IEEJ：December 2016 © IEEJ2016

IAEE Distinguished Lecturers Series"Oil Markets in Transition:
Where are We and What’s Next?"
David Knapp, President‐Elect IAEE
Chief Energy Economist, Energy Intelligence Group
Institute for Energy Economics of Japan, Tokyo, December 6, 2016

Powerful Thinking
for the global energy industry

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Dr. David Knapp
pp Biographyg p y Dr. David Knapp is President Elect for 2018 of the International Association for Energy
Economics and Chief Energy Economist of Energy Intelligence. At EI, he has edited Oil
Market Intelligence forf over 15 years and writes regularly forf several other off thecompany’s publications, including Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Energy Compass, Oil
Daily, Energy Intelligence Finance and International Oil Daily.
 Before joining Energy Intelligence in late 2000, Dr. Knapp was a senior official with theInternational Energy Agency in Paris and served as Editor of the IEA’s influential monthly
Oil Market Report through much of the 1990s. He has analyzed energy markets for morethan 45 years in the international,
international government,
government business and financial sectors as Energy
Economist and Energy Team Leader for the Wall Street banking and investment firm ofBrown Brothers Harriman & Co. throughout the 1980s, after starting his career at theFederal Energy Administration/Department of Energy and then Chase Manhattan Bank’s
Energy Economics Division in the 1970s.
1970s
 Dr. Knapp holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of California at Santa Barbara
professional organizations
gin the energy
gy area. He is aand is a member of numerous pfounding Member of the IAEE and was also a founder, and currently serves as Presidentof the Board of the New York Energy Forum. He is a Senior Fellow of the US Association
for Energy Economics and currently VP for Business. He has served on various USAEEpp
Advisor to five recent USAEE Presidents. Dr.
committees,, as well as beingg an Appointed
Knapp is a former council member of the IAEE and reviewer for the organization’s Energy
Journal . Dr. Knapp holds the IAEE 2007 Award for Excellence in Written Journalism.
2

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Outline Part 1: The Volume Side of the Story Saudi Arabia has been for years -- and will continue to be -- at the center of the oil market
 Several myths about the causes of the “Shale Revolution” need to be overturned There are distinct differences between short-term and longer term oil market rebalancing
 If the market and Opec is the short-term answer, Saudi Arabia is the answer to the longer term Is current thinking within the Kingdom is evolving to reflect an altered view of the longer term?

 Part 2: The Ultimate Barometer, Oil Prices
 What does all this mean for prices?
 Why the wide range between bulls and bears?
 Market outlooks differ mostly on supply, Opec behavior and most recently, decoding Trump
 A look at aggregate supply demand balances, a peak at some details, and some more details

 Part 3: More Contrasts Between Short Term and Long Term Oil Market Dynamics
 What Comes Next; 2018-2020 Trump vs. Paris and Beyond Oil Markets in an Environmentally Challenged World

3

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Part 1The Volume Side of the Story

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

It Used to be All About Saudi Arabia…Until US Shale Arrived
 A “Willy Sutton” theory of oil markets:
 “because
because thatthat’ss where they keep the oil;”oil; but Saudi Arabia is not a Central Bank of oil, never was, never will be; In a sense, Saudi Arabia is “too big to succeed” so stays clear of financial side; politically and economically Saudi Arabia is most comfortable with a passive rolerole,
 “let the market rebalance itself” is an exemplary response to the US shale revolution.

 Dealing with longer term consequences of an oil market capital investment
collapse in marginal oil supply areas raises three questions: can Saudi Arabia be counted on to fill any future supply gaps? Are they sufficiently motivated?
 what is the Paris Cop 21 “green swan” doing to future demand for Saudi and other Opec oil?
 how much of the supply expansion burden can be assumed by others -- Iran,
Iran Iraq
Iraq, UAE
UAE, Kuwait,
KuwaitLibya, returning US shale, rising of non-US shale? Why US shale can’t be the “Swing Producer.” What is Opec’s role in the post-shale-revolution oil world? Saudi Arabia’s role in
Opec?
p
Russia’s and other non-Opecp producers’prole in coordinating
g with Opec?
p Opec has added four members in the last five years (three returnees), are they staying are morecoming? Can and will IEA add non-OECD members? What about geopolitics, energy security?
 Can Opec, non-Opec cooperation ever work? What about Opec-IEA cooperation?
 And what does the Trump Presidency mean for all this? – stay tuned
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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

