ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank Ian Tennant for his feedback as well as
the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC)'s
Publications and Communications teams.
This policy brief was produced with the support of the United Kingdom’s
Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). However, theviews expressed do not necessarily reflect the UK Government’s official
policies.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Summer Walker is the GI-TOC’s head of security and rights initiatives.
She leads projects and provides research and analysis on international
policy, with issues ranging from drug policy to cybercrime. She has
worked with the United Nations, international NGOs, development
agencies and research institutes.
Ana Paula Oliveira is a senior analyst in the GI-TOC’s Global Policy team.
She provides analysis on a range of policy issues, including the impact oforganized crime on human rights law and policy, human rights responses
to transnational organized crime, cybercrime, and organized crime
violence in the context of illicit economies. She has an LL.M. cum laude ininternational law from the Graduate Institute of International andDevelopment Studies in Geneva.

© 2024 Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
All rights reserved.
No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any formor by any means without permission in writing from the Global Initiative.
Please direct inquiries to:
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime
Avenue de France 23
Genevawww.globalinitiative.net
HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

2

Contents
SUMMARY .................................................................................................................................... 2
BACKGROUND............................................................................................................................ 3
What’s in a name? ................................................................................................................................... 3

THE STICKING POINTS ............................................................................................................. 5
Scope .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
Human rights and legal safeguards ..................................................................................................... 6
Technical assistance ................................................................................................................................ 9Preventative measures ........................................................................................................................... 9

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 10
Notes ........................................................................................................................................................ 11

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

1

SUMMARY
The attempt by the United Nations (UN) to develop a treaty to address cybercrime – or crimes committed online– has been put on pause. At the February 2024 concluding session of the Ad Hoc Committee to Elaborate aComprehensive International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications
Technologies for Criminal Purposes (henceforth ‘AHC’) in New York, member states were unable to reachagreement on several substantial issues. A final draft of the treaty therefore cannot be implemented – for now –and the process is on hold.
The issues on which states have not been able to agree after two years of negotiations have left a large question
mark over what this convention, or potential convention, fundamentally entails. They include critical unansweredquestions, such as the treaty’s scope for preventative measures; the scope for collecting electronic evidence; thequestion of how human rights and legal safeguards would be protected were the treaty to be enacted; and whatkinds of legal activities would be criminalized under its terms. The disagreements over these core components
hinged on what types of government intervention – and interference – would be sanctioned by this treaty wereit to be adopted. For example, would it allow states to criminalize certain activities that fall beyond the scope ofwhat is ‘normally’ considered to an act of cybercrime, such as ransomware attacks? Could it become, for example,
a legal instrument to suppress online dissent?
So, while delegates from all over the world have worked together to come up with a draft a treaty, line by line
over the last two years, decisions to determine critical language – and function – of the treaty could not be made.
For this reason, the negotiations have been put on hold until possibly July 2024, and maybe even later. At thisstage, there are three possible scenarios:§ The first is that funding and UN General Assembly approval are secured for another meeting in July 2024 (orperhaps earlier). If so, delegates would in the meantime work to find consensus, so that at that meeting theywould be able to adopt a treaty.
§ The second is that funding or agreement is not secured within the UN to continue the process, orgovernments delay the approval of funds as a political tactic to stall the overall process, and the process getsshelved, meaning there would be no final treaty.
§ The third scenario is that a country or group of countries bypass the AHC process and bring a draft to a voteat the General Assembly. This would mean a simple majority would be needed to approve a treaty, and it isunclear which way that vote would go.
This paper analyzes the sticking points that remain, namely the scope of the convention, the extent of humanrights protections and the scope for international cooperation on electronic evidence, and assesses the challengeof moving forward with the treaty.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

