Country-Specific
Safety Culture ForumJapan

Country-Specific Safety Culture
Forum: Japan© OECD 2024
NEA No. 7680
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY
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NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCYThe OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1 February 1958. Current NEA membershipconsists of 34 countries: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czechia, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, theNetherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Korea, Romania, Russia (suspended), the Slovak Republic,
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to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international
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to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues as input
to government decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD analyses in areas such asenergy and the sustainable development of low-carbon economies.

Specific areas of competence of the NEA include the safety and regulation of nuclear activities,
radioactive waste management and decommissioning, radiological protection, nuclear science, economic
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Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found online at: www.oecd.org/about/publishing/corrigenda.htm.
The present version replaces the initial version released on 30 July 2024 and subsequently updated on
7 August.
© OECD 2024
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about/terms-conditions.html.
Cover photos: Mount Fuji, Japan (Sean Pavone/Shutterstock); Ohi Nuclear Power Plant, Japan (Kansai Electric Power Co./CC BY-SA 2);
Technicians (maroke/Shutterstock).

FOREWORDS

Forewords
William D. Magwood, IV
Director-General, NEA
Of the many lessons learnt about nuclear safety over the years, among
the most difficult to address and to communicate has been that humanand organisational aspects of nuclear safety are as important as any
technical issue. Fortunately, it is now widely accepted by theinternational nuclear community that human and organisational
aspects, as well as safety culture, all require substantial attention. Indeed, theaccidents that have occurred in the nuclear sector and in other areas over the years
remind us of just how important it is to take into account the women and men andthe organisations in which they work.
The Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has carried out significant work and analysis
in this area over the years and one key conclusion it has reached is that safety culture
is influenced substantially by national culture. In other words, the manifestation ofcultural traits in an organisation has a critical impact on its safety culture.
With this in mind, the NEA, in co-operation with the World Association of
Nuclear Operators (WANO), developed a framework for advancing dialogue and foroffering an introspective analysis on this topic. This framework, entitled theCountry-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF), has held events so far in Sweden(2018), Finland (2019) and Canada (2022).
Each CSSCF starts out from the respective country’s cultural realities andinvolves a fulsome and in-depth assessment of its cultural assets and challenges, aswell as of the measures that may be taken to strengthen the safety culture in theregulatory bodies and operators. CSSCF Japan provides the opportunity to identify
and understand elements of the national traits and attributes in the Japanese culturethat could either enhance safety and day-to-day operations or provide challenges
that should be addressed across the nuclear community.
CSSCF Japan has been made possible by the commitment of Japan’s Nuclear
Regulation Authority (NRA), the Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan(FEPC) and all affiliated Japanese nuclear operators and organisations that havejoined the NEA and WANO on this journey. We hope that the results of the CSSCF
presented in this report will stimulate the Japanese nuclear community to explore
its national context so as to enhance its safety culture and nuclear safety overall.
The NEA team along with our colleagues from the WANO Tokyo Centre haveworked intensively to develop, organise and co-ordinate the many elements
associated with this CSSCF. All should be proud of their contributions and of theircollective mission of assuring high levels of nuclear safety.

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FOREWORDSDr Naoki Chigusa
Chief Executive Officer, WANO
The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) has on fouroccasions had the privilege of participating in the Country-Specific
Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF). I was particularly pleased to attend thefourth CSSCF meeting in 2023 in my home country of Japan.
WANO has long held the belief that a strong safety culture is essential to theongoing safe and successful operation of nuclear power facilities. Recognising theimportance of safety culture to all nuclear facilities, WANO’s report entitled Traitsof a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture acknowledges that a number of fundamental
principles must be present in the behaviour of leaders and workers in the nuclear
power sector if we are to collectively deliver our mission of ensuring the safe andreliable operation of nuclear facilities.
Although Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture was written by aninternational team with the goal of applying its conclusions broadly across theglobal membership of WANO – a “think globally” philosophy – we also recognisethat local factors may influence how individuals interact in their specific situation.
We must therefore acknowledge the necessity of being prepared to “act locally.”
The CSSCF provides this “act locally” opportunity. Through role-playing andrelated discussions, the CSSCF helps its participants gain a deeper and broader
understanding of how regional and national culture influences the way individuals
interact in the performance of nuclear operations.
For the CSSCF in Japan, the strong participation by the Nuclear Regulation
Authority representatives and Japan Nuclear Operators staff allowed a transparent
and effective interaction. This was a positive step in promoting understanding anda synergistic relationship that can provide great benefits for nuclear safety and theperformance of Japanese nuclear power plants.
The CSSCF in Japan also benefited from the participation of regulators andnuclear energy experts from several other countries, providing an international
perspective to complement the discussion of Japan-specific cultural attributes.
WANO continues to appreciate its collaborative effort with the Nuclear Energy
Agency to sponsor the Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum.

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FOREWORDS

Kingo Hayashi
Chairman, Federation of Electric Power Companies of JapanThe 13 years since the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant have been a time of unprecedented difficulty and change
for the nuclear industry in Japan. The high level of concern andanxiety from the public is directly related to the loss of trust in the
nuclear industry. We have been working to restore this trust and to
improve safety based on the consensus that such an accident mustnever happen again.
The discussion at the Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) examined
the possible influence of national culture and traditions on safety culture, which
was a new approach and a very important input to the efforts that we have been
making.
In particular, the fact that light was shed on issues that had been implicitly
present among organisations, such as authority gradients and communication, andthe mutual recognition of the need for operators and the regulatory body to faceand discuss common issues, were the most important outcomes of this forum.
In the future, it will be important to continue these discussions, not only withineach organisation and across the nuclear industry, but also with the regulatory
body, based on a thorough understanding of the contents of the report. This willlead to further fostering a culture for safety and restoring public trust in nuclear
energy.
Finally, I would like to thank the NEA and WANO for planning and hosting
the CSSCF in Japan. I would also like to express my sincere gratitude to the many
people involved in the preparation and organisation of the Forum, and to theparticipating local governments, national governments and operators for theiropen and dedicated discussions.
We encourage all countries with nuclear power plants to host Country-Specific
Safety Culture Forums.

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FOREWORDS

Shinsuke Yamanaka
Chairman, Nuclear Regulation Authority
Over the years, it has been widely recognised that human aspects
such as safety culture, human and organisational performance andcommunications are as important for nuclear safety as material
conditions and engineering aspects.
Following the successful Country-Specific Safety Culture Forums (CSSCF) in
Sweden (2018), Finland (2019) and Canada (2022), the fourth CSSCF took place inTokyo, Japan, on 14-15 December 2023. It was the first opportunity for operators,
regulators, local governments and international observers to come together anddiscuss how nuclear safety culture can be influenced by the domestic culturalcontext of a country and how operators and regulators perceive these effects intheir day-to-day activities. This made it an extremely valuable forum, providing aunique opportunity to deepen our understanding of our own safety culture. The
participants gave their personal insights and shared their collective experiencethroughout the forum on the importance Japanese culture places on nuclear safety.
It is important to make use of this awareness and the other gains from the forumin the future.
It is also the responsibility of the participants to share their experiences tofurther expand the discussion throughout their communities. This will provide a
valuable opportunity for colleagues to ensure that their daily activities provide aneven stronger culture for safety in Japan.
Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the NEA and WANO Tokyo forthe excellent preparations and organisation of the Forum.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Acknowledgements

The NEA thanks the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) and the Japan
Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) for their valuable contribution to therealisation of the Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) Japan, as well as
all the affiliated Japanese nuclear operators and organisations that joined the NEA
and WANO on this journey. The NEA is also grateful to the Japan Atomic Energy
Agency (JAEA) senior experts who acted as facilitators during the Forum alongside
the NEA staff.
Finally, thanks are due to the NEA and WANO team that worked hard tocomplete this project, particularly Nobuhiro Muroya, Anaïs Nouailles Mayeur,
Minori Kato, Ursula Diffu, Yuji Kumagai, Keiko Chitose, Joji Kohara, and Gabrielė
Gedvilaitė of the NEA and Isao Sugawara and Paul James of the WANO Tokyo
Centre.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents

List of abbreviations and acronyms ................................................................ 11
Executive summary ........................................................................................ 13
Background ............................................................................................... 13
Conducting CSSCF Japan .......................................................................... 14
Overview of outcomes ............................................................................... 14
Safety culture in a national context ................................................................ 17
National culture ........................................................................................ 17
Nuclear safety culture ............................................................................... 19
Policy on safety culture in the Japanese nuclear context .......................... 20
CSSCF framework relating to safety culture in a national context ............ 22
Japanese cultural context ............................................................................... 25
Geography of Japan .................................................................................. 25
Japanese historical and societal context ................................................... 25
History of the Japanese nuclear sector ..................................................... 27
Recent developments in the Japanese nuclear sector ............................... 29
The methodology of the Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum .................... 31
Conducting a Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum ............................... 31
Study ......................................................................................................... 32
Forum ....................................................................................................... 36
Safety culture in the Japanese context: Observations from CSSCF Japan ....... 39
Introduction .............................................................................................. 39
National culture as an influence on safety culture in the Japanese
nuclear community ................................................................................... 45
National culture as an influence on the relationship between the
NRA and the licensees............................................................................... 56
Reflections on safety culture in the Japanese context, and paths forward ..... 61
Summary of Japanese national attributes and their potential influenceon safety culture ........................................................................................ 61
Suggestions for paths forward .................................................................. 65
Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 69
References ...................................................................................................... 71

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

List of abbreviations and acronyms

CSSCF

Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum

FEPC

Federation of Electric Power Companies

GDP

Gross domestic product

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

INPO

Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (United States)

JAEA

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

JAPC

Japan Atomic Power Company

JNFL

Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited

JPDR

Japan Power Demonstration Reactor

LNG

Liquefied natural gas

NEA

Nuclear Energy Agency

NUMO

Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan

NRA

Nuclear Regulation Authority (Japan)

OECD

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

RP-HANS

Division of Radiological Protection and Human Aspects of Nuclear
Safety (NEA)

WANO

World Association of Nuclear Operators

Units of measure
TWh

Terawatt-hour

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary

Background
Throughout the history of nuclear energy, one of the common objectives andabsolute priorities of both nuclear operators and the organisations that regulatethem has been to achieve and maintain high levels of safety. For several decades, ahealthy safety culture has been considered essential to the overall safety
performance of any organisation. Although the safety goals in countries with
nuclear power programmes are similar, the operational realities vary due to a range
of factors including national cultural contexts. Those national culturalcharacteristics can have a positive impact on a healthy safety culture within nuclear
organisations or present notable challenges. For this reason, it is essential for the
nuclear community to identify what influences are present within their individual
cultural contexts and to reflect on how these influences may have an impact on theiroverall nuclear safety culture. A clear understanding of these impacts can lead tothe strengthening of safety culture through, for example, having open andtransparent communication, having explicit responsibility and accountability, or
ensuring that safety is considered a priority in all decision-making.
The Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) is a programmeestablished by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the World Association of
Nuclear Operators (WANO) to provide host countries and their principal nuclear
institutions and organisations an opportunity to reflect on national characteristics
and engage in exercises to assess the influence those characteristics could have on
the overarching nuclear safety culture.
Since its inaugural event in 2018, the CSSCF has proven to be a valuable tool
and approach in raising awareness in a country’s nuclear community of theattributes that can influence their organisations and the safe operation of its
nuclear facilities. This process does not strive to make a comparative analysis ofnational contexts. Instead, it offers an opportunity for a given country to reflect andassess the influence of its national culture on the nuclear safety culture and to
consider, within the national context, methods (where applicable) for sustainableimprovements to its safety culture. In this regard, across a range of nuclear
activities in a given country, the CSSCF analyses the cultural traits of the country’s
nuclear sector and identifies how they might influence assumptions, values, beliefs
and behaviours within nuclear organisations. To achieve this, the CSSCF
comprises a series of steps: data gathering and analysis, development of a scenario
script, the conduct of a two-day Forum, detailed analysis, and development of the
final report containing findings and, most importantly, country-specificrecommendations for continuous improvement in enhancing the safety culture
across the nuclear community.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYWith the conclusion of the CSSCF Japan, it is the responsibility of eachparticipating organisation to determine its next steps by reflecting on the present
report. Without prescribing any specific follow-up activities, the NEA does
recommend the use of this report as the basis for further exploration of theprincipal cultural traits and attributes through various introspective exercises andtraining activities.

Conducting CSSCF JapanCSSCF Japan was initiated in late 2022 with the NEA, WANO, the Federation ofElectric Power Companies (FEPC) and the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)
agreeing on the basic framework for the project and then planning the initial stepfor the data-gathering exercise. Consistent with the previous CSSCF activities,
substantive work began with the data collection effort. The NEA travelled to many
Japanese nuclear organisation offices and facilities and a data collection team held
91 interviews and focus groups across the nuclear operations community and the
NRA, gathering perspectives and information from 368 participants. The
organisations included all 11 nuclear power plant operators in Japan, a fuelreprocessing company, and the Japanese nuclear regulator. The participantsinterviewed were specifically chosen from various levels and across diverse
operational units within the organisations, ranging from CEO/CNO level to middle
managers to operational staff.
The data collected across all activities resulted in an overview of specificnational characteristics, themes and relevant concepts in safety culture reflectiveof the Japanese nuclear context. These findings supported the development of a
scenario script that was used as a basis for discussion at a two-day forum held on
14-15 December 2023 in Tokyo, Japan. The Forum was attended by a large anddiverse group (more than 100 participants) representing very senior to more juniorlevels of the national nuclear organisations that took part in the data collection
exercise, including international guests and local government representatives. The
Forum allowed for an in-depth exploration of the Japanese national characteristics
and themes and their potential impacts on nuclear safety culture.

Overview of outcomesThis report is based on views ofrepresentatives of the Japanese
nuclear community, as
expressed during interviews,
focus groups, and at the 2023
CSSCF held in Tokyo, Japan.

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After three highly successful CSSCFs, in Sweden in 2018,
in Finland in 2019, and in Canada in 2022, CSSCF Japan
was the first Forum conducted in Asia. This report
documents the background, method, outcomes,
observations and self-reflections collated throughout theprocess, including the conclusions of the two-day Forum
held on 14-15 December 2023 in Tokyo, Japan.
CSSCF Japan outlined several noteworthy national
characteristics that are reflected in the Japanese nuclear

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

sector. The following eleven traits were found to be the most significant, based on
the discussions and resulting analysis:•

Peer pressure – implicitly encourages people to conform to the opinions of
the majority and to be hesitant to speak up.

•

Majime (diligence) – prompts honesty, diligence and hard work to achievegoals and objectives, which leads to a great respect for rules and deadlines.
It also sometimes encourages the search for an excessive level of perfection
or to apply rules without questioning.

•

Fear of failure – is due to strong peer pressure and because it can be hard
to have mistakes forgiven. The fear to fail or to make mistakes can lead tohighly risk-adverse organisational cultures.

•

Hoshu-teki (conservativeness) – means that precedence is not broken anda guarantee of success is needed before trying new ways of doing things.
The pursuit of perfection sets the bar very high and, coupled with a strong
tendency towards risk aversion, makes it difficult to be proactive. This isperhaps especially true in the nuclear sector.

•

Wa (harmony) – implies a peaceful unity without conflict and conformity
within the group in which members prefer the continuation of aharmonious community over personal interests. Achieving wa can be soimportant in Japan that people distinguish between honne (a person’s true
feelings or real intention) and tatemae (the face borne in public or a
stance/political statement).

•

Don’t speak out – can be due to peer pressure and the wa described above,
meaning individuals can tend to align themselves with the majority and, asa result, be reluctant to speak up and express divergent opinions.

•Collectivism – creates a strong sense of social cohesion and national
commitment, the needs of the group being more important than those of
the individuals.

