Confidence-Building
Measures for
Artificial Intelligence
A Multilateral Perspective
IOANA PUSCASAcknowledgments
Support from UNIDIR’s core funders provides the foundation for all of the Institute’s activities. Workof the Security and Technology Programme on artificial intelligence is funded by the governments ofCzechia, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, and by Microsoft.
The author wishes to thank Dr. Giacomo Persi Paoli (UNIDIR) for advice and guidance on the project
and for the review of this report, Dr. Beyza Unal for her review and suggestions, and UNIDIR experts
who shared views at an internal workshop. The final part of this report summarizes the outcomes of a
dedicated closed-door workshop; the author also wishes to thank workshop participants for their active
engagement and invaluable insights.

About UNIDIRThe United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous
institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament,
UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Basedin Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas
needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

Note
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning thelegal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of
its frontiers or boundaries. The views expressed in the publication are the sole responsibility of the individual author. They do not necessary reflect the views or opinions of the United Nations, UNIDIR, its
staff members or sponsors.

About the Author
Ioana Puscas (@IoanaPuscas1) is Researcher on artificial intelligence with UNIDIR’s
Security & Technology Programme.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

2

Acronyms & Abbreviations
AI

Artificial intelligence

BWC

Biological Weapons Convention

CBM

Confidence Building Measure

CCW

Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons

GGE

Group of Governmental Experts

L AWS

Lethal autonomous weapons systems

O EWG

Open-ended Working GroupO SCE

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

U NIDIR

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research

U NO DA

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

3

Contents
Part I. 		

5

1.

Background and Purpose of UNIDIR Project52.

Confidence-Building Measures8

2.1

Conceptual Framework8

2.1.1 Definition

8

2.1.2 Historical Background8

2.1.3 CBMs: Appraisal and Key Characteristics

9

2.2

CBMs at the United Nations

11

3.

A Typology of CBMs

13

Part II. 		

20

1.

Confidence-Building Measures for AI: From Concept to Action

20

2.

Food for Thought List: Possible CBMs for AI

22

3.

Confidence-Building Measures for AI: Views from States

24

3.1

Multilateral Perspective: Workshop Summary		

24

3.2

CBMs Survey: Acceptability and Impact

27

3.2.1 Surveys Results

27

3.2.2 Discussion and Analysis

31

Conclusion

33

Bibliography

34

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

4

Part I.
1. Background and Purpose of
UNIDIR Project
Confidence-building measures (CBMs) have

Deliberations in the Group of Governmen-

been invoked frequently in recent discussions

tal Experts (GGE) on lethal autonomous

about artificial intelligence (AI) governance,

weapons systems (LAWS), which operates inin different policy forums, and by different

the framework of the Convention on Certain

actors. Calls for CBMs have emphasized theConventional Weapons, have also covered

need for more cooperative frameworks thatvarious aspects related to CBMs for auton-

can help to build more trust or reduce risks

omous weapons (which would also include

of unwanted consequences in the use of AI-

AI-enabled autonomy).1 States with histori-

enabled systems.

cally very different positions on the desired

1

Notably, in the first session of the GGE in 2023, which took place between 6–10 March, CBMs were formally included as a
topic in the indicative timetable proposed by the Chair. See Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons
Systems, “Food for thought paper – Indicative timetable”, https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_on_Certain_Conventional_Weapons_-Group_of_Governmental_Experts_on_Lethal_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_(2023)/Indicative_
timetable_-_first_GGE_LAWS_session_2023.pdf. CBMs were also part of the indicative timetable for the first session of the
GGE on LAWS in March 2024. See Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous
Weapons Systems, “Indicative timetable of the first 2024 session”, https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_on_Certain_
Conventional_Weapons_-Group_of_Governmental_Experts_on_Lethal_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_(2024)/Indicative_timetable_-_first_GGE_LAWS_session_2024.pdf.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

5

outcome of the GGE process have expressedWith this project, UNIDIR aimed to meaningful-support for the development of CBMs. It is nev-

ly push these conversations forward.

ertheless noteworthy that mentions of CBMs
have been consistent with States’ dominantpositions within the process. A number ofStates have been careful to highlight that
CBMs should not be a substitute for a legallybinding instrument,2 while others consider
CBMs an important goal in themselves and not(necessarily) complementary, or adjacent, to aThis report presents a framework for conceptual and practical considerations for confidence-building measures for AI, with a particular focus on the advancement of such initiatives
in the multilateral domain. Further, it includes
preliminary perspectives collected through aworkshop and survey with a group of Member

legally binding instrument.3

States.

However, the content, format, and actionable

This report concludes the second, and final,

points that may be promoted by CBMs in thecontext of AI have not been discussed at length
at the multilateral level. While there is growing
consensus and calls for CBMs in this domain,
there have been no advanced conversations at
the multilateral level on, effectively, how to getphase of the UNIDIR project on CBMs for AI.
Phase I consisted of a comprehensive AI risk
mapping in the context of international security.4
The risk taxonomy provided a basis for discussing CBMs during the consultation with States,
and it can be leveraged in future discussions.

there, what CBMs for AI may look like, which
actors would be engaged and so on.

2This point was, for example, highlighted in the Proposal “Roadmap Towards New Protocol on Autonomous Weapons Systems”
submitted by a group of States (available here: https://view.officeapps.live.com/op/view.aspx?src=https%3A%2F%2Fdocuments.unoda.org%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2022%2F05%2F20220311-G10-proposal-legally-binding-instrument.docx&wdOrigin=BROWSELINK), and in a Working Paper submitted by the Non-Aligned Movement and other States
Parties (available here: https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/WP-NAM.pdf). In its Proposal, Pakistan
further highlighted that transparency and confidence-building measures find meaning against the backdrop of legally binging
rules, which they complement but do not replace (see CCW/GGE.1/2023/WP.3/Rev. 1, “Proposal for an international legal instrument on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)”, 8 March 2023, https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_
on_Certain_Conventional_Weapons_-Group_of_Governmental_Experts_on_Lethal_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_(2023)/CCW_GGE1_2023_WP.3_REv.1_0.pdf).
3

For example, the Working Paper submitted by the Russian Federation simply refers to the role of CBMs in the context of regionaland global collective security; see “Working Paper of the Russian Federation ‘Application of International Law to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS)’”, 18 July 2022, https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/WP-Russian-Federation_EN.pdf). Türkiye also mentioned the importance of following “a step-by-step approach” and giving priority to
CBMs, “in order to create a conductive environment to move forward” [on LAWS], in a statement delivered at the GGE on LAWS
on 7 March 2023, available on UN Web TV: https://webtv.un.org/en/asset/k19/k19n8iayzg (approx. min. 10:45-15:45).
In a statement in 2023, the United Kingdom raised the point that a legally binding instrument “cannot adequately fulfil the requirement for risk mitigation and confidence building measures”. Further, the statement stressed that CBMs do not preclude efforts
towards the future emergence of a legally binding instrument and, should such an instrument achieve consensus, CBMs would
still be needed to operationalize the instrument. See CCW/GGE on LAWS, United Kingdom Statement, “Item 5 – Topic 6: Risk
mitigation and confidence-building measures”, 9 March 2023, https://docs-library.unoda.org/Convention_on_Certain_Conventional_Weapons_-Group_of_Governmental_Experts_on_Lethal_Autonomous_Weapons_Systems_(2023)/UK_Intervention_Item_5_Topic_6_Risk_Mitigation_and_Confidence_Building_Measures.pdf.
4

Ioana Puscas, “AI and International Security: Understanding the Risks and Paving the Path for Confidence-Building Measures”,
UNIDIR, 12 October 2023, https://unidir.org/publication/ai-and-international-security-understanding-the-risks-and-paving-the-path-for-confidence-building-measures/.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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ScopeThe scope of the project applies to AI in thecontext of international peace and security,
in a broad sense. It is not limited to an application area, to military uses only, or specificweapons systems, such as (lethal) autonomous weapons systems.