2BACKGROUND
After two years of negotiations, governments gathered at the UN in New York from 29 January to 9 February
2024 for the final session of the AHC. Failing to reach agreement on key issues needed to finalize a treaty, thecommittee decided to suspend the session and reconvene later this year, depending on approval by the UN
General Assembly and availability of resources. The latter is an important condition, given the UN’s current
liquidity crisis and the fact each AHC meeting costs about US$1million.1 As mentioned in GI-TOC coverage ofthe treaty negotiations, the response from the General Assembly and the committee of delegates dealing withthe budget will reflect the level of political importance that states attach to the process.2
The political divide that has characterized the previous six meetings3 continued to set the tone for February’s
negotiations. The AHC worked in two streams, trying to reach agreement on the wording and terms of the treaty
in the plenary, while addressing the thorniest issues in ‘informal’ negotiations outside of the main room – withoutobservers from civil society and the private sector being present. Progress in the first week was slow, and doubts
about the very future of the process started to emerge.4 While major issues were still being discussed behindclosed doors, the plenary moved to discuss what should be in the accompanying resolution that would besubmitted for approval to the General Assembly with the future treaty. To debate the resolution that would givebirth to a convention that did not yet even exist was a surprising use of the plenary’s time.
In the second week, the Chair proposed a compromise package to the plenary, which had been discussed in theinformal sessions. This included provisions on the core issues on which member states had not yet reachedagreement, namely human rights safeguards, the scope of the convention and international cooperation.
However, during the final days of the proceedings it was evident that substantive progress was not being made.
The disagreements stuck, often exposing the diverging cultural and social values that countries have brought tothese negotiations since the start. Some countries even recommended inserting entire new articles, making thecommittee redirect and address these additions. At that stage, there was simply not enough time or political
capital left to reach the necessary compromises5 and ultimately the delegates could not overcome the substantial
divisions that have plagued the discussions from the beginning.

What’s in a name?
Down to the very name of the treaty, two competing visions for this convention have not been reconciled during
the AHC’s two years of negotiations. The first option, favoured by one set of states, envisions a cybercrime treaty
to address cyber-dependent crimes; the second is a treaty that addresses crimes committed using ICT. There isa vast, and now seemingly insurmountable, chasm between the two.
In the case of the former, a global treaty that addresses cybercrimes models itself on the Council of Europe’s
Budapest Convention. The ultimate aim of this type of treaty would be to combat crimes that can be committed
only through the use of information and communications technology (ICT) devices, though governments
advocating for this kind of treaty have allowed for the inclusion of tech-facilitated fraud and offences related tochild sexual abuse material (CSAM) – in other words, extending its scope to certain cyber-enabled crimes. Those
advocating for this type of treaty have generally also been open to including cooperation on electronic evidence
on a wider set of crimes.
The question then is, why is there a need for another treaty that would in many respects duplicate an existingone? The answer is that the Budapest Convention is regional, and it needs to be recalibrated for a global context.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

