
46 Eisner, ‘What causes large scale variation’, pp. 141-48.
47 Verkko, Homicides and suicides; Dobash and Dobash, When men murder women, p. 4.
48 Statistics from the Homicide Monitor. http://homicide.igarape.org.br/ (accessed on 13 May 2018).
49 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global study on homicide 2013, pp. 28-37.
50 See Racovita, ‘Lethal violence’, pp. 109-13.
51 Ibid., p. 107.

12

The Availability Puzzle
Domestic and intimate partner violence is very rarely organized (if at all) and is often aspontaneous act. In contrast males are far more likely to be victims of instrumental violence(e.g. motivated by economic gain). Instrumental homicide and other violence committed bypeople who are members of groups, or are involved in other forms of criminal activity, ismuch more likely to be organized and prepared (or at least anticipated to the extent that
individuals routinely carry weapons in public). A large scale United Nations study
summarizes that:
There is a regional and gender bias towards male victims in homicide related toorganized crime and gangs, but interpersonal homicide in the form of intimate partner/family-related homicide is far more evenly distributed across regions and is, on
average, remarkably stable at the global level.52
The study later shows that there is an apparent relationship between higher national levelsof homicide, and the involvement by victims directly in organized criminal groups, or otherforms of criminal activity (such as drug sales or robbery).53 For example, where data isavailable, in Europe and mostly low homicide Asia an average of about one per cent ofhomicides are linked by governments to organized crime or gangs, whereas in generallyhigh homicide Latin America the average is around 30 per cent. Importantly, the study
notes that the simple prevalence of organized crime groups did not explain high levels ofhomicide. Instead violence is often ‘linked to competition between involved parties, suchas organized criminal groups, or between them and the State, with regard to control overterritory or illicit activities, including trafficking’ whereas criminal groups in other areas
went about their business without engaging in such high levels of violence.54
Research suggests that there may be a relationship between high levels of homicide andwith gangs, guns and a low likelihood of prosecution. Importantly, ownership by gangmembers of firearms has been found to be much higher than in the general population.55
Researchers in the US have long found such a relationship between guns and gangmembers, and similar findings have been made more recently by: Katz, Maguire, andChoate who find that firearm possession among gang members is twice as high as thegeneral population in the US, and eight times higher in Trinidad and Tobago;56 Glaister
describes a similar relationship between gangs and firearms in Jamaica, and Lemard andHemenway point out that over 1998-2002 94 per cent of drug or gang related homicides inthat country used firearms;57 similar findings can be found concerning gangs in Nicaraguaand Guyana.58
Malby points to high national levels of homicide, particularly in Latin America and the
Caribbean, being linked to an interaction between gang violence, use of firearms and low
conviction rates for homicide.59 Gangs are in conflict with each other and the state, and use
lethal means when they fight (a shootout is far more likely to involve death than a punchup). He notes that the ‘ubiquitous involvement of firearms’ in gangs or organized crime is
52 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Global study on homicide 2013, p. 13
53 Ibid., pp. 39-48.
54 Ibid., pp. 42-3.
55 Karp, ‘Elusive arsenals’, pp. 109-13.
56 For example see Blumstein, ‘Youth violence’, p. 30; Miller, Crime by youth gangs, pp. 115-8; Lizotte et al.,‘Patterns of illegal gun carrying’, p. 338; Katz, Maguire, and Choate, ‘A cross-national comparison’.
57 Glaister, Confronting the don; Lemard and Hemenway,‘Violence in Jamaica’.
58 Rodgers and Rocha, ‘Turning points’; Owen and Grigsby, In transit.
59 Malby, ‘Characteristics of armed violence’.

13

NICHOLAS MARSH‘well established’ in countries in which there are high levels of homicide (in contrast, in
low homicide countries members of gangs do not habitually carry firearms).60 In particular,
he notes that in countries ‘where more than half of all homicides are committed by firearm,the average proportion of gang- or organized crime-related homicides tends to be higher’than in countries where firearms account for a minority of homicides.61 Similarly Tracy,
Braga, and Papachristos review 16 studies which find high concentrations of gun violencein small social networks (in particular exposure to a victim or perpetrator of violence insocial networks increases the risk of individual being a victim or a perpetrator).62
To sum up this section, in both countries affected by warfare, and in countries affected byhigh levels of homicide, the killings committed by non-state actors are mainly carried out
by armed groups (rather than by individuals acting independently). The most common
perpetrator is the ‘gunman’, and that man is usually acting as part a group.

VII
When the focus of inquiry is shifted toward the groups that perpetrate violence in conflictor in countries affected by high levels of homicide a solution to the puzzle presented above
becomes apparent. The key question is not how many weapons are there in civilian
possession in a country, but does a difficulty in acquiring weapons constrain whether agroup can achieve its objectives?
To reiterate the point made above, fragile and conflict prone areas that experience highlevels of violence often do not contain large numbers of privately owned firearms even if
they have high levels of violence. For example, Kolbe and Muggah present the results of ahousehold survey in Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti, which shows that 2.3 per cent ofhouseholds contained firearms.63 Such a level of firearms ownership resembles that foundin several low violence countries such as England and Wales, Poland, or Japan,
nevertheless, the 2012 reported homicide rate in Haiti was 10 per 100,000, while it was at 1
per 100,000 or lower in those three countries.64 Similarly, Atwood, Glatz, and Muggahreiterate that ‘a small number of weapons can have a devastating impact’ when they point
to 2004 estimates that in the whole of the Solomon Islands there were only an estimated3,500 firearms – in a country that had been wracked by ethnic violence from 1998-2002
that led to 20,000 people being internally displaced. Instead of arms being widely dispersed
throughout society, all that is needed is that it is relatively easy for groups intending tocommit acts of violence to obtain arms.65
Arms acquired lawfully or possessed by the civilian population are one source ofweapons for an armed group. But there are several others. The various sources are:••••Lawful purchase (e.g. for a licensed gun dealer).
Obtaining weapons possessed by the general civilian population (e.g. through theft,or purchase).
Illicit trafficking.
Theft or corrupt purchase from government stocks.

60 Ibid., p. 100.
61 Ibid., pp. 100-1.
62 Tracy, Braga and Papachristos, ‘The transmission of gun’.
63 Kolbe and Muggah, ‘Securing the state’.
64 van Kesteren, ‘Revisiting the gun ownership’, p. 7.
65 Atwood, Glatz, and Muggah, Demanding attention, p. 43

14

The Availability Puzzle

Lawfulpurchase

Civilian
popula�on

IllicittraﬃckingThe� fromgovernment
stocksDona�onGroupacquiringarms

Figure 3. Potential Sources of Arms Acquisition•

Donation (by a foreign government, elements with the home government or byanother group or organization).

These different sources are summarized in Figure 3.
As mentioned above, lawful purchase or arms present in the civilian population may not
be the most useful source for an armed group. Lawful purchase will usually require that thegroup member making the purchase identifies themselves. Arms are widely dispersed
among civilians and they often own weapons that are relatively less useful for fighting
against another group or government forces. Shotguns, for example, are widely used for
hunting but are difficult to conceal (unlike handguns), are only lethal against humans atlimited ranges (unlike rifles) and versions usually owned by civilians are not capable of
rapid fire (unlike automatic weapons).
The other methods of acquisition may be more useful. Their main drawback is that theyare (almost always) illegal. The risk of prosecution will often prevent normal members of
the public from, say, acquiring arms via traffickers or looting state arsenals. But armed
groups engaging in criminal or political violence are already outlaws. A group that uses
illicit channels has a greater likelihood of being able to obtain arms (and associatedammunition) in greater quantity than could easily be obtained from civilian owners, andcrucially, arms that are more powerful or otherwise useful (such as automatic or semiautomatic rifles, handguns that can easily be concealed, or more powerful weapons such as
grenade launchers).
An important distinction between the mostly developed countries with low levels ofviolence (and comparatively successful governance of arms) and the developing countries
with high levels of violence (associated with warfare, criminality, or both), is that thedeveloped low violence countries have been able to limit illicit sources of arms acquisition.
In contrast, countries experiencing high levels of violence generally also experience limited
control over one or more of the above methods. The following examples suggest thatcountries that experience fragility and are affected by high levels of violence are also
places where groups can obtain weapons from illicit sources with greater ease than is foundin low-violence countries.
A key characteristic of many high violence countries is that while the absolute number offirearms in the country may be relatively low, there are a high proportion of illicit arms.
For example, concerning Brazil, Dreyfus et al. note that for all firearms in the country

15

NICHOLAS MARSH
including state holdings, ‘the proportion of legal to illicit holdings is almost 40:60 per cent.
More than half of the circulating firearms are in the hands of either criminals or private
citizens in the informal market’.66 Dreyfus et al. note that with the exception of one state, in
Brazil handguns ‘are the predominant type of weapon seized by police’ something
consistent with the guns being acquired for anticipated violent encounters rather than for
hunting or recreation.67 Concerning Mexico, McDougal et al. note that Mexico has highly
restrictive firearms laws, and Mexican armed forces estimate that ‘only one-third of 1% of
firearms in Mexico is legally registered, and 90% of all firearms are used for criminal
purposes’.68
A clue as to the pervasiveness of unlawful ownership can be found from Karp who
provides data on the number of registered firearms and estimates of unregistered firearms
for 46 countries.69 National laws differ and an unregistered firearm is not always with anunlawful firearm (see below) and some countries, particularly the US, do not have aregistration system in place at all. Nevertheless, Parker’s analysis of 42 jurisdictions findsthat outside the US only two do not register firearms or require individual licenses topossess firearms.70
An assessment of Karp’s data shows that in 28 countries a majority of firearms werelikely to have been unregistered, and of those all but four were among the 40 least
developed countries (according to the 2007/8 Human Development Index index).71 The
four developed countries with higher levels of unregistered firearms are France, Germany,
Greece, and New Zealand, and some explanation is appropriate. Unusually, New Zealanddoes not require registration for shotguns and rifles used for hunting by civilians, and inGermany and France registration of types of sporting guns was not required for many
decades during the 20th Century, and so large quantities of lawfully acquired sporting guns
were not registered. 72 Conversely, among 18 states in which the number of registeredfirearms was higher than the estimate for unregistered, all but seven were among the 40
most developed countries in 2007/8.73 The proportions apparent from Karp’s data show aclear preponderance in his sample that in developing countries a majority of firearms are
unregistered (and vice versa in developed).74 Certainly, one should be aware of caveats
concerning differences in national regulation and the quality of estimates of unregisteredfirearms. Nevertheless, the most plausible explanation is that the members of the sample
included in the 40 most developed states (with a few exceptions) are able to register the
majority of firearms within their territories, whereas a clear majority of developing states
were not. The minority of registered firearms in developing countries is indicative of an
inability of the state to govern access to weapons; something not found in most of the low
violence developed countries.
66 Dreyfus et al., Small arms in Brazil, p. 130.
67 Ibid., p. 147.
68 McDougal et al., ‘The way of the gun’, p. 302.
69 Karp, ‘Completing the count’, pp. 1.
70 Parker, ‘Balancing act’, pp. 13-4.
71 Watkins, Human development report, pp. 229-232. Included if the ‘low’ estimate for unregistered firearms ishigher than the number of registered firearms: Afghanistan, Albania, Bangladesh, Brazil, Colombia, Croatia,
Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan,
Macedonia, Mexico, New Zealand, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Tanzania,
Thailand, Turkey.
72 Karp, ‘Fewer blanks’, pp. 69-70; Marsh, ‘Firearms seizures’; Thorp, Review of firearms control.
73 Included if the ‘low’ estimate for unregistered firearms is lower than the number of registered firearms:
Australia, Belgium, Canada, England and Wales, Finland, Georgia, Israel, Moldova, Montenegro, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Russia, Serbia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Uruguay.
74 Karp, ‘Completing the count’.

16The Availability Puzzle
Existing research suggests that illicit flows of arms are much more common in highviolence states. Due to lack of resources, poor motivation, or actual corruption, police,customs, border guards and other agencies are unable to prevent illicit flows of weapons.
Borders are often described as being porous, enabling traffickers to transport arms overnational boundaries. For example trafficking arms out of Libya after the 2011 civil war
took place in desert and sparsely populated areas that are difficult for governments tomonitor or control due to the limited capacities of the governments in the Sahel.75 Killicoat
finds that after analysing prices overall ‘[c]ountries with more porous borders tend to havelower weapons prices. This is especially the case in Africa, where porous borders allow the
supply of weapons to meet potential demand more readily’.76 In areas with the lowest levelsof government control, illicit arms are openly traded. For example, Schroeder and Kingstate that ‘[u]ntil 2007, arms were openly sold in Yemen in at least 18 arms markets;
however, arms control campaigns in 2007 and 2009 shut down most of the arms markets’.77
Theft, corrupt purchase, or other losses from government stocks are also reported to be
far more common in high violence countries. State law enforcement or military forces are
not able to secure their own stocks of weapons and ammunition. Large scale diversion fromstate stocks occurs during wars and in countries not at war, and from both military arsenals
and weapons held by law enforcement and the judiciary. Research examining state
stockpiles and losses from them emphasises that they are often a significant source ofweapons for non-state groups.78 Jackson summarises that:
In many conflicts, opposition groups’ most important source of arms is the government
they are fighting. The importance of this supply channel is borne out by evidence fromnumerous internal conflicts throughout the world. Rather than importation, or by
producing weapons themselves, rebel groups prefer to acquire arms from thegovernment forces they oppose because this method is frequently the easiest, yields
high returns for relatively little effort or cost, and does not require any external
supporter or the development of a war economy.79
Capture of arms depots during warfare is the most dramatic example, but in many partsof the world there are also important losses from judicial and law enforcement stocks. For
example, the South African Police Service has stated that between 2009-13 its officers hadreported the loss of 8,614 firearms that had been issued to individual officers.80 Similarly,
through analysis of seized ammunition in Rio de Janeiro and of ammunition samples
collected form pastoralists in the Karamoja region of Uganda, Bevan and Dreyfus present
evidence that large quantities of ammunition were lost, stolen, or corruptly sold frommilitary or police stocks and ended up in the hands of non-state groups (in particularcriminal organizations in Rio de Janeiro and people involved in cattle raiding in Karamoja).81
International forces can also be a source of arms, for example Berman and Racovita outline
how peacekeeping troops in Sudan and South Sudan were the source of arms and
75 Marsh, ‘Brothers came back’, p. 80.
76 Killicoat, What price the kalashnikov.
77 Schroeder and King, ‘Surveying the battlefield’, p. 347.
78 For example Jackson, ‘‘From under their noses’; Karp, ‘Introduction: inconspicuous disarmament’; Marshand Dube, Preventing diversion.
79 Jackson, ‘From under their noses’, p. 131.
80 Marsh and Dube, Preventing diversion, pp. 6-7.
81 Bevan and Dreyfus, Enemy within.

17

NICHOLAS MARSH
ammunition circulating in those markets.82
The provision of arms by states to proxies fighting in civil wars in foreign states hasreceived previous scholarly attention.83 External arms supplies can provide a significant
boost to a rebel group’s military capacity, especially if they receive weapons (such as antiaircraft missiles) that they could not obtain otherwise.
Another source of donations of arms are political and business leaders who provide, or
encourage the provision of, arms to groups of supporters. For example, Staniland observes
that in many areas there are ‘multiple armed political actors’ in which people are ‘trainedand equipped with weaponry under the control of a leadership group’.84 Hazen and Horner
describe how Nigerian politics ‘has been militarized, with violence becoming an ordinary
tool of elections and a part of the political culture’ and that the procurers of arms include‘individuals, communities, or community leaders for community arsenals, and vigilantegroups and ethnic militias’. 85 Greene and Macaspac examine the links between armed
gangs and business or political elites in the Philippines and show how local notables who
are active in both business and politics equip groups of supporters with arms in order to
intimidate rivals or other actors (such as journalists or trade unionists).86 Similarly, Leslie
describes ‘Dons’ in Jamaica who are men that exercise control over a gang or community,
are often involved in politics, and use violence in the course of providing services to anddisciplining the communities they lead.87 They are involved in equipping armed gangs.
In particular, the use of violence by political or business leaders is often particularly
apparent during elections as rival gangs seek to intimidate support for their leader’s
opponents.88 Duquet, Hazen, and Horner note that prior to elections in Nigeria politicians
across the country recruited and armed groups made up of local youths.89

VIII
The relationship between arms and violence within states can better be understood by firsttaking into account the role of intention as well as the presence (or not) of arms. Weapons
are tools which multiply human strength. But use of that tool in an act of violence also
requires intention. Even high levels of arms present in a society can be managed and not be
used to kill, injure, or intimidate if violent intentions can be reduced. Second,
understanding the role played by arms in affecting global variations in the level of violence
requires that the level of analysis be moved away from national level and toward variables
and indicators that shed light on the acquisition by armed groups. Instead of examining thetotal quantity of firearms in society, the relationship can better be examined by focusing
upon the ease or difficulty by which groups can acquire arms (including via illicit
trafficking, theft from government stocks and donations). The important question is thenwhether lack of weapons limits an armed group’s capabilities and so prevents it fromachieving its objectives.

82 Berman and Racovita, Under attack.
83 For example see Mumford, Proxy warfare.
84 Staniland, ‘Armed politics’, p. 460.
85 Hazen and Horner, Small arms, armed violence, and insecurity in Nigeria, pp. 10-1, 48.
86 Greene and Macaspac, ‘Arms, private militias’.
87 Leslie, Confronting the don.
88 See Birch and Muchlinski, Electoral violence patterns; Burchard, Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa.
89 Duquet, ‘Arms acquisition patterns’; Hazen and Horner, Small arms, armed violence.

18

The Availability Puzzle
References
Altheimer, I. and Boswell, M., ‘Reassessing the association between gun availability and homicide at thecross-national level’, American Journal of Criminal Justice, 37 (2012), pp. 682-704.
Arendt, H., On violence (New York, 1970).
Atwood, D., Glatz, A. K., and Muggah, R., Demanding attention: addressing the dynamics of small arms
demand (Geneva, 2012).
Bell, J. B., The dynamics of the armed struggle (1998).
Berman, E. and Racovita, M., Under attack and above scrutiny?: arms and ammunition diversion frompeacekeepers in Sudan and South Sudan, 2002-14 (Geneva, 2012).
Bevan, J. and Dreyfus, P., ‘Enemy within: ammunition diversion in Uganda and Brazil’, in E. Berman, K.
Krause, E. LeBrun and G. McDonald, eds., Small arms survey 2007: guns and the city (Cambridge,2007).
Birch, S. and Muchlinski, D., ‘Electoral violence patterns and trends’, in Electoral integrity and politicalregimes (2012).
Blumstein, A., ‘Youth violence, guns, and the illicit-drug industry’, Journal of Criminal Law andCriminology, 86 (1995), pp. 10-36.
Bourne, M., Arming conflict: the proliferation of small arms (Basingstoke, 2007).
Bourne, M., ‘Small arms and light weapons spread and conflict’, in O. Greene and N. Marsh, eds., Smallarms, crime and conflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence (2012), pp. 29-42.
Burchard, S., Electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa: causes and consequences (Boulder, CO, 2015).
Chapman, S., Alpers, P., and Jones, M., ‘Association between gun law reforms and intentional firearm
deaths in Australia, 1979-2013’, JAMA, 316 (2016), pp. 291-9.
Clausewitz, C.V., On war, edited and translated by M., Howard and P. Pare (Princeton, 1976).
Collier, P., Elliott, V. L., Hegre, H., Hoeffler, A., Reynal-Querol, M., and Sambanis, N., Breaking theconflict trap: civil war and development policy (Washington, D.C.,2003).
Cukier, W. and Sidel, V., The global gun epidemic: from saturday night specials to AK-47s (Westport, CT,
2006).
Dobash, E. and Dobash, R., When men murder women (Oxford, 2015).
Dreyfus, P., Lessing, B., Nascimento, M. S., and Purcena, J. C., Small arms in Brazil: production, trade,and holdings (Geneva, 2010).
Duquet, N., ‘Arms acquisition patterns and the dynamics of conflict: lessons from the Niger delta’,
International Studies Perspectives, 10 (2009), pp. 169-85.
Eisner, M., ‘What causes large scale variation in homicide rates’, in H. Kortüm and J. Heinze, eds.,
Aggression in humans and other primates: biology, psychology, sociology (Munich, 2012).
Greene, O. and Macaspac, A., ‘Arms, private militias and fragile state dynamics’, in O. Greene, O. and N.
Marsh, eds., Small arms, crime and conflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence(London, 2012), pp. 138-59.
Hazen, J. and Horner, J., Small arms, armed violence, and insecurity in Nigeria: the Niger delta inperspective, Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper, 20 (2007).
Hemenway, D. and Miller, M., ‘Firearm availability and homicide rates across 26 high income countries’,
The Journal of Trauma, Injury, Infection, and Critical Care, 49 (2000), pp. 985-88.
Hemenway, D. Shinoda-Tagawa, T., and Miller, M., ‘Firearm availability and female homicide
victimization rates among 25 populous high-income countries’, Journal of the American Medical
Womens Association, 57 (2002), pp. 100-4.
Hepburn, L. and Hemenway, D., ‘Firearm availability and homicide: a review of the literature’, Aggression
and Violent Behavior, 9 (2004), pp. 417-40.
Hoskin, A., ‘Armed Americans: The impact of firearm availability on national homicide rates’, Justice
Quarterly, 18 (2001), pp. 569-92.
Imbush, P., ‘The concept of violence’, in W. Heitmeyer, and J. Hagan, eds., International handbook ofviolence research (Berlin, 2003), pp. 13-39.
Jackson, T., ‘From under their noses: Rebel groups’ arms acquisition and the importance of leakages fromstate stockpiles’, International Studies Perspectives, 11 (2010), pp. 131-47.
Jackson, T. and Marsh, N., ‘Guns and deaths a critical review’, in O. Greene and N., Marsh, eds., Smallarms, crime and conflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence (2012), pp. 105-21.
Kahaner, L., AK-47: The weapon that changed the face of war (Hoboken, 2007).
Karp, A., ‘Fewer blanks: global firearm stockpiles’, in P. Batchelor and K. Krause, eds., Small arms survey
2003: development denied (Oxford, 2003), pp. 57-95.

19

NICHOLAS MARSH
Karp, A., ‘Completing the count civilian firearms’, in E. Berman, K. Krause, E. LeBrun, and G. McDonald,eds., Small arms survey 2007: guns and the city (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 38-71.
Karp, A., ‘Elusive arsenals: gang and group firearms’, in E. Berman et al., eds., Small arms survey 2010:
gangs, groups, and guns (Cambridge, 2010), pp. 100-27.
Karp, A., ‘Introduction: inconspicuous disarmament’, in A. Karp, ed., The politics of destroying surplus
small arms inconspicuous disarmament (2010), pp. 1-14.
Katz, C., Maguire, E., and Choate, D., ‘A cross-national comparison of gangs in the United States andTrinidad and Tobago’, International Criminal Justice Review, 21 (2011), pp. 243-62.
van Kesteren, J., ‘Revisiting the gun ownership and violence link: a multi- level analysis of victimisation
survey data’, British Journal of Criminology, 54 (2013), pp. 53-72.
Killias, M., ‘International correlations between gun ownership and rates of homicide and suicide’,
Canadian Medical Association Journal, 148 (1993), pp. 1721-25.
Killias, M., van Kesteren, J., and Rindlisbacher, M., ‘Guns, violent crime and suicide in 21 countries’,
Canadian Journal of Criminology, Oct. (2001), pp. 429-48.
Killicoat, P., ‘What price the Kalashnikov? The economics of small arms’, in E. Berman, K. Krause, E.
LeBrun, and G. McDonald, eds., Small arms survey 2007: guns and the city (Cambridge, 2007), pp. 25787.
Kolbe, A. and Muggah, R., ‘Securing the state: Haiti before and after the earthquake’, in E. Berman et al.,eds., Small arms survey 2011: states of security (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 228-59.
Kontya, M. and Schaeferb, B., ‘Small arms mortality: access to firearms and lethal violence’, Sociological
Spectrum, 32 (2012), pp. 475-90.
Kreutz, J. and Marsh, N., ‘Lethal instruments: small arms and deaths in armed conflict’, in O. Greene and
N. Marsh, eds., Small arms, crime and conflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence(2012), pp. 43-76.
Krug, E., Dahlberg, L., Mercy, J., Zwi, A.B., and Lozano, R., World report on violence and health (Geneva,
2002).
Latour, B., ‘On technical mediation - philosophy, sociology, genealogy’, Common Knowledge, 3 (1994),
pp. 29-64.
Lemard, G. and Hemenway, D., ‘Violence in Jamaica: an analysis of homicides 1998–2002’, Injury
Prevention, 12 (2006), pp. 15-8.
Leslie, G., Confronting the don: the political economy of gang violence in Jamaica (Geneva, 2010).
Lizotte, A., Howard, G., Krohn, M., and Thornberry, T., ‘Patterns of illegal gun carrying among urban
males’, Valparaiso University Law Review, 31 (1997), pp. 375-93.
Malby, S., ‘Characteristics of armed violence’, in K. Krause, R. Muggah, and E. Gilgen, eds., Global
burden of armed violence 2011 (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 87-122.
Marsh, N., ‘Conflict specific capital: the role of weapons acquisition in civil war’, International Studies
Perspectives, 8 (2007), pp.54-72.
Marsh, N., ‘Tools of insurgency: a review of the role of small arms and light weapons in warfare’, in O.
Greene and N. Marsh, eds., Small arms, crime and conflict: global governance and the threat of armed
violence (2012), pp. 13-28.
Marsh, N. and Dube, G., Preventing diversion: the importance of stockpile management (Oslo, 2014).
Marsh, N. ‘Firearms seizures and trafficking: a «local» phenomenon’, Strategic Trade Review, 1 (2015),
pp. 73-87.
Marsh, N., ‘Brothers came back with weapons: the effects of arms proliferation from Libya’, PRISM, 6(2017), pp. 79-96.
McDougal, T., Shirk, D., Muggah, R., and Patterson, J., ‘The way of the gun: estimating firearms
trafficking across the US–Mexico border’, Journal of Economic Geography, 15 (2014), pp. 297-327.
Miller, W., Crime by youth gangs and groups in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1992).
Miller, M., Azrael, D., and Hemenway, D., ‘State-level homicide victimization rates in the U.S. in relation
to survey measures of household firearm ownership, 2001-2003’, Social Science and Medicine, 64(2007), pp. 656-64.
Most, B. and Starr, H., Inquiry, logic and international politics (Columbia, 1989).
Mumford, A., Proxy warfare (Hoboken N.J., 2013).
Nowak, M., ‘Lethal violence update’, in A. A. del Frate, K. Krause, and M. Nowak, eds., Global burden ofarmed violence 2015: every body counts (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 49-86.
Owen, T. and Grigsby, A., In transit: gangs and criminal networks (Geneva, 2012).
Parker, S., ‘Balancing act regulation of civilian firearm possession’, in E. Berman, K. Krause, E. LeBrun,

20

The Availability Puzzle
and G. McDonald, eds., Small arms survey 2011: states of security (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 261-309.
Racovita, M., ‘Lethal violence against women and girls’, in K. Krause and M. Nowak, eds., Global burdenof armed violence 2015: every body counts (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 87-210.
Rodgers, D. and Rocha, J., ‘Turning points gang evolution in Nicaragua’, in E. LeBrun et al., eds., Smallarms survey 2013: everyday dangers (Cambridge, 2013), pp. 46-73.
Sislin, J. and Pearson, F., Arms and ethnic conflict (Oxford, 2001).
Sislin, J. and Pearson, F., ‘Arms and escalation in ethnic conflicts: the case of Sri Lanka’, International
Studies Perspectives, 7 (2006), pp. 137-58.
Smith, T. and Stevens, B., ‘A cross-national investigation of firearm availability and lethal violence’, The
European Journal of Psychiatry, 17 (2003), pp. 34-7.
Squires, P., Gun crime in global contexts (2014).
Staniland, P., ‘Armed politics and the study of intrastate conflict’, Journal of Peace Research, 54 (2017),
pp. 459-67.
Tracy, M., Braga, A. A., and Papachristos, A. V., ‘The transmission of gun and other weapon-involved
violence within social networks’, Epidemiological Reviews, 38 (2016), pp. 70-86.
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). UCDP/PRIO armed conflict dataset codebook, Version 17.2.
(undated) http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/ucdpprio/ucdp-prio-acd-172.pdf (accessed 13 May 2018).
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Global study on homicide 2011 (Vienna, 2011).
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Global study on homicide 2013 (Vienna, 2013).
Verkko, V., Homicides and suicides in Finland and their dependence upon national character(Copenhagen, 1951).
Watkins, K., Human development report 2007/2008 (New York, 2007).
Weinstein, J., Inside rebellion: the politics of insurgent violence (Cambridge, 2006).
Wellford, C., Pepper, J., and Petrie, C., Firearms and violence: a critical review (Washington, D.C., 2005).
Wolf, A., Gray, R., and Fazel, S., ‘Violence as a public health problem: an ecological study of 169
countries’, Social Science & Medicine, 104 (2014), pp. 220-7.
World Bank, World development report 2011 (Washington, D.C., 2011).

21

History of Global Arms Transfer, 6 (2018), pp. 23-37

Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories
of Gun Acquisition and State Violence†
By ITSUHIRO HAZAMA*This paper aims to practice history from below concerning the disarmament of
the pastoral communities of north-eastern Uganda, the Karimojong and the
Dodoth. The central government is a major source of so-called illegallytransferred guns for East African pastoralists, and state violence has awoken thememories of local residents in terms of their experiences with violence. In thedisarmament of the twenty-first century, newly purchased guns are being
submitted to the military in order to emancipate captive pastoralists who weretaken to and detained in military barracks. Those who will be exchanged for theseguns are represented by the pastoralists as homologous with nineteenth century
slaves who were caught by outsiders engaged in ivory trade when guns werebrought into the Karamoja region. The ritual healing of violence-related illnesses
requires a shared history of state violence to make people realize that those who
rule always exercise violence against those being ruled and how people have
lived as cultural existence. This past reconstruction is currently present and is aprocess of interweaving personal memories into collective memories. The historyof arms transfer and the state control of north-eastern Ugandan pastoralists is thepast facts selected trough problem consciousness directed at external violent rule.
It is also a composition of facts and current history in the sense of Croce’s
historical thought and is a history lived with the body.
In East African pastoral societies, automatic rifles have been abundant since the 1980s.
Political scientists and anthropologists have sounded an alarm bell that pastoralists’survival is being threatened by inter-group armed violence over livestock. According theirarguments, arms transfer control can only be accomplished effectively by disarmament
conducted by the state and international society.1
In Karamoja (Figure 1) in north-eastern Uganda, when the collapse of the Ugandan
government under Idi Amin Dada Oumee’s (1925–2003) military dictatorship resulted in
an inflow of automatic rifles to the region in 1979–80, cattle-raiding by using automatic
rifles have become a daily occurrence.2 The central government, which is backed by the* Author’s affiliation: Associate Professor, School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki
University; Graduate School of Global Humanities and Social Sciences, Nagasaki University.
† Acknowledgements: A previous version of this article was presented at ‘Relationships between arms
availability and violence’ organized by the Meiji University Research Institute for the History of Global Arms
Transfer on 28 March 2018. The author would like to thank Tomoji Onozuka, Nicholas Marsh, Toru Sagawa,Tamara Enomoto, and Katsuhiko Yokoi for their extensive advice and comments. This work was supported by
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology’s Program for the Strategic Research
Foundation at Private Universities, 2015–19, JSPS KAKENHI grant numbers JP16K17075, JP16KT0040,
JP22710253, and JP16H05664.
1 Gray et al., ‘Cattle raiding’; Schlee, ‘Comment’.
2 Many raids are carried out against people belonging to other ethnic or territorial groups. However, raiding

23

ITSUHIRO HAZAMA
United Kingdom and the United States, has been implementing a disarmament policy thatwas praised by the Ugandan government as being the most consistent and longest in
Ugandan history since 2000.3 While achievements in terms of arms control are emphasizedin history by the state, they have also led to complex arms transfer and armed conflicts,
including violent confrontations between the national army and local pastoralists andfrequent raids provoked by disparities of arms. As a result, coping practices for illnesses
caused by political and physical violence have been developed.

Figure 1. Map of the research area.

Figure 1. Map of the Research Area
Source: Author.

Source: Author.

This paper describes and analyses an everyday history from below4 of gun acquisitionand complex violence under the hegemony of disarmament based on explicit endeavours inorder to attend to the voices of pastoralists who have been marginalized and to explain theireveryday experiences to those of people with dominant force. It will note the pastoralists’creativity in the face of the difficulty in surviving and elucidate on the culture of resistancebeing formed against the self-contained culture of violence. Resistance, in this case, will
not remain at the level of resistant violence against dominant violence, which is obviously
within one ethnic group and territorial group is not unusual.
3 Hazama, ‘Intergroup’.
4 Rosaldo, ‘Celebrating’.

24

Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories of Gun Acquisition and State Violence
futile in front of large scale and systematic violence of the dominant power. This paper
grasps the possibility that pastoralists who are structurally in the lowest social stratum are
actually able to domesticate unreasonable violence and alter the modern violence systemby means of sustaining everyday life.
Field research has been conducted in Karimojong society since 1998 and in Dodoth
society since 2002. They are the semi-nomadic pastoralists in the Karamoja region, thesemi-arid savannah of north-eastern Uganda bordering Kenya and South Sudan. The
Karimojong and the Dodoth engage in cattle-, goat-, and sheep-based pastoralism, speak acommon Eastern Nilotic language, sometimes practice inter-marriage, and sometimes share
pasture land.

I
Two historical events caused the inflow of guns into the Karamoja region. This gun
acquisition is remembered in current local gun designations and transactions.
Eastern Nilotes living on the borders between Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and Ethiopia, suchas the Karimojong, the Dodoth, the Jie, the Toposa, the Turkana, and the Nyangatom, use
the word ngatomyan (s. atom) to describe guns. The word ngatomyan relates to the word
for elephant (etom). The word calls to mind the earliest influx of rifles in the nineteenth
century when Ethiopians, British people, North Americans, Arabs, and Swahili people
supplied rifles to Eastern Nilotic pastoralists as payment for ivory and as tools for hunting
elephants. The Karimojong-speaking cluster of the Eastern Nilotes (Ateker) firstencountered gunrunners operating in the Maji border area of south-west Ethiopia.5 Thus,
firearms were first introduced into the Karamoja region to secure ivory as a commodity.
After Uganda became a British protectorate in 1894, the Karamoja region was excluded
from British rule for 17 years because its semi-arid land was seen as unsuitable for the
production of the cash crops that were in high demand in Britain, such as cotton and coffee.
However, elephants were numerous in the area, and ivory traders were attracted to thisunexplored commodity. Local inhabitants joined traders in ivory hunting and received
livestock as a reward. As the number of elephants decreased throughout the world and theprices of ivory climbed, competition between traders became intense.6 It was at this pointthat traders gave pastoralists in the Karamoja region guns to hunt for ivory or as a reward,
replacing livestock as payment for hunting.
It is this time in the beginning of twenty century that ivory traders appeared as gun
suppliers for the first time in administrative records. The traders included Arabs, British
people, North Americans, Greeks, Ethiopians, and slaves from the Swahili coast. In the
1910s, rifles were supplied as tools or rewards; traders initially exchanged modern firearms
for ivory and slaves both before and after the Karamoja region came under colonial rule.7
Today, the Karimojong and the Dodoth must frequently release their friends and relatives
who were caught by the army from detention huts in army barracks; this is referred to as
the emancipation (alakakin) of a slave or a porter (ekadalan). Bringing back a captive
involves the transfer of automatic rifles and livestock; this is described in more detail in
Section V.
Estimating the total number of guns in the Karamoja region is difficult due to the lack of
5 Mburu, ‘Delimitation’.
6 Mamdani et al., Karamoja.
7 Barber, ‘Karamoja in 1910’; Welch, ‘Pastoralists’.

25

ITSUHIRO HAZAMA
records, but Mamdani et al. reported that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, guns
entered northern Uganda from the Karamoja region.8 They based this assertion on a report
written by a district officer that stated that, when two chiefs from the Acholi explored thearea, including Kotido, Kaabong, and Moroto, by the order of the colonial government,
they acquired 1,200 rifles from traders who worked primarily in the Karamoja region. In
1931, the population of the Karamoja region was estimated to be 65,000.9 It is almost
certain that the population was smaller in the 1910s than in the 1930s. Thus, in the 1910s,
pastoral societies, including the Karimojong and the Dodoth, had at least one gun for every
54 people.
In 1979, the regime of Idi Amin was overthrown. In the same year, the Matheniko, one of
the three main territorial groups of the Karimojong, raided Idi Amin’s armoury in Moroto,
the capital of the district. The Moroto army barracks had been abandoned, and the
Karimojong took advantage of the situation to acquire guns from the deserted armoury. The
number of guns taken was sufficient for the needs of the group, with a surplus left over for
trade with neighbouring ethnic groups. 10 Quam estimated that 10,000 guns went into
circulation at the time.11 Sylvester and Jeremy estimated that, in addition to the 10,000
guns, two million rounds of ammunition were transported at the time,12 and Odhiambo
cited 12,000 guns in accordance with an estimation by Wangoola.13 An elder Karimojong
from Lotome, in 2003, recalled in conversation with author (Hazama) that people hadtransported guns in bundles on the backs of donkeys and that they had reminded him ofbundles of firewood. According to the event calendar, a list of historical events sharedorally to indicate certain years, 1979 was ‘the year the Matheniko broke into army barracks
for guns’ (ekaru ngolo abwangunita Ngimatheniko ngatomian).
It is highly probable that not only guns but also bullets had been exchanged much more
frequently than guns for various daily necessities; this remains true today. For example, in
2003, an AK-47 bullet sold for 500 UGX in Kaabong. At the time, this is equivalent to theprice of two litres of local brew made from maize or millet, which can be acquired in
exchange for bullets. In these transactions, brew purchasers are usually soldiers dispatchedto the Karamoja region; when their salaries were delayed, they use bullets in place of cash
to buy brew from women in pastoral society. The soldiers have been spread all over the
Karamoja region since implementation of disarmament, and women store crops, money,
and bullets in food granaries.
The commodification of arms dates back to the beginning of colonisation, and arms havebecome a part of everyday life for pastoralists, not only as tools of protection andaggression but also as a transaction method.

