Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management

National Report of Japanfor the Fourth Review Meeting

October, 2011

Government of Japan

Joint Convention
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
National Report of Japan for the Fourth Review Meeting
Table of Contents
A

Introduction

1

A1
A2
A3

1
6

A4
A5

Current status of management of spent fuel and radioactive waste in Japan
Main theme of the National Report
The Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (NPSs) of TEPCO due
to the Tohoku District-off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the resulting
tsunamis
Other topics
Preparation of the report

14
15

B

Policies and Practices

17

B1
B2
B3
B4
B5
B6

Spent fuel management policy
Spent fuel management practices
Radioactive waste management policy
Radioactive waste management practices
Criteria used to define and categorize radioactive waste
Measures for decontamination and waste due to the Accident at Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations (NPSs) of TEPCO

17
18
19
20
24
28

C

Scope of Application

33

D

Inventories and Lists

35

D1
D2
D3
D4
D5

List of spent fuel management facilities
Inventories of spent fuelList of radioactive waste management facilities
Inventories of radioactive waste
List and status of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned

35
36
36
41
42

E

Legislative and Regulatory System

45

E1
E2
E3

Implementing measures
Legislative and regulatory framework
Regulatory body

45
51
60

F

Other General Safety Provisions

71

F1
F2
F3
F4
F5
F6

Responsibility of the license holder
Human and Financial resources
Quality assurance
Operational Radiation protection
Emergency preparedness
Decommissioning

71
73
79
81
89
101

i

10

G

Safety of Spent Fuel Management

105

G1
G2
G3
G4
G5
G6

General safety requirements
Existing facilities
Siting of proposed facilities
Design and construction of facilities
Assessment of safety of facilities
Operation of facilities

107
111
113
115
117
118

H

Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

123

H1
H2
H3
H4
H5
H6
H7

General safety requirements
Existing facilities and past practices
Siting of proposed facilities
Design and construction of facilities
Assessment of safety of facilities
Operation of facilities
Institutional measures after closure

125
128
130
132
134
136
141

I

Transboundary Movement

145

I1
I2

Transboundary movement
Prohibition of shipment to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees South

145
146

J

Disused Sealed Sources

147

J1
J2
J3
J4

The infrastructure for regulatory control of sealed sources
Management of radioactive sources
Reentry of returning sealed sources
Compliance with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security ofRadioactive Sources

147
147
149
149

K

Planned Activities to Improve Safety

151

K1
K2
K3

151
151
152

K4
K5

Development of laws and related rules
Safety research and regulatory support research
Measures to ensure reliability of technology by experiences, tests andanalysesContinuation of research to improve reliability of disposal technology
Operation of sealed radioactive source tracking system

153
154

L

Annexes

155

L1
L2
L3
L4
L5
L6
L7

Inventory of spent fuelInventory of radioactive waste
Excerpt of regulation relevant to Section G
Excerpt of regulation relevant to Section H
Illustrations related to spent fuel storage
Illustrations related to waste disposal
Reports etc., related to the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear
Stations

155
156
161
170
182
184
188

ii

Acronyms
ACNRE

Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy

AIST

National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

ANRE

Agency of Natural Resources and Energy

BWR

Boiling Water Reactor

CATV

Cable Television

CRIEPI

Central Research Institute of Electric Power Industry

CSD-B

Colis Standard de Dechets Boues

CSD-C

Colis Standard de Dechets Compactes

ERSS

Emergency Response Support System

FBR

Fast Breeder Reactor

FNCA

Forum for Nuclear Cooperation in Asia

GNEP

Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

HLW

High level radioactive wastes

HRD

Human Resource Development

IAEA

International Atomic Energy Agency

ICRP

International Commission on Radiological Protection

IFNEC

International Framework of Nuclear Energy Cooperation

INES

International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale

JAEA

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

JAEC

Japan Atomic Energy Commission

JAPCO

Japan Atomic Power Company Inc.

JNESJapan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization

JNFL

Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited

LLW

Low level radioactive wastes

LWR

Light Water Reactor

METI

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

MEXT

Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology

MHLW

Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare

MLIT

Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism

MOFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

NISA

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, METI

NISS

Nuclear and Industrial Safety SubcommitteeNPO

Non Profit Organization

NPS

Nuclear Power Station

NSC

Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan

iii

NUMO

PCV

Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan
Nuclear Energy Agency of Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment
Primary Containment Vessel

PFSB

Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau, MHLW

PWRPressurized Water Reactor

RCIC

Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System

RPV

Reactor Pressure Vessel

RM

Relationship Management

RWMC

Radioactive Waste Management Funding and Research Center

STPB

Science and Technology Policy Bureau, MEXTTEPCOTokyo Electric Power Company

OECD/NEA

iv

Definitions
Advisory Committee on
Mid- and Long-term
Measures
Category1
waste
disposalCategory2
waste
disposalContaminated Water
Designated Radioactive
Wastes
Disposal operator
Final Disposal Act
Investigation Committee
JEAC 4111-2009
Long-term Program
June Report
Medical Care Act, etc.
MOX fuel
Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness Act
Off-Site Center
Preliminary Investigation
Areas, etc.
Radiation
DiseasePrevention Act
Reactor Regulation Act
Subsurface disposal
Specified Radioisotope

TRU wastes

Waste fromfacilities, etc.

research

Advisory Committee on Mid- and Long-term Measures at the
Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.
Geological disposal for high-level radioactive waste andTRU waste for geological disposal.
Disposal for low-level radioactive wastes other thangeological disposal.
Accumulated water with high concentration of radioactive
materials
High-level radioactive wastes generated from spent fuelreprocessing
Professional operator who has sufficient economic andtechnical abilities
Designated Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act
Investigation Committee on the Accidents at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company
JEAC 4111-2009, "Rules of Quality Assurance for Safety of
Nuclear Power Plants"
Long-term Program for Development and Utilization of
Nuclear Energy
Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial
Conference on Nuclear Safety
The Medical Care Act, the Clinical Laboratory Techniciansand Health Laboratory Technicians Act and thePharmaceutical Affairs Act
Uranium and Plutonium Mixed Oxide fuelAct on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness
Emergency Response Key Facility
Preliminary Investigation Area, Detailed Investigation Area
and Construction Site for Final Disposal Facility
Act on Prevention of Radiation Disease due to Radioactive
Isotope, etc.
Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear
Fuel Material and Nuclear Reactors
Disposal in the underground deeper than 50 meters. This
disposal method is classified in Category 2 waste disposal.
Sealed radioisotope that exceeds criteria of a certain
quantity and has a possibility of bearing serious influence tohuman healthLow-level radioactive wastes generated from MOX fuelfabrication or reprocessing facilities. Also known as“long-lived low-heat-generating radioactive wastes” in theradioactive waste regulation in Japan. Generally, this waste
contains Trans Uranic material.
Low level radioactive wastes generated from the facilities
such as research institutes and medical facilities.

v

vi

Introduction

Section A Introduction
A1 Current status of management of spent fuel and radioactive waste in Japan
A1.1 Status of utilization and management of nuclear energy in Japan
Nuclear facilities in Japan are listed in Table A1-1, the details of which are described in
Section D.
The overview of spent fuel management and radioactive waste management and the current
status of the preparation of radioactive waste disposal regulation system are shown in Table
A1-2 and Table A1-3 respectively.
A1.2 Activities in the nuclear facilities in Japan since the last report
1. The start of construction in Recycle-Fuel Storage Center
The Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company jointly established by the Tokyo Electric Power
Company Inc. (TEPCO) and the Japan Atomic Power Company Inc. (JAPCO) filed an
application for license to Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in March 2007
based on the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material andNuclear Reactors (hereinafter referred to as “Reactor Regulation Act”) for the Recyclable-Fuel
Storage Center (See Fig.L5-1 and Fig.L5-2) to be established in Mutsu City of Aomori
Prefecture. And the application was licensed in May 2010. Application for the design andconstruction approval was submitted to the Minister of METI in June 2010, and it wasapproved in August 2010, and the construction work started. The Recyclable-Fuel Storage
Center has the maximum storage capacity of about 3,000 tons (metallic uranium prior toirradiation) to store spent fuels generated from Boiling Water Reactors (BWRs) and
Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) in metallic dry casks (See Fig.L5-3), and is scheduled tostart commercial operation in July 2012.
2.

Start of decommissioning of Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 and 2 of the Chubu
Electric Power Co., Inc.
In November 2009, the Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. received the approval (modified in
February 2011) from METI, for the decommissioning plan for the Unit 1 and 2 which describeda basic policy for the entire period of decommissioning and the items to be carried out during
the first stage of “Period of preparation for dismantling”. According to the decommissioning
plan, the Company will continue to ship out fuel and start the survey and evaluation ofcontamination status, system decontamination, and dismantling and removal ofequipment/components located outside the radiation controlled areas in the first stage of“Period of preparation for dismantling”. The Company expects to complete thedecommissioning in 2030s.
3. Issuance of clearance certificate for modification of former JRR-3
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) intended to handle 4,000 tons of concrete
fragments generated from the JRR-3 (research reactor for neutron utilization) modification
activities as extremely low radioactive materials that does not need to be dealt with asradioactive waste (items below clearance level). Therefore, in November 2007, JAEA applied
for approval of the methods for measuring and assessing radioactivity concentrations in
concrete fragments for clearance purpose to the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT), and received the approval in July 2008. MEXT confirmed
the radioactivity concentrations for about 758 tons of the concrete fragments, and issued eachclearance certificate for about 377 tons in May 2010, and for about 381 tons in December
2010.
4. Status of Rokkasho nuclear fuel cycle facilities
Japan focuses its nuclear policy on nuclear fuel cycle in “the Framework for Nuclear Energy
1

A

A

Introduction

Policy (2005)” to reprocess spent fuel and to effectively utilize the recovered uranium andplutonium. The Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL) has its nuclear fuel cycle facilities(uranium enrichment facility, reprocessing facility, uranium-plutonium mixed oxide fuel(hereinafter referred to as MOX fuel) manufacturing facility, waste storage facility and low
level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facility) in Rokkasho Village of Aomori Prefecture.
Among those facilities, uranium enrichment facility, waste storage facility and LLW disposal
facility are already in operation.
Among reprocessing facilities, spent fuel receipt and storage facility has been in operation
since 1999. The pre-service tests of the main part of the reprocessing plant are now
implemented by Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and the completion is plannedin October 2012. As of April 2011, the modification work for the improvement of temperature
control in the glass melting furnace for vitricification process of high level radioactive waste
has been completed and the restart of performance verification test is in preparation.
The construction of MOX fuel manufacturing facility started in October 2010 and it isscheduled to be completed in March 2016.
A 1.3 Response to the items pointed out at the last review meeting
1. Establishment and implementation of regulatory system for subsurface disposal
NISA amended the Reactor Regulation Act in June 2007, in order to make two classificationsin the regulatory system. The conventional radioactive waste disposal of LLW including
subsurface disposal was categorized as "Category 2 waste disposal" and disposal of HLW
was categorized as "Category 1 waste disposal" and in March 2008, amended the related
ministerial order, which specifies safety requirements. 
The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) issued the "Policy of the Safety Assessment of
Subsurface Disposal after the Period for Active Control" in April 2010, and the "Basic Guide
for Safety Review of Category 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal" in August 2010.
The regulatory system for subsurface disposal is reported in Section H.
2. Implementation of radioactive waste disposal in non-nuclear power areas
The Committee on the Research and Development in Nuclear Field under the Research
Plan/Assessment Subcommittee of the Council for Science and Technology issued a reporton the framework to implement the disposal of low level radioactive wastes generated fromthe facilities such as research institutes and medical facilities (hereinafter referred to as“waste from research facilities, etc.”) in September 2006.
In response to this report, MEXT amended a part of the “Law for the Incorporated
Administrative Agency, JAEA”, in June 2008, and JAEA was designated as the implementing
entity of the disposal of the waste from research facilities, etc.
MEXT issued the “Basic Policy for Implementation of Waste Disposal” together with METI in
December 2008. JAEA established the “Plan for Implementation of Waste Disposal”
according to the Basic Policy and received approval from Ministers of MEXT and METI in
November 2009. JAEA is proceeding with the work toward full-scale disposal operationaccording to the annual plan.
The implementation of radioactive waste disposal in non-nuclear power areas is reported in
Section B.
3.

Selection of final disposal site for high level radioactive waste and establishment of thesafety regulation
The “Plan for Designated Radioactive Waste Final Disposal” that was approved in the Cabinet
meeting in March 2008, requests NUMO to select areas for detailed investigation areas
around mid 2010’s and select the site for repository construction around 2030.
NSC’s Advisory Board on High-level Waste Repository Safety issued the report on “Safety
Communication on Geological Disposal” in January 2011. This report is based on theCommittee’s recognition that it is important, in confidence building of the safety of geologicaldisposal, to establish a safety communication system, which enables stakeholders or their2Introduction

representatives to participate in the process to establish the confidence in long-term safety, as
well as a regulatory framework that fully takes account of ensuring the robustness oflong-term safety functions of waste disposal facilities.
Selection of final disposal site for high level radioactive waste and establishment of the safety
regulation are described in Section B and E.
4.

Consideration of long-term management of sealed radioactive sources unreturnable tomanufacturers
Almost all of the sealed radioactive sources have been originated and imported from abroad
and they are to be returned to the foreign manufacturers after the usage. Thus there exist very
few unreturnable sealed radioactive sources to originated country, and the management ofthem has been executed appropriately under “the Act on Prevention of Radiation Disease due
to Radioactive Isotope, etc.” (hereinafter referred to as “Radiation Disease Prevention Act”). It
is considered that there exist no specific issues concerning to the unreturnable sealed
sources.
The long-term management of sealed radioactive sources unreturnable to manufacturers isreported in Section J.
5. Consideration of clearance system for Uranium waste
NSC issued the report titled “Clearance Level for Uranium Processing Facilities” in October2009.
In response to this report, NISA investigated the matter in the Radioactive Waste Safety
Subcommittee under the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory
Committee for Natural Resources and Energy (hereinafter referred to as NISS/ACNRE) in
order to incorporate metals generated from uranium processing facilities into the current
clearance system. As a result, NISA published “Establishment of the Clearance System for
Uranium Processing Facilities” in November 2010. Based on the results of theseinvestigations, the relevant ordinance was amended in June 2011. MEXT prepared a report
titled “Confirmation of the Clearance Level for Uranium Processing Facilities” at the Technical
WG of the Research Reactor Safety Regulation Study Committee, etc., and amended therelevant ordinance in February 2011 based on the report.
The clearance system for Uranium waste is reported in Section B.
A 1.4 Systematic activities for safety improvement
1. Continuation of research for enhancing the confidence in waste disposal technology
The Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), JAEA and the National Institute ofAdvanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) concluded the “Cooperation Agreement
for the Safety Research on Geological Disposal of Radioactive Wastes” in accordance withthe system for implementing the research activities presented in the report titled “Research
Activities to Support Regulation of Management and Disposal of Radioactive Wastes (fiscal
years 2010 - 2014)” issued by the Radioactive Wastes Safety Subcommittee under the
NISS/ACNRE in October 2009. Under this Agreement, these organizations are continuously
conducting joint-studies such as “Study on the Applicability of Performance Assessment
Methods for the Horonobe Underground Research Laboratory Project”, according to NISA’s
regulatory needs.
The research for enhancing the confidence in waste disposal technology is reported in
Section K.
2. Operation of sealed radioactive source tracking system
MEXT amended the Rules for the enforcement of the Radiation Disease Prevention Act in
October 2009 to introduce “National Registration System of Radioactive Sources” based on
the IAEA’s “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources”, and started
its formal operation in January 2011.
The sealed radioactive source tracking system is reported in Section K.
3

A

A

Introduction

A 1.5 Responses to all recommendations adopted at the previous Review Meeting
For the following action items listed in the executive summary of the previous Review
Meeting:x
Establishment of comprehensive regulatory framework;x
Effective independence of regulatory bodies;x
Implementation of strategic plan which sets forth clear milestones;x
Financial resources for ensuring waste management;x
Education and recruitment of competent staff and personnel; andx
Geological repository for high level radioactive waste.
Necessary actions have already been taken or are being taken by the responsibleorganizations. The details are described in relevant Sections of this report.
Table A1-1 Nuclear facilities in Japan
Nuclear facility

NumberNuclear power rector

54

Nuclear power rector under construction

3

Nuclear power rector at decommissioning stage

4

Nuclear fuel fabrication facility

6

Spent fuel reprocessing facility

2Radioactive waste storage facility

2Radioactive waste disposal facility

2Operating research reactor

15

Research reactor at decommissioning stage

7

Nuclear fuel material utilization facility*

15*: The facilities that use nuclear fuel material and are prescribed in Article 41of the Enforcement ordinance of the Reactor Regulation Act.

Table A1-2 Overview of Policy and Practice on Spent FuelManagement and Radioactive Waste Management
Type of Liability

Long-term
management policy

Spent fuelReprocessing

Nuclear fuel cycle
waste

Non-power waste

Geological,
intermediate depthor near surface
disposalGeological,
intermediate depthor near surface
disposal

Decommissioning
liabilities

Decommissioningof NPP

Disused Sealed
SourceReturn to
manufacturer /Long-term storage

Funding
Utility pays
fund forreprocessing
Utility pays
fund fordisposal of
waste

Current practice /Facilities
Domestic
reprocessing
plantsPlanned Facilities
Interim storage
facility

HLW Storage
Facility / LLW
Disposal Facility

Geological,
subsurface or nearsurface disposal
facilities

Operator pays

On site storage

near surface
disposal facilities

Operators
pays into
reserve fundDecommissioning
underway-

User

Return to
manufacturers /Storage insidefacilities

-

4

5

Completed, except forradioisotope
wastedisposal facility
Basic guide for safety
review of category 2
radioactive waste disposal,(August 2010)

Completed
Basic guide for safety
review of category 2
radioactive waste disposal,(August 2010)

Completed
Basic guide for safety
review of category 2
radioactive waste disposal,(August 2010)

Completed
Basic guide for safety
review of category 2
radioactive waste disposal,(August 2010)

Partially Completed
Basic guide for safety
review of category 2
radioactive waste disposal,(August 2010)
Future discussion
Guide
for
geologicaldisposal

Future discussion

Safety review guidelines

5*1): Waste from research facilities, etc. includes not only the waste regulated under the Reactor Regulation Act but also the waste regulated under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, the Medical Care Act or the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act.
*2): “Basic concept of safety regulation on low-level radioactive waste burial” (Interim Report) (July 12, 2007)“Basic policy of processing and disposal of
uranium wastes” (December 2000)

Under discussion since May 1997
a: Completed: Major nuclear reactor facilities (March 1999), Heavy water reactors, fast neutron reactors, etc. (July
2001), Nuclear fuel material use facilities (facilities dealing with irradiated fuels and materials) (April 2003),
Radionuclide concentrations for materials not requiring treatment as radioactive wastes, generated fromdismantling etc. of reactor facilities and nuclear fuel use facilities" (December 2004), (Partial amendment, March,
2005), Uranium processing facilities (October 2009)b. Under discussion: TRU facilities
c. Future discussion: Radioisotope facilities

Completed“Policy on processing and disposal ofradioactive wastes” (Interim Report)(August 1984)

2

Waste from research facilities,
etc.

Completed,
exceptforradioisotope
wastedisposalfacility“Upper Bounds of Radioactive
Concentration for Burial of Low-Level
Radioactive Solid Waste” (May 2007)

Completed“Basic policy of safety regulation of near surface
disposal of solid radioisotope wastes generated fromradioactive isotope use facility” (January, 2004)“Basic policy of safety regulation for near surface
disposal of solid radioactive waste generated fromresearch laboratories, etc.” (April, 2006)

Future discussion

Completed“Reference
radionuclide
concentration values for safety
regulations of land disposal of
low level radioactive solid
waste” (Third Interim Report)(September 2000)

Completed“Reference
radionuclide
concentration values for safety
regulations of land disposal of
low level radioactive solid
waste”(Second
Interim
Report) (June 1992)

Completed“Fundamental concept of processing and disposal of wastes
generated at research laboratories, etc.”(May 1998)
The report on “The approach to realize the disposal ofradioisotopes and waste from research facility etc. (to bedisposed of near surface)”(October, 2006)“The promotion of the approach to realize the disposal ofwaste from research facility etc.” (February 2008)

Completed“Basic policy of safety regulation for land disposal of
low-level solid radioactive waste” (October 1985)

Completed“Reference
radionuclide
concentration values for safety
regulations of land disposal of
low-level
radioactive solid
waste”(ThirdReport)(September 2000)
Completed“Reference
radionuclide
concentration values for safety
regulations of land disposal of
low level radioactive solid
waste”(Interim
Report)February 1987), ib. (Second
Interim Report) (June 1992)

Completed“UpperBoundsofRadioactive
Concentration for Burial of Low-Level
Radioactive Solid Waste” (May 2007)

Upper bound ofradioactive waste disposal

Partially Completed“Basic concept of safety regulation for near surface disposal ofsolid radioactive waste generated from research laboratories,etc.” (April 2006)

Completed“Policy on processing anddisposal of radioactive wastes”(Final Report) (October 1985)

Completed“Basic policy of safety regulation on low-level
radioactive waste disposal that exceeds theconcentration limit value in the ordinance” (July 2007)“Policy of the safety assessment of subsurface disposal
after the period for active control” (April 2010)

NSC

Completed“Basic policy of processing and disposal of Uranium wastes”(December 2000)

Metal,
etc.

Completed“Policy on processing
anddisposalofradioactive
wastes”(Interim
Report)(August 1984)

Completed“Basic policy of disposal of low level radioactive waste thatexceeds the concentration limit value in the ordinance”(October 1998)“Geological disposal of long half lives low heat radioactive
waste, Technical feasibility of co-disposal with high level
radioactive waste” (April 2006)

Completed“Basic policy of safety regulation on low level radioactive waste
disposal” (Interim Report) (July 2007)“Policy of the safety assessment of subsurface disposal after theperiod for active control” (April 2010)

Completed“Basic policy of safety regulation on high level radioactive waste
disposal ” (November 2000)“Environmental requirements to be considered at the selection of
the preliminary investigation areas for high level radioactive waste
disposal” (September 2002)“Licensing procedure relating to the safety regulation of specified
radioactive waste disposal and involvement of Nuclear Safety
Commission in these activities” (Interim Report) (May 2007)“Safety Communication on the Geological Disposal” (January
2011)

Fundamental concept of safety regulation

Uranium waste

Very lowlevel
Radioactive
waste

Concrete,etc.

Low level radioactive
waste(Relatively lower
radioactive waste)

Waste of Core Structures
etc.
(Relatively higher
radioactive waste)Long Half Lives Low HeatRadioactive Waste(TRU waste)Completed“Basic policy of processing and disposal of radioactive wastes
containing transuranic nuclides” (March 2000)“Basic policy toward disposal of high level radioactive wastes”(May 1998)

Completed“Policy on processing and disposal of radioactive wastes”(Interim Report) (August 1984)

System and Responsibility

JAEC

Completed
Basic Policy for Safety Regulations on Low-Level
Radioactive Waste disposal (Interim Report), (July 2007)

Disposal method

Law

Published“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Reactor Regulation
Act” (December 2005)

Published“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Radiation Disease
Prevention Act”
(May 2005)“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Reactor Regulation
Act” (April 2008)

Published“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Reactor Regulation
Act” (April 2008)

Published“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Reactor Regulation
Act” (December 2000)

Published“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Reactor Regulation
Act” (September 1992)

Published“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Reactor Regulation
Act”(March,1987),(September 1992)

Published“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Reactor Regulation
Act” (December 2000)

Published“Enforcement Ordinancefor the Reactor Regulation
Act” (April 2008)

Partially Published“Rules for the enforcement ofRadiation Disease Prevention
Act” (June 2005)“Rules for category 2 waste
disposal for nuclear fuelmaterial contaminated with
nuclear fuel material”(April 2008)
Partially Published
Rules for the confirmation ofradioactivity
concentration
within the materials used in thefactory of licensee defined inclause 4 of Article 64-2 ofReactorRegulation
Act(December 2005), (June2011)“Rules for confirmation, etc. onradioactivity of reactors, etc. foruseofresearchanddevelopment”(November2005), (February 2011)

Future discussion

Published“Rules for category 2 waste
disposal for nuclear fuelmaterialormaterial
contaminated with nuclear fuelmaterial” (April 2008)

Partially Published“Rules of category 1 waste
disposal for nuclear fuelmaterialormaterial
contaminated with nuclear fuelmaterial” (April 2008)“Rules for category 2 waste
disposal of nuclear fuelmaterialormaterial
contaminated with nuclear fuelmaterial” (April 2008)

Published“Rules for category 1 waste
disposal for nuclear fuelmaterialormaterial
contaminated with nuclear fuelmaterial” (April 2008)

Legislation etc. on safety regulations
Rules

Government order

Table A1-3 Classification of basic concepts for disposal and status of activities preparing relevant regulations

Completed “Upper Bounds of Radioactive Concentration for Burial of
Low-Level Radioactive Solid Waste”(May, 2007)

High level radioactive waste

Materials that need not be treated asradioactive wastes (Waste equivalent toclearance)

Low- level radioactive wasteA

The Reactor Regulation Act*
Radiation Disease Prevention Act

Classification

Commonly Important Issues for the Safety Regulations of Radioactive
Waste Disposal,( June, 2004),
Completed

Waste from power reactor facility

Introduction

Introduction

AA

Introduction

A2 Main theme of the National Report
A2.1 Policies and Practices
ANRE amended Designated Radioactive Waste Final Disposal Act (hereinafter referred to as“Final Disposal Act”), reviewed the total research and development program at the“Geological Disposal Basic Research and Development Coordinating Council” and compiled“Overall Research Programme on Basic R&D of Geological Disposal of HLW”. The Agency is
to promote international cooperation in this field using the frameworks of IAEA, OECD/NEA,
International Framework of Nuclear Energy Cooperation (IFNEC), etc.
MEXT amended the “Law for the Incorporated Administrative Agency, JAEA” in June 2008,
and JAEA was designated as the implementing entity for disposal of “wastes from researchfacilities, etc”. MEXT issued the “Basic Policy for Implementation of Waste Disposal” withMETI in December 2008. JAEA established an implementation plan according to the Basic
Policy, and received approval from the Ministers of MEXT and METI in November 2009.
The Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company received operation license for the Recyclable-Fuel
Storage Center from the Minister of METI in May 2010, received approval for the design andconstruction methods in August 2010, and started construction of the facility. The
Recyclable-Fuel Storage Center has the storage capacity of about 3,000 tons (as metallic
uranium prior to irradiation), and is scheduled to start operation in July 2012.
The Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. received approval for the decommissioning plan for
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 and 2 in November 2009. The Company expects tocomplete the decommissioning in 2030s.
JAEA received certificate for clearance confirmation, from the Minister of MEXT based on theReactor Regulation Act in May and December 2010, for about 758 tons out of 4,000 tons ofconcrete fragments generated from the modification work of JRR-3 which is a research
reactor for neutron utilization.
Based on the progress of the Nuclear Energy Policy and the outside and inside situations, etc.
surrounding the nuclear energy in Japan, the Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC)
decided in November 2010 to initiate efforts to compile a new policy plan setting up the New
Nuclear Policy-planning Council under the Commission to conduct surveys and deliberations
on matters necessary for formulating the new policy. As a result of the accident of Fukushima
Dai-ichi NPS of TEPCO, JAEC decided interruption of deliberations in April 2011. And then in
August JAEC again decided to resume the activities, and now deliberations are being
conducted to formulate the new policy.
A2.2 Decommissioning
Power Reactors in the process of being decommissioned include Tokai Power Station of
JAPCO, the Advanced Thermal Reactor “Fugen” of JAEA and the unit 1 and 2 at Hamaoka
NPS of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
JAPCO applied for decommissioning plan approval for the Tokai Power Station (gas cooled
reactor) in March 2006 and received approval from the Minister of METI in June 2006. As it
took much time to prepare for the installation of a conveyer for dismantled equipment, JAPCO
decided 3 years’ prolongation of the schedule for this preparatory work. As a result, JAPCO
notified NISA, in July 2010, of the modification of the decommissioning plan to change theschedule for dismantling work of reactor area.
JAEA terminated commercial operation of advanced thermal reactor “FUGEN” in March 2003
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and received approval based on the Reactor Regulation Act from the Minister of METI for
decommissioning plan in February 2008. With this, “FUGEN” entered into decommissioning
stage. The “Advanced Thermal Reactor Fugen Power Station” was renamed as“Decommissioning Research and Development Center”.
In November 2009, the Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. received approval from the Minister of
METI for the decommissioning plan for Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 and 2, which
describes the basic policy for decommissioning plan over the entire period and the items to be
carried out during the first stage of “Period of preparation for dismantling”. In the first stage,
the Company will continue to ship out fuel and start the survey and evaluation ofcontamination conditions, system decontamination, and dismantling and removal ofequipment/components outside the radiation controlled areas.
Moreover, a total of 8 Research Reactors in the process of being decommissioned or planned
to be decommissioned include JRR-2 of JAEA, the Reactor Facilities of The First Nuclear
Ship (Mutsu) and Deuterium Criticality Assembly (DCA) of JAEA, and Hitachi Training
Reactor (HTR) of Hitachi Ltd., Training Reactor-1 (TTR-1) of Toshiba Corporation, Rikkyo
University Institute for Atomic Energy (RUR), Tokyo City University (former Musashi Instituteof Technology) Research Reactor (MITRR), The University of Tokyo Research Reactor(Yayoi).
A2.3 Legal and Regulatory systems
1. Development of legal systems for the final disposal of HLW
As a step for facilitating nuclear fuel cycle, the government of Japan amended relevant laws in2007 in order to take necessary measures for steady implementation of the disposal of highlevel radioactive wastes and long-lived low-heat-generating radioactive wastes (hereinafterreferred to as “TRU wastes”) generated in the processes of nuclear fuel cycle.
The laws amended and their outlines are shown below:(1) Amendment of the Final Disposal Act
In addition to the HLW, the following wastes are also added to the waste that is disposed of
NUMO.
a. TRU wastes generated from spent fuel reprocessing and from MOX fuel fabrication
processb. HLW to be returned from abroad (as exchanged wastes) in exchange for TRU wastes
originally planned to be returned
In addition, TRU waste disposal costs were added to the disposal reserve fund that is paid to
NUMO by the licensees of nuclear power plants and of reprocessing facility as the costs forthe final disposal of Designated Radioactive Wastes.
(2)

Amendment of the Act for Deposit and Administration of Reserve Funds for
Reprocessing of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Generation.
An amendment was made to add the provisions to adjust the reserve fund for the decrease of
the radioactive waste storage and disposal costs due to receiving of the exchanged wastes(3) Amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act
Since the operation of disposal of high level radioactive waste (vitrified waste) became
foreseeable, the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Subcommittee under the NISS/ACNRE
studied the approach to nuclear material safeguard related to radioactive waste disposal
operation and issued a report titled “Approach to Nuclear Material Safeguard for Radioactive
Waste Disposal” in October 2007. In response to this report, the Reactor Regulation Act waspartially amended to add the provisions for the safeguard measures related to the final
disposal of high level radioactive waste, and the Enforcement Order for the Reactor
Regulation Act and some of the relevant ministerial ordinances were also partially amended
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as necessary rulemaking for implementing the Act in 2008.
2. Quality improvement of regulatory activities of NISANISA started to develop a management system for the quality improvement of regulatory
activities in fiscal 2006 and has been implementing the system since fiscal 2007.
Addressing to the report of the Basic Policy Subcommittee of NISS/ACNRE titled as“Identification of Nuclear Safety Regulation Issues” that points out the following five items for
future challenges concerning nuclear safety regulation, NISA discussed the system and policy
for the approach to these challenges. NISA reflected the discussion result to the “Mission andaction plan of NISA” (Mission Paper) that is revised annually.
y  Use of experience and findings from safety regulation ;y  Anticipation of possible changes of the object of regulation ;y  Response to changes of economic and international situations ;y  Improvement of communication with stakeholders ;y  Undertaking toward functional regulatory body.
A2.4 General provisions
1. Undertaking for securing human resources
The regulatory bodies and nuclear industries in Japan are striving to develop humanresources as a part of ensuring future nuclear safety infrastructure.
In 2006, NISA established the Subcommittee for Nuclear Safety Infrastructure under the
NISS/ACNRE and the Subcommittee is discussing measures for developing and ensuring
human resources for nuclear safety area.
As part of human resource development, NISA established the Nuclear Safety Training
Center in Hitachinaka City, Ibaraki Prefecture in April 2008, to enhance the training for
fostering and skill up of NISA staff. In addition, the capability management system wasincorporated into the education and training program in 2009. This system not only provides
the staff with the opportunities for training courses or OJT for acquiring knowledge necessary
for their duties, but also prepares customized education and training programs, with the
involvement of their superiors, so that they can be sure to take courses and to build up
experience. NISA continues mid-career recruiting of personnel who have practical experiencein nuclear power industry. This approach has been proven to be effective for upgrading thetotal technical competence of NISA.
MEXT and ANRE of METI have been implementing “Nuclear Energy Human Resources
Development Program” since 2007, focusing on the research activities in the areas of basic
nuclear technology. Also, from 2010, MEXT has been carrying on International Nuclear
Human Resource Development Initiative to support cross-sectional Human Resource
Development (HRD) activities among the nuclear-related organizations in academy, industry
and government. The “Japan Nuclear Human Resource Development Network” wasestablished in November 2010, with the aim of enhancing this mutual cooperation among
academy, industry and government, and to create an all-Japan nuclear HRD system.
A2.5 Safety of spent fuel management
1. Development of safety regulation system for spent fuel storage and transportation
Joint Working Group (“Intermediate storage WG under Nuclear Fuel Cycle Safety
Subcommittee” and “Transport WG”) deliberated about the inspection to confirm the integrityof metallic cask and its contents during the storage of spent fuel and the rational inspection
program at the time before the transport of the spent fuel contained cask after the terminationof storage. The Joint WG summarized the result in “Long term integrity of the cask and its
contents during the interim spent fuel storage facility using metallic casks (June 2009)”
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Addressing the report, NISA amended the relevant regulations that enable Holistic Approachto cope with the taking out of metallic cask without opening the sealed boundary of metallic
cask lids after the interim storage of spent fuel at interim storage facilities.
A2.6 Safety of radioactive waste management
1. Development of safety regulation system for radioactive waste
NSC studied the clearance level for nuclides such as uranium based on the concept of
regulatory exemption and issued the report titled “Clearance Level for Uranium Processing
Facilities” in October 2009. On the basis of this report, NISA requested the Radioactive
Wastes Safety Subcommittee of the NISS/ACNRE to discuss the clearance system, in order
to incorporate metals generated from the uranium handling facilities into the existing
clearance system, and issued the report titled “Establishment of the Clearance System for
Uranium Processing Facilities” in November 2010, on which basis NISA amended relevant
ministerial ordinances. MEXT amended relevant ministerial ordinances in February 2011, on
the basis of the report titled “Confirmation of the Clearance Level for Uranium Processing
Facilities” issued by the Technical WG of the Research Reactor Safety Regulation Study
Committee.
NSC issued the “Policy of the Safety Assessment of Subsurface Disposal after the Period for
Active Control” in April 2010, which incorporated risk-based safety assessment in order toappropriately address uncertainties in the long-term prediction after the period for active
control. NSC also issued the “Basic Guide for Safety Review of Category 2 Radioactive
Waste Disposal” in August 2010, by adding the safety assessment of subsurface disposal to
the safety assessment of near surface disposal of low level radioactive waste which was
already in practice in Japan.
2. Implementing entity for disposal of “waste from research facilities, etc.”
MEXT designated JAEA as the implementing entity of disposal of wastes generated fromresearch facilities, etc. by amending a part of the “Law for the Incorporated Administrative
Agency, JAEA”, in June 2008. JAEA established the annual plan according to the “Basic
Policy for Implementation of Waste Disposal” and the ”Plan for Implementation of Waste
Disposal”, and is proceeding with the actual disposal activities.
A2.7 Disused sealed sources
1. Establishment of the National Registration System of Sealed Radioactive Sources
Based on the IAEA’s “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources”,
the National Registration System of Sealed Radioactive Sources has been introduced by theamendment of the Rules for Enforcement of the Radiation Disease Prevention Act in October
2009 and enforced in January 2011. The system requests the concerned licensee to report to
MEXT, the information on specification, receipt, delivery, etc. of sealed radioactive sourcesthat exceed criteria of a certain quantity and have a possibility of affecting serious influence tohuman health.
A2.8 Systematic activities for enhancing safety
1. Coordination of safety research and research activities to support regulation
The regulatory needs were reaffirmed in view of the changing situations surrounding safety
regulation of radioactive wastes such as amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act andreconsideration of the Regulatory Guides by NSC. Based on such reaffirmation, theRadioactive Wastes Safety Subcommittee under the NISS/ACNRE developed the report“Research Program to Support Regulation of Management and Disposal of Radioactive
Wastes (from FY 2010 to FY 2014)” in October 2009, and the Decommissioning Safety
Subcommittee developed the report “Research Program to Support Regulation of
Decommissioning (from FY 2010 to FY 2014)” in November 2009. In addition, the “research
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programs to support regulation of management/disposal of radioactive wastes anddecommissioning (from FY 2010 to FY 2014)” were developed to define yearly research plansthat fit the regulatory needs.

A3

The Accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (NPSs) of TEPCO due to the
Tohoku District-off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the resulting tsunamis

A3.1 The incidence and development of the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of TEPCO
In terms of the operating status at Fukushima NPSs before the earthquake on March 11, 2011
Unit 1 was under operation at its rated electric power, Units 2 and 3 were under operation attheir rated thermal power, and Units 4, 5 and 6 were under periodic inspection.
At the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, Units 1 to 3 which were under operation automatically shut
down at 14:46 on March 11. All six external power supply sources were lost because of theearthquake. This caused the emergency diesel power generators to start up. However,seawater pumps, emergency diesel generators and distribution boards were submerged
because of the tsunami strike, and all emergency diesel power generators stopped except for
one generator in Unit 6. For that reason, all AC power supplies were lost except at Unit 6. One
emergency diesel power generator (an air-cooled type) and the distribution board escaped
submersion and continued operation at Unit 6. In addition, since the seawater pumps were
submerged by the tsunami, residual heat removal systems to release the residual heat inside
the reactor to the seawater and the auxiliary cooling systems to release the heat from various
equipments to the seawater lost their functions.
TEPCO’s operators followed TEPCO’s manuals for severe accidents and urgently attempted
to secure power supplies in cooperation with the government, in order to recover various
kinds of equipment within the safety systems while the core cooling equipment and thewater-injection equipment, which had automatically started up, were operating. However,ultimately power supplies could not be secured.
Since the core cooling functions using AC power were lost in Units 1 to 3, core cooling
functions not utilizing AC power were put into operation, or, alternately, attempts were madeto put them into operation. These were operation of the isolation condenser in Unit 1, theoperation of the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) in Unit 2 and the operation of the
RCIC and the high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) in Unit 3.
These core cooling systems that do not utilize AC power supplies stopped functioning
thereafter, and were switched to alternative injections of freshwater or sea water by fire
extinguishing lines, using fire engine pumps.
Concerning Units 1 to 3 of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, as the situation where water injection toeach the Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) was impossible to continue for a certain period oftime, it seems that the nuclear fuel in each reactor core was not covered by water but was
exposed, leading to a core melt. There is a possibility that part of the melted fuel stayed at thebottom of the RPV.
It seems that a large amount of hydrogen was generated by chemical reactions between thezirconium of the fuel cladding tubes, etc. and water vapor. In addition, the fuel cladding tubes
were damaged and radioactive materials therein were discharged into the RPV. Further, it
seems that these hydrogen and radioactive materials were discharged into the PrimaryContainment Vessel (PCV) during the depressurization process of the RPV.
Injected water vaporizes after absorbing heat from the nuclear fuel in the RPV. Accordingly, it
seems that the inner pressure rose in the RPVs which had lost their core cooling functions,and this water vapor leaked through the safety valves into the PCV. Due to this, the innerpressure within the PCVs in Units 1 to 3 rose gradually, with PCV wet well vent operations
carried out a number of times, in which the gases in the PCVs were released from the gas
phase area in the suppression chamber into the atmosphere, through the ventilation stack, for10Introduction

the purpose of preventing damage to the PCV caused by the pressure therein.
After the wet well venting of the PCVs, explosions presumably caused by hydrogen which had
leaked from the PCV occurred in the upper area of the reactor buildings, ruining the operation
floor in the reactor buildings of Units 1 and 3. As a result of these incidents, a lot of radioactive
materials were discharged to the atmosphere. Following the ruination of the Unit 3 building,an explosion probably caused by hydrogen occurred in the reactor building of Unit 4, ruining
its upper area. In Unit 4, all core fuels had been transferred to the spent fuel pool for periodic
inspection before the earthquake. During this time, various measures, including the PCV vent
operation, were being taken along with water injection, however a big impulsive sound wasobserved.
The most urgent task at the site, along with recovery of the power supply and the continuationof water injection to reactor vessels, was water injection to the spent fuel pools. In the spent
fuel pool in each unit, the water level continued to drop on account of the evaporation of water
caused by the heat of the spent fuel in the absence of the pool water cooling function, due tothe loss of power supply. Water injection to the spent fuel pool was carried out by the
Self-Defense Forces, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency and the National Police
Agency, using helicopters and water cannon trucks. Concrete pump trucks were ultimately
secured, which led to stable water injection using freshwater from nearby reservoirs after the
initial seawater injection.
A3.2 Current status of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of TEPCO and future efforts to settle thesituation regarding the Accident
Regarding the current status of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, as of the end of August 2011,
freshwater has been injected to the RPVs through feed water systems using temporary
installed electricity driven pumps at Units 1, 2 and 3 and has been continuously cooling thefuel in the RPVs. This has helped the temperature around the RPVs stay less than 100
degree Celsius in Unit 1, 130 degree Celsius in Unit 2 and 120 degree Celsius in Unit 3 at thelower part of RPVs. From June 27, recirculation water cooling has started, that thecontaminated water (accumulated water) retained within the buildings are processed andinjected to reactor. Although the RPV and PCV of Unit 1 have been pressurized to someextent, steam generated in some units such as Units 2 and 3 seems to have leaked from the
RPV and PCV, which appears to have condensed to form accumulations of water found inmany places, including the reactor buildings, and some steam seems to have been released
into the atmosphere. To respond to this issue, the status has been checked by dust samplingin the upper part of the reactor buildings, and discussion and preparation for covering thereactor buildings has been underway, together with securing a variety of depository for theaccumulated water. As for Unit 1, the construction of the structure to cover up the reactor
building started in June 28. Cold shutdown of Units 5 and 6 has been maintained using
residual heat removal systems with temporary seawater pumps.
TEPCO published the “Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima
Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station” on April 17. In the Roadmap, Step 1 as “Radiation dosesteadily decreasing” and Step 2 as “Release of radioactive materials is under control andradiation dose is being significantly held down” are to be implemented as the target. Time
period for Step 1: around 3 months, and the time period for Step 2: about 3 to 6 months after
the Step 1 were mentioned as the target.
TEPCO published revised editions of Current Status of “Roadmap towards Restoration fromthe Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station” on May 17 and June 17 reflecting
the evolution of the situation of the NPS.
The Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters published “Summary ofProgress Status of Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO” on May 17. In it Government announced of the basic policy
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as “By bringing the reactors and spent fuel pools to a stable cooling condition and mitigating
the release of radioactive materials, we will make every effort to enable evacuees to return totheir homes and for all citizens to be able to secure a sound life”. And the progress status isrevised in the Summary on June 17.
On July 19, the government and TEPCO jointly published the revised edition of ““Summary ofProgress Status of Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO”.
The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters confirmed that the roadmap to settle thesituation regarding the accident will transition from Step 1 to Step 2. This was the result of acomprehensive assessment of the situations including that the radiation doses indicated bymonitoring posts, etc. were steadily on the decrease, efforts to cool the reactors and spent
fuel pools have progressed, the treatment of stagnant water has progressed, etc.
Under Step 2, from October of 2011 to January of 2012, efforts will be made to achieve asituation in which the release of radioactive materials is under control, and the radiation
exposure dose is being significantly held down through the realization of the cold shutdown of
the rectors etc. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters positioned Step 2 as aneffort to be undertaken by the Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office, and that the
government will be sufficiently engaged to settle the accident, including efforts to improve thelife and work environment for workers, the enhancement of radiation control and the medical
system, and the training of staff. The government will make its utmost efforts to surely achieve
the goals of Step 2 and settle the accident as soon as possible.
As the specific situation so far, regarding the cooling of the spent fuel pools, by August 10,“more stable cooling” (a target in Step 2) was achieved before others, as circulating coolingwith heat exchangers has been implemented in all Units (1, 2, 3 and 4). In order to implement
the treatment of stagnant water and more stable and efficient injection of treated water into
the reactor, as second-line treatment facilities, a cesium adsorption treatment facility(SARRY) has been installed and has begun treatment on August 19 and treatment began with
evaporative concentration equipment, which reinforces the desalination process.
After that, the Government and TEPCO published the progress on August 17 and September
20. (See Annex L7)
At the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS where the recent nuclear accident occurred, there are plans to
aim to remove the spent fuel and debris and, ultimately, to take measures fordecommissioning. To achieve these objectives, the Mid- and Long-term Response Team of
the Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office is discussing for efforts to address thesemid- and long-term challenges at “Advisory Committee on Mid- and Long-term Measures at
the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.,” (hereinafter referred to as“Advisory Committee on Mid- and Long-term Measures”) of the Atomic Energy Commission
along with addressing issues by dividing them into mid-term challenges and long-term
challenges.
Mid-term challenges include consideration of preventive measures against sea contamination
by way of the groundwater, integrity and seismic safety evaluation, and the removal of spent
fuel from the spent fuel pools. The Mid- and Long-term Response Team is currently
discussing and designing the construction of underground boundaries on the ocean-side of
the NPS site in order to prevent the expansion of sea contamination by way of thegroundwater, etc. For the present, the removing spent fuels from the spent fuel pools, etc. will
be tackled for the next three years, with preparations now underway, including the installationof equipment necessary to clear rubble scattered atop the reactor buildings and remove spent
fuel, and modifications to the common pool to which spent fuels in the spent fuel pools are to
be transferred.
Long-term challenges include the construction of reactor containment boundaries, theextraction of debris, and the disposal of radioactive waste..

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Introduction“Advisory Committee on Mid- and Long-term Measures” of the JAEC is currently discussing
and putting together basic policies for efforts to address these mid- and long-term challenges
and a set of research and development issues that are expected to be useful and helpful inpursuing those efforts. This Advisory Committee is identifying and sorting out technicalchallenges to be solved so that debris can be removed from the RPV and then put undercontrol, using examples from the activities at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear power
plant in the United States.
A3.3 Investigation of the cause of, and derivation and sharing of the lessons learned from,the accident of Fukushima Dai-Ichi NPS of TEPCOThe Japanese Government published the “Report of the Japanese Government to the IAEA
Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety (hereinafter referred to as “June Report”)” on June 7,2011 (See Annex L7), as a preliminary accident investigation report, that was prepared by the
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters on the evaluation of the accident and thelessons learned mainly in the areas of nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness,based on the domestic investigation of the accident. The June report has shown 28 lessons
learned together with specific measures, including enhancement of severe accident
prevention measures, enhancement of severe accident management measures,enhancement of preparedness and response to nuclear disaster, strengthening of
infrastructure to ensure safety, and strengthening of safety culture.
Japan is making its greatest possible efforts to address the 28 “lessons learned” indicated in
the June report. The state of progress among these items is not uniform, with some items
already having been fully implemented, others now in the process of being implemented, andstill others that are to be newly planned in the future. Japan will prevent the recurrence of suchan accident as this by addressing each item steadily and thoroughly based on the idea of“defense in depth,” which is the most important basic principle in securing nuclear safety. In
addition, while the NISA has given directions of immediate emergency measures to operatorssince March 30 based on the findings about this accident as of the time point, it iscontemplating that the contents which are supposed to respond to each of the lessons need
to be further reviewed based on extensive knowledge in Japan and overseas from now on
and be improved and reinforced.
The Government established the “Investigation Committee on the Accidents at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company” (hereinafter referred to as“Investigation Committee”) in order to provide an overall investigation of the utility ofcountermeasures being taken against the accident. Aspects stressed within this Investigation
Committee are independence from Japan’s existing nuclear energy administration, openness
to the public and the international community, and comprehensiveness in examining various
issues related not only to technical elements but also to institutional aspects. These concepts
are used as the basis for strictly investigating all activities undertaken so far, including
activities by the Government in terms of countermeasures against the accident.
As for the accident investigation by the international agency, IAEA conducted a preliminary
investigation, under the agreement between IAEA and the Japanese Government, to makefact-finding of the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-Ichi Nuclear Power Station, to identify
preliminary lessons learned, and to disseminate the information to the international nuclear
community. The expert mission from IAEA visited Japan and made investigation including
on-site survey on May 24 through June 1. The result of the investigation was published onJune 16, and was reported at the IAEA Ministerial Conference which was held on June 20-24.
The government recognizes that it is incumbent upon Japan to continue to provide accurate
information regarding the accident to the international community, including lessons learned
through the accident. In accordance with this approach the Government of Japan decided tocompile information on the state of affairs subsequent to the June report in the form of anadditional report and submit it to the IAEA on the occasions of the Board of Governors
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meeting and the General Conference held in September this year.(See Annex L7)

A4 Other Topics
A4.1 International activities
It is a policy of Japan to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes. In line with this policy,
Japan has been participating in and will further contribute to the IAEA’s activities as aframework for international cooperation. For instance, the IAEA’s safety standard committees
have been working for developing and updating the safety standards topped by the Safety
Fundamentals (SF-1) and Japan has been striving to introduce those standards into
deliberation on the nation’s policies for peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Japan, recognizing the importance of international cooperation in ensuring safety in spent fueland radioactive waste management, will continuously take part in the activities of the IAEA
and OECD/NEA.
In Asian region, Radioactive Waste Safety Management project (Radioactive Waste
Management project to 2008) has been implemented within the framework of the Forum for
Nuclear Cooperation in Asia (FNCA), formerly called the International Conference for Nuclear
Cooperation in Asia (ICNCA) from 1995 through 2000. This project is intended to contribute to
the safety improvement of radioactive waste management in Asian region throughexchanging and sharing the experience, findings and information on radioactive waste
management among participating countries. Japan has been playing a leading role for thisactivity. Particularly, this project prepares and updates, as appropriate, a consolidated reporton radioactive waste management that summarizes the activities in the participating countries
by using this Convention as a reference.
The Radioactive Waste Management Topical Group of the Asian Nuclear Safety Network(ANSN), which is being operated as a part of the IAEA’s Extra-Budgetary Program for Asia,
helps non-contracting countries to prepare for becoming contracting parties to this Convention
by using the results of FNCA activities. Japan has been actively working in support of the
Joint Convention. As part of such activity, Japan hosted an IAEA-sponsored workshop on the
Joint Convention in Tokyo in September 2010, to facilitate understanding and ratification of
the Joint Convention. Ten Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, Thailand, andVietnam participated in the workshop.
A4.2 Impacts of Niigataken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake
The Niigataken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake that occurred on July 16, 2007, affected
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station of the TEPCO. The operating units wereautomatically shut down by detecting the earthquake and safety of the station was ensured.
However, a number of impacts were identified by the post-earthquake investigation. As for the
impact on spent fuel management, some equipment held on the inner wall surface of the
spent fuel pool dropped down on the fuel storage racks, however, the investigation confirmedthat there was no effect or damage to the spent fuel stored in the pool and thus safety was
ensured.
As for the impact on radioactive waste management, drums that contained radioactive wastes
and were stored in the solid waste depository fell down on the floor and lids of some drums
came off, however, there was no release of radioactive material to the outside of thedepository and no safety problem was caused by this occurrence. These occurrences were
evaluated as “below scale” in the International Nuclear Event Scale (INES).
Since the water in the spent fuel pool overflowed due to sloshing, TEPCO estimated quantityof the overflowing water and its impacts. NISA verified the estimation revealed that, although
the water level of the pool was lowered, it was kept well above the spent fuel storage racks
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which are installed to keep the spent fuel submerged, and that the pool water can be made up
by the suppression pool water via residual heat removal system.

A5 Preparation of the report
A5.1 Structure of the report
This report describes the steps taken in Japan for implementing the obligations under the“Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive
Waste Management” in accordance with the provision of Article 32 of the Convention.
The report was prepared in accordance with “the Guidelines regarding the Form and Structureof National Reports”. The text of each Article of the Convention is indicated at the top of thesection.
In principle, this report compiles the information available as of the end of March 2011, unlessotherwise specified. However, it compiles the information of the accident of Fukushima NPSof TEPCO as of the end of August 2011.
This report is structured as described below for the purpose of comprehensive andsystematical explanation of the spent fuel management and radioactive waste management
activities in Japan. Section B describes the policy of the Government of Japan for facilitating
management of spent fuel and radioactive waste and the activities of the Licensees in linewith the policy. Section E describes the legal systems to facilitate management of spent fueland radioactive wastes as well as the legal systems for safety regulation and theorganizations responsible for safety regulation. The relevant organizations other than theregulatory bodies are also described in Section E. Section F describes, as in the previous
national report, general activities for ensuring safety, not to specific to spent fuel management
and radioactive waste management. Section G describes the safety regulation of spent fuelstorage, as an example of the safety regulatory system for spent fuel management. Section H
describes safety regulation of “waste disposal” which mainly deals with radioactive wastes, as
an example of the radioactive waste management defined in the Convention.
The major items that made progress or was newly implemented during the period covered by
the report are outlined in Section A. In the section, the outline of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
Accident due to the Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the resulting
tsunamis is also described.
A5.2 Organizations involved in the preparation of the report
The report has been prepared by the NISA of METI. The major organizations involved in the
preparation of the report are as follows:
Governmental organizationsy The Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) and the Nuclear Safety Commission ofJapan (NSC) of the Cabinet Officey Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) and Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Agency (NISA) of Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI)y Research and Development Bureau, Research Promotion Bureau and the Science andTechnology Policy Bureau of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports Science andTechnology (MEXT)y The Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau and Health Policy Bureau of the Ministryof Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW)y Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)y Minister's Secretariat and Environmental Management Bureau, Minister ofEnvironment*1
y Nuclear Sufferers Life Support Team, The Government Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters*1
Business operators
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Introductiony The Federation of Electric Power Companies*2
y The Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO)
y Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)
In addition, cooperation was obtained from the following organizations in preparing the report.
y Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)y Radioactive Waste Management Funding and Research Center (RWMC)
1* :Minister’s Secretariat and Environmental Management Bureau, Minister of Environment andNuclear Sufferers Life Support Team, the Government Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters were involved in measures for decontamination and radioactive waste
management due to the accident at Fukushima NPSs of TEPCO. In addition, Nuclear Sufferers
Life Support Team is such an organization that was established on March 29, 2011 under theGovernment Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters on the basis of the determination of
the head of the Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, in order to respondto refuge of the sufferers and securement of acceptance of them, transportation of commodities
to emergency evacuation areas, etc. and other challenges of information service, etc. due to theaccident.
2* :The Federation of Electric Power Companies consists of 10 electric power utilities, i.e.,
Hokkaido Electric Power Co. Inc., Tohoku Electric Power Co. Inc., Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.,
Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Chubu Electric Power Co. Inc., Kansai Electric Power Co. Inc.,
Chugoku Electric Power Co. Inc., Shikoku Electric Power Co. Inc., Kyushu Electric Power Co.
Inc., and Okinawa Electric Power Co. Inc. In preparing the report, the Federation of ElectricPower Companies also provided information on the activities of the Japan Atomic Power
Company, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited and the Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company.

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Section B Policies and Practices
Article 32
1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 30, each Contracting Party shall submit a national
report to each review meeting of Contracting Parties. This report shall address the measures taken
to implement each of the obligations of the Convention. For each Contracting Party the report shallalso address its:(i) spent fuel management policy;(ii) spent fuel management practices;(iii) radioactive waste management policy;(iv) radioactive waste management practices;(v) criteria used to define and categorize radioactive waste.

Section B describes the national policy for promoting the spent fuel management andradioactive waste management in Japan and the operator’s actions based on that policy. The
policy and actions for the safety of spent fuel management and radioactive waste
management are described in “Section G Safety of Spent Fuel Management” and “Section H
Safety of Radioactive Waste Management”, respectively.
In Japan, on the basis of the basic principle provided in “the Framework for Nuclear Energy
Policy”, ANRE of METI established concrete policies for the utilization of nuclear energy as
energy source, and MEXT established concrete policies for the utilization of nuclear energy
and radioisotopes for science and technology and Ministry of Foreign Affairs formulates andestablishes foreign policy with regard to international cooperation in the field of nuclear energyarea.
B1 Spent Fuel Management Policy
In the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy, JAEC evaluated the “Basic Concepts of the
Nuclear Fuel Cycle from the following ten viewpoints: safety, technical feasibility, economic
viability, energy security, environmental protection, nuclear non-proliferation, international
trends, issues resulting from policy changes, social acceptability, and adaptability to emerging
circumstances (adaptability to future uncertainty)..” and the Framework concluded “Whenpromoting nuclear power generation in Japan, we should comprehensively consider suchmatters as ensuring economic viability, working to create a sound material-cycle society,ensuring energy security, and ensuring the capability to respond to future uncertainty.” “We
have reached the conclusion that our basic policy is, aiming at using nuclear fuel resources as
effective as reasonably achievable, to reprocess spent fuel and to effectively use therecovered plutonium and uranium, while ensuring safety, nuclear non-proliferation,
environmental protection, and paying attention due to economic viability. Spent fuel will be
reprocessed, within the available reprocessing capacity, for the time being, and the surplus
volume exceeding the capacity will be stored intermediately.”
In accordance with the basic principle provided by the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy,
the “Act for Deposit and Administration of Reserve Funds for Reprocessing of Spent Fuel from
Nuclear Power Generation” (see Section E) was established that requires the operators todeposit the funds for spent fuel reprocessing in a fund administration corporation. The
objective of “the Act” is to ensure the proper implementation of spent fuel reprocessing,disposal of radioactive wastes generated from reprocessing, and disassembling of
reprocessing facilities. The amount of reserve by the end of March 2011 is about 2,400 billion
yen by 10 electric utilities. As a part of such steps, The Minister of METI designated“Radioactive Waste Management Funding and Research Center” (public interest incorporated
foundation) as a non-profit “fund administration corporation” (October 2005) that is supervisedby the Minister through supervisory orders and on-the-spot inspection.

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B2 Spent Fuel Management Practices
1. Reprocessing of spent fuel generated from nuclear power generation
Electric utilities had sent spent fuel to British and French reprocessing companies since 1969.
And the export of spent fuel to foreign reprocessing plants closed in July 2001. Approximately
7,100MTU of spent fuel had been exported.
A part of national demand for reprocessing had been covered by the reprocessing plant(reprocessing capacity: 0.7MTU per day) of the incorporated administrative agency, JAEA,
which was commissioned in December 1980, in Tokai village in Ibaraki Prefecture. This plant
was built for the purpose of establishing reprocessing technology and of training and fosteringengineers and technicians in Japan. However, the plant terminated the reprocessing service
contracted by the electric utilities in the end of March 2006. Since then, it has been utilized asa facility for developing technologies for reprocessing spent MOX fuel in light water reactors(LWRs), spent fuel in an advanced thermal reactor and spent fuel in a fast breeder reactor.
The plant has reprocessed a total of approximately 1,100MTU of spent fuel since thecommissioning.
In response to the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 1979, a private reprocessing
company, the Japan Atomic Fuel Service Co., Ltd. (presently, the Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd.)was established in 1980, funded by the electric utilities. This company commenced
construction of a commercial reprocessing plant with annual reprocessing capacity of 800
MTU in Rokkasho village, Aomori Prefecture in 1993, based on the operating experience ofthe reprocessing plant of JAEA, considering the trends of domestic demand for reprocessing,and introducing technologies and experiences accumulated in the leading countries in thefield of reprocessing. Spent fuel storage has already begun in a plant, completed in 1999, withthe storage capacity of 3,000MTU. This plant has accepted a total of approximately
3,300MTU by the end of March 2011. As of the end of March, 2011, the amount of spent fuelstored in nuclear power plants of LWR in Japan amounts to approximately 14,000MTU. The
reprocessing plant started pre-service inspection using actual spent fuel in 2006 aiming at
commencement of operation in 2012. The plant has reprocessed a total of approximately
430MTU for the pre-service inspection at the end of March 2011.
2. Offsite interim spent fuel storage
The Reactor Regulation Act was amended in 1999 to incorporate provisions on interim spent
fuel storage. In response to this amendment, TEPCO and JAPCO jointly established“Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company”. The “Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company” applied to the
Minister of METI for the license for the construction and operation of Recyclable-Fuel Storage
Center at Mutsu city, Aomori Prefecture, which is the Japan’s first offsite interim spent fuelstorage facility (See Fig.L5-1, L5-2) in March 2007, based on the Reactor Regulation Act. The
application was accepted in May 2010. The application for the design and method of
construction was made to the Minister of METI in June 2010, and was approved in August
2010. Upon receipt of the approval, the construction was started. The Recyclable-Fuel
Storage Center is a facility to store spent fuel generated in BWRs and PWRs in metallic dry
casks (See Fig. L5-3), and is capable of storing maximum of approximately 3,000 t (metrictons of metal uranium before irradiation) of spent fuel. This facility is scheduled to start theoperation in July 2012.
3. Management of spent fuel from research reactor facilities
The spent fuel from research reactor facilities is either returned to the USA, or is reprocessedor stored in Japan.

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B3 Radioactive Waste Management Policy
Radioactive wastes may need extraordinarily long time for their effects to attenuate to an
insignificant level and disposal of them has to be governed by four principles; “principle ofgenerators’ liability”, “principle of minimization of radioactive wastes”, “principle of reasonable
treatment and disposal” and “principle of implementation based on mutual understanding withthe public”. On the basis of such recognition, JAEC deems it important to appropriately
categorize the wastes so that they may be safely treated and disposed of according to thecategorization. From such viewpoint, JAEC categorized the wastes into “radioactive wastes
subject to geological disposal” and “radioactive wastes subject to disposal with active control”
and indicated basic strategies for each category. In accordance with such strategies, thegovernment of Japan developed the policy for promoting radioactive waste disposal as
described below.
1.

Radioactive waste subject to geological disposal(1) High level radioactive waste
In Japan, a site for geological disposal of high level radioactive waste is determined throughthree steps of the selection of “preliminary investigation areas”, “detailed investigation areas”
and “construction site of final disposal facility”, in accordance with the “Final Disposal Act”
(See Section E). Pursuant to the Act, the Cabinet approved the “Basic Policy for Final
Disposal” and the “Final Disposal Plan” and the Nuclear Waste Management Organization ofJapan (NUMO) was established as an organization to implement final disposal. In addition,utilities have been deposited the reserve funds for final disposal to NUMO. The amount ofreserve by the end of March, 2011 is about 840 billion yen. Appeal to the public for candidate
areas for literature survey on possible installation of final disposal facility was conducted by
NUMO, but the literature survey has not yet been commenced.
Under such situation, JAEC stated that the current activities should be enhanced to obtainunderstanding and cooperation of the electricity consumers who are benefitted with nuclear
power generation as well as the local residents of various sectors of local communities,
including local authorities, across the country.
In response to that, the Radioactive Waste Subcommittee under the Nuclear Energy
Subcommittee of Electricity Business Subcommittee prepared an interim report on theenhancement of the activities to promote the final disposal. The report requires that the
government should, by itself, ask local governments to conduct literature survey, while
maintaining the present procedure of open solicitation of candidate areas. The report alsoasks the government, NUMO and electric utilities to enhance national and regional public
relations, to propose regional development plans, to enhance research and development andinternational cooperation for promoting the public understanding.
Specifically, publicity works are conducted in each prefecture in Japan and workshops areorganized in association with non profit organizations (NPOs). It is proposed to build a“geological disposal concept demonstration facility” with ground and underground facilities,
that facilitate public understanding of geological disposal concept and clarifies its engineering
feasibility as well as long-term behaviors. This demonstration facility will be used for thedemonstration of the emplacement of wastes, installation techniques, monitoring technology,
and retrieval technology. The “Coordination Council for Basic Research and Development of
Geological Disposal” organized by ANRE discussed and made up a master plan for the basic
research on geological disposal (December 2006), to facilitate effective and efficient
implementation of the total research and development program by the government, JAEA andother research organization. As for international cooperation, Japan has been studying, andusing as reference, the cases in foreign countries where the selection of disposal site is inprogress, and will continue to exchange views with the countries that have final disposal
programs and also to promote multinational cooperation using cooperative frameworks of the
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IAEA, OECD/NEA, IFNEC, etc.
(2)Long-lived low-heat generating radioactive wastes (TRU wastes) to be geologicallydisposed of
As for TRU wastes, JAEC stated that the interaction in the case of geological disposal of TRU
wastes together with the high level radioactive wastes (single-site disposal: See Fig. L6-4)
should be evaluated and necessary implementation steps, including function of theimplementing body and government involvement, should be studied on the basis of theevaluation results.
In response to that, ANRE amended the Final Disposal Act. According to this amendment,
TRU wastes from reprocessing that need to be geologically disposed of and high level
radioactive wastes that are returned from overseas reprocessing plants in exchange for TRU
wastes were added to the wastes to be finally disposed of by NUMO, and generators of such
radioactive wastes were legally requested to provide the cost needed for final disposal.
2.

Radioactive wastes subject to disposal with active control
In Japan, disposal with active control is categorized in the following three type; namely“near surface trench disposal”, “near surface pit disposal” and “subsurface disposal.” JAEC
stated in the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy that It is often effective and efficient tomanage and dispose of radioactive waste in an integrated fashion according to the propertiesof the waste material regardless of the generators or waste sources, and therefore, theGovernment should coordinate various systems accordingly.
Low level radioactive wastes generated in nuclear power plants that are subject to nearsurface trench disposal and near surface pit disposal are already being disposed of with suchmethods.
JAEC, considering the results of operator’s investigation and tests, indicated that necessary
systems for implementing subsurface disposal including safety regulation system should beestablished without delay. In response to that, the Radioactive Waste Safety Subcommittee
under the NISS/ACNRE prepared an interim report on safety regulation of subsurface
disposal of low level radioactive waste in January 2008. This report shows the outline ofsafety regulation and further technical study items. Considering the results of the study, NISA
developed an Ordinance of the METI based on the Reactor Regulation Act.
3. Ban on sea dumping of radioactive waste
In compliance with the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping ofWastes and Other Matter (1972) and its amendment to Annex I in 1993, JAEC decided “thegovernment of Japan will eliminate the option of sea dumping as a principle of low level
radioactive waste in the future. However, JAEC may consider reviewing of theabove-mentioned policy in case political and social situations significantly change in the
future.” Based on this decision, the Reactor Regulation Act was amended in May 2005, andsea dumping of radioactive waste was banned.

B4 Radioactive Waste Management Practices
Operators, recognizing their responsibility concerning radioactive waste management, shallmanage radioactive waste generated at their facilities in compliance with The Reactor
Regulation Act, the Radiation Disease Prevention Act and relevant regulations.
B4.1 High Level Radioactive Waste Management Practices
In Japan, spent fuel has been reprocessed by the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant of JNFL,
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Tokai Reprocessing Plant of the JAEA and reprocessing plants in France and the United
Kingdom. JNFL is conducting active test of the vitrification facility of HLW, attached to its
reprocessing plant, at the Rokkasho. This facility will be completed in October 2012 and 118
vitrified radioactive waste canisters generated during the test have been stored.
High level liquid waste generated at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant of JAEA is stored in tanks
within the facility. The vitrification facility started operation in January 1995. As of March 2011,about 380 cubic meters of liquid waste and 247 vitrified waste canisters are in storage.
Utilities in Japan have concluded reprocessing contracts with British and French companies
for a total of 5,600 MTU of spent fuel from light water reactors and 1,500 MTU of spent fuelfrom a gas cooled reactor. In accordance with these contracts, vitrified waste canisters are
returned to the utilities and are stored by JNFL. As of the end of March 2011, 1338 vitrified
canisters had been returned from UK and France. Return shipment of the vitrified waste
canisters from UK started in 2010, and will be continued for more than ten and several years.
As a result, a total of ca. 2,200 canisters is planned to be returned from UK and France.
Vitrified HLW will be disposed of by geological disposal. Based on the Final Disposal Act,
NUMO, the responsible implementing organization, will start disposal in mid 2030s after threesteps procedure of site determination, that is, selection of the preliminary investigation areas,
detailed investigation areas and final disposal facility. NUMO, in 2002, started the first step by
open solicitation of candidate of sites for the preliminary investigation areas, and publishedthe “application format”, “outline of the disposal facility”, “investigation items” and “coexistenceof disposal facility and local community”. In case of receiving proposal of candidate areas,
NUMO will assess validity of the candidates by conducting survey of the site with existing
literature on volcanic activities, active faults and other geological conditions. NUMO will
decide the preliminary investigation areas based on the assessment.
NUMO, as the implementing organization, has conducted public offering for areas forliterature survey which is the first stage for selection of disposal site since December 2002.
Study meeting on HLW disposal had been organized by Toyo town, etc. in Kochi Prefecturesince September 2006, and subsequently, an application form was submitted to NUMO by the
town in January 2007. Responding to the application by Toyo town, NUMO received thepermission of final disposal plan by ANRE on the basis of the provisions of the Final Disposal
Act. However, since the Toyo town turned down the application in April 2007, the literature
survey has not been commenced yet.
In the government decision of “Plan on Final Disposal of Designated Radioactive Waste” inMarch 2008, selections of the Detailed Investigation Areas and the Construction Site for Final
Disposal Facility are planned to be conducted at mid 2010s and at around 2040, respectively.
NUMO decided to publish a technical report, titled “Safety Assurance of Geological Disposal
Activities 2010 - for Achieving Safe Geological Disposal Based on the Reliable Technologies-”
in order to extensively present its commitments to securing safety which has formed afoundation for NUMO to promote its activities, and to demonstrate that the technologies
required for accomplishing geological disposal have been steadily developing, including theachievements of the relevant research organizations in Japan. Prior to publication of thisreport, NUMO published the “Safety Assurance Concept 2009” to show the principles andpolicies for the safe promotion of its activities. “Safety Assurance of Geological Disposal
Activities 2010” consists of two volumes. That is “Activities” in which commitments by NUMO
for safety assurance of geological disposal as an implementing entity are presented, and“Technologies” in which status of progress of geological disposal technologies is presented. A
briefing session was held in October 2010, where a draft version of the report for review was
released. The contents of this draft version are expected to be further enhanced based on thereviews conducted by the Atomic Energy Society of Japan, the Science Council of Japan, etc.

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B4.2 Low Level Radioactive Waste Management Practices
LLW is classified into waste from power reactors, TRU waste, uranium waste and waste frommedical, industrial and research facilities. The waste management strategy for each of thesecategories is as follows, while gaseous and liquid radioactive wastes are discharged undermonitoring, after attenuation of radioactivity, filtering, adsorption and/or distillation. (See H.6.5)
1. Waste from Power Reactors
As of March 2011, fifty-five nuclear power reactors were in operation*. Liquid waste
concentrate is solidified with cement in drums after evaporation. Paper, clothing and othercombustibles are placed in drums after incineration. Plastics, metals and othernon-combustibles are placed in drums after compaction. These drums are stored in theon-site storage facilities. Replaced steam generators and other large-volume solid wastes areplaced in depository. Replaced control rods and channel boxes, etc. are stored in spent fuelpools and spent ion exchange resins are stored in tanks. Near-surface disposal of drums(solidified liquid waste and compacted and solidified non-combustible wastes) started in 1992
at the disposal facility of JNFL at Rokkasho Village in Aomori Prefecture.
The Clearance system is in operation since December 2005 after the amendment of The
Reactor Regulation Act and other related cabinet and ministerial ordinances. In June 2006,
JAPCO filed an application for “the methods for measurement and assessment of radioactivity
concentration of waste generated from dismantling of the Tokai Power Station” in accordancewith the amended Reactor Regulation Act and obtained approval of the government in
September 2006. Clearance measurement was conducted on the waste in the Tokai Power
Station and application for confirmation by the regulatory body was filed in April 2007. In June,the certified materials cleared from regulatory control (cleared material) were carried out fromthe Tokai Power Station for the first time after getting the confirmation certification. For thetime being, the cleared material is recycled at the site related to the nuclear installations,
namely they will be used as shielding material, bench and so on. Past records of approval ofthe methods for measurement and assessment of radioactivity concentrations of radioactivity
materials, and those of issuance of the confirmation certificates of the radioactivity
concentrations are as follows:y September 2006: Approval of the methods for measurement and assessment ofradioactivity concentrations of materials (applied for approval in June 2006);
y May 2007: Issuance of the confirmation certificate of radioactivity concentrations ofradioactive materials (applied for confirmation in April 2007)y May 2008: Issuance of the confirmation certificate of radioactivity concentrations ofmaterials (applied for confirmation in March 2008)
The clearance system would be applied to the wastes generated from the operation of lightwater reactors and the dismantling of “ATR-Fugen”, etc.
JNFL, as a part of study on subsurface disposal of waste from power reactors, conducted
research on geological features, underground water and ground from 2001 to 2006 at the siteof uranium enrichment and waste disposal facilities. (See Fig.L6-3-4)*: A period from the first criticality to the time before decommissioning. The Monju which is now
under construction is included in those in operation due to the fact that it already accomplished thecriticality.

2. TRU Waste
At present, in Japan, the reprocessing of spent fuel is in progress at the Tokai Reprocessing
Plant of JAEA.
Liquid TRU waste generated at the Tokai Reprocessing Plant of JAEA is stored in tanks andconcentrated by evaporation, and a portion of it is solidified in drums. Segmented fuelcladding, used filters and sampling bottles are put in containers and other solid waste is put in22

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drums. These drums and the containers are being held in storage at on-site depositories.
The reprocessing plant of JNFL at Rokkasho Village, Aomori prefecture is now performing the
integrated operational test (active test) using actual spent fuel in preparation for completion of
the reprocessing plant of JNFL in October 2012, and generation of waste at full-scale isexpected in the near future.
As Japan had sent spent fuel to France and UK under contracts of reprocessing spent fuel,the waste generated from reprocessing plants in these countries is gradually returned toJapan. TRU waste generated at spent fuel reprocessing plant in France is scheduled to be
returned to Japan from around 2013, as compacted waste form (hereinafter referred to as“CSD-C”) and vitrified low level radioactive waste form (hereinafter referred to as “CSD-B”).
Under these circumstances, NISA investigated the basic safety of CSD-C and CSD-B at theRadioactive Waste Safety Subcommittee under the NISS/ACNRE, and published “the Safetyof Compacted Waste Form (CSD-C) among Returned Low Level Radioactive Waste Form” inMarch 2008, and “the Safety of Returned Low Level Waste Form (CSD-B)” in August 2010.
Because CSD-C is a type of waste sealed in the canister, “the Rules on Disposal of Nuclear
Fuel Materials, etc. Outside the Plant or Office” was amended so that waste sealed in thecanisters can be accepted at the plant in addition to the waste solidified in the canisters.
In March 2010, the government of Japan, the Federation of Electric Power Companies andthe JNFL requested the government of Aomori Prefecture to accept the waste returned fromoverseas, taking into consideration political importance and urgency of returned waste
storage and management. The government of Aomori Prefecture established” the Review
Commission on Safety Check Regarding Acceptance of Returned Waste from Overseas” andissued the review results in July 2010. Finally, the governor of Aomori Prefecture accepted the
proposal based on the review results and opinions of all levels and all quarters of people in
the Prefecture.
In October 2010, JNFL applied for the approval of alteration in the waste management
activities in order to store the returned low level radioactive waste in the High-Level
Radioactive Waste Storage and Management Center. In response to this request, NISA
started the review.
TRU waste generated from the fabrication of MOX fuel in Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering
Laboratories of Tokai Research and Development Center is held in storage at on-site
depositories as well as TRU waste from reprocessing.
Research and development programs on TRU waste disposal have been promoted mainly by
JAEA and the Federation of Electric Power Companies.
3. Uranium Waste
Liquid waste containing uranium generated from enrichment or fuel fabrication facilities of
JAEA or other private facilities are stored in tanks. Solid uranium waste and ash resulting fromincineration are put in drums. They are held in storage at on-site depositories.
NSC issued the report titled “Clearance Level for Uranium Processing Facilities” in October
2009.In response to this report, NISA investigated the matter in the Radioactive Waste Safety
Subcommittee under NISS/ACNRE in order to incorporate metals generated from uranium
processing facilities into the current clearance system. As a result, NISA published“Establishment of the Clearance System for Uranium Processing Facilities” in November 2010.
Based on the results of these investigations, the relevant ordinance was amended in June
2011. MEXT prepared a report titled “Confirmation of the Clearance Level for Uranium
Processing Facilities” at the Technical WG of the Research Reactor Safety Regulation Study
Committee, etc., and amended the relevant ordinance in February 2011 based on the report.
4. Waste from Research Facilities, etc.
Waste generated from research and medical facilities is safely stored in the purpose-built
facilities after compacted or incinerated, as appropriate.
In November 2007, the incorporated administrative agency, JAEA applied for approval of “the
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methods for measurement and assessment of radioactivity concentrations” of approximately
4,000 tons of concrete fragments generated in association with modification of the former
JRR-3, taking advantage of the previously mentioned clearance system, and obtained
approval from the national government in July 2008. Up until today, clearance measurement
and application for confirmation was carried out, and the confirmation certificates were issued
for about 377 tons in May 2010, and about 381 tons in December, 2010, respectively. Clearedmaterials are planned to be reused as roadbed material, etc. in the JAEA site, after issuanceof the confirmation certificate.

B5 Criteria used to define and categorize radioactive waste
In Japan, radioactive waste is categorized as shown in Table B5-1.
1. Upper bounds of concentration of low level radioactive waste
In May 2007, NSC published “Upper Bounds of Radioactivity Concentration for Burial of
Low-Level Radioactive Solid Waste” concerning low level radioactive waste except uranium
waste. Conventionally, the upper bounds of radioactivity concentrations had been specified
only for the waste generated in power stations. In this document NSC expanded the subject of
disposal to include the low level radioactive waste except uranium waste, and proposed theupper bound for each category of subsurface disposal, near surface pit disposal and nearsurface trench disposal. Concerning calculation of the upper bounds of concentrations, theupper bounds of radionuclide concentrations of the waste packages are recommended
considering the distribution of radionuclide concentrations of the waste disposed, based on
the assessment of the public exposure due to the radioactive nuclides in the waste disposedof and the radioactivity concentrations to be the reference dose level, according to theprevious concept by NSC*1. Furthermore, the parameters used to calculate the upper boundsof radioactivity concentrations are in conformity with the latest knowledge in the international
community. Based on these concepts, disposal of radioactive waste is categorized into
Category 1 Waste Disposal (geological disposal) and Category 2 Waste Disposal (subsurface
disposal, near surface pit disposal and near surface trench disposal).(See Fig.L6-1)
1* : “Reference Radionuclide Concentration Values for Land Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive
Solid Waste (interim report)”, NSC, December 1986, “Reference Radionuclide Concentration
Values for Land Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Solid Waste (2nd interim report)”, NSC,
June 1992, and “Reference Radionuclide Concentration Values for Land Disposal of Low-Level
Radioactive Solid Waste (3rd interim report)”, NSC, September 2000

2. Criteria to clarify materials not requiring management as radioactive wastes
Concerning “materials not requiring management as radioactive wastes”, NSC has studied
the clearance level of radionuclide concentrations and its calculation method. NSC referred to
IAEA-TECDOC-855*2 for calculation method, and to the ICRP document (Pub. 46, 1985) fortarget value of dose. The results are reported as “Clearance Level for Major Nuclear Facilities”(March 1999), “Clearance Level for Heavy Water Reactors, Fast Neutron Reactors, etc.” (July
2001), and “Clearance Level for Nuclear Fuel Use Facilities (Facilities dealing with irradiatedfuels and materials” (April 2003).
In accordance with the IAEA issued the safety guide “Application of the Concepts of Exclusion,
Exemption and Clearance”, Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.7 (2004), NSC has made are-evaluation of the above mentioned three reports on the clearance level. The results were
issued as a report “Radionuclides Concentrations for Materials not Requiring Treatment asRadioactive Wastes, Generated from Dismantling etc. of Reactor Facilities and Nuclear Fuel
Use Facilities” in December 2004. NSC concluded that as the re-evaluated values and thevalues of exemption level provided in the IAEA safety guide are comparable, it is suitable touse the values in the IAEA safety guide. The Radioactive Wastes Safety Subcommittee of the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee and Technical WG of the Research Reactor

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Regulation Study Committee, etc. also studied this matter and concluded that it is essentiallysuitable to use the values of the IAEA safety guide (“Establishment of the Clearance System
for Nuclear Facilities (December 2004)”) and “Technical Requirement concerning Check andQualifying Clearance Revel from Research Reactor Facilities, etc (July 2005)”).
Through this process, related ministerial order was formulated to provide clearance levels of
33 nuclides of wastes from reactor facilities and 49 nuclides of wastes from nuclear fuelmaterial utilization facilities (hot laboratory facilities).
2* : “Clearance levels for radionuclides in solid materials, Application of exemption principles,Interim report for comment” (January 1996)

3.

