The Global Kaleidoscopeof Military AI Governance
Decoding the 2024 Regional Consultations
on Responsible AI in the Military Domain
YA S M I N A F I N AAcknowledgments
Support from UNIDIR’s core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute’s activities. This
policy brief was prepared by UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme, which is funded by theGovernments of Czechia, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom, and by Microsoft.
The author wishes to thank Dr. Giacomo Persi Paoli (UNIDIR) for advice, guidance and support for thisprogramme of work and for his review of this report; as well as Ioana Puscas (UNIDIR), Netta Goussac,
Dr. Alexander Blanchard and Major Jamal Mohamed Hassan for their reviews and suggestions. The
author also wishes to thank the Republic of Korea and the Netherlands for convening the regional consultations, along with Chile, Costa Rica, Kenya, Singapore and Türkiye, which acted as co-hosts, aswell as the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue for the facilitation of the forecasting exercise that preceded
four of the regional consultations.

About UNIDIRThe United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous
institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament,
UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Basedin Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas
needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

Note
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning thelegal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of
its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual authors. They do not necessary reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its
staff members or sponsors.

About the Security and Technology ProgrammeContemporary developments in science and technology present new opportunities as well as challenges to international security and disarmament. UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme seeks tobuild knowledge and awareness on the international security implications and risks of specific technological innovations and convenes stakeholders to explore ideas and develop new thinking on ways toaddress them.

T H E G L O B A L KA L E I D O S C O P E O F M I L I TA R Y A I G O V E R N A N C E

2AuthorThis report was produced by UNIDIR’s Security and Technology Programme. It wasdrafted by Yasmin Afina, who attended all five regional consultations.

Yasmin Afina
Researcher, Security and Technology
Yasmin Afina is a Researcher for the Security and Technology Programme at UNIDIR, where her
research covers the intersection between international security, international law and artificial intelligence. Her research experience and interests cover nuclear weapons policy, outer space security,
and wider international security and policy issues surrounding emerging technologies, including
neurotechnology, quantum technologies, and cyber. She is also a PhD Researcher in law at the University of Essex.

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3Acronyms & Abbreviations
AI

Artificial intelligence

CCW(Convention on) Certain Conventional Weapons

ISRIntelligence, surveillance and reconnaissanceNATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NSAG

Non-State armed group

REAIM

Responsible AI in the Military Domain

UAV

Uncrewed aerial vehicle

U NIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

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4Contents
Executive Summary

6

1.

Background92.

General Views on AI Fundamentals, Applications and Opportunities

11

3.

General Views on Risks, Challenges and Implications

14

4.

Key Policy Priorities: Points of Nuanced Convergence

18

4.1

Facets of Responsible AI Practices in the Military and Wider Security Domains:
Taking Stock of Opportunities							

19

4.2

Compliance with International Law and Ethical Considerations

20

4.3

The Human Element as a Key Enabler for Accountability

22

4.4

Multi-Stakeholder Engagement

23

4.5

Meaningful Regional Dialogue and Frameworks

25

4.6

The Importance of Capacity-Building Efforts

26

5.

Key Policy Priorities: Points of Divergence

28

5.1

Unique Local Contexts and Realities		

28

5.2

Varying Regulatory Approaches and Legal Traditions

30

5.3

Prioritization and Risk Perceptions

33

5.4

Resource Availability and Allocation

34

5.5

Desired Endgame

34

6.

Conclusion and the Way Ahead

36

6.1

Prioritize Capacity-Building and Information Exchange		

36

6.2

Foster the Implementation and Operationalization of Responsible AI through Engagement

37

6.3

Ensure the Complementarity of Processes

37

6.4

Intensify Research Efforts and Reflections on Underexplored Areas

38

6.5

Reflect on AI in the “Military Domain”, its Boundaries and Interplay with
Wider Security Applications

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5Executive Summary
In the run-up to the second iteration of the Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) Summit, tobe held in Seoul, Republic of Korea, on 9–10 September, the Governments of the Republic of Korea
and the Netherlands organized, in partnership with Chile, Costa Rica, Kenya, Singapore and Türkiye, aseries of five regional consultations on responsible artificial intelligence (AI) in the military domain. Fourof the consultations were held in-person and were preceded by a one-day forecasting exercise, facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, which equipped participants with insights into key policy
issues associated with the development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain and, when applicable, the wider security domains.
The present report seeks to capture UNIDIR’s main reflections on the key takeaways stemming fromthe five regional consultations. These consultations did indeed enable the dissection of local contexts,
realities and approaches with regards to the responsible development, deployment and use of AI in the
military and wider security domains – including the identification of areas of convergence and of divergence at the regional level.
The report first discusses the reflections shared by states on the unique characteristics of AI technologies, and the opportunities that they provide in the military domain. These applications range fromsupporting, or even enhancing, the conduct of warfare (e.g., enhancing intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance capabilities, cyber operations, and cognitive electronic warfare), to the organizational
level (e.g., training, simulation and planning, and back-end support). Many of these opportunities areeven found to extend beyond the military domain and have wider security applications (e.g., to counterorganized crime and piracy).
In addition to a host of opportunities, states also discussed and exchanged views on the risks, challenges and implications stemming from the development, deployment and use of AI in the military andwider security domains. Perspectives, viewpoints and experiences were shared on a number of risks,challenges and implications, both technological and non-technological. These include an exacerbation of escalation risks, disruptions to the information environment, compliance with international law
and ethical considerations, as well as socio-economic risks. It is important to note that, despite manyof these risks being shared across most (if not all) regions, there are variations in states’ perceptions of
the risks and their subsequent approaches to mitigation of the risks. These differences have an impact
on their prioritization too, at both the regional and national levels, and how they are subsequently translated into policy or regulatory responses.
The report then covers points of convergence, six of which emerged from the regional consultations:a. The opportunities offered by responsible AI in the military and wider security domains
b. Compliance with international law and ethical considerations
c. The human element as a key enabler for accountability and responsibility
d. Multi-stakeholder engagement
e. The need for meaningful regional dialogue to understand local contextsf.

The importance of capacity-building efforts
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6

These six areas were consistently discussed and dissected, to varying degrees, across most if not all
regional consultations. Thus, in order to achieve widespread buy-in across regions, each of these six
aspects should be considered for future governance discussions and pathways on responsible AI in the
military domain. It is, however, important to note that each of these six points of convergence is far frombeing monolithic and should, rather, be considered as having a nuanced nature: each region may beapproaching these six themes with variations and nuances due to a number of factors such as politicaland cultural divergences, varying security landscape, and different socio-economical contexts.
In the same vein, this report identifies five main points of divergence observed across and even withinregions:a. Unique local contexts and realities
b. Varying regulatory approaches and legal traditions
c. Prioritization and risks perception
d. Resource availability and allocatione. Desired endgame
These differences, like the convergences, are also due to a host of factors, including those mentioned
above. However, it is important to note that these variations in approaches are not inherently harmful
to an aligned international approach to responsible AI in the military and wider security domains. At
times, these variations and nuances are, in fact, desirable or even necessary to account for regional
contexts and realities. Most of the time, as long as there is effective coordination at the international level, and mutual understanding of states’ and regions’ different approaches and rationales (i.e.,
drivers and underlying reasons for certain policy directions), the points of divergence will not, in and ofthemselves, lead to fragmentation. Instead, they will lead to a reinforced and inclusive policy and regulatory landscape that is united in diversity, ultimately enabling and promoting responsible AI in the
military and wider security domains.
The regional consultations demonstrated that responsible AI in the military and wider security domains,and efforts towards its implementation and operationalization, is a priority area for states across all
regions. Yet, the international policy landscape and existing approaches are far from being a monolithic block. The multifaceted and complex elements underpinning the present variations are subsequently, more often than not, reflected in the ways in which each state and each region grapples withthe development, deployment and use of AI in the military and wider security domains. As stressed
throughout this report, however, these differences are not necessarily intrinsically harmful to international alignment and cooperation which, in most circumstances, states acknowledge the importance ofin any case. Processes, discussions and frameworks at the international, regional and national levels
must not be seen as mutually exclusive and in competition, but rather as complementarity in the kaleidoscope of military AI governance.
As such, the conduct of the regional consultations – which joined information exchange on policies
and national viewpoints on the one hand, with discussions framed by expert intervention on theother hand – was not only useful to ensure inclusivity in the REAIM process. These consultations

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7also paved the way for further reflections, at times shared across regions, at times unique to certain
regions. As such, the food for thought to consider for the (future) governance of responsible AI in the
military domain include: Prioritize capacity-building and information exchangeStates across regions see the establishment of regularly convened, formalized processes and frameworks for information sharing and the exchange of knowledge and best practices, including from thecivilian domain, as being critical. Beyond the policy, legal and ethical realms, there is also the desire togain granularity at the technical level (e.g., on the black box issue, effective integration and interoperability, computing power and data).
 Foster the implementation and operationalization of responsible AI through engagement
States have expressed the desire to move beyond norms, principles and political commitments. Thereis indeed appetite for initiatives that help bridge the gap between the technical and policy communities
for operationalization, implementation and execution.
 Ensure the complementarity of processes
States have expressed a desire to shed clarity on the respective mandates, roles and responsibilitiesof each of the many parallel processes and forums, at the international and regional levels both within
and outside the United Nations, and ensure that they complement one another instead of brewing competition.
 Intensify research efforts and reflections on underexplored areas
A number of themes have emerged as being underexplored in this space and deemed to require further
reflections. These include data governance; dual-use technologies; interoperability; computing power;
the traceability and transparency of systems; as well as the different dimensions of security in relation
to AI development, deployment and use in the military domain (e.g., human security, environmental
security and economic security).
 Reflect on AI in the “military domain”, its boundaries and interplay with wider security applications
While the regional consultations were all conducted around the theme of “AI in the military domain”(with the Latin American and Caribbean segment also including wider security applications),
questions arise with regards to the scope of the domain and the extent to which its boundaries areclearly delineated.

