Voluntary Transparency Initiatives: The Case of Peer Review Exercises in the Context of the BWCMARÍA J. ESPONAAppendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE)L O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

FRANCEParis andMaisons-Alfort
4–6 December
20131

MAIN OBJECTIVES

FOCUS

S TA K E H O L D E R S

EXERCISE PROCESSR E S U LT S

Provide proof ofconcept of the PRE
proposal submittedby France.

The national
biosafety andbiosecurity system,
including thenational authorization and control
system for manipulating dangerous
pathogens.

National experts from: theMinistry of Foreign Affairs(Strategic Affairs andDisarmament Department),
the French National Agency
for Medicines and Health
Products Safety (ANSM),
the Ministry of Industrial
Renewal, the Pasteur
Institute of the Ministry ofHealth, the Animal Health
Laboratory of the French
Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational
Health and Safety (ANSES),
the National Institutefor Health and Medical
Research (INSERM)
and the French Military
Health Service.

Presentations bytechnical expertson the three areasof focus, followedby visits to two laboratories: first, the unit
created by the French
Ministry of Health at
the Pasteur Instituteto respond to specialized biologicalemergencies(Cellule d'Intervention
Biologique d'Urgence– CIBU) in Paris;
second, the ANSES
Animal Health Laboratory in MaisonsAlfort.

The PRE was considered usefulas a transparency tool that could
strengthen confidence between theparties. The visits to laboratories
were particularly useful.

The national export
control systemwith a focus on
the licensing
procedures fordual-use biologicalmaterials andrelated equipment.
Awareness raising
policy, including
the courses,trainings andguidelines on
biosafety andbiosecurity implemented by different
institutions.

Other state party experts
from: Canada, China,
Germany, India, Mexico,Morocco, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom andthe United States.
National non-governmental
experts from the Fondation
pour la Recherche
Stratégique (FRS).

1 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2013/WP.8 https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2014/WP.3

It was considered useful tostrengthen national implementation
through identifying gaps and goodpractices, both for France and forother participating states.
Some indicated that it would be
useful to expand the focus to otherareas (e.g. response to alleged
use and international cooperation),while others would have preferreda narrower focus.
It was proposed to make use ofavailable tools under the BWC
to share best practices andinformation identified in thePRE with all states parties.
Some participants were sceptical
about how useful implementing
a PRE through the BWC would
be and indicated a preference fora more formal verification regimeinstead.

1/6

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued
L O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

BELGIUMLUXEMBOURG
and theNETHERLANDS
Brussels,
Dudelange,
Esch-SurAlzette,
Rijswijk,
Bilthoven
June toNovember
20152

MAIN OBJECTIVES

FOCUS

S TA K E H O L D E R S

EXERCISE PROCESSR E S U LT S

Improve the implementation of theConvention at thenational level
through the review ofelements of national
implementation andthe sharing of bestpractices.

National biologicalmilitary researchand development
programmes andresearch centres
and laboratories(as declared in CBM
Form A).

National experts
from the departments of defence,
public health, andforeign affairs ofthe three states
parties.

Written phase in which experts
from each country assessed
Forms A and E of one another’s
2015 CBMs.

The PRE format (written phasefollowed by in-country visits)
was found useful in improving
national implementation, increasing international cooperation andraising awareness of the BWC
among national stakeholders.

Contribute tobuilding confidence
between statesparties.
Raising awarenessof BWC among
national stakeholders, encouraging
participation inrelevant inter-agencyinitiatives.

National legislation,regulations, andother measuresrelated to BWC
implementation(as declared in
CBM Form E),
focusing on nationaloversight ofbiosafety andbiosecurity.

Contribute to discussion at the Eighth
BWC Review Conference by presenting
the PRE experience.
Enable feedback on
CBMs and increasing
their role as a declaration tool within theConvention.
2 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2015/WP.12 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.13/Rev.1

In-person phase in each stateparty that included a meeting
to clarify points on the shared
CBM forms and visits to thefollowing relevant facilities
declared in the Form A:•The Centre for Applied
Molecular Technologiesof the Defence
Laboratory Department
in Brussels, Belgium,on 9 November.

•The Health National
Laboratory inDudelange, and the Instituteof Health in Esch-Sur
Alzette, Luxembourg,on 17 November.

