Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 3 No. 1 | January 2008

Defining Normalcy: The Future Course ofJapan’s Foreign Policy
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIE
It has become increasingly popular in recent years to
speak of Japan becoming a “normal” country, yet theactual meaning of the term remains ambiguous. Originally intended to refer to the weakening of the normative and legal constraints preventing Japanese leadersfrom adopting a more proactive role in international
security affairs, widespread misconceptions of what is“normal” for Japan have led some pundits to exaggerate its definition and create misleading expectations—or even fears—about Japan’s future course.
The argument that Japan’s foreign policy has until recently been anything but normal is inherently
flawed. Like any other state, it has pursued its strategic objectives in the manner policymakers have
deemed most expedient in light of domestic and international circumstances at the time. Although theform and style of its foreign policy are admittedly
undergoing a remarkable transformation, so too is
the global order. Recent changes in security policy
have been driven more by calculations of national
interest and a determination to review self-inflictedtaboos in the process of adapting to the changing domestic and international strategic environment thanany particular desire to be thought of as “normal.”
What follows is a vision for the future course ofJapanese foreign policy that aims to reconcile theneed for leaders to actively pursue the national interest in a rapidly transforming global context with arecognition of and sensitivity to remaining normative and legal constraints.

Global Trends: A Rapidly TransformingInternational System
There is no denying that the post–Cold War era of
US unipolar dominance is nearing its end and multi­
polarity and multilateralism increasingly define thegeopolitical landscape. In no part of the world is thisdevelopment more apparent than Japan’s own backyard, where the entire region, spearheaded by theremarkable rise of China, has succeeded the UnitedStates as the primary driver of global growth and—through institutions such as ASEAN+3 and thethree-year-old East Asia Summit—shown that community building and regionalism are global, not only
European, trends.
The United States
There is no denying that the United States, despitea gradual decline in its relative global influence, willremain the world’s dominant power for the foreseeable future. In an attempt to salvage its foreign policy legacy after seven years of less-than-remarkableIndiaIn recent years, India’s massive population, rapid
economic growth, and status as an established democracy have combined to turn it into a nationof immense strategic importance to the rest of theworld. Leaders in New Delhi find themselves in an
enviable position as the United States, Japan, andEurope seek to improve ties with India and balance
China’s rise.

results, the administration of President Bush will
likely concentrate on a very fixed agenda in its final
year: aiming to restore stability to the Middle Eastand denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.
While it is premature to attempt to predict the exact course of future US foreign policy so far in advance of the November elections, there are alreadysigns of an emerging supra-partisan consensus on
the need for the United States to reengage the international community and expand its support ofmulti­lateralism. Widespread discussions are currently
taking place in US foreign policy circles about how
best to restructure international institutions. No matter what conclusions are reached, it is clear that 21st
century threats to global peace and stability such asenergy security and the environment will require innovative and inclusive multilateral solutions.

RussiaThroughout the 1990s, in an attempt to fix the many
weaknesses inherent in Russia’s centrally planned
economy and put its country on the path to recovery, Moscow pursued widespread political reform.
Unfortunately, however, social and economic conditions prevented Russia from quickly developing
into a mature democracy and, in the eyes of many
leaders in Moscow, continued economic malaise led
some outsiders to look at it as a “second-class nation.” In recent years, the administration of President Vladimir Putin has embarked on a campaign torestore Russia to its former glory, capitalizing on rising global energy prices to toe an increasingly confrontational foreign policy line and utilizing popular
domestic support to consolidate its autocratic rule.
How Russia’s foreign policy will evolve in the coming years remains an open question.

EuropeEurope is in the midst of its own political transformation, and recent years have seen relatively conservative governments come to power in Germany,
France, and several other nations. The region continues to wrestle with how to most effectively address growing nationalism and further strengthen
the European Union. Recent developments suggest
transatlantic relations are likely to continue to improve. European leaders are also actively working toformulate an Asia strategy that will put the region ina better position to reap the benefits of Asia’s economic rise, yet exactly how Europe-Asia relations
will evolve in the future remains to be seen.