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81. Background
The inaugural 2023 Responsible AI in the Military Domain (REAIM) Summit, organized by the Netherlands and co-hosted by the Republic of Korea, was a landmark global and multi-stakeholder summit tocollectively discuss, deliberate and address the opportunities, challenges and risks associated withmilitary applications of artificial intelligence (AI). The summit has successfully put the topic of responsible AI in the military domain higher on the political agenda of many states. With its Joint Call to Action,
endorsed by over 50 states, it underlined the need to further promote initiatives and efforts to foster the
responsible development, deployment and use of military AI.
Against this backdrop, and in the run-up to the second iteration of the REAIM Summit in Seoul on 9–10
September 2024, the Netherlands and the Republic of Korea have sought to build on this momentum
and to deepen engagement with partners across regions. As such, and in partnership with regional
partners, five regional consultations were held in the first half of 2024:•

Asia: Singapore, 27 February 2024 (co-hosted by Singapore and in partnership with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore)•

South East Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central Asia: Istanbul, Türkiye, 23
May 2024 (co-hosted by Türkiye and in partnership with the National Defence University of Türkiye)•

Europe and North America: Virtual, 30 May 2024•

Africa: Nairobi, Kenya, 6 June 2024 (co-hosted by Kenya and in partnership with the Kenya Defence
Forces and the National Defence University–Kenya)•

Latin America and the Caribbean: Santiago, Chile, 14 June 2024 (co-hosted by Chile and Costa
Rica and in partnership with the Law Faculty of the University of Chile)1

The consultations held in Singapore, Istanbul, Nairobi and Santiago were preceded by a one-day forecasting exercise for the invited consultation participants and additional observers led by the Centre for
Humanitarian Dialogue. These exercises equipped participants with insights into key policy issues associated with the development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain and, in Santiago, thewider security domains, as well as the range of practical approaches to responding to their implicationsin specific situations. These include the implications of procurement from abroad of AI systems for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) functions; military decision-making in high-tension
and time-sensitive situations; as well as the training on public databases and synthetic data of decision-support systems for law enforcement use.
The regional consultations then provided states with the opportunity to share their national views, priorities and engagements with regards to the governance of AI in the military domain and, when applicable, wider security domains. The format of the consultations was critical in providing participants with a

1

The Latin American and Caribbean segment of the consultations, in recognition of the region’s security landscape and realities,
was extended beyond the military to also include the broader security domain (including law enforcement, border security, as wellas efforts to counter transnational organized crime).

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9focused framework for exchanges on trends, approaches and the general context in which states seek
to implement principles and norms for responsible AI in military applications and, when applicable,
wider security applications – all critical viewpoints to inform subsequent discussions and deliberations
at the 2024 REAIM Summit.
In addition to state representatives, the forecasting exercises and consultations were also attended
by experts and representatives from a range of organizations including UNIDIR; the United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs; the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP); the Center for Security
and Emerging Technology (CSET); the National Defence University of Türkiye; Bilkent University; theFoundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA); the Centre for Security Cooperation (RACVIAC); the Organization of Turkic States; the National Defence University–Kenya (NDU-K);
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI); the African Observatory on Responsible AI;
the REAIM Global Commission; as well as the Fundación para la Paz y la Democracia (FUNPADEM).
Specifically, the regional consultations were designed to provide a platform for open discussions,knowledge-sharing and deepening regional understanding on this emerging issue. As such, they wereguided and framed by the following questions:•

What are the most important challenges for each region regarding the responsible use of AI in the
military domain and, when applicable, the broader security domains?

•

What are the factors that facilitate or, conversely, hinder regional and international cooperation withrespect to the responsible use of military AI?

•

What are the region’s views on – and challenges to – the application of international humanitarianlaw in military AI?

•

What are the different states’ approaches to implementing responsible AI in the military domain?
And what good practices can states share with regards to responsible AI in the military domain?

•

What are the states’ views on priorities for international discussions on this topic and what are thechallenges for the region?

•

What should be the next steps for governance of military AI?

The present report seeks to summarize UNIDIR’s reflections on the main findings and takeaways fromthe regional consultations. Attendance at the five regional consultations has enabled the dissectionof local contexts, realities and approaches with regards to the responsible development, deployment
and use of AI in the military and wider security domains – including the identification of areas of convergence and divergence at the regional level. In addition, the conduct of these regional consultations has
enabled the identification of areas of cross-regional convergence that may, if leveraged and developed
appropriately, open up governance pathways at the international level. On the flipside of the coin, there
are a number of points about which regions diverge. However, it is important to note that, in many if not
most cases, divergences are not necessarily or intrinsically harmful to an aligned international approachto responsible AI in the military and wider security domains (as discussed in Section 5). A comprehensive mapping of areas of divergence can thus support governance initiatives, which will foster cooperation and mutual understanding. Such efforts will ultimately prevent uncoordinated efforts and harmful
fragmentation, while enabling unity in the international community and strength in diversity.

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102. General Views on AI Fundamentals,
Applications and Opportunities
The consultations provided an opportunity for states to share reflections on theunique characteristics of artificial intelligence technologies, and the opportunities
they provide in the military domain. These applications range from organizational roles to supporting or even enhancing the conduct of warfare. Specifically, thefollowing applications were among those discussed by states and experts during
the consultations, understood as an overview of the main opportunities AI could
offer in the military domain:Intelligence, surveillance andreconnaissance

Cyber capabilities

Target recognition and decisionsupport systems

Training, simulation and planningElectronic warfare
Information and cognitive warfare

Autonomous and uncrewed vehicles
Predictive maintenanceBack-end

Many of these opportunities are even found to extend beyond the military domain andto have wider security applications.
States generally agree that AI holds tremendous potential and offers many and deeply transformative opportunities when developed, deployed and used responsibly in the military and wider security domains.
Consistent with the general historical trend that technology has a profound impact on warfare and constitutes a force multiplier, there is a shared understanding that AI considerably enhances existing capabilities across a wide range of applications in the military domain and beyond. In fact, states generally
agreed that the military use of AI holds the potential to increase efficiency and reach and, if applied tothis end, could be used to mitigate some humanitarian harm of armed conflict. Therefore, and in linewith the desire and promise to provide those harnessing novel capabilities with competitive advantage
and to make war more frictionless overall, many states and experts see AI innovation as an imperative
to preserve and maintain international peace and security.
Unlike other technologies, however, both states and experts across regions share the sentiment that
AI is distinguished by its general-purpose nature and accessibility (i.e., lower barrier of entry from theavailability of low-cost models, if not free open-source AI). These technologies are in fact deployable
across domains, both digitally to enable or enhance cyber capabilities and as part of physical, kinetic
systems. The majority of states have thus agreed that AI is indeed poised to play a key enabling role in

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11the military and security domains through increased autonomy, speed and scalability, ranging from navigation to data collection, data processing and target identification. The following examples are among
the wide range of applications the states have identified where AI could bring tremendous opportunities
in the military and security domains.
Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissancethe enhancement of electronic warfare capa-

The ability to collect and process vastbilities (including for target identification andamounts of ISR data at speed and at scale willbring tremendous advantages for enhanced
situational awareness and, ultimately, tosupport decision-making. These capabilities are particularly appealing for operationsin cluttered environments where, coupledwith remote systems such as uncrewed
aerial vehicles (UAVs), they enable rapid andreliable target identification and recognition(e.g., using computer vision programmes). In
naval warfare, AI enables the collection of intelligence to be continuous and uninterrupted,
which enables the processing of vast amountsof data in a timely manner to support military

engagement), as well as threat detection, interception and disruption within short timeframes and at scale.
Information and cognitive warfare
AI offers opportunities in the psychologicalrealm. While AI is generally found to exacerbate disinformation risks and make themmore complex, it also holds the potential tocounter hostile information operations. For
instance, technological solutions are being
developed to identify content made by generative AI (e.g., watermarking). Blockchain
has also been identified as a promisingand security operations (e.g., counter-piracy).

means to help with authentication to contrib-

Advances in natural language processing

addition, these technologies can also help

also play a critical part in the digital space – forexample, to enable multilingual speech or text

ute to such counter-disinformation efforts. In
with sentiment analysis and for the prediction of future attacks. In the longer term, AI’s

recognition across digital platforms.

convergence with neurotechnology and theTarget-recognition
systems

explored (e.g., for human enhancement).

anddecision-support

In order to complement ISR capabilities,

rise of brain–computer interfaces is also to be

Cyber capabilities

AI-enabled decision-support systems are also

AI is both a force multiplier and a threat mul-increasingly explored as a means to support

tiplier, including in the cyber domain. For

command and control across all domains of

instance, AI can create advanced threat-em-

operations. In principle, these capabilities

ulation systems that enable better planning

can also be integrated into weapons systems

and, subsequently, the development of cybereither with or without humans in the loop.

defensive capabilities to safeguard against theincreasing sophistication of cyber offensive

Electronic warfare

capabilities (including those AI-enabled).

The notion of “cognitive electronic warfare”– AI-enabled electronic warfare capabilities – has emerged and has been discussed.
Possible applications include, for example,

This is particularly important to safeguard
states’ critical national infrastructure against
risks of being exposed to cyber operations. In
addition, AI can play a critical role in detecting

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12anomalies at a much faster pace, as well as
subsequently enhancing incident responses
which, at times, may not even necessarily
require humans in the loop.

