East Asia Insights
TO WA R D C O M M U N I T Y B U I L D I N GJapan Center for International ExchangeVol. 2 No. 2 | April 2007

East Asia Community Building:Toward an “East Asia Security Forum”
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIEThe East Asian region today barely resembles thatof only a decade ago. The recent proliferation ofministerial conferences and multilateral dialogues,
along with increasing calls for the creation of an“East Asia Community,” are welcome developmentsthat will go toward building confidence between
states and ensuring stability in the midst of sucha rapid transformation. However, to this day the
primary impetus for enhancing regionalism andEast Asian economic integration has been more orless market driven. Enhanced cooperation between
states in a wider range of areas would greatly facili­tate the realization of a more cooperative, compre­
hensive, and stable regional community.
While much of the regional transformation inrecent years has been positive, particularly in theeconomic sphere, challenges abound, such as prolif­
eration of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), in­fectious disease, and trafficking in people and drugs,
that have the potential to destabilize the region andreverse recent achievements. The creation of a multi­
lateral institution to efficiently deal with such non­traditional and transnational security issues would
not only foster a more secure environment for con­tinued economic expansion but also—through joint
action on issues of common concern—push the re­gional community-building process forward. One
effective way to achieve these goals is the creation ofan “East Asia Security Forum.”

The Situation in East Asia
Discourse on East Asia in recent years has been
dominated by talk of a rising China, whose con­tinued economic growth and increasingly activerole in foreign affairs have transformed the geo­
political landscape in the region and sent policy­
makers in neighboring countries searching for aneffective means to cooperate, while still hedging
against uncertainty regarding its future course. A
further look into the continent finds India, whose
economy and international political influence arealso expanding quickly. Somewhat in contrast to
relatively guarded engagement strategies vis-à-vis
China, many in the region see India as a potential
contributor to regional stability, manifested mostclearly in a successful campaign to include India asa member state in the East Asia Summit (EAS).
Yet another trend in the region not to be over­looked is Japan’s own gradual transformation.
­China’s growing regional and global political in­fluence, along with rapidly growing (and nontransparent) defense expenditures, has stirred up
Japanese public sentiment toward China. Addi­
tionally, the situation on the Korean peninsula hasin recent years become an increasingly destabiliz­
ing security and geopolitical flashpoint. With do­
mestic opposition to Japan playing a more assertiverole in the region on the decline in the face of thechanging regional environment, Japan’s security

policy has undergone a significant transformationin the new century as it seeks a more pro-activeand “normal” role.
Farther south, despite substantial progress,
ASEAN countries continue to face a number ofchallenges with respect to their domestic gover­nance. While annual GDP growth among South­
east Asian states has continued to clip along at ratesof over five percent for several years, corruption,
environmental degradation, and an expanding
disparity between the rich and poor remain seri­
ous issues of concern and pose substantial threats
to sustainable development. Additionally, transna­
tional environmental and health challenges suchas HIV/AIDS and avian influenza all pose direct
threats to regional stability.
Thus, we are presented with an East Asia that, instark contrast to remarkable GDP growth rates andincreasing economic interdependence throughout
the region, faces a number of serious challenges
outside of the economic sphere. Not only do thesecircumstances pose a direct threat to the securityof individual states in the region, the lack of an
efficient mechanism to tackle such problems in acooperative way poses a significant challenge to re­gional community-building processes.

with nations such as Thailand, Singapore, and thePhilippines.
While the contribution that such a traditional
approach can make to regional stability should be
acknowledged, the most sensible way forward has
as its keystone an expanded emphasis on inclusive
multilateralism. The US focus on ad-hoc multi­
lateralism—building coalitions only with coun­tries supportive of US policy—is not necessarily
applicable to a region as large and diverse as East
Asia. Rather, what is critical is a forum predicatedon an inclusive policy of multilateralism, actively
engaging all states in the region, in which mattersof concern are addressed directly, without ostra­cizing any individual state or group of states. As
will be discussed below, an East Asia Security Fo­
rum would not only contribute to a more stable
and secure region but also itself strengthen a senseof community among states that cooperatively
solve problems, thereby indirectly facilitating therealization of an East Asia community.