The US Shale Revolution” Was Not Driven by Market Dynamics
 The Shale Era is more about how geologists think about their job than about the tools
and information they have. A good geologist is no longer just the guy who is best at
figuring out where the oil stopped
stopped, where it stated now mattersmatters.
 Source rock as a target -- rather than an academic afterthought -- brought about the
US shale surge; not oil prices
prices, not “new”
new technology,
technology not any “new”
new discoveries.
discoveries The oil world is now confronted with a new, huge, producible resource base and has
so farf beenbable
bl tto producedit economicallyi ll att supposedly
dl llethal
th l pricesiandd costs.
t The birth of the Shale Era changed oil market rules and roles in place for ½ a century.
 So far the shale revolution is dominated by the US, because of unique individual
property rights, upstream experience, technology and equipment. Places like
Argentina, Canada, China, Russia and the Mideast/North Africa are far behind the US.
 Saudi Arabia was unable to ignoregthe existence of this new new resource base, so itrightly chose to change the economics.
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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Supply Demand Roughly Rebalanced If Opec Agreement Holds
Supply-Demandt Absent significant economic events
events, 2017 demand growth is slightly slower at 1
1.24
24
million b/d with non-Opec supply up 1.05 million b/d vs. 2016 growth of 1.41
million b/d demand rise and a nearly flat 10,000 b/d non-Opec gain, respectively.
 Opec NGL & Other production rise to 170,000
170 000 b/d versus 2016’s
2016 s 100,000
100 000 b/d.
b/d But
Opec crude drops 980,000 b/d, after a 1.1 million b/d expected rise this year.
 A key assumption is that Opec financial pressures from low oil price, on balance of
payments, and government budgets, dondon’tt spawn production
production-inhibiting
inhibiting upheavals.
 Iraqi growth, depending mostly on KRG, a sputtering Libyan recovery, returning
Neutral Zone and post-sanctions Iran increases threaten Opec’s Nov. 30 agreement.
 Demand responses will again be depressed by currency movements in favor of thedollar and further devolution of subsidies. Supply responses depend on gov’t fiscal
policies and financial health of producing companies, plus related asset transfers.
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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

A Wide Range of Opinions on Volumes Keep Markets Unsure Price outlooks already differed based on
differing views the state of rebalancing.
 But prices and balances are interactive.
 Higher prices, in anticipation of rebalancing,
can be self-defeating given the agility andsteep learning curve for US shale production.
 Three of the four forecasting group saw nonOpec declines for this year.
 But
B t with
ith recentt higher
hi h prices,i
persistencei t
off
US shale and some large one-off non-Opec
additions.
 Notably among them are Kazakhstan’s
Kazakhstan s
infamous Kashagan Caspian offshore field,
the UK’s Schiehallion and several Brazilian
pre-salt fields, plus some deepwater US Gulf
of Mexico fields and Canadian incremental I And now Opec’s deal adds new uncertainties
on compliance and Saudi willingness tocompensatecope sate foro Opec/ot
Opec/othere non-compliance.
o co p a ce

Sources: Energy Intelligence, Oil Market Intelligence, Nov.15'16;
International Energy Agency, Oil Market Report, Nov.10'16; Opec
Monthly Oil Market Report, Nov.11'16; US Energy Information
Ad i i t ti
Administration,
Sh t T
Short
Term Energy
E
Outlook,O tl k Nov.8’16.
N 8’168

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

US Shale is Not the Only,
Only or even the Major,
Major Supply in Play

 Russia’s surprise 2015 increase, was supposed to set the stage for a 2016 decline,b t thingsbutthiwentt theth otherth way. China’s
Chi ’ dropdi reall lled
is
db
by D
Daqing’si ’ “fi“finall reckoning.”
k i ”
 Excluding China and the US, only four of the other top 15 non-Opec producers areseen declining in 2016, mostly unrelated to price, same as 2015, two less than 2014.
 Non-Opec growth has been dominated by the US -- 70% of 2014 and still 64% of
2015; but growth swings from an 878,000 b/d gain to a 2016 363,000 b/d drop.
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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

US Light,
Light Tight Oil Surge Has Changed US and Global Oil Markets
The US shale liquids are dominated by North Dakota and Texas, Now US Gulf
of Mexico is kicking in with a post-Macondo surge, despite lower prices.

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How Shale Changed the Oil MarkeOil Markets in Transition:
Where Are We and What’s Next?

