Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on
Materiality
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Khan, Mozaffar N., George Serafeim, and Aaron Yoon. "Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence
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Corporate Sustainability: First
Evidence on Materiality
Mozaffar Khan
George Serafeim
Aaron Yoon

Working Paper 15-073

Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence
on Materiality
Mozaffar Khan
Harvard Business School

George Serafeim
Harvard Business School

Aaron Yoon
Harvard Business School

Working Paper 15-073

Copyright © 2015 by Mozaffar Khan, George Serafeim, and Aaron Yoon
Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and discussion only. It may
not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working papers are available from the author.

Corporate Sustainability: First Evidence on Materiality

Mozaffar Khan, George Serafeim, and Aaron Yoon

Abstract
An increasing number of companies make sustainability investments, and an increasing number ofinvestors integrate sustainability performance data in their capital allocation decisions. To date however,the prior academic literature has not distinguished between investments in material versus immaterial
sustainability issues. We develop a novel dataset by hand-mapping data on sustainability investments
classified as material for each industry into firm-specific performance data on a variety of sustainability
investments. This allows us to present new evidence on the value implications of sustainability
investments. Using calendar-time portfolio stock return regressions we find that firms with good
performance on material sustainability issues significantly outperform firms with poor performance onthese issues, suggesting that investments in sustainability issues are shareholder-value enhancing. Further,firms with good performance on sustainability issues not classified as material do not underperform firms
with poor performance on these same issues, suggesting investments in sustainability issues are at aminimum not value-destroying. Finally, firms with good performance on material issues and concurrently
poor performance on immaterial issues perform the best. These results speak to the efficiency of firms’
sustainability investments, and also have implications for asset managers who have committed to theintegration of sustainability factors in their capital allocation decisions.



Mozaffar Khan is a visiting Associate Professor at Harvard Business School. George Serafeim is the Jakurski
Family Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. Aaron Yoon is a doctoral
student at Harvard Business School. We are grateful for comments from seminar participants at National Universityof Singapore and Harvard Business School. We are grateful for financial support from the Division of Faculty
Research and Development at Harvard Business School. George Serafeim has served on the Standards Council of
SASB. Contact emails: mkhan@hbs.edu; gserafeim@hbs.edu; ayoon@hbs.edu.

11. Introduction
Corporate investment policies are a key determinant of firm value and continue to be widely studied in
the literature. Multiple studies have investigated different types of investments and how these relate tofuture financial performance. A relatively newer class of corporate investments, broadly termedsustainability investments, has attracted the attention of firms, institutional investors, academics, andsocietal advocacy groups. Are such corporate investments ultimately value-enhancing for shareholders? A
number of studies have investigated this question but the results remain mixed. One potential reason forthe mixed results is that no prior paper has distinguished between sustainability issues that are material for
a company versus all other less material sustainability issues (which we refer to as “immaterial”
throughout the rest of the paper). Investments in immaterial issues are less likely than investments inmaterial issues to be value-enhancing, and it therefore becomes important in testing the value implicationsof such sustainability investments to distinguish between investments in material versus immaterial
issues. We respond to this gap in the literature.
A large number of companies now identify sustainability issues as strategically important andrelease a wealth of information in the form of environmental, social and governance (ESG) data.
However, the materiality of the reported sustainability investments for firm value is regularly questioned,
with companies releasing an increasing amount of information that might be immaterial from an
investment standpoint.1 Similarly, an increasing number of investors commit to the integration of ESG
data in their capital allocation process, but which of these ESG data should be taken into consideration isstill a point of tension.
The importance of the different sustainability issues likely varies systematically across firms andindustries (Eccles and Serafeim 2013).2 As such, the efforts of many organizations providing guidance on

1

See for example http://www.corporatesecretary.com/articles/compliance-ethics-csr/12425/sasb-previewssustainability-standards-financials/
2
See for example United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative and World Business Council for
Sustainable Development. 2010. Translating environmental, social and governance factors into sustainable businessvalue http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/translatingESG.pdf.

2

reporting of ESG issues (for example, the International Integrated Reporting Council, the Global
Reporting Initiative, and the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)) are now concentrated
on identifying material issues by industry in order to guide both company disclosure and investor
integration of sustainability data in asset allocation decisions.
We develop a unique and novel data set to measure firm performance on material sustainability
issues by hand-mapping recently-available industry-specific guidance on materiality from SASB to MSCIKLD that has firm-level performance ratings on an array of sustainability issues. Section 3 describes thedata and mapping in detail. We then construct a materiality (immateriality) performance score for eachfirm-year that measures performance on material (immaterial) sustainability issues in order to test theshareholder value implications of sustainability investments.
To test the future performance implications of sustainability investments we first orthogonalize afirm’s change in materiality score with respect to changes in firm size, market-to-book ratio, leverage,
profitability, and sector membership. Next, we form portfolios based on the unexplained portion of themateriality score change (the residuals from the first step) and estimate Fama and French (1993) calendartime regressions to test for one-year-ahead abnormal stock return performance of the portfolio. This
procedure allows us to attribute the future performance of this portfolio more confidently to material
sustainability investments, rather than to underlying firm characteristics of portfolio firms.
Results indicate that firms with strong performance on material topics outperform firms with poor
performance on material topics, consistent with material investments being shareholder value-enhancing.
In contrast, firms with strong performance on immaterial sustainability topics do not outperform firms
with poor performance on immaterial topics, indicating sustainability investments are at a minimum notshareholder value-destroying. Finally, firms with high materiality scores and concurrently low
immateriality scores have the best future stock performance, as expected. A series of additional tests
indicate that the results are robust to alternative factor models, different subsamples, and alternative
portfolio construction rules. Moreover, we find that firms with strong performance on material topics

3exhibit better future changes in accounting performance compared to firms with poor performance onmaterial topics
The results contribute to a large literature that investigates the relation between sustainability andfinancial performance (Margolis et al. 2007; Eccles et al. 2014). The results from this line of research still
remain mixed and a number of explanations have been suggested for the mixed results. We show thatfirms can engage both in material and immaterial sustainability issues and the two actions have different
implications for stock prices. Failure to distinguish between the two can produce an insignificant relation
between performance on sustainability issues and future financial performance. The results are also likely
to be of interest to firms making sustainability investment decisions, and to investors making portfolio
allocation decisions based in any part on sustainability criteria.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the motivation and literature
review. Section 3 presents our sample and data. Section 4 discusses the results from our research design.
Section 5 concludes.

