History of Global Arms Transfer, 8 (2019), pp. 39-53

Challenges in Developing a Risk
Assessment Criteria for Arms Transfers inSoutheast Asia
By MITZI AUSTERO* and PAULEEN GOROSPE**
This article looks into the challenges of developing criteria for the risk assessmentof arms transfers in Southeast Asia, carefully considering the region’s experienceswith armed conflicts, high levels of armed violence, and proliferation of weapons.
Distinct regional experiences call for a regional approach. Informal and subnational cooperation in the region, which is used more than the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN)’s official regional mechanisms, can help build
and strengthen formal structures to support arms control regimes and encouragenational governments to adopt international instruments. This pragmatic approach
incorporates disparities in the levels of development, presence of armed conflicts,
and the different security needs of each country, which can complement
international agreements, such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). This article
recommends a regional focus on the risk assessment for arms transfers, including
national and regional contexts to ease the adoption of international agreements in
the region.
In Southeast Asia, the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) has remained low despite
the urgency of arms control in the region. Since the ATT was passed in 2013, five countries
have signed it: Cambodia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. As ofwriting this article, no state has ratified or acceded to the ATT. However, this does notnecessarily signify an unwillingness to adopt or implement it. This article shows thatnational mechanisms for regulating arms transfers are present in some Southeast Asian(SEA) countries. In others, the lack or absence is due to political reasons or other priorities.
Nuancing these issues against broader multilateral agreements can help overcome thesechallenges and move towards the adoption and universalization of the ATT and similar
agreements.
The SEA region has experienced various internal armed conflicts, particularly inIndonesia, Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand, resulting in hundreds of deaths andmillions of displaced civilians. The conflict in Western New Guinea between theindigenous populations and the government of Indonesia is still ongoing. Myanmar isdealing with several ethnic armed groups, of which the most widely known is the rising
Rohingya armed group. Though the Philippines has been tackling Communist and Muslim
insurgencies for decades, peace talks with Muslim armed groups have progressed as* Author’s Affiliation: Mitzi Austero is the Programmes Manager of Nonviolence International Southeast Asia.
** Pauleen Gorospe is the Communications and Research Manager of Nonviolence International Southeast

Asia. She is a Ph.D. Candidate of Advanced Policy Studies at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies(GRIPS) in Tokyo.

39

MITZI AUSTERO and PAULEEN GOROSPE
expected so far, though not without threats from ISIS-inspired armed groups who haverecently clashed with government officials in Marawi City. In Thailand, deaths due to gun
and explosive violence continue to plague the Deep South despite the opening of peace
negotiations with rebel armed groups.
Apart from internal armed conflicts, territorial disputes occasionally become the subjectof foreign relations. Several states in the region have laid claim to sections of the disputed
South China Sea, namely, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
Although not the primary driver of increasing arms imports, opposition against China’s
territorial claims has increased the demand for weapons importation over the last five
years, along with defence modernization and assertions of sovereignty. In a region where
differences in levels of development are stark and underdevelopment is a constant concern,
military spending is not the sole priority in these developing countries (see Figure 1).
However, data show that military spending in some SEA countries has seen a steadyincrease in recent years (see Figure 2).

60,000.00

50,000.00

40,000.00

30,000.00

20,000.00

10,000.00

0.00

Brunei

Cambo Indone Laos Malays Myan Philippi Singap Thailan
Viet
dia
sia
ia
mar
nes
ore
d
Nam
Per Cap GDP 28,290.6 1,384.40 3,846.90 2,457.40 9,951.50 1,256.70 2,989.00 57,714.3 6,595.00 2,342.20
Per Cap Milex

808.7

29.0

31.0

0.0

110.5

32.0

41.7

1786.491.8

53.1

Milex/GDP%

2.86%

2.09%

0.81%

0.00%

1.11%

2.55%

1.40%

3.10%

1.39%

2.27%

Per Cap GDP

Per Cap Milex

Milex/GDP%

Figure 1 - Per Capita GDP and Per Capita Military Expenditure in ASEAN (2017)
Note: *Laos’ military expenditure data for 2017 is unavailable
Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database1
1 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Military Expenditure Database 2017.