II
In 1980 in the Karamoja region, the transition from traditional guns to modern guns was
accomplished. This was a considerably earlier inflow compared to that experienced by thegeneral citizens of Sudan and Kenya. The Boran and the Gabra, pastoralists in northern
Kenya and south-western Ethiopia, respectively, acquired AK-47s in 1991 from members
8 Mamdani et al., Karamoja.
9 Langlands, ‘The population’.
10 Mamdani et al., Karamoja.
11 Quam, ‘Creating peace’.
12 Sylvester and Jeremy, Karamoja, Uganda’s land.
13 Odhiambo, The Karamoja conflict; Wangoola, ‘Cattle rustling’.

26

Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories of Gun Acquisition and State Violenceof the Ethiopian government military who fled southward into Kenya after the fall of the
Derg government to Tigrean insurgents.14 The Sudanese army began supplying northern
Baggara groups with AK-47s and bullets in 1986, encouraging them to raid the Nuer andthe Dinka located in the Western Upper Nile and northern Bahr el Ghazal.15
When modern European guns capable of continuous fire, including AK-47s and G3s,
were brought into the Karamoja region after 1980, they completely dominated gun trade in
the Karamoja region and replaced traditional match-lock guns. As a result, automatic rifles
now account for 90 per cent of the guns owned by pastoralists today. By 1998, 64 per centof Karimojong men whose semi-permanent settlement was Lotome and who were over 18
years of age owned a gun (n = 123), and, in 2003, 90 per cent of Dodoth men over 18 yearsof age whose semi-permanent settlement was Kalapata (n = 30) owned a gun.
In July 2008, I studied approximately 214 rifles owned by the Karimojong in Bokora
County in the Moroto District.16 Of these, 89.7 per cent were semi-automatic rifles. The
rifles owned by the Karimojong can be classified into the eight categories listed below.
1) In total, 65 AK-47s or copies of AK-47s were found. Locally, the AK-47 is called
Amakana, and it occurs in ten versions: Aceger, Akeju-asuulu (or Akeju-batat), Asili-reng,Apas, Ameri-keju, Ayesengor, Nakasongola, Atodobokakilegit (or Aritongit), Akwapenek,
and Ariamakor. Both Atodobokakilengit and Akwapenek can be fitted with a fixed bayonet(ekileng). The sight of Atodobokakilegit is ring shaped (todo means a round horn shape of
cattle), and its wooden gunstock is dark (bok). Although it is very popular because it lasts
well and has little kickback, Nakasongola, a word that originates from the name of a
district in central Uganda in which the gun is manufactured, is an inferior product thatmelts at the neck after repeated firing. Apas, which is a silver-white iron (apas), is made in
Yugoslavia.
2) The G3 is called Aliba. In total, 44 G3s were found. Aliba refers to a small green
weaverbird. Germany, France, and Israel were identified as the countries that produce thisgun, and Kenyan police often use G3s.
3) There are two types of light machine guns: Acoronga and Narikot. In total, 35 lightmachine guns were found. People say that Narikot ‘drinks’ a chain (erikot) of bullets at one
time. Acoronga has a tripod (awed) that looks like a chicken’s foot.
4) The self-loading rifle is called Epian, which sounds like the word for thunder(ngipian). In total, 31 self-loading rifles, divided into five types, were found: Locicuwa,
Lokirion, Nato, Akosowan, and Elekejen. Locicuwa has a split on the side of the barrel near
the front so that bullets can be seen as they are fired. Lokirion has a black body and a long,quadratic barrel.
5) A self-match-lock gun called Amatida was the oldest one found. In total, 22 were
found. Amatida is a handmade gun made of iron pipes, such as water pipes. There aretypes: abicir and logelegel. Both are shotguns that use gunpowder. They are stuffed andthen ignited by friction. The cartridge case is removed by a single shot. The older of thetwo, lolegel, has no sight.
6) The assault self-loading rifle (ASLR) is called Apeledeng. The ASLR is divided into
four types: Achinese, Agurigur, Agorogoro, and Aparipar. In total, ten ASLRs were found.
Achainis is used by the Uganda People’s Defence Force when they march in ceremonies.
Aguriguri is powerful enough to shoot helicopters in the air. Agorogoro is an old type of
14 Galaty, ‘Boundary-making’.
15 Hutchinson, ‘Nuer ethnicity’.
16 Administratively, the district was reorganized along with the creation of the Napak District adjacent tosouthwestern Moroto in 2010. Then, Bokora County was incorporated into the Napak District.

27

ITSUHIRO HAZAMA
gun, and it makes a particular sound, like ‘gorogoro’, as empty cartridges are removed one
by one during shooting.
7) The Uzi gun is called Eitabui. Six Uzis were found, divided into two types: Achacha
and Loringiring. The Uzi is a compact, boxy, and lightweight sub-machine gun. Eitabui
originally referred to a square, three-litre can of oil that was distributed as aid supply
during a period of starvation in 1980.
8) The G2 is called Eleponbong. Five G2s were found. This gun has a stand and a square‘cup’. The stem of the word Eleponbong (lep) comes from akilep, which means to milk,
and the gun is said to run bullets as smoothly as milk coming from the teat of a cow.
Data on the types of guns and the years of their acquisition showed that, first, before
1979, gun transactions were recorded less than once every two years, but, from 1980
Figure1. Maptransactionsof the researchtook
area.place every year. Second, the AK-47, which was developed byonwards,
MichaelKalashnikov and adopted by Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1947, were
Source:Author.
acquired by the Karimojong in 1980. Third, when the history of gun transactions is divided
into before 1979 and after 1980, the average number of guns acquired per year increased
more than tenfold, from 0.6 per year before 1979 to 6.5 per year after 1980 (Figure 2).17

Figure 2. Types of guns acquired before 1979 and after 1980
Figure 2. Types of guns acquired before 1979 and after 1980.
Source: Author.

Source: Author.

Thus, the increases in AK-47s and G3s demonstrate that guns taken from the centre of the
Karamoja region in raids spread across the area. It can be said empirically that the influx ofrifles began in the late nineteenth century along with the ivory trade brought in byoutsiders, whereas the proliferation of automatic rifles, especially AK-47s and G3s, began
in 1980 in the Karamoja region.
Although the guns used before automatic rifles became widespread were used even in the
17 When the Karamojong and the Dodoth express a certain past, they refer to events that their conversational
partners can understand, such as ‘when a comet flows’ and ‘when a drought happens’. In popular memories,
drought, conflict, livestock disease, and hunger play key roles. See Appendices 1 and 2.

28

Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories of Gun Acquisition and State Violence
2000s, the low frequency of their transaction before 1979 may reflect that they became
unnecessary due to the proliferation of new guns or the malfunctioning of old guns. The
reason people have guns is usually to safeguard their families and herds from attacks. If theincrease in the frequency of transactions after the inflow of automatic rifles reflects, tosome extent, the reality of gun transaction, it is expected that the necessity of defence
increased. A 12-year-old Karimojong shepherd composed and sang the following song in2003 to describe the feeling of being protected by his elder brother’s gun during herding:
Go to graze in Lomuriakori.
There is a gun of Lokiru always.
Go to graze in Lomuriakori.
There is a gun of Lokiru.
Go to graze in Lomuriakori.
The yellow one [ox] is becoming fat.
There is a gun of Lokiru always.
Lomuriakori is the name of place where cattle grazes, especially in dry seasons, and interethnic raids usually revolve around livestock. The song is inspired by the potential battle
field in which the elder brother’s gun can protect the ‘yellow ox’, as contemporary pastoral
scenery involves both guns and cattle in order to protect the herd and allow the family tosurvive.

III
Although successive political powers have engaged in disarming pastoralists in the
Karamoja region since 1980, the army of the central government has played contradictoryroles, first removing guns and then providing them during violent political conflicts. For
example, as a countermeasure against anti-government forces, guns were provided topastoralists by the government because the local people were considered a militarycapability that would favour the government.18 With a change in political power, fleeing
soldiers deployed in Karamoja region exchanged their guns for food provided by the local
people.
This contradictory structure of disarmament by the government is not a holdover from the
distant past. In 1999 and 2005, I conducted research on how the 34 guns owned by men in
Lotome were acquired. The research revealed that the number of guns given to people whoserved as local security19 was less than the number of guns bartered for livestock from anarms merchant (10 of the 34 guns). These guns were distributed as a substitute salary, thepayment of which had been delayed, and as a means of self-defence for special forces, suchas the Anti Stock Theft Unit and the Local Defence Unit.
Disarmament is not an apolitical process. The changing tolerance for transferring arms toconvenient actors based on the intentions of the dominant power resulted in the paradoxthat has enabled and even encouraged people who do not have guns to acquire them.
The disarmament of automatic rifles in the Karamoja region has been attempted bysuccessive governments since it was first implemented 1983–5 by the government led by
18 For example, during the second period of Obote’s rule (1980–85), pastoralists in Karamoja were recruited as
military forces to suppress anti-government activity by the National Resistance Army.
19 The military organisation was formed as a part of the disarmament policy, which people can join bysubmitting illegal guns to the government.

29

ITSUHIRO HAZAMA
Apollo Milton Opeto Obote (1924–2005). The government has a formal written history
regarding the military intervention in the Karamoja region and notes that it was a legitimate
pacifying action, assuming that physical violence was performed by pastoralists using
illegally acquired weapons. 20 However, in the everyday history of pastoral people,
disarmament, called akilem ngatomyen (to pick guns) in the Karimojong and Dodoth
languages, is remembered as a conflict with the state that also involved raids between
neighbouring pastoralist groups.
The first example of disarmament of automatic rifles occurred between 1983 and 1984,
after Obote borrowed an armed helicopter from the Kenyan government, utilizing themilitia established in the district bordering neighbouring countries. In December 1983, thearmy bombed villages and shopping centres in Matany and Kangole, both of which belong
to the Napak District today. In the Government report, these operations are stated to havebeen punishments for resistance to disarmament.21 From the perspective of the Karimojong,these operations were more of a revenge by the state as theft. They began looting cattle tobe eaten by Christian soldiers in celebration of Christmas. A middle-aged Karimojong man
based in Kangole narrated a story like the one below:
Militia from Langoland came in a very large number of heavy-duty trucks for the
purpose of getting ‘Christmas cow’ and attacked in Lokwasonyong in Matany. Anothermilitia group also arrived in Kangole but did not know where to go, asked questions
and got answers from people, and then moved to Matany. Soon, the explosion began
to come from the direction of Matany. The battle began at the herding camp in Matany.
The Karimojong opposes the militia. Battle started from two p.m. to three p.m.
Militias were brought back eastward to Moroto, where the main troops settled. On theway, a fierce battle occurred between the Karimojong and the militia. When they
arrived in Kangole, they began to rage and bombard the houses indiscriminately. It
continued without interruption until dawn, and the shooting fight never ceased. The
battle was severe, but the Karimojong forced the militia to give in, and militia began
to escape into Moroto. Soon, the army soldiers stationed in Moroto and the militia
came to support Lango militia. The soldier kept killing people and continuing to blow
up. But they were rebuked, lost the direction, and dispersed. Some returned to Soroti;
others ran away to Moroto. I was eight years old then. I was with my parents in asemi-permanent settlement in Kangole. During the bombing, we were forced to run.
We ran to the church and evacuated because we knew they would not bomb the
church. So, I led an evacuation life with a lot of people for a week.
The second example involves the implementation of a security maintenance plan from
1983–5, which is called ‘the year of stealing’ in the event calendar of the Karimojong. In
this period, military personnel fired at and bombed pastoralists, confiscated their livestock,and murdered locals rampantly, resulting in physical conflicts due to local civilian
resistance. In addition, the ‘Pian people [one of major territorial groups of the Karimojong][had] nowhere to go’. About seventy per cent of the population of southern Karamoja wasforced to relocate.22 This estimate supports the narratives of the Karimojong concerningstate violence.
The third example of the disarmament of the Karimojong occurred during ‘the year
20 Office of the Prime Minister, Karamoja integrated.
21 Ibid.
22 Dodge, ‘Uganda-rehabilitation’.

30

Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories of Gun Acquisition and State Violencepeople were tied with rope’. It was led by Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the current president,
in 1986. In this case, it is said that the ‘Kadonya method’, which involved violence aimed
to force people to abandon their guns, was implemented. Although the original meaning of
Kadonya is unknown, Karimojong men talked the following: ‘Museveni’s soldiers came topick our guns. Those who had refused the submission of guns were hung on trees and poles
with the knees and elbows tied together’. From this explanation, it seems that impersonal
torture was being carried out as a warning to others or as corporal punishment.

IV
The contradictions pertaining to disarmament and violence are not simply memories of the
distant past. They affect the everyday lives of people in the Karamoja region, which is now
under today’s disarmament intervention; thus, these memories are being physically andsocially updated and revived.
Military operations designed to confiscate guns in the Karamoja region begin byobtaining secret information. One or two intelligence officers are posted in a barrack tofacilitate the process. In the Moroto District, at least 25 barracks, including detachment,
brigade, and divisional barracks, were counted in 2008. Each holds 50–100 battalions. In
actual operation, armies in charge of the area come from barracks and surround a village,
usually in the early morning, to capture suspected gun owners and to determine probablegun owners. Residents are forced out of the settlement and divided into two lines according
to gender, and the males are physically searched. Meanwhile, inside the village, the soldiers
go door to door searching for guns and other items, such as bullets, military uniforms, andsoldiers’ caps. If any of these items are found, their owners are either taken to the army
barracks or questioned. Any man who is taken to the army barracks and might face a court
martial.
Former captives claimed to have experienced torture at the army base; soldiers were said
to have beaten them with sticks, forced them into small, low-roofed huts (ejaa) where they
could only kneel, forced them to perform heavy labour, and only allowed them to have one
or two bathing per week. For example, a Karimojong man was captured and held in thebarracks of Lotome in the Moroto District three times for a total of 16 days since November
2007. According to his reports, the daily schedule for those who were captured was asfollows: wake at 7 a.m., perform labour from 7 a.m. to 1 p.m. with one toilet break at 10a.m., eat at 1 p.m., perform labour immediately after eating until 4 p.m., and receive abeating at 4 p.m. His labour consisted of carrying stones to construct the commander’s hut,fetching water, gathering firewood, gathering grass for the hut’s roof, and mowing grass
inside the army compound.
It is not uncommon for a suspect who is charged with gun possession or raiding and taken
to a detention hut in the army barracks to make a false confession of possessing a gun
during interrogations accompanied by torture. Once a confession is made, the interrogation
is over. From then on, interrogations accompanied by torture are held until a gun issubmitted.
Given the torture, the relatives and friends of the captive generally attempt to free him.
Among the Dodoth, three methods were used to free a captive in 2007: (1) obtain verbal
evidence from administrative leaders and military officials (eight cases), (2) submit a gun
possessed by a relative or friend (nine cases), or (3) submit a newly purchased gun (16cases). Bringing back a captive is often expressed as the emancipation (alakakin) of a slave

31

ITSUHIRO HAZAMA
or a porter (ekadalan). In the Karamoja region, during times of ivory hunting and tradearound 1911, men were provided as a labour force for traders23 and as a labour force forcargo carriers.24 These workers were slaves to be mentioned as homologous with captives
under disarmament in 21st century.
When the disarmament programme currently in progress resorts to force, the people are
terrified, and the friends and family of captives struggle to achieve the freedom of thecaptives. Among other strategies, a common way to negotiate a captive’s freedom involves
submitting newly purchased guns or guns owned by other people. It may seem that such abehaviour satisfies the purpose of removing guns from local ownership in north-eastern
Uganda; however, although guns are given to the army in exchange for captives, the reality
is that the demand for guns is stimulated by the desire to obtain guns in order to barter for
captives’ freedom.
[Case 1]In September 2007, a Dodoth man (X) in Kalapata did not possess his own gun. X wastaken as a rebel against the military, as X kept his military cap. An elder brother of X
purchased a gun from a Dodoth man (Y) with two young bulls and put this gun in the
mayor’s hand. The mayor submitted it to the army commander, and X was released.
Y is a herd owner, a livestock trader, and a gun handler. In the period of disarmament,
and especially after the policy of forced sedentarisation established in 2007, gun supply
decreased due to the strengthened crackdown on guns. The exchange rate rose to ten to
twenty cattle per AK-47. However, the number of cattle Y received was variable from two
to ten heads. This means that, while Y received a large number of cattle from the owner, hesells guns at a fixed exchange rate of one gun to two cattle when clients are hoping to freea captive.
Apart from the market rate, the Dodoth have an exchange rate for cattle at the village
level. The standard price in the village is strongly fixed. Guns to free captives are also
included in this exchange system. If market principles are brought into livestock exchanges
between the Dodoth, the person who holds the exchange cannot help but respond to
disadvantageous transactions; thus, locally fixed exchange rates work to prevent them.
Regarding those who bought guns with a small number of cattle, Y said, ‘they wererobbed of cattle and humans by “enemies” (or army), and they fell into ruin. The village isdifferent from the market. This is same to the case that number of cattle is small in case ofbridewealth paid by a poor family’. It is emphasized here that the non-market principle
works in terms of establishing exchanges. In the exchange of guns and cattle for villagers
who have fallen into difficulties, the soaring yet floating exchange rate, which is the resultof supply and demand, cannot be used. This transaction is executed within the frameworkof mutual aid using the fixed exchange rate set by the commune. For the Dodoth, the23 Ngitome, one of the Karamojong territorial groups, literally means ‘elephant people’. The elder who lives inthe village nearest to the centre of their hometown, Lotome, said, ‘The beginning of the cattle of Lotome is ivory.
The ivory was brought to Baringo in Kenya, where people received cattle. Ivory was taken from Baringo to Addis
Ababa. Ivory was brought, and cattle were driven by ekadalan. The meaning of the name of Lotome is “the place
to hunt ivory”’.
24 Lopuko was made a chief in Bokora by Captain Tufnell, who was appointed Touring Officer for the Rudolpharea, which included Karamoja in 1911. Berber noted, in 1962, that ‘[t]he chiefs were expected to keep theirpeople in order, and to provide porters and food when called upon to do so. … While the traders had raided andtaken slaves, they had brought cattle, but government seemed to offer nothing but hard work for little reward’.
See Barber, ‘The Kalamoja’.

32Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories of Gun Acquisition and State Violencetransaction of acquiring a gun to free a human captive is different from a market exchange.

V
The Karimojong and the Dodoth have similar past and present positions in terms of theviolence they have experienced in the region, and these positions and superimposing
between past and present have become a resource to safeguard people’s daily lives.
Individual and collective memories of history and oralities play a decisive role in allowing
people to cope with illnesses caused by violence.
Disarmament, including state violence, caused a gap between people who had automaticguns and people who did not and resulted in further armed violence and raiding between
neighbouring groups. Violence-related illnesses occurred in the prolonged low-intensity
conflict, and people faced the problem of how best to heal the bodies.
One way was to construct a healing place to recall the history of state violence. Consider
an illness called etukuri as an example. Etukuri is a type of ‘heart illness’ (etau) caused bya continuous gunshot ‘entering the heart’, an armed helicopter’s flying sound, or the shockcaused by the sound of a rocket gun. In hearing gunshots and explosions and recalling
battles and torture, those suffering from etukuri have acute episodes of feeling as though
their heart and blood vessels are jumping with their heartbeat and experience chest pain,
difficulty breathing, fainting, and confusion. People living with etukuri experience
traumatic events through their bodies.
Historicising violence and state plays critical role in sustaining everyday life of
pastoralists. In ritual healing, participants sing songs to compare the violent events theyexperienced with the state violence that people in the past experienced. Songs of medicine
in ritual healing refer to history (ngakiro nguna etakanuniyete, literally, ‘events that
happened’).
In January 2013, after being taken to the army barracks and tortured for giving incorrect
information, a Dodoth man fell into madness. Songs of medicine reminded him of theviolence of the colonial government, for example, the burning of the house of a Dodoth
man who fought with the current government as a militia of the former government in1988, armed helicopter bombings in 2007, and Jie and Dodoth women collectively
throwing themselves into a muddy stream to protest against being prohibited from wearing
the traditional clothing of pastoralists and made naked by the colonial government in the
1950s and Idi Amin’s government in 1971.
Shared histories never repeat static images. One male participant of the Dodoth while
singing these songs of medicine said, ‘talking about living with each other among
overwhelming violence makes one forget to kill oneself’. Songs of medicine in ritual
healing allow people to realize that everyday life continues even after those who rule
exercise violence against those being ruled. The present is a reconstruction of the past thatinvolves interweaving personal memories into collective memories. To this extent, historyis current, productive, and creative.

VI
Successive central governments with violent military systems play contradictory roles indisarming the Karimojong and the Dodoth and then providing them with guns when violent
political conflicts occur. In the disarmament of the twenty-first century, this contradiction

33

ITSUHIRO HAZAMA
is not a holdover from the distant past. Newly purchased guns have been submitted to themilitary in order to emancipate captives who were pastoralists taken to and detained inmilitary barracks. Those who were exchanged for guns are found its similarity withnineteenth-century slaves who were caught by outsiders when guns were brought into the
Karamoja region. In superimposing memories in healing practices, the collective
remembering of past state violence is carried out through the body of the person
experiencing violence-related illness. The history of arms transfer and the state control ofnorth-eastern Ugandan pastoralists is the past fact selected by problem consciousness
directed at external violent rule. The history of gun availability is a composition of facts,
and current history in the sense of Croce’s historical thought is lived through the body. The
everyday lives of the Karimojong and the Dodoth involve the accumulation of certain
practices, and history only depicts popular lifestyles. The entanglement of individual
entities becomes the foundation for cultures of resistance that overturn regimes present in
the modern violence system, enabling the identification of the existing consequences of
prolonged violence and the sharing of existing knowledge and new strategies for changing
armed violent regime. People affected by violence not only wish to talk about it but also
want to look for ways to break the social chain of violence and for new possibilities foralternative order. Detailing how resistance to violent dominant power is specificallyorganized by the weak in their daily life is the next task.
References
Barber, J. P., ‘The Karamoja district of Uganda’, Journal of African History, 3:1 (1962), pp. 111–24.
Barber, J. P., ‘Karamoja in 1910’, Uganda Journal, 28:1 (1964), pp. 15–23.
Dodge, C. P., ‘Uganda-rehabilitation, or redefinition of health services?’, Social Science and Medicine,
22:7 (1986), pp. 755–61.
Galaty, J., ‘Boundary-making and pastoral conflict along the Kenyan-Ethiopian borderlands’, African
Studies Review, 59:1 (2016), pp. 97–122.
Gray, S., Sundal, M., Weibusch, B., Little, M., Leslie, P., and Pike, I., ‘Cattle raiding, cultural survival, andadaptability of East African pastoralists’, Current Anthropology, 44 (2003), pp. 3–30.
Hazama, I., ‘Intergroup and face-to-face relations among East African herders’, in V. Y. Mudimbe and A.
Simpson, eds., Recontextualizing self & other issues in Africa (Trenton, 2013), pp. 35–52.
Hutchinson, S. E., ‘Nuer ethnicity militarized’, Anthropology Today, 16:3 (2000), pp. 6–13.
Langlands, B. W., ‘The population geography of Karamoja district’, Occasional Paper, 38, Department ofGeography, Makerere University (1971).
Mamdani, M., Kasoma, P. M. B., and Katende, A. B., Karamoja: ecology and history (Kampala, 1992).
Mburu, N., ‘Delimitation of the elastic Ilemi Triangle: pastoral conflicts and official indifference in thehorn of Africa’, African Studies Quarterly, 7:1 (2003), pp. 15–37.
Odhiambo, M., The Karamoja conflict: origins, impacts and solutions (Nairobi, 2003).
Office of the Prime Minister, Karamoja integrated disarmament and development programme: creating
conditions for promoting human security and recovery in Karamoja, 2007/2008-2009/2010 (Kampala,2007).
Quam, M. D., ‘Creating peace in an armed society: Karamoja, Uganda, 1996’, African Studies Quarterly,
1:1 (1997), pp. 33–46.
Rosaldo, R., ‘Celebrating Thompson’s heroes: social analysis in history and anthropology’, in H. J. Kayeand K. McClelland, eds., E. P. Thompson: critical perspectives (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 103-24
Schlee, G., ‘Comment on Sandra Gray et al.: cattle raiding, cultural survival, and adaptability of East
African pastoralists’, Current Anthropology, 44 (2003), pp. 23–4.
Sylvester, O., and Jeremy, O., Karamoja, Uganda’s land of warrior nomads (Stäfa, 2007).
Wangoola, P., ‘Cattle rustling and conflicts in N.E. Uganda: views and perspectives reported by Ugandan
papers, 1989-1999’, A paper presented at the Brainstorming Workshop on Cattle Rustling and Conflictsin North Eastern Uganda, Yiga Ngokola Folk Institute, 25–8 October 1999, p. 4.
Welch, C. P., ‘Pastoralists and administrators in conflict: a study of Karamoja district, 1897-1968’ (unpub.

34

Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories of Gun Acquisition and State Violence
M.A. thesis, Univ. of East Africa, 1969).
Appendix 1. Karamojong Event Calendar
1914
ekaru a Ngalebei [the year of women workers]
1920
Nasogolo a Lakalees [Nasogolo and Lakaleese]1923
ekaru ngolo arere a Toto Kobok Achia [the year Toto Kobok Achia was killed]
1926
ekaru a lomee [the year of goats]ekaru ngolo awaria akolong [the year the sun became dark]
1927
emorimor [continuous rainfall]
1928
ekaru a lobil a ngitomei [the year of the disease of elephants]
ekaru a ngimongo [the year of the fruits of Balanites]
1933
ekaru ngolo emarere ngitunga [the year they counted people]
1939
ekaru a lokwakoit [the year of white bones]
1941
ekaru ngolo abokeke ngataparin [the year they dug dams]
1943
ekaru ngolo ke euga a Lote [the year of the food relief of Lote]1945
lorengelaga [red necklace]1946
lotekonyen [eyes]
Ngaduruko [the last women’s initiations]1952
lotiira [the star of hunger]
1953
ekaru ngolo arere ngiruwosi [the year chiefs were killed]
1954
ekaru ngolo a longeu [the year of fulfilled granaries]
1956
Apule
1958
asapan a Ngigetei [the initiation of Ngigetei]
1960
ekaru ngolo emeleku ka ngakan [the year of the hoe of hands]
1961
locuu [starvation]
lolibakipi [green water]
1962
ekaru kobote [the year of Obote]mukuki [the year of spears]
ekaru a Namongo [the year of Namongo]
1963
ekaru ngolo a nagilgil [the year of the helicopter]1965
ekaru ngolo lomoroko [the year of the comet]
1966
ekaru adwarakile [the year of bitter milk]
1966–67 ekaru ngolo acakinori agilgil Kwarikwar [the year a helicopter landed in Kwarikwar]
1967
ekaru ngolo keetom [the year of the elephant]
Cepsekunya
1968
ekaru ngolo lopetun [the year of widespread]1969
ekaru ngolo emarere ngitunga [the year they counted people]
1971
ekaru ngolo alaca Amin ngitunga [the year Amin undressed people]
1973
ekaru ngolo atwana akolong [the year the sun died]1974
ekaru ngolo angolia Apalosiel ngitunga [the year Apa-Losiel killed people]
1979
ekaru ngolo eritare Amin [the year Amin was chased away]
ekaru ngolo abwangunita Ngimatheniko ngatomian [the year the Matheniko broke into army
barracks for guns]
1980
ekaru ngolo ka akoro [the year of hunger]ekaru ngolo kebuta [the year of smut]
ekaru ngolo a ngikolya [the year of fish]
1982
ekaru ngolo arere Apa-Loris [the year of Apa-Loris]
1983
ekaru ngolo ecunya arieng Matany ka Kangole [the year the army burnt Matany and Kangole]
1984
ekaru ngolo amica [the year of the army]
ekaru a akooko [the year of theft]
1985
ekaru ngolo Nakichumet [the year of Nakichumet]
1986
ekaru ngolo ekamaria Museveni apukan [the year Museveni came into government]
ekaru ngolo ayenere ngitunga angamuguwae [the year people were tied with rope]
lorionokoriot [black ground]1987
ekaru ngolo kemogo [the year of cassava]
1988
ekaru ngolo amunyarere Ngimatheniko alo Matakul [the year the Matheniko were killed in

35

ITSUHIRO HAZAMA
Matakul]1989
Arusi [RC]1990
ekaru ngolo ka awi ka Alinga [the year of the herding camp of Alinga]
1991
ekaru ngolo ateregege [the year of meningitis]
1992
ekaru ka Apuno [the year of Apuno]
1993
ekaru ngolo a Natoo [the year of Natoo]
1994–95 ekaru ngolo ka akiriket arengepuwa [the year of the initiation of Arengepuwa]
1997–98 ekaru a kolera [the year of cholera]
2000
ekaru ngolo aarere Ekoneakamilyo [the year Ekoneakamilyo was killed]ekaru ngolo acuna ariang Lokopo [the year the army burned Lokopo]
2001
ekaru ngolo aremyoto Ngipian Loroo [the year the Pian raided Loroo]ekaru ngolo ejaaria apukan Ngikarimojong ngatomian [the year the government disarmed the
Karamojong]
2002
ekaru ngolo aremyoto Ngiupe awi a Ngibokora a Namanit [the year the Pokot raided the herding
camp of the Bokora in Naminit]
Appendix 2. Dodoth Event Calendar
1928
ekaru a lokijuka [the year of rushing]
1939
ejie a jiriman [the fight of Germany]ekaru a Locim [the year of Locim]
1943
ekaru arengelaga [the year of red marriage bangles]
1951
ekaru emaase [the year of the locusts]
1959
ekaru kakimaro[the year of counting]1960
ekaru ngolo emeleku ka ngakan [the year of the hoe of hands]
ekaru atwania emusugut a Naurat [the year the white man died in Naurat]
1961
ekaru a Loyoro [the year of Loyoro]
1962
ekaru auru [the year of independence]
1963
ekaru a lolibikipi [the year of green water]
ekaru anagiliigil [the year of the helicopter]1964
aremun Ngididinga Uganda [the Didinga flee to Uganda]
1965
ekaru a lodiri [the year of Lodiri]ekaru a looyamorok Logum [the year of the green vegetables in Logum]
ekaru ka Adungo Alichan [the year of Adungo-Alichan]
1969
ekaru ngolo kakimaro [the year of counting]1971
kikama Amin apukan [Amin took over the government]
akilac ngitunga [to undress people]
1972
kirita Amin Ngimiidi [Amin chased away the Asians]
1973
ekaru atwania akolong (ecapio) [the year the sun died (during weeding)]
1974
ekaru ka bulokku haam [the year of the block farm]
1976
ekaru alobolei [the year of gourds]
1978
ekaru anawokoupal [the year they brought shields]
1979
kirit Obote Amin [Obote chased Amin]
1980
ekaru kakimaro [the year of counting]ekaru a lopiar [the year of sweeping away]
ekaru a Elia [the year of Elia]
1981
ekaru akitanai [the year of feeding]ekaru ngolo anya mere nyicolubei [the year of eating rats]
1982
ekaru ewokere ngimomwa Turkan[the year of carrying Sorghum to the Turkana]
1983
ekaru angarere Lopedo [the year of opening Lopedo]
1984
ekaru a lorengepelu [the year of the red field]
1985
kikama Tito Okello apukan [Tito Okello took over the government]
ekaru a Loumo [the year of Loumo]
1986
kikama Museveni apukan [Museveni took over the government]siripis [three pieces]
1987
Namusali
1989
Tarau Marwas Emupi a Dodoth [Marwas became the MP of Dodoth]1990
eryangiryang [earthquake]36

Ugandan Pastoralists’ Everyday Histories of Gun Acquisition and State Violence

1991
1992
1994
1996
1997
1998
2000
2001
2002

ekaru a lomongin [the year of male animals]
ekaru ateregege [the year of meningitis]
ekaru kakimaro angitunga [the year of counting people]
ekaru ngolo aramareta Nyidodoso ngaitu a Lokongikile [the year the Dodoth raided the cows oflokongikile]
ekaru ngolo aloto ngitunga Loding Turkan [the year people went to the Loding (and Turkana)]
asere ata Museveni [the election of Museveni]
ekaru ngolo alokimul [the year of saliva]
ekaru ngolo agiligil [the year of the helicopter]ekaru arere Limangiro [the year Limangiro was killed]ekaru a gialanarere ngimongin [the year of selling male animals]
ekaru ka abass kakuri [the year of the bus and the dove]ekaru ngolo aramareta Ngijie ngaituk a Lokitela Arengan [the year the Jie raided the cattle in
Lokitela Arengan]asere a Museveni ka Lodou [the elections of Museveni and Lodou]
ekaru ngolo enyakarya ariang ngatomian [the year the soldiers returned the guns]

37

History of Global Arms Transfer, 6 (2018), pp. 39-44

Arms Availability and Violence in the
Ethiopia-Kenya-South Sudan Borderland †By TORU SAGAWA*
Is there any correlation between arms availability and violence intensification orconflict frequency? It has been reported that the proliferation of automatic rifles
has increased the seriousness and frequency of conflicts over the past 40 years inEast African pastoral societies. Early literature insisted that pastoral societies
have been inundated with uncontrolled youth violence due to new rifles.
However, much of the research shared a technologically-deterministic bias. This
study focuses on the conflict dynamics of pastoral groups after the proliferationof automatic rifles to examine the relationship between arms availability andviolence. I show that the pastoral peoples in the border area of Ethiopia, Kenya,
and South Sudan have controlled the extensive use of violence and maintained
local order. To examine the relationship between arms availability and violence,
it is important to consider the historical processes in place after the proliferationof new arms, the social and cultural contexts in which the groups with new arms
are embedded, and people’s agency to control the violence.

I
Is there any correlation between firearms availability and violence intensification orconflict frequency? Although much of the literature focuses on the arms, conflicts, andviolence, this relationship has not been properly analysed. In his paper published in 1990,
George Raudzens wrote, ‘(e)ven including the latest publications, weapons impact
analysis… has not received more than marginal attention from scholars…(W)e haveassertions, images, and impressions of technological decisiveness in war but we have no
detailed measurement, analysis, or consensus’1. After almost 20 years, Thomas Jackson andNicholas Marsh, who extensively reviewed the literature on the topic, concluded that
‘research is not yet sufficiently clear to definitively state that increased availability of
firearms causes an increase in homicide’2. Their conclusion is also applicable to researchon the East African pastoral societies.
A number of pastoral groups with populations of several thousand to several hundred
thousand people are widely distributed throughout the dry and low lands of East Africa.
Inter-ethnic conflicts have occurred for many years around the border areas of Ethiopia,*Author Affiliations: Toru Sagawa, Associate Professor, Faculty of Letters, Keio University.
† Previous version of this article was presented at an international seminar entitled Relationships between Arms

Availability and Violence on 28 March 2018 at the Meiji University, Tokyo. The author would like to thankTamara Enomoto for continued discussion on the subject. This work is partially funded by the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology’s (MEXT) Program for the Strategic Research Foundation atPrivate Universities, 2015-2019, JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers JP16K17075, JP16KT0040, and 16K21736
1 Raudzens, ‘War-winning weapons’, pp. 403, 432.
2 Jackson and Marsh, ‘Guns and deaths’, pp.120-1.

39

TORU SAGAWA
South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda. Many reports by researchers, non-governmentalorganizations (NGOs), and international organizations asserted that the proliferation of
automatic rifles has drastically changed the intensity of violence and increased thefrequency of conflict. At the end of the 1970s, when several national political upheavals
occurred in this region, automatic rifles flooded pastoral societies around the border area3.
For example, Jon Abbink insisted that the Suri society of south-western Ethiopia wereinundated with violence perpetrated by youths with AK-47s. Since 1987, when automatic
rifles were introduced, the traditional rules of the battlefield that regulated the exercise ofviolence have declined. Abbink described this change: ‘The new technology of violence
itself transformed ritual violence into real violence due to the decline of the role of what
Robin Fox has called ‘‘circuit breakers’’’4. According to Abbink, ‘the new technology ofviolence itself’ has destroyed these social norms and real or uncontrolled violence has
become widespread.
These studies shared a technologically-deterministic way of thinking5. They insisted thatthe violence associated with the new arms caused chaos in those societies. In contrast, I
focus on the historical processes and socio-cultural contexts where the new arms rifles
were introduced and proliferated. George Raudzens pointed out that ‘(i)t [the introductionof new arms] has been more obvious in its effects on the way people fight rather than on
the outcomes of combat. New weapons have changed soldiers’ behavior’6. For analysing
the relationship between firearms availability and violence intensification or conflict
frequency, it is necessary to clarify how local people use the new firearms, interpret theirexperiences on the battlefield, change their behaviours, and how these new behaviours
influence violence intensification or conflict frequency.
In this paper, I analyse the conflict dynamics of pastoral peoples in East Africa after the
proliferation of automatic rifles to examine the relationship between arms availability andviolence. The data analysed in this paper was collected during 14 months of fieldwork
between 2001 and 2006.

II
The Daasanach live in the border areas of Ethiopia, Kenya, and South Sudan. Their
population in Ethiopia is approximately 65,000 people, according to the 2016 census. In
addition, some of Daasanach live in north-western Kenya.
Six ethnic groups live around the Daasanach. They refer to the Kara and Arbore to thenorth as ‘our people’ (gaal kinnyo). The two groups have maintained peaceful relations
with the Daasanach. In contrast, the Turkana to their southwest, the Gabra to theirsoutheast, the Nyangatom to their northwest, and the Hamar to their northeast are referred
to as kiz or ‘enemy’. Indeed, there are frequent small-scale attacks (sulla) between the
Daasanach and enemy groups, involving a few to several dozen people. A more collective
and organized violent attack, called osu, involves 100–1000 or more people. The
Daasanach youths explain that they have two aims in going to war. The first is to raid theenemy’s livestock and keep their access to the pasturelands for their livelihood. The second
is to kill members of enemy to prove their masculinity7.
3 Mkutu, Guns and governance.
4 Abbink, ‘Violence and culture’, p. 137.
5 Sagawa, ‘Automatic rifles’.
6 Raudzens, ‘War-winning weapons’, pp. 432-3.
7 Sagawa, ‘War experiences’.

