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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

23-Apr-2003___________________________________________________________________________________________English - Or. English

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYCOMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSNEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
Unclassified
ANSWERS TO REMAINING QUESTIONS ON BUBBLER CONDENSER
Activity Report of the OECD NEA Bubbler-Condenser Steering Group

January 2003

English - Or. English

JT00143253

Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d’origine
Complete document available on OLIS in its original format

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT
Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 14th December 1960, and which came into force on 30th
September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shall promote policies designed:−to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member
countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy;− to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic
development; and− to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance withinternational obligations.
The original Member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom
and the United States. The following countries became Members subsequently through accession at the dates indicated hereafter:
Japan (28th April 1964), Finland (28th January 1969), Australia (7th June 1971), New Zealand (29th May 1973), Mexico (18th
May 1994), the Czech Republic (21st December 1995), Hungary (7th May 1996), Poland (22nd November 1996), Korea (12thDecember 1996) and the Slovak Republic (14th December 2000). The Commission of the European Communities takes part in thework of the OECD (Article 13 of the OECD Convention).

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYThe OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1st February 1958 under the name of the OEEC
European Nuclear Energy Agency. It received its present designation on 20th April 1972, when Japan became its first
non-European full Member. NEA membership today consists of 27 OECD Member countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and theUnited States. The Commission of the European Communities also takes part in the work of the Agency.
The mission of the NEA is:−

to assist its Member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, thescientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes, as well as− to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues, as input to government
decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD policy analyses in areas such as energy and sustainable
development.
Specific areas of competence of the NEA include safety and regulation of nuclear activities, radioactive waste
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countries.
In these and related tasks, the NEA works in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna, with which it has a Co-operation Agreement, as well as with other international organisations in the nuclear field.
© OECD 2003
Permission to reproduce a portion of this work for non-commercial purposes or classroom use should be obtained through theCentre français d’exploitation du droit de copie (CCF), 20, rue des Grands-Augustins, 75006 Paris, France, Tel. (33-1) 44 07 47
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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

COMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSThe NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) is an international committee made up of
scientists and engineers. It was set up in 1973 to develop and co-ordinate the activities of the Nuclear Energy Agency
concerning the technical aspects of the design, construction and operation of nuclear installations insofar as theyaffect the safety of such installations. The Committee’s purpose is to foster international co-operation in nuclear
safety amongst the OECD Member countries.
CSNI constitutes a forum for the exchange of technical information and for collaboration between organisations
which can contribute, from their respective backgrounds in research, development, engineering or regulation, to these
activities and to the definition of its programme of work. It also reviews the state of knowledge on selected topics ofnuclear safety technology and safety assessment, including operating experience. It initiates and conducts
programmes identified by these reviews and assessments in order to overcome discrepancies, develop improvements
and reach international consensus in different projects and International Standard Problems, and assists in the
feedback of the results to participating organisations. Full use is also made of traditional methods of co-operation,such as information exchanges, establishment of working groups and organisation of conferences and specialist
meeting.
The greater part of CSNI’s current programme of work is concerned with safety technology of water reactors. The
principal areas covered are operating experience and the human factor, reactor coolant system behaviour, various
aspects of reactor component integrity, the phenomenology of radioactive releases in reactor accidents and theirconfinement, containment performance, risk assessment and severe accidents. The Committee also studies the safetyof the fuel cycle, conducts periodic surveys of reactor safety research programmes and operates an international
mechanism for exchanging reports on nuclear power plant incidents.
In implementing its programme, CSNI establishes co-operative mechanisms with NEA’s Committee on Nuclear
Regulatory Activities (CNRA), responsible for the activities of the Agency concerning the regulation, licensing andinspection of nuclear installations with regard to safety. It also co-operates with NEA’s Committee on Radiation
Protection and Public Health and NEA’s Radioactive Waste Management Committee on matters of common interest.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Answers to Remaining Questions on Bubbler-Condenser
Activity Report of the OECD NEA Bubbler-Condenser Steering Group
January 2003

Table of Contents

Page

Executive Summary

7

List of abbreviations

11

1.

Introduction

2.

Background
Description of the bubbler-condenser, the experimental facility,
the results of previous research

173.

Analyses
Results and methods of previous calculations

29

4.

Experimental Approach
The pre-test calculations, the objectives and scope of the tests
and their scenario, description and conduct of the experiments,
as well as their results

37

5.

Results interpretation
Post-test calculations and answers to the open questions

43

6.

Conclusions

61

Appendix 1: Mandate of the GroupAppendix 2: Minutes of the meetings
Appendix 3. Members of the Steering Group

63
67
107

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Executive Summary
The Russian design VVER-440 (type 213) pressurised water reactors are fitted with a pressure-suppression
containment structure, called bubbler-condenser, having the function to reduce the pressure of the entire
containment in case of a design basis accident (DBA), such as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). This
device consists of a tower of typically 12 floors communicating with the reactor containment building.
Each floor is flooded with a pool of cold water (at room temperature) and includes gap-cap inlet openings.
In the unlikely case of a LOCA, the steam from the primary circuit of the reactor and air enter the bubblercondenser tower and are forced by the gap-cap system to bubble into the cold water present at each floor of
the bubbler-condenser. This causes the steam to condense, thus maintaining both temperature and pressure
within containment below given limits during the entire course of a postulated design basis accident
The bubbler-condenser was designed to withstand design basis accident conditions and to maintain its
integrity in order to fulfil its safety function. Nevertheless, particularly for design basis accidents, detailed
analyses identified the need to improve the modelling of accidents and to extend the knowledge of integral
and separated effects. There was also a need to produce qualified experimental data in order to strengthen
the basis for computer codes validation.
During the 1990ies, a number of investigations, including analyses and experiments by the utilities, as well
as EU PHARE projects and related OECD NEA Expert Group activities, have been performed in order tofully ascertain the capabilities of the VVER-440/213 bubbler-condenser. These investigations consisted
among others of experiments intended to simulate large break LOCA conditions (i.e. the most challenging
ones for the bubbler-condenser structure) and provided adequate answers to the most important issues
related to the bubbler-condenser function. However, certain questions still remained open and needed
further assessment.
In response to a request of their safety authorities to answer the remaining questions and complete thebubbler-condenser assessment, the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak utilities took the initiative in 2001 to
perform a joint experimental programme. This was to be realised at a specialised facility in the RussianFederation, i.e. the EREC facility located at Electrogorsk near Moscow, which had also been used forearlier bubbler-condenser experimental work. The utilities involved were the Hungarian Paks NPP, theSlovak Bohunice NPP and Mochovce NPP and the Czech Dukovany NPP.
Parallel to the initiative for establishing this consortium, the Hungarian Safety Authority (HAEA)
requested the assistance of the OECD NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) forthe preparatory phase of the experimental work as well as for the analyses of code calculations andexperimental results. The CSNI supported the HAEA request of assistance and approved the establishmentof a Bubbler-Condenser Steering Group (BC SG) to carry out given tasks according to an agreed mandate.
The Steering Group consisted of a representative of each of the Czech, Hungarian and Slovak regulatory
bodies and of each of the utilities involved, as well experts from the German GRS, the French IRSN, the
US DOE and the EU. These organisations had all been involved with previous bubbler-condenser work.
The objectives of the Steering Group were:•to produce convincing evidence that the VVER-440/V213 type bubbler-condenser works during
DBAs as designed•

To help in the planning of the new EREC experiments and in the interpretation of the results•

to provide well qualified experimental results serving as basis for the validation of best estimate
calculation tools.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
In particular, it was considered important that, through the planned EREC experiments and throughadequate code calculations, the SG provided answers to the questions that remained open from theprevious experimental work, and were as follows:
Q1. The scaling of energy discharge rate is important for determining the thermal-hydraulic load oncontainment structure. Can estimates be made on whether the conclusions drawn are conservative ornot, and if they are, on the degree of conservatism?
Q2. Are the conservatism and adequacy of the [EREC] facility properly addressed?
Q3. Unexpected non-uniformity of flow rates and of water temperatures has been observed in earlier
tests. Are these observations relevant and why? Can specific code calculations help in thisassessment?
Another issue to be addressed was the oscillatory loading of the water pool trays by condensation
phenomena. It was hypothesised that these phenomena might be more likely to occur under longer duration
small break LOCA conditions, such as in case of steam line break or small/medium size primary breaks.
The BC SG activities, as well as the experimental work at EREC, were carried out in 2002. The BC SG
held four meetings, one at the end of 2001 and three in 2002, and had extensive inter-meeting
consultations. The major items covered in these meetings are outlined below.
Meeting 1, Paris, December 7, 2001•
Overview of the bubbler condenser issue including former projects•
Formation of the SG, approval of the mandate and of the work-scope•
Overview of the new tests
Meeting 2, Budapest, February 25-26, 2002•
Post-test calculations of the previous experiments and remaining uncertainties•
Status of the related EU projects•
Status of definition of the new experiments
Meeting 3, Bratislava, 29-30 April, 2002•
Status of the preparations to the experiments and status of the facility•
Discussion on the relevance of certain phenomena previously not investigated experimentally•
Proposed content of the BCSG Activity Report
Meeting 4, Prague, 25-26 November 2002•
Review of experimental results and code calculations•
Discussion of the Final Report prepared by the utilities•
Review of the BCSG Activity Report•
Main conclusions and answers to the questions remaining from previous work
The EREC experiments and the related pre- and post-test calculations addressed the following postulated
events:•Main steam-line break (MSLB) of the Paks NPP, modelled by a d=55 mm break at the EREC
facility. Pre- and post-test calculations were co-ordinated by the Paks NPP (calculated by VEIKI,
Budapest). The experimental work was done in June 17-21, 2002.

•

Medium break loss-of-coolant accident (MBLOCA) of the Dukovany NPP Unit 1, loop 1. cold leg(200 mm, modelled by a d=19 mm break at the EREC facility). Pre- and post-test calculations wereco-ordinated by the Dukovany NPP (calculated by NRI, Rez). The experimental work was done in
July 01-05, 2002.

•

Small/medium break loss-of-coolant accident at the Mochovce NPP, in loop 1 with the pressurizer(90 mm, modelled by a d=8,5 mm break at the EREC facility). Pre- and post-test calculations were

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
co-ordinated by the Mochovce and Bochunice NPPs (calculated by VUJE, Trnava). The
experimental work was done in July 15-19.
The conclusions from the three experiments were that:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The test parameters measured by different transducers provide values that are generally consistent
with each other
The discrepancies between the measured and calculated values are not significant and thecalculations are conservative.
The observed differences between the measured and calculated values can be adequately explained
The maximum pressure experienced in the tests is far from the 0.25 MPa design pressure of thecontainment system.
The maximum pressure load on the tray walls measured during the tests, is far less than the 30 kPa
limit value
Water level fluctuations were experienced but were found to be minor and disappeared when thesteam started to flow into the bubbler condenser pool
Within the range of conditions explored in the EREC tests, condensation-oscillation phenomena
were not observed
The sequences investigated in the tests do not cause any significant challenge for the VVER-440/213
type BC and localization system

Based on the experimental and analytical evidences of the newly performed investigations and in-depth
discussions, the OECD Bubbler-condenser Steering Group has concluded with the following answers to
the three open questions mentioned above:
A1. The verification of the blow-down mass and energy rates (MER) producing loads to the BC was
performed in the frame of the present project for both the previous LBLOCA tests and for the recent
tests. Results confirmed conservative mass and energy estimations. It was shown that the injected
MER were higher in the tests than the scaled MER (NPP/100) values. These findings confirmed theconservative nature of the approach. Conclusions were that the related loads do not represent achallenge to containment integrity. A parallel assessment of this issue with respect to LBLOCA tests
is going on in the PHARE project PR/TS/17.
A2. The first part of the question concerning conservatism (initial conditions, scenarios, test conditions,different break locations, etc.) can be answered positively. The adequacy was addressed by the scalingof the facility and possible distortions were compensated by different measures (e.g. installation of
additional insulation).
A3. Non-uniformities of flow rates and water temperatures have been observed in the experiments. An
appropriate understanding of the non-uniformities was obtained by detailed (3D) code calculations.
The reasons and the nature of the distributions have been satisfactorily explained by code calculations.
The activity and conclusions of the Steering Group have been summarised in a BC-SG Activity Report,
which is primarily meant for the Nuclear Regulatory Bodies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovak
Republic. However, it can be of interest also for regulatory bodies in other CSNI member countries. The
draft report was submitted for CSNI approval in December 2002 and is to be published as a CSNI report.

9

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
List of abbreviations
AQG- Atomic Question GroupBC- Bubbler Condenser

BCC- Bubbler Condenser Containment

DBA- Design Basis Accident

ECCS- Emergency Core Cooling Pump

EREC

- Electrogorsk Research end Engineering Centre on Nuclear Plant
SafetyFWLB- Feed Water Line Break

LB- Large Break

LOCA- Loss of Coolant Accident

MB- Medium Size BreakMCP- Main Circulation Pump

MSLB

- Main Steam Line BreakSB- Small BreakTAC- Technical Advisory Committee

11

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)1212

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
1.

Introduction

A number of investigations, including analyses and experiments by the utilities, as well as previous EU
PHARE projects and related OECD NEA Expert Group activities have been performed in order to clarify
the role and capabilities of the VVER-440/V213 type bubbler-condenser (BC) in design basis accidents.
Most of the related important issues have been treated satisfactorily, certain questions, however, haveremained open or needed further assessment.
In order to complete the investigations related to the proper functioning of the bubbler-condenser during
design basis accidents, the Atomic Question Group on Nuclear Safety in the context of enlargement
recommended to the candidate countries operating VVER-440/213 nuclear power plants to “report on
progress [….] concerning measures to complete the regulatory review regarding full verification of theperformance of the containment bubbler condenser system for all design basis accidents”.
As a reaction to that the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA – the nuclear regulatory body in
Hungary) had requested the Hungarian Paks Nuclear Power Plant to have additional experiments
performed. The Czech and Slovak nuclear regulatory bodies have raised similar requests to the utilities
under their authority. As a follow-up on this, the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak utilities formed aconsortium aimed to perform on a joint basis a series of relevant experiments in the Russian EREC
facility. The participants of the consortium financing and evaluating the new experiments were: Paks NPP(Hungary), Jaslovske Bohunice NPP and Mochovce NPP (Slovakia) and Dukovany NPP (Czech
Republic). Parallel to the initiative for establishing this consortium, HAEA requested OECD NEA CSNI
for assistance in advising during the preparatory phase of the experimental work as well as during theanalysis of the experimental and numerical results.
In specific the following three questions were considered important to be answered:
Q1.
The scaling of energy discharge rate is important for determining the thermal-hydraulic load oncontainment structure. Can estimates be made on whether the conclusions drawn are or are notconservative, and if they are, on the degree of conservatism?
Q2.
Are the conservatism and adequacy of the BC facility properly addressed?
Q3.
Unexpected non-uniformity of flow rates and of water temperatures has been observed in earlier
tests. Are these observations relevant and why? Can specific code calculations help in this assessment?
The CSNI supported the HAEA request of assistance for answering these questions and approved theestablishment of a Steering Group (SG) to carry out such task according to the mandate presented in thefollowing.

The objectives of the Steering Group activities have been defined as follows:•

to produce convincing evidence that the V-213 type containment works during DBAs as designed•

to help in the planning of new tests and in the interpretation of the test results•

to ensure well qualified experimental results serving as basis for the validation of best estimate
calculation tools.

During later discussions of the Steering Group it was made clear that producing convincing evidence does
not presume that all aspects will be responded to by the intended tests. The national safety authorities willin any case determine the extent to which the experimental evidence is sufficient for their assessments andconclusions on BC safety.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
The mandate is attached in Appendix 1.
The Steering Group included as members one representative from each of the Czech, Hungarian and
Slovak regulatory bodies and from the utilities involved, representatives of GRS, IRSN, DOE and the EC.
The role of the Steering Group was intended as follows:•

The SG shall review the scope of new tests and make recommendations as to the test set-up andconduct, including, e.g., instrumentation and pre- and post test calculations.

•

The agreed experiments and analyses shall be carried out and reported upon in the SG by the Project
Operating Agent.

•

The SG shall be entitled to receive relevant experimental results and will aim to reach consensus on
their interpretation. The technical conclusions will be intended for the use of national regulators.

The first meeting of the SG was held on December 7, 2001 in Paris and had as items on the
Agenda the following activities:•
overview of the bubbler-condenser issue including former projects•
formation of the SG, acceptance of the mandate and of the work-scope•
overview of the new tests.
During the second meeting, held in Budapest on February 25-26, 2002 the items below were discussed:•
post-test calculations of the previous experiments and remained uncertainties•
status of the related EC projects•
status of the new experiments.
The third meeting was held in Bratislava on 29-30 April, 2002 and included the topics as below:•
status of the preparations to the experiments and status of the facility•
importance and relevance of certain phenomena previously not investigated experimentally•
proposed contents of the SG Activity Report.
The fourth meeting was held in Prague on 25-26 November 2002 and addressed the status of the Final
Report prepared by the utilities on the experimental and analysis results, and discussed certain parts of the
SG Activity Report.
The minutes of the meetings and the SG members are attached in Appendix 2 and 3
Between two consecutive SG meetings in-depth discussions were held via e-mail on the pre-test
calculations and related issues.
The experiments performed by the consortium included:•

Main steam-line break (MSLB) of the Pask NPP, modelled by a d=55 mm break at the EREC
facility. Pre- and post-test calculations, performed by VEIKI, Budapest are provided by the Paks
NPP. The measurements were held on June 17-21, 2002.

•

Medium break loss of coolant accident (MBLOCA) of the Dukovany NPP Unit 1, loop 1, cold leg(200 mm, modelled by a d=19 mm break at the EREC facility). Pre- and post-test calculations
carried out by NRI, Rez are provided by the Dukovany NPP. The measurements were held on July
01-05, 2002.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12•

Small/medium break loss of coolant accident at the Mochovce NPP, in loop 1 with the pressurizer(90 mm, modelled by a d=8,5 mm break at the EREC facility). Pre- and post-test calculations by
VUJE Trnava are provided by the Mochovce and Bochunice NPPs. The measurements were held on
July 15-19, 2002.