Public dose criteria after the period for management of radioactive solid waste disposalsite
The Radiation Council published a report titled “the Basic Principles Concerning RadiologicalProtection for Radioactive Solid Waste Disposal and Clearance” in January 2010. This reportsuggests that, based on the policies of ICRP and IAEA, it is appropriate to define the publicdose criteria after the period for management of radioactive solid waste disposal site to be adose constraint of 300ȝSv/year, regardless of the disposal methods. Also it suggests that10ȝSv/year is appropriate as an individual dose criteria used for calculation of the clearance
level.
4. Criteria to categorize radioactive wastes
NSC specified the basic concept to distinguish “Solid wastes that are not radioactive wastes”
from radioactive wastes in the report “Reference Radionuclides Concentration Values for
Safety Regulations of Land Disposal of Low-Level Radioactive Solid Waste (The 2nd interim
report)” (June 1992). The report clarified that “solid wastes that are not radioactive wastes”
are those materials; such as materials clearly identified as not contaminated or not activated,material where significantly contaminated portion is identified and is deleted or contaminationof the remaining portion is negligible, and materials where significantly activated operation isevaluated and is deleted and activation of the remaining portion is negligible.
In July 2009, due to the necessity to establish a practical judgment method for wastes
generated from the material or structure that is installed or used in the radiation controlledarea of nuclear facility, in consideration of the past practices, NISA determined a practical
judgment method on the management of “non radioactive waste”, deliberating the concept of“non radioactive waste”, protective methods to contamination, detection limit, guideline toselect a portion of “non radioactive waste”, on-site survey, etc.
5. Clearance level of nuclides such as uranium
NSC investigated the clearance level of nuclides such as uranium based on the concept of
exclusion and published “Clearance Level for Uranium Processing Facilities” in October 2009.
In response to this report, NISA investigated the matter in the Radioactive Waste Safety
Subcommittee under NISS/ACNRE in order to incorporate metals generated from uranium
processing facilities into the current clearance system. As a result, NISA published“Establishment of the Clearance System for Uranium Processing Facilities” in November 2010.
Based on the results of these investigations, the relevant ordinance was amended in June
2011. MEXT prepared a report titled “Confirmation of the Clearance Level for Uranium
Processing Facilities” at the Technical WG of the Research Reactor Safety Regulation Study
Committee, etc., and amended the relevant ordinance in February 2011 based on the report.
6. Introduction of clearance system into the Radiation Disease Prevention Act
MEXT carried out technological studies that can contribute to amendment of the Radiation
Disease Prevention Act, based on “the Basic Principles of the Institutional Design Concerning
Incorporation of the Clearance System,” “the Basic Principles for Establishing the Clearance
Level Provided in the Radiation Disease Prevention Act,” and “the Basic Principles
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Concerning Investigation of Clearance Judgment Method,” which were published in July 2009
for the introduction of the clearance system into the Radiation Disease Prevention Act . As aresult of studies, MEXT specified the investigation results concerning establishment of theclearance level, a method to judge clearance and the condition of activation products causedby the radiation generator and also the major items required for introducing the clearance
system (“The Technological Studies for Introducing the Clearance System into the Radiation
Disease Prevention Act” (Second Interim Report).” (January 2010)) Subsequently, based on
the Second Interim Report, MEXT studied the concrete clearance levels to be specified in the
Radiation Disease Prevention Act,” and proposed the clearance levels (criteria of radioactivity
concentrations) for 53 nuclides for the materials contaminated in association with use ofradioisotopes, and 37 nuclides for the activated materials generated in association with
operation of a radiation generator. (“Clearance Levels to be Designated in the Radiation
Disease Prevention Act,” (November 2010))
In addition to the amendments to the Radiation Disease Prevention Act (May 2010), further
investigation will be conducted to contribute to establishment of technical standards andclearance levels for ordinances and notices. Studies will be conducted to establish theoperational criteria required for starting the operation of the clearance system.

26

Policies and Practices

Table B5-1

Classification of Radioactive Wastes

Classification

ExampleOrigin of Waste
Highradioactivity liquid

waste

or

vitrified waste canister that contains
Vitrified Waste

High-Level Radioactive Waste

Canisterfission products

like Sr-90 andCs-137 and Actinides elements like
Am-241 and Np-237 separated fromspent fuel during the reprocessing

Waste of Core

Control Rods,

Structures etc.

Core Internals
Liquid Waste,

Waste

Low Level

from
Power
Reactors

Filters,

Radioactive

Used

Waste

Equipment,

Waste Generated at Power Reactors

Expendables
Very Low Level
Radioactive
Waste

Concrete,
MetalsLow
Level

Long-lived

Sludge, Filters,

Radio-

Low-Heat -Generating

Used

activeRadioactive Waste

Equipment,

Waste( TRU Waste)

Expendables
Expendables,

Uranium Waste

Low

Level

Radioactive

Waste

Generated from the Operation andDismantlingofReprocessing

Facilities and MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facilities
Radioactive Waste Generated from

Sludge,Enrichment

Used Equipment

Facilities

and

Fuel

Fabrication

Liquid waste,
Metals,Concrete,
Waste from ResearchRadioactive Waste Generated from

Plastics,

Facilities, etc.

Research Facilities, Medical Facilities,

Filters,etc.

Disposable
SyringeThose waste generated from theoperation and dismantling of nuclear
installations
Material that need not be treated asradioactive waste(Waste below the Clearance Level)

and

the

radioactivity

concentration of the waste is so low
Concrete,that no measures to avoid radiation

Metalshazards is necessary. (From May 2012
onward,waste

generatedatthefacilities regulated by the Radiation
Disease Prevention Act will also be
included in this category.)

27

B

B

Policies and Practices

B6 Measures for decontamination and waste due to the Accident at Fukushima Nuclear
Power Stations (NPSs) of TEPCO*
1. Processing and disposal of the waste affected by the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPSof TEPCO
NSC proposed the following policy regarding the management of waste affected by theaccident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and the criteria in the “Near-term policy to ensure thesafety for treating and disposing contaminated waste around the site of Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company (June 3, 2011)”.
As to the materials which were affected by the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power
Station of TEPCO and which are to be disposed of (materials such as debris, sludge from thewater and sewerage treatment, incinerated ash, trees and plants and soil resulted from thedecontamination activities, etc.), it is necessary that the disposal of those materials be finallyaccomplished after the safety of residents living in the vicinity of the facilities and workers are
fully considered, and after the treatment and storage of these materials are pursued under theproper management.
A part of the above mentioned materials affected by this accident may be considered to be
subject for reuse. As to the products manufactured from these reused materials, it isnecessary to check that the concentration of radioactive materials is managed appropriately,
before the products are circulated in the market, so that the concentration is lower than the
VWDQGDUGOHYHOFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRȝ6Y\HDUHPSOR\HGIRUWKHFOHDUDQFHOHYHO
When the materials concerned is treated in recycling, incineration and melting facilities, andtemporary storage facilities or areas, it is important to take measures in consideration of theparticularity of this accident that the level of radiation exposure dose of residents living in thevicinity of the facilities and the workers engaged in the treatment of contaminated materials
should be kept as low as reasonably achievable, based on the fundamental idea of theradiation protection indicated by NSC.
In particular, special care is necessary to prevent radiation exposure of the residents living in
the vicinity of the facilities caused by the treatment of contaminated materials from exceeding
1mSv/year, by performing the improvement measures of environment for the periphery oftreating facilities. Furthermore, the radiation dose of workers exposed by the treatment of
those materials is desirable to be controlled possibly less than 1mSv/year. It is consideredthat the waste of relatively high radioactivity concentration is generated in the processes suchas incineration and melting, therefore such processes should be performed under the proper
management of radiation protection for the worker, in compliance with "The Ordinance on
Prevention of Ionizing Radiation Hazards (Ordinance of the Ministry of Labor No.41 ofSeptember 30, 1972)".
Furthermore, for the exhaust and drainage from treating facilities, it is important to confirm
that the level of radioactivity concentration is less than the limit shown in "Notification for Dose
Equivalent Limits on the Basis of the Rules for Commercial Power Reactors (Public notice of
METI No.187 of March 21, 2001)".
In the final disposal, based on full understanding of the basic information such as shape andquantity of the waste, type of radioactive material and radioactivity concentration, it isnecessary to select a proper method of disposal depending on radioactivity level, to set a
method and a period of necessary management depending on the type and concentration ofradioactive materials, and to evaluate the long-term safety of disposal facilities.
*: The waste described in this item means waste contaminated by radioactive materials
discharged by the nuclear power station accident associated with the Tohoku District – Off the
Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011.

28

Policies and Practices

Even when disposing waste affected by this accident, the NSC considers that there arescientific basis of ensured safety after the terminating active control, if scenario depending onan adopted disposal method is set followed by conducting proper assessment, and if theresult of the assessment satisfies the "target dose" for each scenario indicated in "Basic
Guide for Safety Review of Category 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal.
2. Enactment of the Act on measures for radioactive wastes and the basic policy of
decontamination(1) The Act on measures for radioactive wastes
The Diet enacted the “Act on Special Measures concerning Handling of Radioactive Pollution”
on August 26, 2011. In light of the fact that contamination of the environment has been
occurring on account of radioactive materials discharged by the recent accident, the Act
intends to reduce impacts on human health and/or living environment promptly by
establishing measures to be taken by the national and local governments and relevant
licensees, etc. Specifically, it stipulates that the national government is to establish the basic
principles regarding the handling of contamination of the environment by radioactive materials,
and, giving due consideration to the degree of significance of the contamination, designate
areas where it is necessary to take measures including decontamination by the national
government and so on.
a Outline of the Act on Special Measures
The “Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution byRadioactive Materials Discharged by the NPS Accident Associated with the Tohoku District –Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake That Occurred on March 11 (Act No. 110 of 2011)” wassubmitted to the 177th Diet by the Chairman of the Committee on Environment of the Houseof Representatives, on August 23 and was enacted on August 26, promulgated on August 30,
with portions of it having entered into effect on the same day.
Subsequent to its enactment, the basic principles and standards based on this Act will beestablished; decontamination plans made by the national government or by local public
institutions grounded in this Basic Principles will be stipulated from January 1, 2012; anddecontamination works will be advanced.
The overview of the systems prescribed by the Act on Special Measures is as follows.
‫ۑ‬Development of the Basic Principles
The Minister of the Environment develops a draft of the basic principles regarding thehandling of the environment pollution caused by radioactive materials, and requests a
resolution at a Cabinet Meeting‫ۑ‬Implementation of monitoring and measurement of contamination of the environment
caused by radioactive materials
The national government promptly prepares and implements a system of unified monitoringand measurement to figure out the situation of environment pollution.
‫ۑ‬Measures including decontamination and disposal of wastes contaminated by radioactive
materials discharged by the accident(i) Measures, etc. taken by the relevant nuclear power producer (the nuclear power producer
discharged radioactive materials)
Relevant nuclear power producer shall carry out disposal, etc. of wastes at the NPS. Also,
based on requests of the national or local governments, relevant nuclear power producer
shall take necessary measures such as the dispatch of personnel, etc.
(ii) Disposal of wastes contaminated by radioactive materials
ձThe Minister of the Environment designates areas where wastes may be contaminatedby radioactive materials, to such a degree that special control is required.

29

B

B

Policies and Practices

ղThe Minister of the Environment develops a plan regarding disposal, etc. of wastes in
the area of ձ.
ճThe Minister of the Environment designates wastes which are located outside the areaof ձ and whose state of contamination by radioactive materials exceeds a certain
level.
մDisposal of the wastes in the area of ձ and the wastes designated as ճ is carriedout by the national government on the basis of the standard.
յAs for the disposal of wastes with low levels of contamination except those of մ, theregulation of the Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law is adapted.
(iii) Measures for decontamination of soils, etc. (including vegetation, workpieces)contaminated by radioactive materials
ձThe Minister of the Environment, giving due consideration to the degree ofcontamination, designates areas where it is necessary for the national governments tocarry out measures for decontamination, etc.
ղThe Minister of the Environment develops a plan to carry out these measures fordecontamination, etc. in the area of ձ, and the national government carries out themeasures for decontamination, etc. on the basis of the standard.
ճThe Minister of the Environment designates areas other than ձ where
decontamination conditions are expected not to conform to requirements.
մAs for zones recognized as not conforming to the requirements through an investigationon the state of contamination in the area of ճ, the governor of the prefecture (including
the mayor of the municipality designated by Cabinet order), develops plans designating
matters regarding the measures for decontamination, etc.
յBased on the plan of մ, the national government, the governor of the prefecture, themayor of the municipality, etc. carry out measures for decontamination, etc. on the basisof the standard.
նThe national government, as requested by the governor of the prefecture, the mayor of
the municipality, etc., and when it is recognized as necessary, shall carry out measuresof decontamination, etc. based on the plan of մ on behalf of the said prefecture andmunicipality, etc.
b Preparation towards full-scale enforcement of the Act on Special Measures
Hereafter, taking into account of the results of verification projects of decontamination andother issues, the national government is scheduled to arrange matters needed for
enforcement of requirements to specify regions, the standards including the disposal
standards, by the end of this year.
(2) ͆Basic Concept for Pushing Ahead with Decontamination Works” and “Basic Policy for
Emergency Response on Decontamination Works”
As decontamination is an urgent issue to be tackled immediately, the Government Nuclear
Emergency Headquarters established the “Basic Policy for Emergency Decontamination
Work” on August 26, 2011 without waiting until the related part of the above-mentioned Act
fully comes into force in January, 2012. It summarized specific targets and working principles
in carrying out decontamination, including that estimated annual exposure dose of generalpublic in residence areas is to be reduced approximately 50% in the next two years, and soon.
<Basic Concepts>a) By directly pushing ahead with decontamination works with focus on the areas where theannual exposure dose is estimated at greater than 20 mSv, the national government aims
to reduce the estimated annual exposure dose to less than 20 mSv;b) Even in areas with an estimated annual exposure dose of less than 20 mSv, the national
30

Policies and Practices

government will work with municipalities and local residents to conduct effective
decontamination work, so that the estimated annual exposure dose will be closer to 1 mSv;
andc) By putting a high priority on thorough decontamination work in children’s living spaces(such as schools or parks), the government aims to reduce their estimated annual
exposure dose closer to 1 mSv as early as possible and continue with further reductions .
<Immediate targets>a) Long-term targets are decided to reduce the additional annual exposure dose to less than
1 mSv in the region of existing exposure situation, and for implementing decontaminationin the radiation-contaminated areas, it is targeted to reduce the estimated annual exposure
dose by approximately 50% for general public and by roughly 60% for children inparticular within the next two years. (IV-2-13)b) With this regards, as to the future impacts of radioactive materials, based on advice fromthe Nuclear Safety Committee, trial calculations was carried out with consideration for thephysical reduction of radioactive materials as well as reduction by the natural factors suchas weather based on the past actual measurement values, and the result has been comeout that the estimated annual exposure dose at the time after two years past decreaseabout 40 % compared to the one at this point.
In order to promote these efforts by coordinating with the local areas the government
launched “Fukushima Decontamination Promotion Team” and enhanced its on-site system on
August 24. Also, on August 25, the Office of Response to Radioactive Materials
Contamination was established within the Cabinet Secretariat and a system forcomprehensively promoting decontamination, the disposal of radioactive wastes, and thehealth investigation of residents is to be prepared. In addition, a coordination meeting tofacilitate close coordination among relevant ministries and agencies will be launched, as well
as a radioactive materials contamination response advisory meeting, to be comprised of
persons of knowledge and experience on the establishment of standards regarding radiation.
Hereafter, the government intends to appropriate about 220 billion yen for thesedecontamination activities from reserve fund provided under a secondary supplementarybudget for this fiscal year.

31

BScope of Application

Section C Scope of Application
Article 3
1. This Convention shall apply to the safety of spent fuel management when the spent fuel resultsfrom the operation of civilian nuclear reactors. Spent fuel held at reprocessing facilities as part of a
reprocessing activity is not covered in the scope of this Convention unless the Contracting Party
declares reprocessing to be part of spent fuel management.
2. This Convention shall also apply to the safety of radioactive waste management when theradioactive waste results from civilian applications. However, this Convention shall not apply towaste that contains only naturally occurring radioactive materials and that does not originate fromthe nuclear fuel cycle, unless it constitutes a disused sealed source or it is declared as radioactive
waste for the purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party.
3. This Convention shall not apply to the safety of management of spent fuel or radioactive waste
within military or defence programmes, unless declared as spent fuel or radioactive waste for the
purposes of this Convention by the Contracting Party. However, this Convention shall apply to thesafety of management of spent fuel and radioactive waste from military or defence programmes if
and when such materials are transferred permanently to and managed within exclusively civilian
programmes.
4. This Convention shall also apply to discharges as provided for in Articles 4, 7, 11, 14, 24 and 26.

The government of Japan declared, pursuant to Article 3, Paragraph 1, of the Convention, that
reprocessing is part of spent fuel management, acceded to the Convention. Therefore Japan
includes the spent fuel stored in reprocessing facilities in these scope of the Convention.
The government of Japan did not make declarations provided for in Article 3, Paragraphs 2,
and 3, of the Convention.

33

CInventories and Lists

Section D Inventories and Lists
Article 32
2 This report shall also include:(i) a list of the spent fuel management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main
purpose and essential features;(ii) an inventory of spent fuel that is subject to this Convention and that is being held in storage and ofthat which has been disposed of. This inventory shall contain a description of the material and, if
available, give information on its mass and its total activity;(iii) a list of the radioactive waste management facilities subject to this Convention, their location, main
purpose and essential features;(iv) an inventory of radioactive waste that is subject to this Convention that:(a) is being held in storage at radioactive waste management and nuclear fuel cycle facilities;(b) has been disposed of; or(c) has resulted from past practices.
this inventory shall contain a description of the material and other appropriate information
available, such as volume or mass, activity and specific radionuclides;(v) a list of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned and the status ofdecommissioning activities at those facilities.

D1 List of spent fuel management facilities
Spent fuel from power reactor facilities is being held in storage at spent fuel storage facilities
within power reactor facilities or Tokai Reprocessing Plant of Tokai Research andDevelopment Center, Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories, JAEA and Rokkasho
Reprocessing Plant of JNFL. Spent fuel from research reactor facilities is being held instorage at spent fuel storage facilities of the research reactor facilities. The locations, main
purposes and essential features of these spent fuel management facilities are listed in Tables
D1-1 and D1-2.
Table D1-1 List of Spent Fuel Management Facilities (Related to Power Generation)
Nuclear facilities where spent fuelmanagement facilities are locatedLocation

purposeJAPCO Tokai-No.2 Power Station

IbarakiStorage

JAPCO Tsuruga Power Station
Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.
Tomari Power Station
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Onagawa NPS
Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Higashidori NPS

Fukui

Storage

Wet storage(partly stored in dry casks)
Wet storage

Hokkaido

Storage

Wet storage

MiyagiStorage

Wet storage

AomoriStorage

Wet storage

TEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPS

Fukushima

Storage

TEPCO Fukushima Daini NPSTEPCO Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS
Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Hamaoka NPS
Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Shika NPSThe Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Mihama Power Station
The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Takahama Power Station
The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.
Ohi Power Station
The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.
Shimane NPS
Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.

Fukushima
Niigata

Storage
Storage

Wet storage(partly stored in dry casks)
Wet storage
Wet storage

Shizuoka

Storage

Wet storage

Ishikawa

Storage

Wet storage

Fukui

Storage

Wet storage

Fukui

Storage

Wet storage

Fukui

Storage

Wet storage

ShimaneStorage

Wet storage

Ehime

Storage

Wet storage

35

featuresD

D

Inventories and Lists
Ikata Power Station
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Genkai NPS
Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.
Sendai NPS
JAEA Fugen Decommissioning Engineering
Center㸦Fugen㸧
JAEA Tokai Research and Development
Center Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering
Laboratories Tokai Reprocessing Plant
JNFL Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant
JAEA Fast Breeder Reactor Research and1Development Center (Monju* )*1: Pre-service inspection stage

Saga

Storage

Wet storage

Kagoshima

Storage

Wet storage

Fukui

Storage

Wet storage

IbarakiStorage

Wet storage

AomoriStorage

Wet storage

Fukui

Storage

Wet storage(As of the end of March 2011)

Table D1-2 List of Spent Fuel Management Facilities (Research Reactors)
Nuclear facilities where spent fuel management facilities
are located
JAEA Tokai Research and Development Center Nuclear
Science Research Institute

Location

purposefeatures

IbarakiStorage

JAEA Oarai Research and Development Center

IbarakiStorage

Wet storage(partially dry
storage)
Wet storage

Kyoto University Research Reactor Institute

Osaka

Storage
Wet storage(As of the end of March 2011)

D2 Inventories of spent fuelSpent fuel stored in above-mentioned spent fuel management facilities are shown in Table
D2-1.
Table D2-1 Spent Fuel Inventory
Nuclear facilities Categories
Commercial Nuclear Power Plants
Power Reactors at the stage of Research andDevelopment
Reprocessing Plants
Research Reactors

Types of Fuel Elements
Inventory
Uranium Oxide Fuel Elements
13,920ton
Uranium Oxide Fuel Elements and
70 tonMixed Oxide Fuel Elements
Uranium Oxide Fuel Elements and2,875 ton
Mixed Oxide Fuel Elements
Uranium Oxide Fuel Elements and
34 tonMixed Oxide Fuel Elements(As of the end of March 2011)

D3 List of radioactive waste management facilities
Radioactive waste management facilities within power reactor facilities include the followings:
waste treatment facilities where waste generated at the reactor facility is treated; solid waste
depositories where drums (homogeneous solidification, fill-up solidification, miscellaneous
solid and others), etc. filled with treated waste are being held in storage; depositories where
the replaced steam generators and other large solid wastes are being held in storage; spent
fuel pools etc. where the disused control rods, the disused channel boxes, etc. are being heldin storage; and tanks where the spent ion exchange resin is being held in storage.
Radioactive waste management facilities within enrichment and fuel manufacturing plants
include the followings; waste treatment equipments that treats waste generated at the plants;
and solid waste depositories where drums filled with treated waste are held in storage.
36

Inventories and Lists

Radioactive waste management facilities within spent fuel reprocessing plants include thefollowings; waste treatment equipments that treats waste generated at the plant; waste
depository where vitrified waste and high level liquid waste are being held in storage; andwaste depository where low level liquid waste and low level solid waste are being held instorage.
Radioactive waste management facilities licensed under the waste related activities include
the followings; radioactive waste dispose facilities where radioactive waste is disposed of,Waste Storage facilities being held in storage before disposal, waste treatment facilities whereradioactive waste is treated.
Radioactive waste management facilities within research reactors and major fuel material use
facilities include the followings; waste treatment equipments that treats low level radioactive
waste generated at those facilities; and solid waste depositories where drums filled withtreated waste are being held in storage.
Main radioactive waste management facilities licensed with waste management businessunder the Radiation Disease Prevention Act include storage facilities etc., where drums, etc.
filled with processed waste generated at radioisotopes use facilities, etc. are being held instorage.
Radioactive waste management facilities licensed on the basis of the Medical Care Act etc.
include the storage facilities, etc., where drums, etc. filled with processed radioactive medical
waste generated from medical facilities, etc. are being held in storage.
The locations, main purposes and essential features of these radioactive waste management
facilities are listed in Tables D3-1 and D3-2.
Table D3-1 List of Radioactive Waste Management Facilities (Power Reactors)
Nuclear facilities whereradioactive waste
management facilities arelocatedLocation

JAPCO Tokai Power Station

IbarakiJAPCO Tokai-No.2 Power
Station

IbarakiJAPCO Tsuruga Power
StationFukui

Hokkaido Electric Power Co.,
Inc. Tomari Power Station

Hokkaido

Tohoku Electric Power Co.,
Inc. Onagawa NPS

MiyagiTohoku Electric Power Co.,
Inc. Higashidori NPS

AomoriTEPCO. Fukushima Daiichi
NPS

Fukushima

TEPCO. Fukushima Daini
NPS

Fukushima

TEPCO. Kashiwazaki Kariwa
NPS

Niigata

Chubu Electric Power Co.,
Inc. Hamaoka NPS

Shizuoka

PurposeFeatures

Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant

Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.

37

D

D

Inventories and Lists

Hokuriku Electric Power Co.,
Inc. Shika NPS
The Kansai Electric Power
Co., Inc.
Mihama Power Station
The Kansai Electric Power
Co., Inc.
Takahama Power Station
The Kansai Electric Power
Co., Inc.
Ohi Power Station

Ishikawa
Fukui
Fukui
Fukui

The Chugoku Electric Power
Co., Inc. Shimane NPS

ShimaneShikoku Electric Power Co.,
Inc. Ikata Power Station

Ehime

Kyushu Electric Power Co.,
Inc. Genkai NPS

SagaKyushu Electric Power Co.,
Inc. Sendai NPS

Kagoshima

JAEA , Fugen
Decommissioning
Engineering Center(Fugen)
JAEA Fast Breeder Reactor
Research and Development
Center (Monju)

Fukui
Fukui

Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant
Processing andstorage of wastefrom the power plant

Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility after
volume reduction bycompaction, etc.
(As of the end of March 2011)

Table D3-2 List of Radioactive Waste Management Facilities (Other Than Power Reactors)
Nuclear facilities where radioactive waste
management facilities are locatedLocation

Global Nuclear FuelJapan Co., Ltd.

Fuelfabrication
facility

Kanagawa

Mitsubishi
Nuclear
Fuel Co., Ltd.

Fuelfabrication
facility

IbarakiNuclear
Fuel
Industries, Ltd. Tokai
Works

Nuclear
Fuel
Industries,
Ltd.
Kumatori Works

JAEA

Ningyo-toge
Environmental
Engineering Center

JAEA

Tokai
ResearchandDevelopment Center
NuclearScienceResearch Institute

Fuelfabrication
facility
Ibaraki
Fuel material use
facility
Fuel
fabrication
facility
Osaka
Fuel material use
facility

Features

Processing andstorage of uranium
waste
Processing andstorage of uranium
waste
Processing andstorage of uranium
waste
Processing andstorage of waste fromfuel material use facility
Processing andstorage of uranium
wasteStored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Trench disposal of concrete
waste

Storage of waste fromfuel material use facility

Enrichment facility
Okayama
Fuel material use
facility
Waste
disposalfacility
Research reactor
facility;
Fuelmaterialuse
facility;
Radioisotope

PurposeIbaraki

38

Processing andstorage of uranium
waste
Processing andstorage of waste fromfuel material use facility
Disposal of low level
radioactive waste
Processing andstorage of radioactive
waste from research
reactor facility , fuelmaterial use facility,

Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, incineration,etc.

Inventories and Lists

Waste
Management1
facility*

JAEA

Tokai
ResearchandDevelopment Center
Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Engineering
Laboratories

JAEA
Oarai Research andDevelopment Centerradioisotope use
facilities, etc.

Processing andstorage of HLW andTrans uranium waste

Reprocessing
facility
Ibaraki
Fuel material use
facility

Processing andstorage of waste fromfuel material use facility

Waste
management
facility;
Research reactor
facility,
Fuelmaterialuse
facility;
Radioisotope
WasteManagement1
facility*

IbarakiProcessing andstorage of radioactive
waste from research
reactor facility , fuelmaterial use facility,
radioisotope use
facilities, etc.

Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, incineration,etc.

Research reactor
facility

Aomori

Processing andstorage of waste fromresearch reactor facility

Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.

JAEA
Aomori Research andDevelopment Center
Mutsu Office

Reprocessing
facility

JNFL
Reprocessing
Business division

JNFL
Enrichment
Disposal Office

Waste
facility
Waste
facility

The University ofTokyo,
Radioisotope Center

Kyoto University
Research
ReactorInstitute
Rikkyo University
Institute for Atomic
EnergyTokyo City University(formerMusashi
InstituteofTechnology)
AtomicEnergyResearch InstituteKinki University
AtomicEnergyProcessing andstorage of HLW andTrans uranium waste

Aomoristorage

Storage of vitrified
waste
Disposal of low level
radioactive waste
Processing andstorage of uranium
waste

disposalandThe University ofTokyo,
Nuclear Professional
School, School ofEngineering

HLW
storedafter
vitrification,
waste
containing Trans uranic
nuclides stored after volume
reduction by incineration etc
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, incineration,
etc.

Aomori
Enrichment facility

Research reactor
facility;
Fuelmaterialuse
facility
Radioisotope
WasteManagement1
facility*

Storage facility of waste
generated from spent fuelreceipt and storage facility(Reprocessing Facility is
now under construction)
A
storagefacilityfor
returned vitrified waste
No.1 Disposal facility,
No.2 Disposal facility
Stored at a storage facility

IbarakiTemporary storage of
waste from research
reactor facility and fuelmaterial use facility

Treated in Japan Atomic
EnergyAgencyTokai
Research and Development
CenterNuclear Science ResearchInstitute

Tokyo

Processing andstorage of waste fromradioisotope use
facility, etc

Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by incineration, etc.

Processing andstorage of waste fromresearch reactor facility
and fuel material use
facility
Processing andstorage of waste fromresearch reactor

Research reactor
facility
Fuel material use
facility

Osaka

Research reactor
facility

Kanagawa

Research reactor
facility

Kanagawa

Storage of waste fromresearch reactor facility

Stored at a storage facility,etc.

Research reactor
facility

Osaka

Storage of waste fromresearch reactor facility

Stored at a storage facility,etc

39Stored at a storage facility,
etc

Stored at a storage facility,
etc

D

D

Inventories and Lists
Research InstituteNational Institute ofRadiological Sciences
Radiotoxicology
Building
Operations Section
AIST
Tsukuba Central 2
NuclearMaterial
Control Center
Rokkasho
Safeguards Analytical
Laboratory
NuclearMaterial
Control Center
Tokai
Safeguards
CenterJapan Radioisotope
Association
The Kaya Memorial
Takizawa Laboratory
Japan Radioisotope
Association
Ichihara Office
Japan Radioisotope
Association
Kanto Waste Relay
Station II
Japan Radioisotope
Association
Kansai Waste Relay
StationToshiba Corporation
Research
ReactorCenterToshiba Corporation
Nuclear EngineeringLab
Hitachi, Ltd.
Power & Industrial
Systems
Nuclear
SystemDivision
Ozenji
HitachiTraining
ReactorCenter
Nippon Nuclear Fuel
Development
Co.,
Ltd.
NFD Hot Laboratory
Nuclear Development
Corporation
Fuel Hot Laboratory
T.N. Technos Co.
Ltd.
Tsukuba Laboratory

VESTA Co., Ltd.

Fuel material use
facility

Chiba

Storage of waste fromfuel material use facility

Stored at a storage facility,
etc.

Fuel material use
facility

IbarakiStorage of waste fromfuel material use facility

Stored at a storage facility,
etc.

Fuel material use
facility

Aomori

Processing andstorage of waste fromfuel material use facility

Stored at a storage facility,
etc.

Fuel material use
facility

IbarakiStorage of waste fromfuel material use facility

Stored at a storage facility,
etc

Iwate

Processing andstorage of waste fromradioisotope use
facility, etc.

Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, incineration,
etc

Chiba

Storage of waste fromradioisotope use
facility, etc.

Stored at a storage facility,
etc.

Chiba

Storage of waste fromradioisotope use
facility, etc.

Stored at a storage facility,
etc.

Osaka

Storage of waste fromradioisotope use
facility, etc

Stored at a storage facility,etc.

Kanagawa

Storage of waste fromresearch reactor facility

Stored at a storage facility,
etc

Fuel material use
facility, Research
reactor facility

Kanagawa

Storage of waste fromresearch reactor facility
and fuel material use
facility

Stored at a storage facility,etc.

Research reactor
facility

Kanagawa

Storage of waste fromresearch reactor facility

Stored at a storage facility,
etc

Fuel material use
facility

IbarakiProcessing andstorage of waste fromfuel material use facility

Disposition on treatment to
JAEA Oarai

Fuel material use
facility

IbarakiRadioisotope
WasteManagement2
facility*
Radioisotope
WasteManagement2
facility*
Radioisotope
WasteManagement2
facility*
Radioisotope
WasteManagement2
facility*
Research reactor
facility

Radioisotope
WasteManagement
facility*1
Radioisotope
WasteManagement
facility*1

Processing andstorage of waste fromfuel material use facility
Processing andstorage of waste fromradioisotope use
facility, etc.
Processing andstorage of waste fromradioisotope use
facilities, etc.

Ibaraki

Chiba

Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by compaction, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by incineration, etc.
Stored at a storage facility,
etc. after volume reduction
by incineration, etc.

(As of the end of March 2011)*: One facility is in operation for each center, laboratory or works unless any description is made. If
more than one facilities for each center, laboratory or works is in operation or one facility or more is40

Inventories and Lists

D

under decommissioning, then said effect is specified.
*1: facility with Radioisotope Waste Management Business licensed on the basis of the Radiation
Disease Prevention Act*2: facility with Radioisotope Waste Management Business licensed on the basis of the Radiation
Disease Prevention Act, the Medical Care Act, etc.

D4 Inventories of radioactive waste
D4.1 Inventory of Radioactive Waste Being Held in Storage
The wastes stored in the above-mentioned radioactive waste management facilities of nuclear
power reactor facilities include ca. 500,000 drums (converted to number of 200 liter drums)(excluding the inventory of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station due to the Tohoku
District – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake) in solid waste storage facilities, 32 used steam
generators in steam generator storage facilities, used control rods, disused channel boxes,
spent resin in spent fuel pools and other facilities at the end of March 2011.
At facilities other than nuclear power reactor facilities, HLW of ca. 1,700 vitrified packages andca. 380m3 high level liquid waste are stored in fuel reprocessing facilities, and LLW of ca.
660,000 drums (counted as the equivalent number of 200 liter drums) in total are stored in fuelreprocessing facilities, fuel fabrication facilities, laboratories, research reactor facilities ofuniversities, and storage facilities of Japan Radioisotopes Association, and ca. 4,120m3 lowlevel liquid waste in total is stored in fuel reprocessing facilities, fuel fabrication facilities,
laboratories, research reactor facilities of universities, concurrently at the end of March 2011.
Details of these inventories are indicated in Section L.
D4.2

Inventory of Radioactive Waste That Has Been Disposed of

A portion of LLW stored at radioactive waste management facilities of commercial powerreactor facilities, which has comparatively low concentration of radionuclides, has beentransported to a radioactive waste disposal facility of JNFL and disposed of at near surface
disposal facility since 1992.
The amount of the waste emplaced at the disposal facility is listed in Table D4-1. Presently,
the disposal facility of JNFL is in operation and has disposed of ca. 230,000 drums (counted
as the equivalent number of 200 liter drums) of waste, as of the end of March 2011. At thedisposal facility of Tokai Research and Development Center, Nuclear Science ResearchInstitute of JAEA, about 1,670 tons of very low level wastes (concrete) resulting fromdismantling of JPDR were disposed of. The facility has started operation in 1995, and thedisposal facility has been at the preservation stage since October 1997.
Table D4-1 The Amount of Waste to be Disposed ofName of facility
JNFL Enrichment and Disposal
Office, Radioactive waste
1
disposal facility*

No. 1 disposal facility
No. 2 disposal facility

Representative nuclides
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137,
Sr- 90, C-14
Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137,
Sr- 90, C-14

3

145,275 drums*

3

83,872 drums*

3

Total
JAEA Tokai Research andDevelopment Center
Nuclear Science Research
2
Institute*

Amount disposed

229,417 drums*

Co-60, Ni-63, Cs-137,
Waste disposal facility Sr- 90, Ca-41, C-14,
Eu-152, H-3

1,670 tons

( As of the end of March 2011)*1: Disposed of very low level concrete waste resulting from the dismantling of JPDR, and shifted to thepreservation stage of the disposal facility since October 1997.
*2: 200-liter drums

41

D

Inventories and Lists

D4.3 Inventory of Radioactive Waste that Has Resulted from Past Practices
None.

D5 List and status of nuclear facilities in the process of being decommissioned
Power Reactors in the process of being decommissioned include Tokai Power Station of
JAPCO, the Advanced Thermal Reactor “Fugen” of JAEA and the unit 1 and 2 at Hamaoka
NPS of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.
A reactor at the Tokai Power Station of JAPCO ceased the operation in 1998 and has been indecommissioning stage since December 2001. Turbine, feed water pumps, etc. started to be
dismantled first. Dismantling heat exchangers started in 2006. In 2016 the dismantling reactor
vessel will be started and it will last for 6 years. The decommissioning will be completed by
2021.
Fugen Decommissioning Engineering Center of JAEA ceased the operation of the advanced
thermal reactor “Fugen” at the end of March 2003, and the application of decommissioning
program was filed in November 2006 and permitted in February 2008. Spent fuel has beingtransferred to Tokai Reprocessing Plant of Tokai Research and Development Center Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories of JAEA, and the decommissioning is planned to becompleted by fiscal year 2028.
The unit 1 and 2 at Hamaoka NPS of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. terminated the operationin January 2009 and the decommissioning plan that describes the basic policy ofdecommissioning unit 1 and 2 for the entire decommissioning period and the activities in thefirst stage for “Period of preparation for dismantling” was approved in November 2009. In thefirst stage for “Period of preparation for dismantling”, shipping of spent fuel, survey andinvestigation of contamination, decontamination of systems and dismantling of systems andequipments outside control area will be commenced and the completion of decommissioning
aims at the 2030s.
Moreover, a total of 8 Research Reactors in the process of being decommissioned or planned
to be decommissioned include JRR-2 of JAEA, the Reactor Facilities of The First Nuclear
Ship (Mutsu) and Deuterium Criticality Assembly (DCA) of JAEA, and Hitachi Training Reactor(HTR) of Hitachi Ltd., Training Reactor-1 (TTR-1) of Toshiba Corporation, Rikkyo University
Institute for Atomic Energy (RUR), Tokyo City University (former Musashi Institute ofTechnology) Research Reactor (MITRR), The University of Tokyo Research Reactor (Yayoi).
The status of decommissioning activities, etc. is listed in Tables D5-1 and D5-2.

42

Inventories and Lists

Table D5-1 List of Nuclear Facilities in the Process of Being Decommissioned and Planned
to Be Decommissioned. Status of Decommissioning Activities at These Facilities(With Respect to Power Reactors)
Name of facility

Location

Reactor Electrical Commercial
type output (MW) operation

Status of decommissioning

JAPCO
Tokai Power Plant

Ibaraki

GCR

Jul 1966
Mar 1998

Decommissioning started in 2001

JAEA Fugen
Decommissioning
Engineering Center(Fugen)

Fukui

ATR

Mar 1979
Mar 2003

165

Unit 154.0

Chubu Electric PowerCo.
Shizuoka
Hamaoka NPS
unit 1 and 2

166

Mar 1976
Jan 2009

BWR
Unit2
84.0

Nov 1978Jan 2009

Termination of operation in March 2003.
Continue taking out of spent fuels andpreparation for decommissioning.
The decommissioning is planned to startfrom February 2008 and be completed
by fiscal year 2028.
Termination of operation in January
2009 and the decommissioning plan wasapproved in November 2009.
In the first stage for “Period of
preparation for dismantling” shipping out
fuel, survey and investigation ofcontamination status, systemdecontamination, and dismantling andremoval of equipment/components
located outside the radiation controlledareas will be commenced and thecompletion of decommissioning aims at
the 2030s.

(As of the end of March 2011)

43

D

D

Inventories and Lists

Table D5-2 List of Nuclear Facilities in the Process of Being Decommissioned and Planned
to Be Decommissioned. Status of Decommissioning Activities at These Facilities(With Respect to Research Reactors)
Name of facility

JAEA, Tokai Researchand Development
Center, Nuclear
Science ResearchInstitute , JRR-2

JAEA Aomori
Research andDevelopment Center
Mutsu Office
The Reactor Facilities
Of The First Nuclear
Ship (Mutsu)
JAEA, Oarai Researchand Development
Center, Deuterium
Criticality Assembly(DCA)
Hitachi Ltd. Power &Industrial Systems
Nuclear System
Division
Ozenji Center Hi 䡐 achi
Training Reactor (HTR)

Location

Reactortype

Thermaloutput (kW)Serviceperiod*Status of decommissioning
The following activities fordecommissioning have been
completed.
Shipment of spent fuel andheavy water, isolation of reactor
cooling system and reactor
body, removal of secondary
cooling system and experimental
equipment.
Dismantling has been
completed.
Accessory land facilities are
currently being maintained forthe purpose of storing solid
waste and processing liquid
waste

IbarakiHeavy
water
moderatedcooling tankreactor10000

Oct 1960
Dec 1996

AomoriPressurized
light watermoderatedand cooled
reactor, PWR

36000

Aug 1974
Feb 1992

Ibaraki

Heavy
water
moderated
reactor1

Dec 1969
Sep 2001

Deactivation of reactor andremoval of heavy-water andcooling system has been
completed.

100

Dec 1961
Feb 1975

Dismantling has been
completed.
Currently being proceeding are
the maintenance of the poolstoring spent fuel and thestorage and maintenance ofradioactive waste.

100

Mar 1962
Jan 2001

Permanent
suspensionofoperational
functionsandremoval of reactor coolingsystem facilities and spent fuel.

100

Dec 1961
Dec 2001

Deactivation of reactor andremoval of spent fuel has been
completed.

100

Jan 1963
Jan 2004

Deactivation of reactor andremoval of spent fuel has been
completed.

2

Apr 1971
Mar 2011

Termination of operation at theend of March 2011. Applicationof decommissioning plan will be
implemented later.

KanagawaToshiba Corporation
Research Reactor
Center, Toshiba
Training Reactor-1(TTR-1)

KanagawaRikkyo University
Institute for Atomic
Energy (RUR)

KanagawaTokyo City University(formerMusashi
Institute of Technology)
Research
Reactor( MITRR)

Kanagawa

The
UniversityofTokyo,
Research
Reactor(Yayoi)

IbarakiLight watermoderatedand cooled
reactorLight watermoderated
inhomogeneousreactor
Zirconium
hydridemoderated
light watercooledreactor
Zirconium
hydridemoderated
light watercooledreactorAir cooling
fast reactor
with
Uranium
Fuel*: A period from the first criticality to the termination of operation

44(As of the end of March 2011)Legal and Regulatory Systems

Section E Legislative and Regulatory System
In Japan, legal systems are provided for promoting proper management of spent fuel andradioactive wastes, and also for safety regulation on them.
This section describes such legal systems.
E1 Implementing measures
Article 18
Each Contracting Party shall take, within the framework of its national law, the legislative, regulatory andadministrative measures and other steps necessary for implementing its obligations under thisConvention.

In Japan, the steps necessary for implementing the obligations under this Convention aretaken in accordance with relevant laws and regulations. The “Atomic Energy Basic Act”
provides the fundamental objectives of promoting nuclear energy research and utilization,
securing of future energy resources, promotion of the progress of science and technology andindustrial development and eventual contribution to the welfare of human society andimprovement of the level of people’s living. The Law also provides for the basic principle thatthe research, development and utilization of nuclear energy shall be made only for peacefulpurposes with ensuring safety, operating democratically and autonomously, publicizing theresults, and actively contributing to international cooperation. In accordance with theobjectives and basic principles provided by the “Atomic Energy Basic Act”, the government ofJapan has established legal systems for safety regulation on spent fuel management andradioactive waste management. The relevant laws and regulations are outlined in E2.
To implement obligations under the Convention, the following organizations have been
established to enforce legal systems described in this section. The roles of thoseorganizations are summarized below.
1. The Japan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC)JAEC was established within Prime Minister’s office on January 1st 1956, in order toimplement national policy on the research, development and utilization of nuclear energy inplanned and democratic manner. (JAEC was transferred to the Cabinet Office in January
2001.)JAEC has responsibility to plan, review and decide the following items;
1) prepare the basic policy on the research, development and utilization of nuclear energy,2) prepare allocation of the budget for the nuclear energy development,3) express opinions on the application of license standards based on the Reactor
Regulation Act,4) make planning, deliberation and decisions on coordinating the related administrative
organizations in the matters that are related to the research, development, and utilizationof nuclear energy.
Based on the Act for Establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety
Commission (JAEC and NSC Establishment Act), when JAEC deems it necessary as a part ofits assigned duties, JAEC may recommend the heads of relevant administrative organizations
by way of the Prime Minister, may request reports and cooperation including submission ofmaterials, statements of viewpoint, and explanation to the heads of relevant administrative
organizations. Under the Reactor Regulation Act, the Minister of METI or Minister of MEXT
shall, before granting a license to establish nuclear facility, receive views of JAEC with regard
to the following items:1) the nuclear facility will not be used for any purposes other than peaceful purposes,2) the license will cause no hindrance to the planned development or utilization of nuclear
energy and3) the applicant has an adequate financial basis to construct and maintain the nuclear
45

E

E

Legal and Regulatory Systems

facility.
In 1956, JAEC established the Long-term Program for Development and Utilization of Nuclear
Energy (hereinafter referred to as “Long-term Program”) that showed the basic policy andimplementation plan for the nuclear research and development in Japan. Since then JAEC
revised the Long-term Program, approximately every five years. The latest version of theLong-term Program decided by Cabinet council was issued in October 2005 with a new title of“Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”.
JAEC is composed of a chairman and four other commissioners appointed by the Prime
Minister with the consent of the Diet. General affairs of JAEC are performed by the office of
nuclear energy policy under the Cabinet Office. It coordinates the matters with related
administrative organizations in order to implement JAEC decisions.
Under JAEC, specialists are assigned to investigate and deliberate the specific matters, andspecial committees, councils or other bodies may be established when necessary. There are
6 special committees (committee for policy evaluation, special committee for nuclear
protection, special committee for research and development, special committee for nuclear
fusion, special committee for international issues and special committee for the new“Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy”). These committees and councils are deliberating
assigned matters. Specialists are appointed by the Prime Minister from persons of knowledge
and experience based on JAEC and NSC Establishment Act.
The discussions of meetings of JAEC including the committees and councils are open to the
public in principle and public people can observe the meetings. The contents of thedeliberations are provided for the public on a website of JAEC (http://aec.go.jp/) and at the
Nuclear Energy Library.
2. The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC)The Atomic Energy Basic Act was partially revised on October 4, 1978 to establish the NSC
under the Prime Minister’s Office. The function of safety regulation, which had been belonged
to JAEC, was transferred to the NSC, in order to strengthen the system of ensuring nuclear
safety. (The NSC was transferred from the Prime Minister’s Office to the Cabinet Office due tocentral government reform in January 6, 2001.)
The NSC is responsible for planning, deliberation and decisions on matters that are related toensuring safety of the research, development, and utilization of nuclear energy.
The NSC conducts its own review of the results of NISA’s examination on the application fromthe view points of the licensee’s technical capability and prevention of nuclear hazards. The
NSC supervises and audits the appropriateness of NISA’s regulatory activity in construction
and operation stages after Safety Review, from the viewpoint of adequacy, effectiveness andtransparency. Thus, the framework that confirms the quality, effectiveness and transparencyof the safety regulation is maintained. (See Fig E1-1)
When the NSC deems it necessary as a part of its assigned duties, The NSC may advice theheads of relevant administrative organizations by way of the Prime Minister, may request
reports and cooperation including submission of materials, statements of viewpoint, andexplanation to the heads of relevant administrative organizations.
From April 2003 (partially, from October 2003), The NSC receives from NISA quarterly reportson the regulatory activities after licensing such as Approval of the Construction Plan,
Pre-Service Inspection, Periodic Inspection, Audit of Licensee's Periodic Check System, Audit
of Licensee's Welding Check System, Approval of Operational Safety Program, theOperational Safety Inspection and accidents and failures of nuclear installations. The NSC
also has the authority to inquire directly of the licensees, and maintenance and inspection
contractors in order to audit the safety regulation implemented by regulatory body.
In the case of a violation of safety regulations in any of nuclear facilities, the employee candirectly allege the fact to the NSC, and the NSC has the authority to investigate the allegation.
The Minister of METI, before granting license to establish nuclear installations, must receive
46Legal and Regulatory Systems

the opinion of NSC on the following matters: (i) that the applicant for the license of a nuclear
installation has adequate technical capability to establish and reliably operate a nuclear
reactor, and (ii) that the site, structures and equipment of the nuclear installation would notcause any hindrance to the prevention of radiological hazards.
The NSC is composed of five commissioners appointed by the Prime Minister with theconsent of the Diet, and these commissioners elect a chairman among them. General affairsof NSC are performed by the Secretariat of the NSC. The NSC Secretariat is composed of theSecretary-General, the Management and Coordination Division, the Regulatory Guides andReview Division, the Radiation Protection and Accident Management Division and theSubsequent Regulation Review Division and has about 100 personnel. (See Fig E1-2)
Under the NSC, two safety examination committees and seventeen other special committees
are organized as shown in Table E1-1. The Special Committees may organize working groups
under them, if necessary.
The members of the Committee on Examination of Reactor Safety and the Committee on
Examination of Nuclear Fuel Safety are appointed from persons of knowledge and experienceby the Prime Minister in accordance with the Act for Establishment of the Japan Atomic
Energy Commission and the Nuclear Safety Commission. The Emergency Technical Advisory
Body is composed of the commissioners of the NSC and the Emergency Measure
Examination Member who are also appointed by the Prime Minister from persons ofknowledge and experience. Other special committees are composed of the member of the
NSC and the experts on the nuclear emergency and the experts are appointed by the Prime
Minister.
Results of the safety examination committees and special committees are reported to the
NSC and are decided after deliberation by the NSC. At nuclear emergency, the NSC
determines advice for nuclear emergency after the discussion of the Emergency TechnicalAdvisory Body.
Deliberations of all committees, including the special committees and working groups under
the NSC are open to the public. The contents of the deliberations are provided for the public
on a website (http://www.nsc.go.jp/) and at the Nuclear Energy Library.
3. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)
MOFA formulates foreign policy of on peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear
non-proliferation. MOFA has the responsibility for ratification, interpretation andimplementation of international conventions concerned.
4. Organizations to promote the implementation of spent fuel management and radioactive
waste management(1) ANRE of METIANRE was established as an external agency of METI, to be responsible for ensuring stableand efficient sharing of mineral resources and energy and for promoting their appropriate
utilization. ANRE plans, develops and promotes comprehensive policies for mineral resourcesand energy, policies for energy saving and new energy, nuclear energy policies and basic
policies for electric power resources development. It promotes utilization of nuclear energy,
ensuring energy resources and developing industry.
On the other hand, ANRE is responsible for the geological disposal of high level radioactive
wastes (HLW) and for the disposal of TRU waste to be geologically disposed. Specifically, as
for the geological disposal of HLW, ANRE has been holding explanatory meetings at every
prefecture as part of public relation to the whole members of the community, and workshops
for local community in cooperation with NPO. Also, in order to promote research anddevelopment to increase the public understanding, ANRE has been developing a part of theverification test facility of the ground/underground facilities for geological disposal as“geological disposal concept verification test facilities” by which geological disposal concept
47

E

E

Legal and Regulatory Systems

and its engineering possibility and long-term behavior could be felt real and understood, hasbeen demonstrating the technologies for fixing, construction, monitoring, and recovery ofradioactive waste, and has been investigating to promote understanding of the wholemembers of the community. Furthermore, for the purpose of promoting entire research anddevelopment effectively and efficiently in this country, research and development
organizations deliberate the overall program of research and development and make reporton the Overall Research Program on Basic Research and Development of Geological
Disposal of HLW at the “Coordination Meeting for the Research and Development of
Geological Disposal Infrastructure” under the guidance of ANRE.
For the geological disposal of TRU waste, ANRE amended “Designated Radioactive Waste
Final Disposal Act”, to add both the TRU waste which was generated from fuel reprocessing
and needed geological disposal and HLW which was to be exchanged with the TRU waste
generated during overseas reprocessing, to the target for final disposal by NUMO. The
generator of the radioactive waste is responsible for burden of expense needed for final
disposal.
(2) The Research and Development Bureau and the Research Promotion Bureau of the
MEXT
MEXT promotes nuclear energy research and development for science and technology. In
MEXT, the Research and Development Bureau is promoting the research and development
for fast breeder reactor (FBR) cycle technology, and for nuclear fusion including International
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project. In addition, the Bureau supervises JAEA
and deals with nuclear liability insurance matters.
The Research promotion Bureau promotes application of radiations, radioactive isotopes andquantum beams. Specifically, the Bureau is promoting the Japan Proton Accelerator ResearchComplex (J-PARC) project and research on heavy particle cancer therapy.
5. Regulatory bodies
The following organizations have been established for the regulation in Japan. The roles of
those organizations are summarized in E3.
(1) NISA of METI
Safety regulation for nuclear energy use as energy source(2) Science and Technology Policy Bureau of MEXT
Safety regulation for nuclear energy use for science and technology and radiation utilization(3) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT)
Safety regulation for transportation of nuclear fuel materials for nuclear energy use(4) MHLW
Safety regulation for radioactive materials etc. for medical use

48

Legal and Regulatory Systems

Establishment Permit etc.
z
z
z

MEXT
METI (NISA)
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure andTransport

Nuclear safety regulation by
regulatory bodyࠝConstruction stageࠞ
z
Approval of design andconstruction methodzPre-service inspectionz
Approval of operation safety
programࠝOperating Stageࠞ
z
Periodic facility inspectionz
Inspection of fitness for
operation safety program etc.
ࠝOthersࠞz
On the spot inspectionzReport of accidents and failuresetc.

Askingconsultation

Nuclear Safety Commission
Secondary review
Emergency preparedness
Technical Capability

Mandatory advice

Reportoftheimplementing
situation,etc.
concerning
nuclearsafetyregulation

ReportObservation andaudit

Objectives:
Promotionofcontinuous
improvement andenhancement
throughobservation andaudit of nuclear
safety regulatory
activities of theregulatory body

Regulatory investigationz

Common subjects andimportantsubjects
forensuring the safety㸦examples㸧
Licensee’s
periodic
inspectionQualityassurance
activities
etc.
zImportantpointed-out
subjects at the individualadministrative disposition
or at the secondary reviewzLicensee’s obligation tocooperatefortheinvestigation

Fig. E1-1 Observation, Audit, Inspection, etc. of the Safety Regulatory Administration by
NSC

Management andCoordination Division

Prime Minister
Cabinet Office

Nuclear Safety Commission *SecretaryGeneral* Established in accordance with the Act for
Establishment of the Atomic Energy Commission
and the Nuclear Safety Commission

Fig. E1-2 NSC Organizational Chart

49

Regulatory Guides andReview Division
Radiation Protection
and AccidentManagement Division
Subsequent Regulation
Review DivisionE

E

Legal and Regulatory Systems

Table E1-1 List of Special Committees within the NSC
Committee on Examination of Reactor
SafetyCommittee on Examination of Nuclear
Fuel Safety
Emergency Measure Examination
MemberEmergency Technical Advisory Bodyí Matters concerning the safety of nuclear reactor facilitiesí Matters concerning the safety of nuclear fuel materialí Technical advices, etc. for emergency response in case of
accident and failure exceeding certain criteria at nuclear
facilities
í Appropriate technical advices of the NSC to Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters in an nuclear
emergency

Emergency Technical Advisory Body forí Technical advices in emergencies/disasters of nuclear
Disaster Prevention of Nuclear Carriers
carriers and submarines
and Submarines
Emergency Technical Advisory Body forí Technical advices in nuclear emergencies/disasters due to
Nuclear Disaster Prevention due to Armedarmed attacks
Attacks
í Matters concerning safety standards and guides of nuclear
Special Committee for Nuclear Safety
reactors, nuclear fuel facilities, and other nuclear
Standards and Guides
installationsíMatters concerning the safety assurance in radioactive
Special Committee on Radioactive Waste
waste disposalíMatters
concerningthesafetyassuranceinand Decommissioning
decommissioning nuclear installations
Special Committee on Radiation
í Matters concerning the radiation protection considering
Protection
domestic and international trends
í Matters concerning the safety assurance in transportation
Special Committee on Safe Transport ofof radioactive materials considering domestic andRadioactive Materials
international trends.
Special Committee on Analysis andí Analysis and evaluation of domestic and international
Evaluation of Nuclear Accidents andnuclear accidents and failures
Failuresí Planning of nuclear safety research programs
Special Committee on Nuclear Safety
í Monitoring of the nuclear safety research programs
ResearchíEvaluation of the nuclear safety research programsí Technical and professional matters concerning nuclear
emergency preparedness of emergency first aid response,
Special Committee on Nuclear Disasterprotective measure to nuclear emergency, etc.
í Technical and professional matters concerning medicalcare of radiation exposureí Survey and analyses of matters relevant to the safety
Project Team on Safety Survey ofregulation activities during the test operation of the
Reprocessing Facilities
Rokkasho reprocessing facility
Advisory Board on High-level Wasteí Technical matters concerning the safety assurance in the
Repository Safety Technical andfinal disposal of high-level radioactive wastes
professional matters
Investigatory Advisory Board on
í Investigation and evaluation concerning the ensuring ofseismic safety of existing nuclear facilities
Assessment of Seismic Safety
Investigatory Committee on the Seismic
í Seismic safety checks of research and test reactors
Safety of Research and Test Reactors(As of the end of March 2011)50

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E2 Legislative and regulatory framework
Article 19
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish and maintain a legislative and regulatory framework to
govern the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management.
2. This legislative and regulatory framework shall provide for:(i) the establishment of applicable national safety requirements and regulations for radiation safety;(ii) system of licensing for spent fuel and radioactive waste management activities;(iii) a system of prohibition for the operation of a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility
without a license;(iv) a system of appropriate institutional control, regulatory inspection and documentation andreporting;(v) the enforcement of applicable regulations and of the terms of the licenses;(vi) clear allocation of responsibilities of the bodies involved in the different steps of spent fuel andradioactive waste management.
3. When considering whether to regulate radioactive materials as radioactive waste, Contracting
Parties shall take due account of the objectives of this Convention.

E2.1 Legislative and regulatory framework
1. Legal system for promoting spent fuel management and radioactive waste management
In Japan, spent fuel management is carried out on the site of facilities such as nuclear power
stations and reprocessing facility. In addition, Japan has an option to alternately store spent
fuel in intermediate storage facility outside of reactor facility. The law currently working for thepromotion of spent fuel management is the “Act for Deposit and Administration of Reserve
Funds for Reprocessing of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Generation” for securing the future
costs for reprocessing in a safe, reliable and transparent means.
As for radioactive waste management, a part of LLW have been already being disposed of ina near surface disposal facility. Meanwhile, the Final Disposal Act is applicable to taking
necessary steps to systematically and securely carry out the final disposal of the radioactive
wastes to be geologically disposed, such as vitrified waste of HLW generated from
reprocessing of spent fuel.
Main regulatory system to promote spent fuel management and radioactive waste
management is shown in Fig. E2-1.
(1) Final Disposal Act
Final Disposal Act enacted in May 2000 provides for the following basic framework forsystematically and securely carrying out the final disposal of the high level radioactive wastes
generated from spent fuel reprocessing (hereinafter referred to as “Designated Radioactive
Wastes”);(i) development and public announcement of a basic policy and a plan (final disposalplan) for the final disposal of designated radioactive wastes by the Minister of METI(ii) process for site selecting for a final disposal of designated radioactive wastes(iii) securing of the expenses required for the final disposal of designated radioactive
wastes(iv) responsible licensee for the final disposal of designated radioactive wastes.
The amendment of the Act in June 2007 newly added TRU wastes to be the subjects ofgeological disposal.
The Minister of METI establishes the basic policy and based on this, provides for the final
disposal plan. NUMO, which was established as an implementing organization based on the
final disposal plan, carries out the activities of final disposal. Utilities shall pay deposits to thefund reserved for disposal, which is managed by RWMC designated by the Minister of METI.
NUMO promotes site selection by three steps procedure, that is, selection of the preliminary
investigation area, detailed investigation area and the construction site for final disposal
facility, (hereinafter referred to as “Preliminary Investigation Areas, etc.”) and NUMO obtains
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approval of the Minister of METI at each step of procedure.
The three step procedure for site selection is as follows, and items for investigation andevaluation are clearly defined.
y Preliminary investigation area
Definition: The area to investigate by boring etc. whether the geological formation
concerned is stable for long term.
Requirements for selection: There shall be no record of noticeable change of thegeological formations by natural phenomena, such as earthquakes.
y Detailed investigation area
Definition: The area to investigate, by constructing underground facility with testing andmeasuring equipment, whether the characteristics of the geological formation
concerned is suitable for construction of disposal facility.
Requirements for selection: Noticeable change of the geological formations by natural
phenomena, such as earthquakes, has not occurred for long term.
y Construction site for final disposal facility
Definition: The site where the final disposal facility is to be built.
Requirements for selection: It is expected that underground facility to be built within thegeological formation will not be exposed to an extraordinary pressure, and that physicalproperty of the geological formation is suitable for the final disposal facility.
When the Minister of METI is to advance a step further of the three-step procedure of site
selection and to put it in the final disposal plan upon receiving NUMO’s selection of an area ora site, the minister shall ask for opinion of JAEC and NSC on the matters of regulation tosecure the safety and shall consult relevant prefectural governors and mayors ofmunicipalities and fully respect their opinions.
(2) “Act for Deposit and Administration of Reserve Funds for Reprocessing of Spent Fuelfrom Nuclear Power Generation” (May 2005)
This law provides for the frame work of deposit etc. to reserve funds for reprocessing of spent
fuel etc. from the nuclear power generation. The fund is managed by an organization
designated by the Minister of METI (Fund Management Organization). The Minister of METI,
every fiscal year, notifies utilities of the amount of deposit based on the amount of electricity
generated by the nuclear fuel, and utilities deposit the amount in the Fund Management
Organization. This law was enacted in October 2005.
2. Legislative and regulatory framework on the safety of nuclear utilization
Major laws established for the purpose of providing safety regulations on the utilization of
nuclear energy and related laws include “Reactor Regulation Act”, “Electricity Business Act“,“Radiation Disease Prevention Act”, “the Act for Technical Standards of Radiation Hazards
Prevention etc.” “Special Act for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness”, “the Medical Care Act”,“the Clinical Laboratory Technician etc Act” and “the Pharmaceutical Affairs Act” (These 3 Acts
are called “Medical Care Act, etc.” hereafter).
Overviews of these laws are provided in the following paragraphs.
(1) Reactor Regulation Act
In accordance with the objectives of “the Atomic Energy Basic Act”, the Reactor Regulation
Act is enacted to ensure that the uses of nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material, andreactors are only for the peaceful purposes, and carried out in a planned manner, to ensure
public safety by preventing hazards and providing physical protection of nuclear fuel material
and to ensure that use of internationally controlled material is regulated to comply withconventions on nuclear utilization or other international commitments.
The Act covers following activities and provides regulation for each of them:y Refining
y Nuclear fuel enrichment and fabrication
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y Establishment and operation of reactor facilities
y Spent fuel storagey Spent fuel reprocessingy Radioactive waste storage and disposal
y Use of nuclear fuel material
The safety of spent fuel management is ensured through the each regulation for“establishment and operation of reactors”, “storage” and “reprocessing”, and the safety ofradioactive waste management is ensured through the each regulation for “enrichment andfabrication”, “establishment and operation of reactors”, “storage”, “reprocessing”, “disposal”
and “use of nuclear fuel materials”.
A business entity must have an approval for business of refining etc. from competent ministerprior to starting business stipulated in the Reactor Regulation Act. The license for refining,fabrication, reactor establishment, storage, reprocessing, disposal and for use of nuclear fuelmaterials are granted on the basis that the location, structures and systems of the facility does
not impair the prevention of hazards due to nuclear fuel materials, etc. and that the applicant
has sufficient technological capability. The competent minister shall ask for opinions of JAEC
and NSC before granting license (except for license for use of nuclear fuel material).
The regulation after granting license includes regulation for ensuring facility safety (facility
regulation) and regulation for ensuring operational safety and safety activities of the operator(operation regulation). The facility regulation includes “approval of design and construction
methods”, “pre-service inspection”, “approval of welding method and welding inspection”,“periodical facility inspection” and “confirmation for waste disposal”. The “approval of designand construction methods” is to confirm that the facility has been designed in accordance withthe “permitted” conditions and the “technical standard”, and the approval must be obtained
before starting construction. The “pre-service inspection” is to confirm that the construction
has been carried out in accordance with the approved "design and construction methods” andthat the facility has the prescribed capability. The licensee cannot operate the facility without
passing the pre-service inspection. Then, the “periodical facility inspection” is conductedperiodically during operation to confirm that the facility and systems maintain the prescribedcapability. The “confirmation for waste disposal” is to confirm that the waste disposal facility
and related safety measures as well as the waste packages and related safety measures arein compliance with the technical standards.
Operational safety regulation for spent fuel management and radioactive waste management
includes the “approval of the Operational Safety Program and observance inspection of the
Operational Safety Inspection”, “assignment of Chief Engineer of Nuclear Fuel or the Chief
Engineer of Radioactive Waste”, “approval of the Physical Protection Program andobservance inspection” and “assignment of the physical protection administrator”. The“Operational Safety Program” prescribes the measures for ensuring safety and facility
maintenance including “operation and management of facility”, “walkdown”, “radiation control”,“radioactive waste management” and “Operational Safety Training”, and must be prepared bylicensee and approved by the regulatory body. Licensee must have the “Operational Safety
Program” approved before starting operation and must undergo periodically the “Operational
Safety Inspection” after the commissioning.
In addition, the Reactor Regulation Act provides for restriction of ocean dumping ofradioactive wastes, reporting of facility accident and other event, measures in emergency andpenalties. Penalties are the steps to ensure the compliance with applicable regulation andlicense condition. If an licensee has built a nuclear facility without obtaining license, hasviolated a cease-operation order, or has not take necessary measures for emergencies,
imprisonment with hard labor or fine or both is imposed on the licensee. It is also provided forthat if an operator does not observe the Operational Safety Program or does not follow anorder to amend the Operational Safety Program, the licensee is subject to penalties such as
revocation of license.
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NSC establishes the Regulatory Guides for design, safety review, etc. which specify technicalrequirements for safety regulation of activities under the Reactor Regulation Act. The guides
are used in the safety review of license application as the criteria for judging adequacy of theapplication. Ministerial orders for each of activities under the Reactor Regulation Act provide
for regulations for each activity. Safety regulation on spent fuel management is described in
Section G and radioactive waste management is in Section H, respectively.
System of main legislations on the safety of spent fuel management and on the safety ofradioactive waste management is shown in Fig. E2-2.
The legal system for safety management of radioactive waste related to nuclear power
generation is also shown in Fig. E2-3.
The Reactor Regulation Act has recently been amended as follows:a. Establishment of the safety regulation system for the final disposal of HLW in June
2007
This amendment was to establish the safety regulation system for the geological disposalof HLW and introduced a licensing system for HLW disposal. This licensing system
requires the Minister of METI to approve the design and construction methods before thestart of construction and to conducts pre-service inspection for the construction andcapability of the facility, inspection on welding method, periodical facility inspection during
operation, to approve the Operational Safety Program with the Operational Safety
Inspection to inspect observance and to approve the Physical Protection Program with
the Operational Safety Inspection to inspect observance”.
To establish an adaptable safety regulation system for radioactive waste disposal, making
two classifications in the regulatory system. The conventional radioactive waste disposalof LLW was categorized as "Category 2 waste disposal" and disposal of HLW was
categorized as "Category 1 waste disposal".
Following this amendment of the Act, ministerial ordinances prescribing detailed
procedures for the Category 1 and 2 waste disposals were established and enacted in
April 2008. The details of the safety regulation for the Category 1 and 2 waste disposals
are described in Section H.
b. Improvement of fire protection system in June 2008
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc. wasextensively affected by the Niigataken Chuetsu-Oki earthquake in July 2007, including
the damages to the fire-fighting system such as main fire-fighting water pipe. The
damage made it difficult to promptly extinguish the transformer fire that broke out
immediately after the earthquake, and caused flooding of fire-fighting water into thereactor building of the unit 1.
In response to this event, NSC revised the “Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Fire
Protection of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities” to add fire detection, mobile
fire-fighting equipment and in-house fire-fighting squad, recognizing importance of fire
preparedness in operation in addition to design consideration against fire caused by big
earthquake.
NISA, also, called a council of the experts from Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy to obtainadvice for fire protection in nuclear facilities. On the basis of the advice of the council,
NISA decided to add the requirement of fire protection provisions, such as in-housefire-fighting activities by operators and notification to the local fire station (initial
fire-fighting activities), to the Operational Safety Programs as a measures to maintainsafety. Specifically, NISA required the licensees to add provisions to the Operational
Safety Programs on the preparation of fire-fighting vehicle equipped with chemical fire54

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extinguisher, preparation of equipment to send alarm to local fire station and first
response stuff for firefighting on regular basis. NISA confirms the implementation of suchprovisions by the Operational Safety Inspection.
MEXT required the operators that operate large-scale research reactors to confirm thecompliance with the "Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Fire Protection of Light Water
Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities” issued by the Nuclear Safety Commission and also
requested to report on the programs for enhancing fire protection measures. The Ministry
confirms the implementation of such programs within the scope of the Operational Safety
Inspection.
c. Improvement of the system to perform maintenance activity of reactor facilities during
the loss of power supply in March 2011
On March 30, 2011, responding to the impact from Fukushima Dai-Ichi NPS from thetsunami caused by the Tohoku District – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake, the rules forcommercial nuclear power reactors concerning the installation, operation, etc., and therules for nuclear reactor at a stage of research and development concerning the
installation, operation, etc., were both revised in order to improve the system to perform
maintenance activity for reactor facilities.
These revisions also request licensee to arrange systems and equipments in his factoryor facility where licensee constructed nuclear installations, in order to secure safety of thereactor facilities, and at the same time, request to add descriptions into the Operational
Safety Program in order to maintain nuclear installations even when functions of all
equipment to supply AC power, for cooling nuclear installations with sea water, and forcooling spent fuel storage tank are lost during tsunami.
(2) The Radiation Disease Prevention Act
It is the purpose of the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, based on the Atomic Energy Basic
Act, to prevent from possible radiation hazards and to secure public safety, by regulating theuse, sale, lease, disposal and other handlings of radioisotopes, regulating the use of radiation
generating apparatus and regulating the disposal and other handlings of the contaminatedmaterials caused by using radioisotopes or the activation products caused by using radiation
generating apparatus.
Under the Law, the Enforcement Ordinance for the Radiation Disease Prevention Act isestablished.
A license holder for use, sale, lease and waste management of radioisotopes, who has astorage facility with a capacity equal to or more than a specified amount or has radiation
generating apparatuses, shall undergo the Facility Inspection before starting operation and
the Periodic Inspection after starting operation.
Those who use the facility licensed under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act must compile
a set of the Internal Rules for Prevention of Radiation Hazards, assign the Supervisor of
Radiation Protection, who is to supervise the prevention of radiation hazards, and notify thesematters to the regulatory body before use of radioisotopes, etc. Furthermore, those who use
the facility have an obligation to conform to the criteria for facilities to be used, which havebeen established by legislation. Other obligations include: measuring the radiation doses
within the premises or on the boundary of the establishment; measuring the exposure dosesof the occupational personnel; providing education and training; and conducting medical
surveillance, etc.
The management of radioisotopes or materials contaminated by radioisotopes generated
within radioisotopes use facility shall be carried out in conformity with the criteria establishedby Law and regulations. They shall be stored within the premises of licensed facility or thepremises of the licensed facility of radioisotope waste management.
The basic framework for radioactive waste disposal by disposal business operators is
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provided by the Radiation Disease Prevention Act amended in June 2004 and by subsequent
amendments of the enforcement ordinances and regulations. Currently, MEXT is developing
the technical details such as dose criteria for the disposal site for progress of waste disposal.
Those who intend to cease the use of radioisotopes or radiation generating devices shallnotify the Minister of MEXT of it, and report on the measures taken to cease operation.
If it is necessary, MEXT instructs the Radiation Inspectors to conduct an on-site inspection inorder to confirm the compliance with the standards established by laws and regulations.
Main items in the revision of the Radiation Disease Prevention Act in May 2010 are;introduction of clearance system into the Act, establishment of regulations for activation
products into the Act and strengthening of regulations for decommission measures.
(3) The Act for Technical Standards of Radiation Hazards Prevention
The objectives of the Act for Technical Standards of Radiation Hazards Prevention is tomaintain consistency with technical standards on radiation hazards prevention among therelated regulations, by the clarification of the basic policy for defining technical standards forradiation hazards prevention and the establishment of the Radiation Council in MEXT.
(4) The Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and the
Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures
The measures to be taken at a nuclear emergency are addressed by the Act on Special
Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (hereinafter referred to as “Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Act”) which was enacted in December 1999. The Special Act
stipulates specific measures for nuclear emergency, including obligation of operators on the
preparedness for nuclear emergency, the Declaration of Nuclear Emergency andestablishment of headquarters for the nuclear emergency, and enforcement of emergency
measures. The Senior Officer for Nuclear Emergency is stationed in the vicinity of eachnuclear facility, to direct and advise the operator in preparing its Plan for Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness, as well as to conduct its duty to prevent occurrence of nuclear emergency andmitigate consequences should it occur.
Moreover, in the part of the nuclear emergency measures of the Basic Plan for Emergency
Preparedness on the basis of the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures, measuresnecessary to the stages of abnormal event, nuclear emergency and recovery from theemergency are clearly described.
(5) Medical Care Act, etc.
The management of radioisotope waste generated from medical use is conducted only by
waste management facility operators designated by the Minister of MHLW on the basis of theMedical Care Act etc. Location, structure, and equipment of the waste management facility
shall be complied with related technical criteria (standards) in order to be designated by the
Minister of MHLW. In addition, Periodical Inspection, Radiation Hazard Prevention Rules,
notification of closure of waste management facility, etc, are provided by these laws
equivalent to the Radiation Disease Prevention Act.
E2.2 Clear allocation of responsibilities in the different steps
The Special Committee on the Safety Standards of the Radioactive Waste of JAEC showed
the basic concept in the “Policy on Radioactive Waste Processing and Disposal” (October1985) that “since radioactive waste is generated according to the activities of operator of
nuclear energy, the operator who is also generator of waste is essentially thought to be
responsible for processing and disposal”, “on the other hand, it may be more effective andreasonable for operator to process and dispose those radioactive wastes, when theprofessional operator who has sufficient economic and technical abilities (hereinafter referred
to as “disposal operator”) to process and dispose them in a concentrated manner. In such acase, it is more reasonable for the operator of radioactive waste to bear legal responsibility
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from the viewpoint of concentration of the responsibility of security and implementation ofeffective processing and disposal. In this regard, it is important that the generator bears thecost necessary for processing and disposal and give the disposal operator appropriate
support in order to promote processing and disposal in a smooth and efficient manner.”
According to the basic concept mentioned above, in Japan, licensees of reactor facilities orother facilities are responsible for the safety of in-house management of the radioactive
wastes generated in their facilities, while a disposal operator is responsible for the safety of
waste management once the wastes are carried into the waste disposal facility. The Reactor
Regulation Act regulates in-house management of spent fuel and radioactive wastes andprovides for the measures to be taken by nuclear operators in transporting spent fuel ofradioactive wastes outside the facilities. Thus the Reactor Regulation Act, while defining thecompetent minister responsible for safety regulation, provides for a system to consistently
ensure the safety in each step of generation of spent fuel and radioactive wastes, on-site
treatment and storage, transportation to disposal facility and disposal by disposal operators.
Law
DesignatedRadioactive Waste
Final Disposal Act

Cabinet order
DesignatedRadioactive
Waste
Final
DisposalOrdinance

Ministerial order
Designated Radioactive
Enforcement Rule

Waste

Final

Enforcement orderfor Deposit
and Administrationof Reserve Funds
for Reprocessing of
Spent Fuel from
Nuclear Power
Generation

Act

Ministerial Order regarding the NUMO

Ministerial
Orderregarding
Accounting of the NUMO

Act for Deposit andAdministration ofReserve Funds for
Reprocessing of
Spent Fuel from
Nuclear Power
Generation

DisposalFinanceandMinisterial Order to Determine Final Disposal Cost Per
Unitage of Designated Radioactive Waste Final Disposal
Act, Article 11, Paragraph 3
Rules for Deposit and Administration of Reserve Funds for
Reprocessing of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power
Generation

Fig. E2-1 Main regulatory system to promote spent fuel management and radioactive waste
management

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Law

Cabinet order

The Atomic Energy
Basic Act
The
ReactorRegulation Act

Ministerial order
Rule for Interim Storage of Spent Fuel

Cabinet order oftheReactorRegulation Act

Rules for Installation and operation of nuclear reactor
at a stage of research and development
Rules for spent fuel interim storage activity

Ministrial Order Regarding Technical Standard for thedesign and construction methods of Spent Fuel Storage
Ministerial order to settle technical standard for weldingof spent fuel interim storage facility
Rule for Disposal of Category 1Waste Disposal of Nuclear
Fuel Material or Material Contaminated With Nuclear Fuel
Material
Rule for Disposal of Category 2
Waste Disposal of Nuclear Fuel
Material or Material Contaminatedwith Nuclear Fuel Material
The Rules for Waste Repository for
NuclearMaterials or Materials
Contaminatedwith
NuclearMaterials
Technical Standard for the Design
and Construction Method forSpecified Waste Disposal Facility orSpecified
Waste
Management
Facility
Rule for technical standard for
welding of manufacturing facility,
reprocessing
facility,
specified
waste
disposalfacility,
andspecified waste storage facility
The Rule for Waste Management of
Nuclear Fuel Materials etc. Outsideof the Factory or Premises

Notification

Rule for Disposalof Category 2
Waste Disposal of
Nuclear
FuelMaterial
orMaterial
Contaminatedwith Nuclear Fuel
Material

Notice on the
DetailsofTechnical
Standards
forTransportof
Nuclear
FuelMaterials Etc.
Outside Plants

Verification of radioactivity concentration of radioactive
material involved in the materials used at the factory oflicensee of refining activity which is defined in the Reactor
Regulation Act, Article 61.2, paragraph 4
The
Radiation
DiseasePrevention Act

Enforcement
Ordinance for the
Radiation Disease
Prevention Act

Rules for the enforcement ofRadiation Disease Prevention Act

Ordinance on the
Enforcementofthe Act on Special
Measures
Concerning
Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness

Ordinance on the Enforcement of the ActonSpecialMeasures
Concerning
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

Basic Act on Disaster
Control Measures
The
Act
on
SpecialMeasures
Concerning
Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness

Fig. E2-2

System of Main Legislations on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management58Legal and Regulatory Systems

Implementing Entity

siting

Activity

Planning

FinancingHigh Level Radioactive Wastes

Designated Radioactive
Waste Final Disposal Act
࣭Reserve funds

Low Level Radioactive
WastesAct for Deposit and Administration of Reserve Funds
for Reprocessing of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power
Generation

Designated Radioactive
Waste Final Disposal Act
࣭Final Disposal Program࣭Implementation Plan
Designated Radioactive
Waste Final Disposal Act
࣭Nuclear Waste
Management
Organization ofJapan

Designated Radioactive
Waste Final Disposal Act
࣭Selection of Preliminary
Investigation Areas etc.

Reactor Regulation Act
࣭Regulation of disposal
Ensuring Safety

Rules for Category 1
Waste Disposal of
Nuclear Fuel Materials
or Materials
Contaminated with
Nuclear Fuel Material

Rules for Category 2 Waste
Disposal of Nuclear Fuel
Materials or Materials
Contaminated with Nuclear
Fuel Material

Rules for Waste Storage of Nuclear Fuel Materials or Materials Contaminated with
Nuclear Fuel Material
Emergency
Preparedness

Regulation

Enforcement Ordinance for the Reactor Regulation Act

Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures

Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness

Fig. E2-3 Legal System for Safety Management of Radioactive Waste Related to Nuclear
Power Generation

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E3 Regulatory body
Article 20
1. Each Contracting Party shall establish or designate a regulatory body entrusted with theimplementation of the legislative and regulatory framework referred to in Article 19, and provided
with adequate authority, competence and financial and human resources to fulfill its assigned
responsibilities.
2. Each Contracting Party, in accordance with its legislative and regulatory framework, shall take theappropriate steps to ensure the effective independence of the regulatory functions from otherfunctions where organizations are involved in both spent fuel or radioactive waste management
and in their regulation.