Structure of the Report
The report first introduces a theoretical andhistorical overview of CBMs, including atypology of CBMs. This theoretical part sets
the framework for the discussion, outlining how
CBMs have emerged in other domains and thekinds of risks and concerns they address. While
the focus is on multilateral processes and multilaterally agreed CBMs, there are also references to CBMs that have emerged out of regional
processes.
The next part of the report focuses on CBMs
for AI. This section outlines key challenges andconcerns that a CBMs process for AI may needto account for, factoring in elements of historical precedent (what can be learned from otherdomains) and priorities and goal setting. It thenputs forward a list of tentative ideas for CBMs,
covering both narrow and broad measures.
This list is not prescriptive and does not necessarily reflect a UNIDIR position on CBMs.
Rather, it is an exercise proposed to encourage
conversations around concrete CBMs and, inthe process, to incentivize early considerations
about priorities, to assess comfort levels andconditions for cooperation around CBMs. The
final part of this section presents initial reactions
from a workshop and survey with States, bothto the suggested CBMs, and more broadly, tothe prospect of developing CBMs for AI.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

7

2. Confidence-Building Measures
2.1. Conceptual Framework
2.1.1. Definition

diplomatic language following a series of

A standard definition of CBMs in the area of dis-of the Conference on Security and Cooperationarmament and arms control describes CBMs
as “planned procedures to prevent hostilities, to avert escalation, to reduce militarytension, and to build mutual trust between
countries”.

5

measures agreed at the 1975 Helsinki Final Act
in Europe. At the time, 35 States agreed to what
is known as the ‘first generation’ of European
CBMs, which covered measures related to
exchange of information, notification, and observation, on a voluntary basis, of major military

As the concept suggests, CBMs aim to build
confidence, which can be achieved and operationalized through a series of actions and initiatives that aim to adjust inaccurate perceptions,to avoid misunderstandings, or to enable further
cooperation. In the case of a peace process, forexample, CBMs may be aimed at deepening
efforts for negotiations without necessarily, or
specifically focusing on the root causes of theconflict.6

activities.7
Two further documents consolidated the importance of CBMs during and in the aftermath of theCold War. First, the 1986 Stockholm Document,
which included provisions for verifiable CBMs.
Second, the 1990 Vienna Document, which
covered measures for immediate risk reduction
and for longer-term routine military interactions(e.g., on-site inspections, annual exchanges of
military information).8

2.1.2. Historical BackgroundIn effect, measures to build confidence, toprevent hostilities or to ease tensions haveexisted for centuries, yet it was only during theCold War, in the second half of the twentiethcentury that the concept of CBMs entered

Prior to the 1975 conference and the following
initiatives, the United States and the Soviet
Union had agreed to measures to permit
direct communication between their leadersduring a military crisis (the so-called “Hotline
Agreement”

of

1963,

the

first

bilateralagreement between the United States and the5United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Military Confidence-Building Measures”, https://disarmament.unoda.org/
convarms/military-cbms/.

6

Simon J.A. Mason and Matthias Siegfried, “Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in Peace Processes”, in: Managing Peace
Processes: Process related questions. A handbook for AU practitioners, Volume 1, African Union and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2013: 57-77, https://peacemediation.ch/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/AU-Handbook_Confidence-Building-Measures-in-Peace-Processes.pdf.
7

Marie-France Desjardins, “In search of a theory: Developing the concept”, The Adelphi Papers Vol 36, Issue 307: Rethinking
Confidence-Building Measures (1996), 7, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/05679329608449406.
8

OSCE Secretariat, “OSCE Guide on Non-military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)”, 2012, 12, https://www.osce.org/
files/f/documents/6/0/91082.pdf.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

8

Soviet Union),9 a limited but practical measuremechanisms to enhance trust, to foster greater

to limit risks of nuclear confrontation. Later, incooperation and adjust inaccurate percep-

1972, the United States and the Soviet Union

tions.10 In emerging policy areas, they can set

signed an agreement to restrict miliary activities

early frameworks for consensus-building overin international waters and included specific

key terminology, and can help to clarify andprovisions on notifications of naval exercises

promote shared understandings of risks.11(the 1972 “Incidents at Sea” Agreement).
These agreements constituted a frameworkof bilateral CBMs and played a significant partin demonstrating the role of measures to build

CBMs can be promoted unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally, as well as take various
forms depending on the context in which they

trust in a complicated strategic environment.

are applied, such as pre- or post-conflict, or

2.1.3. CBMs: Appraisal and Key
Characteristics

have played a key role in the development ofConfidence-building measures are now a tested

access to key stakeholders (e.g., the Organi-

instrument in international relations, adopted andzation of American States and the Organization

applied across a multitude of diplomatic, military,for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

political and arms control processes. From theplayed important roles in developing CBMs inearlier, narrow focus during the Cold War (mainly

the digital domain).

centred around ‘hard security’ concerns, and on
reducing risks of surprise attacks), CBMs havebeen promoted across a wide range of politicalintra- or inter-State.12 Regional organizations
CBMs, and have been able to leverage theirunderstanding of regional contexts as well as

There is no universal prescription for identifying CBMs. Measures under the scope ofor arms control processes.

CBMs are situation specific and vary according

While it is only fair to acknowledge that CBMs

However, the procedures underpinning CBMs

have not always been successful or the result

are essential to their effectiveness in practice,not always commensurate to the intended

and these procedures must be jointly developed

goals, when pursued and promoted by shared

and applied to facilitate trust and mutual under-interests and a framework of implementation

standing.13

to the domain area in which they are applied.

that is feasible, CBMs can be highly effective

9

The communication links (which comprised both a duplex wire telegraph circuit and a duplex radiotelegraph circuit) were usedon several occasions, including in the Arab–Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1973.

10

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Transparency and Confidence-Building”, https://disarmament.unoda.org/
convarms/transparency-cbm/.
11

For example, in the cyber domain, one of the measures in the first set of CBMs agreed at the OSCE with Decision No 1106
in 2013 acknowledged “the risk of misunderstandings in the absence of agreed terminology” and decided on voluntary steps
to share lists of relevant national terminology, with an added longer-term goal “to produce a consensus glossary”. See OSCE
Permanent Council, Decision No 1106, Initial Set of OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict
Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies, PC.Dec/1106, 3 December 2013, https://www.osce.
org/files/f/documents/d/1/109168.pdf.
12Giacomo Persi Paoli et al., “Modernizing Arms Control: Exploring responses to the use of AI in military decision-making”,
UNIDIR, 2020, 28, https://unidir.org/files/2020-08/Modernizing%20Arms%20Control%20Final.pdf.
13

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Military Confidence-Building Measures”, https://disarmament.unoda.org/
convarms/military-cbms/.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

9

Basic Principles of CBMs: Lessons from Outer Space Security
The Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures inOuter Space Activities, which was established by a General Assembly resolution in 2010, submitted
a consensus report to the Sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly in 2013.
While the document discusses the context of outer space activities, it presents a characterization of
CBMs that can be informative, more broadly. Notably, the document mentions:“there are two types of transparency and confidence-building measures: those dealing with•capabilities and those dealing with behaviours”; and“transparency and confidence-building measures developed in a multilateral framework are•

more likely to be adopted by the wider international community”.14
Further, it advances a method for testing the implementation and validation/demonstration of CBMs
through a set of key indicators.15

I M P L E M E N TAT I O N

D E M O N S T R AT I O N

Who

Who should implement the measure?

Who will be able to confirm that the measure has
been implemented?

