Self-Determination Theory and the
Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation,
Social Development, and Well-Being
Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci
University of Rochester

Human beings can be proactive and engaged or, alternatively, passive and alienated, largely as a function of thesocial conditions in which they develop and function. Accordingly, research guided by self-determination theo~has focused on the social-contextual conditions that facilitate versus forestall the natural processes of self-motivation and healthy psychological development. Specifically,factors have been examined that enhance versus undermine
intrinsic motivation, self-regulation, and well-being. The
findings have led to the postulate of three innate psychological needs--competence, autonomy, and relatedness-which when satisfied yield enhanced self-motivation andmental health and when thwarted lead to diminished motivation and well-being. Also considered is the significanceof these psychological needs and processes within domains
such as health care, education, work, sport, religion, andpsychotherapy.

T

he fullest representations of humanity show people
to be curious, vital, and self-motivated. At their best,
they are agentic and inspired, striving to learn; extend themselves; master new skills; and apply their talents
responsibly. That most people show considerable effort,
agency, and commitment in their lives appears, in fact, tobe more normative than exceptional, suggesting some very
positive and persistent features of human nature.
Yet, it is also clear that the human spirit can bediminished or crushed and that individuals sometimes reject growth and responsibility. Regardless of social strata
or cultural origin, examples of both children and adults
who are apathetic, alienated, and irresponsible are abundant. Such non-optimal human functioning can be observed
not only in our psychological clinics but also among themillions who, for hours a day, sit passively before their
televisions, stare blankly from the back of their classrooms,
or wait listlessly for the weekend as they go about theirjobs. The persistent, proactive, and positive tendencies ofhuman nature are clearly not invariantly apparent.
The fact that human nature, phenotypically expressed,
can be either active or passive, constructive or indolent,suggests more than mere dispositional differences and is afunction of more than just biological endowments. It also
bespeaks a wide range of reactions to social environments
68

that is worthy of our most intense scientific investigation.
Specifically, social contexts catalyze both within- and between-person differences in motivation and personal
growth, resulting in people being more self-motivated,energized, and integrated in some situations, domains, andcultures than in others. Research on the conditions that
foster versus undermine positive human potentials has boththeoretical import and practical significance because it cancontribute not only to formal knowledge of the causes ofhuman behavior but also to the design of social environments that optimize people's development, performance,
and well-being. Research guided by self-determination theory (SDT) has had an ongoing concern with precisely theseissues (Deci & Ryan, 1985, 1991; Ryan, 1995).

Self-Determination Theory
SDT is an approach to human motivation and personalitythat uses traditional empirical methods while employing anorganismic metatheory that highlights the importance ofhumans' evolved inner resources for personality development and behavioral self-regulation (Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci,
1997). Thus, its arena is the investigation of people's
inherent growth tendencies and innate psychological needs
that are the basis for their self-motivation and personality
integration, as well as for the conditions that foster thosepositive processes. Inductively, using the empirical process, we have identified three such needs--the needs forcompetence (Harter, 1978; White, 1963), relatedness(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Reis, 1994), and autonomy(deCharms, 1968; Deci, 1975)--that appear to be essential
for facilitating optimal functioning of the natural propensities for growth and integration, as well as for constructive
social development and personal well-being.
This work was supported in part by research Grant MH-53385 from the
National Institute of Mental Health. We thank all of the members of the
Human Motivation Research Group at the University of Rochester who
have contributed to these ideas and research, and to Jennifer LaGuardia,
Charles Couchman, and Phyllis Joe for their specific help with this article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to either
Richard M. Ryan or Edward L. Deci, Department of Clinical and Social
Sciences in Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.
Electronic mail may be sent to either ryan@psych.rochester.edu or
deci@psych.rochester.edu.

January 2000 • American Psychologist
Copyright2000 by the AmericanPsychologicalAssociation,Inc. 0003-066X/00/$5.00
Vol. 55, No. 1, 68-78
DOI: 10.1037110003-066X.55.1.68

correlates and the conditions that ale likely to promotethese different motivations. Third, we focus on studies thathave directly examined the impact of psychological need
fulfillment on health and well-being.

The Nature of Motivation

Richard M.
Ryan

Photoby JoeGawlowicz,
Universityof Rochester

Much of the research guided by SDT has also examined environmental factors that hinder or undermine selfmotivation, social functioning, and personal well-being.
Although many specific deleterious effects have been explored, the research suggests that these detriments can bemost parsimoniously described in terms of thwarting thethree basic psychological needs. Thus, SDT is concerned
not only with the specific nature of positive developmental
tendencies, but it also examines social environments thatare antagonistic toward these tendencies.
The empirical methods used in much of the SDT
research have been in the Baconian tradition, in that social
contextual variables have been directly manipulated to
examine their effects on both internal processes and behavioral manifestations. The use of experimental paradigms
has allowed us to specify the conditions under which people's natural activity and constructiveness will flourish, aswell as those that promote a lack of self-motivation andsocial integration. In this way, we have used experimental
methods without accepting the mechanistic or efficientcausal meta-theories that have typically been associatedwith those methods.
In this article we review work guided by SDT, addressing its implications for three important outcomes. We
begin with an examination of intrinsic motivation, theprototypic manifestation of the human tendency towardlearning and creativity, and we consider research specifying conditions that facilitate versus forestall this special
type of motivation. Second, we present an analysis ofself-regulation, which concerns how people take in social
values and extrinsic contingencies and progressively transform them into personal values and self-motivations. In
that discussion, we outline different forms of internalized
motivation, addressing their behavioral and experiential
January 2000 • American Psychologist