40

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

MyanmarCambodia

Indonesia

Laos

Malaysia

MyanmarPhilippines

Singapore

Thailand

Viet Nam

20.0 6.9 7.5 6.1 4.7 4.1 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.2 11.0 12.2 15.1 20.8 24.7 27.4 30.2 30.0 37.2 40.7 46.0 48.8 53.1 53.1

Viet Nam

Brunei32.9 34.8 39.1 45.4 51.2 54.1 61.3 64.7 65.5 53.6 34.3 33.0 29.9 27.1 28.3 29.3 28.7 30.3 37.1 53.2 67.1 71.8 73.8 81.6 80.9 86.6 83.7 83.4 85.3 91.8

ThailandSingapore 419. 479. 598. 653. 731. 754. 826. 1055 1149 1221 1196 1176 1106 1072 1096 1111 1154 1216 1264 1377 1536 1518 1598 1723 1740 1743 1761 1695 1757 1786

Philippines 15.8 15.8 15.4 14.4 16.6 17.6 20.4 24.3 26.3 21.6 16.4 17.6 16.7 14.1 14.7 15.7 14.7 15.9 18.3 22.6 25.0 22.9 26.0 28.4 29.9 34.3 31.0 32.8 36.0 41.7

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 58.2 46.0 45.7 48.7 46.4 32.0

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.7 23.3 24.5 21.4 15.8 13.3 6.5 2.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.3 2.5 3.0 3.2 3.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0

50.3 58.1 62.4 84.8 92.9 98.7 106. 119. 115. 96.9 52.4 73.4 66.1 81.6 92.5 116. 112. 121. 124. 149. 162. 143. 137. 163. 154. 165. 162. 147. 133. 110.

7.8 7.9 8.9 9.2 10.1 10.1 11.5 12.6 14.4 15.9 4.7 5.4 5.3 4.3 6.3 9.7 10.9 9.5 11.4 14.4 13.7 13.8 19.2 23.8 26.2 33.3 27.2 29.6 28.3 31.0

Malaysia

0.0 0.0 3.2 4.7 6.5 4.5 10.4 11.6 10.3 9.2 7.2 7.4 6.7 5.7 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.6 5.8 6.0 9.7 11.7 13.2 14.7 16.2 18.2 24.6 23.5 29.0

Indonesia

Laos729. 740. 893. 921. 918. 830. 904. 961. 1077 1182 920. 792. 732. 640. 652. 688. 554. 680. 792. 862. 954. 911. 1005 1054 1028 1015 1282 1015 953. 808.

Cambodia

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Brunei

0.0

200.0

400.0

600.0

800.0

1000.01200.01400.01600.01800.02000.0

Challenges in Developing a Risk Assessment Criteria for Arms Transfers in Southeast Asia

Figure 2 - Per GDP Military Spending ASEAN (1988-2017)

Note: Data for Myanmar for years 1997-2005 are unavailable.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database2

2 Ibid.

41

MITZI AUSTERO and PAULEEN GOROSPE
The potential for arms flows to be diverted from state-authorized use to any of theseinternal conflicts increases with the magnitude of arms imports, making it imperative tomonitor arms transfers and usage closely. To date, a region-wide acceptance of the dangers
of arms diversion and trafficking has been demonstrated by both the statements from the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the individual states’ efforts tocreate domestic structures that regulate arms transfers. Basic regulatory policies exist.
However, these policies are not currently sufficient to cover the lifecycle of arms inregional trade, something the ATT risk assessment process is supposed to fill. The
challenge rests in how SEA countries can adopt these provisions and apply them to theircurrent national and regional mechanisms to ensure that arms are transferred to theirintended recipients and not diverted to conflict areas.
This article has five parts. The first part provides a short discussion of the ATT risk
assessment process, especially its criteria. The second part is an overview of the existingtreaties and international agreements adopted by SEA countries and the areas of regionalarms trade they cover. The third part explains the nuances of the low priority fordisarmament regimes in the region. The fourth part examines how arms proliferation
contributes to the ongoing armed violence in the region and other risks that misuse of
weapons pose to the civilian population and society at large. The fifth and concluding
section provides recommendations for the adoption of more effective and efficient risk
assessment mechanisms to address diversion issues in the region. This article recommends
a combined formal and informal regional approach to facilitate the adoption of the ATTamong SEA countries. This also serves to supplement unilateral implementation.
Traditional perspectives on regionalism especially on the sometimes unilateral behaviour
and actions of blocs do not apply in the SEA region.3 Instead, as shown in the following
parts of the article, the SEA region has its own pragmatic, bottom-up approach to theimplementation of international agreements, owing much to its attitudes on independence
and state-building.

