1

Contents
4

Background4
4
4

About MEAC
About This Series
About This Report

5

Banditry Violence in the North West of Nigeria

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10
11
13
14
15
17

Evolution of Banditry ViolenceSize of the Current Problem
Impact on Communities in the North West
Illicit Sectors
Bandits’ Modus Operandi
Potential Crime-Terror Nexus
Government Response

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Methodology and Sample

22

Findings

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30
35

Banditry’s Impact on Communities in the North West
Community Perceptions About Bandit GroupsContextualizing Banditry within the Broader Conflict Dynamics

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Policy and Practical Implications

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40
41
41

How We Typecast Violent Groups Shapes Response Strategies
Differentiated Victimization Requires Tailored Programming
Importance of a Coordinated and Integrated Response
Role of Weapons

This Findings Report, and the research that supported it, were undertaken as part of UNIDIR’s
Managing Exits from Armed Conflict (MEAC) project. MEAC is a multi-donor, multi-partner
initiative to develop a unified, rigorous approach to examining how and why individuals exit
armed conflict and evaluating the efficacy of interventions meant to support their transitions.
While the Findings Report benefited from feedback from MEAC’s donors and institutional
partners, it does not necessarily represent their official policies or positions.

Citation: Johanna Kleffmann, Swetha Ramachandran, Noah Cohen, Siobhan O'Neil, Mohammed
Bukar, Francesca Batault, Kato Van Broeckhoven, "Banditry Violence in Nigeria's North West:
Insights from Affected Communities,” Findings Report 36, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024,
https://doi.org/10.37559/MEAC/24/05

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Key Findings•

The labelling of banditry as “organized crime,” “unknown gunmen,” or, more lately,“terrorists” has distorted this multi-faceted and still poorly understood phenomenon.
Likewise, some of the frames that have been applied to banditry – particularly thefarmer/herder conflict or Hausa/Fulani tensions – do not appear to fully align with local
communities’ understandings of today’s evolution of banditry. Simplistic categorizationand narrow lenses for understanding banditry may contribute to inappropriate or insufficient
policy and programmatic responses. MEAC’s survey unearths some of the lived
experiences with bandits and sheds light on the nuances of the phenomenon and its
profound impact on communities.

•

Community perceptions of bandit groups corroborate earlier research depicting them ascomprised of largely distinct, organized groups, albeit with shifting configurations andsubject to fragmentation. Bandit groups operate in highly mobile, armed, and largely forestbased units that use quick-strike attacks on motorbikes against communities. Their
motivations are primarily perceived as economic/financial by victims, including the notable
subsection of the sample of Fulanis who have been victimized by bandits.

•

For the surveyed communities, weapons are the most recognizable feature of banditgroups. This bears critical implications for the potential for escalation of violence, further
proliferation of illicit arms and ammunition including in the neighbouring regions,community violence reduction efforts and future DDR programming.

•

Victimisation experiences differ considerably with gender, age, and location in the North
West. While physical violence and killings disproportionately affect adult men, sexual
violence appears to especially affect women and girls (although it likely remains
underreported). Variations of victimization across states indicate the volatile and dynamic
nature of overall banditry presence and violence.

•

Banditry violence has profound and pervasive effects on the physical safety, access toincome-generating activities, education, and mobility of residents in the northwesterncommunities surveyed. The perceived intensity and frequency of attacks are on the rise,with one in three respondents reporting experiencing weekly attacks in recent years. Close
to two-thirds of respondents have family members who have been attacked by bandits.

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Background
About MEAC
How and why do individuals exit armed groups, and how do they do so sustainably without
falling back into conflict cycles? These questions are at the core of UNIDIR’s Managing Exits
from Armed Conflict (MEAC) initiative. MEAC is a multi-year, multi-partner collaboration thataims to develop a unified, rigorous approach to examining how and why individuals exit armed
conflict and evaluating the efficacy of interventions meant to support their transition to civilian
life. MEAC seeks to inform evidence-based programme design and implementation in real time
to improve efficacy. At the strategic level, the cross-programme, cross-agency lessons that will
emerge from the growing MEAC evidence base will support more effective conflict resolution
and peacebuilding efforts. The MEAC project benefits from generous support by the German
Federal Foreign Office (GFFO); Global Affairs Canada (GAC); the Swiss Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs (FDFA); and the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs; UNICEF; and is run inpartnership with the International Organization for Migration (IOM); the UN Development
Programme (UNDP); UN Department of Peace Operations (DPO); the World Bank; and United
Nations University Centre for Policy Research (UNU-CPR).

About This Series
The MEAC findings report series seeks to put evidence about conflict transitions and related
programming into the hands of policymakers and practitioners in real time. The reports present
short overviews of findings (or emerging findings) across a wide range of thematic areas andinclude analyses of their political or practical implications for the UN and its partners.

About This Report
This report is based on quantitative survey data collected from January to March 2024 with
2,947 community members across the North West of Nigeria, mainly the states of Katsina,
Zamfara, and Sokoto. This baseline constitutes the first part of a panel study on banditry andconflict to be conducted in the North West. The report examines victimization and the everyday
impact of banditry violence and how the groups’ presence manifests in northwesterncommunities to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the phenomenon and help
identify more effective policy responses.

4Banditry Violence in the
North West of Nigeria
While banditry has sporadically punctuated Nigeria’s history, the contemporary wave1 ofbanditry in the North West of the country has reached the level of a full-blown security crisis.
Despite having received limited attention compared to the insurgency in the country’s North
East,2 banditry violence in recent years has outweighed the violence perpetrated by groups like
Boko Haram.3
Banditry today has come to be associated with its most common manifestations including“kidnapping, armed robbery, murder, rape, cattle-rustling, and the exploitation ofenvironmental resources.”4 Typically, these acts are perpetrated by a loose collection of rural
armed criminal groups. The explanations of the origins and motivations behind thecontemporary semi-structured wave of violence differ, with analyses alternatively placingemphasis on rural organized crime, conflict over land use between farmers and herders, andviolence between Fulani and Hausa, amongst other causes—all exacerbated by climatechange and the lack of employment.
Owing to the escalating number of and violence associated with bandit attacks, banditry has
become a significant political focus in recent years. The violence spiralled so high that, in 2022,
the Nigerian government designated individuals engaging in select bandit groups as“terrorists.”5 According to ACLED data, bandit attacks on communities in the North West roseby 731 per cent between 2018 and 2022.6 There are concerns that insurgent groups in Niger
and bandit groups in the North West could start cooperating or even merge, potentially creatinga “land bridge”7 between jihadists in the North East of Nigeria and those operating in Niger, a

1 It is widely accepted in the region that this wave or particular manifestation of banditry first appeared in Zamfara in2011. UNIDIR, Interviews with researcher/expert, (Maiduguri, Borno State, July 2024)
2 Center for Democracy and Development, “Multiple Nodes, Common Causes: National Stock take ofContemporary Insecurity and State Responses in Nigeria,” (Abuja, 2022).
3 International Crisis Group, “Halting the Deepening Turmoil in Nigeria’s North West”, 26 May 2021; Global Rights,“Mass Atrocities Casualties Tracking, 2020 Report”, 28 May 2021; Tosin Osasona, “The question of definition:
Armed banditry in Nigeria's North-West in the context of international humanitarian law,” International Review of the
Red Cross No. 923 (June 2023); Fidelis Mac-Leva and Haruna Ibrahim, “Bandits Kill More Nigerians Than BokoHaram, Robbers, Kidnappers, Cultists, Others,” Daily Trust, 22 September 2019.
4 Claire Brenner, “Combating Banditry in Northwest Nigeria”, American Security Project, 19 March 2021.
5 Tosin Osasona, “The question of definition: Armed banditry in Nigeria's North-West in the context of international
humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross No. 923, (June 2023)
6 ACLED as cited in: Mahmud Malami Sadiq and Oluwole Ojewale, “Why Nigeria’s bandits are recruiting women for
gunrunning,”, ISS Africa, 14 August 2023.
7 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).

5

development that many fear could destabilize an already fragile region entirely.8 Banditry is theNorth West’s greatest security challenge today, but despite the effects of banditry being widely
felt across the region, there is still confusion as to what banditry is, and questions about what
can be done to address it.
This report seeks to address this gap. Provided the manifold dimensions and fault lines thebanditry phenomenon has been associated with in previous scholarly work and public
discourse (Hausa/Fulani, farmer-herder conflicts, climate, socio-economic and land use
issues), this report seeks to provide insights on banditry through the lens of those most affectedby it. It interrogates survey data on personal victimization experiences as well as perceptionsof bandit groups and the dynamics underlying bandit violence. These insights seek tocontribute to a sounder understanding of banditry and try to identify entry points for policy andprogrammatic responses to address the issue.
The following literature review will summarize existing analysis of the evolution of banditry in
Nigeria and the discussions around its contemporary manifestations, including the way bandits
operate and potentially cooperate with insurgent groups as well as its impact on communities
and the historical government responses to banditry.

FIGURE 1 – MAP OF NIGERIA’S SIX GEOPOLITICAL ZONES

8 Johanna Kleffmann, Francesca Batault, Juan Armando Torres Munguía, Siobhan O’Neil, Jente Althuis, Rabby

Shakur, Anna Hallahan, Hana Salama and Mohamed Coulibaly, "Factors Driving Weapons Holding in the North Eastof Nigeria,” Findings Report 33, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland, 2023; UNDP, “Conflict Analysis in the Lake ChadBasin 2020-2021: Trends, Developments and Implications for Peace and Stability,” (N’Djamena, Chad: UNDP,
2022).

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Evolution of Banditry Violence
Armed banditry in the North West of Nigeria, as well as in other parts of the country, is not anovel phenomenon but dates back to pre-colonial and colonial eras. The antecedent ofpresent-day banditry is thought to be traced back to the activities of cross-border criminals inWest Africa during Nigeria’s colonial period.9 Banditry has sporadically flared up at moments
throughout the country’s history.10 A confluence of conflicts, including between farmers andherders, different tribes, and tensions over land use, as well as exacerbating factors such as
shifts in climate patterns, limited governance, and poverty, have all contributed to thismultidimensional phenomenon currently understood as banditry.
Until the 2000s, the different tribes in the North West of Nigeria—as well as farmers andherders, whose professions, to a great extent, were once aligned with tribal identity with
farmers being predominately Hausa and herders being predominately Fulani —largely
coexisted in peace. There were strong economic and cooperative practices amongst farmers
and herders, common social activities, and intermarriage between Fulani and Hausa wascommon, thereby blurring divisions between tribes significantly.11 In small-scale instances ofdisputes between farmers and herders, community-level authorities usually mediated thesesuccessfully.12
Around that time, however, shifts in land ownership, notably through government andcommunity sales and renting to farmers, started to undo the pre-existing system including a
mixture of demarcation and informal but commonly accepted access to grazing land. The
ensuing encroachment by farmers onto pastoralist routes and herders onto newly privatizedfarming land—both mistaken and intentional—led to rising tensions between still largely Fulani
herders and predominantly Hausa sedentary farmers. Fulani pastoralists felt marginalized byland sales and government measures to regulate land ownership and access.13
Changing climate patterns further compounded these tensions by diminishing alreadycontested land and water resources. Declining and erratic precipitation, rising temperatures,
9 UNIDIR, Interviews with researcher/expert, (Maiduguri, Borno State, July 2024)

10 Janet Roitman, "The Ethics of Illegality in the Chad Basin," in Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff (eds), Law andDisorder in the Postcolony (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2006), pp. 247–72; Scott MacEachern,
Searching for Boko Haram: A History of Violence in Central Africa (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018);
Azeez Olaniyan and Aliyu Yahaya, ‘Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling in Northern
Nigeria’, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2016).
11 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020. Note: the current ethicalmakeup of the northwestern population is unknown. Since questions around tribe, religion or language have grownin sensitivity, the last census in 2006 did not disaggregate by these markers. Another reason is the increasingly
blurred line between Hausa and Fulani who are frequently also grouped together as ”Hausa-Fulani” (Minority Rights
Group International, "World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Nigeria," May 2018).
12 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).
13 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020; Jessica Caus, “Climate-driven
Recruitment into Armed Groups in Nigeria,” Findings Report 1 (New York: United Nations University, 2021).

