HTTP/2 & QUICTEACHING GOOD PROTOCOLS TO DO BAD THINGSPEOPLE - KATE
• Catherine (Kate) Pearce• @secvalve• Sr. Security Consultant(Customer Focused) at Cisco• Break & report• Coach the builders• Research what’s ahead• Distinguishing Features:• Loud, Yellow• Or is that “Loud Yellow”?

PEOPLE - KATE
• Plays with fire, will never have abetter photo taken in her life:

CCSA, https://m.flikr.com/#/photos/4nitsirk

PEOPLE - VYRUS• Carl Vincent• Security Consultant• Distinguishing Features:• Hates photos• Red team guy• Jack of many trades, in search of more!
• Suffers from a severe compulsion to continuallycontemplate the best way to control, and/or
destroy, absolutely everything and everyone in
the room – including the room itself.

TEASER 1

Teaser 1

Wait… firewall was blocking ALL TCP?

Teaser 1

Wait… PFSENSE was blocking ALL
TCP?

Teaser 1

Teaser 1

Teaser 2

What type of traffic is this?

Teaser 2

What type of traffic is this?

Teaser 2

What about this?

What’s going on here?

àLet’s talk about upcoming web
transport protocols

What’s going on here?

àLet’s talk about recent web
transport protocols

INTRO(WHY IS THE WORLD EXPLODING?)

DRIVERS FOR CHANGE• Increasing scale of…everything• Flow size increases• Flow count increases (e.g. web pages)• Flow diversity increases (e.g. web pages)• Mobility• Multiple connections

1,80016

1,600
DRIVERS FOR CHANGE

14

1,400

12

1,200

10

• Increasing Scale Everything
1,000

8

• 800
Flow Size increases

6

• 600
Flow count increases (e.g.

4400
web pages)

2200• Flow diversity increases
0(e.g. web pages)

0• Mobility• Multiple connections
Total Bytes MedianAvg Flow Size (Bytes)

AVG REQUEST SIZE (KIB)TOTAL SIZE (KIB)

Total page size and average flow size

SIZE
120

25

100

20

80

15

60
10

40
20

5

0

0

Domains Contacted (median)

medianRequest Count Median

NUMBER OF REQUESTSNUMBER OF DOMAINS

Number of contacted domains and number of total
TRENDS CHANGING THE
WORLD – PAGE
requests

WHY IS THIS HAPPENING?

Network communication needs better capabilities, butthere’s more than one way to do it
1.

HTTP/2 - Multiplexes within TCP

2.

QUIC

- Ignores TCP to handle it itself

These technologies change the way the internet
behavesWHY DO YOU CARE?

Familiar Problems• Opaque Technology Shifts“New” Problems• New Fragmentation Attacks• Blind Network Security

TO BE CLEAR:
These technologies are more culture shock than direct
vulnerabilities / concerns
Personally, we like them, and want them to succeed
Network tools and operators need to be readyI’m skipping ENORMOUS amounts of detail.

BACKGROUND(HOW DID WE GET HERE)PREVIOUS WORKoMPTCP
oMPTCP Implications
oMultipath Implications
oMultipath “defences”

WHY NOT CHANGE TCP?

Lessons from MPTCP:• Slow moving, OS- and hardware-dependent• Middleboxes limit protocol deployability• Chicken and egg deployment

CURRENT TCP IS RATHER LIMITED

Doesn’t support use cases for:• High Availability• Link Aggregation• Multihoming• Mesh networking
Makes a lot of round trips
Blocks stream on retransmits

MPTCP

Future of QUIC?

QUIC & HTTP/2

WHY NOT CHANGE TCP?

WHY NOT CHANGE TCP?

TCP Characteristics:• Handshake design• Outside user-space• End-of-line blocking

WHY NOT CHANGE TCP?

If you can’t change TCP, what’s left?
• SCTP?
• Same problems, but
amplified• Application Layer?
• Http/2 & SPDY

• UDP?
• But it doesn’t do
ANYTHING fancy?
• Exactly – QUICBACKGROUND – THE JOURNEY TO HERE

TCP -> MPTCP -> QUICBACKGROUND – THE JOURNEY TO HEREHTTP -> SPDY -> HTTP/2

SO WHAT?