What

What is the measure that should be implemented?
Is it clearly identified and understood?

What should be demonstrated to confirm implementation?

Why

What is the value or benefit of performing themeasure?

Does a clear understanding of why it is important to beable to confirm or demonstrate implementation exist?

When

When should the measure be implemented?

At what point is demonstration or confirmation
performed?

How

How should the measure be implemented?

How is implementation of the measure validated,demonstrated or confirmed?

14

General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures inOuter Space Activities, A/68/189, 29 July 2013, 12, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F68%2F189.

15

Ibid., 15.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

102.2. CBMs at the United Nations
CBMs have been a key priority in United Nations

The United Nations has led several initiatives

disarmament and arms control processes.

over the years in the area of transparency and

The Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament of 2018 acknowledged the strategic roleof CBMs as part of the disarmament toolbox.

confidence–building measures, and it has
worked on the elaboration of concrete recommendations for Member States.

The definition and characterization of CBMs

In the area of conventional arms, it establishedin the document highlighted the importance of

the Report on Military Expenditures (MilEx) in

CBMs, as well as their potential value as part of1981, and the United Nations Register of Con-a multi-step process:ventional Arms (UNROCA) in 1991.

Measures

for

and

con-

In its 2017 Report, the Disarmament Commis-

pursuedassion included recommendations for practicalvoluntary means for sharing information with

CBMs in the field of conventional weapons,

the aim of creating mutual understand-such as setting up channels of direct com-

ing and trust, reducing misperceptions

munication between Member States toand miscalculations, enhancing clarity

reduce risks of misunderstandings; capaci-of intentions, and ultimately reducing the

ty-building and other educational efforts torisk of armed conflict. They can serve as apromote CBMs; dialogue on strategies andbaseline for the pursuit of legally binding

policies linked to weapons use, deployment,

measures. [emphases added]

control, trade and transfer; advance notifica-

fidence-building

transparency
are

often

16

Further, the role of CBMs was reiterated in the
Secretary-General’s “A New Agenda for Peace”

tion of major military manoeuvres; and specificvoluntary military constraint measures.18

of July 2023, which mentioned that trust is “theThe General Assembly also mandated thecornerstone of the collective security system.

creation of the Repository of military CBMs, an[…] To help reinforce trust, confidence-building

evolving list of tested measures grouped in fivemechanisms have been of great value”.17

large categories:19

16

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Securing Our Common Future. An Agenda for Disarmament”, 2018, 11,https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/sg-disarmament-agenda-pubs-page.pdf.
17

United Nations Secretary-General, “Our Common Agenda. Policy Brief 9: A New Agenda for Peace”, July 2023, 8, https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-for-peace-en.pdf.
18

General Assembly, “Report of the Disarmament Commission for 2017”, A/72/42, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F72%2F42.

19

The table presents a summary of the CBMs published under the Repository. The full list can be viewed here: United Nations
Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Military Confidence-Building Measures,” https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/military-cbms/.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

11

C AT E G O R Y

I.

II.

Communication andcoordination measures

Observation andverification measures

III. Military constrains
measures

D I S T I N C T M E A S U R E S I N E A C H C AT E G O R Y / S E L E C T E X A M P L E S•

Information exchange•

Communication (e.g., direct communications/hotline)•

Troop movement, exercises, and weapon management (e.g., advance notification)•

Exchanging and convening personnel

E.g., agreement to exchange invitations to observe demonstrations of new weapon
systems•

Troop movement, exercises, weapons (specific restrictions on major military
exercises; agreements on acceptable/unacceptable military activities)•

Border areas/demilitarized zones (e.g., develop dedicated code of conduct for activities in demilitarized/other zones)

IV. Training andeducation measures

E.g., teaching CBM approaches in military schools; applying CBM techniques incommand and in field exercisesV.

E.g., establishing joint crisis-management or conflict prevention centres; establishingjoint military and/or science and technology research centres/programmes

Cooperation andintegration measures

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

12

3. A Typology of CBMs
This section outlines a typology of CBMs, which

what could be promoted and implemented forcan be a starting point for future conversations

AI. The same categories of CBMs describedon CBMs for AI. The typology is presented

below may also demonstrate where existingin the following table and is organized in twoframeworks for CBMs may be inadequate for AI

broad clusters of measures: measures to takeor simply not applicable.

(transparency CBMs and cooperation CBMs)and measures to avoid (constraint CBMs).
This categorization draws broadly on frameworks proposed in other regional and multilateral forums where discussions have progressedover the past years, such as in the fields of cyberspace, outer space, or the system of CBMs
under the Biological Weapons Convention.
While the distinct formulation of CBMs for eachdomain is specific and tailored to that domain,
this typology aims to provide a high-level
overview of types of agreed measures acrossseveral policy areas, including newer/emerging
areas, such as the cyberspace domain. In otherwords, although there are terminological differences and more granular classifications of
CBMs,20 CBMs generally fit into one of thesetwo clusters of measures.

Constraint CBMs: Note on
Conceptualization
Historically, constraint CBMs, which encourage
limits or some form of restraint, have been lessfrequently promoted by States in the context ofmultilateral processes (relative to transparency and cooperation CBMs). Constraint CBMs
have been especially promoted across bilateralor regional processes and have been oftentied to notification requirements. For example,
the Stockholm document of 1986 placed constraints on the number of troops involved inmiliary activities and tied this measure to requirements of prior notifications.21
In theory, some transparency or cooperation
CBMs could be said to contain implicit provisions of constraint, meaning that by encouraging one kind of behaviour (e.g., to provide timely

Furthermore, this typology is not exhaustive, and it does not aim to formulate a canon
for CBMs, nor to assess the success of the
CBMs in the respective domain. The aim of thisnotifications of future troop movements in agiven area), they implicitly promote restraint
on the opposite or adverse behaviour (e.g.,
pursuing future troop movements in a given
area in the absence of prior notifications). In thistypology is to provide a conceptual resource forpaper, constraint measures are categorized as

discussions on CBMs for AI.

distinct CBMs when they are explicitly and orig-

As discussions on CBMs for AI start to gainstraint, either on capabilities or behaviour, andinally worded in a language that promotes con-ground, the legacy of existing CBMs can provide

not following post hoc interpretation.

a foundational starting point for considering

20

For example, the 2013 Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures inOuter Space Activities grouped CBMs under several categories, such as transparency, international cooperation, consultative
mechanisms, outreach and coordination. See General Assembly, A/68/189, 29 July 2013.
21

OSCE, Document of the Stockholm Conference On Confidence- And Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe
Convened in Accordance with the Relevant Provisions of the Concluding Document of the Madrid Meeting of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe, 19 September 1986, 13, https://www.osce.org/fsc/41238.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

13

CBMs Typologies
Actions to Take
TYPES OF MEASURE

I N F O R M AT I O NONEXCHANGE

POLICIESACTION ITEMS – EXAMPLES

Biological Weapons Convention:22 CBM E: Declaration of legislation, regulations and other measures.
Cyber – OSCE 2016:23 Voluntary information-sharing on measures taken by

T R A N S PA R E N C Y M E A S U R E S

the Participating States to ensure an open, interoperable, secure, and reliable
Internet; meetings of designated national experts (at least three times/
year), within the OSCE framework, to discuss information exchanges andexplore appropriate development of CBMs; information-sharing on nationalorganization, strategies, policies and programmes; (given the absence ofagreed terminology) provision of a list of national terminology related to ICT
security, accompanied by an explanation or definition of each term.
Cyber – UN GGE:24 Sharing of information, good practices, lessons/white

papers on existing or emerging threats and incidents; national strategies andstandards for vulnerability analysis; national and regional approaches torisk management and conflict prevention, including national approaches toclassifying ICT incidents in terms of the scale and seriousness of the incident.
Information exchange on national approaches to ICT security, ICT-enabled critical infrastructure etc., including the legal and oversight regimes
under which these operate; sharing of national views on the classificationof critical infrastructure, sharing of relevant national policies and legislation, and frameworks for risk assessment and for identifying, classifying andmanaging ICT incidents that affect critical infrastructure.
Cyber – OEWG:25 Sharing national views on technical ICT terms and terminologies.