2. Motivation and Literature Review
An increasing number of investors have also committed to integrating sustainability issues in their asset
allocation decisions and an increasing number of companies have been disclosing sustainability
information. Specifically, the number of companies issuing sustainability reports has grown from lessthan 30 in early 1990s to more than 7,000 in 2014, while the United Nations Principles for Responsible
Investment (UNPRI), as of 2014, had 1,260 signatories with $45 trillion in assets under management.
These signatories commit to six principles ‘recognizing the materiality of environmental, social, andgovernance issues.’ 3 Therefore, given the number of companies that now disclose sustainability
information and the size of the committed assets under management, understanding the investment
relevance of sustainability issues is an important topic.

3

See http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/about-pri/4

Scholars within the neoclassical economics tradition have argued theoretically that sustainability
investments unnecessarily raise a firm’s costs, thus creating a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis
competitors (Friedman, 1970; Aupperle et al., 1985; McWilliams and Siegel, 1997; Jensen, 2002).
Arguing from an agency theory perspective (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), other studies have suggested
that employing valuable firm resources for positive social performance strategies results in significant
managerial benefits rather than financial benefits to shareholders (Brammer and Millington, 2008).
Cheng, Hong and Shue (2014) find support for an agency motive for corporate social
responsibility. They use the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut to increase after-tax insider ownership and find thatafter the tax cut firms with moderate levels of insider ownership have lower sustainability performancecompared to firms with low levels (where the tax cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is lessof an issue). De Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) find that social responsibility investments are motivated bypolitical beliefs and that these sustainability investments driven by political beliefs are value destroying
for shareholders.
On the other hand, scholars have argued that enhanced sustainability performance may lead to
obtaining better resources (Cochran and Wood, 1984; Waddock and Graves, 1997), higher quality
employees (Turban and Greening, 1997), and better marketing of products and services (Moskowitz,
1972; Fombrun, 1996). Better sustainability performance may also function in similar ways as advertisingdoes, by increasing overall demand for products and services or by reducing consumer price sensitivity(Dorfman and Steiner, 1954; Navarro, 1988; Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Milgrom and Roberts, 1986).
Moreover, it has been suggested that positive social performance could reduce the level of waste within
productive processes (Konar and Cohen, 2001; Porter and Van Der Linde, 1995). Stakeholder theory
emphasizes that effective management of stakeholder relationships may mitigate the likelihood ofnegative regulatory, legislative or fiscal action (Freeman, 1984; Berman et al., 1999; Hillman and Keim,
2001), while protecting and enhancing corporate reputation (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun,
2005; Freeman et al., 2007).

5

Eccles et al. (2014) identify a set of U.S. firms that adopted corporate policies related toenvironmental and social issues before the adoption of such policies became widespread. They match
those firms to competitors with similar financial performance, size, capital structure and valuation andfind that firms that adopted the sustainability policies outperform their peers over the long-term, both interms of stock market and accounting performance. Borgers et al. (2013) find that firms with better
sustainability performance have higher risk-adjusted returns in the future but that in more recent years
firms with better sustainability performance have lower alphas. Consistent with the claim that improving
sustainability performance leads to better financial performance, Dimson, Karakas and Li (2014) showthat after successful engagements, particularly on environmental/social issues, companies experience
improved accounting performance and governance, and increased institutional ownership. However, all of
the studies that have used KLD and more generally sustainability data so far (e.g. Derwall, Koedijk, andTer Horst 2011; Galema, Plantinga, and Scholtens 2008) have not differentiated sustainability factors tomaterial and immaterial.

3. Data and Sample
3.1. Data on Materiality
Our data collection is driven by the availability of materiality guidance from SASB. SASB is anindependent 501(c)3 non-profit. SASB’s mission is to develop and disseminate sustainability accounting
standards that help publicly-listed corporations disclose material factors in compliance with SEC
requirements. Through these standards, along with associated education and outreach, SASB is working
to increase the usefulness of information available to investors, and improve corporate performance on
the environmental, social, and governance issues most likely to impact value. SASB standards aredesigned for the disclosure of material sustainability issues in mandatory SEC filings, such as the Form
10-K and 20-F. SASB is accredited to establish sustainability accounting standards by the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI). Accreditation by ANSI signifies that SASB’s procedures to develop

6

SASB sustainability accounting standards meet the Institute’s requirements for openness, balance,
consensus and due process.
By February 2014, SASB had produced guidance for six sectors (out of a total of 10) that include
45 industries. These sectors were healthcare, financials, technology and communications, non-renewable
resources, transportation, and services. SASB’s standards are developed via a multi-stakeholder process
consisting of research supported by Bloomberg technology, data and analytical tools; balanced, multistakeholder industry working groups; a public comment period; and review by an independent Standards
Council comprised of experts in standards development, securities law, environmental law, metrics andaccounting. Appendix I illustrates each step of the standard setting process. SASB convenes balanced
industry working groups—consisting of 1/3 corporations, 1/3 market participants, and 1/3 otherstakeholders—to provide feedback on SASB’s draft sustainability accounting standards. For the four
sectors mentioned above, more than 2,100 experts representing $21.7 trillion in assets under management
and $9.7 trillion in company market capitalization had participated in SASB’s industry working groups.
For each topic, SASB conducts an evidence of materiality test, informed by staff research andindustry working groups, the results of which ultimately are debated and reviewed by the Standards
Council after industry working groups composed of industry experts have provided their input. The test
has three components: evidence of interest, evidence of financial impact, and forward impact adjustment.
We describe each one in more detail in Appendix II but the interested reader can find more informationon the SASB website.