Opec Country Level Crude Production Details 2016-17

t and What Comes Next

 2016 Ni
Nigeria
i anddV
Venezuela
l bbothth down,df th byfurtherb 320,000
320 000 b/d and
d 110
110,000
000 b/d respectively.
ti l Iran and Iraq lead rise by 1.14 million b/d combined in 2016, with sanctions relief for Iran from midJan; active marketing into Asia and Europe, but still payments constraints. Iraq saw higher Basray more KRG: when companies g
got paid, and pipelines unbombed.
field expansions, supplemented by Saudis up 280,000 b/d, at all-time high (10.65 million b/d) in Q3, is this a sign of the future?
 Exempted Nigeria is seen down in 2017, but Iran and Libya up 230,000 b/d and 110,000 b/d.
p
to add 240,000 b/d that mayy or mayy not come out of Saudi and Kuwait Neutral Zone return expected Saudi down 500,000 b/d, or about half the expected Opec cut, perhaps strategizing for 2018’s
Aramco IPO?
11

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?
res No Oil Market is an Island The advent of paper markets brings with it asset allocation influences
 Physical market interactions have also become more intense Oil also lives in a world of inter-fuel and inter-factor competition Headline driven oil price movements are increasingly financial
 But classic geopolitics still can paly a supporting (or depressing) role
 One great irony of the current oil market is Middle East geopolitics
being more threatening than ever while oil production makes records

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Saudi Play Leading Roll in the Coming Oil Market Drama Saudis can use up current sparecapacity in 2017-18, but then either
add capacity,
capacity or produce fasterfaster.
 Some capacity may be added in 2018,
but existing giant fields could also be
used more aggressively.
 Incremental capacity can be added totap new zones in some older fields -Berri, Qatif and Abu Sa’fa.
 By 2020 capacity would have to be
expanded to around 15 million b/d tokeep markets near balance given an
accelerating non-Opec slide.
 If maximum efficient rate (MER) to
protect ultimate recovery is tossed out,
operatingti volumes
lcan beb raisedi dbbyadding above ground equipment.

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Current Supply
Supply-Demand
Demand Response Only Half the Storyu For us, Saudi/Opec’s strategy has always had a longer-term component: to assure oil’srole into the next decade and beyond, likely with accelerated Saudi production rates.
 Arguably the bigger “success”
success for the market share strategy is the delays andcancellations of the next tranche of competing non-Opec oil from deepwater and, to alesser extent the Arctic, not the immediate reversal of US shale area growth.
 A small surplus from 2014 more than doubled in 2015 and fell only modestly this year
year,
but if Opec’s deal holds together that could drop to 420,000 b/d next year.
 Given current trends of non-Opec project cancellations, assuming Saudi capacity stays
flat,, and even with more from Iran,, Iraq
q and Libyay balances turn negativegfor 2018-20.
 However, Saudis can push harder on existing fields, or higher prices appear by theend 2020, something not in Saudi (new) longer term interest.
14

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

What are the Risks to the “New” Saudi Arabian Leadership Deputy Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Naiflook like a very thin coalition in a largely conservative 7,000 member Saudi royal family.
 But a mantle of legitimacy was bestowed on Mohammed bin Salman after a weeklong
session with ailing King Abdullah; making him the “vessel of change” for the kingdom.
 And these changes are profound -- economically, socially and politically. Much of theroyal family are reported to be nervous, if not outright angry, as are the Wahhabis.
 So far the relationship between bin Naif and bin Salman has been fully functional, but
the first tactic by disaffected other princes could be to drive a wedge between them. It is
now the relationship between President Trump and Saudi Arabia that is in play.
 So is yet another episode of the oft-played the “Fall of the House of Saud” upon us?
• As the guy who has been on the other side of the table saying, “Do not underestimate the ability ofthi hithishighlyhl pragmatic
ti ffamily
il iin thi
this culture
lt
and
d th
the partt off th
the world
ld tto fifind
d a way tto survive,”i ”• I am still on that side of the table, but frankly I have never been more uncertain and nervous.

 What we do know however, is that whomever sits in the chair will be sitting on possibly
the largest potential stranded asset in the history of the planet
planet, unless the oil can beconverted, relatively promptly, into other productive physical and/or financial assets.
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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Part 2
Oil Prices: Uneven Path More Uneven Outlook

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

How and Why Did The 2014-16/17 Price Collapse Happen?
 The prime cause of the oil price collapse was NOT Opec’s decision in November, 2014
to follow a low price/market share strategy.
 The price decline started in late June, 2014 as a result of the impact of US light oil
production on Atlantic Basin balances.
 Opec decision merely spread the global surplus to Asia and from light oil to medium our oil that dominate the Mideast-to-Asia oil trade.
 The size of the surplus and the resultant inventory overhang have effectively removed
geopolitical concerns from the oil price equation.
 Demand side responses to low prices were muted by currency movements, reduced
subsidies and high taxes
 Supply side responses were overwhelmed by ongoing cost reduction for US shale andforward momentum of projects
jelsewhere well advanced in the development process.

