STRENGTHENING SHARED
UNDERSTANDING ON
THE IMPACT OF THE ATT
IN ADDRESSING RISKSOF DIVERSION IN ARMS
TRANSFERSA COMPENDIUM OF KEY RESOURCES AND TOOLS2

ABOUT THE RESEARCH'Strengthening shared understanding on the impact of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in addressing risks of diversion inarms transfers' is a joint research initiative by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), ConflictArmament Research, and the Stimson Center (jointly referred to as the Consortium). Through a series of Issue Briefs
and dialogue events, the objective of the initiative is to enhance knowledge and facilitate dialogue among States tostrengthen shared understanding on the impact of the ATT in addressing risks of diversion in arms transfers, and to
identify options and avenues for more effective policies and practices under the Treaty moving forward. The Consortium
highlights challenges for preventing diversion and generates ideas to strengthen counter-diversion measures. It seeks tocontribute to efforts to tackle diversion risks associated with poorly regulated arms transfers at the national, regional andmultilateral levels. Our research is intended to inform the development of good policies and practices to counter diversion within the framework of the ATT and other relevant multilateral and regional instruments. The research is funded by
the Governments of France and Germany.

THE COMPENDIUM
During 2020–22, the Consortium, produced three Issue Briefs. In addition, at the Eighth Conference of States Parties to
the ATT (ATT CSP8), the Consortium launched a new Counter-Diversion Assessment Tool1 that can assist States Parties
in examining the existence and efficacy of an enabling environment to counter diversion, as well as a report containing
the findings of an initial assessment of the ATT's impact on progress made by States Parties in implementing appropriate
measures to address diversion risks.
This Compendium presents key findings, recommendations, resources and tools from the 4 publications mentioned
above. Video recordings of the nine virtual dialogue events and three diversion case studies produced by the Consortium
as of August 2022 can also be found on the partner organisations' websites.2

EXTRACTS FROM ISSUE BRIEF #1
Obligations to Prevent the Diversion of Conventional Arms3
EXTRACTS FROM ISSUE BRIEF #2
Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms4
EXTRACTS FROM ISSUE BRIEF #3
Diversion Analysis Framework5
EXTRACTS FROM THE IMPACT REPORTThe Arms Trade Treaty: Assessing its Impact on Countering Diversion6

3
6
13
18

Cover Image: Weapons Seized from Rebels in DR Congo, 2012. UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti. Design and Layout: Ribale Sleiman Haidar.
1
Brian Wood, 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Assessing its Impact on Countering Diversion', United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research with
Conflict Armament Research and Stimson Center, 2022.

See https://www.stimson.org/2021/addressing-diversion-risk-arms-transfers/ and https://storymaps.arcgis.com/collections/175f3dff24be4a2086
a04f860a59f0ed.

2

3
Brian Wood, 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Obligations to Prevent the Diversion of Conventional Arms', Issue Brief no. 1, United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research with Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey and Stimson Center, 2020. The Small Arms Survey contributed as a
research partner until June 2021.
4
Brian Wood and Paul Holtom, 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms',
Issue Brief no. 2, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research with Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey and Stimson Center, 2020.
5
Alfredo Malaret Baldo, Manuel Martinez Miralles, Erica Mumford and Natalie Briggs, 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Diversion Analysis Framework', Issue
Brief no. 3, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research with Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey and Stimson Center, 2021.

Brian Wood, 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Assessing its Impact on Countering Diversion', United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research with
Conflict Armament Research and Stimson Center, 2022.
6

Small arms ammunitions in an unexploded ordnance (UXO) pit at the Malian Armycamp in Timbuktu, 2013. UN Photo/Marco Dormino.

3

EXTRACTS FROMISSUE BRIEF #1
THE ARMS TRADE TREATY:OBLIGATIONS TO PREVENT THE
DIVERSION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMSPURPOSE OF THE FIRST ISSUE BRIEF
The first ATT Issue Brief examines the legal obligations of States Parties under the ATT to prevent, detect and eradicate
the diversion of conventional arms transfers, including arms already transferred. This Issue Brief does not explore in detail the examples of practical measures to address diversion included in the provision of the Treaty as these are addressedin a related paper.
The ATT does not define diversion, nor does it specifically define any of the other key terms used in its provisions. Nevertheless, the interlocking provisions of the Treaty do provide indications of how States Parties can interpret their international legal responsibilities regarding diversion in order to implement them at the national level. It is argued in thisIssue Brief that such analysis by States Parties requires consideration not only of the ATT's core provision on diversion,
namely Article 11, but also the Treaty's object and purpose, its scope and other key provisions, especially its prohibitions.
Additionally, the analysis should take into account the relevant obligations in various international agreements that ATT
States Parties have each entered into, in particular those relating to the transfer and illicit trafficking of conventionalarms. In doing so, States Parties can address the shortcomings of basing a definition of 'diversion' entirely on the notionof 'authorisation' by one or more States involved in the transfer. Using these relevant international legal frameworks,
States can also consider elements for a definition of an act of 'diversion' to develop in their national legislation, regulations and administrative procedures.

4

BOX 1. A DESCRIPTION OF DIVERSION
The ATT does not contain formal definitions of its key terms and therefore the precise meaning of diversion
has to be derived from established international and national law and practice. To support the efforts of States
Parties to implement the ATT provisions regarding the diversion of conventional arms, the first Issue Brief
reviewed relevant international standards to elaborate key elements for a description of diversion as follows.7
For the purposes of the ATT, 'diversion' is the rerouting and/or the appropriation of a transfer or of alreadytransferred conventional arms or related items contrary to relevant national and/or international law leading to a potential change in the effective control or ownership of the arms and items.
Instances of such diversion can take various forms:
a An incident of diversion can occur when the items enter an illicit market, or when redirected to an unauthorised or unlawful end user or for an unauthorised or unlawful end use.
b The rerouting and misappropriation of the items can take place at any point in the transfer chain, including the export, import, transit, trans-shipment, storage, assembly, reactivation or retransfer of the items.
c

The transaction chain facilitating a change of effective ownership and/or control can involve various
forms of exchange, whether directly negotiated or brokered – grant, credit, lease, barter, and cash – atany time during the life cycle of the items.

7

BOX 2. THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE 11
The obligations and measures to tackle diversion under the ATT apply to conventional arms covered by
Article 2(1) of the Treaty. Ammunition/munitions and parts and components are not explicitly mentioned,
but the largest arms exporting States Parties already apply their national control lists to the broadest rangeof conventional arms, ammunition, and other technologies with military applications.8 This is encouraged
under Article 5(3) of the ATT. Moreover, under international agreements to which they are also party, mostState Parties have accepted obligations to prevent the diversion of such items.
National legislation and regulations to address diversion must also define which activities of the international trade are subject to the national arms control system. ATT Article 2(2) states that "for the purposesof this Treaty, the activities of the international trade comprise export, import, transit, trans-shipment andbrokering, hereafter referred to as 'transfer'". Excluded from the activities constituting a 'transfer' are themovement of conventional arms beyond the borders of a State Party to its armed forces or law-enforcement authorities operating outside national borders, provided the arms remained in the ownership of that
State Party, as provided for in Article 2(3).
8 C

7Brian Wood, 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Obligations to Prevent the Diversion of Conventional Arms', Issue Brief no. 1, United Nations Institute for
Disarmament Research with Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, Stimson, 2020, p. 33, https://unidir.org/publication/arms-trade-treatyobligations-prevent-diversion-conventional-arms.
8
Control lists for the most significant conventional arms export states have been developed in the Wassenaar Arrangement. These are updated
regularly and can be found at https://www.wassenaar.org/control-lists/.

TABLE 1. UNPACKING ATT ARTICLE 11 AND CLOSELY RELATED ATT ARTICLESArticle 11 (paragraphs)

Examples ofclosely related
ATT Articles

What type of action to
take? (obligation or encouraged practice)Transfer stage

Which States Parties are
obliged or
encouraged to act?

What type of systemic and practicalmeasures are listed in Article 11?

11(1) Each State Party involved in the transfer of conventionalarms covered under Article 2(1) shall take measures to prevent
their diversion.

5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14

Prevent (obligation)All

All States Parties

Type of measures not specified

11(2) The exporting State Party shall seek to prevent thediversion of the transfer of conventional arms covered under
Article 2(1) through its national control system, established inaccordance with Article 5(2), by assessing the risk of diversionof the export and considering the establishment of mitigation
measures such as confidence-building measures or jointly
developed and agreed programmes by the exporting andimporting States. Other prevention measures may include,
where appropriate: examining parties involved in the export,
requiring additional documentation, certificates, assurances,
not authorising the export or other appropriate measures.

