REPORT

Voluntary Transparency
Initiatives: The Case ofPeer Review Exercises in
the Context of the BWCMARÍA J. ESPONAContents
Acknowlegdements

4

Author5

Abbreviations

5

Executive summary										

61 I N T R O D U C T I O N 								 		

92 H I S T O R Y A N D E V O L U T I O N O F P E E R R E V I E W E X E R C I S E S 					

113 K E Y E L E M E N T S O F PA S T P E E R R E V I E W E X E R C I S E S 				

15A. France

15

B. Benelux countries

18

C. Germany

20

D. Morocco

22

E. Georgia

24

F. Kyrgyzstan

27

4 A N A LYS I S O F K E Y E L E M E N T S O F P E E R R E V I E W E X E R C I S E S 				

295 DISCUSSION AND CRITICISM CONCERNING PEER REVIEW EXERCISES

31

6 R E F L E C T I O N S O N B E N E F I T S , L I M I TAT I O N S A N D O P P O R T U N I T I E S

33Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises				35

Acknowledgements
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all the Institute’s activities. This projectof the WMD Programme was supported by the European Union through the United Nations Office for
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA).
The author and editors would like to thank Elisande Nexon and colleagues from UNODA for theirvaluable insights on early drafts of this report. Emily Youers did the copyediting and Kathleen Morf did
the layout of this publication. UNIDIR’s James Revill and María Garzón Maceda provided editorial
support throughout.

About UNIDIRUNIDIR is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy
institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue
and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community
to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

Note
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply theexpression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning
the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitationof its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of theindividual authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations,
UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.

Citation
Espona, M.J. (2024). Voluntary Transparency Initiatives: The Case of Peer Review Exercises in theContext of the BWC, UNIDIR, Geneva. https://doi.org/10.37559/WMD/24/CBW/02.

Cover photography © Flickr/pixellaphotowww.unidir.org – © UNIDIR 2024

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

4

About the author
María J. Espona
Dr María J. Espona is an expert in the weapons of mass destruction field, especially on chemical andbiological weapons and export control. She has published on these topics and teaches at universities
in Argentina, Georgia and Peru.
She currently leads the Targeted Initiative on Export Controls of Dual-Use Materials and Technologies
in Central Asia. She is South America's Regional Coordinator for the European Union Partner-toPartner Export Control Programme for Dual-Use Goods (EU P2P) and works with the Belgian Nuclear
Research Centre (SCK-CEN) on an export control-related project. She is also a subject matter expert
in several projects from Health Security Partners and the non-profit Coalescion on topics such asbiorisk management and export control in Latin America and other regions. She is a member of theWorld Health Organization's Technical Advisory Group on the Responsible Use of the Life Sciences
and Dual-Use Research (TAG-RULS DUR). She is the director of Argentina Information Quality(ArgIQ).
Espona is a biologist and holds a master’s degree in terrorism studies and a PhD in criminology.

Abbreviations
BSL-3

Biosafety Level 3

BWC

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

CBM

confidence-building measure

ISU

Implementation Support UnitPRE

peer review exercise

VTI

voluntary transparency initiative

A B O U T T H E A U T H O R – A B B R E V I AT I O N S

5Executive Summary
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) lacks any mechanism to verify compliance.
In the absence of a verification mechanism and while not a substitute for such a system, states parties
have developed a system of confidence-building measures (CBMs) to increase transparency arounda state’s activities in the biological field. However, over the years various limitations in the CBMs
regime have been noted.
To address these limitations and look for innovative approaches to strengthen the Convention, somestates parties have explored the concept of voluntary transparency initiatives (VTIs), non-binding
measures agreed by interested states parties to enhance transparency among other things. Among
several VTIs is the concept of peer review exercises (PREs) in which one or more states parties invite
others to assess selected aspects of their treaty implementation through a flexible and tailoredapproach that can include document review, facility visits and exchanges of best practices.
In 2011 France proposed the concept of a peer review mechanism for the BWC that could, among
other things, strengthen national implementation, increase confidence in compliance and improve
international cooperation, while respecting the sovereignty of the participating states. Subsequently,
six peer review exercises (PREs) have been organized (see Table 1) along with several otherinitiatives under the broader VTI framework.
Table 1. Summary of BWC peer review exercises

L O C AT I O N

MAIN

A N D D AT E S

OBJECTIVESFRANCE

Provide proof
of concept of the
PRE proposal

Paris and
Maisons-Alfort
4–6 December
2013

BELGIUM,LUXEMBOURG
and THENETHERLANDS
June toNovember
2015

FOCUS

S TA K E H O L D E R S

Biosafety andbiosecurity(including
awarenessraising)

National experts
from several
agencies

Export control

Strengthen
national
implementation
Raise awarenessamong national
stakeholders
Provide CBM
feedback

Biological military
defence research
Legislation
Biosafety andbiosecurity

Other stateparty experts

EXERCISE
PROCESS

Presentations
Visits to twolaboratories

National nongovernmental
experts
National experts
from several
ministries of
the three states
parties

Written assessment of CBM
Forms A and E
Meetings to clarify
CBM forms
Visits to
five facilities

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

6

L O C AT I O N

MAIN

A N D D AT E S

OBJECTIVESGERMANY

Augment
confidence incompliance

Munich

FOCUS

Biologicalmilitary defence
research

2–4 August
2016

MOROCCORabat andCasablanca
9–11 May2017

GEORGIA
Tbilisi

S TA K E -EXERCISE

HOLDERSPROCESS

National experts fromvarious ministries

Visit to a
microbiology
research
institute

Other state party
experts
International nongovernmental experts

Strengthen
national
implementation
Augment
confidence incompliance

Biosafety andbiosecurity(including
pathogenand biorisk
management)

Enhanceinternational
cooperation
Augment
confidence incompliance

National experts fromseveral ministries
and agencies
Other state party
experts

Presentations
Visits to fiveinstitutions

National nongovernmental experts
BWC Implemetation
Support Unit

Biologicalresearch

National experts fromseveral agencies
Other state party
experts

14–15 November
2018International
non-governmental
experts

Presentations
Visit to a facility,
including a
Biosafety Level
3 laboratory
Discussion andassessment

BWC Implementation
Support Unit andEuropean External
Action Service
KYRGYZSTAN
Issyk Kul
16–18 August
2022

Strengthen
national
implementation
Enhanceinternational
cooperation

Legislation
Biosafety andbiosecurity
International
cooperation

National experts
from various agencies

Preparatory
meetings

Other state party
experts

Presentations

International andregional organizations, including
BWC Implemetation
Support UnitEXECUTIVE SUMMARY

7

There is no one size fits all approach to implementing the BWC. Implementation varies dependingon the national context. Correspondingly, states parties may also have different requirements forincreasing transparency, exchanging good practices and sharing progress on national implementation.
The PRE is a flexible instrument that is useful in this regard and generates ownership through abottom-up approach. The exercises analyzed in this report vary in their duration and locations,objectives, areas of focus, stakeholders, processes and results, which shows that the tool can beadapted to each state party’s needs and priorities.
The report also demonstrates the value of PREs as tools to increase transparency, improve national
implementation of the BWC, strengthen networks of experts nationally and internationally andsupport international cooperation and assistance. The process of conducting a PRE can generate
additional benefits to those explicitly intended, for example in bringing together different branches ofgovernment and other relevant stakeholders such as NGOs and scientific institutions to collectively
discuss aspects of BWC implementation and potentially foster communities of actors that serve as
guardians of BWC compliance. In light of these benefits, many states parties have expressed support
for organizing PREs.
However, not all states parties are supportive of VTIs and PREs, as indicated in this report. Several
states parties have expressed scepticism over the utility of PREs. One particular criticism is thatthe organizing states parties retain control over the objectives, focus, participants, and access to
information involved in PREs. This minimizes the extent to which such initiatives can ever reallybuild confidence in compliance among all states parties. Besides, some criticize the PRE format’s
malleability due to the lack of a consolidated framework that would allow an easier comparative
analysis and measurement of success. The enduring value of the PREs is also unclear, as it isdifficult to gauge the degree to which the organized exercises have fulfilled their objectives in thelonger term and generated sustainable change, for example in improving national implementation.
If BWC states parties are interested in continuing work in this area, they can consider the lessons
learned from previous exercises and put measures in place to address or mitigate issues of concern.
Further work on PREs could look at building in metrics during the planning phase to enable thelonger-term success of such initiatives to be assessed. Furthermore, states parties could consider
developing a series of standardized templates to address specific topics of interest at any PREs that
may be conducted in the future.
PREs and other voluntary measures are not a substitute for a verification regime, should not replace
existing confidence-building measures, and should not preclude any future mechanism to strengthen
the Convention. However, as this report demonstrates, they can play a role in strengthening the BWC
and the wider biosecurity regime.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

