MARCH2020

Five Steps to Bolster theUS-Japan Alliance
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIEIn January 2020, the United States and Japan
marked the 60th anniversary of the revised USJapan Security Treaty. This anniversary was an important milestone that reflects the determinationof both countries to overcome the numerous difficulties that have arisen over the years to sustain
this important alliance. It should also serve as areminder that the US-Japan alliance should not betaken for granted.
The regional security order today faces serious
strains. US-China rivalry is intensifying, there are anumber of flashpoints around East Asia that could
easily erupt into a crisis, and US foreign policy underPresident Donald Trump continues to be characterized by unpredictability. Some may argue that Tokyowould be wise to seek some neutral ground at a distance from both the United States and China, but forJapan there really is no viable option other than towork to shore up the US-Japan alliance and encourage the United States to deepen its commitment aswell. Securing the sustainability of the alliance overthe coming decades will require the United States andJapan to adopt a comprehensive and multilayered approach to security cooperation.

East Asian Security Under Strain

The last 60 years have witnessed many major changes
in the US-Japan alliance and East Asia’s regional order. During the Cold War, the shared objective wasto contain the threat of the Soviet Union, and thus
the end of the Cold War required the two countries
to reconsider the raison d’être of the alliance. In
1996, US President Bill Clinton and Japanese Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto reaffirmed the alliancefor the post–Cold War era with the US-Japan Joint
Security Declaration, which bolstered and clarified
US-Japan cooperation to address regional unpredictability. Subsequently, Japan gradually expanded
the roles and missions of its Self-Defense Forces(SDF) to make greater contributions to support theUS military in the region.
Yet over the last quarter century, the security
environment in East Asia has become increasingly
characterized by tensions. One fundamental change
is the rise of China. Ten years ago, China overtook
Japan as the second biggest economy in the world
and today its GDP is nearly three times the size ofJapan’s. China’s rapid economic growth has enabled
it to expand its military capabilities, making it theMARCH 2020 | 2
second biggest defense spender in the world. China
has also displayed increasingly assertive behavior that has fed tensions at flashpoints around theregion, whether in the South China Sea, the East
China Sea around the Senkaku Islands, Hong Kong,or across the Taiwan Straits.
Chinese growth has slowed from its heyday of
10 percent annual GDP growth, but it was still expected to reach 6 percent under the “new normal,”
at least before the coronavirus outbreak hit. Yet,
China faces considerable difficulties. To the extent
that the future decline of Chinese economic growthcomes to be associated with domestic frustrations
over tightly controlled individual freedoms, the legitimacy of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule
may be shaken. The CCP’s handling of the coronavirus epidemic demonstrates serious shortcomingsof the current system, which incentivizes a lack ofpolitical transparency. In the event that the legitimacy of its rule is seriously questioned, there is arisk that the CCP may adopt a more aggressive foreign policy as a diversionary tactic to distract fromdomestic shortcomings.
Meanwhile, the behavior of the Trump administration has made the United States a source of unpredictability as well. Under the banner of “AmericaFirst,” the United States is moving away from multi­
lateral cooperation. The Trump administration isunilaterally demanding that allies make exorbitant
increases in their defense budgets and host-nation
support while sowing doubt over US defense commitments. Moreover, the Trump administration’s
unilateral imposition of tariffs and obstruction of theWTO Appellate Body undermines the global rulesbased trading system.

Where to Next for the US-Japan Alliance?