Autonomous and uncrewed vehicles
These include, in particular, swarming capabilities across all domains of operation.

In addition, because of its general-purpose nature, AI’s impact and implications will reach beyond the
conduct of warfare. The areas in which the armed forces and other adopting organizations, including
law enforcement agencies, will see implications on the organizational level include the following.
Training, simulation and planning

Back-end

Advances in generative AI hold the promise

AI also holds tremendous potential inof providing the armed forces with safer,enhancing back-end capabilities, ranging

synthetic environments for the conduct offrom logistics (e.g., ammunition storage andtraining exercises and for planning purposesmanagement) to streamlining administra-(e.g., to predict the adversary’s behaviour,tive processes. In addition, armed forces

tactics and strategy).

generally consist of a vast pool, and a wide
variety, of personnel. AI-enabled systems are

Predictive maintenanceexpected to greatly affect personnel man-

AI can be used to estimate, anticipate andplan when systems would need to undergo
repairs or servicing, especially for those capabilities that require regular maintenance (e.g.,heavy artillery).

agement as they cannot only automate andstreamline a number of human resources-related processes, but can also make the mostof the pool of talent available to leverage thepersonnel’s respective skills and knowledge.

States’ and experts’ deliberations have demonstrated that the above-mentioned AI applications arebeing increasingly integrated across domains of operation – in the air, on land, at sea, in space andin cyber operations. A number of states across all regions have indeed announced the adoption, toa certain extent, of a number of the above-mentioned capabilities. For instance, the navies of certain
African states are using AI-enabled ISR technologies in counter-piracy efforts and, more generally,
to track and curb organized crime across borders. UAVs with increasingly autonomous functions arealso heavily commercialized (e.g., by Türkiye, Iran and China) and deployed in various armed conflicts
around the globe. In Latin America and the Caribbean, AI already plays a critical role in enhancing cyberdefensive capabilities – especially to compensate for the lack of resources and personnel that certain
states face against the increased sophistication of offensive cyber operations conducted by non-statearmed groups (NSAGs) and criminal organizations.

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3. General Views on Risks, Challenges
and Implications
In addition to a host of opportunities, states also discussed and exchanged views on
the risks, challenges and implications stemming from the development, deployment
and use of AI in the military and wider security domains. These range from the technological to the legal and the socio-economic.
The following risks, challenges and implications were among those discussed bystates and experts during the consultations:
Cyber risks

Availability of reliable data

Accessibility

Economic and social implications

Risks of misuse

Structural risks

Conflict and security dynamics
Characteristics of AI technologies

Overdependency and technicalilliteracy

Disruptions to the information
environment

Compliance with international law
and ethical considerations

Escalation

Interoperability and integration

In parallel to the opportunities offered by AI technologies, they introduce a host of risks that can be
novel or can make existing risks more complex or even exacerbate them. These risks are multidimensional and can stem from a number of factors, including the technology’s inherent characteristics, thesurrounding conflict dynamics, regional realities on the political and legal fronts, the culture of adoption
and use, as well as risks to and from persons in conflict. Disinformation, inadvertent escalation, proliferation to non-state armed groups, as well as the increased vulnerability of systems at risk of adversarial attack constitute some of the many risks shared during the consultations. These risks apply both inarmed conflict and below its threshold (i.e., in law enforcement operations, during peacetime), which
requires states to be prepared and to have clear risk-mitigation plans in both instances. Some, if not
most, of the following risks are generally shared across regions; however, their order of importance andmagnitude generally tend to diverge from one another (see Box 1).
Cyber risks

number of security implications. Safeguard-

The integration of AI not only across theing them against cyber operations will require

military domain but also more widely (e.g.,in critical national infrastructure) will have aa level of resilience, in addition to dedicatedresources and capabilities.

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14Accessibility

including for border security and electronic

Many factors – including the mass and rapid
commercialization of products, the affordability of these technologies and the adventof open-source AI – provide plenty of opportunities to increase the accessibility of AI for
security and defence applications. Ensuringthat measures are in place to prevent accessfor misuse, however, will be critical. Policy
responses must strike the right balance
between the need to curb proliferation risks
versus maintaining the opportunities offeredby accessible AI (e.g., open-source AI).
These measures must not work unfairly at theexpense of states with more limited resources
and that would (greatly) benefit from lower

warfare. However, the impact that AI will haveon conflict and security dynamics remains
very much speculative at this stage; althougha host of concerns and risks arise, especiallyin tense environments where distrust prevails(e.g., in the case of erroneous early warning
against risk escalations). As such, pre-existing state-to-state relationships and also thosebetween states and other actors (especiallyfor contexts where NSAGs or organized crime
prevail) will bear great influence over how
these dynamics ultimately unfold.
Characteristics of AI technologies
Given the probabilistic nature of AI technolo-

points of access to these technologies.

gies and the inherent black box in many, if not

Risks of misusedictably, unexpectedly and unexplainably. The

The dual-use nature of many, if not most, technologies raises concerns related to accessand misuse by NSAGs. This is the case, forinstance, with the use of generative AI by subcontracted hacktivists to write or enhancemalware; another example pertains to the repurposing of uncrewed vehicles. Beyond
access concerns, questions also arise withregards to traceability and accountability,
both made even more complex in the eventof acquisition and use of AI technologies by
NSAGs. The acquisition of these technologies and subsequent misuse by NSAGs may
cause increased destabilization from hybrid
warfare. Furthermore, misuse can also occur
in the hands of intended and licit users, whichfurther accentuates the need for traceability and measures for upholding accountability

most, applications, AI could function unprelegal, policy and ethical implications of thesetechnologies across the military and security
domains remain to be determined, especiallyas information and evidence on the concrete
impact of these technologies in security anddefence remain relatively limited to date.
These concerns, however, ought to be counterbalanced by the inherent uncertainty of warfare– the “fog of war”: Thus, in the context ofmilitary operations, it would be the commander’s responsibility to adopt a holistic approachto assessing the opportunities and risks fromthe eventual use of certain AI technologies.
Disruptions to the information environment
Artificial intelligence and, in particular, generative AI can erode trust in the information

and responsibility of use.

environment, both internally and between

Conflict and security dynamics

intelligence may be at risk; and the genera-states. The veracity and accuracy of military

The deployment of AI technologies will inevitably affect local and regional dynamics– especially certain sensitive applications,tion of deepfakes can, for example, disrupt intelligence-sharing frameworks between two
states.

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Escalationsocietal biases in training and testing data;

AI will affect perceptions, assumptions andjudgments and, thus, can (heavily) affect risk
assessments and lead to unintended escalation. Indeed, AI could reduce barriers to theuse of force, in addition to opening the door
to miscalculations and unintended consequences, which, in turn, can result in escalatory responses. These escalation risks will be
increased in contexts of high tension.
Availability of reliable data

algorithmic bias; the need for contextualized
data versus the unavailability of local data;
limitations or even scarcity in the financial,human or technical resources available topromote responsible AI; as well as the main
players in the local and regional security
landscape.
Overdependency and technical illiteracy
AI holds tremendous potential in enhancing
situational awareness in conflict and, thus,

Cognizant of the role of data in the development, training, testing and use of AI in the
military and security domains, it is criticalthat high-quality data sets that reflect the
local contexts and realities are used for such
purposes. Yet, the availability of local data may,at times, be a challenge especially for states
where digital transformation is still on-going.

informing the commander’s risks assessments and decision-making. Amidst theincreased use and even dependency on AI-enabled decision-support systems, the absenceof adequate training and clear rules of engagement, coupled with techno-solutionism, carryrisks with regards to the system’s reliability,
compliance with international law and ethicalrequirements. Some states were even of theview that such risks could, potentially, go as

Economic and social implications
The unregulated and unrestrained development, deployment and use of AI in the military
domain would have a number of economic
and social implications. These can range frompublic perceptions of the legitimacy of such
use to the second- and third-order impact of
NSAGs acquiring, deploying and using suchtechnologies (e.g., impact on trade and, thus,
the economy). These will ultimately have an
impact on the availability and subsequent allocation of resources for upholding responsible practices surrounding AI in the military
domain.

far as affecting national, regional and international peace and security, for example, in thecontext of conflict escalation due to overreliance on the output of AI technologies.
Compliance with international law and ethicalconsiderations
States generally prioritize compliance with international law and ethics in their national andregional approaches to responsible AI in the
military domain. This is generally reflected inregional and national policies and strategy
documents, as well as in states’ national
positions in regional and international deliberations. However, the development, deploy-

Structural risks
A number of risks stem from structural issues
that have subsequent implications for responsible practices surrounding AI in the military
and wider security domains. These include

ment and use of these technologies, alongwith their procurement (especially those
off-the-shelves) raises questions about thestates’ ability to comply with these frameworks.

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16Interoperability and integration

contextualized training), safety and security

The dependence of many states on foreigntechnologies, especially from certain regions,raises the question of coordination, interoperability, reliability (i.e., against the need for(against different testing standards). The interaction between novel and legacy systems
adds another layer of complexity and uncertainty with regards to interoperability.

BOX 1.