8

1 Introduction
The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was opened for signature on 10 April 1972
and entered into force on 26 March 1975. Over the course of nearly half a century, BWC states parties
have made a concerted effort to strengthen the Convention. However, it still lacks a verification
mechanism similar to other disarmament treaties. Ongoing discussions in the Working Group on theStrengthening of the Convention may yet set out a road map for such a regime. In the absence of sucha mechanism, and due to sensitives around aspects of verification and compliance, one of the key
tools that the BWC has at the moment to increase transparency is the confidence-building measures(CBMs) that each state party is requested to submit each year to the BWC Implementation Support
Unit (ISU).
In the past few years, the number of states parties submitting CBMs has increased, reaching 54%
of all states parties in 2023.1 However, some submissions are incomplete and in some cases there
are inconsistencies across the forms.2 Moreover, as the BWC ISU has no mandate to assess CBM
submissions and not all of them are open to the public, the analysis of this data is limited. In partas a result of these constraints, some states parties have explored alternative tools to increasetransparency, including through voluntary transparency initiatives (VTIs), such as peer review
exercises (PREs).
There are no agreed definitions for these concepts under the framework of the BWC. In the context of
this report, VTIs are measures intended to enhance transparency and build confidence in compliance.
These initiatives have been non-binding and voluntarily agreed either bilaterally or multilaterally
between the interested states parties. PREs are conceived as a type of VTI where one or more states
parties invite others to assess their implementation of selected aspects of their BWC measuresthrough a flexible approach that allows tailoring to the preferences and needs of the organizers
or participants. PREs have been comprised of a number of elements, including presentations,documentation review, site visits and exchanges of best practices. VTIs, such as PREs, are nota substitute for a verification mechanism. Nor are they intended to replace CBMs or any future
mechanism to facilitate the implementation of the BWC or assess compliance. However, as thisreport demonstrates, they can play a key role in strengthening the Convention.

1	Daniel Feakes, “Confidence building measures under the Biological Weapons Convention”, Third Session of the Working
Group on Strengthening of the Convention (4-8 December 2023), https://docs-library.unoda.org/Biological_Weapons_
Convention_-Working_Group_on_the_strengthening_of_the_ConventionThird_session_(2023)/2023-1204_ISU_ppt_
on_transparency_and_CBM_final.pdf.
2	Ibid.

INTRODUCTION

9This report begins by laying out the genesis and evolution of the implementation of peer review-type
initiatives in the context of other voluntary initiatives to enhance transparency. The report proceeds
to outline the key elements of the six PREs that were organized to date, providing an overview of
their duration, location, objectives, focus, stakeholders, process, and results. The report then turns
to address the wider discussion within the BWC around the VTIs in general and the PREs in particular.
The report concludes with some reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of such initiatives
and possible ways to advance work on this topic. An annex to this report includes a side by sidesummary of the main features of each of the PREs that were held to helps compare the different ways
in which they are conceived and executed.

INTRODUCTION

102 History and evolutionof peer review exercises
The concept of PRE had its genesis at the Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011. After nearlya decade of stalemate following the collapse of negotiations around a verification protocol, several
states parties proposed different approaches to enhance transparency, improve national implementation, assess compliance and strengthen the Convention. For example, one of the proposals wasa “compliance assessment” through national declarations on the implementation measures of the
BWC, forwarded by Canada in 2010, then joined by Switzerland and the Czech Republic.3
As part of this trend, France submitted a working paper to the Seventh BWC Review Conference
to initiate a debate on a new mechanism to enhance confidence in national implementation and tofoster international cooperation.4 The French proposal suggested the exploration of a peer review
mechanism for the BWC as an example of “more proactive mechanisms for enhancing confidence
among States parties”.5
The French proposal drew from experiences in other fields, specifically the Financial Action Task
Force on money laundering.6 The working paper noted that in this area, the “introduction of a peer
review mechanism has helped States parties involved in the Task Force to implement a set ofrecommendations that they themselves had developed”.7 The paper went on to lay out somepossible features of a voluntary BWC peer review mechanism, suggesting that it could cover“national legislation, biosecurity as such and biosecurity standards, national codes of conduct forscientists and operational planning.” The working paper concluded by identifying several areas inwhich the PREs could be beneficial while respecting the sovereignty of the organizing state. Theseadvantages included strengthening national implementation, increasing confidence in complianceand improving international cooperation.8

3	Canada, the Czech Republic and Switzerland, “National Implementation of the BTWC: Compliance Assessment:
update”, BWC/MSP/2012/WP.6, 5 December 2012. https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2012/WP.6.
4
France. “A peer review mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention: enhancing confidence in national
implementation and international cooperation”, BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28, 13 December 2011.
https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28.
5
Ibid.
6
James Revill. A Peer-Review Mechanism for the Biological and Toxins Weapons Convention, (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2012),
pp. 30–34, https://unidir.org/publication/a-peer-review-mechanism-for-the-biological-and-toxin-weapons-convention.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.

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11Building on this working paper and wider interest in the concept of BWC peer review, in 2012 UNIDIR
published a detailed study on a peer review mechanism for the BWC.9 This report analysed similar
processes employed by other entities, including the African Union, the Development AssistanceCommittee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Financial Action
Task Force, and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report further identified a number offunctions of a peer review mechanism, including as a transparency and confidence-building
mechanism, as a mechanism for quality control, and as a means of sharing best practices andbuilding capacity. The report went on to look at some of the advantages, disadvantages andrequirements for a peer review mechanism, before concluding with a series of steps for taking
forward such a mechanism. It was noted that peer reviews could be applied to assess a wide rangeof topics in a flexible way, with exercises tailored to address the requirements of the organizing state.
In December 2013, France organized a pilot PRE, designed as a proof of concept for a peer review
mechanism. This first peer review exercise was designed to “strengthen confidence between State
parties, enhance national implementation of the Convention and enable exchanges of bestpractices”.10
Several states parties have subsequently undertaken peer review-type exercises, with various
modalities, topics and outcomes. One early initiative was a PRE between Belgium, Luxembourg and
the Kingdom of the Netherlands – the Benelux countries – in 2015, focused on assessing CBMs.11
Drawing from this exercise and the earlier French pilot study, a working paper submitted by Belgium,
France, Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Eighth BWC Review Conferencein 2016 identified a number of anticipated benefits of this proposed mechanism, including improving
national implementation, building confidence through increased transparency, and offering thepossibility of fostering international cooperation.12
The next PRE was held at a military microbiology research facility in Munich, Germany, in August
2016. National and international experts visited the facility, that had been declared in CBM Form A
and included a Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory. A working paper was subsequently publisheddescribing the details of the exercise and the results achieved.13

9Ibid.
10	France, “Exercice pilote de revue par les pairs, Paris, 4-6 décembre 2013”, BWC/MSP/2013/WP.8, 9 December 2013,https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2013/WP.8.
11	Kingdom of the Netherlands, “Statement on behalf of the Benelux-countries, at the Preparatory Committee
for the 8th Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)”, 8 August 2016,
https://docs-library.unoda.org/Biological_Weapons_Convention_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eighth_Review_
Conference_(2016)/Benelux%2B-%2BBTWC%2BPrepCom%2B2%2B-%2BJoint%2BStatement%2BBenelux%2B-%2BAgenda%2BItem%2B5%2B-%2BPeer%2BReview%2B-%2Bfinal2.pdf.
12	Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. “Peer review: an innovative way to strengthen
the BWC”, BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.13, 4 May 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.13.
13	Germany, “Confidence in compliance – peer review visit exercise at the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich,Germany”, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11, 21 October 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11. See also
https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11/Corr.1.

H I S TO RY A N D E VO LU T I O N O F P E E R R E V I E W E X E RC I S E S

12In the meantime, other VTIs such as implementation reviews or voluntary visits were also being
further developed. In 2016, Canada, Chile, Ghana, Mexico and the United States explored theconcept of an implementation review, which combined elements from both compliance assessment
and peer review initiatives.14 This process involved, among other things, the development of“an agreed format for reports on measures to implement the BWC’s obligations”, followed by thecompletion and exchange of reports and a series of visits to capitals and facilities. The exercise waspresented in a series of working papers submitted to the Eighth BWC Review Conference.15, 16, 17, 18
Chile and Spain presented a proposal for voluntary visits within the framework of the BWC in 2016.19
The aim was to increase cooperation and transparency between states parties, particularly on
biosafety and biosecurity issues, but also on science and technology, assistance in cases of alleged
use of biological weapons, and international cooperation, among other topics. The following year,
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru andSpain submitted a working paper outlining how they had organised a series of visits focused on
biosafety and biosecurity, including visits to 20 laboratories in Ecuador in 2015.20 The report highlighted
some of the follow-up actions, including the development by Chile of a national plan for biosecurity
and the proposed establishment of a national commission for biosafety.
At the Eighth BWC Review Conference in 2016, a group of states parties provided a summary of theirexperiences with VTIs in a working paper submitted by Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic,
France, Germany, Ghana, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland,
and the United States. The paper included short descriptions of the different exercises, identified
several benefits of voluntary exercises and suggested language to be included in the final report of
the Review Conference, including encouraging “additional States Parties to organize or participate
in future voluntary transparency initiatives”.21 This language was not included in the final document.

