February 2010

Japan Center for International Exchange

The US-Japan Alliance:
Beyond Futenma
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIEOver the past several years, and especially since
September’s historic change of government in Japan,
it has become clear that there is a need to reassess theUS-Japan alliance to ensure that it is equipped to face
the challenges of the 21st century. There have beenchanges in Japan that are now reflected in domestic
politics, but we cannot ignore the fact that there havebeen important changes in the regional context as well.
China’s rise is apparent to everyone, and there is now aconsensus view that East Asia is becoming an engineof growth whose dynamism is benefiting the world.
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has spoken frequently of two lofty concepts that arise out of a recognition that the regional context has changed: thedesirability of forging an “East Asian community”
and the need to have a more equal US-Japan relationship. What is missing in this talk, however, is a clear
articulation of how to link the goals of a strong andmore balanced US-Japan relationship with a vision ofregional community that is equipped to deal with thechanges unfolding before us. Although some observers may see these aims as inconsistent or even mutually exclusive, they can be complementary. In fact,
effectively coordinating them should be the focus ofintense and forward-looking discussions between
Japan and the United States.

Reassessing the US-Japan Alliance
As the world around us changes, we should not be
shy about analyzing the costs and benefits of theUS-Japan alliance and acknowledging that it needs
to continue to benefit both parties in order to retain
its meaning and political support. The central agreement of the alliance is encapsulated in two of its articles: Article V in essence commits the United States
to defend Japan from attack, while Article VI basically pledges Japan to provide basing facilities for theUnited States to use in the protection of Japan andthe maintenance of regional security. A hardnosed
analysis of this trade-off does indeed show that it
continues to yield important strategic benefits forboth Japan and the United States.
The benefits for Japan are clear. The alliance wasconceived during the Cold War as a mechanism toprotect Japan from a single looming threat—the SovietUnion—that has since disappeared. However, the endof the Cold War has not eliminated Japan’s need forsome sort of deterrence capacity. Nearby countries
such as China and Russia have nuclear capabilities andNorth Korea is developing its capability. Japan cannot
ignore this.
But even putting aside the critical issue of the US
nuclear umbrella, it is clear that the alliance helps

Japan immensely, given the uncertainties in the region. For example, Japan benefits on purely economic
grounds. It has maintained its defense budget at lessthan one percent of GDP for historical reasons, but it
is difficult to imagine how Japan’s low levels of defense
spending could be sustained without US protection.
The alliance continues to yield crucial benefits
for the United States as well. One thing that has notchanged is the fact that the alliance makes it less costly
for the United States to maintain defense capabilities
closer to potential trouble spots in the region. Thisbetter enables it to quickly deploy substantial forcesin the case of regional contingencies, and it enhances
the US capacity to promote stability in Asia.
Furthermore, although the wording of bilateralagreements does not get into this, there is no avoiding the fact that US forward deployment in Japan
also benefits US strategy elsewhere in the world. TheSeventh Fleet, which is homeported at Yokosuka, isdispatched to protect sea lanes in the Indian Ocean
and to undertake other missions outside the immediate region. Meanwhile, it is no secret that US Marines
based in Okinawa are not solely there for the defenseof Japan. They rotate around the world, and many of
those who come to Okinawa for training are eventually deployed to Afghanistan or the Middle East.

has been moving in the right direction, although there
is more it should do.
On the other hand, it is important to recognize thatthe burden of maintaining the US-Japan security alliance has been disproportionately shouldered by local
citizens in a few areas in Japan, especially in Okinawa.
In today’s world, it is natural for people in a place like
Okinawa, which hosts 75 percent of the US military facilities for the entire country of Japan, to be botheredby the presence of foreign bases and another country’ssoldiers, with all the disruption they inevitably bring.
If local relations cannot be managed skillfully, the entire US-Japan security alliance can be put at risk.
The Japanese and US governments established theSACO [Special Action Committee on Okinawa] process in 1995 to work to reduce the US military footprint, but unfortunately they have not yet put in placea precise implementation plan for the reversion of theMarine Corps base, Futenma Air Station, which is ina heavily populated area and has become a prominentissue in bilateral relations. The relocation of the baseto new facilities in Okinawa simply cannot be implemented without eventually gaining the acquiescenceof local communities. Given all of the time and energy that has gone into pushing forward the currentagreement, it is entirely understandable for the US
government to claim that there is no alternative to theexisting relocation agreement. Nevertheless, we cannot deny the fact that there has been a sea change inJapan. The Democratic Party of Japan came to poweron the strength of a campaign that, in part, opposed
the current agreement, and the local community of
Nago voted on January 24 to repudiate the base moveto their city in a mayoral election that was widely
perceived as a referendum on the relocation plan.
Democratic governments have to find some way torespond to the voices of their people, and the Japanese
government cannot simply disregard these pressures.

