Au
ugust 20
016

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Contents
Convention on Nuclear Safety National Report of Japanfor the Seventh Review Meeting

Contents

A

Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 7
1

Overview of Nuclear Program in Japan..................................................................................... 72

Implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Japan ............................................. 93

Development of the National Report ......................................................................................... 9

B

Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period ............................................. 12
1

Activities related Nuclear Regulation ...................................................................................... 12

2

Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS) ........................................................................ 15

3

Vienna Declaration ..................................................................................................................... 17

4

Activities by Licensees ............................................................................................................... 19

5

Effort to Address the Challenges Identified in Country Group Discussions of the 6th

Review Meeting ................................................................................................................................... 20
6Efforts to Address Challenges Stated in the Summary Report of the 6th Review Meeting
29

C

Outline of the Report for Each Article ....................................................................................... 32
I

Relationship between Domestic Measures and Conformity to the Convention on Nuclear

Safety ..................................................................................................................................................... 32
II

Activities Contributing to Enhancement of Nuclear Safety .................................................. 38

ARTICLE 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS................................................................ 40

ARTICLE 7

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK............................................ 49

Article 7 (1)Establishment of a Legislative and Regulatory Framework ................................. 50

Article 7 (2)Safety Requirements and Safety Regulations ......................................................... 54

ARTICLE 8

REGULATORY BODY .................................................................................................. 58

Article 8 (1)Establishment of a Regulatory Body........................................................................ 59

Article 8 (2)Status of the Regulation Body .................................................................................. 66

ARTICLE 9RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSE HOLDER .................................................... 68

ARTICLE 10

PRIORITY TO SAFETY ........................................................................................... 71

ARTICLE 11

FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES ......................................................... 76

Article 11 (1)Financial Resources ................................................................................................ 77

Article 11 (2)Human Resources .................................................................................................. 78

ARTICLE 12

HUMAN FACTORS .................................................................................................. 81

ARTICLE 13

QUALITY ASSURANCE ......................................................................................... 85

ARTICLE 14

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY .......................................... 89

Article 14 (1)Safety Assessments ................................................................................................ 90

Article 14 (2)Verification of Safety .............................................................................................. 98
3

Contents
ARTICLE 15

RADIATION PROTECTION .................................................................................. 99

ARTICLE 16

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ......................................................................... 107

Article 16 (1)Emergency plans .................................................................................................. 109

Article 16 (2)Information to the Public and Neighboring Countries ................................... 124

ARTICLE 17

SITING ...................................................................................................................... 127

Article 17 (1)Evaluation of Factors Related to Siting Location ............................................. 128

Article 17 (2)Prevention of Impacts on Individuals, Society, and the Environment

Resulting from Reactor Facilities ..................................................................................................... 130
Article 17 (3)Re‐evaluation of Factors Related to Siting Location ........................................ 131

Article 17 (4)Discussion with Other Countries That Could be Affected by Reactor

Facilities................................................................................................................................ 132

ARTICLE 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ...................................................................... 133

Article 18 (1)Implementing a Defense in Depth Strategy ..................................................... 134

Article 18 (2) Application of Proven Technologies ........................................................................ 143
Article 18 (3)ARTICLE 19

Design for Highly Reliable, Stable, and Easily Manageable Operations ...... 145
OPERATION ............................................................................................................ 146

Article 19 (1) Initial Authorization .................................................................................................. 148
Article 19 (2)Limiting Condition for Operation...................................................................... 153

Article 19 (3)Procedures for Operation, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing ................ 155

Article 19 (4)Procedures for Dealing with Events Occurring during Operation ............... 161

Article 19 (5)Engineering and Technical Support................................................................... 163

Article 19 (6)Reporting of Events and Failures ....................................................................... 163

Article 19 (7)Making Effective Use of Operational Experiences .......................................... 165

Article 19 (8)On‐site Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste........................... 167

D

Annexes .......................................................................................................................................... 170
1List of nuclear installations ...................................................................................................... 171

2

List of accidents and failures reported under the Reactor Regulation Act during thereporting period................................................................................................................................. 173
3

The overview of Conformity Review for Sendai NPS ......................................................... 174

4

List of IRRS Review Result ...................................................................................................... 182

5Result of IAEA OSART review and measures taken by Tokyo Electric Power Company ....
..................................................................................................................................................... 186

6

References .................................................................................................................................. 196

4

List of Abbreviations
List of Abbreviations
ABWR

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor

APWR

Advanced Pressurized Water Reactor

ATR

Advanced Thermal Reactor

BWR

Boiling Water Reactor

CAO

Cabinet Office

ConvExConvention Exercise

CV

Containment Vessel

EAL

Emergency Action Levels

ECCS

Emergency Core Cooling System

EPREV

Emergency Preparedness Review

FBR

Fast Breeder Reactor

GCR

Gas Cooled Reactor

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICRP

International Commission on Radiation Protection

INES

International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

IRRS

Integrated Regulatory Review Service

IRS

Incident Reporting System

JAEA

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

JANSI

Japan Nuclear Safety Institute

JAPC

Japan Atomic Power Company

JEAC

Japan Electric Association CodeJNESJapan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization, an incorporated
administrative agency

LOCA

Loss of Coolant Accident

METI

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

MEXT

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

NAC

National Assistance Capability

NCA

National Competent Authority

NIRS

National Institute of Radiological Science

NISA

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (former nuclear regulator)

Notification on Doses

Notification to Establish Dose Limits in accordance with theProvisions of the NRA Ordinance Concerning the Installation,
Operation of Commercial Power Reactors

NPP

Nuclear Power Plant

NPS

Nuclear Power Station

NRA

Nuclear Regulation Authority

NRA Ordinance on

NRA Ordinance concerning the Installation and Operation, of5

List of Abbreviations
Commercial Reactors

Commercial Power Reactors

NRA Ordinance onStandards for the
Location, etc.

NRA Ordinance prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure,

NRA Ordinances on
Quality Control
Methods

and Equipment of Commercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary
Facilities
NRA Ordinances on Technical Standards for Quality Control
Methods Concerning the Design and Construction of Commercial
Power Reactors for Licensees of Power Reactor Operation and
Systems for their Inspection

NRA Ordinance on
Technical Standards
NSC
Nuclear Emergency Act
OECD/NEANRA Ordinance prescribing Technical Standards for Commercial
Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities
Nuclear Safety Commission, former safety related governmentalorganization resolved on September 2013
Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness
the Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development
Nuclear Energy Agency

OIL

Operational Intervention Level

OSART

Operational Safety Review Team

PAZ

Precautionary Action Zone

PPA

Plume Protection Planning Areas

PRA

Probabilistic Risk Assessment

PWR

Pressurized Water Reactor

RANET

Response Assistance Network

Reactor Regulation Act
SPEEDI

Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel
Material and Reactors
System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose
Information

SSC

System, Structure and Component

TEPCO

Tokyo Electric Power Company

TRU Waste

Low Heat Production and a Long Half‐life Waste

UPZ

Urgent Protective Action Planning Zone

USIE

Unified System for Information Exchange in Incidents andEmergencies

6

A Introduction

A

1

Introduction

Overview of Nuclear Program in Japan

Based on the definition in Convention on Nuclear Safety, there were a total of 58
reactors (24 Pressurized Water Reactors, 33 Boiling Water Reactors and one Fast
Breeder Reactor) in Japan. Six reactors in TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Station (Units 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6), one reactor of JAPC’s Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station(Unit 1), two reactors of Kansai Electric Power Company Mihama Nuclear Power
Station Units 1 and 2, one reactor of Chugoku Electric Power Company Shimane
Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, one reactor of Kyushu Electric Power Company Genkai
Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, one reactor of Shikoku Electric Power Company Ikata
Nuclear Power Station Unit 1, twelve reactors in total were permanently shutdown totakedecommissioning

measures,anddecommissioningof

anotherfourreactors(JAPC’s Tokai Unit 1, Chubu Electric Power Company’s Hamaoka Nuclear
Power Station Units 1&2, JAEA’s Fugen (ATR)) are currently underway.
In Japan, following the accident of TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Station, nuclear
regulation regime was renewed, the Reactor Regulation Act and related legislation
were revised and the NRA was established on September, 2012. The new regulatory
requirements for nuclear power reactors came into force on July, 2013. Licensees are
required to obtain authorization of NRA through the Conformity Review whichassesses on whether the reactor meets the regulatory requirements to resume operation.
The NRA has accepted applications of Conformity Review for 26 units of nuclear
reactor in 16 sites by the end of March, 2016. Commercial operation of Kyushu ElectricPower Company’s Sendai nuclear power station Units 1&2 have been resumed after the
Conformity Review has been completed.
In the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act on June, 2012, the operational periodof power reactor is limited up to 40 years, in principle. NRA has accepted applications
for extension of the operational period for three units of two Nuclear Power Stations by
the end of March, 2016. Among two units (Kansai Electric Power Company Takahama
unit 1 and unit 2) are approved by the NRA in 20 June, 2016.
Figure A‐1 shows the location and status of nuclear power reactors in Japan.
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power Station Units 1, 2, 3, &4 were designated as theSpecified Nuclear Facilities by the NRA, and based on the Implementation Plan,
specialized safety measures are implemented. Five years have passed from the accident,
7

A Introduction
the process has shifted to the stage for which measures of waste management anddecommissioning of reactor is being advanced deliberately. The work to transfer thefuel assemblies stored in spent fuel pool in the reactor building of Unit 4 to the
Common Pool located in the site has been completed in December, 2014. Contaminatedwater is being treated by Multi‐Nuclide Removal Facility (ALPS) which is supposed toremove the radioactive materials other than tritium, but the disposed water is still
stored inside the site.
Because of the accident, residents around the nuclear power station have been forced toevacuate from their homes for long time, and decontamination works outside the site
has been continued. The decontamination works in Tamura city, Kawauchi‐village
Naraha‐town, Katsurao‐village and Minamisoma city were completed and evacuation
order was lifted as of 25 July, 2016.
In Japan, retail of electric power is fully liberalized in April 2016 in order to keep stableelectric power supply and suppressing electricity charges. Electric power supplying
system reform was conducted, and the monopolistic electric power supply regime by
the conventional local electric power companies was abolished. New entry to theelectric power industry is promoted by this, and electric power companies have been
put under the competition environment. In the 4th Strategic Energy Plan of Japan1
stated that the government should consider the appropriate business environment sothat a nuclear operator can also take the best measure for safety, contribute to a countermeasures for global warming and stable power supply even in the competition
environment, maintain technology and work force in high level and proceed
decommissioning of reactor smoothly.
In the discussion at the Nuclear Energy Subcommittee, which is the advisoryorganization of Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry of Japan, the risk that operators will not be able to recover/secure funds
they have invested in a liberalized market were pointed out, since nuclear energy
business are characterized by a recovering huge initial investment through long term
project period.
With this, the possibility of disturbing to invest for measures for higher safety thanregulatory requirements due to the fear of failing to recover investment, the possibility
that the financial status of operator is aggravated remarkably by the financial loss dueto the back‐fit requirement, and the anxiety of relation between cost and safety for the1

Strategic Energy Plan, April 2014(http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf)

8

A Introduction
sustainability of nuclear business were pointed out. It can be said that Japan entered
the new steps in nuclear energy use. Agency for Natural Resources and Energy is
considering settlement of environment of nuclear business such as how accounting
system of decommissioning should be in the competition environment.
2

Implementation of the Convention on Nuclear Safety in Japan

Japan has been fulfilling its obligations described in from article 6 to article 19 of theConvention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), including improvements in nuclear regulation by
the revision of the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel
Material and Reactors (The Reactor Regulation Act), and the establishment of the NRA
in order to ensure the independence of the regulatory body. Situations regarding thefulfillments of these obligations of CNS are reported respectively in Chapter C.
As for the obligation in the CNS article 4, Japan accepts that the CNS has the same legalbinding power as domestic laws, through the approval by the National Diet andpromulgation of Japan. In addition, with domestic legal frameworks such as Reactor
Regulation Act, necessary measures are taken, which are described in Chapter C. The
obligation of CNS article 5 is fulfilled by this report documentation.
As for the article 24, Japan has participated in meetings of the Contracting Parties of
CNS, and fulfills its obligation as a government. However, there is room for
improvement in terms of full participation of CNS review process. Especially,
considering that the full participation to the review process was a concern among theContracting Parties in the 6th Review Meeting, it is a big challenge for Japan to
improve the quality of participation.
3

Development of the National Report

The National Report of Japan for 7th Review Meeting is based on the guideline2, andconsists of “Introduction”, “Summary”, “Reporting article by article” and “Annexes”.
In principle, this report is based on the information as of March, 2016.
For well‐understandable review by the Contracting Parties, measures for identified
challenges and suggestions in the last review meeting are concentrated and reported in
Chapter B” The summary of measurements during the seventh review process period”.
Summary of various regulatory issues and measures in Japan is also included in this
Chapter.
2

INFCIRC/572/Rev.5

9A Introduction
In the National Report for 7th Review Meeting, in order to improve review process of
CNS, identification of good practice is given priority in the review plan in Japan. In the
Guidelines regarding the Review Process under the Convention on Nuclear Safety3,“Good practice” is defined as “A Good Practice is a new or revised practice, policy orprogram that makes a significant contribution to nuclear safety. A Good Practice is one
that has been tried and proven by at least one Contracting Party but has not been
widely implemented by other Contracting Parties; and is applicable to other
Contracting Parties with similar programs”. In the National Report for 7th Review
Meeting, we interpret this definition as “A Good Practice is a practice that makes asignificant contribution to enhance nuclear safety and has worth to be shared by allover the world”.
When seeking solution against difficulties for safety improvement, itʹs constructive to
make an effort to identify such practice in a review process, increases the attractivenessof the review process and results in the improvement of the quality of participation toreview process. For reviewing this report, the review process is expected to focus on
the identification of not only challenges or suggestions as ever, but also good practices.
Reports for each article of CNS are mainly intended to explain the compliance status ofobligations of CNS. These provide comprehensive information about a regulatory
system in Japan as well as complement the contents indicated in Chapter B.

3

INFCIRC/571/Rev.7

10

A Introdu
uctionNuclear pow
wer station
BWR （operationnal）

PWR （operattional）

BW
WR(under consstruction）

PWR （under construction）

B
BWR （decommissioned orppermanently shu
ut down）

PWR (decom
mmissioned
permanently sshut down）

orPermaanently shut do
own means the reactorrwhich ooperators has
declaare shutdown untiluapproval off decommissionning plan.

Tomarii NPS
1

2

3

Oma N
NPS
Higaashidori NPS

Kash
hiwazaki‐Kariiwa NPS
1

2

3

4 5 6

1 （Toohoku Electric PowerP
Co., Inc.）

7（Tookyo Electric Pow
wer Company Holdings,Inc.）

Shika
S
NPS
1

2

On
nagawa NPS
1

F
Fugen
NPS Tssuruga NPS
ATR (being decommissione
ed)

1

2

2

3

Fukkushima Daiichi NPS

Monju NPS
S

1 2

3 4

FBR (unnder constructionn)Fuukushima Dainni NPS

Mihamaa Power Statioon

1 2 3 4

1 2 3

Ohi Power Station
S
2

1

3

T
Tokai NPS

4GCR (beinggdecommisssioned)

Takahhama Power
1

2 3

5 6

Tokai Daini NPS
N

4Shimanee NPS
1

2

Haamaoka NPS
1

2

3

4

Genk
kai NPS
1 2

Ikata Poweer Station

3 4

1 2

3

Sendai N
NPS
1 2F
FigureA‐1

Locattion and Sta
atus of Reacctor Facilitiees

115

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting PeriodB1
1‐1

Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
Activities related Nuclear Regulation

Review on Compliance to New Regulatory Requirements

The new regulatory requirements related to power reactors have been entered into force
in July 2013 by NRA. Licensees must submit applications on compliance to the new
regulatory requirements to the NRA to obtain authorization for their operation ofreactors.
To install and operate a new reactor in Japan, it is necessary to obtain Installation
Permit and make a specific design; obtain approval on a construction plan and carryout construction work; and finally obtain approval on Operational Safety Programs
prior to start of operation. In addition, for reactors on which authorization have been
already obtained, based on the back‐fitting system introduced with the amendment of
the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012, a review regarding conformity to the new
regulatory requirements (Conformity Review) is to be conducted; approval ofamendment of a Reactor Installation Permit already issued is to be obtained; andapproval on a Construction Plan and Operational Safety Programs based on theapproval of amendment is also to be obtained.
In the Conformity Review, a review for Amendments on a Reactor Installation Permit,a review on a Construction Plan, and a review on Operational Safety Programs are
conducted in parallel so as to review efficiently on both hardware and software in a
unified manner.
The NRA implements a Conformity Review by holding an Examination Meeting where
Commissioners participate. The Examination Meeting is made open to the public byallowing their attendance and Internet broadcasting, along with material for theexamination basically disclosed, thus maintain transparency of the review. In a processof the review, there are chances to hear the opinions of manufacturers and external
experts depending on judgment by Commissioners.
In addition to the Examination Meeting, hearings from a licensee as appropriate areoccasionally held for purposes such as confirmation of facts related to matters included
in an application. A summary of hearing proceeding is made open along with relatedmaterial basically disclosed. A licensee who has opinions to a summary of hearing
proceeding made open by the Secretariat of the NRA may present its opinions in a
specified period of time.
12

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
The Examination Meeting started review on July 16, 2013, and since then it has been
conducting review on applications submitted to the NRA in order of precedence,
holding more than 300 meetings as of the end of March 2016.
As of the end of June 2016, permission was given to total seven nuclear power plants:
Sendai Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 of Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.,
Takahama Nuclear Power Station Units 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.,and Ikata Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 of Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
As an example of Conformity Review, a summary of the review on the Sendai Nuclear
Power Station Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. is presented in the Annex 3.
1‐2

Review on Extension of Operation Period of Commercial Power Reactors

According to provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, the period of allowable operationof power reactors is 40 years from the date they passed Pre‐service Inspections. During
this period, it is possible to extend it once, for a period of no more than 20 years, if
approval is obtained from the NRA. The NRA received application for operation period
extension approval from Kansai Electric Power Company for Takahama Nuclear Power
Station Units 1 and 2 on April 30, 2015 and Mihama Power Station Unit 3 on November
26, 2015.
Each of Takahama Nuclear Power Station Units 1 and 2 is a pressurized water reactor
with electric output of 826 MW; commercial operation started in 1974 for Unit 1 and in1975 for Unit 2. The licensee applied for 20 year extension of the operation period ofeach Unit, specifically, till 2034 for Unit 1 and till 2035 for Unit 2.
Along with filing this application, the licensee conducted a Special Inspection andtechnical evaluation of deterioration conditions and formulated a MaintenanceManagement Program.
In the Special Inspection, they focused on reactor vessels, containment vessels, andconcrete structures as follows:•

Reactor vessels
For 100% of base material and weld parts in core regions, a check on defects ismade by adopting ultrasonic inspection with focus on neutron irradiation
embrittlement. For the corner parts of the primary coolant nozzle, a check on
defects is made by penetration testing or eddy current flaw detection with focus on
fatigue. For all the number of in‐core instrument piping, a check was made on
defects at weld parts by visual inspection with focus on stress corrosion cracking,and also check was made on defects at the welding heat‐affected zone inside the13B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
in‐core instrument piping by applying eddy current flaw detection. This work was
carried out using a CCD camera and an ECT probe suspended from a crane of therefueling platform.
•

Containment vessels
Over all the areas of steel plates of containment vessels that can be approached forinspection, a check was made on coating conditions with focus on corrosion by visualinspection.

•

Concrete structures
Targeting reactor containment facilities, reactor auxiliary buildings, etc., checks weremade on strength, shielding ability, neutralization, salt penetration, andalkali‐aggregate reaction using core samples with focus on deterioration of strengthand decrease in shielding ability.

Deterioration condition evaluation is performed through following steps; identifying andcategorizing target equipment from equipment having safety functions, equipment
against sever accidents; selecting typical one from the equipment; and extracting aging
degradation phenomenon to be paid attention to from a viewpoint of taking measures todeal with the aging of facilities. Following review standards on operation period
extension, the licensees identify degradation phenomenon, such as low‐cycle fatigue
cracks; neutron irradiation embrittlement of reactor vessels; irradiation‐assisted stresscorrosion cracking; thermal aging of duplex stainless steel; insulation deterioration ofelectric and instrumentation devices; deterioration of strength and decrease in shielding
ability of concrete.
To these identified aging degradation phenomenon, licensees conduct degradationassessment or integrity evaluation regarding 60 years operation and then, the assessment
is deployed to the equipment which classified in same category. On this occasion,
evaluation of the aging degradation trend and evaluation of maintenance records, which
are additional evaluation items at the 40th year of taking measures for aging management,
and evaluation of effectiveness of long‐term Maintenance Management Program at its
30th year are reflected.
In addition, seismic safety evaluation and tsunami safety evaluation are added toformulate a Maintenance Management Program.
Maintenance Management Program is consisted with measures, methods, and timingof maintenance works to be newly added along with extension of an operation period.
The Takahama nuclear power station has decided to implement middle and long‐termmonitoring tests against neutron irradiation embrittlement at the core area of reactor
14

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
vessels, taking into account operation hours and irradiance levels; reevaluation andreplacement of products equivalent to actual potting material and outer leads of thetriple axial type of electric penetration for their insulation degradation within five
years; and for against corrosion of piping, supports are reinforced while its seismic
resisting performance is kept, but till completion of the reinforcement, seismic safety
evaluation of piping are conducted by grasping a tendency of pipe‐wall thinning.
As of June 20, 2016, the NRA approved operation period extension of Takahama Nuclear
Power Station Units 1 and 2.
2

Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS)

IAEA provides the Integrated Regulatory Review Service (IRRS), as one of the IAEA’s
international peer review services, upon request of Member States. IRRS covers broad
issues related to nuclear regulation e.g., legal framework, organization, etc., and it
provides comprehensive review. The Japanese Government declared to invite an
IAEA’s IRRS review mission in December 2013, started self‐assessment in May 2014,
completed a self‐assessment report in October 2014, and invited a review mission
between January 11 and 22, 2016. The report of this review was provided by IAEA for
the Japanese Government on April 22, 2016. The IRRS report and related material usedin the IRRS review mission are made public in Web sites of the NRA4.
The report introduces the following two items as good practices.
•

The legal framework for setting up the regulatory agency where independence
and transparency are embodied and whose authority is strengthened was built
and positioned in governmental organizations.

•

In the fields of natural hazard response, severe accident measures, response to
emergency as well as intensification of safety of existing facilities, the NRA
reflected swiftly and effectively lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
accident to the new regulatory framework.

The report also stresses a need for the Japanese Government and the NRA to continue
efforts to implement a new regulatory framework where nuclear power and radiation
safety are intensified, and it presents 13 recommendations and 13 suggestions to theJapanese Government and/or the NRA where it is indicated that it is necessary or
desirable for the Japanese framework to be improved so as to continually harmonize
with IAEA’s safety standards.

4

http://www.nsr.go.jp/english/cooperation/organizations/IAEA_20160423_01.html

15

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
Among recommendations and suggestions stated in the report, major ones andresponses to them the NRA is planning are as follows:
2‐1•

Response to findings on the inspection system
In the present inspection program, items and frequencies of inspections are
specified by law in detail, and a check list method to confirm prescriptive
inspection items is adopted. NRA should ensure further effectiveness of inspection
program by amending law and NRA Ordinances

NRA plans to amend Reactor Regulation Act in order to introduce mechanism
which allows effective inspection. Under the clear allocation of primal
responsibility of safety to licensee, NRA plans that Inspection Division is able
to make decision to select inspection items depend on licensee’s efforts toensure safety.

•

Inspectors are to be given authority to swiftly decide corrective measures when
they find safety‐related problems. Furthermore, it is recommended that additional
resources need to be deployed to address increased inspection work load in
addition to current enormous examination workload.


NRA plans to provide clear definition of implementation plan/procedures, andstrengthen organization on corrective actions as well as deploying capable andexpertized inspectors, thus Inspection Division can take corrective actions
depend on inspection results with prompt and responsible manner.

•

Law should define the authority of inspectors to have free access to any places in a
power plant at any time.


NRA plans to amend the Reactor Regulation Act to ensure inspector’s
free‐access to anywhere in the nuclear power plant.

•

To change the inspection system so as to stop using a current check list method, it isnecessary to further enhance capability and ability of inspectors however, time for
initial training of inspectors is limited.


NRA plans to strengthen training system in order to enhance capability ofinspectors by applying year base training period.

2‐2•

Response to findings on radiation source regulation
Arrangement to address radiological emergency by radiation sources should be
prepared. Supervision of radiation protection measures taken by licensees should
be prioritized, and further resources should be allocated into this area.
16

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period

NRA plans to amend Radiation Hazard Prevention Act to take following
measures; arranging emergency response measures by high risk radiation
sources; reconstruction of radiation source regulation including security
measures; strengthen regulation such as examination and on‐the‐spot
inspection.

2‐3•

Response to findings on human resources
Following efforts should be made to maintain capable and experienced staff;
enrich trainings; enhance attractiveness of office to be advantage of employ new
staff; develop strategy to retain existing experts.


NRA plans to enrich staff training programs including achieving inspection
staff can take long‐term training. In parallel with strengthen NRA’s
organizational system, NRA makes effort to prepare appropriate treat tomaintain capable and experienced staff by continuous employment. In
addition, legal experts will be maintained to strengthen legal businessincluding administrative decision made by NRA.

In May 2016, a study team was established including external experts to study
details of the inspection program and radiation source regulation, with anestimate to compile results of the study around autumn of the year. According to aschedule, necessary proposed laws expected to be submitted to the National Diet
around February 2017 and part of it seek to be enforced around April of the year.
In addition to taking these measures, it is planned to invite a follow‐up mission around2019. A list of recommendations, etc. of IRRS is shown in the Annex 4.
3

Vienna Declaration5

The Vienna Declaration was adopted in a diplomatic conference for discussion of therevision of the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS) on February 9, 2015. Elements of
the Vienna Declaration are as follows:•

New nuclear power plants are to be designed, sited, and constructed, consistent
with the objective of preventing accidents in the commissioning and operation and,should an accident occur, mitigating possible releases of radionuclides causing
long‐term off site contamination and avoiding early radioactive releases or

5

INFCIRC/872

17

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
radioactive releases large enough to require long‐term protective measures andactions.
•

Comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are to be carried out
periodically and regularly for existing installations throughout their lifetime inorder to identify safety improvements that are oriented to meet the above objective.
Reasonably practicable or achievable safety improvements are to be implemented
in a timely manner.

•

National requirements and regulations for addressing this objective throughout
the lifetime of nuclear power plants are to take into account the relevant IAEA
Safety Standards and, as appropriate, other good practices as identified inter alia in
the Review Meetings of the CNS.

In Japan, conventionally it has been required to take prevention measures on disaster
caused by nuclear power reactors as a regulatory requirement, and as a result of theamendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012, measures against severe accidents,
etc. were stipulated as regulatory requirements, resulting in tightening of regulations.
Furthermore, this revision made it newly compulsory to conduct evaluation for safety
improvement, report its results, and make them open to the public. Accordingly
periodical implementation of comprehensive and systematic safety evaluation andtimely implementation of necessary improvement measures have come to be ensured
along with application of Periodic Facility Inspections, Periodic Safety Management
Reviews, and Operational Safety Inspections. Evaluation to enhance safety is reported
in Article 14, and Periodic Facility Inspections, Periodic Safety Management Reviews,
and Operational Safety Inspections are reported in Article 19.
In the 2012 amendment of Reactor Regulation Act, back‐fit requirement was introduced.
In case of regulatory requirements are revised, licensees have obligation to meet their
existing power reactors to new regulatory requirements. The NRA Ordinances whereback‐fitting is applied are the NRA Ordinance on Reactor Installation Permit and the
NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards, which are reported in Articles 17, 18, and 19.
The back‐fit system corresponds to measures taken to prevent operation of powerreactors where safety is not ensured, reported in Article 6.
In the formulation process of regulatory requirements laid down by the NRA, the
IAEA Safety Standards and other international standards have been taken into account.
As stated above, Japan has already taken measures corresponding to elements of theVienna Declaration.
18

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period

4
4‐1

Activities by Licensees
Compliance to the new regulatory requirement

In response to entering into force of the regulatory requirements in July 2013, thelicensees have taken measures based on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi
NPS accident in order to conform to the requirements. For example, they have taken
necessary measures to improve fragility of protection against tsunamis, including
installation of coast levees, installing watertight doors to important areas, enhancementof resistance to pressure and the waterproof property of outside walls of buildings. As
measures for the case of water injection means at the time of station black out, they havearranged alternative power sources, such as air‐cooled gas turbine generator vehicles, tohigh ground, increased the number of batteries, and constructed water reservoirs. In
addition, as measures to mitigate influences of core damage, they have taken measures
such as installation of top‐vent facilities on reactor buildings, top‐head flange coolinglines to fill water into the top part of containment vessel, filter vent facilities, etc. As formeasures on the software side, emergency‐response organizations have beenreorganized so that they can respond to accidents when severe accidents or the likes
should occur simultaneously in two or more units, so that a necessary number of thepersonnel for immediate response are ensured to enable initial response on emergency.
The new regulatory requirements require that preparation of necessary functions (offacilities or procedures) should be completed at the enforcement stage in July 2013
based on the lessons learned from the accident. This condition is a further demand that
preparation of backup facilities (a Specialized Safety Facility and a permanent DC
power supply facility as the third power system) to further enhance reliability should
be completed within five years from the date of approval of a construction plan related
to measures to deal with severe accidents, etc. that are needed at the enforcement stageof the new regulatory requirements. The Specialized Safety Facility is a facility formeasures against acts of terrorism such as intentional large‐airplane crashes to thereactor building.

It is required to have a facility necessary to prevent containment

vessel failure at a location about 100 meters or more from a reactor building.
4‐2

Safety Improvement Activities

The NRA holds a dialog where to exchange views concerning safety improvement withresponsible managers of major licensees that have nuclear facilities. The objectives ofthis dialog are promoting efforts to foster safety culture and hearing basic policy for19B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
safety improvement activities in licensees, and perspectives on current regulatory
system. This dialog is open to public. In this dialog, licensees report their voluntary
efforts to enhance safety. NRA and licensees discuss about licensees’ voluntary efforts
to enhance safety, licensees’ idea for improving regulatory system, and licensees’ policy
on mechanism of voluntary safety improvements based on the recommendations
provided by JANSI.
5

Effort to Address the Challenges Identified in Country Group Discussions of
the 6th Review Meeting

In Country Group discussions of the 6th Review Meeting, the following items are
identified as the “challenges” for Japan:•

NRA is to be recognized as reliable source of safety information in the frame of
discussions on the future role of nuclear power in Japan•

Stabilization and resolving the situation at the severely affected site in Fukushima
Daiichi is a long‐term challenge that can last for decades.

•

Treatment of a large amount of contaminated water•

Implement the legally required back‐fittings and improvements to reactor facilities
for restarting NPP•

Fostering Licensees’ safety culture through dialogues. Emphasis on the leadershipof the top‐ management of Utilities will be essential•

Enhancing management system and human resource development of NRA,
utilizing the merger with JNES

• Improvement of NRA’s inspection functions, including corresponding inspections forrestarting the NPPs
In addition, the following items were identified as “suggestions”:•

To invite Operational Safety Review Team(OSART)and Emergency Preparedness
Review(EPREV) missions•

Continue to develop independent regulatory information on the situation at the
Fukushima•

NRA should consider the need to enhance co‐operation with regulators ofcountries introducing the similar technologies
The following part explains how these items are being tackled.
20

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period

5‐1

The NRA’s states, as taken up in discussions on future roles of nuclear power
generation in Japan, to be positioned as a reliable supplier of information related tosafetyThe NRA formulated medium‐term targets in February 2015, presenting its action
policy for five years between April 2015 and March 2020. In the medium‐term targets,
it is upheld as the organization objective to “protect people and environment throughtrusted regulation on nuclear power,” and as one of objectives of measures and policies,
it is stipulated to “ensure confidence in nuclear regulation administration.” The basic
idea in this objective of measures and policies is ensuring independence, neutrality,
and transparency of nuclear regulation administration; continual improvement of theorganization and activities; partnership and cooperation with other countries andinternational agencies, etc.
As for ensure independence, neutrality, and transparency of nuclear regulation
administration, various efforts are made, including independent decision making from ascientific and technological viewpoint; rigorous operation of code of conducts, etc. set up
to ensure neutrality; achievement of accountability through full disclosure of information
related to regulation, including decision‐making processes; and hearing of various
opinions inside and outside Japan through exchange of opinions related to safety
improvement with organizations subject to regulation, actively inviting public comments
on issues not required in the Administrative Procedures Act, and through exchange ofviews with international advisors.
As for continual improvement of the organization and operations, organizational
structure and operation related to nuclear regulation are to be continually improved by
fixing the Management System whose operation was fully started in 2015 into the wholeorganization through continual improvement of the system aimed at fostering of safety
culture and enhancement of regulation, acceptance of an international peer review (the
IRRS) managed by the IAEA, etc. Furthermore, in order to achieve the medium‐termtargets, resource allocation is always checked so as to make the organizational systemeffective and efficient.
As for partnership with the international community, contribution is made tointernational nuclear safety through consistent, continuous, reliable, and active
international activities and reflection in nuclear regulation of Japan as well as cultivationof human resources acceptable in light of international standards by promoting
partnership with the IAEA, OECD/NEA, etc. and also through activities by theregulatory body based on agreements in bilateral cooperation, cooperation with21

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
regulatory bodies of emerging nations that are introducing nuclear energy, etc.
5‐2Stability and solution of serious site conditions of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Since the accident in TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS, about five years have passed, and
it is recognized that the status of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS has currently changed froman “Emergency Response Stage” where various troubles were responded to in an
emergency manner to a “Planned Action Stage” where each plan is fully determined,
covering management of wastes and entire measures toward reactor decommissioning
so as to steadily implementation of the measures.
The NRA made a mid‐term risk reduction target map in order to clarify items to besolved with priority for the safety, and make them clear by past items and future items.
The NRA revises this map periodically and evaluates the achievement of the targets.
Subsequently, TEPCO has planned and implemented each step of fuel removal fromthe spent fuel storage pools inside the reactor buildings, removal of fuel debris,
dismantlement of reactor facilities, etc., following the medium and long‐term roadmaps, revised in June 2015, toward implementation of decommissioning measures, etc.
of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS. Removal of fuel assemblies from the spent fuel storage
pool inside the reactor building of Unit 4 was completed in December 2014, and now it
is planned to carry out removal of fuel assemblies from the spent fuel storage pools
inside the reactor building of Unit 3, 1, and 2 in a sequence.
As stated in the National Report of Japan for 6th Review Meeting, the Fukushima Daiichi
NPS had a large amount of groundwater flowing into the reactor buildings, etc.,
resulting in an increase of water contaminated by radioactive material, so that additional
contaminated water storage facilities have been installed and other necessary measures
have been taken to prevent inflow of groundwater into the buildings and securely
operate contaminated water disposal facilities. TEPCO got engaged in treatment ofcontaminated water using the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS) as a means
for the decontamination, and it completed processing of RO6 concentrated water stored
in tanks in May 2015.
The removal of contaminated water left in the seaside trench was completed in July, 2015.
Decontaminated water by the ALPS is stored in the storage tanks in the site because
6

Reverse osmosis22

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
tritium is still remained in the water. The NRA has announced decontaminated water
should be released to the ocean in the condition which complied with regulatory
requirements, under the consideration that continuous storage of treated water inside thesite is not favorable for proceeding safe and smooth decommissioning of Fukushima
Daiichi NPS.
In addition, it has implemented construction of impermeable walls on the land sideusing the Frozen Ground Method to prevent groundwater from flowing into thebuildings; the groundwater bypass to pump up groundwater before it reaches thebuilding and release it to the sea; and impermeable walls on the sea side to prevent
contaminated water from flowing into the port; in addition, TEPCO has also put into
operation underground drain (sub‐drain) that pumps up contaminated groundwater
being accumulated inside the impermeable walls for cleaning treatment. These measuresagainst contaminated water have achieved certain effects, contributing to stability ofconditions of the Fukushima Daiichi NPS.
The NRA established ʺThe Commission on Supervision and Evaluation of the Specified
Nuclear Facilitiesʺ to supervise and evaluate a medium and long‐term safety ensures in
TEPCO’s Daiichi Fukushima site. In addition to that, the NRA established “Study Teamfor Specified Nuclear Facilities Radioactive Waste Regulation” on December 2015, to
study items related stable management of radioactive waste disposal in 1F site ,including study in the early design phase of implementation plan, considering longterm decommissioning in the future from the viewpoint of safety regulation.
5‐3

Implementation of back‐fitting measures and safety improvement based on laws
to resume operation of nuclear power stations

As reported in the National Report of Japan for 6th Review Meeting, existing nuclear
power stations are now obliged to conform to the new regulatory requirements due tothe amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012. The regulatory requirements the
NRA formulated were reported in the National Report of Japan for 6th Review Meeting.
Conventional regulatory requirements (design basis) and measures against natural
disasters have been reinforced, and at the same time, new requirements for measuresagainst severe accidents have been introduced, which has resulted in significant
improvement of safety.
Immediately after the enforcement of the new regulatory requirements in July 2013,
licensees submit to the NRA applications concerning conformance to the new regulatory23

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Periodrequirements; actually, applications for 26 reactors were submitted as of the end of March
2016.
There are three elements for the Conformity Review: “Application for amendment ofReactor Installation Permit,” “Application for Construction Plan Approval,” and“Application for amendment of Operational Safety Program Approval.” Licensees mustcomplete these authorization procedures before resuming operation of reactors.
Moreover, unless it is confirmed that power reactor facilities at issue conform to theapproved construction plan in a Pre‐service Inspection to be conducted after the
Conformity Review. Licensee cannot use power reactor facility without pass thePre‐service Inspection.
The NRA is in charge of review of these applications, and as of the end of March 2016,
Conformity Reviews and Pre‐service Inspections were completed with Sendai Nuclear
Power Station Units 1 and 2 of Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc. and Takahama Nuclear
Power Station Unit 3, of Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc. which accordingly resumedcommercial operation. (However, Takahama Nuclear Power Station Unit 3 has been in
shutdown because a petition by residents of Shiga Prefecture for a provisional
disposition order to stop operation of the Takahama Unit 3 that was approved by Otsu
District Court on March 9.)
Aiming at safety improvement after restart of NPPs, the amended Reactor Regulation
Act provides a new safety improvement assessment system. In this system, thelicensees are requested to make an assessment by themselves in a period within six
months of the date when a Periodic Facility Inspection on safety of the power reactor
facilities at issue is completed, and after the assessment, they are requested to submit
report of the assessment results to the NRA without delay and make them open to the
public.
5‐4Enhancement of safety culture in licensee through dialogues and fostering ofleadership especially needed for management layers of facilities

The NRA holds a dialog where to exchange views concerning safety improvement withresponsible managers of major licensees that have nuclear facilities. The objectives ofthis dialog are promoting efforts to foster safety culture and hearing basic policy forsafety improvement activities in licensees, and perspectives on current regulatory
system. This forum is open to public. In this forum, licensees report their voluntary
efforts to enhance safety. NRA and licensees discuss about licensees’ voluntary efforts
to enhance safety, licensees’ idea for improving regulatory system, and licensees’ policy24B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
on mechanism of voluntary safety improvements based on the recommendations
provided by JANSI.
The forum started in October 2014, and NRA completed the opinion exchange with 12
licensees by September 2015. In light of the results, the NRA reached to the conclusion thatthe forum was a meaningful occasion for NRA to hear various views and also for licensees
to enhance recognition of licensees’ primal responsibility for safety, through discussion onsummarizing the forum and policy for continue the opinion exchange. NRA also pointed
out a challenge that deeper discussion wasn’t performed in some cases due to limit ofdiscussion points. As a response to this challenge, NRA decided that trying to discuss
about any regulatory issues including issues proposed by licensees without limitation toachieve fruitful discussion with active participation of managers of licensees. Following
this policy, the opinion exchange get into the second round from February 2016.
5‐5

Enhancement of human resource development and the Management System of
the NRA in light of integration with JNES

Due to the merger of JNES in March 2014, NRA developed the Management System
which systematically integrated various internal rules applied to daily business in NRA
and JNES. NRA developed NRA Management Rule in September 2014. NRA’s
Management System has been entering into force on April 1, 2015, after trial run from
October 1, 2014.
The Management Rule of the NRA stipulates that a PDCA cycle consisting of periodic
formulation of an Annual Strategic Plan, implementation of activities, management
review, and improvement should be put into practice as the Management System. It
also specifies organizations, leadership, and documentation and recording needed as abasis of implementation of the Management System as well as management of
resources needed for effectiveness of Management System. In addition, there areprovisions related to processes to handle items to be improved, preventive measures,internal audits, etc. in order to allow the whole organization to tackle improvement
work aiming at effective and efficient implementation of activities.
5‐6

Enhancement of functions of the NRA, including handling of inspections forresumption of nuclear power stations

For power reactors that passed the Conformity Review to be put into operation, it mustalso pass a Pre‐service Inspection NRA conducts. Due to the 2012 amendment of theReactor Regulation Act, an inspection on quality assurance activities is added to thePre‐service Inspection, so that it has become necessary to make an inspection more
25

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
rational. For this reason, in a Pre‐service Inspection related to a method of quality
control, etc., NRA confirms common matters regarding construction and inspection oftarget facilities, such as implementing organization for quality control, and plan,
implementation, evaluation, improvement, are implemented along with Construction
Plan, applying audit methodology. Regarding implementation status of quality controlof licensee is a checking item of Operational Safety Inspection and Periodic Safety
Management Review, also. To avoid overlap of inspection, in the Pre‐service Inspection,
NRA checks licensee’s quality control focus on the construction and inspection in theextent of Pre‐service Inspection.
In Pre‐service Inspections of major facilities having safety functions, a focus is on
facility structure, functions, performance, etc. The Inspections are put in practice withattendance of inspectors or by a method of checking related records. NRA makes
comprehensive review on how much the attendance of the inspectors is needed toachieve effective inspection.
As for Pre‐service Inspections on facilities other than major facilities having safetyfunctions, a check is made on items stated in a basic design policy of a Construction
Plan and adequacy of conformity confirmation made by licensee with reference torecords made by them for each facility as well as on consistency between records madeby the licensee and conditions of real facilities in a form of a sampling test.
The Conformity Review includes approval of Operational Safety Programs, so that the
NRA checks each licensee’s status of conformance to approved Operational Safety
Programs in Operational Safety Inspections which take place four times per year. The
NRA has made a study to enhance effectiveness of Operational Safety Inspections,based on which following improvements have been fully put in operation since 2015.
•

In order to leverage an unannounced inspection and an inspection with interviews
to operating staff, a study for implementation of them was made with reference toopinions of Nuclear Safety Inspectors, and implementation manuals for both theinspection were developed.

