Malitz, David M. (Ed.); Sriyai, Surachanee (Ed.)

Working Paper

Civil societies' reactions of East- and Southeast Asian
countries to the Russian war on Ukraine: Preliminary
observations
Working Papers on East Asian Studies, No. 135
Provided in Cooperation with:
University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies IN-EAST

Suggested Citation: Malitz, David M. (Ed.); Sriyai, Surachanee (Ed.) (2022) : Civil societies' reactionsof East- and Southeast Asian countries to the Russian war on Ukraine: Preliminary observations,
Working Papers on East Asian Studies, No. 135, University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East AsianStudies (IN-EAST), Duisburg

This Version is available at:https://hdl.handle.net/10419/262144
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DAVID M. MALITZ
German Institute for Japanese Studies (DIJ), TokyoW https://www.dijtokyo.org/de/people/david-m-malitz/
E malitz@dijtokyo.org

SURACHANEE SRIYAIFaculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok
W https://www.hssriyai.com
E surachanee.s@chula.ac.th

Institute of East Asian Studies / Institut für Ostasienwissenschaften
University of Duisburg-Essen
Duisburg Campus, Forsthausweg
47057 Duisburg, Germany
T +49(0) 203 37-94191
F +49(0) 203 37-94157
E in-east@uni-due.de
ドイツ日本研究所
Deutsches Institut für Japanstudien (DIJ) Tokyo / German Institute for Japanese Studies
Jochi Kioizaka Bldg. 2F
7-1 Kioicho Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
102 0094 Japan
T +81 3 3222 5077
F +81 3 3222 5420
E dijtokyo@dijtokyo.org
ISSN: 1865-8571 (Printed version) / 1865-858X (Internet version)
Download: https://www.uni-due.de/in-east/news/green_series.php© by the authors, July 2022

﻿

CONTENTDavid M. Malitz, Surachanee Sriyai
Introduction

5

David M. Malitz
Strong Public Support for the Japanese Responses to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

9

Hee Kyoung Chang
Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Responses from the South Korean Civil Society

17

Kasira Cheeppensook
Remaining on the Fence? ASEAN and the Russia-Ukraine War

23

Patrick ZiegenhainIndonesian Reactions to the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022

29

Wan Elis Regina Wan Ahmad
Malaysians and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine Conflict:
Understanding the Diverse Perspectives among Non-­Governmental Actors in Malaysia

37

Sirada Khemanitthathai
Different Reactions in Myanmar toward the Russia-­Ukraine War

45

Manuel R. Enverga III
Philippines Taking Sides on Being Neutral:
Discursive Contestation on the Ukraine Invasion in the Philippines

51

Surachanee Sriyai
Thailand’s Perspectives on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

57

3

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

DAVID M. MALITZ / SURACHANEE SRIYAI (EDS.)

Civil Societies’ Reactions of East- and Southeast
Asian Countries to the Russian War on Ukraine:
Preliminary Observations
WORKING PAPERS ON EAST ASIAN STUDIES, NO. 135, DUISBURG 2022

Abstract
Undoubtedly, the war in Ukraine has far-reaching political and economic implications for many regionsof the world, including East and Southeast Asia. The governments’ reactions to the war have varied
considerably ranging from fully supporting Ukraine in alliance with the United States and the European Union, as Japan and Korea have done, to the full backing of Russia by North Korea and Myanmar.
That said, many governments in Southeast Asia remain neutral. Nonetheless, the responses to thewar in the public spheres neither necessarily agree with their respective governments’ stances, nor
are they expected to be homogenous.
This collection of articles serves as a preliminary attempt to take stock of the reactions of selectedcivil societies in East and Southeast Asian countries to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022
by analyzing the respective countries’ public sentiment through press and social media. While the reactions of the publics of East and Southeast Asian societies have no direct influence on global society,they will shape their governments’ future courses, where they can be expressed and where elections
are held. As the long-term consequences of the geopolitical and economic shifts initiated by this conflict will only slowly become fully discernible, their analysis is of great interest.
The papers have been presented and discussed at an online workshop jointly organized by the Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of Duisburg-Essen (IN-EAST), the German Institute of Japanese Studies, Tokyo (DIJ), the Chair of Transregional Southeast Asian Studies at Humboldt University
Berlin, and the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok.

Keywords
Ukraine, East Asia, ASEAN, Southeast Asia, civil society, public opinions

4

David M. Malitz, Surachanee SriyaiDavid M. Malitz, Surachanee Sriyai: Introduction

INTRODUCTIONDavid M. Malitz German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo
Surachanee Sriyai Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24,
2022 has been a global watershed moment. In
Europe, it has resulted in a newfound solidarity with Ukraine and a boosting of relations with
the United States. At the same time, long-heldpolitical certainties are being abandoned. The
German government’s rewriting of its defense
policy has made the term Zeitenwende describing a historical turning point a recognizable termin the international press.1 Finland and Sweden have given up their policy of neutrality andapplied for NATO membership.2 After Switzerland, a country that have remained neutral evenduring the Second World War, joined the European Unions’ sanction against Russian individuals
and entities, the question was raised whether
Bern had likewise abandoned its famed neutrality.3 The war and international sanctions are driving inflation globally, but in the global South, they

1 See e. g. Isaac Stanley-Becker, “Russia’s war in Ukraine
may boost German interest in military service,” Washington Post, April 19, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/2022/04/19/germany-military-recruitmentukraine/; Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, “Berlin
doit reconnaître que la force militaire est un facteur dansles relations internationals,” Le Monde, March 23, 2022,
https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2022/03/23/berlin-doit-reconnaitre-que-la-force-militaire-est-un-facteur-dans-les-relations-internationales_6118695_3232.
html.
2 Johanna Lemola, “The leaders of Finland and Sweden
say they will jointly submit their NATO applications,” NewYork Times, May 17, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/
2022/05/17/world/europe/sweden-finland-nato.html.
3 Tobias Gafafer, “Für Russland ist die Schweiz nicht mehr
neutral – der Bundesrat sucht in der Krise seine Rolle”,
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, April 8, 2022, https://www.nzz.
ch/schweiz/fuer-russland-ist-die-schweiz-nicht-mehrneutral-der-bundesrat-sucht-in-der-krise-seine-rolleld.1678456.

are also about to cause mass famine, and havealready triggered shortages of essential goods.4
Across East and Southeast Asia, the Russian attempt to redraw international borders by force
in obvious violation of the UN Charter, based on
flimsy historical arguments and claims of ethnic
ties, is widely seen as a dangerous precedent.5
The territorial conflicts in the regions ranging
from the Southern Kuril Islands in the North,over the Diaoyu/Senkaku and Dokdo/TakeshimaIslands to the South China Sea are internationally-recognized geopolitical issues. In Southeast
Asian countries with large communities of Chinese descent, the promotion of a Chinese ethnic nationalism under President Xi Jinping thatblurs the distinction between Chinese citizens
and ethnic Chinese has also become a major
concern.6 Especially so, since the 2019 defense
white paper of the People’s Republic of China
explicitly identifies protecting the ‘rights and in-

4 Dominic Faulder, “Asia’s food crisis: Ukraine war triggers
chain reaction of shortages,” Nikkei Asia, May 18, 2022,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/The-Big-Story/Asias-food-crisis-Ukraine-war-triggers-chain-reaction-ofshortages.
5 The prime ministers of Japan and Singapore were to mostoutspoken ones in this regard: Fumio Kishida, “Press
Conference by Prime Minister Kishida,” Prime Minister ofJapan and His Cabinet, March 3, 2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202203/_00005.html;
Lee Hsien Loong, “The shadow cast by the Ukraine war
over Singapore’s outlook,” Straits Times, May 14, 2022,
https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-shadowcast-by-the-ukraine-war-over-singapores-outlook.
6 Amy Qin, “Worries Grow in Singapore Over China’s Calls
to Help ‘Motherland’,” New York Times, August 5, 2018,https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/05/world/asia/singapore-china.html.

5

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

terest of overseas Chinese people’ as one of its
armed forces’ mission.7
Nevertheless, the government responses to theRussian aggression across the regions varied
considerably. With the exception of North Korea,
no country voted against the UN resolution condemning Russian aggression and demanding
a withdrawal on March 24, 2022 though there
were notable abstentions; namely, China and India as well as the former Soviet allies of Vietnamand Laos.8 When it comes to the suspension of
Russia from the Human Rights Council on May
4, 2022, however, only Myanmar, representing
the civilian opposition and not the military junta in power, and the Philippines joined Japanand South Korea by voting in favor.9 Singapore,on the other hand, is the only Southeast Asian
country that has implemented a comprehensive
sanction packages against Russia, as Japan and
Korea have done in East Asia.10 As it has been
pointed out in a number of international fora, thereliance on Russia to hedge against an assertive
China as well as to acquire weaponry and spareparts in combination with economic relations
are all factors contributing to an understanding of these more muted official responses inSoutheast Asia in contrast to Japan and Korea,
who are to a large degree reliant on the UnitedStates for their security. Historical ties to the former Soviet Union, as well as the wish to ascer-

7 The State Council Information Office of the P­ eople’s Republic of China, “China’s National Defense in the New
Era,” July 24, 2019, https://english.www.gov.cn/
archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_
WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.
8 UN News, “Ukraine: General Assembly passes resolution demanding aid access, by large majority,” March 24,
2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1114632.
9 UN News, “UN General Assembly votes to suspend
Russia from the Human Rights Council,” April 7, 2022,
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782.
10 Warren Fernandez, “Why Singapore had to take a strong
stand against Russia’s attack on Ukraine,” Straits Time,
March 26, 2022, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/why-singapore-had-to-take-a-strong-standagainst-russias-attack-on-ukraine.

6

tain sovereignty through an independent foreign
policy in line with domestic demands, are othercontributing factors.11
In contrast to the governments’ responses, thepublics’ reactions in East and Southeast Asian
countries have so far received very little attention. This is understandable as they are of little
immediate political consequences. Yet public
opinion, where it can be expressed, will influencenational policies in the future; and therefore, deserves due attention. This is even more so thecase because an end to the war is not foreseeable; and its assumingly long-lasting economic repercussions are proving already painful tomany countries in the regions. This collection ofarticles is the first attempt to take stock of thediverse public responses in selected countries
across East and Southeast Asia. Noting that the
Indo-Pacific has become a widely-shared foreign
policy framework, and the economic and political ties between East and Southeast Asia havebeen intensifying, this collection draws together
articles from both East and Southeast Asia.
Nearly all of the countries discussed enjoy robust civil societies and a reasonably free publicsphere, allowing for diverse public opinions to beaccounted for and shaping their countries’ future
courses. This is not the case in Myanmar, where

11 See for e. g. CSIS, “The Ukraine Crisis and Asia: Implications and Responses,” March 2, 2022, https://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraine-crisis-and-asia-implications-and-responses; Susannah Patton, “Reading
Southeast Asia on Ukraine,” Lowly Institute, March 7,2022, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/
reading-southeast-asia-ukraine; Ian Storey and William Choong, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Southeast
Asian Responses and Why the Conflict Matters to the
Region,” ISEAS Perspective 2022/24, March 9, 2022;
ISIS Malaysia, “War in Ukraine: What does it mean forSoutheast Asia?,” April 7, 2022, https://www.isis.org.
my/recent-event/war-in-ukraine-what-does-it-meanfor-southeast-asia/; GIGA, “The War in Ukraine and
the Global South: Perceptions, Reactions, and Implications,” May 17, 2022, https://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/
events/giga-forum/war-ukraine-global-south-perceptions-reactions-implications.

David M. Malitz, Surachanee Sriyai: Introductiona civil war broke out after the coup d’état on February 1, 2021; but precisely due to the civil war,different opinions exist and can be analyzed. The
collection does not claim to be comprehensive;
particularly, the omission of cases from South
Asia is a weak point. One must furthermore
note, though, that the analyses presented here
are of a preliminary nature, as the responses in
the countries’ civil societies are prone to change
against the backdrop of the future developmentsof the conflict as well as of its global and local
ramifications. Moreover, this collection also includes an analysis of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is indeed nota country with its own civil society; but the inclusion of Southeast Asian cases certainly necessitates its inclusion.
The diversity of the countries under discussionis also reflected in the case studies. Nevertheless, one can identify important similarities between case studies. The concern that the Russian aggression in violation of the UN Charteris setting a dangerous precedence is widely
shared in the region. This sentiment is particularly salient where territorial conflicts are amajor concern as the papers on Malaysia, Philippines, and Japan show. At the same time, thecase studies show that local political and economic challenges also shape the stances toward the war in Europe. Economic concerns are
an important factor not only in the Philippines,
but also in Indonesia and Thailand, respectively. Local political cleavages, furthermore, serve
as lenses through which the war in Europe canbe perceived and interpreted. This is certainly
the case in Myanmar, where the junta has been
supported by Russia, and Thailand, where protests against the government originally coming
to power through the coup in May 2014 flared

up in 2020/21. Opponents of both governments see the war in Europe mirroring theirown struggle for democracy. Anti-Westernism
also plays a role. This is especially the case in
the Muslim majority countries of Indonesia andMalaysia, where the war between the US-supported Ukraine and Russia is connected to theconflict in the Middle East. Here, the social media savvy Head of Chechnya and militia leader,Ramzan Kadyrov, regarded as a brutal dictator
in Europe, is seen by some as a devout Muslim. Finally, there are truly unique factors in the
countries under investigation. In South Korea,
partition of the Korean Peninsula looms large
over the South Korean reactions to the war in
Europe. In Malaysia, the downing of Malaysia
Airlines flight MH17 by pro-Russian separatists
in Eastern Ukraine in July 2014, killing all 283
people on board, is still fresh in the public memory. Similarly, in Japan, the public perception of
the war is shaped by the unresolved issue of thesouthernmost Kuril Islands occupied by Russia
since the end of World War II, which has so far
prevented a formal peace treaty.
The analysis on Japan, Korea, ASEAN, as well asof the three largest economies in Southeast Asia:
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, were
presented online on April 26, 2022 at a workshop
jointly organized by the Institute of East AsianStudies at the University of Duisburg-Essen (INEAST), the German Institute of Japanese Studies,Tokyo (DIJ), the Chair of Trans­regional Southeast
Asian Studies at Humboldt University Berlin, andthe Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn
University, Bangkok. The authors thank Nele
Noesselt (Director, IN-EAST) and Franz Walden­
berger (Director, DIJ) for an introduction, andClaudia Derichs (Humboldt University, Berlin)
for moderating the session.

7

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine8David M. Malitz: Strong Public Support for the Japanese Responses to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE JAPANESE RESPONSESTO THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF UKRAINEDavid M. Malitz German Institute for Japanese Studies, Tokyo

The Japanese government under Prime Minister Kishida Fumio responded swiftly and robustly
to the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. In alliance with the United States andthe European Union, Japan imposed far-reaching economic sanctions. Breaking with precedent,
Japan delivered protective equipment to Ukraine and allowed the entry of hundreds of Ukrainians
fleeing from the conflict. Additionally, fundamental changes to Japanese defense policy are now
being seriously discussed. Striking about the Japanese case is that the public has been not only
nearly uniformly supportive of Ukraine in the conflict, but also largely very supportive of these
response by the Japanese government despite a rapid devaluation of the Yen and rising consumer
prices.
This can be explained through a number of factors. First, due to the strained Japanese-Russian
relations, the Japanese public did not hold a positive view of Russia to begin with. Second, theinvasion is widely seen as having caused a deterioration of Japan’s security environment. Third,
there is no right-wing populist party that has developed ties with the regime of Russian President
Putin or embraced his brand of nationalism. Fourth, Japan has also no party on the left that has ahistory of alignment with the former Soviet Union.

Keywords
Invasion of Ukraine, Japan, Japanese-Russian relations, Japanese defense policy, Article 9

THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT’S­RESPONSE TO RUSSIA’S INVASION OF
UKRAINE
In contrast to 2014, when the government of
Abe Shinzo attempted to maintain a working
relationship with Russia after its annexationof Crimea, the Japanese government reacted
swiftly and decisively after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and imposed
far-reaching sanctions.1 The Japanese Self-­
Defense Forces delivered bullet-proof vests, helmets, drones and other non-lethal equipment

1 日本経済新聞「首相、ロシアへの追加制裁発表
金融機関の資産凍結など」, 2022年2月25日,
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA2508Y0V20C22A2000000/.

to the Ukrainian military.2 To do so, the government had to amend its rules on the transfer ofdefense equipment.3 Accordingly, the Japanese
Self-­Defense Forces announced on Twitter thatthe said shipment was a first for them.4 Food andother supplies for the civilian population as well

2 Japan Times, "In rare move, Japan to send bulletproof
vests and helmets to Ukraine," March 4, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/03/04/national/sdfvests-helmets-ukraine/.
3 Kyodo News, "Japan to offer protective masks, clothing,drones to Ukraine," April 19, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/04/00e4cd64dc1c-japan-to-offer-protective-masks-clothing-drones-to-ukraine.html.
4 Twitter account of the Japanese Ministry of Defense,
Self-Defense Forces, 防衛省・自衛隊@ModJapan_jp,
11:53 pm on March 8, 2022, https://twitter.com/ModJapan_jp/status/1501209547540733952?cxt=HHwWgIC56aaIr9UpAAAA.

9MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

as a loan from Japan International Cooperation
Agency to support reconstruction are also being
provided.5 Japan has long been criticized for its
reluctance to accept refugees. Yet, following theinvasion of Ukraine, the Japanese government
quickly allowed for the entrance of Ukrainians
fleeing the conflict. Twenty of them were flown toJapan on a government plane following Foreign­Minister Hayashi Yoshimasa's visit to Poland inearly April.6 By April 17, 2022, 661 individuals
from Ukraine had entered the country.7 This is
more than half of Japan’s total refugee population in 2021.8 Yet, as fleeing from war does not
qualify for refugee status in Japan, entrants from
Ukraine are not recognized as ‘refugees (nanmin難民)’, but are referred to as ‘evacuees (hinanmin避難民)’. ‘Evacuee’, however, is not a clearly defined status under Japanese law; and in practice,
it means that short-term but extendable visas allowing for employment are granted.9 In contrast
to the refugee status, there is no clear pathway
to permanent residency for evacuees.10 To provide for a sound legal basis, the introduction ofa ‘quasi-­refugee (jun-nanmin 準難民)’ status is
5 読売新聞「岸田首相、ゼレンスキー大統領と電話会談…新たに食料品や医薬品の提供伝える」,
2022年5月26日, https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/
20220426-OYT1T50286/; JICA, 「ウクライナ向け円借款貸付契約の調印：軍事侵攻を受けて経済危機に直面するウクライナに対する財政支援」, 2022年5月16日,
https://www.jica.go.jp/press/2022/20220516_10.html.
6 Japan Times, "20 Ukrainian evacuees arrive in ­Tokyo on
government plane," April 5, 2022, https://www.japantimes.
co.jp/news/2022/04/05/national/japan-ukraine-evacuees-arrive/.
7 NHK, 「ウクライナから日本への避難民661人ことばや就労の支援が課題」, 2022年4月19日, https://www3.
nhk.or.jp/news/html/20220419/k10013588121000.html.
8 UNHRC, “Refugee Data Finder,” https://www.unhcr.org/
refugee-statistics/download/?url=S5yP0q(accessed
April 24, 2022).

10

now being discussed.11 Assumingly, this wouldease entry to Japan for other people fleeing conflicts as well.
11

Shortly after the Russian invasion, former prime
minister Abe Shinzo, who is now the leader ofthe largest faction of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, refloated two ideas pertaining to Japan’s defense policy. He advocated to consider‘nuclear sharing’ with the United States as well
as developing the capability to strike enemy bases abroad.12 The first would mean abandoning
the ‘three non-nuclear principles’, core principles of Japanese defense policy since 1967.13
The idea was rejected outright by Prime Minister
Kishida. The second one has been already under discussion by the Liberal Democratic Party.
Its coalition partner, Komeito, shared the concern with the opposition parties that the policychange might allow for preventive attacks on
foreign soil, which would be a clear violation of
the Japanese constitution.14 In late April, the Liberal Democratic Party’s national security panel
proposed instead a ‘counterstrike capability’as well as an increase in the defense budget
to reach 2 % of GDP. Komeito has accepted thechange of terminology, concluding that preventive attacks are excluded from national defense

11 時事ドットコム「『準難民』法案の成立急務
送還条項削除に否定的―古川法相」, 2022年4月17日,
https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2022041700148&g=pol.
12 Asahi Shimbun, “Abe suggests Japan start ‘nuclear
sharing’ discussion,” February 28, 2022, https://www.
asahi.com/ajw/articles/14560003; 産経新聞 「安倍元首相『防衛に努めぬ国と共に戦う国はない』」,
2022年3月25日, https://www.sankei.com/article/2022
0325-K4UAOYHIAVNTNOT2NDYRHDKLAM/.

9 時事ドットコム「『避難民』位置付け曖昧 難民認定・法整備に課題」, 2022年4月2日, https://www.jiji.com/
jc/article?k=2022040101107&g=pol.

13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Three Non-Nuclear Principles,” https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/
nnp/index.html#:~:text=My%20responsibility%20is%20
to%20achieve,line%20with%20Japan's%20Peace%20
Constitution (accessed April 25, 2022).

10 真鍋弘樹「ウクライナ人受け入れは二重基準なのか『難民』」と『避難民』の間で」『朝日新聞』,
2022年4月27日, https://www.asahi.com/articles/
ASQ4V3QRZQ4TUPQJ00L.html.

14 Kyodo News, “Japan’s ruling LDP to seek enemy basestrike capability,” April 12, 2022, https://english.kyodo­
news.net/news/2022/04/4c9a21a17096-japans-ruling-ldp-to-seek-enemy-base-strike-capability.html.

David M. Malitz: Strong Public Support for the Japanese Responsesto the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

policies, but argued that the increase in defense
spending needs further deliberations. Opposition parties remain skeptical about the constitutionality of the new capabilities to be acquired by
the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.15

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE­G OVERNMENT
Immediately after the war, large demonstrations
against the war and in support of Ukraine took
place across Japan.16 Smaller, creative forms ofprotest were also reported in the press.17 Donations poured into the account of the Ukrainianembassy with Japanese Internet billionaire,
Mikitani Hiroshi, alone giving more than USD 8
million.18 In contrast, the embrace of Russian
disinformation about the Ukrainian government
remains limited to the fringes of the Japanesecyberspace. According to an analysis of the University of Tokyo, around 90 % of the accounts
tweeting such information, had a history of promoting conspiratorial anti-vaccine contents, andnearly 50 % had tweeted QAnon contents.19

15 NHK, 「公明 北側副代表「反撃能力」に名称変更評価」, 2022年4月28日, https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/
html/20220428/k10013603541000.html; NHK, 「政治マガジン自民『敵基地攻撃能力』の名称を『反撃能力』に 変更案を了承」, 2022年4月21日, https://www.
nhk.or.jp/politics/articles/lastweek/81486.html.
16 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Julia Mio Inuma and Shibani
Mahtani, “In Japan and across Asia, an outpouring of
support for Ukraine,” Washington Post, February 28,
2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/
02/28/japan-asia-ukraine-russia/.

