“Asian Marit
M time Organ
O nizatiionfor Secu
urity and C
Coopeeratioon” (AAMOSSC)—In
nitial Reporrt on C
Conceeptuall Frammeworrk—

Marrch 31, 2015
2
Instittute forr Interna
ational Policy Studies
S((IIPS)

Preface
The Symposium on New
w Maritimee Security ArchitectureA
e in East Assia was heldd by theInstitutee for Intern
national Pollicy Studiess (IIPS) withh the suppo
ort of the YYomiuri Shimbun inTokyo oon January 30,
3 2015 with the partticipation ofo 9 foreign experts froom Southeaast Asian
countriees and Chinna, Taiwan, the U.S., a nd Australiaa. Along with the pressence of moore than80 profeessional aud
dience mem
mbers, the eexperts had lively discu
ussions.
In
n my openinng remarks,, as preside nt of IIPS I proposed thhe idea of aan “Asian Maritime
M
Organizzation for SecuritySandd Cooperatiion (AMOSC
C),” pointing out that tthere is no regionalorganizaation with maritime domain awaareness whiich is most urgently reequired for tacklingthe currrent situatioon.
The idea of the AMOSC
C is very tim
mely, given that the Japan‐China summit meeeting in
Novembber 2014 waas followed
d by the receent Japan‐C
China High‐level Consu ltation on maritimemaffairs o
on January 22,
2 and the year 2015 is the year of maritime
e cooperati on between
n ASEANand China.
IIPS compiled this initiaal report onn the idea ofo establish
hing a multiilateral coo
operative
securityy framework to better manage mmaritime seccurity issue
es in the reggion, refleccting theoutcome of our onn‐going currrent researcch includingg consultatio
ons with a number of regional
think‐taanks, intelleectuals, andd officials aand also inccorporating valuable ccomments received
from the participants during thet worksh op and sym
mposium heeld on Januaary 29th and 30th inTokyo.
I sincerely ho
ope that th
his report w
will be usefu
ul as a basiss for furthe r discussion
ns in theo come to promote a multilateraal framewo
ork to safeg
guard peacee and ordeer in theyears toregion. Further, IIP
PS will continue to conssult with all partners in the regio n on this prromisingidea whhich we hop
pe will bringg a sea chan ge for regio
onal stabilityy.

Ken SA
ATO
President, IIPS

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Table of Conte
ents
1. Major Observvations on
n Maritim e Securityy in East Asia…………
A…………………3
2. The OSCE as a Coopera
ative Security Modeel for the East Asia…
………………
…..4
3. Appplicability ofo the OSC
CE model to the East Asia……
………………
…………………
….8
4. Basiic Conceptt on the AMOSC……
A………………………………
………………
………………….8
5. Conclusion……
………………
…………………
………………
………………………………
………………
….11
Appenndix I: Sum
mmary of thet Symposium….…
…….…………
………………
………………....12

Editor: M
Maritime Security
S
Study Group, IIIPS
Futoshi MATSUMOOTO, Seniorr Research FFellow
Miyuki MATSUZAK
KI, Senior Re
esearch Fel low
Junichi FUKUDA, Research
R
Fellow-2-

1. Major Observations on Maritime Security in East Asia
In recent years we have observed a number of dangerous incidents that led to higher
tensions in the regional maritime arena. Salient characteristics of those tensions and politicalrealities in East Asia can be summarized as follows: In East Asia, major disputes in the region are not land‐centric but maritime‐centric.
 There is no agreed set of concrete principles for maritime conduct except current
negotiations on the Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China regarding the South
China Sea.
 Even a common understanding on the rule of law including UNCLOS is not fully
shared.
 Maritime domain awareness of the ASEAN countries is insufficient due to theirlimited capabilities.
 East Asia lacks any regular forum where diplomats, coast guard officials, and navy
officers can get together and discuss maritime issues.
 There are insufficient maritime confidence building measures with a multilateralframework in place.
 There are no multilateral organizations regarding maritime capacity‐building in theregion.
 Given a clear trend in the region for increasing military spending, there is no concretemechanism to avoid a security dilemma in the future.
In light of these distinct features of the regional security environment, it is critical tothink ahead to come up with policy suggestions for safeguarding maritime security in East
Asia. In an endeavor to formulate policy, it is useful to compare the realities that East Asia isfaced with to those of Europe. The following conceptual comparison may highlight what East
Asia lacks in the current context.
EuropeEast Asia