Varied Approaches to Risks, Challenges and Implications
While many, if not most, of the concerns about the risks of AI in the military domain are generally sharedacross regions, they tend to be approached and prioritized differently at the regional or even subregional level. These divergences are reflected, for instance, in states’ assessment with regards to theirlikelihood and (potential) impact; the key actors; types of harm involved against local contexts; ordersof consequences; as well as their time frame (i.e., whether they are considered as short-, medium- or
long-term risks). Some regions may prioritize risk-reduction efforts and measures in the realms of legal
compliance and ethics; others’ policies may revolve further around increasing national security.
Perceived risks differ too at the cross-regional and subregional levels. In Asia, a number of states would
prioritize risks surrounding the misuse of these technologies and their appropriation by and proliferation to “malicious” actors. Others are more focused on the humanitarian impact and risks stemmingfrom these technologies. Risks associated with strategic stability, nuclear affairs and regional stability
are also among those raised as a priority by some. However, it is important to note that the differences in risk perceptions and prioritization were not necessarily found to be mutually exclusive by states
within the region.
Similarly, in Africa, some states would prioritize addressing the (existential) risks stemming from thepossible integration of AI into nuclear command, control and communications systems; while others
are of the view that these risks are less relevant for the region and that other risks prevail. In Latin
America and the Caribbean, a distinct emphasis is put on the risk of proliferation of these technologies
into the hands of non-state armed groups and their subsequent use to exacerbate organized criminal
activities. Additionally, the region is also particularly concerned by the far-reaching impact of AI on theadvancement of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); as well as the preservation of human rights in the light of the development, deployment and use of AI in the military and wider
security domains and its subsequent impact on political, socio-economic and cultural rights.

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4. Key Policy Priorities: Points ofNuanced ConvergenceThrough the five consultations, six points of convergence were identified as surfacing
and applying across regions:
Facets of responsible AI practices in the military and wider security domains:
Taking stock of opportunities
Compliance with international law and ethical considerations
The human element as a key enabler for accountability and responsibility
Multi-stakeholder engagement
The need for meaningful regional dialogue to understand local contexts
The importance of capacity-building efforts
There are, however, nuances within and across regions in these commonalities. Thesevariations are due to a host of factors, including political and cultural differences,varied socio-economical contexts, as well as differences in legal traditions.
At the cross-regional level, a number of commonalities, patterns and areas of convergence emerged
from the consultations. There are, generally, shared sentiments between states on the following six
thematic areas:a. Facets of responsible AI practices in the military and wider security domains: Taking stock of opportunities
b. Compliance with international law and ethical considerations
c. The human element as a key enabler for accountability and responsibility
d. Multi-stakeholder engagement
e. The need for meaningful regional dialogue to understand, and factor in, local contexts – which is key
to promoting, enabling and operationalizing the responsible development, deployment and use of
AI in the military and wider security domainsf.

The importance of capacity-building efforts

Together, these similarities constitute building blocks for the responsible development, deployment
and use of AI in the military domain. However, they are far from being monolithic and there are nuancesand variations across regions, despite shared patterns and the existence of common threads. In fact,
akin to the general observation on risks, regions may be approaching these areas of convergence differently, hence they are “nuanced”.

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4.1 Facets of Responsible AI Practices in the Military andWider Security Domains: Taking Stock of Opportunities
There is agreement, across regions, that AI in the military domain offers a host of opportunities,
from enhancing ISR capabilities to supporting command and control, logistics and planning, as wellas personnel management. Integration of AI across all functions and domains can, indeed, act asa force-multiplier, with many even considering the adoption of these technologies as a necessity torespond to the evolving nature of warfare and conflict (e.g., with the rise in hybrid warfare and asymmetrical threats). Beyond combat, AI is also seen as a critical component of the conduct of (collective)
self-defence, and even conflict prevention. These opportunities extend far beyond the military domain
and concern wider security applications, including to support law enforcement, bolster border security,
enhance counter-piracy efforts, as well as aid with humanitarian and relief efforts in response to natural
disasters.
Yet, there is also the shared sentiment that responsible behaviour and practices must be upheld whilethese opportunities are being explored and harnessed and must remain central to the development,
deployment and use of AI in the military domain. While there is no consensus as to what “responsible”
means, Figure 1 shows elements and considerations that constitute some of the facets of responsible
AI in the military domain shared across regions.
FIGURE 1.

Facets of Responsible AI in the Military Domain

PRESERVATION
OF THE HUMAN
ELEMENTCOMPLIANCE WITH
NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAWDATA GOVERNANCEFOR RESPONSIBLE AI

CAREFULCONSIDERATIONOF DUAL-USE
TECHNOLOGIES ANDRISK MITIGATIONEFFORTSFACETS OFRESPONSIBLE AI
IN THE MILITARYDOMAINPERMANENCE OF
ACCOUNTABILITY ANDRESPONSIBILITY
THROUGHOUT THE
TECHNOLOGY'S
LIFECYCLEIDENTIFICATION
AND MITIGATION OF
RISKS ASSOCIATED
WITH AI DEVELOPMENT,DEPLOYMENT AND USE

CROSS-POLLINATIONWITH RESPONSIBLE AI
EFFORTS IN THE
CIVILIAN REALM

INCLUSIVITY
THROUGH CAPACTY
BUILDING EFFORTS
AND REGIONAL
DIALOGUE

PROMOTION OFETHICS, EQUITY AND
HUMAN RIGHTST H E G L O B A L KA L E I D O S C O P E O F M I L I TA R Y A I G O V E R N A N C E

19

4.2 Compliance with International Law and Ethical
Considerations
The overwhelming majority of states across regions place compliance with international law and ethicalconsiderations, a key complementary element to the latter (see Box 2) as a central component of theirgovernance approaches to AI in the military, and even wider security domains.
There is indeed a shared sentiment that international law is an important framework that must be upheld
throughout the life cycle of AI technologies. Among other things, international law considerations must
be considered from the earliest stages (i.e., design, development and testing), which would require
efforts to “translate” international law into technical requirements in order to frame and shape thepre-deployment stages of these technologies. In addition, international law – and in particular international humanitarian law and international human rights law – ought to inform, or even frame and shape,
procurement processes as many states are increasingly considering purchasing AI-enabled capabilities. To this end, guidance documents and frameworks with best practices for legal compliance would
be useful, in particular for states without vast resources and capacity available for such efforts.
From a policy standpoint, however, there are nuances across regions in states’ approaches to international law. States in Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, generally dedicate more attention
and efforts to foster compliance with, and uphold, international human rights law. While states in all
regions acknowledge the importance of the latter, international humanitarian law tends to overwhelmingly dominate the policies and discourse of states in regions other than Latin America and the Caribbean
and, as discussed below, Africa. This approach is reflective of the regional security landscape, wheretransnational efforts at combatting organized crime prevail and in the light of international human rights
law’s applicability both in and outside conflict. Nevertheless, this is not to discount the importance ofinternational humanitarian law in the Latin American and Caribbean region. These states’ approach toand interpretation of international humanitarian law, however, tends to differ from that of other regions
by revolving around its underlying spirit – that is, minimizing the effects of war and protecting civilians– in hand with the predominating perception that AI further dehumanizes war and conflict. In contrast,
other regions would tend to approach international humanitarian law from a permissibility and compliance standpoint.
Human rights also play a critical role in Africa, particularly within the framework of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights; the underlying reasons, however, vary. In the light of the strong emphasis
in Africa on contextualization, this approach enables the consideration of the wider socio-economic implications stemming from the development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain.
States in Asia, while affirming the importance of ensuring compliance “by design” and throughout
the technology’s life cycle, put great emphasis on the importance of realistic monitoring and enforcement mechanisms based on scientific evidence, through the input and expertise of the technicalcommunity. Furthermore, there are specific concerns with regards to the implications that AI technologies will have for the application of international maritime law, which many in the region believe will
require further reflection.

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20Meanwhile, states in South East Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central Asia are particularly concerned about the applicability and subsequent application of international law to non-state
actors. These concerns are twofold. First, as non-state armed groups are increasingly seeking to adopt
and use AI technologies to support their military operations, these groups’ liability, and the ability to holdthem accountable, will depend on a number of variables such as the political will of parties involved,
the resources available, as well as accessibility to conflict areas for investigation and evidence collection. Second, in addition to state responsibility and that of individuals (e.g., the commander, throughinternational criminal law), the development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain raises
questions about corporate accountability. This question is of particular relevance for incidents resulting
from a technology’s malfunction: Many states have indeed shared concerns with regards to the blackbox nature of AI systems that will make it difficult, if not impossible, to ensure traceability and thereby
establish accountability and responsibility. This conundrum is made more complex in situations wherestates are procuring capabilities from foreign defence contractors or technology companies – an issue
many in other regions are encountering too.

BOX 2.