Certainly, one important explanation for the rejection of Russian disinformation as well as
pro-Russia stances is that the Japanese publiclargely shared negative views of the neighboring
country to begin with. According to a survey of
the Cabinet Office conducted in September 2021,
49 % of the respondents considered the country
as rather unfriendly, while 37 % considered Russia as an unfriendly country.20 This negative attitude can be explained by the history of Russo-­
Japan relations. The Soviet Union declared war
on Imperial Japan in August 1945, proceeding tocapture Japan’s Northeast Asian possessions aswell as the Kuril Islands. While the Soviet–Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956 ended the stateof war, a formal peace treaty has never beensigned. Until the present, ownership of the four
southernmost Kuril Islands, referred to in Japanas the Northern Territories, remains the main
hurdle in the negotiations. Former prime minister Abe Shinzo had made improving relations
with Russia a key element of his foreign policy
agenda with the ultimate goal of normalizing
relations. For this goal, he was willing to makeconsiderable concessions, including a muted response to the Russian annexation of Crimea in
2014. Both parties had agreed to base future negotiations on the 1956 declaration that promised
the return of some of the islands after the signing of a peace treaty,21 but the 2020 amendments
to the Russian constitution that must have had
Vladimir Putin’s approval then outlawed ceding
any territories to a foreign power. The Russianpresident publicly promised to honor the constitution making a peace treaty thus contingent on
the Japanese acceptance of the status quo.22

17 E. g. Asahi Shimbun, “Blue and yellow: Cities across Japan light up to support Ukraine,” March 2, 2022, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14561932.
18 Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Julia Mio Inuma and Shibani
Mahtani, “In Japan and across Asia, an outpouring of
support for Ukraine,” Washington Post, February 28,
2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/
02/28/japan-asia-ukraine-russia/.
19 産経新聞「親露アカウントの９割、過去に反ワクチン関連ツイート 東大大学院教授分析」,
2022年4月20日, https://www.sankei.com/article/
20220420-JCFZ2YCNSBPWHDLLEES4UJKYA4/.

20 内閣府「外交に関する世論調査（令和3年9月調査）」,
2022年1月21日, https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/r03/
r03-gaiko/zh/z04.html.
21 Tobias Harris, The Iconoclast: Shinzo Abe and the New­Japan. London: Hurst & Company, 2020, 301–304.
22 Shin Tokiwa, “What is Putin’s Strategy on Japan? Vigilance needed on Russia’s ‘Peace Treaty’ Proposal,” JFIR
Commentary No. 136, August 2, 2021, https://www.jfir.
or.jp/en/commentary/3354/.

11

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

Russian actions after the start of the war havelikely further worsened the public perception of
Russia. In response to the Japanese sanctions,
the Russian government formally ended negotiations of a peace treaty, and began military exercises on the Kuril Islands. Former residents
are now also banned from visiting the graves of
their ancestors.23 The Russian government’s unwillingness to rule out the use of nuclear weapons resonated strongly in Japan due to the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.24 In
Naga­saki, two organizations of atomic bombing
survivors, who are usually at odds, jointly called
for a protest in response.25 Russian attacks onor near nuclear power plants were also regarded with much concern in Japan. Public criticism
was amplified by residents of Fukushima, site of
the 2011 nuclear disaster, who have since developed ties to Ukraine, site of the Chernobyl disaster, as well as of those of Kyoto, a sister-city of
Kyiv since 1971.
The monthly surveys on public opinions conducted by national broadcaster NHK show thatthe government enjoys broad support. In early
May, 68 % of respondents supported its overall responses to the war.26 The sanctions were
supported by 82 % in April. Among these, 47 %supported their further toughening, even though
70 % are feeling the impact of rising consumer
prices already.27

23 Kamata Tomoko, “Japan-Russia peace treaty talks suspended,” NHK World, April 5, 2022, https://www3.nhk.
or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/backstories/1958/.
24 Asahi Shimbun, “Hundreds in Tokyo protest Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine,” March 5, 2022, https://www.asahi.
com/ajw/articles/14564817.

Former prime minister Abe Shinzo’s remarks,
arguing for giving up Japan’s ‘non-nuclear principles’ for a policy of ‘nuclear sharing’, triggered
immediate protests. These ended quickly, however, after the government had categorically rejected the idea.30 The government’s proposal toraise the defense spending in contrast was supported by 52 % of respondents to the NHK survey in May, and the acquisition of ‘counterstrike

28 Naoko Hashimoto, “OPINION: Japan should not forsake
evacuees from countries other than Ukraine,” Kyodo
News, April 13, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/
news/2022/04/40eb3d250232-opinion-japan-shouldnot-forsake-evacuees-from-countries-other-thanukraine.html; 小熊慎司 「ウクライナ難民受け入れ
で日本の難民政策を変える」『毎日新聞』, 2022年
4月19日,
https://mainichi.jp/premier/politics/articles/20220415/pol/00m/010/032000c;
田島麻衣子「ウクライナ難民受け入れで豊かになる日本」『毎日新聞』, 2022年5月2日, https://mainichi.jp/premier/politics/articles/20220428/pol/00m/010/006000c.

26 NHK, 「NHK世論調査 2022年5月」, 2022年5月9日,
https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/.

29 NHK, 「NHK世論調査2022年4月」 2022年4月11日,
https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/archive/
2022_04.html; 毎日新聞「ウクライナ避難民『もっと受け入れるべきだ』69 % 本紙世論調査」』, 2022年
4月23日, https://mainichi.jp/articles/20220423/k00/
00m/040/217000c.

27 NHK, 「NHK世論調査2022年4月」, 2022年4月11日,
https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/archive/
2022_04.html.

30 Asahi Shimbun, “Abe draws fire from hibakusha forsuggesting ‘nuclear sharing’,” March 1, 2022, https://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/14560829.

25 毎日新聞「核の脅威へ共闘 82 歳『被爆者が束になって』次代へ対立残さず」, 2022年3月24日, https://mainichi.jp/articles/20220323/k00/00m/040/395000c.

12

The policy of the Kishida government to grantUkrainian refugees visas as ‘evacuees’ has been
criticized as insufficient by representatives ofthe opposition Constitutional Democratic Partyof Japan and academics. They have called for
acknowledging the reality of the Ukrainians as
refugees as well as offering other people fleeing
from war the same protection.28 The more cautious approach by the government has, however, resulted in high support. 76 % of respondents
agreed with allowing Ukrainian ‘evacuees’ cometo Japan, while approximately 70 % responded
in the survey of a large national newspaper thatJapan should allow more Ukrainians to enter­Japan.29

David M. Malitz: Strong Public Support for the Japanese Responsesto the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

capabilities’ by 55 %.31 This relates to a survey
by national newspaper, Asahi Shinbun, which
reported that the number of people supporting
constitutional change has increased from 45 %to 56 % over the course of the last year.32 Thelong held goal of Japan’s conservatives to revise Article 9 of the Japanese constitution that
denies state the right of belligerence has clearly
become more feasible because of the Russian
aggression. This reflects the belief that, as a direct result of the Russian invasion, the security
situation in East Asia had deteriorated. This was
confirmed by 88 % in a survey conducted by theForeign Ministry of Japan in late March.33

UNPOPULAR POPULISTS
Given the strong support for the government’s
responses to the invasion of Ukraine, there islittle opportunity for opposition parties to scorepolitical points, as populists both on the left andright discovered quickly.
The right-wing populist party, Nihon Ishin no
Kai (41/465 seats in the House of Representatives; 10/245 seats in the House of Councillors),
strongly condemned the Russian aggression in
its official stance, while party co-leader Matsui
Ichiro supported former prime minister Abe
Shinzo questioning of Japan’s ‘three non-nuclear principles’ banning the stationing of nuclear weapons on its soil.34 He also attacked theCommunist Party of Japan as possibly being on
the Russian side given its defense of Article 9

31 NHK, 「NHK世論調査2022年5月」, 2022年5月9日,
https://www.nhk.or.jp/senkyo/shijiritsu/.
32 朝日新聞「『憲法改正』と『9条改正』に温度差ある世論」, 2022年5月14日, https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASQ5F3555Q56UZPS003.html.
33 NHK, 「ロシアなどへの制裁強化との回答は4割 外務
省実施の世論調査」, 2022年4月21日, https://www3.
nhk.or.jp/news/html/20220421/k10013591411000.html.
34 東洋経済「下がる支持率『維新の会』に吹き始めた
逆風の正体
注目度が高まるにつれて問われる『党体質』」, 2022年3月3日, https://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/535803.

of the Japanese constitution.35 Ironically, two of
his own party members later drew the ire fromJapanese netizens for apparently siding with
Russia. Suzuki Muneo and Hashimoto Toru madeheadlines for arguing that Ukraine shared responsibility in the outbreak of the war and thatthe invaded country should make concessions to
end the war as soon as possible. Arming Ukraine
would only unnecessarily prolong the war whilesiding with Ukraine on principle, according tothem, was also not in Japan’s best interest.36
The online backlash was swift and harsh withclose to no support for their statements on Twitter, forcing the party to publicly distance itself
from the ‘shameful’ statements.37 Suzuki himself refuted in an interview that he was ‘Putin’s
spokesperson’ without changing his positions
on his blog. By early May, responses to these
entries have fallen significantly, but they remain
largely negative.38
The progressive populist party, Reiwa Shinsen­
gumi (3/465 seats in the House of Representa-

35 産経新聞「ウクライナ侵攻に『自国を守る決意と覚
悟必要』維新松井氏」, 2022年2月25日, www.sankei.
com/article/20220225-QTQKKQZDXFMSNNDDY4CJRS7Z7A/.
36 時事ドットコム「『ウクライナにも責任』 維新・鈴木氏、ロシア侵攻めぐり」, 2022年3月13日, https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2022031300405&g=pol; 産経
新聞「ウクライナ発言で物議の橋下氏 維新『切っても切れぬ』距離感に腐心」, 2022年4月8日, https://www.sankei.com/article/20220408-CJGM3JJTZFNAHNMUZ7CIWLU3Q4/; 中日スポーツ『橋下徹さんがウクライナ出身学者と生放送で口論…“国外退去”発言が物議『じゃあ一体誰が国を護る』『よくこんな的外れなこと言えるな』」, 2022年3月3日, https://www.chunichi.co.jp/article/428056.
37 時事ドットコム 「維新・松井氏、立民代表を批判
鈴木宗氏擁護―ウクライナ侵攻」, 2022年3月17日,
https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2022031701354&g=
pol.
38 President Online, ｢プーチンの代弁者｣ではない…鈴木宗男｢私がロシアへの非難決議に賛成票を投じた
本当の理由｣, 2022年3月31日, https://president.jp/articles/-/56167?page=1; 鈴木宗男｢鈴木ムネオ日記５
月８日（日）｣, https://ameblo.jp/muneo-suzuki/entry-12741666722.html.

13

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

tives; 2/245 seats in the House of Councillors),
meanwhile surprised supporters and opponents
alike by not voting for the resolutions condemning Russian aggression in the two chambersof the Japanese parliament on March 1 and 2,
2022. According to the party’s statement, theresolution was rejected for being a performative utterance of words only. Nevertheless, Reiwa Shinsengumi then condemned the Russian
aggression ‘in the strongest terms’ in a separate statement. At the same time, the party also
blamed NATO expansion for the outbreak of thewar.39 On Twitter, few agreed with this stance.
Critics either pointed out that the party could
have voted for the resolution just as well, giventhat they had issued their own condemnation, or
accused the Reiwa Shinsengumi to inadvertently
have supported the Russian side.
Hatoyama Yukio, who briefly served as prime
minister for the defunct Democrat Party from
September 2009 to June 2010 received muchless public attention. On Twitter, he first identified the NATO extension as the root cause of
the conflict; and then the Ukrainian president
for not having worked hard enough for a diplomatic solution as well as having contributed tounspecified massacres in Eastern Ukraine.40 His
comments were not entirely surprising. Having
retired from politics, he accepted an invitation tovisit Crimea in 2015 against the explicit recommendation of both his own former foreign minister and the then foreign minister Kishida Fumio, the current prime minister. During his visit,
he assessed that the referendum conducted by

39 れいわ新選組「ロシアによるウクライナ侵略を非難する決議について」, 2022年2月28日, https://reiwa-shinsengumi.com/comment/11439/.
40 See the tweets by Yukio Hatoyama (鳩山友紀夫) 鳩山友紀夫（由紀夫） Yukio Hatoyama@hatoyamayukion at
10:04 am on April 14, 2022, https://twitter.com/hatoyamayukio/status/1514409147244355590?cxt=HHwWjIDRoZDGoYQqAAAA and at 10:22 am on March 1, 2022,
accessed June 4, 2022, https://twitter.com/hatoyamayukio/status/ 1498468658984910848?cxt=HHwWgIDQ3cvT0MspAAAA.

14

Russia had been ‘democratic’.41 Briefly before
the war, he also warned in an interview with theRussian news agency in mid-February 2022 that
the Japanese government might not understandthe situation in Ukraine correctly for being beholden to the United States.42

ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-PUTIN­C OMMUNISTS
Matsui Ichiro of the Nihon Ishin no Kai had attempted to link the Communist Party to Russia
for their support of Article 9. Yet for the Communist Party of Japan (10/465 seats in the Houseof Representatives; 13/245 seats in the House ofCouncillors), positing itself clearly against Russia, posed no problem at all. Japan’s oldest political party has long become a Japanese social-­
democrat party, and has been highly critical of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)
as well as of Soviet and later Russian foreign policy.43 The Socialist Party of Japan that did entertain close relations with the CPSU was dissolvedin 1996. The Communist Party’s newspaper, Akahata (Red Flag), could thus easily demonstrate
a long history of the party’s stringent opposition to and criticism of the Soviet Union and theRussian Federation.44 Yet, it had to concede that
41 産経新聞「民主・岡田代表 鳩山元首相を猛批判『国益に大きなマイナスだ』普天間移設も『首相が願望言うのは間違い…』」, 2022年3月27日, https://www.sankei.com/article/20150327-3OTNK7RQNFIC7E55K3S5U3CM4E/; 日本経済新聞「鳩山元首相、
クリミア訪問計画 外相が再考要請」, 2015年3月6日, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFS06H2B_
W5A300C1EAF000/; 日本経済新聞「クリミアで鳩山氏『住民投票、民主的だった』」, 2015年3月11日,
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDE11H04_
R10C15A3PP8000/.
42 TASS, “Former Japanese PM says Tokyo may misjudge Ukraine crisis because of US,” February 10, 2022,
https://tass.com/world/1401043.
43 See Peter Barton and Sam Atherton, The Japanese Communist Party: Permanent Opposition, but Moral Compass(London: Routledge, 2018).
44 しんぶん赤旗「旧ソ連・ロシアの覇権主義と対決」,
2022年3月16日, https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik21/
2022-03-16/2022031605_01_0.html.

David M. Malitz: Strong Public Support for the Japanese Responsesto the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

renewed criticism of the party’s stance that theexistence of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces
are unconstitutional, made an explanation of theparty’s defense policy necessary. Since 2000,
the official policy of the Communist Party has
been to begin a gradual dissolution of the military once the security situation permitted this.
Until then, the party does not object to a purely
defensive use of Japan’s military capabilities.45
The party’s own criticism meanwhile aimed not
at the government’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine itself, but at the comments byformer prime minister Abe Shinzo, as well as thegovernment’s proposed new defense policy.46 In
the Akahata, both the increase in defense spending as well as the development of ‘counterstrikecapabilities’ are rejected as fundamentally unconstitutional. The party argues that only a true‘peace diplomacy’ based on Article 9 will guarantee the security of the Japanese people.47

CONCLUSION
Under Prime Minister Kishida Fumio, the Japanese government broke with foreign and defense
policy precedence by introducing far-reaching
sanctions against Russia, permitting the delivery of military-grade protective equipment
to Ukraine as well as accepting hundreds of
Ukrainian refugees though officially referring tothem as ‘evacuees’. Surveys show that the public

remains highly supportive of the government’s
response to the crisis despite these seismicchanges. This can be explained, on the one hand,by the concern that the war is deteriorating thesecurity situation in East Asia; and on the other hand, by the already negative view of Russia
held by the Japanese public prior to the war.
Their view will likely have deteriorated since,with Russian attacks on nuclear power plants
and not ruling out the use of nuclear weapons
having been particularly sensitive in Japan.
There are also no political groupings in Japan
with a vested interest in ties with Russia, whotherefore might attempt to rally supporters to amore neutral stance, or even a somewhat pro-­
Russian position. Netizens’ reactions to the two
members of Nihon Ishin no Kai have also demonstrated that, for the time being, there is nothing to
be won by doing so. While Abe Shinzo’s proposal
to allow for the stationing of nuclear weapons inJapan has been rejected by the government, it
has proposed to raise the defense budget and todevelop the capability to strike back on enemy
targets abroad. This is being heavily criticized by
the Communist Party of Japan, but for now there
appears cautious popular support. It is too early to tell, however, if this support holds until theupper house elections in July, and if this support
will turn into support for revising Japan’s peaceconstitution in the future.

45 しんぶん赤旗「党の自衛隊政策への非難に反論」,
2022年4月12日, https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik22/
2022-04-12/2022041202_02_0.html.
46 しんぶん赤旗「平和 ９条基づく外交で」, 2022年
4月15日 15 April 2022, https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik22/2022-04-15/2022041503_01_0.html.
47 しんぶん赤旗「軍事費倍増の自民提言」, 2022年4月
28日, https://www.jcp.or.jp/akahata/aik22/2022-0428/2022042802_01_0.html.

15

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

16

Hee Kyoung Chang: Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Responses from the South Korean Civil Society

RUSSIA’S WAR ON UKRAINE AND THE RESPONSES FROM THE
SOUTH KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY
Hee Kyoung Chang University of Duisburg-Essen

Russia’s war on Ukraine is not an unfamiliar story to the Korean people who experienced the
Korean War in the 1950s. Both countries, South Korea and Ukraine face similar geopolitical circumstances in that both are located between two strong powers. Therefore, the South Korean
government and civil society closely follow the situation in Ukraine to learn lessons on how todeal with the security dilemma under similar conditions. The South Korean government and civilsociety strongly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine and expressed their support to the
Ukraine people. The South Korean government actively joined economic sanctions against Russia,
while refraining from military support such as providing a missile protection system. The South
Korean civil society is divided on the issue based on whether they see North Korea as an enemy ora partner to coexist with peacefully and who will later be part of a unified state. Likewise, the different camps in civil society also differ on how to resolve the North Korean issue that is whether tostrengthen South Korea’s security capabilities, or whether to resolve it through diplomatic means.
Against this background, the liberal camp not only condemn the Russian invasion strongly but
also criticize NATO’s expansion in Eastern Europe. They argue that balancing between Russia andNATO is key for Ukraine to maintain peace. The conservative camp, in contrast, strongly condemn
the Russian attack on Ukraine based on the logic of ‘anti-communism’. They rarely criticize NATO’s
eastward expansion policy. They argue that a strong alliance with the US and increased military
preparedness are more important to prevent a war on the Korean peninsula.

Keywords
Invasion of Ukraine, Korea, South-South conflict, namnamgaldŭng, Korean-Russian relations

THE MEANING OF THE RUSSIA’S WAR
ON UKRAINE IN SOUTH KOREAFor South Korea (hereafter Korea), the war in
Ukraine appears as a familiar scenario. Just as
Ukraine, Korea is located between superpowers,
the continental powers of China and Russia, andthe maritime powers of the USA and Japan. The
Korean War (1950–1953) is a representative example of a conflict between maritime and continental powers, besides having been an ideological conflict between liberalism and communism.
The current complex conflict in Ukraine is similar in that the country is caught between Russia
and NATO. Even though the Korean Peninsula islocated on the far eastern side of Eurasia, Kore-

ans observe the war on Ukraine closely because
it could affect the security environment on the
Korean Peninsula and in East Asia. In the 1950s,
the Korean War had a tremendous impact on thedevelopment of NATO and led to the rearmamentof Germany supported by the USA.1 Far-reaching consequences of the Russian invasion of
Ukraine on the security environment in East Asia
are likewise feared. For example, China could be
induced to invade Taiwan in the name of unification. North Korea could also increasingly contribute to destabilizing security by developing
1 For more detail see Robert Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 24, No. 4 (1980): 563–592.

17

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

further nuclear and missile technologies. Accordingly, for Korea and the Korean people, thewar on Ukraine is not a distant conflict of little
significance.
According to a recent public survey, 94.2 % of
the respondents were interested in the Russian
attack on Ukraine (somewhat interested 46.5 %,very interested 47.7 %) because they were concerned about the innocent civilian refugees andwar victims in Ukraine (36.0 %); about the global
economic downturn, such as energy prices andstock prices (31.6 %); about the escalation of
the war (20.0 %); and about serious challengesof freedom and democracy (12.4 %).2 Regarding
their view on what to do, 61.6 % responded that
the Korean government should closely align with
the needs of the USA for supporting Ukraine in a
relatively passive way rather than ‘actively support Ukraine’ (26.2 %). Noteworthy, many thinkthat the war on Ukraine will affect North Korea’s
strategy toward South Korea. 58.1 % of the respondents said North Korea’s military threat will
increase, and 15.4 % thought military provocation from North Korea will become a reality. In
general terms, both the Korean government andcivil society strongly condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, there are different
reactions to understanding the Ukraine due todiffering explanations for the causes of the war
and possible solutions.

REACTIONS OF THE KOREAN­G OVERNMENTThe Korean government strongly condemned
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine right away. On February 28, the Korean government decided to actively join the international community’s efforts
to impose economic sanctions against Russia.

2 One of the Korean survey institutes, nownsurvey surveyed 1,000 respondents between 10 and 79 years old
between March 16 and 18, 2022, with a 95 % confidence
level and a sampling error of 3.10 %. Last modified April
4, 2022, https://www.nownsurvey.com/board/hotissue/
view/wr_id/159/ptype/all/stx/.

18

As part of these efforts, it blocked the export ofstrategic items to Russia and joined in the exclusion of Russian banks from SWIFT. Furthermore, on March 7, the Korean government imposed an additional prohibition on transactions
with the Central Bank of Russia. Meanwhile, theKorean government is very cautious regarding
imposing sanctions on Russian oil and natural
gas because of the country’s high energy dependency.3 Russian crude oil accounts for 5.6 % of
Korea’s total imports of crude oil. At the sametime, the Korean government plans to increase
its humanitarian assistance to Ukraine by providing up to 10 million dollars including emergency medical supplies. In April, the Ukrainianminister of defense requested the Korean government’s support for a missile defense system.
On April 11, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy delivered a video speech at the Korean
National Assembly to appeal for military support
in the form of tanks, warships, and missiles. But
the Korean minister of defense stated that theexport of lethal weapons systems to Ukraine
was restricted given Korea’s own security situation and the impact the delivery would have on
its military preparedness. Furthermore, Korea
borders North Korea, which in turn shares borders with both China and Russia. Thus, from theperspective of Korea’s security environment, itis crucial to maintain working relationships with
the Chinese and Russian governments to ensure peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, according to the Korean ministerof defense, the Korean government and even its
parliament should take a cautious approach toward providing military weapons to Ukraine.4

3 Most of the crude oil (93 %) in South Korea is provided
by imports. Russian crude oil is charged 5.6 % of thetotal imported oil. See 박정호 외, “우크라이나 사태와 대러 제재의 경제적 영향,” World Economy Today 22, No. 6(2022),
https://www.kiep.go.kr/galleryDownload.es?bid=0003&list_no=10004&seq=1.
4 This speech was held in the library of the National Assembly instead of the general hall and almost 60 members of the National Assembly among 300 members attended it.