•The Organisation forApplied Scientific Researchin Rijswijk and the National
Institute of Public Healthand the Environment inBilthoven, the Kingdomof the Netherlands, on27 November.

Participants indicated thatthe process provided in-depth
feedback on CBMs, improving
the accessibility and relevanceof the CBMs of the participating
countries.
Participants identified the valueof organizing a preparatory
meeting ahead of the in-person
visit to increase its effectiveness.

2/6

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued
L O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

GERMANYMunich
2–4 August20163

MAIN OBJECTIVES

FOCUS

S TA K E H O L D E R S

EXERCISE PROCESSR E S U LT S

Test whether a peer
review visit could
serve as a tool toincrease transparency with regard
to research anddevelopment
activities.

Complianceassessment of amilitary facility,
including among
other things:
laboratory
activities andequipment,
infrastructure,
security
measures, laboratory conduct,
documentationin relation toresearch anddevelopment,
as well as procedures for thetransfer andexport ofpathogens andtoxins.

National experts from:the Federal Foreign
Office, the Ministry ofDefence,
the Bundeswehr
Verification Centre, theBundeswehr Instituteof Microbiology and theGerman Partnership
Programme for Excellence in Biological and
Health Security.

Visit to a military researchfacility declared in theGerman CBM Form A,
part 2 (iii): the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich.

The report highlighted thatthe objectives of the exercise
were met.

Contribute to therelevance and valueof the peer review
concept.
Share bestpractices, discussnational implementation systems,
raise awareness andestablish contacts
that could serve toincrease international cooperation.

Other state party
experts and civil society
experts from: Algeria,
Austria, Belgium,
Burundi, France,
Georgia, Indonesia,
Jordan, Lithuania,
Myanmar,the Kingdom of theNetherlands, Nigeria,
Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Saudi Arabia,
Switzerland, Uganda,
the United Kingdom
the United Statesand Yemen.

Participants wereorganized in two groups:••

Visiting team: fourbiology experts and six
observers participatedin a pre-visit briefing
and a tour of thefacility.
Monitoring team: ten
participants monitored
the exercise andattended presentations
about legal and policy
matters, biosecurity
and biosafety.

It was considered that visits
could be an appropriate meansof increasing transparency
and demonstrating a facility’scompliance with the BWC.
Visits were also considered
useful for the exchange of goodpractices among all participants.
The report included suggestions
for the planning and methodology that could be used in acompliance assessment of amilitary facility.

The visiting team prepareda summary report incollaboration with themonitoring team and thefacility staff. The report
was discussed between
the participants in the final
session.

3 https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11 https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.29 Filippa Lentzos, “Increasing transparency in biodefense: a 2016 visit to a German
military medical biodefence facility”, Non-Proliferation Papers no. 52, (EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, November 2016).

3/6

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued
L O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

MOROCCORabat andCasablanca
9–11 May
20174

MAIN OBJECTIVES

FOCUS

S TA K E H O L D E R S

EXERCISE PROCESSR E S U LT S

To strengthen
national implementation of the BWC;
to improve
confidence incompliance byincreased transparency; and todeepen internationalcooperation.

Biosafety, biosecurity, biorisk
and pathogen
management
measures.

National experts from:
the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministryof Health, the Ministryof Interior, the Ministry ofForeign Trade, the National
Defence, the Gendarmerie
Royale, the Ministry ofHigher Education, andthe Ministry of Agriculture.

One day of seminars andpresentations on, inter alia,
the Moroccan implementation of the BWC, the nationalsystem for detection andhandling of pathogens, anddisease surveillance andexport control measures.

Presentations on both
existing measuresand gaps in national
implementation were foundto be helpful for experts
to generate recommendations.

A further overarching objective
was to broaden
support for the peer
review mechanism
concept.

Other state party experts
from: Belgium, China,France, Gabon, Germany,
the Kingdom of theNetherlands, Saudi Arabia,
Spain, the United ArabEmirates and the UnitedStates.
National non-governmental
experts from two biosafety
associations: the Moroccan
Biosafety Association andthe Moroccan Biosafety,
Biosecurity and Sanitary
Security Association.
One representative fromthe BWC Implementation
Support Unit.