•

Ambiguity – can describe the way leaders and workers in Japaneseorganisations sometimes make decisions or communicate. As far as
communication is concerned, they rarely express their thoughts directly
using unequivocal language, and sometimes imagine or surmise what
others are thinking.

•Consideration – means Japanese tend to be prize benevolence andshowing respect and politeness to others in all aspects of social andprofessional life.

•

Nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority) – allows a seniority-wage system
where, because of age, the longer a person has worked in a company, themore power and salary they have compared to others.

•

Okami-ishiki (obedience to superiors) – leads to a strong emphasis onhierarchy and respect for authority figures, particularly those working forthe government.
The broad national characteristics outlined above play out in a variety of
individual and organisational behaviours associated with a healthy safety culture.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The discussions held during CSSCF Japan identified the following safety culture
dimensions:• accountability and responsibility for safety;• clearly defined roles and responsibilities on safety;• continuous learning and improvement around safety;• importance given to safety in decision-making;• human resource allocation, effective competencies and training management
to ensure safety;• open and transparent communication on safety.
The observations outlined in this report highlight Japanese cultural attributes
that the participants recognised could influence assumptions, values andorganisational structures and processes, and consequently impact nuclear safety
performance. The objective of CSSCF Japan and this report is to offer the Japanese
nuclear community tools they can use to continue to strengthen safety culture in
their nuclear organisations and collectively throughout the nuclear sector in Japan.
This report can be used by the host country to reflect on national attributes and to
consider any potential “blind spots” within their organisational behaviour and toaddress these through further dialogue, training and safety management processes
improvement, when appropriate.
The findings from CSSCF Japan demonstrate the strong emphasis that theJapanese nuclear community places on safety and the robust progress made by
the Japanese nuclear community since the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
accident in terms of maturity in safety culture. The data identify national
characteristics of Japanese culture that contribute positively to operational safety
and promote a strong nuclear safety culture, but also reveal areas in which thenational safety culture could be further strengthened.
The discussions and reflections in the study (the findings from the interviews
and focus groups identifying national characteristics), as well as the two-day Forum,
resulted in a substantial amount of data, which the NEA team collected andanalysed. The qualitative and thematic analysis encompasses the core of this report.
The wide representation of the Japanese nuclear sector in this process highlights
the commitment of the country to the improvement of nuclear safety culture.
Direct feedback from CSSCF Japan participants highlighted the positive impactof the exercise in encouraging open and constructive dialogue, particularly acrossdivisions and organisations, as well as between the license holders and theregulatory body. The Forum enabled exchanges among regulatory officials andindustry representatives and stimulated reflections. Within the individual Japanese
nuclear organisations, these discussions raised new perspectives and prompted
actors to consider advancing the conversation on how national attributes influence
nuclear safety culture.
The report’s authors invite the Japanese nuclear community to contemplate
the CSSCF Japan findings and determine the most effective way to apply them tofurther enrich their national nuclear safety culture. To assist in this, the reportoffers a matrix of exploratory questions that can help prompt dialogue and support
measures that might lead to improvements.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

Safety culture in a national context

National culture
Experience in the nuclear sector has shown that the dominant cultural context inwhich facilities are operated in a host country is not disconnected from the national
cultural context (NEA, 2016b). In the prevailing academic literature exploring thislink, Guldenmund notes that: “Culture emerges at places where people live andwork together. Living and working together requires a certain degree of sharedunderstanding – e.g. about daily reality, about work and its context, and so on –and it is this (shared) understanding that a culture provides” (Guldenmund,2018: 21). The actual essence of national culture is hard to define, but it embodies
norms, behaviours, beliefs, customs and values shared by the population of asovereign nation, which in turn influence individuals’ behaviour and social
relationships by enabling people to make sense of their society and perform in it
as well as to make sense of other people’s behaviours (Hofstede, 2001;
Guldenmund, 2018).
Culture emerges spontaneously, even unintentionally, even if we would preferotherwise. Edgar Schein, a pioneering researcher on organisational culture,
proposed a model of culture that provides some grip on a culture’s elusiveness(Schein, 1985). The deepest level of an organisation’s culture is composed of
implicit, tacit and basic assumptions that are taken for granted (strongly held
beliefs, values, norms, etc.). This level is not directly visible but can be uncoveredby observing how people interact and inquiring as to the reasons why things aredone in certain ways and the perceptions of what is appropriate behaviour indifferent situations. This inner level is surrounded by two more tangible layers.
“Observable artifacts”, the external layer, is clearly visible but not directly
convertible to an underlying culture although it might be an expression of it.
Artifacts are most easily acquired and can function as a façade rather than acultural expression (Guldenmund, 2018). The same goes for the second layer, the“espoused values”. These are publicly stated and shared principles, rituals,
standards of behaviour and goals, which, again, are tangible but do not necessarilytranslate directly into underlying basic assumptions.
Influential research by Geert Hofstede studied the impact of national culture
on values in the workplace, based on the analysis of a large database of employee
value scores collected at IBM, a multinational computer manufacturing company,
between 1967 and 1973, across 50 countries (Hofstede, 2001). Hofstede’s work
found large differences between countries along the following five dimensions:power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, masculinityfemininity, and short vs. long-term orientation. For instance, the power distance

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SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

index shows that in countries where power distance is high, people may find it
difficult to express disagreement with their superiors. This situation can preventthe adoption of a questioning attitude and lead people to give in consistently togroup pressure, even when doing so undermines effective teamwork. Later, otherresearchers added restraint vs. indulgence to this list. Some research has
attempted to determine whether these different dimensions lead to variability inthe level of risk behaviours and safety performance at a national level and has
shown that other factors such as management’s perceived commitment to safety
and the effectiveness of safety measures have a greater impact (Mearns and Yule,2009).
Figure 1: Schein’s “onion layer” model of organisational culture(adapted from Schein, 1985)
Observable
artefacts

Visible manifestations oforganisational culture

EspousedvaluesFormalised statements oforganisational culture

Basicassumptions

Tacit suppositions
concerning organisational
cultureCulture influences, but is also influenced by, the structure and formal part ofan organisation as well as the daily execution of its processes. Indeed,organisational cultures depend on the structures that organisations put in place toachieve desired outcomes. These structures reflect the priorities of top leaders, whoin turn may depend on factors outside the organisation, such as regulatory
pressure and public opinion (Hopkins, 2016). If safety is an integral part of theorganisation’s primary aim or mandate, the resulting culture is called “safety
culture” (Guldenmund, 2018).
In the National Diet of Japan Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent
Investigation Commission (known as the Diet Report), the reader’s attention is
specifically drawn to the subject of how national culture might influence theorganisational and safety culture (The National Diet of Japan, 2012). These
concepts of national culture and safety culture became an active area of discussion
in fora associated with the NEA. While the conversation emerged fromconsiderations made after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, it
was quickly recognised that no culture is superior to another when it comes toachieving a high level of nuclear safety. In fact, different characteristics or
attributes may, at times, reinforce or weaken safety performance.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

Nuclear safety culture
Safety culture is one of the toughest topics in nuclear safety because it is a matterof improving human functioning in a very technical and regulated industry.
Nonetheless, it is today a well-established view that nuclear installations can beseen as systems influenced by humans, organisations and technology. The
relationship between the human element, the technical aspects of nuclear
operations and the organisation in which they reside has been acknowledged as
key to any effort to improve safety (NEA, 2022). It is also now well established thatthe cultural context influences the human and organisational factors: it is therefore
essential to include perspectives and elements that focus on cultural attributes that
may affect the conditions for the human and organisational factors that contributeto nuclear operations.
The idea of safety culture emerged after Chernobyl, in the late 1980s, as
described in many writings (e.g. Cox and Flin, 1998). Since then, safety culture,used as a social construct, has been prominent as a root cause for both
occupational accidents and process-related events and as a concept needing
continuous attention, evaluation and reinforcement (Cooper, 2018). As such, theconcept has been the subject of numerous publications, which proposed new
definitions, ways of evaluating it and levers to enhance or maintain it, but also
criticisms regarding the fuzziness of the concept and the simplistic vision of
mechanical links between management actions and culture (Marsden, 2020). In
the end, everyone agrees that safety culture cannot be imposed: it is built,
reinforced and put to the test each day through words and actions.
Over the past thirty-plus years, in an effort to support institutions seeking tosustain high levels of safety and continuously improve their safety culture, anumber of organisations and the academic world have developed normative
frameworks that describe the kinds of behaviours, attitudes and principles
necessary for the safe operation of nuclear facilities (IAEA, 2006; WANO, 2013;
INPO, 2012). The World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) has developed
its ten Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, with corresponding attributesand examples of behaviour. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has
arranged similar standards into a framework of 5 characteristics and
37 underlying attributes. Also, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO)
released in 2012 the Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety Culture, which sets out aframework for open discussion and enhancement of safety culture within theindustry. Countries can use these international normative frameworks to build thefoundation of a healthy and effective safety culture.
Before the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, safety culture
focused almost entirely on nuclear operators. Investigation of the accident in Japanhighlighted the importance also of a healthy safety culture within the nuclear safety
regulator. This revealed the need to better understand the regulator’s role in thesafety culture of a given nuclear community, acknowledging that it includes boththe interactions between the regulating body and licence holders as well as thesafety culture within an effective regulating body. In response to this increased
focus on the regulator’s role in safety culture, the NEA developed and publishedseveral reports within its series of regulatory guidance documents:

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SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT•The Mutual Impact of Nuclear Regulatory Bodies and License Holders froma Safety Culture Perspective (NEA, 2024) explores interactions between
nuclear regulatory bodies and licensees and how each influences the safety
culture of the other.

•

The Characteristics of an Effective Nuclear Regulator (NEA, 2014)
describes the characteristics in terms of roles and responsibilities,
principles and the attributes of an effective nuclear safety regulator thatcan be applied to both mature regulators as well as those of countries thatare new to nuclear energy.

•

The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body (NEA, 2016b)
outlines five principles and their associated attributes that underpin andsupport the safety culture of an effective nuclear regulatory body. This
report highlights the importance of the national context – including acountry’s cultural attributes – and how it can frame, support, and influencean organisation’s safety culture.

•

Methods for Assessing and Strengthening the Safety Culture of theRegulatory Body (NEA, 2021) provides both an overview and practicalinformation on the methods and tools used by regulatory bodies to assess
their own safety culture and to build safety culture competence andawareness.

NEA work in particular has emphasised the importance of the national context
when considering the foundation for an effective safety culture. As highlighted in
the NEA report The Safety Culture of an Effective Nuclear Regulatory Body (2016),
distinct national characteristics can serve as strengths to be leveraged and further
developed and should not be considered a barrier to safety culture. It is in thisspirit that the NEA and WANO developed in 2017 the CSSCF process, aiming for it
to be carried out in countries around the world. The NEA and WANO agreed on
the need to address the sensitive and important issue of national context in relation
to safety culture. The CSSCF methodology was developed to help organisations
reflect on their national attributes and identify what could be done to enhancesafety culture. The NEA Division of Radiological Protection and Human Aspects of
Nuclear Safety (RP-HANS) leads in this effort.

Policy on safety culture in the Japanese nuclear context
The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has set five principles as its core values towhich all NRA employees must adhere at all levels in the organisation (NRA, 2013):

20•

independent decision-making;•effectiveness when taking action;•

open and transparent organisation;•

improvement and commitment;•

emergency response.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

Establishing and fostering a healthy safety culture within the Japanese nuclear
community is one of the NRA’s top priorities, as specified in the Statement of
Nuclear Safety Culture, published in 2015 (NRA, 2015). The Statement reflects thelessons learnt about safety culture from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
Plant accident and includes the following eight traits:•

giving priority to safety;•

taking into account risks during decision-making;•fostering, sustaining and strengthening safety culture;•

maintaining a high level of expertise and organisational learning;•communicating effectively;•

developing a questioning attitude;•

taking rigorous and prudent decisions and being agile when taking action;•

harmonising with nuclear security.

The NRA Ordinance Prescribing Standards for System Required for Quality
Control Concerning Operational Safety of Nuclear Facilities (NRA, 2020), called
Regulations for Quality Control Standards, incorporates requirements from the
IAEA Safety Standard GSR Part 2, Leadership and Management for Safety (IAEA,
2016a), and requires the license holders to foster a healthy safety culture. NRA
inspectors use two NRA guides (Quality Management System Operation Guide [NRA,2023] and Guide for Fostering a Healthy Safety Culture [NRA, 2019a]) to assess theoperator’s safety culture. The latter guide describes four major categories, 10 traits(personal accountability; questioning attitude; communication; leadership; decision
making; respectful work environment; continuous learning; problem identification
and resolution; work processes; and environment for raising concerns) and43 safety culture attributes to be referred to when conducting a comprehensive
safety culture assessment (NRA, 2019a). For example, the attributes relating to the“personal accountability” trait are “adherence”, “ownership” and “collaboration”.
All licensee organisations participating in CSSCF Japan have reported asignificant strengthening in their policies supporting safety culture. Their policies
include elements that were formulated in accordance with the NRA regulatory
documents presented above as well as the ten Traits of a Healthy Nuclear Safety
Culture from WANO (WANO, 2013). Also, according to the interviews, over several
years, operator CEOs and/or CNOs clarified their safety messages to emphasise theimportance of safety culture, more specifically on the two points described below.
•

Eliminating the culture of blame: It was reported that while in the past
there were cases where individuals were identified and denounced for
mistakes, the intention was to stop blaming individuals. This is in line with
the NRA's requirements in terms of having a “just” culture as described in
the Cause Analysis Guide (NRA, 2019b).

•

Providing psychological care for depressed individuals: After making a
mistake, Japanese workers would often blame themselves and experience
psychological stress; at some sites, psychological care seems to be provided
by the organisation to these individuals.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

These two objectives aim at supporting Japanese staff in speaking up andraising issues or concerns in order for the organisation to effectively and continually
improve.

CSSCF framework relating to safety culture in a national context
The framework used for the CSSCF draws from the frameworks described above
and an understanding reached in the nuclear community since the Chernobyl
accident on what constitutes a sound safety culture. While attempting to make theconcept of “safety culture” or “culture for safety” less vague, these frameworks:•

affirm the fact that risk management approaches are embedded at all levelsof the organisation whereas, until recently, attention was principally
focused on workers, particularly through the prism of “human error”; and•emphasise the more informal dimensions of the organisation (values, habits,
professional standards, local contexts, etc.) in addition to the technologicaland procedural dimensions which have so far been predominant.

Safety culture reflects the importance that the organisation gives to safety inall decisions, departments and professions and at all hierarchical levels. Safety
culture also involves understanding the characteristics of the organisation that
positively or negatively influence the relationship of employees to safety (clarity ofprocedures, dialogue with management, shared vigilance, relations with subcontractors, reporting and processing of alerts, policy of recognition/sanction, etc.).
During the CSSCF in Japan, the following safety culture dimensions in particularwere discussed:

22•

Accountability and responsibility for safety: In an organisation with ahealthy safety culture, all individuals should be personally accountable forsafety and comply with regulations and procedures, while being fully
informed of the safety risks and requirements relevant to their job. They
also demonstrate a questioning attitude by examining and challenging
safety policies, procedures and behaviours.

•

Clearly defined roles and responsibilities on safety: From a healthy safety
culture perspective, the roles and responsibilities should be clearly definedand assigned for all levels and positions in the organisation. This importantsafety culture dimension also implies that the scope of everybody’s
decision-making authority related to safety is clear.

