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he government of President Hu Jintao has entered its second year and has
gradually begun to show its individuality. One typical example is its
advocacy of China’s “peaceful rise” theory. Under this theory, his government
seemed to position itself to sweep away the “China threat” theory externallyand to create an environment conducive to economic development over the
opposition of hard-liners internally. This was supposed to serve as a platform
for promoting omnidirectional diplomacy, mainly for the purpose of spurring
Chinese economic development. However, the government’s new policy line
has been wavering in practice and, despite Jiang Zemin’s retirement frompublic life, a new era has yet to arrive.
As it has in the past, China’s foreign policy stresses peace in the international
arena. However, the biggest obstacle standing in the way of China’s peacefulrise is the Taiwan issue. Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian was reelected on aplatform of a national referendum to adopt a new constitution. China views a
new constitution, if adopted, as tantamount to independence from the mainland
and warned that it would not rule out the use of force to prevent that fromhappening. It may be said that China is seeking effective measures to curb thegrowing movement within Taiwan that is attempting a process of “reverse
Sinocization” to establish a Taiwanese identity.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which is responsible for preparing for
the worst-case scenario in the Taiwan Strait, has been accelerating the pace ofits modernization in various areas including equipment, organization, andtraining. In particular, it has often carried out “joint” (yitihua) training of its
troops with the use of force against Taiwan and the blocking of US militaryintervention in mind. Meanwhile, Taiwan has been emulating its rival China bycarrying out the modernization of its own armed forces. However, as the
opposition alliance held on to a majority in the Legislative Yuan (legislature)election, it is uncertain whether the government’s budget proposal for the
procurement of large military equipment such as submarines would beapproved intact or not. This has added to the uncertainties surrounding themilitary balance across the Taiwan Strait.

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Is a Hu Jintao Line Emerging?

(1) Jiang Zemin Bows Out
Two years have elapsed since President Hu Jintao assumed power, but a new era
is yet to arrive. On September 1, 2004, Jiang Zemin sent a letter to the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC), informing that he would beresigning as chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CPC,
and the fourth plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC held on
September 19 accepted his resignation. Hu Jintao was elected in his place, but
Zeng Qinghong, long considered as a close aide to Jiang Zemin, was not elected
as CMC vice chairman. Strictly speaking, Jiang Zemin remained in office aschairman of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China(PRC) but Hu Jintao replaced him in this capacity too at the National People’s
Congress (NPC) in March 2005. As Jiang Zemin did before him, Hu Jintao has
consolidated his power base by holding the top posts of the Communist Party(general secretary of the CPC Central Committee), the state (president of thestate), and the military (chairman of the CMC).
Since the 16th National Congress of the CPC held in 2002, the strained
relations between General Secretary Hu Jintao and CMC Chairman Jiang
Zemin have been reported in the foreign press on repeated occasions. Until thefirst half of 2004, Jiang Zemin showed no signs of retiring. As late as June 1,
Jiang Zemin flaunted his control over the PLA by promoting 15 officers to therank of general. In an effort to demonstrate his loyalty to Jiang Zemin, Hu
Jintao reiterated on many occasions the important thought of the “Three
Represents,” an ideology advocated by Jiang Zemin to the effect that the CPC
must always represent: (a) the requirements of development of China’s
advanced productive force; (b) the orientation of development of China’s
advanced culture; and (c) the fundamental interests of the overwhelming
majority of the people in China. It appeared that Hu Jintao tried to steer clear of
a new line lest such would be considered a challenge to the orthodoxy of Jiang
Zemin’s line.
Even after Jiang Zemin’s retirement, it is not clear whether a Hu Jintao line thatwould mark an epoch distinct from the Jiang era is in existence. One key phrase
coined by the Hu Jintao government that is steadily catching on is the “scientificconcept of development” that stresses balanced economic development. The
policy of reform and opening-up had suffered a setback on account of the東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ95

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Tiananmen Square incident ofJune 1989. By seizing a change inthe political mood touched off by
the so-called “South China
Speeches” made by Deng
Xiaoping in 1992, the Chinese
government continued to fine-tune
the policy of reform and openingup. It introduced measures to:
Zemin (center), who had resigned as chairman
improve the ecological environment Jiangof the CMC of the CPC, and his successor Hu Jintao(1995); narrow regional income (right) (September 19, 2004) (Xinhua News
Agency/Kyodo Photo)disparities—the “great strategy
of Western China development” (1999); address social security andunemployment issues (2000); and solve problems facing agriculture, rural areas
and farmers—the “three farm-related measures” (2002).
In May 2002, then President Jiang Zemin proposed the idea that the first two
decades of the 21st century offer a last “strategic opportunity” for China toachieve rapid economic growth. At the 16th National Congress of the CPC in
November 2002, the CPC adopted the slogan “a well-off society” (xiaokang
shehui) as its policy objective and aimed to quadruple the 2000 figure for grossdomestic product by 2020. The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) thatspread throughout many parts of the country in 2003 jolted the leadership into anawareness of social contradictions. The third-generation leadership led by Jiang
Zemin had espoused the “well-off first theory” (xianfulun), which allowed partof the population or certain localities to become well-off first through hard workthat earned them greater income; but the new leadership, confronted with suchsocial contradictions, had to steer the course of its policy toward one in favor of“common prosperity” (gongtong fuyu), which it had thought should have been
pursued in parallel with the well-off first theory.
According to Hu Angang, a professor at Tsinghua University, theconventional type of economic development that had made light of balanced
development was faced with five problem areas. These were: (a) the disparities
in income between cities and farming communities; (b) the disparities in
economic development among regions; (c) the disharmonies between economic
and social development; (d) the disharmonies between natural resources, theenvironment, and economic development; and (e) the disharmonies between

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economic growth and employment growth. True, economic growth has raised
living standards and strengthened national power, but it has aggravated thesecontradictions. In fact, mass suicides and demonstrations in protest against the
nonpayment of wages have occurred frequently in many regions and discontent
among people left behind by the development is growing.
The scientific concept of development stresses the importance of shifting
priority from goods-centered to people-centered development and aims at
comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development. This concept owes
its genesis to the disturbances touched off by SARS. Party leaders repeatedly
stressed that the scientific concept of development must be fully understoodand seriously implemented and instructed key party and government officials tosystematically study it. Thanks to these efforts, it has become firmly established
as an integral part of the new government’s economic and social policies. The
scientific concept of development adjusts the reform and opening-up policy of
the Jiang Zemin era. In this sense, it has largely been inherited from thepreceding generations.
(2) Departure from Socialism and Laggard Political Reforms
One carryover from the Jiang Zemin era to the Hu Jintao era is the evolution of
an ideology away from socialism, as indicated by an amendment to theconstitution. Since 1954, China has made wholesale constitutional amendmentson three occasions. The current version, adopted in 1982, is called “the Deng
Xiaoping Constitution,” which was partially amended three times later. The
current amendment, the fourth, indicates the acceleration of the move awayfrom socialism. The first point worthy of note is the creation of legal grounds—
the listing of the important thought of the “Three Represents” in its preamble
next to Marx-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and the Deng Xiaoping
Theory—allowing the Communist Party to shed its image as a political party
representing a particular social class.
Secondly, the amended constitution clearly specifies that the state protects
the lawful rights and interests of nonpublic economies, such as individual
economy and private economy; that it encourages, supports, and guides thedevelopment of nonpublic economies; and that it supervises and administers
nonpublic economies in accordance with the law. Thus the amendment madeclear a policy affirming the development of nonpublic economies. It may besaid that the idea of nonpublic economies, which had come under severe東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ97

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criticism from so-called leftist ideologues up until a few years before, survived
and became a national consensus in the course of the country’s joining theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 and implementing
various institutional reforms associated with it.
Third and finally, a section clearly provides protection for private property.
More specifically, it says that the state shall not encroach upon and protect
citizens’ lawful private property and inheritance rights in accordance with thelaw, and that it may impose or expropriate—and compensate for—citizens’
private property in accordance with the law where the public interest so
requires. The protection of private property, a barometer of the evolution awayfrom socialism, has thus been written into the constitution.
Will the Hu Jintao government be able to deliver political reforms that would
lead to democratization? The concept of human rights was written into theconstitution for the first time by virtue of the recent amendment stating that the“state shall respect and safeguard human rights.” However, the term “thepeople’s democratic dictatorship” in Article 1 of the Constitution of thePeople’s Republic of China denies the universality of human rights. The idea
underlying this article is that the concept of human rights differs from class toclass, and that while the principles of democracy rule the affairs of working
class people, dictatorship is enforced against the enemies of the working class.
Therefore, the incorporation of the idea of human rights into the constitution
represents a step in the evolution away from socialism, and may be seen as apreparatory step for ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. One might be reminded of the fact, however, that the constitution has
contained expressions such as “freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of
association, of procession and of demonstration.” At present, these freedoms
are countenanced only to the extent that the people defend—and do not
oppose—the Communist regime. In China, the concept of human rights can be
exercised only to the extent tolerable under the single party dictatorship of the
CPC. Therefore, the process has to be gradual and protracted of necessity.
In China, the degree of freedom of speech enjoyed by intellectuals has been
increasing year by year, and signs have emerged of a questioning of the wisdom
behind government policies. Jiang Yanyong, a physician at the No. 301 Hospitalof the PLA who had promptly disclosed the government’s initial attempts tocover up the spread of SARS and thus effectively helped improve thetransparency of the governmental measures against the epidemic, reportedly sent東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ98

