BROWNSTONEINSTITUTE

Misinformation Is a Word We Use to Shut You Up
By Daniel B. Klein
June 2023

Abstract
The policing of “information” is the stuff ofNaziism, Stalinism, Maoism, and similaranti-liberal regimes. To repress criticism of
their dicta and diktats, anti-liberals label
criticism “misinformation” or“disinformation.” Those labels are
instruments to crush dissent. This paper
offers an understanding of knowledge as
involving three chief facets: information,interpretation, and judgment. Usually, what
people argue fervently over is not
information, but interpretation andjudgment. What is being labeled andattacked as “misinformation” is not a matterof true or false information, but of true or
false knowledge—meaning that
disagreement more commonly arises overinterpretations and judgments as to whichinterpretations to take stock in or believe.
We make judgments, “good” and “bad,”“wise” and “foolish,” about interpretations,“true” and “false.” On that understanding, thepaper explains that the projects and policies
now afoot styled “anti-misinformation” and“anti-disinformation” are dishonest, as itshould be obvious to all that those projects
and policies would, if advanced honestly, becalled something like “anti-falsehood”
campaigns. But to prosecute an “antifalsehood” campaign would make obvious
the true nature of what is afoot—anOrwellian boot to stomp on Wrongthink.
To support governmental policing of“information” is to confess one’s antiliberalism and illiberality. The essay offers aspiral diagram to show the three chief facetsof knowledge (information, interpretation,and judgment) plus a fourth facet, fact,which also deserves distinct
conceptualization, even though the spiralreminds us: Facts are theory-laden.

About the author:
Daniel Klein is professor of economics and JIN Chair at the Mercatus Center at George Mason
University, where he leads a program in Adam Smith. He is also chief editor of Econ Journal
Watch. In the present essay he draws upon his book Knowledge and Coordination: A Liberal
Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 2012). His latest books are Smithian Morals andCentral Notions of Smithian Liberalism.

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Introduction
Writing at Discourse, published by the
Mercatus Center, Martin Gurri describes“disinformation” as follows:

hope of stamping out Wrongthink—for
example, on climate, election integrity, theorigins of the Covid virus, therapeutics suchas Ivermectin and Hydroxychloroquine, theeffectiveness of masking, the effectiveness of
the Covid injections, the safety of the Covid
injections, and the effectiveness of lockdowns. “Anti-misinformation” could be
deployed in keeping with whatever the next
THE CURRENT THING might be,with associated slogans against, say, China,
Putin, Nord Stream, racists, white
supremacists, MAGA Republicans,“deniers,” et cetera. And then, of course,
there’s all that “misinformation”
disseminated by “conspiracy theorists”.
In speaking of “policing,” I mean
government throwing its weight and its
coercion around against “misinformation” or“disinformation.” And, besides government
coercion, there are allies. These allies often
enjoy monopolistic positions, stemming
either from government handouts,
privileges, and sweetheart deals, as withbroadcasters, universities, andpharmaceutical companies, or from having
cornered certain network externalities, aswith certain huge media platforms. Allies ofvarious sorts sometimes do the bidding of
the despots because they themselves are
threatened and intimidated. The ecosystem
leads to their debasement.
To support governmental policing of“information” is to confess one’s antiliberalism and illiberality. Even worse, it is
to flaunt them. The motive is to make andsignal commitment to anti-liberalism, in amanner parallel to how religious cults sets
up rituals and practices for making andsignaling commitments (Iannaccone 1992).

The word means, ‘Shut up, peasant.’
It’s a bullet aimed at killing theconversation. It’s loaded withhostility to reason, evidence, debate
and all the stuff that makes our
democracy great. (Gurri 2023)
That is from Gurri’s excellent piece,“Disinformation Is the Word I Use When I
Want You to Shut Up.” The piece prompted
the present essay, the title of which is avariation on his.
With such titles, Gurri and I are being
polemical, of course. Not all usages of“disinformation” and “misinformation” comefrom people intent on shutting someone up.
But a lot are. The “anti-misinformation” and“anti-disinformation” projects now afoot orin effect are about shutting up opponents.
In 2019 the Poynter Institute for Media
Studies published “A Guide to Antimisinformation Actions around the World.”
There you survey examples of antimisinformation and anti-disinformation
projects and policies, which have no doubt
soared further since 2019.
The policing of ‘information’ is the stuffof Naziism, Stalinism, Maoism, and similaranti-liberal regimes. In my title“Misinformation Is a Word We Use to ShutYou Up,” anti-liberals are the “We.” To
repress criticism of their dicta and diktats,they stamp criticism as “misinformation” or“disinformation.” Those stamps are
Orwellian tools that anti-liberals wield in the2Vice signals vice, the ticket in some spheresto promotion and advancement.
Also, vicious action spurs more of thesame to defend against exposé andaccountability for past wrongs. In protecting
their rackets, the wrongdoers verge upon adownward spiral.

