A REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR

NATIONAL WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION MANAGEMENTBASELINE ASSESSMENTS
HARDY GIEZENDANNER & HIMAYU SHIOTANIUNIDIRiACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Support from UNIDIR core funders provides the foundation for all the Institute’s activities. This
research is supported by the Governments of Finland, Germany and Switzerland.
UNIDIR is thankful for the cooperation of the governments of eleven States – Burkina Faso, theCentral African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Iraq, Liberia,
the Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Somalia – that have conducted weapons and ammunition
management (WAM) baseline assessments at the national level, together with UNIDIR, in
cooperation with regional, United Nations and other partners (2015–2020). The Institute extends
sincere thanks to the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States (Peace andSecurity Division, Small Arms and Light Weapons Department) and the African Union (Peace andSecurity Department) for their continuous support and cooperation in this area of work. UNIDIR also
thanks its United Nations partners, including the United Nations Mine Action Service, the United
Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, the United Nations Department of Peace Operations(Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section), and other United Nations entities andpartners. The authors, and the entire UNIDIR Conventional Arms Programme WAM research team,wish to thank all government officials, representatives, experts and practitioners who supported,
directly or indirectly, the development of this document (e.g. through participation in national
WAM baseline assessments and consultative processes, other meetings or events, research andrelated activities, and reviews of drafts). The development of this document would not have beenpossible without all these partners and individuals. UNIDIR extends sincere thanks to all of them fortheir cooperation and collaboration as well as their support of the Institute’s research-based andinformed approach to advancing and strengthening WAM policy and practice, at different levels
and in different contexts. The authors extend special thanks to Savannah de Tessières and Paul
Holtom. At UNIDIR, Mohamed Lamine Coulibaly, Anna Edna Esi Mensah, Manuel Martinez Miralles,
and Simon Yazgi have provided substantive, research and other support during the drafting andproduction process.
Design and layout: Eric M. Schulz. Photos courtesy of UN Photo and UN Missions.
NOTES
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply
the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations
concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning
the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole
responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of theUnited Nations, UNIDIR, its staff members or sponsors.
ABOUT UNIDIRThe United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) – an autonomous institute within
the United Nations – conducts research on disarmament and security. UNIDIR is based in Geneva,
Switzerland, the centre for bilateral and multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation negotiations, and home of the Conference on Disarmament. The Institute explores current issues pertaining
to a variety of existing and future armaments, as well as global diplomacy and local tensions andconflicts. Working with researchers, diplomats, government officials, NGOs and other institutions
since 1980, UNIDIR acts as a bridge between the research community and governments. UNIDIR
activities are funded by contributions from governments and donor foundations.
unidir.org | © UNIDIR 2021

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REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

This Reference Methodology for National Weapons and Ammunition Management Baseline
Assessments is a UNIDIR Tool, designed to contribute to ongoing State efforts to strengthen
governance, oversight, accountability and management of arms and ammunition throughout theirlife cycle at the national level in order to prevent diversion and misuse, address illicit proliferation,and reduce and mitigate risks associated with unplanned explosions.
This reference methodology should be considered a working document subject to changes,
additions, editions, updates and corrections. The working reference methodology document ismeant to stimulate discussion, debate and feedback. It is to be understood as a reference: it does
not pursue a “one size fits all” approach but recognizes that it is one of several methods available
to the community of practice in conducting national assessments on weapons and ammunition
management. The authors may revise and correct the text without announcing the edits or issuing aformal erratum. As such, users are encouraged to use the most up-to-date version of this reference
methodology, as posted on the unidir.org site.
The use of this reference methodology is voluntary. UNIDIR welcomes and encourages all feedback
on improving the present methodology and building on it for future iterations.
Please share comments and feedback with cap-unidir@un.org.

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iv

TABLE OF CONTENTSREFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARY................................................................................................................................ xiii
MODULE 1: INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE, AND CONTEXT (SECTIONS 1-3)............................................. 1
1. INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1. Why weapons and ammunition management matters.............................................................................................. 1
1.2. Advancing WAM policy and practice: UNIDIR’s approach...................................................................................... 2
1.3. About this reference methodology............................................................................................................................... 3
1.4. Audience of this document............................................................................................................................................ 5
1.5. Structure of this document............................................................................................................................................. 6
1.6. Key working terms and definitions............................................................................................................................... 7
1.7. General and guiding principles..................................................................................................................................... 8
1.7.1. National ownership................................................................................................................................................... 8
1.7.2. Comprehensive and integrated approach to WAM................................................................................................... 8
1.7.3. Inclusive, consultative and participatory................................................................................................................... 8
1.7.4. Gender sensitivity...................................................................................................................................................... 9
1.7.5. Safety and security.................................................................................................................................................... 9
2. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT........................................................ 11
3. CONTEXT AND SITUATION RELEVANT TO NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT.......................................... 15
3.1. National normative framework.................................................................................................................................... 16
3.2. Applicable international, regional and subregional instruments........................................................................... 17
3.2.1. United Nations Security Council............................................................................................................................. 17
3.2.2. International instruments........................................................................................................................................ 17
3.2.3. Regional and subregional instruments.................................................................................................................... 18
3.3. Synergies and linkages to broader security processes.......................................................................................... 20
3.3.1. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of United Nations arms embargoes................................... 20
3.3.2. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of DDR................................................................................ 21
3.3.3. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of SSR................................................................................ 21
3.3.4. National WAM baseline assessments in different armed violence contexts, including in local andurban settings.......................................................................................................................................................... 22

MODULE 2: PLANNING AND DESIGN (SECTION 4).................................................................................. 25
4. PLANNING AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS FOR A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT......................... 25
4.1. Stakeholders and participation................................................................................................................................... 25
4.1.1. National actors........................................................................................................................................................ 25
4.1.1.1. Political stakeholders..................................................................................................................................... 25
4.1.1.2. Competent national authorities and focal points.......................................................................................... 26
4.1.2. Regional and subregional organizations................................................................................................................. 26
4.1.3. CSOs at the national level....................................................................................................................................... 27
4.1.4. Assistance-providing and partner States................................................................................................................ 28
4.1.5. United Nations entities........................................................................................................................................... 29
4.1.6. Other international and regional organizations and entities.................................................................................. 30

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4.1.7. Specialized international NGOs.............................................................................................................................. 30
4.2. Scope of a baseline assessment................................................................................................................................ 31
4.2.1. General.................................................................................................................................................................... 31
4.2.2. Assessment of current institutional processes, capacities and practices.............................................................. 32
4.2.3. Identification of WAM needs and challenges........................................................................................................ 33
4.2.4. Identification of assistance needs.......................................................................................................................... 34
4.2.5. Options to strengthen a national WAM framework............................................................................................... 34
4.2.6. Drafting of a road map to strengthen a national WAM framework....................................................................... 35
4.3. Additional specific design considerations................................................................................................................ 36
4.3.1. Specific considerations related to security............................................................................................................. 36
4.3.2. Specific considerations related to safety................................................................................................................ 36
4.3.3. Relevant international standards and guidelines providing the point of reference to the methodology............... 37
4.4. Practical pre-assessment planning considerations................................................................................................ 38
4.4.1. Expression of interest by the host Government...................................................................................................... 38
4.4.2. Preparation mission and meetings with stakeholders in the country..................................................................... 38
4.4.3. Consideration pertaining to the use of information and the report........................................................................ 39
4.4.4. Composition of an assessment team...................................................................................................................... 39
4.4.5. Pre-assessment desk research and information collection.................................................................................... 40
4.4.6. Mapping of stakeholders, existing initiatives and activities.................................................................................. 41
4.4.7. Timing of assessment.............................................................................................................................................. 41
4.4.8. Modalities and format of dialogue during the baseline assessment..................................................................... 42
4.4.9. Considerations pertaining to possible site visits.................................................................................................... 44
4.4.10. Summary of pre-assessment resources................................................................................................................ 45
4.4.11. Overview of operational resource considerations................................................................................................ 46

MODULE 3: IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING (SECTIONS 5-6)....................................................... 49
5. CONDUCTING A WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT............................................................................................................ 49
5.1. General............................................................................................................................................................................ 49
5.2. National coordination mechanism.............................................................................................................................. 51
5.2.1. Key guiding questions............................................................................................................................................. 51
5.3. Legal and regulatory framework at the national level............................................................................................. 53
5.3.1. Key guiding questions............................................................................................................................................. 53
5.4. Transfer controls............................................................................................................................................................ 55
5.4.1. Key guiding questions............................................................................................................................................. 56
5.5. Stockpile management................................................................................................................................................. 59
5.5.1. Weapons.................................................................................................................................................................. 59
5.5.1.1. Key guiding questions.................................................................................................................................... 60
5.5.2. Ammunition............................................................................................................................................................. 61
5.5.2.1. Key guiding questions.................................................................................................................................... 62
5.6. Marking............................................................................................................................................................................ 66
5.6.1. Key guiding questions............................................................................................................................................. 67
5.7. Recordkeeping............................................................................................................................................................... 70
5.7.1. Key guiding questions............................................................................................................................................. 71
5.8. Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition............................................................................................................. 74
5.8.1. Key guiding questions............................................................................................................................................. 75
5.9. Processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition................................................................................ 78
5.9.1. Key guiding questions............................................................................................................................................. 78
5.10. Weapons collection.............................................................................................................................................. 80

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5.10.1. Key guiding questions........................................................................................................................................... 80
5.11. Disposal including destruction.................................................................................................................................. 83
5.11.1. Weapons................................................................................................................................................................ 84
5.11.1.1. Key guiding questions.................................................................................................................................. 84
5.11.2. Ammunition........................................................................................................................................................... 85
5.11.2.1. Key guiding questions.................................................................................................................................................85
6. REPORTING ON NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENTS...................................................................................... 89

MODULE 4: REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY (SECTION 7).................................................................... 93
7. REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY......................................................................................................................................... 93
7.1. Informing regional and subregional road maps on WAM....................................................................................... 93
7.2. Local- or subnational-level baseline assessment.................................................................................................... 93
7.3. Refining the scope of the methodology..................................................................................................................... 94
7.4. Introducing measurability of maturity covered under this methodology............................................................. 94
7.5. Supporting follow-through implementation by improved coordination................................................................ 94

ANNEXES:GENERIC TEMPLATES FOR PLANNING, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A NATIONAL
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT BASELINE ASSESSMENT...................................... 97
ANNEX I. Template programme of work for a national WAM baseline assessment................................................ 97
ANNEX II. Template draft agenda for a national WAM baseline assessment......................................................... 106
ANNEX III. Template table of options for the development of a national WAM framework.................................. 110
ANNEX IV. Template outline of a national WAM baseline assessment report......................................................... 113

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LIST OF BOXES AND FIGURES
Figure 1.		
Situating a national baseline assessment
Box 1.
International legally and politically binding instruments (arms control)
Box 2.
Sub-/regional politically and legally binding instruments (arms control):		Africa
Box 3. 		
10 key WAM functional areas
Box 4. 		
Tip on assessing institutional processes, capacities and practices
Box 5. 		
Tip on scope of assessment and time management
Box 6.
Tip for facilitation
Box 7. 		
Tip for contextualizing the national WAM road map
Box 8.
Tip for planners on ammunition technical personnel as part of assessment
		teamBox 9.
Tip for remote preparatory ‘missions’ (preparatory virtual meetings)
Box 10. 		
Tip for planners on high-level segment planning
Box 11.
Tips for assessors during the technical consultative sessions
Box 12.
Tips on in-country venue for the consultative meetings
Box 13.
General guiding questions
Box 14. 		
Tips on facilitating assessment of the national coordination mechanism
Box 15. 		
Tips on facilitating an assessment of the legal and regulatory framework
Box 16.
Tips on facilitating an assessment of transfer controls
Box 17.
Tips on facilitating an assessment of stockpile management (weapons)Box 18.
Tips on facilitating an assessment of stockpile management (ammunition)
Box 19.
Tips on assessment, facilitation and dialogue marking
Box 19.
Tips on facilitating an assessment of marking
Box 20. 		
Tips on facilitating an assessment of recordkeeping
Box 21.
Tips on facilitating an assessment of arms tracing and profiling of		ammunition
Box 22.
Tips for facilitating an assessment of the processing of illicit arms and		treatment of illicit ammunition
Box 23. 		
Tips on facilitating an assessment of weapons collection
Box 24. 		
Tips on facilitating an assessment of disposal including destruction
Box 25. 		
Tip for reporting in a multilateral peace operation context
Box 26. 		
Explanatory note on template programme of work and draftingBox 27. 		
Explanatory note: Template draft outline national WAM baseline assessment
		report
Box 28. 		
Explanatory note: Template draft outline of a national WAM baseline		assessment report, international and sub-/regional instruments (arms		control)

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ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Hardy Giezendanner is a researcher at the Conventional Arms Programme of
UNIDIR. He specializes in research on the prevention of diversion, illicit flow ofarms and ammunition, United Nations arms embargoes, weapons and ammunition
management, as well as, more recently, counter-terrorism and conflict prevention.
Hardy has previously worked for the Arms Embargo Cell of the United Nations
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo(MONUSCO), the United Nations Mine Action Service, UNIDIR, MONUSCO, Geneva
Call, UNIDIR, and the Swiss Federal Department for Foreign Affairs. He hasadvanced postgraduate studies; a master’s degree in international relations, peaceand security studies from the Institute for International Studies in Barcelona; and abachelor’s degree in international relations from the University of Geneva.
Himayu Shiotani is the Head of International Policy at Conflict Armament Research(CAR). He is also a non-resident fellow at UNIDIR. Prior to his time at CAR, Himayu
was the Head of the Conventional Arms Programme at UNIDIR. Himayu specializes
in research strategy and policy advisory on conventional weapons to promoteknowledge on the regulation of the global arms trade, armed violence reduction,
explosive hazard risk mitigation, and weapons and ammunition management inWest and Central Africa, as well as in Iraq and Somalia. Prior to his work with theUnited Nations, he served as a research associate at the James Martin Center for
Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California. He holds a master’s degree in international policy studies, with a certificate in nonproliferation studies, from theMiddlebury Institute of International Studies.

UNIDIRix

ABOUT THE RESEARCH TEAM
Mohamed Lamine Coulibaly is a non-resident Researcher for the ConventionalArms Programme at UNIDIR. His areas of expertise include conflict prevention
and management, armed violence, nonproliferation and disarmament, weapon
and ammunition management, prevention of diversion and the illicit flow of arms
and ammunition. He assists in baseline weapons and ammunition management
assessments in the African region and develops partnerships with African regionalorganizations. Prior to his work with UNIDIR, Mohamed worked with UNDP, UNREC,ECOWAS, and OXFAM. He has degrees in Economics from the Université de Reims
Champagne-Ardenne and the Ecole Nationale D’Administration, France.
Anna Edna Esi Mensah is an Associate Researcher at the Conventional Arms
Programme of UNIDIR. She focuses on regional and national approaches toweapons and ammunition management, regulating arms transfers and theprevention of diversion. Prior to joining UNIDIR, she worked on a United States
Department of State technical assistance programme in Africa, where she assisted
in developing and implementing training programmes aimed at building capacityof criminal justice and law enforcement officials on various international security
issues. With her team, she assisted in training over 4,000 security professionals on a wide range of topics including arms control, trafficking in persons, crime
scene investigations, financial and cybercrimes investigation, gender and security.
Anna holds a Bachelor Degree in Political Science and French from the Universityof Ghana and the University of Strasbourg, and a Master’s Degree in International
Relations and Political Science from the Graduate Institute of Geneva.
Manuel Martinez Miralles is a Liaison Officer at UNIDIR, based in New York.
Previously he worked as a Researcher at UNIDIR’s Conventional Arms Programme.
Manuel’s areas of expertise include arms transfer controls, armed violence, weapons
and ammunition management, diversion prevention, illicit trafficking, and arms andammunition in criminal activities. He joined UNIDIR after five years of working on
peace and disarmament issues at the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace,
Disarmament, and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC). He
spearheaded more than 40 initiatives in Latin American and Caribbean countries training more than 300 government officials. He holds a master’s degree in Public
Administration from the Monterey Institute of International Studies and a B.A. in
Business Administration from University Complutense of Madrid.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ATT		
AU		
CVR		
CSO		
DDR		
ECOWAS
EU		
EOD		
FP		
		
HQ		
IED		
IATG		
INTERPOL
ITI		
		
		
M&E		
MOSAIC		
NGO		
NCB		
PSCs		PSSM		SALW		
SDG		
SME		
SSR		
SOP		
UN		
UNDP		UNGA		UNIDIR		UNMAS		UNODA		UNODC		UNREC		UNPoA				UNRoCA		UNSC		UN PoE		
UN GoE		
WAM		
WCO		

Arms Trade Treaty
African Union
community violence reduction
civil society organization
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
Economic Community of West African States
European Union
explosive ordnance disposal
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their 		
Parts and Components and Ammunition (“Firearms Protocol”)
headquarters
improvised explosive device
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines
International Criminal Police Organization
International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely 		and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons(“International Tracing Instrument”)
monitoring and evaluation
Modular Small-arms control Implementation Compendium
non-governmental organization
National Central Bureau
private security companies
Physical security and stockpile management
small arms and light weapons
Sustainable Development Goal
subject matter expert
security sector reform
standard operating procedure
United Nations
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations General Assembly
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
United Nations Mine Action Service
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat andEradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
United Nations Security Council
United Nations Panel of Experts
United Nations Group of Experts
weapons and ammunition management
World Customs Organization

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYREFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
WHAT IS WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT?
Weapons and ammunition management (WAM) is the oversight, accountability and governanceof arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment ofrelevant national frameworks, processes and practices for safe and secure materiel acquisition,
stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal. WAM does not focus on small arms
and light weapons only, but on a broader range of conventional weapons, related systems, andammunition.
WHY IS WAM IMPORTANT?
Armed violence claims over half a million lives each year, and the annual global economic
costs of armed violence run into the hundreds of billions of dollars. Poorly regulated arms andammunition and their misuse are key contributors to these human and associated socioeconomic costs and pose a significant challenge to peace, security and development.
Security and humanitarian risks posed by unregulated and illicit arms and ammunition are
multifaceted. Their diversion contributes to strengthening the capacity of armed spoilers,
including criminal and terrorist groups, and to exacerbating situations of insecurity. Illicit arms
and ammunition are multipliers of armed violence, including gender-based violence, displacement of people, serious human rights violations, international crimes, and organized crime. The
impact of their misuse ranges from direct1 to long-term effects.2 States affected by patternsof recurring armed violence are often disproportionately burdened by arms-related risks,
impeding their efforts to establish and implement adequate national controls to secure andregulate State-owned materiel and to prevent diversion, mitigate risks of unplanned explosions,and address illicit proliferation as well as misuse.
Among policymakers and practitioners, WAM is increasingly recognized as a fundamental
component of conflict prevention and actions to tackle armed violence, ensuring that States
can exercise governance, oversight, management and control over the full life cycle of arms andammunition within their national territory. Moreover, the effective implementation of United
Nations Security Council resolutions,3 a wide range of subregional, regional and multilateral instruments, as well as control systems at national levels, require States to have effective
and comprehensive WAM frameworks in place. This is why the 2018 United Nations SecretaryGeneral’s Agenda for Disarmament places WAM at the centre of efforts for “Disarmament That
Saves Lives”. More broadly, WAM contributes to the prevention and development agendas byhelping create a safe and secure environment conducive to sustainable development.4
1 The short-term effects of unregulated and illicit arms and ammunition and their misuse include deaths,
injuries, displacement of people and individuals, and psychological harm.
2 The long-term effects of unregulated and illicit arms and ammunition and their misuse include undermining access to health and education, the delivery of humanitarian services, the protection of civilians, andsustainable development.
3 For example, over the last decade, the United Nations Security Council has increasingly introduced WAM
as part of United Nations peace operation mandates and related obligations in situations of armed conflict,as part of stabilization efforts, and as an integral component of monitoring and implementation of United
Nations arms embargoes.
4 By creating a safe and secure environment to advance peace, justice and strong institutions (Sustainable
Development Goal [SDG] 16), poverty reduction (SDG1), economic growth (SDG8), health (SDG3), genderequality (SDG5), and safe cities and communities (SDG11).

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WHY A REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENTS?
Comprehensive, holistic and systematic national WAM baseline assessments are an essential
prerequisite for informing and guiding effective strategic formulation, programme planning, andmonitoring and evaluation, and they – more broadly – support governance and accountability.
This Reference Methodology for National Weapons and Ammunition Management Baseline
Assessments codifies the current UNIDIR methodology, which has been used to design andimplement national WAM baseline assessments for 11 States (2015–2020), in cooperation withsubregional, regional, United Nations and other partners. At the African regional level, WAM
is recognized as a key contributor to the African Union Roadmap for Silencing the Guns, andthe five-year action plan for the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms
and Light Weapons. This reference methodology represents UNIDIR’s practical contribution tothese as well as other efforts at subregional, regional and international levels to undertake comprehensive national WAM baseline assessments, drawing on lessons learned while applying andrefining the methodology with partners.5
The codification of this reference methodology seek to enhance transparency, and its release
responds to two particular needs: first, to provide practical reference and guidance on how
to implement a strategic WAM baseline assessment at the national level; second, to enhance
the knowledge of interested United Nations entities, regional organizations and specialized
NGOs and enable them to jointly and collaboratively support assistance-requesting States inundertaking WAM baseline assessments at the national level. The release of this reference
methodology is also expected to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on assessment
methods and approaches associated with WAM.
WHY CONDUCT A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT?
The establishment of a national WAM baseline allows comparison and measurability ofvariation or progress over time periods, as well as impact, in different environments. A national
WAM baseline assessment should be designed to be useful to all interested States. It can beundertaken and conducted in various environments and contexts, including:• Where indicators point towards an increasingly volatile security situation, underlying
grievances, or emerging conflict(s)• During a conflict where political will exists among relevant national and local stakeholders toprioritize efforts to address risks associated with arms and ammunition• In a transitioning security or stabilization environment• In a post-conflict setting• Outside of a conflict setting, in an environment experiencing various levels of armed violence,
including in urban or localized settings• In situations of relative peace and stability (where such an assessment may also be applicable).

5 For general information on this broader UNIDIR workstream and related research, publications andevents, see www.unidir.org/projects/supporting-policies-and-frameworks-weapon-and-ammunition-management.

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WHO IS THIS DOCUMENT FOR?
This document and its submodules are intended for use by:
•
•
•
•
•

Policymakers and government officials
United Nations headquarters, field missions and country team representatives and staff
National technical experts and officers
WAM or related field managers or programme, technical and planning officers
Subject matter experts and facilitators

WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT?
A national WAM baseline assessment aims to assist States in their efforts to comprehensively and systematically assess WAM institutions, and their policy and operational processes andcapacities, in line with international, regional and subregional obligations and commitments aswell as relevant international standards and technical guidelines. Specifically, a WAM baseline
assessment aims to:• Map national institutions and their responsibilities for the full life cycle of WAM• Support the identification of the current status and priority needs as well as areas forenhancement across the life cycle• Support the collective identification of options for the host Government to implement suchenhancements• Support the design (or review) of a national road map and/or strategic plan to strengthen thenational framework governing WAM
One of the general, key guiding principles and prerequisites for a national WAM baseline
assessment to be effective is national ownership. Its design, planning and implementation, as
well as the assessment results and findings, are to be nationally led, owned and driven (further
general and guiding principles are introduced in Module 1 of this reference methodology).
WHAT KEY WAM FUNCTIONAL AREAS ARE CONSIDERED PART OF AN ASSESSMENT?
This reference methodology is primarily designed for strategic- and operational-level WAM
baseline assessments. The methodology pursues a comprehensive, life cycle approach to the
management of weapons and ammunition, and seeks to establish a WAM baseline of stakeholders, processes and practices at the national level, across 10 key functional areas:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

National coordination mechanism
Legal and regulatory framework at the national level
Transfer controls
Stockpile management
Marking
Recordkeeping
Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition
Processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition
Weapons collection
Disposal including destruction

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The reference methodology is sufficiently flexible and adaptable for it to be contextualized
and situated in different environments and contexts. In this regard, these key WAM functional
areas are considered non-exhaustive (i.e. some may be explored in more depth; additional
WAM functional areas may be considered; or context-specific arms-related threats, risks anddynamics may be taken into account). Where relevant, applicable or necessary, the methodology
distinguishes between weapons management and ammunition management functions. The
substantive focus and scope of a WAM baseline assessment may be defined or redefined,
expanded, and adjusted during the design and planning phase of a national baseline assessment,
taking into account the needs and priorities at the national level.6
WHAT FORMAT DOES A NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT TAKE?
A national WAM baseline assessment takes the form of a series of consultative meetings,
both at strategic/policy and operational/technical levels, which facilitate inclusive, participatory and gender-sensitive dialogue by all relevant stakeholders, and decision-making among
relevant national stakeholders on WAM and related issues. The national consultative meetings
are organized in a sequence, with various national and international stakeholders operating atdifferent levels of governance. Typically, this series of meetings and activities is conducted overa week-long period (five days), although the duration of in-country implementation will varydepending on the scope of the assessment, as designed and agreed with the host State.7 The
design and planning of such a national WAM baseline assessment takes three to five months.
A ‘NATIONAL ROAD MAP’ TOWARDS A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL WAM FRAMEWORKOne of the key results of a national WAM baseline assessment, and the starting point forfollow-up activities to strengthen WAM, is the development of a ‘national road map’ on WAM.
Such a road map – presented in the form of a report (and annex) – includes the current statusof WAM institutional capacities and processes; identification of WAM enhancement opportunities; and options for implementation, by key WAM functional areas, prioritized over a time frame
and including actor-specific attribution of WAM roles and responsibilities.

6 This reference methodology is not designed to facilitate an in-depth legal review and analysis of potential gaps in the legal and regulatory framework applicable to arms and/or ammunition controls at the national
level. Instead, it identifies and takes into account the scope and applicability of existing national legislation
and regulations in the assessment of WAM policies, institutions and relevant management processes. National WAM baseline assessment findings may include, where relevant, recommended options to conduct
a more detailed assessment analysis of legal frameworks pertaining to WAM at the national level, including
in some cases to review or revise existing legislation and/or regulation.This reference methodology does
not constitute or replace technical assessments (e.g. of ammunition depots, weapon storage or other sites).
Such technical assessments can, however, also inform a national WAM baseline assessment or be resulting,recommended options and activities.
7 Generally, the consultative meetings are organized in the following sequence over the period of one
week: (i) a formal, high-level national consultative meeting; (ii) a segment of national technical consultations;(iii) bilateral meetings; (iv) a coordination meeting among international partners and assistance providers; (v)a visit to specific operational sites (optional); (vi) another segment of national technical consultations; and(vii) a final, formal high-level national meeting.

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WHAT IS THE CONTENT AND STRUCTURE OF THIS DOCUMENT?
This document is structured in a modular way as follows:
MODULE 1. Introduction, Purpose and Context (Sections 1–3)
This module provides an introduction to national WAM baseline assessments, the reference
methodology, defining key terms and terminologies, and general principles (Section 1). It
defines the purpose, goal, and objectives of a national WAM baseline assessment (Section2), and situates it in varying contexts and highlighting linkages and synergies with broader
security institutions, rule of law, peacebuilding and conflict prevention processes (Section 3).
It primarily serves as informational purpose, introducing context and applicability
MODULE 2. Planning and Design (Section 4)
Module 2 (Section 4) covers key aspects of the timely, effective, and efficient planning anddesign of a national WAM baseline assessment, including stakeholders and participation,
the scope of a baseline assessment, specific additional design and practical planning considerations. It serves as a practical guide for those planning and designing a national WAM
baseline assessment.
MODULE 3. Implementation and Reporting (Sections 5–6)
This module contains core elements of the national WAM baseline assessment methodology
developed by UNIDIR, with supporting of host States, UN, and other partners (Section 5). It
serves as a practical guide for those implementing a national WAM baseline assessment.
Module 3 also provides guidance for those who report on a national WAM baseline
assessment (Section 6).
MODULE 4. Review of the Reference Methodology (Section 7)
This module (Section 7) provides possible ways for utilizing a national WAM baseline
assessment, possible next steps and follow on activities, once a first assessment has been
implemented. It also looks at potential ways forward to further review and strengthen thebaseline assessment reference methodology.

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MODULE 1:
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. WHY WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENT MATTERS
Armed violence claims over half a million lives each year, and the annual global economic costs ofarmed violence run into the hundreds of billions of dollars.8 Poorly regulated arms and ammunition
and their misuse are key contributors to this human and associated socioeconomic cost and posea significant challenge to peace, security and development.
Security and humanitarian risks posed by unregulated and illicit arms and ammunition are multifaceted. The diversion of such materiel contributes to strengthening the capacity of armed spoilers,
including criminal and terrorist groups, and to exacerbating situations of insecurity. Illicit arms andammunition are multipliers of armed violence, including gender-based violence, displacement ofpeople, serious human rights violations, international crimes, and organized crime. The impact of
their misuse ranges from direct effects such as deaths, injuries, displacement and psychologicalharm, to long-term effects that undermine access to health and education, the delivery of humanitarian services, protection of civilians and the implementation of the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs). States affected by patterns of recurring armed violence are often disproportionately burdened by arms-related risks, impeding their efforts to establish and implement adequate
national controls to secure and regulate State-owned materiel and to prevent diversion, mitigate
unplanned explosions at munition and other sites, and address illicit proliferation as well as misuse.
As such, policymakers and practitioners increasingly view weapons and ammunition management(WAM) as a fundamental component of conflict prevention and actions to help tackle armed
violence. WAM is an essential tool for States to exercise governance, oversight and management
over the full life cycle of arms and ammunition, and it forms the basis for the effective implementation of national control systems as well as relevant regional and multilateral instruments. In thepast decade, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has increasingly included WAM as part of
United Nations peace operation mandates and related obligations in situations of armed conflict,and as part of stabilization efforts as well as an integral component of the monitoring and implementation of United Nations arms embargoes.
WAM is recognized as a key contributor to “Disarmament That Saves Lives” in the 2018 United
Nations Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament, the African Union Master Road Map ofPractical Steps for Silencing the Guns in Africa by 2020, as well as the five-year action plan for
the implementation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention
on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials. More broadly,
WAM contributes to the prevention and development agendas by helping create a safe and secureenvironment to advance peace, justice and strong institutions (SDG16), poverty reduction (SDG1),
economic growth (SDG8), health (SDG3), gender equality (SDG5), and safe cities and communities(SDG11).