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a letter to the NPC and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) asking them to take a second look at the
Tiananmen Square incident of June 1989. An article entitled “Declaration of theCampaign against the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee”
authored by Jiao Guobiao, an associate professor at the School of Journalism
and Communication, Peking (Beijing) University, was published on the Internet.
Tian Jiyun, former vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee and seniorreformist member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee,
published an article in the October 2004 issue of the monthly journal Yanhuang
Chunqiu, in which he sang the praises of the “historical achievements” made by
Hu Yaobang, who was sacked as general secretary of the CPC Central
Committee for failing to rein in “bourgeois liberalization” in 1987. As Hu Jintao
had once been a subordinate of Hu Yaobang, the article may have been designed
to restore the honor of the late Hu Yaobang. Such isolated remarks were heard
now and then, but they failed to touch off an organized movement.
In October 2004, the CPC Central Committee issued regulations to protect
the rights of CPC members. This is an important document as it shows the
direction of political reforms that the Hu Jintao government has been gropingfor. When compared with a set of regulations enforced on a trial basis in
January 1995, several new measures aimed at promoting inner-party democracy
can be found. Up until then, the party had reached a decision by a show ofhands or by ballot. The new regulations, however, introduced a secret ballot.
The regulations guarantee members a certain degree of freedom of speech suchas criticism of the party, but “no party member may make public any viewpointthat contravenes the decisions” of the Central Committee.
As this indicates, members can express their dissenting views only at closed
party meetings, and the CPC promotes inner-party democracy only within theframework of the system of “democratic centralism.” The direction of political
reforms proposed at the fourth plenary session of the 16th CPC Central
Committee held in September 2004 was not aimed at institutionalizing a systemof checking the party but rather at building up the party’s ability to govern the
country. Put another way, the political reforms pursued by the Hu Jintao
government may be characterized as a combination of measures for controlled
inner-party democracy and an age-old anticorruption campaign. As such, it may
be said that they are not intended to undertake a structural, democratic reformof the political system in China.

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The “Peaceful Rise” Theory in Disarray and Development ofGreat-power Diplomacy
On the diplomatic front, President Hu Jintao has sought to establish his own
foreign policy line. The debate has centered on the “peaceful rise” theory that is
aimed externally at sweeping away the “China threat” theory and internally at
creating an environment conducive to economic development over the
opposition of the hard-liners. It is a strategic concept formulated by Zheng
Bijian, chairman of the China Reform Forum, who reportedly organized aseries of research projects for this purpose. The theory is intended to show thatthe objectives, nature, means, and effects of China’s peaceful rise theory are allfor peaceful purposes, and that China will never repeat the mistakes made byGermany and Japan in the periods up to the Second World War which, as
rapidly rising powers, challenged the world order and the status-quo powers atthat time. In an address delivered at Harvard University in December 2003,
Premier Wen Jiabao said that “China today is a country in [the process of]reform and opening-up and a rising power dedicated to peace.” At a seminar
marking the 110th anniversary of the birth of the late Chairman Mao Zedong,
Hu Jintao said that China would steadfastly tread the path to a peaceful rise.
Although the slogan “peaceful rise” is not couched in the official language
adopted by the party machinery, the references made to it by the two top
leaders at official forums added significant weight. It is also to be noted thatthe language has met with criticism in China and fell into disuse soon
thereafter. Some members of the CPC Central Committee’s Political Bureau
Standing Committee, who are believed to have toed the Jiang Zemin line, havenever uttered these words, and it is said that Jiang Zemin himself did not likethe term. The peaceful rise theory has reportedly come under scrutiny within
the CPC. Those who doubt the wisdom of the “theory of a peaceful rise of
China” argued that (a) the word “peaceful” is liable to send a wrong message
that China will not use force against Taiwan; (b) it self-imposes restraints on
China’s defense and military buildup; and (c) it not only makes it difficult torefute the “China threat” theory but also creates too strong an impression
about the “rise” of China. Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian’s inaugural
address on May 20, 2004, contained favorable references to China’s peacefulrise, and this further undermined the theory. Although Zheng Bijian persisted
in his argument for China’s peaceful rise, Chinese leaders have stopped using
the words. Retraction of the theory so soon after its debut suggests that the東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ100

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new-generation leadership of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao has met with checks
within China.
The fact of the matter is that few significant changes in Chinese foreign policy
have emerged on Hu Jintao’s watch. While China is trying to develop better
relations with Russia, Europe, and neighboring countries by using its economic
leverage, it is quarreling with the United States over arms sales to Taiwan andwith Japan over differences concerning the interpretation of history. Thus far, no
progress has been made in solving North Korea’s nuclear issue.
In 2004, China’s economic relations with the United States improved
steadily and, on the security front, relations remained stable thanks to its
cooperation with the United States on counterterrorism. On the other hand,
China took sharp exception to the export of US arms to Taiwan, poisoning thepolitical relations between the two countries. During a visit he made in April
2004, US Vice President Richard B. Cheney showed consideration for China’s
concern over the Taiwan issue by stating that the United States would adhere to
the one-China policy based on the three joint communiqués between China andthe United States, and stressed that the United States would not support
Taiwan’s “independence,” or any unilateral actions to change the status quo ofthe two sides of the Taiwan Strait. But he made no compromises on thequestion of arms sales to Taiwan. When the then US national security adviser,
Condoleezza Rice, visited China, then CMC Chairman Jiang Zemin and otherleaders she met with also sharply criticized the US policy toward Taiwan,
including the arms exports.
The United States toughened its demands on China over issues pending
between the two countries without making any compromises on the Taiwan
issue. Meanwhile, for the first time in three years, the United States introduced amotion censuring China at a plenary meeting of the United Nations Commission
on Human Rights. Colin L. Powell, then US secretary of state, asked European
countries not to lift the arms embargo on China, and the State Department
expressed concern over China’s failure to elect a chief executive of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region through a direct election. In a press interview hegave after talks with President Hu Jintao during his visit to China in October
2004, Powell said that they had agreed to resume the bilateral human rights
dialogue. He also said that he strongly urged China to resume cross-strait
dialogue with Taiwan that had been suspended, and reiterated that the UnitedStates would not cease providing Taiwan with arms as requested by China.

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Meanwhile, cooperation with its northwestern neighbors through the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), a regional cooperation organization
made up of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan
has been increasing, and steady progress has been made in bilateral energy
cooperation and settling border issues. The SCO established an Executive
Committee of the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure in Tashkent in June 2004
and its member states conducted a joint counterterrorism military exercise in
September 2004, as they had in 2003.
On October 14, 2004, President Hu Jintao had talks with Russian President
Vladimir Putin then visiting China and signed a Joint Statement (Declaration)committing themselves, among other things, to counterterrorism cooperation.
They also announced an “Implementation Outline” (Action Plan) aimed atfurther strengthening the bilateral “Strategic Partnership.” This is a basic
document that defines working-level cooperation in diplomatic, military, andeconomic fields from 2005 through 2008. In addition, they signed aComplementary (Additional) Agreement between the People’s Republic of China
and the Russian Federation on the Eastern Section of the China-Russia Boundarythat solved all the disputes over the demarcation of borders between the twocountries. According to Wen Wei Po, a PRC-affiliated Hong Kong daily, there
is a likelihood of garrisoning a PLA unit on Heixiazi Island (Bol’shoy
Ussuriskiy Island). The two countries also agreed to create a joint businesscouncil to solve trade issues, and Russia agreed to increase the supply of oil andnatural gas to China, where demand for both has increased sharply of late. For
China, which depends on Russia for 8.5 percent of its energy requirements,
stable relations with its resource-rich neighbor are crucial.
In 2004, it became clear that Europe, in addition to Russia, had assumed
greater importance in Chinese diplomacy. As Europe is an industrialized region
far removed from, and less threatening to, China geopolitically, China expects
Europe to provide it with weapons and dual-use technologies. Furthermore, US
civil aircraft makers are vying with their European competitors for a bigger
share of the Chinese market. Europe is also in competition with Japan toconstruct high-speed railways. If the European Union (EU) lifts its arms
embargo on China, Russia will have to promote its weapons more vigorously in
China, in competition with European weapons makers. The EU imposed thearms embargo on China to punish it for its human rights abuses during andfollowing the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989. Subsequently, China

