June 2010

Japan Center for International Exchange

Hatoyama’s Resignation andJapan’s Foreign Policy
HITOSHI TANAKA, Senior Fellow, JCIE
Less than nine months after he assumed office inan atmosphere of jubilation on the back of the
Democratic Party of Japan’s (DPJ) historic electoral
victory over the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
Yukio Hatoyama fell from grace and resigned as
prime minister. Naoto Kan, the former finance minister, was officially sworn into office on June 8 as the
new prime minister of Japan. Hatoyama’s fumblingover the Futenma issue, and the money scandals
that hit both him and DPJ Secretary-General Ichiro
Ozawa, drove Hatoyama’s approval rating down rapidly to as low as 17 percent. With an Upper House
election looming large next month, this change ofgovernment was motivated by the desire of the DPJ
to take action against widely predicted heavy electoral losses.
Given these recent events, the question must be
asked, what implications will the fall of Hatoyama
and the establishment of the new Kan government
have on Japan’s foreign and national security policy?
The DPJ controls the Lower House, so regardlessof the results of the Upper House election the DPJ

will remain the governing party. Further, Kan has
retained many of the Hatoyama cabinet’s ministers.
Therefore, few analysts expect any substantial policychanges as a result of this change at the top. However,the causes behind the fall of the Hatoyama government may have a far-reaching impact on future foreign and national security policy.

Causes behind the Fall
While some analysts have focused on Hatoyama’s
personality and his inability to deliver on promises,
there are two more critical reasons that explain his
fall from the top job.
First, the Hatoyama government failed to formulate a solid foreign or national security policy. Thiswas mainly due to fundamental differences with
one of its coalition partners, the Social Democratic
Party (SDP), which has strong pacifist tendencies.
The main issue is that Hatoyama spoke of the needfor a more equal US-Japan alliance, but he neverdefined this rough concept or his expectations forthe future of the alliance in concrete terms. In fact,traditional powers—the United States and Japan—to
newly emerging powers, particularly China andIndia. Given the continuing economic growth anticipated in China and India, this shift in the balanceof power is only expected to intensify. Further, as
the emerging powers’ economies grow, interdependence between the traditional and emerging powers is set to deepen, meaning that we will be more
dependent on their markets. Therefore, there is apressing need to manage foreign and national security policy and the US-Japan alliance so that thisinterdependence can proceed smoothly without anexcessive feeling of threat. To facilitate discussions
between the United States and Japan toward thisend, a joint wisemen’s commission on the future of
the US-Japan alliance should be established, comprised of government officials, politicians, public
intellectuals, and business leaders.
At the domestic level too, defining the importanceof the US-Japan alliance in the future will help garner support and understanding from the Japanesepeople, and critically the Okinawans. The Futenma
agreement, however incomplete it may be, will haveto be implemented in a timely manner. Even though
the prime minister has changed, this is an agreement
made by a DPJ government, and Prime Minister Kan
will have to honor it. At the same time, given theheightened expectations of the people of Okinawa asa result of Hatoyama’s flowery rhetoric, implementation has become more difficult, and we can expect
strong opposition from affected localities. Given theobjective of a politically sustainable US-Japan alliance, it would be preferable to have the agreementof—or at least some degree of understanding from—
affected localities regarding government decisions
concerning the Futenma relocation.
Over the long term, both the United States andJapan realize that the alignment of forces in the region should be gradually adjusted as the security situation evolves. To that end, strong diplomatic efforts
should focus on reducing tensions, and a safer region
should provide the basis for corresponding changes
to US military levels in the region. However, in thecurrent context, a continued US presence in the region remains necessary. Therefore, formulating new

DPJ policy toward the United States can be explained more simply as an “anything but the LDP”
policy. For instance, Japan’s contribution to the “waron terror” was changed when the Maritime Self
Defense Force was pulled out of its refueling mission in the Indian Ocean, where it was supporting
US-led activities in Afghanistan. (In place of this,the DPJ decided to provide a substantial aid package.) Also, the DPJ had made a campaign promise
to move the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
outside of Okinawa. However, Hatoyama publicly
set an unrealistic deadline for himself to achieve aresolution on the relocation by the end of May. The
critical point here is that once the Futenma relocation became such a high profile issue, coming to a
resolution required making agreements with the US
government, the people of Okinawa, and the DPJ’s
coalition partners. This proved impossible in such ashort timeframe, and consequently Hatoyama wasforced to go back on his promise, issuing a May 28
joint statement that prioritized the conclusion of an
accord with the United States.
Second, there was a lack of expert input in formulating policy. Foreign and national security policy
must be based on a very realistic assessment of theinternational situation and the intentions of othercountries in the region. However, looking at the personnel in the Hatoyama government and the Prime
Minister’s Office, it is apparent that this expertise
was lacking. Furthermore, as part of the DPJ’s campaign promise to reduce excessive dependence on
the bureaucracy, the lines of communication for bureaucrats to make policy recommendations to thepolitical leadership were almost entirely cut off, andbureaucrats were, on the whole, routinely ignored.