The regulatory bodies in Japan are responsible for reliable implementation of regulation
provided by the Reactor Regulation Act, the Radiation Disease Prevention Act and otherrelevant laws. The structures and duties of the regulatory bodies are clearly specified in each
Establishment Acts and financed by the government budget.
The regulatory bodies share the responsibilities for nuclear safety regulation according to thetypes of nuclear energy utilization. The Minister of METI regulates the safety in the utilizationof nuclear energy as an energy source, the Minister of MEXT regulates the safety in theutilization of nuclear energy for science and technology and the utilization of radioisotopes
excluding medicines, etc., and the Minister of MHLW regulates the safety of the activities inradioactive medicines and medical facilities.
The subordinate agency or bureau of each ministry takes charge of the practicalimplementation of safety regulation: NISA of METI, the Science and Technology Policy
Bureau of MEXT, the Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau and the Health Policy Bureauof MHLW.
NSC, whose members are appointed by the Prime Minister with the consent of the Diet, audits
the activities of regulatory bodies, and establishes fundamental policy on the safety regulation,
coordinating activities among regulatory bodies.
E3.1 Regulatory bodies
1. Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), METINISA administrates the safety regulations for nuclear installations related to the utilization of
nuclear energy. Specifically, NISA, entrusted by the Minister of METI, administers following
duties under the competence of the Minister of METI.
The Minister of METI is responsible for implementing necessary regulation for safe utilizationof nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material and nuclear reactors. The Minister has theauthority to grant the license for establishing such nuclear facilities and, for that purpose,
examines that the location, structures and systems of the proposed facility do not impair theprevention of hazards. The Minister has also the authority to revoke the license, when alicensee violates the Reactor Regulation Act.
The Minister of METI establishes the ordinances that provide for the operational safety,
measures to be taken for protection of specific nuclear fuel materials, the Operational Safety
Program, measures in emergency, etc. for the safety regulation of refining of nuclear source
material, nuclear fuel material processing and fabrication, establishment and operation of
nuclear reactors, storage of spent fuel, reprocessing of spent fuel, storage of radioactive
wastes and disposal of radioactive wastes. The Minister approves the design andconstruction methods of facility, conducts inspection, approves the Operational Safety
Program, approves decommissioning program of nuclear facility, collects reports fromlicensees and carries out on-the-spot inspection when necessary.
The Minister of METI has the competence to revoke or suspend a license, to order measuresfor operational safety, to dismiss a Chief Engineer of Reactors, to order measures for60Legal and Regulatory Systems

decommissioning or emergency preparedness, etc.
The Minister of METI conducts examinations for Chief Engineers of Nuclear Reactors andissues the certificates. The Minister of METI has the authority also to order to return suchcertificates in a case of violation of the law by the Chief Engineers.
NISA has 11 divisions dedicated to the administration of the safety regulation of nuclear
installations. They are Policy Planning and Coordination Division, Nuclear Safety Public
Relations and Training Division, Nuclear Safety Regulatory Standard Division, Nuclear Safety
Special Investigation Division, Nuclear Power Licensing Division, Nuclear Power Inspection
Division, Nuclear Fuel Transport and Storage Regulation Division, Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Regulation Division, Radioactive Waste Regulation Division, Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Division and Electric Power Safety Division. The assigned duties of thosedivisions are provided in Fig. E3-1.
Nuclear Safety Inspectors are assigned to each site of the nuclear installations. Fig. E3-2
shows the locations of the Nuclear Safety Inspectors Offices.
NISA has a total of ca. 350 staff engaged in the nuclear safety regulation as of March 2011,
out of which 100 staff members are Nuclear Safety Inspectors and Senior Specialists for
Nuclear Emergency stationed at nuclear installations.
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee under the Advisory Committee for Natural
Resources and Energy was established as an advisory council to NISA, that proposed
policies on nuclear safety and safety of electric power. The members of the subcommittees
are assigned based on their expertise and experience from the fields of nuclear andthermal-hydraulic design, nuclear fuel design, system design, equipment design, seismic
design, material strength, radiation control, meteorology, geology, ground foundation etc.
"What challenges exist in the future in order to assure safety in nuclear power generation andsafety in the electric power system operation, while under rapid social and economicalchange" were entrusted to the subcommittee to be discussed. The subcommittee and othersubcommittees have deliberated on what nuclear safety regulation systems should be, andthe results were reported to NISA.
NISA, when necessary, asks for opinion from experts of the subcommittee, etc. The Nuclear
Fuel Cycle Safety Subcommittee and the Radioactive Waste Safety Subcommittee under theAdvisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy are advisory councils to NISA in thearea of spent fuel management and radioactive waste management. (See Table E3-1)
NISA provides a strong commitment to its mission, scientific and reasonable judgments,
transparency, neutrality and fairness as the code of conduct for their activities. In this context,
the Policy Planning and Coordination Division watches and assesses the performance ofother divisions of NISA in discharging their duties, and take timely remedial actions after
consulting with the senior managements. In order to improve the quality of regulatory activities,
the development of the NISA Work Management System started in fiscal year 2006 andimplemented from fiscal year 2007. NISA conducted study on investigation framework andimplementation policy of the regulation issue, and reflected the implementation policy ofregulation issues on “Mission and Action Plan of NISA” (mission paper) issued every year, on
the basis of “Arrangement of Issues Concerning Nuclear Safety Regulation” which wasdeveloped as “Future Issues on Safety Regulation” in February 2010, developed by Nuclear
and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources andEnergy Fundamental Policy Subcommittee.
In addition, NISA makes a continuous effort to maintain the high quality of regulation througheducation and training of the personnel, international activities and the hearing of advice fromexperts e.g. members of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee.
September 2001, NISA started information disclosure activity systematically integrating it withthe regulatory work process, and introduced public relationship management (RM) program
as a new effort, which makes feedback from outside into quality enhancement of theregulatory activities. The objectives of the RM are to improve stakeholders’ recognition and
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understanding of NISA’s daily activities, to make appropriate response to the stakeholders’concerns, to activate discussion of a better regulatory system, to improve emergency
preparedness and to activate internal communication.
The main items of NISA information disclosure activity are as follows;(i) NISA executive’s visit to the local government,(ii) publication of newsletters and mail magazines,(iii) explanation of policies and activities of the nuclear safety regulation to the public,(public meeting on the clearance system and on amendment of the Reactor
Regulation Act, Pu-thermal symposium, public meeting on seismic safety, "one-day
seminars to introduce NISA" were held in major cities and site municipalities),(iv) making dialogue with local residents,(v) activities to hear from the public at the Nuclear Safety Inspector's Offices,(vi) implementation of risk-communication training course for local-government
personnel etc.,(vii) utilization of local cable television (CATV), website, etc. to communicate with thelocal residents, where NISA’s executives introduce its main policies such as the newinspection system or the locally stationed Nuclear Safety Inspectors Offices.
Also, NISA opens the Nuclear Energy Library in JNES, where the public can accessdocuments for the reactor establishment license, reports of incidents and accidents of nuclear
installations and, books and booklets on energy and nuclear power generation.
2. Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)In October 2003, JNES was established as a technical support organization for NISA in
ensuring safety in utilization of nuclear energy, and has 432 officers and staffs as of April
2011.
The missions of JNES who conducts the fundamental duties of nuclear safety regulation, arefollowings;
y to effectively implement their duties scientifically and rationallyy to contribute to the enhancement of nuclear safety regulation by utilizing competence
as a specialized agency
y to proactively deliver and provide with information for ensuring nuclear safety to the
publicy to foster public confidence in the safety of nuclear energy
JNES implements the following activities to accomplish the above missions:y Inspection of nuclear facilities, reactor facilities, etc.
y Safety analysis and evaluation of design of nuclear facilities and reactor facilities
y Activities to prevent occurrence of nuclear emergencies, to prevent progression of a
nuclear emergency, and to recover from the nuclear disastery Investigation, testing, research, and training concerning ensuring safety in utilization of
nuclear power as energyy Collection, analysis and transmission of information relating to ensure nuclear safety
The framework for JNES to implement activities and the relation with NISA are as follows:y NISA develops a plan on each activity based on the regulatory needs, and defines themedium-term objective in accordance with the Act of the General Rules for
Incorporated Administrative Agency, and the Minister of METI assign it to JNES.
y JNES prepares a medium-term program to accomplish the medium-term objective,
submits the program to the Minister of METI, obtains approval, prepares annual plan(fiscal year) in accordance with the medium-term program, notifies the plan to theminister of METI and implements it.
The budget for JNES consists of government budget and commission of inspections.
3. Science and Technology Policy Bureau (STPB), MEXT
The safety regulation concerning the activities on the nuclear utilization from a scientific and62

Legal and Regulatory Systems

technological aspect and utilization of radioisotopes and radiation generating apparatus(excluding medicines, etc.) is regulated by the Minister of MEXT as the competent minister,and the Science and Technology Policy Bureau (STPB) of MEXT conducts the actual duties tobe implemented by the authority of MEXT.
With regard to the licensing of establishment of test and research reactor facilities and use of
nuclear fuel materials under the Reactor Regulation Act and approval for use of radioisotope
etc. and for waste management carried out as business under the Radiation Disease
Prevention Act, the Minister of MEXT has the authority to permit the respective licenses, after
conducting an examination of the site, structure and equipment from the standpoint of nuclear
disaster prevention. The Minister also has the authority to revoke the licenses under certain
circumstances, such as the violation of applicable laws and regulations by the license holder.
STPB contains the Nuclear Safety Division, which has a further three offices. The assignedrole of the divisions and offices are listed in Table E3-2. In addition, MEXT deploys a resident
inspector for the safety management of nuclear facility to each site where the research reactor
facility or the major fuel material use facility. Their missions are to conduct examinations andinspections stipulated in the Reactor Regulation Act to confirm the compliance with the
Operational Safety Program and surveillance of reactor operation management, investigationof implementation of education and training, periodic licensee’s inspection and to respond toan emergency situation. The locations of offices of Nuclear Safety Inspectors are illustrated in
Fig E.3-2. As to the education and training programs for the staff members in charge of
nuclear safety regulations are conducted in order to enhance competency of regulatory
personnel.
The Radiation Council is established within MEXT under “the Act for Technical Standards ofRadiation Hazards Prevention”. The mandate of the Radiation Council is to clarify basic policy
on establishing technical standards for prevention of radiation hazards and to maintainconsistency among related technical standards. The basic policy is that the doses of radiation
workers and the general public shall be less than the dose that may cause radiation hazards.
The council reports to the consultation from the heads of the administrative organization
concerning technical standards for prevention of radiation hazards, and states its opinion to
the heads of administrative organization to keep consistency among technical standards. The
Radiation Council consists of a maximum of 20 members, and the Basic Committee
composed of experts from different fields is established under the council.
The STPB holds Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety Regulation, etc. with an objective tocontribute to the transparent and efficient administration of nuclear safety by MEXT. Under
this committee, sub-committees are held, as listed in Table E3-3, in order to study safety
regulations for research reactor and for utilization of radiation supervised by MEXT.
4. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW)MHLW administer the safety regulations for radioactive medicines, the regulations for theprotection against clinical radiation, and the regulations for the structure and equipment ofclinical laboratory equipped with radioisotope for specimen inspection. The mandate of MHLW
is shown in Table 3-2.
The Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau (PFSB) regulates the production of radioactive
medicines based on the Regulations for Structures and Equipments for Pharmacies, etc. andthe Regulations for Manufacturing and Handling of Radio Pharmaceuticals under the
Pharmaceutical Affairs Act. The Independent Administrative Agency, Pharmaceuticals andMedical Devices Agency, conducts periodic inspections of manufacturing plants that produce
radioactive medicines. And, PFSB also regulates disposal of radioactive pharmaceuticals.
The Health Policy Bureau regulates structures and equipments of X-ray clinical room and use
room of radioisotope for clinical, etc., based on the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Medical
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Care Act. This ordinance also provides standards for the facilities of storage, and disposal, etc.
of clinical radioisotopes, etc.
Also, structures and equipments of the radioactive isotope laboratory test rooms wereregulated by the Ordinance for Enforcement of the Clinical Laboratory Technicians, etc.Act,“Standards for Structures and Equipments of Clinical Laboratory equipped with Radioisotope
for Specimen Inspection, Provided by Clinical Laboratory Technicians, etc.Act Enforcement
Regulations Article 12, Paragraph 1. 5” (MHLW, Notification No.16, March 2, 1981). The
ordinance, etc. shows the standard for the storage or disposal of radioactive isotopes forlaboratory test.
E3.2 Ensuring of effective independence of regulatory functions from other functions
Regulatory bodies have clearly defined authorities and competences on safety regulation
based on the Reactor Regulation Act. Although each of the regulatory bodies is establishedwithin a ministry which has departments promoting utilization of nuclear energy orradioisotopes, etc., the competence of each regulatory body is clearly separated from that ofpromotional department by its establishment law and order. Each regulatory body administers
safety regulation independently, and NSC audits activity of each regulatory body. (See Fig.
E3-3)
NISA is established as “special organization” of ANRE by the METI Establishment Act. The
responsibility is clearly defined as “Agency to ensure the safety and industrial operationalsafety regarding nuclear and other energy” by the law.
NISA have clearly defined authorities and competences on safety regulation based on theReactor Regulation Act. Regulatory activities based on the Law such as licensing, approval of
construction plan, inspection for facilities or operation safety, are conducted by the name of
Minister of METI. NISA independently makes decision or proposes of decision to the Minister
without any interference of ANRE.
The regulatory activities of NISA are supervised and audited by NSC that is the Commission
established by “JAEC and NSC Establishment Act”. The commissioners of NSC aredesignated by the Prime Minister with the consent of Diet.
NISA have to consult with NSC before granting the license of nuclear business facility andactivities based on the Reactor Regulation Act. And NISA have to report to NSC of theregulatory activities such as approval of construction plan and the inspections of operationalsafety activities afterwards. NSC has the authority to make recommendation through Prime
Minister if it deems necessary.
With these arrangements, the effective independence of NISA as a regulatory body has been
ensured.
Nuclear Safety Division, STPB of MEXT has clearly defined authorities and competences onsafety regulation based on the Reactor Regulation Act and the Radiation Disease Prevention
Act. Regulatory activities based on these Laws such as licensing, approval of construction
plan, inspection for facilities or operation safety, are conducted by the name of Minister of
MEXT. STPB, which is assigned to conduct these regulatory activities by the order fororganization of MEXT, independently makes decision or proposes of decision to the Minister
without any interference of promotion body.
Based on the JAEC and NSC establishment Acts, NSC may require the head of eachadministrative organization to report matters necessary to accomplish the assigned mission
and make recommendation through Prime Minister if it deems necessary.
With these arrangements, the effective independence of Nuclear Safety Division, STPB of
MEXT as a regulatory body has been ensured.
Based on the accident of TEPCO’s Fukushima NPSs, in August 15, 2011, the Minister for the
Restoration from and Prevention of Nuclear Accident, announced his tentative plan to review
64Legal and Regulatory Systems

an organization in charge of nuclear safety regulation.
He announced that (1) the government should firstly conduct an immediate review, mainly on
the separation of NISA from METI so that an new regulatory body can be created in April 2012.
He also pointed out that (2) the government should further conduct broader study on a futurenuclear and energy policy review as well as the outcome of the investigation into the accident,
it should then present the result of its review by around the end of 2012 on areas covered by
the new organization and on the way to upgrade a more effective and robust organization.
Taking into consideration five principles below, a tentative plan for a review on a new
regulatory organization was presented.
y Separation of regulation and promotion functions.
y Unification of relevant functions regarding nuclear safety regulations.
y Strengthening of the crisis management functions.
y Reform of organizational culture, and securing/training talented expertsy Strengthening of new nuclear safety regulations
The Japanese Government decided on the “Basic Concept of Structural Reform of Nuclear
Safety Regulations” at the Cabinet Meeting of August 15 this year and decided on the
launch of a new safety regulatory body. Specifically, considering international discussions in
the past, and on the basis of the principle of “separating regulation from utilization,” thenuclear safety regulatory divisions of NISA will be separated from the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry, with “Nuclear Safety and Security Agency (tentative name)” aimed to beestablished by April 2012 as an external  agency of the Ministry of Environment byintegrating into it the functions of the NSC. For this purpose, the capabilities of this regulatory
body will be enhanced by centralizing nuclear safety regulatory activities, a dedicated risk
management division will be established to enable this Nuclear Safety and Security Agency totake quick initial responses, and efforts will be made to recruit highly qualified personnel fromboth the public and private sectors to adequately execute the regulatory activities. In addition,a “Task Force for the Reform of Nuclear Safety Regulations and Organizations” wasestablished on August 26 for the preparation of the bill necessary to establish the neworganization.

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Director-General
Vice Director-General for
Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Fuel Cycle
Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Power
Deputy Director-General for Nuclear Safety Infrastructure
Deputy Director-General for Industrial Safety and Physical Protection
Deputy Director-General for Safety Examination
Policy Planning and Coordination Division(General affairs of NISA, personnel and staff, budget, international cooperation, etc.)
Nuclear Public Relations and Training Division(Public relations/hearing for nuclear safety, activity management of Nuclear Safety Inspectors andSenior Specialists for Nuclear Emergency

Nuclear Safety Regulatory Standard Division (Planning of basic system for technology)
Nuclear Safety Special Investigation Division(Management of allegation and litigation concerning nuclear safety)

Nuclear Power Licensing Division(Licensing for commercial reactors, approval of construction plans)

Nuclear Power Inspection Division(Inspection of commercial reactors, approval of safety regulations)

Nuclear Fuel Cycle Regulation Division(Safety regulations governing refining, processing, reprocessing facilities)

Nuclear Fuel Transport and Storage Regulation Division(Safety regulations governing nuclear fuel storage and transport of nuclear materials)

Radioactive Waste Regulation Division (Safety regulations for waste disposal and management
facilities and decommissioning of nuclear installations)
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Division (Preventive measures for nuclear hazard, response
to failures and incidents at nuclear installations, physical protection for nuclear materials)
Electrical Power Safety Division(Safety of turbines and generators at nuclear power installations, and safety of electric power)

Industrial Safety Division(Safety of explosives, high-pressure gas, and petroleum industrial complexes)

Gas Safety Division (Safety of utility gas and heat supply)
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Safety Division (Safety of LPG)
Mine Safety Division (Safety of mines)

Fig. E3-1 Organization of Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

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1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14
15
16

Name of Office
Tomari Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Higashidori Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Rokkasho Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Rokkasho Nuclear Safety Administration Office
Onagawa Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Fukushima-Daiichi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Fukushima-Daini Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Tokai & Ooarai Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Ibaraki Nuclear Safety Administration Office
Kanagawakita Nuclear Safety Administration Office
Yokosuka Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Shika Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Hamaoka Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Tsuruga Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Mihama Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Ohi Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Takahama Nuclear Safety Inspectors OfficeOsaka Nuclear Safety Administration Office
Kumatori Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Kamisaibara Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Kamisaibara Nuclear Safety Administration Office
Shimane Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Ikata Nuclear Safety Inspectors Office
Genkai Nuclear Safety Inspectors OfficeSendai Nuclear Safety Inspectors OfficeCompetent ministry
METI
METI
METI
MEXT
METI
METI
METI
METI
METI
MEXT
MEXT
METI
METI
METI
METI
METI
METI
METI
MEXT
METI
METI
MEXT
METI
METI
METI
METI

Fig. E3-2 Nuclear Safety Inspectors Offices and Nuclear Safety Administration Offices

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Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry (METI)
Agency for Natural Resources
and Energy (ANRE)
Nuclear and Industrial Safety
Agency (NISA)

Reporting

Regulation

Cabinet Office
Japan Atomic Energy
Commission (JAEC)

Licensees

Audit

Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC)
Audit

Reporting

Ministry of Education,
Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology (MEXT)
Research and Development
Bureau and Research
Promotion Bureau

Reporting

Science and Technology
Policy Bureau (STPB)

Regulation

Reporting

Licensees

Fig. E3-3 Relation among nuclear safety regulatory bodies in subsequent stage regulation

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Table E3-1 Organization of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee
Basic Safety Policy Subcommittee.

- General matters securing safety- Technical matters on commercial power reactors andNuclear Reactor Safety Subcommittee.
power reactors at the stage of research and development- Fabrication and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, storage of
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Safety
spent fuel, transportation of nuclear fuel material, and the
Subcommittee.
technical standards
Decommissioning Safety Subcommittee. - Decommissioning of nuclear installations
Radioactive Wastes Safety- Securing safety of disposal and storage of radioactive
Subcommittee.
wastesSeismic and Structural Design- Technical matters on seismic safety and structural
Subcommittee.
integrity of nuclear installations- Measures for incidents and failure, and general crisis
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
management for emergencies of nuclear installations andSubcommittee.
physical protection of nuclear material- INES Evaluation on incidents and accidents of nuclear
INES Evaluation Subcommittee.
installations
Electrical Power Safety Subcommittee. - Securing safety of electrical power
Study Group on the Way of Inspection- Matters concerning inspection system of nuclear power(Acton is now intermitted)
generation facilities and nuclear fuel cycle facilities
Subcommittee. for the Institution of- Study of the legal system for the Institution of Nuclear
Nuclear Safety Regulation
Safety Regulation(Acton is now intermitted)
Subcommittee. for fitness-for-service- Study of the Verification of validity in the check methods
assessment etc. of nuclear power
for nuclear power plantsystem (Acton is now intermitted)
Study Group on Countermeasures for- Clarification of basic standards, guides etc. for aging
Aging
Radiation Control Subcommittee.
- Deliberation on radiation control in nuclear facility- Study of Risk-Information usage to Nuclear Safety
Study Group on Use of Risk Information
Regulations
Nuclear Safety Infrastructure- Study of safety infrastructure,
Subcommittee- Study of safety infrastructure on codes and standards
Chuetsu-oki Earthquake Nuclear- Investigation and future challenges due to the effects by
Installations Investigation and Study
Chuetsu-oki Earthquake at the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa
Subcommittee
nuclear power station

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Table E3-2

Organizations of MEXT and MHLW regarding nuclear and radioisotope
regulation

1. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Science and Technology
Nuclear Safety Division
Nuclear Safety Division
Office of Nuclear Regulation

Regulations for research reactor facility, fuel material use facility,
etc.

Nuclear Safety Division
Office of Radiation Regulation

Regulations for radioisotopes, etc.

Nuclear Safety Division
Office of Emergency Planning andEnvironmental Radioactivity

Nuclear emergency measures
Environmental radiation measures

2. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare
Pharmaceutical and Food Safety
Bureau, General Affairs Division
Pharmaceutical and Food Safety
Bureau, Compliance and Narcotics
Division
Health Policy Bureau, Guidance ofMedical Service Division

Regulations concerning the entrustment of disposal ofradioactive medicines, etc.
Regulations for Manufacturing, etc. of Radioactive Medicines
Regulation for structure and equipment of X-ray clinical room
and use room of radioisotope for clinicalRegulation for structure and equipment of clinical laboratory
equipped with radioisotope for specimen inspection

Table E3-3 Subordinate Organization of Advisory Committee on Nuclear Safety Regulation,
etc.
Subcommittee on Safety Regulation for
Research Reactors, etc.
Subcommittee on Safety Regulation for
Radiation Protection.
Subcommittee on Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness
Subcommittee on Evaluation ofRadioactivity in Environment

Directions for safety regulation of research reactors, nuclear
fuel materials, etc.
Directions for safety regulation of radiation protection.
Comprehensive assessment of institutional andbusiness-operational aspects of the Act on Special
Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
Assessment of the Results of Survey on Radioactivity in
Environment and of the Contents of the Survey

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Section F Other General Safety Provisions
F1 Responsibility of the license holder
Article 21
1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that prime responsibility for the safety of spent fuel orradioactive waste management rests with the holder of the relevant license and shall take theappropriate steps to ensure that each such license holder meets its responsibility.
2. If there is no such license holder or other responsible party, the responsibility rests with theContracting Party which has jurisdiction over the spent fuel or over the radioactive waste

F1.1 Steps to ensure that each license holder meets its responsibility
The prime responsibility for the safety of nuclear facility and activities of spent fuel orradioactive waste management rests with the license holder of the nuclear facility. That is, thelicense holder is responsible for adopting necessary measures to fully meet the regulatory
requirements stipulated in the Reactor Regulation Act, etc. at all of the stages of planning,establishment, operation, maintenance and decommissioning of the nuclear facility. In
addition to meeting with regulatory requirements, the license holder is required to make efforts
for improving safety and reliability of the nuclear facility, through implementing education andtraining programs of personnel, and preparing operation manuals.
In accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, the regulatory body conducts inspections toconfirm the compliance of the performance of facilities and systems of reactors, reprocessing,storage, disposal, operation, etc. with the legal technical standards and to confirm theobservance of Operational Safety Program and Regulations by an operator. The regulatory
body also can conduct on-the-spot inspection when necessary, and can impose
administrative penalties including revocation of license if an operator violates laws andregulations.
For the radioisotope waste management facilities subject to the Radiation Disease Prevention
Act, the regulatory body conducts the Periodic Inspection to confirm radiation facility’scompliance with the technical standards, and the Radiation Inspector conducts theOn-the-spot Inspection of radiation facilities as necessary. In case the operator does notobserve provisions of relevant laws and regulations, the regulatory body has authority to
revoke the license or order shutdown of the operation.
On the basis of the Reactor Regulation Act, the license holder shall cooperate inquiry by NSC
when NSC conducts the on-the-spot investigation after the report by regulatory body on thestatus of safety regulation.
F1.2 Steps to ensure that if there is no license holder or other responsible party exists
In Japan, in the case of revocation of the license, if the status of the operator is not succeeded
through merger or inheritance stipulated by the Act, the license holder whose license isrevoked shall continue to be deemed as a license holder and responsible for “record keeping,”“protective measures,” “Operational Safety Program,” and “physical protection” provided by
the Reactor Regulation Act, and shall be subject to regulations. In the case of dissolution, etc.
of the business of the license holder, if the status of the operator is not succeeded throughmerger or inheritance stipulated by the Reactor Regulation Act, a liquidator or a bankruptcy
administrator shall be deemed as a license holder and responsible for “record keeping,”“protective measures,” “Operational Safety Program,” and “physical protection” provided by
the Reactor Regulation Act, and shall be subject to regulations. In addition, theabove-mentioned persons shall develop a decommissioning program, have it approved by thecompetent minister, carry out decommissioning and obtain confirmation of the competent
minister for the completion of decommissioning.

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Under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, in the case of no succession of the businessfollowing dissolution, a liquidating partner shall take appropriate measures, such as removalof contamination by radioisotopes, etc, on cessation of the business.
As described above, it is ensured in Japan to avoid a case where no license holder exists due
to succession of business, and the business is closed if nobody succeeds the business.
A license holder of radioisotope waste management facility issued under the Medical Care Act
etc. is allowed to close its operation only after it completes necessary measures for the
closure of facility and activities stipulated by the law.

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F2 Human and financial resources
Article 22
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i)
Qualified staff are available as needed for safety-related activities during the operating
lifetime of a spent fuel and a radioactive waste management facility;(ii)
Adequate financial resources are available to support the safety of facilities for spent
fuel and radioactive waste management during their operating lifetime and fordecommissioning;(iii)
Financial provision is made which will enable the appropriate institutional controls andmonitoring arrangements to be continued for the period deemed necessary following
the closure of a disposal facility.
F2.1 Measures for maintain human resources
1. Human resources
The regulatory body confirms in the review for the license etc. on the basis of the Reactor
Regulation Act application that the applicant has technical competence including humanresources sufficient for installing the facility and appropriate operation. The applicant has toverify that its technical competence is sufficient for its activity. For confirming the technicalcompetence, objective and reasonable examination is carried out by applying the“Examination Guide for Technical Capability of License Holders of Nuclear Power” issued by
NSC in May, 2004. This Regulatory Guide defines the technical competence as organizational
management capability to appropriately operate the activity with ensuring safety including
knowledge, technology and expertise, and provides fundamental requirements to be met by
the license applicant.
As a prerequisite to operate the activities, the Reactor Regulation Act requires licensees toappoint the following chief engineers from qualified employees for safety supervision ofoperation; Chief Reactor Engineer for reactor operation, Chief Engineer for Nuclear Fuel
Material Handling in fabrication or reprocessing activity, Chief Engineer for Spent FuelHandling in spent fuel storage facility, and Chief Engineer for Radioactive Waste Handling forhandling nuclear fuel materials and other radioactive wastes in disposal facility.
Furthermore, regarding education and training, the Reactor Regulation Act requires operators
to provide, in the Operational Safety Program, for the policy, the implementing program andcontents of operational safety education. The regulatory body confirms the compliance withthese requirements through the Operational Safety Inspection.
Also, operator of a business licensed under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act is required
to select and appoint a Chief Engineer for Radiation Protection, who supervises safety
management of handling of radioisotopes, etc., from qualified persons before commencing
the business. The operator is also required to specify the matters related to duties andorganizations of the persons engaged in safety management and handling of radioisotopes
and the matters related to education and training required to prevent radiation hazards in the"Rules for Preventing Radiation Hazards".
2. Activities to ensure human resource infrastructure in Japan
In Japan, both regulatory body and nuclear industry are striving to ensure human resources
as a part of activities for ensuring future nuclear safety infrastructure.
NISA is preparing a strategy to develop and secure human resources in the area of nuclear
energy at the Nuclear Safety Infrastructure Subcommittee established in 2006 under the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources
and Energy. Regarding the concept of human resource infrastructure in the future, in October2007 this Subcommittee made the report concluding that:“The matter of human resource depends upon a balance between demand and
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supply. In order to secure human resource it is important for industry andgovernment side to show the actual needs from each point of view to educational
institutes and research institutes those make decision to foster human resource in
own institutes. And it is necessary to consider the measures from the both view
points of fostering and securing human resource.”
Based on the concept, the skill management system was introduced into education andtraining programs and operated.
In parallel with the above activities, MEXT and METI have been implementing “Nuclear
Energy Human Resources Development Program” since 2007 to foster stuff effectively inuniversities, etc. who are prospected to be engaged in safety regulation administration,
research institutes like university etc., nuclear industry etc. Also, from 2010, MEXT has been
carrying on International Nuclear Human Resource Development Initiative to support
cross-sectional HRD activities among the nuclear-related organizations in academy, industry
and government. The “Japan Nuclear Human Resource Development Network” wasestablished in November 2010, with the aim of enhancing this mutual cooperation among
academy, industry and government, and to create an all-Japan nuclear HRD system.
(1) Training of Experts in MEXT and NISA
Staff members, who are in charge of nuclear regulation in MEXT and NISA, are the Senior
Specialist for Nuclear Emergency, the Operational Safety Inspector, the Nuclear Facility
Inspector, the Electric Facilities Inspector, the Safety Examiner and the Senior Specialist forFire Protection. A Senior Specialist for Nuclear Emergency is stationed at each nuclear
installation, guides and advises the licensees in preparing its Plan for Emergency
Preparedness, and conducts duties necessary to prevent progression of nuclear emergency
should it occur. An Operational Safety Inspector is stationed at each nuclear installation,
conducts the Operational Safety Inspection to confirm licensee’s compliance with the
Operational Safety Program, conduct investigation, communicate with the staff of nuclear
installation at incident if they occur, and supervises operation management of a nuclear
installation. A Nuclear Facility Inspector conducts inspection activities, such as the
Pre-Service Inspection and the Periodic Inspection of a nuclear installation. An Electric
Facilities Inspector is dispatched from NISA head office, and conducts inspection activities,
such as the Pre-Service Inspection of Electric Facilities, the Fuel Assembly Inspection, and
the Periodic Inspection of Electric Facilities. Safety Examiners conduct the Safety
Examination of a nuclear installation. A Senior Specialist for Fire Protection of NISA is
stationed at each nuclear installation, guides and advises the licensees in fire protection
measures in collaboration with local fire protection agency.
As stated above, each staff of Nuclear Regulatory is required to have expertise in nuclear
technology. The system of long term and multistage education and training programs
necessary for improvement of his/her expertise is developed, taking account of his/herexperience and of the nature of the facility to which he/she is assigned. In order to increase
effectiveness of the training, the contents of the training being implemented are also reviewed
and improved suitably. The capability of the personnel engaged in securing safety of nuclear
installations is improved through these training. Besides developing professional humanresources as mentioned above, NISA recruits professional human resources for nuclear
safety from industries or other ministries.
NISA has appointed six Special Inspection Instructors in December 2003. They advise
inspectors for the Operational Safety Inspection, the Periodic Inspection, etc. in each power
station, instruct them to equalize the levels of inspections, and they collect opinions andproposals from inspectors and licensees for the purpose of opinion exchanges at the site.
NISA also introduced a skill management system into its education and training program in2009. This system provides personnel with opportunities to participate in instruction and OJT
courses to learn necessary knowledge required for accomplishing their tasks. The system
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also develops an education and training program under the involvement of the administrator
so that personnel can take part and gain experience in these courses. This skill management
system aims at promoting voluntary participation of personnel in training courses, and also at
improving conditions for personnel to take part in training courses due to their busy work
schedule, which has traditionally been regarded as a challenge. The conventional educationand training programs, other than the above competence management system, have also
been continued. Thus, there is no change in recognition that it is important for fostering
regulatory body staff that they acquire necessary skills and knowledge while performing theirown tasks. The required skills and the relevant major training provided for the personnel of thenuclear safety division in Fig. F2-1.
(2) Training of Experts in JNESThe Electricity Utilities Industry Law or the Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that activities
such as Electric Facilities Inspection, the Nuclear Facility Inspection, the Welding Inspection,
the Audit of Licensee's Periodic Check System, the Audit of Licensee’s Welding Check
System, the Safety Confirmation of Disposal Facility, the Safety Confirmation of Radioactive
Waste Package, the Confirmation of Transportation Packaging, the Confirmation ofTransportation Method and the Confirmation of Clearance Measurement shall be conducted
by JNES’s qualified personnel under the instruction of NISA. JNES prepares various training
courses for its staff members to get appropriate qualification in their respective activities.
President of JNES assigns inspectors from those qualified persons. JNES develops training
courses for its personnel, putting emphasis on inspection activities. JNES also isrecommending its staff to obtain relevant official qualification, and to participate outside
lectures and academic seminars in order to brush up the capability for inspection and safety
review and knowledge in his specialty.
(3) Efforts by Nuclear Industry
The nuclear industry has concerns in the succession of expertise and experiences, and themaintaining sufficient number of skilled workers. In Japan, the first generation experts are in
the age of retirement. Each organization in the industry has made various efforts including
revitalization of research and development activity, practical use of IT technology, etc. The
Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc. established the "Subcommittee for Human Resources"consisting of senior managers in the industry and experts from outside, and studied on humanresources in the future.
The subcommittee has made the proposals for training and career development of experts inJune 2003; establishment of an industry’s qualification system of nuclear maintenance andrepair technicians, simplification of organizations, establishment of an engineering center toshare training facilities and resources of maintenance and repair technicians, establishment of
a nuclear educational network system to share common educational infrastructure to ensure
resources for future.
Main activities currently performed for human resource training and succession of expertise in
the nuclear industry are shown in the following;a. Training of on-site technicians and succession of skills
In the area where the nuclear installation is established, the training for qualification,
training of practical skills for maintenance and repair, OJT training at the power station, etc.
are implemented beyond the frame of an individual operator.
b. Study on qualification and certification system for private sectors
For the purposes of improved skills of maintenance-and-repair workers, appropriate staffing,and ensuring future human-resources, the common standards and qualification /certification procedures for objective evaluation of skill level are being studied. Thesestandards etc. will be made to harmonize with the licensee's in-house qualification system.
c. Acquisition of advanced expertise
Licensees’ engineers are sent to the graduate school in nuclear engineering to acquire
advanced expertise.

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Moreover, the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc., consisting of enterprises related to the
nuclear power and developing industry-wide policies, has investigated and studied the current
status of universities, graduate schools and research institutes in 2006, in order to improvethe effectiveness of “Nuclear Energy Human Resources Development Program”. “The
Nuclear Human Resource Development Committee” investigated the issues related to humanresource development in the field of nuclear energy since 2007, by sharing visions anddiscussing about the roadmap, based on the challenges faced by the nuclear industry inJapan, and on future perspectives. Since 2010, these activities have been taken over by the“Japan Nuclear Human Resource Development Network”.
(4) Efforts by University and Research Institutes
The Tokyo University established a graduate school, in April 2005, consisting of three coursesof the “Nuclear Reactor Specialist Course”, the “Nuclear Fuel Specialist Course”, and the“Administrator Course”.
Since 1958, JAERI, now JAEA has been operating training courses for engineers andtechnicians in radioisotope, radiation and nuclear technologies. Recently, JAEA started acourse for nuclear emergency preparedness in close cooperation with national and local
governments.
(5)

Establishment of Professional Engineers System for Nuclear and Radiation
Technologies
The Professional Engineers System is the qualification system in order to intend to foster
competent engineers who have special knowledge on science and technology, high capabilityof application, abundant experience in actual business, and high morality as engineers for
ensuring public benefit.
The MEXT who has jurisdiction over the Professional Engineers System established a nuclear
and radiation field of specialization for professional engineers in 2004 fiscal year. The
qualification examination has been implemented every year, and a total of 381 people werequalified as the Professional Engineer by the end of FY 2010. The purposes of theProfessional Engineers System are such to enhance nuclear engineering capabilities, toutilize the capability in the nuclear safety regulation, to strengthen the safety management
system in each corporation.
F2.2 Financial Resources and Financial Rules
In permission of establishment license of a nuclear facility, except for nuclear fuel material use
facility, the regulatory body, in accordance with the Reactor Regulation Act, confirms that theapplicant for the license possesses necessary financial basis. The applicant should submit
business plan that explains about the financial base of the business.
For the financial base of the decommissioning of nuclear installations, METI stipulated theMinisterial Order established under the Electricity Utilities Industry Law on the reserves fordecommissioning of nuclear power generation facilities. Based on the Ministerial Order,
Electric Utilities internally reserved the money for the decommissioning as the expense of
dismantling and removal of commercial power reactor facilities, and as the expense of theprocessing and disposal of the waste from decommissioning. The amount of reserve by theend of March 2011 is about 1,700 billion yen by 10 electric utilities.
In addition, the electric utilities are depositing money to be used for spent fuel reprocessing
from electricity sales, in a fund administered by an administrative organization, designated by
the Minister of METI in accordance with the “Act for Deposit and Administration of Funds for
Reprocessing of Spent Fuel from Nuclear Power Generation” enacted in May 2005. The total
funds deposited by 10 electric utilities amount to about 2,400 billion yen at the end of March
2011.
In accordance with the Final Disposal Act enacted in May 2000, operators of power reactor
facilities deposit funds for disposal of high level radioactive waste to NUMO, the implementing76

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body for disposal, who entrusts management of the fund to RWMC. The Minister of METI,
every year, notifies utilities of the amount of money to be deposited to the fund. The amount ofdeposit per vitrified package was 39,543,000 yen in the year of 2010. The amount of money
for construction of depository and disposal of about 40,000 vitrified packages of high level
waste is estimated about 3 trillion yen. The amount of the money deposited to RWMC at theend of March 2011 was about 840 billion yen.
As for disposal of waste from Research, Medical and Industrial Facilities, a generator of waste
must pay for the disposal under the principle of the liability of generator, as set forth in the
Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy. The largest generator of the above waste, JAEA
started funding for disposal based on the amendment of the Law for the Incorporated
Administrative Agency, JAEA in June 2008. The amount of budget plan for fiscal year 2008 is
about 4.3 billion yen.
Financial basis of a license holder of nuclear fuel material use is to be confirmed throughprocedures to approve the Operational Safety Program and the steps to be taken at the timeof decommissioning.
Financial basis of the operator of radioisotope waste management facility licensed under the
Radiation Disease Prevention Act (except for disposal business) is to be confirmed throughreceiving the Periodical Inspection, obligation to maintain the facility in compliance withtechnical standards, implementation of education and training programs, notification of theInternal Rules for Prevention of Radiation Hazards and the steps to be taken at the time ofdecommissioning.
Financial basis of disposal business is an essential condition of licensee of waste
management.

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Job title

Skill䞉Director for Safety
Examination
䞉General Manager of
Office for Inspectorsof Nuclear Safety
Management

䞉Deputy General
Manager of Office forInspectors of Nuclear

Personnel
with experience at
NISA

Safety Management

Personnel
without
experience
NISA

at

䞉Assistance UnitManager䞉Inspector
䞉Specialist for Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness

OJT

Knowledge ofradiological protection

Education and training on radiation

Knowledge related toreview & examination
Knowledge related toinspection   Advanced training
on seismic safety

Basic training onseismic safety

Advanced training for

Nuclear facility inspector

nuclear safety㸭Basic training for

inspector

nuclear safety inspector

TrainingforKnowledge related toemergency
preparedness

Manager

Knowledge and skills
related to
Public Relations

Advanced training
on risk㻌

Skills related toinspection
Skills related toemergency
preparedness
Safety㻌 management/quality assurance

GeneralAdvanced training
for specialist for
nuclear emergency
prep.

Basic training forspecialist for nuclear
emergency prep.

Basic training on nuclear safety

Simulator
training

On-site training at nuclear facilities

Outline of nuclear
facilities

Specialized training on nuclear energyy

Laws concerning
nuclear safetyadministration

Training on nuclear safety Public
Basic training on
Relationsrisk
i iTraining on condition monitoring,
simulator training, loop training,
NDT training

On-site training on broad area assistance

Advanced training on quality
management(JAEC4111, safety culture)

Basic training on quality
management(ISO9000)

Fig. F2-1 Training System of Nuclear Safety Regulation at NISA

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F3 Quality assurance
Article 23
Each Contracting Party shall take the necessary steps to ensure that appropriate quality assurance
programmes concerning the safety of spent fuel and radioactive waste management are establishedand implemented.

By the amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act enacted in September 2003 and February
2004, it is provided that the licensee establishes quality assurance plan for the operationalsafety activities, and plan, do, check and improve the operational safety activities, andimprove quality assurance plan continually. And it is provided that the quality assurance
system should be included in the Operational Safety Program. NISA confirms operator’scompliance with it through the Operational Safety Inspection. The quality assurance activities
at the nuclear facilities except for research reactor facilities and fuel material use facilities aredescribed in the followings.
F3.1 Regulatory Requirements on QA of Nuclear Installations
NISA’s regulatory activities on major nuclear facilities, based on the Reactor Regulation Act
and the Electricity Business Act, include licensing, approval of design and construction
methods, pre-service inspection, periodical facility inspection, etc., are covering from planningstage to operation stage.
By the Reactor Regulation Act, a licensee is required to integrate its quality assurance
program into the Operational Safety Program. NISA approves the Operational Safety Programand confirms the operator’s compliance with it through the Operational Safety Inspection.
This establishment of the quality assurance system provides a mechanism for systematic
implementation of the activities that influence the quality. By establishing the quality
assurance system, a licensee can have confidence in its safety activities, and by achieving its
accountability for the quality assurance, the licensee can obtain public understanding.
The key points of QA activities are; i) to involve top management, ii) to be based oninternational standards on QA (ISO9001:2000), iii) to improve them by Plan-Do-Check-Act
cycle, iv) to establish an in-house independent audit organization.
The Reactor Regulation Act stipulates that licensee's QA program should include i)organization managing QA activities, ii) plan for operational safety activities, iii)
implementation of operational safety activities, iv) evaluation of operational safety activities,
and v) improvement of operational safety activities.
Note) The term, operational safety activities, means activities necessary for maintenance ofmajor nuclear facilities, use of major nuclear facilities, and shipment, storage anddisposal of nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminated by nuclear fuel materials.

Licensees prepare their QA program of the nuclear facilities and implement them, according
to JEAC 4111-2009, "Rules of Quality Assurance for Safety of Nuclear Power Plants"(hereinafter referred to as “JEAC 4111-2009”), which was developed by the Japan Electric
Association (JEA) in autumn of 2003 (last revised in 2009) based on the ISO9001:2000 to
specify QA management, top management, management of resources, business plan, andevaluation/improvement in QA program for nuclear power plant. NISA evaluated the standard
and endorsed that it meets the regulatory requirements for nuclear facilities other than test
and research reactors and use facilities.
The major items of JEAC4111-2009 revised from the original 2003 version are as follows:y Statement on technical information is added in the procurement process.
y Statement on root cause is added in the corrective action and preventive action.
y Statement on implementation of PSR is added in the special notes of data analysis.
y Statement on information sharing is added in the special notes of preventive action.
y Response to the IAEA’s revision of GS-R-3 and ISO9001:2008, etc.
Moreover, NISA is studying to clarify requirements of quality assurance during not only
operating stage but also construction stage in legislation.

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As for research reactors and nuclear fuel material use facility, MEXT confirms theimplementation of QA program described in Operational Safety Program based on theReactor Regulation Act through Operational Safety Inspection.
F3.2 Confirmation of Quality Assurance by NISA
1. Examination of the Policy for QA at Licensing StageNISA confirms the applicant’s technical capability in the process of Safety Review. In addition,
NISA requests the applicant to submit the “Policy for Quality Assurance” attached to theapplication format, and examines it.
2. Examination of QA Program in Construction StageAt the construction stage of a commercial power reactor facility, NISA requests the license
holder to submit the “Description on Quality Assurance Program” as specified in the Rules for
the Electricity Utilities Industries Law, which describes license holder’s QA activities during
detailed design, manufacturing, installation and functional tests, and examines it. Also, NISA
confirms that license holder of nuclear power reactor oversees subcontractor's quality control,material control, etc. in appropriate procedures, in addition to its QA audit of primarycontractor and primary contractor's own management of manufacturing process.
3. Confirmation of QA Activities throughout Operation StageNISA confirms QA activities of the license holder throughout service life of major nuclear
facilities by the Operational Safety Inspection. Furthermore, at the commercial power reactor
facility, NISA, at the Periodic Safety Management Review, examines adequacy of operator’sorganization and methods for the Licensee's Periodic Inspection.

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F4 Operational radiation protection
Article 24
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetimeof a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility:(i)the radiation exposure of the workers and the public caused by the facility shall be kept as low
as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors being taken into account;(ii)
no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed nationalprescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed standards
on radiation protection; and(iii)
measures are taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive materials
into the environment.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that discharges shall be limited:(1)
to keep exposure to radiation as low as reasonably achievable, economic and social factors
being taken into account; and(2)
so that no individual shall be exposed, in normal situations, to radiation doses which exceed
national prescriptions for dose limitation which have due regard to internationally endorsed
standards on radiation protection.
3. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate steps to ensure that during the operating lifetime of aregulated nuclear facility, in the event that an unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive
materials into the environment occurs, appropriate corrective measures are implemented to control
the release and mitigate its effects.

In Japan, necessary steps are taken as described in F4.1 and F4.2 for (i) and (ii) of Item 1 and(i) and (ii) of Item 2 of Article 24 of the Convention, in F4.3 for (iii) of Item 1, and in F4.4 forItem 3 of the Article.
F4.1 Laws, Regulations and Requirements on Radiation Protection
The national standards for radiation protection at nuclear facilities are prescribed by the
Reactor Regulation Act, the Electricity Business Act, the Radiation Disease Prevention Act,etc. and related government ordinances, ministerial ordinances, orders and notifications, andguidelines based on these laws. The recommendations of the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP) are given due consideration and are incorporated into national
legislation and regulation. The Radiation Council coordinates these technical standards in thelaws and regulations on prevention of radiation hazards.
In examining application of a license for a nuclear facility, it is confirmed that the application
conforms to the Examination Guides established by NSC as well as the legislation andtechnical standards. In these guides, operators are required to reduce the radiation dose
received by the public in the vicinity of the facility site as low as reasonably achievable.
Ministerial ordinances on the basis of the Reactor Regulation Act prescribe area control forradiation protection, radiation control of personnel engaged in radiation activities in controlledareas, measurement and surveillance of radiation levels, monitoring of discharged radioactive
materials, and maintenance of radiation control equipment. The Notification for Dose Limits
on the basis of each of these rules prescribes dose limits and concentration limits ofradioactive materials in air and surface activity density of the material contaminated byradioactive materials inside controlled area and dose limits and concentration limits ofradioactive materials outside peripheral monitoring area, and dose limits and concentration
limits of radioactive materials for personnel engaged in radiation work, and dose limits for
personnel engaged in emergency activities. All these limits are shown quantitatively in the
Notification for Dose Limit.
In order to ensure compliance with these regulations, in the Reactor Regulation Act for
example, operators are required to prescribe in the Operational Safety Program, i) controlledareas, access controlled areas and peripheral monitoring area and access control to theseareas, ii) monitoring equipment at air ventilation and water discharge, iii) monitoring of dose,
dose equivalent, concentration of radioactive materials in the air and density of radioactive

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materials on the surface of contaminated objects, and the decontamination, and iv)
maintenance of radiation monitoring equipment. And operators are also required to keep therecords regarding occupational exposure.
F4.2 National Requirements on Radiation Protection and the Implementation
1.

Allowable Dose Limits(1) Definition of Controlled Areas
The abovementioned rules and dose limit notifications define a controlled area as an area
where dose of external radiation may exceed 1.3mSv for a period of three months, theconcentration of radioactive material in the air, excluding natural background, may exceed thelimit specified in the notification, or the density of radioactive material on the surface ofcontaminated objects may exceed the limit specified in the notification, and request operators
to take necessary measures in the area.
(2) Allowable Dose Limits for Occupational Exposure
The abovementioned rules and dose limit notifications provide for the allowable dose limits foroccupational exposure listed in Table F4-1.
The government has changed the dose limit for radiation workers in emergency rescue workfrom 100mSv to 250mSv in light of the present situation of the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi
NPS of TEPCO in order to prevent escalation of the accident.* This was decided based on theinformation that a 2007 recommendation of the ICRP provided for 500mSv as the dose to
avoid deterministic effects that has been set for radiation workers in emergency rescue work.
*: In the event of an unavoidable emergency, in the emergency response measures implementation area,from the day of the declaration of nuclear emergency situation to the day of the declaration of cancellationof the situation, according to the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act.

Table F4-1
Dose limits for personnel engaged in radiation work
Items
Limits
1. Effective dose limits(1) Personnel engaged in radiation work 100mSv/5 years (do not exceed 50mSv/year)
In addition to the provision (1), 5mSv/3 months(2) Female personnel(3) Pregnant female personnel
In addition to the provision (2), 1mSv for internal
exposure during a period after her employer etc.
knows her pregnancy until the childbirth
2.Equivalent dose limits
150mSv/1 year
(1) Eye lens
500mSv/1 year(2) Skin(3) Pregnant female’s abdominal region
2mSv during a period after her employer etc.
knows her pregnancy until the childbirth
3.Dose limits for the personnel engaged in emergency radiation work
(1) Effective dose limit
100mSvЍ250mSv (Changed in response to theaccident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of TEPCO)*(2) Equivalent dose limit for eye lens
300mSv(3) Equivalent dose limit for skin
1Sv*: In the event of an unavoidable emergency, in the emergency response measures implementation area, provided
in the Paragraph 8, Article 17 of the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, from the day of the issuance of thedeclaration of nuclear emergency situation according to the provision of Paragraph 2, Article 15 of the Act (Law
No. 156 of 1999) due to the occurrence of the Tohoku District – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake in 2011, until
the day of the issuance of the declaration of Cancellation of the situation, provided in Paragraph 4 of the same
Article.

(3) Dose Limits for the Public
The abovementioned rules and dose limit notifications provide for the allowable dose limits forthe public listed in Table F4-2.
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Table F4-2
Dose limits for the public
Items
Limits
Dose limits outside the peripheral monitoring area
Effective dose
1mSv/year
Equivalent dose for eye lens
15mSv/year
Equivalent dose for skin
50mSv/year
2. Numerical Guide to Reduce Dose to the Public in Vicinity and Discharge Control
Regarding nuclear facilities licensed on the basis of the Reactor Regulation Act, operators are
required to keep the radiation dose received by the public in the vicinity of the facility low
taking the ALARA principle, in addition to comply with dose limits and concentration limits ofradioactive materials outside peripheral monitoring area due to the discharge of radioactive
materials.
For nuclear power reactors, the guidelines prepared by NSC, "the Guides for the Dose Target
Value in the Vicinity of the Light Water Nuclear Power Reactors", defines the target value forradiation doses received by the public in the vicinity of the facilities as 50ȝ6YSHU\HDUGXHWR
the release of radioactive materials to the environment during normal operation. Operators
establish the annual numerical discharge control guide that satisfies the above-mentioned
target, put it in the Operational Safety Program, and obtain approval of the regulatory body.
For the reprocessing facility, fabrication facility, use facility, waste disposal facility, and waste
management facility and spent fuel intermediate storage facility, the operators are required toreduce radiation doses based on the ALARA principle at the license examination. Operators
define the control target value smaller than the dose limit of 1mSv / year, put it in the
Operational Safety Program, and obtain approval of the regulatory body.
During the decommissioning, operators continue the radiation control, setting the control
target value equivalent or lower than the value during operation.
The regulatory body approves the control target value, confirms compliance with the
Operational Safety Program, and collects report from operators.
At radioisotope waste management facilities licensed on the basis of the Radiation Disease
Prevention Act, an operator, in addition to comply with concentration limits of radioactive
materials within gaseous and liquid discharge, makes efforts to keep dose at site boundary
below 250PSv/3 months.
3. Measurement of Environmental Radiation
A licensee on the basis of the Reactor Regulation Act conducts radiation monitoring at the site
vicinity during normal operation, assesses the impact upon the environment of the dischargeof radioactive materials from the facility, and feedbacks the results in improving discharge
control and facility management.
Local governments hosting nuclear facilities also monitor radiation level independently at thesite vicinity to protect public health and safety.
Meanwhile, NSC indicates fundamentals of the monitoring plan and its implementation andthe evaluation of radiation dose in the “Guideline for Environmental Radiation Monitoring”
which was established in March 2008, integrating the existing “Guideline for Environmental
Radiation Monitoring” and the “Guideline for Environmental Radiation Monitoring in
Emergencies”, in order to improve and standardize monitoring technology. Local governments
and licensees implement monitoring in accordance with the guide.
An operator of radioisotope waste management facility licensed on the basis of the Radiation
Disease Prevention Act monitors radiation level and measures contamination by radioactive
materials at controlled area boundary, site boundary and any appropriate points.
4.

Environmental monitoring concerning the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of TEPCO
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The environmental monitoring has been implemented in response to occurrence of theaccident at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of TEPCO.
In the Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness, local governments are in charge ofenvironmental monitoring when a nuclear emergency occurs. However, most of themonitoring posts became disfunctional at first when the accident occurred. From March 16, it
was decided that MEXT would take charge of summarizing the environmental monitoring
carried out by MEXT, local governments and cooperating U.S. organizations.
As for the land areas outside the premises of the NPS, MEXT measures the air dose rate,
radioactivity concentrations in the soil, and concentrations of radioactive materials in the air
and takes environmental samples in cooperation with JAEA, Fukushima Prefecture, theMinistry of Defense, and electric companies. MEXT also carries out monitoring by aircraft incooperation with the Ministry of Defense, TEPCO, the U.S. Department of Energy, etc.
In terms of the sea areas near the NPS, MEXT, the Fisheries Agency, the Japan Agency for
Marine-Earth Science and Technology, JAEA, TEPCO, and others cooperate with each otherto carry out the monitoring of radioactivity concentrations, etc. in the seawater and in theseabed, while the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology simulates the
distribution and spread of radioactivity concentrations.
Environmental monitoring of the air, sea and soil of the premises and the surrounding areas of
the Fukushima NPSs is conducted by TEPCO.
F4.3

Measures taken to prevent unplanned and uncontrolled releases of radioactive
materials into the environment

The abovementioned rules provide that three-month-averaged concentration of radioactive
materials in air outside peripheral monitoring area shall not exceed the concentration limits fordischarge of gaseous radioactive waste, that three-month-averaged concentration ofradioactive materials in water at the outside of the boundary of the peripheral monitoring area
shall not exceed the concentration limits for discharge of liquid radioactive waste with adischarge facility, and that doses due to liquid discharge of radioactive wastes from
reprocessing facilities monitored at the outlet to the ocean shall not exceed the dose limit. The
rules also provide that licensees shall immediately report to the competent minister when anyof these limits are exceeded, and report within 10 days on details of the event and corrective
measures taken.
F4.4 Provision for mitigate the effects by an unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive
materials
Licensees of Nuclear Facilities, on the basis of abovementioned rules, shall stipulate themeasures that should be taken in case of emergency in the Operational Safety Program andhave them approved by the regulatory body, which provide that operators, in case of
unplanned or uncontrolled release of radioactive materials, should take measures against the
spread of contamination by nuclear fuel materials or radioisotopes to control the discharge
and mitigate the infruence. And as an example, the Safety Examination Guide for
Reprocessing Facility, which is used in safety examination of reprocessing facility with large
inventory of radioactive materials, provides that fire and explosion due to fine metal particles
from fuel cladding or organic solvent, criticality accident, leakage or loss of function due todamage or failure of equipment or piping, or spent fuel handling failure do not cause
excessive exposure of radiation to the public.
When an unplanned or an uncontrolled release of radioactive materials initiates any specific
events (Table F5-1) defined in the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, emergency
activities start according to the procedure, and the Prime Minister declares Nuclear
Emergency if the initial event progresses and exceeds the predetermined level. Nuclear
emergency will be described in detail in the ensuing section.

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F4.5

Discharge of radioactive materials to the environment due to the accident at
Fukushima NPSs of TEPCO㸯㸬Discharge of radioactive materials to the atmosphere
On April 12, NISA and NSC each announced the total discharged amount of radioactive
materials to the atmosphere so far.
NISA estimated the total discharged amount from reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPSs
according to the results analyzing reactor status, etc. by JNES and presumed thatapproximately 1.3x 1017 Bq of iodine-131 and approximately 6.1x 1015 Bq of cesium-137 weredischarged. Subsequently, JNES re-analyzed the status of the reactors based on the reportwhich NISA collected on May 16 from TEPCO on the plant data immediately after the accident
occurred. Based on this analysis of reactor status and others by JNES, NISA estimated thatthe total discharged amount of iodine-131 and cesium-137 were approximately 1.6 x 1017 Bq
and 1.5 x 1016 Bq, respectively.
NSC estimated the amount of certain nuclides discharged into the atmosphere (discharged
between March 11 to April 5) with assistance from JAEA through back calculations, based on
the data of environmental monitoring and air diffusion calculation; the estimations are 1.5 x
1017 Bq for iodine-131 and 1.2 x 1016 Bq for cesium-137. The discharged amount since early
April has been declining and is about 1011 Bq/h to 1012 Bq/h in iodine-131 equivalent.
On June 3, NSC issued “Near-term policy to ensure the safety for treating and disposing
contaminated waste around the site of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plants” as an
approach for the immediate future that ensures safety related to the 1) reuse, 2) treatment,
transportation and storage, and 3) disposal of wastes affected by this accident.
*: According to the current Reactor Regulation Act and the associated regulations in Japan, the matters which
are to be disposed of among the matters contaminated by nuclear fuel materials, etc., generated in thecourse of operation and dismantling of nuclear facilities are regarded as “radioactive waste”, and the soil, etc.
contaminated by radioactive materials discharged and flown in association of the accident is not subject toregulation.

The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) reported on May 12 to the Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC) about its trial calculation of the amount of release to the atmosphere ofiodine-131 and cesium after the accident occurred, and, as the result of emergency
monitoring from March 12 to 15 was thus newly confirmed, the JAEA reevaluated and
reported the result to the NSC on August 22.
For the current release amount of radioactive materials at the site, TEPCO, using a graph ofthe concentration distribution which had been made in advance by means of observed data ofconcentration measurements of radioactive materials in the atmosphere near the site and adiffusion model (a diffusion model based on the “Regulatory Guide for MeteorologicalObservation for Safety Analysis of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities” of the NSC), estimatedthe current release amount of radioactive materials to the atmosphere. As a result, at a time inearly August, the release amount including the total of both cesium-137 and cesium-134 perunit time was estimated to be approximately 2.0×108 Becquerel/hour (Bq/h).
The government, to assess the impact of radioactive materials released from the Fukushima
Dai-ichi NPS, has actively continued environmental monitoring. In July, the government
established the “Monitoring Coordination Meeting” to promote precise implementation andevaluation of monitoring based on the overall results of wide-range environmental monitoring
performed by related ministries and agencies, municipalities and the operators. The
Coordination Meeting determined the “Comprehensive Monitoring Plan” on August 2 toperform careful monitoring without omissions regarding 1) general environmental monitoring,2) harbors, airports, etc., 3) the water environment, etc., 4) agricultural soil, forests and fields,
etc., 5) food, 6) the water supply, in cooperation with related organizations.
Although the RPV and PCV of Unit 1 have been pressurized to some extent, steam generated
in some units such as Units 2 and 3 seems to have leaked from the RPV and PCV, and some
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steam seems to have been released into the atmosphere. To respond to this issue, the status
has been checked by dust sampling in the upper part of the reactor buildings, and discussion
and preparation for covering the reactor buildings has been underway. As for Unit 1, theconstruction of the structure to cover up the reactor building started in June 28. Cold
shutdown of Units 5 and 6 has been maintained using residual heat removal systems withtemporary seawater pumps.
㸰㸬Discharge of radioactive materials to the seawater(1) Leakage of radioactive materials to the sea from the power station
In Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, the water containing dissolved radioactive materials that werereleased from inside the RPV leaked into the PCV. In addition, as a result of injecting waterfrom outside in order to cool the reactors and Spent Fuel Pools, some of the injected waterleaked out of the PCV and accumulated inside the reactor buildings and the turbine buildings.
The management of the contaminated water in the reactor and turbine buildings became an
important issue from the viewpoint of workability inside the buildings, and the management ofcontaminated water outside the buildings became an important issue from the viewpoint ofpreventing the release of radioactive materials into the environment.
TEPCO found at around 09:30 on April 2, 2011 that water with a reading of over 1,000mSv/h
had accumulated in a pit storing electric cables near the Intake Channel of Unit 2 and that
there was a crack (about 20cm) on the lateral surface of the pit, from which water was flowing
out into the sea. From this reason, TEPCO took some measures such as pouring concrete,
etc. and injecting soluble glass to stop water discharge and confirmed that the water outflow
stopped at 05:38 on April 6. TEPCO evaluated the amount of contaminated water that had
flowed into the sea from Unit 2, including highly-concentrated radioactive materials(hereinafter referred to as “contaminated water”) and NISA also confirmed it.
On April 1, the day before the outflow was detected, the air dose rate near the sea surface
around Unit 2 screen was confirmed as 1.5mSv/h, which was the same as the surrounding
background level. Immediately after the outflow was confirmed, the air dose rate measured at
almost the same place was 20mSv/h. This makes it reasonable to assume that contaminatedwater flowed out in a period from April 1 to 6. The outflow rate was calculated as about 4.3
m3/h based on photos, etc. The total amount of radioactive materials contained in the outflow
of the contaminated water can be estimated at 4.7×1015 Bq using measured values obtained
via sampling.
TEPCO confirmed that the outflow from a pit near the Intake Channel of Unit 3 into the sea at
16:05 on May 11 and that it stopped around 18:45 on the same day. TEPCO evaluated theamount of contaminated water that flowed out to the sea from Unit 3 and the NISA also
confirmed it. As a result of the evaluation, the amount of radioactive materials discharged from
Unit 3 was calculated as 250m3 in an outflow period of 41 hours (from 02:00 on May 10 till
19:00 on May 11). As for the concentration of contaminated water that flowed out into the sea,
the total amount of radioactive materials contained in the outflow of contaminated water canbe estimated at 2.0×1013Bq using a measured value of water that flowed into the pit.
(2) Discharge of radioactive materials to the sea from the power station
Because of a possible leakage of highly-concentrated radioactive waste water accumulated in
the basement floor of the turbine building of Unit 2, TEPCO decided to discharge the low-level
radioactive water accumulated in the Radioactive Waste Treatment Facilities to transfer thehighly-concentrated radioactive waste water as an emergency measure, pursuant to Article
64 paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Regulation Act. In addition, to protect important equipment fromthe subsurface water entered into the building, TEPCO also discharged such subsurface
water, including low-level radioactive waste water accumulated in the sub-drains of Units 5
and 6. Therefore, NISA requested TEPCO to report on the facts, and draw up an impact86

Other General Safety Provisions

assessment and TEPCO’s view related to the discharge to the sea, pursuant to Article 67
paragraph 1 of the above Act. NISA confirmed the report details and obtained technical advice
on the discharge to the sea from NSC Japan as an emergency measure.
TEPCO discharged about 10,393tons from the Radioactive Waste Treatment Facilities andsub-drains of Units 5 and 6 from April 4 to 10. The total amount of radioactive materials is
estimated at about 1.5×1011Bq based on the amount discharged during this period.
To check the environmental impact of the above (1) and (2), TEPCO carried out somemeasures including strengthening coastal sea area monitoring and installing silt screens(leakage protective fences).
Regarding the above, the Japanese government sincerely regrets that we had to discharge
stagnant water, even though with low-level radioactivity, to the sea, and recognized that muchneeds to be improved regarding the communication with neighboring countries on thisdischarge. Therefore, we reviewed the communication channels in the governmentalorganizations and explained to individual countries and areas about the background of thedischarge, the relevant data and other information. Also, we identified a contact point where
the Japanese government can maintain around-the-clock communication with the neighboring
countries and regions. Subsequently, prior notification on specific areas of interest for theneighboring countries and regions such as shift of INES level, establishment of restricted
zone, evaluation of contaminated water and opening of the airlock (See F5.5).
(3)

Processing of contaminated water with high concentration of radioactive materials andprevention against sea contamination
At the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, a great volume of water with high concentration of radioactive
materials due to the water injection for cooling the reactor core is now being accumulated.
TEPCO installs processing facilities for the Contaminated Water and is controlling theoccurrence of the Contaminated Water by injecting the processed water reused after
removing the radioactive materials from the Contaminated Water newly added to the reactor
core.
NISA requested TEPCO on June 1 to submit a report regarding the effect of reducing theContaminated Water by the installation of the following processing facility, etc. and regarding
the safety measures related to the installation, prior to the installation of water processing
facility for high level radioactive water, storage facility of the Contaminated Water and storage
facility for highly-concentrated, high level radioactive materials generated from the treatmentof the Contaminated Water.
As the result, on June 8, TEPCO submitted the report to NISA. On June 8, NISA reviewed thereport and judged necessary measures for preventing radiation hazards would be planned to
be implemented as the emergency measures pursuant to Article 64, Paragraph 1 of theReactor Regulation Act.
TEPCO has decreased the risk of unintended leakage by securing storage facilities for theContaminated Water and by commissioning the processing facilities for contaminated waterfrom June 17. For the outflow of radioactive materials to the sea from the Fukushima Dai-ichi
NPS, TEPCO has implemented measures to prevent outflow and mitigate diffusion, including
the closure of the seawater piping trench located in the upper part of outflow routes as well as
blocking pits with the risk of outflow. The concentration of radioactive materials in seawater
near the NPS’s water intake and water discharge locations has now decreased to a level near
the regulatory limits defined by law. However, in the future, there would be a possibility that
the Contaminated Water might increase the level of contamination of the sea by way of theoutflow of the groundwater.

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In light of this situation, the installation of a water shielding wall (at the seaside) made of steel
pipe sheet pile with an adequate water shielding function in front of the existing seawall ofUnits 1 to 4 is planned.

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F5 Emergency preparedness
Article 25
1. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that before and during operation of a spent fuel or radioactive
waste management facility there are appropriate on-site and, if necessary, off-site emergency
plans. Such emergency plans should be tested with appropriate frequency.
2. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps for the preparation and testing of
emergency plans for its territory insofar as it is likely to be affected in the event of a radiologicalemergency at a spent fuel or radioactive waste management facility in the vicinity of its territory.

F5.1 Laws, Regulations and Requirements for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
The JCO Criticality Accident in September 1999 was a very serious accident when local
residents were instructed for sheltering or evacuation for the first time in Japan, shattering
basic premise of securing safety in promoting utilization of nuclear energy. Lessons learned
from the accident clarified the special characteristics of nuclear emergency, which would
demand quick initial response, coordinated cooperation among the national and local
governments, strengthening of the national emergency preparedness and the clarification ofoperator’s responsibilities. The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act was enacted in
December 1999 and enforced in June 2000, addressing the special characteristics of nuclear
emergency*1 mentioned above.
The law was enacted within the legal framework already established by the Basic Act on
Disaster Control Measures, which had defined roles of the national government, local
governments, etc. expect operators in emergencies such as earthquakes, typhoons,conflagrations and nuclear emergency.
The part of “Nuclear Emergency Preparedness” in the Basic Plan for Emergency
Preparedness based on the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures, was extensively revisedin accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, clarifying roles andresponsibilities of the national government, local governments, and nuclear operators*2.
*1 The term “nuclear emergency” means unusual release of radioactive materials or unusual
radiation streaming outside of a nuclear facility, by operation of a nuclear reactor, fabrication,
reprocessing and use of nuclear fuel materials, storage of spent fuels, management of nuclear
fuel materials or the materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials, and the accompanying
shipment, and the term “nuclear disaster” means the damage caused by a nuclear emergency tothe life, health or property of the public, according to the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act.
*2 The term “an operator” means a license holder for fuel manufacturing operation of nuclear
reactors, spent fuel storage , reprocessing , radioactive waste disposal , or use of nuclear fuelmaterials, according to the Nuclear Regulation Act.

NSC, taking into consideration the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act and the lessons
learned from the JCO Criticality Accident, revised the “Guideline on Emergency Measures for
Nuclear Facilities” on technical and specialized matters for nuclear emergency in May 2000,
y to correspond to the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act,y to expand the scope for research reactors and nuclear fuel related facilities in addition
to the nuclear power stations, reprocessing facilities, etc., andy to include measures against the nuclear fuel material release and the nuclear criticality
accident in addition to the noble gases and iodine release.
After that, the Guideline has been revised several times and developed by NSC. Recent main
revisions are as follows:
y to correct the description concerning medical care for emergency exposure withrevision of the “Principles of Medical Care for Emergency Exposure” in October 2008.
y to add spent fuel storage facility in nuclear facilities covered by this guideline in August2010 in response to issuance of a license to spent fuel storage business in May 2010
and also to add the statement that the reference distance of the Emergency Planning
Zone (EPZ) of the spent fuel storage facility should be about 50m, by applying theprinciple of the range of the area where minimum emergency preparedness should beparticularly enhanced.
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As the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act provides that its enforcement situation is
subject to review five years after its enforcement, the enforcement situation was investigatedby MEXT and METI. Results of the investigation were reported to the Special Committee on
Nuclear Disaster, the NSC in March 2006.
NISA checked the enforcement situation concerning four issues that were presupposed to be
noted when the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act was enacted, and reported thefollowing:y Concerning the speeding up of the initial response, non-scenario-based training should
be carried out, and the effort should be continued;
y Concerning enhancing the cooperation between the national government and local
governments, the "Integrated Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Network", which is alarge-scale system and preparation of a fast unified network of communication among
them, should be established;y Concerning enhancing the emergency response system of the national government,
necessary renewal of materials and equipment of the Emergency Preparedness Center
should be promoted; and,y In relation to clarification of the licensees’ duties, effective functioning of nuclear
emergency specialists in an emergency should be verified and improved.
In this section, emergency preparedness of main nuclear facilities in accordance with the
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act is described.
F5.2 Nuclear Emergency Preparedness and the Emergency Measures
The responsibilities of related authorities for nuclear emergency preparedness and theemergency measures concerning operators and major nuclear facilities in accordance with
the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act are as follows.
1. Outline of Nuclear Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Facilities (See Fig. F5-1)
Quick response and coordinated cooperation among related organizations are important in a
nuclear emergency.
y The Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act defines specific initial events in major
nuclear facilities (See Table F5-1), the occurrence of which the operator shallimmediately notify the competent minister and the heads of related local governmentsof.
y The competent minister, receiving the notification, starts activities according to theprocedure stipulated by the law. Staff with expertise in emergency measures will besent to local governments on request. The Senior Officer for Nuclear Emergency
collects information and coordinates activities preventing expansion of the events.
y When the competent minister recognizes that the specific initial event exceeds thepredetermined level and has developed into an emergency, the minister immediately
reports it to the Prime Minister.
y The Prime Minister declares “Nuclear Emergency”, and advises or directs related local
governments on necessary measures such as sheltering, evacuation or preventive useof stable iodine tablets to be taken by them.
y The Prime Minister establishes the "Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters" inTokyo, which he will head, and the "Local Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters".
y NSC, when a nuclear emergency occurs, calls the Emergency Technical Advisory Body
that consists of members from the NSC and the Investigation Committee for
Emergency Measures and makes technical advices to the Prime Minister.
y Local governments establish their own emergency response headquarters.
y The national government, local governments and related operators etc. establish the"Joint Council for Nuclear Emergency Response" at the emergency response key
facility “Off-Site Center (See Fig. F5-2)” in order to share information and coordinate
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Other General Safety Provisions

their emergency measures.
2. On-site and Off-site Nuclear Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Facilities
Organizations related to nuclear emergency preparedness keep themselves always ready tocollect and send information and start quick response against an emergency, and conduct
exercises, disseminate knowledge and promote research on emergency preparedness.
Outline of roles and responsibilities of related organization are as follows.
(1) On-Site Emergency Preparedness at Nuclear Facilities
When the operator detects abnormal release of radioactive material or abnormal level ofradiation at a nuclear facility, it takes necessary measures to prevent progression of the event
into an emergency.
The operator develops Operator’s Plan for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness after consultingwith related local governments, which provides for prevention of, emergency measuresagainst, and post-emergency restoration from, a nuclear emergency, including on-site andoff-site cooperation with other organizations. Especially, quick and accurate notification of
occurrence of specific initial events to related organizations is a very important obligation of
the operator.
Moreover, the operator is required to take part in comprehensive exercise with relatedorganizations, and keep close contact with them.
(2) Off-Site Emergency Preparedness of Nuclear Facilities
Roles and responsibilities of the national government and local governments in emergency
preparedness are defined in the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act and the Basic Plan for
General Emergency Preparedness. Each local government develops its own Local Plan for
Emergency Preparedness. They conduct emergency environmental radiation monitoring, andrecommend or instruct evacuation, sheltering or preventive use of stable iodine to the resident,
receiving advice or direction from the Prime Minister.
3.

Responsibility of the National Government, Local Governments and Operatorsconcerning the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness(1) Responsibility of the National Government
The national government establishes following preparation to prevent occurrence of nuclear
emergency and to take measures in emergency.
y The competent minister stations a Senior Officer for Nuclear Emergency in the vicinityof each nuclear facility, who guides and advises the operator in preparing Operator’sPlan for Emergency Preparedness and, in emergency, takes necessary measures
preventing progression of the emergency.
y NSC, when a nuclear emergency occurs, calls the Emergency Technical Advisory Body
that consists of members from NSC and the Investigation Committee for Emergency
Measures and makes technical advices on dissolution of nuclear emergency, change ofarea for emergency measures, and other technical matters to the Head of the Nuclear
Emergency Preparedness Headquarter (the Prime Minister).
y The competent minister designates a facility in the vicinity of a nuclear facility as
Off-Site Center to be used in an emergency. In case of an emergency, the national
government, the local governments and the operator establish at the Off-Site Center
the "Joint Council for Nuclear Emergency Response", in order to share information andto coordinate their activities. Off-Site Centers, located on the points shown in Fig.F5-2,
have communication equipment with the Prime Minister’s Official Residence, theCabinet Office, the Emergency Response Centers of NISA or MEXT and related local
governments, and other necessary equipment.
y The Off-site Center is provided with equipment to monitor the environmental radiationlevel in the vicinity of the facility and display it on-line. Also, it is provided withequipment to display on-line information on accident condition in the nuclear facility
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except for the temporary data, and information on accident progression predicted by
ERSS (Emergency Response Support System). Also SPEEDI (System for Prediction ofEnvironmental Emergency Dose Information) net work was developed that predict
quickly the concentration of airborne radioactive materials and exposure around thesurrounding area based on the radiation source information provided by ERSS,
meteorological condition and topographical data.
The national government establishes arrangements to initiate quick and coordinatedactivities in an emergency.
The national government conducts comprehensive nuclear emergency exercise once a
year according to the plan prepared by the competent minister.

(2) Responsibilities of Local Governments
The local governments are required to develop and revise Local Plan for Emergency
Preparedness in accordance with Article 40 of the Basic Act on Disaster Control Measures,consulting with the Prime Minister beforehand.
(3) Licensee’s Responsibilityy The licensee develops its own Operator’s Plan for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness
after consulting with related local governments, and submits it to the competent
minister before operation of the nuclear facilities.
y The licensee establishes on-site organization for nuclear emergency preparedness,and designates a Manager for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness who administers theorganization.
y The Manager for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness shall notify specific initial events tothe competent authorities.
F.5.3 Implementation of the Nuclear Emergency Exercises
Plans for Nuclear Emergency Preparedness are developed in the vicinity of each nuclear
facility in accordance with the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, and an Off-Site Center
is located in the vicinity of each nuclear facility. Exercises of various levels are conducted toconfirm the effectiveness of the emergency preparedness. The purpose of exercise includes
1) to enhance understanding of the nuclear emergency preparedness by responsible
personnel of related organizations and local residents, and 2) to verify whether emergency
measures function in predetermined way, and whether information sharing and cooperation
among related organizations are adequate. Exercises cover communication, monitoring,decision making on emergency measures to be taken, sheltering or evacuation etc., ranging
from large scale national exercise to operator’s on-site exercise. Exercises in the past years
are shown below.
1. Exercise Planned by the National Government (See Table F5-2)
The national government started nation-wide comprehensive exercises for nuclear
emergency involving national and local governments, designated public organizations,operators of the nuclear facility and the local residents once a year, upon enforcement of the
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act established after the JCO Criticality Accident,
increasing its involvement in exercises planned and executed mainly by local governments inthe past. The exercise for power reactor facilities includes a scenario assuming core damage
and relevant accident management activities.
The following exercises were conducted since 2008.
y On October 21 and 22, 2008, the government, Fukushima Prefecture, concerned cities,TEPCO, and other emergency-preparedness-related organizations conducted a joint
exercise for the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (in Fukushima Prefecture) with a participationof about 4,000 persons including local residents. Firefighting training assuming
radioactive material release and evacuation of the persons who need help in time of
emergency were conducted within this exercise and the PR activities from the92

Other General Safety Provisionsyyviewpoint of local residents, including communication with the residents were alsoemphasized in this exercise.
On December 21 and 22, 2009, the government, Ibaraki Prefecture, concerned cities/
villages, JAPCO, and other emergency-preparedness-related organizations conducteda joint exercise for the Tokai Dai-ni Power Station (in Ibaraki Prefecture) with aparticipation of about 3,100 persons including local residents. This was the firstexercise held in Ibaraki prefecture, commemorating the 10th year from the JCO
Criticality Accident. Improvement of evacuation of residents in the heavily-populatedareas was included in one of the emphases of the exercise. Car evacuation of thepersons who need help was also attempted during this exercise for the first time inJapan.
On October 20 and 21, 2010, the national government, Shizuoka Prefecture,
concerned cities/towns/villages, Chubu Electric Power Co. and otheremergency-preparedness-related organizations conducted a joint exercise for the
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station (in Shizuoka Prefecture) with a participation of about
2,400 persons including local residents. PR activities for residents including foreign
residents in Japan and the persons who need help in time of emergency by taking
advantages of CATV were among the emphases of the exercise.
Comprehensive evaluation of the exercises has been conducted since FY2009, basedon the results of questionnaires to the participants including the exercises held by the
local communities and the electric utilities, opinions provided by the third-party experts
observing the exercises, and also assessment of the results of questionnaires to theresidents by the third-party experts, in addition to the comprehensive assessment of
the exercises conducted by the national government in Tokyo and at the local
emergency response headquarters.