The present Project Activity Report summarises the activity and conclusions of the Steering Group, and isprimarily meant for the Nuclear Regulatory Bodies of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovak Republic.
However, it can be of interest also for the regulatory bodies in other CSNI member countries. Further, theBubbler-condenser issue and the way in which the open questions have been handled here can be ofinterest for various institutions in the EU member states.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

16

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)122.

Background2.1

BC description and function

In NPPs with VVER-440/213, the containment system (also called Bubbler Condenser Containment –BCC) consists of the following main parts:•

the hermetic compartment system (2 and 3 in Fig. 2.1) with the primary system coolant loop
components. The system consists of more than 40 compartments and is connected with the bubbler
condenser building (tower) via corridors (7 in Fig. 2.1);•

the bubbler condenser (BC, 8 in Fig. 2.1), which provides the passive pressure suppression;•

the air traps (9 in Fig. 2.1), which in case of accidents holds non-condensable gases transferred fromthe hermetic compartment system through the bubbler condenser, and•active and passive spray systems providing long-term pressure reduction.

The interaction of hermetic compartment system, bubbler condenser and air traps determines the designpressure of the containment system, 245 kPa absolute pressure.
The bubbler condenser is the specific feature of the BCC. It provides reduction of the accident containmentpressure by the expansion of the released steam to a large volume and condensation in water pools. The BC
consists of 12 staggered water trays (pools). Each tray is made of 17 sections, whereas each section
comprise 9 so-called gap-cap systems (see Fig. 2.2). Every three trays are connected to one air trap (seeFig. 2.1). The gap-cap system provides intensive contact between the air-steam mixture and the cold waterin the water pools and thus a highly-effective condensation.
In case of an accident (LOCA, MSLB, FWLB) the air-steam mixture generated inside the hermetic
compartment system will be transferred through the corridors into the BC shaft (1 in Fig. 2.2) and further
on to individual trays. Through the volumes between ceilings and bottoms of the floors the mixture entersabout 1800 gap-cap systems (2 in Fig. 2.2). After the expulsion of water column (vent clearing) in the gapcap systems the mixture bubbles through the water layer where steam condenses, what finally causes a
corresponding reduction of the mixture volume.
Air and other non-condensable gases will be accumulated above water level and due to arising
overpressure be transferred through the check valve DN 500 into the air traps (4 in Fig. 2.2).
The time history of the presented process is governed by the pressure difference arising between BC shaft(1 in Fig. 2.2) and air traps (5 in Fig. 2.2). In case of a LB LOCA the accident is characterised bysignificant dynamic impacts of jet flows on all technological devices, as well as on the structures of
bubbler-condenser and compartment system. Dynamic effects of the steam-air mixture flow at the bubbler
condenser inlet are captured by a special reflexive wall anchored to the bearing structure of BC trays and in
this way to the reinforced concrete building.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Fig. 2.1 Containment system of VVER-440/213

9 - Airtraps

8 - coBu nd
bbl ene ser

6 - Reactorhall

2 - SG

1reactor

7-corridor

cavitydoor

12
6

Reactor Pressure Vessel
Steam Generator Box
Reactor hall

789Corridor
BC unit
Air trap

In the further course of the accident the pressures in gasrooms, i.e. above the water level, and in air traps
equalise while DN500 check valves (4 in Fig. 2.2) automatically close retaining compressed air and othernon-condensable gases in the traps. The flow of hot water and steam from the break continuously decreases
and pressure in the BCC begins to fall due to steam condensation and heat transfer to the walls as well as
due to operation of an active spray system.
Reverse pressure difference, when the pressure above water seal becomes higher than the pressure in the
BC shaft, causes the reverse water flow from trays into the BC shaft. Water flows along the inclined
ceiling of the lower floor to the perforated collectors on the front wall of the lower tray and is sprayed into
the shaft volume. This passive spraying leads to further depressurisation inside the BCC. Spilled waterfrom trays is collected on the BC shaft bottom and due to the inclination of the bottom flows through the18

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
corridor to the SG boxes. There it is accumulated together with water from the break and from the active
spray system in the containment sump. Finally, it is transferred to the suction side of ECCS and spraypumps (recirculation mode).
Accidents with significant smaller coolant release have a similar but longer lasting course on lower
pressure level. In order to prevent an undesirable reverse flow of the tray water, there are two DN250 relief
valves installed in parallel on each tray (6 in Fig. 2.2).

Fig. 2.2 Details of the bubbler-condenser system

12
3BC shaftgap-cap systems
Level of water solution (H3BO3)

4
5
6

Check valve DN500 (2 in series)
Air trap
Lockable relief valve DN250

The valves are fitted with a special blocking system which, depending on BC shaft pressure, automatically
locks or unlocks the valve. The blocking system is set to the value of 165 ± 5 kPa (absolute pressure).
Above this value the valves are locked. Consequently, if during an accident (MB and SB LOCAs) pressurein the shaft does not exceed 165 ± 5 kPa, the valves remain unlocked and, in case of pressure drop in theshaft, allow equalisation of pressures before and behind the water seal - thus water remains in the trays.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
The localisation of the accident is accomplished by active spraying into SG boxes which gradually reduces
pressure in containment up to the minimum allowed value of 80 kPa (absolute) when the spray system is
automatically switched off. A moderate vacuum in sealed area will prevent the release of radioactive
substances. The vacuum is maintained by controlled actuation of active spray systems. A pressure decrease
under the minimum value with possible consequent violation of system tightness is prevented by thedeactivation of active spray systems.
2.2

Short description of the EREC experimental facility BC V-213

The test facility BC V-213 (Fig. 2.3) has been designed and built-up especially for investigating thermalhydraulic and fluid-structure interactions of the BC system under conditions typically expected during
DBAs1. It is located in a separate building and consists of the following main systems and components:•

a simplified room system simulating the hermetic compartment system of the Paks NPP containment
upstream of the BC tower;•a bubbler condenser model consisting of 2x9 original sized gap-cap systems, corresponding sidewalls, bottom and ceiling parts with mechanical properties identical to the Paks Nuclear Power Plant
and a corresponding air space above the bubbler condenser water volume of the trays;•

an air trap connected to the aforementioned air volume by a check valve;•a relief valve to the BC shaft and a spray system providing the simplified room system with spraywater;•

a blowdown system consisting of 5 interconnected pressure vessels, pipe systems and blowdown
nozzles to provide the necessary mass- and energy reservoir to simulate the anticipated DBA
blowdown rates at three different locations inside the compartments;•

the necessary auxiliary equipment including instrumentation and the data acquisition system.

1

The facility was built under the funding of a PHARE project20

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Fig. 2.3 General view of the EREC test facility BC V-213

1
2
3
4

Dead-end volume (V0)
SG box (break node, V1)
SG box (V2)
BC shaft (V3)

5
6
7
8

21

BC module (V4)
Air trap (V5)High pressure vessel system
DN500 check valve

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
Other items characterising the test facility are:•dimensioning of the blowdown nozzle derived on the basis of the scale results of ATHLET
calculations for the anticipated failure conditions of the reference NPP;•

preservation of the mechanical properties of the tray and the gap-cap systems, closely linked to theexisting configuration of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant;•preservation of scale characteristic main volumes and/or flow cross section areas of the prototype
plant with limited modelling of the corridors between the steam generator boxes and the BC shaft;scaling factor 1/100 for the design of the test rig volumes and the necessary mass- and energy reservoirs tosimulate the variety of DBA conditions.
Geometrical data of the test facility BC V-213 are provided in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1. The Dimensions of Test Facility and Paks NPP Compartments
Designation
unit symbol

Paks NPP

Test facility

V0, m3V1, m3V2, m3V3, m3V4, m3V5, m3Vw, m3F01 = F10, m2
F02 = F20, m2
F12 = F21, m2
F13 = F23, m2
F34, m2
F45, m2

4670
7450
7400
6500
6252
17800
1354
5.5
5.5
38.4
34.0
167
2.35

46.53
74.36
73.84
65
61.29
178.20
12.70
0.055
0.055
0.39
0.34
1.67
0.0235

Dimensions of Test
Facility Compartments[m]
1.42x6.5x5.04
10.0x2.86x2.60
10.0x2.84x2.60
6.75x4.0x2.27
3.24x5.50x10.0(6.75x4.0x0.50)-0.5 F34
0.1x0.55
0.1x0.55
0.148x2.6
0.485x0.7(1.855x0.05)x18
diameter - 0.173

V 0 — deadline compartment volume;
V 1 and V 2 — volumes of the right-hand and left-hand side SG boxes respectively;
V 3 — volume of the accident localization shaft space upstream of the water seal:
V 4 — volume above water level in the BC;
V 5 — air traps volume;
V w — water volume in the BC trays;
F 01 , F 02 — cross sections of openings between the deadline compartment and the SG boxes;
F 12 = F 21 — cross section of opening interconnecting the SG boxes;
F 13 = F 23 — cross section of each half of the steam discharge corridor between SG boxes and shaft ofBC;
F 34 — total cross-section area of the cap sections;
F 45 — cross-section area of the check valve.
22

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Specific features of BC V-213
For the correct understanding of the tests results and for the transfer of these results to the real units
specific features of the test facility should be taken into account. These features are: distortion of thevolume-to-surface ratio; modelling of the break location; modelling of two BC sections.
Distortion of the volume-to-surface ratio
The scaling factor during the test facility design and construction was 1:100 concerning the volume, therelevant flow cross section areas and the energy input. Due to this the scaling of the linear and surface
dimensions could not meet this factor. As a consequence of the scaling the test facility has approximately
two times larger structure surfaces than the real containment, whereas the metallic structures of the BC
module are about 35% larger. To make the ratio more similar to that of Paks NPP, most of the concrete
walls of the test facility are insulated with wood. This feature should be taken into account regarding theassessment of heat losses and leads, finally, to a substantial complication in experimental resultsinterpretation. The wooden insulation and the areas of the insulated surfaces are substantiated withcorresponding calculations for the LB LOCA case (limited to 30 s, [2.10]).
Modelling of the break location
In the real unit the break will appear in the primary circuit (or main steam lines). At the test facility thebreak - rupture disk - is located at the end of the relatively long pipe-line. This causes flashing effects
during the blow-down, which became significant specially in tests with relatively low energy input or
steam flow.
Number of sections in the test facility
The 1:100 scaling factor in terms of BC sections was met installing two sections of original sizes instead of
1:100 scaled down 200 elements. It was chosen as appropriate solution under consideration that the mainconcern was the strength behaviour of the thin walled gap-cap systems. As a consequence the two sectionsin the test facility worked in conditions different from the real unit. There, the majority of single sections islocated in the surroundings of other sections (from the point of view of heat losses for example). These
circumstances should be taken into account during the transfer of the tests results to the plant.
A detailed description of the test facility BC V-213 is given in [2.9].

2.3

Previous BC research

A short summary of the BC research history
The early works related to the BC and performed in the former USSR have been summarised in a status
report by OECD NEA CSNI (c.f. [2.0]) and in a number of publications therein. Accordingly the firstexperimental facilities involved a single gap-cap system and a multi gap-cap system, respectively, whichwere meant to confirm the design decisions.
A so called “Reduced BC Model”, including two halves of one gap-cap system of reduced length served to
study condesation efficiency. This was followed by an “Enlarged Experimental Model” to investigate asystem with several gap-cap systems connected to an air-trap simulator.

23

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
The OECD Support Group on "VVER-440 Bubbler Condenser Containment Research Work" (1991-1994)
stated that supplementary research work is needed in various areas such as: dynamic loading of the cap-gap
systems by mass flow induced differential pressure upon occurrence of a LOCA, oscillatory loading of theflat water pool trays by condensation phenomena, water carry-over into the air traps during the impulsive
air transfer period.
Since that the BC research history can be briefly summarised as follows:
1994

EC launched the PHARE project NUC 93428 Bubbler-condenser Qualification Feasibility Study. It
was completed in early 1996 and had the following conclusions:- The structural behaviour of the pressure retaining boundary of the bubbler-condenser needs tobe studied in depth experimentally.
- The thermal-hydraulic behaviour of the bubbler-condenser system needs to be tested on a test
section which could replicate in full size the original configuration of a portion of the BC floor
and which models the relevant adjacent systems. These tests shall generate the maximum loads
to which the pressure retaining boundary can be subjected in case of DBAs.

1996

PHARE project PH2.13/95 “Bubbler-condenser Experimental Qualification” (BSEQ) was
launched. The main objectives of the project were to investigate experimentally and analyticallythe behaviour of the BC during phenomena induced by postulated DBA.

1997

Licensing procedure of the Mochovce NPP, (c.f. [2.1] through [2.8])

1997 September: PH2.13/95 contract was awarded to Siemens-EdF-EA consortium.
December: PH2.13/95 project Kick-off meeting
Main tasks of the PH2.13/95 project:- to design and to erect a test facility, which replicates a portion of a prototypical BC
configuration of the Paks NPP; to perform thermal-hydraulic and fluid-structure interaction
tests on a test prototype configuration which replicates the BC of Paks NPP; to perform pre-test
and post-test analyses with appropriate computer codes.
- to design and to erect a test facility which replicates a portion of a prototypical BC
configuration of the Dukovany and Bohunice NPPs; to perform structural verification tests on
the weaker pressure-retaining steel structure of Dukovany and Bohunice NPPs under
differential pressure which occurs during the first moments of a LOCA; to perform pre-test andpost-test analyses with appropriate computer codes.
- both the above tasks were accompanied by analytical support with established computer codes,
in order to make sure that the test configurations reproduce the NPPs and that the test results are
relevant for the NPPs. In addition, some small-scale separate effect tests were carried out tosupport the large-scale test facilities.
1998

Start of the construction of the EREC facility
February: Kick-off meeting of the TSO project SK/HU/CZ/TS/08 "EU TSO Support to CEEC andCIS Nuclear Regulatory Authorities and their TSOs in the Safety Related Evaluation of the VVER440/213 Bubbler-condenser Experimental Qualification Project";24

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

December: Completion of the TSO project SK/HU/CZ/TS/08; issue of the project final report[2.11].
1999

June: EREC test facility is completed with 7 months delay. September - October: Three tests
performed; Users team and TAC meetings
December: Issue of the final project report [2.12]; in general conclusions of the BCEQ projectstressed that the tests demonstrated the BC functionality and the physical parameters are far below
the values which could create any risk to the BC.

2000

April: 11th OECD Support Group Meeting in Berlin; discussions had evidenced several
contradictory points of view amongst the experts addressing interpretation and extrapolation of theobtained results. The OECD Support Group recommended [2.13]:- to perform further post-test analyses of the results obtained so far (incl. investigations of nonuniformities in temperature and flow velocity distributions observed in the EREC tests);- to use post-test calculation results for the bubbler condenser design qualification, code
validation and modelling improvements;- to perform tests for completion of the EREC test matrix i.e. simulating MSLB, the medium andsmall break LOCA accidents ;- to perform further bubbler condenser investigations for the Kola nuclear power plant.
October: VEIKI performed detailed post test calculations answering questions raised by the OECD
group with regard to the three EREC experiments.

2001 Atomic Question Group (AQG) report on Nuclear Safety in the context of EU enlargement:“Measures to complete the regulatory review regarding full verification of the performance of thecontainment bubbler condenser system for all design basis accident.”
2002 June: Kick-off meeting of the TSO project PR/TS/17 "EU TSO Support to CEEC Nuclear
Regulatory Authorities and their TSOs in the safety related evaluation of the VVER 440/213 Bubblercondenser Experimental Qualification Project".
Main tasks of the project:- Evaluation of EREC Test Facility related investigations performed in the PH 2.13/95 Project;- Evaluation of VUEZ Test Facilities related activities performed in the PH 2.13/95 Project;- Performance of independent post-test calculations; incl. post-test calculations of experiments inthe EREC and VUEZ test facilities, investigation of the possible behaviour of BC during
SBLOCA and MSLB, evaluation of experimental results with respect to the measured space
effects;- Review of the PH 2.13/95 Project final report.
Open questions prior to the BC Trilateral project
The OECD group recommended to perform post-test calculations and to carry out further tests. The
following critical remarks have been raised [2.13]:- Post-test analyses were not completed- Non-uniformities in temperature and flow velocity distributions
25

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12- Differences in values of pressure (dp) between test and calculation- Assessment of conservatism (test facility ↔ real BC)- Further tests are needed to study the oscillation phenomena.
Methodological and technical preconditions set up for the additional tests
Clarification of the blow-down rate problem:
After the 11th Meeting of the OECD Support Group the EREC verified the blow-down rate by means ofadditional ATHLET calculations using measured vessel parameters (P, L). The blow-down rate used in thePH2.13/95 project was confirmed. It became clear that the VTI tube measurement did not give correct
results on the first tenths second due to their inertia [2.14].
A question after the post-test calculation remained pending:
The calculation predicted 50% higher heat-up of water in the BC comparing the test results. To use thecalorimetric method for determination the heat balances transient scenarios "with no water spill back" wasselected.
Some minor changes in the instrumentation (relocation of and adding a few new sensors) were made which
improved the outcome of the test significantly.
2.5 References[2.0]

H. Karwat and H.E. Rosinger: The Status of the Bubbler-condenser Containment System for
the Reactors of the VVER-440/213 Type, OECD NEA Report No. NEA/CSNI/R(98)13,
February 1998.

