Center for Economic Institutions
Working Paper SeriesNo. 2010-14“ Foreign Ownership, Listed Status and the
Financial System in East Asia: Evidence fromThailand and Malaysia”

Fumiharu Mieno
March 2011

Center for Economic
Institutions

Working Paper SeriesInstitute of Economic Research
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-8603 JAPANhttp://cei.ier.hit-u.ac.jp/English/index.html
Tel:+81-42-580-8405/Fax:+81-42-580-8333

Foreign Ownership, Listed Status and the Financial System
in East Asia: Evidence from Thailand and Malaysia
Fumiharu Mieno,
Kobe University
fmieno@kobe-u.ac.jp

Abstract
Existing studies on the financial system in East Asia have emphasized its excessive
debt financing, the lack of a bond market and its limited function on corporate
governance. Other apparent facts, such as the average low debt ratio, the existenceof large but unlisted firms, and the significance of foreign firms in its economy are
generally ignored. Based on a uniquely compiled database for the top 1000 firms in
Thailand and Malaysia, we examined the distributional feature of listed status andforeign ownership, and then re-estimated the determinants of the capital structures.
We confirmed basic facts, such as the fact that unlisted firms occupy a large portionin the distribution, and that the debt financing of major firms is relatively inactive.
We also found the significance of foreign ownership and its negative relationshipwith debt financing and ‘going public’. Finally, we found that certain kinds offoreign firms tend to keep large retained earnings and non-bank debt, suggesting
their deep reliance on self-financing and internal capital markets. The characteristics
of corporate finance in East Asia can be explained in part by distributional featureson listing status and foreign ownership. Our findings raised questions about theconventional view of the current policy framework which emphasized on the shift
from financial intermediation to the capital and bond markets.

Keywords: Financial System, Corporate Finance, East Asia, FDI
JEL Categories: G30, G32, O52

Acknowledgement:
The paper is written based on the products of the research project on the corporate finance in Malaysia
and Thailand, conducted at Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JIBC) in 2006-08. The author
thanks for JBIC institution for realizing such uneasy research attempt, and for project colleagues at theinstitute: Toshiro Nisizawa, Masahiro Shimobacbi, Qun Liu, Akiko Sugiyama and Shinya Handa, for theoverall cooperation and support. The Author also thanks for valuable comments from Satitniramai
Apichat, Yutaka Arimoto, Yoshihisa Godo, Laurence Harris, Akira Kohsaka, Takashi Kurosaki, Anna
Maria Cristina Menichini, Hiroyuki Mizuno, Mamoru Nagano, Machiko Nissanke, Eiji Ogawa,
Hidenobu Okuda, Marco Pagano, Xu Peng, Iichiro Uesugi. Remaining errors are mine.

11. Introduction
Conventional policy arguments on the financial system in East Asia have emphasized theissues of excessive debt financing, the lack of a bond market and the problems with weakcorporate governance.

On the other hand, some apparent facts which are contradictory to sucha view but crucial for the argument have generally been ignored. For example, the debt ratio ofmajor firms is comparably low on average in East Asia, and many of the large but unlisted firms
play a significant role in the economy. Also, the size of the numerous foreign firms in a formof foreign direct investment (FDI) varies widely, from large multinational companies (MNCs) tovery small enterprises.
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the conventional understanding of corporate financein East Asia, expanding the sample focus from the major listed firms referred in most studies towider varieties including unlisted firms and foreign subsidiaries. The country focus is Thailand
and Malaysia.
Based on the financial statement of the listed firms in 9 countries, Claessens et al. pointed
the high debt ratio of the firms and their increasing trends during the early 1990s, the period
preceding the Asian financial crisis in one of their representative studies on the corporate
finance and governance in the East Asia (Claessens et al. 1999,2000).

They also asserted thatthe weak corporate governance caused the major inefficiency problems under the
pyramid-shaped ownership structure. Meanwhile, Booth et al. (2001) examined thedeterminants of capital structure based on the financial data of the listed firms in developing
countries including East Asia, and pointed out that the equity dependent features, instead of debt,
are found in developing countries.
Many studies have focused on the corporate finance in the individual countries in East
Asia: e.g. Mieno (2006) on Thailand, Okuda and Saito (2007) on the Philippines, Suto (2003)
on Malaysia, and Lee et al. on Korea (2000).
structures.

All examine the determinants of the capital

Although the results of the estimations vary across the countries and theapproaches, the debt ratios observed in all the studies are generally lower than those of2

Classens’s studies1, and shows only very partial relationships among debt ratio, ownership andweakness of governance.
One possible research breakthrough on this issue may be achieved by examining on how
the financial system does or does not play an intermediation role to the sectors which have led
economic and industrial growth in East Asia, rather than by merely criticizing theunderdeveloped financial and corporate system, or of excessively emphasizing the significanceof capital inflow in the macroeconomic point of view.

Looking back on the last decade, thetransformation in the real sectors accompanied in the recovery process from the Asian crisis,
independently from the prolonged distress in the financial sector.

The fact suggests that thecurrent financial sectors in East Asia may not play a major role in providing funds to leadingindustrial sectors, although it appears so and that industrial sectors behave more independently
in their fund raising.
In fact, the largest impediment for accurate examination on the reality of the financial
intermediation from the microeconomic stand point in East Asia is the simple fact that the basic
information on the major firms currently existing and operating is not easily available.

This isin part because many firms still stay unlisted and do not participate in the organized capital
market(securities exchange), and in part because economic growth has largely depended on FDI,
and requires numerous foreign firms to operate, most of which are not easily observable inresearches.

Actually, the corporate finance focusing only on listed firms has been studied anddiscussed in the situation that no one knows how the major firms are distributed in the East
Asian countries, and no one knows where the listed firms are actually located in these
distributions.
Recognizing such shortcoming, the research question here is set in rather simple form;
does the financial sector really play a sufficient role of intermediation to the corporate sector,
and how much significant is it?

The question can be expressed in different words; does thecorporate sector really depend on the financial sector for their fund raising, and how much
1

The ratios seem consistent only in Korea.

3crucial is it?

In order to find the answer to this, we will start with a very basic work ofconstructing a higher-coverage firm database and of draw the picture of the distribution of firms
in the economies.

To acquire the better-covered sample data, the firm information wascollected not from the disclosed data of listed firms at the stock exchanges, but from the stored
microfiches in the company registration offices of the each government2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
data.

In Section 2, we explain how we use our

The characteristics of the firm distributions are examined in Section 3, and the generaltendency of the capital structures is observed in Section 4.

In Sections 5 and 6, we estimate

the determinants of the capital structure, namely debt ratio, bank borrowing ratio and non-bank
debt, with focus on foreign ownership structure and listed status.

Section 7 gives somediscussions and concludes the paper.

2. Data
We selected the data sample for the corporate profiles and financial statements using thefollowing process (Table1). First, based on the total asset size in 2004, we listed the top 1,000
unlisted firms in the non-financial sector, and collected their corporate profiles. Adding the same
information of all the listed firms in the non-financial sector available at the stock exchanges,
we completed a “firm profile database” of 1,301 firms for Thailand and 1,860 firms for
Malaysia.

Setting the minimum size criteria at the smallest total asset size of the unlisted firms(e.g. 1,040 Million Bahts in Thailand), we got rid of listed firms that were smaller than theminimum criteria ,from the samples and finally arrived at sums of 1,189 and 1,860 samples
respectively (Table 1).
Second, we collected shareholder information for all the available firms.

Information for

the top ten shareholders in Thailand, and the top five in Malaysia, were available in our data

2

The registration office operates under the ministry of commerce in Thailand, and under local (state)
governments in Malaysia. All the firms are obligated to submit their company profiles and simplified
financial statements. For Malaysia, we focus the regions on Kuala Lumpur Capital and Negri Sembilan
State.

4source.
Third, we collected and compiled the financial statements (i.e. the balance sheet andincome statement) of the unlisted firms, for the top 300 firms in Thailand and the top 250 in
Malaysia in the period of 2000-043.

Adding the financial statements of listed firms in the sameranges of the total asset size, we completed a “financial statement database” in panel data form
for top 447 firms and 846 firms respectively.
The main sources of the data for the unlisted firms were registration documents stored in
the registration offices in microfiche form.

We entrusted consultant companies in each country

to collect and compile the primal data of the unlisted firms.

The data for the listed firms arefrom a commercial database, OSIRIS by Bureau van Dijk Ltd.

3. Distribution of listed status and foreign ownership3.1. General Characteristics
Table 1 summarized the sample structure classified by the asset size and the listed status.
Apparently, the unlisted firms weigh significantly in total samples for both countries. The
number of listed firms is counted to only 33.3% in the top 447 and 22.5% in the top 1,189 in
Thailand, and 74.8% in the top 846, and 48.6% in the top 1,824 in Malaysia. The table also
shows that the listed firm sample includes very small-sized ones.

Particularly in Thailand, thelisted firms are tail-long distributed, and as much as 29.5% (112 / 380) of the firms are so smallthat they do not satisfy our observation criteria.

3.2. Foreign Ownership
In order to investigate the foreign ownership structure, we classified the foreign sharebased on the top 10 (Thailand), or top 5 (Malaysia) shareholders’ information. We defined thepercentage of foreign shares as the total sum of shares in the top 5 or 10 shareholders.

We

employed the following typology of foreign ownership.
3

The sample sizes of the available data are a little smaller due to the lack of the data quality.

5

A. 0-10%: Financial Investment
B. 10-95%: Joint Venture – participation in managerial control
B-a: 10-50%: controlled mainly by local counterparts
B-b: 50-95%: controlled mainly by foreign capital
C. 95% or more: Foreign Subsidiary – completely controlled by foreign capital
Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of the ownership combined with listed status.
Each bar shows the composition of 100 firms, ordered by total size from left to right.

Thegraphs include more detailed classification than the typology above, 33.3% and 66.7% forreference.

ThailandFor Thailand, Figure 1 confirms that the weight of the listed firms is relatively low; they arecounted in around 50% of the top 100 firms, and less than 30% of the smaller layers.
figure also indicates several remarkable facts.

The

First, many firms accept foreign capital in fact.

For example, the foreign shares are found in as much as 52.3% of firms (62.1% in the listed,
and 54.5% in the unlisted) among the top 400 in various forms, and 31.8% of firms (14.7% and40.5% respectively) accept more than 10% of the foreign shares.
Second, the main form can be classified into two types;- Type (1) financial investment (A), less than 10% share, to the listed firms;- Type (2) joint venture (B-a and B-b), or local subsidiary (C) to the unlisted firms.

The case of more than 10% share is rarely found in the listed firms, while conversely,
investment share in the unlisted firms is over 10% in most cases, suggesting that FDI-related
firms generally remain as unlisted firms.
Third, the type (1) investment is prevalent and significant in the top 400 layer,
outreaching to 47.4% of all the listed firms. Thai securities market recovered and portfolio
investment restored to be active after 2003.

However, this finding suggests that the recovering

6inflow of foreign portfolio investment is largely biased to the layer of large listed firms, hence,the expanding foreign portfolio investment have had a limited role for firms’ fundraisingsituation as whole.
Fourth, the wide prevalence and significance of type (2) investment is a little surprising.
About 18% of the unlisted firms are owned by foreign capital as local subsidiaries, C, and27-30% of all the unlisted firms are under their control by over 50% (C, and B-a).

Type (2)firms are not concentrated in the large firm layer, but are distributed more broadly to the smaller
firm layer.

Malaysia
In contrast to the case of Thailand, a substantial portion of the large firms in Malaysia
participate in the securities market as listed firms. The listed firms occupy around 97% in the
top 100, and 74% in the top 600. This fact confirms a common view that Malaysia retains themost developed securities market in Southeast Asia.

Figure 2 also shows that Malaysia holds a

substantial amount of genuine local firms compared with Thailand, and foreign firms are lesssignificant both in the listed and the unlisted groups.
We found three striking characteristics in the distribution of Malaysian firms.

First, thefinancial investment in the listed firm by less than 10% (Type (1)), is rare in Malaysia.
the listed firms in the top 600, only 4% are classified into this type.

Among

On the other hand, in thelarge firm level, such as the top 200, firms with substantially high foreign shares are common,some of which hold more than 50% of the foreign share.