40Arms Availability and Violence in the Ethiopia-Kenya-South Sudan Borderland
Although the conflict among pastoral peoples seems to be ‘traditional’, one of the root
causes of conflict is associated with state policy. For example, the British colonial
government controlled livestock herding by local pastoralists around the border area,
increasing the scarcity of pastures in the area. This policy caused an intensification of
hostility between the Daasanach and the neighbouring peoples. After the Second World
War, the Ethiopian government lost interest in this remote area and made few attempts toresolve their inter-ethnic conflicts. The Ethiopian government had not enforced adisarmament operation in the region from the mid-1960s to the mid-2000s.
The history of the proliferation of the rifle in the Daasanach can be classified into three
periods8. The first period began after the conquest of the Ethiopian state in 1898. Singleloader rifles were introduced to the region by merchants and soldiers from the north. The
second period began with the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in 1936. The Italian army
trained the Daasanach to become a border defence corps against British-Kenya andsupplied them with approximately a thousand rifles9. After the withdrawal of Italy in 1941,
rifles left by the Italian army were circulated by local merchants. During the third period,
the proliferation of automatic rifles (mainly the AK-47s and G3s) occurred in the late1980s. The Daasanach acquired the rifles primarily by bartering with merchants,neighbouring peoples, and other Daasanach.
At around 15 years of age, a Daasanach boy conducts an initiation ceremony and enters
into age-set. At this point, he is allowed to purchase his own rifle and go to the battlefield.
In 2006, 48% of adult (initiated) males I interviewed (N=163) owned rifles and 87% ofrifle owners had automatic rifles.

III
After the proliferation of the automatic rifle, larger scale battles occurred between the
Daasanach and their neighbours. The relationships between the Daasanach and threeneighbouring peoples, the Nyangatom, Turkana, and Gabra, changed after the 1980s. Dueto the detailed history I presented in my other paper10, I only summarise the relationships
between new arms and violence intensification or conflict frequency.
The Nyangatom are a northern neighbour of the Daasanach. Relations between them were
mostly amicable from the 1940s to the 1960s. A chain of revenge was brought about by alarger conflict in 1972, when the Daasanach killed over 100 Nyangatom. During the 1970s,
the Nyangatom were also involved in serious battles with other neighbouring peoples.
The situation changed to the Nyangatom’s advantage in the mid-1980s. The Nyangatom
acquired automatic rifles from their allies, the Toposa, who live in the south-eastern Sudan(currently South Sudan)11. They attacked neighbouring peoples one by one. From 1988–9,
the Nyangatom and Toposa destroyed three Daasanach villages on the western side of the
Omo river.
The most devastating attack on the Daasanach was against the village called Salain. The
Nyangatom attacked the village before sunset and killed hundreds of Daasanach in just a
few hours. In this battle, the Daasanach survivors observed that some Nyangatom continued
to shoot at the dead bodies of the Daasanach, even after they ran out of bullets. It was also
observed that after the battle, the Nyangatom moved to a nearby hill and shot their rifles
8 Sagawa, ‘Automatic rifles’.
9 Almagor, ‘Raiders and elders’.
10 Sagawa, ‘Automatic rifles’.
11 Tornay, ‘More chances’.

41

TORU SAGAWA
into the sky and then ate the livestock meat that they raided from the Daasanach. This was
unusual because a group of fighters who raid an enemy’s livestock return to their village assoon as possible, fearing a counterattack from the enemy. That time, the Nyagantom andToposa stayed near the village for several hours and displayed their superior strength ofpower to the Daasanach. The Daasanach recall this time as, ‘The Nyangatom got drunkwith Kalashnikovs’. Due to the of fear of the Nyagantom’s fighting power, the Daasanachabandoned the land on the western side of the river and moved to the eastern side.
To defend themselves against the Nyangatom, the Daasanach demanded the local
government to supply them with automatic rifles—but the request was refused. After this,the Daasanach heard that many AK47s were supplied in the Arbore land from the east. In
1991, after many adult males acquired automatic rifles, the Daasanach attacked Kibish, oneof the biggest villages of the Nyangatom. Although the Daasanach did not achieve military
victory in the battle, they established the fact that they could fight the Nyangatom as
equals.
After this war, the Daasanach youths slowly moved to the western side of the river, which
remained in no-man’s land, and herded their livestock. The Nyangatom did not execute
another well-organized attack until 2006. In the late 1990s, the Daasanach moved further
north and started living together with the Nyangatom in Kibish.
The Turkana live in the western region of Lake Turkana. The Daasanach maintained amilitarily superior position since the early twentieth century. This was partly attributed to
the fact that they were able to acquire older-styled rifles from the Ethiopian region, as
opposed to the Turkana of Kenya, where the circulation of firearms was strictly regulatedby the colonial government. However, when the Ugandan regime under Idi Amin collapsed
in 1979, the automatic rifles flooded into the Karimojong of Uganda, and the Turkana
began acquiring automatic rifles from over the border.
When they were equally matched militarily, a large-scaled violent crash occurred in 2000.
The Daasanach attacked a Turkana village named Kanamagur to avenge themselves against
the Turkana. It is estimated that about 200 people were killed or wounded in both groups.
At this battle, the Daasanach attacked the village with three military units from the left,right, and front before dawn. This had been their usual attack strategy. However, in thisbattle, large quantities of bullets from automatic rifles flew in every direction in the dark.
The Daasanach not only killed livestock, but also accidently shot and killed some of theirown comrades.
This was a serious issue for the Daasanach because in their culture, killing another
Daasanach is considered a mistake of the highest order. A Daasanach who kills another
Daasanach must have a nyogich. The person who has a nyogich must engage in apurification ritual, otherwise the nyogich will infect other Daasanach. Even if the person
performed the ritual, it is said that the person who has a nyogich will inevitably die aftersome years. Since it was not known who had accidentally killed the other Daasanach in thebattlefield, those killers had not performed the purification ritual. This created widespreadfear among the Daasanach that a nyogich would infect the whole community.
After this conflict, the young men discussed the unexpected result of the battle and theelders advised them of the present danger. Elders called the new rifles ‘bad or dangerous
rifle (jiete dedewa)’ compared to the older-styled rifles and warned the young men to
restrain themselves from using them. After a long discussion, the young men decided tochange their attack strategy. Instead of invading the village before dawn, they would attack
the enemy with small members after sunrise when the people and their livestock were42Arms Availability and Violence in the Ethiopia-Kenya-South Sudan Borderland
herding outside of the village. In an attack outside the village, the livestock would scatter,
reducing the risk of shooting their own community members. Although small-scaled raids
against the Turkana occurred after the Kanamagur’s conflict, the number of dead andwounded was much less than in the conflict in 2000.
The Gabra are the south-eastern neighbours of the Daasanach. Since the colonial period,
the Daasanach were armed with older-styled rifles, having attacked and defeated the Gabra.
Unlike the Turkana, the Gabra living in Kenya could not get automatic rifles, because theirterritory was far from the Ugandan border. In March 1997, the Daasanach, armed with newrifles, attacked the village of Kokoy and killed more than 100 Gabra. In addition, theDaasanach killed Kenyan policemen a day after the fighting with the Gabra.
After this battle, the Kenyan government instituted a law designed to deter violent
conflicts. If a member of one group killed a member of another group, his group had to pay
50 cattle to the other group in compensation. There had been no similar form of ‘bloodprice’ between the Daasanach and neighbouring groups before the government establishedthe law. It appears that the new law had an impact on the inter-group relationships because
no large-scale battles occurred until 2006.
However, the risk of a conflict re-occurring still exists. In January 2006, approximately
150 members of the youngest age-set planned a large-scale attack against a Gabra village.
The main reason for the planned attack was that the younger men were jealous of the older
members who had battle experience, and they wanted to go to war to prove theirmasculinity. Before the attack was carried out, it was disclosed to the older members. The
members of all age-sets hit the members of the youngest age-set with sticks and made themwithdraw their plan. The Kenyan Daasanach have three generation-sets and eachgeneration-set consists of five to eight age-sets. Their relationships are complex. In short,the interaction of the generational system and age system creates a complex system of
opposition and cooperation among age-sets. Thus, it was unusual for all age-sets tocooperate with each other to regulate the activities of the youngest age-set.
Underlying these issues was a sense of crisis elder Daasanach men felt under the Kenyan
government. The Daasanach living in Kenyan side are demographically and politicallyminority groups in their county. They believe that they have consistently been marginalized
by the government, as compared to the Gabra in the same administrative zone. The Kenyan
Daasanach indicated that, after the War in Kokoy, government pressure had increased. To
prevent another oppressive intervention by the Kenyan government, the elder Daasanach
men intensified their control of the activities of the youngest age-set, which otherwise
would have provided a reason for the government to threaten their livelihoods.

IV
I showed the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations between the Daasanach and neighbouringgroups. It is clear that violence on the battlefield has intensified since the proliferation of
automatic rifles. However, inter-ethnic relations did not deteriorate into disorder. The
sociologist Lewis Coser aptly described the situation of this area: ‘By bringing about new
situations, which are partly or totally undefined by rules and norms, conflict acts as a
stimulus for the establishment of new rules and norms’12. The Daasanach, who have been
confronted with ‘new situations’ in the proliferation of automatic rifles, have attempted to
institute ‘new rules’ to control the excessive use of violence.
12 Coser, The functions of social conflict, p. 124.

43

TORU SAGAWA
Regarding the Nyangatom, the military factor, or their mutual balance of power, hasmainly contributed to the control of excessive violence. In the relationship with theTurkana, the cultural and social factors, like the local concept nyogich, and the advice fromthe elders, has changed the strategy on the battlefield and decreased the scale andcausalities of the conflict. In the relationship with the Gabra, the political factor, or externalpressures from the Kenyan local government, has made elder members intensify theircontrol of the youths and their violence. As previously mentioned, George Raudzens
pointed out that the introduction of new arms ‘has been more obvious in its effects on theway people fight rather than on the outcomes of combat. New weapons have changed
soldiers’ behavior’13. I would add that the introduction of new weapons has also changed
community member’s attitudes toward ‘soldiers (youth in pastoral societies)’, and their
new attitudes have managed the exercise of violence with new arms by ‘soldiers (youth)’.
Examining the relationships between firearms availability and violence, it is important toconsider historical processes after the proliferation of new arms, social and culturalcontexts involved, and people’s agency to control violence.
References
Abbink, J., ‘Violence and culture: anthropological and evolutionary-psychological reflections on intergroup conflict in southern Ethiopia’, in B.F. Schmidt and I.W. Schröder, eds., Anthropology of violence
and conflict (2001), pp. 123-42.
Almagor, U., ‘Raiders and elders: a confrontation of generations among the Dassanetch’, in K. Fukui and
D. Turton, eds., Warfare among East African herders (Osaka, 1979), pp. 119-45.
Coser, L. A., The functions of social conflict (1956).
Jackson, T. and Marsh N., ‘Guns and deaths’, in O. Greene and N. Marsh, eds., Small arms, crime andconflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence (Oxford, 2012), pp. 105-21.
Mkutu, K. A., Guns and governance in the rift valley: pastoralist conflict and small arms (Oxford, 2008).
Raudzens, G., ‘War-winning weapons: the measurement of technological determinism in military history’,
Journal of Military History, 54–4 (1990), pp. 403-34.
Sagawa, T., ‘Automatic rifles and social order amongst the Daasanach of conflict-ridden East Africa’,
Nomadic Peoples, 14–1 (2010), pp. 87-109.
Sagawa, T., ‘War experiences and self-determination of the Daasanach in the conflict-ridden area ofnortheastern Africa’, Nilo-Ethiopian Studies, 14 (2010), pp. 19-37.
Tornay, S., ‘More chances on the fringe of the state?: the growing power of the Nyangatom’, in T. Tvedt.,
ed., Conflict in the Horn of Africa (Uppsala, 1993), pp. 143-63.

13 Raudzens, ‘War-winning weapons’, pp. 432-3.

44

History of Global Arms Transfer, 6 (2018), pp. 45-59

Giving Up the Gun?
Overcoming Myths about Japanese
Sword-Hunting and Firearms Control †By TAMARA ENOMOTO*
Every time a mass shooting occurs in the United States, there is a call for tighter
regulation of civilian firearm possession. Debates often ensue as to whether
tighter regulation would lead to a reduction in the number of deaths and injuriescaused by firearms. In such debates, present-day Japan is often used as an
example of a correlation between tight regulation and a low level of firearmsrelated deaths and injuries. Stringent firearm regulation in Japan is said to dateback centuries. It has been claimed that successful precedents which formed thehistorical and social basis of current Japanese gun control include regulations
enacted by Hideyoshi Toyotomi in the late sixteenth century, by the Edo
shogunate between the early seventeenth and mid-nineteenth centuries, and by
the Meiji government between the late nineteenth century and the early twentiethcentury. But what if the ‘successful historical precedents’ are not based on
historical facts? This article addresses this widely held myth concerning theJapanese case and seeks to contribute to the theory on the relationship between
arms availability and armed violence based on the available historical findings.
Since the 1990s, domestic firearms control has been one of the key issues in small arms
control. Numerous initiatives have been taken by government agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to strengthen control over ownership, carriage,
storage, and use of firearms in their own countries or to help other countries by providing
financial and technical assistance to implement stronger domestic regulation of firearms. In
countries such as the United States (US), where more than 30,000 gun-related deaths havebeen reported annually in recent years, domestic firearms control has met with both
enthusiasm and resistance.1* Author’s Affiliation: Tamara Enomoto, Research Fellow, Organization for the Strategic Coordination of
Research and Intellectual Properties (Research Institute for the History of Global Arms Transfer), Meiji
University.
† A previous version of this article was presented at an international seminar entitled Relationships between
Arms Availability and Violence on 28 March 2018 at Meiji University, Tokyo. The author would like to thankNicholas Marsh (Peace Research Institute Oslo) for his extensive advice and comments and Katsuhiko Yokoi(Meiji University) and Kouichi Takei (University of Okinawa) for their historical insights and advice. This work
is partially funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology’s (MEXT) Program
for the Strategic Research Foundation at Private Universities, 2015-9, JSPS KAKENHI Grant Numbers
JP16K17075, JP16KT0040, JP16H06318, and JP16H05664. The author translates Japanese key terms into
English where possible and provides the original Japanese terms upon first usage. When translations may cause
misunderstanding, the author uses the Japanese term throughout the article and provides its approximate English
translation in brackets upon first use.
1 Kristof, ‘How to reduce shootings’, New York Times, 20 Feb. 2018; Xu, Murphy, Kochanek, and Bastian,‘Final data for 2013’.

45

TAMARA ENOMOTOAt the same time, an increasing volume of theoretical studies and case studies havefocused on the relationship between arms availability and the level of armed violence,
especially in Anglophone literature. At first glance, a higher level of arms availability may
seem to lead to a higher level of armed violence. However, studies have shown that it ishard to establish a straightforward positive correlation between the two variables, and therelationship between them is more complex, dynamic, and context-dependent than
generally thought. 2 Therefore, research has been conducted to identify, for instance,parameters which tend to contribute to lower levels of armed violence in societies wherearms are widely available. Studies have also analysed the defining factors which havehelped domestic firearms regulations to effectively reduce the level of armed violence insome societies.
In such literature as well as in policy debates and media reports over domestic firearm
control, present-day Japan is often used as an example of a simple positive correlation
between tight regulation and a low level of armed violence.3 Moreover, the current firearm
regulation in Japan is said to be founded on a centuries-old history of weapons prohibitions
and the cultural and social basis which was formed over the course of the country’s
history.4 Therefore, studies of Japanese gun control tend to focus on why the stringent
regulation was effectively implemented and why the Japanese consented to give up guns.
Most Anglophone literature and media reports on past Japanese cases draw heavily on abook authored in 1979 by Noel Perrin, then professor of English at Dartmouth College inthe US.5 The book, Giving up the gun: Japan’s reversion to the sword, 1543-1879, argued
that the Japanese stopped using guns for over 200 years after 1637 and became almost
entirely gun-free.6 However, Perrin’s argument has received heavy criticism and a plain
dismissal by Japanese historians, who state that it is based neither on historical facts nor
the existing archives.7 Instead, Japanese historians have shown that guns were not given up,
and in fact guns were possessed by hyakusho (peasants; cultivators; villagers)8 and bushi(warriors). Despite the clear dismissal by Japanese historians, the central argument of
Perrin’s book has been treated as an undisputed truth in gun control policy debates as wellas in the Anglophone academic literature on the relationship between arms availability andarmed violence.
This article addresses this ‘alternative fact’ concerning the Japanese case by correcting
the information based on the available historical findings. It also analyses the implicationof such historical findings for the theory on the relationship between arms availability andarmed violence.

2 Greene and Marsh, ‘Conclusions’.
3 Ashkenazi, ‘What do the natives know?’; Kodan, ‘In Japan, gun violence’; Fisher, ‘A land without guns’ inAtlantic, 23 July 2012; Kopel, ‘Japanese gun control’; idem, ‘Why Japan is so safe from guns’ in New York Daily
News, 19 Dec. 2012; Kristof, ‘How to reduce shootings’, New York Times, 20 Feb. 2018; Low, ‘How Japan has
almost eradicated gun crime’ in BBC World Service, 6 Jan. 2017; Weller, ‘Japan has almost completely’ in
Business Insider Nordic, 11 Oct. 2017.
4 Ashkenazi, ‘What do the natives know?’; Astroth, ‘The decline of Japanese’; Kopel, ‘Japanese gun control’;idem, ‘Why Japan is so safe from guns’ in New York Daily News, 19 Dec. 2012; Law Library of Congress,
Firearms-Control Legislation and Policy, pp. 117-31; Low, ‘How Japan has almost eradicated gun crime’ in BBC
World Service, 6 Jan. 2017; Weller, ‘Japan has almost completely’, in Business Insider Nordic, 11 Oct. 2017.
5 Perrin, Giving up the gun.
6 Ibid.
7 Fujiki, Katanagari; idem, Toyotomiheiwarei; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’; idem, Teppou; Tsukamoto, Shourui.
8 Hyakusho included not only those who engaged in agriculture, but also mountain villagers and fishingvillagers who had other means of livelihood. See Takei, Teppou, p. 8.

46

Giving Up the Gun?

I
Before looking into the findings of Japanese historians, this section explains the ways inwhich the Japanese case has been presented in the Anglophone literature. One of thechapters included in a book published in 2012, Small arms, crime and conflict: Global
governance and the threat of armed violence, receives especial attention, since the chapter
entitled ‘What do the natives know?: societal mechanisms for controlling small arms’9
seems to exemplify the common understanding of the Japanese case in the policy-oriented
Anglophone academic literature. In the section entitled, ‘And the prize for the mostsuccessful gun-control programme goes to…’, the case of Japan is brought up and Perrin’s
book is refereed.10 The main argument presented by the author of the chapter, Michael
Ashkenazi, researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conversion, is explained below.
Ashkenazi argues that in 1588, the ruler of Japan decreed ‘taiko no kantanabari [sic]’11
and ordered ‘all those people not members of the warrior stratum to turn over their
weapons, including swords, spears, bows and guns to the authorities’,12 and the peopleobeyed this order. The decree’s success was possible because ‘the preceding two centuries
were a period of civil wars which came to an end with the unification of Japan. Strong local
and national forces were available for policing’.13 As a result, the ‘powers of the swordwielding warrior class were entrenched and in so doing most possibilities for social
achievement were suppressed’. 14 The decree ‘established swords as the pre-eminent
instrument of violence. So powerful was this symbol that members of the warrior classwore them for centuries as badges’, 15 while firearms ‘were dismissed as unmanly,
dishonourable weapons’.16 This ‘powerful cult and symbolic value of the sword combinedwith state and communal sanctions to lead to guns being effectively abandoned’.17
The following government (the Edo shogunate) also ‘embarked on a country-wide effort
to suppress the use, development and manufacture of firearms in the early seventeenth
century’,18 and firearm ownership fell dramatically as a result. Ashkenazi argues that ‘[t]heprogramme was so successful that though there were numerous rebellions against the
government in the succeeding 150 years, almost none used firearms in any substantial
numbers’.19 The government also ‘had internal controls to ensure no guns were brought
into the capital’.20 Some interpersonal violence was permitted and controlled. For instance,a ‘member of the warrior class could kill someone from the lower class provided hereported on the incident fully and absolutely no guns were involved’.21 Nonetheless, guns
were given up, and therefore gun violence was put to an end.
Based on such ‘facts’, Ashkenazi argues that the following four factors were key insuppressing firearm use and possession.
1. Separate control of violence from firearm use
The authorities recognized that firearm ownership or use was (to them) pernicious, but
9 Ashkenazi, ‘What do the natives know?’.
10 Ibid., p. 232.
11 Ibid., p. 232. The term should be spelt as katanagari.
12 Ibid., p. 232.
13 Ibid., p. 232.
14 Ibid., p. 232.
15 Ibid., p. 232.
16 Ibid., pp. 232-3.
17 Ibid., p. 233.
18 Ibid., p. 232.
19 Ibid., p. 232.
20 Ibid., p. 233.
21 Ibid., p. 232.

47

TAMARA ENOMOTO
that interpersonal violence needed an acceptable outlet’.22 It should be acknowledged that
firearm use and possession on the one hand and violence on the other are distinct andseparate variables, and therefore society needs to treat them separately.23
2. Involve local interests
The local domains recognized that ‘allowing a populace to arm itself would challenge thedomains’ authority’,24 believed in the need to suppress firearms, and therefore ‘helped thecentral government in its programme as a way of protecting their self-interest’. 25 It isnecessary for the state and local leaders to have a shared interest.26
3. Work firearm control into an ethos, or an ideology, to generate widespread support
An ethos was developed in which ‘[m]uch of the control over firearms was exercised bysymbolically labelling them as inappropriate’,27 ‘unmanly and dishonourable’.28 A ‘sword
cult and complete social stratification’29 were adopted. Based on this example, ‘[p]roviding
an emotional or ideological context for rejecting firearm use could well be one of the mostcritical elements in the ways societies can control small arms. Firearm control needs to beworked into the popular (and state) ethos’.30
4. Security and safety
The Japanese felt that they were safe. This is vital, as ‘[t]he feeling of personal security isa requirement that cannot be ignored’.31
Ashkenazi concludes that the Japanese case shows that both a complex mix of societal,
symbolic, and cultural practices were at play at the group and community levels, and legal
practices were influential at the state level. 32 These different levels are difficult todistinguish when they are, as in the Japanese case, complicit in controlling firearms.33
Other Anglophone literature tends to draw on Perrin’s work. For instance, Neil Cooper,
professor of international relations and security studies at Bradford University, refers toPerrin’s work and argues that restrictions on guns in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries resulted in their almost total disappearance from Japanese society.34 He points outthat guns represented a threat to the warrior class when in the hands of the lower classes,35
and that the construction of guns as illegitimate weapons was related to the romanticizingof the heroic samurai sword as emblematic of one’s honour.36 David Hemenway, professorof health policy at the Harvard School of Public Health, also refers to Perrin’s work,
claiming that Japan gave up the gun for three centuries beginning in the late sixteenth
century.37 Hemenway describes similar political and symbolic reasons for this policy: Guns
were a threat to the ruling class, and it was thought that their use removed the skill andbeauty from combat.38
22 Ibid., p. 233.
23 Ibid., p. 233.
24 Ibid., p. 233.
25 Ibid., p. 233.
26 Ibid., p. 233.
27 Ibid., p. 233.
28 Ibid., p. 242.
29 Ibid., p. 233.
30 Ibid., p. 233.
31 Ibid., p. 234.
32 Ibid., p. 234.
33 Ibid., p. 234.
34 Cooper, ‘Humanitarian arms control’, p. 141.
35 Ibid., p. 143.
36 Ibid., p. 144.
37 Hemenway, Private Guns, p. 191.
38 Ibid., p. 191.

48

Giving Up the Gun?
The Anglophone media also argues that gun control has continued to succeed in modern
Japan because it is embedded into society and culture. For example, the BBC World
Service reported in 2017 that the current Japanese gun control law ‘was introduced in 1958,
but the idea behind the policy dates back centuries’.39 The report included an interview
with Iain Overton, an advocate of stronger domestic gun control and executive director of
Action on Armed Violence, a London-based NGO specialized in armed violence issues.40
Overton explains that people in Japan were rewarded for giving up firearms as far back as
1685 and that such measures laid ‘a bedrock saying that guns really don’t play a part incivilian society’.41
The myth is also promulgated by a gun rights advocate: David B. Kopel, a member of the
National Rifle Association of the US and research director of the Independence Institute.
Kopel refers to Perrin’s work and claims that Toyotomi and the Edo shogunate were able toremove guns from society because the country was an isolated island with a totalitarian
dictatorship in which class oppression was harsh and a free political system was absent.42
He also argues that the former bushi class lost its right to bear arms after the Sword
Abolishment Edict (Haitourei) was issued by the Meiji government in 1876, and explainsthat the 1876 edict and post-Second World War gun control have continued to succeed
because they have matched the basic character of Japanese society.43 He argues that theJapanese present-day police have little interest in using or glamorizing guns because they
have inherited the idea that guns are for cowards.44 Kopel also emphasizes that the strict
gun control and the broad weapons search and seizure powers endowed to the Japanesepolice are accepted by the population since they are embedded in their culture that
subordinates the individual to the collective and accepts the authority of their police andgovernment--- the culture which he claims to have been consolidated through thedisarmament programme during Toyotomi’s period and the Edo period. 45 In his view,
Japan’s gun laws have grown out of the country’s long history and the resulting culture, inwhich the individual is subordinate to the collective.46 Following this logic, Kopel argues
that such an undemocratic norm is not necessarily replicable or desirable in Western
democracies.47
Moreover, as pointed out by Japanese historian Hisashi Fujiki, some Japanese academics
have adopted Perrin’s argument without conducting archival research. 48 The mythunderlying Japanese gun control is especially shared among Japanese arms control
practitioners and scholars in international relations, since they tend to rely on the
Anglophone literature rather than the work of Japanese historians. For instance, Kenki
Adachi, an international relations scholar at Ritsumeikan University, refers to Perrin’s workand argues that people rarely used guns between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries.49
As one of the defining factors behind the prohibition of guns during this period, he
39 Low, ‘How Japan has almost eradicated gun crime’ in BBC World Service, 6. Jan. 2017.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Kopel, Gallant, and Eisen, ‘A world without guns’ in National Review Online, 5 Dec. 2001; Kopel, ‘Japanese

gun control’. The author thanks Nicholas Marsh for pointing out that Kopel refers to Perrin’s work and argues
from a gun-rights advocate’s viewpoint.
43 Kopel, ‘Japanese gun control’.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Fujiki, Katanagari; pp. 2-4, 230-3.
49 Adachi, Kokusai Seiji, pp. 60-1.

49

TAMARA ENOMOTO
identifies the process of ‘norm-grafting’, by which a new norm (i.e. prohibition of gunownership and use) gained acceptance by virtue of its association with an already acceptedand established norm—the samurai spirit (bushido) and its associated sword cult.50
There are some overseas historians in Japanese history, such as David L. Howell, whohave refuted Perrin’s work and analysed the role of firearms in the Edo period. 51
Nevertheless, most of the existing Anglophone literature as well as some Japanese literaturetake the Japanese past and present cases as representing a simple positive correlation
between tight domestic firearms regulation and a low level of armed violence, and thefocus of their debates has been on why the Japanese ‘gave up guns’. Whether pro-gun
control or not, many media reports and commentators have also relied on the same myth inmaking their arguments.

II
Despite the general acceptance of Perrin’s book in the Anglophone literature, Japanese
historians have widely criticized the book for its lack of evidence. Although there used to
be a general lacuna of literature on this issue in the field of Japanese history, since the1980s many Japanese historians have argued against Perrin’s claim.52 There are inevitabledifferences in opinion among Japanese historians when it comes to the details,53 but themain criticism against Perrin’s work is as follows.
The prominent feudal lord Hideyoshi Toyotomi (1536-98) indeed ordered the Sword
Hunting Ordinance (Katanagari) in 1588, and the first article of the ordinance in factordered that all hyakusho (peasants; cultivators; villagers) be disarmed of their swords(katana), short swords (wakizashi), bows, spears, firearms, and any other kinds of military
instruments. However, there was a significant gap between this article and the actual
measures on the ground.
In fact, the first article contradicted the second article in the ordinance, which mentioned
only swords and short swords, and it was generally untrue that the overall measure wasdesigned for the total disarmament of the non-bushi classes.54 The ordinance as a whole
was meant to target the hyakusho class’s carriage of swords and short swords, not firearms,
and it was mostly aimed at consolidating the class differentiation between bushi andhyakusho.55 Carriage of swords and short swords was allowed to the bushi class, enablingthem to carry these weapons to signify their social strata.56 Some members of the chounin(townspeople) class who did not cultivate land were also allowed to carry swords and shortswords under licence.57 The central government did not seem to make concerted efforts todeprive hyakusho of firearms, and there are records of orders which permitted hyakusho topossess firearms for the purposes of hunting varmints (animals such as boars, deer, bears,
monkeys, and birds).58 Although the actual use (firing) of firearms seems to have beenprohibited in three areas near Toyotomi’s castle, their possession was not prohibited even
50 Ibid., pp. 62-4.
51 Howell, ‘The social life of firearms’.
52 Fujiki, Katanagari; idem, Toyotomiheiwarei; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’; idem, Teppou; Tsukamoto, Shourui.
53 See the difference in opinion between the following authors: Fujiki, Katanagari; Kobayashi, Oushuushioki.
54 Fujiki, Katanagari; idem, Toyotomiheiwarei, pp. 174-9.
55 Fujiki, Katanagari; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, pp. 54-5; idem, Teppou, pp. 13-6.
56 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 58-60; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, pp. 54-5; idem, Teppou, pp. 13-6.
57 Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 77.
58 Ibid., pp. 76-83; Fujiki, Toyotomiheiwarei, pp. 178-83.

50

Giving Up the Gun?
in such areas. 59 Moreover, the ordinance by the central government was not evenly
implemented across the country, and there are records of hyakusho possessing and carrying
short swords, as well as possessing bows, spears, firearms, wakizashi, and even swords.60
Therefore, there was a huge gap between the language of the first article of the 1588
ordinance and the actual measures taken by the government and by local domains.
During the Edo period (1603-1867), regulations over the possession and carriage of arms
slightly changed over time, and often differed from one domain to another. 61 Firearms,
bows and spears were to a greater or lesser degree owned by all classes, and hyakusho usedfirearms for game and vermin hunting.62 In some areas and periods, they even possessedand carried swords. For example, Tadatoshi Hosokawa, a lord of the Kokura domain(located in present-day Fukuoka prefecture), permitted hyakusho to carry both swords andshort swords in 1624.63 He was transferred to the Kumamoto domain (located in presentday Kumamoto prefecture) in 1632 and served as its lord, issuing an order in 1633 to
obligate ordinary hyakusho to carry short swords and village headmen to carry both swords
and short swords. Tadatoshi even charged penalties for not carrying them.64 According to asurvey that Tadatoshi conducted himself, hyakusho living in some major parts of the
Kumamoti domain possessed 1,630 firearms in 1634 and 2,173 firearms in 1641. 65 Other
records show that in 1745, the 955 households in villages on Shiiba mountain (in thepresent-day Miyazaki prefecture) possessed 436 firearms for hunting purposes, and that
number increased to 586 in 1836.66 Moreover, hyakusho seem to have owned more firearms
than the bushi class in their domains.67 For example, records from the Matsumoto domain(located in the present-day Nagano prefecture) show that the number of firearms possessedby hyakusho in 1687 exceeded 1,000, while the domain’s bushi class possessed only 200
firearms.68 In 1863, the Mibu domain (in the present-day Tochigi prefecture) recorded 158
authorized firearms owned by hyakusho, whereas other records from 1633 show that thelord of Mibu domain was obliged to store 80 firearms so that the domain could submit
them to the Edo shogunate in the event of a war.69
Other available statistics also indicate that hyakusho possessed firearms, swords, shortswords, bows, and spears. For instance, after one of the extremely few instances of serious
unrest during the Edo period, the Amakusa uprising (1637-8), in which an estimated 14,000
hyakusho rose up against their lords in the Shimabara and Karatsu domains, the lord of the
Karatsu domain, Katataka Terazawa, disarmed the remaining rebels in his area. Most of thecombatants and their family members (estimated at 37,000 in total) are said to have beenannihilated during the uprising, and therefore the number of remaining rebels is likely tohave been small. 70 Nevertheless, the lord of the Karatsu domain is reported to haveconfiscated 324 firearms, 1,450 swords and short swords, and smaller numbers of bows andspears from the remaining rebels.71 The hyakusho seem to have been skilled shooters since
59 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 65-6.
60 Ibid., pp. 83-107.
61 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 134-87; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’.
62 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 134-87; idem, Toyotomiheiwarei, pp. 18-31; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’.
63 Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 138.
64 Ibid., p. 139.
65 Ibid., p. 141.
66 Ibid., pp. 168-9.
67 Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, p. 55; idem, Teppou, pp. 6-7.
68 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 160-1.
69 Takei, Teppou, pp. 6-7.
70 Takei, Teppou, p. 5.
71 Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 5.

51

TAMARA ENOMOTO
they hunted vermin on a daily bases, which could have been one of the reasons why thegovernment forces struggled to suppress the uprising despite the fact that they were larger(an estimated 120,000 combatants) and used cannons.72 Moreover, after Katataka wasremoved from his position for his failure to prevent the uprising, a new lord appointed by
the central government, Ieharu Yamazaki, returned the confiscated firearms and otherweapons to the hyakusho immediately after he took office in 1639.73
Chounin in the Edo area (located in present-day Tokyo) were also allowed to carry shortswords, and in some special circumstances they were also permitted to carry swords until
this was banned for them in 1683. 74 However, it was the carriage of swords that wasbanned, not their possession. When the carriage of swords was regulated for those who did
not belong to the bushi class, such regulation was generally intended to differentiate thebushi class from the rest or to help combat outlaws, who would wear flashy clothes andcarry swords. 75 For instance, in 1619, the Satake domain (in the present-day Akita
prefecture) attempted to apply the Edo area’s regulation in his domain and prohibitedhyakusho and chounin from wearing certain kinds of hairstyles, from growing a type ofnarrow moustache that grows downward called tenjinhige, and from bearing short swords
longer than forty-nine centimetres and swords with long handles or in red lacquered
sheaths.76 Similar orders were issued in other domains, all of which were meant to clearly
distinguish bushi from the rest and to help combat outlaws, but not to entirely disarm those
who did not belong to the bushi class.77 These orders also indicate that flashy swords andlonger types of short swords were in fact carried by some hyakusho and chounin as well as
by outlaws, which necessitated the above measures to prohibit their carriage.78 Obviously,
Japan was far from ‘almost entirely gun-free’, nor was the possession of swords the soleprerogative of bushi during this period.
After the Meiji Restoration (1868), the new government issued the Regulations to Control
Firearms (Jyuuhou Torishimari Kisoku) in 1872 and the Sword Abolishment Edict(Haitourei) in 1876. The Regulations to Control Firearms prohibited civilian possession of
military-style firearms except for those which were licenced by the authority. Firearms for
hunting purposes were outside of the scope of this regulation, and the possession of
military-style firearms was permitted under licence, and the arms needed to be registeredwith the authority and marked.79 The Sword Abolishment Edict did not deprive civilians of
the right to possess swords and short swords, but it restricted the right to carry theseweapons to authorized users such as members of the military and police. 80 These authorizedusers were moreover only allowed to carry them while on duty.81 The main aim of the edict
was not to entirely disarm civilians but to distinguish members of the authority, such as themilitary and police, from the rest.82 ‘Carriage’ meant openly carrying and displaying these
items, and therefore carrying them in pockets and bags was not prohibited,83 nor was
72 Ibid., pp. 6-7.
73 Ibid., pp. 5-6.
74 Ibid., pp. 142-51.
75 Ibid., pp. 142-5.
76 Ibid., p. 142.
77 Ibid., pp. 142-5.
78 Ibid., pp. 146-7.
79 Ibid., pp. 194-6; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, p. 68.
80 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 198-200.
81 Ibid., pp. 198-200.
82 Ibid., pp. 198-200.
83 Ibid., pp. 204-5.

52

Giving Up the Gun?
carriage of other kinds of weapons regulated by the edict.84
To summarize, guns were not relinquished, the society was not ‘almost-entirely gun-free’,and firearms, swords, short swords, bows, and spears were possessed by all strata of society
between the late sixteenth and early twentieth centuries. The prohibition measures during
Toyotomi’s reign and the Edo period were focused on the carriage of weapons, especiallyswords, and they were meant to consolidate class differentiation rather than to disarm thenon-bushi classes. Similarly, the new regulations after the Meiji Restoration were notmeant to entirely prohibit the possession of military-style firearms or to deprive civilians of
the right to possess swords and short swords, but were rather designed to distinguish themembers of the authority from the rest of society.

III
As noted above, the existing Anglophone literature as well as some Japanese literature havetaken the Japanese past and present cases as emblematic of a positive correlation between
tight regulation and a low level of armed violence. They have therefore sought to answer toresearch questions such as why the stringent regulation was effectively implemented andwhy the Japanese accepted the relinquishment of their guns.
However, as we revise the basic facts based on the available historical findings, we now
need to address an entirely different research question. What needs to be analysed andexplained is the relationship between the widespread possession of firearms, swords, shortswords, bows, and spears by all strata of society on the one hand, and the relative restraint
in private violence on the other hand during Toyotomi’s reign and the Edo period.85
Based on Japanese historians’ findings, the defining factors which contributed to therestraint in private violence during these periods can be explained at three levels: the state,regional, and village levels.
1. State level: State-making and restraint in private violence
Prior to the unification of the country by Toyotomi, Japan was composed of a number of
feudal territories which had been at war for over 100 years. As Toyotomi unified thecountry, he was able to issue a country-wide law and sought to develop a uniform policy
framework. He sought to form a new state based on clearly distinguished class structuresand divisions of roles and responsibilities. In this context, limiting the right to carry bothswords and short swords to the bushi class was primarily meant to differentiate the bushi
class from the rest and thereby to clarify which class was charged with security matters(bushi), to expressly assign the security roles to the central government and domain lords,
and to encourage other classes to focus on their own work rather than on security issues.
Moreover, some historians point out that this measure formed a policy package with othermeasures, and these measures taken together generally aimed to restrain what was now
regarded to be private (and ‘illegitimate’) violence, placing it in contrast to the ‘legitimate’monopolized use of physical force by the bushi class.86 For instance, Toyotomi mediatedboundary conflicts between domains, made decisions on boundary issues to settle disputes,
and ordered domains to suspend violence and reconcile with each other.87 He also took
measures to suppress acts of piracy and armed violence between villages and sought to84 Ibid., pp. 204-5.
85 Considering the internal uprisings and conflicts in which firearms were used during the Meiji period, thischapter focuses on Toyotomi’s reign and the Edo period.
86 Fujiki, Toyotomiheiwarei, p. iv.
87 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 67-72, 228-9; idem, Toyotomiheiwarei, pp. 12-76.