5(2), 7(1), 7(5), 7(7),8(1), 10, 15(4)Prevent, including by consideringrisk mitigation (obligation)

BeforeExporting and importing States
Parties involved in the transfer
chain

Systemic risk assessment measures; practicalmeasures for prevention and risk mitigation;practical measures for bilateral cooperation andinformation exchanges

11(3) Importing, transit, trans-shipment and exporting States
Parties shall cooperate and exchange information, pursuant
to their national laws, where appropriate and feasible, in orderto mitigate the risk of diversion of the transfer of conventionalarms covered under Article 2(1).

7(6), 7(7), 8(3), 9,15(4)Cooperate with other States
involved in the transfer
to mitigate diversion risk
(obligation)

Before; during

Exporting, importing, transit/
trans-shipment States Parties
involved in the transfer chain

Systemic risk assessment measures and practicalrisk mitigation measures; practical measures forbilateral cooperation and information exchange

11(4) If a State Party detects a diversion of transferredconventional arms covered under Article 2(1), the State Party
shall take appropriate measures, pursuant to its national laws
and in accordance with international law, to address suchdiversion. Such measures may include alerting potentiallyaffected States Parties, examining diverted shipments ofsuch conventional arms covered under Article 2(1), andtaking follow-up measures through investigation and law
enforcement.

14, 15(5)Detect and address (obligation)All

All States Parties

Systemic and practical measures for detection,
investigation, and prosecution; systemic andpractical measures for bilateral cooperation andinformation exchange

11(5) In order to better comprehend and prevent the diversionof transferred conventional arms covered under Article 2(1),States Parties are encouraged to share relevant information
with one another on effective measures to address diversion.
Such information may include information on illicit activities
including corruption, international trafficking routes, illicit
brokers, sources of illicit supply, methods of concealment,
common points of dispatch, or destinations used by organised
groups engaged in diversion.

7(1), 8(1), 8(3), 9, 10,
13(2), 15(4), 15(6)Comprehend and prevent(encouraged practice)All

All States Parties

Practical measures for bilateral cooperationand information exchanges; systemic measures
for multilateral cooperation and informationexchange11(6) States Parties are encouraged to report to otherStates Parties, through the Secretariat, on measures taken in
addressing the diversion of transferred conventional arms
covered under Article 2(1).

13(2)

Report (encouraged practice)All

All States Parties

Practical measures for bilateral cooperationand information exchange; systemic measures
for multilateral cooperation and informationexchange

Consider specific measures toprevent, including mitigation(encouraged practice)

Consider specific measures todetect and address (encouraged
practice)

Note: In column 3, the distinction between an 'obligation' and 'encouraged practice' is based on treaty language. This table uses 'obligation' when the Treaty declares that States Parties 'shall' take measures and 'encouraged practice' where it'encourages States Parties' to take or consider measures.

6

EXTRACTS FROMISSUE BRIEF #2
THE ARMS TRADE TREATY: MEASURES TO PREVENT,
DETECT, ADDRESS AND ERADICATE THE DIVERSION
OF CONVENTIONAL ARMSPURPOSE OF THE SECOND ISSUE BRIEF
The second Issue Brief is intended to support the efforts of ATT States Parties to implement treaty provisions to tackle
diversion and help to achieve one of the main objectives of the Treaty, which is to "prevent and eradicate the illicit tradein conventional arms and prevent their diversion".
In order to achieve the objective, this Issue Brief approaches the issue of identifying effective measures to deal with diversion, consistent with the ATT's provisions, in two broad inter-connected ways:
Systemic Measures: mechanisms or comprehensive arrangements that are established and maintained for national
control systems and international cooperation to prevent, detect, address, and eradicate diversion; andPractical Measures: specific actions taken to prevent, detect, address, and eradicate diversion before, during, andafter an international arms transfer has taken place.
This Issue Brief examines treaty provisions and materials developed by ATT States Parties to support the implementationof Article 11 and related provisions, including the paper from the ATT Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) on 'Possible Measures to Prevent and Address Diversion' [Paper on Possible Measures], in order to achieve
two main objectives. First, the Brief provides detailed information and guidance on systemic and practical measures toprevent and address diversion that are already undertaken by ATT States Parties, which others may adopt, be required toadopt, or could develop further. Second, the Brief presents a potential analytical framework for examining/assessing theapplication by ATT States Parties of various systemic and practical measures designed to prevent, detect, address, anderadicate diversion. This framework can help to determine the direct and indirect impact of applying these measures toachieve the object and purpose of the Treaty.

7

DIVERSION RISK INDICATORS
There is no internationally agreed upon common list of indicators to assess the risk of diversion of a potential arms export in any particular case. Since the 1990s, several multilateral export risk assessment guidelines to prevent proliferation
have been developed that include diversion risk indicators. For example, in 1998 the participating States of the Wassenaar Arrangement adopted the Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons, which presents a series of questions to be addressed by national arms export licensing authorities when confronted with an application for an authorisation to export conventional arms. The Elements,
which were updated in 2004 and again in 2011, call on States to consider a range of factors when determining whether
there is a risk of diversion to unauthorised end use or end users, or to the illicit trade. Recommended key questions are
posed for a more comprehensive assessment of whether the export would contribute to a potentially destabilising accumulation of conventional weapons, taking into account regional stability, the political, economic, and military status of
the prospective importing State, and its record of compliance with transfer controls, among other issues.
In addition, the European Union's User's Guide to Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules
governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment provides recommended questions to help EU
member States conduct export risk assessments, including assessing the risk of diversion. The latest version of the User's
Guide notes that the risk of diversion needs to be considered as part of a holistic risk assessment of an arms export. It
provides a list of questions that national export control authorities should ask in order to assess the risk of diversion
when considering an application to export conventional arms and military equipment.
Building on these multilateral efforts, the box below in this Issue Brief proposes a series of diversion risk indicators andquestions in four main areas that national authorities of ATT States Parties can incorporate into their diversion risk assessments for a potential export. The four main areas are:
The importing State's requirements and its capacity to control transferred conventional arms;
Risks associated with the type of conventional arms and related items;
Legitimacy and reliability of the intended end user/end use of the export; andLegitimacy and reliability of the other entities involved in the transfer of the proposed export.
These four areas and a list of suggested questions to ask in regard to these risk indicators are further elaborated in thebox below. The references to conventional arms may also apply to other items included in a national control list, suchas ammunition/munitions fired, launched or delivered by the conventional arms, and to parts and components where
the items to be exported are covered by the State's national control list. The list does not imply a fixed order of priority
among the questions and answers to be taken into account because priorities may change depending on the specificcase under consideration. Nevertheless, the predictability and reliability of the importing State, the ultimate end-user
and the other actors involved with regard to their record of diversion and ability to manage the particular conventionalarms and related items proposed for export should form a basic starting point for any diversion risk analysis.

8

BOX 3. EXAMPLES OF DIVERSION RISK INDICATORS AND QUESTIONS TO
ASK(a) The Importing State’s Requirements and its Capacity to Control Transferred
Conventional Arms
The quantities involved in the State's accumulation of conventional arms may be inconsistent with its likely
requirements, signaling a heightened danger of diversion. Moreover, if a potential importing State has
a history of conventional arms diversion or it has inadequate regulation of arms transfers due to lack of
capacity or corrupt practices, then the risk of diversion will be high and comprehensive prevention andmitigation measures will need to be put in place before authorising an export. The diversion of transferredconventional arms after delivery within the importing State can be distinguished from when imported conventional arms are re-exported in breach of re-export restrictions imposed by the exporting State or by relevant international legal obligations such as those in Article 6 of the ATT. Either form of diversion may takeplace as soon as an item has reached the point of import, but could also occur years after the initial entryof the conventional arms into the importing State. Diversion of transferred conventional arms after theirdelivery within the importing State can include cases where the imported arms are sold or given to anotherunauthorised entity in the importing State, or cases of theft or loss of the imported conventional arms,
possibly leading to illicit circulation and also to cross-border trafficking of the conventional arms. Eitherway, the diverted conventional arms end up in the hands of unauthorised or illicit end users. Assessing suchrisks of diversion within or from the importing State may require consideration of a broad range of factors.
Are the quantities of conventional arms involved in the proposed transfer inconsistent with theimporting State's likely requirements?
Is the importing State's accumulation of conventional arms greater than that required by its
legitimate defense and security interests?
Are similar conventional arms already in service in the importing State? Are they well maintained?
Are imported arms effectively managed in accordance with physical security and stockpile management standards such as those in the Modular Small-arms-control Implementation Compendium(MOSAIC) and the International Ammunition Technical Guidelines? Are there known cases of problems with the diversion of conventional arms and ammunition from national stockpiles in the importing State?
Will the imported conventional arms create or contribute to a surplus? If yes, how and when will thesurplus be safely disposed of in line with existing end-user commitments?
Is the technological level of the equipment requested proportionate to the needs expressed by theimporting State and to its operational capacity?
Does the importing State have any history of diversion of conventional arms, including the nonauthorised re-export of surplus equipment to States of concern?
Is the importing State bordering or affected by a State subject to multilateral sanctions includingarms embargoes or experiencing armed conflict, internal tensions, terrorism, organised crime, or corrupt practices that could give rise to diversion?
Is there an adequate system of laws and administrative procedures in place in the importing State toeffectively regulate the movement, storage, possession and use of the exported conventional arms?
Does the importing State apply effective transfer controls encompassing dedicated control legislation and licensing arrangements that conform to international norms and relevant international arms
control frameworks?
Does the importing State provide valid and credible end-use/end-user or retransfer assurances?