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and desertification intensified competition over water resources as well as arable land andpasture.14 Ongoing population growth further aggravated this resource scarcity.15 In a region
that struggles with poverty (especially the rural population16), and where approximately 70 per
cent of the population makes a living through agriculture,17 climatic shifts put significant stresson livelihoods (and food security). Together with limited access to alternative economic
opportunities and inadequate governmental support, these factors provided a fertile ground forthe escalation of farmer-herder grievances while also increasing the attraction of ostensibly
easy profits to be made with banditry.
In the mid-2000s, criminality including highway robberies—perceived to be largely
perpetrated by Fulani men—rose in Zamfara state. Starting in 2009, cattle rustling increased.18
As it spread, bandit groups grew increasingly militarized, using AK-pattern rifles andmotorbikes, which enabled them to steal larger numbers of cattle at a time.19 The following
years also saw a greater incidence of village raids.20 In 2015, banditry began to also appear in
the neighbouring states of Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto, and Kebbi as well as in the North
Central zone, particularly Niger state,21 and as far as the states of Nasarawa, Plateau andBenue.22 While there is some evidence to suggest that the same groups have crossed from one
state over to another (e.g., groups from Zamfara evading a peace dialogue by moving into
Katsina),23 that has not always been the case for all states in the North West. New groups havealso started to replicate bandit methods in new places.
In the context of contested presidential elections in 2011, politicians used young Fulani men as“political thugs”24 to disrupt and influence elections. This included snatching of ballot boxes,
intimidation of voters, and physical attacks against opponents.25 In response to the upsurge in
14 Huma Haider, “Climate change in Nigeria: Impacts and responses.” K4D Helpdesk Report 675. (Brighton, UK:

Institute of Development Studies, 2019). For instance, correlations between both decreasing precipitation and risingtemperatures on the one hand, and bandit attacks on the other have been found. See: Oluwole Ojewale, Tosin
Osasona, and Yekeen Shamsudeen, “Climate Change and Armed Banditry in Northwest Nigeria: A Troubled
Synergy of Insecurity,“ in Armed Banditry in Nigeria, pp 15–42.
15 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).
16 In Nigeria’s rural areas 72 per cent of people are considered poor, compared to 42 per cent in urban areas. NBS
Nigeria, ”Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (2022),“ (National Bureau of Statistics of the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, FCT Abuja, 2022)
17 FAO, ”Nigeria General Household Survey 2018–2019,” RuLIS COUNTRY BRIEF (2022).
18 Pastoral Resolve, Search for Common Ground and Terre des Hommes, Zamfara Conflict Analysis andMultisectoral Needs Assessment (2019).
19 Obi Anyadike, "Everyone knows somebody who has been kidnapped’: Inside Nigeria’s banditry epidemic," The
New Humanitarian, 30 January 2023.
20 Pastoral Resolve, Search for Common Ground and Terre des Hommes, Zamfara Conflict Analysis andMultisectoral Needs Assessment (2019).
21 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020); Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020.
22 Mohammed.J. Kuna and Jirbin Ibrahim, Rural Banditry and Conflicts in Northern Nigeria (Abuja, Centre for
Democracy and Development, 2016).
23 UNHCR and Government of Nigeria, “Joint Protection Assessment Mission to Northwest Nigeria, 25 July – 4
August 2019,” 9 September 2019; Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February
2020.
24 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020.
25 International Crisis Group, ”Lessons from Nigeria’s 2011 Elections,” Briefing No. 81, 15 September 2011.

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election violence, and given limited governance presence in the North West,26 Hausa
communities mobilized community security groups called Yan Sakai or Yan Banga (in someplaces from partly pre-existing forces). These vigilante groups meted out harsh punishments,
ranging from indiscriminate confiscation of cattle to extrajudicial killings in public spaces forboth actual and perceived robberies and raids.27 Town-dwelling Fulani were often treated assuspects and thought to be complicit with bandits, and they were particularly impacted by harsh
Yan Sakai/Yan Banga sanctions.28 To protect themselves, Fulani communities in turn took up
arms as so-called Yan Bindiga—militias who quickly became equated with bandit groups.29
The proliferation of small arms and ammunition in the region, facilitated by the porous national
border to the north, enabled armament across all militia groups.30 As hostilities amplified,bandit groups formed strategic alliances with either ethnic community.31 By instrumentalizing
tensions and recruiting from aggrieved communities, bandits further entrenched themselves in
the area.32
Patterns of recruitment and community mobilization fed the mutual perception that all Fulani
were bandits, and all Hausa were militia members. Bandits engaged in forced recruitment
within Fulani communities. Most Hausa men of fighting age were expected to be involved intheir community’s vigilante group. This led to the perception that any male belonging to the outgroup was a valid target,33 and contributed to the narrative that the violence in the region was
driven by inter-tribal competition. However, as the violence spread, also those communities
who were not actively involved in any fighting were increasingly caught in the middle: being
perceived to side with one group or having associated family members often meant to be
attacked at some point. Those communities perceived as uncommitted to neither banditry nor
vigilantism were sanctioned for their lack of commitment by their in-group too.34 In fact, manyargue that today, bandit victimization affects Hausa and Fulani alike.35
While a problematic analytical category, “banditry” has quickly become the most widespreadterm used by frontline communities, the media, academia, and policymakers.36 As a catch-all
26 National Investment Promotion Commission, Nigerian States, (2023)
27 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020)
28 Ibid.
29 See : Tosin Osasona, “The question of definition: Armed banditry in Nigeria's North-West in the context ofinternational humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross No. 923, (June 2023).
30 Azeez Olaniyan, and Aliyu Yahaya. "Cows, bandits, and violent conflicts: Understanding cattle rustling in Northern
Nigeria." Africa Spectrum Vol.51, No. 3 (2016).
31 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020..
32 Johanna Kleffmann, Francesca Batault, Juan Armando Torres Munguía, Siobhan O’Neil, Jente Althuis, Rabby
Shakur, Anna Hallahan, Hana Salama and Mohamed Coulibaly. "Factors Driving Weapons Holding in the North Eastof Nigeria,” Findings Report 33, UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland, 2023.
33 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020.
34 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).
35 Center for Democracy and Development, “Multiple Nodes, Common Causes: National Stock take ofContemporary Insecurity and State Responses in Nigeria,” (Abuja: 2022).
36Ibid.

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term, it arguably falls short of clearly delineating a phenomenon. It is difficult to distinguishbanditry from common crime. Having mentioned these limitations, the present study will use
the term “bandits,” but it makes a conscious effort to look beyond simplistic labels—often
imposed from outside—to understand how local communities define and perceive banditry.

Size of the Current Problem
While Katsina, Sokoto, and Zamfara are considered the most affected states in the North West,banditry has long impacted areas beyond their borders, particularly the North Central politicalzone. The number of armed bandits in the North West has been estimated at around 30,000,
grouped into hundreds of small gangs ranging in size from just a few people to over a
thousand.37 While bandit groups consist mostly of men, some evidence suggests that women
have also engaged in banditry, often in logistical or support functions.38 Bandit groups havecontinuously changed leaders, and shifted in size and structure, also due to infighting.
Intergroup fighting flares up in the shape of skirmishes over territory, intergroup cattle rustlingas well as more minor issues such as setting up camp too close to another group.39 The
fractiousness and volatility of the groups also make them more difficult to interact or evennegotiate with.40
A single cell called Kungiyar Gayu, founded by Kundu and succeeded by Buharin Daji, isthought to have started the contemporary wave of banditry. Buharin Daji is often credited withbeing the first to spread the activities of his group (and hence banditry violence) to the otherparts of the North West.41 Throughout recent years, there have been a few notable banditgroups that have held sway over large swaths of the territory, including those known as (orassociated with) Alhaji Shingi, Doge Gide, Kachalla Turji, and Kachalla Halilu Sububu Seno,42
holding power over communities and in some cases playing governing functions.43

37 John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole, and Folahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity inNorth-west Nigeria." Democracy and Security, (2023).
38 PM News, “Police nab Kaduna Women Ferrying Girls to Bandits for Sex,” 9 January 2022; Sahara Reporter,“Police Arrest 25-year-old Woman Supplying Logistics to Bandits in Katsina,” 16 September 2021; Mahmud Malami
Sadiq, "Why Nigeria’s bandits are recruiting women for gunrunning," ISS Africa, 14 August 2023.
39 Ibrahim Hassan Wuyo, “Bandits Fight Each Other in Kaduna Forest, Kingpin Nasiru Kachalla, Others
Killed”, The Vanguard, 28 December 2020; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Criminal Gangs Destabilizing
Nigeria’s North West," 14 December 2021; James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz.
"Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry or a “Banditization” of Jihad?." CTC Sentinel, Vol. 15, No. 1(2022).
40 Tosin Osasona, “The question of definition: Armed banditry in Nigeria's North-West in the context of international
humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross No. 923 (June 2023).
41UNIDIR, Interviews with researcher/expert, (Maiduguri, Borno State, July 2024)
42 Daily Trust, "In Rare Access To Enclave: Bandits Speak On Ravaging Insecurity," 26 February 2021; James
Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz. "Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry or a“Banditization” of Jihad?." CTC Sentinel, Vol.15, No. 1 (2022).
43 Obi Anyadike, "Everyone knows somebody who has been kidnapped’: Inside Nigeria’s banditry epidemic," The
New Humanitarian, 30 January 2023.

10Impact on Communities in the North West
The extent of bandit violence in the region has reached critical levels. Conservative estimatessuggest that there were 8,300 banditry-related deaths between 2013 and 2022.44 Between
2019 and the first quarter of 2024, in the North West, there were 9,527 people kidnapped,
representing 62 per cent of Nigeria‘s overall abduction cases, with bandits being the primary
culprits.45 As many cases go unreported, the ”data inevitably undercounts the true extent of the
problem.”46 Between 2019 and 2023, kidnappings in the North West were 169 percent more frequently reported than in the North East.47 Numerous instances of sexual violenceat the hands of bandits have been reported.48 Sexual violence perpetrated by bandits is thought
to mainly target women and girls, and is often used strategically to enforce communities’compliance, e.g. with demands for levies.49 Many accounts of forced marriage also exist.50
While the figures presented herein speak to the extent of banditry violence, because banditry
disproportionately affects rural communities where there is little government presence, it isdifficult to get a full picture of banditry-related violence.51
Banditry violence has also had numerous secondary effects. For example, more than 25,000
children have been orphaned in Zamfara alone52 and over 200,000 people have been internallydisplaced in the North West53 as a result of bandit violence. Across the North West and North
Central zones, many individuals who flee the region find themselves in underequipped camps
or unofficial settlements with irregular and inadequate access to basic necessities. 54 Those
who remain in their communities, risk attacks on schools, further economic and educational
disenfranchisement, kidnappings, and gender-based violence.55 Banditry also has economic

44 John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole, and Folahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity inNorth-west Nigeria." Democracy and Security (2023).
45 SBMintel, "Mass Abductions: The catastrophe of Nigeria’s kidnap epidemic," 21 March 2024.
46 Obi Anyadike, "Everyone knows somebody who has been kidnapped’: Inside Nigeria’s banditry epidemic," The
New Humanitarian, 30 January 2023.
47 Global Initiative, ACLED, “What does the recent escalation of mass abductions in Nigeria tell us?”, 15 March 2024.
48 It is expected that the actual number is exponentially higher, but instances of sexual violence are largely
underreported. Human Rights Watch World Report 2024: Nigeria. Events of 2023 (2024)
49Tosin Osasona, “The question of definition: Armed banditry in Nigeria's North-West in the context of international
humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross No. 923 (June 2023); Oluwole Ojewale and Omolara
Balogun, "Banditry’s impacts on women and children in Nigeria needs a policy response," LSE Blogs, 10 January2022.
50 UNHCR and National Commission for Refugee, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, ”Joint Protection
Assessment Mission to Northwest Nigeria, 25 July- 4 August 2019,” (2019); International Crisis Group, "Violencein Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288 (Brussels, 18 May 2020).
51Tosin Osasona, “The question of definition: Armed banditry in Nigeria's North-West in the context of international
humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross No. 923 (June 2023)
52 Human Rights Watch. World Report, Nigeria: Events of 2022. (2023).
53 UNHCR and National Commission for Refugee, Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons, ”Joint Protection
Assessment Mission to Northwest Nigeria, 25 July- 4 August 2019,” (2019). About 60,000 fled into Niger in the2010s. International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No.
288 (Brussels, 18 May 2020).
54 Mas’ud Bello, and Ahmed D. Garba. “Gender Based Violence in The Light Of 21st Century Security Challenges In
Zamfara State, Nigeria.” International Journal of Advanced Academic Research, Vol 8, No. 7 (2022).
55 Ibid.

