THE
GLOBALSLAVERY
INDEX
2023

50

MILLIONPEOPLEare living in modern slavery

NORTH
KOREA,ERITREA+

MAURITANIA
have the highest prevalenceof modern slavery globally

UNITED

KINGDOM,

AUSTRALIA+NETHERLANDS
have the strongest government
responses to modern slavery

GO TO CONTENTS

Cover image:
Sydney, Australia, May 2021.

This page:
Irpin, Ukraine, March 2022.

Workers install solar panels on the roof of ahouse. Modern slavery risks permeate every
step of solar panel supply chains — from thecollection of quartz through to the manufactureof solar panel modules. Solar panels, as withother renewable energy products, are key tocombatting the climate crisis. However, any
shift away from fossil fuels must also protect
human rights and ensure a just transition anddecent work for all, including those working in
supply chains.
Photo credit: Brendon Thorne/Bloomberg
via Getty Images.

Evacuees cross a destroyed bridge as theyflee Ukraine following the invasion by Russia.
While there has not been a spike in identified
cases of modern slavery, there are several
reasons that risks of modern slavery could behigher than currently detected.
Photo credit: Dimitar Dilkoff/AFP
via Getty Images.

US$
468
BILLIONof G20 imports are goods
at risk of modern slavery

01
HIGHLIGHTS
2023
NAVIGATINGTHE INDEXMORE PEOPLE ARE LIVING
IN MODERN SLAVERY…

…BUT GOVERNMENTS ARE STILLNOT TAKING ENOUGH ACTION.

On any given day in 2021 there were…

Most government action

50
10

28

MILLIONMILLIONPEOPLEMILLION
increasesince
the 2018
index

68

In
FORCEDLABOURPER CENT

22

living in modern slavery

UNITEDIn
FORCEDMARRIAGEMILLION

KINGDOM

Least government action

67

5

PER CENT

AUSTRALIAPER CENTERITREAPER CENT67
PER CENTPER CENT

NETHERLANDS

IRAN

8

-3

NORTH

KOREA

12 CHILDRENMILLION

8
5
6

10

2

3

4

1

9
7

Prevalence ofmodern slavery
Low

ii

High

Highest prevalence
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

North Korea
Eritrea
Mauritania
Saudi ArabiaTÜrkiyeTajikistan
United Arab Emirates
RussiaAfghanistan
KuwaitLowest prevalence
160
159
158
157
156
155
154
153
152
151

Switzerland
NorwayGermany
Netherlands
SwedenDenmark
Belgium
IrelandJapan
FinlandGovernment
response
Most

Least

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Most action

Least action

United Kingdom
Australia
Netherlands
Portugal
United States
Ireland
NorwaySpain
Sweden

North Korea
Eritrea
Iran
Libya
Somalia
Equatorial Guinea
RussiaGabon
Chad

Afghanistan, Palestine,South Sudan, Syria, andYemen have been excluded
due to ongoing conflictand extreme disruption to
government function.

iii

THE PRODUCTSWE BUY…

…CONNECT US TO
MODERN SLAVERYCANADA

UNITED
KINGDOMGERMANYRUSSIA

US$

US$

US$

Value ofat-risk goods
imported by
G20 countries

US$

01
HIGHLIGHTS
2023
NAVIGATINGTHE INDEXBILLIONBILLIONBILLIONBILLION

20.0

26.1

44.0

15.2

Annual value of
at-risk products
imported in US$TÜRKIYE
US$

5.3

UNITED
STATESBILLION

CHINA

169.6

COUNTRY

XX

JAPAN
US$

53.1

SAUDI
ARABIAMEXICO

9.2

7.4■ Palm Oil■ Cocoa■ RiceBILLION■ Coffee■ Solar Panels■ Electronics■ Sugar Cane■ Fish■ Textiles■ Garments■ TimberUS$

US$■ Gold■ Coal20.2

BILLIONBILLION

INDIA

5.2

23.6

US$

BRAZIL

INDONESIAUS$BILLION

US$

5.6

BILLIONBILLIONBILLION

Governments
and businesses
must do more to
tackle slavery insupply chains.

SOUTH
AFRICA

AUSTRALIA
US$

US$

1.6

US$

ARGENTINA
BILLION

Products■ Cattle

SOUTH
KOREA

10.9

BILLION

Top 5 at-risk
products
imported

US$

ITALY
US$

US$

BILLIONBILLIONBILLION

FRANCE

11.8

US$

US$

US$

17.2

BILLION

LegendBILLIONBILLION

4.8

17.4

At risk goods
imported by
the G20

US$468BILLION

iv

Electronics

Garments

Palm Oil

Solar Panels

TextilesUS$243.6

US$147.9

US$19.7

US$14.8

US$12.7

BILLIONBILLIONBILLION

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

BILLIONBILLIONv

About Walk Free

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Walk Free is an international human rights
group working to accelerate the end of all formsof modern slavery. Walk Free is the creatorof the Global Slavery Index, the world's mostcomprehensive data set on modern slavery. We
use this data to mobilise powerful forces forchange against these human rights abuses. We
work with governments and regulators, businesses
and investors, and faith and community leaders
to drive systems change and we partner directlywith frontline organisations to impact the livesof those vulnerable to modern slavery. We workwith survivors to build the movement to end
modern slavery, recognising that lived experienceis expertise and they are central to identifying
lasting solutions.

Walk Free would like to thank all the individuals andorganisations who contributed to the production of thisreport. While the nature of the contributions varied,each one was invaluable.

Our international team includes statisticians,
criminologists, lawyers, and international
development experts, working to create andagitate for mass systems change to address theroot causes of modern slavery.

First and foremost, we extend our deepest gratitude
to the survivors from all over the world whoenriched our understanding of modern slavery,
improved our efforts to measure its extent, andinformed efforts to prevent modern slavery in all its
forms. Our thanks go to Survivor Alliance for theirpartnership in bringing the Lived Experience Expert
Groups (LEEGs) to life. We are proud to have worked
with Survivor Alliance in the United Kingdom, andalongside Challenging Heights in Ghana and Azadi
in Kenya, to run LEEGs workshops. The input ofsurvivor leaders across these workshops led us to aclearer understanding of what a strong government
response to modern slavery should be.
We extend our sincere gratitude to the frontline
voices featured in this report — Nasreen Sheikh,Ashante Taylorcox, Biram Dah Abeid, Caroline
Adhiambo, Shivan Pavin Alungnat, and survivor
networks and individuals from around the world
who wish or have to remain anonymous — for
their invaluable contributions and commitment todismantling the core drivers of modern slavery.  

Lesbos, Greece,
September 2020.
People carrying their belongings flee
after a major fire broke out in the Moria
migrant camp. Thousands of asylum
seekers were left homeless after a fire
gutted Greece’s largest migrant camp,plunging the island into crisis andprovoking an outpouring of sympathy
from around Europe and calls for reformof the refugee system. The blaze, whichbegan hours after 35 people tested
positive for coronavirus at the Moria
camp, sent thousands fleeing for safety
into surrounding olive groves. Photo
credit: Angelos Tzortzinis/AFP via
Getty Images.

vi

There is another group of survivors whose
contributions were anonymous but without whom
the estimates we present in this report would
not have been possible. Thousands of survivorsof modern slavery shared their lived experienceswith us through nationally representative surveys
across 75 countries. In doing so, they contributed
to a deeper understanding of the extent of modern
slavery and how it manifests across the world.
Special thanks go to Pablo Diego-Rosell (Gallup),
Kyle Vincent (statistical consultant), and
AlexStuckey (Pink Lake Analytics), whose survey
methods and statistical expertise were invaluable
in producing our estimates of prevalence. We
also wish to thank Cristina Patriarca and Chloe
Cranston (Anti-Slavery International), Kim Abbott
and Claire Cozens (The Fuller Project), Zan Times,

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Andrew Stone (Hopeland), Commonwealth Human
Rights Initiative, Laureen van Breen (WikiRate),
AnnieCannons, Regenesys BPO, Ulula, Dr Stephanie
Perkiss (University of Wollongong), Clean Clothes
Campaign, Coalition to End Uyghur Forced Labour,Måns Carlsson OAM (Ausbil Investment ManagementLtd.), Liza McDonald (Aware Super), Phil Bennett,
Caroline Haughey, and the International JusticeMission for their time, expertise, and contribution of
information and data to this report.
Special thanks also go to policy experts on our
Government Response Expert Working Group,
namely Claire Healy (International Centre forMigration Policy Development), Isabelle Johansson
and Jesper Samson (United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), Yuki Lo (The Freedom Fund),and independent researchers Jan van Dijk and Phil
Marshall for their support in strengthening ourassessments of government responses.
Several other organisations provided invaluable
support that informed our assessment ofgovernment responses to modern slavery,
including, Anusha Munasinghe (UNODC), Benu
Maya Gurung (Alliance Against Trafficking in Womenand Children in Nepal), Jonathan Kojo Anderson(Challenging Heights), Sandigan Kuwait, Sheku
Banguara (Advocacy Network Against Irregular
Migration), Australian Red Cross, El Pozo de Vida,
Empower Pacific, Hagar Singapore, Innovations
for Poverty Action, Mariko Yamaoka (Not For Sale
Japan), Pathfinders Justice Initiative, and Save theChildren Colombia.
With the exception of contributions fromexternal authors, the Global Slavery Index is
produced by Walk Free. We are solely responsible
for the contents of this report.
All survivor quotes and case studies are anonymised
for their protection, unless otherwise agreed.

vii

FOREWORD

For over a decade, Walk Free has studied the number ofpeople living in modern slavery around the world. Througheach edition of the Global Slavery Index, our understandingof the problem has deepened, our estimates have become
more precise, and our advocacy has catalysed global efforts.
Despite having more knowledge about modern slavery thanever before, the situation has worsened.

This edition of the Index highlights how fragile hardwon human rights still are throughout the world,and how in times of crisis — be it the COVID-19
pandemic, the growing climate crisis, or ongoingarmed conflict — it is the world’s most vulnerable
people who are hit hardest and fastest.
Modern slavery permeates every aspect of oursociety. It is woven through our clothes, lights up
our electronics, and seasons our food. At its core,modern slavery is a manifestation of extreme
inequality. It is a mirror held to power, reflecting
who in any given society has it and who does not.
Nowhere is this paradox more present than in our
global economy through transnational supply
chains. The growing demand for goods has led tothe accumulation of vast wealth, with G20 counties
accounting for 85 per cent of the world’s GDP. It has
also led to environmental degradation, deep social
inequality, and prolific forced labour.

Yangon, Myanmar, October 2020.

Unsurprisingly, no country in the world is effectively
responding to modern slavery – an issue which
the international community continues to rally
against but has failed to address. Since the releaseof the 2018 Global Slavery Index, we have seen
only four countries introduce mandatory humanrights due diligence or modern slavery laws — with
Australia, France, Germany, and Norway setting new
standards for the type of legislation we would liketo see adopted everywhere. While this progress is
promising, it is nowhere near enough. Governments
worldwide continue to display a shocking capacity
for cognitive dissonance; for example, funding

GRACE
FORREST
Co-Founder
Walk Freesupport services for women and girls while
simultaneously failing to close legislative gaps that
increase their risk of being forced to marry, such as
not having a legal minimum age of marriage set at 18
without exception.
If modern slavery reflects existing man-madepower structures, it follows that we cannot win
this fight working within the bounds that thosesame structures created. As the effects of historicalslavery are still felt today, we cannot continue toturn a blind eye to the millions of people sufferingin modern slavery around the world. It is time forgovernments, businesses, and individuals to take astand and demand change.
This report comes at a critical juncture — a time
when the world is awakening to ongoing injustices
and their connection to historical inequalities, while
confronting unprecedented crises. At the same time,
Walk Free’s reporting has also grown more accurate
and truly global by increasingly embedding survivor
voices in our data collection, our methodology, andour advocacy.
If there is one message you should take from thisIndex, it is that exploitation is by design, not default.
As you read through the report, remember that eachstatistic reflects the reality of tens of millions ofpeople. Let this data serve as an alarm bell, one thatshakes us from inaction and loudly demands that we
all act now.

A young woman in Personal Protective Equipment takes a breakoutside a medical facility where people were being quarantined due
to suspected COVID-19 infections. Social and economic disruptions
caused by the pandemic increased risks of domestic violence, labour
exploitation, and forced marriage. Photo credit: Sai Aung Main/AFP
via Getty Images.

viii

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

ix

CONTENTS
SNAPSHOTSPOTLIGHTSGLOBAL
FINDINGSESSAYSAPPENDICESIMPORTINGRISKREGIONAL
FINDINGSxi
GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023
x

192
144
68

34
22
12

CONTENTS

01
02

05

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

vii

FOREWORD		

ix

NAVIGATING THE INDEX

1Arab States..................................................................................................................................98

Executive summary..................................................................................................................................... 2

Disempowered, dehumanised, deported: Life under the kafala system............................108

About the index............................................................................................................................................ 8

Asia and the Pacific..................................................................................................................116

Methodology................................................................................................................................................. 9

Orphanages as modern slavery hubs....................................................................................126

ESSAYS		The Americas..............................................................................................................................88

Europe and Central Asia..........................................................................................................130

12

Climate change and human rights: The inextricable link.......................................................1406

22

SPOTLIGHTS		34

Understanding forced and child marriage..............................................................................36

144

Importing products at risk of forced labour...........................................................................146

Spotlight on the garment sector:
Stitched with slavery in the seams..........................................................................................176
Spotlight on the fishing sector:
Charting progress against forced labour at sea......................................................................182
Spotlight on the cocoa sector:
Forced labour: Chocolate’s hidden ingredient.......................................................................188

07

APPENDICES		192

Appendix 1: Terminology.........................................................................................................194

Anti-social: Modern slavery on social media...........................................................................44

Appendix 2: Methodology behind the Global Slavery Index.................................................196

Guardians and offenders: Examining state-imposed forced labour.......................................48

Appendix 3: Methodology for identifying the highest value products
at risk of forced labour imported by the G20..........................................................................254

Modern slavery: A weapon and consequence of war..............................................................58
The costs of the climate crisis..................................................................................................62

xii

IMPORTING RISK		

Spotlight on the financial sector:
Investing in exploitation..........................................................................................................172

The real price of our purchases:
How consumer culture fuels modern slavery...........................................................................20

GLOBAL FINDINGSRegional Overview.....................................................................................................................70
Africa...........................................................................................................................................76Controlling COVID-19, compounding injustice: The impact ofpandemic control measures on modern slavery......................................................................18

04

68

ii

Conflict and modern slavery: Surviving the unimaginable but
thriving only when we disrupt the cycle...................................................................................16

03

REGIONAL FINDINGSHIGHLIGHTS		

08

ENDNOTES		GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

264

xiii

01

NAVIGATINGTHE INDEX
Acknowledgements...................................................................... ix
Foreword........................................................................................... xi
Executive summary....................................................................... 2
About the Index............................................................................... 8
What is modern slavery?..................................................................8

Methodology.................................................................................... 9Jubaland, Somalia, April 2022.
A man walks in a sandstorm. After three failed rainy seasons, Somalia
is experiencing the worst drought in decades, exposing about 6 million
people to extreme food insecurity which has been heightened after
the war in Ukraine blocked wheat exports. Food insecurity and social
instability are key drivers of risk of modern slavery. Photo credit: Sally
Hayden/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images.

xiv

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

1

01
01

NAVIGATINGNAVIGATINGTHE
THE INDEXINDEXEXECUTIVE
SUMMARYEXECUTIVE
SUMMARY

Modern slavery is hidden in plain sight and is deeplyintertwined with life in every corner of the world. Eachday, people are tricked, coerced, or forced into exploitative
situations that they cannot refuse or leave. Each day, we buy
the products or use the services they have been forced tomake or offer without realising the hidden human cost.
Modern slavery takes many forms and is knownby many names — forced labour, forced or servile
marriage, debt bondage, forced commercial
sexual exploitation, human trafficking, slavery-likepractices, and the sale and exploitation of children.
In all its forms, it is the systematic removal of aperson’s freedom — their freedom to accept orrefuse a job, their freedom to leave one employer
for another, or their freedom to decide if, when,
and whom to marry — in order to exploit them forpersonal or commercial gain.
An estimated 50 million people were living inmodern slavery on any given day in 2021. These
Global Estimates of Modern Slavery produced by theInternational Labour Organization (ILO), Walk Free,and the International Organization for Migration(IOM) form the starting point for the national
estimates of modern slavery for 160 countries
presented here in Walk Free’s flagship report, theGlobal Slavery Index (GSI). Our estimates draw on
thousands of interviews with survivors collected
through nationally representative household
surveys across 75 countries and our assessment of
national-level vulnerability. This report, the fifth
edition of the GSI, shows how the compounding
crises of the last five years have impacted modern
slavery and provides a road map for actions toeradicate it.

2

A growing global problem
against a backdrop ofcompounding risks
Nearly 10 million more men, women, girls, andboys have been forced to work or marry since 2016.
The worsening situation has occurred against a
backdrop of increasing and more complex armed
conflicts, widespread environmental degradation,
assaults on democracy in many countries, a global
rollback of women’s rights, and the economic andsocial impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. These
factors have caused significant disruption toemployment and education, leading to increases inextreme poverty and forced and unsafe migration,
which together heighten the risk of all forms ofmodern slavery.
The 10 countries with the highest prevalence ofmodern slavery in 2021 are North Korea, Eritrea,
Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Tajikistan, theUnited Arab Emirates, Russia, Afghanistan, andKuwait. These countries share some political,
social, and economic characteristics, including
limited protections for civil liberties and humanrights. Many are in volatile regions, which haveexperienced political instability, conflict, and/or
authoritarianism. Several of these countries havegovernments that force their citizens to work in
different sectors, in private prisons, or throughforced conscription. Others are home to large
numbers of refugees or migrant workers, who areoften not afforded the same legal protections as
citizens and are highly vulnerable to exploitation.
Some, like Mauritania, live with the legacy ofhistorical exploitation through hereditary slavery
which continues to be practiced; and around theworld, inherited systems of inequality continue
to embed risk of modern slavery for the mostmarginalised groups within communities.

The largest estimated numbers of people in modern
slavery are found in the following countries — India,
China, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Indonesia,
Nigeria, Türkiye, Bangladesh, and the United States.
Collectively, these countries account for nearly two
in every three people living in modern slavery andover half the world’s population. Notably, six are G20
nations: India, China, Russia, Indonesia, Türkiye, andthe US.
Most of the countries with lowest prevalence ofmodern slavery — Switzerland, Norway, Germany,
Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland,
Japan, and Finland — are also members of the G20.
Yet, even in these countries, thousands of people
continue to be forced to work or marry, despite
their high levels of economic development, genderequality, social welfare, and political stability, as
well as strong criminal justice systems.
The widescale deterioration of civil and politicalrights in the face of multiple crises increases risks
for those already vulnerable to modern slavery. The
most vulnerable — women, children, and migrants— remain disproportionately affected. Over half ofall people in modern slavery are female. A quarterare children. Women and girls are disproportionately
at risk of forced marriage, accounting for 68 per centof all people forced to marry. Migrant workers are
more than three times more likely to be in forced
labour than non-migrant workers. People who
belong to multiple marginalised groups — such as
those related to religious beliefs, ethnicity, race,
caste, sexual identity, or gender expression — faceeven greater risks, reflecting deeply entrenchedbiases around the world.
GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Those fleeing conflict, natural disasters, orrepression of their rights, or seeking to migrate forwork, are particularly vulnerable. More people are
migrating now than at any other point in the last
five decades. Refugees, asylum seekers, internallydisplaced persons, and irregular migrants faceeven greater risks during their precarious migration
journey, during which they are typically copingwith significant upheaval to social networks
and economic status. Increasing anti-immigrantsentiment in many countries, including Europe,
where many seek to start a new life, has led to more
restrictive policies, which in turn expose displaced
people to even greater risks of exploitation.

Low prevalence among
the G20 masks their
responsibility

Strait of Gibraltar,
Atlantic Ocean,
September 2018.
A boat carrying migrants is
pictured while stranded atsea, before being rescued by
the Spanish Guardia Civil andthe Salvamento Maritimo
rescue agency. More people
are migrating now than at anyother time in the last fifty years,
according to reports by theInternational Organization for
Migration; and many of thesemigrants are driven to leave
their homes due to crises, suchas conflict or displacement
caused by the effects of climatechange. Photo credit: Marcos
Moreno / AFP via Getty Images.

While estimating prevalence of modern slavery
where it occurs is critical in identifying where theneed for intervention is most pressing, it does notpaint a complete picture of where responsibilitylies. Forced labour occurs in all countries regardlessof income, with the majority occurring in lowermiddle and upper-middle income countries. It isdeeply connected to demand from higher-income
countries. The production and movement ofgoods between countries — from the sourcingof raw materials to manufacturing, packaging,and transportation — creates complex andopaque supply chains, many of them tainted withforced labour.

3

01
NAVIGATINGTHE INDEXEXECUTIVE
SUMMARY

The purchasing practices of wealthier governments
and businesses fuel exploitation in lower-income
countries that are at the frontlines of global supply
chains. In fact, G20 nations account for more than75 per cent of the world’s trade and consume many
products at risk of forced labour. Collectively, thesecountries import US$468 billion worth of at-riskgoods per annum. The top five highest value at-risk
products imported by the G20 were electronics(US$243.6 billion), garments (US$147.9 billion),
palm oil (US$19.7 billion), solar panels (US$14.8
billion), and textiles (US$12.7 billion).

Spotlight on sectors
The growth of consumer culture and demand forgoods has both positive and negative impacts.
On one hand, it can drive economic growth andinnovation, create jobs, and improve quality of life.
On the other, it can contribute to environmental
degradation, social inequality, and unsustainable
patterns of consumption and waste. Goods
produced using forced labour now travel farther
around the world than ever before, with nearly twothirds of all forced labour cases connected to global
supply chains. Workers are exploited across a wide
range of sectors and at every stage of the supply
chain, although most forced labour occurs in thelowest tiers such as the extraction of raw materials
and production stages.
Modern slavery permeates industries that arecharacterised by informality, with higher numbersof migrant workers, and where there is limited
government oversight. Global demand for fast
fashion has spurred exponential growth in thegarment industry, while garment workers, hidden
deep in supply chains, face poor and exploitative
work. Forced labour in fisheries is driven by the
motivation to reduce costs amid diminishingprofits and as the industry tries to meet the
global demand for seafood. Despite the progressof some companies, forced labour and theworst forms of child labour are used to farm andharvest the cocoa beans that end up in chocolate.
Perhaps surprisingly, recent investigations haveuncovered troubling associations between
children’s institutions (including orphanages) andmodern slavery.
Greater connectivity between countries, economies,and people can create new risks of exploitation.
For example, modern slavery has permeated theentire digital value chain, from the raw materials
that create the devices that consumers use daily
to connect online to the overseas workforces
processing data and even onto social media
platforms themselves. The growth of new“sustainable” industries to create renewableenergies to tackle the climate crisis has led tofurther risks of exploitation, with evidence of stateimposed forced labour of Uyghurs and other Turkic
and Muslim majority groups in China occurringin the supply chains of solar panels and otherrenewable technologies.

4

Government action is
critical but current efforts
fall short of the challenge
The strongest government responses to modern
slavery were found in the United Kingdom, Australia,
Netherlands, Portugal, the US, Ireland, Norway,
Spain, and Sweden. Among these countries, themost notable improvement in the last five years is
the passing of Australia’s Modern Slavery Act, which
requires certain companies to report on modern
slavery risks in their supply chain and actions
they are taking to respond. However, while wecommend all efforts to address modern slavery, theimprovements since our 2018 assessments were far
fewer and weaker than the situation requires.
During the same period in which millions more
people were forced to work or marry, efforts by thewealthiest nations stagnated and, in some cases,
hard-won progress has reversed. Many wealthy
countries are failing in their duties to protect
the most vulnerable. For example, while the UK
currently has the strongest response, significant
gaps in protections expose survivors to risks of retrafficking. Some countries with strong responses,
such as Brazil and the US, undermine their own
efforts by forcing their citizens to work beyond
the specific circumstances that international
conventions deem acceptable. In the Gulf States,
where eight in every ten workers is a migrant andworking under the kafala (sponsorship) system,
many of the reforms intended to provide muchneeded protection have not been fully implemented
or fall far short of providing real protection fora highly vulnerable group. Migrants working in
high-income countries across Asia and Europe arealso subject to tied visa systems which offer themlimited protection from unscrupulous employers.
Most G20 governments are still not doing enoughto ensure that modern slavery is not involved in the
production of goods imported into their countries
and within the supply chains of companies they dobusiness with.

Stagnating action on modern slavery appears to
be connected more to compounding crises thanto changes in attitudes or a diminishment of thewill to eradicate this crime. There is no doubtthat governments have faced many challenges
since 2018, including those that have significantly
impacted funding and delivery of modern slavery
programming as national resources are diverted
to tackling more immediate harms. However, theobligation of governments to protect people frommodern slavery cannot be set aside when crises
occur. In fact, addressing modern slavery needs tobe embedded into crisis responses if we are to get
progress towards ending it back on track.

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, theworld largely awakened to the need for an overhaulof current systems in order to curtail the worst
impacts of the pandemic and to better respond tothe climate emergency. The impacts of COVID-19
drew global attention to the points at which
vulnerable populations fall through the gaps andto the structural inequalities that advocates havelong highlighted as core drivers of modern slavery
but that governments have failed to meaningfully
address. Despite the uncertainty created during
the height of the pandemic, a great deal of hopelies in an important lesson that it revealed — thatthe global community is, in fact, capable of rapidly
responding to crisis at scale.

The urgent need to movefrom intention to real action

When it comes to addressing modern slavery, theglobal community must move from intention toaction without delay. This requires reinvigorating
the movement to end modern slavery, withsurvivors leading the way to identify lasting
solutions. It requires recognising that the world’s
great challenges are all interconnected: modern
slavery, climate change, conflict, poverty, genderinequality, and racial injustice. None can beeffectively addressed in isolation. Recognising thisinterconnectedness, and resolving to act on it,
presents a huge opportunity to ensure the resources
mobilised go further and have lasting impact for theworld’s most vulnerable people.

World leaders agreed on an ambitious agenda toaddress the world’s most intractable problems
when they adopted the Sustainable Development
Goals (SDGs) nearly 10 years ago. This included
a commitment to ending modern slavery, forced
labour, and human trafficking by 2030 (Target 8.7).
In 2018, we warned that progress towards ending
modern slavery was too slow to achieve this goal.
In the period since, a significant increase in thenumber of people living in modern slavery and astagnation in government action highlights that the
global community is even further from achieving
the goals they agreed to make a priority. Thissobering picture of the current state of progress is
not necessarily a signal for the future. In fact, it likely
reveals truths that can point the way to success.

Portland,
United States,
January 2018.
Cary Dyer tells her story ofsurvival during a vigil in
support of the National Human
Trafficking Awareness Day heldby Hope Rising in Monument
Square. Dyer graduated fromHope Rising and is now thepresident of Survivor Speaks
USA board of directors. Photo
credit: Brianna Soukup/
Portland Press Herald via
Getty Images.

There has been some notable progress since 2018.
Another 15 countries have criminalised humantrafficking in line with the UN Trafficking Protocol,bringing the total to 137. Some countries, such as
Republic of the Congo and Brunei Darussalam, have
improved their response to modern slavery, while
Albania, Georgia, and the Philippines have relatively
stronger responses despite having fewer resourcesat their disposal. More countries are beginning toengage with survivors in the development of policies
and programs, although this remains woefully low
at only 16 governments. The high proportion ofmodern slavery connected to global supply chains,while dismaying, also presents new opportunities
to drive change through businesses and investors
whose actions could quickly and directly improve
the working conditions and livelihoods of workers
across at-risk sectors — and perhaps succeed where
governments have failed.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

5

01
NAVIGATINGTHE INDEXEXECUTIVE
SUMMARY

Recommendations

1

Governments and the international
community must recognise andrespond to modern slavery as anintersectional issue.
– Embed modern slavery responses
in humanitarian responses,
including by providing training forhumanitarian actors.
– Strengthen social protection
and safety nets so vulnerable
communities are more resilient
to shocks, including addressing
discrimination of people who belong
to multiple marginalised groups, suchas those related to religious beliefs,
ethnicity, race, caste, sexual identity,
or gender expression.
– Ensure that human rights, including
right to freedom from forced labourand from other forms of modern
slavery, are embedded in efforts tobuild a green economy to respond tothe climate crisis.

2

Governments must focus on
prevention and protection for thosealready vulnerable.
– Increase access to primary andsecondary school education for
all children and particularly girls.
These programs should focus on
those most at risk of not receiving
an education, such as girls in conflictzones, people with disabilities, or
those from socio-economicallydisadvantaged backgrounds.
– Ensure survivor support services,
including shelters, crisis support
centres, and community-based
protection. Cover all populations —including males, adults, and migrants —and make available specialised support
for children.
– Strengthen efforts to protect vulnerable
populations on the move by repealing
hostile migration policies that placenational security above human rights,
expanding the provision of safe andregular migration pathways, and by
screening asylum seekers and irregularmigrants for modern slavery indicators,
regardless of how they arrived in
the country.

3

Governments must ensure effective
civil and criminal protections inlegislation to tackle forced andchild marriage.
– Raise the legal age of marriage to
18 without exceptions, criminalise
the act of marrying someone whodoes not consent, regardless of age,and provide civil protections thatallow survivors to choose which
solution best suits their needs,
as not all wish to pursue criminal
actions, particularly when it caninvolve bringing an action against
family members.

4– Provide trauma-informed
protection measures for survivorsof forced marriage, including safe
accommodation, emergency funds,
and psychosocial support.

– Extend labour laws and fundamental
labour rights to all groups without
exception, including freedom of
association and collective bargaining.
Extend social protection to all
workers and provide remedy formodern slavery survivors.

– Tackle underlying drivers of forced
marriage, including engaging with
communities to subvert harmful
patriarchal norms and amending
gender discriminatory legislation.

– Introduce and enforce laws toprohibit charging of recruitment feesto employees, register and monitor
recruitment agencies for deceptive
practices, and ensure contracts are
made available in a language migrants
can understand.

5

Newtok, Alaska,
June 2019.
Indigenous women living
in temporary housing, aserosion caused by climatechange has displacedcommunities. Social
instability caused byincreasing volatile climate
events increases risk of
exploitation and modern
slavery. Photo credit: Bonnie
Jo Mount/The Washington
Post via Getty Images.

Governments must implement
stronger measures to combat
forced labour in public and private
supply chains.
– Introduce mandatory human rights
due diligence to stop governments
and businesses from sourcing goods
or services linked to modern slavery.
In G20 countries, enact additional
legal measures, such as importcontrols on products linked to forced
labour, Magnitsky-style sanctions,and public lists of companies foundto tolerate forced labour in their
supply chains.

Governments and businesses mustprioritise human rights when engaging
with repressive regimes.
– Conduct due diligence to ensure thatany trade, business, or investment
is not contributing to or benefittingfrom state-imposed forced labour,
including where it occurs in the
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Regionof China.
– Where links to state-imposed forced
labour are identified, and operatingin line with the UN Guiding Principles
has become impossible, withdraw
from sourcing goods and services.
– Ensure survivors of state-imposed
forced labour have access toremediation, which may include
financial compensation and accessto legal, health, and psychosocial
services.

6

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

7

01
NAVIGATINGTHE INDEXABOUTTHE INDEXABOUT THE INDEXMETHODOLOGYThe Global Slavery Index presents a detailed pictureof modern slavery as it exists across industries
and countries today. It also indicates the actions
governments are taking to combat modern slavery
and the risks that populations face around the world.

Modern slavery affects us all, from the food we eat
to the clothes we wear and across a wide spectrumof the goods we purchase. Accordingly, it iseveryone’s responsibility to address and eliminate
this crime everywhere it occurs.

Estimating prevalence

The Global Slavery Index is a tool for citizens, civilsociety, businesses, and governments to understandthe scale of the problem, existing responses, andcontributing factors so that they can advocate
for and build sound policies that will eradicate
modern slavery.

In some regions, ongoing conflict, politicalinstability, and forced displacement are key
drivers of modern slavery. Elsewhere, increased
vulnerability to exploitation is driven by global
events such as transformations in the world ofwork, climate change, and migration.

All supporting data tables and methodology areavailable to download from the Walk Free website:
walkfree.org.

From poverty to gender discrimination andinequality, addressing risk factors is fundamental
to combating and preventing modern slavery.
Effective responses to modern slavery mustaccount for these drivers and risks if we areto achieve the 2030 target for UN Sustainable
Development Goal 8.7, which calls for theeradication of forced labour, modern slavery,
human trafficking, and the worst forms of childlabour.

What is modern slavery?
Modern slavery refers to situations of exploitationthat a person cannot refuse or leave because of
threats, violence, coercion, deception, or abuses ofpower. It takes many forms and is known by many
names — forced labour, forced marriage, debt
bondage, sexual exploitation, human trafficking,slavery-like practices, forced or servile marriage,
and the sale and exploitation of children. Refer toAppendix 1 for full terminology.
Modern slavery is a hidden crime that affects every
country in the world. It has been found in manyindustries, including garment manufacturing,mining, and agriculture, and in many contexts, frombrick kilns and fishing boats to private homes andrefugee camps.

Nearly every country in the world has committed
to eradicate modern slavery through their national
legislation and policies. Governments have a central
role to play by enacting legislation, providing safety
nets to their populations, and pursuing criminals
who participate in this heinous crime. But no single
actor can address all these challenges. To meettheir commitments, governments need the supportand engagement of the private sector, civil society,and the public at large.

In 2022, the second edition of the Global
Estimates of Modern Slavery was published by
the International Labour Organization (ILO), Walk
Free, and International Organization for Migration(IOM). The regional estimates produced throughthis collaboration form the starting point for thenational level estimates presented here for 160
countries.
These national estimates were calculated using
individual and country-level risk factors of modern
slavery. The analysis draws on data from nationally
representative surveys — 68 forced labour surveys

and 75 forced marriage surveys, and data from the
Global Slavery Index vulnerability model. The ﬁnal
set of risk factors was selected from an exhaustive
list of variables to optimally predict conﬁrmed
cases of forced labour and forced marriage. The
model was then used to generate average predictedprobabilities of modern slavery by country. The
regional totals in the 2022 version of the Global
Estimates were then apportioned based on eachcountry’s average predicted probability of modern
slavery.
A detailed description of the methodology is
set out in Appendix 2: Part A.

Phase 1

Phase 3I ndividual and country-level risk factors wereidentified and then used to build a model thatpredicts modern slavery. This drew on data fromthe Global Slavery Index vulnerability model andnationally representative surveys.

 egional-level population estimates of modernRslavery from the 2022 Global Estimate wereallocated to individual countries in the region,
proportionate to each country’s relative risk.



Figure 2:
Estimating
prevalence ofmodern slavery at
the national level





50m





Trafficking for labourand sexual exploitation

Figure 1:
Modern slavery isan umbrella term

ForcedlabourSexual exploitation

Domestic

Domestic servitude

International

Worst forms ofchild labour

Forced labour as a resultof forced marriage

Human
trafficking

Phase 2Phase 4I ndividual predictions were aggregated into
country-level risk scores.

 he number of people living in modern slavery wasTthen estimated by applying the country prevalence
estimate to population data for each country.

WHAT IS
MODERNSLAVERY

Slavery andslavery-like practices

Trafficking for slavery
and slavery-like practices

Forced marriage
Debt bondage
Child soldiers

8

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

9

01

Measuring vulnerability

NAVIGATINGTHE INDEXThe Global Slavery Index vulnerability model is built
on statistical testing and processes to identify thefactors that explain or predict the prevalence ofmodern slavery. The vulnerability model provides
a risk score for 160 countries based on an analysisof data covering 23 risk variables across ﬁve major
dimensions (see Figure 3).
A detailed description of the methodology is set out inAppendix 2: Part B.

Assessing government responses

Identifying promising practices

The government response assessment provides acomparative assessment of the legal, policy, andprogrammatic actions that 176 governments aretaking to respond to modern slavery. This is basedon data collected on 141 indicators that are relevant
to understanding how each government is tracking
towards achieving ﬁve milestones (see Figure 4).

The Promising Practices Database was created in 2015
to collate evaluations of anti-slavery and countertrafficking programs in a searchable format — allowing
stakeholders to quickly identify what works, andwhat does not, through a simple search by country,
population, type of slavery, sector, or intervention. To
date, the Database houses 262 evaluations, covering
every region of the world.

A detailed description of the methodology is set out inAppendix 2: Part C.

A detailed description of the methodology is available
on the Walk Free website.

Assessing business compliance with
Modern Slavery Acts
We also work with WikiRate to understand thelevel of compliance with the UK’s and Australia’s
Modern Slavery Acts. With an estimated thousandsof companies having to publish statements perannum, this work entails reviewing modern
slavery statements and creating tools for greatertransparency for consumers, businesses,
policymakers, and civil society organisations. We takea sector-specific approach to conduct a more tailoredanalysis of the statements and their quality, and todevelop recommendations of what constitutes astrong statement and good business practice.
A detailed description of the methodology is available
on the Walk Free website.

Figure 3:
Vulnerability
model 2022

Figure 4:
Government
response
conceptual
framework

Governance Issues
Political Instability,
GSI Government Response,
Women’s Physical Security,
Political Rights, Regulatory
Quality, Disabled Rights,
Weapons Access

Lack of Basic Needs

Eﬀects of Conflict
Impact of Terrorism,
Internal Conflicts Fought,
Internally Displaced
Persons

Vulnerability

DisenfranchisedGroupsEmployees Prioritise Nationals,
Social Group Equality,
LGBTI Acceptance

10

Undernourishment,
Social Safety Net,
Ability to Borrow Money,
Tuberculosis, Accessto Clean Water,
Cell Phone Users

Inequality

Survivors of slavery
are identified andsupported to exit andremain out of modern
slavery

Governmentand business stop
sourcing goods
and services
produced byforced labour

Ability to Obtain
Emergency Funds, Violent
Crime, Gini Coefficient,
Law Enforcement
Reliability

Criminal justicemechanisms function
effectively to prevent
modern slavery

Government
Response

Coordination occurs
at the national andregional level
and across borders,and governments
are held to accountfor their
response

Risk factors thatenable modern slavery
are addressed

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

11

02

ESSAYSClimate change and human rights:
The inextricable link.............................................................. 14
Conflict and modern slavery:
Surviving the unimaginable,
but thriving only when we disrupt the cycle.................... 16
Controlling COVID-19, compounding injustice:
The impact of pandemic control
measures on modern slavery.............................................. 18
The real price of our purchases:
How consumer culture fuels modern slavery.................. 20

Suva, Fiji, December 2022.
A woman swims off the coast of Suva. The Fijian government has been
preparing to relocate more than 600 coastal communities and 42
villages when climate changes cause sea levels to rise. Climate-induced
displacement is driving risks to modern slavery. Photo credit: Saeed
Khan/AFP via Getty Images.

12

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

13

02

ESSAYS

CLIMATECHANGEESSAY BY

VANESSANAKATE
Young Leader
UN Sustainable
Development Goals

Climate change
and human rights:
The inextricable link

Crises heighten the risk of all formsof modern slavery, and one of thegreatest we currently face – theclimate crisis – is no exception.
In this essay, Vanessa Nakate,
Young Leader for the Sustainable
Development Goals, and climate
activist from Uganda, reminds usthat the climate crisis is about morethan statistics and targets; it’s about
the millions of people around theworld who are currently bearing thebrunt of the crippling impacts of a
warming planet.
The climate crisis is a human rights crisis. The
environmental consequences of climate change— ecological degradation, increasing global
temperatures, rising sea levels, and extreme
weather events — have devastating impact oncommunities around the world. Associated effects
such as resource scarcity, loss of livelihoods,
increases in poverty, and unequal access tohealth and education, push millions of people into
precarious situations, and magnifying drivers ofmodern slavery.
There is no escaping that rising temperatures arehaving a disproportionate impact on those who are
already the most vulnerable in our world. During
times of upheaval and fragility, any protections
that women, children, migrants, and the poorest in
our society have gained are more likely to be taken
away.

With the climate crisis, as so often is the case,women’s suffering is intensified by the structuralgender inequalities that dominate their lives.
The United Nations estimates that 80 percent of
those displaced by climate change are female.
Women in Uganda, for example are most likely
primary caregivers who are responsible for feeding
families and gathering water. They struggle themost when extreme weather hits. Women and girls
are then especially vulnerable to sexual violenceand being trafficked into sexual exploitation inand from emergency shelters, tents, or camps,that are designed to house and protect displacedcommunities, fleeing climate related events.
The child bride is another invisible victim of theclimate crisis. Extreme weather creates economic
suffering and more precarious situations forfamilies. Increasingly, parents are being forced togive away their children for marriage in order tosecure some financial stability. In the Horn of Africa,
increases in the rate of child marriages in droughtaffected areas have been linked to the impacts ofthe climate crisis, particularly family poverty andinterrupted education for girls.
The irony is that these vulnerable groups are usually
the least emitting in the world. The average citizen
in Australia or Canada emits around 100 times morethan the average citizen in Uganda, my country. And
within our societies, the poorest contribute almost
nothing to greenhouse gas emissions comparedto the rich. Vast inequalities in energy access andusage, and carbon emissions, mean that people in
the United States produce more emissions in a few
days than people in many low-income countries
produce in an entire year.
Yet, many people in the Western world still blame
overpopulation in countries like mine for our global
environmental crises. This is not a population
problem, it is a consumption problem.

14

But it’s also a not an individual problem; it is apolitical one. People are reliant on systems built
and perpetuated by powerful corporate interests.
Governments continue to give subsidies to fossil
fuels, which poison our air and heat our climate,while fossil fuel companies make billions in profits.
I see my role as being to share the stories ofmany people I have had the honour to meet. One
particular story has stayed with me and gives me
motivation to keep going: in September 2022 I
travelled to Turkana, Kenya, with UNICEF. I was
there to meet children suffering from severe
acute malnutrition as a result of years of drought
caused by years of failed rainy seasons in theregion. Millions of children in the Horn of Africa aresuffering. One morning, I met a boy at a hospital in
Lodwar, where the worst cases are referred. The boy
hadn’t been able to access life-saving medical carein time and that evening, sadly, he passed away.
There are many solutions that we need to fund andimplement in the global south and across the world.
The non-profit organisation Project Drawdown lists
the most effective solutions we can take, orderedby the levels of emissions that would be saved ifthey were fully implemented. As well as lowering
global greenhouse gas emissions and striving for theinternational targets, solutions in the short and longterm should focus on the vulnerabilities to modern
slavery and human rights infringements that somany are experiencing as a result of the crisis.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

One holistic response that I am particularly
passionate about is educating girls in low andmiddle-income countries. Providing girls and young
women with a full education drastically increases
their resilience to climate shocks. They are more
likely to have a secure income and less likely torely on subsistence crops that are vulnerable toextreme weather. They know how to respond tofloods or droughts when they hit. And they end up
having smaller, healthier families. Educating girls
not only equips them to lead better lives overall,it will provide a lifeline in our fight against theclimate crisis.
As an activist, my role is to highlight the humanimpacts of the climate crisis. I use my platform — aprivilege many on the frontlines of the crisis are notafforded — to demand world leaders to act upon
the reality and severity of climate change and toplace human rights and justice at the heart of theirefforts. In doing this, we must ensure that stories
of activists, survivors, and diverse communities arebeing centred and heard. By prioritising emissions
reductions, supporting vulnerable communities,
applying a human rights lens to all responses, andworking together across the global community, we
can create a more just and sustainable future for all.

Stockholm, Sweden,
June 2022.
Environmental activists
protest with the Fridays
for Future group against
inaction by governments
to tackle climate change.
Modern slavery and climatechange are interconnectedissues. Increasingly intense
weather events are displacing
communities and spurring
risks of modern slavery; while
sectors at high risk of forced
labour such as mining, logging,and textile and garment
manufacturing, contribute toclimate degradation. Photo
credit: Jonas Gratzer via
Getty Images.

See page 62 “The costs of the climate crisis” fora wider discussion on this intersection, including
recommendations for government action.

15

02

ESSAYS

CONFLICTESSAY BY

NADIA
MURAD
UNODC Goodwill
Ambassador

Conflict and modern slavery:
Surviving the unimaginable,
but thriving only when we
disrupt the cycle
Nadia Murad, a proud Yazidi woman,
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate, and
UNODC Goodwill Ambassador, is aleading advocate for survivors of
genocide and sexual violence. The
Yazidi community, largely locatedin the north of modern-day Iraq,
is an ancient population united bytheir ethnic and religious identity.
Throughout their long history,
Yazidis have faced discrimination,persecution, and severe forms of
exploitation. In 2014, in the most
brutal of attacks, militants fromthe Islamic State in Iraq and Syria(ISIS) terror group led a systematic
campaign to destroy the Yazidi
community. Sexual slavery was used
as a weapon of the genocide.
In this essay, we learn how Nadia’s
own escape from ISIS captivity led
to an unwavering pursuit of justicefor her community and for survivorsof sexual violence worldwide.
Nadia explores the ways in which
exploitation is both a weapon andconsequence of war, and offers
hope that with community-driven
and survivor-centric approaches,
persecuted communities can not
only survive, but thrive.

Genocide does not happen by accident. The
enslavement and sexual abuse of women does not
happen by accident. The decision by ISIS to brutalise
and break my Yazidi community in Sinjar in Northern
Iraq was no accident. Centuries of persecution had
exacerbated our vulnerabilities, so that when the
militants surrounded us in the summer of 2014, wewere left like lambs to be slaughtered.
When the terrorists entered my village of Kocho,
men and women were immediately treateddifferently. The men were murdered and the
young boys captured and brainwashed. Womenand children were captured, forcibly converted,
subjected to domestic servitude and many
were forced to marry fighters. Through thisinstitutionalised sexual violence — and theindoctrination of our children — they sought todestroy our community first through our bodies, andthen in our minds.
As with other genocides, they did so with precisionand planning. They bureaucratised rape andviolence against women, first with “guideline”
pamphlets for fighters, then through the use of
online platforms like Telegram to buy and sell
women. They opened a road between Iraq and
Syria for the express purpose of trading Yazidi girls,
hoping their presence might lure more fighters fromacross the globe.
The sexual violence ISIS unleashed on us was aweapon of war, but our experience was not wholly
unique. If you look back at human history, thesexual enslavement and abuse of women and girls
caught in conflict happens over and over. We readof it in Homer’s Iliad, we heard about it through thetestimonies of the women during the Second World
War and today we still watch as journalists report on
it for the news.
How can it be that, as we enter the third decadeof the 21st century, a century in which society
is making huge advances in so many ways, ourtreatment of women in conflict is still stuck in the
Bronze Age?
Why is it that even though I, and others, havetold our story over and over, the international
community seems to have lost interest in pursuingthose who perpetrate sexual violence?

16

While I am proud to have successfully advocated forthe passage of resolution 2467 at the UN Security
Council, which expands commitments to end sexual
violence in conflict with a survivor-centric approach,
it is not enough.

and safety for women and girls, and to support
the healing and re-development of besieged Yazidi
communities. As we approach the ninth anniversaryof the genocide, more than 2,800 women andchildren are still missing and enslaved by ISIS.

Neither the International Criminal Court nor
the national courts in Iraq have yet convened toformally try ISIS members for the genocide andsexual violence they perpetrated. To date, only
two criminal proceedings have been brought
against fighters and their co-conspirators. Bothof which resulted in German courts handing down
convictions for crimes of genocide, including
through the systematic enslavement of Yazidi
women and girls.

I began this essay by writing that genocide does not
happen by accident.

In the aftermath of the ISIS invasion, the UN
Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for
Crimes committed by Da’esh/ISIL (UNITAD) collected
evidence against more than 2,100 perpetratorsof sexual violence. So, two trials from over two
thousand does not seem much of a future deterrent.
I believe we must use every tool we have, fromsanctions through to universal jurisdiction, to show
the entire world that sexual violence in conflict will
not be tolerated.
My book “The Last Girl” is so-called because I
want to be the last girl in the world with a story
like mine. However, that will only be the case if theinternational community truly fights for justice, andif we address the gender inequalities and societal
vulnerabilities that puts communities at risk of thesekinds of barbaric crimes.
That is why rebuilding communities and advocating
for survivors of sexual violence became my mission.
In 2018, I founded Nadia’s Initiative to create peace

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Sexual violence in conflict does not happen by
accident. The root causes of our vulnerability as
Yazidi women are achingly familiar to so many othermarginalised groups whether in Afghanistan, Yemen,or Democratic Republic of the Congo. We mustuproot poverty, inequality, political oppression,and the norms that legitimise such discrimination,
wherever they are found.
Secondly, we must take a holistic approach toincrease access to basic needs and comprehensive
protections where and when they are needed most.
This should include embedding gender-responsive
approaches and modern slavery considerations
within all humanitarian responses, including
facilitating access to justice.

Mosul, Iraq,
August 2014.
Thousands of Yazidi people flee
their homes in the Sinjar regionof Iraq after it was invaded byIslamic State militants, whoorchestrated a strategic ethnic
cleansing of the community.
During the invasion, over 6,000
women and children wereabducted by the Islamic State,many of whom were forcibly
married and traded as sex
slaves by fighters. Although theextremist group was defeatedin 2019, many of those taken
are still missing today.
Photo credit: Emrah Yorulmaz/
Anadolu Agency
via Getty Images.

Finally, we must ensure that calls for justiceand meaningful survivor-centric support for
women and girls do not cease when global
media turns its attention elsewhere. Only thenwill we begin to break the patterns of abuse that
instil vulnerability to violence and exploitation
throughout generations.
See page 58 “Modern slavery: A weapon andconsequence of war” for a wider discussion on
this intersection, including recommendations forgovernment action.  

17

02

ESSAYSCOVID

ESSAY BYA SURVIVORCOLLECTIVE
IN INDIA

Controlling COVID-19,
compounding injustice:
The impact of pandemic control
measures on modern slavery
The COVID-19 pandemic exposed andamplified inequality and instability
across the globe. The human impact
has been catastrophic, with research
revealing sharp declines in health,living, and working conditions, aswell as mass unemployment. As
shocks rippled through communities,
vulnerabilities compounded andmodern slavery spiked. While many
communities continue to grapple
with the health and social impactsof the pandemic, members of asurvivors’ collective in India haveshared their experiences andrecommendations on how to reverse
the devastating rise in modern
slavery. Their observations are
summarised below:
Mass unemployment, high personal debt, andlimited government support created opportunities
for traffickers to prey on growing numbers of people
who have been pushed into survival mode during
the COVID-19 pandemic. Many of those desperate tostay afloat have been driven into forced and bonded
labour, often in sex work and brick kilns. With manyindustries yet to return to pre-pandemic operations,pathways out of modern slavery remain limited.
Even those who were able to stay in their existingjobs have seen their wages and working conditions
plummet — meaning forms of employment thatwere previously safe became exploitative in nature.

“I know of people who had travelled to
Bombay to work before the pandemic,
who are now unemployed and homelesshundreds of kilometres from home. They
are forced into exploitative work because
they have no other choice. Employers saythat workers can leave if they are unhappy,
but they are trapped because there is
nowhere else to go for better work.”

18

With financial insecurity spreading across India,
digital lending apps exploded in popularity, followedby an increase in loan sharks using heavy-handed
collection tactics and extortionately high interest
rates that left borrowers in further desperation.
Many borrowers have been forced into precarious
forms of employment to repay their loans and to
avoid violent repercussions. Others have fled theirhomes so as not to be found by lenders, making
them vulnerable to even worse forms of exploitation
as they attempt to carve out a new life in isolation.

Creating new risks
and abuses
Global lockdowns to try to halt the spread of thevirus caused widespread social isolation. For many,
this led to a sharp increase in the amount of timespent online; a trend that has been capitalised onby those with criminal intent. Shielded by online
anonymity, perpetrators were able to use deceptive
job advertisements and targeted outreach using
chat features to recruit vulnerable people into
exploitative labour. Adolescent girls became aparticular target for online perpetrators, with many
being lured into forms of sexual exploitation under
the guise of building a romantic relationship.
In some instances, criminals have used facemask mandates to their advantage by disguising
their identity, or that of their victims, from law
enforcement officials or eyewitnesses.

Heightened discrimination
and reversing progress onsocial norms

by violence, where they become vulnerable tofurther exploitation and abuse. Additionally, school
closures, social isolation, and rising poverty haveincreased the practice of child and forced marriage,
with fears that this could impact millions of girls foryears to come.
In India, migrant workers returning home due to
COVID-19 restrictions were stigmatised for theirheightened risk of carrying the virus. Despite
government drives to ensure testing of all returning
workers, access to facilities was limited, leading toentire households being forcibly isolated from theircommunities and thereby facing destitution andbecoming easy targets for exploitation.

“Many parents are forcing their young
daughters into marriages with older men
to ease the financial burden at home.
Some of these men have sold the girls
into exploitation in another city, falsely
claiming that she has run away. With thesestories circulating, I know of situations
where girls have run away from home to
avoid this fate, only to then find themselves
sold into exploitation on the streets.”

Communities are experiencing indirect effects fromthe pandemic, including heightened discriminationthat threatens years of progress, especially for
women and girls. The shockwaves to family units
and restrictions on mobility have bought abouta sharp rise in domestic violence. There are fears
that these trends may continue long after COVID-19
eases and impact future generations. In somecases, women have been driven out of their homes

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Looking ahead
The COVID-19 pandemic is a perfect example of
how crises compound other crises. While it has
not discriminated in its spread across the globe,
as with many other disasters its effects have fallen
disproportionately on the world’s most vulnerable
people. With the global economy still facing high levelsof uncertainty, continued employment losses, andconcerns of an uneven global recovery, there is anurgent need for more effective government responses.
The pandemic exacerbated the systemic economic
and societal inequalities that are among theroot causes of modern slavery. It is vital that thisintersectionality become central to global responses.
For example, solutions focused on addressing
poverty, discrimination, and exploitation could
prevent the proliferation of conditions that makepeople more vulnerable to modern slavery. Income
generation schemes to help poor people earn aliving, expanded access to education, targeted publicawareness campaigns on gendered violence andchild marriage, and tailored support to marginalised
groups are examples of the responses needed toalleviate the effects of these compounded crises.

Delhi, India,
April 2020.
Circles on the ground show
where migrants can standwhile waiting for food. The
Indian government announced
on March 24 that the country
will go into lockdown withfour hours’ notice. This led to
day labourers leaving major
city hubs and returning totheir communities, often
on foot. Photo by Yawar
Nazir/Getty Images.

There are reasons to be hopeful. The COVID-19
pandemic has put a spotlight the experiences of those
exploited by the global economy and the systems thatare upholding the inequalities they face. There is apandemic-induced realisation among governments,
industries, and communities that they must reassess
the way things work with a new awareness of and focus
on global risks, vulnerabilities, and intersectionalities.
All of this represents a renewed opportunity togalvanise commitments to action from both the public
and private sectors and to mobilise resources for thetask ahead.

19

02

ESSAYSCONSUMERISMESSAY BY

NASREENSHEIKHCEO and Founder
Empowerment Collective

The real price ofour purchases:
How consumer culture
fuels modern slavery
From raw materials to
manufacturing, and throughto packaging and delivery,
modern slavery is embedded in the
supply chains of the global garment
industry. The clothing industry has
doubled in size in the last 15 years
alone, partly driven by demand
for fast fashion. Garment workers,
hidden deep in these supply
chains face exploitative working
conditions, including forced labourand debt bondage. Nasreen Sheikh
is a former child labourer, forced
marriage survivor, and a leader
in the movement to end modern
day slavery.
In this essay, she reveals the ugly
truth behind consumer culture,
revealing the human cost that we
so often choose to ignore. Whilereflecting on the interconnectednature of globalisation, Nasreen
offers hope that radical supply chaintransparency, strong government
legislation, and meaningful
engagement by businesses could
ultimately transform industries
built on the exploitation of workers
and the cognitive dissonanceof consumers.

20

As a survivor of modern slavery who has escaped
both forced marriage and child labour, over the past
decade, I have trodden the long road of educating
the public on these issues and working directlywith those affected. I am acutely aware of how
entrenched systems and societal behaviours in
one part of the world can have a direct impact oncommunities in another. It is my belief that blindconsumption is at the very centre of the exponential
rise in the number of people living in modern slavery
that this report highlights.
I come from a very remote village on the border ofIndia and Nepal, where, like most births, mine was
undocumented. Growing up, I witnessed my sisterand many girls forced into marriages as children.
While I hope most would agree that this is an
unconscionable act, I know that far fewer would beaware of how it can be connected to consumerism.
You see, forcing young girls into marriage is a way topreserve the slave labour force in countries that sellcheap labour to foreign export companies.
This is because forced marriage can serve as ameans of control — it impedes upon girls’ educationand their opportunities in life, making themmore likely to be forced into exploitative work.
It also supports a generational cycle of poverty
and modern slavery, as children born into thesecircumstances are more likely to have their freedom,rights, and options restricted in a similar way. I knew
as a young girl that I would be next, so I chose toescape the village to the city of Kathmandu in hopesof finding a better life.
It was in Kathmandu that I was exploited inforced child labour and fell prey to the massive
organisation of illegal sweatshops in the inner-cityslums. It was here that I realised my childhood,along with the childhood of thousands ofothers, were traded for a life of pure suffering,malnourishment, and industrial poisoning
happening on a scale unimaginable to the average
consumer. I worked 12 to 15 hours per day in a
textile sweatshop, receiving less than the equivalentof US$2 per gruelling shift — but only if I completed
the hundreds of garments demanded of me. I ate,
slept, and toiled in a sweatshop workstation the sizeof a prison cell. Even then, I knew in my heart thatpeople would not choose to purchase these items
if they truly understood where they came from andhow they were made.

After breaking free from my exploitation, I cameto America and went to a large chain store for the
first time. I walked the aisles in disbelief looking at
the thousands of products available to purchase in
one location. I had never experienced this level ofboth luxury and convenience, but it was horrifying
to connect with the reality of how these products
had likely come to be. When I gazed upon the
countless consumer goods as I walked from aisle toaisle, I couldn’t help but see the faces of children ineach of them, of men’s and women’s lives marredby poverty, inhumane working conditions, andunimaginable exploitation. The suffering woven into
each fibre and reflecting on every surface. That night
I just wept in pain for this world.
Businesses have increasingly complex global supply
chains that lack transparency of who is working
where and under what conditions. Too often, thisworks to their advantage; by failing to meaningfully
engage with modern slavery risks, businesses canturn a blind eye, avoid remediation, and continue
to place profit over people. The sad fact for mostbusinesses is that if they look hard enough forworker exploitation — or if they even look at all —they will find it.
While businesses should willingly take on the
responsibility to ensure their supply chains are freeof modern slavery, governments also have a role tohold them to account and to set a level playing field
for our global economy. This role includes ensuringbusinesses and government are actively looking forforced labour in supply chains.
While some governments around the world are
stepping up, there remain serious gaps in legislation
which businesses can exploit. For example, research

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

by Walk Free finds that most companies are fallingat the first hurdle when it comes to even reportingon the actions they are taking.
The result is decades of corporate social
responsibility that is merely voluntary, modern
slavery reporting legislation with no consequencefor non-compliance, and greenwashing campaigns
that could convince the savviest of consumers thatthey are acting ethically.
The development of policy to address modern
slavery will always be impeded as long as it ignores
how the issues are deeply intersected with wider
structures, systems, and behaviours. Focusing on
issues in silos will potentially hold us back fromsolutions for more decades to come. Modern slavery
thrives in the shadows and darkness, the unspoken
truth, the hidden parts of our global society too ugly
or horrific to witness in light. But truth is the key.

Kandla, India,
September 2022.
A worker sorts jeans according
to grade at a used textile
factory. The garment industry
impacts many issues.
Overconsumption and highvolumes of garment waste
fuels climate change, and thefast-paced industry is rife withthe exploitation of workers.
Photo credit: Prashanth
Vishwanathan/Bloomberg via
Getty Images.

We need radical supply chain transparency andnon-negotiable, meaningful engagement from all
businesses. We need modern slavery legislation that
imposes the duty to protect all workers in supply
chains, that holds companies liable for breaches
and inaction, and that leaves no one behind in the
pursuit of a thriving global economy.
For the 50 million people living in modern slavery
around the world, the time for meaningful action
and renewed commitment is now. It is my life story,
my life mission.
See page 176 “Stitched with slavery in the seams”
for a wider discussion on this intersection, including
recommendations for government action.

21

Afar, Ethiopia, February 2022.
Women seek shade from the blaring sun under boxes while waiting to be registered at the
Agda Hotel compound, were millions of displaced Eritreans and Ethiopians have fled toescape violence at the Barhale refugee camp. One attack near the campsite led to “at least
five refugees [being] killed and several women [being] kidnapped” according to survivors.
Photo credit: Eduardo Soteras/AFP via Getty Images.

03

22

GLOBAL FINDINGSGLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

23

03

GLOBAL
FINDINGSGLOBAL
FINDINGS

8
10

4
7

6

1

5
2

3

9

An estimated 50 million people were living in situations ofmodern slavery on any given day in 2021, according to thelatest Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. Of these people,
approximately 28 million were in forced labour and 22 million
were in forced marriages.
The most vulnerable — women, children, andmigrants — remain disproportionately affected.
More than 12 million of all people in modern slavery
are children, and women and girls account for overhalf of them (54 per cent). Migrant workers were
three times more likely to be in forced labour thannon-migrant workers.
Modern slavery occurs in every country,
regardless of wealth. More than half (52 per cent)of all forced labour and a quarter of all forced
marriages can be found in upper-middle income or
high-income countries.
The new Global Estimates revealed that thesituation is worse than when we last measured
in 2016. Since then, the number of men, women,
and children forced to work against their willor in a forced marriage has risen by 10 million.
The worsening situation has occurred against a
backdrop of increasing conflict, environmental
degradation, over a decade of global democratic
decline,1 a global rollback of women’s rights, 2 andthe economic and social impacts of the COVID-19
pandemic and responses to it. These compounding
crises have led to significant disruption toemployment and education, increases in extreme
poverty, and forced and unsafe migration,
which together heighten the risk of all forms ofmodern slavery, particularly for those who are
already vulnerable.

Overview and trends
The Global Slavery Index is a national breakdownof the extent of modern slavery in 160 countries,
taking the Global Estimates as its starting point.
This section presents findings of our country-level
analysis of the extent and drivers of modern slavery,
together with actions taken by governments to
respond to modern slavery.

24

From global to national estimates
The 10 countries with the highest prevalence ofmodern slavery are:1. North Korea

6. Tajikistan

2. Eritrea

7. United Arab Emirates

3. Mauritania

8. Russia

4. Saudi Arabia

9. Afghanistan

5. Türkiye

10. Kuwait

Figure 5
Estimated prevalence ofmodern slavery by country(noting estimated prevalenceper 1,000 population for the 10
countries with highest prevalence)

Low

High

Four of the five world regions — Africa, Arab States,
Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia —are represented in the list of countries with highest
prevalence, which underscores the global reach ofmodern slavery.
The 10 countries with highest prevalence sharesome political, social, and economic characteristics,
including limited protections for civil liberties andhuman rights. Many of these countries are in volatileregions, which have experienced political instability,
conflict, and/or authoritarianism. Many are hometo large numbers of vulnerable people, such as
refugees or migrant workers. Migrant workers
comprise the vast majority of the workforce in Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait where
they effectively fall under the control of employers
due to the kafala (sponsorship) system and havefew, if any, labour rights.
While our understanding of the relationshipbetween conflict and modern slavery is growing,
protracted conflict is a known risk multiplier, as
breakdown in the rule of law, loss of social support
networks, and the large-scale disruption that occurs
during conflicts all serve to increase risk of bothforced labour and forced marriage. North Korea,
Eritrea, and Afghanistan have all been involvedin protracted conflicts.3 Türkiye, which hosts

millions of refugees from Syria, and Russia wereboth involved in the Syrian conflict. Russia also
launched an invasion of Ukraine in 2022 after having
annexed Crimea in 2014.4 A lack of data in countries
experiencing conflict means that estimates in thesecountries, and the regions they are situated in, will
fall short of the true extent of modern slavery.
North Korea, Eritrea, Mauritania, and Afghanistan
were among the ten countries with highest
prevalence of modern slavery in the 2018 Global
Slavery Index and remained in the list of countries
with the highest prevalence in 2023. North Korea
and Eritrea each have a high prevalence of stateimposed forced labour. While international
conventions recognise that states have the power
to compel citizens to work, this is limited to
specific circumstances; for example, compulsory
military service or obligatory work or service forcitizens in emergency situations such as famineand natural disaster. A state exceeds these limits

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Rank

Country

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

North Korea
Eritrea
Mauritania
Saudi ArabiaTÜrkiyeTajikistan
United Arab Emirates
RussiaAfghanistan
KuwaitPrevalence
104.6
90.3
32.0
21.3
15.6
14.0
13.4
13.0
13.0
13.0

when it compels citizens to work as a punishment
for expressing or acting on political views, or for the
purpose of economic development, or as a means ofracial, ethnic, social, or religious discrimination.
In North Korea, one in 10 people are in modern
slavery, with the vast majority being forced to workby the state. This is a conservative estimate in acountry that the UN Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights found engages in widespreadand systematic abuses such as torture, wrongfulimprisonment, and forced labour against its
citizens. 5 There are also reports of North Korean
women being lured or coerced into leaving thecountry to be sold as brides in China. Women who
escape from those situations and return to North
Korea often face punishment by the authorities
rather than receiving support as victims ofbride trafficking.6

25

03

GLOBAL
FINDINGS

Global Estimates of Modern Slavery
Since 2016, the International Labour
Organization (ILO), Walk Free, and theInternational Organization for Migration(IOM) have collaborated on the developmentof the Global Estimates of Modern Slavery(Global Estimates). The three organisations
worked together to harmonise definitions andmethodologies to provide a single baseline
estimate against which progress towards ending
modern slavery could be measured.
In September 2022, the new Global Estimates
were released. Each edition of the Global
Estimates is based on the best available
data and information about the scale anddistribution of modern slavery. The estimates
are derived from multiple data sources, asno single source can adequately measure thedifferent forms of modern slavery. As was thecase in 2016, the principal sources are data fromnationally representative household surveys (68forced labour surveys and 75 forced marriage

Eritrea has the world’s second highest prevalenceof modern slavery (9 per cent of the population),
representing an estimated 320,000 people. The
Eritrean government runs a mandatory national
conscription program through which citizens
between the ages of 18 and 40 must undertake
military service but typically are forced to perform
work of a non-military nature.7 The length of thisnational conscription is indefinite, with reportsof Eritreans spending decades in service of thegovernment. This has led to an estimated 15 percent of the population — primarily those under 40 —fleeing the country to avoid conscription.8 In doing
so, many face further risk of exploitation.
Eritrea also has among the weakest government
responses to modern slavery, second only to North
Korea. Its state-imposed forced labour systemfundamentally undermines any other response tomodern slavery, including the ratification of relevant
conventions, or existence of national legislation.
Corporations have been linked to state-imposed
forced labour in Eritrea. Allegations made in 2014
against Nevsun Resources, a Canadian-basedmining company, claimed it was complicit in the useof forced labour by the firm’s sub-contractor at the
Bisha mine in Eritrea. The case, which ended in asettlement with plaintiffs for an undisclosed amountin October 2020,9 is seen as a positive step towards
corporate accountability for forced labour in their
supply chains.

26

surveys) and anonymised data from the Counter
Trafficking Data Collaborative that is collected
by IOM and its partners in the process ofproviding services to trafficked persons.
The methodology underlying the new Global
Estimates is the product of an ongoing processof refinement made possible by an improved
understanding of forced labour and forced
marriage and of how best to measure them. Dueto the refinements in measurement and morebalanced geographical coverage in data, the
new Global Estimates are the most complete
and comprehensive to date. Despite this, theestimate is conservative as substantial gaps
remain. Forms of modern slavery, such asorgan trafficking, recruitment of children byarmed forces, and all child marriages, are notcaptured, and there remain parts of the world,such as countries experiencing profound andongoing conflict, where using existing methods
is difficult and dangerous.

As the last country to abolish slavery, which it
did in 1981, Mauritania continues to have one of
the highest rates of slavery (32 people in every
thousand). Despite this, hereditary slavery
continues to impact the Haratine and AfroMauritanian communities, with many survivors
and their descendants dependent upon former“masters” because of limited skills and lackof alternative economic opportunities.10 The
government has taken some steps to address theissue, such as criminalising slavery and creating
anti-slavery tribunals, but enforcement remains
weak. In addition, societal attitudes and cultural
norms continue to contribute to the perpetuationof slavery.11 In Mauritania, minority groups facediscrimination in various areas, including education,
employment, and access to public services, while
there are also numerous reports of arbitrary
detention, torture, and other forms of repressionof political dissidents, journalists, and humanrights activists.12

two in every three people living in modern slavery
and over half the world’s population. Notably, sixof these countries are G20 nations — India, China,
Russia, Indonesia, Türkiye, and the United States.
With the exception of Japan, the countries withlowest prevalence of modern slavery are from
northern or western Europe — Switzerland, Norway,
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, Belgium,
Ireland, and Finland. Yet, even in these countries,
thousands of people continue to be forced to workor marry, despite their high levels of economic
development, gender equality, social welfare,and political stability, as well as strong criminal
justice systems.13
A regional assessment reveals that whilevulnerability to modern slavery is lowest in Europe
across all dimensions, discrimination on the basisof race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or migration
status is the largest driver of modern slavery.
Migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and ethnocultural minorities face discrimination, including
limited access to services and protection. Morepeople are migrating now than at any other pointin the last five decades.14 As more people flee
conflict and abuse of their human rights, Europe has
increasingly closed its borders — either physically15
or through ever more complex and opaquemigration policies. “Fortress Europe” does not stop
asylum seekers and migrants from arriving, butinstead forces people to take riskier routes.16

Part of the issue is that there is not a simple,
coherent migration policy across the European
Union. The Dublin system, for example, meansthat asylum seekers should seek asylum in thefirst country they reach in Europe.17 However,the so-called “migrant crisis” in 2015, which led
to approximately one million people landing on
European shores to seek asylum, with thousands
dying en route, exposed the weaknesses in thesystem. The burden disproportionately fell onstates bordering the Mediterranean, such as
Greece and Italy, with asylum seekers and migrants
originating from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq
and a significant, albeit smaller, number arriving
via Libya.18 Since then, EU countries have been
negotiating a system based on “solidarity andfair sharing of responsibility,”19 but they have notcome to an agreement. In March 2023, migration
ministers from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Netherlands, and Switzerland releaseda joint statement to strengthen the Dublin system,
reaffirming that asylum seekers would need to seek
asylum in the first country they reached in Europe ina bid to curb illegal migration.20

Hauts-de-France,
France, November
2021.
Tents belonging to
refugees seeking shelterin the woodland near
Loon-Plage, after a boat
capsized in the English
Channel and claimed
the lives of at least 27
refugees. NGOs havecriticised consecutive
Conservative governmentsin the UK for theirattempts to curb “illegal”
migration, which increases
the risk of leaving
modern slavery survivors
unprotected. Photo credit:
Thierry Monasse via
Getty Images.

The 10 countries with the largest estimated numbersof people in modern slavery include some of theworld’s most populous. Collectively, these countries— India (11 million), China (5.8 million), North Korea(2.7 million), Pakistan (2.3 million), Russia (1.9
million), Indonesia (1.8 million), Nigeria (1.6 million),
Türkiye (1.3 million), Bangladesh (1.2 million), andthe United States (1.1 million) — account for nearly

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

27

03

GLOBAL
FINDINGS

What are governments doing toaddress modern slavery?
The last few years have taught us that the ability torespond to modern slavery in times of crisis requires
governments to continually invest in modern slavery
responses and to build resilient systems that canwithstand external shocks. However, governmentsin the top 10 global responses to modern slavery in2023 have largely stagnated.
The top 10 are traditionally characterised byhaving more resources at their disposal, relatively
strong political will, and a strong civil society tohold government to account. Notably, in 2018
Australia passed its Modern Slavery Act, 21 which
requires companies that have a consolidated
revenue of over AU$100 million (approximately
US$67 million) per annum to report on the actions
they are taking to respond to modern slavery. In
Portugal, there is evidence of an increasing numberof referrals of victims to services.22 These changes
remain the exception and not the rule, with few
new developments. At the very top, the United
Kingdom’s (UK) overall response has declined since
2018; the government saw an increase in referrals
of just 1 per cent, but a worsening of measures on
victim protection and access to visas, largely as aresult of the 2022 Nationality and Borders Act.23 A
proposed Illegal Migration Bill24 introduced in March2023 is a potential violation of international law andthe UN Refugee Convention and it shows that the UK
is at risk of continuing its downward trend.
There is promising action outside of the top 10. In
August 2020, Tonga ratified the ILO Convention,
1999 (No. 182) to reach universal ratification
ensuring all children now have legal protection
against the worst forms of child labour.25 Since
2018, a further 15 countries have criminalised
human trafficking in line with UN Trafficking
Protocol, bringing the total number of countries to137. Nearly 150 countries have a National Action
Plan related to some form of modern slavery — a
30 per cent increase since 2018. Some countries
stand out: Brunei has acceded to the Protocol toPrevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, 26 finalised a
National Action Plan on tackling human trafficking, 27
and established a National Committee on Trafficking
in Persons since the last Global Slavery Index.28
Oman, 29 Qatar, 30 and Saudi Arabia31 adopted somereforms to the kafala (or sponsorship) system,
the Republic of the Congo criminalised humantrafficking in domestic legislation in 2019, 32 andCanada amended its Custom Tariff to incorporate
restrictions on forced labour. 33

28

When correlated against GDP per capita PPP(current international $), countries such as Albania,
Georgia, Montenegro, the Philippines, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina have relatively stronger responses
despite the fewer resources at their disposal. In
2021, the Philippines raised the minimum of age ofmarriage to 1834 while in Albania a Victim Advisory
Board was established to involve survivors in thedesign of awareness-raising campaigns, police
interviews of victims, and the treatment of victims
during court proceedings. 35
Encouragingly, countries are starting to recognise
the expertise of those with lived experience.
Sixteen governments from across the globe have
either consulted with survivors as part of policy
development or have provided them seats on
their national coordinating councils or as partof a separate survivor advisory council. Since
2015, the United States Advisory Council on
Human Trafficking has provided a formal avenue
for survivors to advise on federal policies to the
President’s Interagency Task Force to Monitor
and Combat Trafficking in Persons. 36 In Rwanda,
the government consulted with survivors as partof the development of the National Action Plan.
That said, 16 still represents a small fraction of the
176 governments37 included in the government
response assessment.
There have been positive developments in tackling
the specific vulnerabilities of women and girls.
A new indicator introduced in 2023 reveals that35 countries have set the age of marriage to 18
for girls and boys with no exception, with the UK
joining the likes of Ireland, the Philippines, Costa
Rica, Rwanda, and Malawi by announcing in early2023 that it will raise the age to 18 and remove
the exception for 16 and 17 year-olds to marrywith parental consent. 38 Fifty countries have
now criminalised forced marriage, an increaseof 12 since the last report. While encouraging,
criminalisation should be implemented as partof a suite of legislative protections in national
legislation. Less encouragingly, few governments
are taking a more holistic approach to tackle theunderlying drivers of forced marriage and providing
protections including access to civil protection
orders, safe accommodation, emergency funds, andpsychosocial support. Nearly half (59 countries) of
the 130 governments that provide access to public
primary education are reporting lower primaryenrolment rates for girls.

6

1

8

4

9
7
2

5

3

Figure 6
Government responses
to modern slavery (noting scores forthe countries with strongest responses)

60-69.9 50-59.9 40-49.9 30-39.9 20-29.9 10-19.9 <0-9.9%

Country
United Kingdom
Australia
Netherlands
Portugal
United States
Ireland
NorwaySpain
SwedenResponse score
68
67
67
67
67
63
63
63
63

New Jersey, UnitedStates, February 2021.
Brigitte gives an interview
at a shelter, “Strengthen
Our Sisters”, which supports
domestic violence victims.
Stay-at-home orders to restrict
the spread of the COVID-19
pandemic led to an increase inreports of domestic violence
worldwide. Family anddomestic violence also spur
unseen risks of modern slavery.
Photo credit: Kena Betancur/
AFP via Getty Images.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

29

GLOBAL
FINDINGS

There is some progress on measures to holdbusinesses more accountable in tackling modern
slavery. Four countries have implemented
mandatory Human Rights Due Diligence (mHRDD)
legislation, which holds businesses accountablefor failing to identify, and act upon, the actualand potential risks for workers in their operations
and supply chains, including the risk of forced
labour. Norway, 39 France,40 and Switzerland,41 haveestablished mHRDD legislation, with Germany’s
coming into force in early 2023.42 The Netherlands
is currently exploring mHRDD43 as an alternative
to its child labour due diligence legislation.44 The
strongest mHRDD legislation includes penalties for acompany’s failure to prevent forced labour in supply
chains and includes a right of action for those whohave been impacted.
Increasingly, mHRDD is seen as part of a suite ofmeasures implemented by governments to hold
both business and public procurement accountable.
Import controls, such as the Tariff Act45 and the2021 Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act in theUS, prevent the entry of goods produced by forced

Duzce, Türkiye,
July 2019.
Heavy rains and landslides
cause significant damage
to homes and community
infrastructure, and have evenled to the disappearanceof three adults and fourchildren. Upheaval caused
by increasingly erratic andvolatile weather events leads
some to seek employment
opportunities elsewhere,
increasing their risk ofmodern slavery. Photo credit:
Ibrahim Yozoglu/Anadolu
Agency via Getty Images.

labour, and specifically by Uyghurs held in stateimposed forced labour in the latter case.46 The UK
has used Magnitsky legislation to impose travelbans and sanctions on individuals who commit
forced labour.47 Other countries have identified
high risk sectors and work collaboratively with theprivate sector to tackle exploitation; the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), for example, created aregulatory authority to tackle child labour in cobalt
and coltan mines.48
The countries taking the least action to respond tomodern slavery remain as in 2018 — Somalia, Libya,
Iran, Eritrea, and North Korea. These countries
continue to be characterised by conflict and/or
active involvement from the government in modern
slavery either through corruption and complicity
or state-imposed forced labour. Those countries
with some of the weakest responses have been
excluded — Afghanistan, Palestine, South Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen — due to ongoing conflict andextreme disruption.

Alleged complicity in modern slavery crimes wasreported in 90 countries in our assessment. This
ranged from active involvement in committing
modern slavery crimes to turning a blind eye tothe action of criminals. In Zimbabwe, for example,
those working in the judicial system, including
police, magistrates, prosecutors, clerks, and court
messengers, allegedly take bribes for not arrestingartisanal mine operators, or swiftly releasing thosein custody,49 who have purportedly kidnapped
workers and forced them to work. In Tajikistan,there are allegations that endemic corruption
among government officials facilitates trafficking of
victims across borders. 50
State-imposed forced labour is practiced in 17
countries in the GSI, and this greatly undermines
any other aspect of a government response. The
figure is likely much higher — our assessment isbased on legal loopholes that enable forced labourto occur and publicly available evidence that thishas occurred since 2018.

When correlated against GDP per capita,
Luxembourg, Singapore, Qatar, Hong Kong,
Brunei Darussalam, Kuwait, South Korea,
Switzerland, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
have taken limited action despite larger resourcesat their disposal. The kafala, or sponsorshipprogram, in the Gulf states has long been criticisedfor exacerbating the vulnerability of migrant
populations that these countries have long relied
upon. The World Cup in Qatar and Dubai World
Expo in UAE spurred reforms, 51 many of which havelargely remained on paper rather than being fully
implemented. 52 Migrants also working in countries
in Southeast Asia, such as Hong Kong, 53 South
Korea, 54 and Singapore, 55 face discrimination andlimited protections alongside tied visas, which
prohibit migrant workers from leaving their jobs
and finding employment elsewhere in the country.
Tied visas are not unique to these countries, as
shown by a growing hostile environment acrossEurope to asylum seekers fleeing persecution anddiscrimination. Many wealthy countries acrossthe Index are failing in their duties to protect themost vulnerable.

Figure 7
Correlation between GDP per capita PPP (current international $)and government responses to modern slaveryPortugal

Government Response (%)

03Albania

United Kingdom
Spain

Georgia

Netherlands
United States
Australia
Ireland

Philippines
UnitedArab Emirates



Switzerland



South
Korea

Qatar

Luxembourg
Singapore

Brunei Darussalam

KuwaitHong Kong

RussiaEquatorial Guinea

Somalia

Libya



Iran




























GDP per capita (PPP)30

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

31

03

GLOBAL
FINDINGS

Table 1Government response score, by country(in order from highest to lowest within each category)*

Comparability to the 2018
Global Slavery Index

60-69.9%

50-59.9%

40-49.9%30-39.9%

20-29.9%

10-19.9%<0-9.9%

UnitedKingdom
Australia
Netherlands
Portugal
United States
Ireland
NorwaySpain
SwedenAlbania
Austria
Denmark
FranceGeorgia
Germany
GreeceCanadaFinlandMontenegro

Azerbaijan
Belgium
Croatia
Czechia
Italy
LatviaPhilippines
Argentina
Bosnia andHerzegovina
CyprusLithuania
North
Macedonia
Romania
Slovakia
Estonia
SerbiaSlovenia
UruguayBahrain
Bulgaria
Chile
Hungary
MexicoPeru
PolandThailandArmenia
New ZealandNigeria
BahamasSouth Africa
Brazil
Costa Rica
Ecuador
GuyanaJamaica
Luxembourg
PanamaSaint Lucia
UkraineIndonesia
RwandaSwitzerland
UnitedArab Emirates

Bangladesh
Malta
Paraguay
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Sri Lanka
Trinidad andTobagoTürkiye
Belarus
Bolivia
GuatemalaHonduras
IcelandKyrgyzstan
Moldova
Singapore
Tunisia
Viet Nam
TaiwanColombia
Dominican
Republic
Fiji
India
JordanKazakhstan
Kenya
Lao PDR
UgandaUzbekistan
BelizeEl Salvador
Ethiopia
Ghana
IsraelMalaysia
Mozambique
Nepal
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
ZambiaKosovoAngolaAntiguaand Barbuda
Egypt
Japan
Namibia
Botswana
Cambodia
Madagascar
Myanmar
Tanzania
Barbados
Cameroon
Liberia

Benin
China
LesothoMongolia
MoroccoSenegalMalawiOman
South Korea
Côte d’Ivoire
Haiti
KuwaitMaldives
Niger
Pakistan
Algeria
Burkina Faso
Democratic
Republic of
the Congo
Djibouti
Eswatini
GambiaGuinea
Mauritius
Nicaragua
Tajikistan
Brunei
Darussalam
Mauritania
Timor-Leste
Guinea-Bissau
Iraq
LebanonSeychelles
Sierra Leone
Togo
Hong Kong
Cabo Verde
Cuba
Liechtenstein
Mali
Papua New
GuineaSolomonIslands
Suriname

BurundiRepublic of
the Congo
Central African
Republic
Palau
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
Sudan
Turkmenistan
Vanuatu
Chad
Gabon
RussiaEquatorial
GuineaSomalia
Libya

Iran
Eritrea
North Korea

While the methodology used in this edition of the
Global Slavery Index (GSI) is broadly consistent
with what was applied in the 2018 edition,some changes were made to reflect updates tothe methodology of the Global Estimates, newdata sources for measures of vulnerability, andstronger scoring systems for assessments ofgovernment response. These changes are likely
to have some impact on comparability between
the 2023 and 2018 editions of the GSI and aresummarised below. A detailed description of themethodology is set out in Appendix 2.

Estimating prevalence
As was the case in 2018, the regional estimates
produced through the Global Estimates of Modern
Slavery56 provide the starting point for thenational level estimates presented in this editionof the Global Slavery Index. As a result, changes
in the methodology for the Global Estimates
will have some impact on the GSI. Althoughboth editions of the Global Estimates draw onnationally representative household surveys andadministrative data, for the most recent edition,
surveys were conducted in a larger number ofcountries, including in regions for which there
was previously a data gap. For example, surveys
were conducted in high and upper-middle income
countries across Europe and the Arab States. 57
Other changes in the methodology of themost recent Global Estimates were due toimprovements in the statistical treatment of theunderlying data. 58 Most notably, an imputation
model was adopted to create estimates forcountries in which national surveys were notconducted. While the refinements to the Global
Estimates methodology do not affect the overall
comparability between the results presented
in 2017 and 2022, there was an impact on theestimates of forced labour at a regional level,
which is reflected in the national estimatespresented in this edition of the GSI and should beconsidered when comparing changes in forced
labour at the national level.

Measuring vulnerability
The model of vulnerability to modern slavery
developed for the 2018 GSI was maintained forthe 2023 edition of the Index. Changes to themodel instead reflected shifts in data sources,
particularly in instances where data sources
had been discontinued (refer to Appendix 2:Part B); as a result, the vulnerability model
had to incorporate new source data for four
indicators. While every effort was made to
replace discontinued data sources with othersmeasuring the same phenomena, these updates
likely contributed to country-level differencesin vulnerability. Every effort was made to selectconsistent and ongoing replacement data sources
to minimise the impact on future editions of
the GSI.

Assessing government responses
Similarly, the assessment of government
responses remains broadly comparable withprevious assessments used in the 2018 GSI.
However, due to changes in both the conceptual
framework underpinning this study, which
outlines what constitutes a strong response tomodern slavery, and the method of analysis.
Extensive reviews by Lived Experience Expert
Groups and our Expert Working Group led to edits
to the conceptual framework. Refer to Appendix 2:Part C for more detail.
The method of analysis changed in 2023,
specifically in relation to calculating total scoresfor milestones to better reflect a government’s
commitment to completely achieving an activity.
This signified a recent improvement to themethodology that was used in the 2018 GSI,
where milestone scores reflected the numberof indicators met. While the data remains
comparable at the indicator level, changes at themilestone level are impacted by the new scoring
system. Accordingly, comparing indicator ratings
would be the most accurate way of understanding
how much better or worse a government has
performed in eradicating modern slavery
between the 2018 and 2023 GSI.

Changes to methods of data collection due to the
COVID-19 pandemic may also have had an impact
on comparability. Some surveys were conducted
after the emergence of COVID-19, which shifted
the face-to-face mode of data collection that wasused for all pre-pandemic surveys, to conducting
the surveys via telephone. While measures weretaken to minimise and assess mode effects, thismay have impacted the comparability of theprevalence estimates.

*Afghanistan, Palestine, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen have been excluded due to ongoing conflict and extreme disruption
to government function.

32

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

33

04

SPOTLIGHTS

Understanding forced and child marriage........................36
Anti-social: Modern slavery on social media.................. 44
Guardians and offenders: Examining
state-imposed forced labour..................................................48
Modern slavery:
A weapon and consequence of war......................................58
The costs of the climate crisis.................................................62

Cox’s Bazaar, Bangladesh,
May 2018.

Bangladesh, March 2020.
Rohingya Waiting for the Rain
Photo credit: Paddy Dowling

34

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

“Before the Storm” depicts a family of Rohingya refugees awaiting the impending
monsoon. Thousands of Rohingya people were forced to flee from their homes in the
Rakhine State, Myanmar to refugee camps in neighbouring Bangladesh, after being
persecuted for their religious beliefs. The protracted displacement has led to higher
rates of poverty and social instability which worsened during the COVID-19 pandemic,
exposing entire families to greater risks of modern slavery.
Photo credit: Paddy Dowling.

35

04

SPOTLIGHTS

Understanding forced
and child marriage

FORCED
NAME HEREMARRIAGE

The ability to freely choose who, when, and whether tomarry is an essential human right,1 yet forced marriages
still occur in almost every country. Globally, an estimated
22 million people were living in a forced marriage on any
given day in 2021.2
This estimate is conservative. UNICEF estimates
there are 650 million women and girls who were
married before the age of 18. 3 While men and boys
are also forced to marry, women and girls remain
disproportionately at-risk and account for 68 percent of all people forced to marry.4 While almost
two-thirds of all forced marriages occur in the Asiaand the Pacific region, the highest prevalence offorced marriage is in the Arab States. 5 Despite this,forced marriage risks are present in all countries
and are often exacerbated for members ofmarginalised groups.6

Family, survival,
and social value
While actors such as traffickers, marriage brokers,7
and armed groups8 can be involved in forced
marriages, they are often a family matter. Seventythree per cent of people in a forced marriage wereforced to marry by their parents, with a further 16
per cent forced by other relatives. Over half (53 percent) were coerced through emotional abuse andthreats, including the threat of estrangement fromfamily members and of self-harm by parents.9
Complex and intersecting factors increase the riskof forced and child marriage. These factors include
gender biases, harmful cultural practices, poverty,
sexuality, gender identity, socio-political instability,
conflict, climate change, irregular migration, and alack of access to education and employment, among
many others.10 Geography also plays a large role inmagnifying risk, as inequalities within and between
countries can impact vulnerability to exploitation.11
Broadly, these risks are a function of survival needs
or social value, although in practice these drivers
are often intertwined.

Guerrero, Mexico, May 2021.
A woman carries a child in the street. In this part of Guerrero,an ancestral practice allows girls to be sold as brides, forprices ranging from $2,000 to $18,000 to other men in theregion. Once married, girls are forced to work by their spousal
family, including on farms and as domestic servants. Many
also experience sexual abuse. While the practice still occurs,
many Indigenous people are calling for it to end as it createsa cycle of abuse for girls and poverty for men. Photo credit:
Pedro Pardo/AFP via Getty Images.

36

When basic needs are threatened, struggling
families may turn to negative coping mechanisms
to survive. Forced and child marriages are seen as
practices that can reduce the economic burden on
a household living in extreme poverty,12 protect
vulnerable (and typically female) family members
from sexual violence,13 ensure access to criticaland limited resources,14 and provide certainty for achild’s future in times of crisis.15 Shocks spur risk as
they exacerbate existing inequalities. Conflict candirectly result in forced marriages, including where
women and girls are abducted and forced to marryfighters.16 For people fleeing crises, risks can arise

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

while on the move or in refugee camps.17 Amongdisplaced populations, and in the absence of otheropportunities, marriage can be seen as the best
option to provide future security. At times, children
themselves have made the decision to marry: forexample, some Syrian refugee girls living in Lebanon
have reportedly chosen marriage to escape poverty
and abuse.18 Further, protracted instability canincrease risk of forced and child marriage long after
the initial ceremony and can entrench vulnerability
across generations.19
Social values dictate when and for whom
vulnerability to forced and child marriages
increases. The risk of being forced to marry is
typically higher for people who belong to multiple
marginalised groups, based on sex assigned at birth,sexual preferences, gender identity, ability status,and belonging to a religious or ethnic minority
group.20 Women and girls are disproportionately
affected due to widespread gender biases thatdevalue girls from conception and throughout
their lifetime.21 These biases are reflected indeeply entrenched patriarchal norms surrounding
female purity, pre-marital sex, and traditionalroles that keep women and girls out of work andthe schoolroom, and limit them to roles of wives,
mothers, and homemakers.22 In some communities,
reaching menarche signals a girl is “ready”
for marriage.23
Patriarchal gender roles also influence access toresources in the home. Parents who are unable toafford to send all of their children to school willprioritise the education of sons over daughters due
to beliefs that boys have a greater future earningpotential, while daughters are destined for anotherfamily. 24 Globally, one out of every four adolescent
girls aged between 15 to 19 years are neither in
education, employment nor training, as compared
to one-tenth of boys of the same age.25 However,these gender roles also influence boys’ risk ofchild marriage. While they are valued as economic
contributors, and when resources are scarce,
typically receive greater resources including accessto food and schooling, 26 an early start into economic
independence can make boys more vulnerable.27
Much like norms that dictate girls’ physical maturity
is a sign that they are “ready” for marriage, boys
who enter the workforce and fill the role of “family
provider” at a younger age face greater risks ofchild marriage.28

37

04

SPOTLIGHTSFORCEDMARRIAGE“I was in love with another girl and got
married … my mother refused and forced
me into a traditional marriage.”

violence, nearly three-quarters of men and boys inforced marriages were coerced through threats orverbal abuse. 31

35-year-old Egyptian male on his forced marriage
at age 24

Similarly, norms that prioritise chastity and sexual
purity for women and girls increase risk of forced
and child marriage. For example, female genital
mutilation (FGM), which involves the cutting, injury,
removal, or modification to female genitalia for nonmedical purposes, 32 is seen as a rite of passage into
adulthood and can act as a precursor to a girl childmarriage. 33 FGM is performed on girls to promote
chastity by reducing female sex drive. 34 Similarly,
fears of social stigma and the threat of damage tofamilial honour can force women and girls to marry
their kidnappers in countries across Africa, Asia andthe Pacific, and Europe and Central Asia, regions
where bride kidnapping occurs. 35 Of females living in
a forced marriage on any given day in 2021, one in 10
had been forced through kidnapping or after being
coerced to travel abroad. 36

Harmful cultural practices, in turn, reinforce
patriarchal social values and are closely linked toforced and child marriages. Norms that dictate
heteronormativity can increase risks of forced
marriage for LGBTQIA+ people, who may be coerced
into heterosexual marriages by their families to“cure” them of their sexual orientation or gender
identity.29 Similarly, norms that pigeonhole men
and boys into hyper-masculine roles mean thatmale victims of forced marriage may not seek help
for fear of being seen as effeminate or offending
family honour. 30 While less likely than females to becoerced into marriage through physical or sexual

Breaking the cycle: A child marriage survivor’s story
Sharon* never had the opportunity to go to schoolin Kenya, where she lived. From the age of six, she
was working to support her family. Her parents
told her that if she stopped working to attend
school, as she wanted, then her siblings would
go hungry. When Sharon was nine years old, herfather forced her to undergo FGM. Sharon was
married only two years later when she was just 11
years old.
Once Sharon was married, her family would
receive her bride dowry. Her father wasparticularly excited to receive the dowry andwould “brag about it to the other elders who had
many cows.” However, at the time, Sharon did
not understand that she had been married — she
believed that she was being sent to live withanother family to help them with their chores.
At the beginning of her marriage, Sharon’s new
husband lived and worked away in Mombasa
and so she spent most of her time with her
kind and elderly mother-in-law who she called
Grandmother (Koko). The situation changed
when her husband returned from work, as not
only was it clear that he was unwell, but Sharon
was obliged to live with him: “I was afraid ofhim. I didn’t want to live or sleep with him in thesame bed. [B]ut they told me that as a wife I was
supposed to live with my husband. It was thenthat the reality dawned on me that I was married.”
They lived together for three years while grapplingwith her husband’s mysterious illness. Despite
trying, they never had children. One day when
Sharon was fetching water from the river, sheoverheard her neighbours gossiping about her

38

husband having “a disease with no medicine”
and that he had given it to his wife. Sharon
did not know what HIV or AIDS were, and herhusband never discussed it. Shortly after hedied, the village elders informed Sharon that
she needed to have children, who according tolocal custom, would be given the name of her
deceased husband. Sharon refused many times,
but eventually was coerced into having sex
with men from the village. It was only when she
became pregnant and attended an antenatal
clinic for the first time that Sharon was told she
was HIV positive.
While Koko was alive, Sharon began taking
antiretroviral medication and went on to haveanother two children to continue her husband’sname. When Koko passed, there was no one tosupport Sharon, and she moved away to findwork. However, as she became increasingly sickand had limited opportunities, she had to leave
her children to go house-to-house begging forfood. She was often abused by her neighbours.
Despite her worsening health, Sharon continues
to provide for her children as she wants to seethem receive the education she missed out on.
“For now, though, I am very weak but havedecided to be strong for my children. I wantthem not to blame me, but to blame my culture.
A culture that oppresses women. A culture thatforces women to marry men they don’t choose.
A culture which forces young girls to marry oldmen. A culture that does not ever listen to womenand girls.”

RegionConvention
on Consent toMarriage, Minimum
Forced marriage
Age for Marriage
criminalised in
and Registration ofnational legislation
Marriages(%)(%)

AfricaAmericas
Arab States
Asia and thePacific
Europe andCentral Asia
All countries

Minimum legal ageof marriage when
all exceptions
considered is 16
or older(%)

Minimum legal
age of marriage
when all exceptions
considered is
18 or older
(%)

24
34
11
16

18
22
11
31

29
59
11
47

18
28
0
25

46

44

77

17

30

28

51

20

Table 2
Protections ininternationaland domestic
law by percentage
of countries ineach region*Data current as of 31 August 2022

Pandemic-driven reversals
While the number of people living in a forced
marriage increased since the 2017 Global Estimates,
current figures only partially account for the impactof the COVID-19 pandemic. 37 Prior to the spreadof COVID-19, UNICEF estimated that one in fivegirls were married before the age of 18. 38 While asignificant population, it is a reversal of previous
trends, meaning there were 25 million fewer childmarriages than estimated in the previous decade. 39
However, following the spread of COVID-19, UNICEF
and UNFPA estimated an additional 10 million40 to
13 million41 girls will be married due to the impactsof the pandemic.
Vulnerability has increased around the world in
the aftermath of the pandemic, and particularly
in Asia and the Pacific, Africa, and the Americas,
where there are already higher risks of forced andchild marriage.42 Not only has the level of extreme
global poverty risen for the first time in 20 years 43
as a result of increased global unemployment, job
losses,44 and increased indebtedness,45 but foodinsecurity46 and gender-based violence have also
increased as a direct result of COVID-19 and related
mitigation measures.47 For example, a greaternumber of women and girls have been exposed
to sexual, physical, and psychological abuse fromfamily members and intimate partners because oflockdown restrictions,48 thereby increasing theirrisk of forced and child marriage. Additionally, 24
of 26 Protection Clusters — coordinated groupsof humanitarian organisations working to meetthe diverse needs of people affected by crises —reported an increase in gender-based violence since
the pandemic began.49 This reflects broader global
trends as rates of violence against women increased
since the pandemic, 50 corresponding with a lack ofaccess to social services51 and the impact of stayat-home orders confining victims to spaces with
their abusers. 52

Efforts to prevent the spread of the virus have also
created barriers to services, including identification
mechanisms. 53 Public health measures reduced
the ability of grassroots and service deliveryorganisations to undertake their work, resulting
in the closure of services or reduced budgets to
support vulnerable people and survivors of forced
marriage. For example, in Niger and Kenya, safe
houses were closed, creating a gap in the protectionof girls at risk of gender-based violence. 54 In
Morocco, at-risk individuals were reluctant to accessservices due to fears of contracting COVID-19. 55
Further research on the impact of COVID-19 on risks
to forced marriage among marginalised groups isurgently required, including on delivery of services
for hard-to-reach populations.