[2.1]

Eksperimentalnyje i rascotnyje issledovanija processov v barbotaznoj systeme AES s VVER
pri avarii s poterej teplonositelja, VTI, Sojuzglavzagranatomenergo, TOM I, II, 1980 (inRussian)[2.2]

Assessment of the maximum pressure across the bubbler-condenser device, CONT01, NSS/1997/2002, Mochovce NPP, Slovakia, 1997 (restricted)[2.3]

Bubbler-condenser strength assessment on representative load at accident conditions,conclusions for upgrading, CONT01, NDA2/97/0127, Mochovce NPP, Slovakia, 1997
(restricted)[2.4]

Bubbler-condenser strength at LOCA conditions, final load specification and assessment on
upgrade, CONT01, NDA2/97/0242, Mochovce NPP, Slovakia, 1997 (restricted)[2.5]

Results of the thermodynamic analyses for the pressure differences and temperatures using the
CONT04/05 intermediate database, CONT04, NS-S/97/2018, Mochovce NPP, Slovakia, 1997
(restricted)[2.6]

Evaluation of containment compartment members for load capability and final assessment,
CONT04, NDA2/97/0336, Mochovce NPP, Slovakia, 1997 (restricted)[2.7]

Full size test of check valves DN500, CONT05, NT34/96/27, Mochovce NPP, Slovakia, 1997
(restricted)[2.8]

Results of the thermodynamic analyses for the pressure and temperature buildup and reduction
using intermediate database, CONT05, NS-S/97/2029, Slovakia, 1997 (restricted)
26

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12[2.9]

Osokin, G.
Detailed Description of the Thermal-hydraulic Test Facility Project PH 2.13/95: Bubblercondenser Experimental Qualification
Task 2: Thermo-hydraulic and fluid-structure interaction test
Deliverable 2.1, Part 1, Rev. 2
Report N° BC-D-ER-SI-0002
BCEQ Project PH 2.13/95, July 1998

[2.10]

Melikhov, O.
Thermal Insulation in the Boxes of the Test Facility
Report N° BC-D-ER-SI-0010, Rev. 2
BCEQ Project PH 2.13/95, June 1999

[2.11]

Wolff, H.; Sweet, D.
EU TSO Support to CEEC and CIS Nuclear Regulatory Authorities and their TSOs in the
Safety Related Evaluation of the VVER-440/213 Bubbler-condenser Experimental
Qualification Project
Final Report, Volumes 1 and 2
RISKAUDIT Report N° 228, December 1998

[2.12]

Kühlwein, K.; Hoffmann, D.; Orden, A.; Peturaud, P
Final Project Report, Rep.-Nr. BC-D-SI-EC-0535, Revision 0
Bubbler-condenser Experimental Qualification Project No. PH 2.13/95
Deliverable 5, December 1999

[2.13]

Karwat, H.; Wolff, H.
Bubbler Condenser Related Research Work - Present Situation
NEA/CSNI/R(2001)3, September 2000

[2.14]

Post test analysis of coolant discharge under LBLOCA modeling on the test facility BC V-213
with ATLETH code
EREC, April 2002

27

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)1228

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)123

Analyses

3.1

VEIKI post-test calculations of the BCEQ tests

The objective of the work was the resolution of open issues of the PHARE/TACIS Project PH 2.13/95“Bubbler Condenser Experimental Qualification (BCEQ)” with more detailed post-test analysis. The
calculations were performed with the CONTAIN code utilizing detailed nodalisation and with the
GASFLOW 3D computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code. The most important conclusions of the work
are summarized below.
Flow patterns and material distributions in the experimental facility
GASFLOW simulations provide flow velocity fields and material distributions in much greater detailcompared to lumped parameter code modeling. 3D analysis was applied to thermal-hydraulic transientphenomena in the experimental facility.
Analyses predicted a rather complex flow pattern around the bubbler condenser. The fluid flow leaving theboxes and passing through the connecting channel goes around the BC facility at both sides. The stream
then enters the volume below the BC trays in different paths: one part passes through the holes of the Ibeams, another part turns around at the rear end of the facility. A relatively small part of the stream entersthe facility from the front side. The reason is that the front flow is impacted and redirected by the BC
pedestal and front gridplate.
According to the 3D calculations, early phase gas flows are directed in opposite directions at two sides of
the connecting channel (Fig. 3.1, Fig. 3.2). This flow pattern was confirmed by measurements, too.
GASFLOW simulations facilitated the development of detailed nodalisation for the CONTAIN code (Figs
3.3 and 3.4). Detailed CONTAIN analyses concerning velocities and mass fluxes are basically inagreement with the 3D calculation. Mass flow, concentration and temperature distributions in the BC wereobtained with detailed modeling of the volumes around and within the bubbler condenser.
Pressure load on the BC wall
Measurement and calculation results concerning the pressure difference load on the BC wall deviated to
substantial extent: calculated values (26 kPa) exceeded the measured loads (19.8 kPa) more, than to 25 %.
First calculations performed with detailed nodalisation within the present study reproduced basically thesame results.
Elastic compression of the BC walls – and a corresponding internal pressure rise – was a suspected reasonof this controversy. Therefore, a specific input was developed for the CONTAIN code to model the volume
shrink due to the deformation of the BC membrane walls. Volume compression was determined fromlinear displacement measurements located at different walls (bottom, top, side) indicating displacements up
to 15-22 mm.

29

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Fig. 3.1 - Flow through theconnecting channel(top view fragment)

Fig. 3.2 - Flow between the boxes, theconn. channel and the dead volume(top view)

Sensitivity analyses indicated that pressure differences calculated with assumption of the BC volume
compression were close to the test results within measurement error bounds (Fig. 3.5). The pressure load
issue therefore can be resolved by the BC volume compression effect, and the discrepancy between
measurement and calculation results can be explained.
Temperature distribution in the BC trays
Test results indicated the existence of a temperature distribution along the bubbler condenser (Fig. 3.7).
Temperature values were higher at the front and the rear trays, while lower values were obtained for the
middle tray rows. CONTAIN calculations with a subdivided bubbler condenser model predicted the sametendency of temperature distribution (Fig. 3.6). However, the calculated differences between maximum
and minimum values were smaller than the measured temperature differences. The phenomenon is caused
by non-homogeneous steam mass flows to individual tray rows as a result of flow distributions. Smaller
water pool masses existing at the front and rear trays also contribute to this effect.

30

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
The energy balance issue remained unresolved. The calculations for all the three tests predicted muchhigher heating of the BC water, than the average heating derived from the temperature measurements.

06/%

/%/2&$

YHV VHOYHV VHO

'1
I ORZ  PHWHUV

18, 15,
4,
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

Fig. 3.3 - The EREC Test Facility and its nodalisation concept

1
4

19

5

12

6 1 7 8

2

9

3

10

24 13

18 15

25

26 4

27

28

16

17

11 20

29

30 21

31

32 22

23

Fig. 3.4 - Detailed nodalisation of the EREC Test Facility for the CONTAIN code31

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12





D
3


H
F
Q
H
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33'

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













7LPHV

Fig. 3.5 - CONTAIN code calculation with assumption of the BC compression. (Test No. 5)

32

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12








.
 
H
U
X
W
D
U
H
S

V
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
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7

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






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







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

1XPEHURIWUD\URZV

Fig. 3.6 - Calculated water temperature distribution along the BC at different times. CONTAIN
code calculation.

33

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Fig. 3.7 - Measured water temperature heat-up distribution along the BC length at 40 s.

BC air volume temperature and air trap temperature
Earlier BCEQ post-test analyses indicated much higher values than test measurements for BC air volume
and air trap temperatures. The CONTAIN code originally did not model any water entrainment from thepool to the atmosphere region. At the same time, video records of the tests confirmed the existence of very
intense two-phase flows in the BC. Therefore, a simplified entrainment model was added to the CONTAIN
code to take into account the effect.
Sensitivity calculations confirmed that discrepancies between calculated and measured temperature values
can be attributed to water entrainment phenomena (Fig. 3.6). Temperatures calculated with this model wereclose to the test values, and inexplicable temperature peaks in the previous BCEQ calculations did notappear any more.

34

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12






7

.

H
U
X
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S

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7

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







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

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7LPHV

Fig. 3.8 - CONTAIN code calculation vs. BCEQ Test No. 5 results.
Temperature of the BC air volume
3.2

Calculations of MB and SBLOCAIn the frame of the OECD Support Group on Bubbler-condenser Containment Research Work and of theOECD Bubbler-condenser Steering Group the issue of possible consequences of MB and SBLOCA on
processes ongoing in the BC system of NPP with VVER-440/213 was discussed thoroughly. From former
BWR related experiments it is known that in case of LOCA with low mass flows with a high steam content
injected into a cold water pool the BWR suppression system is likely to run into condensation oscillations,which may endanger the construction. As the working principle of VVER Bubbler-condensers is the sameas in BWR pressure suppression systems the issue has also to be assessed.
In order to get a better insight into the processes during MB and SBLOCA at VVER a set of calculations
was performed by VEIKI and GRS. CONTAIN calculations were performed by VEIKI for the Paks NPP
containment in the Phare/Tacis Project PH 2.13/95 “Bubbler Condenser Experimental Qualification” forLOCAs DN73 and DN46 [3.1]. The RALOC code has been applied by GRS for the investigation of the
response of a typical VVER-440/213 containment in the frame of a project sponsored by the German BMU(Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety) for anticipated LOCA
DN40 and DN10 [3.2].
3.4

References[3.1] Taubner R.: Simulation of MBLOCA and SBLOCA accidents on Paks NPP configuration. Bubbler
Condenser Experimental Qualification Project PH 2.13/95,
VEIKI Report BC-D-OT-SV-3004, 1999
[3.2] Wolff, H., S. Arndt
RALOC4 analysis of postulated LOCAs DN10 and DN40 in NPP with
WWER-440/W-213
Technical Note, TN-WFF-1/02, GRS Berlin, October 2002
35

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)1236

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

4.

Experimental approach

4.1

Motivation and objectives for the tests

The concerned nuclear plants decided in 2001 to perform additional to Phare project tests at the EREC
facility to close the open issues and answer remaininig questions (eg oscillation phenomena). Althoughpart of the open questions were answered by that time by VEIKI post test calculations, it was decided to go
ahead with the test to dispel any doubt concerning the safety function of the BC in case of DBAs.
Additional goal was to get extra experimental data for the code verification and validation.
Knowing the results from the tests performed in 1999 it deemed unnecessary to go on with the previous
test matrix. That matrix was set up during the design and construction of the test facility and covered large
variety of the possible transients and loads to the BC. After several rounds of discussions it was decided toperform a main steam line break test and two medium break LOCA transients. Definition of the size of
LOCA was influenced by the existing transient calculations and by the judgement of the test facility
limitation concerning modeling very small breaks. Finally the 200 and 90 mm break sizes were selected.
During the consideration of break sizes as an important aspect was taken into count to avoid the water spillback from the bubble trays providing better conditions for the calorimetric assessment of heat losses.
4.2

Analytical and experimental approach

Characteristics of the planned tests:
MSLB (Main Steam Line Break simulation) under conditions proposed originally in the PHARE Project(BC water level 500 mm, duration 1800 sec, simulated break location - as close as possible to Bubbler
Condenser).
MBLOCA (Medium Break LOCA 200 mm simulation) the size of the simulated break was proposed to
be 200 mm, in order to prevent total water discharge from tray (BC water level 500 mm, duration 1800 sec,
simulated location of break - as close as possible to BC).
SBLOCA (Small Break LOCA - according to EREC equipment possibility scenario was changed via
Medium Break LOCA 90 mm simulation). The necessary time for accident simulation was determinedbased on the pre-test calculations (BC water level 500 mm, duration 3600 sec, simulated break location medium distance from the Bubbler Condenser), due to smaller flow rates condensation effects in BC are ofinterest.
The detailed specific test conditions were based on consultations with the national research institutes andon discussions within the SG.

37

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
Scope of the analytical works performed
Pre-test calculations
A.

Plant blow-down and containment calculations for the representative scenario

These calculations were performed to have a basis for preparation of test scenario and for comparison with
the EREC pre test blow-down proposal.
B.

EREC TF blow-down

For the EREC facility the blow down calculations of each specific case were performed with ATHLET
code to define the blow down rates and enthalpy in order to define and agree initial and boundary
conditions of each test to be convenient as possible to NPP scenario. When it was necessary, several
iteration steps were made to achieve the best results.
C.

Plant containment calculations

These calculations prior to the tests (also with proposed EREC data) were done to have a basis forcomparison and possible requirements to EREC to modify test conditions in order to keep
representativeness and/or conservatism of the tests being prepared. Wide discussion was concentrated
especially to MSLB test preparation, where several proposals have been treated to reach a technicalconsensus.
D.

EREC TF containment calculations

It was appropriate to perform these calculations prior to the tests, in order to be ready for the discrepancies
caused by the modeling.
Responsible organizations and codes used in pre-test phase

TransientA
Blow-down,
plant

MSLB

VEIKI/APROSSBLOCA

VUJE/
RELAP

MBLOCA

NRI/
RELAP

B
Blowdown,
EREC TF
EREC/
ATHLETVEIKI
EREC/
ATHLETVUJEEREC/ATHLET
NRIC
Containment
plant

DContainment
EREC TF

VEIKI/ CONTAIN
NRI/ COCOSYS
VUJE/ TRACOVEIKI/ CONTAIN
NRI/ COCOSYS
VUJE/ TRACOVEIKI/ CONTAIN
NRI/ COCOSYS
VUJE/ TRACOVEIKI/ CONTAIN
NRI/ COCOSYS
VUJE/ TRACOVEIKI/ CONTAIN
NRI/ COCOSYS
VUJE/ TRACOVEIKI/ CONTAIN
NRI/ COCOSYS
VUJE/ TRACO

Post-test calculations
The goal was to perform additional validation of containment codes and provide both industry andregulators with well-validated codes serving as best estimate calculation tools for any type of DBAs
involving BC functioning. Results of post test calculations were summarized in 3x3 reports on transients38

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
which give a unique possibility to assess the capability of applied codes. This work – consequence of
which goes well beyond the present trilateral project – can be valued as a benchmarking practice.
Responsible organizations and codes used in post-test calculations

TransientMSLB
SBLOCA
MBLOCAA
Blow-downcorrected – basedon measured data
EREC/ATHLET+ VEIKI + NRI +VUJEBEREC TF
ContainmentC
EREC TF
Containment

D
EREC TF
Containment

VEIKI/CONTAINNRI/COCOSYSNRI/COCOSYSVUJE/TRACONRI/COCOSYSVUJE/TRACOVEIKI/CONTAINVEIKI/CONTAIN

The diagram of the methodology is in the figure below.

39

VUJE/TRACONEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

EDU

EREC
BOW-DOWNFOR SCENARIARELAP / COCOSYS

ATHLET

EBO EMORELAP / TRACOPAKSEREC TF

APROS / CONTAIN

EXPERIMENTS
MEASUREMENTS

EDU / COCOSYS
ATHLET - TF BLOW-DOWN CORECTED
EBO, EMO / TRACOPAKS / CONTAIN.

BC and CONTAINMENT CODESCONTAINMENT RESULTS CORECTEDCONTAINENT AC FULFILMENTQUALIFICATION
40

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

4.3

Justification for the choice of scenario

During the discussion of tests scenarios two main questions were considered: Should a small break
LOCA test be performed and what sizes of the small break would have. The utilities and their support
organizations expressed concerns regarding the added value of the small break test at the test facility.
Due to the specificity of the test facility mentioned in Chapter 2 there were doubts that SBLOCAs willproduce any effects to the bubbler-condenser.
The results of the performed tests justified the expert’s concern: In the case of the 90 mm LOCA the
maximum of dp on the trays was 5 kPa, which demonstrated that the inflow of the air-steam mixture
was ongoing without dynamic effects. In case of smaller breaks this value of dp would not have beenreached or just for a short interval of time.
4.4

Test description and conduct

Tests were performed in June and July of 2002. The EREC staff prepared the test facility (TF)
according to the agreement reached during the iteration process of pre-test analyses. The type andnumber of necessary measurement devices were agreed during the preparation.
Operation manual for the test preparation and the execution was compiled and handed over to theutility representatives. Representatives from the involved plants and their support organizations
participated at the final checks of TF prior the test and during the test performance.
Prior each test a zero-stage printout was made about the measured values to document the initialconditions and the possible deterioration in the measuring channels. Test data were recorded on the TF
computer with 10 Hz sampling speed. Tests were recorded on video as in the case of previous Phareproject tests.
4.5

Results

The most important data from the tests – including tests from 1999 – are shown in Table 4.1. Columns
contain the measured and the calculated values as well. The CONTAIN calculation results have been
selected here because these data are available from the previous post test calculation.
The new tests have not revealed any problems concerning the BC function.
During tests no oscillation effects were observed.
Table 4.1. Values of the main parameters (measured/calculated by CONTAIN)
Test

Break

P1max [kPa] T1max [0C]

location

P5 max

dPmax

dTwa

[kPa]

[kPa]

[0C]

LBLOCA N5

F

276/286

130/132

208/216

19.17/17.62

15/29

LBLOCA N4

C

251/248

127/127202/20215.84/18.25

15/28

LBLOCA N1

M

209/225

121/124

19/19611.16/11.09

13/19

MSLB

C

152/160

112/172

150/152

7.1/8.8

5/12

200 mm LOCA

C

145/156

104/112145/149

5.7/6.95/10

90 mm LOCA

M

136/142102/108

137/137

4.8/5.2

5/17

Legend:P1,T1 – pressure and temperature in the break compartment
P5 – pressure in the airtrapdP– pressure load on the tray
dTwa – average value of the heat-up of the tray water
F,C,M – location of the break: far, close and middle

41

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

The discrepancy between the measured and calculated maximum atmosphere temperatures in the
MSLB test is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
Systematic discrepancies remained between measured and calculated values of the BC water heat-up
caused most likely by the differences between the actual and the modeled heat losses from the trays.
4.6

References[4.1]

Post test calculations of tests on EREC TF, VEIKI, 2002 November[4.2]

Post test calculations of tests on EREC TF, VUJE, 2002 November[4.3]

Post test calculations of tests on EREC TF, UJV REZ, 2002 November

42NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

5.

