OCTOBER
2020

Navigating China Relations and the
US-Japan Alliance
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIET

he intensification of the US-China rivalry
is increasingly putting the security and stabilityof East Asia at risk. Across the international community there is growing concern about Chinese actions,
including its assertive maritime behavior, its rapidly increasing influence through the Belt and Road
Initiative, its cyber and industrial espionage, its oppression of Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang, and its stronghanded approach in seeking the “Chinafication” ofHong Kong. At the same time, there is increasing anxiety about the US retreat from multilateralism and its
response to China, including its instigation of a trade
war and calls by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to“decouple” the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)from the international community.
This situation leaves Japan and other US allies
and partners in Asia facing the conundrum of how
to maintain an appropriate balance in their relations
with these powers. On the one hand, the region relies on the United States and the US-Japan allianceto uphold regional security and stability, but on theother hand, its economic prosperity is anchored inregional economic integration and supply chains thatare deeply intertwined with China. Moreover, thestructural nature of the US-China confrontation—
shaped by the rapid growth of Chinese economic andmilitary power, the Chinese Dream to become a fully
developed nation by 2049, the battle for high-techsupremacy, and the two countries’ different politicalsystems—means that it is a long-term issue and unlikely to disappear any time soon.
From a Japanese perspective, establishing a joint
US-Japan approach to China is a critical step in orderto prevent China from exercising regional hegemony
and to protect the shared peace and prosperity of theregion. A joint approach must recognize respective
interests and must be based on careful security andeconomic policy planning in order to deter aggressive Chinese behavior in a targeted manner while
also enabling the engagement of China on shared interests where feasible. The only realistic way for thisapproach to succeed is to move China onto a morecooperative track as a constructive regional stakeholder over the long term, as attempts to exclude it
from international society will undoubtedly prove
futile and counterproductive.

OCTOBER 2020 | 2
Understanding the Nature of US-China
Confrontation

Since Xi Jinping became president in 2013, he haspromoted the “Chinese Dream.” This entails a national rejuvenation of China across economic, political, diplomatic, scientific, and military dimensions tobecome a fully developed nation by 2049, the 100th
anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic.
The Chinese Dream has to be understood in the context of the country’s historical memory of national
humiliation. This deeply ingrained narrative focuseson the Opium Wars with Britain between 1839–1842
and 1856–1860, which resulted in the establishmentof treaty ports and the loss of Hong Kong, and the
Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895, which resulted in
the loss of Taiwan. As such, economic growth andprotecting China from experiencing any further humiliation at the hands of foreign powers continue toform two critical pillars of the CCP’s domestic political legitimacy.
On its current trajectory, the Chinese economy
will continue to be a key engine of global economic
growth for the foreseeable future. Globalization has
reduced the economic disparity between China andthe established industrial democracies of North
America, Europe, and Asia, and the COVID-19 pandemic appears set to accelerate this trend. While
China was the first epicenter of the pandemic, it isalso the first country to have recovered, at least economically, and it appears poised to be one of the few
countries to post a positive growth rate in 2020. As
such, irrespective of US frustrations with China overits questionable trade and intellectual property practices, it is clear that the blunt instrument of a wholesale decoupling from the Chinese economy cannot
be realized without fatally undermining the sustainability of the economies of the United States, China,
Japan, and the wider region, as well as triggering
China’s fear of humiliation.

US-Japan Cooperation and Japan’s­National Interests

Moving China onto a more cooperative track in theregion is not a task that can be done by any one country alone. Japan must work with all of its regional allies that face a similar balancing act between China
and the United States. The crucial element is the USJapan alliance, as it remains the linchpin of regional
stability. However, a joint US-Japan approach mustreflect Japanese interests as well as US and regional
interests. What, then, are Japan’s key interests?

Upholding Basic Values

As a democratic country that values the rule of law,human rights, political transparency, and free trade,
Japan seeks to prevent Chinese hegemony in East
Asia. Japan has been warily eyeing China’s maritime
activities in the South China Sea and around the
Senkaku Islands, as well as the passage of the Hong
Kong national security law. To protect its basic values
and guard against the potential threat of Chinese coercion, Japan has no better alternative than to maintainthe US-Japan alliance. The alliance must continue toserve its critical functions of upholding regional security—including the deterrence of aggressive Chinese
behavior—and providing a basis from which engagement and cooperation with China can be negotiated.
The Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have incrementally expanded their roles and missions since the endof the Cold War. But with the continuing deterioration of the regional security environment, Japan willneed to continue to gradually expand the roles of the
SDF within the framework of the US-Japan alliance,
both in terms of functions and budget.

