Teach ‘em to Phish:
State Sponsorsof Surveillance

July 2018

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance“The most significant human rights issues included:
an incident of forced disappearance; abusive anddegrading treatment by security officials that insome cases led to death; the use of caning as a legal
punishment; indefinite detention without warrant or
judicial review for persons suspected of certain
security-related crimes; arbitrary arrest and detentionof government critics; limits on the freedoms ofexpression, including for the press, assembly, andassociation; limits on political rights and privacy.”1- Malaysia Human Rights Report,
United States Department of State, 2017

“We only knew how to use Google to get evidence andinformation, but after the first day here, I learned fromthe FBI agents how to use different tools and devices
to find other activities, which are linked together…
I called my team that night and told them about thesenew devices, and I just heard from them that theresults were tremendous.”2- Ravindar Singh, Assistant Director of the Narcotics Intelligence
Division, Royal Malaysia Police, 2017

Privacy International would like to thank Tim Shorrock for his
contribution to this report.

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of SurveillanceContents

Executive Summary

04

Introduction: From Military Aid to Security Assistance

06

What it Looks Like Now: Law Enforcement and Military Security Assistance

07

Cover image courtesy of Unsplash / Icons & graphics courtesy of Flaticon.com

United States

07

		

Department of State

07

		

Department of Defense

10		

Department of Justice

13

		Schools of Surveillance

13

		

Use of Contractors

15

		

US-Funded Training in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)

20

Europe23		European Union

23

		

Diversion of Development Funds

26

		European Countries

27

China

29

What We Aren’t Permitted to Know: Intelligence Agencies Assistance

31

Conclusion - Assisting Human Security

33

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Executive Summary

Countries with the most extensive security and military agencies are transferring
electronic surveillance capabilities, practices, and legislation around the world.
They’re doing it by training foreign personnel, donating and providing loans forequipment, and directly financing security and military agencies. It’s happening
through security cooperation agreements, development assistance, and security
sector reform programmes. Implementation involves numerous donors, internationalorganisations, countries, government agencies and departments, implementing
partners, and contractors.
While such cooperation and assistance can strengthen
security capacity in recipient states, there are also huge
Assistance can reinforce
risks. As more data is being generated and as surveillanceauthoritarianism, undermine
technology advances ahead of laws sufficiently regulating
them, and while authoritarian leaders continue to use
governance, facilitate corruption,
surveillance as tools of political control, such transfers
can illegitimately equip non-statepose a substantial threat to human rights around theactors, and exacerbate interworld. Many of the recipient countries and agencies
have a documented history of human rights abuses,
communal tensions.
meaning that in many cases, without appropriate
safeguards and accountability, such assistance canfacilitate gross abuses - something recognised by the
US Government Accountability Office 3 and by a UK Parliamentary Home Affairs
Committee.4 Assistance can reinforce authoritarianism,5 undermine governance,6facilitate corruption,7 can illegitimately equip non-state actors, and exacerbate intercommunal tensions.8
Military and security capabilities proliferated worldwide during the Cold War era
because of military assistance programmes and state support of a defence andsecurity industry in large arms exporting states. As well as facilitating security
cooperation and giving them political influence, such cooperation played, andcontinues to play, a defining role in maintaining the ability of recipient governments
to exercise functions of the state and political control. Technological developments
and a new security climate has meant that electronic surveillance used to identify
and monitor people, their movement, their internet activity, and their electronic
devices has become an established and ever-increasing internal security practice.
As a result, surveillance for internal security purposes has been incorporated into
these foreign security assistance programmes. In 2001, the US spent $5.7 billion
in security aid – in 2017 it spent over $20 billion.9 In 2015, military and non-military
security assistance in the US amounted to an estimated 35% of its entire foreign
aid expenditure.10

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At the same time, developed countries andinstitutions such as the European Union (EU)In 2001, the US spent $5.7 billion inare spending billions of Euros transferring
security aid – in 2017 it spent over $20
surveillance and border control capabilities toforeign countries to ensure they stop people
billion. In 2015, military and non-military
migrating to their countries. The number of
security assistance in the US amounted toforcibly displaced people around the world isan estimated 35% of its entire foreign aid
at a record high: in 1997 there were 33.9 million
people displaced as a result of persecution,
expenditure. At the same time, developed
conflict, violence, or human rights violations;countries and institutions such as thein 2016 there were 65.6 million.11 84% of
the world’s refugees are being hosted inEuropean Union (EU) are spending billions
developing regions, with the least developedof Euros transferring surveillance andcountries providing asylum to 28 per centborder control capabilities to foreignof the global total.12 The EU and individual
European countries are sponsoring surveillancecountries to ensure they stop people
globally to ensure that developing countries
migrating to their countries.
continue to host the vast majority of people
forcibly displaced. Not only have such policies
facilitated human rights abuses, they haveallowed authoritarian and even genocidal leaders to use migration to gain politicaland economic support.13 To fund this securitisation of foreign countries, donor
countries are repurposing development funding for surveillance, border control,
military and other ‘security’ spending.14
Such securitisation is hugely appealing for industry, allowing security companies
and contractors to benefit from increased sales of security equipment, training
contracts, and increased public financial support for the research and developmentof their products. Contractors are deeply involved in the delivery of surveillance
training programmes around the world.
This report outlines the varying forms of foreign security assistance by law
enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies. These examples show how
specific programmes and agencies drive and advance the capabilities ofother government agencies around the world. As such assistance involves theengagement of security actors, it offers a powerful mechanism through which tosafeguard surveillance practices in recipient states by improving governance,rule of law, and adherence to human rights standards. Recommendations to thisend are provided in the conclusion.

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

Introduction: From Military Aid to
Security Assistance

The projection of soft and hard power throughout the Cold War saw theformation of military and intelligence alliances as well as the large-scale transferof military and intelligence capabilities from hegemonic and colonial states toallied, non-aligned, and postcolonial states. The provision of military aid - key tothe development of military alliances15 - was a central foreign policy instrument
for the US and Soviet Union: not only did it consolidate the domestic power offavourable regimes and strengthen their military capabilities, it also allowed themto leverage considerable political influence over them, obtain political favours, andcovertly deliver military equipment to allied regional non-state actors.16 The colonial
European powers, in entrenched positions of influence in colonies, developed
similar assistance programmes with newly liberated states beginning initiallyin the late colonial period with the establishment of independent security andmilitary institutions.17
At the same time, the increasing prevalence of digital and computerised systems
saw their wide use for a range of internal security purposes, including surveillance
devices and computerised identification systems – the trade in which was dubbed
the International Repression Trade in 1979 by Michael Klare.18 While in-depth data
about the extent of the trade in these capabilities was lacking at the time, theexamples available showed transfers - generally mandated or at least supported bypolicy in the exporting government - overwhelmingly originating in industrialised andhegemonic states to allied countries in the global South.19
During the Cold War, for example, US security assistance programs led to theprovision of internal security equipment and other assistance to a wide range ofallied countries, including Nicaragua, the Philippines, and Thailand.20 Similarly, theIsraeli government provided counter-insurgency advisors and other assistance to
the Guatemalan government during the civil war.21
While espionage and state monitoring of the civilian population was extensive
throughout the Cold War, the subsequent digitalisation of networks, the rise in useof the internet, and prevalence of mobile phones, brought new sources of data, andtechniques for state internal security agencies conducting electronic surveillance.22
Simultaneously, the emergence of transnational non-state actors as a national
security priority, particularly in the US – the largest provider of security assistance has been reflected by changes in security assistance policy and funding.23

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What it Looks Like Now: Law Enforcement and
Military Security Assistance

United States
In 2001, the US spent $5.7 billion in security aid – in 2017 it spent over $20 billion.24
In 2015, military and non-military security assistance in the US amounted to an
estimated 35% of its entire foreign aid expenditure.25
In 2016, the US departments of Defense and State trained approximately 122,500
students from 155 countries, the total cost of which was approximately $953.9
million.26 Activities financed include programmes focusing on counter-narcotics andcounter-terrorism issues, the training and equipping of militaries in African countries
for crisis response and peacekeeping purposes, and the financing of a range ofaffiliated worldwide centres and fellowships.