9

Has the importing State agreed to include a provision in end-use/r documentation to grant theexporting State's national authorities the right to conduct on-site inspections of transferred conventional arms after delivery as a confidence-building measure?
Are there sufficient trained personnel and infrastructural capacity in the importing State to effectively
manage the quantity of transferred arms at points of delivery and storage?
Does the importing State assist other States in conformity with its responsibilities under internationallaw by providing them with early warnings and by exchanging information regarding acts of arms
trafficking, terrorism, organised crime, and other serious crime?
Are the conventional arms intended for use in United Nations or other international peacekeeping
activity and, if so, what will be the destination of the conventional arms after participation in peacekeeping activity has ended?

(b) Risks Associated with the Type of Conventional Arms and Related Items
Different types of conventional arms pose higher or lower risks of diversion. For example, the risk of diversion would be higher if the proposed transfer appears to be of a type of conventional weapon inconsistent
with the declared end use or the inventory of the potential recipient. Risks of diversion may also be higher
if the conventional arms can be used by non-military persons or easily concealed and used for criminal
activities, such as the use of firearms and their ammunition, as well as parts and components. Therefore,
consideration could also be given to the risk of diversion for deactivated conventional arms that are notrendered inoperable and can be reactivated, or readily convertible weapons, such as acoustic expansion
weapons and alarm pistols, which can be converted from blank to live fire and thus adapted for an unintended end use. Other items, like man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), weapons with night visionequipment, and high explosives, have been identified by various States as types of materiel that are highly
sought after by terrorist networks, armed opposition groups and organised criminals and thus subject tohigher risks of diversion.
Would the exported conventional arms include sensitive technologies or parts and components that
could be analysed and diverted to develop similar equipment?
Are the proposed types of conventional arms consistent with the importing State's existing inventory? If not, is the proposed acquisition consistent with new procurement and/or mission plans forthe end user?
Are the conventional arms of a type that can be easily used by non military agents or non-State
actors?
Can the conventional arms be incorporated into other weapon or munitions systems?
Are the conventional arms easy to conceal, carry, and use in serious crime and therefore require
enhanced risk assessment and mitigation measures?
Are the conventional arms deactivated and, if so, is it permanent and irreversible so the item is rendered inoperable, or can the deactivation be reversed?
Does the potential transfer include sensitive technology or machines and materials for production
that, if diverted, would have a major impact on uncontrolled proliferation of such materiel?
If ammunition/munitions are being requested, can the importing State safely handle, store, and usethat type of material?
If components or spares are being requested, is the importing State known to operate the relevant
system that incorporates these items?

10(c) Legitimacy and Reliability of the intended End User/End Use of the Export
The competent authorities of the exporting and importing States should verify in advance of any final
authorisation whether the intended end use is lawful, and if the ultimate end user of the exported conventional arms or related items is legitimate and reliable. States should take particular care when consideringexports to recipients that are neither governments nor their authorised agents. Even if the end user is aState agency and/or company whose arms-related activities are authorised and closely regulated by theauthorities of the importing State, indications of unreliability may include a previous record of not honouring certified end-use/user documents. Reliability is also dependent on whether the end user or receiving
entity is known to have safe storage facilities and to keep comprehensive records. A previous involvementby the end user in criminal activity related to international trade, such as fraud or organised crime, or verifiable information from a United Nations or other credible authority demonstrating that the end user hasdeliberately diverted arms or related material, should be a strong signal that the risk is too high to authorize
the export.
Are the conventional arms intended for use by a government agency or an individual company, andwhat is the role of the government agency or the company?
Does the importing State provide clear, comprehensive, and verifiable end-use/end-user or retransfer assurances and clearly identify the ultimate end-user entity?
Is the documentation provided by the end user 'authentic' (i.e. the document has been checked toensure it is not a forgery or an unauthorised copy, or subject to corrupt practices)?
Have the contents of the end-user documentation been 'verified' to establish the legitimacy andcredibility of the stated end-use/r?
Have checks been conducted through diplomatic channels or consultations between the national
contact point in the competent authorities in the exporting and importing States to authenticate theend-user documentation and verify its contents?

If the end user is a government entity:
Is there any reason to suspect that the government or the specific government entity is not a reliable
end user, including any past track record of committing or facilitating acts of diversion?
Has the government and the end user honoured previous end-user certificates or other provisions
regarding the authorisation of re-export, particularly relevant non-retransfer clauses?
Would the export go to a military or police unit, or another branch of the security forces, accused in
credible reports of criminal acts?
Is there a risk that the procurement is driven by other factors than legitimate defense and domestic
security interests?

If the end user is a company:
Will the company be the final end user of the conventional arms or is it intending to trade the conventional arms?
If intending to trade the conventional arms, what onward restrictions are in place regarding purchasers, such as effective background checks and robust authorisation requirements?
Is the company registered and authorised to carry out such activities by the national authorities in
the importing State?
Are the company's activities and beneficiaries known to the national authorities in the importing State?

11

Has the company or any of its directors or owners previously been involved in undesirable transactions, negligent conduct, or been convicted for illicit arms trafficking?
Does the company keep comprehensive records of all stocks and transactions, and engage in transparent financial and banking practices?
Does the company maintain safe storage facilities and robust security procedures that are inspectedby the national authorities?

(d) Legitimacy and Reliability of the Other Entities Involved in the Proposed Export
Arms transfers may not only involve the officials of national authorities and the intended end users in an
exporting and importing State, but also involve a range of intermediaries located within and outside those
two States, including brokers and various individuals and companies who 'make the deal' and arrange thedelivery. If it is the case that the ultimate end user is not the same as the importer or intermediate consignee, then the exporting and importing State authorities should obtain the necessary details of thoseactors as well as check their reliability to handle and deliver the consignment(s). Checking the bona fides ofthese various businesses and individuals can help to determine if a transfer is legitimate or at risk of being
diverted to an unauthorised end user or use. Unfortunately, the exact role of such entities in a proposedtransfer may not always be known by the national authorities when conducting a risk assessment before authorising or denying the proposed export. Therefore, wherever possible such information should be sought
out prior to any authorisation of a transfer. Evidence of the role of some intermediaries in corrupt businesspractices with State entities dealing with conventional arms is an important indicator.
Where known at the pre-authorisation/transfer stage, do any of the contractual or financial arrangements raise concerns, for example the use of 'shell' companies whose beneficiaries are unknown?
Are the details of the exporter, brokers, shipping agent, freight forwarder, intermediate consignee,
distributor or other actors involved in the commercial arrangements all sufficiently identified and aretheir authorisations and/or registration documents as operators all authenticated?
Has the importing authority/applicant been reluctant to provide details identifying any intermediaries involved in the transfer?
Where known at the pre-authorisation/transfer stage, does the proposed physical routing of theshipment raise concerns, for example because of unreliable controls in the transit, trans-shipment orimporting locations or means of transport?
Has any actor involved in the commercial arrangements for the transaction or physical routing of theshipment, including in previous companies linked to their ownership/directorships, been formerly
convicted or accused on the basis of credible evidence for participating in conventional arms or otherillicit trafficking, or for violations of arms export legislation (including the violation of multilateralarms embargoes), or for other closely related crimes such as corruption and money laundering?

