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Transportation Security Administration’s Deployment
and Use of Advanced Imaging Technology

OIG-13-120 (Revised)

March 2014

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

MAR 26 2014
MEMORANDUM FOR:John W. Halinski
Deputy Administrator
Transportation Security Administration

FROM:

Anne L. Richards
Assistant Inspector General for Audits

SUBJECT:

Transportation Security Administration’s Deployment andUse of Advanced Imaging Technology

Attached for your information is our revised final report, Transportation Security
Administration’s Deployment and Use of Advanced Imaging Technology, OIG‐13‐120. We
reissued the report to correct errors related to cost information for advanced imaging
technology units purchased shown on page 3, table 1. The revision did not change thefindings or recommendations made in this report. Please see the attached errata pagefor details.
Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Mark Bell, Deputy AssistantInspector General for Audits, at (202) 254‐4100.

ErratafpagefforfOIG-13-120f
Transportation Security Administration’s Deployment andUse of Advanced Imaging Technology

Table 1 on page 3 of the final report contained errors and was updated (see below):

Original table in published report:
Table 1: Cost of AIT Units Purchased
Cost of AITs by
Type
Unit CostType
Millimeter Wave AIT
Backscatter AIT
Total$148,200$159,584$110,557,200
40,055,584$150,612,784

No. of AIT Units
Purchased
746
251
997

Source:fOIGfanalysisfoffTSAfdata.f

New table:
Table 2: Cost of AIT Units Purchased
Cost of AITs by
Type
Unit Cost*Type
Millimeter Wave AIT
Backscatter AIT
Total$146,452$159,672$109,253,434
40,077,571$149,331,005

No. of AIT Units
Purchased
746
251
997

*Unitfcostfcalculatedfbyfdividingftotal costfoffAITs byfunitsfpurchasedfandfroundedftofthef_nearestfdollarf
Source:fOIGfanalysisfoffTSAfdata.f

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Table of Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................ 1
Background ........................................................................................................................ 2
Results of Audit ................................................................................................................... 4
Strategic Deployment Planning .............................................................................. 4
Data Reliability ........................................................................................................ 6
Recommendations .................................................................................................. 9
Management Comments and OIG Analysis ............................................................ 9

Appendixes
Appendix A:
Appendix B:
Appendix C:
Appendix D:

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology ............................................ 11
Management Comments to the Draft Report ............................... 13
Major Contributors to This Report ................................................ 16
Report Distribution ........................................................................ 17

Abbreviations
AIT
DHS
GAGAS
OIG
PMIS
TSA
TSO

www.oig.dhs.gov

advanced imaging technology
Department of Homeland Security
generally accepted government auditing standards
Office of Inspector General
Performance Measurement Information System
Transportation Security Administration
Transportation Security Officer

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Department of Homeland Security

Executive Summary
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) secures the nation’s airports and screens
commercial airline passengers and baggage. It uses advanced imaging technology to screen
passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats, including weapons, explosives, and otherconcealed objects, without physical contact.
TSA began deploying advanced imaging technology in 2007 and accelerated its deployment
after the attempted airplane bombing on December 25, 2009. In 2012, Representative John
Mica requested that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector
General (OIG) conduct an audit to determine whether TSA is effectively deploying advanced
imaging technology and is fully utilizing the equipment at airports.
TSA created and followed deployment schedules. However, it did not develop acomprehensive deployment strategy to ensure all advanced imaging technology units
were effectively deployed and fully used for screening passengers. This condition
existed because TSA did not—••Have a policy or process requiring program offices to prepare strategic
deployment plans for new technology that align with the overall goals of the
Passenger Screening Program, andHave adequate internal controls to ensure accurate data on advanced
imaging technology utilization.

Without a documented, approved, comprehensive plan and accurate data on the use ofadvanced imaging technology, TSA continued to use walkthrough metal detectors,
which are unable to identify non-metallic objects, to screen the majority of passengers;
therefore not taking advantage of the advanced imaging technology’s security benefits.
Additionally, TSA may have used resources inefficiently to purchase and deploy
underused advanced imaging technology units.
We made two recommendations to improve the effectiveness of how TSA deploys andmeasures the use of advanced imaging technology. TSA concurred with both
recommendations.

