No. 20-1599

IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States_____________
JOHN DOE 7, JANE DOE 7, JUANA DOE 11, MINOR DOE 11A, SEVEN SURVIVINGCHILDREN OF JOSE LOPEZ 339, and JUANA PEREZ 43A,
Petitioners,v.
CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Respondent.
_____________ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT_____________
BRIEF FOR AMICI CURIAE HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORTOF PETITIONERS’ PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI_____________CHARITY RYERSON
Counsel of Record
AVERY KELLYTATIANA DEVIACORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY LAB(773) 346-5545
charity@corpaccountabilitylab.org
6214 N. GLENWOOD AVENUE
CHICAGO, IL 60660

TABLE OF CONTENTSTABLE OF AUTHORITIES……………………...…iii
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE ….….………….....1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT …………...…………..1
ARGUMENT………………………………………..…...2I.

AS HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS,PETITIONERS ARE AT RISK OFTARGETING BY STATE AND NON-STATEACTORSIN
COLOMBIA,ANDRESPONDENT’S REVELATION OF THEIRIDENTIFYINGINFORMATION
PUTS
THEM AT RISK OF PHYSICAL HARM……2
A.

Petitioners are at Risk of PhysicalHarm because they are Human
Rights Defenders in
Colombia………………………..…..…3

B.

Petitioners are at Risk of PhysicalHarm by Paramilitaries inColombia….....……………...……….10

C.

Petitioners are at Risk of PhysicalHarm by State Actors in
Colombia……………………….…….18

ii
II.

COLOMBIAN
GOVERNMENTINSTITUTIONSTASKED
WITH
PROTECTINGHUMAN
RIGHTSDEFENDERS
ARE
UNABLEOR
UNWILLING TO PROTECT THEM,
ELEVATING PETITIONERS’ RISK OF
PHYSICAL HARM IF RESPONDENT IS
ALLOWED TO PUBLICLY REVEAL THEIRIDENTIFYING INFORMATION………….20
A.

The National Protection Unit is
Failing to Protect Human Rights
Defenders from Physical Harm…..21

B.

The Attorney General’s Office is
Failing to Investigate or Prosecute
Killings of Human Rights
Defenders…………………………….24

C.

The Ombudsman’s Office is Failingto Comply with its Mandate toProtect, Defend, and Promote
Human Rights.................................26

III.

CONCLUSION………………………………29

IV.

APPENDIX……...…………..……………….30

iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIESCASES
Civil Court of Bogotá, Óscar Gerardo Salazar andothers, Case No. 110013103045202000025-00,
ruling of March 25, 2020……………………………15
United States v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, 1:07–cr–
00055 (D.D.C.)………………………………………..18
COURT DOCUMENTS
Order Den. Defs.’ Joint Mot. to Dismiss Basedon Forum Non Conveniens, In re: Chiquita Brands
Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder
Derivative Litig., No. 08-01916-MD-MARRA (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 29, 2016) ………………………………………8
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opp. to Def.
Chiquita’s Mot. to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(B)(6) and for Forum Non Conveniens, In re:
Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute andShareholder Derivative Litig., No. 08-01916-MDMARRA (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2015) ……………………8
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Expedited Pls.’
Opp. to Defs.’ “Expedited” Mot. to Preclude
Continued Use of Pseudonym, In re: Chiquita
Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder
Derivative Litig., No. 08-01916-MD-MARRA (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 13, 2019) ………………………………………8

iv
FOREIGN LAW
Alerta Temprana No. 018-2020, De Inminencia,
Defensoría del Pueblo 1 (Apr. 30, 2020), available
athttps://colombiapeace.org/files/200430_def.pdf.....17
Decree 4065 of 2011 (Colombia)……………………... 21
Defensoría del Pueblo Resolución Defensorial No.
074-2020 [Ombudsman’s Office Resolution No.
074-2020] (Aug. 14, 2020)…………………………….3
Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict andBuild a Stable and Lasting Peace, Special
Jurisdiction for Peace (English translation) (Nov.
24, 2016), available athttps://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocu
ment/1845...................................................11, 26, 27
OTHER AUTHORITIES2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices:
Colombia, U.S. Dep’t of State (Mar. 30, 2020),
available at https://www.state.gov/reports/2020country-reports-on-human-rightspractices/colombia/.......................................6, 11, 19
About Human Rights Defenders, OHCHR, available
athttps://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/srhrdefenders/pag
es/defender.aspx.......................................................5
Americas: State Protection Mechanisms For Human
Rights Defenders, Amnesty International (May2017), available athttps://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AM
R0162112017ENGLISH.pdf........................... passim
Amicus brief on killings of human rights defenders in
Colombia, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 2021),

v
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/amicus-briefkillings-human-rights-defenderscolombia..................................................6, 13, 14, 22
Business & human rights defenders in Colombia,
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre(Mar. 2020), available at https://media.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/files/Business__Human_Rights_Defenders_in_Colombia.pdf..........
.......................................................................5, 7, 8, 9
Camilo González Posso, Ley 975 de 2005: Ocho Años
Después, INDEPAZ (Feb. 2014), available at
http://www.INDEPAZ.org.co/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/LEY975veredicto.pdf................................................10, 11
Ch. IV: Colombia, Annual Report of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights (2011)..21
Colombia: Armed Groups’ Brutal COVID-19
measures, Human Rights Watch (Jul. 2020),
available athttps://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/15/colombiaarmed-groups-brutal-covid-19-measures..............17
Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations,
Congressional Research Service R43813 (Oct. 26,
2020), available athttps://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R438
13............................................................................. 11
Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses Against
Protesters, Human Rights Watch (Jun. 2021),
available athttps://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/09/colombiaegregious-police-abuses-against-protesters....21, 28
Colombia: Escalating human rights to deescalating
violence, International Commission of Jurists (Mayvi2021), available at https://www.icj.org/escalatinghuman-rights-to-deescalating-violence/................28
Colombia: Events of 2020, Human Rights Watch(2021), https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2021/country-chapters/colombia................. 16
Colombia: Veto Could Undermine Accountability.
Move Could Delay Badly Needed Progress, Human
Rights Watch (Mar. 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/12/colombiaveto-could-undermine-accountability#..................12
Con Líderes Hay Paz, Agresiones contra la paz en
Colombia Noviembre 2016 - Abril 19 de 2021,
INDEPAZ at 16 (2021)………………………………14
Danelly Estupiñán, Colombia’s social leaders are still
being killed during the quarantine, Amnesty
International (Jun. 2020), available athttps://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/li
deres-sociales-nos-siguen-matando-durantecuarentena/.......................................................17, 18
Declaration on the Right and Responsibility ofIndividuals, Groups and Organs of Society toPromote and Protect Universally Recognized
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Officeof the High Commissioner on Human Rights(OHCHR), General Assembly resolution 53/144(1998), available athttps://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pag
es/RightAndResponsibility.aspx................................3
Doe v. Chiquita Brands International, EarthRights
International, available athttps://earthrights.org/case/doe-v-chiquita-brandsinternational/#documentsff69-1a905f26-f4b6....... 14
Global Analysis 2020, Front Line Defenders (2020),
available at