US allies in Europe are expressing concerns that theUnited States under President Trump no longer upholds its traditional values, such as free trade, democracy, and human rights. NATO allies have also decried
the failure of the United States to consult in advanceon critical moves, such as its withdrawal in Syria andthe killing of Iranian General Qasem Soleimani. Thesedevelopments have fueled discussion in the European
Union about the reliability of the United States andthe possible need to come up with a “plan B” for an
independent security system without the UnitedStates. Similarly, in East Asia, the US standoff with

South Korea regarding burden sharing for US military forces and the Philippines’ announcement that itwill terminate its Visiting Forces Agreement with theUnited States risks undermining security networks inthe region.
Nonetheless, Japan has compelling reasons tosustain and strengthen its commitment to the USJapan alliance despite the current challenges. Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe has worked hard to promotestrong relations with the United States irrespective of
Trump’s tariff threats and demands for extraordinary
increases in host-nation support. Japan would struggle to cope with the rise of China on its own without
the support of US military might, and it is not feasible
for Japan to seek its own nuclear deterrent outside of
the US nuclear umbrella.
The Trump administration has at times criticized
the US-Japan alliance for lacking proper reciprocity.
Yet aiming to have an absolutely reciprocal alliancerelationship in the near future would not serve USor Japanese interests, nor would it improve regionalstability. With the April 2015 revision of the US-Japan
Defense Cooperation Guidelines and the September
2015 security legislation freeing the SDF to engage
in limited forms of collective self-defense, reinterpretation of the Article 9 “peace clause” of Japan’sConstitution may have reached its limit. Far-reaching
formal revisions of Article 9 to “normalize” Japan remain a controversial prospect due to both domestic
public sentiment as well as lingering regional suspicions given Japan’s historical wartime aggression. At
the same time, Japan’s provision of military bases
to the United States serves not only to secure Japanbut also to promote the broader security of the Asia
Pacific and enable the United States to maintain its
status as a Pacific power. The US-Japan alliance continues to be a win-win, but alliance cooperation needs
to be enhanced and fine-tuned to meet the challengesof the current era.

Toward More Comprehensive and Multilayered Security
A number of steps should be taken at both the bilateral and multilateral levels in order to bolster the USJapan alliance and foster the type of comprehensive
and multilayered approach to security cooperationthat will be essential to maintain an effective alliancein the coming decades. This should include the following five key elements.

MARCH 2020 | 3
1. Do More to Lighten the US Footprint inOkinawa

Additional measures are needed to reduce the burden
on local Okinawan communities that host US military bases. Close to 70 percent of US military facilities
in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, and efforts toreduce this burden have so far failed to yield results.
Failure to address this politically divisive issue risks
undermining the long-term goodwill between theUnited States and Japan that serves as a key foundation for alliance cooperation.
Renewed efforts should be put into closing
Marine Corps Air Station Futenma in a timely manner while maintaining the integrity of the US forward
deployment strategy and expeditionary capabilities.
Almost 20 years have passed since the original agreement to relocate the base was reached, with little toshow for it. This is much too long. A new approach isneeded to break this impasse. Generally, the Marines
conduct an expeditionary combat role without theirown transport or bases in foreign countries, which
undermines the argument for maintaining Futenma.
Moreover, the number of Marines stationed atFutenma is insufficient to deal with likely contingencies on the Korean Peninsula or Taiwan on theirown without reinforcements. Therefore, the viability of relocating Marines to Guam and using Navyand Air transport for contingency scenarios should
be seriously reexamined as one potential measure toalleviate Okinawa’s burden.

2. Expand Japan’s Defense Budget

Japan should continue to incrementally increase its
defense budget. It must ensure that the SDF has thecapabilities it needs to work together with the UnitedStates to defend Japan and to contribute to joint efforts to maintain regional stability. At the same time,
Japan should also strive to make reasonable increases
in its host-nation support for US military forces stationed in Japan under the banner of deepening USJapan security cooperation. Yet President Trump’s
demands go too far. Japanese host-nation support forthe maintenance of facilities and to pay the salaries ofJapanese personnel employed on US bases deepens
US-Japan cooperation, but having Japan pay to employ US forces would undermine the principle of USJapan cooperation.

