Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 2 No. 5 | October 2007

Japanese Foreign Policy Under
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIEIn the immediate aftermath of Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe’s sudden resignation on September 12,
2007, it appeared as though Abe’s former foreign
minister, Taro Aso, was certain to become Japan’s
new prime minister. Nevertheless, on September
23, Yasuo Fukuda, a widely respected party elder
and son of former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda,
was elected president of the Liberal DemocraticParty (LDP) and subsequently as prime ministerof Japan. Fukuda was chosen largely because of hisreputation as a moderate, his collaborative style,and the personal and political distance between
him and Abe. While an Aso administration would
have signaled continuity in foreign policy, Fukuda
is likely to shift gears and adopt a more subtle approach to foreign affairs.
Prime Minister Fukuda inherits a number ofvery serious foreign policy challenges that demand
the government’s immediate attention, ranging
from the North Korea issue to the extension of
the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law. The following pages will address several questions about
Fukuda’s election and its implications for Japan’s
foreign policy.

1. What are some of the core ideas that will pro-­vide the foundation for the new administration’s
foreign policy?
First, Prime Minister Fukuda believes that foreign
policy should be created through a process that involves joint consultations between popularly elected
politicians (necessarily policy-generalists) and experts in the professional foreign policy establishment.
He is a strong advocate of a pragmatic approach toforeign affairs and is unlikely to push a nationalistic
or populist agenda.
Second, Prime Minister Fukuda has long held theconviction that Japan’s foreign policy should not bethought of in zero-sum terms as a choice between
regionalism and its alliance with the ­ United States.
Rather, he has expressed the belief that proactive andconstructive relations toward both the region andJapan’s most important ally are not only in Japan’snational interest but can also be mutually reinforcing: strong ties with the United States facilitate regional economic growth and security, while expanded links with East Asia would keep the United States
engaged in the region and facilitate deeper bilateraland ­multilateral ties.

2. Where does Mr. Fukuda stand on visits to
Yasukuni Shrine and relations with China andSouth Korea, and what kind of approach toward
the region can be expected from his adminis-­tration?
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s repeated visits to
Yasukuni Shrine damaged Japan’s political relations
with several East Asian countries, particularly Chinaand South Korea. His successor, Prime Minister Abe,surprised many pundits by making improved relations with China and South Korea a clear priority
during the first month of his administration. Thisbehavior stood in stark contrast to the hard line hisadministration adopted vis-à-vis North Korea.
Prime Minister Fukuda has always been something of a realist when it comes to Japan’s relations
with its neighbors. Throughout his tenure as former Prime Minister Koizumi’s chief cabinet secretary, Fukuda cautioned Koizumi about his visits toYasukuni Shrine given the negative impact he knew
these visits would have on Japan’s relationships withcountries in the region. In contrast to Koizumi’ssuccessor, Shinzo Abe, who consistently refused tocomment on the issue, Fukuda has already made anumber of public commitments that he will not go
to Yasukuni Shrine while prime minister.
One of Prime Minister Fukuda’s main foreign
policy goals may be a kind of grand bargain withChina, not only concerning bilateral issues but alsowith regard to Japan and China’s respective roles in
the region, particularly in the field of community
building. In order to achieve this grand bargain, hewill avoid actions likely to provoke anti-Japanesesentiment and instead focus on complementary interests. He can be expected to push for an expansionof substantive dialogue and cooperation with China
on energy security and the environment, in addition
to other issues of common concern.
Regarding North Korea, in Japan “the North Korea issue” refers not only to international concerns
about nuclear proliferation but also to the whereabouts of a number of Japanese citizens who wereabducted by North Korean agents in the 1970s and1980s. Even prior to the election campaign, Fukuda
had long been critical of a hard-line stance, stating
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