vii
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/fil
es/fld_global_analysis_2020.pdf............................. 24
Historia, La Defensoría del Pueblo, available athttps://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/public/institucion
al/5848/Historia.htm.............................................. 26
Human rights defenders operating in conflict andpost-conflict situations: Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/43/51 (Mar. 20, 2020), available athttps://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/43/51........................18
Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right toDefend Human Rights, UN, United Nations Fact
Sheet No.29, available athttps://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/Fac
tSheet29en.pdf..........................................................5
IACHR Expresses Concern over Increase in Violencein Colombia in Territories Where Illegal Armed
Groups Are Operating, I Commission on Human
Rights (Oct. 13, 2020), available athttps://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleas
es/2020/251.asp....................................................... 17
IACHR Reiterates Its Concern, Organization ofAmerican States (Jan. 22, 2021), available athttps://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2021/013.asp.........7, 9, 21
In a Blow to Truth and Justice, Colombia’s President
Puts a Fragile Peace Deal on Life Support, WOLA
(Mar. 2019), available athttps://www.wola.org/2019/03/colombia-peace-dealduque-transitional-justice-system/........................ 13
Informe de Temblores ONG, INDEPAZ y Paiis a la
CIDH sobre la violación sistemática de laConvención Americana y los alcances

viii
jurisprudenciales de la Corte IDH con respecto al
uso de la fuerza pública contra la sociedad civil en
Colombia, en el marco de las protestas acontecidas
entre el 28 de abril y el 31 de mayo de 2021,
Temblores, INDEPAZ & Paiss (2021), available athttps://4ed5c6d6-a3c0-4a68-819192ab5d1ca365.filesusr.com/ugd/7bbd97_691330ba1
e714daea53990b35ab351df.pdf.............................. 19
Jerrod Demir, The rise of the AGC, Colombia’s
criminal powerhouse, Colombia Reports (Mar. 19,2018), available at https://colombiareports.com/therise-of-the-agc-colombias-criminal-powerhouse/...11
Julia Zulver & Megan Janetsky, “Colombia: How
armed gangs are using lockdown to target
activists,” BBC News (May 21, 2020), available athttps://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america52661457................................................................. 16
Left Undefended: Killings of Rights Defenders in
Colombia’s Remote Communities, Human Rights
Watch (Feb. 2021), available athttps://www.hrw.org/report/2021/02/10/leftundefended/killings-rights-defenders-colombiasremote-communities....................................... passim
Misión, Fiscalía General de la Nación, available athttps://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/laentidad/mision/....................................................... 24
Ni la pandemia mermó la violencia contra los líderes
sociales, Verdad Abierta (May 2021), available athttps://verdadabierta.com/ni-la-pandemia-mermola-violencia-contra-los-lideres-sociales/........... 16, 22
Paramilitaries’ Heirs: The New Face of Violence inColombia, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 2010),
available athttps://www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/03/paramilitar

ix
ies-heirs/new-face-violencecolombia#_ftnref386..........................................10, 11
Pese a amenazas contra la lideresa Jani Silva, UNP
retira una de sus medidas de protección,
Contagioradio (Dec. 2020), available athttps://www.contagioradio.com/pese-amenazascontra-jani-silva-unp-retira-proteccion/................ 23
Protect Colombia’s Peace, Latin American Working
Group (Jul. 2020), available athttps://www.lawg.org/wp-content/uploads/ProtectColombias-Peace-F.pdf........................................... 23
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
and Social Leaders in Colombia, Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.
Doc 262/19 (Dec. 6, 2019), available athttps://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Colombia
Defenders.pdf.................................................. passim
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
in the Americas, Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, Doc. 5 rev.1(Mar. 7, 2006), available at
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Defenders/defender
schap1-4.htm#Human.......................................... 4, 6
Rolling Back Social and Environmental Safeguards
in the time of COVID-19, Forest Peoples
Programme (Feb. 2021) available athttps://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/default/files/doc
uments/Rolling%20Back%20Social%20and%20Env
ironmental%20Safeguards%20%20Global%20Report%20ENGLISH%20FINAL.pd
f.......................................................................... 16, 25
Sistema de Alertas Tempranas - SAT, La Defensoríadel Pueblo, available athttps://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/public/atencionciu

xdadanoa/1469/Sistema-de-alertas-tempranas--%20SAT.htm........................................................... 27
Statement By Special Representative Of The
Secretary-General And Head Of The UN
Verification Mission In Colombia Mr. Carlos Ruiz
Massieu, UN Verification Mission in Colombia(Mar. 28, 2020), available athttps://colombia.unmissions.org/en/statementspecial-representative-secretary-general-and-headun-verification-mission-colombia-mr.....................15
Steve Hege, Colombia’s National Strike: Inequality
and Legitimacy Crises Drive Unrest, United States
Institute of Peace (May 27, 2021), available athttps://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/colombi
as-national-strike-inequality-and-legitimacycrises-drive-unrest.................................................. 18
Ted Piccone, Peace With Justice: The ColombianExperience With Transitional Justice, Foreign
Policy at Brookings (Jul. 2019), available athttps://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190708_colombia.p
df.............................................................................. 12
The Risk of Returning Home: Violence and Threatsagainst Displaced People Reclaiming Land in
Colombia, Human Rights Watch (Sept. 17, 2013),
available athttps://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/17/riskreturning-home/violence-and-threats-againstdisplaced-people-reclaiming-land.......................... 20
Thomas Harvey Power, Paramilitares y empresas
bananeras en el Urabá 2016–2020, Universidad
Nacional de Colom. (2020)…………………………..11
U.S. Support for Human Rights Defenders, U.S.
Dept. of State (Jan. 20, 2021), available atxi
https://www.state.gov/u-s-support-for-humanrights-defenders/.......................................................3
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia,
Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2021/603 (Jun. 25,2021), available athttps://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n2116026_en.pdf.........................................................7
Visit to Colombia: Report of the Special Rapporteuron the situation of human rights defenders, Human
Rights Council, U.N. Doc A/HRC/43/51/Add.1 13(Mar. 20, 2020)………………………………….passim
World Report 2021, Human Rights Watch (2021),
available athttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/
01/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf........................12, 13