Ending forced
and child marriages
A strong, multifaceted global approach is needed to
end forced and child marriage and achieve the SDG
targets, in particular SDG 8.7 on the eradication ofmodern slavery, SDG 5.3 on eliminating child, early,
and forced marriage and female genital mutilations,and SDG 16.2 to end abuse, exploitation, trafficking,and all forms of violence against children. This will
require norms change across national, community,and household levels to ensure that harmful norms
that perpetuate risk are dismantled. It will also
require empowering vulnerable communities tobe resilient in the wake of shocks that spur risk offorced marriage.
Globally, there are insufficient legal protections
against forced and child marriage. Most countries
have not ratified the UN Convention on Consent
to Marriage, Marriage Age for Marriage, andRegistration of Marriages, nor fully criminalised
forced marriage in national legislation. Further, only
35 countries have set a minimum age of marriage at*Not her real name

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

39

04

SPOTLIGHTSFORCEDMARRIAGE

18 without exception (Table 2). Harmful attitudes
and practices that increase women’s and girls’ riskof forced and child marriage remain entrenched inlaws around the world. Examples are legal loopholesthat exonerate rapists from punishment if they
marry their victim, 56 customary laws that allow
widowed women to be inherited by a male relativeof their deceased husband, 57 laws that leave womenor their children stateless or those that do not allow
women to hold or inherit land and property. 58
While important, legislation alone will not end
forced and child marriages. 59 For example, it was
found that legislation banning child marriage andimposing fines for non-compliance in Malawi drove
the practice underground and led to methods
such as marriage hiding or marriage withdrawal,
which involves parents or community members
intervening to forcibly return a married girl to
her natal home, being used to avoid fines.60 Legal
protections must be diversified beyond criminalisingforced marriages. Such measures should include
civil protection orders that are independent ofother legal proceedings.61 To ensure protection
measures are trauma-informed and put survivors
at the centre, survivors must be able to choose
which solution best suits their needs as not all wish
to pursue criminal actions, particularly when it caninvolve bringing an action against family members.62
Programs to reduce child marriage should target
underlying drivers such as poverty and the lackof alternatives to child marriage. 63 Interventions
are also needed at the community and household
levels to challenge social norms that create riskof forced marriage. These interventions should
involve a range of advocates, including faith andcommunity leaders, and must also combat harmful
understandings of masculinity that silence andshame male victims64 and prevent them fromseeking assistance.

“My parents though I was old enough formarriage and I needed to marry to reduce
the family burden.”Nigerian female on her forced marriage at age 15

40“I had to leave the situation or be killed.
I know I can never return home because
I am considered a dead person forbreaking the culture and bringing shameto the families. According to my father,
I am dead.”
Afghan female survivor of three forced marriages.65

Ensuring adolescent girls have access to education
is essential: when a girl receives an education,
her earning potential increases by almost 12 percent per year of schooling, helping to alleviate
household poverty.66 However, current estimates
predict that 20 million adolescent girls will neverreturn to the classroom when schools reopen after
the pandemic.67 To ensure girls enter and returnto the schoolroom, multi-generational behaviourchange campaigns that specifically target heads offamily must be delivered together with educationand poverty alleviation measures.68 Additionally,
new pathways to education and employment must
be opened for already-married girls to return toschool and for adult women to be economicallyempowered.69 This is critically important in thewake of learning losses caused by COVID-19,
which saw 1.6 billion students around the world
having their learning disrupted,70 left 129 million
girls out of school in 2020,71 and led to a higher
rates of teen pregnancy in lower and lower-middle
income countries.72
In addition to enhancing access to education,
reducing the risks of exploitation faced byvulnerable groups, such as people living in crisis
situations, will require efforts to combat forced
marriage to be embedded, prioritised, andadequately resourced within broader humanitarian
actions.73 This should be context-specific, so as toenhance effectiveness in addressing risk factors
for the impacted population, and will require
coordinated and comprehensive action acrossall appropriately trained74 stakeholders from the
beginning of a crisis through to recovery.75 In theaftermath of COVID-19, it is clear that existing
institutions must be “future-proofed” to better
respond to crises.76 This will require strengthening
institutions that support the most vulnerable
people, including social services and welfare,77 as
well as enhancing access to sexual and reproductive
health services78 and dismantling legal frameworks
that embed norms which create risks to forced andchild marriage.

Promising Practices to end
forced and child marriage
There were 38 evaluations of programs that
aimed to combat forced or child marriage in thePromising Practices Database, which covered
32 countries, with the majority delivered incountries in Asia and the Pacific, followed by
Africa. Most programs were targeted to females
and most often focused on adolescent andchild girls. Only one program solely targeted
adults who were forced to marry. Interventions
commonly included some aspect of risk-based
prevention or service delivery and included
activities such as preventative education,awareness-raising campaigns, training forservice providers, community groups, andconditional cash transfers. Conditional andunconditional cash transfers, specifically, have
had some success in delaying the age of firstmarriage and to improve educational outcomesfor girls.79 While some reliable lessons can belearned from this subset of evaluations, there
is a clear need for stronger methodologies
and pre – and post-implementation analyses
to make more effective decisions about
what works.
Effective programs included preventativeeducation, community or support groups,
and training for service providers. Among the
programs evaluated was the Tostan Community
Empowerment Program (CEP), which hasreported promising impacts in Somalia andSenegal.80 The CEP is a community-led programthat aims to transform harmful gender norms
and empower women and girls to become
leaders in their communities and be able to
make their own decisions regarding health,education, and finances, promoting better life
outcomes for themselves, their families, andfuture generations.81 In Senegal, the program
was linked with changed attitudes towards
forced and child marriage among community
leaders and other participants, as well as asubsequent decline in child marriages within
the community.82 Similar results were identified
in Somalia, where changes in attitudes led
to the abandonment of FGM and forced andchild marriage.83

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Recommendations
for governments

1

Enshrine a suite of trauma-informed
and survivor-centred measures inlegislation, and ensure these measures
are available for survivors of forced
and child marriage. It should include
criminalising the act of marrying
someone who does not consent,
regardless of their age, and civil
protections that protect the individualfrom marriage without having topenalise the perpetrators, who are oftenfamily members.

2

Ensure the minimum legal age ofmarriage is set at 18 years of age
without exception, including incustomary and religious laws.

3

Conduct community-driven attitudechange campaigns to subvert harmful
patriarchal norms that subjugate
women and girls and confine men to
rigid stereotypes of masculinity, allof which work to increase their risk offorced and child marriage.

4

Amend gender discriminatory
nationality laws including those thatallow the denial, loss, or deprivation ofnationality on discriminatory grounds.
Grant protection status to statelessmigrants, facilitate their naturalisation,and ensure all infants are registered atbirth to prevent statelessness.

5

Increase access to primary andsecondary school education for all
children and particularly girls, which
may include the removal of school
fees, provision of cash or in-kindtransfers, and raising awareness amongfamilies of the benefits of educating
girls. These programs should focus
on those most at risk of not receiving
an education, such as girls in conflictzones, people with disabilities, or
those from socio-economicallydisadvantaged backgrounds.

41

04

SPOTLIGHTS

Frontline voices:
Modern slavery and gender

FRONTLINE
VOICESCAROLINE
ADHIAMBO
Membership andResearch Coordinator,
Azadi Kenya

Although modern slavery affects everyone, there is no escaping the factthat it is a gendered issue. Fundamentally, modern slavery is enabled bypower imbalances. For women and girls, this imbalance is exacerbatedby gender inequality and discrimination that is deeply engrained into thefabric of our lives. For these reasons, integrating a gender perspective into
research, policy, and practice is essential to ensuring effective solutions
to modern slavery and to achieving gender equity. Here, survivor leader
and researcher Caroline Adhiambo reflects on the gendered aspects ofmodern slavery and why applying a lens that recognises the unique lived
experiences of all genders is integral to tailoring effective solutions.

The laws and social norms we live by, and thedifferent expectations imposed on daughterscompared to sons, have contributed to there being
more women and girls living in modern slavery thanthere are men and boys. Crucially, when looking at
what increases a person’s vulnerability to modern
slavery — factors such as lack of access to educationand health services, poverty, and working in theinformal economy — more women are exposed tomultiple risk factors than men. Exacerbating thesefactors are structural imbalances, ingrained into
legislation in many instances, which stack the odds
against females. Examples include laws impeding
women’s rights to autonomy, freedom of movement,
and access to employment.
As the causes of modern slavery are interconnected,
putting structures in place that foster genderequality and ensure equal access to resources isessential as it creates a platform for empowerment.
Also essential are inclusive data and research that
focus on the perspective of all genders. Data allows
for the creation of gender-sensitive approaches andinterventions when addressing the issues faced bysurvivors of modern slavery.

42

Despite these gendered imbalances, it is vital torecognise and respond to the aspects of modern
slavery that uniquely affect men. For example,
societal expectations and gender roles in many
parts of the world can make it difficult for men to
speak up when they are exploited.
Those who do are often exposed to stigmatization,
which can act as both a barrier to reporting
and accessing support services and can lead toconditions that create and maintain vulnerabilities.
Accordingly, there is a need for safe avenues formen to report cases of exploitation.
Championing inclusion and addressing genderinequality should not be done at the expense ofeither gender but should be aimed at empoweringboth. Recognising that both men and women often
have different experiences of modern slavery,
and therefore can require different responses, isnecessary if equity is to be achieved.

Creating spaces where the voices of all genders canbe heard with equal representation is essential,
including in research, as is raising awareness of the
impact of intersectionality on lived experience.
Putting the unique experience and expertise ofsurvivors at the heart of solutions is critical tobringing these objectives together, which in turn will
go a long way towards ensuring that the root causesthat expose women, men, boys, and girls to modern
slavery are addressed.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Azadi Kenya is a survivor-led, countertrafficking NGO that focuses on the provisionof long-term support for survivors of
trafficking who, too often, find a lack ofcommunity support and understanding
when reintegrating into society ensuing theirexperience with trafficking. Our goal is tocreate spaces and programmes that enhance
the agency of survivors of trafficking, tosupport long term recovery from trauma, andto sustain their reintegration into society.

Nairobi, Kenya,
March 2022.
Campaigners march on
International Women’s
Day and call for an end togender-based violence.
Women and girls remain
disproportionately vulnerable
to all forms of extreme
exploitation, including modern
slavery, due to discriminationthat devalues them from birthand throughout their lifetimes.
Photo credit: YASUYOSHICHIBA/AFP via Getty Images.

43

04

SPOTLIGHTS

Anti-social:
Modern slavery on social media

SOCIAL MEDIA

While social media has enabled unprecedented levels ofglobal connectivity and delivered many socio-economic
benefits,1 greater connectivity has also brought new risks,with consequences that transcend the digital world. There ismounting evidence social media is used to facilitate modern
slavery,2 with perpetrators able to simultaneously target
multiple people in different geographic locations, accesstheir personal information, and exploit vulnerabilities whileshielded by online anonymity.3
At the same time, rapid technological advancements
have outpaced the development of regulatory
frameworks, resulting in a lack of effective
governance and accountability that enables modern
slavery risks to flourish online.
The facilitation of forced commercial sexual
exploitation (FCSE) of adults and children usingsocial media is well documented.4 Social media
users may be recruited through deceptive job
advertisements or targeted outreach using chatfeatures, typically under the guise of building a
relationship. 5 In June 2021, for example, 11 people
were arrested for trafficking women and girls
from Bangladesh to India for sexual exploitation
after luring them via TikTok with the promise ofwork.6 Following recruitment, social media may
be used to track victims’ locations, control their
movements, and to record, advertise, and distribute
FCSE material.7 In 2023, shareholders launchedlitigation against Meta, arguing that the company’s
leadership and board failed to protect shareholderinterests by purportedly turning “a blind eye” towidespread evidence of sex trafficking and childsexual exploitation on Facebook and Instagram.8
Some measures intended to curb FCSE online havealso exacerbated risks. For example, legislation
introduced in the United States in 2017 to combat
sex trafficking online reportedly increased thevulnerability of sex workers.9 In effect, the law
placed greater pressure on platforms to censor
users, thereby removing safer spaces for sex workers
to communicate and reduce their risk of harm, while
increasing their risk of violence and poverty.10

44

Less is known about how social media impacts
forced labour;11 however, increasing use of social
media to search for employment and the growing
perception of it as a reliable source of information
has created new opportunities for exploitation.12
Fraudulent recruiters and traffickers may target
potential victims via social media business pages,13
recruitment advertisements,14 and direct outreachon social media platforms.15 Key word searchesof some popular video-sharing platforms reveal
the presence of unverified accounts posing as
government-approved recruitment agencies
which poses significant risks. Traffickers may also
use social media to lure victims onto end-to-end
encrypted platforms, such as WhatsApp,16 where
oversight by law enforcement for prevention
and evidence collection is both legally andtechnically difficult.17
Harrowing accounts of trafficking for labour
exploitation and domestic servitude via social
media have emerged in recent years. In 2021,
leaked Facebook documents revealed that
Instagram and Facebook were used to recruit
migrant workers from low-income countries via
deceptive job advertisements and traffic them to
the Gulf Cooperation Council countries for domestic
servitude and forced sex work.18 This followeda 2019 investigation which found that migrant
domestic workers employed under the kafalasystem in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were bought andsold via Instagram and other applications listed by
Google Play and the Apple App Store.19 Instagram’salgorithm reportedly promoted hashtags used toadvertise domestic workers on the platform.20

Building and abusing trust online:
Experiences of a domestic worker
Cherry*, a 25-year-old from the Philippines,
migrated to Kuwait in 2013 to earn a better
income as a domestic worker.

“I went to the jamiya, the location we agreed
to meet. I was excited to meet Joan for the
first time.”“I accepted the job opportunity to help my family
be able to stand poverty.”

Yet, when Cherry called Joan, she said she could
not come. Instead, a man in a white car picked
Cherry up and brought her to an old building, andtold her Joan was inside waiting for her.

Cherry’s first employer treated her well; however,they paid her less than the salary of KWD 120(approximately US$390) she was promised,
so they agreed to release her at the end of her
contract. Meanwhile, Cherry used social media,
especially Facebook, to connect with family andfriends back home.
“My employer didn’t mind it as long as I finished
my daily tasks. It is where I met Joan, a domestic
worker who lived in Salwa, Kuwait. We spoke alot, shared videos, thoughts, and family life. We
became very close.”With her contract coming to an end, Cherry
told Joan she was looking for a new employer.
They continued to talk, send greetings, andoccasionally make video calls, and their friendshipgrew deeper. Then suddenly, Joan stopped
sending messages. When she eventually cameback online, she refused to accept video calls,
claiming her employer forbid them.
One day, Cherry received a message from Joan
saying that she had found an employer willing to
pay Cherry KWD 250 (approximately US$815) if
she went immediately. Cherry sought permission
from her employer but was told she needed to
wait three more months before she could transfer
to a new job. So, she ran away, believing this washer only chance to change her fate.

“The place was dark and scary. The man locked
the door behind me. Grabbed me and pushed
me in one of the rooms. I was abducted andforced to have sex with men…I felt like I am nolonger human.”
The perpetrators had taken the Facebook
accounts of Joan and the other women trapped in
the building and forced them to call their friends.
“They took my Facebook account and stole myidentity just like they did to Joan. They sent KWD
120 monthly to my family so they would notreport that I am missing to the OWWA [Overseas
Workers Welfare Administration]. They let me talkto my family sometimes, but for a very short timewith a knife pointing at me not to say anythingsuspicious. I was scared and helpless.”
One day, a tip off led to a rescue operation.
Cherry was taken to the police station and thena shelter where she received assistance and a
medical check-up.
“I got deported for running away from myemployer. I was thankful being deported andseeing my family.”
The men who operated the scheme were captured
and imprisoned by the Kuwait authorities.
*Not her real name

While it is clear that social media exacerbates
modern slavery risks, it can also provide an avenue
for vulnerable users and survivors to share theirexperiences and access support.21 In 2021, forexample, a Kenyan woman who was exploited
while working as a cleaner in Saudi Arabia reported
receiving assistance from an internationalorganisation after posting about her situation on
Facebook.22 She was also recruited via Facebook,and claimed that the platform saw her into andout of the situation.23 Migrant domestic workers
experiencing abuse and mistreatment in the Gulf
have also used Facebook and TikTok to share
their experiences, ask for information, and raiseawareness.24 While this has reportedly helped
domestic workers connect with other workers on
the platforms, without the necessary safeguards
in place, domestic workers can be exposed tofurther harms such as re-trafficking by exploitative
recruiters who are also active on the platforms,
employer retaliation, and even deportation.25

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Modern slavery risks permeate the entire social
media value chain — from sourcing raw materials,
such as cobalt, 26 to the exploitation of workers indata labelling 27 and overseas data centres, 28 and into
the digital platforms themselves.
The international community has recognised theneed to safeguard human rights in the digital era.29
In 2011, the United Nations Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) established the“corporate responsibility to respect,” which requires
businesses, to (a) avoid causing or contributing toadverse human rights impacts through their own
activities and to address such impacts when theyoccur, and (b) seek to prevent or mitigate adverse
human rights impacts that are directly linked totheir operations, products, or services by theirbusiness relationships, even if they themselves
have not contributed to those impacts. 30 As a result,social media companies have a duty to respond toany harm they cause or contributed to, including

45

04

SPOTLIGHTSSOCIAL MEDIA

harm caused by a third party using their platform. 31
Despite this, little is being done to protect social
media users from modern slavery risks. Under
current Modern Slavery Acts (MSAs) in the UK andAustralia, certain companies are required to reporton modern slavery risks in their operations andsupply chains, 32 however there is no requirement
for social media companies to report on how they
are addressing modern slavery on their digitalplatforms. 33 Further, several companies withsignificant reach in the UK and Australia, but withno operations in either country, are not required
to report. Gaps in the application of MSAs allow
social media companies to evade responsibility forpotential violations linked to their platforms.
In 2023, Walk Free assessed statements publishedunder UK and Australian MSAs by 10 companies.
These companies cover 10 social media platforms
and two e-stores distributing social media
applications. 35 Our assessment found that social
media companies are not doing enough to reporton modern slavery within their direct operations
or supply chains. 36 In their most recent statements(current as of 28 February 2023), no company
complied with all minimum requirements underthe Australian37 or UK MSAs. 38 Supply chains areopaque: while all companies had some form ofmodern slavery policy, only four had a policy that
extended beyond the first tier of their supply chain.
Although five companies reported conducting risk
assessments and risk management activities, withthese same companies also identifying modern
slavery risks, only two disclosed potential incidents
of modern slavery. This suggests these companies
should be doing more to actively identify risks
and remediate incidents of forced labour where
they occur.
34

Beyond requirements in the MSAs, we also reviewed
the statements to understand how well companies
are engaging with modern slavery risks on theirsocial media platforms. While companies are notpresently required to report on these aspects under
the MSAs, we wanted to understand if companies
were going beyond compliance to effectively engage
with known risks.
Half of the statements assessed made specificdisclosures relating to modern slavery risks on theirplatforms. Four companies reported having modern
slavery policies relating to social media, including
policies against apps, content, and behaviours thatfacilitate human trafficking, child exploitation, andhuman exploitation. Further, only three companies
reported activities to detect modern slavery onsocial media, including through use of image
matching technology and mechanisms allowing
users to report slavery-related content.

46

One company reported making information on
support services available for all users, however
no other prevention measures were reported.
Some of the companies assessed reported having
policies against sexually explicit advertisements,
however none reported assessing advertisements
for indicators of modern slavery, despite known
risks and the significant control companies haveover paid promotions and advertisements. None
reported including modern slavery considerations
into product design and development, wheresuch efforts are crucial to addressing risks before
impacting vulnerable end users.
Concerningly, only four companies reported
remediation strategies for incidents identified
on social media: measures included cooperation
with law enforcement and removal of content,
user accounts, or apps. Without further action toinvestigate and remove the source of risk, content
removal merely displaces risk. Multi-stakeholder
cooperation is vital to lifting industry standards,
fostering greater transparency, and ensuring thatmodern slavery risks are effectively removed. 39
Three companies assessed reported participation inindustry collaborations seeking to combat modern
slavery on social media. Tech Against Trafficking40
and the Tech Coalition,41 for example, represent
industry initiatives to combat human trafficking
and child sexual exploitation online. More targeted
efforts must be made to combat all forms of modern
slavery that manifest on social media.
An assessment of statements released by social
media companies shows that they must take moreaction to understand how modern slavery manifests
online and to address the modern slavery risks that
occur. Social media companies, with more than
4.5 billion users now active across the globe, haveenormous influence worldwide.42 There is an urgent
need for them to stop perpetrators from operatingwith impunity and to prevent modern slavery fromflourishing online.

Recommendations
for governments

Recommendations
for social media

1

1

Develop and publish clear and specificpolicies to detect, prevent, and remedy
modern slavery risks across the entire
value chain, including their social
media platforms.

2

Conduct due diligence, including
implementing and reporting on
measures to systematically detectmodern slavery on their platforms.
These efforts should include dedicatedmonitoring for indicators of modern
slavery, as well as mechanisms for users
to report modern slavery and for local
support providers to reach at-risk users
safely and securely.46

3

Provide effective remediation forincidents that occur on their platforms
through removing violating content
and accounts, transparent reporting oncontent moderation, cooperating withlaw enforcement (while safeguarding
privacy and human rights), and referring
affected persons to support services.

4

Actively prevent modern slavery risks
on social media through verifying
recruitment advertisements andsocial media business pages, targetingawareness-raising on risks, promoting
anti-slavery hotlines,47 providing
identity verification options for allusers, and requiring compulsory
modern slavery training for product andthird-party software developers.

5

Engage in industry collaborations tolift industry standards for preventing,identifying, and mitigating modern
slavery risks. These collaborations must
involve consultation with survivors andanti-slavery experts.

2

Introduce mandatory human rights due
diligence laws, similar to the French
Duty of Vigilance law,43 which requirebusinesses and other organisations to
conduct due diligence to proactively
identify and remediate forced labourrisks and which cover the entire value
chain including end-users.
Strengthen existing MSAs to requiresocial media companies to report on
how they are addressing modern slavery
on their platforms (including companies
with a significant user base in Australia
and/or the UK, regardless of annual
revenue) and to issue detailed guidance
to support implementation.44

3

Cooperate with other governments
to strengthen governance andaccountability frameworks for social
media companies. Such frameworks
must consider the constantly evolving
nature of digital technologies andensure sufficient geographic coverage.

4

Consider potential unintended
consequences, such as the removalof safeguards for sex workers, in all
legislative and policy responses toregulate online digital spaces, andinclude those with lived experience inany consultations regarding addressing
human rights and modern slavery risks
on social media.45

5Ensure all legislative and policy
responses are informed by researchand developed in consultation withsurvivors, social media experts, andanti-slavery stakeholders.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

47

04

SPOTLIGHTSSTATEIMPOSED
NAME HERELABOUR

Guardians and offenders:Examining state-imposed
forced labour

In 2021, an estimated 3.9 million people were forced to work by stateauthorities.1 It is among the most egregious forms of modern slavery
as it involves states not only failing in their duty to safeguard humanrights,2 but actively using their power to perpetrate abuse.
While international conventions recognise thatstates have the power to compel citizens to work,
this is limited to specific circumstances; for example,
compulsory military service or obligatory workor service for citizens in emergency situations
such as famine and natural disaster. A state
exceeds these limits when it compels citizens towork as a punishment for expressing or acting on
political views, or for the purpose of economic
development, or as a means of racial, ethnic, social,or religious discrimination.

Abuse of compulsory
prison labour

The US has both the resources and longstanding
political will to lead the fight against modern
slavery, receiving the fifth highest government
response score globally. However, these positive
actions are belied by laws that allow state-imposed
forced labour to occur. Under the 13th Amendment
to the US Constitution: Abolition of Slavery (1865),
a sentence of involuntary servitude can still behanded down for an offence.17 Prisoners are
summarily excluded from the scope of labour law
protections — including those that prohibit forced
labour — given that compulsory prison labouris considered a legal punishment rather than an
economic activity.18 While international law permits
compulsory prison labour under certain conditions,
it cannot be used for the benefit of private parties,
unless additional requirements are met.19 Detainees
in US private prisons, including pre-trial detainees,
allege that they have been forced to work without
pay under the threat of punishment.20

Abuse of compulsory prison labour includes
compulsory labour for those convicted of a nonviolent political offence, participating in non-violent
strikes, breaches of labour discipline, or as a means of
discrimination. It also includes compulsory labour inadministrative detention and abuse of prison labourfor private interests. Reports indicate that state-

While noting a lack of recent and available data insome countries such as China and North Korea, theUS has the world’s largest rate of imprisonment,
therefore the risk of state-imposed forced
labour is particularly concerning.21 The burdenof risk is disproportionately borne by peopleof colour, who are overrepresented among US

State-imposed forced labour can be categorised
into three major types: abuse of compulsory prison
labour, abuse of conscription, and forced labour
for economic development (Figure 8). Abuse ofcompulsory prison labour accounts for over half (56percent) of all state-imposed forced labour.
Our assessment of government responses tomodern slavery found evidence of all forms ofstate-imposed forced labour across 17 countries.
While most governments have taken some action
to end modern slavery, these responses vary widely(Figure 9). All these actions are fundamentally
undermined by the practice of state-imposed
forced labour.

Birlik, Uzbekistan,
October 2021.

imposed forced labour occurs in public and private
prisons around the world, including Brazil,3 China,4North Korea,5 Poland,6 Russia,7 Turkmenistan,8 theUnited States,9 Viet Nam,10 and Zimbabwe.11 It also
occurs in migrant detention centres in Libya,12 reeducation camps in China,13 administrative detention
camps in North Korea,14 and in medical labour
centres in Belarus15 and Viet Nam,16 in which citizens
struggling with drug addiction are forced to work as
part of their recovery.

17.3%
0.7 million

An Uzbek man hauls cottonbuds through a plantation.
After decades of systemic
forced labour, the governmentin Uzbekistan successfully
eradicated this widespreadabuse from the annual cotton
harvest in 2021. Photo credit:
Vyacheslav Oseledko/AFP via
Getty Images.

55.8%
2.2 million

Type of state-imposed forced labour

Figure 8
Types ofstate-imposed
forced labour

Abuse of compulsory prison labour
Abuse of conscription
Forced labour for economic development,
and abuse of the obligation to perform work
beyond normal civil obligations or minor
communal services

26.9%
1.1 million

48

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

49

04

SPOTLIGHTS

STATE IMPOSEDLABOUR

prison populations, in part due to over-policing
and historical mass criminalisation of theircommunities.22 This is particularly true for black
men living in the US, who in 2020 were 5.7 times
more likely to be imprisoned than white men.23
The ILO Committee of Experts on the Applicationof Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR)
has urged the government to take steps to ensure
prison sentences involving compulsory labour
are not disproportionately issued due to racial
discrimination in the criminal justice process.24 In
December 2020, a joint resolution was introducedin the US Congress to amend the Constitution andprohibit involuntary servitude from being used topunish offenders.25“… I had to work. You don’t get days off. You
don’t get to have sick days. And if I didn’t go
to work, it was a rule violation.”
Dominique Morgan, a former inmate of Omaha
Correctional Center, US, 202026

Abuse of conscription
Conscription constitutes state-imposed forced
labour where conscripts are forced to perform workof a non-military nature.27 Abuse of conscription isevident in Egypt, 28 Eritrea, 29 Mali, 30 and Mongolia.31
In 2022, the Special Rapporteur on the situation ofhuman rights in Eritrea reported that the Eritrean
national service systematically subjects conscripts
to forced labour.32 This followed a 2015 investigationby the United Nations Commission of Inquiry,
which found that the national service effectively
served to “abuse, exploit and enslave” citizens.33
Forced labour in the national service is reported
in the construction of roads, dams, and mines, 34
teaching, 35 and other sectors. Young people intheir final year of secondary school are forced to
combine exam preparation and military training at
the Sawa military camp, with many also made toperform agricultural work on surrounding farms
owned by government and military officials, 36 andare later conscripted directly into the national
service. 37 In addition to intensive forced labour,
conscripts receive harsh punishments and abuse,with females also experiencing sexual violence andharassment. 38 Eritreans who flee to evade forced
conscription, including unaccompanied children, 39
face heightened vulnerability to modern slavery
along dangerous migration routes 40 in addition to
the threat of detention, torture, and extrajudicial
killing if they are caught.41

50“Although some conscripts perform
purely military roles in the army, mostdraftees are assigned to work in civilian
administration, infrastructure projects,
education and construction and perform
other duties, without any free choice about
the area of their employment.”
Mohamed Abdelsalam Babiker, Special Rapporteur on thesituation of human rights in Eritrea, 202142

Compulsory labour forthe purpose of economic
development, and abuse of
the obligation to perform
work beyond normal
civic obligations or minor
communal services
States may perpetrate forced labour throughabuse of the obligation to perform work beyond
normal civic duties. This is reported in Myanmar,
for example, where members of Chin and Rakhine
ethnic groups report being forced to work by
military forces (Tatmadaw) as labourers andporters.43 In 2019, four villages in Chin state wererequired to supply one worker per family totransport food rations for the military.44 Rohingya
were also reportedly forced to construct security
camps for the Tatmadaw under inhumane
conditions and the threat of violence.45 In 2020,
disturbing evidence emerged of children being
forced by the Tatmadaw to clear landmines andwork in portering, with some children reportedlyused as human shields.46
Compulsory labour is also exacted by stateauthorities for the purpose of economic
development. In Turkmenistan, workers andstudents are forced to participate in the annual
cotton harvest, which runs from September toNovember, for little or no compensation or under
the threat of punishment.47 Public sector workers
including doctors and teachers are enlisted to pickcotton, or are made to send others in their place.48
The private sector may also be required to supply
workers, while vulnerable groups such as migrants
and students are also forced to work.49 An estimated198,000 metric tonnes of cotton are produced in
Turkmenistan per year, making cotton the fourthmost valuable export for the government. 50 The
cotton — and the state-imposed forced labour
through which it is harvested — enters the global

market through complex supply chains. 51 Activists
such as the Cotton Campaign are increasingpressure on the government to reform this systemand call on other governments to adopt robust
import controls and businesses to avoiding sourcing
Turkmen cotton. 52

While there is much progress yet to be made, there
were significant positive developments since 2018.
In Uzbekistan, following years of collaboration with
the ILO and civil society, 57 a global boycott of Uzbek
cotton, 58 and a commitment from the government
to end its use of forced labour in the annual cotton
harvest, 59 independent civil society monitoringby the Uzbek Forum for Human Rights found thatno forced labour was imposed by the central
government in 2021.60 In 2022 however, the Forum
reported that despite firm political will to prevent
forced labour, risks persist in the tightly controlled
cotton harvest due to pressure to meet production
targets.61 Continued engagement is needed tocreate an enabling environment for labour rights bystrengthening civic participation and protections for
freedom of association and expression.62

In Rwanda, compulsory labour is present inUmuganda, a national community service that takes
place once every month. 53 While Umuganda is widelybelieved to benefit the community, 54 the practice iscompulsory for those age 18 to 65 years and failure
to participate may result in a fine or other penalty
under Law No. 53/2007 Establishing Community
Works in Rwanda. 55 While the prescription of fines
in practice is unclear, the law establishes a threatof penalty for non-participation. In 2021, CEACR
requested that the Rwandan government ensurecommunity works are limited to “minor services” inline with international standards. 56

United States

67

Poland55

Brazil51

Rwanda50

Belarus49

Viet Nam

47

Egypt

44

Myanmar42

Mongolia

40

China

40

Mali

31

Zimbabwe

27

Turkmenistan

26

Russia

24

Libya

10

Eritrea
North Korea

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Figure 9
Government
response scoresamong countries
with reports ofstate-imposed
forced labour(per cent) (higherscore reflects
stronger response)

5
-3

51

04

SPOTLIGHTS

STATE IMPOSEDLABOUR

Pyongyang, North
Korea, January 2020.
Men work on farmland
during the year’s first“Friday labour” program,
under which while-collar
workers are made toundertake physicallabour every Friday. Photo
credit: Kyodo News via
Getty Images.

State-imposed forced labour in North Korea
North Korea’s ostensibly socialist system is
upheld by widespread state-imposed forced
labour of citizens.63 Under the authoritarianrule of the Supreme Leader, work is centrallyorganised and the nature of employment isdetermined by an archaic social class structurethat facilitates forced labour.64 Forced labour isused as a punishment for expressing politicalviews or views ideologically opposed to theestablished political, social or economic system.
It is also used as a method of mobilising labour
for the purpose of economic development andas a means of labour discipline.
In 2017, Walk Free and the Leiden Asia Centre
interviewed 50 defectors to better understandthe reality of modern slavery in North Korea.
The study found evidence of forced labour
for economic development and abuse of theobligation to perform work beyond normal
civic obligations or minor communal services.
According to the study, adults and children areforced to work in mandatory, unpaid communal
labour, including in agriculture, road building,and construction.65 For children, this may
involve daily or month-long agricultural work
under the threat of punishment at school,
while adults may be mobilised for “battles”
lasting up to 100 days.66 Those who refuse facedeprivation of food rations or further taxes, andbribery is the only escape.67 Among the general
population, workers are paid in rations, if at all,and in many cases workers report paying fortheir own employment to avoid imprisonment inlabour camps, while also trading labour on theblack market to survive.68

The study also found that pervasive abuse ofcompulsory prison labour is perpetrated by
the state, with recent evidence suggesting thiscontinues.69 Individuals held in short and longterm detention and prison camps are subjected
to forced labour under extremely harshconditions in construction, farming, logging,mining, manufacturing, and other forms of hardlabour.70 This includes individuals detained forbeing unemployed or absent from work, andthose sentenced for “crimes” such as receiving
unauthorized information and exercising otherhuman rights, which are heavily suppressed in
North Korea.71 In 2021, the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights found thatthe level of control, physical and psychologicalabuse, cruelty, and hard labour within theprison system may amount to the crimes
against humanity.72 North Koreans are also sent
abroad to work in sectors such as construction,
where they remain subject to threats ofsevere punishment for non-compliance orpolitical opposition.73
North Korean women and girls additionallyrisk being forced into sexual slavery by officialsof various ranks, including the Supreme
Leader himself.74 Further, the state’s control ofresources contributes to widespread starvationand malnutrition, which spurs vulnerability
to other forms of modern slavery, such as
trafficking for forced marriage.75“The punishment for being unemployed was six months in a labour training camp.
In more severe cases, it was one to three years. The severe cases are people who havenever worked. Those are people who continuously did not have any working
experience and stayed only at home.”
Lea, a North Korean defector forced to work by the state

52

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

53

04

SPOTLIGHTS

STATE IMPOSEDLABOUR

Akto, Xinjiang
Province, China,
June 2019.
Vehicles pass through acheckpoint on a road neara facility believed to be agovernment re-education campdetaining Uyghur peoples.
Various reports allege that
Uyghurs, and other Muslim
ethnic groups, are forcibly held
in a network of internment
camps in the province, where
they reportedly face abuses
including forced labour.
The government claims thefacilities are simply “vocational
education centres” to steer
people away from extremism.
Photo credit: Greg Baker/AFP
via Getty Images.

State-imposed forced labour of Uyghurs
and other Turkic and Muslim majority groups
State-imposed forced labour can be used
as a means of racial, social, national, andreligious discrimination, political coercion andeducation, and as punishment for expressing
political views or views ideologically opposedto the established political, social, or economic
system.76 Since the 2018 Global Slavery Index,
there has been a growing body of evidenceof state-imposed forced labour of Uyghurs
and other Turkic and Muslim majority groups
in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region(Uyghur region) of China.77 Abuse of compulsory
prison labour and forced labour for economic
development forms part of a wider, decadeslong campaign to exercise control of Uyghurs.78
State-imposed forced labour reportedly
occurs alongside political indoctrination,
religious oppression, mass surveillance, forced
separation of families, forced sterilisation,
sexual violence, and arbitrary detention in socalled “re-education camps” within the Uyghur
region.79 Several governments have statedthat China’s treatment of Uyghurs amounts
to genocide.80
Under the guise of poverty alleviation andvocational training,81 state-imposed forced
labour is reported in cotton picking82 and the
production of textiles, garments,83 electronics,84
polyvinyl chloride (PVC),85 and other goods.86
An estimated 45 per cent of the world’s solargrade polysilicon (a critical component in solar
panels) is manufactured in the Uyghur region
and is therefore at high risk of being producedwith forced labour.87 While globally there has
been a shift towards renewable energy tomeet sustainability targets,88 the use of stateimposed forced labour prevents a just transition
to protect both planet and people.
Reports indicate that forced labour also occurs
through the transfer of rural populations towork in farms and factories, as well as theinvoluntary placement of detainees and exdetainees in factories located inside or near“re-education camps” in the Uyghur region andin factories across China.89 For example, a 2020
report identified 27 Chinese factories acrossnine provinces that had used forced labour of
Uyghurs since 2017.90 State-imposed forced
labour has been linked to factories supplying
large global brands and is reportedly fuelledby political and financial incentives for local
governments and businesses to participate.91
Those in forced labour face threats of arbitrary
detention as well as physical barriers toescape.92 Similar patterns of abuse are evident
in the Tibet Autonomous Region as a means ofreligious discrimination against and politicalindoctrination of Tibetans.93
State-imposed forced labour is also reported in
the prison system administered by the Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps (XPCC), an
economic and paramilitary organisation thatexercises administrative authority in several
parts of the Uyghur region.94 The XPCC operates
several farms, factories, and enterprises out of
its prisons that produce coal, cotton, textiles,
chemicals, plastics, and other products using
forced labour of Uyghurs.95 Han Chinese
imprisoned within the XPCC system are also
reportedly subject to forced labour.96
The Chinese Communist Party denies the useof forced labour in its factories, and statecontrolled media claims that participation isvoluntary.97 However, state-imposed forced
labour in China has received heightened
attention in recent years, with calls for allcompanies to restrict sourcing from the Uyghur
region as it has become impossible to operatein accordance with the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights(UNGPs).98 The European Union and several
countries have introduced sanctions andmeasures such as divestment in response to theabuse.99 In the United States, specific legislative
measures have been adopted to prevent theimport of goods made with state-imposed
forced labour in the Uyghur region.100“I was sent to the factory, a kind of sweatshop, I suppose, making gloves. … The
products were exported abroad, we were told, and sold to foreigners. You madesome money, but if you stopped working, they sent you back to the camp. So, there
wasn’t much of a choice.”
Gulzire Auelkhan, Khazakh woman in forced labour in the Uyghur region, China, 2019101

54

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Tainted supply chains

STATE IMPOSEDLABOUR

State-imposed forced labour may seem like anissue contained within national borders, yet many
products associated with forms of state-imposed
forced labour end up in global supply chains, with
implications for governments, businesses, andconsumers around the world. During the pandemic,
for example, personal protective equipment (PPE)at risk of being produced using forced labour of
Uyghurs was reportedly imported to Australia102
and the United Kingdom,103 and PPE produced using
forced labour of North Korean women in China wasreportedly procured by the UK government.104

SPOTLIGHTS

Businesses that profit from state-imposed forced
labour are increasingly exposed to associated legal,financial, and reputational risks.105 As noted above,
the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in February2020 that a mining company could be prosecutedin Canada for using the forced labour of conscripts

at their mine in Eritrea.106 A confidential settlement
was reached following the decision.107 At the timeof writing, other legal actions are underway inGermany, the Netherlands, and France againstcompanies that allegedly used state-imposed forced
labour in their supply chains.108
State-imposed forced labour is arguably the mostchallenging form of modern slavery to address.
Ending abuses by the state against the very citizens
it is entrusted to protect requires strong politicalcommitment. While governments imposing forced
labour must ultimately take action to reform thesystems that enable their abuse, the reality isthat change is most likely to arise from sustained
external pressure from other governments,
businesses, and civil society.

Recommendations
for governments

Recommendations
for business

1

1

Where state-imposed forced labour
exists in a country, region, industry, or
company and if operating in line with
the UN Guiding Principles has become
impossible (for example, conducting
due diligence or providing effective
remediation), withdraw from sourcing
goods and services from that country,
region, industry, or company asnecessary.

2

Avoid investing in companies connected
to state-imposed forced labour, forexample, private equity investmentsthat might contribute, or listed equity
investments that might be directly linked,
to state-imposed forced labour.

Governments committing state-imposed
forced labour must immediately
publicly acknowledge the existence ofserious human rights violations that are
tantamount to state-imposed forced
labour and take actions to end it. This
must include addressing underlying
persecution and discrimination
driving state-imposed forced labour
practices and repealing legislation andcriminalising practices that allow stateimposed forced labour to occur.

Other governments mustprioritise human rights
and take action, including:1

Leverage bilateral relations, trade,and other diplomatic measures topressure perpetrators of state-imposed
forced labour to eradicate the practice,including introducing Magnitsky-styleand other coordinated sanctions.

2

Strengthen public procurement systems
to prevent sourcing goods made withstate-imposed forced labour and ban
companies from tendering if they areconnected to state-imposed forced
labour.

3

Introduce legislation requiring
businesses to conduct mandatory humanrights due diligence to avoid sourcing
goods made with state-imposed forced
labour, banning import of goods madewith state-imposed forced labour,and prohibiting the export of goods tocompanies using state-imposed forced
labour.

4

Introduce restrictions on investments
connected to state-imposed labour.

Hebei, China,
October 2021.
A farmer tends his sheepnear solar panels installed
on a hillside. Modern
slavery risks permeate thesupply chains of renewableenergy products like solar
panels and wind turbines.
Photo credit: Greg Baker/
AFP via Getty Images.

56

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SPOTLIGHTS

CONFLICTNAME HERE

Modern slavery:
A weapon andconsequence of war

Gumuruk, South Sudan, June 2021.
A woman from Murle ethnic group stands near her burnt tea shop
after an attack on her village by an armed youth group. In the wakeof conflict, thousands have been displaced in South Sudan, which
has deepened humanitarian needs in a country already dealing withfamine. Photo credit: Simon Wohlfahrt/AFP via Getty Images.

58

Each year, people living in warzones and those fleeing
them are subjected to horrific violence and abuse. For
children, the elderly, and everyone in between, sexual andgender-based violence, psychological trauma, torture,family separation and disappearance,1 recruitment
and use by armed groups, abductions and kidnapping
for ransom, forced marriage, forced labour, starvation,and being left for dead,2 are a daily risk. Perpetrators
range from the organised to the opportunistic, including
smugglers, traffickers, parties to the conflict, community
members, and sometimes state actors.
While protracted conflict is a known risk multiplier,
our understanding of the intersection between
conflict and modern slavery is beginning to growmore nuanced. In the immediate aftermath ofcrises, including the outbreak of conflict, where
governments and systems break down, we may
see a temporary suspension of modern slavery
and related crimes. 3 However, as conflict becomes
more protracted, large-scale disruption increases
the risk of forced labour and forced marriage. This
complexity is evidenced in Ukraine. There has
not been an increase in the number of traffickedpersons identified largely due to a proactive early
warning system, and, unlike many communities who
experience conflict, refugees from Ukraine havebeen largely welcomed into their host communities.
Even here, however, there is a need for theinternational community to stay vigilant due toconcerns of under-reporting and ongoing challenges
associated with the conflict (see case study on
Ukraine in the European and Central Asia regional
section). There is a need for more data to truly
understand the intersection of conflict and modern
slavery in both acute and protracted settings.4

Ukrainian refugees, particularly women andchildren, in border towns.11 Ukrainian women havebeen targeted for exploitation,12 including casesof deceptive offers of work abroad that result insexual exploitation.13 In Afghanistan, the erosion of
women’s rights following the Taliban’s takeover of
Kabul compounds vulnerabilities to modern slavery,
including forced marriage, forced commercial sexual
exploitation, and forced labour.14 Under the lawsof the Caliphate established by the Islamic Statein Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014, 6,000 Yazidi womenand children were captured, forcibly converted,and subjected to domestic servitude and forced
marriage.15 Many are allegedly still enslaved in Iraq,
Syria, and Türkiye,16 or held captive in ISIS widow
camps, such as the al-Hawl detention camp innorth-eastern Syria.17 The ways in which children
and adolescents are vulnerable to modern slavery
also manifest differently depending on gender.
While girls are especially vulnerable to commercial
sexual exploitation, domestic servitude, or forced
marriage, boys are typically at risk of forced labour,
forced begging, or of being used in combat or
support roles by armed groups or forces.18

In protracted situations, people struggle to provide
for their basic needs or to safely seek protection5
as conflict damages infrastructure and disrupts
services.6 At the same time, the breakdown in the ruleof law enables perpetrators to act with impunity.7
Parties involved in conflict may recruit children
into their ranks, forcibly marry women and girls totheir members, or force civilians to perform labouror sexual services.8 Those who try to flee conflictaffected areas may be targeted by traffickers at
any point on their journey.9 The countries withprotracted conflicts have some of the highest overallvulnerability to modern slavery, and relatedly, ahigh prevalence of modern slavery. These countries
include Afghanistan, Syria, Nigeria, Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, Pakistan, Iraq,
Central African Republic, Sudan, and Libya.

Although conflict and forced displacement are
known to exacerbate vulnerabilities to modern
slavery,19 there is little data on the scale of modern
slavery among displaced populations. To address
this evidence gap, Walk Free, together with the
ILO and IOM, set out to measure the prevalence of
certain forms of modern slavery among InternallyDisplaced Persons (IDPs) in three countries facing
protracted conflict and widespread displacement:
South Sudan, Nigeria, and the DRC. Surveys
on experiences of modern slavery and relatedabuses were conducted among IDPs residing
in displacement sites in North Kivu province inthe DRC, South Sudan, and Northeast Nigeria.20
These surveys captured experiences before andafter displacement.

Women and children are particularly vulnerable
to modern slavery in conflict.10 High levels ofdisplacement following the invasion of Ukraine
in February 2022 led to concerns that predators
masking as volunteers were targeting vulnerable
GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

IDPS AND
MODERNSLAVERY
IDPs who
experienced forced
labour, recruitment
and abductions

NORTH KIVU,
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO
1 IN 5*

SOUTH SUDAN
1 in 20NORTH EAST
NIGERIA
1 in 60*Among the sample
of IDPs in North Kivu,
Democratic Republicof the Congo

The results indicated that not only were modern
slavery and related abuses prevalent among the
IDPs surveyed, but they were inherently linked
to conflict. One in five IDPs surveyed in North
Kivu experienced either forced labour, forced
recruitment, or abduction in the preceding five59

04

SPOTLIGHTS

CONFLICT

years. In South Sudan, an estimated one in 20
IDPs experienced at least one of these slaveryrelated abuses, and an estimated one in 60 IDPs in
Northeast Nigeria. In all three settings, perpetrators
were most often members of the armed groups orarmed forces who deliberately exploited displaced
populations to further their operations.21 In South
Sudan and North Kivu, most forced labour activities(63 per cent and 75 per cent respectively) directly
supported armed groups and armed forces,
including through fighting, military service, or
providing support services such as portering or
spying.22 Armed groups also use modern slavery andrelated abuses as weapons in conflict. In Northeast
Nigeria, Boko Haram and its factions have recruited
thousands of children to undertake support roles orengage in violence, including suicide attacks. The
group has also abducted girls to be forcibly marriedor provide sexual services to its members.23“On four occasions I was taken to clear theforest next to the military soldier’s houses
and to build their huts. We could not refuse
because we would be whipped to death.”
Respondent, DRC, 2017

In conflict situations, IDPs are at risk of modern
slavery following their displacement, including at
displacement sites. For instance, in North Kivu, halfof respondents who reported forced labour were
living in a displacement site when the forced labour
began. Similarly in South Sudan, more than half offorced recruitment cases, 61 per cent of abductions,and 21 per cent of forced labour cases occurred
after displacement.24 Though sufficient data was notavailable for Northeast Nigeria, similar experiences
are likely.25 The need for urgent action to address
the vulnerabilities inherent in forced displacement isincreasingly apparent as understanding of modern
slavery in conflict settings grows,26 and the number of
IDPs displaced due to conflict and violence increases.27

No safe path: Perspectives from a former child soldierJames*, 17, is the eldest of three brothers fromthe Democratic Republic of the Congo. Theirfather died and their mother worked in the fields
to support their family. One day, James waswalking home from school with three friends
from his village when he heard someone calling
his name. As they crossed the fruit plantation, aboy of about 10 years old suddenly appeared. He
amused James by telling him stories and asking
strange questions, so James told his friends to go
ahead. Then, everything changed.

“…four armed men appeared and forced
me to go with them, knocking me about
and striking me with a whip. That is how
I found myself recruited into an armed
group.”
While held by the armed group, James was forced
to learn their ideology and received training inmilitary intelligence, armed robbery, weapons,
livestock theft, and intimidation methods forrobbing people on the road or in the fields or
abducting them. He was forced to perform manyjobs, starting as a cook before being promoted
to bodyguard of the camp commander, andwas eventually made to lead operations on anational road. He was sometimes sent with otherchildren to support joint operations with different
armed groups.

“There were times when I cried,
especially when I thought about mymother and my two brothers, but I
couldn’t leave the bush because all thepaths out were watched by members of
the armed group. They also kept a watch
on me.”
One day, during an operation to steal livestock,
James seized his opportunity to escape. He left
his weapon on the roadside and reported to
the United Nations Organization Stabilization
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
who took him to Uvira where the International
Committee of the Red Cross helped him to find
his family.
James was happy to be reunited with his mother.
He received assistance from an NGO to start his
own hairdressing salon, which now enables him tosupport himself and his mother. He is starting tothink about having his own family.

“I think the armed groups should lay
down their arms and stop recruiting
children because it’s not right.”
James shared his story for the 2019 International
Review of the Red Cross, which features theexperiences of former child soldiers recruitedin the Democratic Republic of the Congo, theirdifficulties, and hopes for a new life.28

Responses to modern
slavery in conflict settings
Much more needs to be done to prevent modern
slavery in conflict-affected areas and to protect
those fleeing warzones. Significant gaps remain in
the humanitarian response and in peacebuilding
and peacekeeping efforts to ensure adequate
support to at-risk persons; in fact, humanitarians
and peace actors are often denied access.29
To address this gap, Walk Free supported thedevelopment of the Global Protection Cluster’s 2020
Guidance to support Protection Clusters to detect,
identify, refer, protect, and assist trafficked persons
in internal displacement settings. 30 Following
dissemination of the guidance and the training of
humanitarian protection actors, Protection Clusters
are increasingly reporting risks of modern slavery
and related crimes — abduction, sexual and genderbased violence, recruitment and use of children byarmed groups, forced labour, and child and forced
marriage — in the areas where they are carrying out
their work. 31
Despite this, there remains limited data about
what works to tackle modern slavery in timesof conflict. Systematic reviews have found few
peer-reviewed studies exploring the connection
between humanitarian disasters and modern
slavery32 and even fewer that have made subsequent
policy recommendations.
Responding to specific forms of modern slavery
in conflict settings requires equally tailored
programming. To date, the evaluations33 ofprograms providing support to former childsoldiers34 highlight that traditional disarmament,
demobilisation, and reintegration programs are notenough to successfully reintegrate child soldiers into
their communities. These evaluations emphasise
the significance of community-based interventions,non-formal education, and apprenticeships
for affected children, in addition to support forhost communities. 35 Likewise, responding tochild and forced marriage requires gender andage-sensitive approaches, and in the context ofhumanitarian settings, should be introduced at theearly stages of the crisis. 36 An analysis of lessons
learned emphasises the importance of enhancing
the agency of girls, promoting access to supportand referral services, empowering girls througheducation, coordination among relevant actors, andlong-term community engagement. 37
There is a need for increased action to prevent
modern slavery in conflict settings and protect
victims and survivors. 38 This will require better
coordination among humanitarian actors, thoseworking in protection and the anti-slavery sector.
Addressing this complex crime within equallycomplex contexts requires concerted action.

Recommendations
for governments

1

Support the integration of antislavery action into humanitarianand peacebuilding responses,
including humanitarian responseplans, action plans to address grave
violations against children in armed
conflict, Women, Peace and Security
agendas, and transition measures forpeacebuilding and peacekeeping. 39

2Work with humanitarian actors toraise awareness of modern slavery
among populations at high risk ofdisplacement. Ensure that needsbased, protection-specific assistance isprovided in areas of high displacement,
which includes facilitating access tolivelihood opportunities, education,
medical services, and legal counsel.

3

Activate safe referral and incident
reporting mechanisms in humanitariansettings. Ensure frontline humanitarianand peacebuilding actors are trainedon modern slavery concepts andresponses, particularly how to identify
and refer cases of exploitation to
support services.40

4Ensure effective access to international
protection and family reunification
for those affected by conflict andexpand resettlement and planned
relocation opportunities.

5

Take urgent action to address thedrivers of conflict by reducing genderbased discrimination and violence,
improving women’s access to socialand economic opportunities, reducing
poverty, combating climate change, andtaking measures to address community
violence based on religious, ethnic,
racial, or other statuses.

*Not his real name60

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SPOTLIGHTS

The costs of theclimate crisis

CLIMATEX

Compounding crises serve to heighten the risks of all formsof modern slavery. The COVID-19 pandemic, armed conflicts,
and climate change have led to unprecedented disruptionin employment and education, as well as increases ininequalities, distress migration, and reports of gender-based
violence and forced marriage.1
Climate change intersects with modern slavery
in multiple ways. The impact of climate changehits hardest those who are already in precarious
situations, such as women, children, indigenous
people, and members of marginalised communities,
increasing their vulnerability to modern slavery. Its
effects may push people to migrate and magnify
drivers of displacement such as loss of livelihoods,
food insecurity, and a lack of access to waterand other natural resources.2 Migration in thesecontexts can be unplanned, with people lacking
the resources they need to move safely. The greater
precariousness that is generated out of thesesituations exposes populations to higher risks ofmodern slavery. 3
Modern slavery is also linked to environmentallydegrading industries with high climate change
impacts. Forced labour is pervasive in key industries
that are driving deforestation around the world.4
Conversely, there is increasing evidence that
renewable industries vital to our urgent transition toclean energy are also reliant on forced labour for themining, processing, and manufacturing of criticalminerals and inputs. 5
Yet modern slavery is seldom mentioned in theintensifying debate over how to protect the world’s
most vulnerable people from climate change while
accelerating the global transition to clean energy. Asa global community, we must give more focus to theseissues to ensure that we understand the different
ways climate change is driving modern slavery andhow at-risk and affected communities can be brought
into the process of designing better solutions.

K’elafo, Ethiopia,
January 2023.
Ethiopia, along with Somalia
and Kenya, has sustained its
worst drought in the last four
decades due to failed rainyseasons. The UN estimates thatdrought has led to 12 million
Ethiopians experiencing acutefood insecurity. Coupledwith an ongoing conflict in
the north, in Tigray, risks of
exploitation have risen. Photo
credit: Eduardo Soteras/AFP
via Getty Images.

62

Anti-Slavery International is the world’s
oldest human rights campaign, founded in
1839. It exists to challenge contemporary
forms of slavery wherever they exist by
tackling slavery’s root causes. Working in
partnership with survivors, experts and its
members, Anti-Slavery International manages
projects in countries worldwide to help
communities to understand and eliminate
the causes and adverse effects of modern
slavery, through legislative change, research
and advocacy. Anti-Slavery International isa UK-registered charity (No. 1049160) and acompany limited by guarantee, registered inEngland and Wales (no. 3079904).

The intersection between
modern slavery, climatechange, and migration
In recent years, the negative effects of climatechange have forced millions of people to leave
their homes and move elsewhere. People on
the move, a group already vulnerable to severe
exploitation6 are at particular risk when moving in
the context of climate change. This is because they
are likely migrating as their livelihood and survival
opportunities at home are severely threatenedor have ceased to exist. In these circumstances,migration takes place “in distress,” meaning ina situation of severe need and precariousness.
As a result, people become more vulnerable toforced labour as they are already lacking adequate
livelihood options and may be more easily tricked
into accepting risky opportunities for survival.
Overall, research by Anti-Slavery International andthe International Institute for Environment andDevelopment (IIED) demonstrates that “climatechange acts as a stress multiplier to factors driving
modern slavery.”7
Governments are failing to respond to thechallenges that migration in these circumstances
poses to individuals. The latest summary report by
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC),8 the United Nations expert body providing
scientific evidence on climate change, suggeststhat severe climate events are pushing people
to migrate in most of the world’s regions. People
are moving across borders as well as within theircountry’s national boundaries. In 2021, climaterelated disasters led to the displacement of nearly
24 million people globally. Most were attributed
to rapid-onset weather-related events such as
storms, floods, wildfires, droughts, landslides, andextreme temperatures.9 The World Bank highlightsthat unless urgent climate action is taken soon,
then by 2050 more than 200 million people will have
moved within their country’s borders as a result ofclimate change.10

For more information
visit https://antislavery.org.

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SPOTLIGHTS

CLIMATE

How do climate change
events push people tomigrate?
While climate change is rarely the only reason
people migrate, migration can be a response toeither slow or rapid onset climate events, andsometimes both.

Rapid onset events
Rapid onset events, such as floods or hurricanes,
are events that destroy livelihood opportunities
and households resources suddenly. In these
instances, climate events push people into suddenor heightened situations of need to earn an income,thereby leaving them vulnerable to exploitation byhuman traffickers and other criminal organisations.

For example, modern slavery risks dramaticallyincreased in the aftermath of Super Typhoon Rai,
which hit the Philippines in December 2021 anddisplaced hundreds of thousands of people.11
The typhoon caused widespread damage in the
agricultural sector and decimated the livelihoods
that depended on it, exacerbating vulnerabilities
particularly for indigenous populations.12
Risks of violence and exploitation were also
identified among women and girls,13 who aredisproportionately vulnerable in the face of theclimate crisis.14 In Bangladesh, an increased riskof early marriage among girls from impoverishedfamilies has been attributed to extreme weather
events. The practice is seen as a means of alleviating
economic pressure and providing protection fromthe heightened risk of sexual violence duringcrises.15

Leaving to survive, fighting to return:the impact of climate change
In 2013, Super Typhoon Haiyan, known locallyas Typhoon Yolanda, struck the Philippines,
destroying millions of homes and livelihoods,
killing more than 6,000 people, and leaving many
more displaced. Luwalhati*, who is 31 years old,and her family were among those who survived;
however, the aftermath of the disaster left themin poverty and Luwalhati was forced to seek work
abroad to support her ailing mother and two
younger brothers in Tacloban City.
She met a local recruiter who offered her a wellpaid position in a factory overseas, promising
all her expenses would be covered as well. Yet
after arriving in Manila for training, Luwalhati
was forced to work in a house there without pay.
The man who later accompanied her to obtainher passport instructed her to apply with thename written in the papers she was holding if she
wanted to go abroad, otherwise she should goback home at her own expense.

“How can I go back to Tacloban? I do nothave the money...My family is hopingthat I will be able to help them cope fromwhat the typhoon had left us.”
Luwalhati left the Philippines for Thailand holding
a tourist visa. From there, she travelled to Dubai.
After working in Dubai for some time, she was soldas a domestic worker to an employer in Kuwait,a country she had never even heard of. Upon
arrival, her passport was confiscated and she wasleft feeling confused, depressed, and isolated.

64

She was forced to work for 12 to 15 hours a day
and her salary was often withheld if she madea mistake. Her employers did not allow her totalk to anyone nor leave the house, and she wasphysically abused by them. All she could do wasstay strong for her family and not give up.
Luwalhati was forced to work in Kuwait for five
years. Every time she disposed of the waste
outside, a young Kuwaiti woman next door smiled
at her. One day, the neighbour told her to contact
an NGO on social media to help her. Luwalhati
contacted them secretly and they helped herescape.

“I saw hope, for almost five years of notseeing my family. This was the chance forme to set myself free.”
She was brought to the authorities, who helped
her file a case and she was repatriated back to
her country. At present, Luwalhati has set up asmall store to support herself and family using thereintegration livelihood assistant program that
the NGO helped her to acquire, while attending
vocational education in Tacloban City.

Slow-onset climate events
Slow-onset events, such as droughts and rising
sea-levels, result in lands becoming increasingly
inhospitable. In these instances, loss of livelihood
opportunities and extreme climate conditions canpush individuals to move elsewhere for survival.
Under these circumstances, their need to earn
income can lead them to accept risky, exploitative
employment solutions and incur debts to financetheir migration journeys, in turn pushing them into
situations of debt-bondage.
While rapid-onset severe weather events or climate
shocks typically receive greater attention due tothe visibility of their impacts,16 the nexus between
slow-onset climate events, migration, and modern
slavery should not be ignored.
A 2022 study of two climate-affected locationsin India found a higher prevalence of trafficking
among migrants from a district suffering from slowonset events compared to a district experiencing
rapid-onset events.17 In Palamu district, increasing
drought and frost in recent decades havedamaged the sustainability of agriculture andforest resources, leading to higher unemployment
and pushing community members to migrate insearch of work. Meanwhile, in Kendrapara district,communities have been affected by cyclones,
floods, sea water intrusion, and salinity. The study
showed that 42 per cent of migrant households from
Palamu had experienced trafficking in comparison
to 16 per cent in Kendrapara, which could be
partly explained by the nature of the climate
events. A lack of support and social protection forcommunities facing slow-onset events exacerbatedthe vulnerabilities they already faced.18 In both
locations, caste and class-based discrimination isdriving disparity of access to resources, exploitation,and land grabs, which contributes to leaving somegroups at greater risk than others.
In the Horn of Africa, increases in the rate ofchild marriages in drought-affected areas havebeen linked to the impacts of the climate crisis,
particularly economic and food insecurity,
displacement from homes, and interrupted
education for girls.19 In families unable to cope withclimate-induced food insecurity, girls are at greaterrisk of being sold into sex work or early marriage
to ease the financial strain on the household, 20
sometimes through payment of bride price.21*not her real name

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

In some cases, slow-onset climate change threatens
the existence of entire nations, such as among
the Pacific Island countries and territories, whereenvironmental factors have been forcing people
from their homes. In 2014, the entire town of
Vunidogoloa in Fiji was permanently relocated by
the government as a result of the impact of climatechange, 22 including encroaching sea water, regularflooding, and soil erosion. In atoll countries – a ringor chain of islands formed by coral – such as Kiribati
and Niue, permanent relocation as a coping strategy
for climate change has been on the political agenda
for more than a decade.23 Across the Pacific Island
countries, risks created by environmental hazards
increase as intensifying weather events and rising
sea levels lead to greater food and water insecurity,
crop loss, loss of arable land, overcrowding, poor
health and sanitation, and increased competition
for limited jobs.24 These conditions create
opportunities for traffickers to exploit vulnerable
individuals, 25 particularly where avenues for regularmigration are not readily available.26 Womenand girls with limited land rights are particularly
vulnerable in these situations because they alreadyface discrimination and become at greater risk of
exploitation, particularly forced commercial sexual
exploitation.27

A vicious circle driven by
extractive industries
Environmental degradation, often a sideeffect of the economic activities of extractive
industries such as mining and oil extraction,
can similarly become a driver of migrationthat causes higher vulnerability to severe
exploitation. In these cases, individuals
can become trapped in a “vicious circle”
where people flee their homelands due
to environmental degradation caused byextractive practices, but end up working inthese very same extractive industries, often
experiencing exploitation. This is evidenced by
Anti-Slavery International’s research in Peru
and Bolivia.28
Extractive industries not only continue todestroy the environment and exacerbate thenegative impacts of climate change, fuelling
migration from affected communities, butalso heavily rely on the severe exploitationof people. Often, people who have lost theirlivelihoods are then left with no option otherthan accepting exploitative conditions to earnsome income to feed their families.

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SPOTLIGHTS

Compounding
vulnerabilities
Who is most vulnerable
to these impacts?

CLIMATE

The impacts of climate change, particularly on
decisions to migrate and on heightened risks
of modern slavery, are not felt equally. They hit
much harder on people who already experience
limited access to resources, representation, andparticipation in society, both in terms of theimmediate impacts from climate-induced weather
events and ongoing risks associated with migrationand exposure to severe exploitation.
Further research conducted by IIED in two statesin India suggests that lower caste households,
such those of India’s Dalits, who are significantly
discriminated against, are three times more likely
to migrate than higher caste households.29 Wheninequalities, discrimination, and marginalisation
exist, resilience to external shocks generated
by the impact of climate change is low,
precariousness increases, and so does vulnerability
to modern slavery. Lack of inclusive access to
support mechanisms often means that specificcharacteristics – such as a person’s gender, age,or disability – creates further barriers to accessing
support. This can increase vulnerability to
severe exploitation.
When the negative impacts of climate change are
combined with immobility, vulnerability to modern
slavery can also be amplified as local resources andnetworks are eroded. Immobility can arise fromlack of options to move elsewhere (such as due tolack of means) or from an unwillingness to migrate.
Immobility is also found among already displaced
people (who lack safe return options to their countryof origin or access to resources) and in communities
that hold a strong link with their ancestral lands.

What other factors can play a role?
Separately, other structural factors, such as conflict,persecution, or political instability, can combine withclimate change and other drivers to push people tomigrate in situations of precariousness and make themmore vulnerable to modern slavery.30
The negative impacts of climate change can also be
among the factors fuelling tensions between local
populations, as basic resources become scarce andthe arrival of new groups puts pressure on existing
infrastructure. 31 This can create competition overresources and in turn increase social tension andconflict, resulting in heightened modern slavery
risks. In Somalia, extreme weather disrupts
access to water and increases food insecurity. 32
Simultaneously, internally displaced people seek
refuge from conflict and droughts by fleeing to
Mogadishu, thereby increasing the strain on hostcommunities. 33 These factors have contributed
to escalating tensions between clans and areamong those which can lead to the proliferation
66

of illegal armed groups, which in turn drive further
displacement 34 and migration35 while recruiting
people affected by famine and food insecurity. 36
Extreme weather and climate-related resource
scarcity are among the factors that have contributed
to recruitment into non-state armed groups suchas al-Shabaab, 37 Boko Haram, 38 and Islamic State, 39
which have been linked to modern slavery, including
forced marriage 40 and the recruitment and use ofchildren.41
Climate change can also exacerbate vulnerability
in displaced settings. In Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh,flooding and landslides during monsoon season
destroyed thousands of shelters occupied by Rohingya
refugees fleeing persecution in Myanmar, further
increasing humanitarian needs in the camps.42 For agroup already vulnerable to exploitation, the impact
of climate events is significant, with further spikes in
exploitation linked to increasing scarcity of resources
and precarious living conditions.
More widely, where conflict has weakened
institutions or aggravated drivers such as economic
and food insecurity, communities and governments
may also find themselves struggling to cope withthe adverse effects of climate change and unable
to adequately support individuals at greater risk ofmodern slavery.43“From South Sudan, to the Sahel, to the
Dry Corridor in Central America, refugees,
internally displaced and stateless people
are often among the first to be affected by
the climate emergency.”
Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees,202144

Exploitation’s circular
economyIn a separate, but related, issue to climateinduced migration, it is well-known that modern
slavery is pervasive in some of the world’s mostenvironmentally- and climate-damaging industries.
The charcoal, cattle, and palm oil industries areassociated with forced labour, where workers
in debt bondage are forced to clear forests; theillegality of this deforestation means that workers
are unable to report such exploitative practices.45
Moves to replace fossil fuels with biofuels, such as
palm oil, have had unintended environmental andsocial impacts.46 In Indonesia and Malaysia — theworld’s leading producers of palm oil — increased
production has led to deforestation and loss of
biodiversity47 and has been linked to forced labour.48
Conversely, those industries most necessary for
our urgent transition to clean energy are also sadly
currently reliant on exploitation and forced labour.
For example, risks have been identified throughout
the solar energy value chain, from evidence offorced and child labour in cobalt artisanal minesin the Democratic Republic of the Congo49 to the
production of polysilicon in the Uyghur region ofChina, 50 which evidence shows is reliant on systemicstate-imposed forced labour of the Uyghurs andother Turkic and Muslim-majority groups. 51 The
need to include just transition measures, suchas ensuring decent work for all in the transition
to a low-carbon economy, has been enshrined ininternational treaties on climate change such as theParis Agreement 52 but has yet to be fully realised.
With global temperatures almost inevitably set tocontinue rising, 53 government and business action
to address both climate change and modern slavery— and its intersections with conflict, displacement,
gender, and industry supply chains — are critical.

What are the solutions
we need?
There are still significant gaps in our understandingof how climate change and modern slavery
interact with one another in different contexts andwhat solutions we need to eradicate the risks. In
fact, the exact manifestations of vulnerability to
severe exploitation emerging from climate change
impacts, including climate-induced migration, arehighly context specific. For example, they change
depending on the type of climate emergency andthe existing structural and individual factors that
can amplify the impacts of climate events, as wellas on the degree of precariousness and need that
individuals experience. While the problem is global,
solutions need to be local and driven by thoseaffected.
This also means that we need to better understand
who is most affected and vulnerable in thecontext of climate-change, including climateinduced migration. To do so, practitioners andpolicymakers need to direct their focus to listening
and understanding the experiences of those who
are traditionally not represented in societies andwho often are excluded in blanket approaches
to climate responses. This includes groups thatare highly dependent on natural resources, suchas indigenous people and rural communities,
but also communities that face multiple formsof discrimination.
As we learn more about the intersection of climatechange and modern slavery, we need to define
specific solutions to reduce vulnerabilities. AntiSlavery International is investigating these elements
and collating evidence that can inform the designof solutions that are effective and speak to theneeds of the most vulnerable. Meanwhile, the global
community should move forward swiftly on actions
that can be taken now. Policymakers have a key arole to play in reducing the risk of modern slavery inthe context of climate change. Responses must be
people-focused, rights-centred and integrated. If
we act quickly in response to the linked challenges
posed by climate change and modern slavery, we
can make real progress toward a more just andequal society that is free of exploitation.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Recommendations
for governments

1

Take decisive climate action to put
a halt to the worsening of climatechange and the negative effects it has
on communities across the world. This
includes making the necessary, sciencebased reductions in carbon emissionsin accordance with internationallyrecognised timelines.

2

Design climate solutions with anintersectional and inclusive approachthat takes into account human rights
violations, including vulnerability tomodern slavery.

3

Develop safer and more legal routes for
migration, to increase protection fromvulnerability to severe exploitation.
This should include removing barriers
that prevent migrants from seeking
refuge54 from the impacts of climatechange. National policies should
address the vulnerabilities to modern
slavery of internal migrants, including
by improving accessibility to social
protection mechanisms.

4

Support local communities to become
more resilient to climate events,
through introducing risk management
strategies, livelihood protection
support, collective bargaining support,
and social protection initiatives
to ease pressure on households toadopt risky coping strategies amid
climate-related displacement. 55

5Ensure that the transition to acarbon-free global economy provides
decent work for all by addressing
and preventing forced labour risks
in the value chains of sustainableenergy products.

6

Ensure that climate finance throughthe United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change isallocated to addressing climate-induced
vulnerability to modern slavery. 56

67

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGS
Regional Overview................................................................ 70
Africa........................................................................................ 76
Frontline voices:
Modern slavery and the LGBTQI+ community................86
The Americas.......................................................................... 88
Frontline voices:Black and Brown like me:
Racial roots of modern slavery........................................96
Arab States.............................................................................. 98
Spotlight: Disempowered, dehumanised,deported: Life under the kafala system....................... 108
Asia and The Pacific............................................................ 116
Frontline voices:“I have no way out”: Forced into marriage,
Afghan girls fear for their future....................................124
Spotlight: Orphanages as modern slavery hubs......... 126
Europe and Central Asia.................................................... 130

King City, California, April 2020.
Socially-distanced migrant farm labourers rest in their dormitory.
Restrictions on movement due to the COVID-19 pandemic, coupled withrising unemployment rates, poverty, and inequality across the UnitedStates, exposed vulnerable workers to greater risks of exploitation.
Photo credit: Brent Stirton via Getty Images

68

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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05

REGIONAL
FINDINGSREGIONALOVERVIEW

Figure 10
Prevalence of modern slavery (per 1,000 people),by region and type









What is the extent andnature of modern slavery
across the world’s regions?
Globally, nearly one in every 150 people are inmodern slavery. Modern slavery affects every region
in the world. More than half the men, women, andchildren living in modern slavery globally are in the
Asia and the Pacific region (29.3 million). However,when the size of regional populations is considered,prevalence of modern slavery is highest in the ArabStates (10.1 per thousand people) (Figure 11). Thisis followed by Europe and Central Asia (6.9 perthousand), Asia and the Pacific (6.8 per thousand),Africa (5.2 per thousand), and the Americas(5 per thousand).
Although comparisons between regions are
impacted by data gaps, particularly in countries
experiencing profound and current conflict(see Appendix 2: Part A for a fuller discussion oflimitations), interesting differences emerge whenforced labour and forced marriage are consideredseparately. For forced labour, Arab States has thehighest prevalence (5.3 per thousand people),followed by Europe and Central Asia (4.4 per
thousand). The prevalence of forced labour is lowest
in Africa (2.9 per thousand). For forced marriage,
prevalence is again highest in the Arab States(4.8 per thousand), followed by Asia and the Pacific(3.3 per thousand), and lowest in the Americas(1.5 per thousand).
At the regional level, the impact of conflict andstate-imposed forced labour on prevalence ofmodern slavery remains consistent with the global
findings, with the highest prevalence occurring incountries with several reports of state-imposed
forced labour or are otherwise impacted byprotracted or recent conflict. The countries withhighest prevalence across the regions include
Eritrea, Mauritania, and South Sudan (Africa);
Venezuela, Haiti and El Salvador (Americas); Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait (ArabStates); North Korea, Afghanistan, and Myanmar(Asia and the Pacific); and Türkiye, Tajikistan, andRussia (Europe and Central Asia).

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AFRICA
California,
United States,
October 2019.

AMERICAS

ARAB
STATESASIA ANDTHE PACIFICEUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA

An inmate firefighter crew
works during the Palisades
Fire which scorched at least 40
acres and threatened hillside
homes. News media reports
indicate that inmates work
under exploitative conditions,
receive little firefighter
training, and are paid as
little as US$2.90 per day.
Photo credit: Mario Tama via
Getty Images.

70

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

71

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGS

What drives vulnerability tomodern slavery across theworld’s regions?
Improving our understanding of which factors
increase vulnerability to modern slavery is essential
to developing and implementing successfulinterventions. Our assessment of country-level risk
factors covers five dimensions — governance issues,lack of basic needs, inequality, disenfranchised
groups, and effects of conflict — and is scored as apercentage where 100 represents extremely highvulnerability (see Appendix 2: Part B).

A regional analysis of our vulnerability measuressuggests higher risk of modern slavery in Africa andthe Americas than is evident in the prevalence data
(Table 3). Africa has the highest vulnerability (64 percent) of any region, despite having relatively low
prevalence scores for both forced labour and forced
marriage. The lowest levels of vulnerability arefound in Europe and Central Asia (27 per cent). Whileregional risk differs across the dimensions, every
region performs poorly on measures of acceptanceof minority groups. In Europe and Central Asia,
where there is relatively strong governance, accessto basic needs, and low levels of inequality, there
remain gaps in protection on the basis of migration
status, sexual orientation, and racial and ethnic
groups. Figure 11 shows how countries in the region
scored in relation to the regional average on eachdimension of vulnerability.

Figure 11
Level of vulnerability to modern slavery
with regional averages








63



Table 3
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by region anddimension

Regions

Governanceissues (%)

Lack of basic
needs (%)

Inequality(%)

Disenfranchised
groups (%)

Effects ofconflict (%)

Total
(%)

Africa

61

53

52

70

37

64

Americas

44

35

55

52

25

44

Arab States

60

38

40

71

40

56

Asia andthe Pacific
Europe andCentral Asia

48

42

39

61

35

48

31

25

30

51

23

27

58



48
44





28




Idlib, Syria,
December 2020.
A young boy crushes stones tosell as construction materials
and help support his familyliving in a tent camp forinternally displaced people.
Thousands of civilians fledfrom attacks by the Assadregime to the camps and arestruggling to survive in theharsh conditions as winterapproaches. Photo credit:
Muhammed Said/Anadolu
Agency via Getty Images.

72

AFRICAAMERICAS



GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

ARAB
STATESASIA ANDTHE PACIFIC

 

EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA

48

73

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGS

Table 4Government
response score,by region andmilestone

74

What are governments
across the world’s region
doing to address modern
slavery?

of many governments in this region had largely
stagnated due to competing priorities in theintervening years.

Figure 12
Government response scorewith regional averages

Our assessment of government responses tomodern slavery covers five milestones of a strong
response — identification and support for survivors,
effectiveness of criminal justice mechanisms,
national and regional level coordination, efforts
to address underlying risk, and governmentand business supply chains. This is scored as apercentage, where 100 represents the strongest
possible response.

The Americas region has the second strongest
response to modern slavery, reflecting continued
improvements in both criminal justice frameworks
and coordination of support services. The ArabStates, while having the highest prevalence ofmodern slavery, has an average government
response score of 43 per cent, driven by significant
improvements in planning and coordinationof responses against modern slavery, but also
reflecting that few governments in the region are
directly tackling the vulnerabilities associated withthe kafala system.

Europe and Central Asia has the strongest response
to modern slavery, with an average score of 54 percent. These governments, particularly those fromthe European subregion, generally had both highlevels of political will to combat the issue andthe required resources to enact comprehensive
responses. Comparatively strong legal frameworks,
including on monitoring business supply chains(for which scores were profoundly low across all
regions), characterised the responses of thesegovernments. However, there is not much differencein these scores in comparison to 2018; the actions

While Africa has the lowest average government
response score across the regions, it isoutperforming Arab States on criminal justicemechanisms (Table 4). Average scores also hide
great regional variability with some nations in
Africa (Nigeria and South Africa) performing at asimilar level to European nations. Implementing
more comprehensive responses to combat modern
slavery is still limited across all regions by resource
constraints and the multiple and converging crises,
such as ongoing conflicts, climate change, and theslow recovery following the COVID-19 pandemic.











54


48
43



40

36

Regions
AfricaAmericas
Arab States
Asia andthe Pacific
Europe andCentral Asia

Criminal
Survivors
justiceidentified andmechanisms
supported(%)(%)

National andregional level
coordination
(%)

Risk
factors are
addressed(%)

Governmentand businesssupply chains
(%)

Total
(%)



34
46
51
38

46
58
45
48

42
56
56
51

37
52
48
45

1
5
0
4

36
48
43
40

54

62

64

58

17

54





AFRICAAMERICAS



GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

ARAB
STATESASIA ANDTHE PACIFIC

   

EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA

48

75

05
05

Africa is a vast and diverse region that accounts
for 17 per cent of the world’s population. Modern
slavery in Africa is driven by ongoing politicalinstability, poverty, displacement of people due
to conflict and climate change, and the impact of
the COVID-19 pandemic. Modern slavery manifests
differently throughout Africa; it occurs in every
country in the region, while those with higher
prevalence typically experience compounding
vulnerability factors. More than 3.1 million Africans
are in forced marriage, the drivers of which depend
on factors in their location, such as the presenceof conflict, poverty, or persistence of certain
traditional practices. There are more than 3.8
million people in forced labour across Africa. At
particularly high risk are adults and children who
travel from rural and remote areas to urban centres
seeking work. Higher rates of descent-based slavery
and forced begging continue to occur in parts of
the Sahel.

AFRICAREGIONAL
REGIONAL
FINDINGSFINDINGSAFRICA

Tunisia
Central African
Republic

MoroccoSenegalAlgeria

Mauritania

Libya

Egypt

Eritrea

Djibouti
Mali

Niger

Sudan

Chad

Somalia
GambiaGuinea-Bissau

Nigeria
Ethiopia

South
Sudan

GuineaBenin
SierraLeone
LiberiaTogo

CôtedʼvoireGhana

UgandaCameroon
Kenya

Democratic
Republicof the Congo

Equatorial
GuineaRwandaBurundiTanzania

MalawiBurkina Faso

Gabon

AngolaZambia
Mauritius

Republicof the Congo
Namibia
Botswana

Madagascar

South Africa

Regional
heat map:
prevalence

Low

76

Mozambique

Lesotho

Zimbabwe

Eswatini

Over the past four years, many African countries
have taken actions to improve their response tomodern slavery. Nigeria and South Africa havetaken the most action, while Eritrea and Libya
have taken the least. South Sudan was excluded
from the assessment of government action onmodern slavery due to ongoing conflict and extreme
disruption to government function. Much moreneeds to be done to provide support for survivors,
strengthen laws to protect people, and develop
national strategies to combat modern slavery.

What is the extent andnature of modern slavery
in the region?
On any given day in 2021, an estimated 7 million
men, women, and children were living in modern
slavery in Africa, a prevalence of 5.2 people inmodern slavery for every thousand people. Africa
had the fourth highest prevalence of modern slavery
among the five regions of the world, following
the Arab States (10.1 per thousand), Europe andCentral Asia (6.9), and Asia and the Pacific (6.8).
Forced labour was the most common form ofmodern slavery in the region, at a rate of 2.9 perthousand people, while forced marriage was at
2.4 per thousand.
When considering the total number of people inforced marriage worldwide, 13 per cent (3.2 million)
were in Africa, second to Asia and the Pacific, which
at 65 per cent has by far the highest share of theworld’s forced marriages. Fourteen per cent of all
people in forced labour were in Africa (3.8 million),
the third highest behind Asia and the Pacific (55 percent) and Europe and Central Asia (15 per cent).

High

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

The countries with the highest prevalence ofmodern slavery in Africa are Eritrea, Mauritania,
and South Sudan. The countries with the lowest
prevalence of modern slavery in Africa are Mauritius,
Lesotho, and Botswana.
Nearly 4 million men, women, and children
experience forced labour in Africa, particularly inthe mining, agriculture, fishing, and domestic work
sectors.1 African job seekers misled by traffickers
with false promises are subjected to forced labour
abroad, such as in the Gulf states.2 Children are also
exploited in their pursuit of education. For example,
under the confiage (trust) system in Togo, children
from rural areas are sent to cities to complete
their education and live with relatives, who may
force them into domestic servitude. 3 Nigerian girls
seeking employment as domestic helpers to help
pay for schooling are also subjected to domestic
servitude.4 In Senegal, talibe (student, seeker)
children in Quranic schools are forced to beg. 5
In Africa, forced marriage particularly impacts
women and girls. One in every 300 females in theregion was in a forced marriage compared to one
in every thousand males.6 In the aftermath of the
COVID-19 pandemic, reports of child marriages
increased in Sudan, Egypt,7 and parts of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC),8 and theynearly doubled in communities across Senegal and
Uganda.9 Women and girls living in conflict zones
also experience forced and child marriage, including
as a negative coping mechanism by families toprotect them from further violence10 and by fighters
who abduct, marry, and exploit women and girls as
domestic and sexual slaves.11 Forced commercial
sexual exploitation of women and girls is used as aweapon of war by both state and non-state groups,
reportedly in the Central African Republic, the DRC,
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan,12 and by both parties
to the civil war in Ethiopia’s Tigray region.13“My father introduced me tohusbands since I was twelve.”

Estimated
number living inmodern slavery:

7.0

MILLION(5.2 per thousand)Regional
proportion of
global estimate:

14%
Forced labour

54%
Forced marriage

46%

Averagevulnerability
score:

64%

Sudanese female on her forced marriage at age 17

Although these figures are the most reliable todate, they are conservative estimates given thegaps and limitations of data collection in Africa. It
is not possible to conduct nationally representative
surveys in countries experiencing profound conflict,which leads to an underestimate of forms of modern
slavery such as the recruitment of child soldiers.
Despite gaps in data, reports indicate children havebeen recruited into armed groups in the DRC, Mali,
Central African Republic, Mozambique, Nigeria,
Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, Niger, Cameroon, Chad,
Burkina Faso, and Somalia.14

Averagegovernment
response rating:36%

Top 3 countries:
Nigeria
54%
South Africa
53%
Rwanda50%
Bottom 3 countries:
Eritrea
5%
Libya
10%
Somalia
18%

77

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGSAFRICA

Table 5
Estimated
prevalence andnumber of people
in modern slavery,
by country

Regional Country
rank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

78

Eritrea
Mauritania
South Sudan
Republic of the Congo
Nigeria
Equatorial Guinea
Gabon
BurundiCôte d’Ivoire
Djibouti
Libya
GambiaEthiopia
Somalia
Chad
Cameroon
Central African RepublicMali
ZambiaKenya
Zimbabwe
Malawi
Niger
Madagascar
Democratic Republicof the Congo
Guinea-Bissau
Egypt
RwandaUgandaAngolaGuineaSudan
Burkina Faso
Eswatini
Sierra Leone
Togo
Liberia
Benin
Mozambique
SenegalGhana
Tanzania
South Africa
Namibia
Tunisia
MoroccoAlgeria
Botswana
Lesotho
Mauritius

Estimated
prevalence ofmodern slavery(per 1,000of population)

Estimated numberof people inmodern slavery

Population

90.3
32.0
10.3
8.0
7.8
7.8
7.6
7.5
7.3
7.1
6.8
6.5
6.3
6.2
5.9
5.8
5.2
5.2
5.1
5.0
5.0
4.9
4.6
4.6
4.5

320,000
149,000
115,000
44,0001,611,000
11,00017,00089,000193,000
7,000
47,00016,000727,000
98,00097,000155,000
25,000106,000
94,000269,000
74,00093,000112,000
127,000
407,000

3,546,000
4,650,000
11,194,000
5,518,000
206,140,000
1,403,000
2,226,000
11,891,000
26,378,000
988,000
6,871,000
2,417,000
114,964,000
15,893,000
16,426,000
26,546,000
4,830,000
20,251,000
18,384,000
53,771,000
14,863,000
19,130,000
24,207,000
27,691,000
89,561,000

4.5
4.3
4.3
4.2
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.7
3.6
3.4
3.3
3.1
3.0
3.0
2.9
2.9
2.9
2.7
2.4
2.3
2.3
1.9
1.8
1.6
1.5

9,000
442,000
55,000190,000
136,000
53,000174,000
77,0004,000
27,00028,00016,00037,00093,00049,00091,000171,000
158,000
6,000
27,00085,00084,000
4,000
4,000
2,000

1,968,000
102,334,000
12,952,000
45,741,000
32,866,000
13,133,000
43,849,000
20,903,000
1,160,000
7,977,000
8,279,000
5,058,000
12,123,000
31,255,000
16,744,000
31,073,000
59,734,000
59,309,000
2,541,000
11,819,000
36,911,000
43,851,000
2,352,000
2,142,000
1,272,000

What drives vulnerability
to modern slavery in theregion?
Africa has the highest vulnerability to modern
slavery of all regions and is home to the four mostvulnerable countries: South Sudan, Somalia, Central
African Republic, and the DRC (Table 6). Mauritius
had the lowest vulnerability in the region. The
largest driver of vulnerability was discrimination
towards migrants and minority cultural and ethnic
groups. Common to the most vulnerable countries
are issues such as conflict, political instability, mass
displacement, and poverty. The impacts of COVID-19
have compounded risk of modern slavery acrossthe region.

Vulnerability to modern slavery was driven bya higher risk of discrimination on the basis of
migration status, race, ethnicity, and/or sexual
orientation. Contemporary reports of slavery exist
in Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and Sudan, where
people, often from minority ethnic groups, are born
into slavery and bought, traded, and sold.15
In Mauritania, Niger, and Mali, widespread ethnic orcaste-based discrimination manifests in descentbased slavery.16 In Mauritania, for example, slavery
tends to follow racial lines, as black Haratine
people are typically forced to work for the lighterskinned “white Moor” community in agriculture anddomestic work.17 Despite some legal reforms, thepractice of Wahaya (put in the bedroom) continues
in northern Nigeria and Niger, where girls born intoslavery are sold as a “fifth wife” and subjected todomestic and sexual servitude.18

Governance issues

61%

Lack of basic needs

53%

Inequality

52%

Disenfranchised groups
Effects of conflict
Total

Figure 13
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by dimension

69%
36%
63%

Lome, Togo,
June 2021.
A young fisherman pulls
the net with his catch fromthe water to the beach.
Children reportedly as
young as five years aretrafficked from within the
country as well as fromneighbouring countries
such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire,
Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria,
and Niger, and are forced
to work in sectors likefishing, agriculture, anddomestic work, among
others. Photo credit: Ute
Grabowsky/Photothek via
Getty Images.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

79

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGSAFRICA

Table 6
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by country

80

CountrySouth Sudan
Somalia
Central African Republic
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Chad
Sudan
Libya
Guinea-Bissau
Republic of the Congo
BurundiNiger
Nigeria
Zimbabwe
Mali
Cameroon
Equatorial Guinea
Ethiopia
Mozambique
Kenya
Mauritania
Eritrea
GuineaUgandaAngolaMadagascar
LesothoEswatini
Gabon
Egypt
Côte d’Ivoire
ZambiaGambiaDjibouti
Togo
Liberia
Burkina Faso
Sierra Leone
MalawiTanzania
RwandaSenegalSouth Africa
Benin
Tunisia
Namibia
Ghana
Botswana
MoroccoAlgeria
Mauritius

Total (%)
100
98
98
94
84
82
80
80
77
77
76
76
75
73
71
69
67
67
66
66
66
66
62
61
60
59
59
59
59
59
58
58
57
57
56
56
55
55
53
53
53
52
48
48
47
45
45
44
43
20

Some countries in the region continued to exhibit
political instability, weak rule of law, and corruption,
all of which increase the risk of modern slavery.
Overall, governance issues were the second greatest
driver of vulnerability in the region. South Sudan
and Somalia have faced violent clashes and politicalinstability.19 From 2020 to early 2022, there havebeen multiple military takeovers in the region: in
Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea, Mali, and Sudan, 20
in addition to failed military coups in Niger andGuinea-Bissau.21 This political unrest can cause
displacement and disrupt national responses tomodern slavery, putting people at higher risk.
Poverty and economic inequality drive vulnerability
in the Africa region. Thirty-five per cent of people
in Sub-Saharan Africa live in poverty.22 Poverty candrive desperate families to marry off daughters to
reduce household costs and generate an income
through obtaining a bride dowry.23 Families livingin extreme poverty may also require their children
to enter the workforce. In 2020, there were morechild labourers in Sub-Saharan Africa than in therest of the world combined.24 Widespread childlabour increases the risk of the worst forms of childlabour.25 Poverty and limited job opportunities inAfrica also drive migration, which increases risk of
exploitation by labour recruiters.26 This migration
is predominantly intra-regional and marked by
the movement of low-skilled workers, particularly
in sectors characterised by high demand such as
agriculture, aquaculture, construction, resource
extraction, and domestic work.27
Compared to other regions, parts of Africa areheavily impacted by conflict. At the end of 2020
there were more than 24 million internally displaced
persons (IDPs) in Sub-Saharan Africa, most ofwhom were displaced due to conflict and violence.28
In Nigeria, the DRC, and South Sudan, modern
slavery and related abuses were not only prevalent
among IDPs but were inextricably linked to conflict.
Perpetrators of slavery-related abuses were largely
members of the armed groups or armed forces who
deliberately exploited displaced populations tofurther their conflict-related operations.29 Risks also
persist within IDP camps. For example, some camps
in Eastern Sudan have decreased security, thereby
becoming targets for traffickers. 30 The number ofpeople displaced from their homes will only increase
further with climate change. It is estimated thatwithout any action on climate change there will be
86 million internal climate migrants in Sub-SaharanAfrica by 2050. 31 Displaced populations are highly
vulnerable to abuse and exploitation.

“When [armed group] kidnapped me, I wasforced to marry one of their leaders.”
Nigerian female on her forced marriage at age 28

What are governments in
the region doing to address
modern slavery?
Walk Free assessed government responses tomodern slavery in 51 countries in the region.
Governments across the region scored an averageof 36 per cent, the weakest average response of
all regions. Overall, while governments improved
identification measures and legal frameworks,
gaps in services available to survivors remained
and only limited action has been taken to address
systemic risk factors to modern slavery. While three
countries have identified and taken action withhigh-risk sectors to address modern slavery, no
country has taken further action to combat modern
slavery in government and business supply chains.
South Sudan was excluded from the assessmentof government action on modern slavery due
to ongoing conflict and extreme disruption to
government function.
GDP per capita PPP (current international $) varies
widely across the region. Of the four countries withthe strongest responses (Nigeria, South Africa,
Rwanda, and Tunisia — see Table 7), it varies from
US$2,494 in Rwanda to a high of US$14,420 inSouth Africa. 32 Relative to their wealth, both Nigeria
and Rwanda are outperforming their wealthiest
neighbours in Africa, such as Seychelles, Libya,
Mauritius, Equatorial Guinea, and Botswana. 33 Given
Rwanda has the lowest GDP per capita of all four
countries, but with relatively strong government
responses to modern slavery, it is outperforming all
countries in the region on action taken to address
modern slavery relative to its wealth.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Nigeria (54 per cent), South Africa (53 per cent), andRwanda (50 per cent) have the strongest responses
to modern slavery in the region. Nigeria andSouth Africa both strongly address risk factors tomodern slavery and provide adequate protection to
citizens overseas.
Eritrea has the weakest government response tomodern slavery in Africa and the second weakest
response globally (5 per cent), followed by Libya(10 per cent). Eritrea’s and Libya’s responses areundermined by state-imposed forced labour.
Eritrean citizens aged 18 to 40 years are forced into
labour indefinitely in the government’s compulsory
national service scheme. 34 They are threatened with
torture, prison, or harm to their family members forrefusing to comply. 35 In Libya, migrants continue
to be trafficked and sold in “slave markets” where
they are then tortured for ransom or exploited inforced labour. 36 In some instances, the only way
out of detention centres for migrants is to be soldto employers. 37

Manica Province,
Mozambique, May 2022.
A woman sits outside of adormitory at a refuge forwomen and children who
have survived sexual violence,
gender-based violence,
and abandonment. Studies
estimate that half of all
Mozambican woman are
married before the age of 18,
and more than one in five haveexperienced violence. Photo
credit: Alfredo Zunigo/AFP via
Getty Images.

Many countries in Africa have taken action to
improve their response to modern slavery since our2018 assessment. Angola introduced the National
Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human
Beings and allocated funding and support to theoperation of shelters. 38 Namibia implemented a
National Referral Mechanism and provided police
and immigration officials with pocket manuals
on procedures. 39 The National Committee toCombat Human Trafficking and Similar Practices
in Guinea introduced standard operatingprocedures for victim identification and referral,
however it is unclear if these procedures havebeen operationalised.40

81

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FINDINGSAFRICA

Table 7
Government
response score,by country andmilestone

82

Country

NigeriaSouth Africa
RwandaTunisia
Kenya
UgandaEthiopia
Ghana
MozambiqueZambiaAngolaEgypt
Namibia
Botswana
Madagascar
Tanzania
Cameroon
Liberia
Benin
Lesotho
MoroccoSenegalMalawi
Côte d’Ivoire
Niger
Algeria
Burkina Faso
Democratic Republicof the Congo
Djibouti
Eswatini
GambiaGuinea
Mauritius
Mauritania
Guinea-Bissau
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Togo
Cabo Verde
Mali
BurundiRepublic of
the Congo
CentralAfrican Republic
Zimbabwe
Sudan
Chad
Gabon
Equatorial Guinea
Somalia
Libya
Eritrea

National and Risk factors Government Total
and business (%)
areregional level
coordination addressed supply chains
(%)
(%)
(%)

Survivors
identified
andsupported(%)

Criminaljusticemechanisms
(%)

68
45
55
50
55
50
41
45
50
50
59
55
55
32
41
45
55
50
32
36
23
36
55
18
23
23
45
32

58
69
62
54
50
50
54
54
54
46
46
42
46
54
65
54
46
42
54
50
54
50
46
50
54
54
42
42

50
63
38
50
50
75
50
63
50
50
63
38
25
63
25
50
38
50
50
50
50
63
38
63
50
38
38
50

57
57
57
57
50
43
57
36
43
57
29
57
57
50
36
36
36
43
43
43
57
36
21
43
43
43
29
36

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
13

54
53
50
47
46
46
45
45
45
45
44
44
44
42
42
42
41
41
40
40
40
40
38
37
37
36
36
36

41
27
23
36
32
27
32
23
27
27
23
23
23
41

46
38
58
50
50
54
35
46
46
42
35
50
42
27

38
50
25
38
25
38
25
38
38
38
50
50
63
38

29
57
43
29
43
29
57
43
36
43
43
14
14
21

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

36
36
36
36
36
35
33
33
33
33
31
31
29
28

23

42

25

21

0

27

27
9
14
27
27
9
-9
-5

35
46
38
31
27
27
35
23

38
38
13
25
25
25
25
25

21
21
36
21
14
21
-7
-21

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

27
26
24
24
22
18
10
5

“After I reported [my employer] to Labour,
they bribed someone at Labour and I wastold to return to work.”
29-year-old female domestic worker in Botswana

No country in Africa has fully criminalised all formsof modern slavery, yet legal frameworks have
improved in Africa over the last four years. For
example, during this period the ILO Protocol of 2014
to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 has enteredinto force in Zimbabwe, Malawi, Madagascar,
Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Côte d’Ivoire.41
Further, the Republic of the Congo criminalised
human trafficking in domestic legislation in 2019.42
Encouragingly, 48 out of 51 governments we
assessed have provided basic training on victim
identification to general police. Only Mauritania,
Libya, and Sudan have not.