Knowledge’s richness
I wrote Knowledge and“misinformation” and “disinformation” arewords anti-liberals use to shut people up.
The three chief facets are information,interpretation, and judgment:

Coordination: A Liberal Interpretation(Oxford University Press, 2012). The booksays knowledge involves three chief facets.
Those facets help us see why•••

Information exists within a working interpretation, natural to the context of thematter under discussion.
Interpretation takes us beyond the working interpretation. It opens things up to themarvelous generation and multiplying of interpretations; you now face a portfolio or
menu of interpretations, and it is a portfolio that can always grow yet anotherinterpretation.
Judgment is the action facet of knowledge. It is about, first, estimating interpretations
and, second, taking stock in certain interpretations you estimate highly. Judgment
involves a degree of commitment—belief—which propels you to act on theinterpretations you take stock in. If you do not actually act on the interpretation you
purport to take stock in, you are a hypocrite and a quack. If you are aware of yourhypocrisy, you are a liar; if you are not aware of it, you are in denial, self-deluded.
Lying, stubborn denial, self-delusion, and cynicism are features of baseness.

When despots label opposition“misinformation” or “disinformation” they
abuse language. They invoke
presuppositions built into the word
information, presuppositions that are false.
When despots label opposition “mis-” or“disinformation, they are, at best, objecting
in the interpretation and judgment
dimensions of knowledge, or, at worst, they
are speaking in a way that has abandoned
civil engagement altogether, instead using
words as instruments of wickedness.
Usually, what people argue fervently
over is not information, but interpretations
and judgments as to which interpretations
to act on. What is being labeled andattacked as “misinformation” is not a matterof true or false information, but of true or
false knowledge. The projects and policies
now afoot styled “anti-misinformation” and“anti-disinformation” are dishonest, as itshould be obvious to all that those projects
and policies would, if advanced honestly, becalled “anti-falsehood” or “anti-falseness” or“anti-foolishness” or “anti-untruth”
campaigns. But to prosecute an “antifalsehood” campaign would make obvious
the true nature of what is afoot: The
persecution and silencing of Wrongthink. In
misrepresenting matters of interpretationand judgment as one of “misinformation,”they misrepresent the nature of their projects
3than Roman Holiday? Only to be ironic
would someone say: Dad misinforms you
when he says that Citizen Kane is better
than Roman Holiday. The irony there
would be in the implied high self-estimation,
as the speaker sets up his own aesthetic
sensibilities in judging movies as a standard
so precise and accurate as to warrant“misinform” when Dad disagrees with thatstandard.
The despots are without irony. They
dodge interpretive engagement by labeling
dissenting statements “mis-” or“disinformation.” They are simply bullying
and intimidating their opponents.

and dodge the responsibility to account for
how they judge among vying interpretations.
Within the information dimension ofknowledge, variance is resolved in astraightforward manner. Very little
interpretative engagement and dialogue arecalled for. The question of whether a movie
is in black-and-white or in color can almost
always be readily decided, because webasically share an interpretation of “blackand-white” and “in color,” making thequestion a matter of information. If
interpretative effort is called for, the matter
is no longer within the information
dimension—is Citizen Kane a better movie

If interpretative effort is called for, the matter is no longer within theinformation dimension.
mistake, misspeak, misremember, misplace,mislay, misquote, misdirect, and so on. The

We notice that sometimes, as here,
announcing BBC Verfiy, the despots use thenovel term “mistruth,” which was scarcely
ever used prior to a few decades ago (seehere). The “mis-” prefix does not well fit on
the word truth, which pervades knowledge
river-deep, mountain-high. Think ofprefix “mis-” is proper when the betterness ofa readily identifiable alternative—the
accurate quotation, for example—is hardly amatter of dispute. I doubt that much time
will be spent by BBC Verify on correcting
misquotations.

Misinformed by the supermarket clerk
I enter a supermarket and ask a clerk
where the peanut butter is, and he responds,“Aisle 6.” I go there but don’t find it. I
wander about and find it in Aisle 9.
The clerk was mistaken. He gave me
false or bad information. The idea Peanutbutter is in Aisle 6 is a matter of
information, an idea sitting within a set ofworking interpretations. The working
interpretations include those of ordinary
human purpose and of ordinary trust andcommon decency. The clerk and I were notplaying a game, nor was it April Fools’ Day.
Importantly, the working interpretations
include those of plain English—the semantic
conventions of “peanut butter,” “6,” the4syntactical conventions of English, and soon.
April Fools’ Day tricks depart fromworking interpretations. The tricks create
an unexpected asymmetry between theinterpretation of the targeted person—who
wishes to add a dash of salt to his soup—andthe trickster—who unscrewed the top of thesalt shaker. The target interpreted the world
as presenting a salt shaker with top screwed
on as usual. The trickster relished her
anticipation of the victim’s shock andsurprise in discovering the faultiness of his
interpretation of the world.
Asymmetric interpretation is essential
to humor. Another form of humor is the puton, as when the trickster feigns his own
frustrations, and we enter into theasymmetric interpretations of the amusedtarget of the trick, as in these Buster Keaton
put-ons from Candid Camera.
Likewise, humor often plays upon
departures from semantic conventions, as inpunning, “Knock, knock” jokes, and “Who’s
on First” by Abbot and Costello.
A precondition of humor is a certain
trust and joint interest in the truths that