1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are eleven non-profit, non-governmentalorganizations and one private law firm thatcollectively have decades of experience working on
business and human rights issues in conflict and postconflict settings, including in Colombia. Amici have asignificant interest in this case because their work is
directly tied to the promotion of human rights and theprotection of human rights defenders in Colombia, agroup that includes Petitioners. This brief contains
unique information regarding Petitioners’ status ashuman rights defenders and the risks of physicalharm they will face if Respondent reveals theiridentifying information. The brief shows that
Petitioners are at risk of targeting by state and nonstate actors, including paramilitary groups, and thatthe principal Colombian institutions charged withpromoting human rights and protecting human rights
defenders are unlikely to protect Petitioners fromphysical harm.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Human rights defenders in Colombia are targeted bystate and non-state actors for their promotion of
1 All counsel of record received timely notice of the intent to file
this amicus brief under Supreme Court Rule 37.2(a). This brief
is filed with the consent of all parties. Petitioners filed with the
Court letters providing blanket consent. Respondent provided
written consent. Amici and their counsel have authored theentirety of this brief. No counsel for any party authored this brief
in whole or in part, nor did any party or other person make amonetary contribution to the brief.

2human rights and their real or imputed politicalopinions. As litigants in human rights-related cases
against Chiquita Brands International, Inc.
(Chiquita), Petitioners are human rights defenders
and at risk of physical harm in Colombia. In the past,at-risk human rights defenders may have turned to
Colombian institutions like the National Protection
Unit, Ombudsman’s Office, and Attorney General’s
Office for protection. However, these institutions
currently lack the capacity and/or political will toadequately protect human rights defenders in
Colombia, leaving Petitioners with nowhere to turnshould they face threats of violence if their identities
are revealed to the public.
Respondent initially agreed to a protective order over
Petitioners’ identifying information. The order the
court granted is the only legal barrier preventing
Respondent from disclosing Petitioners’ names, phone
numbers, and employers to the public, which would
make Petitioners easily identifiable by actors who
may seek to target them. The public revelation of
Petitioners’ identifying information, including toillegal armed groups and state actors known to target
human rights defenders, exposes Petitioners togreater risk of physical harm. The Court should
therefore grant certiorari and reverse the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision.
ARGUMENTI.

AS HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS,PETITIONERS ARE AT RISK OFTARGETING BY STATE AND NON-STATE3
ACTORSIN
COLOMBIA,ANDRESPONDENT’S
REVELATIONOF
THEIR IDENTIFYING INFORMATION
PUTS THEM AT RISK OF PHYSICAL
HARM.
A. Petitioners are at Risk of PhysicalHarm because they are Human
Rights Defenders in Colombia.
Petitioners are human rights defenders under
the United Nations (“UN”) Declaration on the Right
and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organsof Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms(“Declarationon
Human
RightsDefenders”), which considers persons who act
individually or with others to peacefully promote orprotect human rights to be human rights defenders.
See Declaration on the Right and Responsibility ofIndividuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promoteand Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Office of the HighCommissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), General
Assembly resolution 53/144 (1998), available athttps://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/RightAndResponsibility.aspx. The U.S. State
Department and Colombian Ombudsman’s Officesubscribe to the UN definition. See U.S. Support for
Human Rights Defenders, U.S. Dept. of State (Jan. 20,2021), available at https://www.state.gov/u-s-supportfor-human-rights-defenders/; see also Defensoría delpueblo Resolución Defensorial No. 074-2020

4[Ombudsman’s Office Resolution No. 074-2020] (Aug.
14, 2020).
The key indicator for determining whether aperson is a human rights defender is one’s
engagement in an activity that promotes or protects
human rights. See Report on the Situation of Human
Rights Defenders in the Americas, Inter-American
Commissionon
Human
Rights(IACHR),OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, Doc. 5 rev.1 ¶¶ 19 (Mar. 7, 2006),
availableat
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Defenders/defenders
chap1-4.htm#Human [hereinafter Situation of
Human Rights Defenders (Mar. 7, 2006)]. See also
Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders
and Social Leaders in Colombia, IACHR,OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc 262/19 ¶ 25 (Dec. 6, 2019),
availableathttps://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/ColombiaD
efenders.pdf [hereinafter Situation of Human Rights
Defenders (Dec. 6, 2019)].
Litigants in human rights cases are humanrights defenders because seeking judicial remedy forhuman rights abuses promotes human rights byaddressing impunity and deterring future abuse.2 By
2 Actors involved in human rights-related litigation are often
considered human rights defenders. For example, in Colombia
lawyers who bring human rights-related cases are considered
human rights defenders and a subgroup of defenders at high riskof harm. Visit to Colombia: Report of the Special Rapporteur on
the situation of human rights defenders, Human Rights Council,
U.N. Doc A/HRC/43/51/Add.1 13 (Mar. 20, 2020) [hereinafter
Visit to Colombia (Mar. 20, 2020)]. The OHCHR recognizes that

5
seeking judicial remedy for human rights violations
that Chiquita allegedly financed, including tortureand murder, Petitioners are engaging in “action tosecure accountability and to end impunity” and aremaking a “special effort” to promote human rights,
recognized as principal activities of human rights
defenders. About Human Rights Defenders.
Petitioners are at risk of physical harm because
human rights defenders are targeted in Colombia.
Visit to Colombia (Mar. 20, 2020) ¶ 19–55. Morehuman rights defenders were killed in Colombia thananywhere else in Latin America between 2016 and2019. Id. at ¶ 20. Many human rights defenders face
threats, attacks, intimidation, and assassination as aresult of their actions to promote and protect humanrights. Business & human rights defenders in
Colombia, Business and Human Rights Resource
Centre (BHRRC) 2 (Mar. 2020), available athttps://media.businesshumanrights.org/media/documents/files/Business__“witnesses” and “those who contribute to assuring justice—judges, the police, lawyers and other key actors,” where they act
to ensure access to justice and guarantee victims’ human rights,“can be said to be acting as human rights defenders.” About
Human
RightsDefenders,
OHCHR,
availableathttps://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/srhrdefenders/pages/defender.aspx [hereinafter About Human Rights Defenders]. The OHCHR
also notes that defenders’ activities include “bear[ing] witness,either in a public forum (for example, a newspaper) or before acourt or tribunal, to human rights violations that have alreadyoccurred.” Human Rights Defenders: Protecting the Right toDefend Human Rights, United Nations Fact Sheet No.29, at 4,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet29en.
pdf.