Department of State
Examples of US providers of security assistance include the State Department’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), which since1995 has funded and administered International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEA)
aimed at “advanc[ing] the anti-crime effort through building the capacity of foreign
criminal justice partners of the United States” and “expanding the skills of partnernation law enforcement affairs, fostering partnerships across national borders
within important regions of the world, and improving partner nations’ relationships
with American law enforcement agencies.”27 Currently, academies led by different
US agencies each serve personnel from regional countries:

Hungary

Federal Bureau of Investigations

ThailandDrug Enforcement Administration

Botswana

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

Peru

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

El Salvador

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

New Mexico

State Department

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of SurveillanceTraining, delivered by personnel from across US government agencies, includes
courses on Computer Crime Investigation, Counter-narcotics, and Counterterrorism. In 2017, the ILEA in Botswana featured courses on Narcotics
Investigations delivered by the DEA to over 30 students,28 on counter-terrorism
and cybercrime delivered by the FBI, and on “Investigations of Computers andElectronic Crimes” delivered by the US Secret Service to 30 students from South
Africa, Lesotho, Nigeria, Ghana, and Botswana.29 Training by the DEA includes“the use of tactical and strategic intelligence; coordinated surveillance operations;the safe utilisation and management of informants; the employment and protectionof undercover operatives and the planning and execution of tactical operations”
as well as training on “interviewing and interrogation”.30 In total, over 60,000
individuals from 85 countries have graduated from the Academies.31
Other US training programmes include the State Department’s Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) Program which has “successfully delivered services” to 100,000+
law enforcement personnel from 154 countries. Between 2012 and 2018, State
allocated about $715 million to the program.32 “Through a blend of training,equipping, mentoring, advising, and consulting partner nations”.33 For example,
between 2008–2013, 17 courses were taught in Morocco under the program to 129
participants from the two leading law enforcement agencies, the Royal Gendarmerie(Gendarmerie Royale —GR), and the General Directorate for National Security(Direction Générale de la Sûreté Nationale —DGSN), of which 11 courses wereon “Cyber Forensics”.34 According to an assessment, the program “has doubled[the DGSN’s] rate of organizational growth for cyber-investigative capacity” andallowed the Gendarmerie Royale to combine “enhanced cyber-forensic capabilities
with database analysis to develop a new approach that they credit with producing adownturn in criminal activity”.
Under the ATA program in 2009, a central monitoring facility was established in
Jordan, which includes a “geographic information system (GIS) covering 568,000
landmarks throughout Amman, a city-wide closed circuit TV (CCTV) network,
an Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system to read license plates
captured in CCTVs, a Mobile Video Recorder System, and an Automated Vehicle
Locator (AVL) to track the location of police vehicles.”35

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The US State Department has also financed and granted a range ofsurveillance equipment to foreign countries, including:

The financing of a monitoring centre designed to ‘intercept,
analyze and use intercepted information from all types ofcommunications systems operating in Mexico’, and deployed by
US/Israeli surveillance company, Verint.36
13 ‘communcations intercept sets’ which were donated to the
Venezuelan National Drug Office 37
The donation of a range of computer forensic equipment
and 113 units of ‘specialized surveillance equipment’ to theSurveillance Unit within the Service for Combating Organized
Crime in Serbia38
The funding of a wiretapping system and assistance in collectionof evidence in Uruguay, without which “many anti-narcotics
projects would not be possible in their current form”.39
The donation of ‘electronic surveillance equipment and tools’
to the Bahamas Drug Enforcement Unit and funding of its
subsequence maintenance, as well as the training on the use of
the equipment for Bahamas officers in the United States.40
The provision of biometric traveller screening systems
developed by defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton – thePersonal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation
System - to Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Mali, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda, Iraq, Jordan, Yemen,
Maldives, Afghanistan, and Macedonia.41
The funding of a 2016 project to “support the development ofa Fusion Center for Argentine security forces, based on the US
model, to expand capabilities and improve communications andinformation sharing between Argentine federal ministries” and“hosted Argentine counterparts and organized training courses
in counterterrorism and fusion center strategic planning”.42

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An analysis of data contained within the 6,000 Department of State diplomatic
cables undertaken by the Intercept in 2016 found that training was being conductedin ‘no fewer than 471 locations in 120 countries — on every continent but Antarctica— involving, on the US side, 150 defense agencies, civilian agencies, armed forcescolleges, defense training centers, military units, private companies, and NGOs,
as well as the National Guard forces of five states.’43 Rachel Kleinfeld, a seniorassociate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and former memberof the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Policy Board, is quoted as saying that
“There are more than 180 authorities and scores of agencies working in theseareas, and the way it has evolved over time has made it absolutely impossible foranyone to know what’s going on. ... There really is no oversight”.44

Department of Defense
Prior to 9/11, the US government was funding 57 security assistance programs; by
2017, it was funding 102, according to WOLA’s “Global Guide.”45 Of the 50 new
programs added since 2001, 48 were funded by the US Department of Defense,“with the bulk focused on counterterrorism. Through these 107 programs, theUnited States funds well over $20 billion in activities, equipment and services inover 160 countries.”46 According to WOLA, the top six programs provide militaryequipment; support for Afghanistan’s military and security forces; global anti-drugprograms; counterterrorism capacity in Africa and the Middle East; counterterrorism
capacity in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria; and support to Iraq against the IslamicState.47
Africa is a key focus of US government-funded military and security training. Thiswas underlined in a “posture statement” in March 2018, from AFRICOM to two US
House and Senate committees by US Marine Corps Gen. Thomas D. Waldhauser,
the commander of AFRICOM.48 “On any given day,” the general said, “up to
7,200 US uniformed personnel, Department of Defense civilians, and contractors
are in Africa,” while security operations “are executed almost exclusively by thepartnered security forces.” To ensure proper oversight, Gen. Waldhauser said
AFRICOM works in concert with the Department of State and other agencies “todevelop human rights-respecting security forces and inspire them to pursue military
professionalism in their institutions.” AFRICOM, the general said, utilises specificskills provided by the State Department, USAID, the FBI, DHS and DOJ, withmany of these agencies having a “liaison cell” within AFRICOM to “synchronize
and complement our approach.” The statement included details about many of
AFRICOM’s training and partnership programs:

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Reconnaissance and surveillance capabilities forcounterterrorism operations are in place in East Africa, including
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) deployed by Kenya andUganda against al-Shabaab in southern Somalia.
In Tunisia, US forces train and equip the country’s special
operations forces and provide mobile ground surveillance radarand ISR aircraft to monitor the border with Libya.
In Niger, AFRICOM provides training and equipment to the
Nigerien Armed Forces and counterterrorism advice to Nigerien
combat units.
In Burkina Faso, US forces support “intra-theater mobility
operations” and provide training to counterterrorism operations.
In Chad, US forces conduct security force assistance with the
Chadian Special Anti- Terrorism Group.
Working with the State Department and other agencies,
AFRICOM’s Security Governance Initiative “builds the capacityof civil and defense institutions” in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria and Tunisia.
Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria are joined in a
Multinational Joint Task Force that coordinates operations andintelligence-sharing with US forces.
In its testimony, AFRICOM disclosed problems in only one
country, Nigeria. There, the US is expanding intelligencesharing agreements and cooperation despite partners in theMultinational Joint Task Force who “sometimes fall short ofrespecting international norms of human rights when dealing
with local populations.” Specifically, they have used “heavyhanded counter-insurgency techniques” that have led to civilian
displacement and forcible returns of Nigerian refugees fromneighboring countries; these practices “produce the grievancesthat fuel support for the enemy,” AFRICOM admits.

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The massive US base at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti serves as the “vital hub”
for US security assistance, operations and logistics for AFRICOM, three othercombatant commands and the US Special Operations Command. The US presence
at Camp Lemonnier is so large that the $200 million in contracts awarded to local
vendors represents nearly 14 percent of the total gross domestic product ofDjibouti, according to an AFRICOM press release.49
The US Department of Defense also provides various other forms of security
assistance through a myriad of programmes. One such programme is theCounterterrorism Partnership Fund, which aims to “support a transition to amore sustainable and partnership-focused approach to counterterrorism” by“build[ing] on existing tools and authorities to respond to a range of terrorist
threats by providing direct support to partner nations as well as augmenting US
capability to support partners in counterterrorism (CT) operations”.50 Proposedby President Obama in 2014, the Department of Defense requested $2.1 billion for
the fund for FY 2016.51 In addition to training and equipping various border security
forces around the world funding intelligence fusion centers, the request includes
allocations for:...“the purchase of US equipment to support Intel sharing”, developing“coordinated intelligence sharing with appropriate African [counterterrorism]
partners” and providing “near-real-time mutual sharing of technical classified
intelligence between the US and Kenya to enhance [counterterrorism]
operations.”...enhancing “the capability of Maghreb and Sahel [counter terrorism] forces tocollect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence … and training and equipping forcommand and control nodes, fusion centers, and military intelligence units.”...“enabling US military units under Africa Command to support partners
with “targeting, intel planning, collection management, intelligence andwarning, operational analysis, and intel for named operations and partner
nation capacity building activities.”...allowing West African nations to “gather, analyze, and disseminate
intelligence” related to Boko Haram.
...building “bilateral networks that enable the US to securely share timely,
relevant intelligence with partners”.
...providing “critical counterintelligence (CI) and human intelligence(HUMINT) mission management technologies to enhance partner nation
information sharing”.

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Since 2002, the US has appropriated $76 billion for various Defense and State
programs aimed at supporting security in Afghanistan.52 The US also provided theAfghan Automated Biometrics Information System, including fingerprint, palm,
and iris scanners used to collect personal identification information, as well as
the Afghan National Tracking System, a system composed of various items
including global positioning system equipment used to provide location andidentification data of Afghan forces. Between 2006 and 2017, the Department of
Defense provided 120 radio monitoring systems, 22 ground-based operational
surveillance systems, 8 unmanned air systems, and 6 surveillance balloons to
the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.53 The Afghan Ministry ofInterior is currently developing a lawful intercept program – used for wiretapping
telecommunications networks – with the aid of a working group comprised of
Coalition and Afghan members.54

Department of Justice
The US Department of Justice also carries out its own foreign assistance underthe International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP),
with funding from State, Defense, and Agency for International Development. The
program currently funds projects in 35 countries,55 and has trained over 17,000
individuals in FY 2017 on topics including Terrorism and Transnational Crime,
Cyber Crime, Forensics, “Specialized and Tactical Skills”, and Border Security.56
For example, under the Program, ICITAP set up a biometric screening system in
Bosnia-Herzegovina,57 as well as a computerised database and software bordercontrol network. The network, developed and donated by ICITAP for use by borderpolice, connects the country’s border crossings, including four airports, with the
Directorate for the Police Body Coordination (DCPB), the State Investigative andProtection Agency (SIPA), the Federation Ministry of Interior, and the BiH Ministry of
Security, and allows access to other databases, including those of INTERPOL.58

Schools of Surveillance
The US government is training hundreds of foreign military officers in the techniquesof military intelligence and surveillance/signals intelligence in two of the Pentagon’s
most important intelligence facilities, as well as a school run by the DefenseIntelligence Agency, according to Pentagon and State Department reports
submitted to Congress.
The two facilities are Fort Huachuca in Arizona, the home of the US Army
Intelligence Center, the premiere center for the training of US military interrogators;
and Fort Gordon in Georgia, the site for one of the National Security Agency’s
largest listening posts in the world. Both schools rely heavily on private
contractors to perform the training. The DIA training is run by the National
Intelligence University.

