April 2014

Japan Center for International Exchange

Challenges for the US-Japan
Alliance in a Changing Asia
Hitoshi Tanaka, Senior Fellow, JCIETokyo will welcome US President Barack
Obama at a key moment in US-Japan relations.
The challenging nature of the current security
situation in East Asia underscores the importance of maintaining and strengthening US-Japan
alliance cooperation. The risk of North Korean
military provocation remains ever-present, andChina is becoming increasingly assertive in its
maritime activities in the East and South China
Seas. Tensions in Japan’s relations with China
and South Korea continue to flare up over history and territorial issues. And the commitmentof the United States to Japan and its other allies in
Asia has also come under scrutiny as the balanceof global power continues to shift. Perceptionsof US decline may be exaggerated given that theUnited States is a highly dynamic society and possesses formidable military and economic power.
However, the long campaigns in Afghanistan andIraq and the economic strain of the global financial crisis have seen the will of the United States
to unilaterally wield its military power diminish, and there is no denying that its relative shareof global GDP is declining as emerging market

economies such as China and India post impressive gains.
Against this backdrop, it is crucial that President
Obama’s trip is utilized by policymakers in boththe United States and Japan to maximum effect toreinforce the solidity of the US-Japan alliance andthe resolve of the United States to pursue its “rebalance to Asia.” On the whole, US-Japan alliancecooperation across a broad range of issues has been
positive, including collaboration on energy and environmental issues, disaster relief operations suchas Operation Tomodachi after the 3/11 triple disasterin northeastern Japan, and the recent announcement that the United States will deploy two additional Aegis ballistic missile defense ships to Japanby 2017. But these cooperative efforts have at times
been overshadowed by sensationalistic journalism.
In particular, contention over policy toward China,
the Korean Peninsula, the Trans-Pacific Partnership(TPP), and Russia have hogged the spotlight.
Increased efforts are needed to address these issues,
and a strong showing during President Obama’s­
visit will lay the groundwork and demonstrate thatthe US-Japan alliance is up to the task.

China Policy

China in a positive and inclusive manner as a responsible regional stakeholder, mitigating misunderstandings, preventing unilateral changes to thestatus quo, and consolidating future regional stability and prosperity.

China’s top foreign policy priority is establishing a
new model of great power relations with the UnitedStates. If operationalized in the right way, a new
brand of great power relations can be a win-win for
all concerned and help promote regional stabilityand prosperity. However, China appears to preferan approach whereby both countries respect eachother’s “core interests.” From a Japanese perspective, there is a concern that the United States may
be too accommodating of this preferred approachby China without first clearly defining how mutual respect for core interests would be applied inpractice. This is risky because it gives China excessive leeway to interpret what its “core interests” are.
While “core interests” typically refers to Taiwan,Tibet, and Xinjiang, other areas have been included
at times, such as territories in the South China Sea
and the Senkaku Islands. This is obviously worrisome from a Japanese standpoint. Great power relations between the United States and China should
not be pursued in a manner that would compromise
the interests of US allies. Therefore, a reaffirmationby the United States of its security treaty commitments would go a long way in reassuring Japan,
especially if it included a clear statement regarding
the Senkaku Islands.
At the same time, Japan’s current approach toChina may be seen as a bit too confrontational.
Indeed, in addition to the Senkaku Islands issue,
history issues and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo
Abe’s recent visit to the Yasukuni Shrine have become major sources of tension in Japan’s relations
with China and irritants to US interests. However,more recent statements by Prime Minister Abeand his government that the Murayama and Kono
statements will be maintained have been helpful inopening the door for future cooperation. Looking
forward, strong affirmation of the alliance must beaccompanied by an equally robust statement that
the United States and Japan will jointly pursue serious and proactive diplomatic efforts to improve
the regional security environment. To this end, itwould behoove the United States, Japan, and China
to agree on establishing a forum for confidencebuilding. This is critical for the sake of engaging
EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