Secondly, while the unlisted firms

are rarely found in the top 200th layer, they occupy a substantial portion in the 200-1000th layers,
with a larger portion in the smaller layer.

Foreign ownership is distributed prevalently in

Malaysia, just as it is in Thailand.
Third, and most strikingly for Malaysia, local subsidiaries of foreign firms counted for avery large portion among Type (2) foreign investment, suggesting that FDI in Malaysia is
implemented in the form of establishing subsidiaries more frequently than joint ventures.

This

7

is a remarkable difference from Thailand, and seems consistent with the FDI ‘enclave’ feature of
the Malaysian manufacturing sector.
Both two cases imply the limited role of portfolio investment for firms’ fund raising.
Although in Thailand portfolio investment at the organized capital markets is popular to adegree, the stock acquisition by foreign capital is mainly realized outside of organized markets(i.e. authorized securities exchanges).

In Malaysia, foreign portfolio investment through themarket is generally rare, and the joint venture relationship of foreign and local capital isseemingly weak.

(3) The nationalities of foreign capital
The nationalities of the sample firms show each country’s characteristics.
summarizes the nationality of the largest shareholders of the sample firms4.

Table 2

While the numberof the genuine domestic firms counted a little larger for Malaysia (77.4% in total) than for
Thailand (63.7%), in both cases foreign capitals occupy substantial weight as the largest
shareholders.

Among foreign capitals, Japanese are the largest in number in both countries,

followed by the U.S., Singaporean and EU’s.

Japanese capital is overwhelming in Thailand(18.8%), but is just comparable with Singaporean and EU’s in Malaysia (6.4%).

The presenceof the U.S. firms is larger in Thailand than in Malaysia, are EU firms are observed only in
Malaysia.

Taiwanese and Korean seem to remain as a minority foreign capital.

4. Capital Structure
Thailand
Table 3 summarizes the capital structure of the top 447 Thai firms in the year averages
classified by their listed status.

Since samples are selected in a common criteria based on total

assets, the figures in the table are controlled for the total assets5. The available sample size
4

Calculated only with the firms available for nationality. The nationality of the largest shareholder
cannot be identified in ** of 1,189 firms in Thailand and ** of 1848 in Malaysia.
5
The available sample size varies across years. Also, we omitted the firms where the data are not8varies by years. Also, we omitted the firms where the data are not available for at least the past
three years.
The table gives us important information.

First, the debt ratios are levels of 50%, whichfalls into a substantially low category in international comparison6 contrary to the assertion ofClaessens (1998, 2000). The ratios are slightly higher in the listed firms.

The debt ratio

generally tends to decline in the early 2000s, suggesting that the firms have weakened theirdependence on financial intermediation for their fund raising during the period of the financial
turmoil and restructuring.
Second, in the capital account side, the listed firms hold greater capital surplus than theunlisted ones. This is seemingly caused from the retained surplus gained at the initial public
offering (Mieno and Gunji (2004)). Conversely, the retained earnings are greater in the unlisted
firm particularly in 2000-01, suggesting the listed firms which depend more on external financewere damaged more seriously from the 1997’s financial crisis.
Third, the composition of bank borrowings show the trend similar to the debt ratio, which
is higher in listed firms than unlisted firms, the gap is much higher; 22.7% in the listed, 17.9%
in the unlisted.

Corresponding to this, the non-bank debts are higher in the unlisted firms. The

listed firms are more dependent on financial intermediation than the unlisted firms, in spite of
the fact that they are more accessible to the capital markets.

The unlisted firms tend to depend

on internal capital market or informal markets. This is evidence of complementarity, rather thansubstitutionality, between financial intermediation and the capital markets.
The bank borrowing ratio also declines in the early 2000s, while the non-bank debt isconstant in the listed firms, and declines in the unlisted firms, implying that the former copedwith the retrogression of financial intermediation by strengthening the preference to the internalmarket, while the latter coped by self-financing.

available at least three years.
6
According to Booth et al.(2001), the debt ratios of major firms in developed countries are roughlyclassified into two categories: Middle of 50% level in Anglo-Saxon type (The U.A., the U.K. etc.) andaround 70% in Continental Europe type (France, Germany, Japan, etc.)

9In sum, Thai firms are not seriously dependent on debt financing, and the levels of thebank borrowing and the long-term debt are low. Their dependence on intermediation isrelatively weak. Comparably, the listed firms more actively utilize financial intermediation in
their fundraising.

And the dependence on the financial intermediation is shrinking recently inboth the listed and the unlisted firms.

Malaysia
Table 4 shows the Malaysian case with the same treatment of the sample selection as
Thailand. The tendency is similar to Thailand in some points, and different in others.
First, the debt ratios show the middle of 40% level in the listed firms, and less than 40%
in the unlisted. The levels are indeed low, much lower than in Thailand, and are incomparable tothe case of developed countries.

The gap of debt ratios between the listed and the unlisted isaround 5%, which is higher than in Thailand.

On the other hand, the ratio keeps constantthrough the observation periods, and the sign of the decline is not found.

The facts suggestthat the function of the financial intermediation was not seriously damaged by the crisis in
Malaysia, while the degree of the dependence on financial intermediation is generally low.
Second, in the capital account side, capital surpluses are almost the same in the listed andunlisted firms, whereas retained earnings are higher in the unlisted firms, suggesting that
financial crisis primarily hit the listed firms.
Third, the bank borrowing ratio, one of the components of debt ratio, is surprisingly low
in Malaysia: 10-13% in the listed firms, and only 4-6% in the unlisted firms.

These striking

figures indicate that, in Malaysia, the bank borrowing or financial intermediation hardly plays arole for firms’ fundraising, and a large portion of the firms’ debt consists of non-bank debt. In
other words, they largely rely on internal capital markets.

The important fact is that non-bankdebt ratios in the listed and the unlisted firms are almost the same, and the gap in debt ratios isgenerated by the gap in bank borrowing.

The bank borrowing and the non-bank debt are not10substitutive in Malaysia, and the listed firms utilize bank borrowing jointly with non-bank debt7.
Summarizing the observation in comparison with Thailand, the debt ratios of major firms
in both countries are not necessarily high, but rather low.

In particular, bank borrowing ratios

are so low in Malaysia that we can see that the financial intermediation hardly plays asignificant role in the firms’ fundraising. The internal market is significant in both countries,
whereas bonds have not yet become a major funding source for firms.

The listed firms are

more dependent on intermediation than the unlisted, which is a common tendency in bothcountries.
Regarding the difference between the two countries, Malaysian firms show remarkably
low dependence on the financial intermediation. However, it has gradually strengthened in theearly 2000s, while it has weakened in Thai firms.

5. Estimation Methodology
Based on the descriptive observation below, the following two sections will estimate
determinants of capital structure, searching for the relationship among fundraising, the listed
status and foreign ownership.

In these sections, we will estimate the determinants of debt ratio,bank borrowing ratio and the non-bank debt ratio, based on the agency cost approach, andinterpret the results with the evidence also from the descriptive statistics.
There are several well known basic factors to primarily influence the capital structure in
numerous relevant studies. The firm size and the level of tangible asset are known to be a proxy
for the potential repayment capacity and collateral, being positively correlated with debt.
Likewise, the risk factor is usually recognized as negative factor for debt since the risk is mainly
shouldered on the creditor under the debt contract.

We adopt the indicators of these factors as

following,Size: log of total asset
Tangible Asset: Fixed Asset / T.A.
7

However, bank borrowing ratio tends to increase in the early 2000s, though the level is still small.

11

Risk: standard deviation of ROA in 2000-04
Another well known factor is the non-debt tax shield.

Even in the Modigliani-Miller’sframework, tax saving mechanism through the debt is a primary influence on the debt ratio(Modigliani-Miller (1963)).

Debt incurs tax saving because interest expenses are treated as

deductions from taxable income.

However, the magnitude of this effect usually depends on

the scope of tax deduction through debt, roughly determined by the residual of the total tax
shield minus the non-debt tax shield.

Thus, the tax-saving effect through debt is negatively

correlated with the non-debt tax shield.

We directly calculate the non-debt tax shield byfollowing the method shown in Titman and Wessels (1988).
NDTS:

Non-Debt Tax Shield = OI – I – T /  8

where  is the tax rate, OI is operating income, I is interest expenses, and T
corporate tax
The agency theory gives us possible control variables.

Financial Hierarchy argument(Fazzari et.al. 1988) and Pecking Order Hypothesis (Myers et.al. 1984) inform us that cash
flow usually loosens the necessity of external finance since the self-finance is the cheapest
fundraising source in term of capital cost. In fact, previous studies obtained negative
correlations between cash flow and debt ratio.

On the other hand, the bank monitoringprocesses information which decreases the information asymmetry between creditors andfirms.

If it is the case, the more active in bank borrowing, the more active debt financing.

We introduce these factors in the following calculation.
Cash Flow: retained earnings / T.A.
Bank Borrowing: bank borrowing / debt
Our major concern is placed on the relationship with listed status and foreign ownership.
List Dummy tests the difference between listed and non-listed firms. For the foreign ownership,
we prepare Foreign Share, the percentage of foreign share, and dummy variables for the four

The formula is deduced from the simple relation; is T =  (OI – I - NDT), and NDT is the non-debt tax
shield.

812and six classes of foreign share: [0%, 0-10%, 10-50%, 50-95%, 95% and more], [0%, 0-10%,
10-33.3%, 33.3-50%, 50-95%, 95% and more],
Manufacturing Dummy and Time Trend are also introduced as explanatory variables insome cases in order to observe basic tendencies.
We focus on three types of debt as dependent variables.
1.

Debt Ratio = Debt / Total Assets;

2.

Bank Borrowing Ratio = Bank Borrowing / Total Assets;

3.

Non-Bank Debt = (Debt – Bank Borrowing) / Total Assets;

6. The Result and interpretation
6.1. Thailand(1) Overall Results
The sample for the estimation is 1451 unbalanced panel data (449 listed, 952 unlisted
firms), covering 2000-2004.

The estimation results in Table 5-1 show that the coefficients offirm size, tangible asset, tax saving effect through debt, indicate consistent sings, and significant
in most cases.

Only the coefficients of risk are inconsistent and insignificant.

The coefficients of cash flow for all the cases, and those of bank borrowing for the case ofdebt ratio as dependent variable show significant in negative sign.

These results suggest theexistence of agency cost associated with external finance, and the role of financial intermediary
for information processing. Roughly, the estimation results of control variables seem reasonable,
which ensures that the agency cost approach makes sense as methodology, and allows us further
interpretation on our concerning points in this framework.
Manufacturing dummy is not significant on any dependent variable.

Time trend clearly issignificant with negative sign on debt ratio and bank borrowings, which means the debt
financing has been shrunk during early 2000s.

(2) Listed Status

13

The coefficients of the list dummy in the estimations on debt ratio and bank borrowing ratioshows positive sign in the estimations on bank borrowing and negative, on debt and non-bank
debt.

However, all the coefficients are not significant. The estimation results do not confirm

our observation in Section 49.

(3) Foreign Ownership and Capital Structure
Before examine the estimation results, we will overview the descriptive statistics for theforeign ownership issue. Table 6 compares the average value of major indices such as debt andbank borrowing ratio classified by listed status and foreign share classes.
certain tendencies.

This shows us

With the unlisted firms, debt ratio is almost similar across the classes ofownership structure, though slightly high at 33.3-95%. On the other hand, while in both local
firms and foreign subsidiaries the bank borrowing ratio is around 19%, the ratio of joint
ventures of ‘up to 33.3% foreign share’ is 14-15%, substantially lower10.

Non-bank debt ratioshows an adverse tendency that the ratio is remarkably high in ‘up to 33.3% foreign share’ firms,
while the ratio is almost constant in the other classes. To sum, bank borrowing and non-bankdebt seems oppositely shaped along foreign shares, reaching the bottom and the roof
respectively at the point of joint venture ownership, up to 33.3%.
In the listed firms, most samples are distributed within a range of 0-10% foreign
ownership. In this range, there seems to be a negative relationship between bank borrowing
ratio and foreign ownership, and a positive relationship between non-bank debt ratio and foreign
ownership, which is consistent to the tendency of unlisted firms.