Lessons for the DPJ
New future-oriented thinking on the alliance
The DPJ must recognize that there is an urgent needfor consultations and discussions with the UnitedStates to formulate new thinking and define the
US-Japan alliance in terms of the changing realities
in the region. A change in the balance of power in
East Asia is taking place, with power shifting fromEAST ASIA INSIGHTS

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June 2010

were politicians and members of the parliamentand one of whom was a senior person from within
the bureaucracy who had the role of coordinating
among the different ministries. Their coordinatingroles were instrumental.
There was machinery in the governing party as
well. In particular the LDP had the seimuchosakai,or Policy Research Council. This council facilitatedintense consultations and discussions on all important policy matters between the cabinet members on
the one hand and the rest of the governing party andcoalition parties and the bureaucrats on the other.
In the less than nine months since the establishment of the Hatoyama government, these three
central policymaking mechanisms were completely
done away with. To begin with, there has been asignificant reduction in consultation with the bureaucrats. A quick analysis of Hatoyama’s daily appointments as prime minister reveals that not many
bureaucrats came to report to him directly. Thiswas part of the DPJ’s election campaign promise toeliminate excessive dependence on the bureaucracy.
At the same time, the chief cabinet secretary did notplay a substantive coordinating role whatsoever; hemerely played the role of a government spokesman.
Illustrative of this is the fact that many high-ranking
government officials did not even meet with thechief cabinet secretary during the eight and a halfmonths of Hatoyama’s reign.
Given Ozawa’s declaration that policymaking
power should be concentrated in the hands of thecabinet, and that the political party should not interfere in the policymaking process, input from DPJ
backbenchers and coalition partners was effectively
shut out. A dual power structure was establishedwhereby Hatoyama was in charge of the government, which was mandated with carrying out policymaking, and Ozawa was in charge of the party,
which was mandated with dealing with the Diet andelections. But, many policies have significant implications for the DPJ’s coalition partners too, andthe Futenma relocation issue is a case in point. The
DPJ agreed to the Futenma Accord with the UnitedStates without due input, consultations, or negotiations with its coalition partner the SDP. Further, thefuture-oriented thinking on the US-Japan alliance,and explaining to the people of Japan—especially
Okinawans—why it is so important in the context
of the changing international situation, is a critical
stepping stone toward gaining public support for
and understanding of alliance policy.

Policymaking process
The DPJ should also recognize the importance ofthe policymaking process in shaping foreign and national security policy. In the era of LDP rule, there
were three main elements of the policymaking process: expert input from bureaucrats, coordinationby the chief cabinet secretary and his deputies, andintensive consultations and discussions among therelevant actors in the Policy Research Council.
The bureaucracy was tasked with providing information, intelligence assessments, and policy recommendations directly to senior political leaders andthe prime minister. I recall when I was in charge ofnegotiations with North Korea during the prime
ministership of Junichiro Koizumi. In a period of
one year I went to see the prime minister 88 times,
and each time I reported the state of affairs of thenegotiations directly to him, discussed possible policies and approaches, and tried to obtain his input
and endorsement. Every aspect of the negotiations
was discussed intensely between the bureaucracy
and the political leaders, not just the prime ministerbut also the foreign minister, the chief cabinet secretary, and so on. While the DPJ has been critical of
the LDP for its excessive dependence on bureaucrats,
sometimes instructions did come from the top. The
2006 agreement on the reversion of Futenma andthe willingness of Koizumi to visit Pyongyang are
examples of this. However, the bureaucracy always
made sure that this happened with sufficient preparation and expert input.
There was also machinery in the Prime Minister’s
Office for the coordination of national security
policy. In particular, the chief cabinet secretary had
two very important roles of coordinating among thegovernment and with the governing parties and acting as a government spokesman. Further, there were
three deputy chief cabinet secretaries, two of whom
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June 2010DPJ expected that the SDP would simply sign off on
this. In this way, the DPJ did not give adequate consideration to the maintenance of the coalition, creating a scenario in which the SDP was left with noalternative but to exit.
It is, therefore, evident that there is an urgent andimmediate need for the new government to establish
appropriate mechanisms for the making of foreignand national security policy. There are two possible
ways forward for the DPJ to resolve this policymaking process dilemma.
The first way is to revive the LDP-era policymaking mechanisms. This would involve allowing
expert input from bureaucrats, reestablishing thecoordinating role of the chief cabinet secretary, andengaging in intensive consultations, discussions,and negotiations among political leaders, the party,
coalition parties, and bureaucrats. However, goingback to the LDP-era mechanisms may not be politically viable for the DPJ given its reformist campaign
promises and need to distance itself from the LDP.
The second possible way to revitalize the foreignand national security policymaking process is to create a new department within the Cabinet Office. In
the lead up to the Lower House election and upontaking power last year, the DPJ spoke of establishing a National Strategy Bureau (NSB). The first step
toward this was taken with the creation of a National
Strategy Office. However, the legislation required to
upgrade it to a full-fledged bureau is still under review as foot dragging continues. Under the DPJ’s
original plans, the NSB was to be mandated with foreign and national security policymaking. However,whether this is part of current DPJ plans or not remains unclear. Nevertheless, in the absence of otherforeign and national security policymaking mechanisms, the NSB should be established as a bona fidebureau, substantiated in terms of staff numbers, andgiven a broad mandate in relation to foreign andnational security policymaking to allow for the formulation of solid, coordinated, and future-oriented
foreign and national security policy with appropriate expert input.
◆ ◆ ◆The resignation of Hatoyama has exposed the DPJ’s
lack of solid foreign and national security policy.
However, the emergence of Kan as the new prime
minister offers the DPJ a chance to learn importantlessons and correct these shortcomings. Soon after
the establishment of the new government, Prime
Minister Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshito
Sengoku started restructuring their relationshipwith the bureaucracy, calling for a new alliance andbringing in additional bureaucrats as aides. The DPJ
also reinstalled the Policy Research Council to allow
better coordination of policies between the politicalparty and the cabinet. This is a good start, but it will
not be until after the Upper House election set forJuly 11 when we can see if substantive policies will
emerge from the Kan government.

Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE. He previously
served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from the Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
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June 2010