Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 4 No. 1 | April 2009

A New Vision for theUS-Japan Alliance
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE

Nearly six decades after its creation, the US-Japan
alliance once again stands at a crossroads. The relative decline of US global influence, the gradual redistribution of power in East Asia, and the global
economic crisis have led pundits on both sides ofthe Pacific to question the alliance’s continued viability and relevance. It is incumbent upon Japaneseleaders to sit down with the Obama administration
to discuss how the US-Japan partnership should
evolve to tackle existing challenges and map out along-term vision for the alliance’s future.
Going forward, the broad objectives of the alliance should be to maximize opportunities for economic and security cooperation among states in theregion and to minimize the risk that existing traditional and nontraditional security threats could
upset regional stability and economic growth. The
two states must reinvigorate the bilateral security
alliance, lead efforts to reform and strengthen global governance, and work with regional partners toactively ensure the peace, stability, and prosperityof East Asia. The partnership between Japan andthe United States must evolve into a more inclusive and comprehensive force for peace, stability,cooperation, and prosperity throughout the Asia
Pacific region and the world.

Concerns about Japanese PoliticalLeadership
One prerequisite for proactive Japanese diplomacy
is greater stability in Japanese domestic politics.
Ever since the opposition Democratic Party of Japan took control of the House of Councillors inJuly 2007, Diet politics have reached an impasse. In
the two and a half years since former Prime Minister Koizumi stepped down at the end of his termas Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) president, theruling coalition has anointed a series of ineffectual prime ministers. Unfortunately, high turnoveramong Japanese prime ministers is not merely arecent trend. Former US President George W. Bushinteracted with five Japanese prime ministers overthe course of his eight-year administration (2001–2009). His predecessor, Bill Clinton (1993–2001),
interacted with seven.
In the past, such high turnover was not seen asa serious problem. After all, although the prime
minister changed often, the party in power—theLDP—was a constant. Additionally, the Japanesebureaucracy was very powerful, particularly theMinistry of Foreign Affairs. Together, these twofactors ensured relative stability in Japanese foreign policy. However, circumstances have changed

strategy is already paying dividends, and there aresigns that Beijing is gradually adopting the mantle
of a responsible global stakeholder.

over the past several years. Not only must the LDP
now deal with an opposition-controlled House ofCouncillors, but public discontent with its leadership has reached a boiling point, and it is increasingly likely that it will lose the upcoming generalelection. Furthermore, the bureaucracy is underconstant attack, and it is unlikely that it will ever
exercise as much influence over foreign policy as
it once did.
It is abundantly clear that the time has come forpolitical realignment and reform. Without stable
leadership and a prime minister who has received
a strong policy mandate from the voters, Japan will
be unable to make a proactive contribution to its
alliance with the United States.

Redefining the Role of the US-Japan
Alliance
The reaffirmation of the US-Japan alliance in themid-1990s made significant progress toward creating a more balanced relationship, yet the process
remains incomplete. Until the United States treats
Japan as a fully independent partner, the consolidation of a healthier and more productive relationship will be impossible.
The past two decades have seen a remarkable
expansion in Japan’s contributions to the international community through official development
assistance (ODA), humanitarian aid such as tsunami relief and Iraq reconstruction, and Japan
Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) involvement in UN
peacekeeping operations. Japan has also taken aleadership role in maritime security in the region:it has been the primary force behind a multi-national Coast Guard forum, is an active contributor
to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), andhas the JSDF currently supporting maritime interdiction operations in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, on March 14 of this year, two JSDF escort
ships were dispatched to the coast of Somalia onan antipiracy mission.
Although substantial progress has been madein recent years, there is no doubt that severe constraints on Japanese security policy remain a concern. Perhaps none of these constraints has received
more attention over the years than Article 9 of theJapanese constitution, a clause which renounces
war and the threat or use of force as a sovereign
right of the nation. The Japanese government’s official interpretation of Article 9 is not only inconsistent with contemporary global norms but is also
somewhat at odds with the UN Charter, which affords the right of collective self-defense to all nations. Under the current interpretation, the JSDF
is forbidden from participating in any missions
that may involve combat, including even those operations that have received explicit sanction fromthe UN Security Council (UNSC). A more flexible
interpretation of Article 9 would set the stage for
the JSDF to adopt a role in multilateral security