3.2. Sustainability Data
We use MSCI KLD as our source of sustainability data, the most widely used dataset by past studies. For
the purposes of this paper, KLD has a number of advantages. First, it includes a large number of U.S.
companies over a long period of time. In particular, between 1991 and 2000 it included approximately
650 companies, 2001-2002 1,100 companies, and 2003-2012 3,000 companies. Other databases withsustainability data have both shorter time-series and they cover fewer U.S. companies. For example,
7

Thomson Reuters ASSET4 starts data coverage in 2002 and it includes anywhere between 300-900 U.S.
companies throughout that period. Another advantage of the KLD data is that it provides information
about performance on a specific issue in a standardized format rather than the presence or absence of
disclosure, as it is the case for many data items in ASSET4 or Bloomberg.
KLD data have been widely used in the literature by researchers examining the relation betweensocial responsibility and financial performance (e.g., Graves & Waddock, 1994; Turban & Greening,
1997; Fisman, Heal, & Nair, 2005; Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Godfrey, Merrill, & Hansen, 2009;
Ioannou and Serafeim 2014). Researchers at KLD review the company’s public documents, including theannual report, the company website, corporate social responsibility reporting, and other stakeholders’ anddata sources. Company ratings represent a snapshot of the firm’s profile at calendar year end. KLD
researchers also monitor media sources for developing issues on a daily basis. The KLD dataset iscompiled around the beginning of every year (i.e. January) and it is typically available in spreadsheets for
distribution at the latest by late February.
The KLD historical ratings data set is designed as a binary system and comprises both strengths
and concerns. Strengths represent policies, procedures, and outcomes that enable a firm to have a positive
impact on the focal issue. Concerns represent policies, procedures, and outcomes that tend to have anegative impact on the focal issue. For each strength or concern rating applied to a company, KLD
includes a "1" indicating the presence of that screen/criterion and a "0" indicating its absence. In total,seven issue areas are included: a) Community, b) Corporate Governance, c) Diversity, d) Employee
Relations, e) Product, f) Environment, and g) Human Rights. Within each issue area, multiple topics andrespective data items exist. For example, under the Environment issue area, KLD tracks performance on
waste management, packaging materials and waste, environmental opportunities, climate change, andwater stress, among other issues. Under the Social issues area, KLD tracks performance on community
engagement, human rights, union relations, workforce diversity, and access to finance, among other issues.
Under Governance issues area, KLD tracks performance on issues including reporting quality, corruption
and political instability, financial system instability, governance structure, and business ethics.
8

Table 1 Panel A shows how we arrive at the final sample from the original KLD dataset. Panel B
shows the number of unique firms and unique firm-years that are covered by KLD and included in our
sample. The sample comprises 647 firms from the financial, 547 from the healthcare, 341 from thenonrenewable resources, 283 from the services, 369 from the technology and communications, and 120
from the transportation sector. In total there are 2,307 unique firms and 13,397 unique firm-years included
in our sample. Firms are allocated to sectors and industries according to the Bloomberg Industrial
Classification System (BICS). BICS is the industrial classification system used by SASB and it is thestandard system used by investments banks and money management firms.4 Panel C shows the frequency
of firms in our sample by year, which, as expected, increases over time. For these firms, we analyze theirsustainability performance and identify good and poor performers.

3.3. Construction of the Materiality Index
To classify each KLD data item to material or immaterial, we follow guidance from SASB for each oneof the 45 industries in our sample. Specifically, we download each industry standard that identifies
material sustainability issues for companies within an industry. To classify topics, one researcher takes
the lead in one sector and all the industries included in that sector. Each topic identified by SASB asmaterial is mapped to a KLD item, when one is available. After having a complete mapping, anotherresearcher follows the same process. The two mappings are then compared by a third researcher, who
assesses any differences. In our case, differences in mappings across researchers were minimal as the
mapping process in most cases was relatively straightforward.5
All KLD data items that were mapped to SASB items were classified as material. All theremaining KLD data items were classified as immaterial. Appendix III shows the materiality map of
SASB at the sector level. A more granular view at the industry level can be obtained by visiting the SASB

4SASB’s industrial classification system is powered by the Bloomberg Industry Classification System. SASB
leverages the Bloomberg Industry Classification System to identify which industry companies are assigned to.
5
The two researchers disagreed on 2% of the total number of mappings. These differences were resolved byconsultation with the third researcher.

9website. Industries within a sector generally had similar issues classified as material but differences could
be found. Approximately 55% of all possible sector-issue pairs were either material or immaterial for allindustries within the sector (Appendix III). The largest variability across industries within a sector is in
the services sector where only 20% of the issues were either material or immaterial across all industries.
The lowest variability is within the financials and technology and communication sectors with more than
67%. The total number of material items identified is small compared to the total number of KLD data
items, which is 109, consistent with SASB claims that their guidance narrows significantly the number ofissues that a firm needs to disclose. The number of material data items ranges from 13 for the healthcare
sector to 32 for services sector while the financials, transportation, and the nonrenewable resources sector
have 22 and the technology and communications sector has 19 data items that are material. Broadly
speaking for the nonrenewable resources and transportation sectors environmental issues dominate, while
for the financial sector governance and product related issues tend to represent most of the material
issues. For the healthcare, services, and the technology and communications sectors social issues
represent a large number of the material issues. Appendix III provides more detailed information and forindustry mappings the interested reader can visit the SASB website.
To construct a materiality and immateriality index for firm i in year t, we follow the practice,common in the literature, of subtracting the concerns from the strengths to arrive at a single net score(e.g., Graves and Waddock, 1994; Griffin and Mahon, 1997; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Johnson andGreening, 1999; Ruf et al., 2001; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014):= ∑𝐾𝐿𝐷 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻 𝑖𝑡, 𝑆𝐴𝑆𝐵 − ∑𝐾𝐿𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁 𝑖𝑡, 𝑆𝐴𝑆𝐵