3

This is essentially what the current process has worked to do, borrowing language from the Budapest Convention,
as well as UN criminal justice treaties such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) andthe United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC). Budapest, drafted 20 years
ago, also contains provisions that some in civil society have cautioned are too flexible for a global treaty, such as
on the collection of electronic evidence.6 Voices in civil society circles have seen this as an opportunity to alignthe cybercrime treaty with current knowledge and best practices. This is especially pertinent in the context ofthe values that Council of Europe members sign up to on issues like human rights and the rule of law. Given thetransnational (and transcontinental) nature of cybercrime (e.g. ransomware attacks), a cyber-dependent treaty at
the UN would provide a suitable forum for discussing and combating these evolving challenges with a wider
group than Budapest Convention members.
The second vision is of a treaty that addresses crimes committed using ICT, which in a draft submitted by Russia
at the beginning of the process in 20227 encompasses cooperation on essentially any type of crime if committedusing ICT. While this conceptualization of the treaty includes cyber-dependent crimes, it would also include mostexisting forms of crimes if committed using information technology. Many were concerned that this approach
would sanction government repression online and increase authorities’ surveillance and monitoring powers, suchas collecting data from a service provider without due process.8 In addition to these serious concerns over the
infringement of rights and liberties, a wide-ranging treaty of this nature raises the issue of how all of its actions
would actually be implemented – for example, where would you prioritize resources and funding? And thequestion remains, what would be implemented through such a treaty that could not be implemented by othertreaties through a resolution addressing technology? Why would a treaty for crimes through ICT differ greatly
from ones addressing existing protocols, such as the mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) system outlined by
the UNTOC and other regional and bilateral treaties? If the existing system were to simply encompass requests
for electronic evidence, would this not satisfy the basic need of this treaty? Will the cooperation system it setsup (a 24/7 mechanism to manage mutual legal assistance requests) be exhausted by the number of requests andcreate a backlog worse that what we have today? There are limitations for any treaty implementation body, so
consideration of what needs are most critical would support better implementation.
Disagreements over the title – and thus the fundamental purpose of the treaty – reigned during the last AHC
session. With states unable to reach common ground, there was no prospect of being able to work through thedetail.
These issues, discussed in more detail below, are representative of the debate that has dominated the process
on the kinds of wide-ranging state powers this treaty would legitimise, and legalize, were it to be adopted. These
are the overall scope of the convention; the collection of electronic evidence; human rights and legal safeguards;
and the scope provided in the treaty for states to take criminal action against certain activities. Most of thesewere addressed in the Chair’s compromise package, which in the end was not enough to bring the divergent sides
together.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

4

THE STICKING POINTSScope
The scope of a convention provides the parameters for what the parties can, and cannot, achieve through its
implementation. The objectives of the treaty are set out in its scope provision. However, the lack of agreementon the purpose of the treaty made it impracticable to agree on the language to be used in such a provision.

WHAT IS CURRENTLY IN THE SCOPE?
The proposed text to Article 3 in the Chair’s latest compromise document states that the Convention has adual propose:
1. To prevent, investigate, and prosecute criminal offences established in accordance with this Convention –this gives states the ability to take criminal action to tackle the crimes listed in the Convention, which are
currently a list of cyber-dependent crimes and some cyber-enabled crimes.
2. To collect, obtain, preserve and share electronic evidence for the purpose of criminal investigations orproceedings – here the Convention authorizes states to cooperate on electronic evidence on crimes
beyond those cybercrimes outlined in the Convention that [may or may not be] cyber-related.

This duality on scope is at the core of many of the other issues that emerged throughout the AHC process. The
reason for expanding the scope of cooperation on electronic evidence is to accommodate the needs of member
states that want to prosecute crimes, even if committed in the physical, offline world but for which evidence canonly be obtained in electronic form. This may include, for example, capturing a conversation on social media that
contains evidence of a murder or footage of a shooting stored in the cloud.
While collecting electronic evidence is indeed critical, in a global treaty this provision has to be weighed against
the need to ensure privacy is protected in the transmission of data and in replying to requests from stateauthorities. This necessitates a consideration of limitations, such as what would warrant a valid request forelectronic evidence. Articles in the treaty should identify and address shortfalls in the current system byconsidering what cooperation needs are not being met by the current international cooperation system. If it is aquestion of speeding up processes, then for governments to be able to use the operational system (the 24/7
network9) to request data would be unlikely solve the problem, and could indeed create more delays. Besides, byexpanding the scope, an opportunity for misuse of the instrument arises. By arguing that collecting e-evidence isessential for criminal prosecution, states could in theory abuse access to personal information to harass minority
groups, opposition parties, journalists and others.
To mitigate these risks, Canada proposed an addition to Article 3. This proposal is designed as a safeguard toprevent the convention from being manipulated to persecute individuals and prevent it from being interpreted ina way that would be inconsistent with the obligations and responsibilities binding upon member states to protect
the rights of individuals.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

5

CANADA’S PROPOSAL
Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as permitting or facilitating repression of expression,
conscience, opinion, belief, peaceful assembly or association; or permitting or facilitating discrimination orpersecution based on individual characteristics.10

Member states opposing this provision argue that the wording proposed by Canada lacks a legal basis andprecedent. The compromise presented in the Chair’s package includes a new article, which that partly reflects
Canada’s proposal and moves the item from the scope to the implementation chapter of the convention text.
Despite the welcome reference to human rights, the difference in language and position in the text deprives
Canada’s proposal of its intended political weight.