•

Continuous learning and improvement around safety: Lessons learnt
from experiences both internal and external to the organisation are used
as a basis for continual improvement and employees are encouraged andrecognised for reporting concerns, are free from reprisal, and feel that they

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SAFETY CULTURE IN A NATIONAL CONTEXT

have been heard when they voice issues. Also, organisational silence 1
being one of the most important enemies of safety, information from thefield during normal operations doesn’t stay in the field and, therefore, istaken into account in strategic decisions.
•

Importance given to safety in decision-making: From a safety culture
perspective, safety must be given importance in the decision-making
process in the organisation, and all workers, including the front-line
workers, should be involved in risk assessment and decision-making
processes.

•

Human resource allocation, effective competencies and training
management to ensure safety: One of the ways of showing that safety is aclearly recognised value is to allocate human resources as necessary toensure safety, to systematically develop individual competencies and to use
various training methods to maintain and improve the professional andtechnical competencies of members of the organisation.

•

Open and transparent communication on safety: Communication on
safety is open and transparent through official channels as well as via
respectful dialogue between individuals.

1. “Organizational silence is a situation where important information, for example regarding safety,
is available in the field but stays there, and cannot be taken into account in strategic decisions”(Daniellou, 2017).

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JAPANESE CULTURAL CONTEXTJapanese cultural context

The societal context and the history of nuclear development in a country impact
nuclear operations in a deep way. After presenting a few facts on the geography ofJapan, this section provides a broad overview of the societal and historical
backdrop of Japan and its nuclear sector.

Geography of Japan
Japan is a verdant and mountainous island country with a total surface of377 973 km² with a population of 125.3 million as of 2022 (SBJ, 2023).
Approximately 80% of the land is covered by forests, fields and farmland, and only
5.2% is built-up. Therefore, cities like Tokyo are densely populated with
6 410 persons per square kilometre (SBJ, 2023). Japan is composed of 4 mainislands (Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu), and of more than 14 000 small
islands spread from north to south over 3 000 km (SBJ, 2023; MLIT, 2023). Climate
conditions are highly diverse, from subarctic in the north to subtropical in the south.

Japanese historical and societal context
Situated in the east of Eurasia, on the border between the continent and the Pacific
Ocean, Japan cultivated its traditions and distinctive culture of isolation by
adopting isolationist foreign policies for nearly 300 years, severely limiting contact
with the wider world. This explains how even today Japan is nearly homogenous
in its ethnic and linguistic characteristics. After 1868, in little more than a century,
Japan moved from total isolation to extensive modernisation and westernisation.
Nearly everything, including administration, education, transportation, industry,
infrastructure and business has changed through this evolution, leading Japan to
become a modern great power with strong industry and technology.
In Japan’s recent past, the unconditional surrender at the end of World War II
became a turning point in the country’s history. The new Constitution, which
included renunciation of war, national sovereignty, respect for fundamental
human rights, and a number of reformed democratisation policies, brought the
postwar Japanese economy back into the global economy. The economy capitalisedon factors such as the introduction of new technologies, effective capital investment,
and an increase in young workers to achieve decades of incredibly rapid growth.
Indeed, as Kissinger said, Japan is demonstrating great: “resilience sustained by

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an indomitable national spirit based on a distinctive national culture” (Kissinger,
2015:189). This resilience was also demonstrated by Japan during the triple
disaster of 11 March 2011, when the Great East Japan Earthquake struck, creating
a tsunami and resulting in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident.
The country has the fourth largest economy in terms of gross domestic product(GDP) after the United States, the People’s Republic of China and Germany (World
Bank, 2023a). Japan’s economy is one of the most prosperous in the world and thecountry is a member of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) and the Group of seven (G7), an organisation of leaders fromthe world’s largest economies.
Political life in Japan is governed by a central government and local
governments, themselves composed of prefectures and municipalities. Prefecturesand municipalities are local public entities of equal status that co-operate to govern
locally. Japan is made up of 47 prefectures and 1 718 municipalities, the lattercomposed of 792 cities, 743 towns and 183 villages (TMG, 2023; MIC, 2023).
Municipalities are local public entities that have a strong and direct relationshipwith local residents.
The Japanese average life expectancy is the highest among the OECD countries
at 84.5 years in 2022 that being 87.6 years for Japanese women and 81.5 years forJapanese men (OECD, 2023a). With these averages, Japan is ranked first in theworld for women and second for men (OECD, 2023a). Meanwhile, the birth rate has
declined dramatically in recent decades: 1.22 births per woman in 2022 marked
the lowest birth rate on record. Only 12% of the population are aged 0-14 years old,while nearly 29% are aged 65 or older as of 2022 (OECD, 2023b; OECD, 2023c).
Some of the integral features of Japanese society include a high regard for
education and support for research and development. Japan invests in the social
well-being of its citizens through various goods and services targeted at groups
of individuals with specific needs, such as the unemployed, young persons, thesick and the elderly. The state’s contributions to social programmes are
significant, as demonstrated by the social expenditure of JPY 136 360 billion(Japanese yen), which was 25.46% of GDP in the fiscal year 2020 (IPSS, 2022).
Also, Japanese expenses for education grew from USD 14 700 (US dollars) in2005 to USD 19 700 per student in 2020 (OECD, 2023d), while the population ofschool-age children shrank from 21.2 million in 2005 to 18.3 million in 2020
(UNICEF, 2023). Also, a large proportion of the investments made by thegovernment and companies are allocated to research and development. Japanremains one of the world's most dynamic innovation hubs, as demonstrated by
Japanese R&D spending, which was 3.27% of GDP in 2020 (World Bank, 2023b).
Education is highly valued in Japan, and the country consistently ranks highin global education rankings. The OECD’s Programme for International Student
Assessment (PISA), a periodic testing programme of student performance, showed
Japanese students excelling in mathematics and sciences (OECD, 2023e). Anothercharacteristic of Japan is its safety standards, as Tokyo is ranked the 5th safest
country in the Economist Safe Cities Index, with one of the lowest crime rates in
the world. For instance, the homicide rate per 100 000 individuals was 0.23% in
2021, which is the fourth lowest number in the world (UNODC, 2023).

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Regarding gender balance, Japan fell in 2023 to a record low 125th place inworld rankings for gender equality published by the World Economic Forum, as
the country was less successful in improving female representation in politics andeconomic activities (World Economic Forum, 2023). This represents a drop of nine
positions from the previous year’s ranking among 146 countries. With its low
percentage of female Lower House members and Cabinet ministers, Japan placed138th in the world in terms of female representation in the political sector. Indeed,
women in politics represent 9.9% of the population, whereas the OECD countries’
average is 33.8%. The rate of women in politics in Japan is the lowest in the OECD
countries (OECD, 2023f).
Overall happiness can be measured by considering perceived satisfaction inlife and the number of positive experiences and feelings, as well as the lack ofnegative experiences. In the Gallup World Happiness Report, Japan’s rank is
47 out of 137 countries (Helliwell et al., 2023).

History of the Japanese nuclear sector
Nuclear issues have played a key role in Japanese politics, society, and culture forthe past seventy years (Nelson, 2011). Japan imports more than 90% of its primaryenergy from abroad and, as a result, has made power generation a priority for thehealth of its economy (FEPC, 2024a). Japan has considered nuclear energy as the
only viable long-term option for production of sufficient electricity for the country
since 1973. This came under review following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant accident, but has then been confirmed, even though nuclear energy
remains a sensitive issue and the public has long expressed ambiguous feelingsand concern towards it.
Japan’s history with nuclear energy started in the 1950s with what someobservers have called a “nuclear allergy” (kaku arerugi) (Nelson, 2011; Aldrich,2012). Japan is indeed the only country to have experienced the non-peaceful use
of nuclear weapons on its territory: The first uranium bomb exploded over
Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, and a second plutonium bomb razed Nagasaki threedays later. In addition to the number of deaths (140 000 estimated in Hiroshima
and 74 000 in Nagasaki by the end of 1945), the discrimination felt by survivors
from Hiroshima and Nagasaki in many parts of the country caused additionalsuffering (MHLW, 2024). From 1946 to 1958, hydrogen bomb tests conducted by
the United States in the Marshall Islands also caused extensive damage to theislanders as well as to neighbouring countries and regions. In Japan, sailors of theLucky Dragon No. 5 fishing boat were covered in ash, while tuna unknowingly
contaminated by radioactivity was sold on markets. The reaction of panicked
people in Japan gave the opportunity to victims from Hiroshima and Nagasaki to
finally talk about their experiences of the atomic bombings, triggering a nationwide
and global campaign in the 1950s-60s against atomic and hydrogen bombs thatgathered over 32 million signatures in Japan (Aldrich, 2012). To calm the anger
and fear from the Lucky Dragon incident, the United States offered to establish an
agreement which was quickly accepted by Japanese politicians to share nuclear
technology and radioisotopes with Japan.

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JAPANESE CULTURAL CONTEXT

After US President Dwight Eisenhower delivered his famous “Atoms for Peace”
speech at the UN General Assembly in 1953, research into nuclear energy began
in earnest in Japan. In 1955, the first Atomic Energy Basic Law was enacted andallowed the creation of the Atomic Energy Committee (Yamashita, 2015).
Additionally, the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute (JAERI) and the Atomic
Fuel Corporation were established in 1956 (both organisations were merged into
the JAEA in 2005). The JAEA and its predecessors were designated as “nuclear
power development organisations” by Chapter 3 of Atomic Energy Basic Law andcarried out research and development of this field. What is known today as Japan
Atomic Power Company (JAPC) was newly established as a private company
specialising in nuclear energy generation. The first reactor to produce electricity inJapan was a prototype boiling water reactor, the Japan Power Demonstration
Reactor (JPDR) which operated from 1963 to 1976. The first commercial nuclear
power plant, which had a British-designed nuclear reactor and was called theTokai Nuclear Power Plant, was built and generated power from 1966 until its
decommissioning in 1998.
With the start of the Tokai Nuclear Power Plant’s operation, the transfer ofnuclear power technology to Japan began, and domestic power plants were
gradually developed, including the boiling water reactors (BWRs) and pressurised
water reactors (PWRs) designed by General Electric and Westinghouse that are thenorm today. By the end of 1970, the Japanese industry had largely established its
own domestic nuclear energy production capacity. In 1973 and 1978, the turmoil
caused by the oil crisis led to the recognition of a “stable energy supply” as animportant issue. Re-evaluation of domestic energy policy resulted in diversification
and a major nuclear construction programme. Japanese leaders saw nuclear
energy as the only viable long-term option for Japan to produce enough electricity
for its double-digit post-war growth. In 2010, there were 54 operational nuclear
reactors supplying 280 TWh of electricity in Japan (NEA, 2011), providing roughly
a third of the country’s electricity, with plans to increase that contribution to 40%
over the following decade.
Japan has opted for a closed fuel cycle to gain maximum benefit from imported
uranium and has been working towards its establishment for many years. The
Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant is the first commercial reprocessing plant in Japan,
and it is being constructed by Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) to produce MOX
fuel from spent nuclear fuel in the near future.
In March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake and a subsequent tsunami
hit the northeastern part of Japan, triggering the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant. It led to the shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japanfor the first time in 42 years. To meet the electricity demand without nuclear power,
the Japanese government shifted to relying on thermal electricity generation byincreasing the thermal power energy production and imports of liquefied naturalgas (LNG) (JAEC, 2022).

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Recent developments in the Japanese nuclear sector
After the devastating disaster in 2011, the Japanese government reformed thenuclear regulatory structure and governance (Andrews-Speed, 2020). The aim wasto reflect what had been learnt through the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
accident and what was lacking in the rules and governance before 2011 to restore
domestic and international confidence in Japan’s nuclear regulatory organisation,and to rebuild nuclear safety management and safety culture with the safety of the
public as the top priority. Previously, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency(NISA), established under the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, itself
under the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), was responsible forboth promoting and regulating nuclear energy in Japan. To solve the problem of
having both “promotion” and “safety regulation” under the same organisation, thetwo mandates were structurally separated in September 2012. While the METI is
still in charge of national energy policy, including the promotion of various regional
development measures to support the use of nuclear energy, the Nuclear
Regulation Authority (NRA) was established as an independent organisation from
the METI. This gave the NRA a much higher degree of independence than any
other government agency in Japan. The NRA aims to perform its duties related tonuclear safety regulation independently and based on expert knowledge. Finally,
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) is
responsible for nuclear research and development.
Beyond the federal level, nuclear energy in Japan is managed at a more local
level through the prefectures and municipalities. The prefectures are involved indisaster prevention measures, including emergency preparedness and response
drills in co-operation with the government, relevant municipalities, and police andfire departments. The prefectures are also involved in monitoring the operational
status of the nuclear power plants and radiation levels in the environment, in
accordance with the agreements concluded with the nuclear operators. Finally,
they are responsible for disseminating information to the public on periodic
inspections and operating conditions (JAEC, 2022). The local governments are also
empowered to influence the decision related to the restart of the nuclear power
plants shut down following the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident.
Since the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, the first two PWRs
restarted in August and October 2015, with a further nine PWRs restarting sincethen. No BWRs have restarted yet. Including all 6 reactors in Fukushima Daiichi,
24 reactors across Japan are under decommissioning, 12 reactors have restarted,
5 reactors have been approved to restart and are waiting to resume operations,and the remaining 10 reactors are under review (some of them are still underconstruction). Among other measures taken after the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant accident, countermeasures against severe accidents were reinforced
and are now subject to regulation by law. Various systems for nuclear power
generation have also been reviewed to enhance safety. For plants that are shut
down, it was decided they would be reviewed based on these new regulatory
standards.

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JAPANESE CULTURAL CONTEXTIn 2023, the release into the sea of the ALPS treated water, in which watercontaminated during the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant
is treated by the Advanced Liquid Processing System (ALPS), began. The
contaminated water generated by the accident and collected from groundwater
passing through the contaminated area since the accident has been treated tosignificantly reduce the concentrations of radioactive substances and then stored
on-site in about 1 000 tanks (TEPCO, 2024). The government concluded that themost appropriate policy for dealing with the accumulated water at TEPCO’s
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant was to discharge it into the sea after
thorough treatment and dilution. The approach and activities for this discharge
were considered by the IAEA as consistent with relevant international safety
standards and as having a negligible radiological impact on people and theenvironment (IAEA, 2023). The first discharge of treated water into the sea was
successfully completed in August to September 2023 and the treated water releases
are to continue for decades.
Radioactive waste in Japan is classified into two main categories according to
its level of activity, namely high-level radioactive waste (HLW) and low-level
radioactive waste (LLW). The disposal of LLW from nuclear reactors has takenplace since 1992 at the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Center of Japan
Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) in Rokkasho village, in Aomori Prefecture. The
Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act sets out the overall scheme for implementing
disposal of vitrified HLW. In accordance with the act, the Nuclear Waste
Management Organization of Japan (NUMO) is responsible for planning andconducting site selection and characterisation of a HLW disposal facility. Indeed,some 60 years after the start of nuclear power generation in Japan, there is still no
long-term solution for the final disposal of nuclear waste, and it has been pointed
out that this is the biggest challenge in Japanese nuclear energy policy (NHK, 2023).
Three municipalities are at the initial stage of site selection and literature review
is being conducted (NUMO).
With the renewed Basic Policy on Green Transformation (GX) approved by thecabinet in December 2022, the Japanese government has changed its policy fromstating that it “does not envision” the construction of new nuclear power plants ortheir reconstruction” (in place since 2011), to clearly stating that nuclear power“will be used sustainably into the future.” This decision signalled a significant
change for Japanese energy policy and the future of the Japanese nuclear energy
sector (METI, 2023; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2022).