(1)

Immaterialit = ∑𝐾𝐿𝐷 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐸𝑁𝐺𝑇𝐻 𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑆𝐵 − ∑𝐾𝐿𝐷 𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑅𝑁 𝑖𝑡, 𝑁𝑂𝑁𝑆𝐴𝑆𝐵(2)Materialit

Panel B of Table 1 shows the number of firms each year with a materiality score and an immateriality
score. These are the firms available each year to form portfolios as described next.

3.4. Portfolio Formation and Estimation

10

To test the future performance implications of firms’ sustainability performance, we begin byorthogonalizing changes in the materiality score with respect to changes in firm size, market-to-book ratio(MTB), profitability (ROA), financial leverage, and sector fixed effects (fs) cross-sectionally each year as
follows:6, 7
ΔMaterialit= b1 + b2ΔSizeit + b3 ΔMTBit + b4ΔROAit + b5ΔLeverageit + fs + ei,tΔImmaterialit = b6 + b7 ΔSizeit + b8 ΔMTBit + b9 ΔROAit + b10 ΔLeverageit + fs + ui,t

(3)
(4)

The signals used to construct portfolios are the residuals from equations (3) and (4), which are
unexplained changes in the materiality and immateriality scores (hereafter “Materiality” and“Immateriality”). This procedure is intended to mitigate concerns about correlated firm characteristics
potentially confounding inferences about the future performance implications of the materiality score.
Moreover, by using for each firm the change in the material or immateriality score, we attempt to isolate
the unexpected level of sustainability investments.
The Materiality portfolios are constructed each year by assigning firms with a Materiality score at
the top (bottom) quintile in that year to the top (bottom) portfolio. Results are robust to constructing the
top and bottom portfolios as the top and bottom deciles or quartiles of Materiality. The Immateriality
portfolios are constructed in the same manner.
The KLD data are released by the end of February each year, and financial statement data neededfor estimation of equation (3) are available for almost all firms by the end of March, so we constructportfolios at the end of March to allow an implementable trading strategy. Value-weighted and equalweighted portfolios are held from the beginning of April until the end of March of the following year.
Abnormal stock return performance of the portfolios is estimated from Fama and French (1993) monthly

6

We regress on those variables because they are fundamental characteristics of a firm in terms of size, growth
opportunities and valuation, financial structure, and profitability. In untabulated results, we added past stock returnand earnings volatility, accruals, and dividend yield, but none of the estimated coefficients on those variables was
significant and the explanatory power of the model was unchanged.
7
Substituting sector for industry fixed effects produces very similar results and does not raise the explanatory powerof the model. While sustainability performance seems to vary across sectors it varies to a less significant extent
across industries within a sector. Moreover, in the early period of the sample, the number of industries is large
enough that the average number of companies within an industry is small.

11

calendar-time regressions that include the market, size, book-to-market, momentum (Carhart, 1997), andliquidity (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) factors.
Table 2, Panels A and B, present summary statistics for our sample and the Compustat universe,
respectively. As expected and consistent with prior studies using KLD data our sample includes larger
firms, with higher price to book ratios and profitability margins, and higher institutional ownership. PanelC presents summary statistics for the level of the materiality and immateriality indices as well as for all
the variables used to estimate models 3 and 4. Panel D presents univariate correlations between thevariables used in the analysis. The correlation between the materiality and immateriality scores is positiveand moderate (0.3). This suggests that different types of investments are related but are sufficiently
different to allow us to differentiate firms. The material index exhibits small positive correlations withboth MTB (0.08) and size (0.03) and a small negative correlation with leverage (-0.02). The immaterial
index exhibits small positive correlations with both MTB (0.05) and ROA (0.08) and a moderatecorrelation with size (0.28). The residuals derived from models 3 and 4 exhibit much lower correlation
between them (0.13), compared to the 0.30 of the raw indices, and they have nearly zero correlation withall MTB, ROA, size and leverage.

4. Results
Materiality Index and Stock Returns
Table 3 presents the estimated coefficients of a five-factor model for the bottom quintile, quartile, anddecile portfolios and top quintile, quartile, and decile portfolios of performance on material sustainability
issues. Panel A presents results for value-weighted portfolios, and Panel B presents results for equalweighted portfolios. The estimated alpha for the top portfolio is significant (p-value<0.05) in all
specifications in Panels A and B of Table 3, ranging from about 3% to about 8% annualized. We findstronger results as we construct portfolios that maximize the difference in material scores with the decile
results producing a larger difference in alphas compared to the quintile and those compared to the quartile
portfolios. The value-weighted alphas are slightly higher than equal-weighted alphas for equivalent
12specifications in Panels A and B. The estimated alphas for the bottom portfolio are insignificant in all
specifications in Panel A, and in two of the three specifications in Panel B. Collectively the results inTable 3 indicate that investments in sustainability issues are value-enhancing for shareholders.
Table 4 presents robustness tests. First we assess the robustness of results to different factor
models. We estimate alphas using the Fama-French (1993) three-factor model that excludes themomentum and liquidity factors, or a four-factor model that excludes the liquidity factor (Carhart 1997).
The results are unchanged using these alternative factor models. We find a 3.84% and 3.98%
outperformance on a three- and four-factor model respectively using value-weighted portfolios. The
outperformance is 2.84% and 3.67% on a three- and four-factor model respectively using equal-weighted
portfolios.
The second robustness test excludes firms with business involvement in controversial businesses.
Past literature documents that ‘sin’ stocks outperform in the future because they have been neglected by
the market (Hong and Kacperczyk 2009). Because the involvement in ‘sin’ business could be directly
related to sustainability scores, we assess the robustness of our results excluding firms that participate insuch lines of business. Although the industries included in our sample do not involve ‘sin’ businesses,
some of the companies might still have ties to ‘sin’ businesses through equity ownerships or alliances.
KLD provides data on business involvement in the alcohol, firearms, gambling, military, and tobacco
businesses. These stocks are just 4% of the entire sample and we exclude them from our portfolios. As
expected, for the industries in our sample, not that many companies are involved in sin businesses.
Therefore, our results are very similar. The outperformance is 5.58% and 3.83% on a value- and equalweighted basis respectively.
Across almost all specifications estimated, we find a larger difference in performance across thetwo groups of firms for value-weighted portfolios, consistent with studies that document sustainability
issues to have a larger impact on larger firms. For example, Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim (2014) showthat firms adopting sustainability policies in the early 1990s, before adoption of such policies became
common, outperformed their matched peers by 2.4% on an equal-weighted basis but by 4.7% on a value13

