Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 2 No. 4 | August 2007

Japan’s Policy Agenda
for East Asia
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE

Japanese foreign policy faces a crucial test in the
coming years as the international system comes to be
increasingly defined by multipolarity and multilateralism. The poster child for the emergence of this new
global order is none other than East Asia itself, whererapid economic growth, a gradual redistribution of
power, and the increasingly important role of multilateral cooperation and regional institutions aredramatically transforming the region. Despite having proceeded relatively smoothly to this point, thismetamorphosis continues to lack a clear long-term
vision to guide policy. What follows is a series of policy proposals through which to ensure the long-term
peace, stability, and prosperity of East Asia.

The Evolving Shape of East Asia
It goes without saying that one of the most important developments in Asia in recent years has been
the incredible economic growth throughout the region, manifest most clearly in the rise of both China
and India. While such economic expansion has no
doubt had a number of positive effects on the region,it also brings with it a fair share of challenges.
Although the global ramifications of the economic growth of both China and India may seemto be ­similar at first glance, global perceptions of thepotential impact of each country’s rise vary. China’s
pursuit of a benign—yet increasingly assertive—foreign policy, which has been characterized by ­doubledigit and nontransparent annual increases in its
defense expenditures, is coupled with elements ofrising nationalistic tendencies, thus giving rise toconcern in some circles about the uncertainty of its
future course.
On the other hand, while India also seeks a more
assertive role in international affairs commensuratewith its growing economic strength, Japan and othernations tend to see India as a collaborative partner.
There are three main reasons that this perception
differs from that toward China: India’s status asan established democracy; its history as one of thefounding members of the Non-Aligned Movement
during the Cold War; and its strengthening ties with
the West, as clearly demonstrated in its improving
relationship with the United States.
A few hundred kilometers west of Tokyo lies
North Korea, a country with a population just onesixtieth the size of China or India. Nevertheless, it
is one of the most important factors affecting thefuture peace and stability of the region. Althoughthere are signs that an end to its nuclear weapons
program may be possible in the near future, it isan unfortunate reality that the challenges on the
Korean Peninsula do not stop with the shutdownof the Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Even if all of thegoals delineated in the Six-Party Joint Statement of
February 13, 2007, are achieved successfully, continued economic and energy assistance, as well as theeventual reunification of the peninsula, guaranteethat North Korea will remain an important issue foryears to come.
No commentary on the region would be complete without mention of ASEAN and the challenges
Southeast Asia continues to face. While annual GDP
growth rates in the subregion have averaged a very
respectable 5 percent in recent years, ASEAN countries continue to struggle for better governance, as
corruption, environmental degradation, and an expanding gap between the rich and poor remain serious issues—not only in their own right but also as
substantial threats to sustainable development.

supplement that loss and make sure that Japan’s bestdays are ahead of and not behind it.

Official Development AssistanceThroughout the postwar era, official development
assistance (ODA) has been one of Japan’s most important diplomatic tools in East Asia. Henceforth,
Japan would be well served to expand its ODA program and improve its standing in the region. The
unfortunate reality, however, is that current policy
seems to be headed in an entirely different direction.
In spite of the various pledges made in recent years
by Japanese leaders to significantly expand Japan’s
ODA program, the ODA budget continues to shrink,having fallen by 40 percent over the past decade.
The top ODA donor nation throughout most of the
1990s, Japan now ranks third after the United States
and Britain, and if budget cuts continue, it will soon
find itself out of the top five.
These recent cutbacks are largely the result ofgovernment efforts to address Japan’s massive public
debt. While such a policy makes sense from a budget
perspective, it comes in the context of leaders calling for Japan to adopt a more “normal” and assertiverole in global affairs. If leaders truly wish for Japan
to be considered a regional ­leader, then its East Asia
policy needs to place greater emphasis on developing its soft-power resources. ODA is arguably themost important of these diplomatic tools.

Japan’s Vision for East Asia
There is no doubt that Japan’s policy toward East Asia
is inextriciably linked to its role outside the region.
However, despite political rhetoric to the contrary,
the reality is that Japan’s influence within the international community is in relative decline. The riseof China and India point to a day in the near futurewhen Japan will no longer enjoy status as the world’s
second largest economy. Nevertheless, this development need not be seen in zero-sum terms; rather, it
provides an opportunity for Japan to reinvent itself
as a global and regional leader in areas outside theeconomic sphere.
Japan is one of a select group of countries with thecapacity to have an impact on events far beyond its
borders. When one takes recent structural changes
in the international system into account, it becomes
clear that the only way for Japan to increase this influence is to reinforce its role as a global democratic
power. To this end, Japan must strengthen its policy
tools and reinvigorate its policy toward the region.
While Japan’s relative economic strength may be on
the decline, enhanced diplomacy and soft power can
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Article 9
The time has come for Japan to update its interpretation of Article 9 of the constitution to more accurately reflect global realities. Although all nations
are afforded the right to collective self-defense underinternational law, the Japanese government’s current
interpretation of Article 9 forbids Japan from exercising this right. Consider the following cases, all ofwhich are unconstitutional under the government’s
current interpretation of Article 9: 1) The Japanese
Self-Defense Forces (SDF) cannot use force to repel
an attack on a US warship on the high seas, even if an
SDF vessel is in the immediate vicinity. 2) Japan cannot shoot down a missile launched by a hostile nation
unless Japan itself is under direct attack. (In ­ otherVol. 2 No. 4 | August 2007