3. Bolster Regional Security Cooperation
on Nonproliferation

Nontraditional security cooperation in Northeast
Asia should also be expanded. For instance, there is a
critical need for the Six-Party Talks countries to deal
with the nuclear nonproliferation and missile issues
that are undermining regional stability. As the SixParty Talks are not currently operational, the region
is relying on direct US–North Korea negotiations toachieve the next step in the North Korean denuclearization process. However, at some point, the Six-PartyTalks will need to be reconvened as a multilateral forum to oversee implementation of any possible USNorth Korea agreement. This should include parallel
roadmaps on denuclearizing North Korea and transforming the Korean War Armistice Agreement into apermanent peace treaty. Multilateralizing the process
among all key regional stakeholders will help to safeguard ongoing international verification of denuclearization against accusations of foul play and ensure thelong-term sustainability of the peace process.
It is also vital to reconsider the regulation of­medium- and long-range missiles. Regional tensions
are being fueled by North Korea’s development of its
missile program, China’s rapid development of new
missile capabilities, the deployment of THAAD inSouth Korea, and the Trump administration’s termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaty with Russia. The failure to address the shiftingbalance in missile technology risks triggering an arms
race. The Six-Party Talks can also be utilized to tamp
down tensions in this area and, ultimately, this forum
should be transformed into a permanent vehicle topromote mutual confidence and trust and to tackle
shared challenges to peace and stability in the region.

4. Expand Security Cooperation with NewPartners

Japan should continue to expand its bilateral andtrilateral security cooperation with other countries beyond the United States. This should include
deepening security cooperation with partners suchas Australia, India, the ASEAN nations, and South
Korea. Renewing commitments to US–Japan–South
Korea trilateral cooperation, for instance, which
has been weakened by recent tensions between
Japan and South Korea over wartime history andtrade restrictions, is critical to show a unified face
to North Korea and establish a credible basis forMARCH 2020 | 4
denuclearization negotiations. Expanding Japan’ssecurity cooperation with regional partners should
not just be geared t­ oward bolstering Japan’s defense
or countering specific threats, but also toward facilitating US engagement in the region and supporting
regional-order-building efforts, as championed by theUnited States over the last seven decades since theend of the Second World War.

act as a constructive regional stakeholder. It should
also include coordination to promote regional confidence-building measures, nontraditional security
cooperation, promotion of free trade, financial cooperation for infrastructure investment, and environmental and energy cooperation.

5. Reinvigorate Multilateral Forums

The longevity of the US-Japan alliance is thanks tothe hard work of officials in both countries to sustain
cooperation over the last 60 years. However, given
the current strains in the East Asia regional security
environment, there is no time for complacency. The
tremendous challenges facing the region require a recommitment to cooperation and a more robust anddynamic approach on the part of the two countries,
starting with the steps outlined above. Through thisapproach, the United States and Japan will be able
to bolster the sustainability of the alliance bilaterally,lead constructive and effective cooperation multilaterally, and maintain the US-Japan alliance as the cornerstone of East Asian security for the next 60 years.

US participation and US-Japan cooperation in multilateral regional forums, such as the East Asia Summit(EAS), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
and the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus(ADMM+), need to be reinvigorated. President
Trump has never attended the East Asia Summit andonly attended the APEC leaders’ summit once in 2017.
This long string of no-shows has raised doubts aroundthe region about the credibility of US engagement inAsia. This undermines US influence, which is underpinned not just by its military power and economic
strength but also by the depth of its cooperation withregional allies and partners. Coordinating US-Japan
cooperation at the EAS, APEC, and ADMM+ on
issues of shared interest should be a stepping-stone
in ending the US retreat from multilateralism. Thisshould include the development of a joint strategy
vis-à-vis China in order to deter Chinese unilateralism, bolster its engagement, and encourage it to■■■Hitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairmanof the Institute for International Strategy at the Japan
Research Institute, Ltd. He previously served as Japan’s
deputy minister for foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on
East Asia regional issues from a Japanese perspective.
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