Disputes

Land‐centric

Maritime‐centricThreatperception

Concentric

Diversified

Forms of
Alliances

Multilateralsuch as NATO

Bilateral such as US hub‐and‐spokes
security arrangements

Forms ofCooperative
Security
Organizations

Permanent andInstitution‐based
including daily meetings, secretariat,
and effective capabilities

Consultation‐based but without any
permanent or sufficiently effective
institutions

ExamplesNATO/PfP, OSCE, etc.

ARF, ADMM+, etc.
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Europe has nurtured a number of security institutions over the years going through thecold war and post‐cold war periods. Europe enjoys a web of institutions such as EU, NATO,and OSCE while East Asia as a whole has developed a number of consultation mechanisms
without consolidating any permanent institution except for ASEAN.
Although a number of annual meetings such as ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asian
Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and the East Asia Summit (EAS) have beenplaying the role of confidence building measures, there has been limited success due to lackof any permanent secretariat. That contrasts with Europe, where NATO (Partnership for
Peace) and OSCE have been serving as cooperative security mechanisms for all participating
countries and both boast of independent and strong institutions with permanent
secretariats.
Thus it seems high time to give serious thought to launching a maritime security
institution in East Asia that could function independently and impartially as a cooperative
security mechanism, bringing in all maritime players in the region and beyond.

2. The OSCE as a Cooperative Security Model for the East Asia
Among European security institutions, the OSCE stands as a good symbol of cooperative
security institutions. The maritime security study group of IIPS has visited the OSCE
secretariat in Vienna and also its field office in Kiev, Ukraine in September 2014 andinterviewed a number of officials working in the OSCE during the course of research. This
report is made on lessons learned from the OSCE experiences.
(1) History of the OSCE
In 1954, at a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the four Great Powers (U.S., U.K., France,
and the U.S.S.R.), the U.S.S.R. first proposed holding a conference on security in Europe. The
U.S. and its Allies rejected the proposal, since it was offered as a replacement to NATO anddid not provide for U.S. participation. However, in the improved political climate of the late1960s, NATO countries began to consider expanding the détente process in Europe.
A key NATO prerequisite for holding a conference on security in Europe was fulfilled
several years later, in 1971, with the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement between the
U.S., U.K., France, and the U.S.S.R. After preliminary consultations in Winter 1972/73, thefirst Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was convened in Helsinki in
1973, with the participation of 35 States. The Conference concluded with the Helsinki Final
Act in 1975. The Helsinki Final Act is a politically, not legally, binding document that sets out
principles of conduct in three areas: military‐political, economic and environmental, andhuman rights.
From 1975 to 1990, the CSCE functioned as a series of conferences and meetings
where new commitments were negotiated and their implementation periodically reviewed.
In the post‐cold war period, the CSCE developed into the Organization for Security and-4-Cooperaation in Eurrope (OSCE)) based on tthe Paris Ch
harter adoptted in 1990 and strenggthened
its instittutional cap
pacities.
The Paris Chaarter establlished a perrmanent administrative
e infrastructture, which
includedd a Secretarriat, a Confllict Prevent ion Center, and an Office for Free Elections. A majorarms coontrol agreeement—the Treaty on CConventional Armed Foorces in Eurrope (CFE)——wasalso conncluded on the margins of the Parris Summit. The Charter emphasizees the following
points ssuch as Humman Rights, Democracyy and the Ru
ule of Law, Economic
E
Liiberty andResponssibility, Friendly Relatio
ons among Participatinng States, Se
ecurity (armms control andconfidence and building meassures), and U
Unity (Europe whole and Free).
A
As part of this institutionalization pprocess, thee name was changed frrom the CSC
CE to theOSCE byy a decisionn of the Budapest Summmit of Headds of State oro Governm ent in Dece
ember
1994.
(2) Orgaanization an
nd principles of the OSCCEThe OSCE is composedcofo 57 membber states and 11 partn
ners of coopperation inccluding 5
Asian mmembers. Th
he organizattion of the O
OSCE is sho
own in the chart below..
Organiization of OSCE