Hee Kyoung Chang: Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Responses from the South Korean Civil Society

North Korea, on the other hand, supported theRussian invasion as a measure of self-defense
responding to NATO’s alleged expansionist policyin Eastern Europe and the USA’s hegemonic policies pursuing military superiority and unilateral
economic sanctions.5 Surprisingly, the North Korean foreign ministry released its official position
relatively late, on February 26, which is two days
after the Russian invasion had begun. Nevertheless, North Korea appears to understand the Russian invasion of Ukraine as an infringement of thecountry’s sovereignty, and seems to have utilized
this for legitimizing its nuclear and missile tests
as necessary activities for national self-defense.

KOREAN CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS: LIBERAL VS. CONSERVATIVE
Korean civil society has a comparably strong influence on Korean politics. Especially after theformal democratization in 1987, civil society
organizations have increased in various fields.
Korean civil society has also strongly influenced
foreign policy decision-making. Generally, most
Korean civil society organizations resolutely
condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, butthere are slight differences depending on theirrespective ideological orientation.
Korean civil society has long been divided basedon the question of how North Korea has to be interpreted: is it a neighbor, an enemy, or a partner for making peace on the Korean Peninsula,possibly leading to a unified state? Dependingon the interpretation, foreign policy positions toward North Korea and the USA differ. In particular, in Korean politics, the categories of progressive and conservative are based on the stancetaken towards North Korea.6 The so-called con-

5 뉴시스, “뒤늦게 우크라 사태 입장 낸 北…전문가 “충격 받은 듯,” 뉴시스/정치, 동아일보, February 27, 2022.
https://www.donga.com/news/Politics/article/
all/20220227/112058296/1.
6 Kap-Sik Kim. “The South-South Conflict in Korea: Origin,
Development, and Characteristics,” Korea and World Politics 23, No. 2 (2007): 31–59.

servatives see North Korea as the enemy fromthe Korean War, and a present threat becauseof its nuclear weapons. Thus, to them the denuclearization of North Korea is the primary policy goal in dealing with North Korea, as well as
strengthening the military alliance with the USA
for deterrence based on a realist perspective ofinternational relations. The conservatives havealso utilized ‘anti-communism’ to gain support
from the public. On the other hand, the liberals
tend to see North Korea as a partner to bringabout peace and unification on the Korean peninsula. For them the Korean War and the divisionof Korea must be understood based against thehistorical context of the Cold War and the conflict between the Soviet Union and the USA atthat time. Thus, for the liberals, it is important toachieve stable relations between the two Koreas
through diplomatic means such as economic,
political, and military cooperation as a way torestrain the conflict. This antagonism between
the conservatives and the liberals regarding foreign policy known as the ‘South-South conflict(namnamgaldŭng)’ has become increasingly pronounced.7

LIBERAL CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
One of the most noteworthy collective actionsof the Korean civil society organizations in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine wasa demonstration on February 28 in front of theRussian embassy in Seoul. In total, 393 Korean
non-governmental organizations and 132 individual persons signed a statement that condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine, anddemanded the end of Russian aggression. The
participating NGOs were composed of organizations from diverse fields. The majority of the organizations were traditional democratic movement organizations such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU), the People’s
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD),

7 For a detailed account of this conflict see Hannes Mosler and Hee Kyoung Chang. “Namnamgaldŭng – Partisan
Media Framing of Political Polarization in South Korea,”
Korea Observe 50, No. 3 (2019): 331–354.

19

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

and religious groups linked to Catholicism,
Christianism, and Buddhism. In addition, various
other civil society organizations advocating issues such as human rights, LGBTQ+ and climatechange participated. They strongly criticized theRussian invasion of Ukraine for two main reasons. First, they argue that Russia’s invasionof Ukraine violated the UN Charter, which stipulates sovereignty, independence, and respect
for the territorial integrity of UN member states.
According to their understanding, the war on
Ukraine is an act that infringes on the principleof the international community that seeks tosolve problems through diplomacy, not by force.
Thus, they concluded that the international community should provide humanitarian support to
Ukraine. Second, they also argued that Russia’s
invasion was not justifiable with the concern
over a possible Ukrainian NATO membership.
At the same time, however, the NGOs also madeclear that they do see a certain responsibility
with NATO, too. The eastern expansion of the alliance had indeed threatened Russia’s security.
They argued that the USA and other Westerncountries should have been more careful not toescalate tensions in the region by expanding themilitary alliance, strengthening military forces, or deploying arms. Fourteen new members
joined NATO even though the Cold War had ended, causing a security threat to Russia.8
Since the abovementioned press conference, theNGO network has organized peaceful candlelight
protests every Friday during March in front of
the Russian Embassy in Seoul to put pressure
on Russia. Besides these demonstrations, several artists, who were trained by Ukrainian artists,
held performances such as dance, jazz, etc. forpeace and in solidarity with the Ukrainian people. One Korean jazz pianist, Jeong Eun-Hye,
who had studied under the famous Ukraine musician, Vadim Neselovskyi, composed the song
Together We March On; and performed it during
8 Peoplepower 21. “Stop the war in Ukraine! Give Peace a
Chance!” Last modified April 1, 2022, https://www.peoplepower21.org/Peace/1867320.

20

a concert, stating that the music expressed emotions, beliefs, and social actions and hoped that
it would deliver solace to the Ukrainian people.9
Another set of activities were organized by NGOs
from the southwestern city of Gwangju. Theyarranged several activities in support of the­Koryoin, ethnic Koreans living in Central Asia as
well as Ukraine and Russia. The ancestors of today’s Koryoin have been deported to Ukraine by
an order of Stalin in 1937. The NGOs assist themto escape from Ukraine and settle in Gwangju,
the city of democratization in 1987, and have established a village for them. To help the Koryoin,
the NGOs in Gwangju have raised over 33 million
won ($ 27,319) in donations during March, whichwere sent to the Koryoin Village from individuals
and groups.10

CONSERVATIVE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS
The conservative NGOs in Korea have alsostrongly condemned the Russian invasion of
Ukraine. They also organized a demonstration in
front of the Russian embassy on March 7. They
criticize Russia as a ‘terrorist state’ and its invasion of Ukraine as a violation of internationallaw and an uncivilized action. According to them,Russia has crossed a red line and must be held
accountable for its crime.11 What differentiates
them from liberal civil society organizations isthat they did not criticize the NATO’s eastward
expansion. Also, they argue that Ukraine was attacked because it did have neither a strong military deterrence nor an alliance with NATO. The
conservatives in Korea traditionally advocate
for ‘liberal democracy’, and oppose North Korea,

9 Ko Jaeyeol, “Quiet Voices of Artists Praying for Ukraine”
Last modified April 2, 2022, https://www.theapro.kr:441/
eng/now/now_view.asp?idx=1420.
10 김우현, “‘우크라이나 고려인’ 31명 광주가 품는다…첫 집단입국 예정,” 매일경제, March 27, 2022, https://www.mk.co.
kr/news/society/view/2022/03/275614/.
11 김철관, “보수 시민단체 “우크라이나 주권 침해 러시아 규탄”,” 민족∙국제, OhmyNews, March 8, 2022, http://www.
ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/View/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_
CD=A0002816489.

Hee Kyoung Chang: Russia’s War on Ukraine and the Responses from the South Korean Civil Society

China and Russia, and other Communist or formerly Communist states or organizations. This‘anti-communism’ and ‘anti-North Korea’ ideology is the main pillar of conservative ideology in
Korea. Simultaneously, they are unconditionally
supportive of the USA and NATO, which leads
them to emphasize a strong alliance with theUSA.

THE PRESIDENTIAL RACE AND THE
RUSSIAN AGGRESSION IN UKRAINEWhen Russia invaded Ukraine, the presidential race in Korea was in full swing. Quickly, theUkrainian crisis became a hotly contested issue during the campaign.12 The candidate fromthe conservative camp, Yoon Suk-yeol, who waselected president, argued that Ukraine was
helpless against the attack of Russia not only because they did not have sufficient militarycapacity to defend themselves including nuclear
weapons, but also because they had not joined
NATO. He pointed out that the Budapest Memorandum on security assurance, as well as the
Minsk accords, had not guaranteed Ukraine’s
security. From a strongly realist perspective, his
camp emphasized the need of strong militarycapabilities as well as a strong military alliancewith the USA to deter any attacks. For the conservative camp, the implication of the war on
Ukraine for Korea is the need to increase Korea’s
defense capacity by acquiring an anti-ballistic
missile defense system, known as THAAD, as
well as strengthening the military alliance with
the USA.
The candidate from the liberal camp, Lee Jaemyung, on the other hand, while also strongly
condemning the Russian attack on Ukraine’s sovereignty and territory argued that the Ukrainian
leadership decided to pursue membership in
NATO too hastily. He proposed that a diplomatic
failure of the Ukrainian government contributed

12 The 20th presidential election in South Korea was heldon March 9, 2022.

to the outbreak of the war. Ukraine had not beenable to balance between Russian security concerns and their own desire to join NATO. Becauseof that, Lee argued, Russia perceived Ukraine asa threat to its security. In line with this interpretation of the war in Ukraine, for the liberals, thelesson of the war is that strengthening Korea’s
military through THAAD and the preemptive
strike capability known as the ‘kill-chain’ would
worsen the security crisis on the peninsula. Liberals believe that the conflict on the Korean Peninsula can only be resolved through diplomatic
tools, ultimately leading to a peace treaty. Such apeace treaty would then solve the issue of North
Korea’s nuclear armament.

CONCLUSION
For the people of Korea, Russia’s war on Ukraine
is not considered a distant conflict with little
significance for their daily lives. Most Koreans
as well as civil society organizations observe
the developments very closely because of their
possible geopolitical effects for the Korean peninsula. Both the Korean government and civilsociety organizations have strongly condemned
the Russian invasion of Ukraine regardless of
their political leanings. Furthermore, the war on
Ukraine could contribute to a deterioration of the
security situation in the East Asian region, andin particular on the Korean peninsula. However,depending on the political stances of individuals
as well as organizations regarding Korea’s relations with North Korea and the United States,
there are different interpretations of the reasonsthat have caused the outbreak of the war as well
as of the possible solutions to end the fighting.
The liberal camp emphasizes that diplomatic failures can explain at least partly the war in
Europe. Diplomatic initiatives should, therefore,
be able to prevent the outbreak of a war in East
Asia. Conservatives, in contrast, stress the overarching importance of strong military capabilities to deter the attack and a strong military
alliance with the USA. For them, it is clear that
if Ukraine had had those, the Russian invasion
would not have occurred.

21

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

22

Kasira Cheeppensook: Remaining on the Fence? ASEAN and the Russia-Ukraine War

REMAINING ON THE FENCE? ASEAN AND THE RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR
Kasira Cheeppensook Chulalongkorn University

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations or ASEAN has long strived to maintain a united front
when confronted with international issues. However, this became increasingly difficult in the wakeof the Russian invasion of Ukraine due to the differences among the various member countries’
stances on the crisis. Almost all ASEAN members voted for the UNGA Resolution on March 2, 2022.
In comparison, ASEAN exercised restraint when the organization had to issue its own joint statement, which was based on its norms of consensus seeking, principled neutrality, and not blamingand naming. As a middle power, ASEAN has potential in conflict transformation. But the different
relationships with Russia entertained by the individual member countries have so far prevented
realizing this potential. ASEAN’s statement contrasts with the actions of civil society organizationsin the member countries, who have sought direct contacts with representatives of Ukrainian todemonstrate their support.

Keywords
ASEAN, neutrality, Russia, Ukraine, middle power

INTRODUCTION
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations,known as ASEAN, has long been accused of remaining on the sidelines in a number of international conflicts, at times attempting half-heartedly to act as a mediator, or providing perfunctory joint statements. This has especially been thecase for domestic crises, regardless of whether
their consequences spilled across borders resulting in international humanitarian emergencies. In the past, ASEAN’s actions have also
been deemed as too little, too late. ASEAN was
most vocal when the conflict encroached upon acore normative principle highly regarded by its
members, namely national sovereignty. Violations of sovereignty were utterly unacceptable.
In the past, ASEAN chose to act after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, becoming active
in UN venues such as the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). However, with increasing
interdependency between member states andpowers outside of the region, it became increasingly difficult for ASEAN to maintain a united

front as one can observe in the case of the South
China Sea. The Russian invasion of Ukraine presented yet again difficulties for ASEAN to cometogether and issue a strong standpoint. With adecision-making process based on consensus,
the result needed to be condoned by all member countries. As it had been the case in the past,this has led to agreements based on the lowest
common denominator, with stronger proposals
being watered down.

VOTING ABROAD AND CONSENSUSAT HOMEIt was clear that efforts at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) would be effectively stalledsince Russia was bound to veto any resolutiontabled to condemn its actions and demand withdrawal of its troops. The system was rigged
since it was founded upon an incomplete collective security system at the very beginning, where
the deemed aggressor could block the collective
efforts should it want to. The activities thenmoved to the UNGA where an emergency special

23

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

session was called by the UNSC. The stalemate
at the UNSC also prompted the Veto Initiative
co-sponsored by almost half UN member states.
The UNGA passed the Resolution in April 2022,
so that a veto casted in the UNSC would lead to a
UNGA debate.1 One day before the UNSC voted tocall for an emergency special session, ASEAN issued a joint statement by its foreign ministers on
February 26, 2022. The tone of the joint statement was mild, mentioning that ‘the ASEAN Foreign Ministers are deeply concerned over the
evolving situation and armed hostilities in
Ukraine’. It called for ‘restraint’ and ‘dialogues’ inline with the UN Charter and the Treaty of Amity
and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).2 The
reference to the UN Charter matters only forpeaceful settlements and is not related to the violation of Article 2(4) regarding the threat or use
of force against territorial integrity. ASEAN
nonetheless reiterated the responsibility of ‘allparties to uphold the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity andequal rights of all nations’.3

One day after the resolution on the Russian aggression against Ukraine was passed by the­UNGA, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued another statement expressing that they were ‘deeply
troubled’ and called for ‘an immediate ceasefire
or armistice’.5 The statement also pledged that

A/RES/ES-11/1‘Aggression
against Ukraine’

A/RES/ES-11/2‘Humanitarianconsequences’

A/RES/ES-11/3‘Suspension of therights of membership’

Brunei

Yes

AbstainAbstainCambodia

Yes

Yes

AbstainIndonesia

Yes

Yes

AbstainAbstainAbstain

No

Malaysia

Yes

Yes

Abstain

Myanmar

Yes

Yes

Yes

Philippines

Yes

Yes

Yes

Singapore

Yes

Yes

AbstainThailandYes

Yes

Abstain

VietnamAbstainAbstainNo

Laos

1 UN General Assembly, “Resolution 76/262, Standing
mandate for a General Assembly debate when a veto iscast in the Security Council, A/RES/76/262,” April 26,
2022, https://undocs.org/A/RES/76/262.
2 Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], “ASEAN
Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Situation in Ukraine,”
February 26, 2022, https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ASEAN-FM-Statement-on-Ukraine-Crisis-26-Feb-Final.pdf.

24

It was almost as if ASEAN had adopted a position of wait-and-see vis-à-vis the international
community with regards to its response. It managed to echo the UNGA’s subsequent resolutions,albeit more subdued. On March 2, 2022, Vietnam and Laos, arguably because of a more pronounced reliance on Russia among other things,
abstained from the UNGA Resolution condemning Russian invasion. The Resolution also called
for Russia’s immediate withdrawal of militaryforces from3Ukraine.4 As can be seen from thetable below, ASEAN members did not vote as a
bloc, with suspension of the rights of membership of the Russian Federation in the Human
Rights Council garnering the least positive votes.
This point will be discussed further below.

3 Ibid.
4 UN General Assembly, “Resolution ES-11/1, Aggression
against Ukraine, A/RES/ES-11/1,” March 2, 2022, https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3965290?ln=en.
5 ASEAN, “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement Calling fora Ceasefire in Ukraine,” March 3, 2022, https://asean.
org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ASEAN-Foreign-Ministers-Statement-calling-for-Ceasefire-in-Ukraine-EN.
pdf.

Kasira Cheeppensook: Remaining on the Fence? ASEAN and the Russia-Ukraine War­ SEAN was ‘ready to facilitate, in any possible way,A
peaceful dialogue among parties concerned’.6 Following the reported killing of civilians in Ukraine
approximately two weeks after the Resolution on
Humanitarian Consequences of the Aggression
against Ukraine had been passed by the UNGA,
the ­ASEAN Foreign Ministers also issued a statement to express condolences, support independent an investigation into alleged atrocities, andreinforced previous calls for an immediate ceasefire.7 The ­ASEAN statement kept to the situation in
Ukraine without further mentioning Russia.
Some member countries were more vocal about
the Russian invasion. For example, Singapore
not only condemned Russia but also initiated sanctions on the Russian financial sector. It
had done so the last time when Vietnam invaded Cambodia, since it was adamant for a small
state to maintain its stance towards violations of
the sacrosanct principle of national sovereignty.
Generally speaking, however, a more restraint
position was favored by the organization’s member states. ASEAN wanted a safe approach, onethat avoided offending anyone, given that a number of member countries entertained deepened
relations with Russia. During the last decade,Russia was one of the most important defense
suppliers to Southeast Asia.8 Russia promised
trade and investment plans with ASEAN shortly
before it initiated military operations in Ukraine,and signaled that it would continue to do so evenwith sanctions in place. Arguably, this might be
for Russia’s domestic audience as well, since
Russian share in ASEAN trade is small in comparison to partners like China.

6 Ibid.
7 ASEAN, “ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on theReported Killing of Civilians in Ukraine,” April 8, 2022,
https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/ASEAN_FM_Statement_on_killing_of_civilians_in_Ukraine_
final_8_April.pdf.
8 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], “SIPRI Arms Transfers Database,” last updated
March 14, 2022, accessed May 15, 2022, https://www.
sipri.org/databases/armstransfers.

ASEAN’S POTENTIAL AS A MIDDLE
POWER IN CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION
Questions arose as to how ASEAN could perhaps
mediate in the conflict or whether this would beasking too much of the organization. Certainly,
ASEAN was not designed to function as a security alliance. It is comprised of members whoare skeptical of such alliances, who prefer not totake sides in international issues, and who arecareful not to be perceived as doing so. Blatantviolation of international legal principles involving territorial integrity usually prompted the organization to act, but concrete contributions as
mediator remain elusive.
There have been discussions on the potentialof ASEAN as a middle power to break out of its
shell to follow up on promises of being a valuable player in maintaining peace and stability inline with its Indo-Pacific vision. Several member
countries have long adopted ‘neutral’ stances ininternational conflicts involving great powers
such as this. But the claim of neutrality alone
would not be a satisfactory substitute for muted
responses. Member countries of the EU such as
Finland and Sweden, long known to be neutral in
the sense that they had previously not intended
to join a security alliance, had voiced out against
Russia in no uncertain terms.
It would be a difficult feat indeed to uphold
ASEAN centrality when members remain di­visive when challenged with violations of thefundamental legal principle also echoed within
the organization’s own charter as well as coretreaties such as the Treaty of Amenity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC). Middle power diplomacy has been deemed important in conflicttransformation, as ASEAN was once expected
to perform. ASEAN has a number of ASEAN-led
mechanisms dealing with common interestsin the Asia-Pacific regional order in place suchas the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the­ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus (ADMM
Plus). These mechanisms already involved Rus-

25

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

sia along with powers like China and the UnitedStates. Russia also acceded to the TAC in 2004,
which explicitly stated the fundamental principleof settling differences or disputes by peacefulmeans and devoted the whole of Chapter IV tothe peaceful settlement of disputes.9 It is truethat Article 13 regarding the constitution of theHigh Council ‘shall apply to any of the States outside Southeast Asia which have acceded to theTreaty only in cases where that state is directly involved in the dispute to be settled throughthe regional processes’, but this also represents
the potential that ASEAN could follow throughwith its pledge of its joint statement on March 3,2022.10
It is undeniable that the Russia-Ukraine war
poses implications far beyond the actual theatre.
It definitely has ramifications for geopolitics
in Asia, where regional power also warily eyed
responses from the international community tofactor in in its own moves in regional hotspots.
If aggression was met internationally with swift
and strong disapproval backed by collective enforcement measures, there might be second
thoughts before any attempts of emulation.

NORMATIVE CONDITIONS:(NON-)SANCTIONS OF ASEAN AND
CIVIL SOCIETY
Although most ASEAN members voted for the
UNGA Resolution on March 2, 2022, a different
scenario could be observed when it came to the
UNGA Resolution regarding the suspension of
Russia from the Human Rights Council (HRC).

26

This underlined further difficulties in presenting a united front among ASEAN members. They
have been careful to voice their disagreements
before in the form of abstentions, negating but
not attempting to block the resolutions. Almost
every ASEAN member country abstained fromthe draft resolution asking for suspension of therights of membership of Russia in the HRC. But
Vietnam and Lao PDR voted against it and thePhilippines and Myanmar voted in favor.11 The
resolution passed, and Russia chose to resign.
It is interesting to note here, albeit not surprising, that ASEAN civil society responses to thesituation between Russia and Ukraine werelargely not in line with those of the ASEAN
states. The heterogeneity of member states isalso reflected here, with some civil society organizations appearing to adopt principled neutrality, a stance that is similar to that of ASEAN
member states. An interesting case in point waswhen representatives from civil society groups
in Vietnam chose to contact Ukrainian representatives in the country directly to express theirsupport for Ukraine. Although Vietnam has longestablished historical ties with Russia and has
more or less supported Russia’s actions in thepast, the press was far less outright pro-Russia and chose to focus on other aspects of the­conflict.12

CONCLUSION
For the international community, collective disapproval was necessary following the serious
violation of international law by Russian forces.
This proved to be difficult for ASEAN as a re-

9 Instrument of Extension of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia by Russian Federation,
signed November 29, 2004, ASEAN, November 1, 2004,
https://asean.org/instrument-of-extension-of-the-treaty-of-amity-and-cooperation-in-southeast-asia-by-russian-federation/.

11 UN News, “UN General Assembly votes to suspend
Russia from the Human Rights Council,” April 7, 2022,
accessed May 15, 2022, https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/04/1115782.

10 ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation, “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” signed
February 24, 1976, July 2018, https://asean-aipr.org/
wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Treaty-of-Amity-and-Cooperation-in-Southeast-Asia-1976-TAC.pdf.

12 To Minh Son, “Explaining the Vietnamese Public’s Mixed
Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis,” The Diplomat,
March 18, 2022, accessed May 15, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/explaining-the-vietnamese-publics-mixed-responses-to-the-russia-ukraine-crisis/.

Kasira Cheeppensook: Remaining on the Fence? ASEAN and the Russia-Ukraine War

gional organization that has long evaded ‘blaming-and-naming’ as means towards behavioral
change. The situation on the ground warranted an inquiry from the Human Rights Council
as well as investigations from the International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding the atrocities
committed in Ukraine.13 In the future, normative

support from the international community could
reinforce Southeast Asian civil society efforts insignaling to governments to take stronger stances. In face of these developments in regard to
the Russia-Ukraine war, it has become increasingly clear that going forward, mildly formulated
reprimands will not suffice.

13 United Nations Human Rights Council, “Independent
International Commission of Inquiry on Ukraine,” lastmodified May 12, 2022, accessed May 15, 2022, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hr-bodies/hrc/iicihr-ukraine/index;
International Criminal Court, “Ukraine,” last modified
April 1, 2022, accessed May 15, 2022, https://www.icccpi.int/ukraine.