Shouldering the Burdens of Security
The evidence is overwhelming that the security alliance continues to be justified by the benefits it provides to both countries. However, one vital issue thatneeds to be carefully managed is the distribution of
the burdens of the alliance.
On the one hand, there is a sense in the UnitedStates that Japan does not contribute as much to thesecurity alliance as it should. Nevertheless, the reality is that Japan has taken important measures overthe past two decades to assume a larger role. It expanded its role with the 1997 revision of the Japan-US
Defense Guidelines and the 1999 Surrounding Areas
Emergency Measures Law. Then, in the aftermath of
the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Diet passed thegroundbreaking Anti-Terrorism Special Measures
Law to allow the dispatch of Japanese Self Defense
Forces outside of the region, and this was eventuallyused to enable them to be deployed to Iraq and to permit refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. Japan
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Deepening the Alliance
The US-Japan alliance is too important to be put at
risk over politics, particularly over the fate of a single
base. Instead, we need to handle issues such as theFutenma relocation in a way that does not damage thealliance. To do this, we should operate with a broader
perspective and take a number of joint steps that are
explicitly linked to one another.
2February 2010

Immediately Begin Joint Consultations on
Futenma Relocation Planframework. The cabinet needs to consider if it is stillright to stick to the existing interpretation of constitutional prohibitions on the use of force, and theissue of collective self-defense must be reviewed infull detail. The basis for this examination should be
the broader legitimacy of potential actions in the regional and global context.
Going a step further, Japan needs to be more proactive in creating a better security environment in EastAsia. Prime Minister Hatoyama rightly talks about
the need for an equal US-Japan partnership and theimportance of East Asia community. But when thosein Asia talk about East Asia community, they cannot
separate this from discussions of the role of the UnitedStates, which has been the region’s security guarantor.
To go this route, Japan has to begin seriously discussing how to create a better security architecture in theregion in partnership with the United States.
One can envision a regional security architecturethat bridges the need for a robust US-Japan allianceand the importance of constructing an East Asia community. This can be best described using the analogyof a building with four floors. The first floor should
be bilateral alliances such as the US-Japan, US-Korea,and US-Australia alliances. All other floors rest uponthis one. Moving up, the second floor is trilateral arrangements and forums, including US-Japan-Korea
cooperation, a China-Japan-Korea relationship thatbuilds trust even while focusing mainly on economic
issues, and, hopefully, some sort of official ChinaJapan-US trilateral forum. The third floor would consist of sub­regional arrangements, most prominently
ASEAN in Southeast Asia and an eventual successor tothe Six Party Talks in Northeast Asia. And the fourthfloor would involve regional arrangements, preferably
an action-oriented institution with broad participation from the East Asia Summit countries and theUnited States that would be designed to respond to ahost of nontraditional security issues such as disaster
relief, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction.* These types of multi-layered institutional arrangements can provide the proper direction for the evolution of the US-Japan alliance as thebasis for the regional security architecture.