2. Exercise Planned by NSC
NSC implements exercise for improvement of the emergency communication system, and for
activation of the Emergency Technical Advisory Body and improvement of its effectiveness.
3. Exercise Planned by Local Governments (See Table F5-2)
The Local Plan for Emergency Preparedness prescribes local exercise to be planned andconducted by local governments, which national government and NSC support by sending
expert staffs, etc.
4. Exercise Planned by Licensees
The licensees have conducted on-site exercises including establishment and operation of
emergency response headquarters, communication, emergency environmental radiation
monitoring, etc. based on Operator’s Plan for Emergency Preparedness for each site about
once per year. The operators conduct the exercise etc. involving accident management
activities, to confirm its effectiveness.
The licensee participates in the exercise planned and executed by the local government.
5. Participation in international exercise
Japan is a contracting party to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident andthe Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency.
Japan has been participating and will continue to actively participate in the international
emergency response exercise (ConvEx) organized by IAEA.
F5.4 Response to the nuclear emergency at Fukushima NPSs of TEPCOAt Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, all AC power was lost due to the disaster of the earthquake andtsunamis. In accordance with Paragraph 1, Article 10 of the Nuclear Emergency
Preparedness Act, TEPCO notified the government at 15:42 on March 11, 2011, the day on
which the earthquake occurred, that all AC power had been lost in Units 1 to 5. After that,
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TEPCO recognized that the injection of water via the emergency core cooling systems was
impossible at Units 1 and 2 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and notified the government at
16:45 on the same day of a State of Nuclear Emergency in accordance with the Article 15 of
the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act.
The Prime Minister declared a state of nuclear emergency at 19:03 on the same day andestablished the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters and the Local Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters. On March 15, the Integrated Headquarters for the
Response to the Incident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (later renamed theGovernment–TEPCO Integrated Response Office on May 9) was established so that the
government and the operator could work together in a concerted manner, decide to takenecessary measures and promptly respond while sharing information on the state of thedisasters at the nuclear facilities and on necessary measures.
The Prime Minister, who serves as the Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters, determined the evacuation area and the in-house evacuation area according to
the assessment of the possibility of discharging radioactive materials, and instructed
Fukushima Prefecture and relevant cities, towns and villages to act in accordance with thisdetermination. Responding to the status of accidents at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, at 21:23,
March 11, the evacuation area was set at the area within a 3km radius and the in-houseevacuation area was a 3 to 10km radius from Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Afterwards, according
to the escalation of events, the evacuation area was expanded to a 20km radius at 18:25,
March 12, and the in-house evacuation area was expanded to a 30km radius at around 11:00,
March 15. Also, responding to the status of the accidents at Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, theevacuation area within a 3km radius and the in-house evacuation area of a 3 to 10km radius
were set at the same time a nuclear emergency situation was declared at 7:45, March 12, withthe evacuation area expanded to a 10km radius at 17:39 on the same day. Then, theevacuation area was changed to a 8 km radius on April 21. Evacuation and stay-in-house
instructions immediately after the accident were promptly implemented through a concerted
effort by residents in the vicinity, local governments, the police and other relevant authorities.
The Prime Minister determined that evacuation areas within a 20km radius of Fukushima
Dai-ichi NPS would be a “restricted area,” in accordance with the Basic Act on Disaster
Control Measures and instructed the mayors of cities and towns and the heads of villages andconcerned local governments to prohibit access to the area on April 21. The Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters announced the basic viewpoints of temporary accessconcurrently with establishment of the Restricted Area. Temporary access is allowed within
20km radius from Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS excluding 3km radius from the NPS and high riskarea. The residents are allowed to enter the area temporarily for a few hours and carry theminimum necessary goods out from there while ensuring safety. Also, corporate bodies, etc.,
whose inability to access the area is expected to cause serious loss of public interest shall bepermitted access by the heads of relevant local governments after consultations with the headof the Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters. On April 23, the Director-Generalof the Headquarters announced the Permission Criteria for temporary access to Restricted
Area (Eligibility, conditions, procedures, etc.). On May 9, NSC Japan provided technicaladvice on “Implementation of temporary access” upon request of the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters. The temporary access of residents has been sequentially
implemented pursuant to the permission criteria from May 10 onward, after coordination of
relevant local governments, Fukushima prefecture and others.
The Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters started its activities at an Off-SiteCenter as designated by the Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness. However, it was
moved to the Fukushima Prefectural Office in Fukushima City due to high-level radiation as
the nuclear accident escalated, in addition to a communication blackout and a lack of fuel,food and other necessities caused by logistic congestion around the site. The longer theaccident lasted, the heavier the burden on residents in the vicinity of the NPS became. In
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voluntarily evacuated and those who remained in the area found it increasingly difficult tosustain their livelihoods due to congestion in the distribution of goods and logistics problems.
In response to this situation, the government launched support measures on March 25.
The environmental monitoring data have revealed that there were areas where radioactive
materials were accumulated at high levels even outside of the 20km radius. Therefore, thePrime Minister as Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters instructed
the heads of relevant local governments on April 22 that deliberate evacuation areas needed
to be established for specific areas beyond the 20km radius, and area between the 20 km and
30km radius which had been set as in-house evacuation areas, excluding the areas within it
qualifying as deliberate evacuation areas, was renamed an “evacuation-prepared area incase of emergency,” since the residents there could possibly be instructed to stay in-house or
evacuate in the case of future emergencies. In this way, residents inside the deliberate
evacuation area were directed to evacuate in a planned manner, and residents inside of thearea prepared for evacuation in case of emergency were directed to prepare for evacuation orfor in-house evacuation in case of an emergency.
In addition, outside the Deliberate Evacuation Areas as well as the Restricted Area, there
exists plural spots inside certain areas that are not wide spread in region to warrant thedesignation of a Deliberate Evacuation Area, at which air dose rates have been maintained at
a level that is estimated to exceed an integral dose of 20mSv over a period of one year after
the accident. The radiation dose decreases when going away from these spots, therefore, arisk of exceeding 20mSv per year through daily life in general is low. Considering that thelevel of 20mSv per year was adopted because it was the lowest figure within the range that
ICRP and other organizations have indicated as a reference level, being different from the
Deliberate Evacuation Areas where high dose areas expand in entire region, the spots are notin a situation that the Government should instruct across-the-board evacuation or restrict
industrial activities from the standpoint of safety. On the other hand, it is natural for residents
to feel anxious about the situation, and since the possibility of exceeding 20mSv per year
depending on a person’s lifestyle cannot be ruled out, it is important for the Government totake measures for the issue. For these reasons, the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters decided the response policy, “Regarding Response to the Specific Spots
Estimated to Exceed an Integral Dose of 20mSv Over a Period of One Year After the
Accident” on June 16, taking into consideration opinions of NSC. This led to the designation ofthese spots as “Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation” and the government has
decided to call attention of residents in these spots, and assisted and promoted theirevacuation. To date, 227 spots have been established as Specific Spots Recommended for
Evacuation, covering 245 households.
The NSC has indicated conditions, etc. for the lifting of each of the designations of
Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of Emergency, Evacuation Area, and Deliberate
Evacuation Area, taking into account radiation protection and reactor stability under the·Basic Policy of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan on Radiation Protection for
Termination of Evacuation and Reconstruction” (July 19) and “Standpoint of the Nuclear
Safety Commission for the Termination of Urgent Protective Actions implemented for the
Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant” (August 4).
Based on the above initiatives, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters indicated the“Concept of Review of Evacuation Area, etc.” on August 9. The Japanese government intends
to lift the designation of Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of Emergency in block at the stage
when all local municipalities have completed the development of a restoration plan based on
their residents’ intentions.
Therefore, related organizations are currently promoting environmental monitoring actively
with a view to the lifting of the Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of Emergency. Whole area
environmental monitoring of the sites of schools and other public facilities, school zones andparks, etc. and environmental monitoring in response to individual requests of cities, towns
and villages, etc. have been performed.

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F5.5 Response to radiological emergencies in neighboring countries
Japan is a contracting party to the "Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident"
and the "Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological
Emergency". To implement the provisions of these conventions, MOFA is designated as"National Warning Point (NWP)" and "National Competent Authority for an Emergency Abroad,NCA (A)" in the case of a nuclear accident and a radiological emergency out side theJapanese territory
When a radiological emergency occurs outside Japanese territory including neighboring
countries, MOFA through the established response system, receives notifications andforwards them to appropriate authorities to share the information and to take necessary steps.
In relation to the Assistance Convention, the response system has been reviewed for its
important by considering registration for Response Assistance Network (RANET) and other sothat Japan as a contacting party could dispatch personal and provide material and equipment
to the extent possible under the Convention.
Regarding the provision of information of the accident at Fukushima NPSs of TEPCO to theinternational community, the Japanese Government reported the accident status to IAEA
promptly pursuant to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, beginningwith the first report on 16:45 on March 11, immediately after the accident occurred. The
Japanese Government has also reported the provisional evaluations of the International
Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) when the government made its announcement
regarding each evaluation.
Notification to other countries including neighboring countries about the deliberate dischargeof accumulated water of low-level radioactivity to the sea on April 4 was not satisfactory. Thisis a matter of sincere regret and every effort has been made to ensure sufficient
communication with the international community and to reinforce the notification system (SeeF4.5).

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Operators

National Government

Manager for Nuclear
Emergency
Preparedness

Reports toF

Local Governments

Competent Minister
Prefectural governors- Establishes an organization to
respond to the event- Judges whether the event is a
nuclear emergency or not (see Table
F5-1 for judging criteria)- Orders resident Senior Officer for
Nuclear Emergency to collectinformation, etc.

- Confirms occurrence ofan event to be reported(see Table F5-1 forreporting criteria)- Onsite nuclear
emergency response
team to take emergency
measures

Request dispatchof experts

Municipal mayors
Dispatches
experts

Prime Minister- Declares

nuclearemergency,
designates emergency zone, anddirect actions to be taken.
- Establishes Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters

Instructs theimplementation of
emergency response
Measures

Residents

Advises

NSC

Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters
Head: Prime Minister
Deputy Head: Competent minister
Members: Heads of related ministries,
agencies, and related government
offices

Directs

Local governments
establish Emergency
Response Headquarters

Participates inEstablish Local Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters

Emergency activities
by the operator’s
onsite emergency
response team

Self-Defense
Force

Establish Joint Council for Nuclear Emergency Response at the Off-Site Center, share informationand coordinate emergency activities.
Coordinating activities of the council- to make accurate information available
Directs and requests
to the public- to advise or direct residents to evacuate - Special support: the National Institute of Radiological- to measure radiation dose in the
Sciences, Japan Atomic Energy Agency, and otherenvironment
institutions.
- to rescue injured persons- Fire fighting, rescue and first aid: the Fire Defense
Agency,- Security guard: the National Police Agency

NSC

Prime Minister
Advises- to declare Dissolution of Nuclear
Emergency
Dissolution of the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters

Measures by the national and local
governments and the operator:- Contamination surveys- Health counseling- Publicity activities to prevent damage
from rumor

Fig. F5-1 Measures Based on the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act

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Kanagawa Yokosuka

Osaka Kumatori
Osaka Higashi-Osaka
Kanagawa Kawasaki

Designated by METI(16) Designated by MEXT(2)  Designated by METI and MEXT(4)Fig. F5-2 Locations of Off-Site Centers

98Other General Safety Provisions

Table F5-1 Main Specific Events, Nuclear Emergencies and Responses Prescribed in the
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act
Eventsa

Dose rate near the siteboundaryb

Detection of radioactive
materials at exhaust stackor other normal release
pointsc

Detection of radiation orradioactive materials due tofire or explosion, outsidecontrolled areasd

Individual
event
in
consideration of facility
characteristics
Failure of scram

Loss of reactor coolant
Loss of all AC power
supplies
A decrease of spent fuelpool water level at a
reprocessing facility

Criteria of Specific Event([FHHGLQJ ȝ6YK DW RQH SRLQW IRUmore than 10 minutes([FHHGLQJ ȝ6YK VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ DW
more than two points
Release of radioactive materials that
UHVXOWVLQPRUHWKDQȝ6YRIGRVHRUPRUH WKDQ ȝ6YK RI GRVH UDWH IRUmore than 10 minutes
0RUH WKDQ ȝ6YK RI UDGLDWLRQ GRVH
rate
Release of radioactive materials that
UHVXOWV LQ PRUH WKDQ ȝ6YK RI GRVH
rate

Criteria of Emergency([FHHGLQJ ȝ6YK DW RQH SRLQW IRUmore than 10 minutes([FHHGLQJ ȝ6YK VLPXOWDQHRXVO\at more than two points
Release of radioactive materials that
results in more than 5mSv of dose or
PRUH WKDQ ȝ6YK RI GRVH UDWH IRUmore than 10 minutes
More than 5mSv/㹦of radiation dose
rate
Release of radioactive materials that
UHVXOWVLQPRUHWKDQȝ6YKRIGRVH
rate

Reactor cannot be shut down withnormal neutron absorbers

Emergency reactor shutdown isrequired, but all reactor shutdown
functions are unavailable

Emergency core cooling system(ECCS) is actuated due to reactor
coolant.
All AC power supply is unavailable
more than 5 minutes.

All ECCS injections are unavailable.
All AC power supply is lost and allcore cooling functions are lost.

Fuel assemblies are exposed due todrop of water level- The competent minister dispatchedexpert staff to local governments attheir request.
- Resident Senior Officer for Nuclear
Emergency conducts prescribed
response operations.

- Officials from concerned ministries
and agencies assemble for theaccident
response
liaisonconference (Tokyo).
- Designated parties assemble in the
Off-site Center for local accident
response liaison conference.

99

The competent minister confirms theoccurrence of nuclear emergency andreports it to Prime Minister.
Prime Minister declares nuclear
emergency and takes following
measures- To advise or instruct the local
governments on evacuating etc.
- To establish Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters in Tokyo
and Local Nuclear Emergency
Response
Headquarters(Off-site
Center)- To set up the Joint Council for
Nuclear Emergency Response inorder to exchange information
among the national and local
governments.

F

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Table F5-2 Records of Nuclear Emergency Exercise
Planned byDate of exercise(1) Exercise planned by National Government
National
Government

Nuclear facility(April 2008 - March 31, 2011)2008/10/21 (Tue) -22 (Wed)Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (TEPCO)

2009/12/21 (Mon) -22 (Tue)Tokai No2 NPS (JAPCO)

2010/10/20(Wed) -21 (Thu)

Hamaoka NPS (Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.)(2) Exercise planned by Local Government (April 2008 - March 31, 2011)
Ibaraki
2008/9/30 (Tue)Tokai No2 NPS (JAPCO)
Okayama

2008/10/9 (Thu)

Ningyotoge Environmental Engineering Center (JAEA)

Fukui

2008/10/25 (Sat)

Takahama NPS (The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc)

Aomori2008/10/29 (Wed)Higashidori NPS (Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Ehime

2008/11/5 (Wed)

Ikata NPS (Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Ishikawa

2008/11/14 (Fri)Shika NPS (Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Saga

2008/11/19 (Wed)~20(Thu)Genkai NPS (Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Miyagi2009/1/22 (Thu) ~23(Fri)Onagawa NPS (Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Kagoshima

2009/1/31 (Sat)

Sendai NPS (Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Hokkaido

2009/2/10 (Tue)Tomari NPS (Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Shizuoka

2009/2/12 (Thu)Okayama

2009/10/9 (Fri)

Aomori2009/10/21 (Wed)Hamaoka NPS (Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.)
Prototype Uranium Enrichment Plant, Ningyotoge Environmental
Engineering Center (JAEA)
Rokkasho reprocessing facility (JNFL)

Ehime

2009/10/22 (Thu)

Ikata NPS (Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Saga

2009/10/23 (Fri) -24 (Sat)Genkai NPS (Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Hokkaido

2009/10/29 (Thu)Tomari NPS (Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Shimane2009/11/13 (Fri)Shimane NPS (The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Miyagi2009/11/17 (Tue) – 18 (Wed) Onagawa NPS (Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Fukui
Fukushima(Public
protection
exercise)
Kagoshima

2009/11/22 (Sun)Mihama NPS (The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.)

2009/12/22(Tue)Fukushima Dai-ni NPS (TEPCO)

2010/1/19 (Tue)Sendai NPS (Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Shizuoka

2010/2/4/ (Thu)

Hamaoka NPS (Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Ishikawa

2010/3/17 (Wed)Shika NPS (Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Ibaraki

2010/9/30 (Thu)

Experimental FBR “Joyo” (JAEA)

Okayama

2010/10/7 (Thu)

Ningyotoge Environmental Engineering Center (JAEA)

Ehime

2010/10/15 (Fri)Ikata NPS (Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Saga

2010/10/23 (Sat)Genkai NPS (Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Fukui

2010/10/26 (Tue)Ohi NPS (The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Miyagi2010/11/4 (Thu) – 5 (Fri)Onagawa NPS (Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Niigata

2010/11/5 (Fri)Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPS (TEPCO)

Aomori2010/11/5 (Fri)

Higashidori NPS (Tohoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Hokkaido

2010/11/17 (Wed)Tomari NPS (Hokkaido Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Ishikawa

2010/11/18 (Thu)Shika NPS (Hokuriku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

Fukushima

2010/11/25 (Thu) – 26 (Fri)Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (TEPCO)

Shimane2011/1/19 (Wed)

Shimane NPS (The Chugoku Electric Power Co., Inc.)

100

Other General Safety Provisions

F6 Decommissioning
Article 26
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure the safety of decommissioning of a
nuclear facility. Such steps shall ensure that:(i) qualified staff and adequate financial resources are available;(ii) the provisions of Article 24 with respect to operational radiation protection, discharges andunplanned and uncontrolled releases are applied;(iii) the provisions of Article 25 with respect to emergency preparedness are applied; and(iv) records of information important to decommissioning are kept

The Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy issued by JAEC states that “it is important to carryout decommissioning of a nuclear facility such as commercial power reactor, experimental
research reactor and nuclear fuel cycle facility, ensuring safety, on the operator's own
responsibility, in accordance with the revised Reactor Regulation Act, under the government's
regulation and obtaining local communities' understanding and cooperation."
The regulatory policy for dismantling or decommissioning of reactor facilities has been
investigated and discussed, resulting in following three reports;y "Basic Philosophy to Assure Safety for the Dismantling Nuclear Reactor Facilities"(December 1985, Decision by NSC, revised in August 2001)y "Aiming at Decommissioning of Commercial Nuclear Power Facilities " (January 1997,
Nuclear Energy Subcommittee, ACNRE)
y "Philosophy for Safety Assurance and Safety Regulation on the Decommissioning ofCommercial Power Reactor Facilities" (August 2001, Decommissioning Safety
Subcommittee, NISS/ACNRE)
Based on these reports, in order to ensure the safety during the decommissioning ofcommercial nuclear power reactors, the regulation was implemented by applying existing
provisions in the Reactor Regulation Act, such as “notification of dismantling” or “modificationof Operational Safety Program, by the operators.
So far, the decommissioning of reactor facilities was implemented at the Japan Power
Demonstration Reactor (JPDR) of JAEA and the Tokai Power Station of JAPCO, etc. and thedevelopment and application of dismantling technologies have been progressed, and theknow-how for decommissioning has been accumulated through these processes.
Under such circumstances, NSC pointed out on October 14, 2004, that it is required toinvestigate the development of a graded approach in safety regulation system in accordancewith the degree of importance in safety commitment and the progress of dismantlingprocesses, considering that the main activities during the period after the termination ofoperation are safety management of spent fuels, dismantling works and the associatedradiation control and handling of radioactive wastes, and that the regulatory experiences
concerning dismantling and decommissioning of test and research reactors have been
accumulated, as the conclusion of the regulatory activities investigation concerning the safety
regulation system during the period after the termination of operation of reactor facilities.
The Decommissioning Safety Subcommittee has investigated appropriate regulatory systemof decommissioning, based on the regulatory experiences on decommissioning of reactor
facilities under the current system. The investigation is conducted on the graded regulatory
approach to cope with the progress of the decommissioning process, the diversity of eachfacilities, reflecting the experiences of decommissioning, and development of technology inthe near future, and reported in "The Way of the Decommissioning Regulation of the Nuclear
Facilities" (December 9, 2004)).
In this investigation, the Subcommittee recognized that the decommissioning of nuclear
reactors is becoming to a routine activity, and the amendment of legislation must cope withgraded regulatory approach and clarification of the responsibilities of licensees. It isconsidered important (i) to clarify the requirement in decommissioning regulations, (ii) to keep

101

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Other General Safety Provisions

the transparency on procedures for the operators, and (iii) to obtain in the understanding andconfidence of the national people and local residents on decommissioning regulations.
The Subcommittee proposed the way of decommissioning regulations, as;y replacing “dismantling notification by licensee”, to the “approval of the licensee’s
decommissioning plan of dismantling processes, methods etc. by regulatory body “y implementation of the decommissioning as approved in the plany completion of decommissioning is confirmed by regulatory body and after theconfirmation of the completion of decommissioning, the operation license loses its
effecty the regulatory activities during the decommissioning process (example: Periodical
Inspections, Operational Safety Inspections etc.) should be changed in accordancewith the changes of the functions of the facilities and safety operation activities as thedecommissioning proceeds (graded regulatory approach)On the basis of such recognition, the Reactor Regulation Act was amended in May, 2005 andthe safety regulation for decommissioning of reactors and other facilities was updated. In
response to this amendment of the Law, the Enforcement Ordinance for the Reactor
Regulation Act and related ministerial ordinances (rules for Refinery, Commercial Power
Reactors, Reactors at Development Stage, Research Reactors, Fuel Fabrication, Spent Fuel
Storage, Reprocessing, Waste Disposal, Waste Storage and Use of Nuclear Material) wereamended in November 2005 and put into force in December 2005.
The above amendment of laws and regulations clarified the legal process of decommissioning.
A licensee applying for approval of decommissioning has to submit a decommissioning
program that describes the facility to be dismantled and dismantling method, management
and transfer of nuclear fuel materials, removal of contamination with nuclear fuel materials,
management of nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials,
process of decommissioning work, radiation exposure control, safety assessment, systems
with functions to be maintained and their performance, financial plan, implementation
organization, etc. The regulatory body approves the decommissioning program after
examining its conformity with the technical standards. At the final stage of decommissioning,
the licensee submits a document that describes the implementation status of dismantling,transfer of nuclear fuel materials, removal of contamination with nuclear fuel materials,
management of nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials
and the final distribution of contamination with nuclear fuel materials, and requests theregulatory body’s confirmation. The decommissioning is completed after the regulatory bodyconfirms that the measures for radiation hazard prevention is no more necessary andmanagement of nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials iscompleted.
In addition, a graded regulation system was introduced. For example, the annual periodic
facility inspection by the government is no more conducted when nuclear fuel materials arecleared from the facility.
The Radiation Disease Prevention Act requires the license holders to take steps, such astransferring the radioisotopes to another user, eliminating contamination with radioisotopes
and disposing radioisotopes or material contaminated by radioisotopes, etc, to remove
radioisotope contamination when they intend to cease the waste management business or
use of radioisotopes and/or radiation generating apparatus. The procedure of cessation ofuse, etc. of radioisotopes is conducted adequately in a law-abiding manner. Furthermore, withthe amendment of the Radiation Disease Prevention Act in May 2010, regulations concerning
decommissioning were reinforced by introduction of provisions including the prior submissionof a decommissioning program when a license holder decides to discontinue the use, etc. ofradioisotopes.

102

Other General Safety Provisions

F6.1

Human resources and financial resources

1. Human Resources
Licensees clarify, in the Operational Safety Program, safety organizations, responsibility androles in decommissioning processes, and planning and implementation of relevant safety
education programs necessary for managers and workers including subcontractors.
The regulatory body confirms the observance of the above-mentioned Operational Safety
Program by the inspection (Operational Safety Inspection).
2. Financial Resources
Electric utilities have deposited funds for decommissioning of commercial power reactor
facilities using the Dismantling Reserve Funds. (See Section B)
F6.2 Operational radiation protection
The regulations on radiation protection applied to nuclear facilities in operation, which is
described at Article 24 (F4), are also applicable to nuclear facilities in the process of being
decommissioned.
F6.3 Emergency preparedness
The regulations on emergency preparedness applied to nuclear facilities in operation, which is
described at Article 25 (F5), are also applicable to nuclear facilities in the process of being
decommissioned.
F6.4 Records of information important to decommissioning are kept.
The Reactor Regulation Act requests to keep important records such as inspection records,
radiation control records, etc. even at decommissioning stage.
And other records specific to decommissioning such as each equipment or system being
dismantled, schedule and method for dismantling it, etc. are required to be recorded and kept
at the end of each dismantling process.
Thus the regulatory body can confirm that the decommissioning has been appropriately
completed ensuring safety and in compliance with the Decommissioning Plan of that facility
by keeping records to show it.

103

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104Safety of Spent Fuel Management

Section G Safety of Spent Fuel Management
The Government of Japan regulates spent fuel management on the activity basis inaccordance with the Reactor Regulation Act. Specifically, in the licensing process of a nuclear
activity, the facility to be used for the proposed activity, i.e. a reactor facility that generates
spent fuel, an independent spent fuel storage facility or a reprocessing facility, is required todemonstrate its adequateness in terms of nuclear disaster prevention. This requirement isapplied to the whole facility including its spent fuel storage sub-facility.
The major safety functions required for the handling and storage of spent fuel within a facility
are "confinement of radioactive materials", "shielding of radiations", "prevention of criticality"and "removal of residual heat" which are common requirements of the laws and regulations
governing any kind of spent-fuel-related activity.
Spent fuel storage activity became practical when the Reactor Regulation Act was amended
in 1999. The first licensing application in Japan was filed in March 2007 by Recyclable-Fuel
Storage Company, for a spent fuel storage facility outside of nuclear power station to store
spent fuel intermediately before reprocessing. This application was approved in May 2010,
and, based on the approval, construction of the facility began in August 2010, aiming tocommence operation in July 2012. The spent fuel storage facility, currently under construction,is the “Recyclable-Fuel Storage Center” (in Mutsu City of Aomori Prefecture. See Fig.L5-1,
L5-2) which is planned to store spent fuel in metallic dry casks (See Fig. L5-3), which will also
be used for transportation. The capacity of the Storage Center will be ca. 3,000 tons in total of
ca. 2,600 tons and ca. 400 tons for BWR and PWR spent fuels, respectively.
Since the Reactor Regulation Act requires almost same safety regulatory procedures for all
types of spent fuel management activities, the explanation on the procedures in this Section
focuses on “spent fuel storage activity”.
The regulatory flow for spent fuel storage is shown in Fig.G-1.

105GSite selection

Safety of Spent Fuel Management

Application for License
Safety Review

LicenseDesign & construction

Application for Design and Construction
Approval of Design and Construction
Welding
Inspection

Pre-service
Inspection

Application for Welding Inspection
Application for Pre-service Inspection
Approval of Operational Safety Program
Approval of Physical Protection Program

Periodic Facility
Inspection
Physical Protection
Inspection

Approval of Decommissioning Program

Application for Decommissioning
Completion Confirmation
Confirmation of Decommissioning
Completion

Fig. G-1 Regulatory Flow for Spent Fuel Storage106

Periodic Safety Review

Operation

Operational Safety
Inspection

DecommissioningGSafety of Spent Fuel Management

G1 General safety requirements
Article 4
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of spent fuelmanagement, individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiologicalhazards.
In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during spent fuel management are
adequately addressed;(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste associated with spent fuel management is kept tothe minimum practicable, consistent with the type of fuel cycle policy adopted;(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel management;(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at thenational level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of
its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards;(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with spent fuelmanagement;(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greaterthan those permitted for the current generation;(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.

G1.1 Prevention of criticality and removal of residual heat
In Japan, spent fuel is handled and/or stored in commercial nuclear power plants,
reprocessing facilities and spent fuel storage facilities. The Reactor Regulation Act requires
an applicant for license for such activity to demonstrate that the location, structures andsystems of the facility to be used for the activity are adequate for preventing a
nuclear-material-related disaster. Spent fuel storage facilities are licensed as spent fuelstorage business, while the spent fuel facilities associated with the commercial power reactor
facilities and reprocessing facilities are licensed as the associated facilities of each facility.
When applying for permission for a spent fuel storage license, the applicant is required by the
Reactor Regulation Act to demonstrate that the structures and systems of the proposed spent
fuel storage facility, especially those for “prevention of spent fuel criticality” and “heat removalof spent fuel”, are safety-designed so as not to hinder disaster prevention.
In addition, prior to actually starting construction of the licensed spent fuel storage facility, theapplicant has to obtain approval of the Minister of METI for design and construction plan.
The Minister gives approval after confirming that the design and construction plan isconsistent with the licensed design and is in compliance with applicable technical standards.
These standards provide safety requirements such as to take adequate measures to maintain
sub-criticality of spent fuel, for instance, through geometrically safe configurations and toprovide systems capable of safe removal of decay heat of spent fuel.
During construction, the facility must undergo the pre-service inspection conducted by the
Minister of METI, pursuant to the Reactor Regulation Act. This inspection is conducted tomake sure that the construction works are being carried out in accordance with the approved
design and construction plan and the performance of the facility meets the requirements of thetechnical standard. The facility has to get through this inspection to be put into operation. The
operator must also undergo the welding inspection of the facility. The operator cannot pass
the welding inspection unless it is confirmed that the welding works are being carried out inaccordance with the method approved by the Minister of METI and that the requirements ofthe technical standard are met.
Spent fuel is stored in the depositories that are associated with a reactor facility or
reprocessing facility as well as in an independent spent fuel storage facility. Such associatedstorage facilities are regulated similarly by the laws and regulations governing the relevant
activities.

107

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Safety of Spent Fuel Management

As above, it is ensured in spent fuel management in Japan that criticality and removal ofresidual heat generated during spent fuel management are adequately addressed.
In the spent fuel pool in each unit of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of TEPCO, which were sufferedof the Tohoku District – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake, the water level continued to drop on
account of the evaporation of water caused by the heat of the spent fuel in the absence of thepool water cooling system, due to the loss of power supply. Water injection to the spent fuelpool was carried out by the Self-Defense Forces, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency
and the National Police Agency, using helicopters and water cannon trucks. Concrete pumptrucks were ultimately secured, which led to stable water injection using freshwater fromnearby reservoirs after the initial seawater injection.
Although the water in the spent fuel pool is usually cooled by releasing heat to the sea, whichis the ultimate heat-sink, using FPC (spent fuel pool cooling and clean-up system), coolingfailed due to the function loss of both the seawater pumps and the external power supply. In
Units 1, 3 and 4, since the upper parts of their buildings were damaged, in order to tentatively
secure the cooling function, efforts were made to maintain the proper water levels by water
injection with external hosing, which was conducted using the Self-Defense Force‘shelicopters, water cannon trucks, and seawater supply system against fire and squirt fireengines of Emergency Fire Response Teams. Since Unit 4 had the greatest decay heat andthe fastest decrease in water level due to evaporation, special attention was paid to it tomaintain the proper water level. On the other hand, Unit 2‘s building remained undamaged,
and this was thought to suppress the decrease in water level to some extent as evaporated
steam condensed on the building‘s ceiling; efforts were made to recover the water supply line
while maintaining the water level by hosing the opening of the building. On and after March 20,
water injection began from the primary water supply line. In Units 5 and 6, the power supply
was secured from Unit 6's emergency DG, and the cooling function was also secured using
the temporary seawater pump, allowing the spent fuel pool and the reactor to be alternately
cooled.
Subsequently, heat exchangers were installed in Units 2 and 3, after the normal lines wererecovered aiming to achieve stable cooling of spent fuel. Finally, circulating cooling wasestablished on May 31 and June 30, respectively in Unit 2 and Unit 3. Water injection via thenormal line began on May 29 in Unit 1, and an external water injection system was installed in
Unit 4 as an alternative to the normal line on June 17. Circulating cooling was also started in
Unit 1 on August 10 and in Unit 4 on July 31, and thus the target of Step 1 for all the Units has
been achieved. Currently the water temperature of Unit 1 through Unit 3 are stabilized ataround 30 degrees Celsius and the water temperature of Unit 4 is also stabilized at around 40
degrees Celsius.
On April 13, in accordance with the laws and regulations, NISA requested TEPCO to report
the results of the seismic safety evaluation of the current situation of the reactor buildings, etc.
and also the results of investigation concerning seismic reinforcement works conducted asnecessary, because the exterior walls of the reactor buildings of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
were severely damaged due to hydrogen explosion and fires, etc.
In response to the report on Units 1 and 4 submitted by TEPCO on May 28, NISA set out thestrict conservative conditions. For example, NISA requested to assume in the seismic
evaluation that the damaged and collapsed part of the building does not exist, and thus theweight of such part is supported only by the floor of the lower level. In the meantime, NISA
confirmed that the reactor buildings of Units 1 and 4, and the spent fuel storage pool of Unit 4
maintained their functions against the basic design ground motion which was established inpursuant to the Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor
Facilities. Furthermore, reinforcement work has been carried out and completed on July 31 at
the bottom of the spent fuel storage pool of Unit 4, aiming to increase the margin as themeasures to reinforce bearing resistance against the load imposed from above.
Results of seismic safety evaluation conducted by TEPCO will also be strictly checked for thereactor building and the spent fuel storage pool of Unit 3, and the reactor buildings of Units 2,108

Safety of Spent Fuel Management

5 and 6.
No significant damage has been assumed to exist concerning spent fuel stored in the pools,
judging from the observation by underwater camera and pool water monitoring results.
Sufficient amount of water is being injected steadily into the spent fuel storage pools so thatcooling and shielding is secured.
G1.2 Minimization of the generation of radioactive waste
Japanese laws and regulations do not require to minimize the radioactive waste amount,however, the capacities of radioactive waste storage facilities such as those in reprocessing
facility etc. as well as the capacities of radioactive waste disposal sites are limited and, whichleads to a common understanding of the necessity to reduce the radioactive waste
generation.
In Japan, spent fuel is reprocessed to recycle valuable nuclear materials and it is understoodthat reprocessing of spent fuel is more effective than direct disposal in reducing the amount ofhigh level radioactive wastes.
Licensees are striving to minimize the amount of radioactive wastes generated from theiractivities by appropriate measures such as evaporating and concentrating liquid radioactive
wastes and incinerating solid radioactive wastes.
By establishing the clearance system, materials of insignificant radiation level, which are partof concrete and metals generated from decommissioning of nuclear facilities, can be released
from regulatory control of radioactive wastes as clearance materials, and recycle of suchmaterials can result in reduction of radioactive waste amount.
G1.3 Interdependencies among the different steps in spent fuel management
Spent fuel is generated in a reactor facility, temporally stored there and then transported tospent fuel storage facility or reprocessing facility. Spent fuel that was stored in a spent fuelstorage facilities is also transferred to reprocessing facility. In reprocessing facility, spent fuelis stored for a certain period and finally reprocessed.
The information such as specifications and irradiation record of spent fuel is shared among
the licensees of the different steps in spent fuel management and the facilities for those steps
are designed considering forms, burn-up, cooling term and other properties of spent fuel. For
getting license, applicant is required by the relevant laws and regulations to clearly show thespecifications of spent fuel that will be handled and thus it is ensured that safety is not
impaired through the different steps in spent fuel management.
G1.4 Protection of individuals, society and the environment
Description on radiation protection for the safety of spent fuel management is provided in F4.
G1.5

Biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with spent fuelmanagement

The Reactor Regulation Act requires that nuclear facilities are adequate for preventing adisaster that involves radioactive materials. For getting license, any spent fuel management
facility, i.e. reactor facility, spent fuel storage facility or reprocessing facility, has to take into
account the measures against the events that may affect the facility, such as leakage ofradioactive materials, fire, explosion and earthquake, to prevent radiological effects on the
public and employees. These measures have to be considered also in the detailed facility
design to get approval for the design and construction plan. Such consideration as well as
subsequent pre-service inspection ensures that the hazards that may affect spent fuel
109

G

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Safety of Spent Fuel Management

management are duly taken into account.
G1.6 To avoid imposing impacts on future generations
The Government of Japan, in the Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy in 2005, makes it abasis of its nuclear energy policy to establish a national nuclear fuel cycle in which spent fuelis reprocessed in order to make effective use of uranium resources. Spent fuel generated by
nuclear power plant is considered as a useful recyclable fuel resource, so that all the spent
fuel is reprocessed and recyclable fuel is re-used as nuclear fuel. There is no fuel stored infuture generations thus no greater impacts than those permitted for the current generation will
be considered.
G1.7 To avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations
The laws and regulations require to ensure the costs for spent fuel reprocessing, etc. not to
impose undue burdens on future generations. (See Section B)

110

Safety of Spent Fuel Management

G2 Existing facilities
Article 5
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to review the safety of any spent fuelmanagement facility existing at the time the Convention enters into force for that Contracting Party andto ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable improvements are made to upgrade the safety ofsuch a facility.

G2.1 Review the safety of existing spent fuel management facility
Periodic Assessment is implemented in Japan to maintain the safety of nuclear facilities. The
Rule for Interim Storage of Spent Fuel requires to make assessments, at an interval of notexceeding 10 years, of the safety activities at the spent fuel storage facility and theintroduction of the latest technological knowledge into the safety. It is also required to make atechnical assessment of aging degradation and to develop a 10-year maintenance plan for the
spent fuel storage facility based on the aging assessment, before the operation period
reaches 20 years.
The regulatory body conducts the following inspections for the spent fuel management
facilities attached to nuclear facilities. Up to now, no major modification of facility has beensuggested by those inspections for continuous operation.
1. Periodic Inspection of Facility
The regulatory body conducts the Periodic Inspection of Facility once a year (once every 13
months in the case of commercial power plants) to confirm if the performance of the facilities
and equipment complies with the technical standards prescribed by laws and ordinances.
2. Operational Safety Inspection
The regulatory body conducts the Operational Safety Inspection by a resident Nuclear Safety
Inspector four times a year to confirm operators’ compliance with the Operational Safety
Program.
3.

Responses to other nuclear power stations based on the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi
Nuclear Power Station of TEPCO
In the accident, the loss of power supplies led to failure of the cooling for the spent fuel pool.
The operators, under instructions from NISA, in order to maintain cooling of the spent fuelpool even when power supplies had been lost, deployed alternative/external cooling water
injection devices for the spent fuel pools (pump tucks, fire engines, hoses, coupling parts,etc.), ensured the capacity of freshwater tanks, and arranged feedwater lines that take waterfrom the sea.Beyond this, they plan to undertake seismic reinforcement of the cooling piping
system for the spent fuel pool, etc. as future efforts.
(1) Instructions on emergency safety measures
On March 30, 2011, NISA instructed all electric power companies and related organizations to
implement emergency safety measures at all NPSs in order to prevent the occurrence of
nuclear disasters and core damage, etc. caused by tsunami-triggered total AC power loss, on
the basis of the latest knowledge gained from the accident at the Fukushima NPSs. On May 6,
NISA carried out on-site inspections at all NPSs (except the Onagawa NPS, Fukushima
Dai-ichi and Fukushima Dai-ni NPS), and confirmed that emergency safety measures wereappropriately implemented at these NPSs. On June 1, NISA confirmed that work to prepare
against tsunamis was appropriately implemented at Onagawa NPS, where such work wasdelayed after it was hit by the tsunamis. Regarding the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, which
achieved a stable condition after cold shutdown on April 21, NISA also instructed the NPS to
implement emergency safety measures, and received an implementation status report from it
on May 20.
Moreover, on May 1, NISA requested reprocessing operators to implement emergency safety
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measures in the event of loss of all systems that supply AC power, all systems that remove
decay heat and all facility for preventing an accumulation of hydrogen, due to tsunamis andother events. As a result, NISA received each report on the status of implementation fromJAEA on May 31 and JNFL on May 31. NISA confirmed, on June 15, that their emergency
safety measures have been appropriately implemented through on-the-spot inspections, etc.
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. is considered to be an
extremely imminent danger as evaluated the anticipated Tokai Earthquake by the
Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion of the Ministry of MEXT, which anticipates
an 87 percent probability of a magnitude 8-level earthquake occurring in the region within 30
years. Given the high possibility of Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station being hit by a major
tsunami following this earthquake, on May 6, based on the decision that the public safety is
the first priority NISA has requested Chubu Electric Power to shut down all the reactors of
Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station until the enough protective measures against tsunami for
middle and long term like a tide embankment, etc., are completed. Chubu Electric Power Co.,
Inc. accepted the request and stopped the operation of all plants by May 14.
(2) Instructions on severe accident measures
On June 7, 2011, NISA directed each Electric Utility, etc. to implement immediate actions toundertake the preparatory measures regarding the response to a severe accident at all the
nuclear power stations in order to implement the measures that should be immediately takenin the event of a severe accident in addition to the preventive measures against a severe
accident. On June 18, NISA confirmed that the measures against a severe accident havebeen appropriately implemented by conducting on-the-spot inspections, etc.
Moreover, on June 15, 2011, NISA directed reprocessing plant operators (JNFL and JAEA) to
implement the necessary measures at the reprocessing plants, based on the measuresagainst a severe accident at nuclear power stations, and received these report on theimplementation status from the reprocessing plant operators. On July 8, NISA confirmed thatthe measures against a severe accident at the reprocessing plants, based on the measuresagainst a severe accident at nuclear power stations have been appropriately implemented
through on-the-spot inspections, etc.
(3)

Implementation of comprehensive safety evaluation of existing commercial powerreactor facilities
Regarding NPS’s resuming operations after the regular inspections, many others questioned
NISA’s safety assessments, thus making it difficult to say that sufficient acceptance has beenobtained from the public and local residents. In this context, aiming to further improve safety
at NPSs and to reassure and regain public trust in terms of nuclear safety, the Japanese
government announced on July 11 that the government will implement safety assessments
based on new procedures and rules including the participation of NSC, basically by making
use of the knowledge and experiences of the stress tests implemented in European countries.
As a result NISA prepared comprehensive assessment procedures and implementation planand reported to NSC. NSC approved them on July 21. On July 22 NISA requested eachElectric Utility, etc. to perform comprehensive safety evaluation of commercial power reactor
facilities based on them and to report the results to NISA.
In such evaluation, each Electric Utility, etc. is required to assess safety margin based on the
scenario leading ultimately to core damage, assuming either the earthquake/tsunamis withthe scale exceeding what is supposed in design, or station blackout, or loss of cooling
functions, and also multiple failures of respective components in the scenario.
Concerning nuclear fuel cycle facilities, implementation of such evaluation will be separately
considered.

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G3 Siting of proposed facilities
Article 6
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are establishedand implemented for a proposed spent fuel management facility:(i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a facility during its
operating lifetime;(ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment;(iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to members of the public;(iv) to consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to beaffected by that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to thefacility to enable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities
shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance withthe general safety requirements of Article 4.

G3.1 Evaluation of site-related factors
In Japan, evaluation of relevant site-related factors and safety impact of the proposed facility
is conducted during the licensing process of each activity. The criteria for the license are that“granting of the license does not impair the planned implementation of the nuclear
development and utilization programs; the applicant has adequate technical capability andfinancial basis to appropriately carry out the proposed activity; and the location, structure andsystems of the proposed facility does not impair the prevention of the hazards due to nuclear
fuel materials or the materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials”. The specificevaluation items for the technical capability and the prevention of hazards are specified in a
guides developed by NSC and are used for the review of an application by the regulatory
body.
One who plans to operate a spent fuel storage facility has to be licensed by the Minister of
METI in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
The license application document must include the descriptions on “the type and storage
capacity of spent fuel to be stored”, “the location, structure and systems of the spent fuelstorage facility and the storage method”, and “the method for removing spent fuel after thetermination of storage”. The document must be supplemented by explanatory materials on“the conditions of meteorology, ground structure, hydrology, seismology, social environment at
the site of the proposed spent fuel storage facility” and “the safety design of spent fuel storage
facility”. With these information, the applicant is required to make an evaluation of site
conditions for the spent fuel storage facility.
METI examines the application form and confirms that “granting of the license does not impair
the planned implementation of the nuclear development and utilization programs"; "theapplicant has adequate technical capability and financial basis to appropriately carry out the
proposed activity"; and "the location, structure and systems of the proposed facility does not
impair the prevention of the hazards due to nuclear fuel materials or the materials
contaminated with nuclear fuel materials” as provided by the Reactor Regulation Act. Basedon this confirmation, the Minister grants the license after hearing the option of JAEC and NSC.
NSC established "Safety Review Guide for Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facility using Metallic
Dry Casks" (See Section L Table G5-1), which is being applied to the safety evaluation of the
spent fuel interim storage facility currently under safety review.
The above Guide provides that the following matters shall be taken into account as basic
siting conditions to ensure the safety of the facility.
<Natural phenomena>(1) Natural phenomena such as earthquake, tsunami, landslide, depression, typhoon,
high tide, flooding, abnormal cold weather and heavy snow(2) Geological conditions and landform etc. such as foundation condition, soil bearing
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capacity and faults,(3) Meteorological conditions such as wind direction, wind velocity and precipitation(4) Hydrospheric and hydrologic conditions such as rivers and underground water<Social environment>(1) Fires and explosions at a neighboring factory etc.
(2) Missiles etc. by air craft crash etc.
(3) Conditions of land use in relation to food production such as agriculture, livestock
farming and fishery industry, and conditions of population distribution etc.
G3.2 Information for general public
The license application documents and other related information are made open to the public
at the Nuclear Energy Library and at the Nuclear Library Room of JNES, except for the
information relevant to nondisclosure causes such as safeguards and commercial
sensitiveness. Such information is also accessible and available at the National Diet Library. A
document requested to an administrative agency under the ”Act on Access to Information held
by Administrative Organs“ is also disclosed in accordance with the provisions of the Act,
unless it is subject to nondisclosure causes.
G3.3 Relation with neighboring contracting parties
The government of Japan does not have it a rule to consult the neighboring countries about
siting of nuclear facilities. The Government of Japan provides neighboring countries withinformation on nuclear energy through bilateral consultation, etc. The government of Japan
will release information promptly in the case when any significant event has occurred at any of
nuclear installation in Japan.

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G4 Design and Construction of facilities
Article 7
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility provide for suitable measures tolimit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment, including those fromdischarges or uncontrolled releases;(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for thedecommissioning of a spent fuel management facility are taken into account;(iii) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a spent fuel management facility
are supported by experience, testing or analysis.

G4.1 Prevention of radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment
A licensee for nuclear reactor establishment, spent fuel storage or reprocessing mustdescribe the design and construction methods for the relevant spent fuel storage facility in theapplication document for the approval of the design and construction methods for the
proposed facility and must attach a document demonstrating the conformity of design andconstruction methods to the technical standards applicable to the proposed facility, pursuant
to the Reactor Regulation Act. The Minister of METI examines the application and gives
approval after confirming that the design and construction methods are consistent with the"contents of license” and the “technical standards” provided in the Reactor Regulation Act.
The "technical standards for the design and construction methods” for spent fuel storage
facility provides the standards for confinement function, shielding, etc., to prevent radiation
hazards (See Annex L: Table G4-1).
The design, construction and inspection of a commercial nuclear power reactor facility isgoverned by the “Electricity Business Act” instead of the “Reactor Regulation Act”, but therequirements are essentially the same.
G4.2 Provisions for the decommissioning of a spent fuel management facility at the design
stage
Reactor facility and reprocessing facility as well as spent fuel storage facility have spent fuelstorage system which is regulated by the Reactor Regulation Act and other relevant laws
individually for each activity. When abolishing the facility, the operator has to establish adecommissioning program and get the approval for it from the Minister of METI.
G4.3 Technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a spent fuel management
facilityAt the stage of design and construction, a licensee applies the proven technologies inside andoutside Japan.
The regulatory body is promoting the studies on the safety of nuclear facilities, environmental
radiations and radioactive waste. The safety studies on nuclear facilities are being conductedwith the objectives to respond to the expansion and diversification of future nuclear
development and utilization and to promote the public consensus on the safety of nuclear
facilities. In particular, the studies for developing safety standards, safety guides andreference documents for safety review and the studies for safety improvement are being
conducted by JAEA, JNES, CRIEPI and other institutes. For example, JNES is conducting thedevelopment of the standards, the long-term integrity tests, and the development andimprovement of safety analysis codes for the interim storage facility of spent fuel, and CRIEPI
is conducting the studies on the long-term integrity test for interim storage equipment, etc.
In the process of safety review of nuclear facilities, the regulatory body conducts, as
appropriate, independent analyses to confirm the validity of applicant’s safety analysis results.
A recent example related to this Convention is that the regulatory body conducted

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independent analyses for criticality, shielding, heat removal, structures and seismic design asa part of the safety review for the license application of the Recyclable-Fuel Storage Center.

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G5 Assessment of safety of facilities
Article 8
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) before construction of a spent fuel management facility, a systematic safety assessment and an
environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering its
operating lifetime shall be carried out;(ii) before the operation of a spent fuel management facility, updated and detailed versions of thesafety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemednecessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).

G5.1 Safety and environmental assessment of a spent fuel management facility
In Japan, activities concerning the spent fuel storage within reactor facilities, spent fuelstorage facilities, and reprocessing facilities are corresponding to spent fuel management
defined in the Convention. These activities are individually subject to the license under theReactor Regulation Act. An applicant for an each license carries out a systematic safetyassessment and an assessment of radiological impacts on the environment, including theassessment of the meteorology, ground structure, hydraulic phenomena, earthquake, social
environments around the site and safety design of the facility. On the basis of suchassessments, the regulatory body examines the appropriateness of siting and basic design ofthe facility, systems and components from the viewpoint of hazard prevention.
The guide "Safety Review Guide for Spent Fuel Interim Storage Facility using Metallic Dry
Casks" provides for radiation control, environmental safety, criticality safety and other safetymeasures assuming 40-60 year period of spent fuel storage.
G5.2 Update of safety and environmental assessment of a spent fuel management facility
The Reactor Regulation Act provides for the procedures for "licensing and notification ofmodification" to appropriately address a change of the descriptions in the application
documents for the license granted in accordance with the Act. Thus the procedures are inplace for updating and detailing the safety assessment and environmental assessment when
deemed necessary to complement those assessments.

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G6 Operation of facilities
Article 9
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the licence to operate a spent fuel management facility is based upon appropriate assessments as
specified in Article 8 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning programmedemonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements;(ii) operational limits and conditions derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments,
as specified in Article 8, are defined and revised as necessary;(iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a spent fuel management facility are
conducted in accordance with established procedures;(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available throughout the operating
lifetime of a spent fuel management facility;(v) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the licence to theregulatory body;(vi) programmes to collect and analyze relevant operating experience are established and that theresults are acted upon, where appropriate;(vii) decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility are prepared and updated, as
necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility, and are reviewed
by the regulatory body.

G6.1 Permission to operate a spent fuel management facility
The Reactor Regulation Act provides that spent fuel storage facility shall not be used before
getting through the inspections conducted by the Minister of METI for the construction andperformance of the facility. The facility passes the pre-serve inspection only if it is confirmedthat "the construction has been done in accordance with the approved design andconstruction plan" and "the performance of the facility meets the technical standards for
performance". "The technical standards for performance" are specified by the Minister of
METI as follows:y The alarm system, emergency power supply system and other emergency systems
and interlocks (devices to actuate the systems or equipment only under specificconditions) described in the license application documents or their annexes shall
operate reliably under the conditions described in those documents.
y The radioactive waste disposal systems shall have more capability than described in
the license application documents or their annexes.
y The main radiation control systems shall the capability described in the license
application documents or their annexes.
y Dose equivalent rate and concentrations of airborne radioactive materials in thealways-manned areas of the spent fuel storage facility, the areas with workers during
the operation of the facility, and other areas that require radiation control shall be lessthan those described in the license application documents or their annexes.
y Capabilities for preventing spent fuel from reaching criticality and for confining spent
fuel and spent-fuel-contaminated materials within restricted areas shall meet thecapabilities described in the license application documents or their annexes.
The same steps as described above for spent fuel storage facility are taken also for reactor
facility and reprocessing facility that are within the scope of spent fuel management facilities
defined in this Convention.
As described above, steps are taken in Japan to ensure that the license to operate a spent
fuel storage facility is based upon appropriate assessments as specified in Article 8 and isconditional on the completion of the pre-service inspection demonstrating that the facility, as
constructed, is consistent with design and safety requirements.

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G6.2 Operational limits and conditions
The operator regulated by the Reactor Regulation Act must establish “Operational Safety
Program” and obtain approval before starting operation of the facility. The Operational Safety
Program have to specify concrete steps for operation of the facility, checks and themaintenance of the facility, radiation monitoring and quality assurance and so on. The
operation and maintenance of the facility have to be performed in accordance with the specificoperational limits defined in the Operational Safety Program. The operator must undergo
quarterly inspection (Operational Safety Inspection) by the regulatory body to confirm thecompliance with the Operational Safety Program. In addition, the conformity of the facility
performance to prescribed technical standards and measures for the maintenance of the
facility are confirmed by annual periodic inspection of the facility and other inspections. Whenany violation is found by those inspections, the Minister of METI may order the operator totake necessary safety steps such as suspension of operation, modification, repair, or
instruction on the facility operation.
G6.3

Operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a spent fuelmanagement facility

When operating a spent fuel storage facility, the operator must take safety steps for“maintenance of spent fuel storage facility”, “operation of spent fuel storage facility ” and“transportation of spent fuel or transportation, storage and disposal of the materials
contaminated with spent fuel” in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
As safety steps, “access control to controlled areas”, “measures for radiation dose”, “patrol
and inspection of spent fuel storage facility”, “periodical self-inspection of spent fuel storage
facility”, “operation of spent fuel storage facility”, “on-site transportation”, “on-site waste
management”, and “Periodical Safety Review of spent fuel storage facility” are provided in a
relevant ministerial ordinance.
The operator must establish its Operational Safety Program covering the above steps andobtain approval of the Minister of METI before starting operation of the facility. (Items to be
described in the Operational Safety Program are shown in the Annex L Table G6-1.)
In addition, operator must undergo Operational Safety Inspection conducted quarterly by the
Minister of METI to check the status of compliance with the Operational Safety Program.
The same steps are taken also for reactor facility and reprocessing facility that are within thescope of spent fuel management facilities defined in this Convention.
G6.4 Measures for ensuring that engineering and technical support in all safety-related
fields is available in the period of operation of spent fuel management facility
During operation of a facility, the regulatory body obtains engineering and technical advice ofexpert committees on operational management, inspection and radiation control and feeds it
back, when necessary, to the safety regulation on operation and maintenance.
For example, NISA has a system to collect experts' engineering and technical advice throughthe deliberations on the specific safety regulation policies by the advisory councils set up
under the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural
Resources and Energy.
The joint working group consisting of the members of the “interim storage working group of
the nuclear fuel cycle safety subcommittee” and “transport working group”, established under
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural
Resources and Energy performed an inspection to confirm integrity of metallic casks andcontents during storage of spent fuel at the interim storage facility, and studied the reasonable
method of pre-shipment inspection for the transport of casks after the completion of storage.
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In addition, because the license for the transport of metallic casks remains to be valid
throughout the period while spent fuel is stored at the interim storage facility, consistent
management of these regulations was also considered, and organized in the report publishedin June 2009.*1 On the basis of this report, the regulatory body revised the relevant ordinance,
and allowed a Holistic Approach to be taken, by which metallic casks can be shipped without
confinement function of the lids etc being lost, during and after the storage period of spent fuelat the interim storage facility.
*1: “Long-term integrity of metallic dry casks and their contents at the spent fuel interim
storage facility using metallic dry casks” [June 2009, the “interim storage working groupof the nuclear fuel cycle safety subcommittee” and “transport working group” of the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural
Resources and Energy)]
G6.5 Report to the regulatory body in a timely manner by the licensee
The Reactor Regulation Act provides that an operator shall report without delay the status of
the event and other necessary matters when an accident accompanying personal injury(including the case with potential personal injury) or a failure or other event has occurred in areactor facility, a spent fuel storage facility, or a reprocessing facility. Reportable events are
specified by a ministerial ordinance that regulates the business concerned. Examples ofreportable events are shown in the Section L table G6-3.
G6.6 Programs to collect and analyze relevant operating experience
Upon receipt of a report on an accident or failure, the regulatory body immediately makes it
open, examines and evaluates the status of cause investigation and recurrence-prevention
measures and publicizes the results. The information on the accident or failure is further
investigated to extract lessons on safety and to improve safety regulation as appropriate.
For the accumulation of information, NISA instructs JNES to maintain a system to collect andevaluate domestic and overseas safety information. The accumulated information is shared
between NISA and JNES through the meeting regularly held to appropriately feed back theinformation to a regulatory response or its follow-up.
As for international information exchange, Japan shares accident/failure information throughcooperation with international organizations such as IAEA and OECD/NEA as well as throughbilateral cooperation.
The electric utilities collect and analyze domestic and overseas information on operating
experiences in their own companies and in the Central Research Institute of Electric Power
Industry. The electric utilities established the Nuclear Information Archive “NUCIA”, as a toolfor national sharing of safety information about domestic commercial nuclear power plants
including information on minor events, and released to the public on internet(http://www.nucia.jp/) in October 2003. The electric utilities exchange information on operating
experience with foreign counterparts through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations(INPO) and the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO) Tokyo Center. In addition,
each electric utility has information exchange agreements with reactor manufacturers andelectric utilities in France, Germany, the United States and other countries to collectinformation. Based of recognition of the importance of safety information sharing andcultivation of safety culture throughout the nuclear industry, a private organization "NS Net"
was established in December 1999 jointly by concerned bodies to make continuous activities
including peer reviews. NUCIA and NS Net were integrated into the Japan Nuclear
Technology Institute (formerly, an intermediate corporation limited, presently, a generalincorporated association) in April 2005 and have been actively continuing their activities.

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G6.7 Decommissioning plans for a spent fuel management facility
An operator that plans to abolish its facility must take necessary steps for “decommissioning”
such as dismantling of the facility, assignment of nuclear fuel material inventory and disposalof materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials, pursuant to the Reactor Regulation Act.
For that purpose, the operator has to establish a “decommissioning program” and obtain an
approval of the Minister of METI for it.
The criteria for approving decommissioning program are that all nuclear fuel materials havebeen removed from the facility; nuclear fuel materials are appropriately assigned; nuclear fuelmaterials and materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials are appropriately managed
and disposed; decommissioning work is appropriately implemented in a way to prevent a
hazard due to nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials, as
provided in the Reactor Regulation Act. The information obtained during operation of the
facility to be decommissioned should be used for the management and disposal ofcontaminated material and hazard prevention. Therefore, the decommissioning program isdeveloped by using the information obtained during the operating period of the facility. The
procedures for “Approval for Modification of Decommissioning Program” are provided by therelevant ordinance to allow update of the decommissioning program when necessary. In
addition, the process of approval for decommissioning program ensures that the plan isreviewed by the regulatory body.

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122Safety of Radioactive Waste Management

Section H Safety of Radioactive Waste Management
In Japan, activity related to radioactive waste consists of following activities; waste treatment,
storage and disposal. Waste treatment means all activities that relate to the handling,
pretreatment, treatment, conditioning, or on-site storage of radioactive waste. Radioactive
waste management in all Japanese nuclear facilities including nuclear reactor facility andreprocessing facility is in the scope of the Convention. Since the waste management in a fuelprocessing facility, spent fuel storage facility and reprocessing facility is governed by thesimilar safety regulation system to that for regulations concerning waste disposal or storage
activities, the regulations concerning waste disposal or storage activities is described in thissection as a representative, unless specially noted. The design, construction and inspectionof a commercial nuclear power reactor is governed by the “Electricity Business Act” instead of
the “Reactor Regulation Act”. The requirements of both Acts are essentially the same.
Therefore, this section describes the safety regulation of “waste disposal and waste storage.”
In Japan radioactive wastes are grouped into HLW that is generated from spent fuelreprocessing and the rest, LLW. The LLW is further classified into TRU waste which is
generated from operation and dismantling of reprocessing facilities or MOX fuel fabrication
facilities, “uranium waste” which is generated mainly from nuclear fuel fabrication facilities,“waste from power reactors” which is generated from nuclear power plants, and “waste fromresearch facilities, etc.” which is generated from research facilities, medical care facilities, etc.
Depending on radioactivity characteristics of radioactive waste to be disposed of and on theconditions of geological environment, radioactive waste is finally disposed of with any of the“geological disposal” in a stable geologic stratum, “intermediate depth disposal” in theunderground deeper than 50 meters, “near surface pit disposal” in a structure such asconcrete pit in relatively shallow underground near the surface and the “near surface trenchdisposal” directly in shallow underground (See Fig. L6-1). Wastes with very low radioactivity
concentration which does not need to be dealt with as radioactive waste (wastes cleared from
regulation) can be exempted from the radioactive waste control, after confirmed by theregulatory body.
The HLW is a stabilized waste in the form of “vitrified waste.” The liquid effluent containing
fission products separated through the spent fuel reprocessing process is solidified with glass
frit at an elevated temperature and put into a stainless steel canister and sealed to form
vitrified waste. The vitrified waste is stored for 30 to 50 years for cooling in the specific waste
storage facility, and then finally disposed of (geological disposal, See Fig. L6-4), being
isolated from the environment.
Highly radioactive TRU waste is to be geologically disposal of like high level radioactive waste,
and is regulated in the same way.
Geological disposal deals with high radioactive TRU waste containing many long-lived
nuclides that require very careful radiation control (See Fig. L6-4). Since HLW needs to beisolated from the environment over a long period of time, enhanced regulatory procedures areapplied, in addition to the safety regulation for LLW, to ensure reliable closure of anunderground facility through approval of a closure program and confirmation that the steps
have been taken as described in the approved closure program.
Low radioactive TRU wastes generated from the operation and disassembling of reprocessing
facility or MOX fuel fabrication facility and power-plant wastes are finally disposed of with anyof the “subsurface disposal (See Fig. L6-3-1)”, “near surface pit disposal (See Fig. L6-2)” or“near surface trench disposal”, depending on the radioactive nuclides and their radioactivity
concentration, and stepwise control is conducted according to radioactive decay.
At present, as the first step operation, Waste from Research Facilities, etc. is to be disposedof by the method of “near surface trench disposal” or “near surface pit disposal”
Figure H-1 shows the safety regulation process for Category 1 disposal and Category 2123

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disposal.
Following partial amendment of the Radiation Disease Prevention Act in May 2010, MEXT
has introduced Clearance System.
Category 2 Waste Disposal(other than geological disposal)

Category 1 Waste Disposal(geological disposal)

2

Confirmation of
Disposal Facility

Confirmation ofWaste Package

Confirmation ofWaste Package

Operational
Safety Inspection

Operational
Safety Inspection

Physical Protection
Inspection

Operation

1

Confirmation of
Disposal Facility

Physical Protection
Inspection(only for intermediate
depth disposal)

Facility Periodic
Inspection

Approval of
Decommissioning
ProgramConfirmation of
Decommissioning

Decommissioning

Confirmation of
ClosureBackfill of shafts
and tunnels

Approval of
Closure Program

Periodic Safety Review ( only for subsurface disposal )*Pre-Service
Inspection

Basic Design

Approval of Design
and Construction

LicenseConstruction

License

Periodic Safety Review *H

Approval of
Decommissioning
ProgramConfirmation of
Decommissionin*1: At an interval not exceeding 20 years after grant of license or when closure program ordecommissioning program of auxiliary facility is planned.
*2: At an interval not exceeding 20 years after grant of license or when stage of step-wise control
advances.

Fig. H-1 Safety regulation processes for “Category 1 waste disposal” and “Category 2
waste disposal.”
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H1 General safety requirements
Article 11
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that at all stages of radioactive waste
management individuals, society and the environment are adequately protected against radiologicaland other hazards. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to:(i) ensure that criticality and removal of residual heat generated during radioactive waste
management are adequately addressed;(ii) ensure that the generation of radioactive waste is kept to the minimum practicable;(iii) take into account interdependencies among the different steps in radioactive waste management;(iv) provide for effective protection of individuals, society and the environment, by applying at thenational level suitable protective methods as approved by the regulatory body, in the framework of
its national legislation which has due regard to internationally endorsed criteria and standards;(v) take into account the biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated withradioactive waste management;(vi) strive to avoid actions that impose reasonably predictable impacts on future generations greaterthan those permitted for the current generation;(vii) aim to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations.

H1.1 Prevention of criticality and removal of residual heat
1. Measures to prevent criticality
In Japan, spent fuel is to be reprocessed and, therefore, is not dealt with as radioactive waste.
As the radioactive wastes dealt with in Japan contain almost no fissile nuclide. When there isno need to consider the criticality due to extremely low concentration of nuclear material suchas uranium-235 or plutonium-239, criticality-prevention capability is not required.
2. Measures for residual heat removal
Adequate heat removal measures are taken in every step of handling process for HLW thatgenerate decay heat.
Specifically, for the “specific waste storage” to temporarily store HLW, adequate removal of
decay heat is taken into consideration in the safety design of the facility.
HLW disposal facility is designed to prevent degradation of barrier material or waste itself byincreasing temperature by residual heat. However, through the term from acceptance of the
HLW to emplacement in underground, backfilling and closure, under some conditions of types,
quantities and concentrations of radioactive materials, significant heat could be generated byradioactive decay. If such heat could significantly degrade the containment or shielding
functions, cooling function should also be considered as appropriate.
H1.2 Minimization of generation of radioactive waste
Laws and regulations in Japan do not require the minimization of radioactive waste generation,
but the "Framework for Nuclear Energy Policy" provides for the principle of minimization ofradioactive waste generation. In addition, radioactive waste storage facilities and radioactive
waste disposal site have only limited capacities. Therefore, the necessity to minimize
radioactive waste generation is widely recognized.
In Japan, spent fuel is reprocessed to recycle valuable materials as a part of fuel cycle inaccordance with the nation’s fundamental nuclear energy policy. It is understood that
reprocessing of spent fuel is more effective than direct disposal in reducing the amount of highlevel radioactive wastes.
Operators are striving to minimize the amount of radioactive wastes generated from theoperation of their activity by appropriate measures such as evaporation/concentration of liquidradioactive wastes and incineration of solid radioactive wastes.
By establishing the clearance system, a part of concrete waste generated from thedecommissioning of a nuclear facility can be dealt with as an object cleared from regulation
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which does not need to be dealt with as radioactive waste. That can contribute to the
reduction of radioactive wastes.
H1.3 Interdependencies among the different steps in radioactive waste management
The waste treatment processes for disposal are designed considering final disposal of waste.
For example, high level vitrified radioactive waste is packed enclosed into a container called
canister, the geometry of which is designed for common handling at reprocessing facility
where the waste is generated, waste storage facility for temporary storage, and Category I
waste disposal facility for final disposal.
Radioactive waste controlled by the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, is also classified in thesimilar way in the waste processing process, considering the final disposal, etc.
H1.4 Radiation Protection based on International Standards
Japanese laws and regulations adopt the recommendations of ICRP as the criteria forradiation protection. One of the unique criteria applied to a radioactive waste disposal site is toadopt the reference dose which used after the period of its management.
The Radiation Council Basic Committee published a report, titled “the Basic Principles
Concerning Radiological Protection for Radioactive Solid Waste Disposal and Clearance,” inJanuary 2010, based on the new ICRP recommendation proposing the framework of radiation
protection for radioactive waste disposal, and the new IAEA safety requirement proposing thestandard of radiation protection of the public after the closure of near surface disposal facilities,
etc. Both of these publications were released after the Radiation Council’s former report wasissued in 1987. The Radiation Council’s recent report suggests that it is appropriate to define
the upper bounds of the public dose for the period after management of radioactive solid
waste disposal sites to be a dose constraint of 300ȝSv/year, regardless of types of thedisposal method. With regard to the criteria in which the potential exposure to long-lived
radionuclides is taken into consideration, the report suggests that it is appropriate to define
the upper bounds to be a dose constraint of 300ȝSv/year, for exposure due to naturalprocesses, regardless of types of the disposal method, and to be 20mSv/year for exposurethat the future public may receive due to inadvertent human intrusion into the radioactive solid
waste disposal site.
NSC introduced the risk-informed safety assessment in order to appropriately take into
account uncertainty associated with long-term prediction after the period for active control.
Specifically, as shown in the “Policy of the Safety Assessment of Subsurface Disposal after
the Period for Active Control” (April 2010) and the “Basic Guide for Safety Review of Category
2 Radioactive Waste Disposal” (August 2010), NSC requires the license applicants toevaluate four scenarios in the safety assessment for the period after active control. These
scenarios are related to the radiation doses to residents or intruder, depending on disposal
method, and the “target dose” set out for each scenario shall be complied. These principles
are comply with the criteria, proposed by IAEA, ICRP and other organizations in the world, tobe used for safety assessment of the repositories after the period for active control.
H1.5 Biological, chemical and other hazards that may be associated with radioactive waste
management
The Reactor Regulation Act requires that nuclear facilities shall not impair the prevention of
hazards due to nuclear fuel materials and materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials,
and also requires the measures for preventing loss of functions to confine the wastes due tovarious causes. For example, in the process of radioactive waste treatment for disposal, afabrication facility is required to use waste containers of leak-tight design to prevent leakage
of waste.
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In a reprocessing facility, various chemicals including organic solvent are used and they could
be entrained into the wastes generated at the facility. To cope with that, the “Rule on theTechnical Standard for the Design and Construction Methods of Reprocessing Facility”
provides for legal requirements, for example, for the handling of organic solvent to prevent
damages due to fire, the measures to prevent hydrogen gas generated from high level liquidradioactive waste from accumulating in a storage tank, and the storage methods of extremelyoxidizable solid waste like zirconium metallic powder.
As for a waste disposal facility, the “Rules on the Technical Standard for the Design andConstruction Methods of Specific Waste Disposal Facility or Specific Waste Storage Facility”
requires that a disposal facility shall take explosion-prevention measures for the systems tohandle or manage radioactive waste that could generate hydrogen. In addition, the law andregulation on disposal business provide necessary measures to prevent a waste package
from containing materials that could impair its integrity.
The similar measures are required by Radiation Disease Prevention Act.
H1.6 To avoid impacts on future generations
In Japan, radioactive wastes generated from the operation of individual nuclear related
activities are finally disposed of at a waste disposal site after appropriate treatment andstorage within the site. According to the safety regulation for final disposal of radioactive
waste, HLW and TRU waste containing radioactive materials that exceed the level specified in
the Enforcement Ordinance for the Reactor Regulation Act are disposed of in a stablegeological formation according to radiological characteristics and geological environment,
while the other sort of TRU waste and waste of core structures, etc. are disposed of at anintermediate depth more than 50 meters, and the other wastes are disposed of at a nearsurface pit or trench. These steps are to isolate radioactive wastes from the environment
appropriately according to their characteristics and conditions. By taking such safety
regulatory steps, it can be avoided as far as reasonably achievable to impose impacts on
future generations than those permitted for the current generation.
H1.7 To avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations
In order to avoid imposing undue burdens on future generations, the cost and management ofdisposal are legally specified. (See Section B)

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H2 Existing facilities and past practices
Article 12
Each Contracting Party shall in due course take the appropriate steps to review:(i) the safety of any radioactive waste management facility existing at the time the Convention enters
into force for that Contracting Party and to ensure that, if necessary, all reasonably practicable
improvements are made to upgrade the safety of such a facility;(ii) the results of past practices in order to determine whether any intervention is needed for reasons ofradiation protection bearing in mind that the reduction in detriment resulting from the reduction indose should be sufficient to justify the harm and the costs, including the social costs, of theintervention.

H2.1 Review the safety of existing radioactive waste management facility
In Japan, the regulatory body regularly inspects the performance of the facilities and thecompliance with the Operational Safety Program for the radioactive waste management
facilities defined in the Convention. In addition, periodic assessment system is implemented inorder to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities. For waste disposal, the ministerial ordinancegoverning such activity requires as follows:
1. Category 1 waste disposal
For the waste disposal site with geological disposal, periodic assessment of the control ofradiation exposure due to nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminated with nuclear fuelmaterials shall be performed with the latest technical knowledge at an interval not exceeding
20 years after obtaining license, and steps necessary for the preservation of the waste
disposal facility shall be taken on the basis of the assessment results. In addition, the same
steps shall be taken when a closure program or decommissioning program of auxiliary facility
is to be established.
2. Category 2 waste disposal
For the waste disposal site with intermediate depth disposal, periodic assessment of thecontrol of radiation exposure due to nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminated with
nuclear fuel materials shall be performed with the latest technical knowledge at an interval not
exceeding 20 years after obtaining license, and steps necessary for the preservation of thewaste disposal facility shall be taken on the basis of the assessment results. In addition, thesame steps shall be taken when the stages of step-wise control advances in response toradioactive decay.
The above inspections conducted up to now identified no items which should be improved forcontinuous operation of the facilities.
H2.2 Review the results of past practices
As a result of review it is found that the past practices caused neither radioactive wastes nor
nuclear facilities that require any intervention for reasons of radiation protection.
In Japan, there are small amount of waste rock and mill tailings generated by past activities(test and research) as shown below.*1
y Tunnel prospecting and mining and milling tests carried out in Ningyo Toge area,
Okayama prefecture from 1957 to 1978.
y Tunnel prospecting carried out in Togo area, Tottori prefecture from 1958 until 1962.
y Tunnel prospecting, solution mining test, and earth sciences research of geologic
environment carried out in Tono area, Gifu prefecture from 1972 until 2003.
These sites are managed as ceased mine under the Mine Safety Law. The amounts of waste
rock and mill tailings are shown in Table H2-1.
For radiation protection, these sites are managed under the Mine Safety Law so as not toexceed 1mSv/year at the boundary of peripheral monitoring area.

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Table H2-1 The amounts of waste rock and mill tailings*
Area
Classification
Volumewaste rockabout 330000 m3
Ningyo Toge mine
mill tailings
about 34000 m3
Togo mine
waste rockabout 32000 m3
Tono mine
waste rockabout 10000 m3*:

As these waste rock and mill tailings are not defined as radioactive wastes inJapan, these materials are out of scope of the Convention in accordance with
Article 2 of the Convention. However the status of these wastes are reported herein accordance with Paragraph 70 of the Summary Report JC / RM.1 / 06 / Finalversion (••••In relation to uranium mining and milling wastes, Contracting Parties
with such wastes agreed to include them in their National reports. ••••).

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H3 Siting of proposed facilities
Article 13
1. Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that procedures are establishedand implemented for a proposed radioactive waste management facility:(i) to evaluate all relevant site-related factors likely to affect the safety of such a facility during its
operating lifetime as well as that of a disposal facility after closure;(ii) to evaluate the likely safety impact of such a facility on individuals, society and the environment,
taking into account possible evolution of the site conditions of disposal facilities after closure;(iii) to make information on the safety of such a facility available to general public;(iv) consult Contracting Parties in the vicinity of such a facility, insofar as they are likely to be affectedby that facility, and provide them, upon their request, with general data relating to the facility toenable them to evaluate the likely safety impact of the facility upon their territory.
2. In so doing, each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that such facilities
shall not have unacceptable effects on other Contracting Parties by being sited in accordance withthe general safety requirements of Article 11.

H3.1 Evaluation of site-related factors
In Japan, evaluation of relevant site-related factors and safety impact of the proposed facility
is conducted during the licensing process of each activity. In the Reactor Regulation Act, thecriteria for the license are that “granting of the license does not impair the planned
implementation of the nuclear development and utilization programs; the applicant has
adequate technical capability and financial basis to appropriately carry out the proposed
activity; and the location, structure and systems of the proposed facility does not impair theprevention of the hazards due to nuclear fuel materials or the materials contaminated with
nuclear fuel materials”. The specific evaluation items for the technical capability and theprevention of hazards are listed in a guide developed by the NSC and are used for the review
of an application by the regulatory body.
The regulatory body, when approving operation of a radioisotope waste management facility
in accordance with the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, conducts safety review to confirm
the descriptions in the application are in compliance with the siting conditions, standards on
facility, technical standards etc, provided in the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, andapproves when the application is confirmed appropriate. It is provided that facilities should belocated at a site where landslide and inundation are unlikely to occur.
The license application document must include the descriptions on “conditions and quantity of
nuclear fuel material or matters contaminated with nuclear fuel material to be disposed of”,
“the location, structure and systems of the waste disposal facility and the disposal method”,
and “time schedule to advance the stages of stepwise control for the Category 2 waste
disposal facility in response to radioactive decay”. The document must be supplemented byexplanatory materials on “the conditions of meteorology, ground structure, hydrology,
seismology, social environment at the site of the proposed waste disposal facility” and “thesafety design of the waste disposal facility”. With these information, the applicant is required
to make an evaluation of site conditions for the waste disposal facility.
METI examines the application and confirms the contents stipulated in the Reactor Regulation
Act that “granting of the license does not impair the planned implementation of the nuclear
development and utilization programs"; "the applicant has adequate technical capability andfinancial basis to appropriately carry out the proposed activity"; and "the location, structureand systems of the proposed facility does not impair the prevention of the hazards due tonuclear fuel materials or the materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials”. Based on
this confirmation, the Minister grants the license after consulting with JAEC and NSC.
As for designated radioactive wastes, based on the Final Disposal Act, METI has to consult
for the amendment of final disposal plan and basic policy on site selection of preliminary
investigation areas, etc., with JAEC and NSC.
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In September 2002, NSC made the report on the environmental requirements, those were forearthquake, fault activity, volcano/volcanic activity, etc., at the stage of site selection of
preliminary investigation areas, to give necessary comments from the point of safety
regulation view and to establish the criteria to environmental requirements in the process ofamendment for final disposal plan, etc.
H3.2 Information for general public
The license application documents based on the Reactor Regulation Act and other related
information are made open to the public at the Nuclear Energy Library and at the Nuclear
Library Room of JNES, except for the information relevant to nondisclosure causes such as
safeguards and commercial sensitiveness. Such information is also accessible and available
at the National Diet Library. A document requested to an administrative agency under the ”Acton Access to Information held by Administrative Organs͆ is also disclosed in accordance withthe provisions of the Act, unless it is subject to nondisclosure causes.
Also as for the safety related information on a facility for waste disposal regulated by the
Radiation Disease Prevention Act, a document requested under the ”Act on Access toInformation held by Administrative Organs“ is disclosed, unless it is subject to nondisclosure
causes.
In September 2006, the Radioactive Waste Subcommittee under the Nuclear Energy
Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural Resources and Energy reported to
expect the comprehensive safety explanatory (safety case), etc., when a business entity
makes the report on preliminary investigation result and detailed investigation.
The Committee on Final Disposal Safety Investigation of Designated Radioactive Wastes of
the NSC established “On Concept of Safety Communication for Geological Disposal” inJanuary 2011, considering that establishment of both the safety regulatory framework withfocus on securing robustness of long term safety function of the disposal facility, and thesafety communication system which allows stakeholders to be involved to make it reliable
enough to ensure long term safety through the framework, in order to establish reliability oflong term safety of geological disposal.
H3.3 Relation with neighboring contracting parties
The government of Japan provides neighboring countries with information on the status of thenuclear energy of Japan through bilateral consultation, and various exchange of opinions.
Moreover, in the case when a safety significant event should occur at a facility in our country,
Japan will provide prompt and comprehensive information to the neighboring countries.

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H4 Design and construction of facilities
Article 14
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the design and construction of a radioactive waste management facility provide for suitablemeasures to limit possible radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment,
including those from discharges or uncontrolled releases;(ii) at the design stage, conceptual plans and, as necessary, technical provisions for thedecommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility aretaken into account;(iii) at the design stage, technical provisions for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared;(iv) the technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive waste management
facility are supported by experience, testing or analysis.

H4.1 Prevention of radiological impacts on individuals, society and the environment
1. Waste Storage facility
Based on the Reactor Regulation Act, the holder of the license for Waste Storage mustdescribe, in the application document for the approval of the design and construction methods
for the activity, the methods of the design and construction of the on-site waste treatment andstorage systems for the radioactive wastes generated from the operation of the activity, andmust demonstrate in the attachments to the application document that the design andconstruction of the facility are consistent with relevant technical standards. The Minister of
METI reviews the application and issues a license based on the Reactor Regulation Act whencompliance with the technical standards is confirmed.
The “Technical Standard for the Design and Construction Methods” provides the standards forthe confinement function, shielding and other necessary features for the prevention ofradiological hazards. As an example of the technical standard for the design and construction
methods, the “Technical Standard for the Design and Construction Methods for Specific Waste
Disposal Facility or Specific Waste Storage Facility” are shown in the Section L Table H4-1.
2. Category 1 waste disposal facility
Based on the Reactor Regulation Act, the holder of the license for Category 1 waste disposal(Category 1 waste disposal licensee) is required to obtain the approval for the design andconstruction methods for the specific waste disposal facility including waste receiving system,
waste handling system and radiation control system prior to the start of construction, and topass the Pre-Service Inspection conducted by the Minister of METI before starting operation.
The procedures and the technical standards for the design and construction methods are thesame as those for Waste Storage facility.
In addition, a Category 1 waste disposal facility is required to undergo Confirmation of
Disposal Facility based on the Reactor Regulation Act by the Minister of METI for the disposalsite and the shafts and tunnels for the duration of operation. The confirmation is made basedon the relevant ordinances on the geography, geology and groundwater at the disposal site aswell as the design and structure of the disposal facility, with the criteria “to be consistent withthe contents described in the license documents”, “not to dispose explosive materials,
materials that significantly corrode other materials and other hazardous materials in the waste
disposal site” and “to backfill the site as stated in the license document”. The waste to bedisposed of has to undergo the Confirmation of Waste Packages based on the relevant
ordinances by METI to confirm that “the waste is encapsulated or solidified”, “radioactivity
concentration does not exceed the licensed level”, “the waste package has sufficient strength
to endure the loads imposed when disposed” and “the waste is not significantly damaged.”
3. Category 2 waste disposal facility
Based on the Reactor Regulation Act, the holder of the license for Category 2 waste disposal(Category 2 waste disposal licensee) is not required to obtain the approval for the design and132

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construction methods or to undergo pre-service inspection for the waste disposal facility by
the Minister of METI, but is required to undergo Confirmation of Disposal facility performed by
the Minister of METI for the duration of operation. The waste to be disposed of has to undergo
the Confirmation of Waste Packages carried out by the Ministry of METI.
4. Waste management facility under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act
A person to obtain a permission of waste management service shall submit an application forthe permission to MEXT. The application shall include the description documents on themethod of management, the locations, structures and equipments of waste refilling facility,
waste storage facility and waste management facility as attachments.
The provisions concerning the location, structure and equipment of each facility require theapplicant, in order to restrain possible radiological effects, to ensure that shielding walls, othershields, ventilation equipments, and drainage equipments are consistent with the technicalstandards prescribed by laws and ordinances.
The license holder of the radioisotope waste management services is obligated to take
Pre-Service Facility Inspections by the Minster of MEXT or his/her representative and obtainits confirmation that the facilities comply with these technical standards.
H4.2 Provisions for the decommissioning of a radioactive waste management facility otherthan a disposal facility at the design stage
Radioactive waste depositories are installed as auxiliary facilities for the nuclear fuelfabrication facility, reactor facility, spent fuel storage facility, reprocessing facility andradioactive waste storage facility. The decommissioning procedures for each of these facilities
are provided for by the Reactor Regulations Act and other relevant laws and regulations. At
the stage of decommissioning, the license holder must establish a decommissioning programfor each facility and have it approved by the Minister of METI.
Also, under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, at each stage (including decommissioning)of license application, the license holder shall be subject to the approval for the conformity to
the technical standards applicable to the storage or processing facility
H4.3 Provisions for the closure of a disposal facility
Implementation of closure of a waste disposal facility must be described in the license
application documents for the radioactive waste disposal. When the Category 1 waste
disposal licensee plans to close the shafts and tunnels, based on the Reactor Regulation Act,the licensee is required to establish a closure program and have it approved by the Minister of
METI.
H4.4

Technologies incorporated in the design and construction of a radioactive waste
management facility

When applying for approval of the design and construction methods, the operator must
demonstrate with analysis, etc. that the design and construction methods meet relevant
technical standards. The regulatory body reviews the application and issues an approval after
confirming that the design and construction methods meet relevant technical standards.
The operator must pass the pre-service inspection conducted by the regulatory body before
operating the facility.
Under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, similar process is applied.