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costs. Over 3 billion Naira has been drained from the government coffers and local
communities in Zamfara alone to pay ransoms to kidnappers.56
There are additional knock-on effects of banditry violence that raise serious concerns about themid- and long-term impact it could have on Nigerian society and development. Abductions ofschool children have become a particularly heinous crime attributed to bandits. Between 2014
and mid-2023, an estimated 1,680 school children were kidnapped, with more than 180 of themkilled subsequently.57 The impact of this violence on school attendance has been drastic. A
2019 assessment in Zamfara found that “33 percent of children aged 5-17 had completely
dropped out of school and a further 29 percent had never attended school” because of a “lackof money, destruction of classrooms, fears for safety, lack of teachers who have fled violence
and the need to earn incomes.”58
Next to education, banditry has directly impacted food insecurity. Nearly 2.6 million people in
Sokoto, Zamfara, and Katsina were facing food insecurity in 2021,59 numbers which were
expected to double in 2023,60 in part due to banditry. For example, 30 per cent of agriculturalland in Kaduna State had been abandoned due to banditry violence by 2020. In Zamfara andKatsina restrictions in farming led to a decline in local food production by 60 per cent.61 The
humanitarian response to growing food insecurity in the region has been critiqued as “patchy
and grossly inadequate.”62
The impact of banditry in Nigeria’s North West has been widespread and profound. To address
the banditry problem, however, it is necessary to look at the illicit sectors that have financed
bandit groups, funds which ultimately allowed them to conduct increasingly sophisticated andlarge-scale attacks.

56 Human Rights Watch. World Report, Nigeria: Events of 2022. (2023).

57 Joan Akpa-Achimugu and Chinyere Ibeh, "Implications of Armed Banditry for Education in Nigeria’s North West

Region," GCSP Alumni Note, (October 2023).
58 Pastoral Resolve, Search for Common Ground and Terre des Hommes, Zamfara Conflict Analysis andMultisectoral Needs Assessment (2019), p.xi
59 International Crisis Group, "Halting the Deepening Turmoil in Nigeria’s North West," 26 May 2021.
60 FAO and WFP, "Hunger Hotspots. FAO‑WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity, June 2023 to November
2023 outlook." (Rome, 2023).
61 WANEP, "Addressing Armed Banditry in the North-West Region of Nigeria: Exploring the Potentials of a MultiDimensional Conflict Management Approach," WARN Policy Brief, (2020).
62 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).

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Illicit Sectors
The major motivation for the individuals engaging in banditry is thought to be financial.63 Thereis a lack of income-generating opportunities in the region. This has particularly affected young
people, with a youth bulge having translated into an estimated youth unemployment rate of 53
per cent in 2020.64 Historic underground markets in the region, notably illegal gold mining65 andcattle rustling,66 preceded the banditry crisis but became more appealing as unemployment,
particularly amongst youth, grew in the region. Banditry has also taken hold in the region as
there are few guardrails against violent crime and illegal economic activities: there is minimal
government presence, particularly with regard to law enforcement. In the region, pervasive
corruption, illicit arms proliferation, and porous borders have created fertile ground for banditgroups.
While bandits long relied mostly on cattle rustling, over time, they have diversified their incomegenerating activities. When in cattle stocks were depleted and many pastoralists relocated tosafer areas, which led bandits to shift to other tactics to raise funds, particularly abduction for
ransom,67 as well as illegal gold mining and extortion.68 This diversity renders them more
resilient to government crackdowns. Whenever the military or police curtail one illegal activity
or certain illicit sources are depleted, the other illicit revenue streams can compensate for suchshocks. These fundraising activities, particularly abductions for ransom and extortion ofprotection money from mining sites enabled bandits to expand their stocks of weapons,69 thus
facilitating more sophisticated and violent attacks.
A recent concern has been a trend towards more mass instead of individual abductions. The
surge of mass abductions in early 2024 led analysts to suggest that individual kidnappings forransom too might gradually decline as it becomes less lucrative.70 Previous abductions haveleft communities impoverished since ransom payments are so high that they typically require

63 Kelechukwu Charles Obi and Victor Chidubem Iwuoha, ”Untold story of the expanding armed banditry in Nigeria’s

Northwest: linking the communal-level collaborators,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 44, No.7 (2023); Folahanmi
Ainaa, John Sunday Ojob, and Samuel Oyewolec, “Shock and awe: Military response to armed banditry and theprospects of internal security operations in Northwest Nigeria,” African Security Review, Vol. 32, No. 4 (2023).
64 NBS Nigeria, ”Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (2022),“ (National Bureau of Statistics of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria, FCT Abuja, 2022). Note: the rate includes Nigerians aged between 15 and 24.
65 Maurice Ogbonnaya, "Illegal Mining and Rural Banditry in North-West Nigeria." Institute for Security Studies,
Policy Brief 19 (2020).
66 Azeez Olaniyan and Aliyu Yahaya. "Cows, bandits, and violent conflicts: Understanding cattle rustling in Northern
Nigeria." Africa Spectrum, Vol 51, No. 3 (2016).
67 Global Initiative, ACLED, “What does the recent escalation of mass abductions in Nigeria tell us?”, 15 March 2024;
Obi Anyadike, “Everyone knows someone who has been kidnapped’: Inside Nigeria’s Banditry Epidemic.” The New
Humanitarian, 30 January 2023.
68 Al Chukwuma Okoli and Mamuda Abubakar. "Crimelordism”: understanding a new phenomenon in armed
banditry in Nigeria." Journal of Asian and African Studies , Vol 56, No. 7 (2021)
69 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020.
70 Global Initiative, ACLED, “What does the recent escalation of mass abductions in Nigeria tell us?”, 15 March 2024,13

family members to sell all their assets and means for making a livelihood (such as farms).71 With
many unable to pay subsequent ransom demands, and potential targets having also fled theregion,72 bandits have increasingly opted for mass abductions. Despite the difficulty of
coordinating these attacks, mass abductions increase the possibility of government ransom
payments, which are more substantial than what can be cobbled together by individual
ransoms.73 As profits from cattle rustling and individual kidnapping ransoms dwindle, anotherobserved trend has been the imposition of levies on farmers and artisanal gold miners74 well as
forced labour on bandit-controlled farms.75 Illegal taxation of farmers typically involves
payments of anywhere from N10,000 to N600,000.76 There are concerns that this coercive
taxation could lead to a further entrenchment of bandit groups in these regions.77

Bandits’ Modus Operandi
Using the vast forests that intersperse the savannah in Nigeria’s North West as their base ofoperations,78 bandits can move undetected and conceal themselves from military forces who
are often assisted by air support.79 In their ventures out of the forests, bandits rely on quickstrike tactics utilizing motorbikes that ensure manoeuvrability in difficult terrain and the speed
to conduct rapid attacks.80 Motorbikes are typically not registered, which helps evade law
enforcement tracking. Motorbikes often serve as transport vehicles for arms and ammunition
as well as for attacks. Typical attacks can involve as many as 200 motorbikes, each with two
armed bandits and space for one abductee.81
Whilst banditry has historically relied on simple tactics and is predominantly a rural
phenomenon, bandit attacks are becoming more sophisticated, and groups havedemonstrated the capacity to conduct complex attacks in urban areas. Examples include
assaults on markets and schools and strikes against government facilities such as military

71 Obi Anyadike, "Everyone knows somebody who has been kidnapped’: Inside Nigeria’s banditry epidemic," The

New Humanitarian, 30 January 2023.
72 In our survey sample nearly half of adult men mentioned to be displaced at the time of the survey. Amongst women,boys and girls’ respondents this number was still high at between 29 and 37 per cent.
73 Global Initiative, ACLED, “What does the recent escalation of mass abductions in Nigeria tell us?”, 15 March 2024;
Priya Sippy, "Nigeria's kidnap crisis: Inside story of a ransom negotiator," BBC News, 21 March 2024.
74 Ibid.
75 SBMIntel, "Mass Abductions: The catastrophe of Nigeria’s kidnap epidemic," 21 March 2024.
76 Global Initiative, "Armed bandits extort crop farmers amid dwindling alternative illicit revenue sources in Zamfara,north-western Nigeria," Risk Bulletin #5, (October 2022).
77 Ibid.
78 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).
79 Azeez Olaniyan. "Foliage and violence: Interrogating forests as a security threat in Nigeria." African Security
Review, Vol 27, No. 1 (2018).
80 Promise Frank Ejiofor, "The Mobility of Terror: Motorcycle Bandits, Violence and Anarchy in Nigeria," The RUSI
Journal, Vol 166, No. 6-7 (2022).
81 Ibid; Daily Trust, “How Unregistered Motorcycles Aid Banditry, Other Crimes in North-West,” 30 May 2021.

14

bases and airports. In 2021, for instance, bandits conducted large-scale attacks in the outskirtsof Kaduna city.82
Owing to their loose structure and fragmentation, bandit groups also display frequent infighting,often over non-ideological issues such as inter-bandit cattle rustling or conflicts over turf.83
Some have argued that the lack of any coordination across or structure connecting thesedisparate bandit groups, presents significant challenges to any attempt to approach them—letalone negotiate with them.84

Potential Crime-Terror Nexus
As the toll of banditry has risen in the North West and the insurgency in the North East andarmed group activity in the Sahel has continued on, there have been rising concerns over thephenomena merging as jihadists advance into the North West attempting to create a West
African “arc of insurgency.”85 Any potential collusion or merging of insurgent and bandit groups
would connect the crisis in the Lake Chad Basin to armed groups active in the North West andpossibly to the wider Sahel regionand increase the prospects of destabilizing the region as awhole. While the implications of such a merger legitimate concern, the evidence so far points
to mostly transactional and tactical rather than strategic collaboration between insurgents andbandits.86
There are some reports substantiating a certain level of operational collaboration between
extremist groups (like Ansaru, which is already present in the North West,87 and the factions ofBoko Haram - Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wah wa'l-Jihād (JAS) and the Islamic State West
African Province/Sahel (ISWAP) in the North East), and bandit groups.88 It has been reported
that cooperation ranges from recruitment to training (e.g., on anti-aircraft guns or IEDs),

Center for Democracy and Development, “Multiple Nodes, Common Causes: National Stock take ofContemporary Insecurity and State Responses in Nigeria,” (Abuja: 2022); John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole, andFolahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity in North-west Nigeria." Democracy andSecurity (2023)
83 James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz. "Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry
or a “Banditization” of Jihad?." CTC Sentinel, Vol.15, No. 1 (2022).
84 John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole, and Folahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity inNorth-west Nigeria." Democracy and Security (2023).
85 Jacob Zenn and Caleb Weiss, "Ansaru Resurgent: The Rebirth of Al-Qaeda’s Nigerian Franchise," Perspectives
On Terrorism, Vol. 15, No.5. (2021); James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz. "Northwestern
Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry or a “Banditization” of Jihad?." CTC Sentinel 15, no. 1 (2022); John Sunday Ojo,
Samuel Oyewole, and Folahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity in North-west Nigeria."
Democracy and Security (2023).
86 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).
87 “Ansaru’s Comeback in Nigeria Deepens the Terror Threat,” ISS Today, 1 June 2022.
88 ISS Regional Office for West Africa, The Sahel and The Lake Chad Basin,“Ansaru’s comeback in Nigeria deepens
the terror threat,” Institute for Security Studies, 1 June 2022; HIIK, Conflict Barometer, 2022.
82