Fundamentally, both the US and Japanese governments understand that it is necessary to reduce theburden of bases on the local populations. Therefore,
it is important for them to engage in an ongoing effort to reduce the size and footprint of the proposed
new facility, which requires a thorough analysis of theoperational requirements it fulfills. Even if it turns outthat there is no other viable alternative to the current
agreement, more thought needs to be given to reducing the facility’s scope and consolidating functions
elsewhere. For example, it may be best to consider
dropping the idea of a runway for fixed-wing aircraftin the planned new facilities, instead using existingrunways elsewhere, while keeping a much smaller heliport in the plans.
Having said this, one thing we cannot forget isthat any solution to the Futenma problem has to be
the product of joint work between two allies, notthe product of confrontational negotiations. The US
approach seems to be to wait for Japan to come up
with a plan, as Prime Minister Hatoyama has promised to do, and then to respond to it. However, thismay not be the right way to go. Once any country’s
political parties publicly commit to a plan that is sohigh profile in nature, it is extraordinarily difficult
to convince them to back down from their position.
The creation of a plan cannot just be a case of Japandeciding what it wishes to do, then going back andforth with the US government. Instead, it needs tobe the product of joint work. If we are to have a successful outcome that accommodates the interests ofboth countries, it is crucial for the United States toenter into deep consultations with Japanese leaders
as soon as possible, before Japanese political leaders’positions become entrenched.

Give Greater Consideration to Strengthening
Japan’s ContributionsWith the changes unfolding in Japan and the world
around it, Japan also needs to think seriously about
how it can better contribute to international security. Japan needs to be taking on a greater share of
the burden of ensuring international security, forexample by supporting peacekeeping operations,but it has serious limitations under the current legal
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS* One option is this author’s proposal for an East Asia SecurityForum. See “East Asia Community Building: Toward an East
Asia Security Forum,” East Asia Insights, April 2007.

3February 2010

Launch a US-Japan Commission on the Future of
the Allianceof the US-Japan alliance and the future of the regional
security architecture. Ideally, its deliberations wouldstart in the spring and could help set the general parameters for a November 2010 US-Japan statement on
the alliance.
Naturally, such a commission could help soothetensions that will inevitably arise in the aftermath of a
final decision on the Futenma relocation plan. But its
major contribution would be to encourage Japan tocome up with a much clearer and more coherent national security policy. Japan has long avoided in-depth
discussions of national security, in a sense closing its
eyes and waiting for the United States to save the day.
Japan and the world have changed, though, and this is
no longer possible, so the time has come for a broader
public discussion of Japan’s role in ensuring its own
security and in contributing to international security.
Defense issues should not be further politicized inJapan, but without defense policy being placed on thedomestic political agenda, it will be difficult for Japanto escape the current pattern in which issues are taken
up in an overly narrow manner—such as the Futenma
relocation plan being examined merely from the perspective of the local burden—so this can instead be
discussed in a healthier, broader context.

President Obama’s scheduled visit to Japan inNovember 2010 provides excellent timing for a jointstatement on the US-Japan security alliance, coming
as it does during the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. Anystatement should be substantive in nature and forward looking, not merely consisting of platitudes, andfor this reason it is important that consultation on thebroad outlines of it start right away. Meanwhile, Japanis undergoing an important revision of its National
Defense Program Guidelines that should be completed by the end of 2010. It is important to link this toAmerican and Japanese consultations on their vision
for regional security and on how to better share theirdefense burdens.
For this purpose, the Japanese and American governments should consider launching a high-­profile
joint commission to examine the US-Japan allianceand chart a way forward for it. Japan has long beenaccustomed to dealing with security affairs in a closed
room, but it has become clear that there is now a needfor greater transparency and active public involvement in the national security debate. This can beaided greatly by a bilateral commission that involves
not just government bureaucrats but also politicians,
public intellectuals, and representatives of civil society.
While the immediate rationale for this review is linked
to the changes in governments in both countries andthe desire to make the 50th anniversary of the alliancemore forward looking—rather than a mere celebration of the past—fundamentally it is needed because
the security situation in Asia is changing dramatically with the rise of powers such as China and India
and the emergence of new non­traditional challenges.
Therefore, the commission should have a broad mandate, covering issues running the gamut from basing
facilities and the nuclear umbrella to the regional role❖❖❖
An objective assessment of the US-Japan alliance reveals that it continues to benefit both countries andplay an essential role in maintaining peace and security in the region. However, saving it from narrowdebates such as the one over the Futenma relocation
plan requires flexibility and far-sighted thinking fromboth sides and, most importantly, it means that theyshould jointly consult with each other as allies rather
than negotiate as adversaries.
Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE. He ­previously
served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from the Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
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4© 2010 Japan Center for International Exchange

February 2010