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Background
TSA was created to strengthen the security of the nation’s transportation systems andensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA is responsible for
conducting checkpoint screening operations at federalized airports. Its mission is toconduct screening operations in a manner that maximizes passenger throughput andthreat detection while alleviating privacy concerns. Within TSA, the Passenger
Screening Program is responsible for providing technology to screen passengers andcarry-on baggage at airport security checkpoints.
Historically, TSA used walkthrough metal detectors toscreen passengers at airport security checkpoints. As
the threat to transportation security evolved, TSA
needed a screening technology to detect nonmetallic
threats. Advanced imaging technology (AIT) screenspassengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats,
including weapons, explosives, and other concealed
objects, without physical contact. TSA began
deploying AIT in 2007 and accelerated its deployment
after the attempted airplane bombing on December
25, 2009.1

Types of AITMillimeter wave technology uses
electromagnetic waves to create thesame generic image for all
passengers.
Backscatter technology projects
low-level X-ray beams over the bodyto create a reflection of the body
displayed on the monitor.
Source: TSA.

TSA deployed AIT with millimeter wave and backscatter technologies. Both types of AITcreate an image of a passenger’s body that identifies items not readily visible. Initial AITunits required a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) to review and interpret theimages, generating privacy concerns among travelers and members of Congress.
Figure 1: AIT with Automated Target Recognition

Source:ffL3fCommunications.

1

In 2011, TSA added automatictarget recognition software to themillimeter wave AIT. Automatictarget recognition software
addresses privacy concerns byinterpreting images and displaying
the results on a generic figure, as
shown in figure 1. The FAAf
ModernizationfandfReformfActfoff
2012 mandated that, beginning

Northwest Airlines flight 253 was the target of a failed Al-Qaeda bombing attempt.

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June 2012, TSA shall ensure AIT used for passenger screening is equipped with
automatic recognition software. The TSA Administrator issued a waiver extending thedeadline to June 1, 2013.
As of January 2013, TSA had purchased 997 AIT units at a total cost of approximately$150 million. Table 1 provides a summary of the total cost of all AIT units purchased.
Table 1: Cost of AIT Units Purchased
Cost of AITs by
Type
Unit Cost*Type
Millimeter Wave AIT
Backscatter AIT
Total$146,452$159,672$109,253,434
40,077,571$149,331,005

No. of AIT Units
Purchased
746
251
997

*Unitfcostfcalculatedfbyfdividingftotal costfoffAITs byfunitsfpurchasedfandfroundedftofthefffffffff_nearestfdollar
Source:fOIGfanalysisfoffTSAfdata.f

In January 2013, TSA decided to remove all backscatter AIT units from airports because
these units would not meet the June 2013 deadline to comply with the FAAf
ModernizationfandfReformfActfoff2012. This affected 251 units purchased forapproximately $40 million.
TSA uses passenger throughput data entered into the Performance Measurement
Information System (PMIS) to measure the use of AIT. TSA extracts data from PMIS toprovide throughput information to airport Federal Security Directors and TSA leadershipto assist in managing operations. TSOs manually collect and enter passenger checkpoint
throughput data (such as AIT and walkthrough metal detector throughput) into PMIS.
TSA has not performed a reliability assessment on AIT throughput data recorded in
PMIS.
Representative John Mica, Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Operations,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform requested this audit in January 2012.
Representative Mica expressed concern about TSA purchasing and deploying AIT units
that it is not using at the airports. 2 This report responds to his request. Our objective,
scope, and methodology are provided in appendix A.

2

Representative Mica requested this audit during the last congressional term where he served as
Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
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Results of Audit
TSA created and followed deployment schedules showing the order in which airports
would receive AIT units. However, it did not develop a comprehensive deployment
strategy to ensure all AIT units were effectively deployed and fully used for screening
passengers. This condition existed because TSA did not—••Have a policy or process requiring program offices to prepare strategic
deployment plans for new technology that align with the overall goals of the
Passenger Screening Program, andHave adequate internal controls to ensure accurate data on AIT utilization.