Concerns about Tightening US-ChinaRelations
At the same time, there has been a sharp increaseover the past few years in the number of Japanese
analysts who are concerned about the future ofUS-Japan relations in the face of stronger USChina relations. Many fear that the Obama administration will downgrade bilateral relations
and begin to treat China—rather than Japan—as
the United States’ most important partner in Asia.
Despite the fact that there is little ground for suchconcern, the Obama administration has nevertheless made a concerted effort to mitigate Japanesefears. Secretary Clinton’s first stop during her trip
to East Asia was in Tokyo, during which time she
extended an invitation to Prime Minister Aso to be
the first head of government to call upon President
Obama at the White House. Such actions, coupledwith President Obama’s nomination and appointment of several seasoned East Asia experts to important foreign policy posts, have reaffirmed theimportance that the Obama administration places
on US relations with Japan and East Asia.
Japanese fears that the United States will eschew
cooperation with Japan and embrace China areunwarranted. Rather than being feared, healthyand stable relations between the United States andChina should be encouraged. By engaging Chinaand encouraging it to play a constructive role inglobal affairs, the United States is pursuing a policy line that suits not only its own interests but
also those of Japan and the rest of the world. ThisEAST ASIA INSIGHTS

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The Obama administration has advocated theend of US unilateralism and an embrace of multilateralism and international institutions. A key
component of Japan and the United States’ contributions to regional and global peace and stability
should be their joint effort to champion the reformof global governance.
Arguably the biggest question mark regarding
the future of global governance concerns the United Nations. Japan and the United States should
push for comprehensive reform of the UNSC. They
must see to it that Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India are made permanent members—although thespecifics of the permanent seats, including issues
concerning veto rights, should be negotiable—andmake sure that the UNSC is transformed into an
institution capable of quickly sanctioning joint security operations whenever global stability comesunder threat.
Other key global governance–related issues forthe two nations to discuss include reform of the“Bretton Woods” institutions to more accuratelyreflect current global realities and the future rolesof the G8 and G20. A growing chorus of voices
has begun to claim that the expanding influenceof the developing world has rendered the G8 ananachronistic institution. In order to stay relevant,they argue, the G8 must be expanded to include
China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, andpossibly a Middle Eastern state. Meanwhile, others argue that—at least as far as economic matters
are concerned—the G20, not the G8, should be thecentral global policy coordination body.
As discussions between Japan and the UnitedStates on these issues move forward, the two allies
must be sure to take two key criteria into accountwhen exploring the best way to reform global institutions. The first criterion is effectiveness. Institutions must be adaptable to the vicissitudes
of global affairs and capable of taking quick andproactive action in response to new challenges.
Institutions must also have inclusive membershipand reflect the changes that have taken place inthe global system since the 1940s (the decade inwhich many currently existing global institutions
were established). The second criterion relates tovalues: although the makeup of global institutions may change as their memberships becomes

operations that transcends humanitarian aid andlogistical support and make a greater contribution
to both the US-Japan alliance and the peace andstability of the international community.
The Japanese government must also work toestablish a permanent legal foundation to govern
JSDF dispatch. The exigency of this legislation became manifest in winter 2008 when inter-party
bickering over the JSDF’s participation in US-led
operations in the Indian Ocean led to months oflegislative gridlock in the Diet. The passage of ageneral law to provide clear guidelines for JSDF
activities overseas is thus necessary.
At the same time, leaders in Washington must
understand that the JSDF will not be able to engage in the same range of operations as the USmilitary. The time has therefore come for Japanand the United States to intensify discussions
about the nature of each nation’s contribution tothe alliance.
In recent years, several influential Japanese politicians have begun to discuss a proposition thatwould see the US military presence in Japan decrease as Japan’s defense capability increases. While
this proposition basically makes sense, it is important to realize that the two nations’ militaries havedifferent roles and missions; not all US forces inJapan are easily replaced by JSDF equivalents. The
JSDF is primarily defensive in nature, and Japanlacks serious offensive or power-projection capabilities. For example, Japan is incapable of a preemptive missile strike against North Korea, and inorder to send forces to Iraq, the SDF had to makerefueling stopovers in other countries. It is also
clear that Japan will continue to depend on the US
nuclear umbrella for the foreseeable future.
Nevertheless, there are certainly areas in which
Japan is capable of gradually taking over responsibility from US forces. For example, a primaryfunction of the US Marine presence in Japan iscrisis management. As Japan improves its ability
to respond to a regional contingency by enacting
various legal frameworks and as ever-advancing
technologies enable rapid global deployment ofUS troops, a reduction of the Marine presence will
become increasingly practical. The two nations
should thus explore possibilities for a more flexible arrangement regarding US forces in Japan.
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norms of behavior, the transaction costs of interaction will decrease, which will in turn deepen
trust, interdependence, and stability throughout
East Asia.
At the same time that Japan and the UnitedStates actively engage China in regional and global
rules-based communities and bring it into multilateral dialogue on issues ranging from macroeconomic policy to talks on energy and theenvironment, they must also work with other US
allies to hedge against the uncertainty surrounding China’s future. Concerns abound about several
aspects of China’s foreign policy—including issues related to rapidly rising defense expenditures,
military transparency, and its aggressive approachto energy security—and domestic policy—such as
CO2 emissions and environmental damage, treatment of minorities, and income disparities. Japanand the United States should place priority on encouraging China to pursue economic policies thatwill make a constructive contribution to efforts toaddress the global economic crisis, make its military affairs more transparent, and agree to fully
participate in the successor to the Kyoto Protocol.
With respect to security issues, Japan and theUnited States should initiate and institutionalize regular trilateral security dialogue with China
involving civilian and military personnel. This
would provide a forum through which to advocate
increased transparency, reduce mutual suspicions,and consolidate trust between the region’s threegreat powers. Stable security ties among these threenations are a prerequisite for long-term peace andstability in the region.
In recent years, the Six-Party Talks format has
emerged as an effective sub-regional security forum for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue, but we still have, unfortunately, a lengthy andbumpy ride ahead of us before the nuclear issue
is resolved. This forum, which has succeeded inbringing together the five most powerful statesin the region to openly discuss and cooperate inresolving a security issue of common concern,should remain active even after the nuclear issue issettled and be used to address remaining issues on
the Korean Peninsula.
Emerging nontraditional security issues pose
an increasingly serious threat to regional stability.