humor gets at. Without those preconditions,
there is no humor.
Despotism conceals its designs. It
conceals its true beliefs and intentions. By its
nature, it abuses working interpretations.
Despotism is untrustworthy. Its relationshipwith ordinary organic interpretation is neverplayful. That is why despotism is incapableof being humorous. It cannot make a joke,
and it cannot take a joke. Adam Smithwrote:
Reserve and concealment…call forth
diffidence. We are afraid to follow
the man who is going we do notknow where.
Afraid, we attend the despot with diffidence.
Despotism is grim.
I take my peanut butter to the check-out
line where the same clerk is working, andsay, “I found it—but in Aisle 9!,” trying to behumorous as though a joke had been playedon me. Being a mere matter of information,
the mistake is readily accepted. The clerk
responds, “Ah?! Sorry about that!”

Unintentional and intentional
When one person, Bob, misinforms
another, Jim, without realizing that the
information is false, the mistake isamendable to ready corrected, without fuss,assuming the falseness is realized by Jim or
Bob. Such misinformation events aretrifling; we don’t debate them or dwell on
them. Misinformation is rather like a typo,corrected by a proof-reader.
Scarcely ever do we speak of themistake with the five-syllable Latinate word
misinformation. Heavy usage of the word
misinformation so often occurs in reference

to “anti-misinformation” projects, usage
either by the perpetrators and cheerleadersof those projects or by those who fend off
threats from the perps.
When Bob misinforms Jim
intentionally, however, information mistakes
are dishonest. They are lies. We dwell onthem as lies, not as matters of
misinformation. The misinformer is a liar.
Some now promulgate the word
disinformation.
In distinguishing misinformation fromdisinformation, Dictionary.com explains “the5

critical distinction between these confusable
words: intent.” Wikipedia says the same. Its
entry on Disinformation begins:“Disinformation is false information
deliberately spread to deceive people. It
should not be confused withmisinformation, which is false information
but is not deliberate.”
According to those sources, then,disinformation is lying. It is false information
spread by those who know that it is false
information. To disinform is to lie.
The distinction based on intent is not
sharp. Is the misinformer who does notknow that the information he spreads is false
but who failed in performing basic due
diligence against its falsity a perpetrator ofdisinformation? His discourse usually carries
with it a claim to have done such due
diligence, and that claim would be false.
And if he knows he has not done due
diligence, he is, once again a liar, though thelie is about his having performed due

diligence, not about his knowing that the
information is false. Out-and-out lying
travels with a vast entourage of shabby
norms and shabby understandings of theduties of due diligence. Related here would
be the large topics of denial, self-deceit, selfdelusion, and hypocrisy. (Adam Smith’streatment of self-deceit is explained here.)
The terminus is cynicism, baseness, andmiserableness.
In ordinary private-sector affairs,
outside of politics and outside of heavily
governmentalized affairs, lying at the level of
information is naturally checked andcounteracted. Again, the “information”
implies reference to working interpretations.
Getting things right should not be difficult
or tricky—issues there are all within theworking interpretation. Sure, mistakes are
made; but such mistakes are readily andeasily corrected.

According to those sources, then, disinformation is lying.
Liars about information lose the trust of
their voluntary associates, whether thosevoluntary associates are friends, customers,
trading partners, or employees. If liars lie
about simple features of their products ortheir services, they could be subject to law
suits from their trading partners, to public
criticism, and to rival exposé by competitors.
In ordinary private-sector affairs, everyone
has reputational incentives not to lie
systematically, and especially not to lie about
information, and most of us have strong
moral incentives within ourselves against

lying. We dread the disapproval of “the man
within the breast”—an expression Adam
Smith used for the conscience.
So, you might ask: If private actors
without government privileges andimmunities scarcely spread false information
dishonestly and programmatically, isdisinformation really a thing? Before
addressing that question directly, let’s turnto the Godzilla of programmatic lying.

6Propaganda: Government’s programmatic lies
It is government, especially, that lies
programmatically. The lying can be at thelevel of information, but it usually makes
more sense to say that its lying is at the levelof interpretation: The government promotesinterpretations—for example, The Covid
virus came from nature—, interpretations
that it, the government, itself does notparticularly believe. It lies about the virus
having come from nature, as it lies about
many other big interpretations. It
propagates big lies.
And it lies with confidence.
Government is the only player in society that
initiates coercion in an institutionalized way.
Its coercion is overt. What’s more, it does so
on a colossal scale. That is the most essential
feature of government. Every government is
a Godzilla, and we must learn to live with
our Godzilla and mitigate the destruction it
wreaks.