“Governments should be providing
training to government officials,
public awareness campaigns, outreacheducation and advocacy campaigns, andprosecute human trafficking by providing
training and technical assistance for law
enforcement officials such as police.”
Survivor of modern slavery, Kenya, 2020

The coordination of modern slavery responses
has shown some improvement across the region.
While 12 countries in the region introduced or
implemented National Action Plans (NAPs) toaddress modern slavery over the past four years,
three countries failed to renew their previous
plans, and 10 countries remained without formal
strategies to combat any form of modern slavery.
Only nine of the countries with NAPs have fully
funded the activities within those plans (Angola,
Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Eswatini, Gambia,
Ghana, Guinea, and Mali). Just under half of thegovernments we assessed in Africa ensure services
are provided to all survivors of modern slavery and28 governments ensure child-friendly services areprovided. In Kenya, five child protection centres
provide child trafficking and child labour survivors
with specialised services.43
Risk factors such as attitudes, social systems,
and institutions that enable modern slavery are
weakly addressed in the region. There are only
five countries in Africa where all children haveaccess to birth registration systems and where
over 95 per cent have a registered birth certificate(Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Republic of the Congo,
and Algeria). No government in the region ensures
universal access to healthcare. Further, children

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

under the age of 18 can legally marry in all countries
except Côte d’Ivoire, the DRC, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya,
Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.
A draft bill in Somalia was proposed in August 2020
that allowed minors to marry based on reproductive
maturity, independent of age.44 While the bill was
ultimately not passed, it reveals a backwards step interms of gender equality.
Systems are in place that allow asylum seekers toseek protection in 22 countries in the region. No
country in Northern Africa (Algeria, Egypt, Libya,
Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia) has appropriate
systems in place for those seeking to flee
humanitarian crises, despite the subregion being a
regular migration route. The Libyan and Egyptian
coastguards are supported by the European Union
to intercept those fleeing and return them to Libya
and Egypt where there is evidence of systemic
discrimination, arrest, detention, and deportation.
In Libya, migrants are additionally vulnerable tobeing bought and sold in slave markets.45 Corruption
and complicity also impede efforts to combat
modern slavery in 36 out of the 51 countries. In
Libya, officials working for coastguard, defence,
immigration, and security authorities commit
modern slavery crimes without fear of investigationor consequence.46 In addition, state-imposed forced
labour reportedly occurs in Libya,47 Eritrea,48 Egypt,49
Mali, 50 Rwanda, 51 and Zimbabwe. 52“The government should be aware of
the people migrating, know the reasons
why they are migrating, ensure that thecontracts and agreements made are valid,and ensure safety and work with the family
to know that the migrant is safe.”
Survivor of modern slavery, Kenya, 2020

Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and more recently the DRC
are the only countries in the region that haveidentified high-risk sectors and have taken action
to eradicate modern slavery within supply chains.
Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire are part of the HarkinEngel Protocol to combat child labour in the cocoa
sector, 53 while in 2019 the DRC created a regulatory
authority to tackle child labour in cobalt and coltan
mines. 54 However, governments in Africa have nottaken broader action such as the introduction oflegislation or human rights due diligence laws toensure government and businesses stop sourcing
goods and services produced by forced labour.

83

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REGIONAL
FINDINGSAFRICA

Freedom through faith
Faith leaders play an important role toidentify, prevent, and remediate modern
slavery in their communities. They occupy aunique position as they can see into the heartsof communities and are often a trusted sourceof information and advice.

“As faith leaders…you can see changes
in people that would pass manyothers by. And you understand whatpoverty and desperation can do tomen, women, and children. So you are
uniquely placed to identify victims
and help victims by putting them intouch with professionals who can help
them and who can help deal with theperpetrators.”
Sheikh Armiyawo Shaibu, spokesperson for Ghana’s
national chief Imam addressing fellow faith leaders
at a Global Freedom Network event in Ghana, 2021

Faith leaders, together with faith-basedorganisations already working to protect
vulnerable people, can empower theircommunities to act by providing them with theinformation and tools to understand modern
slavery. Walk Free, through its faith-based
arm the Global Freedom Network, works withreligious leaders across the world to address
modern slavery.

Nouakchott,
Mauritania,
June 2018.

In 2014, faiths leaders from many Christiandenominations, including Catholic, Anglican,
and Orthodox, and representatives of Buddhist,
Hindu, Jewish and Muslim faiths came together
to sign the “Joint Declaration of Religious
Leaders Against Modern Slavery,” pledging
to do everything in their power to eradicate
modern slavery. Since then, more than 100 of
the world’s most influential faith leaders fromthe Americas, Africa, Asia, and Oceania havealso pledged to help end modern slavery. The
Global Freedom Network is developing a rangeof tools to support their efforts.
One tool, the Faith for Freedom smartphoneapp, was developed in consultation with a faithleaders advisory panel and gives faith leaders
and their staff information on how to identify,
respond to, and prevent modern slavery
within their communities. The app has beenlaunched in Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, DRC, Kenya,
Nigeria, and South Africa, and will expand toother countries. Further information on WalkFree’s work with faith leaders and religiousorganisations is available from the Walk Freewebsite: https://www.walkfree.org/projects/
global-freedom-network/.

Promising Practices inAfricaOver 20 per cent of evaluated programs
housed in the Promising Practices Databaseare delivered in Africa. These programs cover
42 countries in the region and target several
types of modern slavery, including humantrafficking, forced, servile or early marriage,
the worst forms of child labour, and the useof child soldiers or exploitation of children byarmed groups. Awareness-raising awarenesscampaigns and formal education were themost common interventions delivered in theevaluated programs. Overall, more than 80
per cent of programs delivered in Africa metsome or all of their objectives, yet only 13
evaluated programs had a reliable evaluation
methodology, scoring 3 or above on the
Maryland Scale. 55

Spotlight on what works
An evaluation of the impact of two
government-run unconditional cash transfers
programs on early marriage and fertility
rates in Malawi and Zambia raises interestingquestions about the role of cash transfers
in tackling modern slavery. The evaluation
found that the impact on safe transition ofyouth aged 14 to 21 to adulthood (i.e., delayed
pregnancy and marriage) was limited in bothcountries, with the exception of protective
impact on marriage for male youth in Malawi. 56
This might point to the limited impact of cashtransfers; however, the Promising Practices
Database57 and other systematic reviews havefound that cash transfers are some of the mostpromising interventions, particularly whenviewed as part of a multisectoral and holistic
suite of interventions.

Mabrouka was a childwhen she was taken fromher mother, also a survivor
of forced labour, and wasmade to work as a domestic
servant for a family in the
Rosso area. When Mabrouka
was 11 years old, she wasbadly burned while cooking
for her abusers. Although
freed in 2011, she was neverable to go to school, and was
married two years later when
she was aged just 16. Now amother, she is pictured withher own child. Photo credit:
Seif Kousmate.

84

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Recommendations
for governments

1

Ensure support services are available
for all survivors of modern slavery— women, men, and children — andthat these support services areappropriately resourced.

2

The governments of Egypt, Eritrea,
Libya, Mali, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe
should immediately end state-imposed
forced labour by repealing legislationand criminalising practices that allow it
to occur.

3

Raise the minimum legal age of marriage
to 18 without exception and support
the economic empowerment of womenand girls through increasing access to
education and providing community
empowerment programming.

4

Strengthen social protections, such as
birth registration, access to education,
unemployment insurance, universal
healthcare, and sick leave to reduce
vulnerability to forced marriage andto provide workers with basic income
security. Extend social protection
to workers in the informal sector inparticular.

5

Identify sectors at high risk of forced
labour and work with businesses andcivil society to develop initiatives toeradicate forced labour and labour
exploitation.

85

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REGIONAL
FINDINGSAFRICASHIVANPAVIN
ALUNGNAT
Musician, artist,
queer activist, feministand survivor leader.
Founder of Africa Nalia.

Frontline voices:

Modern slavery andthe LGBTQI+ community

Experiencing marginalisation and discrimination is a key factor that candrive people into forms of modern slavery, intensify the lived experienceof exploitation, and create barriers to accessing support. Despite some
progress, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex(LGBTQI+) community still faces discrimination and marginalisation aroundthe world today, which increases their vulnerability to modern slavery.
Shivan Pavin Alungnat is a musician, artist, queer activist, feminist,and survivor leader based in Kenya. Shivan is the author of upcoming
research on the intersection between queer communities and humantrafficking. Here, Shivan shares their experience and expertise on how themodern slavery movement can best recognise and respond to the uniqueexperiences of the LGBTQI+ community.

Being LGBTQI+ has been viewed as criminal aswell as politically, religiously, and traditionally“un-African” across the African continent. The
LGBTQI+ community faces systemic discrimination,
violence, and exclusion, with society maintaining
conservative views on gender identities androles. Because these factors contribute tovulnerabilities to modern slavery, LGBTQI+
individuals are more vulnerable to various formsof exploitation.
In many African countries, members of the
LGBTQI+ community are particularly vulnerable toexploitation and enslavement due to legislation that
limits, and in some cases eliminates their rights.
For example, some countries, such as Nigeria,
Somalia, Sudan, and, more recently, Uganda, havelaws that criminalise homosexuality and impose
severe punishments, including imprisonment andeven the death penalty. In many other countries,
such as Kenya and Zimbabwe, there are laws that
restrict the rights of LGBTQI+ people by prohibiting“promoting” homosexuality or denying them access86

to sexual orientation and gender expression persists
across Africa, with one study estimating that suchdisparity costs South Africa alone US$316.8 million
each year. 3
For many LGBTQI+ people, structural disadvantages
and societal rejection begin in childhood. Cultural
responses can force young members of the LGBTQI+
community into early and forced marriages to“convert” their identities, and access to education
can be restricted.
The intersection between the LGBTQI+ community
and modern slavery in Africa highlights the need for
greater recognition of the unique challenges faced
by LGBTQI+ individuals in the global fight against
slavery. To date there has been limited knowledge
sharing between both the modern slavery
movement and the LGBTQI+ community. As a result,
LGBTQI+ people are not always adequately informed
about modern slavery risks to which they are likely
more vulnerable and service providers in the spacefrequently lack the required knowledge and training
to effectively respond to their needs. This creates
multiple barriers to LGBTQI+ survivors accessing
support and increases the risk of survivors returning
to their situations of exploitation.

In order to address this intersection, it is crucial forgovernments, NGOs, and the LGBTQI+ community
to work together to raise awareness and implement
effective prevention and response strategies. Thisshould include:– Providing safe spaces for LGBTQI+ individuals who
are at risk of exploitation, including shelters andsupport services for survivors of slavery.
– Developing anti-trafficking laws and policies thatare inclusive of LGBTQI+ individuals and address
their unique needs and experiences.
– Strengthening anti-trafficking efforts by working
with LGBTQI+ organisations and advocates toincrease awareness and advocacy on this issue.
– Providing training and education to law
enforcement, immigration officials, and otherrelevant stakeholders on the specific challenges
faced by LGBTQI+ individuals in the context ofmodern slavery.
– Implementing modern slavery programs andservices that are specifically designed to meetthe needs of LGBTQI+ individuals and ensure theiraccess to justice and protection.

Kigali, Rwanda,
May 2022.

to health services. These laws have a devastating
impact on the LGBTQI+ community, making it
difficult for them to access basic services, such as
healthcare and education, and putting them atrisk of violence and persecution. Despite ongoing
efforts by human rights organisations and LGBTQI+
activists, the rights of LGBTQI+ people remain under
threat in many African countries. To compound thisissue, LGBTQI+ people who flee their home countries
to escape persecution may find themselves trappedin exploitative situations, including forced labourand sex trafficking, in countries of asylum.

Prince, a Rwandan model getshis make-up done before the
Isano Fashion Show in Kigali
to celebrate the International
Day Against Homophobia,
Transphobia, and Biphobia.
“Families are rejecting theirfamily members because
they’re gay, and we are in
2022, people need to getused to LGBTQI+ people”,
says model Tonia. Around theworld, many LGBTQI+ people
face increased risks to modern
slavery, included forced into
‘corrective’ marriages.
Photo credit: Simon Wohlfahrt/
AFP via Getty Images.

As well as facing legal barriers to inclusion, research
has revealed widespread social intolerance anddiscrimination against the LGBTQI+ community in
Africa. According to one survey, the vast majorityof respondents across 34 countries said they would
not want to live next door to homosexuals.1 Only
7 to 14 per cent of respondents in a similar study
conducted in Kenya, Tunisia, and Nigeria agreed
that homosexuality should be accepted by society.2
Wage discrimination and underemployment related

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

87

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REGIONAL
FINDINGS

THE AMERICAS

The Americas region is home to 13 per cent of theworld’s population, with varying levels of wealth,mobility, and security across and within countries
in the region. Modern slavery in the region is driven
by inequality,1 increasing poverty, 2 discrimination
against migrants and minority groups, politicalinstability, and conflict. The situation has been
exacerbated by economic and social impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic and responses to it, 3 as well as
the impacts of climate-related displacement.

THE
AMERICAS

An estimated 3.5 per thousand people in the region
are in forced labour and 1.5 per thousand in forced
marriage. Mass migration fuels forced labour,
particularly in the world’s largest migration corridor
from Mexico to the United States (US). Migrants
flee countries such as Venezuela and others andcongregate on the border between the US and
Mexico.4 Forced marriage is linked to increased
poverty and lower educational attainment, 5 andis driven by longstanding patriarchal norms andfundamentalist religious beliefs within the region;
for example, in North America forced marriage isreported in conservative religious sects.6

CanadaUnited States
Cuba

Jamaica

GuatemalaTrinidad
And Tobago

El Salvador

Venezuela

Honduras

GuyanaNicaragua

Suriname

Costa Rica

PanamaPeru

BrazilBolivia

EcuadorColombia

Paraguay

Argentina

Regional
heat map:
prevalence

88

Dominican
Republic

Barbados

Mexico

Low

Haiti

Chile

Uruguay

The US has taken the most action to tackle modern
slavery in the Americas, followed by Canada,
Argentina, and Uruguay. Cuba, Suriname, andVenezuela have taken the least action. Of the fiveG20 countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil,
Canada, Mexico, and the US), Brazil, Canada andthe US have taken action to tackle modern slavery
in supply chains. Much more needs to be done tostrengthen legislation to hold businesses to accountand to tackle gender inequality that drives modern
slavery of women and girls.

What is the extent andnature of modern slavery
in the region?
An estimated 5.1 million men, women, and children
were living in modern slavery on any given day in2021. The Americas had the lowest prevalence ofmodern slavery among the five regions, with 5 inevery thousand people living in modern slavery. The
Americas had the third highest prevalence of forced
labour (3.5 per thousand) and the lowest prevalenceof forced marriage (1.5 per thousand) compared toother regions.7
Within the region, Venezuela, Haiti, and El Salvador
had the highest prevalence of modern slavery. In
Haiti8 and Venezuela9 modern slavery is intertwinedwith migration, political instability, and drugtrafficking routes from South America to Central andNorth America,10 while in El Salvador it is associatedwith gang violence and gender-based violence.11

The largest estimated numbers of people inmodern slavery include some of the region’s mostpopulous countries — Brazil, the US, and Mexico.
Three of every five people in modern slavery in theAmericas are exploited in one of these countries.
The countries with the lowest prevalence in theregion are Canada, Uruguay, and Chile.
Children in the Americas are at particularly highrisk of all forms of modern slavery. They havebeen recruited as soldiers in protracted civil
conflicts in Colombia and Venezuela, resulting in
long-lasting trauma.12 Child recruitment by armed
groups, gangs, and organised crime has increasedin the region, impacting children in Colombia,
Venezuela, Ecuador, and El Salvador.13 Moreover,children are reportedly involved in hazardous
labour in industries such as mining in gold andtin,14 drug trafficking,15 and agriculture, mostnotably in cotton, cattle, fishing, and tobacco.16
Commercial sexual exploitation of children occurs
in the region. In the Caribbean, sex tourism,17particularly involving children18 remains an issue,
with sex tourists, primarily from the US, seeking
to exploit children in countries such as Belize.19 UN
estimates reveal that child marriage is prevalent
in the region with 22 per cent of women between
ages 20 and 24 having been married before theage of 18 years.20 In the US, recent research
estimated that 300,000 children were married
between 2000 and 2018.21
Seasonal, temporary, and undocumented
workers in the agricultural sector are vulnerable
to forced labour, including workers in higherincome countries such as the US and Canada.22
This is particularly true in informal or rural labour
contexts where there are limited regulations andfew labour inspections.23 Forced labour in US
supply chains remains an issue in the Americas, 24
with agricultural workers in countries that
supply products to the US market vulnerable
to exploitation. Moreover, there are reports ofcompulsory prison labour in public and private
prisons in Brazil25 and the US.26
Although these estimates are the most reliable
to date, they are conservative given the gaps andlimitations of data collection in the Americas.
These figures do not capture all forms of modern
slavery, such as recruitment of child soldiers,
trafficking for the purposes of organ removal,
and all child marriages.

“The farm owner hired me…[and] he used
to say to me to wait when the work wasdone then he would pay me, but at theend he did not pay.”
42-year-old Brazilian male agricultural worker

High

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Estimated
number living inmodern slavery:

5.1

MILLION(5 per thousand)Regional
proportion of
global estimate:

10%
Forced labour

71%
Forced marriage

29%
Averagevulnerability
score:

44%
Averagegovernment
response rating:48%
Top 3 countries:
United States
67%
Canada60%
Argentina
58%
Bottom 3 countries:
Venezuela
27%
Cuba
31%
Suriname
31%

89

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Table 8Estimated
prevalence andnumber of people
in modern slavery,
by country

Recife, Brazil,
October 2022.
A transgender woman, whoworks as a sex worker in Brazil,sits outside overlooking thewater. While sex work is notcriminalised in Brazil, manyrights were rolled back under
the conservative governmentof President Bolsonaro. Today,
the industry remains heavily
stigmatised and workers
suffered significant hardshipduring the pandemic, exposing
them to greater risks of labour
exploitation. Photo credit:
Natália Corrêa/ Freedom Fund.

90

Regional Country
rank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Venezuela
Haiti
El Salvador
GuatemalaColombia
EcuadorNicaragua
Jamaica
Bolivia
Peru
Honduras
Dominican Republic
MexicoParaguay
Cuba
BrazilTrinidad and Tobago
PanamaGuyanaArgentina
United States
Costa Rica
Chile
Uruguay
CanadaEstimated
prevalence ofmodern slavery(per 1,000 of
population)

Estimated numberof people inmodern slavery

9.5
8.2
8.1
7.8
7.8
7.6
7.3
7.3
7.2
7.1
7.0
6.6
6.6
6.4
5.4
5.0
4.7
4.7
4.2
4.2
3.3
3.2
3.2
1.9
1.8

270,000
94,00052,000140,000
397,000
135,000
49,00022,00083,000234,000
69,00072,000850,000
46,00061,0001,053,000
7,000
20,0003,000
189,000
1,091,000
16,00061,0007,000
69,000Population

28,436,000
11,403,000
6,486,000
17,916,000
50,883,000
17,643,000
6,625,000
2,961,000
11,673,000
32,972,000
9,905,000
10,848,000
128,933,000
7,133,000
11,327,000
212,559,000
1,399,000
4,315,000
787,000
45,196,000
331,003,000
5,094,000
19,116,000
3,474,000
37,742,000

What drives vulnerability
to modern slavery in theregion?
Vulnerability to modern slavery in the Americas
region is driven largely by inequality, politicalinstability, and discrimination against migrants
and minority groups (Figure 14). Conflict
disproportionately impacted two countries in theregion, Mexico and Colombia, while vulnerability
was further compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic
and climate-related disasters across the region. At
the country level, vulnerability to modern slavery ishighest in Haiti and lowest in Canada (Table 9).
Inequality represents the greatest driver ofvulnerability in the Americas. Certain populations,
including women, children, migrants, andIndigenous people, face heightened vulnerability asa result of systemic discrimination. In Haiti, children
known as restavecs (stay withs), who are given awayby their parents to a host household, are vulnerable
to exploitation in domestic servitude, with girls
particularly at risk.27 Restavec children are trafficked
and are at increased vulnerability to sexual abuse.28
Across the region, Indigenous populations are
particularly vulnerable to modern slavery. For
example, although Indigenous women make up
only 4 per cent of the population of Canada, they
comprise at least 50 per cent of identified survivorsof human trafficking.29 Migrant workers are also
at greater risk, with the absence of protections inseveral countries, such as the right to form a unionor laws prohibiting recruitment fees. 30

Governance issues

Governance issues, such as political instability,
lack of political rights, and poor regulatory quality,
also drive vulnerability to modern slavery by
causing displacement and hampering the national
response. Violent protests in Chile, Colombia,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela, the assassination of the
President of Haiti in 2021 and increasing control of
the country by street gangs and growing politicalpolarisation in Brazil and the US31 drive vulnerability
across the region. High rates of violent crime inseveral countries including Venezuela, El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Jamaica, 32 and weak confidence
in judicial systems in Mexico, Haiti, and Venezuela,
diminish accessibility to legal rights, representation,and prosecution. 33 In Venezuela, political instability
and corruption among the prosecution and judiciaryundermines law enforcement efforts, 34 while armed
groups continue to commit acts of violence against
civilians, thereby driving mass migration. 35
Women and girls are disproportionately impacted
by governance issues across the region, as
patriarchal attitudes that suppress women’s agency
persist at both the household and institutional
levels. 36 Such attitudes contribute to the absenceof laws protecting women and girls — for example,
laws that set the minimum age of marriage at 18
without exception37 — and a lack of enforcementof existing legal frameworks covering violenceagainst women. 38

Figure 14
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by dimension

46%

Lack of basic needs

34%

Inequality

54%

Disenfranchised groups

52%

Effects of conflict
Total

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

24%
44%

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FINDINGS

THE AMERICAS

Table 9Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by country

Violence, poverty, political dysfunction, andenvironmental degradation across the region have
led to a substantial increase in refugees, asylumseekers, and other vulnerable and displaced
populations. 39 The continual movement of migrants
and refugees is a pressing issue in the Americas,
which hosted 26 per cent of the world’s internationalmigrants in 2020.40 Venezuela’s political instability
and socio-economic breakdown has pushed morethan 6 million citizens to flee the country as ofNovember 2021.41 The Mexico-US border is theworld’s most popular migration corridor;42 overthe five years from 2016 to 2021, some 4 million
migrants were apprehended along the Mexico-US
border, nearly half of whom came from El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras. The remaining came
predominately from Mexico and other nations.43
In Mexico, migrants are held in crowded detention
centres, while those who had sought assistance inshelters reported experiencing robbery, extortion,bodily harm, kidnapping, and abuse of authority
while migrating, all factors which make these
individuals vulnerable to modern slavery.44 As
many countries in the Americas have restrictive
immigration policies, which force migrants to takeincreasingly precarious routes, thereby further
exacerbating their vulnerability to trafficking andother forms of modern slavery.45

Country
Haiti
Venezuela
Honduras
MexicoGuatemalaNicaragua
El Salvador
Colombia
EcuadorParaguayPeru
BrazilBolivia
Jamaica
Cuba
GuyanaDominican Republic
Trinidad and Tobago
Argentina
PanamaUruguay
United States
Costa Rica
Chile
CanadaTotal (%)
66
66
62
58
57
54
53
51
48
48
47
47
47
45
43
41
41
38
36
33
27
25
24
22
11

What are governments in
the region doing to address
modern slavery?
Walk Free has assessed government responses tomodern slavery in 32 countries in the Americas.
Governments across the region scored an averageof 48 per cent, second only to Europe and Central
Asia. National responses in the Americas are mixed.
Despite some strong responses in the region, thereis evidence of weak criminal justice systems andinadequate protection for survivors, which arecompounded by government crises, corruption, andlarge migration flows.
Wealth disparity impacts government responses
to modern slavery within the region. Wealthiercountries typically demonstrated stronger
responses to modern slavery, with the US (67 percent) and Canada (60 per cent) — the region’s
wealthiest countries — ranking first and second
respectively. The US also performed well at the
global level, ranking within the top five. At thesame time, some countries with comparatively
lower wealth also demonstrated strong responses
to modern slavery. Argentina’s response (58 percent) ranked third in the region, only just below
Canada, despite having less than half the GDP per
capita PPP (current international $) (US$20,769
compared to US$46,572).46 Some of the countries
that demonstrated the least action to respondto modern slavery had the lowest GDP per capita
among countries assessed and had experienced
political and economic disruption; for example,
Venezuela (27 per cent) and Cuba (31 per cent).
The US, Canada, Argentina, and Uruguay
demonstrated the strongest responses to modern
slavery. Compared to others in the Americas, thesecountries are generally taking concrete actions
to improve certain aspects of survivor support,
strengthen criminal justice systems, and address
risk factors. The Canadian government routinely
releases annual reports describing actions tocombat modern slavery and has an independent
oversight mechanism in place for monitoring
the functioning and effectiveness of its National
Action Plan.47In 2019, Canada also ratified the ILO
Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention,
1930 with its ratification entering into force on 17
June 2020.48 Venezuela demonstrated the weakest
responses to modern slavery. Venezuela continues
to be affected by protracted economic and politicalinstability, which hampered the government’s
ability to respond.49“My employer took away my passport,
locked me in the house and disconnected
the phone whenever she left home. I was
made to sleep on the basement floor. I was
so isolated from the outside world that I
had no idea there was help available.”
Fainess Lipinga, United States 50

92

Saint Lucia, Canada, and Uruguay have all taken
further action to combat modern slavery since theprevious assessment of government responses in2018. In Saint Lucia, the government introduced
a hotline that facilitates reporting to specialised
human trafficking task forces, federal authorities,
local law enforcement, and service providers. 51
This was accompanied by a widespread awarenesscampaign to promote the hotline. 52 Since the lastreport, Peru, Antigua and Barbuda, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, and Suriname have also ratified the ILO
Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention,
1930, 53 while the ILO Domestic Workers Convention,2011 (No. 189) entered into force in Mexico, Peru,
and Antigua and Barbuda. 54
The strength of legislative frameworks to combat
modern slavery in the Americas is varied. Across theregion, 21 countries criminalise human trafficking,12 countries criminalise forced labour, and only
seven countries criminalise forced marriage

Country(Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Saint Lucia, Bahamas,
Canada, and Belize). The US provided up to US$10
million in funding for programs to prevent childmarriage around the world from 2017 to 2020, 55 yet
most of its states still allow children under the age of
18 to marry and eight have not set a minimum age. 56
In most countries assessed, governments provided
training for the judiciary and prosecution, however
only 11 countries provided this training regularly.
When considering protections for children, 15
countries have criminalised child commercial sexual
exploitation; however, only Colombia, Nicaragua,
and Panama have criminalised the use of children
in armed conflict. Only Barbados and Trinidad andTobago are yet to ratify the Optional Protocol to theConvention on the Rights of the Child on the sale ofchildren, child prostitution and child pornography.
While the majority of countries in the region had
specialised law enforcement units to investigate
modern slavery, 16 of them did not have theGovernment Total
Risk
National andregional level factors are and business (%)
coordination addressed supply chains
(%)
(%)
(%)

Survivors
identified
andsupported(%)

Criminaljusticemechanisms
(%)

86
59
50
55
55
50
59
68
45
50
50
50
41
41
45
41
50
32
59
45
45
32
50
45
59

62
58
73
73
69
65
65
65
50
62
58
65
62
65
69
69
65
58
50
54
46
62
58
58
50

63
75
75
50
50
88
63
25
75
63
63
63
88
50
50
63
63
75
63
50
63
63
38
50
63

64
79
64
64
64
57
57
50
57
50
57
50
57
71
57
43
36
57
43
64
57
57
43
43
29

38
25
0
0
0
0
0
0
38
13
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
13
0
0
0
0

67
60
58
56
55
55
55
53
51
51
51
51
51
51
51
49
49
47
47
47
46
46
45
45
45

36
36
41
27
27
36
14

54
54
38
50
38
35
46

63
38
38
38
50
25
25

50
50
50
43
29
36
29

0
0
0
0
0
0
0

44
41
37
36
31
31
27

United States
CanadaArgentina
Uruguay
Chile
MexicoPeru
BahamasBrazil
Costa Rica
Ecuador
GuyanaJamaica
PanamaSaint Lucia
Paraguay
Trinidad and Tobago
Bolivia
GuatemalaHonduras
Colombia
Dominican Republic
BelizeEl Salvador
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
Antigua and Barbuda
Barbados
Haiti
Nicaragua
Cuba
Suriname
Venezuela

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Table 10Government
response score,by country andmilestone

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FINDINGS

THE AMERICAS

resources to operate effectively. In El Salvador, boththe anti-trafficking police and prosecution units
did not have enough resources to investigate andprosecute cases and were further impeded by thelack of an electronic case management system. 57
Additionally, there is evidence that survivors ofmodern slavery have been treated as criminals for
conduct that occurred while under the control ofcriminals in the US, Brazil, Cuba, El Salvador, Mexico,and Honduras. In the US, survivors are criminalised
and face challenges finding employment andhousing because of charges laid against them while
they were under the control of criminals. 58
All countries in the Americas are involved in a regional
response to modern slavery. National coordination
bodies exist in all but two countries (Cuba and
Venezuela); however, only the US, Guyana, andCanada include survivors of modern slavery in thiscoordination. Almost all countries in the Americas
have a National Action Plan to combat modern
slavery; only Chile does not. Chile’s draft National
Action Plan has not been formally approved or
made public, while after years of awaiting approval,
Paraguay finally implemented a National Action Plancovering the period from 2020 to 2024.59
While nearly all countries in the Americas havecriminalised corruption, allegations of official
complicity in modern slavery cases were reportedly
not investigated in 17 countries. In Mexico, where an
anonymous hotline to report corruption of officials
received no tips despite reports of government
officials facilitating modern slavery, some officials
have been investigated but there have been noconvictions.60 Labour inspections specificallytargeting modern slavery occur in 24 countries,
although none have sufficient labour inspectors
to cover the entire population or to allow labour
inspectors to enter premises unannounced. Onlyin Honduras are labour inspectors able to enforce

Mexico City, Mexico,
August 2021.
A young boy searches throughwaste for fruit, vegetables
and any food that is in goodcondition to take home. While
many children are returning
to the classroom after
pandemic-related restrictions
have lifted, he and his brotherare not able to as theirfamily’s economic situation
has been affected bylockdowns and they have had
to work with their parents tobe able to eat. Photo credit:
Aidee Martinez / Eyepix
Group/Future Publishing via
Getty Images.

94

fines. In 12 countries, not all children are able toaccess birth registration systems, which createssignificant vulnerability due to related barriers toaccessing education and employment.

Promising Practices
in the Americas

There is evidence of awareness campaigns targeting
known modern slavery risks in all but two countries
in the region. In 2021, Canada launched a five-year
awareness campaign based on a survey of public
attitudes and awareness on human trafficking.61
There is also evidence that governments havefacilitated research on modern slavery in 19
countries, including, for example, a 2021 study on
the state of human trafficking in Honduras62 anda 2020 study to reduce vulnerability to humantrafficking and crime in Saint Lucia.63 That being
said, state-imposed forced labour, such as abuseof compulsory prison labour, undermines any
government efforts to tackle modern slavery inBrazil64 and the US.65

In the Promising Practices Database, 53 of
262 evaluations cover 20 countries in theAmericas. Most evaluated programs target
human trafficking, child labour, and the worst
forms of child labour. Only one evaluation
focused on forced, servile, or early marriage,
despite it being a significant issue within
the region. While the majority of evaluatedprograms in the region met some or all theirobjectives, fewer than half of the evaluatedprograms had reliable methodologies thatfeatured a control or comparison group.
However, of these reliable evaluations, themajority had some success in providing
insights into what works to address modern
slavery in the Americas.

Although the Americas has the second strongest
response in terms of addressing forced labour inglobal supply chains in comparison to other regions,the level of action remains low. Recently, Mexico andCanada joined the US in enacting legislation thatprohibits companies from importing goods produced
through forced labour. The US-Mexico-Canada free
trade agreement came into effect in July 2020 andprohibited the importation of goods produced withforced labour into each country’s territory.66 In thesame month, Canada amended its Customs Tariff toincorporate the restriction on goods produced withforced labour,67 and, more recently, passed its own“Modern Slavery Act” which imposes a mandatory
reporting obligation on certain government
institutions and private sector entities.68 The US
also passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act
in 2021, which entered into effect in June 2022, toprevent goods made with forced labour of Uyghurs
from entering the US market.69

Recommendations
for governments

1

Introduce legislation requiring
governments and businesses totake steps to identify and address
modern slavery in their supply chains,
including mandatory human rights
due diligence.

2

Enact or strengthen existinglegislation to ensure that all formsof exploitation are criminalised andpenalties for crimes associated withforced labour, forced marriage, andhuman trafficking are appropriate forthe severity of the crime.

3

Improve support and identification
efforts for all victims throughout theAmericas by providing services to all
survivors of modern slavery, including
men, children, and migrants.

4

Establish bilateral agreements
protecting labour migrants between
countries of origin and destination.

5

Adopt and distribute nationalguidelines for identifying andscreening victims and provide
systematic and regular training forpolice and other first responders, aswell as border guards, immigration
officials, labour inspectors, teachers,
doctors, nurses, social workers,
and tourism sector workers, witha particular emphasis on countries
receiving large influxes of migrants
fleeing crisis in the region.

Spotlight on what works
The Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) cashtransfer program has provided unconditional
cash transfers to families in Ecuador since1998 and offers valuable lessons for reducing
child labour through economic empowerment.
The program randomly assigned money to
low-income families, while others in the target
area who did not receive a transfer were used
as a control group. The transfers involved
monthly payments of US$15 to female headsof household, which accounted for 7 percent of monthly expenditure. The evaluation
included a sample of 1,488 randomly selectedhouseholds and conducted baseline andfollow-up surveys. The program led to a 78
per cent decline in child labour outside thehome among all participants. Inside thehome, child labour decreased by 32 per cent.
Reducing child labour can lead to a reduction
in children who are at risk of the worst formsof child labour, a form of modern slavery. The
program demonstrates the importance ofunconditional cash transfers in empoweringand protecting vulnerable individuals.70

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

95

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FINDINGS

THE AMERICASASHANTETAYLORCOXFounder and Executive
Director of You Are MoreThan Inc.

Frontline voices:Black and Brown like me:
Racial roots of modern slavery

Protesters march on
Juneteenth, which marks theend of slavery in the UnitedStates, with signs depicting
George Floyd, an African
American man who was killed
by a white police officer Derek
Chauvin during an arrest.
Floyd’s arrest and subsequent
death sparked a new wave of#BlackLivesMatter protests as
people across the United States
demanded an end to police
brutality against people ofcolour and deep-seated racism.
Photo credit: Ira L. Black/Corbis
via Getty Images

Ashante Taylorcox is the Founder and Executive Director of You Are MoreThan Inc. — a US-based organisation that aims to transform the growth andpotential of marginalised survivors of modern slavery. It does this throughsurvivor-centred aftercare support that provides barrier-free access tomental health services, education, and financial stability. In this essay,
she focuses on the unique experiences of survivors of colour and offers
solutions for how the modern slavery movement can best respond andadapt to ensure true racial equity.

Historically, slavery has been deeply rooted
in racial inequity. To justify the trafficking andexploitation of Black women and girls during andprior to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, we were often
sexualized at a very early age and seen as “jezebels,”“promiscuous,” and “sexual deviants.” Today, Black
women are disproportionately represented intrafficking statistics and the sexualisation of Black
women and girls continues. Racial tropes deeply
rooted in slavery still impact survivors’ access toservices throughout the anti-trafficking movement.
When disclosing experiences of sexual violence toservice providers, survivors of trafficking often faceculturally specific barriers. This is due to systemic
and individual biases and stereotypes throughout
the anti-trafficking movement. These biases canlook like the “Strong Black Women” trope, in which
Black youth and women of colour are seen as lessdeserving of support because of stereotypes thatsexual violence is normal for Black survivors.
It follows that we cannot feel harm from theseexperiences because it is “normalised” withinBlack communities. Black men and boys often facegendered racism and are more than likely to be
seen as perpetrators and/or criminals rather than as
potential victims. As young as five years old, Black96

New York, United States
June 2020.

girls are adultified, seen as needing less nurturance,and more knowledgeable about adult experiences
and topics, and because we develop more quickly
than our white peers, we are often over-sexualised.
Finally, many service providers struggle with
understanding the deep-rooted correlation
between exploitation and the racial trauma thatmany survivors face in their daily lives that can
impact their sustainability out of the commercial
sex industry. This, in turn, leads to minimising theimpact that racial trauma has on survivors andthey often face microaggressions and further racial
discrimination when reaching out for support.
When marginalised survivors exit their trafficking
situations, they often enter a world not built forthem to succeed. Survivors need access to services
and provisions that can support them in finding
long-term employment, sustainable housing, andhigher education. Additionally, it is vital to holdspace for understanding and dismantling systemsof oppression, power, and privilege and to address
society’s often discriminatory view of Black and
Brown survivors when accessing services. Placing
marginalised survivors at the forefront of the
movement and supporting them in building theirown tables rather than forcing them to sit at ones

that weren’t made for them can cause a positive
ripple effect within the modern slavery movement.
In order to address structural and embedded racismin this space, it is vital that we work to dismantle the“ideal victim” trope throughout the modern slavery
movement. Persons of colour accessing victim andsurvivor services must be humanised as individuals
worthy of responses that recognise their uniqueexperiences. In line with this, culturally specificservices for marginalised populations must be
prioritised and appropriately funded throughout theUnited States and beyond, with a particular focus
on those that are led by and for survivors of colour.
Agencies that are primarily led by white providers
should work towards expanding knowledge in

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

decolonising and deconstructing whiteness within
the modern slavery movement through specifictrainings that aim to increase understanding ofdiversity and inclusion. Additionally, it is vital fororganisations to invest in economic opportunities
for survivors of colour, particularly within
leadership roles.
Until we can address the racial roots of slavery
globally, survivors of colour will continue to remain
marginalised, underserved, and underrepresented
within the modern slavery movement and beyond.

97

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FINDINGS

ARAB STATESThe Arab States region is comprised of 12
countries, accounting for 2 per cent of the world’s
population. While the Arab States is the world’s
least populated region and smallest in terms ofland mass, it comprises a rich diversity of culture,religion, industry, and geography. Yet, the region
is impacted by the effects of conflict, politicalinstability, economic shocks, and climate change —factors, among others, that drive modern slavery.
More than 20 million refugees, asylum seekers,
and internally displaced persons (IDPs) originate
from the Arab States, and the region continues tohost nearly 14.5 million of those who were forcibly
displaced.1 The effects of protracted conflicts in
Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen spur displacement,
food insecurity, and economic instability.

ARAB
STATES
Syria

Lebanon
Iraq
Palestine

KuwaitJordanBahrain
Qatar

United Arab Emirates
Saudi Arabia

Oman

Yemen

Regional
heat map:
prevalence

Low

98

High

The region is also home to nearly 37 million
migrants, originating from within the region,
Asia and the Pacific, and Africa.2 Populations arevulnerable to sexual slavery and forced labour
imposed by armed groups, forced labour as aresult of displacement from their homes, andforced and child marriage to ease financial strain
on households. In Jordan, Lebanon, and wealthier
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries —Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, andthe United Arab Emirates (UAE) — migrant workers
are vulnerable to modern slavery under the
exploitative kafala (sponsorship) system. Forced
labour is reported in sectors such as domestic
work, 3 construction,4 hospitality, 5 and security.6
Within these contexts, gender inequality, climatechange, and the COVID-19 pandemic work to amplify
existing vulnerabilities.
Bahrain took the most action to address modern
slavery in the Arab States, followed by the UAE,
while Iraq and Lebanon took the least action. Syria
and Yemen were excluded from the assessmentof government action on modern slavery due
to ongoing conflict and extreme disruption to
government function. The need to reform gender
discriminatory laws and grant all workers, including
migrants, equal protection under national labourlaws remains a pressing issue. At the same time, far
greater action is needed to address modern slavery
in the context of conflict, crisis, and displacement.

What is the extent andnature of modern slavery
in the region?
An estimated 1.7 million men, women, and children
were living in modern slavery in the Arab States
region on any given day in 2021. Despite having thelowest number of people living in modern slavery
across all regions, once population was considered,
the Arab States had the highest prevalence ofmodern slavery. An estimated 10.1 people perthousand people were living in modern slavery
in the region, which breaks down to 5.3 in forced
labour and 4.8 in forced marriage. Forced labour

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

was the most common form of exploitation,accounting for just over half of people living
in modern slavery (52 per cent). As in all otherregions, the prevalence of forced marriage
was higher among females (5.5 per thousand)compared to males (4.3 per thousand).
Within the region, Saudi Arabia, the United ArabEmirates, and Kuwait were the countries withthe highest prevalence of modern slavery. Saudi
Arabia also had the highest estimated number ofpeople in modern slavery, followed by Iraq, andtogether they accounted for half of all people inmodern slavery in the region. Migrant workers
face particular risk of labour exploitation in theregion as a result of the kafala (sponsorship)
system that operates in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and theUAE.7 While not a form of modern slavery itself,
the system embeds a steep power imbalance
between workers and employers, with the resultthat employers control whether a migrant worker
can enter, reside, work, change jobs, and, in somecases, exit the country.8 Female domestic workers
residing the GCC and Jordan and Lebanon are
particularly at risk of forced labour in privatehouseholds9 and males vulnerable to debt
bondage in construction.10
Conflict continues to shape experiences ofmodern slavery in the Arab States.11 Families
displaced by conflict in Syria, Iraq, and Yemen rely
on negative coping mechanisms such as forced
and child marriage to relieve economic stressand protect daughters from the threat of sexual
violence.12 Syrian and Iraqi refugees have been
trafficked from host communities in Jordan andLebanon for forced marriage, forced commercial
sexual exploitation, and forced labour, including
forced begging.13 Almost 3,000 Yazidi men andwomen remain missing after being abducted by
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2014.14
Anecdotal reports note that some missing Yazidi
women and children are still enslaved in Iraq,
Syria, and Türkiye,15 while others are reportedly
held captive inside ISIS widow camps, such as theal-Hawl detention camp in north-eastern Syria.16
Although these figures are the most reliable todate, they are conservative estimates given thegaps and limitations of data collection in the ArabStates. It is not possible to conduct nationally
representative surveys in countries experiencing
profound and current conflict which leads to anunderestimate of some forms of modern slavery.
Moreover, the estimates do not capture all formsof modern slavery, such as the recruitment ofchild soldiers, trafficking for the purposes oforgan removal, and all child marriages. Despite
gaps in data, sources indicate that children havebeen recruited into armed forces in Lebanon,17
Iraq,18 Syria,19 and Yemen, 20 while trafficking fororgan removal has been reported in Jordan21
and Lebanon.22

Estimated
number living inmodern slavery:

1.7

MILLION(10.1 per thousand)Regional
proportion of
global estimate:3%
Forced labour

52%
Forced marriage

48%
Averagevulnerability
score:

56%
Averagegovernment
response rating:43%
Top 3 countries:
Bahrain
55%
UAE
50%
Qatar
49%
Bottom 3 countries:
Lebanon
33%
Iraq
33%
Kuwait
37%

99

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGS

Table 11
Estimated prevalence and number of people in modern slavery, by country
Rank

Country

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Saudi Arabia
United Arab Emirates
KuwaitJordanSyria
Lebanon
Qatar
Bahrain
Oman
Yemen
Iraq

ARAB STATES

Estimated
prevalence ofmodern slavery(per 1,000 of
population)

Estimated numberof people inmodern slavery

Population

21.3
13.4
13.0
10.0
8.7
7.6
6.8
6.7
6.5
6.0
5.5

740,000
132,000
55,000102,000
153,000
52,00020,00011,00033,000180,000
221,000

34,814,000
9,890,000
4,271,000
10,203,000
17,501,000
6,825,000
2,881,000
1,702,000
5,107,000
29,826,000
40,223,000

What drives vulnerability
to modern slavery in theregion?
The Arab States is the second most vulnerable
region in the world to modern slavery. Conflict asa driver of vulnerability is more significant in the
Arab States than any other region. Other drivers ofvulnerability were discrimination towards minority
groups, political instability, and lack of politicalrights. At the country level, Yemen, Syria, andIraq were the most vulnerable countries; thesecountries also fall within the top 10 most vulnerable
countries globally. Qatar, Kuwait, and the UAE had
the lowest levels of vulnerability within the region;
yet compared with the least vulnerable countries
around the world, vulnerability is still relatively highin these countries.
Discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity,or sexual orientation is the greatest driver ofvulnerability in the region. In Yemen minority
groups such as the Al-Muhamasheen have longexperienced marginalisation, 23 while in Jordan,
Lebanon, and GCC countries, migrant workers arehighly vulnerable to exploitation under the kafalasystem, which grants employers substantial control
over their lives.24 Risks have compounded in thewake of COVID-19, 25 with reports of increased wage
theft, 26 detention, 27 confinement to the workplace, 28
and unemployment.29 In GCC countries where
migrants comprise 82 per cent of the workforce on
average, 30 the pandemic has led to an escalation of
workforce nationalisation policies; that is, efforts
to increase the proportion of nationals employed. 31
Such policies have spurred increased xenophobia
and stereotyping of migrants as responsible

for the spread of coronavirus. 32 Individuals
belonging to the LGBTQI+ community also facewidespread discrimination throughout the region,
as homosexuality and gender non-conformity are
criminalised in several countries in the region. 33
Governance issues linked to political instability,
restricted political rights, and government inaction
to combat modern slavery drive vulnerability acrossthe Arab States. In Iraq and Yemen, corruption andconflict contribute to severe political instability
and disrupt government functions, exacerbating
vulnerability. 34 Throughout the region, genderinequality both drives, and is reinforced by,governance issues compounding vulnerability for
women and girls. Despite some progress, all ArabStates countries except the UAE were ranked in thebottom fifth of more than 150 countries assessedin the World Economic Forum’s 2021 Global Gender
Gap Index, reflecting poorer gender equality in theregion across economic, education, health, andpolitical dimensions. 35 No countries in the region
afford women equal rights in matters of divorce,
inheritance, citizenship, and employment, while
in most countries women lack equal access tojustice and freedom of movement. 36 These domains
are typically governed by personal status laws
and male guardianship systems, 37 which severely
restrict women’s agency and increase their risk of
exploitation. 38 Further, during the pandemic, womenand girls across the region experienced a heavier
domestic work burden39 and heightened risk ofgender-based violence.40

Conflict drives vulnerability in the Arab States, yet
the effects are not uniform throughout the region.
While Oman and the UAE experience comparatively
low levels of conflict, heightened risk of modern
slavery in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen is spurred byconflict. The erosion of state protection has led toincreased risk of conflict-related sexual violenceand slavery in these countries.41 Meanwhile,
conflict-related displacement has entrenchedrisks region-wide. At least 12.3 million people wereinternally displaced in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen in
2021,42 and a further 2.1 million refugees, asylum
seekers, stateless persons, and others of concern
were recorded throughout the Arab States.43 With
resources in host countries increasingly strained,44
most of these people face insecure conditions
and complex humanitarian needs,45 fuelling theirvulnerability to modern slavery. For example,
Syrian refugee girls in Jordan46 and Lebanon47 may
be forced to marry as a means to access supplies
and private shelters, and to protect against sexual
violence and community perceptions of impurity. At
the same time, research indicates that the influenceof the host community may see families resist
traditional expectations and delay child marriage.48
Underreporting of sexual violence due to patriarchal
norms, particularly when victims are men andboys,49 as well as a lack of services for males, limits
our understanding of their experiences of child andforced marriage in displacement settings. 50
The effects of climate change are felt acrossthe region, from severe drought in Syria51 todesertification in Jordan, 52 with extreme water
stress affecting most Arab States countries. 53 In
Yemen, natural disasters displaced more thanCountry

Total (%)

Yemen
Syria
Iraq
LebanonSaudi Arabia
JordanBahrain
Oman
United Arab Emirates
KuwaitQatar

220,000 people in 2020 alone, 54 while the war in
Ukraine has caused disruptions to critical foodimports in the Arab States region, 55 worsening thehumanitarian crisis there. The impacts of climatechange exacerbate the push factors that makepeople vulnerable to modern slavery, including
poverty, loss of livelihoods, displacement, anddistress migration, 56 with women and girls
disproportionately impacted. 57 Where livelihoods
are threatened, families may turn to negative coping
mechanisms such as forced and child marriage, 58 orresort to irregular migration in search of alternative
income, where risks of trafficking are heightened. 59
Climate-related resource scarcity can also trigger
conflict, or spur recruitment into armed groups
due to loss of livelihoods,60 further compounding
vulnerability to modern slavery.

Governance issues
38%

Inequality

40%

Disenfranchised groups

Total

Figure 15
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by dimension

60%

Lack of basic needs

Effects of conflict

89
83
82
60
53
49
40
40
40
39
38

Table 12
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by country

71%
40%
56%

“My mother was sick and wanted someone
to help her with the housework.”
Qatari male on his forced marriage at age 24

100

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

101

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGS

ARAB STATES

What are governments in
the region doing to address
modern slavery?
Walk Free assessed government responses tomodern slavery in nine countries in the region.61 Dueto ongoing disruptions to government and limited
data, Palestine, Syria and Yemen were excluded.
The Arab States region scored an average
government response rating of 43 per cent, thethird highest score of the five regions. Government
responses featured efforts to improve survivor
support and better coordinate the response tomodern slavery at the national and regional level.
Despite some efforts to strengthen criminal justicemechanisms, the criminal justice response remained
the weakest of any region. As in the 2018 GSI, no
countries in the Arab States region have taken
action to combat modern slavery in supply chains.
GDP per capita PPP (current international $) varied
greatly at the country level,62 with wealthier GCC
countries typically taking relatively stronger
action to respond to modern slavery. For example,
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE, and Qatar areamong the region’s wealthiest nations anddemonstrated the strongest responses to modern
slavery in the region. However, when compared tocountries of similar wealth in other regions, GCC
countries — particularly Kuwait — displayed aweak response relative to wealth,63 with significant
gaps in protections for migrant workers persisting
across the subregion. Migrant workers are highly
vulnerable to exploitation under the kafala system,
Jordan, Lebanon, and the GCC countries.64 During
the reporting period, these countries continued
to implement laws or policies that made it difficult
for migrant workers to freely leave abusive
employers. Across the region, only Kuwait and Iraq

Table 13Government
response score,by country andmilestone

Country*

Bahrain
United Arab Emirates
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
JordanOman
KuwaitIraq
Lebanon

Survivors
identified
andsupported(%)

Criminaljusticemechanisms
(%)

77
59
59
59
50
41
36
41
32

50
42
42
54
54
38
42
38
42

Chtoura, Lebanon,
May 2021.

covered all categories of workers under national
labour laws.65 In a positive step, Oman,66 Qatar,67
and Saudi Arabia68 adopted reforms to the kafalasystem, yet these were insufficient to dismantle thesystem entirely.

A young female Syrian refugee,
who is just 19 years old, visits
the office of a local NGO
which provides assistanceto young female survivors ofchild marriage. She was 17
years old when she married,and divorced a year later.
Yet, young female divorcees
living in Syrian refugee camps
face significant stigma andhardship, and are particularly
vulnerable to abuse including
forced marriage and forced
sexual exploitation. Photo
credit: Marwan Naamani/
picture alliance via
Getty Images.

GCC countries have significantly higher GDP per
capita than Lebanon and Iraq, the two countries
taking the least action to address modern slavery.
Government response efforts in Jordan, Lebanon,and Iraq were constrained by limited resources asthese countries continued to grapple with the flowon effects of conflict in Syria and Yemen.69 However,despite this, Jordan took some positive action to
respond to modern slavery in 2021, amending its
2009 anti-trafficking law to enhance witness andvictim protection and access to compensation.70
Since 2018, most countries have taken further action
to improve their response to modern slavery. For
example, the government of Qatar established its
first dedicated shelter for survivors of trafficking71
and Kuwait commenced meetings of its nationalanti-trafficking committee.72 Saudi Arabia launched
an awareness campaign on how to identify andreport modern slavery73 and established a National
Referral Mechanism,74 with the ILO Protocol of 2014
to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 also entering
into force there in 2021.75 No other countries
made efforts to ratify international conventions
since 2018 and, concerningly, the ILO Domestic
Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189)76 has to date
not been ratified by any country in the region.
Further, no country has fully criminalised all formsof modern slavery, hampering access to justice forsurvivors. Oman,77 the UAE,78 and Qatar are the only
countries to criminalise forced labour, while forced
marriage is criminalised only in Iraq.79 No countries
have established a minimum marriage age of 18
without exception.

Government Total
Risk
National and%)and businessfactors
regional levelsupply chainsarecoordination(%)
addressed
(%)
(%)
63
75
63
63
50
50
50
38
50

57
64
64
43
50
50
43
29
29

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

55
50
49
49
46
38
37
33
33

Gaps in support services appeared across theregion, with four countries neglecting to makeservices available for all survivors. Lebanon took
the least action to identify and support survivors,
while Saudi Arabia joined Bahrain as the only othercountry in the region to distribute national victim
identification guidelines to all first responders.80
Three countries provided training for police recruits
and only Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided regulartraining for frontline responders. There is evidence
that survivors were detained or deported for
immigration violations in all countries except theUAE,81 where information suggests that inconsistent
application of screening procedures may havemeant survivors were wrongly criminalised.82(NAP) to combat slavery in place, yet there
is no evidence the NAPs were fully funded or
independently monitored. No governments in theregion addressed modern slavery in governmentand business supply chains.

“I needed support from the police but
the police didn’t help. I wanted themto contact my consulate but they only
called the agent.”
24-year-old Sierra Leonean female survivor ofdomestic servitude in Lebanon

Notably, all countries in the region have establisheda national body to coordinate the government’s
response to modern slavery. All countries except
Bahrain and Lebanon had a National Action Plan

* Palestine, Yemen and Syria excluded from analysis due to limited data

102

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

103

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGS

ARAB STATES

Understanding modern slavery in Palestine
Palestine has not been included in ourassessments due to the complex and intertwining
system of governance and occupation in the WestBank and Gaza Strip, which hampers reliabledata collection. Administrative control over theWest Bank was unevenly split between Israeli
and Palestinian authorities under the Oslo
Accords, signed in 1993 and 1995, which resulted
in the Israeli authorities having greater control
over the area than Palestinian authorities.83
A de facto Hamas government controls the
Gaza Strip, however an Israeli land, air, and sea
blockade has been in place since 2007 following
their election.84 Data on modern slavery in the
Gaza Strip is severely limited; international andhuman rights organisations have been routinely
denied entry by Israeli forces enforcing theblockade.85 Several international organisations,
including the United Nations Special Rapporteuron the situation of human rights in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories, have recently
acknowledged that the Israeli government isperpetrating apartheid in Palestine.86
Despite limited data, anecdotal evidence
indicates that Palestinians experience various
forms of modern slavery, including forced labour,
worst forms of child labour, forced begging, andforced and child marriage.87 Palestinian men
and boys employed in the Israeli construction
sector are vulnerable to debt bondage, as
discriminatory employers charge them highfees and commissions and sub-contract themto other employers illegally. 88 Illegal workers
without permits face greater risks of abuseand exploitation. 89 Gender biases further
embed women and girls’ risk of modern
slavery, particularly forced commercial sexual
exploitation and forced and child marriage, 90
with risk heightened for Palestinian womenand girls living in refugee camps.91 Palestinian
government data estimates that more than
17,600 girls age 15 to 19 were married in theWest Bank in 2018.92 In Gaza, an estimated 11 percent of women were married before the age of
18.93 There are also reports of women and girls
being trafficked from the West Bank to the Al
Naqab desert 94 where they are forced to marryolder men.95
Vulnerability to, and experiences of, modern
slavery are also shaped by the systemic
discrimination, dispossession, and displacementof Palestinians living under apartheid. In the104

West Bank, Palestine,
October 2020.

West Bank and Gaza, Palestinians are denied
citizenship rights, and require Israeli-issued
identity documents to live and work in the
territories.96 The work permit system creates
greater risks of exploitation as it ties Palestinian
workers to their employer. In addition, overnight
workers have their identity documents withheld
as a requirement of their permit.97 Reforms to
the permit system were introduced in 2020 toease worker mobility in the construction sector,
yet these have not been enforced.98 Like theconditions created under the kafala system, thepermit system entrenches power imbalances andrestricts workers’ movements, increasing theirvulnerability to labour exploitation in Israel.99
The ongoing occupation also prevents somepeople from seeking help, for example, womenand girls who have been trafficked within the1948 borders for the purposes of forced marriage
report not seeking assistance due to fears of being
intercepted by Israeli authorities.100
It is difficult to comprehensively assess Palestine’s
efforts to combat modern slavery as a result of
the complex and continuing history of occupation,
which has resulted in several different legislative
regimes having the force of law. However, someactions, albeit limited and often with exceptions,have been undertaken. A broad summary of
the criminal justice framework is listed in Table
14. There are several gaps in removing risks inlegislation, including gaps in labour laws thatleave domestic workers without protection,prohibitions on sex work, and laws that entrench
gender biases in areas such as guardianship,
inheritance, and divorce.101 Field sources confirm
that there are significant gaps in the government’s
response, ranging from a lack of support for NGOs
that provide direct services to survivors to a lackof awareness among government officials andfrontline responders on how to identify victims
and apply the relevant anti-trafficking laws.102
Within the West Bank, there is significant room
for the government authorities to strengthen thelegislative framework criminalising all forms ofmodern slavery, support survivors, and reducerisk of exploitation.

A Palestinian man harvests
olives on his land that was
split by Israel’s controversial
separation wall. To be able toharvest his crops on the otherside of the wall, a special Israeli
army permit is required. The
United Nations has noted thatthe separation wall violatesinternational laws and severely
limits Palestinian movement
and access to livelihoods. Photo
credit: Emmanuel Dunand/AFP
via Getty Images.

Form of modern slavery

Level of protection

Source of law

Slavery

It is not clear that Jordanian prohibitions
against slavery apply extraterritoriallyto Palestine.

Jordanian Abolition of
Slavery Act of 1929.103

Forced labour

Forced labour is not separately criminalised
in Palestine. Previously, Jordanian labour
law had criminalised causing, procuring, or
encouraging children under the age of 16 into
forced begging.

Palestinian Labour Law No.
7 of 2000, which replaced
the Jordanian Labour Law of1960 in the West Bank.104

Forced marriage

Forced marriages are not criminalised within
Palestine, however both brides and grooms
must provide their full and free consent to themarriage. In practice, the importance of thebride's consent may be limited, as women andgirls of any age require the consent of a maleguardian to enter into a marriage.

Jordanian Personal Status
Law of 1976.105

Human trafficking

Trafficking for the purposes of sexual
exploitation is criminalised. However, noother offences exist for other forms ofhuman trafficking.

Jordanian Penal Code of1960.106Child marriageChild marriage is not criminalised. However, aminimum age of marriage is set at 18 for bothboys and girls, although exceptions exist if
judges of religious and family courts consider
it is in the interests of both parties to allow
the marriage.

Decision by the Palestinian
Authority passed in
November 2019.107

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Table 14
Legal protections
against modern
slavery in theWest Bank

105

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGS

ARAB STATES

Mauritania,
June 2018.
Promising
Practices in the

Arab States

Mabrouka (pictured) was achild when she was taken from
herOnlymother,also acentsurvivor,
6 perof program evaluations into be forced into domesticthePromising
Practices Database wereservitude. When Mabrouka wasdeliveredtheArab States region. Several
11 yearsold, shein
was
badly
burnedwhile cooking
for her targeted specific forms
evaluated
programs
abusers.
Althoughslavery
freed whenof modernsuch as human trafficking,she was 14 years old in 2011,
while others targeted related areas such as
she was never able to go to
migration,school.
After beingrefugees,
married at and internal displacement.
Evaluations
programs targeting forced
16 years,and is nowof
a mother.
Photo
credit: Seif
Kousmate/
marriageremaina significant gap: despite the
Hans
Lucas viaregional
the Guardian.
highestprevalence of forced marriage

being found in the Arab States, only threeevaluated programs from the region targeted
forced marriage. Overall, there is limited
information on what works to reduce risk in
specific sectors, with only two evaluations
explicitly targeting high-risk sectors. One
evaluated program targeted camel racing in
the UAE and four countries outside the region,
while another targeted the domestic work
sector in nine Arab States countries. While mostevaluated programs were found to have met
some objectives, potential lessons learned
are significantly limited as no evaluation
methodology included a control or comparisongroup to reliably test these findings. Program
designers, funders, and evaluators mustsystematically capture data and publicly share
future evaluations to help fill the significant
evidence gap on what works to address modern
slavery in the Arab States.

Recommendations
for governments

1

Dismantle kafala by expanding
coverage of national labour laws to
include all workers, including migrant,
domestic, seasonal workers. Ensurethat migrant workers can freely
enter, reside and exit the country
and leave or transfer jobs without
employer consent.

2

Abolish provisions in the law thatcriminalise absconding and enforce
measures to discourage employers
from filing false allegations against
workers. Enforce laws that criminalise
charging of recruitment fees andwithholding of passports and identity
documents.

3

Equip humanitarian practitioners to
respond to modern slavery risks incrisis settings by rolling out the Global
Protection Cluster’s Introductory
Guide to Anti-Trafficking Action inInternal Displacement Contexts.108

4

Introduce a suite of legal protections
to tackle forced marriage, including
by criminalising all forms of modern
slavery in line with internationallaw and raising the minimum age ofmarriage to 18 with no exceptions.

5

Tackle underlying gender inequality
by affording women equal rights
in matters of divorce, inheritance,
citizenship, and employment, andstrengthen access to access to justiceand freedom of movement for womenand girls.

Badra, Iraq,
July 2022.
A man climbs a palm tree to harvest
dates in a country once known as
the home of “30 million palm trees.”
Iraq’s date production has beenblighted by decades of conflictand environmental challenges,
including drought, desertification,and salinisation. This has resulted
in greater rates of poverty, foodinsecurity, and vulnerability tomodern slavery. Photo credit:
Asaad Niazi/ AFP via Getty Images.

106

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

107

05

REGIONAL
SPOTLIGHT

KAFALA

Disempowered,dehumanised, deported:
Life under the kafala system

The promise of decent wages and steady employment
attracts many migrants from countries throughout
Africa and Asia to the Arab States. However, the reality
often differs substantially once in country and under thekafala (sponsorship) system, a restrictive work permit
system that ties migrant workers to their employer.1
By placing control over entry, exit, work, andresidence in the hands of employers, the system
leaves migrant workers vulnerable to exploitationand modern slavery, 2 particularly in domestic
work, 3 construction,4 hospitality, 5 and sectors
where seasonal work is common.6 Variations of thekafala system exist in Jordan, Lebanon, and the GCC
countries — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,7 Saudi
Arabia, and the UAE. Collectively, the Arab States
region is home to more than 24 million migrant
workers,8 comprising over 40 per cent of the labour
force — the highest share of any region.9

What is the kafala system?

Beirut, Lebanon,
September 2020.
A former domestic worker
from Sierra Leone uses hermobile phone while waiting
to be repatriated later thatevening. Lebanon’s economic
collapse, as well as COVID-19
and the August 4 blast at thePort of Beirut, have left asignificant number of migrant
workers in a humanitariancrisis. Many domestic workers,
forced to live on the streets,are desperate to leave but
cannot afford to buy a planeticket home, and have received
limited assistance from
diplomatic representatives.
Photo credit: Aline Deschamps
via Getty Images.

108

The kafala system is a set of laws and policies thatdelegate responsibility for migrant workers to
employers, including control over their ability toenter, reside, work, and, in some cases, exit thehost country.10 Workers typically cannot leave orchange jobs prior to completion of their contract,
before a certain time period, or without permission
from their employer. Those who do leave may run
the risk of arrest and deportation for the crime ofabsconding.11 The system also limits the ability of
exploited workers to access justice. In practice, aworker who leaves their job not only risks losing
their means of earning an income, but also risks
becoming an illegal migrant. This threatens theirability to pursue legal action against their employer
and recover any income they are owed. If deported,
workers may also face bans on returning to thecountry to work.12 Legal redress is made even moredifficult by prolonged, expensive court processes,
limited legal assistance, and the absence ofinterpreters.13 Some employers reportedly create
additional barriers to justice; for example, bylevelling false allegations of theft against migrant
workers in retaliation for leaving14 or filing false
absconding reports with law enforcement to avoid
paying wages owed.15 Migrant workers can bedeported even where no evidence exists to support
the accusations, while employers enjoy impunity.16

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

What are the origins of
the kafala system?
The differences between past and present
understandings of the kafala system are vast.
In classical Arabic, the term kafala referred
to relationships between an authority figure
or person with power (the kafeel) and avulnerable or relatively weaker person (themakfūl), whereby the kafeel would take legal
responsibility for the makfūl without benefittingfrom the relationship. Specifically, kafala meant“to guarantee” (as one would a business loan)and “to take care of” (for example, become
the legal guardian of orphaned children).17 The
traditional interpretation of kafala as a form ofalternative care is recognised in internationallaw,18 and may still be practiced in modern
settings; for example, in the care of orphaned
children and unaccompanied refugee minors.19
However, the understanding of the system as ameans of protection, trust, and social solidarity
has largely been eclipsed by the widespread
oppression of migrant workers under its presentday application as a sponsorship process.20
This divergence between past and present
applications highlights the lingering impact ofcolonialism.
The first example of present kafala wasreportedly in the pearl diving industry in the
British Colonial Protectorate of Bahrain in the
1920s, and subsequently spread throughout
other colonies in the Gulf states.21 In Bahrain,colonial administrators used the kafala system
to facilitate the entry of migrant workers to fill
perceived labour shortages on British-owned
pearl diving ships while exerting their control
over a foreign labour force by ensuring an
acceptable kafeel took legal responsibility for
the workers.22 Most pearl divers were bound totheir ship by debt and subject to abusive labour
practices while onboard.23 The repression of
migrant workers is now entrenched in law andsocial norms. While present kafala is upheld bysponsorship requirements rather than debt, 24
both national and foreign employers today
benefit from the disproportionate control
the kafala system provides over workers.25
Infantilising attitudes that position migrant
workers as in need of protection justify
restrictions on their mobility and other freedoms
under the kafala system.26

109

05

REGIONAL
SPOTLIGHT

KAFALA

Modern slavery experiencesin Lebanon and Kuwait
Female migrant domestic workers face specificchallenges under the kafala system. Globally,
patriarchal norms that devalue domestic labour
as “women’s work” confine women within
the household and make them less visible toauthorities.27 In high-income countries, domestic
work is typically performed by low-paid femalemigrants who fill gaps in care driven by thecurtailing of social welfare. These workers are
subject to constant surveillance and face higher
risks of gender-based violence, discrimination, andexploitation within their employer’s households.
With their movements heavily restricted, it iseven more difficult for victims to leave situationsof abuse.
In 2020, Walk Free interviewed 30 female survivors ofdomestic servitude who were exploited in Lebanon
and Kuwait. Respondents came from six countries,
including Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, thePhilippines, and Sierra Leone, and were employedin Kuwait and Lebanon, where strict versions of
the kafala system operate. While migrants do not
require an exit permit to depart Lebanon or Kuwait,
all other elements of the kafala system are present.
In Lebanon, migrants cannot leave their job without
their employer’s permission28 and in Kuwait,
domestic workers must receive approval from the
Ministry of Interior and Labour Court to transfer jobs
without consent from their employer.29 Getting thisManila, Philippines,
February 2023.
Relatives of Jullebee Ranara,a migrant domestic worker
who was killed in Kuwait,
call for justice at her funeral.
Police later arrested the 17
year-old son of Jullebee’s
employers in relation to her
killing. Migrant domestic
workers in Kuwait often facesexism and racism, as wellas risks of exploitation by
employers due to the extreme
power imbalance createdby the kafala system. Photo
credit: Jam Sta Rosa/AFP via
Getty Images.

110

approval requires workers to leave their employer’s
household, which can lead to accusations ofabsconding and result in deportation:30 seeking help
is not without significant risks for migrant domestic
workers. The interviews highlighted the difficulties
women faced when seeking to leave their situation.
Three-quarters of respondents had limited or noaccess to a phone in at least one household where
they worked, and more than half reported having
their movements restricted, including by being
locked inside places of employment or monitored on
camera. Half of all respondents physically escaped
their household, and five women were subsequently
arrested by police despite having experienced abuse
and mistreatment by their employers. At least nine
respondents were deported or repatriated after
leaving their workplace, however this number islikely higher given not all respondents reported how
they returned home.

“After I escaped, [my employers] told
me that I had been reported to police forhaving stolen money from the home.
Shortly afterwards, the police showed up
and arrested me…When the day of my flightarrived, I wasn’t even allowed to collect mypossessions. I was still owed four months’
salary and returned empty-handed.”23-year-old Ghanaian female survivorof domestic servitude

Perceived or actual lack of protection prevented
victims leaving situations of exploitation.
Respondents reported that a lack of assistancefrom embassies, consulates, employment agencies,
police, and beliefs that they could not turn toauthorities were barriers to seeking help. While itis unclear how some respondents returned home,several were assisted by civil society organisations
or family members, while few others had the costof their tickets home paid for by their employers
and agents. In one instance, a worker in Kuwait
was required to pay her employer to be allowed
to leave. For some workers, returning was further
complicated by unpaid wages and confiscationof passports. When specifically asked if their
documents were seized, all respondents in
Cameroon reported that their passports were seizedin Lebanon, where the practice is not outlawed, 31
and in Kuwait, where passport withholding
is illegal. 32“I think Lebanese law needs to change sothat we may have our rights protected. I
wouldn’t have had to escape.”
33-year-old Ethiopian female survivorof domestic servitude

Most migrant workers reported having very little
to no knowledge about the destination country
prior to travelling. Respondents in Cameroon wereasked further questions on what would have been
helpful for them in preparing for work. The mostcommon response was knowing the true natureand conditions of the work. When the remaining
respondents (those in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, thePhilippines, and Sierra Leone) were asked what
support they needed but did not receive, the mostcommon responses focused on greater support
from embassies, employment agencies, or police.

Impact of COVID-19“I didn’t go to police because they always
support their citizens and will always treat
my escape as a breach of contract. That waswhat my employer told me. I got to a church
owned by a Ghanaian and they also told me
they can’t be of help since I’ve breached acontract...I was arrested by police on thestreet, the Kuwait government paid for myflight.”31-year-old Cameroonian female survivor of domestic
servitude

Almost two-thirds of respondents paid fees tobrokers in their country of origin or transit, including
in Ethiopia and Guinea, where domestic laws
prohibit workers being charged recruitment fees. 33
Payment of fees increases risk of debt bondage in
the Gulf states, where workers are forced to work
for little or no pay in order to repay recruitment andrelated fees. 34 While Kuwait 35 and Jordan36 prohibit
charging recruitment fees to migrant domestic
workers, and the remaining kafala countries
prohibit charging recruitment fees to all migrant
workers, 37 exorbitant fees are still passed on inpractice. 38 To cover these costs, some respondents
borrowed money from family or arranged to pay
the money when they began their job, which
typically carried the false promise of a good salaryand ultimately led to situations of debt bondage.
Many respondents were also deceived about thenature and conditions of the work, with more thana third of them being promised an entirely different
form of employment than domestic work. Amongrespondents in Cameroon, just under half did notsign a contract and some respondents signed
contracts in a language they did not understand.
Meanwhile, two Ethiopian migrant workers reported
being encouraged to travel despite a temporary ban
on labour migration to Gulf states being in effect at
the time.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

The situation worsened for many migrants during
the COVID-19 pandemic, with reports of wage theftin the construction, 39 hospitality, and manufacturingsectors in Gulf countries,40 largely driven by ordercancellations, weakened labour protections(allowing employers to reduce wages), and dismissal
or repatriation of workers without pay.41 Migrants
from countries in Asia and Africa are often recruited
to work in these sectors by a complex network of
local brokers, recruitment agents, friends, andrelatives.42 They may receive limited or inaccurate
information about the nature of the work and berequired to pay substantial recruitment fees tomigrate through informal and formal channels,
thereby increasing their risk of debt-bondage
and exploitation in the destination.43 During the
pandemic, some migrants reportedly defaulted
on loan repayments due to wage theft and were
subsequently arrested in the UAE,44 while several
migrant workers in Qatar were deported before
receiving their wages.45 Construction workers were
physically abused after requesting their unpaid
salaries in Saudi Arabia,46 where the government
also allowed a temporary 40 per cent pay reductionin the private sector.47 Lockdowns intensified social
isolation and vulnerability among domestic workers
in private households 48 and compounded difficulties
in sending remittances home.49 Some domestic
workers in Lebanon were abandoned outside theirconsulates by employers who said they can nolonger afford to pay them. 50

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SPOTLIGHT

KAFALA

Forms of tied visa programs operate in several
other countries globally, and these systems
similarly increase migrant workers’ vulnerability
to exploitation. 51 However, the various iterationsof the kafala system involve some of the mostrestrictive conditions and are present in countries
which have among the highest concentrationsof migrant workers in the world. 52 Over the past
decade, countries that uphold kafala have faced
significant criticism due to the pervasive abuseof migrant workers under the system, with majorinternational events such as the Qatar 2022 FIFA
World Cup and Dubai World Expo 2020 drawing
global attention to the issue. 53 Several countries
have instituted reforms, some in response tomounting international pressure, yet no country
has abolished kafala entirely, with vestiges of thesystem undermining reform efforts.
Qatar represents one example in which preparations
for the FIFA World Cup since 2010 have drawn
attention to grave migrant worker abuses in theconstruction, hotel, and security sectors. 54 Amid
mounting criticism in 2017, 55 Qatar agreed toundertake a technical cooperation program with
the ILO, 56 seeking to align laws and practices withinternational labour standards. 57 Promisingly, in2020 Qatar ceased requiring exit permits for workers
excluded from the scope of the labour law, including
migrant domestic workers, expanding upon asimilar 2018 amendment. 58 Qatar also removed NoObjection Certificate (NOC) requirements, allowing
workers to change jobs without permission fromtheir employer under certain conditions. 59 However,these positive reforms have been undermined bygaps in implementation and protections. In practice,
the system is not only difficult for migrant workers
to navigate, but many are unaware of their right toleave,60 and even if they are they still face the threatof retaliation from their employers who may file
false allegations of theft or absconding.61 As reports
of abuse persisted in the lead-up to the World Cup,human rights organisations continued to call forthe government to enforce reforms and for FIFA andthe Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy(the body responsible for delivering the event) tostrengthen due diligence and monitoring,62 as wellas establish a scheme to remediate harms caused.63
While global attention was brought to the issue
following the games, it has not been followed by any
meaningful commitment or action by FIFA and the
Qatari government, with impacted migrant workers
still struggling to access compensation.64
Several other countries have implemented limited
reforms to increase job mobility in recent years.
In 2021, the government of Oman removed its
NOC requirement, allowing workers to transfer
jobs without their employer’s permission upon

112

completion of their contract.65 Saudi Arabia’s 2021
Labour Reform Initiative similarly allows workers
to change jobs or leave the country without
employer consent;66 however, workers mustcomplete one year of their contract and migrant
domestic workers, among others, are excluded
from this protection.67 Under 2016 reforms allowing
workers to transfer jobs in the UAE, workers mustcomplete their contract or provide advance notice
to avoid an employment ban, and may be required
to compensate their employer.68 As in Qatar,
absconding is punishable in each of these countries
and places migrant workers at risk of arrest ordeportation for leaving abusive workplaces.
Even in Bahrain, which previously had the mostsweeping reforms to the kafala system, gaps inprotections persisted.69 In 2017, the government
introduced the Flexi-Permit, allowing migrant
workers to freely change jobs and leave the country
without facing possible charges of absconding.70
This granted greater freedom than had ever been
seen under the kafala system, yet the steep priceof the permit deterred those eligible from selfsponsoring71 and permit-holders lacked definedlabour protections under the law.72 Rather thanaddress these shortcomings in line with civilsociety recommendations,73 Bahrain abandoned
the system entirely in October 2022,74 replacing itwith a program that allows workers to self-sponsor
within designated professions.75 Under the new
system,76 workers must obtain a vocational work
permit through a certified registration centre,
effectively privatising the process.77 While thereforms purport to strengthen protections for
migrants, those with irregular status from October
2022 are not eligible for the permit (unlike theFlexi-Permit system).78 Further, workers must stillbear the cost of the permit and can no longer obtaincommercial registration.79 The reforms were passed
amid pressure from the business community,
which was driven by fears that freelance migrant
workers posed a threat to local businesses, anddue to a government push to nationalise theirworkforce in a bid to move away from reliance on
migrant workers.80

The state of reform
The five elements of the kafala system present across countries in the Arab States are set out in Table 15.81
Table 15
Status of key elements of the Kafala system, by country
Rating scale:Country= in force= partially in force= not in force

Employer must sponsor
entry into country

Employer controls
residency / work permit

Employer must grant permission
for workers to change / leave job

Employer can report worker
for absconding

Under reforms introducedin December 2022, visit
visas can no longer be
converted into a work
permits, meaning migrants
cannot obtain a work permit
without exiting Bahrain.83

The vocational work
permit allows workers
to self-sponsor indesignated professions.
It is unclear if domestic
workers are eligible. 84

Vocational work permit holders
can transfer labour registration
centres after a minimum of 30days from initial registration.85
Excluding domestic workers, 86
other migrants can transfer
after one year with threemonths’ notice.87

Before the Flexi-Permit wascancelled in October 2022,
permit holders could nothave absconding cases filed
against them. 88 It is unclear
whether the new permit
allows absconding charges
to be filed. Other migrant
workers can be punished
for absconding.89

Employer must grant
permission for worker toexit country

Bahrain 82

Oman 90

UnitedArab
Emirates 93

Visit visas may be converted
into a work visa without
the worker having to exit
Oman, however granting of
the work visa depends onthe employer.91

Migrant workers can transfer
jobs without permission after
completion of their contract.92

Free zone workers aresponsored by the free zone
authority rather than an
employer.94 Visit visas may
also be converted without
the worker having to exit
the UAE.95

Requirement for permission iswaived in certain circumstances,such as contract expiry or nonpayment of wages.96 Domestic
workers may end their contract
without consent if their employer
violates legal obligations. They
can transfer employers upon
expiry of the contract.97

Kuwait 98
Migrants can change jobs after
three years and 90 days’ noticewithout permission.99 Excludes
domestic workers, who requireapproval from the Ministry ofInterior and Labour Court totransfer jobs without consent
from their employer.

Lebanon100
Qatar101

Saudi
Arabia105

Migrant workers can transfer
jobs under certain conditions
and with at least one or twomonth’s notice.102

Almost all migrant workers
can depart without
permission; however,
employers can apply to haveup to 5 per cent of certain
employees to require priorapproval.103 Domestic
workers must give 72 hours’
notice.104

Migrants can transfer employers
upon completion of theircontract, or after one year undercertain conditions.106 Domestic
workers can transfer in somecases such as abuse.107

Migrant workers canapply to exit the country
without their employer’s
permission.108 This does
not apply to domestic
workers.109

Jordan110
Migrants can terminate
unlimited term contracts with
one month’s notice; however,they may be required tocompensate the employer.
Limited term contracts canbe terminated under certain
conditions without permission
or upon expiry. Excludes
certain categories such as
agricultural workers.111

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113

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SPOTLIGHT

KAFALA

Doha, Qatar,
December 2022.
Construction workers, mainly
from India, Bangladesh and
Nepal, watch the ArgentinaAustralia match in the2022 FIFA World Cup. Civil
society activists criticised
the labour conditions facedby the thousands of migrant
workers involved in preparing
the global tournament,
and many migrant workers
lost their lives during theconstruction. At the time ofwriting, a campaign is being
run by civil society activists
calling for FIFA to create a fundand financially compensate
families of deceased workers.
Photo credit: ChristianCharisius/picture alliance via
Getty Images.

Several countries in the region still grapple withstrong opposition to comprehensive reforms due toperceived economic benefits of the kafala systemand entrenched discriminatory attitudes towards
foreign workers.112 In 2020, prior to the installationof a new government in Lebanon, a new standard
unified contract was proposed to allow migrant
workers to change employers after one month’s
notice, among other protections.113 However, thecontract was swiftly struck down by the ShuraCouncil, Lebanon’s highest administrative court,
after the Syndicate of Owners of Recruitment
Agencies in Lebanon claimed that the contract
violated the labour law and would adversely affectdomestic worker recruitment, a lucrative tradein Lebanon.114“I wish I knew that going to work there, I
didn’t have to pay any money to process
any documents because my employer was
to do everything. And if I fully knew that I
was supposed to work as a housemaid, belocked up and denied free movement or bea prisoner, I shouldn’t have gone there. I
knew nobody working in Lebanon. I signed
a contract when I got to Lebanon but did
not understand the terms of the contract. I
didn’t know who the employer was.”Recommendations
host governments

Recommendations
sending governments

1

Dismantle kafala by expanding coverageof national labour laws to include all
workers and. ensuring migrant workers
can freely enter, reside, and exit thecountry, and leave or transfer jobs
without employer consent.

1

Introduce and enforce laws to prohibit
charging of recruitment fees to
employees and register and monitor
local recruitment agencies for deceptive
practices, ensuring contracts are
made available in a language migrants
can understand.

2

Strengthen monitoring and regulationof recruitment agencies and highrisk sectors by increasing resources
and capacity of labour inspectorates
and conducting unannounced labour
inspections. In addition, operatereporting mechanisms with whistleblower protections to allow workers tofreely report grievances.

2

Pursue and strengthen bilateral labour
agreements to protect migrant workers(rather than implementing labour
migration bans) and cooperate withother sending countries to advocate forcommon standards for the protection ofworkers, in consultation with migrant
workers, survivors, and civil society.

3Strengthen criminal justice responses,
including the provision of free legal andinterpretation services, and provide
systematic, regular training on victim
identification for police and first
responders to ensure no victims aredetained and deported. Provide training
for prosecutors and the judiciary on
related legislation to support access tojustice, including timely compensation
for survivors.

3

Strengthen the capacity of embassies inreceiving countries to support survivors,
including through deployment oftrained labour attachés, and makesurvivor funds accessible to all migrant
workers, regardless of their status.

4

Launch targeted information campaigns
and formal training to ensure
prospective migrants are informedof the risks, their rights, and support
services available in the destination
country, and support and engage withreturned migrant workers to inform
policies and decision-making.

4

Address underlying discriminatory andxenophobic attitudes towards migrant
workers that increase their vulnerability
to modern slavery across all sectors.

5

Ratify international conventions
including the ILO Domestic Workers
Convention, 2011 (No. 189), and the ILO
Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour
Convention, 1930.

34-year-old Cameroonian female survivorof domestic servitude

The government of Jordan has taken the leastaction to reform the kafala system. Jordan currently
maintains all elements of the kafala system,
whereby migrant workers typically cannot enteror exit the country or transfer jobs without written
employer consent.115 While the government has
made some attempts to curb illegal practices of
unscrupulous recruitment agents and improve
protections,116 there is a lack of capacity and will to
enforce the regulations.117

114

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

115

ASIA ANDTHE PACIFIC

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGSASIA ANDTHE PACIFIC

Bangladesh

Afghanistan

North Korea

South Korea

Japan

Nepal

Mongolia

Hong Kong,
China
China

Taiwan, China

Iran

Lao PDR
India

Vietnam

Cambodia
Pakistan
Philippines
Myanmar

Sri Lanka

Thailand

Malaysia

SingaporePapua
New Guinea

Indonesia

Brunei

Timor-Leste

Regional
heat map:
prevalence

Low

116

Australia

New Zealand

Asia and the Pacific is home to 56 per centof the world’s population, including the twomost populous countries, India and China, andexperienced the greatest increase in internationalmigrants from 2000 to 2020.1 The region hosts thelargest number of people in modern slavery, with anestimated 15 million people in forced labour. This
includes debt bondage among migrants exploited
within the region, hereditary forms of bonded
labour in South Asia, and state-imposed forced
labour in China, North Korea, and other countries.
The prevalence of forced marriage in Asia and thePacific is second highest in the world, after the ArabStates, impacting an estimated 4.5 females and 2.1
males per every thousand people.
Although the region is highly diverse in termsof geography, ethnicity, culture, religion, andwealth, modern slavery occurs in every country.
Discrimination on the basis of gender, race, caste,
and ethnicity drives vulnerability to modern slavery.
This vulnerability is compounded by conflict, asseen with the mass displacement of the Rohingya
population in Myanmar, political instability, as
shown by the seizure of power by the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and economic insecurity, as illustrated
by the economic crisis and humanitarian emergency
in Sri Lanka. To varying extents, the effects ofclimate change and the COVID-19 pandemic haveexacerbated vulnerability across the region —driving increased unemployment, poverty, andgender inequality.
Australia took the most action to combat modern
slavery in the region, followed by the Philippines
and Thailand, while North Korea and Iran took theleast. Across most countries, governments should
address significant gaps including raising the age ofmarriage to 18 for girls and boys with no exemptions
and ensuring that labour rights are extended to all
workers, including migrants.

What is the extent andnature of modern slavery
in the region?
On any given day in 2021, an estimated 29.3 million
people were living in modern slavery in Asia andthe Pacific. This accounts for 59 per cent of the
global total. When population size is taken into
account, Asia and the Pacific had the third highest
prevalence of modern slavery in the world with 6.8
per thousand people in the region forced to workor marry. Among the five regions, Asia and thePacific had the second highest prevalence of forced
marriage (3.3 per thousand) and the third highest
prevalence of forced labour (3.5 per thousand).2

High

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

The country with by far the highest prevalencein Asia and the Pacific, and, indeed, the world,
is North Korea, where the population is forced
to work by the state or risk being penalised withhard labour in prison camps. 3 In North Korea,
an estimated one in every 10 people are insituations of modern slavery.
Following North Korea, Afghanistan, andMyanmar had the second and third highest
prevalence of modern slavery in the region.
India, China, and North Korea had the highest
number — and together accounting for twothirds of all people in modern slavery in
the region. Instability continues to shapeexperiences of modern slavery across highprevalence countries in Asia and the Pacific. For
example, the worsening humanitarian situation
caused by the political and economic turmoil
drives modern slavery practices in Afghanistan
and Myanmar.4 In these contexts, families may
resort to negative coping mechanisms, such as
marrying their young daughters, to deal witheconomic stress. 5 In other countries with a highprevalence of modern slavery, such as Pakistan
and India, economic insecurity drives workers
to take on risky jobs or loans from unscrupulous
employers. Employers then exploit theseworkers by forcing them into labour-intensive
jobs to repay their debts.6
Although these regional figures of modern
slavery are the most reliable to date, they areconservative estimates given the gaps andlimitations of data in key regions and subregions.
For example, difficulties in conducting surveys incountries that are experiencing conflict meansthat our estimates for these countries likely
understate the problem, despite our efforts toaddress data gaps. These estimates also do notinclude the recruitment of child soldiers or organ
trafficking, which other sources note occur inparts of the region.7 The true number of people
living in situations of modern slavery in Asia andthe Pacific is likely much higher.

Estimated
number living inmodern slavery:

29

MILLION(6.8 per thousand)Regional
proportion of
global estimate:

59%
Forced labour

52%
Forced marriage

48%
Averagevulnerability
score:

48%
Averagegovernment
response rating:40%
Top 3 countries:
Australia
67%
Philippines
59%
Thailand55%
Bottom 3 countries:
North Korea
-3%
Iran
8%
Vanuatu
26%

117

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGSASIA ANDTHE PACIFIC

Table 16
Estimated
prevalence andnumber of people
in modern slavery,
by country

Figure 16
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by dimension

Regional Country
rank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27

North Korea
Afghanistan
Myanmar
PakistanPapua New Guinea
India
Philippines
Iran
BangladeshIndonesia
Sri Lanka
Malaysia
Timor-Leste
ThailandLao PDR
Cambodia
Viet Nam
Mongolia
China
South Korea
Nepal
Hong Kong
Singapore
TaiwanNew ZealandAustralia
Japan

Estimated
prevalence ofmodern slavery(per 1,000of population)

Estimated numberof people inmodern slavery

104.6
13.0
12.1
10.6
10.3
8.0
7.8
7.1
7.1
6.7
6.5
6.3
6.1
5.7
5.2
5.0
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.5
3.3
2.8
2.1
1.7
1.6
1.6
1.1

2,696,000
505,000
657,000
2,349,000
93,00011,050,000
859,000
597,000
1,162,000
1,833,000
139,000
202,000
8,000
401,000
38,00083,000396,000
13,0005,771,000
180,000
97,00021,00012,00040,0008,000
41,000144,000

25,779,000
38,928,000
54,410,000
220,892,000
8,947,000
1,380,004,000
109,581,000
83,993,000
164,689,000
273,524,000
21,413,000
32,366,000
1,318,000
69,800,000
7,276,000
16,719,000
97,339,000
3,278,000
1,439,324,000
51,269,000
29,137,000
7,497,000
5,850,000
23,817,000
4,822,000
25,500,000
126,476,000

What drives vulnerability
to modern slavery in theregion?
Asia and the Pacific is the third most vulnerable
region in the world to modern slavery. The drivers
most influencing this risk include widespread
discriminatory social norms, political inequality andinstability, and economic insecurity. While conflictinduced displacement and disruption widened
gaps in wealth and social capital in some countries,
vulnerability was compounded by the COVID-19
pandemic and climate-related disasters. Overall,Afghanistan had the highest levels of vulnerability(86 per cent) and Australia the lowest (7 per cent).
Discriminatory social norms that devalue
marginalised groups on the basis of their migration
status, race, ethnicity, and/or sexual orientation are
the greatest driver of vulnerability in the region. In
Myanmar, the Rohingya minority continue to facemass displacement, abductions, sexual violence,and murder,8 driving many to seek protection
in Bangladesh. Once in Bangladesh, Rohingya
refugees face increased risks of modern slavery as
offenders prey on their extreme vulnerability,9 whilefamilies living in camps struggle to cope with foodand economic insecurity,10 which, coupled withgender discrimination, has led to increased rates
of child marriage.11 The persecution of religious
and ethnic minorities occurs in China, including theuse of state-imposed forced labour to control the
Uyghur population and other Turkic and Muslim
majority groups in the Uyghur region.12 The extent
of arbitrary and discriminatory detention of Uyghurand other predominately Muslim groups has beencalled a crime against humanity by the UN Human
Rights Commissioner.13
Political inequality and instability pervade many
countries in the region, driving vulnerability toGovernance issues
Lack of basic needs

41%

Inequality

39%

Effects of conflict
Total

modern slavery. Notably, Afghanistan is considered
the least peaceful country in the world.14 In August
2021, after four decades of war, the Taliban seized
control, triggering political, economic, and social
shocks and worsening the humanitarian situation.15
The crisis has caused many civilians to turn tosmugglers to flee the country, often to countries
with measures in place to actively deter Afghan
refugees,16 which compounds their vulnerability
to exploitation. Afghan women and girls havereportedly been forced into marriages by theirfamilies to escape the country.17 In Iran, physical andsexual violence is perpetrated by security forces as ameans to repress women’s rights and stifle politicaldissent, which has attracted coordinated sanctions
from 30 countries in March 2023.18 Hundreds ofactivists have been unfairly imprisoned and subject
to torture and sexual assault or killed since protests
erupted in September 2022, following the death inpolice custody of Mahsa Amini — who was arrested
for wearing her hijab incorrectly.19 Personal statuslaws that deny women equal rights in matters ofmarriage, divorce, inheritance, and children further
entrench gender inequality and vulnerability
to exploitation.20
Economic instability and increasing poverty limit
access to essential needs for survival such as
shelter, food, and water, and increase vulnerability
to all forms of modern slavery in Asia and thePacific. This is underpinned by widening wealthgaps: in 2021, an additional 80 million people
were forced into poverty due to pandemic-related
disruptions in economic activity.21 This risk iscompounded for disenfranchised groups who werealready living in precarious conditions. In India, forexample, a sudden lockdown in early 2020 left many
migrant workers, who were largely employed as
day labourers, stranded and without support fromthe government or their employers.22 Many had noalternative but to make the journey home on foot,50%
Kabul, Afghanistan,
August 2021.

Disenfranchised groups

118

Population

Men walk past an all-girl
school in Afghanistan. The
Zarghuna High School
previously educated 8,000
girls, until it was locked andshuttered per orders from the
Taliban-controlled Education
Ministry. Photo credit: Marcus
Yam/ Los Angeles Times via
Getty Images.

61%
35%
48%

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

119

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGSASIA ANDTHE PACIFIC

Table 17
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by country

120

often walking hundreds of kilometres, 23 while others
took out loans to meet their basic needs.24 After adevastating second wave of COVID-19 buckled theIndian health system in 202125 and caused many
deaths from the disease, 26 thousands of newly
orphaned children were exposed to higher risks ofabuse and trafficking.27
Climate change and climate-related disasters
exacerbate risks to modern slavery by reducing
access to essential needs and increasing existing
disparities in wealth and social capital levels.
These burdens were not evenly shared across theregion. Many people in low-lying countries in the
Pacific Islands expect to be displaced from theirhomes due to the effects of climate change, 28 ifthey have not been already.29 Intensifying weather
events and rising sea levels contribute to foodand water insecurity through crop loss, lossof arable land, overcrowding, poor health andsanitation, and increased competition for limited
jobs. 30 These conditions create opportunities for
traffickers to exploit vulnerable individuals, 31
particularly where avenues for regular migration
are not readily available. 32 Risk of modern slavery
also increases through reliance on negative
coping mechanisms. For instance, in Bangladesh,one of the most vulnerable countries to climatechange, 33 extreme weather has been linked to childmarriage to both minimise household expenses
and protect daughters from the heightened risk ofsexual violence. 34
Country
Afghanistan
PakistanPapua New Guinea
Iran
Myanmar
North Korea
Philippines
Bangladesh
Cambodia
India
Sri Lanka
Lao PDR
Timor-Leste
Mongolia
Indonesia
Thailand
Nepal
China
Viet Nam
Malaysia
South Korea
Hong Kong
Singapore
TaiwanJapan
New ZealandAustralia

Total (%)
86
80
79
68
67
67
66
58
58
56
56
52
51
50
49
46
46
46
44
37
29
28
24
21
11
8
7

What are governments in
the region doing to address
modern slavery?
Walk Free assessed government responses
to modern slavery across 32 countries in theregion. Asia and the Pacific scored an average
40 per cent rating on government response, thesecond lowest score of the five regions. Overall,governments did not have sufficient measures tosupport survivors or the criminal justice process,coordinate the response, address underlying risk
factors, or eradicate modern slavery from supply
chains — though responses vary significantly acrossthe region.
Within Asia and the Pacific, there are starkdifferences in GDP per capita PPP (current
international $), 35 meaning certain economies
have far more resources available to dedicate
to responding to modern slavery than others.
However, on overall government response scores,
countries with a higher level of wealth, particularly
Brunei Darussalam, Hong Kong, South Korea, andJapan are taking relatively little action to respondto modern slavery. In comparison, Bangladesh, Fiji,
Lao PDR, the Philippines, and Thailand are all taking
positive steps to respond to this issue relative totheir level of wealth.
Australia took the most action to combat modern
slavery in the Asia and the Pacific region, followedby the Philippines, Thailand, and New Zealand.
For the first time, Australia allocated a budget tosupport implementation of its National Action
Plan. 36 In December 2021, the President of thePhilippines signed Republic Act (R.A.) No. 11596 into
law, which effectively criminalises child marriage,
setting the minimum age of marriage at 18. 37
The Philippines is only the eighth country in ourassessment of the region to do so. However, thePhilippines has not yet criminalised forced marriage,
which remains a critical gap across the region,
with only 10 countries having done so. 38 Thailand,
New Zealand, Australia, Bangladesh, and Malaysia
recently joined Sri Lanka as the only countries in theregion to have brought the Protocol of 2014 to theForced Labour Convention, 1930 into force. 39
North Korea and Iran still demonstrate the weakest
response to modern slavery, reflecting a lack ofpolitical will to address modern slavery and, in thecase of North Korea, the active use of state-imposed
forced labour. For many Pacific Island countries,
the challenge of operating in resource constrained
environments largely accounts for existing gaps in
the response to modern slavery.40
Many countries in the region took further action
to combat modern slavery since the last editionof the Global Slavery Index in 2018. For example,
since then, Palau, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam,
Nepal, and Pakistan41 acceded to the Protocol
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children.42 Brunei
Darussalam finalised a National Action Plan on

human trafficking43 and established a National
Committee on Trafficking in Persons.44 Palau, which
was not included in the previous edition of the GSI,
has also made significant strides in improving themodern slavery response over the last four years,
during which it set up a coordinating body andadopted a National Action Plan,45 ratified the ILO
Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No.
182),46 and established a trafficking hotline.47“Once they are rescued and back in theircommunities, the victims needed to beconnected with services within theircommunity. They need services so that
there is no re-trafficking.”
Female survivor of modern slavery, India, 2019

There are significant gaps in legislative frameworks
to combat modern slavery across the region. Ninecountries in Asia and the Pacific have stated inlegislation that survivors are not to be treated as
criminals for conduct that occurred while under
the control of criminals. However, even where thisprotection exists, it is not always implemented inpractice. A total of 19 countries in the region treatedsurvivors of modern slavery as criminals. For example,
in 2020, 81 returned migrant workers who had been
exploited in Viet Nam were jailed in Bangladesh.48
This is not the only gap between policy and practice.
While almost all countries have criminalised
corruption, there were reports that official complicity
in modern slavery cases were not investigated in
19 countries. In India, officials allegedly received
bribes from traffickers in exchange for protection
against prosecution, while in the state of Tamil
Nadu, local politicians allegedly benefitted fromthe commercial sexual exploitation of children andforced begging rings.49 Further, despite National
Action Plans in 28 countries, only 11 governments
routinely reviewed their modern slavery response
and just two countries monitored the government
response to modern slavery through an independent
entity, such as the Office of the Special Rapporteuron Trafficking in Persons in Nepal, which is tasked
with monitoring human trafficking in the country andmaking recommendations to government.50 Morerecently, Australia announced funding to establish
an Anti-Slavery Commissioner.51 Of 26 countries thathave a legal framework that supports compensation
or restitution for modern slavery crimes, only 15
awarded compensation or restitution to survivors
in practice.
Labour laws in 18 countries prevented certain groups,
such as migrant workers or domestic workers, fromexercising their rights to freedom of association andcollective bargaining, and only the Philippines has
ratified the ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011(No. 189).52 Despite significant levels of regular andirregular migration — largely intra-regional but also
to destinations such as North America, Europe, andthe Middle East53 — only six countries had ratified theInternational Convention on the Protection of theRights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families, 199054 and fewer than half have ratified theProtocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air.55 Further, recruitment agencies wereregistered and monitored by governments in only
13 countries, and even fewer countries in the region
had laws or policies stating that recruitment fees — aknown driver of risk among migrants — are to be paidby employers.
Only six countries took any steps to eradicate modern
slavery from supply chains. This includes Australia’s
2018 Modern Slavery Act, which requires businesses
with an annual consolidated revenue of at least
AU$100 million (approximately US$67 million) toreport on their efforts to address modern slavery
within their operations and supply chains.56 In 2022,
New Zealand also proposed legislation to prevent
modern slavery within business supply chains.57“Holding company owners directly
liable for what happens in their business or
supply chains.”
Female survivor of modern slavery, India, 2019

Regional cooperation through theBali Process Government and Business ForumThe Bali Process Government and Business Forum provides a unique platform for government andbusiness leaders from 45 countries across the Asia-Pacific to collaborate on initiatives with the joint goalof eradicating modern slavery. Its “Acknowledge. Act. Advance.” Framework was the first major policy
document agreed upon by the private and public sectors to tackle issues of human trafficking and forced
labour in the region. It focuses on the pillars of supply chain transparency, ethical recruitment, and worker
protection and redress.
At the high-level meeting in February 2023, many business leaders called on their own governments tointroduce robust legislation addressing modern slavery offences, noting that such legislation can create alevel playing field for those businesses complying with their human rights obligations. Future plans include
a series of regional events to raise awareness of modern slavery risks and promote closer collaboration
between business and government. For example, the Indonesian co-chair will hold a forum aimed at young
entrepreneurs, while the Nepalese business leader will host a Responsible Business Summit in Kathmandu.