•

To implement an unannounced inspection and an inspection with interviews tooperating staff, Operational Safety Inspectors came to be required to enhance theirskills of communications with licensees, so that the “Basic Training forCommunications” was newly set up in cooperation with the Nuclear Human
Resource Development Center. In addition, the “Inspector Communication
Training” that has been practiced was reviewed to enrich contents of the Training.

•

Based on the implementation manuals for the unannounced inspection and the26B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
inspection with interviews to operating staff, both the types of inspections were put
into practice in the third and fourth Operational Safety Inspections in FY2014 insome Commercial Power Reactors. Accordingly, findings in the Inspections werereflected in the implementation manuals for improvement.
•

As an index for safety, a new index was selected which reflected an actual status ofoperational safety activities in licensee with reference to the IAEA TECDOC‐1141:
Operational safety performance indicators for nuclear power plants, a technicalreport made up by the IAEA, in addition to the number of non‐planned scramsthat is an index frequently used.

•

A method to select items of Operational Safety Inspection by identifying
information to know licensee’s operational safety activities from the findings ofOperational Safety Inspector’s daily plant walk‐down was introduced.

•

In preparation for a case that a need arises for implementing inspections
specialized in a certain field of expertise such as activities to foster safety culture, asupport system for Operational Safety Inspectors was studied and a system for
conducting expertized inspections was developed.

The following are matters identified as “suggestions” in the 6th Review Meeting for Japan.
5‐7

Hosting IAEA OSART and EPREV review missions

TEPCO has been taking various measures aiming at further improvement of safety andreliability of the Kashiwazaki‐Kariwa Nuclear Power Station in light of lessons learned
from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident. As part of this effort, TEPCO invited the
IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) to review operational safety measuresin Units 6 and 7 of the Power Station from June 29 to July 13, 2015. Fields of assessmentare (1) management, organization and administration, (2) training and qualification, (3)operations, (4) maintenance and technical support (related to mechanics, electricalinstrumentation, and civil engineering), (5) operational experience feedback, (6) radiation
protection, (7) emergency planning and preparedness, and (8) severe accident
management. Consequently, six recommendations, nine suggestions and nine goodpractices were brought up or identified.
In response, immediately after the review, TEPCO swiftly launched a study on
measures necessary to cope with these indications, and it further intends to put inpractice all the indications raised in the review. In addition, to review progress of
implementation of the measures, TEPCO indicates a willingness to accept a follow up
visit in about eighteen months after this mission. Results of the OSART review and the27B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
measures TEPCO has taken are presented in the Annex 5.
Incidentally, EPREV was not hosted during the period covered by this report.
5‐8Continue to develop independent regulatory information on the situation at the
Fukushima

The NRA has continuously provided information on situations of the Fukushima
Daiichi NPS for international organizations and major nuclear power countries.
Fukushima Daiichi NPS is still in a status in recovering from accident, but as more than
five years have passed since the accident, site conditions have come to be stabilized. To
this change, the NRA has taken reasonable response such as decrease in frequency of its
provision of information to foreign countries. Currently, the NRA provides information
on results of environmental radiation monitoring, including the sea as a monitoringtarget, at a frequency of once a month.
5‐9Consideration of the need to enhance co‐operation with regulators of countries
introducing the similar technologies

In order to ensure nuclear safety, it is quite important for countries importing the nuclear
technology to develop a robust regulatory infrastructure. The basic policy of cooperatewith these emerging countries is to “help them develop a robust regulatory
infrastructure by themselves,” and Japan puts the highest priority on cooperation fordevelopment of human resources to be in charge of executing regulation. Japan also
positions information exchange and sharing of experiences as important factors for thecooperation, and thus regulatory information exchange meetings have become a pillar ofbilateral cooperation in which Japan is involved.
Japan does not conduct cooperation in the form of transfer Japanese regulatory
infrastructure to emerging countries like take over those countries’ responsibility
because such form of cooperation provides less contribution to develop their own
regulatory infrastructure.
As stated above, the NRA is acting based on a study on what form of cooperation witheach country is suitable, and future regulatory cooperation with the countries
importing technologies from Japan is to be pursued in line with this policy.

28

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
6Efforts to Address Challenges Stated in the Summary Report of the 6th Review
Meeting

Japan has addressed the challenges indicated in Paragraph 35 of the Summary Reportof the 6th Review Meeting as mentioned below.
6‐1

Minimize gaps between Contracting Parties’ safety improvements

The measures taken based on lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS
accident are accompanied by a significant change: installation of the NRA whose
authority in independent decision making is guaranteed by law; review on regulation
where measures against severe accidents and the back‐fit system are adopted; rigorous
review on conformity to the newly developed regulatory requirements, etc. Since it isconsidered that there are differences among safety measures taken by Contracting
Parties due to different circumstances of each Party, it is judged that proper
information exchange among Contracting Parties should contribute to minimization of
the gap.
6‐2

Achieve harmonized emergency plans and response measures

Japan is surrounded by the sea without connecting to neighboring countries directly overnational borders. In fact, Japan’s nuclear power station that is the closest to neighboring
countries is more than 100 km distant from the nearest country. Therefore, Japan does notshare EPZ where emergency measures should be taken with its neighboring countries, sothat there are no emergency plans and countermeasures in Japan to be harmonized with
theirs.
On the other hand, in order to take proper protective actions, it is important that an
accident country provides monitoring data without delay.
For the purpose, Japan develops the system to make monitoring data publicly available
on the website.
6‐3

Better use of operating and regulatory experience, and international peer review
services

In Japan, there is a duty to report operational experiences of domestic nuclear power
stations subject to laws. In addition, Japan has also built a scheme where events alicensee consider necessary to be shared are deployed to other licensees despite nolegal duty of reporting, which is regarded as a voluntary activity among licensee. As
for overseas operation experiences, information collection or information provision is29

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
made by actively using international databases on operational experiences such as IRS,
jointly operated by IAEA and OECD/NEA.
As for regulatory experiences, experience sharing is made mainly in the form ofbilateral regulatory information exchange.
In terms of international peer review services, the Government of Japan invited IRRS
and TEPCO invited OSART, and there is a plan to invite EPREV in the future. The
active use of these international peer review services is a future challenge; however,since follow‐up mission of the said services are expected to be made within several
years, and it is expected to be clear, on the occasion, how much they have been utilized.
6‐4

Improve regulators’ independence, safety culture, transparency and openness

In the Act for Establishment of the NRA, it is stipulated that the NRA executes
independently its official authority so as to ensure its independent decision making. In
terms of safety culture of the regulatory body, the NRA enacted the “Statement on
Nuclear Safety Culture” in May 2015. The NRA has announced a Code of Conduct onsafety culture, and it has declared that it is to take the initiative in taking actions basedon the Code of Conduct, make all the parties concerned with nuclear energy have sureawareness on importance of safety culture, and thereby contribute to development ofsafety culture in Japan.
Transparency and openness are issues being tackled by the NRA since its foundation,
while the NRA reported on them in the National Report of Japan for 6th Review
Meeting.
The above stated matters are reported in the reporting on Article 8.
6‐5

Engage all countries to commit and participate in international cooperation

In the context of promotion to spread nuclear safety, one of the challenges related toparticipation in international cooperation is to achieve complete participation of theContracting Parties in review processes of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. In
Paragraph 14 of the Summary Report of the 6th Review Meeting, issues to be further
enhanced toward future meetings are identified, and Japan is making efforts for thispurpose as stated below.
Japan has defined that the obligations of the Contracting Parties are; submission of
National Reports; submission of appropriate questions through reviews and response toquestions directed to Japan; participation in Review Meetings; and participation in all the
meetings of the group to which Japan belongs so as to have useful discussions. Not only30

B Summary of Major Activities during the 7th Reporting Period
knowledge and experiences of engagement in regulation in Japan but also knowledge
and experiences in the Global Nuclear Safety Regime are needed for properly reviewing
National Reports. That means that a different expertise from that of ordinary regulatory
administrator is needed, so that the NRA is trying to introduce a scheme of developing
such as internationalized human resource. Development of internationalized humanresource is an approach to further contribution to the international cooperation. On theother hand, from a viewpoint of full participation to Review Meetings, it is important toencourage experts of Japan to join the Review Process. To promote expertʹs participation,
NRA would like to propose to shift the review process to ʺsolution finding approachʺ,more focus on identifying “good practice” which can contribute to significantly enhance
nuclear safety. Review process should be a chance to solve the difficulties a Contracting
Party faces.
Focusing on “good practice” in the review process can be achieved without amend
Review Process Guideline. It can be achieved only by changing attitudes of Contracting
Parties, so we are trying to involve the G7 member countries and the major nuclear
power countries and call for cooperation to make harmonized efforts.

31

C Outline of the Report for Each Article
C

Outline of the Report for Each Article

This Chapter reports Japan’s implementation status of each Article of the Convention
on Nuclear Safety. Section I explains an outline of domestic measures taken for
implementation of Japan’s obligation of the Convention, and section II states about
efforts to enhance nuclear safety.
When Japan concluded the Convention on Nuclear Safety, it took a measure to fulfill
obligations stipulated in the Contract by securing performance of the fulfillment withdomestic laws. Since the Convention was put into effect in Japan in October 1996, Japan
carried out revisions of laws and ordinances related to nuclear regulation, reorganizationof the regulation body, etc., which has resulted in the following implementation status of
the Convention on Nuclear Safety as of now.
Among all the duties specified in the Convention on Nuclear Safety, those specified
between Article 9 and 19, except Article 16, are performed in the form of nuclear
regulations of Japan.
Nuclear regulations are stipulated in the Reactor Regulation Act, and regulations
applied during the life period of each commercial power reactor are as follows:I

Relationship between Domestic Measures and Conformity to the Convention
on Nuclear Safety

1Commercial Power Reactors

1‐1

Reactor Installation Permit

For installation of a commercial power reactor, a Reactor Installation Permit must be
obtained from the NRA. In this procedure, review is made on siting conditions for
installation of reactor facilities, basic design related to facility safety, technicalcapability, and financial reserves of operators. In the case of changing mattersdescribed in the application documents after obtaining a Reactor Installation Permit,
a permit must be obtained on the changed parts from the NRA.
This procedure covers Articles 11, 12, 14, and 17 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
1‐2Construction Plan Approval

Licensees who have obtained Reactor Installation Permits must obtain approval from32

C Outline of the Report for Each Article
the NRA on their construction plans before starting work to install or change reactor
facilities. This procedure focuses on specific facility design that should conform tobasic design on which a Reactor Installation Permit has been obtained as a review
target. A review is also made on a quality assurance system applied to the design andthe construction. For changing contents of a Permit, including the case of changing a
construction plan already permitted or remodeling of an approved facility, a change
permit of the construction plan at issue must be obtained.
This procedure covers Articles 13, 14, and 18 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
1‐3

Pre‐service Inspections

This is an inspection conducted by the NRA to confirm that construction of reactor
facilities has been carried out as specified in an approved construction plan, andperformance of the facilities conforms to the technical standards specified in the NRA
Ordinance. Without passing this inspection, the licensees cannot use the facilities.
A Pre‐service Inspection is made at each step of construction when inspection becomes
possible at the step. However, without passing all the inspection items, the facilities atissue cannot be used, so that this Inspection means the first approval action toward useof the facilities and it covers the Article 19 paragraph 1 of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety.
1‐4Fuel Assembly Inspections

Manufacturers of fuel assemblies to be used in reactor facilities must beforehand
obtain an approval on design of the fuel assemblies from the NRA and then must be
subject to a Fuel Assembly Inspection. The NRA is to confirm that fuel was
manufactured as specified in the approval through a Fuel Assembly Inspection. Thisis a procedure needed each time design of fuel assemblies is changed, and it is an act
of approval that enables use of the fuel assemblies in reactors. Therefore, like thePre‐service Inspection, it is one of the procedures to cover the Article 19 paragraph 1of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
1‐5

Welding Inspections of Contractors and Welding Safety Management Reviews

Licensees must inspect weld parts on important ones of reactor facilities. The NRA
reviews and assesses methods, schemes, etc. of welding inspections licensees are to
make.
This procedure is also one of procedures that cover the Article 19 paragraph 1 of theConvention.
33

C Outline of the Report for Each Article
1‐6Operational Safety Program Approval

Licensees must formulate Operational Safety Programs and obtain approval from the
NRA before starting use of their reactor facilities. The Operational Safety Programs
are a document that is positioned at the highest level of documents related to reactor
facility safety. Licensees are obliged to comply with their Operational Safety
Programs, and they must have their employees in charge of nuclear power stations
comply with the Programs.
Requirements of Operational Safety Programs cover the Articles 10 and 11 paragraph
2, and further Articles 12, 13, 15, and 19 paragraphs 2 to 8 of the Convention.
1‐7

Operational Safety Inspections

This is an inspection made by the NRA to check a status of conformity to Operational
Safety Programs. A periodic Operational Safety Inspection is implemented four times
per year. It is also implemented in a manner of accompanying actions important for
securing safety such as operation to start up or shut down a power reactor and operation
related to replacement of fuel.
This procedure covers the Article 19 paragraph 3 of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety.
1‐8Periodic Facility Inspections, Periodic Licensee’s Inspections and Periodic
Safety Management Reviews

These are inspections periodically implemented on reactor facilities after they havepassed Pre‐service Inspections. Licensees are obliged to implement Periodic Licensee’s
Inspections, and the NRA reviews and assesses methods, schemes, etc. of the Periodic
Licensee’s Inspections. In addition, inspectors from the NRA attend especially
important Periodic Licensee’s Inspections.
This procedure covers the Article 19 paragraph 3 of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety.
1‐9Evaluations to Improve Safety

This is a system instituted by the Reactor Regulation Act revised in 2012 and put into
effect in December 2013. Licensees of power reactor operation must evaluate safety of
power reactor facilities at issue in a period within six months from the date wheneach Periodic Facility Inspection is completed, report results of the evaluation, andmake them open to the public. Details are mentioned in the reporting of Article 6.
34

C Outline of the Report for Each Article
This is one of activities corresponding to Article 14 of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety.
1‐10Technical Evaluation of Aging Facilities and Aging Management System

Licensees are obliged to take measure for safety of power reactor facilities. And as
part of it, they must make a Technical Evaluation of Aging Facilities by the day when
30 years have passed after the date when operation of the reactor facilities started,and based on its results, they must formulate a long‐term maintenance policy. After
that, they are to conduct a Technical Evaluation of Aging Facilities in every 10 years
and to revise the long‐term maintenance policy as a need arises.
This procedure covers the Article 14 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety.
1‐11

Approval of Extension of the Limit of Operational Periods

This is a procedure instituted in the 2012 revision of the Reactor Regulation Act. The
operational periods of power reactors are limited to 40 years calculated from the dateof passing a Pre‐service Inspection on construction for installation of each powerreactor, but an operational period of each reactor can be extended, one time only, foranother 20 years or less if approval is obtained from the NRA. When a licensee files foran extension of operation, the NRA can approve the extension only if it finds
conformance to standards it specifies for securing safety during a period for the
expected extension in light of conditions of degradation of the reactor at issue andother facilities that has occurred due to long‐tern operation. Application must havedocuments attached, where the following items are described.
(1)

Results of inspections made to grasp conditions of degradation that has
occurred on a reactor at issue and other facilities.

(2)

Results of technical evaluations on conditions of degradation that will occur ona reactor at issue and other facilities during a period for the expected extension.

(3)

A policy of maintenance management of a reactor at issue and other facilities
during a period for the expected extension.

In order to obtain approval of an extension of the limit on an operational period, it isrequired to conform to the technical standard rule, even if degradation due tooperation of a reactor at issue and other facilities during a period of the expected
extension is taken into account.
1‐12

Suspension of Facility Use

The NRA can order licensees of power reactor operation measures necessary for35

C Outline of the Report for Each Article
safety such as suspension of use, remodeling, repair, and transfer, and designate
operation methods of facilities, when it finds that locations, structure, and equipmentof power reactor facilities do not conform to the installation permit standard rule orwhen it judges that measures related to safety and operation of power reactor
facilities, transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear fuel or items contaminatedby nuclear fuel material violate the rule of commercial power reactors.
The measures, in this regulation, taken when there is no conformance to the NRA
Ordinance on Standards for the Location, etc., and the NRA Ordinance on TechnicalStandards request back‐fitting of existing power reactor facilities. They conform to
Articles 17 and 18 and also cover Article 6 and the Vienna Declaration.
1‐13

Approval of Decommissioning Plan

For licensees to decommission reactor facilities, they must obtain permission fromthe NRA. Licensees are to obtain a change permit of their Operational Safety
Programs for decommissioning measures till the date of approval of theirdecommissioning plan and then implement the decommissioning measures.
What should be carried out as decommissioning measures is dismantlement of apower reactor, transfer of possessed nuclear fuel material, removal of contamination
caused by nuclear fuel material, disposal of nuclear fuel material or items
contaminated by nuclear fuel material, and delivery of radiation control records to a
designated institution.
1‐14

Confirmation of Completion of Decommissioning Measures

This is the last approval action to licensees where the NRA confirms completion of
decommissioning measures for sites where decommissioning measures werecompleted. With this confirmation, related Reactor Installation Permits lose theireffects.
1‐15

Other Regulations

In addition to above stated regulations, the Reactor Regulation Act stipulates
procedures related to revocation of permits, merger and breakup of corporate bodies
that are licensees of power reactor, succession of licensees of power reactor, etc.
2Specified Nuclear Facility

Licensees must immediately take emergency measures when it is thought that a36

C Outline of the Report for Each Article
disaster might occur or it has occurred due to nuclear fuel material, items
contaminated by nuclear fuel material, or a reactor in consequence of an earthquake, afire, or other disasters. With these measures taken, when the NRA judges that it isespecially necessary to implement management in a suitable manner according toconditions of facilities, it can designate the facilities at issue as the “Specified Nuclear
Facilities” that mean facilities requiring special measures for protection of Specified
Nuclear Fuel Material. After this designation, the NRA is to indicate items licensees
should take measures against and a time limit for submission of plans (hereinafter
called the “Implementation Plans”) to implement measures for safety or protection ofSpecified Nuclear Fuel Material and then require them to submit the Implementation
Plans. The licensees must submit their Implementation Plans by a time limit and obtainapproval from the NRA.
In Specified Nuclear Facilities, it is allowed to apply only part of the Reactor
Regulation Act, only if it is judged that measures such as safety measures subject to an
Implementation Plan can be properly implemented there. This enables taking measuresmore fitting into an actual status of facilities, since provisions of the Reactor Regulation
Act are stipulated with in mind safety and so on of normal reactor facilities and it is notproper to require damaged facilities to take the same measures as normal facilities.
Incidentally, it is the Fukushima Daiichi NPS that is designated, so far, as Specified
Nuclear Facilities.

As stated in this section, through enforcement of regulation based on the Reactor
Regulation Act, Japan is implementing duties stipulated in Article 10 to 15 and Article
17 to 19 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Furthermore, the Reactor Regulation Act
includes miscellaneous regulations, in addition to those related to a regulation system,
where there are provisions about responsibilities and duties of licensees that cover the
Article 9 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Other provisions are explained below.
The NRA has its ground of institution in provisions of the Atomic Energy Basic Act,and its concrete capacity and power, conditions on enforcement of them, etc. are
stipulated in the Act for Establishment of the NRA. The NRA is a committee
established subject to Article 3 of the National Government Organization Act thatgoverns administrative organizations of the Japanese Government. Staff of the NRA, as
government officials, are subject to control of the National Civil Service Law. Theseissues will be reported in Article 8.
Since Article 7 of the Convention requests establishment of related laws and rules, our37

C Outline of the Report for Each Article
report is made to present a hierarchical law system Japan has for nuclear regulation
and an overview of Japanese laws and rules to regulate nuclear power stations.
About Article 6, our report is made on measures taken to secure safety of existing
facilities,

following

provisions

of

the

guideline

about

National

Reports(INFCIRC/572/Rev. 5).
Response to nuclear emergency is stipulated at each stage, such as preparation for andrestoration from emergency, in terms of duties and responsibilities of the central
government, municipalities, and licensees in the Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (the Nuclear Emergency Act).
Along with the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures, this covers the Article 16 of theConvention on Nuclear Safety.
With the above stated matters totally considered, it is judged that measures Japan has
taken conform to duties specified in the Convention on Nuclear Safety. A result ofindividual conformity assessment on each Article is presented at the start of a report
related to the Article.
II

Activities Contributing to Enhancement of Nuclear Safety

Through expansion of domestic measures and international cooperation, it is one ofimportant objects of the Convention on Nuclear Safety to globally achieve andmaintain nuclear safety at a higher level and conformity to the Convention contributes
to securement of the object. Below stated are activities that are considered to contributeto nuclear safety improvement among activities Japan put into practice during thisreported period.
1

Implementation of the Back‐fit System (Article 6, Article 17, and Article 18)

It contributes to safety improvement in utilization of nuclear energy to make not only
new but also existent nuclear facilities conform to regulation standards that have beenrevised with the latest technical knowledge taken in. Japan has strengthened legal force
by institutionalizing back‐fitting to include it in laws. Activities on back‐fitting Japan
has been promoting are reported in a following way: Article 6 in terms of related
institutions from a viewpoint of operation of facilities whose safety was confirmed;
Article 17 from a viewpoint of site conditions; Article 18 from a viewpoint of design;and Chapter B in terms of activities that have been implemented in this reported
period.
38

C Outline of the Report for Each Article
2

Measures for Severe Accidents (Article 19)

Although prevention of severe accidents is important, it is an important element ofsafety improvement in utilization of nuclear energy to make preparation for measures
for restoration to the normal status on the assumption that a severe accident should
occur.
In the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, it was obliged to adopt procedures different fromordinary ones such as injection of water into reactor pressure vessels by use of fire trucks;
therefore, but training for and learning of this kind of flexible response contribute tosecurement of safety. In Japan, severe accident measures are required to be adopted indesign by the new regulatory requirements, and furthermore, appropriate operation ofsevere accident countermeasures, including maintaining appropriate scheme and training,are included in Operational Safety Programs.
With reference to past examples in the world, it is apparent that severe accidents never
happen frequently. But it is thought that significant efforts are required to maintainactivities, at a high level for a long time, in preparation for such a rare event. It is an
important challenge to take measures for maintaining awareness and technicalcapability at a high level, so that what is prepared for severe accidents can be swiftly
deployed at any time if a need arises.

39

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
ARTICLE 6

EXISTING NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONSEach Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the safety of nuclear
installations existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party isreviewed as soon as possible. When necessary in the context of this Convention, the Contracting
Party shall ensure that all reasonably practicable improvements are made as a matter ofurgency to upgrade the safety of the nuclear installation. If such upgrading cannot be achieved,plans should be implemented to shut down the nuclear installation as soon as practicallypossible. The timing of the shut‐down may take into account the whole energy context andpossible alternatives as well as the social, environmental and economic impact.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 6
There are 48 commercial power reactors in Japan, five of which were recognized asconforming to the new regulatory requirements which the NRA implemented andobtained amendments on a Reactor Installation Permit.
As for TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS, it was designated as the Specified Nuclear
Facilities by the NRA and, accordingly, it has been under special control.
Nuclear facilities in Japan are required to conform to the regulatory standards
stipulated in the NRA Ordinance, according to provisions of the Reactor Regulation
Act. When the regulatory standards are amended, even existing reactor facilities will
be obliged to conform to amended regulatory standards, and if nonconformity is found,the NRA can order suspension for use of the facilities. Therefore, there is no continuing
operation of nuclear facilities in Japan that are in a state without safety secured, so that
conformity to the provision of Article 6 of the Convention is achieved.

40

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
1

Reactor Facilities in Japan

As of the end of March 2016, there were a total of 48 power reactors (24 BWR and 24
PWR) in Japan. Six reactors were permanently shut down to take decommissioning
measures, and the decommissioning of another four reactors is currently underway.
The Annex provides a list of reactors for nuclear installation in Japan.
2

Accidents or Failure that Occurred during the Reported Period

During the three‐year period FY2013 ‐FY2015, 15 incidents were reported to the NRA
by licensees in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act. Although the number ofreported incidents has decreased compare to the past, this is because almost all thecommercial power reactors in Japan have suspended. 12 among above mentioned 15
incidents are occurred in TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS. The list of accidents or
failure that occurred during the reporting period is shown in the Annex.
3Efforts to Secure Safety

3‐1

Conformity Reviews

The NRA Ordinance so called the new regulatory requirements stipulates thatcommercial power reactors should conform to them which is put into effect in July
2013 An outline of the new regulatory requirements is presented in the National Reportof Japan for 6th Review Meeting.
The conformity review is a regulatory procedure needed for operation of existing
power reactors in Japan, which consists of review procedures for amendment on
Reactor Installation Permit, on a construction plan, and on Operational Safety
Programs. The NRA checks conformity to the regulatory requirements through theseprocedures.
Regulatory requirements measures against severe accidents were added, andregulatory requirements against earthquakes, tsunamis were reinforced base on thelessons learned from the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS. Accordingly,
existing reactors need to take back‐fitting to them. In case of occurrence on accidents or
natural disasters that exceed estimation in the regulatory requirements, it is required totake measures for prevention of core damage, containment vessel failure, anddispersion of radioactive material. The review of amendment on Reactor Installation
Permit focuses on whether the reactor location, structure, and facilities of the power
41

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
reactor as well as technical capability of the licensee of power reactor meet theserequirements.
The review on Construction Plan focus on whether detailed design of power reactor
facilities, quality control methods related to design and construction fit with theReactor Installation Permit and conform to the regulatory requirements.
The review on Operational Safety Programs focus on whether measures needed forsafety of power reactor facilities specified in the Operational Safety Programs are
sufficient for prevention of disasters caused by nuclear fuel material, items
contaminated by nuclear fuel material, or the power reactor.
After these reviews on the regulatory requirement, the NRA conducts a Pre‐service
Inspection on a power reactor that has obtained Permission of amendment on Reactor
Installation Permit, Construction Plan Approval, and Approval of amendment on
Operational Safety Program.
In a Pre‐service Inspection, the NRA’s Nuclear Facility Inspectors check conformity toan approved Construction Plan and technical standards. Licensees of power reactor
shall not use the facilities before passing the Pre‐service Inspection.
The Operational Safety Inspection is designed to check licensee’s compliance toOperational Safety Programs which measures necessary for safety concerning a powerreactor are stipulated. An Operational Safety Inspection is periodically carried out
four times a year with focus on whether licensees carries out a series of planning
processes, implementation, evaluation, and improvement of safety activities properly.
In addition to Operation Safety Inspection, there are also inspections to checkcompliance on important measurements securing safety such as in startup andshutdown of reactors, refueling, training related to the case of occurrence of a severe
accident or Loss of Large Area.
The Periodic Facility Inspection is the regulatory inspection periodically conducted by
NRA. The licensees who own specified important nuclear facilities are obliged to
conduct Periodic Licensees’ Inspection to confirm conformity to technical standards,
and NRA’s inspector checks these licensees’ inspection on site or by record.
After the new regulatory requirements enter into force, nuclear power plants cannot
resume their operation without completing these reviews and inspections.
3‐2

Assessment to Enhance Safety

The Reactor Regulation Act revised in 2012 newly introduced a safety assessment
system for enhancement of nuclear safety. In this system, licensees of power reactor are
42

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
requested to make an assessment by themselves in a period within six months of thedate when a Periodic Facility Inspection on safety of the power reactor facilities at issue
is completed, and after the assessment, they are requested to submit reports of theassessment to the NRA without delay and make them open to the public.
3‐3

Specified Nuclear Facilities

The NRA designated TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS as the Specified Nuclear
Facilities in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act and requested TEPCO to
submit an implementation plan with measures to take. The implementation plan was
submitted on December 7, 2012, and accordingly, the NRA approved it on August 14,
2013. Afterwards, amendments were made in the implementation plan in accordancewith working progress in Fukushima Daiichi NPS, 112 applications for amendments
are made as of the end of 2015. The NRA has been progressively reviewing them.
4

Nuclear installation to be decommissioned

4‐1

Tokai Nuclear Power Station, Japan Atomic Power Company

Electric generating power:

166,000kW

Reactor type:

Graphite‐moderated

carbondioxidegas‐cooled

reactor (GCR)
Fuel:Natural uranium

Commissioned:

July 25, 1966

Operations terminated:

March 31, 1998

Operation period:

31 years, 8 months

Status:

Decommissioning

measures

underway(beingdismantled outside the reactor area)
Overview:
Tokai NPS is natural uranium, graphite‐moderated carbon dioxide gas‐cooled
reactor facility that began trial operations on May 4, 1965 and became the firstcommercial nuclear power station to begin operating in Japan on July 25, 1966; itceased commercial operation on March 31, 1998.
Subsequently, the Japan Atomic Power Company submitted notification of its
dismantling on October 4, 2001, and decommissioning commenced on December 4of that year.
The decommissioning plan was approved on June 30, 2006, following the revisionof the Reactor Regulation Act.
43

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
All of the spent fuel had been removed by June 21, 2001, before notification of thedecommissioning.
The decommissioning began with the serial dismantlement of the auxiliary
equipment. The dismantlement of the reactor area has been deferred untilradioactivity levels are reduced and the immediate focus has been on safe storage
until reactor dismantlement begins.
At present, non‐operational facilities and equipment which have comparatively
low levels of radioactivity or are uncontaminated are being dismantled in the area
outside the reactor area are being dismantled.
4‐2

Fugen Nuclear Power Plant Advanced Thermal Reactor, Japan Atomic Energy
AgencyElectric generating power:

165,000kW

Reactor type:Heavy‐water‐moderated light‐water‐cooled boilingwater reactor (pressure tube reactor)

Fuel:

Natural or enriched uranium, plutonium mixed
oxide

Commissioned:

July 29, 1978

Operations terminated:

March 29, 2003

Operation period:

24 years, 8 months

Status:

Decommissioning measures underway (spent fuelcurrently being removed)

Overview:
The Advanced Thermal Reactor facility (Fugen) reached its first critical state on March
20, 1978 and operated for about 25 years before ending operations on March 29, 2003.
Removal of the whole fuel assemblies from the reactor was completed on August 13,
2003.
On February 20, 2004, MET I approved measures to ensure that the fuel could not be
reloaded and to shut down the reactor permanently.
Subsequently, J AEA received approval for its decommissioning plan on February 12,2008.
It called for dismantling the facilities safely and efficiently, taking into account the needfor ongoing management and equipment maintenance even after operations ends.
According to the decommissioning plan, it is planned to continue dismantling offacilities in a safe and reasonable manner while taking into consideration conditions of
44

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
specific equipment that need continued control of maintenance after completing theiroperation.
As for spent fuel stored in the spent fuel storage pools, JAEA initially planned todispose of all the amount of them at the reprocessing plant of the Japan Atomic Energy
Agency’s Tokai Research and Development Center, Tokai Reprocessing Technology
Development Center. Although a new policy for abolish this reprocessing plant wasannounced in 2014, a study on a possibility of committing the work to overseas parties
is going on.
4‐3

Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station, Chubu Electric Power Company (Units 1 & 2)
Electric generating power:

540,000kW (Unit 1); 840,000kW (Unit 2)

Reactor type:Light‐water‐moderated, light‐water‐cooled reactor,
boiling water reactor (BWR)

Fuel:

Enriched uranium

Commissioned:

March 17, 1976 (Unit 1); November 29, 1978 (Unit 2)

Operations terminated:

January 30, 2009

Operation period:

32 years, 10 months (Unit 1); 30 years, 2 months(Unit 2)

Status:

Decommissioning

measures

underway(Dismantling facilities in the peripheral of thereactor area underway)
Overview:
Both Units 1 and 2 at Hamaoka NPS are enriched uranium, light‐water‐cooled andmoderated reactors (BWR); Unit 1 reached its first critical state on June 20, 1974
and operated for about 27 years until November 7, 2001, when the reactor was shut
down due to the rupture of a pipe in the residual heat removal system.
Subsequently, the Chubu Electric Power Company decided halt reactor operations
after January 30, 2009, and began decommissioning following approval of its
decommissioning plan on November 18 that year.
Unit 2 reached its first critical state on March 28, 1978 and operated for about 26
years, until it was shut down on February 22, 2004 to conduct the 20th periodic
inspection.
Subsequently, the Chubu Electric Power Company decided to end reactor
operations after January 30, 2009 (the same date as Unit 1), and commenced
decommissioning measures following approval of its decommissioning plan on
November 18 that year.
45

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
In response to amendment on decommissioning plan permit granted on February 3,
2016, each unit has shifted to a period of dismantlement on facilities in the
peripheral reactor area. Investigation and study on status of contamination andsystematic decontamination are continued and work for dismantling and removal
are ongoing.

4‐4

Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, Tokyo Electric Power Company(Units 1‐4)

Electric generating power:

460,000kW (Unit 1); 784,000kW (Units 2‐4)

Reactor type:

Boiling Water Reactor (BWR)

Fuel:

Enriched uranium

Commissioned:

March 26, 1971 (Unit 1); July 18, 1974 (Unit2); March 27, 1976 (Unit 3); October 12,
1978 (Unit 4)

Operations terminated:

March 11, 2011

Operation period:

40 years (Unit 1); 37 years, 4 months (Unit2); 35 years (Unit 3); 33 years, 7 months(Unit 4)

Status:

Decommissioned as a commercial source ofpower under the Electricity Business Act(April 19, 2012)

Overview:
In the wake of the March 11, 2011 accident and having concluded that it was
impossible to further use Units 1‐4 of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station aselectric facilities for business purposes, TEPCO submitted a plan, on March 30, 2012,
for their decommissioning as a commercial source of power on April 19 that year,
pursuant to the provisions of the Electricity Business Act.
After the accident, emergency measures pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act were taken at the Fukushima Daiichi plant to deal with this dangerous
situation.
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (as it was known at the time) published The
Concept of Securing Mid‐Term Safety, which set out basic targets to be achieved before
starting work on specific decommissioning tasks. It instructed TEPCO to submit afacility operation plan and then evaluated the validity of this emergency plan.
46

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
Because the safety of the Fukushima Daiichi power station could not be guaranteed in
the long‐term by such emergency measures, the NRA On November 7, 2012,
designated it as a Specified Nuclear Power Facility requiring special management. It
further gave TEPCO a list entitled Matters for which Measures Should be Taken andtold the company to submit an implementation plan to ensure operational safety andthe protection of specified nuclear fuel materials.
The NRA established the Supervision and Evaluation Committee for Specified Nuclear
Facilities, and reviewed TEPCO’s implementation plan to ensure to ensure its
compliance with the guidelines.
4‐5

Nuclear installations decided to be decommissioned

Operators decided to decommission the following power reactors. The following statusof power reactors are in permanent shut down status.

NPS
Tsuruga Nuclear Power Station unit 1(Japan Atomic Power Company)
Mihama Power Station unit 1(Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.)
Mihama Power Station unit 2(Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.)
Genkai NPS unit 1(Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.)
Shimane Nuclear Power Station unit 1(Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)
Ikata Power Station unit 1(Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

5

ReactorType

Output(MWe)Commissioned

Shutdown

BWR

357 MW

1970/03/14

2015/04/27

PWR

340 MW

1970/11/28

2015/04/27

PWR

500 MW

1972/07/25

2015/04/27

PWR

559 MW

1975/10/15

2015/04/27

BWR

460 MW

1974/03/29

2015/04/30

PWR

566 MW

1977/09/30

2016/05/10

Operation of ‘Safe’ Reactor Facilities

The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that “In the event that the location, structure, or
equipment of a nuclear power reactor facility does not comply with the standards set
forth in the Ordinance of the NRA, the NRA can suspend the use of the reactor facility
in question, or its modification, repair, or relocation, or may designate a specificmethod of operating the reactor in question, or may order any other measure required
to ensure operational safety.”

47

ARTICLE 6 Existing Nuclear Installations
This means that reactor facilities that have not been confirmed to be safe will not be
operated unless such necessary steps are taken, and that no reactor will be allowed tooperate for power generation without its safety having first been ensured.
When regulatory requirements are revised, existing nuclear installations are obliged tomeet revised regulatory requirements.

48

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
ARTICLE 7
1
2

LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework
to govern the safety of nuclear installations.
The legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations;(ii) a system of licensing with regard to nuclear installations and the prohibition of theoperation of a nuclear installation without a license;(iii) a system of regulatory inspection and assessment of nuclear installations to ascertain
compliance with applicable regulations and the terms of licenses;(iv) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of licenses, including
suspension, modification or revocation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 7
The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates regulations on use of nuclear energy in Japan.
The NRA Ordinance detailed regulations stipulated in the Reactor Regulation Act anddefines regulation requirements. To install a nuclear power plant, a Reactor Installation
Permit shall be obtained subject to the Reactor Regulation Act. Construction Plan
Approval, a Pre‐service Inspection, Operational Safety Programs Approval areprocedures to check compliance to regulations and approval conditions.
The Reactor Regulation Act includes provisions of revoke of permits and suspension offacility use as exercise of the NRA’s authority; it also provides implementation methodsof regulations and approval conditions within a legal framework.
Therefore, Japan has a legal framework to regulate conditions for safety which defines
necessary regulatory requirements. It means that Japan conforms to Article 7 of theConvention.