East Asia Security Forum vs. the ASEAN
Regional Forum
Critics may argue that an East Asia Security Forum
would be a mere redundancy given the existenceof the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an organi­zation already tasked with managing security is­sues in the region. Such individuals would argue
that an attempt to create another security forum
is tantamount to an attempt to destroy the ARF.
However, such critics would fail to realize two key
points: 1) the limits of the ARF’s capabilities; and2) the potential for an East Asia Security Forum tocomplement, rather than substitute for, the ARF.
Despite its designation as “Asia’s leading secu­
rity forum” the ARF has not accomplished muchoutside of a conference room since its establish­
ment almost thirteen years ago. It has proven itself
ineffective when faced with either specific threats
to regional stability, such as the nuclear issue on
the Korean peninsula, or crises requiring a spe­cificand quick response, such as the December 2004
tsunami. The former has been primarily handled
in the context of the Six-Party Talks while the lat­ter was more or less handled by a “coalition of thewilling” whose main members included the Unit­
ed States, Japan, Australia, and India. The ARF’s

Moving Forward: Policy Options for
Regional Stability
Given current realities, it goes without saying thata return to a Cold War–era strategy of contain­
ment to pre-empt China’s rise is impractical. Sucha strategy would serve only to reverse many of theregion’s economic gains in recent years. In its stead,regional powers are most likely to pursue a policyof cautious engagement predicated on a tradition­
al balance-of-power approach, which addresses,
but does not fall victim to, the uncertainty andskepticism surrounding China’s rise. Such a policy
would allow states to effectively hedge against theunpredictability of China’s future course with­out simultaneously antagonizing it. In pursuitof this goal, we are likely to see a consolidationof strategic links among the region’s four largest
democratic states (Japan, India, Australia, and theUnited States) as well as continued emphasis on
US bilateral security alliances with Japan, Korea,
and Australia and its strong security partnerships
EAST ASIA INSIGHTSVol. 2 No. 2 | April 2007

beyond the nation-state and help absorb and dissi­
pate destabilizing nationalistic sentiment that theregion has seen rise sharply in recent years. An East
Asia security community would serve as an effec­
tive way for states in the region to cooperatively
address common security threats such as terrorism
and the proliferation of nuclear weapons, leaving
not only the region but also the rest of the world
more secure in the process.
The best way to facilitate the strengthening ofcommunity ties is to emphasize functional issues
that serve the interests of all regional partners.
Action-oriented regionalism, through which asmall number of core actors are bound together
by rules and operations—rather than values, re­ligion, or political systems—will effectively push
the community-building process forward. Whilethe expansion of economic ties in the region iswell known, one potential area for extensive coop­eration yet to be adequately addressed is that ofsecurity. As touched on above, despite the ARF’svaluable role as a broad security dialogue forum
effective for confidence building, very little in
the form of concrete cooperative action ever re­sults from its meetings. With issues such as piracy
or terrorism, merely discussing the issue, while
not absent of value, does not go far toward actu­
ally solving the problem. Rather, specific and pro­active operations are necessary.
It should be emphasized that an East Asia Secu­
rity Forum would not function as an alternative toexisting bilateral security alliances with the UnitedStates as a guarantor of regional stability any timein the foreseeable future. Rather, for the time be­ing, its function should be to complement such al­liances. While the global strategic environment haschanged such that war between states is now rela­
tively rare and the greatest risk often comes from
non-state actors, such “hard” security alliances arean effective hedge against unpredictable future
threats. There is an increasing consensus among
regional players—even China—that bilateral alli­
ances are fundamentally stabilizing for the region
as a whole.
In addition to maintaining the ARF as a forum
for dialogue on security issues, the Six-Party Talks
format could emerge as an effective sub-­regional
security dialogue forum for resolving North

response to last year’s earthquake in Indonesia, in­creased efforts to jointly combat cyber-terrorism,
and this past January’s joint exercise in Singapore(the ARF’s first ever operational exercise) suggestthat it is indeed evolving, but two things neverthe­less remain uncertain. First, there are doubts as tohow far the ARF, with such a wide-ranging groupof member states, will be able to move beyond its
original mandate to promote confidence building,transparency, and stability in the region. Second,even if it is ultimately able to move forward on
the 1995 Concept Paper’s road map and engage
in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution,*
it remains unclear how many years it will take be­fore those goals are achieved. The simple fact ofthe matter is that there are a number of urgent
issues demanding attention in East Asia, and the
ARF is currently not sufficiently capable of deal­
ing with them.
Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize herethat the ARF’s function as a forum for regular min­isterial dialogue and confidence building remains
an invaluable contribution to regional stability. As
mentioned above, the goal of an East Asia ­Security
Forum would not be to supplant the ARF but tocomplement it by establishing a community ofstates pro-actively working together through op­
erations to solve issues of common concern.