I
An important component of the ATT, intended to prevent the diversion of arms, includes
the criteria espoused in Articles 6 and 7 of the ATT regarding prohibitions, export controls,
and risk assessment. Article 6 is clear on which arms exports are prohibited. For example,
6.1 explicitly mentions ‘obligations under measures adopted by the United Nations Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular, arms
embargos’,4 while 6.2 declares that states shall not take any action that ‘would violate its
relevant international obligations under international agreements to which it is a Party, inparticular, those relating to the transfer of, or illicit trafficking in, conventional arms’.5
While the first two provisions in Article 6 are straightforward, 6.3 narrowly defines thecontext of armed conflict by using the word ‘knowledge’: as stated, ‘knowledge at the timeof authorization that the arms or items would be used in the commission of genocide,crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, attacks
directed against civilian objects or civilians protected as such, or other war crimes as
defined by the international agreements to which it is a Party’.6 This provision implies that
3 Norkevičius, ‘Regional institutionalism in southeast Asia’, pp. 98.
4 Arms Trade Treaty, Article 6.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.

42

Challenges in Developing a Risk Assessment Criteria for Arms Transfers in Southeast Asia
exporters are given the discretion to determine whether to send an arms shipment orwithhold authorization, in accordance with national legislation and mechanisms aftersufficient due diligence has been conducted. Due diligence is critical to ensure that theitems will not undermine peace and security, and will not be used to commit violations ofInternational Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law (IHRL), offences
relating to terrorism or transnational organised crime, or acts of gender-based violence.
Article 7, which addresses export and export assessment, provides a guideline to inform
this decision. Article 7 requires that states consider the following dangers when making
export determinations, along with those already mentioned: if the arms ‘(a) would
contribute to or undermine peace and security; (b) could be used to (i) commit or facilitatea serious violation of international humanitarian law; (ii) commit or facilitate a serious
violation of international human rights law; (iii) commit or facilitate an act constituting an
offence under international conventions or protocols relating to terrorism to which theexporting State is a Party; or (iv) commit or facilitate an act constituting an offence underinternational conventions or protocols relating to transnational organized crime to which
the exporting State is a Party.’7 The application of the risk assessment is expected to bedone objectively. States must gauge whether an arms shipment provides an overriding riskof the weapons being used in violation of the ATT, though the definition of overriding risk
is not indicated in the treaty’s text. The scale or extent of this overriding risk, however, isleft to the state’s sense of whether these dangers exist.
The ATT also recognizes that export assessments require the cooperation of states toperform due diligence regarding importing parties. Article 7 highlights that states should
endeavour to consider ‘relevant factors, including information provided by the importing
State’8 regarding the importing party or end user. However, if the importing state provides
little to no information, the exporting state has the sole responsibility to perform due
diligence.
The lack of an objective scale for an overriding risk discourages several SEA countries
from becoming parties. Some countries in the region have arms manufacturing companies
who would like to have a clear scale to use. In addition, following the risk assessment
guidelines in Articles 6 and 7 poses several challenges for SEA countries, who areconcentrated on building capacity and technical expertise, something not all countries in
the region or even the ASEAN regional mechanisms possess.
In order to establish proper assessment procedures, institutional capacity must be present
and dedicated personnel should have the knowledge and practical understanding of theprocess. In lesser-developed arms export mechanisms, institutional capacity is a concern
since knowledge, training, and expertise are not institutionalized. Given the limited
resources of lesser-developed countries, there may not be enough individuals to receive thetraining. Furthermore, changes in government administration sometimes trigger a turnoverof bureaucrats and civil servants before knowledge is retained by government institutions.
Individuals thus retain the technical know-how and are sometimes not able to pass it down
to their replacements or other personnel. Unless the person has attended conferences ortraining programmes where processes for other states are shared, he or she will have noprior knowledge. For example, an Applicant Exporter informed the relevant agency inCountry A that an Importing End User in Country B is exempt from presenting an importpermit, a typical documentary requirement before a transfer is authorised in Country A.
7 Ibid., Article 7.
8 Ibid.

43

MITZI AUSTERO and PAULEEN GOROSPEThe exemption was allegedly due to a policy in Country B. Officials in Country A could
not access the information regarding Country B’s import exemptions from the publicrecord. Had the official in Country A not known an officer from Country B, Country A
would not have been able to determine that the claim of exemption was inaccurate and that
the Importing End User was not eligible.9
This lack of institutional memory is also due to a lack of documented or available
information. In some countries, there is no easily accessible information on national
processes for licensing, import, and export. National policies are not disseminated widely
throughout the region, compelling ASEAN Member-States to conduct new research oneach country’s procedure for numerous transactions. The context of each export applicationmust thus be assessed, so the prior information and public availability of this information
are very important.