53

TAMARA ENOMOTO
resolve inter-village conflicts through court hearings and judgments.88 Combined with suchmeasures aimed at restraining private violence between domains, between villages, and by
pirates, the limitation of the right to bear both swords and short swords was not expected tocontribute to the complete disarmament of villages. Rather, it was intended to strengthenclass stratification and thereby prevent hyakusho from resorting to private violence.
Engaging in private violence could lead to harsh repercussions. During the Edo period,
hyakusho and chounin were allowed to possess firearms and various kinds of weapons withvarying degrees depending on the time and place, but their use for private violence was
generally prohibited and often responded to with severe punishment.89 For instance, theEdo shogunate issued an ordinance in 1610 in which it prohibited hyakusho from using
bows, spears, and firearms to fight over land or water disputes. The ordinance stipulated
that if such incidents were to occur, all members of the village concerned would beannihilated.90 There are records of villages refraining from armed violence with each otherfor fear of the government’s potential response, even though the villagers possessed
hundreds of swords, short swords, firearms, bows, and spears.91 Records also show that thelords’ use of firearms against hyakusho was tightly regulated and generally prohibited by
the central government in the mid-eighteenth century, except in cases where the hyakusho
also used firearms in their uprisings against their lords.92
Moreover, the demand for carrying weapons actually decreased as private violence cameto be restrained. While villagers had no recourse but to defend themselves against outlaws,
plunderers, or aggressive neighbours before Toyotomi unified the country, such serious
security matters could now be handled at the domain level. 93 Since hyakusho found thatthey were generally able to entrust their security matters to their domains and therefore did
not need to respond to such matters themselves with weapons,94 they did not necessarilyneed to carry weapons.
2. Regional level: ‘Social contract’It was not only the above top-town initiatives that were at play. Historians point out that ageneral informal agreement was formed in the Edo period between domain lords andhyakusho, holding that neither group would use firearms against the other.95 Lords largely
abided by the government regulation and refrained from using firearms against hyakusho.
This was not because firearms were regarded as dishonourable weapons that should not be
used by the bushi class, nor was it solely because the government severely punished the useof firearms against hyakusho by the bushi class. Rather, it was largely because any
aberration from this rule was feared to break the relationship between the governor and thegoverned and to lead to the loss of the governor’s legitimacy among the governed. 96 The
political system was not democratic in a modern or contemporary sense, and lords were not
88 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 114-26; idem, Toyotomiheiwarei, pp. 77-92, 217-39.
89 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 151-2. Chounin of the Edo area were allowed to carry short swords but were severely

punished for actually using them. For instance, a document produced by the magistrate’s office of the Edo area inthe latter half the seventeenth century recorded 300 deaths and injuries, 250 of which seem to have beencommitted by edged tools. The types of items used were described in some 100 out of the 250 cases. The 100
cases were mostly committed by hyakusho and chounin. Seventy out of 100 cases were committed with shortswords, 10 with knives, 5 with kitchen knives, and 10 with other kinds of edged tools. The perpetrators were
given severe punishments such as the death penalty.
90 Ibid., pp. 126-7.
91 Ibid., pp. 127-31.
92 Ibid., pp. 173-4.
93 Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, pp. 65-6.
94 Ibid., pp. 65-6.
95 Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 173.
96 Ibid., pp. 173-6; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, p. 60.

54

Giving Up the Gun?
elected by the populace. Nevertheless, the legitimacy of the lords appears to have been
informally ascribed to their relationships with villagers and depended upon whether they
were recognized (by villagers) as playing the expected roles.97 On the other hand, whenhyakusho undertook an uprising, they did not use firearms to harm their lords. Whenvillagers brought firearms to an uprising, they fired them to give signals to participants, but
not to harm fellow humans.98 An uprising was one of the ways for hyakusho to negotiatewith their lords, such as for a reduction in the amount of annual tribute, and they rarely
intended to overthrow their lords. 99 The case of the Amakusa uprising, which wasmentioned in the previous section, was one of the rare cases when firearms were used byboth sides with the intent to harm humans. In view of such practices by both the lords andhyakusho, historians have observed that there seems to have been an informal agreement
between the lords and those involved in uprisings as to the kinds of items to be used against
each other,100 which appears to have been grounded on a certain kind of social contract
between the governor and the governed at the regional level.
3. Village level: Tight gun control practices
During the Edo period, villages were entrusted to resolve issues in their daily matters.101
While firearms in the hands of hyakusho were nominally regarded as the property of thedomains in which they lived, and while the detailed registration records for these arms
were kept at the domain level, their day-to-day control was practically undertaken at thevillage level. 102 In the record, one finds the account of one individual who asked for
permission to continue to use his firearm in the following year.103 This was not authorized
by the village as he was judged as having selfish tendencies, and so the firearm was handed
to a person who was believed to be trustworthy.104 Another record shows that when afirearm was no longer used, villagers sealed the firearm to ensure that it could not be
used.105 Still another record indicates that villages were required to report to their domains
when they needed to repair a broken firearm or to substitute a firearm with a new one, sothat the records would be updated.106 Hyakusho did not always strictly follow the orders by
their domains, but a number of records indicate that villagers registered their firearms with
their domains, conducted ‘background checks’ before authorising the possession of a
firearm, and safely stored their firearms so that only the licenced users would use theirfirearms for the authorized purposes. Firearm control faced challenges in the nineteenth
century near the end of the Edo period, when the rise of the commodity economy resulted
in an increasing number of landless people, some of whom became outlaws and illicitly
possessed firearms. However, firearms had been relatively under control until that point.107
Going back to Ashkenazi’s argument on the ‘lessons learnt’ from the Toyotomi and Edo
periods, we could agree that a mix of practices at different levels of society were at play.
However, the contexts in these periods were entirely different. A mix of legal, normative,
and political factors at different levels of society were at play, not in abandoning guns
97 Takei, ‘Nihonjin’; idem, Teppou, pp. 137-9.
98 Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, p. 60; idem, Teppou, pp. 135-7.
99 Takei, Teppou, pp. 135-7.
100 Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 176-8; Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, p. 60.
101 Takei, Teppou, p. 36.
102 Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, pp. 58-60; idem, Teppou, pp. 115-26.
103 Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, p. 59; idem, Teppou, pp. 226-7.
104 Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, p. 59; idem, Teppou, pp. 226-7.
105 Takei, ‘Nihonjin’, p. 59; idem, Teppou, p. 228.
106 Takei, Teppou, p. 41. This record also implies that firearms were in circulation, and hyakusho could obtainthem or repair them when needed.
107 Ibid., pp. 137-63.

55

TAMARA ENOMOTO
altogether, but in controlling the possession, carriage, and use of weapons and in restraining
private violence. These periods can be better analysed as a case where a certain kind ofsocial contract was formed in the process of state unification and early-modern (or premodern) state-making and where laws and regulations to differentiate classes and restrain
private violence developed and at least moderately functioned at the state, regional, andvillage levels.
This analysis also indicates that Japan’s post-Second World War domestic gun control has
not been based on the ‘centuries-old history of weapons prohibitions’ nor on the ‘popularand state ethos’ of stigmatizing firearms as dishonourable weapons. Since such ‘centuriesold history of weapons prohibitions’ did not exist, and firearms were not given up between
the late sixteenth and early twentieth centuries, we need an alternative explanation as to
how the post-Second World War control was formed.

Ⅳ
Based on the available information provided by Japanese historians, the post-Second WorldWar Japanese domestic gun control seems to have been initiated as follows.
Under the Allied Occupation, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ordered theJapanese government to collect ‘all arms’ possessed by ordinary Japanese nationals
between August and September 1945, so as to reduce the risk of any possible danger thatmight be caused by arms in the hands of ‘civilians’, some of whom were former soldiers or
were feared to resist the occupation.108 The intention was to disarm the defeated state, notjust its military apparatus but also its citizens.109 The post-war Japanese government
initially resisted this order, negotiated to exclude swords from the scope of the disarmament
programme, and argued that civilian firearms were already registered and under control by
the police.110 However, the Allied Forces refused to compromise, and the Ministry of theInterior accepted the order and directed each prefectural police force to collect weapons
except for valuable artistic swords and necessary hunting firearms.111 The Ministry of theInterior at first directed in late September 1945 that swords other than valuable artistic
swords should be voluntarily submitted to and kept at one’s respective prefectural police
department, but the Allied Forces demanded in October that weapons should be surrendered
and transferred to US military headquarters and that valuable artistic swords and hunting
firearms should be strictly regulated.112 Under pressure from the Allied Forces, in November
1945 the Ministry of the Interior directed prefectural police departments to inspect eachhousehold to deal with the illicit possession of arms, and the Ministry of the Interior andthe police became increasingly active in efforts to control civilian arms possession.113
By the end of March 1946, within several months after the Ministry of the Interior called
for weapons collection, 11,916 handguns, 22,994 machine guns, 395,891 rifles, 384,212
hunting rifles, 243 cannons, 560 autocannons, 239,160 sabres, 582,106 bayonets, 897,786
Japanese swords, and 144,407 spears were confiscated.114 The disarmament programme
continued. During the occupation (1945-52), each prefecture seems to have gone through108 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, pp. 15-8; Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 209-10.
109 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, pp. 15-8.
110 Ibid., pp. 18-23; Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 210.
111 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, pp. 24-5; Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 210-2.
112 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, pp. 24-6; Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 211-2.
113 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, p. 26; Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 212-3.
114 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, p. 31; Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 214.

56

Giving Up the Gun?
five to six rounds of weapons collection interventions. 115 Local networks such asneighbourhood associations were utilized to inform and mobilize the public. 116 Records
from Shizuoka, Kumamoto, and Ibaraki prefectures indicate that the stationed troops
themselves patrolled the areas in cars and conducted on-site home inspections.117 Rumours
were spread, even by the police, that the stationed troops would use special detectors andthat anyone who was found to possess arms would be tried by court martial.118 People
relinquished arms or buried them deep underground out of fear.119
In June 1946, the Ministry of the Interior issued the Jyuuhoutou Shoji Kinshirei, anordinance to prohibit the possession of firearms and other kinds of weapons, and its
enforcement regulations after close consultation with the Allied Forces. It banned thepossession of firearms, ammunition, and swords by civilians in principle, though thepossession of hunting firearms, valuable artistic swords, and gunpowder for industrial use
were allowed under licence.120 Penalties against the ordinance were stipulated in Article 2,
and its detailed mechanisms were set out in the enforcement regulations. 121 The 1946
ordinance was replaced with a new ordinance in 1950, which was recognized as the law of
the state when Japan regained its independence on 28 April 1952.122 It was then updated
and replaced by the Law Controlling the Possession of Firearms and Swords in 1958,
which has been updated several times up to the present. 123 There have been slight
modifications to the details of regulatory mechanisms, but the general prohibition ofcivilian ownership of firearms and swords has remained unchanged.
In sum, it is not an exaggeration to say that it was the US, whose Second Amendment to
its Constitution stipulates the right of the people to keep and bear arms and whose
population suffers from a high level of gun violence, which was the founder of one of themost stringent domestic gun control laws in the world. Such strict control was initiated as ameasure to disarm not only state forces but also the general population of the defeatedstate. Its basic idea, design, and mechanisms emerged out of the post-war disarmament
programme of the former enemy population, not out of domestic policy debates amongrights-bearing citizens.

Ⅴ
When Perrin published his book in the 1970s, the story of a country that voluntarily choseto give up guns, turned back the clock on military technology, and created a relatively
peaceful society may have fascinated those who dreamed of a world without nuclear
weapons. The myth continues to be promulgated by gun-control advocates as a prelude tocontemporary Japan’s ‘successful’ domestic gun control policies. On the other side of the
US debate, gun-rights advocates such as Kopel argue that the Japanese gave up guns while
under oppressional, dictatorial rule during the Toyotomi and Edo periods and that therefore,
Japanese-style gun control is not necessarily relevant in the United States.
Most of the Anglophone literature as well as some Japanese literature on Japan’s past and
115 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, p. 27; Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 212-3.
116 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, pp. 28-30; Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 212-3.
117 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, p. 28; Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 213.
118 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, p. 29; Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 213-4.
119 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, p. 30; Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 213.
120 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, p. 36; Fujiki, Katanagari, p. 218.
121 Ara, ‘Senryouki’, p. 36; Fujiki, Katanagari, pp. 218-9.
122 Ara, Nihon, pp. 62-64.
123 Ara, Nihon, p. 64.

57

TAMARA ENOMOTO
present-day domestic arms control also draw heavily on Perrin’s book. The past and present
cases are regarded to depict a simple positive correlation between tight regulation and a
low level of armed violence. Therefore, the central research question has been ‘why theJapanese gave up guns’.
However, even a brief look at the findings of Japanese historians reveals an entirely
different story. Guns and other weapons were never given up; in fact, people from all social
strata possessed them. Despite this, private violence was restrained for several centuries.
This generates a fundamentally different research question, that is, why private violence
was restrained despite the widespread availability of weapons in the society. Since the‘centuries-old history and culture of weapons prohibitions’ did not exist in Japan, we alsoneed to find an alternative explanation as to how Japan’s modern domestic gun control wasformed. This article has tried to address these new questions based on the available
historical findings.
Such revision of the previously shared understandings and ‘facts’ also prompts us torethink the implications of the Japanese cases on the current domestic gun control debates.
For instance, the pre-modern (or early-modern) Japanese case could provide lessons, not on
how to make a society entirely gun-free, but on how to control guns and reduce armed
violence in a society. It could potentially provide more practical lessons for the current gun
control debate in the United States and elsewhere, such as mandatory licensing
requirements, registration and record-keeping, background-checks, safe storage, and asense of trust between the public and the authorities.
Moreover, this case may also imply the need for more informed research on nonAnglophone cases where reliable data and analysis are mostly provided in local languages.
As Greene and Marsh demonstrate, there have been substantial advances in research-basedknowledge on the relationship between arms availability and armed violence in the last few
decades.124 Some previously shared ‘conventional wisdom’ has been proven to be deficientor misleading, while the fallacy over the Japanese case is still widely shared by academics,
activists, and the media. Since research and policy discussions on this theme tend to be
dominated by people from or based in the global north, and particularly those from North
America and Western Europe, the fallacy has rarely been refuted. Since the commonly
available information provided in Japanese, a language spoken by some 128 million people,
has not been acknowledged in much of the Anglophone literature, it may be plausible toassume that information found in less dominant languages is likely to have been overlooked
in such literature.
This case also indicates that further research is needed as to why the post-Second World
War domestic arms control has taken root in Japanese society and is widely accepted by the
public. Despite their initial resistance, the Ministry of the Interior and the police seem tohave later cooperated with the Allied Forces and actively proposed detailed mechanisms
and methodologies to implement the control.125 Domestic arms control has since thencontinued to be updated and has received widespread acceptance and support among theJapanese public. Such phenomena cannot be explained simply as the result of the forcible
imposition by the occupying forces, and therefore require further explanation.

124 Greene and Marsh, ‘Conclusions’.
125 Ara, Nihon, pp. 38-66.

58

Giving Up the Gun?
References
Adachi, K., Kokusai seiji to kihan: kokusaishakai no hatten to heikishiyou wo meguru kihan no henyou(Tokyo, 2015).
Ara, T., ‘Senryouki ni okeru higunjika to bushoukaijyo: tokuni “senryougun no katanagari” wo chuusin toshite’, Shien, 51:2 (1991), pp. 15-40.
Ara, T., Nihon senryoushi kenkyuu jyosetsu (Tokyo, 1994).
Ashkenazi, M., ‘What do the natives know?: societal mechanisms for controlling small arms’, in O. Greene
and N. Marsh, eds., Small arms, crime and conflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence(2012), pp. 228-47.
Astroth, A., ‘The decline of Japanese firearm manufacturing and proliferation in the seventeenth century’,
Emory Endeavors in World History, 5 (2013), pp. 136-48.
Cooper, N., ‘Humanitarian arms control and processes of securitization: moving weapons along thesecurity continuum’, Contemporary Security Policy, 32:1 (2011), pp. 134-58.
Fujiki, H., Toyotomiheiwarei to sengokushakai (Tokyo, 1985).
Fujiki, H., Katanagari: buki wo fuuin shita minshu (Tokyo, 2015).
Greene, O. and Marsh, N., ‘Conclusions and priorities for further research’, in O. Greene and N. Marsh,eds., Small arms, crime and conflict: global governance and the threat of armed violence (2012), pp.
248-62.
Hemenway, D., Private guns, public health (Michigan, 2004).
Howell, D. L., ‘The social life of firearms in Tokugawa Japan’, Japanese Studies, 29:1 (2009), pp. 65-80.
Kobayashi, S., Oushuushioki no kouzou (Tokyo, 2003).
Kopel, D. B., ‘Japanese gun control’, Asia-Pacific Law Review, 2 (1993), pp. 26-52.
Law Library of Congress, Firearms-control legislation and policy (Washington, 2013).
Perrin, N., Giving up the gun: Japan's reversion to the sword, 1543-1879 (Boston, 1979).
Takei, K., Teppou wo tebanasanakatta hyakushoutachi: katanagari kara bakumatsu made (Tokyo, 2010).
Takei, K., ‘Nihonjin ha jyu to donoyouni mukiatte kitanoka: jyushakai nihon no rekishi’, in T. Kayano, ed.,
Genzaichi, Vol. II (Tokyo, 2014), pp. 51-70.
Tsukamoto, M., Shourui wo meguru seiji (Tokyo, 1983).
Xu, J. Q., Murphy, S. L., Kochanek, K. D., and Bastian, B. A., ‘Deaths: final data for 2013’, National Vital
Statistics Reports, 64:2 (2016).

59

History of Global Arms Transfer, 6 (2018), pp. 61-72

Total War and Japan: Reality and
Limitations of the Establishment of theJapanese Total War System†
By ATSUSHI KOKETSU*
Interest in the First World War among the Japanese people was relatively mild
during that conflict. In contrast, the Japanese ruling classes perceived the war
with shock and a deepening sense of crisis. Thus, party politicians, military
officers and bureaucrats had to adjust their interests to prepare for Japan to
conduct the sort of “total war” that they observed in WWI. However, they failed
to reach a consensus about the total war system, and this conflict continued until
the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Even afterward, they were never able toconstruct a Japanese model of the total war system. The primary reason for thisfailure was the existence of multiple layers of authority in the Japanese state andthe inability of the nation’s elite groups to mutually adjust their own vested
interests. In doing so, they put their own particular interests above the needs ofthe state and the people. In other words, it was the state structure of Japan, withits multiple powerful stakeholders, that comprised the main obstacle to theconstruction of a total war system. In this article, I will outline the conflicts that
accompanied discussions of the creation of a total war system, arguing that theseconflicts were at the very core of Japan’s essence as a state. I will conclude that
the Japanese model of a total war system was highly deficient, particularly incomparison with those of Europe and the United States.

Ⅰ Introduction: The Emergence of Total War and Japan’s Response(1) The First World War as a total war
The First World War (1914–1918) brought significant changes to the traditional form ofwars. Traditional wars, i.e. cabinet wars, were waged between regular military forces, andthere was a certain separation between the battlefront and the home front. However, during
the First World War, that border became ambiguous due to the appearance of an array of
new military technology. Thus, World War I is often considered a total war.
While traditional war had been limited to the ground and the surface of the sea, the* Author Affiliation: A specially appointed professor of Meiji University. Former Executive Director & Vice
President of National Yamaguchi University.
† A previous version of this paper was presented at a workshop at the NIDS International Forum on War
History at Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies Ministry of Defense in September 14,2011, Japaneseversion of this paper was International Forum on War History at Japanese National Institute for Defense Studies
Ministry of Defense in September 14,2011, Japanese version of this paper was published as an editorial in Miyke,
Kenshou: Taiheiyosenso to Senryaku. This paper is a modified version of a Japanese paper.

61

ATSUSHI KOKETSU
appearance of modern weapons such as aircraft, tanks and submarines extended warfare
into the air and under the sea. While the appearance of modern weapons is a result of thedevelopment of modern technologies, wars fought using these technologies have caused
enormous human and physical damage that is not comparable to that caused by traditional
wars. Already, during World War I, the expansion of battlefields and an increase in war
damage was predicted to accelerate in future wars.
A total war is characterized by mass mobilization, mass consumption and mass
destruction, requiring mobilization not only of the military sector but also of the economy,
education, thought, mentality and culture of a people. It is possible, therefore, to call a statethat establishes a mobilization system with which it may enact total wars a “total war
state.” It was Leon Daudet (1869–1942) of the Action Française, a French royalist, who
proposed a theory of the “total war state” for the first time. He argued that World War I wasa total war and released a book entitled La Guerre Totale (The Total War) in 1918, when
the war ended.
Daudet argued in the book that World War I was different from traditional wars and thatits impact would spread to various fields, such as politics, the economy, industry, intellect,commerce and finance and would reach all states and their people. It was German General
Erich Ludendorff (Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff, 1864–1937) who, based on
Daudet’s argument, did the most to familiarize the public with the theory of total war.
Ludendorff wrote Der Totale Krieg (Total War Theory) in 1935 and advocated the necessityof mass mobilization of military forces by universal conscription.
(2) Characteristics of the total war theory
The characteristics of total wars can be summarized as follows: a) a change in the way ofwars, b) the increased importance of economic and industrial mobilization, and c) thenecessity of mental and ideological mobilization. Generally, either one of the following
strategies are chosen in a war: the annihilation strategy, the purpose of which is to utterly
destroy the enemy, or the exhaustion strategy, the purpose of which is to force the enemy toexhaust its national strength, including its military power. In the former case, the aim
would be to achieve results in a short, decisive battle, deploying active operations from thevery beginning of the war by intensively mobilizing forces and supplies in large quantities
in order to achieve that aim. This strategy requires the maintenance of military forces andstockpiles of strategic goods and resources during peacetime, an extension of the period a
person service in the military and an increase in the military budget. Concerning weapons,
the focus is on offensive and frontal equipment. This is a strategy chosen by countries withlimited natural resources, such as Japan and Germany.
On the other hand, in the case of the exhaustion strategy, the draining of the enemy’s
military resources is the main goal, and thus, mobilization of forces can be kept to aminimum initially, in order to save military capabilities until the time of a decisive battle.
This strategy expects a long conflict. Strategic goods are stockpiled moderately, andpressure on private demand is avoided. This strategy is adopted by countries that haveadvantages in terms of capital and technology, such as the U.S., the U.K. and France.
The increased importance of economic and industrial mobilization imposed a substantial
burden on the Japanese industrial structure because of its inferiority to advanced Westerncountries in terms of technology and capital accumulation. Limited capital, technology andhuman resources in Japan were used for economic and industrial mobilization. This helped
the military sector to be reinforced, but the private sector fell behind. In addition,62

Total War and Japan
concerning mental and ideological mobilization, increased military education was
introduced to the classroom, and this resulted in rigid indoctrination. Free speech andactivities were limited. As the wartime system was put in place, Japanese society wasstagnated and blinkered.
As mentioned above, wide gaps emerged in discussions of total war theory and debates
about how to establish a total war system and its content. These exchanges were often
influenced by each country’s conditions and the respective stage of total war the country
was in. World War II, which assumed the character of total war to an even greater extent
than the First World War, led to the emergence of further differences. Japan and Germany
had tried to develop an active all-out system with the aim of establishing a total war statefrom the late 1920s to the early 1930s, and they ultimately set out on the path to a total war
state involving short-term, decisive battles with a view to establishing the national
mobilization system by the initiative of the military.
(3) Impact of total war debates on Japan and preparations for a total war system
Interest in WWI among the Japanese people was relatively low. On the other hand, the war
had a strong impact on major leaders in the government, and quite a few started to wonder
how their country might handle a future crisis.
For example, Aritomo Yamagata (1838–1922), one of the most powerful political leaders
at that time, on October 15,1917, stated that “we have no choice but resorting to the fullstrength of the whole nation from top to bottom”1 to prepare for a future war. Tsuyoshi
Inukai, a famous proponent of party politics who was respected as an advocate of universal
suffrage and was also called the “God of Constitutionalism,” asserted in the National Party
convention in January 1918 that “all men in the country are soldiers and all industries in
the country are military factories for producing weapons.”2 Kazushige Ugaki, who had
sketched out a response to total wars from an early stage together with Giichi Tanaka,accurately grasped the nature of such wars: “victory or defeat [in] a future war will depend
not only on military battles and military tactics but also on [the] huge crash of all energies
that compose states and deployment and operation of all energies.”3
A group of progressive officers in the army, whom were later called the Control Faction,
advocated preparation for a total war in an organized manner and involved various
authorities in Japan. In particular, the Control Faction established a special military
investigation board in the Ministry of the Army on December 27, 1915 and invested lots offinancial and human resources into the investigation and analysis of wartime mobilization
systems and the state of affairs in those countries that were involved in the war.
Their results were recorded in booklets such as Overseas Missions Report and Monthly
Report of the Special Military Investigation Board. Based on their research, they also
published the Agenda on Necessity of a Nationwide Mobilization Plan (September 1917,
Chief of Staff), the document Imperial State National Defence Resources (August 1917,
Chief of Staff) and Opinions on National General Mobilization (May 1920, Special
Military Investigation Board). The preparation for establishing a total war system had
progressed steadily.4
After WWI, the world started to move towards democracy and national selfdetermination, and party politics began to rise in Japan. Under these circumstances, it
1 Comment by Tokutomi, I., Koshaku Yamagata.
2 Washio, p.406.
3 Tsunoda, Kazushige, p.327.
4 The above-mentioned principal reports are contained at the end Koketsu, Soryokusen.

63

ATSUSHI KOKETSU
became inevitable that Japan would reconcile advocacy of a total war system withdemocratic ideas and institutions. In other words, although ideas of total war might besuperficially considered mutually contradictory with democracy, both were adjusted so thata total war system on a grand scale could be prescribed as the response of Japan to global
developments.
Against this background, a drastic review of civil-military relations became an urgent
issue. The Munitions Industries Mobilization Act was enacted in 1918 as a starting point of
the development of legislation that eventually led to the enactment of the National
Mobilization Law in April 1938. During this process, confrontation and compromise
occurred repeatedly between military and politics.
In the process of preparing for total war, civil-military relations were complicated, andcontradictions frequently emerged which could not be resolved until a Japanese defeat in
World War Ⅱ. Therefore, I believe that the establishment of a total war system was nevercompleted in Japan. The principal reason for this is that Japan had a structure in which
different powers existed separately so that coordination among them did not progresssmoothly or sufficiently though the country and the people saw the need to establish a total
war system. This is to say, the national structure of Japan itself as a pluralistic polity was adecisive factor inhibiting the establishment of a functioning total war system.
I want to point out that it is possible to analyse the nature of modern war in the Japanesestate by summarizing the process of preparation for total war and by discovering thecontradictions that this process revealed, while, at the same time, drawing the conclusionthat the Japanese total war system was insufficient compared to that of Western states.

Ⅱ Japan’s Total War System:
Development, Legislation and Establishment of the Total War State(1) Preparation for total war
After the end of WWI, the Japanese government came to think that future wars would be
total wars, based on the results of investigations by the army and the navy. Therefore, it
started to develop laws for the establishment of a total war system. The Munitions
Industries Mobilization Act (Act No. 38), put into place in March 1918, the year in which
WWI ended, was a starting point in this process.
The act was to provide various munitions industries with protection and promotion,clarifying the resources required in wartime, and to establish an administrative system thatwas suited to respond to an outbreak of war immediately by enhancing those industries
during peacetime. This was different from a requisition order, the purpose of which is toforce industries to donate resources, in that its purpose was to encourage industries tovoluntarily donate resources that were expected to be necessary in wartime. This kind of
mobilization was different from traditional mobilization, which occurs after the outbreak ofwar.
A course toward the establishment of a total war system was pioneered by the Munitions
Industries Mobilization Act and was further concretized by the establishment, in May 1918,
of the Munitions Bureau, an institution that supervised matters related to the enforcementof the Munitions Industries Mobilization Act under the control of the cabinet. The presidentof the Munitions Bureau was the Prime Minister, and the vice ministers of the army and thenavy also served as vice ministers of munitions. In addition, representatives from all64

Total War and Japan
ministries and agencies were allocated to the Munitions Bureau. Although the bureau was acomprehensive organization in which representatives of all concerned ministries andagencies were present, its membership initially consisted of ten military officers, and the
preparation for full-scale mobilization of munitions industries, in reality, was led by the
military.
The total war system is a political system for dealing with total wars, but it is establishedin peacetime. The changes in warfare and the emergence of total war thinking in the earlytwentieth century left no choice but to align a state system with a total war approach,particularly in the case of countries with relatively low national endurance, especially whensuch states, like Japan and Germany, are involved in a long, drawn-out war.
Based on such views, the preparation for mobilization was sketched out starting in the
1920s, and organizations dealing with national mobilization were established in quick
succession. Mobilizing human resources was the most important aspect of establishing thetotal war system, and various approaches were suggested. The Resources Bureau,
established under the cabinet in May 1927, considered humans as “resources,” and the“mobilization of human resources” began to spread as a slogan among advocates of total
war thinking.
These developments accelerated in the 1930s and the 1940s. In my work, Soryokusen,5 I
have identified the most important steps in this development. For example, Opinions on
National Mobilization, drafted by the Special Military Investigation Board in May 1920, isa document of extreme importance. It is the first official document to use the term “public
mobilization,” defining it as industrial mobilization, transportation mobilization, financial
mobilization and mobilization in other areas. In this document, which was a foundational
document for the later total war system, “public mobilization” was understood as themobilization of human resources. The public is specified as a target of the concept ofmobilization.
In other words, goods and humans are classified as “resources,” and it is this kind ofsociety in which a total war system can be implemented at the national level, opening theway for the process of establishing a national mobilization system. The recognition ofhuman beings as a state resource is the fundamental thought that underlies the total war
system. Total war theories based on a variety of approaches were presented during the1920s and the 1930s. Resultingly, the controversy over how to turn humans into resources
was a common issue in those theories.
(2) Toward the enactment of the National Mobilization Act
As a central organization in charge of national mobilization was established under theleadership of the military, the army, decided to establish the Munitions Division in the
Army Ministry’s Ordinance Bureau. This division was in charge of formulating an annual
plan for munitions industry mobilization. In a related move, in May 1920, the National
Statistics Bureau was established as a central control organization for munitions industry
mobilization by the cabinet of Hara Takashi, the president of the political party Seiyukai.
The Munitions Bureau and the Statistics Bureau were later integrated into the National
Statistics Bureau for the purpose of coordinating the cooperation of governmentalorganizations related to industrial mobilization.
However, the government decided to dismantle the National Statistics Bureau in October
5 See pp. 213–244 of the first edition (Sanichishobo, 1981) or pp. 224–255 of the new edition (Shakaihyoronsha
Co., Ltd., 2010).

65

ATSUSHI KOKETSU
1922 because international opinion strongly favoured disarmament after World War I andparticularly during the Washington Conference (1921/22). As a result of this conference
and the post-war recession that followed, administrative and financial streamlining became
necessary for the Japanese military.
Under such circumstances, the government had to postpone policies premised on theestablishment of the total war system. In addition, as the influence of the Great Depression
in the late 1920s started to reach Japan, it became even more difficult to pursue theestablishment of the total war system. Nevertheless, the army enhanced the Engineering
Division under the Munitions Bureau as its industrial mobilization organization, andstarting in 1920, it steadily implemented “industrial mobilization plans.” In May 1927, theResources Bureau, which was under the direct jurisdiction of the Prime Minister, wasestablished as an organization for handling central managing duties and consultations inorder to prepare for the control and operation of resources supplied under the generalmobilization system. Duties related to national mobilization were brought back on track.
Just as in the case of the National Statistics Bureau, nearly half of the Resources Bureau
consisted of military officers on active duty, and it was basically a military-dominatedorganization in charge of general mobilization.
Organizations for national mobilization were repeatedly established and abolished, but inMarch 1930, the commissioner of the Resources Bureau issued a notification on generalmobilization upon an initiative of the army at the time before and after the Manchurian
Incident on September 18, 1931. At the time of the Manchurian Incident, a generalmobilization planning meeting was convened to initiate specific works for designing ageneral mobilization plan. Twenty army officers, including Hajime Sugiyama, Chief of theMilitary Affairs Bureau, participated in drafting these plans.
Such developments became more prevalent as a result of the Manchurian Incident and led
to the establishment of the Planning Agency in May 1937 and the Planning Bureau in
October 1937. The drafting of the general mobilization plan continued steadily. Then, theNational Mobilization Act was enacted in April 1938, and a legal basis for military
mobilization and national mobilization was established.
The repeated establishment of organizations in charge of general mobilization and thedevelopment of relevant laws had advanced, and the establishment of a Japanese total war
system was pushed forward. Of course, it is not possible to assert that such developments
directly led to the formation of a total war state. However, there was no doubt that, withkeen awareness regarding the possibility of future wars becoming total wars, the creationof a Japanese total war system began to make rapid progress.

Ⅲ Preparation for Total Wars under Taisho Democracy:
Background of its Limitations(1) Preparation for total war in the age of Taisho democracy (1910s–1920s)
Submarines, aircraft, tanks and toxic gas weapons appeared during WWI as a result of therapid development of modern military technology. In addition, while battlefields used to belimited to the ground and the surface of the sea, fighting now also extended into the air andunderseas. The border between the battlefront and the home front was graduallydisappearing because of the expansion of war areas and spaces. A war was not far fromdaily reality anymore for many people, and they were now exposed to the risk that their66

Total War and Japanliving space might turn into a battlefield any time.
The appearance of modern weapons with levels of killing power that did not exist in thepast was a major characteristic of World War I and led to immense damage. At the sametime, because the war turned into a total war, a social structure emerged in which a great
number of people were forced to participate in the conflict. This structure was the biggest
factor in causing unprecedented, disastrous harm. In order not to experience further suchdisasters, democracy became a major trend in the world after WWI.
The origins of democracy may be traced back to the age of the French Revolution, but
WWI was a moment when the importance of democracy was recognized on a worldwide
level. The idea spread that it was impossible to prevent a battle for supremacy by a groupof nations seeking supremacy unless people (demos) and power (kratia), which are theroots of democracy, were connected and activated worldwide.
On the other hand, democracy was reaffirmed as an essential factor for establishing thetotal war system. That is to say, after WWI, the capability of corresponding with total war
became essential for any political thought or system adopted.
Taking the concept of modernization, for example. As it became necessary to establish
and expand a system related to the development, production and deployment of the newweapons systems that appeared during WWI, the weight of a concept that regarded
technological modernization and the capability of producing large quantities of weapons
and ammunition increased. Therefore, a technology-centred system, i.e. a technocracy,
emerged which would become all-powerful. Furthermore, as total war resulted in enormous
human cost, this necessitated an increase in human mobilization to satisfy the demands ofthe battlefields and the home front.
The two issues of scienticism and human mobilization became the key issues in the
response to the emergence of total wars. The state’s role expanded to ensure technocracy.
In addition, the promotion of human mobilization relied to a high degree on bottom-up
public initiative rather than forced mobilization by the state. To that end, the raising ofinterest in technological innovation and the democratization of human mobilization had tobecome a goal. In a total war, Japan was originally inferior to Western countries both interms of capital and technology, so the mobilization of human resources was expected to beurgently required to reinforce national strength. For that reason, the framework of the total
war system was established as a system for human mobilization.
The motivation for driving (particularly) the mobilization of human resources for a total
war must be considered. That awareness of both internal and external factors must be able
to be shared by the public, and it is easy to achieve with the public’s interest in and support
for a response to total war. However, the thing is not that simple, so it is necessary tostrongly appeal to equality in the appearance of total war society in the process ofestablishing the total war system. In any case, the change of a state regime to a total war
system as an internal issue became urgent after WWI.
An important external factor was the necessity for Japan to gain supremacy in mainland
China and Southeast Asia as supply centres for resources, with the ultimate aim of reachingautarky, because a large quantity of resources would be consumed in a total war. The
orientation toward self-sufficiency—the desire to secure a physical base for the total war
system—would eventually lead to the wars against the other parts of Asia in the 1920s andthe 1930s.
(2) Total war systems and democracy
Did the power of democracy that became a global trend after WWI influence the67

ATSUSHI KOKETSU
establishment of a total war state or a total war society? This issue has attracted particularattention among researchers, including myself, and is now prominent in academic
discussions. As mentioned earlier, democracy is premised on the expression of the public
will in discussions about the realization of national, social or individual growth andhappiness.
The public collectively collaborates with the state by forming organizations such aspolitical parties and labour unions and strives to realize its goals. In fact, the participationof social organizations increased worldwide after WWI. In Japan, the party cabinet underTakashi Hara appeared in 1918. The Universal Manhood Suffrage Act enacted in 1925 wasbased on the same type of desire of the people to participate in political discussions. On theother hand, in Korea, which was under Japanese colonial rule, the March 1 Independence
Movement occurred in March 1919. Under such circumstances, democracy played an
important role in establishing the total war system.
A total war system cannot be realized by a small number of military leaders, bureaucrats
and politicians. Rather, it depends on the active involvement of the public and theemergence of an understanding among the people regarding the importance of a total war
system. The development of organizations such as political parties and labour unions which
acknowledge the importance of democracy for the establishment of a total war system, wasextremely important in nurturing the same understanding among the public. In brief, ideas
about democracy and ideas of total war emerged at almost the same moment.
At a glance, it may sound strange that thought regarding both democracy and total war
were related phenomena; they have contradictory aspects. We need to understand that apolitical system that is capable of responding to a war at any given time can avoid national
crisis in the age of total war. At the same time, a total war system is implemented andestablished in various forms as a national strategy for stabilizing the domestic politicalorder under the excuse of national crisis prevention and crisis management.
In other words, large numbers of troops should be kept ready at all times, including
peacetime. Even in peacetime, the dissemination of the consciousness of national defence
and of nationalism were necessary to create a state which is always ready to go to war. The
distinction between wartime and peacetime disappears by converting peacetime into
wartime and vice versa.