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was received back into the international community fold and has formed avariety of partnerships with the EU and its major countries. China’s EU Policy
Paper, released in October 2003, states in part that the “common groundbetween China and the EU far outweighs their disagreements.” It also statesthat both “China and the EU stand for democracy in international relations,”
obliquely expressing the hope that the EU will play a role in restraining US
unilateralism. One Chinese leader after another paid visits to European
countries. During the first week of May 2004, timed to coincide with the launchof an enlarged 25-member EU, Premier Wen Jiabao visited Germany, Belgium,
Italy, Great Britain, Ireland, and EU headquarters to discuss measures to further
develop economic relations with these countries and strongly urged them to lift
the arms embargo on China. Premier Wen Jiabao met with European
Commission President Romano Prodi and asked him to lift the embargo that
had been in place since 1989 as soon as practicable and to grant China full
“market economy status” under the WTO rules. At that meeting, the two
leaders signed an agreement on customs cooperation aimed at preventing
copyright infringements and also agreed to cooperate in space development
projects. President Hu Jintao visited France early in the year, and Poland,
Hungary, and Romania in June. Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Wu
Bangguo visited Bulgaria, Denmark, and Norway, and Chairman of the 10th
National Committee of the CPPCC Jia Qinglin embarked on a tour of South
Korea, Australia, Spain, and Portugal from August 26. Four top leaders of the
Hu Jintao government thus visited Europe after the EU enlargement in May to
win recognition of its “market economy status” and the lifting of the arms
embargo on China. This unprecedented all-out diplomatic effort suggests that
China views Europe as a strategic breakthrough in getting the sanctions byindustrialized nations in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident completely
lifted. At a China-EU summit meeting held in The Hague in December, theleaders discussed the lifting of the embargo, and the EU side confirmed its
political will to continue to work towards this end. In response, US Secretary ofState Powell urged the EU to continue the embargo on grounds of the lack ofimprovement in human rights protection in China.
For all the mediating efforts by China, the Six-party Talks on the North
Korean nuclear issue remain deadlocked. Appreciative of the role played by
North Korea as a buffer zone, China does not want to see a sudden and sharpchange in the status quo. For this reason, China has not been able to exercise its

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influence over North Korea as strongly as the international community would
like. Symbolic of China’s intricate position was the closing down by the
Chinese authorities of Strategy and Management (Zhanlue yu Guanli). The
journal carried in its August issue an article written by Wang Zhongwen, an
academic at the Tianjin Academy of Social Science who argued that North
Korea had not given any thanks at all for the support and economic assistancethat China had provided; that it had not shown adequate understanding andsupport toward China at crucial times; and that China has no moral obligation
to extend its wholehearted support to such a country. He demanded suspensionof assistance to North Korea. By virtue of its food and energy aid to North
Korea, China holds de facto power of life and death over North Korea, but
China has not used it as a trump card, at least not yet.
China has been actively playing the role of a diplomatic mediator. To theextent that China seeks to bring to fruition a nuclear-free Korean Peninsulathrough diplomatic means, China’s national interests coincide with those ofJapan and the United States, but their interests also diverge over many otherissues. In fact, what China gained from North Korea’s National Defense
Commission Chairman Kim Jong Il when he visited China in April 2004 was amere promise to continue the Six-party Talks, and precious little progress wasmade with respect to the crucial issue of suspending the nuclear development
programs. US President George W. Bush was reelected in November 2004, and
it is hardly conceivable that his government will allow North Korea still moretime to develop nuclear weapons by allowing the Six-party Talks to drag on as
they have in the past. It is anybody’s guess what the outcome of China’s
mediating diplomacy will be, as it is seeking compromises from both theUnited States and North Korea. On the multilateral diplomatic stage provided
by the SCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), where it
can take a leadership position, China has achieved some results. However, on
issues such as problems on the Korean Peninsula, it cannot be denied that
China sometimes encounters difficulties despite all the lengths it goes to.
(4) Fragile Relations with Japan
China’s fragile relations with Japan, which have often been described as “coldpolitically while warm economically,” continued into 2004. The dollar value ofChina’s trade with Japan recorded all-time highs for five consecutive years
from 1999, reaching approximately $132.43 billion in 2003, up 30.4 percent

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from the previous year. Meanwhile, official mutual visits by the heads of stateagreed to in the Japan-China Joint Declaration on Building a Partnership ofFriendship and Cooperation for Peace and Development of 1998 have remained
suspended, and there is no sign yet of an improvement in the politicalatmosphere between the two countries. When Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
visited the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan’s war dead are enshrined, on New
Year’s Day 2004, China showed strong indignation and expressed its
condemnation. The “New Thinking” on China’s relations with Japan—anargument proposed from late 2002 to promote better relations with Japan bytranscending the thorny issues of history—was a diplomatic policy advocated byprivate citizens with a view to taking a strategic approach to developing relations
with Japan, but it was drowned out by a wave of nationalistic opposition.
The Japanese were shocked by anti-Japanese outrages perpetrated by
Chinese supporters at the Asian Football Confederation Asian Cup matches inJuly–August 2004, including the supporters’ inflicting damage on a car
belonging to the Japanese Embassy. Some of the Japanese mass media
attributed the rising anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese to patriotic
education centering on anti-Japanese education promoted by the Chinese
government, and the Chinese mass media were infuriated at their comments. It
was reported that the Chinese authorities have intervened and made the mass
media restrain their anti-Japanese comments. One of the big problems clouding
the news coverage of Chinese mass media is more their long-running failure toportray Japan as it really is. Instead, they have played up Japan’s militaristic era
and focused their coverage on affairs that tended to mislead their readers andviewers into associating present-day Japan with those times. Ordinary Chineseare often fed with knowledge biased against the Japanese and with uniform
views invented by the establishment that are prejudicial to the Japanese. Thereis no denying that Japan-China relations have been taking on growing
importance, but bad blood between the two peoples could complicate thealready worsening situation.
During an ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and South Korea) Summit held in
October 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi had informal talks with Premier Wen
Jiabao and, at an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit meeting
held in November the same year, he also had talks with President Hu Jintao.
However, during an Asia-Europe Meeting held in October 2004, the Japaneseprime minister and the Chinese premier merely had a short discussion while東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ105

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standing. Despite the lack of communication between the two leaders in recent
periods, a summit meeting with the Chinese premier eventually did notmaterialize. Prime Minister Koizumi spoke with President Hu Jintao during the
APEC Summit in November 2004 and with Premier Wen Jiabao during theASEAN+3 Summit in the same month, but they merely talked about theformer’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. These serve to symbolize the frosty
political relations prevailing between the two countries. In a customary year-end
press interview in People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), China’s minister of foreign
affairs, Li Zhaoxing, discussed the accomplishments of Chinese diplomacy
during the year 2004 but made no mention of China’s relations with Japan.
In 2004, several conflict-of-interest problems came to the fore. Chinese
vessels had conducted maritime research near Japan’s territorial waters or its
exclusive economic zones without giving prior notification to Japan, in violationof an agreement between the two countries. China has also been developing gas
fields in areas near the midway line between the two countries that Japan has
long insisted upon. While the impression has been growing stronger in Japanthat China was making inroads in the ocean in disregard of Japanese concerns, asubmerged Chinese nuclear-powered submarine entered Japanese territorial
waters in November 2004. This did not fall into the category of innocent passage
through the territorial waters of another country and was therefore in violation ofinternational law. The Japanese government issued a maritime security operation
order to the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF), whose aircraft and ships
tracked the movements of the submarine. The Chinese government later
revealed that the submarine belonged to the PLA Navy.
The Chinese government said that the entry of its nuclear submarine into theJapanese territorial waters was caused by “technical reasons” and expressed its“regret.” Hardly any news media of consequence in China reported the fact thatthe nuclear submarine that had infiltrated the territorial waters of Japanbelonged to the PLA Navy or that the Chinese government had expressed its
regret to the Japanese government. During an APEC summit meeting held in
Santiago, Chile, on November 20, 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi spoke with
President Hu Jintao. At that meeting, Prime Minister Koizumi asked President
Hu Jintao for his understanding of the traditional and cultural backgrounds
against which he had visited the Yasukuni Shrine and at the same time called
upon the president to prevent any recurrence of Chinese submarines infiltrating
Japanese territorial waters and to take appropriate steps to restrain the東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ106

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development of gas fields in the East China Sea. In response, President Hu
Jintao insisted that Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine wasto blame for the stalled political exchange between the two countries. The firstJapan-China summit meeting held after the retirement of Jiang Zemin as CMC
chairman gave the impression that the position of the new leadership of China on
the issue of history has not changed much from that of its predecessor. During an
ASEAN+3 summit meeting on November 30, 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi metwith Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao. At that meeting the Chinese premier again
criticized Prime Minister Koizumi for his visit to the Yasukuni Shrine and asked
the prime minister to take appropriate action. It appears that the Hu Jintao
government’s policy in foreign and cross-strait relations has become increasingly
susceptible to public opinion and the nationalism of its people.