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Stark Differences in Price Outlooks: Bears vsvs. Bulls

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Is Successful 2015 Price Forecast Affecting 2016 Strategy

Source: Jan.’15 - New York Energy Forum, "2015 Oil Market Outlook"; Feb.’15 - CSIS, "Energy Market Impacts of Low OilPrices"; Mar’15 - Saudi Aramco Energy Week, "Global Oil Markets in a New Lower Oil Price 'Shale Era"'; Apri’15 - CERIWorld Oil Conference, "Energy Market Impacts of Low Oil Prices"; May’15 - client presentations in London, Paris andMadrid, "Energy Market Impacts of Low Oil Prices"; Jun’15 - client presentations in Houston, "Shale Era Challenges Oil
Market Traditional Structures"; Sep’15 - client presentations in Europe. Nov-Dec’15 Houston clients, China International Oil& Gas Trade Congress, Tokyo client presentations,19

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Oil Prices 2014-17
2014 17 -- One Man
Man’ss View ()

subject to major changes without notice Since the fundamentals continue to be
choppy,ppy next yearydue to inventories
rather than on and off optimism about S&D.
 Much of the work was already done on
prices during 2nd half of 2014 and 2015,
in 2016 and 2017 fundamentals catch up.
 Brent should be more volatile than WTI,
since it is more global and geopolitics havea bigger Brent effect. WTI is more about
improving US shale supply logistics.
 Last year’s Jan-Feb, Q2 and Q3 prices
bumps, were based the on financial side
positioning and expectations, ultimately
merely delaying the supply adjustment
process with hedge and re-hedging
re hedging.
 This year has already seen more of thesame, this time was about a lowprobability production cut that may now
be happening.
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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

Part 3What Comes Next?

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

 The Middle East: The Oil Market’s Next Main Actors


Non-Opec investment has declined by between $800 billion-$1.5 trillion.



The differences in global balances will likely show up in 2018-2020.

The Mideast Gulf is the obvious willing candidate to fill the global gap:
higher oil prices favor other fuels over oil, lower prices preserve a market for oil,higher prices accelerate consuming gov’t anti-oil measure, lower prices don’t;
higher oil and other energy prices lower energy’s share vs. capital labor and materials.



Saudi Arabia and its neighbors have a need, to convert large volumes of oil
resource into other productive assets, while oil market is viable.



Geopolitical risk in the Middle East has never been higher, but neither has its
oil production.

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

 Saudi
S di Arabia:
A bi TheTh StarSt off theth Late-Decade
L t D
d Oil Market
M k t Drama
D

If Saudi Arabia ignores maximum efficient rate (MER) assessments it can
produce enough from existing fields to meet the market needs.

 The demand for Saudi oil will depend on demand growth (moderate), nonOpec supply declines (large) and production of other Opec (mixed), Non-Gulf Opec members are expected to be of limited relevance,
possible increases from Libya, Nigeria, Ecuador and Angola
big losses from Venezuela, slow declines for Algeria, Indonesia, and Gabon

 Non-Saudi Gulf Opec members are expected to grow for the same reason
the Saudis are pushing, except for Qatar’s gas shift and old oil.
 Iraq and Iran will lead the way, but with help from UAE and Kuwait (outside of
Burgan, on return of and possible expanding Neutral Zone).

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

 How would Saudi Arabia Bridge a Possible Late-Decade Gap
Saudi expansion will likely first involve pushing harder on Ghawar;



Accelerating additional onshore development at Khurais and Shaybah;Offshore ggiants Safaniyahy and Manifa have much more to ggive,, albeit notvery pretty oilRefining capacity has been upgraded to handle lower quality crude -- morecapacity could be coming.

Natural gas development (hopefully from possibly prolific shale gas areas)
could be stressed for domestic substitution to maintain or increase
exportableepo tab e su
surplus.
p us

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Oil Markets in Transition: Where Are We and What’s Next?

 US Shale: Still an Important Agent of Change for Oil MarketsTrump is good for US shale, so is the price reaction to Opec’s cut deal.