Outer Space - GGE:26 Information exchange on principles and goals ofnational space policies and strategies; publication of information on
national space research and space application programmes; informationexchange on major military outer space expenditure.
Outer Space – Disarmament Commission:27 Regular dialogues about
national space policies and activities (dialogues could be supported by theUnited Nations).

22

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, BWC Confidence Building Measures, https://disarmament.unoda.org/biological-weapons/confidence-building-measures/.

23
OSCE Permanent Council, Decision No. 1202, OSCE Confidence-Building Measures to Reduce the Risks of Conflict
Stemming from the Use of Information and Communication Technologies, PC.DEC/1202, 10 March 2016, https://www.osce.
org/files/f/documents/d/a/227281.pdf.
24

General Assembly, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Advancing Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace in the Context of International Security, A/76/135, 14 July 2021, https://front.un-arm.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/
A_76_135-2104030E-1.pdf.

25
General Assembly, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on Security of and in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies 2021–2025, A/78/265, 1 August 2023, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4020967?ln=en&v=pdf.
26

General Assembly, A/68/189, 29 July 2013.

27

General Assembly, Report of the Disarmament Commission for 2023, A/78/42, 27 April 2023, https://documents.un.org/
symbol-explorer?s=A/78/42&i=A/78/42_7529841.
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

14

I N F O R M AT I O NONEXCHANGE

ACTIVITIES(AND

Biological Weapons Convention28•

CBM A– Part 1: Exchange of data on research centres and laboratories;

EVENTS)– Part 2: Exchange of information on national biological defence
research and development programmes.
•

CBM B: Exchange of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases andsimilar occurrences caused by toxins.

•

CBM F: Declaration of past activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research and development programmes.

•

CBM G: Declaration of vaccine production facilities.

Cyber – OSCE 2016:29 Voluntary exchange of information related to ICTs
security; responsible reporting of ICT-related vulnerabilities and sharing of
associated information on available remedies.
T R A N S PA R E N C Y M E A S U R E S

Cyber – UN GGE:30 Exchange of national views and practices on ICT security
incidents.
Outer Space – GGE:31 Information exchange and notifications on orbital parameters of outer space objects and potential orbital conjunctions (involving
spacecraft to affected government and private sector spacecraft operators);
information exchange on natural hazards, and voluntary information-sharing to governmental and non-governmental spacecraft operators of natural
phenomena that may cause harmful interference to spacecraft; notification ofplanned spacecraft launches.
Outer Space – Disarmament Commission:32 Share space situation
awareness data and information, to the extent practicable.
(RISK REDUCTION)N O T I F I C AT I O N S

C O N TA C T S A N D V I S I T SOuter Space – GGE:33 Notifications on scheduled manoeuvres that may
result in risk to the flight safety of other objects; notifications and monitoring of uncontrolled high-risk re-entry events (e.g., re-entry of space objects
or residual material); notifications in case of emergency; notification of intentional orbital break-ups.
Outer Space – GGE:34 Voluntary familiarization visits; expert visits including
visits to space launch sites, invitation of international observers to launchsites, flight command and control centres and other facilities; demonstrationof rocket and space technologies.
Cyber – OEWG:35 Regular in-person or virtual meetings of Points of Contact
to share practical information and experiences on the operationalization andutilization of the global Points of Contact directory.

28

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, BWC “Confidence Building Measures”.

29

OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEC/1202, 10 March 2016.

30

General Assembly, A/76/135, 14 July 2021.

31

General Assembly, A/68/189, 29 July 2013.

32

General Assembly, A/78/42, 27 April 2023.

33

General Assembly, A/68/189, 29 July 2013.

34

Ibid.

35

General Assembly, A/78/265, 1 August 2023.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

15

P O I N T S O F C O N TA C T

Cyber – OSCE 2016:36 Nomination of a contact point by Participating States
to facilitate pertinent communications and dialogue.
Cyber – OEWG:37 Consider nominating a national Point of Contact at thetechnical, policy and diplomatic levels, taking into account differentiated capacities.
Cyber – OEWG:38 Tabletop exercises to simulate the practical aspects of participating in a global Points of Contact directory.

C O O P E R AT I O N M E A S U R E S

Cyber – UN GGE:39 Establish Points of Contact at policy, diplomatic andtechnical levels.
Outer Space – Disarmament Commission:40 Consider designating pointsof contact to facilitate the notification of potentially affected States ofscheduled manoeuvres that may result in risks to the flight safety of space
objects of other States.
DIALOGUE AND
C O N S U LTAT I O N S

Biological Weapons Convention:41 CBM D: Active promotion of contacts
between scientists, including exchanges for joint research. (NB: this CBMs
was deleted by the Seventh Review Conference in 2011).
Cyber – OSCE 2016:42 Consultations between Participating States toreduce risks of misperception and tensions related to use of ICTs; using
OSCE as a platform for dialogue, exchange of best practices, awareness-raising and information on capacity-building; activities for officials and experts to
support the facilitation of authorized and protected communication channels
to prevent and reduce the risks of misperceptions, escalation and conflict,and to clarify technical legal and diplomatic mechanisms; developing mechanisms to exchange best practices.
Cyber – UN GGE:43 Continued dialogue through bilateral, subregional,
regional and multilateral consultations and engagement, with contributions from private sector, academia, civil society and the technical community.
Outer Space – GGE:44 Consultations through bilateral and multilateral diplomatic exchanges, government-to-government mechanisms (e.g., military-to-military, scientific etc.) to clarify information, to discuss implementation of CBMs, to prevent/minimize potential risks, etc.

36

OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEC/1202, 10 March 2016.

37

General Assembly, Report of the Open-ended Working Group on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/75/816, 18 March 2021, https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2F75%2F816&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False.
38

General Assembly, A/78/265, 1 August 2023.

39

General Assembly, A/76/135, 14 July 2021.

40

General Assembly, A/78/42, 27 April 2023.

41

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, BWC “Confidence Building Measures”.

42

OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEC/1202, 10 March 2016.

43

General Assembly, A/76/135, 14 July 2021.

44

General Assembly, A/68/189, 29 July 2013.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

16

C A PA C I T Y- B U I L D I N GCyber – OSCE 2016:45 Using OSCE as a platform for dialogue, exchange ofbest practices, awareness-raising and information on capacity-building; conducting activities for officials and experts to support the facilitation of authorized and protected communication channels […] to clarify technical legal anddiplomatic mechanisms.
Outer Space – GGE:46 Bilateral, regional and multilateral capacity-building
programmes on space science and technologies (for developing countries).
Outer Space – Disarmament Commission:47 Provide assistance andtraining and transfer technology, data and material (in particular to developing countries).

ACTION ITEMS – EXAMPLES
MEASURESCONSTRAINT

Actions to Avoid

OSCE Vienna Document (1999):48 Constraining provisions on number of military activities subject to prior notification within three calendar years involving more than 40,000 troops, or 900 battle tanks, etc.; constraining provisions
on number of military activities subject to prior notification within one calendar year, and involving more than 13,000
troops or 300 battle tanks, etc.

45

OSCE Permanent Council, PC.DEC/1202, 10 March 2016.

46

General Assembly, A/68/189, 29 July 2013.

47

General Assembly, A/78/42, 27 April 2023.

