MARCH2018

Confronting Uncertainty inEast Asia
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIEF

rom a Japanese perspective, the defining
characteristic of East Asia’s regional order today
appears to be the high degree of uncertainty thatprevails about what might come next. Geopoliticaluncertainty seems to be intensifying on all fronts,
whether one looks at the disarray engulfing US politics and foreign policy, the escalation of tensions withNorth Korea, the challenge of managing relations
with China, or even Japan’s domestic politics. Thissense of uncertainty itself poses a risk, potentially
fueling a dynamic that makes our greatest worries areality. It is therefore critical that leaders around theregion work to find a way to dispel this uncertainty
if we are to maintain the stability and prosperity thathas benefitted us all.

Political Disarray in the United States

Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump inJanuary 2017, US politics have become more divided
and chaotic than at any time in the modern era. This
has a ripple effect for the rest of the world, and particularly for East Asia.
The disarray in Washington can be traced to threefactors. The first is President Trump. He appears tolack any coherent political convictions or governing philosophy to guide his policy agenda. Instead,
Trump’s approach could be characterized mainly

as an attempt to roll back former President Barack
Obama’s policy programs. Also, Trump’s utterances
often cryptically contradict his stated positions. Forinstance, while Trump withdrew the United Statesfrom the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free tradedeal and the Paris Agreement on climate change, hehas also hinted that a return might be possible underthe right circumstances.
Second, a gap in US foreign policy has emerged
between President Trump’s transactional approach
under the banner of “America First” and the strainof traditional Republican thinking that has been reflected in official announcements from his administration, such as the recent National Security Strategy.
It remains to be seen how this extreme incongruity
will be resolved. That uncertainty complicates US allies’ cooperation with Washington.
Third, an unprecedented number of senior administration positions are still empty, especially inthe State Department and Pentagon. In fact, as ofFebruary 2018, seven out of nine of the top posts under Secretary of State Tillerson need to be filled. Thisleaves US allies with few interlocutors to whom they
can turn in order to coordinate foreign and defense
policy. For instance, there is a critical need for deep
consultations between the United States and allies
to coordinate a joint approach on North Korea but,

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without sufficient senior staff, it is unclear how theUnited States can formulate and implement soundpolicy as new developments unfold.

Tensions with North Korea

Another area of uncertainty is whether a negotiatedsolution can be reached on the North Korea situation.
Tensions with North Korea have reached new heights
as Kim Jong-un has intensified the country’s missileand nuclear weapons development program. In 2017,
North Korea launched 23 missiles during 16 separate
tests and carried out its sixth and biggest-ever nuclear
explosion. Sanctions have been progressively tightened, and there have been four UN Security Council
resolutions since June 2017, including limits on North
Korean oil imports. However, sanctions must be partof a broader strategy to facilitate a diplomatically negotiated resolution. The alternatives—military action, which would undoubtedly entail a devastating
loss of life, or recognizing North Korea’s nuclear status, which risks further emboldening Pyongyang—both have unacceptable costs.
In order to draw North Korea into credible denuclearization negotiations, a “P3C” approach is needed—
pressure, coordination, contingency planning, andcommunication channels. Pressure through the application of sanctions must demonstrate to North Korea
that if it continues down its nuclear path it will not beallowed to survive. Coordination is needed to ensurethat sanctions continue to be applied in a patient andsustained manner. A united front among the UnitedStates, China, South Korea, and Japan is critical to ensure that North Korea is not allowed to drive wedges
between these key actors or mitigate the impact of thesanctions. Coordination must also include US-ChinaROK-Japan contingency planning for a worst-casescenario on the Korean Peninsula given the risk of aNorth Korean collapse. This must address how North
Korea’s nuclear weapons can be secured quickly andefficiently as well as how to deal with refugee flows
out of North Korea.
More effective communication channels areneeded to avoid miscalculation that could spark awar. Given North Korea’s unique political structure,
this must include a channel to Kim Jong-un’s innercircle. This channel must be used to convey to theNorth Korean leadership in no uncertain terms thatpressure through sanctions will continue indefinitely
until it denuclearizes and that denuclearization is theonly way in which North Korea can be welcomed into

the international community and survive as a nation.
An invitation from Kim Jong-un—delivered by his
sister Kim Yo-jong as part of the Korean Olympic
détente—to ROK President Moon Jae-in for aninter-Korean summit at the earliest possible datemeans Moon could become the first world leader tomeet with Kim Jong-un. This would provide an opportunity to communicate a united denuclearization
message on behalf of the international community.
However, South Korea must take the utmost care notto undermine the commitment of the international
community to maintaining pressure on North Korea.