12
SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR DIVERSION RISK ASSESSMENT
The primary source of information and analysis for diversion risk assessments remains government agencies dealing
with curbing the illicit trade and diversion. These include customs, law enforcement, justice, intelligence, financial intelligence units, defence, and trade ministries. Intelligence agencies are a critical resource for information on individuals
and companies believed to be involved in illicit arms trafficking, international trends in illicit markets, foreign corrupt
practices, and information about controlled commodities sought by embargoed States, terrorist organisations and criminal networks. Diplomatic missions and other governmental institutions such as customs, police and other law enforcement services also conduct checks on entities involved in the transfer and documentation provided in support of an
application for an export or other transfer authorisation. In addition to government sources, officials also use credible
open source information, generated via multilateral organisations (for example, the reports of United Nations panels of
experts that monitor and investigate the implementation of United Nations arms embargoes) and reputable NGOs; aswell as, reliable information contained in commercial directories and specialised online resources can provide accurate,
timely and objective information on diversion risks. The diversion reference documents prepared by the sub-working
group on Article 11 indicate some of the sources of information that could be used to inform an export authority's assessment of diversion risks.
An important source of information for a diversion risk assessment is the documentation provided in support of anexport authorisation application. This can include the export application form, the import authorisation, the end-use/r
documentation, the contractual information plus any other supporting documents. As part of the export authorisation
application process in the majority of significant exporting States, government procurement agents and companies arenormally required to formally submit information on the end use/r, the intermediate and final consignee, the type, characteristics, value and quantities of the arms to be exported, reference to the contract or order number concluded withthe end user, and a relevant import authorisation from the country of final destination. Other documentation and typesof information from the parties involved in the potential transfer, including brokers and other intermediaries, also need
to be considered in the risk assessment and may have to be cross-checked with other States.
End-use/r documentation "comprises documents whose purpose is to identify, authorize, commit to certain undertakings and verify delivery". Conflict Armament Research, the Small Arms Survey, UNIDIR and the United Nations Officefor Disarmament Affairs have extensively reviewed the misuse of such documentation to divert conventional arms andammunition to unauthorised end users and uses. Therefore, while such documentation can be useful for risk assessment
purposes, the receipt of such documents on their own is insufficient for reassuring a national export licensing authoritythat diversion risks have been prevented or sufficiently mitigated to not pose a realistic danger.910

BOX 4. LIMITATIONS OF RELYING ON END-USE/R DOCUMENTATION AND
ASSURANCES TO PREVENT DIVERSION
Research into the diversion of conventional arms and ammunition has repeatedly shown that relying only on
end-use/r documentation with an official stamp and a signed assurance not to re-export the imported items toprevent diversion is insufficient for preventing diversion. Documents that have been used as a basis for issuingexport licenses have been incomplete and did not even fulfil the recommended 'essential' elements of bestpractice guidelines, or can include vague or imprecise re-export commitments.9 Unfortunately, undertakings
and assurances on re-export are not always fully understood or adhered to by end users in importing States.10
Due to negligence, ignorance, or willful disregard, such undertakings and assurances all too often prove an
ineffective measure for preventing diversion. As a result, more States Parties are including clauses in end-use/r
documentation to provide for post-delivery cooperation between the competent authorities in the exportingand importing States. As discussed below, this post-delivery measure is being developed by several major arms
exporters to ensure that end-use/r assurances by the end user are respected, thus preventing diversion andensuring the security of further supply.

9

Conflict Armament Research, 'Diversion Digest Issue 02: End-User Documentation', 2019, p. 17.

Paul Holtom, Irene Pavesi, and Christelle Rigual, 'Trade Update: Transfers, Retransfers, and the ATT', Small Arms Survey 2014: Women and Guns,
Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 117-28.
10

UNMAS and Nepalese FPU moving confiscated weapons to a safe storage, 2017.
UNMISS / flickr.com

13

EXTRACTS FROMISSUE BRIEF #3
THE ARMS TRADE TREATY:
DIVERSION ANALYSIS FRAMEWORKPURPOSE OF THE THIRD ISSUE BRIEF
The third Issue Brief from UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research and the Stimson Center,11 presents the Diversion Analysis
Framework (DAF). The Framework has been designed as an analytical tool for interested States and relevant stakeholders to enhance their ongoing efforts to prevent, detect, eradicate, and address diversion. The goal of the Framework is
to unpack the problem to facilitate its analysis, to identify weaknesses in the various stages of the life cycle of arms andammunition, and to help prioritize efforts to address the issue in each context. It is hoped that by gaining a better understanding of the problem, appropriate measures can be taken by each State to create an enabling environment to counter,not facilitate, diversion. The Framework has been envisioned with whole-of-government applicability, since addressing
diversion requires coordinated action across ministries, government departments, and agencies.
The DAF has been designed to analyse the diversion of items contained in Articles 2(1), 3, and 4 of the Arms Trade Treaty(ATT) – that is, conventional arms, ammunition, and parts and components thereof (hereinafter referred to as 'arms andrelated items'). At the same time, ATT Article 5(3) encourages each State Party to "apply the provisions of this Treaty to
the broadest range of conventional arms". Each State Party indicates the scope of items to be subject to transfer controls
in its national control list.12 The Framework can be used to analyse the diversion of items covered by national control
lists, including those that go beyond the minimum requirements of ATT Articles 2(1), 3, and 4. It has also been designed
to catalogue the broad array of factors that contribute not only to the diversion of international transfers of arms andrelated items, but at all stages in the transfer chain and life cycle of the arms and related items.

11

The Small Arms Survey was a partner in this joint research endeavor for the first two Issue Briefs.

Brian Wood and Paul Holtom, 'The Arms Trade Treaty: Measures to Prevent, Detect, Address and Eradicate the Diversion of Conventional Arms',
Issue Brief no. 2, UNIDIR with Conflict Armament Research, Small Arms Survey, and Stimson, 2020, https://unidir.org/publication/arms-trade-treatymeasures-prevent-detect-address-and-eradicate-diversion-conventional.
12

14

THE INTERPLAY OF THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE
DIVERSION ANALYSIS FRAMEWORKThe DAF is composed of the interplay between four elements and their subcategories. These elements and subcategories should not be understood as mutually exclusive because diversion incidents can incorporate, and usually do,
a combination of several elements in one event. These four key elements can be described in more detail as follows:
Diversion-enabling factors are circumstances that create an environment that is conducive to diversion. These factors facilitate or exacerbate diversion. These factors are interwoven throughout the transfer chain and the life cycleof arms and related items and can accumulate to aggravate existing risks. The diversion-enabling factors are what
facilitates diversion.
The diversion-enabling factors include aspects of the environment such as dysfunctional systems and institutions, aswell as devious and opportunistic tactics. The diversion-enabling factors include systemic conditions and practicaltactics that can be present throughout all stages in the transfer chain and the life cycle of arms and related items.
The diversion-enabling factors aid the methods used at the points of diversion by unauthorised actors to divert arms
and related items.
Points of diversion refer to the stages throughout the transfer chain and the life cycle of arms and related items
at which diversion can happen. These can also be understood as points of susceptibility where diversion happens.
Methods used at the points of diversion are the means by which acts of diversion are carried out, given the presence of certain diversion-enabling factors. These actions refer to specific methods of how diversion takes place at the
points of diversion. Some methods only apply to one point of diversion, whereas others can be used at different
points of diversion.
Actors refer to the natural or legal persons that play a role in planning and/or carrying out a diversion of arms andrelated items. The actors exercise agency in the process of diversion and represent the who behind such incidents.
The complete DAF is presented in the following table. Diversion is a complex phenomenon, and the Framework underlines this complexity – even while trying to unpack the interplay between these elements to make it easier to understand.

LIFECYCLE OF ARMS AND RELATED ITEMSDIVERSION
DURING
TRANSFER

3

4

DIVERSIONFROM STOCKPILES(STATE-OWNEDAND PRIVATE)

DIVERSION
DURING ACTIVE
USE AND
DEPLOYMENT

1B Illicit removal;
distribution;
overproduction;
and/orunauthorized
production byinternal actors

2B Rerouting and/or
misappropriation
by boat/ship

3B Illicit removal byinternal actors

4B Defection/
Desertion

3C Loss throughnegligence instockpile security

4C Surrender

2C Rerouting and/or
misappropriation
by groundtransportation

DIVERSION BY
UNAUTHORIZEDCROSS-BORDER
MOVEMENT

5A Legacy arms

6A ‘Ant’ trade

5B Illicit
recirculation of
conflict arms
and ammunition

6B Drop-off points or‘drop shipping’

6C Postal shipments
5C Changes inlegislation

6D Large shipments

4D Abandonment
3D Unauthorizedtransfer/sale/trade/gift

3E Rental fromthe authorized
holder

4E Violent capture
4F Unauthorizedtransfer/sale/trade/gift
4G Rental from theauthorized end
user

GOVERNMENT ACTORSPRIVATE ACTORSNON-STATE ARMED GROUPS (NSAGs)

6E Inadvertentchange ofjurisdiction

DIVERSION ENABALING FACTORS

3A Theft and violent
capture byexternal actors

DIVERSIONBY NONREGULARIZATION
AND THROUGHGAPS IN
NATIONAL
CONTROLSDECEPTION

2A Rerouting and/or
misappropriationby plane/aircraft

6

INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES AND FAILURE

4A Loss throughnegligence during
active deployment

1A Theft and violent
capture byexternal actors

5

ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

ACTORS

DIVERSION FROMMANUFACTURER

2TECHNOLOGIESMETHODS USED AT THE POINTS OF DIVERSIONPOINTS OF
DIVERSION

1

16

GUIDANCE ON HOW TO USE THE DIVERSIONANALYSIS FRAMEWORKThe DAF can be used to monitor and to analyse the complex dynamics that underpin the diversion of international transfers of conventional arms, including those already transferred, to support implementation of ATT Article 11. It can also
support efforts to understand better the diversion of ammunition and other items contained in national control lists. It is
intended as a resource to find tailored solutions to prevent, detect, eradicate, and address diversion of arms and related
items, both in conflict and in non-conflict settings. Finally, the Framework can also serve as a vehicle to promote dialogue
on the lessons learned on diversion monitoring and prevention at the national, regional, and international levels. Suggestions for utilising the DAF include:

FOR ATT STATES PARTIESStates Parties to the ATT and other relevant multilateral processes and bodies could discuss the adaptation, adoption, or use of the DAF, or certain elements thereof, to enhance diversion monitoring and diagnostics, as well as topromote multilateral dialogue on the problem of diversion.
States Parties to the ATT could use the DAF to structure reporting and to standardize the data shared on the Diversion Information Exchange Forum. Sharing standardised data on detected cases of diversion will facilitate reporting,analysis, and the generation of lessons learned.