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THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM

The methodology of the Country-Specific
Safety Culture Forum

Conducting a Country-Specific Safety Culture ForumThe Country Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) offers a structured framework enabling
the themes of national culture and safety culture to be addressed and is designed
in such a way that it can be tailored to a country’s specific needs and circumstances.
As designed, the Forum also facilitates dialogue and enables license holders andthe regulatory body to jointly examine which Japanese national characteristics caninfluence safety culture.
The general structure of the CSSCF methodology consists of five steps, as
displayed in Figure 2 and described below.
The first step is designed to collect insightful information about underlying
characteristics of the national culture. This is how the NEA undertook a study togather initial data on the Japanese cultural context and how national attributes
interact to frame and influence safety culture within the Japanese nuclear
community. Data was collected both virtually and in-person from 12 Japaneselicensees and from the NRA. The data gathered were then analysed to propose
initial findings regarding identified national culture characteristics relevant tonuclear safety culture attributes in the Japanese context.
As part of step 2, the study results were used to inform the scenario script andto direct the development of the event’s content and the discussion questions to be
used at the Forum in step 3. The observations gathered at the Forum constitutethe second round of data-gathering and analysis validation (step 4), which leads tothe development of the CSSCF report, as the final step of the CSSCF structured
framework.
With national culture and safety culture being qualitative phenomena, the datacollection methodology chosen for the CSSCF is composed of qualitative methods(interviews and focus groups for the study; observations and focus groups for theforum) and it follows the recommendations put forward by the NEA and the IAEA
regarding the methodologies deployed to analyse culture and safety culture (NEA,
2021; IAEA, 2016b). It is worth noting that the methodology chosen for the CSSCF
offers the opportunity for the Japanese nuclear community to provide selfreflection feedback and express its own views on Japanese national culturalcharacteristics.

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Figure 2: Structure of the CSSCF methodology (5 steps)
Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5GatherIntegrate

Dialogue

AnalysePresent

Conduct theForum with a wide
representation of
the nuclear
community.
Designcomposition ofForum withattendees fromvarious levels oforganisation.

Perform a detailed
analysis of material
collected during thestudy and from theplenary and small
group discussions
in the Forum.

Conduct a study
to capture
information about
national cultural
aspects, includinginterviews andfocus groups.

Review
information
gathered andintegrate national
attributes into roleplay scenario.

Qualitatively
analyse thecaptured data to
distinguish themes
related to thenational attributesof the culture.

During the Forum,
facilitate dialogue
in smaller groups
and in plenum.
Solicit ideas fromparticipants on thepaths forward in
addressing issues
identified andutilising strengths
that contribute toa healthy safety
culture.

Examine theidentified national
attributes and their
manifestation inorganisational
behaviours basedon the combinationof Forum results.

Construct thereport to include
the analysis andthe process.
Include exploratory
questions intended
to inspire selfreflection, anddetermine nuclear
safety implications
and any follow-up
proactive actions.

Study
Data collection methodology
The nuclear organisations that participated in the study included all the Japanesecompanies operating nuclear facilities and the regulatory authority. They are listed
below.
•

32

All the public and private companies operating nuclear power plants:–

Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.;–

Electric Power Development Co., Ltd. (J-power);–

Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.;–

Hokuriku Electric Power Company;–

Kyushu Electric Power Company, Inc.;–The Chugoku Electric Power Company, Inc.;–The Japan Atomic Power Company;

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THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM–

The Kansai Electric Power Company, Inc.;–

Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.;–Tokyo Electric Power Company Holdings, Inc.;–

Shikoku Electric Power Company, Inc.

Except for the Japan Atomic Power Company, all these companies play a moreor less important role in the thermal and renewable energy sectors, heat supply,
telecommunications, or gas supply, in Japan but also sometimes abroad.
•

The Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited. This company deals with uranium
enrichment, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, temporary storage of
wastes returned from overseas reprocessing plant, disposal of low-level
radioactive waste, MOX fuel fabrication.

•

The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA). This is the national nuclear safety
regulatory authority of Japan, with responsibility for ensuring the safety of
nuclear activities.

The nuclear facilities that took part in the study are in bold in Table 1, which
presents all Japanese nuclear operators and facilities.
Data collection for the study was conducted through 91 semi-structured
individual and group interviews, including 32 individual interviews and 61 focus
groups from all 12 Japanese licensees and from the Japanese nuclear regulator(NRA), ultimately gathering perspectives and information from 368 participants.
More precisely, the discussions were composed of:•

28 virtual interviews with licensee CEOs, CNOs and management at theorganisation headquarters;•

4 virtual interviews with NRA senior management (Chairman, Commissioner,
Secretary General and Councillor);•

59 on-site focus groups at 12 licensee facilities across Japan (workers,
managers and NRA site inspectors) and 2 focus groups at NRA
headquarters (managers and directors).

The participants of the semi-structured interviews were drawn from various
levels of the nuclear power plant operators, a fuel reprocessing company, and the
NRA. These included senior management (CEO, CNO, Chairman, etc. as mentioned
above) as well as managers from quality assurance, operation, maintenance,engineering, radiation and chemistry control, nuclear fuel, decommissioning,
environment, and general affairs; and workers from the same departments aslisted for the managers.

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34

Higashidori
Fukushima
Daiichi
Fukushima
Daini
KashiwazakiKariwa

J-Power

TEPCO

Takahama

Ohi
Shimane
Ikata
GenkaiSendai

Hokuriku
Chubu

Kansai

Chugoku
Shikoku

Unit 1
Unit 5

Unit 1, 2,
3, 4, 5

Unit 3

Unit 1

Unit 1, 2

Unit 1

Unit 1, 2, 3, 4

Unit 1, 2,
3, 4, 5, 6

Unit 1

Unit 2

Unit 1

Unit 6, 7

Unit 2

Unit 3

Unit 2
Unit 3, 4

Unit 1 (underconstruction)

Unit 1

Unit 3
Unit 3, 4
Unit 1, 2

Unit 3
Unit 1, 2,
3, 4
Unit 3, 4

Unit 1, 2
Unit 1, 2

Unit 1, 2

Unit 1, 2

BWR
PWR
To be
To be
Resumed Stopped
Approved Under review Resumed Stopped
Approveddecommissioned
decommissioned

Note: Participant facilities are in bold.

KyushuTokai Daini
Tsuruga
Shika
HamaokaMihamaJAPC

Ohma

TohokuTokai

RokkashoHigashidori
Onagawa

JNFL

Hokkaido Tomari

Company Facility
name
name

Unit 2

Underreview
Unit 1,
2, 3

Unit
1

GCR

Table 1: Presentation of all Japanese nuclear power plants and reprocessing facilities

X

Reprocessing
facility

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THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM

The purpose of the interviews was to capture information about national
cultural aspects relevant to nuclear safety culture attributes. Using the same
approach as for individual interviews, the objective of the focus groups was to allow
collective conversations on cultural topics. In this report, the term “interview” isused to refer to the one-on-one interviews with senior management and the term
“focus group” is used for to collective interviews conducted at the 12 facilities(licensees and NRA regional offices).
Based on the questionnaires used for previous CSSCFs – for Sweden, Finland
and Canada – a questionnaire was developed for CSSCF Japan. The following
topics were addressed:•

national cultural characteristics;•

nuclear community cultural characteristics;•

organisations’ cultural characteristics (leadership, decision-making, roles
and responsibilities, learning organisation, and other topics such as just/blaming culture, etc.).

Interviews and focus groups included questions about what behaviour, values
or assumptions are considered typically Japanese, and the interview teamsubsequently narrowed the focus gradually over the duration of the discussion
from the national industry level to the organisation’s level, and ultimately to thelevel of individuals in working units.
The interview team was comprised of a lead specialist with a background insafety culture and human and organisational factors (HOF) complemented by across-functional team with expertise in the areas of nuclear science and operations,radiological protection, nuclear engineering, and communications and stakeholder
engagement. All interviews and focus groups were conducted in Japanese by NEA
staff and were audio recorded. The interviewees were reassured that there wereno right or wrong answers to the questions as it was not a test of their knowledge.
Indeed, this report discusses overall cultural and organisational characteristics, notindividual or even organisational-level responses. Also, especially since they wererecorded, all interviews and focus groups were conducted in accordance with an
ethical framework to protect the anonymity and confidentiality of the interviewees
and the information provided.
All interviews were transcribed to provide the basis for the analysis.

Data analysis
The total data set, including all focus groups and interviews, underwent a thematic
data analysis, followed by a reflection on the influence of the national context onsafety culture. This means that once the data collection for the study was complete,
the responses given by participants were analysed to identify repeated phrases,
similar statements, and dominant characteristics. Particular attention was paid toexamples of behaviours, customs and values cited by the participants. Finally,
relevant information from a literature review on Japanese culture supplemented
or clarified the findings from the thematic analysis.

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Forum
Preparation of the role-play scenario
The study highlighted the characteristics that were identified in the interviews andfocus groups and outlined potential areas in which those traits can influenceorganisational behaviour. The results of the studies were used to adapt a role-play
script, which was based on a WANO-generated scenario of an operational eventthat occurred at a commercial nuclear power plant. The event scenario consists of
4 principal acts and a total of 10 scenes. Each act represents a sequence ofmeetings and dialogue, including interactions within the NRA and the licensee, andbetween the operator and NRA. Although information gathered during the datacapturing process was used to inform the scenario, it should be noted that somedetails in the scenario did not attempt to reflect precisely the reality of the Japanese
nuclear sector.
Aligning the scenario script (prior to the Forum) to correspond with thenational context of the country, and tailoring it to prompt reactions for discussion,facilitated lively and informative exchanges around the safety culture themes thatcame to light through the role-play activity.

Holding the two-day Forum
For CSSCF Japan, 107 participants from the various Japanese nuclear
organisations participated in the Forum and contributed to the discussions. All
nuclear power plant license holders and fuel reprocessing companies sent 5 to
7 participants, including staff and management. The Federation of ElectricPower Companies (FEPC) 2 , the Nuclear Waste Management Organization ofJapan (NUMO) 3, and the local governments of Shizuoka, Fukui and Kagoshima
were also represented.
Four non-Japanese participants, representing the nuclear regulatory andoperator organisations of China, Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States
also joined the Forum as observers. These international observers were present at
the plenary discussions and observed the dynamic exchanges between participants
on what they were seeing on stage and how that translated into both national
cultural traits and safety culture issues.
During the two-day Forum, the plenary dialogue was facilitated by amoderator from the NEA. The Forum began with keynote speeches that framed
the exercise, followed by a presentation by Dr Robert Campbell 4 that included
insightful views on culture. Participants were then separated into break-out groups,
each consisting of representatives from the various organisations to reflect on five

2. FEPC is a professional organisation whose aim is to promote the development of the nuclear
industry in Japan.
3. NUMO’s mission is to implement safe geological disposal of radioactive waste in Japan.
4. Dr Robert Campbell is an American-born Japanese literature scholar and university professor at
Waseda University, whose frequent media appearances have made him a well-known public figure
in Japan.

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THE METHODOLOGY OF THE COUNTRY-SPECIFIC SAFETY CULTURE FORUM

key words they remembered from the social commentator’s talk on typicalJapanese cultural traits through a “yellow post-it” exercise.
Following this opening session, the role-playing of the scenario began. Several
participants took on the roles of characters and played their roles by reading
dialogue from the scenario script and acting out their parts. After each Act (within
which there were 2 to 4 scenes), the participants were divided into seven groups
with around 12 participants per group. Groups were asked to reflect on the aspectsof safety culture embedded into the scenes and how the Japanese context
influenced those aspects. Notably, the participants were instructed to participate
as individuals, and not according to their respective positions within theirorganisations, that there was no hierarchy within the Forum, and that all views
and opinions were encouraged. The international observers were placed in aneighth group and discussed their views on the safety culture-related challenges thatthey observed in the scenes and compared them to their own national perspectives
and processes. Each group included a designated facilitator and note taker. FourJapan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) 5 senior experts acted as facilitators alongside
the NEA staff. In addition to facilitating the flow of the discussion, posing questions
and provoking reactions, the role of the facilitator was to create a safe and relaxedenvironment conducive to sharing opinions, to be cognisant of any perceptions of
power dynamics within the group, and to take steps to encourage openness andequality of voices within the room. After each break-out session, all participants
gathered in the main plenary to address findings from group discussions tohighlight national characteristics and their influence on safety culture.
Towards the end of the Forum, a final group discussion brought participants
together into groups based on the organisations in which they work to discuss how
any lessons might be addressed in their home organisations. After the group
discussions, the participants had the opportunity to openly report theirobservations in a plenary session. Additionally, the international participants
served on a final panel providing insights and observations from their uniqueinternational perspectives.

Data analysis
Throughout the two-day Forum, note takers were assigned to capture theexchanges and reflections made among the participants, during both the separate
group discussions and the plenary. This information was then collected by the NEA
team, which conducted a final comprehensive review of the qualitative data in its
entirety for use in producing this report. The information collected through thestudy and the Forum was used to undertake the extensive qualitative thematic
analysis as described previously.
“Culture” is not considered by the NEA as an immediate and exclusive whole.
The results of the data analysis presented hereafter aim to avoid, as much as
possible, any amplification (situation in which a detail, a case, a singular example
is raised to the level of generality), homogenisation (i.e. that Japanese society is

5. JAEA is a Japan’s national research and development organisation for nuclear energy.

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considered as uniform) or overarching simplification. In addition, the culture
within the Japanese nuclear community is not synonymous with the broader
Japanese culture. CSSCF reflects an understanding that the Japanese nuclear
culture can be regarded as both a part of the prevailing Japanese cultural context
as well as the culture of the broader nuclear community that extends beyond Japan.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPAN

Safety culture in the Japanese context:
Observations from CSSCF Japan

Introduction
The study and the two-day Forum yielded a broad range
of insights on various facets of Japanese national
characteristics. These national traits are general themesthat may manifest through a range of organisational
behaviours specific to the nuclear sector and its
organisations.

CSSCF Japan should beconsidered as a catalyst for
further reflection andsubsequent actions and not
as definitive conclusions

CSSCF Japan does not represent a comprehensive
study of the Japanese culture.
The discussions during the study and the Forum were limited to the context of
normal operations and incident management and did not explicitly cover nuclear
emergency management aspects.

Japanese national cultural characteristics
Applying a label to a cultural phenomenon means making basic assumptions
explicit and conscious (cf. Schein model presented previously). To help make thisexplicit, an open question was asked during the study to encourage interviewees
to spontaneously express their views on the typical behaviours, beliefs, customs
and values of Japanese culture. During the Forum, the same theme was discussed
at the first break-out session following the social commentator’s speech. These
discussions at the Forum confirmed the results of the interviews and focus groups
held as part of the study.
Based on observations, it was found that the Japanese participants tended tobe quite self-critical, highlighting challenges but rarely citing some of the positive
aspects of their cultural traits. This is reflected in the results presented below.

Analysis through the quantitative lensNine national cultural characteristics emerged that are important not necessarily
to Japanese culture as a whole, but in the context of the Japanese nuclear
community. These traits are repeated in the data from the study and from thediscussion that took place during the first break-out session at the Forum, aspresented in Table 2.

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Table 2: Number of times each national cultural characteristic was expressed
during the study and the first break-out session at the Forum
National culturalcharacteristics
expressed by theinterviewees andparticipants

Study(Number of times according to interviews/focus groups)
Licensees
Total: 76
CEO/CNO Managers
Total: 28
Total: 24

Workers
Total: 24

Forum(Number of times
according to groups)

NRA
Total: 15

Total:
91

Total: 7

Majime(diligence)

7

18

16

5

46

7

Hoshu-teki(conservativeness)

3

11

13

3

30

4

Wa (harmony)

8

5

7

7

27

5

Don’t speak up

6

8

6

5

25

6

Collectivism

3

5

2

6

16

3

Ambiguity

3

3

5

1

12

6

Fear of failure

1

2

6

1

10

2

Consideration

4

1

2

1

8

1

Okami-ishiki(obedience tosuperiors)

4

0

0

0

4

1

No statistical treatment has been applied to these figures; nevertheless, adescriptive analysis shows that:•40

The cultural characteristics the most frequently expressed during the study
and the Forum are majime (diligence), followed by hoshu-teki(conservativeness), wa (harmony), and “don’t speak up”:–

During the study, majime (diligence) is the prevalent characteristic
among licensees’ managers and workers with approximately 75% and
67% expressing it. This importance has been confirmed during theForum, with all the groups stating that majime was a Japanese cultural
trait;–Wa, majime, and “don’t speak up” are the prevalent characteristics
expressed by CEOs/CNOs.