27

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine28Patrick Ziegenhain: Indonesian Reactions to the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022

INDONESIAN REACTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN WAR IN
2022
Patrick Ziegenhain President University, Cikarang, Indonesia

This article analyzes the reactions of the Indonesian government and civil society in the firstmonth after Russia’s military attack on Ukraine. President Joko Widodo and his administration
condemned the invasion since it constituted a break of international law. The government, however, avoided to explicitly mention Russia as aggressor and did not support any economic sanctions.
This reaction was widely supported by the national media and most commentators from academia and civil society. Only a few asked for more support for the Ukraine and sanctions against
Russia. In the online media there was even support for Russia’s actions, since many Indonesians
have Anti-American attitudes and believe that Russia is fighting against mighty America and anassumed American puppet government in the Ukraine.

Keywords
Indonesia, Russia-Ukraine War, anti-Westernism, Indonesian public opinion, Indonesian foreign
policyINTRODUCTION
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24,
2022, shocked the world and made headlines
worldwide. The reactions of governments, politicians, and the general public, however, werequite distinct in different parts of the world.
Whereas in Western countries (USA, C­ anada,Australia, the EU member states) a strict­condemnation of Russian military aggression
was the norm, the reactions in Asia were more
mixed.1 In this article, I will take a closer lookon the public reactions in Indonesia, the biggest
country in Southeast Asian and with more than
270 million people the fourth most populous
country in the world. I will focus on the reactions of the Indonesian government, the Indonesian academia, but also include the ordinary cit-

1 Sui-Lee Wee, Emily Schmall, and Sameer Yasir, “We Are
on Our Side’: Across Asia, a Mixed Reaction to Ukraine
War,” New York Times, March 2, 2022, updated March 4,2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/
asia/asia-russia-ukraine-war.html.

izens’ responses, particularly in online media. In
terms of methodology, I relied on media reports
in English and Indonesian language, but also
on daily-life observations, such as commentsof colleagues, friends and my students around
Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. All translations
from Indonesian language into English weredone by the author. On April 1, 2022, the author
took part in a public online discussion with theformer ambassador of Indonesia in the Ukraine(2017–2021), Yuddy Chrisnandi, which was organized by President University in Cikarang,­Indonesia.

DEBATES ABOUT INDONESIA’S­RESPONSE TO THE WAR
Directly after the first news about the Russian
military attack on the Ukraine became public, Indonesian President Joko Widodo sent the following message on his official Twitter account: ‘Stop
the war. This war torments humanity and endan-

29

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

gers the world’.2 A few days later, Indonesia was
one of the 141 countries that supported the UN
General Assembly Resolution ES‑11/1 on March
2, 2022, that condemned and deplored Russia’s
invasion of the Ukraine as a violation of Article
2 of the UN Charter and demanded a full withdrawal of Russian forces and a reversal of its
decision to recognize the self-declared People’s
Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk.3 Indonesian
Foreign Minister Retno reiterated Indonesia’s
principled position of respect for internationallaw, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and thatall parties must guarantee humanitarian accessand safe passage for civilians. Like President
Joko Widodo in his initial reaction, the Indonesian government condemned the hostilities but
also tiptoed around any pressure to antagonize
Moscow, at the behest of Kyiv.4 President Widodo
has so far refrained from making explicit statements criticizing Russian aggression. He andthe Indonesian Foreign Ministry, however, havemade clear that the ‘military attack’ was ‘unacceptable’ and violated international law. Indonesia did not follow other countries by imposing
sanctions or sending military support to Ukraine.
Academic Teuku Faizasyah explained that thecountry had no intention of imposing sanctions
against Moscow, arguing it would ‘not blindly follow the steps taken by another country’.5 Thus,
the country seemed to be content with a waitand-see approach.6

2 Jokow Nugraheny Dian Erika, “Setop Perang, Men­yengsarakan Manusia, Membahayakan Dunia,” kompas.com,
February 24, 2022, https://nasional.kompas.com/read/
2022/02/24/19163021/jokowi-setop-perang-menyengsarakan-manusia-membahayakan-dunia.

30

The main reason behind Indonesia’s careful response was likely5economic6pragmatism. Russia is not a top trading partner of Indonesia, butthere is some economic cooperation and someRussian investment in Indonesia, such as theconstruction of an oil refinery in Tuban, East Java worth US$ 14 billion.7 In addition, Russia isa major source of Indonesia’s imported metals
and mineral fuels.8 There is also some military
cooperation between both countries. Russia has,for example, several times sold Sukhoi fighter
jets to Indonesia, and in December 2021, Indonesia was the host of the first-ever joint maritime
exercise between Russia and the Association ofSoutheast Asian Nations, or ASEAN.9
Many Indonesian commentators have recommended that the country should stay neutral in
the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, but also contribute to its solution. Directly after the beginningof the Russian invasion, the before-mentioned
International Relations expert Teuku Rezasyah,
said Indonesia as a country that stands ‘in the
middle’ of Russia and Ukraine, should become
a mediator and finally end the war between

5 Sui-Lee Wee, Emily Schmall, and Sameer Yasir, “We Are
on Our Side’: Across Asia, a Mixed Reaction to Ukraine
War,” New York Times, March 2, 2022, updated March 4,2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/
asia/asia-russia-ukraine-war.html.
6 I Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, “Indonesia should takea stand with Ukraine,” Jakarta Post, March 10, 2022,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/03/09/
indonesia-should-take-a-stand-with-ukraine.html.
7 Ibid.

3 Tommy Kurnia, “Bela Ukraina, Indonesia Resmi Kecam Rusia di Resolusi PBB,” Liputan 6, March 4, 2022,
https://www.liputan6.com/global/read/4902352/belaukraina-indonesia-resmi-kecam-rusia-di-resolusi-pbb.

8 Dian Septiari, “Indonesia caught in the middle of Russia-Ukraine struggle,” Jakarta Post, March 25, 2022,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2022/03/24/indonesia-caught-in-the-middle-of-russia-ukraine-struggle.html.

4 Dian Septiari, “Putin ‘wants’ to attend G20 summit despite potential boycott,” Jakarta Post, March 24, 2022,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2022/03/23/
putin-wants-to-attend-g20-summit-despite-potentialboycott.html.

9 Sui-Lee Wee, Emily Schmall, and Sameer Yasir, “We Are
on Our Side’: Across Asia, a Mixed Reaction to Ukraine
War,” New York Times, March 2, 2022, updated March 4,2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/
asia/asia-russia-ukraine-war.html.

Patrick Ziegenhain: Indonesian Reactions to the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022

Russia and Ukraine.10 Such a form of neutrality would be in accordance with the longstanding Indonesian foreign policy principle of bebas
dan aktif (free and active). This foreign policy
approach, which has remained unchanged since
the country’s independence in 1945, means thatIndonesia does not maintain a passive or reactive stance on international issues, but seeks toactively participate in their settlement. Therefore, Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ policy is not aneutral policy, but rather one that does not alignIndonesia with any superpower, nor does it bindthe country to any military pact.11
Another current big topic for the Indonesian Foreign Ministry and the general public was the G20
Summit, which is scheduled to take place underIndonesian presidency in Bali in mid-November
2022. Russian President Vladimir Putin had already been invited to the G20 Summit and he intends to be there, Russian Ambassador to Indonesia Lyudmila Vorobieva said in March 2022.12
Several European countries but also Indonesia’s
southern neighbor Australia have already expressed reluctance to attend the G20 summit
when Putin will arrive there. Indonesian Coordinating Economic Affairs Minister, Airlangga Hartarto, commented that Indonesia should uphold
the G20’s traditional role as an economic forum.
The Indonesian government has no plans to discuss any geopolitical issues, ‘which are clearly
political and security issues’. ‘There are many forums for geopolitical and security issues, such

10 Dwi Andayani, “Hanya Indonesia yang Dinilai Mampu
Akhiri Invasi Rusia ke Ukraina,” Detik.com, February
25, 2022, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5958072/
hanya-indonesia-yang-dinilai-mampu-akhiri-invasi-rusia-ke-ukraina.
11 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy,” accessed May 20, 2022, https://
kemlu.go.id/washington/en/pages/kebijakan_luar_
negeri_ri/716/etc-menu.
12 Dian Septiari, “Indonesia caught in the middle of Russia-Ukraine struggle,” Jakarta Post, March 25, 2022,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2022/03/24/
indonesia-caught-in-the-middle-of-russia-ukrainestruggle.html.

as the United Nations general meeting and UN
Security Council. These are the channels to resolve geopolitical issues in Ukraine’, he wasquoted as saying.13 Most commentators agreed
on the government’s policies and positions.
President University’s International Relation
expert, I Bagus Dharma Agastia, was one of the
few academics who openly criticized the Indonesian government’s lukewarm reaction to Russian aggression. Referring to Russia’s economic
relations, he asked rhetorically: ‘Is foreign investment really worth losing moral credibility?’
About the typical position that Indonesia should
stay neutral and not side with the Western countries, he argued that ‘as a middle-power, it is inIndonesia’s interests to see international law
and order be upheld. Without it, Indonesia may
have long been subjected to the throes of great
power politics. By choosing not to act, Indonesia
betrays its commitment to the “active” principle.’
Agastia also demanded that Indonesia should
clearly convey its opposition to the invasion at
the international and domestic level by naming
the aggressor and calling it an unjustified andunwarranted invasion. In addition, Indonesia
should consider economic sanctions and also toformulate regional action within ASEAN against
Russia.14 The former ambassador of Indonesia
in the Ukraine (2017–2021), Yuddy Chrisnandi,also made clear that he expected a more critical
reaction of the Indonesian government. In an online debate, he demanded that President Jokowi
and the Foreign Ministry should not hide behindslogans of bebas dan aktif and instead upholdbasic principles of international law. He alsoquestioned the rightfulness of Indonesia’s neu-

13 Norman Harsono, “Indonesia stands firm on G20 economic agenda,” Jakarta Post, March 25, 2022, https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2022/03/24/indonesia-balks-at-pressures-to-add-ukraine-war-to-g20agenda.html.
14 I Gusti Bagus Dharma Agastia, “Indonesia should takea stand with Ukraine,” Jakarta Post, March 10, 2022,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/opinion/2022/03/09/
indonesia-should-take-a-stand-with-ukraine.html.

31

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

trality since it was obvious for everybody whichcountry is the aggressor and which country is
the victim.
How did the Ukraine and Russia react to Indonesia’s response? Both governments, represented by their ambassadors in Indonesia’s capital
Jakarta expressed their unhappiness with theIndonesian response, but also requested further
support from Indonesia’s government and society. The Ukrainian government considered Indonesia’s reaction in response to Russia’s invasion
as too weak because it did not name Russia as
the aggressor and did not impose any economic
sanctions on Russia. The Ukrainian Ambassador to Indonesia, Vasyl Hamianin, issued a letter
requesting public support from the Indonesian
citizens. He described Indonesia as a free anddemocratic country, as a strong and brave nation, fighting for truth, freedom, peace and justice. He referred to the long Indonesian struggle
for independence against Dutch colonial ruleand added that the Ukraine has not bowed tothe threat of death, just as Indonesia did not surrender in their war of independence in 1945.15
On March 4, 2022 Indonesian and Ukrainian citizens gathered in front of the Russian Embassy in Jakarta to protest Russia’s invasion in the
Ukraine.16 Meanwhile, Russia was disappointed
that Indonesia has become one of the supporters of the resolution at the UN General Assembly
demanding that Russia immediately end the attack on Ukraine.17 However, the Russian ambas-

32

sador to Indonesia, Lyudmila Vorobieva, showedalso some relief that ‘fortunately and different
from many other countries the Indonesian government does not support the internationalanti-Russia campaign’ and added that Russia
hopes ‘that the Indonesian government will not
succumb to the terrible pressure imposed by
the West’.18 Russian as well as Ukrainian embassies tried to convince not only the national
government from their positions but also theIndonesian society. Both sides organized meetings with leading figures of Indonesia’s Islamic
community, for example with Muhammadiyah or
the chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama, Yahya Cholil
Staquf. The latter, however, refused to be siding
with one of the two countries.19

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
OF THE WAR
Beside the topic of how the Indonesian government should react to Russia’s invasion in the
Ukraine, the economic consequences of the war
between Russia and Ukraine were a big topic in
Indonesia’s media. It was often speculated thatthe conflict would rattle financial markets anddrag down the Indonesian gross domestic product (GDP) thereby endangering the recovery
after the covid-19 pandemic.20 Both countries,
Russia and Ukraine, were usually portrayed as
major commodity exporters and analysts predicted spikes in commodity prices, spikes in

15 Basuki Eka Purnama, “Ukraina Minta Dukungan Indonesia,” Media Indonesia, March 02, 2022, https://
mediaindonesia.com/internasional/475092/
ukraina-minta-dukungan-indonesia.

18 Marcheilla Ariesta, “Dubes Rusia: Reaksi Barat Terhadap
Operasi Militer di Ukraina Tidak Proporsional,” Medcom.
id, March 23, 2022, https://www.medcom.id/internasional/asean/1bVqzy7N-dubes-rusia-reaksi-barat-terhadap-operasi-militer-di-ukraina-tidak-proporsional.

16 Yudha Baskoro, “Indonesians, Ukrainians Protest
Against War Outside Russian Embassy,” Jakarta Globe,
March 6, 2022, https://jakartaglobe.id/vision/indonesians-ukrainians-protest-against-war-outside-russian-embassy.

19 Dian Septiari, “Indonesia caught in the middle of Russia-Ukraine struggle,” Jakarta Post, March 25, 2022,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2022/03/24/
indonesia-caught-in-the-middle-of-russia-ukrainestruggle.html.

17 Valdya Baraputri, “Ukraina dan Rusia kecewa sekaligus
berharap pada Indonesia: Wawancara dengan Duta
Besar Ukraina dan Rusia,” BBC News Indonesia, March
16, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/indonesia/indonesia-60746748.

20 Norman Harsono, “Indonesia stands firm on G20 economic agenda,” Jakarta Post, March 25, 2022, https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2022/03/24/indonesia-balks-at-pressures-to-add-ukraine-war-to-g20agenda.html.

Patrick Ziegenhain: Indonesian Reactions to the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022

energy prices, and supply chain shocks.21 And
indeed, the war led to a surge in product prices, which directly affected ordinary consumers.
Particularly, cooking oil was impacted but also
wheat, corn and barley, and products composedof them.22 President Widodo stated on March 11,2022 that the Ukraine crisis might tip the balance of domestic price stability as the war exacerbates a rally in global commodity prices.
He stated that government subsidies have upheld price limits on crude palm oil, cooking oil,beef, fuel and cooking gas. In this context, theIndonesian President admitted that supportingthese prices was becoming increasingly difficult.23 Other government officials tried to playdown fears of an economic downturn in Indonesia. Coordinating Economic Affairs Minister Airlangga Hatarto, for example, stated thatIndonesia expected the Ukraine war to haveminimal effect on the domestic economy in the
mid-term, as trade and investment between Indonesia and Ukraine-Russia was less than one
percent. He did, however, acknowledge that the
war might strain fiscal health in the long run asrising commodity prices, especially oil, mightforce the government to spend more on energy­subsidies.24

21 Firman Hidranto, “Perang Rusia Vs Ukraina dan Perekonomian Indonesia,” Bisnis.com, March 6, 2022, https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20220306/9/1507157/
dampak-perang-rusia-vs-ukraina-terhadap-perekonomian-indonesia.

Other economic experts even pointed out risingexport opportunities for Indonesia. When Europe
must adapt to the new reality of the scarcity ofvegetable oils, it might reverse its anti-palm oil
ideology into more pragmatic views and importpalm oil from the world’s largest palm oil producer, Indonesia.25 In a similar direction went
the proposal to economically benefitting fromthe war by strengthening Indonesia’s exports of
non-alloy steel products to European and Asian
countries.26 Whereas many Western European
countries considered reducing their oil and gas
imports from Russia, Indonesia openly voiced interest in increasing them. The president directorof state-owned oil and gas company Pertamina,
Nicke Widyawati, stated that Pertamina had approached several Russian sellers to buy crude
oil and gas for testing at Pertamina’s refineries.
She told members of House of Representatives
Commission VI overseeing trade, industry, andinvestment that she sees an opportunity to buy
oil from Russia at a good price at the moment.27
This and the other reactions of the Indonesian
government showed a sort of economic pragmatism that ignored the violation of basic international rules and Russian atrocities in Ukraine.
In this regard, Indonesian strong nationalist andbenefit-seeking attitude seemed to be more important than a foreign trade policy based on ethical principles.

22 Damiana Cut Emeria, “Efek Perang, Harga Pangan,
Sandang, dan Papan RI Beterbangan,” CNBC Indonesia, March 07, 2022, https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/
news/20220306235020-4-320418/efek-perang-hargapangan-sandang-dan-papan-ri-beterbangan.

25 Edi Suhardi, “Ukraine crisis dampens Europe’s anti-palm oil sentiment,” Jakarta Post, March 31, 2022,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/paper/2022/03/31/
ukraine-crisis-dampens-europes-anti-palm-oil-sentiment.html.

23 Vincent Fabian Thomas, “Jokowi raises alarm on domestic inflation amid Ukraine crisis,” Jakarta Post,
March 14, 2022, https://www.thejakartapost.com/
business/2022/03/14/jokowi-raises-alarm-on-domestic-inflation-amid-ukraine-crisis.html.

26 Pradnyawati, “Opini: Konflik Rusia-Ukraina dan Potensi
Ekspor Indonesia,” Bisnis.com, March 15, 2022, https://ekonomi.bisnis.com/read/20220315/9/1510670/opini-konflik-rusia-ukraina-dan-potensi-ekspor-indonesia.

24 Norman Harsono, “Indonesia stands firm on G20 economic agenda,” Jakarta Post, March 25, 2022, https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2022/03/24/indonesia-balks-at-pressures-to-add-ukraine-war-to-g20agenda.html.

27 Divya Karyza, “Pertamina turns to Russia for oil amid
energy price hike,” Jakarta Post, March 30, 2022, https://www.thejakartapost.com/business/2022/03/29/pertamina-turns-to-russia-for-oil-amid-energy-price-hike.
html.

33

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

PRO-RUSSIAN VOICESWhile the large majority of the TV and newspaper
reports remained somewhat balanced in theircoverage of the Russian war against Ukraine,
the public debates in the online community, particularly in social media, showed an astonishingdegree of sympathy if not support for Russia’s
position. Usually, the Indonesian general public
tends to sympathize with the smaller countries
that became victims of aggression by bigger
powers. The most important examples for thisattitude are the popular support for Palestinians
in the Middle East conflict or the Rohingya minority in Myanmar. Both cases are, however, influenced by the fact that the attacked minorities
are Muslims, which is stressed and sometimes
instrumentalized by influential Muslim organizations from all kinds of shade in Indonesia.
Russia is not particularly known for its pro-Islamic stance and has in the past brutally suppressed the Muslim community in Chechnya andoccupied Afghanistan in the 1980s. International
Relations scholar, Radityo Dharmaputra, however, reported that in the last few years, Russia has
undertaken concerted efforts to portray Russia
as a friend and ally of Islam in social media. He
refers to a popular Indonesian-language YouTube channel, Rabbanians.id. This channel has avery popular video with nearly 900,000 views at
the end of March 2022, which described Russia
as corresponding to the ‘Rum’ people describedin the holy Quran. The online report explains in avery empathic way that this people follow Christianity at the moment, but will align themselveswith Islam at the end of days.28 Many Indonesian
newspaper and online reports also extensively
covered Islamic Chechen leader, Ramzan Kadyrov, and his military support for Vladimir Putin. In
an article for Republika, for example, he was por-

28 Radityo Dharmaputra, “Why do so many Indonesiansback Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?,” University of Melbourne, March 9, 2022, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.
unimelb.edu.au/why-do-so-many-indonesians-backrussias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

34

trayed as a gentle person who loves the Prophet
and the Islamic community (umat) and nevertheless is a fearless fighter in defending Islam fromits enemies.29 The photo of Fayadh’s report depicting Ramzan Kadyrov, whom Western media
often describe as a brutal warlord, in a devout
Islamic praying position, certainly appealed tomillions of pious Indonesian Muslims.30
Another explanation for the pro-Russian stanceof many Indonesians is more evident: Anti-­
Americanism or a refusal of the policies of theallegedly imperialist, capitalist, immoral, and Islamophobic Western culture and their representatives in the pro-Western governments. From
this perspective, the Ukraine or more precisely
the Ukrainian government under President Zelenskyy is described as a puppet of the Americans(or the CIA, or the World Jewish Community). In
so far, it is absolutely justified by the Russians toraise their weapons against US imperialism andcapitalism in self-defense, because otherwise
the already dominating USA will further increase
their control of the world. Hikmahanto Juwana,
professor of international law at the University of Indonesia stated that Russia’s President
Putin was right in his argumentation that Russia is threatened by Ukraine’s announcement tojoin NATO.31 He voiced his regret that Indonesia
supported the UN resolution against Russia andcriticized that Indonesia blindly followed the USA
and their Western friends. In his opinion, it would

29 Faisal Abu Fayadh, “Sosok Presiden Chechnya: Kadyrov, Sekutu Rusia yang Muslim,” Republika, March 3,2022,
https://retizen.republika.co.id/posts/64193/
sosok-presiden-chechnya-kadyrov-sekutu-rusia-yang-muslim.
30 George Grylls, “Notorious Chechen warlord Ramzam
Kadyrov rises up the ranks,” The Times, March 29, 2022,
https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/notorious-chechenwarlord-ramzam-kadyrov-rises-up-the-ranks5qhm0t8l7.
31 Antara News, “Hikmahanto jelaskan dua narasi terkait konflik Rusia-Ukraina,” Antara News, February 24,
2022, https://www.antaranews.com/berita/2724813/
hikmahanto-jelaskan-dua-narasi-terkait-konflik-rusiaukraina.

Patrick Ziegenhain: Indonesian Reactions to the Russian-Ukrainian War in 2022

be better to remain neutral by keeping in mind
that Indonesia also was accused by Westerncountries of occupying another country, namely Timor Leste, in the past.32 Anti-Western resentments came also from another Indonesianpublic figure. Military expert, Connie Rahakundini Bakrie, explained publicly that the USA is themain responsible force behind the escalation of
the conflict since the Americans pushed Russia’s
neighbor countries like the Baltic states and recently the Ukraine to join NATO. This aggressive
American behavior of course caused tensions
with Russia that could only be resolved by war.33
In the same direction went Achmad Munjid from
the Muslim organization Nahdlatul Ulama who
accused the Americans of systematically betraying the Russians by expanding their military tool,
the NATO, more and more into Eastern Europe,
what led to the Ukraine crisis. The author avoided the word ‘war’ for Russia’ s military attack
and portrayed the USA as the sole culprit for thehumanitarian tragedy taking place in Ukraine aspart of the American geo-strategic strategies,
which are not only directed against the Palestinians but also the Russians. Indonesia should
not listen to US demands to condemn Putin, butinstead invite him to the G20 summit and try tofind a diplomatic solution for the ‘crisis’.34

dymyr Zelenskyy. Putin has long been portrayedby Indonesian media and influential persons asa hypermasculine, strong, and assertive longterm leader who is smart and has a cool background as a former intelligence agent.35 Thesefeatures have a highly positive appeal among
many ordinary Indonesians. The preferences
for a strong, ultra-nationalist leader became already visible in the two Presidential elections in2014 and 2019, in which former general and alleged war criminal Prabowo Subianto operated
quite successfully with this image in order to win
votes. Many ordinary Indonesians agreed whenin 2018 Prabowo’s close ally Fadli Zon argued
that Indonesia needs ‘a strong, brave, visionary,smart, and authoritative leader like Putin’.36 In
sharp contrast, Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelenskyy is often ridiculed in Indonesian social
media, not only because of his Jewish religion
but also because of his previous life as a TV comedian. In one article, for example, it was stated that as a former comedian, Zelenskyy seems
driven by his own feelings of wanting to get applause from America and the West in his ‘resistance’ against Russia. America and the West willcontinue to support him as a ‘puppet’ to prolong
the conflict with Russia.37

Another aspect is that the conflict between two
countries is personalized as a struggle between
two personalities. And by doing so, there is aclear preference for Vladimir Putin over Volo-

Radityo Dharmaputra sums up convincingly why
pro-Russian positions dominate in Indonesian
online debates: The lack of profound expertiseand knowledge on Eastern Europe is ‘filled bylatent anti-American and anti-western perspec-

32 Arief Ikhsanudin, “Guru Besar UI Sayangkan RI Setujui Resolusi PBB soal Rusia: Ngekor ke AS dkk,” Detik.
com, March 03, 2022, https://news.detik.com/berita/d-5966346/guru-besar-ui-sayangkan-ri-setujuiresolusi-pbb-soal-rusia-ngekor-ke-as-dkk.