Su
ummit
Heads of S
States, irregularr★ directly reelatedtoo the CBMs functions

Ministe rial Council
Foreign Ministe
ers level, once a year

Chairman--in-Officeanndthe OSCE troika

Permannent Counc
cil★
Ambassadoria
al level, once a weekw

(former, incumb
bent, and nex
xt)

Foru
um for SecurrityCoo-operation★
★
Arms Control and CSBMs, once a week

OSCE Parlliamentary AssemblyA
inn CopenhagenOS
SCE Court ofoConciliattion and Arb
bitrationOS
SCE Secretariat (in Vien
nna)

Sec
cretary Gen
neral

•
•
•

High CommissioCner onNattional Minorrities

Office ofo the Secretaary General
Conflictt Prevention Center (CPC) ★
Office ofo the Coordin
nator of OSC
CE Economic
and Env
vironmental A
Activities
Departm
ment of Humaan Resourcess
Departm
ment of Manaagement and Finance
Office ofo Internal Ovversight•••

Representativee on
Freedom of the MediaOSCE Field Missions★
M

Offic
ce for DemoccraticInstitution
ns and Humman Rights

•

Cauca
asus: Yerevavan (Armenia)), Baku
(Azerbbaijan)•Centraal Asia: Uzb
bekistan, Astaana
(Kazakkhstan),Biishkek (Kyrgyyz), Tajikistann, Ashgabat(T
Turkmenistan)•
East Europe:
E
Ukraiine, Moldova•
South East Europee: Albania, Bo
osnia

Personal Representattives of theChhairman-in-Offfice-5-Regarding the principles, the so‐called “Decalogue” of the OSCE serves as fundamental
common principles. The Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating
States in the first basket of the Helsinki Final Act includes the following principles:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
Refraining from the threat or use of force
Inviolability of frontiers
Territorial integrity of States
Peaceful settlement of disputes
Non‐intervention in internal affairs
Respect for human rights and fundamental freedom of thought, conscience, religion or
belief
8. Equal rights and self‐determination of peoples
9. Co‐operation among States
10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law(3) Confidence Building Measures
The OSCE has been providing a number of various confidence building measures to themember states such as follows: Regular meetings at the Permanent Council in Vienna and the Forum of Security
Co‐operation
 Communication network among participants for the exchange of military information(Computer‐based) Military CBMs such as exchange of military information, regulations on the specificmilitary activities, and contacts/visiting/consultations among participants based on
Vienna document of 2011
 Other Risk‐reduction measures: Mechanism for Consultation and Co‐operation with
Regard to Emergency Situations (Berlin Mechanism), Stabilizing Measures for
Localized Crisis Situations, etc.
In particular, we should note the importance of the Vienna Document. It is a very
detailed document for military CBMs in OSCE since 1990. Its updated version was adopted in
2011. This document could serve as a good model for future CBM prototypes in East Asia. It
is composed of 11 chapters that include Annual Exchange of Military Information, Defense
Planning, Risk Reduction, Prior Notification of Certain Military Activities, and observation of
Certain Military Activities, Compliance and Verification, and other measures.
The feature of the OSCE’s confidence building measures can be summarized as follows:Agreed basic principles
Inclusiveness and Impartiality
Established framework of CBMs
Regular dialogue by the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security
Co‐operation-6- Daily activities of Secretariat and Monitoring Missions
 Well‐supported human resources and rudimentary use of “assets” such as UAVs
to monitor the situation
 Mutual complementarity of functions with other organizations and alliances
The OSCE has never replaced the role of NATO even after the Cold War.
(4) Monitoring Activities in case of Ukraine
The ongoing conflict in the Eastern Ukraine in particular sheds light on the importanceof monitoring activities by the OSCE. The OSCE field office is playing a critical role inconveying the facts on the ground as an impartial and independent player in the conflict.
It should be noted that all resolutions at the OSCE regarding its mission in Ukraine aretaken on a consensus basis that included both Ukraine and Russia as its members. For
instance, President Vladimir Putin of Russia also acknowledged the important role of the
OSCE by saying at the meeting of the Valdai International Discussion on October 24, 2014:“This is true of improving the work of the UN, whose central role is irreplaceable, as
well as the OSCE, which, over the course of 40 years, has proven to be a necessary
mechanism for ensuring security and cooperation in the Euro‐Atlantic region. I must say thateven now, in trying to resolve the crisis in southeast Ukraine, the OSCE is playing a very
positive role.”
It is also worth mentioning that the OSCE field mission in Ukraine used even UAVs tomonitor the Eastern states in Ukraine. The following points could be of much use inenvisaging possible maritime monitoring activities in East Asia.
 “Special Monitoring Mission (SMM)” from March 21, 2014. Russia also agreed on thisdecision.
 SMM’s main tasks are to observe and report in an impartial and objective way on thesituation in Ukraine, and to facilitate dialogue among all parties to the crisis.
 Gathering information through human contacts with actors including pro‐Russian
separatists.
 Utilizing several UAVs: SCHIEBEL’s camcopter S‐100 are used for monitoring activities.
 Setting up two check‐points on the Ukraine‐Russia border for monitoring Russian
activities not to send illegal materials to the east region Russia could use it to justify theirown actions.
 Consisting of some 250 civilian unarmed monitors from more than 40 participatingstates and local staff from Ukraine as of September 2014.
Most recently, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Germany have agreed on concrete
steps for the observers from the OSCE to monitor the situation in eastern Ukraine after theagreement on ceasefire on February 17, 2015.