48

OSCE, Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, FSC.DOC/1/99, Istanbul, 16
November 1999, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/b/2/41276.pdf.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

17

Lessons from other domains: Cyber, Nuclear, Outer Space, Biological
Weapons/ BWC
The processes underpinning the elaboration ofin the Open-ended Working Group was in

CBMs in other domains, as well as the resulting

itself considered a CBM (a point that echoes

measures, provide valuable insights that may

the views of many delegations at the GGE on

be carried forward as States begin to articulate

LAWS) although it is acknowledged that not all

CBMs for AI. The following overview derives

States are able to participate in the same way

from comparative views collected at an internal

due to limited capabilities.

workshop, which convened UNIDIR experts
from several disarmament areas, including the
cyber domain, outer space, and weapons ofmass destruction (biological weapons, nuclear

Self-reporting is also an established practice in
the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
domain, through the CBMs forms, but submis-

weapons).

sion of forms has been rather scant and incon-

Generally, CBMs have enjoyed wide support attrained personnel, has been an issue; however,

the multilateral level, even as States recognize

States’ lack of willingness to participate is rec-the many challenges in developing and imple-

ognized as the bigger and more persistentmenting measures that are not enforceable

challenge. Further, even as submitted material

through legal agreements.

could be done promptly there are other inherent

sistent. Here too, lack of capacity, including

The moral and political obligation attached
to respecting agreements, though voluntary,
has meant that non-cooperative behaviours
or non-compliance received stern political
reactions, especially when long-standing anddecades-long practices were abandoned unilaterally or abruptly (e.g., self-reporting ofassets or activities in the nuclear domain, suchas through the International Atomic Energy
Agency). There emerges, in other words, an
expectation of compliance, and a political obligation attached to the process even if it is‘voluntary’.

risks when the information that is submitted
may be inconsistent with publicly available
information about bio-related activities in acountry, when States may decide to declare no
major changes despite significant advancesin the biotech industry, or simply due to morepractical reasons: States may submit incorrect
information not because they intend to violate
the Treaty but due to factors such as time constraints or miscoordination between national
agencies. One or a combination of such factors
may alter the overall trust in the process and be
counter to its aim, which is to reduce ambiguities and doubts.

In domains as intangible as cyber (arguably
opaquer than domains such as bio or nuclear),
where it is difficult to understand or monitor
national capabilities and activities, self-reporting is essential and the cornerstone of multilateral processes. In that regard, participation

A delicate balancing act between transparency, on the one hand, and protecting what
States view as the purview of national security
interests, on the other, has also characterized the CBMs process in the context of outerspace. This has resulted in lengthy attempts to

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

18

agree on implementation plans and an overall

there is broad consensus that bringing Statesstalled process, which incentivized commercial

together and promoting CBMs in the multilater-

actors (motivated to protect their own invest-

al framework carries political benefits and has

ments) to pursue parallel efforts for defining

value in reducing risks of misunderstanding

best practices—in effect, ‘unofficial CBMs’.

and unpredictability.

In the cyber domain, the technical community

The formulation of technical and scientificthat effectively works on cyber incidents has alanguage that is part of CBMs is important, es-history of operationalizing technical standards.

pecially in the context of ever-evolving technical

To many in this community, the conversa-

and scientific advancements. This critique wastions on CBMs at the multilateral level are araised on numerous occasions in the bio/BWC

rebranding of standards or regulations that

context where it was highlighted that the CBMs

have already existed for some time, and in that

forms have run into the risk of being surpassed

sense a potential duplication of efforts. Yet,by changes in science.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

19

Part II.
1. Confidence-Building Measures for
AI: From Concept to Action
To date, some national initiatives constitute, inmany critical areas of risks in the use of AI,

effect, incipient forms of CBMs. For example,

which cannot be mitigated by national strat-

a proliferation of national AI defence strate-egies alone. For example, such documents

gies in recent years can be seen as a measure

do not per se build more trust among adver-

to outline high-level principles for the devel-saries, they do not build channels of com-

opment and use of AI in military contexts. The

munication or a shared language of risks andlanguage across these documents tends toconcerns, and do not clarify how specifichighlight key principles related to safety, testing

incidents involving AI-enabled systems would

and responsible use. Though not necessarily

be managed. The growing and wide-scale use

framed as CBMs, these documents can provide

and adoption of AI, already present acrossreassurance that States commit to being re-weapons systems and domains of warfare,sponsible actors in how they develop, procure

warrants the need for meaningful conversa-

and use the technology.

tions at the multilateral level about how to

At the very least, this may signal to other actors
a commitment to deploy the technology in a way

manage the development, adoption and integration of this powerful technology.

that would minimize risks of accidents or unin-

Existing CBMs may provide useful lessons on

tended behaviour and escalation. At the multilat-

how to articulate the language of CBMs, under-eral level, the 11 Guiding Principles,49 adopted

stand where stakeholders with very different

by the GGE on LAWS in 2019, establishedinterests have historically found it easier toimportant baseline principles for the work of thereach consensus language and articulateGroup. Though non-legally binding, these princi-

shared goals. The intrinsic complexity of AI

ples codified key shared understandings about

technologies, however, including AI’s scalabili-

LAWS among the large group of States whichty and potential for use across diverse domains,are part of the GGE. The Principles remain re-may also mean that existing CBMs may not bestrictive in their scope, however, as they refer tosuited as templates, or only with limited use.

a specific class of weapons systems.

As a next step, a conversation about CBMs

In the context of AI, the need for CBMs is

could take into account a combination of narrowprompted by several factors. There remain

and broad concerns, including:49

GGE on LAWS, Report of the 2019 session of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, CCW/GGE.1/2019/3, 25 September 2019, https://documents.unoda.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/09/CCW_GGE.1_2019_3_E.pdf.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

20

Objectives

Process

Content•

What should be the aim of CBMs for AI? Build confidence about what exactly?

•

How can common interests be identified?

•

What are key priority areas and the risks to address in a CBMs framework?

•

How can States begin a process of articulation of CBMs?

•

How would such a process function and what resources (financial or otherwise) would
need to be committed to the process?

•

Which actors need to be part of the process?

Phase I of this project introduced a taxonomy of risks of AI, which can be leveraged toadvance initial substantive discussions about the content and articulation of CBMs for
AI. The taxonomy identified two large clusters of risks: risks inherent to AI technologies(safety, cybersecurity, and human–machine interaction risks) and risks of AI to global
security (miscalculation, escalation, proliferation risks).
Discussions about confidence-building measures could begin with an initial consideration of risks, and address questions such as:•

What CBMs can address risks of AI technologies?

•

How can different types of measures (e.g., transparency measures or cooperation
measures) address concerns about the risks of AI technology?

•

What type of CBMs could address miscalculation/escalation/proliferation risks?