15

logistics, acquisition of weaponry, and community attacks.89 However, it is thought that theirfundamentally different incentive structures keep bandits and insurgents from more strategic
collaboration or merging. Traditionally, banditry has been thought to be primarily driven byfinancial incentives, while the armed groups operating in the North East are seen as driven by
their political ideology.90 Some have raised concerns that given that bandits are mostly Sunni
Muslims they could potentially be lured in by in-group insurgents, resulting in what some calleda potential “jihadization of banditry.”91 Some sources, however, have suggested the opposite
has happened. More fighters have left insurgent groups for banditry than vice versa,
presumably due in part to the allure of profits to be gained,92 and disillusion with their factions
and conditions in the Sambisa forest and on the battlefield. Additionally, the structure andorganization of banditry undermines an easy transition from the insurgency in the North East.
Bandit groups abound; many of them are small and hard to identify, and there is rampant
infighting between them, making a comprehensive co-optation by insurgent groups
unattainable. Furthermore, scholars have underlined that “ISWAP and Ansaru havedramatically different approaches toward treatment of Muslim civilians than bandits” (andhistorically the JAS faction).”93 ISWAP and Ansaru seek to abstain from harming Muslim
civilians. On the contrary, bandits apply indiscriminate violence, which due to the North West’s
demographic, ends up harming mostly Muslims: precisely those amongst whom insurgent
groups attempt to build popular support including through offering quasi-governmental
services to communities.94 This is at least true for ISWAP, which is known to harshly punish
fighters for attacking Muslim communities95 or having taken away weapons from the other
Boko Haram splinter, JAS.96 Since preying on and the treatment of Muslim civilians has been
one of the major points of contention between both splinters, at least any sort of bandit-ISWAP
alliance seems implausible at this stage.
With regards to Sahelian groups, there are multiple claims that they are already operating in
Nigeria’s North West. According to International Crisis Group, “Since 2018, Nigerian security
sources say, Islamic State fighters operating in the Sahel have been trying to open a corridor
89 James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz. "Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry

or a “Banditization” of Jihad?." CTC Sentinel, Vol.15, No. 1 (2022); John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole, andFolahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity in North-west Nigeria." Democracy andSecurity (2023); Sahara Reporters, “Boko Haram Fighters Training Bandits In Northern Nigeria To Use Anti-aircraftGuns, Explosives—Report,” 26 September 2021.
90 Folahanmi Ainaa, John Sunday Ojob, and Samuel Oyewolec, “Shock and awe: Military response to armed
banditry and the prospects of internal security operations in Northwest Nigeria,” African Security Review, Vol. No.32,(2023).
91 Jacob Zenn and Caleb Weiss, "Ansaru Resurgent: The Rebirth of Al-Qaeda’s Nigerian Franchise," Perspectives
On Terrorism, Vol. 15, No. 5. (2021).
92James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz. "Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization of Banditry
or a “Banditization” of Jihad?." CTC Sentinel, Vol.15, No. 1 (2022).
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Francesca Batault, Malik Samuel, Celestin Delanga with Mohammed Bukar, Fatima Yetcha Ajimi Badu, Fanna
Abdu Muhammad, Fatima Ajimi, Sani Boubacar and Siobhan O’Neil, ”Prospects for Dialogue and Negotiation to
Address the Conflict in the Lake Chad Basin,“ UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.
96 International Crisis Group, "JAS vs. ISWAP: The War of the Boko Haram Splinters," 28 March 2024.

16

from northern Mali through Dogondoutchi town in Niger (Republic) to north-western Nigeria
and, further west, northern Benin.”97 Other sources claim that Islamic State in the Greater
Sahara (ISGS) came from Niger to Sokoto State several years ago, but rather than work withbandits, initially the group ingratiated itself with local communities by providing protection
against bandits.98j

Ultimately, the relationship soured when ISGS imposed its harshpunishments for minor infractions against the group’s rules, and it was later pushed back overthe border by the military.￼ Significant coordination between bandits and armed groups thatoriginate from across the Nigerien border or the wider Sahel region has yet to be well
documented. The potential alignment of violent actors across Nigeria’s northwestern borderremains a concern, but one subject to many of the same caveats outlined above for armed
groups from within the country’s borders.

Government Response
Government responses to banditry have predominantly been militarised,99 apart from somedevelopmental and resettlement programmes. There have been localized negotiation
attempts, both to release those abducted, as well as some strategic negotiations involving
amnesties in return for weapons. However, these efforts have typically remained on the statelevel and lack coherence and coordination across the North West.
Overall, the federal government has relied heavily on the use of force to fight banditry. Military
operations against bandits started as early as 2015.100 Some notable operations to dateincluded Operation Sharan Daji, Harbin Kunama, Thunder Strike, Sahel Sanity, and Hadarin
Daji—all of which covered multiple northwestern states. Military operations have periodically
been followed by periods of improved security, but they have usually been short. 101 Anothershortcoming of the approach has been the overreliance on air strikes. The military, which the
Senate already attested to be overstretched,102 has not been able to couple air strikes with
sufficient ground support.103 Owing to bandits’ high mobility, aerial bombardments and thedisruption of some of their funding activities in one locality often simply led to a shift to nearby

97 International Crisis Group, “Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem,” REPORT 288 /AFRICA, 18 MAY 2020.
98 James Barnett & Murtala Ahmed Rufa'i, “A “Sahelian” or a “Littoral” Crisis? Examining the Wideningof Nigeria’s Boko Haram Conflict,” Hudson Institute website, April 5, 2023.
99 Folahanmi Aina, John Sunday Ojo, and Samuel Oyewole, ”Shock and awe: Military response to armed banditry
and the prospects of internal security operations in Northwest Nigeria,“ African Security Review, Vol.32, No. 4(2023) .
100 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020; Folahanmi Aina, John
Sunday Ojo, and Samuel Oyewole, ”Shock and awe: Military response to armed banditry and the prospects ofinternal security operations in Northwest Nigeria,“ African Security Review, Vol 32, No. 4 (2023).
101 Idayat Hassan, "Nigeria’s rampant banditry, and some ideas on how to rein it in," The New Humanitarian, 8November 2021.
102 Vanguard, "Kidnapping: Military are overstretched — Senate," 25 March 2024.
103 Sallek Yaks Musa, "Nigeria’s banditry: why 5 government strategies have failed," The Conversation, 22 April
2022.

17

areas and other activities,104 a dynamic elsewhere known as the ”balloon effect.”105 Similar
dynamics were observed in Kaduna in 2021, where 300 soldiers from the Nigerian Army
Women Corps were deployed along the A2 Abuja-Kaduna highway. While abductions along
the route declined, it soon became clear that bandits had simply moved operations to the A235
Kaduna-Kajuru-Kachia route and adjacent communities further east, which then reported anupsurge of kidnappings.106 Attacks by the Nigerian military on bandit groups have further raised
concerns about violations of international human rights law (e.g. in January 2023, killing 40
civilian herders in the North Central zone).107 Aerial strikes have also been deployed in error.108
For instance, in December 2023, an accidental bombing of Tudun Biri in Kaduna State resulted
in 120 civilian deaths.109
Individual state responses to banditry generally differ in focus from the federal response asstates lack the same military capacity. Yet, states in the North West have tried to limit bandits’ability to operate by using alternate, low-cost approaches, for example, by cutting
communication lines.110 However, these measures have at times been criticized for negatively
affecting communities rather than constraining banditry activity.111
Multiple state governments and hyper-local initiatives have also sought to negotiate
strategically with bandit groups in an attempt to convince them to lay down their arms. Seldom,
however, are these processes comprehensive. They have failed to consult all those involved
and affected by violence, nor have they sufficiently addressed root causes or helped bandits tofully transition to alternative livelihoods. These negotiations—some modelled after past peacedeals in the Niger Delta, some using private mediation—awarded amnesty to bandits, offeredthem cash or ran cows-for-guns schemes had mixed results.112 Typically however, negotiation
attempts do not include local (farmer) communities, victims, or Yan Sakai. The fragmented
bandit group landscape with volatile leadership structures has further complicated any
negotiation attempts. Even if one group agrees to lay down their arms, so many others stillengage in violence. Overall, the lack of a cross-state, coordinated approach (e.g. with Kaduna
adopting a no-negotiation/no-amnesty approach) has also created gaps which some fear could

104 Ibid.

105 UNODC, "Organized Crime Strategy Toolkit for Developing High-impact Strategies," (UN, Vienna, 2021).
106 Sallek Yaks Musa, "Nigeria’s banditry: why 5 government strategies have failed," The Conversation, 22 April

2022.
107 Statement by Alice Wairimu Nderitu, Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, on the worsening security
situation in Nigeria, (New York, 2 February 2023)
108 Freedom Onuoha, "Nigeria’s military mistakes cost the country its civilians," ISS Today, 13 December 2023.
109 Okechukwu Nnodim et al, "Kaduna village bombing: Death toll hits 120, villagers allege military bombed twice,"
Punch, 6 December 2023.
110 Reuters, “Nigeria's Katsina state shuts some communications as bandit battle widens,” 10 September 2021.
111 Folahanmi Aina, John Sunday Ojo, and Samuel Oyewole, ”Shock and awe: Military response to armed banditry
and the prospects of internal security operations in Northwest Nigeria,“ African Security Review, Vol. 32, No. 4(2023).
112 Idayat Hassan. “Nigeria’s rampant banditry, and some ideas on how to rein it in,” The New Humanitarian, 8November 202118

be exploited by bandits (e.g. by groups benefitting from concessions in one state and thencontinuing to perpetrate crimes in another one).113
Dialogues on a tactical level, such as those initiated by the state governments of Katsina andZamfara, remain similarly atomized and unconnected. They have yielded some positive
outcomes, such as in Zamfara where the peace and reconciliation initiative led to the release of
525 hostages and the return of hundreds of displaced persons.114 However, the new governorsof Zamfara and Katsina who assumed office in May 2023, have both indicated they are either
not willing to negotiate with bandits, or do not support any current efforts by the federal
government to do so. 115
Although historically, there has been little focus on addressing the underlying causes that arethought to contribute to banditry such as poverty, conflicts over land use, and tensions between
Hausa and Fulani,116 some state governments have adopted developmental or settlement
initiatives. Soft-handed approaches have included resettlement policies like the 2018 Rural
Grazing Area (RUGA) Policy as well as the National Livestock Reform Plan (NLRP). Bothworked to resolve resource conflicts through resettlement of herders and livestock but hadcome under heavy scrutiny, and their respective impact was limited.117
Most recent efforts appear to work towards revamping some of these earlier resettlement
policies. During his campaign, President Tinubu made promises to end banditry, with specificreferences to bolstering policing capacity and “promot[ing] inclusion and boost[ing] theeconomy of our local communities.”118 In February 2024, his administration launched the
Pulaku Initiative, a large-scale resettlement programme seeking to address farmer-herderconflicts, which was rolled out in the states of Sokoto, Kebbi, Benue, Katsina, Zamfara, Niger,
and Kaduna. At the time of writing, an inter-ministerial Pulaku committee had been set up
including participation from state governors and the ministries on housing and urban

113 Defence Headquarters Nigeria, ”Interstate Movement of Armed Bandits,” 2022; Folahanmi Aina, John Sunday

Ojo, and Samuel Oyewole, ”Shock and awe: Military response to armed banditry and the prospects of internal
security operations in Northwest Nigeria,“ African Security Review, Vol.32, No. 4 (2023).
114 WANEP, "Addressing Armed Banditry in the North-West Region of Nigeria: Exploring the Potentials of a MultiDimensional Conflict Management Approach," WARN Policy Brief, (2020); Oladayo Jonathan, ”525 kidnap victims
regain freedom in Zamfara," Premium Times Nigeria, 31 December 2019.
115 Daily Trust, "Why I Will Not Negotiate With Bandits – Gov Radda," 21 March 2024; Premium Times, "Insecurity:
Zamfara governor accuses federal government agencies of negotiating with terrorists," 25 September 2023.
116 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).
117 Promise Frank Ejiofor. "Beyond ungoverned spaces: Connecting the dots between relative deprivation, banditry,and violence in Nigeria." African Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2022).
118 Abubakar Ahmadu Maishanu. “2023: How I’ll tackle insecurity if elected president – Tinubu,” Premium Times, 18
October 2022..

19

development and agriculture.119 It remains to be seen whether the new Pulaku Initiative willaddress the shortcomings of earlier efforts (e.g., RUGA, NLRP).120
The existing research presented above shows that there is still a considerable dearth of
information about banditry as a phenomenon, its impact on communities as well as potential
underlying drivers and fault lines propelling this crisis. This survey shall shed more light onthese aspects. The following section describes the methodological considerations andsampling that guided this survey, and the findings report at hand.

Methodology and Sample
As part of MEAC’s multi-year study of conflict trajectories into and out of armed groups in
Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin region, the project expanded its data collection into the NorthWest of Nigeria to study the dynamics of banditry. Banditry is typically categorized as“organised crime” or “terrorists”, but this oversimplification leads to insufficient policy
responses. Acknowledging this, the survey sought to understand the multi-faceted ways inwhich banditry attacks impact communities, how bandit groups operate in the region, and how
they influence the overall conflict dynamics in the region. Through this bottom-up approach
which centers around community voices, we hope that the findings contribute to an openended and evidence-based discussion on banditry.

119 Premium Times Nigeria, "Nigeria commences initiative to end farmers-herders conflicts," 13 February 2024.
120 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020; Idayat Hassan, “Nigeria’s

rampant banditry, and some ideas on how to rein it in,” The New Humanitarian, 8 November 2021.

