DIPLOMACY Y

East Asia after Taiwan’s Presidential Election:
China’s armed unification is unrealistic[…] it is far too far from reality to view China-Taiwan relations in terms of “the DPP government wants independence” and “theXi Jinping government wants to unify by force.” Cross-Strait relations are more pluralistic and complex.

Key points● China’s peaceful unification policy and cross-Strait relations are pluralistic.
● Weak Democratic Progressive Party government, China plans to unseat it in 2028
● In addition to defense capabilities, international cooperation is necessary to protect democracy

Matsuda Yasuhiro, Professor, The University of Tokyo
Taiwan’s presidential and Legislative Yuan elections were held on January 13, 2024, and William Lai ofthe ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was elected president. This time, as there were three strong
candidates, Lai’s vote share was only 40.05%, and the ruling party is expected to fall short of a majority inthe Legislative Yuan election, resulting in a “weak DPP” government.
The international community has been paying close attention to the presidential election because offears that a war could break out in the Taiwan Strait, following in the footsteps of Russia and Ukraine, andIsrael and the Palestinian Islamic organization Hamas. Concerns about the “Taiwan contingency” aregrowing.
However, from my experience of observing this region for many years, it is a bit too far from reality toview cross-Strait relations in terms of “the DPP government wants independence” and “the Xi Jinping
government wants to unify by force.” Cross-Strait relations are more pluralistic and complex.

Discuss Japan—Japan Foreign Policy ForumNo. 80◆◆◆ ◆◆◆The chart shows the concept of China’s policy toward Taiwan. The horizontal axis shows whether thestrategic goal is to prevent independence (prevent Taiwan-led changes to the status quo) or to promote
unification (China-led changes to the status quo), and the vertical axis shows whether the measures aremoderate or hard. This is defined by four sub-goals: (1) peaceful unification, (2) formation of antiindependence forces, (3) prevention of Taiwan independence and foreign interference, and (4) unification
by force. Each quadrant contains the means to achieve the four goals.