Managing Relations with China

A number of uncertainties have also intensified regarding the future of relations with China. First, while
it appears that China has become more serious about
applying sanctions against North Korea over the last
six months, its calculations will continue to dependon an unappealing tradeoff. Namely, is the risk of losing North Korea as a buffer state and dealing with apotential collapse and refugee crisis worse than having a nuclear North Korea? The United States, SouthKorea, and Japan must engage and coordinate with
China on contingency planning in order to persuade
it to maintain the united front on sanctions pressure.
Second, China will have to reconcile its impulse
toward repression in the political sphere with its liberalization policy in the economic sphere. In October
2017, the Communist Party’s 19th National Congressconfirmed that President Xi Jinping will continue toconsolidate his rule through increased discipline andtighter social controls. Xi is also reportedly seeking
to amend the constitution to allow him to serve beyond his second term as president. At the same time,
to bolster growth, Xi intends to pursue further economic liberalization, especially in the financial sector.
The liberalization of product markets during the earlystages of reform did not require much sacrifice on thepolitical side. However, the successful liberalization offinancial markets will eventually require a tradeoff between political control and economic openness given
the way that it is likely to challenge vested interests.
Third, it is uncertain whether the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI) can be implemented in a way that
accords with international standards—including
financing, construction, environmental, and labor
standards—although it is clear it cannot be sustainable without doing so. The Sri Lankan example,
where the acceptance of massive Chinese investment

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without reasonable safeguards has created a severe
debt burden, must not be replicated. Following international best practices will help ensure that new infrastructure to bolster trade and connectivity between
China, Central Asia, South Asia, Africa, the Middle
East, and Europe will result in win-win cooperation
for all countries involved.
Fourth, there is uncertainty about the futureof US-China relations. Over the last few years, Xi
has proposed a new model of great power relations
whereby both countries respect each other’s “coreinterests.” If not carefully managed, this risks giving
China too much leeway in defining its core interests
at the expense of US allies. How the United States
under the Trump administration will respond to thenew model is unclear given the conflict between traditional Republican thinking and Trump’s “AmericaFirst” approach.

Political Governance in JapanThe changing nature of politics in Japan may also
emerge as a new source of uncertainty. One importantdevelopment involves the erosion of the checks andbalances on prime ministerial power due to changes
in party politics, the media, and the balance of power
between elected officials and the bureaucracy.
Within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party(LDP), there has been a decline in the importanceof factions. This has opened the door for greater policy cohesion, but it has come at the expense of policy
diversity and innovation. No rival leader within theLDP seems capable of seriously moderating Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s agenda. At the same time, thepolitical opposition is fractured. Japan’s main opposition party, the Democratic Party, collapsed in thelead-up to the October 2017 Lower House elections,and there is no credible opposition that looks capableof holding the government to account.
The media environment in Japan has also worsened. Reporting is polarized between outlets suchas the Yomiuri Shimbun that consistently support thegovernment, and others, such as the Asahi Shimbun,
that consistently criticize it.
The bureaucracy has also become more timid aspoliticians have taken greater control of policymaking.
The Prime Minister’s Office established the Cabinet
Bureau of Personnel Affairs in 2014, which controls
the fate of Japan’s top 600 bureaucrats. The fact that
top bureaucrats are now subjected to a new level ofpolitical control means that they risk becoming “yesmen,” unwilling to offer serious advice or constructive criticism to political leaders for fear of jeopardizing their future career prospects.