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Table 18
Government
response score,by country andmilestone

Country

Australia
Philippines
Thailand
New ZealandIndonesia
Bangladesh
Sri Lanka
Singapore
TaiwanViet Nam
Fiji
India
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Nepal
Japan
Cambodia
Myanmar
China
Mongolia
South Korea
Maldives
Pakistan
Brunei Darussalam
Timor-Leste
Hong Kong
Papua New Guinea
Solomon Islands
Palau
Vanuatu
IranNorth Korea

Survivors
identified
andsupported(%)

Criminaljusticemechanisms
(%)

64
59
50
45
45
41
45
55
45
64
50
36
59
41
36
45
41
50
41
36
41
41
36
27
32
27
23
14
27
9
-5
-9

69
73
65
65
65
69
65
54
36
46
50
58
50
58
58
42
46
42
46
54
46
38
42
42
42
35
42
42
31
38
19
8

National and
Risk
Government Total
regional level factors are and business (%)
coordination addressed supply chains
(%)
(%)
(%)
75
75
75
50
50
50
50
38
63
75
38
75
50
50
63
63
75
75
50
25
50
38
50
25
50
38
50
50
25
50
25
13

79
50
64
64
57
50
50
57
79
36
64
50
43
50
50
57
43
36
36
43
36
50
43
57
36
50
29
43
36
29
0
-21

38
13
0
25
0
0
0
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
13
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

67
59
55
54
50
49
49
47
47
47
46
46
46
45
45
44
42
42
40
40
38
37
37
35
35
32
31
31
27
26
8
-3

Promising Practices in Asiaand the PacificWithin the Promising Practices Database,46 per cent of evaluated programs are deliveredin Asia and the Pacific, covering 22 countries in
the region. While most programs tackle known
forms of modern slavery in the region such as
forced marriage, there are significant gaps inrelation to debt bondage and forced labour
despite the high prevalence of these issues in
the region. Over three quarters of evaluatedprograms delivered in Asia and the Pacific
had met some or all their objectives; yet as
only 19 of these evaluations featured reliable
methodologies with a control or comparisongroup, the ability to determine lessons learned
or identify promising practices in the region
was limited.

1

Ensure survivor support services,
including shelters, crisis support
centres, and community-based
protection, cover all populations —including males, adults, and migrants —and make specialised support available
for children.

2

Strengthen legislation to protect
survivors of exploitation by ensuring
they are not treated as criminals for
conduct that occurred while under thecontrol of traffickers. Ensure legislation
supports compensation and restitution
for survivors of modern slavery andthat this occurs in practice, including
by setting up a compensation fund forsurvivors.

3

Raise the minimum age of marriage
to 18 for girls and boys with noexemptions.

4

Extend labour laws to ensure that allgroups are covered without exception
and ensure that labour inspections are
regularly conducted across all sectors,
including the informal sector. Introduce
and enforce laws to prohibit charging
of recruitment fees to employees andregister and monitor local recruitment
agencies for deceptive practices,
ensuring contracts are made available
in a language migrants can understand.

5

Introduce mandatory human rights
due diligence to stop governments andbusinesses sourcing goods or services
linked to modern slavery.

Spotlight on what works
Using a community-based program toempower adolescent girls with life skills, theBangladeshi Association for Life skills, Income,and Knowledge for Adolescents (BALIKA)
aimed to reduce child marriage across threehigh-prevalence districts. The program offerednearly 10,000 adolescent girls 44 hours oflife skills lessons in addition to 100 hours of
training focused on education support, genderrights awareness, or livelihoods training. The
program also engaged local young womenas mentors and engaged with communities
to build awareness around adolescent skills
development. The evaluation of the BALIKA
program found that all three interventions
significantly reduced child marriages,
demonstrating the importance of a communitybased approach and investment in education,
skills development, and livelihoods training foradolescent girls. 58

Aceh province,
Indonesia,
August 2019.
Fishermen collect their catch.
Fishing is a high-risk industry
for forced labour. Migrant
workers are particularly
at risk of experiencing
exploitation in the Indonesianfishing industry. Photo by
Chaideer Mahyuddin/AFP via
Getty Images.

122

Recommendations
for governments

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THE FULLER
PROJECT
AND ZANTIMES

Frontline voices:“I have no way out”:
Forced into marriage, Afghan
girls fear for their future
Afghanistan has experienced decades of political instability and insecurity
amid successive wars and violent conflicts. The most recent Taliban
takeover in Afghanistan, in August 2021 following the withdrawal of US
troops, saw the militant group seize control of the country’s capital city,
Kabul, after a rapid advance across the country. The Taliban’s return topower has seen mass degradation of human rights in the country as wellas mass violence and terrorism. The emerging restrictions on women andgirls’ mobility and participation in government and education are further
contributing to the rapid rise of modern slavery risks across the country.
With Afghan women increasingly confined to their homes, reports on
their welfare are difficult to obtain. For this piece The Fuller Project, a
global newsroom that reports on issues that impact women, and Zan
Times, a women-led investigative newsroom that covers human rights
in Afghanistan spoke to women facing the worst impacts of Taliban rule.
What their interviews reveal is a nation grappling to resist ongoing violenceand exploitation.

Afghan teenager Rukhsar once dreamed of
becoming a doctor and finding a well-educatedhusband who would support her work. That was
before the Taliban banned secondary education forgirls and the 15-year-old’s father forced her to getengaged to an older man.
“Sometimes I think to myself, it is better to … run
away from home,” said Rukhsar, whose name has
been changed for her protection, in the western cityof Herat.
Yet Rukhsar said she feared that fleeing home would
lead to her being caught by the Taliban — putting
her in an even worse situation.
Her situation is far from unique. Reports of earlyand forced marriages have soared since the Taliban
seized power in August 2021 and excluded girls
from middle and high schools, according to Afghan
experts and international organisations working in
the country.
Rukhsar’s father arranged her engagement to theson of his business partner — a 22-year-old car
salesman, in December. Without an education,
Rukhsar said her father saw marriage as the only
option for her. Her desperate appeals to him havebeen answered with violence.

124“Every time I object to this marriage, my father beatsme very hard,” she said in an interview.
“My mother can’t help me either because sheherself got married at the age of 14,” added Rukhsar,
whose wedding is set for June. “I don’t really know
anything about marriage, I still play with my dolls. I
have no way out of this situation.”
Even before the Taliban’s takeover, child marriage
was prevalent in Afghanistan. According to thelatest national data1 from 2017, about 28 per centof women aged 20 to 24 were married before
turning 18, and 4 per cent before reaching 15.
The former Afghan government set the minimum
age for marriage at 16 for girls, but even this was
rarely enforced. But the Taliban’s crackdown on
women’s and girls’ freedoms, such as the right towork and attend school, as well as the worsening
economic and humanitarian outlook, are fuelling an
increase in early and forced marriage rates acrossthe country.
“The Taliban’s draconian policies on women andgirls are only increasing in number and severity, andthis means that prospects are extremely dim for any
improvements in terms of child, early and forced
marriage in Afghanistan,” Nicolette Waldman, senior
crisis advisor for Amnesty, said in an interview.

UNICEF Afghanistan spokesman Salam Al-Janabi
said there is a growing number of reports of“destitute parents being forced into heart-breaking
measures to keep their families alive” — fromexchanging daughters for a dowry to selling infants
to strangers.
Shaharzad Akbar, the former chairperson of
Afghanistan’s Independent Human Rights
Commission, said the laws and structures meant toprotect women and children “no longer exist.”“The economic conditions of poor families andtolerance of child marriage have led to increase offorced and child marriage for girls in Afghanistan,”said Akbar, who is now executive director of
Rawadari, an organisation that monitors andreports on human rights violations in the country.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid dismissed
reports of an increase in early marriage and said
people were not forcing their children to wed.
“We don’t have a number for it, but propaganda
about this is not true,” he said in a phone interview.
“The level of awareness about [child marriage andforced marriage] is high among people and they
don’t give their children into marriage … forced
marriage is not possible at all.”
The Taliban issued a decree on women’s rights
which said, “no one can force women to marryby coercion or pressure.”2 However, last May a
spokesman for the Ministry of Promotion of Virtue
and Prevention of Vice told Voice of America
that girls “can be given to marriage” uponreaching puberty. 3
It is not just the Taliban’s policies but its members
themselves who are also fuelling forced marriage,
according to rights groups and some of the girls
interviewed for this story. Cases of Taliban members
forcing women and girls to wed them has even led
some families to marry off their daughters urgently
as a preventative measure.
Fatima, 14, lives in a village in Kang district insouthwestern Nimroz province where gossip spreadlast year that the Taliban would force girls under
the age of 18 into marriage. “My father engaged me
because of these rumours,” she said in an interview.
She was married off in February 2022 and moved
to Zaranj city, the capital of Nimroz, to live with her
husband and his family. There, she faced abuse andviolence. “I was very young. I did not understandanything about being a housewife and doing
chores,” she said. “My mother-in-law used to tortureme because I couldn’t do housework.”
The situation grew even worse, with Fatima recalling
how her husband would beat her repeatedly, evenwhen she was seven months pregnant. Although her
husband moved to Iran several months ago to makemoney as a labourer, Fatima said she is still trappedwith his family as she raises her baby.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

“I would wish no one else to experience the pain andsuffering that I am going through,” she said.
Girls who are forced into marriage face a greaterrisk of domestic servitude and other forms offorced labour both inside and outside the home.
They experience domestic abuse and violence,marital rape, complications during pregnancy
and childbirth, and disproportionately suffer frommental health conditions.
“The consequences will be devastating not only forthe physical and mental health of these girls, but for
generations to come.” said Akbar of Rawadari.
An Afghan doctor in a mental health ward in Heratprovince, who asked not to be identified for fearof reprisals from the Taliban, said more womenand girls were arriving with extreme mental healthconditions, in many cases as a result of being forced
into marriage.
“This unfortunate situation has increased thenumber of our visitors,” he said in a phone interview,referring to a rise in forced and early marriages.
“The Taliban’s restrictions have left women in avulnerable position … (they) are paying the price,”
he said.
Having been married off by her uncle last November
to avoid a Taliban wedding, 17-year-old Arzu said
she is treated like “a slave” and is now sufferingfrom severe depression. “I am married to someone
with whom I cannot live and I have no escapefrom it,” she said in an interview from northern
Samangan province.
“I hate him more everyday. My life will be ruined bythis man.”Arzu said she endures constant beatings, rapeand death threats, and that her husband’s family
refuse to take her to a doctor despite her poor
mental health.
“From the day I got married, my body melts likea candle.”“My memory is weakening. I have become forgetful.
I don’t remember anything. I don’t talk to anyone —it’s no use.”
Recognition of the intersection between conflictand modern slavery risks in Afghanistan is vital. In
the face of an uncertain future, Afghanistan needs
continued and sustained advocacy and action fromthe international community, towards the goal ofestablishing stability and rule of law. In the immediate
term, there is an urgent need to reopen secondary
schools and universities for women and girls, and fora humanitarian response to ensure support to all atrisk persons and to enhance monitoring and reporting
mechanisms throughout the country.
See page 58 “Modern slavery: A weapon andconsequence of war” for a wider discussion on
this intersection, including recommendations forgovernment action.

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SPOTLIGHT

ORPHANAGES

Orphanages:

Modern slavery hubsX

Despite overwhelming evidence cataloguing the harms of institutionalcare for children, an estimated 5.4 million children worldwide live inorphanages and other institutions.1 While many assume that orphanages
are home to children who have no living parents, research consistently
demonstrates that this is not the case for over 80 per cent of children
living in orphanages globally.2
In many countries, only a small proportion ofchildren’s institutions are registered with thegovernment, which leaves many children invisible
to necessary oversight and protections, and hinders
data collection efforts. 3 The institutionalised
population, including children in orphanages, areunderrepresented in the prevalence estimates
within this Global Slavery Index for this reason.
While the case for global care reform is not new,more recent evidence from governments and civilsociety organisations highlights the multifaceted
relationship between children’s institutions andhuman trafficking — revealing a complex web offactors that position orphanages as both a driverand an outcome of exploitation.4 In 2019, thelinks between institutions and child trafficking
were recognised by the United Nations General
Assembly (UNGA). For the first time, member statescollectively expressed their concern over the harmthat institutions can cause to children and called
for them to be progressively phased out. In its
historic Resolution on the Rights of the Child, theUNGA set out the political and human rights case fortransforming care systems and made some groundbreaking recommendations. Governments and civilsociety now have an opportunity to implement
these recommendations.
A residential care institution is any residential
setting where children are isolated from thewider community and are compelled to livewith other children to whom they are notrelated. These children, and their families, do
not have control over their lives or involvementin the decisions that affect them. Crucially,an institutional culture prevails, meaningthat the requirements of the organisation
tend to take precedence over the children’s
individual needs. 5 This Spotlight uses the terms“institution” and “orphanage” interchangeably.

Deoria, India, August 2018.
A bungalow which served as an old age facility andorphanage for girls living with mental disabilities wasinvestigated for allegations of forced sexual exploitation ofresidents by shelter staff. Police raided the shelter after a 10year old girl escaped and reported that many young girls,
who were usually locked inside rooms, were taken away forshort periods of time by strangers in cars parked outside.
Photo credit: Deepak Gupta/Hindustan via Getty Images.

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GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Trafficking into orphanages
Child trafficking into institutions, also referred
to as orphanage trafficking, is described as“the recruitment of children into residential
care institutions for the purpose of profit andexploitation.”6 This practice is linked to thefunding of orphanages through private donations,
volunteer tourism, mission trips, and other formsof fundraising.7 It is estimated that US Christianorganisations alone donate approximately US$3.3
billion to residential care each year.8 The popular
practice of orphanage volunteering — people fromhigh-income countries traveling abroad to help
children living in orphanages — also serves to provide
a continual income for the orphanage, as well as
reduced labour costs for the care of the children.9
However, there is a grim downside to all of this.
Although often well-intentioned, these sources offinancial and in-kind support undermine national
efforts to support broader child protection andsocial welfare systems by creating a parallel system
without official oversight and accountability. They
also create a marketplace that can incentivise
the expansion of existing orphanages and theestablishment of new ones, with the supply offunding and resources into orphanages increasing
the demand for children to be in them.10 There isevidence of children being deliberately recruitedfrom vulnerable families to fill spaces in orphanages,
under the guise of better care and access to
education.11 Once trafficked into orphanages,
children are vulnerable to neglect, abuse, andexploitation. Orphanages that are run for profit
have been found to operate under extremely poor
conditions to drive down care costs, with evidence
also pointing to children being kept deliberately
malnourished to encourage further donations,12
forced to interact with and perform for visitors, orforced to beg for financial donations.13
The popularity of orphanage “volunteering” hasseen a rise in orphanages built in tourist hotspots
to fulfil demand and capitalise on the financial
potential.14 In Cambodia, for example, there wasa 75 per cent increase in the number of residential
care institutions in a five-year period, despite nocorrelating increase in the number of children losing
both parents.15 In Uganda, the number of children in
institutions increased from just over one thousandin the late 1990s to 55,000 in 2018, despite large

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SPOTLIGHT

ORPHANAGES

decreases in the number of orphans.16 The presenceof volunteers also places children at increased
risk of sexual abuse. There have been numerous
documented cases of perpetrators posing as wellintentioned orphanage volunteers to gain accessto vulnerable children, taking advantage of often
unregulated, unvetted, and unsupervised access.17

Australian Modern Slavery
Act addressing orphanage
trafficking
The Australian Modern Slavery Act (2018)
defines and recognises orphanage trafficking
as a form of modern slavery under the Act’s
definition.18 As such, reporting entities withorphanages in their structures, supply chains,funding models, or operations must assess forand report on risks of modern slavery in thesecontexts. Additionally, the CommonwealthModern Slavery Act Guidance Material19
includes information on orphanage trafficking
and the exploitation of children in orphanages,
identifying orphanage volunteering and tourism
as a related risk factor. Guidance has beendeveloped by civil society organisations toassist entities reporting under the Australianlegislation to understand its implications.20

Trafficking out oforphanages
Traffickers and organised criminal groups are known
to target institutions where they can exploit weakor absent child protection mechanisms.21 Evidenceshows children in orphanages are groomed,
coerced, and deceived into leaving facilities and aretrafficked into sexual exploitation, forced labour,
forced criminality, and other forms of modern
slavery.22 In some cases, orphanages have been
complicit or directly involved in the trafficking andexploitation of children within their care.23
Demand for adoption among childless families —
often from high-income countries — also drives
trafficking and kidnapping of children into andout of orphanages. 24 This is particularly evident incountries where private and international adoptions
are common, for example in China, where it isestimated that more than 200,000 children are soldfor the purposes of international adoptions per
year.25 In Nigeria, some orphanages have been linked
to “baby factories,” where traffickers hold women
against their will, rape them, and force them to carryand deliver a child for the purpose of selling.26

Hopeland creates programs andcampaigns that improve the lives of children
by strengthening families. Learn more atwww.ourhopeland.org.

128

Child survivors of modern
slavery and unaccompanied
migrant children being placed inorphanages
Children who have been trafficked are often placed
in institutions, either as a mechanism intended toprovide them with protection and support or asa law enforcement response because the child is
not being treated as a victim of crime. Government
responses fall short of providing child-centricsafeguards; for example, only 55 per cent ofgovernments assessed in the Global Slavery Index
were found to have special support for child victims
of modern slavery. In some cases, children identified
as victims are returned to the same institutions fromwhich they were trafficked and are re-exposed to
the risks that led to their initial exploitation.27
Without the protection provided by parents andguardians, unaccompanied migrant and refugee
children are at greater risk of trafficking andexploitation, both in transit and on arrival intheir destination country.28 Often, these children
are either placed in reception facilities akin toorphanages or they enter the institutional caresystem.29 The institutionalisation of traffickedchildren and unaccompanied migrant andrefugee children increases their vulnerability to
exploitation on account of entering a high-risk andinsecure system. 30

Modern slavery risks experienced
by care leavers
Children who have grown up in institutional settings
are more vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation
once they have aged out of the system or if they
have run away from the facilities. 31 This is linked
to the impact of having had fewer opportunities todevelop the social skills and networks needed to live
successfully and independently in the community. 32
This vulnerability is increased where there
are limited services and support available forreintegration into society. 33 Further, care leavers
are particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation.
Girls in Moldova who grew up in institutions, forexample, were found to be 10 times more likely
to be trafficked for sexual exploitation than theirpeers raised in families. 34 International analysis
highlights similar disadvantages among care leaver
populations globally, including higher rates ofhomelessness, unemployment, isolation, poverty,
and mental health issues compared to peers raisedin families. 35
Globally, orphanages and other institutional settingsfor children are hubs where child exploitation andmodern slavery can thrive, as they are often hiddenfrom official oversight, operate with weak childprotection systems, attract a continuous flow oflarge and unmonitored donations, and are home tochildren who are already vulnerable. Addressing thisrequires a multi-faceted response.

Times of crisis and children in care
More than 5 million children have lost a parent or
caregiver as a result of COVID-1936 and the numberof children being separated from their parents
and at risk of subsequent exploitation is expected
to increase. 37 In some parts of the world, COVID-19
has reportedly led to family reunification. For
example, authorities in Nepal, India and Kenya
instructed orphanages to reintegrate children
with their family during the national lockdown38
In Nepal, this resulted in nearly 10 per cent of thecountry’s institutionalised children returning
to their communities in the early stages of thepandemic. 39 While this shows that not all children
in orphanages lack family-based alternatives,
there are concerns that children may have been
sent home without the necessary assessment,
preparation, and support.40 Additionally, experts
warn that inadequate records of where children
have been placed, as well as of those who
remain institutionalised, could lead to morechildren falling through the gaps and becoming
unaccounted for.41 For many orphanages aroundthe world, lockdown and social distancing
measures mean that the child-to-caregiver ratio
has decreased due to reductions in staff andaccess to facilities, raising concerns over declines
in quality of care.42
Social distancing restrictions have hamperedorphanage inspections in some countries.43
Encouragingly, one study on the impacts of the
COVID-19 pandemic on children’s institutions
globally found that the vast majority offounders, funders, and directors of orphanages
participating in the research (91 per cent) statedthat to some degree the pandemic had catalysedreflection and created an opportunity to consider
or implement changes or adaptations to theorphanage model of care. This included a greater
focus on sustainability and a renewed belief in theability for institutionalised children to be reunited
with their families and communities.44
Much can be learned from the impact of previous
international crises on children in institutionalcare. In the wake of disaster, support fororphanages is a popular response for overseas
audiences wanting to contribute to relief efforts.45
Following the devastating 2015 earthquake
in Nepal, an increase in child trafficking andof children being placed in institutions led
to immediate child safeguarding concerns.46
Officials recorded cases of traffickers posing as
either aid workers or religious representatives,
coercing poor and vulnerable families to give up
their children for placement into orphanages forthe purposes of financial exploitation.47 Similar
conclusions have been drawn from post-disaster
analysis in Haiti48 and Indonesia.49 It is vital that
there be close monitoring of COVID-19’s impact
of on children in institutions and on those fromfamilies and communities whose vulnerabilities
have increased due to the pandemic.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

In addition, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has had
a devastating impact on children in institutions.
Ukraine already had the largest populationof institutionalised children in Europe, andthe displacement brought on by the conflicthas caused those numbers to rise. 50 Concerns
continue to grow regarding living conditions inorphanages and the risk of child exploitation
and abuse, with instances of traffickers targeting
Ukrainian orphanages. 51 Additionally, the UN
has expressed concern about the risk of forced
adoption of Ukrainian children, warning thatchildren in institutions cannot be assumed to
be orphans. 52 In March 2023, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) indicted the Russianpresident, Vladimir Putin, and children’scommissioner, Maria Lvova-Belova on war crimes
for the mass abduction of Ukrainian children.
The children are allegedly being taken to Russia
and adopted by Russian families, under the guiseof a humanitarian mission to save the children
from the war. 53

Recommendations
for governments

1

Recognise the link between children
in orphanages and modern slavery.
Orphanage trafficking must be
criminalised and children in thesesettings recognised and responded to as
being highly vulnerable to exploitation.

2

Curb the proliferation of orphanages
by prioritising family and communitybased care in all policies relating to thecare and protection of children. This
includes ensuring adequate funding
for family and community services
and prioritising long-term, sustainable
solutions that enable families andcommunities to thrive together.

3

Focus international aid on family andcommunity strengthening initiatives,as opposed to being directed towards
institutional care for children.

4

Monitor international donations andraise awareness among philanthropic
communities of potential risks offunding orphanages.

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Slovakia

EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA
NorwaySwedenHungary

PolandFinlandLithuania

Estonia

LatviaBelarus
Moldova

Czechia
Austria
Slovenia
Germany
Netherlands
Iceland
Belgium

RussiaUnitedKingdom
Ireland
Luxembourg

UkraineKazakhstan

Switzerland
FranceTurkmenistan
TajikstanPortugal

Georgia

Spain

Azerbaijan
Italy

Armenia

Croatia

Romania
Bulgaria
Montenegro

Albania

KosovoRegional
heat map:
prevalence

130

GreeceNorth Macedonia

IsraelCyprusConflict, the COVID-19 pandemic, and climatechange further compound these vulnerabilities.
The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated existing
vulnerabilities and created new ones, with increased
economic insecurity across the region and unequal
access to vaccines and healthcare. To varying
extents, countries across the region are impacted
by climate change, with effects on agriculture andother primary industries driving poverty and foodinsecurity. Climate-related displacement continues
to drive the risk of exploitation, particularly in forced
labour, across the region. Although not reflectedin our estimates, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has
increased the risk of modern slavery, with mass
displacement and forced migration both in-country
and across the region.
The United Kingdom (UK) took the most action
to combat modern slavery, followed by the
Netherlands and Portugal, while Turkmenistan
and Russia took the least. Europe has taken themost action of any region to tackle forced labourthat ends up in global supply chains. Across all
countries, governments should address significant
gaps, including expanding the provision of safe andregular migration pathways for the most vulnerable,
and tackling underlying discrimination of migrants
and other marginalised groups.

Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan

Bosnia &Herzegovina

Europe and Central Asia is home to 12 per cent of
the world’s population. Although the region is highly
diverse in terms of geography, ethnicity, culture,religion, and wealth, modern slavery occurs in every
country. Europe and Central Asia has the second
highest prevalence of modern slavery of the fiveglobal regions. Various factors contribute to theprevalence of forced labour and forced marriage,
including poverty, discrimination, migration, and alack of economic opportunities.

SerbiaTürkiyeWhat is the extent andnature of modern slavery in
the region?
An estimated 6.4 million people were living inmodern slavery in Europe and Central Asia on any
given day in 2021. The region had the second highest
prevalence in the world, with 6.9 per thousandpeople living in modern slavery. Europe and Central
Asia had the second highest prevalence of forced
labour at an estimated 4.4 per thousand people
and the third highest prevalence of forced marriage(2.5 per thousand).1
Türkiye, Tajikistan, and Russia had the highest
prevalence of modern slavery in the region. Russia,
Türkiye, and Ukraine had the highest number ofpeople living in modern slavery, accounting fornearly three in every five people in modern slavery in
the region. The countries with the lowest prevalence
are Switzerland, Norway, and Germany.

LOW

HIGH

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

There are 4.1 million people trapped in forced
labour in Europe and Central Asia. Forced
labour takes many forms across the region forboth adults and children, including domestic
servitude, agricultural labour, and construction
work and forced commercial sexual exploitation.
There is a high population of migrant workers,
both from within and outside the region, who are
more vulnerable to being trapped in situations ofdebt bondage and exploitation.2 Displacement
fuelled by conflict, climate change, and politicaland economic instability also contributes toforced labour prevalence in the region, as wellas rising discrimination against certain groups,
such as the Roma community. 3
Ten per cent of all forced marriages in the world,
involving an estimated 2.3 million people, arein Europe and Central Asia. Forced marriages
occurring across the region represent a rigidityof gender beliefs that uphold traditionalroles for girls and restrict their prospects.
Patriarchal attitudes towards girls, including
the preservation of “family honour,” are often
associated with forced and child marriage, as
well as poverty rates. Growing crises may also
be driving forced marriages in the region. For
example, data from the UK highlights that theincreased risks of forced marriage created by
COVID-19 and pandemic-related restrictions
were experienced significantly by children,
while their access to identification and support
services were limited.4 In some countries inCentral Asia, the practice of bride kidnapping,or Ala-Kachuu, occurs — where men abduct agirl or woman and force them to get married.
Despite existing domestic laws and international
obligations, the practice is widespread in
Kyrgyzstan, with an estimated 12,000 cases
taking place a year. 5
Although these estimates are the most reliable
to date, they are conservative given the gaps
and limitations of data collection in the region.
These estimates do not capture all forms ofmodern slavery, such as, the recruitment of childsoldiers, trafficking for the purposes of organ
removal, and all child marriages. Notably, thesefigures do not capture any impact of the ongoing
conflict in Ukraine.6

Estimated
number living inmodern slavery:

6.4
MILLION(6.9 per thousand)Regional
proportion of
global estimate:

13%
Forced labour

64%
Forced marriage

36%
Averagevulnerability
score:

27%
Averagegovernment
response rating:54%
Top 3 countries:
United Kingdom 68%
Netherlands
67%
Portugal
67%
Bottom 3 countries:
Russia24%
Turkmenistan
26%
Liechtenstein
31%

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Table 19
Estimated
prevalence andnumber of people
in modern slavery,
by country132

Regional Country
rank

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47

TürkiyeTajikistan
RussiaUkraineNorth Macedonia
Turkmenistan
Albania
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Azerbaijan
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Moldova
Armenia
Kyrgyzstan
Bulgaria
Cyprus
KosovoGeorgia
Slovakia
Romania
Uzbekistan
SerbiaHungary
GreeceLithuania
PolandCroatia
Slovenia
Czechia
Estonia
Portugal
IsraelLatviaItaly
Spain
FranceAustria
United Kingdom
Finland
Ireland
Belgium
Denmark
SwedenNetherlands
Germany
NorwaySwitzerland

Estimated
prevalence ofmodern slavery(per 1,000of population)

Estimated numberof people inmodern slavery

Population

15.6
14.0
13.0
12.8
12.6
11.9
11.8
11.3
11.1
10.6
10.1
9.5
8.9
8.7
8.5
8.0
8.0
7.8
7.7
7.5
7.4
7.0
6.6
6.4
6.1
5.5
5.2
4.4
4.2
4.1
3.8
3.8
3.4
3.3
2.3
2.1
1.9
1.8
1.4
1.1
1.0
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.6
0.5
0.5

1,320,000
133,000
1,899,000
559,000
26,00072,00034,000107,000
208,000
107,000
33,00038,00026,00057,00059,00010,00014,00031,00042,000145,000
249,000
61,00063,00066,00017,000209,000
22,0009,000
45,0005,000
39,00033,0006,000
197,000
108,000
135,000
17,000122,000
8,000
5,000
11,000
4,000
6,000
10,00047,0003,000
4,000

84,339,000
9,538,000
145,934,000
43,734,000
2,083,000
6,031,000
2,878,000
9,449,000
18,777,000
10,139,000
3,281,000
4,034,000
2,963,000
6,524,000
6,948,000
1,207,000
1,806,000
3,989,000
5,460,000
19,238,000
33,469,000
8,737,000
9,660,000
10,423,000
2,722,000
37,847,000
4,105,000
2,079,000
10,709,000
1,327,000
10,197,000
8,656,000
1,886,000
60,462,000
46,755,000
65,274,000
9,006,000
67,886,000
5,541,000
4,938,000
11,590,000
5,792,000
10,099,000
17,135,000
83,784,000
5,421,000
8,655,000

The realities of risk and resistance:
How one survivor of domestic violence andsex trafficking fought her way home
Katya* is a 25-year-old woman from Belarus. Following her father’s death when she was a child, hermother remarried and had another child, after which her mother’s attitude towards her changed. Overtime, her mother became psychologically abusive, emotionally distant, and would constantly seek tohumiliate Katya. This abuse led Katya to spend as little time at home as possible.
After finishing school, Katya took up a job in sales, but her family criticised her for not earning enoughmoney. Feeling unsupported and lost, Katya accepted the offer of a friend who told her about a job in
Moscow. She agreed to work in a market, but upon arrival quickly found that the promised job was not
real. Instead, after arriving in Russia, Katya was forced into sexual exploitation. Unable to leave, she wassubjected to daily physical, sexual, and psychological violence.
After months of living in modern slavery, Katya found an opportunity to escape when a client fell asleep
while she was with him. Not willing to let an opportunity for freedom pass her by, Katya jumped out ofa second-story window, injuring both her legs in the fall. Luckily, she was assisted in seeking medical
attention and, with the help of friends, Katya finally returned to Belarus. Having made a daring escapeto fight her way back to her homeland, Katya sought help from a non-governmental organisation andbegan rebuilding her life.
*Not her real name

Pitesti, Romania,
January 2017.
Adolescent girls who had
been exploited by Romanian
traffickers operating in Italy,
Spain, Germany, and France,
greet the psychologist at
the shelter. Photo credit:
Daniel Mihailescu/AFP via
Getty Images.

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What drives vulnerability
to modern slavery in theregion?
Europe and Central Asia is the least vulnerable
region in the world to modern slavery. While
the region performed relatively well across all
dimensions, disenfranchised groups remain
particularly vulnerable to modern slavery.
Inequality and conflict disproportionately impacted
some countries, while vulnerability was further
compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic, conflict,and climate-related displacement.
Conflict exacerbates vulnerability to modern
slavery 7 and although it was found to be the lowest
driver of vulnerability in the region, it is important
to note that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine fell outside
our data collection period, therefore its impact is
not reflected in these findings. The United Nations
Refugee Agency (UNHCR) reports more than 8
million refugees and 5 million internally displaced
people in what has become the largest movementof refugees since World War II.8 Ukrainian citizens
fleeing the conflict are at increased risk of trafficking
for various purposes, including sexual and labour
exploitation.9 Media reports and crisis-response
work have highlighted instances of exploitation of
women and girls crossing the Russian border and of
those in refugee camps.10 This vulnerability predates
and is exacerbated by the war.

“Hundred of thousands of Ukrainian
women have been victims of humantrafficking. This was the case before the war
and the war has only made it worse.”
Robert Biedron, EU lawmaker and chair of the
Women’s Rights Committee.11

Discrimination against disenfranchised groups on
the basis of migration status, race, ethnicity, and/or
sexual orientation represents the greatest driver ofvulnerability in the Europe and Central Asia region.
The region is a source, transit, and destination
for significant migrant and refugee populations.
Figure 17
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by dimension

In 2020, more than 71.1 million migrants12 and6.7 million refugees13 lived in the region. These
people often encounter a lack of legal protection
and insufficient information about their rights,
which increases vulnerability to exploitation andabuse from recruiters, employers, and authorities.14
Discrimination fuelled by bigotry and xenophobia
has also grown alongside mass migration, withblack, Muslim, Roma, and Jewish communities in theregion often experiencing social exclusion, verbal
harassment, and physical attacks.15 For example,
recent reports in Germany,16 Austria,17 France,18
the UK,19 and elsewhere in Europe20 highlight steep
spikes in antisemitism and other hate crimes against
Jewish people. In some instances, discrimination
against certain groups has been grounded in policy
and justified under national security measures, suchas increased surveillance of Muslim communities inFrance, Germany, and Austria.21
Governance issues such as corruption drive
vulnerability to modern slavery in the region
and particularly in Central Asia. Corruption isincreasingly prevalent in fragile democratic states
throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 22 withthe subregion performing second lowest in the mostrecent Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).23 Populist
governments in Eastern Europe have cracked down
severely on the freedoms of expression and assembly
needed to call out corruption.24 Additionally, forseveral years, international bodies and NGOs
have condemned state-imposed forced labour in
Belarus,25 Poland, 26 Russia, 27 and Turkmenistan.28
Despite Western Europe and the European Union
performing better on governance issues and scoring
consistently well on the CPI, progress has stagnated.
The neglect or curtailment of accountability andtransparency measures resulting from the COVID-19
pandemic have remained unrestored across thesubregion, and public trust has fallen in the wakeof scandals associated with procurement of PersonalProtective Equipment (PPE) in response to thepandemic.29 These have included allegations ofcorruption, overpricing, substandard quality of PPE,and unequal distribution.30
Despite impressive economic growth that has helped
halve the number of people living in poverty inthe region over the 20 years prior to the COVID-19

Governance issues

47%

Lack of basic needs

38%

Inequality

42%

Disenfranchised groups
Effects of conflict
Total

134

59%
30%
45%

pandemic, 31 economic inequality still leaves many ata stark disadvantage, 32 increasing their vulnerability
to modern slavery. The impacts of income inequality
in some communities include higher rates of healthand social problems, such as poor health outcomes,
increased poverty and homelessness, and lower
levels of economic growth.33 Inequality will likely
increase as the region faces a cost-of-living crisis
fuelled by COVID-19, climate change, and mostrecently the war in Ukraine. 34 As food and energy
prices surge, already vulnerable populations acrossEurope and Central Asia will be further impacted.
When individuals and families struggle to accessbasic necessities, they become more vulnerable toexploitation and forced labour. Additionally, theincreased demand for food and energy can create
opportunities for traffickers and exploiters to takeadvantage of the situation by profiting from thehigher prices. This can lead to the exploitation ofvulnerable populations, including forced labour inthe agriculture, fishing, and energy sectors.
While some countries such as Norway, Switzerland,
and Ireland have made significant progress on genderand income inequality, women in neighbouring
countries still face widespread discrimination.35
However, even among countries with strong
performances on gender rights measures, domestic
and intimate partner violence remains a significant
problem, as in the region more broadly.36 Evidence
also suggests that this issue has been exacerbated byrecent crises across the region, such as the COVID-19
pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.37 In
addition to being paid on average 30 per cent lessthan their male peers, 38 women living in Europe andCentral Asia are more likely to work in the informal
sector, be irregular migrants, and face greater risks oftrafficking and abuse.39
Limited access to basic needs also drives
vulnerability to modern slavery. Across the region,
the COVID-19 pandemic has had major health,social, and economic impacts on people andcommunities, as around the world,40 which in turnhave compounded challenges for already vulnerable
populations. For Tajikistan, one of the least
economically developed countries in the region, theimpact on access to basic needs was felt across the
population. Four out of 10 Tajik households reported
they were forced to reduce their consumption offood, while one in five families have said they wereunable to obtain medical care.41 An analysis of
impacts of the pandemic across the EU revealed
educational gaps across low-income families andsignificant rises in households in arrears.42
Vulnerability to modern slavery in Europe andCentral Asia is also exacerbated by the adverse
impacts of climate change and climate-related
disasters, which in turn are not evenly shared acrossthe region. For example, severe drought has affectedmany parts of Europe and is expected to expand
and worsen,43 which ultimately increases the risk of
exploitation and modern slavery through decreased
livelihood opportunities and increased migrantflows to and from the region.44

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Country
Tajikistan
RussiaAzerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Türkiye
Armenia
UkraineTurkmenistan
Kazakhstan
Belarus
KosovoAlbania
North Macedonia
Georgia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Moldova
IsraelSerbiaCroatia
Bulgaria
Romania
Italy
CyprusLithuania
GreecePolandHungary
LatviaSlovakia
Estonia
United Kingdom
Switzerland
FranceCzechia
Belgium
Germany
Spain
Ireland
Slovenia
Austria
SwedenPortugal
Netherlands
Denmark
Finland
NorwayTotal (%)
67
60
57
56
55
51
48
48
47
42
41
40
40
38
38
36
36
35
34
30
26
26
22
21
21
21
19
19
17
16
15
14
14
13
13
11
11
10
9
9
8
7
6
6
6
5
1

Table 20
Level ofvulnerability tomodern slavery,
by country

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Finding cooperation in crisis:
Tackling modern slavery in Ukraine
after the Russian invasion
In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scaleinvasion of Ukraine, resulting in a displacement andprotection crisis on a scale not witnessed in Europe
since World War II. Today, 8.1 million refugees 45
and 5.4 million internally displaced people 46 require
protection and assistance.
Unlike many other global conflicts, where modern
slavery is often a neglected protection risk, theresponse to prevent exploitation was swift andcoordinated. For the first time in a humanitarian
response, an anti-trafficking response wasembedded from the outset in the work of thehumanitarian Protection Cluster. By May 2022, theCluster’s Anti- Trafficking Task Force, consisting ofover 30 local and international organisations,47 wasdisseminating modern slavery risk information,
ensuring that modern slavery was put on the agendaof humanitarian responders, mapping available
services, operating hotlines, and establishingreferral pathways.48
One year on, despite the scale of the crisis, andcredible evidence of conflict and displacement
exacerbating modern slavery risks and giving riseto new ones, an increase in the number of victims
identified in Ukraine and host countries has notbeen observed.49

The Ukraine crisis: an anomaly in theequation that crises = modern slavery?
Crisis responders, including governments, NGOs,international organisations, and UN agencies, haveexpressed surprise that the projected spike in casesof modern slavery has not occurred. There may be
several reasons for this, both positive and negative.
Firstly, the proactive and prolific early warning
system about the risks of trafficking, genderbased violence, and exploitation disseminated toconflict-affected people and those on the move
may have helped to raise awareness and mitigate
the risks of these forms of abuse. Unlike in many
conflicts, where government breakdown or collapse
creates ideal conditions for traffickers to operate
without risk of punishment, in Ukraine, government
institutions remain functioning, alongside civilsociety actors and NGOs, reducing opportunities
for offending, and ensuring vulnerable people canaccess support.
Regionally, for the first time in the European Union’s
history, the Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)
was activated to provide refugees with legal accessto entry and stay, freedom of movement, and accessto vital protection and assistance. This has enabledrefugees from Ukraine to receive emergency healthcare, education, and employment. 50 Members of
the host communities have volunteered their time136

and resources, opened their homes to host refugee
families, and donated food, clothing, and otheressential items. 51
These internal and regional factors have served
preventative and protective functions against
compounding risks for conflict-affected anddisplaced people. They have played an importantrole in mitigating exploitation risks and have helped
to build resilience and strengthen crisis responses.
However, there are several reasons that risks ofmodern slavery could be higher than currently
detected, and that the reduction in the reportingand detection of trafficking cases should still because for concern.
Within Ukraine, despite sustained efforts toprovide humanitarian assistance to the millions
in need, support is stretched. Some populations
remain highly vulnerable to exploitation, including
women and girls in active fighting zones who areinaccessible to humanitarian responders, andunaccompanied and separated children and childheaded households, who are not receiving sufficient
practical assistance. 52 For Ukrainian men, previously
vulnerable to forced labour, the decision to bar
them from leaving the country — while potentiallystemming the flow of labour exploitation abroad —may be forcing some into irregular and dangerous
routes and could reduce their likelihood of coming
forward to be identified and receive assistance. 53
Regionally, four million refugees have not formallyregistered for the support and protection under
the TDP. Some refugees, particularly those fromminority groups, are sometimes refused registration
due to lack of documentation. Many Ukrainianchildren, particularly unaccompanied and separated
children, and children previously in institutions,also remain unregistered and unmonitored. 54 Thelack of oversight over these two hugely vulnerable
groups may be impacting our understanding of what
exploitation is occurring.
It is possible that victims and survivors may not be
ready to come forward, or that ongoing challenges
associated with the conflict will go on to impact
levels of modern slavery in Ukraine and the region.
These challenges include the depletion of resources,
dwindling access to goods, reduced access toaffordable accommodation, loss of documentation,and family separation. In many hosting countries,
the gap between social benefit payments andpotentially lucrative work offered by unscrupulous
employers or traffickers may become too good torefuse. 55 In addition, the potential for donor, hoststate, and community compassion fatigue could
also make it difficult to sustain effective responses
to this ongoing crisis.

Recommendations for governments
Approximately two billion people, equating to over a quarter of the world’s population, currently live in
conflict-affected countries. 56 There is much to be learnt from the swift, coordinated, and compassionate
response to the Ukrainian people and the impact this has had to date on reducing anticipated casesof modern slavery. It is vital these lessons be applied to some of the most neglected conflicts acrossthe globe, where thousands of victims of modern slavery, and people at risk of exploitation, remaintrapped, displaced, and unassisted.
Governments must:

1

2

Extend social assistance andbenefits to refugees without
conditions, especially to those who
are unable to secure employment,
to help minimise risks of modern
slavery. Such assistance may
include facilitating accreditationof licenses for refugees, expanding
employment opportunities, andproviding free or subsidisedchildcare and free language classes
to increase employability, foster
integration, and reduce risks.
Strengthen screening at borders
and at all stages of the asylum
or registration process withthe support of UN agencies andspecialised NGOs to ensure thatvulnerabilities and risks are
identified and addressed.

Walk Free is proud to support the workof the Global Protection Cluster (GPC), a
network of nongovernmental organisations,international organisations and United
Nations agencies, engaged in protection
work in humanitarian crises, including armed
conflict and disasters. The GPC is led by
UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency. Walk Free
have supported the GPC to improve antitrafficking action in crisis contexts since 2020.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

3

Address the issue of discrimination
against non-Ukrainian nationals
and Roma people fleeing Ukraine
and improve their access to rights
and services, including accessto registration and safe andsuitable accommodation.

4

Individual safety should beprioritised over immigration.
Investigation and prosecution
should be decoupled from accessing
protection and services for survivorsof modern slavery or for those
identified as at risk of exploitation,
ensuring timely referral and accessto asylum procedures, with provisionof free counseling on rights tointernational protection or asylum.

5

Strengthen government oversightover care and accommodationof unaccompanied or separated
children (UASC), particularly children
coming from institutions, andstrengthen best interest assessments
where return is being considered.
Strengthen support to guardians andcarers of UASC to ensure adequate
care and support is provided.

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What are governments in
the region doing to address
modern slavery?
Walk Free assessed government responses tomodern slavery across 52 countries in Europe andCentral Asia. Overall, the Europe and Central Asia
region continues to have the strongest response
to modern slavery, scoring an average 54 per centrating among countries. Responses to modern
slavery vary significantly within the region and there
remains a relatively higher level of political will toaddress modern slavery in Europe, in part driven
by regional and multilateral coordination bodies
which hold governments to account and monitor
their responses.
GDP per capita PPP (current international $)varied greatly across the region, 57 meaning certain
economies have far more resources available todedicate to responding to modern slavery thanothers. Overall, the countries with the strongest
government response to modern slavery are thosewith a higher level of wealth, such as the top-ranking
countries in the region and globally — the UK and
the Netherlands. However, notable outliers arepresent. For example, Liechtenstein and Iceland,
despite having some of the highest GDP per capita
in the region and as such having relatively moreresources to combat modern slavery, were among
the nine governments taking the least actionin the region. Both countries scored poorly on
indicators relating to national, regional, and crossborder coordination and tackling forced labour ingovernment and business supply chains. Conversely,
while Albania and Georgia are among the region’s

countries with lower levels of GDP per capita,
they have shown relatively stronger government
responses to modern slavery, with both countries
scoring highly on addressing risk factors.
Strong government responses in the region
are typically characterised by robust criminal
justice mechanisms and effective identificationand support to survivors of modern slavery. The
countries with the strongest government responsescored high on indicators related to criminal
justice mechanisms, highlighting their function toeffectively prevent modern slavery. Conversely, it isconcerning that more than half of the countries in
the region did not have laws in place that recognisethat survivors should not be treated as criminals
for conduct that occurred while under control ofcriminals. Treating survivors as criminals not only
fails to acknowledge the exploitation they have
faced, but it also creates additional barriers toaccessing support and justice. This approach also
undermines the EU Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings, which states that the“rights and dignity” of trafficking survivors must be
respected and that they should not be penalised
for their involvement in criminal activities that are adirect result of their trafficking situation.

“Police need more training on the signs
for victims. Many don’t know what thesigns are — they take the word of thetrafficker over the victim.”

Throughout Europe and Central Asia, Turkmenistan
and Russia have the weakest responses to modern
slavery. This is characterised by limited action toaddress underlying risk and drivers of modern
slavery. In general, this reflects a combination oflimited political will and a lack of resources, whichmeans these governments do not prioritise theresponse to modern slavery. Our assessment ofgovernment responses also reflects evidence ofstate-imposed forced labour in both countries, aswell as in Belarus and Poland. In Turkmenistan,reports highlight forced labour being used as amethod of mobilising labour for the purpose of
economic development; and as a means of labour
discipline, tens of thousands of adults are forced
to pick cotton, and farmers forced to fulfil stateestablished quotas, under the threat of penalty.64 In
Poland, abuse of prison labour for private interests
has been reported.65 In Russia, an initiative has
been approved by the prison service and several
government bodies for prisoners to exchange
confinement for labour on major construction
projects.66 More than a third of the country’s total
prison population are eligible, while it is unclear how
voluntary this labour is and if it will be paid.67
Further, there have been reports of North Koreansin forced labour within the construction andagriculture industries in Russia, with migrant
workers sending the majority of their earnings backto North Korea to help prop up the regime.68 Abuseof prison labour occurs in Belarus69 while so-called
medical labour centres70 see citizens struggling
with drug addiction forced to work as part oftheir recovery.

Encouragingly, for the first time in 11 consecutive
years of monitoring forced child and adult labourin Uzbekistan’s cotton fields, the latest reports
found that state-imposed forced labour during thecountry’s cotton harvest no longer occurs.71 Thisis due to central government policy, internationalpressure, and national awareness raising of theillegality of forced labour.72 In other countries
across the region, modern slavery responses havebeen undermined by state authorities. While mostcountries have criminalised corruption, reports ofofficial complicity in modern slavery cases failed to
be investigated 14 countries. This includes reported
instances in Bulgaria, where police officers have notbeen investigated for allegedly taking payments
to turn a blind eye towards women exploited incommercial sex.73
Albania, Portugal, and Ireland have all taken further
action to combat modern slavery since the previous
assessment of government responses in 2018.74
Recent developments have occurred in Albania, withthe government operating one specialised shelter
and allocating US$175,390 to NGO-run sheltersin 2020 to support staff salaries.75 Additionally,in Portugal, guidelines were published to outlinethat frontline responders, including police andNGOs, could identify and refer presumed victims
to services.76

Male survivor of modern slavery, United Kingdom, 2018

Berlin, Germany,
August 2017.
Two of four accused cover
their faces during a trial
against them where they areaccused of trafficking people
from Hungary and Austria
into Germany. Photo: Gregor
Fischer/dpa via Getty Images.

Restricting routes, reducing protections:
Impact of recent changes to UK immigration policy
Recent changes to the UK’s immigration policy, particularly post-Brexit, have been criticised for putting
vulnerable people at greater risk of exploitation and modern slavery. The shift towards a more hostileand discriminatory environment has made it increasingly difficult for vulnerable people to accessessential support and services. 58 The criminalisation of immigration offences and the tightening of
immigration laws59 has led to individuals not coming forward and reporting instances of modern
slavery out of fear of being arrested and deported. This allows traffickers to operate with impunity,
putting people at even greater risk of abuse and exploitation. In March 2023, the UK government
proposed the Illegal Immigration Bill,60 which aims to detain and swiftly remove anyone entering thecountry “illegally.” In its current form, the bill contravenes the UN Refugee Convention,61 which the UK
government has ratified, and could prevent modern slavery victims from reaching safety and accessing
support.62 The increasing curtailment of clear and accessible pathways to safe and legal migration
leaves people vulnerable to exploitation by traffickers and other criminal networks.63 As such, therecent changes to UK immigration policy pose a serious threat to the safety and well-being of people
who are vulnerable to modern slavery.

138

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

139

05

REGIONAL
FINDINGSEUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA

Significant gaps remain in legal frameworks tocombat modern slavery across Europe and Central
Asia. Thirty-four countries have failed to criminalise
forced labour and 29 countries have failed tocriminalise forced marriage. Both Cyprus and Malta
were the latest countries to criminalise forced
marriage since the last Global Slavery Index in 2018.
Although 14 countries in the region have ratified
the ILO Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour
Convention, 1930 since 2018, overall ratification
remains disappointing, with 23 countries in theregion failing to do so. Other critical gaps acrossthe region include uptake of the ILO Domestic
Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189) and theInternational Convention on the Protection of theRights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their
Families, 1990.
Where countries have enacted legislation or put
in place relevant policies, implementation is notalways consistent. Gaps in services appeared
across the region, with 15 countries failing toprovide services to all survivors. For example, in
Serbia,77 Germany,78 and Hungary,79 among others,
services for men and children were inconsistent.
Further, despite National Action Plans existing in
41 countries, only 11 governments fully funded
activities within these plans and just 10 countries
monitored their implementation through an
independent entity. Most recently, in October 2020,
the Irish government appointed the Irish Human
Rights and Equality Commission as the independent
national rapporteur responsible for monitoring
human trafficking policy and data collection.80

Kherson, Ukraine,
November 2022.
Since the start of theinvasion, staff at a children’s
hospital in Kherson haveprotected a group of 10orphans between the agesof two months and three
years old, after hearing thatoccupying authorities were
forcibly removing children
to Crimea and Russia. There
are allegedly thousands ofsuch abductions, including
46 from the local orphanage
where these children lived
prior to the invasion. The
whereabouts of these missing
children remains unknown.
Photo credit: Chris McGrathvia Getty Images.

140“There needs to be some sort of global
standard of aftercare to avoid retrafficking.”

Country

Female survivor of modern slavery, United Kingdom, 2018

Given the significant migrant flows across theregion, cross-border collaboration on issues
specifically related to modern slavery is integral.
Encouragingly, most governments in the region did
cooperate bilaterally in some way, either throughrepatriation efforts or labour migration agreements,and often this is facilitated through EU agreements.
These agreements can help to prevent exploitationand modern slavery, as they can provide a legal
framework for movement and workers’ rights.
However, 35 countries did not have systems inplace to allow asylum seekers to seek protection or
there was evidence of systematic discrimination,
detention, and/or deportation of these groups.
This includes countries in the region with some of
the largest asylum seeker populations, including
Germany, the UK, Greece, Armenia, and Spain. For
example, in April 2022, the UK announced plans
to deport to Rwanda asylum seekers from thatcountry who enter the UK using “irregular routes,”such as on small boats or in the backs of trucks.81
Although the European Court of Human Rights(ECHR) stepped in to issue injunctions that halted
deportation flights,82 a judicial review published in
December 2022 found the policy to be lawful.83 The
scheme has been justified by the UK government as
a way to deter people making dangerous journeys;
however, the numbers crossing have not fallen since
the policy was announced. More than 45,000 people
used irregular routes like this to come to the UK in
2022, the highest figure since records began.84

Government Total
Risk
National andregional level factors are and business (%)
coordination addressed supply chains
(%)
(%)
(%)

Survivors
identified
andsupported(%)

Criminaljusticemechanisms
(%)

59
77
73
59
55
55
59
55
59
64
41
68
50
68
55
68
64
45
59
59
50
64
68

81
62
73
69
73
73
69
69
65
65
81
65
81
62
62
73
69
65
65
62
65
65
65

75
88
75
88
75
75
63
75
75
75
88
75
63
75
88
63
63
75
75
88
63
63
63

71
64
64
64
64
71
79
79
71
64
57
71
57
64
71
57
64
71
64
57
79
57
57

38
38
25
25
38
25
25
13
25
25
38
0
38
25
25
0
0
38
13
25
25
25
0

68
67
67
63
63
63
63
62
62
62
62
62
62
62
60
60
59
59
59
59
59
59
58

64
59
68
59
50
59
64
50
50
50
50
64
50
64
50
64
64
64
55
41
45
45
45
41
59
23
27
14
5

62
65
65
65
62
46
69
65
65
58
65
58
62
54
50
58
54
50
50
65
50
50
54
50
50
54
42
46
46

63
50
75
75
63
75
63
63
63
63
75
75
50
63
50
38
63
38
38
63
63
50
50
63
50
50
25
25
38

57
64
50
50
79
79
50
64
57
71
50
50
50
50
64
29
36
50
50
43
57
64
57
57
36
36
29
21
21

25
25
0
25
25
25
0
25
25
25
25
0
25
0
25
25
0
0
25
0
13
0
0
0
0
0
13
0
0

58
58
58
58
58
56
56
56
55
55
55
54
51
51
50
49
49
47
47
47
47
46
46
45
45
36
31
26
24

United Kingdom
Netherlands
Portugal
Ireland
NorwaySpain
SwedenAlbania
Austria
Denmark
FranceGeorgia
Germany
GreeceFinlandMontenegro
Azerbaijan
Belgium
Croatia
Czechia
Italy
LatviaBosniaand Herzegovina
CyprusLithuania
North Macedonia
Romania
Slovakia
Estonia
SerbiaSlovenia
Bulgaria
Hungary
PolandArmenia
Luxembourg
UkraineSwitzerland
Malta
Türkiye
Belarus
IcelandKyrgyzstan
Moldova
Kazakhstan
UzbekistanIsraelKosovoTajikistan
Liechtenstein
Turkmenistan
RussiaGLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Table 21
Government
response score,by country andmilestone

141

05

Promising Practices in
Europe and Central Asia

REGIONAL
FINDINGS

Within the Promising Practices Database,just over 20 per cent of evaluated programs
were delivered within Europe and Central
Asia, covering 36 countries in the region. The
majority of programs focus on industries
where there are known modern slavery risks,such as sex work, agriculture, and domestic
work. Seventy per cent of evaluated programsin the region targeted human trafficking,followed by the worst forms of child labour.
The most common activities delivered within
the evaluated programs included awarenessraising campaigns, policy advocacy, andtechnical support for the government. Almost
75 per cent of evaluated programs in theregion met some or all of their objectives.

EUROPE AND
CENTRAL ASIA

Dunkirk, France,
October 2022.
A migrant man carrying
a child runs to board asmuggler’s boat and attempt
to cross the English Channel,
while smugglers standbehind him. Many people,
forced by circumstance, takedangerous journeys to find abetter life in the UK. However,hostile attitudes towards
migrants and refugees are
increasing their vulnerability
to exploitation. Photo credit:
Sameer Al-Doumya/AFP via
Getty Images.

Notably, none of the evaluated programsin Europe and Central Asia that had somesuccess featured a reliable evaluation
methodology that included a control orcomparison group to test the veracity ofthese positive outcomes. This severely
limits the insights able to be drawn on whatworks to end modern slavery in Europe andCentral Asia.

European migration policies in response to thecrises in Libya have also been criticised for their
hostility and focus on border enforcement andcontrol.85 From 2020 to 2021, there was a 90 per
cent increase in those attempting the crossing from
Libya to EU countries.86 The safe and legal options
for those seeking to flee humanitarian crises across
Africa via Libya are limited and have been further
impeded by the European Union’s support of the
Libyan coastguard and its intercepting of those
fleeing and returning them to Libya, where they
are vulnerable to being bought and sold in slavemarkets.87 Such policies appear to be addressing thesentiments of European audiences at the expenseof Libyan stakeholders and local vulnerable groups.
Similar border management measures have been
implemented by the EU and its member states withother African countries in recent years in an attempt
to limit irregular migration from the region, such asan €80 million (approximately US$87 million) deal
signed with Egypt in October 2022. Egypt is likely to
see intensified flows of migrants in the medium tolong term as a result of regional instability, climatechange, demographic shifts, and a lack of economic
opportunities.88 By limiting safe legal pathways for
migrants, modern slavery, and exploitation risks willrise considerably.
Other examples of rights curtailments across theEurope and Central Asia region include labour laws
in 12 countries preventing certain groups from142

exercising their rights to freedom of association andcollective bargaining. For example, in Israel, prison
staff do not have the right to form and join unions,nor do self-employed workers.89 In Denmark, certain
groups of non-resident foreign workers do not havethe right to collective bargaining.90
The Europe and Central Asia region scored poorly
on indicators relating to government and businesssupply chains, although countries in the Europe
subregion have among the strongest legislative
responses globally in this area. France,91 Germany,92
and Norway 93 have active mandatory Human Rights
Due Diligence (mHRDD) legislation while the same
type of legislation has been proposed Switzerland94
and the Netherlands.95 What this means in practicein Norway, for example, is that all Norwegiandomiciled “larger enterprises” (as determined bysize and income thresholds) are required to carryout due diligence in identifying, preventing, andmitigating possible adverse impacts on humanrights and labour rights. Failure to do so results infines and/or injunctions. Encouragingly, progressin this area is likely to grow in the region. An EU
Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence(CSDD), including environmental concerns, wasproposed in 2022 but has not yet been adopted.96
It would require in-scope companies to conduct due
diligence on the human rights and environmental
impacts of their operations and supply chains, andto take steps to address adverse impacts.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Recommendations
for governments

1

Strengthen efforts to protect
vulnerable populations in situationsof conflict and disaster from modern
slavery risks, including repealing
hostile migration policies that placesecuritisation above human rights
and expanding the provision of safeand regular migration pathways
and screening asylum seekers
and migrants for modern slavery
indicators. This should include ending
political, financial, and material
support to the system of forcible
returns from international waters
in the Central Mediterranean Sea to
Libya.

2

Ensure that the right of survivors
to not be treated as criminals for
conduct that occurred while under thecontrol of traffickers is enshrined inlegislation.

3

Enhance efforts to prevent
discrimination against certain
populations — such as Muslim, Roma,and Jewish people — and ensure thatstate policies serve to further integrate
rather than target these communities.

4

Ensure that legal loopholes thatfacilitate state-imposed forced labour
are closed and that the practice isabolished in Belarus, Poland, Russia,
and Turkmenistan.

5

Expand enactment of mHRDD laws
across the region to place more robust
requirements on companies to reporton identifying and mitigating modern
slavery in their supply chains.

143

06

IMPORTING RISK

Importing products at risk of forced labour................. 146
Maps of top at-risk products by G20 countries............ 153
Spotlight on the financial sector:
Investing in exploitation........................................................ 172
Spotlight on the garment sector:
Stitched with slavery in the seams.................................... 176
Spotlight on the fishing sector:
Charting progress against forced labour at sea.......... 182
Spotlight on the cocoa sector:
Forced labour: Chocolate’s hidden ingredient............ 188

Huai’an, China, September 2022.
Workers of an electronics company work on the production line.
Electronics, including laptops and mobile phones, are the highest value
product at risk of forced labour imported by G20 countries.
Photo credit: CFOTO/Future Publishing via Getty Images.

144

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

145

06

IMPORTINGRISK

PRODUCTSAT RISK

IMPORTING RISK
Importing products
at risk of forced labour

In this chapter we focus on the at-risk products thatare imported into G2010 countries and their value.
There are two important factors to understanding
the movement of risk through supply chains to
the end consumer. The first is to identify which
globally traded products are likely to be at riskof being produced with forced labour and thesecond is to match them with their trade value.
The methodology used to identify a short list of
products at risk of being produced using forced
labour and the extent to which they are imported by
G20 countries is described in Appendix 3.

The value of products
at risk of forced labour
Over the past few decades, the culture of consumerism andthe demand for goods has grown substantially, particularly
in developed countries. This growth has been driven by manyfactors, including rising incomes, increased access to credit,
and advances in technology and e-commerce.1
With the COVID-19 pandemic, online shopping
became more popular as people sought to avoid
physical stores and social distancing measures thatwere put in place.2 This led to a surge in demand for
products like electronics, home office equipment,
and household goods. 3
The growth of consumer culture and demand forgoods has both positive and negative impacts.
On one hand, it can drive economic growth andinnovation, create jobs, and provide people withaccess to goods and services that can improve their
quality of life. On the other, it can contribute toenvironmental degradation, social inequality, andunsustainable patterns of consumption and waste.4
It also means that goods produced using forced
labour are sold by businesses and consumed bypeople all over the world.
The estimates of prevalence presented in thisreport count forced labour where it occurs.
While this is critical in identifying where the needfor intervention is greatest and most pressing,it does not paint a complete picture of where
responsibility lies. The production and movementof goods between countries — from the sourcingof raw materials to manufacturing, packaging, andtransportation — creates supply chains connecting
manufacturers, distributors, and consumers acrossthe world. Many of these supply chains are at riskof forced labour, but their complexity makes it very
difficult to trace the origin of products and thepresence of forced labour.

146

Understanding the risk
imported by G20 countries
Although the highest prevalence of forced labour
is found in low-income countries, it is deeply
connected to demand from higher-income
countries. Nearly two-thirds of all forced labourcases are linked to global supply chains, withworkers exploited across a wide range of sectors
and at every stage of the supply chain. Most forced
labour occurs in the lowest tiers of supply chains;that is, in the extraction of raw materials and in
production stages. 5
While modern slavery occurs within the borders ofwealthier countries,6 the purchasing practices of
their businesses and governments fuel exploitation
in lower-income countries that are at the frontlinesof global supply chains. G20 countries collectively
account for 85 per cent of the world’s GDP and over
65 per cent of the world’s population.7 Two G20
countries, China and the United States (US), remain
the world’s largest exporting8 and importing 9
economies respectively. Given the G20’s level ofinfluence in the global economy, it is critical toexamine their efforts to address forced labour
through economic and trade measures.

The sheer volume of imports into the G20
demonstrates the power these countries have toinfluence market standards and combat forced
labour. Currently, G20 countries are importing morethan US$468 billion worth of products at risk ofbeing produced with forced labour, compared to
US$354 billion estimated in the 2018 Global Slavery
Index, an increase of US$61 billion when accounting
for inflation.11 This estimate considers only the
top five most valuable at-risk products imported
per G20 country, which for the first time includes
solar panels exported from China. Broken down by
country, the value of imports ranges significantly
across the G20, from a minimum of US$1.6 billion
spent by Argentina to a maximum of US$169.6 billion
by the US (Table 22).
Electronics remained the highest value at-risk
import for the majority of G20 countries, worth
an estimated US$243.6 billion. This was followed
by garments (US$147.9 billion) and palm oil (US$19.7 billion). Solar panels were the fourth highest
value at-risk product (US$14.8 billion), reflecting
the high global demand for renewable energy
products12 as governments begin to take steps tocombat the climate crisis and seek alternative clean
power sources.13 Cocoa has dropped from 5th to12th highest at-risk product imported by the G20
by value. This is consistent with reports that global
demand for cocoa beans and chocolate fell during
the COVID-19 pandemic.14

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

As in the 2018 GSI, electronics from China andMalaysia remain the highest value at-risk productimported by G20 countries (Table 23), while for 18of the 19 G20 country members included in thisanalysis, electronics are among the top five at-risk
products. In Malaysia, there are reported cases offorced labour and debt bondage in the electronics
manufacturing industry, which is reliant on migrantlabour from Bangladesh, Nepal, Myanmar, andIndonesia.15 In China, factories manufacturing
electronics for global brands reportedly force
Uyghurs to work under state-imposed forced
labour.16 The forced labour of Uyghurs has beenfound in other sectors in China, including textiles
and garment manufacturing17 and renewableenergy products.

Country
Argentina
Australia
BrazilCanadaChina
FranceGermany
India
Indonesia
Italy
Japan
MexicoRussiaSaudi Arabia
South Africa
South Korea
Türkiye
United Kingdom
United States

Product
Electronics
Garments
Palm oilSolar panels
TextilesTimberFishGold
CattleSugarcane
Coffee
Cocoa
Rice
Coal

Total valueof at-risk imports(in billions $US)
1.6
17.4
5.6
20.0
17.2
11.8
44.0
23.6
5.2
10.9
53.1
9.2
15.2
7.4
4.8
20.2
5.3
26.1
169.6
Total import value(in billions $US)
243.6
147.9
19.7
14.8
12.7
7.4
6.3
5.2
4.4
2.5
1.6
1.0
0.8
0.4

Table 22
Value of top 5
at-risk imports,
by country

Table 23
Value of top 5
at-risk imports,
by product

147

06

IMPORTINGRISK

PRODUCTSAT RISK

Labour exploitation is pervasive in the garment
industry,18 which is the second most valuableat-risk product. At-risk garments imported
into the G20 are manufactured in Argentina,
Bangladesh, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, andViet Nam. In India, women and girls who belong to
ethnic minority groups are exploited in informal
factories, which are sub-contracted by global
brands’ tier one suppliers to produce garments.19
These garment workers do not earn a living
wage and have no formal work agreements,
while some work in conditions that amounts toforced labour.20 A 2021 study on the Vietnamese
garment industry found that 6 per cent ofworker-participants were likely in a situation offorced labour.21 Many noted that they could notrefuse work or change employers due to threatsof “exit costs,” such as withholding valuables
and wages, receiving threats of legal action, andpsychological or physical violence.22
Textiles are within the five most valuable
imported products in over 70 per cent of the 19
nation states in the G20. Textiles are imported
by G20 countries to make many other products
within that country, including bedding, PPE,
carpeting, upholstery, and garments. Forced
labour reportedly occurs in textile factories in
China, where Uyghurs have been allegedly forciblytransferred and made to work in textile factories
by a labour transfer program.23

West Java, Indonesia,
June 2022.
Palm fruit is harvested by aworker in Indonesia. Palmoil, derived from the fruit, isamong the top five productswith the highest risk of forced
labour pervading supply
chains that are imported
by G20 countries. Palm oil
production has also been
linked to other issues,
including the climate crisis.
Photo credit: Dimas Ardian/
Bloomberg via Getty Images.

There is evidence of widescale abuse in thefishing industry.24 Multiple reports in the last
five years have highlighted instances of forced
labour onboard flagged fleets from China, Ghana,Indonesia, Thailand, and Taiwan that supply fish
to a range of G20 countries, including Australia,
Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the
US (see Table 42 in Appendix 3). A 2021 study byGreenpeace identified fishers aboard Indonesian
vessels living in forced labour across 45 ships.
Workers reported multiple forms of coercion,
including withholding of wages and deception.25
The palm oil industry harms both people andplanet.26 Nine G20 countries imported morethan US$19 billion worth of at-risk palm oil fromIndonesia and Malaysia. In Malaysia, migrant
workers make up the majority of the palm oilworkforce, and once on a plantation they canface heightened risks of debt bondage, restrictedmovement, confiscation of identity documents,and having their wages withheld.27 Conversely,
the Indonesian palm oil industry relies solely on
domestic labour, including internal migrants,
however the use of a piece-rate system of pay
with no mandatory minimum wage or social
protections has led workers to involve theirchildren in the work in order to meet the highharvest quotas and earn a survival wage.28

Renewable energy products
As global demand grows for governments to take
immediate and impactful action to address theclimate crisis, businesses are modifying theiroperations to adopt renewable energy practices.
In 2020, the global renewable energy industry
was worth US$881.7 billion and future forecasts
estimate it to grow to US$1,977.6 billion by
2030.29 However, in the worldwide push to moveto sustainable energy, vulnerable workers
are exposed to greater risks of exploitation inmining, agriculture, and manufacturing. 30
From 2019 to 2021, the Business and Human
Rights Centre tracked almost 200 allegationsof human rights abuses related to the miningof cobalt, copper, lithium, manganese, nickel,
and zinc — all essential minerals for renewableenergy products. 31 Abuses included unpaid
wages, underpaid wages, exploitative hiring andfiring practices, child labour, and discrimination
based on gender, sexuality, race, caste, or
religion. 32 Widespread experiences of forced
labour also occur in cobalt mining in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 33
Solar panels are within the top five at-risk
products for 11 G20 countries: Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan,
Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and Türkiye.
Polysilicon, a silica-product derived fromquartz sand, is essential to manufacturing solar
panels. China is the market leader in polysilicon
production and in 2021 about 45 per cent of
the world’s polysilicon supply originated fromthe Uyghur region. 34 Forced labour is prevalentthroughout the industry. Multiple reports allege
that state-imposed forced labour of Uyghurs andother Turkic and Muslim majority peoples occur
in the Uyghur region, 35 alongside the systematicabuse of other human rights36 that somegovernments have called a genocide. 37
Forced labour permeates all businesses
operating in Uyghur region, including those thatare part of the solar panel supply chain, fromthe collection of raw quartz and its purification

What are G20 governments
doing to address this risk?
No country in the world, including among the G20,
has taken comprehensive action to stop sourcing
goods made with forced labour, but there has been
increased action by some countries to addressforced labour risks within business and government
supply chains in recent years. These actions range
from voluntary guidelines and commitments andnon-judicial complaints systems to laws establishingdisclosure or human rights due diligence regimes
and civil or criminal liability for misconduct.45

148

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

into solar grade polysilicon to its transformation
into ingots, wafers, cells, and eventually solar
panel modules. The Chinese government statesthat the associated “labour transfer” schemes
are intended to alleviate poverty, yet workers
are reportedly unable to refuse to participate
and are coerced through threats of internment
within re-education camps and extra-judicial
detention. 38 In June 2021, the US issued aWithhold Release Order (WRO) to prevent theimport of silica-based products made by specificcompanies operating within the Uyghur region. 39
The transition from fossil fuels to renewableenergy should not come at the expense of humanrights, including the rights of those involvedin the manufacture of sustainable energy
products. The interconnected relationshipbetween the environment and human rights
was acknowledged at the UN Climate Change
Conference hosted in Scotland in 2021, and morethan 30 countries signed a declaration to support
a “Just Transition.”40 The recommendations
adopted within the declaration build uponpractical guidelines created by the ILO in 2015,
which aimed to provide countries with practicalmeans to work towards sustainable economies
and societies 41 while meeting their commitments
under the subsequent Paris Agreement toaddress the impacts of climate change.42 These
included supporting workers to transition
into new jobs, promoting social dialogue andstakeholder engagement between governments
and representatives of workers and employers,and embedding the United Nations Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights(UNGPs) and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, among other rights-based instruments,
within global supply chains.43 However, fewer
than half the members of the G20 have signed
the Just Transition Declaration: signatories
include Canada, the European Union, France,
Germany, Italy, the UK, and the US.44

Among G20 countries, Australia, France, Germany,
Brazil, the UK, and the US are taking the most action
to eliminate risks of forced labour permeating global
supply chains (Table 24).
Given their leverage, all G20 governments should
do more to tackle forced labour in supply chains. In
the G20, half of the members did not address supply
chain risks, including those with the capacity to do
more, including Saudi Arabia, Japan, and Russia.47
Relative to its resources, Australia is currently
outperforming wealthier G20 members such as
Canada, China, and Italy in taking action against
forced labour in supply chains.48

149

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Table 24
G20 governments’ actions to address forced labour in supply chainsa
Government
regulates andinvestigates public
procurement toprevent use offorced labour

Government
encourages
mandatory reporting

Government
encourages
mandatory
human rights
due diligence

Government is using alternative avenues
to ensure businesses are tackling forced
labour in supply chains e.g. publicprivate partnerships, investor reporting

Australia, Brazil,
Canada, France,
Germany, Italy,
UK, US

Australia, Brazil,
France, Germany,
Italy, UK, US

France,Germanyb

Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Germany,
UK, USa: Although a member of the G20, the European Union has been excluded from this analysis as government response data
has not been collected at a supranational level for the Global Slavery Index.
b: The Supply Chain Due Diligence Act (LkSG) which entered into force on 1 January 2023,[i] sits outside the data collection
period for the assessment of government responses in this Index. While the Act will be included for assessment in futurerounds of data collection, it is noted in the table above for completeness.

Public procurement
G20 members have taken more action to addressrisks of forced labour within public supply chains incomparison to other countries in the Global Slavery
Index. Eight G20 nation state members (Australia,
Brazil, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK, andthe US) have implemented rules to prevent goods
and services made with forced labour from being
sourced by the government. These rules typicallyinvolve guidelines for procurement officers, suchas the guidelines in the US pursuant to Executive
Order No. 13627 of 201249 or through policies that
explicitly prohibit the use of businesses suspectedof using forced labour within their supply chains.
For example, in Australia, Rule 7.27(f) of theCommonwealth Procurement Rules make specificreference to the Modern Slavery Act 2018 andensure that procurement officials comply with thereporting requirements under the Act. 50 Australia
and the UK are the only G20 members that havereleased public reports on efforts to mediate therisk of products made with forced labour entering
government supply chains, as required under theirrespective disclosure laws. 51
Even where rules and guidelines on public
procurement exist, pressures caused by sudden
surges in demand and insufficient global supply cancircumvent these standards. 52 In the early stages of
the COVID-19 pandemic, governments worldwide
raced to procure PPE in a highly competitive global
market to respond to the emerging health crisis. 53
Textile factories in China producing PPE werereported to have used the forced labour of North
Korean workers, who had 70 per cent of their wages
taken by the North Korean state. 54 Governments
also sourced disposable rubber gloves fromfactories in Malaysia despite continuing widespread
concerns of forced labour within the sector; several
countries, including the US, lifted bans on the150

import of Malaysian rubber gloves in 2020 to meetdemand. 55 In 2022, legal proceedings were launchedagainst the UK government for similarly sourcing
disposable gloves for the National Health Service(NHS) from a Malaysian factory that reportedly used
forced labour within its supply chain. Workers whobrought the suit claimed they were forced to workfor up to 12 hours each day for months at a time
and that they experienced debt bondage. 56 The UK
government passed an amendment to the National
Health Service Act 2006 that banned the NHS fromprocuring goods made with forced labour in its
supply chain pursuant to Section 81 of the Healthand Care Act 2022.57

Mandatory reporting vs mandatory
human rights due diligence
Since the 2018 Global Slavery Index, Australia58
has joined the UK 59 and the US state of California60
in enacting legislation requiring organisations topublicly disclose whether and how forced labourrisks are present in their supply chains, as well as
any actions they have taken to reduce those risks.
In 2022, three bills were introduced in Canada,each of which require businesses to disclose efforts
taken to remove child and forced labour fromtheir supply chains ; Canada’s “Modern Slavery
Act” passed in May 2023.61 In recent years, theefficacy of these disclosure regimes has beenquestioned. For example, the Modern Slavery Act
in the UK was criticised for failing to set legallybinding standards that ensure practical rather thanperformative compliance.62

As a result, there has been a shift towards lawsthat require businesses to go beyond disclosure
and proactively identify and remediate actualand potential risks of human rights violations forworkers within their operations and supply chains[mandatory human rights due diligence legislation(mHRDD)]. Laws have come into force in France,63
Norway,64 and Germany65 or have been proposed
in Switzerland66and the Netherlands,67 while the
EU Directive on Corporate Sustainability Due
Diligence (CSDD) has not yet been adopted.68 In the
Netherlands, mHRDD laws adopted in 2017 specificto child labour (including the worst forms of childlabour) impose a duty of care on companies toprevent the supply of goods or services made withchild labour to Dutch consumers.69 However, the law
has not yet come into force; the Dutch governmentis reportedly developing implementation orders.70
In 2021, Dutch legislators considered the Bill on
Responsible and Sustainable International BusinessConduct, which obliges large businesses to addresshuman rights and environmental damage andconduct due diligence on their supply chains.
However, the bill has not yet been passed.71 In
Switzerland in 2020, following the failure to pass areferendum to change the Constitution to ensurecompanies mandatorily conduct broad humanrights due diligence in accordance with the UNGPs,72
amendments were instead made to the Swiss Codeof Obligations to narrow the scope of due diligencerequirements to child labour and conflict metals
and minerals.73 A hybrid approach that includes
both mandatory disclosure and due diligencerequirements is being considered in New Zealand.74
Enforcement continues to be a key issue acrossregulatory frameworks for both government
procurement and business supply chains. Whilesome laws penalise companies that fail to comply
with reporting, due diligence, or other procurement
regulations (for example, France, Germany, Italy,
the UK, and the US), our government response
assessment found no evidence that any country
in the G20 enforced such penalties in the last five
years. Remedies available for survivors of modern
slavery offences are also limited. France is the only
country which provides survivors with a cause ofaction, pursuant to Article 2 of the Duty of Vigilance
law.75 The German mHRDD shows promise in thisregard by imposing fines for failure to comply
with the due diligence requirements and uniquely
provides civil liability avenues against businesses.76
Similar civil liability regimes are envisioned at the
EU level, under the proposed CSDD Directive.77

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Other initiatives: Import controls,
Magnitsky sanctions, and “nameand shame” lists
Until recently, the US was the only country in theworld to explicitly prohibit the importation of goods
made with forced, convict, or indentured labour
pursuant to section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.
This law empowers the US Customs and Border
Protection agency, either on its own initiation or on
external petition, to issue a WRO and prohibit theentry of a particular product into the country if it was
reasonably believed that the goods were producedwith forced labour.78 Canada has now also taken
steps to regulate the import of goods to prevent
products made with forced and prison labour
from entering domestic supply chains throughamendments made in 2021 to Regulation 132(m),which lists banned products under Part 5 of the
Customs Tariff Act of 1997.79 A wider proposal to ban
all products made with forced labour to reduce therisk of forced labour entering the European market
was adopted by the EU parliament in June 2022.80
Other initiatives to reduce the import of products
made with forced labour have typically been limited
to specific sectors or forms of modern slavery.
For example, EU Regulation 2017/821 entered into
force in 2021 and requires importers to ensurethat certain high-risk minerals and metals do
not contribute to forced labour or conflict.81 In
response to reports of forced labour in the Uyghur
region,82 the US Congress passed the Uyghur Forced
Labor Prevention Act in 2021. The law has a broad
application aimed at “stopping the importation of
any goods made with forced labour, including those
goods mined, produced, or manufactured wholly orin part” in the Uyghur region.83 Importantly, the Act
envisions collaboration with Mexico and Canada toincorporate the restriction within the US-MexicoCanada free trade agreement; Mexico and Canada
have now both passed similar forced labour importcontrols.84 A Private Member’s Bill proposed in2020 sought to amend the Australian Customs Act
and introduce a specific ban on goods producedby the forced labour of Uyghurs; however, it was
not passed.85

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Laws in the US, Canada, the UK, the EU,86 and more
recently in Australia, allow for targeted “Magnitsky”
sanctions against foreign entities or persons whoare involved in serious human rights violations
anywhere in the world.87 Similar legislation wasconsidered in Japan in 2022, but no further action
has been taken.88 “Magnitsky” sanctions take theirname from a deceased Russian accountant andwhistle-blower who was imprisoned and abused
after uncovering large-scale tax fraud in Russia thatinvolved senior government officials.89 Penalties
vary depending on jurisdiction but typically involve
travel restrictions and asset freezes90 and havebeen used to penalise individuals and organisations
involved in modern slavery crimes. For example,
in the UK, sanctions were levied against twoorganisations running North Korean prison camps
where detainees were forced to work, the leader ofa Ugandan non-state armed group that recruitedchildren into armed conflict, and a senior general of
the Myanmar Armed Forces operating in the RakhineState, whose military operations included forcibly
exploiting the labour of Rohingya people, among
others.91 Lists of individuals and organisations who
have received sanctions are publicly available.92
Other government-run “name and shame” efforts
have targeted those involved in forced labour
offences, particularly in relation to goods andservices made with forced labour. For example, theList of Products Produced by Child Labour or Forced
Labour has been maintained by the US Departmentof State since 2005 and currently lists 156 goods
from 77 countries.93 In Brazil, the government has
updated its “Slave Labour Dirty List” on a biannual
basis since it was first established in 2004.94 Updates
to the list were temporarily suspended following a
2014 lawsuit brought against the government by the
Associação Brasileira de Incorporadoras Imobiliárias
(Abrainc), a real estate business association, which
alleged that the publication of the list was an
unconstitutional use of executive power. While theSupreme Court of Brazil rejected this argument in
2020,95 other issues limit the continued impact of
the list. In 2022, researchers found that businesses
and individuals circumvent the Dirty List process to
avoid punishment.96

Recommendations
for G20 governments

ARGENTINA

1

Enact legislation to require large
businesses and publicly funded entities
to undertake mandatory human rights
due diligence to proactively identify andremediate forced labour risks.

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY

2

Require government contractors(and their sub-contractors) to certifythat they have specific preventative
measures to detect and eliminate forced
labour in their supply chains.

3

4
5● Coffee● Electronics†● Garments● Solar Panels● Textiles

China
India

Develop and implement rapid response
guidelines that provide a practicalframework for procurement agents
to follow when consumer demand
outstrips global supply, such as inresponse to crises, to reduce the riskof products produced with forced
labour being introduced into public
supply chains.
Strengthen existing mandatory
reporting legislation by adding andimplementing penalties and managing
a free and publicly accessible repository
to file all modern slavery statements
to ensure businesses can be held
accountable for non-compliance.
Take other legal measures to ensure
value chains do not adversely impact
human rights, such as import controls
on products linked to forced labour,
Magnitsky style sanctions, and public
lists of those companies that have beenfound to tolerate forced labour in their
supply chains.

Bangladesh
Vietnam

MalaysiaBrazilArgentina● Importer country● Source country
Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

China

1,249,673

Malaysia

19,969China

103,034

Vietnam

16,574

Bangladesh

11,673

India

6,338

Brazil

5,914

Malaysia

448

China

82,025

Brazil

59,467

China

55,545ARGENTINA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$

1.6

BILLION152

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

153

06

IMPORTINGRISK

G20 IMPORTS

AUSTRALIABRAZILTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Electronics†● Electronics†● Fish● Garments● Solar Panels● Textiles● Garments● Palm Oil● Solar Panels● Textiles

China

China

Bangladesh
India

TaiwanIndia

VietnamBangladesh
VietnamThailand
Ghana

Malaysia
Malaysia
Indonesia

BrazilBrazilArgentina
Australia

Argentina● Importer country● Source country†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

8,499,583

China

2,771,297

Malaysia

387,144

China

1,207,778

China

4,847,261

Malaysia

15,137

Bangladesh

814,958

China

624,307

Vietnam

400,830

Bangladesh

108,725India

298,593

Vietnam

52,986

Malaysia

25,397

India

46,369Brazil1,830

Argentina

6,385

33

Malaysia

1,963

China

1,302,216

Indonesia

511,464

China

469,839

Malaysia

19,313Thailand

199,156

China

269,509

China

75,023

Indonesia

73,488

Taiwan39,283Ghana

2

Argentina

AUSTRALIA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

5.6

17.4

BILLIONBILLION
154

BRAZIL’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

China

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

155

06
IMPORTINGRISK

CANADACHINA

G20 IMPORTS

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Electronics†● Cattle● Garments● Gold● Sugarcane● Textiles● Garments● Palm Oil● Sugarcane● TimberRussiaCanada

China

China
India
Bangladesh

India

Bangladesh

VietnamVietnam
Malaysia
Indonesia

Malaysia
Peru

Peru

BrazilBrazilArgentina● Importer country● Source country(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

11,203,647

Indonesia

4,902,375

Malaysia

76,024

Malaysia

1,432,821

China

3,068,653

Russia3,564,090

Bangladesh

1,278,694

Brazil

322,095

Vietnam

1,053,657

Peru

37,308

India

259,998

Brazil

3,907,805

Malaysia

12,618Vietnam

1,173,538

Brazil

1,309

Bangladesh

404,894India

60,244

Argentina

6Peru

2,097,402

Malaysia

16,998

China

482,486

Brazil358

Brazil

427,598

CANADA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

China

20.0

Argentina
Brazil24
1,408,718

17.2

BILLIONBILLION
156

CHINA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

157

06
IMPORTINGRISK

FRANCEGERMANY

G20 IMPORTS

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Cocoa● Electronics†● Garments● Solar Panels● Textiles● Coffee● Electronics†

France● Garments● Solar Panels● Textiles

Germany

China

China

Bangladesh

Bangladesh

India

India

VietnamCôte dʼIvoire

Vietnam

Ghana
Malaysia

MalaysiaBrazilBrazilArgentina

Argentina● Importer country● Source country(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

China

China

20,319,762

Malaysia

151,570

India

682,554

China

7,993,142

Vietnam

564,909

Bangladesh

7,785,869

Malaysia

6,475

India

1,301,894

Brazil2,301

Vietnam

1,284,308

577

Malaysia

36,160Argentina
China

2,609,763

Brazil857

Malaysia

13,678Argentina

51

Côte d’Ivoire

462,434

China

2,425,414

Ghana

172,531China

1,620,893

Brazil

1,064,743

China

434,278

China

362,406

FRANCE’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

4,524,306

Bangladesh 1,917,574

44.0

11.8

BILLIONBILLION
158

GERMANY’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

159

06
IMPORTING
RISK

INDIA

INDONESIA

G20 IMPORTS

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Electronics†● Coal● Garments● Gold● Palm Oil● Solar Panels● Electronics†● Garments● Sugarcane● Textiles

China
China
Pakistan

Bangladesh
Burkina Faso

Bangladesh
India

India
VietnamVietnam

Malaysia

Malaysia

Indonesia

Peru

BrazilIndonesia
BrazilArgentina● Importer country● Source country(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

China

7,345,027

China

2,919,522

Malaysia

432,868

Malaysia

77,909

Malaysia

4,014,696

China

563,955

Indonesia

3,588,848

Bangladesh

58,744

China

3,820,664

Vietnam

49,025Peru

2,143,967

Malaysia

21,467

934,503

India

15,410China

753,798

BrazilBangladesh

472,834

Argentina

Vietnam

47,222

China

663,425

Malaysia

7,523

China

432,649

Brazil78

Burkina Faso

INDIA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

23.6

PakistanBrazil7
0.4

0.2
353,740

5.2

BILLIONBILLION
160

INDONESIA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

161

06
IMPORTING
RISK

ITALY

JAPAN

G20 IMPORTS

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Coffee● Electronics†● Garments● Palm Oil● Textiles● Electronics†● Fish● Garments● Solar Panels● Textiles

Italy

China

China

Japan

Bangladesh
India

TaiwanBangladesh
India

Vietnam
Ghana

Indonesia

Thailand

Vietnam

Malaysia
Indonesia

BrazilBrazilArgentina

Argentina● Importer country● Source country
China

29,015,858

Bangladesh 1,420,659

Malaysia

111,882

India

353,801

China

13,008,247

Vietnam275,277

Vietnam

3,129,860

Malaysia

4,419

Bangladesh

1,161,546

Brazil

1,110

India

207,494

Malaysia

116,704

Brazil

1,773

Argentina†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

2,560,544

143

China

4,099,594

Malaysia

11,962

Argentina

Indonesia

769,786

China

1,617,554

Malaysia

416,258

Thailand484,290

China

533,455

Brazil

477,026400

ITALY’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

Taiwan376,438

Indonesia

189,292

Ghana

1305

China

1,887,658

China

1,805,444

10.9

53.1

BILLIONBILLION
162

JAPAN’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

China

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

163

06
IMPORTINGRISKMEXICORUSSIA

G20 IMPORTS

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Electronics†● Garments● Solar Panels● Textiles● Timber● Cattle● Electronics†● Garments● Palm Oil● Textiles

RussiaRussia

China

China
India
Bangladesh

Bangladesh

VietnamVietnamIndia

MexicoMalaysia

Malaysia

Indonesia
BrazilPeru

BrazilParaguay

Argentina● Importer country● Source country
5,553,221

China

8,699,722

Malaysia

178,698

Malaysia

24,478

China

1,525,355

China

2,976,065

Bangladesh

394,062

Bangladesh 1,161,231

Vietnam

119,953

Vietnam399,252

India

109,101

India

150,554

Malaysia†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

5,633

Malaysia

7,103

Brazil

1,235

Brazil372

China

498,915

Argentina

0.1

China

476,471

Indonesia

886,351

Brazil

305,542

Malaysia

15,946

Russia12,402

Peru

8,671

MEXICO’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

Paraguay

333,732

Brazil129,229

China

420,059

9.2

15.2

BILLIONBILLION164

RUSSIA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

China

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

165

06
IMPORTINGRISKSAUDI ARABIASOUTH AFRICA

G20 IMPORTS

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Electronics†● Electronics†● Garments● Palm Oil● Rice● Sugarcane● Garments● Palm Oil● Solar Panels● Textiles

China
China

Saudi Arabia

Bangladesh

Vietnam

India

Bangladesh

Vietnam

India

Malaysia
Malaysia

Indonesia

Indonesia

BrazilBrazilArgentina

Argentina
South Africa● Importer country● Source country(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

2,317,822

China

India

414,568

Malaysia

Bangladesh

394,959

China

1,157,112

Vietnam

53,416

Bangladesh

105,396

Malaysia

6,613

India

97,275

Brazil626

Vietnam

32,184

Argentina

11

Malaysia

3,157

2,435,721
4,566

China

2,150,220

Brazil456

Malaysia

22,842

Argentina

24

Indonesia

480,481Indonesia

436,801

Malaysia

369,096

Malaysia

116,863

China

256,757

China

142,188India

812,366

Brazil

340,235SAUDI ARABIA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

China

7.4

4.8

BILLIONBILLION166

SOUTH AFRICA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

167

06
IMPORTING
RISK

SOUTH KOREA

TÜRKIYE

G20 IMPORTS

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Electronics†● Cocoa● Fish● Garments● Palm Oil● Solar Panels● Electronics†● Garments● Palm Oil● Solar Panels

TürkiyeSouth Korea
China

China

India

Bangladesh

VietnamBangladesh

Vietnam

India

ThailandCôte dʼIvoire

Ghana

Ghana
Malaysia

Malaysia

Indonesia

Indonesia

BrazilBrazilArgentina

Argentina● Importer country● Source country†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

168

9,275,468

China

Malaysia

15,132

Malaysia

3,173,722

China

4,882,687

Malaysia

659,919

Vietnam

3,020,662

Indonesia

223,729

8,515

Bangladesh

443,987

China

271,493

India

56,823

Bangladesh

190,776

Malaysia

8,626

Vietnam

63,508Brazil

243

Malaysia

27,209Argentina

136

India

23,756

China

1,003,783

Brazil171

Indonesia

453,534

Argentina

65

Malaysia

373,781

China

533,256

Taiwan114,442

Indonesia

32,753Thailand

22,362

Ghana

1,815

SOUTH KOREA’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

China

374,515

Côte d’Ivoire

243,290

Ghana

76,29820.2

TÜRKIYE’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

5.3

US$

(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

China

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

BILLIONBILLION

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

169

06
IMPORTINGRISKUNITED KINGDOMUNITED STATESG20 IMPORTS

TOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERYTOP 5 IMPORTED PRODUCTS AT RISK OF MODERN SLAVERY● Electronics†● Electronics†● Fish● Garments● Textiles● Timber● Fish● Garments● Textiles● TimberRussiaRussiaUnited Kingdom

United States

China

VietnamBangladesh
India

China
Bangladesh

Taiwan

Ghana

Ghana
Ghana
Malaysia

Malaysia

Indonesia

Peru

TaiwanThailandIndia

Thailand

VietnamIndonesia

BrazilPeru

BrazilArgentina

Argentina● Importer country● Source country†
Applies to laptops,
computers and mobile
phones only
*see Appendix 3^This relates to the
top at-risk imports, byimport value

170

Malaysia

14,713,414
37,016

China

106,158,032

Malaysia

1,427,054

China

5,257,572

China

24,889,568

Bangladesh

3,009,806

Vietnam

15,288,211

India

1,255,998

Bangladesh

7,273,296
4,657,696

Vietnam

509,046

India

Malaysia

22,225

Malaysia

256,474

Brazil

1,294Brazil25,173

Argentina

189

Argentina

950

China

230,258

China

4,752,876

Ghana

38,875

China

1,015,843

Indonesia

18,615Thailand

16,475

Taiwan761

China

538,295

Russia352,850

Brazil130,422

Peru

77

UNITED KINGDOM’S AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

Thailand

670,363

Indonesia

406,921

Taiwan144,891

Ghana

257

Brazil2,107,498

Russia549,653

Peru

8,361

26.1

BILLION

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

UNITED STATES’ AT-RISK
IMPORTED PRODUCTS

169.6

US$

(annually, in thousandsof US$)*^

China

US$

Breakdown of
at-risk imported
products bysource country

BILLION

171

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IMPORTINGRISKSPOTLIGHT

FINANCIALSECTOR

Spotlight on thefinancial sector:
Investing in exploitation

Traditionally, the financial sector is perceived as low riskfor human rights abuses.1 In reality, there are multiple ways
the sector is exposed to risks of modern slavery, including
through its operations, supply chains, and business
relationships.
Financial actors may unknowingly engage
vulnerable workers through labour agencies inhigher risk industries such as catering and cleaning
services, or purchase goods at risk of being
produced with forced labour such as IT equipment
and corporate merchandise.2 There are serious
risks of becoming part of value chains that rely on
exploitation by investing in or lending to businesses
that are complicit in modern slavery within theirown operations or supply chains. 3 Certain financial
actors may also inadvertently facilitate criminal
activities where profits generated by modern
slavery practices are laundered through legitimate
financial channels.4
At the same time, financial institutions have a
critical role to play in combating slavery. They havethe ability to influence global business, drive better
investment and lending frameworks and practices,
identify financial flows and unscrupulous clients
linked to these crimes, and use their leverageover companies invested in to improve company
practices. While the sector is complex and involves
a range of different financial institutions andservices, 5 this spotlight focuses predominantly on
asset owner and manager investment in companies
listed on stock exchanges.