INTERPRETATION OF THE RESULTS

The following discussion is based on the comparison of the test results with the post-test calculation
results. Three codes have been used in the analyses: CONTAIN (VEIKI) [5.1], COCOSYS (NRI) [5.2]
and TRACO (VUJE) [5.3]. The codes provided generally similar, but obviously not identical results
for most parameters. The aim of this chapter is the interpretation of the results, not code comparison,
therefore the discussion will be based on CONTAIN data, unless specifically indicated. However, thediagrams of parameter histories include plots of COCOSYS and TRACO results as well.
Measurement error bands are shown in the plots of test measurements. For the sake of clarity, the error
bands are listed here as follows:•

Error of pressure measurements: +/- 6 kPa•

Error of pressure difference measurements: +/- 1 kPa•

Error of temperature measurements: +/- 0.5 oC

5.1

Main Steam Line Break - MSLB

Blow-down history
The difference between the mass flow rate of pre- and post-test ATHLET calculations is quite large inthe first few seconds. After 8 seconds both curves are very similar. The discrepancy between theinjected mass curves is about 10% at 1800 s.
The pre-test and post-test enthalpy versus time curves calculated by EREC using ATHLET code arevery similar from 5 seconds. The calculated enthalpy curve from the measured values shows a very
good agreement with the ATHLET calculation until 50 s. Then the difference becomes about 100-200
kJ/kg.
Pressure history
Pressure in the break compartment (Fig. 5.2).
The shape of the calculated pressure curve by CONTAIN code is similar to the measured one. The
discrepancy between the measured and calculated overpressure values in the highest degree is about
20% all the while.
CONTAIN gives conservative evaluation, the maximum pressure is about 10 kPa higher, and apressure decrease is minor between 150 and 300 s than the measured one. From 400 s CONTAIN
predicts well the pressure decrease due to the steam condensation on spray droplets and on walls.
Pressure in other compartments.
Similar trends can be observed in these cells. CONTAIN slightly overestimates the maximum
pressure.

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Temperature history
Temperature in the break compartment (Fig. 5.1).
Water droplets fall out from the gas volume or evaporate at the very start, therefore CONTAIN
predicts that the maximum temperature of the gas volume is nearly the same as the temperature of inlet
steam (around 200 oC). Due to the effect of heat loss and the injected water droplets (spray system) thetemperature decreases and converges to the measured values. There is a discrepancy between thecalculated and measured values, which amount in the maximum value to about 70 oC and to less than
20 oC after 10 minutes.
The reason of this deviation is that the non-equilibrium CONTAIN model predicts superheated state in
the break compartment with water droplets depleted from the break compartment gas volume. Similar
trend was obtained with COCOSYS, while the TRACO code reproduced the trend very well. In caseof CONTAIN the sensitivity studies proved that artificial droplet retention in the break volume would
eliminate the discrepancy between the code predictions and test results.
Temperature in other cells
The difference between the predicted and the measured temperatures is generally less than 10 - 15 oC.
Mostly the calculated value is between the two measured temperatures.
Pressure difference on the tray structure
Figs 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 show the measured and calculated pressure differences in different time frames.
CONTAIN calculates only the opening of the water seal, then the inertial effect of the water is notmodelled. The calculated maximum pressure load is 8.8 kPa versus the measured 4.8 kPa,
overestimated by CONTAIN, the conservatism of the code is about 4 kPa. The measured pressureload fluctuation, which is not calculated, has a maximal amplitude of 4 kPa. This oscillation lasts
about 5 s.
The steam-air mixture flows through the water seal while the pressure load is higher than thehydrostatic pressure of the water on the tray. The duration of this period is about 54 s, CONTAIN
predicts quite well this value (50 s).
Water conditions on the trays
Water level on the tray
CONTAIN calculates a nearly constant water level, about 0.49 m, because the condensed steam masschanges the water level negligibly and the code does not calculate the pool swelling. According to themeasurement the water level behaves in a different manner. After the water lock opens, there is astrong fluctuation between 0.1 and 1 m, then the water level becomes 0.53-0.58 m. From about 60 s
until 150 s the water level sinks under 0.45 m.
It was assumed that part of the water spills back from the trays because the check valve suspected to
be closed or partly closed during that time.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
In the CONTAIN calculation the suspected operation of the valve was not modelled, therefore the spillof the water could not be predicted.
Water temperature on the trays
The calculated water temperature (Fig. 5.6) is in the range of the average measured temperatures until
150 seconds. This time interval includes "the gas flow through the pool" period. From 150 s, when theheat transfer through the bubbler condenser walls, (temperature in shaft, cell 3) determines the watertemperature, the code overestimates the water temperature. The calculated water temperature gradientdeviates from the measured one from 150 seconds.
In the first 150 s CONTAIN predicts well the water heat up due to flow through the pool.
Flows between cells
Flow between box and shaft.
In the first 20s the velocity measurement and the calculated inter-cell flow pattern agree, and thevalues are similar. The maximum velocity (in the corridor between cell 1 and cell 3) is about 35 m/s
for both measured and calculated cases. The timing of this maximum occurs at around 1 s. From 100 still 1800 s, the CONTAIN predicting velocity is about 2-3 m/s in this corridor, but the flow meters forvelocity in both corridors start and stop in this time span. It seems that this velocity is too small tomeasure it.
Flow through the check valves
Flow-meters were not installed to measure the velocity through the check valves. CONTAIN predicts
flow between 4th (bubbler condenser) cell and 5th (air trap) from about 0.7 s until about 100 s. The
maximum calculated velocity exceeds 100 ms. The relief valve between shaft and bubbler condenser(DN 250 valve) opens a few seconds after the other check valve locks. The predicted maximum mass
flow through the DN 250 valve is 0.18 kg/s, it corresponds to about 5 m/s through the valve.
Conclusions•

Test parameters measured by different transducers provide values that are generally inagreement within the error bounds•

Most discrepancies between the measured and calculated values are not significant and thecharacter of the predictions is conservative•

A few observed differences between the measured and calculated values can be explained

Challenge for the real nuclear power plant:•

Maximum pressure (0,151 MPa) is far from the design pressure (0.25 MPa)•

Maximum pressure load on the tray walls is 7 kPa, far less than the 30 kPa limit value•

The water level fluctuation disappears when steam starts to flow into the bubbler condenser
pool•

Condensation-oscillations were not found. There was a water level fluctuation with a period of
about 1 s at the very beginning, but it disappeared when steam started to flow into the bubbler
pool. The reason of the fluctuation is the dynamic motion of the water seal. The amplitude of
the fluctuation due to air flow is 3-5 kPa in the first 5 s.

•

The main steam line break sequence investigated does not cause any significant challenge for
the VVER-440/213 type BC and localization system

48

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

5.2

Medium Break LOCA (200 mm) - MBLOCA

Blowdown history
The difference between the mass flow rate of pre- and post-test ATHLET calculations is negligible in
the first 100 seconds. Between 100 and 150 seconds the two curves are parallel but there is adifference of about 40% in the mass flowrate. After 300 seconds the pre- and post-test ATHLET mass
flowrate calculations are identical.
The pre-test and post-test enthalpy versus time curves calculated by EREC using ATHLET code are
fairly similar.
Pressure history
Pressure in the break compartment (Fig. 5.8)
The shape of the calculated pressure curve by CONTAIN code is similar to the measured one after 200
s. The gradients of the measured and calculated pressure curves are different in the first 10 seconds.
Between 10 and 60 seconds the shape of the curves is similar. There is a discrepancy in the maximum
pressure, it is about 20%. The calculated pressure is nearly constant between 60 and 150s while themeasured value increases until 125s, then decreases. From 270 s the deviation between the measured
and calculated values is less than 5 %.
CONTAIN gives conservative evaluation, the maximum pressure is about 0.1 bar higher, than themeasured maximum. From 300 s CONTAIN predicts well the pressure decrease due to the steam
condensation on spray droplets and on walls
Pressure in other compartments
Similar trends can be observed in the other cells, CONTAIN slightly overestimates the maximum
pressures.
Temperature history
Temperature in the break compartment (Fig. 5.7)
In the first 600 seconds the T.10.01 thermometer indicates higher temperature (sometimes thedifference is 10 oC) than the value of T.10.03. CONTAIN predicts higher temperatures, but the
maximum difference between T.10.01 and the calculated values is about 10 oC. Between 300 and 400
seconds the CONTAIN results are equal to T.10.01 readings.

49

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Temperature in other cells
The difference between the measured values (T40.01, T40.02) and the measured and calculated values
is generally less than 10 oC, with a maximum of 20 oC for some limited time periods.
Pressure difference on the tray structure
Figs 5.10, 5.11 and 5.12 show the measured and calculated pressure differences in different timeframes.
The maximum pressure load is 6.5 kPa, overestimated by CONTAIN, the conservatism of the code isabout 1.5 kPa. The pressure load fluctuation, which is not calculated, has a maximal amplitude of 1
kPa. The oscillation lasts about 3 s.
The steam-air mixture flows through the water on the trays while the pressure load is higher than thehydrostatic pressure of the water on the tray. The measured duration of this period is about 124 s,
while CONTAIN predicts this interval for 153 s.
Water conditions on the trays
Water level on the tray
CONTAIN calculates a nearly constant water level, about 0.49 m, because the condensed steam mass
adds to the water level negligibly and the code does not calculate the pool swelling. CONTAIN
predicts the average water level on the trays. According to the measurement the water level behaves indifferent manner. After the water lock opens, there is a fluctuation between 0.4 and 0.7 m, then thewater level becomes 0.53-0.56 m (because the water from the gap is added to the water on the trays).
From about 124 s until 160 s the water level sinks to 0.5 m (the initial level).
Water temperature on the trays (Fig. 5.9)
The calculated water temperature ranges with the average measured temperatures until 260 seconds.
This time interval includes "the gas flow through the pool" period. In the first 260 s CONTAIN
predicts well the water heat up due to flow through the pool. The discrepancy between the measured
and calculated average value is 3 oC. The code overestimates the water temperature from 260 seconds.
Flows between cells
Flow between box and shaft
In the first second the flow from break compartment to the shaft is predicted very well. The calculated
velocity is between the two measured ones in the first 20s. The maximum velocity is about 25-35 m/s
at around 1 s.
The flow from the other box half to the shaft is underestimated until 10 s. From 10 s the velocity
measurement and CONTAIN calculated inter-cell flow pattern agrees and the values are roughly
similar.
From 150 seconds the predicted velocity and measured velocity are in the same range, they are
between 0-3 m/s.

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The mass flow rates measured by different flow meters differ from each other, and from the calculated
mass flow rate.
Flow through the check valves
Flow-meters were not installed to measure the velocity through the check valves. CONTAIN predicts
flow between 4th (bubbler condenser) cell and 5th (air trap) from about 1.2 s until about 165 s. The
maximum calculated velocity is about 85 m/s (2.5kg/s). The check valve between shaft and bubbler
condenser (ND 250 valve) opens when the other check valve locks. The predicted maximum mass
flow through the ND 250 valve is 0.18 kg/s, it corresponds to about 5 m/s through the valve.
Conclusions•

Test parameters measured by different transducers provide values that are generally inagreement within the error bounds.

•

There were some minor problems as a few wrong thermocouples.

•

The discrepancies between the measured and calculated values are not significant and thecharacter of these predictions is conservative.

•

The differences between the measured and calculated values can be explained.

Challenge for the real nuclear power plant:•

Maximum pressure (0.145 MPa) is far from the design pressure (0.25 MPa).

•

Maximum pressure load on the tray walls (5.75 kPa) is far less than the 30 kPa limit value.

•

The water level fluctuation is minor (a few milimeters) the pressure difference oscillation issmaller than 1 kPa.

•

Condensation-oscillation did not appear during the test. The main reason of the pressure
fluctuation is the dynamic motion of the water seal in the first 3 seconds.

•

The medium break loss of coolant accident does not cause any significant challenge for the
VVER-440/213 type containment and localisation system.

5.3

Small Break LOCA (90 mm) - SBLOCA

Blowdown history
The difference between the mass flow rate of pre- and post-test ATHLET calculations is minor. The
largest discrepancy between the injected mass curves can be found at 600 s, it is about 2 kg/s. At 1300
seconds the total injected mass is 2000 kg in both cases. From this time the pre and post test mass flow
calculations are identical.
The pre-test and post-test enthalpy versus time curves calculated by EREC using ATHLET code arevery similar. The integrated energy difference becomes about 50 MJ (1.5%) at the end of thecalculation.

Pressure history
Pressure in the break compartment (Fig. 5.14)
The calculated pressure gradient is increasing faster than the measured one in the first 100 s, then thecalculated curve is enveloping the measured pressures from above.

54

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
The shape of the calculated pressure curve by CONTAIN code is similar to the measured one. The
slope of the calculated pressure curve after the maximum value is similar to the measured one.
Between 600 and 1500 s the shape of the calculated and measured curves is similar.
CONTAIN gives conservative evaluation, the maximum pressure is about 6 kPa higher than measured,and a pressure decrease is minor. It seems that the calculated heat loss is less than in reality.
Pressure in other compartments
Similar trends can be observed in other cells. CONTAIN slightly overestimates the maximum
pressures and the calculated values are above the measured ones. The maximums of the discrepancies
are about 0.1 bar, but the most part of the calculation time span the calculated values are inside of thegiven error limit of the measurements.
Temperature history
Temperature in the break compartment (Fig. 5.13)
During the whole test CONTAIN overestimates the temperature. The discrepancy is in the range of 1
to 7 oC. Calculated temperature shows the same trend as the predicted pressure. This overestimation
may be caused by the heat transfer calculation between the atmosphere and walls. The accuracy of the
CONTAIN calculation is 10%, assuming that the measurement is exact.
Temperature in other cells
The difference between the predicted temperature and the measured one is generally less than 10 oC
with a maximum of 20 oC.
Pressure difference on the tray structure
Figs 5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 show the measured and calculated pressure differences in different timeframes.
In this sequence the maximum pressure load equals to nearly the height of the water column on the
tray. The inertial effect of the water is not too important in the SBLOCA case. The measured
maximum pressure load is less than 5 kPa, but CONTAIN overestimates this value by 10%. During
the time period when the flow through the water seal occurs (from 2.5 s till 490 s), a certain pressure
difference oscillation could be observed. The maximum amplitude of this measured oscillation isabout 1 kPa and the period of it is between 10 - 30 s. This oscillation is very slow, therefore it cannot
be caused by condensation. The most probable reason for this oscillation is the opening and closing of
the water seal.

55

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Water conditions on the trays
Water level on the tray
CONTAIN calculates a nearly constant water level, about 0.49 m, because the condensed steam masschanges the water level negligibly and the code does not calculate the pool swelling. According to themeasurement the water level behaves in different manner. After the water lock opens, there is a fluctuation
between 0.46 and 0.58 m, then the water level becomes 0.52-0.56 m. From about 440 s until 490 s thewater level sinks to the initial level. CONTAIN predicts the water level behaviour with its modelling
limitation.
The water level oscillation is small, its amplitude is not more than 2-3 cm and the period of it changes quite
irregularly from 10 s till 30 s. Any kind of condensation oscillation was not found.
Water temperature on the trays (Fig. 5.18)
The calculated water temperature is in the range of the average measured temperatures until 200 seconds.
This time interval includes "the gas flow through the pool" period. From 200 s the heat transfer through the
bubbler condenser walls, (temperature in shaft − cell 3) determines the water temperature. The code
overestimates the water temperature, the calculated water temperature gradient diverge from the measured
one from 200 seconds. At the end of the test (3600 s) the difference between the average water temperatureand calculated one is 10 oC. The heat transfer between the shaft gas volume and the water pool through asteel structure is overestimated by CONTAIN.
Flows between cells
Flow between box and shaft
During the test CONTAIN predicts quite well the flow direction and gas velocity between the breakcompartment and the shaft. In the first 3s and after 480 s the calculated and measured flow direction in thevent between the other box-half and shaft is opposite. From 10 s till 480 s, the code predicts suitably thevelocity between volume 2 and 3. After 800 seconds the calculated velocity is about 1 m/s, while themeasured value is 0 m/s.
Flow through the check valves
Flow-meters were not installed to measure the velocity through the check valves. CONTAIN predicts flow
between 4th (bubbler condenser) cell and 5th (air trap) from 3 s until 527 s. The maximum calculated mass
flow rate is 1 kg/s (mass velocity: 42.6 kg/m2-s). The check valve between shaft and bubbler condenser(ND 250 valve) opens a few seconds after the other check valve locks. The predicted maximum mass flow
through the ND 250 valve is 0.06 kg/s (which corresponds to about 1.2 kg/m2.s mass velocity).

59

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
Conclusions•

Test parameters measured by different transducers provide values that are generally in agreement
within the error bounds•

The discrepancies between the calculated and measured values are not significant and the characterof these predictions is conservative

Challenge for the real nuclear power plant:•

Maximum pressure (0.137 MPa) is far from the design pressure (0.25 MPa)•

Pressure load on the trays is negligible, less than 5 kPa•

Condensation-oscillation was not found. At the beginning there was a water level fluctuation, but it
disappeared when steam started to flow into the bubbler pool. At a later stage the reason of thisfluctuation is the opening and closing of the water seal. The amplitude of the fluctuation is about 1
kPa and the period is between 10 and 30 s.

•

The small break LOCA accident does not cause any challenge for the VVER-440/213 typecontainment and localisation system

5.4

References[5.1] K.K. Murata et. al.: “User’s Manual for CONTAIN 1.1, A Computer Code for Severe Nuclear
Reactor Accident Containment Analysis”, Revised for Revision 1.11 NUREG/CR-5026, SAND873209, Revised July 1990.
[5.2] W. Klein-Hessling, S. Arndt, M. Heitsch: COCOSYS V1.2 User Manual, GRS, July 2000.
[5.3] User’s Manual of the TRACO5/MOD1 Code, VUJE Nr. 151/89, December 1989.

60

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

6.