•

Ambiguity emerged as an important Japanese cultural characteristic at theForum, but less so during the study;•

Managers and workers at the licensees are quite consistent in the national
cultural traits they voiced;•

Okami-ishiki (obedience to superiors) is a characteristic raised only by
CEOs/CNOs during the study, and later by a few groups during the Forum.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANDescription of the national cultural traits
Many of the cultural characteristics presented in Table 2 are interlinked, as will be
explained below. In addition to the open question about the typical behaviours,
beliefs, customs and values of Japanese culture, a specific question related to the
influence of nenko-joretsu (respect towards seniority) was asked. Nenko-joretsu was
not included in Table 2 as it was not always spontaneously expressed by theinterviewees during the study. However, if not already expressed during theinterview, it was generally recognised by participants in response to the related
question as being part of the Japanese national cultural traits and as a result nenkojoretsu is presented in this section. Also, during the Forum, the concept of nenkojoretsu was voiced by five out of seven groups during the first break-out session.
Finally, “peer pressure” is another characteristic added here because it istransversal to several others, such as “don’t speak up” and “fear of failure”. It
increases the number of Japanese characteristics presented in this report to eleven.
Note that most of Japanese words can be used with both positive and negative
meanings. Some of the keywords used by the interviewees to describe national
cultural characteristics that were used referred to both their positive and negative
meanings. This was particularly true for the first national characteristic, majime(diligence).
Peer pressure
The Japanese society has a strong tendency towards peer pressure, which
implicitly encourages people to conform to the opinions of the majority. This
characteristic is deeply ingrained in Japanese culture, where group co-operationand harmony often take precedence over individual expression, and as such isstrongly related to the “don’t speak up” and “fear of failure” characteristics.
Majime (diligence)
Majime (diligence) means someone who is hard-working, diligent and honest. It is
not easy to precisely translate the word in English as it has several meanings
depending on the context, but in most cases it refers to someone who is earnest,
truthful and always tries to do the right thing. In the workplace, this means that
individuals are working hard to achieve their work objectives and respect the rules
and deadlines. It also means that once a target has been set by management,
people in Japanese organisations will work hard to achieve it, which reinforces thenotion that since the 1930s-40s work is, in a sense, defined in Japan as a kind of
patriotic duty.
Sometimes majime (diligence) has a negative meaning to describe a person orgroup of people who take everything too seriously and without understanding
jokes. It is also related to the notion that Japanese people tend to be risk averse,
which makes it difficult to try new things. When encountering unexpected issues,
people in Japan can find it difficult to adapt and find alternative solutions. In theworkplace, it also means that Japanese people can pursue an excessive level ofperfection or take instruction as it is, without questioning the rationale behind it.
As a result, workers in Japanese organisations can sometimes force themselves tocarry out tasks, which can lead to going to extremes and making mistakes.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANHoshu-teki (conservativeness)
Hoshu-teki (conservativeness) was mainly used by interviewees and participants
to describe a negative cultural trait. It means that many Japanese don’t tend to
break precedence and need a guarantee of success before trying new ways of doing
things. As a result, Japanese people can be uncomfortable responding to changes,
even minor ones, and can tend to be bystanders. This national characteristic is
linked to the national characteristic majime (diligence) given that the pursuit ofperfection sets the bar extremely high and is also linked to the “fear of failure” andthe tendency to be risk averse, which makes it difficult to try new things. Japanesepeople interpret the word risk (risuku) as something dangerous that will lead to anegative outcome and not as a calculated act that will be a success if it goes welland if managed appropriately. This helps explain why Japanese society has atendency to avoid risk, which is especially true in the nuclear sector. Public opinion
on nuclear energy is highly risk-averse, with many citizens believing that zero risk
is the only appropriate outcome. This has a major influence on relations between
the public and operators, as well as between the regulatory body and the operators.
According to some interviewees, the lack of positive Japanese public opinion
on nuclear energy has a negative impact on this national cultural trait and makes
it even more distinctive in the nuclear community compared to Japanese society ingeneral, which can be explained by the history of Japan with nuclear.
Wa (harmony)
Wa is usually translated in English as harmony. It implies a peaceful unity without
conflict within a social group, in which members prefer the continuation of aharmonious community over their personal interests. Wa is thus a guiding
principle in all interactions in Japanese society, whether in a family, social or
business context. Wa stresses interdependence over independence, co-operation
over dissent, and patience over resistance. It should be mentioned that living inharmony doesn’t mean living in conformity. There is a proverb that says: 君子は和して同ぜず、小人は同じて和せず, which means that a wise man maintains harmony
but doesn’t blindly follow the crowd. An unwise man blindly follows the crowd but
doesn’t maintain harmony.
This national characteristic could be related to the tendency of many Japanesepeople to avoid conflict. Individuals who break the ideal of wa to further their own
purposes could be brought in line, either overtly or covertly, by reprimands froma superior or by their family or colleagues’ tacit disapproval (peer pressure).
Japanese businesses encourage wa in the workplace, with employees typicallygiven a career for life in order to foster a strong association with their colleagues
and their organisation.
Even though Japanese people can act and speak to preserve wa, it doesn’tmean they don’t have dissenting thoughts or get frustrated. It’s just that achieving
wa can be such an important social value that people distinguish between honne(true feelings or real intention), and tatemae (the face worn in public or a politicalstatement/stance). While Western culture may view tatemae as hypocrisy or deceit,
in Japan there is a tendency to wrap up real intentions, such as what you want
and how much you want to ask for, in a complex and formal manner and proceed

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANwith dialogue in a tatemae manner. This comes from the notion that, whennegotiating for example, it is not considered a virtue to fight with one’s true
feelings. Japanese people tend to understand that rising above one’s personal
feelings for the good of society is its own virtue.
Don’t speak up
Japanese people tend to stay quiet and not share their opinions, especially during
meetings at the workplace. They can be sensitive to the gaze of others, modelling
their behaviour accordingly. Japanese people can tend to feel that when they speak
up in a meeting, they will be judged. Because of this feeling of peer pressure andfear of failure, they can be afraid of reputational damage, of becoming a minority
within the group or even being separated from the group. There is a tendency toalign with the majority or to follow the loudest voice within the group, i.e. theperson or group that is able to be assertive, and even to expect to be told what toexpect. It should be noted that the larger the group, the less the Japanese will tendto speak up. Some people, regardless of rank or station, are assertive enough to
speak up without fear of failure or reputational damage, but they might thendominate discussions, making the other participants in the discussion even lesslikely to speak up. Another reason for not speaking up mentioned during theinterviews is related to wa. It was raised during the focus groups and interviews
that the educational system implicitly encourages people not to disagree or to speak
up. Japanese people also sometimes don’t speak up because they don’t want toextend the duration of meetings or tasks.
Collectivism
The notion of the group is important in Japanese culture, so much so that it has
been described as a sense of national commitment (Kissinger, 2015). The historyof Japan shows that, in all social classes, the basic unit of society was the household
as a hierarchical unit under the leadership of a male leader, not the individual.
Social cohesion and a sense of national commitment can enable Japanese people
to respond to difficult situations, such as the 2011 earthquake, tsunami and nuclear
accident, with a display of mutual assistance and national solidarity. One CEO andCNO used the term hyakuman issin (coined by the feudal lord Motonari Mouri inthe 16th century), which means “one million but one heart”, to describe how greatthings can be accomplished. People in Japan tend to want to belong to groups orcompanies, to avoid arguing and to co-operate with each other. Once a decision is
made, they are likely to move forward and implement the decision together. Group
responsibility therefore tends to be stronger than individual responsibility, whichis inspired by Confucianism, similarly to other traits such as self-control andrespect for hierarchy, which are taught and reinforced to this day through theschool system.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANThe notion of collectivism can lead to what a CEO called a “lenient unity”,
where unity becomes uniformity. Japanese people are often trained not to bedifferent from others and not to challenge anything and as a result, healthy debate
and exchanges of opinion can be difficult. Individuals often make decisions and act
based on the logic of the group. The expression of uniformity can be seen at theworkplace in the fact that employees often wear uniforms (Bernier, 2009).
Ambiguity
Leaders and workers in Japanese organisations can sometimes be ambiguous in
the way they make decisions or communicate. As far as communication isconcerned, Japanese people tend to not express their thoughts directly using
unequivocal language, but rather convey them in a roundabout way, taking care
not to hurt the other person through their actions or words. In the workplace, theyshow agreement, but do not always indicate the level of agreement. According to
one CEO in the interviews, Japanese people have a fuzzy middle ground between
absolute opposition and absolute approval, and at certain times can swing between
them. The Japanese language is also sometimes ambiguous: the subject insentences is not always specified. Also, because the Japanese have a similar
background, they tend to assume that they have a common understanding andsometimes use short-cuts to get straight to the point.
In relation to the wa cultural trait and in an environment where ambiguity ishigh, Japanese people can look at the expression on senior peoples’ faces, surmise
the feelings of others (sontaku), imagine what others are thinking, act upon these
implicit desires of another person and do not always use words to communicate toeach other. Honne and tatemae, as explained previously, can also lead to a certain
level of ambiguity in the way some Japanese people communicate and makedecisions.
Fear of failure
In Japan, failure is generally difficult to forgive. In many cases, a second chance israrely given. According to the interviewees, many people in Japan sense a strong
fear of failure and could become very emotional or depressed if faced with failure.
Peer pressure is strong in Japan, as respecting the harmony within the group isparamount, as explained below. If one individual is judged as unrespectful, theywould be side-lined from the group which, given that the group is more importantthat the individual, would be for him/her very difficult to live with. This national
characteristic explains why Japanese are conservative (see hoshu-teki, orconservativeness) and are not inclined to try new things or new ways of doing
things.
Considerate
In association with wa, Japanese people tend to place a strong emphasis on
showing respect, being polite to others and being careful not to inconvenience,cause issues or harm others. Formalities and greetings are essential in social andbusiness settings and Japanese people use very polite language. Also, they will tend
to express humility and avoid criticising others face-to-face.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANNenko-joretsu (respect for seniority)
In Japan, workers tend to want to stay for life in the companies that they join after
graduating from college. This lifetime employment, or sararîman, is generally
found in both the public and private sectors, particularly in large companies ororganisations. It is a notion that’s been in existence in the workplace in Japan sincethe 1950s. In general, the longer a person stays in a company, the more they will
be promoted and the more power they will have over more junior staff. As a result,between two people who are in the same position, the person who has been there
the longest will usually be given more consideration during a discussion. Even justa year can make a difference.
Nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority) is a significant part of communication
between people and the Japanese language has layers of politeness built into it
depending on the age of the speaker and listener. Younger people will generally
use politer terms with older people and neutral terms with people of the same age.
Older people, meanwhile, can use rough, coarse language when talking to younger
people. At the workplace, the person who has been there the longest or is the oldest
will usually get to speak first and be able to act more boldly. Those with lessseniority will usually act more politely, using softer words if they have to pose acounterpoint to their superior. According to interviewees, the nenko-joretsu(respect for seniority) system still exists in Japan, especially at the licensees and at
the NRA, but less than before.
Okami-ishiki (obedience to superiors)
In relation with nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority), okami-ishiki (obedience tosuperiors) means that Japanese civil servants, as they represent the government,
have a tendency to consider themselves as an elite corps and to impose their
viewpoints on their private sector counterparts as well as on the public. This,
combined with the emphasis that the Japanese tend to place on hierarchy, title,
and respect for authority figures, can lead to an even more formal and distantrelationship between civil servants and the private sector, where the latter is likely
to show deference and the wider public expects these private sector entities to act
with a sense of responsibility and authority.

National culture as an influence on safety culture in the Japanese
nuclear community
By using the CSSCF framework previously presented, the following section outlines
how the national characteristics can manifest themselves via individual andorganisational behaviours. The above-mentioned national characteristics retain
their nuance but are grouped to construct thematic narratives around safety
culture in the Japanese context. National attributes are neither good nor bad but
could have positive or negative implications depending on the context. An attributehas the potential to manifest itself in an organisational behaviour in a way that
leads to a stronger safety culture, but it also has the potential to undermine a soundsafety culture.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANThe following safety culture dimensions in particular were discussed:•

accountability and responsibility for safety;•

clearly defined roles and responsibilities;•

continuous learning and improvement around safety;•

importance given to safety in decision-making;•resource allocation, effective competencies and training management toensure safety;•

open and transparent communication on safety.

Before presenting in detail the results related to these dimensions, it should be
noted that what safety culture means in general terms is well understood by theJapanese nuclear community and that the promotion of a healthy safety culture isprevalent at all sites and at the NRA, even though it was pointed out on several
occasion during the focus groups that the vision, strategy, and operational
objectives related to safety culture are not always clearly communicated to theworkers in the field or are not received/well understood at their level.

Accountability and responsibility for safety
The safety culture dimension “accountability and responsibility for safety” isinfluenced by the following national cultural traits: ambiguity; collectivism; don’t
speak up; fear of failure; majime (diligence); hoshu-teki (conservativeness); peerpressure; and wa (harmony).
Taking responsibility refers to a list of things to which a person is obliged torespond, either through word or action. The obligation weighs on individuals, thegroup, or the company. Accountability goes beyond the strict legal obligation
because the individual voluntarily chooses to become the “go-to” person for thethings for which he or she is responsible. It is a willingness to be accountable for
one's actions and to take specific actions where no obligation previously existed.
In summary, responsibility may be shared, but accountability is not, and safety
should be seen as a shared responsibility, with each individual being accountable
for their actions. Being accountable also means to take personal ownership for
safety and as such, demonstrate a questioning attitude by examining andchallenging safety policies, procedures, behaviour and norms. It should be notedthat a misunderstanding of responsibility and accountability can increase thetendency within a given organisation to look for the causes of an adverse event inindividual behaviour and avoid analysing root causes, particularly organisational
ones. Also, when individuals are held responsible, especially after they admit to anhonest mistake, it should be done in a fair way, with open and transparent
arrangements. In other words, the culture of the organisation should be “just” andaim to eliminate the fear of blame by ensuring that everyone is clear on theboundary between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour (Dekker, 2012).
It emerged from the discussion during the study and the Forum that
responsibility in the Japanese nuclear community is always collective, rarely
individual, and as such when a mistake is made, the manager will take the blame46

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANfor his/her employee. Put another way, the individual responsibility is not soimportant compared to the collective one, and front-line workers are neverofficially blamed for their mistakes or failures. As one worker said during theinterviews: “We may get angry, but there is no punishment, no impact on theindividual’s performance evaluation”. This is consistent with the “collectivism”
cultural trait, as Japanese people tend to put the group before the individual andco-operate with each other, which is positive from a safety point of view. The
tendency to not blame front-line workers is not considered as representative of
national Japanese behaviour, but as specific behaviour of the nuclear community.
Even if the workers aren’t directly or formally blamed by their managers orcolleagues, they would likely nevertheless still blame themselves, which can be
explained by the influence of several national cultural characteristics such as
majime (diligence), fear of failure and wa (harmony). As Japanese people can tend
to be serious, afraid of failure, and hesitant to break the harmony of the collective,
they can feel responsible to such an extent that they sometimes blame themselves
even when they should not.
The discussion during the focus groups revealed that the licensees’ safety
policies held workers accountable for adherence to established policies andprocedures. Nevertheless, the discussions and exchanges during the study and theForum revealed that the terms “responsibility” and “accountability” are not wellunderstood or seem to be confused in the Japanese nuclear community. Language
is an important cultural vehicle, and it should be noted that there is no directtranslation for accountability into Japanese; as a result, communicating theconcept of being accountable can be challenging. Concerns were expressed about
the possibility of the Japanese being individually accountable. It was reported thatworkers in Japan have a strong sense of responsibility but at the same time tend
to avoid being in a position where they must take responsibility, which is consistent
with the “ambiguity” cultural trait. Some of the interviewees also said that the
responsibility is collective because in case of failure, Japanese staff members don’t
want themselves or their colleagues to be held accountable, which is their way ofpreserving themselves. It was also reported at the Forum that the highly pyramidalorganisational structure and top-down decision-making process typical in Japan
does little to place individuals in a position to be fully accountable.
The data collected led to the conclusion that the high level of compliance withregulations and procedures in Japan is facilitated and even supported by the major
Japanese cultural trait of majime (diligence), as Japanese people, especially in the
nuclear field, have a strong tendency to follow procedure or not take short-cuts. It
has even been reported on several occasions that workers in Japanese nuclear
organisations try excessively to follow procedures, especially young workers withless experience because they can’t rely as much on skills that haven’t yet been fully
developed. However, questioning the safety policies, procedures and behaviour,and avoiding complacency (cf. questioning attitude) could be impeded by theJapanese tendencies to be hoshu-teki (conservative), to not speak up, and to workas part of a group (collectivism). Yet this attitude of continuously questioning helps
to prevent “groupthink”. Groupthink arises when the desire for conformity andcohesiveness in a group leads all members to minimise conflict and criticalevaluation of ideas, and to discourage diversity of thought and curiosity.