172

Financial institutions are captured under theUnited Nations Guiding Principles on Businessand Human Rights (UNGPs) which established the“corporate responsibility to respect”, including therequirement to avoid causing or contributing toadverse human rights impacts and seek to preventor mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are
directly linked to their operations, products, orservices by their business relationships, even if they
themselves have not contributed to those impacts.6
This responsibility has been increasingly translated
into national legislation targeting human rights
related to business activity.7 As large businesses,
many investors are captured by legislation imposing
reporting requirements on the steps taken to
identify and address modern slavery in operations
and supply chains8 and, more recently, by laws
requiring entities to undertake human rights due
diligence.9 For example, the Australian Modern
Slavery Act’s official guidance recognises the
responsibility of financial institutions by clarifyingthat entities are expected to report on the risks ofmodern slavery in their financial investments.10
However, investor action to assess and address
modern slavery is still lagging behind these laws.
In 2021, Walk Free, WikiRate, and the Business andHuman Rights Resource Centre assessed statements
published by 79 asset managers who were required
to report under the UK Modern Slavery Act.11 The
assessment found that asset managers were notadequately considering the risk of modern slavery
within their direct operations or supply chains of thegoods and services they purchase. More importantly,
given the size of their investment portfolios, asset
managers also failed to consider modern slavery risks
in their investments, with only about a quarter (27per cent) indicating that they conducted some formof due diligence on human rights or modern slavery
issues in their portfolios. Few assessed their investee
companies for modern slavery risks (9 per cent) or
engaged directly with companies to address modern
slavery through social audits, self-assessment
reviews, filing shareholder resolutions, or providing
training (15 per cent).12 This was similarly reflected
in a 2022 assessment of asset owners and managers
based in Australia and the UK who were exposedto the garment industry. Less than a quarter (24per cent) of garment investors described that they
conduct pre-investment assessments to identify
modern slavery risks, despite the risks associatedwith the garment sector.13

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Despite the growing number of voluntary initiatives,
only one in three asset managers in the UK
disclosed being part of any relevant initiatives orcollaborations.14 These initiatives provide important
opportunities for financial actors to learn fromexperts and peers, and to lift the industry standard
for preventing, identifying, and mitigating modern
slavery in their own businesses and investee
companies.15 Within the evolving movement, someinvestors have taken on an active role in using theirleverage to address modern slavery such as the
CCLA impact investment firm’s Find It, Fix It, Prevent
It initiative16 and the Investors Against Slavery andTrafficking Asia-Pacific (IAST APAC) initiative.
With the support of Walk Free and the Finance
Against Slavery and Trafficking (FAST) initiative,17
IAST APAC is an investor-led, multistakeholder
initiative comprising 37 investors from Asiaand the Pacific representing AU$7.8 trillion(approximately US$5.2 trillion) in assets undermanagement, together with the Australian Councilof Superannuation Investors. IAST APAC engages
with investee companies spread throughout theregion in the consumer, healthcare, and technology

London, United
Kingdom, August 2022.
Public artwork is stationed
outside the Bank of England, aspart of a new art trail exploring
the impact of the Trans-Atlantic
slave trade. In 1833, when
The Slavery Abolition Act was
passed, the UK government
agreed to provide £20 million
to compensate 3,000 slaveowners. No reparations havebeen paid by the government
to former slaves or theirdescendants to date. Photo
credit: Mike Kemp/In Pictures
via Getty Images.

173

06

IMPORTINGRISKSPOTLIGHT

FINANCIALSECTOR

sectors to find, fix, and prevent modern slavery
from occurring in their businesses.18 In 2020, IAST
APAC signed and published a statement to the top
100 companies listed on the Australian Securities
Exchange (ASX), setting out investor expectations
for addressing the risks of modern slavery under theAustralian Modern Slavery Act.19

legal risks related to maximising short-term
profits over long-term sustainability.23 ESG efforts
are increasingly linked to the United Nations
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).24 It is clearthat actions to address modern slavery must —as an abuse of both labour and human rights, adriver of unsustainable earnings, 25 and a key issue
addressed through Targets 5.2, 8.7, and 16.2 of theSDGs26 — form part of the ‘S’ in ESG.

“As investors we expect companies tomeet their reporting and complianceobligations and in doing so encouragecompanies to examine broader risks oflabour exploitation as a leading indicatorof modern slavery.”At the regional level, building upon the Action Plan
on Financing Sustainable Growth, 27 the European
Union in 2019 set obligations on financial actors
to disclose the impact of investment decisions onsustainability, including the environment and social
justice, with EU Regulation 2019/2088.28 In addition
to introducing transparency requirements, theregulation calls on financial market participants andfinancial advisers to consider guidance publishedby the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment 29 and the Principles for Responsible
Investment. 30 The EU Platform on Sustainable
Finance has further proposed a structure for a social
taxonomy to promote investment in sustainable
activities in Europe, which would cover decent work,
including for workers in value chains. 31

Investors Against Slavery and Trafficking
Asia-Pacific, 202020

Alongside human rights legislation, the burgeoning
responsible investment/sustainable financemovement — incorporating environmental,social and governance (ESG) considerations into
investment decisions and reporting frameworks21— is rapidly being translated into formal regulations
and guidance. Investors that do not incorporate
ESG considerations into their investment practices
and decision-making, for instance, increasingly
risk failing to meet their fiduciary duties22 and canface reputational, operational, and potentially

Bangkok, Thailand,
October 2020.
Increasingly, investors aretaking action on modern
slavery issues. Pictured
is the Stock Exchange ofThailand, which in 2022
partnered with Walk Free andthe Finance Against Slavery
and Trafficking initiative todevelop a set of tools to help
investors manage humanrights risks, specificallymodern slavery. Photo credit:
Taylor Weidman/Bloomberg
via Getty Images.

174

Stock exchanges are also increasingly requiring
listed companies to disclose ESG risks, including
those related to modern slavery. As of August
2022, 32 stock exchanges have mandatory ESG
reporting, and 67 had offered written guidanceon ESG reporting. 32 In Thailand, for example,
listed companies must report annually onsustainability issues, including human rights
protection throughout the value chain. In 2021,
Walk Free partnered with the Stock Exchange ofThailand and FAST to produce the Guidance on
Modern Slavery Risks for Thai Businesses, as wellas an online Modern Slavery Benchmarking Tool,
to help companies manage labour risks acrossa range of sectors and meet their sustainability
reporting obligations. 33

and other sustainability disclosure regulations.
In 2021, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI)
released its revised standards to align with
instruments such as the UNGPs. 34 At COP26,
the International Sustainable Standards Board
was established to develop a global baseline ofsustainability disclosure standards. 35 Further,
the EU is set to adopt mandatory sustainability
reporting standards to guide company reporting
under the proposed Corporate Sustainability
Reporting Directive. 36

International standards act as a framework to guidebusiness in their reporting under stock exchange

Recommendations
for governments

Recommendations
for investors

1

Introduce mandatory humanrights due diligence laws to requirecompanies, including investors, toconduct due diligence to prevent,mitigate, and remedy modern slavery
in operations and value chains.

1

Improve reporting under national
Modern Slavery Acts and otherrelevant regulations to ensure theminimum requirements are met and toprovide more detailed disclosures onmodern slavery risks.

2Strengthen existing mandatory
reporting laws by including andimplementing penalties.

2

Implement strong risk assessment
processes prior to making
investment decisions to avoid
high-risk investments.

3

Establish disclosure requirements
for listed companies to report on
ESG risks, including modern slavery,
and actions being taking to address
them. Encourage stock exchanges
to publish guidance on thesereporting requirements.

3

Conduct continuous engagement withinvestee companies to improve theirmodern slavery risk management andconsider the use of collective leverage
to improve company risk performance.

4

Collaborate to ensure sustainability
reporting standards fully address
modern slavery issues.

4

Engage and share good practice withindustry initiatives and collaborations,such as IAST APAC or CCLA’s Find It, Fix
It, Prevent It initiative.

5

Ensure that any national or regional
reporting regime has in place single
reporting deadlines, easily accessible
reports in a centralised repository,
and that the reports produced aremachine-readable.

5

Advocate for and support government
efforts to strengthen legal andregulatory frameworks and resources
for preventing and remediating
modern slavery.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

175

06

IMPORTINGRISKSPOTLIGHTGARMENTS

Spotlight on thegarment sector:
Stitched with slavery
in the seams

Global demand for fast fashion has spurred exponential growthin the garment industry over the last two decades.1 Clothing
production has almost doubled in the past 15 years alone2 andtoday G20 countries are collectively importing US$148 billion
worth of apparel goods and US$13 billion worth of textiles atrisk of being produced by forced labour every year.
Big brands based in wealthy countries increase
profits by producing in lower-income countries withlow wage rates. 3 Garment workers, hidden deep
within these supply chains, face poor or exploitative
working conditions, including poverty wages,
piece-rate pay (that is, pay rate determined by the
number of individual pieces made), forced andunpaid overtime, irregular work, health and safety
risks, and lack of benefits such as maternity leave.4
In their most extreme forms, these exploitative
practices can lead to situations of forced labour anddebt bondage.

What are the risks of modern
slavery in garment supply
chains?
There are risks of modern slavery at each stageof the garment supply chain, from growing andproducing raw materials, to processing these into
inputs, to manufacturing. 5

RAW
MATERIALS176

TEXTILES +INPUTS

Raw materials
Raw materials that feed into textile production
range from synthetic fibres such as polyester andpolyamide, plant fibres including cotton and rubber,manmade cellulosic fibres such as viscose andacetate, and animal fibres such as wool, silk, andleather.6 The production of many of these materials
have been linked to forced labour. Silk cocoon
cultivation, for instance, has been associated withforced labour in Uzbekistan,7 while in Myanmar,
children have experienced forced labour onrubber plantations.8
Cotton production has a long history of slavery,9and continues to be harvested by men, women,
and children working in conditions tantamountto modern slavery. Children are recruited to pickcotton due to the perception that smaller hands
reduce damage to crops.10 Forced labour was used
to produce cotton in Benin, Burkina Faso, China,
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,and Uzbekistan,11 though the circumstances giving
rise to exploitation may vary. In Pakistan, a 2021

MANUFACTURING

survey among cotton farm workers found that 27
per cent indicated that they could not leave workon the farm if they found another job and one-fifth
had seen children below the age of 15 working on
cotton farms during school hours. These cotton
farms relied largely on temporary workers recruited
through third parties and often retained the identity
documents of their workers12 — practices that
increase the vulnerability of workers and likelihoodof modern slavery taking place.13 In some countries,
such as Turkmenistan,14 China,15 and formerly in
Uzbekistan,16 governments have forced their citizens
to work in the production of cotton.

Textiles/inputs
During processing, raw cotton is ginned, spun, andwoven into textiles.17 Fibres sourced from multiple
countries are combined into a singular fabric at
a textile mill,18 complicating efforts to trace theorigins of a finished product. In response to tightturnaround times and reduced profit margins,
suppliers sub-contract their production to homebased workers, often women and girls,19 reducing
brand oversight of their supply chains. Informal
and home-based workers usually lack formal
contracts, making them even more vulnerable
to exploitation.20

Risks of child and forced labour follow the raw
materials into textile production, particularly incountries based in the Asia and the Pacific region.21
Forced labour has been documented in major
exporting countries such as China, where Uyghurs
and other Turkic and Muslim majority groups havebeen forced to work in the production of textiles.22
In Southern India, recruiters offer young women andgirls employment opportunities in spinning mills,
where they are paid a lump sum at the end of theircontract.23 This practice, known as a Sumangali(married woman) scheme, traps women and girls— many who are migrants or from lower castes24— into working until the end of their contract orelse risk losing their accumulated earnings thatare earmarked to become their bride dowries.25
Women and girls working in the spinning mills facerestrictions on their movement, are forced to work
long hours, and are exposed to physical and sexual
abuse.26 Despite awareness-raising on the abuses
under Sumangali schemes, risk of exploitation
continues as recruiters reportedly still market
similar practices to vulnerable migrant workers,
albeit under different names.27

Dhaka, Bangladesh,
April 2020.
Female garment workers
block a road during
a protest to demand
payment of due wages.
Thousands of garment
workers who produce items
for international fashion
brands protested against
unpaid wages, and claimed“they were more afraid of
starving than contracting
the coronavirus.” Volatile
demand coupled withincreasing pressuresfrom factories to meetdeadlines has reportedly
led to an increase in labour
exploitation in the sector.
Photo credit: Munir Uz
Zaman/AFP via Getty Images.

BRANDS +BUYERSGLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

177

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IMPORTINGRISKSPOTLIGHTGARMENTS

Unravelling discrimination and exploitation in the textiles
industry: The perspective of a survivor of bonded labour
Adhi is a young Indian woman who wanted to savemoney for her bride dowry. As both of her parents
had died, Adhi had to rely on herself to fund her
wedding and so she decided to join a working
scheme at a local mill.
She approached an aunt and asked for help to findwork at a local mill and join the scheme. “…I told
my aunt that I wanted to go for some mill workand also help me to join a hostel. She first refused,then later on through a broker for 2000 rupees(approximately US$24) I got a job at the mill at
Vedachanthur,...” she said. Eventually, Adhi began
working in the winding department of a textile
manufacturing mill in Tamil Nadu state. She also
moved into the hostel where the scheme workers
were required to stay. “…The work at the mill
was hard. ... Even though I had difficulties I was
happy that I had people around me, so I joined
the hostel...”Unfortunately, living at the hostel brought its own
challenges. Adhi was forced to work long hours
with little to no sleep. Access to food and water
was also limited. “…In the hostel I experienced lotof problems.

Manufacturing
Following processing, textiles are dispatched to
manufacturing facilities to be made into garments,
where factory workers are exposed to exploitative
working conditions, including excessive hours. In
Myanmar, a 2021 survey found that 51 per cent offactory workers usually worked more than 48 hours
per week.29 Similarly, average hours for apparelworkers in Uganda ranged between 48 to 65 hours
per week. Without set shift times, Ugandan apparelworkers are expected to work long hours to finish
their tasks, leading them to work to fatigue. 30
Vulnerable groups such as women and girls are
particularly at risk of exploitative conditions ingarment manufacturing. Although women andgirls are overrepresented in garment factories
across the globe, they are relegated to lower-paid
and subordinate roles, such as machine operatorsand checkers. Even if their tasks are the same,
women generally receive lower wages than malegarment workers due to perceptions that female
income is “complementary” to income generated
by male breadwinners. 31 In Cambodia, women andgirls make up almost 80 per cent of the garment
workforce; however, they earn 13 per cent less thanmale workers. 32 Similarly, in Croatia, women accountfor 89 per cent of garment workers despite receiving
a significantly lower net wage. 33 In Ethiopia’s rapidly
growing garment sector, workers receive some

178

There was limited food; if you asked for extra
food it was denied. To take a bath there were
five bathrooms, and some days, water would
not come. It was quite difficult. In one room sixof us had to sleep. One of us will be in day shift
or night shift or afternoon shift. … We cannot
sleep properly. If the regular working girls wereon leave, they will come and ask us to work evenwhen we had just finished night shift.”
When scheme workers like Adhi would try topush back on the long working hours, the regular
workers would become abusive. “They willpressure us to do overtime. [They would say] ‘You
are only in the hostel; why can you not do it? What
are you going to do with the scheme money?’ We
used to receive such scolding.”
Adhi’s experience reveals a great deal about
the dynamics of bonded and child labour inspinning mills in Tamil Nadu. In the years since
this experience, Adhi has shared her story to help
inform anti-slavery strategies.28of the lowest wages compared to other garment
exporting countries, in part due to the absence of anational minimum wage for private sector workers. 34
Workers in Ethiopia were found to be earning as
little as 12 cents an hour in addition to experiencing
wage deductions as punishment, verbal abuse, andforced overtime. 35
Migrant workers are also highly vulnerable toexploitation in the garment sector, receiving lower
wages and unfair wage deductions, and facing
precarious working conditions and higher risksof debt bondage, retention of documents, andthreats of violence or deportation. In countries
where migrant workers cannot join or form tradeunions, they face greater risk as employers exploit
their lack of legal protection. 36 In a 2021 survey offactory workers in China, 45 per cent of those who
had migrated from another state in China reported
that they worked more than 60 hours per week,
compared to 31 per cent of those who had not
migrated for work. 37 Exploitative labour practices
such as excessive hours, low wages, discrimination,and physical and verbal abuse have been reported
in garment factories among Bangladeshi migrant
workers in Jordan38 and Syrian refugees in Türkiye. 39
In Malaysia, high recruitment fees, deceptive
recruitment, passport retention, overcrowded living
conditions, and abusive working conditions havebeen reported among Southeast Asian migrant
workers in garment factories.40

Purchasing practices
Under the UN Guiding Principles, all businesses,
including garment businesses, have a responsibility
to avoid and address any adverse human rights
impacts that their activities caused or contributed
to.41 To do so, they must also ensure that thedemands they make to their suppliers are notdriving exploitative practices. However, in practice,brands trying to cater to rapidly changing consumer
preferences often make unrealistic demands of their
suppliers, such as insisting on lower costs and fasterdelivery times. In turn, this pressure incentivises
suppliers to reduce labour costs and increase
working hours, exacerbating the risk of labour
abuses within a supply chain.42 Poor forecasting,late changes to order volumes, and delays inproviding order requirements intensify pressures
faced by suppliers and their workers.43 Since theoutbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, in addition toorder cancellations, suppliers have experienced
more order variability, which further complicatesproduction and operations management.44 Action
by brands to address labour rights and modern
slavery risks must include efforts to ensure that
their purchasing practices are not incentivising
suppliers to exploit workers.

“Sometimes my girls use to help in ourwork. We are a very poor family and haveno other source of income…When the
lockdown was announced, all our orders
were suspended and the supplier blocked
our payment.”
Female apparel worker in India, 202045

How has the pandemic impacted garment workers?
COVID-19 has worsened conditions for garment
workers around the world. At the onset of thepandemic, many international brands shifted
losses onto their suppliers.46 As stores wereforced to close and demand fell, brands began
to cancel orders for products that had alreadybeen manufactured.47 Some suppliers wereforced to close, leading to worker dismissals,
lower pay, and poorer working conditions.48 In
Cambodia, for example, garment factory owners
were unable to pay workers’ entitlements as
many buyers refused to pay for goods that werealready manufactured.49
A study into the impact of COVID-19 on thegarment sectors of Ethiopia, Honduras, India,
and Myanmar found that working and living
conditions had significantly deteriorated during
the pandemic. This included — in addition tojob and income losses — rising debts, verbal
abuse, threats and intimidation, and unfair
wage deductions. Many respondents had notexperienced these conditions prior to thepandemic and, for others who had, the problems
had become more common or severe.50 A failure
to enforce regulations enabled businesses toviolate labour standards with impunity, leaving
garment workers unprotected. 51

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Brands that had previously been accused of
exploitative working conditions, such as Boohoo,
were also found to be putting workers at riskof COVID-19. During the pandemic, there werereports of garment factories linked to Boohoo
operating illegally through lockdowns, forcing
workers to work with a COVID-19 infection, andworking in conditions of modern slavery. 52
The impact of the pandemic on garment workers
varies depending on gender, ethnicity, caste
status, or union membership. A study of garment
workers across supplier factories in Bangladesh,
Cambodia, Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, andPakistan found that wage theft disproportionately
impacted female workers during the pandemic.
For example, suppliers would hire women
workers on low wages during lockdowns and force
them to work unpaid overtime, in addition toverbally, physically, and sexually abusing them on
production lines. Heightened economic insecurity
left many women workers with little option but
to take on large debts or sell assets to afford
basic needs. 53 Additionally, garment workers who
belonged to an ethnic minority or lower caste
were also more likely to have their contracts
terminated during the pandemic. Comparatively,
those least likely to lose their jobs were workers
who belonged to a union. 54

179

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IMPORTINGRISKSPOTLIGHTGARMENTS

How are brands
responding to the riskof modern slavery?
Recent legislative changes establishing mandatory
reporting for large companies in California, 55 theUnited Kingdom, 56 Australia, 57 and the EU, 58 as
well as mandatory due diligence in France59 andGermany,60 have pushed companies, including thosein the garment industry to be more transparent.
Even more recently, legislation has been proposedin the US state of New York to require fashioncompanies to disclose their due diligence policies61
and in the US Senate to require large businesses
to audit for forced labour.62 Today, the biggest
brands are paying greater attention to how they are
producing their goods.63 However, efforts are still
falling short.
In December 2022, Walk Free and WikiRate assessed
97 statements submitted by the top garment
companies and their investors required to reportunder the Modern Slavery Acts of the UK andAustralia. Brands fell short of the requirementsof the legislation and largely failed to address the
specific modern slavery risks associated with thegarment sector. For example, despite increased
scrutiny surrounding the sector because of thepandemic64 and heightened attention to stateimposed forced labour in garment supply chains,65
many companies failed to disclose taking action
to respond to modern slavery risks associatedwith COVID-19 or to restrict sourcing from regions
where the state is involved in the exploitation

Figure 18
Addressing
modern slavery
risk in thegarment sectorof workers. Further, although the complex andtransnational nature of garment supply chainsrequires engagement with workers, suppliers, andother stakeholders within supply chains, and withindustry initiatives, less than half (48 per cent) ofcompanies disclosed engaging with supply chain
workers or groups representing them, while twothirds (67 per cent) mentioned membership or
partnership with industry-specific initiatives that
address modern slavery issues (see Figure 18 forbreakdown of the assessment of statements against
sector-specific metrics).
Twenty-nine per cent of assessed companies
committed to providing a living wage to their supply
chain workers. Factory-level data collected by the
Clean Clothes Campaign revealed that across 59
factories, the living wage gap averages 40 per cent,meaning that on average these workers need to earnalmost 40 per cent more to meet their basic needs.66
Despite this, it is estimated that the price of a final
garment would need to increase by only 1 per centfor all garment workers to earn a living wage.67
Notably, expensive brands do not guarantee
ethically made products. Despite enormous
revenues,68 luxury brands have been found tobe among the poorest performers in terms ofaddressing risks of forced labour within garment
supply chains.69 Data from the Clean Clothes
Campaign also showed that the living wage gap forworkers linked to luxury brands assessed by Walk
Free and WikiRate was significantly higher (53 percent) than for non-luxury brands (38 per cent).70

Supply chain wages

42%

Restricition sourcing regions

31%

Employee dialogue

1

Strengthen existing supply chaintransparency legislation that requires
mandatory reporting and implement
mandatory human rights due diligencelaws. Legislation should require
brands to undertake due diligence,
including identifying supply chain
risks and taking appropriate steps toaddress and mitigate them.

2

Conduct regular labour inspections
to identify exploitative practices in
the garment sector. Protect rights tofreedom of association and collective
bargaining in both legislation and inpractice to help identify and remedy
exploitation and monitor working
conditions, ensuring vulnerable
groups such as migrant workers canaccess these safeguards.

3
4

Ensure the national minimum wage
meets the standards of a living wage.

5

Provide avenues for redress for
exploited workers.

Prevent the import of goods madewith forced labour overseas andprovide support to producing nations
to address forced labour issues.
Embed forced labour provisions withintrade agreements.

48%

Industry collaborations

180

Evaluations housed in the Promising Practices
Database71 can identify what works to end
modern slavery in the garment sector. While
there are relatively few evaluated programs
targeted to the sector — mostly risk-based
prevention programs, almost all of which
incorporated awareness-raising campaigns
and/or preventative education — there is one
worth noting. In 2019, the Freedom Fund’s
hotspot program in Southern India,72 whichtargeted bonded labour in spinning mills andgarment factories,73 evaluated the impact of afilm-based curriculum within the program thatbrought young women and girls together todevelop solutions to issues faced at home andin the spinning mills. It was found to positively
change attitudes around seeking genderequitable employment and safer working
conditions among participants, as well as
improving knowledge on wage entitlements
and increasing confidence to act when facing
situations of bullying or harassment.74 Anotherevaluation of efforts to end labour abusesin Tamil Nadu state found shortcomings inprogram designs that did not involve local civilsociety groups,75 highlighting the significanceof ensuring that responses are holistic andare community-led.

Recommendations
for governments

29%

COVID response

No sector specific disclosure

Promising practices:
Examples fromSouthern India

67%
20%

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

181

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IMPORTINGRISKSPOTLIGHTFISHING

Spotlight on thefishing sector:
Charting progress against
forced labour at sea

In 2015, exposés revealed the exploitation of thousands offishers aboard Thai fishing vessels in Indonesian waters,1which in some cases had been going on for years.2 While not
the first reports of forced labour at sea, nor in Southeast
Asian waters, they catalysed awareness of the pervasivenessof this form of modern slavery in the fishing industry. Since
then, documentaries,3 research,4 and media reports5 havecontinued to highlight the plight of those forced to work at
sea in many parts of the world.
Increased focus on modern slavery at sea has
galvanised political pressure to reform theregulatory environments which allow high-risk
fleets to operate with near impunity.6 It has also
spurred research into innovative methods toimprove monitoring of labour practices at sea
and intensified demand for seafood imports freeof slavery in its supply chains.7 Yet progress onprotecting fishers remains slow and the gains thatwere made initially have since been offset by the
COVID-19 pandemic.8
Forced labour in fisheries is driven by the motivation
to reduce costs amid diminishing profits, as theindustry tries to meet global demand for seafood.9
The overfishing that results serves to push profits
further out of reach of fishing operators andperpetuates a cycle that leaves fishers vulnerable toforced labour. Fishers can be lured into situationsof modern slavery by seemingly legitimate
employment opportunities, but once recruitedfind themselves unable to leave due to threats ofviolence, physical confinement on – and off-shore,
withholding of wages, and debts incurred throughthe recruitment process.10 Confiscating passports
and other identity documents is another means ofkeeping fishers from leaving situations of forced
labour by preventing them from returning homeor finding another job.11 More recently, COVID-19
restrictions have also provided a convenient excuse
for controlling fishers’ movements.

Hainan province, China, August 2020.
Deep sea fishing boats return to harbour to escape Typhoon Higos. There arewidespread reports of forced labour and debt bondage in the deep-sea fishing industry.
Migrant workers – typically men – are particularly vulnerable. Issues with regulations offoreign-flagged vessels leaves these workers with few, if any, protections. Photo credit:
Luo Yunfei/China News Service via Getty Images.

182

Protection of fishers requires regulation by
governments of flag states, which bear primary
responsibility for the conditions in which fishers
work and live aboard fishing vessels flying theirflags.12 Other states that have responsibility are
port states where fishing vessels refuel and offload
their catch and which are authorised to inspect
vessels entering their ports, coastal states whichhave jurisdiction over and licence fishing in theirwaters, labour source states where migrant fishers
are recruited and transit through, and market statesthat import fisheries products.13

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Persistent gaps in legal
protection of fishers
While globally there has been progress to improve
the legal frameworks that protect fishers, coverage
is inadequate. Together, two international legal
instruments provide a comprehensive frameworkfor preventing forced labour in the fishing sector— the ILO Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No.
188) and the ILO Protocol of 2014 to the Forced
Labour Convention, 1930.14 Only 21 countries have
ratified Convention No. 188, which promotes decent
working and living conditions for fishers.15 Of those,
only six are among the top 25 countries responsible
for producing the greatest marine capture andonly two, Spain and Thailand, are among the sevencountries deemed to have high-risk fisheries.16In2018 and 2019, the Thai government ratified
Convention No. 188 and the Protocol 2014 of theForced Labour Convention, 1930,17 becoming
the first Asian government to do so.18 The 2014
Protocol, which requires measures to be taken toprevent forced labour and to identify, protect andprovide remedy for victims has been more widely
ratified, but still by fewer than half of the top 25
countries responsible for producing the greatest
marine capture.19
Gaps in domestic labour laws reduce protections
for fishers. Fifty-five percent of the 176 countries
included in Walk Free’s assessment of government
response do extend labour law protections to all
workers regardless of sector or migration status.
Most notably, labour laws in South Korea and Japan— countries with fisheries at high risk of forced
labour20 — lack protection for all fishers. Specifically,in South Korea, labour laws do not extend to
migrant fishers21 and, in Japan, labour laws do notextend to seafarers.22
Fishers also have limited recourse to freedomof association or collective bargaining rights.
Forty-one per cent of the countries assessed do
not provide these rights for all groups, while themajority of countries deny those rights to migrant
workers, temporary workers, and, in some cases,

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maritime workers specifically. For example, inThailand, where 90 per cent of the fishing workforce
are migrants from Myanmar and Cambodia, 23
migrant workers do not have legal rights to join orform their own unions, a legal gap that advocatesassert has impeded progress on addressing labour
exploitation among migrant fishers.24
Risks of debt bondage and confiscation of passports
and other identity documents are inherent to theindustry and are not adequately addressed innational laws.25 Just over one third of countries
assessed mandate that recruitment fees cannot
be charged to employees and less than a quarter
register and monitor recruitment agencies.
Further, only a quarter of countries prohibit thewithholding of passports in either labour, criminal,
or anti-trafficking laws. Even when laws do
exist, enforcement in distant waters is a difficult
task. Observers who are tasked with collecting
information on fishing practices have minimal
access to some fishing fleets.26 Without adequate
monitoring, vessels using forced labour can operatewith impunity.

Tackling the demand
for seafood with opaque
supply chains
Demand-side levers such as import bans havegained momentum in recent years as ways topressure fishing nations to improve regulation of
the fishing sector and to address human and labour
rights abuses in the industry. The US and Canadiangovernments have attempted to prevent seafood
produced with forced labour from reaching theirmarkets through existing bans on the importationof goods likely mined, manufactured, or producedby forced labour.27 This passes responsibility toimporters to ensure the goods they bring into thecountry are at low risk of being produced withforced labour or else risk financial loss as a resultof the seizure of these goods.28 In the US, Withhold
Release Orders (WROs) prohibit goods producedby forced labour being imported into the country
under Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930.29 In
2021, WROs were used for the first time to ban theimport of goods produced by an entire fishing fleet,
the Chinese company Dalian Ocean Fishing Co,
based on recurring reports of forced labour. 30 As of
September 2022, an additional four fishing vessels
flagged to Fiji, 31 Taiwan, 32 and Vanuatu33 had active
WROs against them. 34 In 2020, Canada introduced
measures to prevent the import of goods produced
wholly or in part by forced labour under the CanadaUnited States-Mexico Agreement Implementation
Act. 35 Similar legislation has been proposed inAustralia36 and the EU. 37 While there is insufficient
data to understand the long-term efficacy of importbans in stopping forced labour in supply chains,there is some evidence of short-term improvements
in corporate behaviour. 38

184

Recent measures aimed at tackling the demandfor illegal fishing also have potential benefits forhuman rights at sea, since illegal, unregulated,
and unreported (IUU) fishing is associated withforced labour at sea. 39 For example, reforms by
the Thai government introduced in 2018 and2019 in response to the European Commission’s
2015 “yellow card,” a warning that without
improved regulations to address IUU fishing, Thai
seafood exports were at risk of European Union
sanctions.40 Reforms included measures to increasetransparency of vessel identity, ownership, andfishing behaviours, and the introduction of asystem to authorise and inspect vessels enteringand leaving Thai ports.41 These were among thechanges that led to the removal of the yellow
card against Thailand in January 2019.42 Reports
indicated that some of the measures improved
the working conditions of fishers;43 however, theThai government subsequently faced criticism
for poor implementation of these reforms.44 Also
endeavouring to reduce IUU fishing, World Trade
Organization members in 2022 finalised theAgreement on Fisheries Subsidies, which prohibits
subsidies to a vessel or operator engaged in IUUfishing.45 The agreement will take effect and become
binding once it is formally accepted by two-thirds of
WTO members 46 and complaints are subject to the
WTO dispute settlement process.47
Governments have also sought to stop the
introduction of goods produced by modern slavery
from entering their jurisdictions through legislationthat encourages the private sector to identify andreduce modern slavery risks in their supply chainsand operations and provide remedy where modern
slavery is detected. Since 2015, 10 governments
have enacted modern slavery legislation48 andan additional seven governments as well as theEuropean Union are considering such legislation.49“We met the captain, the ship boss, and theforeman. The boss of the ship wanted toissue a ticket: ‘If you don’t sign it, then you
will be homeless here. So, you’re trappedin Peru!’ Finally, there was no more choice,even though I was sick. Due to lack of cleanwater, my kidneys were sick ... so okay, it’sokay ... I finally signed. ‘If you don’t signthen you won’t be taken home,’ they said.”
Indonesian migrant fisher on experiencesof intimidation at sea, 202050

COVID-19: A convenient crisis. A fisherman’s story.
Angelo*, from a fishing community in thenorthern part of the Philippines, was encouragedby his family when he was in his 20s to take a job
as a fisher in the Taiwanese fishing industry tosupplement his family’s income. As is common
among Filipinos looking to work abroad in thefishing industry, Angelo engaged a recruitment
agency. Based in Manila, the recruitment agency
made all necessary arrangements for Angelo,
including sending his monthly salary to his family
in the Philippines on his behalf. Angelo did notsign a contract but was told he would earn morethan what he was earning as a local fisherman
at home. Angelo was employed on Taiwanese
vessels for several years and was satisfied withthe work. However, without a contract he did notknow how long he would be aboard a vessel andsometimes spent more than a year at sea.
In 2018, Angelo, who at the time was in his late30s, was working on a Taiwanese flagged fishingvessel with a Taiwanese captain and crew fromthe Philippines, Taiwan, and Bangladesh. The
living and working conditions were poor andtheir salaries were often delayed. Availability offood and water was restricted by the captain andthe Taiwanese crew, and they were made to workwith little rest. They did not complain due to fearof not being paid.
In 2019, Angelo was informed by his family thatthey had not received any income from therecruitment agency for three months.

COVID-19 turning back theclock on transparency andprotection at sea
Restrictions to curb the spread of COVID-19 reduced
oversight of working conditions aboard fishingvessels and increased opportunities for fishers
to be exploited. Pandemic travel restrictions
interrupted the rotation of crew at the beginningand end of their contracts. 51 As a result, somevessels were not allowed to dock, which in turn
prevented fishers from leaving these vessels andreturning home. 52 The inability to change crews led
to extended periods on board, sometimes beyond
contract end dates, putting fishers at increased
risk of forced labour. 53 Towards the end of 2020,
some 400,000 seafarers (those involved in fishingand shipping) were reportedly stranded at sea. 54
Because of the pandemic, 55 several regional fisheries
management organisations halted the requirement
for independent observers to be onboard vessels intheir areas of competence. 56 While the purpose wasto overcome labour shortages and reduce personnel

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

The company that operated the vessel told
Angelo and his fellow crew that their pay would
be delayed because it was used to fund repairs toequipment aboard the fishing vessel. They werealso told that the ship had to wait in international
waters, on the boundary of Chinese waters,
until the condition of the vessel was verified by ashipping agent from China. Angelo and the crew
remained stranded without pay in international
waters for five months, during which time the
COVID-19 pandemic was declared. Despite therepatriation of other crew members, Angelo
and eight other Filipino crew were refused
repatriation by the company that owned thevessel and made to stay on the vessel to guard
the ship under the command of the Taiwanesecaptain. Angelo and the Filipino crew continued
to make requests for repatriation to the captainof the vessel and were told that COVID-19
restrictions prevented this.
After several pleas from Angelo via social media,
welfare organisations and faith leaders basedin the Philippines called on the government of
the Philippines to intervene. In April 2020, afternine months aboard the fishing vessel without
pay, the Chinese authorities facilitated therepatriation of the crew with costs paid by thePhilippines government. Angelo never received
the salary owed to him. Following repatriation,
he was informed that the recruitment agency was
unregistered and had illegally recruited him.
*Not his real nameon vessels, it also obscured labour practices,limiting opportunities for exploited fishers to be
identified and removed from such situations. 57
While the pandemic saw an increased risk of
exploitation, research points towards technologicalinnovations to help address the lack of oversight.
Improved vessel monitoring and open-source vessel
tracking data can aid observers in maintaining
oversight of fishing and labour practices at sea
by identifying “risky” behaviour by vessels. Suchinformation can inform enforcement activities
and allow targeting of vessels with identified risky
behaviour. 58 Automatic Identification Systems(AIS) and Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS) are two
approaches that use satellite tracking to monitor
fishing vessels and their activities while at sea. 59
Despite their advantages, VMS and AIS are notused systematically, even by vessels equipped withremote monitoring capabilities.60 Remote electronicmonitoring, such as through the use of onboard
cameras, also has the potential to help address theimpact of observer shortages as well as reduce thecosts associated with monitoring fishing practices
and improve observer safety.61

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Thailand, 2018.
Thailand is a top 5 global
seafood producer, with
exports reaping over
US$7 billion. But the
profitable industry supplying
consumers around the world
with cheap seafood comesat a high cost to both theenvironment and to workers.
The overwhelming majority ofworkers in Thailand’s fishingand seafood processing
industries are migrants
from Myanmar, Laos andCambodia. Labour brokers
recruit from vulnerable
communities, promisingfavourable employment in theconstruction, manufacturing,or agriculture industries.
Migrants often incur debt
from their recruitment,
fees and costs associatedwith transportation andsecuring employment inThailand. These debts arepaid off through deductions
from workers’ earnings
with employers and brokers
frequently using debt
manipulation to inflate theamounts and force people
into bonded labour. Photo
credit: Freedom Fund.

186

Tech helping to narrow the search
In 2021, Walk Free and Minderoo Foundation’s
Flourishing Oceans initiative supported Global
Fishing Watch in the development of a modelthat would help reveal the extent of forced
labour onboard fishing vessels at sea. Building
on recent research that employed a machinelearning approach to identify high-risk vessels,62
Global Fishing Watch researchers trained a model
to associate certain behavioural patterns offishing vessels at sea with a higher risk of forced
labour. To do this, they created a comprehensive
database of 358 known instances of forced labourat sea between 2012 and 2020. However, only
about 80 of these cases could be matched to AIS
data — either because most offenders did notaccurately broadcast AIS or, in some cases, they
intentionally turned off their AIS equipment.

Despite this, the model was able to identify
several vessel characteristics that were
important in predicting risk of forced labour,
including average voyage time, number ofvoyages, maximum distance the vessel operated
from shore, and number of foreign port visits.
Through this, more than 3,000 vessels —including longliners, squid jiggers, and trawlers —were identified as potential offenders associatedwith high risk of forced labour. Additionally,
approximately 66,000 individuals, representing
30 per cent of all crew, were estimated to haveworked onboard these vessels in 2020. However,
the inability to match known instances of forced
labour to the AIS data suggests that this may be
a considerable underestimation of the scale ofthe problem.

Recommendations for Governments:
Recommendations
for governments

1

All governments must improve thepublication and sharing of information
on vessels with a history of humanrights abuses, including identifying
information, vessel behaviours, anddetails of human rights abuses. This
includes developing, supporting,and implementing remote electronicmonitoring programs while ensuringcrew privacy is protected.63

Given the different types of state jurisdiction
under international maritime law, thegovernments of the following states should:

2

3Flag states: Ratify and domesticate
the ILO Protocol of 2014 to the Forced
Labour Convention, 1930 and the ILOWork in Fishing Convention, 2007
(No. 188), and ensure labour laws
extend to migrant workers, temporary
workers, and maritime workers. Theselaws must criminalise withholding ofpassports and other identity documents
and guarantee workers full rights tofreedom of association and collective
bargaining regardless of nationality.
Source states: Address the factors thatmake fishers vulnerable to modern
slavery before they leave their countryof origin. This includes registering andmonitoring recruitment agencies andestablishing and implementing laws toensure workers do not pay fees or are
not charged for services provided byrecruitment agencies.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

4

Coastal states: Use their leverage
to protect fishers in their waters bymonitoring vessels operating underflags of convenience and refusing
access to vessels where forced
labour has occurred. Require remote
electronic monitoring, such as AIS, tobe consistently used to access fishinglicences.

5Port states: Ratify and domesticate theILO Work in Fishing Convention, 2007
(No. 188). Ensure that port authorities
are adequately resourced and trained to
conduct inspections of vessels to assess
the working and living conditions offishers and identify indicators of forced
labour. This must include survivor
support services and enforcement ofrelevant laws to ensure perpetrators offorced labour are held to account.

6

Market states: Implement measures
to address the demand for seafoodcaught with modern slavery. This
includes strengthening existing modern
slavery mandatory reporting laws or,preferably, introducing mandatory
human rights due diligence legislation.
These laws should require action to
be taken by businesses to prevent,mitigate, or remediate modern slavery
and have financial penalties, including
civil liability for non-compliance.
Additionally, governments should
implement import bans of goods where
there is a reasonable belief that theseare made with forced labour.

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COCOA

Spotlight on thecocoa sector:
Chocolate’s hidden ingredient

Chocolate is a vastly popular treat all over the world, yetmany consumers do not know that forced or child labour may
have been used to produce it.1 The farming and harvestingof cocoa beans are particularly vulnerable to forced labour,
trafficking, and the worst forms of child labour.2
Nearly two-thirds of the world’s cocoa originatesfrom West Africa, primarily from Côte d’Ivoire (44per cent) and Ghana (16 per cent). 3 Despite thesteep profits made by chocolate companies, cocoa
farmers earn significantly below a living income.
For example, in 2021 the largest company in thecocoa sector, Nestlé, reported annual gross profits
of approximately US$18 billion.4 In comparison, theaverage daily income of cocoa farmers is reportedly
only the equivalent of US$1.42 in Ghana and US$1.23
in Côte d’Ivoire. 5 Farmers earn just 6 per cent of theretail price of a standard milk chocolate bar while
chocolate manufacturers earn 33 per cent.6
In a 2018 study funded by the Chocolonely
Foundation, Walk Free estimated that 3.3 in every
thousand adult cocoa workers in Ghana had
experienced forced labour, while in Côte d’Ivoire thefigure is 4.2 in every thousand workers in medium
and high cocoa production areas. Children werealso at risk of forced labour; approximately 16,000
children across the two countries had been forced
to work and were typically coerced by someone intheir family.7 Parents and adult family members,
including siblings, aunts, uncles, and grandparents,
are commonly found to be responsible8 due
to widespread poverty and limited alternative
opportunities to earn income. Other reports
indicate that children and migrants from Burkina
Faso and Mali are trafficked for the purposes oflabour exploitation within the Ivorian and Ghanaian
cocoa sector.9188

Modern slavery is driven by widespread poverty
within cocoa-growing communities, together withhighly variable cocoa prices, barriers to education,10
small profit margins for farmers,11 and the limited
bargaining power of farmers to insulate against
price shocks.12 These structural inequalities leadcocoa-farming operations to recruit vulnerable
workers, including their own children and migrants— and sometimes through forced labour, trafficking,or debt bondage13 — in order to meet demand,14
improve profitability, and earn a living income.
Meanwhile, major companies reap the benefitsof the expanding chocolate industry, which is
expected to be worth US$200.4 billion by 2028.15
In fact, as the industry grows, risks of exploitation
increase. Over the last decade, a 62 per cent rise incocoa production in Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana wasaccompanied by a 13 per cent rise in hazardous childlabour,16 with children aged 10 to 17 years involvedin land clearing, lifting heavy loads, using agrochemicals and sharp tools, and working long hours
and at night.17
COVID-19 increased the risk of modern slavery
and left workers with even fewer protections.
Vulnerability to modern slavery increased in thecocoa sector due to pandemic-related supply chaininterruptions, price fluctuations, and unstabledemand — in addition to increased food insecurity,18
rising poverty,19 and greater barriers to education.20
For example, school closures, limited government
assistance, and decreased parental incomes21
exposed more vulnerable Ghanaian children to
hazardous work.22 In Côte d’Ivoire, one study founda 21 per cent increase in hazardous child labour on
cocoa farms during a partial lockdown in 2020.23

Commitments, action,and inaction
Efforts to reduce exploitation in the West Africancocoa sector have focused almost exclusively onchild labour. Since the 2001 Harkin-Engel Protocol, 24
a public-private partnership developed with
United States federal legislators to eliminate theworst forms of child labour in the cocoa industry, 25
several cocoa buyers have made commitments
to end the exploitation of children. Eight of theindustry’s major players26 signed the Protocol
and pledged to eliminate the worst forms of childlabour from their cocoa growing operations.27 Yet,in the two decades since the Protocol was adopted,
exploitation remains common, with more than 1.5
million children engaged in child labour in cocoa
productions in Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.28
Some efforts have been made to monitor, identify,
and provide remedy for children exposed to childlabour. For example, the Child Labour Monitoring
and Remediation Systems (CLMRS), first developed
by Nestlé in partnership with the International
Cocoa Initiative, 29 provides a structured approachto address and remediate child labour in Côte
d’Ivoire and Ghana. 30 The CLMRS model is basedon the proactive identification, record-keeping,engagement, and remediation with children
vulnerable to hazardous work and their families.
The work is delivered via specialised Community
Liaison Officers, who maintain regular contact withvulnerable children, families, and communities as

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

needed. 31 When implemented correctly, CLMRS
highlights how companies can work together with
communities to identify, remediate, and in turn
reduce child labour risks. However, the model has
faced criticisms of ineffectiveness, poor coverage, 32
and untimely remediation. 33 Increased resources,
collaboration, and funding are required tostrengthen and expand current systems.
Other company actions to reduce risk include thecreation of internal certification schemes. However,these schemes have also attracted criticism due
to a lack of action and transparency on how thestandards are implemented. 34 Certification schemes
developed by independent sustainability labels,
such as Fairtrade and the Rainforest Alliance, andthose developed by regional bodies, including the
ISO/CEN 34101 and ARSO/SRS 1001 standards, 35
have also faced issues. In 2021, 39 per cent ofFairtrade-certified cocoa farmers in Cote d’Ivoire
were living in extreme poverty, while only 15
per cent of Fairtrade-certified farmers earned aliving income. 36 Despite increases to Fairtrade
minimum prices for cocoa in 2019, current prices
paid for cocoa do not meet their own Living Income
Reference Prices, which were established toquantify the gap between sustainable and market
prices. 37 Clearly, unless they are coupled with otherinterventions addressing the core issue of poverty
through paying more for cocoa and strengthening
CLMRS, certification schemes alone will not addresslabour exploitation in the cocoa sector.

Accra, Ghana,June 2019.
A worker removes the husk fromroasted cocoa beans, as partof the chocolate production
process. Cocoa farming is asignificant source of income
for families in Ghana and Côte
d’Ivoire, yet despite the massive
profits made by chocolatecompanies, farmers earn
little income and often require
their children to skip schoolin favour of going to work, inorder to survive. Photo credit:
Cristina Aldehuela/AFP via
Getty Images.

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COCOA

Big chocolate company disclosures
under the Modern Slavery Acts
An analysis of statements produced by cocoa
companies required to report under the United
Kingdom and Australian Modern Slavery Acts
(MSAs) highlights the limited actions taken
to address forced labour and exploitationin the industry. In February 2023, Walk Free
and WikiRate assessed the modern slavery
statements of 39 companies against a seriesof metrics38 derived from the MSAs and theiraccompanying guidance. 39
Perhaps most surprisingly, almost two-thirds ofthe cocoa companies did not include any sectorspecific disclosures within their statements,
despite including well-documented modern
slavery risks within the sector such as addressing
and monitoring child labour and supply chain
wages. Not a single company disclosed a modern
slavery policy applied beyond their immediate
suppliers (tier 1), despite modern slavery risks
increasing in deeper tiers. Further, despite thehigh risk of forced labour and the worst forms ofchild labour in the sector, only seven companies
identified an incident of modern slavery intheir cocoa-specific supply chain. Rather
than indicating that the industry is low risk,these findings point to severe lack of industry
transparency and reveal that the majority ofcompanies are failing to conduct due diligence.

Consumers, human rights groups, and survivors
have attempted to hold chocolate companies toaccount through legal action. Separate lawsuits
against major chocolate companies 41 concerning
exploitation in the cocoa sector in the US, underthe Alien Tort Statute,42 the Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act,43 and consumer
protection laws in the state of Massachusetts,44
have had limited success to date. These cases
have been dismissed due to the extraterritorial
nature of the conduct45 and for failing to show a
traceable connection between the companies
and the cocoa workers.46 However, a new classaction against Nestlé USA alleging a breach ofa Californian law,47 for deceiving consumers
through sustainable and certification labels, isproceeding to trial.48 Actions by source country
governments have also had some limited impact,

The companies were also assessed against five
metrics that were specific to the cocoa industry.40
Of these, the most commonly met was thedisclosure of collaborative efforts, partnerships,
or support for initiatives such as the International
Cocoa Initiative and the World Cocoa Foundation.
Over half of company statements included thistype of disclosure. Only 33 per cent of companies
included disclosure of supply chain wages,
although for most this did not go further thanreferencing pledges to increasing farmer andworker incomes, rather than citing a commitment
and action plan for implementing living wages
throughout supply chains. Only one company
disclosed that they had a CLMRS that covered
all their cocoa suppliers, although five others
described that they were planning to expand
their current CLMRS to cover all cocoa suppliersby 2025. Despite increased modern slavery risks
in the cocoa sector associated with COVID-19,
only two companies reported having provided
pandemic-related support to their suppliers
or workers.

Tony’s Chocolonely has a mission to make all
chocolate slavery-free. The Netherlands-based
company advocates for chocolate companies
to take full responsibility for their supply chainsby observing the company’s Five Sourcing
Principles, 55 which include: comprehensively
tracing the production of cocoa beans;paying a higher price through premiums thatenable a living income; strengthening farming
cooperatives; improving the quality of cocoa
beans and productivity through promoting
sustainable farming practices; and making along-term commitment to sales at a higher priceto reduce demand shocks. 56 Transparency is a
key part of the company’s ethos, as evidenced
through its annual FAIR report, which details its
policies and their impact, along with gaps andtrends, and identifies cases of modern slavery
within its supply chain. 57 This commitment totransparency, despite attracting some criticism, 58
is crucial to raising awareness and to evaluating

the effectiveness of the company’s theoryof change. 59
Awareness-raising efforts begin at the pointof sale through the design of the chocolate
bars,60 through Tony’s “Serious Friends” peerambassador network,61 and through purposedriven campaigns such as the “Sweet Solutions”
campaign launched in 2021,62 which involved
the creation of four chocolate bars resemblingiconic products but made using Tony’s sourcing
principles. The campaign reached 32 million
people, more than doubled the number ofsignatories on a petition demanding due
diligence legislation and led to almost 15,000
new “ambassadors” joining the fight to makechocolate slavery-free.63 Tony’s decision tosource cocoa from the West Africa, instead of
avoiding this sector all together, demonstrates tothe wider industry that sustainable sourcing andtraceability is possible.

Recommendations
for governments
but not without a struggle. For example, in 2020,
the governments of Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire
instituted the Living Income Differential (LID), which
required chocolate makers to pay an extra US$400
per tonne of cocoa, in addition to the farm gate
price.49 However, companies avoided paying thepremium by negotiating with other cocoa-producing
governments50 and thereby diversifying their cocoa
sources, 51 which resulted in decreased demand,
oversupply, and reduced earnings for farmers. 52
Fortunately, following negotiations between buyers,
cocoa regulators, and the Côte d’Ivoire Ghana
Cocoa Initiative, 12 major cocoa buyers formallyagreed to pay the LID and set a price floor in July
2022. 53 However, it remains yet to be seen if thiscommitment is being implemented.

“I admit that it is a kind of slavery…
They are still kids and they have the rightto be educated today. But they bring themhere to work, and it’s the boss who takes
the money.”
Ivorian farmer on unaccompanied children from Burkina
Faso who come to work on cocoa farms.54

190

Confectionery with a conscience: Tony’s Chocolonely

In cocoa-producing nations:

In cocoa-consuming nations:

1

Collaborate to raise farm gate
prices and develop national
traceability schemes.64

12Commit to improve regional supply
management to protect workers
from price fluctuations, with morecomprehensive regional coordinationand strategies that target oversupply
and enable sustainable domestic andinternational prices.

Strengthen existing MSAs andintroduce mandatory human rights
due diligence to mandate stronger
due diligence, transparency, andaccountability mechanisms acrossentire supply chains. Voluntary
codes and reporting alone will notprevent or address exploitation in
the cocoa sector.

2

Fund independent research thathighlights good practice andleading industry examples to trackprogress, address root causes,
and identify effective remedy anddetection mechanisms.

3

Strengthen partnerships andagreements with both cocoaproducing and other cocoaconsuming countries that
hold international companies
accountable and ensure good
governance is upheld.

3
4

Increase support for cocoa workers
and establish farmer-controlled
cooperatives that enhance theirbargaining power and foster acompetitive domestic sector.
Undertake greater policy reform insocial and safety protections, such as
employment insurance and increased
investment in cocoa agriculture,
education, and healthcare.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Terminology......................................... 194
Appendix 2: Methodology behind the
Global Slavery Index............................................... 196
Appendix 3: Methodology for identifying thehighest value products at risk of forced labour
imported by the G20................................................ 254

Tehran, Iran,
September 2022.
Nasibe Samsaei, an Iranian woman living in Turkey, cuts her ponytail off
during a protest outside the Iranian consulate in Istanbul following the deathof Jina (Mahsa) Amini, a Kurdish-Iranian woman arrested by the country’s
morality police responsible for enforcing the strict dress code for women.
Higher rates of gender inequality have been linked to higher prevalence ofmodern slavery. Photo credit: Yasin Akgul/AFP via Getty Images.

192

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1:
Terminology

TEXT HERETERMINOLOGY

In the context of this report, modern slavery covers a set of
specific legal concepts including forced labour, debt bondage,
forced marriage, other slavery and slavery-like practices, andhuman trafficking.

Although modern slavery is not defined in law, it
is used as an umbrella term that focuses attention
on commonalities across these legal concepts.
Essentially, it refers to situations of exploitation thata person cannot refuse or leave because of threats,
violence, coercion, deception, and/or abuse of
power. For example, their identity documents might
be taken away if they are in a foreign country, they
may experience threats or actual violence, or theirfamily might be threatened.
Countries use varying terminology to describe
modern slavery, including the term slavery itself, as
well as other concepts such as human trafficking,forced labour, debt bondage, forced or servile
marriage, and the sale or exploitation of children.
These terms are defined in various international
agreements and treaties, which many countries
have voluntarily signed onto and ratified intolaw. The following are the key definitions most
governments have agreed to, thereby committing toprohibit through their national laws and policies:

Human trafficking
Human trafficking is defined in the UN Trafficking in
Persons Protocol as involving three steps.
1. Recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring,or receipt of persons;
2. by means of threat or use of force or otherforms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of
deception, of the abuse of power or of a positionof vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of aperson having control over another person;
3. with the intent of exploiting that person through:prostitution of others, sexual exploitation, forced
labour, slavery (or similar practices), servitude,
and removal of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer,harbouring, or receipt of a child for the purposeof exploitation shall be considered “trafficking inpersons” even if this does not involve threat, use offorce, or coercion.

Forced labour
Forced labour is defined in the International Labour
Organization Forced Labour Convention, 1930
(No.29) as “all work or service which is exacted fromany person under the menace of any penalty andfor which the said person has not offered himself
voluntarily.” The ILO conventions C29 and C105
list precise exceptions under which labour can be
imposed by state authorities.

194

State-imposed forced labour

Forced marriage

State-imposed forced labour refers to forced labour
imposed by state authorities, including involuntarylabour exacted by government officials, as means of:a. political coercion, education, or as a punishment
for expressing political views;

Forced marriage refers to situations where aperson has been forced to marry without giving
their consent. A forced marriage might occur underphysical, emotional, or financial duress as a resultof deception by family members, the spouse, orothers, or by the use of force or threats or severepressure. These marriages are prohibited by several
international conventions, including those thatprohibit slavery and slavery-like practices, including
servile marriage.

b. punishment for participating in
non-violent strikes;
c. mobilising labour for the purpose of economic
development;
d. enforcing labour discipline; or
e. discrimination based on race, social status,
nationality, or religion.
While some circumstances may justify a state’s
ability to impose compulsory work on citizens for
specific tasks — for example, to perform civic or
military obligations or to enforce penal sanctions —the scope of this ability is limited by conditions set ininternational conventions such as ILO Forced Labour
Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and ILO Abolition ofForced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105). Imposing
compulsory labour outside of these limitations
may result in an activity being regarded as stateimposed forced labour.

Forced commercial sexual exploitation
Forced commercial sexual exploitation refers
to forced labour imposed by private agents forcommercial sexual exploitation and all formsof commercial sexual exploitation of children,
including the use, procuring, or offering of children
for the production of child sexual abuse material.

Slavery and slavery-like practices
Slavery is defined in the 1956 Slavery Convention as
the status or condition of a person over whom any or
all of the powers attaching to the right of ownershipare exercised. In a later treaty, states agreed that
there are also certain “slavery-like practices”:
debt bondage, forced or servile marriage, sale or
exploitation of children (including in armed conflict),and descent-based slavery.

Debt bondage
Debt bondage is a status or condition where one
person has pledged their labour or service (or thatof someone under their control) in circumstanceswhere the fair value of that labour or service is notreasonably applied to reducing the debt or length ofdebt, or the length and nature of the service is not
limited or defined.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

As set out in the joint general recommendationof the UN’s Committee on the Elimination ofDiscrimination against Women (CEDAW) and theCommittee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), childmarriage – where at least one of the parties is under
18 years of age – is considered a form of forced
marriage, given that one and/or both parties cannot
express full, free, and informed consent due to theirage. However, in many countries 16 and 17-year-olds
who wish to marry are legally able to do so following
a judicial ruling or parental consent.
For the current estimates, the measurement offorced marriage is limited to marriages of both
adults and children that respondents to the survey
reported as having been forced without consent. As
a result, the estimates do not include every instanceof child marriage.

Worst forms of child labour
Drawing on the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour
Convention, 1999 (No. 182), the term “worst forms ofchild labour” for the purpose of these estimates iscomprised of:  
a. all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery,such as the sale and trafficking of children, debt
bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory
labour, including forced or compulsory
recruitment of children for use in armed conflict;b. the use, procuring or offering of a child forprostitution, for the production of pornography,
or for pornographic performances;c. the use, procuring or offering of a child for illicit
activities, in particular for the production andtrafficking of drugs as defined in the relevantinternational treaties.

195

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APPENDIX 2
1

TEXT HEREMETHODOLOGYAPPENDIX 2:

Methodology behind the
Global Slavery Index
The Global Slavery Index was designed to shed light on theextent of modern slavery and level of vulnerability to modern
slavery for 160 countries, as well as the actions taken by
176 governments to address these crimes and human rights
violations. The methodology that enables these assessments
is described in detail in three parts:
1. Part A – Estimating prevalence.
2. Part B – Measuring vulnerability.
3. Part C – Assessing government action.

APPENDIX 2:
Part A: Estimating prevalence

The regional estimates presented in the 2021 Global
Estimates of Modern Slavery (Global Estimates)
produced by the International Labour Organization(ILO), Walk Free, and the International Organization
for Migration (IOM) are used by Walk Free as thestarting point for our independently produced
national level estimates, which are presented in the2023 Global Slavery Index (GSI).
This section summarises the methods used
to produce the global and regional estimatespresented in the 2021 Global Estimates and details
the process to get from the regional estimates tonational prevalence estimates. A detailed account of
the methodology of the 2021 Global Estimates canbe found in the Global Estimates of Modern Slavery
report on the Walk Free website.

Global Estimates of Modern Slavery
München, Germany,
January 2019.
A woman co-defendant in
the case of human trafficking
hides behind a file in acourtroom of the district
court before the trial begins.
She allegedly helped a manforce another woman into
sex work, after luring her
with promises of marriage
and tricking her into a sexual
relationship. Photo credit:
Matthias Balk/picture alliance
via Getty Images.

The 2021 Global Estimates were comprised of two
sub-estimates: an estimate of forced labour andan estimate of forced marriage. The sub-estimateof forced labour was then further broken down
into three categories: forced labour in the private
economy, forced commercial sexual exploitation,and state-imposed forced labour.
As no single source provides data that is suitable forthe measurement of all forms of modern slavery, acombined methodological approach was adopted
for the 2021 GEMS, drawing on three sources of data
to calculate the sub-estimates:
1/

Nationally
representative surveys
The estimates of forced labour in the private
economy (excluding the sex industry) andforced marriage are derived from 68 nationally
representative surveys on forced labour andforced marriage jointly conducted by ILO and
Walk Free, and implemented through the Gallup
World Poll.1 During the 2017-2021 period, a
total of 77,914 respondents aged 15 years andover were interviewed either face-to-face orby telephone across the 68 survey countries.
Surveys also collected information on forced
labour and forced marriage among immediate

196

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

family members (spouse, biological parents,
children, and biological siblings) of respondents
who were alive at the time of interview. As aresult, the full network sample (respondents andtheir family network) was 628,598 persons andincluded children below 15 years of age as wellas individuals 15 years old and over. Only casesof modern slavery that occurred between 2017and 2021 were included in these estimates, andall situations of forced labour were counted in
the country where the exploitation took place. In
the five-year reference period for the estimates,
while surveys were conducted in 68 countries,men, women, and children were reported
to have been exploited in 129 countries (seeFigure 20).
The estimates of forced marriage also draw onnational telephone surveys on forced marriage
conducted in four countries in the Arab States
region: Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United
Arab Emirates.2 During 2021, Arabic speaking
residents aged 18 and over were recruited via
random digit dialling with quotas based on themost recent national census used to achieve
an approximately representative sample of
2,000 respondents per country. Respondents
were asked about their own experiences offorced marriage and those of their immediatefamily members. The inclusion of these surveys
brought the total network sample for forced
marriage to 109,798 persons.
Estimates for countries in which national surveys
were not conducted were produced through an
imputation model. 3 A weighted linear model on
the prevalence rate of forced labour included
geographic variables and a variable on thenumber of international migrant workers in the
country as covariates. For forced marriage, theweighted linear model consisted of geographic
variables only. Because no national surveys
were available for the North America region,that region was assimilated with the Northern,Southern, and Western Europe region.

197

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APPENDIX 2
1

2/ Counter Trafficking Data
Collaborative (CTDC) dataset

Figure 19
Typology of Modern Slavery

MODERN SLAVERYMETHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART AFORCED LABOUR

Privately-imposed
forced labour

FORCED MARRIAGEState-imposed
forced labour

Forced labour
exploitation

Administrative data from IOM’s CTDC dataset4
was used in combination with the 68 survey
datasets to estimate forced commercial sexual
exploitation of adults and commercial sexual
exploitation of children. The CTDC dataset
comprises cases of trafficking for both sexualand forced labour exploitation and includes
information on the profile of the survivors ofhuman trafficking (e.g., age, gender, citizenship,country of birth) and on the trafficking
situation (e.g., country of exploitation, type of
exploitation, industry of exploitation, meansof control). Statistical models were used toestimate the odds ratios of forced commercial
sexual exploitation relative to forced labour
exploitation separately for adults and children
by gender using the CTDC database. These odds
ratios were applied to the corresponding global
estimates of forced labour exploitation of adults
and children derived from the national surveys.

Forced commercial
sexual exploitation

Figure 20
Countries of exploitation identified from the countries surveyed

3/ Comments from the ILO
Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions andRecommendations relating tostate-imposed forced labour, andother secondary sources
Because the surveys focused on the noninstitutionalised population, meaning thatpeople in prisons, labour camps or militaryfacilities and other institutional settings are notsampled, they are not suitable for estimatingstate-imposed forced labour. Instead, theestimate of state-imposed forced labour wasderived from validated secondary sources anda systematic review of comments from the ILO
Committee of Experts on the Application ofConventions and Recommendations relating tostate-imposed forced labour.
The estimates are calculated as stock estimates;that is, the average number of persons inmodern slavery at a given point in time during
the 2017 to 2021 reference period. The stock
estimate is calculated by multiplying the total
flow by the average duration ( the amount oftime in which people were trapped in forced
labour) of a spell of modern slavery.

Variable

Description

FL/FM

Age

Age (years) of primary respondent

FL & FM

wp12

Residents 15+ in Household

wp14

Urban/Rural

FL & FMwp1219GenderFL & FM

wp3117

Education Level

FL & FM

wp1223

Marital Status

FL & FM

emp_2010

Employment Status

FL & FM

wp16

Life TodayFL

wp2319Feelings About Household Income

FL

wp40
wp23

Not Enough Money for Food
Health Problems

FL

Table 25
Individual-level
predictors ofmodern slavery

FL & FMFL

Surveyed countries
Countries identified by people surveyed elsewhere
Countries not surveyed

198

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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APPENDIX 2
1

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART A

From global and regional tonational estimates
The national estimates presented in this GSI were
calculated using individual and country-level risk
factors of modern slavery. A risk model was used togenerate average predicted probabilities of modern
slavery by country. The regional totals in the 2021
Global Estimates were then apportioned based oneach country’s average predicted probability ofmodern slavery. This process involved the following
key steps:

1/ Validating individual-level risk
factors of modern slavery andpredicting modern slavery at theindividual-level
During the development of the 2018 GSI
risk model to estimate the risk of modern
slavery, a set of individual-level risk factors
for forced labour and forced marriage wereidentified using national surveys that included
questions on experiences of forced labour andforced marriage. This included using a seriesof statistical tests to identify relationships
between instances of victimisation and othervariables collected in the Gallup World Poll. 5 In
developing the 2023 GSI vulnerability model,
the relationship between these individual-levelrisk factors and modern slavery was assessed.
The individual-level risk factors are presented
in Table 25. Tests confirmed the variables
identified in 2018 remained significantly
associated with forced labour and/or forced
marriage and were therefore retained as
variables in the 2023 risk model. Individual-levelrisk factors included age, gender, marital status,
education level, urban/rural, employment,
life evaluation, health, and ability to live on
current income.

Multi-level models
Multilevel models (MLM) were fitted to the data
to enhance the predictions of the individuallevel models and account for the hierarchicalnature of these data. MLMs allow for the
extrapolation of model results beyond thesample of 68 countries. Model coefficients were
estimated using Bayesian hierarchical linear
models with random intercepts, with weakly
informative normal priors (mean = 0, SD = 2.5).
Model coefficients were calculated separately forforced labour and forced marriage which wereset as outcome variables. Model coefficientswere then applied to survey data in each country
to calculate individual-level risk. Individual risks
were then aggregated into a country average,
which was calculated using post-stratification
weights. This followed the same approach thatwas used in 2018 GSI estimate calculations.
This model produced unrealistically high risk offorced labour for several countries in the Latin
America and the Caribbean and Eastern Europe

200

subregions. As a result, the sample of surveys
on which calculations of individual-level risk
were based was limited to those where there
was greater confidence based on alignment withthe vulnerability model. As a result, 12 countries
were removed and the models re-estimated. The
final model is represented by equation 1:
Equation 1.
In

(

)

p
= β0 + β1хij + β2yij + β3νj + uj + Eij
1 – p ij

where

In

(

p
1–p

)

is the logit of the probability
p of forced labour or forced
marriage for each individual i in
ija country j.

β0

is a constant term (intercept).

β1 хijis a vector of individual-level
demographic control variables
х with values varying foreach individual i within acountry j, and with unknown
coefficients β1.

β2 yijβ3 νjis a vector of individual-level
predictor variables y, with values
varying for each individual i
within a country j, and withunknown coefficients β2.
is the vulnerability score ν,
with values varying for eachcountry j, and with an unknown
coefficient β3.

uj

is a random coefficient that isallowed to vary by country.

Eijis an individual error term.

Model Performance
The overall accuracy of a model was measured
by the area under the ROC curve (AUC), withan AUC of 1 representing a perfect model, andan AUC of .50 representing a model with nodiscrimination, as good as a random guess. The
assessed AUC value of 0.75 indicates the model
has acceptable discrimination, according to the
Hosmer & Lemeshow (2013) heuristic.
Actual versus fitted prevalence plots for the
55 countries with modern slavery survey data
showed a similar or better fit (Pearson’s r = 0.71).
The random intercepts model showed a poorer
fit with the actual values than the other twomodels (a perfect fit is exemplified by the red
dotted line). Alternate models were examined
for improved fit; for example, a model removing
random intercepts but leaving country as a fixed
effect. However, a random intercepts modelwith country level predictors provides themost comprehensive framework to undertakethese inferences and was the model on which
estimates were based.

2/ Estimating prevalence andaligning with Global Estimatesof Modern Slavery regional
estimates
Individual predictions were aggregated into risk
scores at the country level. For the 29 countries
that were missing Gallup Word Poll data, risk
factors were imputed as an average over several
multiple imputation approaches (glm, amelia,
multiple imputation by chained equations).
Country risk scores were used to estimate
country prevalence by apportioning the regionalcounts of modern slavery from the 2021 Global
Estimates based on the risk of modern slavery ina country relative to the risk of other countries in
the region. This was undertaken as follows:First, country risk was adjusted by country of
exploitation. The basic premise is to apply an
adjustment factor equal to the ratio of victims
identified in the national surveys in a subregion,
to total exploited victims in the same subregion.
If no national surveys were conducted in a given
subregion, we estimate that the prevalence isequal to modelled risk multiplied by population.
This is calculated using the following steps:
a. Calculate number of victims identified by
the country surveys who are exploited in adifferent country, by country of exploitation.
b. Code countries as either “net sending” or“net receiving” based on income level ofcountry and international migrant stock as
a percentage of the total population (2020).6
Countries with an international migrant stockof less than 5 per cent of their populationand grouped as either “low income,” “lowermiddle income,” or “upper-middle income”
were assigned as sending countries, as were“high income” countries with an internationalmigrant stock of less than 10 per cent of their
population.
c. Calculate aggregate number of victims byplace of exploitation in sending and receiving
areas.
d. Adjust down the risk score of regions thathave a lower number of victims being
exploited in country.
e. Adjust up the risk score of regions that havea higher number of victims being exploited incountry.
Second, taking adjusted country risks, estimate
prevalence in a country based on the regional
prevalence and the distance between theadjusted country risk and the weighted averageregional risk score, following these steps:
a. Normalise the adjusted and imputed country
risk scores to a 1-100 range, with 1=min risk,
100=max risk.
b. Multiply the normalised risk score by thecountry population.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

c. Calculate regional prevalence by dividing
aggregates for total modern slavery(excluding state-imposed forced labour) overtotal population.
d. Calculate average normalised regional scoreby dividing the sum of normalised risk scoresby the country population.
e. Calculate country prevalence by multiplying
the regional average by the ratio of
normalised country risk score over the
average normalised regional score.
To simplify, since normalised modern slavery
risk in Afghanistan (60.1) is 2.28 times higher
than the average risk in Asia and the Pacificregion (26.3), we estimate that prevalencein Afghanistan is 2.28 times greater than theregional average.
Third, use the survey estimate for Mauritania(3.2 per cent) rather than the modelled risk
score due to the distinct nature of slavery inthe country. The practice is entrenched in
Mauritanian society with slave status being
inherited and deeply rooted in social castes
and the wider social system. Those owned bymasters had no freedom to own land and cannot
claim dowries from their marriages nor inherit
property or possessions from their families.7
When it abolished slavery in 1981, it was the lastcountry to do so. Hereditary slavery continues
to impact the Haratine and Afro-Mauritanian
communities, with many survivors and theirdescendants dependent upon former “masters”
because of limited skills and alternate economic
opportunities. Given the evidence available
that supports the higher survey estimate, that
estimate is taken from Mauritania, and othercountries in Sub-Saharan Africa are adjusted
down to ensure totals are aligned with the
Global Estimates of Modern Slavery.
To account for heightened risk experienced
by migrants in the Arab States, we made an
additional adjustment within the region basedon national surveys of returned migrant workers
in six origin countries across Asia and Africa.

3/ Final calculation of
estimated prevalence
The process outlined in steps 1 and 2 produces
prevalence estimates for all forms of modern
slavery except state-imposed forced labour.
Given the nationally specific manifestations ofstate-imposed forced labour where it does occur,
it was excluded from the steps outlined above
and a final adjustment based on publicly available
data sources was made to account for this. A final
estimate of the prevalence of all forms of modern
slavery is then calculated. Additionally, estimatesof the number of people in modern slavery foreach country are calculated with reference to UN
population estimates.8 The resulting estimates
are presented in Table 26.

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APPENDIX 2
1

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART A

Data limitations
Limitations of the source data
As with all empirical research, there are some
limitations of the data used to produce the 2021
Global Estimates, within which the findings of thisIndex should be interpreted.
First, the use of imputations models introduce someerror and, as such, the national estimates should not
be interpreted as hard findings.
Second, while the sample of countries on which
the estimates were based in the 2021 estimates islarger than in previous editions, there remain someregions where the coverage is limited or lacking —this specifically concerns North America and theArab States (however, regional forced marriage
data gaps have been somewhat addressed). The
sample of countries also omits some of the mostpopulous countries, namely China, India, Pakistan.
While surveys were conducted in India andPakistan, fragility of the underlying data led to their
exclusion. Fielding of these surveys during COVID-19
restrictions is likely to have had an impact on data
quality. Similarly, it is usually not possible to survey
in countries that are experiencing profound andcurrent conflict, such as Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya,
South Sudan, and parts of Nigeria and Pakistan.
Yet it is known that conflict is a significant risk
factor — the breakdown of the rule of law, the lossof social supports, and the disruption that occurs
with conflict all increase risk of both forced labourand forced marriage. The lack of data from countries
experiencing conflict means that modern slavery
estimates in regions in which conflict countries are
situated will understate the problem.
Third, COVID-19 affected the data collected fromcountries surveyed during 2020 and 2021, during
which time data was collected via telephone rather
than face-to-face, as had been done exclusively inprevious rounds of data collection.
Fourth, the estimates of forced commercial sexual
exploitation and forced labour of children were built
on models of profiles of assisted cases of humantrafficking in the CTDC dataset compiled by IOM andits partners. While the dataset provided rich data for
global estimation, the regional distribution must be
taken with caution.

Lastly, due to changes in some areas of themethodology and the expansion of the data
coverage, the 2021 global and regional estimates
on forced labour are not truly comparablewith the estimates of the previous edition. The
high variability of the estimates, especially, atthe regional level also warrants caution whencomparing between editions. Forced labour andforced marriage are not only difficult to capture insample surveys and administrative sources, but also
hard to measure through survey questionnaires andadministrative reporting systems. The result is thatthe estimates have relatively high sampling errors
and a low degree of replicability. Even withoutchanges in methodology and data coverage, theestimates are likely to exhibit high variability making
comparison over time somewhat hazardous.

Limitations of the risk modellingThis analysis is not without the limitations inherent
to any cross-sectional research endeavour. Our
selection of variables is driven by both theoreticaland statistical considerations, but unfortunately
the field of modern slavery lacks a unifying causal
theory that can be used to inform variable selection.
Finally, we have a limited sample size of confirmed
individual cases, which limits the extent to which
we can expand our predictive models and enhance
the accuracy of our predictions. Further surveys willlead to an increase in our sample, thereby enabling
the study of more complex effects and refinement of
the modelling.

Table 26
Estimated prevalence and number of people in modern slavery, by country
Country

Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
AngolaArgentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
BelarusBelgium
Benin
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
BrazilBulgaria
Burkina Faso
BurundiCambodia
Cameroon
CanadaCentral African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Côte d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
CyprusCzechia
Democratic Republic of the Congo
DenmarkDjibouti
Dominican Republic
EcuadorEgypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Eswatini
Ethiopia
FinlandFranceGabon
GambiaGeorgiaLow

202

Estimated
prevalence ofmodern slavery(per 1,000of population)

Estimated numberof people inmodern slavery

Population

13.0
11.8
1.9
4.1
4.2
8.9
1.6
1.9
10.6
6.7
7.1
11.3
1.0
3.0
7.2
10.1
1.8
5.0
8.5
3.7
7.5
5.0
5.8
1.8
5.2
5.9
3.2
4.0
7.8
3.2
7.3
5.2
5.4
8.0
4.2
4.5
0.6
7.1
6.6
7.6
4.3
8.1
7.8
90.3
4.1
3.6
6.3
1.4
2.1
7.6
6.5
7.8

505,000
34,00084,000136,000
189,000
26,00041,00017,000107,000
11,0001,162,000
107,000
11,00037,00083,00033,0004,000
1,053,000
59,00077,00089,00083,000155,000
69,00025,00097,00061,0005,771,000
397,000
16,000193,000
22,00061,00010,00045,000407,000
4,000
7,000
72,000135,000
442,000
52,00011,000320,000
5,000
4,000
727,000
8,000
135,000
17,00016,00031,00038,928,000
2,878,000
43,851,000
32,866,000
45,196,000
2,963,000
25,500,000
9,006,000
10,139,000
1,702,000
164,689,000
9,449,000
11,590,000
12,123,000
11,673,000
3,281,000
2,352,000
212,559,000
6,948,000
20,903,000
11,891,000
16,719,000
26,546,000
37,742,000
4,830,000
16,426,000
19,116,000
1,439,324,000
50,883,000
5,094,000
26,378,000
4,105,000
11,327,000
1,207,000
10,709,000
89,561,000
5,792,000
988,000
10,848,000
17,643,000
102,334,000
6,486,000
1,403,000
3,546,000
1,327,000
1,160,000
114,964,000
5,541,000
65,274,000
2,226,000
2,417,000
3,989,000High

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

203

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APPENDIX 2
1

Table 26
Estimated prevalence and number of people in modern slavery, by country
Country

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART A

Germany
Ghana
GreeceGuatemalaGuineaGuinea-Bissau
GuyanaHaiti
HondurasHong Kong
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
IrelandIsraelItaly
JamaicaJapan
JordanKazakhstan
Kenya
KosovoKuwaitKyrgyzstan
Lao PDR
LatviaLebanonLesothoLiberia
Libya
Lithuania
Madagascar
MalawiMalaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
MexicoMoldova
Mongolia
MoroccoMozambique
MyanmarNamibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria

Table 26
Estimated prevalence and number of people in modern slavery, by country

Estimated
prevalence ofmodern slavery(per 1,000of population)

Estimated numberof people inmodern slavery

Population

0.6
2.9
6.4
7.8
4.0
4.5
4.2
8.2
7.0
2.8
6.6
8.0
6.7
7.1
5.5
1.1
3.8
3.3
7.3
1.1
10.0
11.1
5.0
8.0
13.0
8.7
5.2
3.4
7.6
1.6
3.1
6.8
6.1
4.6
4.9
6.3
5.2
32.0
1.5
6.6
9.5
4.0
2.3
3.0
12.1
2.4
3.3
0.6
1.6
7.3
4.6
7.8

47,00091,00066,000140,000
53,0009,000
3,000
94,00069,00021,00063,00011,050,000
1,833,000
597,000
221,000
5,000
33,000197,000
22,000144,000
102,000
208,000
269,000
14,00055,00057,00038,0006,000
52,0004,000
16,00047,00017,000127,000
93,000202,000
106,000
149,000
2,000
850,000
38,00013,00085,00093,000657,000
6,000
97,00010,0008,000
49,000112,000
1,611,000

83,784,000
31,073,000
10,423,000
17,916,000
13,133,000
1,968,000
787,000
11,403,000
9,905,000
7,497,000
9,660,000
1,380,004,000
273,524,000
83,993,000
40,223,000
4,938,000
8,656,000
60,462,000
2,961,000
126,476,000
10,203,000
18,777,000
53,771,000
1,806,000
4,271,000
6,524,000
7,276,000
1,886,000
6,825,000
2,142,000
5,058,000
6,871,000
2,722,000
27,691,000
19,130,000
32,366,000
20,251,000
4,650,000
1,272,000
128,933,000
4,034,000
3,278,000
36,911,000
31,255,000
54,410,000
2,541,000
29,137,000
17,135,000
4,822,000
6,625,000
24,207,000
206,140,000

Country

North Korea
North Macedonia
NorwayOman
Pakistan
PanamaPapua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
PolandPortugal
Qatar
Republic of the Congo
Romania
RussiaRwandaSaudi Arabia
SenegalSerbiaSierra Leone
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
SomaliaSouth Africa
South Korea
South Sudan
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
SwedenSwitzerland
Syria
TaiwanTajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
TürkiyeTurkmenistan
UgandaUkraineUnited Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Yemen
ZambiaZimbabwe

Low

204

Estimated
prevalence ofmodern slavery(per 1,000of population)

Estimated numberof people inmodern slavery

Population

104.6
12.6
0.5
6.5
10.6
4.7
10.3
6.4
7.1
7.8
5.5
3.8
6.8
8.0
7.5
13.0
4.3
21.3
2.9
7.0
3.4
2.1
7.7
4.4
6.2
2.7
3.5
10.3
2.3
6.5
4.0
0.6
0.5
8.7
1.7
14.0
2.9
5.7
6.1
3.3
4.7
2.3
15.6
11.9
4.2
12.8
13.4
1.8
3.3
1.9
7.4
9.5
4.1
6.0
5.1
5.0

2,696,000
26,0003,000
33,0002,349,000
20,00093,00046,000234,000
859,000
209,000
39,00020,00044,000145,000
1,899,000
55,000740,000
49,00061,00027,00012,00042,0009,000
98,000
158,000
180,000
115,000
108,000
139,000
174,000
6,000
4,000
153,000
40,000133,000
171,000
401,000
8,000
28,0007,000
27,0001,320,000
72,000190,000
559,000
132,000
122,000
1,091,000
7,000
249,000
270,000
396,000
180,000
94,00074,00025,779,000
2,083,000
5,421,000
5,107,000
220,892,000
4,315,000
8,947,000
7,133,000
32,972,000
109,581,000
37,847,000
10,197,000
2,881,000
5,518,000
19,238,000
145,934,000
12,952,000
34,814,000
16,744,000
8,737,000
7,977,000
5,850,000
5,460,000
2,079,000
15,893,000
59,309,000
51,269,000
11,194,000
46,755,000
21,413,000
43,849,000
10,099,000
8,655,000
17,501,000
23,817,000
9,538,000
59,734,000
69,800,000
1,318,000
8,279,000
1,399,000
11,819,000
84,339,000
6,031,000
45,741,000
43,734,000
9,890,000
67,886,000
331,003,000
3,474,000
33,469,000
28,436,000
97,339,000
29,826,000
18,384,000
14,863,000

High

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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APPENDIX 2
1

APPENDIX 2:
Part B: Measuring vulnerability

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART B
Walk Free measures the extent to which a
population is vulnerable to modern slavery across
160 countries. The vulnerability model has threemain aims:– Inform prevalence estimation, contributing to therisk model which allows national estimates to bemade at the country-level, including for countries
where there is no national survey.
– Identify and quantify individual, systemic, andstructural factors that make people vulnerable
to modern slavery, informing the allocation anddirection of anti-modern slavery efforts.
– Help to identify potential data “blind spots”
where future research should be targeted.
The vulnerability model maps 23 risk variables
across five major dimensions:
1. Governance Issues
2. Lack of Basic Needs
3. Inequality
4. Disenfranchised Groups
5. Effects of Conflict
The following section provides an overview of themethodology of the vulnerability model.

Development of thevulnerability model
The vulnerability model methodology has evolved
since the 2018 edition of the Global Slavery Index
with the input from an independent Expert
Working Group. During 2016 and 2017, the Expert
Working Group provided feedback on addressing
theoretical and empirical gaps, normalisation, andstandardisation of the data, dealing with missing
data, and weighting of the data. This advice has
carried through to the methodology used to
calculate the vulnerability model. Further detail on
the feedback of the Expert Working Group can befound in the 2018 GSI methodology.

206

Theoretical framework
The vulnerability model is guided by human security
and crime prevention theories. The human security
theory was developed by the UN Development
Programme to capture seven major areas of
insecurity: economic, political, food, community,
personal, health, and environment. The most basic
shared characteristic of human security as a concept
involves a focus on the safety and well-being ofindividuals regardless of their citizenship status orrelationship to a nation state. Importantly, the field of
human security allows us to situate our understandingof modern slavery — a complex crime that is both acause and a symptom of many other global problems
such as pandemics, environmental disasters, conflict,and financial crises — within the larger discourse on
vulnerability and to ensure that we were not missing
significant dimensions of vulnerability to modern
slavery. The use of human security theory alsoemphasises the global importance of the Sustainable
Development Goals and links our vulnerability
theory and modelling exercises to the developing
global discussion on common metrics and goals forinternational development. Finally, this approachallows for the inclusion and exclusion of variables tobe grounded in theory.

Review of the 2018 vulnerability
model
Developing the 2018 vulnerability model involved
selection of variables based on the human security
theory that were published and updated regularly,
were transparent about their methodology
and source of the data and were the product ofa methodology that did not suffer significant
limitations that would impact the reliability of thedata. A total of 35 variables were collated and,
where necessary, normalised to a 1-100 scale andinverted so that higher numbers represented greater
vulnerability. The 35 variables were then tested
for collinearity, with any variables with a varianceinflation factor above 10 and tolerance score below
0.1 dropped from the model. Principal factor

analysis was then performed on the 24 variables
which were retained. This reduced the number ofvariables to 23 and grouped them into five factors.
The next step involved conceptualising the factors
as distinct dimensions based on the final factor
loadings and focused on risk of modern slavery.
Imputation was used where threshold levels of
missing data were met, and subregional averages
imputed. Vulnerability scores were finally weighted
by eigenvalues to give more weight to dimensions
that have the most explanatory power in our overallvulnerability score. Quality assurance checks were
performed on data transcription and calculations. A
detailed description of the 2018 methodology can befound in Appendix 1 of the 2018 Global Slavery Index.

Data collation
The 23 variables used in the 2018 vulnerability
model were assessed for updated data and changes
to methodology. Where updated data was available,
the most recent version was used, as of 31 December
2021. Six variables were discontinued or covered too
few countries. Substitute variables were identified
through a literature search and selected based ontheoretical and empirical similarity to maintaincomparability to the 2018 model. The discontinued
variables and their substitutes are listed in Table 27.
Table 28 presents the placement of variables within
dimensions in the vulnerability model.

Impact of changes to variables on total
scores and ranks
The substitution of discontinued variables withtheoretically and empirically similar variables had
the effect of increasing data availability for somecountries which, in addition to methodologicaldifferences between the 2018 variable and its

2023 substitute, led to indicator and dimension
level changes for some countries that do notnecessarily reflect actual changes in vulnerability.
Similarly, changes to methodology for three of thevariables used in the 2018 vulnerability model saw
a reduction in data availability for those variables
and thus for some countries. This meant that
there were some countries for which imputation
was required whereas for others, increased data
meant that averages were no longer imputed.
This led to significant shifts in scores and ranks forsome countries. For example, Papua New Guinea
previously benefitted from imputed regional scoresbased on Australia and New Zealand, however more
complete data in 2023 meant imputation was nolonger required and led to an increase in overallvulnerability relative to 2018.

Data preparation and analysis
Updated data was cleaned and analysed using
Microsoft Excel. The variable Internally Displaced
Persons was calculated by summing four different
datasets sourced from UNHCR: Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs), New Asylum Applications, Returned
IDPs, and Returned Refugees. Internally Displaced
Persons was then logarithmically transformed.
Where necessary, variables were normalised to a
1-100 scale and inverted so that higher numbers
represented greater vulnerability. For more
information on normalisation and inversion ofvariables, please download the 2023 vulnerability
data and codebook from https://www.walkfree.org/
global-slavery-index/downloads/.
To address issues relating to missing data, theproportion of missing data was calculated at thedimension level for each country. For dimensions
Inequality, Disenfranchised Groups, and Effects

Discontinued variable from 2018vulnerability model

Variable substituted in the 2023
vulnerability model

Disabled rights, Gallup World Poll

Protection from workplace harassment based on
disability, World Policy Analysis Centre

Same sex rights, Gallup World Poll

LGBTI Acceptance Index, UCLA School of Law

Judicial confidence, Gallup World Poll

Law enforcement reliability (Global
Competitiveness Report), World Economic Forum

Acceptance minorities, Gallup World Poll

Social Group Equality, IDEA Global
State of Democracy Indices

Acceptance immigrants, Gallup World Poll

Employers prioritise nationals, World Values Survey

Alt political rights (Polity IV Dataset),Center for Systematic Peace

Political rights, Freedom House

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Table 27
Variables replacedwith substitutes
in the 2022
vulnerability model

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APPENDIX 2
1

Table 282023 vulnerability model with new variables indicated in italics
Dimension

Variables

Governance Issues

Political instability
Government response

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART B

Women’s physical security
Political rights
Regulatory quality
Disability based workplace harassment
Weapons access
Lack of Basic Needs

Cell phone users
Undernourishment
Social safety net
Ability to borrow money
Tuberculosis
Access to clean water

Inequality

Emergency funds
Violent crimeof Conflict, the threshold was 50 per cent. For
dimensions Governance Issues and Lack of Basic
Needs, the threshold for missing data was 51 percent due to the larger number of total vulnerability
variables included in the first two dimensionsof vulnerability. Subregional averages were
imputed for variables within a dimension where
the proportion of missing data met the thresholdfor that dimension. Exceptions to this approachwere made in order to maintain variability within
the regions where some data may have been more
limited and are described in Table 29. Dimension
averages were then calculated for each dimension
and weighted by the factor eigenvalue determined
in development of the 2018 vulnerability model.
Weighting by eigenvalue is performed to give moreweight to factors that have the most explanatory
power in our overall vulnerability score. That is, thefactors are not equal, and eigenvalues indicate theamount of variance explained by a certain factor.
Factors with greater eigenvalues explain more of
the overall model and have thus been weighted
accordingly in the overall score which was thencalculated by averaging the eigenvalue-weighted
dimension scores and was normalised so to scalefrom 1-100. As a final step, quality assurance checks
were performed by external consultants to ensurethat no errors were made in the transcription fromoriginal sources, nor in calculations made in Excel.

Gini coefficient
Law enforcement reliability
Disenfranchised Groups

Limitations
The vulnerability model should be interpreted withthe following limitations in mind:
1. How well the vulnerability variables measure thereal-world phenomena they are approximatingin our model is limited by the need to selectvariables that cover most of our 160 countries, arepublished regularly, and explain clearly how thesemeasures were developed.
2. The lag in administrative data reflecting real world
situations on the ground affected the quality ofthe vulnerability model, as even the most recent
information may still not reflect current situations
on the ground at this moment.
3. Collinearity checks on our variables resulted
in dropping several empirically redundant
but conceptually important variables such as
corruption, gender inequality, and environmental
performance.
4. Data imputation ensured that missing data points
were supplemented with regionally specifictrends and information on affected vulnerability
variables. However, imputed values are unlikely tobe the true values for those countries.
5. Comparability between the 2023 vulnerability
model and the 2018 vulnerability model isreduced by the substitution of discontinued
variables with variables that are conceptuallyand empirically similar, which nonetheless differ
in how they measure the real-life phenomena
they approximate or measure slightly different
phenomena.

Employers prioritise nationals
Social group equality
LGBTI acceptance

Effects of Conflict

Internally displaced persons
Impact of terrorism

Velika Kladusa,
Bosnia andHerzegovina,
August 2018.

Internal conflicts fought

A refugee man speaks with ajournalist through an onlinetranslator on his phone. His
message reads: "We left Syria
because of the war and wewant safety. We do not wantanything else." Many refugees
and asylum seekers havebeen exposed to even greaterrisks as a result of hostile
immigration policies adopted
across Europe. Photo credit:
Maciej Luczniewski/NurPhoto
via Getty Images.

Table 29
Exceptions to the general approach to missing data

208

Proportion
missing

Country

Dimension

Treatment

Hong Kong

Governance issues

57%

Maintained at 57%

Papua New Guinea

Access to basic needs

75%

Maintained at 75%

Inequality

67%

Maintained at 67%

Burkina Faso

Disenfranchised groups

67%

Partially imputed,
reduced to 25% missing data

Guinea-Bissau

Disenfranchised groups

67%

Partially imputed,
reduced to 25% missing data

Syria

Inequality

75%

Maintained at 75%

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

209

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APPENDIX 2
1

APPENDIX 2
Part C: Government responses

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART C

Governments play a critical role in the developing
and implementing the laws, policies, and programs
that are needed to prevent and respond to modern
slavery. To complement the prevalence estimatesand assessment of vulnerability, as with previous
editions, the GSI includes an assessment of theactions governments are taking to respond tomodern slavery.

This assessment is based on tracking government
progress towards the achievement offive milestones:
1. Survivors of slavery are identified and supported
to exit and remain out of modern slavery.
2. Criminal justice mechanisms function effectively
to prevent modern slavery.
3. Coordination occurs at the national and regional
level and across borders, and governments areheld to account for their response.
4. Risk factors, such as attitudes, social systems,
and institutions that enable modern slavery are
addressed.
5. Government and business stop sourcing goods
and services produced by forced labour.

Our assessment of government responses isunderpinned by situational crime prevention theory(Figure 21).9 This is based on the understanding thatin order for the crime of modern slavery to occur,
there needs to be a vulnerable victim, a motivatedoffender, and the absence of a capable guardian.
It also recognises that crime does not happen in a
vacuum and that broad contextual factors like state
instability, discrimination, and disregard of humanrights are critical to any government response.
Therefore, to reduce the prevalence of modern
slavery crimes, governments need to:– Reduce the opportunity for offenders to commit
the crime.
– Increase the risks of offending.
– Decrease the vulnerability of potential victims.
– Increase the capacity of law enforcement andother guardians.
– Address the people or factors that stimulate or
facilitate slavery.

Motivated
offenderContextual factors:
state instability,
discrimination, disregard
for human rights etc

MODERNSLAVERY

Vulnerable
victim210

Using this theoretical framework as a starting
point and drawing on the UN Trafficking Protocol10
and the European Convention on Action against
Trafficking Beings,11 as well as literature on effective
responses to modern slavery,12 we first devised (in2014) a conceptual framework of what constitutes
a strong response to modern slavery. We further
refined this conceptual framework in consultation
with our independent Expert Working Group andscholars in fields related to modern slavery, suchas harmful traditional practices, health, social
welfare, and migration. It was organised around thefive milestones outlined above, which, if achieved,
would ensure that governments are taking sufficient
steps to address modern slavery, and underpinned
our assessment of government responses in the2014, 2016, and 2018 Global Slavery Indices.

Figure 21
Situational crime
prevention theory

Bamian, Afghanistan,
August 2021.
Afghan woman walks
by a mural calling for
women and children’s
rights. Humanitarian fears
proved well-founded, as
rollbacks occurred soonafter the takeover, with
Afghan girls aged 12 years
and over prohibited from
attending secondary school.
Subsequent reports indicatethat forced marriages ofwomen and girls increased
after the ban, as poverty
rates rose. Photo credit: Wakil
Kohsar/AFP via Getty Images.

Development of the conceptual
framework

Theoretical framework:
crime prevention theory

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Absenceof a capableguardian

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APPENDIX 2
1

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART C

Updating the conceptual
framework
After the publication of the 2018 Global Slavery
Index and following consultations with several
stakeholders from the end of 2018 until datacollection began in late 2020, further refinements
were made to the conceptual framework in advanceof the 2023 Global Slavery Index. After three editionsof the GSI, we needed to keep apace of legislativeand policy developments and consult with thosewith lived experience to review and strengthen
our framework.
To this end, we held two workshops with our
independent Expert Working Group to identify gaps,
enhance the ability to measure outputs, and refine
the ways issues such as harmful traditional practices
were incorporated in the conceptual framework.
The Expert Working Group also provided guidanceon the processes of data collection and theweighting of milestones. Broadly, the rounds ofreview with the Expert Working Group culminatedin the inclusion of indicators that assess concrete
outputs as opposed to processes and of moreindicators that focused on labour rights and childrights, as well as aligning our understanding ofunderlying risk factors and how to address thesewith international conventions and grey literature.
The need to include survivors in developing
solutions to modern slavery has long been
identified but rarely actioned.13 To systematicallyembed survivor perspectives in the assessment ofgovernment responses, Walk Free partnered with
Survivor Alliance and NGO partners to convene
more than 50 survivors in four Lived Experience
Expert Groups in Ghana, India, Kenya, and theUnited Kingdom.