6
Human_Rights_Defenders_in_Colombia.pdf[hereinafter BHRRC Colombia (Mar. 2020)]. The UN,
IACHR, the U.S. State Department, and the U.S.
Congressional Committee on Appropriations haveidentified heightened risks for human rights
defenders in Colombia. See, e.g., Visit to Colombia(Mar. 20, 2020) ¶ 20; Situation of Human Rights
Defenders (Dec. 6, 2019); 2020 Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices: Colombia, U.S. Dep’t of
State
(Mar.
30,
2020),
availableathttps://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reportson-human-rights-practices/colombia/[hereinafter
Colombia Country Report (Mar. 30, 2020)].
The IACHR has reported that attacks, threats,and harassment “hinder the work of human rights
defenders” in the Americas, noting that a Colombian
lawyer representing a Colombian petitioner was
assassinated, along with two of the petitioner’s
brothers, while preparing for a hearing before the
IACHR. Situation of Human Rights Defenders (Mar.
7, 2006) ¶ 151, 154.
Violence against human rights defenders in
Colombia has significantly increased since thegovernment signed the Peace Agreement with theFuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de ColombiaEjército del Pueblo (“FARC-EP”) in 2016. Situation of
Human Rights Defenders (Dec. 6, 2019) ¶ 41; Amicus
brief on killings of human rights defenders in
Colombia, Human Rights Watch (Apr. 2021),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/20/amicus-briefkillings-human-rights-defenders-colombia[hereinafter Amicus brief on killings of human rights

7
defenders (Apr. 2021)]. Amicus Business and Human
Rights Resource Centre (“BHRRC”) has tracked
attacks on human rights defenders who raise
concerns about business-related harms since 2015,
finding the largest number of incidents in 2017 and2018. BHRRC Colombia (Mar. 2020) (noting that“[t]his coincides with the general increase in attacks
against all HRDs – whether related to business or not– throughout the country, as reported by several
organisations. While there are numerous reasons for
this, it is noteworthy that there has been a significant
increase since the signing of the Peace Agreement inNovember 2016.”)
UN offices report more than 400 killings of humanrights defenders in Colombia between January 2016
and December 2020, approximately 120 killings in
2020, and at least 71 killings so far in 2021, including
49 between March 27 and June 25, 2021 alone.
IACHR Reiterates Its Concern, Organization ofAmerican States (Jan. 22, 2021), available athttps://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2021/013.asp [hereinafter
IACHR Reiterates Its Concern (Jan. 22, 2021)]; United
Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2021/603, ¶ 32 (Jun. 25, 2021),
availableathttps://colombia.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/n2
116026_en.pdf.
Petitioners’ risk of physical harm is elevatedbecause they raise concerns about business activities,
namely Chiquita’s alleged financing of paramilitaries
who killed their family members, and because they

8
reside in rural areas. See, e.g., BHRRC Colombia(Mar. 2020) 2 (noting that Colombia is the second
most dangerous country for human rights defenders
who raise concerns related to business conduct.);
Situation of Human Rights Defenders (Dec. 6, 2019) ¶3; Visit to Colombia (Mar. 20, 2020) ¶ 20; Left
Undefended: Killings of Rights Defenders in
Colombia’s Remote Communities, Human Rights
Watch
(Feb.
2021),
availableathttps://www.hrw.org/report/2021/02/10/leftundefended/killings-rights-defenders-colombiasremote-communities [hereinafter Human Rights
Watch (Feb. 2021)]. Petitioners are from Urabá, abanana growing region in the Antioquia department.
Other plaintiffs in the multidistrict litigation against
Chiquita are from Antioquia and Magdalena andeither still live in these departments, or have been
displaced to other parts of Colombia. See, e.g.,
Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Expedited Pls.’
Opp. to Defs.’ “Expedited” Mot. to Preclude Continued
Use of Pseudonym at 10–11, In re: Chiquita Brands
Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder
Derivative Litig., No. 08-01916-MD-MARRA (S.D.
Fla. Feb. 13, 2019) (explaining that many of thebellwether Plaintiffs live in Urabá and Magdalena,and displaced Plaintiffs live in Medellin); Order Den.
Defs.’ Joint Mot. to Dismiss Based on Forum Non
Conveniens at 6–7, In re: Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc.
Alien Tort Statute and Shareholder Derivative Litig.,
No. 08-01916-MD-MARRA (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2016)(stating that Plaintiffs still live in the banana growing
regions of Colombia, and most of the Plaintiffs residein Antioquia); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opp.
to Def. Chiquita’s Mot. to Dismiss Under Fed. R. Civ.

9
P. 12(B)(6) and for Forum Non Conveniens 6 at 18–19,
31, In re: Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc. Alien Tort
Statute and Shareholder Derivative Litig., No. 0801916-MD-MARRA (S.D. Fla. June 23, 2015) (notingthat many Plaintiffs reside in Antioquia and in thebanana growing regions, and some Plaintiffs have
moved to other regions). Both Antioquia andMagdalena are largely rural. From 2016–2020, 70% of
human rights defenders killed in Colombia resided inrural communities, the vast majority in areas
controlled by armed groups where the government’s
presence is weak. See ibid. In 2020, killings of humanrights defenders were concentrated in rural
departments including in Antioquia and Magdalena.
IACHR Reiterates Its Concern (Jan. 22, 2021).
Amicus BHRRC reported 181 attacks and 72
assassinations against Colombian human rights
defenders who raised concerns related to businessfrom 2015–2019. BHRRC Colombia (Mar. 2020) 2–3.
The majority were committed against defenders
promoting human rights in the agricultural or
extractive industries and nearly half of the defenders
had raised concerns about transnational companies’
activities. Id. at 2 (noting that “companies do not
operate in a vacuum. They are aware – or should beaware – that critics of their business or industry are
at risk and they should work to prevent and mitigate
these attacks.”).
By virtue of litigating human rights-related
harm, Petitioners are human rights defenders andare at risk of physical harm in Colombia. The risks
Petitioners face are exacerbated by their opposition to10business activity, namely Chiquita’s alleged financingof paramilitaries who killed their family members,
and their rural status. In this context, removing theprotective order that prohibits Chiquita fromrevealing Petitioners’ identifying information to the
public puts their lives in jeopardy.
B. Petitioners are at Risk of PhysicalHarm by Paramilitaries in Colombia.
The Colombian civil conflict, which began in
the 1960s and spanned more than five decades,
involved the Colombian government, left-wing
guerillas, and the far-right paramilitary group
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”).
In 2005, the Colombian government introduced
a framework to demobilize the AUC that was
ultimately ineffective. Camilo González Posso, Ley
975 de 2005: Ocho Años Después, INDEPAZ (Feb.
2014), available at http://www.INDEPAZ.org.co/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/LEY-975veredicto.pdf;
Paramilitaries’ Heirs: The New Face of Violence inColombia, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 2010),
availableathttps://www.hrw.org/report/2010/02/03/paramilitaries-heirs/new-face-violence-colombia#_ftnref386[hereinafter Paramilitaries’ Heirs (Feb. 2010).]
Thousands of AUC members did not demobilize but
instead splintered into “paramilitary heir” groups. Id.
These groups include the Autodefensas Unidas
Gaitanistas de Colombia (“AGC”), also known as“Clan del Golfo” or “Los Urabeños,” which maintains
a territorial stronghold in Urabá. See Thomas Harvey