Motivation concerns energy, direction, persistence andequifinality--all aspects of activation and intention. Motivation has been a central and perennial issue in the field of
psychology, for it is at the core of biological, cognitive, andsocial regulation. Perhaps more important, in the realworld, motivation is highly valued because of its consequences: Motivation produces. It is therefore of preeminentconcern to those in roles such as manager, teacher, religious leader, coach, health care provider, and parent thatinvolve mobilizing others to act.
Although motivation is often treated as a singularconstruct, even superficial reflection suggests that people
are moved to act by very different types of factors, withhighly varied experiences and consequences. People can be
motivated because they value an activity or because there isstrong external coercion. They can be urged into action by
an abiding interest or by a bribe. They can behave from asense of personal commitment to excel or from fear of
being surveilled. These contrasts between cases of having
internal motivation versus being externally pressured aresurely familiar to everyone. The issue of whether people
stand behind a behavior out of their interests and values, ordo it for reasons external to the self, is a matter of significance in every culture (e.g., Johnson, 1993) and represents
a basic dimension by which people make sense of their own
and others' behavior (deCharms, 1968; Heider, 1958; Ryan
& Connell, 1989).
Comparisons between people whose motivation is authentic (literally, self-authored or endorsed) and those whoare merely externally controlled for an action typicallyreveal that the former, relative to the latter, have moreinterest, excitement, and confidence, which in turn is manifest both as enhanced performance, persistence, and creativity (Deci & Ryan, 1991; Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, &Ilardi, 1997) and as heightened vitality (Nix, Ryan, Manly,& Deci, 1999), self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995), andgeneral well-being (Ryan, Deci, & Grolnick, 1995). This isso even when the people have the same level of perceived
competence or self-efficacy for the activity.
Because of the functional and experiential differences
between self-motivation and external regulation, a major
focus of SDT has been to supply a more differentiatedapproach to motivation, by asking what kind of motivation
is being exhibited at any given time. By considering theperceived forces that move a person to act, SDT has beenable to identify several distinct types of motivation, each ofwhich has specifiable consequences for learning, performance, personal experience, and well-being. Also, by articulating a set of principles concerning how each type ofmotivation is developed and sustained, or forestalled andundermined, SDT at once recognizes a positive thrust tohuman nature and provides an account of passivity, alienation, and psychopathology.
69

E d w a r d L.
Deci
PhotobyJoeGawlowicz,
Universityof Rochester

Intrinsic Motivation
Perhaps no single phenomenon reflects the positive potential of human nature as much as intrinsic motivation, theinherent tendency to seek out novelty and challenges, toextend and exercise one's capacities, to explore, and tolearn. Developmentalists acknowledge that from the timeof birth, children, in their healthiest states, are active,
inquisitive, curious, and playful, even in the absence ofspecific rewards (e.g., Harter, 1978). The construct of intrinsic motivation describes this natural inclination towardassimilation, mastery, spontaneous interest, and exploration that is so essential to cognitive and social development
and that represents a principal source of enjoyment andvitality throughout life (Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde,
1993; Ryan, 1995).
Yet, despite the fact that humans are liberally endowed with intrinsic motivational tendencies, the evidence
is now clear that the maintenance and enhancement of thisinherent propensity requires supportive conditions, as it canbe fairly readily disrupted by various nonsupportive conditions. Thus, our theory of intrinsic motivation does notconcern what causes intrinsic motivation (which we view
as an evolved propensity; Ryan et al., 1997); rather, it
examines the conditions that elicit and sustain, versus subdue and diminish, this innate propensity.
Cognitive evaluation theory (CET) was presented by
Deci and Ryan (1985) as a subtheory within SDT that had
the aim of specifying factors that explain variability inintrinsic motivation. CET is framed in terms of social andenvironmental factors that facilitate versus undermine intrinsic motivation, using language that reflects the assumption that intrinsic motivation, being inherent, will be catalyzed when individuals are in conditions that conduce
toward its expression. In other words, it will flourish if
70