14	Canada, Chile, Ghana, Mexico and the United States of America, “BWC implementation review initiative”,
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.22, 8 November 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.22.
15	United States of America, “BWC implementation review initiative: report by the United States of America on the visit
to Washington, DC”, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.18, 8 November 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.18.
16	Canada, “BWC implementation review initiative: report by Canada on the visit to Ottawa”,
BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.27, 9 November 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.27.
17	Ghana, “Ghana’s report on Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) implementation review exercise held in Accra 19–20 October, 2016”, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.33, 14 November 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.33.
18	Chile, “Ejercicio de revisión de la implementación informe de visita a Santiago de Chile”, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.4,
17 November 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.41.
19	Chile and Spain, “Visitas voluntarias en el marco de la CABT: el concepto”, BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.28,
10 August 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/PC/WP.28.
20	Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, España, Guatemala, México, República Dominicana, Panamá, Paraguay and Perú,“Visitas voluntarias: un instrumento para una mejor cooperación en el marco de la CABT”, BWC/MSP/2017/WP.13,
1 December 2017, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2017/WP.13.
21
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Ghana, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Kingdom of theNetherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United States, “Building Confidence Through Voluntary Transparency 		
Exercises”, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.35, 10 November 2016. https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.35.

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13Subsequently, two further PREs were organized. One took place in Morocco in 2017. This Moroccan
peer review focused on how the country handles pathogens, emphasizing biosafety, biosecurity andbiorisk management measures. The peer review included visits to five government institutions andlaboratories. The next PRE was organized in 2018 in Tbilisi, Georgia, with a different angle. This
exercise opened the doors of the national health laboratory to a group of international experts,
with a view to showing the nature of work undertaken. The last PRE to date aimed to strengthen theimplementation of the BWC in Kyrgyzstan. This PRE included a preparatory phase in 2021 in
Geneva, Switzerland, followed by an exercise that took place in August 2022 in Kyrgyzstan withthe participation of national experts from other BWC state parties. This exercise was focused on
biosafety and biosecurity, legislation and cooperation and assistance.
Finally, in an effort to take stock of the various VTIs, at the Ninth Review Conference in 2022,
France (together with Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czechia, Georgia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco,
the Kingdom of the Netherlands and Spain)22 proposed creating an exchange platform – in the format
of a meeting – to, among other things:
Discuss and exchange information and best practices on voluntary transparency exercises
conducted by BTWC States parties … [and] Create a Compendium of all voluntary transparency
exercises, as well as related best practices, conducted by BTWC State parties and lessons
learned from exchanges within the Platform; and … Identify potential needs for assistance andcooperation for national implementation of the Convention.23
As shown in this chronology, there were different approaches to voluntary initiatives within the BWC.
The PRE format in particular was developed over time as a flexible tool that can take different forms
and be adapted to various contexts and requirements.

22

23

Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands
and Spain, “An exchange platform for voluntary transparency exercises”, BWC/CONF.IX/WP.21, 16 November 2022,
https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.IX/WP.21.
Ibid.

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14

3 Key elements of past
peer review exercises
This section analyses each of the PREs organized so far in relation to the criteria in Table 2 tofacilitate comparison and reflection on the concept and execution of PREs. Despite their differences,
they all share the intention of increasing transparency, enhancing confidence between participants,
and exchanging best practices concerning BWC national implementation, with the overall purposeof strengthening the BWC and the wider biosecurity regime.
Table 2. Criteria for analysis of peer review exercises

Duration and location
Objectives

The length and location(s) of the exercise.
The objectives (ultimate goals) of the exercise, as outlinedin the available documents.
The aspects of BWC implementation selected as the main topic(s)Focusof the exercise.
The participating organizations (attending or presenting) from the

Stakeholders

partnering states parties, as well as other participants if any (e.g.
international organization representatives, experts from other countries).

Process
Results

The process and methods applied in the exercise.
The substantive findings of the exercise and the experience withthe peer review process itself, as captured in the available documents.

A.

FranceI.

Duration and location

France, as the original champion of the concept of peer review in the BWC, organized the first pilot
PRE.24 It took place on 4–6 December 2013 in Paris and lasted three days. The exercise included
visits to two laboratories: the Cellule d’Intervention Biologique d’Urgence at the Pasteur Institutein Paris, which responds to specialized biological emergencies, and the ANSES25 Animal Health
Laboratory in Maisons-Alfort. The first day of activities took place at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and the last at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS), both in Paris.

24	France, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2013/WP.8, p. 5.
25
French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety.

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15

II.

Objectives

The objective of this pilot exercise was to test the concept of the proposal presented by France
to the Seventh BWC Review Conference in December 2011.26

III.

Focus

The agenda for the peer review pilot exercise covered discussion around three areas of France’s
BWC implementation:•

The system of biosafety and biosecurity, specifically the “national authorizationand control system for manipulating dangerous pathogens”27•

The national export control system, with a specific focus on the licensing proceduresfor dual-use biological materials and related equipment•

The biosecurity and biosafety awareness-raising policy, including the teaching
and training measures developed or implemented at different institutions

IV.

Stakeholders

The participants of this exercise can be divided into two groups. The first was a panel of international
experts representing Canada, China, Germany, India, Mexico, Morocco, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States.
The second group consisted of representatives of French governmental and non-governmentalorganizations, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French National Agency for Medicinesand Health Products Safety, the Ministry of Industrial Renewal, the Pasteur Institute of the Ministry of
Health, the ANSES Animal Health Laboratory, the National Institute for Health and Medical Research,
the French Military Health Service; and the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique.

V.

Process

The exercise included a series of presentations by technical experts from the French government on
the three identified focus areas of national implementation. The participants then visited laboratories
to see how the three different aspects already discussed were implemented in practice and to identify
areas for improvement.28 The results of the PRE were assessed through a questionnaire to participantsat the end of the exercise.

26
27
28

France, BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28.
France, BWC/MSP/2013/WP.8.
France, “Exercice pilote de revue par les pairs tenu du 4 au 6 décembre 2013 à Paris”,
BWC/MSP/2014/WP.3, 2 December 2014, p. 12, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2014/WP.3.

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16

VI.

Results

The 2014 French working paper submitted to the BWC states that “Overall, this pilot exercise wasassessed as an excellent approach in bringing closer and explaining the particularities of the French
legislative system relevant to the BTWC”.29 An important point shown through the exercise was thateach state party implements the Convention in its own way, including which decision-making bodies
are involved and how they interact.
Moreover, the French working paper notes that the participants appreciated the opportunity to talkwith the laboratory staff. The participants found the visits to the laboratories particularly useful as
they could see how the regulations on the national authorization and control system for manipulating
dangerous pathogens worked in practice.30
Some experts indicated that it would have been useful to expand the focus of the exercise to include
presentations from other ministries involved in the implementation of the BWC; other participants
contended that having a narrower focus would have allowed for an in-depth discussion of the topics.
Participants had different perceptions on the wider value of peer review. Some participants were
sceptical about how useful implementing a PRE through the BWC would be and indicated apreference for a more formal verification regime instead.31
However, there was agreement regarding the usefulness of the PRE itself as a transparency tool andhow much it had helped in strengthening the confidence between the parties. The participants also
agreed on the utility of the exercise for strengthening the national implementation of the BWC. The
best practices shared and gaps identified could be useful not only for France to improve its implementation but also for other countries since they could benefit from the information shared. Some states
parties asked for more detailed information about French national legislation.32
The process also generated some early lessons learned, particularly around the breadth of PREs.
Some participants considered that future exercises should address other aspects of the BWC, suchas measures to respond to alleged use and international cooperation, while still including aspects
relating to Articles III and IV. Also, to promote the strengthening of BWC implementation beyond
the participating parties, the participants proposed making use of currently available tools in theframework of the Convention to share the best practices and information identified in the exercise.33

29
30
31
32
33

Ibid, p. 15.
Ibid, p. 15.
Ibid, p. 15.
Ibid, p. 16.
Ibid, p. 16.

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B.

Benelux countries

I.

Duration and location

The three Benelux countries – Belgium, Luxembourg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands –jointly organized the second PRE. This exercise took place between June and November 2015
across the three countries. The in-person visits took place at the following locations:•

The Centre for Applied Molecular Technologies of the Defence Laboratory Department in Brussels,
Belgium, on 9 November•

The Health National Laboratory in Dudelange, and the Institute of Health in Esch-Sur Alzette,
Luxembourg, on 17 November•

The Organisation for Applied Scientific Research in Rijswijk and the National Institute of Public
Health and the Environment in Bilthoven, Kingdom of the Netherlands, on 27 November

II.