Conclusions

Conclusions of the experimental work are twofold. On one hand certain general conclusions of technicalmerit follow from the experimental results that pertain to the safety and functionality of the VVER440/213 Bubbler-condenser. On the other hand the Steering Group has drawn conclusions that answer thequestions that remained open in the previous projects and were meant to be answered on the basis of thetrilateral experiments.
6.1 General conclusions drawn from the experiments
The three experiments described in the previous parts allow to conclude in general in certain points. As asummary of the conclusions given in Chapter 5, the following statements hold:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The test parameters measured by different transducers provide values that are generally in agreement
within the error bounds.
The discrepancies between the measured and calculated values are not significant and the character ofthe predictions is conservative.
The observed differences between the measured and calculated values can be explained.
The maximum pressure experienced in the tests is far from the design pressure of the containment
system (0.25 MPa).
The maximum pressure load on the tray walls measured during the tests, is far less than the 30 kPa
limit value.
Water level fluctuations were experienced but were found to be minor and disappeared when the steam
started to flow into the bubbler condenser pool.
Condensation-oscillations were not found within the investigated experimental conditions.
The sequences investigated in the tests do not cause any significant challenge for the VVER-440/213
type BC and localization system

6.2 Answers to the open questions
As described in Chapter 1 three questions were considered important to be answered following the newly
performed tests. Based on the experimental and analytical evidences of the newly performed investigations
the OECD Bubbler-condenser Steering Group has concluded in the following answers to the open
questions:A1.

The verification of the blow-down mass and energy rates (MER) producing loads to the BC was
performed in the frame of the present project for both the previous LBLOCA tests and for the recent
tests. Results confirmed conservative mass and energy estimations. It was shown that the injected
MER were higher in the tests than the scaled MER (NPP/100) values.
These findings confirmed the conservative nature of the approach. Conclusions were that the relatedloads do not represent a challenge to containment integrity.
A parallel assessment of this issue with respect to LBLOCA tests is going on in the PHARE project
PR/TS/17.

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A2.

The first part of the question concerning conservatism (initial conditions, scenarios, test conditions,different break locations, etc.) can be answered positively. The adequacy was addressed by thescaling of the facility and possible distortions were compensated by different measures (e.g.
installation of additional insulation).

A3.

Non-uniformities of flow rates and water temperatures have been observed in the experiments. An
appropriate understanding of the non-uniformities was obtained by detailed (3D) code calculations.
The reasons and the nature of the distributions have been satisfactorily explained by code
calculations.

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APPENDIX 1
BUBBLER CONDENSER STEERING GROUP (SG)Outline of mandate and programme

1.

Overall objectives

The activities will be organised as a Project having the following main objectives:•

Produce convincing evidence that the V-213 type containment works during DBAs as designed•

Help in the planning of new tests and in the interpretation of the test results•

To provide well qualified experimental results serving as basis for the validation of best estimate
calculation tools.

2.

Pending questions

Q1.

The scaling of energy discharge rate is important for determining the thermal-hydraulic load oncontainment structure. Can estimates be made on whether the conclusions drawn are or notconservative, and if they are, on the degree of conservatism?

Q2.

Are the conservatism and adequacy of the BC facility properly addressed?

Q3.

Unexpected non-uniformity of flow rates and of water temperatures has been observed in earlier
tests. Are these observations relevant and why? Can specific code calculations help in thisassessment?

3.

Organisation•

The Project’s Steering Group (SG).

•The Operating Agent.

•

The OCED-Nuclear Energy Agency.

There will be no financial compensations associated with the activity of the Steering Group.

4.

Role the Project’s Steering Group•The SG shall review the scope of new tests and make recommendations as to the test set-up andconduct, including, e.g., instrumentation and pre- and post test calculations.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12•

The SG shall be entitled to receive relevant experimental results and will aim to reach consensus on
their interpretation. The technical conclusions will be intended for the use of national regulators.

•

The SG shall define content and provide approval of the Project Final Report.

•

The agreed experiments and analyses shall be carried out and reported upon in the SG by the Project
Operating Agent.

•

The SG will elect its chairperson who will be responsible for the correct SG operation.

•

There will be no voting in the SG.

5.

SG members•

It is intended that the following organisations be represented in the Group:- Hungarian, Czech and Slovak utilities- Hungarian, Czech and Slovak regulatory bodies- GRS, Germany- IPSN, France- DOE, USA- EU•

With the approval of the chairperson, SG members may be accompanied by supporting personnel.

6.

Role of the Operating Agent•The Operating Agent will be the consortium of three utilities, which will be funding the experiments
and will be represented in the SG by three or more members.

•

The Operating Agent will be entitled to establish work relations and contracts with third parties andin particular with relevant experimental facilities for executing the experimental work scope.

•

The Operating Agent shall be responsible for carrying out the experiments and the analyses
according to agreed specifications.

•

The Operating Agent will in general support the SG work, preparing in particular the Project overall
workscope and reporting on results to the SG.

•

The Operating Agent will nominate a Project Manager who will be responsible of the co-ordination
with, and of the reporting to and from the SG.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

7.

Role of the OCDE-NEA•The OECD-NEA will cover secretariat functions and will support SG establishment and operation,seeking for the achievement of the Project’s objective within the agreed time frame.

8.

Time table•

Meeting 1 December 01

Discussion of the SG mandate and work scope.
Preliminary discussion on test needs, requirements
and objectives.

•

Meeting 2 Jan/Febr 02

In-depth discussion of the test objectives, test set-up
and experimental procedures, boundary conditions
and instrumentation•

Meeting 3 April 02

Final specification of the tests and outline of the SG
activity report.

•

Experimental

Test execution and initial write up of final report.
Discussion of the test results and on the answers to
the three pending questions via e-mail.

•Meeting 4 November 02

Test results, interpretation and conclusion, including
answers to the three pending questions. Review of thereport.

•Reporting December 02

Activity report.

May - October 02

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
APPENDIX 2

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC
CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

PROJECT USE ONLY

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYENGLISH TEXT ONLYSTEERING COMMITTEE FOR NUCLEAR ENERGY
Bubbler-Condenser Project

Minutes of the
Meetings of the
BUBBLER CONDENSER STEERING GROUP (SG)67

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

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Minutes of theFirst Meeting of the
BUBBLER CONDENSER STEERING GROUP (SG)Paris, 7 December 2001

Summary of actions

A1.

This Group endorsed the proposed tests in that they address the B-C remaining issues.

A2.

The Group recommends that the planned experimental work be co-ordinated to the feasible extent
with the German - Russian bilateral activities.

A3.

Co-ordination with the EU -TSO project is to be ensured by members of the OECD SG.

A4.

The Czech, Hungarian and Slovak utilities shall address their authority and receive formal
endorsement and/or recommendations on the proposed tests.

A5.

Mr. Bajsz is to co-ordinate further definition of test details with Mr. Wolff and keep IPSN informed

A6.

The Operating Agent will nominate a Project Manager by end of January and communicate thenomination to the SG chairman and to Mr. Vitanza.

A7.

The next meeting date is February 25 and 26. The meeting will be held at the HAEA premises in
Budapest. The topics on the agenda include in-depth discussions on- Status on actions from the first SG meeting (Operating Agent, NEA)
- Status of contract with EREC.
- Test objectives and boundary conditions (Operating Agent).
- Test set-up, experimental procedures, schedule (Operating Agent)- Test instrumentation (Operating Agent)- Interaction with other B-C activities (EU and D-RU bilateral work)- VEIKI presentation of calculations of flow and temperature non-uniformities.
- VEIKI presentation of calculations of expected pressure differential for various type of test initialand boundary conditions.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
1.

Opening

Mr. Frescura, director of Nuclear Safety at the NEA, welcomed the participants, expressing his satisfactionthat in spite of the difficulties with transportation, so many participants were able to attend. He said that the
Bubbler-Condenser (B-C) issue had been on the agenda for a long time. He reminded of what has been
done in approximately the last decade, and added that additional experimental work is expected to occur
during next year. At the last CSNI meeting (summer 2001), the NEA had been asked to support thisexperimental work, which is to be financed by Czech, Hungarian and Slovak utilities. The aim is to define
the experiments in such a manner that they respond to remaining B-C issues in a practical and convincing
manner. He concluded that the NEA was looking forward to fruitful discussions in this Steering Group andthat these would help to arrive to make significant progress on the matter.
Mr. Vitanza said that apologies for absence had been received from Mr. Sabata, Krajmer and Macek. He
added that the US Department of Energy had expressed its desire to join the project and that the DOE
designated representative would be Mr. Jim Sienicki of Argonne National Laboratory.

2.

Election of the SG chairman

Mr. Vitanza proposed Mr. Ivan Lux, of the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority, as chairman of theSteering Group. Mr. Lux, who is very familiar with the B-C issue, raised the matter of an OECD project on
bubbler condenser experiments at the June CSNI meeting. The Group approved the nomination.
Mr. Lux thanked for the confidence of the Group, adding that he would do his utmost to make the SG workas effective as possible.
3.

Adoption of the Agenda

The chairman proposed to discuss agenda point 4 after the technical discussions on the new intended tests,
such that the mandate is seen in the context of the work scope of the SG (Agenda point 8). The Groupagreed.
With this modification, the Agenda was approved.
4.

Overview and status of the Bubbler-Condenser issue

The chairman invited Mr. Wolff of GRS, Germany, to address this point. Mr. Wolff said that the B-C as asafety issue was addressed by the OECD NEA since 1992. An OECD meeting was held on the subject inApril 2000. The IAEA and WENRA have also addressed this matter.
On the OECD work, Mr. Wolff recalled that there were a number of phenomena that were suggested forconsideration, as well as for separate effects experiments and integral experiments. Experimental work was
carried out under a PHARE project (PH 2.13/95), which lasted 27 months. Tests were to be performed at70

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

EREC on thermal-hydraulics and structural tests, at VUEZ on static structural tests and at SVUSS on small
scale tests and thermal-hydraulic analyses. The general project conclusions were that•

The analytical results indicate that the loads on the B-C structure due to LB LOCA envelopes theloads by MB LOCA, SB LOCA and MSLB with respect to confinement pressure and differential
pressure on the BC structure.

•

Tests and analyses showed that for Paks, Dukovany, Bohunice (and Rovno) NPP’s, the B-C structure
is capable to withstand the imposed loads and maintain their functionality. For Kola NPP further
investigations were recommended.

However, Mr. Wolff noticed that only 3 out of 16 (+ 3 contingency) EREC tests were carried out in the
Project, and that the initial and boundary conditions have been matter of discussion.
In the PHARE TSO project (SK/HU/CZ/TS/08), recommendations were expressed as to the experimental
work at EREC and at the VUEZ static structural test facility. Further, the OECD support group at its
meeting of April 2000, recommended amongst others, that•

Further test analyses on existing results be carried out•

Existing results be used for design qualification, code validation and modelling improvements•

MSLB and medium/small break LOCA tests be performed in order to better understand nonuniformities.

In the frame of a German-Russian bilateral contract one test on Steam Line Break (SLB) at the EREC
facility together with a repeat test will be investigated. This bilateral contract is due for completion in
2003. During Mr. Wolff’s presentation, there were a number of questions, mainly related to remaining
issues and to how relevant some considerations are for the actual B-C function. One of these issues is on
the extent to which LB LOCA is bounding other transients. Mr. Wolff expressed consideration that SBLOCA might induce pressure oscillations, which under some conditions might endanger the structure. To
that, Mr. Bajsz observed that there is no other basis than speculation that such phenomenon can occur orthat it has safety implications. However, as noticed by Mr Wolff, the OECD support group "…agreed that
additional work is necessary to reach comprehensive understanding of “….oscillatory problems andassociated sensitivities under medium-break and small-break loss-of-coolant accident" [Report
NEA/SEN/SIN(2000)6]".
Mr. Deksnis said that the view of the regulatory authority in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovak
Republic are essential in the definition of what phenomena or aspects represent a safety concern. Mr.
Frescura added that in general it should indeed be up to the regulators to decide the depth required forgiven safety assessments.
Mr. Bajsz (Hungarian utility) started his presentation on the history of the BC experimental projects,
basically from the same basis as Mr. Wolff. Chronologically, things went as described below.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12•

1991-94: OECD Support Group on VVER-440 Bubbler Condenser Containment Research Work →supplementary research work needed.

•

1994: EC launched the PHARE project (NUC 93428) Bubbler Condenser (BC) Qualification
Feasibility Study. It was completed in early 1996 → need for additional research.

•

1996: PHARE project PH2.13/955 was launched.

•

1997: BCEQ was awarded to a Consortium consisting of Siemens/KWU, EdF and Empresarios
Agrupados. The following subcontractors were selected:-

EREC (Electrogorsk, Moscow, Russia), for TH tests and structural tests-

VUEZ (Levice, Slovak Republic), for static structural tests-

SVUSS (Bechovice, Czech Republic), for small scale tests and TH analyses•

1998: Start of the construction of the EREC facility.

•

1998 (December): TSO project is terminated.

•

1999: EREC test facility is ready in June, with 7 months delay.

•

1999: 3 tests were performed in September-October, Users team and TAC meeting → Final reportin December.

•

2000: Berlin meeting of the OECD group and TAC → Significant differences in opinions.

•

2000: In October VEIKI performed the detailed post test calculations, most of the questions ofOECD group is answered.

•

2001: AQG report on Nuclear Safety in the context of enlargement: "Measures to complete theregulatory review regarding full verification of the performance of the containment bubbler
condenser system for all design basis accident".

•

2001 (August) Start of the trilateral cooperation (CZ-SL-HU) to perform additional tests andanalyses.

•

2001: A new TSO project is under preparation.

Mr. Bajsz said that the recommendations made by the OECD support group were or are being followed up.
In particular-Further post-test analyses to understand non-uniformities in temperature and flow distribution
have been performed.

-

Further testing under MSLB and MB LOCA are in preparation.

-

The analytical support for pre- and post-test calculation is being set up.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

On the questions that are remaining, Mr. Bajsz commented that
- The question as to whether further tests are needed or not, the tests that are being planned provide apractical answer.
- The question on the scaling of the energy discharge rate and its effects has been definitely addressed.
From blow-down calculations based on pressure and level parameters, it has been derived that the flow
measurements had an inertia in the first 4-5 tenths of a second.
- The issue of non-uniformities has been analysed with CFD calculations. The outcome is that thisphenomenon can be explained by the calculated flow pattern and by the changing steam content in thegas-steam mixture.
-5.

The item of conservatism of the EREC facility is being addressed in preparation of the next tests.

Ongoing assessments at the EU

Mr. Deksnis provided an overview of the status of the B-C issue as seen from the EU perspective. He
stated that there is a marked difference now between the PHARE and the TACIS perspective, mainly inthat the PHARE activities are being incorporated into the EU Directorate General for Enlargement.
For what concerns TACIS, the Kola-relevant experimental programme is being launched, how soon is tobe seen. From what Mr. Deksnis had seen on time-scale, there should be no interference time-wise between
the TACIS-Kola work and the "trilateral" tests, i.e. those planned by Cz, Hu and Sk utilities.
For what concerns PHARE, Mr. Deksnis pointed out that the original programme could not be extended
beyond reasonable time limits, that is why it had to be limited to three tests. The PHARE programme is
now devised to help the EU to enlarge. On the B-C issue, there is a request (by the EU) to the Cz, Hu andSk regulatory authorities to come with a report stating the degree to which the resolution of B-C issues issatisfactorily accomplished. Mr. Deksnis said that, while realising that only few tests have been done, there
is a hope that the community of experts will come to a consensus, possibly with the support of the tests
being planned now. He reiterated that one simply not in the position to postpone the resolution of thissubject beyond the time period given, which is mid 2003. These are the boundary conditions given to the
TSO. The TSO activities will be based on existing tests, the kick-off meeting is expected in January at theearliest. The TSO project is a form of collaboration of EU and candidate countries on an analytical effort.
Through this, one hopes to get good support to document that the B-C works under DB scenarios. Mr.
Deksnis concluded that the TSO is to be intended as a support to the regulatory authority of the candidate
countries and as such, the three beneficiaries have to agree on it. The EU-TSO contract is not yet signed.
The chairman noticed that this is an appreciable shift in EU policy and asked if the TSO participants areaware of it. Mr. Deksnis replied that the shift is a fact and was decided under the French presidency of theEU.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
6.

The new intended tests

Mr. Bajsz provided information about the tests that the Czech, Hungarian and Slovak utilities intend tocarry out at the EREC facility in Electrogorsk. The experimental proposal consists of three tests and is toaddress the following points:• Main steam line break (MSLB). This transient is a long time process with high temperature conditions.
The break flow rate is 1000 kg/s at beginning of transient. Mr. Bajsz said that the envisaged time
duration is up to 1200 s. To a question on feasibility, Mr. Bajsz said that this had been checked withEREC experts and that this long time duration can be achieved by using the steam produced by a power
plant, which is at the EREC site. Mr. Wolff said that in his view it might be not necessary to have suchlong time duration. It was agreed that the item of duration be clarified in further discussions between
Mr. Bajsz and Mr. Wolff.
• Medium Break LOCA (MB LOCA). The proposal contemplates that a 250 mm break, when the reverse
flow of tray water is not yet occurring. Mr. Wolff said that the actual size should be assessed by
calculations. Also in this case, it was recommended that the test parameters be optimised throughconsultations between Mr. Bajsz and Mr. Wolff.
•

Small Break LOCA (SB LOCA). Mr. Bajsz said that, although this item had been recommended forconsideration by the OECD support group [Report NEA/CSNI/R(2001] the utilities doubts that a test on
SB LOCA would provide valuable data. Mr. Bajsz expectation is that in a SB LOCA one would hardly
measure any significant differential pressure on the structure. The three utilities feel that one would
perhaps make a better use of the third test by addressing the BC function with decreased water level.

Mr. Amri raised the issue of oscillatory condensation and chugging, which are more likely to occur and areof longer duration in a SB LOCA. Mr. Wolff referred to the above-mentioned report of the OECD Support
Group, where this specific item was mentioned as one of the point of diverging opinion within that group(Page 31, point 3 of the quoted NEA report). Mr. Lipar and Mr. Bajsz said that arguments on possible
oscillations and/or chugging are of speculative nature. There is no calculation showing that suchphenomena are likely to occur to an extent that it can really endanger the BC structure. Mr. Deksnis
stressed the point that the key requirement is that the B-C structure is kept during its function, i.e. once. It
does not need to be in full shape for a second time. Mr. Amri said, that we need to understand if
oscillations and chugging can have a real impact on the integrity under which conditions it can occur. Mr.
Bajsz said that chugging may occur and be relevant for other configurations, but he just sees no realistic
basis for this to be relevant in the B-C case. The option of studying SB LOCA however, remains open; hedoes not exclude it at all. However, he feels it will be a waste to make a test at conditions in which nothing
significant is expected to occur. Also on this point it was agreed that Mr. Bajsz and Mr. Wolff would
consult on the merit to address SB LOCA or, alternatively, lower B-C water level in the third test.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

In conclusion, the tests proposed by the utilities are as follows

Test No.