Trilateral Cooperation with South Korea
While Japan-ROK cooperation has been hinderedby tensions over history and territorial issues, there
is cause for optimism following the US-JapanROK trilateral meeting among President Obama,President Park Geun-hye, and Prime Minister Abeon the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit.
Recognizing the efforts of the United States in facilitating this meeting, the Japanese and South Korean
governments can use this opportunity as a springboard to mend relations and revitalize cooperation.
It is crucial that Japan-ROK cooperation and communication are strengthened in order to ensure effective US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation.
The Abe government is moving toward reinterpreting the Article 9 peace clause of Japan’sconstitution in order to enable Japan, in certain
situations, to exercise collective self-defense. This
may not be a palatable development for South
Korea, given its domestic political dynamics. But
US support will go a long way in persuading Seoul
to live with the reinterpretation. Additionally,
Japanese collective self-defense, especially if formulated in a manner that adheres to the spirit ofJapan’s exclusively defense-oriented security policy, should benefit South Korean security as it willallow for increased robust trilateral contingency
planning vis-à-vis North Korea. In particular,
given that US troops based in Japan will almost
certainly be involved in any contingency plan fora major crisis in North Korea, giving greater clarity—through constitutional reinterpretation—tothe roles that the Japan Self-Defense Forces canplay in assisting US and ROK troops will result in
more efficient planning and operations.

New Momentum for TPP Negotiations
The TPP aims to forge a high-quality 21st century
agreement that furthers regional economic integration through a sophisticated set of liberal economic
2April 2014

rules that go beyond trade, investment, and services. The TPP is important to the United States asa mechanism to boost growth in the wake of the
global financial crisis and to solidify its rebalance
to Asia. It is also important for Japan’s economic
growth strategy as it looks to overcome the lostdecades, maintain momentum on the third arrowof Abenomics—structural reform—and overcome
vested interests in heavily protected sectors of theeconomy, such as agriculture.
However, at present, the TPP risks losing momentum as negotiations drag on. In order to rise above
dead-end discussions and overcome the noodle bowl
effect produced by multiple overlapping trade agreements with contradictory rules, the United Statesand Japan—as the two biggest economies participating in the negotiations—need to be at the forefrontof efforts to realize its early conclusion. The refusal of
the US Congress to grant the president trade promotion authority (TPA), which is necessary to fast-track
ratification, is regrettable. Under the current circumstances, negotiators on both sides must look at thebigger picture and find ways to compromise in orderto forge a breakthrough and achieve a commitment
to new tariff reductions. This could help convince
the US Congress to reconsider approving TPA, demonstrate to other participants that the United States
and Japan are serious about getting a deal done, andgenerate fresh momentum.

has long blocked the normalization of Japan-Russia
relations, and the opportunity to peacefully resolve
it should be seized. On the other hand, Japan needs
to support G7 efforts to resolve the Ukraine crisis,
including imposing sanctions on Russia. Failure tocooperate with G7 efforts would undermine Japan’s
status as a responsible member of the internationalcommunity. Yet by supporting harsher sanctions,Japan may risk undermining the recent improvement in Russo-Japanese relations and the fragile
moves to reopen talks on the Northern Territories.
Given this situation, there is a perception that Japanis unwilling to give its full support to the other G7states. But Japan must stay true to its principles andback G7 efforts to assist Ukraine. A clear message
from Japan to this effect is needed and will pave theway for unfettered G7 cooperation.
◆ ◆ ◆While overly sensationalistic media coverage has
focused on tensions in bilateral relations, the USJapan alliance continues to be a solid force for promoting regional stability. The US-Japan alliance ismore important now than ever given the shiftingbalance in regional power and changes to the regional security environment. In order to address
the key challenges facing the alliance, the UnitedStates and Japan must increase cooperation with afocus on proactive diplomacy. President Obama’svisit provides a unique opportunity to push forward
on a range of fronts. With a thoughtful approach,the United States and Japan will surely prove to theworld once again that the US-Japan alliance is anindispensable cornerstone of regional security.

Russia Policy
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, in violation of international law, has created a strategic dilemma forJapan. On the one hand, since Vladimir Putin regained Russia’s presidency, he and Prime Minister
Abe have developed a close rapport, and under theirleadership there was new hope that Japan and Russia
could reach a resolution on the territorial dispute
over the Northern Territories. This is an issue thatHitoshi Tanaka is a senior fellow at JCIE and chairman of the Institute for International Strategy at theJapan Research Institute, Ltd. He p­ reviously served
as Japan’s deputy minister for ­foreign affairs.

East Asia Insights
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from a Japanese perspective.
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EAST ASIA INSIGHTS

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3© 2014 Japan Center for International Exchange

April 2014