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Fort Huachuca
In 2006 and 2007, the US Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca in Sierra
Vista, Arizona, sponsored 195 classes for foreign military officers.59 This training
facility came under sharp focus during the Iraq War after eight US Army officers
investigated for abuse at the Iraqi prison at Abu Ghraib were stationed there prior totheir deployment to Iraq.60 After the abuse became a national scandal, such training
greatly expanded.
In 2006, the Washington Post reported, “the greatest one-year expansion of the
Army’s interrogation program, from 500 to 1,000 trainees, which took place in 2005,
the year after public disclosure of the scandals…Today, with the Army introducing
a new interrogation manual and Congress wrestling with legislation sought by theWhite House that would legalise the CIA’s more aggressive questioning techniques,
the number of people training to be interrogators is to rise again.”61 At the time,
the Post reported, subjects covered by the contracted training included “how tointerrogate and debrief enemy personnel, potential threat forces, warrior skills,
intelligence analysis, and military justice and intelligence law.”
Countries with personnel currently trained at Fort Huachuca include Botswana,
Cameroon, Djibouti, Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South
Korea, the Philippines, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Serbia, Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia (which appears to havethe largest number of students), Tunisia, Pakistan, Barbados, Belize, El Salvador,and Suriname.62

Fort Gordon
In 2006 and 2007, the Signals School at Fort Gordon sponsored 113 classes
for foreign military officers.63 Classes at Fort Gordon, which defines itself as
the “Home of the US Army Cyber Center of Excellence,” include training for“Signal Basic Officers” and “Information Systems Management.” Countries thatsent personnel there for training include Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi,
Swaziland, South Korea, Georgia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Ukraine,
Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Tunisia, Bangladesh, Krygyztan,
and Maldives.64
The school is run by Fort Gordon’s Signal Center of Excellence (SIGCEN), which“trains, educates, and develops adaptive Leaders and IT professionals” andalso “synchronizes, experiments, and implements Future Network capabilities,”a reference to the NSA’s role as a provider of operational security to military andintelligence communications organizations.65

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Use of Contractors
Many of the US-funded courses in military intelligence, signals intelligence, ISR,
Special Operations and policing/security are run by private contractors. They range
from small, focused companies to large, well-known military contractors. Some
programs, such as the DOJ’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
Program, are run almost entirely by contractors.
Historically, one of the consequences of the vast privatisation of US security
and military forces over the past 20 years has been an inappropriate influence ofcontractors on policy. This is particularly true in the outsourcing of security andmilitary training in Iraq and Afghanistan. According to a 2011 joint audit conductedby the Inspector Generals of the Pentagon and Department of State of police
training in Afghanistan:“DoD and DOS officials did not develop a comprehensive plan or develop
a memorandum of agreement to guide, monitor, and assign transition
responsibilities. Instead, officials relied on independently developed
contractor plans, some of which were not feasible and did not address
inherently governmental tasks. This occurred because DoD and DOS lacked
guidance for planning a transition of contract administration responsibilities
from one agency to another, which contributed to contractor schedule delays.
In addition, DoD officials reported that the incoming contractor did nothave 428 of the 728 required personnel in place within the 120-day transition
period, which placed the overall mission at risk by not providing the mentoringessential for developing the Afghan Government and Police Force.”66
Seven years later, the over-dependence on contractors has not changed. A Defense
Department Inspector General report published in January 2018 concluded“that the Afghan air force was too dependent on foreign contractors, noting that
contractors were responsible for 80 percent of all maintenance work, while Afghans
conducted just 20 percent.” According to the OIG report, the contracts “limit the
progressive transfer of maintenance responsibilities to Afghan air force maintainers”
and did not include “timelines for transitioning maintenance work to local forces.”

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The following contractors are prominently mentioned throughout
US government reports on overseas security training:

DynCorp International
is the largest US contractor in Afghanistan and is deeply involved in US
security and counterinsurgency (also known as “contingency”) operations
around the world as a provider of logistics, aviation and military andintelligence training. A DynCorp pamphlet obtained at a 2017 Washington
exhibition of the Association of the US Army explains that much of its
training is focused on aircrews and maintenance. “Our global programsupport encompasses all branches of the US Armed Forces and the
US Department of State. We also support national, state, and local
governments with expert training.” DynCorp’s training, according to thispamphlet, includes “education, training and certifications for police,
intelligence officials, and mission-support operational personnel.” Until
2018, it held the Worldwide Aviation Support Services (WASS) contract
with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs.

Leidos Inc.
is one of a handful of companies that dominate privatised intelligence inthe United States. As was reported in The Nation, it was formed in 2016,
when Leidos Holdings, a major contractor for the Pentagon and the NSA,
completed a long-planned merger with the Information Systems and Global
Solutions division of Lockheed Martin, the global military giant. The 8,000
operatives employed by the new company do everything from analysing
signals for the NSA to tracking down suspected enemy fighters for US
Special Forces in the Middle East and Africa. As the Leidos web page on
training states, the company will “develop, deliver, and maintain holistic live,
virtual, and constructive (LVC) training systems to support force protection
for fixed, semi-fixed, and expeditionary sites resulting in improved
information management, operational performance, and efficiency.” One ofits largest contracts, described below, is providing training at the US Armyintelligence school in Fort Huachuca, Arizona.

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AAR
describes itself as “an independent provider of aviation services tocommercial and government customers in more than 100 countries.” It is alarge, highly profitable company that, among other things, is tasked by the
US government to fly diplomats around the world. It competes intenselywith DynCorp. It currently holds the Worldwide Aviation Support Services(WASS) contract with the State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, which provides education andtraining to foreign police and intelligence officials. AAR is deeply involved incovert operations as a contractor; in 2018 it signed a logistics contract with
the US Naval Special Warfare Group also known as SEAL Team 6, the teamthat assassinated Osama bin Laden.67 AAR has also been the subject ofseveral investigations; in 2017, it was banned by the US military from using a
key airfield in Afghanistan because of safety violations. 68

North American Surveillance Systems (NASS)
provides training in ISR techniques critical to wars against terrorist groups
in Chad, Niger and other countries where AFRICOM has a large presence.
It is one of the only contractors listed as a trainer in the bi-annual Pentagon
and State Department reports to Congress on overseas training. NASS’s
primary business is modifying aircraft so they become “sophisticatedsolutions for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) systemfor domestic and foreign militaries as well as law enforcement agencies and“private special mission companies,” according to its website.

PAE Government Services PAE(Pacific Architects and Engineers) “supports the implementation of US
foreign policy objectives through worldwide diplomacy missions,” its
website states. It has major training contracts with the US government in
Afghanistan, including a $59.9 million contract signed in December 2017with the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs.69 One of its largest contracts is a $142 million projectwith the US Army to “provide logistics support, training and mentoring” toAfghanistan’s National Defense and Security Forces.70 In 2017, it reached a$5 million settlement with the US government after a whistleblower accused
the company of failing to conduct background checks on hundreds of
employees on its civilian police contract in Afghanistan, Haiti, Lebanon,
Liberia, South Sudan, and elsewhere.

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Engility

is a well-connected company with decades of experience in classified
US intelligence operations. It runs training programs provided by the
Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training
Assistance Program in the Balkans, Mexico and Ukraine. According
to the company’s website, its contracts with ICITAP include “program
implementation methods focused on being executed on-the-ground in thehost country” as well as “pre-program assessments; program planning,
program management & review.” Engility support also includes: “curriculum
development; classroom training, seminars and workshops; internships;
equipment donations; donor coordination; and on-the-job training andmentoring by our embedded long-term advisors.”

Obera LLC

a Virginia company involved extensively with AFRICOM. “Throughout thepast three years,” its website states, “Obera has conducted ‘Engagementin Depth’ throughout Africa and other Combatant Commands Area of
Operations in support of various US, United Nations and NGO programs.
As a Prime Contractor under the Counter Narcotics and Global Threat(CN&GT) Operations and Logistics Support multiple-award IDIQ contract,
we remain well positioned to build on our past performance in Africa.”
Obera has undertaken US government-financed training in Nigeria,
Niger, Chad, Mali, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and theAfrican Union.