2.

The Cross-strait Situation and President Chen Shuibian’s Reelection(1) Chen Shui-bian’s Victory and Frustration
Earlier it was noted that the Taiwan issue was one of the reasons why China’s
peaceful rise theory came in for such criticism. Developments that occurred inconnection with the presidential election held in March 2004 have madeChina’s concerns a reality. China had been trying to dissuade the Taiwanesefrom holding a national referendum because it would accelerate the pace of
Taiwanese independence. As expected, incumbent President Chen Shui-bianproclaimed as his campaign pledge that he would hold a national referendum to
ask the people (a) whether or not the government should purchase moreadvanced antimissile weapons to strengthen Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities,and (b) whether or not the government should establish an organization topromote negotiations with mainland China. He also promised to enact a new
constitution through a national referendum in 2006 and promulgate it in 2008.
China was deeply offended because, in its eyes, such a move would change
Taiwan’s legal status and could lead to its independence. In the past, China had
been trying to curb Taiwan’s move toward autonomy by threatening to use
force. Since China started threatening Taiwan in 1996 by test-firing ballistic
missiles and carrying out tri-service joint military exercises, the United Stateshas been trying to restrain and persuade China. Thanks to US efforts, China has
toned down threats to use force. At the time of the Taiwanese presidential東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ107

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107election in 2000, the then Chinese premier, Zhu Rongji, issued a verbal
warning. In an editorial carried in its New Year issue, the PLA Daily(Jiefangjun Bao) said that to prepare for a military conflict was the year’s mostimportant mission for the PLA, but its tone was rather subdued. During therecent presidential election in Taiwan, China, perhaps conscious of the US
position on the Taiwan issue and possible responses of the Taiwanese, refrained
from publicizing the annual large-scale military exercise it carried out in thesame period.
In exchange for showing self-restraint in its threats to use force against
Taiwan, China called on the United States, Japan, and other countries concernedto restrain Taiwan. The Taiwanese government did convey to the United Statesin advance the specifics of the proposed national referendum, but the UnitedStates, which has attached importance to a peaceful and stable situation in the
Taiwan Strait, did not disguise its displeasure when Taiwan disregarded its
advice, took the plunge, and held a national referendum. Following an indirect
expression of displeasure by a senior official from the Bush administration, thepolitical atmosphere hanging over US-Taiwan relations has deteriorated, andthe United States has reportedly refused to receive a special envoy planned by
Taiwan. Japan officially sent word to Secretary-General to the President Chiou
I-jen through the Taipei Office of the Interchange Association, Japan, expressing
its concern over the national referendum. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson
Liu Jianchao praised the Japanese government for expressing its concern over
the Taiwan issue. Given that China has been vigorously trying to restrain
foreign governments from having political relations with the Taiwanese
authorities, such praise would have been unthinkable in the past. France alsojoined the chorus of censure. When President Hu Jintao visited France,
President Jacques Chirac strongly criticized the national referendum as “a grave
mistake,” and went out of his way to say that he opposed any measure,including the holding of a “referendum,” aimed at unilaterally changing thestatus quo and exacerbating tensions in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwanese
authorities bitterly showed their resentment by complaining that industrialized
democracies that are supposed to share values of freedom and democracy havesided with China, which is threatening Taiwan with the use of force.
One must say that holding a national referendum is an act of direct democracy,
and as a matter of principle the United States, which advocates democracy,cannot completely deny the use of a referendum. Although the political東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ108

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atmosphere between the United States and Taiwan has worsened, it did notnecessarily degenerate into a tense confrontation, and no change has occurred in
US policy towards Taiwan. It is thought that President Chen Shui-bian had
persisted in the national referendum even at the risk of courting foreign criticism,
because he calculated that putting the security of Taiwan on his agenda would
enhance Taiwan’s sense of identity and be strategically advantageous for his
reelection. On the other hand, the opposition alliance that had pushed thereferendum bill through the Legislative Yuan turned the scales against itself by
opposing it when the national referendum was actually held, thus putting itself inthe same position as the Communist Party of China. In the presidential election of
1996, Lin Yang-kang and Chen Li-an—and in the presidential election of 2000,
Lien Chan and James Soong—repeatedly made pro-Chinese remarks and warned
voters that if their opposing candidates Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian,
respectively, won the election, a war would break out with mainland China. But
these remarks provoked voters’ antipathy, and these opposition candidates lostthe elections to their respective rivals, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. As it
turned out, the Lien Chan–James Soong ticket held the upper hand through mostof the campaign period, but when the Chen Shui-bian camp organized a humanchain of two million people on February 28, 2004, it turned the tables on them.
By proposing Taiwan’s defense as a national referendum theme, Taiwan’s senseof identity received a boost and a large number of voters flocked to the Chen
camp, creating a close fight in the final stage of the campaign.
For lack of decisive issues, both camps stepped up negative campaigns in
the final stage. On the last day before voting, Chen Shui-bian and Lu Hsiulien were wounded by gun
Figure 4.1. Results of the Taiwaneseshots while riding throughpresidential election
a street of a southern town
(March 2004)
in a campaign car. The
truth about this shooting
incident is not yet known
Chen Shui-bianLien Chan
and what effect it had on
49.89%
50.11%
andand(6,442,452 votes)(6,471,970 votes)
James Soong Lu Hsiu-lien
voter behavior is a matterof speculation. As a result,candidate Chen Shui-bianwon the presidential
Source: Data from the United Daily News, March 21, 2004.
Note: The turnout rate was 80.28%.
election by a slim margin.

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However, as the referendum fell short of the required 50 percent or morevoting of the eligible population, its result was declared null and void.
As the opposition Lien–Soong ticket lost the election by the slim margin of
29,518 votes (0.228 percent), the opposition candidates objected to the results
and filed lawsuits to have them as well as the election itself declared void.
Furthermore, a conspiracy theory about the shooting spread like wildfire, andthe Lien–Soong pairing harped on about the Chen Shui-bian camp’s election
fraud and conspiracy, called on the voters to join protest demonstrations, as aresult of which even incidents involving bloody confrontation ensued. As
recounting of the votes found that, contrary to expectations, there were nolarge-scale irregularities, the approval rating of the People First Party (PFP)that had staged often violent protest rallies dropped, and opposition parties lost
both lawsuits.
In the calendar of Taiwanese politics in 2004, the Legislative Yuan electionsin December had importance second only to that of the presidential election.
Until then, the ruling parties of the Chen administration were in the minority.
Despite this handicap, President Chen Shui-bian has been promoting a
movement toward de facto independence for Taiwan as demonstrated by his
refusal to accept the one-China principle and the holding of a nationalreferendum. Therefore, the focal point of the recent Legislative Yuan elections
was whether the ruling party and its allies—the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)—could wrench a majority fromthe opposition alliance—the PFP and the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist
Party)—and promote reforms such as the enactment of a new constitution.
However, the opposition
alliance held on to its majority,and the ruling DPP, although it
increased the number of its seatsin the Legislative Yuan, failed to
win a majority, There were two
reasons for this: in an attempt to
win a majority, the DPP and
TSU had put up too many
candidates using the multiple
seat constituency system, with
President Chen Shui-bian announcing his election
the result that its candidates vied victory (March 2004) (Kyodo Photo)東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ110

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Table 4.1. Results of the Legislative Yuan elections in 2001 and
2004
Party

No. of seats

Ratio of votes won (%)

2001

2004

2001

2004

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)

87

89

33.38

35.72

Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU)

13

12

7.76

7.79

Non-partisan Solidarity Union

0

6

0

3.63

Other parties/ independents

10

4

8.71

5.94

Kuomintang

68

79

28.56

32.83

People First Party (PFP)

46

34

18.57

13.90

New Party

1

1

2.61

0.12

Source: Data from the Web site of the Central Election Committee.
Note: The DPP is the ruling party to which the TSU is allied, and the opposition alliance is made up of theKuomintang, the PFP, and the New Party.

for the same votes and failed together to win parliamentary seats; and the namerectification campaign—changing the name from “China,” “the Republic ofChina” and “Taipei” to “Taiwan”—put off middle-of-the-road voters. On theother hand, the opposition alliance won the elections in part because, out of fearof losing elections, it trimmed the number of its candidates down to minimum
hopefuls. However, the overall ratio of votes for the opposition parties had long
been in decline, making it difficult for China to predict what will happen in
coming years. As a result, the pro-Chinese opposition alliance is highly likely
to maintain its leadership in the Legislative Yuan, and the effort President Chen
Shui-bian and former President Lee Teng-hui have been making to amend theconstitution and promote the name rectification movement has thus been
frustrated, for the time being at least. After the election, President Chen has
indicated his willingness to cooperate with the opposition alliance, and somepoint out the possibility of President Chen steering his policy closer to his “newmiddle-of-the-road” line. As the PFP, which has lost some of its parliamentaryseats, is still in a position to exercise a casting vote either by siding with the
DPP or with the Kuomintang, its moves will bear close scrutiny.
(2) China’s Policy toward Taiwan
On the other hand, China’s policy toward Taiwan is in trouble. Since 1996,
China has intervened continuously in Taiwanese presidential elections, but
intimidation through a show of force came to naught and fostered Taiwan’s
move toward independence. Although China refrained from making a similar