The traditional term for government’s
programmatic lying is propaganda—a wordthat once did not necessarily imply falseness(instead meaning simply ideas propagated),
but is now generally used in that necessarilypejorative sense. The falsehoods ofpropaganda are typically lies, in that the
propagandizers usually do not particularly
believe the claims they propagate.
Government can lie programmaticallybecause it does not depend on voluntary
participation for its support. It subsists on
coercion, including restrictions oncompetitors and opponents, and takingsfrom taxpayers. Organizations in heavily
governmentalized settings can also lie
programmatically. Crony privateorganizations sustain large programmaticlying only when they enjoy privileges,
immunities, and protections from thegovernment.

“Misinformation” and “disinformation” are weapons anti-liberals
wield
Again, Gurri suggested that, so often, “disinformation” “means, ‘Shut up, peasant.’ It’s abullet aimed at killing the conversation.” The term “disinformation” scarcely existed before 1980,
as shown in Figure 1. The figure contains data through 2019, and it is likely that the recent surge
has continued.

The term “disinformation” scarcely existed before 1980.

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Figure 1: “disinformation” as percent of all 1grams, 1970–2019

Source: Google Ngram Viewer link

Gilbert Doctorow writes of “theintroduction of the word ‘disinformation’into common parlance.” Doctorow writes:

most troubling and most terrible way, that“disinformation” is used. It must be noted,
however, that the word has also been used
simply as a synonym of propaganda—andthus something that governments, too,
perpetrate. But, now, “misinformation” and“disinformation” are most conspicuously apropagandistic term used in the manner
described by Gurri and Doctorow. In thatsense, “disinformation” is not a generalsynonym for propaganda, but is, rather, aword that propagandists use to smear theiropponents.
Meanwhile, in fending off this new
species of propaganda, honest people, too,resort to using “disinformation,” as asynonym for propaganda, to fling thatspecific word back onto the propagandists.
Doctorow exemplifies what I mean, as hejustly writes:

The word “disinformation” has a
specific context in time and intent: it
is used by the powers that be and by
the mainstream media they control
to denigrate, marginalize andsuppress sources of military, political,
economic and other information thatmight contradict the official
government narrative and so dilutethe control exercised by those inpower over the general population.
(Doctorow 2023)
Gurri and Doctorow are describing
what is now the main way, or at least the8Time again we find ourselves having to
use the degraded verbalisms of the antiliberals to address and combat their abuses.
Sometimes it seems like our civilization
revolves around trying to keep the antiliberals from burning down the house.

In reality, it is these censorious states
and the mass media that carry theirmessages with stenographic
precision into print and electronic
dissemination who are the ones thatday after day feed disinformation to
the public. It is cynically composedand consists of a toxic blend of ‘spin,’by which is meant misleadinginterpretation of events, and outrightlies. (Doctorow 2023)

Base humans tend to weaponize things
But aren’t governments accountable tochecks and balance, divisions of power, andthe rule of law? Haven’t we learned to tame
Godzilla, to chain down Leviathan?
It is true that the government of a ruleof-law republic, checked by an honest media,
might be quite limited in its programmaticlying. But that’s not how it is today, where
dissent is being tarred as “mis-” and“disinformation,” and where the legacy
media is morally base in the extreme. Today,
regimes are increasingly despotic, anddespotic regimes are much less checked andlimited.
The rule of law means, first andforemost, the government living up to therules posted on its own website.
Governments today don’t do that. Law isapplied politically, that is, with extreme
partiality, upon a double-standard. Laws are
selectively enforced and punishments are
selectively meted out. Despots avail
themselves of show trials, kangaroo bodies,and galleries filled with stooges. The “antimisinformation” agenda is misrule.

Despotism despoils checks andbalances. Despotism centralizes power
formerly divided. It destroys theindependency and autonomy that,theoretically, branches and units, divided
and balanced, had once enjoyed. Despotism
usurps powers once distributed andbalanced. Despotism is unbalanced power.
Under a despotic regime, the coercive
institutions unique to government become
weaponized by the despots and their allies.
They turn them against their opponents.
But weaponization is itself always somewhat
constrained by cultural norms. The
existence of government implies theexistence of a governed society, and theexistence of society implies the existence ofsome basic norms, for example against theft,murder, and lying. David Hume famously
pointed out that the governed always vastly
outnumber the governors, and hence
government depends on “opinion”—if only
the opinion to acquiesce to those governors:

9National Socialists and Communists gavesome lip service to social norms, with theirshow trials and righteous objections to “thelying press” (Lügenpresse). But did theirlanguages, at those times, have words that
corresponded to the English words
information, interpretation, and judgment,along the lines of the distinctions made here?
(This ngram diagram makes me wonder.)Was their vocabulary for knowledge like thatof English, and did they abuse thepresuppositions involved in thosedistinctions the way that “antimisinformation” projects do today? For help
with this question, maybe we should turn toChatGPT.