8 See G. Hideg and A. Alvazzi del Frate, Darkening Horizons: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2018–30,
Small Arms Survey, 2019, www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP-Violent-Deaths-Scenarios.pdf.

UNIDIR11.2. ADVANCING WAM POLICY AND PRACTICE: UNIDIR’S APPROACH
UNIDIR seeks to promote knowledge and dialogue among States, the United Nations system, international and regional organizations, and specialized NGOs on ways to strengthen national, regionaland multilateral frameworks and approaches to govern the through-life management of weapons
and ammunition to prevent their diversion and misuse, and to reduce and mitigate risks associatedwith unplanned explosions.
UNIDIR’s research-based approach to strengthen WAM is grounded and centred on national andregional ownership and experience. Through its applied research, and in cooperation with national
authorities, regional organizations, and United Nations partners, UNIDIR pursues a bottom-up, evidence-based approach for enhancing knowledge on ways to improve WAM policy and practice.
Building on this cumulative knowledge, UNIDIR focuses on generating ideas and facilitating
dialogue “upstream” at the cross-regional and multilateral levels to identify good practices andlessons learned, to strengthen shared understanding among the community of practice, and toenable a “learning loop” to improve WAM policy and practice, while informing the applicability of
WAM in broader peace, security and development agendas. UNIDIR’s approach to WAM promotesa United Nations system-wide approach.
UNIDIR utilizes four services in the delivery of its WAM research:• WAM baseline assessment at national levels: Supporting States to (i) assess and identify their
WAM policy and practice baselines by facilitating a consultative multi-stakeholder national
dialogue, and (ii) subsequently assisting national stakeholders to establish national road maps,
in cooperation with relevant regional organizations and United Nations partners, to promote a
cohesive approach to WAM.
• Dialogue at regional and global levels: Utilizing the Institute’s convening power to initiate andfacilitate dialogue among States, regional organizations and specialized entities on ways toimprove national and regional WAM policy and practice.
• Lessons learned for improvements and continuous learning: Enhancing knowledge on WAM
by capturing lessons learned and good practices at national, sub-regional and cross-regional
levels, thereby informing improvements in WAM policy and practice.
• Practical tools to support implementation: Generating demand-based practical tools forStates and specialized organizations in assessing and addressing arms- and ammunition-related risks, thereby supporting implementation efforts of States and partners on the ground.
The desired impact sought is (i) for States to establish and implement comprehensive national,
regional and multilateral frameworks governing the full life cycle of weapons and ammunition toprevent diversion and misuse and to reduce and mitigate the risks of unplanned explosions, and(ii) for the United Nations and relevant specialized organizations to provide high-quality advice
on these topics. At the national level, this effort will contribute to establishing and strengthening
accountable and reliable national security sector and governance architecture. At the regional level,
this effort will support States and regional organizations in developing and implementing credible
regional strategies and road maps for the management of weapons and ammunition.
More broadly, UNIDIR seeks to promote knowledge on means and methods in which WAM cancontribute to achieving peace, security and development goals, including but not limited to conflict
prevention, armed violence reduction, accountability of the security sector, protection of civilians,
and advancement of the SDGs.

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1.3. ABOUT THIS REFERENCE METHODOLOGY
A national WAM baseline assessment is an essential prerequisite for informing and guiding effective
strategic formulation, programme planning, and monitoring and evaluation; in addition, and more
broadly, such assessments support governance and accountability. However, WAM baseline
assessments are not consistently undertaken by States and remain underused by the expert
community. Where assessments are undertaken, they may not be comprehensive in assessing thefull management cycle of weapons and ammunition, or they may be more specifically focused at thetechnical levels. While specific and targeted technical assessments are important and necessary,
when conducted in isolation, they only reveal part of the problem and what needs to be done toaddress it. Moreover, practical guidance is limited on strategic-level assessments of WAM thatinvolve the mapping of national stakeholders and the review of institutions and processes relating
to decision-making on, and implementation of, WAM at the national level. UNIDIR has produced thisreference methodology to fill the gap that existed for a practical resource for entities undertaking
comprehensive and strategic baseline assessments on WAM. In developing this methodology,
UNIDIR built on its current baseline assessment methodology and drew on lessons learned in its
application.
Since 2015, States, together with UNIDIR, have undertaken a series of in-country baseline
assessments to inform and strengthen WAM policies and practices at the national and regional
levels. These baseline assessments, organized under the ownership and lead of the host
Governments,9 take the form of a national consultative process that facilitates dialogue and decision-making among all relevant national security stakeholders on WAM and related security issues.
The methodology draws from, and aligns with, relevant international guidelines, in particular thevoluntary, practical Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), and theInternational Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG). As of September 2020, 11 States (Burkina
Faso, the Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana,Iraq, Liberia, the Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Somalia) have conducted national-level baseline
assessments on WAM in cooperation with UNIDIR and relevant regional organizations (particularly,
the ECOWAS Commission), United Nations entities (including peace operations, special politicalmissions and country teams), and specialized NGOs, with a view to developing a road map towards
a comprehensive national WAM framework.
This document represents the codification of the existing UNIDIR reference methodology, which
has been used to design and implement baseline assessments on WAM at the national level. The
codification and release of the baseline assessment methodology responds to two particularneeds: first, to provide practical reference and guidance on how to implement a WAM baseline
assessment at the national level; second, to enhance the knowledge of interested United Nations
entities, regional organizations and specialized NGOs and enable them to jointly and collaboratively
support assistance-requesting States in undertaking WAM baseline assessments.
The codification effort seeks to (i) promote transparency and respond to these needs by making
the reference methodology widely available and providing practical guidance to support its implementation and (ii) better facilitate engagement by interested stakeholders in WAM baseline
assessments. The release of this methodology is also expected to contribute to the existing bodyof knowledge on assessment methods and approaches associated with the management of arms
and ammunition at the national level. In this regard, this methodology is to be understood as a
9 Reference is made here and throughout the document to the “host government”: the government of aState that undertakes a national WAM baseline assessment.

UNIDIR3

reference: it does not pursue a “one size fits all” approach but recognizes that it is one of several
methods available to interested stakeholders to inform their planning and conduct of a national
WAM baseline assessment. Users may apply this methodology flexibly to meet the needs of thenational context and priorities, whether in full or in part (see Section 1.5).
The methodology is primarily designed for strategic- and operational-level WAM assessments. A
technical assessment of tactical capabilities of national stakeholders, including detailed assessment
and analysis of storage and materiel conditions, is beyond the scope of this methodology (seeSection 4).
The methodology has undergone a review process and integrates feedback received from relevant
policymakers and expert practitioners. Internal review includes revisions by researchers and subject
matter expert (SME) consultants, including SMEs who have substantively led or supported the facilitation and implementation of UNIDIR WAM baseline assessments. External review includes
revisions by representatives and experts of national authorities, United Nations entities, regionalorganizations, and specialized NGOs that have engaged with UNIDIR in the implementation ofnational WAM baseline assessments.
This is a living, working document and may be subject to modifications and revisions based on new
trends and findings, lessons from different regions and countries, as well as new tools and methods
that would help further improve the national baseline assessment methodology.

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1.4. AUDIENCE OF THIS DOCUMENT
The language and content of this document have been carefully and purposefully chosen. They
seek to strike a balance between strategic, policy-oriented language and technical, operational
language in order to communicate to different target audiences.
This document is intended for use by:
•

•

•

•

•

•

•

Policymakers and government officials of States involved in policy development and decision-making on WAM, formulation of WAM-related mandates and national strategies, andplanning and decision-making for the allocation of resources and provision of international
assistance related to WAM.
Competent national authorities of States receiving WAM assistance, including those
responsible for planning and identifying national needs and opportunities, as well as for coordinating implementation and follow-up actions related to national WAM baseline assessment.
Representatives and staff of United Nations headquarters, field missions and country teams
working on mandates, mechanisms for the allocation of resources and budgets, as well asplanning, implementation and reporting on weapons or ammunition management programming,
projects and related activities.
National technical experts and officers of relevant national competent authorities involvedin the planning, organization and implementation of national baseline assessments, including
day-to-day WAM operations and activities in the country.
WAM or related field (e.g. small arms control; mine action; explosive ordnance disposal [EOD];
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration [DDR]; community violence reduction [CVR];
security sector reform [SSR]; arms embargo) managers, programme and technical officers
leading or involved in the planning, organization and implementation of a national WAM baseline
assessment, as well as day-to-day WAM operations and activities in the country.
Country directors, managers, experts, practitioners or staff of other international organizations, regional organizations or specialized expert NGOs involved in WAM advocacy and policy,
or operational WAM, or related field activities.
SMEs and facilitators who lead or support the substantive preparation, facilitation and implementation of a national WAM baseline assessment. This document is also intended to serve
them when preparing a national WAM baseline assessment report.

UNIDIR5

1.5. STRUCTURE OF THIS DOCUMENT
This document is structured so that users can easily extract, review, use or circulate subsections in a
flexible, modular way. This guide does not seek to explain every activity carried out during a national
WAM baseline assessment. Instead, it helps readers through the planning, design and implementation of the assessment process. Readers can use it holistically throughout the whole assessment
or to better understand and apply the methodology at particular points in the assessment process.
Sections 1–3 are primarily informative, introducing the context for and applicability of a national
WAM baseline assessment. Sections 4–6 serve as a practical guide to the design, planning and implementation of a baseline assessment. Section 7 looks at potential ways forward to further review
and strengthen the baseline assessment methodology.
MODULE 1: INTRODUCTION, PURPOSE AND CONTEXT
Section 1 provides an introduction to national WAM baseline assessments, the methodology containedin this document, key terms, definitions and general principles.
Section 2 defines the purpose, goal and objectives of planning and implementing a WAM baseline
assessment.
Section 3 situates national WAM baseline assessments in varying operational contexts and highlights
relevant links and synergies with broader national and regional security institutions, rule of law, andpeacebuilding and conflict prevention processes.
MODULE 2: PLANNING AND DESIGN
Section 4 covers key aspects related to timely, effective and efficient planning and design of a national
WAM baseline assessment.
MODULE 3: IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTING
Section 5 contains core elements of the national WAM baseline assessment methodology developed
by UNIDIR, with the support of host States, and United Nations and other partners.
Section 6 provides guidance for those who report on a national WAM baseline assessment.
MODULE 4: REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGY
Section 7 provides possible ways for utilizing a national WAM baseline assessment as well as possible
next steps and follow-on activities once a first assessment has been implemented.

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1.6. KEY WORKING TERMS AND DEFINITIONSThis document does not provide a comprehensive glossary of terms and definitions. A comprehensive list of terms and definitions applicable to small arms control is available in the Modular
Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC 01.02 Glossary, available at www.
un.org/disarmament/convarms/mosaic). A comprehensive list of terms and definitions applicable
to ammunition management is available in the IATG 01.40 Glossary, available at www.un.org/
disarmament/ammunition.
Weapons and ammunition management (WAM) is defined in this document as the oversight,
accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle,
including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for safe andsecure materiel acquisition, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing, and disposal.10 WAM
does not focus on small arms and light weapons (SALW) only, but on a broader range of conventional weapons, related systems, and ammunition.
Baseline in this document refers to a justified, relational reference in space and time of WAM institutional and operational capacities, practices and procedures, which allows comparison andmeasurability of variation or progress over time, as well as impact, including in an evolving peaceand security environment. Such a baseline can be established, followed, monitored and reviewed
across a number of key WAM functional areas, or a specific key WAM functional area at the national,
subregional or regional unit level of analysis.
Assessment in this document refers to a mapping of WAM stakeholders and a related examinationof institutional and operational capacities, practices and procedures in key WAM functional areas,
as well as decision-making processes among these stakeholders.
This reference methodology and its accompanying process do not constitute or replacetechnical assessments, such as safety or security assessments of ammunition depots or security
assessments of weapon storage sites. Such technical assessments can, however, inform a national
WAM baseline assessment or be resulting, recommended options and activities.
Life cycle approach in this document refers to the life cycle of weapons and ammunition from ageographical point and space in time of manufacture or production throughout the various life cycle
phases to final disposal, including destruction at another point in space and time. For ammunition,
the term may be used elsewhere similarly or interchangeably to describe “whole of life” or “whole oflife cycle” or “through-life” management of ammunition. For the purpose of this document, the term
“full life cycle management” is used interchangeably with the term “through-life management”.
Diversion refers to the phenomenon whereby at one point in space and time, arms, ammunition
or related material at any stage in their life cycle are diverted from the legal sphere/ possession of
authorized end users to the illegal or illicit sphere, to (an) unauthorized end user(s) or for unauthorized or unlawful end use(s). Diversion occurs in defiance of national and/or international law. Notethat there is currently no internationally agreed upon definition of the term diversion nor of thedifferent types of diversion that occur.11
10 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, “4.11: Transitional Weaponsand Ammunition Management”, 2020, www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.11-Transitional-Weapons-Ammunition-Management.pdf.
11 See Group of Governmental Experts on problems arising from the accumulation of conventional ammunition stockpiles in surplus, “Diversion Typology”, GGE/PACAS/2020/3, 10 February 2020, https://undocs.
org/GGE/PACAS/2020/3; B. Wood, The Arms Trade Treaty: Obligations to Prevent the Diversion of Conventional Arms, UNIDIR, Issue Brief no. 1, 2020, https://unidir.org/publication/arms-trade-treaty-obligations-prevent-diversion-conventional-arms.

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1.7. GENERAL AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES
1.7.1. National ownership
Generally, in and by principle, the State through its relevant and competent national institutions and authorities has the sovereign right and responsibility to control and manage weapons
and ammunition on its territory, as well as on those entering, transiting or exiting its territory,
in a secure, safe and accountable manner. Therefore, national ownership and leadership are
considered a prerequisite and an essential component of planning, organizing and implementing
a national WAM baseline assessment. The information and knowledge generated by a national
WAM baseline assessment, its results and possible subsequent steps (e.g. the development andimplementation of a road map to strengthen the national WAM framework) are to be nationallyowned and led. Unless required by a relevant body of law, including relevant national law or
regulation, conducting a national baseline assessment is voluntary. Those entities assisting thehost State in the design and implementation of WAM baseline assessments are best characterized as supporting actors, providing advisory and technical support services under the lead of
the host Government and its designated national authorities, in alignment with relevant regional
and international arms control instruments, standards and guidance, including the IATG and
MOSAIC.
1.7.2. Comprehensive and integrated approach to WAM
A comprehensive and integrated approach to WAM recognizes that efforts to better manage
and control arms and ammunition are linked to and inform broader security sector, rule of law,armed violence reduction, and peacebuilding processes. Where applicable, national baseline
assessment should be coordinated with other relevant activities of broader peace processes,
including but not limited to, ceasefires and arms control measures associated with transitional
security arrangements, arms embargo measures where existent and applicable, DDR, and SSR(see Section 3). Further, the findings of the baseline assessment should be situated within the
broader national security or development architecture and processes to ensure sustainability
and integration into the wider security and development goals of the State. A holistic approach
to WAM also entails the need to be inclusive with actors involved in the assessment (seeSection 1.7.3). Further, a comprehensive approach to WAM necessitates that functional WAM
measures, such as stockpile management, are not assessed in isolation from other functional
WAM measures, such as transfer controls and disposal, among others. This ensures that theassessment is comprehensive by design and that the results of the assessment do not lead to apartial response or to siloed programming at the national level.
1.7.3. Inclusive, consultative and participatory
A comprehensive approach to WAM requires inclusive engagement with a wide range of stakeholders operating at different levels of WAM policy and practice at the national level. This may
range from policymakers responsible for strategies relating to national security, development
plans and related budgets; competent national authorities responsible for developing andoverseeing regulations of arms and ammunition; operational officers who manage different
aspects of WAM measures, from transfer controls to disposal; enforcement and judiciary actors
responsible for addressing violations of rules and regulations; assistance providers operating in
the country to support the host State; civil society actors working in the field of arms control,
peacebuilding and development; and communities affected by armed violence. It is therefore
critical that a national WAM baseline assessment is conducted in an inclusive and consultative
manner, with active and full participation of relevant local, national, regional and international
stakeholders. This approach also promotes coherent planning, prioritization and the fosteringof cooperation and dialogue among participating entities at the national level.

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1.7.4. Gender sensitivity
Poorly regulated arms and ammunition and their misuse has significant gendered impact on
individuals, communities and societies, hindering efforts to achieve a wide range of SDG
objectives, including but not limited to SDG5, gender equality, and SDG16, peace, justice andstrong institutions. The misuse of arms impacts gender in all contexts, from conflict, transitionalor post-conflict settings, to environments suffering from armed violence. Strengthening WAM
frameworks and practices can play an essential role in the prevention of gender-based andrelated violence. Moreover, integrating and streamlining gender policies and practices into WAM
will strengthen the national security sector in the oversight, accountability and governance ofarms and ammunition. Mainstreaming gender considerations in WAM policies and practices
also supports the implementation of relevant international arms control instruments, as wellas subregional and regional instruments. A gender-sensitive approach to arms control anddisarmament, as well as women’s participation in WAM, is an integral part of the planning, design,
implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of a national WAM baseline assessment, and of
WAM initiatives and activities.12
1.7.5. Safety and security
Handling weapons, ammunition and explosives comes with high levels of safety and security
risks. In particular, inadequately managed conventional ammunition poses an explosive risk
and threatens public safety.13 The involvement of technically and appropriately qualified WAM
personnel in the planning and implementation of a national baseline assessment is critical.
Planners of national baseline assessments shall ensure that technical advisers who participate
in them have formal training and operational field experience in weapon and ammunition
management, including (but not limited to) storage, marking, transportation, deactivation anddisposal, including the destruction of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

12 UNIDIR’s Gender Programme is conducting research to develop a framework to integrate gender into
UNIDIR’s national WAM baseline assessment methodology. Key findings of this research have been integrated into this reference methodology.
13 See IATG, “01.30: Policy development and advice”, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/IATG-01.30-Policy-Development-and-Advice-V.2.pdf.

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10REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS2. PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES OF A
NATIONAL WAM BASELINE 		
ASSESSMENT
National frameworks govern weapons and ammunition through the establishment of norms,
standards, strategies and action plans. These frameworks are grounded and sustained byaccountable security institutions, including systems and processes, at the national level thatoversee the planning and resourcing required to effectively implement the framework. The
maturity of such frameworks and the capacities of the responsible institutions, however, vary considerably from one country to another, as does their operational environment, all of which impacts
the ability of States to design and implement effective WAM. The point of departure for a baseline
assessment is recognizing that each State is unique in its challenges and opportunities to improve
WAM and that there is a need for a shared understanding among national stakeholders on current
strengths and vulnerabilities of WAM policy and practice as a starting point.
The development of a national framework on WAM is a continuous, nationally driven process,grounded on evidence of needs and priorities. Where relevant, framework development efforts
may involve support of subregional, regional and international partners. It is also an incremental
process, which should reflect the realities of what can be achieved with the resources available ina country at a specific time. Effective WAM requires a multisectoral approach, which necessitates
an inclusive and holistic approach at the national level. In this regard, the strategic planning process
to identify the current status of national management processes and practices, opportunities fortheir enhancement, and options for implementation to achieve them needs to be (i) grounded on
information that is generated through an inclusive and consultative process involving all relevant
national stakeholders and (ii) regularly monitored and assessed in terms of progress against theestablished baseline.
While there are various means and methods to assess and gather information on WAM, thecommon objective of a baseline assessment is to enable States and their national institutions tomake good decisions about ways to improve WAM policy and practice and to gather and allocate
resources to address risks associated with arms and ammunition in order to meet the needs of the
security services and of affected communities. This is achieved by putting information together
to build up a full picture of the risks and vulnerabilities associated with the life cycle managementof arms and ammunition. In short, strategic baseline assessments make good decision-making on
WAM possible for national stakeholders.

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11

The objective of a national WAM baseline assessment is to assist States in their effort to comprehensively and systematically assess WAM institutions and their policies and operational
processes and capacities. Such an assessment is undertaken in line with international, regionaland subregional commitments, as well as relevant international standards and technical guidelines,
namely MOSAIC and the IATG. A national WAM baseline assessment aims to:

MAP NATIONAL INSTITUTIONSIDENTIFY STATUS AND PRIORITY NEEDS

Map national institutions and their responsibilities for the full life cycle of WAM

Support the identification of the current
status and priority needs, as well as areas forenhancement across the life cycle

IDENTIFY OPTIONS FOR ENHANCEMENTDESIGN A NATIONAL ROAD MAP

Support the collective identificationof options for the host Government toimplement such enhancements

Support the design (or review) of a nationalroad map and/or strategic plan to strengthen
the national framework governing WAM

In doing so, the assessment lays the foundations for national efforts to strengthen WAM policy andpractice. More broadly, national WAM baseline assessments provide a unique forum for national
dialogue among security, development and violence reduction stakeholders to identify common
challenges, priorities and ways to work together to address risks associated with arms andammunition and to reduce suffering caused by them. Figure 1 further situates and illustrates thecontext of a national WAM baseline assessment. The assessment further promotes informed andevidence-based discussion on arms and violence at the national level and facilitates an exchangeof lessons learned and good practice among a wide range of stakeholders, which may have broader
benefits to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives.
FIGURE 1: Situating a national baseline assessment

WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT CONTEXTSTRATEGIC

National Policy / Strategy
Defence planning & Material Management
Counter-proliferation
WAM Strategy / Road Map

OPERATIONAL

WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT
Stakeholder, Process& Capacity Mapping

National Coordinating Mechanism
National Action Plans

TACTICAL

Programmes & Projects

IMPLEMENTATION

12REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

One of the key results of a national WAM baseline assessment, and the starting point for follow-up
activities to strengthen WAM, is the development of a “national road map” (and/or a strategic plan)
to strengthen the national framework governing WAM. A national WAM baseline assessment andits results, including such a road map, have been and can be used by governments and relevant
national authorities, both at strategic or policy and at operational levels, in several ways. For
example, at the strategic level, national WAM baseline assessments and results have been used to:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Review or inform national security strategies
Develop a dedicated national WAM strategy
Inform and support the establishment of a dedicated national WAM coordinating mechanism
Establish, or reposition and leverage, a national WAM lead entity
Inform the development of a dedicated national policy for ammunition management
Inform United Nations partial arms embargo regime benchmarking, implementation, reportingand monitoring

At the operational level, for example, the results of the baseline assessment serve as an essential
component in the subsequent development and/or review of national actions plans. Several States
have also used national WAM baseline assessments and road maps to inform the development
and/or revision and adoption of specific (written) operational procedures, as well as capacity-building programming and activities at the tactical level (further information on situating a national WAM
baseline assessment is included in Module 2, Planning and Design, specifically Section 4.2).

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3. CONTEXT AND SITUATION RELEVANT TO
NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENT
A national WAM baseline assessment takes place at a specific time in a dynamic security
environment, shaped by different armed actors, the availability of different categories and types ofarms and ammunition, flows, stocks and holdings, as well as their management and levels of control
across a territory. There may be different types and degrees of threats and risks to public safety or
subregional, regional, national or local security, or specific non-State armed groups posing threats
to the integrity of a territory, zone or area. Different points, types and sources of diversion may leadto arms and ammunition ending up in the illicit sphere. Illicit flows of arms and ammunition may belinked to organized crime, supply networks or corruption. Together, these factors can contribute todifferent types and levels of armed violence.
A national WAM baseline assessment should be designed to be useful for all interested States. The
assessment can be undertaken in various contexts, including:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Where indicators point towards an increasingly volatile security situation, underlying grievances,or emerging conflict(s)During a conflict where political will exists among relevant national and local stakeholders toprioritize efforts to address risks associated with arms and ammunition
In a transitioning security or stabilization environment
In a post-conflict setting
Outside of a conflict setting, in an environment experiencing various levels of armed violence,
including in urban or localized settings
In situations of relative peace and stability (where such an assessment may also be applicable).

Therefore, a national WAM baseline assessment needs to be contextualized and situated as partof design and planning and prior to its implementation. The methodology, its scope and related
processes described in this document allow for sufficient flexibility and adaptability by users toalign the assessment to national contexts and priorities. For example, the methodology is designed
to draw from and inform the implementation of relevant and applicable international, regional andsubregional normative frameworks and processes. It can also be used to create synergies and links
with other arms control and related conflict prevention and peace operation processes, including
in support or as part of peacebuilding, SSR and/or DDR, as appropriate. When applied effectively
and consistently, relevant national stakeholders in a specific context and situation are engaged andconsulted through dialogue in a form of participation in a national consultative process on WAM.
Understanding the context and the applicability of the baseline assessment to support a range ofnational objectives is essential to maximize the impact of the baseline assessment and to facilitate
the sustainability of WAM policy and practice over time.

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3.1. NATIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKNational legislation, regulation and standards form the principal framework for the managementof arms and ammunition at the national level.14 A national WAM framework encompasses in mostcases at least one, or sometimes several, applicable national laws and regulations, which define
the legal status of designated competent national authorities, their mandates, organization andfunctioning, as well as the level and scope of their WAM operations. In some cases, decrees oradministrative procedures may exist in lieu of legislation or to further codify, operationalize andprovide guidance on provisions contained in primary legislation.
The maturity of national legal and regulatory WAM frameworks, including enforcement of them,varies considerably among States. In many States, dedicated legal frameworks exist for the control
of arms and ammunition by various users at the national level (State security forces and services, orcivilians). In other cases, including in situations affected by conflicts, existing legal frameworks may
be weakened due to the lack of rule of law, or they may be outdated or entirely absent. Reviewing
and understanding the maturity and applicability of a national legal and regulatory framework istherefore an essential aspect of contextualizing national WAM baseline assessments.
The exercise of national WAM baseline assessments does not constitute or comprise a detailed
legal review and analysis of gaps in national laws, regulations, decrees and administrative instructions. Instead, it identifies and takes into account the scope and applicability of existing
national legislation and regulations in the assessment of WAM policies, institutions and relevant
management processes. Findings from WAM baseline assessments may include, where relevant,recommendations to conduct a more detailed assessment and analysis of legal frameworks
pertaining to WAM, including in some cases to review or revise existing legislation and regulations.

14 For detailed guidance on developing national standards for ammunition management, see www.un.org/
disarmament/publications/more/a-guide-to-developing-national-standards-for-ammunition-management.

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3.2. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Domestic WAM efforts and initiatives are reinforced, and may be shaped, by a set of relevant international, regional and subregional instruments, with commitments that the host State has agreed
to domesticate and implement with respect to WAM. Where these are UNSC resolutions and otherlegally binding instruments, the host State has an obligation to implement them.
3.2.1. United Nations Security Council
The UNSC has adopted thematic resolutions on SALW that refer to WAM, and numerous
resolutions on related or linked thematic issues or tools (e.g. on conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, DDR, SSR, women, peace and security, arms embargoes, and preventing
terrorists from acquiring weapons), in addition to country- or region-specific resolutions thatare applicable, depending on the context. Overall, an increasing number of UNSC resolutions
reference WAM obligations.15 A national WAM baseline assessment should link, respond andfeed in to these obligations. WAM-related obligations from UNSC resolutions may, dependingon the context, apply directly or indirectly to a State; to one, several or all other Member
States; to the United Nations (e.g. United Nations peacekeeping operations or special politicalmissions); or to other actors (e.g. regional organizations). These obligations might require theState to strengthen WAM and might also mandate the United Nations or other actors to provide
assistance to the State in this area of work. Such obligations may include reporting commitments
to the UNSC. Where they exist, UNSC resolutions also define arms embargo regimes, corresponding mandates (e.g. monitoring and reporting by a panel or group of experts, a United
Nations mission, or other actors), as well as conditions to be met for the UNSC to reassess arms
embargo measures (see Section 3.3.1). A national WAM baseline assessment is a tool that canbe used by States or the United Nations in all these scenarios.
3.2.2. International instruments
International instruments (see Box 1) to which the host State has committed or is a State Party
should guide host Governments and their relevant national authorities to develop, strengthenor adjust national WAM frameworks to their national contexts and situations. The objectivesof international instruments relevant to WAM vary, as do their implementation and review
processes. Those involved in the planning and implementation of WAM baseline assessments
should identify and review the relevant international instruments applicable to the host Stateand consider how such instruments can further support efforts to strengthen WAM at thenational level. In particular, planners of the baseline assessment should ensure that legallybinding instruments to which the host State is a party are reviewed and integrated as part ofsubstantive preparations for the baseline assessment.

15 For a compilation and categorization, see United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Aide-Memoire: Options for Reflecting Weapons and Ammunition Management in Decisions of the Security Council, 2nd
Edition, 2020, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/aide-memoire-2ed-1.pdf.

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BOX 1: International legally and politically binding instruments (arms control)International legally and/or politically binding
instruments include:
•

•

•

•

The Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (entry into force in 1983; legallybinding for States Parties) and its relevant
Additional Protocols
The Convention on the Prohibition of theUse, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction (entry into force in 1999;
legally binding for States Parties)
The United Nations Programme of
Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate
the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light
Weapons in All Its Aspects (adopted in
2001; politically binding)
The International Instrument to Enable
States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely

•

•

•

and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms
and Light Weapons (adopted in 2005;
politically binding)The
Protocolagainstthe
Illicit
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, Their Parts and Components
and Ammunition (entry into force in 2005;
legally binding for States Parties)
The Convention on Cluster Munitions(entry into force in 2010; legally binding
for States Parties)
The Arms Trade Treaty (entry into force in
2014; legally binding for States Parties)

Other international legally or politically binding
instruments may also be relevant to WAM.