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intimidation toward Taiwan in the last presidential election, Chen Shui-bian, apro-independence candidate, was reelected. His reelection as president of
Taiwan came as a shock to China. However, the invalidation of the nationalreferendum and the violent protest rallies led by the opposition camp that
continued after the election temporarily softened the blow. China stressed thatthe national referendum and the election results were rejected by the Taiwanesepeople and expressed the view that the advocacy of independence of Taiwan byChen Shui-bian was not embraced by the Taiwanese people.
China severely criticized the Central Election Commission for announcing
the election results one week after the voting and the representative offices andlawmakers of other countries for having sent congratulatory telegrams to
President Chen Shui-bian. In a comment made on the social turmoil that had
occurred in certain quarters of Taiwan, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs
Office of the State Council of China suggested the possibility of using force
against Taiwan by saying: “We will not sit by watching should the postelection situation in Taiwan get out of control, leading to social turmoil,
endangering the lives and property of our flesh-and-blood brothers andaffecting stability across the Taiwan Strait.” In reaction, Taiwan took offense,
and the United States expressed its concern. In his testimony given before the
US House International Relations Committee on April 21, 2004, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly said thatsuch moves by the Chen Shui-bian administration carried the potential for adangerous response from China, and strongly urged Taiwan to restrain itself bysaying that “there are limitations with respect to what the United States will
support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its constitution.” In its Annual
Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China submitted toCongress on May 28, 2004, the US Department of Defense expressed concern
over China’s use of force against Taiwan. Under such circumstances, attention
was focused on the inaugural speech President Chen Shui-bian was to deliveron May 20.
On May 17, three days prior to the inaugural speech, the Taiwan Affairs
Office of the State Council of China issued a statement on cross-strait relations.
Among other things, it said that (a) at present, the relations across the Taiwan
Strait are severely tested; (b) China will never compromise on the one-China
principle; (c) as long as the Taiwan authorities recognize that there is only one
China in the world, cross-strait relations can hold out many bright prospects

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including the “three direct links” (direct trade, transport, and postal links); and(d) should Taiwan declare independence, China will crush it at any cost.
Chen Shui-bian, as he had done four years ago, thus had to deliver his
inaugural speech under pressure from both the United States and China. Chen
Shui-bian accommodated the concerns of the United States and China bydeclaring that he would withdraw his campaign pledge to enact a new
constitution by means of a referendum; would not touch on problems relating to
the sovereignty and territory of the country and those relating to the question ofunification or independence; and would follow the rules set out in the existing
constitution and its amendments. He reaffirmed the promises and principles set
forth in his inaugural speech of May 20, 2000, and said that these commitments
had not changed over the previous four years and would not in the next four
years, indicating that he would continue to observe the “five nos”—that is, aslong as China has no intention of using force against Taiwan, Taiwan would (a)not declare independence; (b) not change its formal name; (c) not enshrine thewords “state-to-state” in the constitution; (d) not endorse a referendum on
formal independence that would change the status quo; and (e) not abolisheither the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification
Guidelines—during his term in office. He also declared that he would establish
a Committee for Cross-strait Peace and Development; build a nationwide
consensus and enlist the enlightened contribution of both the ruling andopposition parties on the issue; create a Peace and Stability Framework for
Cross-strait Interactions; and strive to establish peace and stability on both sidesof the strait and an enduring new relationship between Taiwan and China.
Subsequently, however, Chen Shui-bian has been provoking China by
advocating, in effect, a change to Taiwan’s official status and thus seeking toenhance Taiwan’s identity. For instance, he has reiterated on a number ofoccasions that “the Republic of China is Taiwan,” and indicated his intention to
use “Taiwan” as an abbreviation of “the Republic of China.” On two
occasions—on November 27 and December 5, immediately before theLegislative Yuan elections—Chen Shui-bian touched on the timetable he had
proposed during the presidential election campaign, saying that he would hold anational referendum on the enactment of a new constitution in 2006 andpromulgate the new constitution in 2008. He also referred to the namerectification campaign, which proposes to change the prefix attached to thename of overseas diplomatic missions and government-run enterprises from東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ113

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113“China,” “the Republic of China,” or “Taipei” to “Taiwan.” A spokesperson for
the US State Department said unequivocally that the United States would notsupport the proposed change of name for Taiwan’s representative offices in the
United States. Chen’s speeches and policy changes seemed to be aimed atconsolidating support for the DPP in the upcoming Legislative Yuan elections.
As a result, many took the remarks Chen Shui-bian made in his inauguralspeech on May 20 as a sign that he had not exactly given up on the idea of
Taiwan’s independence, and his remarks deepened the mistrust in the UnitedStates and in an international community that wanted to maintain the status quo
in the Taiwan Strait.
But it was also around the time of Chen Shui-bian’s inauguration ceremonythat the United States and Taiwan began to take steps to mend relations;
China’s response, on the other hand, started to become increasingly frosty.
China had reportedly given the US State Department advance notice of its
statement that was scheduled for release on May 17. It is also reported that
Chen Shui-bian consulted with the US government in advance concerning thecontents of his inaugural address and that it was well received by the latter. In
addition, the United States ordered an aircraft carrier to cruise in the waters
around Taiwan in order to restrain China in the event of any contingencies. On
the other hand, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the StateCouncil of China repudiated almost all of the claims made in the inaugural
address and strongly suggested that China would use force by saying that
Taiwanese independence would not lead to peace; that division would not breed
stability; and that “the Chinese people will crush their schemes firmly andthoroughly at any cost.”
However, a statement released by the Chinese government on May 17 did
not directly refer to unification or the use of force, and this is symbolic of theChinese government’s current Taiwan policy. It may be said that the Chinese
government is unable not only to come up with a Taiwan policy acceptable to
the Taiwan authorities or to use force against Taiwan, but also to take a stepfurther to adjust the existing policies. The Chinese government made it clear in
December that the NPC Standing Committee would deliberate on an “antisecession law,” creating the impression that it may come up with a new policy
toward Taiwan. It is thought that the introduction of an anti-secession law isbased on the idea that if the United States keeps selling weapons to Taiwan inaccordance with its Taiwan Relations Act, and if Taiwan pits itself against東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ114

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China by amending its constitution, then China too should meet the challenge
by enacting and enforcing a law.
Commenting on China’s move to enact an anti-secession law, Taiwan’s
Mainland Affairs Council Chairman Jaushieh Joseph Wu strongly charged that
it was an attempt to invent a pretext to legalize a unilateral change in the statusquo of the Taiwan Strait by use of force against Taiwan. According to thefindings of a public-opinion poll released by the Mainland Affairs Council on
December 24, 73.2 percent of the respondents said that they did not accept the
way China was trying to unify Taiwan forcibly by enacting the anti-secession
law, and 82.8 percent of them said that they did not approve of the way China
used the law as a pretext for using force against Taiwan. It appears that China
announced the schedule for the deliberation of the bill after the Legislative
Yuan elections in Taiwan in order to avoid having an impact on the election,but even then Taiwanese resentment against it ran extremely high.
(3)

Debate over the Use of Force and the “Three Direct Links”
Negotiations
China, whose threats that it would use force against Taiwan had been muted
during the presidential election, became increasingly vocal after Chen Shui-biandelivered his inaugural address. On May 20, 2004, the day of Chen’s inaugural
address, People’s Daily, the organ of the CPC, reported that Jiang Zemin, at a
meeting with Hu Jintao and air force officials, had demanded that the PLA Air
Force should contribute more to national reunification. As we will see later, theexercise conducted on Dongshan Island from the end of June was carried out
with the use of force against Taiwan in mind and was reported through a PRCaffiliated Hong Kong newspaper. A so-called “unification timetable” plan—
China will complete unification with Taiwan by 2020—was also circulated
through a PRC-affiliated Hong Kong newspaper. During the election campaign,
Chen Shui-bian remarked that Taiwan would promulgate a new constitution in2008. The thinking behind this remark is his belief that China could ill afford touse force against Taiwan, if only to make the 2008 Beijing Olympics a success.
In an attempt to discredit such thinking, Wang Zaixi, deputy director of the
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China, strongly restrained Taiwan
by saying that it could not rule out a cross-strait military conflict in 2008.
Some newspapers report that Jiang Zemin had supported this hard-line policy
before he resigned and that he tried to maintain his influence by taking