Debt ratio itself is indifferent

to foreign ownership, probably because the two components cancel out each other.
Now, estimation results also confirm these tendency. In Table 5-1, in the cases of bankborrowing ratio and non-bank debt ratio, the coefficients of foreign share are significant in

9

The results is inconsistent with Mieno(2006), which examined the nature in early 1990’s and foundlisted firms are significantly high in bank borrowings.
10
However, the changes occurred in the ratios during the early 2000s, resulting the orders reversed in
2004.

14

negative and positive signs respectively, and the coefficients of its squared values are significant
in the adverse signs, implying that the slope of bank borrowing ratio is U-shaped, while that ofnon-bank debt is inverse U-shaped along foreign share.
However, the detailed observation by class dummies dose teach us that the picture is not
so straightforward, i.e. consistent but unclear.

Table 5-2 shows the results of the estimation

with class dummies, instead of foreign share itself.

Most coefficients of control variables areunchanged. Here we adopt two different types of class dummy: the same classification ofSection 3.2, and more detailed classification. The benchmark (the omitted dummy variables)
is local firms, i.e. firms with zero percent foreign shares.

In these estimation, we could not

find any significant result in bank borrowings, though coefficient itself forms U-Shape,suggesting that the U-shape correlation is relatively weak even if though exists.

Meanwhile,

only the evidence consistent to inverse U-shape in non-bank debt is positive sign type B-a joint
venture.
On the other hand, on debt ratio estimation, the coefficient of foreign subsidiary issignificant in positive sign, and on bank borrowing estimation, nearly significant in the same
sign.

Foreign subsidiaries seem relatively high in debt and bank borrowing ratio comparedwith joint ventures, and even with local firms, which may be a main factor to forms the U-shapein bank borrowing ratio.

6.2. Malaysia(1) Overall Results
The sample of estimation is 3346 unbalanced panel data (2593 listed, 753 unlisted firms),
covering 2000-04.

The estimation results in Table 7-1 show that the signs of coefficients ofmost control variables, namely size, tangible asset, NDTS are consistent and significant in mostcases, and that of risk factor is insignificant. The coefficient of cash flow and bank borrowing is
also consistent and highly significant. The results are almost same as in the case of Thailand,

15and show that agency approach seems to capture the nature of corporate finance also in the caseof Malaysia.
Different from Thai’s case, the manufacturing sector borrow from bank more, and is lessdependent on non-bank debt.

Debt ratio as total sum of the two components is rather lower inthe sector. Time trend also shows the opposite tendency to Thailand, firms have increased bankborrowing, and decreased non-bank debt during the early 2000s. The pace of change, however,seems very slow.

(2) Listed Status
As to the listed status, the clearer results are obtained from estimation. The bankborrowings are significantly high in listed firms, and the non bank debt seems lower in listed
firms, although the coefficient does not clear the 10% significance criteria in the latter case.
Contrasted to the case of Thailand, the estimation results clearly support the difference shown indescriptive statistics in Section 4.

(3) Foreign Ownership and Capital Structure
Table 8 compares the average value of debt ratio, bank borrowing ratio, classified by listed
status and grouping of the classes in foreign ownership.

In Malaysia, the negative relationshipbetween foreign shares and debt ratio is more clearly observed, which is common in the listed
and unlisted firms.
The estimation results suggest that the relationship between foreign share and capital
structure is significant but non-linier in Malaysia.
U-Shaped along foreign share.

Table 7-1 tells us that debt ratio is

The bank borrowing ratio is negatively correlated to foreign

share, but unclear about whether the relationship is linier or non-liner. On the other hand,non-bank debt is clearly U-Shaped, which is the same nature as debt, and opposite for the caseof Thailand.

16

Table 7-2, which tests with class dummies for foreign share, give us richer information.
On the estimations for bank borrowing ratio, the firms accepting foreign share 0-10% (Type A,
Financial Investment), the debt ratio is significantly lower.

And ignoring this case, the bankborrowing ratio forms clear U-shape along the foreign share (10-100%). The estimation
confirms the U-shaped form in debt ratio and non-bank debt; the ratios are lowest at joint
venture case (Type B-b), and subsidiaries are lower than local firm or financial investment firms,
but higher than joint ventures.

6.3. Interpretation(1) Listed Status
Different from the descriptive statistics in Section 4, the relationship between externalfinance and listed status remains unclear, and uncommon in two countries. In Malaysia, bankborrowing ratio is significantly high, and non bank borrowing ratio is seemingly low.

In

Thailand, however, listed status is not significant in any dependent variables, though the signsof coefficient (positive in bank borrowing, negative in non bank debt), seemingly same in
Malaysia.

(2) Foreign Ownership
Although the estimation results in Thailand and Malaysia include different naturesassociated with foreign ownership in detailed facts, we can find certain common characteristics.
Minor difference lies rather in the pole cases.

In Thailand, foreign subsidiaries show highdependence on external finance, even higher than local firms. In Malaysia, the firms accepting
financial investment from foreigners (within 10%) are especially less dependent on bankborrowing. Ignoring such exceptions, the results show us that bank borrowing ratio is
U-shaped in both countries; a certain type of joint-venture firms are the lowest on thedependence on external finance.

17

On the other hand, there is major difference between two countries in the nature ofnon-bank debt.

Whereas it shows inverse U-shape along foreign share, opposite to the shapeof bank borrowing in Thailand, in Malaysia it is U-shaped, a nature same as the bank borrowing.
This seems to suggest that the alternative fund sources for substitution of bank loan are different
in two countries. Namely, the firms less dependent on bank borrowing tend to utilize theinternal capital market in Thailand, and tend to depend on self-financing in Malaysia.
One of the main research questions in the paper is whether or not the large presence of
foreign firms under the FDI-led industrialization in East Asia influences the local financial
system.

In Sections 3 and 4, we observed that foreign ownership is distributed mainly in theunlisted firm groups and that firms are generally less dependent on external finance, or financial
intermediation, than developed countries.

Our estimations show that certain forms of joint

ventures in Thailand and Malaysia are less dependent on financial intermediation than local
firms or foreign subsidiaries. While, the relationship between debt, bank borrowing and foreign
ownership is neither linear nor large enough, suggesting that foreign ownership does not seemto be a solo factor to bring about weak financial intermediation in Thailand.

7. Discussions and Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we examined corporate finance in Thailand and Malaysia based on theoriginally compiled rich company database covering unlisted firms, which enabled us to
examine the issue in light of listed status and foreign ownership.
We found that financial intermediation is pretty inactive as a method for firms’ fundraising,as far as debt ratio or bank borrowing ratio shows, particularly in Malaysia.

In fact, theseratios are much lower than in developed countries, where the securities market is better
developed.

This fact sharply contradicts the conventional view that excess debt financing is

one of the core problems in East Asia and is a major cause of financial distress in 1997-8.
We also found that a large portion of the major firms still remain unlisted, i.e. they choose
not to participate in organized capital markets.

This is a common practice in Thailand.

18

The arguments to restructure the East Asian financial system have been emphasizing theprompt shift from a bank-oriented financial system to a market-based one.

Taking such basic

facts of our finding into account, these policy stances are probably misleading, and are insulated
from the real circumstances.

Thailand and Malaysia, and probably most East Asian countries,

currently stand on a much earlier phase of financial development, where the core policy issues
should be how inactive financial intermediation can be overcome, and how the firms can be
encouraged to participate in organized capital markets.
It is noteworthy that this situation has not been brought about by the recent financial crisis
or financial liberalization policy of the proceeding period, but is rooted in the features of
FDI-led industrialization, or the real sector growth in East Asia.
We examined the relationship between foreign ownership and financing, searching for thesignificance of the FDI-led industrialization on the financial system.

As a result of thisobservation and estimation, we found a general rule: in firms whose foreign shares are higher,bank borrowing ratio is lower and non-bank debt is higher.

However, the relationship is notnecessarily linear; i.e. in Thailand, the bank borrowing ratio of foreign subsidiaries is higher
than that of joint ventures (U-shape), and in Malaysia firms accepting financial investment fromforeigners is especially low in bank borrowing. Also, the firms with a higher foreign share tend
to depend on internal markets (Thailand) and self-financing (Malaysia).
As for foreign subsidiaries, the most important component of non-bank debt source may be
a credit channel between parent companies and subsidiaries.

However, the information onparent–subsidiary lending was not available in our database, and not easily available in any
database. The analysis on this point remains as a future issue.
We attempted to raise a new discussion on the financial system in East Asia, and the work
is still in a primitive stage. There remains much incompleteness in hypothesis setting, estimation
methodology and results, which should be solved in future analysis.

19

Bibliography
Antra, Pol, Mihir A.Desai and C.Frit Foley, 2007, “Multinational Firms, FDI Flows andImperfect Capital Markets”, NBER Working Paper, 22855
Booth, Laurence, Varouj Aivazian, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic,2005, Capital
Structures in Developing Countries, Journal of Finance LVI(1): 87-130.
Claessens, Stijin, Simeon Djankov and Larry Lang, 1998, “Corporate Growth, Financing, andRisks in the Decade before East Asia's Financial Crisis”, Policy Research Working
Paper, WPS2017, World Bank
Claessens, Stijin, Simeon Djankov, and Larry Lang, 2000, “The separation of ownership andcontrol in East Asian Corporations”, Journal of Finance, 58, pp. 81–112.
Daude, Christian and Marcel Fratzscher, 2008, “The pecking order of cross-border investment”,
Journal of International Economics 74, pp.94-119
Lee, Jong-Wha and Young Soo Lee, Byung-Sun Lee, 2000, “The Determination of Corporate
Debt in Korea”, Asian Economic Journal 14(4):333-56
Mieno, Fumiharu 2006 “Fund Mobilization and Investment Behavior in Thai Manufacturing
Firms in the Early 1990s”, Asian Economic Journal 20.1
Mieno, Fumiharu and Shinya Handa, 2006, “Distributional Features and Fund Raising of Major
Firms in Thailand and Malaysia: The Location of Foreign and Japanese Affiliation”,
JBIC Review, Vol.31, JBIC Institution, (Japanese).
Mieno, Fumiharu and Hiroshi Gunji, 2004, “Firm's IPO Behavior and its financial impacts in
Developing Financial Market: A Case of Thai Security Market in Early 1990”, a paper
presented at Annual Conference of East Asian Economic Association at Chinese Hong
Kong University, November 2004
Rajan, Raghuram. G and Luigi Zingales, 1995, “What Do We Know about Capital Structure?
Some Evidence from International Data”, The Journal of Finance 1(5)Suto, Megumi, 2003, “Capital structure and investment behavior of Malaysian firms in the
1990s – a study of corporate governance before the crisis”, Corporate Governance: anInternational Review, 11, 1

20

Figure 1

Distribution of Firms by Listed Status, Foreign Ownership & Asset in Thailand
100

ListedFS.95%- Listed

90

FS.66.6-95% Listed

80

FS.50-66.6% Listed
FS.33.3-49.9% Listed

70

FS.10-33.2% Listed

Local Firms(Foreign Share 600%)FS.0-10% Listed
Local (FS.0%) Listed

Non- listed

50

Local (FS.0%) Non-listed40

FS.0-10% Non-listed30

FS.10-33.2% Non-listed
FS.33.3-49.9% Non-listed

20

FS.50-66.6% Non-listed

10

FS.66.6-95% Non-listed
FS.95%- Non-listed

0
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100
ListedUnlisted
Rank by Size
1-400
401-800 801-1100
1-400
401-800
No. of Firms
135
76
46
265
324
Total of 10% or more
14.8%
18.4%
10.9%
40.4%
40.7%
Foreign Share 95%0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
18.1%
18.5%
Foreign Share 50-95%
1.5%
2.6%
0.0%
12.1%
9.0%
Foreign Share 10-50%
13.3%
15.8%
10.9%
10.2%
13.3%
Foreign Share -10%
48.9%
26.3%
28.3%
5.7%
6.8%
Foreign Share 0%
36.3%
55.3%
97.8%
54.0%
52.5%
Note: The percentages present the shares in number in the listed and the unlisted firms respectively

801-1100
254
42.1%
13.4%
13.4%
15.4%
3.5%
54.3%

21

Figure 2
Local Firms(Foreign
Share 0%)Distribution of Firms by Listed Status, Foreign Ownership & Asset in Malaysia