Ⅳ Conclusion: Total War Systems and Pluralistic Federation of Japan(1) Fascism and total war systems
Before concluding this article, I would like to touch on the correlation between fascist
systems and total war systems.
According to textbooks, the reasons for the emergence of fascism in Europe after WWI
were the impasse of the capitalist system and the appearance of questions andcontradictions regarding the capitalist system revealed by the emergence of a socialist
country, the Soviet Union. Those problems, coupled with internal contradictions, caused
domestic conflicts in many countries. This is why fascist movements and parties, which
advocated the necessity of overcoming the contradictions and uniting nations across thelines of races and social classes, appeared one after another.
In 1922, the emergence of a fascist regime in Italy after the March on Rome by Benito
Mussolini (1883–1945) became a turning point. Francisco Franco y Bahamonde (1892–

68

Total War and Japan1975) of Spain, Antonio Salazar (1889–1970) of Portugal and Adolf Hitler (1889–1945)
then succeeded in establishing fascist systems in their countries. In addition, fascist parties
and fascists, such as the Action Française (French Royalists) in France and Oswald Mosley(1896–1980) in the United Kingdom, were influential in Western countries, although theyfailed to take the reins of power.
The concept of fascism is summarized in a famous speech given by Mussolini on October
28, 1925. He said, “Everything shall be under the control of the state. No one shall beoutside the state nor oppose the state.” (Tutto nello Stato, niente al di fuori dello Stato,
nulla contro lo Stato.) “Everything shall be under the control of the state” meant that thestate came ahead of the importance of social classes and races and that a state in which all
people were homogenized under state power was the ultimate objective.
Such ideology gradually started to appear in Asia, particularly in Japan. Japanese fascism
was formed, through the absolutism of the emperor system, as a vehicle to integrate all thepeople on a mental and a constitutional level.6
Fascism in Germany and Italy, however, was defined as “bottom-up fascism” (in thewords of Masao Maruyama). This was because, particularly in the case of Germany, thefascist (Nazi) party was the fruit of a subjective movement of the people that grasped
power through legal procedures, based on an election. With regards to Japan, the theory
that denies the establishment of fascism in that country has emerged because Japanesefascism was not established through legal procedures as in the case of Germany. The
controversy over Japanese fascism has been discussed from various angles based on thecontradictory opinions of Marxists and anti-Marxists.
To solve the seeming contradictions with regards to Japan, the theory of total war has tobe taken into consideration. The above-mentioned speech by Mussolini may be understoodas a suggestion of a total war system, not just a fascist system, in that he appealed to theestablishment of a stable and robust political community across different social classes andraces. In that context, socialist and communist systems can also be understood as types of
total war systems because they are dictatorial systems in which there is only one class.7
After all, where a political system focuses on the mobilization and unity of the people,
regardless of whether it is a top-down iron hand or a bottom-up approach, it may be
categorized as a “total war system.” It would be important to point out the risks andproblems of such systems by actively questioning their significance.
It is widely-known that Mussolini was an activist from the Italian Socialist Party andstrongly influenced by Marxism and that he was committed to the ideas of Georges Sorel(1874–1922), philosopher of revolutionary Syndicalism. In addition, the political style of
Nazism owed much to the propaganda practices of Soviet socialism and the Communist
party; Hanna Arendt (1906–1975) pointed out the similarity between Nazism and Stalinismand maintained that Italian Fascism, German Nazism and Soviet Stalinism were “twin6 Eguchi, Nippon Fascism.
7 Concerning the connection between the total war system and the fascism system, in a recent study by

Arakawa, Senjikeizaitaisei and Koketsu, Soryokusen is discussed, and Arakawa points out that “the purport ofAtsushi Kouketsu is that the establishment of the total war system is a factor of changing the prewar social
system into fascism and that the entire process of establishing the total war system is thus called Japanesefascism” (a nationalism movement with an irrational system of thought) (p. 16, note 4). He offers the critique that
“Kouketsu moves his discussion forward on the premise that fascism is irrational” (p. 16, note 8). It is true that I
discussed the premise that the Japanese total war system was basically Japanese fascism in my book published 30
years ago. Although I emphasized the unity of relation between the two systems in my book, I did not explore
their interrelation sufficiently. I would now argue that the course toward the establishment of the total war system
was a background that promoted the formation of Japanese fascism from a point of view of coordination andintegration of democracy and fascism.

69

ATSUSHI KOKETSU
totalitarianism[s],”8 meaning that the three systems were the same nature.
Although we can point out a number of issues in comparative discussions, the point here
is a comparative discussion of fascism and the total war system. To deliberate on that issue,
we need to know: What is the support base of the total war system? There are two reasonsfor asking that question.
The first is that political systems that can be regarded as total war systems have beenborn since World War II (WWII). A number of military and authoritarian regimes can serveas examples, such as those of Park Chung-hee (1917–1979) in South Korea and Jiang Jieshi(1887–1975) in Taiwan in the 1950s; other instances include South American military
regimes, such as those of Juan Domingo Peron (1895–1974) and Augusto Pinochet (1915–
2006). While these regimes stood for domestic democratization through physical violence,
they aggressively pushed forward policies for modernization at the national level. This is apolitical system called developmental dictatorship.
These regimes may be called modern fascism. They advanced policies that gave national
development the first priority at high costs by hiding the demands for domestic democracy
and contradictions based on the excessive supremacy of nationalism and succeeded inachieving a certain degree of economic development and forming a large middle class, i.e.
a white-collar class. The middle class formed in that process became the support base of
the total war system.
Although there is no need to provide examples from those countries, the total war system
in pre-war Japan and the total war system in the post-war reform period and the economic
reconstruction period no doubt had in common their promotion of economic development.
As a result, the large middle class emerging in post-war Japan, not comparable to that of
pre-war times, was formed, and it was said that “all Japanese belong to the middle class.”
This has inevitably created a structure in which the people have a middle-class mentality
and are indifferent to their own social class or position. This is actually what the total war
system intends.
The second issue to be challenged is directly and indirectly related to the abovementioned point. Given the use of a kind of propaganda in which a total war system
functions to promote equalization and homogenization by neutralizing differences anddisparities, each individual who belongs to the society naturally sharply spurs the people’s
consciousness. A national crisis, such as a war, is tactfully termed a public crisis, and apolitical system is established in which the people are driven into the war for the purposeof WHAT? When the people are mobilized for a common national issue, such as a war, in
an integrated manner, the differences between social classes and positions are dissolved,
irrespective of whether the issue at stake is domestic or international.
For example, differences in origins and backgrounds are dissolved when persons aredrafted into the army and sent to the battlefield. This was certainly evident in the army life,
but the Japanese people who were put into the wartime regime were converted into
fictitious soldiers while the whole country was turned into a fictitious battlefield. In
summary, the total war system can be understood as a nationalism-oriented society that
disables the differences between individuals and converts them into objects that constitutethe state in the name of victory in war and economic development.
(2) Today’s research issues regarding total war systems
What are the important topics of research on total war systems today? I believe that at least
8 See Arendt(1951).

70

Total War and Japanthe following two issues are relevant.
The first issue is that, if there is any possibility that the modern total war system will
become more dominant, it is necessary to consider abolishing modern democracy in orderto prevent this from happening. Although democracy is an important concept and systemthat relativizes existing power, it is often used as a tool for mobilizing the public. The
United States has employed a method of waging consecutive wars in the name of saving
democracy. This American pattern gives the impression that democracy has become
nothing but a tool for mobilizing the public.
The second issue is to overcome the false egalitarianism that is said to be created by the
total war system, although its merits and demerits have already been discussed with regard
to the study of total war systems. By way of this false sense of egalitarianism, the people’s
consciousness is unified. This tendency is spreading in our society, where a variety ofsocial contradictions are hidden under false egalitarianism and incorporated into the total
war system.
On the other hand, the reality of a society under the total war system is that the younger
generation in Japan, due to an underlying sense of stagnation in society and the existenceof many people who are effectively ousted from society. In that sense, we have to accept
subjectively that the total war society is a tool for hiding a variety of contradictions andsocial problems.
We should not secure our position by first taking a free ride on goals presented by thestate. Rather, each of us has to answer the question of how much space we can secure in the
future for being independent from the state, maintaining autonomy and acting freely.
Unless we keep asking this question, we have no choice but to be incorporated into thetotal war system or total war society, characterized by mobilization, control andmanagement.
Total war systems may be differentiated by establishing categories, such as the European
total war system or the Japanese/German total war system. However, what is important
here is to take measures for effectively utilizing democracy when, even in the case of ademocratic state, it is intended to establish a total war system. In the case of Japan, theslogan of all nations and partial revision of the power structure were enforced whenestablishing the total war system.
I insist on this point because I would like to call attention to the fact that the post-war
total war system in Japan has succeeded in mobilizing the people through the slogan“production first” with the aim of economic development based on democracy, and thishigh economic growth was achieved, a characteristic of recent total war systems.
References
Arakawa, K. ed., Senjikeizaitaisei no kousou to Tenkai (Iwanami Shoten, 2011).
Arendt, H., The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, 1951).
Atsushi, K., Nihon Rikugun no Souryokusen Seisaku (Daigaku Kyoiku Shuppan,1999).
Berghahn, V., Militarismus: Die Geschichte einer internationalen Debatte,1861-1979 (Hamburg:
Berg,1986).
Eguchi, K. ed., ‘Nippon Fascism’ Ron (Azekurashobo, 1977).
Fujiwara, A., Nihon Gunjishi (Nihonhyouronsha, 1987 first published by Toyoukeizai shinpousha 1961).
Harold, S., Japanese Militarism:Past and Present (Chicago:Nelson Hall,1975).
Hideo, K., Teikoku Nihon to Souryokusen Taisei (Yoshikawa Kobunkan,2004).
Hirama, Y., Daiichiji Sekaitaisent to Nihonkaigun (Keiougijujudaigaku Shuppan,1989).
Huntington, S., The Soldier and the States: The Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations

71

ATSUSHI KOKETSU(Cambridge.Mass:Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1957).
Kato, Y., Mosakusuru1930nendai: Nichibei Kankei to Rikugun Chuukensou (Yamakawa Shuppansha,1993).
Koketsu, A., Kindainihon no Seigun Kankei: Gunjinseijika Tanaka Gichi no Kiseki (Daigaku
Kyouikusha,1987).
Koketsu, A., Soryokusen Taisei Kenkyu: Nippon Rikugun no Kokkasodoin Koso” (Shakaihyouronsha 2010,
first published by Sanishi Shobo,1981).
Koketsu, A., Kindai Nihon Seigunkankei no Kenkyu (Iwanami Soten,2005. Chinese version is published by
ChuugokSshakaikagaku Bnken Shuppan 2012).
Koketsu, A., Tanaka Giichi: Souryokusenkokka no Sendousha (Fuyou Shobo,2009 Chinese version is
published by Chuugoku Shakaikagaku Bunkenshuppan 2017).
Koketsu, A., Shinryaku Sensou to Souryokusen (Shakaihyouronsha,2011).
Koyama, H., Nihon Gunjikougyou no Shitekibunseki (Ochanomizu Shobo,1972).
Kurosawa, F., Taisenkanki no Nihon Rikugun (Misuzu Shobo,2000)
Maxon, Y., Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil Militart Rivarl 1930-1945” (Wesport.
Conn.: Grenwood Press,1973).
Minatogawa, M., Souryokusen no nakano Nihonseiji (Yoshikawa Koubunkan,2017).
Mitani, T., Kindai Nihon no Sensou to Seiji” (Iwanami Shoten,1997).
Miyake, M., Seigunkankei Kenkyu (Ashi Shobo,2001).
Miyake, M., ed., Kenshou: Taiheiyou-sennso to sonosenryaku (Chuo Koronsha,2013).
Smethurst, R., A Social Basis for Prewar Japanese Militarism: An Army and Rural Community (Berkeley:
University of California Press,1974).
Takemura, T., Dokusen to Heiki Seisan (Keisoushobo,1971).
Terada, Y., Nihon Souryokusen no Kenkyu” (Nihon Denki Tushin Shuppan,1942).
Tokutomi, I., Koshaku Yamagata Aritomo Den, Yamagata Aritomo Memorial Project Association, Vol. 1/2(Hara Shobo, 1969).
Tsuchiya, T., Kokka Soryokusen (Daiyamonndosha,1943).
Tsunoda, J., Kazushige Ugaki, Vol.1 (Misuzu Shobo, 1970).
Tsunoda, J., Seiji to Gunji (Koufuu Shuppansha,1987)
Washio, Y., Inukai Bokudo Den, Vol.2/3 (Hara Shobo, 1968).
Watanabe, Y., Gunshuku: Rondonjouyaku to Nihonkaigun (Beppu-Shuppan,1989).

72

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月） 73 － 91 頁

論説

オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶―「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」論の視点から―
津田 博司＊

Historiography on Australian Nationalism and the Commemorationof the World Wars in the Context of the ‘British World’
By HIROSHI TSUDA

Anzac Day, which began as a memorial to the First World War’s Gallipoli campaign, is asymbolic occasion in Australia during which the nation state commemorates its losses allwars since. This essay examines the transformation of Australian nationalism from theinterwar period through to the 1970s by tracing the national integration through war
memory in the context of the ‘British world’: Australians’ perceptions of the imperial
wars in which they participated and of their own national history have been defined bytheir country’s identity as a former British dominion. The nationalist historiography that
arose following the Second World War encouraged a trend to emphasise a dichotomy
between Australian nationalism and British imperialism. In this conceptualisation, theexperiences of the two World Wars are the moment at which Australia’s identity
separated from that of the Empire. The analysis on Anzac Day, however, suggests thatthe imperial identity generated within the ‘community of culture’ prevailed even after
the Second World War. The decline of traditional British solidarity coincided with
Australia’s gradual decolonisation and the subsequent self-examination that occurred
during the ‘new nationalism’ of the 1960s–70s. The emergence of a nationalist historical
discourse and the reinterpretation of war narratives reflected this reformation of national
identity, which was not as self-evident as supposed in nationalist historiography.

１ はじめにオーストラリアでは、第 1 次世界大戦の 100 周年にあたって、数多くの記念事業が行われている。イギリス帝国の一員として大戦を戦ったオーストラリアは、当時の総人口約500 万人のうち、従軍対象となる年代の男性の 38.7％にあたる約 42 万人を志願兵として動員し、約6万人の戦死者を出すに至った 1）。21世紀の現在においてもなお、大戦に対する高い社会的関心が維持されている現状からは、オーストラリアが払った犠牲の大きさがうか＊

筑波大学人文社会系・助教（Assistant Professor, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University ofTsukuba）

1） Scott［1941］p. 874.

73

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）がえる。とりわけ 1915 年のガリポリ上陸作戦に由来するアンザック・デイ（Anzac Day、
4 月 25 日）は、オーストラリアにとって最も重要な記念日として、第 1 次世界大戦以降の戦争における戦没者追悼の場となっている。オスマン帝国領内のダーダネルス海峡の攻略を目指したガリポリ上陸作戦は、イギリス帝国を中心とする連合国軍に多大な被害を出しながら（オーストラリア兵士の戦死者は約 8,000 人）、目的を果たすことなく撤退に終わったものの、この作 戦 で 初めて実 戦に 投 入され たアン ザック軍 団（Australian and New
Zealand Army Corps、略称 ANZAC）の勇敢な戦いぶりから、オーストラリアにとっての世
界大戦の記憶の中核をなす経験となった。公式の従軍記者としてガリポリ上陸作戦から西部戦線まで同行し、大戦間期に編纂された公式戦史の総責任者を務めたチャールズ・ビー
ンは、「現実的な意味で、オーストラリアの国民意識が生まれたのは1915年4月25日であった」という表現を用いて、第 1 次世界大戦を国民国家としての誕生と結びつける歴史観を普及させることになった 2）。アンザック・デイは大戦間期にその伝統を確立し、戦没者に捧げる礼拝と生還した兵士を称えるパレードを中心とする式典が、現在まで引き継がれている。
遠い異国での敗戦の記憶がナショナル・アイデンティティの象徴として顕彰され、アンザック神話と呼ばれる言説がその後の戦争経験を包摂しつつ、国民統合に機能し続けている事実に対して、歴史家の解釈は分かれている。ケン・イングリスは、第 1 次世界大戦以降に大量に建設された戦争記念碑の分析を通して、世俗的な「市民宗教」としてのアンザック神話の役割を指摘している。イングリスによれば、戦争の記憶は既存の宗教の代替として、共同体を結びつける役割を果たしており、アンザック神話は帝国主義や多文化主
義といった各時代の統合原理に応じて文脈を読み替えられながら、ナショナリズムの核として存続した 3）。イングリスの議論を裏づける近年の傾向として、第 1 次・第 2 次世界大戦の記憶を有する世代が減少する一方で、戦争を直接経験していない人々の間でアンザッ
ク・デイに代表される伝統への関心が高まっており、その流れと軌を一にして、帝国主義時代に周縁化されてきた先住民などのマイノリティによる戦争貢献に関する言説が増加している現状がある。バックパッカーによる戦跡訪問などを分析したブルース・スケーツは、
若年層や非イギリス系マイノリティがアンザック神話との関わりを通じて、国民としての帰属意識を見出す過程を明らかにしているが、それぞれジェンダー史と先住民史の代表的研究者であるマリリン・レイクとヘンリー・レイノルズは、こうした大戦間期から受け継がれてきた伝統への回帰を、「オーストラリア史の軍国主義化」として批判する著作を発
2） Bean［1941］p. 910.
3） Inglis［2008］pp. 433-445.

74オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）

表している 4）。
オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズムの性質をめぐっては、帝国主義戦争の経験をどのように評価するかが論点となっている。独自の外交権を有さず、イギリス本国による意志決定に追従することになったオーストラリアは、激しい愛国心によって参戦に応じた。
初期の戦時内閣を率いた首相アンドリュー・フィッシャーは、「最悪の事態が起こったな
らば、オーストラリア人は母国（mother country）を守るため、その最後の 1 人、最後の 1
シリングまで、母国の側に立って戦うだろう」という言葉を残している 5）。ここでの「母国」
はオーストラリアではなく、イギリス本国を指すものとして一般的に用いられていた表現
であり、それ自体が自国と帝国を不可分とするアイデンティティを象徴するものである。
しかし、植民地時代と思考の枠組みを異にする歴史家にとって、こうした自意識は相対化の対象となる。従軍した兵士の手記を渉猟したビル・ガメージは、当初は帝国主義戦争に熱狂した若者たちが、悲惨な戦争経験によって幻滅する様子を描き出している。オース
トラリアがイギリスという「他者」のために戦争を強いられたとする大戦像は、ガメージが監修した映画『ガリポリ』（1981 年制作）を通じて、単なる学術研究を超えた影響力を得た。ガメージが「壊れた日々」と形容する大戦の経験は、「きわめてナショナリスティッ
クな感情への関心を呼び起こし」、独自のナショナリズムの覚醒は「不可避的にオースト
ラリア人の帝国への執着を弱めた」とされる 6）。本稿の課題はこうした評価と史実との整合性を検証することにあるが、議論の出発点として注目すべきなのは、ガメージの歴史観
がメディアを介して流通する 1970 年代までには、かつてオーストラリア人を支えていた帝国的な帰属意識がもはや共有しえない過去として位置づけられ、歴史叙述における「脱植民地化」と形容できるような、自国のナショナリズムと帝国主義を差異化しようとする動向が確認できる点である。
フィッシャーのようなイギリスからの移民とその子孫、すなわち広義の「イギリス人」
が人口の大半を占めていた第 1 次世界大戦当時において、帝国規模の総力戦をオーストラ
リアがともに戦うことは自明の選択であった。そこには、現在の国民国家を基準とすれば、複数の国家を横断するようなアイデンティティの存在が見てとれる。しかし同時に、多大な犠牲を払ったオーストラリアは、戦争貢献の対価として主権の拡大を要求することになり、植民地としてのナショナリズムは新たな段階を迎えた。第 1 次世界大戦期のオースト
ラリアとイギリス本国との関係を論じたエリック・アンドリュースは、パリ講和会議での4） Scates［2006］; Lake and Reynolds［2010］.
5） Argus, 3 August 1914.
6） Gammage［1974］p. 277.

75

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

代表権や太平洋地域の旧ドイツ領の処遇などで生じた両国の齟齬を強調し、第 2 次世界大戦を経て帝国的な紐帯は消滅したとしている 7）。ガメージとも共通するナショナリズムと
帝国主義という対立軸は、イギリス帝国のコモンウェルスへの再編やその後の脱植民地化の流れを明解に説明する反面で、歴史家自身が生きた時代における国民国家の境界を過去に投影し、広義の「イギリス人」から狭義の「オーストラリア人」への変容を所与のものとして図式化する危険性をはらんでいる。
オーストラリアにおける「ナショナリズム」はその本質として、帝国的あるいは脱帝国的な二面性を内包するものであった。後述するように、近年のイギリス帝国史研究において「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」として形容される、かつてイギリス帝国およびコモンウェ
ルスを構成した諸国家においては、君主制や「自由」の概念を重視する民主主義といった
イギリス的共通文化が長期にわたる影響を及ぼしており、その盛衰が研究上の関心を集めている。
「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」論という視点を採用した結果、帝国主義時代の重要性を過度に強調することは避けなければならないが、第 1 次世界大戦当時のオーストラ
リア人と現在の国民国家を前提とする歴史家にとっての「ナショナリズム」の内実の違いを明らかにするためには、あえて広義の「イギリス史」である帝国主義時代までさかのぼった上で、その後の脱植民地化に伴うアイデンティティの変容を追跡する必要があるだろう。
本稿は、オーストラリア史研究における脱イギリス帝国的な歴史観の来歴とそこから生じる研究上の問題点を確認した上で、戦争の記憶の次元においてオーストラリアのナショ
ナリズムがたどった変遷を検証する。換言すれば、イギリス帝国およびコモンウェルスへの帰属意識に支えられたアイデンティティが最終的に機能不全に陥り、戦争の記憶が単一の国民国家の境界のなかで語られるようになったこと自体は疑いないとして、それはいつ、どのような過程を経た結果なのかという問いについて、大戦間期から 1970 年代にかけてのアンザック・デイを中心に考察したい。

２ オーストラリアにおける自国史の構築とイギリス帝国
イギリスの植民地であったオーストラリアにおいては、19 世紀末の「グレーター・ブリ
テン」論に端を発するイギリス帝国史的な枠組み、すなわち本国と海外植民地を含めた広義の「イギリス」のなかに自国を位置づける歴史叙述が、長らく支配的であった。第 1 次世界大戦中の 1916 年に出版された『オーストラリア小史』において、メルボルン大学教授のアーネスト・スコットは、ガリポリ上陸作戦に代表されるオーストラリアの戦争貢献

7） Andrews［1993］pp. 222-225.

76

オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）を称えた上で、オーストラリア人にとってイギリス史が「自らの」歴史であり、オースト
ラリアの国土は、イギリスを起源とする人種の優秀性を発揮するための場であると述べている 8）。第1次世界大戦の公式戦史の編纂にも関わることになるスコットの著作は、オース
トラリア史に関する教科書の先駆として広く受け入れられ、1939 年に彼が死去した後も改訂を加えられながら、1950 年まで版を重ねた。
このスコットを師とするアデレード大学教授のキース・ハンコックは、1930 年の著作によって、オーストラリア史についての社会的認知をさらに高めたことで知られる。ハンコックは、植民地時代から続いてきたオーストラリア人の自意識の特徴を、20 世紀初頭の首相アルフレッド・ディーキンが残した「自立したオーストラリアのイギリス人（independent Australian Britons）」という言葉に求め、オーストラリアにおけるナショナリ
ズムが白豪主義的な人種意識を介して、帝国主義的な愛国心と結びついていると論じている9）。スコットはイギリスからの移民でありながら、オーストラリアにおける歴史学の礎を築いた人物であり、ハンコックはオーストラリア生まれでありながら、研究生活の多くをイギリスで送っているという歴史家自身の出自からも、当時における「イギリス人」と「オーストラリア人」、あるいは「イギリス史」と「オーストラリア史」の境界の曖昧さがうかがえるだろう。
こうした帝国史的な伝統に対して、第 2 次世界大戦後から現在にかけて、よりオースト
ラリアそのものに特化した「自国史」を希求する動向も続いてきた。1962 年から 1987 年に発表した叢書を通じてオーストラリア史研究の第一人者となったマニング・クラークは、
1945 年にメルボルン大学で当時異例であったオーストラリア史の講座を担当することになった経験を、次のように述懐している。
「第 2 次世界大戦は、我々が何者であるかという問いに対して、多くのオーストラリア人の意識を変えた…オーストラリア人は、より
オーストラリアを中心に置くようになりつつあった。我々の歴史はイギリス植民地史の一部ではない…我々はイングランドやアイルランド、スコットランド、ヨーロッパの歴史地
10）
図は知っていたが、オーストラリアの歴史地図はほとんど空白であった」。クラークの脱帝国史的な問題意識は、「ブリティッシュネス」と形容されるイギリスとの共通性ではなく、オーストラリアの独自性を強調するナショナリスト史観の流れを生むことになる。
その典型例であるラッセル・ウォードの『オーストラリアの伝説』は、文学作品などのフォークロア的な伝承を論拠として、元流刑囚を起源とする階級的均質性やブッシュの開8） Scott［1916］p. 336.
9） Hancock［1930］pp. 66-68.
10）Clark［1990］p. 159.

77

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

拓で培われた同志的連帯感にオーストラリア人の「個性」を求め、その個性は第 1 次・第
2 次世界大戦を戦った兵士にまで受け継がれていると結論づけた 11）。ウォードや前述のガメージは、オーストラリア国立大学でクラークの指導を受けた経歴があり、帝国への帰属意識と自国のナショナリズムを対比的にとらえる大戦像は、イギリス帝国史からの脱却と自国史の構築を志向する長期的な潮流の反映としてとらえられる。メルボルン大学でアーネスト・スコットの名を冠した教授職を継承したスチュアート・マッキンタイアは、1990
年代末の時点でのオーストラリア史研究の整理として、スコットのような初期の歴史家が所与のものとしていた帝国的次元への関心が失われ、むしろイギリス帝国への言及が忌避されるような傾向があると指摘している 12）。
オーストラリアにおいて国民国家を単位とする歴史叙述が台頭する一方で、近年のイギ
リス帝国史研究の分野においては、いわゆる一国史観に対する批判が高まっている。その嚆矢となったのは、ジェントルマン資本主義論の提唱者であるアントニー・ホプキンズによる問題提起であった。ホプキンズは、旧ドミニオン諸国におけるナショナル・アイデンティティの高まりの結果として、それぞれの国家の国内史とかつて隆盛を極めた帝国史の知見が乖離してしまった弊害を批判し、二つの研究領域を改めて接合する必要性を説いた 13）。こうした議論の延長として、2000 年代以降のイギリス帝国史研究では、現在のグ
ローバル化の先行事例としてイギリス帝国全体をとらえなおす「グローバル」な方向性、
本国および海外植民地における国境を越えた関係性に着目する「トランスナショナル」な
方向性など、複数の国家を横断する歴史叙述が主流となっている 14）。とりわけ後者の方向性においては、過去の帝国主義的な歴史観を相対化しつつも、イギリス的な政治制度や共通文化を介して結びついていた広大な領域を「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」として再解釈することによって、各地域における経験の多様性を描きなおす試みが進んでいる。こう
した研究史の文脈において、オーストラリアはまさに「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」論の中核となりうる位置を占める反面で、脱一国史的な帝国史への回帰とナショナリスト史観との衝突が避けられない。オーストラリア国立大学でマニング・クラークの名を冠した教授職を継承したアン・カーソイズが分析したように、オーストラリアの歴史家は先住民や

11） Ward［1958］pp. 213-218.
12）MacIntyre［1999］pp. 163-164.
13）Hopkins［1999］pp. 215-216.
14）前者の方向性の例としては、ジョン・ダーウィンによる一連の著作 Darwin［2009］; Darwin［2012］が挙げられる。後者の方向性については、論者によって解釈が多様であり、必ずしもその内実に統一性があるわけではないものの、2002 年以降に各国の研究者によって開催されてきた国際会議の成果として、
Bridge and Fedorowich［2003］; Buckner and Francis［2005］; Darian-Smith et al.［2007］がある。

78

オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）

多文化主義といった独自の研究対象を開拓し、自国を中心に置いた「オーストラリア史」を確立するという課題を達成するや否や、研究上の転回を遂げた外国の「イギリス史」研究者との対話を迫られるジレンマを抱えることになったのである 15）。
アンザック神話の文脈で言えば、帝国主義戦争を戦った当時のオーストラリア人の認識と脱植民地化後の国民国家を前提とした歴史叙述との間には、大きな落差が存在する。さらに世界大戦という主題の性格上、戦没者追悼のような社会文化史的な次元と安全保障政策のような政治外交史的な次元での評価を、整合的に集約する手法が求められる。オーストラリア外交史の専門家であるネヴィル・メイニーは、イギリス帝国への依存が自国の成熟を妨げたというナショナリスト史観の前提（「抑圧された（thwarted）ナショナリズム」）に反論した上で、オーストラリアにとっての帝国が有した「文化の共同体」と「利害の共同体」という二つの性格に注目している 16）。すなわち、広義の「イギリス人」としての自意識を支えた背景として、人種意識や歴史といった種々の共通文化の共有と、政治・経
済・軍事を横断する権益の共有という、二つの次元の要素が指摘できる。第 1 次・第 2 次世界大戦期には、白豪主義に代表されるイギリス本国との文化的連帯感が継続する一方で、太平洋地域の防衛をめぐる国益の不一致が表面化する状況が生じており、位相を異にする複数の「共同体」の方向性を峻別しながら、全体としての帰結を示すことが課題となる。
本稿での議論が示すように、オーストラリアが独自のナショナル・アイデンティティを獲得した過程は単線的ではなく、国民国家と帝国の二項対立的な図式ではとらえられない。
メイニーの議論を引き継いだスチュアート・ウォードやジェームズ・カランによる脱植民地化についての分析によれば、イギリス側がヨーロッパ回帰へ向かう1960年代までのオーストラリアの政策決定者や世論においては、長らく続いてきた帝国的な自己規定が支配的であって、帝国の終焉はむしろ深刻なアイデンティティの危機を伴ったとされている 17）。
以下では、こうした先行研究による知見をふまえた上で、大戦間期から 1970 年代にかけてのアンザック・デイを概観し、オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズムの構造転換を跡づける。

３ アンザック・デイに表れるナショナル・アイデンティティ（1）第 1 次・第 2 次世界大戦と「文化の共同体」
アンザック・デイにおける戦没者追悼の主要な担い手となったのは、1916 年に結成さ15）Curthoys［2003］pp. 70-89.
16）Meaney［2001］.
17）Ward［2001］, Curran and Ward［2010］.

79

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

れたオーストラリア海陸帰還兵士帝国連盟（Returned Sailors’and Soldiers’Imperial League
of Australia、以下 RSL）であった 18）。オーストラリアでは大戦中から在郷軍人会の一元化が進み、帰還兵士は各地での戦争記念碑の建設やパレードなどを主導して、現在に至るまで大きな発言権を有してきた。アンザック兵士の優れた身体能力と同志愛をオーストラリア人の理想像として称賛したビーンは、第 1 次（さらには第 2 次）世界大戦の帰還兵士
を指して、「ほぼ純粋なイギリスの血統、すなわちイングランド人、アイルランド人、ス
コットランド人、ウェールズ人で成り立っており、ブリテン諸島のようにお互いが分離しているのではなく、混ざり合っている」と述べている 19）。ここでは、当時の白豪主義を支えた人種意識とともに、その人種が（例えば「イングランド」ではなく）「イギリス」を単位として語られている。前述の「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」論を援用するならば、オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズムの言説の基盤は、ブリテン諸島内の地域性が捨象された「ブリティッシュネス」の概念にあったことがうかがえる。こうした人種意識は戦争の記憶と結びつきながら、オーストラリアおよびイギリス帝国についての認識を形成することになる。
例えば、大戦中の戦争貢献に謝意を示すことを目的として、1920 年にイギリス王太子
エドワード（のちのエドワード 8 世）がオーストラリアを訪れた際、フィッシャーの後継として戦時内閣を率いた首相ビリー・ヒューズは、次のような歓迎の演説を残している 20）。
「今回の戦争が起こったとき、オーストラリアはまだ産着を着た状態でした。今日のオーストラリアは、その偉大さを意識した国民国家です。その国民はオーストラリア人であることを誇りとし、イギリス帝国に属することを誇りとしています…我々はあなたを、我が人種および帝国の親善大使として歓迎します」。大戦を経た国民国家としての成熟は、人
種意識や王族への忠誠心を媒介として、旧来の帝国への帰属意識と矛盾なく共存している。ヒューズによれば、イギリス帝国は「諸国家がそれぞれの問題をそれぞれの方法で管理する、自由国家の集合」であって、「地球の最果てまで広がりながら、我々全員が狭い
ブリテン諸島の住人であるかのように」結びついていた。ヒューズは自国の権益をめぐって、パリ講和会議でしばしばイギリス首相デヴィッド・ロイド＝ジョージと対立したこと

18）空 軍 の 設 立 に とも な っ て、1940 年 に オ ー スト ラリア 海 陸 空 帰 還 兵 士 帝 国 連 盟（Returned Sailors’,
Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Imperial League of Australia）へ改称。1965 年にオーストラリア帰還兵士連盟（Returned
Services League of Australia）へ改称されるまで、「帝国」を冠した象徴的な団体名が維持された。団体の略称としては、簡略化された RSL を用いることが結成当初からの慣例であったことから、本稿でもそれに倣って表記する。
19）Bean［1940］p. 3.
20）Sydney Morning Herald, 28 May 1920.

80

オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）

で知られるが、オーストラリアがそうした主張を行いうる前提には、イギリス本国との対等かつ親密な関係が想定されていたのである。
大戦間期におけるイギリス帝国のコモンウェルスへの再編は、オーストラリアを始めとするドミニオンへの権限委譲（ナショナリスト史観的に形容すれば、植民地的従属からの脱却）によってもたらされたが、同時代人はこうした変容をどのように受け止めたのだろうか。前年の帝国会議によってドミニオンが理念上、イギリス本国と対等な主権を有するものと定められた 1927 年には、キャンベラでの連邦議会開設にあたって、ヨーク公アルバート（のちのジョージ6世）
がオーストラリアを訪れている。メルボルン滞在中にアンザッ
ク・デイの追悼式典に参加したヨーク公は、つめかけた群集に対して次のように呼びかけた。
「オーストラリア連邦が成立した当時、イギリス帝国は、支配的なイギリス本国とほぼそれに従属する人々で構成されていました。それ以降イギリス帝国は進化の過程を経て、対等な立場で、それぞれが自治権と主権を有し、王冠への忠誠と共通の市民権で結びつけられた国家による、コモンウェルスが存在するに至りました。私たちは、私たちが自由であるがゆえに結びついています。私たちの自由の意識こそが、私たちを一つにしているのです」21）。ここでは、過去の従属関係が反省されつつも、イギリス的民主主義に基づく「自由のコモンウェルス」という論理によって、むしろオーストラリアと帝国の調和が強調されている。
ヨーク公の言説が共有された空間そのものが帝国主義的な色彩の強いものであったことも、注目に値する。この日の式典の様子を撮影した写真（図 1）からは、左手に白色の記念碑の存在が確認できる。これはロンドンにおける戦争記念日の式典の場であった戦没者記念碑（図 2）を模したレプリカで、当時のメルボルンでの式典の際に毎年設置されていたものである。つまり、オーストラリアの人々は、帝国の首都での式典の様式を複製することを通して、戦争の記憶を顕彰していた。ヨーク公とともに式典に参加した第 1 次世界大戦の英雄ジョン・モナシュ中将によれば、アンザックの経験は「オーストラリアの人々をたちまちに国民として一体化させ、全世界に対して、我々［オーストラリア人］がその22）
祖先［イギリス］に不釣り合いな存在ではないことを証明した」。大戦間期のアンザック・

デイにおいては、大戦の経験によってナショナリズムの核とドミニオンとしての主権拡大がもたらされたとされるものの、そこに帝国からの離反に向かうような意識の萌芽は見出せない。イギリス帝国はウェストミンスター憲章に結実する国制上の変革を経験したにもかかわらず（あるいは、ヨーク公の言説にしたがえば、経験した「からこそ」）、「ブリ21）Argus, 27 April 1927.
22）Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April 1927.

81

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

図
図
1（上図）
図 1（上図）1（上図）
1927
1927 年のメルボルンにおけるアンザック・デイの式典
年のメルボルンにおけるアンザック・デイの式典
1927年のメルボルンにおけるアンザック・デイの
出典：
出典：Sydney
Sydney Morning
Morning Herald
Herald,, 27
27 April
April 1927
1927

式典

Morning Herald, 27 April 1927
出典：Sydney
図
図 2（下図）2（下図）
1920
1920 年のロンドンにおける戦没者記念碑の除幕式
年のロンドンにおける戦没者記念碑の除幕式

図 2（下図）出典：Australian
出典：Australian War
War Memorial
Memorial H12221
H12221

1920 年のロンドンにおける戦没者記念碑の除幕式（※図
11 が長細い図版のため、視認しやすいように横向きに割付）（※図
が長細い図版のため、視認しやすいように横向きに割付）
出典：Australian
War Memorial H12221

ティッシュ・ワールド」を横断するアイデンティティを維持することに成功した。別の表
1

現をすれば、政治外交史上の画期であるコモンウェルスへの再編は、「文化の共同体」に基づくオーストラリアの帝国的なナショナリズムを根本的に変えるには至らなかったと考えられる。
一方で第 2 次世界大戦の勃発によって、オーストラリアを取り巻く「利害の共同体」は動揺を迎えた。1942 年のシンガポール陥落が示すように、イギリス帝国の枠組みでの太平洋地域の防衛はもはや不可能であり、オーストラリアは戦後の ANZUS 条約が示すように、アメリカとの同盟へと傾斜することとなった。戦時内閣を率いた首相ジョン・カー
ティンは 1941 年のクリスマス演説として、太平洋戦線において「アメリカ合衆国とオー
ストラリアが最大の発言権をもつべき」であって、「イギリスとの伝統的な結びつきや血縁関係による呵責を離れて、アメリカに目を向ける」方針を表明している 23）。この演説は、後年のナショナリスト史観において、オーストラリアからイギリスへの決別宣言として受け止められる。ガメージは、先の大戦時には導入に至らなかった徴兵制がカーティン政権下で迅速に導入された点を論拠として、自国への直接的脅威の結果、オーストラリアが独
自の「国益」を意識したと評価している 24）。オーストラリアの安全保障上の対米依存の起源として、第 2 次世界大戦が重要な転機であることは間違いない。しかし、それをもって23）Herald (Melbourne), 27 December 1941.
24）Gammage［1995］pp. 5-15.