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H5 Assessment of safety of facilities
Article 15
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) before construction of a radioactive waste management facility, a systematic safety assessment
and an environmental assessment appropriate to the hazard presented by the facility and covering
its operating lifetime shall be carried out;(ii) in addition, before construction of a disposal facility, a systematic safety assessment and an
environmental assessment for the period following closure shall be carried out and the results
evaluated against the criteria established by the regulatory body;(iii) before the operation of a radioactive waste management facility, updated and detailed versions of
the safety assessment and of the environmental assessment shall be prepared when deemednecessary to complement the assessments referred to in paragraph (i).

H5.1 Safety and environmental assessment of a radioactive waste management facility
1. General provisions
In Japan, fuel fabrication, establishment and operation of reactors, spent fuel storage,
reprocessing, waste storage, waste disposal and utilization of nuclear fuel materials fall within
the scope of the radioactive waste management defined in the Convention. These activities
are individually subject to the license under the Reactor Regulation Act. An applicant for alicense carries out a systematic safety assessment and an assessment of radiological impacts
on the environment, taking into account the meteorology, ground structure, hydraulicphenomena, earthquake, social environments around the site and safety design of the facility.
On the basis of such assessments, the regulatory body examines the appropriateness of
siting and basic design of the facility, systems and components from the viewpoint of hazard
prevention.
The guide prepared by the NSC for the safety review for each license provide, as the siting
conditions common to nuclear facilities, that “there should be no factor that could induce a
serious accident” and that “there should be little factors that could expand accident influence”.
The “Basic Guide for Safety Review of Category 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal” is shown in
Section L Table H5-1 as an example of safety review guidelines.
2. Waste Storage facility
The “Basic Approach for Safety Assessment of Radioactive Waste Management Facilities”
prepared by the NSC for the safety review of a Waste Storage provides that the seismic
design of a high level solid radioactive wastes storage facility shall be assessed including thatshielding function as well as confinement function is adequately maintained during anearthquake.
In Japan, radioactive waste storage facility, same as one established with reprocessing facility,
etc., is established as an independent facility. In spite of the differences of type or treatment
process of waste, it is possible to conduct the safety evaluation of radioactive waste storage
facility in accordance with the same principal concept as reprocessing facility, because theprocesses of the radioactive waste storage are involved in the waste storage system of the
reprocessing facility etc.
The general provisions described above are applied also to a waste storage.
3. Category 1 waste disposal facility
Based on the Reactor Regulation Act, an applicant for the Category 1 waste disposal license
has to show the property and quantities of nuclear fuel materials or materials contaminatedwith nuclear fuel materials to be disposed of, the location, structure and systems of the waste
disposal facility as well as disposal method to the Minister of METI, and obtain license from
the Minister. A basic approach to safety review will be established by the NSC in near future
considering the progress in the implementation of disposal.

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4. Category 2 waste disposal facility
As for Category 2 waste disposal, the NSC prepared the “Basic Guide for Safety Review ofCategory 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal” for “near surface disposal” and “subsurface
disposal” (see section L Table H5-1). This guide adds the safety assessment for subsurface
disposal in the safety assessment for the existing low level radioactive waste disposal.
5. Disposal Facility under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act
For granting the license for the disposal facilities under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act,the competent regulatory body examines the appropriateness of the site conditions and thecompliance with the technical standards. Relevant guidelines and standards require that thefacility be constructed at a site that has little chance to be affected by land slide or flooding, toadopt fire-proof structures or to use incombustible materials for the essential parts of the
facility, etc., and to provide with shielding function such as shielding walls.
H5.2 Safety and environmental assessment of after closure of a disposal facility
The safety of disposal facilities is regulated in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act and its enforcement ordinance, and the Ministerial Ordinances or Notifications
such as the “Rules for Category 1 Waste Disposal” and the “Rules for Category 2 Waste
Disposal.” These rules require the license application document to be attached by“explanation on the control of radiation exposure due to nuclear fuel materials, etc.” that also
describes long-term safety assessment including post-closure period. In addition, Periodic
Safety Review is conducted on the basis of the latest knowledge, to confirm that long-term
safety will be ensured also after the construction of a geological disposal facility orintermediate depth disposal facility. The assessment is performed at an appropriate timing(including timing necessary for technical succession in operators) as a part of safety steps
and the necessary measures are taken based on the assessment results. Through this
Periodic Safety Review, a systematic safety assessment for the period following closure until
termination of the activity is carried out.
The Radiation Disease Prevention Act is also in process to provide the same requirements.
H5.3 Update of safety and environmental assessment of a spent fuel management facility
The Reactor Regulation Act provides for the procedures for "licensing or notification of changeof license" to appropriately address a change of the application documents for the license
granted in accordance with the Act.
The detailed design of the facility has to follow the procedures for “approval for the design andconstruction methods” and any change of the design or construction methods is also subject
to such procedures. In addition, the government confirms that the facility has been built as
approved through “pre-service inspection”.(See Section H4.4 and H6.1)
The Radiation Disease Prevention Act also provides the similar requirements.

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H6 Operation of facilities
Article 16
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that:(i) the license to operate a radioactive waste management facility is based upon appropriate
assessments as specified in Article 15 and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning
programme demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety
requirements;(ii) operational limits and conditions, derived from tests, operational experience and the assessments
as specified in Article 15 are defined and revised as necessary;(iii) operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a radioactive waste management
facility are conducted in accordance with established procedures. For a disposal facility the results
thus obtained shall be used to verify and to review the validity of assumptions made and to update
the assessments as specified in Article 15 for the period after closure;(iv) engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields are available throughout the operating
lifetime of a radioactive waste management facility;(v) procedures for characterization and segregation of radioactive waste are applied;(vi) incidents significant to safety are reported in a timely manner by the holder of the license to theregulatory body;(vii) programmes to collect and analyze relevant operating experience are established and that theresults are acted upon, where appropriate;(viii) decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than a disposal facility
are prepared and updated, as necessary, using information obtained during the operating lifetimeof that facility, and are reviewed by the regulatory body;(ix) plans for the closure of a disposal facility are prepared and updated, as necessary, using
information obtained during the operating lifetime of that facility and are reviewed by the regulatorybody.

H6.1 Permission to operate a radioactive waste management facility
1. Waste Storage and Category 1 Waste Disposal
The Reactor Regulation Act provides that Waste Storage facility (the radioactivity of the waste
is equal to or more than 3.7TBq.) and specified waste disposal facility (Waste AcceptanceFacility, Waste Handling Facility, Instrumentation and Control Facility, Radiation Control
Facility and Associated Facilities) in Category 1 Waste Disposal shall not be used before
getting through the Pre-Service inspections conducted by the Minister of METI for theconstruction and performance of the facility. The facility passes the pre-serve inspection only
if it is confirmed that "the construction has been done in accordance with the approved designand construction plan" and "the performance of the facility meets the technical standards for
performance". "The technical standards for performance" are specified by the Minister of
METI as follows:y The alarm system, emergency power supply system and other emergency systems
and interlocks (devices to actuate the systems or equipment only under specificconditions) described in the license application documents or their attached documents
shall operate reliably under the conditions described in those documents.
y The radioactive waste disposal systems shall have more capability than described in
the license application documents or their attached documents.
y The main radiation control systems shall have the capability described in the license
application documents or their attached documents.
y Dose equivalent rate and concentrations of airborne radioactive materials in thealways-manned areas of the Waste Storage facility and Category 1 waste disposal
facility, the areas with workers during the operation of the facility, and other areas that
require radiation control shall be less than those described in the license application
documents or their attached documents.
In Category 1 Waste Disposal, the facilities other than specified waste disposal facilities must
be confirmed by the Minister of METI, similarly as the case with Category 2 Waste Disposal

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2. Category 2 Waste Disposal
Category 2 waste disposal requires no approval for the design and construction methods nor
pre-service inspection. However, based on the Reactor Regulation Act, the waste disposal
facility has to undergo the Confirmation of Disposal Facility by the Minister of METI. The
confirmation is conducted at the following timing:y The confirmation regarding installation of the waste disposal facility is conducted when
the dimensions of the major parts of individual system become measurable, except forradiation control system.
y The confirmation regarding installation of radiation control system is conducted when
the installation of the system is completed.
y Confirmation regarding the shafts and tunnels (only for intermediate depth waste
disposal facility) is conducted when backfill of the shafts and tunnels and closure of themouth are carried out.
y Confirmation regarding other items is conducted when the waste disposal facility iscovered with earth and sand or when the Minister of METI deems appropriate.
The confirmation is conducted according to the technical standards shown in Section L Table
H6-1: “1. Technical Standard for Waste Disposal Facilities” and “2.Technical Standard forRadioactive Waste to be Disposed.”
3. Radioactive waste management under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act
The operator of the waste management facility under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act
shall be subject to the approval for the license mainly as described in the previous section.
And the license holder shall be subject to pass the pre-service inspection before the operationof the facility and shall not use the facility until after it has passed the inspection.
As described above, Government of Japan takes steps to ensure that the license to operate awaste disposal facility or waste storage facility is based upon appropriate assessments as
specified in previous Article and is conditional on the completion of a commissioning program
demonstrating that the facility, as constructed, is consistent with design and safety
requirements.
H6.2 Operational limits and conditions
The operator regulated by the Reactor Regulation Act must establish “Operational Safety
Program” and obtain approval before starting operation of the facility. The Operational Safety
Program have to specify concrete steps for operation of the facility, inspections of maintaining
the facility, radiation monitoring and quality assurance. The operation and maintenance of the
facility have to be performed in accordance with the specific operational limits defined in the
Operational Safety Program. The operator must undergo quarterly inspection (Operational
Safety Inspection) by the regulatory body to confirm the compliance with the Operational
Safety Program. In addition, when the annual facility Periodic Inspection indicates that
performance of the Waste Storage facility and Category 1 waste disposal facility does notcomply with the technical standards, or the operational safety measures for the maintenanceof the facility violate provisions of the ministerial order, the Minister of METI may order theoperator to take necessary operational safety measures such as suspension of operation,
modification, repair, or instruction on the facility operation.
Operator licensed under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, before the start of operation,
shall prepare the Internal Rules for Prevention of Radiation Hazards specifying details ofinspections, radiation measuring and treatment of radioactive wastes, and notify it to the
Minister of MEXT. The Internal Rules shall specify operational requirements, and the facility
shall be operated and maintained in compliance with the Rules.

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H6.3 Operation, maintenance, monitoring, inspection and testing of a radioactive waste
management facility
1. Waste Storage
When operating a Waste Storage facility, the operator must take operational safety measuresfor “maintenance of waste storage facility”, “operation of waste storage facility” and“transportation and treatment (only within the premises of the facility that is installed with thewaste storage facility) of the nuclear fuel material or material contaminated by nuclear fuelmaterial” in accordance with the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act. Other measures for,“record of radiation control, etc. (record of monitoring result, etc.)”, “access control tocontrolled areas”, “measures for radiation dose”, “patrol and inspection of waste storage
facility”, ”maintenance of waste storage facility”, “periodical self-inspection of waste storage
facility”, “operation of facility relevant to waste storage facility”, “Periodical Safety Review ofwaste storage facility”, “on-site transportation” and “on-site disposal” are provided for in aministerial ordinance.
The operator must establish the Operational Safety Program covering the above measuresand obtain approval of the Minister of METI before starting operation of the facility. (Items to
be described in the Operational Safety Program are shown in the Section L TableH6-2.)
In addition, operator must undergo Operational Safety Inspection conducted quarterly by the
Minister of METI to confirm the status of compliance with the Operational Safety Program.
2. Category 1 and 2 waste disposal
For the use of waste disposal facility, the Reactor Regulation Act requires the same steps as
described above for Waste Storage facility. The Ministerial Ordinance provides for “periodic
evaluation, etc. of waste disposal facility” as the steps to be taken after closure of the waste
disposal facility. Specifically, the Ministerial Ordinance requires “to evaluate the radiation
exposure control due to nuclear fuel materials, etc. in the light of the latest technicalknowledge” and “to take necessary measures for the preservation of waste disposal facility on
the basis of the results of such evaluation”.
The timing of the assessment shall be: for Category 1 waste disposal, at an interval of lessthan 20 years after the date of grant of license and when a closure program ordecommissioning program is developed; and for Category 2 waste disposal of intermediate
depth disposal, at an interval of less than 20 years after the date of grant of license and when
the stage of step-wise control.
3. Waste management under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act
Waste management license holder under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, before thestart of operation, shall prepare the Internal Rules for Prevention of Radiation Hazards andnotify it to the Minister of MEXT. The conformity to the Internal Rules shall be confirmed
through Periodic Inspections and the On the Spot Inspections conducted by the Minister of
MEXT or his representative, through these procedures the appropriate operation of the facility
is maintained.
H6.4 Engineering and technical support in all safety-related fields
During operation of a facility, the regulatory body obtains engineering and technical advice ofexpert committees on operational management, inspection and radiation control and feeds it
back, when necessary, to operation, maintenance or safety regulation.
For example, NISA has a system to collect experts' engineering and technical advice throughthe deliberations on the specific safety regulation policies by the advisory councils set up
under the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee for Natural
Resources and Energy.
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and overseas operational experience information, technological development on their own
funds, maintenance activities, etc. Private technical support organizations are also making avariety of supporting activities.
H6.5 Characterization and classification of radioactive waste
The Reactor Regulation Act regulates the on-site waste treatment, grouping the wastes into
"gaseous waste", "liquid waste" and "solid waste", and provide for the methods of on-site
treatment of these groups of waste. Examples of the provisions are shown in Section L Table
H6-3.
In addition, the disposal methods by burial are categorized into "Category 1 waste disposal"and "Category 2 waste disposal" according to the concentration of each radioactive nuclide in
the wastes that are provided for in the Enforcement Ordinance for the Reactor Regulation Act.
By the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, the equivalent procedures are required inaccordance with the specification of wastes except for disposal by burial that is in process ofestablishment.
H6.6 Report to the regulatory body in a timely manner by the licensee
The Reactor Regulation Act provides that an operator shall report without delay the status of
the event and other necessary matters when an accident accompanying personal injury(including the case with potential personal injury) or a failure or other event has occurred in a
milling facility, a fuel fabrication facility, a reactor facility, a spent fuel storage facility, a
reprocessing facility, waste storage facility, waste disposal facility or a fuel material use facility.
Reportable events are specified by relevant ministerial ordinances that regulate the activity
concerned. Examples of reportable events are shown in Section L Table H6-4.
The Radiation Disease Prevention Act requires the operators to report to regulatory bodywithout delay about the content and counter-measure of accident in radioactive waste
management facility.
H6.7 Programs to collect and analyze relevant operating experience
Upon receipt of a report on an accident or failure, the regulatory body immediately makes thereport open to the public. It examines and evaluates the status of cause investigation andrecurrence prevention measures, and distributes the results. The information on the accident
or failure is further investigated to extract lessons on safety and to improve safety regulation
as appropriate.
For the accumulation of information, NISA instructs JNES to maintain a system to collect andevaluate domestic and overseas safety information. The accumulated information is shared
between NISA and JNES through regular meetings to appropriately feed back the information
to a regulatory response or its follow-up.
As for international information exchange, Japan shares accident/failure information throughcooperation with international organizations such as IAEA and OECD/NEA as well as throughbilateral cooperation.
H6.8

Decommissioning plans for a radioactive waste management facility other than adisposal facility

An operator that plans to terminate its activity must take necessary steps for“decommissioning” such as dismantling of the facility, assignment of nuclear fuel material
inventory and management of materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials. For that
purpose, the operator has to establish a “decommissioning program” and obtain an approvalof the Minister of METI for it.
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The criteria for approving decommissioning program are that all nuclear fuel materials havebeen removed from the facility; nuclear fuel materials are appropriately transferred; materials
contaminated with nuclear fuel materials are appropriately managed; and decommissioning
work is appropriately implemented in a way to prevent a hazard due to nuclear fuel materials
or materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials. The decommissioning program isdeveloped by using the information obtained during the operating period of the facility. The
procedures for “Approval for Modification of Decommissioning Program” are provided for toallow update of the decommissioning program when necessary, which ensures that the plan isreviewed by the regulatory body.
An operator of the facility of radioisotope waste management services licensed under the
Radiation Disease Prevention Act, in order to terminate the services, shall notify to the
Minister of MEXT. The operator shall take measures such as decontamination of materials
contaminated by radioisotopes, and the action program shall be prepared by reflecting theoperational experience of the facility and the operator shall report to the Minister of MEXT
about the program and the measures taken.
H6.9 Plans for the closure of a disposal facility
When the Category 1 waste disposal licensee plans to close the tunnels and shafts, it musttake "closure steps" including backfill of tunnels and shafts, closure of pit mouths anddismantling of the underground facilities. Prior to that, the operator must establish a "closure
program" and have it approved by the Minister of METI based on the Reactor Regulation Act.
The criteria for approving the closure program are that the closure of the facility is carried out
according to the conditions described in the license application documents based on theReactor Regulation Act and in an adequate way to prevent radiological hazards due tonuclear fuel materials or other radioactive materials. The closure program is prepared using
such information obtained during the operating period of the facility. The procedures for“Approval for Modification of Closure Program” are provided for to allow update of the Closure
Program when necessary, which ensures that the program is reviewed by the regulatory body.
An operator of the facility of radioisotope waste disposal licensed under the Radiation Disease
Prevention Act, in order to terminate the operation of disposal facility, shall take necessary
measures to prevent radiation hazards. The action program shall be prepared by reflecting
the information obtained during the operation of the disposal facility and he shall report to the
Minister of MEXT about the measures taken.

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H7 Institutional measures after closure
Article 17
Each Contracting Party shall take the appropriate steps to ensure that after closure of a disposal facility:(i) records of the location, design and inventory of that facility required by the regulatory body arepreserved;(ii) active or passive institutional controls such as monitoring or access restrictions are carried out, if
required; and(iii) if, during any period of active institutional control, an unplanned release of radioactive materials
into the environment is detected, intervention measures are implemented, if necessary.

H7.1 Preserve of required records
1. Category 1 waste disposal
Licensee shall preserve the following records concerning the waste disposal for a period oftime pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor Regulation Act.
y Records on disposal of Category 1 wastey Inspection records on specified waste disposal facilityy Radiation control records
y Operation records
y Maintenance records
y Records of accidents in waste disposal facilityy Meteorological records
y Level of groundwatery Records on operational safety educationy Documents on quality assurance program and records on plans, implementation,
evaluation and improvement of quality assurance programy Results of periodic assessment of waste disposal facility for geological disposal
y Records on physical protectiony Results of closure confirmationy Methods and time of decommissioning, and names of auxiliary systems of therepository to be decommissioned
y Records on materials subject to clearance confirmation
2. Category 2 waste disposal
Similar to the case of Category 1 waste disposal, licensee shall preserve the following records
concerning the disposal for a period of time pursuant to the provisions of the Reactor
Regulation Act.
y Records disposal of on Category 2 wastey Radiation control records
y Maintenance records
y Records of accidents in waste disposal facility
y Rainfall records
y Level of groundwatery Records on operational safety educationy Documents and records on plans, implementation, evaluation and improvement ofquality assurance programy Results of periodic assessment of waste disposal facility for intermediate depth
disposaly Records on physical protectiony Methods and time of decommissioning, and names of auxiliary systems of therepository to be decommissioned
y Records on materials subject to clearance confirmation

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H7.2 Active or passive institutional controls
1. Category 1 Waste Disposal
The Reactor Regulation Act provides for decommissioning procedures (dismantling ofauxiliary systems of waste disposal site, removal of contamination with nuclear fuel materials,
transfer of nuclear fuel materials and other radioactive materials and transfer of radiation
control records to an organization assigned by the Minister of METI) after closure of a
Category 1 waste disposal. Decommissioning Program of a waste disposal facility is subject
to approval by the Minister of METI. For establishing a decommissioning program, theoperator is required to perform an assessment of the control of radiation exposure due tonuclear fuel materials and other radioactive materials with the latest technical knowledge andto take necessary measures for the preservation of the waste disposal facility on the basis of
the assessment.
The activity terminates after getting confirmation that no radiation hazard prevention measureis required for the site of auxiliary facilities to be decommissioned as well as for the remaining
facilities in the site; disposal of nuclear fuel materials, etc. has been completed; and transferof radiation control records to an organization assigned by the Minister of METI has been
completed.
Institutional control of a closed facility is deemed to be helpful to further reduction of undue
human activities such as careless intervention in waste and to the promotion of public
acceptance of geological disposal and safety.
As an example of specific institutional control, the Final Disposal Act designates the released
site as a preservation area in response to the operator's request and restricts excavation workwithin the conservation area.
2. Category 2 Waste Disposal“Basic Guide for Safety Review of Category 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal” established by
NSC requests to assess radiation dose after the period for active control to the residents or to
intruder, according to the 4 scenarios, those are depending on disposal methods, as likely
scenario, less-likely scenarios, very unlikely scenario, and human intrusion scenario, and to
confirm each result satisfies the target dose for each scenario. The “Basic Guide for Safety
Review of Category 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal” also requests, in order to restrain dose to
the public as low as reasonably achievable, to control the waste disposal site step wisely(hereinafter referred to as “stepwise control”) until the time when the impact of the radioactive
materials to the biosphere will remain at a safe level due to the decrease of radioactivity overtime.
The regulatory body requests a license applicant for waste disposal to submit a plan for
stepwise control and examines the conformity to the requirements specified in the “Basic
Guide for Safety Review of Category 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal.”
The Radiation Disease Prevention Act also provided the similar system.
The Stepwise Control required by “Basic Guide for Safety Review of Category 2 Radioactive
Waste Disposal” is as follows.
(1) The case of subsurface disposal*1< Stage up to backfilling >This is a stage that requires preventing release of radioactive materials using engineered
barriers*2 to the outside of the engineered barriers, and surveillance to verify that there is norelease of radioactive materials from the engineered barriers.
In this stage, a perimeter surveillance area shall be established around the waste disposal
facilities, to which access control shall be provided. A disposal preservation area shall also
be established within the area to provide patrols and inspections.
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No release of radioactive materials from the engineered barriers constructed in the waste
disposal facilities shall be verified through surveillance, and the engineered barriers shall bechecked to determine if they are constructed as designed.
If any release of radioactive materials or abnormal conditions of engineered barriers were to
be discovered, then required measures such as repairs shall be taken.
< Stage after backfilling >This is a stage that requires restricting migration of radioactive materials to the biosphereusing engineered and natural barriers*3, and taking measures to restrict or inhibit specificactions.
In this stage, the disposal preservation area shall be established to provide patrol andinspection as well as to restrict or inhibit specific actions such as unplanned excavations inthis area.
Radioactive materials released from the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities tothe biosphere shall be surveyed by, for example, measuring the concentration ofradioactive materials in the groundwater or other parameters.
*1*1㸸”Subsurface disposal ”means the disposal of radioactive waste, which is encapsulated in the containeror solidified in the waste disposal area provided with the engineered barrier at the depth with sufficientmargin for common usage of the underground.
*2㸸”Engineered barrier” means the engineered structure which is installed in order to prevent or to reduceleak of the radioactive material from disposed radioactive solid waste into the living environment*3㸸”natural barrier” means the host rock or the foundation that exists around the engineered structure or thesolid radioactive material, and is expected to restrict migration of the radioactive material, which leaksfrom the solid radioactive material into living environment.

(2) The case of pit disposal*4< Stage 1 >In this stage, a perimeter surveillance area shall be established around the waste disposal
facilities, to which access control shall be provided. The disposal preservation area shallalso be established in the area to provide patrols and inspections.
No release of radioactive materials from the engineered barriers constructed in the nearsurface or sub-surface disposal facilities shall be verified through the surveillance. If any
release of radioactive materials from the engineered barriers were to be discovered, thenrequired measures such as repairing the engineered barriers shall be taken.
< Stage 2 >In this stage, a perimeter surveillance area shall be established around the waste disposal
facilities, to which access control shall be provided.
Radioactive materials released from the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities tothe biosphere shall be surveyed by, for example, measuring the concentration ofradioactive materials in the groundwater and other parameters.
< Stage 3 >In this stage, a disposal preservation area shall be established to provide patrols andinspections, as well as to restrict or inhibit such actions as farming in this area.
*4㸸” Pit disposal” means the disposal of radioactive waste, which is encapsulated in the container or solidified
in the near surface of the waste disposal site where the engineered barrier is provided.

(3) The case of trench disposal*5< Emplacement stage >In this stage, a perimeter surveillance area shall be established around the waste disposal
facilities, to which access control shall be provided. A disposal preservation area shall also
be established in the area to provide patrols and inspections.
Concentration, etc. of radioactive materials that migrate from the near surface or
sub-surface disposal facilities to the biosphere shall be surveyed by, for example,
measuring the concentration of radioactive materials in the groundwater and other
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parameters.
< Preservation stage >In this stage, a disposal preservation area shall be established to provide patrols andinspections, as well as to restrict or inhibit such actions as farming in this area.
*5㸸” Trench disposal” means the disposal of radioactive solid waste, which is not solidified in the container, inthe near surface of the waste disposal site where the engineered barrier is not provided.

Thus, the safety assessment of the waste disposal facilities during the active control period
should be conducted based on the stepwise control described above, taking into accountany decrease of performance of the systems in the near surface or sub-surface disposal
facilities over time.
The active control should be terminated within 300 to 400years for subsurface disposal andpit disposal. And, in the case of trench disposal without engineered barrier, as the disposed
waste is non-solidified concrete etc. with low radioactivity level, emplacement stage andsubsequent 50years preservation stage are regarded as the “limited time period”.
H7.3 Intervention measures
When issuing a license, the regulatory body requests the operator to take following measuresduring each stage of institutional control.
In the First Stage, if a leakage of radioactive material from engineered barriers is detected, theoperator who would dispose radioactive waste in the Category 2 by near surface pit disposal
facility without artificial barrier should immediately repair the barriers to prevent leakage. In
the Second Stage, the operator should monitor leakages from engineered barriers and, if
necessary, take measures to retard migration of radioactive material. At the same time, theoperator should conduct patrol and inspection of the disposal facility and, if necessary, restore
the cover soil and others. In the Third Stage, the operator should conduct patrol and check
and, if necessary, restore the soil cover and others.
The Radiation Disease Prevention Act also requires similar control to the waste disposal in its
scope.

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Section I Transboundary Movement
Article 27
1. Each Contracting Party involved in transboundary movement shall take the appropriate steps toensure that such movement is undertaken in a manner consistent with the provisions of thisConvention and relevant binding international instruments.
In so doing:(i) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps to ensure thattransboundary movement is authorized and takes place only with the prior notification andconsent of the State of destination;(ii) transboundary movement through States of transit shall be subject to those international
obligations which are relevant to the particular modes of transport utilized;(iii) a Contracting Party which is a State of destination shall consent to a transboundary movement
only if it has the administrative and technical capacity, as well as the regulatory structure, needed
to manage the spent fuel or the radioactive waste in a manner consistent with this Convention;(iv) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall authorize a transboundary movement only if it
can satisfy itself in accordance with the consent of the State of destination that the requirementsof subparagraph (iii) are met prior to transboundary movement;(v) a Contracting Party which is a State of origin shall take the appropriate steps to permit re-entry
into its territory, if a transboundary movement is not or cannot be completed in conformity withthis Article, unless an alternative safe arrangement can be made.
2. A Contracting Party shall not licence the shipment of its spent fuel or radioactive waste to a
destination south of latitude 60 degrees South for storage or disposal.
3. Nothing in this Convention prejudices or affects:(i) the exercise, by ships and aircraft of all States, of maritime, river and air navigation rights andfreedoms, as provided for in international law;(ii) rights of a Contracting Party to which radioactive waste is exported for processing to return, or
provide for the return of, the radioactive waste and other products after treatment to the State oforigin;(iii) the right of a Contracting Party to export its spent fuel for reprocessing;(iv) rights of a Contracting Party to which spent fuel is exported for reprocessing to return, or provide
for the return of, radioactive waste and other products resulting from reprocessing operations to
the State of origin.

The electric power utilities in Japan have concluded reprocessing contracts with British andFrench firms and had exported 7,100 tons of spent fuel between 1969 and 2001.They, in
return, receive nuclear fuel material recovered from the spent fuel and vitrified packages(HLW) generated in the reprocessing. 1,338 vitrified packages were sent back to Japanbetween 1995 and March 2011 and the remaining packages will be returned in the next
ten-odd years. As they are constructing a reprocessing plant at Rokkasho Village in Aomori
Prefecture since 1993, there has not been any export of spent fuel originated fromcommercial nuclear power reactors after 2002.
I1 Transboundary movement
I1.1 Steps to Ensure Prior Notification and Consent of the State of Destination
For the export of the spent fuel or the radioactive waste, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign
Trade Control Law provides that an applicant should apply for and obtain the Export Permit
from the Minister of METI. This Export Permit should be applied once it is confirmed that theauthorities of the State of destination recognized the administrative and technical capacity of
the importer.
I1.2 Steps to Ensure Transboundary Movement Subject to International Obligations
Japanese domestic laws, such as the Ship Safety Law, etc, have incorporated obligations
under the IAEA Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Materials and relevantinternational conventions on each mode of transport, such as International Convention for the

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Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), etc.
I1.3 Consent as a State of Destination
After being notified by a State of origin of a transboundary movement to Japan of the spent
fuel or the radioactive waste, the government of Japan decides whether it gives consent to thetransport, and notifies its decision to the State of origin.
Japan expressed that, upon notification from a State of origin, it would consent to the import of
returned radioactive waste as long as such transport would comply with the safety regulationof Japan.
I1.4 Confirmation of the Capacity of a State of Destination
The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law provides that an exporter should apply
for and obtain the Export Permit from the Minister of METI for the export of the spent fuel or
the radioactive waste. The Minister of METI judges the grant of the Export Permit after
confirming the general conditions of safety of the country of destination such as its regulatory
structure, the membership in relevant international agreements, and the administrative andtechnical capacity of the importing body.
I1.5 Steps to Permit Re-entry in case of Uncompleted Transboundary Movement
The Import Trade Control Order allows, as special exemption, re-entry of exported goods, incase of uncompleted transboundary movement so long as original characteristics andconfiguration of exported goods are preserved, and the other case of the exemption is atransport accident. Re-entry of exported spent fuel and radioactive waste is allowed by thatprovision.

I2 Prohibition of shipment to a destination south of latitude 60 degrees SouthThe Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law provides that an applicant should
apply for and obtain the Export Permit from the Minister of Ministry of Economy, Trade andIndustry for the export of the spent fuel or the radioactive waste. The Export Permit shall not
be granted for the export of spent fuel or radioactive waste to a destination south of latitude 60
degrees south for storage or disposal.

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Article 28
1. Each Contracting Party shall, in the framework of its national law, take the appropriate steps toensure that the possession, remanufacturing or disposal sealed sources takes place in a safemanner.
2. A Contracting Party shall allow for reentry into its territory of disused sealed sources if, in theframework of its national law, it has accepted that they be returned to a manufacturer qualified toreceive and possess the disused sealed sources.

J1 The infrastructure for regulatory control of sealed sources
The use of radioisotope and radiation generation apparatus etc, are regulated by the
Radiation Disease Prevention Act, as mentioned in paragraph E2.1 Sealed sources are also
regulated by this Law.
As there are about 7000 licensees, each licensee is responsible for the safety andradioisotopes including sealed sources are properly controlled.
MEXT, as the competent regulatory authority, has been carrying out safety review and on-spot
inspection.
It is recognized that Radiation Disease Prevention Act has been functioning effectively asstated below.
y The person who intends to use more quantities of radioactive sources than specified
shall apply to MEXT for license, or notify MEXT.
y Radiation Disease Prevention Act provides technical criteria and requirements, such as
criteria relating to the use of facilities, dose limits for radiation workers, etc. For
example, the licensee is required, from the point of radiation safety, to; a) limit anaccess to storage facility, etc. by locking, etc.; b) install walls or fences to restrict easy
access to the boundary of controlled area; c) restrict access to controlled area without
permission of supervisor of the facility. These safety measures will effectively work also
for security, such as physical protection.
y Licensee is responsible for annually reporting to MEXT regarding facility management
such as the inventory of radioactive sources. MEXT carries out on-spot inspections of
the facility if needed, and check that the inventory of radioactive sources is inconformity with the license.
As a result of this strict regulation system as described above, there has been no incident,such as excess exposure to the public by “orphan sources”.

J2 Management of radioactive sources
The licensee is regulated by law to hand over highly radioactive sources only to license
holders who are authorized to possess and use the sources, and the disused radioactive
sources are by practice handed over from the licensees to specific licensees. Licensees haveobligation to report the results of such handover to MEXT when they terminate the use ofsources.
The licensee has a responsibility to do an annual inventory check of both sealed andunsealed radioactive sources and to report the results to MEXT.
The “Radiation Disease Prevention Act” provides for penalty and clarifies licensee have theresponsibility for safe control of the radioactive sources.
Most of sources in Japan are imported from foreign countries and the sources with long
half-life and high activity are sent back to the original foreign manufactures.
Regarding the distribution of radioisotopes and sealed sources in Japan, one supplier (Japan
Radioisotope Association) carries out consistently from distribution and delivery of almost allradioactive sources to recovery of disused radioactive sources.
As the result of this, there have been no incidents of serious radiation hazard involving
radioactive sources or serious radiation hazard involving orphan sources until now.

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J2.1 Criteria for the storage of disused sealed radioactive sources
The Radiation Disease Prevention Act lays down technical criteria relating to the storage ofsealed sources as stated below.
y Sealed sources shall be put in containers and stored in storage pits or bins.
y Sealed sources shall not be stored in quantities exceeding storage capacity.
y Appropriate measures, such as a) installing a shield, b) distancing personnel fromsealed sources, and c) shortening the time during which personnel may be exposed toradiation, shall be taken in order to prevent personnel engaged in handling ofradioactive substances from being exposed to radiation exceeding the effective dose
limit.
y Appropriate measures, such as immobilizing storage bins, shall be taken in order toprevent containers storing sealed sources from being carried from one place to anotherwithout permission.
y Appropriate measures shall be taken to prevent surface contamination from exceeding
the surface contamination limit.
y Radioactive contaminated substance whose surface concentration exceeds one-tenthof the surface concentration limit shall not be taken out from the controlled area without
permission.
y Notice showing the remarks necessary to prevent radiation hazards shall be posted at
appropriate location within storage facilities.
y Appropriate measures shall be taken in order to prevent unauthorized persons fromentering the controlled area.
J2.2 Response to missing radioactive sources
In case of loss of any radioactive source, the licensee shall immediately report the matter tothe police and MEXT. While MEXT orders the licensee immediately to search the sources, thepolice carry out criminal investigations, if the loss relates to criminal acts.
In April 2008, MEXT introduced the notification system for evaluated rating of radioactive
source events based on the additional guidance of the International Nuclear Event Scale.
Then, in April 2010, MEXT has started to apply the “INES –The International Nuclear andRadiological Event Scale - User’s manual 2008 Edition” issued by IAEA in 2009 to “INES
Assessment for usage facility, etc. of Radioisotope” in Japan.
J2.3 Response to orphan sources
In case of find of any orphan source, the police immediately take an initial action including
setting of exclusion area, radiation survey and immediate assessment of the situation. MEXT
requests the discoverer of the source and relevant people that safety measures should betaken and also dispatch a radiation inspector to confirm that the safety measure has been
properly taken. The found orphan source is to be recovered by the experts.
J2.4 Detection for orphan sources
About 30 percent of the operators of scrap metal recycle industry voluntarily carry out
radiation monitoring with gate type monitors or portable monitors. At the gateway of almost all
the blast furnace or electric furnace steel companies, which use such scrap metal, carry out
radiation monitoring on acceptance of the scrap metal for use.
The steel industry and the scrap metal recycle industry are voluntarily taking measures suchas development of manuals and training courses to cope with the discovery of orphan
sources.
Under the initiative by U.S.DOE the Customs conducts inspections to detect such sources forexport and import containers by having set up radiation measurement equipment and X-ray
machines in main ports.
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J2.5 Response to accident relating radioactive sources
In case of accidents involving radioactive sources, the police and fire service perform initial
response immediately depending on the notification. MEXT dispatches radiation inspectors toadvise the licensee to take suitable measures.
J2.6 Progress in establishing a National Registration System of Sealed Radioactive Sources
Based on the IAEA’s “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources”,
the National Registration System of Sealed Radioactive Sources by which a licensee must
report to MEXT the information on specification, receipt, delivery, etc. of sealed radioactive
sources that exceed criteria of a certain quantity and have a possibility of affecting serious
influence to human health (hereinafter referred to as “specified radioisotope*”) has been
introduced by the amendment of the Rules for Enforcement of the Radiation Disease
Prevention Act in October 2009 and enforced in January 2011.
The Registration System obligates a licensee to report of the information, such as periodicallyinventory of the specified radioisotope at the end of fiscal year and every time when theradioactive source is received and/or replaced by source exchange or registered informationis changed by a processing and manufacturing etc.
The purpose of the system is to detect and deter an illegal trade and possession of thespecified radioisotope. And in case of emergency, database on the registered information
which include the specification and transaction etc. will be used for tracking the specified
radioisotope against an early emergency response. And the “registration system of specified
radioactive source” has been developed since 2007 so that a licensee has been able to report
the necessary information by using the dedicated web-site. This system has shifted to asituation of full-scale use in January 2011, through graded trial use by the administrative
guidance from August 2009 for the purpose of smooth operation of the system.
*: Equivalent to Categories 1, 2 and part of 3 of the classification based on RS-G-1.9“Categorization of Radioactive Sources Safety Guide” issued by IAEA
J2.7 Consideration of long-term management of sealed radioactive sources unreturnable tomanufacturers
As previously described, most of sealed radioactive sources used in Japan are made abroad,imported and returned to the foreign manufacturers after the use. Therefore, unreturnable
sealed radioactive sources hardly exist in Japan. The storage and management of someunreturnable sealed radioactive sources are performed appropriately pursuant to theRadiation Disease Prevention Act, so it is considered that there exist no specific issues
concerning to the unreturnable sealed sources under current situation.

J3 Reentry of returning sealed sources
The reentry of approved sealed sources which returned from abroad by a licensee
manufacturer is allowed within the license of storage capacity. In this case, legal procedureon export and import that is consistent with the IAEA's “Guidance on the Import and Export ofRadioactive Sources” shall be applied. The manufacturer intending to possess or renew the
returned sealed sources is required to store them in accordance with the storage criteria
mentioned in the regulations specified in the Radiation Disease Prevention Act.

J4 Compliance with the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
As mentioned in the above paragraph J1 and J2, fulfillment of the IAEA's “Code of Conduct on
149

J

J

Disused Sealed Sources

the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources” can be achieved under the regulation basedon the Radiation Disease Prevention Act, etc.
For example, the “Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources” issued by IAEA
has already been introduced since January 2006 by the amendment of the Export Trade
Control Order.
In addition, National Registration System of Sealed Radioactive Sources was introduced by
the amendment of the Rules for Enforcement of the Radiation Disease Prevention Act(promulgated in October 2009 and enforced in January 2011) as mentioned in item J2.6.
MEXT made the interim guideline as provisional edition in May 2006 and is to complete theguideline for security of radioactive sources which operators should adopt. The domestic
guideline hereafter will be completed by using the guideline for security of radioactive sources
issued by IAEA in May 2006 as a reference.

150Planned Activities to Improve Safety

Section K Planned Activities to Improve Safety
K1 Development of laws and related rules
There are safety examination guides and legislations, etc. to be prepared for safety
regulations of radioactive waste management from now on, such as disposal of HLW, disposalof low level radioactive wastes with a comparatively high radioactivity concentration, disposalof uranium wastes, disposal of TRU wastes and radiation level which distinguishes materials
not requiring management as radioactive wastes. These are shown in Table A1-1 as thestatus of activities concerning preparation of regulation on radioactive waste disposal.
NSC and the related regulatory bodies continue to study and prepare these safety
examination guidelines and legislations etc.
Safety regulation for geological disposal of HLW is to be implemented as the safety review ofthe license application for geological disposal based on the Reactor Regulation Act. At thesiting for selection of a final disposal site, NISA, as the involvement to the 3 staged site
selection processes (selection of preliminary investigation areas, selection of detailed
investigation areas, and selection of a final disposal facility) provided by the Final Disposal Act,deems to review adequacy of the outcome on safety conducted by the licensee.

K2 Safety research and regulatory support research
Since fiscal year 1976, NSC has been promoting research projects concerning the safety of
nuclear installations, environmental radioactivity and radioactive waste through formulation of
Five-year research plans (2001-2005) on nuclear safety and evaluation of their achievements.
The products of these safety research projects have been reflected in the formulation ofvarious standards and guidelines, including establishment of principles such as
safety-ensuring policy, basic ideas, etc. and establishment of standards on specific means ofachieving safety and specific guidance to be adapted to expansion and diversification ofdevelopment and utilization of nuclear energy. NSC developed in August 2009 the “Prioritized
Nuclear Safety Research Plan (Second Term)” that showed the prioritized items for safety
research in the area of radioactive waste management and decommissioning to bechallenged for 5 years started from 2010, in coordination with the status of preparation of
relevant regulations (Table A1-1), environmental requirements for the stepwise procedure ofsite selection of high level radioactive waste final disposal and the development schedule of
the regulatory guides.
NISA got together regulatory needs of “geological disposal”, “subsurface disposal”, “nearsurface disposal”, “clearance”, “returned waste”, and “decommissioning” in “On Needs for
Nuclear Safety Research by NISA” (March 2006), and the regulatory support research has
been conducted by the technical support organizations of NISA. Then, NISA reconfirmed theregulatory needs on the basis of changes of circumstances around the safety regulations ofradioactive waste, such as amendment of the Reactor Regulation Act in 2007 and the review
of Regulatory Guides by the NSC, etc., and then the report “Policy on Regulatory Support
Research for Radioactive Waste Management and Disposal (2010-2014)” was established byRadioactive Wastes Safety Subcommittee of NISS/ACNRE in October 2009, and also thereport “Policy on Regulatory Support Research for Decommissioning (2010-2014)” by
Decommissioning Safety Subcommittee of NISS/ACNRE in November 2009. Then NISA
established the Regulatory Support Research Program for Radioactive Wastes Management/ Disposal and Decommissioning (2010-2014), which laid out yearly the research items which
satisfied the regulatory needs.
The Regulatory Support Research Program is to be carried out mainly by JNES and it should
151

K

K

Planned Activities to Improve Safety

be planned to develop the program by centralizing the outcomes which will be gained from allof the regulatory support researches, promoted under solid coordination with NISA.
Regulatory support research program should also be intended to support assessment which
will be conducted by the NSC, reviewing the timely report of the results of regulatory support
research, because the regulatory support research is performed based on ͆Prioritized
Nuclear Safety Research Plan͇ developed by the NSC. JNES is conducting its safety
research comprehensively and systematically all over the nuclear area including radioactive
waste management / disposal and decommissioning, however, as for its own safety researchon these areas, research which has been carried out by JNES as its own regulatory support
research has principally been the same as those in the programs. JNES is promoting
exchange of technical information positively with universities, licensees, national basic
research development agencies, academic institutes, and private companies, and is also
promoting regulatory support research by utilizing the outcome gained from other thanregulatory support research, taking into consideration the international trend of safety
research on radioactive waste management / disposal promoted by IAEA and foreigncountries.
In order to sustain the regulatory support research, JNES intends to promote meetings for
information exchange in order to grasp trends of research among the relevant academic
institutes and operators and to make discussion to find out any new items to be studied, froma viewpoint of both carrying out regulatory support research flexibly to utilize any newprograms developed by licensees and also to utilize, if possible, any outcome to be gained
from these researches other than regulatory support research.

K3 Measures to ensure reliability of technology by experiences, tests and analyses
For management of radioactive wastes, especially for disposal, it is important to improve its
safety and reliability of disposal technologies.
Therefore, regulatory bodies continuously obtain specialist's engineering and technicaladvices and reflect them in operation and maintenance and safety regulations, as needed.
As safety research conducted by regulatory needs of the NISA in the area of the safety ofspent fuel management and the safety of radioactive waste management, the study on safety
technology of radioactive waste disposal (scheduled to be completed in 2013) is now being
implemented.
On the other hand, operators continuously promote to buildup the latest technical informationby collection of the internal and external information on operational experiences, technologicaldevelopments by self-finance, maintenance and repair activities, etc.
For researches and developments of reliability improvement, the implementing body, NUMO
continues to takes charge of technical development on geological disposal of HLW, aiming at
safe operation and improvement for economical and efficient final disposal.
The national government and related research agencies are conducting researches anddevelopments necessary for establishing safety regulations and assessment for final disposal,
fundamental researches such as geoscientific research of deep underground and technicaldevelopments for reliability improvement of geological disposal technologies.
Especially, the institutes leaded by JAEA promote R&D under mutual independency forunderstanding of deep geological environments, confirmation of the reliability of geologicaldisposal technologies, development of the advanced safety assessment methodology andcontribution to the safety regulation along with “The basic research and development programon geological disposal of high level radioactive waste” (ANRE of METI and JAEA, December2006) and “Important Research Program on the Nuclear Safety, the second stage ”(NSC,2009).
152

Planned Activities to Improve Safety

And also, two deep underground research laboratories of JAEA are planned and expected tofacilitate not only as the place of research and development of geological disposal, but also
used as a cooperation to the activities of the government and the implementing body todeepen public understanding of the geological disposal in Japan.
Moreover, in July 2003, the Radioactive Wastes Safety Subcommittee of NISS/ACNRE
showed the important research tasks which should be investigated from now on in the“Toward Ensuring Foundation for the Safety Regulation of High-Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal”, and those tasks will be promoted by the technical support organization for safety
regulations, JNES, as a center, utilizing the results of researches of all organizations including
the above-mentioned deep underground research laboratories, and the outcomes will bereflected in the preparation of the future safety regulation system.

K4 Continued research to improve reliability of disposal technology
In October 2009, basic policy for developing regulatory support research program was
proposed in the report “On Regulatory Support Research for Radioactive Waste Management
and Disposal (2010-2014)͇ established by the Radioactive Wastes Safety Subcommittee of
NISS/ACNRE, and at the same time, the following suggestion was indicated as therecommendable system for regulatory support research:y JNES is relevant to undertake scheduling the program by reviewing progress ofregulatory support research and unifying outcomes under solid coordination with NISA.
JAEA and Research Core for Deep Geological Environment of AIST are expected toprovide assistance.
y In the area of geological disposal, it is desirable that JNES, JAEA, and AIST are toenter into “The Agreement of Cooperative Research on the Safety of the Geological
Disposal of Radioactive Waste” and to promote implementation of cooperative
research, exchange of human resources, and sharing of data. Utilization of theframework for research cooperation by these three agencies is also desirable topromote regulatory support research. It is also desirable to extend the scope of thecooperative research to the subsurface disposal which has much in common withgeological disposal, and to intensify exchange of human resources among theseagencies.
y In order to utilize the accumulated domestic and foreign research outcome
appropriately, it is important that knowledge and experience are smoothly succeeded to
the next generation. To that end, it seems useful for cultivation of human resources toutilize such chance like, for example, periodical development of “Regulatory Research
Report for the Safety of Geological Disposal (tentative) ”.
Based on the above proposal, the subcommittee approved ”On Regulatory Support Research
for Radioactive Waste Management and Disposal Program (2010-2014) ” submitted by JNES.
In the subcommittee, the outcome from the past research was laid out concretely, and at thesame time detailed item to be studied was determined as regulatory support research by
excluding one with less necessity, because the outcome from the research other than theregulatory support research could be utilized. Then, the research program, which meets theachievement date required by NISA, was finalized with the detailed and yearly-laid-out
research item.
Thus, following the above research implementation system and the needs from NISA, thecoordinated research projects, such as͆Research on Applicability of the Safety Assessment
Method for Horonobe Underground Research Program”, are successively promoted
under the agreement of research cooperation between JNES, JAEA, and AIST.
ANRE, in charge of NUMO, an implementing body, suggested in the interim report “On the
Approach to the Research and Development of Geological Disposal” developed in May 2009,
153

K

K

Planned Activities to Improve Safety

by Radioactive Waste Disposal Technical WG of Nuclear Energy Subcommittee of ElectricBusiness Sectional Committee of ACNRE, the importance of more intensified coordination
among the relevant agencies in the coordination meeting for basic research and developmentof geological disposal, of pointing out the needs from NUMO as the user of the outcome fromthe basic research, and of making request to increase younger participants into theseresearch projects carried out by NUMO.
Also in October 2009, NUMO presented the strategy for rearrangement and presentation of its
needs, roll-out of technical development in accordance with outcome from research, andimprovement of technical capacity through medium-term acquisition and cultivation of humanresources and also technical transfer from other research organizations.
In order to promote geological disposal project, NUMO reviewed needs for technicaldevelopment in order to select detailed investigation areas, and developed the report in June
2010. NUMO published the report on technical achievement for geological disposal (review
version) in November 2010, and the review by a special committee of Japan Atomic Energy
Society was finished in the end of March 2011.

K5 Operation of sealed radioactive source tracking system
Based on the “Code of Conduct for Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources” adopted in
the IAEA General Assembly in September 2003, MEXT introduced the registration system ofradioactive sources, by amending the Rules for Enforcement of the Radiation Disease
Prevention Act in 2009 and has started formal operation of the system since January 2011.
This target of the Registration System is the sealed sources with large amount of radioactivity
that will affect to human health (specified radioisotope mentioned in the RS-G-1.9), as
described in J 2.6, and the licensee must report the information such as specifications, receipt
and delivery etc. to MEXT.
The Registration System obligates a licensee to report of the information, such as periodicallyinventory of the specified radioisotope at the end of fiscal year and every time when theradioactive source is received and/or replaced by source exchange or registered informationis changed by a processing and manufacturing etc.
The purpose of the system is to detect and deter an illegal trade and possession of thespecified radioisotope. And in case of emergency, database on the registered information
which includes the specification and transaction etc. will be used for tracking the specified
radioisotope against an early emergency response. And the “registration system of specified
radioactive source” has been developed since 2007 so that a licensee has been able to report
the necessary information by using the dedicated web-site. This system has shifted to asituation of full-scale use in January 2011, through graded trial use by the administrative
guidance from August 2009 for the purpose of smooth operation of the system.

154

Annexes

Section L
L1

AnnexesInventory of spent fuelNuclear operators and facilities

JAPCO
Hokkaido Electric Power
Co., Inc.
Tohoku Electric Power Co.,
Inc

TEPCO

Chubu Electric Power Co.,Inc.
Hokuriku Electric Power
Co., Inc.
The Kansai Electric Power
Co., Inc.
The Chugoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Shikoku Electric Power
Co., Inc.
Kyushu Electric Power
Co., Inc.

JAEA

JNFL

Inventory (t)Tokai㻌 No2 Power Station
Tsuruga Power Station

370
580

Tomari Power Station

370

Higashidori Nuclear Power Station
Onagawa Nuclear Power Station
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power
StationFukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station
Kashiwazaki Kariwa Nuclear Power
Station60
420

Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station

Stored spent fuel

1,860
1,120
2,270
1,140

Uranium oxide fuel assemblies

120

Shika Nuclear Power Station

370
1,370
1,200

Mihama Power Station
Ohi Power Station
Takahama Power Station
Shimane Nuclear Power Station

390

Ikata Power Station

560

Genkai Nuclear Power Station
Sendai Nuclear Power Station

840
850

Reactor Decommissioning R&D Center70

FBR Research and Development Center
Tokai Research and Development
Center,Nuclear Fuel Cycle Technology
Development Directorate, Reprocessing
Facility
Tokai Research and Development
Center,Nuclear Science Research Institute
Oarai Research and Development
CenterRokkasho Reprocessing Plant

0

Total

155

Uranium oxide fuel assemblies
MOX fuel assemblies

41

Uranium oxide fuel assemblies
MOX fuel assemblies

18

Uranium oxide fuel assemblies

16
2,834
16,869Uranium oxide fuel assemblies
MOX fuel assemblies
Uranium oxide fuel assemblies

LL

Annexes

L2

Inventory of radioactive waste

L2.1

High level radioactive waste
Vitrified waste(number of containers*)
247
118
1,338
1,703

Facility
JAEA

Reprocessing facility
Reprocessing facility
Waste Storage Facility

JNFL
Total
* : 120 litter container

L2.2
1.

Power station waste

Homogeneous solid, packed solid and miscellaneous solid
Homogeneous
solid (drum)

Packed solid(drum)

Miscellaneous
solid (drum)

Total (drum)

0
453
2,496

0
347
382

1,433
54,93365,202

1,433
55,73368,080

576

0

6,870

7,446

Onagawa NPS
Higashidori NPS
Fukushima Daiichi NPS
Fukushima Daini NPS
Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS

1,684
0
-*
644
0

0
0
-*
1,658
0

25,384
7,860-*
15,00831,92327,0687,860-*
17,31031,923

Hamaoka NPS

3,295

1,576

29,93934,810

8

562

4,964

5,534

2,240
5,041
3,522

1,882
0
4,132

24,774
41,59725,38728,896
46,63833,041252

1,897

25,567

27,716

Ikata Power Station

1,317

724

27,97830,019Genkai NPS
Sendai NPS
Reactor Decommissioning
R&D Center
Fast
Breeder
ReactorResearch and Development
Center (Monju)

3,907
2,339

1,100
0

33,138
16,63838,145
18,9772,016

017,28819,304

20

0

4,944

4,964

Power station
JAPCO
Hokkaido ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Tohoku ElectricPower Co., Inc
TEPCO
Chubu
Electric
Power Co., Inc
Hokuriku ElectricPower Co., Inc.
The Kansai ElectricPower Co., Inc.
The
ChugokuElectric Power Co.,Inc.
Shikoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Kyushu ElectricPower Co., Inc.

JAEA

High level liquid radioactive
waste
3
380 m
0
0
3
380 m

Tokai- Power Station
Tokai㻌 No2 Power Station
Tsuruga Power Station
Tomari Power Station

Shika NPS
Mihama Power Station
Takahama Power Station
Ohi Power Station
Shimane NPS

Total
29,810+(*)
14,260+(*)
46,0827+(*)
Inventories are in the number of 200 litter drums (or converted into number of drums for miscellaneous solid).
* ; Under evaluation due to the affect by the Tohoku District – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake

156

504,897+(*)

Annexes

2.

Steam generator (SG)Power station

Number of SGs
76
8
4

Mihama Power Station
The Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.

Takahama Power Station

Shikoku Electric Power Co., Inc.

Ikata Power Station

Ohi Power Station

Kyushu Electric Power Co., Inc.

Genkai NPS

4

Sendai NPS

3
32

Total

3.

Control rod, channel box, etc.
Control rod
1(number)*

Channel box(number)

Others3(m )Resin, etc.
3
(m )

91 m
273
165
353

3

0
3,591
1,850
0

1,299
16
49
0

60
881
829
87

Tomari Power Station

300

0

0

90

Onagawa NPS
Higashidori NPS
Fukushima Daiichi NPS
Fukushima Daini NPS
Kashiwazaki Kariwa NPS

195
50
-*2
699
710

3,103
408
-*2
9,233
12,927

1
0
-*2
43
0

484
86
-*2
5,170.2
2,414

Hamaoka NPS

536

11,05731

2,585

Shika NPS

44

886

0

141

690
1,336
1,112

0
0
0

0
0
0

111
115
113

Shimane NPS

269

4,416

56

847

Ikata Power Station

637

0

0

155

777
444
8,590 +*2
3+(91 m )0000(1,495+*2)
3
m

165
142
(14,475+*2)
3m

Power station

JAPCO
Hokkaido ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Tohoku ElectricPower Co., Inc
TEPCO
Chubu
Electric
Power Co., Inc
Hokuriku ElectricPower Co., Inc.
The Kansai ElectricPower Co., Inc.
The
ChugokuElectric Power Co.,Inc.
Shikoku ElectricPower Co., Inc.
Kyushu ElectricPower Co., Inc.

Tokai Power Station
Tokai㻌 No㻌 2 Power Station
Tsuruga Power Station Unit 1
Tsuruga Power Station Unit 2

Mihama Power Station
Takahama Power Station
Ohi Power Station

Genkai NPS
Sendai NPS

Subtotal

JAEA

47,471+*

2

Control rod(number)

Neutron detector(number)

Others(number)Resin, etc.
3
(m )

5

102

0

216

Reactor Decommissioning R&D
CenterControl rod drive mechanism guide tube, etc.(number)Fast Breeder Reactor Research and5
Development Center (Monju)*㸯 For other than Tokai Power Station.
*2 Under evaluation due to the affect by the Tohoku District – off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake
JAEA

157

L

L

Annexes

L2.3

Long-lived low heat generation radioactive waste

JAEA

JNFL

JNFL

Bituminizedsolid(drums)Plastic solid(drums)Other waste(drums)Total(drums)32,14729,967

1,812

11,81375,73910,42300

16,174

26,597

1,064

0

0

44

1,108

43,63429,967

1,812

28,031

103,444Drum(drums)Facility
Reprocessing
facility
Reprocessingplant㸦 Reprocessi
ng facility㸧
Reprocessing
plant㸦Waste
storagefacility 㸧

Subtotal

Sheared cladding(drums)JAEA
JNFL

Reprocessing
facility
Reprocessing
plant

Spent filter(drums)

4,956

302

㸨1

219

0
Sludge3(m )Low activity concentrated
3
liquid waste (m )JAEA

Reprocessing
facility

Sample bottle(drums)

2,768

Total
(number)

1,356

6,614

0

219

Waste solvent
3
(m )
1,136

105

Total
(drums)Low level liquid waste
3(m )The storage unit is (or is converted into) 200 litter drum.
: The sheared cladding pieces are stored in 1,000 litter drums.

㸨1

L2.4

Uranium waste
Drum(drums)Global Nuclear Fuel - Japan Co., Ltd.
Mitsubishi Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd.
Nuclear
Fuel Tokai Works
Industries, Ltd.
Kumatori Works
Prototype Uranium
JAEA
Enrichment Plant
Enrichment
andJNFL
Disposal Office
Total

Other waste(drums)15,625
9,703
5,515
7,155

2,769
828
867
46

18,394
10,531
6,382
7,201

0.14
1.80
7.15
11.6

524

56

580

0

4,786

1,192

5,978

1.47

43,3085,758

49,066

22.16

The storage unit is (or is converted into) 200 litter drum.

158

Annexes

L2.5

Waste stored in research facilities

The data shown in this table is arranged using
the data in “Radioactive waste management status report (FY2010)” based on the “Periodic
report on management of the radioactive waste (notice)” issued by Director, MEXT, Nuclear
Safety Division, Science and Technology Policy Bureau, the data ordered for reporting for
FY2010 on Reactor Regulation Act, Article 67 Clause 1 and the data ordered for reporting on
the data in “Radiation management status report (FY2009)” pursuant to Radiation Disease
Prevention Act Article 42 Clause 1 and Ordinance and Rules for Enforcement of the Act,
Article 39 Clause 3 etc.
Solid
waste
*1
(drums )Liquid
waste
3
(m )

Tokai Research and Development Center
Nuclear Science Research Institute135,460㸫

Tokai Research and Development Center
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Engineering Laboratories

62,032

26.3

Oarai
ResearchCenter(North Area)

andDevelopment

1,478
29,075㸫㸫

Oarai
ResearchCenter(South Area)

andDevelopment

135

0.03

14,951

10.1

Using facility

1,060

21.5

Reactor facility

26

2.7

Facility

JAEA

Ningyo-toge Environmental Engineering
Center
Aomori Research and Development Center
Mutsu Office
The University of Tokyo,
Nuclear Professional School, School of Engineering

Description
Reactor facility, using facility for nuclear material(hereinafter referred to as “using facility”)
Using facilities
Reactor facility, Using facilities
Waste management facility(*1)Reactor facility (temporary storage)(*2)Using facility(*1)Reactor facility, Using facility (temporarystorage)(*2)Reactor facility.

63
918
201

0.0
㸫
㸫

Reactor facility, Using facility213

㸫Using facility

15

7.2

Reactor facility

5㸫Reactor facility

3㸫Reactor facility

6,382

7.2

Research Reactor Center

294
1,754
73

13.3
㸫
㸫

Nuclear Engineering Lab.

1,597

0.7

494

㸫

256,229

89.0

Kyoto University, Research Reactor InstituteNational Institute of Radiological Science
Nuclear
Tokai Safeguards Center
Material
Rokkasho
Safeguards
Control
Laboratory
CenterAnalytical

Rikkyo University
Institute for Atomic Energy
Tokyo City University (former Musashi Institute ofTechnology)
Atomic Energy Research InstituteKinki University
Atomic Energy Research Institute
Nuclear Fuel Industries, Ltd,
Tokai Works
Nippon Nuclear Fuel Development Co., Ltd.
Nuclear Development Corporation
Toshiba
Corporation

Hitachi, Ltd. Power & Industrial Systems Nuclear System
Division Ozenji Hitachi Training Reactor Center
Total

Using facility
Using facility

Using facility(same in the Table L2.4; this facility
is also categorized as fabrication facility)
Using facility
Using facility
Reactor facility(*1)Reactor facility, Using facility(*2)Using facility.
Reactor facility

The wastes stored by the licensee who is not applied to usage facility of nuclear fuel materials by Order for the Reactor
Regulation Act, Article 41
The sum of solid waste inventory and liquid
Other small Using Facilities㸦195 facilities㸧
76,866 drums*1 waste inventory* This data includes the data of inventory of Long-lived low hear generation radioactive waste and Uranium waste which
generated in the using facilities.
*1; The storage unit is (or is converted into) 200 litter drum.

159

L

L

Annexes<Waste Inventory data reported under the Radiation Disease Prevention Act>
Waste
(drums᧦)0Facilities of the waste management business
The University of Tokyo, Radioisotope Center
Japan
Radioisotope
Association

The Kaya Memorial Takizawa Laboratory
Ichihara OfficeKansai Waste Relay Station

8,501
747
66,818041,038Tokai Research and Development Center
Nuclear Science Research Institute96,223

Oarai Research and Development Center (North Area)

28,836

Kanto Waste Relay Station ൖ

VESTA Co., Ltd.
JAEA

Description

This data is also reported under
the Reactor Regulation Law.
This data is also reported under
the Reactor Regulation Law

T.N. Technos Co., Ltd. Tsukuba Laboratory
214
Total
242,377
Outside this inventory, the wastes of 12,619 drums are stored by licensees approved by Radiation Disease Prevention Act Article
3 Clause 1*;The storage unit is (or is converted into) 200 litter drum. This data includes the inventory of liquid waste.

160

Annexes

L3

Excerpt of Regulation Relevant to Section G

Table G4-1

Technical Standard for the design and construction methods of Spent Fuel
Storage Facility(Prevention of spent fuel criticality)
Article 3 A spent fuel storage facility shall be provided with adequate measures such as criticality-safe
geometries to eliminate the possibility of spent fuel going critical.
(Prevention of fire damage)
Article 4 If the safety of a spent fuel storage facility could be significantly impaired by a fire, the facility
shall be provided with fire extinguishing and alarm systems as appropriate (limited to systems that
automatically detect a fire and set off an alarm, such as automatic fire-alarm box and electric fire
alarm system).
2 Any failure, damage or malfunction of the fire extinguishing system and alarm system in thepreceding paragraph shall not significantly impair the safety of the spent fuel storage facility.
3 A System important to safety, such as emergency power supply system, that could be damaged by afire shall consist of noncombustible or nonflammable materials as far as possible and shall be
provided with adequate fire protection measures such as fire walls where necessary.
(Seismic design)
Article 5 A spent fuel storage facility shall be designed so as not to have a serious radiological impact
on the public when damaged by seismic forces applied on it.
2 The seismic forces mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be estimated taking account of theconditions of foundation ground, degree of earthquake damages in the region estimated from pastearthquake records, characteristics of seismic activities and other various factors, on the basis of thestructures of the spent fuel storage facility and the degree of hazards due to the damages to thefacility.
(Materials and structures)
Article 6 The materials and structures of the vessels, pipes and support structures in a spent fuelstorage facility that are important to ensure the safety of the facility (hereinafter in this Article referred
to as “vessels”) shall be adequate for ensuring the strength and corrosion resistance required by thedesign of the vessels.
2 The vessels and pipes in the spent fuel storage facility that are important to ensure the safety of the
facility shall be designed so as to endure appropriate pressure test or leakage test without significant
leakage.
(Heat removal)
Article 7 A spent fuel storage facility shall be designed so as to safely remove the decay-heat of spent
fuels.
(Confinement function)
Article 8 A spent fuel storage facility shall be so designed to have the function for confining spent fuelor materials contaminated with spent fuel (hereinafter referred to as “spent-fuel-contaminatedmaterials”) within restricted areas pursuant to the following requirements:(1) The structure of a container containing spent fuel shall not allow any leakage of spent fuel orspent-fuel-contaminated materials to the outside.
(2) When a pipe delivering any liquid not containing spent-fuel-contaminated materials is connected
to a vessel or pipe containing spent-fuel-contaminated materials, the structure shall ensure thatthe contaminated liquid does not flow back into the pipe delivering liquid not containing
spent-fuel-contaminated materials.
(3) A facility that has equipment for handling any liquid contaminated with spent fuel (solely for thoseareas where leakage of the liquid contaminated with spent fuel may expand), shall be designed
pursuant to the following requirements:(a) The surfaces of floors and walls inside of the facility shall have structures to inhibit the leakageof the liquid contaminated with spent.
(b) The periphery of a facility handling the liquid contaminated with spent fuel or gateways leading
to the outside of the facility or its vicinity shall be provided with lashers to prevent the liquidcontaminated with spent fuel from leaking outside the facility, unless the floors inside of the
facility are lower than the floors of the adjacent facilities or the ground surface and the liquidcontaminated with spent fuel cannot leak to the outside of the facility.

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Annexes(c) The floors of a spent fuel storage facility shall be above the discharge water channels thatdischarge effluent to the outside of the facility site (excluding ground water drainage channels
which have no opening in the controlled areas that could be contaminated with materials
contaminated with spent fuel), unless those discharge water channels are provided with thesystem that safely disposes the effluent containing spent-fuel-contaminated materials andinstrumentation to monitor the items listed in Article 15-2.
(Shielding)
Article 9 Shielding with capability required for preventing radiation hazards shall be provided if theprevention of the radiation hazards due to external radiation in a spent fuel storage facility site isrequired. For the prevention of radiation hazards. In such case, measures to prevent radiation
leakage shall be taken if necessary to prevent radiation hazards due to any opening, pipe or otherpenetration in the shielding structures.
(Ventilation)
Article 9-2 Ventilation system that meets the following requirements shall be provided, if it is required
to prevent radiation hazards due to the air contaminated with spent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminatedmaterials in the spent fuel storage facility:(1) The ventilation system shall have necessary capability for preventing radiation hazards.
(2) The structure of the ventilation system shall prohibit reverse flow of the air contaminated withspent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials.
(3) Filtering system, if it is installed, shall be capable for appropriate maintenance of its filteringfunction and shall have a structure to allow easy removal of the materials contaminated withspent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials or easy replacement of the system.
(4) The ventilation system shall have air intake ports that prohibit intake of the air contaminated withspent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials.
(Prevention of contamination by spent-fuel-contaminated materials)
Article 10 As for the spent fuel storage facility buildings that are frequently accessed, the surfaces of
their walls, floors and other parts, that could be contaminated by spent-fuel-contaminated materials
and could be touched by people, shall be easy to remove the spent-fuel-contaminated materials.
(Systems important to safety)
Article 11 The systems important to safety such as emergency power supply system shall be designed
to meet the following requirements:(1) If a system is shared among two or more nuclear facilities (such as fabrication facility, reactor
facility, spent fuel storage facility, reprocessing facility, waste disposal facility and nuclear
material utilization facility), the functions to ensure the safety of spent fuel storage facility shall not
be impaired by such sharing.
(2) Inspection or test to confirm the functions to ensure the safety of spent fuel storage facility, andmaintenance or repair for maintaining the integrity of such functions shall be possible.
(Transportation and receiving systems)
Article 12 The systems used for the transportation and receiving of containers containing spent fuelshall be designed to meet the following requirements:(1) The systems for the transportation and receiving of containers containing spent fuel shall havecapability for safe handling of the containers.
(2) The containers containing spent fuel shall be safely retained in case of loss of power supply forthe transportation and receiving systems.
(Instrumentation and control systems)
Article 13 A spent fuel storage facility shall be provided with the instrumentation to measure thefollowing parameters. If it is difficult to directly measure any of such parameters, indirect
instrumentation may be used as an alternative:(1) Surface temperature of container containing spent fuel.
(2) Pressure at the closure head of container containing spent fuel for monitoring seal performanceof the head (excluding welded closure head).
(3) Temperatures of air supply and exhaust of the buildings where spent fuel is stored.
2 A spent fuel storage facility shall be provided with the devices for reliable detection and quick
alarming of such situations as: when safety of spent fuel storage facility could be significantly
impaired due to loss of equipment function, malfunction or any other cause; when the concentration ofradioactive materials described in Article 15 (ii) or the dose equivalent of external radiation describedin Article 15 (iv) shows significant increase; or when significant amount of liquid radioactive materials

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could leak from liquid radioactive waste disposal system.
(Disposal systems)
Article 14. Radioactive waste disposal system (excluding radioactive waste retaining system) shallmeet the following requirements:(1) Radioactive waste disposal system shall be capable of disposing radioactive wastes generated in
the spent fuel storage facility so that concentration of airborne radioactive materials outside theenvironmental monitoring area and concentration of radioactive materials in the water at the outerboundary of the environmental monitoring do not exceed the values specified by the Minister of
Economy, Trade and Industry.
(2) Radioactive waste disposal system shall be installed separately from non-radioactive waste
disposal system, unless the system that leads non-radioactive liquid waste to radioactive liquid
waste disposal system is provided with the measures to prohibit for radioactive liquid waste toflow back into non-radioactive liquid waste systems.
(3) Gaseous radioactive waste disposal system shall not discharge gaseous wastes at any part ofthe system other than exhaust port.
(4) If filtering system is installed in the gaseous radioactive waste disposal system, it shall be capable
for appropriate maintenance of its filtering function and shall have a structure to allow easy
removal of the materials contaminated with spent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials oreasy replacement of the system.
(5) Liquid radioactive waste disposal system shall not discharge liquid waste at any part of thesystem other than water discharge outlet.
(Radiation control system)
Article 15 A spent fuel storage facility site shall be provided with the radiation instrumentation tomeasure the values listed below. If it is difficult to directly measure any of such parameters, indirect
instrumentation may be used as an alternative:(1) Dose equivalent rate at the side wall of radiation shielding structure of spent fuel storage facility(2) Concentration of radioactive materials in exhaust gases at or near the gaseous radioactive waste
exhaust port
(3) Concentration of radioactive materials in discharge water at or near the liquid radioactive waste
discharge outlet(4) Dose equivalent of external radiation, concentration of airborne radioactive materials anddensities of radioactive materials on the surface of contaminated items in the controlled area
(5) Dose equivalent of external radiation in the environmental monitoring area
(Emergency Power Supply System)
Article 16 A spent fuel storage facility shall be provided with power generating system driven byinternal combustion engine, or other power generating system with equal or more capability, in orderto maintain the function of the systems necessary for ensuring the safety of the facility in the event ofloss of electric power supply from off-site power grid.
2 Systems especially important for ensuring the safety of spent fuel storage facility shall be provided
with an uninterruptible power supply device or other power supply system with equal or morecapability.

Table G5-1

Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Safety Assessment of the Spent Fuel Interim
Storage Facility Using Metal Dry Casks

Siting Condition
Guideline 1 Basic conditions
The following events shall be investigated for the site and its surroundings of the spent fuel interim
storage facility, and it shall be confirmed that the adverse conditions for ensuring safety does notexist.
1. Natural environment(1)Natural phenomena such as earthquake, tsunami, landslides, depression, typhoon, high tide,
flood, abnormal cold weather, heavy snowfall.
(2)Geological conditions and landform etc. such as ground conditions, soil bearing capacity, fault.
(3) Meteorological conditions such as wind direction, wind velocity, waterfall.
(4) Hydrological and hydraulic conditions of rivers, underground water, etc.
2. Social environment(1) Fire, explosion at a neighboring factory etc.

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Annexes(2) Missiles etc. by air craft crash, etc.
(3)Conditions of land use in relation to food production such as agriculture, livestock farming, fisheryindustry and condition of population distribution etc.
Guideline 2 Normal conditions
The dose in normal condition of the general public due to the spent fuel interim storage facility shall belower than the dose limit specified by the law and regulation, and it shall be as low as reasonably
achievable.
Guideline 3 Accident conditions
Under the assumption of the occurrence of the maximum credible accident at the spent fuel interim
storage facility, the general public shall not receive excessive radiation exposure.
1. Selection of accidents
In the design of the spent fuel interim storage facility, accidents, which occurrence is technicallypossible to be assumed in the worst case and is considered important in view of radiation exposure to
the general public, shall be selected by thoroughly studying the possibility of occurrence of accidents
that may significantly fail the fundamental safety functions of metal casks from the technical point ofview considering aging of metal cask components by long term storage, such as:(1)Collision or fall of metal cask caused by wrong operation etc. during transfer in the facility(2)Natural disaster etc.
2. Calculation of release amount of radioactive materials etc.
The release amount of radioactive materials etc. shall be calculated for each accident selected inaccordance with the paragraph 1 above, applying appropriate analytical model and parameters andsetting appropriate conditions with safety margin, by thoroughly studying the followings:(1)Amount of leakage of radioactive materials from the fuel cladding(2)Integrity of metal casks concerning their confinement function and radiation shielding function(3)Number of metal casks to be assumed for leakage of radioactive materials(4)Conditions of atmospheric dispersion of radioactive materials(5)Period of release for the evaluation
3. Dose evaluation
It shall be confirmed that the general public does not receive excess radiation exposure from the doseeven in case of the maximum credible accident, which is defined as an accident which effect to thegeneral public is the maximum among accidents selected by the paragraph 1 as the result from thecalculation in accordance with the paragraph 2 above. However, this evaluation is not required when
there is no radiation exposure to the general public due to the accident selected by the paragraph 1.
Radiation Control
Guideline 4 Confinement function
The spent fuel interim storage facility shall be designed to confine radioactive materials in the limitedarea with the following measures.
1. The metal cask shall be designed to maintain the negative pressure in the space where spent fuelassemblies are contained throughout the design storage period.
2. The metal cask shall be designed to isolate the space where spent fuel assemblies are contained
from outside of the cask with the multi-layered confinement structure at the cap portion. And its
confinement function shall be monitored.
3. The metal cask shall be designed with considerations of the restoration capability of confinement
function such a design as that allows the attachment of an additional cap to cope with unlikely eventof confinement function abnormality of cap structure.
4. The metal cask shall be designed to maintain the temperature of fuel claddings low throughout thedesign storage period in view of maintaining the integrity of fuel cladding.
5. The metal cask shall be designed to keep the temperature within the range to maintain the integrityof the structures throughout the design storage period in view of maintaining its confinement function.
Guideline 5 Radiation shielding
The spent fuel interim storage facility shall be appropriately shielded to lower the exposure dose of
the general public by the direct and sky shine ray.
In addition, the sufficient radiation shielding shall be provided considering working conditions of
personnel engaged in radiation work.
In case the radiation shielding of concrete etc is used, in addition to the metal cask, the shielding
material shall be designed to maintain the temperature low enough not to impair its radiation shielding
capability.
Guideline 6 Radiation exposure control
1. Radiation exposure control in working environments

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the monitoring system and measuring equipment for dose rates etc. and alarm system forunusual increase in the dose rate should be prepared.
(2) The important information from the above-mentioned monitoring system and alarm systemshould be designed that the centralized monitoring is possible at an appropriate place.
2. Equipments, such as dosimeters required for individual exposure control for personnel engaged inradiation work should be prepared.
3. The control area of the spent fuel interim storage facility shall be designed so that the appropriate
access control could be implemented in accordance with the dose rate and surface contamination
density.
Environmental safety
Guideline 7 Discharge control of radioactive wastes
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be designed so that the concentration of radioactive
materials released to the environment is as low as reasonably achievable with appropriate treatmentof radioactive wastes generated during the storage.
Guideline 8 Consideration for long-term storage etc.
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be designed to maintain the integrity of spent fuelassemblies and the integrity of the components that have fundamental safety functions throughout
the design storage period by taking the following measures, in considerations of degradation etc.
accompanied by the long-term storage.
1. Components of metal cask important to maintain fundamental safety functions should be designed
not to lose required safety function maintaining required strength and performance by selecting
materials that have sufficient reliability in the environments such as temperature and radiation
during design storage period and to the degradation such as corrosion, creeping, and stresscorrosion cracking under the above environments.
2. The metal cask should contain and store the spent fuel assemblies together with sealing inert
gases.
3. The metal cask should be designed to be able to remove the decay heat from spent fuels in view ofmaintaining the integrity of spent fuel assemblies and the integrity of the components that havefundamental safety functions.
4. The storage building should be designed to be able to maintain the room temperature in thebuilding low in view of the heat removal from the surface of a metal cask. And, it should bedesigned to be able to monitor that the room temperature in the storage building will not elevate to
the unusual level.
Guideline 9 Radiation monitoring
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be provided with measures to monitor the concentration
etc. of radioactive materials in the release path of radioactive wastes appropriately. Moreover,measures to monitor the dose rates, concentrations etc. of radioactive materials in the surrounding
environment should be taken appropriately in consideration to the potential release of radioactive
materials.
Criticality
Guideline 10 Criticality safety of a single metal cask
A single metal cask in the spent fuel interim storage facility should be designed to prevent thecriticality under any technically conceivable conditions when spent fuel assemblies are contained in
the cask.
In case the internal basket shares the criticality prevention function, the metal cask should bedesigned to keep the structural integrity of the basket throughout the design storage period.
Guideline 11 Criticality safety of multiple metal casks
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be provided with measures to prevent the criticality
under any technically conceivable conditions considering the neutron interference among metal casks
in the facility.
Guideline 12 Consideration for nuclear criticality accidents
If any possibility of a nuclear criticality accident caused by operational error etc. at the spent fuelinterim storage facility should not be neglected, appropriate measures for the unlikely event of nuclear
criticality accident shall be prepared.
When Guideline 10 and Guideline 11 are conformed and when spent fuels are contained in the metalcask, criticality could not physically occur, so that the application of this guideline is exempted.

