JULY2018

Engaging North Korea after theSingapore Summit
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIEO

n June 12, 2018, US President Donald Trumpand North Korean Workers’ Party Chairman
Kim Jong-un met in Singapore for a historic US-DPRKsummit. Expectations in the lead-up to the meetingwere high, as Trump had bragged that he would get agreat deal and his supporters suggested he deserved aNobel Peace Prize. When the moment arrived, however, the joint statement signed by Trump and Kim
simply committed North Korea to “work toward
complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula”
and failed to mention a CVID (complete, verifiable,irreversible dismantlement) approach. There was also
no mention of a concrete roadmap to guide the denuclearization process. As a result, an atmosphere ofdisappointment surrounded the post-summit commentary and the joint statement was criticized as an
empty document.
While I too share a healthy dose of skepticism,as one of the few diplomats who has engaged in intensive negotiations with Pyongyang, I am struckby the fact that the summit has changed the dynamics surrounding North Korea in a way that gives us
a rare chance to peacefully settle the nuclear threat
and other pressing issues. Certainly, it must be acknowledged that the tensions surrounding theKorean Peninsula have been reduced as a resultof the summit. Rather than focusing on the exact

wording of the joint statement, then, I believe thatthe priority should be on taking advantage of thepost-summit détente to achieve the objective of
CVID over the long term. The process by which thatis achieved must be based on a gradual developmentof trust between the United States and North Korea.
Conversely, rushing to conclude a watertight document at this stage could prove counterproductive
since it would make any small hiccups that would
inevitably occur along the way appear that much
more dramatic, which could derail the fragile trust-­
building process.
This approach of putting trust before the process
was also taken by former Japanese Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi and then North Korean leader
Kim Jong-il when they concluded the 2002 JapanDPRK Pyongyang Declaration. Japan should now
return to the framework of that declaration and avoid
being left on the sideline. The ongoing, broader regional diplomatic process, which began with South
Korea’s Olympic diplomacy, has so far seen Kim
Jong-un hold meetings with ROK President Moon
Jae-in, Chinese President Xi Jinping, and Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, as well as President
Trump. This provides an opening for Japan to deepen
its strategic thinking and take the initiative to begin
talks with North Korea.

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North Korea’s Rationale

Since Kim Jong-un took over the leadership of North
Korea from his father, Kim Jong-il, in December2011, he has emphasized the so-called byungjin (parallel development) line to simultaneously develop
the nation’s economy and nuclear weapons. In his
first speech, Kim confirmed this policy shift and declared that the North Korean people would not haveto tighten their belts again. Subsequently, NorthKorea intensified its missile and nuclear weapons
testing. There are some doubts about the actual capability of North Korea’s nuclear weapons, such as
its nuclear warhead miniaturization and the abilityof its ICBMs to withstand re-entering the earth’s atmosphere. Yet North Korea rapidly improved its nuclear capabilities to the point that Kim Jong-un wasable at the end of 2017 to declare that his country
had become a nuclear power.
Realizing the second element of the byungjin
line—developing the economy—will be impossible
so long as North Korea continues to be subject totough economic sanctions and to fear for its survival.
At the same time, actually using its nuclear devices asa weapon of war is not particularly useful for NorthKorea. War would not only risk the lives of millionsof South Koreans in Seoul and tens of thousands of
US military personnel stationed in South Korea but,given the ROK-US Combined Forces’ overwhelming military strength, it would be an act of suicide forthe Kim Jong-un regime. Nuclear weapons are only
useful for North Korea as a deterrent mechanism
or as a bargaining chip as they seek robust security
guarantees—especially from the United States—andeconomic aid and cooperation from relevant countries around Northeast Asia. Even as a deterrent, itis doubtful whether North Korean nuclear weapons
would be effective vis-à-vis the United States given
the vast differences in the actual nuclear capabilitiesof the two countries. As such, Kim Jong-un appears
to have little choice but to use North Korea’s nuclear
capability as a bargaining chip.
This North Korean strategic thinking may not
be compatible with rapid denuclearization in one
stroke, but it does accord with a longer-term, phased,­action-for-action approach. Thus there is scope forNorth Korea to denuclearize in good faith if theinternational community can guarantee its post-­
denuclearization survival. Moreover, while Kim
Jong-un has often been castigated as an irrational
madman, his foreign policy is quite rational whenviewed in the broader context of North Korea’s security situation and the grim fate that would surely
await North Korean leaders under a collapse or­unification-by-absorption scenario.

Establishing a Roadmap

Follow-through is needed now by both the UnitedStates and North Korea based on the platform set by
the Singapore summit. The success of Trump’s decision to meet with Kim Jong-un and engage North
Korea will hinge on the continuing negotia­tions ledby US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and ViceChairman of the Workers’ Party of North Korea
Kim Yong-chol. These negotiations—the first step inestablishing a roadmap toward denuclearization—
should keep a number of key elements in mind.
First, trust-building momentum between theUnited States and North Korea must be maintained. To this end, the commitment expressed in
the Singapore joint statement on the recovery andrepatriation of POW/MIA remains represents low-­
hanging fruit that is ripe for picking. Building trust
will smooth the road toward establishing a sustainable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula as well as
achieving CVID. An emphasis on building trust canalso help mitigate the chance that North Korea willrenege on its denuclearization pledge.
Second, there needs to be a long-term view of thedenuclearization process, understanding that it may
take five years or more. North Korea should be encouraged to take some substantive actions toward
denuclearizing early on in this process to shows its
sincerity. The demolition of tunnels at North Korea’s
Punggye-ri nuclear test site in May was a welcome
step. A good next step would be for North Korea tomake a comprehensive declaration of all its nuclear
facilities and assets. This will then enable meaningful conversations about establishing procedures for
an inspection regime by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA).
Third, a potential roadmap will need to lay outplans for security guarantees and a sustainable peace
regime on the Korean Peninsula to demonstrate toNorth Korea that, so long as it denuclearizes, it will
be permitted to survive and be integrated into international economic institutions. President Trump
announced that US-ROK military exercises will besuspended and no new sanctions will be implemented
so long as negotiations with North Korea continue
in good faith. This will help to build trust between