49

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
Article 7 (1)Establishment of a Legislative and Regulatory Framework

1

Outline of Major Legislation Relating to Nuclear Safety

1‐1

The Atomic Energy Basic Act

Promulgated in 1955, the Atomic Energy Basic Act is the legal basis of nuclear energy
use in Japan.
The objective of the Act is to secure current and future energy resources, promoting
advanced learning and industrial development thus ensuring that nuclear energy
will contribute to improved standards of living and the overall welfare of mankind.
The Act’s basic principles ensure that the research, development and utilization of
nuclear energy shall be strictly limited to peaceful purposes, developed safely andcontribute to international cooperation.
The objects of securement for safety are protection of lives, health, and property ofthe people, conservation of the environment, and contribution to security of Japan.
In reflection of lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident, theReactor Regulation Act was revised in 2012 to stipulate the foundation of the NRA
and the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Commission. It also provides the grounds
for the establishment of the NRA as a government supervisory body for enforcementand democratic control of nuclear energy polices for utilization of nuclear energy.
1‐2

the Act for Establishment of the Nuclear Regulation Authority

The Act for Establishment of the NRA was enacted on September 19, 2012, stipulates
foundation of the NRA as the nuclear regulation body of Japan, its powers andresponsibilities.
The object of the Act is to emphasize the importance for exercise its powers
integrated in a neutral and fair manner independently.
This Act provides the organizational structure of the NRA, the appointment anddismissal of its Chairman and Commissioners, the duty of reporting to the national
Diet and disclosure of information, and other competence and responsibilities
needed for NRA to carry out its mission. A report on the competence and functions
this Act guarantees is to be provided in the reporting of Article 8.

50

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
1‐3

The Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material
and Reactors (Reactor Regulation Act) and Relevant Ordinances

Promulgated in 1957, the Reactor Regulation Act is a law dealing with all regulations
concerning the use of nuclear energy.
This Act, in accordance with the spirit of the Atomic Energy Basic Act, was enacted toprovide necessary regulations on refining, fabricating and enrichment, interim
storage, reprocessing and waste disposal activities, as well as on the installation andoperation of reactors. The Act provides necessary regulations on the uses ofinternationally controlled materials. It executes treaties and other international
agreements ensuring the use of nuclear energy – source materials, nuclear fuel andreactors are limited to peaceful ones. At the same time, it promotes public safety andthe protection of nuclear fuel materials in the event of a serious nuclear accident
resulting in abnormal radioactive levels.
The Reactor Regulation Act governing the construction and operation of reactors
establishes safety regulations and standards for granting permits and approval,
including Reactor Installation Permits, Approval of Construction Plan, Pre‐service
Inspections, Periodic Facility Inspections, Approvals for Operational Safety Programs
and Operational Safety Inspections, and reactor decommissioning. The regulations
establish administrative procedures such as suspension of operations and therevocation of permits, as well as criminal penalties, such as imprisonment or a fine,which can be imposed if an operator does not comply with the provisions of this Act.
It stipulates a system for employee feedback system (whistle blowers) whereby they
can report any violation of the Reactor Regulation Act to the NRA without any fearof penalty.
While Installation Permits for commercial power reactors are regulated on the basisof the Reactor Regulation Act, certain procedures from design and construction
through to operation – namely Approval for Design and Construction Methods,
Pre‐service Inspections, welding methods and their inspection, and Periodic Facility
Inspections – were also subject to equivalent regulation under the Electricity BusinessAct.
Of the NRA Ordinances established in response to the Reactor Regulation Act, those
covering the regulation of reactor facilities are as follows.
•

NRA Ordinance Concerning the Installation and Operation, of Commercial
Power Reactors (NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors)-

Rules prescribing the Installation and operation of commercial powerreactors
51

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, andEquipment of Commercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities (NRA
Ordinance on Standards for the Location, etc.)-

Standards relating to the location, structure, and equipment of reactor
facilities, which form one of the criteria for obtaining a power reactor
construction permit.

•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Commercial Power Reactors
and their Auxiliary Facilities (NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards)-

Technical standards relating to construction plan approvals and themaintenance of power reactor facilities.

•

NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards for Quality Control Methods Concerning
the Design and Construction of Commercial Power Reactors for Licensees ofPower Reactor Operation and Systems for Their Inspection (NRA Ordinance on
Quality Control Methods)-

Technical standards prescribing quality control methods relating to designand construction for licensees, which are one of the criteria for approval of aconstruction plan, and systems for their inspection.

•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Nuclear Fuel Material Being
Used as a Fuel in Commercial Power Reactors-

These are technical standards relating to the inspection of fuel assemblies.

As well as BWR and PWR commercial power reactors, Japan has the Monju prototype
fast breeder reactor. However, Monju is considered in law to be a reactor for power
generation at the research and development stage, so the following NRA Ordinances
have been established, separate from those governing commercial power reactors.
These ordinances take into account the attributes of power reactors at the research anddevelopment stage, but still establish the same regulations as those for commercial
power reactors.
•

NRA Ordinance on the Installation and Operation of Reactors for the Purpose ofPower Generation at the Research and Development Stage•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, andEquipment of Reactors for the Purpose of Power Generation at the Research andDevelopment Stage and their Auxiliary Facilities•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Reactors for the Purpose ofPower Generation at the Research and Development Stage and their Auxiliary52

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
Facilities•

NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards for Quality Control Methods Concerning
the Design and Construction of Power Reactors for Licensees of Power Reactor
Operation at the Research and Development Stage and Systems for Their
Inspection•

NRA Ordinance Prescribing Technical Standards for Nuclear Fuel Material Being
Used as a Fuel for the Purpose of Power Generation at the Research andDevelopment StageIn addition to the aforementioned ordinances, the Reactor Regulation Act stipulates
that it may be only partially applied if proper implementation of measures to ensure
operational safety is ensured. Accordingly, the following ordinances have been enacted
that stipulate the steps to be taken to ensure safety at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station, as the situation there differs from that at ordinary reactor facilities.
•

NRA Ordinance on the Operational Safety of Reactor Facilities at the Tokyo
Electric Power Companyʹs Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and the
Physical Protection of Specified Nuclear Fuel Material

1‐4

The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness(Nuclear Emergency Act)

Because of the specific nature of nuclear disasters, the Nuclear Emergency Act waspromulgated in 1999, with the objective of strengthening measures against nuclear
disasters. Combined with the Reactor Regulation Act, the Basic Act on Disaster Control
Measures, and other related laws, they were designed to protect the lives, bodies, andproperty of citizens by prescribing responsibilities of licensees, the Declaration of a
Nuclear Emergency Situation, the establishment of a Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters, and the implementation of emergency response measures, and otherspecial measures relating to nuclear disasters.
Under this law, licensees must take all possible steps to prevent a nuclear disaster,
preventing the spread of the effects of a crisis and repairing any damage caused bysuch an incident.
It stipulates that the government must implement emergency response measures, takesteps to precautionary protective measures and measures following the nuclear
emergency to prevent any nuclear disaster
Following the TEPCO Fukushima accident the Nuclear Emergency Act was revised on
September 19, 2012, to enhance precautionary protective measures and strengthen the
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ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters during nuclear emergency
Measures relating to nuclear emergency preparedness are detailed in Article 16.
2

International Conventions

Japan is a contracting party of the following conventions relating to nuclear safety.
•

Convention on Nuclear Safety•

Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety ofRadioactive Waste Management•

Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident•

Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency

Article 7 (2)1Safety Requirements and Safety Regulations

Safety Requirements

In light of lessons learned from the accident of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS, NRA
put into effect the new regulatory requirements in July 2013.
The

new

regulatory

requirements

haverequiredmultiple(multi‐layer)countermeasures effective for achieving objectives, and adopted, as a basis,theconcepts of defense‐in‐depth that independence effectiveness of different levels ofdefense (If one level of protection or barrier were to fail, the subsequent level or barrier
would be available.)when considering countermeasures at each layer. Accordingly,
they have intensified estimation of, and countermeasures against, natural phenomena,etc. that would bring about common‐cause failure and also reinforced countermeasuresagainst events other than natural phenomena, such as a fire that would trigger
common‐cause failure. Moreover, they request prevention of core damage andcontainment vessel breakage in case of a severe accident as well as measures forsuppression of radioactive material dispersion and against intentional airplane crashes.
The basic policies for measures against severe accidents and acts of terror are as
follows:•

Protective measures through multiple stages such as “prevention of core damage “,“maintenance of the containment function”, “controlled discharge through vents”,
and “suppression of dispersion of radioactive material.”•

Further enhancement of reliability in combination of portable facilities with54

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
permanent ones, although the basis of response is use of portable facilities.
•

Reinforcement of preventive and protective measures in spent fuel storage pools.

•

Enhancement of resistance properties of Emergency Response Center, reliability
and durability of communications, and reliability and sustaining power ofmeasurement systems including those in spent fuel storage pools (reinforcement ofcommand communications and measurement systems).

•

Development of procedures, securement of personnel, implementation of training
are required since it is important to exercise necessary functions in integration of
hardware (facilities) and software (on‐site work).

•

As countermeasures against intentionally caused airplane crashes, distributed
storage and connection of portable facilities are requested. A specialized safety
facility is introduced as a backup measure for reliability enhancement.

2

Regulation System

2‐1Permitting Approval Systems

When constructing commercial power reactors, a permit must be obtained from the
NRA, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Reactor Regulation Act sets forth the reasons for disqualification from obtaining apermit, stipulating that anyone who has had a Reactor Installation Permit revokedwithin the last two years may not obtain a new permit.
If a licensee wishes to change an already approved he must seek permission for any
amendment or, if the change is a minor one prescribed in law, must submit notificationof the change.
No expiry date is set for Reactor Installation Permit in Japan so there are no procedures
for renewing a permit. A 40‐year operation limit is stipulated though this may be
extended one time only for a maximum of 20 additional years.
The safety reviews for obtaining a Reactor Installation Permit are carried out by the
NRA, the regulatory authority.
Article 17 provides an explanation concerning Reactor Installation Permit.
In granting Reactor Installation Permits, the NRA must seek the opinion of the Atomic
Energy Commission of Japan, in order to confirm that there is no risk that the facility
will be used for anything other than peaceful purposes.
Anyone who constructs a reactor without obtaining a Reactor Installation Permit will
be subject to a penalty of imprisonment with work for not more than three years, or afine of not more than three million yen, or both, pursuant to the provisions of the55

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
Reactor Regulation Act.
Holders of a Reactor Installation Permit must obtain NRA approval for theirconstruction plan before commencing construction, or notify the NRA of the plan.
NRA approval must be sought for the design of the fuel assembly to be loaded into thereactor.
2‐2

Inspection and Assessment Systems

In constructing a reactor facility, the licensee must undergo a Pre‐service Inspection by
the NRA and may not use the reactor facility in question if it does not pass thisinspection.
The fuel assembly to be loaded into the reactor must undergo a Fuel Assembly
Inspection by the NRA and may not be used if it does not pass this inspection.
As well as conducting inspections of welding parts, particularly in areas which mustwithstand high pressures and the containment vessel itself, licensees must undergo areview by the NRA (Welding Safety Management Review). This will focus on thesystems involved in conducting the inspection, the inspection method, process controls,
and other matters stipulated in the NRA Ordinance.
After commencing operations, licensees must undertake Periodic Licensee’s Inspections,as well as undergoing Periodic Facility Inspections by the NRA, focusing on designated
key safety components.
Systems involved in conducting inspections, inspection methods, process controls andother matters stipulated in NRA Ordinances must undergo a Periodic Safety
Management Review by the NRA.
Operational Safety Inspectors from the NRA will also periodically conduct inspections
to confirm compliance with Operational Safety Programs of operational facilities
pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
Other inspections will examine compliance with regulations concerning the physicalprotection of nuclear material, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation
Act.
If reactor facilities or fuel assemblies that have not passed the Pre‐service Inspection or
Fuel Assembly Inspection are used, or if a licensee is obstructionist they may be subject
to imprisonment with labor for not more than one year, a fine of not more than one
million yen, or both, pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. These
include a refusal or obstruction or evasion of a Pre‐service Safety Management Review,a Welding Safety Management Review, a Periodic Facility Inspection, or a Periodic
56

ARTICLE 7 Legislative and Regulatory Framework
Safety Management Review. Additionally, if a licensee has refused, obstructed, or
evaded granting entry to the site, an inspection, or submitting samples for an
Operational Safety Inspection or nuclear material physical protection inspection, or
fails to respond to questions, or makes false statements in response to questions.
3

Law Enforcement Measures

The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates law‐enforcement measures for the NRA
execution
The NRA can revoke a Reactor Installation Permit if a licensee does not start operationof the power reactor without reasonable excuse within five years of the date ofobtaining the Permit or if it discontinues operation for more than a year.
The NRA can also revoke a Reactor Installation Permit or order a licensee to shut down
the power reactor at for a period of one year or less if it has come to fall into a
disqualification state for the permit or if it violates a provision of the Reactor
Regulation Act or an order issued based on the Act.
In addition, the NRA can order licensees to take measures necessary for safety such asa halt, remodeling, repair or transfer of power reactor facilities or designate a methodof operation if it finds that the power reactor facilities do not conform to the installation
permit standard rule or the technical standard rule, or that measures being taken
related to safety, operation. The NRA can order licensees to dismiss Chief Reactor
Engineers if they violate provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
As for measures against dangerous situations, the NRA can order licensee to takemeasure against disaster prevention in the case of occurrence on disaster caused by areactor. .
There are penalty provisions in the Reactor Regulation Act. For example, if anyone
who installed a power reactor without a Reactor Installation Permit or an order relating
to shutdown of a power reactor which is issued by the NRA is not complied shall besentenced to imprisonment with work for not more than three years or a fine of not
more than three million yen. However, these punishment provisions are not executed
directly by the NRA, but the judiciary authorities shall enforce them after receiving an
accusation from the NRA.

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ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
ARTICLE 8
1

2

REGULATORY BODY

Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with theimplementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 7, andprovided with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfill
its assigned responsibilities.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure an effective separation
between the functions of the regulatory body and those of any other body or organization
concerned with the promotion or utilization of nuclear energy.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 8
The NRA is a regulatory body entrusted with enforcement of legal framework, and the
Act for Establishment of the NRA guarantees its independence to execute of official
power. The NRA has the authority to establish the NRA Ordinance to execute laws, it
has the authority to grant permission and approval, implement of inspections, andissue necessary orders. The NRA is financed by the national budget and its staffs arecentral government officials.
The Chairman and Commissioners of the NRA are appointed by the Prime Minister withthe consent of the national Diet, and the NRA Chairman appoints the staff of the Secretariatof the NRA.
Therefore, the NRA has authority, financial resources, and human resources needed topursue its mission, and secure effective separation from implementation organizations as
defined by law, which means that it conforms to provisions of Article 8 of the Convention.

58

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
Article 8 (1)Establishment of a Regulatory Body

1

Nuclear Regulation Authority

1‐1

Organization, Authority, and Duties

The NRA regulates nuclear‐related activities in Japan, while the Secretariat of the NRA
deals with related administrative matters.
The NRA is established as an external bureau of the Ministry of the Environment. The
Chairman and Commissioners of the NRA are appointed by the Prime Minister, withthe consent of the Diet, based on the provisions of the Act for Establishment of the
NRA. It will exercise independent authority from a fair and neutral standpoint.
The NRA will provide the Diet with a detailed report, via the Prime Minister,concerning its activities. The appointment or dismissal of the Secretariat of the NRA’smembers rests with the NRA Chairman.
The NRA has the authority to establish the NRA Ordinance to implement laws andCabinet Orders relating to the affairs under its jurisdiction. The term of office of the
Chairman and Commissioners is five year but they may be reappointed at the end of
this initial term.
The duty of the NRA is to ensure safety in the use of nuclear energy, so it has the rightto review planned nuclear installations to confirm their location, structure, andequipment do not pose a disaster threat, and that being the case to give the permission
for their construction.
Moreover, as well as formulating the NRA Ordinance that includes regulations
concerning nuclear‐related activities such as emergency, operational safety measuresand programs, and the physical protection of specified nuclear fuel material, the NRA
handles other issues such as the approval of the design and construction of facilities,
inspections, approval of Operational Safety Programs, and the approval of plans fornuclear reactor decommissioning measures. It also collects reports from licensees andconducts on‐site inspections, if necessary.
It has the authority to revoke Reactor Installation Permits or suspend the use of such
facilities; to order safety measures, the dismissal of Chief Reactor Engineers andmeasures covering decommissioning and disaster prevention.
In March 2014, following a notion that more enhancement of expertise is indispensable
for reinforcement of the NRA’s functions, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization(JNES) was integrated into the Secretariat of the NRA.
As a result of the integration, the number of staff members of the NRA reached about
59

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
1,000 as of the end of March 2014, including Nuclear Safety Inspectors and Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Officers stationed at nuclear sites.
The Act for Establishment of the NRA specifies that the Reactor Safety Examination
Committee (for investigation and review of nuclear safety), the Nuclear Fuel Safety
Examination Committee (for investigation and review of nuclear fuel material safety),and the Radiation Council (for review of technical standards related to radiation
damage prevention) shall be established under the NRA.
The Secretariat of the NRA consists of the three Departments of the Regulatory
Standard and Research Department in charge of preparation of standards and policies
and research on nuclear systems, severe accidents, nuclear fuel and nuclear waste,safety research related to earthquakes and tsunamis, the Radiation Protection
Department in charge of setup of the systems of nuclear emergency preparedness andresponse, initial emergency response, physical protection of nuclear material, radiation
monitoring, regulation for radiation isotopes, and safeguards based on international
commitments, and the Nuclear Regulation Department consisting of the Nuclear
Regulation Policy Planning Division and other seven Divisions for BWRs; PWRs;
inspections of nuclear reactors; research reactors, and decommissioning; nuclear fuelfacilities; radioactive waste storage, transport and disposition; and implementation ofregulations on earthquakes and tsunamis, in addition to the General Affairs Division,
the Personnel Division, the Counsellor of Budget and Accounting.
Moreover, as shown in Table 8‐1, there are NRA Regional Offices at 22 nuclear sites,with safety inspectors and nuclear emergency preparedness officers permanently
stationed there.

60

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
Table 8‐1

NRA Nuclear Regulation Offices

Office Name
Tomari Nuclear Regulation Office
Higashidori Nuclear Regulation Office
Rokkasho Nuclear Regulation Office
Onagawa Nuclear Regulation Office
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Regulation
OfficeFukushima Daini Nuclear Regulation
OfficeTarget Facilities
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (BWR); research reactor; SF interim
storage
Uranium enrichment; reprocessing; disposal facility
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR)

Power plant (BWR)

Kashiwazaki‐Kariwa Nuclear
Regulation Office
Tokai and Oarai Nuclear Regulation
OfficeKawasaki Nuclear Regulation Office
Yokosuka Nuclear Regulation Office
Shika Nuclear Regulation Office
Hamaoka Nuclear Regulation Office
Tsuruga Nuclear Regulation Office
Mihama Nuclear Regulation Office
Ohi Nuclear Regulation Office
Takahama Nuclear Regulation Office
Kumatori Nuclear Regulation Office
Kamisaibara Nuclear Regulation Office
Shimane Nuclear Regulation Office
Ikata Nuclear Regulation Office
Genkai Nuclear Regulation OfficeSendai Nuclear Regulation Office

1‐2Resource for Regulation(1)

Funding

Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR, GCR); research reactor, fuelfabrication, reprocessing, and usage facilities;
disposal facility
Research reactor; usage facilities
fuel fabrication; research reactor
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (PWR, BWR, FBR, ATR)Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
fuel fabrication; research reactor; usage facilities
Uranium enrichment
Power plant (BWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)
Power plant (PWR)

As a regulatory body the government funds the NRA which compiles a proposed
annual budget and submits it to the appropriate financial authorities.
This procedure is carried out in the same manner as all government departments.
The NRA budget in FY2016 is 57.7 billion yen.
(2)

Human resources

The NRA is composed of the Chairman and four Commissioners who are appointed by

61

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
the Prime Minister, and the Secretariat of the NRA was established with staff acceptedmainly from the NISA, the Nuclear Safety Commission, and the Atomic Energy
Commission of Japan in September 2012. In order to integrate functions of safeguards
and radiation protection in April 2013, the NRA accepted staff from MEXT. The NRA has
integrated JNES a technical support organization, in March 2014, it accepted staff fromthe Organization. Furthermore, it has employed new graduates and mid‐career withexperiences in the industry and other R&D institutes, so that the NRA has come tocommand human resources with various expertise.
In order to make scientific and technical judgments without relying on knowledge andexperiences of electricity utilities, the NRA needs to maintain a certain level of theamount and quality of human resources and continually enhance their technical ability.
With this in mind, the NRA formulated the basic policy for development of humanresources in June 2014 so as to make clear the fundamental principles and the outline
policy of human resource development. In this basic policy, the following points are
identified as duties of the NRA: (1) properly distribute resources needed for learning,training, (2) connect future challenges and strategies of the organization with humanresource development, and (3) encourage staff to promote their voluntary learning.
1‐3

Ensuring Transparency and openness(1)

Ensuring Transparency

The Policy on Ensuring the Operational Transparency of the NRA stipulates that the basic
policy of the organization is (1) to be able to release information not subject todisclosure under the Act on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs; (2)to adhere to the process of disclosure and discussion; and (3) to adhere to the principleof administration based on written documents. Accordingly, to ensure fulltransparency it has been decided that details of the agenda, minutes and distributed
materials at NRA Commission and committee meetings and information from its study
teams, shall be published, as a general rule.
Following meetings concerning regulations attended by at least three Commissioners
or interviews between NRA Commissioners or Secretariat staff and those subject toregulation, it was decided that outlines of these proceedings will be published,
together with the names of those present and reference materials used. Overviews ofparticularly important information will be reported at the NRA Commission Meetings.
Based on such guidelines as the Policy on Ensuring the Operational Transparency of the
NRA and Operational Guidelines for NRA Commission Meetings, the proceedings of NRA
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ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
Commission Meetings and its study teams will generally be made available to the
public.
For this purpose, an official page has been set up on online video‐sharing websites
such as YouTube, with the NRA Commission Meetings and study teams meetings
being broadcast live whenever possible; in addition, recordings and edited highlightsof these meetings will also be made available.
Reference materials used in the NRA Commission Meetings and its study teams are
published on the NRAʹs website at the start of each meeting, increasing the ease andaccessibility of interested parties.
As a rule, minutes of NRA Commission Meetings are posted on the website thefollowing day while those of study team meetings are generally published within aweek.
The NRA Chairman conducts weekly press conference. The Deputy Secretary‐Generalof the NRA Secretariat, in his capacity as spokesman, also conducts press conference
twice a week. If necessary, extraordinary press conferences are held.
These press conferences are made available as live broadcasts and recordings, in thesame way as the NRA Commission Meetings and study team meetings, while theminutes of the press conferences are made available on the NRA’s website on the same
day of the Chairmanʹs press conferences, and the following day of the spokesmanʹspress conferences as far as possible.
(2)

Ensuring openness

One of the guiding principles in NRA’s Core Values and Principles is “We shall be open
to all opinions and advice from Japan and the international community and avoid bothself‐isolation and self‐righteousness.”
Based on these principles, the NRA has utilized the expertise of external experts,
including those serving on study teams, and has actively held discussions with otherexperts and relevant licensees.
To seek the opinions of a wide range of both domestic and foreign experts concerning
its activities, the NRA held a meeting in November 2012 with members of the accident
investigation committees established by the Diet and the government and NPO
specialists; in December international advisors participated in an exchange of opinions.
In other activities, the NRA has published information and conducted interviews with
relevant experts and licensees to ensure transparency, closer communications andstronger relationships to facilitate a swift response to any emergency, encouraging awider understanding of regulations and gathering a wider knowledge from both
63

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
domestic and overseas sources.
The NRA canvassed widespread public views to help formulate new regulatory
requirements and countermeasures in the event of nuclear disasters and publishedthose findings.
Even before inviting public comment on the draft text of provisions, the NRA sought
public comment on the draft framework stage, further encouraging widespread public
participation.
The NRA established a website and call centers enabling the public to express theiropinions or questions via the internet or telephone whenever they wish.
1‐4Technical Support(1)

Technical support organizations

As Technical Support Organizations, NRA has joint jurisdiction over JAEA and NIRS
with the MEXT.
JAEA is a body that, in accordance with the basic policy prescribed in the Atomic
Energy Basic Act, conducts basic and applied research into nuclear energy; thedevelopment of fast breeder reactors and the nuclear fuel material required for this, inorder to establish the nuclear fuel cycle. It also seeks the comprehensive, systematic,
efficient development of reprocessing of nuclear fuel material techniques and thedisposal of high‐level radioactive waste. This information is disseminated to help
promote nuclear energy research which in turn should help improve the standard ofliving and welfare of mankind.
Activities carried out by JAEA in the fields of ensuring the safety in nuclear energy
research, its development, and use fall under the joint jurisdiction of MEXT and the
NRA.
NIRS encouraged search and development focused on the radiation effects on thehuman body, thereby improving the scientific and technological level of medicine; theprevention of human radiation injuries, diagnosis and treatment, and the medical useof radiation.
Activities by NIRS in the fields of radiation effects on the human body, the preventionof radiation injury in humans, and diagnosis and treatment also fall under the joint
jurisdiction of MEXT and the NRA.
(2)

Input from external experts

The NRA provides opportunities to hear opinions from external experts working in
64

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
Japan and abroad. There are various study teams where experts discuss individual
regulatory challenges, including formulation of new regulatory standards, measuresagainst nuclear disasters, etc. For assessment of conformity to the new regulatory
standards, an examination meeting is held to hear opinions from external experts.
(3)

Safety study

For the NRA to adequately implement its activities, it is necessary to pursue safety
study to continue improving nuclear safety and to accumulate scientific/technicalknowledge. The NRA decided to review research fields to tackle after FY2015 in lightof past progress of safety study. On April 22, 2015, the NRA formulated “Safety Studyin the NRA – 2015 version,” based on which the safety research project has been
implemented covering the nine research fields (nuclear installation; Specified Nuclear
Facilities; internal/external events that trigger common‐cause failure; the nuclear fuelcycle; the back end; nuclear disaster countermeasures and radiation protection;
safeguards and physical protection of nuclear material; radiation regulation/ control;and cross‐sectional challenges).
The NRA states in “The Mid‐Term Goal for the First Term of the NRA” that it shouldespecially put emphasis on the following items:•

Regulatory issues in the decommissioning process of TEPCO’s Fukushima
Daiichi NPS,•Countermeasures against natural phenomena that cause common‐cause
failure leading to severe accidents,•

Expansion of scientific/technical knowledge related to severe accident
measures, and•Development of technical bases that support the above stated issues.

As for evaluation of the safety study, the NRA performs evaluation at each phase fromprior evaluation in the research planning phase to follow‐up evaluation after the
research based on “The Implementation of Evaluation Related to the Safety Research in
the NRA.”In addition, from a viewpoint of practical use for nuclear regulation, it is important tomake results of the safety research scientifically and technologically reliable while
securing traceability. It is also important to reflect results of safety study in efforts toaddress imminent challenges immediately. For this reason, the NRA promptly discloses
results of the safe study as NRA technical report.
Collaborative research is pursued in international agencies, because nuclear safety is acommon issue global. Participation in such international collaborative research plays
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ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
an important role in grasping needs for future nuclear regulation and obtaining thelatest knowledge. Therefore, the NRA is actively joining international agencies such as
OECD/NEA and IAEA and international collaborative research where frameworks ofbilateral/multilateral cooperation are adopted.
1‐5Management system

In order to carry out duties stipulated in the Act for Establishment of the NRA, the
NRA Management Rules was established in September 2014 for the purpose ofmaintaining and improving work quality of the NRA and building, implementing,evaluating, and enhancing an integrated management system that enables
development of robust and sound safety culture supported by effective leadership withreference to ISO 9001 (JIS Q 9001), a standard specified by the IAEA. Full operation ofthis management system started in April 2015.
The NRA Management Rules stipulates that a PDCA cycle should be implemented as amanagement system in a unified manner where the cycle consists of periodical
formulation of a fiscal‐year emphasis plan, implementation of activities, management
review, and improvement. It also stipulates organizational structure, leadership, anddocumentation and recording needed as a basis for implementation of the Management
system as well as management of resources needed for securement, development, andeffective use of high‐quality human resources. In addition, the Rule also includes
provisions about processes to handle items where improvement is needed, preventive
measure, internal audits, aiming at promotion of efforts by the whole organization
toward improvement of activities for effective implementation of them.
Article 8 (2)Status of the Regulation Body

The NRA carry out its regulation activities in a far, neutral and independent mannerbase on the approach to separate the regulation from the promotion of nuclear energy
use. The Chairman and Commissioners of the NRA are appointed by the Prime
Minister with the consent of the Diet, and the NRA Chairman appoints the staff of theSecretariat of the NRA, so other authorities on the promotion side of nuclear energy
have no involvement in the appointment and dismissal of staff.
From a fiscal perspective, the activities of the NRA are funded by the national budget,with budget proposals being submitted to the Ministry of Finance by the NRA.
The budget proposals undergo appraisal by the financial authorities, according to the66

ARTICLE 8 Regulatory Body
fiscal situation of the government as a whole, but the authorities tasked withpromoting nuclear energy are not involved from a financial perspective either.
The NRA has clear authority and competence over safety regulation, in accordancewith the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, and it engages in independent
decision‐making concerning regulatory activities focused on reactor facilities, such as
permits, approvals, and inspections, including nuclear reactor construction permits,without any involvement by the authorities tasked with promoting nuclear energy.
Moreover, with the objective of ensuring the independence and neutrality of regulation,
Article 6, paragraph (2) of the Supplementary Provisions of the Act for Establishmentof the NRA stipulates that, following a five‐year period of transitional measures after
the entry into force of the Act, staff members of the Secretariat of the NRA shall not be
permitted to be redeployed to administrative bodies with jurisdiction overadministrative matters relating to the use of nuclear energy (the so‐called “no‐returnrule”).
In 2015, in order to clarify the “no‐return rule”, the NRA designated offices in ministry
and agency where the Secretariat of the NRA’s members should not be transferred.

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ARTICLE 9 Responsibility of The License Holder
ARTICLE 9RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LICENSE HOLDER

Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear
installation rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall take the appropriate steps toensure that each such license holder meets its responsibility.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 9
In Japan, nuclear energy use should be aimed to ensuring safety and be performed
independently under democratic management in accordance with the Atomic Energy
Basic Act, and it is basic policy that licensees has primary responsibility for ensuringsafety. For implementing this principle, the Reactor Regulation Act aims to enforce
nuclear‐related activities and regulations and stipulates primary responsibility oflicensees to ensure safety.
The Reactor Regulation Act includes a system of penalties to be imposed on licensees ifthey violate the law or any orders based thereon.
Therefore, the provisions of the Act clearly state that those who have been granted
permits shall have total responsibility about safety and be requested to perform it,which conforms to Article 9 of the Convention.

68

ARTICLE 9 Responsibility of The License Holder
1

The Primary Responsibility to Ensure Safety

The Atomic Energy Basic Act establishes the most basic issues concerning theuse of nuclear energy in Japan. This Act stipulates that “The research,development and utilization of nuclear energy shall be limited to peacefulpurposes, aimed at ensuring safety and performed independently underdemocratic management. The results therefrom shall be made public tocontribute to international cooperation.”
Based on this provision, licensees bear the primary responsibility to ensure thesafe and peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Furthermore, the Atomic Energy Basic Act establishes that “Those wishing tobuild a nuclear reactor must comply with the regulations imposed by thegovernment, as prescribed separately by law.”
In other words, those seeking or holding a license bear responsibility to comply
with regulations imposed by the government as set forth in the Reactor
Regulation Act.
The Reactor Regulation Act explicitly states the legal responsibilities of licenseesthat they “shall be responsible for installing equipment or apparatus
contributing to the improvement of the safety of nuclear facilities, enhancing
education on operational safety, or taking any other necessary measures forpreventing disasters resulting from nuclear source material, nuclear fuelmaterial, and reactors, while taking into account the latest knowledge on safetyat nuclear facilities.”
2. Measures to Ensure That Licensees Meet Their Responsibilities
In the Reactor Regulation Act, measures for operation and maintenance of reactor
facility, shipment, storage and disposal are stipulated as the measures licensees shouldtake to ensure operational safety.
These measures are detailed in the NRA Ordinance pursuant to the Reactor Regulation
Act.
In addition to establishing Operation Safety Programs and obtaining NRA approval,
licensees must also undergo NRA compliance inspections.
Licensees must stipulate in their Operational Safety Programs that they will disclose
noncompliance information in the event that such noncompliance results in the non‐fulfillment of basic operational targets. Measures have thus been put in place to ensure
69

ARTICLE 9 Responsibility of The License Holderthat licensees do not conceal noncompliance.
Licensees are liable to penalty if they fail fulfill the legal responsibility for operationalsafety.
In case nuclear installations fails to meet legal technical standards or its operations
contravene regulatory requirements, the NRA may require the licensee to adopt
alternative operating methods or order it to take any other necessary measures
pursuant to the provisions of the Act. If the licensee violates this order, the NRA may
revoke its permission or order it to suspend operations for a specified period notexceeding one year.
If an operator establishes a power reactor without permission, it shall be sentenced to
imprisonment with work and/or a fine, pursuant to the provisions of the Act.
The same shall apply if licensee fails to obtain Approval of Operational Safety
Programs or amends it without obtaining approval, or if a licensee and/or its
employee(s) fails to comply with those Operational Safety Programs.

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ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety
ARTICLE 10

PRIORITY TO SAFETY

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that all organizations engagedin activities directly related to nuclear installations shall establish policies that give due priority
to nuclear safety.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 10
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribes that Operational Safety
Programs established by licensees shall stipulate provisions fostering safety culture
and disclosing noncompliance, thereby focusing on the operational safety of reactor
facilities.
Quality assurance plans have been established in Operational Safety Programs andincorporated into a quality management system to prioritize overall safety.
The NRA has been engaged in its activities along with NRA’s Core Values andPrinciples. Furthermore, it has formulated the Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture,and setting priority to safety, it has been engaged in its activities.
Therefore, in Japan, the regulatory body and licensees and their related organizations
are taking measures to set reasonable priority to safety, which means conformity to
Article 10 of the Convention.

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ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety1

Regulatory Requirements Prioritizing Safety

The Reactor Regulation Act clearly states that licensees are responsible for installing
appropriate safety equipment and apparatus, enhancing operational safety education,and other appropriate measures, while incorporating the latest nuclear safetyknowledge.
It further stipulates that licensees must ensure safety in the maintenance and operationof nuclear installation, in the storage of waste and in other related activities.
In the event that a licensee contravenes these rules, the NRA may order to take othernecessary safety measures and, if the licensee violates this order, may revoke its
Reactor Installation Permit or order the licensee to suspend operation of the facility fora specific period not exceeding one year.
Moreover, licensees must establish and obtain NRA approval for Operational Safety
Programs before commencing reactor operations, in accordance with the Reactor
Regulation Act.
Such Operational Safety Programs are required to establish a system fostering safety
culture and a plan for quality assurance incorporating safety‐first into the quality
management system.
Licensees and their employees must comply with Operational Safety Programs, as
stipulated by the Reactor Regulation Act. If the programs are violated, the NRA may
revoke its Reactor Installment Permit or order the licensee to suspend operations for aperiod not exceeding one year.
2

Measures to Prioritize Safety Taken by Licensees

In Operational Safety Programs, licensees must establish provisions to foster a safety
culture wherein safety is the first priority of the nuclear energy business.
Further licensees must establish the policy for fostering safety culture, develop annual
plan, and implement the activities for fostering safety culture, in order to realize
prioritize safety in their business operations.
They must evaluate the implementation of the plan, report the results to the company
president, and seek improvements in subsequent fiscal years.
Operational Safety Programs must comply with relevant legislation and the
Operational Safety Programs themselves at the same time as activities to improve
compliance awareness are followed.
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ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety
The quality assurance plan must assign the highest priority to nuclear safety under the
direct responsibility of senior management. Duties must be clearly specified, andstructured in such a way to ensure that these requirements are met.
3

Efforts by the Regulatory Authority to Prioritize Safety

At its 22nd Commission Meeting in FY2012 on January 9, 2013, the NRA discussed its
core values and principles, and decided that the organization’s mission was to “protect
the general public and the environment through rigorous and reliable regulation of
nuclear activities.” It established five guiding principles focusing on independence,
effectiveness, transparency, expertise, and readiness, in order to achieve this mission(Table 10‐1).
Table 10‐1

The NRA’s Core Values and Principles

The Nuclear Regulation Authority was established to absorb and learn the lessons of the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident of March 11, 2011. Such nuclear accidents should never beallowed to happen again. Restoring public trust, both within Japan and overseas, in the nation’s
nuclear regulatory organization is of utmost importance, and the nuclear safety system andmanagement must be rebuilt on a solid basis, placing the highest priority on public safety and agenuine safety culture.
Everyone involved in nuclear activities must have a high degree of responsibility and ethicalvalues, and seek to achieve the highest levels of global safety.
We hereby solemnly pledge our full commitment and unwavering efforts in regard to theforegoing.
MissionOur fundamental mission is to protect the general public and the environment throughrigorous and reliable regulation of nuclear activities.
Guiding Principles for Activities
We in the NRA and its supporting Secretariat shall perform our duties diligently, acting inaccordance with the following principles.
(1) Independent Decision Making
We shall make decisions independently, based on the scientific and technologicalinformation, free from any outside pressure or bias.
(2) Effective Actions
We shall discard the previous formalistic handling of regulatory work and stress theimportance of a field‐oriented approach in achieving genuinely effective regulations.
(3) Open and Transparent Organization
We shall ensure transparency and appropriate information disclosure on regulations,
including the decision‐making process.
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ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety
We shall be open to all opinions and advice from Japan and the international community
and avoid both self‐isolation and self‐righteousness.
(4) Improvement and Commitment
We shall be assiduous in learning and absorbing the latest regulatory know‐how and bestpractices, enhancing individual capacity, and performing our duties, mindful of highethical standards, a sense of mission, and rightful pride.
(5) Emergency Response
We shall be ready to swiftly respond to all emergency situations while ensuring that in‘normal’ times a fully effective response system is always in place.

On May 27, 2015, the NRA formulated “Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture,” as asubordinate document related to NRA’s Core Values and Principles, which concretely
and clearly explains activity principles from a viewpoint of nuclear safety culture. The
NRA has pronounced that it will enhance awareness of importance for nuclear safety
and contribute to development of safety culture in Japan by taking initiative inaccordance with “Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture”
Table 10‐2Statement on Nuclear Safety Culture

Safety shall be given the overriding priority in the utilization of nuclear energy. Safety culture isrecognized as continued practices with an awareness of this principle. It is the duty of everyone
involved in nuclear energy to foster safety culture.
Recognizing its importance, the NRA has developed the code of conduct on safety culture
taking due account of the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima Dai‐ichi Nuclear
Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company. The NRA will take the initiative in acting
based on it.
Thereby, the NRA will strive for raising awareness of the importance of safety culture among
everyone involved in nuclear energy and hence contributing to fostering safety culture in Japan.
Code of conduct
1. Priority to safety
In lucid recognition that absolute safety is not achievable and the possibility of a serious
accident remains, the overriding priority shall be placed on safety for “protecting people andthe environment”.
2. Decision making taking into account the risks
Decision shall be made in an independent and objective manner taking due account of therisks. Anyone who makes a decision is responsible for explaining logically the rationale of thedecision while clarifying its own roles, responsibilities, and authority.
3. Fostering, sustaining and strengthening safety culture
Managers shall take the initiative in fostering the attitudes and actions that place theoverriding priority to safety in their respective organizations. For sustaining and further
74

ARTICLE 10 Priority to Safety
strengthening safety culture, they shall also be vigilant to any early warning signs of decline
in safety culture and shape and enhance the working environment so that the staff canmaintain high morale.
4. Maintaining high level of expertise and organizational learning
Recognizing the importance of scientific and technical expertise for safety, each organization
shall collect and analyze the latest information in Japan and overseas on regulatory activities,
operating experience, and failures to feedback the findings in its activities. Managers shall
shape and enhance the working environment to promote such organizational learning.
5. Effective communication
Open and frank discussion in the workplace shall be the basis in the pursuit of safety. Managers
shall create such working environment and promote active discussion in their respective
organizations.
Adequate communication shall be pursued both inside/outside the organization and withstakeholders for enhancing transparency and building trust by taking the initiative in
information disclosure and exchange of a wide range of opinions.
6. Questioning attitude
All the personnel shall always have one’s own “questioning attitude” without complacency
whether there are any weaknesses that may affect safety, as well as whether there is any roomfor further improvement, and thereby identify safety issues.
7. Rigorous and prudent decisions and agile actions
In response to any challenges to ensuring safety, all the staff shall make conservativedecisions for safety taking into account even the worst‐case scenario, and take necessary
actions with agility.
8. Harmonization with nuclear security
It is necessary to recognize that nuclear safety and security activities do not exist
independently, namely complement each other and interfere with each other. All the
personnel involved in nuclear safety and security activities shall respect each other’s way of
thinking and make efforts for harmonizing both activities. Senior managers shall takeresponsibility to select the most appropriate solution.