Japan’s Future Course
The ongoing transformation of the regional and geopolitical landscape has made it abundantly clear thatJapan must restructure its foreign policy to better
suit its new environment. In recent years, Japanese
foreign policy has been plagued by overdependence
on the United States, insufficient attention to China’s
emergence as a challenger for regional leadership, an
excessively confrontational North Korea policy thatrisks diplomatic isolation, and a foreign policy line
increasingly characterized by rhetorical flourish anddevoid of substantive policy prescriptions. Since
coming to power last fall, the administration ofPrime Minister Yasuo Fukuda has gradually shifted
Japan toward a more “realist” foreign policy but has
yet to fully articulate its vision. The recent legislative

China
China increasingly seeks a level of political influence concomitant with its status as a rising economic­superpower. Although soaring defense expenditures
and a growing confidence in its ability to take on amore assertive role internationally have been met witha certain degree of suspicion overseas, current circumstances suggest that, at least for the time being, Beijing
has calculated that a benevolent international environment is essential for continued economic growth.
Consequently, China is unlikely to engage in any behavior that will dramatically upset global stability.
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

2

Vol. 3 No. 1 | January 2008

deadlock resulting from the Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) loss of its upper house majority has madeit abundantly clear that a political accommodation
between the LDP and the Democratic Party of ­Japan
will be necessary if Japan is to set a clear course for
its foreign policy. What follows below are several of
the possible areas for compromise. While simultaneously maintaining its alliance with the United States
as the central pillar of its foreign policy, it is incumbent upon Japan to expand its participation in
multilateral security operations and become a more
active player in East Asia.

­ perations, and other multilateral initiatives underothe auspices of regional organizations “provided
that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and principlesof the United Nations.”2
An obvious prerequisite for a permanent law on
JSDF dispatch is a candid and earnest national debate about why a proactive contribution to international security is in the interests of the Japanesepeople. Once a compromise is reached concerning
the upper limits of Japan’s contribution, a “generallaw” should provide legal backing for the JSDF’s future participation overseas. Once they have clarified
Japan’s willingness to play an active role in international security, leaders should renew their efforts toacquire a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Any attempt to reform the Security Council will
require extensive consultations with world powers,
in particular the United States and China, as well asa substantial amount of patience and resolve.

Multilateral Security Operations
No discussion of Japan’s security policy can avoid
addressing the issue of the constitution. While constitutional revision should remain a long-term objective in order to provide policymakers with thestrategic flexibility necessary to cope with exigent
circumstances, the more pressing issue at the moment is achieving a more open interpretation of
Article 9 to allow the Japan Self-Defense Forces(JSDF) to play a role in multilateral security operations that transcends humanitarian aid and logistical support.
The most recent controversy surrounding the
dispatch of the JSDF to the Indian Ocean, which
resulted in several months of legislative gridlock,1
made it abundantly clear that Japan is in need of a
new—and permanent—legal foundation for JSDF
dispatch. Policymakers should base decisions onwhether or not to dispatch the JSDF overseas on thelegitimacy of the operation in question rather than beheld hostage to excessively legalistic interpretationsof existing laws.
While “legitimacy” is by its very nature subjective, the UN Charter provides an effective framework for determining what missions are appropriate
for ­Japanese participation. Chapters 7 and 8 of thecharter allow for such UN Security Council–backed
operations as the current International Security
Assistance Force in Afghanistan, peacekeeping

Regional Focus
While there is no doubt that a shifting balance ofpower in East Asia poses a number of novel challenges for policymakers, the region’s recent evolution has also provided a substantial number ofstrategic opportunities. In order to ensure continuing peace, stability, and prosperity in the region,
policymakers should center Japan’s Asia policy onfive primary objectives: 1) achieving a “grand bargain” with China; 2) institutionalizing a trilateral
security dialogue among Japan, China, and theUnited States; 3) maintaining the Six-Party Talks asa mechanism for subregional consultations on security issues; 4) establishing an East Asia Security
Forum; and 5) creating a regionwide rules-based
economic community.
An increasingly close economic relationship, together with lessons learned from the recent deterioration in Japan-China relations, has finally set thestage for Tokyo and Beijing to conclude a “grandbargain” and enter into a new era of mutually

1 On January 11, 2008, Prime Minister Fukuda pushed an extension of the JSDF mission through the Diet, overriding opposition in the upper house.