Ethics: A Key Element Complementary to International Law
Beyond international law, states across regions generally shared the view that ethics constitute animportant approach to complement international law for the governance of AI in the military domain.
While there is no consensus as to the key ethical principles that underpin the “responsible” development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain, the following elements constitute some of themain considerations shared by states throughout the consultations:•

Traceability•

Accountability•

Responsibility•

Explainability•

Humanity•

Transparency•

Equity•Fairness

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4.3 The Human Element as a Key Enabler for Accountability
and Responsibility
Building on the previous point, states generally agree that accountability and responsibility must be
upheld in the context of the development, deployment and use of AI in the military and wider security
domains. There are a number of ways through which accountability and responsibility can be established. On an individual basis, commanders will always be responsible for the military operations thatthey helm. States may also be held liable for attributable internationally wrongful acts in the development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain. Beyond these, a number of states across regions
are also keen on exploring the extent to which corporate responsibility can be upheld, including the individual responsibility of developers involved in the design, development and testing of these technologies, especially with regards to incidents.
The human element is often raised as a key enabler to establishing and maintaining accountability andresponsibility. To this end, two particular aspects of the human element are central:a. Human judgment, intervention, oversight and control
b. The effective sensitization and training of individuals involved throughout the life cycle of the technology – from its design and development to its testing, deployment and subsequent use
Generally, human–machine teaming, with varying degrees of human judgment, intervention, oversightand control, is seen as necessary to maintain accountability and responsibility in decision-making.
Certain states would even argue that there may be circumstances in which humans in the loop are notnecessarily feasible, nor desirable for those deploying these systems; the deployment of AI-enabledcyber defence capabilities being one of such examples. Nevertheless, commanders will always, ultimately, maintain individual responsibility for military operations, including those that involve AI-enabled technologies and including operations in the cyber realm. Clarity on the extent to which humans
are involved and can exercise judgment, intervention, oversight and control over the technology can
only help with establishing and maintaining accountability and responsibility.
Furthermore, and in order to enable effective and reliable human–machine teaming, there is the sharedsentiment that the sensitization and training of individuals involved throughout the life cycle of the technology must be prioritized. This implies raising awareness among technologists and developers on
legal requirements and ethical considerations in order to factor these “by design”; end users will alsoneed to have undergone training in order to fully understand the technology, including its capabilities
and limitations. The latter is particularly important in order to maintain the accountability and responsibility of commanders with regards to risks assessments and the eventual decision to deploy and use
AI-enabled technologies for military operations.
In addition, consultation participants from all regions drew attention to the rigorous deliberations undertaken in this space, specifically in the context of autonomous weapons systems both within theConvention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems and within the United Nations General Assembly. A number of states
have discussed (or, in certain cases, expressed the desire to reflect on) how to connect and bridge thediscussions occurring in different forums, as well as what lessons could be drawn for future, broader
discussions on AI in the military and wider security domains.
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4.4 Multi-Stakeholder Engagement
States generally recognize the value of multi-stakeholder and cross-sectoral engagement to promoteresponsible AI in the military domain. A number of (varying) incentives to conduct such engagement
have been put forward, including the following examples.
Compliance by design
Multi-stakeholder

engagement,

subsequently inform and provide inspiration,
especiallywith industries, provides the platform needed
to take stock of legal frameworks and ethicalconsiderations, and “translate” them into
technical requirements and solutions in order

as appropriate, for governance efforts surrounding responsible AI in the military domain.
Inclusivity
Perspectives drawn from industry, civil society

to foster compliance by design.

and academia will ensure that governance

Effective implementation and operationalization of responsible norms and behaviour

domain are inclusive, equitable and holistic;

Engaging the multi-stakeholder community

stakeholder can play in their implementation

solutions for responsible AI in the military

will ensure that policy discussions, deliberations and solutions remain grounded, realistic
and evidence-based. This is a critical feature inand that there is clarity as to what role eachand operationalization.
Capacity-building and awareness-raising

the light of the technical nature of AI integration

Multi-stakeholder dialogue bridges perspec-in the military domain and in addition to its po-tives and efforts between and across commu-

tentially profound implications for peace andnities, from the scientific and technical circles

security. As such, multi-stakeholder platforms

to those in the policymaking, legal and ethicalprovide room for evidence-based forecasting,spaces. Multi-stakeholder consultations willrisk assessments and the subsequent devel-thus raise awareness on alternative perspec-

opment of risk-mitigation measures.

tives and approaches to responsible AI in the
military domain. These will need to be coupled

Risk mitigation

with capacity-building efforts to foster mutual

Platforms for cross-sectoral and multi-stakeholder exchange of good practices and information will be key for risk mitigation, especially to feed into and consolidate complianceefforts from the “upstream” stages in the tech-understanding and governance pathways
that are actionable and holistic. It is hoped bymany states and experts alike that these willsubsequently pave the way for risk-mitigation and governance measures that are coor-

nology’s life cycle.

dinated across regions and across sectors, inCross-pollination from other security fields

fostering preparedness globally.

addition to solidifying incident responses andA number of states and experts alike see
multi-stakeholder engagement as an opportunity to draw lessons from the governanceof other security fields, such as the nuclear
and cyber domains. Cross-sectoral dialogue,
coupled with comparative studies, could

For instance, certain states in Latin America
and the Caribbean and in Asia are of the viewthat there is a need to increase the awarenessof industry actors of applicable laws and thesubsequent implications for the design andT H E G L O B A L KA L E I D O S C O P E O F M I L I TA R Y A I G O V E R N A N C E

23development of AI technologies in the military

under international humanitarian law in an

domain. For instance, companies should

armed conflict. There is indeed no clarity as

consider whether the development of systems

to whether companies, especially small andto support war efforts could be considered

medium enterprises, have in-house capacity

as direct participation in hostilities and,and processes to test against states’ legal ob-

thus, would make developers lawful targets

ligations and ultimately foster compliance.

There are, however, diverging views as to how multi-stakeholder engagement should be conducted,
and why. In fact, while states generally agree that it is at least important to consider multi-stakeholder perspectives, regional and national sensitives cause disagreements as to the best approach to thisissue and the motivations. States’ views particularly diverge with regards to the level of involvement
by industry: despite the common understanding that parallel discussions with industry and the overall
technical and expert community are much needed, the level to which they should be involved in governance discussions and deliberations remain contested. Some are of the view that norm-setting and policymaking exclusively remain the sovereign prerogative of states and, thus, their development, negotiation and adoption must continue to be done by states, while companies, civil society and academia
will play a critical role in helping implement norms and principles. Others were of the view that input
from industry and civil society organizations is essential and must be embedded within formal deliberations and processes; a number of states have raised and discussed the model followed in multilateral
discussions on cyber that involve, to a certain extent, industry representatives who are provided space
to share knowledge, technical expertise and perspectives, while ensuring that states maintain theirsovereign prerogative for policymaking and regulation-making. These variations were not only present
across regions but also among states within the same region.
As such, different forms of multi-stakeholder engagement have emerged. For instance, a number ofstates are keen to explore formal public–private partnerships to promote the responsible development, deployment and use of technologies. Informal forms of multi-stakeholder engagement were also
discussed, such as joint capacity-building activities (e.g., multi-stakeholder tabletop exercises), as wellas informal exchanges of best practices. A number of states across regions have expressed support
for initiatives akin to UNIDIR’s Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics (RAISE), which provides for an
independent and neutral platform that generate cross-regional and cross-sectoral perspectives, recommendations and action points on the governance of AI in the military and wider security domains.2
The Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain (GC-REAIM), established as an
outcome to the first REAIM Summit, constitutes another example of such efforts that has been deemedas promising by certain states.

2

UNIDIR, ‘RAISE: The Roundtable for AI, Security and Ethics’, https://unidir.org/raise/T H E G L O B A L KA L E I D O S C O P E O F M I L I TA R Y A I G O V E R N A N C E

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4.5 Meaningful Regional Dialogue and Frameworks
There is a general appetite for maintaining dialogue at the regional level on AI governance in the militaryand security domains, as well as the exchange of information and best practices. Far from supplanting multilateral processes, such regional dialogues would in fact complement and consolidate the discussions held at the international level on the issue of AI in the military and wider security domains(e.g., within REAIM, within the framework of the United States-led Political Declaration on Responsible
Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy, as well as within the First Committee of the United
Nations General Assembly). While higher-level political discussions can take place in multilateral andinternational forums, parallel regional deliberations provide states with an avenue for further granularity.
Certain regions have specifically stressed more than others the importance of contextualization – thatis, putting an emphasis on regional contexts and realities to inform and shape policy and regulatory
responses. This sentiment was particularly prominent among African states, as they consider contextualization as a sine qua non condition to all governance approaches and solutions to promote responsible AI in the military domain. Contextualization is indeed key to considering local technological, geopolitical and security realities – all of which require dialogue at the regional level in order to capture theirbreadth and depth.
There are a number of ways and forms in which such regional dialogue can be conducted. Regionalorganizations and processes constitute one key platform to enable the convening of such a dialogue,
eventual alignment (e.g., through a regional-level policy or strategy document) and the subsequent establishment of enforcement mechanisms. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)value, for instance, the alliance’s efforts to enable coordinated and concerted approaches to AI development and innovation: beyond dialogue within the alliance, initiatives and frameworks such as the
Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) and NATO’s AI Strategy are consideredas key influencing factors. The latter, for example, places key ethical principles (e.g., traceability andexplainability) high on member states’ political agenda. To go even further, during the consultations
certain NATO members expressed an interest in establishing a regulator at the organizational level,with a supervisory board or authority supported by select experts, including from academia and theindustry. This body would enforce legal and ethical requirements in addition to conducting independent
investigations, cognizant of the sensitivities of military operations.
In parallel, while African states generally acknowledge the diversity of viewpoints within and across theregion, the local context is such that there is a shared desire for a united regional front. It is therefore
a priority to arrive at a collective vision on responsible AI in the military domain that fosters regional
cooperation, mutual trust, shared understandings, and the meaningful exchange of information, bestpractices and resources. States generally align their national approaches and policies to the efforts doneat the regional level; at the time, many Africa states were awaiting the formal adoption of the African
Union’s Continental AI Strategy, which would then be integrate into their national policies and legislation.3 As such, states in Africa share the desire to raise awareness, at the international level, of thisunique approach that promotes unity in diversity, all the while respecting states’ national sovereignty.

3

At the time of the consultations, on 6 June 2024, the African Union’s Continental AI Strategy had not yet been adopted.
The Strategy was adopted on 17 June 2024. African Union, “African Ministers Adopt Landmark Continental Artificial Intelligence
Strategy, African Digital Compact to drive Africa’s Development and Inclusive Growth”, Press release, 17 June 2024, https://au.int/en/pressreleases/20240617/african-ministers-adopt-landmark-continental-artificial-intelligence-strategy.

