April 2012

Japan Center for International Exchange

The Japan Center for International Exchange mourns the loss of its founder and president, Tadashi
Yamamoto. He was a champion of intellectual dialogue to strengthen cooperation among peoples andnations in East Asia as well as around the world, and this issue of East Asia Insights is dedicated to hismemory. He will be sorely missed by his many friends and colleagues around the world.

After the Launch:Moving Forward with North Korea
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIEOn April 13, North Korea launched its
Kwangmyongsong-3 satellite to mark the100th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung.
Although the launch was a failure, the USDPRK Leap Day Agreement that was reached onFebruary 29, 2012, was undermined, and otherefforts toward resolving the North Korean nuclear issue were dealt a serious blow.
The Leap Day Agreement was aimed at facilitating
preliminary steps toward resolving the long-stalled
nuclear issue and was hailed, albeit cautiously, as amajor breakthrough. North Korea agreed to a moratorium on nuclear tests, long-range missile launches,and uranium enrichment activity at Yongbyon. It alsoagreed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency
inspectors back into the country—for the first timesince 2009—to monitor the moratorium on uranium
enrichment. The United States, for its part, agreed toprovide North Korea with 240,000 metric tons offood aid.

But cracks in the agreement soon began to appear. On March 16, North Korea’s space agency,
the Korean Committee for Space Technology, announced plans for a satellite launch. The UnitedStates and its allies, including Japan and South
Korea, have condemned the launch as an egregious
violation of not only the Leap Day Agreement butalso UN Security Council resolutions. North Korea,
on the other hand, has consistently asserted its sovereign right to the peaceful use of space under the1967 Outer Space Treaty.
North Korea’s violation of the Leap Day Agree­­ment and various UN Security Council resolutions—particularly resolution 1874—must be explicitly
condemned by the international community, including China. The United States has now been forced
into a position in which it had to suspend the deliveryof food aid to young children and pregnant women
given this violation of the agreement. But, this single
violation aside, the question remains whether or not
North Korea will keep its commitments under theagreement, and it must be strongly encouraged todo so. If North Korea departs from the moratorium
on nuclear testing and uranium enrichment, the international community must impose stronger sanctions. The crucial point here is whether China will
do its utmost to persuade and prevent North Korea
from carrying out further violations of the moratorium, including a possible third nuclear test. And in
the event of further violations will China agree toand fully implement sanctions?

one. As such, the Six-Party process must continue,
combined with informal bilateral negotiations to lay
the groundwork for meaningful negotiations.

Establishing a Credible Negotiation Channel

North Korea cannot be recognized as a nuclear
state. To this end, diplomatic negotiations withNorth Korea need to continue. But as is true inany negotiation process, it is crucial to interact
with the right interlocutors. Dealing with a counterpart that cannot implement its end of a bargain
is inherently a waste of time. Thus, if the UnitedStates is serious about resolving the North Koreannuclear issue, it must negotiate with those entities
that control its nuclear weapons. This means dealing not with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs butwith the National Defense Council and establishing a streamlined and direct channel with North
Korean negotiators who have unfettered access toKim Jong-un, his inner ruling circle, and top military generals.
While under normal circumstances diplomatic
protocol dictates that negotiations between countries be conducted through their respective foreign
ministries, North Korea presents a special case.
North Korea has a unique political structure; it is amilitary state, and the Korean People’s Army is given
first priority in line with the state’s songun (militaryfirst) policy. Moreover, it is normal that military anddefense ministry personnel would participate in negotiations dealing with nuclear weapons in any context, as was the case in US-Soviet negotiations overnuclear arms reductions.
It is clear that the North Korean Ministry ofForeign Affairs cannot give credible assurance
on any measures relating to military matters andthat any agreement negotiated with it regarding
nuclear weapons will not be seriously implemented. Repeating this mistake will only resultin further failed agreements destined to meet thesame sorry fate as the 2005 agreement reached at
the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks and themore recent Leap Day Agreement.

Lessons from the Launch: How to Negotiatewith North Korea
At the same time, we must learn from this tumultuous episode. The guiding principles I previously advocated for dealing with a nuclear North Korea stillring true today.* Moving forward in the aftermathof the satellite launch, the other Six-Party countries
should keep the following three points at the forefront of their minds. First, it is evident that negotiations must be conducted directly with North Korea’s
power center and not necessarily the Ministry ofForeign Affairs. Second, policy needs to be consistent across the other five Six-Party countries. And
third, contingency planning is crucial, as we stillcannot predict whether or not North Korea will live
up to its commitments.
This approach is necessary because a comprehensive, negotiated settlement is the only practicalway forward. North Korea needs to denuclearize.
At the same time, the establishment of a permanent
peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, international
economic and energy cooperation with North Korea,
and the normalization of diplomatic relations withJapan and the United States are all critical. Given thecomplexities involved in negotiating such a comprehensive settlement and the nature of past disagreements over the timing of implementation, the roadto a meaningful result will be a long and difficult* Hitoshi Tanaka, 2009. “The North Korea Nuclear Crisis: Five
Guiding Principles,” East Asia Insights. <http://www.jcie.or.jp/insights/4-2.html>; Hitoshi Tanaka, 2011. “Rethinking Our Approach to the Korean Crisis,” East Asia Insights. <http://www.
jcie.or.jp/insights/6-1.html>.