Survivors were asked to share their perspectives
on the actions governments should take to end
modern slavery, to rank the milestones frommost to least important, and any other feedback.
The vulnerability of women and children tomodern slavery was emphasized across the LivedExperience Expert Groups, as well as the need forsensitisation campaigns to raise awareness of therisks of modern slavery, and for the provision ofproactive social safety nets as part of prevention
activities. Depending on location, the ranking of
which milestone was most important differed:Milestone 1 (UK and Ghana), Milestone 4 (Kenya),and Milestone 5 (India) (see Table 30). Interestingly,
despite several groups noting the need for laws
to criminalise modern slavery and corruption, no
group rated Milestone 2 as the most important partof a government’s response.
Based on the consultations with the LivedExperience Expert Groups, indicators within
the conceptual framework were edited to take
into account survivor’s assessments of essential
services. This included ensuring indicators bettermeasure government action on registering
recruitment agencies, ensuring that survivor
compensation is delivered in practice, and ensuringthat National Referral Mechanisms include providing
survivors with the right to work. All survivor groups
emphasised the importance of involving survivors
in the development of policy and advocacy; in the
UK and India, survivors suggested they should
be incorporated in the data collection process toovercome data gaps for output indicators. Although
this did not form part of the data collection process
for the purposes of this report (discussed in greater
detail below), Walk Free will consider how to further
involve survivors in future rounds of data collection
analysing government responses.

Table 30
Lived Experience Expert Groups ranking of government response milestones(ranked from most important (1) to least important (5))

212Country

Milestone
1: Survivors
identified andsupported

Milestone 2:
Criminal justicemechanisms

Milestone 3:
National andregional level
coordination

Milestone 4:
Risk factors are
addressed

Milestone 5:
Governmentand businesssupply chains

UK
India
Kenya
Ghana

1
4
3
1

3
3
4
5

2
5
2
2

3
2
1
3

4
1
5
4

In cases where feedback received from the Expert
Working Group or the Lived Experience Expert
Groups was not incorporated into the conceptual
framework, the proposed change either was
already captured under another indicator within
the framework, there was limited data available,or the suggested indicator was not conceptuallyconsistent. For example, the suggestion to include a
specific indicator to capture whether governments
had publicly committed to using a survivor-centred
approach was not included as it was considered
preferable from a conceptual perspective to
examine whether a government had streamlined
a survivor-centred approach throughout their
entire response, rather than simply making a publicdeclaration. To test the robustness and availabilityof data for suggested indicators, we worked with
Regenesys BPO, an offshore ethical sourcing
business which employs survivors of modern
slavery in the technology sector. From the review
of indicators and this round of testing, we excluded
54 proposed indicators where suggestions were notconceptually consistent with the current frameworkor where data was not available consistently and at
the level required for data collection. This included
some of the indicators that measured “outputs” asopposed to existence of policies and processes. We
will continue to review these suggested indicators
to potentially incorporate in the next round of datacollection. For examples of indicators excluded inthis round, refer to Table 31.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

The Expert Working Group and the Lived Experience
Expert Groups identified a greater need to reflect
the rights of the child and our understanding of how
governments should address underlying risk factors
in the conceptual framework. As such, an internal
review was conducted to map the conceptual
framework to international rights instruments suchas the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
the Child and Guidelines on International Protection
No. 8.14 The purpose of this mapping exercise wasto ensure all relevant standards are reflected in theconceptual framework. The conceptual framework
was also compared to areas of vulnerability
identified by the Alliance 8.7 Migration Action
Group15 and joint research by Walk Free and theInternational Organization for Migration16 to ensuresites of vulnerability, victim characteristics, andguardian responses are all reflected within theframework. Finally, the conceptual framework was
mapped against the vulnerability model developedby Walk Free, as discussed in Part B, to ensure
vulnerability was comprehensively represented in
the conceptual framework.

Kaparelli, Greece,
April 2018.
A Syrian refugee removes
weeds from the field at anorganic farm. Salman Dakdouk
Kastro, a Syrian activist longsettled in Greece, set up theorganic farm to help refugees
grow their own food and asa means of integration. The
project includes a collective
restaurant using the produce
from the farm.
Photo credit: Louisa
Goullamaki/AFP via
Getty Images.

The full updated conceptual framework can befound at the end of this section.

213

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APPENDIX 2
1

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART C

Table 31
Example of suggested indicators which cannot be included in the current conceptual
framework due to conceptual or data gaps

Table 31
Example of suggested indicators which cannot be included in the current conceptual
framework due to conceptual or data gaps

Proposedindicator
numberOutcome

Proposedindicator
numberPotentially included in
the next round of datacollection. Review data
sources available to ensurethat sufficient information
exists for majority ofcountries.

Milestone 3, Reports on the
National Action
1.1.9
Plan are used to
inform budget
allocations

Description

Milestone 1, There has been
an increase
1.2.7
in number ofvictims being
identified
through the
hotlineIf yes to 2.1.1, there has been an increase in
number of victims being identified throughthe hotline. The indicator is met if there has
been an increase in number of victims being
identified through the hotline
AND this must have occurred since 15
February 2014.

Description

OutcomeIf yes to there is a National Action Plan,annual reports on the NAP inform where
the money is spent for the coming year
AND
reports to be released during the period 15
February 2019 to 31 August 2022
If no to is there an action plan, then thisindicator cannot be met

If no to 2.1.1, this indicator cannot be rated
as 1 and must be rated as 0.
NOT there hasn’t been an increase in
number of victims being identified throughthe hotline.
NOT the number of victims identified
through the hotline decreased;
NOT there is no information regarding thenumber of victims being identified throughthe hotline.
Milestone
2, 2.2.5

Free translation
services forvictims exist inlegislation

Potentially included in
the next round of datacollection. Review data
sources available to ensurethat sufficient information
exists for majority ofcountries in the database.
To be further refined to
be clearly differentiated
NOT free translation services for victims
from existing indicator
are not in legislation.
analysing services available
to victims within the
NOT translation services are available andfree, but there is evidence to contradict this; courtroom (Milestone 2,
2.1.3).
NOT translation services are available, but
not free;Free translation services for victims are
made explicit in legislation. This meansthat any type of free translation orinterpretation services exists in legislation
AND these are either specific to victims
of modern slavery OR victims of modern
slavery can access translation services,which are available for all victims of crime.

Potentially includedin the next round ofdata collection. Review
language to ensure theindicator is not tied to
the National Action Planand reports. Purpose of
the update is to look forevidence that reviews of
responses inform budget
allocations. Covered
partially by “Government
routinely reviews its
response to modern
slavery” (Milestone 3,
1.2.2).

Milestone 4,
3.1.10

There arelegislative
and/oradministrative
measuresto addressenvironmental
degradationand climatechangePotentially included in
SDG Target 13.2.1: Number of countries
that have communicated the establishment the next round of datacollection.
or operationalisation of an integrated
policy/ strategy/ plan which increases theirability to adapt to the adverse impacts ofclimate change and foster climate resilienceand low greenhouse gas emissions
development.

Milestone 5,
2.3.5

A policy
framework
exists foreradicating
illicit money
flows

N/a

NOT free translation services are available
only for citizens, not foreign victims;

Potentially included in
the next round of datacollection. Review language
to ensure the indicatoris clear and linked to ameasurable standard suchas anti-money laundering
legislation. Review also
to ensure conceptuallyconsistent with the broader
framework.

NOT free translation services are available
for certain types of crime (such as violent
crime) and modern slavery is not specified;
NOT free translation services are offered byNGOs, but not made explicit in legislation.

214

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APPENDIX 2
1

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART C

Process of assessing
government responses tomodern slavery
Throughout 2020 and 2021, data was collected
for 176 countries for the government responsecomponent of the GSI. As in previous editions of
the Global Slavery Index, this included data on
Commonwealth countries17 in our government
response database. Where data is limited18
in smaller Commonwealth nations, we haveexcluded these countries from our analysis. Dueto the ongoing conflict and extreme disruption
to government, we have not included ratings for
Afghanistan, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen thisyear.19
The conceptual framework underpinning ourassessment is arranged around the five milestones,
which are then broken down into activities, which
are further disaggregated into indicators. There
are a total of 141 indicators in the conceptual
framework and 42 activities. This included five
additional indicators that were developed by the
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) in

Table 32
Breakdown ofmilestones into
activities andindicators

Illescas, Spain,
March 2023.

2018 and are referenced in a report released by Walk
Free and CHRI in 2020 that assessed the modern
slavery responses of Commonwealth governments.
These additional indicators are:
1. ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) is
ratified.
2. Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by
Land, Sea and Air (2000) is ratified.
3. NEGATIVE: Certain groups, such as migrant workers
or domestic workers, are not able to unionise.
4. NEGATIVE: There are lower primary school
enrolment rates for girls.
5. NEGATIVE: Homosexuality is criminalised.

A car drives past two night clubs
popular for sex work, while
debates continue in the Spanish
Parliament regarding whether
to criminalise sex work. Humanrights groups note that doing
so would lead to increases insexual violence and humantrafficking, as there would beless visibility over the industry.
Photo credit: Pablo Blazquez
Dominguez via Getty Images.

The breakdown by milestone is described in Table
32 below.

Data collection
Data is collected at the indicator level, where eachindicator describes an element of an activity. Take
Activity 1.2 under Milestone 1, “Comprehensive
reporting mechanisms operate effectively” as an
example, set out in Table 33.

Milestone

No. of activities

No of indicators

Milestone 1: Survivors of slavery are identified and supported to exit and remain out of modern slavery

1Survivors of slavery are identified and supported to exit
and remain out of modern slavery

12

41

Activity:

1.2.1 There is a reporting mechanism, such as a hotline

2

Criminal justice mechanisms function effectively
to prevent modern slavery

1340

1.2 Comprehensive reporting
mechanisms operate
effectively

1.2.2 Reporting mechanism is available for men,
women, and children

3

Coordination occurs at the national and regional level and acrossborders, and governments are held to account for their response

4

13

4

Risk factors – such as attitudes, social systems and institutions –that enable modern slavery are addressed

9

31

5

Government and business stop sourcing goods andservices produced by forced labour

4

16

1.2.5 The reporting mechanism operates in multiple languages
or has capacity to provide immediate access to translators

42

141

1.2.6 Operators have had specialist training in modern slavery,
call-handling and case referrals*

Total

Table 33
Activity 1.2,
Milestone 1

1.2.3 Reporting mechanism is free of charge to access1.2.4 Reporting mechanism operates 24/7

1.2.7

Taiwan and Kosovo have 41 activities, not 42, as they are unable to ratify international conventions.

There has been an increase in number of victims being
identified through the hotline** These indicators were added to the conceptual framework following
consultation and review with the Expert Working Group and the LivedExperience Expert Groups. However, data was not collected against them
due to limited available sources. These indicators are ‘aspirational’ andwill be retained in the conceptual framework for future rounds of datacollection and analysis.

216

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APPENDIX 2
1

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART C

There are seven indicators under this activity, eachof which determine the existence of the reporting
mechanism, and how well it is operating. Desk
research was conducted for five of these indicatorsand others in the conceptual framework by a teamof 17 researchers and research assistants following
a strict protocol. Through AnnieCannons, a nonprofit that provides technology and software
focused vocational training to survivors of modern
slavery, and Regenesys BPO, 12 researchers were
survivors of modern slavery. Specific protocols
were developed on an indicator-level for theseresearchers to provide further technical support andto ensure consistency in data collection across theglobal research team. All protocols described boththe types of reports and sources to be reviewed
and what constitutes “relevant” information. The
multilingual global team20 conducted researcheither by country or by indicator and saved thesereferences in the government response database.21
These data points were then verified, as far as
possible, by NGO contacts within each country.
NGOs were given the opportunity to either respond
via email, hold Zoom interviews, or complete asurvey. Over 25 survey responses were received, anda further 51 NGOs responded to individual requests
for information via email or Zoom calls.
Data is current as of 31st August 2022.

Creation of a database
All data collected for our assessment ofgovernment responses since 2014 is publicly
available; a total of over 100,000 datapoints.
Ratings are available for 2016, 2018, and 2022.

Rating
The 2023 scoring system, which is based on
activities, has not been used in previous editions of
the GSI. Activities are used to clearly communicate
the actions a government is taking, or not taking, toeradicate modern slavery in its simplest form.
Of the 141 indicators in the conceptual framework
against which data was collected, 125 are what
we have called “positive indicators.” Put simply,
these cover the actions the government is taking
to implement each activity and ultimately eachmilestone. The indicators described in Table 33
below are all positive indicators. In some instances,
they go beyond implementation to measureeffectiveness of an activity (There has been an
increase in number of victims being identified throughthe hotline in the above example).
These indicators are supplemented by 16
standardised “negative indicators,” which attempt
to measure implementation of a particular activity(listed in Table 34). For example, if shelters exist
for modern slavery victims, the negative indicator
victims are held in shelters against their will and do
not have a choice about whether or not to remain in a
shelter would capture whether victims are detainedand experience secondary victimisation despite theexistence of these shelters. The negative indicators
also cover broader factors, which, if conducted bygovernments, would increase the risk of humantrafficking and child exploitation. These include
state-sanctioned forced labour, high levels ofgovernment complicity, criminalisation of victims,
deportation of potential victims, and policies thattie migrant workers to their employers.

Once data had been collected and verified, eachindicator was scored on a 0 to 1 scale. On this scale,0 meant no information was identified or available,
or information explicitly demonstrated that the
government did not meet any indicators, and 1
meant that the indicator had been met. Negative
indicators were scored on a 0 to – 1 scale, where 0
meant no information was identified or available,
or information explicitly demonstrated that the
government did not meet any indicators, and – 1
meant that the indicator had been met. As an
advocacy tool, we have retained our rating where
no information found is rated as “0.” However, wehave identified indicators within the government
response database that have consistently had no
information found since 2014. In future roundsof data collection, we plan to prioritise testingthese indicators to ascertain if no information isavailable, whereupon we will ultimately remove
the indicators for future rounds of data collection.
As part of the data collection that informed thisassessment of government responses, an indicatorthat assessed whether evaluations of anti-slavery
projects were provided to government officials to
inform their future programming was removed fromdata collection due to consistent gaps in available
information (Milestone 1, Indicator 3.3.3).
The data and ratings then underwent a seriesof quality assurance — first by country, where
each country was reviewed against the rating
descriptions to determine if ratings were sound.
Secondly, following data collection being
completed, each indicator was reviewed across all
countries to check for consistency in the applied
logic. Any final edits were then reviewed, and final
edits made in the database.

The data was then imported into STATA, whereindicators were grouped into activities and scored.
Indicators are organised into 42 activities, which
are given a score from – 2 to 2, dependent on thenumber of indicators met and the nature of thoseindicators. Activity scores are outlined in Table 35.
The three negative rated activities in Table 36 are
subtracted from the overall score as they typicallyinvolve systemic issues that significantly undermine
the veracity of the entire government response tomodern slavery, rather than increasing vulnerability.
For example, these systemic issues are represented
by indicators relating to corruption and complicity,
the use of state-imposed forced labour and whena government has identified no victims of modern
slavery, which indicates that any systems in place tosupport survivors in the country are ineffective.
Activity scores are summed to give a total score foreach milestone. Milestone scores are then summed
to give a total government response score out of 78.
Each activity is weighted equally so that a country
can only obtain a total of 78 points, noting thatthe final score is presented as a percentage. This
does lead to an implicit weighting of milestones,
where the more activities in a milestone, the moreweight it is given. Table 37 describes the milestone
weightings below.

Contact info@walkfree.org to download
the dataset.

Table 34
Example ofnegative
implementation
indicators,
Activity 2.1,
Milestone 1

Milestone 1: Survivors of slavery are identified and supported to exit and remain out of modern slavery

Indicators

Activity

Activity:

No positive indicators within an activity are met OR for negative
rated activities (Table 36) no negative indicators are met

Activity is notachieved

0

Activity is partly
achieved

1

2.1.2 NEGATIVE Suspected survivors are held in shelters against
their will and do not have a choice about whether or not toremain in a shelter

At least one positive indicator is met, OR all positive indicators
are met and at least one negative indicator is met
All positive indicators are met, and no negative indicators are
met

Activity is achieved2

2.1.3 Government contributes to the operational costs ofthe shelters and there are no significant resource gaps

For negative rated activities only (see Table 36), the negative
indicator is met

Undermining the
response tomodern slavery-2

2.1: Emergency support
is available for identified
survivors

2.1.1 Survivor support services are available for some suspectedsurvivors of modern slavery (men, women, non-binary, andchildren where relevant)

2.1.4 Physical health services are provided to survivorsof modern slavery

Score

Table 35
Scoring activities

2.1.5 Mental health services are provided to victims of modern
slavery

218

2.1.6

NEGATIVE Survivor support services are not available for all
survivors of modern slavery

2.1.7

NEGATIVE No survivors have accessed the services or shelters

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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APPENDIX 2
1

Table 36
16 Negative indicators, and three negative activities in which the government
undermine their own response to modern slavery
Negative rated indicators
M1 1.5.1

METHODOLOGY
TEXT
HERE
PART C

M1 2.1.2
M1 2.1.6
M1 2.1.7
M1 2.3.5
M1 2.3.6
M2 2.1.3
M2 3.1.2M2 3.2.4
M4 2.1.5
M4 2.2.4
M4 3.1.3
M4 3.1.9
M4 3.3.1
M4 3.4.3
M4 4.1.1

There is evidence that victims of modern slavery have
M1 Activity 1.5 Victims have not
NOT been identified between 15 February 2019 and 31
been identified
August 2022.
Suspected survivors are held in shelters against their willand do not have a choice about whether or not to remain
in a shelter
Survivor support services are not available for all victims
of modern slavery
No survivors have accessed the services or shelters
between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Foreign survivors are detained for immigration
violations
Foreign survivors are deported for immigration
violations
There is evidence that survivors of modern slavery havebeen treated as criminals for conduct that occurred
while under control of criminals
Units do not have necessary resources to be able tooperate effectively
Judicial punishments are NOT proportionate to severityof the crime and culpability of the offender.
Certain groups, such as migrant workers or domestic
workers, are not allowed to unionise
There are laws or policies that prevent or make it difficult
for workers to leave abusive employers without risk ofloss of visa and deportation and/or security deposits
There are lower primary school enrolment rates for girls
Homosexuality is criminalised
Reports of individual officials’ complicity in modern
M4 Activity 3.3 Official
slavery cases have not been investigatedcomplicity is notinvestigatedDiplomatic staff are not investigated for alleged
complicity in modern slavery cases or abuse of survivors
State-sanctioned forced labour exists
M4 Activity 4.1 Government
places its
population,or part of its
population, in
forced labour

Limitations
Collecting data for 141 indicators across 176
countries is a complicated undertaking. Access todata is limited for all indicators where information
is not available publicly or available in languages
spoken by the research team. The continued
absence of Arabic speakers prevented verification
with NGOs in countries where these are the primarylanguages spoken. Limits also remain in measuring
the implementation of a response — while thenegative indicators and NGO verification are the firststeps in measuring this, more remains to be donein getting at the reality of what is occurring on the
ground as opposed to what is reported publicly.

220

Negative rated activities

Comparability to previous
assessments

Milestone

No. ofactivities

Milestone
score out ofPercentage
weightSurvivors of slavery are identified and supported toexit and remain out of modern slavery

12

22

28%

Criminal justice mechanisms function effectively toprevent modern slavery

13

26

34%

Coordination occurs at the national and regional
level and across borders, and governments areheld to account for their response

4

8

10%

Risk factors, such as attitudes, social systems
and institutions that enable modern slavery are
addressed

9

14

18%

Government and business stop sourcing goods andservices produced by forced labour

4

8

10%

Total

42

78

100%

While the data remains comparable at theindicator level, comparing milestone percentage
scores between 2018 and 2023 will be indicativeof both changes made to the scoring system andactual government improvement. When seeking
government improvement, it is most accurate tocompare indicator ratings between 2018 and 2023.
The comprehensive consultations and review of the2018 conceptual framework led to the addition of
43 indicators and removal of 49 indicators acrossall five milestones in the conceptual framework.
Additionally, some indicators have been moved
to different activities in different milestones aftera final review of the framework and the shift toactivity-based scoring.
Other changes at the indicator level involved edits
to the existing indicators rather than removing
or introducing new indicators: however, acrossmilestones 1, 2, and 3 only 11 indicators were
substantially changed.
Country

Most action in
2023

The government response assessment is broadly
comparable with previous iterations of the GSI(Table 38). However, due to the significant changes
in both the method of analysis and the conceptual
framework, this is limited to comparisons at theindicator rating level rather than comparisons
against milestone or total scores.
In 2023, the method of calculating total scoresfor milestones was updated to better reflect agovernment’s commitment to completely achieving
an activity. Percentage scores for milestones were
calculated based on the achievement of activities
rather than the number of met indicators as has
been done in the past.

Least action in2023

No substantial changes were made to indicators
in either milestone 4 and 5. As a result of theadditions, removals, and edits there was a relatedchange in the categorisation of indicators at theactivity level. Most changes were concentrated in
Milestone 2 and were largely the result of regrouping
the criminal justice indicators into activities
responding to specific types of modern slavery or
to support particular vulnerable groups. In 2018, allconventions were grouped into one activity and all
criminal justice provisions into a separate activity.
In 2023, we organised these by type of modern
slavery, so all conventions and domestic legislation
related to trafficking were grouped into one activity.
We also split out the implementation in legislation
versus implementation in practice related to accessto justice mechanisms.

2023 score

2018 scorein 2023
framework

United Kingdom

68

69

Australia

67

68

Netherlands

67

67

Portugal

67

65

United States

67

67

Ireland

63

63

Norway

63

67

Spain

63

59

Sweden

63

64

North Korea-3-1

Eritrea

5

5

Iran

8
10
18

8
12
17

Libya
Somalia
GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Table 37
Implicit weightingof each milestone

Table 382018 rankings
when considered
under the 2023
framework

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APPENDIX 2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Milestone 1:

Survivors of slavery are identified and supported to exit and remain out of modern slavery

Outcome 1:

Increase (and eventual decrease) in reported cases of modern slavery

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

Activity 1.1

The public knows what modern slavery is and how to report it

1.2.2

Reportingmechanism isavailable for men,
women, andchildrenIf yes to M1, 1.2.1, this reporting mechanism is available for men, women, andchildren to report cases of modern slaveryOR
there are separate hotlines that cover men, women, and children.
Please refer to the most relevant reporting mechanism identified in M1, 1.2.1 forindicators M1, 1.2.2 through 1.2.5.
For example, a modern slavery or trafficking hotline would be most relevant,followed by multiple hotlines that cover all sub-populations (e.g., hotline forwomen and girls, separate hotline for men and boys).
If multiple relevant hotlines exist covering all sub-populations, please rate as
indicator met. If some populations are not covered (e.g., a single hotline exists
where women and girls can report, but there is nowhere for men or boys to report
exploitation), rate as indicator not met.
If it is not specified which sub-populations are covered, assume all are covered andrate as indicator met.
This/these reporting mechanism/s must have been operational at some point
between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
If no to M1, 1.2.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1 and must be rated as 0.

1.2.3

Reportingmechanism is freeof charge to accessIf yes to M1, 1.2.1, this reporting mechanism is free to access.
Please refer to the most relevant reporting mechanism identified in M1, 1.2.1 forindicators M1, 1.2.2 through 1.2.5.
For example, a modern slavery or trafficking hotline would be most relevant,followed by multiple hotlines that cover all sub-populations (e.g., hotline forwomen and girls, separate hotline for men and boys).
If multiple relevant hotlines exist covering different populations and all are free ofcharge, please rate as indicator met. If some of the available and relevant hotlines
are not free, please rate as indicator not met.
If it is unclear that the hotline/s is/are free, then rate as indicator not met.
NOT
the website or reporting form is available online (would still require internet
connection to access it).
This/these reporting mechanism/s must have been operational at some point
between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
If no to M1, 1.2.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1, and must be rated as 0.

1.2.4

Reportingmechanism
operates 24/7

If yes to M1, 1.2.1, this reporting mechanism operates 24/7.
Please refer to the most relevant reporting mechanism identified in M1, 1.2.1
for indicators M1, 1.2.2 through 1.2.5.
For example, a modern slavery or trafficking hotline would be most relevant,followed by multiple hotlines that cover all sub-populations (e.g., hotline forwomen and girls, separate hotline for men and boys).
If multiple relevant hotlines exist covering different populations and all areavailable 24/7, please rate as indicator met. If some of the available andrelevant hotlines are not available 24/7, please rate as indicator not met.
If the hotline refers to “24 hours a day” but it is unclear if this is 7 days a week,
please rate as indicator met.
If it is unclear that the hotline/s is/are available 24 hours a day OR 7 days aweek, then rate as indicator not met.
This/these reporting mechanism/s must have been operational at some point
between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
If no to M1, 1.2.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1, and must be rated as 0.

Activity 1.2

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.1.1

National
campaigns provide
information tomembers of the
public on how toreport and identify
victims

Campaigns on how to identify potential victims, such as promotion of a hotline,
website, or text messaging service
ORcampaign on how to report potential victims, such as distributing indicators ofmodern slaveryANDmust be distributed to the public at the NATIONAL levelAND
distribution has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
NOT
training for government officials, NGOs, embassy staff, health and social workers.
NOT general awareness campaigns that do not mention hotline or indicators of
trafficking.
NOT
information is distributed to at-risk or specific populations or geographic
locations, such as migrant workers or at-risk communities. This is covered underM4, 1.2.1.
If yes to M1, 1.1.1, the campaign or information has been distributed at least twiceor annually since 15 February 2014ORthe campaign or information is promoted regularly through social media AND
there is evidence that this online promotion has been regularly updated (at least
once since 15 February 2019 (please refer to dates of Facebook posts, tweets, etc.).
If no to M1, 1.1.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1 and must be rated as 0.
If yes to M1, 1.1.1, there has been an increase in public reports of modern slavery
cases in recent yearsANDthis increase in reports is directly related to the campaign OR has occurred since
the campaign has been distributed to the general publicANDthis must have occurred since 15 February 2014.
If no to M1, 1.1.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1 and must be rated as 0.

1.1.2

These campaigns
are distributed
systematically andat regular intervals(as distinct fromone-off, isolated)

1.1.3

There has been
an increase inreported cases ofmodern slavery
from the public

Comprehensive reporting mechanisms operate effectively

Comprehensive reporting mechanisms operate effectively
1.2.1

222

Activity 1.2

There is a reporting
mechanism, suchas a hotline

Reporting mechanism exists where modern slavery crimes can be reported(either in isolation or as part of a larger phone or web service). This includes text
messaging, an online form, or a phone hotline
ANDthis/these reporting mechanism/s must have been operational at some point
between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
a centralised police number, unless there are trained operators or specific sub-unit
for reporting modern slavery crimes.
NOT
hotlines that provide information to migrants before they migrate overseas.
NOT
hotlines providing legal advice.
If there is one hotline covering one population (such as a trafficking hotline forwomen and girls)
OR
there are multiple operating hotlines covering different populations, please rate as
indicator met.

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APPENDIX 2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Milestone 1 (cont.) Survivors of slavery are identified and supported to exit and remain out of modern slavery

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Activity 1.4

First responders know what modern slavery is and how to identify victims

Outcome 1:

Increase (and eventual decrease) in reported cases of modern slavery

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

Activity 1.2

Comprehensive reporting mechanisms operate effectively

1.4.1

Training on how
to identify victims
of modern slavery
is provided
to officials
with front-line
regulatory bodies
whose personnel
are likely to be“first responders”

Personnel at regulatory bodies have received training on modern slavery,
which may include indicators of modern slavery and how to refer individuals
AND
training is formal face-to-face or through online modules
AND
training is provided to one or more of the following types of personnel: border
guards, immigration officials, labour inspectors
AND
training has been provided at least once since 15 February 2014.
Training can be provided by INGOs with government support (support definedas permission, development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support).
NOT
leaflets have been distributed to labour inspectors or posters have been put
up in airports on how to identify/report victims.

1.4.2

Training on how
to identify victims
of modern slavery
is provided to
non-regulatory
workers likely
to be “first
responders”

Non-regulatory bodies have received training on modern slavery, which may
include indicators of modern slavery and how to refer individuals
AND
training is formal face-to-face or through online modules
AND
training is provided to one or more of the following: teachers, doctors, nurses,
social workers, tourism sector workers (including private tourism operators)AND
training has been provided at least once since 15 February 2014.
Training can be provided by INGOs with government support (support definedas permission, development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support).
NOT
leaflets on how to identify/report victims have been distributed to tour guides
or posters put up in healthcare facilities.

1.4.3

Training forfirst responders
is delivered
systematicallyand at regularintervals (asdistinct from oneoff, isolated)

If yes to M1, 1.4.1 OR 1.4.2, and training is delivered regularly (defined as at least
twice in the last five years) to at least one of the members of the above groups(labour inspectors, border guards, immigration officials, doctors, nurses,
teachers, social workers, tourism sector workers) since 15 February 2014
OR
if yes to M1, 1.4.1 AND 1.4.2, and training is delivered at least twice in the last
five years to BOTH of these groups.
NOT
training has been delivered to each of these groups once since 15 February 2014.
If no to M1, 1.4.1 AND 1.4.2, then this indicator cannot be rated as 1, and mustbe rated as 0.

Activity 1.3

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.2.5

The reporting
mechanism
operatesin multiple
languages or
has capacity
to provide
immediate accessto translators

If yes to M1, 1.2.1, this reporting mechanism operates in multiple languages, orbrings in translators as necessary.
Please refer to the most relevant reporting mechanism identified in M1,
1.2.1 for indicators M1, 1.2.2 through 1.2.5. For example, a modern slavery or
trafficking hotline would be most relevant, followed by multiple hotlines thatcover all sub-populations (e.g., hotline for women and girls, separate hotline
for men and boys).
If relevant multiple hotlines exist covering different populations and all areavailable in multiple languages, please rate as indicator met. If some of theavailable and relevant hotlines are not available in multiple languages, please
rate as indicator not met.
“Multiple languages” means the national language + at least one otherlanguage.
This/these reporting mechanism/s must have been operational at some point
between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
If no to M1, 1.2.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1, and must be rated as 0.

Front-line police know what modern slavery is and how to identify victims
1.3.1

1.3.2

224

Training on basic
legal frameworks
and victim
identification
has been carriedout for front-line“general duties”
policeTraining for front-line police has taken place on basic legal frameworks
surrounding modern slaveryANDtraining has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Definition of training includes formal in-person training, as part of broader
curriculum on human rights or other training programs, or part of an online
training program.
Training can be provided by International Organisations (IOs)/ International
Non-Government Organisations (INGOs)/ Non-Government Organisations(NGOs) with government support (support defined as permission,development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support).
NOT
training manuals have been developed by INGOs or NGOs.
NOT
booklets with indicators of trafficking have been handed out to police.
NOT
training for immigration, border guards, or labour inspectors.

Training on victim
identification isprovided as partof basic training
for new police
recruits

Training on modern slavery is provided as part of basic training for new police
recruits.
If the source mentions that modern slavery training takes place as part of theacademy training for all police officers
ORthat all new police officers or new recruits receive trainingAND
there is evidence this has occurred since 15 February 2014, please rate as
indicator met.
NOT
training on modern slavery is provided to some police officers, but it’s notclear if this is for all new recruits or provided as part of academic training. This
would mean that the indicator is not met.

Activity 1.5

NEGATIVE Victims have not been identified
1.5.1

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

NEGATIVE Thereis evidence thatvictims of modern
slavery have NOT
been identified

Government authorities or officials OR NGOs or international organisations
have not identified any victims of modern slavery between 15 February 2019and 31 August 2022.
This indicator is met only when victims have been identified during thereporting period, regardless of who has identified them.
Note: This indicator is not dependent on training provided under M1, 1.3.1, M1,
1.4.1, or M1, 1.4.2.

225

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APPENDIX 2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Milestone 1 (cont.) Survivors of slavery are identified and supported to exit and remain out of modern slavery
Outcome 2:

Survivors are provided with support to help break the cycle of vulnerability

Activity 2.1

Emergency support is available for identified survivors
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.1.1

Survivor support
services areavailable forsome suspectedsurvivors ofmodern slavery(men, women,
non-binary, andchildren where
relevant)

Any kind of survivor support service is available for men, women, non-binary
individuals or childrenAND
services must be government run, or funded by government, or provided with inkind support from the governmentANDthese services are available since 15 February 2019.
NOT
evidence that services are available but have not been used. This indicator islooking at availability of services, not use.
NOT
INGOs run a shelter without any government support. (Support defined aspermission, development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support.)

NEGATIVE
Suspected
survivors are heldin shelters against
their will and do
not have a choice
about whether or
not to remain in a
shelter
Government
contributes to theoperational costsof the shelters
and there are no
significant resource
gaps

If yes to M1, 2.1.1, adult survivors are unable to leave a shelter or safe house when
they wish (or are unable to leave without a chaperone).
Children must also be able to leave when they wish but should be accompanied bya chaperone. If evidence that survivors (adults and children) are detained against
their will or are unable to leave unaccompanied (adults) or with a chaperone(children)ANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
If no to M1, 2.1.1, this indicator cannot be scored as -1 and can only be scored as 0.
If yes to M1, 2.1.1, government provides financial support to the shelters. Support
defined as in-kind or monetary support (not just permission)AND
services must be operational between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
INGO funds and runs a shelter or safe house without any government support.
If government provides some resources, but there are significant gaps in financial
resourcing not covered by governments or INGOs, then please rate as indicator notmet.
If no to M1, 2.1.1, this indicator cannot be scored as 1, and must be scored as 0.
If yes to M1, 2.1.1, there is evidence of some physical health support for survivorsof modern slaveryAND
services must be operational between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Synonyms for physical health support would include medical support.
If explicit groups are excluded (e.g., there are no physical health services for men),then please rate as not met.
If no to M1, 2.1.1, this indicator cannot be scored as 1, and must be scored as 0.
If yes to M1, 2.1.1, there is evidence of some mental health support for survivors ofmodern slaveryAND
services must be operational between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Synonyms for mental health support would include counselling and psychologicalsupport.
If explicit groups are excluded, e.g. there are no mental health services for men,then please rate as not met.
If no to M1, 2.1.1, this indicator cannot be scored as 1, and must be scored as 0.

2.1.2

2.1.3

226

2.1.4

Physical healthservices areprovided tosurvivors ofmodern slavery

2.1.5

Mental healthservices areprovided tosurvivors ofmodern slavery

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Activity 2.1

Emergency support is available for identified survivors
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.1.6

NEGATIVE

If yes to M1, 2.1.1, there are gaps in existing services.
There have been identified modern slavery cases of men, women, non-binary
individuals, children, or other groups such as foreign survivors, forced labour
survivors, survivors of commercial sexual exploitation.
AND
there are NO specific shelters or services for themORevidence that certain groups of survivors have been turned away from shelters orservicesANDthis has also occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
services are not available for a particular group, but no cases within that groupwere identified.
Please specify which groups have been excluded.
If no to M1, 2.1.1, this indicator cannot be scored as -1, and must be scored as 0.
If yes to M1, 2.1.1, despite availability of services, survivors have not accessed themANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Examples include cases where facilities exist but survivors are not beingtransferred to these facilities.
If no to M1, 2.1.1, this indicator cannot be scored as -1, and must be scored as 0.

Survivor support
services are notavailable forall survivors ofmodern slavery

2.1.7

Activity 2.2

NEGATIVE No
survivors haveaccessed theservices or shelters

Survivor-centred determined longer-term support is available for all identified survivors
2.2.1

2.2.2

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Survivors are provided with any form of longer-term financial support, including
receipt of social welfare or longer-term housing
NOT
long-term stays in sheltersANDthere is evidence that these are available between 15 February 2019 and 31 August
2022.
NOT
provision of emergency shelters under M1, 2.1.1.
Note: This indicator is not dependent on M1, 2.1.1
If yes to M1, 2.1.1, adult survivors are provided with long-term rehabilitation
Survivors are able
to access education support beyond financial support. This is defined as access to employment, job
training, employability support (jobs, skills, or confidence building) or educationor employment
support.
Please rate as indicator met if there is any evidence of these programsANDthese are available between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
education is available for children (see M1, 2.4.1 below).
Education and/or employment services must be government-run, or funded bygovernment, or provided with in-kind support government.
If access to education and/or employment is restricted to some survivors (e.g., on
the basis of gender, migration status, or ethnicity), the indicator is not met.
Longer-term
financial support
is available forsurvivors

227

07

APPENDIX 2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Milestone 1 (cont.) Survivors of slavery are identified and supported to exit and remain out of modern slavery
Outcome 2:

Survivors are provided with support to help break the cycle of vulnerability

Activity 2.2

Survivor-centred determined longer-term support is available for all identified survivors
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.2.3

Survivors have theright to information
regarding theirsituations and theirrights, including
protection
mechanisms

Legislation includes provisions that survivors are entitled to information regarding
their situation and rights, including protection mechanisms such as seeking
asylum, other available services, and the processes of family reunification andrepatriation.
NOT
evidence that this is given in practice, but no evidence in legislation.
NOT
potential survivors are given information when arrested.
NOT
survivors are given information about their court case (covered under M2, 2.1.1).
Legislation includes provisions that survivors have the right to confidentiality,
including that the state has protected the privacy and identity of survivors,
including ensuring that the name, address, and all other information that could
lead to the identification of a survivor shall not be revealed to the media orotherwise to the public.
NOT
survivors don’t have the right to confidentiality.
NOT
legislation that excludes some survivors from the right to confidentiality.

2.2.4

Activity 2.3

Activity 2.3

Visas provide protection and are in the best interests of the survivor
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.3.3

Foreign survivors
can access visas
that allow them to
work

2.3.4

Visas to stay inthe country are
not dependent
on survivor
participation in the
court process

2.3.5

NEGATIVE Foreign
survivors aredetained for
immigration
violations

2.3.6

NEGATIVE Foreign
survivors aredeported for
immigration
violations

If yes to M1, 2.3.2, these visas allow foreign survivors to work. This could be
while they are waiting for the outcome of the court process, or while they areparticipating in survivor assistance programs, such as a National Referral
Mechanism.
If no to M1, 2.3.2, this indicator cannot be scored as 1, and must be scored as 0.
If yes to M1, 2.3.2, these visas are not tied to a survivor’s participation in the court
process or court case.
For example, visas are awarded to trafficking survivors on the basis ofhumanitarian or personal reasons, not because they have agreed to participate in
the court process.
NOTvisas are available to survivors only while OR if they participate in the criminal
process.
If no to M1, 2.3.2, this indicator cannot be scored as 1, and must be scored as 0.
Foreign survivors are detained in detention facilities for immigration violations.
Can include instances where survivors are detained for a breach of visa conditionsAND
this occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
foreign survivors are deported for immigration violations. This is covered underM1, 2.3.6.
Note: If survivors are arrested for crimes committed while exploited, please referto M2, 2.1.4.
Foreign survivors are deported for immigration violations. Can include instanceswhere foreign survivors are deported to countries of origin without access to
assistanceAND
this occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
foreign survivors are detained for immigration violations. This is covered under M1,
2.3.5.
Note: if survivors are arrested for crimes committed while enslaved, please refer toM2, 2.1.4.

Visas provide protection and are in the best interests of the survivor
2.3.1

2.3.2

228

Survivors havethe right toconfidentiality

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Reflection periods
exist in law forsurvivors

Visas are in place
to address the
migration situationof survivors whowant to remain or
be resettled

Reflection periods are available for survivors of modern slavery so that theymight access support while they decide if they want to remain in the country or
participate in a court case ANDreflection periods are minimum 30 daysANDthey are available to all survivors.
NOT
there is a reflection period, but no mention of a minimum 30-day periodORthe reflection period is less than 30 days.
NOT
the source mentions that reflection periods are available and at least 30 days but
they exclude foreign survivors or other groups.
Visas are in place to address the migration situation of survivors who want toremain in the country. This indicator is met if visas are available so that foreign
survivors can receive support either in-country or in a third country after areflection period has expiredANDthese are available between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
These visas include any type of longer-term visas of at least one year, or shorterbut renewable visas, or a visa permits up to at least one year when renewed.
NOT
visas are temporary, of less than a year, not renewable and less than a year, or
renewable but not up to one year.
NOT
visas are in place, but they exclude some groups or there are restrictions.
Note: This indicator is not dependent on M1, 2.1.1.

Activity 2.4

Special protections for child survivors are available
2.4.1

Specialised
support services
exist for children

2.4.2

Survivors are
assisted to makecontact with theirfamily or contact
person of choice

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Children have specialised services, or are given some kind of special support
NOT
including support in the criminal justice systemANDthese are available between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Specialised child services can include: when the age of the child is uncertain,
authorities presume the survivor to be a child; child survivors are appointed aguardian who supports their recovery; those who provide support services to childsurvivors have received specialist training.
NOT
children are placed in correctional facilities, boarding schools, or other nonspecialised institutions.
Survivors are assisted by the government to make contact with familiesORthere is a family reunification programAND
this is operating between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
family reunification program exists but is not currently funded.
NOT
INGOs operate a family reunification program without government support.
If there is evidence of family reunification in legislation and there is no evidence of
it not operating, then indicator met.

229

07

APPENDIX 2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Milestone 1 (cont.) Survivors of slavery are identified and supported to exit and remain out of modern slavery
Outcome 2:

Survivors are provided with support to help break the cycle of vulnerability

Activity 2.5

Services are continually improved2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.5.1

Training has been
carried out for all
staff providing
direct survivor
assistance services

If yes to M1, 2.1.1, there is evidence of training for those who provide direct
survivor support services on how to assist survivors of modern slavery, and can
include trauma informed care, do no harm principles, individualised treatment
and care, comprehensive care, self-determination and participation, nondiscrimination, confidentiality and right to privacyANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Training can be provided by INGOs with government support (support defined aspermission, development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support).
NOT
training is provided by unskilled volunteers.
NOT
general modern slavery training is provided to social workers.
Direct survivor assistance services means those services provided by workers
who have regular contact with survivors post-identification. It can include shelter
workers, case managers, doctors, and psychologists.
If no to M1, 2.1.1, it is not possible to score 1 on this indicator and it must be rated
as 0.
If yes to M1, 2.1.1, evidence that formal reporting or evaluation of direct survivor
support services has been undertakenANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Evaluation (internal or external) is defined as an assessment of the current services
against the service objectives and incorporating client feedback.
NOT
a description of the program or services provided.
NOT
ad hoc inspections without a clear sense of follow up activities.
NOT
evaluations of the National Action Plan – this is covered under M3, 2.1.1.
If no to M1, 2.1.1, it is not possible to score 1 on this indicator and it must be rated
as 0.

2.5.2

Direct survivor
assistanceservices have been
evaluated

Outcome 3:

Government coordinates the identification and referral of survivors

Activity 3.1

Identification guidelines are used by all first responders
3.1.1

230

The government
has clear nationalguidelines for
identifying
and screening
victims for all first
responders

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Activity 3.1

Identification guidelines are used by all first responders
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

3.1.2

The guidelines
make provision
for a category of“presumed victims”
who can be provided
with services
until a formal
determination ismadeThe guidelines
clearly set
out whichorganisations havethe authority toidentify victims ofmodern slavery
The government
has distributed
guidelines for
identifying
and screening
victims to all first
responders

If yes to M1, 3.1.1, the national guidelines include provisions so victims who have
not yet been assessed to be survivors of modern slavery can still receive services.
Examples include “presumed” categories within guidelines or “informal”
assistance given to victims while determination is made.
If no to M1, 3.1.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1 and must be rated as 0.

3.1.3

3.1.4

Activity 3.2

If yes to M1, 3.1.1, the national guidelines outline which organisations can or
cannot formally identify victims of modern slavery.
Examples include a list of approved agencies and NGOs that can identify andcertify that individuals are survivors of modern slavery.
If no to M1, 3.1.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1 and must be rated as 0.

If yes to M1, 3.1.1, the national guidelines have been distributed to all first
respondersANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
First responders are defined as: police, immigration, border patrol, labour
inspectors, NGOs, teachers, social workers, doctors, nurses, and the tourism
industry.
If no to M1, 3.1.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1 and must be rated as 0.

National Referral Mechanism is operating effectively
3.2.1

A “National Referral
Mechanism”
brings together
government andcivil society toensure survivors
are being referred
to services

3.2.2

There is evidence
that survivors arebeing referred toservices using the
National Referral
Mechanism

There is a National Referral Mechanism (NRM) for survivors of modern slaveryAND
the NRM includes government and NGOsAND
it is operating during the period between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
A National Referral Mechanism is a group of approved NGOs and government
agencies that refers survivors to services at the national level.
NOT
evidence that survivors have been referred to services without a national system
in place.
If yes to M1, 3.2.1, there is evidence that survivors are referred through the
National Referral MechanismANDthis has happened at least once between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
If no to M1, 3.2.1, this indicator cannot be rated as 1 and must be rated as 0.

National general guidelines exist for all first responders to identify AND screen
victimsAND
these guidelines exist as of 31 August 2022.
First responders are defined as: police, immigration, border patrol, labour
inspectors, NGOs, teachers, social workers, doctors, nurses, and tourism industry
workers.
General guidelines should exist at the national level for all responders.
NOT
police have their own guidelines or standard operating procedures.
NOT
multiple guidelines exist for each type of first responder.
NOT
guidelines have been distributed. It is sufficient that the guidelines exist to meetthe indicator. Distribution is covered under M1, 3.1.4.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

231

07

APPENDIX 2

Milestone 2:

Activity 1.1

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Criminal justice mechanisms function effectively to prevent modern slavery

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.1.1

Slavery
Convention, 1926

Ratification or succession [denoted by a (d)] or accession [denoted by an (a)] of the1926 Slavery Convention as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
signed the 1926 Slavery Convention, WITHOUT accession (a), succession (d), or
ratification.
Ratification, succession [denoted by a (d)] or accession [denoted by an (a)] of the1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, andInstitutions and Practices Similar to Slavery as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
signed the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade,and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery 1956, WITHOUT ratification, or
succession (d), or accession (a). ratification, or succession (d).

1.1.3

Supplementary
Convention on
the Abolitionof Slavery, theSlave Trade, andInstitutions andPractices Similar to
Slavery, 1956
Slavery is
criminalised

Forced labour is effectively criminalised
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.3.1

ILO Abolition ofForced Labour
Convention 1957
(No. 105)

1.3.2

Protocol of 2014 to
the Forced Labour
Convention, 1930

1.3.3

ILO Forced Labour
Convention, 1930
(No. 29)

1.3.4

Forced labour iscriminalised

Status must be “In Force” for the ILO Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957
(No. 105)AND“In Force” as of 31 August 2022.
NOT“In force” for the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29).
Status must be “In Force” for the Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour
Convention, 1930
AND
“In Force” as of 31 August 2022.
Status must be “In Force” for the ILO Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29)
AND“In Force” as of 31 August 2022.
NOT“In Force” for the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105).
Forced labour is criminalised as a distinct crime.
Forced or compulsory labour means all work or service which is exacted from any
person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has notoffered himself voluntarily. Does not include compulsory military service, work
which forms part of the normal civic obligations of the citizen, or work performedin cases of emergency (such as war, fire, famine, or flood).
The offence of forced labour must include(1) work performed under the menace of any penalty;(2) work for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily. These twocomponents must be present in order for the indicator to have been met.
Forced labour may be listed as a standalone crime in the penal or criminal code orin trafficking-specific legislation or in another act.

Slavery is criminalised as a distinct crime.
The offence of slavery must include a situation in which the status or condition ofa person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownershipare exercised. Slavery may be listed as a standalone crime in the penal or criminal
code or in trafficking-specific legislation or in another act.
NOT
slavery is prohibited in the Constitution.

Trafficking is effectively criminalised
1.2.1

1.2.2

232

Activity 1.3

Slavery is effectively criminalised

1.1.2

Activity 1.2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress andPunish Trafficking
in Persons,
Especially Womenand Children,
supplementing
the United Nations
Convention against
Transnational
Organized Crime,
2000
Human trafficking
is criminalised

Ratification, acceptance [denoted by an (A)], accession [denoted by an (a)], or
succession [denoted by a (d)] of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 as of 31 August
2022.
NOT
signed the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime 2000, WITHOUT ratification, Acceptance(A), accession (a), or succession (d).

Activity 1.4

Forced marriage is effectively criminalised
1.4.1

Convention
on Consent toMarriage, Minimum
Age for Marriage
and Registration ofMarriages, 1964

1.4.2

Forced marriage iscriminalised

Human trafficking is listed as a standalone article in the penal code or criminalcodeORhuman trafficking is criminalised under a distinct piece of legislationAND
within either the penal code or distinct legislation human trafficking does not
require movement of individualsANDthe legislation covers men, women, and children.
Movement may include cross-border/transnational movement, or internal
movement such as movement from a rural to urban location.
Definition of trafficking includes action, means, and purpose.
Trafficking in persons shall require action (e.g., recruitment, transportation,transfer, or harbouring), means (e.g., by the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, abduction, or fraud), and purpose (e.g., the purpose of exploitation).
For children, trafficking shall not require the means component and this isreflected in legislation.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Ratification, succession [denoted by a (d)] or accession [denoted by an (a)] of theConvention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration ofMarriages, 1964, as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
the country has signed the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age forMarriage and Registration of Marriages, 1964, WITHOUT accession (a), ratification,or succession (d).
Forced marriage is criminalised as a distinct crime, in the penal or criminal code,
trafficking legislation, or other act.
NOT
the legal age of marriage is set at 18.
If kidnapping is required to be present for the crime of forced marriage to occur,
this is indicator not met.

233

07

APPENDIX 2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Milestone 2 (cont.) Criminal justice mechanisms function effectively to prevent modern slavery
Activity 1.5

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.5.1

ILO Worst Formsof Child Labour
Convention, 1999
(No. 182)
Optional Protocol
to the Convention
on the Rights of
the Child on the
involvement ofchildren in armed
conflict, 2000
Optional Protocol
to the Convention
on the Rights of theChild on the saleof children, childprostitution andchild pornography,
2000
Use of children inarmed conflict iscriminalised

Status must be “In Force” for the ILO Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,
1999 (No. 182)
AND
“In Force” as of 31 August 2022.
Ratification, succession [denoted by a (d)] or accession [denoted by an (a)] of the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvementof children in armed conflict, 2000, as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the involvement of children in armed conflict, 2000, WITHOUT accession (a),ratification, or succession (d).
Ratification, succession [denoted by a (d)] or accession [denoted by an (a)] of
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the sale ofchildren, child prostitution and child pornography, 2000, as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, 2000, WITHOUT
accession (a), ratification, or succession (d).

1.5.3

1.5.4

1.5.5

Child commercial
sexual exploitationis criminalised

Criminal code or standalone legislation specifically criminalises use of children inarmed conflict.
NOT
where the age of recruitment is 18, but there is no criminalisation of the use ofchildren in armed forces.
Must cover use of children in state (national army) and armed groups (non-statearmed groups).
The penal or criminal code or trafficking legislation includes standalone provisions
that it is an offence to sell/force a child into prostitution / commercial sexual
exploitationAND
to purchase sexual acts with a child.
NOT when selling a child is criminalised AND child sex abuse is criminalised(second component must criminalise purchase of sexual acts with a child).

Activity 2.1

Exploitation of women is effectively criminalised
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.7.1

Convention on
the Eliminationof All Forms ofDiscrimination
against Women(CEDAW), 1981

1.7.2

Optional Protocol
to the Convention
on the Eliminationof All Forms ofDiscrimination
against Women

1.7.3

ILO Domestic
Workers
Convention, 2011(No. 189)

Ratification, accession [denoted by an (a)], or succession [denoted by a (d)] of
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW), 1981, as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
the country has signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1981, WITHOUT ratification, accession (a),or succession (d).
Ratification, accession [denoted by an (a)], or succession [denoted by a (d)]of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms ofDiscrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1981, as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
the country has signed the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 1981 WITHOUT ratification,accession (a), or succession (d).
Status must be “In Force” for the ILO Domestic Workers Convention, 2011 (No. 189)
AND
“In Force” as of 31 August 2022.

Survivors are able to participate in the criminal justice system as victims
2.1.1

2.1.2

Exploitation of migrants is effectively criminalised
1.6.1

1.6.2

234

Activity 1.7

Exploitation of children is effectively criminalised

1.5.2

Activity 1.6

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

International
Convention on
the Protection of
the Rights of All
Migrant Workers
and Members of
their Families, 1990
Protocol against
the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air, 2000

Ratification, succession [denoted by a (d)] or accession [denoted by an (a)] of theInternational Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families, 1990, as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
signed or signed to succeed the International Convention on the Protection of
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, 1990, WITHOUT
accession (a), ratification, or succession (d).
Ratification, acceptance [denoted by an (A)], approval [denoted by an (AA)],
accession [denoted by an (a)], or succession [denoted by a (d)] of the Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, 2000 as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
the country has signed the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air, 2000, WITHOUT ratification, acceptance (A), approval (AA), accession(a), or succession (d).

2.1.3

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

National laws allow victims to participate in the legal system regardless of theirrole as a witness.
This includes: allowing victims to give evidence (without being called as a witness),allowing victims to inspect and add documents to the file, giving the victim
information regarding the court case, OR allowing for the admission of victim
impact statements.
NOT
there is evidence or a general statement that victims participate in the criminal
justice process as witnesses.
Relevant national laws include the criminal procedure code, or criminal sentencing
acts.
National laws recognise survivors are not criminals for all conduct during their
Law recognises
exploitationthat survivors
ANDshould not betreated as criminals this must refer to modern slavery crimes, not general provisions in legislation.
Modern slavery crimes are defined as human trafficking, forced labour, slavery,
for conduct thatforced marriage, and children in armed conflict.
occurred while
NOT
under control ofsurvivors are protected from criminalisation only for certain crimes (e.g.,criminals
prostitution or immigration offences).
NOT
there is no evidence that survivors have been criminalised.
There is definitive or concrete evidence that survivors have been arrested for
NEGATIVE Therecrimes committed while under the control of the person exploiting themis evidence thatANDsurvivors of
this has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
modern slavery
NOT
have been treatedforeign nationals have been deported OR detained for immigration offences (noas criminals forvisa, overstaying visa, etc.). This is covered under M1, 2.3.5 and 2.3.6.
conduct that
Examples would be survivors have been arrested on prostitution charges or
occurred whilearrested for drug production. If survivors are arrested and released as soon as it isunder control ofrealised that they are survivors, please rate as indicator not met.
criminals
If there is evidence those arrested MAY be survivors, please rate as indicator not
met.
National laws
allow victims toparticipate in
the legal system
regardless of theirrole as a witness

235

07

APPENDIX 2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Milestone 2 (cont.) Criminal justice mechanisms function effectively to prevent modern slavery
Activity 2.2

Activity 2.2

Victim-witnesses are protected in legislation
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.2.1

Free legal services
for survivors ofmodern slavery
exist in legislation

2.2.2

Witness andvictim protection
mechanisms exist
in legislation
to ensure thatneither witnesses
nor victims are
intimidated,
nor interferedwith INSIDE thecourtroom

Any type of free legal services or advice exists in legislation, including free legal
advice and free legal representationANDthese are either available for, or specific to, victims of modern slavery.
NOT
legal services are in legislation, but are not free.
NOTlegal services are available, or offered by NGOs, but not specified in legislation.
This is covered under M2, 2.3.1.
NOT
free legal services are available only for citizens, not foreign survivors or othergroups.
NOTfree legal services are available for certain types of crime (such as violent crime)and modern slavery is not specified.
Witness and victim protection mechanisms exist in legislation so that survivors are
not intimidated or interfered with INSIDE the courtroom
Victim protection mechanisms INSIDE the courtroom refers to provision of video
testimony, not cross-examining survivors, and any other protection mechanisms
to prevent survivors coming into contact with perpetrators.
NOT
applicable outside the courtroom (see M2, 2.2.3.).
NOT
these exist in practice, but not in legislation. This is covered under M2, 2.3.2.

Activity 2.3

Victim-witnesses are able to access justice in practice2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.3.1

Free legal services
for survivors ofmodern slavery
are available inpractice

2.3.2

Witness andvictim protection
mechanisms areused in practiceto ensure thatneither witnesses
nor victims are
intimidated
nor interferedwith INSIDE thecourtroom

2.3.3

Witness andvictim protection
mechanisms areused in practiceto ensure thatneither witnesses
nor victims are
intimidated norinterfered withOUTSIDE thecourtroom

Any type of free legal services or advice has been provided in practice, including freelegal advice and free legal representationANDthese are either specific to survivors of modern slaveryORsurvivors of modern slavery can access broader legal advice, which is available for all
victims of crimeANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022
NOT
legal services are available, but not free.
NOT
free legal services are available only for citizens, not foreign survivors or other groups.
Free legal services can be offered by governments or IOs/NGOs.
If there is any evidence that free legal services exist in practice, please rate as indicatormet.
If there is no evidence they are or are not being used, please rate as no information
found.
If there is evidence that free legal services are not used or are poorly implemented,
please rate as indicator not met.
If free legal services exist in legislation, please move information to M2, 2.2.1.
Government operated or supported witness and victim protection mechanisms areused in practice so that survivors are not intimidated or interfered with INSIDE thecourtroomANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Victim protection mechanisms inside the courtroom refers to provision of video
testimony, victims are not cross-examined, and victims are protected fromperpetrators.
Government operated or supported is defined as government run or funded bygovernment or provided with in-kind support from the government.
NOT
applicable outside the courtroom (see M2, 2.3.3.).
If there is any evidence that witness protection mechanisms are used in practice,please rate as indicator met.
If there is no evidence of these being used or not being used, please rate as information
not found.
If there is evidence that these are not used or are poorly implemented, please rate as
indicator not met.
If witness protection mechanisms INSIDE the courtroom exist in legislation, please
move information to M2, 2.2.2.
Government operated or supported witness and victim protection mechanisms areused in practice so that survivors are not intimidated or interfered with OUTSIDE thecourtroomANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Witness and victim protection mechanisms include an official witness protection
program where individuals are provided with security, new identities, and relocation
support, or protection whereby the victim’s identity is not revealed to the public.
Government operated or supported is defined as government run or funded bygovernment or provided with in-kind support from the government.
NOT
applicable inside the courtroom (see M2, 2.3.2.).
If witness protection mechanisms are used in practice, please rate as indictor met.
If there is no evidence of these being used or not being used, please rate as information
not found.
If there is evidence they are not used or are poorly implemented, please rate as
indicator not met.
If witness protection mechanisms OUTSIDE the courtroom exist in legislation, please
move information to M2, 2.2.3

Victim-witnesses are protected in legislation
2.2.3

2.2.4

236

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Witness andvictim protection
mechanisms exist
in legislation
to ensure thatneither witnesses
nor victims are
intimidated norinterfered withOUTSIDE thecourtroom
The legalframework
supports
compensation
or restitution
for survivors ofmodern slavery
from perpetrators

Witness and victim protection mechanisms exist in legislation so that survivors are
not intimidated or interfered with OUTSIDE the courtroom.
Witness and victim protection mechanisms OUTSIDE the courtroom include an
official witness protection program where individuals are provided with security,
new identities, and relocation support, or protection whereby the survivor’s
identity is not revealed to the public.
NOT
applicable inside the courtroom (see M2, 2.2.2.).
NOT
these exist in practice, but not in legislation. This is covered under M2, 2.3.3.
The legal framework allows survivors of modern slavery to receive compensation
for damages incurred as a result of exploitationORthe legal framework allows survivors of modern slavery to receive restitution fordamages incurred as a result of exploitation.
Compensation is when a court orders the defendant (perpetrator) to pay theclaimant (victim) for their loss.
Restitution is when a court orders the defendant (perpetrator) to give up theirgains to the claimant (victim).
When the compensation and/or restitution is available only for victims of violent
crimes, please mark as indicator not met, as this may exclude some survivors ofmodern slavery.
NOT
evidence that compensation and/or restitution has been given in practice, but noevidence found in legislation. This is covered under M2, 2.3.4.
Includes the ability to file a civil suit against the perpetrator.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

237

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APPENDIX 2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Milestone 2 (cont.) Criminal justice mechanisms function effectively to prevent modern slavery
Activity 2.3

Activity 2.4

Activity 3.1

Activity 3.1

Victim-witnesses are able to access justice in practice2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.3.4

Modern slavery
survivors havebeen awarded
compensation or
restitution fromperpetrators

There is evidence survivors of modern slavery receive compensation for damages
incurred as a result of exploitation
OR
there is evidence of modern slavery survivors receiving restitution for damages
incurred as a result of exploitationANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Compensation is when a court orders the defendant (perpetrator) to pay theclaimant (victim) for their loss.
Restitution is when a court orders the defendant (perpetrator) to give up his/her
gains to the claimant (victim).
If there is evidence of compensation and/or restitution being awarded to survivorsof modern slavery, please rate as indicator met. Please also include details of theaward.
If there is no evidence of compensation being awarded or not awarded, please rate
as information not found.
If compensation or restitution exists in legislation, move information to M2, 2.2.4.

Activity 3.2

Specialised police units are able to investigate modern slavery crimes
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

3.1.2

NEGATIVE Units do
not have necessary
resources to beable to operate
effectively

If yes to M2, 3.1.1, these units, sub-units, or teams do not have funding, sufficientbudget, or operational equipment, or are understaffed. This has had an impact on
their ability to function effectivelyANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.

Increased number of quality prosecutions
3.2.1

Special procedures for children are available in legislation and in practicein the criminal justice system
2.4.1

Legislation exists
detailing thatchildren shall bequestioned ina child friendly
manner

2.4.2

Legislation existsthat allows childtestimony to bevideotaped or toprovide evidence
remotely

The legal framework allows child survivors to be questioned by police, thejudiciary, and other authorities in a child friendly manner.
Child friendly questioning respects the child’s dignity and capacity. It includes
special safeguards to avoid any thoroughly abusive interrogation process forchildren.
For example, where legislation includes:- Only specially trained members of the law enforcement authorities shall question
child survivors.
- Child survivors are questioned by officers of the same sex, except when there iscultural evidence that this would not be in the best interests of the child.
- Guardians shall be present when a child is interviewed about their experience.
A child is defined as under 18 years old.
Any of these examples when described in legislation would be indicator met.
Any evidence that these are used ONLY in practice please rate as indicator not met.
The legal framework allows for child testimony to be videotaped and presented in
the courtroom as an official piece of evidence.
If the criminal procedure code, trafficking legislation, or Group of Experts on
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) report describes legislationthat allows children or minors to present evidence via videotape, or to act as awitness via video, this would be indicator met.
A child is defined as under 18 years old.
If no evidence in legislation, this would be indicator not met.
If there is evidence of this being used in practice, but no evidence in legislation,please rate as indicator not met.

3.2.2

3.2.3

Specialised police units are able to investigate modern slavery crimes
3.1.1

238

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Specialised law
enforcement units
exist

There is a specialised law enforcement unit or a sub-unit or team within the law
enforcement structure that has specialised mandate to conduct investigations intomodern slavery
ORprovide specialist support for colleagues
ANDthis unit has been in operation at any point since 15 February 2014.
NOT
local level anti-trafficking coordination bodies that are outside the police.

3.2.4

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Training is provided Training for the judiciary has taken place on modern slavery and related
to the judiciary
legislation, victim needs in the courtroom, basic international legal standards inmodern slavery cases, trends in modern slavery in the country, or victim profiles.
ANDthis training has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Definition of training includes formal in-person training or an online training
program as part of broader curriculum on human rights or other training
programs.
Training can be provided by INGOs with government support (support defined aspermission, development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support).
The judiciary includes judges and magistrates.
NOT
training manuals have been developed by INGOs or NGOs.
NOT
booklets with description of modern slavery laws have been handed out tojudiciary.
Training is provided Training for prosecutors has taken place on modern slavery and related legislation,
to prosecutors
victim needs in the courtroom, basic international legal standards in modern
slavery cases, trends in modern slavery in the country, or victim profiles
ANDthis training has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Definition of training includes formal in-person training or an online training
program as part of broader curriculum on human rights or other training
programs.
Training can be provided by INGOs with government support (support defined aspermission, development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support).
NOT
training manuals have been developed by INGOs or NGOs.
NOT
booklets with description of modern slavery laws have been handed out toprosecutors.
If yes to M2, 3.2.1 OR 3.2.2, training is delivered at least twice in the last five years
Training is
to either the judiciary OR prosecutors
systematic andORrecurrent (asif yes to M2, 3.2.1 AND 3.2.2 and training is delivered at least twice in the last five
distinct from oneyears to BOTH of these groups
off, isolated)ANDthis has occurred since 15 February 2014.
Please rate as indicator not met if training has been delivered to each of thesegroups only once since 15 February 2014.
If no to M2, 3.2.1 AND 3.2.2, then this indicator cannot be rated as 1, and must be
rated as 0.
Judicial punishments are either too lenient or too harsh for offenders
NEGATIVE JudicialANDpunishments are
NOT proportionate these punishments have been handed out during 15 February 2019 and 31 August2022.
to severity of
Examples of too lenient include giving of fines, suspended sentences, andthe crime andsentences that are less than the prescribed minimum. Examples of too harsh areculpability of thecorporal punishment and capital punishment.
offender239

07

APPENDIX 2

Milestone 3:

Outcome 1:

Activity 1.1

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Coordination occurs at the national and regional level and across borders,and governments are held to account for their response

Activity 1.1

Responses to modern slavery are coordinated and held to account at the national level

National mechanisms exist to coordinate the response
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.1.6

Activities in the
National Action
Plan are fully
fundedIf yes to M3, 1.1.5, there is evidence that there is a budget attached to the National
Action Plan (NAP) and this is fully funded.
Indicator still met if the NAP is part funded by government and part funded by IOs
or NGOs, but that all activities are funded.
NOT
the activities are costed, but it is unclear where this money is coming fromOR
there are reports of significant gaps in funding that are not plugged by IOs, NGOs,or other agencies.
If more than one relevant NAP exists, all must be funded to meet the indicator.
If no to M3, 1.1.5, then this indicator cannot be met and must be rated as 0.

National mechanisms exist to coordinate the response
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.1.1

National
coordination body
existsNational coordination body on any OR all forms of modern slavery (trafficking,slavery, forced labour, children in armed conflict) exists
ANDthis body coordinates the whole-of-government response to modern slavery.
It can consist of solely government representatives OR government AND NGOs orother groups such as trade unions, survivors, or other civil society groups.
If no government representatives are present (e.g., it consists solely of civil society
representatives), then indicator not met.
NOTa National Action Plan.
NOTa group or body that refers survivors to services — this is covered under M1, 3.2.1.
Survivors are included in the government response through an advisory council orthrough other forms of consultation on national policy specifically with survivor
groups.
Evidence of a meeting of a survivor advisory council or group OR
evidence of meeting of national task force or coordination body where a survivor isrepresentedAND
this group or meeting occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
If yes to M3, 1.1.1, the national coordination body meets regularly to coordinate
the government’s responseAND
at least one meeting has taken place between 15 February 2019 and 31 March
2021.
Regularly includes if the national coordination body meets monthly, quarterly, orat least once every six months.
If no to M3, 1.1.1, indicator is not met and must be rated as 0.
If yes to M3, 1.1.1, the national coordination body on modern slavery includes both
NGOs AND government representatives.
NOTa National Action Plan.
NOTa group or body that refers survivors — this is covered under M1, 3.2.1.
NOT
survivors are included in the coordination body (this is included under M3, 1.1.2).
If no to M3, 1.1.1, this indicator cannot be met and must be rated as 0.
Any National Action Plan (NAP) on modern slavery, or that covers any componentof modern slavery, such as trafficking, forced marriage, children in armed conflictANDthis NAP has been approved and is being implementedAND
the NAP covers part or all of the period 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
child labour NAPs, or broader human rights NAPs, women empowerment NAPs,
or business and human rights NAPs, unless they include a specific modern slavery
section.
NOT
regional action plans, such as the Regional Action Plan to End Child Marriage inSouth Asia (developed with SAARC countries).

1.1.2

240

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Survivors areincluded in thegovernment
response

1.1.3

The national
coordination bodymeets regularly
to coordinate thegovernment’s
response

1.1.4

National
coordination body
includes bothgovernment and
NGOs

1.1.5

A National Action
Plan exists withclear indicators
and allocation of
responsibilities

Activity 1.2

Government monitors its response
1.2.1

Independent entity
to monitor the
implementationand effectivenessof thegovernment’s
response exists

1.2.2

Government
routinely reviews
its response tomodern slavery

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

An independent entity is established to monitor the activities of the government inrelation to its anti-modern slavery efforts. This body can be outside the NAP anddoes not have to focus solely on modern slavery.
Independent entity can be an independent statutory body or individual or otherthird party that DOES NOT implement the government response to modern
slavery. Examples would include a national human rights commission or nationalrapporteur
AND
entity must exist as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
regional entities that inspect government responses, such as Group of Experts on
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings (GRETA) in Europe.
The government publicly releases its own review of government policyORthere is evidence that the government is actively reviewing its own responseANDthis is made publicANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
This can be through public inquiries, the release of annual reports, or other public
monitoring mechanisms.
The review must be released by a government body. This includes the national
coordination body described in M3, 1.1.1 or the ministry or department in chargeof the government response. It could also be released by a separate government
entity.
NOTcivil society reporting.
NOT
reporting completed by an independent entity (described by M3, 1.2.1).

241

07

APPENDIX 2

Milestone 3:

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Coordination occurs at the national and regional level and across borders,and governments are held to account for their response

Milestone 4:(cont.)

Risk factors – such as attitudes, social systems, and institutions –that enable modern slavery are addressed

Outcome 1:

Responses to modern slavery are coordinated and held to account at the national level

Outcome 1:

Government programming reflects and responds to known risk factors and drivers ofmodern slavery and patterns of exploitation

Activity 2.1

Cross-border collaboration exists
Activity 1.1

Risk factors, drivers, and patterns of exploitation are understood and inform government
action2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

2.1.1

The governmentis involved in aregional response

2.1.2

2.1.3

Activity 2.2

242

Indicator description

The government is part of a regional response.
A relevant regional body includes:- a regional body with more than two country representatives as members of thegroup, and- a focus on some form of modern slavery.
The government must have signed onto, or have agreed to abide by, the sharedvalues and objectives developed by the group (i.e., a code of conduct, an MoU on
proposed outcomes, etc.)
ANDregional body must exist as of 31 August 2022AND
regional body must have had anti-slavery or anti-trafficking activities between 15
February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
country is a member of regional bodies which have not taken any action onmodern slavery since 15 February 2019.
Bilateral agreements exist between governments of countries of origin and/or
Agreements exist
destination to collaborate on modern slavery issues
between theANDgovernment andthese agreements must be current as of 31 August 2022.
countries of origin
and/or destination NOTbilateral labour OR migration agreements (covered under M3, 3.2.2).
to collaborate on
NOTmodern slavery
evidence of repatriation (covered under M3, 2.2.1).
issuesJoint investigations There is evidence joint investigations into trafficking or other modern slavery
crimes have occurred between two or more nations
occur betweenANDnations
these joint investigations must have occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
An example would be evidence that police in Thailand have conducted a joint
investigation with Malaysia.

Cross border collaboration exists, specific to foreign survivors of modern slavery
2.2.1

The government
cooperates withthe governmentof the homecountry to facilitate
repatriation

2.2.2

Agreements
between countries
on labour
migration provide
protection for
labour migrants

The government cooperates with home country for voluntary repatriation offoreign nationals. This could include repatriation mediated by IOM
AND
this has occurred since 15 February 2014.
NOT
evidence of deportation or any involuntary return of individuals.
Repatriation refers to the voluntary return of individuals to their home country.
Deportation refers to the removal of individuals from a country without theirconsent.
Bilateral labour agreements exist between countries
AND
include provisions for protection of labour migrantsANDthese agreements are current as of 31 August 2022.
Protection can include access to labour laws, or social protection or other safety nets.
For countries that are part of the EU, membership is not sufficient to offer protection.
Instead, please see whether national legislation has been harmonised with EU
requirements under EU law.
NOT
agreements regarding number of labour migrants sent/received.

Activity 1.2

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

1.1.1

Government
facilitates orfunds research on
modern slavery

1.1.2

Government
interventions that
aim to address
modern slavery areevidence-based

Government funds or has been actively involved in research on any type of modern
slavery, including responses to modern slavery, and on the attitudes, social systems
and institutions that place people at risk of modern slaveryANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Active involvement is defined as development of the research, participation in the
research, or monetary or in-kind support.
Modern slavery includes trafficking, forced labour, slavery, worst forms of child labour,
forced marriage, and use of child soldiers.
Research can be both qualitative and quantitative and include prevalence studies.
NOT
civil society conducts research without government involvement.
NOT
government conducts research on child labour.
NOT
the government releases statistics on convictions and sentencing under modern
slavery laws.
There is evidence that government interventions or programs are based on strategies ortheories of change identified by researchANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Evidence can include a broader government strategy that incorporates modern slavery
research, the National Action Plan incorporates modern slavery research, or that the
National Action Plan or strategy is reviewed in line with recent modern slavery research.

Government interventions are tailored to known risks
1.2.1

Awareness
campaigns target
specific known
risks of modern
slavery

1.2.2

Awareness
campaigns arerepeated at regularintervals (asdistinct from oneoff, isolated)

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Any awareness campaign implemented by the government that provides detailed
information on how to avoid the risks of modern slaveryANDthis campaign has run at least once since 15 February 2014.
Campaign can be implemented by the government with a partner NGO
OR
funded by the government and solely implemented by an NGO.
These campaigns can include domestic violence, trafficking, forced marriage,
child marriage, the worst forms of child labour, child soldiers, and risky migration
practices as they relate to modern slavery.
These campaigns can be national, regional, or local campaigns, as long as they are
targeted to specific risks.
NOT
an awareness-raising, counter-trafficking campaign run by an internationalorganisation without government support (support defined as permission,development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support).
NOT
promotion of a hotline or how to identify victims — this is covered under M1, 1.1.1.
If yes to M4, 1.2.1, the awareness campaigns have occurred regularly, e.g.,
campaign started in 2014, and was updated and delivered again in 2015, 2016 etc.
ANDthis has occurred regularly since 15 February 2014.
If no to M4, 1.2.1, this indicator cannot be met and must be rated as 0.

243

07

APPENDIX 2

Milestone 4:(cont.)

Outcome 1:

Activity 2.1

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Risk factors – such as attitudes, social systems, and institutions –that enable modern slavery are addressed

Activity 2.1

Government programming reflects and responds to known risk factors and drivers ofmodern slavery and patterns of exploitation

Labour rights exist and are enforced
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.1.5

NEGATIVE Certain
groups, such as
migrant workers ordomestic workers,
are not allowed tounionise

2.1.6

Labour inspectors
are able toenter premises
unannounced

2.1.7

Labour inspectors
are able to enter
premises andenforce fines

If yes to M4, 2.1.4, labour laws do NOT provide for freedom of association andcollective bargaining for groups in line with ILO Convention No. 98.
Groups that are often excluded are fishers, domestic workers, and migrant
workers. If these groups are explicitly excluded, rate as indicator met.
Aligned with ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
(No. 98). National labour laws shall allow all workers the right to organise andencourage and promote voluntary negotiation between employers or employers’organisations and workers’ organisations (Article 3 and 4 of Convention No. 98).
NOT
military forces, police force, and the corrections service are excluded (this falls
within the scope of the Convention).
If no groups apart from military forces, police force, and the corrections service are
explicitly listed as excluded, then assume right to association apply to all and rate
as indicator not met.
If no to M4, 2.1.4, this indicator cannot be met and must be rated as 0.
Labour law details that labour inspectors are able to enter premises unannouncedAND
observations including details on the existing of unannounced audits must befrom 15 February 2019 onwards.
This is verified by the observations for each country on the Convention Labour
Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) made by the ILO Committee of Experts andpublished on Normlex.
NOT
ILO has explicitly stated that labour inspectors are not able to enter premises
unannounced or that all inspections are scheduled.
Labour law details that labour inspectors are able to enter premises and enforce
fines
AND
observations are from 15 February 2019 onwards.
This is verified by observations and direct requests for each country on theConvention Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) made by the ILO
Committee of Experts and published on Normlex.
Labour inspectors are enforcing fines or fines are levied where infringements arefound during the inspection process.
NOT
ILO has explicitly stated that either there are no fines, or these are not enforced.

Labour rights exist and are enforced
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.1.1

The government
conducts labour
inspections to
identify modern
slavery

The government conducts labour inspections in order to identify exploitative
practice, including forced labourANDthese inspections have occurred since 15 February 2014.
NOT
private companies conduct their own inspections.
NOTlabour inspectors are trained to identify modern slavery — this is covered underM1, 1.4.1 — but there is no evidence that they have conducted inspections.
NOTlabour inspections solely focused on child labour.
There a sufficient number of labour inspectors to cover the populationANDthese observations must be from 15 February 2019 onwards.
This is verified by the observations for each country on its application of ILO
Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (No. 81) made by the ILO Committee ofExperts and published on Normlex.
Number of inspectors meets ILO’s requirements if there is one labour inspector
per 10,000 workers in industrial market economies, one per 20,000 workers intransition economies, and one per 40,000 workers in less developed countries.
The legal definition of an employee includes all vulnerable workers, such as
domestic workers, migrant workers, construction workers, maritime workers, etc.
If the jurisdiction does not have a generic definition of an employee or a labour
code, the information can come from NGOs, related legislation, or reports.
If there are separate laws covering particular groups (e.g., separate legislation
providing protections for domestic workers), this would be indicator met.
This indicator does not extend to military, judiciary and civil service — if these are
NOT included, and all other groups are included, this is still indicator met.
Labour laws provide for freedom of association AND collective bargaining to ANYgroups.
Aligned with the ILO Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949
(No. 98). National labour laws shall allow all workers the right to organise andencourage and promote voluntary negotiation between employers or employers’organisations and workers’ organisations (Article 3 and 4 of Convention No. 98).
Indicator is met if ANY group has freedom of association and collective bargaining.
NOT
gaps in collective bargaining and freedom of association. This is covered under M4,
2.1.5.

2.1.2

2.1.3

2.1.4

244

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

There is a sufficientnumber of labour
inspectors to cover
the population

Labour laws extend
to everyone,
including migrant
workers, domestic
workers, andthose in the fishingand construction
sectors
Labour laws
provide for
freedom of
associationand collective
bargaining

Activity 2.2

Protections exist for migrant workers
2.2.1

Recruitment
agencies areregistered andmonitored by thegovernment

2.2.2

Laws or policies
state that private
recruitment feesare paid by theemployer, not theemployee

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Recruitment agencies are registered AND monitored by the governmentANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Forms of monitoring include: investigation of recruitment agencies, closing ofrecruitment agencies’ operations, cancelling of recruitment agencies’ contracts,
visits to recruitment agencies, and applying penalties to recruitment agencies.
NOT
only that recruitment agencies are registered by the government. There must be
some mention of form of monitoring or tracking.
Government legislation or policies state that recruitment fees and costs payable
to recruitment agencies are not charged to the employee (i.e., fees are paid by theemployer, not employee).
NOT
fees or costs associated with getting a job are not paid in practice.

245

07

APPENDIX 2

Milestone 4:(cont.)

Outcome 1:

Activity 2.2

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Risk factors – such as attitudes, social systems, and institutions –that enable modern slavery are addressed
Government programming reflects and responds to known risk factors and drivers ofmodern slavery and patterns of exploitation

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Activity 3.1

Social protections exist
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

3.1.1

All are able toaccess to healthcare

All are able to access affordable health care within in a given countryANDthis health care system is available as of 31 August 2022.
Affordable health care includes the presence of state health care schemes,
community health schemes, or financial assistance focused on providing access tohealth care for vulnerable groups.
Health care is available for all and does not discriminate based on gender,
ethnicity, religious background, or geographic region.
NOT

Protections exist for migrant workers
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.2.3

There are lawsthat prohibit thewithholding ofpassports

National laws prohibit the withholding of passports.
This MUST be explicit in the criminal/ penal code, labour legislation or code, ortrafficking legislation.
Withholding passports is defined as passports are held by an employer, official, orgovernment authority and are not available on request.
NOT
withholding passports is an aggravating offence in trafficking crimes.
NOT
withholding passports with a view to trafficking or smuggling a person is a criminal
offence.
NOT
crimes related to forgery of passports.
Any current specific government policy or law that leads to loss of visa or todeportation of migrant workers (or specific groups of migrant workers, such as
domestic workers) for leaving abusive employers.
Can be referred to as “tied visas” where a particular group of migrant workers aretied to one employer and unable to leaveANDthis policy is in place as of 31 August 2022.
NOT
there is evidence of survivors being deported for breach of visa conditions, but thisdoes not occur as a direct result of government policy – this is covered under M1,
2.3.5 and M1, 2.3.6.
Safe migration pathways exist for those seeking employment AND
country registers a value of at least 80 per cent of migration policies that facilitate
orderly, safe, regular, and responsible migration and mobility of people.
A country can belong to one of the following categories:
Fully meets indicator that country has the safe migration pathways — values of
100 per cent of necessary migration policies to facilitate orderly, safe, regular, andresponsible migration and mobility of people:
Meets — values of 80 per cent to less than 100 per cent.
Partially meets — values of 40 per cent to less than 80 per cent.
Requires further progress — values of less than 40 per cent.

2.2.4

2.2.5

NEGATIVE There
are laws or policies
that prevent or
make it difficult forworkers to leave
abusive employers
without risk ofloss of visa anddeportation and/or
security deposits
Safe migration
pathways exist
for those seeking
employment

3.1.2

3.1.3

3.1.4

Must fall in one of the following categories:
Fully meets (values of 100 per cent).
Meets (values of 80 per cent to less than 100 per cent).
NOT

health care is available for survivors of modern slavery – this is covered under M1,
2.1.4 and M1, 2.1.5.
For example, if health care is too costly, thereby excluding certain groups, or
health care is too centralised, thereby excluding certain geographical regions,please rate as indicator not met.
Source: Universal Health Coverage Index (SDG 3.8.1). If score is above 80 thenindicator is met.
All children are able Public primary education system exists and children are able to access public
primary educationto access public
primary education AND
this primary education system is available as of 31 August 2022.
regardless of
All children are able to access education, regardless of gender, ethnicity, religious
ethno-cultural
background, or geographic region.
or religious
For example, if primary education is too costly, thereby excluding attendance bybackgroundcertain groups of children, or education is not available to certain groups (such asRoma) please rate as indicator not met.
Sources: UNICEF primary education data and US Department of Labor Worst
Forms of Child Labour report. Using these two sources, if there is evidence that
free public education exists and that less than 10 per cent of the primary schoolage population are out of school, then this indicator is met.
Out of primary school rates are higher for girls than boys
NEGATIVE ThereAND
are lower primary
this is current as of 31 August 2022.
school enrolment
Source: UNICEF out of primary school data.
rates for girls
NOT
out of school rates are the same for female and male.
All children are
included in birth
registration
systems

All are able to access the government run or supported birth registration systemANDthis is current as of 31 August 2022.
Can include systems which are implemented or funded by INGOs, but withgovernment support. Government support is defined as development of the birth
registration system, participation in the system, or monetary or in-kind support.
Covering the entire population refers to the percentage of people who are
registered. Indicator is not met if less than 95 percent of the population isregistered, OR specific groups are missing.
Source: UNICEF statistics on birth registration and additional research on missing
vulnerable populations. Vulnerable populations can include ethnic, cultural, or
religious groups whose members do not have equal access to birth registration.

falls in one of the following categories:
Partially meets — Values of 40 per cent to less than 80 per cent.
Requires further progress — Values of less than 40 per cent.
Source: SDG indicator 10.7.2 (UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs andInternational Organization for Migration).

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GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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APPENDIX 2

Milestone 4:(cont.)

Outcome 1:

Activity 3.1

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Risk factors – such as attitudes, social systems, and institutions –that enable modern slavery are addressed

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Activity 3.1

Government programming reflects and responds to known risk factors and drivers ofmodern slavery and patterns of exploitation

Social protections exist
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

3.1.9

NEGATIVE
Homosexuality is
criminalised

Homosexuality is criminalised.
Source: Human Rights Watch.

Social protections exist
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

3.1.5

Systems are inplace to allow
asylum seekers toseek protection

There are legal protections, such as legislation, laws, or systems in place thatenable asylum seekers to access basic support and protection within a country’s
bordersAND
this system is available as of 31 August 2022.
Services may be provided by IOs/NGOs with government support. Government
support is defined as development of the asylum seeker system, participation in
the system, or monetary or in-kind support.
NOTasylum seekers are detained without access to services.
NOT
asylum seekers are deported without their claims being assessed.
NOT
asylum seekers claims are assessed outside of the country where they sought
asylum.
NOT
protections that are available for migrants (so not specific to refugees or asylum
seekers).
NOT
evidence that refugees or asylum seekers cannot work.

3.1.6

Legal age ofmarriage is 18

3.1.7

Unemployment
protections
for vulnerable
populations exist

3.1.8

Poverty alleviation
schemes exist

Activity 3.2

Official complicity in a crime is illegal
3.2.1

Activity 3.3

National laws
criminalise
corruption in the
public sector

Public corruption is criminalised in legislation.
Public sector includes government officials, including police, immigration, andborder guards. Corruption includes, at a minimum, bribery of officials. Please referto legislation, not to instances of combating corruption.

NEGATIVE Official complicity is not investigated
3.3.1

Sources: US State Department country reports on human rights practices,
Amnesty International, Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch.
The legal age of marriage is 18 for males and females with NO exceptionsAND
this is current as of 31 August 2022.
At least one form of unemployment protection for vulnerable populations exists
ANDthis is current as of 31 August 2022.
Forms of unemployment protections, also referred in the source as unemployment
benefit programs, may include but are not limited to: social, universal or
voluntary insurance, severance payments, social assistance, unemployment aid,
unemployment insurance, and right of withdrawal from provident fund.

NEGATIVE Reports
of individual
officials’ complicity
in modern slavery
cases have notbeen investigated

Any reports of officials’ complicity or corruption in modern slavery cases
ANDthat these have NOT been investigatedANDthese have occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
Officials include: government officials, police, immigration officials, border guards,
and labour inspectors.
Excludes consular staff (covered by M4, 3.4.3).
MUST be related to modern slavery crimes (trafficking, forced labour, slavery, forced
marriage, use of child soldiers, and worst forms of child labour).
If there is evidence of widespread corruption, but investigations are regularly taking
place, please rate as indicator met.
If there is evidence of widespread corruption, but only a minimal number ofinvestigations have been completed OR there is limited information available, please
rate as indicator not met.
NOT
evidence of general corruption of law enforcement.

Source: International Labour Organization World Social Protection Report.
Poverty alleviation schemes exist
ANDthis is current as of 31 August 2022.
At least seven of the following eight policy areas are covered: child and family,maternity (cash), sickness (cash), unemployment, employment injury, disability/
invalidity, survivors, old age.
The following categories meet the indicator:- Comprehensive scope of legal coverage – eight policy areas covered.
- Nearly comprehensive scope of legal coverage - seven policy areas covered.
NOT
the following categories:- Intermediate scope of legal coverage – five to six policy areas covered.
- Limited scope of legal coverage - one to four policy areas covered.
- Incomplete information available – no known policy areas covered.
Source: International Labour Organization World Social Protection Report.

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APPENDIX 2

Milestone 4:(cont.)

Outcome 1:

Activity 3.4

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Risk factors – such as attitudes, social systems, and institutions –that enable modern slavery are addressed

Government provides support for citizens overseas
2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

3.4.1

Government
provides training
on modern slavery
for its consular staff

3.4.3

Government and business stop sourcing goods and services produced by forced labour

Outcome 1:

Government sources goods and services that are slavery-free

Activity 1 .1

Government regulates and investigates public procurement to prevent use of forced labour

Government
providesidentification
documents andsupports travel
arrangements for
citizen return

NEGATIVE
Diplomatic staff are
not investigated foralleged complicity
in modern slavery
cases or abuse ofsurvivors

Indicator description

Government provides training for its embassy or consular staff before departure
for a posting or during a postingAND
this has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Definition of training includes formal in-person training or part of an online
training program as part of broader curriculum on human rights or other training
programs.
Training can be provided by INGOs with government support (support defined aspermission, development of the training, or monetary or in-kind support).
NOT
training manuals have been developed by INGOs, NGOs.
NOT
booklets with indicators of trafficking have been handed out to embassy staff.
Any citizen found exploited overseas can obtain ID documents from their own
country OR be helped to travel back to their country by their own government.
These documents are normally given by a citizen’s embassies or consulates in thehost countryANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
Evidence in law or in practice is sufficient to meet the indicator.
This information can be found in modern slavery legislation, or on ministry/
department of foreign affairs websites.
Diplomatic OR embassy staff are complicit in the exploitation of nationals or abuse
those who seek assistance at the embassyANDno investigations have taken place into this complicity
ANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

1.1.1

Guidelines exist for The government has drafted guidelines or an internal memo for public
public procurement procurement officials that outline standards and/or operating procedures toprevent the purchase of public goods or services that involve modern slavery
officialsANDthis has occurred since 15 February 2014.
These can be general guidelines on human rights that include sub-sections on
modern slavery. The guidelines can include outlining steps to be taken should acontractor be found to use forced labour or requiring government contractors overa certain value to maintain compliance plans.
Public procurement The government drafts and implements public procurement policies andstandards that explicitly prohibit public procurement agencies from engaging
policies andbusinesses suspected of using forced labour OR from purchasing products thatsystems exist towere made using forced labour
minimise the riskANDof governments
this has occurred since 15 February 2014.
purchasing
products tainted by These policies can include prohibiting those found to be using forced labour frompublic contracts OR inserting clauses in public contracts prohibiting the use offorced labour
forced labour.
The government releases reports on activities taken to prevent use of forced
Annual reports on
government action labour in public procurementAND
to prevent use ofthis has occurred since 15 February 2014
forced labour inpublic procurement OR
if the policy has been adopted since 15 February 2019, it is enough that reporting is
are produced andstipulated as part of regulating compliance.
publicly available
The report can be on human rights but include a sub-section on modern slavery.
Modern Slavery Act statements produced by the government would meet thisindicator.
The government has provided training to procurement officials on what modern
The government
slavery is, how it is relevant to their role, and on existing government policies andhas provided
their implementation
training to publicANDprocurement
officials on modern this has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.
This training is provided face-to-face, or through online training modules.
slavery
There is evidence that the government has worked with contractors in public
There is evidence
supply chains that have been identified as having issues with use of forced labourthat theto implement corrective action plansgovernment has
ORtaken remedialwhere the use of forced labour is prevalent in public supply chains and theaction wherecontractor is unwilling to work with the government, there is evidence that theforced labour has
been discovered in government has cancelled the contract
public procurement AND
this has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.

1.1.2

1.1.3

1.1.4

NEGATIVE Government places its population, or part of its population, in forced labour
4.1.1

250

Milestone 5:

Government programming reflects and responds to known risk factors and drivers ofmodern slavery and patterns of exploitation

3.4.2

Activity 4.1

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

NEGATIVE Stateimposed forced
labour exists

Any form of state-imposed forced labour, where the government forced the whole
population, or segments of it, to work under threat of penalty, and for which work
people have not offered themselves voluntarilyANDthis has occurred between 15 February 2019 and 31 August 2022.
NOT
compulsory military service, work which forms part of normal civil obligations of
the citizen, or work performed in cases of emergency (such as war, fire, famine, or
flood).
This is verified by ILO Committee Experts through both direct requests AND
observations for the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) AND for the
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105).
Follows ILO typology - see Global Estimates of Modern Slavery.

1.1.5

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Indicator description

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07

APPENDIX 2

Milestone 5:

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Government and business stop sourcing goods and services produced by forced labour

Table 39
Conceptual framework formeasuring government responses

Activity 2 .2

(cont.)

Outcome 1:

Activity 2 .1

Government sources goods and services that are slavery-free2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.1.1

Laws or policies
require businesses
to report on
their actions to
implement risk
minimisation
policies
Penalties exist forcompanies that failto report
Penalties havebeen applied tocompanies that failto report
The government
implementsa responsible
investment
reportingrequirement
for investment
funds and banks
headquarteredin their country
to ensure thatinvestment does
not support
modern slavery

Legislation or policies require businesses to report on their actions to minimiserisk of forced labour in their supply chain.
For example, the UK Modern Slavery Act requires businesses earning more than
GBP36 million annually to report on their actions to combat modern slavery or theAustralian Modern Slavery Act requires businesses with a turnover of more than
AUD100 million to report on their actions to combat modern slavery.

2.1.3

2.1.4

252

2022
Indicator
NumberIndicator

Indicator description

2.2.3

Penalties havebeen applied tocompanies thathave failed tocomply with theirdue diligence plans

If yes to M5, 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, there is evidence that penalties have been enforced for
those companies that have failed to comply with their due diligence plansANDthis has occurred at least once since 15 February 2014.

Government encourages mandatory reporting

2.1.2

Activity 2 .2

Government encourages mandatory due diligence

If yes to M5, 2.1.1, mandatory reporting requirements include civil or criminal
penalties for companies that fail to report.
If no to M5, 2.1.1, indicator is not met and must be rated as 0.
If yes to M5, 2.1.1 and M5, 2.1.2, there is evidence that the government has pursued
civil or criminal proceedings for companies that have failed to report.
If no to M5, 2.1.1 and M5, 2.1.2, indicator is not met and must be rated as 0.
Investment funds and banks headquartered in the country MUST report on
modern slavery risk in investmentsANDthis reporting must occur at least every two years.
If policy is in place, there MUST be evidence that this has occurred since 15
February 2014 OR if the policy has recently been adopted, it is enough thatreporting is stipulated as part of regulating compliance.
NOTE: There must be explicit mention of modern slavery NOT that investment
funds or banks have corporate social responsibility policies that require them toreport on human rights UNLESS modern slavery is part of this reporting.
ESG reporting that includes forced labour / modern slavery on stock exchanges is
included in this indicator.

Activity 2 .3

Government is using alternative avenues to ensure businesses are tacklingforced labour in supply chains
2.3.1

2.3.2

2.3.3

2.3.4

Government encourages mandatory due diligence
2.2.1

The government
has put in place
mandatory humanrights due diligencelegislation

2.2.2

Mandatory humanrights due diligencelegislation includes“right of action”
for survivors ofmodern slavery
crimesLegislation or policies require business to produce a due diligence planthat identifies and prevents risks to human rights (and sometimes also theenvironment) that could occur as a result of their business activities.
This could include the production of publicly available due diligence plans forwhich they can then be held accountable.
For example, French Duty of Vigilance legislation
If yes to M5, 2.2.1, the legislation allows for a “right of action” whereby interested
persons, including those harmed by corporate failures to observe human rights
due diligence standards, can make applications to judicial authorities requesting
companies to correct problems with compliance. It can also include potential
compensation for those affected.
E.g., French Duty of Vigilance legislation

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

The governments
has identified highrisk sectors andhave taken action
to work with these
sectors to eradicate
modern slavery
Laws or policies
allow governments
to create a public
list of businesses
that have beenfound to tolerateslavery in their
supply chains
Laws or policies
prevent the importof goods andservices made withforced labour
Laws are in placethat make it acriminal offence
for company
directors orcompanies who failto prevent modern
slavery and failto undertake
reasonable due
diligence in firsttier supply chain

The government has collaborated with businesses to identify high-risk sectors
and set up national sector-specific initiatives that support businesses in tacklingmodern slavery. These can be broader initiatives that cover sustainability, healthand safety, etc., but must include some elements of tackling modern slavery (e.g.,
the sustainable textile partnership in Germany)ANDthis has occurred since 15 February 2014.
The government has worked with businesses and NGOs to create a public list of
businesses that have been found to tolerate forced labour in their supply chains
AND/OR
these businesses are prevented from accessing public funds (e.g., the “dirty list” inBrazil)ANDthis is operational as of 31 August 2022.
The government has prohibited the import of goods and services made with forced
labour (e.g., the US Tariff Act)AND
this is current as of 31 August 2022.
Directors can be charged and prosecuted for slavery in first tier supply chains
where it can be shown that due diligence has not occurred. This indicatormeasures the existence of this provision in legislationANDthis is current as of 31 August 2022.

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APPENDIX 3
1

PRODUCTSTEXTHEREAT RISKAPPENDIX 3:

Methodology for identifying thehighest value products at risk offorced labour imported by the G20
The world’s most developed countries areconnected to modern slavery not only throughexploitation occurring within their own borders but
also through the goods they import. In the GSI, we
identify the highest value products at risk of being
produced by forced labour which are currently being
imported into G20 countries. The G20 are the largest
importers (and exporters) in the world, accounting
for 75 per cent of global trade.1

Table 40
Initial list of
goods producedby forced labour
as reportedby the US
Departmentof Labor

254

Ranking

As a first step we developed a list of products at
risk of being produced by modern slavery. This was
informed by high-risk countries and industries aswell as recent suspected cases of forced labour
identified in the production of these goods.2 We
then compiled import data for all G20 countries forthese products.