For example, international instruments relevant to WAM include voluntary or legally binding
reporting commitments to help monitor implementation, which are useful for ensuring accountability and transparency, and more broadly, to demonstrate national political commitment toimplementing international arms control norms. National reports that are submitted to show
implementation of international instruments can provide a valuable source of information– a starting point – for the development of an initial country profile in preparation for a WAM
baseline assessment (see also Module 2, Sections 4.4.5 and 4.4.6). The results of the baseline
assessment, in turn, can inter alia inform future national reports and can feed back into informing
progress made in the implementation of relevant multilateral instruments.
Further, many international instruments have provisions for international cooperation andassistance that aim to support States in implementing their commitments. Findings of national
WAM baseline assessments can supplement national efforts to identify gaps, vulnerabilities
and needs in WAM and can inform the prioritization of international assistance.
3.2.3. Regional and subregional instruments
Regional and subregional instruments (see Box 2 for the African region) can also help guide andreinforce a national WAM framework. Regional and subregional instruments often form the basisof, as well as shape, positively influence and reinforce, the development and review of national
legal frameworks at the national level. Regional and subregional instruments have also informed
the development of relevant regional and subregional WAM strategies and road maps at thestrategic level, and implementation action plans at the operational level, among participating
States within a region or subregion. Where regional strategies or road maps may not exist at theregional or subregional level, national WAM baseline assessments can help identify and inform
shared understanding among States on regional means and methods to address risks and gaps
in WAM. Where such strategies or road maps exist, results of baseline assessments can help
inform the review of such strategies or road maps and the implementation progress made by
States. As in the case of international instruments, planners of the baseline assessment should

MODULE 2
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review and integrate regional and subregional commitments as part of the substantive preparations for the assessment.
BOX 2: Regional and subregional politically and legally binding instruments (arms control): Africa
The African Union’s initiative, Silencing theGuns, is a politically binding instrument for
African States.
For the African region and subregions, legallybinding instruments (arms control) include:••

The Protocol on the Control of Firearms,
Ammunition and Other Related Materials
in the Southern African Development
Community Region (entry into force in
2004, revised in 2020; legally binding forStates Parties)
The Convention on Small Arms and Light
Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other
Related Materials (ECOWAS Convention;
entry into force in 2009; legally binding
for States Parties)••

The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention,
Control and Reduction of Small Arms andLight Weapons in the Great Lakes Region
and the Horn of Africa (entry into force in
2006; legally binding for States Parties)
The Central African Convention for theControl of Small Arms and Light Weapons,
Their Ammunition, and All Parts andComponents That Can Be Used for Their
Manufacture, Repair and Assembly (entry
into force in 2017; legally binding forStates Parties)

Other regional or subregional legally binding
instruments may also be relevant to WAM in
Africa.

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3.3. SYNERGIES AND LINKAGES TO BROADER SECURITY PROCESSES
Taking a comprehensive and holistic approach to WAM is essential in ensuring that efforts to better
regulate and manage arms and ammunition are not undertaken in isolation but aligned with DDR,
security sector and broader rule of law, armed violence reduction and peacebuilding processes.
WAM baseline assessments should recognize and identify concrete links and synergies with suchbroader processes and seek to use, where relevant, related tools to maximize the impact theassessment can have to help achieve supporting objectives at the national level. These national
processes can often serve as crucial entry points or incentives to engage on WAM at the national
level with wide range of stakeholders.
3.3.1. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of United Nations arms embargoes
United Nations arms embargoes are adopted and imposed by the UNSC to prevent or manage aconflict’s armament situation by addressing a State and/or non-State armed actors in a country
or geographical area over a defined time period. In general, the UNSC commits to review an arms
embargo, usually on an annual basis, taking into account a variety of sources of information.
These can range from information obtained as part of a reporting obligation placed on the State
under the arms embargo; reporting by relevant panels or groups of experts monitoring the implementation of the arms embargo; reporting by relevant United Nations entities mandated by the
UNSC to help monitor or implement the arms embargo; or reporting on conditions, sometimes
referred to as benchmarks, set by the UNSC to support the reassessment of the arms embargo.
Such conditions may include a general improvement of the security situation, progress made in
SSR, DDR, or, – in some cases – explicitly strengthened national WAM capacity, practices andprocedures.
In recent years, the UNSC has increasingly used a partial lifting of arms embargoes as a way
to help States under embargo strengthen national security services to improve the security
situation in the country (or a particular territory). This practice has seen, in parallel, the increasingly frequent introduction of WAM-related commitments and measures as part of the partial
lifting of an arms embargo to address potential risks of arms diversion by those security services,while also aiming to address illicit arms proliferation and misuse. In such contexts, national WAM
baseline assessments can help inform the design of national control processes and procedures
to adequately implement the obligations set by the partial lifting of the arms embargo. The
assessments can also help identify synergies between WAM priorities, obligations of the arms
embargo, and the implementation of broader security sector strengthening processes. Where
reporting obligations exist for various actors (e.g. host State, or United Nations mission, panel
or group of experts), findings from the baseline assessment can serve as a useful additional
evidence base reference to inform the implementation of a partial arms embargo, as well as
progress made against established benchmarks, where relevant.16

16 See S. de Tessières et al., Applying Conventional Arms Control in the Context of United Nations Arms
Embargoes, UNIDIR, 2018, https://unidir.org/publication/applying-conventional-arms-control-context-united-nations-arms-embargoes. The national WAM baseline assessment reference methodology has been
applied, and key findings of UNIDIR WAM baseline assessments have been used to inform such processes,
including to support implementation and monitoring of specific partial arms embargo regimes, such as in theCentral African Republic and Somalia.

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3.3.2. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of DDR
Where applicable, national WAM baseline assessments should be contextualized and situatedin varying DDR contexts in mission and non-mission settings. In line with the new United Nations
approach to DDR,17 transitional WAM18 is recognized as a DDR-related tool applicable in transitional settings, including in an ongoing armed conflict, where a peace agreement has neither
been signed nor implemented and where disarmament as part of a DDR programme may not
be the most suitable approach to manage and control the circulation of arms and ammunition
because armed groups may be reluctant to disarm without strong security guarantees and arrangements. In contexts where a peace agreement has been signed and the necessary preconditions for a DDR programme are in place, transitional WAM can be used before, during andafter the DDR programme as a complementary measure. Transitional WAM may also be usedin combination with other DDR-related tools, including CVR programmes.19 The disarmament
component of a DDR programme also includes key WAM functions and operations, including
the surrender or collection of weapons, ammunition and explosives; systematic and proper
registration (and, where required, the marking of weapons); stockpile management (including
accounting, transportation and storage); profiling and tracing (if needed and required); anddisposal, including destruction.20 The scope of national baseline assessments cover these WAM
functional areas and thereby can help assess and inform risks, gaps, vulnerabilities and areas for
improvements to implement WAM in the context of DDR. It may also help to situate and alignDDR-related activities and processes to the national WAM framework as appropriate.
3.3.3. National WAM baseline assessments in the context of SSR
A national WAM baseline assessment may take place in a context where the host State isundertaking an SSR process.21 WAM can be an effective entry point for ongoing SSR processes
in several ways. Synergies between WAM and SSR may include the creation or strengtheningof national security institutions and coordination mechanisms, including on WAM; processes toreview national laws and regulations, including those on arms, ammunition and related material;national security strategies or defence plans and their implementation across a territory, which
may include WAM or related activities; the rightsizing of defence and security forces, including
the adaption of weapons and ammunition stockpiles to the size, needs and objectives of theforces; identification of surplus, unserviceable weapons and obsolete and unstable ammunition
to be destroyed in relation to the operational readiness of security forces; a cost-effective,needs-based and efficient procurement policy and process for the acquisition of “new” orreplacing weapons and ammunition; assessment of arms held by civilians in support of, or
independent of, security services and their operations; or parliamentarian and public oversight,
as well as corresponding accountability mechanisms for security services and their use of force.
National WAM baseline assessments can help facilitate dialogue among national stakeholders
17 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, “2.10: The UN Approach to
DDR”, www.unddr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IDDRS-2.10-The-UN-Approach-To-DDR.pdf.
18 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, “4.11: Transitional Weapons and Ammunition Management”, www.unddr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IDDRS-4.11-Transitional-Weapons-and-Ammunition-Management.pdf.
19 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, “2.30: Community Violence
Reduction”, www.unddr.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/IDDRS-2.30-Community-Violence-Reduction.pdf.
20 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, “4.10: Disarmament”, www.
unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.10-Disarmament.pdf; S. de Tessières, Effective Weapons and Ammunition
Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Context, 2nd Edition, United
Nations Department of Peace Operations and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2021, www.
un.org/disarmament/ddr-handbook-2ed.
21 For more information on small arms control in the context of SSR, see MOSAIC, “02.20: Small Arms andLight Weapons in the Context of Security Sector Reform”, 2020, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/MOSAIC-02.20EV1.0.pdf.

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responsible for or involved in these processes. Moreover, findings from the assessment canform a baseline from which priority actions can be identified and implementation progress canbe monitored to support both SSR and WAM objectives at the national level.
3.3.4. National WAM baseline assessments in different armed violence contexts, including in
local and urban settings
A national WAM baseline assessment can take place outside of an active conflict setting inan environment with high levels of armed violence.22 Such armed violence may occur in urban
settings, as well as localized contexts. The baseline assessment methodology is applicable andsufficiently flexible to be adapted to such a context, which may be characterized by increased
presence of law enforcement operations targeting gangs, (organized) criminal groups andnetworks, and specifically the fight against illicit trafficking. The scope of arms and ammunition(e.g. categories, calibres) can differ from a conflict or post-conflict setting (e.g. there is likely
more emphasis and focus on firearms and small calibre ammunition), whereas national actors
and participation may also vary (e.g. more focus may be placed on national law enforcement,
customs, intelligence entities, crime prevention and investigative authorities and agencies).
Depending on specific context, as well types and patterns of armed violence, the baseline
assessment methodology may be used to place focus on assessing specific WAM functional
areas or management capacities, processes and practices of targeted national institutions.

22 See, op. cit., G. Hideg and A. Alvazzi del Frate, Darkening Horizons: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2018–30, Small Arms Survey, 2019, www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/
SAS-BP-Violent-Deaths-Scenarios.pdf. See also, for example, MOSAIC, “02.10: Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Context of Preventing Armed Violence”, forthcoming.

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MODULE 2:
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PLANNING AND DESIGNSECTION 4

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4. PLANNING AND DESIGN 				CONSIDERATIONS FOR A NATIONAL WAM
BASELINE ASSESSMENT
This section presents key aspects related to timely, effective and efficient planning and designof a national WAM baseline assessment by individuals of a government’s national lead entity andpartners (hereafter generically referred to as “planners”). Section 4 consists of four subsections: (i)stakeholders and participation; (ii) scope of a baseline assessment; (iii) additional specific design
considerations; and (iv) practical pre-assessment planning considerations.
4.1. STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTICIPATION
A key principle of the WAM baseline assessment is a comprehensive approach to WAM, centred
on inclusiveness as well as the involvement and participation of all relevant stakeholders during
the assessment. Considerations related to actors and participation are an essential aspect ofthe planning and organization of a national WAM baseline assessment. A national WAM baseline
assessment in most cases provides a unique opportunity for national stakeholders responsible
for a wide range of WAM or related areas of work (e.g. broader arms control, SSR, DDR, peacebuilding, sustainable development) to gather, exchange on good practices and gaps, and engage
in policy-oriented and operationally guided discussions on WAM while pursuing various goals andobjectives.
The baseline assessment methodology has been designed to follow a sequenced, consultative
process with relevant national stakeholders, both at strategic/policy and operational/technicallevels. Additionally, civil society organizations (CSOs) and regional and international partners may
be involved in the planning and implementation of the baseline assessments. In some situations, it
is beneficial for other actors, such as private security companies, to participate in select segmentsof the baseline assessments based on the host Government’s determination. The roles and stakesof these different actors in a national WAM baseline assessment are explained in the subsections
below. Section 4.4 provides information on how to prepare and organize a consultative process,which is also illustrated in Annex I (template programme of work) and Annex II (template agenda).
4.1.1. National actors
4.1.1.1. Political stakeholders
A key prerequisite for effective design and planning of a national baseline assessment is agood understanding of the government’s internal structures and dynamics as they relate to
WAM. This is a prerequisite to facilitate national buy-in and ownership for a national WAM
baseline assessment and to inform subsequent follow-up activities, including allocation of
the necessary resources to implement them. Planners are encouraged to seek engagement
at high political levels of the host Government. The higher the political interest, support andleverage, the more likely that participation of key national stakeholders will be facilitated
for the baseline assessments. It is also more likely that the results of the assessment will
be followed, coordinated and implemented over time in a sustainable manner. Politicalleaders responsible for WAM in a host Government may vary from one State to another;thus, planners should identify the appropriate entry point for engagement in consultation
with national stakeholders. Examples of high-level engagement include national security

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advisers to the president; senior security and political advisers to the prime minister; chefs
de cabinet; ministers or deputy-ministers of defence, interior or other relevant ministries;
heads of national security services and institutions; and parliamentarians sitting on securityand defence-related committees that oversee activities and budgets in this domain.
4.1.1.2. Competent national authorities and focal points
In countries where a national coordinating body relevant to WAM exists, such an entity canserve as the focal point for the joint planning of a baseline assessment. While the mandates,
placement in the government structure, and scope of such coordinating bodies vary among
States, the principal functions of these bodies include coordinating national WAM policies,
strategies or action plans to support the development, review and implementation of WAMrelevant activities.23 In many cases, such coordinating bodies are referred to as national
commissions or committees on SALW.24 Such entities are often also directly responsible foror coordinate the reporting to relevant regional or international instruments. Planners should
engage with such national coordinating bodies to identify relevant national authorities thatshould participate in the baseline assessment from strategic to operational levels. Further,planners should identify a wider set of national stakeholders involved in national security,
humanitarian and sustainable development processes to ensure that dialogue on WAM issituated appropriately within the broader sets of national priorities. Examples of the national
authorities most frequently and commonly engaged as part of conducting a baseline
assessment include:••••

Ministries of defence, interior, foreign affairs, trade, justice, finance, gender, etc.
National security institutions and related agencies, including offices of national security,
national intelligence agencies, and customs and border control
National security services including the armed forces, law enforcement agencies, and allother relevant25 and related services
National stakeholders responsible for SSR, peacebuilding, peace and reconciliation,
violence reduction, DDR, and sanctions, including arms embargoes

4.1.2. Regional and subregional organizations
In addition to national stakeholders, planners should consider engagement with relevant regionaland subregional organizations and their experts in the planning, design and implementation ofnational WAM baseline assessments. Regional approaches and cooperation on WAM have a
critical, instrumental and important role to play in facilitating the implementation of existingregional and subregional instruments, strategies, road maps and action plans. Some regionaland subregional organizations working in the area of WAM have dedicated offices, teams or
capacities that support States of the region or subregion in the monitoring and implementation of WAM-related commitments. Where relevant, planners should identify such focal points
and consider consulting them during the planning and design of the national WAM baseline
assessment.

23 Depending on the placement of these coordinating bodies within the government, such entities may
have more strategic or operational roles. In some cases, the entity may play a strictly coordination role, whilein others it may be more involved in strategic or operational planning related to WAM.
24 Designations of commissions and committees vary among States. WAM-related coordinating bodies
are often established through or recognized in a relevant national legal framework.
25 Relevant national defence and security services include, at a minimum, all those that hold, manage and/or control weapons and ammunition.

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Practically, partnerships with a regional or subregional organization may be sought andestablished for the implementation of one or several national WAM baseline assessments in therespective region or subregion. This approach, taken by UNIDIR and the ECOWAS Commission
for the West African region, for example, has helped to inform the development of the five-year
action plan for the implementation of the ECOWAS Convention in 2020.
Another approach, taken in select cases in the Horn of Africa region, for example, may be to
integrate an expert from a regional or subregional organization into the assessment team thatfacilitates the in-country national WAM baseline assessment. Further approaches include
inviting a representative of a regional or subregional organization to participate in a number of
relevant consultative meeting sessions during the national WAM baseline assessment.
These examples demonstrate the important and, in some cases, key role that regionaland subregional organizations can play in supporting the implementation of the baseline
assessment, as well as in feeding back the findings and results of the assessments into regionaland subregional processes and aligning national road maps with regional and subregional roadmaps and action plans.
4.1.3. CSOs at the national level
CSOs highlight human security and safety needs as well as negative impacts associated with
illicit and poorly managed arms and ammunition on affected communities. CSOs are also criticalin putting pressure on governments to bring about change in behaviour and practice in theregulation and promotion of arms control, including in the fight against the illicit proliferationand misuse of arms at national and local levels.
In some cases, CSOs may be organized under WAM-related networks or associations (e.g. SALW
control civil society networks; national NGOs specializing in academic, judicial, policy-oriented
or field research; NGOs promoting gender aspects of arms control and disarmament; associations of local manufacturers and hunters). Planners should assess whether such networks andassociations already form part of, and participate in, the national WAM coordination mechanism
and related processes, which can inform the types and levels of influence they may possess on
WAM-related matters.
Relevant CSOs present in the country may bring varying expertise, accessibility, insights andinfluence to conducting a WAM baseline assessment. Thus, planners should consider CSO roles
and responsibilities as part of the planning of a national baseline assessment. Furthermore,planners should then consult relevant CSOs as well as the focal national authorities as part ofplanning on the potential roles and scale of CSO engagement to support the implementationand follow-up of the baseline assessment.

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4.1.4. Assistance-providing and partner States
States may be in the position to use their own national resources to undertake a national baseline
assessment and to operationalize follow-up activities to improve WAM policy and practice.
However, some States may require, and subsequently request, financial, technical or advisory
support from external stakeholders to undertake a baseline assessment and implement
follow-up WAM enhancement activities. In such contexts, assistance-providing States, often
referred to as partner States, play an essential role in the planning of the WAM baseline
assessment. Partner States may have technical expertise relevant to WAM in a country throughtheir embassies (e.g. defence and police attaches and advisers) or, in some cases, as part of multilateral peace or political missions or military operations (e.g. specialized military, logistics orother related roles). Planners should identify and map relevant partner States, and in particular
the types and scale of assistance they can provide on WAM-related activities, as part of theplanning and implementation of a baseline assessment. Depending on the host Government’s
indication, such partner States’ representatives may be invited to participate in all or specificsessions of a national baseline assessment. Alternatively, they can be invited to a dedicatedcoordination and consultative meeting, as part of the in-country WAM baseline assessment
process (see Annex I). Involving partner States in the assessment process may facilitate theassistance provided to the host Government in supporting follow-up implementation of WAM
enhancement activities.
4.1.5. United Nations entities
Specific United Nations entities may themselves, as part of their mandate and in support oftheir mandated objectives, support a host Government and relevant national authorities in thedesign, planning and implementation of an integrated, holistic and comprehensive national
WAM baseline assessment, thereby working towards strengthening the WAM framework at
the national level. In other cases, United Nations entities may be mandated to support WAM
and related activities in a country where a national WAM baseline assessment is planned andimplemented. In such contexts, relevant regional United Nations entities or offices may manage
WAM-relevant programming and projects in the country or remotely. In both scenarios, planners
should consider the respective roles, responsibilities and contributions of United Nations
entities in supporting the planning and implementation of national WAM baseline assessments.
United Nations presence in a country where a baseline assessment is taking place may vary.
The guidance provided below helps planners to identify the type of United Nations presence
and actors who may be present and to situate engagement with United Nations stakeholders;
however, it is not a comprehensive list. In mapping relevant United Nations stakeholders andassessing the roles they could play in supporting the implementation and follow-up to baseline
assessments, planners could consider:•

United Nations Resident Coordinator Offices and country teams:26 United Nations country
teams currently exist in 131 countries and not only serve as a “one United Nations” portal tothe activities of the United Nations in a country but also may have established programmingor projects relevant to WAM. These may include peacebuilding or DDR and CVR initiatives
that include risk education activities as well as weapons management components (e.g.
obsolete weapons collection and destruction from affected communities) or capacity-building activities to strengthen security institutions and rule of law. There are ongoing
efforts to promote the inclusion of arms and ammunition considerations into the common
country analysis and the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework.

26 See United Nations Sustainable Development Group, “Countries and Territories”, https://unsdg.un.org/
un-in-action/country-level.

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•

•

•

Planners should consider how the national WAM baseline assessment and its results could
contribute to such efforts and to existing programming and projects, in addition to consideration of how national WAM baseline assessment and results could inform the developmentof new initiatives.
United Nations peacekeeping operations:27 United Nations peacekeeping operations
may have dedicated or related mandates to support WAM activities at the national level
including in the context of DDR, CVR, SSR, SALW control, military operations conducted byUnited Nations troops, monitoring and implementation of an arms embargo, capacity-building of police and law enforcement, prevention of serious organized crimes, justice sector
reform, or conflict analysis. Many of the peacekeeping operations have established formal
or informal structures that facilitate or involve the planning and implementation of activities
related to WAM, including through the convening of working groups (e.g. as part of SSR or
DDR, arms embargo, or counter illicit trafficking working groups), or have designated focal
office or points in the management of arms and ammunition (e.g. the United Nations Mine
Action Service). Planners should consider how to best use existing mission mandates andcomponents28 to support the planning, implementation and follow-up of national WAM
baseline assessments.
United Nations special political missions:29 United Nations special political missions may
have a dedicated WAM mandate, or responsibilities to provide advisory or other formsof support (e.g. operational, technical) to a host Government on topics relevant to WAM,
ranging from disarmament (e.g. laying down the arms) to monitoring and implementation of related processes that may have an arms control component, such as ceasefire,
mediation, DDR, CVR, SSR and arms embargo. As part of the design of the national baseline
assessment, planners should, on the one hand, examine the role that the United Nations
special political mission could play in supporting the implementation and follow-up of thebaseline assessment and, on the other hand, consider how the findings of the assessment
could support the objectives of the political mission, as appropriate.
United Nations headquarters and other specialized entities: Planners could also consider
engaging with other relevant United Nations entities and bodies as part of planning for abaseline assessment, including with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs andits three Regional Centres;30 the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, including the
DDR Section, SSR Unit and Mine Action Service;31 the United Nations Office on Drugs andCrime and the Global Firearms Programme;32 the United Nations Development Programme(see also United Nations country teams at the beginning of this list); United Nations CounterTerrorism Executive Directorate;33 and relevant panels or groups of experts mandated tomonitor the implementation of arms embargoes,34 where they exist. Such engagement

27 See United Nations Peacekeeping, “Where We Operate”, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/
where-we-operate.
28 For information and further guidance in this regard, planners can use the UNSC Field Missions Dashboard, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/field-missions-dashboard.
29 See United Nations Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, “DPPA Around the World”, https://dppa.un.org/
en/dppa-around-world.
30 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Regional Centers”, www.un.org/disarmament/disarmsec/regional-centers.
31 See United Nations Peacekeeping, “Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions”, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/office-of-rule-of-law-and-security-institutions.
32 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, “Global Firearms Programme”, www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/firearms-protocol/index.html.
33 See UNSC Counter-Terrorism Committee, Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, “About Us”, www.
un.org/sc/ctc.
34

See UNSC, “Sanctions Committee Information”, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information.

UNIDIR29

at the planning stage would strengthen the knowledge of planners on the context of the
proposed baseline assessment, help identify synergies in initiatives (e.g. with other technicalassessments or capacity-building initiatives), and facilitate national efforts to coordinate
implementation of follow-up activities post-assessment.
4.1.6. Other international and regional organizations and entities
Planners should also determine if there are other relevant international organizations working
on WAM-related issues in the country of the baseline assessment prior to deployment. In Africa,such organizations might include African Union peace operations. European Union special
technical assistance missions, or similar entities, can also support the strengthening of WAM
at the national level. In particular, planners should consider engagement with the relevant
assistance programming units of INTERPOL, which provides support to their respective national
central bureaux, as well as the World Customs Organization, as relevant. Both INTERPOL andthe World Customs Organization have various WAM-relevant programmes and projects that
aim to support the operational capacity-building of States, in particular in the area of monitoring,
diagnostics and tracing of illicit arms and related material, as well as international cooperationin the area of border controls and law enforcement. Where synergies exist, planners should
consider integrating the knowledge and tools available from relevant existing projects by international organizations into the design of the WAM baseline assessment.
4.1.7. Specialized international NGOs
Specialized international NGOs with expertise in WAM may also be present in the country thatis undertaking a national WAM baseline assessment. These NGOs may be providing or seeking
to provide, various types of assistance in one or several WAM functional areas to national
WAM authorities, defence and security forces, or CSOs. Specialized NGOs bring expertise andexperience in support of relevant national authorities in the planning and implementation of
specific WAM functional areas. They may also be undertaking activities that can support in theidentification of priority areas for assistance. Depending on access and the duration of theirpresence in country, such specialized NGOs can offer technical advisory support to planners
in the planning and design of national WAM baseline assessments. In turn, specialized NGOs
may welcome engagement in national baseline assessment processes, where they may facechallenges relating to access, or in obtaining a more comprehensive overview of how theirassistance fits into the broader national strategic WAM planning process. Planners should
consider the benefits of engaging with specialized NGOs in the implementation of the baseline
assessment, taking into account how they may be able to support the identification of WAM
gaps and needs as part of the assessment, as well as how they could facilitate the implementation of follow-up activities identified in the findings of the assessment.

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4.2. SCOPE OF A BASELINE ASSESSMENT
4.2.1. General
The baseline assessment methodology pursues a life cycle approach to the managementof weapons and ammunition, from the point of manufacture or production through to final
disposal, including destruction, at the end of the life cycle. Such a holistic approach is criticalfor identifying relevant stakeholders that manage arms and ammunition at each stage ofcustody in the life cycle, to differentiate controls and management functions by the relevant
and competent national authorities, and to assess potential vulnerabilities in the institutional
WAM processes and capacities to inform ways to strengthen WAM at the national level. The
assessment seeks to establish a WAM baseline of stakeholders, processes and practices at thenational level across 10 key functional areas of WAM.
BOX 3: Ten key WAM functional areas
1. National coordination mechanism
2. Legal and regulatory framework at
national level
3. Transfer controls
4. Stockpile management
5. Marking
6. Recordkeeping

7. Tracing of arms and profiling of
ammunition
8. Processing of illicit arms and treatment ofillicit ammunition
9. Weapons collection
10. Disposal including destruction

The functional areas covered under this methodology are not exhaustive. For example, thismethodology currently does not cover governance and regulation of manufacturing of arms andammunition. Further, where the host State may express interest, the scope of the assessment
may be redesigned to be more targeted (e.g. to focus solely on ammunition management) or
expanded to consider additional functional areas. Planners should consult the host State in
the planning and design phase to jointly identify and agree on the scope of the assessment.
Examples of additional WAM functional areas or considerations include manufacturing controls,
craft production, and artisanal weapons control and management; broader focus on civilian
possession; community-based WAM; WAM by authorized civilian or non-public entities (e.g.
private security actors); and border controls; among others.
The design of the methodology aims to help assessors better understand:••Existing national stakeholders and their institutional roles, responsibilities and functions
relevant to WAM.
The maturity of national WAM processes through mapping of the decision-making and implementation processes of national stakeholders and their institutional capacities to carryout their respective WAM-related roles, responsibilities and functions.

Under each functional area, the methodology seeks to identify relevant stakeholders, andthe current status of their institutional WAM processes and related capacities and practices,
including possible vulnerabilities and gaps, and to thereby facilitate the assessment of areasfor enhancement in alignment with relevant international guidelines, namely MOSAIC and the
IATG (see Section 4.3.3). Additionally, under each functional area, the methodology provides
specific considerations pertaining to the safety of conventional ammunition, thereby separatingarms management measures from ammunition management measures, where relevant andnecessary (see Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Gender-sensitive approaches and considerations

UNIDIR31

are mainstreamed and integrated under each functional area, instead of being presented as a
dedicated functional area of assessment.
A technical assessment of the tactical capabilities of national stakeholders, including a detailed
assessment and analysis of storage and materiel conditions, is beyond the scope of thismethodology. As such, this methodology is not suitable for such exercises. However, findings
from technical WAM assessments at the tactical level conducted by the host State or its partners
may form a useful preparatory resource for the assessment team should the host State permit
the sharing of such information on a voluntary basis. Where such tactical-level assessment
has not yet been undertaken at the time of the WAM baseline assessment, proposed follow-up
activities stemming from the baseline assessment may include a recommendation to undertakea more detailed technical assessment at the tactical level.
4.2.2. Assessment of current institutional processes, capacities and practices
A key component of the methodology is the assessment of existing, actual, de facto institutionaland operational capacities and practices of national WAM stakeholders in key WAM functional
areas (see Section 4.2.1). The identification of national stakeholders and their current institutional capacities and practices forms the essential backbone of the baseline. Assessors should
work closely with the participating national stakeholders to differentiate between current institutional capacities and practices and those they aspire to achieve, as establishing a baselineof the current status enables the identification of opportunities for enhancement as well as
options for implementing those opportunities and for making progress. The assessment teamshould be clear in its communication with national stakeholders prior to and during the baseline
assessment that identifying a baseline of current institutional capacities and practices does notentail a critical investigation of the shortfalls of the State’s WAM systems but, rather, aims tobring all stakeholders on the “same page” regarding the current state of play of WAM in the
country.
On a practical level, the assessment team may use an internal reference matrix that presents thestakeholder mapping by WAM functional areas to populate information on the current baseline
during the baseline assessment exercise (see Section 4.4.6).35

35 The maturity categories draw on and are adapted from the Counter-IED Capability Maturity Model,
as initially released as the UNIDIR Counter-IED Capability Maturity Model and Self-Assessment Tool. It canbe accessed here: https://unidir.org/publication/counter-ied-capability-maturity-model-and-self-assessment-tool.