Objectives

The objective of the exercise was to “improve the national implementation of the Convention while
also contributing to build confidence between Sates Parties”.34 In a 2015 working paper submitted
by the three Benelux states, four specific objectives were identified:35•

Reviewing “elements of national implementation by qualified experts and sharing best practices”
in order to enhance national implementation•

Raising awareness of the BWC among national stakeholders to encourage participationin relevant inter-agency initiatives•

Contributing to discussion at the Eighth BWC Review Conference by presenting
their experiences with declarations, consultations and on-site visits

•

III.

Enabling feedback on CBMs and increasing their role as a declaration tool within the Convention

Focus

The Benelux PRE focused on the following aspects of CBMs in each participating state party:36•

National biological defence research and development programmes and research centres
and laboratories (as declared on Form A of the CBM)•

National legislation, regulations and other measures related to BWC implementation(as declared on Form E of the CBM), focusing on national oversight of biosafety and biosecurity

34
35
36

Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, “Benelux BTWC peer review: outline of key features and objectives”,
BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.13/Rev1, 6 August 2015, p. 1, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.13/Rev1.
Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid, p. 2.

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IV.

Stakeholders

The main stakeholders involved in the exercise were the three national peer review teams, eachconsisting of experts from the departments of defence, public health, and foreign affairs. Most
participating national experts had been involved in the drafting and submission of the national
CBMs.37 There were no third-party participants.

V.

Process

The Benelux exercise consisted of two phases. The first was a written phase in which experts fromeach country assessed Forms A and E of one another’s 2015 CBMs.38 The second was an in-person
phase that included a meeting to clarify points on the shared CBM forms and visits to relevant facilities
declared on CBM Form A in each of the participating states parties to check the consistency of theinformation submitted in the CBM with the “on-site reality”.39

VI.

Results

Regarding the substantive issues, the Benelux countries noted in a working paper that there wasagreement about the adequacy of the biosafety standards and their implementation in the three states
parties, although approaches to biosecurity differed in certain aspects.40 The working paper further
highlighted a number of specific tools employed to increase biosecurity awareness and stressed theimportance of a financially viable, customized approach to biosecurity in different laboratories, evenamong countries in close proximity.41
The working paper indicated that participating experts were satisfied with the results and included
a number of observations on the peer review process. It pointed out that one reason for the exercise
was “to make sure that the BTWC remains a living instrument, not only on paper and in Geneva, butalso among experts and practitioners within States Parties”. The paper further indicated how theprocess provided those compiling CBMs with in-depth feedback, thereby improving “the accessibility
and relevance of the CBMs of the participating countries”42. The Benelux countries concluded thatan approach to peer review comprising a written phase followed by in-country visits could help in“improving national implementation, increasing international cooperation and raising awarenessof the BTWC among national stakeholders”.43

37
38
39
40
41
42
43

Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, “Benelux BWC peer review: initial observations”, BWC/MSP/2015/WP.12,
17 December 2015, p. 1, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2015/WP.12.
Unfortunately, the documents produced during this phase were not openly available; as a consequence,
it was not possible to include more detail about the scope and observations made by the experts.
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.13/Rev.1.
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, BWC/MSP/2015/WP.12.
The working paper states that the “function of a laboratory dictates the type of measures needed and theirrespective feasibility”.
Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, BWC/MSP/2015/WP.12.
Ibid.

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19Finally, the paper also outlined some of the lessons that could be implemented in future exercises.
These included the potential value of organizing a meeting ahead of a visit to the host countries
to “run through the issues that would require special attention and make the visit more effective”.44
Also, some participants felt more time could be beneficial for an in-depth exchange and could
increase understanding of one another’s national systems with a view to further improving them.

C.

Germany

I.

Duration and location

A third PRE was jointly organized by the Federal Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence ofGermany. It was held on 2–4 August 2016 at the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich.

II.

Objectives

As outlined in a working paper submitted by Germany to the Eighth BWC Review Conference,
the main objective of this process was to “test whether a Peer Review visit could serve as a tool
to increase transparency among the States Parties to the Convention with regard to research anddevelopment activities”45 and therefore contribute to discussion around the relevance and valueof PREs in the context of the BWC.
The working paper further specified that the PRE could “provide a good opportunity to share bestpractices, discuss national implementation systems, raise awareness and establish contacts,
which could serve to increase international cooperation”.46

III.

Focus

The German exercise focused on one military research facility, the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology
in Munich. Its aim was an:assessment of all aspects of the facility that are relevant to provisions of the BTWC and provided
on the CBM Form, comprising laboratory activities and equipment, infrastructure, security
measures including access control, laboratory conduct, documentation in relation to research anddevelopment, including Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC), as well as procedures for thetransfer and export of pathogens and toxins.47

44
45
46
47

Ibid.
Germany, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11. See also https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11/Corr.1.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 3.

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IV.

Stakeholders

Officials from the German Federal Foreign Office and Ministry of Defence participated in the process,along with representatives of the German Partnership Programme for Excellence in Biological and
Health Security and of specific laboratory units, who delivered presentations.
The German Federal Foreign Office invited all interested states parties to participate in the exercise.
Over 20 diplomats and experts, including members of civil society, from the following countries
participated in the exercise: Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Burundi, France, Georgia, Indonesia,
Jordan, Lithuania, Myanmar, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Yemen.48

V.

Process

Participants in this PRE were divided into two teams: a visiting team and a monitoring team.
The visiting team comprised four biology experts and six “expert observers” who participated in a
pre-visit briefing, followed by a tour of the facility. The monitoring team comprised ten participants
who monitored the exercise and participated in presentations about BWC-related legal and policy
matters, biosecurity, and biosafety.
The process employed a number of methods, including:[an] examination of rooms, laboratory equipment and installations; requests for visual accessto paper documents; requests for written answers to questions that were submitted in writing prior
to the implementation of the activities; interviewing of personnel; requests for photographs andthe determination of geographical coordinates.49
At the exercise’s conclusion, the visiting team prepared a summary report in collaboration withthe monitoring team and the facility staff. The summary report was then discussed among theparticipants in the final session of the process. Subsequently, a paper was published by one civilsociety member, in their capacity as a participating expert.50

48
49
50

Ibid, p. 3.
Ibid.
Filippa Lentzos, “Increasing transparency in biodefense: a 2016 visit to a German military medical biodefence facility”,
Non-Proliferation Papers no. 52, (EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, November 2016),
https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Increasing-transparency-in-biodefence.pdf.

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VI.

Results

Regarding substantive findings, in a working paper submitted to the Eighth BWC Review Conferenceby Germany, it was indicated that participants concluded they had been given valuable insight into
the facility’s activities. They acknowledged that the host’s’ cooperation had helped to promotetransparency and confidence in the implementation of the BWC and provided reassurance that thefacility’s activities were consistent with German obligations under Article I of the Convention.51
In regard to the process, a summary of the report included in the working paper further suggested
that the exercise had convinced participants that compliance visits could be an appropriate means ofincreasing transparency and demonstrating a facility’s compliance with the BWC as well as providing“a useful platform for the exchange of good practices amongst all participants”.52 The report further
pointed to some ideas for improvement, including suggestions for the planning and methodologythat could be used in a compliance assessment of a military facility.
The working paper concluded with language proposed for inclusion in the additional understandings
under Articles IV and V of the final document of the Eighth BWC Review Conference, including references to the importance of PREs for improving national implementation, stimulating international
cooperation and improving confidence in compliance.53

D.

MoroccoI.

Duration and location

The Moroccan Ministry of Health, in collaboration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation, organized the fourth PRE, which was the first conducted outside Europe. It took place
on 9–11 May 2017 in Morocco and included visits to bio-related facilities in Rabat and Casablanca.

II.

Objectives

The objective of the Moroccan PRE, as stipulated in a Moroccan working paper, was:to broaden support for the European Union promoted peer review mechanism concept, which
has the following objectives: to strengthen national implementation of the BWC; to improve
confidence in compliance by increased transparency; and to deepen international cooperation.54

51
52
53
54

Germany, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11, p. 5.
Ibid, p. 5.
Germany, “Peer review visit exercise at the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich, Germany:
civil society observer report”, BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.29, 9 November 2016, https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.29.
Morocco, “Peer review exercise on the national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention(Morocco 9–11 May 2017)”, BWC/MSP/2017/WP.1, 8 November 2017, p. 2, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2017/WP.1.

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III.

Focus

This PRE focused on biosafety and biosecurity, particularly the biorisk and pathogen management
measures adopted by Morocco. Five visits to bio-related institutions were included to facilitate experts’
understandings of how the mechanisms were operationalized in practice in different institutions,allowing for recommendations on how to improve these aspects of the implementation of the BWC.55

IV.

Stakeholders

Approximately 60 experts participated in this event, including national experts from the Ministryof Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
the National Defence, the Gendarmerie Royale, the Ministry of Higher Education, the Ministry ofAgriculture, and two Moroccan biosafety associations: the Moroccan Biosafety Association and
the Moroccan Biosafety, Biosecurity and Sanitary Security Association.
The event also included the participation of 16 international experts from 10 countries(Belgium, China, France, Gabon, Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, Spain,
the United Arab Emirates and the United States) and one international entity, the BWC ISU.56
The exercise was organized with financial support provided by the European Union and wider
support from Belgium, France and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

V.