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advantage of the strait crisis, and that, as a result, the policy options of the Hu
Jintao government have narrowed. Put another way, in attempting to deflect
criticisms that their policies were too soft on Taiwan, Jiang Zemin and Hu
Jintao fell foul of one another by each vying to make his policy appear tougher
than the other’s. A source close to the meeting leaked to the press that when he
met with Condoleezza Rice, then US national security adviser, Jiang Zemin
criticized the US weapons sales to Taiwan and said that China had no choice
but to attack Taiwan. Staunch hard-liners on Taiwan also made their voices
heard: Senior Colonel Luo Yuan, a military expert with the Academy of
Military Sciences of the PLA, said that the United States should be made awareof the cost of intervention; and Yan Xuetong, director of the Institute ofInternational Studies at Tsinghua University, argued that the sooner the
independence of Taiwan is checked by force the better. Emotional, hard-line
arguments have thus been conspicuous in China.
However, an article published on the Internet after Chen’s inaugural address by
Guo Zhenyuan, a research fellow at the China Institute of International Studies,suggests that even if further changes were to occur in Taiwan in the coming
months, they would be unlikely to lead directly to the use of force. He argued thatthe solution to the Taiwan issue should be incorporated into, and subordinated to,
China’s overall strategy and that only by achieving such an overall strategy as amodern state through economic development can China create the optimum
conditions for solving the Taiwan issue and finally bring the complete unificationof the country to fruition. He firmly maintained that the use of force should not be
rashly advocated because, while preserving the integrity of sovereignty is one
objective of unification, a deeper objective lies in maintaining the stability andprosperity of a unified China and therefore only the relationship between themeans and objectives of unification has any significant meaning.
Meanwhile, in a National Day message delivered on October 10, Chen Shuibian urged China (a) to use the results of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong as abasis for resuming the long-stalled negotiations; (b) seriously consider the issue
of arms control and establish a code of conduct across the Taiwan Strait; and(c) open talks on the “three direct links.” Taiwan had reportedly consulted with
the United States in advance about the substance of his proposal, but China
showed no positive reaction to it.
Even if no significant change emerges in China’s policy toward Taiwan,
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allow private negotiations for the implementation of the “three direct links” toproceed separately from the one-China principle. In 2003, the number of
Taiwanese firms that had invested in mainland China had risen to 68,115.
Taiwanese investors are eagerly awaiting the establishment of direct flight links
between China and Taiwan, and further delays would have a damaging
influence on Taiwanese economic competitiveness. In July 2002, then Vice
Premier Qian Qichen of China declared that it was not necessary for Taiwan tomention the political definition of “one-China” in negotiations over the “three
direct links.” The question as to whether the badly strained cross-strait relations
could be restored to that level would become a focal point to watch.
During the Taiwanese presidential election campaign, Chinese leaders maderemarks that conveyed the impression that China had receded to a position
linking the one-China principle to the “three direct links.” In a policy paper on
the “three direct links” made public in December 2003, the Taiwan Affairs
Office of the State Council of China stated that “cross-strait direct air andshipping services are air and shipping routes” across the strait and that China
would “resolutely oppose anyone who attempts to describe ‘three direct links’
as links ‘between nations’ or as ‘quasi-international’ links, or to ‘internationalize’
them in [a] disguised form.” On May 17, after the Taiwanese presidential
election, a statement from the Taiwan Affairs Office said that if only the
Taiwan authorities were to recognize the one-China principle, China would
implement comprehensive, direct, and two-way direct links. In July, Wang
Zaixi, deputy director of the Taiwan Affairs Office, called the “three direct
links” a “domestic” route.
In the policy paper on the “three direct links” mentioned earlier, China
vaguely referred to the sovereignty issue by using new expressions describing
the “three direct links,” for instance, as “affairs between both sides of the
Taiwan Strait,” or “internal affairs of the Chinese,” thus showing signs that
China may separate the “three direct links” from the one-China principle. In apress interview held on May 25, 2004, a spokesperson from the Taiwan Affairs
Office said that the “three direct links” was an economic issue that should not
be politicized and stopped short of saying that the links were out of the question
unless the Taiwan authorities recognized the one-China principle. As Jiang
Zemin has retired, Hu Jintao’s policy options may broaden, if only slightly,
opening a window of opportunity for Hu Jintao to return to the position taken
by Qian Qichen two years ago. Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council Chairman

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Jaushieh Joseph Wu said that if China were to return to the line taken by Qian
Qichen, Taiwan might take the plunge and sit down with Chinese
representatives to discuss the “three direct links.” China, too, welcomed theidea of entrusting negotiations to private groups. What impact the opposition
alliance that won a parliamentary majority in the December election will haveon the talks over the “three direct links” warrants close attention.

3.

(1)

Military Trends in the People’s Republic of China andTaiwanAdvancing Integration and Modernization in the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA)
The fourth plenary session of the 16th CPC Central Committee held on
September 19, 2004, approved the resignation of Jiang Zemin as chairman of
the CMC and elected Vice Chairman Hu Jintao (general secretary of the CPC
Central Committee and president of the state) as his successor. At the sametime, the Central Committee promoted Gen. Xu Caihou to the vicechairmanship of the CMC and added Gen. Chen Bingde (director of theGeneral Armament Department), Lt. Gen. Zhang Dingfa (PLA Navycommander), Gen. Qiao Qingchen (PLA Air Force commander), and Lt. Gen.
Jing Zhiyuan (PLA Second Artillery Corps commander) as its new members.
Of these, Chairman Hu Jintao promoted Lt. Gens. Zhang Dingfa and Jing
Zhiyuan to the rank of general on September 25. Hu Jintao’s assumption of thepost of CMC chairman was a foregone conclusion, but the appointment ofcommanders from the Navy, the Air Force, and the Second Artillery Corps as
CMC members is symbolic of a change in its composition into a more fully
integrated and more professional command structure. Although this was thefirst personnel shakeup carried out by Hu Jintao, it was in line with a previously
adopted policy and may be considered as a sign of tri-service integration, towhich the PLA has attached importance in recent years.
Since around February 2004, the PLA, in an effort to promote the“Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” has beenstressing the need to intensify joint training among the services by frequently
trumpeting the slogan “joint” (yitihua) training. In a New Year’s Day editorial,
the PLA Daily emphasized the intensification of joint training among services
and arms at all levels using sophisticated high-tech equipment. The Outline of

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Table 4.2. Members of the CPC Central Military Commission
Chairman

Hu Jintao (general secretary of the CPC Central Committee andpresident of the state)

Vice Chairmen Guo Boxiong (member of the CPC Central Committee’s Political
Bureau), Cao Gangchuan (member of the Political Bureau and ministerof national defense), Xu Caihou (member of the Secretariat of the CPC
Central Committee)
Members

Liang Guanglie (chief of the General Staff), Li Jinai (director of theGeneral Political Department), Liao Xilong (director of the General
Logistics Department), Chen Bingde (director of the General Armament
Department), Zhang Dingfa (PLA Navy commander), Qiao Qingchen(PLA Air Force commander), Jing Zhiyuan (PLA Second Artillery Corps
commander )Sources: Data from the PLA Daily, September 20 and 21, 2004.

