February 2014

Japan Center for International Exchange

Japan’s Debate on Constitutional
Reinterpretation: Paving the Way forCollective Self-Defense
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE
Recent developments in Japan’s national security
policy under the Shinzo Abe government—including the November 2013 establishment of a National
Security Council based on the US model, the announcement of the first National Security Strategy amonth later, and ongoing moves to change the interpretation of the constitution to allow for the exerciseof the right to collective self-defense—have gained attention around the world.
Given the potential ramifications, these changes toJapan’s security posture need to be debated extensively
in Japan and placed within the historical context. It is
important that the Japanese government clearly explains to both its citizens at home and allies and partners abroad why these changes are necessary and how
they are part of a natural historical progression. Given
Japan’s history in Asia, it is natural that its neighbors
would be skeptical of any changes in Japan’s security policy, and many people in the region are concerned thatany talk of collective self-defense is a signal of a rightward hawkish tilt. However, experts across the political
spectrum in Japan recognize that moderate changes tothe interpretation of the constitution can contribute tolong-term stability and peace in the region.

Evolution of Postwar Japanese Security
PolicyTo understand how moderate changes are part of a natural policy progression it is useful to review the evolution of Japan’s postwar national security policy. This canbe divided into the following three main phases.

Occupation and Rearmament (1945–1960s)
The postwar constitution includes the now famousArticle 9 peace clause, which renounces war as a sovereign right of the state and commits Japan to refraining
from threatening or using force as a means of settlinginternational disputes. As the Cold War intensified,
Mao Zedong and the Communist Party took control
of China and war broke out on the Korean Peninsula.
It became increasingly evident that the assumptionsof a peaceful postwar world, in which international
security issues were managed within UN frameworks
such as the Security Council, would not come to bear.
Facing up to this challenging security environment,
the United States dedicated itself to fostering the reconstruction of Japan and embracing it as a US ally
under the auspices of the US-Japan Security Treaty.
The Japanese Prime Minister of the day, Shigeru

Yoshida, set forth the so-called Yoshida Doctrine,
which emphasized the mobilization of resources foreconomic reconstruction, “light rearmament,” andreliance on the US military for Japan’s defense. This
strategy proved to be a great success, and within thespace of 23 years Japan rebuilt itself to become thesecond-largest economy in the world.

countries, countries under arms embargoes pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions, and countries that are either involved in or likely to become
involved in international conflict.

Post–Cold War Reorientation (1990–present)
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Japanese national security debate shifted to the question of how toreorient the US-Japan alliance to focus on post–Cold
War challenges, including the legal framework governing operations of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF).
There were high hopes in this new unipolar worldthat the paralysis that had previously characterized
the UN Security Council would finally come to anend. At last a world with a collective security system centered in the UN, as envisioned when Article
9 was written at the end of World War II, appeared
to be within reach. The system seemed to be working when UN member states, led by the United States,
successfully passed UN Security Council Resolution
678 authorizing the use of force against Iraq to repel
its invasion of Kuwait. This brought up a major concern for Japan about what role it could take on to contribute to this task. The United States requested thatJapan make both financial and physical contributions,going in with “boots on the ground.” However, given
the constitutional restrictions on the SDF, Japan ultimately decided that it could only make a financial
contribution. It raised new taxes and provided US$13
billion to the war effort, the largest financial donation
to come from outside of the Gulf region. However,this enormous contribution gained Japan little praise
and was instead criticized as another example of its
reliance on checkbook diplomacy.
Smarting from this experience, Japan passed the1992 Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Law to establish a legal framework for SDF participation inUN-led PKOs. The first SDF dispatch based on thislaw was under the auspices of the UN Transitional
Authority in Cambodia. However, the conditions
imposed on the SDF personnel by the PKO Law
were highly restrictive and severely limited the useof weapons, making it difficult for Japan to contribute substantially.

Credibility of the US-Japan Security Treaty(1970s–1980s)
During the second phase of Japan’s postwar history,
the security debate focused on the credibility of theUS-Japan alliance. In the United States, Japan wasperceived by many, especially in Congress, as free riding on the alliance and not taking on enough of theburden for its own defense responsibilities. In Japan,
the concern was that it was being used as part of theUS global security strategy, and doubts lingered as towhether the United States would actually fulfill its security treaty commitments to defend Japan if it cameunder attack.
With the threat of the USSR ever looming, however, Japan needed to maintain the US security guarantee, including the nuclear umbrella, and moves thatwould harm alliance relations were carefully avoided.
The thrust of Japanese debates during this period focused on how best to manage the abandonment-entrapment dilemma. In order to avoid abandonment
by an ally increasingly concerned about burden sharing, Japan increased its defense spending, shouldering the costs associated with stationing US military
troops in Japan. At the same time, however, the Liberal
Democratic Party government set forth a number ofmeasures to avoid becoming entangled in a US-led
war by clearly limiting Japanese security policy to anexclusively defense-oriented framework. Central tothese measures was an interpretation of the Japaneseconstitution’s Article 9 peace clause as renouncing theexercise of the right to collective self-defense. Other
important measures included the three non-nuclear
principles of not possessing, producing, or permitting the entry into Japan of any nuclear weapons, aswell as the three principles on arms exports, which
restrict the provision of weapons to Communist Bloc
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2February 2014