more inclusive, it is nevertheless imperative thatthese institutions continue to treat the creation ofa rules-based and democratic system as their primary objective. For example, at the time of its establishment, the G7’s core identity was that of “we,advanced industrial democracies.” Over the past
several decades, it is these advanced industrial democracies that have taken responsibility for global
peace and prosperity, serving as leaders on tradeliberalization, ODA expansion, and efforts to curtail CO2 emissions.
It is possible that these two criteria are somewhat incompatible. In order to prevent this issue
from becoming a major obstacle to reform, thesystem of global institutions should be conceptualized as concentric circles. For example, at thesame time that the G7/G8 should be strengthened
as a core entity (the inner circle), more inclusive
groupings—such as the G20—should exist ascomplementary institutions (the outer circle).

A New Approach to East Asia
Threats to regional stability increasingly comefrom nontraditional areas such as WMD proliferation, human and drug trafficking, natural disasters, energy security, environmental degradation,
maritime piracy, and infectious disease. All of thesechallenges will require multilateral and cooperative solutions. The scope of the US-Japan alliancemust expand beyond bilateral military deterrence.
It must become more inclusive and place greater
emphasis on functioning more as a public good.
Although Japan and the United States should
lead this initiative, efforts will not make muchprogress without the support of other advanced
democracies in the region such as South Korea,
Australia, and New Zealand. The two allies should
move to strengthen and expand existing trilateral
strategic consultations (e.g. US–Japan–South Korea and US-Japan-Australia). It should be stressed,
however, that the objective is neither to unilaterally impose western values upon East Asian nations
nor to exclude non-democratic nations from reaping the benefits of regional stability and economic
prosperity. Rather, the objective is for Japan andthe United States to engage states in the region inrules-based communities through inclusive multilateralism. As states adopt standardized rules andEAST ASIA INSIGHTS4Vol. 4 No. 1 | April 2009

Conclusion
The time has come for Japanese and US leaders
to engage in earnest discussions over how the USJapan partnership should best evolve to meet thenumerous challenges brought on by a transformed
global system. In addition to strengthening bilateral ties, the alliance partners must also champion
major reform of global governance and proactively
engage regional partners in joint efforts to guarantee peace and prosperity in the Asia Pacific region.

Building on the existing network of US security
partners in the region, Japan and the United Statesshould work with states in the region to establish
an East Asia Security Forum to proactively address
such security issues as human and drug trafficking,natural disasters, infectious disease, resource scarcity, maritime piracy, terrorism, and WMD proliferation. With ASEAN+6 member nations andthe United States working in concert, this forum
would adopt an action-oriented and functional
approach to addressing these threats and carry out
operations in a manner similar to the PSI.

Hitoshi Tanaka is a Senior Fellow at JCIE. He
previously served as Japan’s Deputy Minister for
Foreign Affairs.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from a Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
www.jcie.or.jp

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5© 2009 Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 4 No. 1 | April 2009