• Have you realized how many security
tools support these?
• It’s… unfortunate

REAL-WORLD PREVALENCE• MPTCP developed surprisingly fast, then faltered• QUIC was even QUIC-ker• Already in use on many Google properties• Youtube, Google search, and more

• Likely several percent of your traffic• Http/2 has become real-world even faster

PROTOCOL PREVALENCE
Servers
MPTCP ~5000?
QUIC
HTTP2

Clients

Key usages

50 000 000

Apple iOS (Siri),OVF OverTheBox

PROTOCOL PREVALENCE
Servers

Clients

Key usages

Apple iOS (Siri),
50 000 000
MPTCP ~5000?
OVF OverTheBox
Google Chrome, Google~25000 [2] 1 000 000 000+[1]QUIC
Duo, Google Websites

HTTP2

1 - https://chrome.googleblog.com/2016/04/chrome-50-releases-and-counting.html
2 - https://www.shodan.io/

1 - http://isthewebhttp2yet.com/measurements/adoption.html#timePROTOCOL PREVALENCE
Servers

Clients

Key usages

Apple iOS (Siri),
50 000 000
MPTCP ~5000?
OVF OverTheBox
Google Chrome, Google~25000 [2] 1 000 000 000+[1]QUIC
Duo, Google Websites
Chrome, Edge, Firefox
200 000+~2 000 000 000 [4] Twitter, Facebook, Yahoo,
HTTP2 [3]Google1 - https://chrome.googleblog.com/2016/04/chrome-50-releases-and-counting.html
2 - Shodan
3 - http://isthewebhttp2yet.com/measurements/adoption.html#time
4 - Uncertain, every up-to-date popular browser supports it

REAL-WORLD PREVALENCE

9 of 19 Alexa Top Sites support H2 or SPDYABOUT(WHAT’S IN FRONT OF US, AND
HOW DO THESE WORK?)COMMON GOALS• Improve perceived performance• Improve latency• Single connection from client to server• Overlap with goals and use cases• Easier to understand QUIC and HTTP/2 together

COMMON FEATURES• Multiplexed Requests• Prioritized Requests• Compression

CURRENT

WHY USE MULTIPLE CONNECTIONS?

MULTIPLEXINGDATA FLOWSA Single Connection
Contains N Streams

TRANSPORT: HTTP VS HTTP/2
BrowserBrowser

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1
HTTP/2Connection

TLS Session

TLS Session

TLS Session

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

HTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamTLS Session
TLS Session

TCP
Connection

TCP
Connection

TCP
Connection

WireClassic HTTP

TCP
Connection

TCP Connection

Wire

H2

CONCEPTUALLY

HTTP/2Connection

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

HTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamTCP Connection

HTTP/2Connection

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

HTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamTLS Session
TCP Connection

H2C

H2

TRANSPORT: HTTP/2 VS QUICHTTP/2Connection

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

HTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamTLS Session
TCP Connection

H2

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

Http1/1

HTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
StreamHTTP/2
Stream

TLS
QUIC
QUIC
Connection Session Stream

QUIC
StreamQUIC
StreamQUIC
StreamUDP
Connection

QUIC
Packet

QUIC
Packet

QUIC
PacketHTTP/2Connection

Note: QUIC Manages H2 Streams
if it is the transport

QUIC
PacketQUICABOUT – APPLICATION PROTOCOLS
oHTTP
o~20 years old
oUniplex
oText BasedoRuns over TCP

oHTTP/2
oTransport encapsulates
HTTP to add:o Binary Framingo Multiplexed Requests
o Prioritized Requests
o Compressiono Server Pushed Streams

H2 STRUCTURE
Transport Layer
FRAME 1
Frame Header
Frame Payload
FRAME 2
Frame Header
Frame Payload
FRAME nFrame Header
Frame Payload

H2 STRUCTURE
Transport Layer
FRAME 1
Frame Header
Frame
PayloadFrame Type Field 1
Frame Type Field nFrame Type Field n
FRAME nFrame Header

Frame
PayloadFrame Type Field 1
Frame Type Field nFrame Type Field n

H2 STRUCTURE
Transport Layer
FRAME 1
Frame Header
Frame
Payload

FRAME nFrame Header

Frame Type Field 1
Frame Type Field nFrame Type Field nFrame
PayloadFrame Type Field 1
Frame Type Field nFrame Type Field n

FRAME nFrame Header
Frame
PayloadFrame Type Field 1
Frame Type Field nFrame Type Field n

FRAME nFrame Header

FRAME nFrame Header
Frame
PayloadFrame Type Field 1
Frame Type Field nFrame Type Field nFrame
PayloadFrame Type Field 1
Frame Type Field nFrame Type Field n

