Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 4 No. 3 | September 2009

Japan under the DPJ
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE

Despite widespread predictions of a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) defeat, the result of the August
30 general election in Japan was nevertheless stunning. Not only is the LDP no longer the dominantparty in the Diet for the first time since the party’s
establishment in 1955, its seat total in the Lower
House plunged from 300 (out of a total of 480) before the election to 119 after. In stark contrast, theDemocratic Party of Japan (DPJ)—the perennial
opposition party in the Lower House—raised its
presence there by a remarkable 191 seats, for a totalof 308. Together with its plurality (109 of 242 seats)
in the Upper House, this means that the DPJ now
controls 417 (or roughly 58 percent) of 722 seatsin the Diet. This paved the way for DPJ President
Yukio Hatoyama to be voted in as prime ministeron September 16. Such a dramatic change in themakeup of the government after five decades of essentially single-party rule will undoubtedly haveimportant implications for Japan’s domestic politics and foreign policy.

What is the significance of the DPJ victoryfor Japan’s domestic politics?
It is important to note that—generally speaking—the LDP’s poor showing in last month’s election

was primarily due to widespread voter dissatisfaction with LDP rule. In other words, the election
result does not necessarily indicate strong voter
support for the DPJ’s policy platform or confidence in its ability to govern. Since popular former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stepped
down in 2006, Japanese voters have become disillusioned with a series of ineffectual LDP prime
ministers. Shinzo Abe and Yasuo Fukuda bothresigned their posts less than a year after taking
office, while outgoing Prime Minister Taro Aso is
not considered by many to be a solid leader. In addition to an absence of strong leadership within
the party, the LDP government was also seen as
beholden to vested interests and excessively dependent on the bureaucracy to formulate government policy.
Whatever the reasons for the LDP’s fall fromfavor, the fact remains that the DPJ is now incharge. In the coming weeks and months, the DPJ
will move to consolidate leadership around Prime
Minister Hatoyama. It remains to be seen how theDPJ will quell rumors about a possible dual power structure between Hatoyama and former DPJ
President Ichiro Ozawa, who is now the party’ssecretary-general.

One of the DPJ’s chief priorities will be toreform the policymaking process so that it iscontrolled by politicians rather than the bureaucracy. As part of this effort, the DPJ has pledged
to establish a Bureau of National Strategy (kokka­senryaku kyoku) directly under the prime minister. This bureau, which is expected to be staffedwith politicians, bureaucrats, and public intellectuals, will be tasked with devising basic policy
outlines, determining the priority of budget allocations, coordinating macroeconomic policies,
and formulating a comprehensive foreign policy
strategy and vision. There is no question that theDPJ’s objectives in this regard are ambitious; indeed, a considerable amount of uncertainty remains as to whether the DPJ will succeed in its
effort to reform the traditional bureaucrat-centered policymaking process.

What is the significance of DPJ President
Hatoyama’s opinion piece published lastmonth?
It is important to note, first and foremost, that thisarticle, a partial translation of which appeared in
the New York Times on August 26, 2009, was published in the run-up to Japan’s most heated general election in a generation. The piece originallyappeared in a Japanese-language journal and was
not intended to be published for an overseas audience. Nevertheless, his critique of US “marketfundamentalism” and financial policy, together
with a clearly expressed interest in deepening Japan’s ties with its Asian neighbors, undoubtedly
gave rise to a great deal of concern overseas, particularly in Washington.
Hatoyama’s main objective was probably todraw a sharp contrast between DPJ policies
and those of the LDP, and he chose the mosteffective way to do so, vehemently criticizing
the LDP’s management of Japan’s economy andforeign affairs. He probably wanted to impress
upon the reader that the world is changing andthe traditional LDP policy line is obsolete. Specifically, his remarks about “market fundamentalism” were a response to widespread publicconcerns with social ills, in particular the widening gap between rich and poor. With regard
to foreign affairs, Hatoyama also stressed in thepaper that excessive dependence on the UnitedStates is an inappropriate path for Japan given
the increasingly multi­p olar nature of the international system.
Although the negative reaction in Washington to Hatoyama’s piece is perhaps understandable, concerns are largely overblown. One should
understand that the DPJ has been the opposition
party throughout its existence and has plenty ofexperience criticizing the government but no experience actually running it. Furthermore, it is notjust Japan whose policies are changing; it is important to point out that US policies are also evolving and the Obama administration’s economic
and foreign policies can hardly be characterized as“market fundamentalist” or “unilateralist.” Generally speaking, the policy platforms of the DPJ andthe Obama administration have much about themthat is complementary.