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Other safety measures
Guideline 13 Consideration for earthquake
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be designed to maintain the fundamental safetyfunctions against design earthquake force considered to be the most appropriate referring to theresults of site investigation of past records at the site and its peripheral area.
Guideline 14 Consideration for natural phenomena other than earthquakes
The facilities important to safety of the spent fuel interim storage facility should be designed
considering the severest natural force of natural phenomena other than earthquake referring to theresults of site investigation of past records at the site and its peripheral area.
Guideline 15 Consideration for fire and explosion
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be provided with appropriate measures to prevent
occurrence of a fire and a explosion, and measures to prevent propagation of fire and explosion, andto control excessive release of radioactive materials into the outside of facility.
1. The spent fuel interim storage facility should be designed to use nonflammable or fire-retardantmaterials as much as reasonably possible.
2. In case flammable material is used in the spent fuel interim storage facility, appropriate measures
such as elimination of fire source, prevention of unusual temperature rise, prevention ofleakage-out or leakage-in of flammable material etc. should be taken.
3. In order to prevent propagation of a fire, the appropriate measures to reduce the influence by fireshould be taken in addition to installation of appropriate detection and alarm systems and the fire
protection equipment.
Guideline 16 Consideration for loss of electric power
A power supply system with sufficient capacity and reliability to operate following equipments required
for safety should be installed in the spent fuel interim storage facility to be prepared for the loss offunction of external power supply systems such as blackout.
1. Monitoring equipment for confinement function of metal casks
2.Radiation monitoring equipment
3.Equipment such as fire alarm equipment, emergency communication equipment, and emergency
lightning equipment
Guideline 17 Consideration for transfer of metal casks
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be provided with appropriate measures for shipping-out
of metal casks containing spent fuels considering the basic safety functions.
Guideline 18 Consideration of accident
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be provided with the appropriate measures for, such as
alarm, communication and evacuation of radiation workers depending on the accident condition.
1. Appropriate radiation measuring devices, the radiation protection equipment etc. should beavailable as required.
2. In the design of the facility, the lighting equipment for evacuation, which function is not lost in acase of loss of normal lighting power source, should be installed and safety evacuation passages
with simple, clear and durable signs should be established.
Guideline 19 Consideration for sharing of facilities
The facilities important to safety of spent fuel interim storage facility, which are shared with nuclear
facilities other than the concerned spent fuel interim storage facility or shared within the concerned
spent fuel interim storage facility, should not cause any inconvenience on the safety of the concerned
spent fuel interim storage facility by the sharing judged by its function, structure etc.
Guideline 20 Applicable codes and standards
The design, material selection, manufacturing, construction, and inspection of the facilities importantto safety of the spent fuel interim storage facility should be in conformity with codes and standards
recognized as appropriate.
1. The spent fuel interim storage facility should be in conformity with Japanese laws and regulations
such as the "Reactor Regulation Law", "Construction Standard Law", "Fire Protection Law" etc.
2. The design, material selection, manufacturing, construction, inspection etc. of facilities important tosafety should be in conformity with domestic codes and standards recognized as appropriate. For
items for which no domestic applicable codes or standards is exist, the codes or standards offoreign countries that are experienced and reliable may be applied.
Guideline 21 Consideration for inspection, repair etc.
The spent fuel interim storage facility should be made to be able to perform inspection, test,
maintenance and repair with appropriate methods according to the importance to safety and theneeds.

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Table G6-1

Contents of the Operational Safety Program for the Spent Fuel Interim Storage
Facility (Article 37 paragraph 1 of the Rule for Interim Storage of Spent Fuel)(1) System of the observance of related laws and operational safety program (including theparticipation of management persons).
(2) System for safety culture cultivation (including the participation of management persons).
(3) Quality assurance of the spent fuel storage facility (including the methods of root cause analysis
and organization for analysis implementation describing the position of working procedure in
operational safety program).
(4) The duties of personnel engaged in the operation and management of the spent fuel storage facility
and organization(5) Scope of duty on chief engineer of spent fuel and the contents as well as authority of chief engineerof spent fuel to supervise operational safety and positioning in the organization.
(6) The following items with respect to the operational safety education for radiation workers at the
spent fuel storage facility(a) Policy for the operational safety education(including preparation of education program)(b) The contents of the operational safety education as follows
1) Relevant laws and the Operational safety program2) Structure, performance and operation of the spent fuel storage facility3) Radiation management4) Handling of nuclear fuel materials and objects contaminated by them5) Measures to be taken in emergencies(c) Other necessary items for the operational safety education of the spent fuel storage facility(7) Operation of the equipment especially necessary to be managed in view of safety preservation.
(8) Designation of controlled areas, and environment monitoring areas, and restriction of access tothese areas(9) Matters related to gaseous and liquid discharge monitoring equipment(10) Monitoring of the dose, the dose equivalent, the concentration of radioactive materials and thedensity of radioactive materials on the surface of objects contaminated by radioactive materials, andthe decontamination(11) Management of radiation measuring instruments and the method of radiation measurement(12) Patrols and checks of the spent fuel storage facility and their associated measures(13) Voluntary periodical inspections of the spent fuel storage facility(14) Receipt, delivery, transport, storage and other handling of spent fuels(15) Disposal of radioactive waste(16) Measures to be taken in emergency(17) Adequate records and reports (including the report on the occurrences of accidents, failures andequivalents to managements.) on the operational safety of the spent fuel storage facility (including
the compliance with the Operational Safety Program).
(18) Periodic Assessment of the spent fuel storage facility(19) Sharing technical information by an operator who conducted maintenance works with otheroperators of spent fuel storage facilities.
(20) Disclosure of the nonconformity information in occurrence of nonconformity.
(21) Other necessary items for safety preservation of the spent fuel storage facility

Table G6-2

Contents of Decommissioning-related Operational Safety Program (Article 37
paragraph 2 of the Rules for Interim Storage of Spent Fuel)

In order to obtain the license for decommissioning program of a spent fuel storage facility, the operator
shall revise the Operational Safety Program for the following points and shall get approval for therevision.
(1) System of the observance of related laws and the operational safety program (including theparticipation of management persons).
(2) System to cultivate safety culture (including the participation of management persons).
(3) Quality assurance for the spent fuel storage facility (including the methods of root cause analysis
and organization for analysis implementation describing the position of working procedure in
operational safety program).
(4) Quality assurance for decommissioning (including the methods of root cause analysis andorganization for analysis implementation describing the position of working procedure in operational

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(5) Duties and organization of a person who will carry out decommissioning work.(except for thefollowing Clause).
(6) Scope of duty on chief engineer of spent fuel and the contents as well as authority of chiefengineer of spent fuel to supervise operational safety and positioning in the organization.
(7) The following safety training items for radiation workers for decommissioning:(a) Implementation principle of safety training (including development of an implementation plan)(b) Safety training contents on the following items:
1) Compliance of relevant laws and regulations and Safety Rules and Regulations.
2) Structures and performance of the spent fuel storage facility.
3) Decommissioning of the spent fuel storage facility.
4) Radiation control.
5) Handling of nuclear fuel materials and materials contaminated with nuclear fuel materials.
6) Measures to be taken at an emergency.
(c) Other necessary matters for safety training on the spent fuel storage facility.
(8) Operation of systems requiring special control for safety.
(9) Establishment of the controlled area, conservation area, and environmental monitoring area, andaccess control to those areas.
(10) Exhaust monitoring system and discharge water monitoring system.
(11) Monitoring of radiation dose, dose equivalent, concentration of radioactive materials andradioactive material density on the surface of items contaminated with radioactive materials, andremoval of contamination.
(12) Control of radiation measuring devices and radiation measurement methods.
(13) Periodic self-imposed inspection of the spent fuel storage facility.
(14) Patrol of the spent fuel storage facility and handling of findings.
(15) Disposal of radioactive wastes.
(16) Measures to be taken at an emergency.
(17) Adequate records and reports (including the report on the occurrences of accidents, failures andequivalents complied with Article 43 Clause 13 to managements.) on the operational safety of the
spent fuel storage facility (including the compliance with the Operational Safety Program).
(18). Adequate records and reports (including the report on the occurrences of accidents, failures andequivalents complied with Article 43 Clause 13 to managements.) on the operational safety of thedecommissioning (including the compliance with the Operational Safety Program).
(19) Sharing technical information by an operator who conducted maintenance works with otheroperators of spent fuel storage facilities.
(20) Disclosure of the nonconformity information in occurrence of nonconformity.
(21) Decommissioning management.
(22) Other necessary items for the safety and decommissioning of the spent fuel storage facility.

Table G6-3

Incident and Failure Reporting Standards at the Spent Fuel Interim Storage
Facility (Article 43-13 of the Rule for Interim Storage of Spent Fuel)

Upon the occurrence of any of the following events, operators of spent fuel storage facilities shallimmediately give notice to that effect to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, and shall reportto the minister about the situation of the event and corrective actions taken within ten days of the event:(1) The spent fuel is stolen or its whereabouts is unknown;(2) A failure of the spent fuel storage facility is found (excluding a failure that cause minor
affection on spent fuel storage);(3) The concentration of radioactive material in air on the boundary outside a peripheral
monitoring area has exceeded the concentration limits provided in the Ministerial Ordinance of
METI Minister due to the gaseous radioactive waste release through discharge facilities;(4) The concentration of radioactive material in water on the boundary outside a peripheral
monitoring area has exceeded the concentration limits provided in the Ministerial Ordinance of
METI Minister due to the liquid radioactive waste release through discharge facilities;(5) Spent fuel etc. has leaked outside the controlled area;(6) Leakage of spent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials inside a radiation controlled area
due to a failure of the spent fuel storage system or other unexpected situation except for thefollowing cases (excluding the cases that access control to the leakage area has been168

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implemented, a new measures such as key control have been taken, or leaked material has
spread outside of the radiation controlled area) where:(a) Leakage of liquid spent fuel or materials contaminated with spent fuel has not spread out of
the lasher provided around the leaked equipment.
(b) The function of relevant ventilation system has been properly maintained when gaseous
spent fuel or materials contaminated with spent fuel has leaked.
(7) Workers engaged in the radiation work have been exposed to radiation that exceeds or is
likely to exceed the dose limits provided in he Ministerial Ordinance of METI Minister; or(8) In addition to the events of the above paragraphs, a hazard to personnel (excluding minor
hazards other than radiation hazards) has occurred or is likely to occur at the spent fuelstorage facility.

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L4

Excerpt of Regulation Relevant to Section H

Table H4-1

“Technical Standard for the Design and Construction Methods for the Specified
Waste Disposal Facility or Specified Waste Storage Facility”(Prevention of fire damage)
Article 3 If the safety of a specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility could besignificantly impaired by a fire, the facility shall be provided with fire extinguishing and alarm systems
as appropriate (limited to systems that automatically detect a fire and set off an alarm, such as
automatic fire-alarm box and electric fire alarm system).
2 Any failure, damage or malfunction of the fire extinguishing system and alarm system in thepreceding paragraph shall not significantly impair the safety of the specified waste disposal facility or
specified waste storage facility.
3 A system important to safety, such as emergency power supply system, that could be damaged by afire shall consist of noncombustible or nonflammable materials as far as possible and shall be
provided with adequate fire protection measures such as fire walls where necessary.
4 Systems for handling or managing radioactive wastes that could generate hydrogen shall be
designed to prohibit retention.
5 Cells and rooms containing systems for handling or storage radioactive wastes that could generatehydrogen (excluding non-explosive systems) shall be provided with appropriate measures to prohibithydrogen retention and to prevent explosion in case of hydrogen leakage from those systems.
(Seismic design)
Article 4 A specified waste disposal or storage facility shall be designed so as not to have a serious
radiological impact on the public when damaged by seismic forces applied on it.
2 The seismic forces mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be estimated taking account of theconditions of foundation ground, degree of earthquake damages in the region estimated from pastearthquake records, characteristics of seismic activities and other various factors, on the basis of thestructures of the specified waste disposal facility or specified waste management facility and thedegree of hazards due to the damages to the facility.
(Materials and structures)
Article 5 The materials and structures of the vessels, pipes and support structures in a specified
waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility that are important to ensure the safety of the
facility (hereinafter in this Article referred to as “vessels”) shall be adequate for ensuring the strengthand corrosion resistance required by the design of the vessels.
2 The vessels and pipes in the specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility thatare important to ensure the safety of the facility shall be designed so as to endure appropriatepressure test or leakage test without significant leakage.
(Confinement functions)
Article 6 A specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility shall be provided with thefunctions to confine radioactive wastes within restricted areas pursuant to the following requirements:(1) When a pipe delivering liquid not containing radioactive waste is connected to a vessel or pipe
containing liquid radioactive waste, the structure shall ensure that the liquid radioactive waste
does not flow back into the pipe delivering the liquid not containing radioactive waste.
(2) The air flow at the opening of a hood for handling of non-sealed radioactive waste shall bemaintained at an appropriate speed.
(3) Inner pressure of a room where contamination by radioactive waste could occur shall bemaintained negative as required.
(4) A facility that has a liquid radioactive waste handing system (solely for those areas where leakageof liquid radioactive waste could expand), shall be designed pursuant to the following
requirements:(a) The surfaces of floors and walls inside of the facility shall have structures to inhibit the leakage ofliquid radioactive waste.
(b) The periphery of a facility handling liquid radioactive waste or gateways leading to the outside of
the facility or its vicinity shall be provided with lashers to prevent the liquid radioactive waste fromleaking outside the facility, unless the floors inside of the facility are lower than the floors of theadjacent facilities or the ground surface and the liquid radioactive waste cannot leak to theoutside of the facility.
(c) The floors of a specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility shall be above

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the discharge water channels that discharge effluent to the outside of the facility site (excluding
ground water drainage channels which have no opening in the controlled areas that could becontaminated with radioactive waste), unless those discharge water channels are provided withthe system that safely disposes the effluent contaminated with radioactive waste and the
instrumentation to monitor the items listed in Article 15-3.
(Shielding)
Article 7 Shielding with capability required for preventing radiation hazards shall be provided if theprevention of radiation hazards due to the external radiation in a specified waste disposal facility or
specified waste storage facility site is required. In such case, measures to prevent radiation leakage
shall be taken if necessary to prevent radiation hazards due to any opening, pipe or other penetrationin the shielding structures.
(Ventilation)
Article 8 Ventilation system that meets the following requirements shall be provided, if it is required toprevent radiation hazards due to the air contaminated with spent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminatedmaterials in the specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility:(1) The ventilation system shall have necessary capability for preventing radiation hazards.
(2) The structure of the ventilation system shall prohibit reverse flow of the air contaminated withspent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials.
(3) Filtering system, if it is installed, shall be capable for appropriate maintenance of its filteringfunction and shall have a structure to allow easy removal of the materials contaminated with spent
fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials or easy replacement of the system.
(4)The ventilation system shall have air intake ports that prohibit intake of the air contaminated withspent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials.
(Prevention of contamination by spent-fuel-contaminated materials)
Article 9 As for the specified waste disposal facility or specified waste management facility buildingsthat are frequently accessed, the surfaces of their walls, floors and other parts, that could becontaminated by spent-fuel-contaminated materials and could be touched by people, shall be easy toremove the spent-fuel-contaminated materials.
(Receiving system or management system)
Article 10 The radioactive waste receiving system of specified waste disposal facility or radioactive
waste management system of specified waste storage facility that could be overheated by decay heatand radiations from radioactive waste shall be provided with measures necessary for cooling.
(Treatment and disposal systems)
Article 11 Radioactive waste disposal system (excluding radioactive waste retaining system) shallmeet the following requirements:(1) Radioactive waste disposal system shall be capable of disposing radioactive wastes generated in
the specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility so that concentration of
airborne radioactive materials outside the environmental monitoring area and concentration ofradioactive materials in the water at the outer boundary of the environmental monitoring do not
exceed the values specified by the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry.
(2) Radioactive waste disposal system shall be installed separately from non-radioactive waste
disposal system, unless the system that leads non-radioactive liquid waste to radioactive liquid
waste disposal system is provided with the measures to prohibit for radioactive liquid waste to flow
back into non-radioactive liquid waste systems.
(3) Gaseous radioactive waste disposal system shall not discharge gaseous wastes at any part of thesystem other than exhaust port.
(4) If filtering system is installed in the gaseous radioactive waste disposal system, it shall be capable
for appropriate maintenance of its filtering function and shall have a structure to allow easy
removal of the materials contaminated with spent fuel or spent-fuel-contaminated materials oreasy replacement of the system.
(5) Liquid radioactive waste disposal system shall not discharge liquid waste at any part of the systemother than water discharge outlet.
(Systems important to safety)
Article 12 The systems important to safety such as emergency power supply system shall be designed

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to meet the following requirements:(1) If a system is shared among two or more nuclear facilities (such as fabrication facility, reactor
facility, spent fuel storage facility, reprocessing facility, waste disposal facility and nuclear material
utilization facility), the functions to ensure the safety of specified waste disposal facility or specified
waste storage facility shall not be impaired by such sharing.
(2)If necessary for maintaining the functions to maintain the safety of specified waste disposal facilityor specified waste storage facility, the system or its parent system shall have appropriate
redundancy.
(3)Inspection or test to confirm the functions to ensure the safety of specified waste disposal facility or
specified waste storage facility, and maintenance or repair for maintaining the integrity of suchfunctions shall be possible.
(Transport system)
Article 13 Transport system for radioactive wastes (excluding those which have no significant impact
on personal safety ) shall be designed to meet the following requirements:(1) Transport system shall be capable of normal transport of radioactive wastes.
(2) When Radioactive wastes shall be safely retained in case of loss of power supply for thetransportation of radioactive waste.
(Instrumentation and control system)
Article 14 A specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility shall be provided withthe devices for reliable detection and quick alarming of such situations as: when the safety of the
facility could be significantly impaired due to loss of equipment function, miss-operation or any othercause; when the concentration of radioactive materials provided in Article 15 (2) or the dose
equivalent provided in Article 15 (4) shows significant increase; or when significant amount of liquidradioactive materials could leak from the liquid radioactive waste disposal system.
2 A specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility shall be provided with the circuits
to actuate the necessary systems immediately and automatically, when the safety of the facility could
be significantly impaired due to loss of equipment function, miss-operation or any other cause and it
is required to quickly actuate the system to maintain the function to confine radioactive waste within
restricted areas or the system to prevent fire or explosion.
(Radiation control system)
Article 15 A specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility site shall be provided
with the radiation instrumentation to measure the values listed below. If it is difficult to directly
measure any of such parameters, indirect instrumentation may be used as an alternative:(1) Dose equivalent rate provided by the Minister of METI at the side wall of radiation shielding
structure of waste storage facility and waste receiving facility.
(2) Concentration of radioactive materials in exhaust gases at or near the gaseous radioactive waste
exhaust port
(3) Concentration of radioactive materials in discharge water at or near the liquid radioactive waste
discharge outlet(4) Dose equivalent of external radiation, concentration of airborne radioactive materials anddensities of radioactive materials provided by the Minister of METI on the surface of contaminateditems in the controlled area
(5) Dose equivalent of external radiation provided by the Minister of METI in the environmental
monitoring area
(Emergency Power Supply System)
Article 16 A specified waste disposal facility or specified waste storage facility shall be provided withpower generating system driven by internal combustion engine, or other power generating systemwith equal or more capability, in order to maintain the function of the systems necessary for ensuring
the safety of the facility in the event of loss of electric power supply from off-site power grid.
2 Systems especially important for ensuring the safety of specified waste disposal facility or specified
waste storage facility shall be provided with an uninterruptible power supply device or other power
supply system with equal or more capability.

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Table H5-1
(Excerpt)

Basic Guide for Safety Review of Category 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal

Basic Siting Conditions
The sites of the waste disposal facilities and their vicinity shall not have the possibility of occurrence ofsuch events that would cause significant accidents. In addition, events that would magnify theconsequence shall also be unlikely, even in case of accident.
Basic safety measures
1. Design of near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities
The near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities shall be designed taking the following points into
account (depending on the disposal methods, so that any radiation dose to the public becomes as low
as reasonably achievable with current technologies):(1) Containment
The near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities shall be provided with the function of containing
radioactive materials within a limited area of the facilities, during a certain period.
(2) Restriction of migration
The near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities shall be provided with measures for restricting
migration of radioactive materials from the facilities to the biosphere.
(3) Isolation
Solid radioactive wastes shall be disposed of sufficiently deep underground to suppress impacts ofradioactive materials on the biosphere assumed to be caused by them, to a level with no safety
hazards.
(4) Other considerations
Potential effects, if any, of the heat from the waste packages and chemicals contained in the waste
packages shall be considered in the design of the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities.
Radiation control
1 Radiation protection(1) The waste disposal facility shall be provided with radiation shielding so that the radiation dose to the
public due to direct gamma rays and scattered gamma rays such as the sky-shine gamma rays is as
low as reasonably achievable.
(2) When disposal of radioactive materials is anticipated, the facility shall be provided with measures tokeep the radiation dose to the public due to the dispersal as low as reasonably achievable.
(3) The waste disposal facilities shall be provided with proper measures such as radiation shielding andventilation to keep the work environment appropriate for the personnel engaged in radiation work.
2 Radiation exposure control
The waste disposal facilities shall be provided with measures for sufficiently carrying out surveillanceon and controlling the radiation dose to personnel engaged in radiation work.
3 Release control of gaseous and liquid radioactive effluentsThe level of concentration of radioactive materials released from the waste disposal facilities to thesurrounding environment shall be kept as low as reasonably achievable, by taking measures such as
appropriate processing of gaseous and liquid radioactive wastes generated in the adjunct facilities tothe near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities.
4 Radiation surveillance(1) In the waste disposal facilities, measures shall be taken to appropriately survey the concentration ofradioactive materials at each point of the release pathways of gaseous and liquid radioactive effluentsfrom the adjunct facilities to the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities.
In addition, measures shall be taken to appropriately survey the radiation dose and concentration ofradioactive materials in the surrounding environment, commensurate to the amount of the released
radioactive materials.
(2) In the waste disposal facilities, measures shall be taken for a certain period of time to appropriately
survey the concentration of radioactive materials that release from the near surface or sub-surface
disposal facilities into groundwater and other media, and further being transported to the biosphere.
Other safety measures
1 Design considerations against earthquakes
The waste disposal facilities shall be designed so that the required safety functions are not impaired
against the design-base seismic force during a certain period.
The design-base seismic force shall be determined in accordance with the seismic classification
based on the significance classification for seismic design that is stipulated in the "Regulatory Guide
for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities".
2 Design considerations against natural phenomena other than earthquakes
The waste disposal facilities shall be designed so that the required safety functions are not impaired

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investigations at the site and its vicinity.
3 Consideration against seepage water
Seepage into the tunnels and caverns shall be properly pumped out. Appropriate measures shall betaken to avoid excessive release of radioactive materials from the waste packages in case of
irruptive seepage water.
4 Considerations against fire and explosion
The waste disposal facilities shall be provided with measures to prevent the occurrence of fires andexplosions. In addition, measures shall be taken to prevent excessive release of radioactive
materials to outside of the facilities in case of fire or explosions.
5 Considerations against loss of power
The waste disposal facilities shall be provided with appropriate measures against the loss of thefunction of the external power.
6 Applicable codes and standards
The design and construction of the waste disposal facilities shall be conducted in compliance withappropriate codes and standards.
Safety assessment during active control period
1 Normal conditions
Radiation dose to the public during normal operation shall be as low as reasonably achievable interms of planning of step-wise control, design of the waste disposal facilities and conditions at thesite and its vicinity.
2 Accident conditions
Any abnormal event that is technically feasible shall not cause excessive radiation dose to the
public.
Termination of active control
It shall be demonstrated that active control of the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities to beprovided for controlling radiation exposure can be terminated in a certain time period, and that thesafety of the facilities will be secured even after terminating the active control. It should be noted thatrecords relevant to the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities shall be transferred to theGovernment, or an organization assigned by the Government.
Safety assessment after the period for active control
In the safety assessment after the period for active control (the safety assessment in this report refers“safety assessment after the period for active control”), radiation doses to residents or intruder shall beassessed for each of four scenarios; likely, less-likely, very unlikely and human intrusion scenarios,
depending on the disposal method. The results shall comply with the target values for each scenario.
(1) Likely scenario
It shall be demonstrated that impacts of radioactive materials on the biosphere assumed to becaused by the disposed solid radioactive wastes will be negligible, by assessing scientificprobability of scenarios.
The assessment shall be conducted for likely and normally conceivable scenarios, under likely
conditions using the most likely parameters. The scenarios shall be classified into three categories,
as shown below, depending on the migration pathway of radioactive materials to the biosphere:i)Likely groundwater scenarios,ii)
Likely gas migration scenarios, andiii)
Likely land use scenarios.
The evaluation of the likely groundwater and gas migration scenarios shall be conducted for each of
the periods set out for defining long-term conditions after the period for active control.
The evaluation of the likely land use scenario shall be conducted for each area of land that will beavailable for use, assuming geomorphological changes due to uplift/erosion and sea level changes,
focusing on the utilization of contaminated areas.
(2) Less-likely scenarios
It shall be demonstrated that the impacts of radioactive materials on the biosphere, assumed to becaused by the disposed solid radioactive wastes, will be limited (even for less-likely scenarios, andconsidering variation of the likely scenarios).
Likely variables shall be analyzed for parameters, based on likely evolution of events for the likely
scenarios.
The less-likely scenarios shall be developed by incorporating safety significant variables
exhaustively. The safety assessment shall be conducted, based on new scientific knowledge, usingparameters that are considered scientifically reasonable while maintaining appropriate

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conservativeness. Parameters shall be defined conservatively considering interrelations amongparameters, if any.
Evaluation shall be conducted for less-likely scenarios in which some of the functions expected forthe disposal system are ignored in order to demonstrate that the long-term safety of the systemdoes not rely excessively on a single barrier function.
As for the likely scenarios, these shall be classified into three categories, as shown below,
depending on the migration pathway of radioactive materials to the biosphere:i)Less-likely groundwater scenarios,ii)
Less-likely gas migration scenarios, andiii)
Less-likely land use scenarios.
As for the likely scenarios, the evaluation of the likely groundwater and gas migration scenarios
shall be conducted for each of the periods set out for defining long-term conditions after the period
for active control.
As for the likely scenarios, the evaluation of the likely land use scenario shall be conducted for eachof lands that will be available for use, assuming geomorphological changes due to uplift/erosion andsea level changes, focusing on the utilization of contaminated areas.
(3) Very unlikely scenarios
It shall be demonstrated that the impacts of radioactive materials on the biosphere assumed to becaused by the disposed solid radioactive wastes will result in conditions that will not require any
special measures for radiation protection, even assuming such very unlikely scenarios that cannot
be assumed even in the less-likely scenario.
In areas where the possibility of the direct destruction of the disposal facilities due toearthquakes/fault movement and volcanic/igneous activity or extreme thermal/chemical
deterioration due to volcanic/igneous activities may not be excluded over a long time frame,
scenarios that consider simultaneous loss of several barrier functions or hypothetical degradation
with levels beyond the less-likely scenarios shall be evaluated in long time frame.
(4) Human intrusion scenario
With regard to human intrusion scenarios that cannot be excluded, even taking measures to reduce
the possibility of occurrence of human intrusion, the waste disposal system shall demonstrate its
sufficient robustness against the safety assessment for human intrusion scenarios; the impacts ofradioactive materials on the biosphere, assumed to be caused by the disposed solid radioactive
wastes due to stylized human actions, will result in conditions that will not require any special
measures for radiation protection for residents around the site and for intruders.
Scenarios shown below shall be evaluated to demonstrate the validity of radioactivity concentration,
radioactivity in each compartment of the cavern, design of near surface or sub-surface disposal
facilities with respect to retarding migration of radioactive materials with engineered barriers, andvalidity of isolation from the biosphere:i)
Borehole scenariosii)
Tunnel excavation scenarios, andiii)
A large-scale land use scenario.
(5) Time frame of the assessment
Impacts of radioactive materials on the biosphere, assumed to be caused by the disposed solidradioactive wastes shall be evaluated for the period of safety assessment during which maximum
values of radiation dose to residents around the site or intruders will appear for each scenario.
(6) Defining of conditions
1) Defining the long-term evolution of events relevant to the geological environment
Events relevant to the geological environment are categorized into those attributable to platemovement, those attributable to climate change and those attributable to both of these. Theirlong-term evolution shall be defined for likely and less-likely scenarios.
2) Defining future biosphere conditions
Evaluation shall be conducted for reasonably maximally exposed individuals in the biospherearound the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities.
Future human lifestyles in the biosphere shall be stylized based on current information relevant toareas around the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities, as well as general lifestyles
currently recognized in Japan.
Natural events that could cause changes in conditions of future lifestyles shall be considered tochange according to the scenarios.
3) Defining near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities conditions
Long-term evolution shall be defined focusing on the characteristics of the near surface or
sub-surface disposal facilities in a long time range after the period for active control.
Since the near surface or sub-surface disposal facilities could be affected by the surrounding
geological environment, physical and chemical phenomena to be caused in the near surface or
sub-surface disposal facilities shall be evaluated to define conditions depending on the long-term

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evolution of the geological environment.
Quality assurance(1)Quality assurance during the period before terminating active control
Policies on quality assurance activities and formulation of their implementation organization systemshall be appropriately demonstrated in order to implement precisely each work concerned coveringfrom design and construction of the waste disposal facilities through termination of their active
control.
(2)Quality assurance for models and parameters
Models and parameters to be used in the safety assessment after the period for active control shalldemonstrate their validity in light of assessment objectives.
(3) Revisions of safety assessment after the period for active control
Policies shall be demonstrated for formulating and updating a plan to revise the safety assessment
after the period for active control to be conducted repetitively until termination of active control and tocollect additional scientific and technological knowledge. This shall include information relevant to thenear surface or sub-surface disposal facilities to be reflected in the safety assessment, while providing
careful considerations to the collection method so as not to reduce safety after terminating the active
control due to the collection.

Table H6-1

Technical standards for Waste Disposal Facilities etc.

1.

The Technical standards for radioactive waste disposal facility(1)Technical standards provided in Article 7 of the Rule for Disposal of Category 1 Waste
Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Material or Material Contaminated with Nuclear Fuel Material(1) A waste repository shall be in consistent with the license application documents set forth in Article
51-2 paragraph 1 or Article 51-5 paragraph 1 of the Law and a document describing the conditions
for the license granted in accordance with Article 62-2 paragraph 1 of the Reactor Regulation Law(hereinafter referred to as "the license documents").
(2) Tunnels and shafts shall be in consistent with the license documents.
(3) The total radioactivity of specific radioactive materials contained in the radioactive wastes disposedin a waste disposal facility site shall not exceed, due to disposal, the total radioactivity described in
the license documents.
(4) Explosive materials, materials that significantly corrode other materials and other hazardous
materials shall not be disposed in a waste repository.
(5) A waste repository shall be backfilled in the way described in the license documents.

(2)

Technical standards provided in Article 6 of the Rule for Disposal of Category 2 Waste
Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Material or Material Contaminated with Nuclear Fuel Material

Article 6(1) The total amount of the radioactivity for each type of radioactive materials contained in theradioactive waste to be emplaced at the place of business where the waste disposal facility isconstructed shall not exceed the total amount of radioactivity for each type of radioactive materials
indicated on the application concerning the license as provided in the provisions of Article 51-2
paragraph 1 or Article 51-5 paragraph 1 of the Law, and the document which describe the conditions
required for the license as provided in the provision of Article 62-2 Paragraph 1 of the Law ("referred
to as "the application etc.", hereinafter in this article, Article 6-3 and Article 8);(2) Before starting waste repository disposal, the stagnant water at the places for disposal in the waste
disposal facility (when the waste disposal facility is demarcated with internal partition equipment of
Subparagraph (3) of the following article, the demarked area for the waste repository disposal, thesame, hereinafter in this subparagraph) shall be removed, and at the time of waste repository
disposal, measures shall be taken to prevent the infiltration of rain water etc. into the places
concerned;(3) In the case of waste repository disposal of solidified concrete etc., measures shall be taken toprevent the scattering of radioactive materials when there is a possibility that the materials may
disperse out of the waste disposal facility;(4) The waste disposal facility shall be taken measures by filling up with the soil etc., so that a void
does not remain after waste repository disposal is completed in the waste disposal facility
concerned;(5) Explosive materials, materials that corrode other materials remarkably, and other hazardous

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substances shall not be disposed of in the waste disposal facility;(6) The waste disposal facility where the disposal is completed, the surface shall be covered with thesoil, so that the disposed materials and the equipment installed in the waste disposal facility does
not expose easily; and(7) Waste disposal facilities shall have the structure and equipment described in the application etc.
other than those provided in the preceding subparagraphs.
2 In case where waste repository disposal is carried out by disposal facility with outer engineered
barrier shall be as described in the following subparagraphs, in addition to those provided in thepreceding paragraphs:(1) It shall be constructed following the methods provided by the Minister of METI for the prevention ofradiation hazards;(2) The engineered barrier structure shall be in conformity with the following requirements;(a)The structure shall be safe from the view point of yield strength against the self weight, earthpressure, seismic force, etc.; and(b)The measure shall be taken for the effective corrosion prevention according to the quality of thesurface water, underground water, and the soil.
(3) The waste disposal facility, which area of opening exceeds 50 square meters or which disposal
volume exceeds 250 cubic meters, shall be in conformity with the requirements of the precedingarticle, and for the prevention of radiation hazards, the place shall be demarcated so that one
demarcated area shall not exceed about 50 square meters or one demarcated disposal volume
not exceed about 250 cubic meters by a method applied with the internal partition equipment
provided by the Minister of METI;(4) When the waste repository disposal is carried out, the engineered barrier structure and theinternal partition equipment described in Subparagraph (3) shall be inspected at any time, andwhen there is a possibility of destruction of these equipments or leak of radioactive materials,
required measures shall be taken to prevent destruction of these equipments, or leak ofradioactive materials; and(5)Waste disposal facility where the waste repository disposal is completed, or where the place isdemarcated by the internal partition equipment described in Subparagraph (3), the demarcatedarea where the disposal is completed, shall be covered by the method provided in the
Subparagraph (2) and provided by the Minister of METI for the prevention of radiation hazards asprovided in Subparagraph (6) of the preceding article, soon before covering with the soil.
3 In the case of waste repository disposal is carried out by disposal facility without outer engineered
barrier shall be as described in the following subparagraphs, in addition to those provided Paragraph1:(1) It shall be constructed following the methods provided by the Minister of METI for the prevention ofradiation hazards; and(2) Radioactive waste materials etc. solidified in one piece shall be in conformity with therequirements described in Subparagraph (2) of the preceding Paragraph, and the volume shall not
exceed about 500 cubic meters,

2.

Technical standards for radioactive wastes to be disposed(1)

Technical standards provided in Article 12 of the Rule for Disposal of Category 1 Waste
Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Material or Material Contaminated with Nuclear Fuel Material(1) Radioactive waste to be disposed shall be waste form.
(2) Technical standards of radioactive waste form shall be as described in the following subparagraphs:(a) For the prevention of radiation hazards, radioactive wastes shall be enclosed or solidified in thecontainer;(b) The radioactivity concentration shall not exceed the maximum radioactivity concentration
indicated in the application etc.;(c) Any materials with a possibility of spoiling the integrity of waste form;(d) It shall have enough strength to bear the potential load that may be extended during waste
repository disposal;(e) There shall be no marked damage; and(f) Waste form etc. shall be labelled with tag with serial number identifying the waste form asprovided by application of the preceding Article. These tag should use the method which does
not disappear easily, and be marked at visible spot

(2)

Technical standards provided in Article 8 of the Rule for Disposal of Category 2 Waste
Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Material or Material Contaminated with Nuclear Fuel Material

Article 8(1) For subsurface disposal

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reprocessing facility.
(b) Radioactive waste to be disposed shall be waste packages.
(c) Waste packages shall meet the following requirements.
(2) For pit disposal(a) Radioactive waste to be disposed shall be from a plant or site with a reactor facility..
(b) Radioactive waste to be disposed shall be waste package or solidified concrete waste.
(c) The waste package or solidified concrete waste shall meet the following requirement or therequirements described in paragraph 3.
(3) For trench disposal(a) Radioactive waste to be disposed shall be from a plant or site with a reactor facility.
(b) Radioactive waste to be disposed shall be solidified concrete waste.
(c) The solidified concrete waste shall meet the requirement described in paragraph3.
2 Technical standards of radioactive waste form for subsurface disposal and for disposal withengineered barrier shall be as described in the following subparagraphs:(1) For the prevention of radiation hazards, radioactive wastes shall be enclosed or solidified in thecontainer using the methods provided by the Minister of METI;(2) The radioactivity concentration shall not exceed the maximum radioactivity concentration indicatedin the application etc.;(3) The density of radioactive materials on the surface shall not exceed one tenth of the surface density
limit specified in Article 14 Paragraph 1 Item (c);(4) Any materials with a possibility of spoiling the integrity of radioactive waste materials shall not be
contained;(5) It shall have enough strength to bear the potential load that may be extended during waste
repository disposal;(6) There shall be no marked damage; and(7)Waste form etc. shall be labelled with tag indicating the radioactive waste with serial number
identifying the waste form as provided by the application of the preceding Article. These tag should
use the method which does not disappear easily, and be marked at visible spot
3 The technical standards to wastes, such as solidified concrete waste shall be as described in thefollowing subparagraphs:(1) An explosive material shall not be included;(2) The measure to compare with items described in the application shall be taken for the solidified
concrete waste. and(3) The radioactivity concentration shall not exceed the maximum radioactivity concentration indicatedin the application etc.

Table H6-2

Items that should be described in Operational Safety Program (Article 63
paragraph 1 of the Rule for Disposal of Category 1 Waste Disposal of Nuclear
Fuel Material or Material Contaminated with Nuclear Fuel Material)(1) System of the observance of related laws and operational safety program (including theparticipation of management persons).
(2) System for safety culture cultivation (including the participation of management persons).
(3) Quality assurance for waste disposal facility (including the methods of root cause analysis andorganization for analysis implementation describing the position of working procedure in operationalsafety program).
(4) Duties and organization of personnel engaged in management of the radioactive waste disposal
facility (except for the following Clause).
(5) Scope of duty on chief engineer of radioactive waste and the contents as well as authority of chiefengineer of radioactive waste to supervise operational safety and positioning in the organization.
(6) Safety education for personnel engaged in radiation work at the disposal facility concerning :(a) Safety education policy (including its implementation plan);(b) Details of safety education concerning:
1) related laws, regulations and the Operational Safety Program;
2) structure, performance and operation of disposal facility;3) radiation control;4) handling of nuclear fuel material ; and5) emergency preparedness;.
(c) Other necessary matters concerning safety education concerning waste disposal facilities.
(7) Operation of systems to be specially controlled for safety reasons(8) Establishment of a controlled area, a peripheral monitoring area and preservation area of a disposal

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facility, and restriction of access to these areas;(9) Gaseous and liquid discharge monitoring equipment;(10) Monitoring of dose, dose equivalent, radioactive material concentration and surface contamination
density by radioactive materials, and decontamination;(11) Management of radiation measurement equipment and measuring method;(12) Patrol and inspection of disposal facility and measures to be taken after patrol and inspection;(13) Self-imposed periodic facility inspection of waste disposal facility(14) Receipt, transport, storage and handling of radioactive waste;(15) Emergency preparedness;(16) Adequate records and reports (including the report on the occurrences of accidents, failures andequivalents complied with Article 89 each Clause to managements.) of the safe operation of disposal
facility (including compliance with the Operational Safety Program)(17). Periodic assessment of waste disposal facility(18) Shearing technical information by an operator who conducted maintenance works with otherlicensee of Category 1 and 2 waste disposal activities.
(19) Disclosure of the nonconformity information in occurrence of nonconformity.
(20) Other matters necessary for the safe operation of disposal facility.

Table H6-3

Methods for Disposal (summary of Article 61 of the Rule for Disposal of
Category 1 Waste Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Material or Material Contaminatedwith Nuclear Fuel Material)

1. Gaseous waste disposal
Gaseous wastes shall be disposed of by any of the following methods:(1) Discharge through ventilation facilities;
The concentration of radioactive materials under ventilation shall be controlled as low as possible
by filtering, decay radioactivity, dilution with a lot of air, etc. at the ventilation facilities. In this case,the concentration of radioactive materials in the air at the ventilation port, or at the exhaust
monitoring equipment shall be monitored, so as not to exceed the concentration limits provided by
the Minister of METI at outside boundary of peripheral monitoring area;(2) Retain and store in a gaseous waste storage tank that is effective for the prevention of radiation
hazards.
2.Liquid waste disposal
Liquid wastes shall be disposed of by any of the following methods:(1) Discharge through discharge facilities;
The concentration of radioactive materials under discharge shall be made as low as possible
by filtering, evaporation, adsorption by an ion exchange resin method etc., decay radioactivity,
dilution by plenty of water, and other methods at the discharge facility. In this case, theconcentration of radioactive materials in the underwater at the discharge port, or at the discharge
water monitoring equipment, shall be monitored so as not to exceed the concentration limits at
outside boundary of peripheral monitoring area provided by the Minister of METI;(2) Retain and store in a liquid waste storage tank that is effective for the prevention of radiation
hazards;(3) Enclose in a container or solidify in a container, and store in a storage facility that is effective forthe prevention of radiation hazards;(a) When enclosing radioactive wastes in a container, the container concerned shall be inconformity with the following standards:
z The structure shall have low permeability, corrosion resistant and low leakage of radioactive
wastes;z There shall be no possibility of crack or damage; andz The lid of the container shall not be taken off easily.
(b) When solidifying radioactive wastes in a container, the container used for solidifying theradioactive wastes shall be protective against dispersion or leakage of the radioactive waste;(c) When storing in a storage facility that is capable of prevention of radiation hazards, thefollowing items shall be subjected:
z When radioactive wastes are enclosed in a container, and are stored, the container
concerned shall be wrapped with materials which are capable to absorb all of the enclosed
radioactive wastes, or provided with a saucer which is capable to accommodate all of thewastes, when a crack or a damage arises to prevent spread of the contamination;z The container in which radioactive wastes were enclosed or solidified, shall be attached withmarks that shows that the content is radioactive wastes, and a serial number corresponding
to the radioactive waste whose recorded content based on the provisions of Article 44 shall

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be displayed to compare; andPost up notes for administration and control of the disposal facility concerned in the place
easily visible.

(4) Incinerate by an incineration facility that is effective for the prevention of radiation hazards(5) Solidify by a solidifying facility that is effective for the prevention of radiation hazards; or(6) Waste repository disposal in a waste disposal facility in accordance with the technical standards
for disposal facility and radioactive waste to be disposed;
The concentration of radioactive materials in the underwater at the boundary of the outside of an
peripheral monitoring area shall be controlled not to exceed the concentration limits provided by
the Minister of METI by monitoring the concentration of radioactive materials in the underwater ofthe peripheral monitoring area
3. Solid waste disposal
Solid wastes shall be processed and stored of by any of the following methods:(1) Incinerate by an incineration facility that is effective for the prevention of radiation hazards;(2) Enclose in a container or solidify in a container, and store in a storage facility that is effective forthe prevention of radiation hazards, and dispose;(a) When enclosing radioactive wastes in a container, the container concerned shall be inconformity with the following standards:
z The structure shall have low permeability, corrosion resistant and low leakage of radioactive
wastes;z There shall be no possibility of crack or damage; andz The lid of the container shall not be taken off easily.
(b) When solidifying radioactive wastes in a container, the container used for solidifying theradioactive wastes shall be protective against dispersion or leakage of the radioactive waste;(c) When storing in a storage facility that is capable of prevention of radiation hazards, thefollowing items shall be subjected:
z The container in which radioactive wastes were enclosed or solidified, shall be attached withmarks that shows that the content is radioactive wastes, and a serial number corresponding
to the radioactive waste whose recorded content based on the provisions of Article 44 shallbe displayed to compare; andz Post up notes for administration and control of the disposal facility concerned in the place
easily visible.
(3) Radioactive waste such as a large machine, which is very difficult to process by the method of
Item (2) or any radioactive waste that needs the decay of radio-activities with time, shall be stored
in a depository that is effective for the prevention of radiation hazards, and dispose; Post up notes
for administration and control of the disposal facility concerned in the place easily visible.
(4) Waste repository disposal in a waste disposal facility in accordance with the technical standards
for disposal facility and radioactive waste to be disposed;
The concentration of radioactive materials in the underwater at the boundary of the outside of an
peripheral monitoring area shall be controlled not to exceed the concentration limits provided by
the Minister of METI by monitoring the concentration of radioactive materials in the underwater ofthe peripheral monitoring area

Table H6-4

The Incidents Reporting Criteria (Article 89 of the Rule for Disposal of Category
1 Waste Disposal of Nuclear Fuel Material or Material Contaminated with
Nuclear Fuel Material)

Upon occurrence of any of the following incidents, the Licensee of a Category 1 Waste Disposal shallimmediately give notice to the Minister of METI, and report within ten days on the details of theincidents and corrective measures taken:(1) Theft or loss of nuclear fuel material;(2) Failures of a disposal facility that disturb category 1 waste disposal work as special measures areneeded for repair of the failure;(3) Failures of a disposal facility that disturb category 1 waste disposal work as a result of loss or
potential loss of confinement function of nuclear fuel materials etc. in the limited area, radiation
shielding function to prevent radiation hazards by external radiation, or fire or explosion protection
function in a waste disposal facility;(4) Abnormal condition of discharge of gaseous radioactive wastes at ventilation facility or dischargeof liquid radioactive wastes from a discharge facility due to failures of a disposal facility or otherunexpected events;(5) Atmospheric radio-nuclides concentrations by radiation monitoring outside peripheral monitoring180

Annexes
area exceeding limit provided by the Minister of METI because of discharge of gaseous radioactive
waste;(6) By radiation monitoring, radio-nuclides concentrations in discharged water at the outer boundaryof peripheral monitoring area exceeding limits provided by the Minister of METI ;(7) Leakage of nuclear fuel materials, etc. outside the controlled area;(8) Leakage of nuclear fuel materials, etc. inside the controlled area due to a failure of disposal facility
or other unexpected events excluding following cases (excluding the case when the measures
such as access control or key control for the area related to the leakage or when the leakedmaterial spreads outside the controlled area);z When the leaked liquid nuclear fuel materials etc. does not spread outside the curb readily
installed around the equipment for prevention of spreading of leakage;z The function of ventilation related to the area of the leakage of gaseous nuclear fuel materials
etc. is maintained appropriately;z The amount of radioactivity of leaked nuclear fuel materials etc. is very small or the degree ofleakage is minor.
(9) Effective dose by radiation exposures of personnel in the controlled area exceeding or likely to
exceed dose limits of 5mSv for radiation workers and 0.5mSv for non-radiation workers due to a
failure of a disposal facility or other unexpected events;(10) Radiation exposures of radiation workers exceeding or likely to exceed the dose limits specified
by the Minister of METI ;(11) Any other hazards to personnel occurring or likely to occur at the facility (excluding minor
non-radiation hazards).

181

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L5 Illustrations related to spent fuel storage

Image of storage building of Recyclable-Fuel Storage Center (3,000 tons)

Fig. L5-1 Conceptual Drawing of Recyclable-Fuel Storage Center(Source: Home page of Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company)

Fig. L5-2 Construction site view of Recyclable-Fuel Storage Center(Source: Home page of Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company)

182

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Pressure‫ן‬щἍὅἇὊᴾ
Primarylid
ɟഏᔟᴾ

BasketἢἋἃἕἚᴾ

ʚഏᔟᴾ
Secondarylid
Fuelassembly༓૰ᨼӳ˳ᴾ

Shell
Ꮮᴾ
Heat transfer finˡ༏ἧỵὅᴾ

Neutron shieldingɶࣱ‫܇‬ᢚồẟ஬ᴾ

Outer‫ٳ‬ለᴾcylinder
TrunnionἚἻἝỼὅᴾ

Fig. L5-3 Concept of metallic cask
(Source: Home page of Recyclable-Fuel Storage Company)

183

LAnnexes

L6
L6.1

Illustrations related to waste disposal
Categorization of waste disposal methods
Near surface
pit disposal

Low

Power station waste

TRU waste

Near surface
trench disposal
Uranium waste

Subsurface
disposalGeologic stratum deeper than 300 m

Radiation level

High level radioactive waste

L

Geological disposal

High

Fig. L6-1 Categorization of radioactive waste disposal methods in Japan(Source: Home page of ANRE)

L6.2

Near surface pit disposal

Cover
soil

(More than 4 m)

Covering withbentonite mixed soil

About
8m

Drum
Inspectio
Cementn pathDrainag
fillere
Bedi

Porousconcrete
layer

Reinforced
concrete pit

Fig. L6-2 Example of near surface pit disposal (Source: Home page of ANRE)184

Annexes

L6.3

Subsurface disposal
Disposalฎศ✵Ὕcavity

Peripheral
corridor࿘㎶㏻㊰

Access䜰䜽䝉䝇㏻㊰corridorFig. L6-3-1

To ground facilityᆅୖ᪋タ䜈

Underground structure of waste disposal facility(Source: "Safety Regulation on subsurface disposal of low level radioactive waste",
Waste Safety Subcommittee, NISS/ACNRE, January 2008)

Sprayedconcrete྿䛝௜䛡䝁䞁䜽䝸䞊䝖
Secondary஧ḟそᕤcoverBackfillᇙᡠ䛧ᮦmaterial
Concretepit䝁䞁䜽䝸䞊䝖

Waste
package layerᗫᲠయᒙ(surrounded with mortar䠄࿘ᅖ䛿䝰䝹
grout)
䝍䝹඘䛶䜣䠅

䝢䝑䝖

Low diffusiveness
layer
పᣑᩓᒙ
Low percolation
ప㏱Ỉᒙlayer

Fig. L6-3-2

Vertical sectional view of disposal cavity(Source: "Safety Regulation on subsurface disposal of low level radioactive waste",
Waste Safety Subcommittee, NISS/ACNRE, January 2008)

185

L

ᣑᩓ
Diffusion
Advection⛣ὶศᩓ
Dispersion

Skeleton㌣యconcreteLow
diffusionపᣑᩓbarrier

DiffusionᣑᩓAdvection⛣ὶศᩓ
Dispersion

୍ᵝ

Waste
packageᗫᲠయFiller඘ሸᮦ㺘㺻㺖㺶㺎㺢

Fig. L6-3-3

ࣂࣜ࢔

࣋ࣥࢺ
Bentonite
ࢼ࢖ࢺ

ᆒ
୍
ΰ
ྜ
ᒙ

DiffusionᣑᩓAdvection⛣ὶศᩓ
Dispersion

⏕≀ᅪ

බ
⾗
ࡢ
⿕
ࡤ
ࡃ

Public exposure㛫㝽
Homogeneous⃰ᗘporosity

DiffusionᣑᩓAdvection⛣ὶศᩓ
Dispersion

Biosphere

Annexes

Homogeneous mixed
l

L

Rock

ᒾ

Performance evaluation model for safety evaluation(Source: "Safety Regulation on subsurface disposal of low level radioactive waste",
Waste Safety Subcommittee, NISS/ACNRE, January 2008)

Inspection tunnel (large)ㄪᰝᆙ䠄኱䠅

Entrance
ᆙཱྀ

about
5⣙䠑㼙
m
about
7
m
⣙䠓㼙

Instrument
tunnelィ ᆙ䠞Instrument
tunnelィ ᆙ䠟Testヨ㦂✵Ὕ
cavity
about
⣙㻝㻢㼙
16
m
Inspection
tunnel (small)ㄪᰝᆙ䠄ᑠ䠅
⣙䠎㼙 2 m
about

about
18 m
⣙㻝㻤㼙

Instrument
tunnel A
ィ ᆙ䠝
about
⣙䠎㼙
2m
about
2m
⣙䠎㼙
Ỉᖹ䝪䞊䝸䞁䜾Horizontal
boring

⣙䠎㼙
about
2m

ᅗ㸫2 ㄪᰝᆙ㫽▔ᅗ

Fig. L6-3-4

ᅗ㸫3 ヨ㦂✵ὝInspection tunnel(Source: "Safety Regulation on subsurface disposal of low level radioactive waste",
Waste Safety Subcommittee, NISS/ACNRE, January 2008)186

Annexes

L6.4

Geological disposal

Common ground facility

High level radioactive waste
TRU waste
Appropriate distance, e.g. approx. 300 m

Fig. L6-4 Concept of single-site disposal(Source: Home page of ANRE)

187

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L7

Reports etc., related to the accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stationsz

Report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety- The Accident at TEPCO's Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations – (Contents of summary)(Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, June 2011)
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/kan/topics/201106/iaea_houkokusho_e.html

zAdditional report of Japanese Government to the IAEA Mini - The Accident at TEPCO's
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations – (Second Report) (summary) (Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters, September 2011)
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/incident/health_and_safety.html

zPoints of Progress Status of “Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO” (Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters, Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office, October 17, 2011)
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/earthquake/nuclear/z

The Act on measures for radioactive wastes (August, 2011)z

Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Work (Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters, Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office, August,2011)
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2011/0826_03.html

188

Attachments

Reports etc., related to the accident
at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations


Report of the Japanese Government
to the IAEA Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety- The Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations –(Summary)






June 2011


Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Government of Japan

Contents of summary
1.

Introduction

2.

Situation regarding Nuclear Safety Regulations and Other Regulatory Frameworks in Japan
before the Accident

3.

Disaster Damage in Japan from the Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake andResulting Tsunamis

4.

Occurrence and Development of the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

5.

Response to the Nuclear Emergency

6.

Discharge of Radioactive Materials to the Environment

7.

Situation regarding Radiation Exposure

8.

Cooperation with the International Community

9.

Communication regarding the Accident

10. Future Efforts to Settle the Situation regarding the Accident
11. Responses at Other Nuclear Power Stations
12. Lessons Learned from the Accident Thus Far
13. Conclusion

1.

Introduction

The Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the resulting tsunamis struck the
Fukushima Dai-ichi and Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Stations (hereinafter, the “Fukushima
NPSs”) of Tokyo Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) at 14:46 on March 11, 2011 (all times herein areJST), followed by a nuclear accident unprecedented in both scale and timeframe.
The situation has become extremely trying for Japan, insofar as it has had to executecountermeasures for the nuclear accident whilst also dealing with the broader disaster caused by
the earthquake and tsunamis.
This nuclear accident has turned out to be a major challenge for Japan, with numerous relevant
domestic organizations working together to respond to the situation while also receiving support
from many countries around the world. The fact that this accident has raised concerns aroundthe world about the safety of nuclear power generation is a matter which Japan takes with the1utmost seriousness and remorse. Above all, Japan sincerely regrets causing anxiety for people
all over the world about the release of radioactive materials.
Currently, Japan is dealing with the issues and working towards settling the situation utilizing
accumulated experience and knowledge. It is incumbent upon Japan to share correct and precise
information with the world continually in terms of what happened at the Fukushima NPSs,
including regarding how events progressed and how Japan has been working to settle thesituation. Japan also recognizes a responsibility to share with the world the lessons it haslearned from this process.
On the basis of the recognitions stated above, this report has been prepared as the report fromJapan for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ministerial Conference on Nuclear
Safety, which will convene in June 2011. The Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Officeis engaged in working toward settling the situation from the accident under the supervision of
Mr. Banri Kaieda, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry, in conjunction with and joining
forces with the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency and also with TEPCO. This report was
prepared by the Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, taking into accountthe approach toward the restoration of stable control taken by the Government-TEPCO
Integrated Response Office and hearing the views of outside experts. The work has been
managed as a whole by Mr. Goshi Hosono, Special Advisor to the Prime Minister designated byPrime Minister Naoto Kan in his capacity as General Manager of the Government Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters (GNER HQs).
This report is a preliminary accident report and represents a summary of the evaluation of theaccident and the lessons learned to date based on the facts ascertained about the situation so far.
In terms of its range, the summary is centered on technical matters related to nuclear safety andnuclear emergency preparedness and responses up to the present moment. Issues related tonuclear damage compensation, the wider societal effects, and so on are not covered.
In addition to preparing this report, the Government has established the “Investigation
Committee on the Accidents at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power
Company” (hereinafter the “Investigation Committee”) in order to provide an overall
investigation of the utility of countermeasures being taken against the accident that has occurredat the Fukushima NPSs. Aspects stressed within this Investigation Committee are independence
from Japan’s existing nuclear energy administration, openness to the public and the international
community, and comprehensiveness in examining various issues related not only to technical2elements but also to institutional aspects. These concepts are used as the basis for strictly
investigating all activities undertaken so far, including activities by the Government in terms ofcountermeasures against the accident. The contents of this report will also be investigated by theInvestigation Committee and the progress of the investigation activities will be released to theworld.
Japan’s basic policy is to release information about this accident with a high degree oftransparency. In preparing this report under this policy, attention has been paid to providing as
accurately as possible an exact description of the facts of the situation, together with anobjective evaluation of countermeasures against the accident, clearly distinguishing between
known and unknown matters. Factual descriptions are based on findings current as of May 31,
2011.
Japan intends to exert its full efforts to properly tackle the investigation and analysis of this
accident and to continue to provide those outcomes to both to the IAEA and to the world as awhole.
2.

Situation regarding Nuclear Safety Regulations and Other Regulatory Frameworks inJapan before the Accident

Safety regulations governing NPSs in Japan are mandated under the “Act on the Regulation of
Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors” and “The Electricity BusinessAct.” The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) within the Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry is responsible for these regulations. The Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC),
established under the Cabinet Office, has the role of supervising and auditing the safety
regulation activities implemented by NISA and has the authority to make recommendations
through the Prime Minister to the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry to take necessary
measures, as necessary. When the Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry issues a license forthe establishment of an NPS, the Minister is required to seek in advance the NSC’s views
regarding safety issues.
The monitoring and measurement activities for preventing radiation damages and for evaluating
radioactivity levels are carried out by related government bodies including the Ministry of
Education, Culture, Sports, Science & Technology (MEXT) based on the related laws andregulations.

3

Responses to nuclear accidents in Japan are supposed to be carried out based on the Act on
Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, (hereinafter “ASMCNE”),
which was established after the occurrence of a criticality accident in a JCO nuclear fuelfabrication facility in 1999. ASMCNE complements the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Law
should a nuclear emergency occur. ASMCNE stipulates that the national and local governments,
and the licensee, shall address a nuclear emergency by acting in close coordination with eachother, that the Prime Minister shall declare a nuclear emergency situation in response to theoccurrence of a nuclear emergency situation and give instructions to evacuate area(s) or to takeshelter as appropriate, that the GNER HQs headed by the Prime Minister shall be established torespond to the situations, and so on.
Emergency environmental monitoring, which is one of the responses to be taken at the time of a
nuclear disaster, shall be implemented by local governments and supported by MEXT.
3.

Disaster Damage in Japan from the Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake andResulting Tsunamis


The Pacific coast area of eastern Japan was struck by the Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean
Earthquake, which occurred at 14:46 on March 11, 2011. This earthquake occurred in an area
where the Pacific plate sinks beneath the North American plate and the magnitude of thisearthquake was 9.0, the largest in Japan’s recorded history. The seismic source was at latitude38.1 north, longitude 142.9 east and at a depth of 23.7km.
The crustal movement induced by this earthquake extended over a wide range, from the Tohoku
District to the Kanto District. Afterwards, tsunamis struck the Tohoku District in a series ofseven waves, resulting in the inundation of an area as large as 561km2. As of the date that thisreport was issued, approximately 25,000 people are reported dead or missing.
In terms of the earthquake observed at the Fukushima NPSs, the acceleration response spectraof the earthquake movement observed on the basic board of reactor buildings exceeded theacceleration response spectra of the response acceleration to the standard seismic ground motion
Ss for partial periodic bands at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. As for the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS,
the acceleration response spectra of the earthquake movement observed on the basic board of
the reactor buildings was below the acceleration response spectra of the response acceleration to
the standard seismic ground motion Ss. The earthquake damaged the external power supply.

4

Thus far, major damage to the reactor facilities which are important for safety functions has yet
to be recognized. Further investigation is needed because the details of the situation remain
unknown.
In terms of the damage to the external power supply at the Fukushima NPSs, a total of six
external power supply sources had been connected to the Dai-ichi Power Station on the day theearthquake hit. However, all power supplied from these six lines stopped due to damage to thebreakers, etc. and the collapse of the power transmission line tower due to the earthquake.
Furthermore, at the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, while a total of four external power supply sources
had been connected as of the day of the earthquake, only one of them remained to supply
electricity after the quake struck, as one line was under maintenance, one stopped due to theearthquake, and yet another also stopped.

(After the completion of restoration works at 13:38

the following day, March 12, one power supply line was restored, resulting in two sources
supplying the electricity thereafter.)With respect to the strike of the tsunamis, the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS was hit by the firstenormous wave at 15:27 on March 11 (41 minutes after the earthquake), and the next enormous
wave around 15:35, while the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS was hit by the first enormous wave ataround 15:23 (37 minutes after the earthquake) and by the next enormous wave at around 15:35(as stated in TEPCO’s announcement). The license for the establishment of nuclear reactors at
the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS was based on the assumption that the maximum design basis
tsunami height expected was 3.1m. The assessment in 2002 based on the “Tsunami Assessment
Method for Nuclear Power Plants in Japan” proposed by the Japan Society of Civil Engineers(JSCE) indicated a maximum water level of 5.7m, and TEPCO raised the height of its Unit 6
seawater pump installation in response to that assessment. However, the inundation height due
to the tsunami this time was 14 to 15m, and in all units, the seawater pump facilities for coolingauxiliary systems were submerged and stopped functioning. In addition to that, all theemergency diesel power generators and the distribution boards installed in the basements of thereactor buildings and turbine buildings except for Unit 6 were inundated and stopped
functioning.
For the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, the maximum design basis tsunami height was expected to be
3.1 to 3.7m. Further, the said assessment by JSCE in 2002 indicated a maximum water level of
5.1 to 5.2m. Because of the tsunamis, most of the seawater pump facilities for cooling auxiliary
systems, except for some, were submerged and stopped functioning, and the emergency diesel
power generators installed in the basement of the reactor buildings stopped.

5

Thus, the assumption of, and the preparedness for, the onslaught of enormous tsunamis were notsufficient.

4.

Occurrence and Development of the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations(1) Outline of the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations
The Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS is located in the towns of Okuma and Futaba, which are in the
county of Futaba in Fukushima Prefecture. This NPS consists of six Boiling Water Reactors(BWR) installed-- Units 1 to 6-- with a total generating capacity of 4,696MW.
The Fukushima Dai-ni NPS is located in the towns of Tomioka and Naraha of Futaba county in
Fukushima Prefecture, and consists of 4 BWRs whose total generating capacity is 4,400MW.
(2) Status of safety assurance for the Fukushima NPSs
In facilities with nuclear reactors, the occurrence of failures must be prevented even if natural
phenomenon, etc. should occur. However, assuming that failures may nevertheless happen,
protective measures are provided to ensure safety even when the unusual situation of designbasis event should happen. In addition, Japan started undertaking accident management
measures in 1992, designed to minimize to the greatest possible extent the possibility ofreaching a state of a severe accident should these protective measures not be enough andmitigate the effects even if the situation were to reach the state of a severe accident.
Implementation of these accident management measures is not required by law under the safety
regulations. The accident management measures are implemented by nuclear operators
voluntarily, and the government requires them to make reports on their implementation.
The accident management measures at the Fukushima NPSs have been implemented for thefollowing four functions: functions to shutdown the nuclear reactor, functions to inject water
into the nuclear reactors and the PCVs, functions to remove heat from the PCVs, and functions
to support the safety functions. For example, measures to maintain functions to inject water into
the nuclear reactors include that the connection to the piping be secured for water injection
functions to nuclear reactors through PCV cooling systems and that, as alternative
water-injection equipment, the core spray system from the existing Make Up Water Condensate(MUWC) system and the fire extinguishing system be utilized.

6

(*Severe Accident: An event that significantly exceeds the design basis event, and a situation
where appropriate cooling for the reactor core or control of reactivity is rendered inoperable by
the postulated measures under the evaluation for safety design, resulting in serious damage tothe reactor core.)(**Accident Management: Measures taken to prevent an event leading to a severe accident, orto mitigate its influence in the event of a severe accident, by utilizing a) functions other than the
anticipated primary ones under the safety margin and safety design included in the current
design or b) newly installed equipment in preparation for a severe accident, etc.)(3) Operating status of the Fukushima NPSs before the earthquake
In terms of the operating status at the Fukushima NPSs before the earthquake on March 11, Unit
1 was under operation at its rated electric power, Units 2 and 3 were under operation at theirrated thermal power, and Units 4, 5 and 6 were under periodic inspection. Among these Units,
Unit 4 was undergoing a major construction for renovations, with all the nuclear fuel in the RPV
having already been transferred to the spent fuel pool. Moreover, 6,375 units of spent fuel werestored in the common spent fuel pool.
At the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, all the nuclear reactors from Units 1 to 4 were under operation attheir rated thermal power.(4) The incidence and development of the accident at the Fukushima NPSs
At the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, Units 1 to 3 which were under operation automatically shut
down at 14:46 on March 11. All six external power supply sources were lost because of theearthquake. This caused the emergency diesel power generators to start up. However, seawater
pumps, emergency diesel generators and distribution boards were submerged because of thetsunami strike, and all emergency diesel power generators stopped except for one generator in
Unit 6. For that reason, all AC power supplies were lost except at Unit 6. One emergency diesel
power generator (an air-cooled type) and the distribution board escaped submersion andcontinued operation at Unit 6. In addition, since the seawater pumps were submerged by thetsunami, residual heat removal systems to release the residual heat inside the reactor to theseawater and the auxiliary cooling systems to release the heat of various equipment to theseawater lost their functions..

7

TEPCO’s operators followed TEPCO’s manuals for severe accidents and urgently attempted tosecure power supplies in cooperation with the government, in order to recover various kinds ofequipment within the safety systems while the core cooling equipment and the water-injection
equipment, which had automatically started up, were operating. However, ultimately power
supplies could not be secured.
Since the core cooling functions using AC power were lost in Units 1 to 3, core cooling
functions not utilizing AC power were put into operation, or, alternately, attempts were made to
put them into operation. These were operation of the isolation condenser*** in Unit 1, theoperation of the reactor core isolation cooling system**** (RCIC) in Unit 2 and the operation of
the RCIC and the high pressure injection system***** (HPCI) in Unit 3.
These core cooling systems that do not utilize AC power supplies stopped functioning thereafter,
and were switched to alternative injections of freshwater or sea water by fire extinguishing lines,
using fire engine pumps.
Concerning Units 1 to 3 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, as the situation where water injection
to each RPV was impossible to continue for a certain period of time, the nuclear fuel in eachreactor core was not covered by water but was exposed, leading to a core melt. Part of themelted fuel stayed at the bottom of the RPV.
A large amount of hydrogen was generated by chemical reactions between the zirconium of thefuel cladding tubes, etc. and water vapor. In addition, the fuel cladding tubes were damaged andradioactive materials therein were discharged into the RPV. Further, these hydrogen andradioactive materials were discharged into the PCV during the depressurization process of the
RPV.
Injected water vaporizes after absorbing heat from the nuclear fuel in the RPV. Accordingly, theinner pressure rose in the RPVs which had lost their core cooling functions, and this water vapor
leaked through the safety valves into the PCV. Due to this, the inner pressure within the PCVs in
Units 1 to 3 rose gradually, with PCV wet well vent operations carried out a number of times, inwhich the gases in the PCVs are released from the gas phase area in the suppression chamber
into the atmosphere, through the ventilation stack, for the purpose of preventing damage to the
PCV caused by the pressure therein.

8

(***Isolation condenser: Equipment with the function of returning water condensed from water
vapor in the RPV by natural circulation (that is, with no driving by pumps required) to cool the
RPV, when the RPV is isolated due to the loss of external power supply, etc. (when reactor
cooling cannot be done by the main condenser). An isolation condenser has a structure to cool
the water vapor that was led into the heat transfer tube with the water stored in the condenser(body side).
(****Reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC): A system that cools the reactor cores whenreactors are isolated from feed water and condenser systems due to loss of external power, etc.
Either the condensate storage tank or the pressure suppression pool water can be used as a water
source. The driving system for the pump is a turbine which uses some of the steam in thereactors.)(*****High pressure injection system (HPCI): One of the emergency core cooling systems that
injects water, with the pump driven by providing the water vapor generated by the decay heat tothe turbine.)
After the wet well venting of the PCVs, explosions presumably caused by hydrogen which had
leaked from the PCV occurred in the upper area of the reactor buildings, ruining the operation
floor in the reactor buildings of Units 1 and 3. As a result of these incidents, a lot of radioactive
materials were discharged to the atmosphere. Following the ruination of the Unit 3 building, an
explosion probably caused by hydrogen occurred in the reactor building of Unit 4, ruining its
upper area. In Unit 4, all core fuels had been transferred to the spent fuel pool for periodic
inspection before the earthquake. During this time, it seems that in Unit 2 a hydrogen explosion
occurred and caused damage at a point presumed to be near the suppression chamber.
The most urgent task at the site, along with recovery of the power supply and the continuationof water injection to reactor vessels, was water injection to the spent fuel pools. In the spent fuelpool in each unit, the water level continued to drop on account of the evaporation of water
caused by the heat of the spent fuel in the absence of the pool water cooling system, due to theloss of power supply. Water injection to the spent fuel pool was carried out by the Self-Defense
Forces, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency and the National Police Agency, using
helicopters and water cannon trucks. Concrete pump trucks were ultimately secured, which led
to stable water injection using freshwater from nearby reservoirs after the initial seawater
injection.

9(5) Status of each Unit at the Fukushima NPSs
1)

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 1· Loss of power supply
The reactor was scrammed by the earthquake that occurred at 14:46 on March 11. The
external power supply was lost due to the earthquake and two emergency diesel generators
started up. The two emergency diesel generators stopped functioning as a result of thetsunami at 15:37 on the same day and all AC power was lost.
· Cooling of the reactor
The emergency isolation condenser* (IC) automatically started up at 14:52 on March 11 andstarted cooling the reactor. Subsequently, the IC stopped functioning at 15:03 on the sameday. According to the operation procedure document, the cooling speed is to be adjusted to
55 degrees Celsius/hour. The pressure in the reactor rose and fell three times afterwards,
which indicates that the IC had been operated manually. According to TEPCO, fresh water
injection from a fire extinguishing line started at 05:46 on March 12, using a fire engine
pump, and 80,000 liters of water were injected by 14:53 on the same day, but they claim that
it is unknown when water injection stopped. Seawater injection started at 19:04 by means ofa fire extinguishing line. There was some confusion between the government and the main
office of TEPCO in communications and in the chain of command on seawater injection, but
seawater injection continued following the decision by the director of the Fukushima
Dai-ichi NPS. Injection of freshwater resumed on March 25 with the injection of water
stored in a pure water tank. For at least one hour after the earthquake, the water level in thereactor was not low enough to trigger an automatic start-up (L-L: 148cm below the bottomof the separator) of the High Pressure Coolant Injection system (HPCI), and there has been
no record of a start-up.
· Status of the reactor core
Water injection seemed to have stopped for 14 hours and 9 minutes, after the total loss of
AC power at 15:37 on March 11 until the start of freshwater injections at 5:46 on March 12.
From the results of the evaluation by NISA (on the assumption that the HPCI was notoperating), it seems that the fuel was exposed due to a drop in the water level around 17:00
on March 11, and that the core melt started afterwards. A considerable amount of melted fuelseems to have moved to and accumulated at the bottom of the RPV. There is a possibility
that the bottom of the RPV was damaged and some of the fuel might have dropped and10accumulated on the D/W floor (lower pedestal).
· Hydrogen explosion
Wet well venting of the PCV was carried out at 14:30 on March 12. Afterwards, a hydrogen
explosion occurred in the reactor building at 15:36 on the same day. Zirconium appears tohave reacted with water as the temperature rose in the RPV, generating hydrogen. It appears
that the gas containing the hydrogen accumulating in the upper area of the reactor buildings
due to leakage, etc. from the PCV triggered the hydrogen explosion. Injecting nitrogen into
the PCV started on April 7.
· Leakage of cooling water
The cooling water that has been injected into the RPV appears to be leaking from the bottomof the RPV. The total amount of water injected into the RPV was approximately 13,700
metric tons (information from TEPCO; current as of May 31), and total amount of steam
generated is estimated at 5,100 metric tons. Therefore the amount of leakage seems to be thedifference between these two, approximately 8600 metric tons, minus the amount inside theRPV (approximately 350m3).
2)

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 2· Loss of power supply
The reactor was scrammed by the earthquake at 14:47 on March 11 and the external power
supply was lost and two emergency diesel generators started up. The two emergency diesel
generators were stopped by the tsunami and all AC power supply was lost at 15:41 on thesame day.
· Cooling of the reactor
TEPCO started up the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) manually around 14:50
on March 11. The RCIC automatically stopped because of the high water level in the reactor
at around 14:51 on the same day. Afterwards, TEPCO manually started it up at 15:02 and it
stopped again at 15:28 on the same day. TEPCO started it up again manually at 15:39 on thesame day. The RCIC stopped at 13:25 on March 14. Seawater injection using a firefighting
pump started at 19:54 on the same day.
· Status of the reactor core
Water injection appears to have stopped for 6 hours and 29 minutes, from 13:25 on March 14

11

when the RCIC stopped, until seawater injection resumed at 19:54 on the same day.
According to the results of NISA’s analysis, it seems that the fuel was exposed due to a dropin the water level at around 18:00 on March 14 and that the core started melting afterwards. A
considerable part of melted fuel seems to have moved to and accumulated at the bottom of the
RPV. There is a possibility that the bottom of the RPV was damaged and some of the fuelmight have dropped and accumulated on the D/W floor (lower pedestal).
· Explosion noise
A PCV wet vent operation, which included that of small valves, was carried out from around
11:00 on March 13. Noise of an explosion occurred at around 6:00 on March 15 around the
suppression chamber of the containment vessel. There is a possibility that the explosion
occurred in the torus room, as the gas, including hydrogen, was generated by a reaction
between the zirconium and water along with a temperature rise in the RPV, invading the
suppression chamber by such means as the opening of the main steam safety relief valve.
· Leakage of cooling water
As of now, injected cooling water is thought to be leaking at the bottom of the RPV. The
total amount of injected water to the RPV was approximately 21,000 metric tons (information
by TEPCO; current as of May 31), and the total amount of steam generated is estimated at
7,900 metric tons. Therefore, the amount of leakage appears to be the difference between
these two, approximately 13,100 metric tons minus the amount inside the RPV(approximately 500 m3).
3)

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 3· Loss of Power supply
The reactor was scrammed by the earthquake at 14:47 on March 11, and the external power
supply was lost and two emergency diesel generators started up. The two emergency diesel
generators were stopped by the tsunami and all AC power was lost at 15:41 on the same day.
· Cooling of the reactor
The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System (RCIC) was manually started at 15:05 on March
11. It stopped automatically at 15:25 on the same day due to a rise in the reactor water level.
It was started manually at 16:03 on the same day, and the RCIC stopped at 11:36 on March 12.
The High Pressure Core Injection System (HPCI) automatically started due to the reactor low
water level (L-2) at 12:35 on the same day, and the HPCI stopped at 2:42 on March 13. The

12

reason for that appears to have been a drop in pressure in the reactor. Another probable cause
could be water vapor outflow from the HPCI system.
· Status of the reactor core
The operation to inject water containing boric acid commenced using a fire extinguishing line
at around 9:25 on March 13. However, the water could not be injected sufficiently due to thehigh pressure in the reactor, and the water level in the reactor lowered. As a result, water
injection was halted for at least 6 hours and 43 minutes after the HPCI stopped at 02:42 on
March 13 until water injection using the fire extinguishing line started at 09:25 on the sameday. According to the results of NISA’s analysis, the fuel appears to have been exposed due toa drop in the reactor water level at around 08:00 on March 13, with the core starting to melt
afterwards. A considerable part of melted fuel seems to have moved to and accumulated at thebottom of the RPV. However, there is a possibility that the bottom part of the RPV wasdamaged and some of the fuel might have dropped and accumulated on the dry well floor(lower pedestal).
· Hydrogen explosion
A wet well vent operation of the PCV was carried out at 05:20 on March 14. A hydrogen
explosion occurred at the reactor building at 11:01 on the same day. It seems that zirconium
and water reacted along with a rise in temperature in the PCV, and that gas containinghydrogen by such means as leakage from the PCV accumulated in the upper area of thereactor buildings, triggering a hydrogen explosion.
· Leakage of cooling water
It is assumed at the moment that injected cooling water is leaking at the bottom of the RPV.
The total amount of water injected into the RPV was approximately 20,700 metric tons
(information by TEPCO; current as of May 31) and the total amount of steam is estimated tobe approximately 8,300 metric tons. A substantial amount equivalent to the difference
between these two, approximately 12,400 metric tons minus the amount in the RPV(approximately 500m3), appears to have been leaked.
4)

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 4· Cooling of the spent fuel pool
The reactor had been shut down for periodic inspection, with the nuclear fuel having beentransferred to the spent fuel pool. External power supply was lost by the earthquake on March13

11 and one emergency diesel generator started up. (The other one was under inspection anddid not start up.) The emergency diesel generator stopped due to tsunami at 15:38 on the sameday, and all AC power was lost. Both the cooling and feed water functions were thus lost. The
spraying of water over the spent fuel pool started from March 20.
· Explosion in the reactor building
At around 6:00 on March 15, an explosion in the reactor building occurred, resulting in all thewalls above the bottom of the operation floor and the walls on the west side and along thestairs collapsing. A fire broke out near the northwest corner on the 4th floor of the reactor
building at 09:38 on the same day. With regard to the explosion in the reactor building, an
inflow of hydrogen from Unit 3 may be possible, as the exhaust pipe for venting the PCV
joins the exhaust pipe from unit 4 before the exhaust stack. However, the cause of the
explosion has not yet been determined.
5)

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 5· Securing a power supply
This reactor had already been shut down for periodic inspection. Upon the loss of the external
power supply due to the earthquake at 14:46 on March 11, two emergency diesel generators
started up. However, the two emergency diesel generators stopped at 15:40 on the same day
due to the tsunamis, causing all AC power to be lost. An alternate power supply was takenfrom the emergency diesel generator of Unit 6 on March 13, 2011.

· Cooling of the reactor and the spent fuel pool
Although an RPV pressure reduction operation was carried out at 06:06 on March 12, thereactor pressure slowly increased due to the effects of decay heat. The alternate power supply
was taken from the emergency diesel generator of Unit 6 on March 13, and water injection
into the reactor became possible, using the transfer pump for the condenser of Unit 5.
Reduction of pressure through a safety relief valve had been carried out since 05:00 on March
14, and there was repeated replenishment of the water from the condensate storage tank to thereactor through the transfer pump in order to control the pressure and water level of thereactor. To carry out cooling by the residual heat removal system, a temporary seawater pump
was installed and started up, and cooling of the reactor and of the spent fuel pool were carriedout in turn by switching the system constitution for the Residual Heat Removal (RHR)
system on March 19. As a result, the reactor reached cold shutdown status at 14:30 on March
20.

14

6)

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Unit 6· Securing of power supply
This reactor had already been shut down for periodic inspection. Three emergency diesel
generators started up upon the loss of external power supply due to the earthquake at 14:46
on March 11. Two emergency diesel generators stopped running due to the tsunami at 15:40
on the same day, and the power supply was maintained by making use of the remaining
emergency diesel generator.
· Cooling of the reactor and the spent fuel pool
Reactor pressure rose slowly due to the effect of decay heat. Water injection into the reactor
became possible on March 13, using the transfer pump for the condenser with the emergency
diesel generator. Reduction of the pressure by means of a safety relief valve has been carriedout since March 14, with repeated replenishment of the water from the condensate storagetank to the reactor through the transfer pump, in order to control the pressure and the waterlevel of the reactor. To carry out cooling through the residual heat removal system, atemporary seawater pump was installed and started up, and cooling of the reactor and thespent fuel pool was carried out in turn by switching the system constitution for the residual
heat removal system on March 19. The reactor reached cold shutdown status at 19:27 on
March 20.

7)

Fukushima Dai-ni NPS· OverallReactors from Units 1 to 4 at the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS which had been in operation werescrammed at 14:48 on March 11. A total of four external power supply lines had beenconnected to this NPS. One line was undergoing maintenance, another stopped due to theearthquake and yet another stopped one hour after the earthquake, which resulted in electric
supply being provided by a single line. (Restoration work was completed at 13:38 on March
12, thereby making two lines available.) The RHR systems of Unit 1, Unit 2 and Unit 4, etc.
were damaged upon the reactors being hit by the tsunami at around 15:34 on the same day.
· Unit 1
In terms of the reactor, cooling and water level maintenance were carried out by means of thereactor core isolation cooling system and the Make Up Water Condensate (MUWC) system.

