July 2015

Japan Center for International Exchange

The Next Step for the
US-Japan Alliance
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE

US-Japan relations gained momentum with
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s US visit in late spring.
Abe’s historic speech to a joint session of the Congress
was well received in the United States. In addition, during his trip the two countries announced the first revision of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines
since 1997, which was based on the understandingthat the Japan Self-Defense Force (SDF) will take ona larger role and US-Japan security cooperation will
be expanded. However, even as Prime Minister Abe’s
administration struggles this summer to pass the legislation that will allow Japan to expand its security
role, structural shifts in East Asia are making it clearthat the next step for Japan and the United States must
be to transform the alliance into a more multifaceted
partnership that better equips both countries to work
together in shaping the evolving regional order.
The evolution in US-Japan alliance relations thatwas on display during Abe’s visit has taken placeagainst the backdrop of ongoing shifts in the regional balance of power; the continued rise of emerging market economies such as China, India, and theASEAN countries; the steady growth of Asia’s middle
class; and a shift in US defense spending toward amore sustainable, “lean but mean” posture. Therefore,
looking ahead, there is a pressing need to strengthen
multilateral cooperation in the region—both in the
diplomatic and security realms—and this means that,on the one hand, the United States needs to change
how it engages in the region, while on the other hand,the allies and partners of the United States also have toincrease their contributions to regional stability.
While US Secretary of State John Kerry was rightto portray the revision to the guidelines as a “historictransition in the defense relationship between our two
countries,” bolstering the US-Japan alliance for its
own sake is no longer as important as it was in thepast; rather it is useful primarily as one element of abroader shared strategy for the region. As such, Japanand the United States should build upon the success of
Abe’s US visit by focusing on long-term efforts to takea more multifaceted approach in order to promote regional stability and prosperity.

Japan: Overcoming History and Building Trust
In the lead-up to this August’s anniversary of the endof World War II, a great deal of attention is being
paid to Japan’s stance on war history, and measuresto ensure that history issues do not hinder broader
cooperation must be taken as one prerequisite forany genuine effort to utilize the US-Japan alliance asa multifaceted vehicle to promote regional stability.
During his US trip, Prime Minister Abe stated clearly
that he would uphold the views expressed by theprevious prime ministers on Japan’s wartime record;referred to Japan’s transgressions in Pearl Harbor,
Bataan Corregidor, and the Coral Sea; and offeredhis “deep repentance” for the suffering caused by thewar. Still, a group of US lawmakers criticized Abe for
failing to mention the comfort women issue in his
Congressional address, while the Chinese and South
Korean governments protested that Abe fell short of adirect “apology.”
The 70th anniversary of World War II offers animportant opportunity for the Abe government toaffirm Japan’s postwar identity as a peace-loving nation and to mend strained ties with South Korea andChina. In his highly anticipated August statement,
Abe must unequivocally face up to Japan’s historical wartime transgressions without dropping any of
the key elements of the Murayama Statement. At thesame time, Abe should set out Japan’s defense policy
in a ­forward-looking and practical way—clearly stating that it is aimed solely at defending Japan and contributing to the peaceful enhancement of the regional
security environment—in order to dispel any misperceptions in China and South Korea that the revised
US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines or Japan’s
new legislation to allow it to exercise limited formsof collective self-defense represent a return to a moreaggressive regional posture.

toward a more engaged day-to-day involvement
and leadership role in the region.
Truly becoming a resident power will also require
the United States to move beyond its security commitment to the region to also having deeper economic and political engagement. For instance, it isincumbent on the United States to play a greater leadership role in economic rulemaking in the region—a
successful conclusion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership(TPP) will be a useful step in this regard—as well as toproject greater political leadership in regional multilateral forums like the East Asia Summit.
In particular, one important step that the UnitedStates can take to project political leadership is tospearhead the establishment of a four-party ChinaJapan-ROK-US confidence-building mechanism totackle two pressing issues: (1) reassurance diplomacy
regarding the evolving role of the SDF and the USJapan alliance, and (2) agreements on crisis avoidanceand communications. On the first point, of course,
the Abe government’s proposed security legislationthat should enable Japan to exercise its right to limited
forms of collective self-defense is within the purview
of Japan’s exclusively defense-oriented security policy
framework. But without adequate confidence-­building
measures that engage Japan’s neighbors, there is a riskof misperceptions and increased regional tensions.
And on the second point, military-to-military directcommunication hotlines and crisis management procedure agreements are urgently needed in order toreduce the risk of accidental collision and to mitigate
damage in the event of a crisis. This is especially critical in the East China Sea given the increasingly highrisk of a sea or air collision near the Senkaku Islands.