100

FS.95%- Listed
FS.66.6-95% Listed
FS.50-66.6% Listed
FS.33.3-49.9% Listed
FS.10-33.2% Listed
FS.0-10% Listed
Local (FS.0%) Listed
Local (FS.0%) Non-listed
FS.0-10% Non-listed
FS.10-33.2% Non-listed
FS.33.3-49.9% Non-listed
FS.50-66.6% Non-listed
FS.66.6-95% Non-listed
FS.95%- Non-listed

90

Listed

80
70
60
50
40

20
10
1800

1700

1600

1500

1400

1300

1200

1100

900

1000

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

0
100

Non - listed30

ListedUnlisted
Rank by Size
1-600
601-1200 1201-1800
1-600
601-1200
No. of Firms
445
279
124
155
321
Total of 10% or more
0.4%
1.4%
0.8%
14.2%
12.8%
Foreign Share 95%0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
9.7%
7.8%
Foreign Share 50-95%
0.2%
0.7%
0.8%
3.9%
2.5%
Foreign Share 10-50%
0.2%
0.7%
0.0%
0.6%
2.5%
Foreign Share -10%
0.2%
0.0%
0.8%
1.3%
0.6%
Foreign Share 0%
99.3%
98.6%
98.4%
83.9%
85.7%
Note: The percentages present the shares in number in the listed and the unlisted firms respectively

1201-1800
476
11.8%
6.1%
3.4%
2.3%
0.2%
86.3%

22

Table 1 Sample Design and Distribution(1) Thailand
Rank by Asset
Listed Firms Non-listed Firms
1st149（33.3%）

Asset Size
501,721298
2,586 ↑'Financial Statement Sample'

447th
119
(16.0%)

623↑'Company Profile & Shareholders
1,040 Inf. Sample'

1189thSub total 1189

268
(22.5%)

921
Omitted from
Observation

112
Total 1,301
380
921
Note: Total Asset in 2004, Million Baths
Parentheses represent the % of no. of listed firms in each class.
(2) Malaysia
Rank by Asset
1st

Listed Firms

Non-listed Firms

633（74.8%）

213
117,011 ↑'Financial Statement Sample'

846th
254
(22..7%)724↑'Company Profile & Shareholders
30,531 Inf. Sample'

1824thSub total 1,824

Asset Size
12,521,700887(48.6%)

97836

Omitted from
Observation

Total 1,860
923
937
Note: Total Asset in 2004, Thousand Ringgt
Parentheses represent the % of no. of listed firms in each class.

23

Table 2 The largest Shareholders' Nationality
Thailand
Malaysia
ThailandJapan
the U.S.
Singapore
Hong Kong
Malaysia
Korea
TaiwanOthers
Total

Number% to total

696
206
78
63
20
12
10
5
3
1093

63.7%
18.8%
7.1%
5.8%
1.8%
1.1%
0.9%
0.5%
0.3%

Malaysia
Japan
SingaporeEU
the U.S.
TaiwanVirgin Island
Hong Kong
Australia
Cayman Islands
Korea
Others
Total

Number% to total

1430
119
92
85
51
13
11
9
6
5
5
22
1848

77.4%
6.4%
5.0%
4.6%
2.8%
0.7%
0.6%
0.5%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
1.2%

Note. Calculated from the sample data in 2005. The classifications follows each definition oforiginal data.

24

Table 3 Capital Structure of the sample firms, Thailand(1) Non-listed
2000
2001
No. of Sample
201
197
57.5%
55.3%
1 Liabilities
39.0%
37.1%
2 Current Liabilities
10.3%
10.7%
3 Account payable
11.9%
11.3%
4 Short term borrowings
13.3%
11.2%
5 Other Current Liabilities
18.4%
18.2%
6 Non Current Liabilities
5.6%
7.5%
7 Long term Borrowings
4.3%
4.3%
8 Other Non Current Liabilities
42.5%
44.5%
9 Capital Accounts
32.3%
30.1%
10 Paid in Capital
3.7%
7.4%
11 Retained Earnings
6.5%
7.1%
12 Capital Surplus
13 Total bank borrowings (4)+(7)
17.5%
18.8%
14 Non-bank debt (1)-(13)
39.9%
36.5%

2002
204
54.7%
37.3%
11.0%
11.8%
12.6%
17.4%
7.5%
3.3%
45.3%
30.9%
8.4%
6.0%
19.3%
35.4%

2003
208
54.4%
37.8%
12.8%
10.6%
13.1%
16.6%
6.9%
3.4%
45.6%
28.5%
11.0%
6.1%
17.5%
36.9%

2004
207
51.7%
37.4%
12.7%
9.8%
13.0%
14.3%
6.6%
2.3%
48.3%
26.3%
16.3%
5.7%
16.4%
35.3%

Average

2002
116
56.3%
32.3%
8.6%
4.4%
19.3%
23.9%
16.9%
2.0%
5.0%
43.7%
24.0%
4.6%
15.1%
21.3%
34.9%

2003
131
53.1%
28.2%
6.9%
3.4%
17.9%
24.9%
17.7%
2.2%
5.1%
46.9%
68.3%
6.3%
-27.8%
21.1%
32.0%

2004
136
53.4%
30.2%
7.2%
4.1%
18.9%
23.1%
16.0%
2.7%
4.5%
46.6%
26.1%
9.9%
10.6%
20.0%
33.3%

Average

54.7%
37.7%
11.5%
11.1%
12.6%
17.0%
6.8%
3.5%
45.3%
29.6%
9.4%
6.3%
17.9%
36.8%

(2) Listed
No. of Sample
1 Liabilities
2 Current Liabilities
3 Account payable
4 Short term borrowings
5 Other Current Liabilities
6 Non Current Liabilities
7 Long term Borrowings
8 Debentures
9 Other Non Current Liabilities
10 Capital Accounts
11 Paid in Capital
12 Retained Earnings
13 Capital Surplus
14 Total bank borrowings (4)+(7)15 Non-bank debt (1)-(13)

2000
84
60.6%
32.5%
7.2%
5.8%
19.5%
28.1%
19.9%
3.8%
4.4%
39.4%
23.4%
-8.7%
24.6%
25.7%
35.0%

2001
101
59.0%
30.0%
6.9%
4.4%
18.7%
29.0%
20.7%
2.7%
5.6%
41.0%
25.9%
-4.2%
19.4%
25.1%
33.9%

56.5%
30.7%
7.4%
4.4%
18.9%
25.8%
18.2%
2.7%
4.9%
43.5%
33.5%
1.6%
8.4%
22.7%
33.8%

25

Table 4 Capital Structure of the sample firms, Malaysia(1) Non-listed
2000
2001
2002
2003
No. of Sample
182
204
206
208
37.9%
39.4%
40.1%
39.0%
1 Liabilities
32.0%
31.8%
32.7%
32.3%
2 Current Liabilities
19.2%
19.0%
22.6%
19.8%
3 Account payable
2.8%
3.2%
2.5%
3.2%
4 Short term borrowings
3.2%
2.8%
2.7%
2.5%
Borrowings from Related Parties
6.8%
6.9%
4.9%
6.8%
5 Other Current Liabilities
6.0%
7.5%
7.4%
6.7%
6 Non Current Liabilities
1.8%
3.1%
2.0%
2.1%
7 Long term Borrowings
4.2%
4.4%
5.4%
4.6%
8 Other Non Current Liabilities
62.1%
60.6%
59.9%
61.0%
9 Capital Accounts
33.1%
30.5%
26.9%
30.8%
10 Paid in Capital
17.0%
17.1%
20.2%
14.3%
11 Retained Earnings
12.0%
13.1%
12.7%
16.0%
12 Capital Surplus
13 Total bank borrowings (4)+(7)
4.6%
6.3%
4.6%
5.4%
14 Non-bank debt (1)-(13)
33.3%
33.1%
35.5%
33.6%
Note: 'Borrowing from Related Parties' are available only for current liabilities.

2004
212
39.0%
32.2%
20.8%
3.3%
2.1%
5.9%
6.8%
2.4%
4.4%
61.0%
29.1%
20.5%
11.5%
5.7%
33.3%

Average

2004
628
46.5%
28.7%
7.7%
2.4%
18.7%
17.7%
10.4%
1.1%
6.3%
53.5%
34.9%
6.7%
11.9%
12.7%
33.7%

Average

39.1%
32.2%
20.3%
3.0%
2.7%
6.2%
6.9%
2.3%
4.6%
60.9%
30.1%
17.8%
13.0%
5.3%
33.8%

(2) Listed
No. of Sample
1 Liabilities
2 Current Liabilities
3 Account payable
4 Short term borrowings
5 Other Current Liabilities
6 Non Current Liabilities
7 Long term Borrowings
8 Debentures
9 Other Non Current Liabilities
10 Capital Accounts
11 Paid in Capital
12 Retained Earnings
13 Capital Surplus
14 Total bank borrowings (4)+(7)15 Non-bank debt (1)-(13)

2000
479
45.7%
31.9%
7.9%
2.2%
21.8%
13.8%
7.7%
0.7%
5.3%
54.3%
30.6%
5.2%
18.6%
9.9%
35.8%

2001
498
43.3%
29.2%
7.1%
2.0%
20.1%
14.1%
8.0%
0.9%
5.2%
56.7%
32.3%
6.4%
18.0%
10.0%
33.3%

2002
552
44.0%
28.4%
7.2%
2.3%
18.9%
15.5%
9.3%
0.9%
5.3%
56.0%
33.9%
5.2%
16.9%
11.6%
32.4%

2003
609
45.8%
28.6%
7.7%
2.6%
18.4%
17.1%
9.6%
1.0%
6.5%
54.2%
34.2%
7.6%
12.5%
12.2%
33.6%

45.0%
29.4%
7.5%
2.3%
19.6%
15.7%
9.0%
0.9%
5.7%
55.0%
33.2%
6.2%
15.6%
11.3%
33.8%

26

Table 5-1 Estimation Result for Thailand
Debt / T.A.
0.0761 ***Size
0.0760 ***Bank Borrowing / T.A.
0.0443 ***0.0449 ***Non-Bank Debt / T.A.
0.0267 ***0.0259 ***

10.34

10.32

Tangible Asset-0.0181-0.0182

-0.66

-0.66

3.68

3.70

-3.56

-3.60

Risk

1.94E-06

1.94E-06-1.14E-06-1.16E-06

2.54E-06

2.55E-06

1.05

1.05

NDTS

-0.1356 ***-0.1357 ***

-4.73

-4.73

-0.22

-0.21

-3.70

-3.71

Cash Flow-0.3157 ***-0.3158 ***-0.1557 ***-0.1547 ***-0.1715 ***-0.1725 ***-16.54-16.54

-7.22

-7.18

-7.6

-7.65

Bank Borrowing

0.1099 ***0.1101 ***

7.50

7.51

List Dummy-0.0196-0.0203

0.00270.0053-0.0177-0.0206

-0.74

-0.77

0.12

0.23

-0.64

0.00060.00110.00020.82

0.56

Foreign Share

1.55(Foreign Share) ^ 2

5.65

5.73

3.16

3.07

0.1102 ***0.1107 ***-0.1142 ***-0.1151 ***

-0.49

-0.49

-0.0078-0.0075

-1.61

1.12

-0.1306 ***0.00040.95

2.19E-05 *-5.90E-06-0.42

0.0112-0.0018 *1.11-0.1300 ***0.0102

1.96-2.54E-05 *1.83

0.0076-0.75

0.0027 **-1.77

Manuf. Dummy

0.01190.0021-0.0009

0.48

0.45

0.35

0.47

Trend

-0.0102 **-0.0102 **-0.0051 **-0.0053 **

-4.97

-4.96

-2.02

-2.07

Constant-0.6079 ***-0.6078 ***-0.5256 ***-0.5290 ***

-5.38

-5.37

-4.39

-4.42

0.17

0.22

R-square0.20140.20260.10630.10650.08480.0855

0.08

-0.03

-0.0039-0.0038

-1.55

-1.49

0.02250.0290Upper column shows coefficients, Lower column shows t values.
Size: log of T. A., Tangible Asset : Fixed Asset /T.A., Cash Flow : Retained Earnings/T.A., Risk: Standard Deviation of ROA during
2000-2004, NDTS : calculated Non-Debt Tax Shield, Bank Borrowing : Bank Borrowing / T.A., List Dummy : = 1 if the sample is oflisted firm, Trend : Time Trend, Foreign Share : Foreign share summed up for 5 top shareholders, Manuf. Dummy : =1 if the sample isof manufacturing Sector