circumstances permit. Put in this way, the study of conditions that facilitate versus undermine intrinsic motivation is
an important first step in understanding sources of bothalienation and liberation of the positive aspects of humannature.
CET, which focuses on the fundamental needs forcompetence and autonomy, was formulated to integrate
results from initial laboratory experiments on the effects ofrewards, feedback, and other external events on intrinsic
motivation, and was subsequently tested and extended byfield studies in various settings. The theory argues, first,
that social-contextual events (e.g., feedback, communications, rewards) that conduce toward feelings of competence
during action can enhance intrinsic motivation for that
action. Accordingly, optimal challenges, effectance-prorooting feedback, and freedom from demeaning evaluations
were all found to facilitate intrinsic motivation. For example, early studies showed that positive performance feedback enhanced intrinsic motivation, whereas negative performance feedback diminished it (Deci, 1975), and res e a r c h by Vallerand and Reid (1984) showed that theseeffects were mediated by perceived competence.
CET further specifies, and studies have shown (Fisher,
1978; Ryan, 1982), that feelings of competence will notenhance intrinsic motivation unless accompanied by asense of autonomy or, in attributional terms, by an internal
perceived locus of causality (deCharms, 1968). Thus, according to CET, people must not only experience competence or efficacy, they must also experience their behavior
as self-determined for intrinsic motivation to be in evidence. This requires either immediate contextual supports for autonomy and competence or abiding inner res o u r c e s (Reeve, 1996) that are typically the result of priordevelopmental supports for perceived autonomy andcompetence.
In fact, most of the research on the effects of environmental events in intrinsic motivation has focused on theissue of autonomy versus control rather than that of competence. Research on this issue has been considerably m o r econtroversial. It began with the repeated demonstration thatextrinsic rewards can undermine intrinsic motivation. Deci
(1975) interpreted these results in terms of rewards facilitating a more external perceived locus of causality (i.e.,
diminished autonomy). Although the issue of reward effects has been hotly debated, a recent, comprehensive
meta-analysis (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999) confirmed,
in spite of claims to the contrary by Eisenberger and
Cameron (1996), that all expected tangible rewards madecontingent on task performance do reliably undermine intrinsic motivation.
Also, research revealed that not only tangible rewards
but also threats, deadlines, directives, pressured evaluations, and imposed goals diminish intrinsic motivation because, like tangible rewards, they conduce toward an external perceived locus of causality. In contrast, choice,acknowledgment of feelings, and opportunities for selfdirection were found to enhance intrinsic motivation because they allow people a greater feeling of autonomy(Deci & Ryan, 1985). Field studies have further shown that
January 2000 • American Psychologist

teachers who are autonomy supportive (in contrast to controlling) catalyze in their students greater intrinsic motivation, curiosity, and desire for challenge (e.g., Deci, Nezlek,& Sheinman, 1981; Flink, Boggiano, & Barrett, 1990;
Ryan & Grolnick, 1986). Students taught with a more
controlling approach not only lose initiative but learn lesseffectively, especially when learning requires conceptual,creative processing (Amabile, 1996; Grolnick & Ryan,
1987; Utman, 1997). Similarly, studies showed that autonomy-supportive parents, relative to controlling parents,
have children who are more intrinsically motivated(Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997). Such findings generalized
to other domains such as sport and music in which supports
for autonomy and competence by parents and mentors
incite more intrinsic motivation (e.g., Frederick & Ryan,
1995).
Although autonomy and competence supports arehighly salient for producing variability in intrinsic motivation, a third factor, relatedness, also bears on its expression.
In infancy, intrinsic motivation is readily observable as
exploratory behavior and, as suggested by attachment theorists (e.g., Bowlby, 1979), it is more evident when theinfant is securely attached to a parent. Studies of mothers
and infants have, indeed, shown that both security andmaternal autonomy support predict more exploratory behavior in the infants (e.g., Frodi, Bridges, & Grolnick,1985). SDT hypothesizes that a similar dynamic occurs ininterpersonal settings over the life span, with intrinsic
motivation more likely to flourish in contexts characterized
by a sense of security and relatedness. For example, Anderson, Manoogian, and Reznick (1976) found that whenchildren worked on an interesting task in the presence of an
adult stranger who ignored them and failed to respond totheir initiations, a very low level of intrinsic motivation
resulted, and Ryan and Grolnick (1986) observed lower
intrinsic motivation in students who experienced theirteachers as cold and uncaring. Of course, many intrinsicallymotivated behaviors are happily performed in isolation,suggesting that proximal relational supports may not benecessary for intrinsic motivation, but a secure relationalbase does seem to be important for the expression of
intrinsic motivation to be in evidence.
To summarize, the CET framework suggests that social environments can facilitate or forestall intrinsic motivation by supporting versus thwarting people's innate psychological needs. Strong links between intrinsic motivationand satisfaction of the needs for autonomy and competence
have been clearly demonstrated, and some work suggeststhat satisfaction of the need for relatedness, at least in a
distal sense, may also be important for intrinsic motivation.
It is critical to remember, however, that people will be
intrinsically motivated only for activities that hold intrinsic
interest for them, activities that have the appeal of novelty,
challenge, or aesthetic value. For activities that do not holdsuch appeal, the principles of CET do not apply, because
the activities will not be experienced as intrinsically motivated to begin with. To understand the motivation for those
activities, we need to look more deeply into the nature anddynamics of extrinsic motivation.
January 2000 ° American Psychologist