Facing Up to Current Security Challenges

The legal framework governing the SDF was again
brought into the spotlight by the 1993–1994 North
Korean nuclear crisis. As the Japanese government
considered its policy options, it became evident that
it was woefully underprepared to deal with any escalation of the conflict on the Korean Peninsula orwith other conflicts in its immediate surroundings.
To address these shortcomings, a joint US-Japan security declaration was announced in 1996 by thenJapanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and US
President Bill Clinton. Building on this declaration,
the US-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines wererevised in 1997, establishing a framework for Japanese
SDF dispatches for noncombatant evacuation operations, SDF support for the US military, and inspections of ships in international waters in accordancewith UN Security Council resolutions. The JapaneseDiet also subsequently passed the “Law Concerning
Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japanin Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan” (SIASJLaw) in 1999 to ensure the revised guidelines could
be implemented effectively.
The most difficult aspect of this process was thatchanges were made with the clear assumption thatJapan’s role would be kept within constitutionalboundaries and that Article 9 would continue to beinterpreted so as not to allow the right to collective
self-defense. As a result, the concept of rear-area support was established based on the argument that supporting the US military in non-combat zones would
not constitute collective self-defense and is therefore
permitted by the constitution.
The new changes were put into action mostprominently with the passage of two temporary
special measures laws based in the SIASJ Law. The
first was the “Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law,” which was passed by the Japanese Diet in
the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks on
Washington and New York in 2001 to allow for thedispatch of the Marine SDF to the Indian Ocean tohelp refuel US ships en route to Afghanistan. The
second was the “Law Concerning Special Measureson Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance inIraq,” enacted in 2003.
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

The idea that laws governing the SDF and its operations must be consistent with the constitution remains a central tenet of Japan’s postwar alliance policy
thinking. At the same time, it is widely understoodthat Japan’s defense capabilities must also adapt to theever-changing regional security environment. But thecurrent interpretation of the constitution, stipulatingthat the exercise of the right to collective self-defense
is not permitted, was established during the Cold War
and fails to respond to the demands of the current
security environment. It is against that backdrop thatmany experts agree that a moderate reinterpretationis needed.
For instance, in the hypothetical case of an emergency situation on the Korean Peninsula, if Japan
were to help the United States track a North Korean
fighter jet and the US military subsequently shot thejet down, this would be considered an integration
with US military forces and an unconstitutional exercise of collective self-defense under the current interpretation. But if Japan cannot help the United States
under such circumstances, the alliance will undoubtedly be undermined.
Before Japan makes a hasty change in the way it interprets the constitution, two points of contention need
to be carefully considered. First, how would a change
of interpretation fit into a comprehensive US-Japan alliance strategy aimed at enriching the regional securityenvironment? If alliance policy is debated only from amilitary viewpoint, it risks giving the wrong impression
to regional neighbors and exacerbating the security
dilemma. In other words, security policy changes notcoupled with diplomacy may trigger countermeasuresby neighbors, worsening the overall regional security
environment. Thus changes to the SDF force structure
to boost Japan’s capabilities to defend outlying territories should be done in a calm and transparent manner.
At the same time, the United States and Japan should
promote a comprehensive approach to alliance strategy
that puts diplomacy at the center of all policymaking
and brings China into the fold as a responsible regional stakeholder by focusing on confidence-building
measures, cooperation on trade and investment, rule3

February 2014

building, and joint energy cooperation. Given the shifting balance of regional power, such a comprehensive
approach to alliance strategy is even more important
now than it has ever been.
Second, given the unified position of the Japanese
government—that the exercise of the right to collective self-defense is not allowed by the constitution—aclear and rational explanation must be given before
the interpretation is changed in order to maintain national integrity. This must take into account the sequence of events that led Japan to this point as well as
the changing nature of the regional security environment, as described above. Failure to rationally explainchanges in their proper context will arouse the suspicion of neighboring countries and worsen the regional security environment.

affect Japanese national security. Given that Japan has
already established the SIASJ Law, and that the UnitedStates is obligated to defend Japan against attacks asper Article 5 of the US-Japan Security Treaty, it isnatural that Japan and the United States should cooperate on planning and implementation of defensive
operations in such scenarios.
It is, however, unnecessary to change the interpretation so radically that all aspects of the exercise of collective self-defense are permitted by the constitutionor that the SDF would be able to participate in US operations anywhere around the globe. Reinterpretation
outside the scope of the two above-mentioned aspects
would break with the exclusively defense-oriented
nature of postwar Japanese security policy and would
risk arousing distrust of Japan’s intentions.
◆ ◆ ◆A Rational Exercise of Collective SelfDefense

Maintaining an exclusively defense-oriented security
policy framework while also adequately facing up
to the security challenges facing Japan and the restof the region requires a careful balancing act. Thisis the crux of the security dilemma. Reinterpreting
Japan’s constitution to recognize the exercise of theright to collective self-defense in strictly limited circumstances—namely unfettered Japan SDF participation in UN-led PKOs under the direction of the UN
Security Council and defensive operations to protect
Japanese territory and the lives of Japanese citizens—
is a rational progression that builds upon Japan’s pastnational security policy while maintaining a liberalinternationalist strategic outlook.

Considering the complex context discussed above,
any reinterpretation of the constitution should belimited to the following two aspects to maintain consistency with past national security policy but also respond to the challenges of the current international
security environment.
First, collective self-defense missions authorized by
the international community through the UN Security
Council, which includes China and Russia, should berecognized by all parties as permissible exceptions tothe restriction on collective self-defense. The conductof SDF personnel in UN-led PKOs must be held to thehighest international standards, but imposing conditions on SDF troops beyond those of other UN PKO
soldiers is unnecessary and complicates the already difficult task of restoring peace in volatile situations.
Second, restrictions on the exercise of collective
self-defense should be lifted for scenarios that directlyHitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairmanof the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan
Research Institute, Ltd. He p­ reviously served as Japan’s
deputy minister for f­oreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
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February 2014