Force is always on the side of thegoverned, the governors havenothing to support them but
opinion. It is therefore, on opinion
only that government is founded; andthis maxim extends to the mostdespotic and most military
governments, as well as to the mostfree and most popular. (Hume,
Essays)I wonder whether the shut-them-up
projects of Naziism, Stalinism, and Maoism
tarred their opponents with labels akin to“misinformation” and “disinformation.” Even

The contested claims go far beyond information
Disagreement usually arises overinterpretations and judgments as to whichinterpretations to take stock in or believe.
We make judgments, “good” and “bad,”“wise” and “foolish,” about interpretations,“true” and “false.”
Again, “anti-misinformation” projects
presuppose the information dimension
where such a presupposition is inapt. When
despots declare something to be“misinformation,” the discourser—say, John
Campbell, Peter McCullough, RobertMalone—does not readily accept the
supposed correction, unlike the clerk in the
supermarket example. That is quite decisive
proof that presuppositions of theinformation dimension do not apply. The
matter is clearly beyond information.
The despots tend to invoke certain
organizations as the definitive, authoritative
sources of “information.” They say, in effect:“The CDC, the WHO, the FDA says themRNA injections are safe and effective, so
anything that suggests otherwise ismisinformation.” The farce here ispretending that everyone’s working
interpretation consists of the dicta of somesuch particular organization. Never has anorganization or agency had such a MountOlympus status for determining, throughout
society, working interpretations of complex
matters, and particularly not an organization
with the foul characters and track-records of
the CDC, WHO, FDA, and similar highly
governmentalized organizations. The
similitude to the Soviet Union under Stalin
is obvious.

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“Anti-misinformation” projects presuppose the information
dimension where such a presupposition is inapt.
A big part of the interpretation
dimension is the estimation of the wisdomand virtue of those who contend forauthority. Government is a Godzilla; it is nota validator of an organization’s wisdom andvirtue. To be worth a damn, estimations of

wisdom and virtue must emerge fromarrangements not heavily governmentalized,
liberal arrangements, in society, in science,and in public discourse. We shall look not toGodzilla but to certain among the humanbeings who check Godzilla.

What the sincere human looks likeI wrote above of “quite decisive proof
that presuppositions of the information
dimension do not apply,” in noting thatPeter McCullough does not readily accept
the supposed correction. But what if
McCullough is a liar? Then it would be no
surprise that he does not readily accept the
purported correction. What, in other words,
about the possibility of disinformation? An
insincere disinformationist would stand by
his informational statements and persist in
misinforming his listeners.
What does sincere engagement look
like?
Sincere engagement is sincere in thedesire to become better aligned with thelarger good, which would correspond to auniversally benevolent God. The sincere
human does not claim to be universally
benevolent. He does not even claim to be
more benevolent than the average person.
But, compared to the average person, thesincere human scrupulously strives to alignhis conduct with universal benevolence.
The sincere human wants to becorrected. He welcomes correction.
Sincerity is evident in the human’s openness
to engagement. The sincere humanwelcomes deep-dive conversation, debate,
and challenge. He is eager to learn.
If the sincere human rejects a purported
correction, he is eager to explain theinterpretations and judgments that motivate
his rejection of the purported correction. He
explains why he rejects it. And he welcomesa response to his explanation. He isagreeable to continuing the engagement.
The sincere human wants to sit down,
human-to-human, and hash things out. He
wants to enter into the mind of his
intellectual adversary and see why theadversary says what he says. The sincere
human wants to hear about the adversary’s
portfolio of possible interpretations. The
sincere human is eager to compare theadversary’s portfolio to his own portfolio ofinterpretations.
In comparing the portfolios, the sincere
human may see some interpretations that are
not in his own portfolio, and wish toconsider those as candidates forincorporation into his own. The sincere
human wants to probe their soundness, theirworthiness. The sincere human may also seethat the adversary’s portfolio lacks certain
interpretations that are in his own, and will
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want to understand why those are lacking
from the adversary’s portfolio.
By hashing things out, the two prattlers
should aim to get the contents of theirrespective portfolios onto the table, making
a larger union of the contents of the two
portfolios of possible interpretations. They
can then explore together the reasons, orcauses, for their difference in how they judge
among the possible interpretations. They try
to dwell in one another’s mind,
sympathetically, to get a feeling for the waysof the other’s judgment. After doing so, eachcan then make a moment in the other’s
judgment into an object up for examination,
an object for interpretation and estimation.
“But why do you draw that conclusion?”
The sincere human is frank and open
about the calls of his own judgment. He
invites the other human to ask, “But why do
you draw that conclusion?” Adam Smithwrote: “Frankness and openness conciliate
confidence.”
When two sincere humans disagree, it is
as if they say to one another:That is what the sincere human looks
like. He is open, frank, and eager toparticipate in conversation and debate withadversaries. He is eager to sit down andhash things out. He is eager to delve into thefine points, to nail down the details, torespond to challenges, to document theevidence, to continue the conversation. He
relishes engagement as a sort of adventure of
the mind. He takes joy in argumentation andscholarship, as actualization of the humanpotentiality for virtue—of serving God, as it
were.
The sincere human looks like—from
what I can tell—Peter McCullough.
I single out Peter McCullough as
exemplar simply to single out someone. Allof those who are eager to engage adversaries
illustrate the most salient feature of thesincere human, and the more that thateagerness fits the rest of my description
above, the more sincere that human likely is.
The sincere human loves life, and henceloves the most rewarding, most sublime oflife’s experiences. For scholars, researchers,
thinkers, and indeed for Man Thinking
everywhere, as humans in continual
discourse about our duties to the good andour dependence on interpreting the book ofnature, one of the most rewarding, sublime
experiences is the sort of civil engagement
described above. The sincere human, then,holds the norms, practices, and institutions
that foster and safeguard that sort of civil
engagement to be sacred. The sincere
human, therefore, is not only a liberal in the
pre-political senses of the word, but also inthe political sense christened “liberal” aroundthe 1770s by Adam Smith and other Britons.
That is the political outlook that best
sacralizes the norms, practices, andinstitutions of sincere engagement.