In addition to dialogue within institutions (e.g., within NATO or the African Union, as discussed above),
there is an appetite for thematic discussions conducted at the regional level. Reaching beyond thepolicy, legal and ethical realms, there is, for instance, a desire to gain granularity at the technical level.
For example, a number of African representatives expressed support for thematic discussions andworking groups on such issues as the black box, effective integration and interoperability, computing
power and data. These could convene technical representatives from states within the region to informand consolidate policy recommendations and operationalization pathways. With regards to data, forinstance, the establishment of a dedicated regional and technical working group to exchange anddissect specific aspects (e.g., data availability and quality in each state, data-protection frameworks, aswell as data-sharing agreements) will be important to foster responsible practices surrounding AI in the
military domain. Focused discussions on hardware and computing power will also be key to promoting
equitable and safe technology transfers while curbing risks of proliferation and misuse.
Finally, joint investment frameworks, whether at the regional or even bilateral level, can also constitutea key avenue for meaningful dialogue and cooperation. States in the Gulf have a cooperation and joint
investment programme into AI technologies, including the military domain, which constitutes one such
example. Additionally, interstate dialogue, confidence-building measures and agreements at the intermediary levels (e.g., between ministries of foreign affairs) must also be explored, especially to circumvent political blockages at the higher level).

4.6 The Importance of Capacity-Building Efforts
Beyond dialogue, states generally emphasize the need to invest in capacity-building, technical literacy
and education, at both the regional and national levels. States are of the view that high levels of investments in AI must, necessarily, be coupled with high levels of investments in education to train, preserveand maintain the human capital needed to foster responsible practices surrounding the development,
deployment and use of AI in the military and wider security domains.
Beyond the need to foster and retain AI talent, training is generally perceived as key in the context of capacity-building initiatives and, ultimately, to foster the responsible development, deployment and useof AI in the military and security domains. End-users, supervisors, operators, commanders, and eventhose procuring and evaluating those systems must go through extensive training that enables them toleverage the opportunities that these technologies have to offer and, conversely, exercise control whensuch need arises. Furthermore, training is considered as key to effective human–machine teaming
and collaboration and, ultimately, responsibility over the deployment and use of AI systems. As such,a number of states across regions have stressed the importance of mandatory and robust training ofarmed forces personnel to ensure responsible practices surrounding AI in the military domain.
To this end, platforms, efforts and regular convenings to facilitate information-sharing and the exchangeof best practices will be key. In addition, investment in talent and public education must also be prioritized to enable mutual learning and cross-pollination between the civilian and public sectors, ultimately
paving the way for robust, resilient and responsible AI systems. Capacity-building needs, however, differ
across regions and actors, and local contexts vary. As such, capacity-building efforts and initiatives
must be adapted accordingly in order to ensure effective knowledge transfer and information-sharing.

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States are not the only target audiences. In fact, states have expressed a desire to intensify capacity-building efforts for industry representatives with regards to international law obligations, especiallyas dual-use technologies are growing in prominence. Not only will these efforts help foster complianceby design, they will also raise awareness of the potential implications that international law may have for
their activities (e.g., whether the development of systems to support war efforts could be considered as
direct participation in hostilities and, thus, would make these entities lawful targets under international
humanitarian law in armed conflict).
A number of capacity-building models were explored and discussed during the consultations (seeFigure 2).
FIGURE 2.

Capacity-Building Models Explored and Discussed over Consultations
T R A I N I N G B Y I N T E R N AT I O N A L

INTERNALP U B L I C - P R I V AT E

A N D R E G I O N A L O R G A N I Z AT I O N S

C A PA C I T Y- B U I L D I N G

PA R T N E R S H I P S••

In Latin America and the
Caribbean, the Organizationof American States (OAS) has
conducted a number of capacity-building efforts in the cyberfield over recent year, which manystates have found to be extremely
useful. There is appetite for such
efforts to expand beyond the cyberrealm and to encompass AI issues
as well.

•Targeted training for the diplomatic corps (as provided by
UNIDIR), which certain states haveexpressly commended, was also
found to be of value, especiallywhen these thematic discussions
are contextualized against the stateof affairs at the multilateral level.

•

There is appetite among moststates for capacity-building
exercises within and across government agencies. In addition tothe "usual" ministries that address
the issue of AI in the military
domain (i.e., ministries of foreign
affairs and of defence), internal capacity-building will not only ensurethat this issue is addressed holistically and across the board.
Such efforts are also seen asnecessary in the light of internal differences in capacity that often leadto diverging, or even competing,approaches across ministries andstate agencies.

•

Public–private partnerships havealso been explored as a means toestablish capacity-building andinformation-exchange mechanisms between governments andthe private sector, thus enabling
cross-pollination.

•

On a less institutionalized level, anumber of states from South East
Europe, the Middle East, the South
Caucasus and Central Asia also
expressed interest in the conductof joint multi-stakeholder tabletop
exercises, ultimately paving the way
for cross-sectoral collaboration.

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5. Key Policy Priorities: Points ofDivergence
Five points of divergence surfaced during the regional consultations:
Unique local contexts and realities

Prioritization and risk perception

Varying regulatory approaches andlegal traditions

Resource availability and allocation
Desired endgame

These divergences, however, are not harmful in and of themselves to the possibility ofan aligned international approach to responsible AI in the military and wider security
domains. At times, these divergences may even be desirable, or even necessary.
A number of divergences have emerged across and within regions. However, it is important to notethat these variations in approaches are not inherently harmful to an aligned international approach toresponsible AI in the military and wider security domains. At times, these variations and nuances are,in fact, desirable or even necessary to account for regional contexts and realities. Most of the time, aslong as there is effective coordination at the international level and mutual understanding of states’ andregions’ different approaches and rationales (i.e., drivers and underlying reasons for certain policy directions), the points below will not necessarily lead to fragmentation. Instead, they will create a reinforced and inclusive policy and regulatory landscape that is united in diversity, ultimately enabling andpromoting responsible AI in the military and wider security domains.

5.1 Unique Local Contexts and Realities
The first primary area of divergence relates to the unique local contexts, realities and strategic priorities across and within regions. A discussion on these variations across regions can indeed help states
understand the rationale, motivations and overall background that may influence the approach of otherstates, or even a whole region, to responsible AI in the military domain: this mutual understanding canthen help provide for an environment conducive to trust and productive dialogue.
In Asia, maritime security is a particularly central (and contentious) subject. Due in particular to thegeopolitical landscape of the region, states are particularly keen to leverage the opportunities that AI
has to offer to bolster their maritime borders and their security and sovereignty at sea. In addition, theunique geographical traits of the maritime environment in the region are such that the integration of
AI and autonomous functions in military assets is of high interest (e.g., because communication links
are difficult, if not impossible, to establish at sea, especially in the high seas). It is also partly due tothese unique geographical traits that states are particularly insisting on the conduct of clear and robust

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acceptance tests, especially for off-the-shelves capabilities local procured from abroad: ensuring thesystem’s ability to operate and adapt, cognizant of local environments, constitutes a paramount step tomitigate risks of unintended consequences upon its deployment and use.
Similarly, states in South East Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central Asia often
have to grapple with cluttered and inaccessible environments – this time on land, and in particular in
the context of military operations against non-state armed groups. As such, a number of states andregional experts have discussed the prominence of UAVs in the region, as attested through the widespread provision of such capabilities, including with autonomous functions, by either Türkiye, Iran or
China, and their use. In addition, the conduct of future joint military operations within the region (e.g., aspart of NATO for members of the alliance) also raises a number of questions and concerns with regards
to the interoperability of AI technologies across states, but also with legacy systems.
In parallel, the African military theatre is uniquely characterized by an array of issues and considerations, including language barriers, ethnics tensions, as well as competition for resources. The Geneva
Academy’s Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts (RULAC) project estimates that there are currently over
30 non-international armed conflicts in the continent, which attests to the growing number of NSAGs
operating across the region.4 Coupled with the rapid technological growth that the continent is facing,as well as regional regulatory frameworks (e.g., the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights) andlegal traditions, these unique traits attest to the need for a continued meaningful regional dialogue. This
would indeed allow for the promotion and implementation of norms and behaviour for responsible AI inthe military and wider security domains at the regional (and, subsequently, national) level, infused withlocal contexts and realities, allowing for their effective operationalization and enforcement.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, there is the widespread and general view that, because the security
landscape in the region focuses more on countering organized crime and less on interstate conflicts, AI
applications for national security (e.g., through law enforcement and border security) are critical to theregion – and more so than in the military domain. The deployment and use of AI technologies can even,at times, be perceived as compensating for capacity issues faced by smaller states in the absence ofthe talent and human resources at the disposal of armed forces and national security agencies (e.g.,
to increase surveillance and cyber capabilities). Additionally, one notable case is that of Costa Rica,
which uniquely does not have an army and, thus, the priority lies in fostering peaceful AI applications.
As such, the region’s approach to its concerns about the development, deployment and use of AI technologies in security and defence will be different from that of other regions. These concerns include
accessibility and proliferation issues; governance of dual-use technologies; as well as the social andeconomic impacts of AI proliferation and use by NSAGs.