-7-

3. Applicability of the OSCE model to the East Asia
It should be understood first that geopolitical environments between Europe and East
Asia are distinctively different and European institutions have their own reasons why they
have developed into the present forms. For this reason, any European model cannot beapplied directly to East Asia. It is more realistic and pragmatic to build our idea based onrealities and facts we have in the East Asia.
The following key points should be taken into consideration in this regard: Basic principles of the international society such as sovereign equality and refraining
from the threat or use of force are also critical in East Asia while values‐related
principles such as respect for human rights or democratic values may be lessapplicable if the OSCE model is applied only to maritime issues.
 Inclusiveness and openness are needed for any cooperative security organization in
East Asia. No state or region that has stakes in global commons such as East China Sea
and South China Sea must be excluded. Impartiality is also critical for any activities bya cooperative security organization.
 Regular contacts and dialogues in a multilateral environment should be maintainedin East Asia including in the time of maritime crisis.
 Maritime CBMs are urgently required in East Asia in contrast to a long history of theland‐centric CBMs of the OSCE.
 Maritime capacity building is much needed in the case of ASEAN countries comparedto activities of the OSCE.
 Independent secretariat is the key. Daily activities led by the secretariat in areas suchas monitoring, sharing information, confidence‐building, and capacity‐building shouldplay a central role.
 Complementary relationship with the existing security cooperation and alliances
should be respected just as the OSCE has not replaced any role or mission of otherorganizations such as EU and NATO. Any other regional arrangements in East Asia
should be mutually complementary.
 Gradual process in launching an idea on solid institution may be more appropriate in
the East Asian context but it should be hastened given the urgency of the matter.