35 Radityo Dharmaputra, “Why do so many Indonesiansback Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?,” University of Melbourne, March 9, 2022, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.
unimelb.edu.au/why-do-so-many-indonesians-backrussias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

33 Sigit Nugroho, “Konflik Rusia-Ukraina: Amerika Heboh ‘Manas-Manasin’, Tapi Pas Kejadian Kemana?,”
Fajar Indonesia Network, March 3, 2022, https://fin.
co.id/read/90219/Konflik-Rusia-Ukraina-Amerika-Heboh-Manas-Manasin-Tapi-Pas-Kejadian-Kemana.

36 Kompas TV, “Fadli Zon Ingin Pemimpin Indonesia Seperti Putin,” Kompas TV, March 31, 2018, https://www.
kompas.tv/article/23270/fadli-zon-ingin-pemimpin-indonesia-seperti-putin.

34 Achmad Munjid, “Krisis Ukraina dan Kebohongan Internasional,” Media Indonesia, April 2, 2022, https://media­
indonesia.com/opini/482735/krisis-ukraina-dan-kebohongan-internasional.

37 Arjuno Welirang, “Beranikah Bekas Walikota Solo Itu
Mendepak Rusia Dari Forum G20?,“ Kedaipena.com,
March 30, 2022, https://www.kedaipena.com/beranikah-bekas-walikota-solo-itu-mendepak-rusia-dari-forum-g20/.

35

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

tives, the idealization of strong leaders like Putin, religious arguments suggesting Russia is anally of Islam, and pervasive pro-Russian public
diplomacy and propaganda’.38

CONCLUSION
The reactions of the Indonesian government on
the Russian invasion of the Ukraine were carefuland somewhat reluctant. On the one hand, thegovernment supported the UN resolution andcondemned Russian aggression, but on the other
hand never mentioned Russia as an aggressor
in an official statement. The Indonesian government also did not impose any (trade) sanctions
on Russia and did insist on Russia’s participation
at the G20 summit in Bali at the end of 2022.
Most commentators in TV and media underlined
the alleged necessity to remain neutral, which

38 Radityo Dharmaputra, “Why do so many Indonesiansback Russia’s invasion of Ukraine?,” University of Melbourne, March 9, 2022, https://indonesiaatmelbourne.
unimelb.edu.au/why-do-so-many-indonesians-backrussias-invasion-of-ukraine/.

36

was only questioned by a few academics. In social media, in contrast, many Indonesians posted
Pro-Russian slogans, in which they blamed the
USA for the outbreak of the war. It is very difficult
to estimate in how far these voices are representative for many Indonesians or if they are just aloud minority. More than 90 percent of the Indonesians have never left their home country andare not particularly familiar with the geographic and historic conditions in Eastern Europe, letalone the Ukraine. In so far, it matters how theRussian invasion is framed by opinion-makers in
the traditional (press, TV, radio) and new digital
media. The large majority of the Indonesian population does not really bother with the situationin this far away region. The economic impact of
the war on their daily lives, such as price hikes
for daily goods, seems to have a higher priority
for ordinary Indonesians than the thousands ofvictims of Russia’s war against Ukraine.

Wan Elis Regina Wan Ahmad: Malaysians and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine Conflict

MALAYSIANS AND THE 2022 RUSSIA-UKRAINE CONFLICT:UNDERSTANDING THE DIVERSE PERSPECTIVES AMONG NON-­
GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS IN MALAYSIAWan Elis Regina Wan Ahmad Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia

The Malaysian government’s reaction to the conflict has been described as ‘muted’ by both domestic and international observers. Based on the coverage of the conflict in the Malaysian press,
the author identifies four different stances on the war in the Malaysian public sphere. The government’s response follows Malaysia’s traditional policy of non-alignment which has gained support
by many Malaysians who are not interested in a politically and geographically distant war. However, there are also vocal commentators in Malaysia in support of either one of the two sides in
the conflict. Those who advocate for a stronger response in favor of Ukraine are also motivatedby the downing of a Malaysian airplane in 2014 by pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine, and due toconcerns that Russia’s actions will set a dangerous precedence for the South China Sea. Those
supporting Russia online are fueled by strong anti-Western and anti-Semitic sentiments and/or
due to a perceived Islamic ‘solidarity’, as Ukraine is being supported by NATO and governed by a
Jewish president.

Keywords
Invasion of Ukraine, Russia, Malaysia, public opinion, MH17, South China Sea, anti-Westernism,
neutrality

INTRODUCTION
The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine has been
described in various ways, among them: a ‘humanitarian disaster’ by various NGOs, a ‘war of
aggression’ by Ukraine and NATO members, andeven a way to ‘de-escalate the ongoing Eastern
Ukraine conflict’ by a Russian spokesperson. The
conflict has drawn numerous reactions from theinternational community, largely against Russia
and in support of Ukraine. This included a historic UN resolution on March 2, 2022 to condemn
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demand thelatter’s unconditional withdrawal.1 Other notableactions include sanctions and punitive measures

1 The Guardian, “UN Votes to Condemn Russia’s Invasionof Ukraine and Calls for Withdrawal,” March 2, 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/02/
united-nations-russia-ukraine-vote.

against Russia by countries and private sector
corporations, especially from the West. Throughout the world, many notable celebrities, civil society activists, politicians, experts, and ordinary
people have also condemned Russia’s actions.
In Malaysia, the government has joined most of
the international community by voting to condemn Russia in the UN resolution. However,Wisma Putra (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) has
publicly stated that it did not agree with every
word of the resolution, but voted for it to upholdthe principles of ‘sovereignty, independence andterritorial integrity of States – principles which
are sacrosanct to Malaysia’. It added that Malaysia would welcome dialogue and other peace-

37

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

ful means of solving the conflict.2 Malaysia has
also refused to impose sanctions on Russia for
the foreseeable future. However, within the Malaysian public sphere, the conflict has eliciteda plethora of opinions that range from strong
condemnation of Russian actions and sympathy
for Ukrainians to support for Russia and denunciation of Western actions in the conflict. These
reactions are not only visible in social media but
also in major national newspapers (online andprinted), press statements and even in Malaysian parliamentary circles.3 People who havecommented on the conflict include politicians,
experts from think tanks, members of civil society and ordinary Malaysians. Furthermore, there
have also been mixed reactions towards the
responses of the Malaysian government. Whilesome have criticized the ‘non-aligned stance’
adopted by the Malaysian government, others
have defended the government’s position.4 Within each of the above-mentioned segments, opinions on the conflict continue to vary. For example, Member of Parliament Ong Kian Ming had
hoped the Malaysian government would take astronger and clearer stance on the conflict.5 On
the other hand, P. Ramasamy, the Deputy Chief
Minister of Penang II has implicitly defended

2 The Star, “Malaysia Votes in Favour of UN Resolution
to End Russian Aggression in Ukraine,” March 3, 2022,
https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2022/03/03/
malaysia-votes-in-favour-of-un-resolution-to-end-russian-aggression-in-ukraine.
3 Borneo Post Online, “Malaysia’s Parliamentary Panel
Condemns Russia for Hostilities against Ukraine,” February 26, 2022, https://www.theborneopost.com/2022/02/
26/malaysias-parliamentary-panel-condemns-russia-for-hostilities-against-ukraine/.
4 Teh Zi Yee, “How Should Malaysia React to the Russia-­
Ukraine Conflict?,” The Diplomat, April 1, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/how-should-malaysia-react-to-the-russia-ukraine-conflict/; Azril Mohd Amin,“Malaysia Must Remain Non-Aligned and Neutral,” New
Straits Times, March 23, 2022, https://www.nst.com.my/
opinion/columnists/2022/03/782314/malaysia-mustremain-non-aligned-and-neutral.
5 Ong Kian Ming, “MP Speaks: How Russian Invasion of
Ukraine Will Affect Malaysians,” Malaysiakini, March 1,
2022, https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/612520.

38

Russian aggression.6 Both politicians are fromthe same party, the Democratic Action Party(DAP) who are part of the opposition bloc.
There are four main stances in the Malaysian
public sphere on the Russian invasion of Ukraine,
the atrocities committed during the fighting, as
well the reactions by the Malaysian government,
and the consequences that the war has for Malaysia. They can be classified as pro-Ukraineor pro-West, pro-Russia, neutral, and as disinterested. There are a multitude of reasons why
different Malaysians may be inclined to take oneof the above stances. These include memoriesof the downing of the Malaysian Airlines flight
MH17 in 2014, concerns about tensions in theSouth China Sea, pervasive anti-West sentiment,
or even a general disinterest of distant affairs.
Sometimes, there are overlapping reasons why
some Malaysians adopt a particular stance. Thisessay attempts to illustrate these major stances
towards the war in Ukraine and tries to explainthem.

MH17, THE SOUTH CHINA SEAS,
AND SUPPORT FOR UKRAINE
There are many commentators in Malaysia whohave expressed support for Ukraine and condemnation of Russia in the wake of the invasion.
This includes political figures from both the opposition and the government coalitions.7 Some
civil society organizations such as the MalaysianBar have also condemned the invasion.8 Many

6 P. Ramasamy, “Letter: Explaining Russian Aggression
Is Not an Endorsement,” Malaysiakini, March 2, 2022,
https://www.malaysiakini.com/letters/612704.
7 Free Malaysia Today, “Netizens Cite MH17 Tragedy in Callfor Solidarity with Ukraine,” February 2022, https://www.
freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/2022/02/25/
netizens-cite-mh17-tragedy-in-call-for-solidarity-withukraine/.
8 A. G Kalidas, “The Malaysian Bar Condemns the R­ ussian
Invasion of Ukraine,” Malaysian Bar, March 6, 2022, https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/about-us/presidents-corner/pressstatements/press-release-the-malaysian-bar-condemns-the-russian-invasion-of-ukraine.

Wan Elis Regina Wan Ahmad: Malaysians and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine Conflict

commentators on international relations and academics have likewise called for solidarity with
Ukraine.9 The same applies for Malaysian netizens on Twitter, who have expressed their support for Ukraine and/or their disagreement with
Russia’s actions.10
One of the biggest reasons why Malaysians showsolidarity with Ukraine is the downing of MH17
in July 2014. For example, on February 25, 2022,
one Malaysian twitter user, ‘@aima015’, said ‘Weshould absolutely stand with Ukraine’ as Malaysians were also affected by the Russian military
after ‘they shot down MH17’.11 Another Twitteruser named ‘Nor’ said that MH17 was the only
reason to stand with Ukraine.12 Other commentators such as MP Ong Kian Ming and MP Kas­
thuri Patto had also brought up MH17 as a reason to take a stronger diplomatic stance against
Russia.13 Even now, the downing of the Malaysian Airlines plane in 2014 has remained deeply etched in the memory of many Malaysians.14
43 Malaysian lives were lost when the plane wasshot down over the Donetsk region, a disputed
area in Ukraine, by Russian-backed separatists.
To this day, Russia has denied any responsibility
for the incident.

9 Lim Thye Goh, “Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: Should
Malaysia Be Bothered?,” Sin Chew Daily Malaysia 星洲
网, March 8, 2022, https://mysinchew.sinchew.com.
my/20220308/russias-invasion-of-ukraine-should-malaysia-be-bothered/.
10 Free Malaysia Today, “Netizens Cite MH17 Tragedy inCall for Solidarity with Ukraine,” February 2022,
https://www.freemalaysiatoday.com/category/nation/
2022/02/25/netizens-cite-mh17-tragedy-in-call-forsolidarity-with-ukraine/.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ong Kian Ming, “MP Speaks: How Russian Invasion of
Ukraine Will Affect Malaysians,” Malaysiakini, March 1,
2022, https://www.malaysiakini.com/columns/612520.
14 Ahmad Suhael Adnan, “Five Years on, Flight MH17 Remembered,” New Straits Times, July 18, 2019, https://www.nst.com.my/news/nation/2019/07/505203/fiveyears-flight-mh17-remembered.

Other than MH17, another reason why many Malaysians condemn Russia’s actions is becauseof the wide-ranging domestic and international
economic effects of the conflict. Domestically,
the World Bank has lowered the expected GDP
growth for Malaysia from 5.8 percent to 5.5 percent largely due to the economic consequencesof the conflict on the global economy. Other important effects include the global food shortage,
as Ukraine is an important food exporter, andthe subsequent rise of food prices in Malaysia.15
Goh Lim Thye from the University of Malaya andOng Kian Ming have argued that the Malaysian
government needs to take more action in pressuring Russia to end the conflict because of theeconomic impact.
The legal and geopolitical ramifications of theconflict also concern Malaysians. A press statement released by the Malaysian Bar denounces
Russia’s violations of the ‘Charter of the United
Nations, principles of international public law,and international humanitarian law’.16 Others
have noted that the Russian invasion could set
the tone for the conflict in the South China Sea(SCS).17 Malaysia has had long-standing territo-

15 Malay Mail, “Agriculture Minister: Measures Taken toControl Food Prices Due to Russia-Ukraine Conflict,”
March 20, 2022, https://www.malaymail.com/news/
malaysia/2022/03/20/agriculture-minister-measurestaken-to-control-food-prices-due-to-russia-uk/2048483.
16 A. G. Kalidas, “The Malaysian Bar Condemns the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Malaysian Bar, March 6, 2022,
https://www.malaysianbar.org.my/article/about-us/
president-s-corner/pressstatements/press-releasethe-malaysian-bar-condemns-the-russian-invasionof-ukraine.
17 Keertan Ayamany and Ashman Adam, “Here’s How theRussia-Ukraine Conflict Affects Malaysia and Why We
Should Care,” Malay Mail, February 26, 2022, https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2022/02/26/
heres-how-the-russia-ukraine-conflict-affects-malaysia-and-why-we-should-ca/2044005; Guido ­Benny,“Russian Invasion May Embolden China, Spelling Trouble for ASEAN,” MalaysiaNow, March 16, 2022, https://www.malaysianow.com/opinion/2022/03/16/russianinvasion-may-embolden-china-spelling-trouble-forasean/.

39

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

rial dispute in the resource-rich SCS with otherclaimant states, including China. The conflict in
Ukraine sets a dangerous, modern-day precedent of an illegal invasion and annexation ofparts of a country by a major world power. Some
Malaysian commentators therefore believe that
Malaysia should take a sterner stance to defend
the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

SUPPORTING RUSSIA AS AN­E XPRESSION OF ANTI-WESTERNISM
AND I­ SLAMIC SOLIDARITY
However, the opposite also holds true. A recent
study conducted by Benjamin Y. H. Loh and Munira Mustaffa found that many Malaysian netizens
who have participated in online discussions of
the conflict have expressed support for Russia.18
This has included Facebook users posting memes disparaging Ukrainian President Volodymyr
Zelenskyy and using the Russian battle cry ‘Ura!’and the letter Z, which stands for za, the Russian word meaning ‘for’, in comment sections of
Ukraine-related posts.19 Another common trend
amongst netizens was to condemn Westernand NATO’s actions in the conflict. Others haveplaced the blame on the US and NATO for provoking Russia. These views about Russia and theWest are deeply rooted in Malaysia’s prevailing
sentiments about other issues: a strong and recurrent anti-Western perspective and an enmity
towards Ukraine as a strong ally of Israel.20 Many
Malaysians have been disillusioned by the Westdue to rising Islamophobia in the West following
the 9/11 attacks and Western involvement in40

conflicts in the Middle East that involve Muslim
people like the Yemeni Civil War.21 They believe
NATO is a tool for Western geopolitical ambitions. In the context of the conflict in Ukraine,
there is a widespread belief amongst netizens
that an active attempt by NATO to recruit Ukraine
was responsible for the conflict. Furthermore,
many Malaysians have a deep distrust of theWestern media, which was further bolstered bydisinformation and fake news propagated by
Russian-affiliated media like RT.22
20This has facilitated the narrative that Malaysia
and Russia shared the West as their common
enemy, and that Russia can serve as an alternative to Western hegemony. Here, support for
Ramzan Kadyrov, the Muslim leader of Chechnya
installed by Putin, also comes into play. As one
Facebook commenter wrote, ‘Kadyrov is withZ, so I stand with Z. Go to hell America!’.23 Suchcomments in support of Kadyrov demonstrate
how Malaysian opinions on the war in Ukraine
are shaped by anti-West sentiments and a pervasive narrative of Islamic solidarity against
Ukraine as a close ally of Israel. Malaysia has
no diplomatic ties with Israel due to the occu-

20 Benjamin Loh and Munira Mustaffa, “Social Media Discourse in Malaysia on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Rationales for Pro-Russia Sentiments,” ISEAS Perspective
2022, No. 41, April 22, 2022, https://www.iseas.edu.
sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2022_41.pdf.
21 Hadi Azmi, “How Russia and Ukraine Are Trying to Win
the Battle on Malaysia’s Social Media,” South China
Morning Post, March 19, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/
week-asia/article/3171049/ukraine-war-battle-malaysias-social-media-propaganda-tool-russia-and.

18 Benjamin Loh and Munira Mustaffa, “Social Media Discourse in Malaysia on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Rationales for Pro-Russia Sentiments,” ISEAS Perspective
2022, No. 41, April 22, 2022, https://www.iseas.edu.
sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2022_41.pdf.

22 Benjamin Loh and Munira Mustaffa, “Social Media Discourse in Malaysia on the Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Rationales for Pro-Russia Sentiments,” ISEAS Perspective
2022, No. 41, April 22, 2022, https://www.iseas.edu.
sg/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ISEAS_Perspective_2022_41.pdf.

19 Hadi Azmi, “How Russia and Ukraine Are Trying to Win
the Battle on Malaysia’s Social Media,” South China
Morning Post, March 19, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/
week-asia/article/3171049/ukraine-war-battle-malaysias-social-media-propaganda-tool-russia-and.

23 Hadi Azmi, “How Russia and Ukraine Are Trying to Win
the Battle on Malaysia’s Social Media,” South China
Morning Post, March 19, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/
week-asia/article/3171049/ukraine-war-battle-malaysias-social-media-propaganda-tool-russia-and.

Wan Elis Regina Wan Ahmad: Malaysians and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine Conflict

pation of Palestinian territory and has routinely criticized Israel for their actions in Palestine.
Also, according to the Anti-Defamation League,
over 61 percent of Malaysians harbor anti-Semitic beliefs and attitudes.24 This has shaped theperspective of many Malaysians, especially Islamists, against Ukraine, which is viewed by themas a ‘Zionist’ country. Tan Sri Abdul Hadi Awang,
the President of the Malaysian Islamic Party, forexample has accused Ukraine of being a Zionist
country and claimed, that the war was a ruse
to coerce Jewish Ukrainians to flee to Israel tostrengthen the country.25 Additionally, he also
made anti-Semitic comments about President
Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

SUPPORTING NEUTRALITY AND
NON-ALIGNMENT AS MALAYSIA’SFOREIGN POLICY PARADIGM
Another notable view about the conflict within the Malaysian public sphere are comments
calling for Malaysia to maintain its neutrality
and non-alignment. Azril Mohd Amin, CEO of thethink-tank Institut Masa Depan Malaysia stated,that it was Malaysia’s interests to remain neutral and not be aligned with any particular country.26 Ibrahim Suffian of the Merdeka Centre, anopinion research firm, pointed out, that Malaysia
wanted to ‘chart an independent route’.27 Similar

24 ADL/Global 100, “Malaysia: ADL / Global 100,” April 28,
2022, https://global100.adl.org/country/malaysia/2014.
25 Ashman Adam, “PAS Chief Accuses Ukraine of Being
Zionists, NATO of Intentionally Provoking Russia,” Malaysia | Malay Mail (Malay Mail, April 6, 2022), https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2022/04/07/
pas-chief-accuses-ukraine-of-being-zionists-nato-ofintentionally-provoking/2052061.
26 Hadi Azmi, “How Russia and Ukraine Are Trying to Win
the Battle on Malaysia’s Social Media,” South China
Morning Post, March 19, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/
week-asia/article/3171049/ukraine-war-battle-malaysias-social-media-propaganda-tool-russia-and.
27 Fazleena Aziz, “Experts: Malaysia’s Stand Is Neutral and
Non-Aligned,” The Star, March 5, 2022, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/nation/2022/03/05/experts-malaysias-stand-is-neutral-and-non-aligned.

comments can also be found amongst Malaysian
netizens. In a video about Ukrainians protestingoutside the Russian Embassy in Kuala Lumpur,
many commentators advocated for Malaysia toremain neutral and not get ‘involved’ in the conflict by neither supporting Russia nor Ukraine.28
This advocacy for non-interference reflects Malaysia’s long-standing principle of ‘neutrality’
as a foreign policy. This usually meant ‘avoiding
conflicts to maintain regional stability and creating an international environment in which allcountries are interested in good relations witheach other’.29 With very few exceptions, Malaysia
has largely refused to take sides in other global
conflicts like the 2017 Qatar Diplomatic Crisis.
Furthermore, the conflict is in a geographicallydistant region. These netizens would feel that it
is not in Malaysia’s interest to meddle in the conflicts of faraway nations.30

WIDESPREAD APATHY AND DIS­INTEREST
Arguably, the most common of the four stancesof Malaysians on the conflict is apathy and indifference. According to a study by Ipsos Malaysia,
a global market research and consulting firm,
only 49 percent of Malaysians are closely following the events of the conflict which implies theconflict is not an important topic for the respondents.31 This is low in comparison to the global

28 The Star Malaysia, “Ukrainians Protest Outside Russian
Embassy in KL,” YouTube, February 28, 2022, https://
youtu.be/RkFBLU0BQNU.
29 Farzana, Kazi Fahmida, and Md. Zahurul Haq, “Malaysia‘s Political Orientation in Diplomatic Neutrality,” Journal of Islam in Asia (E-ISSN 2289-8077) 16, No. 3 (2019).
30 David Hutt, “Ukraine Conflict: What’s behind Southeast Asia’s Muted Response?,” DW, March 7, 2022,
https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-conflict-whats-behind-southeast-asias-muted-response/a-61039013.
31 Ashman Adam, “Study Finds Less than Half of Malaysians Care about Impact of Russia-Ukraine Conflict
than Covid Economic Recovery,” Malay Mail, April 27,
2022,
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/
2022/04/27/study-finds-less-than-half-of-malaysianscare-about-impact-of-russia-ukrain/2055880.