4 Geneva Academy, RULAC, https://www.rulac.org.

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5.2 Varying Regulatory Approaches and Legal Traditions
States generally agree on the need to align AI development, deployment and use with international
norms and principles, societal values, legal requirements and ethical considerations. Compliance withinternational law features prominently in states’ national approaches to promoting responsible AI in the
military domain; and there is a general acknowledgment of the importance of an environment conducive
to compliance. This is reflected in states’ positions, national strategy documents and respective policy
frameworks. Their development, adoption, implementation and review are indeed considered, by moststates, as key not only to establish their approach and interpretation, but also to upholding international and regional peace and security, international law, as well as ethical values such as transparency, accountability and humanity.
However, while states agree on their applicability (and their need to be prioritized), the interpretation
and application of international law and ethics are done in such a way that regional, national and local(i.e., subnational) contexts will inevitably lead to variations in approaches, interpretation and prioritization to international law – even if these regions are facing similar concerns. One stark example of suchvariations pertains to the African; South East European, Middle Eastern, South Caucasus and Central
Asian; and Latin American and Caribbean regions. These three regions have consistently expressed
concern about NSAGs, a topic that has inevitably been discussed in all consultations. Nevertheless,their respective approaches to international law and main concerns present variations (see Box 3).
While they may not, in themselves, necessarily be harmful, knowledge of those nuances can be usefulin better understanding these regions’ individual approaches to the same question.

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BOX 3.

One Issue, Three Regions, Three Approaches: The Question of
Non-State Armed Groups
AFRICAIn Africa, there is a strong emphasis on upholding human rights, particularly those enshrined in regional frameworks such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In fact, while it is acknowledged that international humanitarian law applies in times of armed conflict, there is also the recognition that international
human rights law also applies in peace time (e.g., for law enforcement and counter-terrorism operations). As
such, it generally confers more protection on individuals than does international humanitarian law through ahost of rights, including the right to life and protection against discrimination. Additionally, the African Charteron Human and People’s Rights, in its Article 23(1), provides for the right to national and international peace andsecurity – a protection specifically conferred from post-colonial experiences.
These legal traditions within the region must indeed be contextualized against historical considerations andwider societal implications while scrutinizing the development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain– such as the impact on economic and social rights and trade. This wider context must also take into accountstates’ adjacent technological concerns and policy priorities, which may have direct and indirect implications
for AI governance pathways. These include digital connectivity and inclusion, the promotion of digital public
goods, the need for an effective architecture for digital cooperation, as well as the development and maintenance of resilient data infrastructures.
S O U T H E A S T E U R O P E , T H E M I D D L E E A S T, T H E S O U T H C A U C A S U S A N D C E N T R A L A S I A

In parallel, states in South East Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central Asia have sharedconcerns with regards to the complex implementation and enforcement of international law, as non-state armed
groups also seek to adopt and use AI-enabled technologies. While it is clear that international humanitarian law
would apply to situations meeting the required threshold for non-international armed conflicts, states are particularly concerned with these groups’ liability and the ability to hold them accountable. This will depend to a great
extent on a number of factors, including the political will of parties involved, the resources available, as well as
accessibility to conflict areas for investigation and evidence collection.
These issues, albeit predating AI and applying more generally in contemporary warfare, are further intensified
as non-state armed groups acquire, deploy and use AI technologies in their operations. Furthermore, there isalso the acknowledgment that, below the threshold of non-international armed conflict, international humanrights law applies along with national laws. This is particularly important in the light of the growing prominenceof “grey zone” conflicts – those that occur neither in peacetime nor in active conflict (e.g., cyber operations).
This issue also featured prominently during the consultations held in Singapore. As such, further researchon the applicability, application and subsequent enforcement of international law in various conflict settingsand shedding light on accountability for “grey zone” operations was seen as a priority by states in South East
Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, in addition to considering compensation mechanisms for civilian victims.

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In Latin America and the Caribbean, there is a general perception that, in the absence of interstate conflicts,
the military paradigm is less prominent than that of law enforcement or, at least, must be complemented by
the latter. In fact, countering organized and transnational crimes constitutes the main priority of most, if not allstates, within the region. As such, for states in the region, compliance with international humanitarian law may
not be as much of a concern compared to enforcing international human rights law, the applicability of which
extends beyond armed conflicts onto peacetime. In fact, outside armed conflict – and thus including law enforcement operations – a series of human rights are relevant with regards to the development, deployment anduse of AI for security applications.
The most cited and studied right in this context is the right to life. This is enshrined in many human rights treaties,
including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR); as well as the American Convention on Human Rights. In many of these treaties, what is prohibitedis a deprivation of life that is “arbitrary”, meaning that it complies with neither international rules and standards
pertaining to the right to life nor domestic law. Compliance with the right to life applies as well in the context of
AI use, both in conflict (subject to its interplay with international humanitarian law) and outside conflict (e.g., forlaw enforcement); this assertion increasingly features both at the national level from states’ positions and internationally.
For example, the United Nations Human Rights Committee issued, in 2019, a General Comment on the Right toLife, which asserts that “States parties engaged in the deployment, use, sale or purchase of existing weapons
and in the study, development, acquisition or adoption of weapons, and means or methods of warfare, must
always consider their impact on the right to life.”5 The report then raises the example of autonomous weaponssystems, which the Committee has determined should not be developed and deployed, either in times of war orin peacetime, unless it has been established that their use is consistent and conforms with the right to life (i.e.,the development and use of these systems would not lead to the arbitrary deprivation of the right to life), alongwith other relevant norms of international law.

Human Rights Committee, “Article 36: Right to life”, General Comment no. 36, CCPR/C/GC/36, 3 September 2019, https://
undocs.org/CCPR/C/GC/36, paragraph 65.

5

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These differences must not be seen as synonymous to a lack of shared understanding, at the higher
level, of the importance and applicability of international law. Compliance with international law has consistently emerged as a key priority for all regions, with the desire by states to ensure its respect acrossthe life cycle of the technologies in question and to disseminate its key principles among all. Variationsin interpretation, however, merit further attention and study to ensure coordination and alignment – ultimately promoting, not undermining, international law.
Beyond legal traditions, variations can also be observed in the policy landscape: states within andacross regions tend to be at different stages in the development, adoption and implementation of AI
policy or strategy documents. Some already have in place established frameworks and may evenbe in the midst of review of their strategy, while others are still in the process of developing one. At
times, there is evidence that instruments and positions adopted at the regional or even international
level trickle down to influence national approaches. In Africa, for example, many states in the processof developing a national strategy on AI in security and defence were waiting for the African Union’s
Continental Strategy on AI, which they will then integrate into their national policies and legislation.
Similarly, a number of NATO member states have acknowledged the influence exercised by the alliance’s Strategy on AI, which plays an important role in shaping their approach to the governance of
AI in the military domain.

5.3 Prioritization and Risk Perceptions
While states are generally aligned on the perceived opportunities and risks arising from the development, deployment and use of AI in the military domain, their prioritization tends to differ among states.
Some may confer more value on legal compliance and ethics, with an emphasis on international law,human dignity and fairness. Others will prioritize national security and ensuring safe and secureenvironments; meanwhile, reducing the risks of civilian casualties may be central to some states.
Similarly, a host of risks have been shared across regions, from concerns of proliferation to NSAGs
to that of inadvertent (nuclear) escalation. Yet, their perception (e.g., perceived weight and scope),
interpretation and prioritization differ from one another. Within Africa, for instance, some would prioritize the (existential) risks stemming from integrating AI technologies into nuclear command, control
and communications systems, while others see it as less relevant for the region. In Asia, some statesprioritize risks surrounding the misuse of these technologies and their appropriation by and proliferation into “malicious” actors. Others focus more on the humanitarian impact and risks stemming fromthese technologies. Risks associated with strategic stability, nuclear affairs and regional stability arealso among those raised as a priority by some. Echoing the points made in Subsection 5.1, variations
in local contexts and realities constitute a decisive factor in states’ policy approaches; their opportunities and risks perception and prioritization are not spared from this.
Interestingly, while these differences can, at times, be a source of friction and can stand in the way ofconsensus (or, at least, alignment on certain issues), it is also important to note that these differences
are not necessarily harmful in and of themselves. For African states, these differences do not necessarily affect the general desire for a united continental front on the governance of AI in the military domain.

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5.4 Resource Availability and Allocation
While states share the desire to promote responsible AI in the military domain, the availability and allocation of resources dedicated to such efforts differ from one state to another. These differences inresource allocation are reflected in the approaches adopted to promoting and implementing responsible practices surrounding AI in the military domain: some states may have dedicated teams exclusively
for AI-related affairs, while other armed forces (if not most) may have personnel tasked with emerging
technologies more generally – ranging from AI to the safeguarding of critical national infrastructure
against cyber operations
Another example relates to capacity-building: while all states generally emphasize its importance, theextent to which dedicated resources and funding have been allocated to such efforts diverge from one
state to another. Some may have formalized institutions for education and capacity-building (e.g., withestablished centres of excellence); such efforts, however, require significant resources that not all states
may necessarily be able to allocate and prioritize yet. Nevertheless, there is a general acknowledgment,in Africa at least, that institutional capacity and regional cooperation will be key to mutual assistance and,ultimately, to foster localized AI solutions to shift away from overdependency on Western technologies.

5.5 Desired Endgame
While all states present at the regional consultations agreed on the importance of responsible development, deployment and use of military AI, there is disagreement as to what processes and outcome areneeded to uphold and ensure such responsible behaviour. For instance:•

Some are of the view that a new international treaty dedicated to AI in the military domain is needed;others were more keen to focus on the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems first, in thelight of the work done on this area for over a decade within the framework of the CCW. In parallel, anumber of states were of the view that these discussions must not be mutually exclusive, and governance deliberations on AI in the military domain must be conducted in concert with efforts within the
CCW framework; other states were of the view that applicable international law is sufficient.