Process

This exercise was designed to cover a wide range of topics related to the national implementationof the BWC in Morocco. The activities included a day of seminars and presentations related to, interalia, the Moroccan implementation of the BWC, the national system for detection and handling ofpathogens, and disease surveillance and export control measures.57 This was followed by two daysof visits to institutions in Rabat and Casablanca that were designed to provide “first-hand, practicalinsights” into the implementation of such measures in Morocco. The institutions visited were:•

The National Institute for Safety of Food Products, in Rabat•

The animal vaccine production facility of the company Biopharma, in Rabat•

The Moulay Youssef Hospital, in Casablanca•

The National Institute of Hygiene, in Rabat•

The Pasteur Institute of Morocco, in Casablanca

55
56
57

Ibid.
Ibid. Appendixes I and II contain detailed information about the national and international participants.
Ibid, p. 2.

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VI.

Results

The results from the Moroccan PRE were presented in a working paper submitted by Morocco in2017. The working paper outlined extensive positive feedback from international experts, noting theambitious breadth and smooth running of the exercise, the “exemplary level of transparency” andthe “very useful” contribution of civil society experts. It was stated that:[the] presentations not only informed participants about mechanisms and procedures alreadyin place, but also highlighted elements currently missing in Morocco’s implementation…[and]enabled the generation of recommendations for enhanced national implementation and provided
suggestions for areas of deepened international cooperation.58
Among such recommendations identified by international experts, the working paper included
suggestions related to legislation (specifically, drafting a list of dangerous materials and establishingan interministerial structure), the development of a national programme for BWC implementation,and the establishment of a BWC awareness-raising campaign.59
The paper concludes with some overall impressions of the peer review approach, noting that theexercise “contributed towards establishing this approach as an accepted standard under the BWC
that is highly valuable to BWC States Parties”.60
Finally, on 10-11 May 2018 in Rabat, the National Institute of Hygiene together with the Departmentof State of the United States of America organized a seminar in order to develop an action plan toimplement the recommendations agreed during the PRE.61

E.

Georgia

I.

Duration and location

Georgia organized the fifth PRE, which took place on 14–15 November 2018 at the Richard Lugar
Center for Public Health Research of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health(NCDC) in Tbilisi.

58
59
60
61

Morocco, BWC/MSP/2017/WP.1, p. 3.
Ibid, p. 4.
Ibid.
Morocco, “Séminaire sur la mise en œuvre de la Convention sur l’Interdiction des Armes Biologiques et à Toxines 		(Rabat, 10 et 11 Mai 2018)”, BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.5, 3 August 2018, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5.

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II.

Objectives

The BWC working paper summarizing the exercise states that:
The primary objective of this visit was to demonstrate that the Richard Lugar Center for Public
Health Research of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health complies with theprovisions and obligations of the BTWC and that its activities are fully in line with stated peacefulpurposes and the information provided in the relevant Confidence Building Measures (CBM) form.62
The working paper further noted that it hoped the opening up of the facility to scrutiny would“encourage other States Parties to conduct similar visits”.63

III.

Focus

The Georgian PRE was focused on one biological research facility’s compliance with the BWC andincluded a BSL-3 laboratory. The exercise included the assessment of all aspects of the facility relevantto the BWC.

IV.

Stakeholders

Georgian experts from the NCDC, the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs participatedon behalf of the host country.
Following an open call in early 2018 to participate in the PRE, 19 experts were selected from thefollowing states parties: Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Germany,
Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Mali, Montenegro, Myanmar, Uganda, the United Kingdom
and the United States. In addition, three observers from the European External Action Service,
the BWC ISU and King’s College London were present at the exercise.64
Financial support for this exercise was provided by the German Federal Foreign Office.

62

63
64

Georgia and Germany, “Building confidence through transparency: peer review transparency visit at the Richard Lugar
Center for Public Health Research of the National Center for Disease Control and Public Health in Tbilisi, Georgia”,
BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5, 3 December 2018, p. 2, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5.
Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid, pp. 2–3.

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V.

Process

The two-day exercise was “preceded by a welcome ceremony and a briefing on the NCDC’s mission
and research activities”. During the first day, participants were split into two equally sized teams,
which each undertook a tour of the facility. On the second day:four experts received the stipulated security briefings and entered the BSL-3 laboratory, while therest of the group examined the facility’s premises and surrounding buildings, such as warehouses
and an administrative complex.65
Over the course of the two days, the participating experts were permitted to undertake the following
activities: “Examination of laboratories, other rooms, laboratory equipment and installations;requests for visual access to paper documents; interviewing of personnel; and requests forphotographs and the determination of geographical coordinates.”66 All the participants were escorted
during the visit.
The exercise concluded with a closing session that comprised “discussions, a summary, and a final
assessment”.67

VI.

Results

A BWC working paper submitted to the 2018 Meeting of States Parties to the BWC by Georgia andGermany (and co-sponsored by several other states parties) presented the results of the exercise.
In terms of the substantive findings, the report from the international visiting team was annexed to theworking paper. It stated that the “facility demonstrated significant transparency about its activities.
The visiting team observed nothing that was inconsistent with prophylactic, protective and otherpeaceful purposes.”
The working paper also included a general conclusion about the PRE as an instrument, mentioning that:[the] on-site visit demonstrated once more that it is possible to reconcile a high level of transparency
with the legitimate security and intellectual property interests of the visited facility. It is thus
expected that voluntary transparency initiatives will continue to advance the ongoing search forinnovative and concrete ways to increase confidence in the implementation of the BTWC in theabsence of any verification procedures.70

65
66
67
68
69
70

Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid, p. 2.
Ibid, pp. 5–6.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 2.

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F.

Kyrgyzstan

I.

Duration and location

The last PRE organized to date was undertaken by Kyrgyzstan between 2021 and 2022. The preparatory
work started with a series of virtual and in-person meetings in Geneva. Then months later, the exercise
was held in Issyk Kul on 16–18 August 2022.

II.

Objectives

The exercise’s overall objective, as laid out in a Kyrgyz working paper, “was to strengthen national
implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and enhance international co-operation
on related matters”.71

III.

Focus

The exercise was structured around three specific goals: first, to “review and further develop thenational legal framework for BWC implementation and related matters, including the draft biosafety
law currently being developed”; second, to “exchange best practices on the development andimplementation of a comprehensive national approach to biosafety and biosecurity”; third, to“identify opportunities for international cooperation and assistance in the framework of the BWC”.72

IV.

Stakeholders

Twenty-eight representatives from several Kyrgyz ministries or other bodies participated in the PRE,
including the following: the Ministry of Economy and Commerce, the Ministry of Health, the Ministryof Emergency Situations, the Ministry of Defence, the State Committee on National Security, the State
Customs Service, the General Staff of Armed Forces, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Public HealthInstitute, and the Center for Non-proliferation and Export Control.73
In addition, representatives from the following five states parties participated: Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Mongolia, the United States and Uzbekistan.
Experts from various international or regional organizations also participated, representing the following
institutions: the BWC ISU; the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Programme Officein Bishkek; the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs’ Regional Coordinator for United Nations

71

72
73

Kyrgyz Republic, “Efforts of the Kyrgyz Republic in enhancing implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention:peer review exercise under EU Council Decision 2019/97 in support of the Biological Weapons Convention”,
BWC/CONF.IX/WP.52, 13 December 2022, https://undocs.org/en/BWC/CONF.IX/WP.52.
Ibid.
Ibid, p. 1.

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Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) for Asia; the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace andDisarmament in Asia and the Pacific; the Delegation of the European Union to the Kyrgyz Republic;
the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence Regional
Secretariat for Central Asia; the World Organisation for Animal Health; and the International Science andTechnology Center. This exercise was organized with the financial support of the European Union.74

V.

Process

This PRE included an extensive preparatory phase that took place in Geneva.75 In this phase,
the Kyrgyz authorities, together with representatives from the BWC ISU and other organizations,
held in-person and virtual meetings in which they revisited the experiences of previous exercisesand discussed several options for the Kyrgyz exercise. These discussions included the goals andobjectives of the exercise, the selection of best practices to share, the facility to visit, the relevant
Kyrgyz policy documents and the possible participants.76
The second phase consisted of the actual peer review in Kyrgyzstan. This phase involved thesharing of documentation and presentations describing the country’s situation, followed by anexchange among participants attending the meeting and a wrap up session outlining the findings
and identifying good practices.

VI.