II

Figure 3 - International Agreements involving SEA Countries

Exporter are parties or signatories
Global to
share
Globalshare
SEA countries
a number Importerof international agreements(see Figure3). In most of these agreements, the capacity to implement is the foremost concern of thestates. However, SEA countries(%)
tend to establish the laws and build the institutions
first,(5)
before acceding to an international agreement. This can be interpreted from an outsiders’pointof view as either inefficiency
1 US
34 or unwillingness.
1 IndiaHowever, for the SEA12region, thisprocess is consistent with each country’s state building experience. With regards to the
ATT,approach also applies.22
In the words ofofficers during consultations,
2 thisRussia2 government
Saudi Arabia
10
communication, 5 August 2018.
39 Personal
France
6.7

3

Egypt

4.5

4
44

5

Germany

5.8

4

UAE

4.4

China

5.7

5

China

4.0

Challenges in Developing a Risk Assessment Criteria for Arms Transfers in Southeast Asia
‘Let’s build our national capacities first, then ratification follows’.10 While signing or
ratification may be postponed, the passage of national legislation and expertise-building
continues in individual countries. SEA has not become stagnant and has demonstrated its
national strategies through national programme. There is also enough national support for
the ATT in most ASEAN countries. Most SEA countries’ behaviour thus points towards
laying the groundwork for implementation before legally submitting to the ATT. By
focusing on effective capacity-building of national institutions and agencies directly
involved in weapons flow regulation, concerns regarding compliance with the ATT may be
alleviated. The bigger challenge for SEA countries is developing the capacity to apply thelaw, which can take several months to years. Because SEA countries are in different stagesof development, poverty alleviation and underdevelopment take priority in national agendas
alongside internal and external security, thus dividing limited resources and reducing theability to implement national programmes promptly.
The lack of capacity and expertise is not the only issue in determining the adaptability of
the ATT in the region. Apart from capacity, the export assessment has not been adopted in
all the national control systems of SEA countries. The current national laws of most of thestates in the region do not have clear criteria regarding arms trade. Because national
systems of some form already exist, adoption requires that ATT provisions be translated tocomplement national laws for state agencies’ compliance. Since the ATT is not the soleinternational instrument to which ASEAN countries subscribe, and laws for these otheragreements are already in place, adoption often requires the amendment of pre-existinglaws or an overhaul of established organizations and institutions. Laws must be harmonizedand procedures streamlined to include the scope and procedures laid out in the ATT.
Problems arise not only when the ATT is supposed to address gaps in legislation and policy
but also when other related instruments already address certain provisions of the ATT.
There are many cases where national legislation and government offices that govern thepolicies concerning conventional weapons overlap with the scope of the ATT; hence,
implementing agencies are thrown into confusion regarding jurisdiction to implement andoversee the transfers of relevant goods and items. These conflicting responsibilities cause
competition and disagreement between national government agencies, further hindering
institutional development in these countries. Instead of focusing on capacity-building forcore implementing agencies, resources are diffused among a variety of government
agencies to keep the knowledge and expertise within existing organizations part of theimplementation of the ATT and to save time in the implementation process. Some
provisions of these laws will require revision to concentrate expertise and resources on
government agencies that oversee arms transfers in all forms, thus streamlining processes
and increasing efficiency, especially in times of crisis. National laws should guide national
implementing agencies, rules, and regulations.
Aside from domestic efforts, the ATT also emphasizes the need for international
cooperation. Regional mechanisms are necessary to transcend the states’ capabilities tomove the ATT towards ratification and application. Regional cooperation and assistancecan complement national efforts in conducting due diligence and monitoring transfers. In
ASEAN countries use informal channels along with formal ones. The use of informal
mechanisms establishes rapport among sub-national agencies, especially law enforcement
offices and eventually builds reliable information channels. The informal communication
also facilitates information exchange and cooperation that would normally be encumbered
10 Personal communication, 3 May 2016.