FRAME nFRAME 1

FRAME nFRAME nStream 2

FRAME nFRAME nFRAME nFRAME nFRAME nStream 1

FRAME nStream n

ABOUT – HTTP/2• Http2 composed of:• One connection per origin with a number of bidirectional, binary framed,
streams per connection• Each stream has an identifier – 31-bit unsigned int, ALWAYS incrementing,never reused, odd for client initiated, even for server initiated• “message” analogous to HTTP request/response, composed of asequence of frames
See https://hpbn.co/http2/

HTTP/2 CONNECTION SETUP• Connection Establishment• Upgrade• Upgraded connections treat the first HTTP 1.1 as stream id 0x01, and switch
to H2 framing once it is done…

• Alt-svc• ALPN• H2, H2c=> H2 over TLS and H2 clear-text respectively• Note:• TLS with NPN <= Not supported, replaced by ALPNHTTP/2 CONNECTION SETUP• Prior Knowledge (Client-> Server):• “The client connection preface starts with a sequence of 24
octets, which in hex notation is:
0x505249202a20485454502f322e300d0a0d0a534d0d0a0d0aThat is, the connection preface starts with the string "PRI *HTTP/2.0\r\n\r\nSM\r\n\r\n“
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540#section-3.5

HTTP/2 CONNECTION SETUP• No Prior Knowledge:• (http) Upgrade Header in client request (with a base64 SETTINGS
payload), responds with an HTTP 101 “switching protocols”
HTTP/1.1 101 Switching Protocols
Connection: UpgradeUpgrade: h2c”

• (https) TLS with ALPN h2, or upgrade header with h2• Note:H2, H2c=> h2 over tls and h2 cleartext respectively
TLS with NPN <= Not supported, replaced by ALPN
Upgraded connections treat the first http 1.1 as stream id 0x01, and switch to H2 framing once it isdone…

H2 FRAMES• Fixed-length header
Type (8)R• Type defined by an 8-bit type code.

Length (24)Current Types:

Flags (8)• DATA[Data+Padding]• HEADERS• PRIORITY• RST_STREAM• SETTINGS• PUSH_PROMISE• PING• GOAWAY• WINDOW_UPDATE• CONTINUATION

Stream Identifier (31)
Frame Payload …

• Variable Length Content

ABOUT – HTTP/2

Header Compression• Compressed with HPACK (Huffman encoding),
using:• A static table of common entries• A dynamic table of other items

ABOUT – HTTP/2

HTTP/2 Pitfalls?
• Connection reuse“ Connections that are made to an origin server, either directly or
through a tunnel created using the CONNECT method (Section 8.3),
MAY be reused for requests with multiple different URI authority
components.”• Server push

ABOUT – QUIC• Takes the things from HTTP/2 and adds the network layer as well
• QUIC Connections combine encryption and connection
handshakes

QUIC(QUICK UDP INTERNET CONNECTIONS)UDP transport protocol- Google championed
successor to SPDY
- Latency optimized- Reliable, multiplexed- Always encrypted

Open Source
User Space- No OS requirements- Fast-evolving

ABOUT – QUICQUIC Also Adds:• 0-RTT• Padding• FEC (currently disabled)• Multipath (proposed in future)QUIC DATA FLOWS• ONE QUIC Packet• ONE QUIC Connection
Contains• N Streams

Contains• 0-1 Frame Packets
Each containing• N frames

Unencrypted
Authenticated

QUIC PACKET STRUCTURE
UDP Packet
QUIC Public Header
AEAD Data

UDP Packet
QUIC Packet

Encrypted
Authenticated

QUIC Private Header
UDPPacket
QUIC Frame

Frame Packet

QUIC Frame 1

Frame

QUIC Frame 2

Frame

QUIC Frame n

Frame

QUIC SETUP (BROWSER)• HTTP Header Advertisements• Alt-svc:• RFC 7838
• alt-svc quic="www.google.com:443"; p="1";
ma=600,quic=":443"; p="1"; ma=600• Alternate-protocol• Old/deprecatedABUSING(WHAT CAN A NEFARIOUS ACTOR DO?)SO WHY ARE THESE INTERESTING ORDANGEROUS?
• Http/2:• Always encrypted• QUIC:• Binary framing• Encrypted, verified back to previous
connections• Compression• User space• Must parse to analyze• Much more complex state• Many side channels• Doesn’t require a socket• Difficult to fingerprint• VERY few tools available• More reliable than TCP over UDPABUSING – THE OBVIOUS
oImplementation flaws