Results

The Kyrgyz working paper lays out a number of substantive results emerging from the exercise,including the following points:
This event helped identify good practices and recommendations for the review and finalization ofbiosecurity legislation. The importance of combining legal provisions to create a comprehensive scopeof application of the law, consistent with the BWC and other relevant international instruments, wasparticularly emphasised… A very important activity was mapping the different institutions’ responsibilities,
which resulted in the identification of how to enhance inter-institutional coordination formally.77
The exercise helped to further identify areas in which assistance was required and facilitated preparations
for an official assistance request under the framework of Article X.78 The working paper did not include
further general considerations from the organizers or participants on the role of VTIs or PREs as a tool
for the BWC.
74
75

76
77
78

European Union, Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/97, 21 January 2019, Official Journal of the European Union,
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec/2019/97.
Kyrgyz Republic, “Meeting summary: peer review exercise under EU Council decision 2019/97 in support ofthe Biological Weapons Convention – preparatory meeting on the conduct of a BWC peer review exercise in
the Kyrgyz Republic, International Conference Center Geneva, 12–14 October 2021”, pp. 1–2.
Kyrgyz Republic, “Peer review exercise under EU Council Decision 2019/97 in support of the Biological Weapons 		Convention (BWC)”, preparatory meeting concept note.
Kyrgyz Republic, BWC/CONF.IX/WP.52, p. 2.
Ibid.

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4 Analysis of key elementsof peer review exercises
This section provides an analysis and comparison of the key elements of the PREs that have takenplace so far.
The frequency of the exercises was relatively stable. Since the first PRE in 2013, one exercise washeld each year until 2018, and the last exercise took place in 2022, after the COVID-19 pandemic(Figure 1).

Figure 1. Timeline of peer review exercises
France2013

Germany
2014

2015
Benelux

2016

Georgia
2017

2018

Kyrgystan
2020

2021

2022

MoroccoThe duration of most of the in-person segments of these PRE was three days. However, these
exercises likely required significant preparations. Certainly the Benelux exercise took place overa period of six months, including a document exchange phase as well as in-person meetings;
the Kyrgyz exercise spanned ten months from the first preparatory meeting in Geneva in 2021
to the conclusion of the meeting in Issyk Kul in 2022.
Another element that can be considered is the participants. The identification or selection of participants
was led by the organizers in all cases. The Georgian PRE recruited participants through and open callto participate. However, in other cases, it is not always clear how participating peers were selected.
Overall, 43 states parties participated in the PREs. Most of these states took part once or twice inPREs organized by other states parties, except for the United States, which participated in five, andGermany and the United Kingdom, both of which participated in three. Kyrgyzstan and Luxembourg
are the only states parties which organized a PRE but did not attend other exercises. Even though
representatives from all five UN regional groups participated in the PREs, the states parties that
tended to participate more were from the northern hemisphere.

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29Various international or regional organizations and other UN entities observed one or more
PRE. The United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs’ BWC ISU attended the most exercises(Morocco, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan). Other institutions participated in only one exercise (most ofthem in Kyrgyzstan).79
Civil society representatives participated in four exercises, through the Fondation pour la Recherche
Stratégique (France); the Center for Non-proliferation and Export Control (Kyrgyzstan); the Moroccan
Biosafety Association and the Moroccan Biosafety, Biosecurity and Sanitary Security Association(Morocco); and King’s College London (United Kingdom).
It is clear that issues across the BWC can be interconnected and overlap. Since the PREs lie under
the overarching concept of VTIs, transparency as a concept is an underlying assumption whenplanning and organizing the exercises, as shown in the related working papers submitted to the BWC.
More specific objectives of the exercises tend to involve strengthening national implementation,
augmenting confidence in compliance and enhancing international cooperation.
The main focus of most exercises was the national biosafety and biosecurity regulatory system. Anotherprominent area of focus was providing transparency about the biological research activities undertaken
in national facilities. Although most PREs were concerned with the national legislation and regulations
that states parties had put in place to implement the BWC, two of the PREs were particularly focusedon legislative review, and one was focused on export control measures. International cooperation wasanother area that was often referred to, but the PRE in Kyrgyzstan placed particular emphasis on this.
Table 3. Key focus areas of the peer review exercises

KEY FOCUS AREA

Biosafety
and biosecurity

FRANCEB E N E LU X✓✓

Legislation review✓

Biological military
defence research✓

Biological research

79

MOROCCOGEORGIA✓KY R G Y Z S TA N

✓
✓

✓
✓

International
cooperation
Export control

GERMANY✓✓The other entities included: the European External Action Service, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 		
Europe’s Programme Office in Bishkek, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs’ Regional Coordinator for United
Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) for Asia, the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmamentin Asia and the Pacific, the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence Regional
Secretariat for Central Asia, the World Organisation for Animal Health and the International Science and Technology Center.

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5 Discussion and criticism
concerning peer review exercises
The reports and presentations on the different PREs done in the context of the BWC by organizing
states parties have largely been positive, in terms of both the substantive findings of the exercises
and the experience with the process itself. This is further reflected in statements to BWC meetingsby states parties whose officials participated in these exercises.
However, discussions at BWC meetings have produced a mixed response, with some states parties
criticizing the concepts of PRE and VTI. These different positions are reflected in, among otherdocuments, the Chairpersons’ summary reports of the Meetings of Experts on Institutional
Strengthening of the Convention, where these issues were discussed during the 2017–2020
intersessional programme. For example, in 2019 the Chairperson remarked that:
A number of States Parties highlighted the benefit of other potential means to foster transparency,
cooperation and national implementation such as voluntary peer review exercises, voluntary visits
or other transparency initiatives. Other States Parties underlined that peer reviews are not formal
mechanisms within the Convention, cautioned about the utility of peer review exercises and notedthat such initiatives would in their view not strengthen the Convention.80
Criticism of these initiatives is largely oriented along two lines. For some states parties, they provide
a false sense of assurance, in part because of their voluntary nature.81 For example, Cuba has
expressed scepticism over the value of peer review as “an instrument for assessing the implementationof the Convention given their completely voluntary nature”.82 Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iranstated that “There are serious difficulties with such concepts in the framework of the BWC includinginter alia that they may create a false sense of assurance regarding the national implementationof obligations arising from the Convention”.83 In addition, the Russian Federation has queried the

80
81
82

83

Report of the 2019 Meeting of Experts on Institutional Strengthening of the Convention, BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/2,
4 October 2019, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2019/MX.5/2.
Report of the 2018 Meeting of Experts on Institutional Strengthening of the Convention, BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/3,
8 November 2018, https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2018/MX.5/3.
Cuban intervention at the BWC 2nd Preparatory Committee, 5 April 2022, 10:00h, UNOG Digital Recordings Portal,
https://conf.unog.ch/digitalrecordings/en?guid=public/61.0321/0440B32C-87DE-482D-9459-D165236ECCD8_10h34&position=4970&channel=ENGLISH.
Report of the Meeting of Experts, BWC/MSP/2013/MX/3, p. 33.

DISCUSSION AND CRITICISM CONCERNING PEER REVIEW EXERCISES

31

usefulness of peer review mechanisms to increase transparency.84 Moreover, in one case, a PRE
resulted in the submission of a note verbale criticizing the procedure, objectives and achievementsof the exercise and stating that it created “an illusion of legitimacy and transparency”.85
Similar sentiments emerge from scholarly research interviews around this topic. For example, a study
undertaken by Johns Hopkins University suggested that “numerous interviewees discussed thevalue of peer review and voluntary site visits”, but notes that “One state party insisted that because
host countries have full control of access to facilities, personnel, activities, and information, theassurance that voluntary activities provide is largely illusory”.86
Some states parties have also been critical of the value of voluntary measures in “the absence ofa protocol including verification mechanisms”.87 Moreover, some states have expressed concernthat the organization of these activities could distract from work on a formal multilaterally negotiatedverification mechanism.88 China has stated that voluntary initiatives should contribute to “rather
than hinder the eventual conclusion of a legally-binding verification protocol”,89 which remains apriority for many state parties.

84

85
86
87

88
89

Russian Federation. “Statement by the Representative of the Russian Delegation at the Meeting of States Parties to the
85 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) on Paragraph 5 of the Agenda ‘General Debate’”, 3 December
2019, https://unoda-documents-library.s3.amazonaws.com/Biological_Weapons_Convention_-_Meeting_of_States_
Parties_(2019)/RF%2BStatement%2B.pdf.
BWC Implementation Support Unit, “Note Verbale by the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to theUnited Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva (Ref. 3663, 10 October 2018)”, 11 October 2018.
Matthew P. Shearer et al., “BWC assurance: increasing certainty in BWC compliance”, The Nonproliferation Review 29,
no. 1–3 (2022): 47–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2023.2178099.
Venezuelan intervention at the BWC 2nd Preparatory Committee, 4 April 2022, 15:00h, UNOG Digital Recordings Portal,
https://conf.unog.ch/digitalrecordings/index.html?guid=public/61.0321/BE1E660B-C98F-4D9C-9937-0620B1510BBE_15h05&position=3749&channel=ENGLISH.
Richard Guthrie, “MX1 on cooperation and assistance: setting the scene” MX Report 1, 23 August 2021,
BioWeapons Prevention Project, https://www.cbw-events.org.uk/MX20-combined.pdf.
China, “Reinforcing the mechanism of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction”,
BWC/CONF.IX/WP.33, 29 November 2022, https://undocs.org/en/BWC/CONF.IX/WP.33.