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ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
ARTICLE 11
1
2

FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that adequate financial
resources are available to support the safety of each nuclear installation throughout its life.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that sufficient numbers ofqualified staff with appropriate education, training and retraining are available for all
safety‐related activities in or for each nuclear installation, throughout its life.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 11
In addition to basic financial reviews in the examination stage of Reactor Installation
Permits, a mechanism is always included for financial reserves to cover the cost of
possible decommissioning as well as the cost of processing and disposal of all spent
fuel and radioactive waste.
The recruitment of competent personnel is a regulatory requirement, and enoughpersonnel who have sufficient competent
Therefore, the regulations are ensuring financial and human resources which means it
conforms to Article 11 of the Convention.

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ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
Article 11 (1)1Financial Resources

Regulatory Requirements

The Reactor Regulation Act requires anyone who installs nuclear facilities to haveadequate financial resources, as one of criteria for permission.
In addition to a request for a Reactor Installation Permit, operators must provide
appropriate financial evidence of outlining funding which is necessary for installation,such as details for acquiring the necessary fuel materials and latest assets and balance
sheets. The NRA will check and confirm that any applicant has the appropriate
financial resources.
2

Steps to be taken by Licensees regarding decommissioning and disposal ofhigh‐level radioactive waste

Licensees are obliged to estimate the total estimated amounts (costs needed fordismantling and those for waste processing and disposal) in each fiscal year. It is
required for decommissioning of each nuclear station through the “Reserve Account for
Dismantling” in accordance with the Electricity Business Act and to reserve a fund tocover decommissioning work with consent of the Minister of Economy, Trade andIndustry.
While the plant is in operation, to fund the costs of any reprocessing of spent fuel,licensees must build up a financial reserve in a deposit management entity designatedby the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, pursuant to the “Spent Nuclear Fuel
Reprocessing Fund Act.”The fund amount shall be determined by such factors as the amount of spent fuelgenerated, the capacity and operational status of reprocessing facilities, and the cost of
reprocessing. The Act states that the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry shallnotify each licensee of the amount of needed reserves according to set criteria and anynecessary changes in accordance with the criteria set forth in an ordinance of the METI
and licensees will be further informed should changes needed to be made in thereserves depending on status of spent fuel generation.
With regard to the final disposal of high‐level radioactive waste and radioactive wastewith low heat production and a long half‐life (TRU waste) generated by reprocessing,the Specific Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act stipulates that needed financial
reserves shall be calculated by multiplying the final disposal cost per unit of high‐level
77

ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
radioactive waste by the quantity of generated waste; and that the final cost of disposal
per unit shall be prescribed in an ordinance of the METI, based on these factors.
Funds designated for the final disposal of high‐level radioactive waste generated
through spent fuel reprocessing shall be deposited with a Deposit Management Entity
designated by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
The legislation limits the ability to utilize these reserves which may not be used foranything other than their designated purpose. Furthermore, the Minister of Economy,
Trade and Industry may conduct on‐site inspections of electric utilities and Deposit
Management Entities.
Article 11 (2)1Human Resources

Regulatory Requirements

In granting Reactor Installation Permits the NRA must ensure that the applicant
possesses the technical and personnel ability to build such a facility, operate it safety
and efficiently and prevent severe accidents.
Before commencing reactor operations, licensees must both outline Operational Safety
Programs and obtain NRA approval.
There are regulatory requirements to ensure operational safety that only fully qualified
staff and technicians meeting NRA criteria and having undergone NRA checks areengaged in the reactor operation. Checks must be carried out before the reactor isstarted, while it is operational, and after it is shutdown.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors outlines Operational Safety Programs,
including the content of operational safety education and its implementation for
personnel operating and managing reactor facilities.
A quality assurance plan in the Operational Safety Programs outlines requirements on
staff competence for operational safety and any supplemental education or training to
be implemented should staff be deficient in such competency.
The NRA conducts inspections four times a year, focused compliance with Operational
Safety Programs, as well as checking that competence management and education andtraining are carried out appropriately.
From among qualified applications, including the provisions of the NRA Ordinance,
licensees must appoint a Chief Reactor Engineers to supervise the operational safety ofreactor operations.
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ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
When implementing decommissioning measures, licensees must establish appropriate
Operational Safety Programs and obtain NRA approval.
Human resource provisions covering Operational Safety Programs follow the same
system as those for reactor operations, including operational safety education in suchfields as decommissioning and providing for competence management and similar
matters in the quality assurance plan as well.
2

Check by licensees on technical ability

To secure safety of nuclear power plant, securing high awareness of nuclear safety andexcellent knowledge and technical ability held by on‐site personnel involved inoperation and maintenance are important. Licensees are making effort on the educationand training of personnel involved in operation and maintenance in specialized facilities
inside and outside their companies on a long‐term basis following their plans. For
operation training, the licensees have operation training facilities (simulators) toimplement emergency response training and training on reproduced failure and troubles.
There are specialized facilities for different reactor types outside their companies: the
BWR Training Center (BTC)7 for BWR and the Nuclear Power Training Center (NTC)8targeting PWR, both of which are used for basic education and simulator training ofoperation staff of nuclear facilities of the licensees. In training in these Training Centers,
curriculums designed according to ability of operation staff are available. The licensees
periodically dispatch operation staff to the operation training facilities for re‐training ofthem.
Persons responsible for operation are required to have not only knowledge andtechnical ability directly needed for operation of reactor facilities but also leadershipand capability of crisis management. Accordingly, training for this purpose is provided
for them. Persons responsible for operation are also required to have a level of
performance that conforms to the following standards set up by the NRA.
• Have five year or more work experiences related to reactor operation.
• Have six month or more work experiences in operation of the same type ofreactors within the last one year.
• Hold state at a management or supervisory level in a nuclear power station.
• Have knowledge and technical ability concerning reactors.

78

http://www.btc.co.jp/e_training.html
http://www.jntc.co.jp/en/index.html

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ARTICLE 11 Financial and Human Resources
In response to designation by licensees in April 2009, JANTI9 has come to be engaged
in competence determination of persons responsible for operation that is subject to thecode related to assessment of persons responsible for nuclear power station operation(JEAC4804) and the acceptance rule of the licensees. The determination is made basedon operation skill tests using a simulator, training sessions, and an oral examination.
When conformance to standards is confirmed with a person, a certification is granted.
This certification is valid for three years.
For maintenance staff, trainings through daily practical business or on‐the‐job training(OJT) applies and each licensee sets up a maintenance training center, thus providing
its employees and employees of maintenance‐related companies with education on
Operational Safety Programs and radiation protection as well as training on practical
maintenance work using actual models of equipment and facilities unique to the
nuclear energy industry. There are also various types of training courses on equipment
produced by manufacturers, and engineers are dispatched to these manufacturers fortraining.

9

The Japan Nuclear Technology Institute. JANTI was reformed to JANSI in November 2012.

80

ARTICLE 12 Human Factors
ARTICLE 12

HUMAN FACTORS

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that the capabilities andlimitations of human performance are taken into account throughout the life of a nuclear
installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 12
Licensees must deal with both human and organizational factors in anticipatingproblems and managing any noncompliance with rules and regulations.
In the Operational Safety Program and its quality assurance plan, licensees set force
guidelines dealing with noncompliance. These include programs for the analysis,
prevention, detection, and correction of human error, and for self‐appraisal ofmanagement and organizational problems.
Incidents of noncompliance due to human or organizational error are shared within
the licensee organization, as well as with other licensees to ensure a strong andeffective system.
All designs must incorporate appropriate measures to prevent mis‐operations by
operators.
Therefore, it is confirmed that human factors are included in the regulatory
requirements, and facility design and safety activities subject to them are put into
practice, which means conformity to Article 12 of the Convention.

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ARTICLE 12 Human Factors
1

Regulatory Requirements

In the rule on the standards about locations, structure and equipment of thecommercial power reactors and auxiliary facilities (the Reactor Installation Permit
standards), it is required in designing nuclear reactors to take necessary measures toprevent operational error. In the rule on technical standards of commercial powerreactors and auxiliary facilities, it is required in design of control rooms to installsystems in such a way as to ensure their safe operation and prevent any operational
error.
It is required to set a quality assurance plan in Operational Safety Programs at a stageof operation, so that nonconformance due to human error is a target of
nonconformance control in quality assurance activities.
Licensees are required to undertake close analysis and evaluation of human error, andtake measures to prevent future human error situations.
The NRA evaluates these licensee measures during Operational Safety Inspections.
Guidelines are described in the Guidelines for Evaluation by Regulatory Authorities ofAutonomous Initiatives by Business Operators for Rectifying Noncompliance Concerning
Direct Factors in Human Error (February 2008). The Guidelines state that clarity isessential in analyzing the direct cause of any problem and whether human error was
responsible. The mechanism for sharing information with other licensees’ about
noncompliance due to human error must also be clear, as well as the system forenabling all licensees to effectively utilize such information.
Noncompliance events are classified according to their impact on overall safety withcategories including accident/failure, deviation from operational conditions, violationof Operational Safety Programs, and autonomous analysis of direct causes. Key points
to be checked in specific examples include:•that the condition of systems, equipment, and components and any changes
therein; and the behavior of individuals, relationships between individuals, andcommunications, are described logically, together with any associated problems.

•that factors surrounding any human error are summarized objectively in a way
easily understood by third parties; that safety factors are identified and describedin specific detail; and that proposed corrective safety measures are described in
specific terms and then applied if necessary.

Accumulating, analyzing and utilizing data from human error noncompliance arechecked during Operational Safety Inspections taking into account the frequency and82

ARTICLE 12 Human Factors
timing of data analysis carried out by each licensee:•that data concerning direct causes of noncompliance resulting from human error
are collected and accumulated;•that this accumulated data is analyzed;•

that, should the collected data indicate such actions are necessary, preventive
measures are formulated, evaluated, and implemented and the outcomes checked;
and•that information about noncompliance resulting from human error is shared withother licensees and utilized as appropriate.

The overall objective is not to assign individual responsibility but to construct a more
efficient operational management structure to try to eliminate human error or, if it
occurs, to reduce the severity of the impact. Based on this objective, the NRA conducts
the aforementioned checks, while encouraging licensees to implement the PDCA cycle(Plan ⇒ Do ⇒ Check ⇒ Act ‐‐‐make improvements and formulate another plan),share the information with their workers and other licensees and implement
continuous improvement initiatives.
2

Prevention of human error

In NPSs in Japan, measures to prevent human error are taken not only with hardware
but also in operation management. As measures to prevent human error based on
hardware, man‐machine interfaces on the control panel have been improved forprevention of mis‐operations, and an interlock system has been introduced to prevent
equipment from working in response to wrong operation. In addition, a fail‐safe
system has been introduced which is designed to ensure operation of equipment on thesafe side in case that failure occurs in part of a system.
For example, the Japan Electric Association formulated the “Rule on Equipment Designfor Mis‐Operation Prevention in Reactor Control Rooms of Nuclear Power Stations”(JEAG‐4624) that specifies required items for systems to be installed in such a way as toensure their safe operation and prevent any mis‐operation in the reactor control roomsof nuclear power stations, which has become a guideline for licensees in theirdesigning of control rooms.
As for measures licensees take to meet regulatory standards related to mis‐opertaion
prevention, such methods of preventing mis‐operation are adopted as use of display
devices on the control panel; arrangement of alarm equipment and operating devices;distinction by color for each type of liquid flowing inside the piping on site; locking
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ARTICLE 12 Human Factors
control of control panels of equipment and manual valves.
In terms of operation and control, licensees are required to set up a system to foster
safety culture and a quality assurance plan, and also provide provisions related tosafety education targeting staff in charge of operation and control of reactors in their
Operational Safety Programs. In addition, as part of quality assurance activities, they
are providing accident prediction training, including case study based on past failure
examples, for staff in charge of operation and control by having them form small
groups as a target of the training, in order to have safety actions established in their
work.

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ARTICLE 13 Quality Assurance
ARTICLE 13

QUALITY ASSURANCE

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that quality assurance
programmes are established and implemented with a view to providing confidence thatspecified requirements for all activities important to nuclear safety are satisfied throughout thelife of a nuclear installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 13
The NRA has standards in place for quality assurance in the design phase of a nuclear
power plant and requires a licensee to develop a quality assurance plan in its
Operational Safety Program. This ensures that a quality assurance plan will be
developed and implemented in all activities, from the design phase to the operationaland decommissioning phases, which are important to nuclear safety. Thus, theprovision of Article 13 of the Convention is achieved.

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ARTICLE 13 Quality Assurance
1

Regulatory Requirements and Measures
Under the Reactor Regulation Act, one of the criteria for obtaining construction
approval of a nuclear facility is that the quality control methods and inspection
systems comply with technical standards of the NRA Ordinance (the NRA Ordinanceon Quality Control Methods).
In practice, this ordinance requires that a quality control supervision system beestablished for the design and construction of reactor facilities; that the responsibilityof management executives be clearly stated; and that management of human andother resources, planning and implementation of specific duties, measurement,
analysis, and continuous improvement be carried out.
Concerning operational safety activities, licensees must outline a quality assurance
plan in their Operational Safety Programs, and must make continuous improvements
to this plan, as well as planning, implementing, evaluating, and improving
operational safety activities.
Quality assurance plans must be operated by licensee senior management; haveclearly identified responsibilities, authority, and duties; and to feature mechanisms
for the formulation, implementation, evaluation, and continuous improvement ofsuch plans.
Operational safety plans must establish appropriate management methods coveringexternal goods or services procurement; procedures for the appropriate managementof operational safety documents and records; and education and training courses insafety activities.
It is necessary to clarify individual goals and requirements during operational safety
activities, and to check at appropriate times that these are being carried out inaccordance with the implementation plan.
To check this, licensees must conduct requisite inspections and tests, and establish aneffective system to deal with incidents of noncompliance.
To evaluate operational safety activities, licensees must conduct systematic
monitoring and implementation procedures; auditing should be carried out on aregular basis by persons not directly involved in the items under review.
Licensees should establish procedures to ensure the continuous improvement ofoperational safety activities and to institute preventive measures to avoid
noncompliance situations or, should one occur, to introduce remedial measures toprevent a reoccurrence. Preventive knowledge acquired at both their own plant andother nuclear facilities should be evaluated and, where appropriate, incorporated by86

ARTICLE 13 Quality Assurance
licensees in their operations.
2

Implementation Status of Quality Assurance by Licensees
Based on the private‐sector quality assurance standard for ensuring safety at nuclear
power stations (JEAC 4111‐2009), licensees formulate quality assurance plans andconduct quality assurance activities in order to meet the regulatory requirements
mentioned above.
The technical adequacy of the JEAC 4111‐2009 standard was evaluated by the former
regulatory authority, NISA, when it was published as a set of specifications andcriteria for meeting statutory performance standards; it complies with the quality
assurance requirements of the IAEA’s safety standard GS‐R‐3.
In terms of the general requirements in JEAC 4111‐2009, licensees are required toestablish, document, implement, and maintain a quality management system, as wellasmakingcontinuous

improvements.

These

regulations

establish

specificrequirements for a quality management system including “responsibility of top
executives,” “operational management of resources,” “planning and implementationof duties,” and “evaluation and improvement.”
Human resources requirements stipulate that key personnel involved in nuclear
safety must be competent in areas such as education, training, skills and experience.
Licensees must identify needed competences and if necessary provide further
education and training to ensure personnel reach the necessary standards.
Licensees should conduct procurement procedures having clearly identified therequirements for product approval procedures, processes, and equipment; personnel
competence checks, and quality management systems.

Moreover, the standard

stipulates that procured items must be inspected on the premises of the supplier if
possible to ensure that they meet set standards.
Reactor quality assurance programs are audited.
To guarantee its impartiality an audit should be conducted by the appropriate
authority at the licensee’s head office and it should have no direct involvement withthe department running the nuclear facility. The auditing department should bedirectly under the president in the company’s organizational structure so that he canbe quickly informed of any situation needing remedial action or improvement.
In procurement management, it is common for licensees to conduct audits ofsuppliers directly, to ensure that the suppliers satisfy the specification sheet
requirements.
Such specification sheets are given to the supplier at the time of ordering and87

ARTICLE 13 Quality Assurance
products are then checked upon delivery.
If checks are required during the product manufacturing process, licensees candirectly check that process.
In the case of services, the specification sheet is given to the service provider inadvance in order to ensure that a person with the requisite skills is recruited.
These include checking to confirm the provider has technicians with the required
specific skills i.e. welding.
On the issue of outsourcing, the provider must submit to the licensee a quality
assurance plan to guarantee all requirements are met.
This prevents sub‐standard outsourcing to providers with inappropriate quality
assurance systems.
This provides licensees in Japan with the confidence that quality assurance systems
constitute one of the major elements for maintaining their own quality assurance
systems; accordingly, mechanisms to enable licensees themselves to conduct audits ofproviders and suppliers are being developed, as required.

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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
ARTICLE 14

ASSESSMENT AND VERIFICATION OF SAFETY

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) comprehensive and systematic safety assessments are carried out before the construction
and commissioning of a nuclear installation and throughout its life. Such assessments shallbe well documented, subsequently updated in the light of operating experience andsignificant new safety information, and reviewed under the authority of the regulatorybody;(ii) verification by analysis, surveillance, testing and inspection is carried out to ensure that thephysical state and the operation of a nuclear installation continue to be in accordance withits design, applicable national safety requirements, and operational limits and conditions.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 14
In obtaining a reactor installation permit, licensees must conduct an evaluation toconfirm that the basic reactor facility design can realize disaster prevention measures.
During construction licensees must evaluate safety measures of all processes approvedin the construction plan.
After the start of operation of the nuclear power reactor facility, the licensee is required
to conduct an evaluation for improvement in the safety of the facility as well as toreport to the NRA and disclose the results of the evaluation. The licensee must conduct
an aging evaluation every 10 years after 30 years of operation and an evaluation for alicense application before 40 years of operation to extend the period of operation.
The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that pre‐service Inspections are conducted at theconstruction stage, and that Periodic Facility Inspections and Operational Safety
Inspections are carried out during the operational stage, with checks focusing on boththe hard and soft aspects of the safety of reactor facilities.
An evaluation was conducted during the installation phase and operational life of thenuclear power facility under the supervision of the regulatory body. Thus, theprovision of Article 14 of the Convention is achieved.

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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Article 14 (1)1Safety Assessments

Overview of regulatory requirements

Anyone seeking to construct reactor facilities, in addition to an installation permit
application, they must provide evidence that the basic design and design principles
can realize disaster prevention. Such documentation will be submitted to the NRA,
pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Installation Permit procedure is detailed in Article 18.
After obtaining a Reactor Installation Permit, licensees must obtain approval for theirconstruction plans, as well as for the design of the fuel assembly to be loaded in thereactor.
When seeking construction plan approval, applicants must append a safety evaluation
conducted by the licensee, based on the detailed design for the reactor facility. This
document will cover earthquake‐resistance and strength, as well as an attachment
document concerning the safety‐related design features specific to the equipment for
which the application is being submitted.
When seeking approval for the design of the fuel assembly, applicants must attach adocument covering such features of the fuel assembly as its heat, radiation andcorrosion resistance, as well as a document featuring calculations of the strength of thefuel assembly (or the fuel elements, if the assembly consists of a bundle of fuelelements), a structural drawing of the fuel assembly, a flow chart for processing, and an
attachment document concerning quality assurance.
Licensees must conduct welding inspections focusing specifically on areas which mustwithstand extra pressures and the containment vessel.

Licensees welding inspections

must be reviewed by the NRA.
Before beginning reactor operations, licensees must obtain approval for their
Operational Safety Programs, with which they must comply to assure such operationalsafety.
Matters concerning construction plans, Pre‐service Inspections, Fuel Assembly Design
Approval, Fuel Assembly Inspections, and Welding Safety Management Reviews aredetailed in Article 18.
In response to the Fukushima Daiichi accident the Reactor Regulation Act was revisedin June 2012 and an evaluation system to enhance the safety of commercial powerreactor facilities was introduced. This is described in Section 2‐2.
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ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
2

Safety evaluation on reactor installation

2‐1

Safety evaluation in the reactor installation permit phase

In the application for a reactor installation permit, the applicant is required to present
the conditions used to evaluate the necessary equipment to manage accidents due toabnormal transient events, design basis accidents and severe accidents and the extent
and effect of the anticipated accidents, and explain that the safety of the reactor facility
is ensured, based on the results of the evaluation.
2‐2

Evaluation of safety improvement

A new safety improvement evaluation program was introduced into the 2012 revised
Reactor Regulation Act. The program is to require the licensee to conduct an evaluationof the safety of the power reactor facility by themselves no later than six months after
the day on which periodic inspection of the facility ends. After the evaluation, thelicensee must report the results of the evaluation etc. to the NRA without delay anddisclose the results.
For the report of evaluation of safety improvement, the investigation, analysis orassessment conducted by the licensee is determined not to comply with the method set
forth in the NRA Ordinance Concerning the installation and operation of Commercial
Power Reactor, the NRA can order the licensee to change to improve the method ofinvestigation, analysis or assessment.
2‐3Aging management

The oldest reactor facilities in Japan have been operating since the 1970s, or 40 plus
years. Dealing with age‐related deterioration is therefore a crucial issue.
In a technical aging evaluation, aging events to be noted in terms of aging management
are identified in all of the aging events that have occurred or may occur in components
and structures with safety functions and the integrity of the components and structures
against the identified events is evaluated. In addition, the effectiveness of current
maintenance management is evaluated and those to be added as needed are identified.
This evaluation is conducted in every ten years after 30 years of operation andimplementing maintenance in the coming ten years must be developed and the revised
operational safety program that reflects the policy must be approved by the NRA.
2‐4

Operational Extension Period

The Reactor Regulation Act prescribes an operating life of 40 years, but it is possible to91

ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
extend this once, for a period of no more than 20 years, if approval is obtained from the
NRA.
In determining whether or not to extend the operation period of a facility, it isnecessary to ascertain the current status of the plant in detail so extension applicantsmust conduct a special inspection to assess such factors as deterioration.
Licensees must carry out a technical evaluation of any deterioration, set out theirmaintenance and management policy during the extension period, and append thesedetails to their extension application.
The special inspection must include all equipment, components, and structures withfunctions required to ensure plant safety that have not hitherto been subject to a
deterioration inspection or which have only undergone partial inspection, excluding
those items that should be dealt with as part of the usual maintenance process. Morespecifically, it involves inspections of such components as the base metal of the reactor
pressure vessel, and strength checks of concrete structures by means of core sampling.
The main equipment subject to special inspections in PWR and BWR is shown in Tables
14‐1 and 14‐2, respectively.
Table 14‐1

Equipment and Areas Subject to Special Inspection at PWR Plants and theInspection Methods Used

Equipment
Targeted

Areas Targeted

Inspection Method- Base metal and welded parts (100%of the reactor core area)- Check for defects using ultrasonicinspection- Check for cracks by means ofsurface inspection or eddy‐current
testing- Check for cracks in the welded partsin question, using MVT‐110, andcheck for defects on the innersurface of the bottom mounted
instrumentation nozzles by meansof surface inspection or
eddy‐current testing- Visual check of the condition of thecoating- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration bymeans of core sampling- Primary coolant nozzle side (the partwith the highest fatigue usage factor)
Reactor vessel- Bottom mounted instrumentation
nozzles (all)Containment
vessel10- Steel plates for the containment
vessel (all areas to which it ispossible to get close enough toinspect)- Pre‐stressed concrete containment

Visual inspection using a camera that can distinguish between wires with a width of 0.025mm

92ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Equipment
Targeted
Concrete
structures

Table 14‐2

Areas Targeted

Inspection Method

vessel- Concrete structures designed toensure the safety of reactor
equipment11 (primary shield wall)- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration bymeans of core sampling

Equipment and Area Subject to Special Inspection at BWR Plants and theInspection Methods Used

Equipment
Targeted

Areas Targeted

Inspection Method- Base metal and welded parts (reactor
core area and all areas to which it ispossible to get close enough toinspect)- Check for defects using ultrasonicinspection- Primary coolant nozzle side (the partwith the highest fatigue usage factor)
Reactorpressure vessel- Control rod drive mechanism stubtubes and drive housing (all).

- Foundation bolts (all)- Suppression chamber vent pipes andvent pipe bellows (Mark I, modified
Mark I)
Containment
vesselConcrete
structures- Steel plates for the containment
vessel (all areas to which it ispossible to get close enough toinspect)- Reinforced concrete containment
vessel- Concrete structures with functions
required to ensure the safety ofreactor equipment2 (reactor pressure
vessel pedestal or equivalent part,etc.)- Check for cracks by means ofsurface inspection or
eddy‐current testing- Check for cracks in the weldedparts in question, using MVT‐11,
and check for defects on the innersurface of the housing by meansof surface inspection or
eddy‐current testing- Check via ultrasonic inspection,
to ensure there are no anomalies
within the bolts- Check for hazardous defects or
cracks, by means of surface
inspection of all relevant surfaces,
using MVT‐112- Visual check of the condition of
the coating- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration
by means of core sampling- Checks of strength, concretecarbonation, and salt penetration
by means of core sampling

It is required for approval of an operational extension period of that, all construction plans
required to comply with the technical standards have already been approved or submitted
by the time the operational extension period is approved and the results of technical aging
11
12

Support functions, shielding functions, leak‐prevention functions, etc.
Visual inspection using a camera that can distinguish between wires with a width of 0.025mm

93ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
evaluation comply with the requirements13 in Table 14‐3 during the extended operational
life. If the results of the technical evaluation do not comply with the requirements, theimplementation of the maintenance policy may be considered in an evaluation forcompliance with the requirements.
Table 14‐3

Requirements for the Extension of the Operation Period

Events/issues to be evaluatedLow‐cycle fatigue
Neutron irradiation embrittlement

Irradiation‐assisted stress corrosion

13

Requirements
As a result of evaluation of integrity, the fatigue usage
factor for the area to be evaluated should be less than 1.
• As a result of evaluation of pressurized thermal shock,the value of the static planar strain fracture toughness
in the area to be evaluated of the reactor pressure
vessel should exceed the value of the stress intensity
factor.
• The following requirements should be met dependingon the in‐service state of the reactor pressure vessel.
This does not apply if the upper shelf absorbed energy
is equal or more than 68 J.
- As a result of evaluation of ductile crack growth, inthe area to be evaluated, the crack growth resistanceexceeds the crack‐driving force.
- As a result of evaluation of crack instability, in thearea to be evaluated, the crack growth resistance isequal to the crack‐driving force and the minimalchange rate of the crack growth resistance exceedsthat of the crack‐driving force.
- As a result of evaluation of crack depth, in the area
to be evaluated, the crack depth does not exceed
75% of the wall thickness of the reactor pressure
vessel.
- As a result of evaluation of a plastic instability
failure, it does not occur in the area to be evaluated.
• From the above evaluation results, it is determined that
it is possible to set the limits of the temperature andpressure range of the primary coolant during normal
heating and cooling of the primary coolant system thatcan be complied with as operating limits, the leakage
during the service life from the reactor coolant
pressure boundary or the minimum temperature of thereactor coolant in a hydraulic test.
If, as a result of evaluation of integrity, it is determined

Examination criteria for the extension of the operation period of commercial power reactors

94

ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Events/issues to be evaluatedcracking

Thermal aging of duplex stainlesssteel

Decrease in electrical insulation ofelectrical and/or instrumentationequipment

Decrease inconcretestrength

Heat

Concrete structure

Radiation

Neutralization

Chloride
penetration

Requirementsthat irradiation‐assisted stress corrosion cracking may
occur in the area to be evaluated, the criteria set forth in
the Technical Standards should be met based on theassumption that an irradiation‐assisted stress corrosion
crack is generated and grows.
• As a result of evaluation of ductile crack growth, inthe area to be evaluated, the crack growth resistanceexceeds the crack‐driving force.
• As a result of evaluation of crack instability, in thearea to be evaluated, the crack growth resistance isequal to the crack‐driving force and the minimalchange rate of the crack growth resistance exceedsthat of the crack‐driving force.
• As a result of evaluation of integrity based on the
results of inspection, there is no significant decreasein the electrical insulation of electrical and/or
instrumentation equipment.
• As a result of evaluation of integrity based on the
results of environmental qualification testing, there isno significant decrease in the electrical insulation ofelectrical and/or instrumentation equipment.
If the concrete temperature in the area to be evaluatedhas exceeded the limit (90°C for penetrations and 650°C
for others), a strength evaluation should be conducted
and the strength of the members or structurescomprising the area should exceed the design load.
If the cumulative radiation dose of the area to beevaluated exceeds or may exceed a level that may affectthe strength of concrete, a strength evaluation should be
conducted and the strength of the members or
structures comprising the area should exceed thedesign load.
If it is determined that the neutralization of concrete in thearea to be evaluated has reached or may reach a depth
where the corrosion of the reinforcing bars is initiated, astrength evaluation should be conducted and the strengthof the members or structures comprising the area should
exceed the design load.
If significant cracking due to reinforcement corrosion
caused by chloride penetration has occurred or may
occur in the area to be evaluated, a strength evaluation
should be conducted and the strength of the members
or structures comprising the area should exceed thedesign load.

95

ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Events/issues to be evaluatedAlkali‐aggregate
reaction

Mechanicalvibration

Freezing andthawing

Degradationof shielding
performanceof concrete

Heat

Decrease in
the strengthofreinforcing
bars

Corrosion

Fatigue caused
by wind andother loads

Events to be evaluated other than theabove

Evaluation of seismic safety

Requirements
If significant cracking due to alkali‐aggregate reaction
has occurred in the area to be evaluated, a strength
evaluation should be conducted and the strength of themembers or structures comprising the area should
exceed the design load.
If significant cracking due to mechanical vibration has
occurred in the surface of concrete in the anchorage zone
in the concrete foundation of the equipment to beevaluated, a strength evaluation should be conducted andthe strength of the members or structures comprising thearea should exceed the design load.
If significant cracking due to freezing and thawing has
occurred in the area to be evaluated, a strength
evaluation should be conducted and the strength of themembers or structures comprising the area should
exceed the design load.
If the temperature of the concrete neutron radiation shield
has exceeded 88°C or the temperature of the concrete
gamma radiation shield exceeds 177°C, a radiation
shielding evaluation should be conducted and theshielding performance of the members or structurescomprising the area should not be lower than the level set
forth in the reactor installation permit.
If a loss of cross‐section due to corrosion has occurredin the area to be evaluated, a strength evaluation should
be conducted and the strength of the members or
structures comprising the area should exceed thedesign load.
If a fatigue failure caused by wind and other cyclic loads
has occurred or may occur in the area to be evaluated, astrength evaluation should be conducted and the strengthof the members or structures comprising the area should
exceed the design load.
In an event not subject to degradation management,such as degradation trend monitoring, has occurred orprogressed or may occur or progress, an evaluation of
integrity should be conducted based on the assumptionthat it occurs and progresses, and the results shouldmeet the criteria set forth in the Technical Standards.
• The stress in equipment or a structure caused byseismic forces and the usage factor that are
determined in consideration of aging events should
be below the allowable seismic design limit.
• The stress in equipment or a structure caused by96

ARTICLE 14 Assessment and Verification of Safety
Events/issues to be evaluatedEvaluation of tsunami safety

Requirements
seismic forces, the crack‐driving forth and the stressintensity factor that are determined in considerationof aging events should be below the allowablefracture mechanics evaluation limit under expected
service conditions.
• The response acceleration of equipment or a structure
required to function dynamically in an earthquakethat is determined in consideration of aging eventsshould be less than the level at which the equipment
or structure has been confirmed to function.
• The displacement of a fuel assembly in an earthquakethat is determined in consideration of aging events isless than the relative displacement at which the fuelassembly has been confirmed to function or thecontrol rod insertion time is less than the value
specified for safety evaluation.
The stress in equipment or a structure caused by atsunami that is determined in consideration of aging
events should be below the allowable limit.

Deterioration situations subject to evaluation and the evaluation techniques to be used
are outlined in technical evaluations of deterioration. The evaluation focuses on
situations such as stress corrosion cracking, corrosion, embrittlement, abrasion, fatigue
cracks, and other possibilities.
During an extension period licensees must submit a maintenance and management
policy covering all relevant maintenance measures identified as a result of technicalevaluation of deterioration.
During an extended operational period, a system for aging management is used. Under
this system, licensees operating reactors 30 years or older are required to include in
their Operational Safety Programs a deterioration evaluation for equipment covering aperiod of ten years and a maintenance and management policy, thereby ensuring
compliance. Efforts are made to ensure appropriate implementation including amaintenance and management policy focused on the period up to the last day of theextended operation period of the facility run for ten years.
The content implemented in each operational cycle, fleshing out the maintenance andmanagement policy, is reflected in the inspections of individual items of equipment
and the maintenance plan, taking into account past inspection performances and thestatus of deterioration. These details are checked by the NRA.
Under this system, an NRA Operational Safety Inspector checks the implementation
97

ART
TICLE 14 Asssessment anda Verificaation of Safeety
statu
us of the maintenancemplan by su
uch means as an Ope
erational Saafety Inspection.
Figurre 14‐2 prov
vides an outline.
Approval of
operational safety

30th year

Operational safety prograams
Maintenance & managementt policy(every 10 years)

Advancesubmissionn

Sppecify the timing ofimmplementation,immplementation plan, andaproogress status

Reflected

Tecchnical evaluation of
aging facilities

Substantial
maintenance planMaaintenanceplan

Substantial
maintenance planSubstantial
periodic
inspection

Periodic
inspeection

Substantial
maintenance planSubstantial
periodic
inspection

Mainttenance plan im
mplementation status checked by means of ann inspection (operational safetty inspection, etc.)eFiggure 14‐2

Articcle 14 (2)Mainteenance Activ
vities at Rea
actor Facilitties

Verificatioon of SafetyyAftter receivin
ng approva
al for the cconstructionn plan, the licensee m
may not usse thefaccility until itt has passedd a Pre‐serv
vice Inspectiion.
Th
he licensee may
m not usse the fuel assembly unlessu
it ha
as passed a Fuel Asse
embly
Insspection.
Liccensees are obliged to undergo Peeriodic Faciility Inspecttions and in
nspections ofo thestaatus of theirr compliance with the O
Operationall Safety Programs.
A rreport on in
nspections pursuantptoo the Reactor Regulation Act is proovided in Article
A
19..

98

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
ARTICLE 15

RADIATION PROTECTION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that in all operational states
the radiation exposure to the workers and the public caused by a nuclear installation shall be
kept as low as reasonably achievable and that no individual shall be exposed to radiation doses
which exceed prescribed national dose limits.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 15
Working conditions of radiation workers at nuclear facilities ensure they are notexposed to levels in excess of those prescribed in law.
Established release control targets for gaseous and liquid wastes are set lower thanlegal concentration limits. Such waste is treated by filtration or allowing radioactive
decay over time to reduce the concentration of radioactive material that it contains, andis managed to ensure that radioactivity concentrations outside the supervised area do
not exceed the prescribed limits.
Activities to reduce the exposure dose include management of prior records ofradiation exposure and task management.
Thus, it is ensured that the dose of workers and those engaged in radiation work is
kept as low as reasonably achievable and does not exceed the dose limits. Thus, theprovision of Article 15 of the Convention is achieved.

99

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
1

Regulatory Requirements

Radiation control in commercial power reactor facilities is provided for in the
Ministerial Ordinance for Commercial Power Reactors under the Reactor Regulation
Act. Baseline levels for dose limits etc. are specified in the notification (Notification on
Doses) of the NRA.
Radiation controlled area, protection area and supervised area are required to be
designated in a commercial power reactor facility. Radiation doses, concentrations anddensity in controlled areas and dose limits outside the supervised areas are specified in the
Notification on Doses.
Radiation controlled area must be clearly separated by a fence or wall from other areas
by placing an identification sign, and is subject to measures, such as access control andlock control, depending on the risk of radiation. A protection area is out of radiation
controlled area that requires special control to ensure the safety of a nuclear reactor
facility. The area must be clearly differentiated from other areas by placing a sign oroffering other means of identification and are subject to measures, such as access
control, lock control and a restriction on objects to be brought out in accordance withthe requirements.
A supervised area is an area around a controlled area, outside of which the dose limits
set by the NRA are not likely to be exceeded. People are prohibited from living in thisarea. A fence must be placed along the boundary to restrict the entry of people otherthan those who enter the area to work.
For the purpose of radiation control of radiation workers, the commercial powerreactor licensee is required to ensure that the dose of radiation workers should notexceed the dose limits set by the NRA and the concentration of airborne radioactive
material inhaled by radiation workers does not exceed the concentration limits set by
the NRA. If it is unavoidable due to an emergency such as damage to a commercial
power reactor, the licensee is allowed to engage radiation workers in emergency workwithin the dose limits set by the NRA. The dose limits set by the NRA are shown in the
Table 15‐1 below.

100

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
Table 15‐1 Dose limits
Item

Dose limits

A Radiation worker(1) Effective dose limit(2) Women(3) Pregnant women(4) Equivalent dose limit for the lens of theeye(5) Equivalent dose limit for the skin(6) Equivalent dose limit for the surface of
the abdomen of pregnant women

100 mSv/5 years and 50 mSv/year
5 mSv/3 months in addition to the limit
specified in (1)1 mSv for internal exposure in addition to thelimit specified in (1); for the period after theemployee comes to know about the
pregnancy until the baby is born
150 mSv/year

500 mSv/year
2 mSv; for the period after the employee
comes to know about the pregnancy until thebaby is born
B Radiation workers to engage in emergency work
(1) Effective dose limit
100 mSv (250 mSv)14(2) Equivalent dose limit for the lens of the 300 mSv
eye(3) Equivalent dose limit for the skin
1 Sv

For the purpose of discharge control of radioactive waste, in discharging gaseous waste,
the concentration of radioactive material in the discharge gas must be reduced as muchas possible in a exhaust air system by means such as filtering the gas, reducing theradiation level over time and diluting it with a large amount of air, and theconcentration of radioactive material in the discharge gas must be monitored at thedischarge outlet or in the discharge gas monitoring system. In discharging liquid waste,
the concentration of radioactive material in the discharge water must be reduced asmuch as possible in a drainage facility by means of filtering the liquid, evaporating it,
adsorption in an ion exchange resin column etc., reducing the radiation level over time,and diluting with a large amount of water, and the concentration of radioactive
material in the discharge water must be monitored at the discharge outlet or in the
discharge water monitoring system.

14

The dose rate limit in case any event described in any number of section 2, article 7th of the “Notification
to Establish Dose Limits in Accordance with the Provisions of NRA Ordinance on Activity of Refining
Nuclear Source or Nuclear Fuel Materials “(NRA Ordinance No.8) occurred.