weighted basis. A more significant impact on larger firms could be attributed to large firms being more
visible and thereby more vulnerable to reputation risk, political and regulatory risk, under more scrutiny
by NGOs, and more likely to be targeted by consumer campaigns (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001;
Campbell 2007). Also, firm size seems to be an important explanatory variable of a firm’s commitment tosustainability issues and a firm’s disclosure practices around those issues (Ioannou and Serafeim 2012).

Immateriality Index and Stock Returns
Table 5 shows results when one ranks firms on immaterial sustainability issues and using quintile
portfolios. For the sake of brevity we do not report quartile or decile regressions but inferences remainunchanged. Specifically, a portfolio of firms scoring high on immaterial issues underperforms a portfolio
of firms scoring low by -1.49% on an equal weighted base. A portfolio of firms scoring high on
immaterial issues outperforms a portfolio of firms scoring low by 0.71% a year on a value-weighted base.
None of the estimated alphas is statistically significant. This suggests that the immateriality index does
not distinguish between firms and thereby is not able to predict future stock market performance.
Table 5, Panel B presents robustness tests. We again assess the robustness of our results todifferent factor models. Results are unchanged when we use these alternative factor models. We find that
portfolio of firms scoring high on immaterial issues does not exhibit different performance compared to aportfolio of firms exhibit scoring low on immaterial issues. Moreover, on an equal-weighted basis we findthat firms scoring high have lower alphas across all specifications although again the estimates are notsignificant.

Materiality Index, Immateriality Index and Stock Returns
So far we have compared firms with superior performance on material sustainability issues versus
companies with inferior performance on those issues. To shed more light on the differential return on
investment from material versus immaterial sustainability issues, we compare firms with good
performance on material issues and bad performance on immaterial issues (‘Material investment firms’)
14

versus firms with good performance on immaterial issues and bad performance on material issues(‘Immaterial investment firms’). This allows us to provide sharper evidence on the shareholder value
implications of sustainability investments.
We use quartile portfolios as cutoff values both for bad and good performance as requiring
quintile or decile portfolios results in very few stocks in portfolios due to the positive univariate
correlation between material and immaterial scores. However, quartile portfolio cutoffs yield weaker
results overall so the results in this section should be benchmarked against that backdrop. Imposing aquartile cutoff for the portfolio results in approximately 35 stocks on average every year in each one ofthe portfolios for Material and Immaterial investment firms. The number of stocks in the All and No
investment firms is closer to on average 50 every year. This makes sense given the positive correlation
between the material and the immaterial index. The number of firms that exhibit high performance on one
index and low performance on the other is lower compared to firms that perform good or bad on both.
Table 6 presents the estimated coefficients of a five-factor model for value-weighted portfolios.
The estimated alpha for the portfolio of Material investment firms is larger in magnitude and statisticallydifferent from zero. We find estimated alphas of 6.01 and 0.60% for top performers on material issues andimmaterial issues for a difference of 5.41% annually. The difference is significant at the 1% level.
Material investment firms also outperform All investment firms by 4.05%. This result shows theimportance of firms distinguishing between the types of investments they make. Grouping both material
and immaterial investments together yields lower performance. Firms that make no investments have theworst performance across all groups of firms with an estimated alpha of -2.90%. The results are similarusing equal-weighted instead of value-weighted portfolios. Comparing the alphas on the set of firms withgood performance on material sustainability suggests that the positive effect from investments in material
sustainability issues are larger for firms that make investments only in material sustainability issues
versus firms that make investments on both material and immaterial issues.

Future Accounting Performance15

Until this point we have examined future stock market performance to understand the value implicationsof sustainability investments. We complement this analysis by examining future changes in accounting
performance. The number of investors integrating ESG data in investment decisions has grownconsiderably over the period of study potentially putting price pressure on the stocks of firms with good
ESG performance and contributing to the positive alphas found earlier for firms with good sustainability
performance. If firms investing in material sustainability issues exhibit superior future accounting
performance then one can infer that price pressure alone cannot explain the superior future stock priceperformance though.
Table 7 shows future changes in accounting performance of firms scoring high and low on themateriality index for quintile portfolios. Firms performing better on material sustainability issues
experience relatively more positive changes in profitability margins. Specifically, we find that changes in
return-on-sales (ROS) and sales growth are more positive for the portfolio of firms performing better onmaterial issues. We tabulate changes in ROS and sales growth up to three years in the future because afterthat the number of observations declines. Across all time horizons the difference in future changes in
profitability margins is positive for both ROS and sales growth. We find similar patterns when we
examine changes in ROA, and return-on-equity. These results are consistent with prior literature thatsuggests that sustainability investments can lead to brand building, competitive differentiation andoperating efficiency (Sen and Bhattacharya, 2001; Konar and Cohen, 2001; Freeman et al., 2007).