4 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2017/WP.1

Two days of visits to fiveinstitutions:•••••

National Institutefor Safety of Food
Products, in Rabat
Animal vaccine
production facilityof the company
Biopharma, in Rabat
Moulay Youssef
Hospital, in Casablanca
National Institute ofHygiene, in Rabat
Pasteur Instituteof Morocco, inCasablanca

The contributions of civilsociety experts wererecognised as useful.
The PRE generated
recommendations for
Morocco regarding
legislation, the development of a national programfor BWC implementation
and a BWC awarenessraising campaign. Notably,a follow-up seminar wasorganized to implement
these recommendations.

The following year a seminar
was organized to develop anaction plan to implement therecommendations agreed
during the PRE.

4/6

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued
L O C AT I O N
A N D D AT EGEORGIATbilisi
14–15
November
2018 5

MAIN OBJECTIVES

FOCUS

S TA K E H O L D E R S

EXERCISE PROCESSR E S U LT S

Demonstrate that
the Richard Lugar
Center for Public
Health Researchcomplies with theprovisions andobligations of theBWC, and that theactivities taking
place have peacefulpurposes and areconsistent with theinformation
provided in therelevant CBM form.

Biological research
activities and otherrelevant aspects of
the Richard Lugar
Center, including
its biological safetylevel 3 laboratory.

National experts from:the Richard Lugar Center
for Public Health Researchof the National Center for
Disease Control and Public
Health, the Ministry ofHealth and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs.

During the first day,participants were split
into two equally sizedteams, which eachundertook a tour ofthe facility anddiscussed research
activities.

The participants concluded thaton-site visits can reconcile ahigh level of transparency withthe legitimate security andintellectual property interestsof the visited facility.

Other state party experts
from: Austria, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Cameroon,
Chile, Colombia, Germany,
Hungary, Iraq, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Malaysia,
Mali, Montenegro,Myanmar, Uganda,
the United Kingdom
and the United States.

On the second day,four participants
entered the Biosafety
Level 3 laboratory,
while others examined
the facility premises.

Observers from theEuropean External Action
Service and the BWC
Implementation Support
Unit.

At the closing session,
participants undertooka final assessment ofthe exercise. A report
was drafted by theinternational visiting
team’s leader.

One observer from a
non-governmentalorganization, King’s
College London.

5 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.2

5/6

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued
L O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

KYRGYZSTAN
Issyk Kul
16–18 August2022
Preparatory
work: Geneva,
Switzerland,
12–14 October
20216

MAIN OBJECTIVES

FOCUSS TA K E H O L D E R S

EXERCISE PROCESSR E S U LT S

Strengthen national
implementation.

National legal
framework andrelated matters,
including the draft
biosafety law underdevelopment.

National experts from: theMinistry of Economy andCommerce, the Ministryof Health, the Ministryof Emergency Situations,
the Ministry of Defence,
the State Committee on
National Security, theState Customs Service,
the General Staff of ArmedForces, the Ministry ofAgriculture, the Public
Health Institute andthe Center for Nonproliferation and Export
Control.

Preparatory phasethat included
in-person and virtual
meetings in Geneva,
Switzerland,
12–14 October 2021.

The exercise helped identify goodpractices and recommendations
for the review and finalization of
the biosecurity legislation.

Enhanceinternationalcooperation.

A comprehensive
national approachto biosafety andbiosecurity.
Opportunities
for international
cooperation andassistance.

Other state party
experts from: Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia,
the United States andUzbekistan.

Exercise in
Kyrgyzstan that
included presentations describing thecountry’s situationand discussions.
A visit to theCholpon-Ata citylaboratory wasplanned but
didn’t take place.

The mapping the different
institutions’ responsibilities
resulted in the identificationof how to enhance interinstitutional coordination formally.
The exercise helped to identify inwhich specific areas assistanceis required and how to prepare theofficial request in the frameworkof Article X of the BWC.

Observers from eightinternational and regionalorganizations, including
the BWC Implementation
Support Unit.

6 https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.IX/WP.52 Kyrgyz Republic, “Meeting summary: peer review exercise under EU Council decision 2019/97 in support of the Biological Weapons
Convention – preparatory meeting on the conduct of a BWC peer review exercise in the Kyrgyz Republic, International conference Center Geneva, 12–14 October 2021”, pp. 1–2.

6/6