101

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
2

Licensee’s radiation protection program

In addition to measures required by regulation, such as compliance with thedesignation of radiation controlled areas and other areas and the dose limits requiredby regulation, licensees have detailed radiation control measures in place, such as theuse of a personal dosimeter with an alarm to measure a radiation dose at each entry
into a radiation controlled area. In Japan, the ALARA concept is widely accepted bylicensees. Essentially, in conducting radiation works, it is understood that unnecessary
exposure should be avoided. In a nuclear power plant in operation, three elements(time, distance and shielding) in reducing exposure are implemented, such as
controlling access to radiation controlled areas, reducing the duration of work by
performing radiation work in a planned manner, ensuring the distance from radiation
sources, and installing a shield. In addition, the water quality of primary systems isfully controlled to reduce the generation of radiation sources by activation in primarysystems.
Based on the Nuclear Reactor Act, in our country, any nuclear reactor licensee is required
to record the dose rate of the radiation workers and store the records during the periodrequired by the NRA Ordinance.
The records as provided above shall be stored, provided, however, that this shall not
apply where the person who has lost his position as a radiation worker or where the said
records are to be passed to the organization specified by the NRA after they have been
stored for 5 years or longer, the Radiation Effect Association is designated as the
specified organization.
The figure below shows the ten‐year total and average dose of radiation workers innuclear power plants, excluding the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is currently in the process of recovery
from the accident and the working conditions there are different from those in otherpower plants. The total number of radiation workers is about 47,900 in all power plants,
excluding the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, while there are about 20,700
radiation workers in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station alone. In
Fukushima Daiichi, a very large number of radiation workers work and doses in thework environment are high. Therefore, if the data from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Station is included, its contribution accounts for most of the total and average
dose data. In 2014, the total dose in Fukushima Daiichi was 104.55 person‐ Sv and theaverage dose was 5.0 mSv.
102

ARTICLE
E 15 Radiaation Proteection

3

Dose redu
uction effortts in the Fukkushima Da
aiichi Nucle
ear Power SStation

In th
he early stagges of the earthquakeeddisaster in the Fukush
hima Daiich
hi Nuclear PowerP
Statioon, the systtem such ass that for w
worker accesss control annd dose datta collectionn andproceessing was damaged andaelectronnic dosimetters and cha
arging equiipment werre notavaillable for usee, making itt difficult too fully perfo
orm individ
dual dose coontrol. Currrently,
the ssystem is baack in opera
ation, and inndividual dosedcontrol has been inn place andd dosereduction effortss have been made.
TEPC
CO has madde efforts too reduce thee doses by providingpa radiation sshield for highlyhradiooactive equuipment on the site off the Fukusshima Daiicchi Nuclearr Power Sta
ation,
cuttinng trees, annd performiing decontaamination activitiesasuch as removving surfacce soil
and pplowing to replace surrface soil wiith subsoil.
Due to these effforts, in most of the sitee area of th
he power pla
ant, workerrs can work
k withsimp
ple respirato
ory protective equipmeent on, suchh as a half‐fa
ace mask orr dust respiirator.
In doose control,, significantt improvem
ments have been madee to the woork environm
ment.
For eexample, the average dosedhas beeen reduced to about 1 mSv/monthmh.

Peerson Sv

Totall dosemS
Sv

Average
A
dose

100

1.5
5

80

1.2
2

60

0.9
9

40

0.6
6

20

0.3
3

0

0.0
0
2005

2006

200
07

2008

Figuree 15‐1

2009

2010
0

Fiscal year

2011

2012
2

2013

Total Dose and Averag
Tge Dose103

2014

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection

4.

Release Control of Gaseous/Liquid Waste
In accordance with the provisions of the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors,
licensees reduce the concentration of radioactive material in gaseous waste as far as
possible by such means as filtration in an exhaust air system, radioactive decay overtime, or dilution, and then, measure and monitor its release.
In the case of liquid waste, they reduce the concentration of radioactive material as
far as possible by filtration, evaporation, adsorbing with the ion exchange resin
method, radioactive decay over time, or dilution in a drainage facility, and then, theymeasure and monitor its release.
Licensees prescribe and manage in their own Operational Safety Programs to control
the release of gaseous and liquid waste ensuring that the legally‐prescribedradioactive material concentration limits outside supervised area shall not be
exceeded.
To ensure that release levels are below the legal limits outside the Surrounding
Monitored Area, licensees decide the control targets based on the annual release
quantity stipulated in their Installation Permit Application. They guarantee in their
Operational Safety Programs that they will not exceed those levels and the NRA
checks the status of compliance when conducting Operational Safety Inspections.
Figures 15‐2 and 15‐3 show the amount of gaseous and liquid waste discharged fromreactor facilities (BWRs and PWRs) in the past ten years reported by licensees inaccordance with the Reactor Regulation Act.

104

ARTICLE
E 15 Radiaation Proteection

1.0E+111
1.0E+100
1.0E+099
1.0E+088
1.0E+07
7

R
Radioactive NobleN
gases

1.0E+06
6

kBq

loodine 131

1.0E+055
1.0E+044
1.0E+03
1.0E+022

2005 2006 2007 2008 20009 2010 201
11 2012 2013 2014
F
Fiscal year

Figure15‐2 The Qu
uantity of Ga
aseous Wasste Releasedd1.00E+12

Tritium
1.00E+10

other

1.00E+08

0E+06
kBq1.01.00E+04

1.00E+02

1.00E+00

2005

2006

2007
7

2008

20009

2010

20
011

2012

2013

2014

Fiiscal year

Figure15
5‐3 The Quaantity of Liq
quid Waste Released

5.

Environnmental Ra
adiation Mo
onitoring
To evaluate th
he impact ofo radioactiive release tot the surro
ounding en
nvironment fromthee nuclear facility, licen
nsees moniitor air rad
diation does rates andd environm
mental105

ARTICLE 15 Radiation Protection
samples with the aim of improving release control and facility management.
To help protect the health and safety of nearby public communities, local
governments (in prefectures where reactor facilities are located) also conduct local
radiation monitoring.
After the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi accident, the government developed a“Comprehensive Radiation Monitoring Plan (decided in August 2011, revised in
March, April 2012, April 2013, April 2014, April 2015 and April 2016)” governing
environmental radiation monitoring work related to Fukushima Daiichi accident.
Environmental radiation monitoring points and frequency increased after theaccident, and relevant ministries and bodies including the government of Fukushima
Prefecture are now working in partnership in accordance with the Comprehensive
Radiation Monitoring Plan.
Environmental radiation monitoring data are uploaded on the website of the Disaster
Prevention

andNuclear

SafetyNetwork

forthe

NuclearEnvironment(http://www.bousai.ne.jp/eng/), which is run by the NRA, enabling the general public
to see it in real time.

106

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
ARTICLE 161

2

3

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESSEach Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that there are on‐site andoff‐site emergency plans that are routinely tested for nuclear installations and cover theactivities to be carried out in the event of an emergency. For any new nuclear installation,such plans shall be prepared and tested before it commences operation above a low power
level agreed by the regulatory body.
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that, insofar as they arelikely to be affected by a radiological emergency, its own population and the competentauthorities of the States in the vicinity of the nuclear installation are provided withappropriate information for emergency planning and response.
Contracting Parties which do not have a nuclear installation on their territory, insofar as
they are likely to be affected in the event of a radiological emergency at a nuclear
installation in the vicinity, shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of
emergency plans for their territory that cover the activities to be carried out in the event ofsuch an emergency.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 16
Basic Plan for Disaster Preparedness was developed in accordance with Basic Act on
Disaster Control Measures and Nuclear Emergency Act. The Plan defines basic issues
about sharing of roles in an emergency by the central and local governments and thenuclear operator (licensees) and about an emergency response. Licensees are required
to develop a nuclear operator’s EPR plan in accordance with Nuclear Emergency Act.
Emergency exercises are conducted in accordance with these plans at the nuclear
operator level and at the local and central government level.
For the purpose to improve and reinforce governmental organizations for the nuclear
disaster preparedness and prevention, Nuclear Disaster Management Bureau wasestablished in the Cabinet Office on October 14, 2014. Nuclear Disaster Management
Bureau, CAO is the organization which conducts to improve and reinforce off‐site
activity for emergency preparedness and response in case of nuclear disasters, and tosupport the relevant local government organizations to develop its local disasterprevention plan and evacuation plan, financial support to the disaster prevention
measure by local governments, and an exercise for nuclear emergency preparedness
and response etc.
In terms of the relationship with the neighboring countries, Japan is separated by theocean from the neighboring countries, and therefore it is unlikely that other countries
will be affected by a radiological emergency. However, in light of the importance of107

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
information sharing, Japan, China and Korea have agreed to share emergency
information within the framework of the Japan‐China‐Korea Top Regulators Meeting.
Thus, emergency response plans are in place and emergency exercises are conducted.
In addition, a framework is available for information exchange with the neighboring
countries. Thus, the provision of Article 16 of the Convention is achieved.

108

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness

Article 16 (1)Emergency plans

1

Outline of the laws and regulations on nuclear emergencies

1‐1

Nuclear emergency response under Nuclear Emergency Act.

(1)

Precautionary protective measures

A nuclear operator has the responsibility of preventing occurrence and development of
a nuclear emergency and taking action for recovery from a nuclear emergency.
Licensee must develop a licensee’s EPR plans for each nuclear site and, prior to its
development, must consult with the governor and head of the prefecture and the city,
town or village where the nuclear facility is located, as well as to the governors of theneighboring prefectures. After developing the plan, licensee must submit it to thePrime Minster and the NRA and disclose the summary. The Prime Minister and the
NRA may order licensee to make changes to the plan if it is considered to beinadequate for preventing occurrence and development of a nuclear emergency.
Licensee must establish a nuclear emergency preparedness organization for each nuclear
site, place nuclear emergency preparedness personnel, and provide an update of thestatus of nuclear emergency preparedness personnel to the NRA and the governor andhead of the prefecture and the city, town or village where the nuclear facility is located,
as well as to the governors of the neighboring prefectures. The NRA may order licensee
to establish a nuclear emergency preparedness organization or place nuclear emergency
preparedness personnel if it is considered that licensee is in violation of this requirement.
Licensee must appoint a nuclear emergency preparedness manager for each nuclear
site to manage the nuclear emergency preparedness organization and a deputy nuclear
emergency preparedness manager to assist the nuclear emergency preparedness
manager. After appointing the nuclear emergency preparedness manager and the
deputy nuclear emergency preparedness manager, licensee must report theappointment to the NRA and the governor and head of the prefecture and the city,
town or village where nuclear facility is located, as well as the governors of theneighboring prefectures. The NRA may order licensee to appoint or dismiss a nuclear
emergency preparedness manager or a deputy nuclear emergency preparedness
manager if licensee is in violation of this requirement or the nuclear emergency
preparedness manager or the deputy nuclear emergency preparedness manager is inviolation of this law.
Upon occurrence of an event specified in the government ordinance, the nuclear
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
emergency preparedness manager must report it to the Prime Minister, the NRA and thegovernor and head of the prefecture and the city, town or village where the nuclear
facility is located, as well as to the governors of the neighboring prefectures. This
notification is commonly called Article 10 Notification because it is required by Article 10of Nuclear Emergency Act. Events subject to Article 10 Notification is called specified
events.
Licensees are required to install and maintain the necessary radiation measurement
instruments to make Article 10 Notification and to have in place the necessary nuclear
emergency prevention equipment for the nuclear emergency preparedness organization
to perform its duties, such as radiation hazard prevention equipment and emergency
communication equipment, and to inspect and maintain the equipment. Radiation
measurement instruments installed by licensee are subject to inspection by the NRA. The
Prime Minister or the NRA can order licensee to take necessary action if it is consideredthat licensee is in violation of these requirements. Licensee must keep a record of thedoses detected by the installed radiation measurement instruments and disclose therecord.
The Prime Minister designates a facility for each nuclear site that will be used as thecenter for emergency response actions and post‐nuclear emergency actions. Thisfacility is called an off‐site center. Licensees must provide the Prime Minister with thenecessary documents to take emergency response actions and post‐nuclear emergency
actions. The documents will be available at the off‐site center.
The Government’s emergency exercises are conducted in accordance with the plandeveloped by the Prime Minister.
Licensees must conduct emergency exercises, report the results of the exercises to the
NRA and disclose the summary. The NRA may order, through consultation with thePrime Minister, licensee to take action, such as improving the excercise procedures, if theexercises are considered to be inadequate for preventing occurrence or development of a
nuclear emergency.
Nuclear Emergency Act provides for the obligation of other licensees to strive tocooperate. Licensees must strive to cooperate in the event of a nuclear emergency in a
nuclear site of other licensees by sending nuclear emergency preparedness personnel
and lending nuclear emergency response equipment.
(2)

Emergency response actions

In Japan, the Prime Minister declares a nuclear emergency situation.
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
If an event occurs that falls under the category of an emergency, the NRA will immediately
provide the Prime Minister with an information on the status of the event, the areas where
emergency response actions should be taken, a brief description of the event, a proposedannouncement on what needs to be communicated to residents in the areas, and proposed
instructions on emergency response actions such as evaluation and sheltering‐in‐place.
Following this, the Prime Minister will immediately declare a nuclear emergency situation
If a nuclear emergency situation is declared, Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters will be set up. The Prime Minister will serve as the chief of the Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
will develop a policy for the implementation of emergency response actions andprovide overall coordination of the emergency response actions and the post‐nuclear
emergency actions. In the area where the nuclear facility is located, local nuclear
emergency response headquarters to perform some of the administrative work of the
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters will be set up within the Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters.
Following the declaration of a state of nuclear emergency, the emergency response
headquarters of the local government (prefecture, city, town or village) will be set up in
the area where the nuclear facility is located. The local nuclear emergency response
headquarters and the emergency response headquarters of the local government will
set up a nuclear emergency joint response conference to exchange information on the
nuclear emergency and develop cooperation in the implementation of emergency
response actions.
If a specified event occurs, the nuclear emergency preparedness manager must
immediately order the nuclear emergency preparedness organization to takeemergency actions to prevent occurrence or development of a nuclear emergency.
Licensee must report the summary of the action to the Prime Minister, the NRA, thegovernor and head of the prefecture and the city, town or village where the nuclear
facility is located, as well as to the governors of the neighboring prefectures.
(3)

Measures following the nuclear emergency

Measures following the nuclear emergency include a survey of the concentration,
density and dose of radioactive material, medical procedures including a medical
examination of residents and a mental and physical health consultation, public
relations activities to prevent economic damage caused by rumors, and measures toprevent development of the nuclear emergency or recover from the emergency. For
measures following the nuclear emergency taken by administrative agencies and local
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
governments, licensees must take actions such as sending nuclear emergency
preparedness personnel and lending nuclear emergency response equipment.
1‐2

Basic Plan for Disaster Preparedness

The Central Disaster Management Council formulated a Basic Plan on Disaster
Response based on the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures and the Nuclear
Emergency Act.
Basic Plan for Disaster Preparedness is a fundamental plan for the Government’s
disaster prevention measures to respond to various disasters in a comprehensive
manner. The section of Basic Plan for Disaster Preparedness that describes nuclear
emergency preparedness defines basic issues on the nuclear emergency preparednessof the Government, licensees and local governments and their responsibility (sharingof responsibility). EPR Guide developed by the NRA applies to specialized andtechnical issues specific to nuclear emergencies.
Broadly, the following measures are set forth in Basic Plan for Disaster Preparedness:•

Precautionary protective measures: ensuring the safety of facilities; disseminatingknowledge of disaster prevention; promoting researches on nuclear emergency
prevention etc. ; implementing measures to prevent recurrence; preparing for
emergency response actions and recovery from a disaster; preparing for
emergency response to an accident during the transport of nuclear fuel material etc.
outside a nuclear site•

Emergency response measures: collecting and communicating information
immediately after the occurrence of an emergency; setting up an emergency contact
system and an activity system; activities to provide protection, such as evacuationand sheltering‐in‐place, and information; activities to assist the life of nuclear
accident sufferers; maintaining social order, including crime prevention; securing
traffic for emergency transportation and conducting emergency transportation
activities; rescue, first‐aid, medical and fire extinguish activities; activities to procureand supply materials; activities related to health and hygiene; accepting voluntary
support; emergency response to an accident during the transport of nuclear fuelmaterial etc. outside a nuclear site; response to the combination of natural disasterand a nuclear emergency•

Measures to recover from a disaster: canceling the declaration ofa Nuclear

Emergency Situation; measures following the nuclear emergency; assisting
accident sufferers in reviewing their life; abolition of the Nuclear Emergency
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
Response Headquarters
1‐3

Guide for Emergency Preparedness and Response

Under the provisions of the Nuclear Emergency Act, the NRA must develop guidelines fornuclear emergency response to ensure the smooth implementation of precautionary
protective actions, emergency response actions and measures following the nuclear
emergency and make the guidelines available to the public without delay.
The purpose of NRA EPR Guide is to allow licensees, the head of designatedadministrative

agenciesanddesignatedlocal

administrative

agencies,

local

governments, designated public organizations, designated local public organizations,and others to take nuclear emergency actions in a smooth manner. The Guide went into
effect on October 31, 2013 and, since then, they have been revised repeatedly. The
ultimate goal of the guidelines is to ensure that in the event of an emergency, protective
actions will be taken to minimize the radiation effects on residents etc. in thesurrounding area of a nuclear facility.
Described below are the main provisions of the Guide for Emergency Preparedness
and Response(1)Preliminary Measures for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and Response

・Establishment of the Nuclear Emergency Response Zone
In the event of a nuclear emergency, the magnitude of the effect that an unusually large
amount of radioactive material or radiation released has on the surrounding
environment and the time for the effect to come into play depend on the form of theabnormal event, the characteristics of the facility, the weather conditions, theenvironmental conditions in the surrounding area, the living conditions of residents,and other factors. Therefore, it is necessary to take the appropriate action for the eventin a flexible manner. To take action to protect residents etc. against radiation exposure
efficiently in a short time, it is necessary to in advance, assume the occurrence of an
unusual event, to define areas that may be affected by the event, taking into accountfactors, such as the characteristics of the facility, and to put in place measures,
particularly for nuclear emergencies.
Nuclear emergency planning zones for nuclear emergency response actions aredesignated for the type of nuclear facility based on the distance from the facility. Forcommercial power reactors, a precautionary action zone (PAZ) is defined as an area
where precautionary protective actions, such as immediate evacuation depending on
the EAL, should be prepared in the stage before radioactive material is released into
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
the environment in order to avoid the deterministic effect of radiation exposure in a
rapidly developing accident. The rough target of the PAZ is approximately within aradius of 5 km from the power reactor facility.
An urgent protective action planning zone is defined as an area where emergency
protective actions should be prepared based on the EAL and OIL to minimize the riskof the deterministic effect of radiation exposure. The rough target of the UPZ isapproximately within 30 km of the power reactor facility.
The designation of these nuclear emergency planning zones is based on theinternational standards and the lessons learned from the accident at the Fukushima
Daiichi Nuclear Power Station.
•

Nuclear emergency category and Emergency Action Level (EAL)In Japan, emergencies situations are divided into three categories: an alert, a site area
emergency and a general emergency condition.
An alert is a phase in which, in a nuclear facility, an unusual event occurs or may occurthat has or may have no immediate radiation effects on the public and preparations
need to be made to collect information, conduct emergency monitoring and implement
protective actions such as the evacuation of those who need to evacuate in a site area
emergency. In this phase, licensee must immediately report the occurrence of an eventin the alert category and the state of the facility to the central government. The central
government must confirm the occurrence of the alert event based on the informationfrom licensee and provide it to the local governments and the public and otherstakeholders without delay. The central government and the local governments must
start to prepare for the implementation of relatively time‐consuming protective actionsin the PAZ near the nuclear facility.
A site area emergency is a phase in which, in a nuclear facility, an event that may haveradiation effects on the public occurs and preparations need to be made to take main
protective actions, such as evacuation in an emergency, in the surrounding area of the
facility. In this phase, licensee must immediately report the occurrence of an event in
the site area emergency category and the state of the facility to the central government
and the local governments. The central government must confirm the occurrence of thesite area emergency and provide information to the local governments, the public andother stakeholders without delay. The central government, the local governments andlicensee must enhance the information collection activities to grasp the development of
the event by emergency monitoring and other means and, mainly in the PAZ, must
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
prepare for the implementation of precautionary protective actions, such as theevacuation of basically all residents etc., and evacuate those who need to evacuate in asite area emergency.
A general emergency is a phase in which, in a nuclear facility, an event occurs that is very
likely to have radiation effects on the public and protective actions need to be taken
promptly to avoid the deterministic effect of radiation exposure and reduce the risk ofthe deterministic effect. In this phase, licensee must immediately report the occurrence ofan event in the general emergency category and the state of the facility to the central
government and the local governments. The central government must confirm theoccurrence of the general emergency and provide information to the local governments,
the public and other stakeholders without delay. The central government and the local
governments must take precautionary protective actions in the PAZ, such as theevacuation of basically all residents and the administration of stable iodine. As in the
PAZ, precautionary preventive actions, such as evacuation, need to be taken in the UPZ,
depending on the scale of the event as well as on how much time has passed.
In the Guide for Emergency Preparedness and Response, the EAL used to determine
the category of an emergency is defined for each of the three emergency categories andfor each of the three reactor types (BWR, PWR and FBR), as well as for different
conditions in the reactor, such as the condition that no nuclear fuel material exists in
the reactor vessel in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station Units 1 to 4.
•

Operational Intervention Level (OIL)

In a general emergency, after release of radioactive material, due to the spread of theradioactive material, there are likely to be points with a high air dose rate in a relatively
wide area. To prepare for such an event, the central government, the local governments
and licensee need to conduct emergency monitoring promptly, determine the necessary
protective actions to be taken by evaluating the results of the monitoring against thecriteria for the implementation of protective actions and take the actions.

Afterrelease of radioactive material, in areas where the air dose rate is high, the zones will
be determined in a few hours and emergency protective actions, such as the evacuationof residents, will be taken to minimize the effect of exposure. In areas where the air
dose rate is relatively low, the zones will be determined in a day and early protective
actions, such as temporary relocation, will be taken in a week or so to avoid
unnecessary exposure.
Operational intervention levels (OILs), which are indicated measurable values, such as
the air dose rate and the concentration of radioactive material in environmental
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
samples, are specified as the criteria for determining whether these protective actions
should be taken. Table 16‐1 shows the relationship between the OIL and the protective
actions.
Table 16‐1

OILs and Protective Actions

Classification

Description

OIL1

Criteria for advising local
residents to evacuate withina few hours or sheltering, inorder to prevent radiation
effects from surface soil,
inhalation of re‐suspended
radioactive material, or
inadvertent ingestion

Urgentprotective
actions

Initial Values

500μSv/h(air radiation dose rate
when measured 1m
above the ground)βrays:40,000 cpm(Counting rate

OIL4

Criteria for conducting
decontamination to prevent
inadvertent ingestion andexternal exposure via skincontamination

measured bydetector at several
centimeters off theskin)βrays:13,000 cpm(Value
1 month later)(Counting ratemeasured bydetector at several
cm off the skin)

Earlyprotective
actions

Restric
tion onintakeof food
and
drink

OIL2

Food anddrink
screening
standards(corresponding to OIL3)

Criteria for restricting
ingestion of local produce
and advising local residents,
to temporarily relocate
within a week or so, inorder to prevent radiation
effects from surface soil,
inhalation of radioactive
material, or inadvertentingestion
Criteria for identifying areas
where measurement ofradionuclide concentrations
in food and drink should be
carried out in preparation
for possible food and drink
restrictions at OIL6

20μSv/h(Air radiation dose

rate measured at 1mfrom ground)

0.5μSv/h(Air radiation dose ratemeasured at 1m fromground)NuclideOIL6

Radioactive
iodineRadioactive
cesiuma nuclide ofplutoniumandtransuranicelements

Criteria when restricting
food and drink intake inorder to prevent radiation
exposure via ingestion

Uranium

116

Drinking
water,
milk,
dairy
produ
cts
300Bq
/kg
200Bq
/kg

Vegetables,cereals,
meat,
eggs,
fish,
other
2,000Bq/
kg
500Bq/kg

1Bq/kg

10Bq/kg

20Bq/
kg

100Bq/kg

Outline of Protective

actions
Identification of zones
and evacuation withina few hours (includingordering those who
cannot easily move toshelter indoors
temporarily)

Contamination
screening of those
who are ordered
evacuation or
relocation andprompt primarydecontamination
when the results
exceed the criteria
Identification of zones
within a day or so andrestriction of ingestionof local produce, as
well as temporary
relocation within aweek or so

Identification of zones
where radionuclide
concentrations in foodand drink should bemeasured
Analysis ofradionuclide
concentrations in foodand drink within aweek, and prompt
restrictions on foodand drink intake if
results are in excessof the criteria

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness•

Development of an emergency monitoring system

In an emergency, information on the air dose rate from radioactive material in thesurrounding environment, the concentration of airborne radioactive material and theconcentration of radioactive material in environmental samples provides the basis forappropriately implementing protective actions for residents and those engaged indisaster prevention work. Measures will be taken to prevent loss of the emergency
monitoring function.
In the implementation of emergency monitoring, the central government will supervise
emergency monitoring; develop an implementation policy; develop a plan for
conducting emergency monitoring and a plan for the organization of monitoring
personnel; provide instructions on the implementation of the monitoring and overall
coordination; collect and disclose data; evaluate the results of the monitoring andchange the implementation plan as the event develops; and conduct wide‐areamonitoring in waters and airspace. The local governments will develop the emergency
monitoring plan and conduct emergency monitoring in nuclear emergency planning
zones
Licensee will provide information on the source of the radioactive material released
and cooperate in emergency monitoring in the surrounding area of the facility andother areas.
If the situation develops into a site area emergency, the central governments will set up
an emergency monitoring center in the off‐site center with the necessary functions to
conduct emergency monitoring in the area where the nuclear facility is located, so thatthe central government, the local governments and licensee can work together to
conduct emergency monitoring. The emergency monitoring center consists of thecentral government, the prefecture where the nuclear facility is located, theneighboring prefectures, the designated public organizations 15 , licensee, andsupportingorganizations,

and

is

responsibleforcollecting

informationonenvironmental radiation levels due to the nuclear emergency and providing
information to be used to determine whether OIL‐based protective actions should betaken and information to be used to evaluate radiation effects from the nuclear
emergency on the residents etc. and the environment.
•

15

Development of a medical care in a nuclear emergency

Japan Atomic Energy Agency and National Institute of Radiological Sciences

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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness•

A medical care to allow specified first‐aid emergency health care institutions toprovide health care in a nuclear emergency and a chain of command are in placeeven at ordinary times to allow for appropriate health care activities in a nuclear
emergency.

The Government designates advanced radiation exposure treatment

support centers and nuclear emergency health care and general support centers,
and reviews them for compliance with the facility requirements every three years
or so. The prefecture and the city, town or village where the nuclear facility is
located designates and registers primary nuclear emergency care hospitals andnuclear emergency health care support institutions, and review them forcompliance with the facility requirements every three years or so.
•

Preemptive intake of the iodine tablets

For the purpose of preemptive intake of stable iodine tablets in a nuclear emergency, atordinary times, the local governments will provide stable iodine tablets to residents in
the PAZ in preparation for an emergency. Iodine tablets are stored in a public facility.
When the tablets are provided in preparation, a physician will explain the preventive
effect of the tablet, the time to take it and its side effects. In the event of a generalemergency, protective actions, such as evacuation, will be taken in the UPZ, dependingon the state of the plant and the air dose rate. In addition, a system for the supply andintake of stable iodine tablets will be put in place.
•

Setting‐up of an off‐site center

The Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of the central government andthe emergency response headquarters of the local governments set up a nuclear
emergency joint response conference to exchange information in the event of a nuclear
emergency and an off‐site center as a center for implementing nuclear emergency
response actions in a coordinated manner in the area where the nuclear facility is
located. The off‐site center is located in an area, considering the guidelines for PAZ and
UPZ and has the necessary systems in place to maintain its function as the primaryemergency facility to take the necessary actions for radiation protection and emergency
actions such as alternative facility and multiple lines of communication channels. .
(2)Emergency response actions•

Comprehend an unusual state and taking emergency response actions

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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
Upon being informed of an alert or a site area emergency by a nuclear operator, thecentral government and the local governments will start to prepare for the
implementation of protective actions and provide information to residents in preparation
for a general emergency. Upon being informed of a general emergency by a nuclear
operator, residents in the PAZ will be required to evacuate and UPZ will be required totake precautionary preventive actions, such as sheltering‐in‐place. If an unusually large
amount of radioactive material is or may be released from the nuclear facility, residents
will shelter in place as needed in consideration of the condition of the facility and therelease of radioactive material in areas other than those where precautionary preventive
actions are taken. In consideration on the results of emergency monitoring, additional
protective actions are implemented, such as evacuation from areas other than thosewhere precautionary preventive actions and restrictions on eating and drinking.
•Emergency monitoring

In the event of an alert, the central government, the local governments, licensee, andthe relevant designated public organizations will prepare for emergency monitoring. In
the event of a site area emergency, the central government will set up an emergency
monitoring center, make a request for the necessary personnel under the plan for theprovision of monitoring personnel and start emergency monitoring.
•

Evacuation, temporary relocation and sheltering‐in‐place

If an unusually large amount of radioactive material is or may be released into thesurrounding area of the nuclear facility, depending on the nuclear emergency planningzone, all residents in the PAZ will be required to evacuate immediately, and residents
in the UPZ will be required to shelter in place when the situation develops into a
general emergency. Subsequently, a phased‐evacuation will be considered dependingon the state of the nuclear facility. In addition, after radioactive material are released,
areas exceeding OIL 1 will be determined based on emergency monitoring andresidents will be evacuated within a few hours, and areas exceeding OIL 2 will be
determined and residents will be temporarily relocated within a day or so.
In the event of a general emergency, evacuation will be implemented in the PAZ
depending on the priority zones for nuclear emergency response actions. However,sheltering‐in‐place will be implemented if it has a higher priority than evacuation. In
the UPZ, sheltering‐in‐place will be implemented until a phased‐evacuation or other
OIL‐based protective actions are taken.

119

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness•

Development and support of local disaster management plans and evacuation
plans

Relevant local governments are required to develop local disaster management plan
based on the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures, and the local government such asprefectures, and municipalities should plan the basic measures for nuclear disasters.
A regional disaster plan (the section for nuclear disaster) (hereafter, itʹs called local
disaster management planʺ) is developed by the related local public organizations
within the radius 30 km range for the most part from a nuclear power plant, based on
the Basic Plan for Disaster Preparedness and the NRA EPR Guide at present.
For local disaster management plan, materialization of the contents and the system
performance are important, and an aggressive support by the national government is
expected in the case that local public bodies have hardship to progress local evacuation
plan or measures for persons needed for special treatments etc.
In order to support the improvement and reinforcement of local disaster management
plans and evacuation plans and evacuation plan developed by local government suchas prefectures, cities, towns and villages, based on the decision of the Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Council in September, 2013, Nuclear Disaster Management
Bureau ,CAO established a ʺRegional Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Committeesʺ
(Hereinafter itʹs called ʺCommitteesʺ.) as a task team and put a working group under it
for a problem solution in every area where a nuclear power plant is located in March,
2015.
In the working group of each area, measures for the support of developing emergency
preparedness and response, coordinating measures among wide areas, supports by thegovernment are studied, and government and local governments are working tomaterialize and improve the local disaster management plans and evacuation plans
together.
In the area where the local disaster management plan was admitted to be materialized
and improved, the ʺ Committees ʺ are required to confirm that their emergency
measures are concrete and reasonable, considering the NRA EPR Guide, and Nuclear
Disaster Management Bureau reports to Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council
results of examination and consultation for the plans by Committees, and then, will ask
to Council their approval.
In the area where the emergency measures has been confirmed, in addition to the
support of materialization and improvement of the emergency measures, andconfirmation(Plan) of the emergency measures, the exercise(Do) based on the120

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
emergency measures confirmed by the “conference” is conducted, items to be
improved from the exercise results(Check) are extracted, and the emergency measuresat the area are improved(Action), considering the items, so the PDCA cycle wasintroduced and the regional disaster prevention system is improved continuously.
As for the local emergency measures, ʺEmergency measures in Sendai Areaʺ wasreviewed at the Sendai area working team special meeting in fiscal year of 2014, andthe confirmation results were agreed by Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Council .
And the ʺEmergency measures in Ikata Areaʺ was reviewed at the Ikata area nuclear
Disaster prevention Conference in fiscal year of 2014, and ʺEmergency measures in
Takahama Areaʺ was reviewed at the Fukui area nuclear Disaster prevention
Conference , and those results were agreed by the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Council .
2

Nuclear Emergency Exercises

Previously, nuclear emergency exercises have been carried out by the national and the
local governments and licensees, in order to check the effectiveness of emergency
response systems in accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Act. However, following
the Fukushima accident these exercises are under review. Future exercises must now
incorporate ‘lessons learned’ from Fukushima Daiichi accident including the possibilityof a complex earthquake‐tsunami‐nuclear accident disaster which had never before
been experienced as well as incorporating more realistic evacuation exercises. Such
exercises range from large‐scale national government exercises to those carried out bylicensees within their site. The explanations on each item are following.
2‐1

Exercises planned by the Government

Hitherto, local governments have planned nuclear emergency exercises. The national
government provided support and coordination. Following the enactment of the
Nuclear Emergency Act, for which the 1999 JCO criticality accident was the catalyst,
the national government planned and implemented exercises, , taking the initiative.
The Fukushima Daiichi accident marked the first time that such a nuclear emergency
situation had been declared in Japan, and the nuclear emergency response system,
including nuclear emergency exercises, was put to the test. Based on this experience,
the NRA is now reviewing the emergency management system, as well as nuclear
emergency exercises.
Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill is an exercise conducted by national
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
governmental organizations, local government organizations and nuclear operators inorder to verify the system and organizations against the nuclear disaster, based on the
Nuclear Energy Act, and the 2015 Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill was
conducted for Shikoku Electric Power Company’s Ikata Nuclear Power Station for thefollowing purposes:•

Confirmation of performance of emergency response system of national
government, local governments and nuclear operator, and confirmation ofcooperation system by relevant organizations.

•

Confirmation of systems and procedures set as manuals in the central organizationand the site organizations in a nuclear emergency situation that is caused by thelarge‐scale earthquake.

•

Verification of further improvement of system performance of the emergency
preparedness and response based on the ʺEmergency measures in Ikata Areaʺ

•

Extraction of lesson‐learned from the exercise results and improvement ofemergency measures etc.

•

Acquirement of personnelʹs skill for nuclear emergency preparedness andresponse and promotion of resident understanding for the nuclear disasterprevention.

Items to be improved were collected from the specialistʹs advice and questionnaire
results from the resident who participated in the 2015 Comprehensive nuclear
emergency response exercise, and the ʺThe result report of the 2015 Nuclear Energy
Disaster Prevention Drill ʺ was issued in March, 2016.
Improvement of the ʺEmergency measures in Ikata Areaʺ and/or various procedures
and manuals will be proceeded through the study in the Committee from now on,
based on the items pointed out in the result report from the view point of operationand communication of the locations for disaster measures such as a measure to prevent
isolation of Cape Sata, a measure to mitigate traffic jam and confirmation of evacuation
time periods.
And for Nuclear Energy Disaster Prevention Drill, executing methods and menu of
exercise should be improved continuously, so that the exercise will become more
effective and practical.
2‐2Exercises planned by a licensee

In accordance with Nuclear Emergency Act, licensees must conduct nuclear emergency
exercises, report the results of the exercises to the NRA and disclose the summary.
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
Activities in the exercises of a licensee include non‐scenario‐based training and sharingof good practice through mutual visits of licensees.
For example, in a power plant, component training programs on individual procedures toimprove the skills to perform work procedures and a comprehensive training programthat combines several component training programs are conducted. The component
training programs include, for example, accident management training to ensure that a
prediction of the development of an event and a judgment and selection of means ofbringing the event under control will be made in an appropriate manner; emergency
response training to ensure that in the event of a nuclear emergency, a power supply will
be provided and emergency action to provide the sources of cooling water will be taken
in a prompt and appropriate manner; emergency exposure medical treatment training toensure that those who suffered from radiation injuries will be taken out of a controlledarea and decontaminated and will receive emergency treatment; and evacuation
instruction training to ensure that visitors in a nuclear power plant will be instructed toevacuate in the event of an emergency and those other than the emergency response
personnel will be instructed to evacuate when a state of emergency is declared.
In the comprehensive training program, more extensive training is conducted with theparticipation of the power plant as well as the head office. For example, in a power
plant, training is provided on accident management, emergency response, organizationof nuclear emergency preparedness personnel, reporting, emergency exposure medical
treatment, monitoring, evacuation instructions, and emergency operations. In the head
office, training is provided on reporting, emergency support organization activities,
power plant support activities, and media relations.
Nuclear Emergency Act requires that a nuclear operator report the results ofemergency exercises to the NRA. The NRA may order, through consultation with thePrime Minister, licensee to improve the drill procedures and take other necessary
actions if the results of the exercises are determined not to be adequate for preventing
occurrence or development of a nuclear disaster. The Basic Plan on Disaster
Preparedness states that the NRA will evaluate the results of exercises for severe
accidents. The NRA developed indices for the evaluation of nuclear operator
emergency exercises and evaluates the exercises by taking opportunities such as
general exercises.
2‐3

The exercise drawn up by the local governments

Local governments which have jurisdiction over the area where the relevant nuclear
site is located and the neighboring governments should put the drills into effect once a123

ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
year based on Disaster Measures Basic Law. In the drills conducted by the relevant
prefectures, the local governments (including the governor), the actual working units,
such as police, fire services, the Maritime Safety Agency and Japan Self‐Defense Forces,and nuclear operator should participate. And, exercises on evacuation of residents andscreening tests for evacuation from emergency zones are carried out, with residents’cooperation and the actual working units’ participation.
More concretely describing, conducted, exercises for evacuation from the PAZ and
UPZ those for emergency communications and, in several areas, exercises for
emergency public communication using an emergency broadcast system and public
information vehicles. Moreover, in some cases, exercises for sending emergency alert
emails are conducted.
In order to materialize local disaster management plans and evacuation plans and to
study these effectiveness, for the areas in which the plans’ improvement are confirmed,
Committees will be supporting to plan and carry out the exercises, to propagate
methods of evaluation, to practice the PDCA cycle for the plans etc.
Besides, to personnel belonging to local government’s organs for nuclear emergency
preparedness, several trainings (for the beginners, for drivers of transport services (e.g.
bus drivers), for nuclear emergency preparedness headquarter staff) and map exercises
at headquarter are carried out.
2‐4Participation in International Exercises

Japan is a contracting party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident orRadiological Emergency. In order to be prepared to certainly send out

notification

under the provisions of these conventions in case of emergencies, Japan continuously
participates in the ConvEx organized by the IAEA.
Article 16 (2)1Information to the Public and Neighboring Countries

Measures for Providing Public Information
To enhance widespread public dissemination of disaster response plans, local
residents participate in national and local government emergency exercises.

Local

authorities explain a disaster response plan to local residents who then simulate
evacuations to actual refugee facilities and radiation surveys are carried out.
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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
NISA launched its emergency information mailing service in July 2008. To enablepeople to register their mobile phone e‐mail addresses in advance and promptly
receive emergency information. This system inherited by the NRA in September 2012
as N‐alert.
During a nuclear emergency, the media will provide information to local residents.
Press briefings, highlighted by television and radio broadcasts, will be held as
required at the local off‐site disaster prevention centers and at the Emergency
Response Center in Tokyo, and these will provide local residents with relevant
information.
Information posted on websites provide emergency information.
2

Providing Information to Neighbor Countries
Japan is an island nation located in the East Asia region and shares no land borders
with its neighboring countries. However, its geographical neighbors across the sea –China and South Korea – also have reactor facilities. Considering the experience of
the Fukushima Daiichi accident, sharing information in case of nuclear emergency is
an issue of mutual importance. In August 2009, Japan, China and South Korea set up
the framework of Top Regulators Meeting (TRM). TRM countries agreed to establish
a rapid sharing of emergency information in 2014. Although the three countries had
continued to exchange information at the working level as necessary, the Fukushima
Daiichi accident re‐emphasized the importance of the trilateral information exchangemechanism. Therefore, discussions to further improve information exchangemechanism are currently underway.
At the TRM Meeting in November 2011, the three countries agreed on, Cooperative
Nuclear Safety Initiative of Japan, The People’s Republic of China, and The Republicof Korea, which includes enhancement of information exchange, cooperation forresponding to severe accidents, as well as nuclear emergency preparedness andresponse capacity.
Besides the aforementioned tripartite cooperation mechanism, , Japan disseminates
information by proactively utilizing the Unified System for Information Exchange inIncidents and Emergencies (USIE) web portal run by the IAEA’s Incident andEmergency Centre (IEC).