45

MITZI AUSTERO and PAULEEN GOROSPE
by red tape if formal channels were used. While there is currently no inter-governmentalgroup, such as the Regional Centre on Small Arms, in the region there are national experts
who are unfortunately overlooked.
Dialogue and consultations with government agencies regarding the regulation of arms
flows have revealed that this knowledge and technical know-how is concentrated on
individuals. Individuals who are experts in various areas of dealing with weapons systems
often possess advanced knowledge, for instance, from experts on the identification of dual
goods in a national control list, to risk assessments of an arms import or export. Much ofthis personal knowledge is drawn from extensive experience in wars and armed conflicts
and issues regarding the diversion of arms. Because these experiences revolve aroundsecessionist movements within their countries, SEA countries also tend to be guarded, eventowards each other. Internal conflicts contribute to a feeling of insecurity, which tends tocontribute to governments becoming more vigilant to internal and external threats, making
the confidentiality or secrecy surrounding existing weapons systems and their quantity
imperative to national security. This lack of complete trust can hinder cooperation whencrises emerge. In addition, the principle of non-intervention and the focus on protecting
sovereignty draws from the region’s history and experience with strong leaders, including
Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen, the Philippines’ President Rodrigo Duterte,
Thailand’s military Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-ocha, Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee
Hsien Loong, Indonesia’s Prime Minister Jokowi Widodo, and Malaysia’s Mahathir,coupled with Myanmar’s long ruling ‘former military’ led party. Any international treaty
that could easily be perceived as intervening in another’s affairs, sovereignty, or security
will not be high in anyone’s priorities.
The existing formal regional mechanisms do facilitate information exchange, and theseexchanges happen on sub-national, agency, and individual levels. At the ministerial andstate levels, there are ongoing bilateral and multilateral agreements through ASEAN andother means that promote cooperation on security issues, all of which can complement
ATT’s efforts. The existence of strong leadership in the region should transcend national
borders and move towards regional solidarity, cooperation, and assistance. ASEAN was,after all, able to negotiate nuclear weapons issues in the region in its early years.
Strengthening regional mechanisms with the ATT through formalization is therefore not an
impossible task.
While informal exchanges and cooperation can supplement the lack of formal institutions
and speed investigations and due diligence, this type of cooperation works best at theindividual level and relies too much on personal rapport and relationships. Formalization isstill important because it can help in institutionalizing practices. SEA countries must
consider the creation of an ASEAN institution that will steer disarmament efforts in theregion and facilitate the exchange of necessary information and technical expertise among
countries in a timely and efficient manner. National approaches are currently more
numerous and context-specific, and many national considerations and efforts to integrate ata regional level require inter-state coordination.
The lack of formal institutions and lack of transparency in arms transfers inhibit thestrengthening of information and expertise exchange among SEA countries. Whiletransparency has always been a thorny issue when dealing with weapon systems or mattersthat affect national security, trust is an important factor in forming and maintaining interstate relationships.

46

Challenges in Developing a Risk Assessment Criteria for Arms Transfers in Southeast Asia

III
The preference of SEA countries for informal mechanisms draws from the importance theyaccord to sovereignty, owing largely to their historical struggles with independence, statebuilding, and internal disputes. In this century alone, the region has seen numerous wars
and armed conflicts, some of which have not yet been resolved. Their positions regardingarms procurement as a means of self-defence thus shape their views regarding the ATT.
Promoting regional peace and security in the region would require these perspectives to begiven importance, since arms procurement is inextricably linked with capacitating thestate’s self-defence. Development is now widely considered to be tied to security; hence,
the term ‘development-security nexus’. Global threats and challenges have moved states
towards arming rather than disarming. Disarmament discussions can no longer be limited
to security issues but instead should go hand in hand with economic development
deliberations as a means to secure progress and development, which is a national priority
for the majority of the states in SEA.
Recent data have shown that several states in the region are increasing their militaryspending. The data below, from SIPRI’s 2018 Yearbook, include Indonesia in the top 10
importers of major weapons from 2013 to 2017 (Table 1). 11
Table 1 - Main Exporters and Importers of Major Weapons (2013-17)
ExporterGlobal share (%)

ImporterGlobal share (5)

1

US

34

2

Russia

22

1

India

12

2

Saudi Arabia

10

3France

6.7

3

Egypt

4.5

4

Germany

5.8

4

UAE

4.4

5

China

5.7

5

China

4.0

6

UK

4.8

6

Australia

3.8

7

Spain

2.9

7

Algeria

3.78Israel

2.9

8

Iraq

3.4

9

Italy

2.5

9

Pakistan

2.8

10Netherlands

2.1

10

Indonesia

2.8

Aside from political considerations, there is greater ease in increasing military spending
for some SEA states due to steady economic growth. Economic development has allowed
more resources to be allocated to upgrading and modernizing national defence forces andweaponry. However, the steady economic growth of some states in the region should take
into consideration that these developments were also possible due to the reduction of armed
violence and the resolution of internal conflicts, which is enshrined in the principles ofhumanitarian disarmament treaties like the ATT.
While signs currently point to SEA countries exhibiting more inward-looking policies,
11 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Yearbook 2018: armaments, disarmament andinternational security (summary).