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

21

2. Food for Thought List: Possible
CBMs for AI
Initial discussions could explore concrete ideas

measures focused on AI safety (e.g., incident

for CBMs as well as tracks that States can takereporting mechanism or database, etc.), which

moving forward (e.g., early plans of work on

may evolve in time to other forms of exchange

how to elaborate CBMs). A conversation overand cooperation. Another possibility is thatsuggested measures is a useful exercise to

States may view a formalized process to beclarify views and priorities.

the most fitting option going forward (see theBelow is a list of possible ideas that States canconsider, which are proposed with the aim tofacilitate a meaningful dialogue, as well as toprovide an opportunity for States to test theirlast suggestion in the list), and thus allow
themselves to consider and test the feasibility of specific CBMs within an institutionalized
framework.

level of comfort as to the nature of engagement

The list below is purposefully heterogenous:

and collaboration they are ready to initiate,

some proposed CBMs are more encompass-at least in an early phase. The scope of theing than others, while some are rather narrow.

suggested CMBs includes measures relevant

Further, among the suggested options, someto international security and is therefore not

CBMs, though agreed at the multilateral level,

limited to military applications only.

could require operationalization to be restrict-

50

The process of articulating CBMs for AI cangrow incrementally. States could develop,
for example, dedicated or single-purpose

LIST OF SUGGESTED CBMs

ed to national action plans while others would
involve active international cooperation. CBMs
regimes afford this level of flexibility.51

O P E R AT I O N A L I Z AT I O N A N D I M P L E M E N TAT I O N O P T I O N ( S )Promote the elaboration of national AI
strategies (for States which have not yet
done so)Publicly commit to elaborate national strategies for AI

CBMs for AI safety: support the conveningof technical experts to elaborate common
definitions and standards for AI safety

Promote exchanges at working level between national experts to discuss
key terminology and standards related to safety and security of AI systems(this may include, for example, horizon-scanning exercises to discuss risks
in emerging AI technologies and applications); these efforts may draw on
existing standards, frameworks, and progress achieved in the civilian domain

Voluntarily share best practices on AI strategies elaboration

50

Relatedly, mentions of AI across the table refer to applications of AI that are relevant in the context of international security
and must be contextualized as such.

51

In some cases, the chosen method(s) to operationalize a CBM may also change or broaden the nature of that CBM, e.g., atransparency or cooperation measure. States could decide to exercise transparency over a specific process, such as by publicizing relevant information on legal reviews for AI-enabled autonomous weapons, for example. Additionally, they may also initiate international exchanges and capacity-building to bolster the capacity of more States to carry out legal reviews, thus making a CBM
focused on legal reviews not only a measure of transparency, but also of international cooperation.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

22

Initiate new international mechanism(s) for exchanges on safety-related
issues (e.g., an intergovernmental forum at the international level, or under
the United Nations)
Promote legal reviews for AI-enabled
weapons systems

Publicize high-level information on methodologies and steps for conducting
legal reviews; this could include information on the process, departments/
expert groups involved etc. while protecting all sensitive information
Provide funding or sponsor training and capacity-building for experts tasked
to review legality of weapons systems

Military-to-military dialogues to exchange
on doctrines, rules of engagement

Exchanges could take place at agreed frequency (e.g., annually) to discuss
scenarios (e.g., involving AI-enabled autonomous systems etc.) that may
result in escalation, to clarify approaches, and to disseminate the outcomeof discussions within national structures
Exchanges could also discuss and clarify issues emerging from non-weapons use cases, specific risks and mitigation strategies

Promote and fund civilian research on AI
safety and cybersecurity

Unilateral measure: States could commit to bolstering AI safety research inacademic and research centres, and enable civilian leadership of AI safety
research (to promote standards of safety and security to be established inopen research settings)
Multilateral measure: promote Track II exchanges between scientific andacademic experts (e.g., to share best practices for incident-reporting,
red-teaming, etc.)

Application or domain-specific CBMs

Identify top priorities and areas of high/unacceptable risks and agree on key
principles and approaches; these could be in the form of politically binding
documents, such as joint declarations, and could cover key concerns suchas: refraining from using AI in specific contexts or applications, high-risk
domains; defining strict boundaries for use of AI technologies, including
AI-enabled autonomous weapons(L)AWS-specific CBM

Code of conduct for autonomous weapons, which could also define ‘rules of
the road’, clarify red lines for autonomous weapons deployment, and ways
to avoid unintended escalatory events

Share best practices for AI testingand evaluation

Publicize, on a voluntary basis, best practices and lessons learned

Promote efforts for non-proliferationand prevention of deliberate misuse

Unilateral: Strengthen domestic mechanisms for counter-proliferation,
which could incorporate risk assessments and mitigation strategies to
respond to AI-generated risks
Multilateral: Convene experts and promote awareness about AI risks acrossother processes and disarmament bodies (e.g., risks of AI in the field of biological weapons/BWC)

Create a GGE on CBMs for AI

Establish a GGE (e.g., at the General Assembly) to promote routinizedexchanges on specific themes and deliberate on the elaboration of CBMs

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

23

3. Confidence-Building Measures for
AI: Views from States
3.1. Multilateral Perspective: Workshop Summary
The topic of CBMs for AI as well as the measures

opportunity to start a dialogue (even) before

suggested in Part II, Section 2 were discussed

the technology is regulated. CBMs ultimate-in a workshop with select Member States in end

ly aim to help States fulfill obligations under the

May 2024; the main conclusions are summa-Charter of the United Nations and the multilater-

rized below. UNIDIR convened a multilateral

al dialogue on the uses and risks of the technol-

meeting gathering delegates from a wide andogy is particularly important to avoid a fragment-

diverse range of countries, with representatives

ed or piecemeal approach. The value of regionalof all regional groups.

discussions on CBMs was also highlighted, with

52

53

The views and recommendations expressed
during the discussions provide compellingarguments about the relevance and scope of
CBMs for AI going forward as well as many con-examples from other domains, notably cyber(these different levels are elaborated below),
though regional and multilateral processes
were, generally, rather seen as complementary.

siderations that must be heeded as part of theIt was also mentioned that CBMs can establish

process of developing such measures.

necessary guardrails to respond to the general

The content of the discussions is grouped
under the following categories:•

Relevance and objectives of CBMs•

Regional versus multilateral CBMs•

Dual-use and opportunities of AI•

Role of capacity-building•

Processlack of predictability around the technology, atleast in the present context. Appreciating therisks of AI to international security requires amulti-sectoral approach, as AI’s likely impact
will span conventional weapons and conflict,and WMD and strategic risks. CBMs can beleveraged to respond to a common interest of
all members of the international community to

Relevance and Objectives of
CBMs
Generally, the discussions highlighted thatthe flexibility of CBMs makes them useful andrelevant for AI and can provide a favorable

achieve ‘some certainty’ about the technology
and its use. Relatedly, another point was raised
about the potential role of CBMs in encouraging responsible development of the technology and opening up channels of cooperation at
different levels, and that options for collaboration could include elements such as incident

52

The workshop observed the Chatham House Rule. The summary of the discussion in this report makes no attribution tonational delegates or Member States.
53

United Nations, Regional groups of Member States, https://www.un.org/dgacm/en/content/regional-groups.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

24

reporting or some form of mechanism for sig-be especially facilitated once there is a clear un-nalling unexpected system behaviour.

derstanding of specific use cases.

The lack of agreed terminology was also

Nevertheless, the strength of multilateral en-

brought up: AI lacks a clear definition, and it

gagement was broadly appraised for reasons

does not refer to one discrete technology orboth pragmatic and foundational to the devel-

capability, which may hinder efforts to develop

opment of CBMs. First, because multilater-

further measures. In response, examples fromal dialogue and establishing common norms

other domains were brought up, such as outerfor security helps address concrete challeng-space, where the lack of a definition for a spacees, such as to prevent outliers. In the absence

weapon, for example, did not preclude the de-of global norms, malicious actors could

velopment of CBMs. Further, the process of de-

exploit more opportune alternatives to, it wasveloping CBMs in the case of outer space did notobserved, “move to other countries that do notfollow (or result from) a full use and militariza-

have constraints”.

tion of outer space, and norms could emerge
ahead of definitions shared by all States.

Second, it was highlighted that discussions inRegional versus Multilateral CBMs

promote local understandings of standards andDrawing on examples from the cyber domain,
it was noted that CBMs have worked well at
the regional level. The question of the appropriate level at which to start the discussion on
CBMs (regional versus multilateral) was raised

smaller groups would be more fragmented andrisk management, rending it “impossible” tolater broaden and socialize these as common
understandings.