CHAIR’S PROPOSAL
59.3. Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as permitting or facilitating unlawful restrictions on humanrights and fundamental freedoms, in accordance with applicable international human rights conventions.11

The dual scope of the treaty meant member states expended more energy on deflecting potential abuses thanon tailoring the provisions on cooperation in obtaining evidence to combat cybercrime in line with thecriminalization chapter. The discussions on scope represent a fundamental impasse that member states will haveto resolve before any the other remaining sticking points can be addressed.

Human rights and legal safeguards
Aside from the safeguards discussed above, two other points on human rights in the general provisions arenoteworthy.
The first is whether the treaty will contain a general provision on human rights, currently represented by Article
5 of a compromise package. This article, titled ‘Respect for human rights’, obliges states parties to ensure that
implementation of the convention is in line with international human rights law. Although this article is supported
by many member states, some expressed concern that a general human rights provision could ‘interfere with thesovereignty and internal affairs of states’.12
This provision is an important measure, in that it aligns any future, potential cybercrime treaty with international
human rights law. It reinforces human rights by placing them on an equal footing to security needs, meaning thathuman rights would be considered as guiding principles in the responses to organized crime, and not as anafterthought. It is critical that this is included in the general provisions chapter, where the rules of the treaty areset forth. This is in line with the approach taken in the Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants Protocols
to the UNTOC, which references human rights in its provisions. However, a reference to human rights in a single
provision is far from enough: criminal justice safeguards, such as due process, should be underscored throughout
the document.
The second question is whether Article 24 (‘conditions and safeguards’) should be strengthened. This article ispivotal to how human rights are envisioned in the treaty, in that it provides protection against abuse in theimplementation of law enforcement. It sets out safeguards that can be invoked by individuals if the actions of law
enforcement agents violate their rights during the course of an investigation or while deploying the intrusive

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

6

powers granted by the treaty. It provides citizens with the right to seek remedy and independent review, among
others. However, the wording of this article has shortcomings. For example, there is no reference to transparency(i.e. the obligation to inform a person whose privacy has been restricted) and there is excessive emphasis on
domestic law, which is a risk, as the potential states parties to this treaty have widely differing standards in respect
to human rights.
Discussions on Articles 5 and 24 were mostly carried out in closed sessions, which were not open to civil society
observers. Ultimately, states failed to reach consensus and both articles remained in the Chair’s package of
proposals.

The collection, storage and sharing of electronic evidence
A related sticking point is the scope of electronic evidence collection. In other words, for which crimes would
states have the power to collect evidence in electronic form? There are two possible provisions set out in thetreaty as it stands:§ Article 23.2c – intra-state collection on electronic evidence. This provision gives state agencies powers tocollect evidence in electronic form for any criminal offence for the purpose of criminal investigations orproceedings. Such a criminal offence includes crimes that have no connection with cybercrime activity, butwhere evidence may exist in an electronic format.
§ Article 35.1c – inter-state cooperation for collection on electronic evidence. This provision imposes on states
the obligation to cooperate with other states to obtain electronic evidence for any serious crime, including
serious crimes established in accordance with other applicable UN conventions and protocols in force at thetime of adoption of this convention.
As can be seen in these articles, one of the options before the committee is therefore to include ‘serious crimes’
as a justification for international cooperation on collecting electronic evidence. This begs an important andconcerning question: what is a ‘serious crime’? Here, the definition of serious crimes is taken from the UNTOC(i.e. crimes that carry a minimum four-year penalty). This is problematic and contentious, as highlighted
previously.13 Effectively, under these terms the treaty would provide for the sharing of electronic evidence
between two states for any offences that have a four-year penalty, qualifying them as ‘serious crimes’. Thismeans, for example, that if two countries consider homosexuality to be a crime punishable by a four-year
sentence, they could use this convention to share electronic evidence, allowing for cross-border prosecution ofindividuals on the basis of their gender identity.
As member states could, once again, not agree on the language and in order to increase safeguards around humanrights, a suggestion that seemed to gain traction (even with some ‘middle ground’ states) was the possible
inclusion of Article 40, paragraph 20 bis to the draft convention.14 This article revives New Zealand’s proposal toprovide states with an opt-out from cooperating (i.e. grounds for refusal). Under this article, states may refuse tocooperate if there are substantial grounds for believing that the request by the other state has been made forthe purpose of prosecuting or punishing a person on account of that person’s sex, race, language, religion,
nationality, ethnic origin or political opinions. This is a welcome step towards a more protective framework –especially if the scope remains broad by allowing for cooperation on any serious crime.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