5. Conclusion
We use recent guidance by an accounting standard setter, namely the Sustainability Accounting Standards
Board (SASB) to classify sustainability topics to material or immaterial according to industry
membership. We find that firms with superior performance on material sustainability issues outperform
firms with inferior performance on material sustainability issues in the future.
Our results represent a way to reconcile conflicting evidence in the literature. First, a large part ofthe literature that has attempted to document a relation between ratings of sustainability performance and16

future financial performance has largely failed to find any strong results (Margolis et al. 2014). We argue
that this is, at least partly, because the literature has failed to distinguish between material and immaterial
sustainability issues. The results in this paper are also likely to be of interest to firms making
sustainability investment decisions, and to investors making portfolio allocation decisions based in any
part on sustainability criteria. Overall, this is paper is the first to show that investments in material
sustainability issues can be value-enhancing for shareholders while investments in immaterial
sustainability issues have little positive or negative, if any, value implications.
Moreover, our results suggest that recent accounting standard setting efforts for nonfinancial
information are successful in separating material from less material information for investment purposes.
A fruitful area for future research would be examining why firms choose to make different types ofinvestments as well as why and how firms choose to make different types of disclosures.

17

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20

Table 1
Panel A: Sample Construction# of firms# of firm-years

KLD Data (From 1991 to 2012)

6,161

38,063

Less: sectors not covered by SASB yet(3,280)(21,097)

Less: missing firm fundamentals (COMPUSTAT/CRSP items)

(65)

(595)

Less: deletion from changes specification(509)(2,974)

Total

2,307

13,397

Panel B: Frequency by Sector
Sector# unique firms# of firm-years

Financial

647

3,874

Healthcare

547

2,958

Non-renewable Resources

341

2,140

Services

283

1,696

Technology and Communication

369

1,914

Transportation

120

815

Total

2,307

13,397

Panel C: Frequency by yearYear

# of firms

Year# of firms

1992

195

2003

459

1993

196

2004

1,104

1994

193

2005

1,148

1995

157

2006

1,133

1996

184

2007

1,112

1997

182

2008

1,197

1998

183

2009

1,244

1999

192

2010

1,226

2000

190

2011

1,297

2001

212

2012

1,217

2002

376

21

Table 2
Panel A: Summary Statistics for the Sample in this Study

ROA
Leverage
Price to Book
Market Cap

Mean
0.02
0.57
1.18
6516.52

Median
0.03
0.57
1.08
1290.25

St Dev.
0.12
0.25
0.53
16021.98

Q1
0.01
0.38
0.80
446.99

Q3
0.07
0.81
1.45
4195.01N
13,397
13,397
13,397
13,397

Q3
0.06
0.80
1.40
753.99N
211,007210,321
182,239
191,466

Panel B: Summary Statistics for the Compustat Universe

ROA
Leverage
Price to Book
Market Cap

Mean
-0.17
0.75
1.09
1987.85

Median
0.01
0.56
0.97
128.01St Dev.
0.74
1.29
0.69
6670.73

Q1
-0.09
0.32
0.67
24.08

Panel C: Summary Statistics for Sustainability Scores and Firm Characteristics

Material Index
Immaterial Index
ΔMaterial Index
ΔImmaterial Index
ΔSize
ΔMTB
ΔROA
ΔLeverage

Mean-0.1032-0.1804
0.03170.01600.0339-0.0321-0.00140.003322

St Dev.
0.90501.95300.63061.2862
0.49250.31830.10060.0776

N
13,397
13,397
13,397
13,397
13,397
13,397
13,397
13,397

Panel D: Correlation Matrix
Material
Index
Immaterial Index

0.3051

Immaterial
Index

MTB

Size

ROA

1.0000<.0001MTB
Size
ROA
Leverage

0.08670.0474<.0001<.00011.00000.03310.2776

0.26400.0001<.0001<.00011.0000-0.0099

0.08370.03820.30050.2508<.0001<.0001<.00011.0000-0.0265-0.0006-0.0587

0.0683-0.08930.00210.9458<.0001<.0001<.0001Panel A presents summary statistics for our sample and Panel B for the Compustat universe. Panel C presents summary statistics for the sustainability scores andchanges in firm measures. Panel D presents a univariate correlation matrix. ROA is income before extraordinary items over the average of total assets of thecurrent and previous year. Leverage is long-term debt plus current debt over the average of total assets of the current and previous year. MTB is market value atthe end of the calendar year over book value of equity. Market Cap is the market capitalization at the end of the calendar year. Size is the natural logarithm of themarket capitalization at the end of the calendar year. Institutional ownership is the percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional investors.

23

Table 3
Panel A: Performance on Material Sustainability Issues- Value Weighted
Low PerformanceHigh Performance

Low Performance

Quintile
Parameter

Estimate

Intercept-0.0013-0.79

Market1.093323.03

SMB-0.2007

HML

Low Performance

Quartilet

Estimate

0.00282.04-0.0001-0.08

0.941527.59

1.095325.15

0.00231.92-0.0028-1.59

0.00452.63

0.950431.32

1.091921.01

0.9515

22.40

-2.34

-0.2337-4.19-0.2099-2.91-0.2261-4.54-0.2681-3.28-0.2306-3.67-0.0738-0.88

0.11362.02-0.0832-1.13

0.12702.51

0.04030.38

0.06271.00

UMD-0.0163-0.29-0.0163LIQ

0.12992.80

0.0837-0.39-0.0239-0.49-0.0495-1.40-0.0513-0.96-0.1166

-2.00

1.93

0.11452.71

0.07001.89

0.19963.83

0.0770

1.54

N

249

249

249

249

249

249

-1.59%

3.39%-0.15%

2.85%-3.30%

5.56%

4.98%**

t

DecileEstimate

Difference in Alphas

Estimate

High Performancet

Annualized Alphat

High Performance
Estimate

3.00%*

24t

Estimate

8.85%***tPanel B: Performance on Material Sustainability Issues- Equal Weighted
Low PerformanceHigh Performance