oBinary framing
oOften implemented in unmanaged codeo…

oProtocol ambiguities

oMANY implementations
oFast-evolving
oScattered documentation

ABUSING – NEW PROTOCOLS BYPASSMONITORS

oIDS / Proxies

DEMO 1

H2

H2

QUIC

QUIC

ABUSING – NEW PROTOCOLS AND OLD
TOOLS[Quick Aside – GoLang payload injection tool by Vyrus
used in these demos]

DEMO 2

ABUSING – NEW PROTOCOLS, NEW
ATTACKS• Easy:Port-based QUIC Masquerading• Simple:• Moderate:• Complex:

Side channels and Scrambling
Protocol-Embedded stego (e.g. DNS TXT field)
Polyglots• Extreme:• Insane:

Steganographic Polyglots
Steganographic Multiplexed Polyglots

ABUSING – NEW PROTOCOLS, NEW
ATTACKSoFragmentation & agility
oMulti-connection
oMulti-pathoMulti-stream

CURRENT

WHY USE MULTIPLE CONNECTIONS?

MULTIPLEXINGMULTIPATH / MULTICONNECTION

ABUSING – NEW PROTOCOLS, NEW
ATTACKS• And if we combine multiplexing andmulticonnection/path…

ABUSING – NEW PROTOCOLS, NEW
ATTACKSoFragmentation & agility
oMulti-connection
oMulti-pathoMulti-stream

MULTIPATH MULTIPLEXEDABUSING – NEW PROTOCOLS, NEW
ATTACKS

oCross-path fragmentation
oCross-path agility

oMulti-stream fragmentation
oMulti-stream agility

ABUSING – NEW PROTOCOLS, NEW
ATTACKS• Forward Error Correction• REMOVED AT PRESENT https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/d/msg/protoquic/Z5qKkk2XZe0/yzAqOgNWHgAJ
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Hg1SaLEl6T4rEU9jisovCo8VEjjnuCPTcLNJewj7Nk/edit• Fake Packet Injection (False Checksums)• Dropping/Corrupting packets

ANALYZING &DEFENDING(WHAT DO WE DO WHEN WE SEE
THESE THINGS)ANALYZING & DEFENDING – DETECT CLIENT
TRAFFIC- HTTP/2 Client- ALPN- Upgrade headers- QUIC Client Traffic- UDP Ports 80 and 443- Bidirectional patterns of communications- No static identifier in header, you have to parse it- QUIC DetectorDEMO 3

ANALYZING & DEFENDING – DETECTSERVERS- HTTP/2 Server- ALPN- Upgrade Headers- QUIC Server Traffic- UDP Ports 80 and 443- QUIC Scanner…

DEMO 4

ANALYZING & DEFENDING - BLOCK- H2- Transparent proxies- Don’t support HTTP2 outbound- Rewrite or remove upgrade headers- HTTPS ALPN- HTTP/H2 on nonstandard ports (80, 443, 8080, 8443)- QUIC- UDP Ports 80 and 443- Application/policy Settings (Chrome)- Fingerprinted/detected/parsed QUICANALYZING & DEFENDING - ANALYSE- H2- Wireshark- Chrome- H2i- Nghttp- curl- QUIC- Wireshark- Chrome

ANALYZING HTTP/2
IN WIRESHARK

Use an
SSLKEYLOGFILE

The dissector’s
pretty good

ANALYZING HTTP/2
IN WIRESHARK

Use an
SSLKEYLOGFILE

The dissector’s
pretty good

ANALYZING HTTP/2
IN CHROME

chrome://netinternals/#http2Dev tools
ANALYZING HTTP/2 IN CHROME

Dev tools
ANALYZING HTTP/2 IN CHROMEANALYZING HTTP/2 IN CHROME-HTTP2-LOG-PARSERANALYZING HTTP/2 IN H2I

ANALYZING HTTP/2 IN NGHTTP

ANALYZING HTTP/2 IN CURLDEBUGGING QUIC

• Chrome:• chrome://net-internals/#quic

ANALYZING QUIC

• Chrome:
chrome://net-internals/#http2

ANALYZING QUIC

• Wireshark:

QUIC dissector =>ANALYZING & DEFENDING - INSPECT- H2- Doable if they aren’t changing the implementation- Look for non-typical behavior- Non-monotonous or non-increasing stream IDs- Strange content sent over control streams- QUIC- Difficult due to crypto setup, likely requires new tools

CONCLUSIONS(WHAT DOES IT MEAN?)