Without a documented, approved, comprehensive plan and accurate data on the use ofadvanced imaging technology, TSA continued to use walkthrough metal detectors,
which are unable to identify non-metallic objects, to screen the majority of passengers;
therefore not taking advantage of the advanced imaging technology’s security benefits.
Additionally, TSA may have used resources inefficiently to purchase and deploy
underused AIT units.
Strategic Deployment Planning
TSA did not develop a strategic deployment planning document to address theintroduction and use of AIT to screen passengers at airports. Rather thandevelop a comprehensive strategic deployment plan, TSA created documents
and schedules with short term goals based on institutional knowledge to deploy
AIT. Documents that TSA provided contained inconsistent information or were
not signed by senior leadership, creating doubt as to whether the documents
were ever approved. In addition, TSA did not have a policy or process requiring
program offices to document strategic deployment plans for new technologythat align with the goals of the Passenger Screening Program. Without adocumented, approved, comprehensive strategic deployment plan to address
short- and long-term goals, TSA may have inefficiently used resources topurchase and deploy underused AIT units.
Deployment Planning Documents
TSA created and followed deployment schedules and documents identifying
short term goals, but did not develop a comprehensive strategic deployment
plan. A strategic deployment plan would provide TSA a baseline to respond toand plan for evolving threats, goals, and priorities. TSA and DHS do not havespecific policies or procedures for developing or documenting deployment plans.
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An effective strategic deployment plan should include the purpose anddescription, identify necessary tasks, define roles and responsibilities, identify
logistics requirements, document site selection methodology and deployment
schedule, and outline disposal plans.
TSA created deployment schedules that documented the order in which airports
would receive AIT units. TSA based the deployment schedules on the following
three priorities:•••

High threat airports with available Transportation Security Officers,
AIT pilot locations, andHighest threat airports.

TSA also considered airport size and available space, but not as a separate factor.
TSA measured the airport’s screening area dimensions (i.e., ceiling height, lane
width) to ensure AIT units could fit the space before including an airport on the
deployment schedule. These documents did not show how or to what extent
TSA aligned AIT deployment with the overall goals of the Passenger Screening
Program.
Additionally, TSA deployed AIT using information contained in various
documents that were fragmented and developed independently from one
another. Some documents contained inconsistent information and were
unsigned and undated, and provided no evidence of TSA’s senior leadershipapproval. TSA had difficulty providing historical information as well. TSA could
not provide strategic deployment planning documents created before 2010; yet
the component deployed an AIT unit at the Phoenix Sky Harbor International
Airport in 2007. Strategic planning is important for a successful deployment ofscreening technology. Without a comprehensive, strategic deployment plan anda process for approving changes to the plan, TSA decision makers do not have asystematic approach to maximizing technology advances for reducing current
and evolving threats. Moreover, the absence of a comprehensive strategy to
deploy AIT units may lead to underused AIT units at airports, possibly
inefficiently using resources to purchase and deploy underused AIT units, andreducing the security benefits of AIT by continuing to use walkthrough metal
detectors to screen passengers.
Actions Taken During the Audit
TSA officials recognized the benefits of developing and maintaining a strategic
deployment plan for its passenger screening equipment and began drafting acomprehensive deployment strategy in July 2012. TSA drafted two separate
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documents—one to provide a historical record of AIT deployment; the second toprovide a deployment strategy for all Passenger Screening Program equipment.
As of April 2013, the documents were still in draft. A comprehensive, strategic
deployment plan defining deployment goals may eliminate or minimize
problems in future equipment deployments.
Data Reliability
TSA did not have adequate internal controls to ensure accurate data on AIT use.
We assessed PMIS data in accordance with the Government Accountability
Office's guidance, AssessingfthefReliabilityfoffComputer-ProcessedfData.3 We
could not determine the reliability of PMIS data used to report AIT use
because—•••PMIS application and quality controls were not sufficient to identify
and correct potential errors;
Airports discarded original source documents, preventing us fromreconciling the information; andPMIS and airport source documents during limited validation testing
for a 10-day timeframe for five category X airports were inconsistent.4