US oil shale area output 2007-15 surge reversed a multi-decade decline.



Eagle
g Ford and Bakken core areas dominated the initial shale pphase.

More vertically diverse Permian, horizontally widespread Niobrara and“gassier”
gassier Marcellus/Utica getting attention as Eagle Ford and Bakken slip.

High-grading kept up momentum in “sweet spots” at expense of future
performance of main shales’ marginal areas and secondary shales.
Fi
Financiali l ffactors
t
will
ill d
determineti whoh stayst
andd who
h goes iin th
the shaleh l parch;hbreak-even costs matter less than debt-equity ratios, debt service costs,
values of reserve collateral and bank regulatory rigor.
A
Asset
reallocationll
i was a victim
i i off ““slowerlffor llonger”” withi h sellers
llplentiful,l if lwith buyers scarce, but that has swung in the last few months.

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How Shale Changed the Oil Market and What Comes Next

The Texas Eagle Ford the “True
True Shale PlayPlay”
Location and developed infrastructure give it an advantage over the Bakken
 Bakken is conventional oil in a shaleenvironment, Permian is a mixed shale/nonshale play with the non-shale portion dominant.
 Shale zones account for most of the Eagle Fordarea liquids under 24 counties in eastern andsouthern Texas, Twelve fields currently produce
liquids often from under multiple countries.
Output now exceeds 1.3 million b/d.
Infrastructure is highly developed, the politicalenvironment strongly positive

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How Shale Changed the Oil Market and What Comes Next

Understanding the Bakken “Shale”
Shale Oil Area
A Key US growth area
 Geographically, the Bakken area is a part of the larger
Willi t Basin
WillistonB i extending
t di iintot M
Montanat
anddS
Saskatchewank t hcontaining a number of other productive sands but nothingclose to the productivity of the Bakken/Three Forks.
 Bakken output, primarily using the same method as shaleareas, isi now 95% off statet t outputt t With Bakken’s remote location/short pipeline capacity, rail
costs have become more important than production costs.
 With its harsh climate and small population as additional
disadvantages the North Dakota Bakken remains on thefront lines of price-induced production cuts.
 Producers are cutting spending but continue to exercise
drilling options to hold leases but not completing somewells. Some already-completed wells are not hooked up
yet for lack offtake space.
 Duc’s (drilled uncompleted) wells could turn aroundproduction decline any time now.
now

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How Shale Changed the Oil Market and What Comes Next

Three Other States Are or Could Contribute to Shale’s
Shale s Revolution
New Mexico and Colorado localized but significant gains, and Oklahoma lurking
 Virtually all of New Mexico
Mexico’ss oil output
comes from two counties, Lea andEddy, with only small amounts from
Chavez and county all n the southeast
cornercoe oof tthee statestate. Northeasto t east cornerco e issa gas area.
 Five of Texas’ Delaware Basin Permiansands cross the border into New
Mexico and are being exploited by anumber of small and medium sizedcompanies.
 Water resources are an issue but thestate is generally seen,
seen like Texas andNorth Dakota, remains “development
friendly.” Shale growth dominates
declines from non-shale areas.
ColoradoCl d h
has a much
h llarger numberb off bbasins,ibbutt only
l th
the D
Denver-Julesburg
J l b(DJ) iin th
the northeasttht partt off
the state is a significant shale liquids area, primarily Niobrara shale in the Wattenberg field ..

Colorado’s other large conventional field Rangely in the Piceance Basin has been in decline for a numberof years. The state is decidedly split and is a battleground on hydraulic fracturing.



A number of D-J fields have potential to contribute and there are a couple of other untapped Niobrarabasins like the North Park Basin in the north central part of the state and some of the western basins.
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How Shale Changed the Oil Market and What Comes Next

Oil Markets for the Next Four Years Depend on Trump
 Like Brexit, the surprise Trump victory in
the US presidential Election has added
serious uncertainties;• How much of his campaign rhetoric will show
up in Administration policy?
• Who will be appointed to key positions in theadministration?
• How will the answers to these two questions
affect US international relations?
• When will all this be clearer?

 The reversal of US positions on Climate
Change and a reworking of US
US-Mideast
MideastGulf relations, Russia-US relations and
US-Mexico relation have critical oil market
implications.
 Geopolitical events involving Syria,
Yemen, Ukraine and China all figure to
test Trump and his administration’s skills,
if heh takesk aR
Reagan-likelik figureheadfih d role?
l ?
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