The Key to Community Building: An
Action-Oriented Regionalism
The obstacles to achieving a genuine communi­
ty of states in a region as diverse as East Asia areconsiderable, both in number and degree. The­community-building process is going to take time.
In light of this fact, it is clear that recognition ofshared interests, rather than divisive issues, shouldbe the point of focus for the foreseeable future.
In addition to addressing the specific problem inquestion, such a process would strengthen regional
identity and facilitate the creation of a more stable
and secure environment for the region as a whole.
The spread of a regional “East Asia” identity could
be a means for individuals to develop an identity* The 1995 Concept Paper for the ARF delineated a three-stage
evolutionary process: 1) confidence building; 2) preventive di­plomacy; and 3) conflict resolution. However, for all intents
and purposes, the ARF has yet to move beyond the first stage.

EAST ASIA INSIGHTSVol. 2 No. 2 | April 2007­ orea’s nuclear issue. Such a forum, which bringsK
together the most powerful states in the region tocooperate on a security issue of common concern,
was not feasible even ten years ago. Although orig­
inally ad hoc in nature, the forum should continue
to exist even after the nuclear issue is settled andaddress remaining issues on the peninsula, such as
normalization of relations with the United States
and Japan, the establishment of a permanent peace
regime, and continued economic development ofNorth Korea. In addition to hopefully leading toeffective solutions to these issues, such interaction
also has value through its function as a confidencebuilding mechanism.
Although both the ARF’s and the Six-Party
Talks’ contribution to regional stability will remain
invaluable, an East Asia Security Forum would
consist of a small number of core members, such
as ASEAN+6 and the United States, and be op­
erational in its orientation. An East Asia ­Security
Forum would handle non-traditional/cooperative
security issues, such as non-proliferation of WMD,
counter-terrorism, counter-piracy, and human se­
curity issues, addressing these challenges throughcooperative action somewhat similar to the Amer­
ican-led Proliferation Security Initiative.
Given that in a region as diverse as East Asia theinterests and values of states are often at odds, an
East Asia Security Forum should not be expected
to function as efficiently or cover the same breadthof issues as other multilateral regional security
forums, such as NATO. One example of the chal­lenges an East Asia Security Forum would face isthe fact that the region’s two most powerful play­ers, China and Japan, do not maintain similar tra­ditional threat perceptions. Despite this fact, there

nevertheless remain a number of issues, such as
those mentioned above, which all regional actors
have a common interest in addressing. The act ofcooperation itself will also play a role as a confi­
dence-building measure and gradually minimize
the perceived threat posed by neighbor states.
If an East Asia Security Forum is successfully
established, it could in some sense be consideredmore progressive than NATO in its insistence oncooperative security despite vast and fundamen­
tal differences among member states. At the sametime, however, it is important to emphasize thefact that no security institution has a legitimatechance of success without US cooperation. Simply
put, without US support, an East Asia Security Fo­
rum would likely fail. Thus, regional actors must
make every effort to ensure that the United Statesfeels welcome and remains engaged in the region.
In this regard, the United States should be encour­
aged to sign the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation(TAC) and join the EAS as soon as possible.
Even if the United States does not sign the TAC,
there are signs that it is likely to be included in aregional security forum anyway. Statements com­
ing out of January’s EAS in Cebu suggest increased
support for expanding the conceptualization ofregionalism to include joint efforts to address in­
fectious disease, energy security, and other chal­lenges. If the EAS continues to discuss strategic
issues such as non-traditional security threats, it
is all but a foregone conclusion that members willagree that US involvement in any countermeasures
to address these threats is indispensable. The hopeis that these statements will ultimately lead to theestablishment of an East Asia Security Forum withfull US support and participation.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from a Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
www.jcie.or.jp

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc. (JCIE/USA)
www.jcie.org

© 2007 Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 2 No. 2 | April 2007