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of SurveillanceContractors at Fort Huachhuca & Fort Gordon
The prime contractor for training programs at Fort Huachuca is Leidos Inc., one of
the nation’s largest intelligence contractors.
Leidos provides its services under the Fort Huachuca Training and Support
Contract (HTASC), with a focus in “the areas of instruction and training, training
development, training support” and other IT and related services, according to a
copy of the contract published on line by Leidos. Disciplines covered include all
the basics of military intelligence, including all-source, imagery, signals intelligence,
counterintelligence and human intelligence. Some of the training is conductedabroad: contractors “may be required to travel to various locations within thecontinental United States (CONUS) and outside CONUS (OCONUS).71
As the prime contractor, Leidos hires subcontractors for these positions, plus
other contractors may be involved in work separately. Companies hiring fortraining positions at Fort Huachuca, according to the contract job site Indeed.com,
include Calibre Systems Inc., General Dynamics Information Technology, Northrop
Grumman, Trace Systems, Raytheon and Jacobs.
RLM Communications Inc, one of the instruction contractors at Fort Gordon,
claims that the outsourcing of operations at Fort Gordon began in earnest during
the Bush administration.
“Based upon an analysis of contracting requirements since thecommencement of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in 2003, the
SIGCEN has determined that a significant quantity of these are recurring,
short-notice actions that could be more rapidly and efficiently met with amultiple-award, task order driven, Indefinite Delivery / Indefinite Quantity(ID/IQ) contract to meet projected requirements.”72
Contractors are deeply involved in the development of the curriculum at Fort
Gordon. A solicitation for business from the US Army and Fort Gordon posted on
FedBizOps in March 2018 for “training for 24 students” states that “the UnitedStates Army Cyber Center of Excellence requires contractor support for Signal
Technician Training and Support courseware development and instruction for the
Network Management Division at the Leader Network Operations College, Signal
School, Fort Gordon, GA.”
Contracted instructors at Fort Gordon also have access to classified intelligence:“All contractors”, the solicitation states, “shall have a SECRET security clearance
and shall maintain the required security clearance throughout the life of thecontract. The contractor is responsible for acquiring the clearances.” Some of thecontracted trainers must also have clearances high enough to access SIPRNET.

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of SurveillanceThis highly classified gateway network, according to the Defense Information
Service Agency (DISA), “provides DoD customers with centralized and protectedconnectivity to federal, Intelligence Community (IC) and allied information at thesecret level.”
The trainers, RLM Communications claims, are involved in every aspect of theschool, including “course development and instructor services, course analysis,design, development and specific classroom instruction.”
In addition to RLM, ManTech International, a large US intelligence contractor,
holds a contract for a “master trainer” at Fort Gordon “to effectively direct theorganization’s education, training and development programs to successfully
meet the customer’s organizational goals.” According to the ManTech website,
it is also hiring for a “Regional Operations Manager” in Fort Gordon to “oversee
and manage operations in support of the training on new and existing C4ISR
Technology and any emerging Cyber technology,” ManTech also provides training
for military forces in Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

US-Funded Training in Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)
As US military strategy and spending has focused increasingly on nations facing
internal insurgencies and threats from ISIS and other terrorist organisations, the US
military, particularly the US Air Force, has turned much of its attention on building
and expanding its ISR capabilities around the world.
“The evolution of globally integrated ISR has fundamentally changed how America
fights wars,” the US Air Force declared in ‘Air Force ISR 2023’,” a “strategic vision”
paper prepared for the Pentagon during the Obama administration. “It is thefoundation upon which every joint, interagency, and coalition operation achieves
success.”
ISR operations involve spy planes and drones equipped with sensors and othersurveillance equipment, used to fly over countries such as Afghanistan and Libya tofind and track terrorist groups. The lethal nature of these aircraft and their tracking
abilities were recently described in The Drive, a US publication about militarytechnology, in an article about two new planes called “Dash-8s” the US Special
Operations Command (SOCOM) recently deployed in Libya to kill ISIS militants:
With this equipment on board, both types of planes had the mission of
performing persistent surveillance missions across relatively wide areas, using
their sensors to build larger maps of entire regions. From there, analysts could
examine the imagery for items of interest, potentially establishing so-called‘patterns of life’ for specific terrorists or small groups of militants.

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

The Army primarily employed them to hunt for improvised explosive devices and, byextension, to trace insurgent movements back to bomb workshops or other basecamps. That same wide-area surveillance information can help US forces determine
when the best opportunity might be to try and kill or capture a particular individualwith as little risk to nearby innocent civilians as possible.
The importance of ISR to US-backed counterinsurgency operations can be seenfrom the example of Nigeria, which has received extensive support from the US
government, including the shipments of surveillance aircraft. In December 2017,
the US ambassador to Nigeria presented the country with 12 A-29 “Super Tucano”
surveillance aircraft to the Nigerian Air Force. The planes were delivered in the
midst of a series of operations launched by Nigerian security forces against BokoHaram terrorists. “The operations started with an (ISR) mission,” DefenceWeb
reported. It added that the $593 million deal with the US government will “permit
sustained and effective round the clock COIN [counterinsurgency] operations” by
the Nigerian Air Force. “The mission can be effective only when it is supported byadequate ISR…NAF is presently not very well equipped in this regard.”
With the expansion of US operations in Africa, ISR spending has become a major
thrust for AFRICOM and its training programs. AFRICOM’s 2018 Posture Statement,
presented to the US Congress in March 2018, states that the 2019 budget for
Africa “includes appropriate resources — notably, Intelligence, Surveillance, andReconnaissance (ISR) assets.”
US government training in ISR is focused heavily on Africa and Central and SouthAmerica. Much of the training is conducted by contractors, led by North American
Surveillance Systems (NASS), Ansible Government Solutions, Orbital ATK, andGeneral Dynamics. According to the US government’s 2016-2017 “Foreign Military
Training Report,” ISR training is taking place in:•

Chad – provided directly by NASS.

•

Niger – provided directly by NASS•

Mauritia – ISR Flight and Ground Training provided in-country•

Tunisia – ISR flying training provided in-country (likely to expand significantly
after US DoD notified Congress in March 2018 of its intention to provide
an additional $20 million worth of sensors “to help Tunisia secure its bordersecurity wall that separates it from Libya.73 ”)•

Philippines – provided directly by NASS

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

For US allies in Central and South America, ISR training is provided at InterAmerican Air Forces Academy (IAFFA) in Lackland, Texas, for personnel from
Argentina, Colombia, Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Peru.
The IAFFA courses in ISR are available online. One class “is designed for officers,
enlisted, National Police and civilian equivalent requiring an understanding of
the fundamentals of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance. Graduates
will learn basic principles of intelligence, analysis, critical thinking, Intelligence
Preparation of the Operational Environment (IPOE), ISR concepts and roles, andtargeting fundamentals. They will receive training in plotting coordinate systems andpresenting intelligence briefings.”
In another recent deal that underscores the importance of ISR to African nations,the US State Department donated several unmanned aerial vehicles to theAfrican Union Mission (Amisom) in Somalia “to provide enhanced ISR capability.”
According to the African military publication DefenceWeb, the UAVs “appear to
be Aerostars manufactured by Israel’s Aeronautics Defence Systems but possibly
acquired through General Dynamics in the United States.” General Dynamics, amajor US military contractor, has had a strategic alliance in place with Aeronautics
since 2004, under which the Israeli company provides UAVs to the “US market andselect international customers”.

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

EuropeSecurity assistance is provided under the auspices of the European Union (EU)to EU and non-EU countries, as well as by individual EU member states. Spending
on such assistance is set to rocket in Europe as a result of the European Union
proposing to increase such expenditure and projects.

European Union
EU funds have been provided to member states to conduct mass surveillance.
For example, €25 million from the European Regional Development Fund’s (ERDF)
was allocated to Romania’s intelligence agency to boost their technical ability tointercept communications, conduct facial recognition, and giving them aggregatedaccess to databases owned by public institutions, including a database of 50-60
million peoples’ images.74 In 2013, €50 million from the Prevention of and Fight
Against Crime budget was made available to set up national Passenger Name
Records (PNR) systems, in effect establishing the infrastructure for a mass travel
surveillance system before any EU legislation was in place.75
Various EU agencies and instruments currently finance or train security agencies
in third countries within the Commission, as part of the Common Security
and Defence Policy, and as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Established in 2014, the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) is
one of the main external assistance mechanisms, focusing on delivering short-term
assistance aimed at crisis response, conflict prevention and peace-building. The
IcSP has a budget of €2.3 billion for 2014-2020 and currently funds 288 projects
in 71 countries.76 Current projects include developing the capacity of Tunisiansecurity agencies to counter terrorism by developing “intelligence processing andanalysis”, “providing training in digital intelligence gathering including throughsocial media and digital mapping”, and “developing inter-service cooperation
among Tunisian security agencies”. Other projects aim to develop the internal
security service in Burkina Faso by improving “Intelligence cycle management”,
support “the planning and gathering, as well as the coordination, of intelligence
efforts” in Somalia, and establish a counter-terror information coordination centre
with the Iraqi National Security Council aiming “to foster coordination and ensurethat the seven Iraqi intelligence services work together effectively.”78