United States: Becoming a Resident PowerA second prerequisite for a long-term effort totransform the US-Japan alliance into a more multifaceted partnership to stabilize the region is achange in the US mindset that enables the UnitedStates to truly act as a resident power. Current projections are that Asia will be home to two-thirds ofthe global middle class by 2030 and will account for
more than half of global GDP by 2050. As the regional order evolves to reflect these shifts, it is critical that the United States become more intimately
and directly involved in the order-building process. This requires the United States to move awayfrom its tendency to act as an external balancer andEAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Strengthening Multilateral Security
Cooperation
The revision of the US-Japan Defense Cooperation
Guidelines is a positive step forward in positioning
Japan and the US-Japan alliance to engage in deeper
multilateral security and diplomatic cooperation.
Since those guidelines were first established in 1978
to facilitate coordinated action in the event of an attack on Japan, the regional security environment has
undergone a fundamental transformation. The firstrevision of the guidelines in 1997 was precipitated by
two key crises earlier in the decade: the first Korean
nuclear crisis and the Taiwan Strait crisis. These crises
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illuminated the fact that—given a lack of legal provisions detailing what the SDF could or could not do
under the Article 9 “peace clause” of the constitution—Japan was unprepared to deal with a regional
contingency. The 1997 guidelines and the supporting legislation passed in 1999 (the Law Concerning
Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in
Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan) detailed theroles of the SDF during regional security situations
and recognized Japan’s right to provide rear-area support to the United States, so long as it did not constitute an “integral part in the use of force.”
Fast-forwarding to the present, the regional security environment has changed yet again. Most
prominently, China’s maritime behavior has become
increasingly assertive as it continues to send ships
into the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands in ever greaternumbers, announced an Air Defense Identification
Zone covering the Senkakus and a large portion of theEast China Sea in November 2013, and is unilaterally
constructing landfill islands in disputed areas of theSouth China Sea. The United States and Japan must
assume that China will continue to rise, although theyshould recognize that its future direction is not predetermined, that engagement can help steer China
toward mutually beneficial outcomes, and that violent
conflict with China is both undesirable and highly
unlikely. At the same time, they must be prepared forfurther possible unilateral or unpredictable behavior
from China. With this in mind, it must be emphasizedthat the Abe government’s proposed security legislation currently being debated in the Japanese Diet iswithin the bounds of the Article 9 “peace clause” ofthe constitution.
Looking ahead, the next task for the United States
and Japan should be to strengthen trilateral security cooperation with partners such as South Korea,
Australia, India, and the ASEAN nations. In particular, deeper US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation,
including contingency planning, is urgent given theuncertain situation on the Korean Peninsula. Since
taking over as leader of North Korea three and a halfyears ago, Kim Jong-un has purged a startling numberof high-ranking officials, including Defense Minister
Hyon Yong-chol earlier this year and his own uncle,
Jang Song-thaek, in 2013. Positions of power are increasingly being stacked with loyalists and closefamily members, including Kim Jong-un’s younger
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

sister. As such, Kim’s power base appears narrow, andeven members of the inner circle may fear for theirpersonal safety. It is thus imperative that the UnitedStates, Japan, and South Korea coordinate closely todevise detailed contingency planning.
Trilateral cooperation directed toward North Korea
should take into account the need to engage China andRussia, make preparations to steer the situation towarda soft-landing unification, and utilize Track 2 diplomacy
to inject fresh ideas from academia to ensure the longterm stability of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time,
trilateral security cooperation with other partners (e.g.,
Japan-Australia-US and Japan-India-US cooperation)
should also be expanded as an important mechanism for
future security collaboration in the region.

The US Forward Deployment Strategy
Of course, utilizing the US-Japan alliance as a vehicle to help maintain regional stability depends onsustaining the US forward deployment in East Asia
over the long term. While the forward deployment of
US troops throughout East Asia serves as a regional
public good, it also needs to be reexamined regularly—through intensive consultation with alliancepartners—to ensure it is politically sustainable and isable to meet contemporary challenges.
First, it is important to reexamine whether maintaining US forces in such a high concentration in one
area of the region, as they currently are in Okinawa,
is the best strategy over the long term to fulfill USJapan alliance goals. Local opposition in Okinawa to
the concentration of US bases there has become more
strident in recent months as the debate over the relocation of US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma hasheated up. The hardening of positions on the part ofthose who wish to reduce the number of US bases in
Okinawa and of those who wish to proceed with theplanned relocation threatens to make the current situation politically unsustainable over the long term. And
if the base relocation is not handled with due sensitivity for local concerns, some fear that the disagreement
between Tokyo and the Okinawan local government
could escalate to an all-out confrontation. Ironically,
this confrontation is coming to a head as advances in
new military technologies and the changing nature of
regional security challenges make it increasingly desirable to establish a broader and more dynamic forward deployment posture where US soldiers are more
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evenly distributed and rotated across the region—atrend that is already underway with increased cooperation with partners such as Australia, India, thePhilippines, Singapore, and Vietnam.
Second, as the SDF continues to expand its roles
and functions in order to engage in the limited exercise of collective self-defense, there will be greater
potential for joint basing arrangements in which the
US military and the SDF share military facilities. Thisshould be utilized as an opportunity to deepen USJapan security cooperation and to have the UnitedStates assist the SDF to gradually transition toward
fulfilling greater contributions to regional peace.