11Power, Paramilitares y empresas bananeras en el
Urabá 2016–2020, Universidad Nacional de Colom.
(2020) at 24; see also Jerrod Demir, The rise of theAGC, Colombia’s criminal powerhouse, Colombia
Reports(Mar.
19,2018),
availableathttps://colombiareports.com/the-rise-of-the-agccolombias-criminal-powerhouse/. These and otherparamilitary successor groups now operate
independently with different strongholds andperpetuate cycles of violence, which include targeting
human rights defenders. See Colombia: Backgroundand U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service
R43813 at 4 (Oct. 26, 2020), available athttps://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R4381;
see also Colombia Country Report (Mar. 30, 2020);
Paramilitaries’ Heirs (Feb. 2010).
Eleven years after the failed AUC
demobilization efforts, the 2016 Peace Agreementthat the Juan Manuel Santos administration signedwith the FARC-EP provided for a ceasefire andestablished the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, theTruth Commission, and other transitional justiceinstitutions and processes. Final Agreement to End
the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting
Peace, Special Jurisdiction for Peace at 1, 8–10
(English translation) (Nov. 24, 2016), available athttps://www.peaceagreements.org/viewmasterdocum
ent/1845 [hereinafter Final Peace Agreement]. The
Peace Agreement also called for the establishment ofa plan to counter stigmatization of human rights
defenders, a comprehensive protection protocol for
defenders, and strengthening the Attorney General’s
power to monitor complaints and investigations

12
related to attacks against human rights defenders.
Americas: State Protection Mechanisms For Human
Rights Defenders, Amnesty International at 2 (May2017),
availableathttps://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR
0162112017ENGLISH.pdf [hereinafter Amnesty
International (May 2017)].
However, five years after the Peace Agreement
was signed, it is undeniable that the country’s civil
conflict did not end. Instead, “conflict-related violence
has since taken new forms, and serious abuses
continue.” World Report 2021, Human Rights Watchat175(2021),
availableathttps://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/0
1/2021_hrw_world_report.pdf [hereinafter World
Report 2021]. The Ivan Duque administration, elected
in 2018 on a platform opposing many of the Peace
Agreement’s reforms, has failed to actively implement
the Peace Agreement’s transitional justice processes,
its provisions to protect communities and humanrights defenders, or its measures to dismantle
paramilitary structures. The government’s reluctanceto adhere to the Peace Agreement has underminednational security and the rule of law and created agovernance vacuum. See, e.g., Ted Piccone, Peace With
Justice: The Colombian Experience With Transitional
Justice, Foreign Policy at Brookings (Jul. 2019),
availableathttps://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2019/06/FP_20190708_colombia.pdf;
Colombia: Veto Could Undermine Accountability.
Move Could Delay Badly Needed Progress, Human
RightsWatch(Mar.
2019),
availableathttps://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/12/colombia-veto-13
could-undermine-accountability#; In a Blow to Truth
and Justice, Colombia’s President Puts a Fragile
Peace Deal on Life Support, WOLA (Mar. 2019),
available at https://www.wola.org/2019/03/colombiapeace-deal-duque-transitional-justice-system/.
These conditions allowed illegal armed
groups, including paramilitaries, to regain control insome areas where they were present before thePeace Agreement and enter into new areas
previously controlled by other groups. See Visit to
Colombia (Mar. 20, 2020) ¶ 71. These conditions
have also contributed to paramilitaries targeting
human rights defenders. Id. at ¶ 72 (“The delays,
lack of political determination and failure to allocate
sufficient funds for the implementation of the Peace
Agreement . . . is undoubtedly one of the key
structural causes that keeps human rights defenders
at risk.”); Amicus brief on killings of human rights
defenders (Apr. 2021) (“Authorities’ failure to
exercise effective control over many areas previously
controlled by the [FARC-EP] has in large part
enabled the violence against human rights
defenders.”).
Paramilitary groups continue to target
perceived opponents, including human rights
defenders. World Report 2021. In 2020, there was a43%
increaseinmurders
committedbyparamilitaries. The majority occurred in Antioquia,
where AGC operates. Situation of Human Rights
Defenders (Dec. 6, 2019) ¶ 95. Amici Temblores and
INDEPAZ documented 91 massacres in Colombia in
2020, including 21 in Antioquia. They reported 43

14
massacres so far in 2021, including eight in
Antioquia. Con Líderes Hay Paz, Agresiones contra lapaz en Colombia Noviembre 2016 - Abril 19 de 2021,
INDEPAZ at 16 (2021). Since the 2016 Peace
Agreement, homicides against human rights
defenders have increased. Visit to Colombia (Mar. 20,
2020) ¶ 21. While most of those responsible for thesekillings have not been identified, the Attorney
General’s Office has linked many cases to illegal
armed groups. Amicus brief on killings of humanrights defenders (Apr. 2021).
Paramilitary groups often target human rights
defenders based on defenders’ real or imputed
political opinions. The former UN Special Rapporteuron the situation of human rights defenders notes thathuman rights defenders’ activities may “trigger the
imputation of opinions, allegiances or intentions andeasily place defenders at risk,” especially in places
like rural Colombia, where illegal armed groups arereasserting power and where peace processes havebroken down. Visit to Colombia (Mar. 20, 2020) ¶ 27.
Furthermore, paramilitary groups often stigmatize
human rights defenders as “guerrilleros,” “terrorists,”“anti-development,” and/or “informants,” and imputeopposition to paramilitary control to human rights
defenders. Id. at ¶¶ 27, 69; Amnesty International(May 2017) 1–2. Historically, the far-right AUC
targeted individuals and communities they identified
as ideological opponents, including social leaders andtrade unionists like John Doe 9. See Doe v. Chiquita
Brands International, EarthRights International,
availableathttps://earthrights.org/case/doe-v-