7

Criminalization
The debates on the criminalizajon chapter centred on whether it should include a wider or narrower range ofcrimes. This dividing line – polarizing the member states who favour a narrowly deﬁned scope for criminalizationand those who want a broad and ambiguous treaty – has characterized the AHC negojajons since the start.
Represenjng the laler group, Russia expressed discontent during the 7th AHC for feeling ignored in its alempts
to introduce more oﬀences into the convenjon.

WHY THE CRIMINALIZATION CHAPTER MATTERS§ The criminalization chapter imposes obligations on states to make a certain activity a criminal act under
their domestic laws. It sets out which activities are deemed illegal and for which perpetrators can beinvestigated, prosecuted and, if found guilty, sentenced.
§ The criminalization chapter provides useful guidance for member states in shaping their domestic laws,
bringing standardization and legal certainty. For example, the definitions of the phenomena included in thecriminalization chapter in the UNTOC serve as the basis for a common global understanding oftransnational organized crime, influencing national laws and international cooperation on criminal matters.
§ Conversely, loosely defined criminalization may lead to excessively punitive state responses to crime andovercriminalization. Consequently, states might face other issues, such as overincarceration.
§ Making something a criminal offence is not the answer to all problems. That is why CSOs have beenarguing for a narrow scope of criminalization in this chapter to avoid the adoption of an overly punitive
approach that criminalizes activities that should not be penalized or do not merit international cooperation.

In this respect, two provisions are sjll in play. One is Arjcle 60 of the compromise package, which creates anobligajon for member states to criminalize oﬀences established in accordance with exisjng UN convenjons andprotocols – if such oﬀences are commiled using ICT. This provision is a version of an earlier arjcle in previous
draos, which attempted to ensure that offences established in accordance with any international conventions
and protocols also apply when committed through the use of ICTs.15 The diﬀerence in the new wording is that it
mandates member states to criminalize oﬀences as deﬁned in the UNTOC, as opposed to any instrument existent
in internajonal law.
Secondly, there is a potential risk that the list of crimes covered by the convention would be expanded by the
proposal Article 5bis of the draft resolution (to accompany the convention through its approval process at theGeneral Assembly), proposed by Russia and not yet agreed by member states.16 This proposed new paragraphwould allow states to begin drafting a protocol to include further crimes that do not make it into this treaty. A
protocol addressing additional forms of offences and relevant mechanisms, consistent with the scope andimplementation of the convention, could be the subject of future negotiations by the AHC over the next year anda half (i.e. before this treaty potentially enters into force). Given that the scope of the convention has not yet been
defined, it is not surprising that this idea was quickly dismissed by the US and others. The concept itself isdangerous, as a group of member states not party to the convention could potentially negotiate a protocol to it.
Two provisions of this chapter that were key for many member states and civil society groups seemed to beheading nowhere towards consensus – namely, the arjcles on online sexual abuse (Arjcle 13) and nonconsensual distribujon of injmate images (Arjcle 15), as discussed below.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