4. Basic Concept on the AMOSC
It would be a useful exercise to envision a new maritime security institution in East
Asia that would be entrusted with various missions including maritime monitoring, maritime
capacity‐building, and confidence‐building measures. Tentatively, we call this new institution“Asian Maritime Organization for Security and Cooperation” and its acronym reads “AMOSC.”The AMOSC can be created, building upon “acquis asiatique” accumulated in a variety
of fora such as the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN, etc. Discussions on the
AMOSC should be open to all stakeholders to Asian maritime security. Its principles, mission,and structure can be summarized as follows:-8-(1) Principles
First, “Asian Maritime Charter for Peace and Prosperity” should serve as principles forsolving maritime disputes. The charter should contain the following elements: peacefulsettlement of maritime disputes and refraining from the threat or use of force, respect ofInternational Law including the UNCLOS, safeguarding Maritime Commons, and other basic
principles acceptable to all members.
The outcome of current discussions such as one about the code of conduct between
China and ASEAN should be incorporated into possible principles of the AMOSC.
For this “Asian Maritime Charter for Peace and Prosperity” to be put into practice, amaritime security organization in East Asia may be established as the “Asian Maritime
Organization for Security and Cooperation (AMOSC).”(2) Mission of the AMOSC
The mission of the AMOSC should contain at least three principal functions: Enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness
The AMOSC dispatches its maritime monitors by patrol boats with crew on loan fromits members (or of its own) to the area where a dispute may arise and reports to the Council
on the relevant situation in an impartial manner. It also gathers information on any potential
maritime dispute or danger in the region and provides early‐warning to the members.
 Maritime Capacity Building
The AMOSC provides funding for technical assistance to nurture and develop coast
guards in the members. It could also coordinate any necessary joint exercise involving coast
guards and navies of the members. The AMOSC may function as a regional clearing house forneeded training and capacities for members.
 Maritime Confidence‐Building Measures
The AMOSC provides the members with fora where diplomats, coast guard officials,
and navy officers of the members may exchange views regularly. It also intends to nurture
respect and understanding on the rule of law including the UNCLOS. The members may also
agree on exchange of information on military or non‐military movement such as major
maritime exercises in East Asia. If conditions are met, information on major maritime military
exercises could be exchanged through the AMOSC.
(2) Organization of the AMOSC
The organization of the AMOSC should be composed of a permanent council made up
of representatives of the members, and a permanent secretariat together with necessary
implementing tools such as monitoring boats with crews.
The following points may highlight some critical elements in creating an independent
organization such as the AMOSC:-9- TThe perman
nent counciil of the AM
MOSC will meet regularly.
 A permanent secretariiat will be eestablished ini a capital of its membbers. It conducts
necessary measuresmbaased on deccisions of th
he council in
ncluding tim
mely dispatcch ofmonitoring boats to a disputed arrea, variouss CBMs, andd maritime ccapacity building.
 SStaff of the secretariatt initially cann be second
ded from th
he respectivve navies, cooast
gguards, andd foreign miinistries of tthe membe
ers. Retired officials andd officers of themembers can be hired
d on a contr act basis.
 Funding and necessaryy patrol boaats will be contributed by the mem
mbers. Stafff will be
ccontributed
d initially byy the membbers. As the institution grows and matures, it canpurchase its patrol boaats and nurtture its crew
w at a later stage.
 Membershiip in the AM
MOSC shoul d be open tot any stakeeholder whoo wishes to
ccontribute tot enhancin
ng Asian maaritime secu
urity. Presen
nce of mem
mbers that cancccontribute financiallyfor/andotechhnically to th
he cause off the AMOSCC is critical for
ccapacity bu
uilding. And the membeers who havve stakes in global com
mmons suchh as theEast China Sea
S and Sou
uth China Seea are also requested tot join.
 TThe ASEAN centrality shouldsbe reespected in the processs leading too the establishmentoof the AMO
OSC. In this regard,r
the AMOSC cann be establiished as an “expandedd ASEANPlus” organ
nization und
der the umbbrella of thee East Asia Summit
S(EASS).
 SStreamlinin
ng of ASEAN
N related meeetings and organizatio
ons should be considerred tominimize unnecessary duplicationn of functions with the AMOSC.
 TThe AMOSC
C functions independenntly but in closeccoope
eration withh existing
international and regio
onal organizzations and architecturres such as ARF, ASEAN
N, andoother regional securityy arrangemeents.
Ide
ea on posssible organization ofo the AMO
OSC
Summ
mit
He
eads of Statees, irregularr