Military Training in the New Year, issued by the General Staff and carried in
the PLA Daily dated February 1, 2004, made frequent references to joint
training. This term seems to refer to simultaneous and parallel training given tovarious services and branches, all of which are connected throughcommunications systems and, by operating on the thus shared information, seek
to foster their joint combat and logistic capabilities—a sign that the PLA is
keenly aware of the importance of joint operations.
Underlying this approach is thought to be the idea that the joint operations of
all services are essential in order to win a modern war, and that a highlyorganized command and control system based on efficient information sharing
is necessary. Furthermore, in order to promote the so-called “mechanization”
and “informationization” of the PLA, training reforms as well as developmentof various items of equipment are essential. An article carried in the July 27,
2004, issue of the PLA Daily points out that joint training is a product of
information warfare and represents an important reform in the area of PLA
military training. The same article goes on to point out that joint training and“informationization” are inextricably linked and that joint training embodies thepractice of training the troops through science and technology.
Generally speaking, the education and training of troops are carried out instages, from basic to advanced. The level of training is raised, from one basedon small units to larger ones, from one based on a single branch of the service
to group training consisting of all branches, and from one based on a single
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sophisticated type of training, requiring the accumulation of a wealth ofexperience to achieve the desired results. If PLA unit training has reached thelevel of joint training, it means that the PLA has the capability of carrying out
joint operations.
The Outline of Military Training circulated throughout the PLA by theGeneral Staff defined 2004 as a year for promoting the “Revolution in Military
Affairs with Chinese Characteristics” and making greater efforts to deepen thecreation and development of a new mode of military training, and went on to
set out, as it did a year ago, key areas of military training. The 2004 version
refers more frequently than that of 2003 to the focus on operations and trainingreforms under the conditions of “informationization” and the need to intensify
joint operations training. With regard to the latter, it says that, in keeping withthe requirements of integrated joint operations, the PLA will build a joint
training model, accelerate the pace of development of military equipment and“informationization,” and create the contents, methods, and mechanisms forjoint training. In addition, it makes various demands on middle-ranking andsenior commanders, military regions and military schools. Various types of
PLA training are carried out in accordance with the policy and points ofemphasis shown in this outline. Actual training started early in 2004. On
January 7, a destroyer flotilla from the North Sea Fleet and a PLA Air Forcedivision carried out joint arms and aircraft combat training under modern hightech conditions in the Yellow Sea for three purposes: to improve the level ofcooperation in an attack jointly mounted by naval vessels and aircraft; toenhance the exchange of data and communications coordination under hightech conditions; and to improve joint operations capabilities. On January 12, a
PLA Air Force division was divided into “Red” and “Blue” teams and engaged
in tactical confrontational training to boost the tactical awareness and air battle
capabilities of its pilots and to improve command capabilities at command
posts on the ground. The April 2, 2004, issue of the PLA Daily reported that aGroup Army from the Chengdu Military Region carried out joint training undermodern high-tech conditions. At the exercise command post, the location of an
enemy unit operating in a remote area was reportedly shown on a screen; thecommand and control systems, information networks, fire control, and logistic
systems were put into operation; and an armored corps, a cannon corps, and anelectronic warfare corps operated in close coordination with one another. The
emphasis on command, control, and coordination shifted to relatively complex

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training—from joint training within the same service (for instance, between two
army units) to joint training between different services (for instance, between
the army and air force, or between the navy and air force). This suggests that
the PLA is pursuing the joint training mandated in the aforementioned Outlineof Military Training.
On November 10, 2004, a nuclear-powered submarine of the PLA Navy wascruising submerged in the territorial waters of Japan. MSDF vessels and aircraft
tracked the Chinese submarine under a maritime security operation order issued
by the Japanese government. The Chinese submarine continued to travel
submerged even after it had moved out of the territorial waters and left Japan’s
air defense identification zone. On November 16, the Chinese government
admitted that it was one of the PLA Navy submarines. If that submarine wasengaged in “normal” training as the Chinese government claimed, it may beseen, judging from the waters where it was spotted and the course it traveled, asa sign that the PLA Navy’s mission has definitely changed from defending its
coastline to one defending areas beyond its coastal waters. That the Chinese
submarine had cruised submerged in relatively shallow waters for a number ofhours suggests that it was familiar with the underwater topography of the area
and that the PLA Navy was trying to upgrade its submarine training.
Another way of looking at the various forms of training noted earlier and thesubmarine incident would be that they demonstrate the improved ability ofcorps commanders, their staff and indeed the units themselves to perform thecomplex task of command, control, and coordination. It may also be said thatthe various types of military equipment, communications and network systems
that support command, control, and coordination have steadily improved. As
the training and exercises of this nature are carried out on a national level, one
can surmise that the combat capability of the PLA as a whole has improved.
The PLA considers the strengthening of logistics as a critical element of its
modernization. An editorial carried in its New Year’s Day issue of the PLA
Daily described the strengthening of logistics as “deepening logistical reforms.”
It is thought that the PLA, as the industrialized countries have done before, istrying to strengthen the logistics that support its frontline combat units. It
appears that the PLA is trying to improve logistical support for its entire army,
from its subordinate brigades to divisions. More specifically, the June 4, 2004,
issue of the PLA Daily reported that a Group Army of the Beijing Military
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Taihang Mountain. It was also reported that an air force unit had improved a
supply capability for its new fighter aircraft by carrying out a 10-point reform
measure to meet future information operations requirements. On June 12, 2004,
the General Staff, the General Logistics Department, and the General
Armament Department promulgated and enforced the Regulations on Routine
Service of the People’s Liberation Army. This is reportedly the first set of
military regulations relating to military and other supplies for the three services
published after the adjustment and reform of the arms and equipment control
systems. They spell out procedures, methods, processes, standards, andrequirements regarding the procurement and supply of military and othersupplies for the three services; technical equipment maintenance; professional
training; the research, development, and reform of military science; and thecontrol of expenditure. On July 24, the Regulations on Guaranteeing Armament
Supplies for the Combined Arms Unit of the People’s Liberation Army were
promulgated and enforced. These regulations are considered as the PLA’s firstmilitary regulations to codify the armament supply activities of the combined
armed units across the board, gearing them up for future joint operations
conducted under the conditions of “informationization.” They are considered acomponent part of the PLA’s new-generation system of operations andequipment regulations. As such, they constitute a legal basis governing
armament supply and training conducted at division, brigade, and regimentlevels. In other words, these regulations constitute a legal basis for centrallyorganizing and operating armament supply units to supply various units withthe armaments necessary for joint operations.
Therefore, it may be seen that the joint operation and logistic support capabilities
of PLA units have improved at all levels thanks to their “informationization”
efforts, transforming them into a modern army. It can be gleaned from the PLA
Daily articles relating to various types of training that “informationization”
within the PLA has made considerable advances. However, an article referringto this topic carried in the July 19, 2004, edition of Outlook Weekly (Liaowang)
pointed out that it would take 30 to 40 years or even longer before the PLA
could build an information infrastructure, and cited as reasons impeding fasterprogress in this area the laggard development of an information society in China
and the Chinese defense industry.

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(2) Development of the PLA’s “Military Diplomacy”
In recent years, China has been stepping up military exchanges with othercountries under the slogan of “military diplomacy.” According to an article in
the August 2003 issue of the PLA Daily, China’s military diplomacy is omnidirectional and wide-ranging, calls for frequent visits and substantive dialogue,
and involves exchanges of high-ranking military officials. The article gives
China’s military diplomacy good marks for playing a positive role insafeguarding its security interests; in creating a peaceful and stable environment
in the international community as well as with its neighboring countries; and inpromoting the modernization of national defense and the military. One recent
characteristic is that the PLA has actively carried out joint exercises with othercountries and has opened its military exercises to foreign observers.
The PLA has actively carried out joint military exercises with foreign countries
in recent years. On March 16, 2004, the PLA Navy conducted its first ever joint
exercise with the French Navy off the coast of Qingdao, a port city in Shandong
Province in Eastern China. This exercise was reported by the PLA Daily for twodays (March 16 and 17) as the first joint exercise with a major Western power. In
the exercise, Chinese and French navy vessels and about 700 officers and troops
participated in fleet formation changes, maneuvers with shipborne helicopters
flying and landing while at sea, replenishment exercises at sea, and search andrescue exercises. According to a press report, French Navy vessels have visited
Chinese ports 12 times since 1978, but this was the first time a joint exercise had
been carried out. On June 20, vessels of the PLA Navy conducted a joint exercise
with their British counterparts for the first time, also off the coast of Qingdao. In
the exercise, the PLA Navy’s 14 vessels and 4 helicopters participated in various
types of drills—search and rescue at sea, fire fighting, mutual shipborne
helicopter flights and landings, and casualty evacuation.
On August 6, 2004, troops from the PLA and the Armed Forces of Pakistan
carried out a joint antiterrorism exercise in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous
Region. This exercise was code-named “Friendship 2004,” and about 200
officers and soldiers from the PLA’s Xinjiang Military Area Command borderdefense units and Pakistani border defense units participated in the exercise. Lt.
Gen. Zheng Shouzeng, deputy commander of the Lanzhou Military Region,
said that the successful conduct of this exercise had helped to strengthen
friendship between the armies of the two countries, expanded bilateral
cooperation in nontraditional security fields, and improved the joint counter-東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ123

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terrorism capabilities of both armies. The PLA and Australian navies carriedout a joint exercise in the Yellow Sea during the period October 10–14, 2004.
In 2003, the PLA Navy conducted a joint counterterrorism military exercise
with the five member countries of the SCO and the first joint maritime searchand rescue exercises off the Chinese coast with the visiting Pakistan Navy in
October and the Indian Navy in November. Since then, China has strengthened
its cooperation with many countries in the field of counterterrorism and is
expected to actively carry out similar joint exercises in the future.
On September 2, 2004, the PLA conducted the first amphibious landing
maneuvers to which it had invited foreign observers. This was the second military
exercise watched by foreign observers, the first having been conducted in August
2003. The latest exercise was staged by the PLA Navy’s South China Sea Fleet at
an amphibious operation and training base in Guangdong Province in thepresence of military observers from foreign countries including France, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and Mexico. After the maneuvers, the foreign military
personnel had an exchange of views with their Chinese counterparts on issues ofcommon interest. On September 25, the PLA invited military leaders from 16
countries including SCO and ASEAN member countries and defense attaches
from 13 countries to watch a military exercise code-named “Iron Fist-2004.” This
marked the third military maneuvers open to foreign observers. The PLA Daily
gave the maneuvers extensive coverage, including commentaries to trumpet theefforts China has been making to promote multilateral military cooperation.
Before and after the joint exercises the PLA conducted with its French andUK counterparts, Gen. Liang Guanglie, chief of the General Staff of the PLA,
visited France and the United Kingdom. The May 14, 2004, issue of the PLA
Daily reported his trip to France, emphasizing that the strategic partnership
between the two countries had entered a new stage in 2004, the 40th year since
the normalization of their diplomatic relations. The May 26th issue of the same
paper reported on his visit to the United Kingdom and commented affirmatively
on the improving relations between the two countries. At work behind theextensive coverage given to his European tour is China’s hope to win “market
economy status” under the WTO rules and the lifting of the EU arms embargo
on China. As noted earlier, four top leaders of the CPC, including President Hu
Jintao, had made successive visits to European countries as part of its
diplomatic campaign, and Liang’s visit may be seen as an act of military
diplomacy in support of this diplomatic campaign.