15chiquita-brands-international/#documentsff691a905f26-f4b6.
Human rights defenders’ risk of physical harmat the hands of paramilitaries has increased during
COVID-19. In March 2020, the UN Verification
Mission in Colombia noted that in the context ofpandemic-related social isolation in Colombia, “social
leaders continue suffering from threats, harassment,
and armed actions.” Statement By Special
Representative Of The Secretary-General And Head Of
The UN Verification Mission In Colombia Mr. Carlos
Ruiz Massieu, UN Verification Mission in Colombia
(Mar.
28,
2020),
availableathttps://colombia.unmissions.org/en/statementspecial-representative-secretary-general-and-headun-verification-mission-colombia-mr. In a judgment
ordering the Colombian government to guarantee theright to defend human rights and protect humanrights defenders, a Colombian court emphasized thatthe state’s obligations continue during emergencies
like the pandemic. The judge noted that while
COVID-19 lockdown requirements were in effect,
attacks and killings of human rights defenders havecontinued due to the government’s failure to identify
risks, implement protection measures, and provide
access to justice. Civil Court of Bogotá, Óscar Gerardo
Salazarandothers,Case
No.
110013103045202000025-00 at 45, ruling of March
25, 2020.
Factors related to the COVID-19 pandemic,
including restrictions on movement and increased
surveillance, have also exposed human rights

16
defenders to elevated risk of paramilitary violence.
See, e.g., Colombia: Events of 2020, Human Rights
Watch, available at https://www.hrw.org/worldreport/2021/country-chapters/colombia. Journalists
have documented that globally, pandemic-related
government restrictions have made human rights
defenders even more vulnerable, as lockdowns
restrict their movements and make them easiertargets. See, e.g., Julia Zulver & Megan Janetsky,“Colombia: How armed gangs are using lockdown totarget activists,” BBC News (May 21, 2020), available
athttps://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america52661457. In Colombia, assassinations of humanrights defenders increased more than 60% in 2020,
during which COVID-19 restrictions were imposed forten months of the year. Ni la pandemia mermó laviolencia contra los líderes sociales, Verdad Abierta(May2021),
availableathttps://verdadabierta.com/ni-la-pandemia-mermo-laviolencia-contra-los-lideres-sociales/ [hereinafter Ni
la pandemia mermó la violencia (May 2021)].
Illegal armed groups have used the pandemic
as a means to tighten control over communities where
they operate in Colombia. See Rolling Back Socialand Environmental Safeguards in the time of COVID19, Forest Peoples Programme 47 (Feb. 2021)
availableathttps://www.forestpeoples.org/sites/default/files/docu
ments/Rolling%20Back%20Social%20and%20Enviro
nmental%20Safeguards%20%20Global%20Report%20ENGLISH%20FINAL.pdf[hereinafter Forest Peoples Programme (Feb. 2021);
Danelly Estupiñán, Colombia’s social leaders are still17
being killed during the quarantine, Amnesty
International(Jun.
2020),
availableathttps://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/06/lide
res-sociales-nos-siguen-matando-durantecuarentena/ [hereinafter Estupiñán (Jun. 2020)]. This
includes targeted enforcement of armed groups’ own
pandemic rules. Human Rights Watch (Feb. 2021)(finding that “[a]rmed groups often oppress humanrights defenders, trying to use them to impose ‘rules’
within communities. That increases the possibility
that groups will target them for real or perceived noncompliance or for allegedly supporting an opposing
party”); Colombia: Armed Groups’ Brutal COVID-19
measures, Human Rights Watch (Jul. 2020), available
athttps://www.hrw.org/news/2020/07/15/colombiaarmed-groups-brutal-covid-19-measures;
IACHR
Expresses Concern over Increase in Violence inColombia in Territories Where Illegal Armed Groups
Are Operating, IACHR (Oct. 13, 2020), available athttps://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2020/251.asp. At least ten people have been killed
for transgressing paramilitary-imposed COVID-19
measures. Alerta Temprana No. 018-2020, De
Immencia, Defensoría del Pueblo 1 (Apr. 30, 2020),
availableathttps://colombiapeace.org/files/200430_def.pdf.
As paramilitary groups continue to target
human rights defenders, allowing Respondent toreveal Petitioners’ identifying information to the
public is even more dangerous, especially given
Respondent’s own history of financing paramilitarygroups. See United States v. Chiquita Brands Int’l,
1:07–cr– 00055 (D.D.C.).

18
C. Petitioners are at Risk of PhysicalHarm by State Actors in Colombia.
The Colombian government’s targeting of
human rights defenders with physical attacks,
surveillance, and criminalization is well documented.
See, e.g., Human rights defenders operating in conflictand post-conflict situations: Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders, Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/43/51, ¶ 29 (Mar. 20, 2020), available athttps://undocs.org/en/A/HRC/43/51. State actors oftenlabel and target human rights defenders as “internal
enemies,” “terrorists,” or “spoilers of peace,development, or social harmony.” Ibid.
Recently, state actors have arrested, and insome cases, physically attacked human rights
defenders in Colombia under the guise of enforcing
pandemic-related restrictions on movement and in
response to the ongoing national strike, which began
in April 2021 in opposition to a regressive tax bill andhas continued in opposition to the Duqueadministration’s policies. Estupiñán (Jun. 2020);
Steve Hege, Colombia’s National Strike: Inequality
and Legitimacy Crises Drive Unrest, United States
Institute of Peace (May 27, 2021), available athttps://www.usip.org/publications/2021/05/colombiasnational-strike-inequality-and-legitimacy-crisesdrive-unrest. Over the course of the strike, Amici
Temblores and INDEPAZ recorded almost 3,800 casesof police violence, including physical violence,
homicides, and arbitrary detentions against

19demonstrators, including human rights defenders.
Informe de Temblores ONG, INDEPAZ y Paiis a la
CIDH sobre la violación sistemática de la Convención
Americana y los alcances jurisprudenciales de la Corte
IDH con respecto al uso de la fuerza pública contra lasociedad civil en Colombia, en el marco de lasprotestas acontecidas entre el 28 de abril y el 31 demayo de 2021, Temblores, INDEPAZ & Paiss (2021),
availableathttps://4ed5c6d6-a3c0-4a68-819192ab5d1ca365.filesusr.com/ugd/7bbd97_691330ba1e714daea53990b35ab351df.pdf.
State surveillance of human rights defenders is
also documented. In May 2020, journalists reported
that the Colombian intelligence community had
inappropriately developed dossiers on more than 100
public figures, including human rights defenders. See
Colombia Country Report (Mar. 30, 2020) 12.
Criminalization also puts human rights
defenders at risk. In his report on a 2018 visit to
Colombia, the former Special Rapporteur on thesituation of human rights defenders noted that 70
human rights defenders from three organizations had
been “accused, prosecuted and detained on charges,
among others, of belonging to illegal armed groups” inconnection with their work. He also reported that atleast 202 land and environmental rights defenders
had been prosecuted between 2012 and the time of his
visit. Visit to Colombia (Mar. 20, 2020) ¶¶ 28–29.
Because Colombian police and military forces
often target human rights defenders, Petitioners will
be at risk of physical harm by state actors if

