JUNE2019

Regaining Momentum on
North Korea Negotiations: One Yearon from the Singapore Summit
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIEAs ‌we approach the one year anniversary of
the Singapore Summit held between President
Donald Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un, the denuclearization of North Korea remains an elusive andexasperating target. But rather than writing the North
Korea question off as too difficult, it is imperative that
the United States and its allies take a clear-eyed viewof why recent negotiations have not borne fruit andfigure out how to regain momentum. Several key factors need to be addressed to help break the impasseand see the current negotiation process through: thecreation of a more credible foundation for negotiations; the parallel pursuit of both denuclearization
and a permanent peace regime; and the appropriate
engagement of all of the other Six-Party Talks nations.
In particular, it is time for Japan to come off the diplomatic sidelines and attempt to resolve the abduction
issue and also play a constructive role in developing
a comprehensive resolution to the North Korean nuclear conundrum.

The Current Situation with North Korea

The June 2018 Singapore Summit was criticized for
failing to establish a concrete agreement on how todenuclearize North Korea. This criticism missed
the bigger picture, namely that a sitting US president met with a North Korean leader for the firsttime, despite the deep distrust that still permeates
relations between the two countries. The Singapore
joint statement, which identified the establishment ofcredibility and confidence building as a first priority,
along with the establishment of a permanent peace
regime and the complete denuclearization of theKorean Peninsula, was a positive step to kick-start thenegotiation process.
The February 2019 Hanoi Summit, however, was amisstep. Some sort of progress in negotiations shouldhave been made to justify a second Trump-Kim
meeting. North Korea demanded that the denuclearization process be carried out step-by-step rather
than being a one-shot deal. As a first step, the North
Koreans offered to completely dismantle facilities at
the Yongbyon nuclear complex, where fissile materials for nuclear weapons are produced, in exchange forthe removal of UN Security Council sanctions that
“hamper the civilian economy.” The United States
seems to have accepted the necessity of a step-by-step
approach, but decided that North Korea’s proposal
would not be feasible until a denuclearization roadmap with all steps listed can be negotiated. This US
decision seeks to avoid the risk of giving up too muchleverage too early in the process.
Many speculated that the early timing of theHanoi Summit was precipitated by domestic politics

JUNE 2019 | 2in the United States, as President Trump faced pressure from FBI Special Prosecutor Robert Mueller’sinvestigation. As the release of the Mueller Report
appeared imminent at that point, President Trump
may have been hoping that a big win on foreign policy would deflect domestic attention. In the aftermathof the report, the pressure on President Trump for a
diplomatic victory has lessened, but it is not difficult
to imagine that, given President Trump’s mercurial
tendencies and his hope for a win on North Korea,
this may emerge as a priority once again during thelead-up to the 2020 election.
At the same time, North Korean behavior seems
to be influenced by a concern over President Trump’s
unpredictability given that he lacks knowledge, criteria for action, or firm principles on foreign affairs.
This fear has led North Korea to return to its traditional playbook of trying to sow divisions among
the regional powers that surround it. Since the failed
Hanoi Summit, North Korea has pulled closer toboth China and Russia. A summit meeting between
Kim Jong-un and Japanese Prime Minster Shinzo Abe
may be in the offing. And South Korean President
Moon Jae-in looks anxious to promote economic
cooperation with North Korea as the South Koreaneconomy falters.

Key Elements for Successful N­ egotiations
Against this backdrop, the ability of negotiators toreach a sustainable agreement will depend on three
key elements.
First, the United States and North Korea need toundertake a range of confidence-building measures
to start to overcome their deep mutual mistrust andestablish the credibility of the negotiating process. To
kick-start confidence building, North Korea should
recommit to its moratorium on missile and nuclear
testing under the Singapore joint statement—amoratorium that, although not technically broken,
was certainly pushed to its limits with Pyongyang’s
testing of short-range ballistic missiles in May 2019,
which did violate UN Security Council resolutions.
Whether intended as a show of strength to the domestic DPRK audience or to US negotiators, the incident was a step backward rather than forward in thetrust-building process.
Meanwhile, the United States and Japan should
explore opening liaison offices in Pyongyang. Given
the two countries’ lack of formal diplomatic relations
with North Korea, liaison offices could provide a