FOR ALL MEMBER STATESStates may adapt the DAF to their national context and use it as the basis for a national checklist to systematically
document diversion cases. The Framework can provide a useful starting point for States to monitor context-specificdynamics observed at the local, national, or regional levels. This can provide a quantitative overview of the morerecurrent elements behind documented cases of diversion and facilitate a context-sensitive analysis.
States could consider using the DAF to analyse and to disaggregate documented diversion cases and to observe
which counter-diversion measures could be more effective based on the recurrence of diversion-enabling factors,
points of diversion, methods used at the points of diversion, and actors identified. Specific counter-diversion strategies could be targeted according to a national analysis of findings. The dynamic nature of diversion underscores
the importance of a whole-of-government prevention strategy to combat diversion and the need for consistentmonitoring and established feedback loops.
Further, as the DAF can help catalogue diversion incidents into various categories, States could consider sharing, whenappropriate and necessary, the counter-diversion measures that seem most effective in mitigating identified risks.
All States may use the DAF to assist in information-gathering and data collection to inform future transfer risk assessments.
States could also use the DAF to structure the provision of information to sanctions committees and panels of experts on United Nations arms embargo violations. The use of a standardised approach for sharing material on suchcases could facilitate the preparation of Implementation Assistance Notices that provide guidance on diversion andembargo evasion patterns and risk indicators.

17
FOR ALL INTERESTED ORGANISATIONS
All interested organisations could use the classification in the Framework to unpack systematically the documented
cases of diversion and to determine the most recurrent points of diversion and weak points for each stage in thetransfer chain and life cycle of arms and related items. The classification in the Framework provides a structure to
document the specific dynamics that lead to diverted arms and related items. An analysis of documented cases could
produce quantitative results indicating the more common ways in which diversion occurs in a particular setting.
United Nations agencies, regional organisations, research institutions, and specialised organisations could consider
using the DAF as the basis for case studies to clearly map the scale and scope of diversion and vulnerabilities in
specific contexts. In particular, bodies responsible for sanctions monitoring, as well as entities working on weapons
and ammunition management across the transfer chain and during the full life cycle of arms and related items, could
benefit from the common language and framework of analysis that this document provides and undertake targeted
analysis on diversion to support States.
Interested parties are encouraged to contact UNIDIR to discuss ways to use the DAF, share results after using it,
and suggest updates, edits, or corrections, on a voluntary basis, at the following email address: cap-unidir@un.org.

EXTRACTS FROM
THE IMPACT REPORTTHE ARMS TRADE TREATY:ASSESSING ITS IMPACT ON
COUNTERING DIVERSIONEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Under Article 11 of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), States Parties have an obligation to prevent diversion in conventionalarms transfers. This report presents findings from the testing of a new voluntary Tool developed to assist interested States
Parties in analysing their enabling environment for preventing diversion, covering measures across all stages of the arms
transfer chain. Therefore, this report provides an initial assessment of the impact of the ATT on measures taken by a sample of eight ATT States Parties. The report makes two contributions: First, it highlights the impact of the ATT on the implementation of counter-diversion measures across the arms transfer chain, showing an overall significant strengthening ofStates Parties' enabling environments. Second, it validates the Counter-Diversion Assessment Tool and demonstrates its
usefulness for identifying gaps and effective measures for preventing diversion in a comprehensive manner.
ATT Article 11 requires every State Party involved in the international transfer of conventional arms to take measures toprevent, detect, and address the diversion of conventional arms at every stage in the transfer chain. Previous research has
identified a comprehensive list of diversion risk factors. The Counter-Diversion Assessment Tool developed for this study
compiles a list of indicative measures corresponding to these risk factors that have a direct relationship to ATT provisions
for the prevention of diversion, encompassing unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral systemic and practical measures. Eachset of measures is accompanied by a list of questions facilitating the assessment of the existence and efficacy of an enabling environment for preventing diversion in each State Party using the Tool.

Unloading weaponry cargo. Israel Defense Forces

18

19

BOX 3. SUMMARY OF SYSTEMIC AND PRACTICAL MEASURES TO
COUNTER DIVERSION
Systemic Measures Related to National Control Systems
National legislation, regulations, administrative procedures on all aspects of the arms transfer chain
National inter-agency cooperation and communication
National licensing system
Systems for information-sharing with other States bilaterally and through multilateral organisations
End-use/user and delivery notification systems and elements
Criminalisation and penalties applicable to deliberate and reckless acts of diversion
Detection and prosecution systems
Outreach and training systems for key stakeholders
Corporate auditing and internal compliance programmes
Public awareness programmes

Practical Measures
For Pre-TransferStage
Prevention measures including risk mitigation measures
Use of diversion risk indicators in licence approvals
Inter-agency and inter-State information sharing
Pre-shipment physical inspections
Consultations with industry

For In-Transfer Stage
Prevention and risk mitigation measures for transit and trans-shipment
Customs notifications and clearance procedures
Additional safeguards such as security escorts, satellite tracking

For Delivery and Post-Delivery Stage
Arrival inspections and delivery notifications systems
Safe and secure storage systems
Post-delivery cooperation

30

ANNEX 1. THE COUNTER-DIVERSION ASSESSMENT TOOLALL STAGES OF TRANSFER
DIVERSION RISKUSE OF DECEPTIVE METHODS▌

Fraudulent use of documentation▌

Use of front companies▌

Illicit brokering activity▌

Physical alteration of items▌

Participation in organized crime▌

Smuggling, including by postal and courierdeliveries▌

Illegal acquisition and sales, includingbyInternet transaction

KEY QUESTIONS
Q1. Is theft or the use of fraud, deception, corruption, violence or any othermethod of rerouting or misappropriation of arms listed as an aggravatedcriminal offence subject to severe criminal sanctions? If so, what sanctions
are applicable?
Q2. Is it also a criminal offence to engage in arms exports, imports or brokering activities without a licence or official authorization, or to do so in amanner that is in contradiction to the terms of a licence or authorization?
If so, what sanctions?
Q3. Does your national system provide for mutual legal assistance in regard
to investigations, prosecutions, and judicial proceedings for the activities
mentioned in questions 1 and 2? (If yes, what / how?)Q5. Does your State allow for sharing with other States such information
as the disbarment of traders and brokers and the revocation of theirregistration?
Q6. Does your State allow for sharing with other States information on illicit
activities including, international trafficking routes, illicit brokers, sourcesof illicit supply, methods of concealment, common points of dispatch, or
destinations used by organized groups engaged in diversion?
Q7. Does your State require any of the following actors to be registered and/or screened on a regular basis before they can engage in the international arms trade?

Q4. Are bilateral and multilateral information-sharing approaches used toprevent the use of deceptive methods? (If yes, what / how)a.

Manufacturers and assemblersb.

Dealers and wholesalersc.

Brokers and agentsd.

Transport service providerse.

Legal advisors

References: ATT Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 11, 12, 13, 14, 15(4), 15(5); UN Firearms Protocol Articles 5, 6, 10, 11, 12; ITI in particular, paragraphs 14 to 21, 24, 25, 31, 33 and 35.

SYSTEMIC
PRACTICALPREVENTION MEASURES*

UNILATERALBILATERAL

MULTILATERALThe State has established in law criminal offences and penalties
applicable to deliberate and reckless acts of diversion, including
the reactivation and conversion of firearms and other arms.

The State has established bilateral arrangements for informationexchanges on export, import, transit and brokering to prevent
deception.

The State is a party to relevant international and regional
agreements on arms transfers including transnational crime andcorruption conventions.

National control systems to detect, trace and prosecute illicit arms
trade activities and illicit arms have been established.

Mutual legal assistance agreements have been established.

The State has adopted legislation and established administrative
systems to implement the above relevant multilateral agreements
and standards.

Law enforcement agencies and the national licensing authority
conduct monitoring, detection, tracing and prosecution.

Bilateral checks have been made with the transferring State toverify arms transfer documents.

The State has examined diverted shipments of such conventionalarms and taken follow-up measures through investigation and law
enforcement.

If a diversion has been detected the State has alerted potentiallyaffected States and endeavoured to jointly trace the arms todiscover points of diversion and take corrective action.