PMIS Application Controls
PMIS application controls did not ensure airports reported accurate passenger
throughput data to TSA headquarters. The Government Accountability Office
defines application controls as internal controls incorporated directly into
computer applications to help ensure the validity, completeness, accuracy, andconfidentiality of transactions. Application controls include processing controls,
data input, and system access.
PMIS may identify passenger throughput entries that exceed hourly thresholds
for a check lane, but it does not prevent the system from accepting incorrect
entries. TSA designates upper limits for passenger check lane throughput, andPMIS notifies a reviewer when an entry exceeds the limit. PMIS does notindicate which lane, hour, or screening equipment exceeded the limit. TSA
attempted to demonstrate the review process, but could not determine which
entry exceeded the limit. In this case, a reviewer may approve a submission
without correcting potential errors. Furthermore, TSA cannot be certain that
3

AssessingfthefReliabilityfoffComputer-ProcessedfData,fGAO-09-680G, July 2009, www.gao.gov.
TSA classifies its regulated U.S. airports into one of five categories—X, I, II, III, and IV. Category X airports
generally have the largest number of passengers boarding planes, and category IV airports have the least.
4

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inaccurate submissions are thoroughly reviewed because PMIS automatically
accepts submissions within 48 hours.
PMIS does not have system access controls that prevent unauthorized or
accidental changes. In one instance, we identified a checkpoint where PMIS
showed AIT throughput that was more than double the total customer
throughput at that checkpoint (figure 2). TSA officials explained that a change in
PMIS settings resulted in recording inaccurate AIT throughput.
Figure 2: Error on AIT Utilization Report for a Category X Airport

Source:fTSA.f

PMIS Quality Controls
TSA’s quality controls for PMIS did not ensure airports submit accurate data to
TSA headquarters for reporting the number of passengers screened by AIT.
Controls are essential for an agency to achieve effective and efficient program
results and safeguard the integrity of their programs. Quality controls include
complying with approved policies and procedures, approving and reviewing data,
and verifying and reconciling information.
Although TSA has guidance documenting responsibilities for PMIS data entry andreview, that guidance does not include procedures for capturing and validating
AIT data. TSA’s guidance includes the PMISfWebfUserfGuide and the Officefoff
SecurityfOperationsfFieldfGuide:fImprovingfSecurityfEffectivenessfbyfOptimizingf
UtilizationfoffAdvancedfImagingfTechnology. These documents define PMIS data
fields, identify fields requiring data entry, and provide examples of TSA reports
on AIT.
TSA did not develop standard procedures or guidance to instruct airports onrecording or entering data into PMIS. For example, the five airports visited useddifferent datasheet logs to record AIT throughput. Additionally, these airports
did not have a documented procedure for validating AIT throughput data prior toentering the information into PMIS. Without specific procedures on data
validation, TSA cannot verify that data entered into PMIS are accurate andreliable.

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TSA is unable to assess PMIS data accuracy because it does not require airports
to maintain source documents for AIT throughput data. Four of the five airports
visited could not immediately provide documentation to validate PMIS data.
One airport maintained the original records at each checkpoint for 30 days andthen transferred those records to an off-site storage facility. Airport personnel
were not able to provide the files quickly when requested because the records
were not organized. TSA confirmed it has not tested the accuracy of AIT data in
PMIS; instead, it relies on staff experience with throughput data to identify
problems with the data.
Airports’ manual processes for recording and entering AIT throughput in PMIS
may lead to inaccurate information and do not provide an audit trail to validate
data accuracy. As illustrated in figure 3, TSOs record passenger throughput using
pen and paper, calculate the hourly throughput, and enter the information into
PMIS.
Figure 3: Manual Process to Capture Hourly AIT Throughput

AIT counterincreases
with eachpassenger
screened

TSO
manually
records
hourly AITcount

TSO manuallycalculates eachhour’s AIT
throughput

TSO enters AIT
throughput data into
PMIS

Source:fOIGfanalysisfoffTSAfairportfprocess.