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The question of lifting the arms embargo on China was discussed at a ChinaEU summit meeting held in December in The Hague, at which the EU indicatedits policy to lift the embargo in the future. If the EU’s arms embargo on China,
which has been in place since the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, is lifted,
European state-of-the-art weapons may find their way to China. As such adevelopment could alter the military balance between the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait, the United States is said to be wary of such a scenario. As theEuropean Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports restricts weapons exports
to countries outside the EU, the lifting of the embargo does not necessarilymean an unregulated export of weapons to China. However, the lifting of thearms embargo would mean the emergence of competitors for China’s
traditional weapons suppliers like Russia, which may in turn raise the level of
performance of their weapons sold to China to win business.
Major suppliers of weapons and military technology to China are Russia andUkraine, and the bulk of them are from Russia. Typically they include Kiloclass submarines, Sovremennyy-class destroyers and Sukhoi fighters. In
December 2003, Minister of National Defense Cao Gangchuan, then Directorof the General Armament Department Li Jinai and leading military personnel incharge of armament visited Russia and, in April 2004, Defense Minister Sergey
Ivanov of Russia visited China to have talks with his Chinese counterpart. They
probably discussed the possibility of supplying weapons and militarytechnology, suggesting Russia’s continuing cooperation with China in this field.
If European countries export advanced weapons and related technology to China
in addition to those from Russia, China’s military capability and weaponsmaking technology could improve dramatically. In this sense, developments in
China’s military diplomacy must be monitored very closely.
(3) A Growing Sense of Crisis in Taiwan
The news media in Taiwan and Hong Kong reported that China’s PLA wasplanning to stage large-scale landing maneuvers in areas surrounding Dongshan
Island, Fujian Province. Although with 18,000 troops the scale of the exercise
was to be far smaller than that held in 2001, when about 100,000 soldiersparticipated, according to their reports it was the first to feature fighting for air
supremacy over the Taiwan Strait as its objective. It was said that the exercise
would represent a departure from the conventional, army-centered strategy that
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weapons in the exercise, including Su-27 fighters, FBC-1 (JH-7) Flying
Leopard (Feibao) medium-range fighter-bombers, Il-76 medium-range
transport aircraft, Zhi-9 helicopters, Sovremennyy-class destroyers, Kilo-classsubmarines, and DF-15 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Wen Wei Po, aleading PRC-affiliated Hong Kong daily, commented that the joint landing
maneuver to take place on Dongshan Island was part of maneuvers carried out
across theaters of operation, provinces and cities (such as Pingtan Island,
Zhoushan Island, Shantou, Zhenhai, and Zhenjiang).
An expert at Wen Wei Po said that the Dongshan Island exercise would havethree objectives: to check the results achieved by the PLA exercises, todemonstrate the Chinese will and capability to solve the Taiwan issue by force,and to declare to the world that this issue is an internal affair and China willbrook no external intervention. During the same period, Taiwan was planningto carry out an exercise code-named “Hankuang 20,” and US forces alsoplanned to stage “Summer Pulse 04” involving a series of military exercisesaround the world. Before-the-fact reporting of Chinese military maneuvers by
PRC-affiliated news media is unprecedented, and the logistic support exercise
planned off the coast of Fujian Province in support of the Dongshan Island
exercise was also reported. This provides a glimpse of the Chinese design torestrain Taiwan. However, the long-awaited details of the Dongshan Island
exercise itself were not reported. In a comment released toward the end of
August, the Taiwanese side hinted that it was possible that the Dongshan Island
exercise had been suspended, and by unilaterally taking it as a sign of“goodwill” on China’s part, Taiwan stopped the live fire exercise during the“Hankuang 20.” Although China has reportedly denied having suspended theDongshan Island exercise, it may be taken to mean that China had achieved its
objectives within a short period. There are reports that China had alreadyfinished the test-firing of missiles planned during the exercise, and this suggeststhat China has accumulated sufficient results from these maneuvers.
On June 1, 2004, in China, the Commission of Science, Technology andIndustry for National Defense and the State Development and Reform
Commission jointly published an Outline of the Policy for Science, Technology
and Industry for National Defense. This deserves close attention as a guideline
for developing defense science, technology, and industry that produces
weapons and military equipment. The outline’s emphasis on several items—
such as the acceleration of modernization of defense science, technology and東アジア戦略概観2005英̲0523 05.10.25 3:29 PM ページ126

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industry, the promotion of development and production of high-tech weaponry,
and a speedy dual-directional shift of the military and civilian technology—
may be seen as a sign of the positive stance taken by both the PLA and theChinese government for a rapid development of the defense industry.
At a hearing on US-China relations held by the Subcommittee on East Asianand Pacific Affairs of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless testified on the present state ofmilitary capabilities of China. In that testimony, Lawless said that “China
continues to improve quantitatively and qualitatively the capabilities of its
conventionally armed SRBM force” and has deployed “between 500 and 550
SRBMs” opposite Taiwan. In addition, regarding the PLA’s organization,armament, and operation, there are reports that China’s naval and air force
capabilities will surpass those of Taiwan during the 2006–2008 period. Facedwith such prospects, a sense of crisis is growing in Taiwan.
According to an article in the Taiwanese daily China Times dated June 18,
2004, Taiwan plans to purchase 10 categories of key weapons in and after 2005
under the Ten-year Military Development Plan, and its investment in military
hardware is expected to top NT$1 trillion. The special budget for arms
procurement approved by the Executive Yuan on June 2, 2004, appropriates
NT$144.9 billion for upgrading the three existing sets of Patriot Advanced
Capability (PAC)-2Plus surface-to-air missiles to PAC-3 standard and for
procuring six new sets; NT$53 billion for 12 P-3C antisubmarine warfare
aircraft; and NT$412.1 billion for eight diesel-electric-propelled submarines. In
addition to long-range early-warning radar and Kidd-class destroyers that havealready been authorized, Taiwan plans to spend approximately NT$200 billion
to procure AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters and M109A6 Paladinself-propelled howitzers over the next five years, for a grand total of NT$610.8
billion. On June 17, Legislative Yuan President Wang Jin-pyng inspected P-3C
antisubmarine warfare aircraft and Aegis-equipped destroyers in Hawaii during
his tour of the United States. However, as the opposition parties that control amajority of the Legislative Yuan opposed the special budget, it failed to pass theLegislative Yuan in November, just one month prior to the Legislative Yuanelections. What is more, as the opposition alliance won a majority in the
December election, the fate of the arms procurement budget hangs in the balance.
A shadow of crisis also hangs over the “Hankuang” exercise. Under the 2004
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20” exercise was to be held in three stages during the period from April throughNovember. In recent years, Taiwan has been carrying out anti-amphibious
landing exercises with a PLA amphibious invasion in mind. In 2004, Taiwan
carried out for the first time in 26 years an emergency landing exercise, with its
fighters using expressways. During the exercise, two Mirage 2000 fighters,
operating under the assumption that an airfield runway had been destroyed by
PLA airstrikes, landed on a stretch of expressway early on the morning of July
21 and, after refueling and maintenance checks, their engines were restarted
and they took off from the expressway. Before and after the exercise, the army
conducted a map exercise and the navy carried out live fire and antisubmarine
exercises, as well as parachute exercises. Taiwanese leaders showed a keeninterest in the exercises and, on July 29, President Chen Shui-bian boarded asubmarine to watch them. China Times denied the connection between these
exercises and the recent PLA maneuvers, but it is fair to say that Taiwaneseleaders are conscious of the military maneuvers that have been carried out on
the other side of the Taiwan Strait. It is necessary to keep a close eye onchanges occurring in the military balance on both sides of the strait, themodernization of their weapons and equipment, and the way the authorities onboth sides are running their armed forces, including their command and control.

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