Leak typePressure (MPa)Break position

Water level (mm)11.5 MSLB

4.7

Near

500

2

LOCA (250 mm)

12.5

Middle500

3, option 1

LOCA (250 mm)

12.5

Middle100

3, option 2

SB LOCA

12.5

Middle500

As to the time schedule, Mr. Bajsz said that the contract with EREC is in preparation, and that anagreement on the overall test scope is to be reached by end of 2001. The subsequent steps will be:- Pre-test analyses until April 2002
- Test performance May - June 2002
- Post-test evaluations and reporting October 2002
At this point, the chairman asked the participants to express their opinion about the proposed tests.
Mr. Svab from the Czech regulatory body, said that the regulator will have the responsibility for the overall
B-C safety assessment and to define the conditions under which the B-C functionality is to be confirmed.
The Czech regulator has defined the scenarios to be addressed, which are reflected in the proposal. He
acknowledges that there can be a number of interesting aspects that can be studied, but one must focus onconditions that are relevant to safety assessments.
Mr. Lipar said that the three regulators must agree on scenarios. The Slovak utilities, however, have not yet
approached their authority on this matter.
Mr. Amri stated that the proposed tests do address the recommendations of the OECD Support Group interms of initiating event, but we must ensure that we are speaking about the right scenario. On SB LOCA
the aim is to close the subject. For this purpose, either one performs a test or one should have ademonstration that the SB LOCA is not important.
Mr. Deksnis was interested in the schedule and how this relates to the EU TSO schedule and to theRussian-German contract schedule. The chairman replied that the interaction between this SG and the TSO
will be discussed in the next agenda point. For what concerns the time schedule, the scheme shown below(see next page) gives a representation of the B-C activities for the next two years.
Mr. Wolff said the tests were addressing the right issues, but that details are to be better defined. He addedthat he would like to explain the methodology he uses (which is given below) and that he was willing tocontinue the dialogue with the utilities in order to optimise the outcome of the tests.
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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Project
OECD B-C SG
3-utility tests __German - Russianbilateral tests
EU - TSO
activities _

2002

2003

________________________ _ _ __________ ____________________________ _________________________________________

The chairman, Mr. Lux summarised this discussion with the following conclusions:
A1.

This Group endorsed the proposed tests in that they address the B-C remaining issues.

A2.

The Group recommends that the planned experimental work be co-ordinated to the feasible extent
with the German - Russian bilateral activities.

A3.

Co-ordination with the EU -TSO project is to be ensured by members of the OECD SG (see next
agenda point).

A4.

The Czech, Hungarian and Slovak utilities shall address their authority and receive formal
endorsement and/or recommendations on the proposed tests.

A5.

Mr. Bajsz is to coordinate further definition of test details with Mr. Wolff and keep IPSN informed.

The Group agreed on these chairman conclusions.
Mr. Wolff gave a concise explanation on what he suggests as a methodology that can be followed forchecking the adequacy of the TH loads on the B-C model. This consists basically of defining the scenario
to be investigated, to calculate the corresponding mass and energy release rate from a NPP and to verify
that the B-C test facility provides adequate conditions based on few criteria, which Mr. Wolff explained indetails. He gave also examples of how this methodology, which is based on calculation sequences, works
in practice.
7.

Mandate, role and work scope of the SG

The chairman went through the points of the draft mandate that had been communicated to the SG
members at an earlier stage. The mandate, revised according to the suggestions made by the SG, is given in
Appendix 1 (most of the items addressed in this agenda point are contained in Appendix 1).

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
Overall objectives
The objectives as stated in the draft mandate were endorsed by the participants.
Pending questions
The second question in the draft mandate was modified by the SG to read.
Q2. Are the conservatism and adequacy of the B-C facility properly addressed?
With this modification, the pending questions were approved.
Role of the Project’s Steering Group (SG)The chairman explained the details of this point, which are•

The SG shall review the scope of new tests and make recommendations as to the test set up andconduct including, e.g. instrumentation and pre- and post-test calculations.

•

The SG shall be entitled to receive experimental results and will aim to reach consensus on theirinterpretation. The technical conclusions will be intended for the use of national regulators.

•

The SG shall define content and provide approval of the Project Final Report.

•

The agreed experiments and analyses shall be carried out and reported upon in the SG by the Project
Operating Agent.

•

The SG will elect its chairperson who will be responsible for the correct SG operation.

•

There will be no voting in the SG.

The chairman notices in particular the second bullet point related to the sharing of information. Mr.
Vitanza added that if requirements on confidentiality (i.e. on restrictions beyond SG use) are needed, theyshould be set forth by the Operating Agent.
The interaction of the SG with the various parties involved in the B-C issue is schematised in the figure
given on the next page.
SG members
The chairman recalled that the SG members, besides the Czech, Hungarian and Slovak regulators andutilities, include a representation from the EU, from the French IPSN, from the German GRS and from the
US Department of Energy. As to the latter, a communication had been received that Mr. Jim Sienicki of
Argonne National Laboratory would represent DOE in the SG.
The chairman noticed that the SG mandate recognises the possibility that SG members be accompanied by
support personnel - for instance EREC experts, subject to chairman approval.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS IN THE B-C PROJECT

OperatingAgent

BCSG - NEA

GRS____________

Authorities

Role of the Operating Agent
The provisions of the mandate related to the role of the Operating Agent, i.e. by the consortium of the threeutilities sponsoring the test, were reviewed by the chairman.
It was agreed thatA6.

The Operating Agent will nominate a Project Manager by end of January and communicate thenomination to the SG chairman and to Mr. Vitanza.

Role of the OECD-NEAThe OECD-NEA is to support the SG establishment and operation, seeking for the Project’s objectives
within the agreed time frame.

78

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12Time table
Meeting 1

December 01

Discussion of the SG mandate
and work scope. First discussion
on test needs, requirements andobjectives.

Meeting 2

Febr 02

In-depth discussion of the test
objectives, test set-up andexperimental procedures, boundary conditions, instrumentation.

Meeting 3

April 02

Final specification of the tests,
outline of the SG activity report

Meeting 4

November 02

Test results, interpretation, conclusions, answers to the pending
questions. Review of the report.

Reporting

December 02

Activity report.

The chairman observed that this timetable is consistent with the one presented by Mr. Bajsz for the tests
and for the related analyses. He asked if, with the modification of the second pending question (Q2. inparagraph 2), the Steering Group would approve the mandate. The Steering Group approved.
8.

Next meeting

Upon proposal from the chairman, the following was agreed
A7.

The next meeting date is February 25 and 26. The meeting will be held at the HAEA premises in
Budapest. The topics on the agenda include in-depth discussions on- Status on actions from the first SG meeting (Operating Agent, NEA)
- Status of contract with EREC.
- Test objectives and boundary conditions (Operating Agent).
- Test set-up, experimental procedures, schedule (Operating Agent)- Test instrumentation (Operating Agent)- Interaction with other B-C activities (EU and D-RU bilateral work)- VEIKI presentation of calculations of flow and temperature non-uniformities.
- VEIKI presentation of calculations of expected pressure differential for various type of test initialand boundary conditions.
79

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)1280

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Minutes of theSecond Meeting of the
BUBBLER CONDENSER STEERING GROUP (SG)thth

Budapest, 25 -26 February, 2002

Actions and deliberations

A8

The SG agreed that VEIKI calculations using the 3D code GASFLOW provide a satisfactory
answer to the issue of non-uniformities of temperature and flow distributions observed in theexperiments (Deliberation)

A.9

A scenario description of test 2 and 3, similarly to what presented for test 1, shall be madeavailable by the OA (PM)A.10

Efforts will be made to enable to perform calorimetric energy balance, which was an uncertainty inprevious tests (OA/PM)

A 11

The SB size for test 3 needs to be finalised (OA/PM)

A 12

The SG agreed that the three proposed tests were relevant ones and addressed therecommendations expressed in earlier assessments (Deliberation)

A 13

There was agreement on the suggested instrumentation improvements. Details to be provided at
the next meeting (OA/PM)

A 14

An understanding emerged that the issues of possible reduction of oscillations and resonance forsmaller breaks shall in one way or another be addressed. Many in the group believe that this is an
issue of a theoretical and speculative nature and that, if it exists, this phenomenon does not pose achallenge to the confinement structure of the BC. The Operating Agents should provide a way toresolve this issue, which appears to be the only one that is left without response

A 15

It was agreed that the next meeting will take place in Bratislava on 29th and 30th April. It willaddress:- EREC contract- Finalisation of the experimental programme- Scenarios to be addressed (for MB and SBLOCA)- Position with regard to the investigation of the oscillation issue- SG activity report

A 16

On the SG activity report, consultations between the SG Chairman, the Project Manager and the
NEA Secretariat are to take place to set forth a tentative structure of the SG report, ahead of thenext meeting81

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
1.

Opening

The Chairman, Mr. Lux, welcomed the participants and expressed satisfaction that so many were present.
He asked that one person per each organisation speak on behalf of that organisation, such that thediscussion could be conducted efficiently. After a tour de table, where the participants introduced
themselves, the Chairman summarised the goals of the meeting, which were basically to:- Explain the flow and temperature distributions that were observed in the previous EREC tests.
- Define to the maximum extent possible the new tests that are to be carried out in the Slovak, Hungarian,Czech trilateral cooperation.

2.

Adoption of the Agenda

In relation to point 10 of the Agenda (in-depth discussions), Mr. Amri requested that any relevant material
to be presented at an SG meeting, should be circulated beforehand. The chair took note of this discussion.
The Agenda was adopted.

3.

Approval of the Minutes of the Previous Meeting

Two small corrections were made on page 2 and page 6 of the Minutes. With these corrections the
Minutes of the previous meeting were approved.
4.

Status of Actions

With reference to the list of actions given on page 2 of the SG1 Minutes, the status of actions was asfollows:
A1

The SG endorsement of test goals had been obtained.

A2 Co-ordination with Germany - Russia at the last meeting. Bilateral activities.
Mr. Wolff explained that there had been a meeting addressing the scenario that GRS intends to investigate.
The meeting took place on 16th January. Exchange of information took place also after this meeting. Mr.
Wolff pointed out that there will be no duplication between the GRS Russian co-operative programme andthe programme addressed by the OECD SG.
A3 Coordination with the EU-TSO project. This is ensured by the participation of EU representatives in
the SG. There will be a presentation on the status of the EU project under agenda item 8.
A4 Endorsement of Czech, Hungarian, and Slovak safety authorities. Mr.Bajsz explained that the
Operating Agents, i.e., the utilities of the three countries, have addressed their respective authorities andreceived formal endorsement on the intended programme of work.
A5 Communication between Mr. Bajsz, Mr. Wolff and Mr. Amri on further definition of tests. As
confirmed by Mr. Amri and Mr. Wolff, such communication has taken place, but limited extend.
A6 Nomination of the Project Manager. Mr. Lux noted that the Operating Agent nominated Mr. Bajsz
as Project Manager and asked for the SG approval. The SG approved.
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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

A7

Points to be addressed in the second SG meeting. These are reflected in the Agenda.

With this, the review of actions from the previous meeting was completed.

5.

Post-test calculations of previous experiments

Mr. Techy, from the Hungarian VEIKI, presented the post -test calculations of previous experiments. The
content of his presentation was as follows:-

Main Findings of the PH2.13/95 (BCEQ) Project
Objectives of the Post-Test Calculations
3D Calculations with the GASFLOW Code
Detailed Nodalisation Scheme for the CONTAIN CodePressure Difference on the Bubbler Condenser
Temperature Distribution in the Bubbler Condenser Pool
Temperature in the Bubbler Condenser Air Volume and in the Air Trap
Conclusions

The Main Findings of the PH2.13/95 (BCEQ) Project were:•••Pressure loads in case of LBLOCA have been found up to 210 kPa for containment pressure
maximum and 20 kPa for maximum pressure difference on the BC walls
The tests indicated the existence of- Temperature gradients in the BC water pool in vertical direction, also significant differences
between individual tray rows in horizontal direction. However, temperature values are far fromsaturation, no challenge for BC operation.
- Complex flow patterns exist in the corridors between the steam generator boxes and the BC shaft.
Code predictions (both CONTAIN and DRASYS) overestimated the actual measured pressure
differences on the bubbler condenser.

Further analyses were recommended to understand the involved phenomena.
The Objectives of the Complementary BCEQ Post-Test Calculations included:
Detailed study of phenomena not fully understood in the PH2.13/95 BCEQ Project. This consisted of:•Flow patterns in the corridors and the bubbler condenser•
Pressure loads on the bubbler condenser membrane walls•
Temperature distribution in the bubbler condenser pools•
Temperatures above the condenser pools and in the air traps
The codes used for analysis were:••

GASFLOW code for 3D modelling of flow fields
CONTAIN code with detailed noding for thermal-hydraulic analyses

GASFLOW 2.1 is a 3D computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code developed at Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) and Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe (FZK) for velocity and material concentration field
analysis of nuclear reactor containments.

83

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

VEIKI obtained the GASFLOW Code from the USNRC under the Cooperative Severe Accident Research
Program (CSARP) agreement
The computational domain or 3D block is discretized using a rectangular finite difference mesh. Several
3D blocks can be defined, which are connected via one-dimensional ducts.
Mr. Techy explained how the bubbler condenser of the EREC facility geometry were treated in
GASFLOW. The outcome of the calculations were that:••

The Pressures trend is satisfactory, but the calculated pressure maxima are less than the measured
values.
The temperatures were predicted with relatively good agreement for the break room and before theBC. Discrepancies between calculated and measured values above the suppression pool wereobserved.

With regard to flow directions and patterns, Mr. Techy reported that:••First phase - until water seal clearing
Flow proceeding from the break room impacted at the pedestal of the BC, passing at both sides
forward and returning at the rear of the structure. Opposite flow directions exist at the sides of theconnecting channel.
Second phase - after seal clearing
Forward direction flow at both sides in the upper part of the BC returning at the rear and passing
backward near the bottom. The flow enters the space below the pool from behind and from bothsides through the holes of I-beams.

With regard to the heat-up of the BC water pool, the calculations gave the following outcome:••GASFLOW predicts a higher heat-up at both ends of the BC in agreement with the experimental
results
Non-uniform steam distribution of steam fluxes entering the pool and different water masses
available at both ends of the BC contribute to the effect

The summary of GASFLOW calculation results was that:•••GASFLOW provided detailed results for spatial distribution of thermal-hydraulic parameters,
velocity fields and gas concentrations.
Complex flow patterns obtained in the tests were explained by the code predictions.
BC pool temperature distributions could be explained by the calculated flow and steam
concentration fields.

84

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12•

GASFLOW simulations supported the development of detailed nodalisation for the CONTAIN code,used in other tasks of the study.

On the Pressure load on the BC wall earlier tests and calculations were that:•

Measurement and calculation results concerning the pressure difference load on the BC wall
deviated: calculations predicted 26 kPa versus measured loads of 20 kPa (deviation up to 25 %).
Plant (Paks NPP) calculations indicated a pressure difference of 24 kPa.

•

Linear displacement measurements performed during the tests indicated the displacement of the BC
membrane walls. This could lead to elastic compression of the BC structure with a corresponding
internal pressure rise and modification of the pressure difference load.
The CONTAIN code was used in VEIKI subsequent assessments. A specific input was developed for the
CONTAIN code to model the volume shrink due to the deformation of the BC membrane walls. Volume
compression was determined from linear displacement measurements.
The conclusion of the VEIKI work on the pressure load on the BC wall were that:••

CONTAIN analyses indicated that pressure differences calculated with assumption of the BC
volume compression were close to the test results within measurement error bounds.
The discrepancy between measurement and calculation results can be explained, therefore thepressure load issue can be resolved by the BC volume compression effect.

On temperature in the BC pools, the results from earlier tests indicated a temperature distribution along the
bubbler condenser. Temperature values were higher at the front and the rear trays, while lower values
were obtained for the middle tray rows.
CONTAIN calculations with a detailed bubbler condenser model predicted the same tendency oftemperature distribution. The phenomenon is caused by non-homogeneous steam mass flow to individual
pools as a result of flow distribution. Smaller water pool masses existing at the front and rear trays also
contribute to this effect.
The calculations for all the three tests predict much higher heat-up of the BC water, than the average heatup derived from the temperature measurements.
With relation to the BC air volume and air trap temperatures, earlier BCEQ post-test analyses indicatedmuch higher values for BC air volume and air trap temperatures than actually measured values.
At the same time, video records of the tests confirmed the existence of very intense droplet entrainment
into the BC air volume. The CONTAIN code does not model any water entrainment from the pool to theatmosphere region. Water entrainment was artificially added to the BC atmosphere.
Temperatures calculated with this model are close to the test values. Unphysical temperature peaks in theprevious BCEQ calculations were removed this way.

The overall conclusions of VEIKI post-test evaluations were that:85

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

•
•

•

•
6.

Flow patterns in the corridors between the steam generator boxes and the BC shaft.
GASFLOW analyses provided explanation for the complex flow distribution patterns.
Pressure difference load on the bubbler condenser
Discrepancy between the measured and calculated values explained by the compression of the
bubbler condenser structure
Temperature distribution in the bubbler condenser pool
Temperature distribution explained by non-uniform steam flow distribution to the BC pools.
However, average heat-up of the water pool derived from the measurements still deviates from thecalculated average heat-up.
Temperatures of the BC air volume and the air trap.
Temperatures calculated with assumption of water entrainment are very close to the measured values
Discussion of the post-test results

The discussion of the post-test results basically confirmed the validity of VEIKI approach and conclusions.
As summarised by the Chairman, the work presented by Mr. Techy was intended to respond to the need tounderstand the reasons for the observed non-uniformities in the previous test and to the recommendationthat further post-test analyses of the results obtained so far should b e performed in order to explain suchnon-uniformities.
Upon questions from the Chairmen, the SG agreed that VEIKI calculations provide a satisfactory answer tothe issue of non-uniformities of temperature and flow distributions observed in the experiments.
7.