41

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

average of 79 percent. Also, around 59 percent
of Malaysians believe that the conflict does notconcern Malaysia.32 This could be due to the belief that the impact of the conflict is minimal. Malaysia does not have strong direct economic nor
diplomatic ties with either Ukraine or Russia. And
government officials including Finance Minister
Zafrul Aziz have stated that the Ukraine conflict
would have a ‘very marginal’ negative economic
impact. The World Bank has reduced their forecast of Malaysia’s expected GDP growth by only 0.3 percentage points.33 Additionally, Defense
Minister Hishammuddin Hussein had reassured
Malaysians that the maintenance of the 30 Russian Sukhoi Su-30 airplanes that are operated
by the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) andthe sale of Russian Metis-M portable anti-tankguided missile systems would not be affected bysanctions placed on Russia.34 This gives the perception that immediate security implications of
the conflict for Malaysia are minimal.
This interpretation is supported by the fact that
the Malaysian respondents in the Ipsos survey
believed that Malaysian economic resources
should be spent on alleviating the dire financial
consequences of COVID-19 rather than ameliorating the effects of the conflict.35 It can be argued that the effects of COVID-19 are far moretangible compared to the conflict. Although theconflict has resulted in rising food prices andlower economic growth for Malaysia, COVID-19

32 Ibid.
33 Oliver Telling and Eleanor Olcott, “Ukraine War Offers
Malaysia a Chance to Reduce Debts, Says Finance Minister,” Financial Times, April 18, 2022, https://www.ft.com/
content/53555493-3781-4aa3-9e54-ab8000a4495d.
34 Martin Carvalho, “Russia-Ukraine War Won’t Affect Our
Strategic Assets, Hisham Tells Dewan Rakyat,” The Star,
March 16, 2022, https://www.thestar.com.my/news/
nation/2022/03/16/russia-ukraine-war-won039t-affect-our-strategic-assets-hisham-tells-dewan-rakyat.
35 Ipsos, “Global Public Opinion about the War in Ukraine,”
April 19, 2022, https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/newspolls/war-in-ukraine-april-2022.

42

has increased the absolute poverty rate from 5.6
percent to 8.4 percent.36
The relative lack of interest in the conflict among
Malaysians can also be explained by socioeconomic factors. A global survey by Ipsos foundthat ‘people over 50, business decision-makers
and those who went to university’ are much more
likely to keep up with the events in Ukraine.37 The
tertiary enrollment rate in Malaysia was 43 percent in 2019.38 An estimated 20.7 % of Malaysia’s
population is above 50 years old.39

CONCLUSION
Malaysian responses to the war in Ukraine arevaried. For nearly half of the country’s population, the conflict is too far away to be of any consequence; and they therefore show little interest.
The stances of those who do follow the war, areshaped by their preexisting attitudes. Anti-Western anti-Semitic sentiments are very common in
Malaysia leading to the embrace of pro-Russian
narratives. They blame NATO for the outbreak ofhostilities and disparage Ukraine and its president as Zionist, as the latter is Jewish. Chechen
leader Ramzan Kadyrov’s support for the Russian military serves as one link between the war
in Europe and the conflict in the Middle East
for Malaysian Muslims. Malaysians supporting

36 Yiswaree Palansamy, “Covid-19: 580,000 M40 Households Fall into B40 Category, Absolute Poverty R­ ises to
8.4 PC, Says PM,” Malay Mail, September 21, 2021,
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2021/
09/21/covid-19-580000-m40-households-fall-intob40-category-absolute-poverty-rise/2007310.
37 Ipsos, “Global Public Opinion about the War in Ukraine,”
April 19, 2022, https://www.ipsos.com/en-us/newspolls/war-in-ukraine-april-2022.
38 “School Enrollment, Tertiary (% Gross) – Malaysia,”
World Bank Data, accessed May 31, 2022, https://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SE.TER.ENRR?locations=MY.
39 Knoema, “Malaysia Population Aged 50+ Years, 1950–
2021,” accessed April 27, 2022, https://knoema.com/
atlas/Malaysia/topics/Demographics/Age/Population-aged-50-years.

Wan Elis Regina Wan Ahmad: Malaysians and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Ukraine in contrast are motivated by the concernthat the Russian invasion poses a dangerous
precedent for the South China Sea, where Malaysian and Chinese territorial claims overlap. But
the shooting down of a Malaysian airplane by
pro-Russian separatist in Eastern Ukraine in2014 has also contributed to siding with Ukraine.
Finally, for some prominent commentators, continuing Malaysia’s policy of non-alignment withany foreign power outweighs any specific meritsof either siding with Ukraine or Russia in the­ongoing war.40

40 I am indebted to my supervisor Thomas Benjamin­Daniel for his advice and comments on an earlier draft.

43

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

44Sirada Khemanitthathai: Different Reactions in Myanmar toward the Russia-­Ukraine War

DIFFERENT REACTIONS IN MYANMAR TOWARD THE RUSSIA-­UKRAINE WAR
Sirada Khemanitthathai Chiang Mai University

In Myanmar, significantly different reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exist among different
stakeholders. They are directly linked to the political situation in Myanmar after the 2021 coup.
This essay is divided into three sections according to the three main actors in Myanmar that havestrong stances toward the invasion. First, Myanmar’s military, or Tatmadaw, which formed thejunta called the State Administration Council (SAC) after staging the coup, has explicitly justified
and defended Russia’s actions. Second, the anti-Tatmadaw political forces led by the government-in-exile, the National Unity Government (NUG), have expressed their support for Ukraine. At
the international stage, the NUG also repeatedly expressed its solidarity with the Ukrainian people
and utilized the situation to call for international attention to the people of Myanmar. Similarly,
Myanmar netizens – the third actor discussed in the essay – relate their own suffering after the2021 coup to the experience of the people of Ukraine and point out the strong ties between Russia
and Tatmadaw. While Myanmar netizens feel empathy and sympathy toward the Ukrainians, negative sentiment has also grown among them against the international community due to the higher
level of global attention and support that Ukraine receives.

Keywords
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Myanmar, NUG, SAC, Russian-Myanmar Relations

INTRODUCTIONIn Myanmar, the divided reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine are directly linked to the polarized politics in the wake of the military coupof February 1, 2021. In one corner, Myanmar’s
military, or Tatmadaw, which formed the junta
called the State Administration Council (SAC) after staging the coup, has explicitly opted to support Russia. The Tatmadaw’s response is due to
its long-term military relationship with Russia,
particularly arms trade, and Russia’s previous
stances at the United Nations (UN) in defending
Myanmar’s coup in 2021. In the other corner,
anti-­Tatmadaw political forces led by the government-in-exile, the National Unity Government(NUG), have expressed their support for Ukraine.
The NUG has issued several official statements
showing its solidarity with Ukraine and has also backed the stances of Myanmar’s permanent

representative to the UN, who was appointed by
the previous civilian government, in condemning
Russia. Public opinion in Myanmar is full of empathy and sympathy toward the Ukrainians. Most
Myanmar netizens’ strong sentiments on the situation in Ukraine can be attributed to their comparing it to their own suffering after the coup
especially from the SAC’s military operation
against civilians, and due to the fact that Russia
is the primary source of military hardware used
for attacking the Myanmar people. However, negative sentiment has also grown among Myanmar
netizens against the international community as
they realize the distinct levels of global attention
and support. Based on the explanations above,
this essay is divided into three sections according to three main actors in Myanmar that haveexpressed strong stances toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The first section summarizes
the responses of Myanmar’s military regime in45

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

support of Russia. The second one explains thereaction of the NUG and Myanmar’s official votes
at the UN. Finally, public opinion in Myanmar’s
online communities is examined.

THE TATMADAW
Unlike other countries that maintain their reluctance and ambiguity in supporting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the military junta of Myanmar has
explicitly justified and defended the Russian invasion of Ukraine.1 Since independence, the Tatmadaw has extended its political and military power,bringing Myanmar under the control of authoritarian military regimes before the country went
through a political transition to a quasi-civilian
government and hybrid regime during the 2010s.
Led by its supreme leader Min Aung Hlaing, theTatmadaw seized power from the civilian government at the beginning of February 2021 andformed SAC, a military government. The reactionsof Myanmar’s current military government cannot
be separated from this context. A close alliance
between the Tatmadaw and Russia has led to thestraightforward support of Russia by the SAC despite the former’s aggressive actions. The military junta’s support of Russia was made throughits spokesperson, Zaw Min Tun, appointed as the
Deputy Minister of Information of SAC. In a special
interview on Voice of America (VOA), broadcasted
through its Burmese-language service, Zaw Min
Tun clearly stated that the SAC perceives Russia’s
invasion of Ukraine as an appropriate response.
He justified Russia’s actions by claiming that Russia strives to secure its sovereignty and show its
powerful status on the world stage.2 This reaction

1 The Star, “Myanmar’s junta says Russia good for ‘world
peace’, supports Ukraine invasion,” last updated February 26, 2022, https://www.thestar.com.my/aseanplus/
aseanplus-news/2022/02/26/myanmar039s-juntasays-russia-good-for-039world-peace039-supportsukraine-invasion.
2 VOA Burmese Service, “Myanmar’s military council
supports Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” last updated
February 25, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/myanmar-s-military-council-supports-russia-s-invasion-0fukraine/6458527.html.

46of the junta has undeniably caused by the strong
ties between the Tatmadaw and the Russian
government. The most visible reason is that
Russia has been a leading arms supplier of Tatmadaw since 2018.3 The Burmese army agreed
to purchase radar equipment, missile systems,
and surveillance drones from before the 2021
coup. After the 2021 coup, this relationship has
become more important for the Tatmadaw due
to Western countries’ arms embargo against
Myanmar’s military government. Russia abstained from the UN General Assembly’s (UNGA)
resolution demanding the end of weapon exports
to Myanmar.4 Thus, Russian military hardware
has enhanced Tatmadaw’s military capacity to
attack civilians.
Moreover, Russia and the Tatmadaw have maintained their connections through several official
visits.5 The presence of the Russian deputy minister of defense in Myanmar’s Armed Forces Day
ceremony was the first sign of Russia’s recognition of the SAC’s legitimacy. In June 2021, Min
Aung Hlaing made his second foreign trip as thechairman of SAC to Russia a few days after the
UN’s resolution condemning Tatmadaw. Someother top military generals of both countries
also reportedly visited, such as the Myanmar
armed forces’ deputy commander-in-chief andthe Russian navy’s deputy commander-in-chief.
Military-to-military relations also include army
training and scholarships that Russia has of-

3 Justice for Myanmar, “Russian arms companies requiring sanctions for supplying the Myanmar military,” accessed March 27, 2022, https://www.justiceformyanmar.
org/stories/russian-arms-companies-requiring-sanctions-for-supplying-the-myanmar-military.
4 Michelle Nichols, “United Nations calls for halt of weapons to Myanmar,” Reuters, last updated June 19, 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-chiefurges-general-assembly-act-myanmar-2021-06-18/.
5 The Irrawaddy, “Myanmar regime backs Russia’s invasion of Ukraine,” last updated February 25, 2022, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-regimebacks-russias-invasion-of-ukraine.html.

Sirada Khemanitthathai: Different Reactions in Myanmar toward the Russia-­Ukraine War

fered to at least 7,000 Tatmadaw officers andmilitary-related scientists.6
Apart from maintaining strong ties with Russia,
the Tatmadaw-government has also utilized the
Ukrainian case for domestic legitimacy. Tatma­
daw has devalued the Ukrainian leader in parallel with its political opponents. Its opinion wasreflected in a two-page commentary, written in
Burmese, in one of its mouthpiece newspapers
called Myanma Alin. In the commentary titled‘Past lessons from wars of aggression (the fifth):
A lesson from Ukraine with an unsatisfactory
past’, published on February 27, 2022.7 The writer praises Putin for his leadership while blaming
Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy for his
incapacity to protect Ukraine from destruction
and causalities. The commentary claimed that
the Ukrainian people must also take responsibility for selecting the ‘poor leader’. The writercompares the characteristics of the Ukrainian
leader with Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar’s former State Counsellor and de facto leader of theousted civilian government. The commentarystrongly criticizes Zelenskyy and Aung San Suu
Kyi, arguing that both have used western values
to deceive their peoples. The piece’s agenda is
to denounce Aung San Suu Kyi through the assumed comparison more than commentatingon the situation in Ukraine as such. The writeralso attempts to convince Burmese readers tofocus on the importance of national interests
and national security rather than on humanrights and democracy.8 The statement demonstrates the military regime’s intention to use the
6 Bertil Lintner, “Russia’s war means fewer arms for
Myanmar,” Asia Times, last updated March 22, 2022,
https://asiatimes.com/2022/03/russias-war-meansfewer-arms-for-myanmar/.
7 Myint Myat, “ကျူးကျော်စစ်ပွဲများမှ အတိတ်သမိုင်း
သင်ခန်းစာများ (၅) မကျေညက်တဲ့အတိတ်သမိုင်းနှင့်အတူ
ယူကရိန်းကပေးတဲ့ သင်ခန်းစာ,” Myanma Alin. February 27,
2022, 8–9.
8 Tin Htet Paing, “Myanmar junta reiterates support for­Putin’s war on Ukraine,” Myanmar Now, last u­ pdated March
1, 2022, https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-junta-reiterates-support-for-putins-war-on-ukraine.

Ukrainian case for its propaganda. Moreover,pro-­Tatmadaw media channels have portrayedthe casualties of Ukrainian civilians to discourage its opponents and stress the inescapable
victory of the mighty.

THE NATIONAL UNITY GOVERNMENT(NUG)
The NUG’s stance in backing Ukraine has beenshown through its statements and throughits representative’s votes at the UN. The NUG,
Myanmar’s civilian government-in-exile, wasformed in April 2021 by a group of elected members of parliament from the National League for
Democracy (NLD) and certain ethnic minority
parties, and some representatives from ethnic
civil organizations and armed groups. Despite
fragmentation and diversity among its members, the NUG is seen as the representative leader of the anti-Tatmadaw and anti-coup politicalforces. Fighting to be the sole legitimate government of Myanmar, the NUG’s legitimacy is officially recognized by the European Parliament.9
At the UN, Myanmar’s permanent representative, Kyaw Moe Tun, has become the voice of the
NUG. He was appointed by the overthrown NLD
government and has repeatedly expressed his
resistance against the 2021 coup. His continuity
in the position after the coup was based on the
UN’s decision to reject the SAC-appointed representative. Kyaw Moe Tun has thus legitimately
maintained his seat in the UN even though themilitary junta discharged him from the positionand charged him with high treason.10

9 Sebastaian Strangio, “EU parliament voices support for
Myanmar’s opposition government,” The Diplomat, last updated October 11, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/
10/eu-parliament-voices-support-for-myanmars-opposition-government/.
10 Marc Perelman, “Myanmar’s UN envoy Kyaw Moe
Tun: “I’m proud to have been charged with high treason by junta,” France 24, last updated March 18, 2021,
https://www.france24.com/en/tv-shows/the-interview/20210318-myanmar-s-un-envoy-kyaw-moe-tuni-m-proud-to-have-been-charged-with-high-treasonby-junta.

47

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

An official statement of the NUG released on February 25, 2022 denounced Russia’s violation of international law and stressed Myanmar’s solidarity with the Ukrainian people.11 Also, it called forthe respect of ‘the territorial integrity, independence, and sovereignty of Ukraine’. Another NUG
statement on March 8, 2022 expressed its agreement with the UN Human Rights Council’s ‘urgent
debate on the situation of human rights in Ukraine
stemming from the Russian aggression, and theadoption of its corresponding resolution’.12 At theUN, the NUG-aligned permanent representativeof Myanmar firmly stood in support of Ukraine. On
March 2, 2022, Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun voted
yes to the UN resolution condemning Russia’s actions at the UNGA’s emergency special session on
the situation in Ukraine. Likewise, the permanent
representative voted in favor of the UN resolution
on ‘humanitarian consequences of aggression
against Ukraine’ on March 24, 2022. In anotheremergency special session held on April 7, 2022,
Myanmar repeatedly called for the halt of Russian aggression and attacks against Ukraine.13
Apart from voting, the NUG also played an activerole in the resolution by co-sponsoring all draft
resolutions. Kyaw Moe Tun’s official statements
at the UN reiterated their solidarity with the
Ukrainian people. For example, the statement on
March 2, 2022 stated that ‘Myanmar understands
and shares more than others the suffering that
11 National Unity Government Myanmar, “Statement on
Ukraine,” Twitter, published February 25, 2022,
https://twitter.com/nugmyanmar/status/
1497202143152984065.

48

the people of Ukraine are encountering. The people of Myanmar are facing similar suffering resulting from the inhumane acts, atrocities, crimes
against humanity committed by the Myanmar
military.’14 Similar messages appeared on March
24’s statement: ‘We fully share the sufferings ofthe people of Ukraine. We stand firm and in solidarity with the people of Ukraine. The people of
Myanmar are experiencing similar manmade
tragedies, and humanitarian crisis resulted fromthe military’s atrocities, crimes against humanity, indiscriminate and disproportionate attacks
against its people.’15
This solidarity is also aligned with the NUG’sdemand for international attention to Myanmar’s severe situation. The statement by Ambassador Kyaw Moe Tun on March 24, 2022
contained a message calling for ‘the international community to provide humanitarianassistance to the people in need in Myanmartransparently and inclusively and to help the
people of Myanmar in our efforts to end themilitary’s atrocities and the military dictatorship in a timely and effective manner’.16 Sim14 Myanmar Mission to UN, “Statement by Ambassador
Kyaw Moe Tun at emergency special session of UNGA
on situation in Ukraine,” Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar to the United Nations, New
York, last updated March 2, 2022, https://www.myanmarmissionnewyork.org/post/statement-by-ambassador-kyaw-moe-tun-at-emergency-special-session-ofunga-on-situation-in-ukraine.

12 National Unity Government, “Urgent debate on thesituation of human rights in Ukraine stemming fromthe Russian aggression,” last updated March 8, 2022,
https://gov.nugmyanmar.org/2022/03/08/urgent-debate-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-ukrainestemming-from-the-russian-aggression/.

15 Myanmar Mission to UN, “Statement by Ambassador
Kyaw Moe Tun at 11th ESS of the UNGA on the situation in Ukraine,” Permanent Mission of the Republic of theUnion of Myanmar to the United Nations, New York, last
updated March 24, 2022, https://www.myanmarmissionnewyork.org/post/statement-by-ambassadorkyaw-moe-tun-at-11th-ess-of-the-unga-on-the-situation-in-ukraine.

13 Myanmar Mission to UN, “Statement by Ambassador
Kyaw Moe Tun at the 11th ESS of UNGA on the situation of Ukraine,” Permanent Mission of the Republic of theUnion of Myanmar to the United Nations, New York, last
updated April 7, 2022, https://www.myanmarmissionnewyork.org/post/statement-by-ambassador-kyawmoe-tun-at-the-11th-ess-of-unga-on-the-situation-ofukraine.

16 Myanmar Mission to UN, “Statement by Ambassador
Kyaw Moe Tun at 11th ESS of the UNGA on the situation in Ukraine,” Permanent Mission of the Republic of theUnion of Myanmar to the United Nations, New York, last
updated March 24, 2022, https://www.myanmarmissionnewyork.org/post/statement-by-ambassadorkyaw-moe-tun-at-11th-ess-of-the-unga-on-the-situation-in-ukraine.

Sirada Khemanitthathai: Different Reactions in Myanmar toward the Russia-­Ukraine War

ilarly, April 7, 2022’s statement compared thetragedy in Bucha, a city in Ukraine, with several
attacks conducted by the military junta against
Myanmar people and children.17 Here, it is also interesting to note that the NUG never mentioned that Ukraine has also supplied arms to
Myanmar. According to a Justice for Myanmar’sreport, some state-owned Ukrainian arms
manufacturers have reportedly sold arms andcrucial military hardware to Tatmadaw-linked
companies since 2015.18

PUBLIC OPINION
The Myanmar people mostly link the Russian
invasion of Ukraine to what has been happening
in Myanmar. In Myanmar, at least 1,700 people
have been killed, and more than 500,000 people
have been displaced. Mass atrocities and human rights abuses are widespread throughout
the country. The Tatmadaw also conducts airstrikes against civilians and has burnt many villages. As the people of Myanmar can relate to
the war in Ukraine, it is much discussed in
Myanmar online communities. Myanmar netizens see both themselves and the people of
Ukraine as fighting for freedom from aggressive authoritarian regimes. One can find two
main dimensions of public opinion among
Myanmar netizens: solidarity with Ukraine andinternational attention. The sentiment of solidarity has developed from the people of Myanmar’s empathy toward the Ukrainians, who they
believe share their suffering and struggle. Most

17 Myanmar Mission to UN, “Statement by Ambassador
Kyaw Moe Tun at the 11th ESS of UNGA on the situation of Ukraine,” Permanent Mission of the Republic of theUnion of Myanmar to the United Nations, New York, last
updated April 7, 2022, https://www.myanmarmissionnewyork.org/post/statement-by-ambassador-kyawmoe-tun-at-the-11th-ess-of-unga-on-the-situation-ofukraine.
18 Justice for Myanmar, “Ukraine is arming the Myanmar
military”, last updated September 8, 2021, https://www.
justiceformyanmar.org/stories/ukraine-is-arming-themyanmar-military.

comments under Ukraine-related online news
and articles praise the fighting spirit of the
Ukrainians and pray for their safety and triumph. Some Myanmar netizens compare thestruggle of the Ukrainian people with themselves and the People’s Defence Force, the antiTatmadaw armed group which was founded
three months after the 2021 coup. Furthermore,
the solidarity that Myanmar people feel for the
Ukrainians is also intensified because of Russia’s involvement in the military operation of
Tatmadaw after the coup. In their opinion, thevictory of Putin would unavoidably strengthen
the material power of the SAC to oppress Myanmar civilians.
Public opinion in Myanmar has also been provoked by the higher degree of global attention
that Ukraine has received in comparison with
Myanmar. The international community could
promptly make their material and financial resources available to support Ukraine and impose more and stronger punitive measuresagainst Russia. But several Myanmar activists
and civil society organizations, such as Thinzar
Shunlei Yi, Linn Thant and the Chin Human
Rights Organization, are also aware of Ukraine’s
domination of international attention, whichmight distract from Myanmar’s catastrophe.19
Although it is understandable for some Myanmar people that the world focuses on the situa-

19 Bangkok Post, “Myanmar’s plight still a global issue,”March 6, 2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/
opinion/2274547/myanmars-plight-still-a-global-issue; David Hutt, “Myanmar’s message to the EU amid
Ukraine crisis: ‘Don’t forget about us’,” Euronews, last
updated March 16, 2022, https://www.euronews.com/
my-europe/2022/03/15/myanmar-s-message-to-theeu-amid-ukraine-crisis-don-t-forget-about-us; Salai Za
Uk Ling, “Why it’s time to talk about the aid void on the
India-Myanmar border,” The New Humanitarian, last updated March 22, 2022, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/opinion/2022/03/22/aid-void-India-Myanmarborder-Chin; see also the tweets by Thinzar Shunlei Yifrom March 6, 2022, https://twitter.com/thinzashunleiyi/status/1500364691281158147?s=20&t=vQwKg4L04EPDqivBt2LydQ.