CONCLUSIONS – FUTURE WORK

- Other protocols- Web RTC
- Extended application layer multiplexing- Multipath QUIC, QUIC FECCONCLUSIONS - SUMMARY- Tools MUST keep up with tech
- If tools can’t, then people must be aware- Even if tools and people are away, playtime isover.

BRIEF TAKEAWAYS - SOUNDBYTES• Technology is moving faster and faster:• Increasingly driven by large vendors, notstandards bodies

Soundbytes• HTTP/2 and QUIC provide enhanced user
experience, making sites load faster andsmoother than ever before• Network security technology is surprisingly• HTTP2 is already bigger than IPv6, QUIC is
unaware of many application layer
techniques
already Bigger than MPTCP• > 1 billion devices using these technologies• Get ready for userspace network stacks • These protocols complicate network security• Get ready for a lot more context heavy,
encrypted, and multiplexedcommunications• Designed to be more private than the legacy
Internet• Security tools do not understand them
• Even if security tools understand them, they offer somuch more complexity that an attacker can hide inQUESTIONSCatherine (Kate) Pearce

Carl Vincent

Twitter: @secvalve
katpearc@cisco.com

carvince@cisco.com

REFERENCES 1 – MPTCP• [MPTCP-A] – Pearce, C and Thomas, P - Multipath TCP: Pwning Today’s Networks with Tomorrow’s Protocols https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Pearce-Multipath-TCP-Breaking-Todays-Networks-WithTomorrows-Protocols.pdf (slides) and https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-14/materials/us-14-Pearce-MultipathTCP-Breaking-Todays-Networks-With-Tomorrows-Protocols-WP.pdf (Paper)• [MPTCP-B] – Pearce, C - Multipath Madness, MPTCP, and Beyond - feat HTTP evasive fragmentation –Hushcon East 2015, Kiwicon 9 - https://kiwicon.org/the-con/talks/#e206• [MPTCP-C] – Pearce, C & Zeadally, S - Ancillary Impacts of Multipath TCP on Current and Future Network
Security - http://www.computer.org/csdl/mags/ic/2015/05/mic2015050058-abs.html• [MPTCP-D] Barré, S., Paasch, C. & Bonaventure, O., 2011. Multipath TCP: from theory to practice. Netw. 2011,
pp.1–42. Available at: http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-20757-0_35
http://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-barre-mptcp-impl/ .
• [MPTCP-E] Bonaventure, O., 2012. An overview of Multipath TCP. ; login Mag. …, pp.17–23. Available at:
http://dial.academielouvain.be/handle/boreal:114081 .
• [MPTCP-F] Raiciu, C. et al., 2012. How hard can it be? designing and implementing a deployable multipath TCP.
NSDI, (1). Available at: https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/nsdi12/nsdi12-final125.pdf .

REFERENCES 2 – HTTP/2•[HTTP2-A] Akamai HTTP/2 Demo - https://http2.akamai.com/demo•[HTTP2-B] HTTP/2 - http://http2.github.io/http2-spec/•[HTTP2-C] caniuse HTTP/2 - http://caniuse.com/#feat=http2•[HTTP2-D] chrome platform status - https://www.chromestatus.com/features/5152586365665280•[HTTP2-E] IE platform status - https://dev.windows.com/en-us/microsoft-edge/platform/status/http2•[HTTP2-F] RFC 7540 - Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2) - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7540•[HTTP2-G] http/2 spec - http://http2.github.io/http2-spec/index.html•[HTTP2-H] HTTP2 – Daniel Steinberg - https://daniel.haxx.se/http2/http2-v1.2.pdf•[HTTP2-I] HTTP2 Explained – Daniel Steinberg - http://www.sigcomm.org/sites/default/files/ccr/papers/2014/July/0000000-0000017.pdf•[HTTP2-J] Scapy-http2 - https://github.com/alexmgr/scapy-http2•[HTTP2-k] HTTP/2 For Web Application Developers – nginx - https://www.nginx.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/NGINX_HTTP2_White_Paper_v4.pdf•[HTTP2-L] Attacking HTTP2 Implementations - https://yahoo-security.tumblr.com/post/134549767190/attacking-http2-implementations
and http://www.slideshare.net/JohnVillamil/attacking-http2-implementations-1•[HTTP2-M] Sans Infosec Handlers Diary Blog – RFC 7540 – HTTP/2 Protocol - https://isc.sans.edu/diary/RFC+7540++http2+protocol/19799•[HTTP2-N] http2fuzz – HTTP2 Fuzzer Written in golang - https://github.com/c0nrad/http2fuzz•[HTTP2-O] Tools for debugging, testing and using HTTP/2 - https://blog.cloudflare.com/tools-for-debugging-testing-and-using-http-2/•[HTTP2-P] HTTP/2 Considerations and Tradeoffs - https://insouciant.org/tech/http-slash-2-considerations-and-tradeoffs/•[HTTP2-Q] Shodan – Tracking HTTP/2 Adoption - https://blog.shodan.io/tracking-http2-0-adoption/