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BOX 4: Tip on assessing institutional processes, capacities, and practices
As a guiding reference, the maturity of institutional processes, capacities and practices may beassessed and understood by assessors in three general categories:35•••

Initial: Processes and practices range from ad hoc to basic management structures, andcapacities to implement WAM may be limited or restricted in some or many functional
areas.
Defined: WAM processes and practices are established and codified, and institutional
capacities are mature enough to adequately implement WAM functions.
Managed: WAM processes and practices are well established and defined, and institutional
capacities are optimized to effectively implement the full life cycle of WAM.

These categories are simply an internal reference tool for assessors. The categories do notseek to grade States and their institutional capacities; rather, they are intended to provide anindication and support the assessors in their effort to target the focus of their assessment appropriately on the national and local context as well as needs.

BOX 5: Tip on scope of assessment and time management
Due to time and resource limitation or access
restrictions, it may not be always possible forthe assessment team to conduct a detailed
assessment of institutional capacities andpractices for each WAM functional area. In
other words, the scope may change or need
to be adjusted during a baseline assessment
in a country. In such a circumstance, communication with the national WAM lead entity

is important, and the assessment should
be characterized and presented as an initialassessment of the institutional capacities andpractices. As such, and in anticipating such a
scenario, planners should carefully consider
the total time and resources available for thebaseline assessment as part of the planningand design phase.

4.2.3. Identification of WAM needs and challenges
Based on the baseline of current institutional capacities and practices, the subsequent step of
the assessment is to collectively identify the challenges and needs faced by national stakeholders in their effort to effectively implement their mandates and tasks on WAM. The assessment
team should conduct this process in a participatory and consultative manner, whereby challenges
and priority needs are clearly identified and defined by WAM functional areas and the respective
national stakeholders responsible for management and implementation.

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33

BOX 6: Tip for facilitation
The assessment team should work jointlywith the designated national lead entity (seeSection 4.1.1.2) in dividing roles and responsibilities in the facilitation of national consultations. To avoid, mitigate or defuse potential
tensions in the identification of challenges
and needs, the designated national leadauthority should be prepared to provide
political navigation support in the dialogue
among national stakeholders. Further, toavoid a scenario whereby the identification ofchallenges and needs turns into a “wish list”,
the assessment team should be preparedto facilitate dialogue on gaining clarity in decision-making processes related to WAM
activities (e.g. the authorization process
pertaining to WAM activities), rather thanfocusing on operational capacity gaps andneeds.

4.2.4. Identification of assistance needs
During the assessment of challenges and needs, the assessment team should promote an
open and transparent dialogue on the types of assistance (e.g. technical, operational, expertise,financial) that may be needed to strengthen key WAM functional areas of the national framework.
Such consideration should take into account what assistance may be available immediately andlocally based on national budgets, as well as those types of support that may be achievable inthe mid to longer term with external assistance. In this process, the assessment team may draw
on relevant experience with and knowledge about the mechanisms available to facilitate international cooperation and assistance to help guide the dialogue among national stakeholders, aswell as to manage their expectations.
4.2.5. Options to strengthen a national WAM framework
One of the key outputs of the baseline assessment is the identification and consolidation ofconsensus-driven options to support the strengthening of the national WAM framework, whichforms a critical component of the national WAM road map (see Section 4.2.6). These options are
generated based on the baseline of institutional capacities and practices and related challenges
and needs, as identified by the national stakeholders. Each of the options is discussed, adjusted
where needed, and validated by participating national stakeholders as part of the baseline
assessment.
The assessment team should consider several factors in the identification and consolidationof options for enhancement. Options for the host Government to strengthen its national WAM
framework should be:
SPECIFIC

MEASURABLE(i.e. aim to strengthen a key WAM functional
area process, capacity, practice orprocedure)(e.g. quantifiable at a higher and lower unit
level of analysis to inform national WAM
baseline assessment follow-on activities)

ORIENTED TOWARDS FUTURE RESULTSREALISTIC AND ACHIEVABLE BY THE
RELEVANT NATIONAL AUTHORITIES(i.e. aim to strengthen a key WAM functional
area process, capacity, practice orprocedure)34(with the support of assistance providers,
where present), thereby taking into accountthe national, regional, subregional and international environment, developments andpriorities

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4.2.6. Drafting of a road map to strengthen a national WAM framework
The end result of a national WAM baseline assessment, and the starting point for follow-up
activities to strengthen WAM, is the development of a national road map on WAM. Such a road
map is presented in the form of a report and includes:

Current status of WAM institutional capacities and processes.

WAM enhancement opportunities.

Options for implementation by key WAM functional areas, organized by prioritization over a time frame andactor-specific attribution of WAM roles and responsibilities. The articulation of options may include international WAM support and assistance providers.

The draft road map is jointly presented by the designated national lead authority and theassessment team to a high authority in the host State (e.g. Minister of Interior or Defence,
National Security Adviser, Office of the Prime Minister), which then constitutes the adoption
through appropriate means of the national road map to strengthen WAM.
Annex III includes a template for the creation of a road map document.
BOX 7: Tip for contextualizing the national WAM road map
At the strategic level, in some baseline
assessments, the national WAM road map
has been used by national authorities toreview their national security strategies and,in some select cases, to develop a dedicatednational WAM strategy. In some baseline
assessments, the national WAM road map
has also been used to inform and support
the establishment of a dedicated national
WAM coordinating mechanism and national
lead entity. In another case, a national WAM
road map has informed the development of
a dedicated national policy for ammunition

management. In select cases, national WAM
road maps have also informed United Nations
partial arms embargo regime implementation, reporting and benchmarking processes.
At the operational level, several States haveused national WAM road maps to inform thedevelopment or revision of national actions
plans on SALW. Several States have also usednational WAM baseline assessments and roadmaps to inform the development, revision or
adoption of specific (written) operational
procedures.

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35

4.3. ADDITIONAL SPECIFIC DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
4.3.1. Specific considerations related to security
Processes related to security and accountability of weapons and ammunition primarily focus
on preventing diversion into the hands of unauthorized recipients or unauthorized end users.
Security and accountability considerations apply throughout the supply chain of weapons andammunition, whether in storage, in possession or during their movement. Planners and assessors
should ensure that the WAM baseline assessment captures decision-making process that
inform the maturity of accountability systems in place to manage weapons and ammunition, as
well as operational practices that physically secure and account for weapons and ammunition
and their movements.
4.3.2. Specific considerations related to safety
Safety considerations apply primarily to ammunition and explosives due to their incendiaryand explosive nature. This methodology recognizes and acknowledges the distinctive nature,
threats and risks posed by ammunition and explosives, including as a result of poor handling,
management or storage, and transport practices that may result in accidental or unplanned
explosions. In this regard, planners and assessors should pay particular and specialized attention
during the baseline assessment to WAM policies and practices relating to the safe and securemanagement of ammunition. Assessors should ensure that the baseline assessment captures
decision-making processes that inform the maturity of safety systems in place to manage
ammunition, as well as operational practices that enable safe handling, transport, storage anddisposal of ammunition. Planners should ensure that the assessment team includes ammunition
technical officers or an equivalent.
BOX 8: Tip for planners on ammunition technical personnel as part of assessment team
Where possible, planners should identify and integrate ammunition technical personnel as partof the assessment team, preferably those who are nationally qualified and certified to manage
conventional ammunition or those who have been rostered through the technical validation
exercise under the United Nations SaferGuard programme, or similar regionally led programme.

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4.3.3. Relevant international standards and guidelines providing the point of reference to themethodology
The baseline assessment methodology draws from, and aligns with, relevant international standards and technical guidelines, in particular the voluntary, practical MOSAIC36 and the
IATG,37 as well as complementary guidance documents.38 The methodology does so by drawing
on the guidance available and formulating it in the form of guiding questions that provide thebasis of national consultations during the baseline assessment.
In turn, the recommendations for WAM enhancement identified as a result of the baseline
assessment are guided by elements from these international guidelines and standards. Further,through this process, the WAM baseline assessment methodology can help raise awareness ofthese guidelines, and in some circumstances, inform and support the practical application anddomestication of MOSAIC and the IATG in a national context. This integrated approach can also
contribute to sharing of experiences and lessons learned in the application of these guidelines
in different national contexts and inform discussions pertaining to relevant review mechanisms
applicable to MOSAIC and the IATG as appropriate.

36 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Modular Small-arms-control Implementation
Compendium (MOSAIC)”, www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/mosaic.
37 See United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “International Ammunition Technical Guidelines”,
www.un.org/disarmament/convarms/Ammunition/IATG.
38 See, for example, guidance developed under the United Nations SaferGuard programme, such as the
IATG implementation support guides, https://unsaferguard.org; see also Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, “4.10: Disarmament” and “4.11: Transitional Weapons and Ammunition
Management”, www.unddr.org/the-iddrs/level-4.

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4.4. PRACTICAL PRE-ASSESSMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
4.4.1 Expression of interest by the host Government
To achieve its objectives and intended outcomes, it is critical that a national WAM baseline
assessment process is nationally owned and led. Where a national WAM baseline assessment
is designed, planned and implemented with external support, a clear expression of interestby a national lead authority or a representative of the host Government is the first step for
initiating the planning and organization of a national WAM baseline assessment. The formatof the expression of interest may vary among States but often includes a request in the formof an official letter or other means of communication among the parties to be involved in theassessment. The second step – following the expression of interest, but prior to an agreement
to engage – involves a discussion on the terms of reference, proposed programme of work (seeAnnex I), and the reference methodology for the WAM baseline assessment among the key
stakeholders involved in the planning and design of the assessment. If a State seeks assistancefrom an external entity in jointly undertaking a baseline assessment, the steps describedabove are discussed and considered between the requesting State and the entity providing
the support (e.g. between the designated national lead authority and the lead planner from theentity providing assistance).
4.4.2. Preparation mission and meetings with stakeholders in the country
Unless there is a presence by the co-organizing entity in the country where the baseline
assessment is being planned, planners should undertake a preparatory mission to the country.
During the preparatory visit, planners should undertake meetings with the designated national
lead authority and with the wider range of stakeholders (see Section 4.1) to further strengthen
national ownership, identify synergies, and ensure efficient, effective joint substantive andlogistical planning and preparations. During this visit, planners should have a detailed discussionof the agreed programme of work of the national WAM baseline assessment and carry out
awareness-raising and sensitization with the high-level national authorities, together with thedesignated national lead authority, to facilitate buy-in and participation from all relevant national
stakeholders and partners. Planners should also discuss administrative and logistical aspects(e.g. venue, catering) as well as possible operational site visits. Such a preparatory mission andon-site meeting go hand in hand with a number of remote meetings to prepare for a national
WAM baseline assessment.
BOX 9: Tip for remote preparatory “missions” (preparatory virtual meetings)
In situations where in-country preparatory
missions are not possible due to travel oraccess restrictions, planners may consider
a remote preparatory virtual meeting. Sucha virtual preparatory “mission” should notnecessarily result in a change of items to becovered by the planners and the host State(as described in Section 4.4.2). However,planners should consider both time andaccess limitations that national stakeholders
may face in terms of participation in virtual
settings. In particular, planners should keep
in mind that not all national stakeholders
will have stable and regular network access,38

which may be restricted due to security ora lack of the necessary network infrastructure at the national level. An ineffective
preparatory process, either through lack ofparticipation or challenges related to connectivity, may impact the implementation of
the baseline assessment. Planners should
consult the designated national lead authority
on how to design a virtual session that would
enable meaningful participation by the target
stakeholders. Other partners may then also
be consulted on the design and conduct of aremote, virtual preparatory mission.

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4.4.3. Consideration pertaining to the use of information and the report
The information and knowledge generated and collected during the baseline assessment, as wellas the resulting report (i.e. road map), is owned by the designated national lead authority. Planners
should discuss and agree with the designated national lead authority on the use, including restrictions and limitations pertaining to the confidentiality of the information to be generated
and used in the report, prior to implementing the baseline assessment. Planners should ensurethat discussions with national authorities clarify the type of substantive information that canand cannot be generated and analysed by a baseline assessment to manage expectations (seeSection 4.2.1). At an early planning stage, the designated national lead authority, representing
the host Government, should be presented with reporting options and modalities (see Section6), in addition to ideas, opportunities or concrete options on how to subsequently use a WAM
baseline assessment report, including to support international cooperation and assistance.

4.4.4. Composition of an assessment teamAn assessment team should represent various skill sets and experiences that facilitate theeffective implementation of baseline assessments. A multisectoral, diverse assessment teamis encouraged, taking into account the political, technical and process-related expertise needed
to facilitate dialogue with a wide range of stakeholders at the national level. While composition
and types of experts may vary from one context to another, an assessment team often includes
the following functions:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Team lead, who assumes political roles and leads on strategic planning and implementationof the assessment
National and/or regional expert, who has strong knowledge of the local armed violence orconflict dynamics
SME(s) on arms and ammunition management, including ammunition technical personnel
SME on broader processes, such as peacebuilding, SSR, DDR and genderOperational coordinator, who facilitates the operational preparation (including logistics) of
the baseline assessment
Rapporteur, who produces the report of the baseline assessment

UNIDIR39

An individual may assume one or more of these functions. Planners should consider several
points regarding the composition of the assessment team:
TO STRENGTHEN NATIONAL OWNERSHIP.

DIVERSITY IS ESSENTIAL.

A national representative or expert shouldbe part of the assessment team. This may
be achieved by integrating a representativefrom the designated national lead authority
into the assessment team.

Planners should ensure as part of teamcomposition that gender balance and genderexpertise, geographical representations, andlanguage requirements are considered andintegrated into the team.

ENSURE SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTISE.

ENSURE POLITICAL AND POLICY EXPERTISE.

Planners should ensure that there is subject
matter expertise on the safety and security
aspects of WAM. This is not limited to safe
ammunition management but might also
include broader WAM expertise, such astransfer controls, as well as profiling andtracing of weapons and ammunition, which
are unique expertise and skill sets.

Planners should ensure that the teamincludes an individual (or several people)
who can provide political and policy advice
to the team and to the national authorities on
WAM-related processes.

These factors and expertise all contribute to meaningful dialogue during the baseline
assessment on a range of different issues at strategic and operational levels. All team members
should (i) demonstrate awareness and sensitivity to local contexts and (ii) have experience inaddressing these appropriately. Additionally, planners could consider team members’ field
experience, team dynamics, commitments and working methods as part of team composition
considerations.
4.4.5. Pre-assessment desk research and information collection
The assessment team should conduct extensive desk research and an information collection
exercise on WAM from relevant sources as part of the substantive planning and design phaseprior to the baseline assessment in the country. Sources may range from primary data, such as
national reports submitted by the host Government in the implementation of relevant international and regional instruments (see Section 3.2)39 or existing baselines established in specific
WAM functional areas, to secondary data such as research papers and analysis conductedby external entities on WAM relevant to the country. Such desk research should aim to cover
information pertaining to the security situation, the status of the State’s participation in relevantinternational and regional instruments, as well as the implementation of life cycle managementof arms and ammunition. Desk research should also include the collection of information on thegendered impact of arms and ammunition in the country, as well as gender-sensitive national
policy and practice relevant to WAM. Additionally, the assessment team may request support
from the designated national lead authority for relevant national documents (e.g. national
legislation, regulations, standard operating procedures) that can be provided in confidence,
so that the assessment team can study and familiarize itself with the available content prior
to the national WAM baseline assessment. Planners should designate an internal lead on desk
research to facilitate information collection efforts for the assessment team.

39 National reports that are submitted to show the implementation of international instruments can provide a valuable source of information – a starting point – for the development of an initial country profile inpreparation for a WAM baseline assessment.

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Based on the information collected, a designated member of the assessment team should
compile an internal background paper for the entire assessment team. This internal paper canalso be a useful basis for the preparation of the report following the conclusion of the baseline
assessment (see Section 7, as well as Annex IV explanatory Box 27 for a possible outline of theinternal background paper).
4.4.6. Mapping of stakeholders, existing initiatives and activities
The assessment team should conduct advance mapping of national, regional, subregional
and international WAM stakeholders in the country where the baseline assessment will takeplace. Such a stakeholder mapping should include the stakeholders’ levels of involvement andplacement relevant to WAM in the country (e.g. strategic, operational, tactical); their capacities;
and the type of operations, programmes, projects and related activities they conduct. Theseshould be categorized by the WAM functional areas predefined and determined together withthe designated national lead authority. Where possible, the assessment team should also seek
information on upcoming initiatives planned by national and other relevant stakeholders. This
information should be integrated into the internal background paper in the form of a matrix
table by WAM functional area.
4.4.7. Timing of assessment
The timing of a national WAM baseline assessment is important. To optimize the impact of anational WAM baseline assessment, it could be conducted in relation to (in no particular order):••••One or several relevant national events (e.g. the development or adoption of security
transition plans, or post-offensive operations against adversaries to regain territories)
Relevant requirements, including reporting requirements of a State or of a supporting United
Nations mission or other United Nations entity (e.g. panels or groups of experts)
Relevant review processes of UNSC committees (e.g. partial arms embargo regime
measures, WAM or related measures), where applicable
Review processes of international instruments, and regional or subregional road maps andactions plans, depending on the context

At the same time and importantly, political developments at the national level, such as electoral
periods, should be taken into account to avoid timing that would distract the focus and attentionof stakeholders away from the assessment.

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INFORMS NATIONALTECHNICAL AND HIGH LEVELNATIONALTECHNICAL LEVELNATIONAL
HIGH LEVEL

4.4.8. Modalities and format of dialogue during the baseline assessment
A national WAM baseline assessment takes the form of a series of national consultative
meetings at the national level. The assessment is designed to be conducted over five working
days, although its duration will vary depending on the scope of the assessment as designed andagreed with the host State. The national consultative meetings are organized in a sequence,targeting various national and international stakeholders operating at different levels ofgovernance at the national level. Generally, the consultative meetings are organized in thefollowing flow:

1

HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIVE MEETING
with relevant high-level national authorities, international partners, current or potential assistanceproviders, and select CSOs to facilitate shared understanding of the objectives, identify common
priorities and set expectations of desired outcomes

2

SEGMENT OF TECHNICAL CONSULTATIONS
with all relevant national WAM stakeholders andother participants (e.g. regional organizations,
CSOs) as agreed with the designated national leadauthority, covering the full life cycle managementof arms and ammunition

3

BILATERAL MEETINGS
with targeted national authorities and other regional
and international stakeholders to fill information
gaps and validate information gathered in technicalconsultations

4

7

A FINAL HIGH-LEVEL MEETING
with relevant national authorities and regional andinternational partners to present and adopt the
proposed draft road map for enhancing WAM

6

A SEGMENT OF NATIONAL CONSULTATIONS
with all relevant national WAM stakeholders toshare preliminary observations and reflections,
including possible recommendations for enhancing
WAM measures (referred to as a draft “WAM road
map”)

5

A POSSIBLE VISIT TO SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL
SITES
to strengthen the quality of information being
obtained and increase the situational awarenessof the assessment team about national WAM
practices

A COORDINATION MEETING
with international partners, including United
Nations entities, to align priorities and obtain
additional inputs and feedback

The high-level consultative sessions that take place during a national WAM baseline assessment
are formal events and require the necessary preparations and protocol in coordination with
relevant ministries and offices within the host Government. The high-level segments are chairedby high-level national authorities to ensure full national ownership and visibility of the baseline
assessment process. Planners should coordinate and design this segment in close consultation
with, and under the advice of, the designated national lead authority to observe appropriate
protocols.

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BOX 10: Tip for planners on high-level segment planning
Planning and implementing the high-levelsegment of the baseline assessment
requires appropriate and dedicated timeby the assessment team. This includes
obtaining buy-in from relevant ministries
and offices of the host Government aheadof the baseline assessment to facilitate participation by authorities in the high-levelsegment. On a practical level, planners
should exercise flexibility in the scheduleof activities during the high-level segmentof the baseline assessment, as there may

be unexpected schedule changes or delays
involving high-level authorities. That said, thehigh-level segments are critical in the accessand sustainability of the baseline assessment,
as well as in the follow-through implementation of the options identified to enhancemeasures at the national level. Planners arestrongly encouraged to integrate and plan
this segment early in the planning and designphase, together with the designated national
lead authority, including as part of the pre-assessment preparatory mission in the country.

The technical consultation sessions are conducted under the Chatham House rule (i.e. participants are free to use information processed during and generated by the national consultative process, but neither the identities nor the affiliation of the speakers, nor that of any
other participant, is to be revealed or attributed). The Chatham House rule seeks to facilitate
active dialogue among participants. The technical sessions are often co-chaired between thedesignated national lead authority and the assessment team to facilitate interactive dialogue
among the participants on substantive aspects of WAM. The assessment team may rotate anddesignate co-facilitation roles to different members of the team based on the WAM functional
area being assessed to maximize the member’s technical expertise and experience.
To ensure effective implementation of the baseline assessment, planners should ensure that all
members of the assessment team are involved in the substantive preparation for the baseline
assessments, including to engage in preparatory dialogue with the designated national leadauthority on the above process.
BOX 11: Tips for assessors during the technical consultative sessions
Facilitating dialogue to assess relevant WAM
functional areas within the allocated time in
the programme of work can be a challenge
for the assessment team. If not carefully
managed, there may be a risk that some WAM
functional areas will be assessed in more
depth than others. In some cases, not all 10
key functional areas may be covered due totime constraints. Planners should ensure thattime management is factored in as part of thedesign and planning of the technical sessionsof the baseline assessment, in particular in
relation to the scope of the assessment asagreed with the designated lead authority.
One good practice example includes
identifying three to four key priority WAM
functional areas with the host State in thedesign phase to ensure that the assessment,
at a minimum, adequately covers those areas

during the exercise (with other functional
areas being briefly covered during theassessment or through a dedicated follow-on
assessment). Another good practice example
is to encourage the assessment team to use
the time available outside of the consultative
sessions to engage with national stakeholders, such as during lunch and tea breaks.
Such efforts not only strengthen informal
networking and trust among participants but
also, at times, facilitate follow-on informal
discussions to fill information gaps on
functional areas covered during the baseline
assessment. Keep in mind, however, that
informal discussions should not replace
the scheduled consultative dialogues withnational stakeholders, which are inclusive andparticipatory by design.

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4.4.9. Considerations pertaining to possible site visits
Depending on the context of the baseline assessment, the assessment team may determinethat supplementary assessments in the form of site visits may be needed to better inform theassessment, including improving the assessment team’s situational awareness of the national
practices pertaining to WAM. Recalling that this methodology is not designed to facilitate atechnical assessment at the tactical levels, such site visits should be characterized as initial,
selective and informative, rather than detailed, comprehensive and definitive, in informing thetechnical capabilities of stakeholders at the tactical level.
As part of this planning, planners should consider a number of factors:
•

•

•

•

Access to sites can only be granted by the host State. Thus, the assessment team should
consult the designated national lead authority early in the planning about the possibility of
conducting site visits.
The assessment team, in particular SMEs on WAM, should identify and consult national
authorities on the areas of WAM they seek to further assess through site visits at theplanning stage. This is because access to sites is often not provided by relevant national
security services on short notice.
Sufficient time should be allocated in the overall programme of work, as a site may or may
not be in proximity to the meeting venue, and secure transport to and from the site mayneed to be organized in advance.
Only those who are adequately trained in the safe and secure management of arms andammunition should participate in technical visits to storage sites due to the potential
materiel hazards posed to the individuals.

Generally, if prior information exists on the tactical-level capabilities of national stakeholders on
WAM resulting from other technical national assessments, the assessment team is encouraged
to use such information as part of the planning and design of the baseline assessment, rather
than seeking to duplicate similar exercises in the country.
Site visits vary but often include weapon storage sites, ammunition depots, weapons marking
and registration sites, national ballistics laboratories, judiciary depots, weapons–technical intelligence units that recover arms and ammunition from operations or crime scenes, weapons
collection sites, and destruction sites. Site visits can be an opportunity for national experts toprovide the assessment team with practical insights on practices and procedures in relevant
WAM functional areas. Information obtained from site visits can further inform dialogue as partof the baseline assessment and the report.
If site visits form a part of the baseline assessment, the assessment team should recognize
their potential limitations, including the scope and depth of technical assessment that may bepossible with the available time and resources. For example, it may be only possible to visit one
or two sites during the baseline assessment. In such cases, the assessment team should refrainfrom drawing wider conclusions about practices at sites that go beyond the visited sites. Should
strong interest exist from the host State in conducting a more thorough technical assessmentof storage sites at tactical levels throughout the country, the assessment team may consider
either (i) including such a recommended option for consideration by national stakeholders (aspart of the draft “national road map”) as follow-up activities for another specialized entity toundertake, or (ii) seeking partnering arrangements with specialized entities during the planningstages to implement such a component.

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4.4.10. Summary of pre-assessment resources
Planners should prepare the following documentation when organizing a national WAM baseline
assessment:









Invitation or expression of interest letter from the host Government
Programme of work40 for a national WAM baseline assessment
Detailed agenda
Invitations and distribution lists for national and international participants
Drafts of formal high-level opening and closing speeches
Communication strategy and information note for possible media requests and coverage
Guiding questions for the high-level segment of the national consultations
Monitoring and evaluation documents and tools (e.g. feedback questionnaires)

These documents should be shared and jointly reviewed with the host State through thedesignated national lead authority.
Additionally, planners should prepare the following internal documents in support of thesubstantive preparation of the assessment: A background paper produced by and for the WAM assessment team.
 A mapping of stakeholders by WAM functional area (e.g. a matrix table), which is to be usedby the assessment team during the assessment.
 A series of reference technical guiding questions, organized by WAM functional area, to be
used by the assessment team internally to orient and facilitate dialogue during the technicalconsultative sessions (see Module 3, Section 5). Guiding questions may need to be adjusted
depending on context and substantive focus priorities, as identified by national stakeholders during the planning mission.
Planners should also help prepare, together with national and relevant international stakeholders, the following presentations for use during the assessment: Generic national WAM baseline assessment introductory presentation
 Presentation on international, regional and subregional instruments, as well as relevant
technical guidelines and standards on WAM
 Presentation prepared by the national lead authority on its current national framework,
including strategy and actions plan(s) for WAM
 Series of presentations prepared by national authorities on relevant WAM functional
areas that help inform stakeholder mapping as well as existing institutional capacities andpractices Presentations by participating international assistance providers on WAM assistance andcooperation
 Presentation comprising an explanation of substantive WAM functional areas
 Presentation summarizing preliminary key findings per WAM functional area and draft
options to strengthen the national WAM framework, to be prepared during the baseline
assessment prior to its conclusion

40 For the purposes of this methodology, the term “programme of work” is used interchangeably with theterm “terms of reference”.

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4.4.11. Overview of operational resource considerations
Operationalizing a WAM baseline assessment can take time. Planners should consider andfactor in planning, implementation and follow-up timelines accordingly. For example, from themoment of the expression of interest by the host Government to the first day of the in-country
WAM baseline assessment – depending on various factors such as political priority, security
situation, operational capacity and support – a minimum period of three months should befactored in by planners. Further, planners should consider an additional one to two months forreporting and follow-up evaluations and discussions.
Planners should consider resource requirements to implement a baseline assessment at an
early planning stage. While costs differ from one assessment to another, they often include thefollowing considerations:

COSTS OF EXTERNAL SMES:
The cost of external SMEs may include travel-related costs, in addition to the cost of the
SMEs’ services, as appropriate.

ACCOMMODATION FOR THE ASSESSMENT
TEAM:
Planners should factor into their budget
the costs associated with accommodation
for the assessment team. Planners should
ensure that they carefully review accommodation sites that adequately meet relevant
security and safety standards for the teamin accordance with local and organizational
requirements.

TRAVEL-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE
ASSESSMENT TEAM:
Planners should adequately budget for thetravel-related costs of the assessment teammembers. Additionally, planners should
review any relevant entry visa requirementsin the early stages of the planning, including
whether supporting letters (e.g. invitation
letters) are necessary from the designatednational lead authority to facilitate entry
visa permits. If the baseline assessment
is being conducted in situations of active
armed conflict or high levels of violence,planners should exercise due diligence inensuring safe and secure travel arrangements for the assessment team, including risk
assessment and subsequent risk acceptanceby the assessment team members, whereappropriate.

IN-COUNTRY VENUE FOR THE CONSULTATIVEMEETINGS:
CATERING SERVICES:As part of the in-country consultative
meetings, planners may consider and budget
for catering service for the participants forthe duration of the baseline assessment.

46

Planners should budget for venue costs
associated with the baseline assessment
activities. The venue should cover theduration of the baseline assessment and offer
corresponding logistics (e.g. meeting-related equipment). This cost may be offered as
in-kind support from the host Government or
supported by an in-country partner. Planners
should consider the size of the venue aspart of the planning and design of thebaseline assessment in consultation with thedesignated national lead authority.

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

BOX 12: Tips on in-country venue for the consultative meetings
Past baseline assessments have hosted 35–70 participants. The reservation of smaller rooms
in addition to the main consultative room for the duration of the baseline assessment has
proven useful in facilitating bilateral consultations.

LOCAL TRANSPORT:LANGUAGE CONSIDERATION:

If not provided as in-kind contribution by
the host Government or in-country partners,
planners should consider and budget forcosts associated with local transport,
where needed. Planners should consider
any safety- and security-related local travel
restrictions that may apply to the assessment
team as part of the planning process.
Planners should also consult the designatednational lead authority if there are any local
transport costs associated with national
participants of the baseline assessment, andif so, to agree on how such costs may be
addressed.