DISCUSSION AND CRITICISM CONCERNING PEER REVIEW EXERCISES

32

6 Reflections on benefits,
limitations and opportunities
As this report has indicated, VTIs such as PREs applied in the context of the BWC are not a replacement
for a verification mechanism or other formal mechanisms to assess compliance. However, these
initiatives have stimulated interest and served as a flexible tool that can generate several benefits
in circumstances where multilateral negotiation on a package of measures to strengthen the BWC
was not possible.
First, PREs and other voluntary measures can increase transparency in selected areas, suchas biosafety and biosecurity and the national regulatory framework, which are critical for sound
implementation of the BWC in the twenty first century.
Second, these initiatives can play a role in enhancing national implementation through theidentification of existing gaps in national systems, and enable discussion around opportunities for
improvements. Furthermore, they can help raise awareness of implementation obligations and allow
for the exchange of good practices and experiences among national and international experts.
Third, peer review-type initiatives can play a role in building networks of stakeholders involved in
the implementation of the Convention, including, in some cases, non-governmental representatives.
They present a unique opportunity to bring together different agencies of the government to discuss
pertinent issues and for national representatives to collectively work on treaty implementation. Suchdiscussions can increase awareness, understanding and communication on specific technical topics.
Creating networks of experts from the host countries, as well as other international participants, that
can act as guardians of compliance is a sustainable way of continuing to enforce the BWC.
Fourth, these initiatives offer a vehicle for international cooperation and assistance. Gaps
identified during an exercise can be addressed by the organising states, but when necessary could
also be translated into requests for cooperation and assistance under Article X of the Convention.
Many states parties are already offering assistance to enhance biosecurity and strengthen theimplementation of the BWC. Peer review could offer one route to better understand issues andoptimise assistance activities to the specific needs of the recipient.
While there are, therefore, clear benefits to PREs, there are also limitations. As illustrated in thisreport, PREs are a flexible tool. Since each state party implements the BWC in accordance with its
national circumstances and priorities, it is important to have an adaptable tool that can cover a rangeof possible requirements and be tailored to different contexts. However, the lack of a consolidated
framework can also present a point of vulnerability – a concern that has been raised by some. Suchis the diversity of peer review processes that there is a risk the term could become overstretched.
Indeed, it is already difficult to assess peer review initiatives through a comparative analysis or
standardized approach.

R E F L E C T I O N S O N B E N E F I T S , L I M I TAT I O N S A N D O P P O R T U N I T I E S

33A related issue is that the organizing states largely retain control over the objectives, areas of focus,
the participants, and the information revealed in a PRE. A bottom-up approach is important ingenerating ownership and ensuring the agenda of topics addresses the needs of those involved.
However, it is also a limitation since it minimizes the extent to which a PRE, or indeed any flexible
voluntary initiative of this sort, can provide assurance to all states parties.
To address these challenges, one option is for states parties to develop a series of templates offormats or agendas to address specific topics of interest. This could include setting the focus,
process, objectives and the criteria for the information to be revealed, including through visits tofacilities, for a geographically representative set of international expert observers. Such a step could
further advance transparency as well as build an understanding of the advantages and disadvantagesof such visits, which could assist in the ongoing activities of the Working Group on the Strengtheningof the Convention. Ideally, states parties would work towards collectively agreeing to these templates.
However, groups of like-minded states parties developing and using a set of templates could be afirst step.
Finally, it is unclear from interviews and documentary research the extent to which PREs haveenduring value in increasing transparency and enhancing national implementation. Thesemechanisms can provide a snapshot of a situation at any given time, and while a PRE can identify
gaps and generate lessons to be learned, it is not always clear if or how gaps are subsequently filled
and lessons absorbed. Therefore, in any future initiative there could be value to integrating methods
in the project design phase to capture impact after the conclusion of the project.
This report has shown that PREs have mostly been a positive tool for those states parties involved
and that they can be useful in the BWC context. The report has also discussed the concerns that
other states parties have raised, along with some specific limitations of these instruments. Given
that six exercises have been organized so far, each varying significantly, there could be value tofurther discussion and an exchange of “information and best practices on voluntary transparency
exercises conducted by BTWC States parties”,90 as proposed by a collective of states during theNinth Review Conference in 2022. Such a discussion could also consider the lessons learned andaddress or mitigate any issues, should there be an interest to continue work in this area.
It is important to reiterate, though, that the organization of any VTI or PRE is not a substitute for a
verification regime and should not replace existing CBMs or preclude any future mechanism tostrengthen the Convention. However, as this report demonstrates, states parties that are interested
in taking forward such initiatives can find in them a useful tool to strengthen the BWC and the wider
biosecurity regime.

90

Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, France, Georgia, Germany, Luxembourg, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands
and Spain, “An exchange platform for voluntary transparency exercises”, BWC/CONF.IX/WP.21, 16 November 2022,
https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.IX/WP.21.

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34

APPENDIX

The national
biosafety andbiosecurity system,
including thenational authorization and control
system for manipulating dangerous
pathogens.

Provide proof ofconcept of the PRE
proposal submitted
by France.

Awareness raising
policy, including
the courses,
trainings andguidelines on
biosafety andbiosecurity implemented by different
institutions.

The national export
control systemwith a focus on
the licensing
procedures fordual-use biologicalmaterials andrelated equipment.

FOCUS

MAIN OBJECTIVESNational non-governmental
experts from the Fondation
pour la Recherche
Stratégique (FRS).

Other state party experts
from: Canada, China,
Germany, India, Mexico,
Morocco, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom andthe United States.

National experts from: theMinistry of Foreign Affairs(Strategic Affairs andDisarmament Department),
the French National Agency
for Medicines and Health
Products Safety (ANSM),
the Ministry of Industrial
Renewal, the Pasteur
Institute of the Ministry of
Health, the Animal Health
Laboratory of the French
Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational
Health and Safety (ANSES),
the National Institutefor Health and Medical
Research (INSERM)
and the French Military
Health Service.

S TA K E H O L D E R S

Presentations bytechnical expertson the three areasof focus, followedby visits to two laboratories: first, the unit
created by the French
Ministry of Health at
the Pasteur Instituteto respond to specialized biologicalemergencies(Cellule d'Intervention
Biologique d'Urgence– CIBU) in Paris;
second, the ANSES
Animal Health Laboratory in MaisonsAlfort.

EXERCISE PROCESS

1 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2013/WP.8 https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VII/WP.28 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2014/WP.3

4–6 December
20131

Paris and
Maisons-Alfort

FRANCEL O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE)Some participants were sceptical
about how useful implementing
a PRE through the BWC would
be and indicated a preference fora more formal verification regime
instead.

It was proposed to make use ofavailable tools under the BWC
to share best practices andinformation identified in the
PRE with all states parties.

Some indicated that it would be
useful to expand the focus to otherareas (e.g. response to alleged
use and international cooperation),while others would have preferreda narrower focus.

It was considered useful tostrengthen national implementation
through identifying gaps and goodpractices, both for France and forother participating states.

The PRE was considered usefulas a transparency tool that could
strengthen confidence between theparties. The visits to laboratories
were particularly useful.

R E S U LT S

Voluntary Transparency Initiatives: The Case of Peer Review
Exercises in the Context of the BWC M A R Í A J . E S P O N A

35

APPENDIX

36

Enable feedback on
CBMs and increasing
their role as a declaration tool within theConvention.

Contribute to discussion at the Eighth
BWC Review Conference by presenting
the PRE experience.

Raising awarenessof BWC among
national stakeholders, encouraging
participation in
relevant inter-agency
initiatives.

Contribute tobuilding confidence
between states
parties.

National biologicalmilitary researchand development
programmes andresearch centres
and laboratories(as declared in CBM
Form A).

Improve the implementation of theConvention at thenational level
through the review of
elements of national
implementation andthe sharing of bestpractices.
National legislation,
regulations, andother measuresrelated to BWC
implementation(as declared in
CBM Form E),
focusing on nationaloversight ofbiosafety andbiosecurity.

FOCUS

MAIN OBJECTIVESNational experts
from the departments of defence,
public health, andforeign affairs of
the three states
parties.

S TA K E H O L D E R S

2 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2015/WP.12 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2015/MX/WP.13/Rev.1

June toNovember
20152

Brussels,
Dudelange,
Esch-Sur
Alzette,Rijswijk,
Bilthoven

BELGIUMLUXEMBOURG
and the
NETHERLANDSL O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued

The Centre for Applied
Molecular Technologiesof the Defence
Laboratory Department
in Brussels, Belgium,on 9 November.
The Health National
Laboratory in
Dudelange, and the Instituteof Health in Esch-Sur
Alzette, Luxembourg,on 17 November.
The Organisation forApplied Scientific Researchin Rijswijk and the National
Institute of Public Healthand the Environment inBilthoven, the Kingdomof the Netherlands, on
27 November.

