July 2014

Japan Center for International Exchange

Forging a Common Regional Approachto China
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE
Recent events continue to highlight the needfor a common regional approach that engages China.
Despite China’s rapid and unprecedented economic
growth, the world has yet to come to grips with thechallenges and opportunities that the country presents. The story of China’s rise is as much about how
the rest of the world responds to China as it is about
the nation that China is growing to become. Yet while
economic interdependence between China and therest of the world continues to grow, tensions with
China also continue to sharpen. Everyone in Asia
Pacific will benefit from a more coordinated responseto the challenges that accompany China’s rise.
US President Barack Obama’s four-nation tour ofAsia this April was largely couched as a trip to reassure US allies and partners that the United States
is sufficiently committed to the region. In Tokyo,President Obama confirmed that, as a territory administered by Japan, the Senkaku Islands are covered
under the US-Japan Security Treaty. He also emphasized the importance of strengthening the US-Japanalliance and the dangers of unilateral changes to theregional status quo, clearly aiming his comments atChina. These comments were welcomed by Japan.

In Seoul, Obama stressed the need for coordinating North Korea policy both trilaterally among theUnited States, Japan, and South Korea and more
broadly with China and other relevant countries.
In Kuala Lumpur, the main focus was on the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), and Malaysia signaled arenewed enthusiasm for the trade deal. And finally inManila, the United States and the Philippines signed
an Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement,
building upon their 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.
Since then, regional tensions with China have continued to flare up. On May 2, China moved its Haiyang
Shiyou 981 oil rig into disputed waters near the Paracel
Islands, provoking a heated response from Vietnam.
China-Philippines tensions boiled over after satellite photos showed China reclaiming land to build arunway on the Johnson South Reef in the disputed
Spratly Islands. Tensions between Japan and China
also remain high after a series of dangerous aerial nearmisses near the Senkaku Islands on May 24 and June
11 between the Japan Self Defense Forces (SDF) andChina’s People’s Liberation Army, with planes fromthe two countries coming as close as 30 meters fromeach other.

This confluence of recent events demonstrates therisk of confrontational postures becoming entrenchedin the fabric of regional relations. It is crucial that diplomacy and policy coordination around the region
be enhanced to foster shared regional prosperity andstability. Obama’s speech at West Point on May 28
highlighted this imperative when he reiterated notjust US resolve to protect core interests, such as theAmerican homeland and the security of US allies, butalso the need for a foreign and security policy framework underpinned by multilateral cooperation.

groundwork for building deeper cooperation and acommon regional approach to China.

Washington’s Partisan Politics
The United States has long pursued a hedging policy
toward China, but the efficacy of its policy is undermined by domestic political divisions in Washington.
Some political leaders tend to emphasize an alliancefirst approach and the need to hedge against unpredictable Chinese behavior while others emphasize theneed to forge constructive relations with China. But
in Washington’s hyper-partisan environment, the issue of how to deal with China has too often been usedby one side as a bludgeon against the other. A continuation of partisan politics will only exacerbate thedifficulties that the United States faces in formulating
its China policy, and there is an urgent need to consolidate this policy before presidential election posturing kicks into high gear and Obama enters a lame
duck period.
Any hedging strategy by definition includes both
deterrence and engagement. The current hedging
strategy mistakes engagement for weakness, but engagement should be bolstered through concrete measures, including strengthening confidence-building
processes. At the same time, deterrence measures
must balance the reality that US resources are limited.
The United States should, therefore, be careful about
drawing any red lines, which may present China witha convenient opportunity to expand its influence rightup to the line without actually crossing it.

China’s Future Trajectory
Even with China’s economy slowing from a target
growth rate of 10 to 7 percent, it is clear that Chinais going to be an increasingly influential player in theregion. But concerns abound regarding what sort ofpower China aspires to be. Will it utilize its increasing power to promote shared stability and prosperity
or to unilaterally alter the status quo in the region?
China’s top foreign policy aim of forging a new modelof great power relations with the United States can beinterpreted either way.
From a Japanese perspective, Chinese activities
regarding the Senkaku Islands seem geared toward
portraying itself as competing for effective control
over the surrounding areas, in contrast to the statusquo, under which Japan maintains effective control.
This can be construed as a tactic to test the resolveof the US-Japan alliance. China’s maneuvering in theSouth China Sea also displays similar tendencies,
and the timing of the incidents with Vietnam and
the Philippines in the aftermath of Obama’s Asia trip
appears more than coincidental. China’s domestic
governance challenges—such as growing income inequality, corruption, environmental degradation, andthe pressure to achieve the target of doubling 2010
GDP and per capita income by 2020—also exacerbate
the risk that China will utilize a tough foreign policy
posture as a diversionary tactic.