Product with risk ofmodern slavery

Source countries

1

Bricks2

Cotton3

Garments

4

CattleAfghanistan, Myanmar, Cambodia, China, India, Nepal, North Korea,
Pakistan, Russia
Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Viet Nam,
Bangladesh
Bolivia, Brazil, Niger, Paraguay, South Sudan

5

Sugarcane

Bolivia, Brazil, Myanmar, Dominican Republic, Pakistan

6

Gold

7

Fish

Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, North Korea, Peru,
Venezuela
China, Ghana, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan

8

TimberBrazil, North Korea, Peru, Russia

9

Carpets

India, Nepal, Pakistan

10

Coal

China, North Korea, Pakistan

11

Rice

Myanmar, India, Mali

12

Brazil Nuts/Chestnuts

Bolivia, Peru

13

Cocoa

CÔte d’Ivoire, Nigeria

14

Diamonds

Angola, Sierra Leone

15

Electronics

China, Malaysia

16

CoffeeBrazil, CÔte d’Ivoire

17

Embellished textiles

India, Nepal

18

Palm oilIndonesia, Malaysia

19
20
21
22

Shrimp
StonesTextilesThread/Yarn

Myanmar, Thailand
India, Nepal
China, North Korea
China, India

Identifying a list of imports
at risk of modern slavery
Our starting point was the 2022 US Department ofLabor list of goods produced by forced labour andchild labour. 3 The list was first filtered by “forced
labour” to ensure that products suspected of being
produced only by child labour were excluded. A
simple country count of products was performed todetermine a ranking: the product with the highest
number of countries listed against it was ranked
first, the product with the second highest numbersof countries against it was ranked second, and soon. This produced an initial list of 22 product/source
country combinations at risk of modern slavery.
As a next step, we conducted a literature
review of the product/source country combinations
to independently validate the list, using thefollowing parameters:– Reference period: 1 January 2017 to 31 July 2022.
– Mix of media and non-media sources (peerreviewed journal articles, research reports,
government documents, internationalorganisation reports, NGO reports, etc.),
whenever possible.
The following hierarchy of sources was usedin conducting this research:
1. Peer reviewed publications, e.g., articles fromjournals identified through database searches
and, if required, through Google Scholar.
2. Reports of international organisations, e.g., ILO,
IOM, UN.
3. Reports of international NGOs, e.g., Human Rights
Watch, Amnesty International.
4. Government websites, e.g., Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
5. National NGOs.
6. Media, through Google searches.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

It should be noted that this list is not exhaustive,
and we performed additional searches
where suggested sources did not provide theinformation required.
Once the literature review was completed, aproduct/source country combination was included
if it was on the 2022 US Department of Labor list of
goods produced by forced labour that are listed inTable 40. In addition, the product/source country
combination had to be independently verified
by credible secondary sources, such as journal
articles, primary research reports, reports froman international organisation or an NGO, or media
reports. If no relevant references were found or
the information was more than five years old, theproduct/source country combination was excluded.

London, United
Kingdom,
December 2022.
A headline from the Evening
Standard newspaper reads“Modern Slavery Blitz on
London embassies” following
the proposal of a new law
to stop foreign embassies
claiming immunity fromlegal actions being taken by
domestic workers under theiremployment. The law willallow these workers to take
diplomats to an employment
tribunal for malpractice,including modern slavery.
Photo credit: Mike Kemp/In
Pictures via Getty Images.

The literature review resulted in the final list of
at-risk products seen in Table 41. Source countries
marked in red were deleted from the list as we could
not find recent evidence to verify the occurrence offorced labour. The countries marked in green wereadded to the final list based on Walk Free primaryresearch into modern slavery in the cocoa sector in
Ghana4 and well-known exploitation occurring in the
products of solar panels in China. 5

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APPENDIX 3
1

PRODUCTSTEXTHEREAT RISK

Table 41
Final list of products at risk of modern slavery by source country.
Product

Source countries

BricksAfghanistan, Myanmar, Cambodia, China, India, Nepal,
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia
Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Malaysia, Thailand, Viet Nam, Bangladesh
China, Ghana, Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan
Benin, Burkina Faso, China, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan
Burkina Faso, Democratic Republic of the Congo, North Korea, Peru, Venezuela
Brazil, North Korea, Peru, Russia
India, Nepal, Pakistan
China, North Korea, Pakistan
Bolivia, Brazil, Niger, Paraguay, South Sudan
Bolivia, Brazil, Myanmar, Dominican Republic, Pakistan
Myanmar, India, MaliCÔte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Ghana
China, Malaysia
Indonesia, Malaysia
China, North Korea
Bolivia, Peru
Brazil, CÔte d’Ivoire
Angola, Sierra Leone
India, Nepal
Myanmar, Thailand
India, Nepal
China, India
China

Garments
Fish
CottonGold
TimberCarpets
Coal
CattleSugarcane
Rice
Cocoa
Electronics
Palm oil
TextilesBrazil Nuts/Chestnuts
CoffeeDiamonds
Embellished textiles
Shrimp
StonesThread/Yarn
Solar Panels

Identifying the mostvaluable imported products
at risk of modern slavery
Trade data was obtained for the 19 G20 member
countries. South Africa was included in thisanalysis for the first time: in 2018 it was excluded
as it reported trade data via the Southern African
Customs Union. The European Union was excluded
to avoid double counting trade data from France,
Germany, and Italy.
The final list of G20 countries are:
1. Argentina
11.
2. Australia
12.
3. Brazil
13.
4. Canada
14.
5. China
15.
6. France
16.
7. Germany
17.
8. India18.
9. Indonesia
19.
10. Italy

256

Japan
MexicoRussiaSaudi Arabia
South Africa
South Korea
Türkiye
United Kingdom
United States

Harmonized Commodity Description
and Coding System
The Harmonized System (HS) is an international
nomenclature for the classification of products.
It allows participating countries to classify traded
goods on a common basis for customs purposes. At
the international level, the HS for classifying goods
is a six-digit code system.
The HS comprises approximately 5,300 productdescriptions that appear as headings andsubheadings, arranged in 99 chapters, and grouped
into 21 sections. The six digits can be broken down
into three parts. The first two digits (HS-2) identify
the chapter the goods are classified in, e.g. 09 =Coffee, Tea, Maté and Spices. The next two digits(HS-4) identify groupings within that chapter, e.g.
09.02 = Tea, whether or not flavoured. The next twodigits (HS-6) are even more specific, e.g. 09.02.10 =Green tea (not fermented). Up to the HS-6 digit level,
most countries classify products in the same way (afew exceptions exist where some countries apply old
versions of the HS).

Data compilation
Each of the products from the final list in Table 41 isrepresented by multiple HS 2017 product categories
within the BACI trade dataset. The relevant
categories were identified using the Foreign Trade
Online directory.7 Using STATA, import data for all
relevant product categories and source countries
was extracted from the 2021 BACI dataset for 19
G20 countries.
The products were then ranked from highest
to lowest according to import value in US$. The
resulting list of top five products at risk of modern
slavery (according to US$ value) imported by eachof the G20 countries is presented in Table 42. This
product list has changed between 2018 and 2023.
Textiles, palm oil, and coffee were not includedin the top five most valuable products at risk ofmodern slavery of any G20 country in 2018. Cottonand carpets remain products at risk of modern
slavery, however they have dropped off the highest
value list since 2018.

The HS was introduced in 1988 and has been
adopted by most countries worldwide. It has
undergone several revisions in the classification of
products, which entered into force in 1996, 2002,
2007, 2012, and 2017.

Data source and definitions

Kolti, Nepal, March
2022.

BACI dataset

A young Nepali woman works in
her family’s vegetable garden,while temperatures rise andthreaten 240 million people
living in the Hindu Kush. The
remote communities in thearea are some of the mostimpoverished, with women andchildren facing the greatest risk
from climate change, including
malnourishment and poverty.
Photo credit: Rebecca Conway
via Getty Images.

The import data used for this analysis was takenfrom the BACI dataset.6 BACI is the world trade
database developed by the French research centre
Centre d’ Études Prospectives et d’Informations
Internationales (CEPII) at a high level ofproduct disaggregation.
Original trade data is provided by the United Nations
Statistical Division (COMTRADE database). BACI isconstructed using a procedure that reconciles thedeclarations of the exporter and the importer. This
harmonisation procedure enables the extensionof the number of countries for which trade data isavailable. The dataset gives information about thevalue of trade (in thousands of US dollars) and thequantity (in tonnes).
For this project, we used the 2021 BACI trade
dataset with the 2017 Harmonized System (HS)nomenclature, which was the most recent available
at the time of writing.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

257

07

APPENDIX 3
1

Table 42
Top five products at risk of modern slavery according to US$
value imported by G20 countries8
G20 country

PRODUCTSTEXTHEREAT RISK

Argentina

Imported product at riskof modern slavery
Electronics
Garments

Australia

TextilesCoffeeSolar panels
Electronics
Garments

Solar panels
TextilesFish

BrazilSolar panels
Electronics
Garments

Palm oil

CanadaTextilesElectronics
Garments

Gold
TextilesSugarcane258

Source country
China
Malaysia
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
BrazilChina
China
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
China
China
Ghana
Indonesia
TaiwanThailand
China
China
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
China
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
Indonesia
Malaysia
China
China
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
Peru
China
BrazilTable 42
Top five products at risk of modern slavery according to US$
value imported by G20 countries8
Import value (inthousands of US$)1,249,673
19,96911,673
5,914
103,034
6,338
448
16,57482,02559,46755,5458,499,583
387,14433
814,958
1,830
4,847,261
298,593
25,397400,830
1,302,216
469,83975,023
2
73,48839,283
199,156
2,771,297
1,207,778
15,137
6,385
108,725
624,30746,3691,963
52,986
511,464
19,313
269,509
11,203,647
76,024
6
1,278,694
1,309
3,068,653
259,998
12,6181,053,657
2,097,402
482,486
427,598

G20 country
China

Imported product at riskof modern slavery
Palm oilTimberCattleGarments

FranceSugarcane
Garments

Electronics
Cocoa

Germany

TextilesSolar panels
Electronics
Garments

India

Solar panels
TextilesCoffeeElectronics
Palm oilSolar panelsGold
Garments

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Source country
Indonesia
MalaysiaBrazilPeru
RussiaBrazilArgentina
Bangladesh
BrazilIndia
Malaysia
Viet Nam
BrazilArgentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
Malaysia
Côte d’Ivoire
Ghana
China
China
China
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
China
BrazilChina
Malaysia
Indonesia
Malaysia
China
Burkina Faso
Peru
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
Malaysia
Viet Nam

Import value (inthousands of US$)4,902,375
1,432,821
322,095
37,3083,564,090
3,907,805
24
404,894358
60,244
16,9981,173,538
1,408,718
577
1,917,574
2,301
4,524,306
682,5546,475
564,9092,609,763
13,678462,434
172,531434,278
362,406
20,319,762
151,57051
7,785,869
857
7,993,142
1,301,894
36,1601,284,308
2,425,414
1,620,893
1,064,743
7,345,027
432,868
3,588,848
4,014,696
3,820,664
934,5032,143,967
472,834
78
753,798
7,523
47,222259

07

APPENDIX 3
1

G20 country

PRODUCTSTEXTHEREAT RISK

Indonesia

Imported product at riskof modern slavery
Electronics
Garments

Textiles
Coal

Italy

Sugarcane
Garments

Electronics
Palm oilJapan

TextilesCoffeeElectronics
Garments

Fish

Solar panels
Textiles260

Table 42
Top five products at risk of modern slavery according to US$
value imported by G20 countries8

Table 42
Top five products at risk of modern slavery according to US$
value imported by G20 countries8
Source country
China
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
China
PakistanBrazilArgentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
Malaysia
Indonesia
Malaysia
China
BrazilChina
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
Ghana
Indonesia
TaiwanThailand
China
China

Import value (inthousands of US$)2,919,522
77,9090.4
58,744
7563,955
15,41021,46749,025
663,425432,6490.2
353,740143
1,420,659
1,110
2,560,544
353,801
4,419
275,277
4,099,594
11,962769,786
416,258
533,455
477,026
29,015,858
111,882
400
1,161,546
1,773
13,008,247
207,494
116,704
3,129,860
1,617,554
1,305
189,292
376,438
484,290
1,887,658
1,805,444

G20 country
MexicoImported product at riskof modern slavery
Electronics
Garments

Solar panels
TextilesTimberRussiaElectronics
Garments

Palm oil
CattleSaudi Arabia

TextilesGarments

Electronics
Palm oil
Rice
Sugarcane

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Source country
China
Malaysia
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
China
BrazilPeru
RussiaChina
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
Indonesia
MalaysiaBrazilParaguay
China
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
Malaysia
Indonesia
Malaysia
India
BrazilImport value (inthousands of US$)5,553,221
178,698
394,062
1,235
1,525,355
109,101
5,633
119,953498,915
476,471
305,542
8,671
12,402
8,699,722
24,4780.1
1,161,231
372
2,976,065
150,5547,103
399,252
886,351
15,946129,229
333,732
420,05911
394,959626
2,317,822
414,568
6,613
53,4162,150,220
22,842
480,481
369,096
812,366
340,235

261

07

APPENDIX 3
1

G20 country

PRODUCTSTEXTHEREAT RISKSouth Africa

Imported product at riskof modern slavery
Electronics
Garments

Palm oilSouth Korea

Solar panels
TextilesElectronics
Garments

Solar panels
Palm oilFishTürkiyeElectronics
Palm oil
Garments

Solar panels
Cocoa

262

Table 42
Top five products at risk of modern slavery according to US$
value imported by G20 countries8

Table 42
Top five products at risk of modern slavery according to US$
value imported by G20 countries8
Source country
China
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
Indonesia
Malaysia
China
China
China
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
China
Ghana
Indonesia
TaiwanThailandChina
Malaysia
Indonesia
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
Côte d’Ivoire
Ghana

Import value (inthousands of US$)2,435,721
4,566
24
105,396456
1,157,112
97,275
3,157
32,184
436,801
116,863
256,757
142,188
9,275,468
15,132
136
443,987
243
4,882,687
56,8238,626
3,020,662
1,003,783
453,534
373,781533,256
1,815
32,753
114,442
22,362
3,173,722
8,515
223,729
659,91965
190,776
171
271,493
23,75627,20963,508374,515
243,290
76,298

GSI 2023 V1.1 / 090823

G20 country
UK

Imported product at riskof modern slavery
Electronics
Garments

TextilesTimberFish

USElectronics
Garments

TextilesTimberFish

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Source country
China
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
BrazilPeru
RussiaChina
Ghana
Indonesia
TaiwanThailandChina
Malaysia
Argentina
Bangladesh
BrazilChina
India
Malaysia
Viet Nam
China
BrazilPeru
RussiaChina
Ghana
Indonesia
TaiwanThailand

Import value (inthousands of US$)
14,713,414
37,016189
3,009,806
1,294
5,257,572
1,255,998
22,225509,046538,295
130,42277352,850
230,258
38,875
18,615761
16,475
106,158,032
1,427,054
950
7,273,296
25,17324,889,568
4,657,696
256,474
15,288,211
4,752,876
2,107,498
8,361
549,653
1,015,843
257
406,921
144,891
670,363263

08

ENDNOTES

Global findings..............................................................................266
Spotlight: Understanding forced and child marriage................268
Spotlight: Anti-social: modern slavery on social media............271
Spotlight: Guardians and offenders: examining
state-imposed forced labour......................................................274
Spotlight: Modern slavery:
A weapon and consequence of war.............................................281
Spotlight: The costs of the climate crisis................................... 284
Regional findings: Africa..............................................................286
Regional Findings: The Americas............................................... 290
Regional Findings: Arab States....................................................292
Spotlight: Disempowered, dehumanised, deported:
life under the kafala system........................................................298
Regional findings: Asia and the Pacific...................................... 304
Spotlight: Orphanages as modern slavery hubs....................... 306
Regional findings: Europe and Central Asia...............................308
Importing products at risk of forced labour...............................311
Spotlight on sectors: Investing in exploitation..........................315
Stitched with slavery in the seams..............................................317
Charting progress against forced labour at sea.........................319
Forced labour: chocolate’s hidden ingredient...........................323
Appendices...................................................................................325

Dhaka, Bangladesh, January 2021.
Labourers unload coal from a cargo ship in Gabtoli on the outskirts of
Dhaka. After unloading 30 baskets of coal they earn around US$1.
Kazi Salahuddin Razu/NurPhoto via Getty Images.

264

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

265

08

ENDNOTESENDNOTESGLOBAL FINDINGS
1.

Freedom House 2022, The Global Expansion of Authoritarian Rule. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/
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2.

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3.

The World Bank 2022, Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2022: Reversals of
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4.

Council on Foreign Relations 2023, Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads ofEurope and Russia. Available from: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/
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5.

UN Human Rights Council 2014, Report of the Commission of Inquiryon Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea – A/
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6.

McCabe, H & Eglen, L 2022, ‘’I bought you. You are my wife’: ‘Modern
Slavery’ and Forced Marriage’, Journal of Human Trafficking, pp. 1–24.
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705.2022.2096366. [15 March 2023].

7.

International Labour Organization 2019, Observation (CEACR) –adopted 2018, published 108th ILO session (2019): Eritrea. Available
from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_
COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:3958326,103282,Eritrea,2018. [15 March 2023].

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

Human Rights Watch 2019, ‘They Are Making Us into Slaves, Not Educating Us’ | How Indefinite Conscription Restricts Young People’s Rights,
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27.

13.

14.

International Organization for Migration 2022, World Migration Report.
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15.

2022, ‘EU Countries Continue to Extend Physical Barriers to Prevent
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16.

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18.

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19.

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common-european-asylum-system/country-responsible-asylum-application-dublin-regulation_en. [22 March 2023].

20.

Ministers and State Secretaries of Interior and/or Migration of the
Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark,the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, the Swiss Confederation 2023, ‘Joint Communiqué’,Politico, 8 March. Available from: https://www.politico.eu/wp-content/
uploads/2023/03/09/JointStatementv8-3.pdf. [22 March 2023]; Orbán,
T 2023, ‘EU Countries Call for Stricter Asylum Rules’, The European
Conservative, 11 March. Available from: https://europeanconservative.
com/articles/news/eu-countries-call-for-stricter-asylum-rules/. [22March 2023].

28.

Hayat, H 2021, ‘Brunei stands firm against human trafficking’, Borneo
Bulletin, 27 January. Available from: https://borneobulletin.com.bn/
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29.

2020, ‘Oman eases restrictions on sponsorship transfer’, MigrantRights.Org, 8 June. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.
org/2020/06/oman-eases-restrictions-on-sponsorship-transfer/. [3November 2020].

30.

2020, ‘Qatar: Significant Labor and Kafala Reforms’, Human Rights
Watch, 24 September. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/
news/2020/09/24/qatar-significant-labor-and-kafala-reforms. [2November 2020].

31.

2020, ‘Saudi Arabia eases ‘kafala’ system restrictions on migrant
workers’, BBC News, 4 November. Available from: https://www.bbc.
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Reforms for Private Sector Workers’, Saudi Press Agency, 4 November.
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32.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2020, Trafficking in
Persons Report: Republic of Congo Narrative, United States Departmentof State, p. 166. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf. [23May 2022].

33.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking in
Persons Report: Canada Country Narrative, United States Departmentof State, pp. 164-168. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/TIP_Report_Final_20210701.pdf. [29 November2021].

34.

An Act Prohibiting the Practice of Child Marriage and Imposing Penalties
for Violations Thereof, 2021 (Republic Act No. 11596) (The Philippines);
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ph/articles/1164695#:~:text=MANILA%20%E2%80%93%20Child%20
marriage%20is%20now,Republic%20Act%20(R.A.)&text=Under%20
the%20law%2C%20the%20facilitation,%E2%80%9Cunlawful%20
and%20prohibited%20acts.%E2%80%9D. [31 January 2022].

35.

Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings 2020,
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36.

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[22 March 2023].

37.

We have excluded Afghanistan, Palestine, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen
due to ongoing conflict and extreme disruption. We have also excluded
small island states where these were not included in the US Trafficking in
Persons Report and/ or excluded from at least five global datasets.

38.

2023, ‘Legal age of marriage in England and Wales rises to 18’, Gov.uk,
27 February. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/
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England%20and%20Wales. [22 March 2023].

21.

Modern Slavery Act, 2018 (Australia Cmlth).

39.

The Transparency Act, 2021. (Norway)

22.

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[22 March 2023].

40.

Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance, 2017 (Act no. 2017-399) (France)

41.

Swiss Code of Obligations, 964j et seqq (Switzerland), Due Diligence andTransparency Ordinance, 2023 (Switzerland)42.

Act on Corporate Due Diligence in Supply Chains, 2021 (Germany)23.

Nationality and Borders Act, 2022 (UK Parliament).

43.

24.

Illegal Migration Bill, 2023 (UK Parliament).

25.

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26.

266

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17.

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44.

Child Labour Due Diligence Law, 2019 (Netherlands)

45.

Tariff Act of 1930 (United States)

46.

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GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

tation-of-the-uyghur-forced-labor-prevention-act/. [12 July 2022];
Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (H.R.6210) (United States)
47.

Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office 2022, UK Sanctions List
Publication, United Kingdom. Available from: https://docs.fcdo.gov.
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48.

Bureau of International Labor Affairs 2020, 2020 Findings on the Worst
Forms of Child Labor, United States Department of Labor, p. 427. Available from: https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_
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49.

2020, ‘All That Glitters is Not Gold: Turmoil in Zimbabwe’s Mining
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50.

Global Organized Crime Index, Tajikistan. Available from: https://
ocindex.net/country/Tajikistan. [22 March 2022].

51.

2021, ‘Qatar: World Cup contractors allegedly misusing visas to recruit
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52.

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53.

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54.

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55.

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marriage.pdf.

57.

As above.

58.

As above.

267

08

ENDNOTES
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47.

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48.

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49.

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50.

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53.

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54.

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SPOTLIGHTS

16.

Understanding forced
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17.

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32.

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Askola, H 2018, ‘Responding to Vulnerability? Forced Marriage and theLaw’, UNSW Law Journal, vol. 41, no. 3, p. 984. Available from: https://www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
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1.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UNHR) 1948, (General Assembly
resolution 217 A (III)), opened for signature 10 December 1948, art.
16(2).

2.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern
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3.

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4.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. Available
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GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf. [21 September 2022].

5.

As above.

6.

See for example, reports of LGBTQI+ people being forced to marry tocorrect perceived deviance: IraQueer & OutRight Action International
2022, ‘I need to be free’: What it means to be a queer woman in today’s
Iraq, OutRight Action International, pp. 9-15. Available from: https://outrightinternational.org/sites/default/files/Iraq_EnglishLowRes.
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Caucasus ‘face sexual violence, forced marriage, and murder’, OC Media.
Available from: https://oc-media.org/queer-women-in-the-north-caucasus-face-sexual-violence-forced-marriage-and-murder/. [10 March2020]; Taylor, L 2018, ‘Young, gay and married - Britons wed to avoid
abuse’, Reuters, 24 August 2018. Available from: https://www.reuters.
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Marriage Unit statistics 2020,’ Home Office. Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/forced-marriage-unit-statistics-2020/forced-marriage-unit-statistics-2020#:~:text=In%20
2020%2C%2053%20cases%20(7,take%20place%20in%20the%20UK.
[1 July 2022]; Itai, D 2022, ‘Lesbian, transgender women across Africa
forced into heterosexual marriages’, Washington Blade, 19 December
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lesbian-transgender-women-across-africa-forced-into-heterosexual-marriages/. [15 March 2023].

7.

8.

9.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern
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Singh, R, Goli, S & Singh, A 2022, ‘Armed conflicts and girl child marriages: A global evidence’, Children and Youth Services Review, vol. 137, pp.
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[27 June 2022].
International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern
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10.

Walk Free 2020, Stacked Odds, Minderoo Foundation, pp. 45,
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11.

Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 2019, Goalkeepers: Examining Inequality, pp. 8-10. Available from: https://www.gatesfoundation.org/goalkeepers/report/2019-report/#ExaminingInequality. [9 June 2022].

12.

UNICEF 2022, ‘Child marriage,’ UNICEF. Available from: https://data.
unicef.org/topic/child-protection/child-marriage/. [13 March 2023].

13.

Singh, R, Goli, S & Singh, A 2022, ‘Armed conflicts and girl child marriages: A global evidence’, Children and Youth Services Review, vol. 137, pp.
2-8. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2022.106458.
[27 June 2022].

14.

As above.

15.

As above.

268

21.

22.

Walk Free 2020, Stacked Odds, Minderoo Foundation, p. 35. Available
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35.

Psaki, SR, Melnikas, AJ, Haque, E, Saul, G, Misunas, C, Patel, SK, Ngo, T& Amin, S 2021, ‘What Are the Drivers of Child Marriage? A Conceptual
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23.

As above.

24.

Sperling, G & Withrop, R 2016, What Works in Girl’s Education, Brookings
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VOA News 2019, Kyrgyzstan Women Fight to End Bride Kidnapping.
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36.

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GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf. [21 September 2022].

37.

As above.

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UN Women & Plan International 2020, A New Era for Girls: Taking Stock of 25 Years of Progress,
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38.

UNICEF 2021, 10 million additional girls at risk of child marriage due to
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Van Waas, L, Albarazi, Z & Brennan, D 2018, ‘Gender Discrimination in
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40.

As above.

41.

27.

Edmeades, JD, MacQuarrie, KLD & Acharya, K 2022, ‘Child Grooms:
Understanding the Drivers of Child Marriage for Boys’, Journal of
Adolescent Health, vol. 70, no. 3, pp. S54-S56. Available from: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1054139X21004316.
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UNFPA 2020, Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Family Planningand Ending Gender-based Violence, Female Genital Mutilation andChild Marriage. Available from: https://www.unfpa.org/resources/
impact-covid-19-pandemic-family-planning-and-ending-gender-based-violence-female-genital. [2 March 2022].

42.

55.

28.

As above.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern
Slavery, p. 71. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/content/
uploads/2022/09/12142341/GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf. [21September 2022].

UNFPA & UNICEF 2021, Child Marriage in the context of COVID-19. Available from: https://www.unicef.org/mena/media/11956/file/Child%20
Marriage%20in%20the%20context%20of%20COVID-19-%20
MENA%20Regional%20Analysis_High%20Res%20(1).pdf.pdf26.05.
[26 May 2022].

29.

Reuters 2018, ‘When coming out as gay or lesbian leads to forced
marriage,’ Freedom United. Available from: https://www.freedomunited.org/news/when-coming-out-as-gay-or-lesbian-leads-toforced-marriage/. [1 July 2022]; Mustikhan, A 2019, ‘Forced marriagesof LGBT+ people are a human rights abuse’, Thomson Reuters Foundation News, 11 March 2019. Available from: https://news.trust.
org/item/20190307171959-kxdop/. [1 July 2022]; Walk Free 2020,
Stacked Odds, Minderoo Foundation, p. 56. Available from: https://
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43.

World Bank 2022, Correcting Course: Poverty and Shared Prosperity
2022, World Bank, pp. 29, 50 Available from: https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/b96b361a-a806-55678e8a-b14392e11fa0/content. [18 March 2022].

56.

Erken A (ed) 2021, My body is my own: claiming the right to autonomy
and self-determination, United Nations Population Fund, pp. 48-49.
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44.

International Labour Organization 2021, ILO Monitor: COVID-19 and theworld of work. Seventh edition. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/documents/briefingnote/wcms_767028.pdf. [26 May 2022].

57.

45.

BSR HERproject 2020, ‘I can hardly sustain my family’: Understanding
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Watson, M 2018, Millions of child widows forgotten, invisible and vulnerable report by action on child, early and forced marriage, Action on Child,
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58.

Human Rights Council 2021, Child, early and forced marriage in timesof crisis, including the COVID-19 pandemic, United Nations General
Assembly, p. 7. Available from: https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=a%2Fhrc%2F48%2Fl.7%2Frev.1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False. [30 May 2022].

25.

26.

30.

Dutt, A 2019, ‘Seeing the Unseen: Male Victims of Forced Marriages’,
MM Idriss (ed), Men, Masculinities and Honour-Based Abuse, pp. 24-43.

39.

As above.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

269

08

ENDNOTES
59.

Chantler, K & McCarry M 2020, ‘Forced Marriage, Coercive Control,and Conducive Contexts: The Experiences of Women in Scotland’,
Violence Against Women, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 89-109. Available from:https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1077801219830234.
DOI:10.1177/1077801219830234. [1 July 2022]; Human Rights Council
2021, Child, early and forced marriage in times of crisis, including the
COVID-19 pandemic, Human Rights Council, United Nations General
Assembly, A/HRC/48/L.7/Rev.1. Available from: https://undocs.org/
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60.

Melnikas, AJ, Mulauzi, N, Mkandawire, J & Amin, S 2021, ‘Perceptionsof minimum age at marriage laws and their enforcement: qualitative
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s12889-021-11434-z#citeas. [1 August 2022].

61.

United Nations Human Rights Commissioner 2023, Report in response to
Resolution A/HRC/48/L.7/REV.1, to be presented at the 52nd Human Rights
Council, forthcoming.

62.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. Available
from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/content/uploads/2022/09/12142341/
GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf. [21 September 2022].

63.

As above.

64.

See for example: Idriss, MM 2021, ‘Abused by the Patriarchy: Male
Victims, Masculinity, ‘Honor’-Based Abuse and Forced Marriages’,
Journal of Interpersonal Violence. Available from: https://journals.
sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0886260521997928. [1 July 2022].

65.

Walk Free 2020, Stacked Odds, Minderoo Foundation, p. 6. Available
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WF-Stacked-Odds-20210517.pdf. [29 April 2023].

66.

2018, Turning Promises Into Action: Gender Equality in the 2030 Agenda
For Sustainable Development, UN Women, pp. 208, 231. Available from:https://www.unwomen.org/-/media/headquarters/attachments/
sections/library/publications/2018/sdg-report-gender-equality-in-the-2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development-2018-en.
pdf?la=en&vs=4332. [20 June 2022].

67.

2020, Girls’ Education and COVID-19: What past shocks can teach us about
mitigating the impact of pandemics, Malala Fund, p. 5. Available from:https://downloads.ctfassets.net/0oan5gk9rgbh/6TMYLYAcUpjhQpXLDgmdIa/3e1c12d8d827985ef2b4e815a3a6da1f/COVID19_GirlsEducation_corrected_071420.pdf. [1 July 2022].

68.

Girls Not Brides n.d., Mobilise families and communities,’ Girls Not
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69.

Walk Free 2020, Stacked Odds, Minderoo Foundation, p. 24. Available
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271

08

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23.

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24.

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25.

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26.

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Hao, K & Hernandez, AP 2022, ‘How the AI industry profits fromcatastrophe’, MIT Technology Review, 20 April. Available from: https://www.technologyreview.com/2022/04/20/1050392/ai-industry-appen-scale-data-labels/. [4 August 2022]; Wakefield, J 2021, ‘AI: Ghost
workers demand to be seen and heard’, BBC News, 28 March. Available
from: https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-56414491. [4 August2022].

Polaris 2018, On-Ramps, Intersections and Exit Routes: A Roadmap
for Systems and Industries to Prevent and Disrupt Human Trafficking, p. 22. Available from: https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/08/A-Roadmap-for-Systems-and-Industries-to-Prevent-and-Disrupt-Human-Trafficking-Social-Media.pdf. [9 February2022].

28.

Uren, T 2022, The future of assistance to law enforcement in an end-toend encrypted world, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, pp. 1-22.
Available from: https://ad-aspi.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.

Mersie, A 2022, ‘Content moderator in Kenya sues Meta over working
conditions’, Reuters, 10 May. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/
technology/content-moderator-kenya-sues-meta-over-working-conditions-2022-05-10/. [4 August 2022].

29.

Report of the Secretary-General 2020, Roadmap for Digital Cooperation,
United Nations, p. 4. Available from: https://www.un.org/en/content/
digital-cooperation-roadmap/assets/pdf/Roadmap_for_Digital_
Cooperation_EN.pdf. [20 May 2022]; Committee on the Elimination ofDiscrimination against Women 2020, General recommendation No. 38

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

(2020) on trafficking in women and girls in the context of global migration
CEDAW/C/GC/38, United Nations, p. 14. Available from: https://reliefweb.int/attachments/50e9a140-16e7-3d3a-847f-05b9174c8c5b/
CEDAW_C_GC_38_9278_E.pdf. [13 June 2022]; Report of the UN
Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation 2019, theage of digital interdependence, United Nations. Available from: https://www.un.org/en/pdfs/DigitalCooperation-report-for%20web.pdf.
[20 May 2022]; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2022,
OHCHR and business and human rights: B-Tech Project, United Nations.
Available from: https://www.ohchr.org/en/business-and-humanrights/b-tech-project. [20 May 2022]; Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights 2019, UN Human Rights Business and Human Rights inTechnology Project (B-Tech): Overview and Scope, United Nations. Available from: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/
Issues/Business/B-Tech/B_Tech_Project_revised_scoping_final.pdf.
[20 May 2022]; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2020,
The UN Guiding Principles in the Age of Technology: A B-Tech Foundational Paper, United Nations. Available from: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/
default/files/Documents/Issues/Business/B-Tech/introduction-ungp-age-technology.pdf. [20 May 2022].
30.

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2011,
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing theUnited Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework HR/PUB/11/04,
pp. 14-15. Available from: https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf. [27 February 2022].

31.

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
2020, Taking Action to Address Human Rights Risks Related to End-Use: A
B-Tech Foundational Paper, United Nations, p. 1. Available from: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Business/BTech/taking-action-address-human-rights-risks.pdf. [22 July 2022];
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
2020, Addressing Business Model Related Human Rights Risks: A B-Tech
Foundational Paper, United Nations, p. 5. Available from: https://www.
ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Business/B-Tech/B_
Tech_Foundational_Paper.pdf. [25 July 2022]; Farthing, S, Howell, J,
Lecchi, K, Paleologos, Z, Saintilan, P & Santow, E 2021, Human Rights
and Technology, Australian Human Rights Commission. Available from:https://tech.humanrights.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-05/AHRC_
RightsTech_2021_Final_Report.pdf. [22 July 2022].

32.

Modern Slavery Act, 2015 (United Kingdom) ; Modern Slavery Act, 2018
(Australia Cmlth)

33.

Guidance issued under section 54(9) of the UK MSA does not explicitly require companies to report on modern slavery risks linked totheir products or services. Meanwhile, the Australian MSA guidance
explicitly states companies are not obligated to report on risks relating
to customers. Home Office 2017, Transparency in supply chains: apractical guide, Government of the United Kingdom, p. 32. Available
from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1040283/Transparency_in_
Supply_Chains_A_Practical_Guide_2017_final.pdf. [11 July 2022];
Australian Border Force n.d., Commonwealth Modern Slavery Act 2018:
Guidance for Reporting Entities, pp. 33-34. Available from: https://www.
homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/modern-slavery-reporting-entities.pdf. [27 February 2022].

34.

We were able to identify and assess 27 statements produced by 10
reporting entities from 2018 to 2022, covering 10 social media platforms, with two companies also distributing social media applications.
Eighteen out of 27 statements explicitly mentioned at least one social
media platform (or stores distributing social media platforms) under
their control.

35.

For the purposes of the assessment, ‘social media’ refers to computerand Internet-based technologies that facilitate sharing of user-generated content through virtual networks via computer or smartphone.

36.

Of the most recent statements published for each reporting entity
assessed, one was published for financial year 2020, six were published
for financial year 2021, and three were published for financial year
2022. Four statements were produced under the UK MSA, three were
produced under the Australian MSA, and two were produced under
both.

273

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ENDNOTES
37.

38.

Statements falling under the scope of the Australian MSA are required
to have their statement approved by a principal governing body andsigned by a responsible member; and must fulfil six mandatory reporting criteria (excluding mandatory criterion seven: any other relevant
information), namely: identify the reporting entity and describe its
structure, operations and supply chains (mandatory criteria one andtwo); describe the risks of modern slavery practices in the operations
and supply chains of the reporting entity and any entities the reporting
entity owns or controls (mandatory criterion three); describe theactions taken by the reporting entity and any entities that the reporting
entity owns or controls to assess and address these risks, including
due diligence and remediation processes (mandatory criterion four);describe how the reporting entity assesses the effectiveness of actions
being taken to assess and address modern slavery risks (mandatory criterion five); and describe the process of consultation with any
entities the reporting entity owns or controls (mandatory criterion six).
Australian Border Force n.d., Commonwealth Modern Slavery Act 2018:
Guidance for Reporting Entities, pp. 33-34. Available from: https://www.
homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/modern-slavery-reporting-entities.pdf. [27 February 2022]. For a comparison on minimum
requirements and guidance under the UK and Australian MSA, seealso: Walk Free & WikiRate 2022, Beyond compliance in the garment
industry: Assessing UK and Australian Modern Slavery Act statements
produced by the garment industry and its investors, Minderoo Foundation, p. 33. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/content/
uploads/2022/02/22150956/Walk-Free-Beyond-Compliance-Garment-Industry.pdf. [19 July 2022].
Statements falling under the scope of the UK MSA are required to:
update their statement every year; publish their statement on the
homepage of their website; obtain approval from the board of directors(or equivalent management body); and obtain sign off from a director(or equivalent or designated member) Home Office 2017, Transparency in supply chains: a practical guide, Government of the United
Kingdom, pp. 20-21. Available from: https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/1040283/Transparency_in_Supply_Chains_A_Practical_
Guide_2017_final.pdf. [11 July 2022]. For a comparison on minimum
requirements and guidance under the UK and Australian MSA, seealso: Walk Free & WikiRate 2022, Beyond compliance in the garment
industry: Assessing UK and Australian Modern Slavery Act statements
produced by the garment industry and its investors, Minderoo Foundation, p. 33. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/content/
uploads/2022/02/22150956/Walk-Free-Beyond-Compliance-Garment-Industry.pdf. [19 July 2022].

39.

Surf and Sound n.d., Surf and Sound: Improving and sharing knowledge
on the Internet role in the human trafficking process. Available from:http://www.surfandsound.eu/?page_id=763. [15 July 2022].

40.

BSR 2022, Collaborative initiatives: Tech Against Trafficking. Available from: https://www.bsr.org/en/collaboration/groups/
tech-against-trafficking#:~:text=Tech%20Against%20Trafficking%20
is%20a,eradicate%20human%20trafficking%20using%20technology.
[27 May 2022].

41.

Tech Coalition 2022, Tech Coalition. Available from: https://www.technologycoalition.org/. [27 May 2022].

42.

As of January 2023. Social media users may not represent unique
individuals. Kemp, S 2022, Digital 2022: Global Overview Report,
Datareportal. Available from: https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2023-global-overview-report. [17 March 2023].

43.

For example, the 2017 French Duty of Vigilance Act and 2021 German Act
on Corporate Due Diligence Obligations in Supply Chains, which enteredinto force on 1 January 2023.

44.

Australian Border Force n.d., Commonwealth Modern Slavery Act 2018:
Guidance for Reporting Entities, pp. 33-34. Available from: https://www.
homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/modern-slavery-reporting-entities.pdf. [27 February 2022]; Home Office 2017, Transparency insupply chains: a practical guide, Government of the United Kingdom, p.
32. Available from: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1040283/
Transparency_in_Supply_Chains_A_Practical_Guide_2017_final.pdf.
[11 July 2022].

274

45.

For a discussion of the unintended negative impacts of the UnitedStates Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act and Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (FOSTA-SESTA) 2018, see: Blunt, D & Wolf, A 2020, Erased: The
Impact of FOSTA-SESTA, Hacking//Hustling, pp. 9-12. Available from:https://hackinghustling.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/HackingHustling-Erased.pdf. [11 July 2022].

46.

Polaris 2018, On-Ramps, Intersections and Exit Routes: A Roadmap for
Systems and Industries to Prevent and Disrupt Human Trafficking. Available from: https://polarisproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ARoadmap-for-Systems-and-Industries-to-Prevent-and-Disrupt-Human-Trafficking-Social-Media.pdf. [9 February 2022].

47.

As above.

Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2020, published 109th ILC session (2021)
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) - Russian Federation(Ratification: 1998), International Labour Organization. Available from:https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:4042098. [13 September 2021]; Committee ofExperts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2021,
Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2020, published 109th ILC session (2021)
Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) - Russian Federation (Ratification:1956) Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 - RussianFederation (Ratification: 2019), International Labour Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:1
3100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNTRY_ID:4046649,102884:NO.
[7 September 2022]; Luxmoore, M 2021, ‘As Russia Touts Convict LaborTo Offset An Exodus Of Migrants, Some Fear ‘A Return To The Gulag’’,Radio Free Europe, 5 June. Available from: https://www.rferl.org/a/
russia-prison-labor-gulag/31291711.html. [7 September 2022]; Human
Rights Watch 2021, World Report 2021: Russia - Events of 2020. Available
from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/
russia. [7 September 2022]; Altynbayev, K 2021, ‘Russian prison labour
initiative draws ire of Central Asian migrant workers’, Central Asia News,
10 June. Available from: https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/
cnmi_ca/features/2021/06/10/feature-01. [7 September 2022].

Spotlight: Guardians andoffenders: examining stateimposed forced labour
1.

2.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern
Slavery, p. 50. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/content/
uploads/2022/09/12142341/GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf. [2October 2022].
Inter-Parliamentary Union & Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights 2016, Human Rights: Handbook for Parliamentarians 26,
Inter-Parliamentary Union, p. 19. Available from: https://www.ohchr.
org/documents/publications/handbookparliamentarians.pdf. [16December 2021]; Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
n.d., International Human Rights Law, United Nations. Available from:https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-and-mechanisms/international-human-rights-law. [17 June 2022]. International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966, (resolution 2200A (XXI)),
opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into forced 3 January
1976; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, (resolution 2200A (XXI)), opened for signature 16 December 1966, entered into
forced 23 March 1976.

3.

Teixeira, F 2019, ‘Volunteers or slaves? Brazil accused of illegal jaillabor’, Reuters, 11 April. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-brazil-slavery-idUSKCN1RN0CN. [3 October 2022].

4.

Murphy, LT, Elimä, N & Tobin, D 2022, ‘Until Nothing Is Left’: China’s
Settler Corporation and its Human Rights Violations in the Uyghur Region.
A Report on the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, Sheffield
Hallam University Kennedy Centre for International Justice, pp. 44-52.
Available from: https://acrobat.adobe.com/link/track?uri=urn:aaid:scds:US:ade22259-dbe7-4628-8975-d808850e7b20#pageNum=2. [2August 2022].

5.

Human Rights Council 2021, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on promoting accountability in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea A/HRC/46/52, United Nations, p. 12. Available
from: https://reliefweb.int/attachments/a8fe95ac-df35-3045-8bd35406b55a28b1/A_HRC_46_52_E.pdf. [8 April 2022].

6.

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2020, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2020, published
109th ILC session (2021) Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) - Poland(Ratification: 1958) Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention,
1930 - Poland (Ratification: 2017), International Labour Organization.
Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:1310
0:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_
COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4054722,102809,Poland,2020. [18 August 2022]; 2019, ‘The Polish prison modernisation
programme as a turning point’, Justice Trends, 22 July. Available from:https://justice-trends.press/the-polish-prison-modernisation-programme-as-a-turning-point/. [3 October 2022].

7.

8.

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2021, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2020, published
109th ILC session (2021). Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No.
105): Russian Federation, ILO NORMLEX. Available from: https://www.
ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_
COMMENT_ID:4042102. [16 December 2021]; Committee of Expertson the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2021,

9.

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2021, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2019, published
109th ILC session (2021) Turkmenistan (Ratification: 1997), International Labour Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_
ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4013850,103551,Turkmenistan,2019. [7 September 2022];
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2021, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2019, published
109th ILC session (2021) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No.
105) - Turkmenistan (Ratification: 1997), International Labour Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:1
3100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_
COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4013853,103551,Turkmenistan,2019. [7 September 2022]; 2022, ‘Turkmenistan: Prisoners in thewomen’s colony are forced to work 16 hours for free’, ACCA Media, 7June. Available from: https://acca.media/en/15167/turkmenistanprisoners-in-the-womens-colony-are-forced-to-work-16-hoursfor-free/. [7 September 2022]; Corley, F 2021, ‘TURKMENISTAN: Fiveconscientious objectors jailed in two days’, Forum 18, 26 January. Available from: https://www.forum18.org/archive.php?article_id=2632.
[7 September 2022]; Human Rights Watch 2020, World Report 2020:
Turkmenistan - Events of 2019. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/
world-report/2020/country-chapters/turkmenistan. [7 September2022].
Castle, L & Polletta, M 2020, ‘NAACP lawsuit targets Arizona private
prisons, accuses state of practicing slavery’, Arizona Republic, 20
June. Available from: https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/
arizona/2020/06/20/naacp-lawsuit-arizona-private-prisons-slavery/3206583001/. [14 January 2022]; Carpenter, E 2020, USA: Inmatesfile lawsuit alleging unpaid labour in prison amounts to forced labour,
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre. Available from: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/usa-inmates-filelawsuit-alleging-unpaid-labour-in-prison-amounts-to-forced-labour/.
[14 January 2021]; Bliss, K 2020, ‘Santa Rita Jail Accused of Slave Labor
in California Class Action’, Prison Legal News, 1 May. Available from:https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2020/may/1/santa-ritajail-accused-slave-labor-california-class-action/. [26 August 2022];
Ruelas et al v. County of Alameda et al (2019), Complaint for Damages
and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief; Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2018, Observation(CEACR) - adopted 2017, published 107th ILC session (2018), Abolitionof Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) - United States of America(Ratification: 1991), International Labour Organization. Available from:https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNTRY_ID:3316111,102871:NO. [23August 2022]; Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations 2021, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2020,
published 109th ILC session (2021). Abolition of Forced Labour Convention,
1957 (No. 105): United States of America, International Labour Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:
13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:4046585:NO. [16 December2021].

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

10.

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions andRecommendations 2021, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2019,
published 109th ILC session (2021): Viet Nam, International Labour
Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_
COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4020538,103004,Viet%20Nam,2019. [16 December 2021];
Humphrey, C & Pham, B 2020, ‘How Vietnam hopes to open to trade – byopening up its prisons to scrutiny’, The Guardian, 15 July. Available
from: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/
jul/15/vietnam-is-cleaning-up-its-human-rights-image-will-thischange-its-prisons. [7 September 2022].

11.

International Trade Union Confederation 2019, ‘Zimbabwe police
target trade union leaders in civil rights crackdown’, ITUC, 23 January.
Available from: https://www.ituc-csi.org/Trade-Unionists-Arrest-Civil-Right-Crackdown-Crisis-Zimbabwe. [23 August 2022]; International
Trade Union Confederation 2020, ‘Zimbabwe: government’s international reputation in the balance as it puts workers’ rights defenders
on trial’, ITUC, 4 February. Available from: https://www.ituc-csi.org/
FreeTheZim28. [23 August 2022]; Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2022, Observation (CEACR)- adopted 2021, published 110th ILC session (2022) Abolition of Forced
Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) - Zimbabwe (Ratification: 1998), International Labour Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P13100_COMMENT_
ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4124478,103183,Zimbabwe,2021. [23 August 2022]; Committeeof Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations
2022, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2021, published 110th ILC session(2022) Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) - Zimbabwe(Ratification: 1998), International Labour Organization. Available from:https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:1310
0:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_
NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4124476,103183,Zimbabwe,2021. [23August 2022].

12.

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2019, Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2018, published 108th
ILC session (2019): Libya, International Labour Organization. Available
from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:1
3100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_
NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:3959811,103130,Libya,2018. [16December 2021]; Human Rights Council 2020, Report of the Office of theUnited Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Summary of Stakeholders’ submissions on Libya* A/HRC/WG.6/36/LBY/3, United Nations, p.
8. Available from: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G20/054/01/PDF/G2005401.pdf?OpenElement. [3 August 2022].

13.

See for example: Lehr, A & Bechrakis, M 2019, Connecting the Dots in
Xinjiang Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation, and Western Supply Chains,
Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available from: https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/Lehr_
ConnectingDotsXinjiang_interior_v3_FULL_WEB.pdf. [14 December2021].

14.

Human Rights Council 2021, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on promoting accountability in the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea A/HRC/46/52, United Nations, p. 12. Available
from: https://reliefweb.int/attachments/a8fe95ac-df35-3045-8bd35406b55a28b1/A_HRC_46_52_E.pdf. [8 April 2022].

15.

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2019, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2018, published
108th ILC session (2019): Belarus, International Labour Organization.
Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:1310
0:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_
COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:3960872,103154,Belarus,2018. [16 December 2021]; United Nations Human Rights Council
2019, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of humanrights in Belarus A/HRC/41/52, United Nations, pp. 3, 13 & 18. Available from: https://www.undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F41%2F52&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False. [6 September 2022]; Freedom House 2022, Freedom
in the World: Belarus. Available from: https://freedomhouse.org/
country/belarus/freedom-world/2022. [6 September 2022].

275

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ENDNOTES
16.

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2021, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2019, published
109th ILC session (2021) Viet Nam (Ratification: 2007), International
Labour Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_
ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_COMMENT_YEAR:4020538,103004,Viet%20Nam,2019. [7 September 2022];
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2021, Observation (CEACR) - adopted 2020, published 109th
ILC session (2021) Viet Nam (Ratification: 2007), International Labour
Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?
p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID,P13100_COUNTRY_
ID:4042091,103004:NO. [7 September 2022]; Human Rights Committee
2019, Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Viet Nam*
CCPR/C/VNM/CO/3, United Nations, p. 7. Available from: https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2FC%2FVNM%2FCO%2F3&Lang=en. [3 October 2022];
Humphrey, C & Pham, B 2020, ‘How Vietnam hopes to open to trade – byopening up its prisons to scrutiny’, The Guardian, 15 July. Available
from: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2020/
jul/15/vietnam-is-cleaning-up-its-human-rights-image-will-thischange-its-prisons. [7 September 2022]; Office to Monitor and Combat
Trafficking in Persons 2020, Trafficking in Persons Report: Vietnam
Country Narrative, United States Department of State. Available from:https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/
vietnam/. [7 September 2022].

17.

The United States Constitution, 1865 (Amendment XIII) (United States)

18.

Harker v. State Use Industries (1993) 990 F.2d 131

19.

Forced Labour Convention (C029) 1930, art. 2

20.

Castle, L & Polletta, M 2020, ‘NAACP lawsuit targets Arizona private
prisons, accuses state of practicing slavery’, Arizona Republic, 20
June. Available from: https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/
arizona/2020/06/20/naacp-lawsuit-arizona-private-prisons-slavery/3206583001/. [14 January 2022]; Carpenter, E 2020, USA: Inmatesfile lawsuit alleging unpaid labour in prison amounts to forced labour,
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75.

As above.

76.

Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (C105) 1957, art. 1

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279

08

ENDNOTES
80.

81.

82.

83.

84.

85.

86.

280

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94.

Gulzire’s story is based on publicly available information from the
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96.

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97.

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98.

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99.

91.

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100. Uyghur Human Rights Project 2022, Responses. Available from: https://
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104. Pattison, P, Bremer, I & Kelly, A 2020, ‘UK sourced PPE from factories
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107. As above.
108. See for example: European Center For Constitutional and Human Rights
2021, Human rights violations off the rack: European brands allegedly
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Spotlight: Modern slavery:
A weapon and consequence of war
1.

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2.

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3.

Bales, K 2021, ‘What is the link between natural disasters and humantrafficking and slavery?’ Journal of Modern Slavery, Slavery and Humanitarian Response Supplemental, vol 6, issue 3. Available from: https://slavefreetoday.org/journal_of_modern_slavery/v6i3a4_What_is_the_Link_between_Natural_Disasters_and_Human_Trafficking_and_Slavery_Bales.pdf. [5 April 2023]; McQuade, A 2021, ‘Older
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4.

Curbelo, V 2021, ‘Exploring the relationship between humanitarian
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vol. 6, issue 3. Available from: https://slavefreetoday.org/journal_of_modern_slavery/v6i3a2_Exploring_the_Relationship_Between_
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The Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons
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6.

United Nations Security Council 2022, Protection of civilians in armed
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7.

The Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons
2017, Trafficking in Persons in Humanitarian Crises, pp. 1-2. Available
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103. Landale, J 2022, ‘NHS to ban products of slavery after PPE concerns’,
BBC News, 21 April. Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/
health-61183965. [3 August 2022].

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

281

08

ENDNOTES
8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

282

Global Protection Cluster Anti-Trafficking Task Team 2020, An
Introductory Guide to Anti-Trafficking Action in Internal Displacement
Contexts, Global Protection Cluster, pp. 5-9. Available from: https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/Introductory-Guide-on-Anti-Trafficking-in-IDP-Contexts_2020_FINAL-1.pdf. [13January 2022]; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2018, Global
Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018, United Nations, pp. 11-12. Available from: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/
glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_web_small.pdf. [13 January 2022];
The Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons
2017, Trafficking in Persons in Humanitarian Crises, pp. 1-2. Available
from: https://icat.un.org/sites/g/files/tmzbdl461/files/publications/
icat-ib-02-final.pdf. [13 January 2022].
Global Protection Cluster Anti-Trafficking Task Team 2020, An
Introductory Guide to Anti-Trafficking Action in Internal Displacement
Contexts, Global Protection Cluster, pp. 5-9. Available from: https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/Introductory-Guide-on-Anti-Trafficking-in-IDP-Contexts_2020_FINAL-1.pdf. [13January 2022]; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2018, Global
Report on Trafficking in Persons 2018, United Nations, pp. 11-12. Available from: https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/
glotip/2018/GLOTiP_2018_BOOK_web_small.pdf. [13 January 2022];
The Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons
2017, Trafficking in Persons in Humanitarian Crises, pp. 1-2. Available
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icat-ib-02-final.pdf. [13 January 2022].

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Hagedourn, E 2020, ‘Rescuers scour Syria for Yazidis still trapped inenslavement’, Middle East Eye, 4 March. Available from: https://www.
middleeasteye.net/news/its-making-my-mission-harder-rescuerssearch-yazidis-sold. [28 April 2022]; Arraf, J & Khaleel, S 2021, ‘3,000
Yazidis Are Still Missing. Their Families Know Where Some of Them Are.’,The New York Times, 3 October. Available from: https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/10/03/world/middleeast/yazidis-missing-isis.html. [11March 2022].

17.

Denereaz, K 2021, ‘’Still going through hell’: the search for Yazidi women
seven years on’, The Guardian, 3 August. Available from: https://www.
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18.

19.

Global Protection Cluster Anti-Trafficking Task Team 2020, An
Introductory Guide to Anti-Trafficking Action in Internal Displacement
Contexts, Global Protection Cluster, pp. 1-2. Available from: https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/Introductory-Guide-on-Anti-Trafficking-in-IDP-Contexts_2020_FINAL-1.pdf.
[13 January 2022]; Smith, A, Datta, MN & Bales, K 2022, ‘Contemporary
slavery in armed conflict: Introducing the CSAC dataset, 1989–2016’,
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org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/CSAC-Article-FINAL.pdf. [20September 2022].
Siegfried, K 2022, ‘Ukraine crisis creates new trafficking risks’, United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 13 April. Available from:https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/2022/4/62569be24/ukrainecrisis-creates-new-trafficking-risks.html. [20 September 2022]; Fallon,
K 2022, ‘Children going missing amid chaos at Ukrainian border, aidgroups report’, The Guardian, 12 March. Available from: https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2022/mar/12/children-goingmissing-amid-chaos-at-ukraine-border-report-aid-groups-refugees.
[20 September 2022].
Fallon, K, Cundy, A & Crean, R 2022, ‘Vigilantes stalk Ukraine border as
sex traffickers target fleeing women and children’, 24 March. Available
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mar/24/vigilantes-stalk-ukraine-border-as-sex-traffickers-targetfleeing-women-and-children. [13 April 2022].
Tondo, L 2022, ‘Ukraine prosecutors uncover sex trafficking ring preying
on women fleeing country’, 7 July 2022. Available from: https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2022/jul/07/ukraine-prosecutors-uncover-sex-trafficking-ring-preying-on-women-fleeing-country. [12 July 2022]; Europol 2022, Human traffickers luring
Ukrainian refugees on the web targeted in EU-wide hackathon. Available
from: https://www.europol.europa.eu/media-press/newsroom/
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United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 2022,‘Afghanistan: Taliban attempting to steadily erase women and girls
from public life – UN experts’, United Nations, 17 January. Available
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2023, ‘About the Genocide’, Nadia’s Initiative. Available from: https://www.nadiasinitiative.org/the-genocide

26.

Global Protection Cluster Anti-Trafficking Task Team 2020, An
Introductory Guide to Anti-Trafficking Action in Internal Displacement
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David, F, Bryant, K & Joudo Larsen, J 2019, Migrants and their vulnerability to human trafficking, modern slavery and forced labour, International
Organization for Migration, pp. 26-32. Available from: https://cdn.
minderoo.com.au/content/uploads/2019/08/28110623/2533_walk.
free_.V8_190723_Digital_P.pdf. [13 January 2022]; United Nations
General Assembly 2021, Nexus between displacement and contemporary
forms of slavery: Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary formsof slavery, including its causes and consequences A/HRC/48/52, United
Nations, pp. 5-9. Available from: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/48/52. [28October 2021]; International Organization for Migration 2015, Addressing Human Trafficking and Exploitation in Times of Crisis- Evidence andRecommendations for Further Action to Protect Vulnerable and Mobile
Populations, pp. 10-13. Available from: https://publications.iom.int/
books/addressing-human-trafficking-and-exploitation-times-crisis-evidence-and-recommendations-0. [3 November 2021]; Beise, J,
Hansen, C, Healy, L, Lee, S, Lindt, N, Pei, Y & You, D 2020, LOST AT HOME:
The risks and challenges for internally displaced children and the urgent
actions needed to protect them, United Nations Children’s Fund, p. 2.
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Lost-at-home-risks-and-challenges-for-IDP-children-2020.pdf. [3November 2021]; Bharadwaj, R, Bishop, D, Hazra, S, Pufaa, E & Annan,
JK 2021, Climate-induced migration and modern slavery: A toolkit forpolicy-makers, Anti-Slavery International & International Institute forEnvironment and Development, pp. 6-34. Available from: https://www.
antislavery.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ClimateMigrationReportSep2021_low_res.pdf. [7 June 2022].

20.

Surveys were conducted between September 2017 and October 2018.

21.

International Organization for Migration, International Labour Organization & Walk Free 2022, No escape: Assessing the relationship between
slavery-related abuse and internal displacement in Nigeria, South Sudan,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pp. ii-viii. Available from:https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/No-Escape-relationship-slavery-abuse-internal-displacement.pdf. [15 March 2023].

22.

As above.

23.

United Nations Security Council 2020, Children and armed conflictin Nigeria: Report of the Secretary-General S/2020/652, pp. 2-13.
Available from: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N20/172/67/PDF/N2017267.pdf?OpenElement. [13 January 2022];
United Nations Security Council 2017, Report of the Secretary-Generalon children and armed conflict in Nigeria S/2017/304, pp. 4-14. Available
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24.

25.

International Organization for Migration, International Labour Organization & Walk Free 2022, No escape: Assessing the relationship between
slavery-related abuse and internal displacement in Nigeria, South Sudan,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, p. vii-viii. Available from:https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/No-Escape-relationship-slavery-abuse-internal-displacement.pdf. [15 March 2023].

Obaji, P, Bukkar, J, Gambo, S, Aloma, H, Jetem, B & Amos, O 2020,
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See David, F, Bryant, K & Joudo Larsen, J 2019, Migrants and theirvulnerability to human trafficking, modern slavery and forced labour,
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minderoo.com.au/content/uploads/2019/08/28110623/2533_walk.
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Populations. Available from: https://publications.iom.int/books/
addressing-human-trafficking-and-exploitation-times-crisis-evidence-and-recommendations-0. [3 November 2021]; Beise, J, Hansen,
C, Healy, L, Lee, S, Lindt, N, Pei, Y & You, D 2020, LOST AT HOME: The risks
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needed to protect them, United Nations Children’s Fund. Available
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Climate-induced migration and modern slavery: A toolkit for policy-makers, Anti-Slavery International & International Institute for Environmentand Development, pp. 6-34. Available from: https://www.antislavery.
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low_res.pdf. [7 June 2022]; International Organization for Migration,
International Labour Organization & Walk Free 2022, No escape:Assessing the relationship between slavery-related abuse and internal
displacement in Nigeria, South Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of
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27.

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28.

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30.

Global Protection Cluster Anti-Trafficking Task Team 2020, An
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31.

Global Protection Cluster 2022, Protection Issues. Available from:https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/protection-issues. [20September 2022].

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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33.

Walk Free’s Promising Practices Database was created in 2015 tocollate evaluations of anti-slavery and counter trafficking programsin a searchable format, so that stakeholders can quickly identify whatworks – and what does not – through a simple search by country, target
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34.

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36.

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283

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in humanitarian settings: Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights A/HRC/41/19, pp. 10-15. Available from: https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/regular-sessions/session41/list-reports. [21 July 2022].
Joint Statement: World Day Against Trafficking in Persons 2022, ‘The
international community must strengthen prevention and accountability for trafficking in persons in conflict situations’, United Nations
Human Rights Special Procedures, 29 July 2022. Available from: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/issues/trafficking/statements/2022-07-29/2022-7-29-2022-World-day-against-trafficking-final-joint-statement.pdf. [20 September 2022].

39.

As above.

40.

International Organization for Migration, International Labour Organization & Walk Free 2022, No escape: Assessing the relationship between
slavery-related abuse and internal displacement in Nigeria, South Sudan,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, pp. 69-70. Available from:https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/No-Escape-relationship-slavery-abuse-internal-displacement.pdf. [15 March 2023].

7.

8.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

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Spotlight: The costs ofthe climate crisis
1.

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14.

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18.

As above.

19.

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GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

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34.

As above.

35.

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39.

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41.

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42.

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43.

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285

08

ENDNOTES
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45.

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46.

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47.

Meijaard, E, Garcia-Ulloa, J, Sheil, D, Wich, S, Carlson, K, Juffe-Bignoli,
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48.

49.

50.

51.

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Bharadwaj, R, Chakravarti, D, Karthikeyan, N, Hazra, S, Daniel, U,
Topno, J & Abhilashi, R 2022, Climate change, migration and vulnerability to trafficking, Anti-Slavery International & International Institutefor Environment and Development, pp. 7-8. Available from: https://pubs.iied.org/20936iied. [1 June 2022]; Bharadwaj, R, Bishop, D, Hazra,
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10.

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56.

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11.

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12.

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13.

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REGIONAL FINDINGS:
Regional findings: Africa
1.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced
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2.

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3.

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4.

Odey, D 2021, ‘A long way from home: The child ‘house helpers’ of
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5.

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Xu, VX, Cave, D, Leibold, J, Munro, K & Ruser, N 2020, Uyghurs for sale:‘Re-education’, forced labour and surveillance beyond Xinjiang, Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Available from: https://www.aspi.org.
au/report/uyghurs-sale. [14 December 2021]; Uyghur Human Rights
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Country Narrative, United States Department of State, pp. 174-180.
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6.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced
Labour and Forced Marriage. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/
content/uploads/2022/09/12142341/GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf.
[8 November 2022].

7.

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8.

Philipose, A 2020, Child marriage in COVID-19 Contexts, United Nations
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9.

World Vision 2021, Child marriage has more than doubled during the
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52.

Paris Agreement, 2015 (United Nations) Preamble

53.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2022, ‘The evidence
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54.

Delta 8.7 2021, Crisis Policy Guide, United Nations University, p. 12.
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286

55.

14.

United Nations General Assembly Security Council 2021, Children andarmed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General A/75/873-S/2021/437.
Available from: https://undocs.org/S/2021/437. [3 February 2022].

15.

United Nations General Assembly 2015, Report of the Special Rapporteuron contemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences,
Urmila Bhoola A/HRC/30/35/Add.1, pp. 8-10. Available from: https://
undocs.org/en/A/HRC/30/35/Add.1. [4 February 2022]; Rodet, M,
Camara, B & Pelckmans, L 2021, ‘Mali fails to face up to the persistenceof slavery’, The Conversation, 16 Feb. Available from: https://theconversation.com/mali-fails-to-face-up-to-the-persistence-of-slavery-147636. [2 June 2022]; Minority Rights Group 2021, Freedom, rights
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16.

Anti-Slavery International, SOS Esclaves, Temedt & Timidria 2022,
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call for input on contemporary forms of slavery as affecting persons
belonging to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities: Mauritania,
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antislavery.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/2022-Joint-Submission-to-SR-Slavery-Minorities-Mauritania-Niger-Mali.pdf. [16 June2022]; Human Rights Council 2022, Report of the Special Rapporteur oncontemporary forms of slavery, including its causes and consequences,
Tomoya Obokata, on Contemporary forms of slavery affecting persons
belonging to ethnic, religious and linguistic minority communities A/
HRC/51/26, United Nations, pp. 7-8. Available from: https://undocs.
org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F51%2F26&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False. [22 August2022].

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

17.

Peyton, N 2020, ‘Activists warn over slavery as Mauritania joins U.N.
human rights council’, Reuters, 27 February. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mauritania-slavery-un-idUSKCN20K2GS. [16 June 2022]; Anti-Slavery International, SOS Esclaves,
Temedt & Timidria 2022, Response to the Special Rapporteur onContemporary Forms of Slavery’s call for input on contemporary
forms of slavery as affecting persons belonging to ethnic, religious,and linguistic minorities: Mauritania, Niger, and Mali (February 2022),
pp. 1-7. Available from: https://www.antislavery.org/wp-content/
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18.

Peyton, N 2019, ‘No more ‘fifth wife’ sex slaves and maids, Niger’s top
court rules’, Reuters, 20 March. Available from: https://www.reuters.
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F 2022, ‘’He bought me like a chicken’: the struggle to end slavery in
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19.

Sheikh, A & Omar, F 2021, ‘Somalia’s PM accuses president of ‘coup
attempt’ after powers suspended’, Reuters, 28 December. Available
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20.

Maclean, R 2022, ‘Five African Countries. Six Coups. Why Now? ‘, The
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21.

Al Jazeera 2021, ‘Niger: Attack on presidential palace an ‘attempted
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The Maryland Scale is a simple 5-point scale developed in the fieldof criminology to assist the assessment of the scientific validity ofcriminological interventions. The benefits of this simplified framework
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ENDNOTES

Frontline voices: Modern slavery
and the LGBTIQ+ community
1.

2.

3.

Howard, B 2020, ‘All in this together’: Africans tolerant on ethnic,
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

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8.

290

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[14 March 2023].

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Regional findings: The Americas
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Extreme Poverty in the Region Rises to 86 Million in 2021 due to the Deepening of the Social and Health Crisis Prompted by the COVID-19 Pandemic.
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11.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2022, Trafficking in Persons Report, United States Department of State,p. 218. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
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12.

Human Rights Watch 2019, The War in Catatumbo: Abuses by Armed
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report_pdf/colombia0819_web_0.pdf. [24 January 2022]; Human
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13.

14.

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Campos, M 2020, ‘The increase of prostitution in Latin America’,
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08

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The International Labour Organization and Government of Qatar claimthat the kafala system has been abolished in the country following
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29.

As above.

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Chapter-3.pdf. [11 July 2022]; UN Women 2018, Rural women andclimate change in Jordan, United Nations, pp. 1-12. Available from:https://reliefweb.int/attachments/2fc415b6-e262-3e9c-92d8f0439722bd2b/66494.pdf. [11 July 2022].

60.

61.

Yemen and Syria are excluded from analysis due to limited data.

62.

The World Bank 2022, GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)- Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Yemen.
Available from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.
PP.CD?locations=QA-AE-KW-BH-SA-OM-LB-JO-IQ-SY-YE&most_recent_value_desc=true. [11 March 2022].

63.

As above.

64.

Amnesty International 2019, ‘Their house is my prison’: Exploitationof migrant domestic workers in Lebanon. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2021/05/
MDE1800222019ARABIC.pdf. [30 November 2021]; McQue, K 2021,‘Alone in Oman: Covid worsens abuse for trafficked women’, The
Guardian, 23 March. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/
global-development/2021/mar/23/alone-oman-covid-worsensabuse-trafficked-women-africa. [30 November 2021]; Zelalem, Z 2021,‘’She just vanished’: Ethiopian domestic workers abused in Lebanon’,Al Jazeera, 16 June. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/
features/2021/6/16/vanished-the-plight-of-3-ethiopian-domesticworkers-in-lebanon. [30 November 2021]; Amnesty International 2021,‘In the prime of their lives’: Qatar’s failure to investigate, remedy andprevent migrant workers’ deaths. Available from: https://www.amnesty.
org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2021/08/MDE2246142021ARABIC.pdf. [30 November 2021].

These countries include Qatar, Lebanon, Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, and are among the world’s
17 most water stressed countries. World Resources Institute 2019,
Aqueduct 3.0 Country Rankings. Available from: https://www.wri.org/
data/aqueduct-30-country-rankings. [11 July 2022].
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2021, Global Report on
Internal Displacement 2021, Norwegian Refugee Council, p. 41. Available
from: https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/
publications/documents/grid2021_idmc.pdf. [18 January 2022].
Khorsandi, P 2022, ‘Yemen: Millions at risk as Ukraine war effect rocks
region’, World Food Programme, 14 March. Available from: https://www.
wfp.org/stories/yemen-millions-risk-ukraine-war-effect-rocks-region. [1 December 2022].
International Organization for Migration 2017, The Climate Change-Human Trafficking Nexus. Available from: https://publications.iom.int/
books/climate-change-human-trafficking-nexus. [18 September2019]; Bharadwaj, R, Bishop, D, Hazra, S, Pufaa, E & Annan, JK 2021,
Climate-induced migration and modern slavery: A toolkit for policy-makers, Anti-Slavery International & International Institute for Environmentand Development, pp. 6-34. Available from: https://www.antislavery.
org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ClimateMigrationReportSep2021_
low_res.pdf. [7 June 2022].
United Nations Development Programme 2018, Climate Change
Adaptation in the Arab States: Best practices and lessons learned, United
Nations, pp. 23-28. Available from: https://www.undp.org/sites/g/
files/zskgke326/files/publications/Arab-States-CCA.pdf. [12 July2022].
United Nations Population Fund, Sama & King Hussein Information and Research Center 2022, Climate Change and Gender-Based
Violence in Jordan, United Nations, p. 4. Available from: https://data.
unhcr.org/en/documents/download/91192. [12 July 2022]; Farge,
E 2020, ‘Child labour, marriages on rise in Yemen as COVID spreads:
U.N. agency’, Reuters, 26 May. Available from: https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-health-coronavirus-yemen-un/child-labour-marriages-on-rise-in-yemen-as-covid-spreads-u-n-agency-idUSKBN2321C3?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews. [31 January 2022].
International Organization for Migration 2017, The Climate Change-Human Trafficking Nexus. Available from: https://publications.iom.int/
books/climate-change-human-trafficking-nexus. [18 September2019]; Bharadwaj, R, Bishop, D, Hazra, S, Pufaa, E & Annan, JK 2021,
Climate-induced migration and modern slavery: A toolkit for policy-makers, Anti-Slavery International & International Institute for Environmentand Development, pp. 6-34. Available from: https://www.antislavery.
org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ClimateMigrationReportSep2021_
low_res.pdf. [7 June 2022].

United Nations Development Programme 2018, Climate Change
Adaptation in the Arab States: Best practices and lessons learned, United
Nations, pp. 23-28. Available from: https://www.undp.org/sites/g/
files/zskgke326/files/publications/Arab-States-CCA.pdf. [12 July2022]; Schwartzstein, P 2017,’Climate Change and Water Woes Drove
ISIS Recruiting in Iraq’, National Geographic, 14 November Available
from: https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/article/climatechange-drought-drove-isis-terrorist-recruiting-iraq. [12 July 2022].

65.

Private Sector Labour Law, 2010 (No. 6 of 2010) (Kuwait); Law No. 68 on
Domestic Workers, 2015 (Kuwait); Labor Law, 2015 (Iraq).

66.

2020, ‘Oman eases restrictions on sponsorship transfer’, MigrantRights.Org, 8 June. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.
org/2020/06/oman-eases-restrictions-on-sponsorship-transfer/. [3November 2020].

67.

2020, ‘Qatar: Significant Labor and Kafala Reforms’, Human Rights
Watch, 24 September. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/
news/2020/09/24/qatar-significant-labor-and-kafala-reforms. [2November 2020].

68.

2020, ‘Saudi Arabia eases ‘kafala’ system restrictions on migrant
workers’, BBC News, 4 November. Available from: https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-54813515. [5 November 2021]; 2020,‘Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development Launches Labor
Reforms for Private Sector Workers’, Saudi Press Agency, 4 November.
Available from: https://www.spa.gov.sa/viewfullstory.php?lang=en&
newsid=2153476#2153476. [13 May 2021].

69.

70.
71.

72.

The World Bank 2022, GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)- Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman,
Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Syrian Arab Republic, Republic of Yemen.
Available from: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.
PP.CD?locations=QA-AE-KW-BH-SA-OM-LB-JO-IQ-SY-YE&most_recent_value_desc=true. [11 March 2022].
Law No. 10 of 2021 amending the Prevention of Human Trafficking Law,
2021 (Jordan).
Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2020, Trafficking in
Persons Report: Qatar country narrative, United States Department ofState, pp. 413-417. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf. [22June 2022]; Pathak, S 2019, ‘Qatar opens shelter for trafficking victims’,
Qatar Tribune, 31 July. Available from: https://www.qatar-tribune.
com/news-details/id/169331/qatar-opens-shelter-for-trafficking-victims. [22 June 2022].
Government of Kuwait 2019, National report submitted in accordancewith paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21- Kuwait A/HRC/WG.6/35/KWT/1, United Nations Human Rights Council,
p. 10. Available from: https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2FWG.6%2F35%2FKWT%2F1&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False. [22 June 2022].

73.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2020, UNODC & Saudi Arabia
Join Forces to Protect Victims of Human Trafficking. Available from:https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2020/November/unodcand-saudi-arabia-join-forces-to-protect-victims-of-human-trafficking.html. [22 June 2022].

74.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2020, Saudi Arabia takes
concrete steps to counter trafficking. Available from: https://www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/Webstories2020/saudi-arabia-takes-concrete-steps-to-counter-human-trafficking.html. [26July 2021].

75.

International Labour Organization 2021, ‘Saudi Arabia reinforces its commitment to eradicate forced labour in all its forms, ‘27
May. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/
subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/forced-labour/
WCMS_795244/lang--en/index.htm. [12 December 2022].

76.

NORMLEX n.d., Ratifications of C189 - Domestic Workers Convention, 2011(No. 189), International Labour Organization. Available from: http://
www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_
INSTRUMENT_ID:2551460. [24 January 2022].

77.

Royal Decree Number 35/2003 Issuing the Labor Law, 2003 (Oman) arts
3bis & 123.

78.

Promulgation of the Penal Code, 1987 (No. 3 of 1987) (United ArabEmirates) art 347.

79.

Personal Status Law, 1959 (Iraq) art 9.

80.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking in Persons Report: Saudi Arabia Country Narrative, United States
Department of State, pp. 481-486. Available from: https://www.state.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TIPR-GPA-upload-07222021.pdf.
[11 March 2022]; The National Committee for Combating Trafficking in
Persons 2017, The National Referral Mechanism for Victims of Trafficking
in Person, Kingdom of Bahrain, p. 5. Available from: http://endtrafficking.bh/nrm/MediaHandler/GenericHandler/documents/NRM%20
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81.

See the country narratives for Bahrain (pp. 104-109), Kuwait (pp.
339-343), Iraq (pp. 264-269), Jordan (pp. 321-324), Oman (pp.434437), Qatar (pp. 463-467), Saudi Arabia (pp. 481-486), and Lebanon(pp. 351-354) in Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons
2021, Trafficking in Persons Report, United States Department of State.
Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/
TIPR-GPA-upload-07222021.pdf. [11 March 2022].

82.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking in
Persons Report: United Arab Emirates Country Narrative, United States
Department of State, pp. 575-580. Available from: https://www.state.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TIPR-GPA-upload-07222021.pdf.
[11 March 2022].

83.

Haddad, M 2020, ‘Palestine and Israel: Mapping an annexation’,
Al Jazeera, 26 June. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2020/6/26/palestine-and-israel-mapping-an-annexation. [17June 2022].

84.

Human Rights Council 2022, Report of the Special Rapporteur on thesituation of Human Rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since
1967* A/HRC/49/87, Office of the High Commissioner, pp. 2-6. Available
from: https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/
ahrc4987-report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-palestinian. [17 June 2022].

85.

Human Rights Watch 2017, Unwilling or Unable: Israeli Restrictions
on Access to and from Gaza for Human Rights Workers, Human Rights
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86.

Human Rights Council 2022, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967*
A/HRC/49/87, Office of the High Commissioner, pp. 2-18. Available from:https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4987-report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-palestinian. [17June 2022]; Amnesty International 2022, Israel’s Apartheid Against
Palestinians, Amnesty International, pp. 16-17. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde15/5141/2022/en/. [17 June2022]; Human Rights Watch 2021, A Threshold Crossed: Israeli Authorities and the Crimes of Apartheid and Persecution, Human Rights Watch.
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GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

87.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking
in Persons Report: Israel Country Narrative, United States Departmentof State, pp. 306-310. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/TIP_Report_Final_20210701.pdf. [29 November2021]; Girls Not Brides n.d., Atlas: Palestine, Girls Not Brides. Available
from: https://www.girlsnotbrides.org/learning-resources/child-marriage-atlas/regions-and-countries/palestine/. [17 June 2022]; SAWA
2013, Trafficking and Forced Prostitution of Palestinian Women and Girls:
Forms of Modern Day Slavery. Available from: ISBN-13: 978-9950-8510-16. [17 June 2022].

88.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking in Persons Report: Israel Country Narrative, United States Department of State, pp. 306-310. Available from: https://www.state.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/07/TIP_Report_Final_20210701.pdf. [29November 2021].

89.

Al’sanah, R 2021, Workers’ Rights in Crisis: Palestinian workers in Israel
and the settlements, International Trade Union Confederation, pp.
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90.

SAWA 2013, Trafficking and Forced Prostitution of Palestinian Women andGirls: Forms of Modern Day Slavery. Available from: ISBN-13: 978-99508510-1-6. [17 June 2022].

91.

As above.

92.

Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics 2018, Registered Marriages
Cases in Palestine by Age of Groom and Bride - 2018, State of Palestine.
Available from: https://www.pcbs.gov.ps/Portals/_Rainbow/Documents/VS-2018-04e.html. [17 June 2022].

93.

Presler-Marshall, E, Jones, N, Alheiwidi, S, Youssef, S, Abu Hamad, B,
Bani Odeh, K, Baird, S. Oakley, E, Guglielmi, S & Małachowska, A 2020,
Through their eyes: Exploring the complex drivers of child marriage
in humanitarian contexts, Gender & Adolescence: Global Evidence,p. 13. Available from: https://www.gage.odi.org/wp-content/
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94.

2018, State of Palestine: Gender Justice & The Law, United Nations Development Programme, p. 22. Available from: https://arabstates.unfpa.
org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Palestine.Country.Assessment.Eng_.
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95.

As above; Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021,
Trafficking in Persons Report: Israel Country Narrative, United States
Department of State, pp. 306-310. Available from: https://www.state.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/TIP_Report_Final_20210701.pdf.
[29 November 2021].

96.

Amnesty International 2022, Israel’s Apartheid Against Palestinians,
Amnesty International, p. 18. Available from: https://www.amnesty.
org/en/documents/mde15/5141/2022/en/. [17 June 2022].

97.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking
in Persons Report: Israel Country Narrative, United States Departmentof State, pp. 306-310. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/TIP_Report_Final_20210701.pdf. [29 November2021].

98.

2022, Who is protecting the rights of Palestinian workers in Israel? Gapsin the enforcement of Palestinian workers’ labor rights, Kav LaOved,
pp. 1-5. Available from: https://www.kavlaoved.org.il/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/02/Enforcement-of-Palestinian-workers-rights-brief.pdf. [17 June 2022].

99.

Maharmeh, I 2021, Israel’s Violations of Palestinian Workers’ Rights:
COVID-19 and Systemic Abuse, Al Shabaka: the Palestinian Policy
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[17 June 2022]; 2022, Who is protecting the rights of Palestinian workers
in Israel? Gaps in the enforcement of Palestinian workers’ labor rights,
Kav LaOved, pp. 1-5. Available from: https://www.kavlaoved.org.il/
en/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/02/Enforcement-of-Palestinian-workers-rights-brief.pdf. [17 June 2022].

100. 2018, State of Palestine: Gender Justice & The Law, United Nations Development Programme, p. 22. Available from: https://arabstates.unfpa.
org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Palestine.Country.Assessment.Eng_.
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101. As above; 2017, Palestine: Overview Of Muslim Family Laws & Practices,
Musawah: For Equality in the Family. Available from: https://www.
musawah.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Palestine-Overview-Table-English.pdf. [17 June 2022].
102. Personal communication.

297

08

ENDNOTES
103. The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 1960, Jordanian Penal Code No.
16 of 1960; Rights Lab & Castan Centre for Human Rights Law 2018,
Antislavery in domestic legislation country reports: States’ international
obligations and domestic legislation regarding slavery, servitude, forced
labour, and human trafficking, University of Nottingham & Monash
University, p. 484. Available from: https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/
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104. 2008 ‘Palestinian Labour Law No. 7 & Worker’s Rights’, Palestine Investment Conference, 21-23 May 2008, Palestinian Economic Policy Institute(Mas) Bethlehem, pp. 1-2. Available from: http://www.palst-jp.com/eg/
pdf/inv/02/Palestinian_Labour_Law.pdf. [3 October 2022].
105. Personal Status Law (1976), art. 14 - 15; Family Rights Law (1954), art.
21 – 22; as cited in Musawah: for Equality in the Family 2018, Thematic
Report On Muslim Family Law And Muslim Women’s Rights In Palestine,
Musawah: for Equality in the Family, p. 11. Available from: https://www.musawah.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Palestine-Thematic-Report-2017-CEDAW70.pdf. [3 October 2022].

5.

2020, ‘Restaurant workers driven to starvation in Saudi’, MigrantRights.Org, 4 August. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.
org/2020/08/restaurant-workers-driven-to-starvation-in-saudi/.
[13 February 2022]; Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2019,
Inhospitable: How hotels in Qatar & the UAE are failing migrant workers.
Available from: https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/
documents/files/Gulf-Hotels-Briefing.pdf. [13 February 2022].

6.

2018, ‘Death and Desolation: Shepherds and Farmworkers in
Saudi Arabia’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 16 May. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.org/2018/05/death-and-desolation-shepherds-and-farmworkers-in-saudi-arabia/. [7 April 2022]; Razzaz,
S 2017, A Challenging Market Becomes More Challenging: JordanianWorkers, Migrant Workers and Refugees in the Jordanian Labour Market,
International Labour Organization, pp. 9-12, 52-55. Available from:https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_556931.pdf. [7 April 2022].

7.

106. As above.
107. 2021, ‘Little Women’: Adolescence and Child Marriage in Palestine,
International Women’s Initiative. Available from: https://static1.
squarespace.com/static/552fe729e4b0c33e91169c8e/t/619745eb95232736a035b9e4/1637303791424/The+IWI+-+%E2%80%9CLittle+Women%E2%80%9D+Adolescence+and+Child+Marriage+in+Palestine+.pdf. [17 June 2022].
108. Global Protection Cluster Anti-Trafficking Task Team 2020, An
Introductory Guide to Anti-Trafficking Action in Internal Displacement
Contexts, Global Protection Cluster, pp. 1-2. Available from: https://www.globalprotectioncluster.org/wp-content/uploads/Introductory-Guide-on-Anti-Trafficking-in-IDP-Contexts_2020_FINAL-1.pdf. [13January 2022].

Spotlight: Disempowered,dehumanised, deported:
life under the kafala system
1.

2.

3.

4.

298

8.

Includes kafala countries plus Iraq, Occupied Palestinian Territories,
Syria, and Yemen.

9.

International Labour Office 2021, ILO Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers: Results and Methodology, International Labour
Organization, pp. 30-31. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/
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10.

Kalush, R, Saraswathi, V, Mohamed, A & Fousdeen, F 2019, Lived Experience of Migrant Women: Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, Migrant-Rights.
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Joudo Larsen, J, McCormack, S & Husn, HA 2015, The Other Migrant
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Freedom: The Sustainable Development Case for Ending Modern Slavery,
Forced Labour and Human Trafficking, United Nations University, p. 218.
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uploads/2021/01/DevelopingFreedom_MainReport_WebFinal.pdf. [2February 2022]; Motaparthy, P 2015, ‘Understanding Kafala: An archaiclaw at cross purposes with modern development’, Migrant-Rights.Org,
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understanding-kafala-an-archaic-law-at-cross-purposes-with-modern-development/. [13 February 2022].
Amnesty International 2020, ‘Why do you want to rest?’: Ongoing abuseof domestic workers in Qatar. Available from: https://www.amnesty.
org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2021/05/MDE2231752020ARABIC.pdf. [30 November 2021]; Amnesty International 2019, ‘Their house
is my prison’: Exploitation of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon.
Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/
sites/9/2021/05/MDE1800222019ARABIC.pdf. [30 November 2021];
McQue, K 2021, ‘Alone in Oman: Covid worsens abuse for trafficked
women’, The Guardian, 23 March. Available from: https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2021/mar/23/alone-omancovid-worsens-abuse-trafficked-women-africa. [30 November 2021.
Equidem 2020, The Cost of Contagion: The human rights impacts of
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Cost_of_Congation_Report_ART_WEB.pdf. [30 November 2021];
Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2018, From Unacceptable
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business-humanrights.org/media/documents/files/Jordan_Report_
FINAL_WEB.pdf. [13 February 2022].

While significant reforms have occurred in Qatar, such as removal of the
No Objection Certificate and allowing migrant workers to change jobs
without permission from their employer, elements of the kafala systemremain in place and undermine claims that kafala has been abolished.
For example, migrant workers can be criminalised for absconding. See:
International Labour Office 2019, Monitoring compliance with international labour standards: the key role of the ILO Committee of Experts of
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations, International
Labour Organization, p. 51. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---normes/documents/publication/wcms_730866.pdf. [26 August 2022].

11.

12.

13.

Motaparthy, P 2015, ‘Understanding Kafala: An archaic law at crosspurposes with modern development’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 11 March.
Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.org/2015/03/understanding-kafala-an-archaic-law-at-cross-purposes-with-modern-development/. [13 February 2022]; Begum, R 2020, ‘What Will it Take for Saudi
Arabia to Abolish Abusive Sponsorship System?’, Human Rights Watch,
30 October. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/30/
what-will-it-take-saudi-arabia-abolish-abusive-sponsorship-system.
[13 February 2022].
Clyde & Co 2020, Comparison of Absconding laws in the GCC, MigrantRights.Org. Available from: https://infogram.com/comparison-ofabsconding-laws-in-the-gcc-1h7v4pzolky86k0. [20 February 2022];
Saraswathi, V 2020, ‘Huroob, Runaway, Absconding: Trapping migrants
in extreme abuse’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 30 September. Available from:https://www.migrant-rights.org/2020/09/huroob-runaway-absconding-trapping-migrants-in-extreme-abuse/. [28 July 2022].
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(No. 8) (Jordan) 12; Zahra, M 2019, The Legal Framework of the Sponsorship Systems of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: A Comparative
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pdf. [13 April 2022]; 2021, ‘Saudi Arabia: Labor Reforms Insufficient’,
Human Rights Watch, 25 March. Available from: https://www.hrw.
org/news/2021/03/25/saudi-arabia-labor-reforms-insufficient. [16February 2022]; Foreigners’ Residence Law, 1995 (Oman); General Directorate of General Security n.d., The expulsion from Lebanon, Government of Lebanon. Available from: https://www.general-security.gov.
lb/en/operations/details/147. [13 April 2022].
Personal communication; Tamkeen 2020, Under the Microscope: Analysis
of Human Trafficking Cases in Jordan, pp. 74-77. Available from: https://
ps.boell.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/Under_The_Microscope_--_Analysis_of_Human_Trafficking_Cases_in_Jordan.pdf. [15 February2022]; International Labour Organization & The Legal Agenda 2020, The
labyrinth of justice: Migrant domestic workers before Lebanon’s courts, International Labour Organization, pp. 19-20. Available from: https://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_777078.pdf. [2 February 2022]; Amnesty International 2019,
All Work, No Pay: the Struggle of Qatar’s Migrant Workers for Justice. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/
MDE2207932019ENGLISH.pdf. [16 May 2022].

14.

15.

16.

As above; 2016, ‘’I Was Sold’: Abuse and Exploitation of Migrant
Domestic Workers in Oman’, Human Rights Watch, 13 July. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/13/i-was-sold/abuse-and-exploitation-migrant-domestic-workers-oman. [28February 2022]; Amnesty International 2020, ‘Why do you want to rest?’:Ongoing abuse of domestic workers in Qatar, pp. 60-61. Available from:https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/sites/9/2021/05/
MDE2231752020ARABIC.pdf. [30 November 2021].
2020, ‘Kuwait drops all ‘absconding’ cases reported during Covid-19
crisis’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 9 July. Available from: https://www.migrantrights.org/2020/07/kuwait-drops-all-absconding-cases-reportedduring-covid-19-crisis/. [20 February 2022]; 2020, ‘Qatar: Significant
Labor and Kafala Reforms’, Human Rights Watch, 24 September. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/24/qatar-significant-labor-and-kafala-reforms. [2 November 2020]; 2021, ‘Saudi Arabia:
Labor Reforms Insufficient’, Human Rights Watch, 25 March. Available
from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/25/saudi-arabia-labor-reforms-insufficient. [16 February 2022].
International Labour Organization & The Legal Agenda 2020, The labyrinth of justice: Migrant domestic workers before Lebanon’s courts, International Labour Organization, p. 13. Available from: https://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/
publication/wcms_777078.pdf. [2 February 2022]; Tamkeen 2020,
Under the Microscope: Analysis of Human Trafficking Cases in Jordan, pp.
54-55. Available from: https://ps.boell.org/sites/default/files/2021-05/
Under_The_Microscope_--_Analysis_of_Human_Trafficking_Cases_
in_Jordan.pdf. [15 February 2022].

Unpaid_Care_Work.Pdf. [11 February 2022]; Kalush, R, Saraswathi, V,
Mohamed, A & Fousdeen, F 2019, Lived Experience of Migrant Women:
Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, Migrant-Rights.Org, pp. 8, 12. Available
from: https://respect.international/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/
Lived-Experience-of-Migrant-Women-Quatar-Bahrain-and-Kuwait.
pdf. [2 February 2022].
28.

International Labour Organization 2019, Regulatory Framework Governing Migrant Workers: Lebanon, p. 3. Available from: https://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/
legaldocument/wcms_728264.pdf. [21 February 2022].

29.

International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory Framework Governing Migrant Workers: Kuwait, p. 3. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776524.pdf. [21 February 2022].

30.

Personal communication.

31.

2020, ‘Lebanon takes crucial first step towards dismantling Kafala in
Lebanon’, International Labour Organization, 10 September. Available
from: https://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/news/WCMS_755008/
lang--en/index.htm#:~:text=BEIRUT%20%E2%80%93%20(ILO%20
News)%20Lebanon,and%20elsewhere%20across%20the%20region. [2February 2022].

32.

Government of Kuwait 2019, National report submitted in accordancewith paragraph 5 of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 16/21- Kuwait A/HRC/WG.6/35/KWT/1, United Nations Human Rights Council,
p. 18. Available from: https://undocs.org/A/HRC/WG.6/35/KWT/1.
[01 July 2021]; ILO Fairway Project 2019, Kuwait: Regulatory framework governing migrant workers, International Labour Organization,
p. 2. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/10/FAIRWAY-Factsheet-GCC.pdf. [02 July 2021].

17.

Dito, M 2013, ‘Kafala: Foundations of Migrant Exclusion in GCC LabourMarkets’, in OH AlShehabi, A Hanieh & A Khalaf (eds) Transit States:
Labour Migration and Citizenship in the Gulf, p. 79. Pluto Press. Available
from: ISBN 9781783712205.

33.

18.

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989, (resolution 44/25),
opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990, art. 20(3).

Ethiopia’s Overseas Employment Proclamation, 2016 (Proclamation No.
923/2016) (Ethiopia) 10; Law L/2014/072/CNT of January 10, 2014 on the
Labor Code of the Republic of Guinea, 2014 (Guinea) 110.5.

34.

19.

Rotabi, KS, Bromfield, NF, Lee, J & Sarhan, TA 2017, ‘The Care ofOrphaned and Vulnerable Children in Islam: Exploring Kafala with
Muslim Social Work Practice with Unaccompanied Refugee Minors in
the United States’, Journal of Human Rights and Social Work, vol. 2, pp.
16-24. Available from: DOI:10.1007/s41134-017-0027-2. [11 July 2022].

Cockayne, J 2021, Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development
Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking,United Nations University, p. 216. Available from: https://www.developingfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/DevelopingFreedom_MainReport_WebFinal.pdf. [2 February 2022].

35.

20.

Jureidini, R & Hassan, SF 2019, ‘The Islamic Principle of Kafala as
Applied to Migrant Workers: Traditional Continuity and Reform’, inLeiden (ed) Migration and Islamic Ethics, pp. 92-109. Brill, The Netherlands. Available from: https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004417342_007. [7July 2022].

International Labour Office 2018, Findings from the global comparative
study on the definition of recruitment fees and related costs, p. 2018.
Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_protect/---protrav/---travail/documents/meetingdocument/
wcms_646693.pdf. [02 July 2021].

36.

21.

AlShehabi, OH 2019, ‘Policing labour in empire: the modern origins of
the Kafala sponsorship system in the Gulf Arab States’, British Journalof Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 291-310. Available from:
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2019.1580183. [7 July 2022].

Regulation No. 12 of 2015 regulating the organisation of Private Recruitment Agencies for the Recruitment of Non-Jordanian Domestic Workers,
2015 (Jordan) 7.

37.

In Bahrain, article 23(C) of Act No. (19) (2006) With Regard to The Regulation of the Labour Market prohibits employers obtaining benefit from an
employee in return for issuing a work permit, however, the Act does not
explicitly prohibit on-charging recruitment fees to workers. For legislation prohibiting recruitment fees in kafala countries see: Act No. 19
With Regard to the Regulation of the Labour Market, 2006 (Bahrain) arts
23 & 24; Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work 2016, Intertwined:
A study of employers of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, International Labour Organization, p. 18. Available from: https://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/
publication/wcms_524149.pdf. [16 February 2022]; Law No. 14 of 2004
Regulating Employment, 2004 (Qatar) 33; Ministerial Resolution No.
(1205) for 2013 Licensing and Regulation of Private Recruitment Agencies,(United Arab Emirates) 6; International Labour Organization 2019,
Regulatory Framework Governing Migrant Workers, p. 1. Available from:https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---robeirut/documents/legaldocument/wcms_728262.pdf. [16 February2022]; Oman Labour Law Issued in accordance with the Sultan’s Decree
no. 35/2003, 2003 (Oman) 20; Mohamed, A 2021, ‘The Flexi Permit Experiment: No Kafala, but poor labour practices persist’, Migrant-Rights.Org,
12 April. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.org/2021/04/
the-flexi-permit-experiment-no-kafala-but-poor-labour-practices-persist/. [2 February 2022]; International Labour Organization 2019,
Labour mobility between Asia and the Arab States: Sharing of experiences
and progress under the Bali Declaration with specific focus on women
migrant workers, p. 55. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/
publication/wcms_754661.pdf. [4 July 2021].

22.

As above; Kanchana, R 2018, ‘Is the Kafala Tradition to Blame for the
Exploitative Work Conditions in the Arab-Gulf Countries?’, in M Chowdhury & RS Irudaya (eds) South Asian Migration in the Gulf, pp. 61-79.
Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. Available from: DOI:10.1007/978-3-31971821-7_4. [8 July 2022].

23.

AlShehabi, OH 2019, ‘Policing labour in empire: the modern origins of
the Kafala sponsorship system in the Gulf Arab States’, British Journalof Middle Eastern Studies, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 291-310. Available from:
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2019.1580183. [7 July 2022].

24.

As above.

25.

Jureidini, R & Hassan, SF 2019, ‘The Islamic Principle ofKafala as Applied to Migrant Workers: Traditional Continuity and Reform’, in Leiden (ed) Migration and Islamic Ethics, pp.
92-109. Brill, The Netherlands. Available from: DOI:https://doi.
org/10.1163/9789004417342_007. [7 July 2022].

26.

See for example: Hourany, D 2022, ‘Beyond the Kafala system’, Now
Lebanon, 6 February. Available from: https://nowlebanon.com/
beyond-the-kafala-system/. [26 August 2022].

27.

Mehzer, Z, Nassif, G & Wilson, C 2021, Women Migrant Domestic Workers
in Lebanon: A Gender Perspective, UN Women, p. 4. Available from:https://www2.unwomen.org/-/media/field%20office%20arab%20
states/attachments/publications/2021/06/migrant-workers-rightsare-womens-rights-june16-2021-final2.pdf?la=en&vs=1249. [2February 2022]; Ferrant, G, Pesando, LM & Nowacka, K 2014, Unpaid
Care Work: The missing link in the analysis of gender gaps in labour
outcomes, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, p.
1. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/Dev/Development-Gender/

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

299

08

ENDNOTES
38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

2021, ‘Saudi Arabia: Labor Reforms Insufficient’, Human Rights Watch,
25 March. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/25/
saudi-arabia-labor-reforms-insufficient. [16 February 2022]; Pattisson, P 2021, ‘G4S migrant workers ‘forced to pay millions’ in illegal
fees for jobs’, The Guardian, 18 January. Available from: https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jan/18/g4s-migrantworkers-forced-to-pay-millions-in-fees-for-jobs#:~:text=An%20
investigation%20into%20G4S’s%20recruitment,for%20G4S%20
in%20the%20UAE. [16 February 2022]; Jureidini, R 2017, ‘Transnational
Culture of Corruption in Migrant Labour Recruitment’, in M McAuliffe& MK Solomon (eds) Ideas to Inform International Cooperation on Safe,
Orderly and Regular Migration, pp. 1-10, IOM, Geneva. Available from:https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/transnational_culture.
pdf. [7 July 2022].
Equidem 2020, The Cost of Contagion: The human rights impacts of
COVID-19 on migrant workers in the Gulf. Available from: https://www.
equidem.org/assets/downloads/1837_Equidem_The_Cost_of_
Congation_Report_ART_WEB.pdf. [30 November 2021].