Self-Regulation of Extrinsic
Motivation
Although intrinsic motivation is an important type of motivation, it is not the only type or even the only type ofself-determined motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Indeed,much of what people do is not, strictly speaking, intrinsically motivated, especially after early childhood when thefi'eedom to be intrinsically motivated is increasingly curtailed by social pressures to do activities that are notinteresting and to assume a variety of new responsibilities(Ryan & La Guardia, in press).
The real question concerning nonintrinsically motivated practices is how individuals acquire the motivation tocarry them out and how this motivation affects ongoing
persistence, behavioral quality, and well-being. Whenevera person (be it a parent, teacher, boss, coach, or therapist)
attempts to foster certain behaviors in others, the others'
motivation for the behavior can range from amotivation or
unwillingness, to passive compliance, to active personalcommitment. According to SDT, these different motivations reflect differing degrees to which the value and regulation of the requested behavior have been internalized
and integrated. Internalization refers to people's "taking in"a value or regulation, and integration refers to the furthertransformation of that regulation into their own so that,
subsequently, it will emanate from their sense of self.
Internalization and integration are clearly central issues in childhood socialization, but they are also continually re]evant for the regulation of behavior across the life
span. In nearly every setting people enter, certain behaviors
and va]ues are prescribed, behaviors that are not interestingand values that are not spontaneously adopted. Accordingly, SDT has addressed the issues of (a) the processes
through which such nonintrinsically motivated behaviors
can become truly self-determined, and (b) the ways inwhich the social environment influences those processes.
The lerm extrinsic motivation refers to the performance of an activity in order to attain some separable
outcome and, thus, contrasts with intrinsic motivation,
which refers to doing an activity for the inherent satisfaction of the activity itself. Unlike some perspectives thatview extrinsically motivated behavior as invariantly nonautonomous, SDT proposes that extrinsic motivation canvary greatly in its relative autonomy (Ryan & Connell,
1989; Vallerand, 1997). For example, students who do their
homework because they personally grasp its value for theirchosen career are extrinsically motivated, as are those who
do the work only because they are adhering to their parents'
control. Both examples involve instrumentalities rather
than enjoyment of the work itself, yet the former case of
extrinsic motivation entails personal endorsement and afeeling of choice, whereas the latter involves compliancewith an external regulation. Both represent intentional behavior (Heider, 1958), but they vary in their relative autonomy. The former, of course, is the type of extrinsic
motivation that is sought by astute socializing agents regardless o1: the applied domain.
71

Figure 1
The Self-Determination Continuum Showing Types of Motivation With Their Regulatory Styles, Loci of Causality,
and Corresponding Processes
Behavior

Nonself-Determined

Self-Determined

E~ic

Motivation

M o t ~

StylesRegulat°ry ~ R e g u l ~Perceived
Locus of
Causality

ImpersonalExternal

Somewhat
External

Relevant
Regulatory
Processes

Nonintentional,
Nonvaluing,
Incompetence,
Lack of Control

Compliance,
External
Rewards andPunishments

Self-control,
Personal
Ego-Involvement, Importance,
Internal Rewards
Consciousand Punishments
ValuingWithin SDT, Deci and Ryan (1985) introduced asecond subtheory, called organismic integration theory(OIT), to detail the different forms of extrinsic motivationand the contextual factors that either promote or hinderinternalization and integration of the regulation for thesebehaviors. Figure 1 illustrates the OIT taxonomy of motivational types, arranged from left to fight in terms of thedegree to which the motivations emanate from the self (i.e.,
are self-determined).
At the far left of the self-determination continuum isamotivation, the state of lacking the intention to act. Whenamotivated, people either do not act at all or act without
intent--they just go through the motions. Amotivation results from not valuing an activity (Ryan, 1995), not feelingcompetent to do it (Bandura, 1986), or not expecting it toyield a desired outcome (Seligman, 1975). To the right ofamotivation in Figure 1 are five classifications of motivatedbehavior. Although many theorists have treated motivation
as a unitary concept, each of the categories identified
within OIT describes theoretically, experientially, andfunctionally distinct types of motivation. At the far right ofthe continuum is the classic state of intrinsic motivation,
the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions. It ishighly autonomous and represents the prototypic instanceof self-determination. Extrinsically motivated behaviors,
by contrast, cover the continuum between amotivation andintrinsic motivation, varying in the extent to which theirregulation is autonomous.
The extrinsically motivated behaviors that are least
autonomous are referred to as externally regulated. Suchbehaviors are performed to satisfy an external demand or72