47

MITZI AUSTERO and PAULEEN GOROSPE
strong political will and leadership can also help in promoting universalization byappealing to each country’s strength and convincing SEA countries to become champions.
Strong and popular leadership means championing people’s causes and aspirations,
including those of their neighbouring countries. These aspirations also include greater
security, sustainable peace, and more economic opportunities.

IV
The SEA region still experiences internal armed conflict, particularly in Indonesia,
Myanmar, the Philippines, and Thailand. This section discusses these issues and the context
in which the risk assessment criteria should be based: (1) to stop weapons from flowing
into armed conflict areas; and (2) to help create a better environment for peace processes tomove forward.
Indonesia
In Indonesia, violence continues to plague the West Papua region, due partially to existing
separatist movements. The most recent clash, on 7 March 2019 between the National
Liberation Army (TPNPB) freedom fighters and the Indonesian Army in Nduga Regency,
has sparked renewed fears of armed violence. The TPNPB even claims to have ‘secured
four weapons from the Indonesian army’12 after the clash, which could potentially point to
the diversion of weapons.
There is more than one separatist movement contributing to the fragile security of West
Papua, along with the prevalence of other types of violence and conflicts arising from otherroot causes, such as resource-related and identity-based clashes. Further exacerbating thisissue as well as being affected by the political turmoil, the homicide rate has increased to alevel of five times higher than the national average. 13 In West Papua, insecurity isaggravated not only by the existing armed conflict but also by disagreements rooted inhistorical issues that contribute to non-conflict-based violence.
MyanmarDespite efforts to negotiate with numerous armed groups that have kept the government
occupied, Myanmar’s peace process is stalled and the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement(NCA), signed on 15 October 2015, is neither fully implemented nor trusted. The NCA has
only 10 armed group signatories out of 16 or a potential 20 that signed with thegovernment: the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front, Arakan Liberation Party, Chin
National Front, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army - Brigade 5 (DKBA-5), Karen National
Union, KNU/KNLA Peace Council, Lahu Democratic Union, New Mon State Party, Pa-O
National Liberation Army, and the Restoration Council of Shan State. Over the past two
years, the Arakan Army has shown its growing strength and has increased attacks in the
broader Rakhine State, located on the Western coast. There are also pockets of armed
clashes between other armed groups that have resulted in the displacement of countless
civilians. The escalation of violence is complicating efforts for the returning Rohingya
refugees; the displacement of the Rohingyas due to violence has already raised the number
to 1,526,000 people.14
12 The Jakarta Post, ‘TNI soldiers killed in clash with West Papua liberation army’.
13 The Asia Foundation, State of conflict and violence in Asia.
14 United Nations Refugee Agency, ‘Myanmar factsheet’.

48Challenges in Developing a Risk Assessment Criteria for Arms Transfers in Southeast Asia
Philippines
The Mindanao region in the Philippines still suffers from armed conflict despite theattempts of former and current presidents to seal a long-lasting peace agreement with
Communist and Muslim insurgents. The five-decades-old conflict between the governmentof the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front has resulted in over 120,000
deaths on both sides as well as civilian casualties.15 The country also has one of the highest
numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) due to armed conflict in SEA, a large partof which are the conflicts in the southern part of the country. The Global Report on Internal
Displacement 2018 has put this number at 645,000 IDPs in Mindanao alone, whichconstitutes 25.5% of the national total of 2,529,000. 16 The Bangsamoro separatist
movement, settled recently through a politically-negotiated peace process, was followed by
the signing of the Bangsamoro Organic Law in 2018 and its ratification through plebiscites
held on 21 January and 6 February 2019. This political settlement will grant the new
Bangsamoro region expanded autonomy. So far, the attitude among the affected populations
has been positive, with higher confidence that the effects of the political agreements would
have a positive impact on reducing armed violence and displacement in the area. All thatremains is the political transition to the new autonomous region and addressing the threatof ISIS-inspired groups in the region. Unlike the peace talks with Muslim armed groups,
the Communist peace process has stalled and sees no immediate end in sight despite apromising cessation of hostilities during the early months of the Duterte administration.
ThailandConflict in southern Thailand due to the Malay-Muslim insurgency erupted in 2004 andhas already resulted in the deaths of 7,000 people. 17 Bombings and arson continue tothreaten lives in the area. Despite the signing of an agreement in February 2013 between
Thai government officials and the armed group Barisan Revolusi Nasional in Kuala
Lumpur, peace remains obscure. Efforts to address the conflict and increase understandingof its root causes do not appear to command a high priority on the country’s agenda.
The presence of ongoing armed conflicts in the four countries of SEA poses a risk that
arms transfers may be diverted to unauthorized end users and used in violation of the ATT.
As with the long history of armed conflicts in the world, human rights (HR) and IHL
violations occur in war-torn communities. The likelihood of armed groups obtaining
firearms from illicit sources, such as the events that surrounded the siege of Marawi City in
Mindanao, might increase due to a lack of more robust and strict regulation of arms andammunitions transfers in the region. There is a danger that similar cases may occur in otherstates where armed conflict is present, and thus may cause even more deaths and suffering.
Deaths caused by firearms can be difficult to measure due to a lack of peace and order thatwould enable field work to be conducted without interruption or risk, the preference ofsome civilians and victims of violence to withhold information out of fear of reprisal, andan overall lack of capability for doing so. However, a general picture can be drawn
regarding the extent of deaths that firearms cause. An estimate made by the Journal of theAmerican Medical Association (JAMA) is presented in Figure 4.