20

FIGURE 2 – SAMPLE DESCRIPTION

The sample visualized above (Figure 1) was the result of MEAC’s baseline survey conducted
as part of a larger panel in the North West of Nigeria. It was administered by phone between
January to March 2024 and captured perceptions of 2,947 community members mostly fromthree states in the North West (Katsina, Sokoto, Zamfara), which are considered to be the mostaffected by banditry violence121 in the region. Most respondents belonged to three local
government areas (LGAs): Gusau (100 per cent of all Zamfara respondents), Jibia (96 per centof all Katsina respondents), and Ilella (94 per cent of all Sokoto respondents).122 These LGAs
were prioritized because of their history of bandit attacks and the government’s focus onaddressing banditry in these communities.
To understand how tensions between Hausa and Fulani drove banditry, it was crucial to recruit
a diverse enough sample consisting of both Hausa and Fulani respondents. However,
respondent recruitment was limited to town centres owing to security considerations, which led
121 John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole, and Folahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity inNorth-west Nigeria." Democracy and Security (2023); Rosenje Musharafa Olapeju and Adeniyi Oluwatobi Peter,"The Impact Of Banditry On Nigeria’s Security In The Fourth Republic: An Evaluation Of Nigeria’s Northwest,"
Zamfara Journal of Politics and Development Vol. 2 No. 1, (2021).
122 The sample is predominately (96 per cent) from these three LGAs.

21

to under-recruitment of Fulani respondents. To correct for this, a snowball recruitment effort ofpotential Fulani respondents via phone was conducted. Notably, several of these respondents
self-identified as Hausa. Upon further investigation, it was found that: a) some respondents
feared the stigma of self-identifying as Fulani, especially in light of the association madebetween bandit attacks and the Fulanis, and b) some respondents identified as Hausa-Fulani
either because of parents who intermarried and/or the fact that they spoke Hausa as theprimary language. Following this, checks were performed to ensure there were others who selfidentified as Hausa respondents in the in-person recruitment who were not, in fact, Fulani or
Hausa-Fulani. It was confirmed over 95 per cent of the respondents reported their tribal identity
the same way each time, and the scale of variation was less than 5 per cent. This exercise
confirmed that while tribe affiliations are fluid, they are nonetheless treated as mutually
exclusive categories for the purposes of analysis.
It must be noted that only one person who took the survey reported having been with a banditgroup. Hence, this survey is not able to provide first-hand insight into bandits’ goals,
motivations, or ways of operating. Instead, it presents how community members affected bybanditry violence perceive it.
The following sections present summary statistics and more advanced regression results(wherever applicable) to make knowledge claims about banditry in the North West. Any claimsof statistical significance and causal relationships are substantiated using relevant statisticaltests (e.g., chi-square tests and multivariate regression analyses).

Findings
In reaffirming banditry’s devasting consequences on communities MEAC’s survey in the NorthWest of Nigeria, this survey also provides further nuance on its varying manifestations andframings. In doing so, it sometimes challenges the conventional explanations for thephenomenon.
In terms of top-level findings, respondents report a rise in the frequency and intensity of banditryattacks, which have far-reaching effects on their everyday lives including their health andsafety, economic well-being, access to education, and their mobility. Reports of victimization
experiences are especially prevalent amongst adult men, with physical violence, stealing(including cattle raids), and abduction being the most reported types of crimes. Sexual violence
likely remains grossly underreported, but interestingly, as in the North East of Nigeria, men andboys are more likely to report knowing about instances of sexual violence relative to womenand girls. In looking across MEAC surveys it is clear that for communities in the North West,banditry ranks as a far greater challenge than communities in the North East rank insurgent

22

violence from the Boko Haram factions. This is incongruous with the amount of international
attention the latter crisis receives. Regarding bandits’ appearance and modus operandi, thefindings validate earlier research which notes bandits as mainly forest-based, criminal groups
who move around on motorbikes, raiding communities in quick strikes. Results show thatbandits typically represent several organized groups, instead of lone wolves.
The findings further challenge notions established by previous reporting and research.
Respondents appear to see banditry as a distinct phenomenon disconnected from intersectoral (farmer/herder) and inter-tribal (Hausa/Fulani) fault lines. Similarly, respondents seemto perceive little connection between the insurgency in the North East of Nigeria and banditry.
Potential explanations driving such framings, and other related themes are discussed in detailbelow.

Banditry’s Impact on Communities in the North
West
Banditry attacks pervade the daily lives of communities in the North West of Nigeria, with thefrequency and intensity of attacks reported to be on the rise. These sub-sections look at theextent of victimization at the personal, familial, and community levels, as well as, at sexual
violence in particular. They also analyze the ways in which the everyday lives of respondents
are impacted by banditry violence—ranging from their mobility and ability to work to education
access.

I. Frequency and Intensity of Attacks by Bandit Groups
MEAC findings suggest that both the perceived frequency and intensity of attacks are on therise with some variation across states. A staggering 72 per cent of respondents affirm there
have been attacks and raids in the area where they live. Response patterns vary considerablyacross the three states: high rates of attacks in their community were reported in Katsina (87per cent) and Sokoto (80 per cent) but were considerably lower in Zamfara (51 per cent). The
lower rate in Zamfara is noticeable given the area is known as an early epicentre of banditry
violence. Zamfaran communities’ longstanding experience with the issue and perhaps fear of
reprisal might have led to particularly cautious response patterns. Additionally, the survey was
conducted in Gusau, the state’s capital city and seat of the state government, both not the casewith Illela and Jibia. The survey location is hence more protected than other parts of the state,
where rates could possibly be much higher.

23

FIGURE 3 – IN THE LAST FEW YEARS , HOW FREQUENTLY HAVE BANDITS
CONDUCTED ATTACKS AND RAIDS HERE ?

Daily
WeeklyMonthly
Numerous times a year
Once a year
Once every few years
Never
0%

25%
Katsina

50%
Sokoto75%

100%

ZamfaraFor many of those living in the North West, banditry is a near-constant threat. Of those thatreported attacks, a third of respondents (32 per cent) live in areas with weekly attacks, and 14
per cent of respondents report daily raids. Of the three targeted survey locations, Sokoto
appears the most attacked with respondents there reporting the greatest number of daily
attacks, and a slightly higher frequency of weekly bandit attacks. Katsina’s rates are not that far
behind that of Sokoto.
Banditry appears to have gotten more pervasive over time. 80 per cent of respondents affirmedthat banditry raids in the last few years have increased in the area where they live. Respondents
from Sokoto report greatest agreement to the fact that bandit attacks have increased (87 percent), followed by respondents from Katsina (82 per cent) and Zamfara (69 per cent). Previous
research had found a reported drop in the number of banditry attacks across the northwesternstates between 2021 to 2022 and after attacks had steadily increased over several preceding
years.123 MEAC findings are not based on the same type of incident data as these earlier
findings and cover only three instead of all states in the North West. However, the analyzed
community reports of bandit attacks in the last few years imply that the frequency of banditry inthe three states is in fact again on the rise.

123 John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole, and Folahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity inNorth-west Nigeria." Democracy and Security (2023).

24

In addition to the continued rise in attack frequency, the severity of the violence associated withbandit attacks also appears to increase. When asked about how “severe” the banditry violence
had been in the preceding month,124 answers varied considerably across states. While in
Katsina, a sizeable portion of respondents said attacks there had been ‘very severe’ or ‘severe’(29 and 34 per cent respectively), compared to somewhat lower response rates in Zamfara, (20and 30 per cent respectively). This could for instance indicate both a perceived high number ofcasualties and/or destruction of property as a result of attacks. Interestingly, very few
respondents in Sokoto reported that attacks had been ‘very severe’ (2 per cent) or ‘severe’ (6per cent) in the last month.
When observing attacks across time, a large majority of respondents attested to a negative
trend. When respondents who reported attacks in their area were asked whether the banditryattacks are becoming more violent, 80 per cent answered ‘yes’. When analysed by state, 84
per cent from Katsina and Sokoto agreed, relative to 65 per cent from Zamfara. This could inpart be due to a rise in kinetic action against bandit groups by security forces and Yan Sakai,125
which bandits are known to respond to by inflicting even more attacks on civilians.126

FIGURE 4 – OVER THAT PERIOD, HAVE THE BANDITRY ATTACKS AND RAIDS
WHERE YOU LIVE BECOME MORE VIOLENT ?
100%

75%
65
84

85

50%

25%
35
16

15

Katsina

Sokoto0%No

ZamfaraYes

124 Only those who had reported attacks in the area where they live over the last month received the question “In thelast month, how severe was the banditry violence against your community?”
125 ARISNEWS, "We’ll Sustain Military Onslaught against Bandits in Zamfara, Tinubu Tells Governor Lawal," 14 April
2024; Folahanmi Ainaa, John Sunday Ojob, and Samuel Oyewolec, “Shock and awe: Military response to armed
banditry and the prospects of internal security operations in Northwest Nigeria,” African Security Review, Vol. No.32,(2023).
126 UNIDIR, Interviews with researcher/expert, (Maiduguri, Borno State, July 2024)25

Since in many locations, both the frequency and intensity of attacks appear to be on the rise
having already reached concerning levels, this warrants a closer look at the extent and formsof victimization experienced by community members.

II. Extent of Victimization
Those surveyed have not just observed bandit attacks, they have been directly impacted bythem in notable numbers. Close to 15 per cent of all respondents stated that they had
personally been attacked by bandits. Men in the sample were disproportionately impacted. Outof the victims, 74 per cent were men and 19 per cent of the victims were women. Children
reported being attacked directly to a relatively lesser extent.127 A statistically significant
correlation is observed between gender and the likelihood of reporting having been attacked bybandits.128 This correlation corroborates previous research which shows that bandit groups
have particularly targeted men.129 One reason could be men’s broader presence and thus
exposure in public spaces, roads and markets particularly, while women are more confined totheir homes.130 Additionally, it is known that at some point most men, and in fact also boys, offighting age (as opposed to little to no women or girls) appeared to be involved either as Yan
Sakai or as bandits. This has likely fuelled the broad perception on both sides, that men andboys are generally a threat to the respective in-group and therefore valid targets.131
Additionally, women are traditionally seen as the “weaker sex” and are thus rarely perceived asa serious security threat, or at least not to the extent that men are.132
The banditry attacks reported by respondents included physical violence (50 per cent), theft(36 per cent), abduction (27 per cent), and extortion (22 per cent).133 The fact that theft featureshigh is understandable given that cattle rustling—one of bandits’ originally most importantcriminal activities—is included in this category. On the contrary, it is surprising that abductionand extorsion do not rank higher, given that according to previous research, these crimes havegrown significantly in recent years and are generally also the most lucrative.134 One grim but
simple reason could be that many of those abducted have not (yet) returned to theircommunities, hence, lowering the number of personal reports. The fact that the share of thosereporting abduction cases amongst close relatives was a staggering 40 per cent higher (at 67
percent), could corroborate this explanation. Additionally, analyses have mentioned that
127 This equated to 317 adult male victims and 82 adult female victims, out of a total of 431 victims
128 The statistically significant correlation is confirmed through a chi-square test. The chi-squared statistic is 98.4034

and the p-value is < 0.00001. It must be noted that this result does not establish which gender is more likely to be
attacked by bandits; it only confirms that the likelihood of reporting being attacked differs by gender.
129 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020.
130 UNIDIR, Interviews with researcher/expert, (Maiduguri, Borno State, July 2024)
131 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020.
132UNIDIR, Interviews with researcher/expert, (Maiduguri, Borno State, July 2024)
133 The total exceeds 100 per cent as the respondents could select multiple forms of victimizations that they sufferedduring the banditry attack.
134 Global Initiative, ACLED, “What does the recent escalation of mass abductions in Nigeria tell us?”, 15 March2024; Obi Anyadike, “Everyone knows someone who has been kidnapped’: Inside Nigeria’s Banditry Epidemic.”
The New Humanitarian, 30 January 2023.