Somewhat
Internal

IntemalInternal

Congruence,
Awareness,
Synthesis
With Self

Interest,
Enjoyment,
Inherent
Satisfaction

reward contingency. Individuals typically experience externally regulated behavior as controlled or alienated, andtheir actions have an external perceived locus of causality(deCharms, 1968). External regulation is the type of motivation focused on by operant theorists (e.g., Skinner,
1953), and it is external regulation that was typically contrasted with intrinsic motivation in early laboratory andfield studies.
A second type of extrinsic motivation is labeled introjected regulation. Introjection involves taking in a regulation but not fully accepting it as one's own. It is arelatively controlled form of regulation in which behaviors
are performed to avoid guilt or anxiety or to attain ego
enhancements such as pride. Put differently, introjection
represents regulation by contingent self-esteem (Deci &Ryan, 1995). A classic form of introjection is ego involvement (deCharms, 1968; Nicholls, 1984; Ryan, 1982), in
which people are motivated to demonstrate ability (or avoid
failure) in order to maintain feelings of worth. Althoughinternally driven, introjected behaviors still have an external perceived locus of causality and are not really experienced as part of the self. Thus, in some studies, external
regulation (being interpersonally controlled) and introjected regulation (being intrapersonally controlled) havebeen combined to form a controlled motivation composite(e.g., Williams, Grow, Freedman, Ryan, & Deci, 1996).
A more autonomous, or self-determined, form of extrinsic motivation is regulation through identification.
Identification reflects a conscious valuing of a behavioral
goal or regulation, such that the action is accepted orowned as personally important. Finally, the most autonoJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist

mous form of extrinsic motivation is integrated regulation.
Integration occurs when identified regulations are fully
assimilated to the self, which means they have been evaluated and brought into congruence with one's other values
and needs. Actions characterized by integrated motivation
share many qualities with intrinsic motivation, although
they are still considered extrinsic because they are done toattain separable outcomes rather than for their inherent
enjoyment. In some studies, identified, integrated, and intrinsic forms of regulation have been combined to form anautonomous motivation composite.
As people internalize regulations and assimilate themto the self, they experience greater autonomy in action.
This process may occur in stages, over time, but we are notsuggesting that it is a developmental continuum in thesense that people must progress through each stage ofinternalization with respect to a particular regulation.
Rather, they can relatively readily internalize a new behavioral regulation at any point along this continuum depending on both prior experiences and current situational factors(Ryan, 1995). Nonetheless, the range of behaviors that canbe assimilated to the self increases over time with increased
cognitive capacities and ego development (Loevinger &Blasi, 1991), and there is evidence that children's generalregulatory style does tend to become more internalized or
self-regulated over time (e.g., Chandler & Connell, 1987).
Ryan and Connell (1989) tested the formulation thatthese different types of motivation, with their distinct properties, lie along a continuum of relative autonomy. They
investigated achievement behaviors among school children
and found that external, introjected, identified, and intrinsic
regulatory styles were intercorrelated according to a quasisimplex pattern, thus providing evidence for an underlying
continuum. Furthermore, differences in the type of extrinsic motivation were associated with different experiences
and outcomes. For example, the more students were externally regulated the less they showed interest, value, andeffort toward achievement and the more they tended todisown responsibility for negative outcomes, blaming others such as the teacher. Introjected regulation was positively related to expending more effort, but it was also
related to feeling more anxiety and coping more poorly
with failures. In contrast, identified regulation was associated with more interest and enjoyment of school and withmore positive coping styles, as well as with expending
more effort.
Other studies in education extended these findings,
showing that more autonomous extrinsic motivation was
associated with more engagement (Connell & Wellborn,1991), better performance (Miserandino, 1996), lower
dropout (Vallerand & Bissonnette, 1992), higher quality
learning (Grolnick & Ryan, 1987), and better teacher ratings (Hayamizu, 1997), among other outcomes.
In the realm of health care, greater internalization has
been associated with greater adherence to medications
among people with chronic illnesses (Williams, Rodin,
Ryan, Grolnick, & Deci, 1998), better long-term maintenance of weight loss among morbidly obese patients (Williams et al., 1996), improved glucose control among diaJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist

betics (Williams, Freedman, & Deci, 1998), and greaterattendance and involvement in an addiction-treatment program (Ryan, Plant, & O'Malley, 1995).
Demonstrations of positive outcomes being associatedwith more internalized motivation have also emerged inother diverse domains, including religion (Ryan, Rigby, &King, 1993), physical exercise (Chatzisarantis, Biddle, &Meek, 1997), political activity (Koestner, Losier, Vallerand, & Carducci, 1996), environmental activism (GreenDemers, Pelletier, & Menard, 1997), and intimate relationships (Blais, Sabourin, Boucher, & Vallerand, 1990),
among others.
The advantages of greater internalization appear, then,to be manifold (Ryan et al., 1997), including more behavioral effectiveness, greater volitional persistence, enhanced
subjective well-being, and better assimilation of the individual within his or her social group.