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ARTICLE 16 Emergency Preparedness
3

Response in the Event of a Nuclear Accident and a Radiological Emergency ina Neighboring Country
To carry out the provisions of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear
Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident orRadiological Emergency, the government designated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
as the National Warning Point (NWP) and National Competent Authority for an
Emergency Abroad (NCA(A)), in the event of a nuclear accident or radiologicalemergency occurring outside the territory of Japan. In the event of a radiologicalemergency outside the territory of Japan, including that in a neighboring country, theMinistry of Foreign Affairs will receive the notification provided through all kinds ofchannels, share immediately with the National Competent Authority for a Domestic
Emergency (NCA(D)) and other relevant authorities, and take any necessary action.
When international emergency assistance is requested, Japan will provide assistanceafter discussing and agreeing bilaterally on terms of the assistance Moreover,pursuant to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident orRadiological Emergency article 2. paragraph 4, the National Assistance Capabilities(NAC) of relevant Japanese organizations
Response Assistance and Network (RANET ).

126

have been registered with the IAEA

ARTICLE 17 Siting

ARTICLE 17

SITING

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that appropriate procedures
are established and implemented:(i) for evaluating all relevant site‐related factors likely to affect the safety of a nuclear
installation for its projected lifetime;(ii) for evaluating the likely safety impact of a proposed nuclear installation on individuals,
society and the environment;(iii) for re‐evaluating as necessary all relevant factors referred to in sub‐paragraphs (i) and (ii)so as to ensure the continued safety acceptability of the nuclear installation;(iv) for consulting Contracting Parties in the vicinity of a proposed nuclear installation, insofar
as they are likely to be affected by that installation and, upon request providing thenecessary information to such Contracting Parties, in order to enable them to evaluate andmake their own assessment of the likely safety impact on their own territory of the nuclear
installation.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 17
Natural conditions and the social environment and all other related factors in the area
where the power reactor is to be built are reviewed by the NRA in the process ofapplication for a reactor installation permit. Factors that may affect the safety of
individuals, society and the environment are evaluated as well. These factors will be
re‐evaluated if a licensee wishes to modify the existing reactor installation permit andif the regulatory standards have been revised and compliance measures are required.
In Japan, it is a requirement for the installation of a nuclear facility that it does notaffect the safety of the area outside the environmental surveillance area. Since Japan issurrounded by water, the neighboring member states will not be affected and therefore
there are no systems in place, such as consultation on the installation of a nuclear
facility, but it is possible to use the framework for information sharing with theneighboring countries.
From the above, the measures of the Japanese Government are in compliance with theprovisions of Article 17 of the Convention.

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ARTICLE 17 Siting
Article 17 (1)Evaluation of Factors Related to Siting Location

Factors relating to the siting location that may affect the safety of reactor facilities areevaluated during the Reactor Installation Permit review process. Licensees are required
to conduct adequate studies of external events that could occur at the siting locationand to take these into account in the design of such facilities.
In order to apply for the Installation permit, the licensee shall submit the application
documents to the NRA, describing the following items;•

The name and address and, in the case of a juridical person, the name of its
representative•

The purpose for which the reactors are to be used•

Type, thermal power output and quantity of the nuclear power reactor•

The name and location of the nuclear power reactor•

Position, structure and equipment of the nuclear power reactor and affiliatedfacility.

•

Construction Plan of nuclear reactor facility•

The types and the annually planned amount of consumption of nuclear fuelmaterials•

Method for disposal of spent fuel•Radiation Control management in the nuclear facilities•

Facilities necessary to handle an accident

And, the followings instructions are required;•

The purpose to use a nuclear power reactor•

Thermal power output of the nuclear power reactor•

The amounts of funds required for the construction and the Procurement plan.

•

Acquisition plan of a nuclear fuel materials•

Technical capability related to the installation and operation of nuclear reactor
facility•

The status of the weather, ground, water channel, seismic and social environmentof the site location where the nuclear reactor is installed•

Map around the site of nuclear reactor facility•

Safety design of the nuclear reactor facility•

Control of Radiation•

Maintenance of facilities and a organizations necessary to handle an accident
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ARTICLE 17 Siting•

Licenseeʹs memorandum, registration certificate, inventory, balance sheet andstatement of profit and loss

In consideration of the above, the NRA determines that the reactor will not be used
for non‐peaceful purposes; the applicant has the necessary technological ability andfinancial basis; the applicant has the necessary technological ability to implement thenecessary measures to prevent occurrence and development of a severe accident; andthe location, construction and equipment of the reactor is in compliance with the NRA
Ordinance on Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment of Commercial
Power Reactor NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, Structure, andEquipment of Commercial Power Reactors , which provides for the regulatory
requirements of the NRA. The NRA will grant a reactor installation permit if thepower reactor satisfies all the conditions to conform to NRA regulatory requirements.
The NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment ofCommercial Power Reactors prescribes regulatory requirements for each of thenecessary facilities (SSCs for DB) to prevent occurrence or development of a designbasis accident and for severe accident. There are requirements for the ground on
which the SSCs for DB are to be built. For example, the SSCs for DB are not allowed to
be built on an active fault. There are general requirements for the facility to prevent
damage from earthquakes, tsunamis and other natural events, and anthropogenic
events, fires and floods and to prevent unauthorized entry and operator errors. Also,
there are requirements for individual facilities. Facilities with a safety function that isparticularly important to safety are required to be independent unless otherwise
stated. A facility is not allowed to be shared by several power reactors, except if its
safety is improved by sharing. Other safety facilities may be shared under thecondition that the safety of the power reactor facility is not compromised. A safety
power supply system that will be connected to several power reactor facilities must
not stop power supply to the power reactor facilities simultaneously. A power supply
system that will receive power from an emergency power supply for other powerreactor facilities must not be too dependent on the emergency power supply system.
There are provisions for safety facilities to manage a severe accident in addition to theprevention of damage from the ground on which the facility is to be built,
earthquakes, tsunamis and fires. A safety facility for severe accident should be locatedin a place where the radiation doses are not likely to be high and should have a shieldin place so that an accident can be managed. Unless otherwise stated, a permanent
safety facility for severe accident is not allowed to be shared by several reactor
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ARTICLE 17 Siting
facilities but may be shared if its safety is improved by sharing. Measures, such as
unification of the standards, must be implemented for a portable safety facility so thatit can be used in several reactor facilities. To prevent a portable facility from being
unavailable due to a common cause, such as a natural event, consideration must be
given to where the facility should be located and stored. Appropriate measures must
be implemented for both a permanent and a portable facility so that the facility does
not lose its function due to a common cause.
As severe accident management facilities, a specialized safety facility must be built to
reduce the release of an unusually large amount of radioactive material in the event of
an intentional large airplane crash or terrorist attack. The specialized safety facility isa facility that can be used until external support becomes available in events such as
intentional air crash, having necessary equipment for preventing damages to reactor
containment vessels, and must be designed and constructed so that it does not lose its
function in the event of an air crash into the reactor building.
The Reactor Regulation Act requires that a power reactor facility, new or existing,conforms to the NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, Structure, andEquipment of Commercial Power Reactor. If the Ordinance is revised, the facility
must comply with the revised one.
Article 17 (2)Prevention of Impacts on Individuals, Society, and the Environment
Resulting from Reactor Facilities

Effects on residents and the environment in the surrounding area of a nuclear facility
are evaluated in the reactor installation permit review process. The Reactor Regulation
Act requires that, the location, structure and equipment of the power reactor facilities
conform with the standards specified by the Ordinance of the NRA as being such thatthose designs are enough to prevent disasters resulting from nuclear fuel material,material contaminated by nuclear fuel material, or the power reactors.
The NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment ofCommercial Power Reactor requires that SSCs for DB as being such that air dose rates
due to direct gamma rays from the power reactor facility during normal operation anddue to sky‐shine gamma rays in the surrounding area of the facility can be reduced to
sufficiently low levels. A radioactive waste treatment facility must be capable oftreating radioactive waste generated in a power reactor facility so that, during normal
operation, the concentration of radioactive material in the air outside the supervised
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ARTICLE 17 Siting
area and in the water at the boundary of the supervised area can be reduced to a
sufficiently low level.
It is required to take the necessary actions to prevent damage to the reactor
containment vessel and release of an unusually large amount of radioactive material tothe outside of the facility in the event of a severe accident. Therefore, it is required to
install the necessary systems to reduce the spread of radioactive material outside thefacility in the event of significant core damage.
The licensee must conduct a basic design of the reactor facility so that it complies withthese requirements and submit a reactor installation permit application to the NRA. In
accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, the reactor installation
permit application must contain the main construction and capability of the reactor
facility and the conditions and results of the calculation of effective doses outside thesupervised area, as well as the conditions used to evaluate the extent and effect ofanticipated operational occurrences, design basis accidents and severe accidents andthe results of the evaluation. The NRA will grant a reactor installation permit if thebasic design presented in the reactor installation permit application conforms to the
NRA Ordinance on Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment ofCommercial Power Reactor.

Article 17 (3)Re‐evaluation of Factors Related to Siting Location

Japan does not have a system for renewal of the reactor installation permit and asystem for periodical re‐evaluation of the permit conditions. If there are changes in theconditions for the reactor installation permit or if the regulatory requirements arerevised and back‐fit is required, the permit conditions will be re‐evaluated in the formof a change to the reactor installation permit.
Factors that cause a change in the permit conditions include new findings on active
fault lines. If new active fault lines are found or if the evaluation of active fault lines
under the site is revised or the results of the evaluation conducted for a reactor
installation permit needs to be revised, the licensee must conduct evaluation and revise
the reactor installation permit.
Since a change in the basic design of the reactor facility or a new construction or
addition involves a change in the permit conditions, re‐evaluation is conducted.
The social factors may not directly lead to a change in the permit conditions. This isbecause, for example, if there is an increase in the population of the surrounding area
131

ARTICLE 17 Sitingof a power plant, the supervised area is defined so that the dose limit is not exceeded at
any locations outside the area and the permit conditions are not directly affected by theincrease or decrease in the population outside the environmental surveillance area.
Article 17 (4)Discussion with Other Countries That Could be Affected by Reactor
Facilities

Japan is an island country surrounded by water and has no land border with theneighboring countries. All nuclear facilities in Japan are located along the coastline
because they use seawater as the ultimate heat sink. However, the closest nuclear
power plant to the closest neighboring country is more than 100 km away from theland of the country. Therefore, it is understood that the location of nuclear facilities
does not affect the neighboring countries. For this reason, there is no system ofconsultation with the neighboring countries and there is no need to makearrangements for consultation with them.
From the perspective of information sharing, Japan has a framework for informationexchange among Japan and the two neighboring countries: China and Korea.

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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
ARTICLE 18

DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the design and construction of a nuclear installation provides for several reliable levels andmethods of protection (defense in depth) against the release of radioactive materials, witha view to preventing the occurrence of accidents and to mitigating their radiologicalconsequences should they occur;(ii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a nuclear installation areproven by experience or qualified by testing or analysis;(iii) the design of a nuclear installation allows for reliable, stable and easily manageable
operation, with specific consideration of human factors and the man‐machine interface.

Outline of the Implementation of Article 18
Japanese regulations require the integration of defense‐in‐depth into the design of a
nuclear reactor facility. In addition to the requirement for first to third layers, measuresfor prevention of core damage, CV failure, mitigation of dispersion of radioactive
material, and Loss of Large Area in Design Extension Condition are required. To obtainapproval of the design of a nuclear reactor facility, the licensee must demonstratecompliance with the standards by using proven technologies or conducting
demonstration testing. In addition, high reliability and ease of operation are requiredof safety equipment and systems.
Thus, the provision of Article 18 of the Convention is achieved.

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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
Article 18 (1)1Implementing a Defense in Depth Strategy

Basic policy on Defense in Depth in Japan

In the past, before NRA’s regulatory requirements were developed, Defense in Depth
concept was stated in Reactor Regulation Act and Regulatory Guides issued by
Nuclear Safety Commission, and requested as follows; for 1st layer, ensure highreliability sufficient to meet importance of SSC to prevent occurrence of abnormality;for 2nd layer, necessary measures for early finding of abnormality and shut‐down
nuclear reactor to prevent expansion of abnormality; for 3rd layer, core does notseverely damaged and core is sufficiently cooled in case of Design Basis Accident
occurred to mitigate Design Basis Accident.
In the new regulatory requirements issued by NRA, measures to eliminate common
cause failure are significantly strengthened, based on the lessons from the Fukushima
Daiichi NPS accident. In addition to the requirements mentioned above, measures toprevent severe core damage in case of loss of function of equipment for addressing
Design Basis Accident, and measures to prevent Containment Vessel failure in case of
severe core damage, are required. Further, new regulatory requirements requiremeasures against Containment Vessel failure because Japan experienced Fukushima
Daiichi NPS accident. The new regulatory requirement also requires measures against
loss of large area of nuclear facilities due to extreme natural disaster, intentional
airplane crash or other terrorism.
It is required in the regulatory requirement that each layer of Defense in Depth
independently performs its function effectively.
2

Requirements in the each layer of Defense in Depth

2.1

Prevention of abnormality

For the purpose of prevention of abnormality, it is required that ensuring highreliability sufficient to meet importance of SSC to prevent occurrence of abnormality,
design with sufficient safety margin, as well as reactor has its core stability
characteristics, preventing mis‐handle, failsafe design, and interlock function, etc.
In the regulatory requirements, measures for seismic safety, tsunami safety, reliabilityof power source, and fire protection are strengthened and introducing measures forinternal flooding, volcano, tornado, forest fire etc., are newly required.
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2‐2Prevention of expand abnormality

In order to detect deviation from normal operation state and make it under control,
measures to prevent anticipated transient, anticipated event in the nuclear power plant
during operation, from expanding accident such as preparing specific system andmechanism in the design, and establishing operation procedure to regain safety state ofnuclear power plant, are required.
2‐3

Mitigation of Design Basis Accident

In case of expansion of anticipated transient or expected initiating event and cannot
control it in the previous layer and allow to progress to Design Basis Accident, it isrequired that core is not severely damaged and be able to maintain sufficient coolingby the Engineered Safety System and core stability characteristics.
2‐4

Prevention of Severe Core damage in the Design Extension Condition without
severe core damage

Licensees are required to confirm effectiveness of measures to prevent severe damageof core in the case of Design Extension Condition without severe core damage.
Design Extension Condition without severe core damage is identified as a “postulated
accident sequence groups”. NRA Ordinance, taking research results into account,stipulates accident sequence groups which cover most of accident sequences withsignificant core damage as “designated accident sequence groups”.
Table 18‐1

Designated Accident Sequence Groups

BWR
Loss of high‐pressure and low pressure water
injection function
Loss of high‐pressure water injection anddepressurization function
Loss of all AC power
Loss of decay heat removal function
Loss of reactor shutdown function
Loss of water injection during LOCA
Containment Vessel bypass(Interface system LOCA)

PWR
Loss of heat removal function of secondary
cooling system
Loss of AC power
Loss of auxiliary component cooling function
Loss of Containment Vessel heat removal
function
Loss of Reactor shutdown function
Loss of ECCS water injection function
Loss of ECCS recirculation function
Containment Vessel bypass(Interface system LOCA, steam generator tube
rapture)135

ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
Considering the difference of each plant, internal events are evaluated by applying
PRA and external events are evaluated by PRA or other applicable means. As a result,in case that the accident sequence group which has significant frequency or impact is
identified although it is not included in the “Designated Accident Sequence Group”, itis required to add into “Postulated Accident Sequence Group”.
In the next step, important accident sequences are identified in each of the Postulated
Accident Sequence Group from the point of the number of equipment which loses its
function simultaneously, length of time of margin, level of equipment capacity
necessary to prevent core damage, and whether represent the characteristic of theaccident sequence group in question. Evaluation of effectiveness are performed toconfirm that equipment against severe accident meets the evaluation requirements (e.g.,
maximum temperature of fuel cladding is below 1,200 degree Celsius) obtained bysimulation code analysis, and sufficiency of plan regarding necessary man‐power andfuel etc., from the view point of whether equipment required as severe accident
measures can prevent severe core damage in the important accident sequence.
Equipment required to address Design Extension Condition have to meet following
regulatory requirements; the equipment do not lose its function simultaneously withsafety function of equipment to address Design Basis Accident caused by common
cause; the equipment have anti‐seismic function, etc. In addition to these requirements,
high reliability is required to permanently installed equipment. For mobile equipment,
meeting general industrial standards and multiple deployment of equipment (coolant
injection, power source, etc.) are required.
2‐5Prevention of Containment Vessel Failure in the Design Extension Condition
with core melting

Licensees are required to confirm effectiveness of measures to prevent Containment
Vessel failure in the case of the Design Extension Condition with core melting.
Design Extension Condition with core melting is identified as “CV failure mode”. NRA
Ordinance, taking research results into account, stipulates “Designated CV failuremode” as the typical CV failure mode. Practical items stipulated as CV failure mode
make certain of assuming are; Static loads by internal pressure/temperature (damage
by CV over‐pressurization/over‐heating); High pressure melt ejection/direct heating of
CV atmosphere; Ex‐vessel fuel‐coolant interaction; Hydrogen explosion; Direct contact
with CV (shell attack); Melted core and concrete interactions (MCCI). Considering thedifference of each plant, internal events are evaluated by applying PRA and external
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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
events are evaluated by PRA or other applicable means to identify CV failure mode
based on the characteristics of each plant. As a result, in case of the CV failure mode
which has significant frequency of occurrence or impact is identified although it is notincluded in the “Designated CV failure mode”, it is required to add into “Postulated
CV failure mode”.
In the first step, for every Postulated CV failure mode, severe accident sequence fromthe point of load etc., against CV is identified as evaluated accident sequence fromamong CV failure sequences based on the results of PRA. Subsequently, evaluation ofeffectiveness is conducted to confirm that equipment against severe accident meets thecriteria such as maximum operating pressure or limiting pressure, provided bysimulation code analysis, and sufficiency of plan regarding necessary man‐power andfuel etc., from the view point of whether equipment required as severe accident
measures can prevent CV damage.
Equipment required to address Design Extension Condition with core melting have tomeet following regulatory requirements; the equipment perform its function in thecondition of accident; redundancy, diversity, and dispersed in the different locations
have to be ensured in case that equipment to address DBA have no similar function,e.g., water injection to CV bottom, hydrogen explosion, etc.; equipment haveanti‐seismic function, etc. In addition to these requirements, high reliability is required
to permanently installed equipment. For mobile equipment, meeting general industrial
standards and multiple deployment of equipment (coolant injection, power source,etc.) are required.
2‐6

Measures to suppress dispersion of radioactive material

As stated in 2‐4 and 2‐5, NRA Ordinance requires measures to prevent severe coredamage and CV failure, as measures to address Design Extension Condition. NRA
Ordinance requires equipment to suppress dispersion of radioactive material tooutside of site based on appropriate analysis of dispersion mode from the point ofpreventing abnormal level of release of radioactive material into the environment, evenif assuming severe core damage and CV failure occur beyond Design Extension
Condition. For example, water cannon is required to suppress dispersion of radioactive
material in aerosol form leaking from reactor building.
2‐7

Measures to address Loss of Large Area

Loss of Large Area is the large‐scale destruction of nuclear installation caused byextreme natural disaster, intentional airplane crash or other terrorism. Extreme natural
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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
disaster means the natural disaster beyond design basis in NRA Ordinance onStandards for the Location, etc.
In NRA Ordinance, measures with mobile equipment and Specialized Safety Facility, as
installed facility, are required.
(1)

Measures with mobile equipment

Loss of Large Area by airplane clash, etc., leads to severe destruction of certain areaof nuclear installation. In this case, it is important to take measures not by based onassumption of certain accident sequence but to avoid losing all measures for
decreasing release of radioactive material, based on the destruction occurred.
In case of natural disaster extremely beyond design basis or large airplane crash, it isrequired mobile equipment is not become unavailable simultaneously by taking
measures of dispersed deployment, etc.
In practical; access route have to be repaired by heavy machinery stored in dispersed
locations when access route such as road etc., are destroyed by natural disasterbeyond design basis, etc.; ensuring to prepare connection points in the opposite sideof damaged side to be able to connect mobile equipment such as feed water pump or
power source in case of connection points are lost by airplane crash into one side ofreactor building, are required.
(2)

Measures with Specialized Safety Facility

Specialized Safety Facility “shall be equipped with adequate measures for preventing
the loss of necessary function due to the intentional crashing of a large airplane into
the reactor building”. Practical requirements are; ensure enough distance, e.g., morethan 100m, between Specialized Safety Facility and reactor building to prevent
simultaneous failure of both facilities; or Specialized Safety Facility have to equippedin robust structure that can withstand the intentional airplane crash or facilities
which has equivalent or more effective. Licensees have to prove that evaluatedequipment has to keep its necessary function by performing structural evaluation ofbuilding and functional evaluation of equipment at the event of airplane crash, withspecifying characterization of airplane and identifying exact point of crash.
“Equipment to prevent CV failure” shall be equipped in Specialized Safety Facility.
Practical requirements are; Depressurization function for Reactor Coolant Pressure
Boundaries, e.g., equipment for reactor depressurization operation from emergency
control room; Cooling function of molten core in the reactor, e.g., equipment for138

ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
injecting low pressure water inside the reactor; function for cooling molten core thathas fallen to the bottom of the CV, e.g., equipment for cooling water injection into thebottom of the CV; CV cooling/depressurization/radioactive material reduction
function,e.g.,equipment

for injecting

water into

CV sprays;

CV heatremoval/depressurization function, e.g., venting system of CV excluding exhauststacks; Function of prevention of CV failure by hydrogen explosion, e.g., hydrogenconcentration control equipment; Support function , e.g., equipment for powersource, instrumentation, and communication. And installing the emergency control
room to control above mentioned functions in emergency is also required.
3

Regulatory Procedures Relating to Design and Construction of Reactor
Facilities

3‐1

Regulation in the design and construction phase

There are licensing process for installation permit which is explained at article 17th,
and a process of construction permit, shown below. The applicant shows theconformance to the regulatory requirement for basic design by Installation permit, andthe detailed design explaining specific equipment design of nuclear facility is reviewed
in the Construction Permit phase.
The licensee shall submit the application of Construction Permit to the NRA before
commencing construction and obtain the permit from the NRA.
In case of constructing nuclear reactor facilities newly, the applicant shall describe
matters concerning detailed equipment design and attach explanatory documents as
required by NRA Ordinances for reactor unit, nuclear fuel material handling facility
and storage facility, reactor cooling system facility, instrumentation and control facility,
radioactive waste disposal facility, radiation controlled facility, reactor containment
facility etc., on the application for Construction Permit.
When the existing nuclear reactor facility is remodeled, licensee shall obtain theapproval for the construction permit, or notify to the NRA in accordance with thecontents of the remodeling work.
When the NRA acknowledges that the applied Construction Permit is compliant withthe approved Installation permit and that the design and quality assurance method of
the applicant is compliant with technical standards of NRA Ordinances, it shallapprove the Construction Permit.
The licensee conducts construction work of nuclear facility after the construction
permit is approved by the NRA. The NRA confirms that the construction work is
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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
conducted in accordance with the approved Construction Permit by the pre‐service
inspection.
Pre‐service Inspection is conducted for every construction work based on the NRA
Ordinances. A licensee of fabricating nuclear fuel assembly to be used for nuclear
facility shall obtain approval of the design from the NRA before the fabrication. Any
fuel assembly is not allowed to use until it passes the fuel assembly inspection by NRA
to confirm that it is fabricated in accordance with the approved design.
Moreover, welding parts of important equipment such as primary containment vessel
shall be inspected by the licensee based on the Reactor Regulation Act.
Any licensee of reactor facility shall undergo the examination by the NRA regarding
his/her system (organization, inspection methods etc.) for carrying out theself‐inspection on welding.
The Reactor Regulation Act requires licensee to comply NRA Ordinance on Standards
for the Location, Structure and equipment of Commercial Power Reactors and on theordinance of Commercial Reactors Technical Standards, and if these ordinances arerevised, conventional nuclear reactors also shall be compliant with the new regulatory
requirements.
The licensing procedure for the type certification and the type designation was newly
introduced by the revision of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2012.
The type certification is given by the NRA when the specified equipment by the NRA
Ordinance Concerning the Installation and Operation of Commercial Power Reactors,
is applied and confirmed to be compliance with the NRA Ordinance on Standards for
the Location, Structure and equipment of Commercial Power Reactors. The equipment
which the certificate is given has no need to prove compliance for every application
because it has already been regarded as it is compliant with the NRA Ordinance onStandards for the Location, Structure and equipment of Commercial Power Reactors.
That is expected to contribute for more efficient licensing process.
For the certified equipment which is given the type certification, the NRA reviews theapplication, and if it is based on and equal to the type certified design, and is compliant
with the Commercial Reactors Technical Standards Ordinance, the type can be
designated.
The specified equipment which the type designation is given has no need to prove
compliance for every construction permit application because it has already been
regarded as it is compliant with the Commercial Reactors Technical Standards
Ordinance, which is expected to contribute to more efficient licensing process of140

ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
construction permit.
3‐2Regulatory Requirements

In the next phase, the licensee with a reactor installation permit must conduct a
detailed design of the reactor facility and, prior to the construction of the facility, mustobtain approval of the design from the NRA in accordance with the provisions of theReactors Regulation Act. Table 18‐2 is a list of articles. Facilities (facilities subject to thedesign standards) to prevent occurrence or development of a design basis accident areclassified into classes as shown in Table 18‐3.
Table 18‐2Class 1

Class 2

Vessels,
pipes,
pumps,
valvesSupportstructures

Classification of facilities subject to the design standards
Components comprising the reactor coolant pressure boundary

Structures to support Class 1 components

Vessels,
pipes,
pumps,
valvesComponents required to safely shut down a power reactor or ensure
the safety of a power reactor facility in an environmental condition,such as a design basis accident or until the period fall in to design basis
accident, that may indirectly cause radiation hazards to the public as aresult of damage or failure and other error.
Components that are for a circuit in which a fluid (steam, feed water)
circulates with the main purpose of driving a steam turbine and arelocated between a Class 1 component in the steam line downstream of
a Class 1 component and the stop valve closest to the component andbetween a Class 1 component in the feed water line upstream of aClass 1 component and the stop valve closest to the component
Components other than the above that are located between apenetration in the reactor containment vessel and the isolation valve
inside or outside of the vessel

Supportstructures

Structures to support Class 2 components

Class 3Vessels,
pipes

Class 4

Pipes

Reactor containment
vessel support
structures

Vessels( which are belong to subjected to design standard facilities) or
pipes (limited to pipes containing a fluid in which the concentration ofradioactive material is more than 37 mBq/cm3 (37 kBq/cm3 if the fluid isa liquid or pipes with a maximum operating pressure of more thanzero MPa), other than ducts, that are for a Class 1 component, a Class 2
component, a reactor containment vessel, a radiation control facility, ora reactor containment facility (limited to emergency gas treatment
systems)
Ducts that are for a radiation control facility or a reactor containment
facility (limited to emergency gas treatment systems) and contain a
fluid in which the concentration of radioactive material is more than 37
mBq/cm3 (excluding Class 2 pipes)
Structures to support the reactor containment vessel

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ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction

Table 18‐3
OperatingCondition I
OperatingConditionII
OperatingCondition
III
OperatingCondition
IV
Testing
Condition

Classification of operating conditions

Normal operating condition of a power reactor facility
A condition in a design basis accident or in an environment that is anticipated
before the situation develops into a design basis accident, other than Operating
Condition I, Operating Condition III, Operating Condition IV and Testing
Condition
A condition that requires an emergency shutdown of the power reactor operation
due to an unusual event, such as a failure or malfunction of a power reactor
facility, in a design basis accident or in an environment that is anticipated before
the situation develops into a design basis accident
A condition in which an event anticipated in the safety design of a power reactor
facility has occurred in a design basis accident or in an environment that is
anticipated before the situation develops into a design basis accident
A condition in which a power reactor facility is being subjected to the maximum
operating pressure in a hydrostatic test

As shown in Table 18‐4, severe accident management installments are classified intoclasses and regulatory requirements are set for each class.
Table 18‐4
SevereAccident
Class 1

SevereAccident
Class 2
SevereAccident
Class 3

Classification of severe accident management facilities

Vessels, pipes,
pumps, valves
Supportstructures
Vessels, pipes,
pumps, valves
Supportstructures
Vessels, pipes,
pumps, valves

Vessels which are subjected to treatment installments
for severe accident , pipes, pumps (Limited to facilities
to manage specified severe accidents)
Structures to support Severe Accident Class 1
components
Vessels, pipes, pumps or valves for permanent severe
accident management systems (excluding those for
specified severe accident management facilities)
Structures to support Severe Accident Class 2
components
Vessels, pipes, pumps or valves for portable severe
accident management systems

In addition to above, method of quality assurance and the organization for its
inspection of the licensee of power reactor operation are reviewed to be technicallyappropriate through the licensing process of construction permit in order to confirm
the licensee’s quality control methods etc. from the stage of design and construction of
nuclear facilities.

142

ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction

3‐3Compliance to the regulatory standard

The licensee is conducting modification such as addition of necessary facility in order
to comply with regulatory standard set forth by NRA. For example, they take measure
to install a protection wall around the sea water pump assuming higher Tsunami, andinstall a protection bank around the nuclear facility.
And the weir for storage is installed at the water intake port to secure cooling water
during a certain period of time in case of undertow of Tsunami. The additional fuelstorage tank for emergency diesel generator engine is increased for the capacity ofmore than 7 days consecutive operation in order to improve reliability of emergency
power in case of loss of off‐site power.
As measures for the case of failure of Emergency Shutdown, an automatic operation
panel is newly installed enables to close MSIV16 and inject emergency boric water toplace Power Reactors in a Subcritical State even if control rod cannot be inserted.
As measures for cooling, reliability is improved by increasing permanent cooling water
pumps to diversify the function of water injection into the reactor pressure vessel andthe primary containment vessel.
In order to prevent the hydrogen explosion, measure to prevent failure of thecontainment vessel are taken such as additional installation of equipment enable toignite hydrogen or recombine to water.

Article 18 (2) Application of Proven Technologies
Though the Reactor Regulation Act and other regulatory requirements does not force
licensees to use only technology proven by the experience or test/analysis, it is aregular manner to use proven technology for application of the Construction Permit,
and if licensee adopts a new technology, he shall prove that the technology comply
with the technical standards of NRA by conducting verification test etc.
Measures that Licensees should take in the Application of Proven Technologies, the
NRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for the Location, Structure, and Equipment ofCommercial Power Reactors and their Auxiliary Facilities requires the highest
standards of reliability for safety structures, systems, and components with safetyfunctions, and that their design is such that this can be maintained.

16

Main Steam Isolation Valve143

ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
This should not impede the application of new technologies, but licensees are required
to ensure the reliability of these technologies when designing reactor facilities.
Safety facilities should function in all envisaged environmental conditions up to theoccurrence of a design basis accident; moreover, in order to check their soundness andcapabilities, they must be tested or inspected while the reactor facility is operating or
shut down.
More specifically, in obtaining Reactor Installation Permits and Approval ofConstruction Plans, it is necessary for licensees to verify the technologies used in thedesign of reactor facilities.
Licensees are taking the following measures.
The hardware of Reactor Protection System (RPS) is physically and functionally•separated, by the measure that signals from the RPS are only sent from the system,
but any signal from the outside is not received by RPS, and any hardware is notallowed to connect the RPS directly. And access from outside is protected by themeasure that signal from the RPS Panel is limited only to those to send.
As the measure to limit access, physical access is limited by the access control at•

the entrance of the nuclear facility, and access to the software is limited by the
maintenance tool of RPS Panel control device and by key control of connector tothe maintenance tools to prevent unauthorized change.
For the software of the Reactors Protection System (RPS), a specific software of•which verification and validation have been done in every phase of design,
fabrication, test and design change control, so that a general computer virus can’t
activate in accordance with the industrial standards1718.
As measures to protect RPS from the disturbance by thunder, induction surge and•electromagnetic waves etc., isolation circuit etc. is installed at the point ofconnection of electric power or signal cables to RPS panels.
A licensee requires the supplier to take the protection measure for virus, security•

measures to prevent sabotage to the RPS design. The supplier takes measures suchas to prohibit connection with the internet directly, and use only the limited tools
for connection for the maintenance.

Standard for adopting RPS on digital calculator（JEAC4620）
Guide for digital RPS on verification and validation（JEAG4609）

17
18

144

ARTICLE 18 Design and Construction
Article 18 (3)Design for Highly Reliable, Stable, and Easily Manageable Operations

Safety facilities should designed that they function in all envisaged environmental
conditions up to the occurrence of a design basis accident by the regulatory
requirement, so high reliability is requested.
Moreover, it is requested that safety facilities can be operated easily.
Facilities for taking response in the event of the severe accident are required to function
effectively and can be operated certainly in the environmental condition when an
envisaged severe accident occurs.
Licensee adopts design for the main control room that has main instrument and control
equipment for safety facility, and enables centralized monitor and control the plant.
Considering obtain good operability and surveillance from the view point of humanengineering, in order to prevent mis‐operation and mis‐judgement and to operate
easily, the control panel is designed that the location of display, alarm and operating
equipment are decided properly.
For the local operation, identification management such as color classification andlocking management are adopted to prevent mis‐operation.
In order to improve operability, proper tool for a local hand‐operation valve or aplatform for local operation is set near the main control room and inside theradioactive controlled area.

145

ARTICLE 19 Operation
ARTICLE 19

OPERATION

Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the initial authorization to operate a nuclear installation is based upon an appropriate
safety analysis and a commissioning programme demonstrating that the installation, as
constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from the safety analysis, tests and operational
experience are defined and revised as necessary for identifying safe boundaries for
operation;(iii) operation, maintenance, inspection and testing of a nuclear installation are conducted inaccordance with approved procedures;(iv) procedures are established for responding to anticipated operational occurrences and to
accidents;(v) necessary engineering and technical support in all safety‐related fields is available
throughout the lifetime of a nuclear installation;(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the relevant
license to the regulatory body;(vii) programmes to collect and analyse operating experience are established, the results
obtained and the conclusions drawn are acted upon and that existing mechanisms are used
to share important experience with international bodies and with other operatingorganizations and regulatory bodies;(viii)
the generation of radioactive waste resulting from the operation of a nuclear
installation is kept to the minimum practicable for the process concerned, both in activity
and in volume, and any necessary treatment and storage of spent fuel and waste directly
related to the operation and on the same site as that of the nuclear installation take into
consideration conditioning and disposal.

Outline of the implementation of Article 19
In order to use the nuclear facilities, the licensee has to pass the pre‐service inspection
to confirm that the construction work has been carried out in compliance with theapproved plan for construction work and that the nuclear facilities conform to thetechnical standards set forth in the Technical Standard Rules.
Moreover, the licensee shall obtain the approval for the operational safety program
which specifies rules concerning in–service safety preservation activities. The
operational safety program specifies the limiting conditions of operation and measuresin case of accidents, as well as operation and maintenance.
The licensee obtains technical support from the plant supplier or its vendors forinspection or construction during the period of in‐service.

146

ARTICLE 19 Operation
And the licensee manages the ʺNuclear Information Archives (NUCIA)ʺ, database fornuclear facilitiesʹ information which is disclosed to the public, for the purpose of
sharing operating experiences.
The NRA has utilizes the nuclear information notification system for sharing operating
information internationally.
The licensee has obligation to report to NRA about accident etc. based on the Nuclear
Regulation Act.
Spent nuclear fuels and radioactive waste are stored inside the nuclear site temporally.
Radioactive waste will be treated by necessary disposal or volume reduction, andtransferred to the final disposal site. As the clearance system is adopted in Japan, waste
whose radiation level under the criteria can be treated as general industrial wastes, that
contribute the volume reduction of radioactive waste.
Therefore, Japan conforms to the article19 of Convention.