Planners should take into account the working
language of the host State when planning
for a baseline assessment and should
assemble an assessment team with language
skills applicable to the local context, where
possible. Should the assessment team require
language support to conduct the consultative
process, planners should plan and budget forinterpretation services. The use of interpretation may contribute additional time to theconsultation and, in some cases, may restrict
the ability of assessment team members tointeract with national authorities.

PUBLICATION-RELATED CONSIDERATIONS:MEDIA, PRESS AND VISIBILITY:

Planners should budget for translation of
the report, where needed. At a minimum,
planners should consider translation requirements covering the host States’ official
language and English to facilitate ease ofaccess and dissemination to national andother interested stakeholders.

Planners should consult the designatednational lead authority on the visibility of thebaseline assessment at the national level,
including engagement with the media andthe press. Practical considerations may
include preparation of joint press statements,
media interviews and engagements(including radio or television), as well as
visibility products (e.g. banners). Planners
should consider and budget for associatedcosts, should such visibility activities not beprovided as in-kind contribution by the host
Government or in-country partners.

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MODULE 3:
48

IMPLEMENTATION AND REPORTINGSECTIONS 5-6

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

5. CONDUCTING A WAM BASELINE 		
ASSESSMENT
5.1. GENERAL
WAM baseline assessments take the form of a national consultative process that facilitates
dialogue and decision-making among all relevant national security stakeholders on WAM andrelated security issues (see Section 3.3). During the baseline assessment, assessors should seek
to facilitate dialogue among participants to generate information on actors, policies, processes andpractices relevant to each WAM functional area, thereby identifying:•••

The current status of actors and their WAM policy and practice
Areas for enhancement
Options to support implementation to achieve improvements

Under each functional area to be assessed, the assessors should seek to address the general guiding
questions below, in addition to specific thematic questions relevant to each WAM functional area.
These questions are not exhaustive; rather, they seek to provide assessors with basic referencematerial for assessing each functional area of WAM.

BOX 13: GENERAL GUIDING QUESTIONS
BOX 13: GENERAL GUIDING QUESTIONS
■
■

■

■

■
■

■

What is the current (de facto) status of this WAM functional area?
Which national actors are involved? Which national entity is leading this WAM functional
area? Where applicable, what decision-making and authorization processes are relevant tothis WAM functional area?
Which mechanisms, procedures and practices are currently working to design, implement
and evaluate this functional area? What good practices and procedures can be identified
from current practices? Were particular lessons learned from past interventions?
Are the current policies and practices applicable to this WAM functional area efficient?
Are there potential gaps in actors, processes, procedures or practices? What are theprimary challenges (policy, operational, technical, financial, etc.) associated with this WAM
functional area?
What are the (short-, medium- and long-term) priority needs and areas for enhancement forthis functional area?
What type of external support or assistance has been received to support design and implementation? What type of national or external support or assistance is currently available?
What additional support may be needed for this WAM functional area?
Which national actors should be involved (more or in addition)? If identified and needed,which external stakeholders should be involved? Which partnerships are to be fostered ordeveloped?

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The following subsections provide a brief description of each WAM functional area to be assessed,
what information the assessors seek to gather during the consultations, and guiding questions to
help assessors in facilitating dialogue with national stakeholders to generate baseline information
on WAM policy and practice.
Under each WAM functional area, the assessors should seek to identify:
 Stakeholders relevant to WAM, and their respective roles, responsibilities and functions
 Decision-making processes on WAM (including what decisions, how decisions are made, andby whom) and the extent of their maturity level (i.e. initial, defined or managed), referred to inthis method as “top-down validation”
 Implementation processes, and the extent of their maturity levels, that detail how implementing entities carry out those decisions or make a request to gain authorizations to implement
WAM activities, referred to in this method as “bottom-up validation”
This approach enables assessors to cross-validate WAM actors, processes and practices at thenational level.
The guiding questions presented under each WAM functional area may be subject to modifications and adaption to a specific national context by the assessment team, taking into account the
preparatory research (see Section 4) and depending on the design of the baseline assessment asagreed with the host Government prior to deployment. Where specific guiding questions under
different WAM functional areas are related or linked, assessors should ensure that such links are
considered. The guiding questions presented in the following subsections should be considered byassessors as an initial entry point for consultations to foster deeper dialogue, rather than being
understood as a checklist exercise.
Maturity of WAM policy and practice at the national level among States participating in the baseline
assessment may vary considerably. As such, the relevance of the guiding questions across the 10
WAM functional areas may also vary. Assessors should take this into account when conducting
consultations and, where necessary, adjust and adapt the relevant guiding questions to best reflect
the local context.

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5.2. NATIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISM
A national coordination mechanism on WAM ensures that all relevant parts of the government work
together with national, regional and international partners to conceive, direct, monitor and evaluate
the safe, secure and accountable practice of WAM. Establishing and implementing effective life
cycle WAM and related control measures requires cooperation and coordination among a wide
range of actors at different levels. Therefore, relevant international and regional instruments andguidelines recommend that there is a designated or established government entity to take the leadin providing overall policy direction and coordination for national WAM-related efforts. This can
include the development, adoption and implementation of a national WAM strategy and/or specificnational action plans. A coordinating body or mechanism may be known as the national coordinating authority or mechanism.41 National coordination is needed for, and applicable to, all WAM
functional areas.
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain a better understanding of: The general mandate and role of the designated national authorities responsible for the coordination of weapons and/or ammunition management at the strategic, operational and tacticallevels The general roles and responsibilities of national focal points on weapons and ammunition
management across their life cycle at the strategic and operational levels
 The roles, composition and functions of coordinating bodies and mechanisms, including
working groups, at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
 Any differences in the coordinating mandate, roles, actors and functions between the
management of arms and the management of ammunition
 The maturity levels (initial, defined or managed) of existing national coordinating bodies andmechanisms to implement their respective WAM roles, responsibilities and functions
5.2.1. Key guiding questions•

Is there a national coordinating mechanism that oversees WAM policies and activities atthe strategic level? If yes, which entities are represented? How often do they meet? Is
national coordination on WAM centralized or decentralized? Is there a national lead entity
providing overall WAM policy direction? Are there different national coordination entities
for weapons management and ammunition management, or are they together under one
coordination entity? Are the same entities responsible for coordination at the operational
level?

•

What are the main duties and responsibilities of the national coordinating mechanism at
the strategic level? Is there a dedicated national strategy on WAM, or is WAM embedded
within a broader national security strategy? Is there an existing national road map orequivalent to support the implementation of the national WAM strategy? Is there a
dedicated national action plan in place to operationalize WAM activities? Where strategies
and action plans exist, are they specific to arms or ammunition, or do they cover both typesof materiel?

41 In many States, these coordinating bodies are known as National Commissions on SALW. There arevariations in the scope of work of such Commissions. Some Commissions strictly cover issues pertaining toillicit SALW, while others cover SALW held by both national security services and civilians. Recently, someCommissions have revised and expanded their mandates to cover issues pertaining to heavier categories
of conventional weapons and to conventional ammunition. See also MOSAIC, “3.40: National Coordinating
Mechanisms on Small Arms and Light Weapons Control”, 2014, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-03.40-2014EV1.0.pdf.

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•

Are there other or dedicated national WAM coordinating mechanisms at the operational
and tactical levels? If so, which entities are represented? At what frequency do they meet?
Which entities lead such mechanisms at the operational and tactical levels? What is theirrelationship, including decision-making and information-sharing, with national coordinating mechanisms at the strategic level?

•

What are the scope and depth of the mandates of the national entities dealing with WAM
issues? Are they formal or informal? How are these entities resourced to carry out theirrespective WAM-relevant mandates?

•

How do different national entities working on WAM coordinate and communicate witheach other? Are there informal or formal channels of communication and informationexchange?

•

What roles do national entities play in monitoring and evaluating the implementation of
WAM activities? Is this monitoring and evaluation centralized or decentralized? How often
are WAM-related policies and activities assessed for their effectiveness and impact at thenational level? Which national entities lead on such an internal monitoring and evaluation
process?

•

Which national authority or authorities act as designated focal points in participating
under relevant international, regional and subregional instruments related to conventional arms control? Are there different national focal points for arms and ammunition? How
do these national authorities coordinate, collaborate and share information for reporting
purposes and requirements? Is there a set of domestic legal or procedural instructions inplace for implementing multilateral and regional reporting commitments?

•

Where applicable, how do national entities coordinate and share information on the implementation of an arms embargo? Is there a national authority that is a designated focal
point to oversee the implementation of an arms embargo?

•

Is there a designated national focal point specific to gender aspects of WAM? How does
the national coordination mechanism account for and enhance the active participation of
women in WAM activities?

BOX 14: Tips on facilitating an assessment of the national coordination mechanism
9

9

52

When assessing the structure andmaturity of a national coordinating
mechanism, consider requesting fromthe host Government a copy of relevant
legislative or related documentation that
presents the mandate, structure andfunctions of the coordinating body at thenational level. Where possible, inquire if
the host Government has an organization
chart pertaining to WAM at the strategiclevel.
Consider organizing the dialogue aroundgovernance levels to obtain clarity on coordinating structures and actors at the9strategic, operational and tactical levels.
Pay particular attention to the placementof national coordination bodies in thegovernance structures (e.g. within aministry, inter-ministerially) as well as thelevel at which they operate (e.g. strategiclevel, operational level).
Inquire whether the coordination of arms
and ammunition management activities
are undertaken under a single national
coordinating mechanism or whether coordination on ammunition is managed
separately from arms.

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

5.3. LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AT THE NATIONAL LEVELThe national normative, including legal and regulatory frameworks applicable in the country andwithin the jurisdiction of the State, in the form of national laws, decrees, regulations and/or administrative documents, form the basis of the national WAM governance structure and guide theirimplementation. These national frameworks may be additionally guided by relevant internationaland regional instruments to which the State is a party or a participant. In cases where the State isa party to a legally binding instrument, the State is responsible for domesticating those international and regional commitments into its national framework governing weapons and ammunition.
Ensuring that multilateral obligations and commitments are domesticated and codified in relevant
national legislation and regulations systematically and in a sufficiently uniform, harmonized andlogical manner is fundamental to enabling the operationalization of WAM by the relevant national
authorities in the country.
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A basic overview of the existing national legal and other normative frameworks applicable to
the governance, regulation and management of arms and ammunition throughout their lifecycle
 An overview of regulations, and their maturity levels, applicable to access, ownership andpossession of arms, ammunition and related parts and components, including the scope,
the actors they apply to, related licensing processes, and any prohibitions, exceptions andexemptions within relevant national legal frameworks
 A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders
to enable and facilitate the implementation of the existing national legal framework
This section provides guiding questions relevant to obtaining a general overview of existing
national frameworks. This methodology is not designed to facilitate an in-depth legal review andanalysis of a national legal framework applicable to arms and/or ammunition controls. Rather, itseeks to obtain an overview of the existing applicable laws and regulations that govern arms and/or ammunition, which can inform dialogue around potential gaps and vulnerabilities in the legal andregulatory framework at the national level. Regulatory frameworks and administrative instructions
applicable to specific WAM functional areas are covered in the subsections that follow.
5.3.1. Key guiding questions•

Are there national laws and regulations in place to govern weapons and ammunition inyour country? Does the law cover both arms and ammunition, or are there dedicated laws
and regulations governing arms and ammunition separately? What is the scope of the law
in terms of the life cycle of weapons and ammunition? Who is the law applicable to (i.e. who
are the legal weapons holders in the country)? Are there any actors or categories/types of
weapons and/or ammunition exempt from this law? To whom does the exemption apply?

•

Is any legislative review process currently being undertaken (e.g. development or review ofexisting laws, or harmonization of domestic legal framework with international or regional
instruments, where applicable)? If yes, who is the leading authority and what is the current
status of the review process? How is the review of relevant laws expected to change theway that arms and/or ammunition are regulated and managed domestically?

•

What are the differences in the national law and regulations for State-held and civilian-held
weapons? Do these different regulatory frameworks define scopes and set different
constraints and levels of applicability? For example, how do they define weapon andammunition categories and types permissible for different users and for different uses?

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•

What legal requirements of the national law, regulations and provisions apply toState-owned weapons and ammunition (i.e. held by State security and defence services
and agencies)? What is the scope of their application (e.g. in what functional areas do they
apply)? Which authority has overall responsibility for authorizations and licences applicableto the access of arms and ammunition by State security forces and services? Are requirements from national law, regulations and provisions applicable to State-held weapons andammunition codified in domestic procedures (e.g. standard operational procedures) orinternal guidelines on the management of these weapons and/or ammunition?

•

What requirements of the national law, regulations and provision apply to weapons andammunition held by civilians? What is the scope of their application? What activities (e.g.
production, acquisition, storage, use, sales) do they apply to? Are there relevant laws
and regulations that apply to the control of arms and/or ammunition to private security
companies? Are there relevant laws that regulate craft and artisanal production by
civilians?

•

Which national authority has overall responsibility for the authorization and licensing ofcivilian access to arms and/or ammunition? What types of preconditions exist to regulate
the acquisition and possession of arms and ammunition by civilians? Are there establishedassessment criteria and categories applicable to the licensing of arms and ammunition tocivilians? Are there any exceptions or exemptions?

•

What types of capacities do the responsible national authorities have in upholding therelevant legislative and regulatory frameworks applicable to arms and/or ammunition?
What type of penalties and enforcement mechanisms exist to address violations of
relevant legislative and regulatory frameworks?

•

Are there other relevant policy frameworks (apart from national law, regulation and administrative instructions) that help govern arms and/or ammunition at the national level (e.g.
national policy on ammunition)? If so, what WAM-related areas do they relate to, and whatis their scope of application?

BOX 15: Tips on facilitating an assessment of the legal and regulatory framework at national level
9

9

9

54

Assess whether and how regulatory
frameworks apply to arms and ammunition
held by both the national security forces
and civilians (including private security
companies where relevant).
Pay particular attention to gaining
clarity on how national laws, regulationand procedures govern the acquisition,possession and use of arms andammunition by national security forces
and by civilians. Make sure to inquire
about any exceptions and exemptions
that may apply, and to whom. Also assess
whether these rules and regulations
differ for different types of weapons andammunition.
Assess whether there are dedicated laws,
regulations and procedures that apply
specifically to conventional ammunition

9and explosives. Inquire whether relevant
safety regulations exist for the control andmanagement of conventional ammunitionat the national level.
Assess the institutional capacities ofnational stakeholders to apply the existing
national laws and related procedures,
including enforcement measures inincidents of violations. Examples of
how this could be better understood
include inquiring about existing activities
pertaining to licensing processes (e.g.
number of licences issued to civilians in
the past years), as well as enforcement(e.g. number of violations documented andany information pertaining to prosecutions of individuals who have committed
violations).

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

5.4. TRANSFER CONTROLS
Effective national controls over international transfers (including, as and where applicable, exports,
imports, retransfers, transit and trans-shipment, as well as brokering) of weapons, ammunition
and related materiel are necessary to prevent excessive, destabilizing and illicit transfers, which
can pose substantive risks and a serious threat to peace and security. Illicit transfers can fuel or
prolong conflicts, violent crime and instability; undermine sustainable development; and cause
grave abuses of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law.42 Existing
international, regional and subregional instruments and guidelines require that laws, regulations
and administrative procedures for transfer controls are in place at the national level. National
controls over transfers of arms, ammunition and related materiel must be effectively designed andimplemented to minimize the risk of their diversion.43
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of existing national law and regulations that control the internationaltransfers of arms and ammunition, including their import, export, transit, trans-shipment andbrokering An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, national management policies,
procedures and practices applicable to the transfer chain, including assessment of transfer
requests, authorization processes, recordkeeping, and relevant controls at post-delivery stages
 An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, national management policies
and practices relating to enforcement, international cooperation and assistance, and transparency relevant to the international transfer of arms and ammunition
 A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders
to enable and facilitate the implementation of national management policies and practices oninternational arms transfers
The guiding questions in this section focus primarily on the regulation of imports into the national
territory of States that engage in international trade and international transfers (i.e. States that
perform primarily importing functions). If a national WAM baseline assessment is taking place in aState performing primarily exporting or other functions (e.g. transit), depending on the substantive
design agreed with the host Government prior to the assessment, the assessment team should
modify and amend these guiding questions accordingly, also taking into account preparatory
research.

42 See MOSAIC, “03.20: National Controls over the International Transfer of Small Arms and Light
Weapons”, 2014, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-03.20-2014EV1.0.pdf; see also IATG, “03.30: International Transfer of Ammunition Module”, 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-03.30-International-Transfer-Module-V.2.pdf.
43 See B. Wood and P. Holtom, The Arms Trade Treaty: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms, UNIDIR, Issue Brief No. 2, 2020, https://unidir.org/publication/arms-trade-treaty-measures-prevent-detect-address-and-eradicate-diversion-conventional.

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5.4.1. Key guiding questions
General•Is there a national law or regulation that governs the international transfer of arms andammunition? Is there a national control list defining which weapons and ammunition
categories and items are subject to international transfer controls (including export,
import, retransfer, transit, trans-shipment and brokering)?

•

Which authorities are responsible for authorizing international arms transfers? Are international arms transfers licensed on the basis of a set of criteria by which each caseis judged (i.e. authorized or denied)? What are these criteria (and are they defined innational law, regulations or documented policy)? By what process are they considered?
How does the decision-making process function in practice?

•

How does the national transfer control system interact or respond to UNSC resolutions
and related obligations pertaining to international arms transfers (e.g. implementationof relevant arms embargo regimes, where they exist)?

Imports

56•

Which national authorities are responsible for authorizing the import of weapons andammunition for State agencies (i.e. State-held materiel)? Is the import authorization
process centralized in one single entity or are several national authorities involved in
the authorization process depending on the intended end user?

•

Are imports of materiel used by civilians or non-governmental entities (e.g. private
security companies) permitted under national law? If so, which authorities are
responsible for governing the import of items for civilians?

•

Describe the step-by-step process for import authorization. What are the detailed
steps to be followed, and by whom?

•

Describe the process involved in evaluating the materiel needs of security forces
and services. For example, how is the need for weapons and ammunition evaluated?
Which entity or authority evaluates and approves procurement requests for arms andammunition? Is the process of evaluating needs and making procurement requests
centralized or decentralized? If centralized, which national authority or entity is
responsible for the oversight of the evaluation of needs and materiel requests? If decentralized, which national authorities and entities are responsible?

•

What types of records are maintained on the import of weapons and ammunition?
Which national entities are responsible for maintaining records of imports? Are recordsof imports kept in a centralized or decentralized manner?

•

Describe the cooperation with supplying entities on end use/r documentation and theprovision of information contained therein. Which national authorities are responsible
for overseeing and managing the end use/r control system at the national level? Is theprocess of recordkeeping of end user documents centralized under one entity or decentralized involving several national authorities? How are assurances provided in end
use/r documentation followed through and implemented?

•

Once a shipment arrives, what procedures are in place at the initial reception of theimported items (e.g. verification, notification of the exporter, registration, transport)?
What accountability enhancement measures are undertaken on imported materiel(e.g. recordkeeping, marking, initial storage etc.) prior to their distribution down the
supply chain? Do the same procedures apply to all forms of import (e.g. gifts, grants)
and types of materiel, or are there exceptions?

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

Exports•

Are there national laws, regulations, administrative procedures and related processes
that govern the export of arms and ammunition? Which national authorities are
responsible for overseeing and managing exports at the national level? Describe theprocess that regulates the export of arms and ammunition, including the decision-making process (e.g. for authorization and denial).

•

Describe the conduct of risk assessments on exports, including assessment of thepotential risk of diversion. Which national authorities are responsible for the conduct ofrisk assessments for exports? Are other national entities involved in the conduct of risk
assessments in particular diversion risk assessments? Are there national procedures
and/or guidelines that guide the process for denial of exports?

•

What types of records are maintained on exported weapons, and which national
entities are responsible for maintaining records of exports at the national level? Are
these records centralized or decentralized?

•

Are there known cases of re-exports? Are provisions and measures in place to control
retransfers of arms and ammunition? If yes, please describe the national process toregulate and manage re-exports. What authority is responsible for authorizations to
re-export arms and ammunition?

Other forms of transfers•

Are provisions and measures in place to control transit and trans-shipments of arms
and ammunition at the national level? If yes, describe the relevant regulation andrelated procedures. Which national entities are responsible for the oversight of transit
and trans-shipment?

•

When participating in multilateral peace operations, are there dedicated national
processes that govern the transfer of arms and ammunition for use in United Nations
or other peace operations (e.g. the African Union)? If yes, describe the authorization
process for transfers applicable to deployment in peace operations. What authority is
responsible for authorizing such transfers?

•

Are provisions and measures in place to control the brokering of arms and ammunitionat the national level? If yes, please describe the relevant regulation and related
procedures. Which national entities are responsible for the oversight of brokering?

Transparency and cooperation•

Is there a civilian oversight and accountability mechanism (e.g. by parliament) in placewith respect to international transfers of arms and ammunition? How does such acivilian oversight and accountability mechanism provide checks and balances on international transfers?

•

If applicable, did the adoption and entry into force of international instruments, suchas the Arms Trade Treaty, require an adjustment of national transfer controls? If so, in
which areas and which provisions or controls? How were adjustments made, and bywhich national entities?

•

Are cross-border cooperation frameworks or processes in place to address the illicit
trafficking and proliferation of arms and ammunition across national territories? If yes,describe the type of cooperation (e.g. border management, law enforcement, judicial
cooperation) and the entities involved in the cooperation, including any other externalState entities.

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BOX 16: Tips on facilitating an assessment of transfer controls
9

9

9

58

Assess the scope and maturity of existing
regulations and procedures in controllingthe various aspects of transfers – fromimports and exports to transit, trans-shipment and brokering.
Focus the dialogue on aspects of transfer
control that are most applicable to theState in question. For example, if the State’sinteraction with international trade andtransfers is primarily through imports (e.g.
primarily through importing functions),
focus the assessment on import controls.
This will facilitate dialogue on the issues
that are most relevant to national entities,
while managing time.
Identify which entities are responsible forthe strategic oversight and governanceof transfer controls, and where needed,hold bilateral consultations with themto obtain further information on authorization processes. Where applicable,
seek to obtain copies of documentation applicable to the application andauthorization processes pertaining to

99international transfer activities.
Identify which entities are responsible forthe physical management of transferredmateriel at the time of import, and where
needed, hold bilateral consultations
with them to obtain further information
on pre-transfer or post-delivery control
measures. Pay particular attention to if
there are specialized control measuresthat apply to the initial reception and safe
and secure management of conventional
ammunition prior to its distribution down
the supply chain.
Pay particular attention to domestic
information management relating to end
user controls. Focus the dialogue on what
type of transfer information is kept, bywhom and for how long, as well as for what
purposes that information is used domestically. This dialogue will give an indicationof the maturity of recordkeeping as wellas what measures are in place to preventor mitigate the risk of diversion relating tointernational arms transfers.

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

5.5. STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT
Effective stockpile management of weapons and ammunition is an essential element of any
defence and security force and their operations. It is critical for ensuring the operational readinessof defence and security forces, protecting national strategic assets, reducing the risk of diversion(including from State-owned stocks to unauthorized or unintended end users for illicit purposes),and reducing the risk of, and mitigating the effect from, unplanned explosions resulting from inadequately managed conventional ammunition stockpiles. On the other hand, effective managementof stockpiles can help identify surplus or obsolete weapons and ammunition, as well as unsafe
ammunition for disposal, in addition to future procurement needs and requirements. The systematic
control of weapons and ammunition stockpiles is in keeping with a philosophy of “due care”, which
requires a proactive, rather than reactive, approach to ensuring that weapons and ammunition are
adequately accounted for, secured and safely stored.44
This section separates assessment questions into those dealing with arms management and those
directed towards ammunition management. The guiding questions provided here are targetedprimarily at the strategic level, namely, to identify actors and processes responsible for the safe,
secure and accountable management of stockpiles. They are not technical questions suited for
conducting a technical assessment of national stockpiles at the tactical level (i.e. individual depot
or unit levels), which fall beyond the scope of this assessment.
5.5.1. Weapons
Poorly managed stockpiles are an important source of weapons for the illicit market. Stockpile
management of weapons is the term used to describe those procedures and activities
necessary for the safe and secure accounting, storage, transportation, and handling of arms.
The effective management of weapon stockpiles is, therefore, an essential element of any WAM
programming, as it can reduce the risk of arms diversion (e.g. the loss and theft of weapons andthereby their illicit proliferation). It can also be used to identify obsolete or surplus weapons, aswell as future procurement requirements. The primary focus of this methodology is on securityof weapons stockpiles.
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible and involved in the securestockpile management of weapons, their organizations and capacities An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, security policies and practices
applicable to national stockpile management, including security regulations, operatingprocedures, risk assessment and management processes, physical security considerations
including access control, and related security plans A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national management policies andpractices on the stockpile management of weapons

44 See MOSAIC, “05.20: Stockpile Management: Weapons”, 2012, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.20-2012EV1.0.pdf; see also specific and relevant IATG, www.
un.org/disarmament/un-saferguard/guide-lines.

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5.5.1.1. Key guiding questions

60•

Which national security forces and services are authorized to manage (i.e. possess,store, handle and transport) weapons? Are there any exceptions?

•

Do these entities have codified regulations and procedures relating to the safe andsecure management of weapon stocks? Describe the scope of these regulations
and procedures applicable to weapons stocks, and how, when, and by whom theseregulations and procedures are applied. Are these regulations and procedures
centralized or decentralized across security forces and services? Do the regulations
and procedures apply to all weapon stockpiles?

•

Which national entities are responsible for overseeing and monitoring the applicationand the review of existing security regulations and procedures that apply to State-held
weapons? How often are relevant personnel of security forces and services trained on
the application of existing regulations and procedures?

•

Which national entities are responsible for conducting risk assessments of storage
locations? Describe what elements are considered as part of this risk assessment.
Which entities are responsible for the oversight of risk management processes,
including acceptance of risks?

•

Which national entities are responsible for conducting needs assessments relating
to technical capacity, equipment and infrastructure for the storage of weapons? How
often are such needs assessments conducted?

•

What regulations and procedures exist to account for the stocks of weapons throughout
the supply chain (e.g. recordkeeping, issuance and receipt)? Describe the scope of thecontrol measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, when andby whom these regulations and procedures are applied.

•

What regulation and procedures exist to manage the physical movement of weapons
throughout the supply chain (e.g. transport, distribution control)? Describe the scope ofthe control measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, whenand by whom these regulations and procedures are applied.

•

What regulations and procedures exist for the identification of surplus, obsolete or
unserviceable weapons? Describe the scope of the control measures in the existing
regulations and procedures. Describe how, when and by whom these regulations andprocedures are applied.

•

What measures exist for the monitoring and diagnosis of weapon diversion fromstockpiles? Describe relevant control measures to prevent the diversion of weapons
stockpiles. Describe how, when and by whom these control measures to prevent
diversion from stockpiles are applied. In the event of suspected diversion, what
measures are taken and by whom?

•

Describe the national processes involved in the training of personnel in charge of thestorage of State-owned weapons. Is the function of store manager professionalized?
If yes, what incentive structures are in place to maintain store managers in charge andavoid the loss of knowledge and expertise over time due to staff rotation?

•

How is the application of existing security regulations and procedures applicable toweapons different, if at all, in remote storage locations? Are particular challenges faced
by security forces in the secure storage of weapons in remote locations?

•

What are the key challenges and needs of security forces and services to strengthen
the stockpile management of weapons at the strategic, operational and tactical levels?
Describe the challenges and needs in particular in the areas of authorizations, coordination and tactical resource priorities.

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

BOX 17: Tips on facilitating an assessment of stockpile management (weapons)
999

Obtain as much information as possible
from relevant national authorities on
existing regulations and procedures
applicable to stockpile management prior
to the in-country conduct of the WAM
baseline assessment. This will enable
meaningful dialogue among participants on gaps in existing processes andpractices.
Assess early in the session if there has
been prior technical assessment of risks
and needs pertaining to national weapons
storage. This will help the assessment
team determine if there is an existingbaseline of storage conditions and needs
at the national level, which can help orient
the consultations on priorities and needs.
Dedicate time to understanding thematurity of stockpile management
processes (e.g. how existing procedures
are implemented, by whom and what9

9challenges may exist), rather than strictly
focusing the dialogue on the identification of material needs (e.g. infrastructureneeds).
Pay particular attention to clarifying
processes codified on paper andmeasures actually being undertaken inpractice. This clarification is essential
in accurately identifying current status
and areas for enhancement. Rememberthat the existence of practices does notnecessarily mean that those measures
are codified in formal documentation in
the form of a regulation, procedure or administrative instruction.
Assessors for this session should be
assigned to technical experts (e.g.
weapons storage technical personnel)
to ensure that appropriate security andsafety elements are adequately covered
during the consultations.

5.5.2. Ammunition
Stockpile management is a wide-ranging term when applied to ammunition. In addition to thesecurity measures applicable to prevent diversion, conventional ammunition has particular,
specialized safety considerations due to its explosive nature. Ammunition may deteriorate
or become damaged unless it is correctly stored, handled and transported, with the resultant
effect that it may fail to function as designed and may become dangerous in storage, handling,transport and use, which may result in unplanned and accidental explosion at munition sites.
Safe, effective and efficient stockpile management can also enhance security as it ensures thatthe best “value for money” is obtained from ammunition, which is an expensive commodity inbulk. It is therefore important that national authorities adhere to basic principles and that improvements in stockpile management, where needed, are made in an integrated and graduatedmanner as resources become available. Effective stockpile management is as much aboutdeveloping appropriate procedures, processes and systems as it is about storage and security
infrastructure. Infrastructure is expensive, but significant improvements in safety and security
can be made at minimal cost through system and process improvements. Changes of attitude
and the development of an ethos of explosive safety can have a major impact on reducing thecurrent high global level of undesirable explosive events within ammunition storage areas.45

45 Language drawn and adapted from IATG, “01.30: Policy Development and Advice”, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-01.30-Policy-Development-and-Advice-V.2.pdf.