critical venue to maintain the open and constant dialogue needed to sustain confidence-building efforts.
Second, we need to come to agreement on parallel roadmaps that lay out step-by-step approaches forboth denuclearization and the establishment of a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. Pastagreements, such as the Joint Statement of the Fourth
Six-Party Talks (September 2005), ultimately failed
due to their lack of a precise roadmap for carrying out
the agreed measures, including details on the sequencing of steps and the methods of implementation.
For denuclearization, the roadmap must include
verification of each step by experts from both theInternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and theUnited States, as was agreed to by North Korea in its
Yongbyon dismantlement proposal in Hanoi.
The roadmap to convert the current Korean War
Armistice Agreement into a permanent peace treaty,
meanwhile, must include steps to normalize relations
between North Korea and both the United Statesand Japan. Normalization negotiations should covera broad range of topics beyond the establishment ofembassies, including economic cooperation, mutual
non-aggression security assurances, and, in the caseof Japan-DPRK negotiations, the resolution of the abduction issue.
The simultaneous and linked implementation ofthese two roadmaps is extremely significant given USconcerns about whether North Korea truly intends todenuclearize and North Korea’s suspicions that theUnited States will pursue denuclearization today andregime change tomorrow. Linking the two roadmaps
on an action-for-action basis can help overcome thetrust deficit.
Third, a permanent peace regime will be moresustainable in the long run if it includes all relevant
countries in the region. For that reason, once USDPRK negotiations make sufficient progress andestablish precise roadmaps, the two parties mustencourage broader international engagement in theprocess through the Six-Party Talks framework. The
ongoing international verification of denuclearization will be less susceptible to accusations of misplay
if the process is multilateralized. And the provisionof economic assistance to North Korea will require
funds not easily raised by any single country. This
international participation should aim not just at
denuclearizing North Korea in the short term but atenriching the regional security environment throughthe long-term transformation of North Korea so that

JUNE 2019 | 3
it does not feel it needs to keep nuclear weapons orisolate itself from the international community in order to survive.

A Role for Japan

In early May, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
indicated that he is prepared to meet with North
Korean leader Kim Jong-un without preconditions.
This represents a significant shift as the Abe government has been exerting maximum pressure—refusing to meet with or provide assistance to North Korea
without a full resolution to the issue of the abductionof Japanese citizens by North Korea. It is also a welcome step forward given that Prime Minister Abe is
the only leader of the Six-Party Talks countries not tohave met with Kim Jong-un since the current regional
diplomatic process kicked off with South Korean
President Moon Jae-in’s “Olympic diplomacy” in
February 2018. At the same time, it has become clearthat North Korea perceives the abduction issue aspart of the broader situation and its fight for survival
and it is thus unlikely to address it outside of the wider
regional diplomatic process.
Before Abe first came to office in 2006, Japan
had pursued a comprehensive approach to North
Korea, as seen in the Pyongyang Declaration that
was announced by former Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il in
2002. The Pyongyang Declaration was then followedby the Joint Statement of the Fourth Six-Party Talks(September 2005). The approach outlined in thesestatements called for the international community
to provide North Korea with economic assistance,
normalize US and Japanese diplomatic relations
with North Korea, and convert the Korean War
Armistice Agreement into a permanent peace treaty
in exchange for North Korea’s denuclearization.
The abduction issue was to be resolved within thisframework as part of Japan-DPRK diplomatic normalization talks.

The possibility of an Abe-Kim summit provides anopportunity for Japan to return to a more comprehensive approach. At the same time, the realization of an
Abe-Kim summit will require careful planning in order to avoid any confrontation or worsening in JapanDPRK relations and to establish a credible basis forfurther negotiations and cooperation. To this end,such a summit should prioritize the establishment ofliaison offices between Japan and North Korea as afirst step toward the opening of negotiations on diplomatic normalization, which would include addressing
the abduction issue.

■■■
The international community is now at a crossroads
with North Korea. The lack of progress at the Hanoi
Summit raises the risk that the opportunity createdby the Singapore Summit may be squandered. In order to break the current impasse between the UnitedStates and North Korea, it is critical that all parties
work to ensure that key elements are in place for successful negotiations: a credible basis for negotiations,parallel and precise roadmaps for both denuclearization and a peace regime, and the buy-in of the other
Six-Party Talks countries. Japan must stop standingon the sidelines, play a more active role in this diplomatic process, and address the abduction issue
within the framework of a comprehensive resolution.
For North Korea to agree to a complete denuclearization, it is essential that the United States, Japan,
and other countries in the region follow these steps
and work to transform North Korea into a country
that no longer perceives a need for nuclear weapons
to guarantee its survival.
Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairmanof the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan
Research Institute, Ltd. He previously served as Japan’s
deputy minister for foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on
East Asia regional issues from a Japanese perspective.
Please direct any comments or questions toeainsights@jcie.or.jp.
JCIE/Japan www.jcie.or.jp | JCIE/USA www.jcie.org© 2019 Japan Center for International Exchange