The State has actively participated in the ATT CSP and working
groups, as well as other international and regional standardsetting processes on arms transfers to prevent diversion.
The State has reported in such forums on the measures it has
taken to prevent diversion.

The State has organized outreach and provides training systems
for key stakeholders involved in arms transfers to prevent incidents
of diversion.

* These prevention and other indicative measures include risk mitigation, monitoring, detection, reporting and information-sharing measures are contained in Article 11 and related provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty

DIVERSION RISKKEY QUESTIONSDIVERSION FROM INSTITUTIONAL WEAKNESSES

Q8. What types of conventional arms, if any, are not included in yournational control list?

▌

Grey areas and ineffective regulation of financial systems▌

Downsizing/dissolution/re-organization of
security forces

Q9. Are any of the activities listed below not regulated under national
legislation?
a.

Manufacture and assembly
Brokering of transactions▌

Government-sponsored unauthorized transfer or re-transferb.

▌Widespread and systematic corruptionc.

Pre-export preparation of cargo▌

Fragmentation of State institutionsd.

Shipment, transit and trans-shipmente.

Import delivery unloading, warehousing and local transportf.

End-use/user operations and stockpiles

Q10. Does the national authority have a system to assess the natureof any institutional risks of diversion such as corrupt practices,
organized crime and lack of parliamentary oversight of procurement, and, if applicable, does the authority consider what
available mitigation measures may help to reduce those risks toan absolute minimum?

SYSTEMIC
PRACTICALPREVENTION MEASURES

References: ATT Preambular Principles and Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15 and 16, especially 5(2), 6(1), 6(2), 6(3), 7(1), 7(5), 7(6), 7(7), 8(1), 8(3), 9, 10, 15(4) and 16(2); UN
Firearms Protocol Articles 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.

UNILATERALBILATERAL

MULTILATERALThe government has taken active measures to uphold the rule oflaw and democratic accountability according to the constitution
and is accountable to parliament.

When the State considers a potential transfer of arms thenational authority has a system of licensing to first assess thenature of any institutional risks of diversion and, if applicable, theauthority considers what available mitigation measures may help
to reduce those risks to an absolute minimum, e g: confidencebuilding measures or jointly developed and agreed programmesby the exporting and importing States; requiring additional
documentation, certificates, or assurances; or not authorizing thetransfer.

The State is a party to the ATT and other relevant international andregional agreements on arms transfers.

The State engages in bilateral information sharing on arms control.

The State actively participates in the ATT CSP process and otherrelevant international and regional standards to prevent thediversion of arms.

National legislation, regulations and administrative procedures
have been established and maintained on all aspects of the arms
transfer chain—import, export, transit, trans-shipment, brokeringand stockpiles/holdings.

The legislature is kept informed of national arms procurement andthe procedures to ensure the rule of law.
National inter-agency cooperation and communication on arms
transfer policies and standards have been discussed in parliament.
Public awareness programmes on the dangers of illicit arms
trafficking and dealing have been conducted.

The State has cooperated bilaterally in anti-corruption, antimoney laundering and security sector reforms according tointernational standards.

The State's agreements on arms transfers include transnational
crime, corruption and counter-terrorism conventions.
The State adopts legislation and establishes administrative systems
to implement the above relevant multilateral agreements andstandards.

The State engages in, or supports, multilateral assistanceprogrammes with United Nations and other multilateral andregional organizations to strengthen arms transfer controls andmanagement, e.g. security sector reforms, which reduce the risksof diversion.

PRE-TRANSFER STAGE
DIVERSION RISKDIVERSION FROM MANUFACTURING
OR ASSEMBLING FIRM▌

Illicit removal▌

Unauthorized distribution▌

Deliberate overproduction and/or unauthorized production byinternal actors▌

KEY QUESTIONS
Q11. Does your State require manufacturing and assembling companies to mark each item (whether a military weapon, other armament or munition) when it is manufactured? Are all manufacturers
required to keep records of the unique markings when each item
is sold, moved or otherwise transferred from the plant site?
Q12. Does your State enforce measures to prevent the manufacture,stockpiling, transfer and possession of any unmarked or inadequately marked arms, in particular SALW?

Theft and violent capture by external actors

Q13. Does your State require any of the following actors to be registered and/or screened on a regular basis before they can engage
in the international arms trade?
a.

Directors of all such companiesb.

Senior managersc.

Techniciansd.

On-site supervisors and dispatcherse.

On-site loaders and guards?

Q14. Does your State license the export and/or import of parts andcomponents in a form capable of assembly into a conventionalarm?
References: ATT Articles 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15(4), 15(5); UN Firearms Protocol Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 11 and 12; ITI paragraphs 7 to 13.

SYSTEMIC
PRACTICALPREVENTION MEASURESUNILATERALBILATERAL

MULTILATERAL

Establish in national regulations and maintain specific registration,
record-keeping, reporting and inspection requirements for all arms
manufacturing and assembly companies, plants and sites.

Bilaterally encourage States to establish national regulations.

Encourage the affected State to implement relevant standards
devised by the Wassenaar Arrangement and in the MOSAIC
modules.

Carry out official inspections of record-keeping and inventories.

Promote the sharing of information regarding illicit activities andactors in order to prevent and eradicate diversion.

Report to other States Parties, through the Secretariat, information
on measures taken that have been proven effective in addressing
the diversion of transferred conventional arms.

Actively encourage corporate auditing and internal complianceprogrammes.
Establish regular outreach and consultations with industry.
Encourage firms to screen for potential diversion risks relating totheir customers, such as particular destinations, end users and end
uses.

DIVERSION RISKINADEQUATE TRANSFER RISK ASSESSMENT▌

Gaps in diversion risk criteria▌

Export risks not considered▌

End-use/users not verified▌

Suspicious brokering not checked▌Documents not authenticated

KEY QUESTIONS
Q15. What risk factors do your national authority consider in order to prevent the diversion of an export orimport before an export or import licence can be issued? Do the risk factors include the following?

Q17. What steps are taken to check the reliability of proposed end users and entities involved in arms
transfers and the authenticity of end-use/user documents? Are these procedures consistent withinternational good practice standards regarding certification and authentication of such documents,and verification of end use/users?

a.

Known cases of diversion in the importing country or by its agents or dealersb.

Transfers involving countries bordering or trading with a country whose State and/or armed
groups are subject to United Nations or other international sanctionsc.

Excessive quantities being ordereda.

Issued in standardized written form that minimizes opportunity for fraud?

d.

Types of arms not in service with the importing or exporting countryb.

Having a limited date of expiry?

e.

The arms transfer regulatory system is known to be inadequate or to lack capacityc.

f.

The proposed route for the transfer is circuitous or the shipping method is unusual

Having a detailed description of the items to be transferred, their origin, quantity, weight andvalue?

g.

A credible system of verifying end use/end user and re-transfer assurancesd.

h.

The right to conduct on-site inspections and post-shipment verification for sensitive items

Having all the names and full addresses of the contract holders, the consignee, the consignor, anyintermediaries or agents involved, and the proposed route and means of delivery?

i.

Relevant information regarding acts of diversion has not been exchangedj.

An effective policy and practice of disposing of surplus arms

Q18. Are such authorizations in each case:

Q19. Does your State require a licence or a specific written authorization, in each case:

Q16. Do transfer assessments take into account whether the transfer would contribute to a potentially destabilizing accumulation of conventional weapons, taking into account regional stability; the political,
economic, and military status of the prospective importing State; and its record of compliance withtransfer controls?

a.

For all exports of arms and related items?

b.

For all imports of arms and related items?

c.

For all transits and/or trans-shipments of arms and related items?

d.

For all brokering activities?

References: ATT Articles 5, 6, 7, 11, 13(2), 15(4) and 15(6); UN Firearms Protocol Articles 10, 11, 12. (See also UNIDIR Issue Brief 2 – pp. 21-26 list of risk indicators which draw upon multilateral guidelines)

UNILATERALSYSTEMIC
PRACTICALPREVENTION MEASURES

National arms trade licensing systems are established with specific diversion risk indicators
to assess licence approvals.

BILATERAL

Bilateral procedures are established for the exchange
of information on risks of diversion.

The State is a party to the ATT and other internationaland regional arms transfer control regimes that
require diversion risk assessments and risk mitigation
measures for exports and other transfers, as well as thesubmission of regular reports to multilateral bodies on
its arms transfer and trade activities.

In sensitive cases, or in the event of diversion, bilateralagreements allow for on-site inspections by the
supplier State.

Standards for the authorization of arms transfers
are consistent with the ATT or similar multilateralagreements and arrangements.

Inter-agency risk assessments are carried out routinely by specialized officials before alldecisions on arms transfers are made using sources of reliable information.