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Table 3 summarises the link between several Japanese national cultural traits,
the safety culture dimension of responsibility and accountability, and someindividual and organisational behaviours.

Table 3: Link between Japanese national cultural characteristics,
responsibility/accountability as a safety culture dimension, and individualand organisational behaviours
National culturalcharacteristics

Safety culture
dimension

Ambiguity

High level of compliance with regulations
and proceduresCollectivism
Don’t speak up
Fear of failure
Hoshu-Teki(conservativeness)
Majime (diligence)
Peer pressure
Wa (harmony)

Individual and organisational
behaviours

Responsibility
and accountability

Collective responsibility, no formal blame
directed at individuals
Still, sometimes individuals blame
themselves
Difficulty challenging directives and orders
from superiors, and safety policies,
procedures, behaviour and norms

Clearly defined roles and responsibilities on safety
The safety culture dimension “Clearly defined roles and responsibilities on safety”
is influenced by the following national cultural traits: ambiguity, collectivism, fearof failure, and nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority).
In an organisation with a healthy safety culture, roles and responsibilities areclearly defined, assigned and understood for all levels and positions in theorganisation. The scope of decision-making authority related to safety is also clear.
Having clearly defined roles and responsibilities is a safety culture dimensionthat is related to the Japanese cultural characteristic of ambiguity and collectivism.
Several interviewees, regardless of their hierarchical level (CNOs, managers or
workers), expressed the view that Japanese people are not always adept at
clarifying responsibilities, both for individual responsibilities but also
responsibilities between departments or sections for cross-functional activities orfor a problem that falls into a grey area. During one of the break-out sessions of
the Forum, it was also acknowledged that there is a tendency in Japan for
discussions to end vaguely, without clear roles being assigned in terms of
responsibilities, and that it might be explained by the fact that many Japanesepeople are afraid of making mistakes or are afraid to fail. Also, because theimportance placed on finishing a meeting on time can hinder attempts to clarify
decisions on roles and responsibilities, ambiguity is often reinforced. “Who will dothat” is always a question, as one worker said, and usually the person who raises
his hand first will have to do the work. This doesn’t mean that people don’t knowwhat they have to do on a daily basis, as it is important for Japanese staff members

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANto stay within the scope of their team’s overall mission; it means their roles andresponsibilities are not completely described in the management system and canremain vague. Also, in general, employment contracts in Japan never specify
details and in many cases employees do not have job descriptions. The lack ofindividual job descriptions didn’t seem to be considered as problematic by theinterviewees, as Japanese people praise the notion of collectivism. The sense of
teamwork is strong and performance evaluations tend to be collective rather than
individual. To some extent, this may challenge human resources management as
people may lose motivation unless a system is put in place whereby motivated andskilled young people can efficiently move through the ranks to become section
managers through clarification of the performance objectives and their individual
performance evaluations and fit.
The data collected also show that nuclear Japanese organisations are very
pyramid-shaped, with all decisions made by senior people (nenko-joretsu): as aresult, a lack of horizontal co-operation was raised as an issue during the Forumand by the interviewees, especially the workers. The interviews also revealed thatthe principle of subsidiarity 6 does not fit well with the Japanese culture. One
worker said that: “In the area of safety and quality assurance, there are many casesthat need to be brought up to the director’s office, which is difficult to do”. Most of
the decision are done from the top of the hierarchy and relatively few
responsibilities are transferred to lower levels.
Table 4 summarises the link between some of the Japanese national cultural
traits, the safety culture dimension of clear roles and responsibilities on safety, andsome organisational behaviours.

Table 4: Link between Japanese national cultural characteristics,
clear roles and responsibilities as a safety culture dimension, andorganisational behaviours
National culturalcharacteristics

Safety culture
dimension

Reluctant to clarify individual responsibilities

Ambiguity
Collectivism
Fear of failure
Nenko-joretsu(conservativeness)

Organisational
behaviours
Lack of individual job description

Roles and
responsibilities

Lack of clarity in performance evaluation andpromotion
Most of the decision are taken top-down within theorganisation (principle of subsidiarity rarely applied)

6. “The principle of subsidiarity holds that decision-making authority is best placed (a) where
responsibility for outcomes will occur; and (b) in the closest appropriate proximity to where theactions will be taken that will produce the outcomes” (Wolf, 2001).

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANContinuous learning and improvement around safety
The safety culture dimension “Continual learning and improvement around safety”
is influenced by the following national cultural traits: being considerate; notspeaking up; fear of failure; hoshu-teki (conservativeness); majime (diligence); peerpressure; wa (harmony).
In a healthy safety culture, employees demonstrate proactiveness by pointingout dangerous situations and suggesting technical or organisational improvements
to management. Also, internal and external lessons learnt from experience at theorganisation, including successes and challenges, are used as a basis for continual
improvement. Processes exist to identify and correct problems in a timely mannerand to develop, implement and measure the effectiveness of corrective andpreventive actions. Employees are also encouraged and recognised for reporting
concerns and suspicions, are free from reprisal, and feel that they have been heard
when they voice concerns. Finally, the nuclear community has a positive attitude
towards new ideas, listens to various opinions, is exposed to new ways of thinking,and encourages open dialogue.
Many interviewees, especially the CEOs/CNOs, voiced the notion that many
people in Japan need external pressure to change because people tend to refer toprecedents. A CEO even said that: “Japanese cannot take initiative in earnest
unless they really suffer”. As explained earlier, Japanese people are often hoshuteki (conservative), risk averse and have the tendency to follow precedents. It wasvoiced that, even if the nuclear operators have been implementing the Corrective
Action Program (CAP) system from the United States for a few years and have madesignificant progress, the concept of continuous improvement is still challenging in
the Japanese context as people do not typically prioritise the need for ongoing,incremental change.
That can make change difficult in Japan, especially when everyone is afraid of
failure and reluctant to speak up. Indeed, the Forum and study participants all
agreed that it is very difficult, and sometimes impossible, for Japanese staff tospeak up. And yet, continuous improvement implies the need to identify andcorrect safety problems in a timely manner. Identification means workers andmanagers will routinely raise their concerns on any issues discovered. Several
reasons have been put forward to explain why workers in Japanese organisations
won’t easily speak up and participate in continuous improvement:

50•

People in Japanese organisations don’t want to be criticised or condemned.
It was highlighted that even if in reality they would not be criticised,Japanese staff might be afraid to be and out of a sense of self-preservation,
they are unlikely to speak up to raise issues in the spirit of continuous
improvement.

•

Japanese workers are often wary of having their workload increased as it
seems that having new ideas means more work. The person who raises anissue is often the person who will have to implement the corrective action
plan, which confirms the previous discussion on the lack of clarity for roles
and responsibilities. Clear roles and responsibilities ensure that corrective
actions are allocated to the right people according to their nature and scope.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPAN•People in Japan generally avoid causing trouble for other people because
again, they are considerate and they want to preserve wa (harmony).

•

Japanese staff members are driven to develop a strong loyalty to thecompany. In this way they find it difficult to raise objections regarding waysof thinking within the company.

Because of a fear of failure, aversion to risk, and hoshu-teki (conservativeness),
Japanese people will often need the potential reward of an action or decision tosignificantly outweigh its risks before acting, implementing any corrective action
plan, or trying new ways of doing things. Trying something new to see if it works
or if the organisation would gain from it is not the normal way of doing things inJapan. Once approved, the corrective actions consist sometimes in adding a checkor a new procedure/rule without cancelling the previous one, and once
implemented, these corrective actions tend to remain, whether efficient or not. Thismeans having to manage an ever-increasing number of procedures or checks
without their risk benefit always being quantified and periodically verified. It was
raised by a worker that “To reduce the amount of procedures, a decision has to bemade to do so, but there is no one who can make this decision”, which raises thequestion related to roles and responsibilities as presented earlier. Because of thestrong sense of majime (diligence), hoshu-teki (conservativeness), and the fear of
making mistakes, Japanese people tend to want to avoid being put in a position of
not being able to justify why a rule or procedure should be removed. As describedin the presentation of the wa national cultural trait, tatemae (the face one wears inpublic or a stance/political statement) can be actioned to develop rules. Making therules explicit or justifying their deletion would force a person to be honne andunveil their real intention. Because of a fear of failure, it can be difficult to see theprocess of honne through the end. Also, it is not the practice to check theeffectiveness of corrective actions after they have been deployed, especially if they
follow top-down decisions. As a result, the old and new ways of doing things canremain in place and complicate the work of those who have to implement both.
As already discussed in the previous section on responsibility andaccountability for safety, all focus groups, from workers to managers, expressedthat there is no blaming culture at their site. The majority of the CEOs/CNOs said
that they regularly emphasise the no-blame policy for employees who makemistakes or raise issues. Also, having to preserve wa and to be considerate might
explain why Japanese people do not in general blame co-workers, which is an
important condition to support continuous improvement. The implementation ofsafety culture policies developed by WANO specifically since the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant accident has amplified the positive tendency for people inJapanese organisations to not blame the individual.
Table 5 summarises the link between some of the Japanese national cultural
traits, the safety culture dimension of continuous learning and improvement, andsome organisational behaviours.

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Table 5: Link between Japanese national cultural traits,
continuous learning and improvement as a safety culture
dimension, and organisational behaviours
National culturalcharacteristics

Safety culture
dimension

Organisational
behaviours

Don’t speak up

No-blame culture

Fear of failure
Hoshu-teki(conservativeness)
Majime (diligence)
Peer pressure
Wa (harmony)

Continuous learningand improvement

Unmotivated by the need for continuous
improvement
Need for external pressure to change
Add corrective actions without eliminating
previous practice

Importance given to safety in decision-making
The safety culture dimension “Importance given to safety in decision-making” isinfluenced by the following national cultural traits: ambiguity; don’t speak up; fearof failure; majime (diligence); nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority); peer pressure
and wa (harmony).
In an organisation with a healthy safety culture, safety is a visible criterion inall strategic and operational decisions and must be granted significant weight in
the decision-making process. Leaders support conservative decisions and theability to recover quickly from unforeseen circumstances and all workers, including
the front-line workers, are involved in risk assessment and decision-making
processes.
All interviewees, whether from the operators or the NRA, expressed the viewthat safety is granted significant weight in decision-making, and that the Japanesetendency to be conservative means that they take decisions carefully. However,decision-making in Japan is generally slow since, in many cases, it involves asking
everyone informally about a topic before asking formally, which means thatdecisions are made before the formal meeting even takes place. This organisational
behaviour is called nemawashi, which literally translates as “turning the roots”
and is an informal Japanese business process of quietly laying the foundation forsome proposed change or project by talking to the people concerned and gathering
support and feedback before a meeting is convened to reach a formal agreement.
Successful nemawashi enables changes to be carried out with the consent of all
sides, avoiding embarrassment and preserving wa (harmony). People expect to be
let in on new proposals prior to an official meeting. If they find out about something
for the first time during the meeting, they will tend to feel that they have been
ignored and may oppose the decision for that reason alone. It is therefore
important to approach people individually before the meeting. Decision-making inJapan is highly collective, which supports a healthy safety culture, but cansometimes be a too collective, according to several interviewees, since many layersof the organisation must be involved and agree. The term “stamp rallies culture”

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANwas used several times by interviewees and the example of having to give
100 stamps a day was provided by one interviewee, indicative of the weight andburden of the review and approval process. Meetings are held according to a script,
and they typically involve extensive preparation: anticipated questions areprepared, and roles and responsibilities are predefined. Some of the interviewees
noted that the fact that employment in the nuclear sector in Japan is a lifetime
engagement might have an impact on the decision-making duration: because aperson can’t be fired, they might not be motivated to be more efficient at work.
As previously mentioned, reaching a consensus, even tacitly by sensing theviews of others (sontaku), is important. Many people in Japan rarely allow theiremotions to have an impact on their discussions at work and in the decisions madeas they are majime (diligent): they tend to think hard before speaking and try to do
everything right. Also, decision-making is strongly related to the cultural traits ofnot speaking up, fear of failure, nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority), and wa(harmony): if the manager or a senior person talks first or if someone with a loudvoice speaks up, Japanese people will tend to agree with that person, as they canbe easily influenced by others and do not feel comfortable disagreeing or being in
the minority. On this subject, one CEO recognised that: “True harmony does notmean keeping quiet and avoiding arguments. It is important to share opinions
based on mutual respect”.
As a result, there is a lot of discussion before a decision is taken, but as soon
as it is made, companies demand everyone’s acceptance. The decision-making
process is based on all those consulted being given the opportunity to give theiropinion frankly, which can lead to fundamental changes to initial suggestions.
Some people may disagree with the final decision, but they must support it andwork as hard as anyone else to implement it.
Table 6 summarises the link between some of the Japanese national cultural
traits, the safety culture dimension of decision making, and some organisational
behaviours.