82

オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）

帝国からの脱却と同一視することは、やや早計である。
スチュアート・ウォードは、カーティンの演説が RSL や野党から反発を招き、カーティ
ンが「オーストラリアはイギリス帝国と一体をなす一部に他ならず、イギリス的生活や制度への献身において、ブリティッシュ・コモンウェルスでオーストラリア以上に根強いところは存在しない」と釈明したことを指摘している 25）。カーティンが依然としてイギリスとの紐帯を重視していた証左としては、1943 年に連邦総督の後継としてイギリス王族のグロスター公ヘンリーを指名したことも挙げられる。カーティンが党首を務める労働党は従来、総督職をオーストラリア出身者に限定すべきだと主張してきたが、カーティンは王冠の一体性を象徴する王族を総督に迎えることで、太平洋地域におけるイギリスとの協力
体制の維持を目指した 26）。アメリカとの同盟がオーストラリアにとって重要であり、前述のクラークによる歴史叙述にしたがえば、「よりオーストラリアを中心に置く」外交上の動向があったこと自体は疑いないものの、イギリス帝国への帰属意識も並存していた点に留意すべきだろう。
アンザック・デイにおける言説に立ち戻れば、ナショナリスト史観に基づく歴史叙述と史実との乖離は明らかである。カーティンのクリスマス演説に先立つ 1941 年には、第 2 次世界大戦に従軍した兵士によるパレードへの参加を指して、『シドニー・モーニング・ヘ
ラルド』紙が次のように報道した。
「老年のアンザック兵士が亡くなることで、行進の列から毎年 2,000 人の隙間ができる、そう我々は聞かされてきた。しかし、行進の列はまだ短くなってはいない。新しいアンザック兵士が父親たちの場所を埋めているのだ。昨日、新旧のアンザック兵士が初めてともに行進した」27）。アンザックの「息子たち」への言及は、メルボルンの『アーガス』紙の論説記事にも共通している。
「アンザック・デイは誇りと悔いが入り混じった日である。すなわちかつての、そして今日のアンザック兵士に対する誇り。そして 26 年前の犠牲が結局、この苦い犠牲の繰り返ししかもたらさなかったことへの悔い…
［二つの世界大戦に共通するのは］ドイツの領土への欲望、もう一つは我々オー
28）
ストラリアの血統、そしてその祖先であるイギリスの血統の健全さである」。こうした論調からは、アンザック神話の継承が帝国規模の連帯感の否定ではなく、再確認をもたらしたことが読み取れる。
第 2 次世界大戦の終戦後初めてのアンザック・デイである 1946 年には、例年よりも大規25）Ward［2008］p. 249.
26）Serle［1998］p. 40.
27）Sydney Morning Herald, 26 April 1941.
28）Argus, 25 April 1941.

83

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

模なパレードが行われ、『アーガス』紙の論説記事は、アンザックの経験を次のように意味づけた。
「そもそもアンザック精神は、忠実なイギリス的精神であり続けてきた…矮小なオーストラリア主義を拡大することは、オーストラリアの二つの世代にわたる行動が強化した構造を傷つけてしまいかねない…オーストラリアが生き延びて成長し、完全かつ創造的に『オーストラリア的』でありうるのは、ブリティッシュ・コモンウェルスの諸国家
29）の一員だからである」。太平洋地域における独自の国益を重視する「オーストラリア主義」

への言及は、第 2 次世界大戦による「利害の共同体」の動揺を反映したものととらえられるが、国民国家と帝国という二項対立的な図式は、「イギリス的精神」を根拠として退けられている。少なくとも第 1 次・第 2 次世界大戦期に関する限り、「文化の共同体」と結びついた帝国的アイデンティティは、新たな戦争の記憶を内包しながら存続したのである。

（2）1960・70 年代の「新しいナショナリズム」
大戦間期に確立した戦没者追悼の伝統と現在における世界大戦の記念事業の隆盛を考慮したとき、1960 年から 70 年代にかけてのアンザック・デイは停滞期にあった。式典に参加する人々の数は減少傾向にあり、メディアでは戦争の記憶の継承をめぐる懸念が表明されるようになった。こうした現象の背景として当時指摘されたのは、第 1 次世界大戦からは半世紀、第 2 次世界大戦からも 20 年以上が経過したことで、直接戦争を経験した世代
がしだいに減少し、とりわけ若年層の関心が薄れつつあるという問題であった。この時代
はオーストラリアがベトナム戦争に関与していた時期でもあり、ベトナム反戦運動に共感する若年層を取り込むためには、これまで認識されてこなかったアンザックの伝統と軍国主義との関わりを払拭する必要があった。
こうした状況のなかで、例えば 1965 年のガリポリ上陸作戦 50 周年にあたっては、『シド
ニー・モーニング・ヘラルド』紙上で特集記事が掲載された。そこでは、アンザック・デイがそう遠くない将来に「何の意味もない歴史上の日付」になってしまう可能性を排除す
ることなく、大学生やガリポリ上陸作戦に参加した退役軍人といった複数の世代による討論が行われている（図 3）。討論における焦点の一つはアンザックの伝統をめぐる世代間の落差であり、同年のアンザック・デイの論説記事もまた、「多くの若者はアンザック・
デイを年長者と同じようには見ていない」ため、戦没者追悼の名を借りた「戦争の賛美や、その言葉の最悪の意味において『浮かれ騒ぐ』場」として受け止められていると嘆いている 30）。このような言説は以前には決して見られなかったものであり、ベトナム戦争をめぐ
29）Argus, 25 April 1946.
30）Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 1965.

84

オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）

図 3 「アンザック・デイは生き残ることができるか？」と題した紙上討論会
図 3 「アンザック・デイは生き残ることができるか？」と題した紙上討論会

出典：Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 1965
図 3 出典：「アンザック・デイは生き残ることができるか？
」と題した紙上討論会
Sydney Morning

Herald, 17 April 1965

出典：Sydney Morning Herald, 17 April 1965

図4

反戦・反核運動のシンボルが落書きされたメルボルンの戦争記念碑

4 反戦・反核運動のシンボルが落書きされたメルボルンの戦争記念碑
図4 図
反戦・反核運動のシンボルが落書きされたメルボルンの戦争記念碑
出典：Age, 23 April 1971
出典：Age, 23 April 1971

出典：Age, 23 April 1971

2
2

る論争が激化した 1970 年代に至っては、戦争記念碑を意図的に損壊する事件が発生するなど、きわめて劇的な変容が起こっていた（図 4）。
さらに年代の経過した現在もなお、アンザック・デイへの関心が高まっている事例を考慮すれば、こうした現象がもたらされた理由を世界大戦との時代の隔たりだけに帰することは適当でない。そこには、例えばベトナム戦争のような、1960・70 年代に特有の要因が想定される。イギリス帝国史の文脈から考察すれば、この年代はイギリス本国のヨー
ロッパ経済共同体への加盟申請やスエズ以東からの撤退、すなわちヨーロッパへの回帰と海外植民地の放棄が決定づけられた時期である。第 2 次世界大戦期には軋轢を生じつつも機能しえた「利害の共同体」は、オーストラリアというよりもイギリスの選択によって強85

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

制的に消滅することとなり、結果として帝国への帰属意識の共有に基づく「文化の共同体」
もまた、深刻な動揺に陥ることとなった。
脱帝国的なナショナリスト史観の図式にしたがえば、帝国からの解放によって独自のナ
ショナリズムが開花する道が開いたはずだが、同時代人の懸念はむしろ確固たるアイデン
ティティの不在にあったようである。社会評論の分野で活躍した歴史家ジェフリー・サー
ルは、オーストラリアおよび帝国への「古い二重の忠誠」に依存した「強固な国民的伝統の不在」の結果、「かつて標準だった帝国的な愛国主義のレトリックが衰退して以降、現在も続く真空状態」によってナショナリズムの基盤が揺らいでいると指摘した 31）。オース
トラリアは「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」の中核を担ってきた代償として、旧来の「ブリティッシュネス」とは異なる論理による「新しいナショナリズム」の模索を強いられた 32）。
この時期のアンザック・デイは、植民地時代の過去の遺物として廃れるか、脱植民地化を遂げた国民国家の象徴として再生するかの岐路にあったのである。
こうしたナショナリズムの構造転換をふまえて報道を追跡すると、アンザックの伝統に対する批判の先鋭化とそれに対応する応酬が見てとれる。1969 年の『エイジ』紙の投書欄では、ある投書が「50 年以上前に起こった軍事上の敗北を公に賛美するために、毎年一日を費やす必要はもはやない」として、「過去の戦争の恐怖に思いをはせる」よりも「現在の紛争を終わらせるための建設的な努力」を訴えたことをきっかけに、数人の帰還兵士が返答を寄せている。ある返答は投書主の「浅はかな思考」を否定し、より投書主に共感的な返答は「常識を備えた人間なら、誰も戦争を美化しない」と諭して、アンザック・デイが国民的記念日である理由を民主主義の防衛にあると説得した 33）。同年の『オーストラリアン』紙の論説記事は、あるべき戦争の記憶に関する議論が起きていること自体はむしろ健全であるという認識に立って、「我々が何を祝っているのかについて最終的な合意には至っていないとしても、アンザック・デイそのもののありようの変化は、我々が合意に近づいていることを示している。未だアイデンティティを模索する国家にとって、それは至るべき重要な合意である」と述べている 34）。こうしたメディアの論調からは、アイデンティティをめぐる世代間の対話の場として、アンザック・デイを再生させようとする意図

31）Serle［1967］pp. 238-239, 244.
32）「新しいナショナリズム」という用語は、政治評論家ドナルド・ホーンの命名によるもので（Horne［1968］
を参照）、白豪主義や帝国主義といった「古いナショナリズム」が成り立たなくなったという前提に立って、今後目指されるべき国民統合の理念を指した。オーストラリアに固有の国民意識を志向するという点を除けば、その内容について共通理解があったわけではないものの、当時の流行語としてしばしば用いられた。
33）Age, 23 and 25 April 1969.
34）Australian, 25 April 1969.

86オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）

がうかがえる。
脱植民地化を志向する「新しいナショナリズム」は「未来形」で語られる言語であって、オーストラリアにとって固有の統合原理が必要であることは確かだとしても、それを達成する方法については不透明であった。つまり、帝国的アイデンティティの機能不全が明らかになる一方で、ナショナリスト史観が想定するような安定的な国民統合の枠組みは容易に成立せず、模索のただ中にあった。アンザック・デイにおいては、戦争の記憶の文脈を読み替えることによって、帝国との差異化を図る方向性が強まっていった。1970 年の『エイジ』紙の論説記事は、アンザック・デイが顕彰しているのは「戦争で亡くなった我が国の人々の人間的な資質、すなわち勇気、自己犠牲、同志愛の資質」だと主張し、次のように結論づけている。
「我々は、自らと彼らを同一視する。なぜなら、彼らは我々の親類や友人であり、我々自身のような人々だったのだから。我々は、彼らがもっていた男らしさ
35）と同じ資質が、我々のなかにもあると思いたいのだ」。ここではその成功の当否はともか

くとして、アンザック神話が曖昧な「我々」の物語として再構成されている。1970 年以降のアンザック・デイにおいて主題となるのは、あくまで一人称で語られる「オーストラリ
ア人」であって、かつてのような「イギリス人」としての連帯感を見出す傾向は後退していった。
アンザック神話の帝国的な文脈の喪失は、後年の多文化主義に適合的な言説を生み出すことになる。一例として、1975 年のガリポリ上陸作戦 60 周年に向けて RSL が実施した懸賞論文の募集では、次のような将来像が寄稿されている。
「オーストラリアが新たな、多人種の社会に発展すれば、我々の記念日としてアンザック・デイの追悼活動を続けることは、ますます難しくなる。アンザック・デイが国民的記念日として祝われるべきだという考えを、大量の外国生まれの人々が当然のものとして受けいれるとは期待できない…
［その反面］祖国のための犠牲により力点が置かれるようになるかもしれない。こうした概念であれば、肌の色、人種、信仰に関わりなく、あらゆる人間に把握できるため、すべ36）ての人々を一つの存在、一つの偉大な国民へと統合できるだろう」。ここには、イングリ

スが示すことになる「市民宗教」への転換の予兆が垣間見える。1970 年代以降のアンザッ
ク・デイからは、かつて「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」の文脈で語られていた要素が取り除かれ、民主主義や愛国心といった普遍的価値の側面が強調されることで、オーストラリ35）Age, 25 April 1970.
36）“The future of Anzac Day as Australia’s national day, 1975”, Records of the Returned Services League ofAustralia 1916-1985, National Library of Australia, MS 6609, Box 1105 (Miscellaneous files, Addition 22
September 1998).

87『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

ア固有のナショナリズムとの合致が目指された。
改めてオーストラリア史研究におけるナショナリズムの評価に立ち戻ると、ガメージの脱帝国的な大戦像が世に問われた時期が、まさに「新しいナショナリズム」による模索の過程と軌を一にしている点に注目すべきである。本稿で検証してきたように、大戦間期のオーストラリアにおける戦争の記憶とナショナル・アイデンティティの分析としてとらえるならば、ナショナリスト史観に基づく歴史叙述には偏りがあると言わざるを得ない。ガメージが史料として用いた手記の多くは当時一般には公開されておらず、帝国主義戦争を取り巻く負の記憶は周縁化されていた。しかし、1970 年代という発表年代の文脈までふまえて再解釈するならば、国民国家としての成熟とイギリス帝国への帰属意識を二項対立的にとらえる思考の枠組みは、「新しいナショナリズム」の台頭がもたらした構造転換を如実に示すものであって、史実との整合性というよりはむしろ、脱植民地化後の歴史学に表出したアイデンティティ、あるいは歴史家とメディアの共同による自国史の読み替えの例として、参照すべき重要性を有していると位置づけられるのではないだろうか。

４ おわりに
映画『ガリポリ』の監督ピーター・ウィアーは、ビーンが編纂した戦史やガメージの著作を参照しながら、志願兵としてガリポリ攻略作戦に参加した 2 人の陸上選手の人物像を設定した。愛国的な主人公アーチーと戦争に対して懐疑的なフランクの間では、次のような会話が交わされる。

アーチー「とくに君みたいな人間は志願しなくちゃ。
」
フランク「どうして俺みたいな人間が？」アーチー「君は陸上選手だろ？」フランク「（笑いながら）それと何の関係があるんだよ？」
アーチー「100 メートル走るのに 12 秒もかかるような仲間でさえ志願しようとしてるのに、君は行かないのか？」
フランク「（いらついた様子で）俺たちの戦争じゃないからさ！」
アーチー「俺たちの戦争じゃないって、一体どういうことだ？」
フランク「イギリスの戦争だろ。俺たちには関係ないよ。
」
アーチー「（フランクの言葉に驚いて立ち止まり）君は自分がどういう人間か知って88

オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）

るか？とんでもない臆病者だ！」37）

結局フランクはアーチーに誘われるまま入隊するが、アーチーがイギリス軍の無謀な作戦によって戦死する場面とともに、映画は幕を下ろす。
「俺たちの戦争」と「イギリスの戦争」を対置し、無垢なオーストラリアの犠牲を強調する大戦像は、ビーンによる歴史叙述を大きく逸脱しているものの、「新しいナショナリズム」をめぐる模索を経た 1980 年代のオーストラリアの観客にとって、史実を反映した「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」を前提とするアイデンティティが共感を得られなかったであろうことは、想像に難くない。
脱植民地化を契機とする戦争の記憶の読み替えは、多文化主義という新たな統合原理の確立とともに加速した。1993 年に行われたキャンベラでの無名兵士の埋葬の際には、首相ポール・キーティングが次のような弔辞を残している。
「私たちはこのオーストラリア
人の名を知りませんし、今後も知ることはないでしょう。私たちは彼の階級や部隊を知りません。私たちは、彼がどこで生まれたのか、いつ、どのように死んだのかさえ、正確には知りません」。無名戦士をあらゆる出自や特徴を喪失した存在として表象しつつ、キー
ティングはこう結論づけた。
「しかし、彼は私たちが誇りとしてきた人々の一員です。私たちは、彼が西部戦線で命を落とした 45,000 人のオーストラリア人の 1 人であることを38）
知っています…彼はその人々のすべてであると同時に、私たちの1人なのです」。こうした匿名性を帯びた戦没者像は、非イギリス系を含む多様な国民の包摂を可能にした。先住民兵士に関する研究で知られるロバート・ホールは、こう述べている。
「多くの先住民の人々が白人の戦友とともに従軍し、命を落とした。無名兵士は、彼らの 1 人かも知れない。
無名兵士は戦争記念館の中心、記憶の霊廟に移葬されたことで、すべてのオーストラリア
人をアンザック神話によって一つにまとめる。無名兵士の匿名性そのものが、彼が眠る場
39）
所を白人と先住民の双方にとって、現代の聖地にしている」。帝国主義戦争の記憶は次々と文脈を読み替えられ、大戦間期のオーストラリアからかけ離れた多文化社会のマイノリ
ティを射程に収めるまでに至った。
あらゆる文化的背景の国民が共通の戦争体験を媒介にアンザック神話へと動員されていくことへの賛否はともかく、アンザック・デイは現時点において強固な基盤を獲得している。この現状を間接的に支えているのは、ホールのような歴史家によるマイノリティの37）Gammage and Williamson［1981］p. 107.
38）Paul Keating, Funeral Service of the Unknown Australian Soldier, 11 November 1993, Department of the Prime
Minister and Cabinet, PM Transcripts. < http://pmtranscripts.dpmc.gov.au/release/transcript-9035>
39）Hall［1995］pp. v-vi.

89

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

戦争貢献の再発見である。もちろん、マイノリティに注目した学術研究は多文化主義による国民統合そのものを目的としているわけではない。しかし、戦争の記憶ひいては自国史を構築するにあたって歴史家の介在が重要であったことは、ビーンやガメージの事例からも見てとれる。オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究は、帝国主義や「新しいナショナリズム」といった思想の影響を受けながら、結果として各時代の社会的要請に対応した
歴史像を生産してきた。本稿が依拠する「ブリティッシュ・ワールド」論もまた、おそら
くその例外ではない。仮にイギリス帝国史研究が「ブリティッシュネス」の長期的な影響力を見出すことに終始するならば、オーストラリア史研究におけるナショナリスト史観と同様の構造的な陥穽を逃れられない。本稿が跡づけてきたナショナリズムと世界大戦の記
憶の変遷は、オーストラリアのように重層的なアイデンティティを有してきた国家の歴史を論じるにあたって、歴史家が自らの研究視角そのものを相対化することが不可欠であると示しているように思われる。

文献リスト
Andrews, Eric Montgomery［1993］The Anzac Illusion: Anglo-Australian Relations during World War I, Cambridge.
Bean, Charles Edwin Woodrow［1940］The Old A.I.F. and the New, Sydney.
Bean, Charles Edwin Woodrow［1941］The Story of ANZAC, The Official History of Australia in the War of 19141918, vol. 2, Sydney.
Bridge, Carl and Fedorowich, Kent, eds.［2003］The British World: Diaspora, Culture and Identity, London.
Buckner, Philip and Francis, Robert Douglas, eds.［2005］Rediscovering the British World, Calgary.
Clark, Manning［1990］The Quest for Grace, Ringwood.
Curran, James and Ward, Stuart［2010］The Unknown Nation: Australia after Empire, Carlton.
Curthoys, Ann［2003］“We've Just Started Making National Histories, and You Want Us to Stop Already?” inAntoinette Burton, ed., After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation, Durham.
Darian-Smith, Kate et al., eds.［2007］Britishness Abroad: Transnational Movements and Imperial Cultures, Carlton.
Darwin, John［2009］The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830-1970, Cambridge.
Darwin, John［2012］Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain, London.
Gammage, Bill［1974］The Broken Years: Australian Soldiers in the Great War, Canberra.
Gammage, Bill［1995］“Was the Great War Australia’s war? ” in Craig Wilcox, ed., The Great War, Gains andLosses: Anzac and Empire, Canberra.
Gammage, Bill and Williamson, David［1981］The Story of Gallipoli: The Film about the Men Who Made a Legend,
Ringwood.
Hall, Robert Anthony［1995］Fighters from the Fringe: Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders Recall the Second
World War, Canberra.
Hancock, William Keith［1930］Australia, London.

90

オーストラリアにおけるナショナリズム研究と世界大戦の記憶（津田博司）

Horne, Donald［1968］“The New Nationalism? ”, Bulletin, 5 October.
Hopkins, Antony Gerald［1999］“Back to the Future: From National History to Imperial History”, Past & Present,
169.
Inglis, Kenneth Stanley［2008］Sacred Places: War Memorials in the Australian Landscape, Carlton, 2008.
Lake, Marilyn and Reynolds, Henry, eds.［2010］What’s Wrong with Anzac?: The Militarisation of Australian
History, Sydney.
MacIntyre, Stuart［1999］“Australia and the Empire” in R. W. Winks, ed., Historiography, The Oxford History of the
British Empire, vol. 5, Oxford.
Meaney, Neville［2001］“Britishness and Australian Identity: The Problem of Nationalism in Australian History andHistoriography”, Australian Historical Studies, 116.
Scates, Bruce［2006］Return to Gallipoli: Walking the Battlefields of the Great War, Cambridge.
Scott, Ernest［1916］A Short History of Australia, London.
Scott, Ernest［1941］Australia during the War, The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, vol. 11,
Sydney.
Serle, Geoffrey［1967］“Austerica Unlimited? ”, Meanjin Quarterly, September 1967.
Serle, Geoffrey［1998］For Australia and Labor: Prime Minister John Curtin, Perth, 1998.
Ward, Russell［1958］The Australian Legend, Melbourne.
Ward, Stuart［2001］Australia and the British Embrace: The Demise of the Imperial Ideal, Carlton South.
Ward, Stuart［2008］“Security: Defending Australia’s Empire” in D. M. Schreuder and Stuart Ward, eds., Australia’s
Empire, Oxford.

91『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月） 93 － 117 頁

論説1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転―ハインケル社と日本海軍との関係を中心に―
西尾 隆志＊

Aero-Technology Transfer from Germany to Japan during the 1930s:
Connection between Heinkel and the Japanese Navy
By TAKASHI NISHIO

The purpose of this article is to explore the aero-technology transfer from Germany toJapan that took place during the 1930s through the connection between Heinkel Co., oneof the leading aircraft manufacturers in Germany, and the Japanese navy. This article
especially focuses on the transfer of Heinkel aircraft and its consistent contribution to
the sudden acceleration in Japanese naval aviation technology, particularly in divebombers.The Japanese Naval Aviation Department firmly intended to attainindigenization of its aircraft design and manufacture as part of the three-year program(1932-34). As the only exception to the plan, the prototype of the navy’s first divebomber, He50, was developed by Heinkel. Just after Germany’s rearmament in 1935, theJapanese navy provided the German navy with development aid in the form of
construction and operation of aircraft carriers as military technical trade, while theGermans exported Heinkel’s latest transport aircraft, He70, and dive bomber, He118, toJapan. The Japanese navy utilized these new aircrafts for its indigenous carrier-based
dive bombers. As the United States embargo on arms to Japan was stricter after 1937,
the Japanese aircraft industry was forced to depend heavily on Germany as its only
major supplier of aircraft technology.

１ はじめに本稿は、1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術の移転過程を、主にハインケル社と日本海軍・愛知時計電機（以下「愛知」と略記）との相互関係に着目し実証分析す
ることを目的としている。近年の武器移転史研究において、日独間の航空技術移転は、
1920 年代における「軍縮下の軍拡」の典型的事例として叙述され、ヴェルサイユ条約による空軍禁止・軍用機製造禁止など厳しい規制下に置かれたため海外への航空機輸出を展開せざるを得なかったドイツ航空機産業と、ワシントン海軍軍縮条約による主力艦保有量の制限、日英同盟の破棄、陸海軍の航空戦力への着目などを背景として、欧米からの広＊明治大学文学研究科博士後期課程（Postgraduate Student, Graduate School of Arts and Letters, Meiji University, Tokyo）

93

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

範な技術導入により生産基盤整備・技術水準向上を企図した日本航空機産業との関係強化が実証されている 1）。
一方で、本稿が注目するハインケルと日本海軍との提携は「軍縮下の軍拡」を特質とする 1920 年代ではなく、30 年代の公然たる軍拡期にむしろ促進された点が特徴である。ドイツでは、35 年の空軍再建やその後の軍拡のために航空機産業が大規模動員された一方、日本では、32 年以降に海軍が主導する形で航空機国産化の推進と航空戦力の大幅な拡充が行われるなど、30 年代の日独航空機産業を取り巻く国内外の状況は 20 年代から大きく変容した。こうした状況において「『ハインケル』との往来は最も頻繁で、我が航空技術の進歩に寄与した点は他に類例がなかった」2）と指摘されるが、事実ハインケルからの技術移転は、日本海軍が 30 年代に登場させた艦上爆撃機（急降下爆撃機）の開発に決定的な影響を及ぼし、海軍航空戦力の強化に貢献したのである。しかし、従来の武器移転史研
究・日独関係史研究では、30 年代のハインケルと日本海軍との関係について簡潔に言及されるのみで、具体的分析はほとんど行われてこなかった 3）。
以下では、第 2 節で 1930 年代前半における日本海軍の航空自立化計画を概観し、同計画内で誕生した艦上爆撃機の開発とハインケルとの関係に言及する。第 3 節では、ドイツ再軍備過程における日本海軍のドイツ海軍に対する空母技術の供与と、その見返りとしての
新型急降下爆撃機に関するハインケルとの購入交渉過程、30年代の世界的な軍用機移転・
航空技術革新と日本航空機産業自立化との関係、日中戦争下での海軍のドイツ航空技術への更なる傾斜を議論する。第 4 節では上記の議論を踏まえ、日本航空機産業自立化の到達点を、戦間期における兵器供給国・需要国の階層構造や、30 年代航空戦力・航空機産業の時代的特質など多角的な観点から再考する。

２ 日本海軍の航空自立化計画（1）航空機試作三ヵ年計画
1930 年にロンドン海軍軍縮条約が締結された結果、日本海軍は水上艦艇保有量の対米劣勢を決定的に意識し、艦隊決戦時の有力な補助兵力として航空戦力の大幅な拡充を企図した。31 年成立の「第一次軍備補充計画」では飛行隊 14 隊、34 年成立の「第二次軍備
1） この過程を実証分析した最近の研究としては、さしあたり永岑［2017］；西尾［2017］；千田［2016］；
横井［2014］を参照。
2） 岡村編［1976］34 頁。
3） カスパリ［1996］42-43 頁；パウアー［2008］216 頁；Braun［1986］［1990］. Braun の研究は当該分野における数少ない実証研究だが、ハインケルと日本海軍との関係にはフォーカスしておらず、対象時期も第二次世界大戦期が中心である。

94

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

補充計画」では 8 隊の増設と空母二隻の建造が決定された（37 年完了）4）。
この傾向は予算面からも看取できる。海軍予算は 1930 年には 2 億 6293 万円、32 年には 3
億 676 万円、34 年には 4 億 8795 万円と、4 年間で約 1.85 倍に増えたが、うち航空予算は 30
年の 3476 万円、32 年の 5939 万円、34 年の 1 億 633 万円と約 3 倍に増え、海軍予算に占める割合も 30 年の 14.29% から 34 年には 21.79% となり、同年の航空予算は艦政本部予算を上回ったのである 5）。
海軍航空の量的拡充と共に推進されたのが、航空機産業の自立化である。1930 年 12 月に航空本部技術部長に就任した航空主兵論者・山本五十六少将の下で、32 年に最初の長期計画である「航空機試作三ヵ年計画」（計画主任和田操大佐）が策定・実行された（以下「試作三ヵ年計画」と略記）6）。本計画は 35 年までに完成されるべき各種海軍機の試作を
航空機製造企業に命じたもので、従来の外国航空技術への依存から脱却し、日本独自の航空機設計・開発が企図されていた。そのため機体設計は「日本臣民に限る」と条件が付けられ外国機のコピーは禁止された 7）。本試作計画からは9機種が海軍に制式採用され、うち九六式陸上攻撃機・九六式艦上戦闘機（三菱・36 年制式採用）は高性能の全金属製単葉機として日本航空技術自立の指標とされている。特に九六陸攻は最高速度 370 キロ、航続距離 4380 キロを有する世界的な優秀機であり、本機は艦隊決戦への航空戦力の策応という海軍の既成戦略を越えて、航空本部内での航空主兵・戦艦無用論を噴出させたのみな
らず、日中戦争では渡洋爆撃・長距離戦略爆撃へと転用されることになる 8）。
試作三ヵ年計画の立案・実施を契機として、日本航空技術・航空機産業は「模倣時代」
から「自立時代」に移行したとされる 9）。当時航空後進国であった日本が 1930 年代半ばに航空技術を飛躍的に向上させた要因として、20 年代初頭からドイツの金属機製作技術を
海軍・三菱が積極的に導入していたこと、ドイツ人を多く含む外国人航空技師から堀越二郎・本庄季郎など一群の日本人機体設計技師が育成されていたことなど、ハード・ソフトの両面にわたる技術移転の成果を指摘することが可能だが、受け手側の制度・組織整備もまた重要であった。
例えば、1927 年設立の海軍航空本部は航空行政・技術・教育の中央統一機関として一元的な指導力を行使し、32 年に横須賀浦郷に設立された航空廠は、航空技術に関する実4） 日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969b］34、47 頁。
5） 日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969b］950 頁；池田［1993］221 頁。
6） 日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969c］277-281、395-399 頁。
7） 池田［1993］232 頁。
8） 山田［2015］88 頁；小野塚［2016］220-221 頁。
9） 日本航空協会［1975］864 頁。

95

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

験研究の総合機関として民間企業の航空機試作を指導・支援したほか、航空廠に隣接した
横須賀航空隊は実験航空隊として試作機の実用飛行試験を担当した 10）。また、試作三ヵ年計画で実施された競争試作制度は、民間企業の競争意欲を引き出し、技術水準を顕著に向上させたのみならず、試作機の審査で敗北した企業は二次サプライヤーとして制式採用された機体・エンジンの生産を予定されるなど、航空機産業内における技術の統合・共有にも貢献したのである 11）。

（2）艦上爆撃機の誕生
艦上爆撃機（急降下爆撃機）は、敵艦船に対する命中率が低い水平爆撃に対して、急降下による爆弾の「一発必中」を企図した機種であり、日本海軍では試作三ヵ年計画における「八試」（昭和 8 年度試作）として初めて盛り込まれた 12）。
初の艦爆試作において、既に 1931 年には、日本海軍がハインケルに 250 キロ爆弾搭載可
能な急降下爆撃機の試作を要請している。ハインケルでの試作一号機は水上機タイプのHe50 として製造されたが、試験飛行で不時着・破損し、He50 試作二号機は陸上機として製造ライセンスと共に33年前半に日本へ輸出された 13）。本機は海軍機専用メーカーの愛知が購入し、八試艦爆としてエンジンを国産の空冷「寿」（中島・460 馬力）に換装した後、34 年 12 月に九四式艦上爆撃機として海軍に制式採用された。三ヵ年計画の設計・開発自立化方針からは逸脱した形だが、他に適当な機体がなく連合艦隊の強い希望もあり、唯一の例外として愛知でのライセンス生産が許可されたのである 14）。九四艦爆装備の艦上爆撃機隊は 35 年に空母「龍驤」
・横須賀航空隊に初めて配置され、航空本部でも「軽爆撃機ノ実現ニ依リ従来ノ艦攻、艦戦等ヲ軽爆ニ編制替シ現航空隊配備予定ヲ変更スルノ要アリ」15）として 30 年代後半に艦爆隊の整備が進められた。九四艦爆とその改良型の九六式艦上爆撃機は愛知で約 590 機が生産され、日中戦争に広く投入されている。
以後、艦爆開発をめぐるハインケルからの技術移転は 1930 年代を通じて継続するが、その前提には、20 年代から既に水上機分野においてハインケルと日本海軍との提携が行われてきた状況があった。例えば、日本海軍は、ハインケルが第一次世界大戦中の 1918

10）水沢［2017］72-74 頁；塚田［1982］34-35 頁；日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969c］42-43、132-135 頁。
11） Peattie［2001］pp. 27-28.
12）日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969a］682-684 頁。
13）Köhler［1983］S. 102-103; Green［1990］pp. 264-265.
14）堀越・奥宮［2007］78 頁。
15）「総務部 上坂部員 主務事項ノ現状」『昭和十年十一月 海軍航空本部各部現状報告』所収（防衛省
防衛研究所所蔵）。当初艦上爆撃機は軽爆撃機と呼称された。

96

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

年に製作した水上機 W29 を大戦後に戦利機として獲得し、愛知・中島飛行機は本機を無断で約 180 機模造した 16）。25 年に、水上偵察機に関するハインケルと日本海軍・愛知との公式契約が初めて結ばれた際―軍用機製造を禁止したヴェルサイユ条約に違反する―、来日したハインケル（Ernst Heinkel）は海軍横須賀飛行場にオリジナルの機体と模造された W29 が多数配置されているのを見て「驚愕し」、自身にはライセンス料が全く支払われていなかったが、これに対しては「それほど怒っていない。なぜならその後日本は私の工場の最も熱心なライセンス受領者になったからだ」と 37 年時点で回顧している 17）。事実、25-32 年に、ハインケルは 6 機種の水上偵察機を日本に輸出し、うち 3 機種が海軍に制式採用され、愛知でライセンス生産された 18）。同社が日本海軍と密接な関係を結び続けた要因
としては、戦間期ドイツ航空機産業のなかでも、ハインケルの技術開発の方向性が際立った高速飛行機＝軍需志向であり、既に第一次世界大戦で高速機開発に実績のあったことを指摘できる 19）。
また、両者の交渉を仲介した重要人物としてハック博士（Friedrich Wilhelm Hack）が挙げられる。ハックは第一次世界大戦の青島戦で日本軍の捕虜となり、大戦後 1920 年にドイツへ帰国後、クルップ社の日本代表として日本への兵器売り込みに携わったシンツィン
ガー（Adolf Schinzinger）とシンツィンガー・ハック商会を設立し、20 年代から 30 年代にかけて兵器売り込みを通じて日本陸海軍との結びつきを強めていく。20 年代初頭には、同商会は日本海軍とユンカース社との航空機取引交渉の大部分を仲介したほか、25 年には既に海軍とハインケルの仲介者を務めており、30 年代初頭にはハインケル対日代表として同社航空機の売り込みに奔走していた。海外市場を求めるハインケル社にとり、ハックの持つ豊富な日本人脈は貴重なものであった 20）。

３ ドイツ再軍備後の航空技術移転（1）日本海軍のドイツ海軍への空母技術提供
1930 年のロンドン海軍軍縮条約締結は、日本海軍内部でのいわゆる条約派と艦隊派の対立を生み、その後の大角人事を経て反軍縮派＝艦隊派の台頭を招いた。艦隊派の中心人物、加藤寛治は第一次世界大戦終結直後の 19 年に海軍視察団長としてドイツを訪問し、
16）野沢編［1989］144 頁。
17）Heinkel［1937］„28 Jahre Flugzeugkonstrukteur“, in: Deutsches Museum München Archiv (DMA), FA 001 /
0173, S. 12-13.
18）Köhler［1983］S. 64-66; 野沢編［1989］158-159、167、173 頁。
19）永岑［2014b］8-9 頁。
20）大木［1995］23-24 頁；永岑［2017］38 頁。

97

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

ドイツ海軍の技術力を高く評価して以降親独的立場を繰り返し示しており、34 年には艦隊派内部でドイツ海軍からの技術導入を企図した対独提携論も浮上するなかで、日本政府は同年末にワシントン海軍軍縮条約からの脱退を通告した 21）。同じく34年にジュネーヴ
軍縮会議から離脱したドイツの海軍は、日本海軍にとり米英への対抗関係を共通軸とした戦略環境のなかで、来るべき海軍軍拡競争における重要な技術供給源として、また潜在的な同盟者として、さらには対米英戦争における牽制要素として重視されたのである 22）。
一方、ドイツ海軍も既に 1932 年 11 月には空母 1 隻、潜水艦 16 隻、海軍航空部隊の増強などを含む軍備計画を立案しており、これはヴェルサイユ条約の軍備規制を明確に破棄した計画であった。しかし空母の建造・運用はドイツ海軍が全く経験を欠く分野であり、また日本海軍がドイツ海軍の戦力強化のため、具体的な技術・経験を提供可能な数少ない兵器体系だった。日本側はドイツから様々な軍事技術を導入するための端緒として、ドイツ
海軍から要望されていた空母技術の提供に前向きな姿勢で臨み、その見返りの一つとして航空本部で重視されたのが、後述するようにハインケルからの新型急降下爆撃機の技術導入だったのである 23）。
1933 年に駐日ドイツ海軍武官として着任したヴェネカー中佐（Paul W. Wenneker）は、
35 年 1 月 10 日にまず空母を除く艦艇を横須賀で視察した。ヴェネカーは戦艦「金剛」
・軽
巡洋艦「多摩」
・潜水艦「伊二」を視察し「懇切ニシテ比較的解放的ナル我方ノ態度ニハ感謝ノ意ヲ表」しつつも、見学した艦艇が比較的旧型艦のためさほど興味を示さず「却テ多摩ノ近傍ニ停泊セル、我カ一万噸級摩耶及航空母艦等ニ注意ヲ集中セルヤニ認メラレタリ」と重巡洋艦・空母に注目した。ヴェネカーは視察に同行した軍令部第三部の前田部員に「独逸ノ再軍備ハ各方面具体的ニ進捗中ナリ。後日実力充実セバ日本ガ華府及倫敦条
約ヲ破棄セル如ク、平和条約少クトモ其ノ軍備条項ノ廃棄ヲ断行スル日来ルベシ」と、再軍備・軍縮体制離脱を明言している 24）。
1935 年 1 月 30 日にはヴェネカーとドイツ航空省（RLM: Reichsluftfahrtministerium）に勤務する元ドイツ海軍航空将校のケーラー（Joachim Coeler）が空母「赤城」を視察した。
外国人の空母視察は前例がなく、ヴェネカーにとり視察は「非常に印象的」であった。翌月には、ドイツ海軍が返礼としてポケット戦艦「アドミラル・シェーア」の射撃管制装置

21）相澤［2002］54-56、66-67 頁。
22）Krug et al.［2001］p. 90.
23）Krug et al.［2001］pp. 91, 133.
24）
「10. 1. 10 在東京独国海軍武官横須賀在港艦船見学同行報告」JACAR（アジア歴史資料センター）Ref.
C05034146900、公文備考 昭和 10 年 D 外事 巻 8（防衛省防衛研究所）。

981930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

を日本海軍将校に視察させている 25）。ケーラーは34年11月から二ヵ月間、日本海軍航空に関して指導を受け、訪問した愛知では好意的に迎えられたが、これは 35 年 5 月、駐日イギ
リス空軍武官が同社を訪問時、かなりの時間が「経営者と数人の下役との茶会や無意味な会話」に費やされ、正式な工場視察許可を得ているにもかかわらず航空機製作部門を視察できなかったことに抗議したのとは対照的な処遇であり、当時の日本海軍の対独・対英姿勢の一端を示している 26）。
日本側は技術交換としてドイツ航空技術の獲得に意欲を示した。1935 年 2 月には、横井忠雄駐独海軍武官が、ドイツ海軍の造船技師一名に日本の空母に関する包括的研究を許可するという提案と引き換えに、ドイツの最新式急降下爆撃機の設計図をドイツ航空省に要求した。同時期に、和田操海軍航空本部技術部部員は、自社の技師 2-3 人に対する製造指導を含む 2 機のハインケル航空機（He70・He74）の購入を希望する愛知とハインケルとの交渉における助力をヴェネカーに要請している 27）。
愛知とハインケルとの交渉は実現し、特に金属機の研究目的で愛知が He70 輸送機を 1
機 1935 年末に輸入し、同社の尾崎紀男技師が同年 4 月より約半年間、ハインケル工場でHe70 の製作方法、設計図面、強度計算書などを教授されたことは、艦上爆撃機の近代化と愛知の設計技術向上に大きく貢献した 28）。ハインケルは「He70 の製造は革命的な斬新さを有するものだった」と記しているが、それは本機が高速性能実現のために最も厳密な空
気力学的観点から製造された結果、33 年 4 月には最高時速 377 キロを記録し、8 つの速度記録を獲得したからである 29）。そして「我々はこの成功と共に、我らの総統による権力掌30）握によって幕を開けた、ドイツ航空の新時代に突入した」。He70 は愛知が開発した 39 年

制式採用の九九式艦上爆撃機の設計上のモデルとされた。九九艦爆は約1500機が生産され、真珠湾攻撃以降戦争中盤まで日本海軍の主力艦爆として広範に使用されている。
ドイツが再軍備を行い、1935 年 6 月に英独海軍協定が締結された後も、空母技術の供与は続けられた。10-11 月には空母「赤城」視察のためドイツ視察団 3 名が来日したが、事前に航空本部で作成された「独乙視察団ノ航空母艦見学ニ関スル件」では、「（一）日独技術提携ハ今日迄比較的順調ニ進捗セルヲ以テ、本格的ノ○○〔判読不能〕ヲ収ムル為独乙25）Krug et al.［2001］pp. 100-101.
26）Krug et al.［2001］p. 101; Report on Messrs. Aichi Tokei Company’s Aircraft and Engine Factory, visited on
May 28th 1935, in: The National Archives (TNA), Air 40 / 2214 Japanese Aircraft Industry: Activities andProduction 1924 Oct. – 1944 May.
27）Krug et al.［2001］p. 101.
28）尾崎［1994］260-261 頁。
29）Heinkel［1937］„28 Jahre Flugzeugkonstrukteur“, in: DMA, FA 001 / 0173, S. 20-21.
30）Heinkel［1937］„28 Jahre Flugzeugkonstrukteur“, in: DMA, FA 001 / 0173, S. 21.