Low Performance

QuintiletHigh Performance

Low Performance

Quartile

Estimatet

EstimatetHigh Performance

DecileParameter

Estimate

Intercept

0.00151.37

0.00432.65

0.0023

1.98

Estimate
0.00352.20

t

Estimate
0.00181.18

t

Estimate
0.00472.71

tMarket

1.073537.32

1.063425.80

1.074036.34

1.066126.90

1.084329.86

1.025725.08

SMB

0.09421.72

0.20532.99

0.10011.75

0.22603.37

0.14302.18

0.14972.39

HML

0.38888.11

0.65559.13

0.33127.19

0.68819.81

0.56569.17

0.52227.15

UMD-0.0991-3.62-0.1831-3.11-0.1115-3.65-0.2088-3.30-0.1277-2.61-0.1916

-3.51

LIQ

0.11103.82

0.14802.58

0.08232.68

0.12532.37

0.19115.10

0.1265

2.05

N

249

Annualized Alpha
Difference in Alphas

1.86%

249

249

249

249

5.24%

2.85%

4.29%

2.13%

3.38%*

1.44%

249
5.76%
3.64%*

Table 4 reports alphas, factor loadings, and t-statistics from monthly calendar-time Fama-French regressions. Panel A (B) reports results for value-weighted(equal-weighted) portfolios. The regressions are estimated over the 249 months from April 1993 to December 2013. Mkt-Rf is the market excess return; SMB
and HML are the Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market factors; UMD is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor; LIQ is the liquidity factor from Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003). ***, **, and * indicate one-tailed p-value less than 1, 2.5, and 5%, respectively.

25

Table 4
Robustness Tests
Low PerformanceHigh Performance
Value-weighted
Annualized Alpha

Low Performance
DifferenceHigh Performance
Equal-weighted
Annualized Alpha

Difference

I. Alternative Factor Models
Raw Return3-factor alpha4-factor alpha6.72%-0.84%-0.71%

10.97%
3.84%
3.98%

4.25%**
4.68%**
4.70%**

11.95%
1.72%
2.63%

16.52%
4.56%
6.30%

4.57%**
2.84%*
3.67%**

II. Excluding ‘sin’ business-1.52%

4.06%

5.58%***

1.96%

5.78%

3.83%**The table reports alphas from Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) calendar-time regressions of monthly returns. Sections II and III report alphas from fivefactor models as in Table 3. The regressions are estimated over the 249 months from April 1993 to December 2013. ***, **, and * indicate one-tailed p-valueless than 1, 2.5, and 5%, respectively.

26

Table 5
Panel A: Performance on Immaterial Sustainability Issues
Low PerformanceHigh Performance

Low Performance

Value-weighted
Parameter

EstimatetHigh Performance

Equal-weighted

Estimatet

Estimatet

EstimatetIntercept

0.00050.33

0.00110.91

0.00332.64

0.00211.80

Market0.945322.67

1.028534.98

1.046134.83

1.069732.82

SMB-0.0955-1.40-0.2033-4.32

0.21004.50

0.1647

2.60

HML

0.00780.11-0.0043-0.08

0.44439.79

0.44409.42

UMD-0.0765-1.28-0.0062-0.17-0.1508-5.52-0.1804

-4.77

LIQ

0.08532.03-0.0657-2.03

0.03861.34

0.01450.42

NAnnualized Alpha
Difference in Alphas

249

249

249

249

0.64%

1.35%

3.99%

2.50%

0.71%

-1.49%The table reports alphas, factor loadings, and t-statistics from monthly calendar-time Fama-French regressions. The regressions are estimated over the 249
months from April 1993 to December 2013. Mkt-Rf is the market excess return; SMB and HML are the Fama and French (1993) size and book-to-market
factors; UMD is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor; LIQ is the liquidity factor from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). ***, **, and * indicate one-tailed p-valueless than 1, 2.5, and 5%, respectively.

27

Panel B: Robustness Tests
Low PerformanceHigh Performance
Value-weighted
Annualized Alpha

Low Performance
DifferenceHigh Performance
Equal-weighted
Annualized Alpha

Difference

I. Alternative Factor Models
Raw Return3-factor alpha4-factor alpha

7.80%
0.53%
1.23%

8.13%
0.82%
0.89%

0.34%
0.29%
-0.34%

13.68%
2.85%
4.27%

11.73%
0.93%
2.60%-1.95%-1.92%-1.67%

II. Excluding ‘sin’ business

0.92%

1.79%

0.88%

4.36%

3.05%

-1.31%The table reports in section I alphas from Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) calendar-time regressions of monthly returns. Sections II report alphas fromfive-factor models as in Table 3. The regressions are estimated over the 249 months from April 1993 to December 2013. ***, **, and * indicate one-tailed pvalue less than 1, 2.5, and 5%, respectively.