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

2 See article 52 of the UN Charter for the full text. An example
of an appropriate regional institution is the East Asia Security
Forum, discussed below.

3Vol. 3 No. 1 | January 2008

­ eneficial and forward-looking bilateral ties. Thisb
grand bargain would require both sides to work to
restructure relations through joint efforts to addressquestions of history, various confidence-building
measures in the field of security, cooperation to ensure that China achieves sustainable economic development, and collaboration to strengthen nascent­community-building efforts in the region.
Japan must continue to advocate trilateral strategic dialogue with China and the United States.
Regular talks among these three powers would go
far toward eliminating mutual suspicions and consolidating an environment of trust in the region.
Increased transparency would minimize US andJapanese concerns about China’s strategic intentions
and alleviate China’s fear that the purpose of the USJapan alliance is to contain its rise.
In addition to maintaining the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) as a venue for regionwide dialogue
on security issues, the Six-Party Talks format has
emerged as an effective subregional security forum
to address the North Korean nuclear issue. This forum, which has succeeded in bringing together thefive most powerful states in the region to openly discuss and cooperate in resolving a security issue ofcommon concern, should remain active even after
the nuclear issue is settled and be used to address remaining issues on the Korean Peninsula such as thenormalization of relations between North Korea andthe United States and Japan, the establishment of apermanent peace regime, and North Korea’s continued economic development.
Although both the ARF and the Six-Party Talks
will continue to contribute to regional peace andstability as forums for multilateral dialogue, Japan
must also actively campaign for the creation of an
East Asia Security Forum to proactively tackle nontraditional or cooperative security issues in ther­ egion. This East Asia Security Forum would betasked with addressing proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, terrorism, maritime piracy, andhuman security issues through cooperative action
similar to the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
Lastly, Japan must actively work with other nations in the region to see that the current proliferationof bilateral and multilateral free trade agreements(FTAs) throughout East Asia ultimately evolves intoa regionwide rules-based economic community. One
important step in this direction would be a trilateral
FTA among Japan, China, and South Korea.

Conclusion
While recent developments in Japan’s foreign policy
do characterize a significant transformation, expectations that Japan will “remilitarize” and develop
into a military superpower reveal a mistaken understanding of Japanese values and objectives. Although
recent support for US-led security operations doessuggest that a fundamental change is taking placein the nature and scope of Japan’s global role, declining aid budgets, coupled with a public not quite
convinced that an assertive role overseas is in thenational interest, run counter to such developments.
In short, what many pundits fail to realize whenconcluding that Japan is “normalizing” is that the
future course of Japan’s foreign policy has yet to be
determined. Whatever its ultimate evolution, Japanis sure to pursue a foreign policy that is consistent
with evolving global norms, embracing multilateralism and allowing the use of military force only in
self-defense or with the explicit sanction of the international community.
Hitoshi Tanaka is a Senior Fellow at JCIE, and he­previously served as Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan.

East Asia Insights
East Asia Insights is an occasional newsletter focusing on East Asia community building
from the Japanese perspective.
Published by: Tadashi Yamamoto, President, JCIE
Please direct any comments or questions to eainsights@jcie.or.jp.
Japan Center for International Exchange
www.jcie.or.jp

EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Japan Center for International Exchange, Inc. (JCIE/USA)
www.jcie.org

4© 2008 Japan Center for International ExchangeVol. 3 No. 1 | January 2008