49

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

tion in Ukraine, they cannot stop campaigning
for more tangible responses and assistancefrom the international community. This sentiment is related to the desire for more international attention by Myanmar’s opposition since
the first day of the 2021 coup. The practice ofMyanmar netizens to post the same set ofhashtags and statements under Myanmar-related news exemplifies their struggle for theworld’s attention. Moreover, it was widely hopedthat the UN and the international community
would impose the Responsibility to Protect
principle and launch a military intervention in
Myanmar. However, the hope rapidly evaporated. Due to Western countries’ rapid efforts toenhance Ukraine’s military capacity, some
Myanmar netizens recalled their former expectation and have criticized the international
community for its neglect and unwillingness tofully help the people of Myanmar and their defense forces.

50

CONCLUSION
The significantly different stances towards thewar in Ukraine that exist in Myanmar reflect thepolitical situation in Myanmar after the coup of
February 2021 and the civil war between the
Tatmadaw’s junta and the NUG. The division inopinions is intimately linked to the Tatmadaw’s
strong military and diplomatic ties with Russia.
Oppositional forces in Myanmar see the war in
Ukraine mirroring their own fighting and suffering. The NUG and its supporters will therefore continue to condemn Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine and resist the Russia’s military cooperation with the Tatmadaw. And having seen how
differently the international community has responded to the fighting and the atrocities committed in Ukraine and Myanmar, oppositional
forces, political activists and netizens from theSoutheast Asian country will keep demanding
more international attention.

Manuel R. Enverga III: Philippines Taking Sides on Being Neutral: Discursive Contestation

PHILIPPINES TAKING SIDES ON BEING NEUTRAL: DISCURSIVECONTESTATION ON THE UKRAINE INVASION IN THE PHILIPPINES
Manuel R. Enverga III Ateneo de Manila University

The significance of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was not lost on the Philippines, which was in the midst of the campaign period for its presidential elections. The ten
presidential candidates were asked for their opinions on the matter during debates and news
interviews. Their positions have broadly coalesced around two opposing perspectives: (1) that thePhilippines should remain neutral on the issue, and (2) that the country should condemn Russia’s
aggression towards a sovereign nation-state. A similar polarization has also been observed on social media, where candidates’ positions have been supported and debated by their supporters anddetractors. This article understands candidates’ and social media users’ articulations on the issueof Philippine neutrality as discursive. That is to say, they represent a particular way of understanding and talking about reality. Implied in this definition is the possibility that multiple discourses can
exist on a topic, and that they can be in competition with one another. The clash between varying
discursive articulations is referred to as discursive contestation. This article examines the discursive contestation on Philippine neutrality, and approaches it from two levels. First, it presents
statements from Philippine presidential candidates whose statements have been the most prominent arguments for or against neutrality. Second, the article presents articulations from social
media that discuss the issue. It is argued that both the pro and anti-neutrality positions are built
on different understandings about the nature of Philippine foreign policy and its capabilities as ageopolitical actor.

Keywords
Invasion of Ukraine, 2022 Philippine election, discursive contestation, Philippine foreign policy

INTRODUCTION
On 24 February 2022, the military forces of theRussian Federation entered Ukrainian territory
engaging in what Vladimir Putin, its President,
referred to as a ‘special military operation’.1
The President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy,
described the incursion as a treacherous attack, like what ‘Nazi Germany did in [the] WW2(World War 2) years’.2 The attack has resulted

1 Reuters, “Russia invades Ukraine: Political, military leaders’ reactions,” last updated February 25, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/leaders-key-quotesafter-russia-invades-ukraine-2022-02-24.

in thousands of2military and civilian deaths.3 It
has also displaced millions of refugees.4 Oneof the responses to the incursion has been theimplementation of severe economic sanctions
against Russia, which has contributed to rising

2 Ibid.
3 Al Jazeera, “UN resolution against Ukraine invasion,”
March 3, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/
3/3/unga-resolution-against-ukraine-invasion-full-text.
4 BBC, “How many refugees have fled Ukraine and where
are they going?,” accessed on March 14, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-60555472.

51

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

oil and gas prices, as well as surges in inflation
throughout the world.5
The significance of the Ukraine invasion was
not lost on the Philippines, despite the fact thatnews outlets and social media have primarily
been focused on the country’s presidential elections. The first Russian military incursions coincided with the official campaign period in thePhilippines, and the ten presidential candidates
have been asked for their opinions on the matter during debates and news interviews. Their
positions have broadly coalesced around two
opposing perspectives: (1) that the Philippines
should remain neutral on the issue, and (2) thatthe country should condemn Russia’s aggression towards a sovereign nation-state. A similar
polarization has also been observed on social
media, where candidates’ positions have been
supported and debated by their supporters anddetractors. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and TikTok became virtual battlegrounds over the topic
of Philippine neutrality on the Ukraine invasion.
Such a spillover from candidates’ statements todebates on social media is to be expected considering that online platforms have long been usedby Philippine politicians and private companies
to promote themselves or harass their opposition online.6 As a politically contentious issue, thetopic of Philippine neutrality on the Ukraine invasion was argued about in cyberspace, supporters defending the positions of their preferredcandidates, while simultaneously attacking thearguments of their political opponents.
This article takes the approach that candidates’and social media users’ articulations on the issue of Philippine neutrality are discursive. That

5 David J. Lynch, “Soaring oil prices will hurt global economy as Ukraine war disrupts Russian supplies,” The Washington Post, March 11, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/03/11/oil-price-global-recovery-russia-ukraine; James Stavridis, “Ukraine conflict
will have a significant impact on Asia,” Nikkei Asia, February 24, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/Ukraineconflict-will-have-a-significant-impact-on-Asia.

52

is to say, they represent a particular way of understanding and6talking about reality.7 Impliedin this definition is the possibility that multiple
discourses can exist on a topic, and that they canbe in competition with one another.8 The clash
between varying discursive articulations is referred to as discursive contestation, and is exemplified in the way that neutrality over Ukraine
has been debated by presidential candidates intheir statements, and by social media users incyberspace.9 This article examines the discursive contestation on Philippine neutrality, and

6 Rob Shields, The Virtual. London: Routledge, 2003; Samantha Bradshaw and Philipp N. Howard, “Troops,
Trolls and Troublemakers: A Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation,” Oxford Internet Institute Computational Propaganda Research Project Working Paper, July 18, 2017, https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/
uuid:cef7e8d9-27bf-4ea5-9fd6-855209b3e1f6; Manuel
Enverga III, “Helpful partner or infringing interloper?
Examining discursive contestation in the engagementson the EU delegation in the Philippines’ Facebook page,”
Place Branding and Public Diplomacy, 2021. https://doi.
org/10.1057/s41254-021-00216-4; Shibani Mahtani andRegine Cabato, “Why crafty Internet trolls in the Philippines may be coming to a website near you,” The Washington Post, last updated July 26, 2019, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/why-crafty-internet-trolls-in-the-philippines-may-be-coming-to-awebsite-near-you/2019/07/25/c5d42ee2-5c53-11e998d4-844088d135f2_story.html; Sean Williams, “Rodrigo
Duterte’s Army of Online Trolls,” New Republic, January
4, 2017, https://newrepublic.com/article/138952/rodrigo-dutertes-army-online-trolls.
7 Marianne Jørgensen and Louise J. Phillips, Discourse
analysis as theory and method. London: Sage Publications, 2002; Martin Reisigl and Ruth Wodak, “The discourse-historical approach,” in: Methods of critical discourse analysis, eds. Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer,
87–121, London, UK: Sage, 2009.
8 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison. New York: Vintage, 1977; Norman Fairclough, Discourse and Social Change. Cambridge: Polity, 1992.
9 Chaewoon Oh (2019), “Political economy of international policy on the transfer of environmentally sound technologies in global climate change regime,” New Political
Economy 24, No. 1 (2019): 22–36; Chaewoon Oh, “Discursive Contestation on Technological Innovation and theInstitutional Design of the UNFCCC in the New Climate
Change Regime,” New Political Economy 25, No. 4 (2020):
660–674.

Manuel R. Enverga III: Philippines Taking Sides on Being Neutral: Discursive Contestation

approaches it from two levels. First, it presents
statements from Philippine presidential candidates whose statements have been the mostprominent arguments for or against neutrality.
Second, the article presents articulations fromsocial media that discuss the issue. It is argued
that both the pro and anti-neutrality positions
are built on different understandings about thenature of Philippine foreign policy and its capabilities as a geopolitical actor.

DEBATES OVER NEUTRALITY AMONGPRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATESDuring a debate organized by CNN Philippines,
the participants present were asked whether
or not they agreed with the Philippine Secretaryof Defense that the country should take a neutral stand regarding the Ukraine invasion. Three
presidential aspirants responded affirmatively
to the question: (1) former Presidential Spokesperson Ernesto Abella, (2) Manila Mayor Francisco Domagoso, and (3) businessman Faisal Mangodato.10 Mayor Domagoso justified his stand bysaying that the invasion of Ukraine had no direct
impact on ordinary Filipinos, and that the focusof the government should be on mitigating thenegative impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. To
the three who stood by neutrality, one can add
Ferdinand Marcos, Jr. who eventually emerged
victorious after votes were cast on May 9. He
was not present at the debate, but expressed his
opinion in a separate occasion. When clarifying
his position, Marcos’ initial response was that
the Philippines did not ‘need to take a stand’. He
went on to say, ‘We are not involved except forour nationals’.11 Three days later, he altered his

10 CNN Philippines Staff, “Should PH remain neutral in
Russia-Ukraine conflict? Candidates weigh in,” CNN
Philippines, February 27, 2022, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/2/27/PH-neutral-RussiaUkraine.html.
11 Rex Remitio, “Marcos-Duterte duo takes neutral standon Ukraine-Russia conflict,” CNN Philippines, March 14,2022, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/3/
2/bongbong-marcos-sara-duterte-ukraine-russia.html.

position the issue, calling on ‘Russia to respect
Ukraine’s freedom and its citizens’ democratic
way of life’.12
There were six candidates who argued against
the Philippines taking a neutral stance. These
were: (1) activist and labor leader Leodegario
de Guzman, (2) former Defense Secretary Norberto Gonzales, (3) Senator Panfilo Lacson, (4)physician and lawyer Jose Montemayor, Jr., (5)Senator Emmanuel Pacqiao, and (6) Vice President Maria Leonor Robredo. When asked about
her position on the Ukraine issue, Robredo condemned the violence against Ukraine, adding
that, ‘it is a moral imperative to stand against
bullying and unprovoked aggression’.13 Lacson,for his part, explained that as a member of theUnited Nations (UN), and a signatory to its Charter, the Philippines had to take a stand on thecrisis. He added, ‘there’s nothing wrong withstanding alongside peace-loving nations so thatour voices could be among those who condemn
because it’s really an aggression, invasion’.14
Examining the two sides of the neutrality debate,
one finds that each side’s reasoning is based on
different assumptions about the nature of Philippine foreign policy. Arguments in favor of Philippine neutrality were underpinned by the ideathat the Ukraine conflict was geographically distant, and that ordinary Filipinos were not directly
impacted by the invasion. Condemning Russian
actions would not benefit the Philippines, andas such, the country should be neutral. On theother hand, candidates who called on the gov12 Marlon Ramos, “Marcos flip-flops on Ukraine,” Philippine
Daily Inquirer, March 5, 2022, https://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/1563623/marcos-flip-flops-on-ukraine.
13 Helen Flores, “Robredo condemns violence vs. civilians
in Ukraine,” Philippine Star, on March 7, 2022, https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2022/03/07/2165375/robredo-condemns-violence-vs-civilians-ukraine.
14 CNN Philippines Staff, “Should PH remain neutral in
Russia-Ukraine conflict? Candidates weigh in,” CNN
Philippines. Accessed on February 27, 2022, https://www.cnnphilippines.com/news/2022/2/27/PH-neutral-Russia-Ukraine.html.

53

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

ernment to take a stand on the issue articulated
themselves in terms of abstract principles, suchas the need to resist bullying. Furthermore, thePhilippines is a signatory to international conventions that oppose the use of force. It is onthese bases that anti-neutrality candidates advance their positions.

DISCURSIVE CONTESTATION ON­CYBERSPACE
A similar contrast in reasoning is also evident
when one examines articulations on social media. The topic of the Ukraine invasion was so
prominent that news articles reporting candidate’s positions on the issue received very highlevels of engagement.15 One example is an article from the Philippine Daily Inquirer, a newspaper with a Facebook page. Its post received
46,400 reactions, 8,000 comments, and 6,000
shares. Another article from the online news site
Rappler got 35,000 reactions, 3,400 comments,
and 2,500 shares.
For this paper, the writer performed a content
analysis of comments responding to a Facebook post from the Philippine Department of
Foreign Affairs, which presented the government’s official position, which was articulated
during the Emergency Special Session of the
UN General Assembly on Ukraine. The post received 3,900 reactions, 336 comments, and3,500 shares. Although its numbers are modest
compared to those received by media outlets,
data was obtained from this post because it was

15 Bobby J. Calder, B. J., Mathew S. Isaac, and Edward C.
Malthouse, “How to Capture Consumer Experiences: A
Context-Specific Approach to Measuring Engagement
Predicting Consumer Behavior across Qualitatively Different Experiences,” Journal of Advertising Research 56,
No. 1 (2016): 39–52; Linda Hollebeek, “Exploring customer brand engagement: Definition and themes,” Journal of Strategic Marketing 19, No. 7 (2011): 555–573; Kim
A. Johnston, “Toward a theory of social engagement,”
The Handbook of Communication Engagement, eds. Kim
A. Johnston and Maureen Taylor,17–32. New York: John
Wiley and Sons, 2018.

54

posted by a government agency, and is expected to be non-partisan. As such, it would attractcommenters who belonged to all segments ofthe political spectrum, instead of just a specificaudience, as is the case with news outlets. The
comments analyzed for the paper were collected and archived on March 15, two weeks after
the post was first published on Facebook. Patterns were then sought following an inductive
thematic analysis approach.16 One of the recognized limitations of the approach used in this paper is that it draws all of its data from comments
written in response to one post. Granted, it may
not be fully representative of the opinions of theentire Philippine population, but the articulations
written by Facebook users is highly informativeof the discourses on both sides of the issue. The
336 comments were sufficiently numerous anddiverse that clear patterns could be found in thearticulations supporting or opposing Philippine
neutrality. What emerged from the analysis weremore nuanced positions on the issue of neutrality, with some commenters drawing on different
rationales than the presidential candidates.
For example, some articulations supporting
Philippine neutrality remarked that the Philippines should take a neutral stance because thecountry would be in trouble, if it took the side of
Ukraine against Russia and the latter retaliated.
Those that articulated in this manner deployed
their knowledge about the Philippines’ limited
military capabilities, and pointed out that thecountry would be unable to defend itself against
Russian attacks. They also accused commenters
who opposed neutrality of being warmongers,and facetiously invited them to volunteer to fightfor Ukraine. Another assumption that underpinned articulations supporting neutrality wasthat the conflict was in faraway Europe, and that

16 Virginia Braun and Victoria Clarke, “Using Thematic
Analysis in Psychology,” Qualitative Research in Psychology 3, No. 6 (2006): 77; Hannah Frith and Kate Gleeson,“Clothing and Embodiment: Men Managing Body Image
and Appearance,” Psychology of Men & Masculinity 5, No.
1 (2004): 40–48.

Manuel R. Enverga III: Philippines Taking Sides on Being Neutral: Discursive Contestation

the Philippines, being a Southeast Asian country, should not be involved. As one commenter
mistakenly remarked, only Singapore and thePhilippines supported Ukraine, while the rest of
ASEAN wisely avoided getting involved into a European conflict. The factual error in this line ofargument is that most ASEAN members actually voted in favor of the UN resolution condemning Russia’s invasion.17 Another variant of thistheme were comments that stated that it was a
Russia-Ukraine issue, and that the two countries
should resolve the issue on their own.
A third justification given for being neutral in theconflict is that condemning Russia would mean
supporting what they view as the wrong side.
Comments that used this line of reasoning dovetailed with Russian propaganda that claimed its
incursions into Ukraine were either a responseto the threat of NATO expansion, or that its ‘special military operation’ was done to de-Nazify the
Kiev government, and protect ethnic Russians in
the Donbass region from mistreatment.18 Articulations such as these indicate that some Filipino
commenters believe Russian propaganda, andthat the information they received impacted how
they thought the Philippines should respond to
the Ukraine invasion.
The articulations against Philippine neutrality, for their part, were underpinned by different
assumptions from their pro-neutrality counterparts. One set of comments justified taking a

17 Shannon Tiezzi, “How did Asian countries vote on the
UN’s Ukraine Resolution?,” The Diplomat, March 3, 2022,
fromhttps://thediplomat.com/2022/03/how-didasian-countries-vote-on-the-uns-ukraine-resolution.
18 Andrew Osborn and Polin Nikolskaya, “Russia’s Putin
authorises ‘special military operation’ against Ukraine,”
Reuters, February 24, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/
world/europe/russias-putin-authorises-military-operations-donbass-domestic-media-2022-02-24; Olivia B.
Waxman, “Historians on what Putin gets wrong about‘Denazification’ of Ukraine,” Time, March 3, 2022, https://time.com/6154493/denazification-putin-ukraine-history-context.

stand on the matter based on moral principle
and international law. As they put it, the Philippines is a UN member state and has the duty to
oppose acts of military aggression, such as what
happened in Ukraine. Corollary to the need to respect international law were comments that referred to the existing territorial dispute between
the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China over islands in the South China Sea.19 These
articulations emphasized that Russia’s actions
set a precedent for the acceptability of invasion
as an instrument to resolve territorial disputes.
By supporting Ukraine, the Philippines would
have moral authority to call on other countries
for support should its territory be invaded by
China in the future.
A third group of comments were made in response to calls for neutrality. These articulations
referred to the decision of Switzerland, a country
widely known for its neutral stance on global political issues, to impose sanctions on Russia. The
Swiss government’s position has been reported
in the news, and commenters emphasized that if
the famously neutral state acted, the Philippines
should also articulate a position on the Ukraine
conflict.20

19 Christopher L. Daniels, South China Sea: Energy and Security Conflicts. Toronto: The Scarecrow Press, 2014;
Katie Hunt, “South China Sea: Court rules in favor ofPhilippines over China,” CNN, last updated July 12, 2016,
https://edition.cnn.com/2016/07/12/asia/china-philippines-south-china-sea/index.html; Katie Hunt, “South
China Sea: Court rules in favor of Philippines over China,” CNN, last updated July 12, 2016, https://edition.cnn.
com/2016/07/12/asia/china-philippines-south-chinasea/index.html; Clive Schofield, “Untangling a Complex
Web: Understanding Competing Maritime Claims in theSouth China Sea,” in: The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions, eds. Ian Storey
and Cheng-Yi Lin. Singapore: ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016.
20 Corinne Gretler, “Swiss follow EU to implement further
sanctions on Russia,” Bloomberg, last updated March
5, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2022-03-04/switzerland-follows-eu-to-implement-further-sanctions-on-russia.

55

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

CONCLUSION
This article examined the discursive contestation
among Filipinos who debated whether or not thePhilippines should condemn Russia or remain
neutral regarding the invasion of Ukraine. To dothis, it presented data from (1) among presidential candidates, and (2) from among Facebook
users. The findings from both levels indicate thatthe assumptions underpinning both positions
are different from one another. Those who support Philippine neutrality on the issue do so because for them the conflict was too distant anddid not affect ordinary Filipinos, or because thecountry could become a target for Russian retaliation, or because a condemnation would mean
allying with the wrong side.
Politicians and commenters who were against
neutrality argued based on principles, emphasizing that military aggression was wrong andshould be opposed vocally. Corollary to that point56

was the argument that the Philippines was inits own territorial dispute, and neutrality would
communicate to its larger neighbor, China, thatmilitary invasion was a legitimate foreign policy tool. Finally, there were commenters who
argued that even traditionally neutral states,
like Switzerland, had broken their neutrality. As
such, the Philippines had no reason to take on aneutral stance.
Having won the presidential elections. Ferdinand
Marcos Jr. will become the Philippine President
at the end of June 2022. During the campaign,
he was initially in favor of neutrality, but later
adjusted his stance towards condemnation of
the invasion. It is unclear at this point how his
administration will respond to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. His victory notwithstanding, thispaper indicates how the debate over neutrality
became significant within the Philippines, andhow the positions taken by politicians influence
the comments by ordinary citizens online.

Surachanee Sriyai: Thailand’s Perspectives on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

THAILAND’S PERSPECTIVES ON THE RUSSIAN INVASION OF
UKRAINE
Surachanee Sriyai Chulalongkorn University

This essay focuses on two key perspectives of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in Thailand:
the official stance and the general public’s reactions. The first part of this essay reports on the official responses to the war from the Thai government and the observable responses from the Thai
general public, particularly those in the online sphere. The article then speculates on the reasonsfor the discrepancies between the two. As such, Thailand’s perspectives on Russia’s aggression
against Ukraine appeared to be mixed. The Thai government’s reserved stance on the invasion,
which has been widely criticized, seem to be backed by grounded concerns about the economy
and trade. Public opinion, on the other hand, is not so much informed by knowledge of the conflictand its background, but has been shaped by narratives from both sides of Thailand’s polarized
political spectrum.

Keywords
Invasion of Ukraine, Thailand, Thai-Russian relations, Thai foreign policy, Thai democracy movement, political polarization

INTRODUCTION
At the time of writing, it has been three months
since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As thefighting intensified, millions of Ukrainians wereforced to become internally displaced people(IDPs) or refugees. The international community’s reactions to Russia’s aggression has varied,
however. While some countries quickly condemned Russia for invading another country’s
territory and violating its sovereignty and havesupported Ukraine, others have simply called
for negotiations to end the conflict; many remain silent. This essay first focuses on two key
perspectives on Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine in Thailand: the official response to theinvasion by the Thai government and reactions
from the Thai general public; particularly in the
online sphere. The article then speculates on
the reasons behind the discrepancies between
the two.

THE OFFICIAL RESPONSES FROM THE
THAI GOVERNMENT
A few days after Russia invaded Ukraine, Thailand remained reluctant to condemn Russia
despite the pleas of 25 foreign ambassadors
posted in Thailand, who reportedly met with thepermanent secretary of the Foreign Ministryof Thailand on February 28, 2022.1 Thailand’s
first official statement about the war came in
the form of its vote in the emergency sessionof the United Nation General Assembly to passa UN Resolution ‘calls [calling] to end the ongoing bombings and attacks on civilians in Ukraine
and for all parties to respect the principles of
the Charter of the United Nations, especiallyprovisions on security and peace among coun-

1 Bangkok Post, “Neutral on Russia-Ukraine: PM,” March
2, 2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2272191/neutral-on-russia-ukraine-pm.