99

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

視察団ノ空母見学ニ対シテ充分好意的態度ヲ示スモノトス （二）独乙視察団ニ見学セシ
ムルモノハ原則トシテ赤城ニ限定スト雖モ、独乙側ノ強テ要望アル場合ハ特ニ好意ヲ示ス
ル意味ニ於テ、龍驤ノ一般見学ヲ許可スルモノトス」と、「赤城」に加え空母「龍驤」の公開まで認めており、その見返りとして日本海軍はドイツ海軍の主砲方位盤射撃装置、主砲射撃盤装置、自動照準装置、魚雷炸薬、艦底起爆装置、甲鈑の入手を予定していた 31）。
一方で、日本海軍は「赤城」の甲板の装甲厚や、艦載機の飛行準備完了に要する時間、一定時間内での発艦回数、数機同時に着艦後その機体が飛行準備を完了し再度発艦できるまでに要する時間など、作戦能力の具体的情報は「説明セズ」と事前に決定していたが 32）、ドイツ視察団は「赤城」の視察において、航空作戦にとり重要な設備や昼夜の発艦訓練を見学し、飛行甲板設備に関する約 100 枚の詳細な青写真を受領したほか、2 名のドイツ人士官は艦載機への同乗も許され発着艦も経験した。また横須賀の海軍飛行場と造船所、中島と川西の航空機工場も見学した。視察団は「問題には全く直面せず〔中略〕日本側との関係は公私にわたり、予測されたあらゆる限界を超えていた」と好意的評価を下している 33）。
一連の日本海軍からの空母技術供与が、長期的にドイツ海軍の戦力強化に貢献したとは言い難い。1936 年 12 月に初のドイツ海軍空母「グラーフ・ツェッペリン」が起工し、38 年 12 月の進水式には小島秀雄駐独海軍武官が招待され、レーダー海軍総司令官（Erich
Raeder）から日本海軍に対して技術提供に関する謝辞を承っていた 34）。しかし、実際のところ同艦にはイギリス空母「カレイジャス」の設計が採用され、第二次世界大戦末期の
45 年 1 月には未完成状態で自沈処分されたのである 35）。日本側にとり、空母技術の提供は、次に述べるハインケルからの新型急降下爆撃機の技術導入を可能にした点で重要であった。

（2）ハインケルとの交渉・契約成立過程
1935 年 11 月、海軍航空本部は「独逸再軍備ノ機会ニ於テ日独技術交換ノ必要ヲ認メ」ており、「独逸視察団ハ十月来朝仔細ニ赤城ヲ視察シ帰国セリ。独逸ニ注文ノ軽爆機ハ目

31）「10. 8. 22 独乙視察団の航空母艦見学に関する件」JACAR: C05034136100、公文備考 昭和 10 年 D 外事
巻 8（防衛省防衛研究所）。
32）「独逸国航空官及海軍武官の赤城見学の際見学証並に説明標準」JACAR: C05034135900、公文備考 昭和
10 年 D 外事 巻 8（防衛省防衛研究所）。
33）Krug et al.［2001］pp. 104-106; Goldman［2003］p. 295.
34）小島［1962］14 頁。
35）Goldman［2003］p. 295; 相澤［2002］78-79 頁。

100

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

下 H 社ニ於テ製作中」であった。本機は「二座単葉高性能軽爆ニシテ独逸『ハインケル』
社ニ試作注文方交渉中」の「十試軽爆」と呼称された 36）。海軍は再度航空自立化方針からは逸脱する形で、空母技術供与の見返りとしてハインケルに艦爆設計・開発を依頼していたのである。航空本部のドイツ重視姿勢は、毎年の航空研究費に含まれる各国別情報収集費にも反映されており、例えば 35 年度はアメリカ、イギリス、フランスに各 3000 円、イ
タリアに1000円、ドイツに4000円が割り振られ、36年度はアメリカ、イギリス、フランス、ドイツに各 2800 円、イタリアに 1000 円が分配予定だったが、同年 7 月にはハインケル社
で研修を受ける技師団の必要経費として、さらに 10 月には航空機生産費低減の研究目的で訪独していた和田操一行の必要経費として、それぞれ予備費から 1000 円ずつが別途ドイツに送金されている 37）。
既に 1935 年 10 月 8 日には、ベルリンのハインケル社事務所において、日本海軍からは佐波次郎駐独航空本部監督官、島本克美造兵少佐、山名正夫航空廠技師、ハインケルからはヘルテル技術部長（Heinrich Hertel）、双子の設計技師ギュンター兄弟（Siegfried andWalter Günter）など 10 名の出席者で、「日本向けの急降下爆撃機」に関するハインケル社の計画が議論されていた。ハインケル側からは機体の三面図・側面図が提供され、機体に装備される爆弾懸架・投下装置、照準器、無線機、艦載機用装置、プロペラ、空冷エンジンの候補などが議論されたほか、航空省への申請（35 年 10 月 20 日）から、完成機の引き渡し（37 年 7 月 1 日）に至る大まかな日程表、日本人技師の研修規定などが決定された 38）。
この「十試軽爆」のハインケルでの新規開発計画は、翌年 1 月には、同社がドイツ空軍向けに開発中だった He118 急降下爆撃機の供与に変更されている。この時点で、ドイツ航空省・駐独日本海軍武官・ハインケル社の三者間では、He118 一機、同機の完全な製造図
面、静荷重状態の計算要約書類の供与と、He118 のライセンス製造権の移譲に関して協定が結ばれており、製造監督者としてハインケル社に滞在する日本人技師（島本克美以下航空廠部員の寺井邦三・山名正夫・山本晴之・石川久能・赤塚武夫）は、本機のあらゆる設
計上・製造上の細部を詳細に習得すると規定された 39）。
日本海軍とハインケル間での、最初の He118 購入契約は 1936 年 6 月 26 日にロストックのハインケル社で締結されている。契約では、He118 の製造見本機一機、予備のダイム
36）「総務部 上坂部員 主務事項ノ現状」「昭和十年十一月 現状報告 技術部」
『昭和十年十一月 海軍
航空本部各部現状報告』所収（防衛省防衛研究所所蔵）。
37）「主務事項現状報告 一○、一○、三○ 総務部二課 鈴木部員」「昭和十一年十一月 現状報告 総務部第二課」『昭和十年十一月 海軍航空本部各部現状報告』所収（防衛省防衛研究所所蔵）。
38）Stuka für Japan, 1935. 10. 8, in: DMA, FA 001 / 0821.
39）He118 Japan - Behandlung Bauaufsicht, 1936. 1. 30, in: DMA, FA 001 / 0821.

101

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

ラー・ベンツ DB600C エンジンとプロペラ、全てのライセンスおよび模造権（満洲含む日
本帝国内において本機を任意の機数模造し納入する権利を含む）の供与のため、日本海軍
が総額 56 万 6000 ライヒスマルク（以下 RM と略記）を支払い、うち 3 万 5000RM はハインケル社の代理店としてシンツィンガー・ハック商会が受領すると規定された。納入期限として、遅くとも 36 年 11 月 30 日までにハンブルクで船に積み込むことが予定されている 40）。
翌 37 年 4 月 10 日には、二機目の購入契約が締結され、翼端折り畳み式の He118 を 19 万 RM
で日本海軍が購入し、うち 8500RM をシンツィンガー・ハック商会が手数料として受領すると規定された（納入期日 37 年 7 月末）41）。三機目の購入契約は、37 年 9 月 7 日に大倉商会
を介して日本陸軍と締結され、He118 の供与のため陸軍は 26 万 RM を支払い、シンツィン
ガー・ハック商会と大倉商会には、手数料としてそれぞれ 1 万 3000RM ずつが支払われると規定された（納入期日 37 年末）42）。陸海軍との交渉は全く別々に行われており、ハイン
ケルも「過去の私と日本との共同業務において繰り返されたように、日本陸軍航空隊の代表者と海軍航空隊の代表者は、お互いを競争相手のように扱ったのである」と回顧している 43）。
He118 の日本への輸出が、1935 年 3 月のドイツ再軍備とその後の空軍増強と同時並行的に進められた点は興味深い。第三帝国下で航空機輸出政策を統括した航空省にとり、再軍
備直後における優先課題は、ドイツ空軍増強のための航空機産業の生産基盤拡大であり、航空機の輸出は二次的な問題でしかなかった 44）。33-36 年において、ドイツの軍事費の約40％を空軍費が占めたほど空軍再建が優先されたなかで 45）、航空機産業は急成長した。例
えば機体生産部門の床面積は 34 年の 12 万平方メートルから、35 年には 23 万平方メートル、
36 年には 45 万平方メートルとなり、機体・エンジン部門の労働者数は 35 年の約 6 万 8000
人から 36 年には約 12 万 4000 人と倍増し 46）、航空機生産数も 34-36 年にかけて急増している（表 1 参照）
。航空機開発においても、36 年 3 月にはメッサーシュミット Me109 単発戦
闘機・Me110 双発戦闘機・ユンカース Ju87 急降下爆撃機・ハインケル He111 双発爆撃機な40）Vertrags – Vereinbarung für die Lieferung eines Flugzeuges He 118 einschl. Lizenz und Nachbaurechte, 1936. 6.
26, in: DMA, FA 001 / 0821.
41）Vertragsvereinbarungen für die Lieferung eines Flugzeuges He118 mit klappbaren Flügelenden, 1937. 4. 10, in:
DMA, FA 001 / 0821.
42）Vertragsvereinbarungen für die Lieferung eines Flugzeuges He 118 Japan Ⅲ mit normalen Aussenflügeln, 1937. 9.
7, in: DMA, FA 001 / 0821.
43）Heinkel［1998, 1953］S. 224.
44）Homze［1976］p. 204.
45）Black［2016］p. 67.
46）Homze［1976］pp. 107, 109.

102

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

ど、新型機の最終試験が空軍によって行われていた 47）。

表 1 1930 年代の各国航空機生産量

単位：機数

1932 年

1933 年

1934 年1935 年

1936 年

1937 年1938 年1939 年

日本

691

766

688

952

1181

1511

3201

4467

ドイツ

36

368

1968

3183

5112

5606

5235

8295

イタリア

不明

386

328

895

1768

1749

1610

1750

イギリス

445

633

740

1140

1877

2153

2827

7940

フランス

不明

不明

不明

785

890

743

1382

3163

アメリカ

593

466

437

459

1141

949

1800

2195

ソ連

2595

2595

2595

3578

3578

3578

7500

10382

出典：Overy［2005］p. 21.

こうした状況下で、ハインケルが空軍再建に果たした役割は顕著であった。1935 年 7 月時点で、同社の従業員数 7611 人は、国有企業ユンカース（9483 人）に次ぎドイツでは二番目に多く、同年 11 月には He111 を平時には一月に 32 機生産可能なオラニエンブルク工場の建設が契約されていた（37 年 5 月生産開始）48）。また He118 は、元々ドイツ空軍の主力
急降下爆撃機用として 35 年 1 月から開発が始められ、36 年 6 月に墜落事故を起こし競争相手のユンカース Ju87 に敗北したため 49）、35 年 11 月時点では、本機は「独空軍ノ試験遅レ
居ル為完成著シク遅レ、明年一月末トナル見込ミナリ」50）と海軍航空本部で報告されている。つまり、日本海軍は未だ試験中であったハインケルの最新鋭機に、それがドイツ空軍の急降下爆撃機に採用される可能性が存在した段階でアクセスし、ライセンス獲得・購入交渉を成功させていたのである。これは輸出より軍事機密保持を重視した同時期の航空省の政策に照らせば異例であり、その背景には前述した空母技術供与の見返りとしての側面があったといえる。
輸入された He118 は航空廠で飛行試験を行った結果、凡庸な機体と判断されライセンス生産は中止され、ハインケル社で講習を受けた山名正夫を主務設計者として、新たに1938 年から He118 を参考に新型艦爆が航空廠（39 年に海軍航空技術廠と改称）で開発された。本機は 43 年に艦上爆撃機「彗星」として制式採用され、日本海軍機としては零戦、47）Tautum Ⅳ / Hoffschmidt (eds.)［1969］p. 12.
48）Homze［1976］p. 108.
49）Green［1990］pp. 325-327.
50）「昭和十年十一月 教育部現状報告」『昭和十年十一月
衛研究所所蔵）。

海軍航空本部各部現状報告』所収（防衛省防103『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

一式陸攻に次ぐ約2160機が生産された 51）。日本海軍の艦上爆撃機は、初代の九四艦爆から「彗星」に至るまで、「自立時代」においても一貫してハインケルからの技術移転を端緒に誕生したことになる。

（3）1930 年代における軍用機の海外移転と技術革新
ドイツ再軍備過程と同時並行的に行われた日本への航空技術移転は、ドイツの航空機輸出政策においていかなる位置を占め、また 1930 年代の世界的な軍用機の移転において
ドイツはどう位置付けられるのか。30-40 年に世界で輸出された軍用機総数（輸送機・練習機を除く）は 1 万 4112 機で、うち輸出機数の多い国はアメリカ（3218 機）、イギリス（2435機）、フランス（2204 機）、イタリア（1786 機）、ドイツ（1336 機）、ソ連（784 機）だが 52）、
30 年代を前半期と後半期で分けると、ドイツの輸出シェアは再軍備後の後半期に伸びている（表 2 参照）。

表 2 軍用機輸出市場におけるシェア（機数による）
1930-34 年

1935-40 年

フランス

26.1%

11.3%

イギリス

24.6％

14.2%

アメリカ

17.3%

25.0%

イタリア

14.7%

11.8%

ドイツ

4.5%

11.5%

ソ連

0％

7.8%

日本

0％

0.7%

出典：Harkavy［1975］pp. 84-85.

1935 年 11 月に成立した武器輸出法により、ドイツでは武器輸出一般が合法化されたが 53）、前述したように再軍備直後の航空省は輸出に消極的であった。しかし外貨の切実な必要性、国際的威信への願望、再軍備景気後における余剰市場の追求などの諸要因により、36 年以降航空省は輸出促進へと次第に政策を変更していった 54）。同年 6 月には航空省技術局長にウーデット（Ernst Udet）が就任したが、ウーデットはドイツ航空機の優越性の宣伝、外国との取引の促進、生産機会の提供による企業のコスト意識強化、産業に対す

51）山名［1994］。
52）Harkavy［1975］p. 61.
53）田嶋［2012］152 頁。
54）Homze［1976］pp. 204-205.

104

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

る潜在市場の開拓等における輸出の重要性を指摘し、航空機製造企業は輸出の価値をより容易に主張可能になった。航空省の政策が軍事機密の保持から、最新機材輸出も厭わない路線へと変化するなかで、ドイツの航空機輸出額は、35 年の 390 万 RM から、36 年の1660 万 RM、37 年の 4345 万 RM、38 年の 9449 万 RM と、3 年間で約 24 倍に増大し、重要な外貨収入源へと成長したのである 55）。主な輸出先はハンガリー、ユーゴスラヴィア、ブル
ガリア、ルーマニア、スペイン、ポルトガルなどの東欧・南欧のほかトルコ、中国などア
ジアにも及ぶが、日本も重要な位置を占めており、例えば 37 年の対日航空機輸出額 653 万
RM は、ハンガリー、トルコに次ぎ三番目に大きい額である 56）。
しかし、特定の航空機の対日輸出に関して、航空省とハインケル間でのトラブルも起きていた。1937 年に日中戦争が勃発し、陸軍はハインケルに He111 双発爆撃機を 70 機注文したが、親中派の航空大臣ゲーリング（Hermann Wilhelm Göring）は輸出を禁じた。陸軍はイタリアに切り替えムッソリーニの仲介で BR-20 重爆撃機を 88 機購入したため、これは 8000 万から 1 億 RM の損失だとハインケルは航空省に抗議している 57）。
ハインケルは、日本への航空機輸出が、日本におけるドイツの政治的影響力増大に資すると指摘し、また以下のように対日輸出を正当化した。第一に、外国に納入される予定の航空機はいつでも差し押さえ可能で本国の空軍が使用できる。第二に、航空機製造における最近の進歩が日本を通じて敵国に渡りうるとの恐れには根拠がない。なぜなら日本人はドイツ人より機密保持に関して信頼できるからだ。第三に、日本人は、ドイツ航空機の輸入やライセンス獲得によっては、航空機製造におけるドイツの技術的優位に決して追い付
けないだろう。なぜなら外国からの航空機注文からその完成まで、もしくはライセンスの供与から外国での実際のライセンス生産までには、常に 1-2 年を要するからだ、と 58）。
ハインケルの三番目の冷徹な指摘は、1930 年代に航空技術がいかに急速に進歩していたかを示唆している。全金属製モノコック構造、引き込み脚、高馬力エンジン、フラップ、
可変プロペラ、夜間飛行装置、無線機、高オクタン燃料を含む戦間期の航空技術革新は、
特に各国の軍事費が抑制された 30 年代半ばまでは、公的な軍事研究ではなく民間企業の投機や民間航空発展の結果として起こり、軍用機開発に転用されていった 59）。例えば、30
年時点では単発戦闘機として主流だった木製複葉機（ホーカー・ハート、ブリストル・ブ55）Homze［1976］pp. 207-209.
56）Homze［1976］pp. 206-207.
57）Homze［1976］p. 208; 今川他編［1962］120-122 頁。
58）Braun［1986］p. 4.
59）Black［2016］p. 62; Buckley［1999］pp. 107-110; Overy［2016］p. 121. 航空技術の軍民転用（デュアル・ユース）については高田［2016］を参照。

105

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

ルドック、ヴォート・コルセア O2U）は、39 年時点では全金属製単葉機（スーパーマリン・
スピットファイア、メッサーシュミット Me109、カーチス P40）に取って代わられ、最高速度は約 2 倍（時速 270~340 キロ→時速 480~620 キロ）、航続距離は約 1.5 倍（640~970 キロ→ 970~1610 キロ）、機体重量は約 2 倍（1270~1950 キロ→ 2270~2720 キロ）と著しく性能が向上した 60）。30 年代の航空機開発は、戦車や艦艇以上に 2-3 年という短期間のサイクルで予定された旧式化を先導し、ある世代の航空機が軍に配備される前でさえ、その後継機が既に開発段階にあるという急速な世代交代と、膨大な費用と激烈さを伴う質的な軍拡競争を促進したのである 61）。

表 3 日本陸海軍機の国別輸入先（1931-41 年）
単位：機数

日本陸軍機

日本海軍機

ドイツ

9（1）

27（25）

アメリカ

25

37

イギリス

4

3

フランス

2

3

イタリア

85

1

注：括弧内はハインケル社からの輸入機数
出典：野沢編［1989］64-105、175-250 頁より作成。

こうした状況下で、1930 年代に世界で輸出された軍用機のうち、85.8％が開発国での生産開始から 5 年以内に輸出されたより新型の機体であり 62）、日本はその「受け手」として多分に恩恵を被った。基本的に、金属機技術はドイツから、空冷エンジン技術はアメリカからの技術導入のもとで機体・エンジンの国産化を追求した日本航空機産業にとり、航空自立化が企図された 30 年代は、欧米各国から最新の航空機・資料を研究目的で輸入でき（表 3 参照）、民間企業は日中戦争以前には大量生産に追われず航空機開発に充分な時間を割くことができ、また海軍航空の行政組織・制度が整備されていたことなど、対外的・対内的に極めて有利な環境であったといえる。陸海軍の航空機に対する戦略的要求の上昇と、
日本航空技術の進歩とのテンポが合致したのは、ごく限られた時期（34-37 年）だけであったが、アジア・太平洋戦争の緒戦で日本軍の攻勢の主役を担った陸海軍機はこの時期に開発が始められた 63）。いずれにせよ、日本航空機産業の自立化は30 年代の技術革新・武器移60）Harkavy［1975］p. 44.
61）Roland［2016］p. 63.
62）Harkavy［1975］p. 93.
63）山田［2015］101-102 頁。

106

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

転・軍拡競争が相互連関する国際関係の下で推進されたことを指摘しておきたい。

（4）ドイツ航空技術への傾斜―技術供給源の多角化から単極化へ―
1936 年末のロンドン海軍軍縮条約失効により、軍縮無条約期を迎えた日本海軍は、37
年に初の「自主的軍備」実行を企図した「第三次軍備補充計画」を成立させ、大和型戦艦
二隻の建造のほか航空隊は 14 隊の増勢（累計 53 隊）が計画された。さらに 39 年成立の「第四次軍備充実計画」では、航空隊は一挙に 75 隊増勢され、これは過去 20 年間に構築された海軍航空戦力を計画 5 年間で倍以上に拡大しようとしたもので、本計画が繰り上げ実施
されおおむね完成した 41 年 12 月に日本は対米英戦に突入した 64）。その間、海軍は 38 年 11月と 41 年 11 月に航空機生産力拡充を民間企業に指示し、海軍航空予算も 37 年 9 月の臨時
軍事費特別会計法の成立も受け膨張し、37 年度は前年度の約 2.6 倍となる 3 億 6290 万円、
39 年度は 6 億 9051 万円となり、海軍予算に占める割合は 35％を超えた 65）。
しかし、日本航空機産業の自立化を支えた海外からの多角的な技術供給源は、日中戦争勃発によって失われつつあった。1938 年 6 月、日本軍の中国に対する爆撃を端緒として、
アメリカ政府は航空機・エンジン・機銃・爆弾・魚雷などの対日輸出を規制し、7 月に国
務省は航空機輸出業者に対し、政府の方針に従うよう通達した。こうした「道義的禁輸（モラル・エンバーゴ）」は 39 年以降実効性を高め、39 年 7 月のアメリカ政府による日米通商航海条約の破棄通告（40 年 1 月失効）に続き、40 年 7 月には大統領に兵器・軍需物資の輸出許可権限を付与する国防法が成立した。
「道義的禁輸」の対象であった航空機・航空機
用燃料・アルミニウムなどは輸出統制下に置かれたのである 66）。日本海軍が39年10月に輸入したダグラス DC-4 試作機が、開戦前に輸入された最後のアメリカ航空機となった 67）。
こうした状況下で、海軍はドイツ航空技術への傾斜を深めた。1937 年 11 月、近衛文麿
内閣は「世界大戦終了後ヨリ現在ニ至ル迄、帝国海軍航空竝民間航空工業ノ向上発展ニ貢献セル所甚大ナルモノアリ」として、ハインケルに勲三等瑞宝章を授与した。叙勲理由のなかで、ハインケルは「一会社ノ社長ナルモ稀ニ見ル親日家」で「永年ニ亘ル帝国海軍ニ対スル貢献ハ、主トシテ其性格竝親日思想ニ基クモノ」と見なされていた 68）。外国の航空機企業の社長に対する叙勲は、極めて異例である。
64）日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969b］53、83-84 頁。
65）防衛庁防衛研修所戦史室［1976］98-99 頁；日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969b］950 頁。
66）水沢［2017］136-138 頁。
67）野沢編［1989］227 頁。
68）「独国人「エルンスト、ハインケル」叙勲ノ件」JACAR：A10113228100、叙勲裁可書・昭和十二年・叙
勲巻九・外国人二止（国立公文書館）。

107

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

1938 年 7 月、海軍航空本部の在独造兵監督官は、ハインケル社が新型の He119 偵察機を基礎として、最高時速 700 キロの爆撃機を試作研究中であり、ハインケル自身は日本海軍の希望があればこの種の飛行機を試作する意向を有していると、航空本部に報告した。さらに監督官は「本件ハ爆撃機ノ高速度化ニ関シ画期的ノモノト認メラルルト共ニ、日独航
空技術連絡上極メテ意義アルモノト思考スル」こと、また「Heinkel 氏ハ、今次事変中ニ
於テモ支那行ト想像セラルル飛行機ノ販売ハ、自己ノ利益ヲ忘却シ全部拒絶スル等、其ノ親日的態度ハ積極的ナリ。海軍トシテ相当考慮ノ要アリト認ム」として、ハインケルに対する試作機の依託を要望した 69）。同年秋には、中国戦線で運用する局地戦闘機用として
海軍はハインケル He112 戦闘機を 12 機輸入している。
同年 12 月には、在独監督官がハインケル社で He119 と He100 戦闘機を見学し、両機の性能や価格（He119：二機分 300 万 RM、三機分 360 万 RM、兵装その他含むライセンス
200 万 RM。He100：二機分 100 万 RM、三機分 120 万 RM、兵装その他含むライセンス 160
万 RM）を航空本部に伝えた。監督官は「総合所見」として「両機トモ多数ノ特許ヲ含ム。
尚空省ヨリ最小三ヵ年ハ日本ニ黙認セル以外何レノ国ニモ販売禁止ノ指令ヲ受ケアリ。見
学ノ結果、益々本機ハ独空軍ノ至宝タルヲ恥ヂザルヲ痛感スルト共ニ、之ガ見学ニ斡旋
セラレタル『ハ』氏竝ニ空省関係者ノ絶大ナル好意ハ誠ニ多トスル所ナリ。我海軍ニシテ之ヲ入手スル時ハ、我技術ニ飛躍的進歩ヲ来スモノト信ズ」と、極秘での早期購入契約を促した 70）。
報告を受けた海軍航空本部技術部では、両機の性能は各国の航空技術水準に照らして「少ナクモ四、五年進歩ヲ示セルモノニシテ、之ヲ試作機時代ニ於テ素早ク購買スルコト
ハ、将来我海軍ニ於ケル優秀機ヲ速カニ実現スル方策トシテ此ノ際特ニ必要ト認ム」とその価値を認めた。特に、空気抵抗減少のため、胴体内部にダイムラー・ベンツ DB601 水冷エンジンを二台並列装備し一本のプロペラを動かす機構や、エンジン冷却法としてラジエーターを廃した翼面利用の空気冷却法など、He119 の「特殊技術」は時速 592 キロの優速を実現し、これは「対敵行動上絶対ノ優越性ヲ得ル」ため、本機購入の価値は「此ノ特殊ノ技術ヲ採リ入レ、之ニヨリ今後成ル可ク早キ時期ニ於テ、我海軍ニ此ノ種優速飛行機ヲ実現セントスル点」にあった。航空本部は、両機種を二機ずつ製造権・図面と共に購入
し、海軍・民間から技術者をハインケル社に派遣し「特殊技術」を習得させ、海軍の用兵上に合致する航空機を帰国後直ちに開発させるとの方針で臨み、価格については「相当高69）「外監電報綴」JACAR：C14120198100、海軍航空本部 支那事変日誌 一般記事 昭和 13. 7. 1~13. 7. 31（防衛省防衛研究所）。
70）「機密第三六七番電」『航空本部関係資料雑綴 昭和 8~ 昭和 13』所収（防衛省防衛研究所所蔵）。

108

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

価ナルモ高度ニ進歩セル技術ノ代償トシテ、又独国ガ最モ極秘トセルモノヲ提供シ来レル点ヲ考慮セバ、蓋シ已ムヲ得ザルモノト認ム」として購入を躊躇しなかった 71）。
両機の技術習得のため、1939 年初頭には、航空本部の塚田英夫中佐を団長として、航空本部・空技廠・三菱・中島・愛知の将校・技師からなる 11 名の官民合同のドイツ航空
技術調査団が派遣された。機体技師はハインケル社で、エンジン技師はダイムラー・ベン
ツ社で、約 2 年間翼面冷却法やプロペラ延長軸駆動装置、DB606 双子型液冷エンジン等の技術を学び、He100・He119 は 2 機ずつが 40-41 年に日本に輸入された 72）。両機の操縦講習を霞ヶ浦で行ったハインケル社首席パイロットのニチュケ（Gerhard Nitschke）には、43年1月に東条英機内閣より勲五等瑞宝章が授与された 73）。また43年春にはHe100・He177大型爆撃機の日立航空機でのライセンス生産も計画され、千葉海岸で大工場建設が準備されたが、ドイツからの工作機械輸送が途絶え頓挫している 74）。
厖大な資金が投入されたこの官民挙げての技術導入だったが、海軍航空戦力の強化に貢献したとは言い難い。その最大の要因は、日本に対する航空技術供給源がドイツに単極化されてしまったことで、具体的には日本の航空エンジン製造に対するドイツ系技術の突然の流入である。1930 年代の航空自立化過程において、日本は主にアメリカからの技術導入に依拠しつつ、中島「寿」（31 年・500 馬力）
・三菱「金星」（36 年・900 馬力）、中島「栄」（39 年・980 馬力）など、性能・機械的信頼性ともに高い空冷エンジンの国産化に成功し、大半の陸海軍機にも空冷エンジンが装備された。欧米先進国に対して裾野の狭い日本の基礎工業技術上、生産・整備の容易な空冷エンジンが量産されたのは適切なプロセスだったといえる。
しかし、1939 年 6 月には、陸海軍主導の下で、愛知・川崎航空機がダイムラー・ベンツ
社と DB601 液冷エンジンのライセンス生産契約を 100 万 RM のライセンス料を支払い締結
した 75）。国産 DB601 は愛知「アツタ」
・川崎「ハ－ 40」「ハ－ 140」として 1941 年から生産されたが、例えば、元々空冷「寿」を生産していた愛知の工場では、部品が多く構造が複雑な液冷「アツタ」への生産技術転換に手間取り、戦時中の軍部からの注文数 3850 台に対して、「アツタ」の生産台数は 1623 台にとどまる 76）。川崎での生産数を含めても、国産
71）「「ハインケル」新攻撃機（一一九型）及新戦闘機（一○○型）購買ニ関スル意見」『航空本部関係資料
雑綴 昭和 8~ 昭和 13』所収（防衛省防衛研究所所蔵）。
72）岡村他編［1976］341-342 頁。
73）「 独 国 人「 ハ イ ン ケ ル 」 飛 行 機 会 社 主 席 操 縦 士「 ゲ ル ハ ル ト、 ニ チ ケ 」 叙 勲 ノ 件 」JACAR：
A10113471500、叙勲裁可書・昭和十八年・叙勲巻十一・外国人（国立公文書館）。
74）岡村他編［1976］349 頁。
75）Braun［1990］S. 332.
76）Cohen［1949］p. 213.