•

Specifically on the issue of lethal autonomous weapons systems, some were of the view that an additional protocol to the CCW would be most valuable; others criticized the limited membership of the
CCW regime and highlighted the need for a wider scope beyond lethal autonomous weapons systems.

•

Some are of the view that taking the conversation outside the United Nations is of value and offers
flexibility and inclusivity, while others insist on maintaining the discussions within the United Nations
in order to not jeopardize the work of the organization.

Beyond the what, differences have also emerged with regards to the why – that is, the underlying
reasons and rationale behind their desired end-result – and the how. For instance, in Asia, some wereof the view that certain intended uses must be prohibited due to the risks of their humanitarian impact(e.g., those with highly destructive capabilities), while those simply with the intention to “neutralize” theadversary may be allowed and even, at times, prioritized. On the other hand, others were of the viewthat this very much remains on a case-by-case basis, and as such, potential opportunities that AI technologies have to offer must not be jeopardized by blanket prohibitions.

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In South East Europe, the Middle East, the South Caucasus and Central Asia, there is a sharedsentiment that formalized processes and frameworks are needed to regulate or, at least, govern andpromote responsible AI in the military domain. In fact, states in the region generally acknowledge theneed for a certain form of regulation surrounding the development, deployment and use of AI in the
military domain. As such, while the development of an international treaty is an option, other means
such as a code of conduct were perceived as being useful too. Such a framework would enable statesto establish shared principles, akin to those of NATO’s AI Strategy – although in the absence of a shared
alliance underpinning such a document, its development, adoption and subsequent implementation
will require tremendous effort, investment and political will. Key principles may include accountability
and responsibility, including for unintended consequences. However, it is important to think beyond thesubstance during the processes needed to lead up to the adoption of such shared principles. As such,beyond international processes and frameworks, regional means and military alliances must also be
explored as a way of formalizing shared principles and fostering cooperation in this space – including
for capacity-building. An effective combination of both international and localized approaches will thus
ensure complementarity and an ecosystem of processes and frameworks conducive to responsible AI
in the military domain.
States in Africa generally prioritize the development, adoption and implementation of a regulatory
instrument at the regional level – perhaps even more so than at the international level. In the light ofAfrica’s unique policy landscape and the desire for unity within the continent, regional processes would
be conducive to an agreement on unique elements that may not be attainable at the international level.
In fact, there is the view that, while international frameworks are important, they must remain general,with regional tools providing more room for granularity and specificity. The national level will then subsequently be the most specific with regards to the implementation of these international and regional
policies. States must thus also prioritize the development, adoption, implementation and review of anational strategy document on AI in security and defence.
Latin America and the Caribbean is generally divided into two blocs, each approaching the questionof AI in the military and wider security domains slightly differently – albeit complementarily. Somestates, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, prioritize an approach centred around legal requirements
and technical solutions; other states, including Costa Rica, prioritize an approach centred around thepolitical process and norm-setting as an outcome. There is also a third group of states that, despite
sharing the view that regulations are much needed, have voiced concerns of prohibitions eventually standing in the way of their combating adversaries – especially NSAGs that, themselves, may haveadopted and may be using AI to support their operations. These approaches, however, are not mutually
exclusive and certain states’ policies may be a hybrid of two or more of these.
In Europe and North America, states are divided in their preference for hard versus soft law as the way
ahead for the governance of AI in the military domain. At one end of the spectrum, states that prioritize
hard law draw inspiration from the European Union AI Act and its risk-based approach. States at theother end of the spectrum are generally wary of overregulation and express concerns about hampered
innovation. The idea of an international treaty, or even any instrument or document that may pave theway for such treaty, is this not desirable for these states.

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6. Conclusion and the Way Ahead
Responsible AI in the military and wider security domains, and efforts to implement and operationalize it, is an area of priority for states across all regions. Yet, the international policy landscape and approaches surrounding AI in the military domain are far from uniform. Across and within regions, there
are a number of convergences and divergences. The former are generally not even uniform and may be
nuanced across and within regions. The divergences can also vary, whether examined at the cross- or
intra-regional level.
These nuances are (partly) explained by the variations across regions in local contexts, realities, legal
traditions, culture, strategic priorities, security landscapes and socio-economic situations. These multifaceted and complex elements are subsequently, more often than not, reflected in the ways in which
each region and each state grapple with the development, deployment and use of AI in the military andwider security domains. As stressed throughout this report, however, these differences are not, in andof themselves, necessarily harmful to international alignment and cooperation. Moreover, states acknowledge the importance, in most circumstances, of such cooperation. Processes, discussions andframeworks at the international, regional and national levels must not be seen as mutually exclusive
and in competition but, rather, as complementarity in the kaleidoscope of military AI governance.
As such, the conduct of regional consultations, joining information exchange on policies and national
viewpoints on the one hand with discussions framed by expert intervention on the other hand, was not
only useful to ensure inclusivity in the REAIM process. These consultations also paved the way forfurther reflections, at times shared across regions, at times unique to certain regions. As such, the foodfor thought to consider for the (future) governance of responsible AI in the military domain includes thefollowing elements.

6.1 Prioritize Capacity-Building and Information Exchange
There is a shared sentiment, across regions, that capacity-building is a key priority. As such, the establishment of regularly convened, formalized processes and frameworks for information sharing andthe exchange of knowledge and best practices, including from the civilian domain, will be important.
Beyond the policy, legal and ethical realms, there is also a desire to gain granularity at the technicallevel: Close examination of specific technical issues (e.g., the black box, effective integration and interoperability, computing power and data) will be key for the formulation of concrete policy recommendations and operationalization pathways. As such, the establishment of standardized and benchmarked training (e.g., through certification) will also be important to ensure coordination and alignment
within and across regions.

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6.2 Foster the Implementation and Operationalization of
Responsible AI through Engagement
States have expressed the desire to move beyond norms, principles and political commitments: there
is indeed appetite for initiatives that help bridge the gap between the technical and policy communities
for operationalization, implementation and execution. To this end, establishing a mechanism to enable
collaboration between these communities will be key. For example, drawing on lessons from cyber, amodel similar to the cyber policy community’s engagement with computer emergency response teams(CERTs) could be adopted. The challenge will be to keep the discussions grounded, evidence-based
and accessible to all communities and stakeholders involved.
In addition to norms and principles, there is an appetite from states to unpack technical approaches andsolutions to uphold international law and ethical requirements. This includes the need to uphold transparency and accountability through evaluations and the auditability of systems. Smaller states in the
Caribbean have consented to the intervention of major states in supporting efforts at combatting crime.
Such interventions may not always be accompanied by use of force; however, they are presented asoften using AI technologies. Yet, this is frequently done in a very opaque manner, resulting in power imbalances and the inability to uphold accountability and responsibility over the use of these technologies
by the intervening states. Transparency standards for transnational operations would, in this sense, be
useful – especially for smaller states consenting to foreign intervention due to limitations in resources
and capabilities. As such, the exchange of best practices and, more generally, the establishment of international and regional cooperation mechanisms that are multidisciplinary and inclusive will be key.

6.3 Ensure the Complementarity of Processes
The parallel processes and efforts in this space range from REAIM to the United Nations High-Level
Advisory Board (HLAB) on AI, the United Nations Security Council discussions, the US Political Declaration, the CCW Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, discussions within the United Nations General Assembly’s First Committee, initiatives within NATO, as wellas the Freetown and Belén Communiqués. Given this constellation, states have expressed the desire
to shed clarity on the respective mandates, roles and responsibilities of each process and forum at theinternational and regional levels, and to ensure that they complement one another instead of encouraging competition. In addition, there is an appetite to explore possibilities for cross-pollination and thesharing of lessons learned from other arms control processes and security fields (e.g., the Montreux
Document as well as the work done on responsible behaviour in cyber and in space).6 To this end, coordination and clear communication will be key.

6

The Montreux Document on Private Military and Security Companies provides for the pertinent international legal obligations
and good practices for states related to the operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict. Whilenot legally binding, the Montreux Document intends to provide clarifications as to how certain well-established rules of international law apply to states in their relations with private military and security companies, and their operation during armed conflict– particularly under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. See: ICRC, “The Montreux Document
on Private Military and Security Companies” (2009), https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0996-montreux-document-private-military-and-security-companies.

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6.4 Intensify Research Efforts and Reflections on
Underexplored Areas
In addition to the recommendations above, a number of themes have emerged as underexplored in international discussions surrounding AI in the military and wider security domains. Among these aredata governance; dual-use technologies; interoperability; computing power; the traceability and transparency of systems; as well as the different dimensions of security in relation to AI development, deployment and use in the military domain (e.g., human security, environmental security and economic
security). While policy deliberations at the higher level are necessary, these discussions must be
supported through further research efforts and examination of specific points that, unpacked, will
ensure that policy outcomes are well-informed, robust and comprehensive.

6.5 Reflect on AI in the “Military Domain”, its Boundaries
and Interplay with Wider Security Applications
While the regional consultations were all conducted around the theme of “AI in the military domain”(with the Latin American and Caribbean segment also including wider security applications), questions
arise with regards to the scope of this domain and the extent to which its boundaries are clearly delineated. Efforts to combat organized crime are considered to be an integral part of the military domain in
certain regions, while others would categorize such operations as law enforcement. Depending on theregion, there would thus be differences in the categorization of AI applications for combatting crime(i.e., as to whether or not they would fall within or outside the scope of “AI in the military domain”).
Further reflections on what “AI in the military” domain consists of, its boundaries, its interplay with wider
security applications, and which applications would fall within the scope of future governance frameworks would indeed be useful to keep the discussions focused and targeted.

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