15 International Crisis Group, Philippines: addressing Islamist militancy after the battle for Marawi.
16 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global report on internal displacement.
17 International Crisis Group, ‘Jihadism in southern Thailand: a problem menace’.

49

MITZI AUSTERO and PAULEEN GOROSPE
14.0
12.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0

1990

1995

2000

2005

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Brunei

1.2

1.1

0.9

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.7

Cambodia

3.1

3.0

2.5

1.9

1.7

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.6

1.5

1.5

Indonesia

0.6

0.6

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.5

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.4

Laos

3.3

2.9

2.4

1.9

1.6

1.5

1.5

1.4

1.4

1.3

1.3

Malaysia

2.3

2.0

1.9

1.6

1.4

1.4

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.2

1.2

Myanmar

2.7

2.6

2.0

1.6

1.4

1.3

1.3

1.3

1.2

1.2

1.2

Philippines

7.4

7.5

9.2

9.9

8.7

8.8

8.8

8.6

8.5

8.5

8.4

Thailand

9.5

11.6

10.2

6.8

5.6

5.5

5.5

5.4

5.3

5.3

5.3

Singapore

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.3

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

0.2

Vietnam

1.1

1.0

0.9

0.8

0.7

0.7

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

0.6

Global

4.5

4.6

4.3

3.9

3.7

3.7

3.7

3.6

3.6

3.6

3.6

Brunei

Cambodia

Indonesia

Laos

Malaysia

Philippines

ThailandSingapore

VietnamGlobalMyanmarFigure 4 - Mean Estimate Firearm Deaths Per 100,000 Population (ASEAN)
Source: The Journal of the American Medical Association, 201818

The reasons for the firearms-related deaths cited in JAMA’s study include physicalviolence or assault, self-harm, and unintentional firearm injury, although the context underwhich these incidents were experienced are not provided. A more detailed documentationof the types of violence in SEA countries can be developed in future research in order tomore accurately depict the link between arms diversion and the exacerbation of internal
conflicts.