27

Table 5-2 Estimation Result for Thailand
Size

Debt / T.A.
0.0764 ***0.0762 ***
10.36

10.34

Tangible Asset-0.0161-0.0167

-0.58

-0.60

3.71

3.75

-3.52

-3.56

Risk

0.00000.00000.00000.00000.00000.0000

1.06

1.06

NDTS

-0.1345 ***-0.1347 ***

-4.69

-4.70

-0.20

-0.20

-3.67

-3.68

Cash Flow-0.3163 ***-0.3161 ***-0.1539 ***-0.1543 ***-0.1735 ***-0.1730 ***-16.55

-7.13

-7.16

-7.68

-7.67

Bank Borrowing

0.1099 ***
7.50

7.50

List Dummy-0.0287-0.03170.01050.0102-0.0335-0.0359

-0.95

-1.10

0.40

0.40

-1.07

-1.19

-16.54

Bank Borrowing / T.A.
0.0451 ***0.0451 ***Non-Bank Debt / T.A.
0.0262 ***0.0260 ***

5.75

5.76

3.09

3.07

0.1116 ***0.1124 ***-0.1131 ***-0.1143 ***

-0.50

-0.50

-0.0071-0.0070

1.13

1.13

-0.1293 ***-0.1296 ***0.1099 ***0 < [Foreign Share] < 10%

0.0187-0.0156

0.57

-0.54

0.93

10 <_ [Foreign Share] < 33.3%

0.0401-0.03430.0690

0.72

-0.71

33.3 <_ [Foreign Share] < 50%

0.0672-0.0333

1.54

-0.89

2.06

50 < _[Foreign Share] < 66.6%

0.0239-0.05280.0679

0.40

-1.03

1.10

66.6 <_ [Foreign Share] < 95%-0.0009-0.0272

0.0212

-0.02

-0.61

0.40

95% <_ [Foreign Share]

0.0731 *0.04890.02471.86

0.03191.19

0.0930 **

1.44

0.61

0 < [Foreign Share] < 10%Type A: Financial Investment
10 <_ [Foreign Share] < 50%
Type B-a: Joint Venture
50 <_ [Foreign Share] < 95%Type B-b: Joint Venture
95 < _[Foreign Share]
Type C: Foreign Subsidiaries
Manuf. Dummy

0.0204-0.0155

0.62

-0.55

0.0574-0.0337

0.03330.0141
0.56

0.59

0.49

0.51

Trend

-0.0102 ***-0.0102 ***-0.0053 **-0.0053 **

-4.97

-4.96

-2.09

-2.08

-1.49

-1.49

Constant-0.6192 ***-0.6149 ***-0.5325 ***-0.5330 ***0.01880.0235

-5.46

-5.43

-4.44

-4.46

0.14

0.18

R-square0.20550.20610.11410.10890.08840.08920.98

0.0843 **

1.59

-1.08

2.25

0.0081-0.0378

0.0394

0.19

-1.05

0.91

0.0718 *0.04870.02371.45

1.84

0.01470.01070.01110.59

0.00140.00160.05

0.06-0.0038-0.0037

Upper column shows coefficients, Lower column shows t values.
Size: log of T. A., Tangible Asset : Fixed Asset /T.A., Cash Flow : Retained Earnings/T.A., Risk: Standard Deviation of ROA during
2000-2004, NDTS : calculated Non-Debt Tax Shield, Bank Borrowing : Bank Borrowing / T.A., List Dummy : = 1 if the sample is oflisted firm, Trend : Time Trend, Foreign Share : Foreign share summed up for 5 top shareholders, Manuf. Dummy : =1 if the sample
is of manufacturing Sector

28

Table 6 Foreign Shares and Debt, Thailand(1) Debt Ratio
2000
2001

2002

2003

2004

Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share

58.3%
62.7%
55.2%
56.0%

57.5%
55.5%
52.5%
53.4%

56.3%
55.5%
51.2%
54.7%

57.1%
53.2%
49.8%
54.0%

51.8%
57.5%
49.5%
51.5%

56.2%
56.9%
51.6%
53.9%

93-100
16-18
50
37-40

63.6%
60.0%
58.4%

59.6%
60.2%
54.9%

57.2%
55.7%
56.3%

51.0%
55.2%
51.7%

51.8%
54.3%
54.2%

56.6%
57.1%
55.1%

24-48
42-65
18-23

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

18.2%
13.2%
14.5%
21.7%

19.3%
11.7%
18.6%
21.3%

21.6%
13.0%
17.3%
18.8%

19.8%
14.0%
12.9%
18.8%

17.7%
19.3%
12.7%
16.6%

19.3%
14.3%
15.2%
19.4%

93-100
16-18
50
37-40

30.2%
26.4%
18.1%

27.8%
26.4%
17.3%

22.0%
23.1%
15.4%

22.8%
22.7%
13.5%

22.7%
20.5%
13.2%

25.1%
23.8%
15.5%

24-48
42-65
18-23

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

40.2%
49.5%
40.7%
34.4%

38.2%
43.8%
33.9%
32.1%

34.7%
42.4%
33.9%
35.9%

37.2%
39.2%
36.9%
35.2%

34.1%
38.1%
36.8%
34.9%

36.9%
42.6%
36.4%
34.5%

93-100
16-18
50
37-40

33.4%
33.6%
40.3%

31.9%
33.8%
37.6%

35.2%
32.6%
40.9%

28.2%
32.5%
38.2%

29.1%
33.8%
41.0%

31.6%
33.3%
39.6%

24-48
42-65
18-23

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

38.3%
36.4%
37.2%
44.2%

36.6%
30.3%
37.8%
40.4%

35.8%
30.3%
37.9%
43.2%

37.7%
28.3%
37.2%
43.0%

35.3%
33.5%
39.2%
42.0%

36.7%
31.8%
37.9%
42.6%

93-100
16-18
50
37-40

32.0%
30.7%
37.4%

25.0%
30.6%
37.0%

31.5%
30.2%
39.6%

25.2%
27.6%
36.0%

28.4%
28.6%
38.8%

28.4%
29.5%
37.7%

24-48
42-65
18-23

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

-3.1%
-4.8%
12.1%
13.5%

1.1%
-6.5%
14.7%
19.5%

2.4%
-12.3%
18.4%
19.7%

1.7%
1.8%
25.0%
21.1%

8.8%
7.5%
27.0%
25.5%

2.2%
-2.9%
19.4%
19.9%

93-100
16-18
50
37-40

-12.6%
-7.6%
-5.9%

-9.2%
-2.8%
0.1%

0.5%
6.3%
7.2%

0.7%
8.4%
12.1%

4.6%
12.5%
13.8%

-3.2%
3.4%
5.5%

24-48
42-65
18-23

ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share(2) Bank Borrowing Ratio
Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share
ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share(3) Non-bank Debt Ratio
Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share
ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share(4) Current Liability / T.A.
Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share
ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share(5) Retained Earnings / T.A.
Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share
ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share29

Table 7-1 Estimation Result for Malaysia
Debt / T.A.
Size
0.0332 ***0.0334 ***Bank Borrowing / T.A.
0.00250.0025

Non-Bank Debt / T.A.
0.0307 ***0.0308 ***

9.56

9.60

1.09

1.11

9.84

9.87

Tangible Asset

0.0728 ***0.0730 ***0.0248 ***0.0249 ***0.0546 ***0.0548 ***

12.54

12.59

6.66

6.66

10.10

10.13

Cash Flow-0.0192 ***-0.0192 ***-0.0086 ***-0.0086 ***-0.0134 ***-0.0134 ***

-6.63

-6.64

-4.59

-4.59

-5.03

-5.03

Risk

-8.9E-06-8.8E-06

4.5E-07

4.6E-07-9.6E-06-9.6E-06

-1.16

-1.15

NDTS

0.0000-0.0002

-0.01

-0.07

Bank Borrowing

0.2656 ***0.2659 ***

17.08

17.11

List Dummy-0.0108-0.0096

-0.14

-0.13

Trend

-1.5E-11-1.2E-11

-0.29

-0.22

3.76

3.77

-1.96

-1.90

Foreign Share-0.0005 ***-0.0011 ***-0.0003 ***-0.0004 **-0.0003 **-0.0008 ***

-3.55

-4.82

-2.02

-3.26

-4.63

0.09

0.09

-1.33

-1.32

-0.0052 ***-0.0052 ***0.00240.0022

-2.95

-2.96

0.91

0.86

0.1604 ***0.1606 ***-0.0996-0.0984

3.07

3.07

-1.56

-1.54

1.3E-10 ***1.3E-10 ***-9.6E-11 **-9.3E-11 *5.8E-06 ***(Foreign Share) ^ 2

2.10

1.76

0.42

Manuf. Dummy-0.0172

Constant-0.0754
-0.84

-0.87

-1.21

-1.22

-0.10

-0.12

R-square0.20140.20260.10630.10650.08480.0855-1.99 **

-0.0172-1.99 **

-0.0774

0.02534.47 ***-0.0735

0.0253-2.77

4.6E-06 *7.5E-074.46 ***-0.0739-0.0277-3.59 ***

-0.0073-0.0276-3.59 ***

-0.0089

Upper column shows coefficients, Lower column shows t values.
Size : log of T. A., Tangible Asset : Fixed Asset /T.A., Cash Flow : Retained Earnings/T.A., Risk : Standard Deviation of ROA
during 2000-2004, NDTS : calculated Non-Debt Tax Shield, Bank Borrowing : Bank Borrowing / T.A., List Dummy : = 1 if thesample is of listed firm, Trend: Time Trend, Foreign Share : Foreign share summed up for 5 top shareholders, Manuf. Dummy : =1
if the sample is of anufacturing Sector30

Table 7-2 Estimation Result for Malaysia
Size

Debt / T.A.
0.0340 ***0.0338 ***Bank Borrowing / T.A.
0.00210.0026

Non-Bank Debt / T.A.
0.0316 ***0.0312 ***

9.75

9.76

0.91

1.13

10.10

10.01

Tangble Asset

0.0729 ***0.0728 ***0.0257 ***0.0257 ***0.0543 ***0.0543 ***

12.63

12.58

6.91

6.88

10.09

10.08

Risk

-9.7E-06-9.7E-06

4.4E-07

5.5E-07-1.0E-05-1.0E-05

-1.28

-1.27

NDTS

-0.0005-0.0009

-0.19

-0.33

-2.69

-2.74

0.66

0.54

Cash Flow-0.0189 ***-0.0190 ***-0.0083 ***-0.0085 ***-0.0132 ***-0.0132 ***

-6.56

-6.58

-4.44

-4.51

-4.97

-4.97

Bank Borrowing

0.2617 ***0.2641 ***

16.84

16.97

List Dummy-0.0165-0.00540.1615 ***0.1621 ***-0.1059 *

-0.22

-0.07

3.09

3.10

-1.65

0.09

0.11

-1.45

-1.45

-0.0048 ***-0.0049 ***0.00170.0014-0.0490 ***0 < [Foreign Share] < 10%

0.0098
0.39

-2.91

1.26

10 <_ [Foreign Share] < 33.3%

0.02360.0221

0.0216

1.12

1.60

1.14

33.3 <_ [Foreign Share] < 50%-0.1495 ***-0.0359 *-0.0982 ***

-4.71

-1.72

-3.43

50 < _[Foreign Share] < 66.6%-0.1185 ***-0.0559 ***-0.0859 ***66.6 <_ [Foreign Share] < 95%-0.1030 ***
-4.57

-0.67

-4.87

95% <_ [Foreign Share]-0.0359 ***-0.0338 ***-0.0181 *

-5.51

-3.97

-4.41

-0.1027 ***

-4.82

-1.78

-0.0487 ***0.0102-1.49

0.0279-0.0097-3.31-0.0956

0 < [Foreign Share] < 10%Type A: Financial Investment
10 <_ [Foreign Share] < 50%
Type B-a: Joint Venture
50 <_ [Foreign Share] < 95%Type B-b: Joint Venture
95 < _[Foreign Share]
Type C: Foreign Subsidiaries
Manuf. Dummy