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The African Peace Facility, which has received €2.1 billion from the European
Development Fund (EDF), finances peacekeeping and early response capabilities
in African countries as well as capacity building for security institutions, including
the operationalisation of the African Union’s African Peace Security Architecture(APSA).79 APSA’s 2016-2020 roadmap, developed by the AU, includes asa priority the training and support of law enforcement agencies to counter
terrorism, including through “information and intelligence gathering and analysis”,“investigations and evidence gathering” challenging “internet abuse”, and thedevelopment of “platforms for intelligence sharing and coordination”.80
Reacting to wide press coverage of the ’migrant crisis’, the EU launched theEmergency Trust Fund for Africa in 2015, aiming to tackle irregular migration by,amongst other things, “enforcing the rule of law through capacity building in
support of security and development as well as law enforcement, including bordermanagement and migration-related aspects” and contributing to “preventing andcountering radicalisation and extremism.”81 The fund, with a budget of 3.2 billion
euros, has 117 programmes across the three regions as of November 2017.
Under the fund, the European Commission allocated €40 million to Sudan in2016 for border management and capacity building for the judiciary and law
enforcement. A EU risk analysis document leaked to the media identified the“provision of equipment and trainings to sensitive national authorities (such as
security services or border management) diverted for repressive aims; criticism
by NGOs and civil society for engaging with repressive governments on migration(particularly in Eritrea and Sudan)” as a risk of the programme.82 EU funding forborder management in Sudan has included the funding of units in which personnel
are former members of the Janjaweed militia, responsible for atrocities during the
Darfur genocide.83
Frontex, the EU’s external borders agency, has concluded working arrangementswith authorities in 17 countries, which include financing and training activities,84
and maintains information sharing mechanisms with regional countries within
Africa-Frontex Intelligence Community (AFIC), the Western Balkans Risk Analysis
Network (WB-RAN) and the Eastern Risk Analysis Network (EaP-RAN). Frontex has
allowed Libyan Coast Guard “with limited access to Frontex Fusion Service” andprovided training on its use, and has trained Libyan Coast Guard officers on “Law
Enforcement at sea”.85

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In May 2018, the European Union unveiled proposals that will see substantial
increases on security assistance programmes as part of the Multiannual
Financial Framework (MFF), which determines the EU’s expenditure between
2021-2027:€13 bn2014-2020€33 bn2021-2027€95 bn2014-2020€120 bn
2021-2027€3.5 bn
2014-2020€4.8 bn
2021-2027€13 bnPROPOSED

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For example, the EU budget forthe management of externalborders, migration and asylum
is proposed to triple from theprevious budget, to reach around€33 billion, compared to €13
billion for the period 2014-2020.

Funding for external action is
proposed to increase by 26%
from the previous budget,to reach €120 billion, with a
specific emphasis dealing “withemerging challenges, notably
in the area of stability andmigration”, according to theEuropean Commission.86

Expenditure on security is
proposed to increase by 40%
to reach €4.8 billion, while a new
Defence Fund worth €13 billion is
proposed to be set up, which will
be provided to arms companies
and researchers to catalyse
research and development insecurity and defence technology.

Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

Diversion of Development Funds
The security-focused policy of the EU has led to a diversion of money fordevelopment towards security projects. Initial recognition of a ‘securitydevelopment nexus’ by EU institutions in 2006 outlined in the European Consensus
on Development began efforts to use security assistance to meet development
objectives.87 Such moves have resulted in, for example, a July 2016 proposal
seeking to alter the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, which
is currently used to provide security assistance to civilian agencies, to also
train, finance, and equip military actors in third countries.88 In December 2017,
amendments were added allowing the Instrument to be used for “the provisionof capacity building programmes in supportof development and security for development,
including training, mentoring and advice, as wellIt further resulted in 97% of the budget
as the provision of equipment, infrastructure
allocated to migration management
improvements and services directly related to thatassistance”. Under the regulation, €100 million willfunding migration containment,
be available for capacity building programmes of
instead of projects “that enhance
military actors in non-EU countries.89

migration’s positive contribution to

According to research by Oxfam 22% of the budget
for the first two years of the overall EU Emergency
is safer and more orderly”.
Trust Fund for Africa (of which 80% comes fromdevelopment and humanitarian aid funds) was
allocated to projects in the field of migration
management.90 Another 13.5% goes to peace-building and security, with the largest
part (between €121 million and €161 million, or 7% of the total budget) used tofund security forces in third countries, which are implemented by private and publiccompanies.

development and ensuring migration

Oxfam’s research into the fund also revealed that the instrument’s securitised
approach resulted in insufficient safeguards, decisions taken without consultation,and insufficient attention to conflict-sensitive measures and ‘do no harm’ principles.
It further resulted in 97% of the budget allocated to migration management funding
migration containment, instead of projects “that enhance migration’s positive
contribution to development and ensuring migration is safer and more orderly”.

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European Countries
In addition to the EU bodies, security assistance is also provided by individual EU
member states. A range of UK organisations currently fund or train foreign security
actors under various funding instruments.
In response to a Parliamentary question regarding Nigeria, Tobias Ellwood, Under
Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, stated that the UK
government has provided “a substantial package of military, intelligence anddevelopment support including training and advice for the Nigerian armed forces”
including the training of over 22,500 Nigerian military personnel and the support of“a Nigerian intelligence analysis and planning cell focused on the North East andbased in Abuja”, the provision of £5 million to support a regional taskforce against
Boko Haram, and the deployment of UK surveillance aircraft in 2014.91
Under the UK’s Conflict, Stability and Security Fund, in 2016-2017 Ukraine’s national
corruption body received over £500,000 to establish a digital forensics laboratory
and associated training, as well a new database system allowing it to “collect,manage and analyse bulk data more effectively in support of investigations.”92
The Fund also committed £180,000 to help fund the training of 180 “Cyber
Police Officers” and provide “specialised equipment to enable trained Cyber
Police officers apply their knowledge in daily work and to establish a cybercrimelaboratory.”93
UK police provided training in “community policing” techniques in Sri Lanka
beginning in 2007, despite government concerns regarding “a veneer of community
based policing being used to cover less palatable behaviour”.94
In 2016, the BBC reported that the UK College of Policing has provided training
to the Saudi Ministry of the Interior in investigative techniques since 2009, and isplanning to expand training to include ‘High Tech Crime and IT Digital Forensics
training’, ‘I-Phone and GSM mobile telephone GSM examination and analysis’,and ‘Senior Investigating Officer Training’. The strategic objectives for UK Foreign
Policy are identified as related to diplomatic, national security, and development
objectives:“UK / KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] interoperability is becoming of evengreater importance, with the in-country Counter Terrorism and Extremism
Liaison Officer now handling evidential as well as intelligence requests, forexample the find of the printer cartridge bomb at East Midlands airport
in 2010. Therefore any assistance that College can provide to assist
developing the evidential gathering and investigative capability and crime
scene management of the Saudi Arabia Police could potentially be of
benefit for prosecutions in the UK or for prosecutions in the KSA thatconcern UK interest”.95

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A UK Parliamentary Home Affairs Committee report published in 2016 concluded
that ‘There must be more transparency in the process and Parliament must not bedenied the opportunity for proper scrutiny’96 of the nearly 60 countries with which
the College has worked.97
The German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskriminalamt) is reported to haveprovided training to Egyptian authorities on investigating internet users in 2011,
weeks before President Hosni Mubarak was forced out of office during the ArabSpring.98 In response to public pressure and parliamentary questions regarding
police training and equipment aid provided to Egyptian security agencies, thegovernment refused to cease or amend the programmes
because there had been ‘no information to suggestthat in the years 2015 and 2016, knowledge shared withor technology made available to Egypt as part of the
A UK Parliamentary Home Affairs
training and equipment aid was used improperly or in
Committee report published in 2016
contravention of constitutional standards.’99 In Octoberconcluded that ‘There must be more 2017, it was reported that the German government
cancelled a workshop aimed at training Egyptian security
transparency in the process andforces in internet surveillance and identifying sites that
Parliament must not be denied the“are misused by terrorists to disseminate their extremist
opportunity for proper scrutiny’ ofideology and prepare terrorist attacks” because,
according to the Federal Foreign Office, “some of thethe nearly 60 countries with whichknowledge and skills imparted during this training course
the College has worked.
could potentially be used not only to pursue terrorists
but also to persecute other groups of people”.100
France has 17 police and military training centres (Les Ecoles Nationales à Vocation
Régionale) in 10 African countries. Internal security training, focusing on policing, isprovided to officers from 23 countries with a Francophone majority.101 Created in
2001, Civipol is a large security consulting and training enterprise 40% owned by
the French state which currently implements security projects abroad for the French
Ministry of Interior. Among other courses, Civipol offers training in investigativetechniques, information sharing and gathering, cybercrime, GPS data analysis,
and mobile phone location tracing/identification. At present, it is the fourth largest
recipient of funds under the EU’s Trust Fund for Africa, and has 40 projects outsideof the EU, of which 35 are in Africa.102 Civipol is an implementing partner of thecreation and training of a border force in Sudan.