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By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the safe
and secure stockpile management of conventional ammunition, their organizations andcapacities An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, safety and security policies
and practices applicable to national stockpile management of conventional ammunition
focusing on
 Measures to reduce the risk of accidental explosions
 Measures to mitigate and manage effects of accidental explosions
 Measures to reduce the risk of diversion
 A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national management policies andpractices on the stockpile management of conventional ammunition
This reference methodology and the guiding questions below are targeted for national stakeholders at the strategic and operational level in the management of conventional ammunition
stockpiles, in particular in the areas of policy, regulations, procedures and operational coordination. This method does not provide detailed technical guiding questions suited for tactical-level assessments relevant at the level of each storage unit and, thus, should not be applied forassessment for such purpose.
5.5.2.1. Key guiding questions
General62•

Is there a formal management system (i.e. organizational structure, processes,
procedures, and methods) for the safe and secure management of conventional
ammunition at the national level? Is the system codified in written documentation?
Describe the scope of the system and to whom it applies.

•

Is there a dedicated national ammunition management policy? If yes, describe thescope of the policy and its applicability.

•

What safety regulations exist for the safe storage of ammunition? Which national
entities are responsible for overseeing and monitoring the application and the review
of existing safety regulations that apply to State-held ammunition?

•

Do safety regulations consider hazard classification codes, storage of compatibility
groups, quantity distances, and net explosive quantities as per the IATG?

•

Which national entities are responsible for the oversight and governance of conventional ammunition storage sites? Are ammunition storage management oversight responsibilities centralized or decentralized across national security forces and services?
What is the level of harmonization in regulations and procedures that apply to different
security forces in the safe storage of ammunition?

•

Is there a national stock accounting system for all types of State-held conventional
ammunition? Describe the scope of the national stock accounting system and how itapplies to safety as well as to security measures.

•

Is there a national ammunition surveillance system and in-service proof of ammunition
safety and stability? Describe the national process for evaluating the properties, characteristics and performance capabilities of ammunition.

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS•Describe the national processes involved in the training and qualification of personnel
in the field of ammunition management. Are functions relating to conventional ammunition management professionalized? If yes, what incentive structures arein place to maintain trained and qualified personnel to avoid loss of knowledge andexpertise due to staff rotation?

•

How is the application of existing safety regulations and procedures applicable toammunition different, if at all, in remote storage locations? Are particular challenges
faced by security forces in the safe storage of ammunition in remote locations?

Reducing risks of accidental explosions•

What current procedures with respect to risk assessments and risk acceptance areapplicable to conventional ammunition storage? Are procedures in place to determine
how the risk assessments should be conducted? Which authority signs off and accepts
risks related to ammunition and explosives?

•

What ammunition storage planning processes exist at the national level that help toensure that ammunition natures in storage locations meet the necessary physical andenvironmental protection? Which national stakeholders are responsible for overseeing
and governing such planning processes? Which national entities are involved andconsulted in the planning processes?

•

What processes exist to identify and segregate serviceable and unserviceable
ammunition natures? Which national stakeholders are responsible for the oversightof this process? How does the process differentiate between ammunition that issafe to store, use and transport, and ammunition that is unsafe and unserviceable?
Describe the process taken at the national level to identify and segregate serviceable
ammunition from unserviceable ammunition. More specifically, describe any national
processes relevant to conducting technical inspection of ammunition stocks.

•

What procedures exist to ensure appropriate stack management of ammunition(e.g. separate ammunition by its nature within storehouses, general maintenance ofstore cleanliness). Which national stakeholders are responsible for overseeing andgoverning this process?

•

What processes and procedures exist to ensure that ammunition is stored according
to relevant hazard divisions and compatibility groups?

•

What processes, procedures and systems exist to ensure fire prevention at ammunition
stores and sites, including dedicated risk assessments, climatic protection, vegetation
control, firefighting equipment, prohibited articles and related enforcement measures?

Mitigating and managing the effects of accidental explosions•

Is there national legislation relating to safeguarding explosive storage areas? Describe
the scope and nature of safeguards applicable to ammunition storage and related
processing facilities. Which national stakeholders are responsible for the governanceand oversight of safeguards applicable to ammunition storage sites?

•

Is there a national process for the licensing of explosives, including the development,
maintenance and enforcement of explosive limit licences? Describe the scope of thenational explosive licensing process, and which national stakeholders are responsible
for the governance and oversight of that process. Describe if explosive limit licences
are applied to all storage locations, and how.

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•

What national processes and procedures exist to ensure that internal and external
quantity distances for ammunition storage sites are respected? Describe the processof establishing and maintaining quantity distances, including the national stakeholders
responsible for their oversight and enforcement.

•

What practical measures are used by national stakeholders to prevent prompt
initiation of adjacent storage in the event of accidental explosions (e.g. use of traverses,
barricades or overhead protection)?

•

What national preparedness processes exist to identify, respond to and manage
incidents of accidental explosions? Describe the scope of the national preparedness
processes, as well as relevant safety response plans and capacities, including for the
ammunition site and for the population and environment impacted by the accidental
explosion.

Security measures to reduce the risk of diversion

64•

What national processes exist to assess security risks associated with ammunition
storage sites? Describe the risk management processes applicable to the securityof ammunition storage, including by identifying any relevant security plans andprocedures that may exist, and identify which national stakeholders are responsible forthe oversight and enforcement of such risk management processes.

•

What national regulations and procedures exist to control the vetting of personnel
and the access of individuals, goods (e.g. vehicles) and services into sites that store
ammunition? Describe the measures that are required to effectively implement access
control for storage sites, and which national stakeholders are responsible for theoversight and enforcement of such measures.

•

What regulations and procedures exist to account for stocks of ammunition throughout
the supply chain (e.g. recordkeeping, issuance and receipt)? Describe the key control
measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, when and by whomthese regulations and procedures are applied.

•

What regulation and procedures exist to manage the physical movement of ammunition
throughout the supply chain (e.g. transport, distribution control)? Describe key control
measures in the existing regulations and procedures. Describe how, when and by whomthese regulations and procedures are applied.

•

What practical security measures exist to reduce risks of diversion of ammunition
stocks from individual storage facilities? Describe relevant security measures usedby national stakeholders that either deter or restrict perpetrators from accessing
ammunition stocks (use of parameter security measures, guards, etc.). What are someof the key personnel capacity and infrastructure challenges?

•

What existing procedures are in place for the secure storage of surplus, obsolete or
unserviceable ammunition?

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

BOX 18: Tips on facilitating an assessment of stockpile management (ammunution)
99

9

Obtain as much information as possible
from relevant national authorities on
existing regulations and procedures
applicable to the stockpile managementof ammunition prior to deploying the
WAM baseline assessment. This will
enable meaningful dialogue among participants on gaps in existing processes
and practices.
Assess early in the session if there has
been prior technical assessment of risks
and needs pertaining to the storageof ammunition, including at individualstorage sites and units. This will inform theassessment team if there is an existingbaseline status of storage conditions andneeds at the national level, which can help
orient the consultations on priorities andneeds.
Dedicate time to understanding thematurityof
ammunition
stockpile
management processes (e.g. how existingprocedures are implemented, by whom
and what challenges may exist), rather
than strictly focusing the dialogue on theidentification of material needs (e.g. infrastructure needs). It is not possible toassess storage and materiel conditions,
including for individual sites, from national
consultations alone. Such a technicalassessment at the tactical level is outside
the scope of this methodology; thus,
assessors should cooperate with relevant
national and international stakeholders
that are responsible for carrying out tactical-level assessments to obtain a more

99in-depth overview of practical safety andsecurity measures and related technicalcapability gaps and needs applicable toindividual storage sites, where appropriate
and necessitated.
Pay particular attention to clarifying
processes codified on paper andmeasures actually being undertaken inpractice. This clarification is essential
in accurately identifying current status
and areas for enhancement. Rememberthat the existence of practices does notnecessarily mean that those measures
are codified in formal documentation in
the form of a regulation, procedure or administrative instruction.
Assessors for this session should be
assigned to technical experts (e.g.
ammunition technical personnel) toensure that appropriate security andsafety elements are adequately covered
during the consultations. For additional
technical guidance on ammunition
management, assessors may consult thefollowing existing guidance:48» Critical
Path
Guide
to
the
International Ammunition Technical
Guidelines» A Guide to Developing National
Standards
forAmmunition
Management» Utilizing
theInternational
Ammunition Technical Guidelines in
Conflict-Affected and Low-Capacity
Environments

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5.6. MARKING
Effective marking and recordkeeping systems (see Section 5.7) together build a national accounting
system. National accounting systems enable competent national authorities to accurately
inventory weapons and ammunition in national stockpiles, as well as to identify potential points
of diversion from stocks, thereby dissuading members of the defence and security forces fromdiverting State-held weapons and ammunition and preventing unplanned explosions. An effective
accounting system requires at least five elements:
The weapons to be marked and uniquely identifiable
To ensure safety and through-life traceability, ammunition to be marked using United Nations
explosive hazard classification systems and codes46• Weapons and ammunition to be recorded in a national registry• Weapons and ammunition to be recorded in the local weapons and ammunition accounts of thestorage facilities or units of the defence and security forces where they are held
• Any movement of weapons or ammunition – for example, between storage facilities or units –to be documented
The following section focuses on assessing policies and practices pertaining to weapons andammunition marking.
••

By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the markingof weapons and ammunition, and their organizations and capacities An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicableto the national marking system for weapons and ammunition, including to define (i) what items
should be marked at the national level, (ii) timing of marking, (iii) methods and format of marking
systems, and (iv) measures applicable to deterring and counteracting the removal or alterationof markings
 A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of national marking systems, including throughprocurement practices or through secondary marking of weapons
This section primarily focuses on assessing policies and practices pertaining to secondary weapons
markings, while for ammunition the section focuses on primary markings. In the case of conventional ammunition, the methodology acknowledges that current marking practices of explosive
ammunition include unique identifiers or lot (or batch) marking, generally allowing for tracing andsafe storage management. In the case of small arms ammunition, markings in the packaging may
enable tracing efforts. In addition, the methodology acknowledges that some States have maturenational systems to enable effective marking of small arms ammunition rounds by batches and/or
lots, which support efforts to prevent diversion and illicit proliferation of ammunition.

46 See IATG, “01.50: UN Explosive Hazard Classification System and Codes”, 2015, http://data.unsaferguard.org/iatg/en/IATG-01.50-Explosive-hazard-classification-system-IATG-V.3.pdf.

66

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

5.6.1. Key guiding questions•

What legal or regulatory requirements exist at the national level to mark weapons? Is therequirement to mark weapons codified in national legislation or a related legal framework?
What is the scope of the marking requirements, and to which national stakeholders dothey apply? Are there any exceptions? For example, do they apply to State-held weapons
and to civilian weapons? What national authority is responsible for the oversight andmanagement of marking processes? Are the national responsibilities for marking of
weapons centralized or decentralized at the strategic level? Are the responsibilities
centralized or decentralized for implementing the marking of weapons at operational andtactical levels?

•

Has a national marking format been adopted? Describe the national marking format, as
well as any associated method of marking used at the national level. Is there more than
one marking format or method, depending on the type of weapons or national stakeholders that the items belong to (i.e. by end users)?

•

Is there a national marking programme to facilitate the implementation of the national
marking system? If yes, describe the scope of the national marking programme. This may
include elaboration of:»

To which national stakeholders the national marking programme applies (e.g. State-held
weapons and/or civilian weapons)»

Items that the marking programme covers, including any unique additional security
markings and if any exceptions apply to items or end users»

Any requirements or strategies applicable to when a weapon is to be marked (e.g. at thetime of manufacture, import, transfer, recovery from operations, or disposal)»

Which actors are responsible for the implementation of marking programmes and forwhich end users»

Associated geographic scope and time frame of implementation, if the marking
programme is ongoing•

Where applicable, describe the marking procedures that apply to marking of weapons at
the time of manufacture.

•

Describe marking procedures that apply to weapons at the time of import. In the case ofimports, describe if weapons are marked at the time of import, including what additional
unique markings are applied to those already marked by the original manufacturer.

•

Describe the marking procedures that apply to marking weapons already held by national
security forces and services that may not have been marked at the time of import ortransfer into their possession. Which national stakeholders are responsible for designingand overseeing such marking programme activities? How are marking operations
sequenced to ensure that there are no gaps in the marking of weapons already in thehands of security forces and services down the supply chain at unit levels?

•

Describe the marking procedures that are being applied, if any, to captured weapons fromoperations; collected and/or surrendered weapons from voluntary collection programmes;
seized or confiscated weapons; unserviceable or obsolete weapons; and deactivatedweapons.

•

What is the existing procedure in place for the marking of civilian-held weapons andammunition? What national authority is in charge of the design, oversight and implementation of this procedure? Is this procedure centralized or decentralized across responsible
national stakeholders? Are particular challenges faced in the marking of civilian-held
weapons and ammunition? If yes, please describe these challenges.

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•

On a practical level:» How many weapons have been marked so far in the country? How many weapons havebeen marked at the point of manufacture?
»

How many marking machines are currently in the country, and are they operational?
What marking technologies and techniques are applied?

»

Are marking operations static (i.e. central location) or mobile in nature?

»

Are particular challenges faced in the marking of State-held weapons, including
capacities and materiel needs? Describe any particular challenges in marking weapons
in remote locations.

»

How are gender considerations included in the national marking programme oroperations? For example, is gender considered in the composition of marking operation
teams?

Additional marking considerations for ammunition:

68•

What legal or regulatory requirements exist at the national level to mark ammunition?
Is the requirement to mark ammunition codified in national legislation or a related legal
framework? What is the scope of the marking requirements, and to which national stakeholders do they apply? Are there any exceptions?

•Has a national marking format been adopted for ammunition? Describe the national
marking format, as well as any associated method of marking used at the national level. Is
there more than one marking format or method depending on the type of ammunition or
national stakeholders that the items belong to (i.e. by end users)?

•

Where applicable, describe the marking procedures that apply to marking of ammunitionat the time of manufacture.

•

What is the existing procedure for the marking of civilian-held ammunition, if any?
What national authority is in charge of the design, oversight and implementation of thisprocedure? Are particular challenges faced in the marking of civilian-held ammunition? If
yes, describe these challenges.

•

On a practical level: Are specific ammunition marking requirements (import codes, lot
numbering of small arms ammunition) requested of ammunition producers at the time of
the ammunition procurement process?

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

BOX 19: Tips on facilitating an assessment of marking
9

9

Obtain as much information as possible
prior to deploying a WAM baseline
assessment on weapons marking in the
country, in particular to obtain information
on national marking format and thestatus of the national marking system,in particular whether marking weapons
or ammunition is a national requirement.
This will help assess and verify withnational experts the current status of
implementation, while also enablingtargeted and in-depth consultations onmarking approaches and practices.
Pay attention to the sequencing and prioritization of ongoing marking programmes,
as this will inform assessors if there are
critical gaps in marking new and existing

9

9

weapons in a country. Also pay attention to
gaining insight on strategic or operational
challenges to the sustainability of marking
programmes and activities.
Assess the opportunities, benefits
and challenges of integrating national
marking requirements into weapons andammunition procurement processes.
Gain insight on what marking techniques
work. This is often closely associatedwith marking machines and technologies.
Consultations can provide an opportunity
to obtain information on which marking
technologies work in differing settingsand capacities, which can be usefulforassessorswhen
consideringenhancement options.

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69

5.7. RECORDKEEPING
An effective national recordkeeping47 system comprehensively records weapons and ammunition
within the jurisdiction of the State. This includes records of transfers (e.g. exports and imports,
end users and uses, transits or trans-shipments); the national stockpile; arms and ammunition in
civilian hands; weapons and ammunition recovered from the illegal or illicit sphere; and disposals(e.g. destructions, international sales, donations). Relevant international and regional instruments
and standards recommend a centralization of the recordkeeping system, managed by a competentauthority of the State.48
For State-held weapons and ammunition, a national recordkeeping system, together with anational marking system, builds a national accounting system. One of its purposes is to record
the weapon and ammunition life cycle along supply chains, including from centre to lower level
units, and vice versa. An effective national accounting system enables national authorities toinventory arms and ammunition in the national stockpile accurately and efficiently. For example,
the recorded information enables national authorities to quantify weapons and ammunition in thenational stockpile, which enables them to identify surplus, obsolete or unserviceable weapons andammunition. This, in turn, enables national authorities to forecast weapons and ammunition requirements and needs accurately, increasing operational efficiency and readiness and reducing
unnecessary government expenditure. National accounting systems can be manually or electronically operated. Regular back-ups should be undertaken to ensure that records are not lost.
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the recordkeeping and inventory management of arms and ammunition, and their organizations andcapacities An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicableto the national recordkeeping system for weapons and ammunition, including to (i) define what
records should be kept for weapons and ammunition at the national level; (ii) identify which
national stakeholders are responsible for keeping such records as well as which other actors
may need access to those records; (iii) identify the methods and format of recordkeeping
systems applicable to weapons and ammunition, including particular safety considerations
pertaining to recordkeeping of ammunition types, quantities and conditions
 A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders
to enable and facilitate the implementation of the national recordkeeping system for weapons
and ammunition
This section provides guiding questions that apply to general recordkeeping processes applicable
to both weapons and ammunition. The section also includes a series of recordkeeping-relevant
guiding questions dedicated to safety considerations applicable to ammunition.

47 See MOSAIC, “05.30: Marking and Recordkeeping”, 2012, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.30-2012EV1.1.pdf.
4870

Ibid, p. 13

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

5.7.1. Key guiding questions
General•Is the recordkeeping of weapons and ammunition a national legal requirement? If so, what
legal requirements exist for the recordkeeping of weapons? What legal requirements
exist for the recordkeeping of ammunition? Describe the scope of national requirements
applicable to the recordkeeping of arms and of ammunition, including:»Which types of arms and ammunition the recordkeeping requirement applies to»What types of information are required to be kept at the national level for arms and for
ammunition, and for how long»

Which functional areas are covered under the recordkeeping requirements (e.g. international transfers, storage, transport)»

To whom the requirements apply»

If there are any exceptions•

What national authorities are responsible for the oversight and management of thenational recordkeeping system(s)? Are the responsible national entities different for therecordkeeping of weapons and the recordkeeping of ammunition? Describe the differing
roles and responsibilities applicable to the recordkeeping of arms and of ammunition.

•

Which national authorities are recordkeepers (i.e. custodians of records) for weapons
and for ammunition? Is the national recordkeeping system centralized under one central
authority, or decentralized by security forces and services and their respective ministries?

•

Describe the level of harmonization of the recordkeeping system across the security
forces and services at the domestic level. To what extent are information requirements
and reporting requirements harmonized at the national level across State-held weapons
and ammunition?

•

Are there operational procedures for the recordkeeping of State-held weapons and of
ammunition? If yes, are these procedures codified in formal national documentation?
Which national entities are responsible for the design, oversight and implementation ofthese procedures, both for arms and for ammunition? In particular:»

Describe the procedures for recordkeeping applicable to arms and to ammunition in
the national registry.

»

Describe the procedures for recordkeeping applicable to arms and to ammunition atunit and/or individual levels.

»

Describe how the movement of weapons and of ammunition (i.e. change of custody) isrecorded.

»

Describe how the issuance and receipt of weapons and of ammunition are recorded at
the unit and/or individual levels.

»

Describe any national processes applicable to stocktaking and audits of weapons andof ammunition.

»

Describe how records of the marking of weapons are kept. How is this information
integrated with the national registry of weapons and with records held at the unit andindividual levels, if relevant?

»What are some of the key challenges associated with recordkeeping of arms and of
ammunition at the national level?

UNIDIR71

••Is the national recordkeeping system applicable to State-held weapons and ammunition
managed manually or electronically? Describe any back-up systems or processes that
may exist at the national level.
»

If the recordkeeping system is operated electronically, which electronic system or tool
is used?

»If the recordkeeping system is operated manually, are there existing recordkeeping templates applicable to national registries and to records at unit levels? Describe
the scope and format of national recordkeeping templates applicable to arms and toammunition.

What national recordkeeping system exists to keep records of arms and of ammunition
for civilians and private security companies? Which national authorities are responsible
for the recordkeeping of civilian-held weapons and ammunition? What informational elements are kept by national authorities of civilian-held weapons and ammunition?
Are records kept manually or electronically? How are records backed up? How often are
inventories updated?

Additional recordkeeping considerations for ammunition

72•

Describe how all types of ammunition are recorded at the national level. In particular, arethe types of ammunition and their information organized by operational, training, surplus
and unserviceable categories?

•

What are the minimum information requirements specific to ammunition? What additional
information, if any, is kept in addition to types, quantities and locations (e.g. lot number andbatch number, hazard classification code, hazard division)?

•

Are there specific records kept in case of ammunition loss or theft?

•

Describe what types of logbook and stack tally cards are kept for each explosive
storehouse.

•

How often are stocktaking and audit exercises conducted?

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

BOX 20: Tips on facilitating an assessment of recordkeeping
99

9Proceed systematically and methodologically in identifying and mapping all recordkeeping authorities (i.e. custodians ofrecords), as well as the type of records (i.e.
informational elements) that they keep.
Use hypothetical scenarios or specificexamples that can help map out andunderstand the build-up and maturity of
the national recordkeeping system.
Pay particular attention to the level ofcentralization or decentralization of thenational recordkeeping system. In thisregard, certain degrees of a decentralized
system are common, thus focus dialogue
on the degree of harmonization andcommunication between the different
registries and databases. This will also
lay the groundwork for the assessmentof tracing of arms and profiling of
ammunition.

99Focus dialogue on the maturity of thenational recordkeeping system and its
information processing performance(e.g. by way of examples of informational
inputs or expected informational outputsof the system).
For ammunition, pay particular attention to
the maturity of records kept on technicalconditions of ammunition natures. Whileoutside the scope of this assessment
methodology, one method of good
validation practice is often to compare thecontent of ammunition records applicable
to a storehouse against materiel actually
held in the storehouse, and to verify thiscontent against explosive limit licences
applicable to the storehouse to determine
if safety requirements are being
adequately met for that particular storage
location.

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5.8. TRACING OF ARMS AND PROFILING OF AMMUNITION
Most illicit arms and ammunition begin their lives legally in a factory (or are imported) but are thendiverted to the illicit sphere during their life. Tracing is the systematic examination of tracking
information related to illicit weapons and ammunition from their point of manufacture or mostrecent import, through the lines of supply, to the last legal titleholder, to determine the pointin space and time at which the item became illicit. The purpose of tracing illicit weapons andammunition (domestically as a priority, and internationally in a sequenced manner) is to establish
the facts of criminal activities leading to diversion to the illicit sphere, which will help in identifying
and enforcing adequate and appropriate countermeasures and in preventing future diversion ortrafficking in arms and ammunition.49
As such, an effective tracing system enables and ensures that a State is able to identify the typesof diversion it may face, including internal or external sources of illicit arms and ammunition (e.g.
diversion points in space and time; suppliers, actors and individuals involved; criminals and criminalor organized crime networks involved; or terrorist groups acquiring arms and ammunition). An
effective national accounting system (including marking) is an essential prerequisite for tracing
operations. Further, national coordination on domestic and international tracing, including throughinformation exchange, is considered essential to enable successful tracing operations. 50
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the identification, documentation and tracing of arms and ammunition and the profiling of small arms
ammunition, and their organizations and capacities An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicableto national tracing and profiling systems, including (i) domestic tracing systems, such as theroles and functions of national stakeholders, as well as essential information pertaining to theidentification, documentation and tracing of arms and ammunition and the profiling of smallarms ammunition; and (ii) means and methods of domestic and international tracing operations,
including through internal and external cooperation and information exchange A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders
to enable and facilitate the implementation of national tracing and profiling

49 See MOSAIC, “05.31: Tracing Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons”, 2012, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.31-2012EV1.0.pdf; see also IATG, “03.50: Tracing of
Ammunition”, 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-03.50-Tracing-V.2.pdf.
50 See A.M. Baldo and M. Martinez Miralles, A Handbook to Profile Small Arms Ammunition in Armed
Violence Settings, UNIDIR, 2021, https://unidir.org/publication/handbook-profile-small-arms-ammunition-armed-violence-settings.

74

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

Profiling of small calibre ammunition
This methodology recognizes that tracing individual small arms ammunition rounds posesvarious challenges for States. However, building evidence and capacity to document illicit smallarms ammunition has unique benefits that can inform counter-proliferation strategies andactivities. This methodology promotes tracing ammunition when feasible (e.g. through unique
identifiers or lot/batch numbers identifiable in the items recovered or their packaging) andprofiling small arms ammunition when tracing may not possible. Profiling of ammunition refers
to data generation and the establishment of comprehensive baseline information regarding
the volumes and origins of illicit ammunition, thereby providing information on the trends andpatterns of diversion and illicit trafficking over time.53
5.8.1. Key guiding questions•

What are the existing legal requirements or regulations for the tracing and/or profiling ofarms and ammunition? What authorities are authorized and responsible for the tracing
and profiling of arms and ammunition? Is there a National Focal Point or similar structure
in place for tracing and/or profiling of arms and ammunition?

•

Is there a national strategy in place to counter illicit trafficking and illicit flows of arms andammunition? If yes, describe the scope of tracing requirements in such a strategy. Whichentities are responsible for the oversight of the implementation of such a strategy? Whichentities are involved in the implementation of such a strategy?

•

Provide a step-by-step description of the domestic tracing mechanism, indicating how
responsible national entities undertake domestic tracing operations. This could include
elaboration of the following:•»

Is there a domestic coordination mechanism or body for tracing? If yes, describe thescope of the coordination body, its mandate and related resources available. Whichnational entities are part of such a coordination body?

»

What procedures exist to facilitate domestic tracing operations? Are the procedures
codified in written national documentation? Describe the scope of the procedures, towhom they apply and when, and if there are any exceptions.

»

What information exchange processes and tools exist to facilitate exchange of
information on illicit arms and ammunition? Are there specific procedures that deal
with the tracing of seized or confiscated, captured, collected or surrendered, or lost andfound weapons and ammunition, or is all such tracing streamlined into one centralized
procedure?

Is there a national system dedicated to keeping records and information on illicit arms
and ammunition? If yes, is it centralized or decentralized? Which entity is responsible forholding such data, and which entities have access to this information? If data are decentralized, which security forces and services maintain this type of information? Describe
the information elements kept and maintained by relevant national authorities on illicit
arms and ammunition.

UNIDIR75

76•

Provide an initial assessment of how effective tracing operations have been at the national
level. For example, is it possible to provide an estimation or figures on how many illicit
arms and ammunition are recovered – that is, seized (e.g. by law enforcement in crime),
captured (e.g. by the military, if applicable), surrendered or collected (if applicable) or found(in other circumstances) – per location, per month or per year by national security forces
and services? How many of those items have been traced successfully domestically and,
where relevant, internationally?

•

Describe national procedures related to the profiling of illicit ammunition, if any. Whatnational authority is responsible for the analysis of the information and data generated
from the profiling of illicit ammunition, including small calibre ammunition?

•

What informational or analytical products are generated based on the profiling of illicit
ammunition? By whom? How are these informational and analytical products used at thenational level? For example, are they used to inform the development of armed violence
reduction strategies, counter illicit trafficking measures or counter diversion measures?

•

Provide a step-by-step description of the process and mechanism in place to undertakeand respond to international tracing requests. What national authority is responsible forinternational tracing operations and responding to international tracing requests? Whichother national authorities are involved? How many international tracing operations are
conducted on average per year? Are records of the results of these operations kept?

•

Describe the nature and extent of cooperation with INTERPOL on domestic and international tracing activities. For example, what is the role of the INTERPOL National Central
Bureau and its capacity to undertake domestic and international tracing operations? Whatis the level of use of INTERPOL resources and tools?

•

Are other international or regional cooperation mechanisms used at the national levelto facilitate international tracing operations? This may include bilateral or subregional
legal agreements among States, information exchange among law enforcement andborder control entities, as well as cooperation on implementation of United Nations arms
embargoes.

•

Is there a national system in place to collect information on the impact of illicit weapons
and ammunition on women, men, boys and girls? If yes, describe the system and how the
information is used for policy and/or operational planning and implementation to reduce
armed violence and illicit proliferation.

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

BOX 21: Tips on facilitating an assessment of arms tracing and profiling of ammunition
99

The maturity of domestic tracing systems
for arms varies considerably between
States. Assessors are recommended
to focus on mapping out, in a stepby-step manner, practices of national
authorities to initiate, or to respond to,
tracing requests at the domestic level.
Assessors should pay particular attention
to the national processes for accurately
identifying weapons, documenting themcomprehensively, and initiating national
coordination and information exchanges
to identify the origin of the illicit arm. This
will give at least an overview of the current
status of tracing systems in the country.
Assessors
shoulddeterminethematurity of national processes for international tracing operations, either tomake a request or to respond to one,
independent from an assessment of thedomestic tracing system (although this isheavily reliant on the maturity of domestic
tracing systems). Assessors should focus
the consultations on which actors are9

involved domestically and internationally, using one or two concrete examples oftracing operations, which will illustrate thenational processes that may be in place.
Assessors should also inquire whether
these processes are codified in national
documentation.
Profiling ammunition may be a long-term
process that necessitates dedicatedcapacity to document illicit ammunition
over time and space if not alreadyundertaken. Some States may havededicated systems and capacities tocomprehensively document ammunitionin their territories, while others may not.
Assessors should focus the assessmenton the maturity of recordkeeping of
ammunition more broadly at the national
level, while paying attention to any
dedicated databases or information
sources for illicit ammunition, and howthat information is used by national
stakeholders.