8

Provisions related to the protection of children and images
One of the challenges faced by delegates relates to online child sexual abuse or child sexual exploitajon material(Arjcle 13). Two main points of discussions were:§ Legal implications of the term ‘without right’. This wording seeks to safeguard those who may be in possessionof such material but had no intention of committing the offence, for example a person who has been trustedwith the material by the victim. If this wording is retained, a person could be prosecuted only if they possess
abusive material ‘without right’ to do so.
§ Deletions of paragraphs 3 and 5 from Article 13. These paragraphs include safeguards to prevent thecriminalizajon of children who engage in consensual relajonships and to ensure protecjon of privacy. The
delejon of the provisions was strongly opposed by Jamaica (on behalf of the Caribbean Community),
Liechtenstein, Argenjna, Norway, Australia, Japan, Uganda, Iceland, Switzerland, Vanuatu, Georgia, Austria, theUK, New Zealand and the EU, considering the detrimental eﬀect of potenjally criminalizing teenagers who
voluntary share images with partners. The delejon was supported by Egypt, Iran, Oman, Libya, Syria, Qatar,
Sudan, Cameroon and other countries.
A second point of contenjon on these issues relates to Arjcle 15 and whether intent should be maintained as arequirement of the oﬀence. This means that if the disseminajon of the material were authorized by the person
who is depicted in the material the conduct would not be a criminal oﬀence. Without considering the vicjm’s
consent, the convenjon would thus risk criminalizing the very vicjms it seeks to protect. By striking oﬀ intent,
there is a risk of over-criminalizing women in countries where pornography is a criminal oﬀence. Canada, forexample, said that a provision designed to protect privacy could instead turn the issue into a ‘moral oﬀence’.
The statements in relajon to these arjcles laid bare the gap between cultural and social principles espoused byWestern countries and the predominantly Arab group (working closely with Iran), represenjng fundamental
diﬀerences of opinion that seem diﬃcult to bridge if the meejng resumes.

Technical assistance
Many of the articles in the chapter on capacity building and technical assistance were agreed to in the concluding
session. However, the issue of the nature of technical assistance continued to divide the AHC, in particular Article
54(1), which imposes on states the duty to provide assistance to one another in accordance with their capacity,in the form of training, exchange of experience and specialized knowledge, and transfer of technology.17
Technological transfer is an important goal in technical assistance to developing countries. While some member
states (many of them developing countries) would prefer a draft that reflects the mandatory nature of theprovision of technical assistance, others (many of the Western countries) would rather downplay the expectationof technology transfer through the convention.

Preventative measures
Another important provision of the draft, which states have not agreed on is contained in Article 53(3) in thechapter on preventative measures. This is a chapter that contains provisions related to the prevention of
cybercrime. The sticking point here is a terminological dispute over the term ‘gender-based violence’. The Chair’s
draft emphasizes the need to develop strategies and policies to prevent and eradicate gender-based violence.
This is a key provision to protect the needs of people who, because of their gender, are disproportionately
affected by the crimes committed through the internet.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

9CONCLUSION
The future of the treaty process now hinges on several bureaucratic and political factors. Funding for the next
meeting has to be requested through the 5th Committee of the UN and approved. It is unclear if this can beachieved before July and whether rooms can be booked during the busy July schedule when other major eventstake place at the UN headquarters. There will also have to be time and budget allocated to interim meetings forgovernments in Vienna ahead of a next AHC meeting, during which states would try once again to bridge theseemingly irreconcilable differences that have plagued the process since the beginning and continue to divide
state positions on this treaty. Given these uncertainties and bureaucratic obstacles, the AHC could either succeed
in adopting a treaty later this year, or face delays or further disruption.
It is now up to the member states to decide what type of treaty they want, and therefore which direcjon thetreaty process will go. At the moment, the drao faces an uphill balle before it can be adopted by consensus bygovernments at the UN.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