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China
China’s government uses a combination of human and highly advanced
technological systems of surveillance to practice political control. As well as
targeting religious, pro-separatist, and democratic movements, Chinese security
agencies employ highly intrusive surveillance against religious minorities,
particularly in Xinjiang, where the Uighur minority are subjected to a wide arrayof surveillance measures, including by a massive human security presence, thedevelopment of a DNA database, iris and body scanners at checkpoints, publicfacial recognition checks, drones fitted with cameras, and apps which monitor
smartphones which are made mandatory.103 The development of a domestic
surveillance industry and capabilities means that Chinese companies andauthorities are also exporting surveillance around the world.
In 2015, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged to continue “to supply Afghanistanwith security supplies, technology, equipment, and training assistance.” China
has concerns about separatist movements in Xinjiang, which shares a narrow
border with Afghanistan.104 In 2015, Tanzania became a pilot country for China–
Africa capacity-building, through which China has reportedly provided technicalassistance to influence a Tanzanian cyber-crime law and place restrictions on
internet content and blogging activity similar to China’s content controls.105

China also uses security
cooperation alliances to promote
surveillance. China was afounding member of the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
in 2001, together with Russia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,and Uzbekistan, allowing it toexercise its security interests in theSurveillance technologies are being exported from
China’s under the Belt and Road Initiative and otherefforts to expand in international markets. Chinesecompanies have reportedly supplied surveillancecapabilities to Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador.106 In
Ecuador, China Electronics Corporation supplied a
network of cameras some fitted with facial recognition
capabilities to the country’s 24 provinces, as well as asystem to locate and identify mobile phones. Chinesecompanies have reportedly also won contracts forsurveillance capabilities in Zimbabwe, Singapore,
Malaysia, and Mongolia.107

China also uses security cooperation alliances topromote surveillance. China was a founding memberof the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in
2001, together with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, allowing it to exercise its
security interests in the region with Russian acquiescence, including dealing withthe threat from alleged Uighur separatist groups and its lingering border disputes
in the region. Today its explicit aims are to focus on countering the ‘three evils’ of
extremism, separatism, and terrorism in the region. An analysis by the Human Rights
Initiative of China reports how the SCO also acts as a platform for intelligencesharing between members, including through the use of shared databases, andregion with Russian acquiescence.

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillancewatchlists. Both Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have stated in reports to the UN
Security Council that they use SCO lists for monitoring, denying entry to, andsharing intelligence on specific individuals.
Pakistan and India both joined the SCO in 2017. The Chinese government hasreportedly provided loans to countries in order to facilitate the purchase anduse of surveillance capabilities for Chinese providers. Huawei, the international
telecommunications company, reportedly installed some 1500 security cameras
in Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, following the provision of a loan between thegovernments of China and Pakistan in 2010 under Islamabad’s “safe city” project.
Dawn reports that the provision of the contract, which was done after waiving thetendering process, was linked to the Chinese government approving the loan. 108

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What We Aren’t Permitted to Know:Intelligence Agencies Assistance

There is extremely limited publicly available information about the extent andapplication of cooperation among intelligence agencies. The most well-known
cooperation agreement, the UKUSA Agreement, began as a series of bilateral
cooperation agreements after the Second World War involving the signals
intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, the UK, the US, and New Zealand(known as the Five Eyes). Today, interception, collection, acquisition, analysis,
and decryption is conducted by national signals intelligence agencies within theirregional areas, with intelligence being shared
among other members. The agreement also
provides for joint operations as well as staff
from multiple agencies working alongside one
Based on documents released byanother.109 For example, Menwith Hill in the UK
Snowden, it was reported in 2017 that thehas been home to US surveillance equipment
NSA also provided substantial surveillanceand personnel since the 1950s, and is currently
capabilities to intelligence units in Ethiopia. being used by the US National Security
Agency (NSA) to intercept global satellite andIn exchange for training and equipment, in
wireless communications, intelligence fromwhich has been used in drone strikes.110
2002 Ethiopian authorities allowed the NSA

to set up a signals intelligence operations
centre in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa.
By 2005 the centre had grown to include
103 Ethiopian personnel and capacity
to monitor communications in Somalia,
Sudan, and Yemen, producing “almost
7,700 transcripts and more than 900 reports
based on its regional spying effort”.

Cooperation among Western intelligenceagencies extends to the ‘Nine Eyes’, which inaddition to the Anglophone Five Eyes includes
Denmark, France, the Netherlands andNorway; the 14 Eyes, which includes the NineEyes, with the addition of Germany, Belgium,
Italy, Spain and Sweden (which has accessto internet traffic travelling along submarine
cables from Russia); and the 41 Eyes: which
includes the 14 eyes plus the allied coalitionin Afghanistan.

Among the documents provided by Edward Snowden was an internal NSA blog
written in 2009 stating that the agency would “share advanced technologies [withthird parties] in return for that partner’s willingness to do something politicallyrisky.”111 Under RAMPART-A, the codename of a programme revealed by Snowden,
foreign partners ‘provide access to [submarine] cables and host US equipment’ inexchange for access to intelligence. The Intercept reports that there have been 13
such data collection points on submarine cables across the world, nine of whichwere active in 2013.112 In a separate file, Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,

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Tunisia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are listed as approved SIGINT partners
for the NSA.113 In 2014, it was reported that the UK’s main signal intelligenceagency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), had a similar
programme in Oman tapping submarine cables.114
Based on documents released by Snowden, it was reported in 2017 that the NSA
also provided substantial surveillance capabilities to intelligence units in Ethiopia.115
In exchange for training and equipment, in 2002 Ethiopian authorities allowed the
NSA to set up a signals intelligence operations centre in Ethiopia’s capital, Addis
Ababa. By 2005 the centre had grown to include 103 Ethiopian personnel andcapacity to monitor communications in Somalia, Sudan, and Yemen, producing“almost 7,700 transcripts and more than 900 reports based on its regional spying
effort”.
Similarly, in 2017 The Intercept reported that for over six decades the NSA has
maintained at least three bases in Japan, which has contributed more than half abillion dollars to finance its facilities and operations, in exchange for surveillance
equipment and the sharing of intelligence.116

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Conclusion – Assisting Human Security

States with large security architectures are instrumental in sponsoring surveillancecapabilities around the world through numerous security cooperation agreements,
development assistance programmes, security sector reforms, and post-conflictreconstruction programmes. This will remain a priority for them with the lure ofintelligence and political influence and the nature of transnational crime. States
which export such capabilities have themselves responded to advances intechnology by expanding and developing new surveillance powers themselves, buthave at the same time failed to develop adequate legislationand safeguards to accompany many of these powers, andvarious courts have found techniques practiced by security
In many cases, such asagencies to be unlawful.117 The export of these surveillance
the support of surveillancecapabilities, sometimes to places which lack basic rule oflaw, therefore carries significant and foreseeable risks to theand security agencies insecurity and rights of individuals.

authoritarian states, the risk offacilitating human rights abuses

In many cases, such as the support of surveillanceand security agencies in authoritarian states, the risk
is considered an acceptableof facilitating human rights abuses is considered an
price to pay for buying otheracceptable price to pay for buying other forms of influence.
forms of influence.
During the Cold War, the provision of military aid toallied nations or former colonies was considered vital toexerting influence to counter an opposing bloc; today it istransnational issues such as counter-terrorism, trafficking, and migration which are
drawing states with large security apparatus to sponsor surveillance worldwide.
Authoritarian dictators, such as Sudan’s al-Bashir - the first world leader to ever be
indicted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes – are being generously
empowered with funds and security capabilities if they promise to keep people
from the shores of Europe. The immediate outlook, as demonstrated by the EU’scommitment to dramatically increase spending in these areas, is that the promotionof security and surveillance will take an even higher prevalence over human rights
and development – and it will use development money to do so.
The arms industry and contractors, which already benefit substantially from thesesurveillance programmes – stand to benefit even more, which will only naturally
increase their potentially damaging influence over public policy, as exemplified
during the most recent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq by US-led coalition forces.
While much of the situation is the result of calculated policy-making, it is clear thatmuch also results from the inability to efficiently manage and coordinate all suchprogrammes when, as in the US, there are so many different priorities, agencies,and departments involved. This is massively compounded by the fact that secret

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intelligence agencies, whose work is largely unknown to separate government
agencies or policy-makers, are also involved in providing surveillance capabilities toforeign government agencies, including in authoritarian regimes.
Mitigating this requires fundamental reforms to foreign assistance programmes andhow they promote surveillance capabilities. At the most basic level, due diligence –such as efforts to ensure that training is not provided to units or individuals involvedin gross violations of human rights, laid out for example in the Leahy Law in the
US - are frequently criticised as insufficient.118 Transparency about the types ofassistance being provided, key to ensuring effectiveness and adequate democratic
oversight, is uneven and wholly lacking for the intelligence agencies.
Ensuring that it contributes to longer-term security however depends onprioritisation and objectives: securing governing structures, critical infrastructure,or territory, which may provide short-term stability or cooperation, is different
from securing individuals, especially in contexts where definitions of national
security and terrorism are overly broad. In the long term, state and human security
both depend on the promotion of democratic forms of governance, accountable
institutions, and the fulfilment of fundamental rights.
Here, security assistance can play a key role by promoting adherence tointernational legal standards as they relate to surveillance. As more public
information has emerged about the technical capabilities used for surveillance,largely instigated by journalists and whistleblowers, or by large-scale examples ofabuses of surveillance powers, there have been significant national and international
legal challenges against specific practices. This has resulted in an evolving bodyof jurisprudence on surveillance practices and their lawfulness under international
human rights law. Simultaneously, best practices for the governance of surveillanceagencies, including their oversight, and the standards for ensuring surveillance iscarried out according to principles of necessity and proportionality, as required byinternational law, have been developed by civil society, academia, and international
bodies around the world. State sponsors of surveillance around the world should
be prioritising promoting such practices and standards by embedding them intotraining programmes, conditioning any provision of surveillance on their adherence,and ensuring foreign security authorities are made democratically accountable andoperate within the rule of law. Failure to do so, while massively increasing spending
on such programmes, will see surveillance being used to not only undermine therights and physical security of people, but actively undermine democracy, rule oflaw, and global security.