words, Japan can do nothing even if it knows thatthe missile is headed for the United States.) 3) SDF
officers participating in UN peacekeeping operations(PKO) cannot return fire against hostile targets thathave fired on friendly PKO personnel from othernations, even if they are in the immediate vicinity.
4) Even if not actually engaged in hostilities, the SDF
is not allowed to provide logistical support to US
military forces or forces operating under a directivefrom the UN Security Council unless such support
occurs in a clearly designated “noncombat area.”
The scenarios described above make it clear thata reinterpretation of Article 9 is a prerequisite forJapan to be able to make a sincere contribution tointernational peace and stability.

do little more than upset regional development andstability. Japan and others must instead encourage­China to become a responsible player—i.e., to enjoy
the benefits of inclusion in, while faithfully observing the norms of, the international system. Japan’s
basic policy toward China should be oriented toward
two primary goals: hedging against uncertainties relating to China’s future course while simultaneously
engaging China in “inclusive multilateralism.”
The first layer of this policy calls for a strengthening of strategic ties among the region’s four largest
democratic states (Japan, India, Australia, and theUnited States) as well as an increased emphasis on
US bilateral security alliances and security partnerships in the region. Since such a policy, if pursued
in isolation, risks either ostracizing or antagonizing
China, the most sensible way forward must instead
have as its primary focus inclusive multilateralism.
This second layer calls on Japan to actively engage
China in regional and global rules-based communities, bringing it into multilateral dialogue on everything from macro­economic policy to talks on energy and the environment. The most effective way toachieve this goal is to increase support for regional
community-building processes already underway.

The Japan-America Security Alliance
The Japan-America Security Alliance, along with
America’s other security partnerships in the region,
will continue to serve as a guarantor of regional stability for the foreseeable future. Despite the dramatic global transformation manifest in the post–Cold
War world, these traditional “hard” security ­alliances
continue to play a role as a hedge against unpredictable future threats. States throughout the region,even China, have acknowledged the contributionthat the US military presence in East Asia makes toregional stability.
Japan’s relationship with the United States should
continue to function as the foundation of its diplomacy. Nevertheless, the scope of the alliance must
be redefined to make regional and global challenges
a core aspect of the bilateral relationship. As East
Asia enters into a critical transition period in the­community-building process, it is incumbent uponthese two democratic powers to expand cooperationand dialogue on how best to realize the emergenceof a stable regional order. It is Japan’s responsibility
to make every effort to ensure that the United Statesremains actively involved in the region.

North Korea
The ultimate goal in the Six-Party Talks is a comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear issue
that not only guarantees that the North Korean regime disbands its nuclear program but also ensuresthat Pyongyang thoroughly transforms its policies
and begins to actively engage the international community. Such a solution will undoubtedly mandatethat the other five parties be willing to learn frompast mistakes and at all times present a united front.
If they are able to do this, North Korea will be left withno choice but to make a strategic decision and fully­honor its commitments to the February agreement.
Japan’s decision to opt out of the initial oil shipment to North Korea and demand a resolution to theabductees issue as a prerequisite for more active participation in the negotiations invited a great deal of
criticism from overseas, with some individuals goingso far as to suggest that Japan has isolated itself from

China
China’s economic rise and increasing influence inglobal affairs is more or less a historic inevitability, and efforts to contain China at this stage would
EAST ASIA INSIGHTSVol. 2 No. 4 | August 2007

the four other nations. Japan’s apparent “hard line”
demands a brief explanation.
There are two primary reasons for Japan’s basic
stance. First, the past two decades of negotiations
with Pyongyang have made it abundantly clear that
the North Korean nuclear issue can only be permanently settled through a comprehensive solution.
In this context, the Japanese government is merely
insisting that the abductees issue be treated as one
aspect of this agreement. Second, the six parties
made clear in the February agreement that any comprehensive solution to the North Korean nuclear issue has as one of its core elements progress in normalization talks between Japan and North Korea.
The abduction of Japanese citizens is an affront toJapan’s national sovereignty and the government has
an obligation to guarantee the safety and wellbeingof its people. Normalization talks will proceed once
the North Korean regime shows a sincere commitment to resolving this ­issue.