We tested a sample of PMIS data for a 10-day period at five category X airports
to evaluate data reliability. We were not able to develop a systematic test
approach because there were no standard procedures and requirements for the
airports to maintain manual records. However, based on this limited testing, we
identified the following problems during our data reliability review:••••www.oig.dhs.gov

AIT throughput data recorded in PMIS were different than the source
document.
AIT throughput data on the source document were not recorded in PMIS.
The starting AIT count was different from the previous day’s ending AIT
count.
AIT throughput source documentation was missing.

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Without documented procedures standardizing the process to capture AIT
throughput and stronger controls to validate AIT data, TSA cannot ensure data in
PMIS are accurate and complete. Without reliable throughput data for AIT, TSA
decision makers cannot ensure the optimal use of its machines, cannot measure
the effectiveness of the technology, and cannot implement improvements inefficiencies.
Recommendations
We recommend that the Deputy Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration:
Recommendation #1:
Develop and approve a single, comprehensive deployment strategy that
addresses short- and long-term goals for screening equipment.
Recommendation #2:
Develop and implement a disciplined system of internal controls from data entry
to reporting to ensure PMIS data integrity.
Management Comments and OIG Analysis
TSA provided comments to the draft of this report. According to its response,
TSA agreed with our recommendations. A summary of the responses and ouranalysis follows. We included a copy of the management comments in their
entirety in appendix B.
In its comments, TSA asserted it created an Executive Steering Committee that
met weekly to discuss deployment goals and progress; technology development
and operational reliability; operator hiring and training progress; operational
metrics; Congressional, stakeholder, and international engagements; andopportunities for continuous improvement. However, the results of the steeringcommittee’s decisions were not developed into a written baseline to respond toand plan for evolving threats, goals, and priorities. TSA acknowledged therecommendations will help it develop a greater focus on documenting its shortand long-term strategies and improve internal controls relative to data used toinfluence or inform those strategies.
Response to Recommendation #1: TSA concurred. TSA launched an effort todevelop and approve updated deployment strategies that address short- andwww.oig.dhs.gov

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long-term goals. The deployment strategies will include Risk Based Security
goals and a methodology for assessing the impact of unplanned events.
OIG Analysis: While TSA’s actions are responsive to the recommendation, TSA
did not provide sufficient detail or a target date for completion of its deployment
strategy documents. This recommendation is unresolved and will remain open
until TSA provides its approved comprehensive deployment strategy.
Response to Recommendation #2: TSA concurred. TSA agreed that its system
can benefit from establishing standard processes and procedures for collecting,calculating, and entering AIT and walkthrough metal detector passenger
throughput, as well as developing auditing mechanisms to ensure the processes
are followed and TSA can identify and correct incorrect data. TSA noted it wasable to both increase the number of AIT deployed and reallocate millimeterwave units to mitigate the removal of backscatter units without degradation in
the percent of passengers screened. In addition, TSA asserted PMIS has
demonstrated the ability to provide data on AIT utilization.
OIG Analysis: TSA’s response to this recommendation does not fully address
the intent of the recommendation. Although TSA acknowledged the benefit ofestablishing standard processes and developing auditing mechanisms for AIT andwalkthrough metal detector throughput, the component did not provide specificactions it will take to address the recommendation. The recommendation isunresolved and will remain open until TSA develops and implements internal
controls to ensure PMIS data integrity.

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Appendix A
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) wasestablished by the HomelandfSecurityfActfoff2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment
to the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, andspecial reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy,
efficiency, and effectiveness within the Department.
In response to a congressional request, we audited TSA’s deployment and use of AIT.
Our audit objective was to determine whether TSA ensured AIT units are being
effectively deployed to and fully used in airports. We conducted this audit in response
to a request by Representative John Mica, Chairman, Subcommittee on Government
Operations, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Representative Micaquestioned whether TSA was wasting taxpayer dollars by purchasing and deploying AITunits that were not being used.
We reviewed Federal regulations, departmental guidance, and agency procedures for
AIT deployment and use, as well as best practices for equipment deployment and datareliability. We reviewed acquisition, deployment, and contract documentation for AIT.
We also reviewed TSA guidance on PMIS.
We interviewed TSA headquarters staff responsible for the acquisition, deployment, anduse of AIT in the following offices: the Office of Security Capabilities, Office of Security
Operations, and the Office of Acquisition. In addition, we interviewed TSA staff
responsible for the use of AIT and observed AIT operations at five airports—Chicago
O’Hare International Airport, John F. Kennedy International Airport, Lambert-St. LouisInternational Airport, Newark Liberty International Airport, and Seattle-Tacoma
International Airport.
To identify AIT throughput, we extracted PMIS data from TSA headquarters’ reporting
system to review passenger throughput data from August 1, 2011, throughJuly 31, 2012. We used IDEA software to review the PMIS data for exceptions to TSA’s
standard throughput rates and to summarize overall AIT usage at TSA’s 28 category X
airports.
We tested the accuracy of passenger throughput data we extracted from PMIS andconcluded the data were of undetermined reliability. We tested PMIS application
controls by evaluating data against TSA’s standard throughput thresholds and identified
instances where values exceeded those limits.