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Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

References

1“Malaysia 2017 Human Rights Report, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2017”
United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. https://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/277339.pdf

2“FBI Shares Tools, Trains Partner Nations to Fight Terrorists Online,” Department of
Defense, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Dec.1, 2017. https://www.
defense.gov/News/Article/Article/1385342/fbi-shares-tools-trains-partner-nations-to-fightterrorists-online/.

3

US Government Accountability Office, ‘Security Assistance: U.S. Government Should Strengthen
End-Use Monitoring and Human Rights Vetting for Egypt’ GAO-16-435, April 12, 2016, http://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-16-435 (accessed 09 September 2016)

4Home Affairs Committee, ‘College of Policing: three years on’, July 2016, para 68 http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/23/2309.htm?utm_source=23&utm_
medium=bulletlinks&utm_campaign=modulereports (accessed 09 September 2016)

5

Brown, R & O’Donnell, B, ‘The Un-Freedom Agenda’, Foreign Policy, 2016 <http://foreignpolicy.
com/2016/04/20/the-unfreedom-agenda-niger-elections-terrorism (accessed 09 September 2016)

6

Adams, G & Sokolsky, R, ‘Governance and Security Sector Assistance: The Missing Link—Part
I’, Lawfare, 2015, <https://www.lawfareblog.com/governance-and-security-sector-assistancemissing-link%E2%80%94part-i (accessed 09 September 2016)

7

Hartung, W, ‘Corruption in Military Aid Undermines Global Security’, LobeLog Foreign Policy,
2016, https://lobelog.com/corruption-in-military-aid-undermines-global-security (accessed 09
September 2016)

8

Watts, S, ‘Identifying and Mitigating Risks in Security Sector Assistance for Africa’s
Fragile States’, RAND Corporation, 2015, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR808.
html (accessed 09 September 2016)911’Military and Police Aid by Year’, Security Assistance Monitor, Washington DC, [website]
http://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/country/2000/2017/is_all/Global (accessed
08 January 2018)10

Tarnoff, C & Lawson, M, ‘Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy’,
Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2016, p 2

11

Global Trends Forced Displacement in 2016, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
19 June 2017, < http://www.unhcr.org/5943e8a34.pdf>

12

Ibid

13

Malik, N, “Bashir Comes in From the Cold”, Foreign Policy, 31 July 2016, <http://
foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/31/europes-new-best-friend-in-africa-is-an-indicted-genocidal-warcriminal/>

14‘Commission proposes measures in support of security and development in partnercountries’, European Commission, Brussels, 2016, [website] http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_MEMO-16- 2408_en.htm (accessed 12 September 2016)

15

Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation, ‘NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954’, [website],
2001, http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/3.htm (accessed 09 September 2016)35/41

Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

16

Klare, M & Anderson, A, ‘US and Soviet Military Aid’, in A Scourge of Guns: The Diffusionof Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America, Washington, DC, Federation of American
Scientists, 1996, pp 27 - 37

17

Klare, M, “The International Repression Trade”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November
1979, p 24

18

Ibid

19

Ibid, p23

20

Ibid, p25

21

Rubenberg, C, ‘Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterinsurgency’, Middle East
Report, Washington, DC May-June 1986

22

Federal Bureau of Investigations, ‘Going Dark’, [website] https://www.fbi.gov/services/
operational-technology/going-dark (accessed 09 September 2016)

23

Tarnoff, C & Lawson, M, ‘Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy’,
Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2016, p 3

24

11’Military and Police Aid by Year’, Security Assistance Monitor, Washington DC, [website]
http://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/country/2000/2017/is_all/Global (accessed
08 January 2018)

25

Tarnoff, C & Lawson, M, ‘Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy’,
Congressional Research Service, Washington DC, 2016, p 2

26‘Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest in Fiscal Years 2016
and 2017: A Report to Congress’, Department of Defense, Department of State, Washington DC,
2015 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/275295.pdf (accessed 08 January 2018)27

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, International Law
Enforcement Academies, US Department of State [website] https://www.state.gov/j/inl/focus/
combatting/ilea/ (accessed 09 January 2018)28

from DR Congo, Republic of Congo, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana

29

2017 Training Schedule, International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Gaborone, http://www.
ileagaborone.com/files/2017_ILEA_Gaborone_Schedule.pdf (accessed 09 January 2018)30

International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Gaborone Course Catalog, International Law
Enforcement Academy (ILEA) Gaborone, http://www.ileagaborone.com/files/ILEA_Course_Cataloggabs_version.pdf (accessed 09 January 2018)

31
32

Ibid
“Antiterrorism Assistance Program,” Government Accountability Office, October 4, 2017,https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-17-704.

33

Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, 2016/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program(Summary), US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/f/evaluations/all/269674.htm(accessed 09 January 2018)34

Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, 2013/Morocco/The Anti-Terrorism Assistance
Program, US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/f/evaluations/all/232979.htm (accessed
09 January 2018)

36/41

Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

35

Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, 2016/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program(Summary), US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/f/evaluations/all/269674.htm(accessed 09 January 2018)36

Beckhusen, R, ‘US Looks to Re-Up It’s Mexican Surveillance System’, Wired, 2013

37

‘INL End Use Monitoring (EUM) Report’, Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington DC, 2008, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137966.pdf p 36

38

‘INL End Use Monitoring (EUM) Report’, Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington DC, 2008, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137966.pdf p 311

39‘INL End Use Monitoring (EUM) Report’, Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington DC, 2008, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137966.pdf p75

40‘INL End Use Monitoring (EUM) Report’, Department of State, Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, Washington DC, 2008, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/137966.pdf p 189

41

Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism
2016, US Department of State, Washington DC, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/index.
htm

42

Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism
2016, US Department of State, Washington DC, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272234.
htm

43

Gillison, D et al, ‘The Network: ‘Leaked Data Reveals How the U.S. Trains Vast Numbers ofForeign Soldiers and Police With Little Oversight’, The Intercept, 2016

44

Ibid

45

“A Global Guide to U.S. Security Aid Programs,” Washington Office on Latin America, April
2017.

46

Ibid.

47

Ibid.

48

2018 Posture Statement to Congress, US Africa Command, 13 March 2018 < http://www.africom.
mil/about-the-command/2018-posture-statement-to-congress>

49“President of Djibouti visits Camp Lemonnier,” AFRICOM press release, November 8, 2017.

50

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Counterterrorism Partnership Fund
Department of Defense Budget Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, Department of Defense, March 2015,
http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2016/FY2016_CTPF_J-Book.pdf(accessed 10 January 2018)

51

ibid

52

US Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Security: U.S.-Funded Equipment for theAfghan National Defense and Security Forces, https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/686477.pdf(accessed 09 January 2018) p3

53

37/41

Ibid p17

Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

54

Report to Congress In Accordance With Section 1225 of the Carl Levin and Howard P. “Buck”
McKeon National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 (P.L. 113-291), as amended,
Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan, US Department of Defense, https://www.
defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/1225-Report-Dec-2017.pdf (accessed 09 January 2018) p88

55

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, ICITAP Field Offices& Funded Countries, US Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/
file/639486/download (accessed 09 January 2018)

56

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, About ICITAP, US
Department of Justice, https://www.justice.gov/criminal-icitap/file/786726/download (accessed
09 January 2018)

57

Ibid

58

Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, Country Reports on Terrorism
2016, US Department of State, Washington DC, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272231.
htm (accessed 09 January 2018)59

Foreign Military Training Report, Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, Joint Report to Congress
Volume II, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/275296.pdf.

60

Abu Ghraib abuses tied to 8 GIs at Huachuca, Tucson Citizen, 31 August 2004, < http://tucsoncitizen.com/morgue2/2004/08/31/137067-abu-ghraib-abuses-tied-to-8-gis-at-huachuca/>

61“As Army Adds Interrogators, It Outsources Training,” Washington Post, September 23, 2006.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/09/22/AR2006092201486.html.

62

Foreign Military Training Report, Fiscal Years 2016 and 2017, Joint Report to Congress
Volume II, https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/275296.pdf.

63

Ibid

64

Ibid

65

“Signal Center of Excellence (SIGCoE) – Fort Gordon,” posted on a website operated by one of
the contractors at Fort Gordon, RLM Communications Inc. http://www.rlm-communications.com/
contract-vehicles/signal-center-of-excellence-sigcoe/

66

A Joint Audit by the Inspectors General of Department of State and Department of Defense,
Afghan National Police Training Program: Lessons learned during the Transition ofContract, DOS Report no. Aud/cG-11-42, 15 August 2011, <https://timemilitary.files.wordpress.
com/2011/08/170762.pdf>

67“AAR wins IDIQ award from US Naval Warfare Command,” AAR press release, February 19, 2018.

68“Congress worries the contractor flying diplomats around the globe isn’t safe,” The Daily
Caller, September 25, 2017, http://dailycaller.com/2017/09/25/congress-worries-the-contractorflying-diplomats-around-the-globe-isnt-safe/.

69“PAE awarded State Department Contract for Security and Support Services in Afghanistan,”
PAE press release, December 8, 2017, https://www.pae.com/news/press-releases/pae-awardedstate-department-contract-security-and-support-services-afghanistan.