Armed unification is currently outside the framework of the policy of peaceful unification. On the other
hand, China’s policy of peaceful unification includes the hard-line measure of limited use of force. This
will be used on a limited basis to demonstrate China’s rejection of extreme situations such as Taiwan
declaring independence or the United States intervening militarily to defend Taiwan. This is what
President Xi refers to when he says, “I will never promise to renounce the use of force against Taiwan.”
Another possibility is that China will use force to deter and subdue the United States, thereby forcing
Taiwan to form an alliance without the use of force (coercive peaceful unification), which would include
the threat of force. However, this is still many years away, as it will only be possible once China acquires
the capabilities necessary for armed unification.
Other Chinese hard-line measures include diplomatic battles to force a change in diplomatic
recognition (from Taiwan to China) or to expel Taiwan from international organizations, and economic
coercion to stop imports of agricultural products from Taiwan and tourists to Taiwan. Then there aremilitary threats, such as the movement of warplanes and warships into close proximity or the conduct oflarge-scale military exercises. These are also means to prevent a step toward the use of force.
Discuss Japan—Japan Foreign Policy ForumNo. 80What we must not forget is the economic and cultural united front work and cognitive warfare thatencompasses both the prevention of independence and the promotion of unification. China has madeTaiwan economically dependent on China and routinely engages in co-optation and infiltration
operations that exploit religious and other cultural ties. They are also taking advantage of Taiwan’s open
Internet space to spread a large amount of false and true information through social media to discredit
the DPP government. This method is being used consciously or unconsciously by Taiwan’s opposition
forces.
◆◆◆ ◆◆◆
Then what will China choose based on the results of this election? The continuation of the DPPgovernment has made it impossible to achieve (1) “peaceful unification,” which aims to achieve unification
through talks and agreements over the next four years. On the other hand, (4) “unification by force” lacks
the capacity and is outside the scope of current policy to begin with. The Xi administration may last morethan a decade, so there is no incentive to use force at this stage.
It is unlikely that Taiwan will ever declare independence, and the United States does not feel theurgency to send troops to Taiwan, but rather seeks to stabilize the situation through communication with
China. Therefore, it is difficult to imagine China using military force in a limited manner (3) to prevent
Taiwan independence and foreign interference.
China will see the birth of a “weak DPP government” and will probably try again to unseat the DPPgovernment in the 2028 presidential election. In other words, it should support (2) the “formation of an
independent opposition force,” that is, the strengthening of opposition forces. At the same time, China
will try to establish channels behind the scenes to control the Lai regime as much as possible.
China is likely to continue its hard-line policy (3) to prevent Taiwan independence and foreigninterference. Immediately after the presidential election, the Pacific island nation of Nauru announced
that it was severing ties with Taiwan and establishing diplomatic relations with China. On the economic
and military front, China is likely to step up economic sanctions and provocative military actions aroundTaiwan, while keeping an eye on Taiwan’s behavior. These are the responsibilities of government
departments coordinated by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the StateCouncil, and the People’s Liberation Army, and each must produce results.
In addition, China’s economic and cultural united front efforts would be stepped up to (2) form an“anti-independence force” and (1) lay the foundation for “peaceful unification.” China will gradually
resume travel from China to Taiwan. People-to-people exchanges in person will make it easier to pushforward the united front work. Preferential treatment for Taiwanese residents to invest, study, set up
businesses and settle in China would also be implemented as planned.
What China can continue to promote is cognitive warfare through the Internet. This election
demonstrated the power of China’s cognitive warfare through services widely used by young people, suchas TikTok and YouTube. Many young people dissatisfied with the current situation are believed to havebeen influenced by information containing anti-regime and anti-establishment messages and switched
their support to Ko Wen-je of the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
This is an area where there is scope for international cooperation. The 2016 US presidential election
is a good example, and election interference through social media and other means is becoming moresophisticated. Suppressing criticism of the government is antithetical to democracy. If the government
tries to suppress it, the opposition parties will fight back, creating a sense in society that “both sides are
Discuss Japan—Japan Foreign Policy ForumNo. 80equal.” If that happens, it will be at the mercy of authoritarian countries seeking to weaken democracy.
Open democracies will be damaged unless governments and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
work together to combat the cognitive warfare of authoritarian states while maintaining fairness. Taiwan
is at the forefront of this effort.
It is recalled that at the US-China summit meeting in November 2023, US President Biden warned
President Xi not to intervene in Taiwan’s election. As a result, it became common knowledge within
Taiwan that China was indeed interfering in elections. In other words, international cooperation andcommunication are effective.
As mentioned above, the answer to the question “What will China do?” is not necessarily the use offorce. However, it is also true that Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, contrary to the predictions of mostexperts, and there are no absolutes in politics. Above all, China is working hard to build the military power
necessary to enforce coercive peaceful unification.
Therefore, it remains important to maintain a deterrence posture in the future so that China will not
be tempted to use force to change the status quo. Japan needs to fundamentally strengthen its defense
capabilities while, like the United States, strengthening dialogue with China. Japan should also engage insubstantive dialogue not only with the Taiwanese government but also with the opposition party thatholds a majority in the Legislative Yuan, which is responsible for deliberating budgets and bills, in orderto build a deterrent posture against China. The countries involved need to take a close look at the regional
realities and make comprehensive responses.

Translated by The Japan Journal, Ltd. The article first appeared in the “Keizai kyoshitsu” column of TheNikkei newspaper on 24 January 2024 under the title, “Taiwan Sotosen go no Higashi Ajia (I): Chugoku
no buryoku toitsu wa hi-genjitsuteki (East Asia after Taiwan’s Presidential Election (I): China’s armed
unification is unrealistic),” The Nikkei, 24 January 2024. (Courtesy of the author)

MATSUDA Yasuhiro, Ph.D.
Professor, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The University of Tokyo
Born in 1965. Graduated Reitaku University in 1988. He earned his M.A. ininternational studies from the University of Tokyo in 1990 and Ph.D. in law
from the Graduate School of Law at Keio University in 1997. He served as
Visiting Research Fellow, the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong,Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies, andassumed his present post in 2011. He specializes in political and diplomatic
history of Asia, politics and foreign relations in the People’s Republic ofChina and Taiwan, the Cross-Strait Relations, and Japan’s foreign andsecurity policies. His publications include “China’s UN Peacekeeping
Operations Policy: Analysis of the Factors behind the Policy Shift toward
Active Engagement,” March 2016. “Changes in the Dynamics of the Taiwan Strait due to Taiwan’s Successin Controlling the Novel Coronavirus,” Asia-Pacific Review, Volume 27, December 11, 2020.

Discuss Japan—Japan Foreign Policy ForumNo. 80