26

targets are often abducted for forced labour on bandit-controlled farms,135 in which casebandits will likely have no interest in releasing their victims as long as their labour produces a
steady flux of income.136 Finally, abduction is a subtype of extorsion, which might haveinfluenced these results too.
Sexual violence is reported at very low levels, although likely being underreported. Given thesensitivity around sexual violence, the question was asked differently than other victimization
metrics. Instead of asking about personal or familial experience, respondents were asked, “Do
you personally know anyone in your community who experienced forced sex or nonconsensual touching or something similar by an armed or criminal group like a group of
bandits?”
Data from 2020-2023 showed that reports of conflict-related sexual violence perpetrated in
Nigeria by non-state armed groups such as insurgent groups, bandits but also militia or security
forces have increased from 12 reported cases in 2020 to 99 in 2022 with a subsequent drop in
2023 to 54. In the North West, 18 cases had been reported in 2021, 41 in 2022, and 6 in 2023,
all perpetrated by either unidentified armed actors or militia groups.137 It is thought that sexual
violence is significantly underreported in the country.138 In 2021, Sexual Assault Referral
Centres (SARCs) in different Nigerian states, providing medical and counselling services but
also support for reporting, were sparsely distributed. This effectively limits survivors’ pathways
towards reporting. At that time, Katsina had no SARCs, while Sokoto and Zamfara only had one
each.139 With severe limitations in mobility caused by the same banditry violence (see next
section) and limited economic resources to travel, existing centres are likely out of reach formany. In 2022, the Nigerian government cut its funding for tracking and rehabilitating survivorsof sexual violence by nearly half.140
The survey shows, that relative to female respondents (12 per cent), a slightly higher
percentage of male respondents (15 per cent) report personally knowing141 community
135 SBMIintel, "Mass Abductions: The Catastrophe of Nigeria’s Kidnap Epidemic," March 2024.

136 Other reports speak of local villagers being forced to work on these farms, in which cases abduction would not benecessary. The same report from 2022 argues that this forced labour has become an even more reliable andlucrative source of income than abduction. GITOC, Armed bandits extort crop farmers amid dwindling alternative
illicit revenue sources in Zamfara, north-western Nigeria, (October 2022).
137 Insecurity Insight, "2020-2024 Nigeria Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) Incident Data", 23 May 2024.
138 Julius Gaiya “Nigeria Needs to Do More to Prevent & Respond to Conflict-Related Sexual Violence,” CIVIC, 19
June 2023.
139 Nigeria Governors’ Forum Digital Repository, “Directory of Sexual Assault Referral Centres (SARCs) in Nigeria”,
March 2021.
140 Osaretin Osadebamwen, "FG cuts funding to fight rape by 49% in 2022 fiscal year," Nigerian Tribune, 6 January
2022.
141 MEAC asked respondents “Do you personally know anyone in your community who experienced forced sex or
non-consensual touching or something similar by an armed or criminal group like a group of bandits?". MEAC’s
previous research has found that casting a wider net and asking about knowledge of sexual violence at a moreanonymous, community level yields a higher readiness to respond. This is likely due to social stigma, feelings ofshame and guilt as well as fear of reliving the situation associated with reporting own experiences of sexual violence.

27

members who have been a victim of banditry-related sexual violence. Earlier MEAC surveys
conducted in the North East of Nigeria revealed similar gender patterns for the same question
regarding knowledge of sexual violence cases.142 It seems rather counter-intuitive that moremale respondents are aware of sexual violence victims, especially when it is already known thatwomen and girls are specifically targeted by sexual violence perpetrated by bandit groups.143
The observed pattern could be driven by a few explanations: a) Men and boys are typically morepresent in the public sphere144 and thus have generally more access to information about
banditry attacks, or hold specific positions which could naturally expose them to more reportsof sexual violence, notably, doctors, soldiers, community leaders, community security actors,
or police. b) Additionally, there have been accounts of women145 deliberately in front of theirfathers, husbands, brothers and sons to humiliate them146 or threats against fathers andhusbands if they refuse to bring their daughters and wives to bandit camps to be raped. 147 In
both cases, men and boys would be aware of cases of sexual violence, although its targets
were women and girls. c) Given the extreme sensitivity, associated social stigma, and trauma
linked to the question, victims of sexual violence themselves, more often women and girls,
maybe especially hesitant to acknowledge knowing of sexual violence even in response to anindirect question. As highlighted by another study, and relayed by a displaced femaleinterviewee, “Many women were raped but they don't want to narrate the story of what
happened to them because of shame.” 148 These dynamics could help explain the mechanisms
guiding the statistical correlation between gender and their response to the question on sexual
victimization.149
Notably, for other forms of victimization such as cattle raids, the gender of the respondent
played an important role. Cattle raids were reported at higher rates by men and boys (23 percent compared to 13 per cent of women and girl respondents). This aligns with expectations
about gendered access to information in general and in particular, a pastoralist system that is(See, Johanna Kleffmann, Francesca Batault, Juan Armando Torres Munguía, Siobhan O’Neil, Jente Althuis,
Rabby Shakur, Anna Hallahan, Hana Salama, Mohamed Coulibaly, "Factors Driving Weapons Holding in the North
East of Nigeria,” Findings Report 33, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2023.)
142 Respondents were asked “Do you personally know anyone in your community who experienced forced sex or
non-consensual touching or something similar by an armed group, like Boko Haram or Yan Gora?”. Eight percent
of women respondents, 12 per cent of men, and 7 per cent of girls and boys each answered affirmatively as reported
in Johanna Kleffmann, Francesca Batault, Juan Armando Torres Munguía, Siobhan O’Neil, Jente Althuis, Rabby
Shakur, Anna Hallahan, Hana Salama, Mohamed Coulibaly, "Factors Driving Weapons Holding in the North East of
Nigeria,” Findings Report 33, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2023.
143 Tosin Osasona, “The question of definition: Armed banditry in Nigeria's North-West in the context of international
humanitarian law,” International Review of the Red Cross No. 923 (June 2023)
144 The practice called “kulle” (seclusion) is still present in some communities, however, it is said to be practiced
more fluidly and at a more moderate level, with presence of women and girls increasing in spaces like hospitals,
schools and markets. Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020.
145 Chitra Nagarajan, “Analysis of Violence and Insecurity in Zamfara”, February 2020.
146 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020).
147 Ibid.
148 Ahmed Rufa'i Usman, Yusuf Balaribah And Geno Ardo, "Armed Banditry and Sexual Violence Against Womenin Zamfara State, Nigeria", Benue Journal of Sociology, Vol. 9 No. 2 (2023).
149 Statistically significant association with gender, verified through a chi-square statistic which is 6.649. The p-valueis < 0.00001.

28

“patently both masculinized and youth-dominated, with women relegated to the backgroundand owning little stock,”150 which results in men and boys being more aware of cattle rustling.
These realities help explain gendered awareness of and experience with different crimes
perpetrated by bandits.
In addition to personal victimization, respondents also reported family victimization. A
staggering 63 per cent of respondents reported that their close relatives had been attacked bybandits.151 The main forms of violence against close relatives included abduction and physicalattacks (67 and 47 per cent respectively).
III. Impact on Mobility, Work and Education
Beyond physical violence, the survey data confirms the far-reaching effects of banditry on
community members’ everyday lives including their livelihoods, access to education, and theirlevel of mobility. On the question of mobility, 46 per cent of respondents stated that they
‘mostly’ or ‘sometimes’ avoided travel due to the risk of banditry. Close to 1 in 5 respondents
reported sleeping outside of their community in the past month due to banditry. Furthermore, aquarter (24 per cent) of the respondents had reported incidents where they were forced to leave
their community because of banditry. Disaggregation of these respondents by gender and age
reveals that 54 per cent of those who had ever been forced to leave their community were adultmen, 36 per cent were adult women, and the remaining 10 per cent were children. Experiencesof displacement due to banditry were reported at roughly similar levels across locations(Katsina (38 per cent), Zamfara (32 per cent) and Sokoto (30 per cent).
Banditry impacts the public’s ability to work and participate in income-generating activities,
including farming and herding. More than a quarter of respondents (27 per cent) stated that
their work had ‘sometimes’ or ‘most times’ been disrupted by banditry. Amongst those whoreported making money from farming (24 per cent of the sample), 51 per cent reported farming
disruptions 'most times' or 'sometimes' due to banditry. Similarly, for those who reported
making money from herding (25 per cent of the sample) from herding, 44 per cent reported
herding disruptions 'most times' or 'sometimes' due to banditry.152 When these153 respondents
150 Azeez Olaniyan and Aliyu Yahaya, ‘Cows, Bandits, and Violent Conflicts: Understanding Cattle Rustling inNorthern Nigeria’, Africa Spectrum, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2016).
151 Notably, a higher proportion of individuals report that their family members have been victims of banditry attacks
compared to those reporting their own victimization. This could be influenced by several factors. One, respondents
might be reluctant to share their personal experiences due to the emotional distress associated with recounting suchtraumatic events. Two, since bandits often resort to extreme physical violence and killings, only the surviving family
members of the victims can report these incidents. Regardless of the specific reason guiding this pattern, it
underscores the profound impact of banditry on community members across the three states of Katsina, Sokoto
and Zamfara. Additionally, how respondents answered this question varied statistically by gender, meaning that thelikelihood of reporting a family member being attacked by bandits varies by gender. This association, however, does
not translate to one gender reporting more than the other.
152 Question posed to those who Identified as farmers or herders; or mentioned making money from farming or
herding
153 This question is specifically posed to those who identify as either ’farmer’ or ‘farmer and herder.’ Additionally,
those who make money by farming are also posed this question.

29

were asked whether banditry caused disruptions in their farming activities in the past month,roughly one in two (51 per cent) confirmed that this was indeed the case. 45 per cent of theherders also confirmed disruptions to their herding activities in the past month. This isnoteworthy as, despite the common perception that bandits are mostly Fulani herders oraffiliated with them in some way (including amongst 66 per cent of all respondents), herders
themselves are heavily impacted by banditry.
Education in the North West is significantly disrupted due to banditry. Close to one in four
respondents noted that in the past month, schools were 'sometimes’ or ‘most times’ closed due
to banditry. Schools in Zamfara state were notably the most impacted, followed by Katsina andthen Sokoto. 36 per cent of respondents from Zamfara stated that schools were ’sometimes’
or ’most times’ closed due to banditry in the past month. MEAC’s data corroborates otherreports about how the banditry-related abductions have affected the educational sector. Past
cases of mass abductions of students154 and attacks on schools have instilled a common fear
amongst communities that schools are no longer a safe place for their children. Many schools
have closed at least temporarily, or parents avoid sending their children to class. Net
attendance rates have traditionally already been low in the North West, however, banditry has
significantly exacerbated the problem.155

Community Perceptions About Bandit Groups
To better understand the workings of bandit groups, MEAC’s survey sought to glean insightsfrom local communities on how these groups operate, how they are organized, which common
features identify them, and which type of individuals are associated with them. Provided thescarcity of information and analysis on the current banditry crisis, this data can prove usefulparticularly because many of the respondents have themselves been victimised by bandits.
Those interactions – including those who were abducted – allowed respondents in this sample
to gain an up-close perspective on how these groups operate and can provide invaluable
insights which can inform future programming.

I. How Are Bandits Organized?
Communities largely see bandits as several organized groups rather than a series of individual
criminals working separately, although there are notable differences across states. Over half of
respondents thought that bandits were organized groups while 20 per cent thought they wereindividuals who were not part of a group. Male respondents were more likely to report bandits

154 In the North West, mass abductions led to at least 1,446 kidnapped schoolchildren in the last ten years, with thethree surveyed states accounting for 831 kidnapped children alone. International Centre for Investigative Reporting,"TIMELINE: Over 1000 schoolchildren kidnapped since Chibok incident," 14 March 2024.
155 Joan Akpa-Achimugu and Chinyere Ibeh, "Implications of Armed Banditry for Education in Nigeria’s North West
Region," GCSP Alumni Note, (October 2023).