53.

54.

Migrant Forum Asia 2021, Crying Out for Justice: Wage Theft Against
Migrant Workers during COVID-19, p. 26. Available from: http://mfasia.
org/migrantforumasia/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/MFA_CryingOut-for-Justice_04.12.pdf. [30 November 2021].
As above, pp. 4-5; ILO Migration Advisory Group (Arab States) 2021,
COVID-19 Pandemic: Wage protection of migrant workers in the ArabStates, International Labour Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/briefingnote/wcms_803052.pdf. [13 April 2022].
Azad, A 2019, ‘Recruitment of Migrant Workers in Bangladesh: Elementsof Human Trafficking for Labor Exploitation’, Journal of Human Trafficking, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 130-150. Available from: https://www.tandfonline.
com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/23322705.2017.1422091.
[17 December 2020]; Five Corridors Project 2021, Nepal to Kuwait and
Qatar: Fair recruitment in review, Fair Square, pp. 17-21. Available from:https://fivecorridorsproject.org/uploads/C2_3_Nepal_Kuwait_
Qatar-report.pdf. [16 May 2022].

43.

As above.

44.

Migrant Forum Asia 2021, Crying Out for Justice: Wage Theft Against
Migrant Workers during COVID-19, p. 8. Available from: http://mfasia.
org/migrantforumasia/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/MFA_CryingOut-for-Justice_04.12.pdf. [30 November 2021].

45.

52.

55.

56.

Gulf Labour Markets and Migration 2022, GCC: Percentage of nationals and non-nationals in employed population in GCC countries (2020),
Gulf Research Center. Available from: https://gulfmigration.grc.net/
gcc-emp-1-1-percentage-of-nationals-and-non-nationals-in-employed-population-in-gcc-countries-2016/. [7 July 2022]; International
Labour Office 2021, ILO Global Estimates on International MigrantWorkers: Results and Methodology, International Labour Organization,
pp. 30-31. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication/
wcms_808935.pdf. [26 August 2022].
Pattisson, P & McIntyre, N 2021, ‘Revealed: 6,500 migrant workers havedied in Qatar since World Cup awarded’, The Guardian, 23 February.
Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/23/revealed-migrant-worker-deaths-qatar-fifaworld-cup-2022. [2 February 2022].
2021, ‘Qatar: World Cup contractors allegedly misusing visas to recruit
Nepali workers left vulnerable to contract substitution & fee-charging; incl. Supreme Committee & co. responses’, Business & Human
Rights Resource Centre, 6 September. Available from: https://www.
business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/qatar-world-cup-contractors-allegedly-misusing-visas-to-recruit-nepali-workers-left-vulnerable-to-contract-substitution-fee-charging-incl-supreme-committee-co-responses/?mc_cid=f45959fa24&mc_eid=a18fa05e7c. [2February 2022]; Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2021,
Checked Out: Migrant Worker Abuse in Qatar’s World Cup Luxury Hotels.
Available from: https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/
documents/2021_Qatar_Hotels_v547.pdf. [30 November 2021];
Amnesty International 2022, ‘They think that we’re machines’: Forced
labour and other abuse of migrant workers in Qatar’s private security
sector. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
mde22/5388/2022/en/. [13 April 2022].
Cockayne, J 2021, Developing Freedom: The Sustainable Development
Case for Ending Modern Slavery, Forced Labour and Human Trafficking,United Nations University, p. 221. Available from: https://www.developingfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/DevelopingFreedom_MainReport_WebFinal.pdf. [2 February 2022].
ILO Project Office for the State of Qatar 2021, Progress report on thetechnical cooperation programme between the Government of Qatar
and the ILO, International Labour Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/---iloqatar/documents/publication/wcms_832122.pdf. [2 February 2022].

2020, ‘Qatar: Migrant workers illegally expelled during COVID-19
pandemic’, Amnesty, 15 April. Available from: https://www.amnesty.
org/en/latest/news/2020/04/qatar-migrant-workers-illegally-expelled-during-covid19-pandemic/. [11 February 2022].

57.

46.

Equidem 2020, The Cost of Contagion: The human rights impacts of
COVID-19 on migrant workers in the Gulf, p. 7. Available from: https://www.equidem.org/assets/downloads/1837_Equidem_The_Cost_of_
Congation_Report_ART_WEB.pdf. [30 November 2021].

58.

47.

2020, ‘Saudi Arabia allows businesses to reduce workers wages without
consent’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 7 May. Available from: https://www.
migrant-rights.org/2020/05/saudi-arabia-allows-businesses-to-reduce-workers-wages-without-consent/. [11 February 2022].

Workers can depart without permission, however, employers can apply
for up to 5 per cent of employees to require prior approval; Interior
Minister Decision No. (95) Of 2019 regarding controls and proceduresfor the exit of some categories of expatriates who are not subject to thelabour law, 2019 (Qatar).

59.

Interior Minister Decision No. (95) Of 2019 regarding controls and procedures for the exit of some categories of expatriates who are not subject
to the labour law, 2019 (Qatar) ; Law No. 19 of 2020 amending certain
provisions of Law No. 21 of 2015 related to organizing the entry and exitof expatriates and their residence 2020 (Qatar) ; Law No. 18 of 2020
amending certain provisions of Labour Law No. 14 of 2004, 2020 (Qatar)art 1,

60.

2021, ‘Job mobility in Qatar is still a mirage despite reforms; domestic
workers most affected’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 5 October. Available
from: https://www.migrant-rights.org/2021/10/job-mobility-in-qatar-is-still-a-mirage-despite-reforms-domestic-workers-most-affected/. [2 February 2022]; Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 2021,
Checked Out: Migrant Worker Abuse in Qatar’s World Cup Luxury Hotels.
Available from: https://media.business-humanrights.org/media/
documents/2021_Qatar_Hotels_v547.pdf. [30 November 2021].

48.

Begum, R 2020, ‘Domestic Workers in Middle East Risk Abuse Amid
COVID-19 Crisis’, Human Rights Watch, 6 April. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/06/domestic-workers-middle-eastrisk-abuse-amid-covid-19-crisis. [11 February 2022]; Redfern, C
2021, ‘’I want to go home’: Filipina domestic workers face exploitative
conditions’, The Guardian, 27 January. Available from: https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2021/jan/27/domestic-workers-philippines-coronavirus-conditions. [11 February 2022].

49.

Donovan, L 2021, ‘Female migrant workers and the families they
support are being abandoned by the money-transfer industry’, Fortune,
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50.

Ramadan, T 2021, ‘’Lebanon is a prison’: Migrant domestic workers
struggle to leave collapsing Lebanon’, L’Orient Today, 16 September.
Available from: https://today.lorientlejour.com/article/1274970/lebanon-is-a-prison-migrant-domestic-workers-struggle-to-leave-collapsing-lebanon.html. [2 February 2022].

51.

300

For example: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan.

61.

62.

Amnesty International 2020, Reality Check 2020: Countdown to the2022 World Cup Migrant Workers’ Rights in Qatar, p. 7. Available from:https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/
MDE2232972020ENGLISH.pdf. [31 January 2022].

Amnesty International 2020, Reality Check 2020: Countdown to the2022 World Cup Migrant Workers’ Rights in Qatar, p. 15. Available
from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/
MDE2232972020ENGLISH.pdf. [31 January 2022].
Amnesty International 2022, ‘They think that we’re machines’: Forced
labour and other abuse of migrant workers in Qatar’s private security
sector. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/
mde22/5388/2022/en/. [13 April 2022]; Business & Human Rights
Resource Centre 2022, FIFA World Cup Qatar 2022 Parallel Portal. Avail-able from: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/fifaworld-cup-qatar-2022-parallel-portal/. [13 April 2022].
63.

64.

65.

Amnesty International 2022, Joint letter to Gianni Infantino: Remedy forabuse of migrant workers’ rights in Qatar. Available from: https://www.
hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2022/05/2022.05.17.Joint%20
letter%20to%20Gianni%20Infantino%20re.%20remedy%20for%20
labour%20abuses.pdf. [21 December 2022]; Human Rights Watch 2022,
Migrant Workers Who Delivered FIFA World Cup in Qatar Suffered Harm.
Tell FIFA to Pay Up Now. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/PayUpFIFA. [21 December 2022].
Amnesty International 2022, ‘FIFA misleading world on remedy for
migrant workers’, 12 December. Available from: https://www.amnesty.
org/en/latest/news/2022/12/fifa-misleading-world-on-remedy-formigrant-workers/. [21 December 2022]; Amnesty International 2022,‘Qatar: Nepali civil society groups denounce FIFA’s continued dismissalof migrant workers’ compensation claims’, 15 December. Available
from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/12/qatar-nepali-civil-society-groups-denounce-fifas-continued-dismissal-of-migrant-workers-compensation-claims/. [21 December 2022].
2020, ‘Oman eases restrictions on sponsorship transfer’, MigrantRights.Org, 8 June. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.
org/2020/06/oman-eases-restrictions-on-sponsorship-transfer/.
[3 November 2020]; 2020, ‘Oman to scrap NOC requirement for expat
workers’, Arab News, 17 June. Available from: https://www.arabnews.
com/node/1690991/middle-east. [13 February 2022].

66.

2020, ‘Saudi Arabia eases ‘kafala’ system restrictions on migrant
workers’, BBC News, 4 November. Available from: https://www.bbc.
com/news/world-middle-east-54813515. [5 November 2021].

67.

2021, ‘Saudi Arabia: Labor Reforms Insufficient’, Human Rights Watch,
25 March. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/25/
saudi-arabia-labor-reforms-insufficient. [16 February 2022].

68.

Ministerial Decree No. 766 of 2015 on rules and conditions for granting apermit to a worker for employment by a new employer, 2015 (United ArabEmirates) art 1(III); International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory
Framework Governing Migrant Workers. Available from: https://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/
publication/wcms_776529.pdf. [29 August 2022].

69.

Mohamed, A 2021, ‘The Flexi Permit Experiment: No Kafala, but poor
labour practices persist’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 12 April. Available from:https://www.migrant-rights.org/2021/04/the-flexi-permit-experiment-no-kafala-but-poor-labour-practices-persist/. [2 February2022].

70.

Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2020, Flexi Permit, Governmentof Bahrain. Available from: http://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/325.
[3 November 2020]; Mohamed, A 2021, ‘The Flexi Permit Experiment:
No Kafala, but poor labour practices persist’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 12April. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.org/2021/04/
the-flexi-permit-experiment-no-kafala-but-poor-labour-practices-persist/. [2 February 2022].

71.

2021, ‘Bahrain’s Flexi-Permit workers reportedly pay high residence
fees and do not benefit from labour law protection’, Business &Human Rights Resource Centre, 12 April. Available from: https://www.
business-humanrights.org/en/latest-news/bahrains-flexi-permitworkers-reportedly-pay-high-residence-fees-and-do-not-benefitfrom-labour-law-protection/. [16 February 2022]; De Bel-Air, F 2018,
Demography, Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain (Demography,
Migration, and the Labour Market in Bahrain, Explanatory Note No
1/2019, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, p. 6. Available from: https://
gulfmigration.grc.net/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2019_01.pdf. [14February 2022].

72.

Mohamed, A 2021, ‘The Flexi Permit Experiment: No Kafala, but poor
labour practices persist’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 12 April. Available from:https://www.migrant-rights.org/2021/04/the-flexi-permit-experiment-no-kafala-but-poor-labour-practices-persist/. [2 February2022].

73.

As above.

74.

HRH Prince Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifa 2022, ‘Bahrain Announces
New Measures to Update Expatriate Worker Permits and Further
Increase Protections’, Crown Prince, Deputy Supreme Commander ofthe Armed Forced and Prime Minister, 5 October. Available from: http://
www.crownprince.bh/en/media-centre/news/13995/2022/10/5/
Bahrain-Announces-New-Measures-to-Update-Expatriate-Worker-Permits-and-Further-Increase-Protections. [20 December 2022].

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

75.

Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2022, LMRA: The Launch of the
New Labour Registration Program, Kingdom of Bahrain. Available
from: http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2022/12/03/lmra-the-launch-of-thenew-labour-registration-program/. [20 December 2022]; Amir, KA
2022, ‘Switching jobs, labour recruitment made easier in new Bahrain
reforms’, Gulf News, 6 October. Available from: https://gulfnews.com/
world/gulf/bahrain/switching-jobs-labour-recruitment-made-easierin-new-bahrain-reforms-1.91087912. [20 December 2022].

76.

Reforms to Bahrain’s Flexi-Permit system took place outside of thegovernment response assessment period for the 2023 Global Slavery
Index and are therefore not reflected in Bahrain’s government responsescore.

77.

Resolution No. (1) of 2022 regarding assigning some tasks of the Labor
Market Regulatory Authority to labor registration centers, 2022 (Bahrain)art. 5; Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2022, General Questions for
the Labour Registration Program, Kingdom of Bahrain. Available from:https://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/428. [20 December 2022].

78.

As above.

79.

2022, ‘Bahrain launches new Labour Registration Program to replace
Flexi-Permit’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 12 December. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.org/2022/12/bahrain-launches-new-labour-registration-program-to-replace-flexi-permit/. [20 December 2022].

80.

Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2022, ‘LMRA and Ministry ofInterior Conduct Joint Inspection Campaigns’, Kingdom of Bahrain,
12 December. Available from: http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2022/12/12/
lmra-and-ministry-of-interior-conduct-joint-inspection-campaigns-4/. [20 December 2022].

81.

Begum, R 2020, ‘What Will it Take for Saudi Arabia to Abolish Abusive
Sponsorship System?’, Human Rights Watch, 30 October. Available from:https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/30/what-will-it-take-saudi-arabia-abolish-abusive-sponsorship-system. [13 February 2022].

82.

Employer must sponsor entry into country: Act No. 19 With Regard to theRegulation of the Labour Market, 2006 (Bahrain) art 24Resolution No. (1)of 2022 regarding assigning some tasks of the Labor Market Regulatory
Authority to labor registration centers, 2022 (Bahrain) art. 5.
Employer controls residency / work permit: Kaur, H 2017, ‘Flexible
work permit launched’, Labour Market Regulatory Authority, 24 July.
Available from: http://blog.lmra.bh/en/2017/07/24/flexible-work-permit-launched/#more-3469. [1 August 2022]; Act No. 19 With Regard
to the Regulation of the Labour Market, 2006 (Bahrain) arts 23 & 24;
Migration Policies in the Arab Region 2022, Change in work permit
management for domestic workers, UNESCWA. Available from: https://
migrationpolicy.unescwa.org/node/3647. [29 August 2022].
Employer must grant permission for workers to change / leave job: Act
No. 19 With Regard to the Regulation of the Labour Market, 2006 (Bahrain)art 25; Order No. 79 of 2009 with regard to the Procedures for Transfer of a
Foreign Worker to Another Employer, 2009 (Bahrain) arts 2 & 3; Order No.
15 of 2011 With Regard to Amending Paragraph (A) of Law No. 19 of 2006
Concerning the Regulation of the Labour Market, 2011 (Bahrain) art 3;
Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2022, Expatriate Employee Transfer,
Kingdom of Bahrain. Available from: https://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/
show/194. [1 August 2022]; Law No. 36 of 2012 with regard to the promulgation of the labour law in the private sector, 2012 (Bahrain) art 2(b)(1).
Employer can report worker for absconding: Law No. 36 of 2012 withregard to the promulgation of the labour law in the private sector, 2012
(Bahrain) art 107; Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2022, Expatriate
Employee Absence From Work Notification, Government of Bahrain.
Available from: https://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/188. [29 August2022].
Employer must grant permission for worker to exit country: LabourMarket Regulatory Authority 2022, Flexi Permit, Kingdom of Bahrain.
Available from: https://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/325. [11 October2021]; Decision No. 87 of 2006 concerning the Issuance of a Residence
Permit Allowing its Holder to Leave and Return to the Country for Multiple
Trips (Bahrain), arts 1 - 2.

83.

Resolution No. (1) of 2022 regarding assigning some tasks of the Labor
Market Regulatory Authority to labor registration centers, 2022 (Bahrain)art. 5.

84.

2022, ‘Bahrain launches new Labour Registration Program to replace
Flexi-Permit’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 12 December. Available from: https://www.migrant-rights.org/2022/12/bahrain-launches-new-labour-registration-program-to-replace-flexi-permit/. [20 December 2022].

301

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ENDNOTES
85.

Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2022, General Questions for the
Labour Registration Program, Kingdom of Bahrain. Available from:https://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/428. [20 December 2022].

86.

Law No. 36 of 2012 with regard to the promulgation of the labour law in theprivate sector, 2012 (Bahrain) art 2(b)(1); Labour Market Regulatory Authority 2022, Expatriate Employee Transfer, Kingdom of Bahrain. Available from:https://lmra.bh/portal/en/page/show/194. [1 August 2022].

87.

Act No. 19 with regard to the Regulation of the Labour Market, 2006 (Bahrain)art 36; Order No. 79 of 2009 with regard to the Procedures for Transfer of a
Foreign Worker to Another Employer, 2009 (Bahrain) arts 2 & 3.

88.

Mohamed, A 2021, ‘The Flexi Permit Experiment: No Kafala, but poor
labour practices persist’, Migrant-Rights.Org, 12 April. Available from:https://www.migrant-rights.org/2021/04/the-flexi-permit-experiment-no-kafala-but-poor-labour-practices-persist/. [2 February 2022].

89.

Human Rights Watch 2012, For a Better Life: Migrant Worker Abuse in
Bahrain and the Government Reform Agenda. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/09/30/better-life/migrant-worker-abusebahrain-and-government-reform-agenda#_ftnref276. [29 August2022]; Clyde & Co 2020, Comparison of Absconding laws in the GCC,
Migrant-Rights.Org. Available from: https://infogram.com/comparison-of-absconding-laws-in-the-gcc-1h7v4pzolky86k0. [20 February2022].

90.

Employer must sponsor entry into country: Royal Oman Police 2022,
Work Visa. Available from: https://www.rop.gov.om/english/dg_pr_
visas_employment.html. [29 August 2022].
Employer controls residency / work permit: Royal Decree No. 16/95
issuing the Foreigners Residence Law, 1995 (Oman); Al Barwani, A& Baxter, R 2020, Doing Business in Oman: Overview - Omanisation,Thomson Reuters Practical Law. Available from: https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/w-007-5872?transitionType=Default&contextData=(sc.Default)&firstPage=true#co_anchor_a722207. [29August 2022].
Employer must grant permission for workers to change / leave job:
Ministerial Decision 157/2020 Amending Some Provisions of the Executive
Regulation of the Foreigners Residency Law, 2020 (Oman).
Employer can report worker for absconding: Ministry of Manpower
Ministerial Decision No. 270 of 2018 (Oman) art 5.
Employer must grant permission for worker to exit country: International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory framework governing
migrant workers: Oman, p. 3. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776526.pdf. [1 August 2022].

91.

Ashok, R 2021, ‘Amended Oman law to allow conversion of visit visa towork visa’, Gulf News, 31 May. Available from: https://gulfnews.com/
world/gulf/oman/amended-oman-law-to-allow-conversion-of-visitvisa-to-work-visa-1.79585578. [1 August 2022].

92.

Ministerial Decision 157/2020 Amending Some Provisions of the Executive
Regulation of the Foreigners Residency Law, 2020 (Oman).

93.

Employer must sponsor entry into country: Ministerial Resolution No.
(52) for 1989 The Rules and Procedures to be adopted at the Labour
permits sections with respect to the recruitment of non-national Labours
for the employment in U.A.E, 1989 (United Arab Emirates) art 5.
Employer controls residency / work permit: Ministerial Decree No. 360
of 1997 Issuing the Implementing Regulations of Federal Law No. 6 of1973 Regarding Entry and Residence of Foreigners, 1997 (United ArabEmirates) art 63.
Employer must grant permission for workers to change / leave job:
Ministerial Decree No. 360 of 1997 Issuing the Implementing Regulationsof Federal Law No. 6 of 1973 Regarding Entry and Residence of Foreigners,
1997 (United Arab Emirates) art 68; Federal Law No (6) for 1973 Concerning Immigration and Residence, 1973 (United Arab Emirates) art 11;
Ministerial Decision No. 826 of 2005 Regarding the Executive Regulations
for the Transfer of Sponsorship, 2005 (United Arab Emirates) arts 6 & 11;
Ministerial Decree No. 766 of 2015 on rules and conditions for granting apermit to a worker for employment by a new employer, 2015 (United ArabEmirates) art 1(III).
Employer can report worker for absconding: Ministerial Decree No. 721
of 2006 Regarding the Procedures for Reporting Absconding Workers,
2006 (United Arab Emirates); Federal Decree-Law No. 9 of 2022 Concerning Domestic Workers, 2022 (United Arab Emirates) art. 11.
Employer must grant permission for worker to exit country: International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory Framework Governing MigrantWorkers. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776529.pdf.
[29 August 2022].

302

94.

Government of the United Arab Emirates 2021, Working in Free Zones.
Available from: https://u.ae/en/information-and-services/jobs/
working-in-free-zones. Laubach, C 2020, A general introduction to
immigration law and policy in United Arab Emirates, Lexology. Available
from: https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=67895d6e08cc-4faa-b021-b74a9adb8a72. [1 August 2022].

95.

Bedirian, R 2016, ‘No need to exit UAE to amend visit visa status’, Gulf
News, 4 January. Available from: https://gulfnews.com/uae/government/no-need-to-exit-uae-to-amend-visit-visa-status-1.1648176. [15August 2022].

96.

Ministerial Decision No. 951 of 2003 Regarding Investors, 2003 (United
Arab Emirates) arts 5 & 6; Ministerial Decision No. 826 of 2005 Regarding
the Executive Regulations for the Transfer of Sponsorship, 2005 (United
Arab Emirates) arts 6 & 11; Ministerial Decree No. 707 of 2006 Regarding
the Rules and Procedures for the Work of Non-nationals in the Country,
2006 (United Arab Emirates) art 13; Ministerial Decree No. 766 of 2015 onrules and conditions for granting a permit to a worker for employment by
a new employer, 2015 (United Arab Emirates) art 1(III).

97.

Federal Decree-Law No. 9 of 2022 Concerning Domestic Workers,
2022 (United Arab Emirates) art. 18.Employer must sponsor entry
into country: Zahra, M 2019, The Legal Framework of the Sponsorship
Systems of the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: A Comparative
Examination, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration, p. 4. Available from:https://gulfmigration.grc.net/media/pubs/exno/GLMM_EN_2019_04.
pdf. [13 April 2022]; Kuwaiti Amiri Decree No. 17 of 1959 issuing the Aliens
Residence Law, 1959 (Kuwait) art 15 (bis).
Employer controls residency / work permit: Human Rights Council 2017,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especiallywomen and children, on her mission to Kuwait A/HRC/35/37/Add.1,
United Nations, p. 6. Available from: https://www.refworld.org/
docid/593a9d554.html. [30 August 2022].
Employer must grant permission for workers to change / leave job:
Administrative Decision No. 842 of 2015 regarding the requirements forthe transfer of labor from one employer to another, 2015 (Kuwait) art 6;
Decree No. 378 of 2016 Regarding the amendment of the decision on thetransfer of labor conditions, 2016 (Kuwait) art 1.
Employer can report worker for absconding: Law No. 68 of 2015 on
Employment of Domestic Workers, 2015 (Kuwait) art 51.
Employer must grant permission for worker to exit country: Regulatory
Framework Governing Migrant Workers: Kuwait, p. 3. Available from:https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776524.pdf. [21 February 2022].

98.

International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory Framework Governing Migrant Workers: Kuwait, p. 3. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776524.pdf. [21 February 2022].

99.

Employer must sponsor entry into country: Law of 10 July 1962 concerning the entry and stay in Lebanon as well as the exit, 1962 (Lebanon) 25;
Decree No. 17561 of 18 September 1964 – regulating the work of aliens,
1964 (Lebanon) arts 2, 4 – 5.
Employer controls residency / work permit: Decree No. 17561 of 18
September 1964 – regulating the work of aliens, 1964 (Lebanon) arts 6& 7; Law of 10 July 1962 concerning the entry and stay in Lebanon as wellas the exit, 1962 (Lebanon) art 36; Amnesty International 2019, ‘Theirhouse is my prison’: Exploitation of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon,p. 14. Available from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/
uploads/sites/9/2021/05/MDE1800222019ARABIC.pdf. [30 November2021].
Employer must grant permission for workers to change / leave job:in cases of abuse, migrant workers can inform General Security or
the Ministry of Labour, who decide on sponsorship transferal; Decree
No. 17561 of 18 September 1964 – regulating the work of aliens, 1964
(Lebanon) art 15.
Employer can report worker for absconding: International Labour
Organization & The Legal Agenda 2020, The labyrinth of justice: Migrant
domestic workers before Lebanon’s courts, International Labour
Organization, pp. 26-28. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/
wcms_777078.pdf. [2 February 2022].
Employer must grant permission for worker to exit country: International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory Framework Governing
Migrant Workers: Lebanon. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776525.pdf. [30 August 2022].

100. Employer must sponsor entry into country: Law No. 21 of 27 October
2015 which regulates the entry, exit of expatriates and their residence,
2015 (Qatar) art 4. A migrant worker entering Qatar under a work visa
must have a signed employment contract with their employer.
Employer controls residency / work permit: Law No. 21 of 27 October
2015 which regulates the entry, exit of expatriates and their residence,
2015 (Qatar) arts 8-16. An employer must obtain and renew residence
permit for the migrant worker as per the permit procedures.
Employer must grant permission for workers to change / leave job: Law
No. 18 of 2020 amending certain provisions of Labour Law No. 14 of 2004,
2020 (Qatar) art 1. Workers can change/ leave jobs at any time during
their contract period, with due notice stipulated by the legal frameworks, without prior permission of their employers.
Employer can report worker for absconding: Law No. 21 of 27 October
2015 which regulates the entry, exit of expatriates and their residence,
2015 (Qatar) art 19; Clyde & Co 2020, Comparison of Absconding laws
in the GCC, Migrant-Rights.Org. Available from: https://infogram.
com/comparison-of-absconding-laws-in-the-gcc-1h7v4pzolky86k0.
[20 February 2022]. Employer has to notify the competent authority
within 14 days from the date on which the worker left the employer or
abstained from leaving the country following the revocation of his/her
residency permit or its expiry.
Employer must grant permission for worker to exit country: 2020,‘Qatar: Significant Labor and Kafala Reforms’, Human Rights Watch, 24
September. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/24/
qatar-significant-labor-and-kafala-reforms. [2 November 2020]; Law
No. 13 of 2018 amending some provisions of Law No. 21 of 2015, 2018
(Qatar) art 1; Interior Minister Decision No. (95) Of 2019 regarding controls
and procedures for the exit of some categories of expatriates who are notsubject to the labour law, 2019 (Qatar) art 1 and 2. Almost all migrant
workers can leave the country temporarily or permanently without
prior approval from their employer. Exceptions apply to certain groups
of workers such as members of the armed forces and up to five percent
of staff in key positions such as chief executive or financial officers,
directors of supervising daily operations and directors of informationand communication technology.
101. Ministry of Administrative Development Labour & Social Affairs 2022,
Changing employers in Qatar: Key information for workers, Governmentof Qatar. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_754449.pdf.
[1 August 2022].
102. Law No 13 of 2018 amending some provisions of Law No. (21) of 2015
which regulates the entry and exit of expatriates and their residence 2018
(Qatar). Almost all migrant workers can leave the country temporarilyor permanently without prior approval from their employer. Exceptions
apply to certain groups of workers such as members of the armed
forces and up to five percent of staff in key positions such as chief executive or financial officers, directors of supervising daily operations anddirectors of information and communication technology.

105. Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development 2020, Ministryof Human Resources and Social Development Launches Labor Reforms
for Private Sector Workers, Government of Saudi Arabia. Available from:https://hrsd.gov.sa/en/news/ministry-human-resources-and-social-development-launches-labor-reforms-private-sector-workers.
[1 August 2022].
106. International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory Framework Governing Migrant Workers: Saudi Arabia. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776522.pdf. [1 August 2022]; Ministerial Decision No. 605,
dated 15/5/1438 H., 2017 (Saudi Arabia).
107. Ministerial Decision No. 51848 of 1442, 2020 (Saudi Arabia); Ministry of
Human Resources and Social Development 2020, Labor Reform Initiative(LRI) Services Guidebook, Government of Qatar, pp. 4-6. Available from:https://hrsd.gov.sa/sites/default/files/1112020.pdf. [1 August 2022].
108. Labor Law, 2006 (Royal Decree No. M/51) (Saudi Arabia) art 7; Residence
Regulations, 1952 (No. 17/2/25/1337 of 1952) (Saudi Arabia) art 14.
109. Employer must sponsor entry into country: Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs 1973 (Jordan) arts 16 & 26; Labour Law and
its Amendments No. 8 of the Year 1996, 1996 (Jordan) art 12.
Employer controls residency / work permit: Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs 1973 (Jordan) arts 16, 22, 26 & 34; Labour
Law and its Amendments No. 8 of the Year 1996, 1996 (Jordan) art 12.
Employer must grant permission for workers to change / leave job:
Labour Law and its Amendments No. 8 of the Year 1996, 1996 (Jordan)arts 12, 21, 23, 26, 29.
Employer can report worker for absconding: Regulation No. 90/2009of Domestic Workers, Cooks, Gardeners and Similar Categories, 2009
(Jordan) art 5; Gordon, J 2020, The Obstacles to Decent Work for Migrants
in Jordan: A Discussion with Alia Hindawi, Civil Society Knowledge
Centre. Available from: https://civilsociety-centre.org/paper/obstacles-decent-work-migrants-jordan-discussion-alia-hindawi. [13February 2022].
Employer must grant permission for worker to exit country: Law
No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs 1973 (Jordan) art
4; Regulation No. 90/2009 of Domestic Workers, Cooks, Gardeners andSimilar Categories, 2009 (Jordan) art 8.
110. Labour Law and its Amendments No. 8 of the Year 1996, 1996 (Jordan)arts 12, 21, 23, 26, 29.
111. Kagan, S 2017, Domestic Workers and Employers in the Arab States, International Labour Organization, pp. 6-7. Available from: https://www.ilo.
org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/
publication/wcms_619661.pdf. [11 February 2022]. Kalush, R, Saraswathi, V, Mohamed, A & Fousdeen, F 2019, Lived Experience of Migrant
Women: Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, Migrant-Rights.Org, p. 6. Available
from: https://respect.international/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/
Lived-Experience-of-Migrant-Women-Quatar-Bahrain-and-Kuwait.
pdf. [2 February 2022].

103. Interior Minister Decision No. (95) Of 2019 regarding controls and procedures for the exit of some categories of expatriates who are not subject tothe labour law, 2019 (Qatar); 2020, ‘Qatar: Significant Labor and Kafala
Reforms’, Human Rights Watch, 24 September. Available from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/09/24/qatar-significant-labor-and-kafala-reforms. [2 November 2020].

112. 2020, ‘Lebanon takes crucial first step towards dismantling Kafala in
Lebanon’, International Labour Organization, 10 September. Available
from: https://www.ilo.org/beirut/media-centre/news/WCMS_755008/
lang--en/index.htm#:~:text=BEIRUT%20%E2%80%93%20(ILO%20
News)%20Lebanon,and%20elsewhere%20across%20the%20region. [2February 2022].

104. Employer must sponsor entry into country: Labour Law (Royal Decree
No. M/51), 2006 (Saudi Arabia) art 33; Residence Regulations No.
17/2/25/1337, 1952 (Saudi Arabia) art 5.
Employer controls residency / work permit: Labour Law (Royal Decree
No. M/51), 2006 (Saudi Arabia) art 33; Labour Law (Royal Decree
No. M/51), 2006 (Saudi Arabia) art 33; Residence Regulations No.
17/2/25/1337, 1952 (Saudi Arabia) arts 5, 11 & 12.
Employer must grant permission for workers to change / leave job:
International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory Framework Governing Migrant Workers: Saudi Arabia. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776522.pdf. [1 August 2022].
Employer can report worker for absconding: Residence Regulations No.
17/2/25/1337, 1952 (Saudi Arabia) art 11; Ministerial Decision No. 310 of
1434, (Saudi Arabia) art 13.
Employer must grant permission for worker to exit country: International Labour Organization 2021, Regulatory Framework Governing
Migrant Workers: Saudi Arabia. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_776522.pdf. [1 August 2022].

113. Dagher, J, Wood, D & Boswall, J 2020, Cleaning Up: The Shady Industries
that Exploit Lebanon’s Kafala Workers, Triangle, p. 2. Available from:https://www.thinktriangle.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Cleaning-Up-The-Shady-Industries-That-Exploit-Lebanons-Kafala-Workers-1.pdf. [2 February 2022].

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

114. Law No. 24 of 1973 on Residence and Foreigners’ Affairs 1973 (Jordan)art 4; Regulation No. 90/2009 of Domestic Workers, Cooks, Gardeners andSimilar Categories, 2009 (Jordan) art 8.
115. As above.
116. Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work Branch 2017, Migrant
domestic and garment workers in Jordan: A baseline analysis of trafficking in persons and related laws and policies, International Labour
Organization, p. 24. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/
groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/
wcms_554812.pdf. [14 February 2022].

303

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ENDNOTES
hingya-girls-bangladesh-compelled-marry-food-rations. [31 January2022]; Ahmed, K 2019, ‘Rohingya women, girls being trafficked to
Malaysia for marriage’, Al Jazeera, 8 May. Available from: https://www.
aljazeera.com/features/2019/5/8/rohingya-women-girls-being-trafficked-to-malaysia-for-marriage. [31 January 2022].

Regional findings:
Asia and the Pacific1.

2.

An increase of 74 per cent from 2000 to 2020. See International Organization for Migration 2022, World Migration Report. Available from:https://worldmigrationreport.iom.int/wmr-2022-interactive/. [1March 2023].
International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery. Available
from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/content/uploads/2022/09/12142341/
GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf.

3.

Walk Free & Leiden Asia Centre 2018, Pervasive, Punitive, and Predetermined: Understanding Modern Slavery in North Korea. Available from:https://www.walkfree.org/resources/. [13 January 2022].

4.

Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar 2022,
Losing a generation: how the military junta is devastating Myanmar’s
children and undermining Myanmar’s future A/HRC/50/CRP.1, United
Nations Human Rights Council, pp. 27-34. Available from: https://www.
ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/06/myanmar-crisis-taking-enormous-toll-children-un-committee-warns. [14 March 2023]; Fore, H
2021, ‘Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan’, United
Nations Children’s Fund, 12 November. Available from: https://www.
unicef.org/press-releases/girls-increasingly-risk-child-marriage-afghanistan. [14 March 2023].

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

304

Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar 2022,
Losing a generation: how the military junta is devastating Myanmar’s
children and undermining Myanmar’s future A/HRC/50/CRP.1, United
Nations Human Rights Council, pp. 27-34. Available from: https://www.
ohchr.org/en/statements/2022/06/myanmar-crisis-taking-enormous-toll-children-un-committee-warns. [14 March 2023]; Fore, H
2021, ‘Girls increasingly at risk of child marriage in Afghanistan’, United
Nations Children’s Fund, 12 November. Available from: https://www.
unicef.org/press-releases/girls-increasingly-risk-child-marriage-afghanistan. [14 March 2023].
Murray, F, Theminimulle, S, Mustaq, N & Fazli, S 2019, Modern Slavery inPakistan, pp. 8-12. Available from: https://assets.publishing.service.
gov.uk/media/5e56a35a86650c53b6909337/DFID_Modern_Slavery_
in_Pakistan_.pdf. [14 March 2022]; Pokharel, S & Page, T 2021, ‘Silk
slaves: India’s bonded laborers are forced to work to pay off debts’,
CNN, 13 March. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2021/03/13/
asia/silk-slaves-india-the-freedom-project-spc-intl/index.html. [9February 2022]; Anti-Slavery International n.d., India: debt bondage.
Available from: https://www.antislavery.org/what-we-do/past-projects/india-debt-bondage/. [14 March 2023]; Nagaraj, A 2019, ‘This
scheme is fighting slavery in India’, World Economic Forum, 30 August.
Available from: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/08/fighting-slavery-in-india/. [14 March 2023].
United Nations General Assembly Security Council 2021, Children andarmed conflict: Report of the Secretary-General A/75/873–S/2021/437,
pp. 3, 17. Available from: https://digitallibrary.un.org/
record/3929648?ln=en. [28 January 2022]; Evans, R 2017, ‘Pakistanipolice rescue 24 from organ trafficking gang’, BBC News, 24 January.
Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/health-38722052. [28January 2022]; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime n.d., Nepal
takes a step forward against human trafficking, United Nations. Available from: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/human-trafficking/
Webstories2020/nepal-takes-a-step-forward-against-human-trafficking.html. [28 January 2022].
Amnesty International 2018, Briefing: Myanmar forces starve, abductand rob Rohingya, as ethnic cleansing continues, pp. 1-2. Available
from: https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/
ASA1678352018ENGLISH.pdf. [2 February 2022]; Reuters Staff 2020,‘Myanmar casualties may amount to further war crimes, U.N. rights
chief says’, Reuters, 14 September. Available from: https://www.
reuters.com/article/uk-un-rights-myanmar/myanmar-casualtiesmay-amount-to-further-war-crimes-u-n-rights-chief-says-idUKKBN2651H4?edition-redirect=uk. [2 February 2022].
Donovan, L 2019, Taking on traffickers at the world’s largest refugee
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35.

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37.

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38.

The nine countries that have criminalised forced marriage are Australia,
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39.

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40.

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41.

Although outside the period of assessment for government responses
reported in this publication, it must be noted that on 4 November 2022,
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Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

42.

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43.

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44.

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45.

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46.

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305

08

ENDNOTES
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48.

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49.

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50.

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51.

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52.

NORMLEX n.d., Ratifications of C189 - Domestic Workers Convention, 2011(No. 189), International Labour Organization. Available from: http://
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INSTRUMENT_ID:2551460. [24 January 2022].

53.

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54.

55.

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no=XVIII-12-b&chapter=18. [1 March 2023]/

56.

Modern Slavery Act, 2018 (Australia Cmlth).

57.

Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment 2022, Discussion
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chains, New Zealand Government. Available from: https://www.mbie.
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58.

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1.

2.

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or%20to%20end%20animosity. [14 April 2021].

3.

Dawi, A 2022,’Afghanistan Poverty Bears More Child Brides’, VOA News,May 04, 2022. Available From: https://www.voanews.com/a/afghanistan-poverty-bears-more-child-brides/6556599.html. [14 April 2023].

Spotlight: Orphanages
as modern slavery hubs
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Desmond. C., et al. 2020, Prevalence and number of children living ininstitutional care: global, regional, and country estimates. Lancet Child
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2.

As above.

3.

Lumos Foundation 2021, Cycles of Exploitation. Available from: https://lumos.contentfiles.net/media/documents/document/2021/12/
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4.

As above.

5.

European Commission 2009, Report of the Ad Hoc Expert Group on
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6.

7.

Van Doore, K. 2016, Paper Orphans: Exploring Child Trafficking for the
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Van Doore, K. 2019, ‘Orphanages as Sites of Modern Slavery’, in Cheer,
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17.

Better Care Network 2018, How orphanages in Uganda profit fromchildren’s misery. Available from: https://bettercarenetwork.org/sites/
default/files/How%20orphanages%20in%20Uganda%20profit%20
from%20children%27s%20misery%20Nianias.pdf. [23 February2022].
Van Doore, K, Martin, F, & McKeon, A 2016, Expert Paper: International
Volunteering and Child Sexual Abuse, Better Care Network. Available
from: https://bettercarenetwork.org/bcn-in-action/key-initiatives/
rethink-orphanages/resources/expert-paper-international-volunteering-and-child-sexual-abuse. [20 December 2022].

18.

Modern Slavery Act, 2018 (Australia Cmlth)

19.

Australian Border Force n.d., Commonwealth Modern Slavery Act 2018:
Guidance for Reporting Entities, pp. 33-34. Available from: https://www.
homeaffairs.gov.au/criminal-justice/files/modern-slavery-reporting-entities.pdf. [27 February 2022].

20.

ReThink Orphanages Australia 2021, Partnerships with Overseas‘Orphanages’: Implications of the Modern Slavery Act 2018. Available
from: https://au.rethinkorphanages.org/sites/default/files/202002/partnerships-with-overseas-orphanages%20%281%29.pdf. [1December 2021].

21.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2019, Trafficking in Persons report, United States Department of State. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/2019-Trafficking-in-Persons-Report.pdf. [14 March 2023].

22.

Lumos Foundation 2020, Cracks in the system: Child trafficking in thecontext of institutional care in Europe. Available from: https://www.
wearelumos.org/resources/cracks-system/#:~:text=Cracks%20
in%20the%20System%20is,and%20child%20trafficking%20in%20
Europe.&text=Despite%20this%2C%20laws%20and%20policies,child%20institutionalisation%20and%20child%20trafficking. [1February 2022].

23.

24.

Lumos Foundation 2020, Cracks in the system: Child trafficking in thecontext of institutional care in Europe. Available from: https://www.
wearelumos.org/resources/cracks-system/#:~:text=Cracks%20
in%20the%20System%20is,and%20child%20trafficking%20in%20
Europe.&text=Despite%20this%2C%20laws%20and%20policies,child%20institutionalisation%20and%20child%20trafficking [1February 2022].
Van Doore, K 2016, ‘Paper Orphans: Exploring Child Trafficking for
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25.

Zheng, T. 2018, Human Trafficking in China. Journal of Historical Archelogy and Anthropological Sciences. Available from: http://medcraveonline.com/JHAAS/JHAAS-03-00080.pdf. [10 February 2022].

26.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking
in Persons Report, United States Department of State, p. 256. Available
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8.

Faith To Action Initiative 2021, Residential Care: U.S. Christian Giving
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9.

Van Doore, K. 2019, ‘Orphanages as Sites of Modern Slavery’, in Cheer,
J.M. et al. (eds), Modern Day Slavery and Orphanage Tourism, CABI.

27.

10.

Lumos Foundation 2021, Cycles of Exploitation. Available from: https://lumos.contentfiles.net/media/documents/document/2021/12/
LUMOS_Cycles_of_exploitation.pdf. [10 January 2022].

Lumos Foundation 2021, Cycles of Exploitation. Available from: https://lumos.contentfiles.net/media/documents/document/2021/12/
LUMOS_Cycles_of_exploitation.pdf. [10 January 2022].

28.

David, F et al. 2019, Migrants and their vulnerability to human trafficking,modern slavery and forced labour. Available from: https://publications.
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29.

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LUMOS_Cycles_of_exploitation.pdf. [10 January 2022].

30.

As above.

31.

As above.

32.

EveryChild 2011, Scaling Down: Reducing, Reshaping and Improving
Residential Care Around the World. Available from: https://bettercarenetwork.org/library/principles-of-good-care-practices/transforming-institutional-care/scaling-down-reducing-reshaping-and-improving-residential-care-around-the-world. [18 February 2022].

11.

12.

306

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16.

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13.

Van Doore, K. 2019, ‘Orphanages as Sites of Modern Slavery’, in Cheer,
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14.

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67.

As above.

68.

Chance, M & Burrows, E 2018, ‘Russia’s hidden world of North Korean
labor’, CNN. Available from: https://edition.cnn.com/2018/01/15/
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2019, ‘The secret world of Russia’s North Korean workers’, BBC. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-43802085. [13March 2023].

69.

70.

310

Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations 2019, Direct Request (CEACR) - adopted 2018, published
108th ILC session (2019): Belarus, ILO NORMLEX. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_
COMMENT_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_ID,P11110_COUNTRY_NAME,P11110_
COMMENT_YEAR:3960872,103154,Belarus,2018. [16 December 2021].
United Nations Human Rights Council 2019, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus A/HRC/41/52,
United Nations, pp. 3, 13, 18. Available from: https://www.undocs.
org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F41%2F52&Lan-

guage=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False. [6 September2022].
71.

Uzbek Forum for Human Rights 2022, A Turning Point in Uzbekistan’s
Cotton Harvest: No central government-imposed forced labor, freedomof association needed to sustain reforms, p. 3. Available from: https://www.uzbekforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/UZBEK-FORUM_harvest_report.pdf?fbclid=IwAR3DT3Nkj8XH2L-zK4lWuXwnzItVmnAWA2q0TtWcBWS4pXZF3zUlx6uyXTk. [23 March 2022].

72.

As above.

73.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking in
Persons Report: Bulgaria Country Narrative, United States Departmentof State. Available from: https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/bulgaria/. [1 February 2022].

74.

Walk Free Foundation 2018, Global Slavery Index: Government Responses Data. Available from: https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/.

75.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2020, Trafficking
in Persons Report: Albania Country Narrative, United States Department of State. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf. [1February 2022].

76.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2020, Trafficking
in Persons Report: Portugal Country Narrative, United States Department of State. Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/06/2020-TIP-Report-Complete-062420-FINAL.pdf. [1February 2022].

77.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2020, Trafficking in
Persons Report: Serbia Country Narrative, United States Department ofState. Available from: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/serbia/. [1 February 2022].

78.

Group of Experts on Action Against Trafficking in Human Beings(GRETA) 2019, Report concerning the implementation of the Council ofEurope Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings byGermany: Second round evaluation. Available from: https://rm.coe.int/
GroupofExpertsonActionagainstTraffickinginHumanBeings(GRETA)-2
019-07-fgr-deu-en/1680950011. [1 February 2020].

79.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2020, Trafficking in
Persons Report: Hungary Country Narrative United States Departmentof State. Available from: https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-trafficking-in-persons-report/hungary/ [1 March 2022].

80.

Irish Human Rights and Equality Submission 2020, Commission Takes on
New Role as Ireland’s National Rapporteur on the Trafficking of Human
Beings. Available from: https://www.ihrec.ie/commission-takes-onnew-role-as-irelands-national-rapporteur-on-the-trafficking-of-human-beings/. [1 March 2021].

81.

The Government of The United Kingdom and the Government of The
Republic of Rwanda 2022, Memorandum of Understanding between the
UK and Rwanda: Policy Paper, UK Home Office Available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/memorandum-of-understanding-mou-between-the-uk-and-rwanda. [20 April 2022].

82.

The Guardian 2022, ‘Rwanda asylum flight cancelled after 11th-hour
ECHR intervention’. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/
uk-news/2022/jun/14/european-court-humam-right-makes-11thhour-intervention-in-rwanda-asylum-seeker-plan. [1 December2022].

83.

AAA and others v The Secretary of State for the Home Department[2022] EWHC 3230

84.

BBC News 2022, ‘What is the UK’s plan to send asylum seekers to
Rwanda?’. Available from: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/explainers-61782866. [2 March 2023].

85.

Medicins Sans Frontieres 2022, Out of Libya: Opening safe pathways forvulnerable migrants stuck in Libya, Medicins Sans Frontieres. Available
from: https://www.msf.org/out-libya-opening-safe-pathways-migrants-stuck-libya. [3 February 2022].

86.

Frontex 2023, Migratory Routes, Frontex. Available from: https://
frontex.europa.eu/what-we-do/migratory-routes/central-mediterranean-route/. [21 March 2023].

87.

Medicins Sans Frontieres 2022, Out of Libya: Opening safe pathways forvulnerable migrants stuck in Libya, Medicins Sans Frontieres. Available
from: https://www.msf.org/out-libya-opening-safe-pathways-migrants-stuck-libya. [3 February 2022].

88.

Lewis, A 2022, ‘EU funds border control deal in Egypt with migration
via Libya on rise’, Reuters, 31 October. Available from: https://www.
reuters.com/world/eu-funds-border-control-deal-egypt-with-migration-via-libya-rise-2022-10-30/. [3 February 2023].

89.

Survey of violations of Trade Union Rights 2022, Freedom of Association,
Collective Bargaining, Strike: Israel. Available from: https://survey.
ituc-csi.org/Israel.html?lang=en#tabs-2. [1 December 2022].

90.

Survey of violations of Trade Union Rights 2022, Freedom of Association,
Collective Bargaining, Strike: Denmark. Available from: https://survey.
ituc-csi.org/Denmark.html?lang=en#tabs-2. [1 December 2022].

91.

Law on the Corporate Duty of Vigilance, 2017 (Act no. 2017-399) (France)

92.

Act on Corporate Due Diligence in Supply Chains, 2021 (Germany)

93.

The Transparency Act, 2021 (Norway)

94.

Swiss Code of Obligations, 964j et seqq (Switzerland), Due Diligence andTransparency Ordinance, 2023 (Switzerland)

95.

Child Labour Due Diligence Law, 2019 (Netherlands)

96.

European Commission 2022, Just and sustainable economy: Commission
lays down rules for companies to respect human rights and environment
in global value chains, European Commission. Available from: https://
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IMPORTING RISK
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Ritzer, G 2020, The McDonaldization of society: Into the Digital Age. 10thed. SAGE Publications.

2.

OECD 2020, Leveraging digital trade to fight the consequences of COVID19. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/leveraging-digital-trade-to-fight-the-consequences-of-covid-19-f712f404/. [17 March 2023].

3.

OECD 2022, International trade during the COVID-19 pandemic: Big shifts
and uncertainty. Available from: https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/
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4.

Ritzer, G 2020, The McDonaldization of society: Into the Digital Age. 10thed. SAGE Publications.

5.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced
Labour and Forced Marriage. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/
content/uploads/2022/09/12142341/GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf.
[17 March 2023].

6.

International Labour Organization, Walk Free & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced
Labour and Forced Marriage. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/
content/uploads/2022/09/12142341/GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf.
[8 November 2022].

7.

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade n.d., The G20, AustralianGovernment. Available from: https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/organisations/g20. [21 March 2023].

8.

Observatory of Economic Complexity 2022, China. Available from:https://oec.world/en/profile/country/chn#latest-data. [23 August2022].

9.

Observatory of Economic Complexity 2022, United States. Available
from: https://oec.world/en/profile/country/usa#latest-data. [23August 2022].

10.

Although a member of the Group of Twenty (G20) intergovernmental
forum, the European Union has been excluded from this analysis as
government response data has not been collected at a supranational
level for the Global Slavery Index. To avoid confusion, the abbreviationof G20 has been retained throughout.

11.

Calculated using an inflation rate of 15 per cent based on: United States
Bureau of Labor Statistics 2023, CPI Inflation Calculator January 2017

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

to December 2021.. Available from: https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm. [5 April 2023].
12.

International Energy Agency 2021, Global Energy Review 2021, International Energy Agency, pp. 22-24. Available from: https://iea.blob.
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13.

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14.

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15.

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16.

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17.

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18.

Chidanand, N & Prasad, E 2021, Renewable Energy Market by Type
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19.

Anti-Slavery International 2021, A Vicious to a Virtuous Circle, Anti-Slavery International, p. 13. Available from: https://www.antislavery.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/04/ASI_ViciousCycle_Report_web2.pdf.
[23 August 2022].

20.

Business & Human Rights Centre 2022, Transition Minerals Tracker,
Business & Human Rights Centre. Available from: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/transition-minerals-tracker/. [23August 2022].

311

08

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32.

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33.

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34.

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35.

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36.

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37.

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38.

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41.

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42.

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43.

Gottwald, E 2018, ‘Certifying exploitation: Why ‘sustainable’ palm oil
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44.

As above.

45.

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313

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2.

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4.

See for example Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office 2022,
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8.

For example, The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, 2010
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9.

For example, Act on Corporate Due Diligence in Supply Chains, 2021
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10.

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12.

Walk Free, WikiRate & Business & Human Rights Resource Centre
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Spotlight on sectors:
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GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

315

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ENDNOTES
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As above.

16.

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17.

18.

19.

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25.

26.

316

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08

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[7 February 2020].

LeBaron, G, Kyritsis, P, Leal, PP & Marshall, M 2021, The Unequal Impactsof Covid-19 on Global Garment Supply Chains: Evidence from Ethiopia,
Honduras, India, and Myanmar, University of Sheffield, pp. 5-7. Available
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55.

The California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, 2010 (California, UnitedStates).

56.

Modern Slavery Act, 2015 (United Kingdom)

57.

Modern Slavery Act, 2018 (Australia Cmlth)

58.

Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of
non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings andgroups, 2014 (European Union); European Commission n.d., Corporate
sustainability reporting. Available from: https://finance.ec.europa.
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59.

LOI no 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance dessociétés mères et des entreprises donneuses d’ordre, 2017 (France).

60.

Act on Corporate Due Diligence in Supply Chains, 2021 (Germany)

61.

State of New York 2022, Assembly Bill A8352

62.

United States 2022, S. 3578 Slave-Free Business Certification Act

63.

Fashion Revolution 2022, Fashion Transparency Index, p. 52. Available
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64.

Goodweave International 2020, Hidden and vulnerable: The impact
of COVID-19 on child, forced and bonded labour, Goodweave International, p17. Available from: https://goodweave.org/wp-content/
uploads/2020/11/GoodWeave-Hidden-and-Vulnerable-Report-Final.
pdf. [22 April 2023].
LeBaron, G, Kyritsis, P, Leal, PP & Marshall, M 2021, The Unequal Impactsof Covid-19 on Global Garment Supply Chains: Evidence from Ethiopia,
Honduras, India, and Myanmar, University of Sheffield, pp. 5-7. Available
from: https://www.workersrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/
The-Unequal-Impacts-of-Covid-19-on-Global-Garment-SupplyChains.pdf. [7 December 2021].

Asia Floor Wage Alliance 2021, A Stitch in Time Saved None: How Fashion
Brands Fueled Violence in the Factory and Beyond, pp. 10-12. Available
from: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1pHlwLVCQ2dO9-LEiaXeooi1ym053wCwn/view?mc_cid=51048ff0de&mc_eid=4e5bb813cd. [18January 2022].

International Labour Organization 2020, What next for Asian garment
production after COVID-19? The perspectives of industry stakeholders, pp.
17-18. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--asia/---ro-bangkok/---sro-bangkok/documents/publication/
wcms_755630.pdf. [13 April 2022]; Asthana, A & Bland, A 2020, ‘The
Leicester garment factories exposed by Covid-19’, The Guardian, 9 July.
Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/news/audio/2020/
jul/09/the-leicester-garment-factories-exposed-by-covid-19. [13 April2022].

65.

Coalition to End Forced Labour in the Uyghur Region 2021, Call to action
on human rights abuses in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.
Available from: https://enduyghurforcedlabour.org/call-to-action/.
[7 February 2022]; United States Customs and Border Protection 2022,
Withhold Release Orders and Findings List, United States Departmentof Homeland Security. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/
forced-labor/withhold-release-orders-and-findings. [24 January2022], Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 2021 (H.R.1155) (UnitedStates of America); Customs Tariff Act, 1997 (Canada) 136(1).

66.

Data shared with Walk Free by Clean Clothes Campaign.

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

Charting progress against
forced labour at sea
1.

McDowell, R & Mason, M 2015, ‘Over 300 slaves rescued from Indonesia
island after AP investigation into forced labor’, Associated Press, 4 April
2015. Available from: https://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-fromslaves/over-300-slaves-rescued-from-Indonesia-island-after-ap-investigation.html. [11 January 2022]; as above.

2.

Mason, M 2015, ‘Myanmar fisherman goes home after 22 years as aslave’, 1 July 2015. Available from: https://www.ap.org/explore/
seafood-from-slaves/myanmar-fisherman-goes-home-after-22years-as-a-slave.html.

3.

Korban, D 2021, ‘’Seaspiracy’ leaps into Netflix top 10 as social media
frenzy hits seafood industry’, Intrafish, 30 March 2021. Available from:https://www.intrafish.com/analysis/seaspiracy-leaps-into-netflixtop-10-as-social-media-frenzy-hits-seafood-industry/2-1-989318. [10February 2022].

4.

Greenpeace & SBMI 2021, Forced labour at sea: the case of Indonesianmigrant fishers, Greenpeace. Available from: https://www.greenpeace.
org/southeastasia/publication/44492/forced-labour-at-sea-the-caseof-indonesian-migrant-fisher/. [11 January 2021]; International Labour
Organization 2020, Endline research: findings on fishers and seafood
workers in Thailand, ILO. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/asia/
publications/WCMS_738042/lang--en/index.htm. [11 January 2022];
Greenpeace 2020, Choppy Waters: Forced Labour and Illegal Fishing in
Taiwan’s Distant Water Fisheries, Greenpeace East Asia. Available from:https://www.greenpeace.org/southeastasia/publication/3690/choppy-waters-forced-labour-and-illegal-fishing-in-taiwans-distant-water-fisheries/. [12 January 2022]; Environmental Justice Foundation
2020, Fear, hunger and violence: Human rights in Ghana’s industrial
trawl fleet, Environmental Justice Foundation. Available from: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/EJF_Ghana-human-rightsin-fisheries_2020_final.pdf. [5 July 2022].

319

08

ENDNOTES
5.

6.

McVeigh, K & Firdaus, F 2020, ‘’Hold on, brother’: the final days ofthe doomed crew on the Long Xing 629’, The Guardian, 7 July 2020.
Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/
jul/07/hold-on-brother-final-days-of-doomed-crew-on-chineseshark-finning-boat. [18 January 2022]; The Phuket News 2018, ‘Phuket
whale shark fishing boats probed for human trafficking’, The Phuket
News, 6 September 2018. Available from: https://www.thephuketnews.
com/phuket-whale-shark-fish-ing-boats-probed-for-human-trafficking-68539.php. [18 January 2022]; Environmental Justice Foundation
2020, ‘Abuse of migrant workers and illegal fishing on Korean vessels
exporting to the EU’, Environmental Justice Foundation, 6 July 2020.
Available from: https://ejfoundation.org/news-media/abuse-of-migrant-workers-and-illegal-fishing-on-korean-vessels-exporting-tothe-eu. [21 February 2022].
Foundation, EJ 2019, Thailand’s road to reform: securing a sustainable,
legal and ethical fishery, Environmental Justice Foundation, p.4. Available from: https://ejfoundation.org/reports/thailands-road-to-reform-securing-a-sustainable-legal-and-ethical-fishery. [11 January2022]; United States Customs and Border Protection 2021, ‘CBP
issues Withhold Release Order on Chinese fishing fleet’, 28 May 2021.
Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-withhold-release-order-chinese-fishing-fleet. [22February 2022]; Palmer, D 2021, ‘U.S. proposes to address high-seasslavery in global fish subsidy talks’, Politico, no. 26 May 2021. Available
from: https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/26/high-seas-slavery-fish-subsidy-490993. [21 February 2022]; International Institutefor Sustainable Development 2021, ‘WTO Fisheries Subsidies Talks
Consider Forced Labor, S&DT’, SDG Knowledge Hub, 21 June 2021. Available from: https://sdg.iisd.org/news/fisheries-subsidies-talks-consider-forced-labor-sdt/. [21 February 2022]; Vigdor, N 2021, ‘Citing Forced
Labor, U.S. Blocks Fishing Boat From Fiji’, New York Times, 4 August,2021. Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/04/us/tunafish-imports-forced-labor.html. [21 February 2022].

7.

United States Customs and Border Protection 2022, Withhold Release
Orders and Findings List, United States Department of Homeland
Security. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor/
withhold-release-orders-and-findings. [24 January 2022].

8.

Carvalho, R 2020, ‘Slow boat to nowhere: coronavirus leaves exploited
fishing crew members stuck on the high seas’, South China Morning
Post, 18 October 2020. Available from: https://www.scmp.com/
week-asia/people/article/3105900/slow-boat-nowhere-coronavirus-leaves-exploited-fishing-crew. [17 February 2022]; Marschke, M,
Vandergeest, P, Havice, E, Kadfak, A, Duker, P, Isopescu, I & MacDonnell, M 2021, ‘COVID-19, instability and migrant fish workers in Asia’,
Maritime Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 87-99. Available from: https://doi.
org/10.1007/s40152-020-00205-y. DOI:10.1007/s40152-020-00205-y;Marine Stewardship Council 2020, ‘COVID-19: MSC sets out expectations
on observer coverage’, Marine Stewardship Council, 22 April 2020. Available from: https://www.msc.org/media-centre/briefings-statements/
covid-19-msc-sets-out-expectations-on-observer-coverage-during-derogation-period. [22 February 2022].

9.

10.

Tickler, D, Meeuwig, JJ, Bryant, K, David, F, Forrest, JAH, Gordon, E,
Joudo Larsen, J, Oh, B, Pauly, D, Sumaila, UR & Zeller, D 2018, ‘Modern
slavery and the race to fish’, Nature Communications, vol. 9, no. 1, p.
4643. Available from: DOI:10.1038/s41467-018-07118-9. [11 January2022].
Issara Institute and International Justice Mission 2016, Not in thesame boat: prevalence & patterns of labour abuse across Thailand’s
diverse fishing industry. Issara Institute and International JusticeMission, p.6-13. Available from: https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/5bf36e_9ec3ea47011343158f7c76fc7f14591f.pdf. [14 February 2018],
Centre, BHRR 2021, All at sea: An evaluation of company efforts toaddress modern slavery in Pacific supply chains of canned tuna, pp. 9-15.
Available from: https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/from-us/
briefings/all-at-sea-an-evaluation-of-company-efforts-to-addressmodern-slavery-in-pacific-supply-chains-of-canned-tuna/. [28 June2022].

13.

International Labour Organization 2016, Fishers first – Good practices
to end labour exploitation at sea, International Labour Organization,
p.8-9. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms_515365.pdf.
[30 August 2022].

14.

As above.

15.

Normlex n.d., Ratifications of C188 – Work in Fishing Convention,2007 (No. 188), International Labour Organization. Available
from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312333:NO. [13 May
2023]; The 21 countries that have ratified the ILO Work in Fishing
Convention, 2007 (No. 188) are Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Congo, Denmark, Estonia, France, Kenya,
Lithuania, Morocco, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, and United Kingdom.

16.

Normlex n.d., Ratifications of C188 – Work in Fishing Convention,2007 (No. 188), International Labour Organization. Available
from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312333:NO. [13 May
2023]; ILO Work in Fishing Convention, 2007 (No. 188) 2007, Entered into
force 16 November 2017; FAO 2022, The State of World Fisheries andAquaculture 2022. Towards Blue Transformation, FAO, p.14. Available
from: https://doi.org/10.4060/cc0461en. [13 May 2023]; Tickler, D,
Meeuwig, JJ, Bryant, K, David, F, Forrest, JAH, Gordon, E, Joudo Larsen,
J, Oh, B, Pauly, D, Sumaila, UR & Zeller, D 2018, ‘Modern slavery and therace to fish’, Nature Communications, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 4643. Available
from: DOI:10.1038/s41467-018-07118-9. [13 May 2023]; The six countries
among the top 25 countries responsible for producing the greatest
marine capture that have ratified the ILO Work in Fishing Convention,2007 (No. 188) are Argentina, Denmark, Morocco, Norway, Spain and
Thailand.

17.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, KoT 2018, ‘Thailand’s Ratification of Protocolof 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention 1930’, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, 9 June 2018. Available from: https://www.
mfa.go.th/en/content/5d5bd15615e39c3060024485?cate=5d5bcb4e15e39c306000683e. [21 February 2022].

18.

Permanent Mission of Thailand to the United Nations 2019, ‘Thailand
first in Asia to ratify the ILO Work in Fishing Convention’, Permanent
Mission of Thailand to the United Nations, 15 February 2019. Available from: https://permanentmission-geneva.thaiembassy.org/en/
content/99812-thailand-first-in-asia-to-ratify-the-ilo-work-in-fishing-convention?cate=5d81d6a815e39c1a0c005773. [21 February2022].

25.

International Labour Organization 2022, Forced labour and humantrafficking in fisheries. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/global/
topics/forced-labour/policy-areas/fisheries/lang--en/index.htm. [21February 2022].

26.

Michelin, M, Sarto, NM & Gillett, R 2020, Roadmap for Electric Monitoringin RFMOs, CEA Consulting, p.3. Available from: https://www.ceaconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/CEA.Roadmap-EM-Report-4.23.20.
pdf. [11 February 2022].

27.

Canada Border Services Agency 2021, Goods manufactured or produced
by prison or forced labour. Memorandum D9-1-6. Available from: https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/dm-md/d9/d9-1-6-eng.html. [21January 2022]; United States Customs and Border Protection 2022,
Forced Labor, United States Department of Homeland Security. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor. [7 July 2022].

28.

Syam, A & Roggensack, M 2020, Importing Freedom: Using the U.S. Tariff
Act to Combat Forced Labor in Supply Chains, The Human Trafficking
Legal Center. Available from: https://htlegalcenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/Importing-Freedom-Using-the-U.S.-Tariff-Act-to-CombatForced-Labor-in-Supply-Chains_FINAL.pdf. [12 January 2022].

29.

As above.

30.

United States Customs and Border Protection 2022, Withhold Release
Orders and Findings List, United States Department of Homeland
Security. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor/
withhold-release-orders-and-findings. [24 January 2022]; Lawder,
D 2021, ‘U.S. bans imports from Chinese fishing fleet over forcedlabor allegations’, Reuters, 31 May 2021. Available from: https://www.
reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-bans-imports-chinese-fishingfleet-over-forced-labor-allegations-2021-05-28/. [11 January 2022].

31.

32.

United States Customs and Border Protection 2021, ‘CBP issues
Withhold Release Order on Seafood Harvested with Forced Labor by the
Hangton No. 112’, United States Customs and Border Protection, 8 April
2021. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-withhold-release-order-seafood-harvested-forced-labor-0. [6 April 2023].
United States Customs and Border Protection 2020, ‘CBP Issues Withhold
Release Order on Seafood Harvested with Forced Labor by Lien Yi Hsing
No. 12’, United States Customs and Border Protection, 31 December
2020. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-withhold-release-order-seafood-harvested-forced-labor#:~:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%20
Effective%20December%2031%2C%202020,owned%20distant%20
water%20fishing%20vessel. [19 September 2022]; United States Customs
and Border Protection 2020, ‘CBP Issues Detention Order on Seafood
Harvested with Forced Labor’, United States Customs and Border Protection,
5 November 2020. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
national-media-release/cbp-issues-detention-order-seafood-harvested-forced-labor. [19 September 2022].

19.

International Labour Organization n.d., Ratifications of P029 – Protocolof 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, International Labour
Organization. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/
en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:3174672.
[2 June 2022]; The 12 countries among the top 25 countries responsible for producing the greatest marine capture that have ratified theProtocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (P029) are
Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Iceland, Malaysia,
Norway, Peru, Russian Federation, Spain, and Thailand.

33.

20.

Tickler, D, Meeuwig, JJ, Bryant, K, David, F, Forrest, JAH, Gordon, E,
Joudo Larsen, J, Oh, B, Pauly, D, Sumaila, UR & Zeller, D 2018, ‘Modern
slavery and the race to fish’, Nature Communications, vol. 9, no. 1, p.
4643. Available from: DOI:10.1038/s41467-018-07118-9. [11 January2022].

United States Customs and Border Protection 2020, ‘CBP Issues Detention Order on Seafood Harvested with Forced Labor’, United States
Customs and Border Protection, 18 August 2022. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/cbp-issues-detention-order-seafood-harvested-forced-labor-0. [19 September 2022].

34.

21.

Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2021, Trafficking
in Persons Report: Republic of Korea Country Narrative, United States
Department of State, pp. 333-338. Available from: https://www.state.
gov/reports/2021-trafficking-in-persons-report/south-korea/. [12July 2022].

22.

International Labour Organization n.d., National Labour Law Profile:
Japan. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/information-resources/national-labour-law-profiles/WCMS_158904/lang--en/index.
htm. [12 July 2022];

United States Customs and Border Protection 2022, Withhold Release
Orders and Findings List, United States Department of Homeland
Security. Available from: https://www.cbp.gov/trade/forced-labor/
withhold-release-orders-and-findings. [24 January 2022]; UnitedStates Department of Homeland Security 2022, ‘DHS Takes Action to
Combat Forced Labor and Hold Companies Accountable for Exploiting
Workers’, United States Department of Homeland Security, 28 January
2022. Available from: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2022/01/28/
dhs-takes-action-combat-forced-labor-and-hold-companies-accountable-exploiting. [19 September 2022].

11.

Environmental Justice Foundation 2020, ‘Abuse of migrant workers andillegal fishing on Korean vessels exporting to the EU’, Environmental
Justice Foundation, 6 July 2020. Available from: https://ejfoundation.
org/news-media/abuse-of-migrant-workers-and-illegal-fishing-onkorean-vessels-exporting-to-the-eu. [21 February 2022].

23.

Department of Fisheries 2018, as cited in: International Labour Organization 2019, Less is more: How policy and technology can impact the Thai
labour market for work in fishing, p. 3. Available from: https://www.ilo.
org/asia/publications/WCMS_733899/lang--en/index.htm. [5 April2022].

12.

Piñeiro, LC 2016, ‘Port State Jurisdiction over Labour Conditions: A
Private International Law Perspective on Extra-territoriality’, The
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, vol. 31, no. 3, pp.
531-551. Available from: https://brill.com/view/journals/estu/31/3/
article-p531_7.xml. DOI:https://doi.org/10.1163/15718085-12341407.

24.

The International Labor Rights Forum 2020, Time for a Sea Change. Whyunion rights for migrant workers are needed to prevent forced labor in theThai seafood industry, ILRF, p.19. Available from: https://laborrights.
org/sites/default/files/publications/ILRF_TimeforaSeaChange.pdf.
[20 January 2022]; International Labour Organization 2020, Endline

320

research: findings on fishers and seafood workers in Thailand, ILO, p.x.
Available from: https://www.ilo.org/asia/publications/WCMS_738042/
lang--en/index.htm. [11 January 2022].

35.

Canada Border Services Agency 2021, Goods manufactured or produced
by prison or forced labour. Memorandum D9-1-6. Available from: https://www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca/publications/dm-md/d9/d9-1-6-eng.html. [21January 2022].

36.

Human Rights Law Centre 2021, ‘Senate votes to ban forced labour
imports in vital step to combat modern slavery’, Human Rights Law
Centre, 23 August 2021. Available from: https://www.hrlc.org.au/
news/2021/8/23/senate-votes-to-ban-forced-labour-imports-in-vital-step-to-combat-modern-slavery. [21 February 2022]; Australian
Labor Party n.d., Tackling Modern Slavery. Available from: https://www.
alp.org.au/policies/tackling-modern-slavery. [30 August 2022].

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

37.

Reuters 2021, ‘EU to propose ban on products made by forced labour- von der Leyen’, Reuters, 15 September 2021. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/article/eu-commission-labour-idAFS8N2O6018.
[24 January 2022]; European Parliament 2022, ‘Ban on products
made with forced labour: Parliament presents its recommendations’,
European Parliament News,, 9 June 2022. Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20220603IPR32222/
ban-on-products-made-with-forced-labour-ep-presents-its-recommendations. [7 July 2022].

38.

Corporate Accountability Lab 2020, Using the master’s tools to dismantle
the master’s house: 307 petitions as a human rights tool. Available from:https://corpaccountabilitylab.org/calblog/2020/8/28/using-themasters-tools-to-dismantle-the-masters-house-307-petitions-asa-human-rights-tool. [24 January 2022]; Pietropaoli, I, Johnstone, O& Alex, B 2021, Policy brief: Effectiveness of forced labour import bans
2021-3, Modern Slavery and Human Rights Policy and Evidence Centre.
Available from: https://modernslaverypec.org/resources/forced-labour-import-bans. [24 January 2022].

39.

Mackay, M, Hardesty, BD & Wilcox, C 2020, ‘The Intersection Between
Illegal Fishing, Crimes at Sea, and Social Well-Being’, Frontiers in Marine
Science, vol. 7. p.5. Available from: https://www.frontiersin.org/
articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.589000. DOI:10.3389/fmars.2020.589000.

40.

Human Rights Watch 2018, Hidden Chains: Rights Abuses and Forced
Labor in Thailand’s Fishing Industry Human Rights Watch. Available
from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/01/23/hidden-chains/rightsabuses-and-forced-labor-thailands-fishing-industry. [17 February2022].

41.

European Commission 2015, ‘EU acts on illegal fishing: Yellow card
issued to Thailand while South Korea & Philippines are cleared’,
European Commission, 21 April 2015. Available from: https://ec.europa.
eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_15_4806. [21 February2022]; Environmental Justice Foundation 2019, Thailand’s road toreform: Securing a sustainable, legal and ethical fishery, EJF, p.21-22.
Available from: https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/ThailandRoadToReform.pdf. [21 February 2022].

42.

Environmental Justice Foundation 2019, Thailand’s road to reform:
Securing a sustainable, legal and ethical fishery, EJF. Available from:https://ejfoundation.org/resources/downloads/ThailandRoadToReform.pdf. [21 February 2022].

43.

Human Rights Watch 2018, Thailand: Forced Labor, Trafficking Persist in
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44.

Environmental Justice Foundation 2021, ‘Thailand downgraded in US
human trafficking ranking: the right decision, says EJF’, Environmental
Justice Foundation, 5 July 2021. Available from: https://ejfoundation.
org/news-media/thailand-downgraded-in-us-human-traffickingranking-the-right-decision-says-ejf. [21 February 2022]; International
Labour Organization 2019, ‘Combatting Forced Labour in the Thai
Fishing and Seafood Industry’, International Labour Organization, 8October 2019. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/asia/media-centre/
multimedia/WCMS_723269/lang--en/index.htm. [21 February 2022];
Human Rights Watch 2018, Hidden Chains: Rights Abuses and Forced
Labor in Thailand’s Fishing Industry Human Rights Watch. Available
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45.

World Trade Organization 2022, Implementing the WTO agreement
on fisheries subsidies, World Trade Organization, p.7. Available from:https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/implementfishagreement22_e.pdf. [4 October 2022].

46.

As above.

47.

As above.

321

08

ENDNOTES
48.

49.

322

Norway, the Netherlands, France, Italy, and Germany have enacted
human rights due diligence legislation, while Australia, Germany,
India, the United Kingdom, and the United States have enacted supply
chain transparency legislation; Foss, D 2021, ‘ForUMs reactions to theNorwegian due diligence law’, Norwegian Forum for Development andEnvironment, 14 June 2021. Available from: https://forumfor.no/en/
news/2021/forums-reactions-to-the-norwegian-due-diligence-law.
[4 October 2022]; La Strada International 2021, ‘Law on mandatory
human rights and environmental due diligence ‘, La Strada, 7 December
2021. Available from: https://www.lastradainternational.org/news/
dutch-government-announces-mandatory-human-rights-and-environmental-due-diligence-legislation/#:~:text=In%202019%2C%20
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van Helmond, ATM, Mortensen, LO, Plet-Hansen, KS, Ulrich, C, Needle,
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ENDNOTES
2021. Available from: https://www.globenewswire.com/fr/news-release/2021/05/25/2235030/0/en/Global-Chocolate-Market-Is-Expected-to-Reach-USD-200-4-billion-by-2028-Fior-Markets.html. [4 July2022].
16.

17.

NORC at the University of Chicago 2020, NORC Final Report: Assessing
Progress in Reducing Child Labor in Cocoa Production in Cocoa Growing
Areas of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, NORC at the University of Chicago
pp. 12, 69. Available from: https://www.norc.org/Research/Projects/
Pages/assessing-progress-in-reducing-child-labor-in-cocoa-growing-areas-of-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-and-ghana.aspx. [23June 2022].
de Buhr, E & Gordon, E 2018, Bitter Sweets: Prevalence of Forced Labour
and Child Labour in the Cocoa Sectors of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, Tulane
University & Walk Free Foundation, p. 13. Available from: https://cdn.
minderoo.com.au/content/uploads/2019/03/06111232/Cocoa-Report_181016_V15-FNL_digital.pdf. [1 August 2022].

18.

Hashmiu, I, Agbenyega, O & Dawoe, E 2022, ‘Cash crops and foodsecurity: Evidence from smallholder cocoa and cashew farmers
in Ghana’, Agriculture & Food Security, no. 11, p. 7. DOI:https://doi.
org/10.1186/s40066-022-00355-8. [14 June 2022].

19.

Bureau of International Labor Affairs 2020, 2020 Findings on the Worst
Forms of Child Labor, Office of Child Labor, Forced Labor and Human
Trafficking, pp. 9-11. Available from: https://www.dol.gov/sites/
dolgov/files/ILAB/child_labor_reports/tda2020/2020_TDA_BigBook_
Online_optimized.pdf. [20 July 2022].

20.

Corporate Accountability Lab 2019, Always Left Holding the Bag:The Economic Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Cocoa Farmers
and Children in Côte d’Ivoire, Corporate Accountability Lab &Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains, pp. 3-15. Available from:https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5810dda3e3df28ce37b58357/t/6215417279e31e7a979b915d/1645560180016/CAL+Always+Left+Holding+the+Bag+English+v7.pdf. [17 June 2022].

21.

As above, pp. 26-27.

22.

Human Rights Watch 2021, ‘I Must Work to Eat’ COVID-19, Poverty, andChild Labor in Ghana, Nepal and Uganda Human Rights Watch. Available
from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/05/26/i-must-work-eat/
covid-19-poverty-and-child-labor-ghana-nepal-and-uganda. [18 July2022].

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

324

International Cocoa Initiative 2020, Hazardous child labour in Côte d’Ivoire’s cocoa communities during COVID-19: Rapid analysis of data collectedduring partial lockdown, International Cocoa Initiative pp. 1-5. Available
from: https://www.cocoainitiative.org/sites/default/files/resources/
ICI_rapid-analysis-covid-impact-child-labour-identifiation_1July2020-2.pdf. [22 June 2022].

29.

The International Cocoa Initiative is a multi-stakeholder partnershipthat formed in response to the Harkin-Engel protocol, comprised andfunded by cocoa industry and civil society members.

30.

International Cocoa Initiative n.d., Our Organisation, International
Cocoa Initiative. Available from: https://www.cocoainitiative.org/
about-us/our-organisation. [26 July 2022]; Tony’s Chocolonely 2021,
CLMRS, Tony’s Chocolonely. Available from: https://tonyschocolonely.
com/nl/en/our-mission/serious-statements/clmrs. [6 July 2022].

31.

Nestlé Cocoa Plan 2019, Tackling Child Labor, Nestlé Cocoa Plan, p. 9.
Available from: https://www.nestle.com/sites/default/files/2019-12/
nestle-tackling-child-labor-report-2019-en.pdf. [20 July 2022].

32.

International Cocoa Initiative 2021, Effectiveness Review of Child Labour
Monitoring and Remediation Systems in the West African Cocoa Sector,
International Cocoa Initiative, p. 37. Available from: https://www.
cocoainitiative.org/sites/default/files/resources/ICI-CLMRS-Effectiveness-Review_EN.pdf. [28 June 2022].

33.

Tony’s Chocolonely 2021, CLMRS, Tony’s Chocolonely. Available from:https://tonyschocolonely.com/nl/en/our-mission/serious-statements/clmrs. [6 July 2022].

34.

Fountain, A & Huetz-Adams, F 2020, Cocoa Barometer 2020, Cocoa
Barometer, pp. 30-40. Available from: https://voicenetwork.cc/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2020-Cocoa-Barometer-EN.pdf. [6 July2022].

35.

As above.

36.

Fairtrade 2021, Cocoa farmer income: The household income of Fairtrade cocoa farmers in Cote d’Ivoire and strategies for improvement,
28 July. Available from: https://www.fairtrade.net/library/household-income-of-fairtrade-cocoa-farmers-in-c%C3%B4te-divoirestudy-2021. [15 May 2023].

37.

38.

WikiRate 2022, Research: Modern Slavery Act – Chocolate Companies,
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Slavery_Act_Chocolate_Companies. [3 August 2022].

39.

Walk Free 2022, Strenghtening Supply Chain Transparency, Walk Free.
Available from: https://www.walkfree.org/projects/strengthening-supply-chain-transparency/. [5 August 2022].

40.

Does the company have a Child Labour Monitoring and Remediation System (CLMRS) in place that covers 100 per cent of their cocoa
sources?; Does the company disclose in its modern slavery statementthat it collaborates with industry and non-industry stakeholders
to learn from experts and peers and/or lift the industry standard
for preventing, identifying, and mitigating modern slavery, labour
exploitation and human trafficking risks, and enabling effective remedy
for harms caused or contributed to?; Does the company disclose that itprovides any type of support to suppliers and/or supply chain workers
as the result of the COVID-19 pandemic?; Does the company disclose
any information about the wages workers receive in their supply chain?;
Does the company identify any incidents of modern slavery specific tothe cocoa supply chain?

Chocolate Manufacturers Association 2001, Protocol for the Growing
and Processing of Cocoa Beans and Their Derivative Products in a Mannerthat Complies with ILO Convention 182 Concerning the Prohibition and
Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor.
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files/Harkin_Engel_Protocol.pdf. [20 June 2022].
International Labour Organization n.d., Africa: Child Labor in Cocoa
Fields/ Harkin-Engel Protocol. Available from: https://www.ilo.org/
africa/technical-cooperation/accel-africa/WCMS_159486. [14 June2022].
Guittard Chocolate Company, Mars Incorporated, World’s Finest Chocolate Incorporated, Archer Daniels Midland Company, Nestle Chocolate &Confections USA, Blommer Chocolate Company, Hershey Food Corporation, Barry Callebaut AG.
Corporate Accountability Lab 2019, Empty Promises: The Failureof Voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility Initiatives to Improve
Farmer Incomes in the Ivorian Cocoa Sector, Corporate Accountability Lab, pp. 3-4. Available from: https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/5810dda3e3df28ce37b58357/t/5d321076f1125e0001ac51ab/1563562117949/Empty_Promises_2019.pdf. [25 June 2022].
NORC at the University of Chicago 2020, NORC Final Report: Assessing
Progress in Reducing Child Labor in Cocoa Production in Cocoa Growing
Areas of Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, NORC at the University of Chicago pp.
148-151. Available from: https://www.norc.org/Research/Projects/
Pages/assessing-progress-in-reducing-child-labor-in-cocoa-growing-areas-of-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire-and-ghana.aspx. [21June 2022]; Perkiss, S, Bernadi, C, Dumay, J & Haslam, J 2021, ‘A sticky
chocolate problem: Impression management and counter accounts
in the shaping of corporate image’, Critical Perspectives on Accounting, no. 81, pp. 2, 21. Available from: DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
cpa.2020.102229. [27 June 2022].

Fairtrade 2019, Fairtrade Living Income Reference Prices for Cocoa,
Fairtrade, p. 5. Available from: https://files.fairtrade.net/2019_RevisedExplanatoryNote_FairtradeLivingIncomeReferencePriceCocoa.
pdf. [11 August 2022].

41.

Nestlé, U.S.A., Cargill Incorporated, Cargill Cocoa, Barry Callebaut USA
LLC, Mars Incorporated, Mars Wrigley Confectionary, Olam Americas,
Inc., the Hershey Company, and Mondelēz International.

42.

Alien Tort Claims Act, 1948 (United States); Nestle USA Inc. v Doe et al.
(2021) 19-416. Available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-416_i4dj.pdf. [15 March 2023].

43.

Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act, 2013 (United States);
Coubaly v. Cargill, Inc. et al. (2021) 1:21-cv-00386. Available from:https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/district-of-columbia/
dcdce/1:2021cv00386/227466/45/0.pdf?ts=1656494951. [15 March2023].

44.

Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, (United States) s93A; Tomasellav. Hershey Co. (2019) 18-cv-10360-ADB. Available at: https://casetext.
com/case/tomasella-v-hershey-co. [30 January 2019].

45.

Nestlé USA Inc. v Doe et al. (2021) 19-416. Available at https://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-416_i4dj.pdf. [15 March 2023];
Cargill, Inc. v John Doe et al. (2019) 17-55435. Available from: https://www.
supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/19-416_i4dj.pdf. [15 March 2023].

46.

Balch, O 2021, ‘Mars, Nestlé and Hershey to face child slavery lawsuit
in US,’ The Guardian, 13 February 2021. Available from: https://www.
theguardian.com/global-development/2021/feb/12/mars-nestleand-hershey-to-face-landmark-child-slavery-lawsuit-in-us. [16 June2022]; Bancroft, H 2021, ‘Nestlé, Mars and Hersey accused of ‘using
child labour to get cheap cocoa’ in new court papers’, The Independ-ent, 1 November 2021. Available from: https://www.independent.
co.uk/world/nestle-mars-hersey-cocoa-child-slaves-b1948199.
html?r=69919. [19 June 2022].

APPENDICES

47.

California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, 1970 (United States) ; California Business and Professions Code, 1993 (United States).

48.

Walker v Nestlé U.S. Inc. 3:19-cv-723-L-BGS. Available from: https://cases.justia.com/federal/district-courts/california/casdce/3:2019cv00723/625201/42/0.pdf?ts=1617182766. [13 March 2023].

Appendix 2:
Methodology behind the Global
Slavery Index

49.

Odijie, M 2021, ‘Why efforts by Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana to help cocoa
farmers haven’t worked’, The Conversation, 30 June 2021. Available
from: https://theconversation.com/why-efforts-by-cote-divoireand-ghana-to-help-cocoa-farmers-havent-worked-162845. [27 June2022]; Blackmore, E & Berger, T 2021, Civil society perspectives on theliving income differential for cocoa producers, International Institute forEnvironment and Development. Available from: https://www.iied.org/
civil-society-perspectives-living-income-differential-for-cocoa-producers. [29 June 2022]; Corporate Accountability Lab 2019, Always Left
Holding the Bag: The Economic Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on
Cocoa Farmers and Children in Côte d’Ivoire, Corporate Accountability
Lab & Mouvement Ivoirien des Droits Humains, pp. 3-15. Available
from: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5810dda3e3df28ce37b58357/t/6215417279e31e7a979b915d/1645560180016/CAL+Always+Left+Holding+the+Bag+English+v7.pdf. [17 June 2022].

50.

Blackmore, E & Berger, T 2021, Civil society perspectives on the living
income differential for cocoa producers, International Institute forEnvironment and Development. Available from: https://www.iied.org/
civil-society-perspectives-living-income-differential-for-cocoa-producers. [29 June 2022].

51.

Aboa, A 2021, ‘Ivory Coast says chocolate traders failing to pay farmers
living wage premium’, Reuters, 19 June 2021. Available from: https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/ivory-coast-says-chocolate-tradersfailing-pay-farmers-living-wage-premium-2021-06-18/. [15 July 2022].

52.

Odijie, M 2021, ‘Why efforts by Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana to help cocoa
farmers haven’t worked’, The Conversation, 30 June 2021. Available
from: https://theconversation.com/why-efforts-by-cote-divoire-andghana-to-help-cocoa-farmers-havent-worked-162845. [27 June 2022].

53.

Aboa, A 2022, ‘Cocoa buyers back Ivory Coast and Ghana’s cocoa
premium schemes’, Reuters, 9 July 2022. Available from: https://www.
reuters.com/article/westafrica-cocoa-idUSKBN2OJ1YJ. [11 July 2022].

54.

Whoriskey P, and Siegel R 2019, ‘Cocoa’s child labourers’, The Washington Post, 5 June 2019. Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.
com/graphics/2019/business/hershey-nestle-mars-chocolate-childlabor-west-africa/. [29 April 2023].

55.

Tony’s Chocolonely n.d., Frequently Asked Questions, Tony’s Chocolonely. Available from: https://tonyschocolonely.com/us/en/frequently-asked-questions. [12 July 2022].

56.

Tony’s Chocolonely n.d., Our Mission, Tony’s Chocolonely. Available
from: https://tonyschocolonely.com/us/en/our-mission. [13 July2022].

57.

Tony’s Chocolonely n.d., Annual FAIR reports, Tony’s Chocolonely. Available from: https://tonyschocolonely.com/nl/en/annual-fair-reports/.
[13 June 2022].

58.

Eccles, L 2022, ‘Anti-slavery chocolate brand Tony’s Chocolonely finds
1,700 cases of child workers in supply chain’, The Times, 6 February
2022. Available from: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/anti-slavery-chocolate-brand-tonys-chocolonely-finds-1-700-child-workersin-supply-chain-0n87qj996. [13 July 2022];

59.

Tony’s Chocolonely 2021, Annual FAIR report 2020/2021, Tony’s Chocolonely, pp. 24-25. Available from: https://tonyschocolonely.com/
storage/configurations/tonyschocolonelycom.app/files/jaarfairslag/2020-2021/jfs_2021_en_binw_13.pdf. [14 July 2022].

60.

Tony’s Chocolonely n.d., Frequently Asked Questions, Tony’s Chocolonely. Available from: https://tonyschocolonely.com/us/en/frequently-asked-questions. [12 July 2022].

61.

Tony’s Chocolonely 2021, Annual FAIR report 2020/2021, Tony’s Chocolonely, pp. 97-101. Available from: https://tonyschocolonely.com/
storage/configurations/tonyschocolonelycom.app/files/jaarfairslag/2020-2021/jfs_2021_en_binw_13.pdf. [14 July 2022].

62.

As above.

63.

As above.

64.

Fountain, A & Huetz-Adams, F 2020, Cocoa Barometer 2020, Cocoa
Barometer, pp. 100-103. Available from: https://voicenetwork.cc/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2020-Cocoa-Barometer-EN.pdf. [6 July2022].

GLOBAL SLAVERY INDEX 2023

1.

Walk Free, International Labour Organization & International Organization for Migration 2022, Global Estimates of Modern Slavery: Forced
Labour and Forced Marriage. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.org/
content/uploads/2022/09/12142341/GEMS-2022_Report_EN_V8.pdf.
[8 November 2022].

2.

As above.

3.

As above.

4.

The Counter Trafficking Data Collaborative n.d., Global Data Hub on
Human Trafficking. Available from: https://www.ctdatacollaborative.
org/.

5.

Diego-Rosell, P & Joudo Larsen, J 2018, ‘Modelling the Risk of Modern
Slavery’, SSRN. Available from: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3215368.
DOI:https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3215368. [6 April 2023].

6.

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, PD 2020.
International Migrant Stock 2020.

7.

United Nations Human Rights Committee 2019, Concluding observations
on the second periodic report of Mauritania CCPR/C/MRT/CO/2, pp. 6-7.
Available from: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
G19/251/82/PDF/G1925182.pdf?OpenElement. [10 February 2023].

8.

United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population
Division 2019. World Population Prospects 2019, Online Edition. Rev. 1.
Available from: https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/
Population/ [6 July 2021]

9.

Clarke, R & Homel, R 1997, ‘A Revised Classification of Situational Crime Prevention Techniques’, in Anderson, OCA (ed)Crime Prevention at a Crossroads. Available from: https://www.
semanticscholar.org/paper/A-Revised-Classification-of-Situational-Crime-Homel-Clarke/1bd6a24bf745f3d9b50feaa63fdead7829db13f9. [5 April 2023]; Ekblom, P & Tilley, N 2000, ‘Going
equipped: criminology, situational crime prevention and the resourceful offender’, British Journal of Criminology, vol. 40, no. 3. Available
from: https://www.jstor.org/stable/i23637160. [5 April 2023];</style> 40.</DisplayText><record><rec-number>5</rec-number><foreign-keys><key app=”EN” db-id=”tv5ds0adc5zxdpez9x35d9sfazwavxzedpv2” timestamp=”1518174539”>5</key></foreign-keys><ref-typename=”Journal Article”>17</ref-type><contributors><authors><author>Ekblom, Paul</author><author>Tilley, Nick</author></authors></contributors><titles><title>Going equipped: criminology,
situational crime prevention and the resourceful offender</title><secondary-title>British Journal of Criminology</secondary-title></titles><periodical><full-title>British Journal of Criminology</full-title></periodical><volume>40</volume><number>3</number><dates><year>2000</year></dates><urls></urls></record></Cite></EndNote> Lampe, KV 2011, ‘The application of the framework of
Situational Crime Prevention to ‘organized crime’’, Criminology andCriminal Justice, vol. 11, pp. 145-163. Available from: https://doi.
org/10.1177/1748895811398459. [5 April 2023].

10.

United Nations 2000. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing theUnited Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
Doc. A/55/383. New York.

11.

Council of Europe 2005. Council of Europe Convention on Action against
Trafficking in Human Beings. 16.V.2005. Warsaw.

12.

Bales, K. 2007. Ending Slavery: How we Free Today’s Slaves, Universityof California Press, Gallagher, A. & Holmes, P. 2008. Developing an
Effective Criminal Justice Response to Human Trafficking: Lessons fromthe Frontline. International Criminal Justice Review, 18, 318-348, Office
to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons 2011. The 3 Ps: Prevention,
Protection, Prosecution. United States Department of State. Available
from: https://www.state.gov/j/tip/3p/. [19 September 2014].

325

08

ENDNOTES
13.

14.

15.

16.

See for example, Dang, M 2018, ‘Survivors are speaking. Are we listening?’, in Walk Free 2018, Global Slavery Index 2018, pp. 18-19, MinderooFoundation. Available from: https://www.globalslaveryindex.org/. [17August 2022]; Rights Lab 2020, Nothing about us, without us, Universityof Nottingham. Available from: https://www.antislaverycommissioner.co.uk/media/1395/rights_lab_survivor_involvement_guide_
final_2020.pdf. [17 August 2022]; United States Department of State
2021, Trafficking in Persons Report 2021, pp. 32-33. Available from:https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/TIPR-GPA-upload-07222021.pdf. [17 August 2022].

Appendix 3:
Methodology for identifying thehighest value products at risk offorced labour imported by the G201.

G20 Indonesia 2022, About the G20, G20.org. Available from: https://
g20.org/about-the-g20/. [26 August 2022].

Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1989, (resolution 44/25),
opened for signature 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990; United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2009,
Guidelines on International Protection No. 8: Child Asylum Claims under
Articles 1(A)2 and 1(F) of the 1951 Convention and/or 1967 Protocol
relating to the Status of Refugees HCR/GIP/09/08, United Nations. Available from: https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/about-us/background/5730cb1a7/guidelines-on-international-protection-no-8-english.html. [16September 2022].

2.

The bibliography used to identify the at-risk products is available online
https://www.walkfree.org/global-slavery-index/downloads/.

3.

Bureau of International Labor Affairs 2022, List of Goods Produced byChild Labor or Forced Labor, US Department of Labor. Available from:https://www.dol.gov/agencies/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods.
[4 Nov 2022].

4.

de Buhr, E & Gordon, E 2018, Bitter sweets: Prevalence of forced labourand child labour in the cocoa sectors of Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana,
Tulane University & Walk Free. Available from: https://cdn.walkfree.
org/content/uploads/2020/10/06164346/Cocoa-Report_181016_
V15-FNL_digital.pdf. [22 January 2022].

5.

Murphy, L & Elimä, N 2021, In Broad Daylight: Uyghur Forced Labour andGlobal Solar Supply Chains, Sheffield Hallam University Helena Kennedy
Centre for International Justice. Available from: https://www.shu.
ac.uk/helena-kennedy-centre-international-justice/research-andprojects/all-projects/in-broad-daylight. [23 March 2022].

6.

For political reasons, the UN is not allowed to show trade statistics for
Taiwan, Province of China. Therefore, Taiwan is included under ‘Other
Asia not elsewhere specified’ (country code 490) in the BACI trade
dataset. In principle, trade data for territories belonging to Asia, but not
specified by country, could end up in code 490. In practice, only tradeof Taiwan is included under this code, except for a few countries (e.g.
Saudi Arabia, which reports all of their exports to unknown countries).
For more information, please see: https://unstats.un.org/wiki/display/
comtrade/Taiwan%2C+Province+of+China+Trade+data. CEPII 2023,
BACI HS17 (2017-2021), CEPII. Available from: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/
en/bdd_modele/bdd_modele_item.asp?id=37. [20 February 2022].

7.

Foreign Trade Online 2021, Harmonized System Codes (HS Code 2017 Current), Foreign Trade Online Available from: https://www.foreigntrade.com/reference/hscode.htm?cat=9. [1 June 2022].

8.

Imports data is presented for 19 countries of the G20. The European
Union was excluded as much of its trade is already captured in the dataof Germany, Italy, and France.

See Alliance 8.7 workshop notes from the initial assessment of the
migrant vulnerability literature review here: Migration Action Group
2018, Workshop Notes: 29-30 November 2018, Geneva, Alliance 8.7,
p. 8. Available from: https://www.alliance87.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/03/Strategic-Workshop-Notes-A8.7-Migration-2018.
pdf. [16 September 2022].
David, F, Bryant, K & Joudo Larsen, J 2019, Migrants and their vulnerability to human trafficking, modern slavery and forced labour, International
Organization for Migration. Available from: https://cdn.minderoo.com.
au/content/uploads/2019/08/28110623/2533_walk.free_.V8_190723_
Digital_P.pdf. [13 January 2022].

17.

Commonwealth countries included are Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas,
Belize, Fiji, Malta, Palau, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines,
Seychelles, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu.

18.

Limited data defined as not included in the United States State Department Trafficking in Persons Report and/or excluded from at least fiveglobal datasets. These excluded countries include Dominica, Grenada,
Kiribati, Nauru, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu.

19.

Identified using the 2019 Fragile States Index, where those countries
that scored 10.0 on the Security Apparatus indicator were excluded.
See https://fragilestatesindex.org/2020/05/08/fragile-states-index-2020-annual-report/.

20.

English, Spanish, Italian, French, German, Chinese, and Portuguese.
Arabic speakers were missing from the team but will be included in thenext iteration. Team members had a background in law, international
relations, international development, or American studies.

21.

Download available on request from info@walkfree.org

326

GSI 2023 V1.5 / 020924

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The Global Slavery Index 2023,
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