Facilitating Integration of Extrinsic
Motivation
Given the significance of internalization for personal experience and behavioral outcomes, the critical issue becomes
how to promote autonomous regulation for extrinsicallymotiwtted behaviors. That is, what are the social conditions
that nurture versus inhibit internalization and integration?
Because extrinsically motivated behaviors are not typically interesting, the primary reason people initially perform such actions is because the behaviors are prompted,
modeled, or valued by significant others to whom they feel(or want to feel) attached or related. This suggests that
relatedness, the need to feel belongingess and connectedness with others, is centrally important for internalization.
Thus, OIT proposes that internalization is more likely to bein evidence when there are ambient supports for feelings ofrelatedness. For example, Ryan, Stiller, and Lynch (1994)
showed that the children who had more fully internalized
the regulation for positive school-related behaviors were
those who felt securely connected to, and cared for by, theirparents and teachers.
The relative internalization of extrinsically motivatedactivities is also a function of perceived competence. People are more likely to adopt activities that relevant socialgroups value when they feel efficacious with respect tothose activities. As is the case with all intentional action,
OIT suggests that supports for competence should facilitate
intermdization (Vallerand, 1997). Thus, for example, children who are directed to perform behaviors before they aredevelopmentally ready to master them or understand theirrationale would be predicted, at best, only to partiallyintern~tlize the regulations, remaining either externally regulated or introjected.
Finally, the experience of autonomy facilitates internalization and, in particular, is a critical element for aregulation to be integrated. Contexts can yield external
regulation if there are salient rewards or threats and theperson feels competent enough to comply; contexts canyield introjected regulation if a relevant reference groupendorses the activity and the person feels competent andrelated; but contexts can yield autonomous regulation only73

if they are autonomy supportive, thus allowing the person
to feel competent, related, and autonomous. To integrate aregulation, people must grasp its meaning and synthesizethat meaning with respect to their other goals and values.
Such deep, holistic processing (Kuhl & Fuhrmann, 1998) isfacilitated by a sense of choice, volition, and freedom fromexcessive external pressure toward behaving or thinking acertain way. In this sense, support lor autonomy allows
individuals to actively transform values into their own.
Again, research results have supported this reasoning.
For example, Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, and Leone (1994)
demonstrated in a laboratory experiment that providing ameaningful rationale for an uninteresting behavior, alongwith supports for autonomy and relatedness, promoted
its internalization and integration. Controlling contexts
yielded less overall internalization, and the internalizationthat did occur in those contexts tended to be only introjected. Using parent interviews, Grolnick and Ryan
(1989) found greater internalization of school-related values among children whose parents were more supportive ofautonomy and relatedness. Strahan (1995) found thatparents who were more autonomy-supportive promoted
greater religious identification, as opposed to introjection,in their offspring. Williams and Deci (1996), using a longitudinal design, demonstrated greater internalization ofbiopsychosocial values and practices among medical students whose instructors were more autonomy-supportive.
These are but a few of the many findings suggesting that
supports for relatedness and competence facilitate internalization and that supports for autonomy also facilitate integration of behavioral regulations. When that occurs, people
feel not only competent and related but also autonomous as
they carry out culturally valued activities.
One further point needs to be made regarding thecontroversial issue of human autonomy. The concept ofautonomy has often been portrayed as being antagonistic torelatedness or community, in fact, some theories equate
autonomy with concepts such as individualism and independence (e.g., Steinberg & Silverberg, 1986), which doindeed imply low relatedness. But, within SDT, autonomy
refers not to being independent, detached, or selfish but
rather to the feeling of volition that can accompany any act,
whether dependent or independent, collectivist or individualist, in fact, recent research in Korean and U.S. samples
has found a more positive relation between autonomy andcollectivistic attitudes than between autonomy and individualistic attitudes (Kim, Butzel, & Ryan, 1998). Furthermore, research has shown positive, rather than negative,
links between relatedness to parents and autonomy in teenagers (Ryan & Lynch, 1989; Ryan et al., 1994). Clearly,
then, we do not equate autonomy with independence orindividualism.

Alienation and Its Prevention
SDT aims to specify factors that nurture the innate humanpotentials entailed in growth, integration, and well-being,
and to explore the processes and conditions that foster thehealthy development and effective functioning of individuals, groups, and communities. But a positive approach74

cannot ignore patholog2( or close its eyes to the alienationand inauthenticity that are prevalent in our society and inothers. Accordingly, we investigate nonoptimal (as well as
optimal) developmental trajectories, much as is done in thefield of developmental psychopathology (e.g., Cicchetti,1991). We now turn to a brief consideration of that issue.
By definition, intrinsically motivated behaviors, theprototype of self-determined actions, stem from the self.
They are unalienated and authentic in the fullest sense of
those terms. But, as already noted, SDT recognizes thatextrinsically motivated actions can also become self-determined as individuals identify with and fully assimilate theirregulation. Thus, it is through internalization and integration that individuals can be extrinsically motivated and still
be committed and authentic. Accumulated research now
suggests that the commitment and authenticity reflected in
intrinsic motivation and integrated extrinsic motivation are
most likely to be evident when individuals experience
supports for competence, autonomy, and relatedness.
It is the flip side of this coin, however, that speaks
directly to the issues of alienation and inauthenticity and isrelevant to such questions as why employees show no
initiative, why teenagers reject their schools' values, andwhy patients adhere so poorly to treatment. SDT understands such occurrences in terms of the undermining of
intrinsic motivation and, perhaps even more typically, thefailure of internalization. To explain the causes of suchdiminished functioning, SDT suggests turning first to individuals' immediate social contexts and then to their developmental environments to examine the degree to which
their needs for competence, autonomy, and relatedness arebeing or have been thwarted. We maintain that by failing toprovide supports for competence, autonomy, and relatedness, not only of children but also of students, employees,
patients, and athletes, socializing agents and organizations
contribute to alienation and ill-being. The fact that psychological-need deprivation appears to be a principal source ofhuman distress suggests that assessments and interventions
would do well to target these primary foundations of mental health.