15

However, the temperature of the suppression pool water exceeded 100 degrees Celsius
because not all the heat could be removed. Cooling through dry well spraying started at 07:10
on March 12. Cooling of the suppression pool started with the operation of the RHR system
by connecting a temporary cable from the functioning distribution board at 01:24 on March
14. The temperature of the suppression pool became lower than 100 degrees Celsius at 10:15
on the same day, and the reactor reached cold shutdown status at 17:00 on the same day.
· Unit 2
In terms of the reactor, cooling and water level maintenance were carried out by means of thereactor core isolation cooling system and the Make Up Water Condensate (MUWC) system.
However, the temperature of the suppression pool water exceeded 100 degrees Celsius
because not all the heat could be removed. Cooling through dry well spraying started at 07:11
on March 12. Cooling of the suppression pool started with the operation of the RHR system
by connecting a temporary cable, just as happened at Unit 1, at 07:13 on March 14. The
temperature of the suppression pool became lower than 100 degrees Celsius at 15:52 on thesame day and the reactor reached cold shutdown status at 18:00 on the same day.
· Unit 3
The RHR system (A) and low pressure core spray system became unusable as a result of thetsunami. However, the RHR system (B) was not damaged and cooling by this system remained
ongoing. Therefore the reactor reached cold shutdown status at 12:15 on March 12.
· Unit 4
In terms of the reactor, although cooling and water level maintenance were carried out by the
RCIC and the MUWC system, the temperature of the suppression pool water exceeded 100
degrees Celsius because not all the heat could be removed. Cooling of the suppression poolstarted at 15:42 on March 14 with the operation of the RHR system. The temperature of the
suppression pool became lower than 100 degrees Celsius and the reactor reached cold
shutdown status at 07:15 on March 15.
(3) Status of the other NPSs
1)

Higashidori NPS of Tohoku Electric Power Co.
The Higashidori NPS of Tohoku Electric Power Co. (one BWR) had been shut down for
periodic inspection, and all fuels in the core had been transferred to the spent fuel pool. All

16

three external power supply lines stopped due to the earthquake, and power was suppliedby an emergency diesel generator.
2)

Onagawa NPS of Tohoku Electric Power Co.
At the Onagawa NPS of Tohoku Electric Power Co. (BWR Units 1 to 3) Units 1 and 3
were under operation and Unit 2 was under reactor start-up operation before the earthquake
on March 11. All 3 reactors were scrammed by the earthquake. Four of five external power
supply lines stopped due to the earthquake, leaving one line remaining. Unit 1 suffered an
on-site power loss and power was supplied by emergency diesel generators. Water injection
into the reactor was carried out by the reactor core isolation cooling system, etc. and thereactor reached cold shutdown status at 0:57 on March 12. In Unit 2, the external power
supply was maintained and the cooling function of the reactor was not affected. In Unit 3,
although the external power supply was maintained, the auxiliary equipment coolingseawater pump stopped. After that, water was injected into the reactor by the RCIC, etc.
and the reactor reached cold shutdown status at 1:17 on March 12.

3)

Tokai Dai-ni NPS of Japan Atomic Power Company
Tokai Dai-ni NPS of the Japan Atomic Power Company (one BWR) was undergoing rated
thermal power operation, and the reactor was automatically scrammed due to theearthquake at 14:48 on March 11. Although all three lines of external power supply stopped,
three emergency diesel generators started up. One of those emergency diesel generators
stopped due to the tsunami, but with the remaining two securing the power supply, thereactor reached cold shutdown status at 0:40 on March 15.

5.

Response to the Nuclear Emergency(1) Emergency response after the accident occurred
At the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, all AC power was lost due to the disaster of the earthquake andtsunamis. In accordance with Paragraph 1, Article 10 of the Special Law of Emergency
Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster, TEPCO notified the government at 15:42 on March 11, 2011,
the day on which the earthquake occurred, that all AC power had been lost in Units 1 to 5.
After that, TEPCO recognized that the injection of water via the emergency core cooling17

systems was impossible at Units 1 and 2 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and notified thegovernment at 16:45 on the same day of a State of Nuclear Emergency in accordance with the
Article 15 of the Special Law of Emergency Preparedness for Nuclear Disaster.
The Prime Minister declared a state of nuclear emergency at 19:03 on the same day andestablished the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters and the Local Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters.
On March 15, the Integrated Headquarters for the Response to the Incident at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Stations (later renamed the Government–TEPCO Integrated Response Office on
May 9) was established so that the government and the operator could work together in aconcerted manner, decide to take necessary measures and promptly respond while sharing
information on the state of the disasters at the nuclear facilities and on necessary measures
The Prime Minister, who serves as the Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters, determined the evacuation area and the in-house evacuation area according to theassessment of the possibility of discharging radioactive materials, and instructed Fukushima
Prefecture and relevant cities, towns and villages to act in accordance with this determination.
Responding to the status of accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, at 21:23, March 11, theevacuation area was set at the area within a 3km radius and the in-house evacuation area was a 3
to 10km radius from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Afterwards, according to the escalation of
events, the evacuation area was expanded to a 20km radius at 18:25, March 12, and the in-houseevacuation area was expanded to a 30km radius at around 11:00, March 15. Also, responding to
the status of the accidents at the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, the evacuation area within a 3km
radius and the in-house evacuation area of a 3 to 10 km radius were set at the same time anuclear emergency situation was declared at 7:45, March 12, with the evacuation area expanded
to a 10 km radius at 17:39 on the same day. Then, the evacuation area was changed to a 8 km
radius on April 21. Evacuation and stay-in-house instructions immediately after the accident
were promptly implemented through a concerted effort by residents in the vicinity, local
governments, the police and other relevant authorities.
The Prime Minister determined that evacuation areas within a 20km radius of Fukushima
Dai-ichi NPS would be a “restricted area,” in accordance with the Basic Act on Disaster Control
and instructed the mayors of cities and towns and the heads of villages and concerned local
governments to prohibit access to the area on April 21.

18

The Local Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters started its activities at an Off-Site Centeras designated by the Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness. However, it was moved to the
Fukushima Prefectural Office in Fukushima City due to high-level radiation as the nuclear
accident escalated, in addition to a communication blackout and a lack of fuel, food and othernecessities caused by logistic congestion around the site.
The longer the accident lasted, the heavier the burden on residents in the vicinity of the NPS
became. In particular, many of the residents who were instructed to stay within their houses
were voluntarily evacuated and those who remained in the area found it increasingly difficult tosustain their livelihoods due to congestion in the distribution of goods and logistics problems. In
response to this situation, the government launched support measures.
The primary functions of the Emergency Response Support System (ERSS), which monitors thestatus of reactors and forecasts the progress of the accident when a nuclear emergency occurs,
could not be utilized because necessary information from the plants could not be obtained. In
addition, the primary functions of the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose
Information (SPEEDI), which conducts a quantitative forecast of variations of atmosphericconcentrations of radioactive materials and air dose rates, could not be utilized because source
term information could not be obtained. Although they were used in alternative ways, theiroperation processes and the disclosure of their results have remained as an issue.
(2) Implementation of environmental monitoring
In the Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness, local governments are in charge ofenvironmental monitoring when a nuclear emergency occurs. However, most of the monitoring
posts became dysfunctional at first when the accident occurred. From March 16, it was decided
that the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) would takecharge of summarizing the environmental monitoring carried out by MEXT, local governments
and cooperating U.S. organizations.
As for the land areas outside the premises of the NPS, MEXT measures the air dose rate,
radioactive concentrations in the soil, and concentrations of radioactive materials in the air andtakes environmental samples in cooperation with the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Fukushima
Prefecture, the Ministry of Defense, and electric companies. MEXT also carries out monitoringby aircraft in cooperation with the Ministry of Defense, TEPCO, the U.S. Department of Energy,
etc. TEPCO carries out environmental monitoring at NPS sites and their vicinities, etc.

19

In terms of the sea areas near the NPS, MEXT, the Fisheries Agency, the Japan Agency for
Marine-Earth Science and Technology, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, TEPCO, and others
cooperate with each other to carry out the monitoring of radioactive concentrations, etc. in theseawater and in the seabed, while the Japan Agency for Marine-Earth Science and Technology
simulates the distribution and spread of radioactive concentrations.

The Nuclear Safety Commission evaluates and announces the results of these environmental
monitoring efforts as they become available.
Environmental monitoring of the air, sea and soil of the premises and the surrounding areas of
the Fukushima NPSs is conducted by TEPCO.
(3) Measures regarding agricultural products, drinking water, etc.
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare decided that the "Indices relating to limits on foodand drink ingestion" indicated by the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan shall be adopted forthe time being as provisional regulation values, and foods which exceed these levels shall not be
supplied to the public for consumption, pursuant to the Food Sanitation Act. The Prime Minister,
as the Director-General of Government Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, has
instructed relevant municipalities to restrict shipments of foods that exceed the provisional
regulation level.
As for tap water, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare notified departments and agencies
concerned in the local governments of the necessity to avoid drinking tap water if theradioactive concentration of tap water exceeds the level indicated by the Nuclear Safety
Commission from March 19 onward, and released the monitoring results by the local
governments concerned, as well.
(4) Measures for additional protected area
The environmental monitoring data have revealed that there were areas where radioactive
materials were accumulated at high levels even outside of the 20 km radius. Therefore, thePrime Minister as Director-General of NERHQs instructed the heads of relevant local
governments on April 22 that deliberate evacuation areas needed to be established for specificareas beyond the 20 km radius, and area between the 20 km and 30 km radius which had been

20

set as in-house evacuation areas, excluding the areas within it qualifying as deliberate
evacuation areas, was renamed an “evacuation-prepared area in case of emergency,” since theresidents there could possibly be instructed to stay in-house or evacuate in the case of future
emergencies. In this way, residents inside the deliberate evacuation area were directed toevacuate in a planned manner, and residents inside of the area prepared for evacuation in caseof emergency were directed to prepare for evacuation or for in-house evacuation in case of an
emergency.
6.

Discharge of Radioactive Materials to the Environment(1) Amount of radioactive materials discharged to the atmosphere
On April 12, NISA and the Nuclear Safety Commission each announced the total discharged
amount of radioactive materials to the atmosphere so far.
NISA estimated the total discharged amount from reactors at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPSs
according to the results analyzing reactor status, etc. by JNES and presumed that approximately
1.3x 1017 Bq of iodine-131 and approximately 6.1x 1015 Bq of cesium-137 were discharged.
Subsequently, JNES re-analyzed the status of the reactors based on the report which NISA
collected on May 16 from TEPCO on the plant data immediately after the accident occurred.
Based on this analysis of reactor status and others by JNES, NISA estimated that the total
discharged amount of iodine-131 and cesium-137 were approximately 1.6 x 1017 Bq and 1.5 x1016 Bq, respectively. The Nuclear Safety Commission estimated the amount of certain nuclides
discharged into the atmosphere (discharged between March 11 to April 5) with assistance fromthe Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) through back calculations, based on the data ofenvironmental monitoring and air diffusion calculation; the estimations are 1.5 x 10 17 Bq for
iodine-131 and 1.2 x 1016 Bq for cesium-137. The discharged amount since early April has been
declining and is about 1011 Bq/h to 1012 Bq/h in iodine-131 equivalent.
(2) Discharged amount of radioactive materials to seawater
Water containing radioactive materials diffused from the RPV leaked into the PCV at the
Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS. Also, because of water injections into the reactors from theoutside for cooling, some injected water leaked from the PCVs and accumulated in reactor
buildings and turbine buildings. The management of contaminated water in reactor
buildings and turbine buildings became a critical issue from the standpoint of workability21

in the buildings, and the management of contaminated water outside of the buildings
became a critical issue from the standpoint of preventing the diffusion of radioactive
materials into the environment.
On April 2, it was discovered that highly contaminated water with a radiation level of over
1000mSv/h had accumulated in the pit of power cables near the water intake of Unit 2 of
the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and it was flowing into the seawater. Despite that, the outflow
was halted by stopping work on April 6, and the total discharged amount of radioactive
materials was assumed to be approximately 4.7x 1015 Bq. As an emergency measure, it was
decided that this highly contaminated water would be stored in tanks. However, as no tanks
were available at the time, low-level radioactive water was discharged into the seawaterfrom April 4 to April 10 in order to secure storage capacity for the contaminated water. The
total amount of discharged radioactive materials was presumed to be approximately 1.5x
1011 Bq.
7.

Situation regarding radiation exposureThe government has changed the dose limit for personnel engaged in radiation work from
100mSv to 250mSv in light of the present situation of the accident in order to prevent escalationof the accident. This was decided based on the information that a 1990 recommendation by theInternational Commission on Radiological Protection provided for 500mSv as the dose limit to
avoid deterministic effects that has been set for personnel engaged in emergency rescue work.
With regard to the activities by personnel engaged in radiation work in TEPCO, there was noalternative but for the chief workers to carry personal dosimeters and observe radioactivity for
their entire work group unit, because a lot of personal dosimeters had been soaked by seawater,
rendering them unusable. Afterwards, as personal dosimeters became available, all workers
have been able to carry personal dosimeters since April 1.
The status of exposure doses of personnel engaged in radiation work is as follows. As of May
23, the total number of workers that had entered the area was 7,800, with an average exposure
dose of 7.7mSv. Thirty of these workers had exposure doses above 100mSv. The internal
exposure measurement of the radiation workers has been delayed and the exposure dose,
including internal exposure of a certain number of workers, could exceed 250mSv in the future.
On March 24, two workers stepped into accumulated water and their exposure doses have been
estimated at less than 2 or 3Sv.

22

As for radiation exposure to residents in the vicinity, no cases of harm to health were found in
195,345 (the number as of May 31) residents who received screening in Fukushima Prefecture.
All 1,080 children who went through thyroid gland exposure evaluation received results lower
than the screening level.
The estimation and the evaluation of exposure doses of residents in the vicinity, etc. are planned
to be carried out through the use of the results of environmental monitoring, in a prompt manner
after the survey of evacuation routes and activities conducted mainly by Fukushima Prefecture,with the assistance of relevant ministries, agencies and the National Institute of Radiological
Science, etc.
8.

Cooperation with the International Community

Since the occurrence of this nuclear accident, experts have visited Japan from the United States,
France, Russia, the Republic of Korea, China and the United Kingdom, exchanged views with
relevant organizations in Japan, and given significant amounts of advice regarding stabilizing
the nuclear reactors and the spent fuel pools, preventing the diffusion of radioactive materials,
and implementing countermeasures against radioactive contaminated water. Japan has also
received support from these countries and accepted materials necessary to undertake measuresagainst the nuclear accident.
Experts from international organizations specializing in nuclear power such as the IAEA and theOECD Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD/NEA) visited Japan, providing advice and so on. Also,international organizations such as the IAEA, the World Health Organization (WHO), theInternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization(IMO), and the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) have provided
necessary information to the international community from their own technical standpoints.
9.

Communication regarding the Accident

Initially after the occurrence of the accident, accurate and timely information was not
sufficiently provided, typically demonstrated in delays in notifying local governments andmunicipalities, a situation which has been identified as a challenge in the field ofcommunication regarding the accident. Transparency, accuracy and rapidity are important indomestic and international communication about accidents. The Japanese Government has

23utilized various levels and occasions such as press conferences at the Prime Minister’s Office aswell as press conferences held jointly by relevant parties. While these have been improved asneeded, in reflection of what and how information should be provided, efforts to improve
communication must be ongoing.
Briefings on important issues regarding the accident have been provided at press conferences by
the Chief Cabinet Secretary to explain to the citizens the status of the accident as well as theviews of the Japanese Government. TEPCO as a nuclear operator and NISA as a regulatory
authority have also held press conferences on the status, details and development of the accident.
The NSC has provided important technical advice and explained the evaluation ofenvironmental monitoring results and other matters at press conferences.
Joint press conferences with the participation of relevant organizations have been held sinceApril 25 in order to share information in an integrated manner. The Special Advisor to the Prime
Minister, NISA, MEXT, the Secretariat of the NSC, TEPCO and other relevant organizations
have participated in these joint press conferences.
As for inquiries from the general public, NISA has opened a counseling hotline on the nuclear
accident, etc., and MEXT has also opened a counseling hotline on the impact of radiation on
health, etc. Experts in academia, including members of the Atomic Energy Society of Japan,
have actively explained and provided information to citizens.
Regarding the provision of information to the international community, the Japanese
Government reported the accident status to the IAEA promptly pursuant to the Convention on
Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, beginning with the first report on 16:45 on March 11,
immediately after the accident occurred. The Japanese Government has also reported theprovisional evaluations of the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (INES) when
the government made its announcement regarding each evaluation.
As for opportunities for communication with countries across the world including neighboring
countries, briefings to diplomats in Tokyo and press conferences for the foreign media havebeen conducted.
Notification to other countries including neighboring countries about the deliberate discharge ofaccumulated water of low-level radioactivity to the sea on April 4 was not satisfactory. This is amatter of sincere regret and every effort has been made to ensure sufficient communication with24

the international community and to reinforce the notification system.
Provisional evaluations based on the INES have been as follows:(1) The first report
A provisional evaluation of Level 3 was issued, based on the determination by NISA at 16:36 on
March 11 that the emergency core cooling system for water injection had become unusable.
This situation occurred because motor-operated pumps lost function due to all-around losses ofpower at Units 1 and 2 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.
(2) The second report
On March 12, the PCV venting of Unit 1 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS was conducted, and an
explosion at its reactor building occurred. Based on environmental monitoring, NISA confirmed
the emission of radioactive iodine, cesium and other radioactive materials, and made anannouncement on a provisional evaluation of Level 4, because NISA determined that overapproximately 0.1% of the radioactive materials in the reactor core inventory had been emitted.
(3) The third report
On March 18, as some incidents causing fuel damage had been identified at Units 2 and 3 of the
Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, NISA announced a provisional evaluation of Level 5 because therelease of several percentages of the radioactive materials in the core inventory was determined
to have occurred, based on the information ascertained at that moment, including that of thestatus of Unit 1.
(4) The fourth report
On April 12, regarding the accumulated amount of the radioactive materials released in theatmosphere, NISA announced its estimates from analytical results of the reactor status, etc.,
while NSC announced its estimates from dust monitoring data. (Please refer to VI. 1.) The
estimation by NISA was 370,000TBq of radioactivity in iodine equivalent, while the calculated
value based on the estimate of NSC was 630,000TBq. Based on these results, NISA announced
a provisional evaluation of Level 7 the same day. One month had passed between the third andfourth reports, and the provisional INES evaluation should have been made more promptly and25

appropriately.
10. Future Efforts to Settle the Situation regarding the Accident
Regarding the current status of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, freshwater has been injected to the
RPVs through feed water systems at Units 1, 2 and 3 and has been continuously cooling the fuelin the RPVs. This has helped the temperature around the RPVs stay around 100 to 120 degrees
Celsius at the lower part of RPVs. Review and preparation for circulation cooling systems,
including the process of transferring and treating accumulated water, have been underway.
Although the RPV and PCV of Unit 1 have been pressurized to some extent, steam generated insome units such as Units 2 and 3 seems to have leaked from the RPV and PCV, which appears
to have condensed to form accumulations of water found in many places, including the reactor
buildings, and some steam seems to have been released into the atmosphere. To respond to thisissue, the status has been checked by dust sampling in the upper part of the reactor buildings,
and discussion and preparation for covering the reactor buildings has been underway.
Cold shutdown of Units 5 and 6 has been maintained using residual heat removal systems withtemporary seawater pumps and their reactor pressure has been stable, ranging from 0.01 ~ 0.02
MPa (Gauge pressure).
Details of the current status of each unit are listed in the following chart.
(Megapascal: Unit of pressure 1MPa = 9.9 atmosphere. Gauge pressure is absolute pressure
minus atmospheric pressure.)
TEPCO announced the “Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident in Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station” on April 17, with the following 2 steps as targets: "Radiation dose insteady decline" as "Step 1" and "Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiationdose is being significantly held down" as "Step 2." The timeline for achieving targets is
tentatively set as follows: "Step 1" is set at around 3 months and "Step 2" is set at around 3 to 6
months after achieving Step 1.
Subsequently, coolant leakage from the PCVs was found in Units 1 and 2. Since the same risk
was found in Unit 3, TEPCO announced a revised roadmap on May 17. In the new roadmap,
basically no changes were made to the schedule, but new efforts were added, including
reviewing and improving cooling reactors, adding measures against tsunamis and aftershocks,
and improving the work environment for workers.

26

In particular, in the review of the issues regarding the “Reactors,” the establishment of a“circulation cooling system” in which contaminated water accumulated in buildings(accumulated water), etc. is processed and reused for water injection into reactors, wasprioritized for “cold shutdown” in Step 2.
The NERHQs also presented an approach toward settling the situation and that related to theevacuation area in the announcement, “Temporary approach policy for measures for nuclear
sufferers,” of May 17.
11. Responses at Other Nuclear Power Stations
On March 30, NISA instructed all electric power companies and related organizations to
implement emergency safety measures at all NPSs, in order to prevent the occurrence of nuclear
disasters and core damage, etc. caused by tsunami-triggered total AC power loss, on the basis of
the latest knowledge gained from the accident at the Fukushima NPSs. On May 6, NISA carriedout on-site inspections at all NPSs (except the Onagawa NPS, Fukushima Dai-ichi and
Fukushima Dai-ni NPS), and confirmed that emergency safety measures were appropriately
implemented at these NPSs. On May 18, NISA received an implementation status report fromthe Onagawa NPS, where work to prepare against tsunamis was delayed after it was hit by thetsunamis. Regarding the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, which achieved a stable condition after cold
shutdown on April 21, NISA also instructed the NPS to implement emergency safety measures,and received an implementation status report from it on May 20. NISA confirmed that all the
nuclear power stations in Japan have appropriately arranged measures against total AC power
loss, etc. which are expected to be implemented immediately as emergency safety measures.
Based on the presumed causes of the accident and the additional knowledge gained from theaccident, which are stated in this report, and the lessons learned from the accident, which are
mentioned in Section 12, NISA and other relevant ministries are to improve and strengthen theemergency safety measures that have been put in place. NISA will strictly verify the
implementation status of enhanced measures by the nuclear operators and promptly come up
with mid- and long-term measures.
The Headquarters for Earthquake Research Promotion of MEXT has estimated that within thenext 30 years there is an 87% percent chance of an imminent magnitude 8 earthquake in the
Tokai region near the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station of Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. As

27this is accompanied by increasing concerns over the high possibility of a large-scale tsunami
resulting from the envisioned earthquake, the government has placed its highest priority on
public safety above all else, and, determining that the operation of all Units at the Hamaoka
NPS should be halted until mid- to long-term countermeasures such as the construction of anembankment that can sufficiently withstand a tsunami resulting from the envisioned Tokai
Earthquake are implemented, requested on May 6 that Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc., halt all
reactors at the NPS. Chubu Electric Power Co., Inc. accepted this request and stopped operationof all the Units by May 14.
12. Lessons Learned from the Accident Thus Far
The Fukushima NPS accident has the following aspects: it was triggered by a natural disaster; it
led to a severe accident with damage to nuclear fuel, Reactor Pressure Vessels and PrimaryContainment Vessels; and accidents involving multiple reactors arose at the same time.
Moreover, as nearly three months have passed since the occurrence of the accident, a mid- tolong-term initiative is needed to settle the situation imposing a large burden on society, such as along-term evacuation of many residents in the vicinity, as well as having a major impact on
industrial activities, including the farming and livestock industries in the related area. There
are thus many aspects different from the accidents in the past at the Three Mile Island Nuclear
Power Plant and the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant.
The accident is also characterized by the following aspects. Emergency response activities had
to be performed in a situation where the earthquake and tsunami destroyed the social
infrastructure such as electricity supply, communication and transportation systems across awide area in the vicinity. The occurrence of aftershocks frequently impeded various accident
response activities.
This accident led to a severe accident, shook the trust of the public, and warned those engaged
in nuclear energy of their overconfidence in nuclear safety.

It is therefore important to learn

lessons thoroughly from this accident. The lessons are being presented classified into fivecategories at this moment, bearing in mind that the most important basic principle in securing
nuclear safety is having defenses in depth.
Thus the lessons that have been learned to date are presented as classified in five categories. We
consider it inevitable to carry out a fundamental review on nuclear safety measures in Japan
based on these lessons. While some of them are specific to Japan, these specific lessons have28

been included regardless, from the standpoint of showing the overall structure of the lessons.
The lessons in category 1 are those learned based on the fact that this accident has been a severe
accident, and from reviewing the sufficiency of preventive measures against a severe accident.
The lessons in category 2 are those learned from reviewing the adequacy of the responses to thissevere accident.
The lessons in category 3 are those learned from reviewing the adequacy of the emergency
responses to the nuclear disaster in this accident.
The lessons in category 4 are those learned from reviewing the robustness of the safety
infrastructure established at nuclear power stations.
The lessons in category 5 are those learned from reviewing the thoroughness in safety culture
while summing up all the lessons.
Lessons in category 1
Strengthen preventive measures against a severe accident(1) Strengthen measures against earthquakes and tsunamis
The earthquake was an extremely massive one caused by plurally linked seismic centers. As aresult, at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, the acceleration response spectra ofseismic ground motion observed on the base mat exceeded the acceleration response spectra of
the design basis seismic ground motion in a part of the periodic band. Although damage to theexternal power supply was caused by the earthquake, no damage caused by the earthquake tosystems, equipment or devices important for nuclear reactor safety at nuclear reactors has been
confirmed. However, further investigation should be conducted as the details regarding thissituation remain unknown.
The tsunamis which hit the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station were 14-15m high,substantially exceeding the height assumed under the design of construction permit or thesubsequent evaluation. The tsunamis severely damaged seawater pumps, etc., causing the failure
to secure the emergency diesel power supply and reactor cooling function. The proceduralmanual did not assume flooding from a tsunami, but rather only stipulated measures against a29

backrush. The assumption on the frequency and height of tsunamis was insufficient, andtherefore, measures against large-scale tsunamis were not prepared adequately.
From the viewpoint of design, the range of an active period for a capable fault which needs tobe considered in the seismic design for a nuclear power plant is considered within
120,000-130,000 years (50,000 years in the old guideline). The recurrence of large-scale
earthquakes is expected to be appropriately considered. Moreover, residual risks must be
considered. Compared with the design against earthquake, the design against tsunamis has been
performed based on tsunami folklore and indelible traces of tsunami, not on adequate
consideration of the recurrence of large-scale earthquakes in relation to a safety goal to beattained.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will consider the handling of plurally linked seismic centers
as well as the strengthening of the quake resistance of external power supplies. Regarding
tsunamis, from the viewpoint of preventing a severe accident, we will assume appropriate
frequency and adequate height of tsunamis in consideration of a sufficient recurrence period for
attaining a safety goal. Then, we will perform a safety design of structures, etc. to prevent the
impact of flooding of the site caused by tsunamis of adequately assumed heights, inconsideration of the destructive power of tsunamis. While fully recognizing a possible risk
caused by the flooding into buildings of tsunamis exceeding the ones assumed in design, we
will take measures from the viewpoint of having defenses in depth, to sustain the importantsafety functions by considering flooded sites and the huge destructive power of run-up waves.
(2) Ensure power supplies
A major cause of this accident was the failure to secure the necessary power supply. This wascaused by the facts that power supply sources were not diversified from the viewpoint ofovercoming vulnerability related to failures derived from a common cause arising from anexternal event, and that the installed equipment such as a switchboard did not meet the
specifications that could withstand a severe environment such as flooding. Moreover, it wascaused by the facts that battery life was short compared with the time required for restoration of
the AC power supply and that a time goal required for the recovery of the external power supply
was not clear.
Reflecting on the above facts, Japan will secure a power supply at sites for a longer time set
forth as a goal, even in severe circumstances of emergencies, through the diversification of30

power supply sources by preparing various emergency power supply sources such as air-cooleddiesel generators, gas turbine generators, etc., deploying power-supply vehicles and so on, as
well as equipping switchboards, etc. with high environmental tolerance and generators forbattery charging, and so on.
(3) Ensure robust cooling functions of reactors and PCVs
In this accident, the final place for release of heat (the final heat sink) was lost due to the loss offunction of the seawater pumps. Although the reactor cooling function of water injection was
activated, core damage could not be prevented due to the drain of the water source for injection,
the loss of power supplies, etc., and furthermore, the PCV cooling functions also failed to run
well. Thereafter, difficulties remained in reducing the reactor pressure and, moreover, in
injecting water after the pressure was reduced, because the water injection line into a reactor
through the use of heavy machinery such as fire engines, etc. had not been developed asmeasures for accident management. In this manner, the loss of cooling functions of the reactors
and PCVs aggravated the accident.
Reflecting on the above issues, Japan will secure robust alternative cooling functions for its
reactors and PCVs by securing alternative final heat sinks for a durable time. This will be
pursued through such means as diversifying alternative water injection functions, diversifying
and increasing sources for injection water, and introducing air-cooling systems.
(4) Ensure robust cooling functions of spent fuel pools
In the accident, the loss of power supplies caused the failure to cool the spent fuel pools,
requiring actions to prevent a severe accident due to the loss of cooling functions of the spent
fuel pools concurrently with responses to the accident of the reactors. Until now, a risk of amajor accident of a spent fuel pool had been deemed small compared with that of a core eventand measures such as alternative means of water injection into spent fuel pools, etc. had notbeen considered.
Reflecting on the above issues, Japan will secure robust cooling measures by introducing
alternative cooling functions such as a natural circulation cooling system or an air-coolingsystem, as well as alternative water injection functions, in order to maintain the cooling of spent
fuel pools even in case of the loss of power supplies.
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31

(5) Thorough accident management (AM) measures
The accident reached the level of a so-called “severe accident.” Accident management measures
had been introduced to the Fukushima NPSs to minimize the possibilities of severe accidents
and to mitigate consequences in the case of severe accidents. However, looking at the situationof the accident, although some portion of the measures functioned, such as the alternative water
injection from the fire extinguishing water system to the reactor, the rest did not fulfill theirroles within various responses, including ensuring the power supplies and the reactor cooling
function, with the measures turning out to be inadequate. In addition, accident management
measures are basically regarded as voluntary efforts by operators, not legal requirements, and so
the development of these measures lacked strictness. Moreover, the guideline for accident
management has not been reviewed since their development in 1992 and has not beenstrengthened or improved.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will change the accident management measures fromvoluntary safety efforts by operators to legal requirements, and develop accident management
measures to prevent severe accidents, including a review of design requirements as well, by
utilizing a probabilistic safety assessment approach.
(6) Response to issues concerning the siting with more than one reactor
The accident occurred at more than one reactor at the same time, and the resources needed for
accident response had to be dispersed. Moreover, as two reactors shared the facilities, thephysical distance between the reactors was small and so on. The development of an accident
occurring at one reactor affected the emergency responses at nearby reactors.
Reflecting on the above issues, Japan will take measures to ensure that emergency operations at
a reactor where an accident occurs can be conducted independently from operation at otherreactors if one power station has more than one reactor. Also, Japan will assure the engineering
independence of each reactor to prevent an accident at one reactor from affecting nearby
reactors. In addition, Japan will promote the development of a structure that enables each unit tocarry out accident responses independently, by choosing a responsible person for ensuring thenuclear safety of each unit.
(7) Consideration of NPS arrangement in basic designs

32Response to the accident became difficult since the spent fuel storage pools were located at ahigher part of the reactor buildings. In addition, contaminated water from the reactor buildings
reached the turbine buildings, meaning that the spread of contaminated water to other buildings
has not been prevented.
  
Reflecting on the above issues, Japan will promote the adequate placement of facilities andbuildings at the stage of basic design of NPS arrangement, etc. in order to further ensure theconducting of robust cooling, etc. and prevent an expansion of impacts from the accident, in
consideration of the occurrence of serious accidents. In this regard, as for existing facilities,
additional response measures will be taken to add equivalent levels of functionality to them.
(8) Ensuring the water tightness of essential equipment facilities
One of the causes of the accidents is that the tsunami flooded many essential equipment
facilities including the component cooling seawater pump facilities, the emergency diesel
generators, the switchboards, etc., impairing power supply and making it difficult to ensurecooling systems.
Reflecting on the above issues, in terms of achieving the target safety level, Japan will ensure
the important safety functions even in the case of tsunamis greater than ones expected by thedesign or floods hitting facilities located near rivers. In concrete terms, Japan will ensure thewater-tightness of important equipment facilities by installing watertight doors in considerationof the destructive power of tsunamis and floods, blocking flooding routes such as pipes, andinstalling drain pumps, etc.
Lessons in Category 2
Enhancement of response measures against severe accidents(9) Enhancement of measures to prevent hydrogen explosions
In the accident, an explosion probably caused by hydrogen occurred at the reactor building in
Unit 1 at 15:36 on March 12, 2011, as well as at the reactor in Unit 3 at 11:01 on March 14. In
addition, an explosion that was probably caused by hydrogen occurred at the reactor building in
Unit 4 around 06:00 on March 15, 2011. Consecutive explosions occurred as effective measures
could not be taken beginning from the first explosion. These hydrogen explosions aggravatedthe accident. A BWR inactivates a PCV and has a flammability control system in order to33maintain the soundness of the PCV against design basis accidents. However, it was not assumed
that an explosion in reactor buildings would be caused by hydrogen leakage, and as a matter ofcourse, hydrogen measures for reactor buildings were not taken.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will enhance measures to prevent hydrogen explosions, suchas by installing flammability control systems that would function in the event of a severe
accident in reactor buildings, for the purpose of discharging or reducing hydrogen in the reactor
buildings, in addition to measures to address hydrogen within the PCVs.
(10) Enhancement of containment venting system
In the accident, there were problems in the operability of the containment venting system. Also,
as the function of removing released radioactive materials in the containment venting system
was insufficient, the system was not effective as an accident management countermeasure. In
addition, the independence of the vent line was insufficient and it may have had an adverse
effect on other parts through connecting pipes, etc.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will enhance the containment venting system by improving
its operability, ensuring its independence, and strengthening its function of removing released
radioactive materials.
(11) Improvements to the accident response environment
In the accident, the radiation dosage increased in the main control room and operators could notenter the room temporarily, and the habitability in the main control room has decreased, as it
still remains difficult to work in that room for an extended period. Moreover, at the on-site
emergency station, which serves as a control tower for all emergency measures at the site, theaccident response activities were affected by increases in the radiation dosage as well as by theworsening of the communication environment and lighting.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will enhance the accident response environment that enables
continued accident response activities even in case of severe accidents through measures such as
strengthening radiation shielding in the control rooms and the emergency centers, enhancing theexclusive ventilation and air conditioning systems on site, as well as strengthening related
equipment, including communication and lightening systems, without use of AC power supply.

34

(12) Enhancement of the radiation exposure management system at the time of the accident
As these accidents occurred, although adequate radiation management became difficult as manyof the personal dosimeters and dose reading devices became unusable due to their submergencein seawater, personnel engaged in radiation work had to work on site. In addition, measurementsof concentration of radioactive materials in the air were delayed, and as a result the risk ofinternal exposure increased.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will enhance the radiation exposure management system atthe time an accident occurs by storing the adequate amount of personal dosimeters andprotection suits and gears for accidents, developing a system in which radioactive management
personnel can be expanded at the time of the accident and improving the structures andequipment by which the radiation doses of radiation workers are measured promptly.
(13) Enhancement of training responding to severe accidents
Effective training to respond to accident restoration at nuclear power plants and adequately
work and communicate with relevant organizations in the wake of severe accidents was not
sufficiently implemented up to now. For example, it took time to establish communication
between the emergency office inside the power station, the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters and the Local Headquarters and also to build a collaborative structure with the
Self-Defense Forces, the Police, Fire Authorities and other organizations which played
important roles in responding to the accident. Adequate training could have prevented these
problems.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will enhance training to respond to severe accidents bypromptly building a structure for responding to accident restoration, identifying situations
within and outside power plants, facilitating the gathering of human resources needed for
securing the safety of residents and collaborating effectively with relevant organizations.
(14) Enhancement of instrumentation to identify the status of the reactors and PCVs
Because the instrumentation of the reactors and PCVs did not function sufficiently during thesevere accident, it was difficult to promptly and adequately obtain important information to
identify how the accident was developing, such as the water levels and the pressure of reactors,
and the sources and amounts of released radioactive materials.

35

In respond to the above issues, we will enhance the instrumentation of reactors and PCVs, etc.
to enable them to function effectively even in the wake of severe accidents.
(15) Central control of emergency supplies and equipment and setting up rescue teams
Logistic support has been provided diligently by those responding to the accident andsupporting affected people with supplies and equipment gathered mainly at J Village. However,
because of the damage from the earthquake and tsunami in the surrounding areas shortly after
the accident, we could not promptly or sufficiently mobilize rescue teams to help provide
emergency supplies and equipment or support accident control activities. This is why the on-site
accident response did not sufficiently function.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will introduce systems for centrally controlling emergency
supplies and equipment and setting up rescue teams for operating such systems in order toprovide emergency support smoothly even under harsh circumstances.
Lessons in Category 3
Enhancement of nuclear emergency responses(16) Responses to combined emergencies of both large-scale natural disasters and prolonged
nuclear accident
There was tremendous difficulty in communication and telecommunications, mobilizing humanresources, and procuring supplies among other areas when addressing the nuclear accident thatcoincided with a massive natural disaster. As the nuclear accident has been prolonged, somemeasures such as the evacuation of residents, which was originally assumed to be a short-term
measure, have been forced to be extended.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will prepare the structures and environments whereappropriate communication tools and devices and channels to procure supplies and equipment
will be ensured in the case of concurrent emergencies of both a massive natural disaster and aprolonged nuclear accident. Also, assuming a prolonged nuclear accident, we will enhance
emergency response preparedness including effective mobilization plans to gather humanresources in various fields who are involved with accident response and support for affected
persons.

36

(17) Reinforcement of environmental monitoring
Currently, local governments are responsible for environmental monitoring in an emergency.
However, appropriate environmental monitoring was not possible immediately after the accident
because the equipment and facilities for environmental monitoring owned by local governments
were damaged by the earthquake and tsunami and the relevant individuals had to evacuate fromthe Off-site Center Emergency Response Center. To bridge these gaps, MEXT has conductedenvironmental monitoring in cooperation with relevant organizations.
Reflecting on the above issues, the Government will develop a structure through which theGovernment will implement environmental monitoring in a reliable and well-planned manner
during emergencies.
(18) Establishment of a clear division of labor between relevant central and local organizations
Communication between local and central offices, as well as with other organizations, was notachieved to a sufficient degree, due to the lack of communication tools immediately after theaccident and also due to the fact that the roles and responsibilities of each side were not clearly
defined. Specifically, responsibility and authority were not clearly defined in the relationshipbetween the NERHQs Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters and Local NERHQs
Headquarters, between the Government and TEPCO, between the Head Office of TEPCO andthe NPS on site, or among the relevant organizations in the Government. Especially,
communication was not sufficient between the government and the main office of TEPCO as
the accident initially began to unfold.
  
Reflecting on the above issues, we will review and define roles and responsibilities of relevantorganizations including the NERHQs, clearly specify roles, responsibilities and tools forcommunication while also improving institutional mechanisms.
(19) Enhancement of communication relevant to the accident
Communication to residents in the surrounding area was difficult because communication tools
were damaged by the large-scale earthquake. The subsequent information to residents in thesurrounding area and local governments was not always provided in a timely manner. The
impact of radioactive materials on health and the radiological protection guidelines of the ICRP,

37

which are the most important information for residents in the surrounding area and others, were
not sufficiently explained. Japan focused mainly on making accurate facts publicly available toits citizens and has not sufficiently presented future outlooks on risk factors, which sometimes
gave rise to concerns about future prospects.
Reflecting on the above issues, we will reinforce the adequate provision of information on theaccident status and response, along with appropriate explanations of the effects of radiation to
the residents in the vicinity. Also, we will keep in mind having the future outlook on risk factors
included in the information delivered while incidents are still ongoing.
(20) Enhancement of responses to assistance from other countries and communication to theinternational community
The Japanese Government could not appropriately respond to the assistance offered by countries
around the world because no specific structure existed within the Government to link suchassistance offered by other countries to domestic needs. Also, communication with theinternational community including prior notification to neighboring countries and areas on the
discharge of water with low-level radioactivity to the sea was not always sufficient.
Reflecting on the above-mentioned issues, the Japanese Government will contribute todeveloping a global structure for effective responses by cooperating with the international
community, for example, developing a list of supplies and equipment for effective responses toany accident, specifying contact points for each country in advance in case of an accident,
enhancing the information sharing framework through improvements to the international
notification system, and providing faster and more accurate information to enable theimplementation of measures that are based upon scientific evidence.
(21) Adequate identification and forecasting of the effect of released radioactive materials
The System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI) could not
make proper predictions on the effect of radioactive materials as originally designed, due to thelack of information on release sources. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports,
Science and Technology (MEXT), the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) and the
Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC) Japan used SPEEDI to calculate the estimation with various
assumptions for the internal examination of the situation. Even under such restricted conditions
without adequate information on release sources, it should have been utilized as a reference of38

evacuation activities and other purposes by presuming diffusion trends of radioactive materials
under certain assumptions, but it could not. Although the results generated by SPEEDI are now
being disclosed, disclosure should have been conducted from the initial stage.
The Japanese Government will improve its instrumentation and facilities to ensure that releasesource information can be securely obtained. Also, it will develop a plan to effectively utilize
SPEEDI and other systems to address various emergent cases and disclose the data and resultsfrom SPEEDI, etc. from the earliest stages of such cases.
(22) Clear definition of widespread evacuation areas and radiological protection guidelines innuclear emergency
Immediately after the accident, an Evacuation Area and In-house Evacuation Area were
established, and cooperation of residents in the vicinity, local governments, police and relevantorganizations facilitated the fast implementation of evacuation and “stay-in-house” instruction.
As the accident became prolonged, the residents had to be evacuated or stay within their houses
for long periods. Subsequently, however, it was decided that guidelines of the ICRP and IAEA,
which have not been used before the accident, would be used when establishing Deliberate
Evacuation Area and Emergency Evacuation Prepared Area. The size of the protected area
defined after the accident was considerably larger than a 8 to 10km radius from the NPS, which
had been defined as the area where focused protection measures should be taken.
Based on the experiences gained from the accident, the Japanese Government will make muchgreater efforts to clearly define evacuation areas and guidelines for radiological protection in
nuclear emergencies.
Lessons in Category 4
Reinforcement of safety infrastructure(23) Reinforcement of safety regulatory bodies
Governmental organizations have different responsibilities for securing nuclear safety. For
example, NISA of METI is responsible for safety regulation as a primary regulatory body, while
the Nuclear Safety Commission of the Cabinet Office is responsible for regulation monitoringof the primary governmental body, and relevant local governments and ministries are in chargeof emergency environmental monitoring. This is why it was not clear where the primary39

responsibility lies in ensuring citizens’ safety in an emergency. Also, we cannot deny that theexisting organizations and structures hindered the mobilization of capabilities in promptly
responding to such a large-scale nuclear accident.
Reflecting on the above issues, the Japanese Government will separate NISA from METI andstart to review implementing frameworks, including the NSC and relevant ministries, for theadministration of nuclear safety regulations and for environmental monitoring.
(24) Establishment and reinforcement of legal structures, criteria and guidelines
Reflecting on this accident, various challenges have been identified regarding the establishment
and reinforcement of legal structures on nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness andresponse, and related criteria and guidelines. Also, based on the experiences of this nuclear
accident, many issues will be identified as ones to be reflected in the standards and guidelines of
the IAEA.
Therefore, the Japanese Government will review and improve the legal structures governing
nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness and response, along with related criteria andguidelines. During this process, it will reevaluate measures taken against age-relateddegradation of existing facilities, from the viewpoint of structural reliability as well as thenecessity of responding to new knowledge and expertise, including progress in system concepts.
Also, the Japanese Government will clarify technical requirements based on new laws andregulations or on new findings and knowledge for facilities that have already been approved andlicensed-- in other words, it will clarify the status of retrofitting in the context of the legal andregulatory framework. The Japanese Government will make every effort to contribute toimproving safety standards and guidelines of the IAEA by providing related data.
(25) Human resources for nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness and responses
All the experts on severe accidents, nuclear safety, nuclear emergency preparedness andresponse, risk management and radiation medicine should get together to address such an
accident by making use of the latest and best knowledge and experience. Also, it is extremely
important to develop human resources in the fields of nuclear safety and nuclear emergency
preparedness and response in order to ensure mid- and long-term efforts on nuclear safety as
well as to bring restoration to the current accident.
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40

Reflecting on the above-mentioned issues, the Japanese Government will enhance humanresource development within the activities of nuclear operators and regulatory organizations
along with focusing on nuclear safety education, nuclear emergency preparedness and response,
crisis management and radiation medicine at educational organizations.
(26) Ensuring the independence and diversity of safety systems
Although multiplicity has been valued until now in order to ensure the reliability of safetysystems, avoidance of common cause failures has not been carefully considered, andindependence and diversity have not been sufficiently secured.
Therefore, the Japanese Government will ensure the independence and diversity of safetysystems so that common cause failures can be adequately addressed and the reliability of safetyfunctions can be further improved.
(27) Effective use of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) in risk management
PSA has not always been effectively utilized in the overall reviewing processes or in risk
reduction efforts at nuclear power plants. While a quantitative evaluation of risks of quite rare
events such as a large-scale tsunami is difficult and may be associated with uncertainty even
within PSA, Japan has not made sufficient efforts to improve the reliability of the assessments
by explicitly identifying the uncertainty of these risks.
Considering knowledge and experiences regarding uncertainties, the Japanese Government willfurther actively and swiftly utilize PSA while developing improvements to safety measures,
including effective accident management measures, based on PSA.
Lessons in Category 5
Thoroughly instill a safety culture(28) Thoroughly instill a safety culture
All those involved with nuclear energy should be equipped with a safety culture. “Nuclear
safety culture” is stated as, “A safety culture that governs the attitudes and behavior in relation
to safety of all organizations and individuals concerned must be integrated in the management
system” (IAEA, Fundamental Safety Principles, SF-1, 3.13). Learning this message and putting41

it into practice is the starting point, the duty and the responsibility of those who are involved
with nuclear energy. Without a safety culture, there will be no continual improvement of nuclear
safety.
Reflecting on the current accident, the nuclear operators whose organization and individuals
have primary responsibility for securing safety should look at every item of knowledge andevery finding and confirm whether or not they indicate a vulnerability of a plant. They shouldreflect as to whether they have been serious in introducing appropriate measures for improving
safety, when they are not confident that risks concerning the public safety of the plant remainlow.
Also, organizations or individuals involved in national nuclear regulations, as those who
responsible for ensuring the nuclear safety of the public, should reflect whether they have been
serious in addressing new knowledge in a responsive and prompt manner, not leaving any
doubts in terms of safety.
Reflecting on this viewpoint, Japan will establish a safety culture by going back to the basics,
namely that pursuing defenses in depth is essential for ensuring nuclear safety, by constantly
learning professional knowledge on safety, and by maintaining an attitude of trying to identify
weaknesses as well as room for improvement in the area of safety.
13. Conclusion
The nuclear accident that occurred at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Station (NPS) on March 11,2011 was caused by an extremely massive earthquake and tsunami rarely seen in history andresulted in an unprecedented serious accident that extended over multiple reactors
simultaneously. Japan is extending its utmost efforts to confront and overcome this difficult
accident.
In particular, at the accident site, people engaged in the work have been making every effort
under severe conditions to settle the situation. It is impossible to resolve the situation without
these contributions. The Japanese Government is determined to make its utmost efforts to
support the people engaged in this work.
We take very seriously the fact that the accident, triggered by a natural disaster of an earthquake
and tsunamis, became a severe accident due to such causes as the losses of power and cooling42

functions, and that consistent preparation for severe accidents was insufficient. In light of thelessons learned from the accident, Japan has recognized that a fundamental revision of its
nuclear safety preparedness and response is inevitable.
As a part of this effort, Japan will promote the “Plan to Enhance the Research on Nuclear Safety
Infrastructure” while watching the status of the process of settling the situation. This plan isintended to promote, among other things, research to enhance preparedness and responses
against severe accidents through international cooperation, and to work to lead the results
achieved for the improvement of global nuclear safety.
At the same time, it is necessary for Japan to conduct national discussions on the proper course
for nuclear power generation while disclosing the actual costs of nuclear power generation,
including the costs involved in ensuring safety.
Japan will update information on the accident and lessons learned from it in line with the future
process of restoration of stable control and also further clarification of its investigations.
Moreover, it will continue to provide such information and lessons learned to the International
Atomic Energy Agency as well as to countries around the world.
Moreover, we feel encouraged by the support towards restoration from the accident received
from many countries around the world, to which we express our deepest gratitude, and wewould sincerely appreciate continued support from the IAEA and countries around the world.
We are prepared to confront much difficulty towards restoration from the accident and also
confident that we will be able to overcome this accident by uniting the wisdom and efforts of
not only Japan but also the world.

43

Higashidori NPS

Onagawa NPS

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Fukushima Dai-ni NPSTokai Dai-ni NPS

Location of NPSs in the Tohoku District

44

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
Fukushima City

Fukushima Prefecture

Fukushima Dai-ni NPS

Location of NPSs within Fukushima

Unit 6
Unit 5
Unit 4
Unit 1

Unit 3

Unit 2
Unit 2
Unit 3
Unit 1

Unit 4

 Layouts of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and Fukushima Dai-ni NPS

45

Generation Facilities at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

Unit 1

Unit 2

Unit 3

Unit 4

Unit 5

Unit 6

Electric output (MWe)

460

784

784

784

784

1100

Commercial operation

1971/3

1974/7

1976/3

1978/101978/4

1979/10

Reactor model

BWR3

BWR4

PCV model

Mark-1

Number of fuel assemblies
400in the core

BWR5
Mark-2

548

548

548

Generation Facilities at the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS

Unit 1

Unit 2

Unit 3

Unit 4

Electric output (MWe)

1100

1100

1100

1100

Commercial operation

1982/4

1984/2

1985/6

1987/8

Reactor model

BWR5

PCV model

Mark-2

Number of fuel assemblies764
in the core

Mark-2 Advance
764

764

46

764

548

764

Status of Each Unit at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS (As of May 31)
Unit No.
Unit 1
Unit 2
Unit 3
Injecting fresh
water via a fire
Injectingextinguishing andInjecting fresh
fresh water
water supply line.
Situation of via a water
water via the
Flow rate ofwater
water supply line.
supply line.
injected water:
injection
Flow rate of
Flow rate of
3
7.0m /h(via theinto reactor
injected water :injected
fire protection
13.5 m3/h
water : 6.03line)㸪5.0m /h(via3m /hthe feedwater
line)

Unit 5

Unit 6

Water injection is
unnecessary as thecooling function of
the reactor cores arein normal operation.

Reactorwater level

Fuel range
A : Off scale
Fuel range
B:-1,600mm

Fuel range A : Fuel
range
-1,500mm
A:-1,850mm
Fuel range B : Fuelrange
-2,150mm
B:-1,950mm

Shut
down
range
measurement
2,164mm

Shut
down
range
measurement
1,904mm

Reactorpressure

0.555MPag(A)1.508MPag(B)-0.011MPa g (A)-0.016MPa g (B)

0.023
MPa g

0.010
MPa g

Reactorwater
temperature(Collection impossible due to low system flow rate)

83.0oC

24.6 oC

Temperatures related toReactorPressure
Vessel(RPV)

Feedwater
nozzletemperature:
114.1 oC
Temperature
at the bottom
head of RPV:
96.8 oC

Feedwater nozzle
temperature:111.5 oC
Temperature at
the bottom headof RPV: 110.6 oC

Feedwater nozzle
temperature:(Monitoringwater
120.9 oC
temperature in theTemperature atreactors.)
the bottom headoof RPV: 123.2 C

D/W
Pressure,
S/C
Pressure

D/W: 0.1317
MPa abs
S/C: 0.100
MPa abs

D/W: 0.030
MPa abs
S/C: Off scale

D/W: 0.0999
Mpa abs
S/C: 0.1855
MPa abs-0.132MPa g (A)-0.108MPa g (B)-We are working on ensuring the reliability of the cooling function
Statusby installing temporary emergency diesel generators and sea water pumps
as well as receiving electricity from external power supplies at eachplant.

47

Additional Report of the Japanese Government
to the IAEA
- The Accident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations -(Second Report)(Summary)

September 2011

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Government of Japan

This page intentionally left blankSummary

SUMMARY
Contents of Summary
1. Introduction
2. Further Developments regarding the Nuclear Accident
3. Efforts to Settle the Accident
4. Responses to people suffering as a result of the nuclear accident (Off-site)
5. Plans for the NPS site after restoration from the accident (On-site plans)
6. Situation regarding efforts to address lessons learned (28 items)
7. Situation on deliberation to enhance standards etc
8. Further Safety Assessment Effort for NPSs
9. Conclusion

1.Introduction
The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters of the Government of Japan
prepared for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Ministerial Conferenceon Nuclear Safety convened in June 2011 a report (hereinafter referred to as the “June
Report”) addressing the situation of the accident at the Tokyo Electric Power Company'(TEPCO) Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations which occurred on March 11 of this year.
This report covered the occurrence and development of the accident, responses to the
nuclear emergency, lessons learned from the accident until that time, and other suchmatters. The Headquarters submitted the report to the IAEA and made presentations of
the report at the Conference.
The Ministerial Declaration and the Chair’s Summary of the Conference’s plenary
session state expectations towards Japan for the continued provision of information. The
government recognizes that it is incumbent upon Japan to continue to provide accurate
information regarding the accident to the international community, including lessons
learned through the accident. In accordance with this approach the Government of Japandecided to compile information on the state of affairs subsequent to the June report in
the form of an additional report and submit it to the IAEA on the occasions of the Boardof Governors meeting and the General Conference.

1

Summary

Restoration from the accident has been steadily proceeding with Step 2 after
completing Step 1, including among other matters the achievement of stable cooling of
the nuclear reactors and the spent fuel pools in Fukushima NPS. That said, the situation
is such that several more months are expected to be required to bring about more stablecooling. Against such a backdrop, the following three points have been noted in
preparation of this additional report.
(1) This report compiles additional information on the accident obtained as well as
efforts being made to bring about restoration from the accident after the June
Report.
(2) The report compiles the current state of efforts to make full use of lessons learned.
(3) The report indicates of the state of affairs regarding the response to those who havesuffered as a result of the nuclear accident (an off-site response) and the state of
examination of a mid- to long-term plan for the site after restoration from theaccident is completed (an on-site plan).
Particularly with regard to (3) above, the Government of Japan not only naturally
advances its own initiatives but also considers it to be of paramount importance in thecontext of steadily advancing the initiatives to undertake matters through obtaining
information, such as the related experiences and research results of other nations aroundthe world and international organizations, as well as through receiving technicalcooperation from them. Japan hopes this report will serve to engender suchpartnerships.
This additional report records in considerable detail what has been ascertained up
until the present time regarding the situation of the responses at not only the Fukushima
NPS but also other NPSs affected by the Tohoku District - Off the Pacific Coast
Earthquake and the subsequent tsunamis. Moreover, the report gives an account ofdevelopments in terms of the response to those suffering as a result of the nuclear
accident, including decontamination efforts. On the other hand, efforts regarding
nuclear damage compensation are not covered, as was also the case with the June
Report.
Preparation of this additional report has been carried out in the Government Nuclear
Emergency Response Headquarters, taking into consideration efforts for restorationfrom the accident conducted by the Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office,2

Summary

while also listening to opinions from outside eminent persons. The work in preparing
this report has been managed as a whole by Mr. Goshi Hosono, Minister for the
Restoration from and Prevention of Nuclear Accidents, and compiled with Mr. Yasuhiro
Sonoda, Parliamentary Secretary of the Cabinet Office, playing a central role.
Japan’s basic policy is to maintain a high degree of transparency as it releases
information about the accident. Consequently in this report as well, it has paid attention
to providing accurate descriptions of the facts of the situation while also evaluating as
stringently and objectively as possible its countermeasures to address the accident.
Hearings were also conducted with related parties as necessary in order to confirm
various situations. The descriptions of factual situations are based on what had been
ascertained as of August 31.
Japan will continue to make full use of appropriate opportunities to disseminate
additional reports to the world about the accident, using a similar format. In addition,with the activities of the “Investigation Committee on the Accidents at the Fukushima
Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company” established by thegovernment now fully underway, the results of the Committee’s investigation will also
be publicly disclosed to the world in the course of time.
Japan intends to engage in efforts for restoration from this accident in partnershipwith the world. It will at the same time firmly uphold the principle of transparency as it
continues to provide information about the state of affairs regarding the accident to theworld through the IAEA.

2. Further Developments regarding the Nuclear Accident(1) The Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake and the resulting tsunamis
A seismic source rupture process (a seismic source model) and a tsunami source
rupture process (a tsunami source model) were obtained through an analysis that used
observed ground motion data and observed tsunami waveform data, respectively. The
results of this analysis indicated that slips, which are one of the major factors inmechanisms that give rise to seismic and tsunami sources, were between 55 m and notquite 70 m in the shallow area along the Japan Trench.

3

Summary

There is a high probability that the recent earthquake was an earthquake of M9 interms of long-period ground motions, yet had at the same time characteristics of anearthquake of M8 in terms of short-period ground motions.
It is likely that those factors that had a great impact on the tsunami water level
include the large slip noted above and the overlap effects of the tsunami water level due
to a delay in rupture start time associated with consecutive rupturing of multiple seismic
source areas.
(2) Status of the accident at the Fukushima NPSs, etc.
TEPCO has reported that, in an effort to ascertain the inundation height andinundation area of the premises of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS on the basis of tsunami
source models estimated through figure simulation, it was successful in reproducing theactual behavior for the most part. TEPCO also reported investigation results which
included that the direct main bus panels of Units 1, 2 and 4 were inundated due to thetsunamis while those of Units 3, 5 and 6 were spared, and that the inundation pathway
leading to the main buildings was mainly the opening on the ground on the sea side of
the turbine building and the opening connecting to the trench duct under the ground.
TEPCO has also reported the results of an evaluation analyzing the impacts ofearthquakes on buildings and structures as well as equipment and piping critical tosafety, stating that it can be estimated that the major facilities and equipment that had
key functions with regard to safety were, at the time of the earthquake and immediately
afterwards, at a status at which safety functions could be maintained. Insofar as many
aspects regarding the detailed status of impacts caused by the earthquake remain unclear,
the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency intends to conduct further investigations andexamination, such as through a substantial on-site investigation, and also carry out
evaluations.
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency has received reports from TEPCO
regarding the accident and has been moving forward with investigations making use ofhearings with the employees of TEPCO and others. Based on these, the major additional
information regarding the status of the initial response at the power stations after theaccident occurred with regard to such matters as cooling, alternative water injection, the4Summary

PCV venting, and so on, as well as the current state of affairs including the state of the
spent fuel pools, the state of the RPV, and the like were determined to be as follows.
1) The status of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS in overall terms
In the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS after the earthquake struck, while the staff designatedfor emergency responses was able to be secured, these persons were required to carryout various responses to the situation of concurrent disasters at multiple Units. As aresult of the lost of all AC power supply due to the tsunami striking, the means ofcommunication within the power station were extremely limited, including the loss offunction of the site-specific PHS system. The Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS),
which is the system to figure out the status of each plant, lost its ability to function,negatively impacting the formulation of response measures within the power station’s
emergency response headquarters.
On the basis of the state of damage of its power supply facilities, TEPCO had power
supply vehicles from all of its branches head to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS beginningon the evening on March 11, but due to road damage and traffic jams, they were notable to proceed as intended. The transportation by air of power supply vehicles by the
Self-Defense Forces was also considered but this could not be realized due to the great
weight of the vehicles. It was against such a backdrop that, utilizing power supply
vehicles secured before dawn on March 12, the staff of the stations undertook work to
lay electricity cables with a view to restoring power supply amidst extremely poor
working surroundings, such as darkness, strong aftershocks occurring intermittently, an
ongoing major tsunami alert, pools of water left by the tsunamis, obstacles strewn about,the high air dose, etc.
2) Unit 1 of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS- Initial cooling
Although cooling by isolation condenser (IC) (two lines) was begun after the
automatic shutdown of the nuclear rector, it was manually stopped by following theoperation procedure documents because of a rapid decrease in the temperature of the
RPV. After that, using only one system of IC, start-up and shutdown was repeatedmanually. The loss of power supplies due to the following tsunami made it impossible
to confirm the operating status of the IC.

5

Summary- Alternate water injection
Since it was unclear whether the IC functions at the plant were able to be maintained
and since it was impossible to confirm the water level of the reactors, at 17:12 on March
11, with the aim of implementing cooling by means of alternative water injection,
TEPCO started to consider adopting alternative water injection actions (the fire
protection system, the make-up water condensate system) set up as accident
management (AM) measures and fire engines using fire cisterns, which had been set up
in response to the lessons learned from the Niigata-ken Chuetsu-oki Earthquake.
Regarding the utilization of the fire protection system, staff manually opened valves of
the core spray system and so on in the dark, making it possible for water injection to
occur after the depressurization of the RPV.
Also, although the deployment of an available fire engine near Unit 1 became
necessary, tsunami-induced driftage interrupted the flow of road traffic on site. A fireengine was deployed near Unit 1 only after securing an access route by breaking thelock of a gate that was closed. It was through such difficult work that at 05:46, March
12, fresh water injection was started using the fire engine, by means of the fire
protection system line.
- PCV venting
Because the means to transfer heat to the ultimate heat sink was lost as a result of thetsunami, TEPCO started to review from the very earliest stages of the accident thepossibility of conducting PCV venting. When station employees connected a small
generator at around 23:50 on March 11 to the instrument to confirm PCV drywellpressure, it was 0.600 MPa abs (maximum operating pressure is 0.427 MPa gage (=0.528 MPa abs)). Therefore the NPS started work in concrete terms to perform venting.
The evacuation of residents in the vicinity was being confirmed prior to performing theventing, and at 9:03 on March 12 the evacuation of Okuma Town (Kuma district) was
confirmed as having been completed. At around 9:15 station employees performed theoperation to open a PCV venting valve (open 25% of the stipulated procedure) using thelight of a flashlight in the darkness. Subsequently station employees went to operate thesmall valve of the suppression chamber (S/C); but, it was impossible to do so due to ahigh dose in the environment of that spot. Due to this, the opening operation of the S/Csmall valve in the Main Control Room was performed with expectations of residualpressure of air in the S/C small valve, and the operation to open the S/C large valve
through the use of a temporary compressor was performed at around 14:00 that day. The
result was that at 14:30 the PCV drywell pressure was confirmed to have decreased, and6

Summary

consequently it was judged that venting had been performed.
- Situation of the spent fuel poolDue to the loss of all AC power and the consequent loss of seawater pump function
due to the earthquake and tsunamis on March 11, the functions of cooling and of
make-up water were lost. The reactor buildings were damaged by hydrogen explosions
on March 12 and portions of the ceilings fell down on the upper side of the pool. Thereis a high probability that exposed fuel was avoided by maintaining the water level at the
spent fuel pool through the spraying of water by concrete pump truck and injections ofwater taken from the piping of the fuel pool cooling and cleanup systems and freshwater
sources. An alternative cooling system has been organized and operated since August
10 and at present the water temperature has been stabilized at approximately 30oC.
- Current status of the RPV
As of August 31, water injection was being undertaken at a flow rate of
approximately 3.6m3/h, which exceeds the flow rate equivalent to decay heat. The
temperature of the bottom of the RPV is below 100oC and has been trending in a stablemanner without showing any continuous increasing trend for the past month, a factindicating that sufficient cooling has been secured through the circulating water
injection cooling system. The injection of nitrogen into the PCV has been underway
since starting the injection on April 7.
3) Unit 2 of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS- Initial cooling
Although the loss of power supplies due to the tsunamis made the operating status of
the reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) unidentifiable, at 02:55, March 12, it
was confirmed that the RCIC was in operation, and thereafter, the monitoring of thereactor continued for a little while as an alternative water injection system was prepared.
- Alternative water injection
Since it was impossible to determine whether or not the RCIC function was being
maintained immediately after the tsunamis struck, just as with Unit 1, TEPCO began toconsider adopting alternative water injection actions (the fire protection system, themake-up water condensate system) which had been set up as AM measures, as well as
fire engines using the fire cistern. Thereafter, upon confirming the operation of the
RCIC, monitoring of the reactor condition continued for some time, and in parallel, a7

Summary

water injection line which took its water from the Unit 3 backwash valve pit wasdeveloped in case the RCIC stopped, and hoses were connected the fire engines
deployed. At 11:01, March 14, an explosion occurred in the rector building of Unit 3,
resulting in the water injection line which had been ready for operation becoming
unusable due to damages to the fire engines and hoses. At 13:25 on the same day, since
it was judged that the operation of RCIC was not available, it was decided that due tothe fact that debris lay scattered on the site direct seawater injection from the landingarea would be implemented. After that, while the work was forced to stop due toaftershock, the subsequent arrangements including, among others, reconnecting hoses,
depressurizing the RPV using main steam safety relief valves (SRV), and refueling fireengines which had stopped operations after running out of fuel, were completed,
although some interruption by aftershocks were unavoidable. At 19:54 on the same day,TEPCO began seawater injections via fire engines.
- PCV venting
In order to create a situation in which PCV venting can be performed, operations toopen a PCV vent valve (MO valve (motor operated valve)) (open 25% of the stipulated
procedure) was performed at 8:10 on the 13th, and the operation of opening the large
valve of the S/C vent (AO valve (air operated valve)) was performed at 11:00 of thesame day to complete the vent line configuration and await the blowout of a rupture
disk. However, after that, the S/C large valve was closed and unable to be re-opened,
affected by the explosion of the reactor building of Unit 3 at 11:01 on the 14th;
nevertheless, efforts were continued to form a line. At around 21:00 on that day thesmall valve of the S/C vent (AO valve) was opened slightly, making the vent line
configuration successful again. However, a policy of drywell venting was adopted
because the pressure on the S/C side was lower than the working pressure of the rupture
disk and the pressure on the drywell side was increasing, and an operation to open thesmall valve of the drywell vent valve (AO valve) was performed once at 0:02 on the
15th; however, it was confirmed several minutes later that the small valve was closed.
After that, drywell pressure maintained a high level of values; large sounds of impact
occurred between around 6:00 and 6:10 of the 15th, while S/C pressure indicated 0 MPa
abs. Lower drywell pressure was also confirmed at around 11:25 on that day.
- Situation of the spent fuel poolDue to the loss of all AC power and the consequent loss of the seawater pumpfunction due to the earthquake and tsunamis on March 11, the functions of cooling and8Summaryof make-up water was lost. A blow-out panel of the reactor building at Unit 2 wasthrown open by a hydrogen explosion at the reactor building of Unit 1 on March 12.
Water injections using seawater as the source water and which made use of the pipingof the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system had started since March 20. (This was
switched to a freshwater source as of March 29.) There is high probability that exposed
fuel has been avoided by maintaining the water level of the spent fuel pool through thismethod of water injection. An alternative cooling system was begun on May 31 and thewater temperature has been stabilized at approximately 30oC at present.
- Current status of the RPV
As of August 31, water injection was being undertaken at a flow rate of
approximately 3.8m3/h, which exceeds the flow rate equivalent to decay heat. The
temperature at the bottom of the RPV is below 130oC and trending in a stable mannerwithout showing any continuous increasing trends for the past month, which indicatesthat sufficient cooling has been secured via the circulating water injection coolingsystem. The injection of nitrogen into the PCV has been underway since starting theinjection on June 28.
4) Unit 3 of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS- Initial cooling
Regarding Unit 3, even after the loss of all AC power on March 11, the RCIC wasfunctioning for some time and cooling of the rector was maintained. However, at 11:36,
March 12, the RCIC was tripped. HPCI, whose operation was begun immediately
following that, which means at 12:35 on the same day, stopped at 02:42, March 13. In
light of this situation, TEPCO attempted to restart the injection of water using existingcooling facilities (HPCI, RCIC, diesel-powered fire pumps), but the HPCI failed tooperate due to battery depletion. An injection of water into the RPV was also attempted
upon confirming the site conditions, but the RCIC failed to begin operating.
- Alternative water injection
After the restoration of roads within the site located to the side of units 5/ 6, including
the removal of debris and other efforts, the recovery of the fire engines which wereparked to the side of units 5/6, and the transfer to Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of a fireengine which had been positioned as a backup for emergencies at Fukushima Dai-ni
NPS, in the early morning of March 13, a line for an injection of water was developedby which freshwater was taken from the fire cistern. In order to depressurize the RPV, it

9Summary

became necessary to operate the main steam safety relief valves (SRV), but due to alack of working batteries, batteries were removed from cars employees used forcommuting and collected. Rapid depressurization of the RPV was implemented using
these batteries as a power supply. Following this, at 09:25 on the same day, alternative
water injection with fire engines was launched. When freshwater from the fire cistern,
the water source, was depleted, at 13:12 on the same day, a seawater injection was
begun by developing the line which injects seawater of the backwash valve pit. The
explosion of the reactor building on March 14 caused the backwash valve pit to become
unusable. Having attempted other sea water injections, around 16:30, March 14,
seawater injections were developed that directly took in seawater, and seawater
injection via fire engines resumed.
- PCV venting
At around 4:50 on March 13 the operation to open the vent valve was started for thePCV vent, and the S/C large valve (AO valve) was not able to be opened despite theforcible energization of the electromagnetic valve for activating the large valve using asmall generator, so it was made to open by changing cylinders. Also, the operation to
open another vent valve was performed manually (open 15% of the stipulated
procedure), the vent lineup was complete at around 8:41 on March 13, and TEPCO
awaited the blowout of a rupture disk. At 9:24 on March 13 it was confirmed thatdrywell pressure had decreased from 0.637 MPa abs (at 9:10 on the 13th) to 0.540 MPa
abs (at 9:24 on the 13th), so that TEPCO judged that venting had been conducted.
However, after that, there was the repeated closure of a vent valve due to decreased airpressure, so that the operation to open the valve was performed each time by changing
cylinders, etc.
- Situation of the spent fuel poolDue to the loss of all AC power and the consequent loss of the seawater pumpfunction due to the earthquake and tsunamis on March 11, the functions of cooling andof make-up water were lost. The entire upper side exterior-wall of the operating floor at
the reactor building was damaged by an explosion assumed to have been a hydrogen gas
explosion on March 14, and a large amount of rubble fell down onto the spent fuel pool.
A large amount of steam emissions from the exposed operating floor was confirmed
because of the damage to the building. On March 17, the spraying of seawater to theupper side of the reactor building by helicopter of the Self-Defence Force began.
Spraying toward the spent fuel pool through the use of a water spraying truck also10Summary

started on the same day. Water injection by a concrete pump truck began on March 27,
and water injection from the piping of the existing fuel pool cooling and cleanup system
was started on April 26. Through this effort, it is highly likely that exposed fuel has
been avoided by maintaining the water level at the spent fuel pool. An alternative
cooling system has been in place since June 30 and the water temperature is presently
stabilized at approximately 30oC.
- Current status of the RPV
As of August 31, water injection was being undertaken at a flow rate of
approximately 7.0m3/h, which exceeds the flow rate equivalent to decay heat. The
temperature of the bottom of the RPV is below 120oC and trending in a stable mannerwithout showing any continuous increasing trend for the past month, which indicatesthat sufficient cooling has been secured by means of the circulating water injection
cooling system. The injection of nitrogen into the PCV has been underway since
starting the injection on July 14.
5) Unit 4 of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS- Situation of the spent fuel poolDue to the loss of all AC power and the consequent loss of the seawater pumpfunction due to the earthquake and tsunamis on March 11, the functions of cooling andof make-up water were lost. The upper wall side and other portions of the operating
floor were damaged by an explosion assumed to have been a hydrogen gas explosion on
March 15. The spraying of freshwater by Self-Defence Forces water spraying trucks
began on March 20 and has been conducted periodically ever since. Injections using atemporary fuel pool injection facility were also launched on June 16. After analyzing
the results, etc. of nuclide analysis of the pool water sample, most of the fuel inside of
the pool appears to be in sound condition and it is presumed that systematic
mass-damage has not occurred. In this respect, due to damage at the reactor building at
Unit 4, the possibility that part of the fuel was damaged by rubble falling into poolcannot be ruled out. An alternative cooling system has been in place since July 31 andthe water temperature is presently stabilized at approximately 40oC.
In addition, the installation of a supportive structure at the bottom of spent fuel pool wascompleted on July 30 and seismic safety has been enhanced.

11

Summary6) Fukushima Dai-ni NPS
In Fukushima Dai-ni NPS (BWR of Units 1~4), before the earthquake on March 11,
all four units were in operation. One external power supply line was secured for theentire Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, and therefore the securing of an AC power supply was
successfully achieved. Regarding Units 1 and 2, the turbine-driven injection system wasensured, and, in the case of the motor-driven injection system, despite the entirety of theemergency core cooling system (ECCS) becoming unusable, all other injection systems
except the ECCS were ensured. Thus, core cooling was successfully achieved.
Regarding Units 3 and 4, the turbine-driven injection system was ensured, and insofar
as motor-driven injection system, part of ECCS and other injection systems wereensured, so that core cooling was successfully achieved. Regarding the removal of
decay heat from the PCV, as for Unit 3, since the residual heat removal system (RHR)
was ensured, continuous cooling was implemented which led to a cold shutdown.
Regarding Units 1, 2 and 4, though the heat removal function was lost due to tsunamis,
one RHR system was restored by replacing motors, installing temporary cables,
receiving power from temporary cables, and receiving power from high voltage power
supply vehicles, and in this way, a cold shutdown was achieved.
7) Other NPSs affected by the earth quake and tsunami- Onagawa NPS
In Tohoku Electric Power Company Onagawa NPS (BWR of Units 1~3), Units 1 and3 were operating, and Unit 2 was in the process of starting reactor operation. Even
after the earthquake and tsunami, one external power supply line was secured for theentire NPS. Due to a fire at the normal distribution panel, Unit 1 could not supply power
to the emergency distribution panel, thus it could not use an external power supply.
However, by activating the emergency diesel generator, it could secure an AC power
supply. As for core cooling, the turbine-driven water injection system and motor-driven
water supply system were secured in Units 1 and 3, and core cooling was successful.
Regarding Unit 2, the operation of pulling out the control rods for starting up the reactor
was carried out, and the water temperature in the reactor was 100ºC or less andimmediately resulted in cold shutdown. Regarding removal of decay heat from the PCV,
all Residual Heat Removal Systems (RHR) could be secured in Units 1 and 3, and were
kept cool and resulted in a cold shutdown. As for Unit 2, the water temperature was 100ºC or less, and it shifted directly to cold shutdown. One RHR system became
dysfunctional due to the following tsunami, but one other system was available, and thiswas successful in securing the removal of decay heat.

12

Summary- Tokai Dai-ni NPS
The Japan Atomic Power Company Tokai Dai-ni NPS (BWR of 1 Unit) was inoperation before the earthquake on March 11.Due to the earthquake, three external
power supply lines were stopped and thus external power supply was lost. All
emergency diesel generators started operating. After that, although one system became
unusable due to the tsunamis, through the use of another emergency diesel generator
and a high-pressure core spray system (HPCS), AC power supply from diesel generators
was successfully achieved. Regarding core cooling, one motor-driven water supply
system could be secured, and core cooling was successful. As for the removal of decay
heat from the PCVs, since one system of power supply was secured by an emergency
diesel generator, and one system of power supply was secured by Residual Heat
Removal System (RHR) as well, it required some time, but cooling was maintained andit resulted in a cold shutdown.
(3) Response regarding Evacuation Areas, etc
The Japanese government has established Evacuation Areas, etc. as necessary inorder to avoid the accident impacting the residents in the surrounding areas. As was
described in the June Report, the Director-general of the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters instructed the mayors concerned of the cities, towns and villages toestablish the area within 20 km radius of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS as a restricted
area from April 22 and residents have in principle been prohibited from access to thearea. At the same time, it permits both residents to temporarily access their own
residences (residents’ temporary access) and public organizations and enterprises, etc. ,whose public interest are badly damaged without temporally access to the area, totemporarily access the area (public temporary access). The first round of residents’temporary access for all the cities, towns and villages in the area was almost complete
by August 31, with 19,683 households (33,181) people having been granted temporary
access by August 31.
On April 22, the government established as the Deliberate Evacuation Area the area
in which the cumulative dose might reach 20 mSv within a year from the occurrence of
the accident. The residents in this area have almost completed evacuation to date.
Regarding the Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of Emergency which was establishedon the day as the Deliberate Evacuation Area, in which a response of “stay in-house”

13Summary

and/or evacuation was required in case of emergency, efforts are currently being madeto lift the designation (cf. 4.(2) below).
In addition, since June particular spots have been found, which have no areal spreadbut of which cumulative dose might reach 20 mSv within a year from the accident
occurrence depending on a life style, the government has identified their residences as
Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation, and it was decided for the residents living
at the spots first to draw attention to these spots and then support and promoteevacuation. To date, 227 spots have been established as Specific Spots Recommended
for Evacuation, covering 245 households.
(4) Situation regarding the release of radioactive materials
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) reported on May 12 to the Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC) about its trial calculation of the amount of release to the atmosphereof iodine-131 and cesium after the accident occurred, and, as the result of emergency
monitoring from March 12 to 15 was thus newly confirmed, the JAEA reevaluated andreported the result to the NSC on August 22.
For the current release amount of radioactive materials at the site, TEPCO, using agraph of the concentration distribution which had been made in advance by means ofobserved data of concentration measurements of radioactive materials in the atmospherenear the site and a diffusion model (a diffusion model based on the “Regulatory Guidefor Meteorological Observation for Safety Analysis of Nuclear Power Reactor
Facilities” of the NSC), estimated the current release amount of radioactive materials tothe atmosphere. As a result, at a time in early August, the release amount including
the total of both cesium-137 and cesium-134 per unit time was estimated to beapproximately 2.0×108 Becquerel/hour (Bq/h).
The government, to assess the impact of radioactive materials released from the
Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, has actively continued environmental monitoring. In July,
the government established the “Monitoring Coordination Meeting” to promote precise
implementation and evaluation of monitoring based on the overall results of wide-range
environmental monitoring performed by related ministries and agencies, municipalities
and the operators. The Coordination Meeting determined the “Comprehensive
Monitoring Plan” on August 2 to perform careful monitoring without omissions

14

Summary

regarding 1) general environmental monitoring, 2) harbors, airports, etc., 3) the water
environment, etc., 4) agricultural soil, forests and fields, etc., 5) food, 6) the watersupply, in cooperation with related organizations.
For the outflow of radioactive materials to the sea from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS,TEPCO implemented measures to prevent outflow and mitigate diffusion, including theclosure of the seawater piping trench located in the upper part of outflow routes as wellas blocking pits having outflow risk. The concentration of radioactive materials inseawater near the NPS’ water intake and water discharge locations has now decreased toa level near the regulatory concentration value defined by law. However, in the future,
there is the possibility that accumulated water might leak under ground and increase
contamination of the sea. In light of this situation, the installation of a water shielding
wall (at the seaside) made of steel pipe sheet pile with an adequate water shielding
function in front of the existing seawall of Units 1 to 4 is planned.

Beyond this, theinstallation of a water shielding wall (at the land side) surrounding the reactor buildingsof Units 1 to 4 is also being investigated and examined.
The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), on thebasis of “Sea Area Monitoring in Wider Areas” published on May 6, has been
continuously implementing monitoring of radioactivity concentrations in refuse on thesea surface, in the seawater and in the marine soil in the sea beds off the coast of Miyagi,
Fukushima and Ibaraki Prefectures, etc. in cooperation with related organizations.
(5) Situation regarding radiation exposure
Regarding the total value of the external and internal exposure of the workers, while
the average value of 3,715 people was as high as 22.4 mSv in March, there is a
declining tendency, with 3.9 mSv as the average value of 3,463 people in April and 3.1
mSv as the average value of 2,721 people in May.
Particularly in March, it was confirmed that six people exceeded 250 mSv, which isthe dose limit for an emergency worker. All of these were TEPCO employees who wereoperators and engineers in electricity and instrumentation engaged in monitoring of
instruments in the main control rooms immediately after the occurrence of the accident.
TEPCO has made it a rule not to allow workers who have exceeded 200 mSv to work at
the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS.