Dual-use and Opportunities of AI

multiple times.

Both the dual-use nature of AI technologies,

The value of regional (and in some cases,

mentioned on multiple occasions. In the militarybilateral) CBMs was recognized for significant

domain, for example, the use of AI was credited

progress and achievements in other policy

for enhancing battlefield awareness and poten-

domains. Furthermore, in the case of AI, recent

tially the protection of civilians in the context of

initiatives led by select States were mentioned

armed conflict. Outside of military applications,as examples of processes where the United

AI plays a critical role for digital transformation

Nations does not have the leading role, which

and for meeting targets under the Sustainable

raises the question if the United Nations should

Development Goals.

and the opportunities afforded by AI werebe the main forum for these conversations.

With these remarks, the aim was to highlight

It was also reiterated that, historically, CBMs

that conversations about CBMs may lose sighthave had a specific connotation in interna-of the technology’s opportunities and overem-tional relations, and that they were commonly

phasize risks. While discussions about security

agreed upon by adversaries, either throughwere deemed important going forward, theybilateral channels or at the United Nations. Mul-

must address specific risks, such as malicious

tilateral forums can thus be an important venue

uses of the technology, risks that AI brings

to garner broad support for CBMs, yet it wasto certain weapons systems, or how it canmentioned that the start of a conversation cantransform the nature of conflict.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

25

Role of Capacity-Building

Process

The role of capacity-building received distinct

Several points were raised about the processattention, both as part of the process of con-underpinning CBMs, and their future elabo-

sidering CBMs and for their implementation.

ration. A recurrent point was about the impor-

It was recognized that the existing disparity intance of dialogue, which could start with a con-the development and adoption of AI technol-versation about risks and ways to address

ogy, and between States at the leading edge

them. A related point was about the critical roleversus those that are not, must be addressedof transparency: to develop a shared under-

to develop common ground, build trust, and to

standing of risks, States must be transparent inallow discussion of the technology’s global im-

how they view the risks of AI technologies, so

plications.

as to promote a definition of risks that “is the

The call to “close the gaps” resonated withsame for everyone”.

several participants, who supported the idea

Other views underlined the importance of sci-that an inclusive and multilateral process must

entific input into the process of elaborating

engage wide participation, including from theCBMs, or potentially taking lessons from other

Global South and from States that are not devel-

relevant discussions happening in domains

oping the technology. This latter argument em-

such as export controls. Another perspective

phasized that for AI, capacity-building efforts

was that it is difficult to consider CBMs (for AI)

must attempt to go further than what was done

through traditional approaches and that the es-

in other processes. Moreover, it was added that

sentially dual-use nature of these technologies

building expertise and preparedness (throughbrings with it the need for multiple forms of in-capacity-building) could also help implementa-

teraction, including with industry.

tion of CBMs, and this is particularly significant
as in the long-term, some CBMs may become
legally binding rules.

Finally, it was noted that a framework of CBMs
for AI that would distinguish between ‘measures
to take’ and ‘measures to avoid’54 could be
useful and that this framing has proven to workin other contexts.

54

The distinction referred to the framing discussed in the first part of this report, which was initially shared with States as aworking paper prior to the workshop.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

26

3.2. CBMs Survey: Acceptability and Impact
The list of suggested CBMs, including the im-

While they reflect views of a diverse group of

plementation and operationalization options

States and regions, they do not represent the(see Part II, Section 2), were surveyed twice

perspectives and preferences of the entire mul-during the workshop: once for “acceptability”

tilateral community; a larger participation baseand once for “impact”, using scoring values

may have produced different results.

from 1 to 4 (1 – no acceptability, 2 – low accept-

3.2.1. Surveys Resultsability, 3 – moderate acceptability, 4 – high acceptability; and 1 – no impact, 2 – low impact, 3

The figures below present the comparative– moderate impact, and 4 – high impact, respec-

distribution of scores for each suggested

tively).55 “Acceptability” essentially referred

CBM, showing the results for “Acceptability”

to the political acceptance and feasibility ofand “Impact”.

the proposed measure, and “impact” to the
expected positive effect of the measure.

The shaded area adjoined to each score line
represents the actual distribution of votes,

The results of these surveys should be inter-

which are stacked along the 1 to 4 values ofpreted as illustrative of the consultation with theStates that participated in the UNIDIR initiative.

the scale.

Acceptability

Impact1
2
3
4

No acceptability
Low acceptability
Moderate acceptability
High acceptability

1
2
3
4

No impact
Low impact
Moderate impact
High impact

1. Promote the elaboration of national AI strategies (for States which have not yet
done so)Acceptability

01Impact

2

3.7

3.3

3.6

3.2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Publicly commit to elaborate national strategies for AI
Voluntarily share best practices on AI strategies elaboration

55

The no – low – moderate – high dimensions were explained as follows—no acceptability/impact: the measure is not acceptable/has no or negligible impact; low acceptability/impact: the measure has very limited levels of acceptability/impact; moderate
acceptability/impact: the measure is likely to have medium levels of acceptability/impact and can yield some positive results;
high acceptability/impact: the measure will likely have strong acceptability/ strong and positive impact.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

27

2. CBMs for AI safety: Support the convening of technical experts to elaborate
common definitions and standards for AI safety
Acceptability

Impact
3.3

3.1

3.1

2.8
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Promote exchanges at working level between national experts to discuss key terminology and standards related to safety and securityof AI systems
Initiate new international mechanism(s) for exchanges on safety-related issues (e.g., an intergovernmental forum at the international level)

3. Promote legal reviews for AI-enabled weapons systems
Acceptability

Impact
3.3

3

3.4

3.3
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Publicize high-level information on methodologies and steps for conducting legal reviews; this could include info on the process,department etc.
Provide funding or sponsor training and capacity-building for experts tasked to review legality of weapons systems

4. Military-to-military dialogues to exchange on doctrines, rules of engagement
Acceptability

Impact
3.5

3.4

3.4

3.3
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Exchanges could take place at agreed frequency to discuss scenarios (e.g., involving LAWS etc.) that may result in escalation
Exchanges could discuss and clarify issues emerging from non-weapons use case, specific risks and mitigation strategies

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

28

5. Promote and fund civilian research on AI safety and cybersecurity
Acceptability

Impact
2.8

3.3

3.2

3.5
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Unilateral measure: States could commit to bolstering AI safety research in academic centres, and enable civilian leadership ofAI safety researchMultilateral measure: promote Track II exchanges between scientific and academic experts

6. Application or domain-specific CBMs
Acceptability

Impact

3.6

3.2
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Identify top priorities and areas of high/unacceptable risks and agree on key principles and approaches (e.g. politically binding documents)

7. (L)AWS-specific CBM
Acceptability

Impact

3.2

3
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Code of conduct for autonomous weapons, which could also define ‘rules of the road’, clarify red lines , ways to avoid escalations

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

29

8. Share best practices for AI testing and evaluation
Acceptability

Impact

3.2

3.5
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

3

2

4

Publicize, on a voluntary basis, best practices and lessons learned

9. Promote efforts for non-proliferation and prevention of deliberate misuse
Acceptability

Impact
3.3

3.3

3.4

3.5
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

3

2

4

Unilateral: Strengthen domestic mechanisms for counter-proliferation, which could incorporate risk assessments and mitigation strategies
Multilateral: Convene experts and promote awareness about AI risks across other processes and disarmament bodies

10. Create a GGE on CBMs for AI
Acceptability

Impact

2.7

2.5
0

1

2

3

4

0

1

2

3

4

Establish a GGE (e.g., at the General Assembly) to promote routinized exchanges on specific themes and deliberate on the elaboration of
CBMs