Other issues on previous tests

There were no other issues.
8.

Status of the EU Projects on BC

Mr. Deksnis presented the status of EU activities related to the bubbler condenser. He reviewed the
Bubbler Condenser Qualification project, which had as major aims to create a unique large-scaleengineering test facility and to provide experimental verification of BC functions. Not all foreseen
experiments were done, however. There was a general conclusion that the function of the bubbler
condenser was assured for LBLOCA. Of the intended matrix, three tests were carried out, i.e.:
Test 1: Integral LBLOCA
Test 4: Initial LBLOCA with higher steam content
Test 5: Initial LBLOCA with higher air content.
Post-test calculations led to the following conclusions:••Tests adequately represented a LOCA with a large pipe line beak in the primary circuit, as applied toPaks NPP.
DRASYS code predictions seem "conservative" as to maximum pressure and pressure difference
over the BC

86

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12•

Pressure increases in the boxes in tests are not higher than postulated values. For a LBLOCA the
maximum pressure in Paks NPP compartments < 0.21 MPa. (acceptable)
Measured •p over the BC is lower than predicted; maximum •p w ill not be higher than 22 kPa for a
LBLOCA for Paks NPP (acceptable for Paks,? For Dukovany and Bohunice NPP)•

With regard to the EU policy, Mr. Deksnis mentioned that the Council Report addresses nuclear safety inthe context of Enlargement (June 2001). The issues of relevance in the BC context are:•

The legislation in the nuclear sector, organisation and management of regulatory authorities and thelevel of safety of installations in each of the Candidate States•

Regarding bubbler condenser systems:
Measures to complete a regulatory review - full verification of the performance of the containment bubbler
condenser system for all design basis accidents.
The New TSO Project must be seen in the dynamics of H, CZ, SK accession in the EU and it involves thefollowing principal activities:
After an initial phase of six months duration, there follows an extended phase of additional numericalanalysis: The final task is to-Evaluate bubble condenser function from a nuclear safety standpoint in compliance with western
standards applied within the licensing process in EU countries for similar facilities:
Review of BCEQ results & others that become available, including a critical review of available
experimental data.

The implementation is to take place in the time period first quarter 2002 - third quarter 2003.
Mr. Deksnis also mentioned the TACIS R2.01/99. The objectives are:-to evaluate bubble-condenser experimental qualification test results.
to perform specific tests and relevant post-test analysis for the Bubbler Condenser at Kola NPP
Units 3 and 4

The tentative time period is 15 months duration from the third quarter 2002 (earliest).

9.

Status of the preparation of the new experiments

Mr. Bajsz presented the developments since the last meeting in Paris
9.1.

EREC contract

There is an agreement on scope, i.e., on three tests including pre-test calculations. There is a preliminary
agreement on test schedule and price. EREC had expressed a positive attitude for possible instrumentation
additions or modifications. A draft contract is under preparation.
9.2.

Preparations and the work scope87

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
On the tests contemplated in the trilateral co-operation, there had been a meeting in Slovakia, where anagreement on test scope was reached. This consists of:-

One MSLB test
One MBLOCA, with 200 mm break size
One SBLOCA orientatively with 90 mm break size (size to be confirmed)

There was also an agreement on the analytical work to be carried out by the three parties. The Hungarian
parties will focus on the analyses of the MSLB test, Czech parties on the MBLOCA and Slovak parties on
the SBLOCA.
Mr. Bajsz observed that additional temperature sensors on the BC walls will be needed. Further, there is arequest to measure the water temperature of three different levels at some locations. Other sensors, such as
ultrasonic level monitors, strain gauges, composition or velocity measurements, were not considerednecessary and could in some cases be misleading due to lack of qualification or to interference with theenvironment to be monitored. The overall work scope and responsibility are shown in the following table.
Tests and analysis will be shared by the NPPs as follows:
Pre-test analysis
Transient
Responsiblity
MSLB
PAKS
MB LOCAEDU
SB LOCA
EBO, EMO

PLANT
Blow down
PAKS
EDU
EBO, EMO

Post-test analysis
Transient

Responsibility

MSLB
MB LOCASB LOCAPAKSEDUEBO, EMO

Containment
ALL
ALL
ALL

EREC Test Facility
Blow down
Containment
EREC
ALL
EREC
ALL
EREC
ALL

EREC Test Facility
Blow-down correctedwith the measured data
EREC
EREC
EREC

Containment
ALL
ALL
ALL

The related administrative work has been started, aiming to perform the first test in June 2002.
Following the presentation of Mr. Bajsz, three presentations were given on the description of the three tests
and related boundary conditions. These were given by Ms. Toth, of Paks NPP, by Mr. Macek of the Czech
NRI and by Mr. Tka• of the Slovak VUJE…[however, handouts were provided only for the firstpresentation] As to the selected MSLB scenario, the case of MSLB on SG1 (steam line closed, feedwaterline opened, 2 valves, which were stuck, opened after dp> 5 bar) was selected in consideration of its
severity and negative frequency rate. A similar description is expected for the second and third test
(ACTION)

10.

Discussion

The discussion clarified, among others, the following aspects:-

There will not be repeated tests, but there will be enough time for feedback from one test to thefollowing one.

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11.

-

The main consideration is to collect data useful for code validation (more than to try to reproduce
all sorts of scenarios). The test parameter range on e.g. break size was chosen accordingly.

-

Efforts will be made to enable to perform calorimetric energy balance, which was an uncertainty inprevious tests (ACTION)-

The MSLB contains in reality a cluster of possible events. In recovering the test, consideration
was given to relevant possible events, as well as to difference among plants.

-

The MB and SBLOCA extend considerably the range of break size (500 mm in the previous LB
test, 200 mm in the planned MB and 90 mm in the SB). The SB size needs to be finalised(ACTION)-

Altogether, the group agreed that the three proposed tests were relevant ones and addressed therecommendations expressed in earlier assessments (Deliberation)-

There was agreement on the suggested instrumentation improvements. Details to be provided at
the next meeting (ACTION).

-

An understanding emerged that the issues of possible reduction of oscillations and resonance forsmaller breaks shall in one way or another be addressed. Many in the group believe that this is an
issue of a theoretical and speculative nature and that, if it exists, this phenomenon does not pose achallenge to the confinement structure of the BC. The Operating Agents should provide a way toresolve this issue, which appears to be the only one which is left without response (ACTION)

Next meeting

It was agreed that the next meeting will take place in Bratislava on 29th and 30th April. It will address:
EREC contract
Finalisation of the experimental programme
Scenarios to be addressed (for MB and SBLOCA)
Position with regard to the investigation of oscillation issue
SG report[On the latter point, consultations between the SG Chairman, the Project Manager and the NEA Secretariat
are to take place to set forth a tentative structure of the SG report, ahead of the next meeting - ACTION].

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Minutes of theThird Meeting of the
BUBBLER CONDENSER STEERING GROUP (SG)(Bratislava, 29-30 April, 2002)

1.

Welcome and Opening Remarks

The Chairman, Mr. Ivan Lux, welcomed the participants and thank the host, the Slovakian Safety authority
UJD and Mr. Husarcek for the preparation of the meeting. He then introduced Mr. Sienicki, from ANL,
USA, who attended the meeting for the first time. Mr. Sienicki said that for practical reasons he could notattend the previous meetings, but he received information through the OECD on what was going on. He
said that he has been working for about 25 years at ANL, mostly in the field of water reactor safety, andthat for the last several years he has addressed VVER safety including Bubbler-Condenser issues.
Mr. Frescura also welcomed the participants. He briefly recalled the motivations for this project and the
CSNI support to this Steering Group and mandate. He was looking forward to fruitful discussions andprogress during this meeting.
The meeting agenda is given in Appendix 1, the list of participants is given in Appendix 2.

2.

Adoption of the agenda

It was agreed that a brief presentation of the status of the B-C PHARE project will be given on point 10 of
the Agenda (other issues). Mr. Vitanza said that a suggestion to re-discuss and possibly modify the B-C
SG mandate had been received by the OECD. It was agreed that also this item be addressed on point 10 of
the Agenda. With this, the proposed Agenda was approved. The Chairman recalled that each participatingorganisation speaks with one voice only, so as to make the discussion more efficient.

3.

Approval of the minutes of the previous meeting

The minutes contained some errors on page 2 (Second Meeting in title and "reduction of" to be eliminatedin A 14) and page 3 ("at the last meeting" to be eliminated in A2 and "to a limited extent" to be corrected
at end of A5). With these corrections the minutes of the previous meeting were approved.

4.

Status of Action Items

The Chairman reviewed the status of the actions from the previous meeting, which were listed on the firstpage of the Minutes.
- A8.

This was a deliberation.

- A9

The scenario description was distributed to SG members ahead of the meeting.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12- A10

Mr. Bajsz said that the key point for calorimetric energy balance is to avoid the water spill-back.
This will be addressed during the meeting.

- A 11The size of break for the test no. 3 is 90 mm-A 12This was a deliberation- A 13

Details of the instrumentation of the tests will be presented during the meeting- A14

The issue of oscillations is on the meeting agenda (point 7)- A15

The present meeting has been planned according to what was recommended in this action item.

- A 16

There have been consultations between the SG Chairman, the Project Manager and the NEA
Secretariat on the structure of the SG report. This would be presented on point 9 of the Agenda.

With this, the action items from the previous meeting were completed.

5.

Status of the preparation of the experiments

Mr. Bajsz presented this item recalling the following points:

Blowdown calculations for the plant were performed for the three tests. In particular, the MSLB
calculations were performed by the Hungarian NPP, the MB 200 mm break calculations were madeby the Czech NRI, and the 90 mm break was calculated by the Slovak VUJE.

The above plant blowdown calculations were carried out for conditions and settings as specified in
the reports that were circulated to participants ahead of the meeting.



The corresponding test facility calculations are to be made by EREC personnel. The choice of the
break location at EREC has also been made: MSLB middle, 200 mm closest, 90 mm LOCA middle
position.



EREC has completed the MSLB calculations for the facility itself.

For the 90 mm break, the corresponding EREC orifice diameter is 8.5 mm.



The blowdown calculations (for NPP) made by the three OA parties provide the energy release vs.
time for the three types of tests. The outcome is (Energy in M Joule)Break
At 400 s
At 1000 s
At 2000 s

6.

MSLB
1.2.10 5
1.5.105
2.2.105

200 mm2.2.105
3.0.105
4.0.105

90 mm
1.4.105
1.8.105
2.6.105

Discussion

The observation was made that the 90 mm break and the MSLB exhibit similar energy release (Wolff),
implying that the statement made earlier that performing tests at lower beak size (i.e. < 90 mm) would havebeen difficult, was perhaps an exaggeration (Amri).

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
Mr. Wolff addressed a point, which he raised in earlier meetings on methodology pointing out that the
1:100 energy scale is not necessarily the optimal way to run the tests. In fact, the GRS intends to use a
different methodology (for the German-Russian bilateral test).
Mr. Téchy agreed with the above and noticed that the calculations for the EREC test facility are still
pending. The blowdown rate for EREC will be used to re-calculate CONTAIN loads for both NPP and
EREC. In practice, there will be an iterative procedure to define the EREC test parameters.
Mr. Bajsz recalled the table presented on page 10 of the second meeting minutes, which shows that all
three parties will make pre-test calculations on containment (pressure) for both plant and facility, for eachof the three tests.
Mr. Wolff was satisfied that such an iterative procedure would be put to work, noticing that this will takesome time.
The Chairman proposed to use the time ahead of the tests for more in-depth discussions andcommunications, both by e-mail or when needed by small group meetings. It was (later in the meeting)agreed that the NEA would set up an electronic discussion group constituted of the following persons:
Ivan Lux, J. Bajsz, M. Sabata, J. Macek, J. Sipek, J. Sienicki, A. Amri. H. Wolff, J. Husarcek, Z. Téchy, A.
Tkac.
During this discussion, Mr. Lux will be the group moderator. Mr. Bajsz presented the intended content of
the test report that would be prepared by the OA. It was (later in the meeting) clarified that there would be
two reports. One is a technical report that in the parts relevant to the new tests will be made available to
the SG. This contains the items as outlined in Appendix 3. This is a detailed experimental and analyticalreport. The second report will be a SG report to the CSNI, containing the main outcome of the project, theprogress made for the B-C assessment and key conclusions. This will not be a detailed technical report,
and the intention is to issue it as an OECD/CSNI report. The context is discussed in Agenda point 9.
The following comments were made on the proposed OA report layout.
- On point 2 one should explain that there are differences among plants and how these are relevant or
accounted for in the experiments.
- On point 3 one should recall key phenomena relevant for B-C and for different scenarios.
- The iterative methodology for the pre-test calculation should be included in point 4
The Chairman summarised the discussion as follows: The test description has been provided with asufficient degree of detail in terms of scenario, event sequence and released energy.
- The pre-test calculations are pending and efficient discussions are needed such that input and commentsfrom participants can be provided to the OA. The time set for discussions for the three tests will be:
May 13-17 for MSLB LOCA
May 20-24 for 200 mm breakMay 27-31 for 90 mm break
Each of these three steps will be preceded by communication of EREC calculation results.
- The proposed OA final report structure, with the suggestion made above, was approved.
Finally, the Chairman asked Mr. Bajsz to return to the point of calorimetric determinations andinstrumentation. Mr. Bajsz reiterated that the best way to provide calorimetric assessments is to avoid
water spill-back. Upon a question from Mr. Téchy, he pointed out that the water spray system does notinterfere with such measurement and that in any case the spray will not be activated for the 90 mm break.
With concern to instrumentation, there will be more temperature measurements, including in-watermeasurements.
7.

Discussion on relevance of possible oscillations.

Mr. Amri proposed a structure for the process to decide how to deal with this issue. This is shown in thefollowing figure
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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

OSCILLATIONS RISKARGUMENTATION(OCCURRENCE CONSEQUENCES)No

ARGUMENTS
ACCEPTABLE?

ISSUE CLOSEDTO DEFINE CONDITIONSAT WHICH THERE IS
OSC. RISKNo FACILITYIS EREC
REPRESENTATIVE?

TO DEFINE THE
APPROPRIATE SCENARIOTESTCODES VALIDATION(ON THE BASIS OF OTHER
RELEVANT TESTS)CALCULATIONAPPROACHING

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
Mr. Téchy suggested a pragmatic approach, i.e., wait and see if oscillation arises in the three tests
contemplated in the project or not.
Mr. Amri noted that we do not know when the oscillations may arise. Mr. Téchy agreed, adding,however, that one cannot for ever chose a phenomena that is thought it might occur but never observed (atrelevant conditions). If the tests show something, we will take it from there.
Mr. Bajsz presented a diagram of test 1 of the previous industrial project, which shows that some
oscillations took place in that test. However, they were of small amplitude (~4 kPa) and decreasing. Mr.
Bajsz also showed calculations indicating that for breaks of 200 mm or lower, the pressure load is below 2
bar regardless if the B-C is in function or not. For SBLOCA, the B-C function is not even needed, only for
LBLOCA (for which the anticipated pressure is 3 bar in absence of B-C, vs. a 2.5 bar confinement pressure
limitation) the B-C function is essential.
The Chairman asked at this point that the licensing authority state their position on the issue in question.
Mr. Husarcek said that in the Slovak Republic the issued license implies that the B-C function isconsidered satisfactory. There is no formal request to review this position. The tests done so far confirm
this position. We will see if the planned tests provide further confirmation or if some aspects such as
oscillations need to be reviewed.
Mr. Sipek from the Czech authority said that one in-depth review had been made based on earlier results.
In all experiments there was no trace that relevant oscillations might occur. Based on 25 years ofexperience, he can mention no technical conditions (relevant for B-C) for which oscillations can occur.
Mr. Téchy reiterated his viewpoint: wait and see the outcome of the tests.
Mr. Sienicki said that based on old experience, a correlation exists for the insurgence of oscillations. He
considered to come back after the meeting with remarks on this point.
Mr. Amri added that concerning the consequences, one might refer to radiological consequences, i.e.,
conditions for which fuel failure occurs. In principle, if there is no fuel failure, there should be no problem
with B-C liner failure. (At this point, an observation was made that there is no failure anticipated in a
SBLOCA).
Mr. Téchy returned to the point that for SB LOCA the spray system will take care of suppressing pressure
rise.
Mr. Wolff said that the presentation from Mr. Bajsz was interesting. He agreed that we wait for theoutcome of the tests and monitor if any oscillation occurs. He said, however, that some consideration on
oscillations was made in designing the B-C, since plastic burst foils were originally present in order toseparate the compartment system from the B-C. These were lately removed. He conceded that the issueof oscillations was raised in relation to BWRs, in which however the conditions are quite different from a
B-C situation, including flow of nearly air-free mixture through the B-C. Concerning the absence ofoscillations in B-C experiments performed so far Mr. Wolff mentioned, that they have all been related to
LB LOCA conditions and, thus, to a short process duration due to the reverse flow (spill-back) of water.
Mr. Bajsz added that in the BWR the pipe configuration is quite different from the one in B-C. One shouldbe very cautious about drawing comparisons.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
Mr. Macek stated that we do not know if and when oscillations occur. But, if they occur, we should
remember that there are 12 floors with trays, each responding differently. It is difficult to imagine that thewhole construction would vibrate with one frequency only.
Mr. Tkac said that if oscillations occur, there will be siphon effects that will end oscillations. This point
will be included in the OA report.
Mr. Wolff said that it would be useful to have a lower "cut" in terms of break size, below which no concern
exists for the B-C function. This "cut" can simply be an indicative value and will be addressed in the OA
report.
Mr. Téchy stated that if relevant oscillations occur in the EREC facility, this would perhaps beconservative with respect to the actual NPP situation (due to the 12 floors). He also stated that oscillations
are not related to a specific break size, so we should look for such evidence in the upcoming tests. They
will be long duration tests, which should favor spotting the size of such phenomena, if it does arise.
Mr. Wolff said that the MSLB scenarios in the bilateral test and in this tri-lateral project are quite different,
so we will cover a wide range for exploring insurgence of oscillations. Code calculations would be very
useful to link such test cases. As one SG member added, one thing is if oscillation may or may not occur,
another is if it has safety related consequences on the B-C function.
The Chairman summarised the discussion as follows:- The methodology proposed by Mr. Amri for addressing oscillations is a good one.
- Relevant oscillation phenomena have not been observed experimentally. However, the experimental
basis is limited at present.
- For authorities, oscillations are not a concern currently. They would reconsider this position if applicable
experiments show that relevant oscillations occur.
- The group takes the position to wait for the outcome of the tests. If the tests show no relevant
oscillations, then the matter is settled for the sake of this group. This would however not prevent othersfrom pursuing this issue further. If so, it is deemed useful.