REFERENCES 3 - QUIC•[QUIC-A] Hamilton, R; Iyengar, J; Swett, I; Wilk, A - “QUIC: A UDP-Based Secure and Reliable Transport for HTTP/2 - draft-tsvwg-quic-protocol-02” - https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-tsvwgquic-protocol-02•[QUIC-B] Chromium Source Tree for QUIC - https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/net/quic•[QUIC-C] Playing with QUIC - https://www.chromium.org/quic/playing-with-quic•[QUIC-D] QUIC: next generation multiplexed transport over UDP - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hQZ-0mXFmk8•[QUIC-E] QUIC FAQ For Geeks - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1lmL9EF6qKrk7gbazY8bIdvq3Pno2Xj_l_YShP40GLQE/edit?pref=2&pli=1•[QUIC-F] QUIC Design Document - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1RNHkx_VvKWyWg6Lr8SZ-saqsQx7rFV-ev2jRFUoVD34/edit?pref=2&pli=1•[QUIC-G] Pearce, C – Multipathed, Multiplexed, Multilateral Transport Protocols - Decoupling transport protocols from what's below – 2016 Asia Pacific Regional Internet Conference on
Operational Technologies (APRICOT 2016) https://conference.apnic.net/data/41/cpearce-multipath-_-apricot-3_1456107769.pdf•[QUIC-H] Pearce, C – Transport Futures: Moving Targets and Multi-dimensional Fragmentation - Multipathed, Multiplexed and Multilateral Network Security - Australian Cyber Security
Conference 2016 - http://acsc2016.com.au/program/?IntCatId=27&IntContId=7741#futures•[QUIC-I] Block QUIC Protocol, Squid Knowledgebase - http://wiki.squid-cache.org/KnowledgeBase/Block%20QUIC%20protocol•[QUIC-J] libquic - https://github.com/devsisters/libquic•[QUIC-K] goquic - https://github.com/devsisters/goquic•[QUIC-L] Fortinet Technical Note: How To Block/Disable QUIC - http://kb.fortinet.com/kb/documentLink.do?externalID=FD36680•[QUIC-M] Nancy Sepuran, Faster Protocols and the Future of Next-Generation Firewalls - http://www.endtoend.com/faster-protocols-future-next-generation-firewalls/•[QUIC-N] - https://www.chromestatus.com/features#quic•[QUIC-O] On the Security of TLS 1.3 and QUIC Against Weaknesses in PKCS#1 v1.5 Encryption - Jaeger, T et al. https://www.nds.rub.de/media/nds/veroeffentlichungen/2015/08/21/Tls13QuicAttacks.pdf•[QUIC-P] (Slides) On the Security of TLS 1.3 (and QUIC) Against Weaknesses in PKCS#1 v1.5 Encryption - https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/T8-jager.pdf•[QUIC-Q] QUIC and TLS – Adam Langley - https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/92/slides/slides-92-saag-5.pdf•[QUIC-R] QUIC Crypto - https://docs.google.com/document/d/1g5nIXAIkN_Y-7XJW5K45IblHd_L2f5LTaDUDwvZ5L6g/edit

REFERENCES 4 - OTHER• [Other-1] TLS 1.3 SPEC - https://tlswg.github.io/tls13-spec/• [Other-2] Tim Taubert - MORE PRIVACY, LESS LATENCY• Improved Handshakes in TLS version 1.3 - https://timtaubert.de/blog/2015/11/more-privacy-less-latency-improvedhandshakes-in-tls-13/