0.0279-0.0197 **
-2.28

-2.24

Trend

-2.4E-11-6.9E-12

-0.47

-0.13

3.71

3.82

-2.13

-1.85

Constant-0.0736-0.0840-0.0675-0.0753-0.0103-0.0148

-0.82

-0.94

-1.11

-1.24

-0.13

-0.19

R-square0.20550.20610.11410.10890.08840.0892

0.40

-2.89

1.26

-0.02810.0047-0.0141

-1.58

0.40

-0.88

-0.1110 ***-0.0336 ***-0.0935 ***

-6.90

-3.22

-6.33

-0.0358 ***-0.0344 ***-0.0176 *-3.29-0.0194 **-4.90

0.0255 ***0.0259 ***-1.73-0.0297 ***-0.0296 ***

4.50

4.56

-3.85

-3.84

1.2E-10 ***1.3E-10 ***-1.0E-10 **-9.0E-11 *Upper column shows coefficients, Lower column shows t values.
Size : log of T. A., Tangible Asset : Fixed Asset /T.A., Cash Flow : Retained Earnings/T.A., Risk : Standard Deviation of ROA during 20002004, NDTS : calculated Non-Debt Tax Shield, Bank Borrowing : Bank Borrowing / T.A., List Dummy : = 1 if the sample is of listed firm,
Trend : Time Trend, Foreign Share : Foreign share summed up for 5 top shareholders, Manuf. Dummy : =1 if the sample is of manufacturingsector31

Table 8 Foreign Shares and Debt, Malaysia(1) Debt Ratio
2000
2001

2002

2003

2004

Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share

36.7%
40.1%
34.2%
40.1%

41.1%
43.3%
32.2%
37.2%

40.6%
35.8%
37.8%
37.5%

40.9%
36.1%
38.7%
36.7%

42.0%
40.1%
41.3%
37.0%

40.3%
39.1%
36.8%
37.7%

89-108
14-16
13-18
62-74

46.7%
37.4%
44.3%
35.0%

44.2%
38.1%
41.5%
31.3%

44.9%
40.7%
38.5%
31.1%

46.3%
44.0%
45.4%
33.1%

46.9%
45.1%
47.6%
33.3%

45.8%
41.1%
43.5%
32.8%

413-551
21-24
26-33
19-20

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%
50% < Foreign Share(2) Bank Borrowing Ratio
Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share

5.0%
4.9%
3.5%
4.2%

7.5%
6.0%
3.3%
5.1%

5.8%
6.1%
6.1%
4.3%

7.2%
3.9%
5.7%
3.8%

5.9%
3.2%
5.5%
2.7%

6.3%
4.8%
4.8%
4.0%

89-108
14-16
13-18
62-74

10.4%
7.2%
8.5%
4.0%

10.5%
9.0%
8.0%
2.6%

12.2%
11.2%
7.4%
2.8%

12.6%
9.8%
13.0%
3.7%

13.0%
11.1%
14.8%
3.4%

11.7%
9.6%
10.3%
3.3%

413-551
21-24
26-33
19-20

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

31.7%
35.2%
30.7%
35.9%

33.5%
37.3%
28.9%
32.2%

34.7%
29.7%
31.7%
33.2%

33.7%
32.2%
33.0%
32.9%

36.2%
37.0%
35.8%
34.2%

34.0%
34.3%
32.0%
33.7%

89-108
14-16
13-18
62-74

36.3%
30.2%
35.8%
31.0%

33.7%
29.1%
33.5%
28.7%

32.7%
29.5%
31.1%
28.2%

33.8%
34.2%
32.4%
29.4%

33.9%
34.0%
32.8%
29.9%

34.1%
31.4%
33.1%
29.4%

413-551
21-24
26-33
19-20

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

30.9%
32.7%
32.0%
33.3%

31.1%
36.0%
30.0%
32.3%

32.3%
30.5%
34.8%
32.1%

32.1%
29.9%
35.2%
32.0%

31.9%
33.1%
35.2%
33.2%

31.6%
32.4%
33.4%
32.6%

89-108
14-16
13-18
62-74

32.3%
27.2%
31.1%
28.8%

29.5%
25.0%
29.0%
26.9%

28.7%
26.2%
27.6%
24.9%

28.9%
26.1%
27.6%
25.0%

28.9%
26.3%
29.5%
26.9%

29.7%
26.1%
29.0%
26.5%

413-551
21-24
26-33
19-20

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

19.3%
19.4%
12.4%
14.3%

19.3%
3.2%
22.3%
15.9%

14.3%
22.6%
-6.5%
17.6%

24.6%
21.4%
-2.7%
20.1%

20.7%
15.5%
6.8%
23.6%

19.6%
16.4%
6.5%
18.3%

89-108
14-16
13-18
62-74

3.8%
8.8%
13.3%
19.7%

5.7%
7.4%
12.0%
12.8%

4.4%
3.9%
15.7%
13.5%

7.9%
-0.5%
4.4%
13.0%

6.8%
-1.5%
6.2%
16.3%

5.7%
3.6%
10.3%
15.1%

413-551
21-24
26-33
19-20

ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%
50% < Foreign Share(3) Non-bank Debt Ratio
Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share
ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%
50% < Foreign Share(4) Current Liability / T.A.
Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share
ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%
50% < Foreign Share(5) Retained Earnings / T.A.
Average No. of Sample

Non-listed
Foreign Share = 10%0%< Foreign Share <= 33.3％
33.3% ＜ Foreign Share <= 95%
95% < Foreign Share
ListedForeign Share = 10%
0% < Foreign Share <= 10%
10% < Foreign Share <= 50%
50% < Foreign Share32

Center for Economic Institutions Working Paper Series
2000-1

Jean Tirole, “Corporate Governance,” January 2000.

2000-2Kenneth A. Kim and S. Ghon Rhee, “A Note on Shareholder Oversight and theRegulatory Environment: The Japanese Banking Experience,”January 2000.

2000-3

S. Ghon Rhee, “Further Reforms after the “BIG BANG”: The JapaneseGovernment Bond
Market,”June 2000.

2000-4

Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov , Joseph Fan , and Larry Lang, “Expropriation of Minority
Shareholders in East Asia,”July 2000.

2000-5

Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph Fan , and Larry Lang, “The Costs of Group
Affiliation: Evidence from East Asia,” July 2000.

2001-1Masaharu Hanazaki and Akie Takeuchi, “An International Comparison of Corporate
Investment Behavior -Some Implications for the Governance Structure in Japan-,” February
2001.

2001-2

Katsuyuki Kubo, “The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Japan and the UK:
Agency Hypothesis or Joint Determination Hypothesis?” February 2001.

2001-3

Katsuyuki Kubo, “Changes in Directors’ Incentive Plans and the Performance of Firms in
the UK,” March 2001.

2001-4

Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Value: Evidence fromThailand,” March 2001.

2001-5

Katsuyuki Kubo, “The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Firm Performance: Case inJapan,” March 2001.

2001-6

Didier Guillot and James R. Lincoln, “The Permeability of Network Boundaries: Strategic
Alliances in the Japanese Electronics Industry in the 1990s,” March 2001.

2001-7

Naohito Abe, “Ageing and its Macroeconomic Implications-A Case in Japan-,” May 2001.

2001-8

Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “The Equity Ownership Structure of Thai Firms,” July 2001.

2001-9Megumi Suto, “Capital Structure and Investment Behaviour of Malaysian Firms in the
1990s--A study of Corporate Governance before the Crisis--,” August 2001.

2001-10

Naohito Abe, Noel Gaston, and Katsuyuki Kubo, “Executive Pay in Japan : The Role ofBank-Appointed Monitors and the Main Bank Relationship,” September 2001.

2001-11

Colin Mayer, “The Financing and Governance of New Technologies,” September 2001.

2001-12Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, “Can the Financial Restraint Hypothesis
Explain Japan’s Postwar Experience?” September 2001.

2001-13Shin-ichi Fukuda, “The Role of Long-term Loans for Economic Development: Empirical
Evidence in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan,” September 2001.

wp-1

2001-14

S. Ghon Rhee, “Further Reforms of the JGB Market for the Promotion of Regional Bond
Markets,” September 2001.

2001-15

Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P. H. Fan, and Larry H. P. Lang, ”The Benefits
and Costs of Internal Markets: Evidence from Asia’s Financial Crisis,” September 2001.

2001-16

Kenneth A. Kim and John R. Nofsinger, “Institutional Herding, Business Groups, andEconomic Regimes: Evidence from Japan,” September 2001.

2001-17

Mitsuhiro Fukao, “Financial Deregulations, Weakness of Market Discipline, and Market
Development: Japan’s Experience and Lessons for Developing Countries,” September 2001.

2001-18

Akio Kuroda and Koichi Hamada, “Towards an Incentive Compatible Financial System:
Accounting and Managing the Non-Performing Loans,” September 2001.

2001-19

Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, “Japanese Economic Success and the Curious
Characteristics of Japanese Stock Prices,” September 2001.

2001-20

Miguel A. García-Cestona, “Ownership Structure, Banks and the Role of Stakeholders: The
Spanish Case,” September 2001.

2001-21

Joseph P. H. Fan and T. J. Wong, “Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativenessof Accounting Earnings in East Asia,” September 2001.

2001-22

Heather Montgomery, “The Effect of the Basel Accord on Bank Lending in Japan,”
September 2001.

2001-23

Naoyuki Yoshino, Sahoko Kaji, and Ayako Suzuki, “The Basket-peg, Dollar-peg andFloating---A Comparative Analysis of Exchange Rate Regimes,” September 2001.

2001-24

Colin Mayer, Koen Schoors, and Yishay Yafeh, “Sources of Funds and Investment
Strategies of Venture Capital Funds: Evidence from Germany, Israel, Japan and the UK,”
September 2001.

2001-25

Yukinobu Kitamura, Megumi Suto, and Juro Teranishi, “Towards a New Architecture for
the Japanese Financial System: Participation Costs, Intermediated Ownership and WealthDistribution,”September 2001.

2002-1

Evgeni Peev, “The Political Economy of Corporate Governance Change in Bulgaria:
Washington Consensus, Primitive Accumulation of Capital, and Catching-Up in the 1990,”
March 2002.

2002-2

Naohito Abe, “Saving, Capital Flows, and the Symmetric International Spillover ofIndustrial Policies,” June 2002.

2002-3Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, “A Review of Japan’s Bank Crisis from theGovernance Perspective,” July 2002.

2002-4Chutathong Charumirind, Raja Kali and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Crony Lending:Thailand before the Financial Crisis,” September 2002.

2002-5Maitreesh Ghatak and Raja Kali, “Financially Interlinked Business Groups,” September
2002.

2002-6

Tarun Khanna, Joe Kogan, and Krishna Palepu, “Globalization and Similarities in Corporate
Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis,” September 2002.

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2002-7

Chongwoo Choe, “Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies,” September 2002.

2002-8

Tarun Khanna and Yishay Yafeh, “Business Groups and Risk Sharing around the World,”
September 2002.

2002-9Yitae Kim, Kwangwoo Park, Ronald A. Ratti, and Hyun-Han Shin, “Do Main Banks Extract
Rents from their Client Firms? Evidence from Korean Chaebol,” September 2002.

2002-10

Armen Hovakimian, Edward J. Kane and Luc Laeven, “How Country and Safety-Net
Characteristics Affect Bank Risk-Shifting,” September 2002.

2002-11Vidhan K. Goyal and Takeshi Yamada, “Asset Price Shocks, Financial Constraint, andInvestment: Evidence from Japan,” September 2002.

2002-12

Clive S. Lennox, “Opinion Shopping and Audit Committees,” September 2002.

2002-13

Seki Obata, “Pyramid Business Groups in East Asia: Insurance or Tunneling? ,” September
2002.

2002-14Ishtiaq Pasha Mahmood and Will Mitchell, “Two Faces: Effects of Business Groups on
Innovation in Emerging Economies,” September 2002.

2002-15

Kwangwoo Park, “Foreign Ownership and Firm Value in Japan,” September 2002.