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5.9. PROCESSING OF ILLICIT ARMS AND TREATMENT OF ILLICIT AMMUNITION
How States process illicit arms and treat illicit ammunition – from the criminalization of illicit
activities to ensuring accountability for items recovered from the illicit sphere – is an importantcomponent of any national WAM framework.51 In addition to tracing (see Section 5.8), effective
processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition can support the domestic judicial
process by providing information and evidence on which illicit traffickers and violence perpetrators
can be convicted, thereby helping to address impunity.52 Further, in some contexts where nationallaws permit, recovered weapons and ammunition may be disposed of through several methods.
In some such contexts, weapons may be disposed of by integration into the national stockpiles of
security forces and services.53 This requires clear regulation and articulation of related national
processes to ensure that integrated weapons are marked, recorded and stored in accordance with
relevant national laws prior to integration and that integration does not contribute to further illicit
proliferation.
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in theprocessing of illicit arms and ammunition, and their organizations and capacities An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicableto processing illicit arms and ammunition at the national level A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the safe, secure and accountable processing of illicit arms andammunition

5.9.1. Key guiding questions•

What are the existing legal requirements or regulations for the processing of weapons andammunition recovered from the illicit sphere or illicit activities, including criminalization?
Which national authorities are responsible for overseeing the national processes relevantto the processing of illicit weapons and ammunition? How are law enforcement entities,
the ministry of justice and military justice involved in the process?

•Is there a national strategy or policy on the processing of illicit arms or ammunition? If
yes, describe the scope of the strategy or policy. In particular, is there a defined approachand methodology for decision-making on the final method of disposal of those recovered
illicit weapons (e.g. destruction, reintegration, or other methods) and ammunition (i.e.
destruction, or other methods)?

•

Describe the role of the national justice system (e.g. the ministry of justice or the militaryjustice system) in the processing of recovered illicit arms and ammunition (including insituations of seized, captured, surrendered, collected or found illicit arms and ammunition).

•

Are recovered illicit arms and illicit ammunition considered as primary or secondary(supporting) evidence in judicial proceedings by the national justice system? Are registries
of such weapons and ammunition maintained by authorities of the national justice system?
If yes, are they linked to other “items” or “goods” in judiciary investigations or processes?

51 For the purposes of this document, the term “recovery” is used and refers to arms and ammunition captured (e.g. by militaries in military operations), seized (e.g. by law enforcement, customs and border agencies),
collected or surrendered (e.g. during DDR processes or CVR activities), or found (e.g. in caches).
52 See S. de Tessières, H. Shiotani and S. Wilkin, The Role of Weapon and Ammunition Management inPreventing Conflict and Supporting Security Transitions, UNIDIR, 2019, pp. 5,18,19, https://unidir.org/publication/role-weapon-and-ammunition-management-preventing-conflict-and-supporting-security.
53

78

Recovered ammunition should never be integrated into a national stockpile.

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS•At the operational level, are there formal (written) procedures covering the means andmethods to process recovered illicit arms and ammunition? If yes, what is their scope
and application, and who are they applied by? Describe relevant national processes atthe operational level, from the point of recovery, through processing (e.g. documentation,
storage, use as evidence, tracing), to disposal.

•

What are the capacities in terms of infrastructure of the national justice authorities tosafely and securely store “judicial” arms and ammunition going through a judicial process?
Describe their management and processing from the moment of their reception on site,
until they are disposed of.

•Where a competent national authority may decide to integrate recovered weapons and/or ammunition into the national stockpile as part of disposal, describe the procedure andcontrol measures applied prior to their integration.

•

Are there mechanisms that allow for follow-ups on recovered weapons for which thelast legal titleholder can be identified (e.g. when bearing official markings or following a
successful international tracing operation), including for restitution? If yes, describe thosemechanisms

BOX 22: Tips for facilitating an assessment of the processing of illicit arms and treatment of illicit
ammunition
999

Practices for processing of illicit arms andtreatment of illicit ammunition, as well as
the national stakeholders involved, mayvary nationally. Assessors should first
focus on gaining a basic overview of legal
requirements, their scope, and the actors
involved in various aspects of processing
illicit arms and ammunition. This may
include understanding the scope of criminalization applicable to illicit arms andammunition generally.
The mapping of processes and capacities
at the operational level is essential forunderstanding the maturity of national
processes relevant to managing illicit
arms and ammunition that are recovered.
In particular, assessors could focus onunderstanding processes related to
how recovered items may be treated as
evidence, how they are managed, andhow they are disposed of.
Integration of recovered weapons isrelatively common in certain situations,where it is permitted by national law.
This is particularly relevant in low-capacity contexts, where security forces andservices may lack adequate serviceable
weapons, which creates demand for
integrating
serviceable
recovered9weapons. In such cases, assessors should
obtain an overview of the safety, security
and accountability measures that are
applied to recovered items prior to theirintegration.
Processing
recoveredconventional
ammunition (i.e. larger categories thansmall arms ammunition) constitutes ahazard activity and poses safety risks
to individuals and civilian objects wheresuch ammunition may be handled, stored
and transported. This is particularly relevant for unclassified ammunition
that is recovered, or in situations where
national authorities lack the technicalcapacity to accurately and safely classify
the recovered item. Assessors should
ensure that consultations highlight suchrisks. Further, when mapping national
processes relevant to the processingof recovered ammunition for use as
evidence or for tracing or disposal,
assessors could seek to understand thetypes of evidence that may be gatheredby national authorities other than thephysical evidence of illicit ammunition,such as the use of witness evidence orphotographic or video evidence.

795.10. WEAPONS COLLECTION
Weapons collection, whether as part of an integrated DDR process or as a separate activity,
removes illegal and/or illicit and unwanted weapons from civilian communities. It does so by
encouraging individuals – and communities as a whole – to relinquish weapons and by rendering
legal (e.g. through licensing or registration) weapons that may be held illegally under nationallaw. By reducing the quantities of unwanted, illegal and/or illicit weapons in circulation, collection
programmes can reduce the availability of these weapons, which might otherwise be used in armed
conflict; political, ethnic or other forms of intercommunal violence; violent crime; and gender-based
violence. A weapons collection programme is not a stand-alone activity. Removing tools of violencefrom communities without addressing the root causes of violence and conflict is unlikely to make a
durable contribution to building peace and security.54
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in thecollection of illicit and unwanted arms, and their organizations and capacities An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicableto national collection programmes, including (i) identification of contexts in which collection
programmes are designed and applied; (ii) assessment of needs and desired impact ofcollection programmes; (iii) planning of collection programmes; and (iv) physical implementation processes, including safety, security and accountability measures applicable to thecollection process as well as items collected A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders
to enable and facilitate the implementation of national weapons collection programmes
While this methodology primarily focuses on the collection of weapons, in particular small arms, it
recognizes that collection programmes in reality may include light weapons and associated conventional ammunition and explosives. Dedicated guidance exists, including on safety measuresapplicable to the collection of ammunition, and should be strictly followed by the assessment teamduring consultations to raise awareness and shared understanding among national stakeholdersof these risks.55
5.10.1. Key guiding questions•

Are there existing legal requirements as defined by national law or regulation for thecollection of illicit or unwanted weapons from civilians? Which national authorities are
responsible for the design, oversight and management of national collection programmes?
Are there any restrictions, prohibitions or limitations defined by regulation relating to thecollection of weapons (e.g. prohibition of certain types of incentives, limitation placed onage of participants, restrictions on collection of certain types of arms or ammunition due
to safety concerns)?

54 See MOSAIC, “05.40: Collection of Illicit and Unwanted Small Arms and Light Weapons”, 2012, https://
unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.40-2012EV1.1.pdf.
55 See Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, “4.10: Disarmament”, www.
unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.10-Disarmament.pdf; annexes of MOSAIC 05.40; S. de Tessières, Effective
Weapons and Ammunition Management in a Changing Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
Context, 2nd ed., United Nations Department of Peace Operations, United Nations Office for Disarmament
Affairs, 2021, www.un.org/disarmament/ddr-handbook-2ed.

80

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS•Describe past and existing initiatives or activities being undertaken to collect weapons
from civilians. What is the scope of such collection programmes? In what context was thecollection programme undertaken and what were the main objectives (e.g. the collectionof illegally held weapons; the collection of legal but unwanted weapons; the collection oflegally held weapons with a status changed due to regulation amendments; reforms inlicensing and registration of civilian-held weapons)?

•

Is a collection programme integrated in national security or other strategies or policies(e.g. prevention of violence or violent crime)? How are collection programmes, if any, linked
to broader national security sector processes (e.g. stabilization, DDR, CVR, broader armed
violence reduction programming)? If applicable, how is weapons collection expected tolink to or complement other programmes, such as voluntary civilian disarmament or otherdisarmament initiatives and activities?

•

What existing procedures are in place for the assessment of needs and risks related tothe collection of weapons from civilians? What national authority is in charge of suchrisk assessments? Which stakeholders are consulted on the conduct of needs and risk
assessments?

•

Where collection of weapons has been undertaken, describe the planning sequence, organization and implementation of the collection of weapons. Which national stakeholders
were involved in the design of the collection programme? For illustrative purposes, describe
the step-by-step approach taken to design and implement a collection programme.

•

What communication and sensitization strategy exists for weapons collection? Is thisstrategy specifically designed to be gender-sensitive and to address all groups of society,including vulnerable communities and affected communities? Are special considerations
made for women, children and youth taking part in collection programmes, with respect toincentives and/or criminalization of illicit detention?

•

What alternatives to the collection of weapons (e.g. the registration and licensing of
weapons) are considered? Describe how such alternatives have been considered in thecontext of past collection programmes, if applicable.

•

What incentive structure (e.g. positive and/or negative incentive structure) has been
considered or applied to maximize the results of weapons collection? Describe instanceswhere certain incentives worked well, and where they did not. What were some of the key
institutional, context or capacity challenges to the successful collection of weapons?

•

If collection programmes include ammunition and explosives, are the national authorities
in charge of the collection of ammunition and explosives the same as those responsible
for weapons collection? What specific procedures are in place to assess risks related tothe collection of ammunition and explosives? What specific safety procedures are in place
to ensure the safe and secure handover and subsequent management of ammunition andexplosives during the collection programme?

•

Which national authority is responsible for defining the end state of collected weapons?
What methodology and what informational elements are considered and taken into
account to define the end state of collected weapons? What means and methods ofdisposal are considered for collected weapons?

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BOX 23: Tips on facilitating an assessment of weapons collection
9

9

82

While good practice references exist
for the design and implementation ofcollection programmes, there is no “onesize fits all” and no one practice will beappropriate in all scenarios. The context
in which the collection programme isdesigned varies considerably, as do theobjectives, intended target audience andcontributing incentives and limitations
for such a programme. Assessors shouldseek to understand if there are domestic
requirements for collection, if they are an
integral part of broader national security
processes or strategies, and if there are
any codified procedures or guidance forthe collection of weapons at the national
level.
Assessors are encouraged to gain abetter understanding of the context
of the collection and to assess if pastcollection programmes were able toachieve the intended objectives, and
if not, why. Gaining insight on what
constitutes successful collection in
relation to the intended objectives, rather
than strictly the number of weapons

9collected, is essential. This is primarily
because the physical number of collected
weapons may in fact be misleading: pastexperience has shown that collecting acertain number of weapons does not, in
isolation, necessarily show a reductionin the supply or demand for arms in thetarget community or – more broadly – areduction in armed violence.
Fundamental planning considerations
for a collection programme relate to
the positive and/or negative incentive
structure that can be provided to theparticipating community in return forparticipating in the collection exercise.
Once again, there is no “one size fits all”
model for incentives. Assessors should
encourage open, inclusive dialogue
among planners of collection and thetarget communities in the design, scopeand desired end goal of the engagement
prior to initiating a collection programme.
Use of surveys may have benefits in thisregard.59

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

5.11. DISPOSAL INCLUDING DESTRUCTION
At the end of their life, illicit arms and ammunition, surplus stocks, unwanted or obsolete
weapons and ammunition, and unsafe ammunition are disposed of. The disposal of weapons andammunition is an essential component of a comprehensive WAM framework. Disposal can serve
several objectives: it can be undertaken to reduce safety risks associated with unsafe ammunition,
to reduce illicit weapon and ammunition circulation, to reduce the risk of diversion of arms andammunition to unauthorized or illicit users, and to reduce redundancies in costs associated withmaintaining unserviceable materiel. 56
Disposal can mean destruction, transfer to another authority or entity, or sale or donation, either domestically or internationally (e.g. if weapons are still serviceable). National practices, including theirmeans and methods for disposal, vary. This variation may be based on national legal frameworks,
as well as operational needs, constraints and opportunities. Environmental concerns should also
be considered when selecting which method of disposal to apply. The United Nations recommends
and applies destruction as the preferred method of disposal for collected, recovered, or otherwise
illicit or surplus weapons, ammunition and explosives.57 After destruction, weapon parts andcomponents rendered permanently unusable may still be recycled, donated or sold as usable scrap(e.g. for public artwork).58 This section is subdivided by weapons disposal and ammunition disposal.
By the end of the assessment of this functional area, assessors should seek to obtain:
 A better understanding of the national stakeholders responsible for and involved in the disposal,
and in particular destruction, of illicit, unwanted, surplus or unsafe arms and ammunition, andtheir organizations and capacities An overview of, including the maturity levels associated with, policies and practices applicableto national processes for disposal, including (i) the authorization process for disposal; (ii)planning stages that define the means and methods for disposal subsequent to the identification of the need for disposal; (iii) related security and safety procedures and practices at theoperational level during implementation; and (iv) how disposal loops back and informs the needfor new materiel A basic overview of the institutional capacity maturity levels of relevant national stakeholders to enable and facilitate the implementation of disposal activities applicable to arms and toammunition
Destruction of arms, and in particular ammunition and explosives, poses significant safety andsecurity risks. Assessors should be clear during the national consultations that activities pertaining
to destruction should only be undertaken by those qualified to manage ammunition and explosives
with specialized skills in EOD. This methodology is designed to help assessors obtain an overview
of the national stakeholders, processes and practices pertaining to the destruction of arms andammunition. The methodology is not designed to provide guidance on how to conduct destruction

56 See MOSAIC, “05.10: Conducting Small Arms and Light Weapons Surveys”, 2018, https://unoda-web.
s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.10-2012EV1.0.pdf.
57 See MOSAIC, “05.50: Destruction: Weapons”, 2012, p. 3, https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2019/05/MOSAIC-05.50-2012EV1.0.pdf; see also Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, “04.10: Disarmament”, p. 30, www.unddr.org/modules/IDDRS-4.10-Disarmament.pdf.
58 See MOSAIC, “05.50: Destruction: Weapons”, 2012; see also IATG, “10.10: Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition”, 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-10.10-Demilitarization-and-Destruction-V.2.pdf.

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at the tactical level and should not be applied for such a purpose. MOSAIC and the IATG, as well as
related guidance documents, contain dedicated guidance available for such exercises.59
5.11.1. Weapons
5.11.1.1. Key guiding questions•

What are the existing legal requirements and regulations for the disposal of weapons?
Which national authority is responsible for the oversight and management of weapons
disposal? Describe the means and methods permitted for the disposal of weapons by
national law or regulation.

•

Is there a national policy on the disposal of weapons? What means and methods ofdisposal are covered by such a policy? Which national authority is empowered toauthorize disposal of weapons? Describe the step-by-step approach for receiving,
reviewing and authorizing disposal of weapons. If the authorization process is differentiated by methods of disposal, describe the difference in the process for each methodof disposal.

•

For unwanted or unserviceable weapons identified for disposal, describe the processapplicable to conducting serviceability checks. Who conducts such serviceability
checks? When and at what frequency are serviceability checks conducted? Is serviceability a criterion considered in authorizing the disposal of weapons?

•

Describe the process for requesting the destruction of weapons, from the evaluation ofdestruction needs through the different stages of the authorization process upstream.
Which entities are responsible for making such an assessment of need? Are templates
or standards available at the national level to facilitate the request for destruction of
weapons?

•

What existing procedures are in place for the destruction of weapons? Are there
dedicated procedures that are applicable to varying methods of destruction? Is there
a dedicated safety procedure for the destruction of weapons? Are these procedures
codified in national documentation? Are these procedures harmonized within eachdefence and security force and service? Are these procedures harmonized across thedefence and security forces and services?

•

Describe the scope and sequence relevant to planning of weapons destruction.
Which national entities are in charge of designing and planning weapons destruction?
Describe how designing and planning for destruction of weapons are undertaken.

•

Are destruction operations conducted on a permanent site or in a mobile manner?
Are there any regulatory restrictions defining constraints and prohibitions on wheredestruction of weapons may be permitted? What challenges are faced by defence andsecurity forces in the destruction of weapons located in remote areas?

59 See MOSAIC, “05.50: Destruction: Weapons”, 2012; see also IATG, including “10.10: Demilitarization
and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition”, 2015. Other useful references include United Nations SaferGuard, Critical Path Guide to the International Ammunition Technical Guides, 2019, https://front.un-arm.org/
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Critical-Path-Guide-to-the-IATG-web.pdf, and UNIDIR, Utilizing the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines in Conflict-Affected and Low-Capacity Environments, 2019, www.
unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/utilizing-the-international-ammunition-technical-guidelines-in-conflict-affected-and-low-capacity-environments-en-749.pdf.

84

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS•Which national entities are responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of weapons
destruction programmes and activities? Describe the relevant criteria applied to
conduct monitoring and evaluation. How does such evaluation inform the materielneeds of security forces and services?

•

Are weapons disposed of by application of methods and in ways other than destruction(e.g. transfers, sales, donations)? If yes, describe the other methods used and any
relevant procedures that may exist to facilitate the disposal of weapons. Which entities
are involved for such other methods?

•

What types of records are kept for disposed weapons? Are records of destroyed
weapons kept? Which national authorities keep records of disposed weapons,
including for destruction? How long are these records kept? Are these recordkeeping requirements defined by national law, regulation or procedures codified in national
documentation?

5.11.2. Ammunition
5.11.2.1. Key guiding questions•

What are the existing legal requirements and regulations for the disposal of
ammunition? Which national authority is responsible for the oversight and managementof ammunition disposal? Describe the means and methods permitted for disposal of
ammunition by national law or regulations. Specify if different regulations apply for
different types of ammunition natures.

•

Is there a national policy on the disposal of ammunition? What means and methods ofdisposal are covered by such a policy? Are disposal and destruction methods consideredat the procurement or acquisition stage? Which national authority is empowered toauthorize disposal of ammunition? Describe the step-by-step approach to receiving,
reviewing and authorizing disposal of ammunition. If the authorization process is differentiated by methods of disposal, describe the difference in the process for eachmethod of disposal.

•

Describe the process applicable to conducting serviceability checks for all types of
ammunition held by the State. Which national authority is responsible for conducting
such serviceability checks? When and at what frequency are serviceability checks
conducted?

•

Describe the process for requesting the destruction of ammunition, from the evaluationof destruction needs through the different stages of the authorization process upstream.
Are requesting processes differentiated by the types of ammunition to be considered
for destruction? Which entities are responsible for making such an assessment ofdestruction need, including the risks associated with keeping the ammunition instorage and its safety and security conditions? Are templates or standards available
at the national level to facilitate the request for destruction of all types of ammunition?

•

What existing procedures are in place for the destruction of all types of ammunition
held by the State? Are there dedicated procedures that are applicable to varying
methods of destruction? Are there dedicated safety procedures that correspond tothe methods of destruction of ammunition? Are these procedures codified in national
documentation? Are these procedures harmonized within each defence and security
force and service? Are these procedures harmonized across the defence and security
forces and services?

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86•

Describe the scope and sequence relevant to planning of ammunition destruction.
Which national entities are in charge of designing and planning ammunition
destruction? Describe how designing and planning for the destruction of ammunition
are undertaken for different types of ammunition, where relevant.

•Which national authorities are responsible for the identification of ammunition
disposal sites? Are there any regulatory restrictions defining constraints and prohibitions on where the destruction of ammunition is permitted? What challenges are faced
by defence and security forces in the destruction of ammunition, including at remotelocations? Are destruction operations conducted in a mobile manner?

•

Which national entities are responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of ammunition
destruction programmes and activities? Describe relevant criteria applied to the
conduct of monitoring and evaluation. How does such evaluation inform the materielneeds of security forces and services?

•Is ammunition (including surplus ammunition) disposed of in methods other thandestruction (e.g. transfers, sales, donations)? If yes, describe the other methods used
and any relevant procedures that may exist to facilitate the implementation of thedisposal of ammunition. Also describe if there are any safety restrictions placed onother means of disposal applicable to ammunition. Which entities are involved in suchother methods?

•

What types of records of disposed ammunition are kept? Are records of destroyed
ammunition kept? Which national authorities keep records of disposed ammunition?
How long are these records kept? Are these recordkeeping requirements defined bynational law, regulations or procedures codified in national documentation?

•

Give an overview of the existing national EOD capacity (e.g. number of teams andtrained personnel, types and quantity of equipment). Describe the national processes
involved in the training of personnel in EOD. Are functions relating to EOD professionalized? If yes, what incentive structures are in place to maintain trained and qualified EOD
personnel to prevent the loss of knowledge and expertise?

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

BOX 24: Tips on facilitating an assessment of disposal including destruction
999Disposal means and methods may be
defined by national law, regulation orpolicy. They may further be shaped byoperational capacity, such as technical,
financial and technological resources. As
such, it is important that assessors try toobtain the full scope of disposal means
and methods used by national stakeholders. The initial focus of the consultation could be dedicated to mappingout relevant authorization processes forthe disposal of arms and ammunition,
including the national stakeholders
involved in such processes.
Various means and methods exist forthe destruction of weapons, some ofwhich are outlined in MOSAIC module05.50, annex B. Technological means
and methods continue to evolve, which
may shape future destruction methods
available to States. However, State
resources may place constraints onavailable methods. Assessors should seek
to evaluate whether the existing means
and methods for weapons destruction
are “fit for purpose” and the best value formoney, including from safety, security, environmental and resource perspectives.
Types of ammunition and their characteristics are connected to the means andmethods for their disposal. Assessors

9should pay particular attention tomapping all relevant types of methods
used by the State to dispose of unwanted,
surplus, illicit or unsafe ammunition. This
will help focus the assessment of needs
and challenges pertaining to specificammunition types and associatedmethods of disposal faced by national
authorities. Means and methods of demilitarization and destruction of ammunition
can be viewed in IATG module 10.10. 63
Assessors should focus their assessment
on gaining a better understanding of theoperational capacities of the national
entities responsible for the disposalof ammunition. This includes seeking
to gain insight into existing technicalknowledge and expertise in EOD, andrelated capacity or knowledge gaps at thenational level. Assessors should also seek
to gain information on specialized training
programmes that may be available at thenational level to national stakeholders
in the area of EOD. This information onhuman and related resources, when put
together with mapping of authorization
processes, infrastructure and equipment
capabilities, will give the assessment
team a more holistic overview of thecapacity gaps and needs.

60

60 See IATG, “10.10: Demilitarization and Destruction of Conventional Ammunition”, 2015, https://s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-10.10-Demilitarization-and-Destruction-V.2.pdf.

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6. REPORTING ON NATIONAL WAM
BASELINE ASSESSMENTS
The final stage of the WAM baseline assessment is the delivery of a report that presents the current
baseline of WAM policy and practice, areas for enhancement, and options to support their implementation, organized by WAM functional area. This document is referred to as the national roadmap towards a national framework for WAM.
The first step in this process is the delivery of the enhancement options for implementation on
the final day of the baseline assessment, as prepared jointly between the national stakeholders
participating in the baseline assessment and the assessment team. To further strengthen national
leadership and ownership of the process, the delivery of this “options document” is undertakenby the designated national lead authority by presenting it to its high authority in the government,at ministerial levels or higher. Onward distribution can include one or several other high national
authorities. This options document is then annexed to the final report (see Annex III).
The distribution of the report and the level of confidentiality of the report should be discussed
and determined in advance with the designated national lead authority. Further, the outline andexpected structure of the report should be discussed with the designated national lead authority
during the planning stages of a WAM baseline assessment (see Section 4). A template outline andstructure are included in Annex IV. Identification and drafting of enhancement options need to beundertaken during the period of the baseline assessment in parallel to the consultative process
as dialogue progresses. The final report should be drafted by experienced WAM SMEs and bereviewed by the assessment team to ensure accuracy and to address any key omissions. Ideally,
the report should be drafted in the official working language of the baseline assessment and be
made available also in English if that is not the working language of the assessment. Experience
shows that drafting and finalizing the final report may take a minimum of three weeks, and up to
two months for comprehensive editing and layout. The lead rapporteur may need to follow up with
the national, regional and international stakeholders that participated in the baseline assessment
to obtain additional information, as well as to clarify or verify specific and essential informational
elements.
Several specific reporting modalities may also be considered by the designated national leadauthority and its partners. If the production of the final report is time sensitive, an executive summary,an extract of the enhancement options, or a confidential advanced draft may be considered for
production and release. In cases where sensitive information has been discussed or documented
during the WAM baseline assessment, the designated national lead authority and the assessment
team may consider redacted versions to enable wider dissemination of the findings report. In themedium term (two to three months after the assessment is concluded), the findings report canalso be accompanied by a “WAM country insight”, which presents a separate, independent reportthat presents the summary and an overview of the baseline assessment findings made available tothe public to facilitate dialogue on international cooperation and assistance.
Where possible and permitted by the host Government, the findings report should also be sharedwith local, regional and international operational partners to facilitate the implementation ofenhancement options identified in the report. This will ensure that assessment findings and recommendations to strengthen the national framework on WAM are not purely a knowledge promotion
exercise but help translate knowledge into concrete actions on the ground. As such, the host

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Government, in particular the designated national lead authority, is strongly encouraged to ensurethat aspects of the report, whether in part or in full, are made available to relevant local, regional andinternational partners that may be in the position to provide assistance to implementation efforts.
BOX 25: Tip for reporting in a multilateral peace operation context
In United Nations or other peace operation and mission contexts, where a national WAM
baseline assessment may support the implementation of one or several mandated objectives,a code cable may be considered by the mission to inform headquarters – immediately after theassessment – of its key results, findings and recommendations for ways forward.

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UNIDIR91

MODULE 4:
92

REVIEW OF METHODOLOGYSECTION 7

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

7. REVIEW OF THE METHODOLOGYThis reference methodology is a living document, informed by past experience with baseline
assessments as well as by research and dialogue carried out with the community of practice on
WAM. In particular, the methodology draws on UNIDIR’s monitoring and evaluation of national WAM
baseline assessments carried out between 2015 and 2020; a survey conducted of States that had
participated in WAM baseline assessments; and dialogue held among participating WAM States
and regional organizations and partners at the first regional seminar in 2020 on lessons learned
from WAM on the African continent, co-organized by UNIDIR in cooperation with the African Unionand the ECOWAS Commission.
This section presents several initial observations and reflections that offer insights into possible
reviews that may be applied to this methodology in the future to improve its utility and applicability,
including in regions where baseline assessments have not yet been undertaken.
7.1. INFORMING REGIONAL AND SUBREGIONAL ROAD MAPS ON WAM
The WAM baseline assessment methodology is currently applied at the national level. That said,
when coordinated with relevant partners at the regional or subregional level, the methodology canbe used to inform the review and development of regional or subregional strategies and road maps
for WAM. The baseline assessments can be conducted in all States within a region or subregion
where national baselines are established, monitored and reviewed. Information on common risks,vulnerabilities, challenges and opportunities, including progress made in the implementation ofenhancement options, could inform dialogue at a regional or subregional level comprehensively or across a number of key WAM functional areas. Such dialogue and exchange of information,
lessons learned, and good practices may serve as a useful basis for the development and review ofregional or subregional strategies, road maps or action plans for WAM. Such an exercise could also
help identify priority information collection needs at national and regional levels to work towards
strengthening national and regional frameworks. Such an exercise was considered and used by
the ECOWAS region between 2015 and 2020, informing the five-year action plan by the ECOWAS
Commission on SALW control.
7.2. LOCAL- OR SUBNATIONAL-LEVEL BASELINE ASSESSMENT
Past baseline assessment experience also indicates a potential benefit for conducting comprehensive or targeted scope baseline assessments at the local and/or subnational levels, where
the designated national lead authority seeks to gain further detailed information on practices atthe local levels. While the methodology may be broadly applicable to local-level assessments,
dedicated attention and care would be needed to undertake mapping of local-level stakeholders and to adjust the guiding questions under each WAM functional area to better reflect the
information needed at the local levels. Such a local-level assessment will need to be sequenced appropriately in coordination with a designated national lead authority and should take into accountthe careful management of the different political, institutional and operational relationships
between the national, subnational and local stakeholders. No matter at which level the assessment
is undertaken, the guiding principles of national (and local) ownership should be applied.