What sort of political realignment canbe expected? What will the resulting
distribution of power in the Diet mean forJapan’s foreign policy?
The fact that the DPJ still lacks a simple majority in the Upper House is significant. It willrule in coalition with its two small allies—theSocial Democratic Party (SDP) and the People’sNew Party. When it comes to foreign policy andnational security issues, the policy differences
between the DPJ and its allies—particularly theSDP—are substantial, arguably much greaterthan those between the DPJ and the LDP. TheSDP, a scion of the defunct Japan Socialist Party—Japan’s main opposition party from 1955
through the early 1990s—is a staunch defenderof Japan’s pacifist constitution. Not only will it
be very reticent to give a green light to security cooperation with the United States, it may
even oppose any overseas dispatch of the SelfDefense Forces (SDF). In short, despite its small
size (the SDP only holds seven seats in the Lower House and five seats in the Upper House), theSDP will undoubtedly “punch above its weightclass” in intra-coalition deliberations and thus
serve as a significant constraint on the DPJ’s
foreign policy agenda. This situation is unlikely
to change until the 2010 election in the Upper
House at the earliest.
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

2Vol. 4 No. 3 | September 2009

The telephone conversation between Obama
and Hatoyama on September 3, 2009, in which
Hatoyama reaffirmed the crucial importance ofthe alliance to Japan, will hopefully help ease suchconcerns. Indeed, it was an important step toward
reassuring the United States of the DPJ’s intentions.
The two sides should continue to hold regular dialogue to prevent such public misunderstandings
from occurring again in the future.

relationship. Rather, it presents a great opportunity. In the context of a rapidly changing security
environment in East Asia and with the 50th anniversary of the US-Japan Security Treaty coming in
2010, it seems reasonable for the new governments
in Washington and Tokyo to sit down together before the end of next year and conduct an in-depth
review of how the US-Japan alliance has evolved
over the past decade and jointly explore ways tostrengthen and expand it in the future.

How will the DPJ’s rise to power affectthe US-Japan relationship?
In a meeting with its likely coalition partners earlier this month, DPJ leaders cited an “equal USJapan alliance” as the top priority on the national
security agenda. Similar phrasing, namely “moreequal-footed relations with the United States,” also
appears in the DPJ manifesto. Such a statement is
not particularly surprising; after all, opposition
political parties in many countries allied with theUnited States often criticize the ruling party forbeing excessively accommodating to Washington.
However, several key items on the DPJ’s foreign
policy agenda suggest that Japan’s policy toward
the United States may be in for a substantive,
though not necessarily negative, change.
First, the DPJ has called for a renegotiation of
the Status of Forces Agreement and a review ofprograms related to the relocation of US forces(e.g. Futenma Air Base).* Second, the DPJ has said
that it will review the Maritime SDF’s refuelingactivities in the Indian Ocean, which are widely
seen overseas as a major contribution on the partof Japan to the fight against terrorism. Third, it hasrepeatedly stressed the importance of maintaining the “three non-nuclear principles”—i.e., notto manufacture, possess, or allow the introduction onto Japanese soil of nuclear weapons—whileat the same time recognizing the need for the US
nuclear umbrella, in particular to deter a possible
nuclear attack from North Korea.
It is abundantly clear that the DPJ government
will seek to reexamine the US-Japan security relationship in light of the changing security environment in the region. However, this is not necessarilya threat to US interests or the greater US-Japan

What will Japan’s policy toward East Asia
look like under DPJ leadership?
Over the past several years, the DPJ has consistently championed closer relations with Japan’s
East Asian neighbors. Not only is the DPJ manifesto quite positive about the future prospects foran East Asia community, DPJ leaders are also arguably more sensitive about issues of history thantheir LDP colleagues. For example, Hatoyamahas already pledged not to visit the controversial­Yasukuni Shrine. Under DPJ leadership, Japan
should be expected to engage in more proactive diplomacy toward the region, particularly as it concerns regional cooperation and its relations with
China and Korea. On the issue of North Korea, theDPJ appears to adopt a pragmatic stance, callingfor international unity and serious and comprehensive negotiations with Pyongyang as necessary
measures to rid North Korea of its nuclear capabilities and achieve a breakthrough in negotiations
over the abductees issue.
What effect will the DPJ’s election victory
have on Japan’s global role?
Indicators suggest that under DPJ leadership Japan
will more actively engage the international community, particularly with regard to Japan’s contributions to the fight against global climate change
and to UN-centered security operations (includingpeacekeeping operations). This is manifest in the
recent statement by Hatoyama calling on Japan toreduce greenhouse gases to 25 percent below their1990 levels. This exceeds the Aso administration’s
less ambitious target of an 8 percent reduction—anumber that was already opposed by many industries as too high. Much like the Obama administration, the DPJ government also is expected to* On August 31, the US Department of State stated that renegotiation of the bases agreement was off the table.

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

3Vol. 4 No. 3 | September 2009

pursue a much more internationalist global posture than its predecessor.

in the midst of a rapid ­transformation. Regardlessof which party is in power, Japan must adapt its
diplomatic strategy to meet the challenges of thisnew era. The historic change that has occurred inJapanese politics presents a prime opportunity forJapan to reinvigorate its foreign policy, strengthenties with both the United States and its East Asianneighbors, and embark on a new course.

Broadly speaking, what are the long-term
implications of last month’s election
result for Japan’s foreign policy?
It will be some time before the DPJ government
will be able to establish its proposed Bureau of National Strategy and consolidate its leadership andpolicy direction. However, there is no question thatJapan stands at a foreign policy crossroads. Theinternational system—in particular East Asia—isHitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE. He­previously served as Japan’s deputy minister for foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from a Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
www.jcie.or.jp

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc. (JCIE/USA)
www.jcie.org

4© 2009 Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 4 No. 3 | September 2009