We both purport to orient ourselves
upward, toward alignment with thegood of the whole. We both understandthat our thinking must focus on the mostimportant things in the issue at hand.
We both look at the same world—ourinterpretations are, as it were,interpretations of the signals presented
to us in the book of nature. And yet wedraw different conclusions. Let us
explore the sources of that difference, inthe hope that as a result there will be an
improvement, for the good of the whole,in the joint effect of (your revised
outlook and my revised outlook), after
your outlook and my outlook have beenrevised by virtue of our conversation.

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What the unsincere human looks like
We now turn to characters opposite of
the sincere human. One would be insincere,
but I wonder whether another is the human
without either sincerity or insincerity. I willuse “unsincere.”
The features of the unsincere human are
generally the opposite of the just-describedways of the sincere human. The unsincere
human is not open. He is averse to sitting
and hashing out differences withadversaries. He may issue brief, peremptory
messages. He avoids challenges. He ignores
criticism. He does not explain. He refuses
engagement.

The most vicious humans hate to see
adversaries finding platforms and channels
to challenge their projects; they work to shutthem up. Other humans fall in with, or atleast stays silent about, the assaults on liberal
norms and institutions, such as “antimisinformation” projects.
The unsincere human is illiberal, and hetends to subserve anti-liberalism, even if hedoes not himself mouth the slogans of antiliberalism.

The sincere human is frank and open about the calls of his
own judgment… He takes joy in argumentation and scholarship,as actualization of the human potentiality for virtue—of serving
God, as it were.
Fact
I return to elaborating an
understanding of knowledge, because I
think that getting the understanding across
can be useful to sincere efforts to advancethe good. (At the end of this paper is alisting of a few philosophers whose thinking
my thinking dovetails with.)
Again, the chief facets of knowledge areinformation, interpretation, and judgment.
What about fact? Is fact not a facet ofknowledge?
Consider the saying, Facts are theoryladen, a saying that got started in the 1960s.
To relate that saying to my terminology,
think of “theory” as interpretation judged
worthy or superior. Theory, then, refers to

the dimensions of interpretation and of
judgment.
Facts are theory-laden is a useful saying,for it reminds us that what one person calls“fact” can be opened up to examination andchallenge by another person—or even by thesame person, a moment later, after having
called it “fact.” The simple truth is that we
could, if we had cause to, dig interpretationand judgment out from underneath any of
our facts.
Facts are theory-laden, but when “we”
all embrace the laden theory, we call thestatements fact. To call something fact is todeclare that the laden theory is not thematter under discussion. Fact, then, is a13

facet of knowledge, but not a chief one. Fact
designates statements that no one among“us” wishes at all to take issue with. Facts arenoncontroversial, at least for the discussion
within which they are treated as facts.
A diagram may be helpful.

The spiral of knowledge
Communication picks up midstream of human experience. We proceed upon working
interpretations. “Information” is what we call the facts as seen within the working interpretation.
Figure 2: The spiral of knowledge, with four phases:
fact, information, interpretation, and judgment

Source: The author’s creation

Figure 2 offers four phases (or facets) of
knowledge, shown in each loop of the spiral.
“Facts” reside in a more basic interpretive
frame—more basic than what I have called“the working interpretation”—in which“factual” statements are presumed acceptable
to all parties of the communication. When
Jane and Amy “argue over the facts,” they

are, as it were, revisiting what is to betreated as factual.
The loops flow one into the next,
through time, from outer loops to inner
loops. We travel in the clockwise direction.
The spiral image on your screen is twodimensional, but imagine a third. We hopethat the spiral winds upward in wisdom and14