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7.3. REFINING THE SCOPE OF THE METHODOLOGY
Stakeholders engaged in the dialogue on WAM, including States, United Nations entities, regionalorganizations and specialized NGOs, have expressed or demonstrated interest in either broadening
or refining the scope and depth of the WAM baseline assessment methodology. Expressed areasof interests include:
•

•

•

•

Elaborating on additional WAM functional areas – including border controls, private security
companies, community-based WAM, and craft production – as well as cross-cutting WAM
issues, such as WAM and SSR, or WAM and CVR
Introducing more in-depth guiding questions focusing on specific categories, calibres or
items (e.g. heavy weapon categories, conventional ammunition, dual-use goods and items), asappropriate
Exploring how WAM baseline assessments can better take into account arms-related security
dynamics, threats and risks (e.g. proliferation of armed actors, terrorist groups, and organizedcrime), thereby supporting broader peace and security processes (e.g. peacebuilding, SSR,
community safety programming) that may be ongoing in the country where a baseline
assessment is being undertaken
Identifying opportunities to create synergies with other existing approaches, assessment
processes and methodologies in this field of work

7.4. INTRODUCING MEASURABILITY OF MATURITY COVERED UNDER THIS METHODOLOGY
The methodology in this document may also be reviewed to explore the feasibility of introducing
more detailed measurability applicable to the maturity of national processes relevant to WAM
functional areas. Generally, the views and feedback received from participating States in thisregard were mixed (e.g. to not introduce metrics that constrain the flexibility and agility of themethodology); thus, such consideration would necessitate further dialogue to ensure a fair balance
between measurability and adaptability.
7.5. SUPPORTING FOLLOW-THROUGH IMPLEMENTATION BY IMPROVED COORDINATION
While going beyond the scope and objective of this document, there is ongoing dialogue on how tobest maximize the utility and impact of findings generated by national WAM baseline assessments.
The discussion includes the following:
•
•

•
•
•
•

94

Recognizing the need for improved coordination at the national level to implement a road map
towards comprehensively strengthening a national WAM framework
Awareness-raising and creating further buy-in, in addition to promoting adherence toassessment results and the road map by all stakeholders in relevant national, regional and international forums
Using national WAM baseline assessment findings for the development of resource mobilization strategies by national authorities
Establishing a national framework and mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the implementation of national road maps
Informing the development of national strategies dedicated to WAM
Supporting a more coherent international cooperation and assistance effort, and building on
the assessment findings, by forming partnerships with operational partners to support implementation efforts

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Many of these issues require partnership among participating States, the United Nations and otherrelevant WAM partners.
These review elements may be considered as part of UNIDIR’s ongoing research efforts tostrengthen WAM policy and practice, while promoting knowledge among States, the United Nations,other international and regional organizations, and specialized NGOs on ways to strengthen local,
national, regional and multilateral frameworks and approaches to govern the full life cycle of arms
and ammunition to prevent diversion and misuse and to reduce and mitigate the risks of unplanned
explosions.

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ANNEXES

96

GENERIC TEMPLATES FOR PLANNING,DESIGN, AND IMPLEMENTION OF A
NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
MANAGEMENT BASELINE ASSESSMENTREFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

ANNEX I – TEMPLATE PROGRAMME OF
WORK FOR A NATIONAL WAM BASELINEASSESSMENT
BOX 26: Explanatory note on template programme of work and draftingThis template programme of work outline canbe used for the design, planning and implementation of a national WAM baseline assessment.
This is a template draft document, which will
require adjustments and amendments aspart of the planning and design phase of any
specific national WAM baseline assessment.
Sufficient consideration should be given
during the design and planning phase to theallocation and repartition of time available
for each of the WAM baseline assessment
in-country activities, including each of theseries of meetings, to ensure that each ofthem is meeting its specific objectives andexpected outcomes of the capacity gaps andneeds.

Baseline assessment to assist national efforts to develop or review national framework
governing the full life cycle management of weapons and ammunition
Summary of the initiative
1. Background
2. Programme of work
2.1. Objectives and expected outcomes
Table 1: Objectives and expected outcomes of the WAM baseline assessment
2.2. Methodology
		
2.2.1. Proposed scope		
2.2.2. Proposed dates
		2.2.3. Location
		
2.2.4. Assessment team composition
		2.2.5. Partners
		
2.2.6. Language (in-country consultations and findings report)
3. Proposed activities
3.1. Preparatory work prior to assessment (mission)
3.2. Day 1: In-country internal preparatory meeting by partners and assessment team
3.3. Day 2: National high-level consultative meeting on WAM strategies and priorities
3.4. Day 3: National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area baselines
3.5. Day 4: National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area baselines
3.6. Day 4: Bilateral consultations with key national stakeholders
3.7. Day 4: Bilateral consultations with key international partners
3.8. Day 4: Meeting with United Nations entities
3.9. Day 4: Consultative coordination meeting with representatives of assistance-providing		and partner States
3.10. Day 4: Site visit [optional]
3.11. Day 5: Presentation and validation of preliminary findings and options to strengthen		WAM
3.11.1. Day 5: National consultative technical meeting to present preliminary findings
and draft options for a road map

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3.10.2. Day 5: National consultative technical meeting to validate and adopt techni
cal-level draft options and road map
3.10.3. Day 5: National high-level meeting to present findings, options androad
map to strengthen the national WAM framework
3.11. After-assessment evaluation [assessment team internal, can be done remotely]
4. Support to be requested from partners
4.1. Venue
4.2. Travel considerations including visas
4.3. Accommodation
4.4. Local transport
4.5. Catering
4.6. Information regarding reimbursements
4.7. Opening and closing remarks
4.8. Media, press and visibility

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DAY (DATE)

Arrival ofassessment team
to country

DATES

ACTIVITIESDAY 2(DATE)

Preparatory*** Start ofinternal meeting
meetings ***by partners andassessment team National high-level(3.2)
consultative meeting on WAM strategies and priorities(3.3)

DAY 1(DATE)PROGRAMME OF WORK – OVERVIEW OF SCHEDULE

National consultative meeting toestablish WAM
functional area
baselines (3.4)

DAY 3 (DATE)

Site visit [optional](3.10)

Consultative coordination meeting withrepresentatives ofassistance-providing
and partner States(3.9)

Meeting with United
Nations entities (3.8)

Bilateral consultations with key international partners(3.7)

Bilateral consultations with key national stakeholders (3.6)

National consultative
meeting to establish
WAM functional area
baselines (3.5)

DAY 4(DATE)*** End of
meetings ***National high-levelmeeting to present
findings, options
and road map tostrengthen national
WAM framework(3.11.3)

National consultative technical meeting to validate andadopt technical-level draft options androad map (3.11.2)

National consultative technicalmeeting to present
preliminary findings
and draft options(3.11.1)

DAY 5(DATE)

Departure of theassessment teamfromthe country

DAY 6(DATE)100

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COFFEE BREAK

Session 2: Introduction to national baseline assess- 10 minute presentation format. The remaining time is allocated to quesment of WAM frameworktions and answers.

Session 3: National presentations on existing WAM 10 minute presentation format. The remaining time is allocated to quesframework, strategy and action plantions and answers.

LUNCH

Session 4: Review of WAM priorities, needs, vulnerabilities and challenges

COFFEE BREAK

Discussion format.
Session 5: Review of international and regional
WAM priorities and assistance activities:• Presentation by international and regional partners on international and regional instruments
and priorities• Presentation by international and regional partners on their international and regional assistance, support and capacity-building work
• Review of assistance and types of assistanceprovided,• achievements and results of activities• Exchange of lessons learned and sharing ofexperiences

END OF MEETING, BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS After the meeting, interested national stakeholders may be invited to holdbilateral meetings with the facilitator or expert team.

10:15 – 10:30

10:30 – 11:15

11:15 – 12:30

12:30 – 14:00

14:00 – 15:00

15:00 – 15:15

15:15 – 16:30

16:30 – 17:00

10 minute presentation format. The remaining time is allocated to questions and answers.

If planned, this coffee break allows the high-level officials who gave theopening remarks to depart the meeting.

High-level welcoming and opening remarks.

Session 1: High-level opening

09:30 – 10:15

NOTES AND COMMENTS

ACTIVITYTIME

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 2. NATIONAL HIGH-LEVEL CONSULTATIVE MEETING ON WAM STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIESUNIDIR101

ACTIVITY

Session 1:
Overview of the WAM baseline assessment

Session 2:
Baseline assessment and process mapping:• Legal and regulatory framework at national
level

COFFEE BREAK

Session 3:
Baseline assessment and process mapping:• National coordinating mechanism• Transfer controls

LUNCH

Session 4:
Baseline assessment and process mapping: Stockpile management of weapons

COFFEE BREAK

Session 5:
Baseline assessment and process mapping: Stockpile management of ammunition

END OF MEETING,
BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

TIME

09:30 – 10:00

10:00 – 11:00

11:00 – 11:30

11:30 – 13:00

13:00 – 14:00

14:00 – 15:00

15:00 – 15:30

15:30 – 17:00

17:00 – 17:30

After the meeting, interested national stakeholders and experts may be
invited to hold bilateral meetings with the facilitator or expert team.

Same as above.

Same as above.

Same as above.

This mapping is conducted through group consultations, moderated by
the national WAM lead entity and its primary partner. It will follow thefollowing methodology:• Mapping of institutions• Mapping of institutional and operational capacities• Mapping of practices and procedures• Mapping of authorization processes• Identification of areas for enhancement and potential options for
implementation
Each session may include group work to identify national options tostrengthen management in these areas.

This session introduces the schedule for the day and discusses expectations.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 3. NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE MEETING TO ESTABLISH WAM FUNCTIONAL AREA BASELINES102

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

Same as above.
Session 7:
Baseline assessment and process mapping:• Tracing of weapons and profiling of ammunition• Processing of illicit weapons and treatment ofillicit ammunition

COFFEE BREAK

Session 8:
Baseline assessment and process mapping:• Collection• Disposal of weapons• Disposal of ammunition

LUNCH

END OF MEETING

10:15 – 11:00

11:00 – 11:30

11:30 – 13:00

13:00 – 14:00

14:00

Same as above.

This overview is conducted through group consultations, moderated by
the national WAM lead entity and its primary partner. It will follow thefollowing methodology:• Mapping of institutions• Mapping of institutional and operational capacities• Mapping of practices and procedures• Mapping of authorization processes• Identification of areas for enhancement and potential options for
implementation
Each session may include group work to identify national options tostrengthen management in these areas.

Session 6:
Baseline assessment and process mapping:• Marking• Recordkeeping

09:30 – 10:15

NOTES AND COMMENTS

ACTIVITYTIME

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 4. NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE MEETING TO ESTABLISH WAM FUNCTIONAL AREA BASELINES (CONTINUATION)

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SessionBilateral consultations with national technical experts from ministries and security forces.

14:00 – 15:00(tbd)

The meetings are held at the conference venue or at relevant government
offices.

Depending on the type, level and schedules of the meetings, the entire
assessment team or individual members of the assessment team may be
conducting these bilateral consultative meetings.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

SessionConsultative coordination meeting with assistance-providing and partner States

15:00 – 17:00(tbd)

ACTIVITY

Site Visit

TIME

15:00 – 17:00(tbd)

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 4. SITE VISIT

SessionBilateral consultations with NGOs and international
assistance providers

SessionConsultations with United Nations partners

ACTIVITY

TIME

Site visit by the assessment team together with national WAM lead entity
and national technical experts.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

These bilateral meetings are held separately from each other at the conference venue. The target participants for each of these bilateral meetings are subject to change, based on availability.

These meetings are devoted to international partners, including the United Nations, expert NGOs and the donor community.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 4. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS

ACTIVITYTIME

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 4. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY NATIONAL STAKEHOLDERS

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REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

Session 1:
Follow up consultations based on baseline assessment

COFFEE BREAK

Session 2:
Sharing of preliminary findings• Baseline status• Key areas for enhancement• Identification of draft options

Session 3:
Discussions on WAM options:• Identifying actors for WAM functional area
options• Setting targets: prioritization and time frame

LUNCH

Session 4:
Discussions on WAM options (continued) and validation• Refinement of WAM options• Validation of findings and WAM options

COFFEE BREAK

Session 5:
Presentation and delivery of WAM road map

Session 6:
Closing

END OF MEETING

09:30 – 10:30

10:30 – 10:45

10:45 – 11:15

11:15 – 13:00

13:00 – 14:00

14:00 – 15:00

15:00 – 15:15

15:15 – 16:00

16:00 – 16:30

16:30

This meeting is devoted to high-level national stakeholders on WAM.

ACTIVITY

TIME

Closing remarks by high-level national authorities and organizers.

Presentation by the national WAM lead entity to the high-level authorityof the government of the validated WAM road map

This session is devoted to national authorities validating the findings andoptions.

This session is devoted to discussing the identified options to strengthen
WAM.

This session is devoted to presenting preliminary findings from the baseline assessments

NOTES AND COMMENTS

PROGRAMME OF WORK – DAY 5. PRESENTATION AND VALIDATION OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS AND OPTIONS TO STRENGTHEN WAM

Programme of work – Proposed participating entities and participants1.
National actors
To be identified by the lead co-organizing national WAM entity.
2.
United Nations actors
To be identified by the lead co-organizing WAM entities.
3.
International and regional actors
To be identified by the lead co-organizing WAM entities.
4.
Civil society and specialized international NGOs
To be identified by the lead co-organizing WAM entities.
5.

Embassies and representatives of current and potential assistance-providing andpartner States
To be identified by the lead co-organizing WAM entities.
6.
Media
To be identified by the lead co-organizing national WAM entity.

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ANNEX II - TEMPLATE DRAFT AGENDA
Annex II - Template draft agenda for a national WAM baseline assessment
FOR
A NATIONAL WAM BASELINEASSESSMENT

National Baseline Assessment on Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) andFrameworks in [Country][Day/month/year][Location], [Country][PROVISIONAL / FINAL] AGENDA
DAY [Day/month/year]
Arrival of external partners (and assessment team members).
DAY 1 – [Day/month/year]
In-country internal preparatory meeting by partners and with the national WAM lead entity of thehost Government.
DAY 2 – [Day/month/year]
National high-level consultative meeting on WAM strategies and priorities, [Location]
Target audience: This meeting is designed for high-level national authorities and relevant national
security services. Implementing partner organizations, international partners from embassies,
international organizations and expert NGOs are also invited to participate in this meeting.
Time
09:30 – 10:15(tbd)

SessionSession 1:
Opening
Introduction of participants

10:15 – 10:30
10:30 – 11:15(tbd)
11:15 – 12:30
(tbd)

106

Group photo/media interaction
COFFEE BREAK
Session 2:
Introduction to national WAM baseline assessment
Session 3: National presentations on existing WAM
framework, strategy and action plan:• Review
ofWAM
priorities,
needs,
vulnerabilities and challenges• Questions and discussion

12:30 – 14:00
14:00 – 15:00
(tbd)

LUNCH
Session 4: National presentations on existing WAM
framework, strategy and action plan:• Review
ofWAM
priorities,
needs,
vulnerabilities and challenges• Questions and discussion

15:00 – 15:15
15:15 – 16:30(tbd)

COFFEE BREAK
Session 5:
Review of international and regional WAM priorities
and assistance activities:

Speakers• Welcome remarks• Remarks by organizing
partners• Opening remarks bygovernment official
Moderation (tbd)• National WAM leadentity• National WAM entities
and stakeholders (tbd)
Moderation (tbd)• All participants
Chair(s) (tbd)
Moderation (tbd)•International
assistance providers

Chair(s) (tbd)

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS
103

•
•
•
•
16:30

Presentation by international partners on theircapacity-building work
Review of assistance provided and result ofactivities
Lessons learned and sharing of experiences
Questions and discussion

Moderation (tbd)

END OF DAY 2

DAY 3 – [Day/month/year]
WAM Baseline Assessment: National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area
baselines, [Location]
Target audience: This full day of informal and technical consultations is designed for national
experts from relevant ministries and national security services.
Time
09:30 – 10:00(tbd)

SessionModeration (tbd)• Presentation by international partners on theirSpeakers
Sessioncapacity-building
1:
Lead
substantive partner•
workorganization
OverviewoftheWAM
baseline
assessment• Review of assistance provided and result of
10:00 – 11:00
Sessionactivities
2: National baseline assessment: mapping • All participants including(tbd)
assessment teaminstitutions,procedures
andpractices;mapping• Lessonslearned andsharingof experiences
authorization processes; identifying areas for• Questions and discussion
Co-Chair(s) (tbd)enhancement
andpotential
optionsforimplementation
16:30
END
OF DAY 2• Legal, regulatory and policy framework
11:00
11:30
COFFEE BREAK
DAY
3 – [Day/month/year]
11:30Baseline– 13:00 Assessment:
Session 3:National
Nationalconsultative
baseline assessment:
All participants
includingWAMmeeting tomapping
establish •WAM
functional area(tbd)
institutions, procedures and practices; mapping
assessment teambaselines,[Location]authorization processes; identifying areas forenhancement
and andpotential
for is Co-Chair(s)(tbd)
Target audience: This
full day of informal
technical options
consultations
designed fornational
implementation
experts from relevant
ministries and national security services.
• National coordinating mechanism• Transfer controls
Time
SessionSpeakers
09:30 – 10:00
Session 1:• Lead substantive partner
13:00 – 14:00
LUNCH
BREAK
(tbd)
organization
Overview of the WAM baseline assessment
14:00
–
15:00
Session4:
National
baseline
assessment:
mapping•
All participants
participants including
including
10:00 – 11:00
Session 2: National baseline assessment: mapping • All(tbd)
institutions,procedures
andpractices;mapping
assessment
team
(tbd)
assessment teaminstitutions, procedures and practices; mapping
authorization processes; identifying areas for
authorization
identifyingoptions
areas forenhancementprocesses;
andpotential
for Co-Chair(s)Co-Chair(s) (tbd)(tbd)
enhancement
potential
optionsforimplementationand
implementation• Stockpile management (weapons)• Legal, regulatory and policy framework
15:00––11:30
15:30
11:00
COFFEE BREAK
15:30––13:00
17:00
5: National baseline assessment: mapping • All participants including
11:30
Session 3:
institutions,procedures
procedures andand practices;
practices; mapping(tbd)
institutions,assessment teamauthorization processes;
processes; identifying
identifying areas
areas forauthorization
enhancement andand potential
potential options
options
Co-/Chair(s)(tbd)(tbd)
enhancement
for Co-Chair(s)implementation
implementation• National coordinating mechanism• Transfer
Stockpilecontrols
management (ammunition)
17:00 – 14:00
13:00
14:00 – 15:00(tbd)

15:00 – 15:30

END OFBREAK
DAY 3
LUNCH
Session 4: National baseline assessment: mapping
institutions, procedures and practices; mapping
authorization processes; identifying areas forenhancement
andpotential
optionsforimplementation• Stockpile management (weapons)
COFFEE BREAK• All participants including
assessment team
Co-Chair(s) (tbd)104
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Day 4 – [Day/month/year]
WAM Baseline Assessment: National consultative meeting to establish WAM functional area
baselines, [Location]
Target audience: This half-day of informal and technical consultations is designed for national
experts from relevant ministries and national security services.
Time
09:30 – 10:15(tbd)

10:15 – 11:00(tbd)

11:00 – 11:30
11:30 – 13:00(tbd)

13:00 – 14:00

SessionSession 6: National baseline assessment: mapping
institutions, procedures and practices; mapping
authorization processes; identifying areas forenhancement
andpotential
optionsforimplementation• Marking• Recordkeeping

Speakers• Allparticipants
includingassessment teamSession 7: National baseline assessment: mapping
institutions, procedures and practices; mapping
authorization processes; identifying areas forenhancement
andpotential
optionsforimplementation• Tracing of weapons and profiling of ammunition• Processing of illicit weapons and treatment ofillicit ammunition• All
participants
includingassessment team

COFFEE BREAK
Session 8: National baseline assessment: mapping
institutions, procedures and practices; mapping
authorization processes; identifying areas forenhancement
andpotential
optionsforimplementation• Weapons collection• Disposal of weapons• Disposal of ammunition• Co-Chair(s) (tbd)

Co-Chair(s) (tbd)• Allparticipants
includingassessment team
Co-Chair(s) (tbd)

LUNCH BREAK

DAY 4 – [Day/month/year] Bilateral consultation with key national stakeholders andinternational partners, [Location], & site visit, [Location]Time
14:00 – 15:00(tbd)

Sessions
Meeting with high-level government officials and key
national stakeholders (tbd)
Bilateral consultations with national technicalexperts from ministries and security forces.

Time
15:00 – 17:00(tbd)

Sessions
Consultative coordination meeting with assistanceproviding and partner States
Consultations with United Nations partners

108

Participants• High-levelgovernment
officials• National
WAM
lead entity• National technicalexperts• Assessment teamParticipants• Assessment team• International
partners
andassistanceproviders

105

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

Time
15:00 – 17:00(tbd)

Bilateral consultations with NGOs and international
assistance providers•

Sessions
Site visit

Participants• National
WAM
lead entity• Assessment team• National technicalexperts

Assistanceproviding
andpartner States

DAY 5 – [Day/month/year] Follow-up consultations and validation of preliminary findings andoptions, [Location]Time
9:30 – 10:30(tbd)

SessionSession 1: Follow-up consultations based on
baseline assessment

10:30 – 10:45
10:45 – 11:15(tbd)

COFFEE BREAK
Session 2: Sharing of preliminary findings• Baseline status• Key areas for enhancement• Identification of draft options

11:15 – 13:00(tbd)

Session 3: Discussions on WAM options• Refinement of WAM options• Identification of actors for WAM functional area
options• Target setting: prioritization and time frame

Speakers• Allparticipants
includingassessment teamModeration (tbd)• Allparticipants
includingassessment teamModeration (tbd)• Allparticipants
includingassessment teamModeration (tbd)

13:00 – 14:00
14:00 – 15:00
(tbd)

LUNCH
Session 4: Discussions on WAM options (continued)
and validation• Refinement of WAM options• Validation of findings and WAM options• All
participants
includingassessment team

15:00 – 15:15
15:15 – 16:00(tbd)

COFFEE BREAK
Session 5: Presentation and delivery of WAM roadmap
Presentation by the national WAM lead entity coorganizing the WAM baseline assessment to thehigh-level authority of the government of thevalidated WAM road map

Moderation
national WAM
entity (tbd)

16:00 – 16:30(tbd)

Session 6: Closing remarks

16:30

END OF MEETING

Moderation (tbd)
bylead• Remarks
byorganizing partners• Closing remarks by
Government official

DAY 6 – [Day/month/year]
Departure of external partners (and assessment team members).

106
UNIDIR109

110

Time frame64

Actor(s)/stakeholder(s)

64

108

The following indicative time-frames may be applied, e.g. short-term: 6 months to 1 year; mid-term: up to 2 years; and long-term: up to 5 years. Other time ranges can be definedand agreed upon by the group of national stakeholders including the national entity co-organizing the national WAM baseline assessment and leading WAM policy and strategy
development. Timeframes can indicate prioritization and sequencing of implementation.

Stockpile management
Stockpile management of weapons
4.1.1
4.1.2

Transfer controls
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
etc.

Legal and regulatory framework at national level
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
etc.

No.
Options
National coordination mechanism
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
etc.

Towards a national framework for weapons and ammunition management in Country X
Options for the Government of Country X

Annex III – Template table of options for the development of a national WAM framework

ANNEX III - TEMPLATE TABLE OF OPTIONSFOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL
WAM FRAMEWORKREFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

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111

Processing illicit arms and treatment of illicit ammunition

Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition
7.1
7.2
7.3
etc.

Recordkeeping
6.1
6.2
6.3
6.4
etc.

Marking
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
etc.

Stockpile management of ammunition
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.2.3
4.2.4
etc.

4.1.3
4.1.4
etc.

109

112

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Disposal including destruction of ammunition
10.2.110.2.210.2.3etc.

Disposal including destruction
Disposal including destruction of weapons
10.1.110.1.210.1.3etc.

Weapons collection
9.1
9.2
9.3
9.4
etc.

8.1
8.2
8.3
8.4
etc.

110

ANNEX IV - TEMPLATE OUTLINE OF A
NATIONAL WAM BASELINE ASSESSMENTREPORT
BOX 27: Explanatory
Template
draftofoutlineof a national
baseline
assessment
reportAnnex IV - note:
Template
outlinea national
WAMWAMbaseline
assessment
report
The following provides a template outline of a cross-comparative analysis, regional or subregional[Start box. Explanatory note]national weapons and ammunition management lessons learned exercises, in-depth analysis ofBox 27. Explanatory note: Template draft outline of a national WAM baseline(WAM) baseline
assessment
assessment
report report. Its structure specific WAM functional areas), a similar or uniform
can vary and be amended, depending on the outline structure should be maintained and continuThe following provides a template outline of a national weapons and ammunition
situation, the context and the WAM functional ously applied for national WAM baseline assessment
management (WAM) baseline assessment report. Its structure can vary and be amended,areas thatare assessed.
baseline
final
reports.
dependingon the For
situation,
the assessment
context and the
WAMfunctional areas that are assessed.
(or reassessment)
andassessment
monitoring (orpurposes(e.g.
For baseline
reassessment)
and monitoring purposes (e.g. crosscomparative analysis, regional or subregional lessons learned exercises, in-depth analysisof specific WAM functional areas), a similar or uniform outline structure should bemaintained and continuously applied for national WAM baseline assessment final reports.
[End box]
Towards a national framework for weapons and ammunition management in country X
About the organization(s)NoteDisclaimers
Contents
Acknowledgements
Abbreviations
Executive summary
1. Contextualization of WAM in country X
1.1. Situation relating to weapons and ammunition management
1.2. United Nations arms embargo [if applicable]
1.2.1. Patterns, types and frequency of arms embargo violations
1.2.2. List of recommendations made by the United Nations group of experts
or panel of experts [Table A]
1.3. United Nations and other support for security sector reform [if applicable]
1.4. United Nations support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (andcommunity violence reduction) [if applicable]
1.5. Armed violence, including urban and localized violence context [if applicable]
2. Mandates related to WAM in country X
2.1. Mandates of United Nations entities
2.2. Mandates of other international organizations
2.3. Mandates of regional and subregional organizations and actors
3. National, regional, subregional and international normative frameworks
3.1. National legislation and instruments (arms control) [Table B]
3.2. Regional and subregional conventions and agreements (arms control) [Table C]
3.3. International conventions and agreements (arms control) [Table D][Start box]
Box 28. Explanatory note: Template draft outline of a national WAM baseline
assessment report: international, regional and subregional instruments (arms control)
This section lists all relevant international, regional and subregional arms control
instruments as well as national legislation and regulations pertaining to the control andmanagement of weapons and ammunition. Separate tables may be used to present thisUNIDIR

111

113

BOX 28: Explanatory note: Template draft outline of a national WAM baseline assessment report: international,
regional and subregional instruments (arms control)
This section lists all relevant international, regional be separately listed by adoption, accession, ratificaand subregional arms control instruments as well tion and signature. Where international instruments
as national legislation and regulations pertaining include voluntary or legally binding reportingto the control and management of weapons and mechanisms and requirements, these should also be
information.
Politicallyregional
and subregional
ammunition.
Separatetables mayorbelegallyused to binding
present international,
included, as should
the number
and dates of national
instruments
shouldbeseparately
listedbyadoption,
accession,
ratification
andsignature.
this information. Politically or legally binding interna- reports submitted.
Where andinternational
instruments
tional, regional
subregional
instrumentsinclude
should voluntary or legally binding reporting
mechanisms and requirements, these should also be included, as should the number anddates of national reports submitted.
[End box]
4. Introduction to baseline assessment and methodology
4.1. Aim of establishing a national framework on WAM
4.2. Aim of a national baseline assessment
4.3. Baseline assessment in country X
5. Baseline assessment of the full life cycle management of arms and ammunition in X

114

5.1. National coordination mechanism
5.1.1. General
5.1.2. Current status
5.1.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.1.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.2. Legal and regulatory framework at national level
5.2.1. General
5.2.2. Current status
5.2.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.2.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.3. Transfer controls
5.3.1. General
5.3.2. Current status
5.3.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.3.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.4. Stockpile management
5.4.1. Stockpile management (weapons)
5.4.1.1. General
5.4.1.2. Current status
5.4.1.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.4.1.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.4.2. Stockpile management (ammunition)
5.4.2.1. General
5.4.2.2. Current status
5.4.2.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.4.2.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.5. Marking
5.5.1. General
5.5.2. Current status
5.5.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.5.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.6. Recordkeeping
5.6.1. General
5.6.2. Current status
5.6.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.6.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.7. Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition
5.7.1. General
5.7.2. Current status

REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS
112

5.4.2. Stockpile management (ammunition)
5.4.2.1. General
5.4.2.2. Current status
5.4.2.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.4.2.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.5. Marking
5.5.1. General
5.5.2. Current status
5.5.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.5.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.6. Recordkeeping
5.6.1. General
5.6.2. Current status
5.6.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.6.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.7. Tracing of arms and profiling of ammunition
5.7.1. General
5.7.2. Current status

5.7.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.7.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.8. Processing of illicit weapons and treatment of illicit ammunition
5.8.1. General
5.8.2. Current status
5.8.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.8.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.9. Weapons collection
5.9.1. General
5.9.2. Current status
5.9.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.9.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X
5.10. Disposal including destruction
5.10.1. General
5.10.2. Current status
5.10.3. Opportunities for enhancement
5.10.4. Options for consideration by the Government of X

112

Annex. List of options for consideration by Government X

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REFERENCE METHODOLOGY FOR NATIONAL WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS

The Reference Methodology for National Weapons and Ammunition Management Baseline
Assessments codifies the methodology which has been used to design and implement
baseline assessments with 11 States (2015–2020), in cooperation with subregional, regional,
United Nations and other partners. It draws inter alia on lessons learned while applying andrefining the methodology with partners. The Reference Methodology represents UNIDIR’s
practical contribution to ongoing regional efforts and new initiatives at different levels toundertake comprehensive national WAM baseline assessments.
This reference methodology is a practical tool to guide interested parties on how to
implement a strategic WAM baseline assessment at the national level. It is being publishedto enhance knowledge and to promote consistency in the use of WAM baseline assessments
by interested stakeholders. It will enable collaboration between States seeking assistanceto undertake a national WAM baseline assessment and United Nations entities, regionalorganizations, and specialized non-governmental organizations that can provide support
for such efforts.

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un_disarmresearch@UNIDIR@unidirgeneva
REFERENCE METHODOLOGYFOR NATIONAL
WEAPONS AND
AMMUNITION BASELINE ASSESSMENTS