147

ARTICLE 19 Operation
Article 19 (1) Initial Authorization
There is no system for operating license in our country, and itʹs possible to use nuclear
facilities concerned by the licensee who obtained nuclear reactor construction permit,
did construction work of nuclear reactor facilities and passed the pre‐service
inspections. Moreover, the licensee must set forth their Operational Safety Programs toensure the operational safety of the facility, and obtain NRA approval before
commencing operation.
The NRA conducts the pre‐service inspection in order to confirm that the nuclear
facility has been constructed in accordance with the approved construction plan
through the construction to operation phase. Pre‐service inspection is the inspection
prescribed in the Nuclear Regulation Act, and the licensee shall not use the nuclear
facility until after they have passed the inspection. Pre‐service inspection is theapproval activity for the nuclear reactor facilities to get into the operational phase. The
acceptance criteria for the pre‐service inspection are that the construction work has
been carried out in compliance with the approved plan for the construction work andthat the power reactor facilities conform to the technical standards19 set by the NRA.
The NRA Nuclear Facility Inspector conducts the pre‐service inspection in accordancewith the construction phase described in the Table 19‐1.
When the NRA receives an application, it shall set forth the inspection implementation
procedures specifying the method of inspection as well as other necessary matters. This
inspection implementation procedure is set forth by each application.
As the safety analysis has already been conducted and approved by NRA at the design
stage, it is not conducted newly in the pre‐operational inspection stage, as a rule.
When the NRA acknowledges that a licensee has passed a Pre‐Service inspection, it
shall deliver a Pre‐ Service inspection certificate regarding such application.
Design of nuclear fuel assembly shall be reviewed and approved by NRA in advance.
Any nuclear fuel assembly with approved design shall be inspected by the NRA,
regarding its fabrication and enrichment process, and the licensee of power reactor
operation shall not use it until after it has passed the inspection.
When the NRA inspect and acknowledges that the fabrication and enrichment of thefuel assembly is carried out in compliance with the approved design, and that the fuel:The NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards for Commercial Power Reactors Facilities (NRA Ordinance,
No.6 dated June28,2013)

19

148

ARTICLE 19 Operationassembly conforms to the technical standards20 specified by NRA, it shall deliver a Pre‐
Service inspection certificate.
Inspection items for nuclear fuel assembly are described in the Table 19‐2.
Table 19‐1

Items Inspected in Each Construction Process during the Pre‐service
Inspection
Construction Process

Matters Inspected

1. The reactor unit, nuclear fuel material handling

The following inspections (excluding those focused on

and storage facilities, reactor cooling system

portable machinery or appliances) relating to thefacilities

turbines),

structure, functions, or performance of the reactor unit,

instrumentation and control system facilities

nuclear fuel material handling and storage facilities,(excluding power reactor operation control

reactor cooling system facilities (excluding steam

devices), radioactive waste disposal facilities

turbines), instrumentation and control system facilities(excluding

steam(excluding exhaust stacks), radiation control(excluding power reactor operation control devices),

facilities or reactor containment facilities, whenradioactive waste disposal facilities (excluding exhaust

it is possible to carry out tests relating to theirstacks),structure, strength, or leakage

containment facilities:

radiation

controlfacilities

orreactor(1) Inspection of material(2) Inspection of dimensions(3) Inspection of external appearance(4) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(5) Inspection of pressure resistance(6) Inspection for leakages(7) Inspection to check the status of foundations on
which the reactor containment facility has been
directly installed
2. When the mounting of the lower half of the(1) The following inspections to check the structure,functions, or performance of the steam turbine:

steam turbine casing has been completed andthe assembly of the auxiliary boiler unit has(a) Inspection of materials

been completed(b) Inspection of dimensions(c) Inspection of external appearance(d) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(2) The following inspections to check the structure,functions, or performance of the auxiliary boiler:(a) Inspection of material(b) Inspection of dimensions(c) Inspection of external appearance(d) Inspection to check assembly and mounting(e) Inspection of pressure resistance(f) Inspection for leakages

3. When the state of the power reactor allows theInspection

to

check

the

necessaryfunctions

The NRA Ordinance on Technical Standards of Fuel Assembly used for Commercial Power Reactors(NRA Ordinance, No.7 dated June28,2013)
20

149

or

ARTICLE 19 Operation
Construction Process
fuel to be inserted

Matters Inspected
performance of the nuclear fuel material handling andstorage facilities, reactor cooling system facilities,
instrumentation

andcontrolsystemfacilities,

radioactive waste disposal facilities, radiation control
facilities, reactor containment facilities, emergency
power supply system, normal power supply system,
fire protection equipment, flood protection facilities,
fuel equipment for driving auxiliaries (excluding that
relating to the emergency power supply system and theauxiliary boiler), emergency water intake equipment,on‐site civil engineering structures, and the Office for
Emergency Response, when the state of the powerreactor is such that the fuel can be inserted
4. When critical reaction operations can commencein the power reactor

Inspection

to

check

the

necessaryfunctionsorperformance of the reactor unit, reactor cooling systemfacilities, instrumentation and control system facilities(excluding power reactor operation control devices),and generators, when the reactor reaches criticality

5. When all construction work in the construction
plan has been completed

Inspection to check the overall performance of thepower reactor facilities when the reactor is generating
output and any other inspections required in order tocheck the completion of construction work

Table 19‐2

Items Inspected in Each Engineering Process during the Fuel Assembly
Inspection

Engineering Process
1. The fuel material, cladding material, and othercomponents, when they are in a state in whichtests relating to their composition, structure, or
strength can be carried out
2. The fuel assembly, which is an assembly of fuelelements, when processing of the fuel elements
has been completed

3. When engineering has been completed

Matters Inspected
Inspection to check the results of analysis of thechemical composition of the fuel material, cladding
material, and other components, and other inspections
relating to the composition, structure, or strength ofthese components
The following inspections relating to the fuel assembly,
which is an assembly of fuel elements:(1) Inspection of dimensions(2) Inspection to check the degree of bend(3) Inspection of external appearance(4) Inspection of surface contamination density(5) Non‐destructive inspection of welded areas(6) Helium leak inspection (excluding cases in which an
inspection will be carried out in relation to (3) initem 3. below)
The following inspections of the assembled fuelassembly:(1) Inspection of dimensions(2) Inspection of external appearance(3) Helium leak inspection (excluding cases in which an

150

ARTICLE 19 Operation
Engineering Process

Matters Inspected
inspection will be carried out in relation to (6) initem 2. above)

Any licensee of power reactor operation shall, specify operational safety programs
before commencing the operation of the power reactors and obtain the approval of the
NRA. Operational Safety Programs also prescribe the measures that should be taken
under conditions that could have a direct impact on safety, such as the establishment oflimiting conditions for operation to ensure the safe operation of reactor facilities, andmeasures in the event of deviation from limiting condition for operation.
Licensees must comply with their Operational Safety Programs when operating andmaintaining reactor facilities.
The matters that should be regulated in the Operational Safety Programs areprescribed in the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, as shown below.
•

Matters relating to systems for compliance with relevant legislation andOperational Safety Programs (including the involvement of senior management)•

Matters relating to systems for fostering a safety culture (including the
involvement of senior management)•

Matters relating to quality assurance at reactor facilities (including matters relating
to root cause analysis methods and systems for implementing this, the positioningof procedure manuals in Operational Safety Programs, and the periodic evaluationof reactor facilities)•

Matters relating to the duties and organization of those who operate and manage
reactor facilities (excluding those listed in the next item)•

Matters relating to the scope and content of the duties of Chief Reactor Engineers,
the authority required by them in supervising operational safety, and theirorganizational positioning•

Matters relating to the scope and content of the duties of Chief Electrical Engineers,
the authority required by them in supervising operational safety, and theirorganizational positioning•

Matters relating to the scope and content of the duties of Chief Engineers of Boilers
and Turbines, the authority required by them in supervising operational safety,
and their organizational positioning•

The following matters relating to operational safety education among those who
operate and manage reactor facilities:•

Matters relating to the policy on implementing operational safety education(including the formulation of implementation plans)151

ARTICLE 19 Operation•

The following matters relating to the content of operational safety education:(1)

Matters relating to compliance with relevant legislation and Operational
Safety Programs(2)

Matters relating to the structure, performance, and operation of reactor
facilities(3)

Matters relating to radiation control(4)Matters relating to the handling of nuclear fuel material and items
contaminated with such material(5)•

Matters relating to measures that should be taken in an emergency

Other matters required in relation to operational safety education concerning
reactor facilities•

Matters relating to the operation of reactor facilities•

Matters relating to the operation period of reactors•

Matters relating to safety reviews of the operation of reactor facilities•

Matters relating to the establishment of controlled areas, conservation areas, andsupervised areas and restrictions on entry to these•

Matters relating to exhaust gas and effluent monitoring equipment•

Matters relating to the monitoring of dose, dose equivalent, radioactive material
concentrations, and the surface contamination density, as well as mattersconcerning the decontamination•

Matters relating to the management of radiation detectors•

Matters relating to patrol to and inspections of reactor facilities and procedures
arising from these•

Matters relating to receipt and send out of nuclear fuel material, as well as its
transport and storage, and other matters relating to its handling•

Matters relating to the disposal of radioactive waste•

Matters relating to measures that should be taken in an emergency•

Matters relating to the development of systems for conducting activities tomaintain the integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident,
large‐scale damage, fire, or internal flooding•

Matters relating to appropriate recording and reporting of operational safety atreactor facilities (including the status of compliance with Operational Safety
Programs)•

Matters relating to the maintenance management of reactor facilities (including
matters relating to systems for the implementation of licensee’s welding
152

ARTICLE 19 Operation
inspections and Periodic Licensee’s Inspections, matters relating to the technicalevaluationofage‐related

deterioration,

and

the

long‐term

maintenancemanagement policy)•

Matters relating to the sharing of information with other licensees, focused ontechnical information concerning operational safety obtained from contractors who
have carried out maintenance checks•

Matters relating to the disclosure of information concerning noncompliance, in theevent that such noncompliance has occurred•

Other matters required in relation to the operational safety of reactor facilities

Operational Safety Programs can be revised after being approved, due to such factors
as those relating to the organization of the licensee or modification of the reactor
facilities.
If intending to change their Operational Safety Programs, licensees must obtain theapproval of the NRA for the amended programs.
Moreover, the NRA may order the amendment of Operational Safety Programs inaccordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, if it deems this to benecessary in order to prevent a disaster resulting from nuclear fuel material, material
contaminated by nuclear fuel material, or reactors.
The Operational Safety Programs are the most important documents in the operationof a reactor facility, so licensees put together various operating procedure manuals andtesting guidelines that set forth the procedures for the actual operation andmaintenance of reactor facilities.
These provisions subordinate to Operational Safety Programs are managed
appropriately under the quality management systems of licensees, including mattersrelating to consistency with their Operational Safety Programs.

Article 19 (2)1Limiting Condition for Operation

Regulatory Requirements Concerning Limiting Conditions for Operation
In Japan, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, licensee
must set forth their Operational Safety Programs and obtain NRA approval therefor
before commencing operation of a reactor facility.
The figures for the limiting conditions for operation of reactor facilities correspond tosuch values as the shutdown margin and thermal limit value of the reactor, and are153

ARTICLE 19 Operation
all prescribed in the Operational Safety Programs.
If a licensee fails to comply with the limiting conditions for operation, the NRA mayorder the licensee concerned to take such action as shutting down the reactor facility,in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
In the event that a reactor facility deviates from its limiting conditions for operation,
the licensee is required to immediately declare a deviation from the limiting
conditions for operation and report this to the NRA.
Licensees must take measures to revert from a state of deviation from the limiting
conditions for operation within the allowed time of operation permitted in the eventof a deviation from limiting conditions for operation. However, if it cannot resolve
the deviation within the time allowed, it must modify the reactor’s status in such a
way as to ensure that the limiting conditions for operation do not apply.
This includes shutting down the reactor.
If the NRA receives a report of a deviation from the limiting conditions for operationfrom a licensee, it examines the root cause and provides other licensees withfeedback, if necessary.
2

Establishment, Implementation, and Revision of Limiting Conditions forOperation
Operators at reactor facilities take turns to operate and monitor the reactor, and are
responsible for such practical duties as ensuring compliance with the limiting
conditions for operation and taking the necessary steps in the event of deviationfrom these.
The limiting conditions for operation and measures to be taken in the event ofdeviation from them are specifically documented in Operational Safety Programs
and operators are required to implement those procedures correctly.
The limiting conditions for operation are conditions relating to the safe operation ofreactor facilities, and there are cases in which it is necessary to alter them, such as
when related equipment is modified.
As described above, the limiting conditions for operation are detailed in operationalsafety programs and if they are revised, it is necessary to obtain approval from the
NRA for that revision.
More specifically, when revising the limiting conditions for operation, licensees must
not only conduct their own review, including a safety evaluation, but also undergo a154

ARTICLE 19 Operation
review by the NRA.

Article 19 (3)Procedures for Operation, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing1

Operation, Maintenance, Inspection, and Testing of Reactor Facilities

1‐1

Periodic Facility Inspections

In Nuclear Facility, Reactor unit, nuclear fuel material handling facility and storage
facility, reactor cooling system facility, instrumentation and control facility, radioactive
waste disposal facility, radiation controlled facility, reactor containment facility,
emergency power supply equipment and Main bodies and accessory equipment ofsteam turbines shall be inspected in Periodic Facility Inspection by NRA. During the
Periodic Facility Inspection, NRA Nuclear Facility Inspector participates in witness ofsome part of Licensee’s inspections, or review licensee’s inspection records.
In accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, the timing of the Periodic Facility
Inspection is stipulated in the NRA Ordinance, which prescribes that reactors and theirauxiliary equipment are to undergo inspection at intervals of 13, 18, or 24 months, as
specified by the NRA in a public notification.
When an application for Periodic Facility Inspection is submitted from a licensee, the
NRA shall set forth the Inspection Implementation Procedures by stipulating
inspection methods and other necessary matters. This procedure is prepared for every
application of each nuclear facility to be inspected.
Through the Periodic Facility Inspection, compliance to the Technical Standards forCommercial Power Reactors Facilities is confirmed.
1‐2Periodic Licensee’s Inspections and Periodic Safety Management Reviews

The licensee is obligated to conduct the periodic self‐inspection to confirm thecompliance with Technical Standards for Commercial Power Reactors Facilities.
Nuclear Facilities where a periodic self‐inspection should be performed are componentof, reactor unit, nuclear fuel material handling facility and storage facility, reactor
cooling system facility, instrumentation and control facility, radioactive waste disposal
facility, radiation controlled facility, reactor containment facility, emergency power
supply equipment, auxiliary boiler unit, fire protection facility, inundation protective
facility, auxiliary machine driving fuel system, emergency water intake system andmain bodies and accessory equipment of steam turbines.
155

ARTICLE 19 Operation
A licensee’s periodic inspection shall be implemented by the following methods such as
an open‐up/overhaul/non‐destructive inspection or any other method that sufficiently
confirms occurrence of any damage, deformation, wear, and abnormality in any part,or by a test drive or any other method that sufficiently confirms functions andoperation, and a sufficient method to confirm during operation any sign of occurrenceof abnormality due to damage, deformation, wear or the like in each part.
When a licensee who carries out a periodic self‐inspection finds, at the time of theperiodic self‐inspection, that is likely to cease to conform with the technical standards21
after the elapse of a certain period of time, he/she shall evaluate the time when said
part is expected to cease to conform with the technical standards, and record andpreserve the results thereof, and at the same time, shall make a report to the NRA.
Targets to be evaluated are the core shroud and the shroud support, out of the vessel,
piping and core support structure those belonged to Class 1 Components defined intechnical standards rules.
Method to evaluate the time when the part cease to conform with technical standards is,to presume the cause of crack generation, specify its shape and size, predict thedevelopment of the crack in a fixed period based on the size and evaluate the time
when the crack is expected to cease to conform with the technical standards, in thecondition that the crack develops as expected.
If itʹs necessary to repair as a result of this evaluation, timing to conduct, scope andmethod to repair shall be evaluated and confirmed to be appropriate.
The licensee has to be inspected about the regime for its periodic self‐inspection
through the periodical safety management inspection by NRA.
This inspection is conducted on the items specified by the NRA such as licensee’s
regime to conduct periodic self‐inspection, inspection methods, schedule management.
1‐3Operational Safety Inspections

Operational Safety Inspections are designed to check that licensees comply with the
Operational Safety Programs previously approved by the NRA in the operation andmaintenance of reactor facilities. They are carried out four times a year, with eachinspection taking about two weeks.
Safety inspectors of NRA are permanently stationed in the Nuclear Regulation Office21

Article 18th of Technical standard Rules prescribes specifically, Class 1 Components, Class 1 Support
Structures that are being used must not have any cracks or other defects that may trigger damage thereof,
and the pressure part of Class 1 Components that are being used must not have any cracks penetrating
said pressure part or other defects..

156

ARTICLE 19 Operationnear nuclear sites. As explained in the Article 8th, a senior safety inspector is assigned
as an office chief, and a nuclear emergency preparedness officer is assigned as a deputy
office chief, and adequate number of nuclear safety inspectors for the nuclear facility isdesignated.
During the Operational Safety Inspections, Operational Safety Inspectors may, in
accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, enter businessestablishments, inspect documents and equipment, ask questions of relevant personnel,
and request the submission of the requisite samples.
Furthermore, as well as the quarterly inspections in accordance with the provisions of
the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, the status of compliance with the
Operational Safety Programs may be inspected when conducting the Periodic Facility
Inspections prescribed in the Reactor Regulation Act, in the event that the following
operations will be carried out.
•

Operations relating to the startup or shutdown of a reactor•

Operations relating to refueling•

Operations relating to the switchover of the residual heat removal seawater
system in BWR•

Operations relating to the reduction of the water level within the reactor vessel
in PWR and operations relating to the removal of residual heat carried out while
the water level within the reactor vessel is reduced•

When exercises which are recognized by the NRA as necessary to inspect are
carried out for key response personnel who would be involved in dealing with asevere accident or large‐scale damage

The NRA checks the implementation status of such maintenance activities as part of its
Operational Safety Inspections.
The Operational Safety Inspection is conducted to confirm that the operation andmaintenance of licensees is performed in accordance with their Operational Safety
Programs, so an certain activity is focused out of all activities, each process of its
planning,

enforcement,

evaluation

andimprovementareexamined,andcomplementally, compliance status of requirements of Operating Safety Program’s all
articles are confirmed for every two years.
The Senior Nuclear Safety Inspector develops a inspection policy every year, based on
NRA policy for operating safety inspection and evaluation result of last year’s
inspection, and furthermore, develops a plan for operational safety inspection before
the inspection. The operational safety inspection is conducted based on this plan.
If a fact which is thought as violation is found through the inspection, the Senior
157

ARTICLE 19 Operation
Nuclear Safety Inspector makes a judgment of degree of violation based on the
judgment criteria of operational safety program violation. The judgment is conductedfrom the viewpoints of influence to the safety function, radiation exposure and quality
assurance.
There are 3 levels of “violation1, 2, 3” and one “observation” for the classification, andif the result is judged as any of “violation1, 2, 3”, it must be reported to the NRA. The
NRA receives information from the licensee, requests the report including measure toprevent recurrence and make an additional inspection in accordance with the violationlevel.
By the Reactor Regulation Act, violation of Operational Safety Program is placed in theimportant violation by which licensing permission may be rescinded or suspension ofoperation may be ordered for a period not exceeding one year.
When the Senior Nuclear Safety Inspector judges the violation level, licensee’s opinionis also heard and considered properly.
The result of the operational safety inspection is summarized and reported to NRA
every quarter of the year, and disclosed to the public through the website of the NRA.
1‐4

Maintenance management of reactor facilities

Licensees must take the following measures in relation to checks, tests, inspections,repairs, replacement, modification, and any other measures deemed necessary to themaintenance of reactor facilities (maintenance management), both while the reactor isoperating and while shut down, in accordance with the provisions of the NRA
Ordinance on Commercial Reactors.
•

Set forth a policy concerning the maintenance management of reactor facilities(hereinafter referred to as the “maintenance management policy”) to ensure thatthe reactor facility performance detailed in the Reactor Installation Permit isbeing maintained.

•

Set out targets for maintenance management that should be achieved inaccordance with the maintenance management policy (including quantitative
maintenance management targets relating to systems of high importance inregard to the reactor and maintenance management).

•

Formulate a plan for the implementation of maintenance management that sets
out the following matters, in order to achieve the maintenance managementtargets, and implement maintenance management in accordance with this plan.
158

ARTICLE 19 Operation-

Matters relating to the timing of the commencement and the duration of theplan concerning the implementation of maintenance management-

Matters relating to methods used for conducting checks, tests, inspections,repairs, replacement, and modifications (inspections, etc.) of reactor
facilities, and the frequency and timing thereof-

Matters relating to measures to ensure operational safety taken when
conducting inspections, etc. of reactor facilities-

Matters relating to checks of the results of inspections, etc. of reactor
facilities and methods of evaluating these-

Matters relating to corrective and preventive measures concerning methodsof conducting the inspections, etc. that should be carried out at reactor
facilities, in light of checks of the results of such reactor facility inspections,etc. and the results of the evaluation thereof, as well as the frequency andtiming thereof•

Matters relating to records of maintenance management at reactor facilities

Periodically evaluate the reactor facility maintenance management policy, themaintenance management targets, and plans for the implementation ofmaintenance management.

•

Reflect the results of the evaluation referred to in the item above in the reactor
facility maintenance management policy, the maintenance management targets, orplans for the implementation of maintenance management.

•

Take special measures in relation to the steps referred to in the foregoing items,
tailored to the particular condition of the reactor facility in question, in the eventthat operation of the reactor is suspended for a considerable period of time or inother situations that differ from the norm from the perspective of the maintenancemanagement of a reactor facility.

In addition, if a licensee has formulated or amended a long‐term maintenancemanagement policy, this must be reflected in the maintenance and management policy.
A report on measures to deal with the aging of facilities is provided in Article 14.
1‐5

On‐site inspections

In accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act, the NRA may conducton‐site inspections to the extent necessary for enforcing the Act.
During these on‐site inspections, NRA staff may enter the offices or businessestablishments of licensees and inspect documents, records, and other articles, as wellas questioning the personnel there.
159

ARTICLE 19 Operation
These inspections include inspections of manufacturers, etc. The NRA may directly
inspect those involved in the design or construction of nuclear facilities, as well as
those involved in the manufacture of equipment for such facilities.
1‐6

Chief Reactor Engineers and Operation Supervisor

Chief Reactor Engineers, who are deployed at each reactor by the relevant licensee, areselected from among those who have qualifications certified by means of a national
examination, and have the practical experience22 stipulated in the NRA Ordinance; it isnecessary to formally notify the NRA of their appointment and dismissal.
If deemed necessary in terms of operational safety, Chief Reactor Engineers may give
their opinions to the station chief, provide staff at all levels with advice andrecommendations, and participate in the formulation of plans for operational safety.
Operation Supervisor are appointed by licensees and deployed at each reactor.
The Reactor Regulation Act requires that records concerning fuel assemblies, reactor
inspections, operation, radiation control, maintenance, anomalies or accidents, andweather be included in the operational records compiled and retained by licensees.
Moreover, the Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that the results of Periodic Licensee’s
Inspections be recorded and saved, covering such matters as the focus of inspections,as well as the methods used to conduct them and the results thereof.
2

Establishment, Implementation, and Revision of Operation Manuals

The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors stipulate that licensees must set forthmanuals, procedural manuals, and other documentation relating to operational safety,
based on their Operational Safety Programs, and must comply with these.
Procedural manuals are required to be documented, following an approval procedure
within the nuclear power station, and applied to the operation and maintenance of thereactor facility in question.

22

The Rules on Commercial Reactors stipulate that at least three years of practical experience are required,adding together the periods listed below.
(i) Period of involvement in duties relating to construction work on or maintenance management of
power reactor facilities(ii) Period of involvement in duties relating to the operation of power reactors(iii) Period of involvement in duties relating to the analysis and evaluation of the safety of powerreactor facility design(iv) Period of involvement in duties relating to the design or management of power reactor fuelassemblies

160

ARTICLE 19 Operation
Moreover, in the event that the procedure is altered, due to such reasons as themodification of equipment, licensees are required to ensure that those carrying out
tasks do not follow the incorrect procedure.
Procedural manuals are required to be made available in such a way as to ensure thatall staff involved in the operation and maintenance of a reactor facility can makeappropriate use of them, such as placing them in the control room.
Procedural manuals are documents put in place on the basis of Operational Safety
Programs, so they are included in the scope of application of quality management
systems.
Procedural manuals are reviewed regularly and revised if necessary.

Article 19 (4)1Procedures for Dealing with Events Occurring during Operation

Regulatory Requirements Concerning Responses to Abnormal Events

In the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors, licensees are obliged to take thenecessary steps, in the form of emergency measures, to prevent radiation hazards.
This is prescribed in Operational Safety Programs as a measure that should be taken in
an emergency.
Furthermore, licensees are obliged to detail “matters relating to the operation of reactor
facilities” in their Operational Safety Programs.
As well as procedural manuals focused on the handling of normal operation, theseinclude procedures relating to handling operation in the event of an accident or otherabnormal situation, thereby ensuring a smooth response to accidents and abnormal
events.
Matters prescribed in relation to “steps in the event of an abnormal situation” include
status checks, the removal of root causes, the necessary measures in order to prevent
escalation, and measures following reactor scram.
The operating procedures in an emergency are one of the operating procedures basedon the Operational Safety Programs. During the operational safety inspection, the NRA
checks the procedures and system for their implementation.
2

Operating Procedures in an Emergency

The emergency operating procedures are put in place as provisions subordinate to and161

ARTICLE 19 Operation
based on the Operational Safety Programs; they include procedures formulated as
standards based on events such as the occurrence of an earthquake or a fire, as well as
those formulated as standards based on changes in the operational parameters of thereactor.
3

Responses to Severe Accidents

As well as stipulating the following with regard to responses to severe accidents, the
NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribe that these measures shall be
evaluated periodically, with the requisite measures being taken on the basis of theresults.
•

Formulating the plans required in order to carry out activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc.

•

Deploying the personnel required in order to carry out activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc. (key response
personnel)•

Implementing regular education and exercises at least once a year among key
response personnel•

Furnishing vehicle‐mounted generators, fire trucks, fire hoses, and othermaterials and equipment required in order to carry out activities to maintain the
integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc.

•

Setting forth the following matters required in order to carry out activities tomaintain the integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc.
and ensuring that key response personnel comply with these-

Matters relating to measures to prevent significant core damage-

Matters relating to measures to prevent the containment failure-

Matters relating to measures to prevent damage to fuel assemblies stored inspent fuel storage facilities-

Matters relating to measures to prevent damage to fuel assemblies when thereactor is shutdown•

Putting in place the systems required in order to carry out activities to maintainthe integrity of reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, etc., other thanthose listed above

Moreover, the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors stipulate that matters relating
to putting in place systems for carrying out activities to maintain the integrity of162

ARTICLE 19 Operation
reactor facilities in the event of a severe accident, large‐scale damage, fire, or internal
flooding should be detailed in Operational Safety Programs; accordingly, licensees takemeasures to prepare for a severe accident.

Article 19 (5)Engineering and Technical Support

There is no regulation of engineering or technical support for licensees.
This enables licensees to respond flexibly, at their own discretion, if they require
engineering or technical support to ensure the safety of reactor facilities.
If licensees outsource technical support for duties relating to the operation andmanagement of reactor facilities to a specialist contractor, it is vital that the contractor
to which the work is outsourced is equipped with the necessary capabilities andconditions to ensure the safety of reactor facilities; accordingly, Operational Safety
Programs require licensees to monitor and manage contractors appropriately, on thebasis of their own quality management systems, and their performance in this regard ischecked by the NRA in inspections such as Operational Safety Inspections.

Article 19 (6)1Reporting of Events and Failures

Regulatory Requirements

In the event of an accident or failure at a reactor facility, licensees are obliged to report
this fact immediately, in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, and also have an
obligation to provide the NRA with a report on the situation and the measures taken to
deal with it within ten days of its occurrence.
Moreover, in the event of a specified event or emergency prescribed in the Nuclear
Emergency Act, licensees are required to notify the Prime Minister and NRA of this fact
immediately.
2

Outline of Reporting Criteria and Reporting Procedures for Events, Failures,etc.

The criteria for reporting an event in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act are prescribed in the NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors.
163

ARTICLE 19 Operation
Licensees are required to report such cases to the NRA, based on these criteria.
The NRA has constructed a system that enables reports of event to be accepted 24
hours a day, 365 days of the year. In the event that should be reported, the licensee
immediately provides an initial report to the duty NRA officer and continues toprovide reports thereafter in accordance with legislation.
Upon receiving such reports from licensees, the NRA releases such information as thedetails of the event, the NRA’s response, and the provisional INES rating without delay.
3

Reporting of Events and Failures during the Past Three Years

The annex provides list of events reported by licensees to the NRA and its predecessor,
NISA, during the period FY2013‐2015, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act.
There were 5 events each in FY2013, FY2014, and FY2015.
4

Investigation of the Causes of Events or Failures and Measures to Prevent
Their Recurrence

Licensees have a primary responsibility to deal with events that occur at their reactor
facilities and must take responsibility for everything from investigating the root causeof the event to implementing measures to prevent recurrence.
The NRA checks that this process is being carried out appropriately, or provides
guidance to ensure that this is the case.
As well as investigating the event, compiling a report outlining the root cause andmeasures to deal with it, and submitting the report to the NRA, licensees also publish
their reports.
The NRA examines the details reported by the licensee concerning the root cause andmeasures to prevent recurrence, in order to check the validity of the investigation andthe measures formulated by the licensee as a result.
Moreover, with regard to measures to prevent recurrence of the event in question,
licensees are required to take preventive measures not only in regard to knowledge
gained from events occurring at their own reactor facilities, but also knowledge gained
from events that have occurred at other facilities, in accordance with the provisions of
the Reactor Regulation Act.

164

ARTICLE 19 Operation
5

Use of INESIn July 1989, Japan began to use its own nuclear event evaluation scale to assign ratings
to events that occurred within Japan, but since August 1992, it has used the INES toevaluate an event.
NRA accepts the report from the licensee of an accident or failure in accordance withlaws such as the Reactor Regulation Act, and after judging that the cause and measuresin the report is appropriate, decide the INES rating based on the report. Besides, in caseof judging level of event occurred at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPS after approval of
its Implementation Plan, INES rating is not applied for the event less than INES 6 level.
That’s why the criteria of the defense in depth and standard to manage radiation
barrier for the facility is not appropriate to apply.
INES is the communication tool to convey importance of safety of an event in nuclear
facilities, and a rating is announced at a website of the NRA. Event which INES ratingis level 2 or higher than level 2 will be registered on the NEWS website IAEA manages,
and if necessary, event which INES rating level is lower than level 2 is also registered.

Article 19 (7)1Making Effective Use of Operational Experiences

Measures for Effective Use of Operational Experiences

If a safety significant event occurs, licensees are required to report this to the NRA
without delay, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. Once inreceipt of the report concerning the event, the NRA immediately publishes the details
and checks the response of the licensee to the event. Moreover, once the root cause has
been identified and a decision has been taken on measures to prevent recurrence, these
are also published.
Having received advice from experts in operation management, inspection, andradiation control, the NRA scrutinizes information concerning the event and strives to
identify safety lessons from it, if necessary, it requests that licensees reflect theselessons in their operation and maintenance activities, or reflects them in its own
regulatory activities.
The NRA has a system to collect and evaluate domestic and abroad information related
nuclear safety. The Reactor Safety Examination Committee and the Nuclear Fuel Safety
Examination Committee are established to collect domestic and abroad information
165

ARTICLE 19 Operation
related nuclear accident, and overseas regulatory movement, and to analyze, to report
and to make advise to NRA.
In the information collection and analysis process in the Secretariat of the NRA,
through the first step of screening process, information with possibility related toregulation of our country is chosen from collected information, and through the second
step of screening process, ʺtechnical information which needs measure to be taken” isselected,
The Secretariat of the NRA study about the ʺtechnical information which needs
measure to be taken” and develop the measure, report to the Reactor Safety
Examination Committee and the Nuclear Fuel Safety Examination Committee
periodically, get the advice and report to NRA periodically.
In such manner, decision by NRA is conducted and reflected to the regulation in ourcountry.
Itʹs prescribed in the NRA Ordinance, as the obligation, licensee must define anoperational safety program covering the matters related to sharing of technicalinformation on operational safety among licensees when such knowledge is gained bya licensee that conducted maintenance or inspection.
This regulation is a measure for licensee to share event information among licensees
and utilize for nuclear safety, even if it has only small influence.
The licensee manages the ʺNuclear Information Archives (NUCIA)ʺ, database fornuclear facilitiesʹ information which is disclosed to the public, cooperating with JANSI.
Database of NUCIA contains operating information from the first nuclear reactor in1966 to the current reactors or reprocessing plant, and is shared not only by licensees
but also the public for the transparency.
In addition to that, as for the collection, analysis, assessment and utilization ofoperating information among licensees, JANSI, as a third party which is independent
from electricity utilities, collect domestic and abroad information such as

event atnuclear facility, analyze, assess and provide the result to the domestic electricity utility.
In addition, during its review process, the NRA instructs licensees to share theinformation and take necessary measures for evens that should be reported to the NRA,in accordance with legislation.
2

International Sharing of Operational Experiences

As a country that has experiences of operating many reactor facilities, Japan believes
166

ARTICLE 19 Operationthat it is vital to share these experiences with a wide range of countries on theinternational stage, and that it has a responsibility to do so in order to improve global
nuclear safety.
The NRA shares information internationally via mechanisms for sharing information
about events with international organizations such as the IAEA and OECD/NEA, as
well as through bilateral cooperation.
Mechanisms relating to the sharing of operational experiences with internationalorganizations include the proactive provision of information via the Incident Reporting
System (IRS). In Japan, the mechanism involves the NRA gathering information about
operational experiences within Japan, compiling it as a database, and providing thesedata to the IRS.
In terms of bilateral activities, information is shared through a long‐established systemof regular meetings etc., to exchange information.

Article 19 (8)1On‐site Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste

On‐site Management of Spent FuelIn addition to the spent fuel pools used at many reactor facilities, dry storage casks areused to store spent fuel at some power stations.
In storing spent fuel, licensees are required to take the necessary measures to cool thefuel, and to ensure that the design of the storage system is such that the fuel is kept
subcritical. The Pre‐service Inspections check that construction work has been carriedout according to this design, while the Periodic Licensee’s Inspections carried out bylicensees check that the soundness of the storage facility is being maintained during the
lifetime of the reactor facility.
The on‐site management of spent fuel is positioned in safety regulations as part ofmeasures to ensure the operational safety of reactor facilities, so its implementation
status is checked in Operational Safety Inspections.
2

On‐site Management of Radioactive Waste

Licensees are required to take appropriate measures in relation to the transport,
storage, and/or disposal on‐site of radioactive waste as part of the measures requiredfor operational safety, in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
167

ARTICLE 19 Operation
If disposing of radioactive waste at a site, licensees are required to ensure that thistakes place under the supervision of someone who has the requisite knowledge
concerning disposal and radiation protection associated with disposal.
The measures that should be taken to dispose of radioactive waste are prescribedaccording to the nature of such waste.
Gaseous radioactive waste is required to be discharged using an exhaust facility, or tobe retained as waste in disposal tanks.
Liquid radioactive waste is required to be discharged using a drainage facility, retained
as waste in disposal tanks, or placed in containers or solidified along with the containerand stored at a retained waste facility, or incinerated at an incineration facility.
Solid radioactive waste is required to be incinerated at an incineration facility, placed incontainers, or solidified along with the container and stored at a retained waste facility.
Alternatively, radioactive waste that is extremely difficult to dispose of using thesemethods, such as large items of machinery, and radioactive waste that requires the
decay of radioactivity over time is required to be stored at a retained waste facility.
The NRA Ordinance on Commercial Reactors prescribe requirements and criteria foreach disposal method in relation to the type of radiation monitoring necessary to
prevent radiation hazards and the containers required for disposal, thereby ensuring
the appropriate handling of radioactive waste. Licensees store radioactive waste
generated by their own reactor facilities at on‐site storage facilities, until it can be taken
to a disposal facility.
Radioactive waste is classified into gaseous, liquid, and solid waste. Gaseousradioactive waste is exhaust gas generated by ventilating components and rooms in theradiation controlled area, and it is discharged via exhaust stacks while using exhaustradiation monitors to monitor it.
Liquid radioactive waste is effluent generated within the controlled area, which isfiltered, demineralized, and concentrated; apart from some that has an extremely low
level of radioactivity, the treated liquid is re‐used in the facility, as a general rule, rather
than being discharged into the environment.
Solid waste such as scrap material generated in the course of maintenance and repair
work during the period of Periodic Facility Inspections is either placed as it is into
drums, or incinerated, melted, or compressed in order to reduce the volume before
being placed into drums, and is then stored at the on‐site radioactive waste storage
facility.
In Japan, there are no legal provisions imposing an obligation to minimize the volume
168

ARTICLE 19 Operationof radioactive waste generated, but as there is a limit to the quantity of radioactive
waste that can be stored on‐site, and it costs money to treat and dispose of waste,
licensees voluntarily strive to minimize the amount of radioactive waste by such means
as evaporative concentration of liquid waste and the compression or melting of solid
waste.
The on‐site management of radioactive waste is positioned in safety regulations as partof measures to ensure the operational safety of reactor facilities, so its implementation
status is checked in Operational Safety Inspections.
3

Clearance Procedures

In Japan, of the scrap material generated due to the operation and maintenance ofreactor facilities or decommissioning measures, radioactive waste with an extremely
low radioactivity concentration is safely classified as “material not required to behandled as radioactive waste” after the approval and confirmation by the NRA,
following which it is appropriately and rationally recycled or disposed of (Clearance
system).
The methods of measuring and evaluating the radioactivity concentration of items forwhich licensees are seeking clearance are formulated in accordance with the provisionsof the Reactor Regulation Act, and the regulatory authority approves radioactivity
concentration measurement and evaluation methods and checks the result of suchmeasurements.
The NRA is involved at the following two stages.
Stage 1: The NRA judges and approves the validity of the radioactivity
concentration measurement and evaluation methods formulated bylicenseesStage 2: Using records and sampling, the NRA checks that licensees are carryingout radioactivity concentration measurement and evaluation using themethods for this for which approval was granted, as well as confirmingthat the licensee concerned is below the clearance level
In addition, this system targets not only reactor facilities, but also other nuclear fuelcycle facilities.

169

D AnnexesDAnnexes1

List of nuclear installations

2

List of accidents and failures reported under the Reactor Regulation Act
during the reporting period3

The overview of Conformity Review for Sendai NPS

4

List of IRRS Review Result

5

Result of IAEA OSART review and measures taken by Tokyo Electric Power
Company6

References170

D Annexes
1

List of nuclear installations

Licensee
Hokkaido
Electric Power
Co., Inc.

Tohoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Power Station

TomariOnagawa

Higashidori

Unit

ReactorType

Output
(MWe)

1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2

PWR
PWR
PWR
BWR4
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
ABWR

1

Commissioned

Status

579
579
912
524
825
825
1,100
1,385

Jun 22, 1989
Apr 12, 1991
Dec 22, 2009
Jun 01, 1984
Jul 28, 1995
Jan 30, 2002
Dec 08, 2005

BWR3

460

Mar 26, 1971

2

BWR4

784

Jul 18, 1974

3

BWR4

784

Mar 27, 1976

4

BWR4

784

Oct 12, 1978

5

BWR4

784

Apr 18, 1978

6

BWR5

1,100

Oct 24, 1979

1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
1
2
3
4
5
1

BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
BWR5
ABWR
ABWR
ABWR
BWR4
BWR4
BWR5
BWR5
ABWR
BWR5

1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,100
1,356
1,356
1,385
540
840
1,100
1,137
1,380
540

Apr 20, 1982
Feb 03, 1984
Jun 21, 1985
Aug 25, 1987
Sep 18, 1985
Sep 28, 1990
Aug 11, 1993
Aug 11, 1994
Apr 10, 1990
Nov 07, 1996
Jul 02, 1997
Mar 17, 1976
Nov 29, 1978
Aug 28, 1987
Sep 03, 1993
Jan 18, 2005
Jul 30, 1993

In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Planning
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
Under Construction
Decommissioning
Decommissioning
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation

2

ABWR

1,206

Mar 15, 2006

In Operation

1

PWR

340

Nov 28, 1970

2

PWR

500

Jul 25, 1972

3
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4

PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR

826
826
826
870
870
1,175
1,175
1,180
1,180

Dec 01, 1976
Nov 14, 1974
Nov 14, 1975
Jan 17, 1985
Jun 05, 1985
Mar 27, 1979
Dec 05, 1979
Dec 18, 1991
Feb 02, 1993

Fukushima Daiichi

Tokyo ElectricPower Co. Inc.
Fukushima Daini

Kashiwazaki‐Kariwa

Higashidori

Chubu ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Hamaoka

Hokuriku
Electric Power
Company

Shika

MihamaKansai ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Takahama

Ohi

171

Permanent
Shutdown
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation

D Annexes
Unit

ReactorType

Output(MWe)Commissioned

1

BWR3

460

Mar 29, 1974

2
3
1

BWR5
ABWR
ABWR

820
1,373
1,373

Feb 10, 1989

1

PWR

566

Sep 30, 1977

2
3

PWR
PWR

566
890

Mar 19, 1982
Dec 15, 1994

1

PWR

559

Oct 15, 1975

2
3
4
1
2
3

PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
PWR
APWR
GCR
BWR5

559
1,180
1,180
890
890
1,590
166
1,100

Mar 30, 1981
Mar 18, 1994
Jul 25, 1997
Jul 04, 1984
Nov 28, 1985

1

BWR2

357

Mar 14, 1970

Tsuruga

2
3
4

PWR
APWR
APWR

1,160
1,538
1,538

Feb 17, 1987

Electric Power
Development
Co.,Ltd.
(J‐POWER)

Oma

1

ABWR

1,383

Japan Atomic
Energy Agency

Advanced Thermal Reactor“Fugen”
Prototype Fast Breeder
Reactor “Monju”

ATR

165

FBR

280

Licensee

ChugokuElectric Power
Co., Inc.

Power Station

ShimaneKaminoseki

ShikokuElectric Power
Co., Inc.