Table 6: Link between Japanese national cultural traits, decision-making
as a safety culture dimension, and organisational behaviours
National cultural
traitsSafety culture
dimension

Ambiguity

Taking decisions carefully

Don’t speak up

Nemawashi (quietly laying the foundation for
decision-making)Fear of failure
Majime (diligence)
Nenko-joretsu(conservativeness)

Organisational
behaviours

Decision-making

Peer pressure
Wa (harmony)

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Importance of reaching a consensus, eventacitly or by sensing others’ views
Slow and collective decision-making: Asking
everyone informally before asking formallyduring meetings

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANResource allocation, effective competencies and training
management to ensure safety
The safety culture dimension “Resources allocation, effective competencies andtraining management” is influenced by the following national cultural traits:ambiguity and nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority).
One of the ways of showing that safety is a clearly recognised value is toallocate human resources as necessary to ensure safety, to systematically develop
individual competencies, and to use various training methods to maintain andimprove the professional and technical competence of members of the organisation
responsible for safety.
Important human resource (HR) allocation and competencies issues wereraised by all interviewees, from both the licensees and NRA. Because some of theplants have been shut down for more than a decade, some of the employees don’t
have any experience in operating plants, which represents a huge challenge interms of competencies and training management. The licensees and the NRA have
set up training courses (using simulators), on-the-job training, and send employees
to other companies for training and development. They also try to hire mid-career
professionals, which is a paradigm shift as, traditionally, lifetime employment
favoured employees joining the company immediately after graduation andremaining until retirement.
The data collected during the study show that Japanese culture may influence
the way in which competence is gained, as well as how competency development
and management is integrated into the management system. As presented earlier,roles and responsibilities are not always clearly defined at an individual level, andby extension, individual competencies don’t seem to be clearly defined either. The
Japanese education system insists on conformity and on a high average quality ofstudents. Historically, Japanese workplaces have tended to prefer workers with abroad skillset instead of highly specialised employees, as a balanced mind-set wasappreciated; this is particularly true for executives. Once in the workforce,
Japanese people are not typically hired to fill a specific position, but rather to join
the company in a general capacity and to remain for the long term. Once workers
are in their post, criteria to assess their job performance (and by extensioncompetencies) are usually not made clear. As expressed by several workers, this
topic is taboo and is not discussed among them as it is a virtue to not be
individualist in motivation. Finally, not being assessed against clear and explicit
criteria is coherent with an HR system that is still strongly based on nenko-joretsu(respect for seniority). A number of workers said that all they had to do was wait
until they were old to get promoted and paid a better salary.
It was expressed during the interviews and focus groups that the workload/
human resource balance is not optimal as licensees have recently been more
prudent financially and both licensees and the NRA have had difficulty recruiting
skilled people and in keeping younger workers. As previously mentioned, thenuclear sector is traditionally a sector which provides lifetime employment, and itis (or was) rare for employees to resign; the Japanese nuclear sector is currently
witnessing a slow change in mentality. The workload is so high that mostemployees do overtime. The time devoted to the interviews did not, however, allow

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANthe NEA to explore whether doing overtime was in fact necessary or due to the factthat workers think it is what is expected of them (cf. peer pressure). At one site,
there is a policy explicitly prohibiting overtime (except if duly justified) and asking
employees to end their working day at 5:00 p.m.
Table 7 summarises the link between some of the Japanese national cultural
traits, the safety culture dimension of resource allocation, competencies andtraining management, and some organisational behaviours.
Table 7: Link between Japanese national cultural traits, resource
allocation and effective competencies and training management asa safety culture dimension, and organisational behaviours
National
cultural traits

Safetyculture trait

Organisational
behaviours

Ambiguity
Nenko-joretsu(conservativeness)

Resource
allocation
Training
management

Ineffective implementation of a systematic andformalised training management system
Little identification of required competencies
Preference for generalised vs. specialisedcompetencies

Open and transparent communication on safety
The safety culture dimension “Open and transparent communication on safety” isinfluenced by the following national cultural traits: ambiguity; being considerate;
nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority); and wa (harmony).
In a healthy safety culture, communication on safety is open and transparent
through official channels as well as via respectful and open dialogue between
individuals. Multiple mechanisms are used to clearly communicate the value ofsafety in the organisation. The expectations and policies to support open
communication are explained to all workers and managers clearly communicate
the expectations for performance in areas that affect safety.
Japanese people can be experts at labelling: they love to classify, number andarrange. One of the first things workers in Japanese organisations do when meeting
each other for the first time is to exchange business cards. This gesture is a practiceof etiquette (professional, social, etc.) to ensure that social norms are in place andrespected (level of politeness, language, intimacy, etc.), as well as a way for
individuals to clearly indicate the organisation they represent. Once the person has
been correctly labelled, and to be considerate and not offend, Japanese people will
use the appropriate language and behaviour, which is generally very polite, bearing
in mind that Japanese language includes different levels of politeness. Regarding
communication on safety culture within organisations, some interviewees notedthat they are sensitive to the tone of the messages communicated from top
management. A safety message communicated in a positive way would have agreater impact compared to a safety message communicated in a negative tone.
Also, one interviewee suggested that communication among Japanese people
should shift from a passive to an active communication approach.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANIn relation to the national cultural characteristic of ambiguity, Japanesecommunication is sometimes vague or indirect as people don’t usually express
their thoughts in clear and unambiguous terms. To understand each other or tounderstand the situation in relation to the wa cultural trait, a lot of Japanese people
do not always use words but read the atmosphere or surmise other people’s
feelings or intentions (sontaku). If the goals and objectives are clearly set up amongpeople who are used to working together, this way of communicating could be
efficient in time of peace, but in time-sensitive or critical situations it can becomea weakness. That being said, even during normal operations that are not timesensitive, due to the generation gap between younger and older workers, someinterviewees wonder if sometimes people really understand each other.
As already explained above in relation to the wa characteristic, Japanesepeople are not in the habit of debating as they don’t consider it a virtue to overtly
challenge their co-workers. This cultural trait doesn’t always nurture the diversityof opinion that supports healthy debates on safety issues.
Table 8 summarises the link between some of the Japanese national cultural
traits, the safety culture dimension of open and transparent communication, andsome individual and organisational behaviours.

Table 8: Link between Japanese national cultural traits, open
and transparent communication as a safety culture dimension,and organisational behaviours
National cultural
traitsSafety culture
dimension

Ambiguity

Using polite language

Considerate
Nenko-joretsu(conservativeness)
Wa (harmony)

Organisational
behaviours

Communication

Vague and superficial communication
Not engaging in debates or exchanges ofdiffering opinions

National culture as an influence on the relationship between the
NRA and the licensees
The relationship between the licensees and the NRA is influenced by many factors,
national culture being only one of them, as discussed below. Japan’s recent nuclear
history, particularly the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident, has
shaped much of the current relationship between nuclear operators and theregulatory body. Official reports have identified significant weaknesses in the
country’s nuclear management structure and systems as one of the root causes of
the accident (see for example the National Diet Report, 2012) particularly as it
applies to nuclear safety regulation. Reviews of the former regulator, NISA,
outlined a range of structural, management and cultural deficiencies.

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANThe Japanese government put considerable effort in the year after the accident
into consult with global experts and internal stakeholders to establish a path togreatly improve the nuclear safety regulatory infrastructure and regain the trust of
the public. The key initiatives taken by the government were to establish the
Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NRA) in 2012 and grant it a high degree of
independence and authority, which has given the NRA the opportunity to take arobust approach to reviewing safety and security standards in plants seeking
approval to restart (Andrews-Speed, 2020). At the same time, local communities
have become more vocal and less trusting of central government and the industry,
and increasingly demanding of transparency.
NRA leadership, from the first day of its operations, emphasised the vital needto rebuild public credibility and trust. In the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi
accident, this was always likely to be a significant challenge. With this focus, the
NRA set about crafting regulatory approaches and practices that were at once very
conservative (in comparison to most peers around the world) and unrelentingly
transparent. Given the scale and impact of the accident, it is not surprising that the
NRA’s approach was tough and uncompromising. Predictably, these circumstances
have had a major influence on the working relationship between the NRA and its
licensees.
While the focus of this report is not on the quality of the relationship between
the licensees and the NRA, the rich data collected during the interviews and focus
groups have demonstrated that this relationship is an important factor in Japan’s
overall nuclear safety culture. As was noted by international observers in thecourse of the Forum, regulators in many countries view their relationships withlicensees as one that balances independence and oversight with mutually respectedroles to assure safety. For example, head regulators in many countries meet
periodically with senior licensee officials in private to facilitate a frank exchange ofviews. In Japan, senior level meetings are far more often held in public.
Based on the data collected, it was observed that the relationship between theJapanese operators and the NRA differs depending on whether it is a question ofregulatory oversight (which is mainly managed by the regional offices), or
licensing, (which is mainly managed by the NRA’s head office). Site interviewees
at various levels, both from the licensees and the NRA regional offices, were almost
unanimous in stating that relations had improved over the last 10 years. In
particular, licensee interviewees consider site inspectors as strict but reasonable,
and communication as honest and respectful. Since the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear
Power Plant accident, the licensees see themselves as more proactive and moretransparent, which was confirmed by several NRA regional office representatives
during the interviews. Interviewees from the licensees and from the NRA consider
the implementation of the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) as positive as it allows
site inspectors to be closer to plant operations and more focused on performance.
The relationship and communication between the licensees and the NRA are
also considered as complex by the licensees, especially on licensing. Licensee
managers view frank and open discussions as impossible since by law all suchdiscussions need to be fully disclosed to the public. Further, interviews withlicensees highlighted that they view the NRA’s attitude towards them as too

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANokami-ishiki” (obedience to superiors) and to the extent that they clearly
characterised the relationship and communication, voiced that they see
themselves as subordinate to the NRA. The licensees interviewed expressed astrong feeling of perceived unfairness as they have had difficulties in engaging
effectively with the NRA considering okami-ishiki and, given that all discussions
are public, they need to take into consideration the negative public attitudes
towards the industry after the accident.
The tendency to keep formal meetings and discussions open to the public alsomeans that changing one's mind or acknowledging that other arguments are
relevant is difficult because, in the Japanese culture, it could be taken as public
humiliation. Japanese culture places a high value on reputation and public
perception and because of the fear of failure, decision-making may be influenced
by the public and the media, which can affect the way the NRA and the licenseesinteract. In addition, expressing concern or disagreement openly might bechallenged by the tendency to not commonly debate and exchange competingviews; communication tends to be indirect and to rely heavily on non-verbal cues.
This can be problematic as a high value is placed on consensus and group decision
making and can influence how agreements between the licensees and the NRA are
reached to ensure that decisions are well supported.
The licensees’ CEOs/CNOs also expressed a feeling of there being a profoundmisalignment between their organisations and the NRA on the key safety goals andhow to appropriately interpret safety regulations, which can also lead to difficult
or untenable discussions. From the interviews and focus groups, as well as theliterature review (see for example, Andrews-Speed, 2020), it appears that afundamental discussion has not taken place between the licensees, the NRA andthe public over “how safe is safe enough” when it comes to nuclear power in Japan.
Discussions of safety philosophy and approach would benefit from open exchanges
and would be difficult to hold in public meetings. This is especially true as people
in Japan are largely hoshu-teki (conservative) and risk averse.
In conclusion, since 2011, dialogue and trust between licensees and theregulatory authority in Japan have gradually increased but still not reached a levelthat strengthens the safety culture in both the licensee and industry. This could be
problematic, as a minimum level of trust is necessary to facilitate effective
communication and achieve consensus and decision-making that satisfies as many
people as possible and is appropriately risk-informed, two qualities that areimportant in Japanese culture. Recent work by the NEA Working Group on
Leadership and Safety Culture (WGLSC) shows that the licensees and theregulatory body influence each other’s safety culture through communication,
relationships and the behaviour of staff between the two sides (NEA, 2024).
According to the study, the nature of the interaction between the regulatory bodyand the licensees that produces a positive effect on each organisation’s safety
culture is a reciprocal, co-operative style of interaction, characterised by respect,
openness and trust, with a shared focus on safety and learning. The WGLSC
recognised that the safety culture maturity of each party determines how they can
implement these characteristics. Even though the regulatory body can adopt a
more prescriptive style according to the circumstances (called “responsive
regulation”), it should, according to the WGLSC, foster the licensee’s accountability

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SAFETY CULTURE IN THE JAPANESE CONTEXT: OBSERVATIONS FROM CSSCF JAPANfor safety, enabling continuous improvement and growth in the licensee’s safety
culture. This is called “accountability-oriented, enabling regulation” andemphasises a less formal approach, with a more dialogue-based style of interactionthat leads to a positive reinforcing relationship between the regulatory body andthe licensees, and overall supports an increase in public trust. That said, this typeof regulatory approach should be carefully applied to Japan while consideringcertain forms of communication such as tatemae (the face one wears in public ora stance/political statement) and honne (one’s true feelings or real intentions),
which could potentially hinder the development of a relationship of trust and allow
some sort of regulatory capture.
As expressed earlier, national culture is just one of many factors that influence
the relationship between the NRA and the licensees. Table 9 summarises thepotential impact of the Japanese national cultural traits on the NRA/licensees
relationship.

Table 9: Potential impact of the Japanese national cultural traits on the
NRA/licensees relationship.
National cultural
traits

NRA/licensees
relationship

Ambiguity

High value placed on reputation and public
perception => influences discussion and decision making

Don’t speak up
Fear of failure
Hoshu-teki(conservativeness)
Okami-ishiki (obedience
towards superiors)
Peer pressure
Wa (harmony)

Strong emphasis on hierarchy and respect for authority
figures => formal, respectful communication, even deference
from licensees to NRA
Indirect and non-verbal communication => potential challenges
in expressing concerns or disagreements openly
High value placed on consensus and group decision
making => influences how mutual agreements are reached toensure that decisions have broad support

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Reflections on safety culture in the Japanese context,
and paths forward

Summary of Japanese national attributes and their potential
influence on safety culture
As detailed in the previous section, the national context influences certain
principles that are integral to safety culture in a variety of ways. The influence ofthe national cultural characteristics on individual and organisational behaviours
related to safety culture is listed and summarised in Table 10.

Table 10: List of the eleven Japanese national cultural characteristics
according to their positive or negative influence illustrated throughindividual and organisation behaviours
Japanese national
culturalcharacteristics

Positive influence

Challenge requiring attention

Majime (diligence,
seriousness)

High level of compliance withregulations and procedures
Attention paid to details

When encountering unexpected issues, difficulties
to adapt and respond effectively
Pursuing an excessive level of perfection
Taking instruction for granted, not always
questioning their rationale/justification

Hoshu-teki(conservativeness)

Decisions not made“on the fly”

Avoiding risk to achieve zero risk
Not taking for granted the fact of having toprogress on a regular basis
External pressure is needed to change
Not breaking precedence, needing a guarantee ofsuccess before trying new ways of doing things
Following precedent, resulting in lost opportunity
for continuous improvement
Adding corrective actions without eliminating
former ways of doing things

Wa (harmony)Interdependence, co-operation andpatience
Nemawashi (quietly laying thefoundation for decision-making)Collective decision-making process
Giving importance to reachingconsensus

Slow decision-making process (due to necessity
for extensive pre-consultation prior to meeting)

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Table 10: List of the eleven Japanese national cultural characteristics
according to their positive or negative influence illustrated throughindividual and organisation behaviours (cont’d)Japanese national
culturalcharacteristics

Positive influence

Challenge requiring attention
Difficulty challenging safety policies, procedures
and behaviour

Don’t speak up

Collectivism

Tendency to align with the majority or to follow
the loudest voice within the group
Once a decision is made, moving
forward and implementing as one
Collective responsibility, no formal
blame on individuals

Individuals making decisions and acting based on
the logic of groups (peer pressure)
Difficulty to have healthy debates and exchangesof opinion
Tendency for individuals to still blame themselves
Thoughts are not expressed with clearly
articulated words or attitudes, but rather
conveyed in a roundabout way
Consensus can be reached tacitly or by gauging
the mood of colleagues
Reluctance to clarify responsibilities

Ambiguity

Fragile implementation of a systematic andformalised training management system
The emphasis on generalised competencies over
specialised competencies undermines the needfor role differentiation in a complex sector such as
the nuclear sector
Fear of reputational damage and of becoming aminority within the group

Fear of failure

Considerate

Nenko-joretsu(respect for seniority)

Tendency to be emotional or depressed if
mistakes or errors happen
Showing respect and being polite toothersLayers of politeness built into thelanguage depending on the age of the
speaker and listener

Lack of willingness to challenge and offer
opposing views
The longer a person is in the company, the more
power they gain, which does not support
promotion based primarily on skills andcompetencies (it should be noted that the current
trend is to give less weight to this phenomenon)
Most of the decision are take at the top of anorganisation, which does not respect the principleof subsidiarity

Okami-ishiki(obedience tosuperiors)

Strong emphasis on hierarchy and respect for
authority figures, especially in and fromgovernmental representatives, which can hinder
openness and dialogue

Peer pressure

Conforming to the opinions of the majority, which
can lead to fear of failure or mistakes and not
speaking up

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Positive influence of Japanese national attributes on nuclear safety
The study and the two-day Forum showed that due to the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Plant accident and lessons learnt, the Japanese nuclear community
has a better understanding of safety culture and is implementing policies toenhance and maintain it.
The attributes referred to as majime (diligence) and hoshu-teki(conservativeness) emerged from the discussions as fundamental and major
driving forces. The CSSCF participants support the view that Japanese people are
hard workers who strictly comply with regulations and procedures, and that they
are very detail oriented. Decisions are never taken on the fly, but rather after
lengthy discussions involving a large number of stakeholders. In that sense, thedecision making is always collective. It is essential for many Japanese people toreach a consensus before making any decision, and they are prepared to spend thetime and energy it takes to achieve this. Once a decision is made, Japanese people
tend to not balk or try to undermine the decision, but rather move forward andimplement it as one. If the decision is collective, so is the responsibility in theJapanese nuclear community. The participants acknowledged that this is not thecase in Japanese society in general, but in the nuclear sector, individuals are notofficially blamed for their mistakes and errors, which is in line with a healthy safety
culture. Japanese people tend to be considerate, polite and show respect to others
when communicating, with different layers of politeness built into the language,
mainly depending on the age of the speaker and listener. Patience and co-operation
are also viewed positively.
Again, it is important to bear in mind that a national attribute is not
intrinsically good or bad. The challenge of examining individual and organisational
dimensions in a specific cultural context is to be aware of and manage aspects that
may negatively affect a healthy safety culture, while preserving and encouraging
the more positive aspects.