Psychologic.a! Needs andMental HealthAs we have seen, both the cognitive evaluation and organismic integration components of SDT have led us to posita parsimonious list of three basic psychological needs as ameans of organizing and interpreting a wide array of empirical results, results that seemed not to be readily andsatisfactorily interpretable without the concept of needs.
Much of our more recent work has used the concept of
three basic psychological needs to address new phenomena
and, more particularly, to evaluate the postulate that thesethree needs are innate, essential, and universal.
By our definition, a basic need, whether it be a physiological need (Hull, 1943) or a psychological need, is anenergizing state that, if satisfied, conduces toward healthand well-being but, if not satisfied, contributes to pathology
and ill-being. We have thus proposed that the basic needs
for competence, autonomy, and relatedness must be satisJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist

fled across the life span for an individual to experience anongoing sense of integrity and well-being or "eudaimonia"(Ryan & Frederick, 1997; Waterman, 1993). Accordingly,
much of our research now focuses on the link between
satisfaction of the basic psychological needs and the experience of well-being.
Specifying psychological needs as essential nutriments implies that individuals cannot thrive without satisfying all of them, any more than people can thrive withwater but not food. Thus, for example, a social environment that affords competence but fails to nurture relatedness is expected to result in some impoverishment of wellbeing. Worse yet, social contexts that engender conflicts
between basic needs set up the conditions for alienation andpsychopathology (Ryan et al., 1995), as when a child is
required by parents to give up autonomy in order to feel
loved.
To suggest that the three needs are universal anddevelopmentally persistent does not imply that their relative salience and their avenues for satisfaction are unchanging across the life span or that their modes of expression are
the same in all cultures. The very fact that need satisfaction
is facilitated by the internalization and integration of culturally endorsed values and behaviors suggests that individuals are likely to express their competence, autonomy,
and relatedness differently within cultures that hold different values. Indeed, the mode and degree of people's psychological-need satisfaction is theorized to be influenced
not only by their own competencies but, even more important, by the ambient demands, obstacles, and affordances intheir sociocultural contexts. Thus, to posit universal psychological needs does not diminish the importance of variability in goals and orientations at different developmental
epochs or in different cultures, but it does suggest similarities in underlying processes that lead to the development
and expression of those differences.
Our recent investigations of the importance of basic
psychological needs have addressed three questions: Are
the pursuit and attainment of all culturally congruent aspirations and life values associated with well-being? Do
need-related processes operate similarly within different
cultural circumstances? Is within-person variability in basic
need satisfaction related to variability in well-being indicators? We briefly consider some of this work.
First, we discuss the relation of personal goals towell-being. We have hypothesized that the pursuit andattainment of some life goals will provide relatively direct
satisfaction of the basic needs, thus enhancing well-being(Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996), whereas the pursuit and attainment of other goals does not contribute to andmay even detract from basic need satisfactions, leading toill-being. In accord with this reasoning, T. Kasser and Ryan
(1993, 1996) examined individual differences in the emphasis people place on intrinsic aspirations (goals such asaffiliation, personal growth, and community that directly
satisfy basic needs) compared with extrinsic aspirations(goals such as wealth, fame, and image that at best indirectly satisfy the needs). They found, first, that placingstrong relative importance on intrinsic aspirations was posJanuary 2000 • American Psychologist