70“PAE Government Services awarded USD142 million contract to train Afghan forces,” IHS Jane’s
Defence Weekly, May 24, 2017, http://www.janes.com/article/70751/pae-government-servicesawarded-usd142-million-contract-to-train-afghan-forces.

38/41

Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

71636827 - Fort Huachuca Training And Support Contract (Htasc), LiveCareer, <https://jobs.
livecareer.com/l/636827-fort-huachuca-training-and-support-contract-htasc-leidos-38027fc191290
2e74163dc0bc7f4a89f>

72

Ibid.

73

Nkala, O, “Tunisia getting $20 million sensor package for border security”,
DefenceWeb, 1 March 2018, <http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=50895&catid=74&Itemid=30>

74

Romanian Secret Service Gets €25 Million from EU for Mass Surveillance Project, Liberties,
24 August 2016, < https://www.liberties.eu/en/news/romanian-secret-services-granted-europeanfund-for-mass-surveillance/9475>

75

Putting the PNR pieces in place: more EU funding for mass surveillance, Statewatch, 30
March 2016, < http://statewatch.org/news/2016/mar/pnr-interconnection-project.html>

76European Commission, Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace, [website] https://
icspmap.eu (accessed 11 January 2018)77

European Commission, Deploying expertise to support the Tunisian authorities in the fightagainst terrorism, [website] https://icspmap.eu (accessed 11 January 2018)

78

Ibid

79

Action Document for 2017-2018 Action Programme of the African Peace Facility, European
Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/3/2017/EN/C-2017-5291-F1-EN-ANNEX-1PART-1.PDF (accessed 10 January 2018) p6

80

African Union Commission, African Peace and Security Architecture. APSA Roadmap 2016 – 2020,
December 2015, http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/2015-en-apsa-roadmap-final.pdf (accessed 10
January 2018)81

The EU emergency Trust Fund for Africa, European Commission, https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/regions/africa/eu-emergency-trust-fund-africa_en (accessed 11 January 2018)82

Baldo, S, Border Control from Hell, Enough, April 2017, https://reliefweb.int/sites/
reliefweb.int/files/resources/BorderControl_April2017_Enough_Finals.pdf (accessed 11 January
2018)

83

ibid

84

‘Third Countries’, Frontex, 2016, [website] http://frontex.europa.eu/partners/third-countries/(accessed 10 September 2016)85

Frontex, Frontex cooperation with non-EU countries April 2015-April 2017, https://www.
asktheeu.org/en/request/4085/response/13249/attach/3/Frontex%20cooperation%20with%20non%20
EU%20countries.pdf (accessed 10 January 2018)86

European Commission, “A modern budget for a Union that protects, empowers and defends:
Questions and Answers”, Press Release, 2 May 2018, < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
MEMO-18-3621_en.htm>

87

The European Consensus’, Joint statement by the Council and the representatives of thegovernments of the Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament andthe Commission on European Union Development Policy entitled, Official Journal, C 46 of
24.2.2006.

39/41

Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

88‘Commission proposes measures in support of security and development in partner countries’,
European Commission, Brussels, 2016, [website] http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-162408_en.htm (accessed 12 September 2016)89

Chadwick, V, EU to invest in military capacity for development work, Devex, 19 December
2017, https://www.devex.com/news/eu-to-invest-in-military-capacity-for-development-work-91756(accessed 11 January 2018)90

Development and humanitarian funding in the post-2020 EU Multiannual Financial Framework,
Oxfam, February 2018, < https://d1tn3vj7xz9fdh.cloudfront.net/s3fs-public/file_attachments/
oxfam_position_on_the_mff_-_working_doc.pdf>

91

Tobias Ellwood MP, Reponse to written question 64841, House of Commons Hansard, 01 March
2017, http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/
written-question/Commons/2017-02-21/64841/ (accessed 10 October 2017)92

British Embassy Kyiv, UK programme assistance to Ukraine 2016-2017, 26 January 2017, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-programme-assistance-to-ukraine-2016-2017 (accessed 11 January
2018)

93

Ibid

94

Miller, P, “Exclusive: Secret Documents Reveal How Britain Funded Possible War Crimes in Sri
Lanka”, 31 March 2016, Vice, < https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/dp5beq/sri-lanka-britishpolice-training-phil-miller>

95

Vallance, C, ‘Torture fears as British police train Saudis’, BBC, 2016 http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-36468268 (accessed 09 September 2016)

96

Home Affairs Committee, ‘College of Policing: three years on’, July 2016, para 77 http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmhaff/23/2309.htm? utm_source=23&utm_
medium=bulletlinks&utm_campaign=modulereports (accessed 09 September 2016)

97

23Ibid, para 69

98

Monroy, M & Mortada, L, German police cooperation with Egypt: New security agreement takes
effect, November 2017, https://digit.site36.net/2017/11/14/police-cooperation-with-egypt-newsecurity-agreement-takes-effect/ (accessed 10 January 2018)99

Naceur, S, ‘Is Germany an Accessory to Repression?’, Qantara, 2016, https://en.qantara.de/content/police-co-operation-with-egypt-is-germany-an-accessory-to-repression

100

Monroy, M & Mortada, L, German police cooperation with Egypt: New security agreement takes
effect, November 2017, https://digit.site36.net/2017/11/14/police-cooperation-with-egypt-newsecurity-agreement-takes-effect/ (accessed 10 January 2018)101‘La formation en sécurité intérieure’, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International
Development, 2013, [website] http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/politique-etrangere-de-lafrance/defense-et-securite/cooperation-de-securite-et-de-defense/les-ecoles-nationales-avocation- regionale/article/la-formation-en-securite (accessed 09 September 2016)

102

Bagnoli, L, Civipol, la multinazionale francese che vende sicurezza in Africa, La Stampa,
May 2017, http://www.lastampa.it/2017/05/24/esteri/speciali/divertedaid/civipol-lamultinazionale-francese-che-vende-sicurezza-in-africa-xwOPuGCSbcpSzBTNs17diM/pagina.html(accessed 10 January 2018)

103

Coca, N, “China’s Xinjiang Surveillance is the Dystopian Future Nobody Wants”, Engadget, 22
February 2018.

40/41

Teach ‘em to Phish: State Sponsors of Surveillance

104“China’s Xi pledges security equipment, training for Afghanistan”, Reuters, 10 July 2015

105

Sacks, S, “Beijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Internet”, The Atlantic, 18 June 2018,<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/zte-huawei-china-trump-tradecyber/563033/>

106

Wade, S, “Chinese Surveillance Tech, from Xinjiang to S. America”, 23 January 2018, China
Digital Times, <https://chinadigitaltimes.net/2018/01/chinese-surveillance-tech-xinjiangsouth-america/>

107

Joplin, T, “China’s Newest Global Export? Policing Dissidents”, Al Bawaba, 31 May 2018,<https://www.albawaba.com/news/china’s-newest-global-export-policing-dissidents-1139230>

108

Khan, I, “Chinese Firm to Provide Equipment for Safe City Project”, Dawn, 22 March 2014

109

‘The Five Eyes’, Privacy International, London, 2015, [website] https://www.
privacyinternational.org/node/51 (accessed 14 September 2016)

110

Gallagher, R, ‘Inside Menwith Hill’, The Intercept, 2016 https://theintercept.com/2016/09/06/
nsa- menwith-hill-targeted-killing-surveillance/ (accessed 16 September 2016)111

Campbell, D, ‘NSA: Inside the FIVE-EYED VAMPIRE SQUID of the INTERNET’, The Register, 2014,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/05/how_the_interenet_was_broken/ (accessed 15 September
2016)

112

Gallagher, R, ‘How Secret Partners Expand the NSA’s Surveillance Dragnet’, 2014, The
Intercept, https://theintercept.com/2014/06/18/nsa-surveillance-secret-cable-partnersrevealed-rampart-a/ (accessed 15 September 2016)113

Campbell, D, ‘NSA: Inside the FIVE-EYED VAMPIRE SQUID of the INTERNET’, The Register, 2014,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/05/how_the_interenet_was_broken/ (accessed 15 September
2016)

114

Campbell, D, ‘REVEALED: GCHQ’s BEYOND TOP SECRET Middle Eastern INTERNET SPY BASE’, The
Register, 2014, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2014/06/03/revealed_beyond_top_secret_british_
intelligence_middlee ast_internet_spy_base/ (accessed 15 September 2016)

115

Turse, N, ‘How the NSA Built a Secret Surveillance Network for Ethiopia’, The Intercept
https://theintercept.com/2017/09/13/nsa-ethiopia-surveillance-human-rights/ (Accessed 08
January 2018)

116

Gallagher, R, Japan Made Secret Deals With the NSA That Expanded Global Surveillance, The
Intercept, 24 April 2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/04/24/japans-secret-deals-with-thensa-that-expand-global-surveillance/ (accessed 12 January 2018)

117

See, for example, Fioretti, J, EU Court Says Mass Data Retention Illegal, Reuters, December
2016, Savage, C, & Weisman, J, N.S.A. Collection of Bulk Call Data Is Ruled Illegal, NewYork Times, 7 May 2015, Gallagher, R, In Historic Ruling, UK Surveillance Secrecy is Ruled
Illegal, The Intercept, 6 February 2015

118

See, for example, Miller, N, ‘The Leahy Law: Congressional Failure, Executive Overreach, andthe Consequences’, Cornell International Law Journal 667, 201241/41

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