on many occasions that Japan’s interests would bebetter served if it were to engage North Korea andcreate an environment in which the two parties cansit down to serious negotiations on such issues ofconcern for bilateral relations. As prime minister,Fukuda will expand efforts to find a constructive
resolution to the abductees issue and set the stagefor Japan to make a more proactive contribution to
the Six-Party Talks.
Regarding Prime Minister Fukuda’s attitude toward East Asia, if speeches given during his campaign for the LDP presidency are any indication,
his administration will place an increased focus onregional community-building efforts. His basic viewof Japan’s role in the region—which continues to beheavily influenced by his father’s famous 1977 speechin Manila—is that while Japan has an importantleadership role to play in East Asia, its leaders mustbe sure to fully acknowledge and respect its political,religious, and cultural diversity. Consequently, farfrom using values as a rubric for dividing states into
ideological camps, Fukuda has indicated that Japan’sinterests would be best served by adopting a lowkey approach and proactively engaging the region
as a whole in a process of inclusive multilateralism.
Thus, while conceding that the spread of democraticvalues should be viewed as a long-term goal for theregion, the new administration will probably takecare to avoid policies or rhetoric that could be interpreted as attempting to impose such values upon its­neighbors.
3. What are the prospects for the Anti-­terrorism
Special Measures Law under Prime Minister­Fukuda?
The Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law is set toautomatically expire on November 1st, and opposition leader and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ)
President Ichiro Ozawa has vowed to derail any LDP
efforts to support an extension. For Prime Minister
Fukuda, the significance of the debate over extension of the law (or new legislation that either party
may introduce to replace it) transcends the issueof the Self-Defense Forces’ (SDF) role in the Indian Ocean. Rather, it serves as a litmus test of hisVol. 2 No. 5 | October 2007a­ dministration’s ability to overcome the challenge
posed by the DPJ’s unprecedented majority in theUpper House and successfully work together withthe opposition in the formulation of policy, foreignor otherwise.
These are largely uncharted waters for the LDP,
which until the July 2007 election had successfully
steamrolled most post-9/11 foreign policy legislation through the Diet. While the makeup of theLower House could change at any moment if theprime minister calls for a general election, the rulingcoalition will continue to face a majority oppositionin the Upper House at least until the next election in2010. Although the LDP-Komeito coalition’s overwhelming majority in the Lower House means that it
could technically force passage of the extension even
without Upper House sanction, Prime Minister Fukuda has made it clear that major policy initiatives
will henceforth have to garner at least minimal opposition support if the government wishes to avoid
three years of legislative gridlock.
In light of these circumstances, the November
1st deadline for extension will likely pass and theSpecial Measures Law will automatically expire.
Fukuda’s most important task will be to clarify therationale for the SDF dispatch to the Japanese people and encourage public debate on the issue. Sucha process will ensure that future legislation receives
widespread understanding and support.

extensive effort to garner support for a basic law concerning dispatch of the SDF.* He is likely to push thisinitiative again, this time aiming to enact a law thatwill receive widespread and supra-­partisan support.
While it is improbable that Prime Minister Fukuda, unlike his predecessor, will become an impassioned advocate of textual revision of the constitution in light of the current political climate, he will
most likely support efforts to change the government’s official interpretation of the constitution’sArticle 9. This new interpretation would aim toexpand the SDF’s mandate to include participation
in international operations that have received sanction from the United Nations Security Council. Thefact that opposition leader Ichiro Ozawa has called
for the SDF to adopt a similar role suggests that theprospects for such a reinterpretation are quite good.
5. What is the long-term significance of theDPJ’s intense opposition to the extension ofthe Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law? Does
it indicate that US-Japan relations have once
again become a fault line in Japan’s domestic
politics?
Developments in the wake of the DPJ’s acquisitionof a majority in the Upper House this past July havemade it abundantly clear that from now on the opposition will play an increasingly significant role in
the formulation of Japan’s foreign policy. While theUS-Japan alliance is unlikely to become a divisive
issue in domestic politics to the extent that it didin the immediate post-war era, debate over its substance will probably become a focal point of intragovernmental deliberations over foreign policy forthe foreseeable future.
While some overseas Japan watchers may be
tempted to frame the ongoing debate over extensionof the Anti-terrorism Special Measures Law in absolute terms as a question of “alliance with the UnitedStates: yes or no?” this, simply put, is not accurate.

4. Does Abe’s resignation, coupled with Aso’s
defeat in the LDP presidential election, signal
the end of Japan’s pursuit of status as a more
“normal” nation? What is the significance of
these developments for Article 9? Is constitu-­
tional revision off the table for the foreseeable
future?
While Prime Ministers Fukuda and Abe may notshare an identical vision for Japan’s future, it would bea mistake to classify the new prime minister as a doveor isolationist. In fact, he has repeatedly expressed adesire to more clearly define Japan’s role and responsibilities in the international community. For example, during his time as chief cabinet secretary underformer Prime Minister Koizumi, Fukuda made an
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS* Distinct from ad-hoc legislation (e.g. the Anti-­terrorism Special Measures Law), which is only valid for specific missions andautomatically expires without periodic extension, a basic law
would permanently clarify the circumstances under which thegovernment can and cannot dispatch the SDF overseas.

Vol. 2 No. 5 | October 2007

The DPJ’s insistence on UN sanction as a prerequisite for SDF participation in overseas activities, aswell as Japan’s growing support for regionalism andcommunity-building activities in East Asia, far fromsignaling a declining interest in the United States,
are both part of a natural evolution in Japan’s foreign policy in an increasingly multipolar and globalizing world. Japan is not alone in this regard, aschanges in US foreign policy during President Bush’s
second term suggest that the United States is also inthe midst of a similar shift toward multilateralism.
Foreign policy speeches by both Democratic andRepublican presidential candidates suggest that thisshift will continue for the foreseeable future.

No matter how events play out in the coming
weeks and months, it is absolutely clear that there
will continue to be a need for extensive bilateral consultations over foreign policy. In order to ensure thatthe alliance remains strong, leaders must use these
consultations to clarify misunderstandings, facilitate
linkages between the United States and East Asia, coordinate future participation in multilateral activities, and reaffirm the US-Japan alliance.

Hitoshi Tanaka is a Senior Fellow at JCIE, and he­previously served as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from the Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
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© 2007 Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 2 No. 5 | October 2007