Managing Interdependence with China

Countries around the region are bound to continue
to depend on economic ties with China for their future prosperity, and this holds true for Japan too. The
Japan-China trade relationship is the third largest
bilateral trade relationship in the world (after USCanada and US-China trade) and Japan will continue
to rely on Chinese trade, investment, and tourism for
decades to come.
Japan’s economic interdependence with China
goes beyond bilateral relations. The integration ofregional supply chains means that Japan’s interdependence with China is inextricably linked to its
economic relationships with ASEAN countries,
Australia, India, and South Korea. When JapanChina economic relations suffer, so too do Japan’s
economic relations with its other regional partners.
And this interdependence is likely to be further
strengthened when the Regional Comprehensive
Economic Partnership (RCEP) comes into force.
Therefore, Japan has no alternative but to find a way
to manage coexistence with China to maintain sustainable economic growth and prosperity.

OCTOBER 2020 | 3
Avoiding Unnecessary Military Conflict

Japan cannot afford an unnecessary military conflictin the region between the United States and China.
With the economic damage being wrought by the
COVID-19 pandemic, military conflict is the last thing
the region needs as it seeks to build toward recovery.
The regional consequences of any conflict, including
disruption to sea lanes and regional supply chains,would be devastating
The most dangerous flashpoint for the UnitedStates and China is Taiwan. Under the 1972 JapanChina Joint Communiqué and the 1978 Japan-China
Treaty of Peace and Friendship, Japan is committed torespecting the “One China” policy while encouraging
a peaceful resolution to the matter. However, if a conflict over Taiwan was determined to be the result ofChinese aggression, and if the United States decided
to act, then Japan’s SDF could not avoid supporting
the US military under the auspices of the US-Japan
alliance. This would fall under the scope of Japan’s
September 2015 security-related legislation that recognizes the right of the SDF to engage in limited
forms of collective self-defense.
No matter how such a conflict played out, it would
be a lose-lose proposition for Japan. Either Japan’s security under the US-Japan alliance would come into
question or Japan’s economic interests in its relations
with China would be dealt a heavy blow.

Formulating Precise Measures for US-­Japan Cooperation
In order to ensure that Japan is not forced to choose
between its security and economic interests andthat the US-Japan alliance can continue to serve as
the bedrock for regional stability and prosperity, it
is imperative that the United States and Japan work
together to formulate a joint strategy vis-à-vis China.
This strategy must be based on careful policy planning. Only in this way can we find the right balance todeter China from aggressive behavior without fatally
undermining regional economic stability.

Deepening Japan’s Consultations with
the United States and China

The new Suga Administration should engage in deep
strategic consultations with both the United States
and China. The key objective ought to be to avoid an
unnecessary military conflict in the region, which isin everybody’s interest.

Japan should engage in intensive dialogue with
China to clearly convey regional concerns about
the aggressive elements of Chinese behavior as wellas to pursue cooperation on shared interests. Thisshould not be seen as a case of Japanese hedging;
Japan is committed to the maintenance of democracy and a liberal international order. However,
without dialogue, we cannot accurately know thethinking, concerns, and objectives of China’s leaders. And without understanding Beijing’s thinking,we cannot formulate the best possible measures
to deter military provocations and unlawful acts,
avoid conflict, and deepen cooperation. This is particularly critical given the recent deterioration in
the discourse between US and Chinese officials. In
a series of four speeches over the summer of 2020
that were long on antagonistic rhetoric and shorton policy substance, Trump administration officials
led by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo asserted thatengagement with China has failed and essentiallydeclared an ideological crusade of “decoupling” theChinese Communist Party (CCP) from the international community.
At the same time, Japan must make clear to theUnited States that jettisoning the “America First” approach to foreign policy, returning to multilateralism,
and forging a common approach with Japan vis-à-vis
China will best serve the US national interests as wellas those of Japan and other regional allies. Under thecurrent US administration, while President Donald
Trump and former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe maintained good personal relations, Japan has struggled todevelop meaningful US-Japan dialogue at the highest
levels of government.
Yet whether the US presidential election is won
by President Trump or by former Vice President
Joe Biden, it is clear that US policy toward Chinaneeds to be reviewed. The current tough approachof the Trump administration toward China may be­election-year posturing. But the pursuit of a wholesale decoupling from China is unrealistic in a globalized world and does not serve US interests. Indeed,
the United States is relying on China to purchase significant volumes of US agricultural products, energy,
manufactured goods, and services under the terms of
the US-China phase one trade deal.