Ikata

GenkaiKyushu ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Sendai
Tokai
Tokai DainiJapan Atomic
Power
Company

StatusPermanent
Shutdown
In Operation
Under Construction
In Planning
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation
In Operation
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Operation
In Planning
Decommissioning
In Operation
Permanent
Shutdown
In Operation
In Planning
In Planning

Jul 25, 1966
Nov 28, 1978

Under Construction

Mar 20, 1979

Decommissioning
Under Construction

Notes:In Planning：

NPS for which the operator submitted a license application,
but not yet approved

Under Construction：

NPS has been licensed, but has not yet passed a pre‐service
inspection

In Operation：

NPS that has passed a pre‐service inspection

Permanent Shutdown：

NPS

that

where

operations

have

been

ceasedfordecommissioning
Decommissioning：

NPS whose decommissioning plan has already been
approved

172

D Annexes
2

List of accidents and failures reported under the Reactor Regulation Act
during the reporting period

Accidents and failures reported in FY2013
Power Station

Accidents and Failures

Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS

Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area
Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area
Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area
Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area
Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area

Date

INES

Aug 19, 2013

Below scale

Oct 02, 2013

Below scale

Oct 09, 2013

Below scale

Feb 06, 2014

Below scale

Feb 20, 2014

Below scale

Date

INES

Apr 13, 2014

Below scale

Jun 09, 2014

Below scale

Sep 17, 2014

Below scale

Dec 17, 2014

Below scale

Feb 22, 2015

Below scale

Accidents and failures reported in FY2014
Power Station

Accidents and Failures

Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS

Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area
Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area
The loss of required function for
Implementation plan
Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area
Releasing traces of radioactive substanceoutside the radiation controlled area

Accidents and failures reported in FY2015
Power Station

Accidents and Failures

Date

INES

Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Prototype Fast
Breeder Reactor“Monju”
Fukushima Daiichi
NPS
Takahama NPS
Unit 4
Kashiwazaki‐Kari
wa NPS Unit 5

Releasing traces of radioactive substanceoutside the radiation controlled area

May 27, 2015

Below scale

Deformation of Diesel generator（B）
Cylinder head Indicator cockJul 17, 20150

Sep 15, 2015

Below scale

Feb 29, 20160

Mar 08, 2016

0

Releasing traces of radioactive substanceinside the radiation controlled area
Automatic reactor shutdown due toPower generator Automatic shutdown
Unexpected operation of control rod

173

D Annexes3

The overview of Conformity Review for Sendai NPS

The followings are the outline of the Conformity Review result for Kyushu ElectricPower Company Sendai NPS as an example of the Conformity Review by the NRA
during reporting period.
New Regulatory Requirement which is enforced in July, 2013, has added themeasurement of severe accidents and has strengthened design standard than previous
standard. This appendix provides review results on the measurements for prevent
occurrence of a severe accident and the measurements for assumed case of occurrenceof a severe accident.
1

The measurements for prevent occurrence of a severe accident(1)

Setting the standard seismic motion

New Regulatory Requirements requires that the important seismic facilities shall be
designed such that their safety functions will not be compromised by a seismic force by
the standard seismic motion. Furthermore, standard seismic motion requires to be set
after assessment of both “Set seismic motion to specifying the seismic center” whichassess subsurface structure on the site for considering influence on propagation
characteristics of seismic wave and specifying earthquake source fault by detailed
survey on active fault and “Set seismic motion without specifying seismic center”
which estimate that it may occur a certain scale of earthquake even the ground are notactive fault according to detailed survey.
Licensee reviewed the length of active fault and set 540 gal as “Set seismic motion
specifying seismic center” and 620 gal as “Set seismic motion without specifying
seismic center” within the review process. By these standard seismic motions, licensee
has designed the important seismic facilities such that their safety functions will not becompromised.
The NRA reviewed that these standard seismic motion are decided based on the latest
knowledge and the important seismic facilities are designed such that their safetyfunctions will not be compromised by a seismic force by the standard seismic motion.
(2)

Set design basis tsunami

New Regulatory Requirements requires that the design basis response systems shall be
designed such that their safety functions will not be compromised by the design basis
174

D Annexes
tsunami. Furthermore, the design basis tsunami are required to be decided as tsunami
occurrence factor, by the consideration for combination of seismic and non‐seismic
factor, such as landslides.
During review process, licensee set tsunami height of 3.52 meter in height at rise side in
front of water intake and 3.8 meter at lower side base on the consideration earthquake
which fault did not originally assume. In addition, licensee assesses run‐up height as
maximum 6 meter in height by taking into account of impact by tide and storm surge.
For tsunami protection measurements, there are 8 meter in height tsunami protection
enclosed in 15 meter in height protective barrier for protection of sea water pomp
which is important for facilities has installed in the 5 meter high area. Furthermore,licensee installed reservoir weir for ensure cooling water when the undertow. The NRA
reviewed that these design basis tsunami are decided based on latest knowledge andreviewed that the design basis response systems are designed such that their safetyfunctions will not be compromised by the design basis tsunami.
(3)

Volcanic Hazards

Regulation Requirements requires that safety functions of nuclear safety facilities shallnot compromise in case of the assumed volcano eruption. And licensee shall assess theimpacts by the volcano eruption by selecting volcano which may have impact to the
nuclear facility, and evaluate the specific impacts. For the case of volcanic events which
may affect safety of NPS, if the same scale of eruption such as Sakurajima Satsuma
volcanic events which had occurred 12,800 years ago, if may have eruption in the
future, licensee estimate there will have 15 meter deposition in the site.
Licensee has concluded that caldera near to the site has possibility for the occurrence ofhuge volcanic eruptions which eruptive volume is more than 100 cubic kilometers is
sufficiently small. Because the most recent eruption was 30,000 years ago, the eruption
average interval was around 90,000 years ago from the past data and currently there
are no information that magma chamber are on shallow level. Licensee indicated policy
for monitoring of volcanic events during operation period.
Licensee’s design policy is the design of reactor building and installations could
withstand if volcanic ash accumulates 15 centimeter and install filter to prevent of flowof volcanic ash. Considering the loss of offsite power and blockage, licensee prepares
installments in the site as necessary measurements. Also licensee performed the actual
testing and confirms that vehicles can pass by removing the ash even if volcanic ash
accumulates 15 centimeter.
The NRA confirmed assessments for volcanic phenomenon which is implemented by
175

D Annexes
licensee are based on latest knowledge. Because the potential of volcanic phenomenon
which it cannot cope by original design is small, and monitoring caldera is appropriate
activity along the guidelines. In addition, the NRA assesses that licensee’s design policy
meet Regulatory Requirements.
(4)

The measurements against natural phenomenon and human action

Regulatory Requirements requires that the safety systems shall be such that their safetyfunctions will not be compromised in the event of postulated natural phenomena andevents by human factor.
Licensee design the safety system such that their safety functions will not becompromised in case of earthquake, tsunami, flooding, typhoon, tornado, frozen,
precipitation, snow covering, lightning strike, landslide, biological influence, forest
fires, excluding volcano, storm surge and in combination of these phenomenon.
Especially it must withstand tornado wind speed of 100 meters per second andinstallments of fire belt for minimizing the effect from forest fire are additional
measurements.
In consideration of human action such as aircraft crash, collapse of dams, explosion,
fire from nearby factory, licensees are required to design safety systems such that theirsafety functions will not be compromised. Furthermore in preparation for additionalfire on the fuel storage tank in the site, additional protection fire wall was installed.
The NRA evaluated the design policy and concluded that the design basis isappropriate and their design is such that their safety functions will not becompromised in case of natural phenomenon and human action.
(5)

The measurements against internal fire

Regulatory Requirements require fire prevention, detecting and alerting fire at an earlystage, fire extinguishing, and measurements reduce the impact from internal fire.
Licensee must have redundancy by fire extinguishing equipment on every section suchas using fire retardant power cable, equipment in combination with different type offire detection equipment, design for extinguishing whole fire section by halon gas fire
extinguishing equipment. In addition, in order to prevent failure simultaneously. In thecase of fire, equipment with safety systems is separated by fire‐resistant walls for about
3 hours.
The NRA evaluated that licensee ensure sufficient safety measures by design policy ofdetect and fire extinguishing, system separation.
176

D Annexes(6)

The measurement against internal flooding

Regulatory Regulation requires that the safety functions will not be compromised incase of internal flooding. Licensee has to assume water leak by the failure ofcomponents by earthquake, water leak due to pipes failure, and drainage water for
extinguishing.
Licensee must design that safety functions will not be compromised by internal
flooding. For internal flooding measurements, licensee installs equipment above thelevel which the flooding impairs function, installs water prevention cover on thecomponent, detects steam blow down and isolate the line, or drainage the water.
The NRA evaluated that licensee has designed to prevent loss of safety functions byinternal flooding.
(7)

Improvement of reliability against off‐site power

Regulatory Regulation requires at least two off‐site power supply lines must be
independently, among that one off‐site supply line must be installed at transmission
tower different from other two off‐site supply line, in the case of multiple units in thesite, more than three transmission lines must be connected. Licensee connects
independently each of off‐site power two 500,000 volts lines and a 220,000 volts line tooff‐site power. These transmission lines configuration are design to have sufficient
function in the case of differential settlement, an inclination and earthquake and canreceive power even if one of two supply lines may lost.
The NRA evaluates that licensee ensure reliability for off‐site power, because they areable to receive from power from three power supply lines independently.
(8)

Improvement of reliability against emergency power

Regulatory Requirements requires installing multiple emergency power supply for theloss of off‐site power, storage enough fuel in the site for operating constantly morethan 7 days and fuel storage tank can withstand to assumed maximum earthquake.
In order to ensure system safety, licensee install two emergency power supply systemsof which one system has enough capacity in every unit,

and install more fuel storage

tanks for operating constantly more than 7 days. Tank trucks drive between usual fuelstorage tank and new fuel storage tank for transporting fuel and four tank trucks arelocated separately due to avoid failure at the same time in the case of natural disasters.
The NRA evaluate that licensee has redundancy for emergency power supply and cangenerate power for seven days even if there is no external support.

177

D Annexes(9)

Improvement of reliability against the Station Blackout

Regulatory Regulation requires obtaining the AC electric power to prevent the severe
accident in the case of Station Black‐out, and to be able to supply DC power from thebattery by the time when the AC electric power is supplied by the above AC power.
The licensee newly installs two High‐capacity power supply vehicles with air coolers,four High voltage power supply vehicles, two mid‐voltage power supply vehicles, andnewly install two sets of on‐site permanent batteries, six portable DC power supply in
addition to four sets of battery for Reactor Protection System, and installs multiple
power panels etc. to connect with power supply vehicles etc.
The NRA has confirmed that the licensee can supply AC/DC power in case of theStation Blackout since variety of AC/DC power supply equipment are installed
diversely and redundantly, and multiple connectors of those are installed properly.
2

The measurements against assumption of severe accidents occurrence

Licensee is required to take measurements on assumption of severe accidents
occurrence even if the measurements on prevention severe accidents are already
implemented.

Licensee is required to take measures to shutdown reactor certainly inthe case existing installments are not available, the measurements for cooling reactor toprevent fuel melt down, the measurements for confine the radioactive material in thecase on melt down of nuclear fuel and the measurements for minimize release of theradioactive material when release of the radioactive material not avoidable.
(1)

The measurements for reactor shut down

Regulation Requirements requires the measurements for prevention of bringing reactor
core damage in the event of failure on the emergency reactor shutdown system.
Licensee takes measure to isolate steam automatically and confine them to risetemperature then lower generating power finally insert enough amount of boric‐acid
solution in the event of insertion of a control rod not available on emergency.
(2)

Measures to prevent Core Damage

Regulatory Regulation requires a measure to prevent core damage by the water
injection to the reactor core, depressurization or secure the heat sink from the core, incase the conventional measures for water injection lose its function.
And it also requires a measure to prevent core damage by the water injection to the178D Annexes
secondary system in case all the functions of conventional measures to water injection
or depressurization of Reactor is lost.
Licensee has measures to hand operated depressurization and water injection to thereactor core by the additionally installed pumps, assuming accident of loss of
conventional water injection and heat removal measures in addition to the leakage of
coolant. Licensee also has measures to secure the ultimate heat sink by pumping thesea water using the large capacity pumping vehicles through the reactor cooling water
system heat exchangers, and remove heat from the reactor, assuming the loss offunction of conventional systems for removing heat to the sea as well as loss of water
injection.
Furthermore, licensee has measures for cooling the reactor indirectly by injecting water
into the steam generator, assuming all the water injection measures of conventional
systems are lost.
(3)

Measures to prevent damage of primary containment vessel after core melt

Regulatory Regulation requires to restrain a rise of pressure and temperature of the
primary containment vessel and to prevent primary containment vessel damage bymelted fuelʹs eroding concrete of the primary containment vessel lower part even if
core damage occurs.
Licensee installs the additional pumps for the containment vessel spray alternative
water injection in order to restrain a rise of pressure and temperature of the primarycontainment vessel, and cool the melted objects flown inside the PCV by injection ofwater through the PCV spray.
Licensee also installs 13 equipment to ignite hydrogen compulsorily and as well as
installs 5 equipment to recombine hydrogen and oxygen passively.
(4)

Measures to mitigate the dispersion of radioactive materials

Regulatory Regulation requires the measure to mitigate the dispersion of radioactive
materials to the outside of the site boundary when a reactor core is damaged and theprimary containment vessel is damaged.
Licensee has large volume water injection vehicles and water cannons in case of loss ofcontainment function of primary containment vessel.
(5)

Organization, procedure and training, etc.

Regulatory Regulation requires establishing the organizations, procedures, educationand training to prevent occurrence and enlargement of severe accident as well as179

D Annexes
countermeasures as the above‐mentioned equipment.
As for the organization to cope with severe accident, the Emergency Command andControl room whose leader is a directors of the Nuclear Power Station is establishedand the system to command and direction and the role of each employee is clarified.
52 personnel to be able to handle the simultaneous severe accidents for Unit 1 and Unit
2 are reserved all the time. Those personnel is required to be able to handle the accident
for seven days after the occurrence of the accident by the fuels and resources on site,
and the system and organization for the support from outside within 6 days shall beestablished.
As for the establishment of procedures and training, the criteria for recognizing andforeseeing plant status, and judgment in accordance with the plant status shall beclarified, the procedures for usage of equipment is established, and education andpractice are conducted repeatedly.
And training assuming the environment of high radiation, night and bad weather, etc.
is also conducted to maintain and improve the ability of the personnel.
Facilities to cope with severe accident are stored in the separated multiple locations to
mitigate the influence of natural disaster such as earthquake, and the paths fortransportation shall be obtained, and the multiple communication measures inside thesite shall be obtained.
(6)

The base facilities to handle a severe accident

Regulatory Regulation requires installing an Emergency Response Center as the basefacility where the directors conducts at the severe accident occurs. In Sendai Nuclear
Power Station, licensee installs the building constructed by concrete with radiation
shield, which can bear against the earthquake or Tsunami, and contains necessary
equipment and materials for the employees on site head office to direct, collectinformation, has capacity for 100 employees at the maximum when the severe accident
occurs. This facility has display equipment for plant parameters, communication
device by artificial satellite, exclusive power generator, air cleaner etc. to enable theactivity for 7 days without outer support.
The evaluated dose rate for seven days inside this facility by the same condition of
Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident was at most 34 mSv.
(7)

Measures for large‐scale damage of nuclear reactor facilities

Regulatory Regulation requires the organization, procedure, education and training180

D Annexes
resource and materials in case of large scale of damage due to the large scale of natural
disaster, crash of large airplane, or the terror etc.
The licensee shall prepare the on‐site organization to be able to cope with for a while aswell as allocate employees on site and in the neighboring areas dispersive.
The licensee prepares procedures of measures against large scale of natural disasters,
crash of large airplane, large scale of fire due to the airplane fuel, and procedure ofmeasure assuming case when the monitoring and operation at the Main Control Room
can’t be done. Facilities and materials are stored at the place where is apart from morethan 100 meters from the Reactor Building, and the same kind of facility is stored
separately at distant multiple location not to lose the function simultaneously.
3.

Study on the monitoring of a volcanic activity.

When the abnormal symptom which may possibly lead to a large‐scale eruption isdetected by the monitoring of a volcanic activity around the nuclear facilities, the NRA
needs to take some measure such as request to shut down the reactor. Therefore, the
NRA held the ʺStudy team on monitoring of volcanic activity around nuclear
facilities23ʺ twice in fiscal year 2015 in order to collect information on the volcanology
related large‐scale eruption and study.
Thereafter, ʺThe Summary Proposal from the Study Team on monitoring of volcanic
activity around nuclear facilitiesʺ was reported to the NRA on the 25th NRA
Commission Meeting in fiscal year 2015.
Based on this proposal, the NRA decided that the Reactor Safety Examination
Committee will study how to evaluate monitoring volcanic activity for the NRA, andalso study the target for the NRA at the judge to require the plant shutdown on the 46th
NRA Commission Meeting in fiscal year 2015.
On the 7th Reactor Safety Examination Committee, (dated March 25th 2016), it was
decided to establish “The Nuclear Reactor Facility Volcanic Activity Study Group” tostudy above matter.

23

The outline of ʺThe Summary Proposal from the Study Team on monitoring of volcanic activity aroundnuclear facilitiesʺ ;The NRA will study its measures by considering the information about monitoring method or results
related volcanic activities around the nuclear facility from each operator from now on. It is necessary for
the NRA to take any outer specialist’s advises of volcanology and the related field of technology andscience, or from related research institute and related administrative agency, shares information andconstruct the firm relation to cooperate together.

181

D Annexes
4

List of IRRS Review Result
RECOMMENDATIONS (R), SUGGESTIONS (S) AND GOOD PRACTICES (GP)AREA

1. LEGISLATIVE AND
GOVERNMENTALRESPONSIBILITIESRecommendations, Suggestions or Good Practices
GP1

GP2

R1

S1

R2

3. RESPONSIBILITIESAND FUNCTIONSOFTHEREGULATORY
BODY

R3

R4

R5

Good Practice: The prompt establishment of a legal andgovernmental framework supporting a new independentand transparent regulatory body with increased powers.
Good Practice: NRA’s prompt and effective incorporation of
the lessons learnt from the TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi
accident in the areas of natural hazards, severe accident
management, emergency preparedness and back‐fitting ofexisting facilities, into the new regulatory framework.
Recommendation: The government should ensure that theJapanese regulatory authorities having responsibilities
relevant to nuclear and radiation safety develop andimplement an effective, collaborative process for theexchange of information regarding policies, authorizations,inspections and enforcement actions to provide coordinatedand effective regulatory oversight that should also ensure aharmonized regulatory framework under their respective
responsibilities.
Suggestion: NRA should consider improving its liaison withthe relevant organizations for joint inspections and oversightof outsourced inspections.
Recommendation: The Government should empower the
regulatory body to establish requirements for authorization
or approval processes for service providers for monitoring ofoccupational and public exposures, and environmental
monitoring in general, and verify that these requirements are
met by licensees.
Recommendation: NRA should put greater priority andallocate more resources on its oversight of theimplementation of radiation protection measures bylicensees as well as its participation in the development ofinternational standards in radiation protection and related
research activities in collaboration with NIRS.
Recommendation: NRA should evaluate the effectiveness of
its current organisational structure, implement appropriate
cross cutting processes, strengthen the collection of
information from interested parties when planning its
annual activities and develop tools to measure its
performance and use of resources.
Recommendation: NRA should further develop andimplement the activities related to the evaluation of182

D Annexes
AREA

Recommendations, Suggestions or Good Practices

S2

S3

4. MANAGEMENTSYSTEM OF THE
REGULATORY
BODY

R6

S4

S5

S6

competencies, execution of training programmes, on the job
training, internal job rotation, and strengthening safety
research, co‐operation with technical support organisations(JAEA),
universities,
researchorganisations
andinternational and overseas organisations, to ensure it has
both qualified and experienced staff to fulfil its regulatory
responsibilities in nuclear and radiation safety.
Suggestion: NRA should consider developing a strategy for
attracting new and retaining its current technical expertisethrough seeking to improve the attractiveness of NRA as an
employer of choice and the roles that its staff undertake byproviding them with more responsibilities, the ability todirectly influence safety performance of licensees, options toregulate in all various sectors of the industry, ability todevelop legislative requirements that impact national policy,
and having a clear career path to senior levels within the
NRA.
Suggestion: NRA should consider reviewing theeffectiveness of the mechanisms to communicate theoutcomes of the regulatory review and assessment, further
regulatory expectations and current issues to licenses/
applicants.
Recommendation: NRA should complete, document andfully implement its integrated management system for all
regulatory and supporting processes needed to deliver its
mandate. Grading of the application of management systemshould be applied consistently and generic processes should
be fully developed such as control of documents, products,
records and management of change. The effectiveness of the
NRA management system should be monitored andmeasured in a comprehensive way to identify opportunities
for improvement.
Suggestion: NRA should consider introducing specificmeasures such as awareness training or surveys to promoteand sustain high level of safety culture in the conduct of its
activities.
Suggestion: NRA Commissioners should consider taking astrategic approach to the implementation of the management
system demonstrating their commitment to the project byinitiating a specific multi‐year management systemdevelopment plan and by reviewing its implementation on
periodic basis.
Suggestion: NRA should consider developing a hierarchicalstructure for the management system that is easy to use andwhich supports effective and consistent implementation of183

D Annexes
AREA

5. AUTHORIZATION

Recommendations, Suggestions or Good Practices

S7

R7

R8

6. REVIEWAND
ASSESSMENT

S8S97. INSPECTION

R9

S10

regulatory activities. Specific descriptions of each process
should be developed in a unified format including
requirements, risks, interactions, inputs, process flow,
outputs, records and measurement criteria.
Suggestion: NRA should consider enhancing the interfaces
and overall coherence of the existing three regulatory
processes related to NPP ageing management.
Recommendation: NRA should incorporate the findings ofthe facility inspection into the review and assessment andthe authorization process for radiation sources.
Recommendation: NRA should establish requirements
relating to consideration of decommissioning during all life
stages of nuclear and radiation facilities and criteria for the
release of sites at the end of decommissioning.
Suggestion: NRA should consider reviewing its current
operating experience feedback process to:•determine whether its criteria allow the reporting of
enough safety significant events;•
ensure lessons learned from these events, including
return to service from extended shutdowns, are taken
into account by the licensees and actually result inappropriate and timely measures at the facilities.
Suggestion: NRA should consider reviewing the regulatory
requirements for all nuclear facilities to ensure that
submissions by licensees give full systematic consideration
to human and organizational factors and human errors in thedesign of the plant, and the sufficiency of qualified andexperienced NRA resource to assess this.
Recommendation: The government should improve andsimplify the inspection framework to:•
Increase NRA flexibility to provide for efficient,performance based, less prescriptive and risk informed
regulation of nuclear and radiation safety;•
Ensure NRA inspectors have formal rights for freeaccess to all facilities and activities at any time;•
Allow NRA decisions about reactive inspections to bemade at the lowest possible level.
Based on the revised inspection framework the NRA should
develop and implement a programme of inspection of all
facilities and activities specifying types and frequency ofregulatory inspections (including scheduled inspections andunannounced inspections) in accordance with a gradedapproach.
Suggestion: NRA should consider improving training and184

D Annexes
AREA

Recommendations, Suggestions or Good Practices

8. ENFORCEMENT

R10

9. REGULATIONSAND GUIDES

R11

10.

R12

EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESSAND RESPONSE

S11

R13

S12

12. INTERFACE WITH
NUCLEAR SECURITY

S13

retraining of its inspectors in order to improve theircompetencies for inspections, associated assessments anddecision making.
Recommendation: NRA should establish a documented
enforcement policy with criteria and processes fordetermining
gradedsanctionsorpenalties
for
non‐compliances, and a provision for processing orders tominimise the decision time for corrective actions if there isimminent likelihood of safety significant event.
Recommendation: NRA should:• improve and document its process for regularly
evaluating and reviewing regulations and guides and as
the emerging need arises;• supplement the regulations with guidance documents
where necessary; and• improve its guidance on periodic safety assessments.
Recommendation: NRA and other authorities having
jurisdiction for radiation sources should develop a single setof requirements and guidance for EPR in relation toradiation sources including requirements related toemergency plans, arrangements for timely notification andresponse, and quality assurance programme using gradedapproach.
Suggestion: NRA should consider strengthening its plansand procedures to consistently respond to emergencies
related to radiation sources.
Recommendation: NRA should establish:• complete set of Emergency Action Levels for nuclear
facilities other than NPPs and associated guidance topromptly define Emergency Action Levels for all
licensees;• verification process that licensees participate in provisionof information to the public within emergency planningzones around nuclear facilities at the preparedness stage.
Suggestion: The Government should consider ensuring thatthe relevant authorities establish consistent requirements for
categories of emergency workers performing similar tasks.
Suggestion: NRA should consider expediting improvementsin the arrangements to assess, oversee and enforce nuclear
safety and security in an integrated manner.

185

D Annexes
5

Result of IAEA OSART review and measures taken by Tokyo Electric Power
Company

Recommendation
Assessment Field
Items
Leadership and Power station
management for groupsafetystructure andfunctions

Education
training

andEmployeecertification
training

Findings by the IAEA
The power stationneeds to establish
work safety policy
standards,
clearly
convey standards thatmeet the risks toleaders,have
theleaders
understandthose risks, and makesure the standards aremet.
Potential
accidents and low
level events should bereported and recorded,and subjected to trend
analysis.

The power stationneeds to employ a
training method thatcomplements lecturesin order to maintainthe effectiveness oflectures.

186

TEPCO Response Policy• Standards (detailed scope of
application
andnumeric
values, etc.) corresponding to
the risks shall be clarified forall
work
safetyrules【 standards to be created in
December 2015】• Management
observation(MO) shall be dispatched toobserve
theworkersʹ
movements
duringfield
patrols.
Also, by coordinating activities
conducted by the VERIFY
teams*, record and analyze
trends with understanding andcomplying of the rules onsite.
【In Progress】*Team for performing onsite
checks to determine whether or
not recurrence risks and rules
are being complied to withregards to past work accidents
and fires, and identifying
problem areas.
• In order to improve theeffectivenessoflectures,ʺInstructor
Guidelines(methods for conveying theobjectives and expectations oflectures, and methods forpromotingdialogueandgiving lectures in an easy‐tounderstand manner by using
diagrams and photographs)ʺ
will be created and instructors
shall give lectures based on
the Instructor Guidelines.
【To begin in December 2015】

D Annexes
Operation

GroupsandfunctionsOperations
Management needs tocreateamorecomprehensive
guideline for activities
related to operation
tasks

Maintenance andEquipment
certification

The power stationneeds to establish andimplementacomprehensive
equipment
certification program.

Operatingexperience
programeffectivenessThe power stationneeds to implement an
integrated system thatmanages
allinformation regarding
operatingtechnical support

Items to verify
regarding
feedback for
operatingexperience187• Guidance regarding activities
related to operation tasks
shall be drawn up whilereferring to U.S. guidance.
【Scheduled to be enacted April
2016】• Clarify responsibilities andrestrictions of positions below
the shift supervisor anddocument in the manual【Scheduled to be reflected on
the February 2016 manual】• Consider method to verify(alcohol check etc.) operator’sability to work.
【Under consideration】• Manuals and guidelines shallbe created for equipment
critical for safety to continue
with the following activities:【list being created】• A master list of equipment
certification
requirements,
suchasenvironmental
resistance, shall be createdand used for maintenancemanagement.
• Any fluctuations in plant
operation conditions andenvironmental
conditions
shallbeperiodicallymeasured and a continual
assessment shall be conducted
to guarantee that equipment
critical for safety meetcertification requirements• If certification standards, suchas environmental resistance
are revised, the impact of therevision shall be done.
• A mechanism for gatheringand analyzing minor events,
such as close calls, for theentire power station to bebuilt.
【Under consideration】

D Annexes

Emergency
countermeasuresEmergency
response planandcountermeasures

Suggestion
Training
certification

andEmployeecertificationand training

experience (OE), andadequately establish
andimplementelements of the OE
programregardingreporting,selection,
analysis,corrective
action, trend analysis
andeffectivenessevaluation.
The power station,
based on the current
emergency
plan(NuclearPower
Operator
DisasterPrevention Plan), shallprepareits
ownemergency response
plan which includes
operation
concepts
and basic functions of
all primary emergency
response departments.
Also,
existing
emergency proceduresand guidelines shall becompleted, and its
details
shallbecomprehensive
andclear. There is also anecessity to enforce
standardization.

• Operating experience (OE)
information,
includinginformation from overseas,
shall be continually applied tofurther improve safety andwork processes【Under consideration】

The power station
shouldconsidercreating pass or failcriteria for periodic
Main Control Room
(MCR)
operatorevaluations• A standard for determining
whether an operator is fit tocontinue work in his/her
position shall be created andused.
【to begin in December 2015】• Methods for re‐evaluationand follow‐up training for
employees that do not meetthese standards to continue.
【Under consideration】• In order to maintain and

The

power
188

station• A basic plan for handling astate of emergency andnuclear emergencies shall becreated along with individual
procedures that clarify howeach functional unit is to
respond.
【During the creation】• Training will be continually
implemented in a planned
mannerbasedontheemergency response plan andindividual procedures.
【 To be implemented after
creation of the procedures】

D Annexes

Operations

Fire protection
program

Maintenance andConfiguration
management

technical support

Radiation
protection

Radiation task
management

shouldconsiderestablishing an official
on‐going
training
program based on
systematic educationand training methods
for maintenance andengineering personnel(radiation protection,
chemistry,fuelmanagement etc. )The power stationneeds to make adecision for organizing
onsite fire brigade, andonsite dedicated firebrigade retraining andprotection in order toguarantee an effective
responsetofire
alarms.
The power station andthe head office need to
officially approve thedesign rights functionand establish methods
forensuring
that
important plant design
documents
arecomplete, reliable, andavailable, and also thatdetailed
designdocuments can be
stored for a longtime
while
the
power
station is in operation.
The power stationneeds to examine what
would
be
the
appropriateorganization
andcommon practices forcontamination
management.

189

improveperformance,
training to be implemented
constantly will be added tothe changes and training fornewequipmenttobeconductedbyeach
department.
【 education and training
criteria will be determined in
December 2015】• Upon reviewing the meeting
point with the operator,
conduct training so that theonsitefirebrigadeʹs
firefighting personnel canarrive at the scene of fire in
the shortest amount of timeand make any necessary
improvements.
【to be reflected in December
2015】• To understand the systems
andequipment
designs,
equipment drawings are to bereorganized and confirmed sothat the location of systems
and equipment shown in the
documents match the actual
equipment.
Thisshouldguarantee
thatthemanufacturing
andoperations are maintained as
designed.
【 Reorganization to start in
October 2015】• During work, contamination
inspectors will always beplaced at the exits ofcontaminated areas to inspect
workers and objects forcontamination. (only objects
were inspected previously)【 To be implemented from
November 2015】

D Annexes

Occupational
exposure
management

Emergency
response planandEmergency
countermeasur
escountermeasures

Severe accident
management

Proceduresand guidelines

The power stationneeds to examine howtoimprovetheorganization
andcommonpractices
according to ALARA
(As
Low
As
Reasonably
Achievable) principles.
The power stationneeds to examine how
to reconfigure andimprovethe
TSC(technicalsupportcenter) layout basedonoperatingexperience,
trainingand designs of othersimilar facilities.

The power stationneeds to update EOP(Emergency Operating
P),
SOP(SevereAccident
Operating
Procedures) and AMG
190• Improve the area so thatworkers can be checked forcontamination before using
toilets in controlled areas.
【 To be implemented from
November 2015】• Enhance
contamination
inspection at the exit ofcontrolledareas.
(review
frequency of inspections for
supplies
used
in
the
controlled area and start
contamination
inspection
when transporting materials
from
the
large
freight
entrances)【 To be implemented from
November 2015】• Set a value and manage
personal dose.
【done November 2015】• Devisemeasuresfor
protecting
workers
who
engage in sampling during
accidents from radiation, to bereflected in the procedures.
【started November 2015】• The layout of the seismic
isolated building will be
reviewed to design new areas
for main office personnel andwork areas for each division.
The work areas of each work
unit will be changed, such as
using existing conference
rooms inside the seismic
isolated building【 review layout: completed
November 2015】• The findings with regards to
EOP/SOP/AMG(including
the current AOP and details
already mentioned in tsunami
AMG) to be organized and
EOP/SOP/AMG to be revisedD Annexes

Verification
andconfirmationof proceduresand guidelines(Accident
Management Guide)in order to expand thescope of documents tocover accidents at
spent
fuel
pools
duringoperation
shutdown and design
extension conditions.
The plant has AOP(Abnormal Operating
Procedures) and fixed
response plans notedin the tsunami AMG,
but these plans need tobeformally
incorporated
into
EOP/SOP.
The power station
shouldconsidercreating an official
approval
procedure
regardingthefeasibility of theseprocedures when an
accident occurs.

are to include procedures that
containpoliciesforresponding to
shutdown
accidents and spent fuel poolaccidents.
【 During the creation ofdrafting】• Narrow the gap between
world
standards(IAEA,
BWR‐OG) and the validationand verification of EOP/SOP/AMG revisions.
【An adequacy assessment has
been underway since October
2015】• Validation and verification foreach guide of EOP/SOP/AMG
revision will be created whilereferencing overseas casestudies and following IAEA
safety standards guidelines.
【 The adequacy confirmation
guide has been created.
Verification guide planned tobe created by March2016】

Good practiceTraining andcertification

Employeecertificationand training

The power station
holds
training
toprepare and readydesignextension
conditions to improve
performance.

191• The training simulator of
Units 6 and 7 has been
remodeled to simulate severe
accident
conditions
toimprovetheskillsofoperators.
• At the Fukushima Daiichi
NPS, special training is being
implemented in order to deal

D Annexes

Operations

Departments
and functions

Organizationalrelicensing
training
periodFire protection
programTemporary flammablematerial management

192

with the physical and mental
stressthat
operators
experience during a severe
accident.
• For recovery team training,
workers
practice
drillscarrying supplies with them(full facemasks and protective
clothing,
etc.)
assuming
high‐doseandsevereenvironments.
• More than 100 employees
have been certified to use
specialvehiclesduringemergencies(firetrucks,debris removal vehicles, etc.),
and
those
employees
periodically take part intraining.
• Operators
undergothefollowing training on how tomove between units so thatthey can understand thecharacteristics of each unit.
- Uniquefunctionsandcharacteristics of each unit
- Characteristics of remodeledplaces and locations whereconstruction is underway- Differencesinsafetyregulations for each unit
• Flammablematerials
arebeing temporarily managed
well in the following manner:- Whencontractors
temporarily store flammablematerials, they must submit
an application to the TEPCO
group in charge that has
jurisdiction over the area
and receive a permit.
- After a permit is obtained,
the flammable materials
storagelocationmap
information is updated so

D Annexes

Maintenance andtechnical support

Emergency
response planandPower source
related power
stationrenovations

The flexibility andcapability of alternate
AC/DC power systems
used to restore power
duringdesignextension conditions.

Civil
engineering
structuressafetyreinforcement
measuresPowerstationprotection
measuresagainst tsunamis

Emergency
response

Methodsforenhancing tracking of
the situation

countermeasures

193

that the group in charge canperform a daily patrol
inspecting
thelocationbased on the information on
the field map and makecorrections as necessary.
• Emergency power sources,
such as mobile gas turbine
trucks and power‐supply
trucks, etc.,
have been
positioned on high ground.
• Furthermore,
cablesarealways connected to theemergency power supply andthe power station so thatthese equipment can bestarted up in a short period oftime.
• The maximum height of thetsunami that the power
station is assessed, is at 7.6m
(runup height) but a seawall
15m
high
has
been
constructed in order toimplement
conservative
tsunami countermeasures.
• Furthermore,considering
possible flooding on thepremises of the power station,
damp proof panels andwatertight doors have been
installed around and insideeach reactor building, and thepenetrability of wires havebeen waterproofed, making it
a model example of tsunami
countermeasures.
• A chat system (system thatconverts speech into text toshare)
andacommonoperating picture (data that
puts
power
stationparameters into visualizeddata) is being used as amethod of communication
between each work unit

D Annexes

Severe accident
management

Emergency
countermeasur
esIntensive simulation
training program for
emergency response
teams

Severeaccident
management
analysis
supportUse of computational
aids to support event
response194

during an emergency to shareaccurate information.
• Furthermore, this informationis shared with TEPCO head
office,thenational
government, the Nuclear
Regulation Agency, and local
governments,
etc.
fororganized
situationalawareness.
• The power station has all oftheemergency
response
departments
dointensetraining every month.
• Training scenarios deal withcomplicated problems andsevere conditions over a wide
area in a systematic manner.
Training is also conducted asrealistically as possible.
• The participation rate of thepower station workers fortraining has also reached ahigh level.
• The following computation
system is being built in orderto check the power stationʹssituation
duringanemergency.
- Software tools that cancalculate the time until TAF(Top of Active Fuel) basedon scram time, current RPV(reactor pressure vessel)
coolant injection speed, RPV
water level, RPV pressureandPCV(reactor
containment vessel) input
information
are
being
developed.
- Software tools that canassess the impact of risingwater temperatures in the
SFP (spent fuel pools) basedon input data of theD Annexes

Use of PSA,
PSR and OEF

Analysis is being usedproactively in order toextendtheplantdesigntohandledesignextension
conditions

195

temperature inside of thereactor and water levels arebeing developed.
Software tools that canestimate when to vent andthe amount of discharged
radiationarebeingdeveloped.
• PSA(probabilistic
safetyassessment)
and
other
analyses are being conductedtodeterminelatentadvantages to design changes
during the design concept
stage.
• For example, during spare
analysis that was conducted,
it was determined that doses
to which MCR operators andonsite response personnel are
exposed to can be greatly
decreased by employing filter
air holes, iodine filters andcontrolling the pH of the
primary containment vessel.
• Based on this insight, iodine
filters were installed, and asystem was designed to use
the MUWC (make‐up water
condensate system) to injectsodium hydroxide into theprimary containment vessel inorder to control pH.

D Annexes
6

References

The following documents are references for writing national report.
A

INTRODUCTION•

Electricity system reform and nuclear power generation, October, 2014, Agency for
Natural Resources and Energy

B

SUMMARY OF MAJOR ACTIVITIES DURING THE 7TH REPORTNG PERIOD•REPORT OF THE INTEGRATED REGULATORY REVIEW SERVICE (IRRS) MISSION
TO JAPAN•

The Nuclear Regulation Authority the first Mid‐term Goal, February 2015, The Nuclear
Regulation Authority

Article 8•

The basic policy on human development for The Nuclear Regulation Authority
personal, The Nuclear Regulation Authority•

The Nuclear Regulation Authority Management Rules, October 10, 2014, The Nuclear
Regulation Authority

Article 14•

The Guideline for Periodic Safety Assessment of Continuous Improvement ofCommercial Power Reactor, November 27, 2013, The Nuclear Regulation Authority•

The overview of application for the extension of operational periods for Takahama
NPS unit 1, unit2, May 28, 2015, The Kansai Electric Power Co, INC•

The Standard Review Plans on the extension of operational periods for Commercial
Power Reactor, November, 2013, The Nuclear Regulation Authority

Article 15•

Report on radiation control in Nuclear installations, 2015, October 28, 2015, theSecretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority•

The measurements for improvement on Field management in Fukushima Daiichi NPS,
September 10 , 2014, The Tokyo Electric Power Co, INC

Article 16
196

D Annexes•

The Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures, November 10, 1961, Act No.223•

the Nuclear Emergency Act, 1999, Act No.156•

Basic Plan for Disaster Preparedness, part 12 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness,
February 16, 2016 amended•

NRA EPR Guide, August 26, 2015 amended•

The overview of installation guideline for emergency monitoring center, October 29,
2014, The Nuclear Regulation Authority•

The response of Nuclear operator’s emergency exercises, April 8, 2015, The Nuclear
Regulation Authority•

The Kyushu Electric Power Co., The summary report of emergency exercises, April 24,
2015

Article 17•

The results of Reactor Installation Amendment Permit of The Kyushu Electric Power
Company’s Sendai NPS （overview）, October, 2014, The Nuclear Regulation Authority

Article 18•

Kashiwazaki‐Kariwa NPS unit 6, unit 7, The prevention for mis‐operation February,
2015 The Tokyo Electric Power Co, INC•

Kashiwazaki‐Kariwa NPS unit 6, unit 7, Safety protection circuit February, 2015 The
Tokyo Electric Power Co, INC

Article 19•

Guide for Periodic Safety Management Review, February, 2014, The Nuclear
Regulation Authority•

Accidents and failures reported in FY2014, April 17, 2014, the Secretariat of the Nuclear
Regulation Authority•

Accidents and failures reported in FY2015, April 17, 2015, the Secretariat of the Nuclear
Regulation Authority•

Measurements for reflecting operational experience on nuclear installations

May 2,

2014, the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority•

Operation of the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale for Eventsoccurred in nuclear facilities, March 18, 2015, The Nuclear Regulation Authority•

Implementation Guideline for operational safety inspection on power reactor facilities,
November 10, 2015, the Secretariat of the Nuclear Regulation Authority

197