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE30

3.2.2. Discussion and Analysis

The highest scores for ‘acceptability’, however,The distribution of scores for the suggested

velopment of national AI strategies. This may

measures reveals a strong preference for addressing high-risk areas, notably military-to-military exchanges (among the highest ranked
measures, both for being politically acceptable and for impact), and non-proliferation andmisuse of the technology. Interestingly, the operationalization of the CBM on non-proliferation was deemed even more acceptable andimpactful at the multilateral level than within
national contexts, which may suggest that many
States either consider that sharing knowledge at
the international level can help build a foundation for the development of expertise, which canbe simultaneously leveraged for the adaptationof national mechanisms, or that many States are
confident that their existing domestic mecha-

were allocated to a unilateral measure, the desuggest that States consider this measureextremely important, first because many still
do not yet have a national strategy on AI,56 andsecond, because the political cost of developing a national strategy is lower relative to othersuggested CBMs, which may be perceived tohave a higher political commitment cost. Of
note, the same measure received a slightly
lower score for ‘impact’, which may reinforce
the premise that, in the context of building
confidence among other States, the net effectof this measure may be considered somewhat
less effective even if it is recognized as animportant transparency measure and politically highly acceptable.

nisms are sufficiently well-positioned to respondAt the lower ends, among the lowest scoresto this challenge and that a more important effort

were given to the option of establishing a GGE

is to streamline these efforts internationally.

on CBMs, which was scored low both for ac-

The option of developing CBMs over specificapplications or domains of use of AI technologies received among the highest scores for
impact, and marginally less for acceptability, which may suggest that the measure is

ceptability and impact, and to the option of initiating new international mechanisms (e.g., anintergovernmental forum) focused on safety-related issues, which was scored relatively low for
acceptability though slightly higher for impact.

acknowledged to be impactful (as it would

It is, however, important to contextualize theaddress concrete concerns in areas of highapparent lack of support for the initiation of newrisk), though slightly less politically acceptable,

processes in that some States may be wary

potentially due to the implied outcome of thisof a possible duplication of efforts (or interfer-

measure, which contains a form of commitment

ence with other processes), as well as foresee(politically binding document). By contrast, thepractical challenges due to lack of capacity, par-option of military-to-military exchanges, whichticularly for smaller delegations. The emphasis

is also focused on high-risk uses of AI, received

on capacity-building during the workshop

a high score both for acceptability and impact,(discussed in the previous section) echoes thisand did not, comparatively, contain an option

concern.

of further commitment (such as a politicallybinding document etc.) other than dialogue andexchanges over areas of risks.

Further, the results which indicate reluctance for creating new institutions need not

The urgent development of national strategies was also one of the recommendations of the Secretary-General in “A New
Agenda for Peace”. See United Nations, “Our Common Agenda”, 28. This is an important unilateral action to consolidate national
action plans on responsible development and use of AI.

56

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE31

be misread for a wholesale rejection of theupon. According to views expressed during thescope of that CBM, which was about AI safety.

workshop, there can be co-existence between

The other option proposed under this CBM –processes, and it may even be inevitable toto promote exchanges over safety concerns

have parallel and interconnected processes

between national experts – received a higher

given the complexity of the topic.

score, both for acceptability and impact.
Moreover, a related measure, focused on the
promotion of civilian research on AI safety
was also assessed favorably (though lessfor impact), and the option to promote Track
II exchanges received among the highest
scores for acceptability, as well as a high score
for impact. This clearly indicates that there isan overall interest to engage in discussions
over AI safety, and that several options can be
explored but short of creating new internation-

Scores for other suggested CBMs weregenerally situated in the middle, and theseincluded some measures discussed over theyears in the GGE on LAWS. The proposal for a
CBM for LAWS such as a code of conduct, or on
legal reviews for AI-enabled weapons systems
were on average assessed to be of moderate
acceptability and impact; these scores tie inwith polarized views on some of these topics
within the GGE. Further, even if the option foral mechanisms or institutions.

a code of conduct on LAWS were in principle

These results align with some of the viewsreceive a slightly higher score for ‘impact’

shared during the workshop, when it wascompared to ‘acceptability’), some States

mentioned that most suggested measures

may see promoting it as detrimental to theirare desirable in theory, but that the answers

sustained national position within the GGE on

rather reflect assessments of feasibility and

LAWS, where they support efforts for a legally

real expected benefit in the current context.

binding instrument on lethal autonomous

Other views provided further nuance in that

weapons systems.

they considered that while important to invest
in many discussions, it is also advisable tostrike a balance between “too many” and “toofew” forums and to avoid “the proliferation of
non-proliferation discussions”. In addition, it
should be mentioned that though the averagescore for the option of establishing new international mechanisms was low (relative to othermeasures), it did receive high scores from someof the respondents, and the overall impractical-

considered beneficial (and this measure did

On legal reviews, it is noteworthy that theoption on supporting capacity-building forlegal reviews scored slightly higher, both for
acceptability and impact, than the option ontransparency. This may suggest a constructive approach to help strengthen national capacities for conducting legal reviews, even as,
outwardly, States may be less inclined to share
information over their own processes.

ity of this option was not unanimously agreed

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

32

Conclusion
The development and proliferation of AI tech-development of CBMs for AI and second, tonologies comes with significant transformative

invite States to provide views on concrete

potential in the context of international security.

ideas of CBMs in order to assess initial areas

As States begin to harness the opportunities

of agreement as well as limitations.

afforded by artificial intelligence, the complexity of the risks landscape is being simultaneously acknowledged: the technology can be deliberately misused by malicious actors to create
escalatory effects or proliferate new weapons,means and methods of warfare, and it presents
numerous risks of malfunctions even whenemployed by responsible (state) actors.
Confidence-building measurescanThis report concludes the second, and final,
phase of the project and provided a realistic assessment of the role, objectives, and possible
pathways for the development of CBMs for AI,
drawing directly from perspectives shared by adiverse group of national representatives.
A general conclusion is that States wish to

help

address concerns related to the development
and use of AI in the context of international
security. Confidence-building measures arevoluntary, non-legally binding measures that
States can take to address either narrow or
broad security concerns. CBMs have a longand tested history in the field of arms control
and disarmament and can exist either in theabsence of, or alongside legally binding instruments and enforceable treaties.
In the field of AI, the discussions on CBMs in
the multilateral domain are in an early stage
and have thus far been mostly tangential to thesubject of lethal autonomous weapons systems

advance conversations about CBMs. This point
was unequivocally shared during the open discussions at the workshop, and the surveys
too reveal a positive spirit of interest in developing measures to build confidence aroundthe development and use of AI, particularly inareas of high risk. The fundamental challenges,
therefore, remain not of intent but rather ofsubstance and degree. The greatest divergences concern how far States are willing tocommit and what they consider to be politicallyfeasible in the current context.
Yet, a certain degree of hesitancy at the start ofa process may be expected. Striking an optimalbalance between what is desirable and whatin the GGE on LAWS.

is feasible is a difficult task in any political and

The UNIDIR project on CBMs for AI aimed toto continue the dialogue and to carve options

advance these conversations and to initiate

for action. By way of recommendation, future

preliminary and substantive points of departure

deliberations may benefit, for example, fromfor future deliberations among Member States.

deeper dives into specific themes, including

multilateral process, and it is critical for States

The first phase of this project, whichconcluded in late 2023, elaborated an AI

through table-top exercises that discuss
concrete scenarios and further clarify positions.

risks taxonomy in the context of internation-

The UNIDIR project on CBMs for AI, including

al security. This study helped inform the con-the discussion convened as part of the project,

ceptualization of the subsequent scoping

is one step in what needs to become an ongoingwork on CBMs, which aimed to identify first,

dialogue. Future UNIDIR work will continue to

how Member States evaluate the role andsupport these efforts.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

33

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