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We could not validate PMIS for our proposed timeframe of August 1, 2011, through July
31, 2012, because airports did not retain the records. We requested that the five
airports visited maintain and provide source documents for a 10-day period from
December 1, 2012, to December 10, 2012. One airport did not comply with the original
request so its time period was from January 19, 2013, to January 28, 2013. Our review
identified inconsistencies between PMIS and the airports’ original source documents.
We conducted this performance audit between May 2012 and May 2013 pursuant to
the InspectorfGeneralfActfoff1978, as amended, and according to generally accepted
government auditing standards (GAGAS), except that we identified an impairment to
our independence in appearance. During this audit, it came to our attention that afamily member of a senior OIG official was employed by an entity associated with thisaudit. To resolve this issue, we employed safeguards to protect the work from thethreat to our independence in appearance. Our safeguards included re-evaluating theevidence supporting our findings and conclusions. In our opinion, the impairment to
our independence in appearance did not affect the findings and conclusions developed
during this audit.
GAGAS requires that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate
evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based upon our
audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based upon our audit objective, and that the impairment to
our independence in appearance did not affect this evidence or any findings andconclusions.

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Appendix B
Management Comments to the Draft Report
U.S. Dep~~rtmeal of Homoload Stcllrily
70 I Sou Ill 12th Street
Arting10n. VA 20598-6021~- Transl?ortatio n\~t" Secunty"~· ,.r:>· Adntin.istration

AOO 1..5 2013
INFORMATIONMEMORANDUM FOR:

Anne L. Richards
Assistant Inspector General for Audits
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

FROM:

JohnS.
Administrator
Transportation

SUBJECT:

Pistole ~~~urity Administration

Transportation Security Administration 's Deployment and Use of
Advanced Imaging Technology - For Official Use Only OJG
Project No. 12-/37-AUD-TSA.

This memorandum constitutes the Transportation Security Administration' s (TSA) response to
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) draft report
entitled, Transportation Security Administration's Deployment and Use ofAdvanced Imaging
Technology - For Official Use Only O!G Project No. 12-1 37-A UD-TSA.
Background
The report identifies measures that can be taken by TSA to enhance its deployment and use of
Advanced Imaging Technology (AJT). TSA begin deploying AIT in 2007 and accelerated its
deployment after the attempted airplane bombing on December 25, 2009. In 2012,
Representative John Mica requested that the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Office of Inspector General (OIG) conduct an audit to determine whether TSA is effectively
deploying AIT and is fully uti lizing the equipment at airports.
Discussion
In 2007, TSA conducted a limited acquisition of eight low-rate initial production (LRIP) AITs todetemline the applicability of such technology in the checkpoint environment. Based on the
success of that initial testing, an additional3S units were purcbased in 2008 and fielded in thesecondary position (post-Walk-Through Metal Detector (WTMD) and for secondary screening
only) at approximately 19 airports. In 2009, six of the original units were re-configured to thewww.oig.dhs.gov