and economic systems, cultures, religions, and ethnicities and lacks the history and common values ofa continent like Europe. However, such a mindset
fails to realize that it is not the formal creation ofa particular institution but the process of community building itself that is the main goal of regionalism. An emphasis on action-oriented regionalism,
through which actors are bound together by rules
and operations, rather than (necessarily) values, religion, or political systems, will go far in pushing theprocess forward.
Other critics express concern that an EAC would
merely be a façade for China’s pursuit of regionalhegemony. However, these critics fail to realize three
key points. First, while China’s leaders indeed seek
greater influence on regional affairs, “greater influence” may be relative rather than absolute. Second,as mentioned above, the fundamental aim of community building is not the creation of the institution itself but the process. That process would engage China at every step along the way, consolidate
trust and confidence among regional states, andmake clear to China the immense benefits of multilateralism. Third, in light of the issues that need tobe addressed in the region, such as energy efficiency
and the environment, capacity building, and publichealth, it is clear that the country with the greatest
resources, and therefore most qualified to lead community building, is in fact Japan, not China.
One final point is the fact that the continued presence of the United States is of integral importancefor the lasting peace, stability, and economic development of the region. Japan must campaign more
actively for the United States to stay involved in theregion and to more clearly articulate an American
vision for Asia’s future.

East Asia Community
The continued expansion and deepening of multilateral dialogue throughout East Asia in recent years
reveals a growing desire among states to consolidate regionalism and move further along the path­toward the establishment of an East Asia Community (EAC). Not only would the spread of a supranational “East Asian” identity be a means to movebeyond the confrontational, nationalistic sentimentthat has been on the rise in recent years, but further
community building could reduce economic disparities and create a more stable and secure region.
Despite the enormous potential benefits of regionalism, however, there continues to be insufficient dialogue in Japan about its merits outside of the economic sphere. While the proliferation of economic
and financial ties no doubt plays a fundamental rolein the community-building process, policymakers
must realize that “regionalism” is much more thanjust economic interdependence, and Japan has an
obligation to adopt a more active role.
Some critics argue that a European-style regional superstructure in East Asia is an ­unrealistic goal
given that East Asia has a diverse array of political
EAST ASIA INSIGHTSA Rules-Based Regional Economic System
Community building in East Asia will undoubtedly
begin with intraregional economic and financial cooperation. This economic community must go beyond the scope of the WTO and address not merely
trade in goods and services but also investment,
standards, and the movement of people. A ­regional(ASEAN+6) economic partnership ­ agreementVol. 2 No. 4 | August 2007

would go far toward achieving these goals and laying the groundwork for the future establishment ofa broader Asia Pacific/APEC free trade zone. This
community should be linked to global institutions
such as the WTO and observe the rules and obligations of the global system. The same holds true forthe establishment of a regional monetary fund.
East Asia may be well known for its near doubledigit GDP growth rates in recent years, but what isoften overlooked is the appalling degree of disparity
between rich and poor within the region. The average per capita GDP in Singapore remains more than
50 times that of Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar,
three countries whose people live on an average income of only US$1.11 per day. In order to alleviatethese economic disparities and create more balanced
growth in the region, Japan must place greater emphasis on human development and support for economic and institutional capacity building. Targeted
ODA investments to develop physical infrastructure
in Southeast Asia will be an integral aspect of thispolicy. Following the success of its programs in Vietnam and Laos, the government should also expand
its intellectual ODA ­program.

action on issues of common concern—would alsofunction as an effective confidence-building measure, setting the stage for still deeper community
building in the future. The membership of an East
Asia Security Forum would consist of a small coreof nations, such as ASEAN+6 and the ­United States.
The forum would have as its mandate a proactive
and operational approach to handling regional security, cooperatively addressing threats in a manner
similar to the ­ American-led Proliferation Security
Initiative.
In addition to the valuable role that the ARF continues to play as a forum for ministerial dialogue on
security issues, the Six-Party Talks format has also
emerged as an important framework for multilateral
cooperation on threats to regional stability. Despite
its originally ad-hoc nature, this novel subregional
forum should continue to function as a confidencebuilding measure even after final resolution of theNorth Korean nuclear ­issue.

Conclusion
Given the increasing importance of the region to
global stability, policymakers must continue to keepa close eye on the changes taking place in East Asia.
As the most powerful democracy in the region, ­Japan
must not only clarify its long-term vision for the region but also develop a clear policy through whichto achieve its goals and make an active contribution to the long-term peace, stability, and prosperity of East Asia. There has been no other time when
Japan’s policy toward East Asia has been of greater
importance.

East Asia Security ForumOne of the most pressing areas demanding expanded regional cooperation is security. East Asia
is in need of a new regional body capable of taking
proactive steps on security issues such as humanand drug trafficking, infectious disease, resource
scarcity, maritime piracy, and WMD proliferation,
all of which continue to pose a threat to regional
stability.
The creation of a multilateral institution to tackle
such nontraditional and transnational security issues would foster a more secure environment forcontinued economic expansion and—through joint

Hitoshi Tanaka was Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan until August 2005. He is currently a Senior Fellow at JCIE.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from the Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
www.jcie.or.jp

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

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© 2007 Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 2 No. 4 | August 2007