10

Notes1
Darren Brookbanks and Ana Paula Oliveira, A dream deferred or a near miss? UN committee postpones decision on
cybercrime convention, GI-TOC, 15 February 2024, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/un-committee-postponesdecision-cybercrime-convention.
2
Ibid.
3
Ian Tennant, The cost of consensus: Sixth session of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on cybercrime, GI-TOC, 14 September
2023, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/united-nations-cybercrime-treaty-negotiations.
4
See Cyber Convention Check-in, GI-TOC, 26 January to 9 February 2024,
https://globalinitiative.net/announcements/cyber-convention-check-in.
5Darren Brookbanks and Ana Paula Oliveira, A dream deferred or a near miss? UN committee postpones decision on
cybercrime convention, GI-TOC, 15 February 2024, https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/un-committee-postponesdecision-cybercrime-convention.
6
Deborah Brown, Cybercrime is dangerous, but a new UN treaty could be worse for rights, Human Rights Watch,
13 August 2021, https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/08/13/cybercrime-dangerous-new-un-treaty-could-be-worse-rights.
7
Unofficial Draft, 29 June 2021, United Nations Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications
Technologies for Criminal Purposes; https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/cybercrime/ad_hoc_committee/ahc-firstsession.html.
8
Rishi Iyengar, Robbie Gramer and Anusha Rathi, Russia is commandeering the U.N. Cybercrime Treaty, Foreign Policy,
31 August 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/08/31/united-nations-russia-china-cybercrime-treaty.
9
The 24/7 network would have a designated point of contact available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in order toensure the provision of immediate assistance for the purpose of international cooperation.
10
Proposal by Canada on behalf of a group of 66 States and the European Union to the Ad Hoc Committee on
Cybercrime (AHC) to further define the scope of the draft Convention,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/Cybercrime/AdHocCommittee/Concluding_session/Submissions/Canada_3.3_05.02.
2024.pdf.
11
See Chair’s proposal on articles 3, 5, 17, 24 and 35,
https://www.unodc.org/documents/Cybercrime/AdHocCommittee/Concluding_session/Documents/2402464E.pdf.
12Egypt statement, on behalf of the Arab Group, supported by Pakistan, Russia, Iran and Iraq.
13
See Ian Tennant, Endgame: The final phase of the UN cybercrime negotiations?, GI-TOC, January 2024,
https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/united-nations-cybercrime-negotiations-final-phase.
14This proposal was supported by the EU, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Canada, Chile, the US, Liechtenstein, Mexico, Peru,
Singapore, Sweden, Norway, Iceland, Colombia, Georgia, Japan, Albania, Costa Rica, Australia, Kiribati, Vanuatu andMoldova. It was not supported by Egypt, Cuba, Mauritania, Iraq, Oman, Burkina Faso, Libya, Tanzania, Namibia andBahrain.
15
Summer Walker, Closing Pandora’s box: UN cybercrime treaty negotiations, GI-TOC, August 2023,
https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/un-cybercrime-treaty-negotiations-august-2023.
16
See Draft resolution for consideration by the General Assembly, UN General Assembly,
https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FAC.291%2F25&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRe
quested=False.
17
One of the changes proposed by the US (supported by Norway, Switzerland and others) in that regard was to add thewords ‘voluntary’ and ‘mutually agreed terms’ to reflect the fact that technical assistance is based on mutual agreement
between the recipient and donor states. In the end, the US withdrew from the proposal for the sake of consensus, whichappeared to be a considerable compromise. However, Iran tried to push further by proposing to delete the caveat ‘where
possible’ from Article 54.1, and the provision was not agreed in plenary.

HITTING PAUSE • THE UNFINISHED STORY OF THE UN CYBERCRIME NEGOTIATIONS

11

ABOUT THE GLOBAL INITIATIVEThe Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime is a
global network with over 600 Network Experts around the world.
The Global Initiative provides a platform to promote greater debate
and innovative approaches as the building blocks to an inclusive
global strategy against organized crime.

www.globalinitiative.net