MinisteriaMl Council
Foreignn Ministers l evel, once a year

AMOSC
Court ofC
Conciliation
andd Arbitratiion((If needed)Peermanent Council
Ambas
ssadorial levvel, once a weekw

Chairmman-in-Offiice
the AM
MOSC troikkaSecretaary GeneraalAMO
OSC Secrettariat
•
•
•
•
•

•

Offfice of the Se
ecretary GeeneralCon
nflict Prevenntion Cente r (CPC)
Offfice of Confidence Build
ding Measurres
Offfice of Maritiime Capacitty Building
Offfice of Maritiime Econom
mic andEnv
vironmental Activities
Dep
partment of Manageme nt and FinanceA
AMOSC Maaritime Mission- 10 -

5. Conclusion
An institutional approach such as the AMOSC should be given serious consideration, as
currently there is no break‐through in sight for any maritime dispute in East Asia.
The AMOSC may not provide a final solution to the current maritime disputes in theregion, as OSCE cannot solve the Ukrainian crisis either. However, AMOSC could provide abasis for a more credible, impartial, and lasting institutional mechanism to properly manage
disputes and crises in East Asia.
Patient yet steady efforts for creating a new maritime security institution are key tolasting peace in the region. The following points for instance remain open for further
elaboration and discussions: How to draw a roadmap for the realization of the AMOSC?
 What principle could be incorporated into the AMOSC
 Does the AMOSC assume a role for non‐traditional security in the maritime
domain too?
 What are the criteria for membership in the AMOSC? Whether or not non‐state
stakeholders such as shipping enterprises should be included as contributing
members?
 Would the ASEAN member states perceive the idea of the AMOSC as a matter ofserious discussion?
 How does ASEAN streamline the existing various fora and institutions inestablishing the AMOSC?
 How could the AMOSC tap into the potential of the existing maritime institutions
such as the Information Fusion Center and RECAAP in Singapore? Could it alsoestablish useful links with the existing maritime training center such as the one
established by Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency for regional cooperation?
 How would other countries other than ASEAN perceive the idea of the AMOSC?
 What kind of capacity building could U.S., Japan and Australia offer to thosecountries in need of maritime capacity building?
 What kind of new tools can be utilized to enhance maritime domain awareness?
For instance, could UAVs and other means be used by the AMOSC?
IIPS intends to consult further with regional players including both official andnon‐official experts on this idea of the AMOSC to concretize the concept to be adopted as arealistic basis for region‐wide official consideration in the near future.

[end]- 11 -

(Appendix I)
Summary of the Symposium on New Maritime Security Architecture in East Asia held by
the Institute for International Policy Studies (IIPS) in Tokyo on January 30, 2015
In his opening remarks, Mr. Ken SATO, President of IIPS, proposed the idea of an “Asian