18 Nagavi, ‘Global mortality from firearms: 1990-2016’.

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Challenges in Developing a Risk Assessment Criteria for Arms Transfers in Southeast AsiaV
SEA states generally experience four factors that could exacerbate the conflict- and nonconflict-based security issues in affected countries. First, internal armed conflicts are
ongoing, and their resolution has met mixed success, or they may not be a priority on thenational agenda. Second, the persistence of internal armed conflicts provides anenvironment where a lack of governance and the rule of law enable unauthorized parties,
such as non-state armed groups, to obtain weapons illicitly, contributing to the potential
extension of the conflict. Third, governments engaged in internal wars have fewer resources
to devote to peacebuilding and economic development, both of which are key programmes
in promoting peace in post-conflict situations. Fourth, as governments struggle individually
without a regional instrument or mechanism to assist in curbing and preventing the illicit
transfer of conventional arms, states have even less capacity to address the problem despite
the presence of informal networks among sub-national agencies and individuals in theregion.
These problems intersect not only domestically, between the risk of weapons diversion to
armed conflicts and the establishment of peace and order and development of progress incountries but also are impacted by national and regional means of addressing the problem.
At different levels, the adoption of sufficient risk assessment criteria and programmes havebeen slow due to reasons already cited, which causes more difficulty for national
governments already dealing with peace and order problems. To further universalize
treaties, such as the ATT, in the region, the means of adopting the risk criteria should
consider how both national and regional adoption can be synergized and how informalcooperation channels can strengthen the formalization of rules and regulations at theregional level. ASEAN’s preference towards non-intervention should not be dismissed asinimical to institutionalization. Non-intervention should instead be seen as the initial stepin establishing an arms control regime.
Institutional regionalism is an important lens to use in Southeast Asia since one of thebases for ASEAN’s formation is centred on non-interference and cooperation. 19
Cooperation among ASEAN Member-States has focused on the capacities each country has
contributed to help shape their individual nation-state building and achieve peace anddevelopment, especially in the earlier period of ASEAN’s establishment. Inextricably
connected to the need to establish counter-mechanisms to curtail and address the threat ofarmed violence and violent extremism, which threatens the very security of each MemberState in ASEAN, is the need to establish robust institutions to counter arms proliferation in
the region, an undertaking that is becoming more relevant. Southeast Asia formed ASEAN
to establish a regional identity in its quest for strengthening their sovereign states, which it
has achieved, but this need not necessarily be its only goal. There are greater benefits inutilising each state’s strength and expertise to ensure further peace and stability, something
for which the ATT can provide a structure.
Specific steps are essential to this process. A regional engagement should be initiated toencourage and ensure that mechanisms developed in the risk assessment process consider
the states’ problems concerning large-scale arms availability. The local context throughwhich diversion happens, and at what stage of the importation process it happens, must be
carefully assessed. An argument could be made that corrupt government officials are
responsible for diversion, but not the government institutions themselves, so this concept
has to be examined carefully. A regional mechanism where the verification of both import
19 Norkevičius, Regional institutionalism in southeast Asia, pp. 98-113.

51

MITZI AUSTERO and PAULEEN GOROSPE
and export licences can be made easier and more accessible to concerned agencies should
be developed and implemented. Enhanced regional cooperation among the implementing
agencies, such as the police, customs, trade, and other related agencies should be
developed. The mechanism should also build trust among the states in the region.
The term ‘overriding risk’ should be operationalized in developing risk assessment
criteria for SEA countries. At the regional level, the risk assessment should have strong
evidence-based criteria that will include multiple factors, such as (a) an accounting of HR
and IHL violations in the armed conflict-affected areas; (b) civilian casualties and genderbased violence in armed conflict areas; and (c) the displacement of civilians in armed
conflict-affected areas. The risk management process is essential for the region but should
focus on foreseen misuse that can be quantified through measurable evaluation. Risk
mitigation should be in place for the exporter and importer alike in such cases.
On the part of SEA countries, experts are tucked away in government offices, academic
and civil society organizations and are largely ignored or untapped. It is important to notethat the region’s experience with wars and internal conflicts should be harnessed and used
to prepare and establish solutions that can be implemented in unique domestic situations.
These same experts can also assist in specific steps towards treaty implementation. SEA
countries should come together to work on a framework for the region that will use theregion’s context and experience of armed violence, non-interference, and post-colonialassertion. Merely targeting the administrative requirements of regulating conventional arms
is a simplistic, one-dimensional solution that does not consider various motivations andinterests of SEA countries. The region is instead looking for a solution that will transcend
the issue of proliferation while working towards development and modernisation while
maintaining national integrity and establishing a stronger, more efficient region.
References
Arms Trade Treaty, https://thearmstradetreaty.org/hyper-images/file/ATT_English/ATT_English.
pdf?templateId=137253 (accessed on 30 March 2019).
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Global report on internal displacement (May 2018) http://www.
internal-displacement.org/publications/2018-global-report-on-internal-displacement (accessed on 20
April 2019).
International Crisis Group, ‘Jihadism in southern Thailand: A problem menace’, Asia Report, No. 291 (8November 2017) www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/thailand/291-jihadism-southern-thailandphantom-menace (accessed on 20 April 2019).
International Crisis Group, Philippines: addressing Islamist militancy after the battle for Marawi (17 July2018) www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/philippines/philippines-addressing-islamist-militancyafter-battle-marawi (accessed on 20 April 2019).
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Challenges in Developing a Risk Assessment Criteria for Arms Transfers in Southeast Asia
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