OCTOBER 2020 | 4
Deepening Regionwide Engagement with
China

Despite Pompeo’s rhetoric, engagement—not decoupling—is the only way to positively change
China. Engagement is not a short-term objective.
It is inevitably a decades-long process. But it is the
only way that countries can learn to overcome conflict and live together, as Japan experienced afterWorld War II.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, theinternational community hoped that Russia would
be a democracy, a market-based economy, and a constructive international stakeholder. Yet the failure tosustain deeper engagement with Russia made it easierfor the country to backslide into authoritarianism andbecome a disruptive force in global affairs. A similar
failure to engage China and the undermining of thebonds of economic interdependence called for by the
Trump administration risks lowering the costs of aggressive Chinese behavior.
Cooperation should be developed through regionwide partnerships that deeply involve China. Japanis cautious about engaging with China simply on bilateral terms or on a trilateral US-China-Japan basis.
Rather, cooperation must include a multilateral component including ASEAN members states, Australia,
India, and South Korea. The vehicles for this are already in place with multilateral regional institutions
such as the East Asia Summit, APEC, and the RCEP.
But to be most effective, the United States must return to multilateralism. Only in this way can we build
back from the economic damage being wrought by
COVID-19 and enmesh China in regional cooperation
in a way that raises the costs of the aggressive elements of its behavior.
Meanwhile, Japan must also further develop
strong partnerships in the region with those nations
such as Australia, India, and ASEAN that have a similar interest in maintaining regional stability in East
Asia. This can help undergird the effectiveness of the
US-Japan alliance.

Managing North Korea

North Korea’s machinations have often driven a wedge
between the great powers in Asia, but a shared interestin North Korean denuclearization presents an opportunity for the United States, China, and Japan to work
together on one issue. Strategically speaking, USChina and Japan-China relations were characterized

by a more cooperative tone during the Cold War thanthey are today because they had the mutual objectiveof countering the threat posed by the Soviet Union.
While there are a number of areas where the interestsof the democracies of the Asia-Pacific do not easilyalign with China—such as on Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Tibet, and Xinjiang—preventing North Korea fromacquiring the status of a full-fledged nuclear power isa critical issue of alignment.
To this end, the Six-Party Talks should be resurrected to push momentum on denuclearization.
As has been argued in previous issues of East Asia
Insights, denuclearizing North Korea requires acomprehensive resolution. This must include theformulation of parallel roadmaps to realize step-bystep sequencing on denuclearization and a permanent peace treaty.
Japan should also play an active role in denuclearizing North Korea. Japan and North Korea agreed
on the importance of multilateral dialogues likethe Six-Party Talks during discussions leading up
to the signing of the 2002 Japan-DPRK Pyongyang
Declaration. North Korea explained that it does notwant to be isolated nor be forced to depend solely
on China, so this creates an opening for Japan. For
Japan to play an active role, the DPRK abductionof Japanese citizens needs to be on the agenda.
However, without addressing the nuclear issue, it isunlikely the abduction issue can be resolved as North
Korea seems to see the issues as connected and may
be holding onto the abductions as a bargaining chipfor its survival. In other words, demanding its resolution as a precondition for negotiations will notwork. The only way to resolve the abduction issue
is within the overall framework of denuclearizationand peace treaty negotiations.

■■■
The region is looking on with increasing anxiety atboth China’s assertive behavior and the response of
the United States. The wholesale decoupling of China
from the international system is unrealistic. While
the US-China rivalry will not disappear anytime
soon, it is in the shared interest of the United States
and Japan to work together to reduce tensions andmanage relations in a more targeted manner with theright balance of deterrence and engagement. Such an
approach must recognize the necessity of US-Japan

OCTOBER 2020 | 5
alliance cooperation to uphold basic values and deter Chinese military provocations, the managementof interdependence with China to uphold sharedprosperity, and the need to avoid unnecessary military confrontation. Through intensive US-Japan and
China-Japan consultations, the development of regionwide partnerships that enmesh China as a constructive regional stakeholder, and progress on theshared strategic objective of denuclearizing North
Korea, we can uphold shared peace and prosperity
and avoid an unnecessary new cold war.
Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairmanof the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan
Research Institute, Ltd. He previously served as Japan’s
deputy minister for foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on
East Asia regional issues from a Japanese perspective.
Please direct any comments or questions toeainsights@jcie.or.jp.
JCIE/Japan www.jcie.or.jp | JCIE/USA www.jcie.org© 2020 Japan Center for International Exchange