•

•

•

In-person phase in each stateparty that included a meeting
to clarify points on the shared
CBM forms and visits to thefollowing relevant facilities
declared in the Form A:

Written phase in which experts
from each country assessed
Forms A and E of one another’s
2015 CBMs.

EXERCISE PROCESS

Participants identified the valueof organizing a preparatory
meeting ahead of the in-person
visit to increase its effectiveness.

Participants indicated thatthe process provided in-depth
feedback on CBMs, improving
the accessibility and relevanceof the CBMs of the participating
countries.

The PRE format (written phasefollowed by in-country visits)
was found useful in improving
national implementation, increasing international cooperation andraising awareness of the BWC
among national stakeholders.

R E S U LT SAPPENDIX

37

Complianceassessment of amilitary facility,
including among
other things:
laboratory
activities andequipment,
infrastructure,
security
measures, laboratory conduct,
documentationin relation toresearch anddevelopment,
as well as procedures for thetransfer andexport ofpathogens andtoxins.

Test whether a peer
review visit could
serve as a tool toincrease transparency with regard
to research anddevelopment
activities.

Share bestpractices, discussnational implementation systems,
raise awareness andestablish contacts
that could serve toincrease international cooperation.

Contribute to therelevance and valueof the peer review
concept.

FOCUS

MAIN OBJECTIVES

Other state party
experts and civil society
experts from: Algeria,
Austria, Belgium,
Burundi, France,
Georgia, Indonesia,
Jordan, Lithuania,
Myanmar,the Kingdom of theNetherlands, Nigeria,
Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Saudi Arabia,
Switzerland, Uganda,
the United Kingdom
the United States
and Yemen.

National experts from:the Federal Foreign
Office, the Ministry of
Defence,the Bundeswehr
Verification Centre, theBundeswehr Instituteof Microbiology and theGerman Partnership
Programme for Excellence in Biological and
Health Security.

S TA K E H O L D E R S

Visiting team: fourbiology experts and six
observers participatedin a pre-visit briefing
and a tour of the
facility.
Monitoring team: ten
participants monitored
the exercise andattended presentations
about legal and policy
matters, biosecurity
and biosafety.
The visiting team prepareda summary report incollaboration with themonitoring team and thefacility staff. The report
was discussed between
the participants in the final
session.

••Participants wereorganized in two groups:

Visit to a military researchfacility declared in theGerman CBM Form A,
part 2 (iii): the Bundeswehr Institute of Microbiology in Munich.

EXERCISE PROCESS

The report included suggestions
for the planning and methodology that could be used in acompliance assessment of amilitary facility.

Visits were also considered
useful for the exchange of goodpractices among all participants.

It was considered that visits
could be an appropriate meansof increasing transparency
and demonstrating a facility’scompliance with the BWC.

The report highlighted thatthe objectives of the exercise
were met.

R E S U LT S

3 https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.11 https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.VIII/WP.29 Filippa Lentzos, “Increasing transparency in biodefense: a 2016 visit to a German
military medical biodefence facility”, Non-Proliferation Papers no. 52, (EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, November 2016).

2–4 August
20163

MunichGERMANYL O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued

APPENDIX

38

Biosafety, biosecurity, biorisk
and pathogen
management
measures.

To strengthen
national implementation of the BWC;
to improve
confidence incompliance byincreased transparency; and todeepen international
cooperation.

A further overarching objective
was to broaden
support for the peer
review mechanism
concept.

FOCUS

MAIN OBJECTIVES

4 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2017/WP.1

9–11 May
20174

Rabat andCasablanca

MOROCCOL O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

One representative fromthe BWC Implementation
Support Unit.

National non-governmental
experts from two biosafety
associations: the Moroccan
Biosafety Association and
the Moroccan Biosafety,
Biosecurity and Sanitary
Security Association.

Other state party experts
from: Belgium, China,
France, Gabon, Germany,
the Kingdom of theNetherlands, Saudi Arabia,
Spain, the United ArabEmirates and the UnitedStates.

National experts from:
the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the Ministryof Health, the Ministryof Interior, the Ministry ofForeign Trade, the National
Defence, the Gendarmerie
Royale, the Ministry ofHigher Education, andthe Ministry of Agriculture.

S TA K E H O L D E R S

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued

National Institutefor Safety of Food
Products, in Rabat
Animal vaccine
production facilityof the company
Biopharma, in Rabat
Moulay Youssef
Hospital, in Casablanca
National Institute ofHygiene, in Rabat
Pasteur Instituteof Morocco, inCasablanca
The following year a seminar
was organized to develop an
action plan to implement therecommendations agreed
during the PRE.

•

•

•

•

•

Two days of visits to fiveinstitutions:

One day of seminars andpresentations on, inter alia,
the Moroccan implementation of the BWC, the national
system for detection andhandling of pathogens, anddisease surveillance andexport control measures.

EXERCISE PROCESSThe PRE generated
recommendations for
Morocco regarding
legislation, the development of a national programfor BWC implementation
and a BWC awarenessraising campaign. Notably,a follow-up seminar wasorganized to implement
these recommendations.

The contributions of civilsociety experts wererecognised as useful.

Presentations on both
existing measuresand gaps in national
implementation were foundto be helpful for experts
to generate recommendations.

R E S U LT SAPPENDIX

39

FOCUS

Biological research
activities and otherrelevant aspects of
the Richard Lugar
Center, including
its biological safetylevel 3 laboratory.

MAIN OBJECTIVES

Demonstrate that
the Richard Lugar
Center for Public
Health Researchcomplies with theprovisions andobligations of the
BWC, and that theactivities taking
place have peacefulpurposes and areconsistent with theinformation
provided in therelevant CBM form.

One observer from a
non-governmentalorganization, King’s
College London.

Observers from theEuropean External Action
Service and the BWC
Implementation Support
Unit.

On the second day,four participants
entered the Biosafety
Level 3 laboratory,
while others examined
the facility premises.

Other state party experts
from: Austria, Bosnia andHerzegovina, Cameroon,
Chile, Colombia, Germany,
Hungary, Iraq, Italy,
Kazakhstan, Malaysia,
Mali, Montenegro,
Myanmar, Uganda,
the United Kingdom
and the United States.
At the closing session,
participants undertooka final assessment of
the exercise. A report
was drafted by theinternational visiting
team’s leader.

During the first day,participants were split
into two equally sizedteams, which eachundertook a tour ofthe facility anddiscussed research
activities.

EXERCISE PROCESSNational experts from:the Richard Lugar Center
for Public Health Researchof the National Center for
Disease Control and Public
Health, the Ministry of
Health and the Ministryof Foreign Affairs.

S TA K E H O L D E R S

5 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2018/WP.5 https://undocs.org/BWC/MSP/2018/MX.3/WP.2

14–15
November
2018 5

TbilisiGEORGIA

L O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued

The participants concluded thaton-site visits can reconcile ahigh level of transparency withthe legitimate security andintellectual property interestsof the visited facility.

R E S U LT SAPPENDIX

40

Opportunities
for international
cooperation andassistance.

A comprehensive
national approachto biosafety andbiosecurity.

National legal
framework andrelated matters,
including the draft
biosafety law underdevelopment.

Strengthen national
implementation.

Enhanceinternational
cooperation.

FOCUS

MAIN OBJECTIVES

Observers from eightinternational and regionalorganizations, including
the BWC Implementation
Support Unit.

Other state party
experts from: Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Mongolia,
the United States andUzbekistan.

National experts from: theMinistry of Economy andCommerce, the Ministryof Health, the Ministryof Emergency Situations,
the Ministry of Defence,
the State Committee on
National Security, theState Customs Service,
the General Staff of Armed
Forces, the Ministry ofAgriculture, the Public
Health Institute andthe Center for Nonproliferation and Export
Control.

S TA K E H O L D E R S

A visit to the
Cholpon-Ata citylaboratory wasplanned but
didn’t take place.

Exercise in
Kyrgyzstan that
included presentations describing thecountry’s situationand discussions.

Preparatory phasethat included
in-person and virtual
meetings in Geneva,
Switzerland,
12–14 October 2021.

EXERCISE PROCESSThe exercise helped to identify inwhich specific areas assistanceis required and how to prepare theofficial request in the frameworkof Article X of the BWC.

The mapping the different
institutions’ responsibilities
resulted in the identificationof how to enhance interinstitutional coordination formally.

The exercise helped identify goodpractices and recommendations
for the review and finalization of
the biosecurity legislation.

R E S U LT S

6 https://undocs.org/BWC/CONF.IX/WP.52 Kyrgyz Republic, “Meeting summary: peer review exercise under EU Council decision 2019/97 in support of the Biological Weapons
Convention – preparatory meeting on the conduct of a BWC peer review exercise in the Kyrgyz Republic, International conference Center Geneva, 12–14 October 2021”, pp. 1–2.

Preparatory
work: Geneva,
Switzerland,
12–14 October
20216

16–18 August2022

Issyk Kul

KYRGYZSTANL O C AT I O N
A N D D AT E

Appendix: Matrix of past peer review exercises (PRE) continued

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