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2

primary position (co-located with WTMD) to test the feasibility and performance of AIT as a
primary screening device. Through data collection efforts during several extended field andlaboratory tests, it was determined that AIT would be successful in the primary position for thedetection of metallic and non-metallic threats.
After the attempted airplane bombing on December 25, 2009, TSA modified screening
procedures to improve the ability to detect explosives hidden in sensitive areas of the body andaccelerated AIT deployment. These strategies were intended to improve TSA' s ability to detectnon-metallic explosives and to increase the use of technology to detect threats concealed on the
body in a way that mitigated the need for physical screening procedures. Over the following
3 years, TSA successfully deployed close to I ,000 AIT machines across the system; hiring andtraining operators, collaborating with internal and external stakeholders to socialize the new
security posture, and attending to customer service impacts by a multitude of outreach events andawareness campaigns.
To affect this amount of change in such a short period of time, TSA stood up an Executive
Steering Committee that met weekly to discuss the items below and ensure immediate attention
to any element of the deployment that presented a risk to the schedule or the efficacy of theeffort.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Deployment goals and progress;
Technology development, operational reliability;
Operator hiring and training progress;
Operational metrics (AIT Throughput, AIT Utilization, Passenger Opt-Outs, etc.);
Congressional Engagements;
Stakeholder Engagements (media, passenger services outlets, industry partners, etc.);
International Engagements; andOpportunities for continuous improvement on all fronts

The recommendations in the OIG's report will help TSA to continue developing a greater focus
on documenting short- and long-term strategies as well as improving our internal controls
relative to data that is used to influence or inform those strategies.
TSA concurs with the recommendations provided by OIG and has already taken steps to address
the recommendations. What follows are TSA's specific responses to the recommendations
contained in the OIG report.
Recommendation #1: D evelop and approve a single, comprehensive deployment strategy that
addresses short and long-term goals for screening equipm ent.
TSA concurs. TSA has already launched the effort to develop and approve updated deployment
strategies that address short- and long-term goals. These strategies will include the impact ofrecent and upcoming Risk Based Security goals as well as provide methodology for assessing
impact of unplanned events, such as security-related incidents.

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3

Rccomm cnd~t tion #2: Develop and implement a disciplin ed system of internal controls fromdata entry to reporting to ensw e PMIS d41a integrity.

T SA concurs. We agree with the recommendation for improving our internal controls for the
manual collection, calculation, and data entry of passenger volumes utilizing AIT and WTMD
equipment. We agree that the system can benefit from establishing standard processes andprocedures for these activities as well as developing auditing mechanisms to ensure they arefollowed and that incorrect data can be identified and corrected expeditiously.
GA0-09-680G "Assessing Data Reliability" defmes risk as "the likelihood that using data ofquestionable reliability could have substantial negative consequences on the decisions ofpolicymak.ers and others." Given that authoritative definition, the Office of Security Operations
stipulates that TSA was able to increase the total number of deployed AlT to just under I 000
units and increased AIT utilization from about 400,000 passengers per day to over l ,000,000
passengers per day. Using PMIS data in early 2013, TSA was also able to strategically reallocate
129 millimeter wave units to mitigate the required removal of the remaining 171 backscatter(non-Automated Target Recognition enabled) units without degradation in percent of passengers
screened. The PMIS application bas demonstrated the ability to provide data on AIT utilization.
We realize there is always room for improvement to ensure we are collecting the most accurate
data possible.

In summary, we concur with the OIG's recommendation . TSA will continue to build on ourability to provide the most accurate data on AIT utilization by working with others internally andexternally to improve our internal controls for the manual collection, calculation, and data entryof passenger volumes utilizing our AIT and WTMD equipment.

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Appendix C
Major Contributors to This Report
Linda Howard, Director
Christine Haynes, Audit Manager
Tiffany Bellinger, Auditor
Karen Gardner, Auditor
David Lu, Program Analyst
Tessa May-Fraser, Program Analyst
Matthew Noll, Program Analyst
Kevin Dolloson, Communications Analyst
Ralleisha Dean, Independent Report Referencer

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
Department of Homeland Security

Appendix D
Report Distribution
Department of Homeland Security
Secretary
Deputy Secretary
Chief of Staff
Deputy Chief of Staff
General Counsel
Executive Secretary
Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office
Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy
Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs
Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs
Acting Chief Privacy Officer
Transportation Security Administration
Administrator
TSA Audit Liaison
Office of Management and Budget
Chief, Homeland Security Branch
DHS OIG Budget Examiner
Congress
Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
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