8.

Status of the preparations at ERECThe current plans call for the following schedule- June 17-21:- July 01-05- July 15-19

Performance of the MSLB test
Performance of the 200 mm test
Performance of the 90 mm test

The status of EREC preparation was circulated prior to the meeting and is as follows:1.

The electrical equipment of the test facility has been revised. Status of the equipment appropriates
to requirements of exploitation. Control scheme of electrical heaters of vessels Vv1, Vv2, Vv5 will
be tested up to 30th April, 2002.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)122.

The main standard measurements (pressure, flow rate, temperature, pressure difference, level) havebeen revised and re-activated. These measurements are operational according to the nominal status.

3.

The electrical valves (53 units) of all test facility systems have been revised. Substitution of grease
has been realized. The function of valves has been verified. Defects of electrical drivers of valves
has been eliminated.

4.

The system of air supply to hermetic boxes has been verified. The system is operational according
to the nominal status.

5.

The sprinkler system has been verified. The system functions are under nominal status. The systemof water supply to the test facility and the system of drainage of the test facility have been verified.
The systems function under nominal status.

9.

Steering Group Activity Report

It was agreed that the structure of the activity report would be as follows:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Executive Summary (C. Vitanza, A. Amri)
Introduction (I. Lux) by end of September- Motivation for setting up the OECD SG- Abstract of mandate- Intended audience- Way of working- Layout of report
Background (J. Bajsz. H. Wolff) by the end of September- BC description and function- Experimental facility- Previous BC research- Open questions prior to BC Trilateral project- Analytical and experimental approach to respond to the open questions
Analyses (Zs. Techy, H. Wolff) by the end of September- VEIKI calculations of flow/temperature- Calculations of SBLOCA cases- Other
Experimental Approach (J. Bajsz)- Pre-test calculational results- Motivation and objectives for the tests- Justification for choice of scenario- What do the tests cover, what do they not cover, why is SBLOCA not considered?
- Test description and conduct- Results
Results interpretation (Zs. Techy)- Post test calculations- Answers to the open questions from the experiments
Conclusions (I. Lux, A. Amri)
Appendix 1: Mandate
Appendix 2: Minutes…..

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The OA report will be ready by the end of October, thus the draft Activity Report should be prepared by
mid-November. Parts of it, as indicated above, should be made ready by September.
A key recommendation is the consistency of the Activity Report and the OA report.

10.

Other items

10.1 Information on PHARE programme
Mr. Husarcek informed the participants that this programme has now been agreed upon and will involve
the three safety authorities on Hungary, Czech and Slovak republic. GRS will have the technical project
leadership. There will be an UK (SERCO), an Italian (ANPA) and a Russian party involved.
The kick-off meeting is foreseen to be held place in Prague in June.
The programme will concentrate on the review of the results of the past industrial experimental project (PH2.13/95), i.e., no experiments are envisaged. Details were provided in the previous meetings (see minutesof the SG meeting).
10.2 Mandate
It was agreed not to change the mandate. It was agreed that the mandate does state that the intention of the
project is to produce "convincing evidence" to resolve remaining questions on B-C function. However, it
does not presume that all aspects will be responded to by the intended tests. The national safety authorities
will in any case determine the extent to which the experimental evidence is sufficient for their assessments
and conclusions on B-C safety.
This concept should be adequately expressed in the introduction of the Activity report.
Further, it was agreed that the 4th SG meeting will be dedicated to the review of the SG Activity Report
11.

Next meeting

The next meeting will be held on 25th and 26th November, tentatively in Prague (Bratislava second option).

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Operating Agent Final Report, Structure and Content(Attachment to the Trilateral Agreement)

1.

Report purpose and objective

Content: Annotation and brief description of history of Final Report origin on the basis of EU and IAEA
activities; to what the report should be used; what is the objective of the report. It will also contain avery brief description with an overview of missions held in individual NPPs as well as opinion of
appropriate state regulatory body with references to developed documents. This part has to be preparedby each participant among all three parties.

2.

Description of the bubbler condenser system and comparison of individual NPPs

Content: description in the sense of already developed description of structure and design functions(performed jointly by Mochovce NPP, Bohunice NPP and Dukovany NPP). This description iscompleted by tables providing comparison of volume differences, main DBA parameters etc.

3.

Requirements for bubbler condenser qualification

Content: Fulfillment of bubbler condenser design function as response to change of parameters inside ahermetically sealed area (pressure reduction); specification of reasons for changes and course ofparameters inside hermetically sealed area (three types of LOCA, MSLB); boundary conditions forbubbler condenser qualification –summary of established parameters for environment and their courses
as response to DBA; requirements for bubbler condenser design functions.

4.

Qualification requirements fulfillment safety caseContent: This section will contain subsections with summary of conclusions to safety cases for initial
events (Max. LB LOCA, MSLB, ML LOCA and SB LOCA) inclusive their analytical parts. Each
responsible party shall create an appropriate subsection for the newly prepared tests. Such subsection
will contain in particular:• Specification for complementary experiment• Established representative discharge characteristics• Defined process for assessment and approval of results from analyses and experiments.
• Summary developed by each respective responsible party containing description and conclusionsof final report with regard to experiment performance.
• Summary of BC Steering Group standpoints.
A separate part for each individual experiment shall be an assessment of impact of previously identified
inhomogenity in distributions as well as assessment of phenomena attendant bubbler condenser
behavior during fulfillment of its design functions. It must be proved that these phenomena do not affectfunction and integrity of system. The following belongs to the observed phenomena:• Temperature distribution inhomogenity• Flow distribution inhomogenity• Chugging• Water escape from trays to chambers• Pressure waves occurrence• Water expulsion/ retaining from/out trays – passive sprinkling (feedback to check valve frompressure in containment)99

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
The subsection „max. LB LOCA„ shall be prepared jointly by all participants based on conclusions fromthe PH2.12/95.

5.

Summary of performed and remaining remedy measures for qualification completion.

Content: In relation to conclusions of subsections the participants shall jointly prepare an overview ofremaining remedy measures for completion of qualification (if any). Each party will complete this partby an overview of its own already performed actions on bubbler condenser tower.

6.

Overall conclusions

Content: Brief summary of analyzed DBAs with an approved scope of conclusions for presentation of
overall opinion on bubbler condenser tower qualification before the Bubbler Condenser SteeringGroup.

7.

References (Literature)

Content: Numbered list of relevant documents to which references are made in text of individual sections.

8.

AppendicesContent: Final reports to individual experiments could be appended as well as other documents
approved by participants of this trilateral agreement.

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Minutes of the
Fourth Meeting of the
BUBBLER CONDENSER STEERING GROUP (SG)Prague, 25th and 26th November, 2002

1.

Opening of the Meeting

The Chairman welcomed the participants and thanked the State Office for Nuclear Safety (SUJB) for
organising the meeting. Mr. Svab gave his welcome and said that all necessary arrangements were made inorder to have a successful meeting2.

Adoption of the agenda

The meeting Agenda was approved3.

Approval of the Minutes from the Previous Meeting

With a minor correction on page 7 (chase instead of chose), the minutes were approved.

4.
-

Status of Actions
The Chairman recalled that for the first test, pre-test calculations were distributed and thoroughlycommented on. The comments were fewer for the other two tests.

- With concern to the oscillations, the scheme of Mr. Amri on method was followed.
- The tests were carried out as scheduled.
- The first step of the activity report is done and the draft version of all chapters is available, except for theconclusions (and Executive Summary), which will be discussed during the meeting. With this, all theactions from the previous meeting were completed.

5.

Review of Test Results

Mr. Bajsz gave an overview of the test results. The tests were carried out as agreed in the SG. Their
execution was successful. The OA experts were present during the test execution. As agreed, additionaltemperature measurements were arranged. The tests showed similarities with previous tests in the sensethat no new physical phenomena were observed. Some uneven temperature distribution was registered asin previous experiences. The measured pressure and •P was much lower than the safety limit. A summaryof the main measured and calculated results is provided in the table below, which is also shown at the endof Section 4 of the SG activity report.

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NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12

Test

LBLOCA N4
LBLOCA N5
LBLOCA N1MSLB200mmLOCA
90mmLOCA

Break
Locationfrom BC
near
far
middlenear
near
middleP1 max(bar)

T1 max(bar)

Ps max
(bar)

dPmax
(Kpa)

dTwa
(oC)

2.76/2.86
2.51/2.48
2.09/2.25
1.52/1.60
1.45/1.56
1.36/1.42

130/132
127/127
121/124
112/172
104/112102/1082.08/2.16
2.02/2.02
1.90/1.96
1.50/1.52
1.45/1.49
1.37/1.37

19.2/17.6
15.8/18.2
11.2/11.1
7.1/8.8
5.7/6.9
4.8/5.2

15/29
15/28
13/10
5/12
5/10
5/17

The first value is the experimental result, whereas the second one represents the calculated value by the
CONTAIN code. As seen, the comparison is, with the exception of the temperature difference dTwa andthe temperature T1max in the MSLB case, rather satisfactory. Some minor oscillations with 2 Hz frequency
were observed in the early phase of the tests.
On the MSLB test, Mr. Bajsz also explained how the results of the tests were fed into the post-test code
calculations in order to verify critical test measurements or results.
Mr. Macek and Mr. Denk provided a review of the NRI (Czech Republic) pre- and post-calculations on the
200 mm LOCA test. The pre-test conclusions were that the EREC tests would provide a good applicability
to NPP. The post-test calculations gave a good comparison with temperature data, whereas pressures were
somewhat overestimated.
Mr. Tkac presented the post-test analyses which were carried out at VUJE (Slovakia) and an overview of
how calculations compare with experiments. Such a comparison was in general rather satisfactory.
Mr. Amri asked if the nodalisation in COCOSYS was fine enough for the purpose of the comparison madeby NRI. Mr. Macek replied that a standard nodalisation was used (the same 6 node model as in theprevious industrial project).
Mr. Wolff expressed his appreciation for the analyses carried out by the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak
colleagues. He added that there are differences between the EREC set-up and the NPP, which need to bemodeled. He suggested the following scheme:
NPP calculations • BC pre-test •Calculations calculationsTEST• B C post-test• N PP calculations

Since EREC is a satisfactory model of the reference plant bubble condenser containment. However, there
is a number of differences between the EREC model and the BCC, which restrict the trivial
implementation of results to the plant. Therefore codes are needed to link the test results to NPP situations.
Mr. Bajsz said that this is exactly the purpose of the analytical effort made by the OAs. Mr. Wolff wassatisfied that the blowdown rate was correctly quantified and verified, as this was an important issue,
which had raised questions in the past. With regard to the calculated temperature in the MSLB case hementioned the importance of the thermocouple orientation on the measured value. In order to avoid apossible collection of water at downward oriented thermocouples, the orientation was changed to upwards
shortly before the steam line break accidents test (in the frame of the German-Russian bilateral project).
Mr. Techy went through the interpretation of the results, which basically consisted of a review of Chapter 5of the Activity Report. Mr. Amri observed that in one of the tests the peak pressure was predicted by one
code (CONTAIN, MBLOCA 200 mm) much earlier than in the other two codes (COCOSYS andTRACO). Mr. Techy said that in fact there was a pressure plateau, which lasted for quite some time.

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6.

Status of the Final Report on the Experiments

Mr. Bajsz had already explained the outcome of the tests and related analyses, which will be compiled into
the Final Report made by the utilities and addressed to the safety organistions in Hungary, the Czech
Republic and the Slovak Republic.
During the discussion, it became clear that a clarification is needed as to which reports will be produced bywhom and their denomination. Mr. Vitanza observed that there is in fact an ambiguity in the SG Mandate,where reference is made to an "activity report" and to a "final report". At the time when the SG Mandate
was written, it was not known that the OAs would prepare their own "final report", thus, the two terms
were used to refer to one report only.
In conclusion:•

For the purpose of the BC-SG work, there will be one report only and it will be called "SG Activity
report". This report is the one being produced by SG as agreed at the last SG meeting, and which will
be discussed under Agenda item 7. The draft report will be made available before the end of January
and will be subject to CSNI approval for publication as a CSNI report.

•

For the purpose of the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak utilities reporting to their safety authorities, there
will be another report called "Final Report". This will be ready by the end of January. The utilities
plan to have the SG Activity Report included as an appendix in their "Final Report. The content of thisFinal Report was presented at the last SG meeting, and is outlined in Appendix 3 of the minutes fromthe last meeting.

7.

Discussion on Answers to Pending Questions

The SG agreed on the following answer to the pending questions:

Q1.

The scaling of energy discharge rate is important for determining the thermal-hydraulic load oncontainment structure. Can estimates be made on whether the conclusions drawn are or notconservative, and if they are, on the degree of conservatism?

A1.

The verification of the blow-down mass and energy rates (MER) producing loads to the BC was
performed in the frame of the present project for both the previous LBLOCA tests and for the recent
tests. Results confirmed conservative mass and energy estimations. It was shown that the injected
MER were higher in the tests than the scaled MER (NPP/100) values.
These findings confirmed the conservative nature of the approach. Conclusions were that the relatedloads do not represent a challenge to containment integrity.
A parallel assessment of this issue with respect to LBLOCA tests is going on in the PHARE project
PR/TS/17.

Q2.

Are the conservatism and adequacy of the BC facility properly addressed?

A2.

The first part of the question concerning conservatism (initial conditions, scenarios, test conditions,different break locations, etc.) can be answered positively. The adequacy was addressed by the103

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scaling of the facility and possible distortions were compensated by different measures (e.g.
installation of additional insulation).

Q3.

Unexpected non-uniformity of flow rates and of water temperatures has been observed in earlier
tests. Are these observations relevant and why? Can specific code calculations help in thisassessment?

A3.

Non-uniformities of flow rates and water temperatures have been observed in the experiments. An
appropriate understanding of the non-uniformities was obtained by detailed (3D) code calculations.
The reasons and the nature of the distributions have been satisfactorily explained by code
calculations.

The above questions are the ones contained in the SG Mandate to be answered. The answers represent the
SG consensus and will be included in the conclusions of the Activity Report.

8.

Status of the SG Activity Report

The Chairman went through a detailed review of the various chapters of the draft Activity report. A
number of changes were proposed to contributors of the various chapters. It was agreed that the answers
on pending questions will be included in the conclusions and executive summary. Mr. Sienicki will help
with a clarification of the concept of conservatism.
The following steps were agreed upon:1.

The corrections to the various chapters will be made by mid-December

2.

The conclusions will be prepared by the end of December.

3.
The executive summary and the entire Draft Activity Report will be prepared before the end ofJanuary
Mr. Wolff requested that in Chapter 5 the COCOSYS calculations made by NRI be skipped, since no
explanation is given for the differences with respect to measured pressure values in steam generator boxes
during SBLOCA. Mr. Techy did not agree. Mr. Macek said the COCOSYS predictions were not bad (thetrend of calculated and experiment values are the same) and heat losses can explain differences in mostcases (definition of boundary conditions). For an exact evaluation of results of computer code against
experimental data all main parameters must be take in to account (pressure, temperature in all main
volumes of hermetic boxes and BC).
It was also agreed that the minutes of the SG meetings be included as Appendices to the Activity Report.
The Chairman said that he would report on the BC SG outcome at the next CSNI meeting.
9.

Other information from SC members

Mr. Wolff reported on the progress of the PHARE Project. There will be a meeting in mid-December with
the Hungarian, Czech and Slovak regulatory bodies for finalising the experiment propagation andreviewing the analytical support. He added that the SG activity might be referred to in the reporting made104

NEA/CSNI/R(2003)12
within the PHARE Project. However, they will b e referred to as neutral statements, i.e., it is not intended
to "evaluate" such activities yet.
10.

ClosureThe Chairman thanked all the participants and in particular the project manager, Mr. Bajsz for theirconstructive contribution to the project.

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Appendix 3

SG Members(and participants of last meeting)

Mr. Ivan LUX, Chairman

Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority

Mr. Pavel KRESAN
Mr. Miroslav SABATA
Mr. Miroslav SVAB
Mr. Jiri MACEK,
Mr. Jaromir SIPEKMr. Lubomir DENK
Mr. Abdallah AMRI
Mr. Holger WOLFF
Mr. Zsolt TECHYMr. Jozsef BAJSZ
Mr. Jan HUSARCEK
Mr. Pavol BAUMEISTER
Mr. Jaroslav HOLUBECMr Jozef HUTTA
Mr. Imrich KRAJMER
Mr. Jan BORAK
Mr. Andrej TKAC
Mr. James SIENICKI
Mr. Eduard DEKSNISEDU, Czech Republic
EDU, Czech Republic
SUJB, Czech Republic
NRI, Rez, Czech RepublicState Office for Nuclear Safety, Czech Republic
NRI, Rez, Czech Republic
IRSN, France
GRS, Germany
Institute for Electric Power Research Co., Hungary
Paks NPP, Hungary
Nuclear Regulatory Authority of the Slovak Rep.
NPP Mochovce, Slovak Republic
NPP Mochovce, Slovak Republic
Jaslovske Bohunice NPP, Slovak Republic
Jaslovske Bohunice NPP, Slovak Republic
Jaslovske Bohunice NPP, Slovak Republic
VUJE, Slovak Republic
Argonne National Laboratory, USAEC

Mr. Carlo VITANZAOECD Nuclear Energy Agency

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