109

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

DB601 は 5275 台の生産にとどまり、これは 41-45 年の日本の航空エンジン生産数約 10 万5500 台の 5％を占めたに過ぎない 77）。国産 DB601 を装備した艦上爆撃機「彗星」
・三式戦闘
機「飛燕」は、機体生産に対しエンジン生産が追い付かず、さらに部隊配備後のエンジン故障も頻発し、戦争後期には両機とも空冷「金星」にエンジン換装されている。言うまでもなく、海軍が「特殊技術」として期待した、DB601 を二台連結した DB606 の量産も、翼面冷却法の実用化も行われていない。日本の狭隘な工業基盤には不適合なドイツの液冷
航空エンジンの技術導入は、武器移転における「受け手」が多角的な技術供給源を喪失した際の脆弱性を如実に示したといえるが、日本は 40 年 9 月の三国同盟締結を契機に、ますますドイツへの技術的依存を深化させていくことになる。

４ 日本航空機産業自立化の到達点
1930 年代の日本航空機産業は、海軍の積極的な航空技術行政の下でどの程度の自立化を達成できたのか。従来の日本軍事史・経済史研究でしばしば指摘されるのは、近代日本の軍需工業全般が、欧米先進国とは対照的に一般重工業の自立的発展の上に形成されず、国家による強行的拡張政策のもとで産業構成上著しく不均衡に発展し、「軍事的に転倒した形態」78）をとったことである。特に高度な総合組立工業である航空機産業は、30 年代の「自立時代」においても、自立化が達成されたのは機体・エンジンの設計技術に局限され、関連基礎工業や自動車産業の脆弱性から戦時の航空機量産が阻害され、工作機械や装備品（プロペラ・照準器・航空機銃等）は輸入・ライセンス生産から脱却できず模倣・外国依存を余儀なくされたなど、日本の経済基盤の狭隘性に起因する自立化の限界が強調されてきた 79）。
上記の指摘は、後発国における兵器国産化の一事例として近代日本を位置付ける際に再考するべき重要な論点である。したがって、以下ではこの問題を、国際的な兵器生産構造としての兵器供給国・需要国間の諸階層における日本の位置や、30 年代航空機産業・航空戦力の時代的特質など、より多角的な視点から検討したい。
武器移転史の先行研究において、軍事技術・兵器の移転と国産化によって構築される兵器供給国・需要国間の国際的階層は、以下のように要約されている。

77）日本航空協会編［1975］871、877 頁。
78）小山［1972］9 頁。
79）さしあたっては、藤原［2006］356-360 頁；林［1957］256 頁；山田［2015］131-133 頁；千田［2016］84-85 頁を参照。

110

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

第一階層供給国：技術的な最先端地点でイノベーションを行い、一時的に特定軍事技術の独占的なあるいは優越的な供給者となる国家（戦間期：アメリカ、イギリス、フランス、ドイツ）
第二階層供給国：技術的な最先端地点かそれに近接した地点で兵器を生産し、特定の市場・安全保障の要求に既存の軍事技術を適合させうる国家（戦間期：日本、ソ連、イタリア、スペイン、チェコスロヴァキア）
第三階層供給国：既存の軍事技術をコピーし再生産するが、イノベーションや改造の基礎的方法を獲得していない国家（戦間期：中国、トルコ、ベルギー、スウェーデン、ポーランド）
第四階層需要国：兵器を獲得し運用するが、兵器生産能力のない国家（戦間期：アジア、アフリカ、ラテンアメリカの小国・植民地）
第五階層需要国：兵器を獲得するが運用できない国家、もしくは獲得もできない国家（戦間期：アジア、アフリカ、ラテンアメリカの小国・植民地）80）

上記の諸階層は特定の時代状況における国際社会のヒエラルキーを反映している。戦間期に第二階層供給国に位置した日本やソ連は、後発工業国として限られた国内工業基盤
や人的・物的リソースに依拠しつつ、多角的な技術移転や部分的なライセンス生産を通じて航空機産業・航空戦力を拡大・強化せざるを得なかったのである。理論的には、直接輸入→ライセンス生産→設計・開発能力獲得に従って兵器国産化能力は向上するとされるが、現実的には第一階層供給国でさえ、部分的には輸入兵器やライセンス生産にも依存している事実を忘れてはならないだろう 81）。兵器国産化能力に関する欧米先進国と後発国との二項対立的な比較や、後発国の限界を過度に強調する議論を相対化するうえで82）、ドイツ
航空省が作成した日本航空機産業の分析報告書（1942 年 1 月）における以下の指摘は示唆的である。

日本航空機産業の状態に関する全ての議論は、この産業が発展してきた期間が短く、諸外国がこの部門に従事してきた期間がかなり長期に及んだことに対する理解に基づかなければならない。したがって、多くの点で日本の航空機が劣るのは驚くに当たら

80）Kraus［1992］pp. 31-32, 72-79; Hoyt［2007］p. 13.
81）Hoyt［2007］p. 16.
82）第三世界諸国、特にインドにおける兵器国産化の成果に着目した最近の研究としては、横井［2018］を
参照。

111

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

ない。膨大な熱意やエネルギーをもって日本人がこの分野に専心し、極めて短期間のうちに航空機産業を現在の地位へと到達させたことに対して、十分な評価が与えられなければならない 83）。

いま一つ考慮すべき点は、1930 年代に急発展した航空戦力と航空機産業の時代的特質である。第二次世界大戦が勃発した時点で、航空戦力は重要な戦略的任務を担えるほどの発展段階に到達していたが、一方で航空機産業は、既存の工場での実践と技術的経験に適合する大量生産が可能な限界点に達していた。軍事史家のオヴァリーが指摘するように、「第二次世界大戦が 5 年早く戦われていたら、戦争は第一次世界大戦における限定的な航空戦闘に類似していただろうし、大戦が 10 年遅く戦われていたら、技術的に極めて複雑で高額な航空機が生産され、実際と同規模の『大量生産型』航空戦力はほとんどあり得な84）かっただろう」。航空機の質・量の両立という極めて厳しい課題に、各国の航空機産業が当時直面していたことに留意する必要がある。
航空戦力の軍事的有効性に関しては、日本海軍航空戦力は熟練搭乗員・質的に優秀な軍用機と相まって、第二次世界大戦ではソ連・イタリアの空軍よりも多様な戦略的・戦術的任務を遂行し、また日本海軍機はソ連空軍機よりも質的に上回り、空母の運用能力・艦載機の開発能力ではイギリスを上回っていたとされる 85）。1930年代半ばにおいて、日本航空機産業は、欧米から導入した機体・エンジン・装備品の多用な技術を、陸海軍の用兵思想に沿う優秀な国産機の開発へと適合させる能力を有しており、この点では第二階層において優越的地位を保持していたといえる。
一方、航空機生産能力に関して日本は第二階層内でも特殊な立場にある。1930 年代、
日本は主要な航空機生産国のなかで唯一輸出実績に乏しかった（表 2 参照）。日本の航空機が「価格ノ点ニ於テ欧米ノ多量生産ニ依ルモノニ比シ不利ナル立場ニ在ル」86）こともそ
83）The Reich-Minister for Air and the Air High Command, “Japan: Air Armament Industry and Equipment” 1942.
Jan. 1, in: TNA, AIR 40 / 2215 Japanese Armament: Report on “Japan: Air Armament Industry and Equipment”
1941 Apr. - 1945 May, p. 58.
本報告書を含め、第二次世界大戦期にドイツ航空省が作成した日本航空機産業に対する評価レポートを、
イギリス空軍省は複数獲得し英訳している。本報告書にその入手経路は明記されていないが、筆者が調査した TNA 所蔵の別史料（1945 年 6 月 6 日付）には、45 年 5 月のドイツ降伏直前に連合軍の捕虜となったド
イツ航空省対日特別代表部部員の覚書と、関連する押収史料が英訳されている。したがって、本報告書も大戦末期にイギリス軍がドイツから押収し英訳した史料の一つと推測される。
84）Overy［1992］p. 20.
85）O’Brien［2015］pp. 65-66; Till［1996］.
86）「昭和十年十一月 教育部現状報告」『昭和十年十一月 海軍航空本部各部現状報告』所収（防衛省防衛研究所所蔵）。

112

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）の一因だが、より重要なのは、事実上軍需にのみ結びついた開発・生産過程のなかで、世界的にも独特の兵器高度化（性能至上主義・量産性軽視）を日本軍用機が遂げたことである。終戦直後の 46 年に、三菱の航空技術者たちは、35-37 年に輸入されたユンカース航空
機（Ju-160・Ju-86・Ju-87）に対する当時の軍部・三菱の評価を以下のように回想している。

当時我国海陸軍共に、飛行機は只その表面にあらわれし性能と操縦性のみにて評価
せられ、多量生産整備取扱い等に対する関心薄かりしため、之等の飛行機は紙上の性能国産機に劣りしため殆ど問題とされず、従って試作改造に寧日無く、且つ漸く自信を強めし三菱技術者之を深く研究することなく、之等輸入機に隠れたる大なる特質、特に多量生産に対する研究にこの当時深く注意せざりしは惜しむべきことなりき 87）。

こうした性能至上主義は、1937 年の日中戦争勃発以降さらに激化したが、新型機の生産・実戦配備は滞るようになる。アジア・太平洋戦争中、第一線で使用された日本海軍機は 28 機種・62 形式・総数 2 万 5000 機に及ぶが、うち 41 年 12 月の開戦以後に設計された試作機のうち実戦で活躍したのは艦上偵察機「彩雲」のみで、開戦前に設計され開戦後初めて試作機が飛行した 8 機種の総生産数は、前記 2 万 5000 機のうち約 15％に過ぎず、37-45
年における多種多様な海軍試作機のうち、実用化されたものはわずか 6％であった 88）。

５ おわりに
1931-41 年の間に、日本海軍と愛知は、ハインケル社から 9 機種 25 機の航空機を輸入した。特に 32 年の試作三ヵ年計画で新たに登場した艦上爆撃機は、全機種がハインケルからの技術導入を起源に開発され、海軍航空戦力の強化に大きく貢献したのである。両者の提携は、日本航空機産業が「自立時代」を迎え、ドイツ航空機産業が自国の再軍備・空軍再建のため動員された軍拡期 30 年代に緊密化した点が、ロールバッハ、ユンカース、ドルニエと日本との提携とは顕著に異なった。本稿では以下の内容を明らかにした。
第 2 節では、日本海軍の航空自立化計画における艦上爆撃機の開発を概観した。ロンドン海軍軍縮条約締結により航空戦力強化の必要性を認識した海軍は、航空機産業の自立化を企図し、機体・エンジンの国産化を試作三ヵ年計画で追求した。同計画で初めて試作
87）高橋巳治郎他［1946］『三菱重工業株式会社製作飛行機歴史』（防衛省防衛研究所所蔵）、665 頁。機体
設計技師の高橋は 1939-40 年にドイツ航空技術調査団の一員としてハインケル社で技術研修を受けている。
88）堀越・奥宮［2007］537 頁；岡村他編［1976］384 頁。

113

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）された艦上爆撃機は、航空自立化方針から逸脱する形でハインケル社から技術導入が行われた。その背景としては、20 年代から既に海軍と同社との間で提携実績のあったこと、またハインケルの技術開発路線が際立った高速機・軍需志向であったことが挙げられる。
第 3 節では、ドイツ再軍備後におけるハインケルからの航空技術移転を議論した。ドイ
ツから様々な軍事技術の獲得を企図した日本海軍は、航空母艦の技術をドイツ海軍に供与し、その見返りとして、ハインケル社から新型急降下爆撃機の技術移転を成功させた。
30 年代は世界的に航空技術が急発展したが、欧米先進国からは新型の航空機が大量に輸出されるなかで、日本航空機産業は多角的な技術導入が可能な有利な状況下で、主に機体はドイツ系、エンジンはアメリカ系の技術に依拠し航空機の国産化・近代化を実現していった。しかし日中戦争勃発後にアメリカからの技術移転が困難になると、日本はエンジン製造を含めた航空技術供給源をドイツにのみ依拠せざるを得なくなり、新型機の開発・生産は滞るようになった。
第 4 節では、これまでの議論を踏まえたうえで、1930 年代における日本航空機産業の自立化の到達点を国際比較の観点から再考した。日本は相対的に狭隘な工業基盤のうえで、
欧米先進国からの技術移転や部分的なライセンス生産に依拠しつつ、航空機産業の自立化を追求せざるを得ない後発国の地位にあった。広範な任務が要求される海軍航空戦力に適合する優秀な国産機の開発能力は保持していたが、性能偏重・量産性軽視という世界的にも独特の兵器高度化を追求した日本航空機産業は、主要な航空機生産国のなかで唯一輸出実績に乏しかった。
近代日本の航空機産業自立化を後発国における兵器国産化の一事例と位置付け、戦間期のソ連や戦後冷戦期の第三世界諸国と比較考察し、先進国からの武器移転と後発国の軍事的自立化との相互関係を解き明かすことが議論の精緻化・普遍化に不可欠だが、これは今後の課題としたい。

文献リスト【邦文文献】
相澤淳［2002］『海軍の選択―再考 真珠湾への道―』中央公論新社。
池田清［1993］『日本の海軍（躍進篇）』朝日ソノラマ（初出 1966）。
今川一策他編［1962］『航空情報・臨時増刊 回想の日本陸軍機』酣燈社。
大木毅［1995］「フリードリヒ・ハックと日本海軍」『国際政治』第 109 号。
岡村純他編［1976］『航空技術の全貌（上）』原書房（初出 1953）。
尾崎紀男［1994］「九九式艦上爆撃機」航空情報別冊編集部編『設計者の証言―日本傑作機開発ドキュメン
ト（上）』酣燈社（初出 1959）。

114

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

小野塚知二［2016］「戦間期航空機産業の技術的背景と地政学的背景―海軍航空の自立化と戦略爆撃への道―」横井勝彦編『航空機産業と航空戦力の世界的転回』日本経済評論社。
カスパリ、ジグルン［1996］「陸・海軍航空史と独日技術交流」『軍事史学』第 31 巻第 4 号。
小島秀雄［1962］「帝国海軍と日独間の技術の交流」『水交』第 106 号。
小山弘健［1972］『日本軍事工業の史的分析』御茶の水書房。
ザンダー＝ナガシマ、ベルトホルト［2008］「日独海軍の協力関係」工藤章・田嶋信雄編『日独関係史 18901945 Ⅱ―枢軸形成の多元的力学―』東京大学出版会。
高田馨里［2016］「軍事航空と民間航空―戦間期における軍縮破綻と航空問題―」『国際武器移転史』第 2 号。
田嶋信雄［2012］「第三帝国の軍拡政策と中国への武器輸出」横井勝彦・小野塚知二編『軍拡と武器移転の世界史―兵器はなぜ容易に広まったのか―』日本経済評論社。
千田武志［2016］「日本海軍における航空機生産体制の形成と特徴」横井勝彦編『航空機産業と航空戦力の世界的転回』日本経済評論社。
塚田英夫［1982］「用兵と技術の接点」海空会編『海鷲の航跡―日本海軍航空外史―』原書房。
永岑三千輝［2014a］「ヴェルサイユ体制下ドイツ航空機産業と秘密再軍備（1）」『横浜市立大学論叢』第 65
巻 社会科学系列 第 1・2・3 合併号。
永岑三千輝［2014b］「ヴェルサイユ体制下ドイツ航空機産業と秘密再軍備（2）」『横浜市立大学論叢』第 66
巻 人文科学系列 第 1 号。
永岑三千輝［2015］「ヴェルサイユ体制下ドイツ航空機産業と秘密再軍備（3）」『横浜市立大学論叢』第 66
巻 社会科学系列 第 2 号。
永岑三千輝［2016］「ヴェルサイユ体制下ドイツ航空機産業と秘密再軍備（4）」『横浜市立大学論叢』第 67
巻 社会科学系列 第 1・2 合併号。
永岑三千輝［2017］「ユンカースの世界戦略と日本―1919-1933―」『横浜市立大学論叢』第 68 巻

社会科学

系列 第 2 号。
西尾隆志［2017］「戦間期ドイツから日本への航空技術移転―日本航空技術
「自立」
化過程と
「軍縮下の軍拡」―」『国際武器移転史』第 4 号。
日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969a］『日本海軍航空史（1） 用兵編』時事通信社。
日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969b］『日本海軍航空史（2） 軍備編』時事通信社。
日本海軍航空史編纂委員会編［1969c］『日本海軍航空史（3） 制度・技術編』時事通信社。
日本航空協会編［1975］『日本航空史 昭和前期編』同。
野沢正編［1989］『日本航空機辞典 1910~1945』モデルアート。
林克也［1957］『日本軍事技術史』青木書店。
パウアー、エーリヒ［2008］「日独技術交流とその担い手」工藤章・田嶋信雄編『日独関係史 1890-1945 Ⅲ―体制変動の社会的衝撃―』東京大学出版会。
藤原彰［2006］『日本軍事史（上巻）戦前篇』社会評論社（初出 1987）。
防衛庁防衛研修所戦史室［1976］『戦史叢書 海軍航空概史』朝雲新聞社。
堀越二郎・奥宮正武［2007］『零戦』学研 M 文庫（初出 1952）。
水沢光［2017］『軍用機の誕生―日本軍の航空戦略と技術開発―』吉川弘文館。
山田朗［2015］『近代日本軍事力の研究』校倉書房。

115

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

山名正夫［1994］「艦上爆撃機「彗星」」航空情報別冊編集部編『設計者の証言―日本傑作機開発ドキュメン
ト（上）』酣燈社（初出 1959）。
横井勝彦［2014］「軍縮期における欧米航空機産業と武器移転」横井勝彦編『軍縮と武器移転の世界史―「軍縮下の軍拡」はなぜ起きたのか―』日本経済評論社。
横井勝彦［2018］「インドの兵器国産化政策と軍事援助」『国際武器移転史』第 5 号。

【欧文文献】
Black, Jeremy［2016］Air Power: A Global History, Lanham, MD.
Braun, Hans-Joachim［1986］“Technology Transfer Under Conditions of War: German Aero-Technology in Japan
during the Second World War”, History of Technology, vol. 11.
Braun, Hans-Joachim［1990］„Technologietransfer im Flugzeugbau zwischen Deutschland und Japan 1936-1945“, in:Josef Kreiner / Regime Mathias (Hg.), Deutschland-Japan in der Zwischenkriegszeit, Bonn.
Buckley, John［1999］Air Power in the Age of Total War, Bloomington, IN.
Cohen, Jerome B.［1949］Japan’s Economy in War and Reconstruction, Minneapolis, MN.
（コーヘン、J・B 大内兵衛訳［1950］『戦時・戦後の日本経済（上・下 )』岩波書店 )。
Goldman, Emily O.［2003］“Receptivity to Revolution: Carrier Air power in Peace and War”, in: Emily O. Goldman/ Leslie C. Eliason (eds.), The Diffusion of Miliary Technology and Ideas, Stanford, CA.
Green, William［1990］The Warplanes of the Third Reich, New York.
Harkavy, Robert E.［1975］The Arms Trade and International Systems, Cambridge.
Heinkel, Ernst〔Jürgen Thorwald (Hg.)〕［1998, 1953］Stürmisches Leben, Oberhaching, Bayern.
（ハインケル、E ／トールヴァルト、J 松谷健二訳［1981］『嵐の生涯』フジ出版社 )。
Homze, Edward L.［1976］Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry 1919-39,
Lincoln, NE.
Hoyt, Timothy D.［2007］Military Industry and Regional Defense Policy: India, Iraq, and Israel, New York.
Köhler, Hans Dieter［1983］Ernst Heinkel: Pionier der Schnellflugzeuge, Koblenz.
Krause, Keith［1992］Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade, Cambridge.
Krug, Hans-Joachim / Hirama, Yoichi / Sander-Nagashima, Berthold J. / Niestlé, Axel［2001］Reluctant Allies:
German-Japanese Naval Relations in World War Ⅱ, Annapolis, MD.
O’Brien, Phillips Payson［2015］How the War was Won: Air-Sea Power and Allied Victory in World War Ⅱ,
Cambridge.
Overy, Richard［1992］“Air Power in the Second World War: Historical Themes and Theories”, in: Horst Boog (ed.),The Conduct of the Air War in the Second World War: An International Comparison, Oxford.
Overy, Richard［2005］The Air War 1939-1945, Dulles, VA.
Overy, Richard［2016］“Aircraft and the Arms Race Between the World Wars”, in: Thomas Mahnken / Joseph Maiolo/ David Stevenson (eds.), Arms Races in International Politics: From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century,
New York.
Peattie, Mark R.［2001］Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese Naval Air Power, 1909-1941, Annapolis, MD.
Roland, Alex［2016］War and Technology: A Very Short Introduction, New York.

116

1930 年代におけるドイツから日本への航空技術移転（西尾隆志）

Tantum Ⅳ, William H. / Edward J. Hoffschmidt (eds.)［1969］The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force (1933 to1945), Old Greenwich, CT.
Till, Geoffrey［1996］“Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese Case Studies”, in:Williamson Murray / Allan R. Millet (eds.), Military Innovation in the Interwar Period, Cambridge.

117『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月） 119 － 122 頁

書評

榎本珠良編著『国際政治史における軍縮と軍備管理――19 世紀から現代まで』日本経済評論社、2016 年、284 頁
後藤 春美
東京大学教授国際政治をすでに出来上がった体系として理解するか、あるいは、体系の形成という観点から見るか。歴史研究を含めた学際的研究は、自ずと後者となる。権威ある条約、法、機構も、欠点を持ち完全ではない人々が生み出したものと知ることのメリットは何であろうか。それは、彼らの取り組みの軌跡を見ることで、出来上がった体系・規範も限界を含むことを痛感し、既存のもののまま固定させる必要はなく、むしろ、より良い、欠点の少ないものにする不断の努力こそが重要なのだと理解することであろう。
本書は、武器移転の規制、軍備管理という非常に具体的な取り組みを 19 世紀末から現代まで追求している。従来、戦争違法化運動や紛争の平和的解決という側面から平和維持の問題を検討した研究は存在したが、本書はその検討対象の具体性において独自と言えよう。なお、軍備管理という概念が作られたのは冷戦期で、「当初、後に軍備管理と呼ばれる施策は、軍縮の施策から区別されておらず、軍備管理的な施策が軍縮へのステップ
だと理解されており、この両概念が区別されたのは第二次世界大戦後であった。
」（第 5 章、
174-5 頁）したがって、本書も、戦間期までに関しては軍備管理と軍縮会議の両方を検討している。
本書の構成を確認しておこう。

序章 武器移転規制と軍備の削減・制限をめぐる歴史

榎本珠良

第１章 アフリカ貿易とブリュッセル会議（1889 ～ 90 年）

竹内真人

第２章 両大戦間期における軍事力と国際的不安定性

ジョー・マイオロ

第３章 第二次ロンドン海軍軍縮会議予備交渉の過程

小谷賢

第４章 ジュネーヴ軍縮会議に至るイギリス国際軍縮政策とフランス安全保障問題
松永友有
第５章 戦間期武器貿易規制交渉の帰結と遺産

キース・クラウス

第６章 アメリカの戦時在外余剰資産の処分と武器移転

須藤功

第７章 冷戦終結後の通常兵器移転規制の進展と限界

榎本珠良

終章 軍縮・軍備管理の学際的研究に向けた諸課題

榎本珠良

119

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

このうち、軍備管理や武器移転に関する研究が、第 1 章、第 5 章、第 6 章、第 7 章、軍縮会議に関する研究が第 3 章、第 4 章である。扱う時期としては、第 1 章が 19 世紀末、第 2章から第 5 章が両大戦間期、第 6 章が第二次世界大戦直後、第 7 章が 1990 年代以降となっている。
19 世紀にヨーロッパの国々は「グローバルな武器貿易に対して最低限の監督しか行わず、規制のための多国間合意の提案や交渉も行わなかった。
」（第 5 章、158-9 頁）その唯一の例外が第 1 章で検討されるブリュッセル会議であり、竹内は先住民保護協会（Aborigines’
Protection Society）という人道主義団体の資料を詳細に検討している。
榎本が序章（7 頁）で紹介するマルティ・コスケニエミの研究が明らかにするように、
19 世紀の国際法は帝国支配を正当化するための議論を展開していた。しかし、国際法は両大戦間期には大きな変化を遂げ、「文明国」間の武器移転規制や列強諸国の軍備の削減・制限も国際的な政策アジェンダと見なされるようになった。
（序章、13 頁）これまで戦間期の国際連盟は失敗した機関として無視されがちであったが、本書第 5 章でクラウスは、
連盟規約 8 条および 23 条 d 項に武器貿易規制が目標として盛り込まれたことに注目する。
この章は、本書第 1 章から第 7 章をつなぐ結節点の役割を果たしている。連盟規約に基づ
く五つのイニシアティヴのうち最初の 1919 年条約は、明らかに 1890 年ブリュッセル協定の延長線上にある。一方で、情報の収集、年鑑の出版などの透明性確保装置、連盟における中央国際事務局の設置など、条項の内容には現在の施策とも類似する点があるという。
多国間フォーラムとして国際連盟は時代の先駆けではあったが、理想にかなう結果を生
むには未発達で、周知のように失敗した。しかし、榎本が終章（254 頁）で、本書の姉妹編『軍縮と武器移転の世界史』での西川純子の指摘 1）を紹介した下記の要約は、やはり重要である。すなわち、「より長期の歴史の中に位置付けた時、戦間期に列強諸国の軍備の問題が国際社会の最大の課題の一つとされ、その制限のみならず削減が謳われ、軍備の削減や制限が諸国家の外交テーマとして正式に掲げられ、度重なる会議が設定され交渉が行われたこと自体は、注目に値する」のである。
第 3 章、第 4 章は、二つの軍縮会議に関し詳細な検討を加えている。その分析の前提として、以下の点に言及しておきたい。第一に、戦間期には確かに戦争違法化という理想を追求する運動が存在したが 2）、国際連盟は現実には集団安全保障に依り、共同制裁を否定

1） 西川純子［2014］「戦間期の軍縮――ウィルソンからフーヴァーまで」横井勝彦編『軍縮と武器移転の世界史――「軍縮下の軍拡」はなぜ起きたのか』日本経済評論社、32-33 頁。
2） この問題を扱った優れた研究として、三牧聖子［2014］『戦争違法化運動の時代――「危機の 20 年」のアメリカ国際関係思想』名古屋大学出版会。

120

榎本珠良編著『国際政治史における軍縮と軍備管理――19 世紀から現代まで』（後藤春美）

していなかった。つまり、究極的な可能性として戦争は否定されておらず、そのためにこそ、いかに軍縮、軍備管理を行うかが重要となり、繰り返し細かい議論がなされたということである 3）。第二に、1932年に開幕したジュネーヴ会議に至る過程を扱う第4章に関して
は、19 世紀以来のイギリス外交の根幹となるバランス・オブ・パワーという発想、および、
J.M. ケインズ『平和の経済的帰結』に代表的に見られるような、パリ講和会議以降のイギ
リスのドイツに対する罪悪感、パワーとしてのドイツ復興への期待の存在を指摘したい 4）。
第三に、第 3 章に関しては、国際連盟規約 1 条により連盟脱退通告が効力を持つのは二年後であったという点を強調したい。すなわち、本章が扱う 1934 年には、1933 年に連盟脱退を通告した日本は依然として連盟国だったのであり、脱退が確定した 1935 年 3 月以降、状況はさらに変化したのである。なお、社会人道分野を含め、日本が連盟を完全に去ったのは、さらに遅く、1938 年 11 月である。
第 6 章は、第二次世界大戦直後を扱っており、中国大陸や東南アジアに残された旧日本軍の武器移転とも比較して考えられるべき興味深い事例を扱っている。第 7 章は冷戦終結後を扱い、終章では本書に対する編者自身の真摯な批判と今後の課題が述べられている。

さて、上記に紹介したように重要なテーマを扱う本書であるが、十分に展開されなかった点もあると考えられる。
第一に、本書の構成を見ると、1950 年代から 80 年代、すなわち冷戦期の軍備管理に関する大きな空白が目につく。冷戦期とは政治的、文化的に国際協力の試みが完全に死滅した時代であったのか。いや、編者執筆の序章 2「軍縮・軍備管理の歴史概観」によると、
そうでもないようである。冷戦期には、とくに核兵器をめぐって軍備管理や不拡散を趣旨とした合意形成が活発に試みられた。また、生物兵器に関しては戦間期の提案が実現された。一方、戦間期との大きな相違は、条約の文言に「文明国」間の戦争に適用される旨が盛り込まれなかったことである。さらに、武器移転規制に関しては、西側諸国が公開ない
し登録の制度を提案した一方、非同盟諸国が大国の軍備削減こそ必要であるとして、それに反対した。このように整理される進展が見られたのであるから、それを検討、分析する章が本書にはやはり必要であったように思われる。
第二に、本書が四章を割いて検討する戦間期には、失敗したとは言え、長期的に見れ
3） 西平等［2016］「連盟期の国際秩序構想におけるモーゲンソー政治的紛争論の意義（１）」『関西大学法学論集』第 65 巻第 6 号、矢嶋光［2017］「日本国憲法第 9 条と集団安全保障――芦田均の軌跡を手がかりに」『比較憲法学研究』第 29 号。
4） この考えは、E.H. カーにも共有されていた。山中仁美［2017］『戦争と戦争のはざまで――E.H. カーと世界大戦』ナカニシヤ出版、98-102 頁参照。

121

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

ば大きな変化が起こっていた。この動因は何であったのか。本書第 2 章は、「管理された軍備増強」（77 頁）から戦争への道を分析するリアリストの論文である。実際、「1890 年代から 1930 年代にかけてのイギリスの政策論議には、このリアリスト的な目的意識が強く影響していた。
」（第 5 章、174 頁）一方で、第 5 章は、E・H・カーが言うところの理想主義者についても言及している。評者は、戦間期の変化の動因としてはやはり理想主義者の存在は無視できず、リアリストの第 2 章の対になるものとして、理想主義者の軍縮、軍備管理への取り組みを検討する章があった方が良かったのではないかと考える。
そのような理想主義者の例として、本書では一度も言及されていないが、フィリッ
プ・ノエル＝ベーカー（Philip Noel-Baker）が考えられる 5）。彼は、パリ講和会議国際連
盟委員会以来セシル卿と政治面では親子のような関係を築いた。1927 年には『軍縮』（Disarmament）という書を著し、29 年の選挙では労働党議員として当選し、アーサー・ヘンダーソン外相によって政策秘書に任命された。31 年の選挙では議席を失ったものの、32 年からのジュネーヴ軍縮会議では議長ヘンダーソンの補佐として活動した。20 年代から 50 年代を通じて労働党きっての軍縮の権威であり、第二次世界大戦後には核の問題に関し、広島も訪れている。
セシルもノエル＝ベーカーも戦争を完全に否定する絶対的平和主義者ではなく、1930
年代後半には、平和を愛好するが必要であれば戦わざるを得ないという態度へと変化していった。本書には戦間期の軍縮会議に関してイギリスを中心として検討する章もあり、その会議の際にヘンダーソンやセシルと密接に活動した思想家であり政治家でもあるノエル＝ベーカーなどを視野に入れた方が、戦間期以降の変化をより良く把握できたのではないかと考える。
以上、評者なりの評を試みたが、思わぬ誤読、理解不足も多いことと思う。ご海容を請いたい。本書を出発点としてさらなる研究が積み重ねられ、今日ますます困難の多い軍備
管理、軍縮が少しでも進展することを願って筆を擱くこととしよう。

5） D. ロング＆ P. ウィルソン［2002］『危機の 20 年と思想家たち――戦間期理想主義の再評価』ミネルヴァ
書房、第 2 章、後藤春美［2016］『国際主義との格闘――日本、国際連盟、イギリス帝国』中公叢書、37-42 頁。また、本書第１章に関連する論文として、五十嵐元道［2016］『支配する人道主義――植民地統治から平和構築まで』岩波書店。

122

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月） 123 － 126 頁

書評

千田武志著『呉海軍工廠の形成』錦正社、2018 年、804 頁
奈倉 文二
獨協大学名誉教授

本書は、A5 判 804 頁（年表、あとがき等を除く本文だけで 770 頁）にも及ぶ大著である。
その目次構成を示すと、以下のように 2 編 12 章（及び序章、終章）からなる。
序章、呉海軍工廠形成史研究の目的と方法
第 1 編、呉海軍工廠の形成過程
第 1 章、鎮守府の候補地の調査と呉港への決定
第 2 章、呉鎮守府建設工事の実態と開庁
第 3 章、呉鎮守府造船部の設立と活動
第 4 章、呉海軍造船廠の設立と発展
第 5 章、呉鎮守府造兵部門の形成過程と活動
第 6 章、呉海軍造兵廠の設立と拡張の実態とその意義
第 2 編、呉海軍工廠形成の背景
第 7 章、海軍の軍備拡張計画と兵器保有の方法
第 8 章、兵器の保有と技術移転
第 9 章、小野浜造船所の艦艇を中心とする造船業の発展と呉海軍工廠の形成に果たした役割
第 10 章、日清戦争期の呉鎮守府の活動と兵器生産部門の役割
第 11 章、海軍の製鋼事業の国産化と呉海軍工廠製鋼部の形成
第 12 章、海軍の呉港への進出と軍港都市の形成
終章、呉海軍工廠の形成と兵器国産化の実態見られるように序章・終章を除く本論部分は 2 編から成るが、第 1 編（第 1 ～ 6 章）が呉海軍工廠の前身にあたる組織から呉工廠設立（1903 年＝明治 36 年）に至る過程を克明に検討した「呉海軍工廠の形成過程」であり、第 2 編（第 7 ～ 12 章）が呉工廠形成に関連する事項を「呉海軍工廠形成の背景」と題して考察したものである。こうした構成について、著者としては最も精力を注いで検討した呉工廠形成過程そのものを第 1 編に置くのが自然だったのかもしれないが、読者にとっては関連する先行研究が極めて少ない呉工廠の形成過程を克明に考察した第 1 編から読み進むのはかなりの労力を要し、評者にとっても難しいところがあるので、以下、序章・第 2 編・第 1 編の順に概要を説明する。
まず、序章については 3 節から成るが、第 1 節「本書の目的と分析方法」に注目しておく。

123

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

本書は何よりも事実の発掘による実態解明を目指すが「決して理論を否定するわけではない」として、「技術移転論」、「国家資本論」に言及した上で、本書では「武器移転論」の適用可能性を探る、とする。著者は、「武器移転論」の「生産過程への適用」に際しては「武器移転的視角」に発展させる必要があり、そのために次の 4 点を加える、とする。第 1 に、「武器移転論」において兵器の取引の「送り手」は兵器製造会社、「受け手」は国家と想定
し、兵器を特殊な商品とみなしている点をさらに発展させること、第 2 に、軍港に立地す
る海軍工作庁の第一次的役割は兵器を運用できるようにする修理 ･ 改造であり、製造は第二次的役割とみなされていること、第 3 に、海軍工作庁の立地に際しては防禦面や秘密保持が重要視されること、第 4 に、海軍工作庁の能力は艦艇の排水量のみでなく、速力・防禦力などを加味した艦艇の性能、兵器の製造 ･ 修理、技術者や職工の技術習得等も考慮すべきこと。
「武器移転論」にこのような 4 点を加えた「武器移転的視角」によって兵器の購入から製造に至る過程が分析されるという（11･12 頁）。
本論の第 2 編では、第 7 章「海軍の軍備拡張計画と兵器保有の方法」で軍備拡張計画を中心とする軍事政策を扱い、第 8 章「兵器の保有と技術移転」で主に兵器取引にともなう技術移転を分析する。著者によれば、第 7 章と第 8 章は「武器移転的視角」の中核として
本書の「理論的な支柱」の役割を担うものという（14 頁）。
そこで今少し第 7・8 章の内容を記すと、第 7 章第 1 節では明治初期の軍備拡張政策を概観し、第 2 節では「甲鉄艦の保有をめぐる諸問題」として第 6 回軍備拡張計画（明治 18 年）を検討し、第 3 節では「内閣制度の発足と軍備計画の推移」と題して、海軍拡張計画を提示し続け第 10 回軍備拡張計画（明治 26 年）でその一部を実現する過程を跡づけ、第 4 節「日清戦争後の軍備拡張計画」として第 10 回軍備拡張計画の全面的な実現を果たしていく状
況を検証する。
第 8 章第 1 節では、海軍が保有した艦艇についてその実態を分析し、第 2 節では、各発展段階の代表的艦艇を選択してどのようにして技術を習得したのかを明らかにし、第 3 節では、砲熕兵器の技術の習得と移転について検証する。なお、艦艇及び兵器の供給元については、保有艦艇は一旦は減少した外国製が明治 30 年代に増加し、イギリス製（とくにアームストロング社製）が高まり、大砲を中心とする兵器供給先としてもドイツ・クルップ社の地位が低下し、アームストロング社が圧倒的地位を占めることが示される。第4 節では技術者・職工の養成、教育、留学について、第 5 節では各兵器生産企業の役割、
第 6 節では海軍による民間企業への工事の発注と同企業の育成について記述される。
第 9 章から第 12 章までは「独自の観点から呉工廠の特徴を把握する役割」を担うとされ、第 9 章では、小野浜造船所に焦点をあて技術移転の実態と呉工廠の形成に与えた影響を明124千田武志著『呉海軍工廠の形成』（奈倉文二）

らかにし、第 10 章では、日清戦争期の呉鎮守府の活動とその一環としての兵器生産部門の役割を検証し、第 11 章では、製鋼事業を対象として呉の造兵部門では兵器生産に欠かせない兵器用特殊鋼を官営製鉄所に委ねることをせず自ら製造した経過について述べ、第 12 章では、呉工廠の所在地であり職工などが生活する呉市の形成過程を検討する。
さて、第 1 編「呉海軍工廠の形成過程」であるが、第 1 章と第 2 章は呉鎮守府開庁（明治 22 年 7 月）までを対象とし、第 1 章「鎮守府の候補地の調査と呉港への決定」では候補地の選定過程を克明に検討し、防禦に最適な呉に鎮守府が選定されたことが明らかにされる。なお、著者は、呉が防禦に最適な地という特性により艦艇の国産化を担う海軍一（日本一）の造船所を有するという役割を担うことを随所で強調している。第 2 章「呉鎮守府建設工事の実態と開庁」では、3 期からなる呉鎮守府設立計画の内容が示され、計画と工事との比較及び工事の実態が示される。第 3 章から第 6 章までは、鎮守府開庁時の造船部
門と造兵部門について、計画、組織・人事、施設の整備、兵器の生産について記述され、造船部門を扱った第 3 章「呉鎮守府造船部の設立と活動」と第 4 章「呉海軍造船廠設立と発展」により、呉鎮守府造船部八ヵ年計画は一等巡洋艦の建造を目指したが途中で戦艦など主力艦に計画変更されたこと、造兵部門を扱った第 5 章「呉鎮守府造兵部門の形成過程と活動」と第 6 章「呉海軍造兵廠の設立と拡張の実態とその意義」では、13 年に及ぶ呉兵器製造所設立計画において一等巡洋艦への搭載兵器と小規模の特殊鋼の生産が目的とされつつも、途中で戦艦用の搭載兵器と兵器用特殊鋼に変更されたことが明らかにされる。
このような内容の本書であるが、著者の最大の貢献は、何よりも先ず、呉海軍工廠については横須賀海軍工廠に比しても関連する先行研究が極めて少ないという状況の下で、永年にわたり蒐集した厖大な諸史料を丹念に検討することにより呉工廠形成過程の全貌を詳細に明らかにしたことにある。とくに戦艦など主力艦建造への計画変更に併せて、第三船台の大改築（実態は建設）実施を断行した経過についての解明と叙述（第 4 章第 3 節「第三船台大改築（建設）の決定とその意義」）は本書の白眉と言えよう。
著者は永年の呉市史編纂室勤務時代から「呉海軍工廠史」執筆をライフワークとして志し、厖大な史料収集に努めてきており、それらの第一次史料を駆使した『呉海軍工廠の形成』の刊行がこのような形で実現したことに敬意を表したい。
なお、本書の随所に掲出されている図面類や口絵写真類も本書初出のものも含めて貴重なものが多く、イメージも湧きやすいことを付記しておきたい。
最後に、著者の「武器移転的視角」という方法について。
「武器移転論」は元々国際政治学で使用されていた「武器移転」概念を国際経済史研究に適用したもので（横井勝彦、小野塚知二及び評者等により）、その意味では著者の言うように「生産過程」にまで適用

125

『国際武器移転史』第 6 号（2018 年 7 月）

する上では何等かの工夫が必要であったのかもしれない。著者はそうした理解に立って「武器移転論」を「生産過程」にまで適用するために「武器移転的視角」に発展させて本書の分析方法に取り入れてきたという。その創意性と努力は十分理解できる。しかしながら、先の序章第 1 節に記された方法に基づき、「武器移転的視角」の中核をなすという第 2 編第7 章及び第 8 章の内容を吟味しても、「武器移転論」の適用（発展的適用）では不十分で、「武器移転的視角」にまで発展させた方法でなければならないのか、評者としては今一つ理解
しづらい。

126

編集委員
須藤 功（明治大学 編集委員長）

横井勝彦（明治大学 本研究所長）

榎本珠良（明治大学）

松永友有（横浜国立大学）

竹内真人（日本大学）

田嶋信雄（成城大学）

纐纈 厚（明治大学）

鈴木 惇（東京大学）

赤津正彦（明治大学）

森元晶文（大阪国際大学）

渡辺昭一（東北学院大学）

山下雄司（日本大学）

永岑三千輝（横浜市立大学名誉教授）『国際武器移転史』第 6 号
2018 年 7 月 18 日印刷

2018 年 7 月 23 日発行

編集・発行 明治大学国際武器移転史研究所
代表者 横井勝彦
連絡先住所 〒 101-8301 東京都千代田区神田駿河台 1 − 1
明治大学グローバルフロント 16 階明治大学国際武器移転史研究所
Email: rihgat_journal@meiji.ac.jp
URL: http://www.kisc.meiji.ac.jp/~transfer/
印刷・製本 株式会社 サンヨー

本誌の刊行は「文部科学省私立大学戦略的研究基盤形成支援事業（平成 27 年～平成 31 年）」に依拠している。