2002-16

Adrian van Rixtel, Yupana Wiwattanakantang, Toshiyuki Souma, and Kazunori Suzuki,“ Banking in Japan: Will “To Big To Fail” Prevail?” December 2002.

2002-17

Stijn Claessens and Leora F. Klapper, “Bankruptcy around the World: Explanations of its
Relative Use,” December 2002.

2003-1Anya Khanthavit, Piruna Polsiri, and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Did Families Lose orGain Control after the East Asian Financial Crisis?” February 2003.

2003-2

Hidenobu Okuda, Hidetoshi Hashimoto, and Michiko Murakami, “The Estimation of
Stochastic Cost Functions of Malaysian Commercial Banks and Its Policy Implications toBank Restructuring,” February 2003.

2003-3Masaharu Hanazaki and Liuqun, “Asian Crisis and Corporate Governance, (in Japanese)”
March 2003.

2003-4

Fukuju Yamazaki and Hiroyuki Seshita, ”Economic Analysis of Bankruptcy law in Japan,(in Japanese)” February 2003.

2003-5

Hirofumi Uchida and Hiroshi Osano, “Bank Monitoring and Corporate Governance in Japan,(in Japanese)” March 2003.

2003-6

Fukunari Kimura and Kozo Kiyota, “Foreign Ownership and Corporate Performance:
Evidence from Japanese Micro Data, (in Japanese)” March 2003.

2003-7

Yukinobu Kitamura, “Corporate Profit and Debt- Panel Data Analysis of The JapaneseFirms in the 1990s, (in Japanese)” March 2003.

2003-8Chaiyasit Aunchitworawong, Toshiyuki Soma, and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, "Do
Families Control Banks Prevail after the East Asia Financial Crisis? Evidence fromThailand" March 2003.

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2003-9

Junko Maru, Yasuhiro Yonezawa and Yuki Matsumoto, "Corporate Governance by Foreign
Investors in East Asia Corporations (in Japanese)" March 2003.

2003-10Sui Qing-yuan, "Declining Firm's Dependence upon Bank Borrowing and Corporate
Performance (in Japanese)" March 2003.

2003-11

Katsumi Matsuura, "Changes in Ownership Structures and Their Impacts upon Corporate
Performance in Japan (in Japanese)" March 2003.

2003-12

Kathy S. He, Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung, “Corporate Stability and Economic
Growth,” May 2003.

2003-13

Robert Dekle and Heajin Ryoo, “Exchange Rate Fluctuations, Financing Constraints,
Hedging, and Exports: Evidence from Firm Level Data,” June 2003.

2003-14

Tsun-Siou Lee, Yin-Hua Yeh and Rong-Tze Liu, ”Can Corporate Governance Variables
Enhance the Prediction Power of Accounting-Based Financial Distress Prediction Models?,”
June 2003.

2003-15

Hideaki Miyajima and Yishay Yafeh, “Japan’s Banking Crisis: Who has the Most to
Lose? ,” June 2003.

2003-16

Guifen Pei, “Asset Management Companies in China,” June 2003.

2003-17

Takeshi Nagase, “The Governance Structure of IPO Firm in Japan,” July 2003.

2003-18

Masaharu Hanazaki and Qun Liu, “The Asian Crisis and Corporate Governance ―Ownership Structure, Debt Financing, and Corporate Diversification ― ,” July 2003.

2003-19

Chutatong Charumilind, Raja Kali and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Connected Lending:Thailand before the Financial Crisis,” July 2003.

2003-20

Gilles Hilary and Tomoki Oshika, “Shareholder activism in Japan: social pressure, private
cost and organized crime,” August 2003.

2003-21

Sanghoon Ahn, “Technology Upgrading with Learning Cost,” September 2003.

2003-22Masaharu Hanazaki and Akiyoshi Horiuchi, “Have Banks Contributed to EfficientManagement in Japan’s Manufacturing? ,” November 2003.

2003-23

Chongwoo Choe and In-Uck Park, “Delegated Contracting and Corporate Hierarchies,”
November 2003.

2003-24

Bruno Dallago, ”Comparative Economic Systems and the New Comparative Economics:
Foes, Competitors, or Complementary?,” November 2003.

2003-25

Adrian van Rixtel, Ioana Alexopoulou and Kimie Harada, “The New Basel Capital Accord
and Its Impact on Japanese Banking: A Qualitative Analysis,” November 2003.

2004-1Masaharu Hanazaki, Toshiyuki Souma and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Silent Large
Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management: Evidence from Banking Crisis in Japan,”January 2004.

2004-2

Ming Ming Chiu and Sung Wook Joh, “Bank Loans to Distressed Firms: Cronyism, bankgovernance and economic crisis,” January 2004.

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2004-3

Keun Lee, Keunkwan Ryu and Jungmo Yoon, “Corporate Governance and Long Term
Performance of the Business Groups: The Case of Chaebols in Korea,” January 2004.

2004-4

Randall Morck and Masao Nakamura, “Been There, Done That –The History of Corporate
Ownership in Japan,” March 2004.

2004-5Dong-Hua Chen, Joseph P. H. Fan and T. J. Wong, ”Politically-connected CEOs, Corporate
Governance and Post-IPO Performance of China’s Partially Privatized Firms,” March 2004.

2004-6Jae-Seung Baek, Jun-Koo Kang and Inmoo Lee, “Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence
from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols,” March 2004.

2004-7

E. Han Kim, “To Steal or Not to Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation,”
March 2004.

2004-8Yin-Hua Yeh and Tracie Woidtke, “Commitment or Entrenchment?: Controlling
Shareholders and Board Composition,” June 2004.

2004-9Hugh Patrick, “Thoughts on Evolving Corporate Governance in Japan,” June 2004.

2004-10

Utpal Bhattacharya and Hazem Daouk, “When No Law is Better than a Good Law”, June
2004.

2004-11

Sanghoon Ahn, Utpal Bhattacharya, Taehun Jung and Giseok Nam, “Do Japanese CEOs
Matter?”, June 2004.

2004-12Megumi Suto and Masashi Toshino, “Behavioural Biases of Japanese Institutional
Investors; Fund management and Corporate Governance”, July 2004.

2004-13

Piruna Polsiri and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Business Groups in Thailand: Before andafter the East Asian Financial Crisis”, August 2004.

2004-14

Fumiharu Mieno, “Fund Mobilization and Investment Behavior in Thai Manufacturing
Firms in the Early 1990s”, August 2004.

2004-15

Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, “Deposit Insurance, Corporate Governance and Discretionary
Behavior: Evidence from Thai Financial Institutions”, September 2004.

2004-16

Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, “Financial fragility under implicit insurance scheme: Evidence
from the collapse of Thai financial institutions”, September 2004.

2004-17

Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, “Ownership-based Incentives, Internal Corporate Risk andFirm Performance”, September 2004.

2004-18

Jack Ochs and In-Uck Park, “Overcoming the Coordination Problem: Dynamic Formationof Networks”, September 2004.

2004-19

Hidenobu Okuda and Suvadee Rungsomboon, “Comparative Cost Study of Foreign andThai Domestic Banks 1990–2002: Estimating Cost Functions of the Thai Banking
Industry,” February 2005.

2004-20

Hidenobu Okuda and Suvadee Rungsomboon, ”The Effects of Foreign Bank Entry on theThai Banking Market: Empirical Analysis from 1990 to 2002,“ March 2005.

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2004-21

Juro Teranishi, “Investor Right in Historical Perspective: Globalization and the Future of theJapanese Firm and Financial System,” March 2005.

2004-22

Kentaro Iwatsubo, “Which Accounts for Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations, Deviations fromthe Law of One Price or Relative Price of Nontraded Goods?”, March 2005.

2004-23

Kentaro Iwatsubo and Tomoyuki Ohta, ”Causes and effects of exchange rate regimes (inJapanese),” March 2005.

2004-24

Kentaro Iwatsubo, “Bank Capital Shocks and Portfolio Risk: Evidence from Japan,” March
2005.

2004-25

Kentaro Iwatsubo, “On the Bank-led Rescues Financially Distressed Firms in Japan,” March
2005.

2005-1

Yishay P. Yafeh and Tarun Khanna, “Business Groups in Emerging Markets: Paragons orParasities?,” September 2005.

2005-2Renee B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira, “Do Directors Perform for Pay?," September 2005.

2005-3

Qun Liu, Shin-ichi Fukuda and Juro Teranishi, “What are Characteristics of Financial
Systems in East Asia as a Region?.” September 2005.

2005-4

Juro Teranishi, “Is the Financial System of Postwar Japan Bank-dominated or Market
Based?,” September 2005.

2005-5

Hasung Jang, Hyung-cheol Kang and Kyung Suh Park, “Determinants of Family
Ownership: The Choice between Control and Performance,” October 2005.

2005-6

Hasung Jang, Hyung-cheol Kang and Kyung Suh Park, “The Choice of Group Structure:
Divide and Rule,” October 2005.

2005-7

Sangwoo Lee, Kwangwoo Park and Hyun-Han Shin, “The Very Dark Side of International
Capital Markets: Evidence from Diversified Business Groups in Korea,” October 2005.

2005-8

Allen N. Berger, Richard J. Rosen and Gregory F. Udell, “Does Market Size Structure
Affect Competition? The Case of Small Business Lending,” November 2005.

2005-9Aditya Kaul and Stephen Sapp, “Trading Activity and Foreign Exchange Market Quality,”
November 2005.

2005-10

Xin Chang, Sudipto Dasgupta and Gilles Hilary, “The Effect of Auditor Choice on
Financing Decisions,” December 2005.

2005-11

Kentaro Iwatsubo, “Adjustment Speeds of Nominal Exchange Rates and Prices toward
Purchasing Power Parity,” January 2006.

2005-12Giovanni Barone-Adesi, Robert Engle and Loriano Mancini, “GARCH Options in
Incomplete Markets”, March 2006.

2005-13Aditya Kaul, Vikas Mehrotra and Blake Phillips, “Ownership, Foreign Listings, and Market
Valuation”, March 2006.

2005-14

Ricard Gil, “Renegotiation, Learning and Relational Contracting”, March 2006.

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2005-15

Randall Morck, “How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups -The Double Taxation ofInter-corporate Dividends and other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy-”, March 2006.

2005-16

Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong and Tianyu Zhang, “The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in
China”, March 2006.

2005-17

Yan Du, Qianqiu Liu and S. Ghon Rhee, “An Anatomy of the Magnet Effect: Evidence
from the Korea Stock Exchange High-Frequency Data”, March 2006.

2005-18

Kentaro Iwatsubo and Junko Shimizu, “Signaling Effects of Foreign Exchange Interventions
and Expectation Heterogeneity among Traders”, March 2006.

2005-19

Kentaro Iwatsubo, “Current Account Adjustment and Exchange Rate Pass-Through(inJapanese)”, March 2006.

2005-20

Piruna Polsiri and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Corporate Governance of Banks in
Thailand”, March 2006.

2006-1

Hiroyuki Okamuro and Jian Xiong Zhang, “Ownership Structure and R&D Investment ofJapanese Start-up Firms,” June 2006.

2006-2

Hiroyuki Okamuro, “Determinants of R&D Activities by Start-up Firms: Evidence fromJapan,” June 2006.

2006-3

Joseph P.H. Fan, T.J. Wong and Tianyu Zhang, “The Emergence of Corporate Pyramids in
China,” August 2006.

2006-4

Pramuan Bunkanwanicha, Jyoti Gupta and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Pyramiding of
Family-owned Banks in Emerging Markets,” September 2006.

2006-5

Bernardo Bortolotti and Mara Faccio, “Reluctant privatization,” September 2006.

2006-6

Jörn Kleinert and Farid Toubal, “Distance costs and Multinationals’ foreign activities”,
October 2006.

2006-7

Jörn Kleinert and Farid Toubal, “Dissecting FDI”, October 2006.

2006-8Shin-ichi Fukuda and Satoshi Koibuchi, “The Impacts of “Shock Therapy” on Large andSmall Clients: Experiences from Two Large Bank Failures in Japan”, October 2006.

2006-9Shin-ichi Fukuda, Munehisa Kasuya and Kentaro Akashi, “The Role of Trade Credit for
Small Firms: An Implication from Japan’s Banking Crisis”, October 2006.