30

are organized in groups than female respondents (55 versus 45 per cent respectively).156
MEAC found a statistically significant relationship between those who reported having been
abducted themselves and those reporting that bandit groups were organized.157 The 119
abductees in the sample likely gained direct insights into some of the inner workings of banditgroups when they were held captive, which makes this noteworthy. Additionally, a significant
statistical association between the state in which the respondents resided and their perception
regarding how bandits are organized was observed.158 54 per cent of respondents from
Katsina, 47 per cent from Sokoto and 50 per cent from Zamfara report perceiving bandits asorganized groups. This could point to differences in the makeup and level of organization
amongst the bandits operating in each state(s), and the extent of visibility that respondents
have to these dynamics.
For respondents who reported that banditry attacks were driven by organized groups, they
were asked a follow-up question of whether they think their community is attacked by the same
bandit group or different ones. Broadly, most of these respondents159 (57 per cent) said thatdifferent groups attacked their communities, while 24 per cent said that the raids and attacks
were repeatedly conducted by the same bandit group.160 The remaining 19 per cent said they
did not know.
When it comes to the number of distinct groups targeting communities in the North West, there
is only slight variation across states. Respondents in Sokoto reported an average of 5.5 distinct
bandit groups targeting their communities, while those from Zamfara reported an average of
5.3 different groups, and the number slightly fell to 4.8 in Katsina.161

156 Women and girls were also more likely to answer “I don’t know” when asked how bandits were organized (37versus 23 per cent for men and boys).
157 This was observed in a logistic regression where the dependent variable was whether bandit groups wereorganized or individuals and the independent variables included whether or not someone had been abducted
themselves, gender, state, tribe, and displacement status. The coefficient for being abducted was -0.68438, with astandard error of 0.22738. This means that being abducted decreases the log odds of reporting that bandits are
singular actors (and thereby increasing the odds of qualifying them as organized groups) by 0.68438 units. The pvalue (0.00261) indicates that this effect is statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. Put differently, thismeans that being abducted decreases the odds of reporting that bandits are singular actors (and thereby increases
the odds of qualifying them as organized groups) to approximately 0.5048 times what they were before theabduction.
158 Significant statistical association between state that the respondent resides in and their perception about how
bandits are organized is observed. The chi-square statistic is 26.15 and the p-value is < 0.00001.
159 Owing to skip logic loops within the survey design, not all respondents were posed the question. A total of 1,071
respondents were asked this question since they had answered ’Organized groups’ to the previous question ’Do you
think these attacks or raids are mostly conducted by somewhat organized groups of bandits, or are they conductedby individuals who are not part of a group?’
160 The patterns diverge slightly at the state level: 73 per cent of respondents from Katsina, 53 per cent from Zamfara,
and 42 per cent from Sokoto indicated the presence of different groups.
161 It is important to note, that only those who mentioned ’different groups’ to be attacking their communities, wherethen also asked to estimate the number of groups.

31II. How Are Bandits Identified?
In the existing literature, bandits are often described as mainly forest-based, criminal groups
who move around on motorbikes, raiding communities in quick strikes.162 MEAC’s survey
findings confirm but give further nuance to these previous conclusions. When respondents
were asked how they would identify individuals belonging to a bandit group, 51 per cent—unsurprisingly—cited the presence of weapons as an indicator and 35 per cent said motorbikes
were a sign. Remarkably, 40 per cent said that they would not be able to identify them as thebandits blend in well with other community members. In a follow-up open-ended question
asking how else respondents would know a certain person is a bandit, several answered thatbandits dress as women e.g. with hijabs or niqabs, to conceal themselves. Some respondents
mention that contrary to other community members, they appear at odd times of the day ornight. Some highlight that they hide their motorbikes nearby and attack on foot to catch
communities and security forces by surprise. The trappings that often characterize politicallymotivated armed groups—such as uniforms and flags—feature low on the list of bandit
signifiers (10 and 0.2 percent respectively), which may reinforce the claim that they are
predominantly motivated by money. Ultimately, their demonstrated ability to blend in likely
helps in evading law enforcement and has operational benefits for conducting attacks.
On the question of whether bandits who attacked communities lived within the community orcame from elsewhere, 85 per cent of the eligible respondents163 flagged that the bandits camefrom elsewhere. Ten per cent of the respondents did not know where they came from and only
0.7 per cent said that the bandits lived in their own community. In line with previous findings,164
MEAC’s research shows that many people in affected communities believe that bandit groups
typically live in forests or other natural spaces such as among rock formations which serve as
hideouts shielding them from law enforcement and the military.
While it is known that bandit groups typically use forests as hideouts, further information on
their base of operations is often lacking. When respondents were asked an open-ended
question about where they thought bandits were generally based, 'forest' [and ‘the bush’]indeed emerged as the top response. As the word cloud below demonstrates, other prominent
responses included ‘Behind Bakalori Dam’, ‘Nearby villages’, ‘Batsari and Zamfara forest’,‘Bush’ etc. Indeed, Batsari, for instance, is known to have suffered a particularly high numberof attacks.165 It is notable, however, that respondents also name specific towns and villages as

162 International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem", Africa Report, No. 288(Brussels, 18 May 2020); Promise Frank Ejiofor, "The Mobility of Terror: Motorcycle Bandits, Violence and Anarchyin Nigeria," The RUSI Journal, Vol. 166, No. 6-7 (2022).
163 2117 out of the 2947 respondents were asked this question owing to the skip logic design within the survey.
164Promise Frank Ejiofor, "The Mobility of Terror: Motorcycle Bandits, Violence and Anarchy in Nigeria," The RUSI
Journal, Vol. 166, No. 6-7 (2022); International Crisis Group, "Violence in Nigeria’s North West: Rolling Back theMayhem", Africa Report, No. 288 (Brussels, 18 May 2020).
165Ibid.

32

bandit bases. These responses highlight the potential that there is an over-emphasis on
bandits existing in ungoverned bush areas to the detriment of recognizing other areas ofoperation that are more accessible and susceptible to leverage.

FIGURE 5 – DO YOU KNOW WHERE THE BANDITS CAME FROM , OR WHERE THEYARE BASED?

III. Perceptions around ‘Who’ Is a Bandit and ‘What’ They WantCommunity perceptions regarding ‘who’ is a bandit vary based on demographic markers.
Specifically, 66 per cent of all eligible respondents agreed that bandits are Fulani herders oraffiliated with them.166 When these respondents are disaggregated by tribe, 87 per cent of those
who self-identified as Hausa agreed to this statement, while only 12 per cent of the selfidentified Fulanis agreed167.
How community members perceive the motivations of bandits also offers interesting insights.
An overwhelming number of respondents (83 per cent)168 stated that bandits primarily wanted
money.169 The economic motivation of bandits also aligns with the modalities of attacks asreported by respondents, which mainly involve abductions and stealing. Interestingly,
166 It shall be noted that this question asks

“Fulani herders” and as such, some respondents might focus in theiranswer predominantly on the question of tribe (Fulani) or professional association (herder). Others mightunderstand ”Fulani herders” as a compound, responding to both dimensions equally.
167 A logistic regression was run to test whether tribe or other demographic factors including age, gender,
displacement status, or location drive the perception that bandits are Fulani. The results show that gender anddisplacement status are statistically significant in influencing whether respondents perceive bandits as being Fulani
herders, but not tribe. This does not mean that tribe is not contextually relevant but could simply be a statisticalconsequence of how the sample is split across the different tribe categories.
168 2932 respondents out of the total sample of 2947 respondents answered this select-multiple question. Since
respondents could select more than one option, the total percentages exceed 100.
169 A negligible number mentioned other factors like power (5 per cent), revenge for past injustices (5 per cent) andprotesting the government (4 per cent).

33

motivations that could be associated with the farmer/herder dimension such as ‘better
pastures’ and ‘better routes or water for cattle’ were mentioned rarely (by 2 and 0.6 per cent ofrespondents respectively). The fact that financial motivations are predominantly noticed bycommunity members reinforces earlier research170 that has argued that bandits seem toprimarily be driven by monetary gains. In the past, bandit group leaders claimed in rareinterviews171 that their motivations are linked to either ethical grievances or protesting agovernment that has, in their view, consistently neglected them. Regardless of whether theseaccounts reflect the groups’ genuine motivations or in fact an image they would like to convey
to the public, it is apparent from the survey at hand, that this image is not shared bycommunities who have borne the brunt of banditry violence.

FIGURE 6 – WHAT DO YOU THINK BANDITS WANT ?
Money

83%

Don't know

13%

Revenge for past injustice

5%

Power

5%

Other

4%

Protest the government

4%

Better pastures2%

Better routes or water for cattle

1%
0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

Unlike other armed groups that control or exert influence over territory, bandits do not appear
to be engaged in governance functions. Almost all respondents (99 per cent) flagged thatbandits do not do anything good to help their communities. The few respondents (0.6 per cent)who stated otherwise did so because of reports they had heard of bandits distributing food andcash in the community during times of need, although many flags that these are mostly hearsay
in the open-ended responses.

170Kelechukwu Charles Obi and Victor Chidubem Iwuoha, ”Untold story of the expanding armed banditry in Nigeria’s

Northwest: linking the communal-level collaborators,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 44, No.7 (2023); Folahanmi
Ainaa, John Sunday Ojob, and Samuel Oyewolec, “Shock and awe: Military response to armed banditry and theprospects of internal security operations in Northwest Nigeria,” African Security Review, Vol. No.32, (2023).
171 BBC, ”The Bandit Warlords of Zamfara,” 25 July 2022; Africa Center for Strategic Studies, "Criminal Gangs
Destabilizing Nigeria’s North West," 14 December 2021.

34

Contextualizing Banditry within the Broader
Conflict Dynamics
In the North East, despite the longstanding Boko Haram insurgency, previous MEAC research
has repeatedly found that poverty, food insecurity and lack of water to be the most prominentconcerns in communities and that Boko Haram ranks lower on their list of concerns.
Contrastingly, in the North West, banditry features second among the biggest perceived
problems in communities (notably behind food insecurity).172 In terms of safety threats morenarrowly,communities

by

far

viewedbanditry

as

their

biggestthreat.173

This

contextualization—and comparison—of banditry vis-a-vis other humanitarian and security
concerns in the region is crucial to better understanding the ground realities.

I. Perceptions about Banditry Vis-a-Vis Other Humanitarian and Security
Concerns
Banditry surpasses all other problems in the North West, barring food insecurity. When
respondents were asked to identify the top three problems in their community, a striking 82 percent cited 'lack of sufficient food' as the primary issue. 'Banditry' was a close second andmentioned by 70 percent of the respondents, followed by 'unemployment', 'lack of sufficientwater', 'bad infrastructure' and 'limited presence of security actors'. Thus, the most pressing
issues at the community level in the North West of Nigeria revolve around food security,
banditry violence, and to a lesser degree factors of economic hardship and development.
Notably in Katsina, banditry was mentioned the most frequently as a top problem in thecommunity by nearly 90 per cent of respondents.
Banditry was the most frequently cited security threat across the surveyed communities in the
North West. When asked 'Who presents the biggest threat to the safety of your community?'174
nearly 80 per cent of the respondents, bandits emerged as the top security challenge, althoughwith slight differences across states.175 In Zamfara, bandits were reported as the biggest threatby 65 per cent of respondents.176 Shares answering 'banditry' went up to 83 per cent in Sokoto
and a striking 93 per cent in Katsina. Expectedly, more men (85 per cent) across all states
identified banditry more often as a safety threat when compared to women (77 per cent), which

172 Respondents were asked: “What are the three biggest problems in your community?”
173 Respondents were asked: “Who presents the biggest threat to the safety of your community?”
174 The question allowed for multiple answer options to be selected and included actors ranging from 'youths in thecommunity' and people from within and outside of the community, to family, community security actors, security
forces, and international actors.
175 The answers 'none' (15 per cent) and 'youths in the community' (3 per cent) ranked second.
176 Note, that in communities where bandits blend in well, as described earlier, some respondents might also be
unable to identify them as bandit groups, then opting for more obvious traits such as their age (“youths in theircommunity.”)35

is likely due to their greater exposure to and victimization at the hands of bandits analyzed
earlier.
These findings are interesting when compared to MEAC findings from the North East of Nigeria,
where despite the international focus on the insurgency, humanitarian and developmental
concerns such as the lack of food and water, and poverty trump Boko Haram-related violenceas the biggest problems facing communities.177 The fact that in the North West survey, banditryranked second behind food insecurity, underscores the pervasive and significant impact thatbanditry appears to have on communities in the region.
While the international community has focussed predominantly on the longstanding BokoHaram insurgency, a more violent security crisis has been brewing next door. As the emerging
findings underline, this crisis has already engendered profound and potentially long-term
developmental setbacks: banditry has severely limited children's access to education
potentially jeopardizing a generation’s future, as well as impaired access to income-generating
activities, health and mobility. Dealing with bandit groups—a hard-to-grasp actor, with neither
discernible or volatile leadership and incentive structures nor clear kingpins to point at—isadmittedly difficult. In consequence, communicating to decision-makers the need or feasibilityof addressing the banditry crisis is equally hard, but in light of the pervasive impact it is havingon communities searching for more effective responses seems imperative. Growing suspicion
over potential links between insurgent groups and bandits in the North West has been anotherissue, which shall be examined in the following section.