20
Respondent is allowed to publicly reveal theiridentifying information.
II.

COLOMBIAN
GOVERNMENTINSTITUTIONSTASKED
WITH
PROTECTINGHUMAN
RIGHTSDEFENDERS
ARE
UNABLEOR
UNWILLING TO PROTECT THEM,
ELEVATING PETITIONERS’ RISK OF
PHYSICAL HARM IF RESPONDENT IS
ALLOWED TO PUBLICLY REVEALTHEIR IDENTIFYING INFORMATION.

The Colombian National Protection Unit
(Unidad Nacional de Protección, “UNP”), Attorney
General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación), andthe Ombudsman’s Office (Defensoría del Pueblo) are
the principal institutions responsible for promoting
human rights and protecting at-risk Colombians,
including human rights defenders, from physicalharm. See The Risk of Returning Home: Violence andThreats against Displaced People Reclaiming Land in
Colombia, Human Rights Watch (Sept. 17, 2013),
availableathttps://www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/17/riskreturning-home/violence-and-threats-againstdisplaced-people-reclaiming-land.
As a result of the current presidential
administration’s influence and instability from theongoing national strike, these institutions lack thecapacity and/or political will to protect human rights
defenders. See Colombia: Egregious Police Abuses
Against Protesters, Human Rights Watch (Jun. 2021),

21
availableathttps://www.hrw.org/news/2021/06/09/colombiaegregious-police-abuses-against-protesters[hereinafter Human Rights Watch (Jun. 2021)]. The
IACHR has repeatedly urged the Colombian
government to use these institutions to prevent
violence against human rights defenders, establish
more robust protection measures for defenders, andimplement a comprehensive protection policy throughthese institutions. IACHR Reiterates Its Concern(Jan. 22, 2021). However, these institutions are
failing to uphold their mandates and create anenvironment in which defenders can freely exercise
their rights. If Petitioners’ identities are revealed tothe public, increasing their vulnerability to physicalharm, it is unlikely that these institutions will
effectively protect them.
A. The National Protection Unit is Failingto Protect Human Rights Defenders
from Physical Harm.
The UNP is charged with designing,
implementing, and evaluating protection measures
for Colombians at risk of physical harm based onprotected grounds, including political beliefs. Ch. IV:
Colombia, Annual Report of the IACHR ¶ 126 (2011).
The UNP’s mandate includes protecting humanrights defenders. See Decree 4065 of 2011, Arts. 1, 3
(Colombia). The UNP provides physical protection
services like bodyguards, bulletproof vests, and/or
safety plans in response to particular risks. See
Amicus brief on killings of human rights defenders(Apr. 2021). However, it is failing to adequately

22
protect human rights defenders. The UNP’s “serious
weaknesses” include failing to provide protection toeligible defenders, long wait times when it does
provide protection, and implementing inadequate orineffective measures. Amnesty International (May2017) 2.
Despite increased risks to human rights
defenders during the COVID-19 pandemic, the UNP
decreased the number of security measures it
implemented in 2020. Ibid. During this same period,
killings of human rights defenders increased
approximately 60% compared to 2019. See Ni lapandemia mermó la violencia (May 2021). The UNP
granted about 14.5% of the protection requests it
received from human rights defenders for security in
2020, 300 fewer requests than in 2019. See Human
Rights Watch (Feb. 2021).
Human rights defenders also often facesignificant and dangerous wait times before the UNP
responds to requests, even when the UNP ultimately
grants protection. While the UNP is legally required
to assess risks within 30 days, as of May 2020 theaverage processing time was 190 days. Human Rights
Watch (Feb. 2021). In some cases, human rights
defenders are killed while waiting for the UNP to
grant or implement protection schemes. See, e.g.,
Situation of Human Rights Defenders (Dec. 6, 2019) ¶28.
When the UNP implements protection
measures for human rights defenders, it often
provides ineffective or inappropriate measures, “such23
as providing a vehicle for secure transport but
without gasoline, or a cell phone without credit.”Amnesty International (May 2017) 2. For example,
around 2016, the UNP began providing panic buttons
with location-sharing technology for at-risk persons
in case of emergency. Defenders who activated theirbuttons reported not receiving responses and privacy
concerns since they were not informed about whenand how the voice-responsive buttons could be
activated. Amnesty International (May 2017) 2.
Human rights defenders who receive UNP security
measures remain concerned about their right toprivacy. Amici Latin American Working Group
Education Fund, Washington Office on Latin
America, Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz,and other human rights groups report that defenders
receiving UNP protection “continue to have serious
concerns regarding the use of the information
gathered by bodyguards, which was made worse withrecent revelations that some bodyguards leaked andsold information to criminal groups.” Protect
Colombia’s Peace, Latin American Working Group at
11 (Jul. 2020), available at https://www.lawg.org/wpcontent/uploads/Protect-Colombias-Peace-F.pdf.
The UNP’s failure to protect human rights also
includes retracting measures provided without cause.
For example, in November, 2020, the UNP
unilaterally removed a bulletproof vest it hadprovided to human rights defender Jani Silva, despiteongoing security risks she faced as a rural defender
raising business-related concerns. After the UNP
retracted this measure, paramilitary groups sent her
death threats. Pese a amenazas contra la lideresa

24
Jani Silva, UNP retira una de sus medidas deprotección, Contagioradio (Dec. 2020), available athttps://www.contagioradio.com/pese-amenazascontra-jani-silva-unp-retira-proteccion/.
Silva’s situation is not unique. See Global
Analysis 2020, Front Line Defenders at 13 (2020),
https://www.frontlinedefenders.org/sites/default/files/
fld_global_analysis_2020.pdf. The UNP’s repeated
failure to provide effective protection to human rights
defenders makes the possibility of Respondent
revealing Petitioners’ identifying information evenriskier.
B. The Attorney General’s Office is
Failing to Investigate or Prosecute
Killings of Human Rights Defenders.
The Attorney General’s Office is mandated toinvestigate and prosecute crimes that come to its
knowledge through complaints, special requests, or ex
officio. Colombian Constitution of 1991, Art. 250. Its
mission includes guaranteeing victims’ access to truth
and justice. See Misión, Fiscalía General de la Nación,
available at https://www.fiscalia.gov.co/colombia/laentidad/mision/. But instead of providing humanrights defenders with access to justice, the Office iscriminalizing human rights defenders and failing tofully investigate or prosecute perpetrators of violenceagainst defenders. See Colombia Country Report(Mar. 30, 2021).
The Attorney General’s Office has largely
failed to investigate and prosecute mounting threats