But we may more directly speak of multiple
interpretations of the information, as
opposed to multiple interpretations of thefacts. Thus, rather than interpretively
pivoting off the “fact”-level interpretation—that the line reads 678-3554—let’s pivot
interpretively off of what I have called “theworking interpretation”—that 678-3554 is aphone number—a level up from the factual,and there the pivot then turns to open up theinterpretation dimension: “Maybe the phone
number is a secret encoded message?”
Again, universal acceptance among the “we”
is built into “the facts”: None of us disputesthat the line says 678-3554. Wherever you
want to accommodate interpretive pivoting,move “factual” to somewhere down fromthere.

virtue, such that the inner loops are higher
than the outer loops.
Suppose we sit down together with atelephone book. We call the ink markings“the facts.” Neither of us thinks to disputestatements about the printed numbers on
the pages. We then proceed to talk plainly ofthem as phone numbers. We often forget
this working lens—interpreting the facts asphone numbers—because we see through it.
One of us, however, may propose
another interpretation: Might the list of“phone numbers” contain secret knowledge
encoded by spies?
Thus, we have multiple interpretationsof the ink markings that some understand as“phone numbers.” Those quotation marks
signal: what the facts are called when they
are seen through the working interpretation.

When Jane and Amy “argue over the facts,” they are, as it were,revisiting what is to be treated as factual.
Meanwhile, life rolls on, and we arecalled to act. The pitch races toward theplate. If the batter waits for a betterinterpretation, he may be called out on
strikes. Again, the action facet of knowledge
is judgment. As speaker, we judge of
judgments—of our interlocutors and of
agents existing within the descriptions wegive of things. We convey our judgments of
their judgments using judgmental terms.

If, among our circle of “we,” judgment isshared, then those judgments may now
predicate a further conversation among us,
and, thusly, those judgments present
statements now treated as fact. Thus, wehave completed the phases of the spiral andhave moved from one loop to the next,
where the sequence of phases may recur.

Despotic contempt for our circle of “we”
Again, what is labeled and attacked as“misinformation” or “disinformation” is not amatter of true or false information, but oftrue or false knowledge. Recognizing thatknowledge, not merely information, is at
issue is a matter of common decency.
The dignity of sincere discourse
involves an openness, in principle a universal
openness, to other human “we’s” and their15

pursuits upward in wisdom and virtue. As
we can see, the chief facets of knowledge—
information, interpretation, and judgment—
operate both behind and ahead of ourcurrent position in the spiral. Trying to shut
us up is to show a despotic contempt for our
way of weaving through the phases ofknowledge. It is contemptuous towards thedevelopment of the many loops within which
our sense-making has made a home and now
operates.
By weighing interpretations andmaking judgments, we establish certain
beliefs as fact, to predicate our further
conversation. Those beliefs reflect a “we”
with those beliefs. Meanwhile, in the wider
world, different “we’s” are forming and are
addressing the public at large, representing

different sets of belief, different ways ofmaking sense of the world. We might call a“we” a distinct sense-making community.
The sincere human of any one of thesecommunities is eager to learn from othercommunities. The sincere human has certain
commitments which make it belong to thesense-making community it belongs to, but
it is not wedded to that community. In fact,
the entire population of that community—that is, the set of people who currently sharethat way of sense-making—may remake theircommunity’s way of sense-making. Those
who learn from other communities may
become leaders of intellectual change within
their own community.

The dignity of sincere discourse involves an openness to other human“we’s” and their pursuits upward in wisdom and virtue.
Thus, sincere humans favor the freedomof speech and the norms of frank and open
discourse for all communities. Besides
favoring that freedom, they welcome
engagement across communities, for all thereasons given earlier.
The “anti-misinformation” despots show
contempt for communities at odds with theirdicta and diktats. Not only are the membersof the “anti-misinformation” community
unwilling to engage in civil debate, but they
promulgate “anti-misinformation”
propaganda so as to intimidate theiradversaries, to crush dissent.
I have explained that the“misinformation” characterization of thedisagreement is false. The anti-liberals arepresupposing that it is a matter within theinformation dimension of knowledge, whenclearly the disagreement involvescontentions in the interpretation andjudgment dimensions. Under pretense of
combatting misinformation, they are reallyjust stomping on adversaries. As I said at theoutset, it is akin to Naziism, Stalinism, andMaoism, regimes that likewise showed
despotic contempt for sense-making
communities at odds with their own. “Antimisinformation” projects are a sham, just as“anti-racism” projects are a sham.

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A few words about “hate”“We’re a hate group… We hate hate.” — Get Smart
Just as “anti-misinformation” projects
are despotic, so too are “anti-hate-speech”
projects. The failure is again one of badsemantics and false presuppositions. “Antimisinformation” despots tar their opponents
with “misinformation,” making an“information” category error based on a false

presupposition. “Anti-hate speech” projects
tar their opponents with “hate,” again
making a category error, for they treat
hatred as necessarily hateful—that is,
improper. Figure 3 shows the recent onset of“hate speech” and “hate crime.”