57

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

tries’.2 On that day, Thailand voted in support of
the Resolution alongside with 141 other countries. Interestingly, there was no mentioning of
Russia in either its statement or Explanation ofVote (EOV) delivered to the General Assembly
despite the session being about Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Rather, Thailand cited
its adherence to ‘the principles enshrined in the
United Nations Charter and those of international law, in particular respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the non-use of force against
States’ as the reasons behind its decision to votein favor of the resolution.3 This indicates that the
government of Thailand prefers to maintain arelatively neutral stance on the issue of conflict
between Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, its abstention from the vote to suspend Russia fromthe UN Human Rights Council alongside a handful of ASEAN countries, notably Singapore, who
had initially been a strong critic of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, underlies the Thai government’s
wish to further distant itself from the issue.4

REACTIONS OF THE THAI PUBLIC
Unlike the government’s lukewarm reaction to
the incident between Russia and Ukraine, thegeneral public, and in particular Thai netizens,
have been quite vocal. An image from Google
Trends in Figure 1 shows that since the time
when the conflict sparked on February 24, there
is an observable surge in web searches on key-

2 UNGA Secretariat, “As Russian Federation’s Invasion of
Ukraine Creates New Global Era, Member States Must
Take Sides, Choose between Peace, Aggression, General Assembly Hears,” March 1, 2022, https://www.un.org/
press/en/2022/ga12406.doc.htm.
3 Suriya Chindawongse, “Explanation of Vote after the
Vote at the 11th Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kingdom of Thailand, April 7, 2022, https://www.
mfa.go.th/en/content/eov-7april22-2?cate=5d5bcb4e15e39c306000683e.
4 Al Jazeera, “UN Suspends Russia from Human Rights
Body: How Your Country Voted,” April 8, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/8/russia-suspendedfrom-un-human-rights-body-how-countries-voted.

58

words like ‘Russia’ and ‘Ukraine’ in Thailand.
This indicates the wish to obtain more information about the conflict in faraway Eastern Europe
among Thai people. It is obvious that they aresearching for these keywords because of theRussian invasion since the peak interest timeframe matches the time of the war. There had
been little interest in these countries during theprevious twelve months. Several pro-democracy
movements in Thailand, for example FreeYouth,
have posted about the war to show support for
Ukraine, openly condemning Russia for violating
the sovereignty of another country. Those posts
have garnered thousands of likes and retweets,
which show that many Thai netizens sympathizewith the plight of the Ukrainians.
As it has been the case in other cities acrossthe globe, many Thais joined Ukrainian expats
to show their solidarity when they protested
against the invasion in front of the Russian Embassy in Bangkok.5 Some Thai citizens with amilitary background also signed up to fight in
Ukraine as the country has called for volunteer
soldiers to join its International Legion of the
Territorial Defense Force.6
It is, however, imperative to note that the sentiment of the Thai public about this issue is far
from being unanimous. In fact, there are also
people who have expressively sided with Russia on the matter. The split views in the public
opinion seem to superimpose on the preexisting
political ideologies and political polarization in
Thailand. Specifically, Thai conservatives tend to

5 Wassayos Ngamkham, “Rally against Russian Invasion of Ukraine in Bangkok”, Bangkok Post, February 27,
2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/thailand/general/2270815/rally-against-russian-invasion-of-ukrainein-bangkok; The Nation, “Ukrainians hold anti-war rallies
across Thailand,” February 28, 2022, https://www.nationthailand.com/in-focus/40012842.
6 Panu Wongcha-um and Jiraporn Kuhakan, “Thai ‘Tyranny’ Fighters Volunteer for Duty in Ukraine – Taipei
Times,” Reuters, March 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.
com/world/thai-democracy-activists-sign-up-fight-tyranny-ukraine-2022-03-03/.

Surachanee Sriyai: Thailand’s Perspectives on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Figure 1: Google Trends Search Volume on “Russia” and “Ukraine” from Thailand over the Year (In Both English
and Thai)side with Russia, while liberals side with Ukraine.
In terms of their understanding of the war, bothgroups seem to interpret it from the same angle,
that of patriotism. But they have entirely different views regarding the question, which side in
the conflict is the righteous one. While conservatives praise Putin’s leadership and the Russianarmed forces display of patriotism in ‘protecting
his [their] territory’, liberals view Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion as patriotic aswell as a fight for democracy.7

ANALYSIS: DIVERGENCE AND­CONVERGENCE IN PERSPECTIVESThe enduring approach of the Kingdom of Thailand’s diplomacy has been to be like ‘bamboo
bending with the wind’, a delicate yet pragmatic and grounded hedging strategy. This strategy has been credited to have contributed to thecountry’s success in overcoming major threats
to its national security, such as European colonization in the 19th century, the Japanese occupation during the WWII, and, notably, the spread

7 Atiya Achakulwisut, “Ultra-Royalist pro-Putin Stance a
Worrying Sign,” Bangkok Post, March 1, 2022, 		
https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2271
795/ultra-royalist-pro-putin-stance-a-worrying-sign.

of Communism in Southeast Asia during theCold War. Therefore, generations of career diplomats have passed down the art of Thai-style’s‘bamboo diplomacy’ and would default to it eventhough things have changed in the world since
the end of the Cold War in 1989. That said, there
should be no surprise that neither Thailand’sstatement to the UNGA nor its EOV have demonstrated any strong gesture against Russia. Like
aforementioned, it did not even mention Russia.
Furthermore, if one were to read between thelines a bit more, it is clear to see that those documents, in fact, were aimed to reprimand bothparties to the conflict, Ukraine included. I speculate that this stance is driven not only by thenature of Thai diplomacy but also by economic
concerns. According to a recent report by the
global financial group ING, which analyzes Asianmarkets vulnerability to the Russia-Ukraine conflict through key indicators such as trade, energy
dependence, and price effects, Thailand ranks
second behind only Vietnam in terms of its economic exposure to this conflict.8 And Russia is

8 Robert Carnel, “The Asian Economies Most Exposed to theRussia-Ukraine Conflict,” ING Economic and Financial Analysis, March 3, 2022, https://think.ing.com/downloads/
pdf/article/the-asian-economies-most-exposed-to-therussia-ukraine-conflict.

59

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

a much larger trade partner for Thailand than
Ukraine. Last year, the figures reached $ 2.7 billion and $ 386.47 million, respectively.9 Understandably, then, Thailand must tread carefully
and avoid picking side as much as possible.
Thailand’s abstention from the UNGA’s vote on
Friday, April 8, 2022 is also noteworthy. Although
it can be perceived as a reflection of the country’s economic interests, it is also equally possible that Thailand is avoiding taking a strong
position on human rights-related issue in fear ofreceiving a backlash about its own human rights
track record. To be fair, this concern is not uniquein the region as it might also be the case for theother five ASEAN countries that have either voted against or abstained from the resolution.
As for the general public, their motivation to rally either behind Ukraine or Russia appears tobe ideologically driven rather than being basedon concerns about the economic implications of
the conflict for Thailand. The younger generations, who have mostly a liberal political outlook
appear to feel a connection with the Ukrainians
fighting a ‘tyrant’. For them, Ukraine’s resistanceagainst Russian aggression is foremost a fightfor democracy. Several Thai volunteers signingup to fight in the Ukrainian International Legion
explicitly mentioned in interviews their wish tofight for ‘democracy’ as their motivation.10 Ironically, none of the recent posts from the Embassyof Ukraine in the Kingdom of Thailand mention‘democracy’ when calling for volunteers.11 Furthermore, Freedom House categorizes Ukraine

9 The Nation, “Thailand Assessing Russia-Ukraine Conflict’s
Impact on Trade amid Fuel Fears,” February 26, 2022,
https://www.nationthailand.com/business/40012791.
10 Panu Wongcha-um and Jiraporn Kuhakan, “Thai ‘Tyranny’ Fighters Volunteer for Duty in Ukraine,” Reuters,
March 3, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/thaidemocracy-activists-sign-up-fight-tyranny-ukraine2022-03-03/
11 Embassy of Ukraine in the Kingdom of Thailand,“Посольство України в Таїланді / Embassy of Ukraine
in the Kingdom of Thailand.”60

as a Transitional or Hybrid regime as Ukraine
receives a Democracy Percentage of only 39 %in the Nations in Transit report.12 Thus, it appears that the Thai volunteers and Thai liberal
netizens interpret the war in Ukraine by projecting their own struggle into it. This is similar to
the interpretation of the war by the ultra-rightwing in Thailand. As mentioned above, basedon Ukraine’s desire to join NATO, they have embraced the reasoning that Putin is preemptively
defending his country from the threat that NATO
expansion allegedly poses for Russia.
Figure 2: Photoshopped Image of Putin

Source: BBC Thai

Moreover, another strand of Thai conservatives,
devoted royalists, justify Russia’s violation of another state’s sovereignty through the unfoundedclaim that Putin’s admired the late King Bhu­mi­bhol of Thailand.13 For instance, the photoshopped image of Putin holding up a photo of thelate King in Figure 2 has been shared on conservatives’ Facebook pages, linking the Russianpresident to the Thai monarchy. However, it wassoon uncovered that Putin was in fact holding aphoto of his own father in the original image.

12 Freedom House, “Ukraine: Nations in Transit 2021 Country Report,” last accessed May 20, 2022, https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/nations-transit/2021.
13 Atiya Achakulwisut, “Ultra-Royalist pro-Putin Stance a
Worrying Sign,” Bangkok Post, March 1, 2022, https://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/2271795/ultra-royalist-pro-putin-stance-a-worrying-sign.

Surachanee Sriyai: Thailand’s Perspectives on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Figure 3: Google Trends Search Volume on “Russia” and “Ukraine” from Thailand over the Week (In Both English and Thai)

Overall, then, it appears that Thai public opinion
about the Russia-Ukraine is based on their projection of Thailand’s political polarization on theconflict rather than on attempts to understandthe conflict, its history, as well as its geopoliticalcontext. As mentioned above, a Google Search
Trend has shown that there was little interest in
the two countries among Thais before the war
erupted. As Figure 3 shows, this public interest
is fickle. The interest of Thai netizens in the war
in Ukraine is gradually decreasing based on thenumber of google searches for the countries’
names. There are two possible key implications
from this observable change in Google Search
Trends. First, the war might very well soon
lose the public’s interest and be replaced bysomething more topical. Second, there appears
not to have been a desire for a more profoundunderstanding of the war, its causes, and its­
consequences beyond to begin with among Thai
­netizens.

CONCLUSION
In Thailand, there appears to be three main perspectives regarding Russia’s aggression against
Ukraine. The Thai government’s reserved response to the war, while widely criticized, ap-

pears to be based on grounded concerns about
the consequences of the war for the Thai economy. Public opinion about the war is as polarized
as Thai society is as a whole and appears to beeasily influenced by narratives from both sidesof the political spectrum. Here, however, it is important to note that comments by Thai netizens
may not be representative of the Thai population
but simply are more visible. Certainly, they are
informative, because they provide an overview ofthe different opinions across the political spectrum in Thailand. The difference between the official stance of the Thai government and the liberal, young netizens is due to their divergent perspectives and values, which result in very different interpretations of the war. In contrast to theeconomic rationales behind the official reactionof the Thai government, the support of Ukraine
by younger netizens is driven by the latter’s humanitarian values. They see the war as a struggle for democracy and against authoritarianism,
which is closely related to their own criticism of
the Thai government. Even the convergence between the official stance and conservative Thai
netizens is based on different reasoning, sincemost conservatives seem to support Russia online because of either the nationalistic or royalist
narratives rather than economic ones.

61

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

62

Surachanee Sriyai: Thailand’s Perspectives on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

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No. 71 / 2006 Norifumi Kawai: Spatial Determinants ofJapanese Manufacturing Firms in the Czech Republic

No. 88 / 2011 Peter Thomas in der Heiden: Chinese Sectoral Industrial Policy Shaping International Trade and Investment Patterns – Evidence from the Iron and Steel In­
dustryNo. 70 / 2006 Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.): Workshop Institutionen in der Entwicklung Ostasiens I – Offenheit und Geschlossenheit asiatischer Wirtschaftssysteme

No. 87 / 2010 Marcus Conlé: Health Biotechnology in China:
National, Regional, and Sectoral Dimensions

No. 69 / 2006 Christian Göbel: The Peasant’s Rescue fromthe Cadre? An Institutional Analysis of China’s Rural Tax andFee Reform

No. 86 / 2010 Anja Senz, Dieter Reinhardt (eds.): Green
Governance – One Solution for Two Problems? Climate
Change and Economic Shocks: Risk Perceptions and Coping
Strategies in China, India and Bangladesh

64

No. 85 / 2010 Heather Xiaoquan Zhang: Migration, Risk
and Livelihoods: A Chinese Case

No. 68 / 2006 Thomas Heberer: Institutional Change andLegitimacy via Urban Elections? People’s Awareness ofElections and Participation in Urban Neighbourhoods (Shequ)Surachanee Sriyai: Thailand’s Perspectives on the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

No. 67 / 2006 Momoyo Hüstebeck: Tanaka Makiko: Scharfzüngige Populistin oder populäre Reformerin?
No. 66 / 2006 Momoyo Hüstebeck: Park Geun-hye: Als Präsidententochter zur ersten Staatspräsidentin Südkoreas?

No. 49 / 2003 Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.): Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft
III. Themenschwerpunkt: Institutionenökonomik und Japanstudien

No. 65 / 2006 Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.): Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft
V. Themenschwerpunkt: Deutschlandjahr in Japan – eine
Zwischenbilanz

No. 48 / 2003 Institute of East Asian Studies (Ed.), Frank
Robaschik (compilation), with contributions from Winfried
Flüchter, Thomas Heberer, Werner Pascha, Frank Roba­
schik, Markus Taube: Overview of East Asian Studies inCentral and Eastern Europe

No. 64 / 2004 Christian Göbel, Thomas Heberer (Hg.): Task
Force: Zivilgesellschaftliche Entwicklungen in China / Task
Force: Civil Societal Developments in China

No. 47 / 2002 Ulrich Zur-Lienen: Singapurs Strategie zur
Integration seiner multi-ethnischen Bevölkerung: Was sichbegegnet gleicht sich an

No. 63 / 2005 Thorsten Nilges: Zunehmende Verschuldung
durch Mikrokredite. Auswertung eines Experiments in Süd­
indienNo. 46 / 2002 Thomas Heberer: Strategische Gruppen
und Staatskapazität: Das Beispiel der Privatunternehmerin ­China

No. 62 / 2004 Jun Imai: The Rise of Temporary Employment in Japan. Legalisation and Expansion of a Non-Regular
Employment Form
No. 61 / 2004 Thomas Heberer, Nora Sausmikat: Bilden
sich in China Strukturen einer Zivilgesellschaft heraus?
No. 60 / 2004 Thomas Heberer, Anja Senz (Hg.): Feldforschung in Asien: Erlebnisse und Ergebnisse aus der Sicht
politikwissenschaftlicher OstasienforschungNo. 59 / 2004 Li Fan: Come by the Wind. Li Fan’s Story in
Buyun Election
No. 58 / 2004 Li Minghuan: Labour Brokerage in China­Today: Formal and Informal Dimensions

No. 45 / 2002 Thomas Heberer, Markus Taube: China, theEuropean Union and the United States of America: Partners
or Competitors?
No. 44 / 2002 Werner Pascha: Wirtschaftspolitische Reformen in Japan – Kultur als Hemmschuh?
No. 43 / 2002 Werner Pascha, Klaus Ruth, Cornelia Storz(Hg.): Themenschwerpunkt: Einfluss von IT-Technologien
auf Strukturen und Prozesse in Unternehmen
No. 42 / 2002 Karin Adelsberger, Claudia Derichs, Thomas
Heberer, Patrick Raszelenberg: Der 11. September und die
Folgen in Asien. Politische Reaktionen in der VR China, Japan,
Malaysia und Vietnam

No. 57 / 2004 Dorit Lehrack: NGO im heutigen China –­Aufgaben, Rolle und Selbstverständnis

No. 41 / 2001 Claudia Derichs, Thomas Heberer (Hg.):
Task Force: Ein Gutachten zu Beschäftigungspolitik, Altersvorsorge und Sozialstandards in Ostasien

No. 56 / 2004 Anja Senz: Wählen zwischen Recht und
Pflicht – Ergebnisse einer Exkursion der Ostasienwissenschaften in die Provinz Sichuan / VR China

No. 40 / 2001 Werner Pascha, Frank Robaschik: The Roleof Japanese Local Governments in Stabilisation Policy

No. 55 / 2004 Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz: Workshop
Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft IV.
Themenschwerpunkt: Wahrnehmung, Institutionenökonomik
und Japanstudien
No. 54 / 2004 Thomas Heberer: Ethnic Entrepreneurs as
Agents of Social Change. Entrepreneurs, clans, social obligations and ethnic resources: the case of the Liangshan Yi
in Sichuan
No. 53 / 2003 Hermann Halbeisen: Taiwan’s Domestic
Politics since the Presidential Elections 2000
No. 52 / 2003 Claudia Derichs, Wolfram Schaffar (Hg.):
Task Force: Interessen, Machstrukturen und internationale
Regime. Die WTO-Verhandlungen zum GATS (Dienstleistungsabkommen) und sein Einfluss auf Asien
No. 51 / 2003 Markus Taube: Chinas Rückkehr in die Weltgemeinschaft. Triebkräfte und Widerstände auf dem Weg zu
einem „Global Player“
No. 50 / 2003 Kotaro Oshige: Arbeitsmarktstruktur undindustrielle Beziehungen in Japan. Eine Bestandsaufnahme
mit Thesen zur Zukunftsentwicklung

No. 39 / 2001 Anja Senz, Zhu Yi: Von Ashima zu Yi-Rap:
Die Darstellung nationaler Minderheiten in den chinesischen Medien am Beispiel der Yi-Nationalität
No. 38 / 2001 Claudia Derichs: Interneteinsatz in den
Duis­burger Ostasienwissenschaften: Ein Erfahrungsbericht
am Beispiel des deutsch-japanischen Seminars „DJ50“No. 37 / 2001 Zhang Luocheng: The particularities andmajor problems of minority regions in the middle and western parts of China and their developmental strategy
No. 36 / 2001 Thomas Heberer: Falungong – Religion,
Sekte oder Kult? Eine Heilsgemeinschaft als Manifestation
von Modernisierungsproblemen und sozialen Entfremdungsprozessen
No. 35 / 2001 Claudia Derichs, Thomas Heberer, Patrick
Raszelenberg (Hg.): Task Force: Ein Gutachten zu den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Ostasien–NRW
No. 34 / 2000 Ulrich Jürgens, Werner Pascha, Cornelia
Storz (Hg.): Workshop Organisation und Ordnung der japanischen Wirtschaft I. Themenschwerpunkt: „New Economy“– Neue Formen der Arbeitsorganisation in Japan65

MALITZ / SRIYAI (EDS.): Civil Societies’ Reactions to the Russian War on Ukraine

No. 33 / 2000 Winfried Flüchter: German GeographicalResearch on Japan
No. 32 / 2000 Thomas Heberer, Sabine Jakobi: Henan –The Model: From Hegemonism to Fragmentism. Portrait of
the Political Culture of China’s Most Populated Province

No. 15 / 1997 Winfried Flüchter: Tokyo quo vadis? Chancen
und Grenzen (?) metropolitanen Wachstums

No. 31 / 2000 Thomas Heberer: Some Considerations on
China’s Minorities in the 21st Century: Conflict or Conciliation?

No. 14 / 1997 Claudia Derichs: Der westliche Universalitätsanspruch aus nicht-westlicher Perspektive

No. 30 / 2000 Jun Imai, Karen Shire: Flexible Equality:
Men and Women in Employment in Japan

No. 13 / 1997 Werner Pascha: Economic Globalization andSocial Stabilization: A Dual Challenge for Korea

No. 29 / 2000 Karl Lichtblau, Werner Pascha, Cornelia
Storz (Hg.): Workshop Klein- und Mittelunternehmen in­Japan V. Themenschwerpunkt: M & A in Japan – ein neuesIn­strument der Unternehmenspolitik?

No. 12 / 1996 Claudia Derichs: Kleine Einführung in die
Politik und das politische System Japans

No. 28 / 1999 Rainer Dormels: Regionaler Antagonismus
in Südkorea
No. 27 / 1999 Claudia Derichs, Tim Goydke, Werner Pascha(Hg.): Task Force: Ein Gutachten zu den deutschen/­europäi­
schen Außen- und Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen mit Japan
No. 26 / 1999 Susanne Steffen: Der Einsatz der Umweltpolitik in der japanischen Elektrizitätswirtschaft
No. 25 / 1999 Claudia Derichs: Nationbuilding in Malaysia
under Conditions of Globalization
No. 24 / 1999 Thomas Heberer, Arno Kohl, Tuong Lai,
Nguyen Duc Vinh: Aspects of Privat Sector Development in
Vietnam
No. 23 / 1999 Werner Pascha: Corruption in Japan –An Economist’s Perspective
No. 22 / 1999 Nicole Bastian: Wettbewerb im japanischen
Fernsehmarkt. Neue Strukturen durch Kabel- und Satelliten­
fernsehen? Eine wettbewerbstheoretische Analyse
No. 21 / 1999 Thomas Heberer: Entrepreneurs as Social
Actors: Privatization and Social Change in China and Vietnam
No. 20 / 1999 Vereinigung für sozialwissenschaftliche­Japan-Forschung (Hg.): Quo vadis sozialwissenschaftliche
Japan-Forschung? Methoden und ZukunftsfragenNo. 19 / 1999 Bong-Ki Kim: Das Problem der interkulturellen Kommunikation am Beispiel der Rezeption Deweys
in China
No. 18 / 1998 Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.): Workshop Klein- und Mittelunternehmen in Japan IV. Themen­schwerpunkt Netzwerke
No. 17 / 1998 Andreas Bollmann, Claudia Derichs, Daniel
Konow, Ulrike Rebele, Christian Schulz, Kerstin Seemann,
Stefanie Teggemann, Stephan Wieland: Interkulturelle Kompetenz als Lernziel

66

No. 16 / 1997 Werner Pascha, Cornelia Storz (Hg.): Workshop Klein- und Mittelunternehmen in Japan III. Themen­schwerpunkt Innovation

No. 11 / 1996 Mikiko Eswein: Die Rolle der Berufsbildung
beim sozialen Wandel in Japan
No. 10 / 1996 Mikiko Eswein: Erziehung zwischen Konfu­
zianismus und Bismarck. Schule und Erziehungssystem inJapan
No. 9 / 1996 Werner Pascha: On the Relevance of theGerman Concept of “Social Market Economy” for Korea
No. 8 / 1996 Carsten Herrmann-Pillath: Strange Notes
on Modern Statistics and Traditional Popular Religion in
China: Further Reflections on the Importance of Sinology
for Social Science as applied on China
No. 7 / 1996 Ralph Lützeler: Die japanische Familie derGegenwart – Wandel und Beharrung aus demographischer
Sicht
No. 6 / 1995 Werner Pascha (Hg.): Klein- und Mittelunter­nehmen in Japan – Dokumentation eines Workshops
No. 5 / 1995 Chen Lai: Die Kultur des Volkskonfuzianismus: Eine Untersuchung der Literatur zur kindlichen Erziehung (Meng xue)
No. 4 / 1995 Carsten Herrmann-Pillath: Die Volksrepu­blik
und die Republik China: Die Gratwanderung zweier chinesischer Staaten zwischen Politik und Wirtschaft
No. 3 / 1995 Carsten Herrmann-Pillath: On the Importance of Studying Late Qing Economic and Social History for
the Analysis of Contemporary China or: Protecting Sinology
Against Social ScienceNo. 2 / 1995 H. J. Beckmann, K. Haaf, H. Kranz, W. Pascha,
B. Slominski, T. Yamada: „Japan im Netz“. Eine Materialsammlung zur Nutzung des Internet
No. 1 / 1995 Claudia Derichs, Winfried Flüchter, Carsten
Herrmann-Pillath, Regine Mathias, Werner Pascha: Ostasiatische Regionalstudien: Warum?