itively associated with well-being indicators such as selfesteem, self-actualization, and the inverse of depression
and anxiety, whereas placing strong relative importance on
extrinsic aspirations was negatively related to thesewell-being indicators. Ryan, Chirkov, Little, Sheldon,
Timoshina, and Deci (1999) replicated these findings in a
Russian sample, attesting to the potential generalizabilityof the findings across cultures.
These findings go beyond goal importance per se.
Both Ryan, Chirkov, et al. and T. Kasser and Ryan (inpress) have found that whereas self-reported attainment of
intrinsic aspirations was positively associated with wellbeing, attainment of extrinsic aspirations was not. Further,
Sheldon and Kasser (1998) found in a longitudinal study
that well-being was enhanced by attainment of intrinsic
goals, 'whereas success at extrinsic goals provided little
benefit. Together, these results suggest that even highly
efficacious people may experience less than optimal wellbeing if they pursue and successfully attain goals that do
not fulfill basic psychological needs. We hasten to add,
however, that the meaning of specific goals is culturally
influenced, so that how specific goals relate to well-being
can vary across cultures, although the relation between
underlying need satisfaction and well-being is theorized to
be invariant.
Clearly, there are many factors that lead people toemphasize certain life goals that may not be need fulfilling.
For example, exposure to the commercial media canprompt a locus on materialism (Richins, 1987), which
provides only fleeting satisfactions and could actually detract from basic need fulfillment and, thus, well-being.
Prior deficits in need fulfillment (e.g., from poor caregiving) might also lead individuals to yearn for more extrinsic
goals as a substitute or compensatory mechanism. In fact,
T. Kasser, Ryan, Zax, and Sameroff (1995) found that teens
who had been exposed to cold, controlling maternal care(as assessed with ratings by the teens, mothers, and observers) were more likely to develop materialistic orientations,compared with better nurtured teens who more strongly
valued the intrinsic goals of personal growth, relationships,
and community. In short, cultural and developmental influences produce variations in the importance of goals, thepursuit of which, in turn, yields different satisfaction ofbasic needs and different levels of well-being.
In other research, we have examined the relations ofpeople's reports of need satisfaction to indicators of wellbeing in various settings. For example, V. Kasser and Ryan(in press) found that supports for autonomy and relatedness
predicted greater well-being among nursing home residents. Baard, Deci, and Ryan (1998) showed that employees' experiences of satisfaction of the needs for autonomy,competence, and relatedness in the workplace predicted
their performance and well-being at work. Such researchshows that within specific domains, especially those central
to the lives of individuals, need satisfaction is correlatedwith improved well-being.
A more compelling way of demonstrating the essential
relations between need fulfillments and mental health has
been the examination of role-to-role and day-to-day fluc75

tuations in basic need satisfaction and their direct effects onvariability in well-being, while controlling for individual
differences and various confounding variables. For example, Sheldon et al. (1997) demonstrated that satisfaction ineach of several life roles (e.g., student, employee, friend),
relative to the individual's own mean satisfaction, wasattributable to the degree to which that role supports authenticity and autonomous functioning. Similarly, in astudy that examined daily variations in well-being, Sheldon, Reis, and Ryan (1996) used hierarchical linear modeling to show that within-person daily fluctuations in thesatisfaction of autonomy and competence needs predictedwithin-person fluctuations in outcomes such as mood, vitality, physical symptoms, and self-esteem. In a more recent study, Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, and Ryan (inpress) found that variations in the fulfillment of each of thethree needs (i.e., competence, autonomy, and relatedness)
independently predicted variability in daily well-being.
These studies support the view that basic psychologicalneeds are determinative with regard to optimal experienceand well-being in daily life.

Conclusions
Debates concerning the activity or passivity, responsibility
or indolence, of human beings have been perennial (Kohn,
1990). As psychology has become more advanced, both interms of our understanding of evolution and neurobiology
and of social behavior and its causation, ample support for
both perspectives could be garnered. SDT addresses thisissue by attempting to account for both the activity and thepassivity, the responsibility and the indolence. To do this,we have assumed that humans have an inclination toward
activity and integration, but also have a vulnerability topassivity. Our focus, accordingly, has been to specify theconditions that tend to support people's natural activity
versus elicit or exploit their vulnerability.
Our early investigations focused on the social conditions that enhance versus diminish a very positive featureof human nature, namely, the natural activity and curiosity
referred to as intrinsic motivation. We found that conditions supportive of autonomy and competence reliably facilitated this vital expression of the human growth tendency, whereas conditions that controlled behavior andhindered perceived effectance undermined its expression.
Subsequently, we investigated the acquisition and regulation of nonintrinsically motivated behaviors and, here too,
we found evidence of the dramatic power of social contexts
to enhance or hinder the organismic tendency to integrateambient social values and responsibilities. Contexts supportive of autonomy, competence, and relatedness were
found to foster greater internalization and integration thancontexts that thwart satisfaction of these needs. This latter
finding, we argue, is of great significance for individuals
who wish to motivate others in a way that engenders
commitment, effort, and high-quality performance.
Yet, our primary concern throughout this program ofresearch has been the well-being of individuals, whether
they are students in classrooms, patients in clinics, athletes
on the playing field, or employees in the workplace. As
76formulated by SDT, if the social contexts in which suchindividuals are embedded are responsive to basic psychological needs, they provide the appropriate developmental
lattice upon which an active, assimilative, and integrated
nature can ascend. Excessive control, nonoptimal challenges, and lack of connectedness, on the other hand,
disrupt the inherent actualizing and organizational tendencies endowed by nature, and thus such factors result not
only in the lack of initiative and responsibility but also in
distress and psychopathology.
Knowledge concerning the nutriments essential for
positive motivation and experience and, in turn, for enhanced performance and well-being has broad significance.
It is relevant to parents and educators concerned withcognitive and personality development because it speaks tothe conditions that promote the assimilation of both information and behavioral regulations. It is also relevant tomanagers who want to facilitate motivation and commitment on the job, and it is relevant to psychotherapists andhealth professionals because motivation is perhaps the critical variable in producing maintained change. Thus, byattending to the relative presence or deprivation of supports
for basic psychological needs, practitioners are better able
to diagnose sources of alienation versus engagement,
and facilitate both enhanced human achievements andwell-being.
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