25
and attacks against human rights defenders recently.
Ibid. The Office has convicted only 60 perpetrators
responsible for more than 400 human rights defender
killings it recognizes occurred between January 2016
and August 2020. Ibid. For crimes against humanrights defenders other than killings, like rape ordeath threats, the likelihood that the Attorney
General’s Office will prosecute perpetrators is evenlower. Human Rights Watch (Feb. 2021). The Office’s
low prosecution rates for crimes against human rights
defenders contributes to an environment ripe forfurther killings and other physical harm. See
Amnesty International (May 2017) 2.
The Attorney General’s Office also contributes
to the criminalization of human rights defenders. In
recent years, the Office has ramped up false or vague
charges against human rights defenders, including“rebellion.” Forest Peoples Programme (Feb. 2021) 47.
Some defenders have been criminalized afterparticipating in peaceful protests or leading
community discussions around business activities. Id.
The Attorney General’s Office has reportedly
targeted individuals who raise concerns aboutbusiness activities, including human rights
defenders, in connection with the Office’s
relationships to the private sector. See Visit to
Colombia (Mar. 20, 2020) ¶ 30. The former Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights
defenders noted an “apparent connection” between an
energy company, the Colombian Army, the Attorney
General’s Support Office, and the arrest of activists
opposed to the energy company’s activities in 2018.

26
Ibid. The Special Rapporteur raised concern about arelated company’s multiple agreements for more than
$24 million to “strengthen the investigative andprosecutorial capacity of the Attorney General’sSupport Office to deal – inter alia – with crimes ofobstruction of public roads during social protests that
affect the functioning of [the company] and/or its
associated companies.” Ibid.
The Attorney General’s Office’s contributions
to the cycle of violence and impunity against humanrights defenders show that it is failing to create a safe
environment for defenders, making the possibility of
revealing Petitioner’s identifying information evenmore dangerous.
C. The Ombudsman’s Office is Failing toComply with Its Mandate to Protect,
Defend, and Promote Human Rights.
The Colombian Ombudsman’s Office wasestablished to protect, defend, and promote theliberties and human rights of all people. Historia, La
DefensoríadelPueblo,availableathttps://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/public/institucional/
5848/Historia.htm. The Peace Agreement made this
Office an autonomous and independent institution
and clarified its role as a check on executive
overreach. Final Peace Agreement 3.4.9. Yet recently,
the Ombudsman’s Office has failed both to effectively
use the Early Alert System, a key mechanism toprotect at-risk defenders, and to condemn state
violence against protesters participating in strikedemonstrations.

27
The Peace Agreement established the
Ombudsman’s Office’s Early Alert System (Sistema
de Alerta Temprana), a mechanism for analyzing andresponding to situations of potential human rights
abuse, including risks to the physical safety of humanrights defenders. Sistema de Alertas Tempranas SAT, La Defensoría del Pueblo, available athttps://www.defensoria.gov.co/es/public/atencionciudadanoa/1469/Sistema-de-alertas-tempranas--%20SAT.htm. To identify and evaluate the level ofrisk in a particular situation, the Ombudsman’s
Office is supposed to consider factors such as threatsand potential risks to at-risk civilians, including
human rights defenders. Final Peace Agreement
2.1.2.2. In its first two years, the Office effectively
used the Early Alert System to notify local authoritiesof potential threats and coordinate responses toprotect human rights defenders and others at risk ofphysical harm. Situation of Human Rights Defenders(Dec. 6, 2019) ¶ 257. However, under the Duqueadministration, the Ombudsman’s Office has
drastically reduced the number of Early Alerts issued
and no longer effectively coordinates Alert responses
with authorities that could provide protection locally.
Human Rights Watch (Feb. 2021).
The Ombudsman’s Office has also “failed toperiodically report on and unequivocally condemn
police abuses” against peaceful demonstrators,
including human rights defenders, during thenational strike. Human Rights Watch (Jun. 2021).
This is particularly concerning given the Peace
Agreement’s clarification that the Office should check28
the government’s infringement on rights. See
Colombia: escalating human rights to deescalating
violence, International Commission of Jurists (May2021), available at https://www.icj.org/escalatinghuman-rights-to-deescalating-violence/ (“The Officeof the Ombudsperson must remember that they are
independent from the Government. They must taketheir independent role seriously. They must fulfil
their constitutional function of defending humanrights and denouncing abuses committed byauthorities.”). The Ombudsman’s Office’s response toabuse committed by state actors contributes to cyclesof impunity and violence against defenders. See
Amnesty International (May 2017) 2 (“Impunity
remains a major challenge. It perpetuates andbolsters the risk for human rights defenders since it
sends the message that defenders can be attacked
without fear of any punishment.”).
The Ombudsman’s Office’s failure to use the
Early Alert System to protect human rights defenders
or condemn state abuse against demonstrators
indicates that it would be unable or unwilling toprotect Petitioners if their identities are revealed andstate and/or non-state actors target them.

29
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we respectfully request the
Court to grant the petition for a writ of certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARITY RYERSONCOUNSEL OF RECORDAVERY KELLYTATIANA DEVIACORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY LAB
6214 N. GLENWOOD AVENUE
CHICAGO, IL 60660(773) 346-5545
CHARITY@CORPACCOUNTABILITYLAB.ORG
COUNSEL FOR AMICI CURIAE
July 8, 2021

30
APPENDIX
List of Amici Curiae:
Business and Human Rights Resource Centre
London, United Kingdom
Colectivo de Abogados José Alvear Restrepo
Bogotá, Colombia
Comisión Colombiana de Juristas
Bogotá, Colombia
Comisión Intereclesial de Justicia y Paz
Bogotá, Colombia
Due Process of Law Foundation
Washington, D.C.
Front Line Defenders
Dublin, Ireland
Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz(INDEPAZ)
Bogotá, Colombia
Latin American Working Group Education
Fund
Washington, D.C.
Robert F. Kennedy Human Rights
Washington, D.C.

31
Simetría Legal
Bogotá, Colombia
Temblores
Bogotá, Colombia
Washington Office on Latin America
Washington, D.C.