January 2011

Japan Center for International Exchange

Rethinking Our Approachto the Korean Crisis
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE

North Korea’s calculated military provocations over thepast year—particularly the sinking of the Cheonan andthe shelling of Yeonpyeong Island—and its continued
nuclear development have raised tensions on the peninsula to dangerously high levels. If left unchecked, thesituation could easily spiral out of control.
Giving extra urgency to this already dangerous
scenario is the 2012 problem: next year we will see
presidential elections in South Korea and the UnitedStates and a leadership change in China. The year
2012 is also North Korea’s target date for becoming a“strong and prosperous country,” in commemorationof the centennial of Kim Il-sung’s birth, and will likely
be used as a mechanism by Kim Jong-il to solidify hisson Kim Jong-un’s powerbase for succession. With
these domestic political changes on the horizon, thereis the risk that foreign policy positions will be premised on serving narrow domestic political interests
rather than on building regional stability and peace. Itis therefore crucial that substantial progress be madethis year—before the mechanics of electoral competition and power legitimization hit full swing—to mitigate tensions and the risk of war. To this end, several

key principles for addressing the North Korea question must be observed.

Countering Future North Korean Military
Provocations
The United States, South Korea, and Japan must demonstrate a strong and serious determination to counter
further North Korean military provocations. The firststeps in this direction have already been taken throughjoint US–South Korea and US-Japan military exercises, the latter of which South Korea also observed.
In addition, the South Korean government is renewing
its efforts to improve strike-back capabilities in border areas that are vulnerable to North Korean military
provocations. But readiness to face a broad range ofthreats and attacks must continue to be enhanced. Ifsuch measures are not carried out, North Korea will
likely calculate that it can continue to get away withmilitary provocations.
Now that we are faced with the eruption of anotherNorth Korean crisis, trilateral cooperation should also
include the formulation of full-fledged contingency
planning for the defense of South Korea in the event ofNorth Korean aggression. The 1994 North Korean crisis led Japan and the United States to conclude a Joint
Security Declaration in 1996 and adopt new Defense
Cooperation Guidelines in 1997, and Japan passed theLaw Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace andSecurity of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding
Japan (SIASJ) in 1999. These measures all upgraded thefunctions of the US-Japan alliance. However, trilateralcontingency planning is still not taking place.
Contingency planning among the United States,South Korea, and Japan that builds upon the SIASJ must
detail how to most effectively utilize the US-Japan alliance to advance trilateral cooperation and how Japan
can support the United States in any given worst-casescenario on the Korean Peninsula. Given the legal restrictions on the role of the Japan Self-Defense Forces(JSDF) and the sensitive relationship between Japanand South Korea over this issue, the precise role ofthe JSDF in any contingency plans must be made absolutely clear. Further, trilateral contingency planningmust also include nonmilitary aspects such as copingwith refugee flows from North Korea and implementing noncombatant evacuation operation measures
to protect the safety of US and Japanese nationals inSouth Korea.
The United States, South Korea, and Japan mustclearly communicate to China that the situation on thepeninsula has become dangerous enough to necessitate that China reassess its strategic relationship withNorth Korea. If left unchecked, the current series ofNorth Korean military provocations could lead to serious conflicts and a bloody end for the North Korean
regime. This is an unwelcome situation all around andwould inflict a tremendous cost on the United States,
South Korea, and Japan. But the collapse of NorthKorea would also inflict a tremendous cost on—andgo against core interests of—China. As the only nation
with any real leverage over North Korea, China could
use its leverage to dissuade North Korea from perpetrating further military provocations.
Furthermore, while relations with North Korea cannot dictate the content of US-China relations, it is important that both countries realize that North Korea’s
modus operandi is to exploit tensions in the relations
between regional powers and adjust the rhetoric of
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

their disagreements accordingly. The recent US-Chinasummit in Washington gave some promising signs forbetter coordination between the two countries on dealing with North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, and it wasencouraging that the joint statement focused more onagreements than on differences. But it is still too early
to tell if the discussions between Chinese President Hu
Jintao and US President Barack Obama will have a longterm positive impact on the North Korea situation.