Potential challenges to enhancing safety culture
The tendency to not speak up was a recognised characteristic that emerged fromthe study and the Forum. Peer pressure and nenko-joretsu (respect towards
seniority) are highly evident in the Japanese nuclear community and partly explain
why individuals tend to align themselves with the majority and, as a result, arereluctant to speak up and express diverse opinions (a tendency which is not uniqueto Japan but is perhaps more salient in the Japanese context). This could make it
impossible to have healthy debates on safety or difficult to challenge safety policies,
procedures or behaviour. Hierarchy is important, and the traditional Japaneseapproach of lifetime employment, with great loyalty to one organisation, leads toan extreme level of conformity at work. This reluctance to challenge authority or
dissent from the consensus promotes groupthink. This lack of questioning attitude
can lead to individuals taking instructions for granted without questioning theirrationale or relevance. Also due to peer pressure, individuals tend to blame
themselves and can be very emotional or depressed if mistakes or errors are made,even if this is not what the organisation and its leaders would like.

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Risk avoidance is deeply rooted in Japanese society. This leads many people
in Japan to be conservative and to have the tendency to wait for external pressure
before initiating changes of any kind. Continuous improvement as a proactive wayof progressing and learning is not seen as a goal to be pursued; instead, it ispreferred to continue doing what has always been done.
Safety doesn’t rely only on the collective, but also on individuals. As described
during the Forum, Japanese society tends to praise collectivism to such an extent
that individual responsibilities are somewhat unclear. Added to this is the tendency
for highly pyramidal organisational structures and top-down decision-making,meaning that individuals are not typically in a position to be held to account. These
characteristics can create challenges in understanding who has the authority tomake decisions and to take action in response to rapidly changing situations that
may have implications for nuclear safety.
The challenge of examining characteristics in a specific cultural context is tobe aware of and highlight those that might challenge a healthy safety culture, whileat the same time preserving and encouraging those that benefit safety.

Further considerations
Importantly, the Japanese nuclear community seems to have made considerable
progress in its understanding of safety culture since 2011 even though it wasrecognised during the Forum that safety culture can still be a difficult concept for
many to grasp. One of the reasons is the difficulty in translating the concept into
Japanese, just like the concept of accountability. Even if the final objective is thesame, i.e. to support a strong nuclear safety programme, the means of achieving itfrom an organisational point of view may differ slightly from one culture to another.
In this respect, the transfer of concepts from Western cultures to Asian culturesdeserves particular attention and should lead to the development of customised
comprehensive policies on safety culture which could contain Japanese proverbs
or examples. This would make it possible to examine safety culture from aperspective other than the Western cultural one.
Findings from the interviews and discussion groups reveal that psychologicalsafety is an important subject for the Japanese nuclear community, given thetendency for organisations to be very hierarchical and national characteristics suchas the “fear of failure” and “don’t speak up”. Given these cultural characteristics,
care should be taken to ensure that the organisation reduces anxiety and allows
openness and a psychologically safe environment so that employees are more
inclined to share their ideas and concerns about safety and to provide feedback onsafety management (Edmondson, 2018). It was discussed at the Forum that theJapanese nuclear community could consider putting in place a strategy to monitor
the mental health of staff, ensuring the optimal conditions for effective safety
culture enhancements and safe operations in general.
The relationship between operators and the regulator was discussed during
the study and the Forum by design via the questionnaire and the scenario.
Difficulties were expressed, more by the operators than by the NRA, but both
agreed that the quality of their communication should be improved and that mutual
efforts must be made to ensure that both parties better understand one another.

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Suggestions for paths forward
The opportunity exists for nuclear organisations in Japan to build on the findingsof CSSCF Japan and to reflect upon actions that could support continuous
improvements in safety culture. Acting on the influence of the national culture on
safety culture means questioning and changing the bases from which both cultures
originate. It is impossible, for instance, to improve the reporting of potentially
dangerous situations by workers without modifying the formal or informal sanction
policy which hinders reporting, or if positive contributions to safety are not moreclearly and overtly recognised. In the case of Japan, this would lead to recognising
the influence of certain national traits, such as “fear of failure”, “don’t speak up”
and hoshu-teki (conservativeness), which can hinder workers from feelingconfident about reporting any issues, whether safety-related or not. In relation todecision-making, improving its efficiency and allowing everyone to express
themselves without fear would lead to recognising the influence of the same
Japanese cultural characteristics. It could be useful to consider having a completely
neutral person/organisation facilitating meetings, whether these are meetings
within each organisation, or meetings involving both licensees and the NRA.
If it is considered that “organisations have it within their power to ensure thatorganisational culture over-rides national culture” (Hopkins, 2016:38),
organisational change should encourage meaningful dialogue and discussion, notonly vertically along the managerial line, but also horizontally at the boundaries
between departments, groups and trades. The process of change should also seek
to respect differences in perspective and strive to reconcile the differences between
teams or group by providing a common vocabulary and representations that help
to overcome boundaries, while accepting a certain degree of ambiguity and lack ofclarity. It should also prioritise changing practices rather than values, as the values
will follow, while ensuring compatibility with the organisation’s overall values andstrategic directions. Ultimately, this should be based on an existing mechanism
within the organisation, the aim of which is to assess whether management
processes are exhaustive or over-reaching, to the point of impacting safety.
A set of exploratory questions is proposed in Table 11 to inspire the Japanese
nuclear community to further reflect, discuss and employ engagement activities.

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Table 11: Exploratory questions
Accountability and responsibility for safety

Ambiguity
Collectivism
Don’t speak up
Fear of failure
Majime (diligence)
Hoshu-teki(conservativeness)
Peer pressure
Wa (harmony)

How can you improve the way your organisation operates by taking into accountthe fact that ambiguity and other characteristics can prevent people from feelingresponsible and accountable?
How do you ensure that your organisation supports teamwork and collective
responsibility?
What mechanisms could you put in place to enable people to feel psychologicallysafe at meetings and to raise any difficulties or problems they have observed, eventhough their intervention could implicate fellow co-workers and lead to morework for others or for themselves?
How could you improve your policy to support safety culture and practices inorder to eliminate formal blame directed at individuals?
What could you put in place to enable people to challenge safety policies,
procedures, behaviour, and norms?

Clearly defined roles and responsibilities on safety
How to ensure roles, responsibilities and authorities are clearly defined anddescribed in the organisation’s management system?
Ambiguity
Collectivism
Fear of failure
Nenko-joretsu (respect
for seniority)

How to evaluate the relevance of the fact that decision-making authority isconcentrated at the top, and not always best placed where responsibility foroutcomes will be assumed or in the closest appropriate proximity to where theactions will be taken to produce results?
How to guarantee that roles and responsibilities are not allocated solely on thebasis of how long someone has worked for the company or organisation(seniority)?

Continuous learning and improvement around safety
How to ensure that politeness and wa don’t keep people from raising concerns?
Considerate
Don’t speak up
Fear of failure
Hoshu-teki(conservativeness)
Majime (diligence)
Peer pressure
Wa (harmony)

How to ensure that staff are encouraged and acknowledged for asking
challenging questions?
How do you encourage and engage those of differing professional/technicalbackgrounds and make sure the opinions of technical staff and junior staff arereflected and addressed?
How can the lack of direct engagement from top management affect workers’
ability and motivation to perform and report?
How to break past the conservative barriers to support changes and be more
adaptable?
Are there mechanisms to support managers, but also workers and CNOs, to drivefor high levels of safety without affecting the wa?

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Table 11: Exploratory questions (cont’d)Importance given to safety in decision-making
Ambiguity

How to ensure decisions are being made in an effective and efficient manner?

Don’t speak up

How to balance between sound operational procedures and flexibility when certain
situations require immediate action?

Fear of failure
Majime (diligence)
Nenko-joretsu (respect
for seniority)
Peer pressure
Wa (harmony)

Do nemawashi and lengthy decision-making processes hinder effective responses
meant to support normal operations and unexpected event management?
Does your organisation have a protocol to ensure that all meeting attendees have achance to offer their opinions?

Resource allocation, effective competencies and training management

Ambiguity
Nenko-joretsu (respect
for seniority)

How to ensure that human capabilities are managed in a systematic and formalisedway?
How to ensure that procedures are used as a supportive tool instead of replacing theskills of operational staff?
How to guarantee that resources are not allocated mainly on the basis of seniority?

Open and transparent communication on safety
How to ensure open communications are nurtured to continuously improve safety?
Ambiguity
Considerate

How can you maintain politeness while encouraging open communication?

Nenko-joretsu (respect
towards seniority)

How can you help staff to feel safe enough to engage in debates or exchanges ofdivergent opinions?

Wa (harmony)

How can you ensure that nenko-joretsu won’t get in the way of open
communication?

NRA/licensees relationshipHow can the high value placed on reputation and public perception influence
discussions and decision making?
Ambiguity
Don’t speak up

Is it problematic that the emphasis on hierarchy and respect for authority figures(okami-ishiki) leads to a formal (albeit respectful) attitude and even deference on thepart of licensees towards the NRA?

Hoshu-teki(conservativeness)

How might the strong peer pressure in Japan and the method of communication(indirect with an important element of non-verbal communication) influence theability of licensees and the NRA to express their concerns or disagreements?

Okami-ishiki(obedience tosuperiors)

How might the high value placed on consensus and group decision making
influence the way mutual agreements are reached to ensure that decisions aresupported?

Peer pressure

Is complete openness of all licensee/NRA interactions to the public problematic anddoes it influence their ability to have fulsome, open and honest dialogues oncomplex topics?

Fear of failure

Wa (harmony)

How to establish a communication channel where psychological safety is ensured
for an effective discussion on nuclear safety?

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CONCLUSION

Conclusion

Conducting the two-day Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum (CSSCF) Japan
provided a valuable opportunity for the Japanese nuclear community to have an
open discussion on important aspects of safety culture and to consider how
Japanese cultural characteristics influence the national safety culture. The
organisers of the Forum – the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the World
Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) – received positive feedback from thediverse and broad range of relevant stakeholders who participated in the Forum.
The outcomes of CSSCF Japan found eleven key traits to be characteristic ofJapanese culture: majime (diligence); hoshu-teki (conservativeness); wa(harmony); don’t speak up; collectivism; ambiguity; fear of failure; being
considerate; nenko-joretsu (respect for seniority), and okami-ishiki (obedience tosuperiors). These national characteristics play out in a variety of safety culture
dimensions and contribute to the climate of safety culture in the Japanese nuclear
community. The safety culture dimensions that were particularly discussed during
CSSCF Japan were: accountability and responsibility; roles and responsibilities;
continuous learning and improvement; decision-making; resource allocation andcapabilities management; and communication.
The Japanese nuclear community places strong emphasis on nuclear safety
and, as such, already manifests many attributes conducive to a healthy safety
culture. Notably, the Japanese nuclear community benefits from a high level ofattention to detail and compliance with regulations and procedures, a collective
decision-making process that tries to get everyone on board, and an explicit nonblaming approach to individual’s mistakes or errors. Japanese also tend to beconsiderate, polite and respectful of others, especially when communicating.
Questions that arose during the Forum concern the tendency for individuals to not
speak up easily to express diverse opinions or to challenge safety-related decisions.
The respect for seniority (nenko-joretsu) shapes relationships at work and leads toan unwillingness to challenge authority. Additionally, many Japanese people tend
to be conservative, are resistant to the concept of continuous improvement, andpraise collectivism to such an extent that individual responsibilities (andauthorities) can be somewhat unclear.
Continued reflection within nuclear organisations – focusing on their particularchallenges based on deeply rooted assumptions – would be necessary to continue
progressing towards a strong and healthy safety culture. Holding periodic group
discussions and maintaining direct communication between different departments
and between the licensees and the regulatory body would be an effective way tocarry this forward.

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CONCLUSION

Enhancing safety culture within organisations is a continuous, progressive
process. Rather than providing a conclusive description of Japanese culture or its
nuclear safety culture, this report is meant to support the process of enhancing
safety culture.
As concluded from the previous CSSCFs carried out in Sweden (2018), Finland(2019) and Canada (2022) and now from CSSCF Japan (2023), the relevance of thenational cultural context on nuclear safety culture is incontestable. As such, theNEA and WANO encourage other countries to reflect on how the characteristics oftheir national culture can influence the nuclear safety culture structures in place
within their nuclear institutions and in their nuclear community as a whole. In thisregard, all organisations involved in nuclear activities should take concrete action
to increase awareness and understanding of how national characteristics impact
their day-to-day communications and general operations. Recognising that
improving nuclear safety is an ongoing process, the report authors hope theprocesses and tools outlined will provide support for continuous self-assessment
and institutional growth well into the future.

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Country-Specific
Safety Culture ForumJapan
A healthy safety culture has long been considered essential to maintaining high levels of nuclear
safety. Although safety goals across countries are similar, the operational realities vary due toa range of factors including national cultural characteristics. These traits can have a positive
impact on the safety culture or present challenges, so it is essential for the nuclear community
to identify what influences are present within their particular cultural contexts and reflect on
how these influences may impact their safety culture.
The Country-Specific Safety Culture Forum was created to gain a better understanding of how
a national context relates to safety culture and how operators and regulators should think
about these effects in their day-to-day activities. The fourth NEA safety culture forum – acollaborative effort between the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the World Association of
Nuclear Operators (WANO) in association with the Japan Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)and the Federation of Electric Power Companies (FEPC) – was held in Japan in December 2023.
This report outlines the process used to conduct the forum, reveals its findings and hopes toinspire the nuclear community to further reflect and take action.

Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA)
46, quai Alphonse Le Gallo
92100 Boulogne-Billancourt, France
Tel.: +33 (0)1 73 21 28 19
nea@oecd-nea.org www.oecd-nea.org

NEA No. 7680