Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 4 No. 2 | July 2009

The North Korea Nuclear Crisis:
Five Guiding Principles
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE

North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has posed aclear danger to peace and stability in East Asia for thepast two decades. North Korea’s recent acts, including its July 2006 missile tests, October 2006 and May
2009 nuclear tests, and April 2009 “satellite launch,”coupled with its insistence that it would never returnto the Six-Party Talks, clearly demonstrate that circumstances have now devolved into a crisis.
The current North Korea nuclear crisis is significantly more serious than that which occurred in 1994.
Not only is North Korea’s nuclear program now far
more advanced, its two nuclear tests represent clear
violations of its past commitments to denuclearize.
There is a narrow—and rapidly closing—window ofopportunity in which the international community
has a chance to prevent North Korea from becoming
a nuclear state. Beyond the obvious harmful effectthat a nuclear-armed North Korea would have on
regional stability, the international community’s failure to stop its nuclear program would also deal a significant blow to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty(NPT) regime and potentially encourage other states
to follow North Korea’s example. The damage would

be particularly pronounced in the wake of US President Barack Obama’s celebrated speech in Prague
this past April in which he called for “a world without nuclear weapons.”
Furthermore, persistent media reports of Kim
Jong-il’s health problems, as well as domestic political issues related to the transfer of power to Kim
Jong-un, Kim Jong-il’s third son and rumored successor, have added an additional dimension to thethreat posed by North Korea and significantly exacerbated long-existing concerns about regime stability. A transfer of power to a new leader could bea positive development and create an opportunity
for a fundamental reversal in Pyongyang’s nuclear
policy, or it could have a negative impact if the newregime seeks to consolidate support within theNorth Korean military through the pursuit of aneven more hard-line and confrontational policy. The
unfortunate reality is that it is simply too early to determine what impact regime change will have on thenuclear issue and whether it will result in changes in
the manner of North Korea’s interactions with theinternational community.

of a policy ­consistency among the five nations haveseriously weakened denuclearization efforts.
Henceforth, more extensive collaboration—aswell as greater cohesion and consistency in policy—
among the states involved will be absolutely essential.
Faithful adherence to UN Security Council Resolutions 1518 and 1874 by the five parties—in particular China and Russia—will also be crucial. Tensions
may deepen among the five nations as North Korea
openly challenges the Security Council’s demands.
However, it is imperative that the UN resolutions beimplemented effectively, particularly as they concern interception of North Korean ships suspectedof carrying banned weapons and technology. In theevent of another North Korean provocation, the fivenations will need to demonstrate a united front byholding a high-level five-party dialogue (to which
North Korea would not be invited).

Guiding Principles for Addressing the North
Korea Nuclear Issue
North Korea must never be recognized as anuclear stateThe international community must not treat NorthKorea’s self-proclaimed status as a nuclear power asa fait accompli by recognizing Pyongyang as a nuclear state. Doing so would seriously undermine thecredibility of the United Nations Security Council,
the NPT, and the Six-Party Talks.
Some observers have suggested that in the wakeof North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, the focusof US policy has shifted away from denuclearization
toward counter-proliferation. In other words, rather
than aiming to end North Korea’s nuclear program
once and for all, they argue that the United States
is now merely seeking to prevent Pyongyang fromselling nuclear technology to third parties. Any such
perceived shift in US policy will inevitably give rise
to debates in Japan about the credibility of US extended nuclear deterrence, a development that could
potentially have a destabilizing effect on the security
environment in East Asia.
The Obama administration must continue tomake unambiguous statements denying these rumors and unequivocally state to both Pyongyang
and the international community that the UnitedStates will never recognize North Korea as a nuclearstate. The joint statement released during the recent
summit in Washington between President Obama
and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak is a fineexample of what is necessary.

Contingency planning is imperative
Given that North Korea sees everything through themirror of power and incessantly threatens militaryresponses to various “acts of war” allegedly committed against it by the international community,
the five parties must always be prepared for the possibility of open conflict. It is imperative that trilateral contingency planning—not only concerning
military tactics but also with regard to evacuatingnoncombatants and responding to a possible refugee crisis—be carried out in an earnest and discreet manner among Japan, the United States, andSouth Korea. During the 1994 nuclear crisis, efforts
to engage in trilateral planning failed to get off theground. Instead, discussions were held bilaterally
between the United States and its alliance partners.
This time, trilateral contingency planning, coupledwith regular consultations with China and Russia
concerning these plans, will be essential.

Policy consistency among and within the fivenations is essential
The absence of a united front and policy consistency among the five parties has created an environment of indecisiveness, allowing the North Korean
regime to effectively exploit policy differences andplay governments off one another to great effect. Thefive parties must learn from experience. The past six
years have clearly demonstrated that disparate policies between different administrations within theUnited States, Japan, and South Korea and the lack
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

A comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the
only practical way forward
In order to make a negotiated settlement possible,
the five parties must demonstrate a willingness topresent a united front and assertively counter any
provocations by North Korea. At the same time, the2Vol. 4 No. 2 | July 2009

five parties must also show that they are willing toreach a comprehensive settlement that will address
North Korea’s concerns. In exchange for verifiabledenuclearization and a clear commitment from
North Korea to seriously reform the manner of its
interactions with the outside world, the five parties
must hold out a number of carrots, most importantly 1) normalization of relations between North
Korea and the United States and Japan and 2) theestablishment of a permanent peace regime on theKorean Peninsula.

a fair and verifiable process to determine the truth
about those Japanese citizens still unaccounted forby Pyongyang. Parallel dialogue on these issues conducted under the umbrella of the Six-Party Talks is
the only realistic way to achieve a comprehensivesettlement.
In order to have any hope of success, these informal talks must be convened at a sufficiently highlevel with the full and complete backing of each nation’s top leadership.
❖❖❖The Six-Party process must continue withinformal negotiations before the talks resume
It is unrealistic to expect that North Korea will
abruptly decide to come back to the negotiatingtable and resume the Six-Party Talks. Rather, informal dialogue will be necessary in order to lay thegroundwork for meaningful negotiations. To thisend, when circumstances are appropriate for dialogue, the United States should engage in a series ofbilateral talks with North Korea concerning its nuclear development and the process of normalizing
bilateral diplomatic relations. Negotiations between
North and South Korea must also be restarted. Forits part, Japan needs to be prepared to negotiate toward diplomatic normalization based upon the 2002
Pyongyang Declaration. As far as the abductees issue is concerned, the two sides will have to establish

North Korea’s recent actions represent egregious
violations of its past commitments to abandon its
nuclear weapons program and have raised doubts
about whether its leaders have any intention of coming back to the table to negotiate in good faith. To
ensure a soft landing, the five parties must adhere
to the guiding principles delineated above as theygo forward. Simply put, the international community cannot afford to fail in its dealings with NorthKorea and needs to adopt a well thought-out jointapproach.

Hitoshi Tanaka is a Senior Fellow at JCIE. He­previously served as Japan’s Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from the Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
www.jcie.or.jp

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc. (JCIE/USA)
www.jcie.org

3© 2009 Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 4 No. 2 | July 2009