Setting the Stage for Negotiation
In retrospect, previous Six-Party Talks appear to havebeen used by North Korea primarily to deflect pressurerather than as a mechanism to make real progress inmanaging affairs or to create a credible road map fora settlement of the nuclear dispute. Even while discussions and agreements gave everybody an illusory senseof progress and comfort, North Korea continued developing its nuclear arsenal. Therefore, it makes sense
that, rather than calling for a resumption of the sixparty process itself in their joint statement, Presidents
Hu and Obama called for “the necessary steps thatwould allow for early resumption.”
Given the complexities of the situation on theKorean Peninsula, informal bilateral talks with North
Korea are needed to lay the foundation for negotiations and explore what is possible. This should include
three sets of informal North Korean bilateral talks withthe United States, South Korea, and Japan respectively.
The Six-Party Talks should only be re-launched whena breakthrough is made through bilateral talks, atwhich point the multilateral process can take on therole of overseeing and supervising implementation ofagreements that are made. Indeed, Japanese Foreign
Minister Seiji Maehara has indicated that informal
bilateral talks with North Korea should be held irrespective of the Six-Party Talks, recognizing the shortcomings of the six-party process.
Improving North Korea’s relationship with SouthKorea and the United States is a crucial step toward
better multilateral relations in the region. As the USChina Joint Statement rightly points out, a constructive inter-Korea dialogue will be an important step
toward better North-South relations. At the same time,
it will be impossible to resolve the nuclear issue without
2January 2011

substantive talks between the United States and theDPRK. Therefore, before any meaningful talks canbe restarted between Japan and North Korea, NorthSouth and US-DPRK dialogue must proceed first.
North Korea has signaled its willingness to have unconditional talks with South Korea, which is a welcomesign. But at the heart of the matter is North Korea’s
lack of credibility, which has been demonstrated repeatedly over the course of previous Six-Party Talks.
Resumption of the dialogue process must be unconditional, but we must indicate to North Korea that we are
not interested in holding talks just for the sake of talking. All parties must clearly demonstrate their intentto negotiate a settlement, and North Korea must proveits credibility at an early stage by showing its sincerity
to move toward denuclearization. One way in which
North Korea could do this is by allowing International
Atomic Energy Agency inspections to verify the exact
state of its nuclear development. Since North Korea has
already shown its newly constructed highly enricheduranium facilities to US scientists, this should not be
an insurmountable hurdle.

regime and economic cooperation. And Japan-DPRK
talks must address normalization based upon the 2002
Pyongyang Declaration and the abduction issue. Thereis no need to call for China-DPRK or Russia-DPRK
talks as they already have established diplomatic relations and ongoing dialogue.
At times the United States has seemed more concerned about the proliferation of nuclear technology than about the denuclearization of North Korea.
Putting emphasis on nonproliferation may send thewrong message to Pyongyang that we could live witha limited number of North Korean nuclear weapons.
But we must not accept as inevitable North Korea’s status as a nuclear state, which will leave us to only address the symptoms of the problem. Denuclearization
is as—or even more—important than nonproliferation
because denuclearization addresses the root cause ofthe problem.
Negotiations must be conducted through informal
bilateral talks with clear high-level political commitment and the intention of moving toward a comprehensive settlement. This requires talks to be conductedunder the auspices of the heads of government to allow for US, South Korean, and Japanese coordination under a strong mandate at both the international
level and the respective domestic levels. Also, knowing North Korea and its complex power struggles, it
is essential that we deal with its true center of power.
This means the establishment of a streamlined anddirect negotiation channel for political dialogue between Kim Jong-il and negotiators, and at the penultimate stage we must deal directly with Kim Jong-il
in person as Japan did in 2002 under Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi.

Negotiating a Comprehensive, Settlement
While bilateral negotiations are critical, they will notprove effective if they focus only on specific disputes
in individual bilateral relationships. Rather, a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the only practical way forward in the long run. This must include
four interrelated key elements, all of which havebeen covered in previous Six-Party Talks agreements:(1) verifiable denuclearization of North Korea, (2) theestablishment of a permanent peace regime on theKorean Peninsula that converts the current armistice agreement to a peace treaty, (3) international
economic and energy cooperation with North Korea,and (4) the normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea on the one hand and the UnitedStates and Japan on the other.
North Korean bilateral negotiations with the UnitedStates, Japan, and South Korea respectively are necessary processes for achieving these elements. Specifically,US-DPRK talks are the key to denuclearization andmust also address the peace regime and normalization.
Meanwhile, North-South talks must address the peace
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS◆ ◆ ◆North Korea’s recent military provocations have resulted in dangerously high regional tensions and evena renewed risk of war. Efforts over the past sevenyears to address the situation on the Korean Peninsulathrough the Six-Party Talks have been unsuccessful
at finding sustainable solutions, so it is only logicalthat we look for new approaches before the situation
gets out of hand. A comprehensive settlement requires a coordinated effort to institute parallel intense,
3January 2011

high-level negotiations at the bilateral level before allof the parties can return to the table to reengage in thesix-party process. Without such bold steps, one canonly expect the situation to get worse, with devastatingconsequences for everyone involved.

Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairmanof the Institute for International Strategy. He ­previously
served as Japan’s deputy minister for ­foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
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4© 2011 Japan Center for International Exchange

January 2011