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

2April 2012

Policy Consistency and the China Question

Contingency Planning

Policy consistency among the other five Six-Party
nations is essential. In the absence of adequate coordination, the North Korean regime has effectively
exploited policy differences and played the five governments against each other.
China is key in forging a coordinated approach.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China hasby default become North Korea’s closest backer.
For its own geopolitical reasons, China’s approach
toward North Korea is decidedly ambivalent; itis stuck between the competing notions of reluctance to pressure North Korea too strongly and adesire to act as a responsible member of the international community. North Korea has clearly calculated that China will not side with Japan, South
Korea, and the United States, and this tacit support has been emboldening.
China’s lack of clear condemnation of the satellite launch demonstrates its inconsistent approach. As a permanent member of the UN
Security Council, China approved Resolution
1874 in 2009. This resolution clearly forbids North
Korea from conducting “any launch using ballistic
missile technology.” Given that the Unha carrier
rocket North Korea uses for its satellites is virtually identical to its Taepodong long-range ballistic
missile, satellite launches—whether intended forpeaceful purposes or not—allow North Korea toimprove its nuclear weapons delivery capacity andare a clear violation. Ultimately, China’s failure tocondemn the satellite launch undermines the UN
Security Council and the efforts of the other four
Six-Party nations to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.
Also crucial for forging policy consistency is trilateral cooperation among Japan, South Korea, andthe United States. It is imperative that these threenations work together and agree to do their utmost
to see the issue resolved diplomatically. In doing so,they must present a united front to China and notallow North Korea to exploit policy differences.

EAST ASIA INSIGHTSWith the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il
in December last year, the succession to his third son,
Kim Jong-un, was forced to move ahead of schedule.
As he works with a ruling inner circle comprised ofold hands from his father’s regime, Kim Jong-un isstill consolidating his grip on power. The failure of
the launch may have seriously undermined this process. We must assume that Kim Jong-un is still in avulnerable position and a power struggle inside themilitary may not be out of the question.
It is, therefore, imperative that Japan, South Korea,
and the United States engage in trilateral contingency
planning. This trilateral planning must outline how
the US-Japan alliance can be best utilized during any
worst-case scenario that might unfold on the Korean
Peninsula and cover issues such as Japan’s rear-arealogistical support for the United States, the evacuation of noncombatants, and dealing with refugee
flows. Given the legal restrictions on the Japan SelfDefense Forces (JSDF) and the sensitive relationshipbetween Japan and South Korea over this issue, theprecise role of the JSDF in any contingency plans
must be made absolutely clear. Moreover, trilateral
cooperation must move beyond the previous patternof hub-and-spokes talks conducted by the UnitedStates with each of its allies and include substantive
communication between Japan and South Korea andregular consultations by the three nations with both
China and Russia.

Moving Forward
A comprehensive, negotiated settlement is still theonly practical way to resolve the North Korean
nuclear issue. But this will be a difficult task. It has
clearly become much more difficult to negotiatewith North Korea now given the diplomatic fallout over this most recent episode. Moreover, given
the US presidential election later this year, neither
President Obama nor the Republicans want to beseen as weak on foreign policy, giving them little leeway to negotiate constructively with North Korea.

3April 2012

But taking our figurative bat and ball and going home to show displeasure over the satellite
launch ultimately gives North Korea more time todevelop its nuclear weapons and delivery capacity
and allows it to edge ever closer toward de facto
nuclear state status. To arrive at a place where we
can forge a comprehensive settlement—throughthe Six-Party process—we must begin with small
confidence-building steps and continue with informal bilateral negotiations to lay the groundwork.

Recent efforts to this end, such as the Leap Day
Agreement negotiations, should be continued, but
this time it is critical for the United States to conduct negotiations through the right channel.

Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at theJapan Research Institute. He ­previously served as
Japan’s deputy minister for f­ oreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from the Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
www.jcie.or.jp

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc. (JCIE/USA)
www.jcie.org

4© 2012 Japan Center for International Exchange

April 2012