Bilateral information-sharing on diversion may include
information on:

Diversion risk checks are made on the effectiveness of:▌Illicit activities including corruption;▌

End-user and end-use controls in the importing State;▌

International trafficking routes;▌

The reliability of agents, businesses, intermediaries and service providers involved in thetransfer;▌

Illicit brokers and sources of illicit supply;▌

Methods of concealment; andThe State actively participates in the ATT and otherinternational and regional control regimes, including
the PoA, Organized Crime Convention, Convention
against Corruption and counter-terrorism treaties, andcooperates in sharing relevant information with otherStates on effective measures to reduce the risks ofdiversion.

▌

The security of the shipping arrangements; and▌▌The procedures for stockpile management and security in the importing State.

Common points of dispatch, and destinations usedby organized groups engaged in diversion.

Effective regulations on arms export, import, transit, trans-shipment and brokering are
established according to relevant international standards.

Extra diversion risk checks are made if the end-user's country is not the same as the buyer
or initial importer's country.
Cases of diversion are analyzed and where possible are prosecuted by the national
authorities.

Bilateral standards and procedures are agreed forauthentication and verification of end-use/user
documentation and monitoring.

MULTILATERALDIVERSION RISKFAILURE OF PRE-SHIPMENT CHECKS▌

Illegal delivery route▌Arms cargo ready for shipment does not match documentation▌

Planned shipment route is unnecessarily circuitous▌Concealed compartments in shipping containers or vehicles▌

Organisers of shipment include known traffickers on watch list

KEY QUESTIONS
Q20. Has your State established inter-agency cooperation for the reciprocal authorization of arms and ammunition transfers between therespective licensing agencies and customs agencies?
Q21. Does your national authority cooperate with national authorities engaged in the transfer of arms and ammunition and supply
advanced notification to those authorities on the route of suchtransfers?
Q22. Do your national authorities deploy technologies such as X-ray
machinery at ports of departure for the prevention and detection ofincidents of diversion?

Q23. Does your State register businesses involved in the arms trade as"approved economic operators" (AEO) according to the World Customs Organization's best practice standards, and what safeguards
are in place when AEOs are given permission to undertake certain
customs clearance procedures?
Q24. Do your customs and other law enforcement agencies conduct
risk profiling for arms and ammunition shipments to help detect
diversion and trafficking incidents?

References: ATT Article 7(5), 7(6), 8, 9, 10, 11,14, 15, 16; UN Firearms Protocol Article 10; Organisation for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Handbook of Best Practices on
Small Arms and Light Weapons, Chapter 5; WCO Safe Framework of Standards; UN Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Sea, Air, Road and Waterways transport.

SYSTEMIC
PRACTICALPREVENTION MEASURESUNILATERALThe State has established and maintained a customs agency
and border police force with appropriate training and capacity
to undertake physical inspections at points of export, transit
and import, specifically to cross-check pre-shipment items with
documentation and determine if any arms are unmarked, and to
notify the receiving customs agency of sensitive consignments.
National procedures are established so that the standard cargo
manifest can be checked by customs, as a norm, against therelevant export licence and initial end-use/user certificate to which
it refers, reporting to the relevant national licensing authorities.
The authorities have taken steps to ensure the security ofinternational arms shipments in circumstances where routes andmethods warrant additional measures and safeguards due to theincreased risks of diversion and abuse of the arms, e.g.:▌

Sensitive nature of arms and munitions;▌

Deliveries to private entities;▌

Danger of unauthorized onward shipment;▌

Deliveries by circuitous routes; and▌Mediated by unregistered/unlicenced intermediaries.

The government has provided X-ray and other means to checkthat contents of consignments match shipping documents.

BILATERALThe State has established procedures to check bilaterally:

MULTILATERALThe State has made a commitment to implement the International
Tracing Instrument and the SAFE Framework of Standards
regarding the movement of goods.

▌

If any additional security measures are required and how thiswill be implemented; and▌If simplified procedures for the temporary import and export
and the transit apply, e.g.: for firearms, their parts and components and ammunition for verifiable lawful purposes such as
hunting, sport shooting, evaluation, exhibitions or repairs.

The government has established and trained personnel to ensure
the implementation of those standards by customs and bordercontrol authorities.

Bilateral sharing of information is conducted so the authorities attransit or trans-shipping ports and airports, including where there
is a free-trade zone or bonded warehouse, are notified in advanceto provide extra security for certain cargoes, and open the cargo ifthey receive such order by law enforcement authorities.

Customs administrations along the supply chain consider
customs-to-customs data exchange, in particular for high-risk
consignments, to support risk assessment and facilitate release;such an electronic messaging system could include the exchange
of notifications about the export transaction, including the control
results, as well as a corresponding arrival notification.

Law enforcement personnel are trained, and secondment andexchange of staff is considered to implement and contribute to therecommendations of the Organized Crime Convention.

IN-TRANSFER STAGE
DIVERSION RISKKEY QUESTIONSDIVERSION DURING SHIPMENT

Q25. What regulations and procedures does your State have to address arms diversion
in road, air and maritime/waterways transport, in particular of SALW and related
ammunition/munitions, to destinations or entities subject to United Nations arms
embargoes?

▌

Falsifying transport documentation▌

Plane/aircraft▌

Concealing actual flight plans, routes, and destinations▌

Boat/ship▌

Turning off transponders▌

Ground transportation▌

Falsifying aircraft registrations▌

Quickly changing registration numbers and vessel names
or national flag registries

PRACTICALSYSTEMIC

Use of deceptive methods en route by:

PREVENTION MEASURES

Rerouting and/or misappropriation of cargo in transit ortrans-shipment by:

Q26. Do your authorities deploy armed guards or use satellite tracking systems for the
shipment of sensitive arms consignments and how routine is this procedure?

References: ATT Articles 5, 8, 9, 10, 11; UN Firearms Protocol Articles 11 and 12; UN Regulations for
the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Sea, Air, Road and Waterways transport; WCO SAFE Framework.

UNILATERALBILATERAL

MULTILATERALLegislation and regulations for customs notifications and clearance
procedures have been established.

Bilateral arrangements for the transport of arms shipments havebeen made to prevent diversion en route, including to mitigate
diversion during transit and trans-shipment involving more than
one vessel for the consignment.

The State implements the regulations and provisions of theConvention on International Civil Aviation and the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea, as well as standards agreed
by the World Customs Organization, the International Labour
Organization, and the International Maritime Organization,
including the International Convention for the Safety of Life atSea, chapter VII on "Carriage of Dangerous Goods" and chapter
XI-2 on "Special Measures to Enhance Maritime Security", theInternational Ship and Port Facility Security Code, and the IMO/ILO
Code of Practice on Security in Ports.

The national authorities have agreed additional safeguards
bilaterally such as special vehicles, security escorts, satellite
tracking and physical checks in transit, especially for more sensitive
cargoes and potentially vulnerable routes and ports.

The State participates regularly in deliberations of the World
Customs Organization's SAFE Framework of Standards to Secureand Facilitate Global Trade, and its national officials participate inWorld Customs Organization training programmes.

Prior registration is required for freight forwarders, shipping
agents and transport companies that provide arms transfer
services. The details of their registration are included along withother intermediaries in export application procedures.
National regulations ensure that customs authorities have accessto basic documents such as export and import licences, bills of
lading, airway bills and cargo manifests, either electronically or in
hard copy.

Initiate government-backed awareness programmes to encourage
relevant private and public sector actors dealing with arms
shipments to alert the authorities to possible diversion of
consignments.

DIVERSION RISKUNAUTHORISED CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENTS

Drop-off points▌

Postal shipments▌

Large shipments▌

Inadvertent change of jurisdiction

PRACTICALSYSTEMIC

Ant trade▌

PREVENTION MEASURES▌KEY QUESTIONS
Q27. Does your State use the lists of risk indicators for border controls
issued by the World Customs Organization and INTERPOL?

Q28. Has your State made agreements with neighbouring States tocooperate on eradicating illicit cross-border movements of arms,
including the apprehension and prosecution of offenders?

References: ATT Articles 11, 14; UN Firearms Protocol Articles 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12; WCO list of border control risk indicators; INTERPOL guidance.

UNILATERALBILATERAL

MULTILATERALNational procedures are established for customs and other law
enforcement agencies to address risks of arms, especially firearms
and ammunition, illegally crossing an international border. The
procedures address:

The State has negotiated and agreed bilateral arrangements withneighbouring States for cross-border law enforcement and air,road, waterway and maritime cooperation.

The State consults regional and other partner States about crossborder agreements and changes in legislation that will affectcross-border cooperation.

The State has agreements with neighbouring States to conductmutually beneficial law enforcement operations, including
procedures for hot pursuit of arms traffickers and groups.

The State participates in World Customs Organization and
INTERPOL deliberations regarding standards for cross-bordercooperation in law enforcement.

Work bilaterally with neighbouring States to create awareness ofthe dangers among local communities along porous borders andensure their cooperation

Use the lists of risk indicators for border controls issued by theWorld Customs Organization and INTERPOL.