Japan’s Strategic Disarray
Japan’s current approach to China under Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe is to talk tough. His keynote
speech at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore on
May 30 was further evidence of this. To fend off hiscritics, Abe insists that the door for dialogue with
China is always open. But what is sorely needed is acomprehensive China strategy that is both firm on security and bold on engagement.
Moves to reinforce Japan’s security should bewelcomed. Japan has often been timid in conducting public debate on security questions. But withObstacles to Regional Policy Coordination
A number of obstacles need to be considered before countries in the region can begin to lay theEAST ASIA INSIGHTS

2July 2014

the shifting balance of power, it is necessary for theJapanese public to deeply consider issues such ascollective self-defense, the role that the SDF shouldbe performing, and how Japan can contribute to themaintenance of peace. Japan may in the future needto play greater roles than rear-area support to theUnited States. And security cooperation with countries such as Australia, India, and ASEAN member
states, as well as trilateral coordination with theUnited States and South Korea, should be promoted
in order to hedge against future unpredictability.
The reinterpretation of Article 9, adopted by
the Abe government through a cabinet decision on
July 1, will remove some of the existing restraints on
SDF troops’ use of weapons during UN-led peacekeeping missions and allow the SDF to contribute
more actively in responding to contingency scenarios that directly threaten Japan’s national security.
But this limited reinterpretation of the constitutionalrestraints has been unfairly criticized as a resurgenceof “Japanese militarism.” Therefore, it is crucial thatfull justifications with in-depth explanations aregiven as to why changes have to be made now, anda robust mechanism should be established to ensurethat the scope of changes stays within the intended
purview and genuinely retains the spirit of Article 9.
At the same time, Japan must boldly build constructive relations with China in order to promote
regional stability. In particular, two main issues
stand out as obstacles to rebuilding meaningful andcooperative government-to-government relations:
tensions surrounding the Senkaku Islands and history issues. The Senkaku issue does not lend itself
to a resolution in the short term. Before a long-term
solution can be achieved, it is critical that the twocountries de-escalate tensions and strengthen crisis
management systems.
Meanwhile, on the question of Japan’s past, it is vital that the Japanese government does not undermine
established official statements, such as the Murayama
and Kono declarations. In order to start building
trust and patterns of cooperation between the twocountries, they should work together to achieve winwin situations, such as through cooperation on theEAST ASIA INSIGHTS

environment and energy efficiency, that are vital toeconomic progress in both countries.

ASEAN Disunity
At the same time, there is a critical need for ASEAN
to demonstrate a unified front and continue to movesteadily toward the implementation of the ASEAN
Economic Community (AEC). An economically robust and united ASEAN will be better prepared to cooperate confidently with China. However, at present
the question of China’s behavior has divided the organization. Most of the countries in the region are hesitant to confront Chinese assertiveness because of its
economic influence. But the Philippines and Vietnam
in particular face a dilemma because responding toterritorial disputes with China puts them at risk ofnegative economic consequences.
The military coup in Thailand is a blow to ASEAN
unity and, in turn, to the organization’s ability to respond in concert to challenges in East Asia. The political turmoil carries high stakes not just for Thailand
in terms of international investor confidence and repairing the fragile foundations of its democratic institutions, but also for ASEAN as a whole in terms of its
organizational unity and Thailand’s weakened ability
to follow through on AEC commitments. The wholeregion will benefit if Thailand’s military restores thecountry to democracy both peacefully and quickly.

A Way Forward
Confrontational postures around the region risk becoming entrenched. As the balance of regional power
shifts, stakeholders in the region need to forge a common approach to China. Given China’s increasingly
assertive posture and the unpredictability of its futurerole, many nations around the region feel a strong
motivation to align themselves with the United States.
At the same time, however, it must be made clear that
hedging is not containment and needs to include astrong component of engagement toward China.
To this end, a robust regional confidence-building
mechanism, perhaps through the East Asia Summit,
is sorely needed. Talk of responsible regional stakeholdership may be perceived in China as an attempt
3July 2014

to constrain its behavior. However, engagement withChina can help to bring about the realization that unilateral changes to the status quo will undermine its
regional relations and that economic growth founded
in international cooperation is the best path forward
both for China’s national interest and for the sake ofshared regional stability and prosperity.
The makeup of the East Asia Summit—theASEAN-10 countries, Australia, China, India, Japan,
New Zealand, Russia, South Korea, and the UnitedStates—means that it is the best venue for working
toward a shared prosperous future in East Asia. With
this in mind, efforts are needed to ensure that the EastAsia Summit will realize its potential as the region’s
preeminent strategic institution. At the very least,
the key stakeholders in the region should make every
possible effort to quickly establish a robust regional
confidence-building mechanism as a component of
the East Asia Summit, starting with efforts to pursue
cooperation on win-win issues, such as energy andthe environment.
Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairmanof the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan
Research Institute, Ltd. He p­ reviously served as Japan’s
deputy minister for f­oreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
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from the Japanese perspective.
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July 2014