Maritime Organization for Security and Cooperation (AMOSC),” pointing out that there is noregional organization with maritime domain awareness which is most urgently required fortackling the current situation. He stressed that the idea of the AMOSC would be a very timely
proposal, given that the Japan‐China summit meeting in November 2014 was followed by the
recent Japan‐China High‐level Consultation on maritime affairs on January 22, and that thisyear would be the year of maritime cooperation between ASEAN and China.
In the first session, Dr. Shinichi KITAOKA, Executive Director of Research at IIPS andPresident of International University of Japan, served as moderator for the session entitled“Current Status and Views on Maritime Security Issues and Disputes in the East China Sea
and South China Sea.” The experts from the Philippines, Vietnam, China, Taiwan, and Japan
respectively expressed their views.
Mr. Roilo Golez, former Senator from the Philippines, emphasized the negative impactof China’s current reclamation activities in the South China Sea islands on the regional andglobal balance of power.
Dr. Zhu Feng from Nanjin University, China stressed the importance of avoiding asecurity dilemma in the region by pointing out that both regional states as well as China arebecoming more assertive on maritime issues.
Dr. John Chuan‐tiong LIM from Academia Sinica, Taiwan emphasized there would be no
final solution to maritime disputes in the South China Sea without Taiwan’s participation, so
Taiwan must be recognized as a claimant state.
VADM Yoji KODA, former JMSDF Officer, Japan, referred to China’s reclamation of
Woody Island, Johnson South Reef, and Scarborough Shoal which would create a strategic
triangle in the center of the South China Sea, thus leading to fundamental changes regarding
the regional strategic landscape.
As a conclusion, Dr. KITAOKA wrapped up the discussions by emphasizing theimportance of solving maritime disputes through calm discussions and consultations basedon international law in a multilateral environment.
After the coffee break, Mr. Futoshi MATSUMOTO, Senior Research Fellow at IIPS,
provided a detailed explanation on the idea of “AMOSC” based on the OSCE model.
He specified the central missions of the “AMOSC” as threefold: (1) Enhancing Maritime
Domain Awareness, (2) Maritime Capacity Building, and (3) Maritime Confidence‐Building
Measures. The purpose of “AMOSC” is to prevent and better manage current maritime
disputes in an orderly manner, thus contributing to building and sustaining peace and order
on a mid‐ and long‐term basis.

- 12 -

Inn the seco
ond sessionn, Mr. Ichiiro FUJISAK
KI, Vice Prresident off IIPS and former
Ambasssador to the U.S., servved as modderator of discussionsdwith the ttheme of thhe “Way
Forwardd and Recoommended Policies reggarding Maaritime Dispputes in Eaast Asia including a
New Reegional Maaritime Arch
hitecture.” The expertts from Ind
donesia, Si ngapore, Malaysia,
M
Australia, and the U.S.
U expresssed their coomments an
nd opinions.
D
Dr. Shafiah F.
F MUHIBAT
T from CSISS, Indonesiaa and Ms. JaneJ
CHAN Git Yin fro
om RSIS,Singapoore shared somesquestions on the “AMOSC” proposal.
pTh
hey commeented by sayying thatit mightt be better first to streamline th e existing ASEAN
A
arch
hitecture onn maritime security
rather tthan creatinng a new one,oand neeed to bettter combinee the AMO
OSC and thee ASEANcentrality concept. In additionn, they noteed that Souttheast Asianns might heesitate to accept theidea if they are told
d to adopt any
a Europeaan centric model.
mD
Dr. Balakrish
hnan R. K. SUPPAIAH,
S
ffrom Malayya University, Malaysia proposed the idea
to start a more infformal framework and develop it into a more
e formal onne incremen
ntally. To
that endd, he propo
osed the moodel of Paciffic Economic Cooperation Council (PECC).
D
Dr. John LEE, from Sydn
ney Universsity, Australia described the threee conditionss for the
success of the proposal: (1) itt must refleect the pow
wer distributtion of the system, (2)) it must
recognizze the geo
ostrategic reeality, and (3) the cosst of non‐ccompliance must be high.
hHeemphassized the immportance ofo an inclusivve framewo
ork in this reegion.
Laastly, Dr. Paatrick CRON
NIN from thhe Center fo
or a New AmericanA
Seecurity (CNA
AS), U.S.
stressedd the neceessity for China to resspect the rule of law
w in the mmaritime areena andcommended the immportance of adoptingg an inclusivve framewo
ork such as the AMOSC in thisregion.
In
n closing, IIIPS announ
nced that itt would com
mpile the reportron tthe desirable “New
Maritimme Security Architectu
ure” based on our “A
AMOSC” prooposal, furrther reflecting thecomments and opinions exprressed by t he experts at the sym
mposium byy the end ofo March2015.
W
With the upcoming rep
port, IIPS is determinedd to continue to disse minate the idea on
maritimme security architecturre includingg the AMOSSC to officials and thee public in regionalcountriees and beyo
ond with a viewv
to prommoting a fraamework too safeguard peace and order inthe regiion.

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The chooice is o urs- 14 -