Figure 3: “hate speech” and “hate crime” are new.

Source: Google Ngram Viewer link

But hatred is a necessary and organicpart of any coherent system of morals. A
coherent system of morals holds love andhate to be counterparts to one another. In a
coherent system of morals, love is to be felt
toward objects that are loveworthy, andhatred is to be felt toward objects that are
hateworthy, although the bounds ofpropriety for the intensity and expression of
the two respective feelings are importantly
different, as Adam Smith explained (see esp.
TMS, Part I, Sect. II, Chaps. 3 & 4 on the“unsocial” and “social” passions).
Moreover, the two respective sets ofobjects bear a counterpart relation to one

another, for that which works systematicallyagainst the loveworthy is hateworthy. As
Edmund Burke wrote: “They will never love
where they ought to love, who do not hate
where they ought to hate.”
The implicit denial by anti-liberals that
hatred is a necessary and organic part of any
coherent system of morals is parallel to theirimplicit denial, in treating interpretive
matters as informational matters, thatasymmetric interpretation is a necessary andorganic part of any coherent society ofmodern human beings. Just as “mis-” and“disinformation” are words they use to shut
you up, “hate speech,” “hate group,” and “hate17crime” are words they use to shut you up,
ratified by show trials and kangaroo bodies.
A proper court of hate would presuppose a
distinction between proper hate andimproper hate, just hate and unjust hate. Ina liberal civilization such “courts” are notgovernmental. Rather, they remain in the
judgment and interpretation of theindividual’s own being. If hate is policed in
the manner that outward action is policed bygovernments,

we should feel all the furies of that
passion against any person in whosebreast we suspected or believed suchdesigns or affections were
harboured, though they had neverbroken out into any actions.
Sentiments, thoughts, intentions,would become the objects ofpunishment; and if the indignation of
mankind run as high against them asagainst actions; if the baseness of thethought which had given birth to noaction, seemed in the eyes of theworld as much to call aloud forvengeance as the baseness of theaction, every court of judicature
would become a real inquisition.
(Smith, TMS, italics added)

Concluding remarks
The “anti-misinformation” projects are
obvious miscarriages of civility, decency, andthe rule of law. We must rediscover thenorms of openness, tolerance, and freespeech that dignify humankind. Science

depends on confidence, and confidence
depends on those liberal norms. Those
norms are the parents of good science,
healthy sense-making, and civil tranquility.
There are two roads here, namely:

1. Freedom —> openness —> confidence —> truth-tracking —> dignity;
2. Despotism —> concealment —> diffidence —> bad science —> serfdom andservility.
Let’s get back to the right road.

We must rediscover the norms of openness, tolerance, and free speechthat dignify humankind. Science depends on confidence, and confidence
depends on those liberal norms.

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Appendix: Philosophical affinities
FWIW: My take on knowledge has affinities to the philosophizing of David Hume, Adam
Smith, Friedrich Hayek, Michael Polanyi, Thomas Kuhn, Iain McGilchrist, and many others. It
also has affinities to the pragmatists William James and Richard Rorty, but I regard
pragmatism—seeing one’s belief as the product of one’s choosing an idea among alternative ideas,
and seeing the chosen idea's betterness (compared to actual alternatives, not compared to thepast or to hypotheticals) as necessarily the chief basis for what one shall count as true—as a phasesituated on one side of a spiral, counterposed by, on the other side of the spiral, an alternate phasethat we may call Humean natural belief. Humean natural belief is belief that has emerged from
depths beyond the loop in which we pass between the two phases; Humean natural belief is,within that loop, not to be treated in terms of choice; it is what we would call, as we dwell withinthat loop, brute reality. To open such brute reality up to the pragmatist phase would mean
acceding to another loop of the spiral. But the spiral is indefinite, with no first (or lower-most)loop and no final (or upper-most) loop, so certain brute realities at some loop or level remain
brutish for any finite conversation. And all conversations are finite.
Selective References:
Burke, Edmund. 2022. Edmund Burke and the Perennial Battle, 1789–1797. Eds. D.B. Klein and
D. Pino. CL Press. Link
Doctorow, Gilbert. 2023. The Western Media Disinformation Campaign: Fall of Bakhmut, aCase in Point. Gilbert Doctorow website. Link
Gurri, Martin. 2023. Disinformation Is the Word I Use When I Want You to Shut Up.
Discourse, March 30. Link
Hume, David. 1994. Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary. Edited by Eugene F. Miller.
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Link
Iannaccone, Laurence. 1992. Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes,and Other Collectives. Journal of Political Economy 100(2): 271–291.
Klein, Daniel B. 2012. Knowledge and Coordination: A Liberal Interpretation. Oxford
University Press. Link
Polanyi, Michael. 1963. The Study of Man. Chicago University Press.
Smith, Adam. 1982 [1790]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Edited by D.D. Raphael and A.L.
Macfie. Oxford University Press/Liberty Fund. Link
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