2006-10

Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Big Business Owners andPolitics: Investigating the Economic Incentives of Holding Top Office”, October 2006.

2006-11

Sang Whi Lee, Seung-Woog(Austin) Kwang, Donald J. Mullineaux and Kwangwoo Park,“Agency Conflicts, Financial Distress, and Syndicate Structure: Evidence from Japanese
Borrowers”, October 2006.

2006-12Masaharu Hanazaki and Qun Liu, “Corporate Governance and Investment in East AsianFirms -Empirical Analysis of Family-Controlled Firms”, October 2006.

2006-13

Kentaro Iwatsubo and Konomi Tonogi, “Foreign Ownership and Firm Value: Identification
through Heteroskedasticity (in Japanese)”, December 2006.

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2006-14

Kentaro Iwatsubo and Kazuyuki Inagaki, “Measuring Financial Market Contagion Using
Dually-Traded Stocks of Asian Firms”, December 2006.

2006-15

Hun-Chang Lee, “When and how did Japan catch up with Korea? –A comparative study ofthe pre-industrial economies of Korea and Japan”, February 2007.

2006-16

Kyoji Fukao, Keiko Ito, Shigesaburo Kabe, Deqiang Liu and Fumihide Takeuchi, “AreJapanese Firms Failing to Catch up in Localization? An Empirical Analysis Based on
Affiliate-level Data of Japanese Firms and a Case Study of the Automobile Industry in
China”, February 2007.

2006-17

Kyoji Fukao, Young Gak Kim and Hyeog Ug Kwon, “Plant Turnover and TFP Dynamics inJapanese Manufacturing”, February 2007.

2006-18

Kyoji Fukao, Keiko Ito, Hyeg Ug Kwon and Miho Takizawa, “Cross-Border Acquisitons
and Target Firms' Performance: Evidence from Japanese Firm-Level Data”, February 2007.

2006-19

Jordan Siegel and Felix Oberholzer-Gee, “Expropriators or Turnaround Artists? The Role ofControlling Families in South Korea (1985-2003)”, March 2007.

2006-20

Francis Kramarz and David Thesmar, “Social Networks in The Boardroom”, March 2007.

2006-21

Morten Bennedsen, Francisco Pérez-González and Daniel Wolfenzon, “Do CEOs matter?”,March 2007.

2007-1

Ichiro Iwasaki, “Endogenous board formation and its determinants in a transition economy:
evidence from Russia*”, April 2007, Revised on October 2007.

2007-2

Joji Tokui, Tomohiko Inui, and Katsuaki Ochiai, “The Impact of Vintage Capital and R&D
on Japanese Firms’ Productivity”, April 2007.

2007-3

Yasuo Nakanishi and Tomohiko Inui, “Deregulation and Productivity in JapaneseIndustries”, April 2007.

2007-4

Kyoji Fukao, “The Performance of Foreign Firms and the Macroeconomic Impact of FDI”,
May 2007.

2007-5

Taku Suzuki, “The Role of the State in Economic Growth of Post-Communist Transitional
Countries”, June 2007.

2007-6

Michiel van Leuvensteijn, Jacob A. Bikker, Adrian A.R.J.M. van Rixtel and Christoffer
Kok-Sørensen*, “A new approach to measuring competition in the loan markets of the euroarea”, June 2007.

2007-7Sea Jin Chang, Jaiho Chung, and Dean Xu, “FDI and Technology Spillovers in China”, July
2007.

2007-8

Fukunari Kimura, “The mechanics of production networks in Southeast Asia: thefragmentation theory approach”, July 2007.

2007-9Kyoji Fukao, Tsutomu Miyagawa, Miho Takizawa, “Productivity Growth and Resource
Reallocation in Japan”, November 2007.

2007-10YoungGak Kim, “A Survey on Intangible Capital”, December 2007.

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2007-11

Sea-Jing Chang and Jay Hyuk Rhee, “Rapid International Expansion Strategy of Emerging
Market Enterprises: The Interplay between Speed and Competitive Risks on International
performance”, November 2007.

2007-12Ishtiaq Mahmood, Will Mitchell, and Chi-Nien Chung, “The Structure of Intra-Group Ties:
Innovation in Taiwanese Business”, January 2008.

2007-13

Kyoji Fukao, Tomohiko Inui, Shigesaburo Kabe and Deqiang Liu, “ An International
Comparison of the TFP Levels of Japanese, Korean and Chinese Listed Firms“, March
2008.

2007-14

Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Yupana Wiwattanakantang, “Allocating Risk AcrossPyramidal Tiers: Evidence from Thai Business Groups”, March 2008.

2008-1

Rüdiger Fahlenbrach and René M. Stulz, "Managerial Ownership Dynamics and Firm
Value", April 2008.

2008-2Morten Bennedsen, Kasper Meisner Nielsen, and, Thomas Vester Nielsen, “Private
Contracting and Corporate Governance: Evidence from the Provision of Tag-Along Rights
in an Emerging Market”, April 2008.

2008-3

Joseph P.H. Fan, Jun Huang, Felix Oberholzer-Gee, and Mengxin Zhao, “Corporate
Diversification in China: Causes and Consequences”, April 2008.

2008-4

Daniel Ferreira, Miguel A. Ferreira, Clara C. Raposo, “Board Structure and Price
Informativeness”, April 2008.

2008-5

Nicola Gennaioli and Stefano Rossi, “Judicial Discretion in Corporate Bankruptcy”, April
2008.

2008-6

Nicola Gennaioli and Stefano Rossi, “Optimal Resolutions of Financial Distress by
Contract”, April 2008.

2008-7

Renée B. Adams and Daniel Ferreira, “Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on
Governance and Performance”, April 2008.

2008-8Worawat Margsiri, Antonio S. Melloy, and Martin E. Ruckesz, “A Dynamic Analysis ofGrowth via Acquisition”, April 2008.

2008-9Pantisa Pavabutra and Sukanya Prangwattananon, “Tick Size Change on the Stock
Exchange of Thailand”, April 2008.

2008-10

Maria Boutchkova, Hitesh Doshi, Art Durnev, and Alexander Molchanov, “Politics andVolatility”, April 2008.

2008-11

Yan-Leung Cheung, P. Raghavendra Rau, and Aris Stouraitis, “The Helping Hand, the LazyHand, or the Grabbing Hand? Central vs. Local Government Shareholders in Publicly Listed
Firms in China”, April 2008.

2008-12

Art Durnev and Larry Fauver, “Stealing from Thieves: Firm Governance and Performance
when States are Predatory”, April 2008.

2008-13

Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro, and Mengxin Zhao, “Determinants of the Size and Structure of
Corporate Boards: 1935-2000”, April 2008.

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2008-14

Ishtiaq P. Mahmood, Hong-Jin Zhu and Edward J. Zajac, “Where Can Capabilities Come
From? How the Content of Network Ties Affects Capability Acquisition”, April 2008.

2008-15

Vladimir I. Ivanov and Ronald W. Masulis, “Corporate Venture Capital, Strategic Alliances,and the Governance of Newly Public Firms”, May 2008.

2008-16

Dick Beason, Ken Gordon, Vikas Mehrotra and Akiko Watanabe, “Does Restructuring Pay
in Japan? Evidence Following the Lost Decade”, July 2008 (revision uploaded on Oct.
2009).

2009-1

Vikas Mehrotra, Dimitri van Schaik, Jaap Spronk, and Onno Steenbeek, “Creditor-Focused
Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions in Japan,” August, 2009.

2009-2

Debin Ma, “Law and Economic Change in Traditional China: A Comparative Perspective,”
September, 2009.

2009-3Robert C. Allen, Jean-Pascal Bassino, Debin Ma, Christine Moll-Murata, and Jan Luiten van
Zanden, “Wages, Prices, and Living Standards in China, 1738-1925: in Comparison with
Europe, Japan, and India,” June 2009.

2009-4Jung-Wook Shim, “The Existence of Nepotism: Evidence from Japanese Family Firms,”
October 2009.

2009-5Morten Bennedsen and Kasper Meisner Nielsen, “Incentive and Entrenchment Effects in
European Ownership,” March 2009.

2009-6

Joseph P.H. Fan, TJ Wong, Tianyu Zhang, “Founder Succession and Accounting Properties,”
April 2009.

2009-7

Hiroyuki Okamuro, Masatoshi Kato, and Yuji Honjo, “Determinants of R&D Cooperation in
Japanese High-tech Start-ups,” November 2009.

2009-8Bill Francis, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, and Qiang Wu, “The Effectiveness ofCorporate Boards: Evidence from Bank Loan Contracting,” November 2009.

2009-9

Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan and Mingming Zhou, “The Effects of Focus Versus
Diversification on Bank Performance: Evidence from Chinese Banks,” November 2009.

2009-10

Leonardo Becchetti, Andrea Carpentieri and Iftekhar Hasan, ”The Determinants of Option
Adjusted Delta Credit Spreads: A Comparative Analysis on US, UK and the Eurozone,”
November 2009.

2009-11

Luciano I. de Castro and Harry J. Paarsch, “Testing Affiliation in Private-values Models ofFirst-price Auctions Using Grid Distributions,” December 2009.

2009-12Chulwoo Baek, YoungGak Kim and Heog Ug Kwon, “Market Competition and Productivity
after the Asian Financial Crisis: Evidence from Korean Firm Level Data,” December 2009.

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2009-13

Jee-Hyeong Park, Stephen J. Spurr, and Sheng-Kai Chang, “A Model of Hierarchical
Professionals: Cooperation and Conflict between Anesthesiologists and CRNAs,” October
2009.

2009-14

Jee-Hyeong Park, “Enforcing International Trade Agreements with Imperfect Private
Monitoring: Private Trigger Strategies and the Possible Role of the WTO,” December 2009.

2009-15

Yuji Honjo, Masatoshi Kato and Hiroyuki Okamuro, “R&D financing of start-up firms:
How much does founders’ human capital matter?”, March 2010.

2010-1

Sergei V. Ryazantsev, “Migrant Workers from Central Asian Russian Federation”, June
2010.

2010-2

Tue Gørgens, Xin Meng, and Rhema Vaithianathan, “Stunting and Selection Effects ofFamine: A Case Study of the Great Chinese Famine,” October 2010.

2010-3Masatoshi Kato and Yuji Honjo, “Heterogeneous Exits: Evidence from New Firms,”
November 2010.

2010-4Sung-Jin Cho, Harry J. Paarsch, and John Rust, “Is the ’Linkage Principle’ Valid?:
Evidence from the Field,” November 2010.

2010-5Jean-Pascal Bassino and Noriko Kato, “Rich and slim, but relatively shorthalt in the secular trend in Japan,” November 2010.

2010-6

Robert G Gregory, Dark Corners in a Bright Economy; The Lack of Jobs for UnskilledMen,” December 2010.

2010-7

Masatoshi Kato and Hiroyuki Odagiri, “Development of University Life-Science Programs
and University-Industry Joint Research in Japan,” December 2010.

2010-8Han Hong, Harry J. Paarsch and Pai Xu, “On the Asymptotic Distribution of the Transaction
Price in a Clock Model of a Multi-Unit, Oral, Ascending-Price Auction within the
Common-Value Paradigm,” January 2011.

2010-9Tue Gørgens and Allan W¨urtz, “Testing a Parametric Function Against a Nonparametric
Alternative in IV and GMM Settings,” January 2011.

2010-10

Timothy P. Hubbard, Tong Li and Harry J. Paarsch, “Semiparametric Estimation in Modelsof First-Price, Sealed-Bid Auctions with Affiliation,” January 2011.

2010-11

Yutaka Arimoto, Kentaro Nakajima, and Tetsuji Okazaki, “Agglomeration or Selection? The
Case of the Japanese Silk-Reeling Clusters, 1908–1915,” March 2011.

2010-12

Yukiko Abe, “Regional Variations in Labor Force Behavior of Women in Japan,” March
2011.

2010-13

Takashi Kurosaki and Hidayat Ullah Khan, “Vulnerability of Microfinance to Strategic
Default and Covariate Shocks: Evidence from Pakistan,” March 2011.

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Explaining the2010-14

Fumiharu Mieno, “Foreign Ownership, Listed Status and the Financial System in East Asia:
Evidence from Thailand and Malaysia”, March 2011.

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