28

Table 6
Performance on Material and Immaterial Sustainability Issues
Low Performanceon Immaterial Issues &High Performance on
Material
Parameter

EstimatetHigh Performance on
Immaterial Issues &Low Performance on
Material

High Performance on
Immaterial Issues &High Performance on
Material

Low Performance on
Immaterial Issues &Low Performance on
Material

Estimate

Estimate

EstimatetttIntercept

0.00492.40

0.00050.23

0.00160.70-0.0024-1.05

Market0.865218.08

1.042917.25

0.955817.98

1.026017.76

SMB-0.1804-2.62-0.1546-1.69-0.1412-1.77-0.0143

-0.12

HML

0.2886

3.86-0.1210-1.02-0.0611-0.56

0.11741.19

UMD-0.0376-0.73-0.0666-1.04-0.2168-2.94-0.1503

-1.99

LIQ

1.49

0.0231249

0.31

0.0331249

0.42

0.2376
249

3.86

N

0.0745249

Annualized Alpha

6.01%

Difference in Alphas

0.60%
5.41%***

1.96%
4.05%**-2.90%
8.90%***The table reports alphas, factor loadings, and t-statistics from monthly calendar-time Fama-French regressions for value-weighted portfolios. The regressions are
estimated over the 249 months from April 1993 to December 2013. Mkt-Rf is the market excess return; SMB and HML are the Fama and French (1993) size andbook-to-market factors; UMD is the Carhart (1997) momentum factor; LIQ is the liquidity factor from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). ***, **, and * indicate onetailed p-value less than 1, 2.5, and 5%, respectively.

29

Table 7
Future Accounting Performance
ROS Growth
Low Performance on Material Issues
High Performance on Material Issues
Differencet=0 to t=1-2.36%
4.50%
6.86%**

t=0 to t=2-3.32%
3.60%
6.91%**

t=0 to t=3-6.03%
3.09%
9.12%**

Sales Growth
Low Performance on Material Issues
High Performance on Material Issues
Differencet=0 to t=1
9.74%
12.25%
2.51%**

t=0 to t=2
20.35%
22.99%
2.65%**

t=0 to t=330.98%
34.64%
3.66%**The table reports changes in return-on-sales (ROS) and sales growth between the year of portfolio formation and future years. ROS is net income over averagesales. t=x to t=y represents a change between year x and year y. ***, **, and * indicate one-tailed p-value less than 1, 2.5, and 5%, respectively.

30

Appendix I
SASB’s Standard Setting Process

Source: Sustainability Accounting Standards Board. www.sasb.org

31

Appendix II
SASB’s Materiality Process
For each topic, SASB conducts an evidence of materiality test, the results of which ultimately are debatedand reviewed by the Standards Council after industry working groups composed of industry experts haveprovided their input. The test has three components: evidence of interest, evidence of financial impact,
and forward impact adjustment.
The interest test has two components, a heat map score and an industry working group score. The
heat map score is derived from a search for relevant keywords in documents stored on Bloomberg servers
and indicates the relative importance of the issue among SASB’s initial list of 43 generic sustainability
issues. Evidence of interest is gathered by searching tens of thousands of industry-related documents—
Form 10-Ks, shareholder resolutions, CSR reports, media and SEC comment letters—for key words
related to 30 general sustainability issues. The industry working group score signals the percentage ofindustry working group members that found the issue to be material. SASB convenes an industry working
group to provide feedback on the disclosure items and accounting metrics identified in the initial researchphase. The industry working groups are composed of balanced representation from corporations, market
participants, and public interest intermediaries. Primary industry working group feedback is collected via
an online survey. After the conclusion of online survey, SASB’s research team conducts outreach toindustry working group members to gain additional insight.
The financial impact test uses a value framework developed by McKinsey and seeks to identify
evidence of financial impact on revenues/costs, assets/liabilities, or cost of capital from the focal issue in
an industry. Evidence of financial impact is gathered by examining sell side research, investor calltranscripts, third party case studies, anecdotal evidence, and news articles. After identifying a minimum
set of disclosure topics for an industry, for which there is solid evidence of both investor
interest and financial impact, SASB identifies and documents existing metrics and practices used toaccount for performance on each disclosure topic. Any evidences found are publically disseminatedthrough industry-specific industry briefs.
32

The forward-looking impact test assesses the future probability and magnitude of financial impact
from the focal issue to capture issues that may fail the financial impact test but may still be relevant forinvestors. The forward-looking impact test also assesses whether the issue will generate significant
externalities in the future. However, it should be noted that to date the forward looking impact adjustment
has been rarely used by SASB to switch a topic from immaterial to material. After the consultation with
the industry working group has finished, SASB prepares an Exposure Draft Standard with accounting
metrics and technical protocols for each of the disclosure topics.
In the next phase, SASB releases the Exposure Draft Standard for a 90 day public comment
period. At this time, any member of the public can download the Exposure Draft Standard from SASB’s
website and provide feedback via a letter. At the conclusion of the public comment period, SASB
incorporates feedback received into the standard. The Standards Council then reviews the standard toensure consistency, completeness and accuracy. With the Standards Council’s final review, theProvisional Standard is considered complete. The Provisional Sustainability Accounting Standard is thenpublished and made available to the public.

33

Appendix III
Sector-level Materiality Map
IssuesHealth Care

Financials

Technology andCommunication

Non-Renewable
Resources

Transportation

Services

Environment
GHG emissions
Air quality
Energy management
Fuel management
Water and wastewater management
Waste and hazardous materials management
Biodiversity impacts
Social Capital
Human rights and community relations
Access and affordability
Customer welfare
Data security and customer privacy
Fair disclosure and labeling
Fair marketing and advertising
Human Capital
Labor relations
Fair labor practices
Employee health, safety and wellbeing
Diversity and inclusion
Compensation and benefits
Recruitment, development and retention
Business Model and Innovation
Lifecycle impacts of products and services
Environmental, social impacts on core assets and operations
Product packaging
Product quality and safety
Leadership and Governance
Systemic risk management
Accident and safety management
Business ethics and transparency of payments
Competitive behavior
Regulatory capute and political influence
Materials sourcing
Supply chain management

Source: Sustainability Accounting Standards Board. www.sasb.org
Note: Dark (light) grey color means that for more (less) than 50% of the industries within the sector the issue is material. Whitemeans that the issue is not material for any industry within the sector. To see materiality maps at the industry level visit
www.sasb.org

34