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the United States and North Korea and to demonstrate sincerity on the part of the US administrationin establishing robust security guarantees for North
Korea’s post-denuclearization survival. This is particularly significant given that the Korean Peninsula hashistorically been a geopolitical crossroads where great
power rivalries have played out and North Korea hasalways felt pressed on all sides by more powerfulnations. The United States should also consider thequick establishment of a liaison office in Pyongyang
as a stepping-stone to normalized diplomatic relations. This is a relatively small and easy concession
to make considering that many countries—including
many in the West—have normalized diplomatic relations with North Korea already.
Fourth, cooperation and coordination with
Northeast Asian countries is needed as part of theprocess to provide security guarantees to North
Korea and establish a permanent peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula. Such a buy-in from all stakeholders is the best way to ensure the long-term stability of any agreement. From this perspective, theunilateral manner in which the suspension of USROK war games was announced was regrettable. As
US-DPRK negotiations progress beyond trust building and ­toward substantive movement on establishing a peace regime and security guarantees, it may
be appropriate to reconvene the Six-Party Talks as avenue to coordinate discussions among stakeholders. Denuclearizing North Korea is certain to be an
expensive process, and President Trump’s statementthat South Korea and Japan must bear the financial
burden is further evidence of the need for deeper consultations. Denuclearizing North Korea benefits notjust the region but the international community as awhole, and appropriate burden sharing will have to becoordinated in due course.

Japan’s Role

When Japan and North Korea concluded thePyongyang Declaration in 2002, both countries resolved that solving the abduction issue, realizing
denuclearization, and building cooperative bilateralrelations was in the national interest of both countries
and would contribute to regional stability. Mutual
recognition of these tenets was to provide the basis
for Japan and North Korea to begin diplomatic normalization negotiations. At the same time, Japan also
pledged to provide North Korea with economic assistance after Japan and North Korea normalized theirdiplomatic relations. Thus Japan has the potential
to play an important role in contributing to the economic dimension of security guarantees for North
Korea’s post-­denuclearization survival.
Japan should now return to the framework set out
in the Pyongyang Declaration. To this end, Japanshould begin a dialogue with North Korea that caneventually lead to a summit between Japanese Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe and Kim Jong-un and the reopening of negotiations on diplomatic normalization. The abduction issue should be addressed andresolved as part of these negotiations.
At its core, the abduction issue—which saw a
number of Japanese citizens abducted by North
Korea from Japan in the 1970s and 1980s—is a bilateral issue that requires a bilateral solution. In particular, a joint investigation into the missing abducteesthat includes officials from both countries needs tobe established in order to ascertain precise details regarding the number of abductees, their fates, and thefates of their family members. Only in this way canJapan and North Korea facilitate a credible resolution
and begin to forge a relationship built on trust. The
Japanese government should also consider establishing a liaison office in order to facilitate regularized dialogue with North Korean authorities and invigorate
negotiating momentum. It is important, however,that Japan keep in mind the big picture of facilitatinga sustainable peace for the Northeast Asian region.

Strategic Foundations

In order to ensure the credibility of the ongoing regional diplomatic process with North Korea, a “P3C”
approach—pressure, coordination, contingency
planning, and communication channel—is needed
as a strategic foundation. Continued quiet pressurein the background is needed to demonstrate to North
Korea that if it abandons diplomacy, sanctions can beincreased and that the international community will
not allow it to develop its economy while it possesses
nuclear weapons. Coordination between the UnitedStates, South Korea, Japan, and China is needed toensure that North Korea is not given room to drivewedges between these four actors and win premature sanctions relief outside the current diplomatic
framework. Contingency planning is needed given
the possibility that tensions on the Korean Peninsula
could suddenly return. This joint contingency planning needs to prepare for a worst-case scenario on theKorean Peninsula, including plans to secure North

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Korea’s nuclear weapons as quickly and efficiently as
possible in the event of a collapse as well as plans todeal with possible refugee flows. Finally, keeping acommunication channel open with core officials in
the North Korean power structure is essential in orderto maintain negotiating momentum, to avoid misunderstandings that could derail the diplomatic process,and to present North Korea with the united message
from the international community that it will be permitted to survive and be integrated into international
economic institutions only if it denuclearizes.

■■■
The first-ever summit between the leaders of theUnited States and North Korea was a positive step forward for regional peace. Now, serious work is needed
to sustain that momentum. Ultimately, the success orfailure of the summit will depend on the next phaseof diplomacy and particularly on the parties’ ability tomaintain the fragile trust-building process, to negotiate a concrete denuclearization roadmap, and to consult consistently and substantively with regional allies
and partners, particularly with regard to providing security guarantees to North Korea. If this process succeeds, it could move the region substantially closer tothe goal of establishing a sustainable peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula.
Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairmanof the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan
Research Institute, Ltd. He previously served as Japan’s
deputy minister for foreign affairs, during which time hewas a top advisor to Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
and was integrally involved in the negotiations that led
to the 2002 Japan-DPRK summit and the return of anumber of the abductees to Japan.

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