Mitigating Uncertainty

A number of steps can be taken in order to mitigate theregion’s rising uncertainty. First, Japan and other US
allies and partners in the region must make the caseto the Trump administration, directly but politely,
why continued US leadership is critical. A withdrawalof US leadership is likely to undermine the postwar
regional order—an order that the United States itself
established and which has brought peace and prosperity to the region. Deeper consultations between
the United States and its allies are critically neededin order to address regional security challenges suchas North Korea. However, these consultations are unlikely to succeed without sufficient staff in place at theState Department and elsewhere.
Second, security cooperation in the region needs tobe strengthened, and these efforts should extend beyond increased security cooperation centered on theUnited States hub-and-spokes system. The concept ofa free and open Indo-Pacific region and the revival of
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad)—between the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—
have received renewed attention recently. But will thisreally enhance peace and stability? Proponents of theIndo-Pacific concept explain that it is aimed at building an open and rules-based maritime order, not containing China. Yet there is no denying that both theIndo-Pacific concept and the Quad are perceived byoutside nations as hedging policies.
Rather, there is an urgent need to build inclusive
rather than exclusionary mechanisms. The top priority for the regional security agenda at this juncture
should be to focus on confidence building among
the major regional powers (especially the UnitedStates, China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, India,and Indonesia). Functional tasks that will enhance
regional stability should also be prioritized, such asenergy and environmental cooperation and North
Korean contingency planning.
Third, in order to counteract the backlash against
globalization and stem the tide of protectionism, Asia
must show global leadership on trade policy. Thiscan begin by concluding the ASEAN-led Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement(RCEP) and moving quickly to implement theTPP-11, which appears on track to be signed within

MARCH 2018 | 4weeks. This should be done in a way that demonstrates to the United States the merits of the liberal
economic order. The members of the TPP-11 should
also live up to their pledge to have an open and inclusive agreement by preparing to consider new
applications for membership from interested countries including China, Indonesia, South Korea, andThailand, as well as the United States when it is ready.
The groundwork should also begin to be laid so that
the TPP-11 and RCEP can eventually be amalgamatedinto a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP).
Fourth, greater clarity is needed regarding Japan’sconstitutional debate and the future of the SDF. TheJapanese people feel a growing sense of threat fromNorth Korea and China, nationalistic sentiment
within the LDP is increasing, and old security taboos
are being questioned. Influential leaders have suggested that Japan increase its defense budget, revise
the Constitution, and acquire new military capabilities, including aircraft carriers and the capability tostrike North Korean launch pads.
Japan’s leaders need to find the right balance
between upholding Japan’s commitment to an exclusively defense-oriented security policy (senshuboei) and ensuring that Japanese military capabilities adequately respond to contemporary security
challenges. Of course, upgrades should be madewhere old capabilities are no longer sufficient, but
the creeping acquisition of power projection capabilities without a true debate must be avoided. In theend, Japan has little choice but to maintain the USJapan alliance and US nuclear umbrella, so sticking
to the exclusively defense-oriented security policy

seems to be a wiser form of deterrence and one thatwill avoid exacerbating tensions in the region.
Prime Minster Abe has said that the Article 9 peaceclause of the Constitution should be revised, arguingthat it is important to add wording to the clause that
explicitly recognizes the constitutionality of the SDF.
However, this is not very convincing. While the SDF
is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, its existence has been widely considered legitimate since
its founding in 1954. New laws that allow the SDF tobetter respond to contemporary security challenges
have also been promulgated based on this understanding—including the security-related bills passed
in September 2015, which recognize the right of theSDF to engage in limited forms of collective self-­
defense. Thus, there is no immediate need to revise
the Constitution simply to recognize the constitutionality of the SDF. But if Japan’s leaders are determined to take another course, they should provide aclearer and simpler explanation to the world about
why constitutional revision is ­really necessary.

■■■In these turbulent times, it is imperative that leaders
around the region not only deal with the immediate
security threats before them but also make a concerted
effort to tamp down the ambiguities and doubts thatare clouding the prospects for shared peace and prosperity in the region. Unless we can find a way to build
greater trust, the uncertainty that is on the rise in East
Asia threatens to become another major impediment
to regional stability.

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East Asia regional issues from a Japanese perspective.
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