▌

Risk areas—those border control procedures and categories ofinternational trade which present a risk;▌

Risk indicators—specific criteria which, when taken together,can be used to identify high-risk individuals, companies ortransports and transporters;▌

Risk management—systematic application of management
procedures to identify, analyse, assess and take enforcement
action against risks; and▌Risk profiling—identifying individuals, organizations, transporters and goods which match a profile that indicates thepossibility of illegal activity.

Provide customs and other law enforcement officials with risk
indicators and appropriate training, including for outreach work
among key stakeholders.

DELIVERY AND POST-DELIVERY STAGE
DIVERSION RISKDIVERSION AT POINTS OF DELIVERY▌

Theft in unloading▌

Unexplained loss▌

Import becomes unauthorized transit or trans-shipment▌

Inadequate port authority and customs procedures▌

Insecure warehousing at port

KEY QUESTIONS
Q29. Does your State's customs authorities have a sufficient presence atall ports of entry and exit, or at the designated ports of entry forconsignments of arms and ammunition?
Q30. Do your competent national authorities verify the end user andprepare and sign a delivery verification certificate (DVC) or comparable documentation which is shared with the national authoritiesof the country of origin or export of the arms and ammunition?

Q31. Are there safe and secure storage facilities at all places of arrival
in ports and at the premises of the final end user in your country,
including routine record-keeping, inventory management andaccounting for the items stored and released?

SYSTEMIC
PRACTICALPREVENTION MEASURES

References: ATT Articles 8, 11(3), 11(4), 11(5), 11(6), 12, 13, 14, 15; Firearms Protocol Articles 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12; UN Regulations for the Transport of Dangerous Goods by
Sea, Air, Road and Waterways transport.

UNILATERALBILATERAL

MULTILATERALThe State has established national laws and regulations to ensure:

The State has agreed bilaterally the arms transfer procedures for:▌▌

Import certificates;▌

Shipment notifications to receiving and transit States;

The State consults regional and other partner States about crossborder agreements and changes in legislation that will affectcross-border cooperation.

▌

Arrival unloading and inspection procedures; and▌Delivery verification systems for consignees.

On-arrival inspections at ports, border controls, transit andtrans-shipment customs procedures and delivery verification
notifications;▌

Safe and secure storage at arrival in ports and at the premisesof the end user, including record-keeping as part of inventory
management and accounting; and▌The security of stockpiles that are in transit and trans-shipment.

The authorities routinely screen candidates and train customs andport officials.
Sufficient numbers of staff are employed and closely supervised tocover all ports of entry and customs warehousing.

The State participates in World Customs Organization and
INTERPOL deliberations regarding standards for cross-bordercooperation in law enforcement.

Bilateral arrangements are in place, such as prior notifications,profiling and spot checks, to give special attention to port
procedures involving transits and trans-shipments in free-tradezones.
Undertake bilateral measures for:▌Post-delivery cooperation to ensure mitigation measures andassurances remain in place; and▌Detecting and investigating diversion of transferred conventional arms.

The authorities exchange information according to the provisions
in the ATT on national points of contact for end-user andend-use control, and according to the tracing provisions in theInternational Tracing Instrument and Firearms Protocol, and otherrelevant instruments.

DIVERSION RISKDIVERSION FROM NATIONAL STOCKPILES

Illicit removal by internal actors▌

Unexplained loss▌

Unauthorized transfer▌

Sale, trade or gift▌

Rental by the authorized holder▌

Failure to destroy or render permanently inoperable
surplus arms

PRACTICALSYSTEMIC

Theft and violent capture by external actors▌

PREVENTION MEASURES▌KEY QUESTIONS
Q32. Does your State have designated national authorities responsible
for overseeing and monitoring the application and the review ofexisting security regulations and procedures that apply to Stateheld weapons?

Q34. Does your State have established measures for monitoring anddiagnosing the diversion of weapons from stockpiles?
Q35. Does your State have established procedures for reporting andinvestigating weapons diverted from stockpiles?

Q33. Does your State have designated national authorities responsible
for conducting risk and needs assessments of storage locations?
Describe what elements are considered as part of this risk
assessment.

References: ATT Articles 11, 14, 16; UN Firearms Protocol Articles 7, 8, 11 and 12; International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG); Wassenaar Arrangement; Modular Small
Arms Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) modules on stockpile security and regulation of civilian possession; UNIDIR Reference Methodology for national WAM Baseline
Assessments.

UNILATERALBILATERAL

MULTILATERALThe State has established national regulations for safe and securestorage systems for transferred arms by State armed forces andlaw enforcement agencies, as well as private actors.

Bilateral arrangements with neighbouring States have been
established to alert each other if arms or ammunition is diverted
from national stockpiles, with provisions to cooperate on tracing
the items, and conducting investigations and prosecutions.

The State actively contributes to the implementation of theinternational standards on stockpile safety and security, including
the International Tracing Instrument, the International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines and the MOSAIC modules.

The authorities alert the State of origin of the arms andammunition and, if applicable, the neighbouring States and Statesof transit or trans-shipment, concerning each instance of diversion
from national stockpiles and where appropriate initiate a formal
tracing request.

The State shares information and discusses tools and existing
standards regarding the safe and effective disposal of surplus
arms, with a view to identifying good practices, including
certificates of irreversible deactivations which can supplement
existing records and the requirement that deactivation isundertaken and verified by authorized entities only.

The State has taken active steps to ensure that adequate marking,record-keeping, inventory management and accounting control
measures are in place.
The national authorities regularly assess the State's security
requirements for national stockpiles held by armed forces, police,or any other body authorized to hold arms; stocks that no longer
meet operational needs are safely disposed of, preferably throughdestruction in accordance with international norms and standards.
Other measures taken include:▌

Inventory management and accounting;▌

Storing records of transactions made by all departments with asingle, central authority;▌

Controlling access to stockpiles including by physical means
such as fencing and locking systems; and▌Strict screening and appropriate training of staff in safe andsecure stockpile management procedures.

DIVERSION RISKDIVERSION DURING ACTIVE USE
AND DEPLOYMENTDefection▌

Surrender▌

Abandonment▌

Violent capture▌

Unauthorized transfer, sale, trade or gift▌

Rental by the end user

PRACTICALSYSTEMIC

Loss▌

PREVENTION MEASURES▌KEY QUESTIONS
Q36. Is the management of arms by personnel in the armed forces andin the law enforcement agencies subject to strict legislation, administrative procedures and practical training consistent with international standards regarding official management and uses of arms,
including under treaties on transnational crime and on international
humanitarian and human rights treaty obligations?

Q38. Which government agency is responsible for responding to a tracing request from another State?
Q39. Does your State have procedures in place to ensure that the confidentiality of such information is guaranteed?

Q37. Do your national authorities share appropriate information about
diversion during active use and deployment with the exporting
State? Is such sharing done proactively or only when handling information related to arms as a result of your State's tracing request?

References: ATT Articles 7(4), 11, 12, 14 and 15; UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials.

UNILATERALBILATERAL

MULTILATERALNational legislation and regulations cover the handling and use ofarms by:Bilateral arrangements with neighbouring States have been
established to alert each other if arms or ammunition is diverted
from national stockpiles, with provisions to cooperate on tracing
the items, and conducting investigations and prosecutions.

The State actively contributes to the implementation of theinternational standards on stockpile safety and security, including
the International Tracing Instrument, the International Ammunition
Technical Guidelines and the MOSAIC modules.

The national law enforcement authorities investigate incidents ofdiversion during active use and deployment by members of thearmed forces and police.

The State participates in one or more multilateral efforts toimprove the management of weapons and munitions, including
through United Nations peacekeeping activities as well as other
United Nations and multilateral assistance programmes for arms
management in the security sector.

▌

Government actors: armed forces; former State officials; internal security forces; customs licensing authority; intelligenceagencies▌

Private actors: individual holders of arms; arms dealers andtraders; arms collectors; private security companies.

The government has taken steps to ensure rigorous training andmonitoring in the management and use of arms consistent withinternational and professional standards.

The State participates in projects supported by the ATT voluntary
trust fund and other multilateral assistance programmes that aim
to strengthen arms and ammunition management by security
forces.

STRENGTHENING SHARED UNDERSTANDING
ON THE IMPACT OF THE ARMS TRADE
TREATY (ATT) IN ADDRESSING RISKS OF
DIVERSION IN ARMS TRANSFERS‘Strengthening shared understanding on the impact of the Arms Trade Treaty(ATT) in addressing risks of diversion in arms transfers’ is a joint research initiativeby UNIDIR, Conflict Armament Research and the Stimson Center (jointly referred
to as the Consortium). The objective of the initiative is to enhance knowledge
and facilitate dialogue among States to strengthen shared understanding on theimpact of the ATT in addressing risks of diversion in arms transfers, and to identify
options and avenues for more effective policies and practices under the Treaty
moving forward. The research aims to reflect on the challenges and generate
ideas to strengthen counter-diversion measures within the Treaty’s framework.

February 2023

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