Second, Japan’s participation is important in orderto foster ADB-AIIB cooperation. China is the ADB’s
second-largest cumulative borrower with a total of
US$31.58 billion in loans since joining in 1986, including US$1.49 billion in 2014. China can self-finance its
own infrastructure development, but continues to go
through the ADB because of the accompanying expertise, quality control, and environmental standards
it brings. ADB-AIIB cooperation would help to establish similar measures in the AIIB, thereby improving
its ultimate impact.
Third, the AIIB calls for a 25/75 percent split offunding between extra-regional and regional members. The addition of Japan, Asia’s second largest
economy, would diversify the sources of Asian funding and mitigate the risk of Chinese dominance.
While the United States may not be able to join in
the near future, Japan’s inclusion in the AIIB can help
raise the American comfort level with the institution
as US-Japan consultations provide an indirect channel through which the United States can coordinate
with the AIIB.

Mutual Engagement With China
The future of East Asian regional stability and prosperity also depends heavily on the rise of China andthe response of the rest of the region. To this end,
Japan and the United States would be wise to complement their security cooperation with more vigorous
efforts to constructively engage with China in key­areas, including cooperation on multilateral financial
institutions, on regional trade agreements, and onenergy and the environment. The basic approach forsuch cooperation must transcend labels like advanced
industrial democracies and emerging market economies, and instead begin from mutual engagement on
an equal basis.

Regional Trade Diplomacy
For both Japan and the United States, the successful conclusion of the TPP would be one importantcomponent of any effort to advance a multifaceted
approach to East Asia. The decision in June by the
US Congress to grant trade promotion authority tothe president was a major step forward. Hopefully,
negotiations can finally be concluded in short order,
so that the TPP can become a strategic vehicle toensure that East Asia’s trade and economic system
will remain free and adopt the high-standard rules
needed for 21st-century economic integration.
However, the two mega-regional trade agreements being negotiated in Asia, the TPP and theRegional Comprehensive Economic Partnership(RCEP), risk dividing the region into competing USand China-led trade blocs if not carefully managed.
In moving toward final TPP and RCEP agreements,
it is important that a pathway be created allowing
for their future amalgamation as a steppingstone toward the establishment of a Free Trade Area of the
Asia Pacific. Over the long term, the TPP should be
utilized as a vehicle to stimulate cooperation with
China. As such, it should include an open accession
clause to establish a clear and transparent process by

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
The AIIB presents a litmus test of how the region
will react to the rise of China. Major democratic
economies in Asia (such as Australia, New Zealand,
and South Korea) and in the EU (including France,
Germany, Italy, and the UK) have signed on as founding members. The two prominent absences are theUnited States and Japan. China’s establishment of the
AIIB should not be a surprise to anyone given thevast demand for infrastructure finance, the domination of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) by theUnited States and Japan, and the decision by the US
Congress to block voting reform that would have engaged China more meaningfully in the IMF.
Japan should join the AIIB promptly for three reasons. First, by participating in its formative period,
Japan will be better positioned to promote high performance standards on governance and transparency
from within.
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

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which China (and other RCEP members) can join
the TPP in the future after reaching predetermined
economic benchmarks. At the same time, the RCEP
should be utilized as a vehicle not just to deepen economic integration among the ASEAN+6 countries
but also to bridge the gap between advanced and developing countries within the region.

nations to promote cooperation for jointly funded
and developed green energy technologies.
◆ ◆ ◆Recent successes in bolstering US-Japan security cooperation are important steps that can help the alliance to meet post–Cold War challenges. However,the United States and Japan need to take a multifaceted approach in order to steer the evolving regional
order in a positive and inclusive direction. This requires that the United States act as more of a resident power in East Asia, including by participating
more in regional forums. And it makes it imperativefor Japan and the United States to work to further
strengthen multilateral security cooperation, enhance regional confidence-building measures, andvigorously pursue cooperation with China that focuses on concrete areas of mutual benefit, including
on international finance institutions, mega-regional
trade agreements, and energy and environmental cooperation. Such a multifaceted approach to regional
cooperation will go a long way in helping to ensure
the peace and prosperity of Asia Pacific throughout
this, the “Asian Century.”

Regional Energy and Environmental Cooperation
Over the coming decades, the demand for energy
will continue to grow exponentially, particularly in
Asia’s emerging economies that have growing middle
classes, such as China, India, and the ASEAN nations.
Regional cooperation—including joint efforts in suchareas as energy exploration, development of new extraction technologies, and strengthening of nuclear
safety measures—is needed to ensure that the energy
demands of all nations are met. Japan and the UnitedStates can cooperate in pushing the East Asia Summit
or other regional forums to take up these issues in amore serious manner.
At the same time, the unabated use of fossil fuels
will cause environmental damage that is detrimental
to sustainable economic growth and poverty reduction, not to mention the ecology of the planet. In order
to meet the growing regional energy demand in an environmentally sustainable manner, the United States
and Japan—as global leaders in technology development—should coordinate and invite all like-minded

Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairmanof the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan
Research Institute, Ltd. He p­ reviously served as Japan’s
deputy minister for f­oreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
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July 2015