II. Possible Connections with the Boko Haram Insurgency
MEAC’s findings also suggest banditry is perceived as unconnected to the Boko Haraminsurgency. The communities surveyed do not report a crime-terror nexus178—or, at least, it is
not apparent to them. When asked whether local bandits may have any connections to BokoHaram in the North East, only 5 per cent of eligible179 answered affirmatively, 67 per cent said
no and 28 per cent said that they ‘did not know’. Thus, respondents in the North West view

177 Sophie Huvé, Dr Siobhan O'Neil, Dr Remadji Hoinathy, Kato Van Broeckhoven with Mohammed Bukar, Fatima

Yetcha Ajimi Badu, Teniola Tayo, Jessica Caus, and Adja Faye, "Preventing Recruitment and Ensuring Effective
Reintegration Efforts: Evidence from Across the Lake Chad Basin to Inform Policy and Practice," MEAC Lake ChadBasin Case Study Report (New York: United Nations University, 2022).
It must be noted that the 2022 survey was administered in communities which were not actively under assault or
under the rule of an armed group. Hence, sources of insecurity might have been ranked differently in such
communities.
178James Barnett, Murtala Ahmed Rufa’i, and Abdulaziz Abdulaziz. "Northwestern Nigeria: A Jihadization ofBanditry or a “Banditization” of Jihad?." CTC Sentinel, Vol.15, No. 1 (2022); John Sunday Ojo, Samuel Oyewole,and Folahanmi Aina. "Forces of Terror: Armed Banditry and Insecurity in North-west Nigeria." Democracy andSecurity (2023); Sahara Reporters, “Boko Haram Fighters Training Bandits In Northern Nigeria To Use Anti-aircraftGuns, Explosives—Report,” 26 September 2021.
179 2287 respondents out of 2997 were posed this question owing to the survey’s skip logic design, with only those
respondents who answered “yes” to “Do you know about the Boko Haram conflict in the North East?” receiving thefollow up question.

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banditry and the Boko Haram insurgency as largely independent security issues.180 Out of theminority of respondents who said that there was a link, many referred when answering a followup, open-ended question to parallels in ”hit-and-run attacks,” sophisticated weaponry used byboth, and the simple fact that both insurgents and bandits kill innocent civilians. The latter
responses appear to suggest a similarity of modus operandi rather than visibility on actual
coordination between Boko Haram and bandits in the North West. While it is quite possible thata transactional relationship between insurgents and bandits could be mutually beneficial, thedifferences in motives—seen in the earlier finding that overwhelmingly bandits are believed tobe motivated by money—somewhat dampens concerns about a strategic merger of these
violent groups. Apart from the insurgency in the North East, the farmer/herder conflict has
traditionally been seen as intertwined with banditry and will be examined in the next section.

III. The Role of Farmer/Herder and Hausa/Fulani Fault Lines
Amongst local communities, banditry may not align as neatly with farmer/herder or
Hausa/Fulani fault lines, a perspective that sits in contrast to the conventional thinking andliterature on banditry. 181 To dissect this issue and see which fault lines are most present
amongst community respondents, MEAC posed the question: 'Today, what is the main causeof conflict in your community?' Respondents could select all answers that apply. What isnotable is that a minority chose ‘Banditry’ and one or two of the cleavages are usually used to
explain it. Respondents overwhelmingly cited banditry as the main cause of conflict (67 percent), but interestingly, the conflict between Hausa and Fulani was only cited by 15 per cent of
the sample and farmer/herder conflict was only named by 14 per cent of the sample.182

180 Insight based on logistic regression implemented by testing the ’banditry connection’ as the dependent variableand gender, state, age, tribe and displacement status as independent variables. No statistical significance isobserved.
181 Center for Democracy and Development, “Multiple Nodes, Common Causes: National Stock take ofContemporary Insecurity and State Responses in Nigeria,” (Abuja: 2022); Kelechukwu Charles Obi and Victor
Chidubem Iwuoha, "Untold story of the expanding armed banditry in Nigeria’s Northwest: linking the communallevel collaborators,” Third World Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 7 (2023).
182 22 per cent saw no noteworthy conflict in their communities. However, this lack of reported conflict incommunities could simply be driven by the respondents in urban areas/larger towns who may not be impacted tothe same extent as other respondents, especially if they do not need to travel outside those centers on the roads
often targeted by bandits.

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FIGURE 7 – TODAY, WHAT IS THE MAIN CAUSE OF CONFLICT IN YOUR
COMMUNITY ?

The Venn diagram in Figure 7 captures how community respondents view and frame the fault
lines driving the conflict in the North West. It is notable that only a relatively small subset (17 percent) answered both banditry and one of the other two cleavages. Eleven per cent (or 241
respondents) frame the main causes along the lines of banditry and Hausa/Fulani cleavages,
while 7 per cent (125 respondents) frame the causes of conflict along banditry andfarmer/herder cleavages. Only a small subset of respondents (81 or 4 per cent of the total
sample) identifies all three - farmers/herder conflict, Hausa/Fulani conflict, and banditry - as
the main sources of conflict in their community. It is possible that respondents have focused on
the manifestation of the conflict (i.e., banditry) in their answers, and not mentioned what they
see as causes, but the drastic falloff of response rates raises questions about whether a binary
conceptualization of conflict (e.g., as a manifestation of farmer/herder or Hausa/Fulani
tensions) does not afford banditry the nuanced introspection it deserves, and how it mightexacerbate existing conflict dynamics. In light of this finding, and the others detailed in thereport, the following section addresses how the overall presented findings should translate to
the policy and practical levels.

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Policy and Practical
Implications
While as a phenomenon, banditry is not new, its current manifestations constitute a full-blown
security crisis of national and regional concern. Original MEAC survey data presented in thisreport underscore the pervasiveness of banditry violence and how it has drastically impacted
the safety, health, livelihoods, food security, and mobility of the populations in the North Westof Nigeria. Through the lens of affected communities, this report examines how bandit groups
operate and how their activities affect local communities, perceptions of how they areorganized, and where the issue sits in the wider context of conflict and violence in Nigeria.

How We Typecast Violent Groups Shapes
Response Strategies
As laid out in the report, banditry violence has been more pervasive, lethal, and impactful in the
North West in recent years than insurgent violence has been in Nigeria’s North East. Despite
the pervasive and profound impact of banditry, the international focus in Nigeria has so far
focused predominantly on the longstanding Boko Haram insurgency. The locus of international
attention is likely driven not just by concerns about the reach of Boko Haram and its
connections to other armed groups, but also by the politics of labelling.
Labelling and the imposition of a certain lens to understand banditry have also impacted the
response to the issue. The predominant public framings of bandit groups have typicallyresorted to catch-all frames such as “bandits,” “criminals,” and sometimes “terrorists.” While
this search for a clear category is understandable, it also appears premature in light of thecontinued dearth of information, the geographical variation of banditry, and its evolution overtime. Ostensibly applying clear labels to a messy phenomenon can contribute to the risk ofprescribing ill-fitting policy and practical measures to address it. MEAC findings highlight how
much herder-farmer violence and the Hausa/Fulani dimension align with response patterns
around banditry, or are in fact directly associated with respondents, depending considerably on
how MEAC asked those questions. Despite the common perception that bandits are mostly
Fulani herders, MEAC findings highlight that herders themselves are in fact impacted
significantly by banditry violence too. Here, targeted communication campaigns incommunities could help break up existing stigma and unite communities against banditry
which appears to affect people across tribal divides.

39Additionally, communities largely perceive the insurgency in the North East and banditry
violence to be distinct phenomena with no significant linkages. Simply conflating thephenomena or responding to the “terrorist” label would be short-sighted. To effectively address
banditry violence, it is necessary to acknowledge it as a security crisis in its own right requiring
specific policy and programmatic responses. Widening the lens requires taking a step back andlooking at the humanitarian impact on communities, how they are victimized, and how bandits
operate and are perceived in the eyes of affected communities—hopefully opening up the viewfor a broader and more nuanced set of policy and programmatic options to respond to banditry.

Differentiated Victimization Requires Tailored
Programming
Banditry violence affects women, men, boys, and girls differently, which indicates the need tocarefully tailor the programmatic responses to it. Men suffer most from abduction and physicalviolence and many appear to have moved out of the area for security reasons (and to find jobs
elsewhere). Better understanding the interplay of the lack of economic opportunities andinsecurity is crucial when trying to tailor support to victimized communities.
Sexual violence, likely grossly underreported, needs to be addressed with sufficient resources,
including a denser offer of referral pathways (including SARCs), to adequately assist survivors
and to get a more complete picture of the situation. Men who seem to be more exposed toreports of sexual violence, could, if informed e.g., by targeted public campaigns, play a more
pivotal role in assisting victims to be directed to the support they need.
Banditry violence has also drastically curbed people’s mobility, access to education and ability
to make a living. Further protection measures for schools and communities, particularly alongfrequented roads and on markets, coordinated between federal and state security forces toavoid blind spots, could help mitigate these effects. Where protection measures do not sufficeor are absent, and peoples' ability to cover the most basic needs and access to education or
health have been entirely curtailed due to insecurity, temporary support through humanitarianassistance is necessary—also to avoid long-term ripple effects.
Victimization also varies considerably across states and locations. For instance, the education
sector has particularly suffered in Zamfara, while people in Sokoto seem to by far experiencethe most frequent attacks. This highlights the importance of locally adapted responses rather
than a one-size-fits-all approach.
This overall pervasive but at the same time differentiated impact of banditry on northwesterncommunities calls for policy responses and programming that is more carefully tailored. The

40

gender, age and location of beneficiaries and the local manifestations and experiences withbanditry must play a role in crafting these responses.

Importance of a Coordinated and Integrated
Response
While tailored approaches are important, previous research has also outlined how coordinatedapproaches across states are necessary to avoid creating loopholes and inconsistencies thatcan be exploited by bandits. MEAC’s evidence together with other data sets, suggests highvolatility in bandit attacks across the three surveyed locations and over time. This may reflect—
as others have argued—how periodic military campaigns in one state may temporarily dislodge
bandits from the targeted locations, leading to more activity in other areas. Such an approachhas not been successful in reducing banditry over the long term. A more sustained military
campaign and enduring presence across the impacted states, coordinated with state- andcommunity-level security actors, could be more effective. The latter have visibility on the local
intricacies of specific bandit groups and better understand locally significant conflict dynamics.
Importantly, such operations need to be integrated with stabilization efforts going beyond
military and law enforcement measures.
Striking a balance between such localized, tailored programming on the one hand, which isembedded in an overall strategic response that is consistent across affected states on the other
hand, is thus one of the larger challenges lying ahead if banditry is supposed to be tackled
effectively.

Role of WeaponsBandit access to weapons bears critical consequences for communities’ perceived and actual
security and the potential for escalation of violence. Given the pervasive presence andproliferation of illicit arms and ammunition in the North West—a region known for sparse state
governance—and given also bandit groups’ high mobility, there is an increased risk ofintensified illicit arms trafficking including across Nigeria’s borders. In light of both frequent andincreasingly violent attacks, with weapons being the most recognizable feature of banditgroups, concerted measures on the national, state, and local levels surrounding weapons andammunition management (WAM) are essential. A UNIDIR-supported weapons andammunition baseline assessment in 2016183 suggested a total number of 55 measures to betaken to stem the flow of weapons in the region. To date, 38 per cent of those measures havebeen implemented. Remaining measures that have been highlighted and could help curtail

183 UNIDIR, Towards a National Framework on Weapons and Ammunition Management in the Federal Republic of

Nigeria,(Geneva, 2016). Implemented in cooperation with the Nigerian government, ECOWAS, BICC and CAR.

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bandits' illicit access to weapons and ammunition include: under the guidance of the National
Centre for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (NCCSALW) increasingly involve thestate and local level in WAM-related processes and a further strengthening of common
practices and coordination between different entities such as the Nigerian Armed Forces andthe Nigerian Police Force on processing illicit arms and the treatment of ammunition recoveredfrom the illicit sphere.184 Strengthened coordination among arms control institutions such as
the NCCSALW, border security and law enforcement in both Nigeria and neighbouring
countries in the Lake Chad Basin would help address the illicit cross-border flow of weapons
into, and out of the country.
This deep dive into banditry in the North West of Nigeria, as seen through the lens of affected
communities, highlights the pervasive nature and profound, in part long-term impacts thatbanditry has had on Nigeria’s northwestern population and their everyday lives. The emerging
evidence calls for more international attention to this still-overlooked crisis. And it underscores
the need for more integrated, tailored responses based on evidence of community impacts
rather than the predominant public and political framings which often so insufficiently capture
the messy and complex realities on the ground.

184 Theò Bajon, “Weapons and Ammunition Management in Africa Insight: 2024 Update”, UNIDIR, Geneva, 2024.

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