15

Summary

For residents, Fukushima Prefecture intends to implement the “Health Management
Survey for the Residents in Fukushima Prefecture” directed at all its residents, who
number about two million. In concrete terms, a basic survey based on behavioral
records, etc., is scheduled and a detailed survey will be implemented for the residents
living in Evacuation Areas, etc. Moreover, supersonic thyroid examinations will be
implemented for all residents who are 18 years old or younger. As part of the previous
survey of the basic survey, a survey of internal exposure by using a whole body counter,etc. was implemented for 122 residents in areas where the possibility of internal
exposure might be relatively high. The internal exposure to the total of cesium-134 andcesium-137 by these subjects was assessed as less than 1 mSv.
(6) Situation regarding measures to address agricultural products, etc.
From viewpoints of securing health, security, and safety of the citizens as well asinternational community, the government is promoting enhanced efforts on inspectionof agricultural products and distribution restriction as necessary, etc., based onprovisional regulation values of radiation dose comparable to those of major countries.
Regarding agricultural products, etc., on June 27, the Government Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters (GNER HQ) re-summarized the policy for restricting
distribution and intake and also for lifting such orders, on the basis that radioactive
cesium exceeding the provisional regulation values has been detected in some food evenas the level of radioactive iodine detected in food has been decreasing. Based on this,relevant municipalities are carrying out distribution restrictions and also lifting theserestrictions in accordance with the monitoring results of radioactive materials.
As for the specific handling by the government regarding tea in tea fields where theconcentration of radioactive cesium of dried tea leaves exceeds provisional regulation
values (500 Bq/kg or less) or has a risk of it, Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries (MAFF) provides guidance towards planning to decrease the amount ofradioactive cesium by carrying out “deep-skiffing,” which is to prune 10 to 20 cm fromthe top to the degree that no leaf layers remain. Also, radioactive cesium exceeding theprovisional regulation values was detected in beef, and, since it is believed that cattle
consumed rice straw collected after the accident and containing radioactive cesium, in
conjunction with calling for attention to the handling of rice straw, distribution
restrictions of cattle were established. Regarding rice, in cities, towns and villages

16Summary

where radioactive cesium concentration in soil is high, preliminary investigations werecarried out in advance in order to figure out the tendency towards concentrations ofradioactive materials at a stage before harvesting, and measurement at the post-harvest
stage as the main investigation will be carried out, measuring radioactive materials todecide whether or not a restriction on distribution is necessary. On the basis of thisconcept of the government, the inspection of rice for radioactive materials has been
conducted by relevant municipalities, and radioactive materials exceeding provisional
regulation values have not been detected to date (August 31). Also, regarding fertilizer,
soil amendments, nursery soil, and feed, provisional acceptable values regarding theconcentration of radioactive cesium were defined and inspection methods, etc. were
established.

3㸬 Efforts to Settle the Accident
On July 19, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters confirmed that theroadmap to settle the situation regarding the accident will transition from Step 1 to Step
2. This was the result of a comprehensive assessment of the situations including that theradiation doses indicated by monitoring posts, etc. were steadily on the decrease, efforts
to cool the reactors and spent fuel pools have progressed, the treatment of stagnant
water has progressed, etc.
Under Step 2, from October of 2011 to January of 2012, efforts will be made toachieve a situation in which the release of radioactive materials is under control, and theradiation exposure dose is being significantly held down through the realization of thecold shutdown of the rectors etc. The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
positioned Step 2 as an effort to be undertaken by the Government-TEPCO Integrated
Response Office, and that the government will be sufficiently engaged to settle theaccident, including efforts to improve the life and work environment for workers, theenhancement of radiation control and the medical system, and the training of staff. The
government will make its utmost efforts to surely achieve the goals of Step 2 and settle
the accident as soon as possible.
As the specific situation so far, regarding stable cooling of reactors, in Step 1, inconsideration of the achievement of treating stagnant water and stable water injection
using it (circulation water cooling), the securing of reliable water injection (actions to17

Summary

address an abnormal event, more than one measure for water injection, etc.), and the
avoidance of the risk of a hydrogen explosion accompanying the nitrogen injection into
the PCV, the targeted “stable cooling” in Step 1 was realized.
Currently, the actual amount of injected water exceeds the amount of water equivalent
to the decay heat, and the temperature of RPV has been stable. Hereafter, regarding
Units 2 and 3, where the temperature at the bottom of the PRV exceeds 100oC, theamount of water injection will be modified on a trial base in order to change thetemperature inside the reactor and the amount of water necessary to be injected toachieve a cold shutdown condition will be evaluated.
Regarding the cooling of the spent fuel pools, by August 10, “more stable cooling” (atarget in Step 2) was achieved before others, as circulating cooling with heat exchangers
has been implemented in all Units (1, 2, 3 and 4).
In order to implement the treatment of stagnant water and more stable and efficient
injection of treated water into the reactor, as second-line treatment facilities, on August
7, treatment began with evaporative concentration equipment, which reinforces thedesalination process. The current accumulated amount of the treated stagnant water isapproximately 66,980 tons (as of August 31) and the cesium decontamination factor
achieved by the treatment facilities is 106. (Note: The “decontamination factor” is theratio of the concentration of cesium in the sample before treatment to the concentrationof cesium in the sample after treatment.)
In order to improve the life and work environment for workers, TEPCO installed
provisional dormitories as well as rest facilities in the NPS in sequence. Also, in orderto improve health control for workers, a medical room has also been installed in the
NPS, and the medical systems have been improving by deploying multiple doctors in aseismic isolation building to provide a 24-hour care system etc.

4. Responses to people suffering as a result of the nuclear accident (Off-site)(1) Off-site measures
The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters established the “Roadmap for
Immediate Actions for the Assistance of Residents Affected by the Nuclear Incidents”
18Summaryon May 17. Currently it is promoting efforts targeting the Evacuation Areas, thereinforcement and continued implementation of monitoring, and efforts such as
decontamination and countermeasures against radioactive waste, etc. with full force inline with the Roadmap. The government will promptly promote such efforts incooperation with related parties such as local municipalities.
(2) Efforts to lift the designation of Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of Emergency
The NSC has indicated conditions, etc. for the lifting of each of the designations of
Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of Emergency, Evacuation Area, and Deliberate
Evacuation Area, taking into account radiation protection and reactor stability under the“Basic Policy of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan on Radiation Protection for
Termination of Evacuation and Reconstruction” (July 19) and “Standpoint of the
Nuclear Safety Commission for the Termination of Urgent Protective Actions
implemented for the Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant” (August 4).
Based on the above initiatives, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
indicated the “Concept of Review of Evacuation Area, etc.” on August 9. The Japanese
government intends to lift the designation of Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of
Emergency in block at the stage when all local municipalities have completed thedevelopment of a restoration plan based on their residents’ intentions.
Therefore, related organizations are currently promoting environmental monitoring
actively with a view to the lifting of the Evacuation-Prepared Area in Case of
Emergency. Whole area environmental monitoring of the sites of schools and otherpublic facilities, school zones and parks, etc. and environmental monitoring in response
to individual requests of cities, towns and villages, etc. have been performed.

(3) Preparation of maps indicating radiation doses, etc.
The MEXT collected soil at about 2,200 places within a roughly 100 km radius fromthe TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS while also measuring the air dose rate and theamount of radioactive materials deposited into soil at these locations. It has made it arule to prepare distribution maps of radiation dose, etc. on the basis of these19Summarymeasurements; so far, it published an air dose rate map on August 2 and a concentration
map of radioactive cesium in soil on August 30.
(4) Enactment of the Act on measures for radioactive wastes and the basic policy of
decontamination
The Diet enacted the “Act on Special Measures concerning Handling of Radioactive
Pollution” on August 26. In light of the fact that contamination of the environment has
been occurring on account of radioactive materials discharged by the recent accident,
the Act intends to reduce impacts on human health and/or living environment promptly
by establishing measures to be taken by the national and local governments and relevant
licensees, etc. Specifically, it stipulates that the national government is to establish thebasic principles regarding the handling of contamination of the environment byradioactive materials, and, giving due consideration to the degree of significance of thecontamination, designate areas where it is necessary to take measures including
decontamination by the national government and so on.
As decontamination is an urgent issue to be tackled immediately, the GNER HQ
established the “Basic Policy for Emergency Decontamination Work” on August 26
without waiting until the related part of the above-mentioned Act fully comes into force
in next January. It summarized specific targets and working principles in carrying out
decontamination, including that estimated annual exposure dose of general public inresidence areas is to be reduced approximately 50% in the next two years, and so on. In
this policy, 1) with a central focus on areas where the estimated annual exposure dose
exceeds 20 mSv, the national government directly promotes decontamination with thegoal of reducing the estimated annual exposure dose to below 20 mSv, 2) effective
decontamination is carried out through the cooperation of municipalities and residents
also in areas where the estimated annual exposure dose is below 20 mSv, with a goal ofbringing the estimated annual exposure dose to close to 1 mSv, and 3) particularly, by
putting high priority on thorough decontamination work in children’s living areas(schools, parks, etc.), the goal is to reduce the estimated annual exposure dose ofchildren close to 1 mSv as soon as possible, and then still lower, and so on. The
contents of the basic policy are consistent with the above-mentioned Act and will be
replaced when this Act fully comes into force. In order to promote these efforts bycoordinating with the local areas the government launched “Fukushima
Decontamination Promotion Team” and enhanced its on-site system on August 24. Also,

20

Summaryon August 25, the Office of Response to Radioactive Materials Contamination wasestablished within the Cabinet Secretariat and a system for comprehensively promoting
decontamination, the disposal of radioactive wastes, and the health investigation ofresidents is to be prepared. In addition, a coordination meeting to facilitate close
coordination among relevant ministries and agencies will be launched, as well as aradioactive materials contamination response advisory meeting, to be comprised of
persons of knowledge and experience on the establishment of standards regarding
radiation. Hereafter, the government intends to appropriate about 220 billion yen forthese decontamination activities from reserve fund provided under a secondary
supplementary budget for this fiscal year.
(5) Individual efforts concerning decontamination, etc.
- Decontamination efforts made by municipalities
In Date City, Fukushima Prefecture, prior to decontamination works of the whole city,
a demonstration experiment targeting swimming pools and private residences was
carried out, whereby the radiation dose was successfully lowered to a level that does notcause problems. Other local governments also have started decontamination andremediation activities.
- Decontamination of residents’ living spaces
The GNER HQ, since radioactive materials were detected from soil and sand in thegutters as well as fallen leaves, carried out a demonstration experiment on thedecontamination of gutters, etc., and compiled and presented instructions for cleaningthese.
- Decontamination efforts in schools, nursery schools, etc.
In cases in which the air dose rate of the school yard, kindergarten yard, etc. exceeds
1 μSv/h, MEXT and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), throughfinancial support from the national government, will carry out measures to reduce thedose rate of school soils, etc., with the goal that the exposure dose for pupils and school
children not be more than 1 mSv per year in principle after summer vacation.

21

Summary- Dose reduction of public facilities and school zone, etc.
The national government funded for measures in Fukushima Prefecture for urgently
preventing the effects of radiation on children, etc. in schools, parks, school zones, andpublic facilities, etc. currently used by children, residents, and others.
- Monitoring and decontamination of agricultural soils, etc.
With regard to agricultural land, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries(MAFF) collected samples of soil from about 360 points in Fukushima Prefecture andabout 220 points in the surrounding 5 prefectures (Miyagi, Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaraki and
Chiba Prefectures), promoted investigations into the status of contamination, andcompiled a distribution map of radioactive materials concentrations (August 30).
MAFF, in cooperation with the Government Council for Science and Technology
Policy, MEXT and the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, has promoted theverification of the effectiveness of physical, chemical and biological decontaminating
methods, has been working to develop technologies for decontaminating radioactive
materials, and has been reviewing necessary measures for each decontamination status.
Also, regarding all forested areas in Fukushima Prefecture, a distribution map ofconcentrations of radioactive materials is to be prepared similarly, and the future
response will be examined accordingly.
- Disposal of disaster wastes, etc.
Ministry of the Environment compiled the “Policy on Disposal of Disaster Wastes inFukushima Prefecture” on June 23. It stipulated the disposal method, etc. of incinerated
ash that burnable waste is to be incinerated at incineration facilities fitted with bag-filter
equipment and having exhaust fume absorption functions, and also that bottom ash
contaminated with 8,000 Bq/kg or less is to be disposed by landfill. Subsequently, on
August 31, the “Policy on Disposal Method of Incinerated Ash, etc. with Contaminationthat exceeds 8,000 Bq/kg and is less than 100,000 Bq/kg” was compiled.

5. Plans for the NPS site after restoration from the accident (On-site plans)
At the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS where the recent nuclear accident occurred, there areplans to aim to remove the spent fuel and debris and, ultimately, to take measures fordecommissioning. To achieve these objectives, the Mid- and Long-term Response Teamof the Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office is discussing for efforts to22

Summary

address these mid- and long-term challenges at “Advisory Committee on Mid- andLong-term Measures at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS of Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc.,”(hereinafter referred to as “Advisory Committee on Mid- and Long-term Measures”) of
the Atomic Energy Commission along with addressing issues by dividing them into
mid-term challenges and long-term challenges.
Mid-term challenges include management of the groundwater on the site, integrity
management of buildings and equipment, construction of reactor building containers,
and the removal of spent fuel from the spent fuel pools. The Mid- and Long-term
Response Team is currently discussing and designing the construction of groundwaterboundaries on the ocean-side of the NPS site in order to prevent groundwatercontamination from expanding, and is evaluating and discussing the safety of the reactor
buildings in the event of a possible earthquake in the future in order to ensure safety.
For the present, the removing spent fuels from the spent fuel pools, etc. will be tackled
for the next three years, with preparations now underway, including the installation ofequipment necessary to clear rubble scattered atop the reactor buildings and remove
spent fuel, and modifications to the common pool to which spent fuels in the spent fuelpools are to be transferred.
Long-term challenges include the reconstruction of primary containment boundaries,
extraction and storage of debris, management and disposal of radioactive waste, anddecommissioning.
“Advisory Committee on Mid- and Long-term Measures” of the Atomic Energy
Commission is currently discussing and putting together basic policies for efforts toaddress these mid- and long-term challenges and a set of research and development
issues that are expected to be useful and helpful in pursuing those efforts. This Advisory
Committee is identifying and sorting out technical challenges to be solved so that debris
can be removed from the reactor pressure vessels (RPV) and then put under control,using examples from the activities at Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island nuclear power
plant (hereinafter referred to as “TMI-2”) in the United States.
The Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS is in a difficult situation, including the facts that theplacement of debris is not known, that debris may have accumulated at the bottom of
the primary containment vessels (PCVs) due to damage to the RPV bottoms, unlike inthe case of the TMI-2 accident, and the fact that it has been determined that the water

23

Summary

injected to cool the RPVs has been flowing out of there into the PCVs, leaking from the
PCVs into the bottom part of the reactor buildings, and then further into the turbine
buildings from there. With this recognition, it has been decided that attention should befocused on identifying points of leakage of the cooling water and on figuring out theposition and nature of the fuel while enabling the circulation pathway for cooling the
RPVs to be shortened and debris to be handled, for which an accommodating
environment should be put in place. To achieve this, work is now underway to identify
technical challenges to be solved and corresponding research and development areas.
For example, the development of engineering and construction methods to locate theleakage points of the PCVs and then repairing them to stop water, thereby enabling the
PCVs to be filled with water after the construction of boundaries, has been identified as
one of these technical challenges. To achieve this, the development of robots for remote
inspection around the PCVs and for repairs, as well as the development of engineeringand construction methods for repairing assumed leakage points to prevent water fromescaping, etc. have been identified as among the research and development areas.

6㸬Situation regarding efforts to address lessons learned (28 items)
Japan is making its greatest possible efforts to address the 28 “lessons learned”
indicated in the June report. The state of progress among these items is not uniform,
with some items already having been fully implemented, others now in the process of
being implemented, and still others that are to be newly planned in the future. Japan will
prevent the recurrence of such an accident as this by addressing each item steadily andthoroughly based on the idea of “defense in depth,” which is the most important basic
principle in securing nuclear safety. In addition, while the NISA has given directions ofimmediate emergency measures to operators since March 30 based on the findings
about this accident as of the time point, it is contemplating that the contents which aresupposed to respond to each of the lessons need to be further reviewed based on
extensive knowledge in Japan and overseas from now on and be improved andreinforced.
Particularly, Japan aims to establish a new safety regulatory organization and systemby establishing Nuclear Safety and Security Agency (tentative name) by around next
April. As efforts to establish reinforced safety regulation under the new system and the24Summary

concrete responses to these “lessons learned” are closely related, they are to bepromoted through appropriate coordination.
Lessons in Category 1
Prevention of severe accidents(1) Strengthen measures against earthquakes and tsunamis
The tsunami damage that caused the recent nuclear accident was brought aboutbecause of inadequate preparedness against large tsunamis, including the failure toadequately envisage the frequency of occurrence and the height of tsunamis. This has
led preventive measures against tsunamis at nuclear power stations becoming one of the
top priorities.
In terms of measures against earthquakes and tsunamis, as noted in this report, thosemechanisms, etc. that caused the Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake andresulting tsunamis, triggering the Fukushima nuclear accident, are being studied indetail by such research institutes as the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization(JNES). Such recent findings are expected to serve as a basis for future preventive
measures against earthquakes and tsunamis at nuclear facilities.
In particular, measures against tsunamis are at the top of the agenda for Japan and on
June 26, 2011 the Central Disaster Management Council set out a basic policy for future
preventive measures against tsunamis, including those that assume the largest possible
tsunami and the most frequent tsunami. The NSC has undertaken and is pursuing
discussions on review of the NSC Regulatory Guides regarding earthquake and tsunami
considering the Council’s suggestions and the progress of discussions by Japan Societyof Civil Engineers etc.
In this context, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) has undertaken
discussions in terms of “defense in-depth,” of a design basis that assumes adequate
frequency of occurrence, with an adequate recurrence period taken into consideration,and height of tsunami; and of criteria for safety design of structures that allows for the
impact force of tsunami waves, etc.

25

Summary(2) Ensure power supplies
One of the significant factors of the accident was failure to ensure necessary power
supplies. Therefore NISA has requested nuclear plant operators to ensure concrete
power supplies, and the operators have already implemented the deployment of
power-supply vehicles which supply the requisite power for emergency reactor cooling,
the securing of emergency diesel generator capacity for a state of cold shutdown(sharing emergency power supplies with other units), countermeasures against flooding
for important equipment within a reactor building (sealing of areas of penetration anddoors, etc), and assessments of the degree of reliability of power grid.
Currently, nuclear plant operators are also taking measures such as the installation oflarge-sized air-cooled emergency diesel generators and air-cooled emergency gas
turbine generators, measures to improve the reliability of power supply based on theoutcome of the assessment of the reliability of the electrical systems (transmission line
enforcement,etc.),

tsunamiprotection

measuresfortheswitchyard,

etc.,

countermeasures against collapses of transmission line towers and seismic
reinforcement of switchyard equipment. In addition, the enhancement of battery
capacity and seismic reinforcement of fuel tanks for emergency diesel have beenplanned as future efforts.
(3) Ensure reliable cooling function of reactors and PCVs
Since the loss of the cooling functions of the reactors and the PCV led to aggravationof the accident, as specific countermeasures, the plant operators, under instructions fromNISA, deployed alternative/external water injection devices (pump tucks, fire engines,
hoses, coupling parts, etc), ensured the capacity of freshwater tanks, and arranged
feedwater lines that take water from the sea.
Currently, in order to bring the reactors to a state of cold shutdown as early as
possible, the operators are procuring seawater cooling pumps, spare parts for motors,
and temporary pumps which facilitate early restoration, as well as installing large-sized
air-cooled emergency generators to drive seawater cooling systems. Also, as future
efforts, they plan to make seismic reinforcements of large-sized freshwater tanks andother related efforts.
(4) Ensure reliable cooling functions of spent fuel pools
In the accident, the loss of power supplies led to failure of the cooling for the spent
fuel pool. The operators, under instructions from NISA, in order to maintain cooling of
the spent fuel pool even when power supplies had been lost, deployed26

Summary

alternative/external cooling water injection devices for the spent fuel pools (pump tucks,
fire engines, hoses, coupling parts, etc.), ensured the capacity of freshwater tanks, andarranged feedwater lines that take water from the sea.
Beyond this, they plan to undertake seismic reinforcement of the cooling piping system
for the spent fuel pool, etc. as future efforts.
(5) Thorough accident management (AM) measures
Since AM measures were found to be insufficient during the current accident,
hereafter efforts shall be implemented to ensure thorough enhancement of AM
measures.
The NSC has resumed discussions on upgrading the AM measures which had been
discontinued due to the accident of this time. Also, NISA developed an operationalsafety program and expanded/clarified the interpretation of technical standards
regarding emergency response procedures and so on which will enable the stablecooling of the reactor even should all AC power supply and all seawater cooling
functions be lost. Hereafter, it plans to implement the work to seek to legislate AM
measures based on the result of the examination undertaken by the NSC.
In addition, it plans to adopt a probabilistic safety assessment approach as it develops
more effective AM measures.
(6) Responses to multi-unit site issues
The accident revealed issues in the area of responses to accidents at sites having
multiple units, since the accidents occurred simultaneously in multiple reactors, anddevelopment of the accident at one reactor affected the emergency responses to theaccident in neighboring reactors. Thus the plant operators, under instructions fromNISA, developed for each reactor independent responsibility systems, systems for
accident responses, and procedures.
Hereafter, the measure to ensure the engineering independence of each reactor at sites
having more than one reactor are planned to be considered.
(7) Consideration of NPS arrangement in basic design
During the accident, response to the accident became difficult since the spent fuelstorage pools were located at a higher part of the reactor building. In addition, situations
arose in which contaminated water from the reactor buildings reached the turbine
buildings, meaning that the spread of contaminated water to other buildings was notprevented. Accordingly, sufficient consideration of an adequate layout for the facilities

27

Summaryand buildings of NPSs is required at the stage of basic design for new construction, andthe embodiment of those considerations is being planned.
(8) Ensuring the water tightness of essential equipment and facilities
During the accident, a substantial amount of essential equipment and facilities were
flooded due to the tsunamis, impeding the ability to ensure power supply and coolingwater. Thus, ensuring the water tightness of essential equipment and facilities even in
the case of a massive tsunami is important. The operators, under instructions from NISA,
took countermeasures against flood damage to important equipment within the reactor
buildings (sealing of penetrations, doors, etc). Currently, the operators are reinforcing
the water tightness of the reactor buildings and installing watertight doors and so on.
Lesssons in Category 2Countermeasures against severe accidents(9) Enhancement of measures to prevent hydrogen explosions
During this accident, the accident was aggravated by hydrogen explosions.
Therefore, enhancement of countermeasures against hydrogen explosions, including
measures pertaining to reactor buildings, became an important issue.
For boiling water reactors (BWRs), the operators, under instructions from NISA, as
countermeasures against hydrogen leakage into reactor buildings will install exhaust
ports by making a hole in the roof of each reactor building, and conducts arrangements
for implementing this work. Also, as mid- to long-term efforts, the installation ofhydrogen vents atop reactor building and of hydrogen detectors in reactor buildings areplanned.
For pressurized water reactors (PWRs), the operators, under instructions from NISA,
confirmed that hydrogen leaked from a PCV into the annulus is reliably vented to theoutside of the annulus by the already installed annulus exhaust system. Also, as mid- tolong-term efforts into the future, the installation of equipment to decrease concentrationof hydrogen in PCVs, including passive catalytic hydrogen recombiners requiring no
power supply, is planned. For reactors with ice condenser type PCVs, it has been
confirmed that hydrogen leaked into the PCV is reliably treated by the already installed
igniters (hydrogen burning equipment). This includes confirmation of the operability of
the igniter using a power supply from power-supply vehicles, should all AC power
supplies be lost.

28

Summary(10) Enhancement of the containment venting systems
In this accident, problems arose in the operability of the containment venting system
for severe accident as well as its functioning in the removal of radioactive materials.
Under instructions from NISA, as initial measures, the plant operators installed
standby accumulators for air valves, which enable operation of valves in vent lines evenshould AC power supplies be lost, as well as transportable compressors and other such
equipment.
Also, in addition to these initial measures, further efforts in future will be madetowards enhancing the PCV vent system by extensively considering technical expertisein Japan and overseas, including enhancement for the radioactive material removal
function.
(11) Improvements to the accident response environment
At the time of this accident, as the radiation dose in the main control room increased,
the situations that the operating staffs were unable to enter the main room temporarily,
etc. posed problems for accident response activities in various situations.
Under instructions from NISA, the plant operators have taken steps to ensure on-sitecommunication tools (a power supply for on-site PHS communication facilities,
transceivers) a portable lighting system, and means of securing a work environment in
the main control room (a power supply by power-supply vehicles to the ventilation andair conditioning systems), etc.
Also, along with implementing measures such as the transfer of on-site PHS facilities,
etc. to higher ground, there are now plans to enhance functions at emergency stations,seismically reinforce office buildings, and so on.
(12) Enhancement of the radiation exposure management system at the time of theaccident
In this accident, adequate radiation management became difficult as the radiationdose increased within the NPS due to the release of radioactive materials. Given thisbackground, under instructions from NISA, the operators deployed the protective
clothing against high radiation doses necessary for the early stages of an accident at
NPSs, arranged mutual cooperation among operators for protective clothing againsthigh radiation doses, personal dosimeters, full-face masks, and other such equipment,
developed a system by which radiation control staff could focus on important operations
to ensure radiation control in emergencies, improved employee training for radiation
control in emergencies, and other such improvements.

29

Summary(13) Enhancement of training for responding to severe accidents
Effective training for responding to severe accidents has not sufficiently implemented
in the past. Moreover, in this accident, had training been implemented before theaccident, more adequate actions could have been conducted.
Therefore, under instructions from NISA, in April the plant operators conductedemergency response training at NPSs witnessed by government staff to prepare workers
for a loss of all AC power supplies, a loss of seawater cooling functions, tsunami strikes
and other such emergent situations.
The government will also request the operators to implement nuclear emergency
drills to prepare for the occurrence of severe accidents and their prolongation andescalation caused by primary coolant pipe breaks or other such accidents. Additionally,
the government is also examining hands-on nuclear disaster prevention drills which
simulate severe accidents that coincide with complex disasters as happened in this
accident, and plans to engage in support and cooperation such as necessary advice forthe drills performed by local authorities.
(14) Enhancement of instrumentation for reactors and PCVs
In this accident, under the severe accident conditions, the instrumentation of thereactors and PCVs failed to function sufficiently, and it was difficult to adequately
obtain information on the water levels in the reactors and other information that wasnecessary for responding to the accident.
Consequently plans are being made for the development and preparation of
instrumentation of reactors, PCVs, spent fuel pools, etc. to enable adequate functioning
even under severe accident conditions.
(15) Central control of emergency supplies and setting up of rescue teams
Shortly after the accident, under the damage conditions caused by the earthquake andtsunamis, the securing of emergency response equipment and the mobilization of rescue
teams to support accident control activities were not performed sufficiently.
Therefore, under instructions from NISA, the plant operators have been engaged in
the establishment and management of emergency response equipment (power-supply
vehicles, pump trucks) and the creation of implementation forces to operate such
equipment. They are also arranging and then preparing for common use among plant
operators of masks, protective clothing, and the like to provide protection during work30

Summary

with heavy machinery to dispose of rubble or work having high radiation doses, andotherwise developing systems for mutual cooperation.
Plans are also being made for the preparation of emergency response equipment,
including robots, unmanned helicopter drones, heavy machinery, decontaminationequipment and accident progression prediction systems, as well as for the enhancementof capacity building through training of Self-Defense Forces, police, firefighters, theJapan Coast Guard, and other key personnel.
Additionally, under the new safety regulatory organization, the system for responding tocrisis management will be enhanced through the establishment of staff specializing in
responding to emergency conditions.
Lessons in Category 3
Responses to nuclear emergencies(16) Response to a combined situation of massive natural disaster and nuclear
emergency
This time a massive natural disaster was followed by a nuclear accident to produce acomplex disaster. Also, the prolonged nuclear accident caused difficulties in securingmeans of communication and of procurement as well as in the mobilization of the fullrange of support personnel for the accident and disaster response.
Therefore, off-site centers have been reinforced by deploying satellite phones,
emergency power supplies and reserves of goods. Deploying alternative materials andequipment is also planned so that alternative facilities may be utilized immediately even
if the situation necessitates relocating the function of an off-site center. Moreover,regarding the response to a complex disaster, a review of the full readiness andchain-of-command structure will be made across ministries and agencies.
(17) Reinforcement of environmental monitoring
During the initial stages of this accident, appropriate environmental monitoring
became impossible due to damage to local authorities’ monitoring equipment andfacilities caused by the earthquake and tsunami.
The “Monitoring Coordination Meeting” has therefore been established within thegovernment for the coordination of, and smooth implementation of, environmental
monitoring conducted by ministries and agencies, local authorities and TEPCO. The“Comprehensive Monitoring Plan” was developed as an initiative for the immediate
future. Based on this Plan, related organizations are engaged in partnership in31

Summarymonitoring by aircraft, monitoring of sea areas and radiation monitoring with a view tofacilitating the lifting of restrictions on Emergency Evacuation-Prepared Areas, among
other endeavors, and preparation of cumulative dose estimation maps and maps
indicating the distribution of radiation doses, etc. Also, in an emergency, thegovernment will take responsibility for establishing the system of performing
environmental monitoring surely and deliberately, and it will have the new safety
regulation organization play a commanding role in environmental monitoring.
(18) Clarification of the allotment of roles between central and local organizations
In the initial stages of the accident, communication and cooperation between thecentral and local governments as well as between various relevant organizations were
not achieved to a sufficient degree, due to the difficulty in securing means ofcommunication and also due to the fact that the roles and responsibilities of each side
were not always clearly defined.
Therefore in responding to the current accident, local bases to respond to the accident
were established by utilizing J Village and the Onahama Coal Center. Central
organizations to coordinate response activities were also established, including theGovernment-TEPCO Integrated Response Office, the sufferers’ livelihood support teamand the Office of Response to Radioactive Materials Contamination.
Hereafter, roles and responsibilities of relevant organizations including the GNER
HQ will be reviewed to enable prompt and appropriate responses, and measures will betaken to amend Acts and revise manuals when necessary. Also, communication systems,
including communication tools and channels, will be reviewed in order to enable thedelivery of information quickly and with certainty. Furthermore, as for the videoconference system used at the time of nuclear disaster, it is planned to interconnect
relevant governmental organizations, all electric power companies and NPSs to ensure
quick and adequate instruction and information collection in emergency situations.
(19) Enhancement of communication regarding the accident
Especially immediately after this accident, actions were not sufficiently taken toprovide local residents with information or easily-understood explanations about
radiation, radioactive materials, or information on future outlooks on risk factors.
Therefore, a “one-stop counseling service”was established to provide consultation
services to local residents, especially residents of Fukushima Prefecture, on the situation
regarding the accident, radiation’s impact on health and other matters. Also, as for thedisclosure of information to the citizens, jointly-held regular press conferences and32Summary

other opportunities have been conducted by relevant organizations such as NISA andthe NSC.
Based on the disclosure of information regarding the Fukushima NPS accident and on
the experience of communicating in the contexts of various domestic and foreign
disasters as well, it is planned to examine ways of disclosing and providing information
during significant NPS accidents, to develop a basic manual, and to provide educationand training on that basis to relevant organizations regarding information disclosure andprovision.
(20) Enhancement of responses to assistance from other countries and communication to
the international community
After the accident, the government could not promptly respond to offers of assistancefrom other countries around the world (e.g., offers to supply equipment). Initiallyinformation was not always fully shared in advance especially with neighboring
countries.
In light of this, in order to immediately notify neighboring countries in the case of an
accident, contact points for each neighboring country have been specified. The list ofcontact points will be updated, as appropriate, to ensure the quick and accurate
provision of information to the international community.
The system for international responses to an accident will be improved as part of
implementing the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, including the development oflists of equipment effective for accident responses and methods for international
information sharing, including through international notifications. Japan will actively
contribute to such international efforts.
(21) Accurate understanding and prediction of the effect of released radioactive
materials
In this accident, the use of the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency
Dose Information (SPEEDI) and disclosure of its calculation results, etc. were notproperly conducted.
Against this background, since April the government has been disclosing the
calculation results of SPEEDI. Since June, the government has also been using SPEEDI
for environmental impact assessment after opening the reactor buildings of the
Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS as well as for estimating external radiation exposure toresidents to supplement the monitoring data that were not sufficiently collected during

33

Summary

the early stages of the accident. The results of such evaluations have been disclosed
without delay.
In future, the new safety regulation organization will serve as a control center forenvironmental monitoring, including the operation of SPEEDI, and more effective waysof utilizing SPEEDI will be considered in that context.
(22) Clear definition of the criteria for wide-area evacuations and radiological protection
standards in nuclear emergencies
Criteria for specific nuclear emergency response actions, etc. were not well prepared
before the accident, especially for wide-area evacuation and radiological protection
associated with a prolonged accident.
Moreover, relevant organizations will promote examination the standard of radiologicalprotection, etc. on the basis of this accident. Moreover, the NSC started reviewing “TheRegulatory Guide for Emergency Preparedness of Nuclear Facilities”, including thedefinition of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ).
Japan will make efforts to reflect the Fukushima experience of accident responses
within the review of the standards of International Commission on RadiologicalProtection (ICRP) and the IAEA standards for nuclear emergency preparedness andradiological protection.
Lessons in Category 4
Enhancement of safety infrastructure(23)
Enhancement of safety regulatory and administrative systems
Due to the unification of administrative organizations over the utilization andregulation of nuclear power and the non-centralized administrative organizations for
ensuring nuclear safety, it was unclear until recently which organization has primary
responsibility for disaster prevention and the protection of public safety. Reviews ofsuch bodies and the enhancement of nuclear regulatory bodies need to be done
promptly.
Therefore, the Japanese Government decided on the “Basic Concept of Structural
Reform of Nuclear Safety Regulations” at the Cabinet Meeting of August 15 this year
and decided on the launch of a new safety regulatory body. Specifically, consideringinternational discussions in the past, and on the basis of the principle of “separating
regulation from utilization,” the nuclear safety regulatory divisions of NISA will beseparated from the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, with “Nuclear Safety and34Summary

Security Agency (tentative name)” aimed to be established by April 2012 as an external
agency of the Ministry of Environment by integrating into it the functions of the NSC.
For this purpose, the capabilities of this regulatory body will be enhanced bycentralizing nuclear safety regulatory activities, a dedicated risk management division
will be established to enable this Nuclear Safety and Security Agency to take quick
initial responses, and efforts will be made to recruit highly qualified personnel fromboth the public and private sectors to adequately execute the regulatory activities. In
addition, a “Task Force for the Reform of Nuclear Safety Regulations andOrganizations” was established on August 26 for the preparation of the bill necessary toestablish the new organization.
(24) Establishment and reinforcement of legal frameworks, standards and guidelines
The accident raised a wide range of issues regarding the establishment of legal
frameworks and related standards and guidelines regarding nuclear safety and nuclear
emergency preparedness. There will also be many issues that should be reflected within
the IAEA’s standards and guidelines in light of the experiences of the accident.
Reflecting this, a revision of the legal framework, standards, and so on with regard tonuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness is scheduled, based on knowledge
learned from the accident, including the introduction of a new safety regulatory
framework (e.g., backfitting), the enhancement of safety standards and the streamliningof complicated nuclear safety regulatory and legislative systems. Furthermore, adetailed evaluation of the basic designs of nuclear reactors, etc. and review of therelationship between reactor types and the causes of the accident will be carried out, andthe safety and reliability of existing reactors will be evaluated on the basis oftechnological progress in nuclear reactor design and comparisons with the latest
technologies.
Furthermore, the Japanese Government will actively provide its experience andknowledge from the accident to contribute to a review of the IAEA’s standards andguidelines.
(25) Human resources for nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness andresponses
The accident re-emphasized the vital importance of developing human resources in
the fields of nuclear safety and nuclear emergency preparedness in order to respond toan accident similar to the Fukushima accident.

35Summary

Therefore, the new safety regulatory body will have among its basic policies securingpersonnel who are highly qualified with regard to regulatory matters through reinforced
training. This body will also deliberate the establishment of an International Nuclear
Safety Training Institute (tentative name), as a research institute that will seek toimprove the quality of its human resources and engage in international cooperation.
Also, through further promoting activities of “Japan Nuclear Human Resource
Development
Network”
establishedincooperation
among
industry-academic-government related organizations, , etc., this body will work toadvance the reinforcement of human resources development in such fields such as
nuclear safety, nuclear emergency preparedness, risk management and radiation
medicine.
(26) Ensuring the independence and diversity of safety systems
With regards to ensuring the reliability of safety systems, insufficient consideration
was given to approaches that would avoid multiple malfunctions all having a common
cause in having been triggered by the earthquake and tsunamis, etc. Furthermore,
independence and diversity were not achieved to a sufficient degree.
In response to this situation, there are plans to respond appropriately to multiple
malfunctions having a common cause, to attain further enhancement of the reliability ofsafety functions such as in ensuring the independence and diversity of types, storing
locations, and other aspects of emergency power generators and seawater coolingsystems and to strengthen ensuring the independence and diversity of safety systems.
(27) Effective use of probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) in risk management
PSA has not always been effectively utilized in the overall reviewing risk reduction
efforts at nuclear power facilities.
Therefore, NISA and the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES) are now
engaged in deliberations of revisions to legislation and standards, etc., on the premise of
the utilization of PSA. Also, regarding the Tsunami PSA, the Japan Atomic Energy
Society is preparing to make a guideline.
In addition, there are now plans to formulate improvements to safety measures,
including effective accident management measures, based on PSA.

36

Summary

Lessons in Category 5
Thoroughly instill a safety culture(28) Thoroughly instill a safety culture
Thoroughness in safety culture, which is the foundation of nuclear safety, has beenstrongly recognized anew through this accident.
Because of this, various responses to this accident will be reviewed carefully and Japanis working to rebuild the attitude in which both nuclear plant operators and individuals
involved in safety regulation sincerely pursue new knowledge, both as organizations
and individuals.
For those engaged in nuclear safety, it is a starting point, an obligation, and a
responsibility for each organization and individual to firmly acquire a culture of nuclear
safety. The fact that continuous improvement in nuclear safety is impossible when asafety culture is lacking, is being positioned as the starting point for Japan’s ensuringsafety in the future. This will be confirmed anew in various forms and will be brought
into being.

7. Situation on deliberation to enhance standards etc
The NSC has been presenting various advice and basic policies based on the views
indicated by the IAEA and the ICRP. Specifically, “Near-term policy to ensure thesafety for treating and disposing contaminated waste around the site of Fukushima
Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station of Tokyo Electric Power Company”, “Basic Policy of
the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan on Radiation Protection for Termination of
Evacuation and Reconstruction”, “Basic Policy on Radiation Monitoring from Now on”,
and “Standpoint of the Nuclear Safety Commission for the Termination of Urgent
Protective Actions implemented for the Accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power
Plant” , etc. have been presented as basic policies and directions related to radiation
protection measures to restore from the accident and to facilitate subsequent
reconstruction.
In light of the recent accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, the NSC has also
started reviewing the NSC Regulatory Guides, such as the “Regulatory Guide for
Reviewing Safety Design of Light Water Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities” and37

Summary“Regulatory Guide for Emergency Preparedness of Nuclear Facilities”, and has
furthermore resumed to enhance severe accident countermeasures.
The Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) has started deliberating a review ofsafety standards and other matters. Also, NISA and the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety
Organization (JNES) have started analyzing the 28 lessons learned through the June
report, have proposed a review of the Guide for Seismic Design of Nuclear Facilities(NS-G-1.6) and Siting Guidelines (DS433) by the IAEA, etc., and also have worked toorganize a Safety Report and Technical Document having concrete cases to which thoseguidelines were applied, etc. with the cooperation of the International Seismic Safety
Center of the IAEA.

8. Further Safety Assessment Efforts for NPSs
On July 11, 2011, aiming to further improve safety at NPSs and ensure security andconfidence of the public and local residents in terms of nuclear safety, the Japanese
government decided to implement safety assessments based on new procedures andrules, basically by making use of international knowledge and experiences of stress tests,
particularly those implemented in European countries.
More specifically, those NPSs that have undergone regular inspection and areprepared to start up will sequentially undergo safety assessments in terms of the degree
to which safety margins are secured against beyond-design-basis events for facilities
and equipment important to safety (preliminary assessments). In addition, all existing
nuclear power stations including those in operation and those examined through thispreliminary assessment will also undergo comprehensive assessments (secondary
assessments), in consideration of the implementation of stress tests in Europe and theprogress of the discussions by the Investigation Committee on the Accident at the
Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations.

9. Conclusion
Approximately half a year has passed since the accident occurred at the Tokyo
Electric Power Co. (TEPCO) Fukushima Nuclear Power Station. This nuclear accident

38

Summarycaused by an earthquake and tsunamis is a massive accident unprecedented in Japan orabroad insofar as severe accidents occurred simultaneously at multiple units, that theaccident has affected an extensive range in its surrounding area, and that it has been
taking a long time to achieve restoration from the accident.
In Japan, related organizations such as the plant operator, the central government andlocal authorities, including the workers on the site, have been tackling this accident
together. While progress has steadily been made with regard to restoration from theaccident, such as stable cooling of the reactors and the spent fuel pools, it is far fromeasy to complete the restoration from the accident, dispose of the radioactive materials
and the spent fuel thereafter and proceed with decommissioning of the nuclear reactors.
Also, it is necessary to advance the efforts while listening carefully to the voices of thelocal people when responding to those who suffered as a result of the nuclear accident,
including such responses as environmental monitoring and decontamination.
In this second report, the responses taken immediately after the occurrence of theaccident at the Fukushima NPS and elsewhere have also been described in greater
details. Moreover, it has described a situation in which the station employees andworkers at the site, as well as personnel in related organizations, have been working
hard in a severe environment that includes damage by an earthquake and by tsunamis,the impact of rubble, and the impact of debris scattered as a result of the hydrogen
explosions. The Government of Japan is determined to continue its utmost efforts to
support the health management and other aspects of the people engaged in this work.
Japan has received a wide array of support from countries around the world, related
international organizations, and others to date. Japan would like to express its deepest
gratitude once more while also requesting continued support.
Japan is confident that it will overcome this accident without fail by mobilizing
wisdom and efforts from around the world.

39

Summary

Onagawa NPS

Fukushima Dai-ichi

Fukushima Dai-ni NPSTokai Dai-ni NPS

Location of NPSs affected by the Tohoku District - off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake40
⥺㔞⋡䠄䃛䠯䡒䠋䡄䠅

41

㻜

㻞㻜㻜㻜

㻠㻜㻜㻜

㻢㻜㻜㻜

㻤㻜㻜㻜

㻝㻜㻜㻜㻜

㻝㻞㻜㻜㻜

㻟㻛㻝㻝

㻟㻛㻝㻟

㻟㻛㻝㻠

㻟㻛㻝㻡

㻟㻛㻝㻢

㻟㻛㻝㻣

᪥᫬
Date

㻟㻛㻝㻤

㻟㻛㻝㻥

㻟㻛㻞㻜

㻟㻛㻞㻝

㻟㻛㻞㻞

㻟㻛㻞㻟

Transportable
MP (West Gate)ྍᦙ㻹㻼䠄す㛛䠅Transportable
MP (Main Gate)ྍᦙ㻹㻼䠄ṇ㛛䠅Northside of main office building
஦ົᮏ㤋໭

MP-5
(near West Gate)㻹㻼㻙㻡䠄す㛛௜㏆䠅

Near
Gymnasium
య⫱㤋⬥

Near
Main Gate
ṇ㛛௜㏆

Near
MP-4
㻹㻼㻙㻠௜㏆

Measurement Results of Dose Rates by Monitoring Car at Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS㻟㻛㻝㻞March 14, 11:01 Explosion at Unit 3 building㻟㻛㻝㻠㻌㻝㻝㻦㻜㻝㻌䠏ྕᶵᘓᒇ⇿Ⓨ
March 15, from 16:05 Venting at Unit 3㻟㻛㻝㻡㻌㻝㻢㻦㻜㻡䡚㻌䠏ྕᶵ䝧䞁䝖

March 13, from 12:30 Venting at Unit 3㻟㻛㻝㻟㻌㻝㻞㻦㻟㻜䡚㻌䠏ྕᶵ䝧䞁䝖March
14, from 05:20 Venting at Unit 3㻟㻛㻝㻠㻌㻡㻦㻞㻜䡚㻌䠏ྕᶵ䝧䞁䝖

March 13, 09:10–09:24 Venting at Unit 3㻟㻛㻝㻟㻌㻥㻦㻝㻜䡚㻥㻦㻞㻠㻌䠏ྕᶵ䝧䞁䝖March
12, 15:36, Explosion at Unit 1 building㻟㻛㻝㻞㻌㻝㻡㻦㻟㻢㻌䠍ྕᶵᘓᒇ⇿ⓎMarch
12, from 14:30 Venting at Unit 1㻟㻛㻝㻞㻌㻝㻠㻦㻟㻜䡚㻌䠍ྕᶵ䝧䞁䝖

Changes in Dose
Rates at Fukushima Dai--  
⚟ᓥ➨୍䚷⥺㔞⋡᥎⛣䚷䠄䝰䝙䝍䝸䞁䜾䜹䞊䠅㻟㻛㻞㻠

SummarySummary

Resricted Area, Deliberate Evacuation Area, Evacuation-Prepared Area in case of Emergency
And Evacuation Recommendation Spots (As of August 3, 2011)42

Air Dose Rate Map Soil Concentration Map of Cs--137

43

SummarySummary

Status of Units 1, 2 and 3 of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS(As of August 27)
Unit

Unit 1

Unit 2

Unit 3

Status of water
injection to thereactor
Reactor Water Level

Fresh water feeding by feedwater system
Flow rate: 3.7m³/h

Fresh water feeding by feedwater system
Flow rate: 3.6m³/h

Fresh water feeding by feedwater system
Flow rate: 7.0m³/h

Fuel range A: Downscale
Fuel range B: -1,700mm

Fuel range A: -1,850mm*
Fuel range B: -2,200mm*

Fuel range A: -1,550mm*
Fuel range B: -2,000mm*

Reactor Pressure

0.017 MPa g(A)- MPa g(B)0.013 MPa g(A)- MPa g(B)0.080 MPa g(A)0.001 MPa g(B)Temperature aroundthe reactor vessel

Temperature in feed-water
nozzle: 92.2 ºC
Temperature at reactor vessel
bottom: 87.7 ºC

Temperature in feed-water
nozzle: 106.9 ºC
Temperature at reactor vessel
bottom: 115.0 ºC

Temperature in feed-water
nozzle: 113.9 ºC
Temperature at reactor vessel
bottom: 108.8 ºC

Pressure in D/W,
S/C
Status

D/W: 0.1275 MPa abs
S/C: 0.105 MPa abs

D/W: 0.114 MPa abs
S/C: Downscale

D/W: 0.1015 MPa abs
S/C: 0.1817 MPa abs

Each plant receives electricity from external power supplies. The process is carried on ensuring
reliability of cooling function by installing temporary emergency diesel generators and theseawater pump etc.

!" #$%#""&!'()#* +  #,

44

㻞㻜㻜

*Injecting water via Feed Water line and Core Spray line

concentration

apparatus

facilityhasutilizing

been

the

injection into the reactors.

reinforced (Oct. 9), that will enable㻌 more stable water

evaporation

processing
㻣㻛㻞

㻣㻛㻝㻣

㻤㻛㻝

㻤㻛㻝㻢

㻤㻛㻟㻝

㻻㻼㻟㻘㻜㻜㻜

㻥㻛㻝㻡

㻥㻛㻟㻜

Ty phoon (Sep. 22)

㻝㻜㻛㻝㻡U3㼀 T/B
B1 WL㻟ྕ㻛㻮㻌㻮㻝Ỉ
఩㼇㼙 㼙 㼉 [m m]

SAR RY beg an o perat io n (Aug .19 )U2 㼀T/B
B 1 WL㻞ྕ㻛㻮㻌㻮㻝Ỉ
఩
㼇㼙
[m㼙
m]㼉

Control of Accumulated water in Turbine Building

Wa ter proce ssing fa cility be gan
op eration (Ju n.17 )

㻞㻤㻜㻜
㻢㻛㻝㻣

㻟㻜㻜㻜

at the present target level of O.P 3,000.

desalination㻟㻞㻜㻜of Oct. 13). The accumulated water level is being kept

z The

㻟㻠㻜㻜

z Approx. 128,140 tons have been processed in total (as

㻟㻤㻜㻜

㻠㻜㻜㻜

T/ B B1
Wa ter Le ve(WL)
䠷mm ]

㻟㻢㻜㻜

[Issue (3) Accumulated water]: Processing
accumulated water at a level where it is able towithstand heavy rains as well as long-term facility
outages

approx.3.7m3/h for Unit 1, approx. 10.4m3/h for Unit 2*, approx. 10.2m3/h for Unit 3*(as of Oct.15).

z Currently, water injection towards achieving cold shutdown is being implemented at the volume ofstabilize below 100 䉝.

injection volume on a trial basis, it has been verified that Unit 2’s RPV bottom temperature canz The RPV bottom temperatures of Units 1 and 3 have stabilized below 100 䉝. By changing the water[Issue (1) Reactors]: Water injection towards achieving 䇾a cold shutdown condition䇿

3. Summary of the past one month and future plans (major changes)

z The total volume of accumulated water is kept to alevel that is able to withstand heavy rains and㻝㻡㻜long-term processing facility outages, and the㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻞㻞ྕᶵcirculating water cooling is ongoing towards㻝㻜㻜㻝ྕᶵ㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻝
achieving “cold shutdown condition.”㼁㼚㼕㼠㻌㻟
㻟ྕᶵz RPV bottom temperature was 74 䉝 for Unit 1,㻡㻜
83 䉝 for Unit 2 and 73 䉝 for Unit 3 (as of Oct. 15),
having reached below 100 䉝.
㻜
㻣㻛㻝㻣
㻤㻛㻝㻣
㻥㻛㻝㻣
㻝㻜㻛㻝㻤
z The current release rate of radioactive materials
from the PCVs is estimated to be approx. 0.1 billion
Bq/h (provisional figure.) The radiation exposure at the site boundaries due to this release is assessed
at 0.2 mSv / year at the maximum (provisional figure.)z Ensure a “cold shutdown condition” by carefully assessing the RPV bottom temperatures, current
release rate of radioactive materials from PCVs together with the radiation exposure due to thisrelease and the securement of the mid-term safety of the circulating cooling system.
z Hereafter, the start of the water shielding wall construction and the completion of the Unit 1 reactor
building cover are scheduled.
Reactor building

0.07billion Bq/hr

At the sea area

Upper part of the Unit 2 R/Bz NISA released “Policy on the mid and long term security” (Oct. 3).
z The Utility reported on the operating plan as well as safety assessment regarding the circulating watercooling system (Oct. 17). Other systems, etc. shall be reported on as well in a rapid manner.

[Action plan for mid-term issues] Released 䇾Policy on the mid and long term security䇿

z Internal exposures are being measured once a month with the expansion of the Whole Body
Counters (twelve units in total).
z Ordinance on Prevention of Ionizing Radiation Hazards has been amended, requiring Utilities toreport records of exposure dose for long-term health care. The guideline stating the implementationof the inspection according to the exposure amount has been released (Oct. 11).

[Issue (9) Radiation control/medical care]: Improved Health Care for workers

being prepared in a rapid manner. Currently, pre-monitoring is being implemented at a part of the area.

z A decontamination model project focused on the Deliberate Evacuation Area and the Restricted Area isreduction tendency of the release rate due to the mitigation countermeasures.

parts of the reactor buildings and in the surrounding area (land and sea), thus grasping thez Continuously implement the measurements of airborne radioactivity concentration at the upper

Nuclear station boundaryLess thandictation limit

Unit1䠖0.04billion Bq/hr
Unit2䠖0.01billion Bq/hr
Unit3䠖0.04billion Bq/hr

At the upper parts of the reactor buildings

㻌Results of the current
release rate

At the west side of the boundary

Upper part of the Unit 1 R/B䞉The radiation exposure per year at the site boundaries is assessed at approx. 0.2 mSv / year at the
maximum (provisional figure) based on the aforementioned release rate (The target is 1 mSv /year. Excluding the effect of the radioactive materials already released until now).

z Comprehensively estimate the current release rate from the PCVs of Units 1-3 based on the airborne
radioactivity concentration (dust concentration) at the upper parts of the reactor buildings and insurrounding area (land and sea).
䞉The current total release rate from Units 1-3 based on the assessment this time is estimated at
approx. 0.1 billion Bq/h at the maximum (provisional figure), which is 1/8,000,000 of that at thetime of the accident.

[Issue (6) Measurement, Reduction and Disclosure]: Estimated the amount of radioactive
materials currently released from the PCVsz Installation work of the PCV gas control system has begun (Unit 1-Oct. 7, Unit 2-Oct. 10, Unit 3-Sep. 30.)

begun (Sep.21).

z Following the Unit 3 (Sep.10), debris removal at the upper part of the Unit 4 reactor building has

z Aim to achieve within the year. As for [Issue (2) Spent fuel pools], [Issue (3) Accumulated water] and[Issue (7) Tsunami, Reinforcement, etc.], the Step 2
RPV Bottom Temperatures䉝targets have already been achieved.

z The Unit 1 reactor building cover will be completed by around the end of October.

2. Targets and achievement date, etc.

[Issue (5) Atmosphere/Soil]: Completing soon the Unit 1 reactor building coverfrom around the end of October.

z Basic design of the water shielding wall has been completed (Aug.31) Construction work will begin[Step 2: Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down]

By bringing the reactors and the spent fuel pools to a stable cooling condition and mitigating therelease of radioactive materials, we will make every effort to enable evacuees to return to their homes
and for all citizens to be able to secure a sound life.

[Issue (4) Groundwater]: Beginning soon construction work of the water shielding wall

Summary of Progress Status of 䇾Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO䇿

1. Basic policy (no change)

Appendix 1
October 17, 2011
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Government-TEPCO Integrated Response OfficeAppendix 2“Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO”

October 17th, 2011
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Government-TEPCO Integrated Response OfficeI. Cooling ................................................................................................................................... - 1 (1) Reactor................................................................................................................................. - 1 1. Target for Step 2 “Cold Shutdown Condition”................................................................. - 1 2. Current status and work implemented ........................................................................... - 1 Ԙ Additional water injection line for more effective cooling [Countermeasures 12, 14, 45]- 1 ԙ Installation of centralized monitoring system in the Main Anti-Earthquake Building[Countermeasures 12,14,45] .............................................................................................. - 2 (2) Spent Fuel Pool.................................................................................................................... - 4 1. Target for Step 2 “More stable cooling” ........................................................................... - 4 2. Current status and work implemented ........................................................................... - 4 Ԙ Current status of Spent Fuel Pool ................................................................................. - 4 ԙ Operation of Unit 4 desalination facility (Aug. 20) [Countermeasures 25, 27] .............................. - 4 II. Mitigation ............................................................................................................................... - 5 (3) Accumulated Water .............................................................................................................. - 5 1. Target for Step 2 “Reducing the total amount of accumulated water”........................... - 5 2. Current status and work implemented ........................................................................... - 5 Ԙ Status of the accumulated water processing................................................................. - 5 ԙ

Implemented reliability enhancement countermeasures towards stable processing[Countermeasure 43].......................................................................................................... - 5 ԚCompleted augmenting desalination processing facility [Countermeasure 43] ............... - 5 ԛ Storage/management of sludge waste, etc. [Countermeasure 81]................................ - 6 Ԝ Securing storage [Countermeasure 42] ........................................................................ - 6 ԝ Prevent contamination in the ocean [Countermeasure 64] ........................................... - 7 (4) Groundwater ........................................................................................................................ - 8 1. Target for Step 2 “Mitigating contamination in the ocean”............................................ - 8 2. Current status and work implemented ........................................................................... - 8 ԘConsideration of water shielding wall [Countermeasure 68] ........................................... - 8 ԙ Implementation of prevention against expansion of contamination in groundwater[Countermeasure 67].......................................................................................................... - 9 (5) Atmosphere/Soil ................................................................................................................. - 10 1. Target for Step 2 “Mitigating dispersion of radioactive materials”.............................. - 10 2. Current status and work implemented ......................................................................... - 10 ԘInstallation of the Unit 1 reactor building cover [Countermeasures 54, 55] ................... - 10 ԙ Removal of debris at the upper part of the reactor buildings (Units 3 and 4)[Countermeasure 84]........................................................................................................ - 10 Ԛ Removal and management of debris [Countermeasures 53, 84, 87] ...........................- 11 ԛ Installation of PCV gas control system [Countermeasure 86] ..................................... - 12 III㧚Monitoring and decontamination ....................................................................................... - 13 -㫀㩷(6) Measurement, reduction, disclosure .................................................................................. - 13 1. Target for Step 2 “Sufficient reduction of radiation dose” ............................................ - 13 2㧚Current status and work implemented........................................................................ - 13 Ԙ Evaluated the amount of radioactive materials currently released from PCVs
[Countermeasures 60, 61] ................................................................................................ - 13 ԙJoint monitoring by the central government, prefectures, municipalities and the operator[Countermeasure 62]........................................................................................................ - 15 ԚConsideration and commencement of full-scale decontamination [Countermeasure 63]- 18
IV. Countermeasures against aftershocks, etc......................................................................... - 20 (7) Tsunami and reinforcement, etc. ........................................................................................ - 20 1. Target for Step 2 “Mitigation of further disasters” ....................................................... - 20 2. Current status and work implemented ......................................................................... - 20 Ԙ Implementation of seismic resistance evaluation for each unit [Countermeasure 71] . - 20 V㧚Environment improvement................................................................................................. - 21 (8) Living/ working environment............................................................................................... - 21 1. Target for Step 2 “Enhancement of Environment Improvement” ................................ - 21 2. Current status and work implemented ......................................................................... - 21 Ԙ Expansion status of temporary dormitories [Countermeasure 75]..................................... - 21 ԙ Establishment status of on-site rest stations [Countermeasure 75].................................... - 21 (9)Radiation Control/Medical Care .......................................................................................... - 22 1. Target for Step 2 “Enhancement of Healthcare”........................................................... - 22 2. Current status and work implemented ......................................................................... - 22 Ԙ Expansion of whole body counters (WBC) [Countermeasure 78] ............................... - 22 ԙ Written notification of exposure dose etc. [Countermeasure 78] ................................. - 22 Ԛ Consideration for long-term healthcare such as establishing a database [Countermeasure78] - 22 ԛ Continuous reinforcement of medical system [Countermeasure 80] ................................... - 22 (10) Staff training/personnel allocation..................................................................................... - 24 1. Target for Step 2 “Systematic staff training and personnel allocation”....................... - 24 2. Current status and work implemented ......................................................................... - 24 Ԙ Promote staff training, etc. in conjunction with the government and utility operators in order
to train and allocate staffs systematically. [Countermeasure 85] ...................................... - 24 VI. Action plan for mid-term issues .......................................................................................... - 25 1. Target for Step 2 ............................................................................................................. - 25 2. Current status and work implemented ......................................................................... - 25 Ԙ NISA instructed the operator to comply with “Policy on the mid and long term security”- 25
ԙ The operator shall report to NISA in accordance with the instructions ........................ - 26 -㫀㫀㩷

I. Cooling(1) Reactor
1. Target for Step 2 “Cold Shutdown Condition”z

Circulating water cooling will be continued and enforced, thus bringing thereactors to a “Cold Shutdown Condition” monitoring the RPV temperatures,zetc.
Maintainz(Implementation items are stated in II. (3))
NISA to continue confirming operating status and related matters.

stableoperationofaccumulated

water

processing

facility.

Definition of “Cold Shutdown Condition”
䊶Temperature of RPV bottom is, in general, below 100㷄.
䊶Release of radioactive materials from PCV is under control and publicradiation exposure by additional release is being significantly held down.
(Not exceed 1 mSv/y at the site boundary as a target.)In order to keep satisfying the above two conditions, secure mid-term safety of thecirculating water cooling system (reliability of parts and materials, redundancy
and independency, assessment of slack time for emergency, detection of failure
and trouble, confirmation of restoration measures and recovery time, etc.)

2. Current status and work implemented㽲Additional water injection line for more effective cooling[Countermeasures 12, 14, 45]䊶RPV bottom temperatures was 74㷄 in Unit 1, 83㷄 in Unit 2 and 73㷄 in Unit
3 (as of Oct.15.) RPV bottom temperatures in Units 1 and 3 have stabilized
below 100㷄. By changing the water injection volume on a trial basis, it has
been verified that Unit 2’s RPV bottom temperature can stabilize below 100㷄.
䊶Currently, water injection towards achieving cold shutdown is being
implemented at the volume of approx. 3.7 m3/h for Unit 1, approx. 10.4 m3/h for
Unit 2* and approx. 10.2 m3/h for Unit 3* (as of Oct. 15.)
*Injecting water via Feed Water line and Core Spray line㪄㩷㪈㩷㪄㩷

(Degrees Celsius)

RPB Bottom Temperatures

RPV Bottom Temperatures (upper) and water injection volume (lower)

㪉㪇㪇
㪈㪌㪇

㪬㫅㫀㫋㩷㪉

㪈㪇㪇㪌㪇㪬㫅㫀㫋㩷㪈
㪬㫅㫀㫋㩷㪊

3(m /h)

Water Injection Volume㪇㪈㪌㪬㫅㫀㫋㩷㪊

㪈㪇㪬㫅㫀㫋㩷㪉

㪌㪬㫅㫀㫋㩷㪈

㪇㪎㪆㪈㪎㽳 Installation

㪏㪆㪈㪎

of

centralized㪐㪆㪈㪎

monitoring

system

㪈㪇㪆㪈㪏

in

the

Main

Anti-Earthquake Building [Countermeasures 12,14,45]
䊶Installed a system that enables the monitoring of various parameters such as
the water injection volume, injection pressure, buffer tank water level, operation
status of accumulated water treatment system, etc., from monitors installed in
the Main Anti-Earthquake Building (Sep. 30.)
䊶That enables monitoring at the place with minimum radiation exposure in theMain Anti-Earthquake Building.
䊶Also, the condition which enables accurate and prompt comprehension of theoperation status of equipments was established.
Image of Centralized Monitoring System㪄㩷㪉㩷㪄㩷

Units 1 to 4 Centralized Remote Monitoring System
Plant Monitoring Instruments

Fukushima Daiichi Anti-Earthquake Building

Total 370 points/4 plants
Wide display
Field
instruments

Electric signal
Visual signal

D/W Pressure
Reactor Water level

Electric signal

New Equipments
Accumulated water collection
and treatment system

Main
Table

Information Collecting
Room

RPV/PCV Temp.
D/W Pressure
S/P Pressure etc.

Entrance

Local control unit
Visual signal

Reactor water injection system
Building water level monitoring system

Fukushima Daiichi Anti-Earthquake Building
Information Collecting RoomFuel pool alternative water injection
systemSite image

N2 filling apparatus

Trend data
Monitoring posts
Wind direction, speed etc.

Alarmdeviceetc

Operation switches

R/B: Reactor Building, T/B: Turbine Building, HTI: High Temperature Incinerator building, RO: Reverse Osmosis membrane,
ANN: Annunciator, RPV: Reactor Pressure Vessel, PCV: Primary Containment Vessel, D/W: Dry-well, S/P: Suppression Pool㪄㩷㪊㩷㪄㩷

(2) Spent Fuel Pool
1. Target for Step 2 “More stable cooling”
z “More stable cooling” (target for Step 2) for Units 2 and 3 was achieved by the endof Step 1 by having installed heat exchangers and maintaining pool water level.
z Circulating cooling systems for Units 1 and 4 have been installed, thus thetarget for Step 2 has been achieved in all Units. (Aug. 10.)

2. Current status and work implemented
㽲 Current status of Spent Fuel Pool䊶Unit 1: 25㷄, Unit 2: 27㷄, Unit 3: 27㷄 and Unit 4: 35㷄 (as of Oct. 15)

㽳 Operation of Unit 4 desalination facility (Aug. 20) [Countermeasures 25, 27]䊶In order to prevent corrosion of the spent fuel pool, the desalination facility has
begun operation (Aug. 20.)
䊶The salt concentration of water (chloride ion concentration) in the spent fuelpool before the operation of the desalination facility was 1,944 ppm (Aug. 20),
while its concentration after the operation was 410 ppm (Sep. 28.)
䊶The desalination for Units 2 and 3, in which sea water injections were carriedout, are planned to be implemented in turn.

Desalination Facility (Unit 4)
Concentrated
Water Tank

Reverse Osmosis
MembranePre-filter
Local Control Panel㪄㩷㪋㩷㪄㩷

II. Mitigation(3) Accumulated Water
1. Target for Step 2 “Reducing the total amount of accumulated water”
z Reduction of the total amount of accumulated water by processing theaccumulated water in the buildings via the stable operation of processing
facility.
z Augmentation of reuse by expansion of high-level contaminated water
processing facility, steady operation and desalination of decontaminated water.
z Begin consideration of full-scale water processing facilities for high-levelcontaminated water.
z Storage/management of sludge waste generated from high-level contaminatedwater processing facility.
z Implement steel pipe sheet pile installation work at the port to mitigate
contamination in the ocean.

2. Current status and work implemented
㽲 Status of the accumulated water processing
䊶Regarding accumulated water processing performance, approx.128,140 tons
have been processed in total 䋨as of Oct. 13.䋩䊶The accumulated water level is being kept at the present target level 䋨O.P
3,000.䋩 In other words, the total amount of accumulated water is at the level
where it is able to withstand heavy rains as well as long-term processing facility
outages.
䊶 Decontamination factor* of the processing facility for cesium is 106 in theapparatus of Kurion-Areva (as of Aug.9), 104 in Kurion 䋨as of Sep.26䋩 and 106
in SARRY (as of Sep 26.䋩 *Decontamination factor䋽cesium concentration of asample before processing / cesium concentration of a sample after processing㽳 Implemented reliability enhancement countermeasures towards
stable processing [Countermeasure 43]䊶Installed cesium adsorption apparatus (SARRY)
augmentation of decontamination facility (Aug.18.)

㽴 Completed

augmenting

desalination

andcompletedprocessing

thefacility[Countermeasure 43]䊶Installed the evaporative concentration apparatus (two lines, Aug.7 and 31) in
addition to the reverse osmosis membrane method (Jun.17.)
䊶Confirmed that chlorine concentration had been decreased from 6,000 ppm toapprox. 20ppm by the reverse osmosis equipment (per the Aug. 9 results) andthat had been decreased from 12,000 ppm to less than 1 ppm by the㪄㩷㪌㩷㪄㩷

evaporative concentration apparatus (per the Aug. 16 results).
䊶Completed augmentation of desalination processing facility via the evaporative
concentration apparatus (Oct.9), enabling more stable water injection into thereactors.
Total PA
[tons]

T/B B1
Water Leve(WL)䌛mm]㪋㪇㪇㪇 Water processing facility began
operation (Jun.17)

Control of Accumulated Water in T/B

Processed Amount㪈㪋㪇㪃㪇㪇㪇

Total PA: 128,140 tons
Sep.23: SARRY 2 lines
KURION 50ă20t/h
SARRY 25ă40t/h㪈㪉㪇㪃㪇㪇㪇

U2 T/B B1 WL㪉ภ㪫㪆㪙㩷㪙㪈᳓૏
㪲㫄㫄㪴
[mm]

㪊ภ㪫㪆㪙㩷㪙㪈᳓૏
U3 T/B B1 WL㪲㫄㫄㪴 [mm]㪊㪏㪇㪇
SARRY began operation (Aug.19)㪈㪇㪇㪃㪇㪇㪇

㪊㪍㪇㪇㪏㪇㪃㪇㪇㪇
㪊㪋㪇㪇

Aug.19: SARRY began operation㪍㪇㪃㪇㪇㪇

Typhoon (Sep. 22)㪊㪉㪇㪇㪋㪇㪃㪇㪇㪇
㪊㪇㪇㪇㪉㪇㪃㪇㪇㪇
㪇
㪍㪆㪈㪎

㪎㪆㪈㪍

㪏㪆㪈㪋

㪐㪆㪈㪉

㪈㪇㪆㪈㪈

㪉㪏㪇㪇
㪍㪆㪈㪎

㪦㪧㪊㪃㪇㪇㪇

㪎㪆㪉

㪎㪆㪈㪎

㪏㪆㪈

㪏㪆㪈㪍

㪏㪆㪊㪈

㪐㪆㪈㪌

㪐㪆㪊㪇 㪈㪇㪆㪈㪌㽵 Storage/management of sludge waste, etc. [Countermeasure81]
䊶Sludge waste with high radioactive concentration generated by processing thehigh-level contaminated water and high radioactive used-adsorption tower areproperly being secured and managed respectively in the Centralized Waste
Processing Building and the adsorption tower storage facility.
䊶Implementing preparation work to install storage facility for sludge waste inorder to expand storage capacity for sludge waste.
䊶Implementing installation work for used-adsorption tower storage facility inorder to expand storage capacity for used-adsorption tower.

㽶 Securing storage [Countermeasure 42]䊶Installed tanks for high-level contaminated water (2,800 tons) in order toexpand storage facility for high-level contaminated water (Sep.17.)

㪄㩷㪍㩷㪄㩷

㽷 Prevent contamination in the ocean [Countermeasure 64]䊶Completed the placement of the steel pipe sheet pile in order to block thedamaged parts of permeation prevention structure due to the tsunami at thesouth side of the intake canal of Units 1 to 4 as a countermeasure to mitigate
contamination in the ocean (Sep.28.)

Status of steel pipe sheet pile㪄㩷㪎㩷㪄㩷

(4) Groundwater
1. Target for Step 2 “Mitigating contamination in the ocean”
z Mitigate contamination in groundwater as well as contamination in the ocean
via groundwater by controlling accumulated water inflow into groundwater.
z Commencing installation work for water shielding wall in front of existingseawalls of Units 1 to 4, with the expectation of mitigating contamination in theocean via groundwater.

2. Current status and work implemented
ԘConsideration of water shielding wall [Countermeasure 68]䊶 In order to further ensure the mitigatation of contamination in the ocean, thebasic design for installing the water-proof steel pipe sheet piles in front of theexisting seawalls of Units 1 to 4 has been completed (Aug. 31.)䊶 Currently the design specificaitons for construction are under consideration.
Construction work will commence from around the end of October.
Basic design of water shielding walls for groundwater
R/B: Reactor Building
T/B: Turbine Building

Groundwater drainage
Existing seawall

Permeable layer

Water shielding wall

Landfill

Low-permeable
layer

Permeable layer
Low-permeablelayer㪄㩷㪏㩷㪄㩷

㽳Implementation of prevention against expansion of contamination in
groundwater [Countermeasure 67]䊶 Installed pumps at sub-drainage pit on the turbine building side at sevenplaces (Jul. 29.)㪄㩷㪐㩷㪄㩷

(5) Atmosphere/Soil
1. Target for Step 2 “Mitigating dispersion of radioactive materials”
z Reduce dispersion of radioactive materials deposited in the site.
z Continue dust inhibitor spraying as well as removal of debris.
z Install the reactor building cover (Unit 1.)z Commence removal of debris on top of the reactor buildings (Units 3 and 4.)z Consider containers for the reactor buildings.

2. Current status and work implemented
㽲Installation of the Unit 1 reactor building cover [Countermeasures 54,
55]䊶 Steel frames has been installed (Sep. 9.)
䊶 Installing panels between steel frames is under construction. The work will becompleted around the end of October.
Installation work of the coverྚRemoval of debris at the upper part of the reactor buildings (Units 3
and 4) [Countermeasure 84]
䊶 Began removing debris at the upper part of the reactor building of Unit 3 (Sep.
10.)
䊶 Began removing debris at the upper part of the reactor building of Unit 4(Sep.21). Covered the fuel pool by floats against drop of debris (Oct. 14.)㪄㩷㪈㪇㩷㪄㩷

Unit 4, Fuel pool protection

Removing debris at Unit 3

As of Oct. 13

As of Sep. 10

㽴 Removal and management of debris [Countermeasures 53, 84, 87]<Removal of debris>䊶 The volume of approx. 900 containers of debris has been removed (as of Oct.
17.) [Countermeasures 53, 84]䊶 The waste such as the removed debris and the trees cut down for site
preparation are classified according to their kinds as well as the amount ofradiation dose in the storage area and transported.
<Management of debris>䊶 Debris are stored in the containers and reserved in the buildings according to
the amount of radiation dose.
䊶 The approach lane to the waste storage area is marked off and a No Entry
sign was posted to prevent entrance of unauthorized personnel.
䊶 Except for the radioactive accumulated water treatment facilities and theother areas under construction, the storage areas are secured, fully utilizing
the land within the site.
Debris storage area (Left: Containers storing the debris, Right: Storage tent)<Water spray in the site>䊶 Purified water, which satisfies the guideline for bathing water, is reused tospray in the site in order to prevent lumber from firing spontaneously and dust㪄㩷㪈㪈㩷㪄㩷

from dispersing.
Result of purified water analysis and guideline for the bating water(Unit: Bq/cm3)
Guideline for radioactive materials in the
Result of purified
bathing water
Nuclidewater analysis(Ministry of the Environment)
Iodine 131

ND (<4.7E-03)

Cesium 134

ND (<9.7E-03)

Cesium 137

ND (<1.2E -02)

3.0E-02
5.0E-02(Sum of Cesium 134&137)

㽵 Installation of PCV gas control system [Countermeasure 86]䊶Installation of PCV gas control system started (Unit 1-Oct 7, Unit 2-Oct 10, Unit
3 (preparation work)-Sep 30).
䊶Careful measures were taken such as nitrogen injection and the adoption of
static electricity resistant hose since highly concentrated hydrogen was
detected in the Unit 1’s piping arrangement on which were to be worked. (Oct10.)

Conceptual Diagram of PCV Gas Control System䊶A system to adjust the pressure in the PCV to the almost same level as the atmosphericpressure by extracting almost the same amount of gas as the nitrogen fill ration in the
PCV in order to reduce the amount of radioactive materials released from PCV after thetemperature at the bottom of the reactor is kept below 100oC.
䊶The system is designed to monitor the extracted and filtered gas before releasing it.

䊶The amount of radioactive materials released from PCV will be further reduced using thesystem, while it is expected to reduce due to the decline in the temperature of the reactor.

Ground Emission

࿾਄᡼಴

Nitrogeninjection⓸⚛ᵈ౉Monitoring䊝䊆䉺䊥䊮䉫
Deviceⵝ⟎
Filter䊐䉞䊦䉺㪜㫏㪿㪸㫌㫊㫋㫀㫅㪾㩷ឃ᳇䊑䊨䊪

Dehumidific
㒰Ḩⵝ⟎
ation
apparatus㪹㫃㫆㫎㪼㫉㩷

Recirculation
ౣᓴⅣ䊤䉟䊮
line㪄㩷㪈㪉㩷㪄㩷

III䋮Monitoring and decontamination(6) Measurement, reduction, disclosure
1. Target for Step 2 “Sufficient reduction of radiation dose”
zExpansion and enhancement of monitoring, and continuation of disclosure.

z

Monitoring by government, prefectures, municipalities and operators.

zCommencement of full-scale decontamination.

2䋮Current status and work implemented
㽲Evaluated the amount of radioactive materials currently released from
PCVs [Countermeasures 60, 61]zIn order to estimate the amount of radioactive materials currently released
from PCVs, implemented the measurement of the airborne radioactivity
concentration (dust concentration) at the upper part of the reactor buildings
and at land and sea.
䊶Measured dust concentration in the site area and sea area (15 points.) As thedust concentration in the site such as near the west gate and monitoring posts
in 15 points is showing decreasing trend, and is almost below detectable limit,
we did not employ these data for estimating current release rate of radioactive
materials from PCVs.
䊶 Implemented sampling of radioactive fallout (12 points in and out of the site.) As
we estimated that almost all of samples were occupied by re-suspended
radioactive materials which were released in the past, we did not employ thesedata for estimating current release rate of radioactive materials from PCVs.

Sampling Points
Dust concentration
at the upper parts of the R/BේሶἹᑪደ਄ㇱ䉻䉴䊃ỚᐲේሶἹᑪደ
Reactor Building
Fallout out of the siteᢝ࿾ᄖ㒠ਅ‛㊂

Offshore sampling:
2 points at north-northeast and 4
points at east-southeast on theleeward side of Units 1-3

Dust concentration in the site⷏㐷ઃㄭ╬ᢝ࿾ౝ䉻䉴䊃Ớᐲ
Falloutᢝ࿾ౝ㒠ਅ‛㊂in the site

Dust concentration
2km offshore
ᴒว2km䉻䉴䊃Ớᐲ

5km
ᢝ࿾Ⴚ⇇
Nuclearstation boundary䌾
10km࿾ὐ

㪄㩷㪈㪊㩷㪄㩷

z The current release rate from PCVs of Units 1 to 3 has been estimated utilizing
the airborne radioactivity concentration (dust concentration) at the upper partsof the reactor buildings and in the sea.
䊶The current release rate for each Unit is estimated at, Unit 1: approx. 0.04
billion Bq/h, Unit 2: approx. 0.01 billion Bq/h and Unit 3: approx. 0.04 billion
Bq/h, respectively, using dust concentration at the upper parts of the reactor
buildings. The total release rate from Units 1 to 3 is estimated at approx. 0.08
billion Bq/h (Release rate for each Unit is rounded up.)䊶The current total release rate from Units 1 to 3 is estimated at approx. 0.07
billion Bq/h using dust concentration at the 2km offshore from the site, andthere might be little effect of radioactive materials that released previously.
䊶Therefore, the current total release rate from Units 1 to 3 is assessed at approx.
0.1 billion Bq/h at the maximum (provisional figure), which is 1/8,000,000 ofthat at the time of the accident.

Results of the current release rate

Upper part of the Unit 1 R/B

Upper part of the Unit 2 R/B

At the upper parts of the reactor buildings

Unit1䋺0.04billion Bq/hr
Unit2䋺0.01billion Bq/hr
Unit3䋺0.04billion Bq/hr
Reactor building

At the west side of the boundaryLess thandictation limit

At the sea area

0.07billion Bq/hr
Nuclear station boundary

Release rates of radioactive㪲ᵈ㪈㪴㩷╙㪍㪊࿁ේሶജ቟ోᆔຬળ⾗ᢱ䈮⸥タ䈘䉏䈢㪊㪆㪈㪌ᤨὐ䈱
materials (Cesium) per hour from 㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎᡼಴₸
Units 1 to 3
Release᡼಴₸rate(Bq/hour)ࡌࠢ࡟࡞
ᤨ





Approx. 800 trillion Bq/hour⚂ళ㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ
14(approx. 8.0 ×10
Bq/hour) *1
⚂ 㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ =ᵈ?

⚂ళ㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ
Approx.
2.5 trillion Bq/hour⚂
(approx.
2.5×1012㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ
Bq/hour)*1
[ᵈ1]

㪊㪆㪉㪌
*1: Total㩿㪙㫈㪆ᤨ㪀䉋䉍㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪋㪃㩷㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎ว⸘᡼಴₸㩿㪙㫈㪆ᤨ㪀䉕᳞䉄䈢䇯ห᭽䈮
release rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was calculated basedon release rate (Bq/hour)ᤨὐ䈍䉋䈶㪋㪆㪌ᤨὐ䈪䈱㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪋㪃㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎ว⸘᡼಴₸㩿㪙㫈㪆ᤨ㪀䉕᳞䉄䈢䇯of Cs-137
as of Mar 15 mentionedon the report of the 63rd Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan.
Total release rates (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 as of Mar.25 and Apr.5 were calculated by the㪲ᵈ㪉㪴㩷㪍㪆㪉㪇㪄㪍㪆㪉㪏䈮⊒㔚ᚲ⷏஥ᢝ࿾Ⴚ⇇ઃㄭ䈪᷹ቯ䈘䉏䈢ⓨ᳇ਛ䈱 㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎same way.
Ớᐲ(ᐔဋ୯)䉕ర䈮㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪋㪃㩷㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎ว⸘᡼಴₸䋨㪙㫈㪆ᤨ䋩䉕᳞䉄䈢䇯ห᭽*2: Total release rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was calculated based on average concentration䈮㪎㪆㪉㪍㪄㪏㪆㪈㪉䈮⊒㔚ᚲ⷏஥ᢝ࿾Ⴚ⇇ઃㄭ䈪᷹ቯ䈘䉏䈢ⓨ᳇ਛ䈱 㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎of Cs-137 in the air measured near the west boundary of the site from June 20 to June 28. Total
releaseỚᐲ(ᐔဋ୯)䉕ర䈮㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪋㪃㩷㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎ว⸘᡼಴₸䋨㪙㫈㪆ᤨ䋩䉕᳞䉄䈢䇯
rate (Bq/hour) of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was calculated based on average concentration of
Cs-137in the air measured near the west boundary of the site from July 26 to August 12.
㪲ᵈ㪊㪴 ේሶἹᑪደ਄ㇱ෸䈶ᶏ਄䈱䉻䉴䊃Ớᐲ᷹ቯ⚿ᨐ䈎䉌䋱ంᢙජਁ*3: Totalrelease rate of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was
at approx. 0.2 billion Bq/hour based on the䊔䉪䊧䊦䋯ᤨ⒟ᐲ䈫⹏ଔ䈘䉏䈢䈖䈫䈎䉌䇮 estimated㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪋㪃㩷㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎ว⸘᡼಴₸䉕
estimationof approx. 0.1 billion Bq/hour utilizing the results of dust concentration measurement at the⚂䋲ం䊔䉪䊧䊦䋯ᤨ䈫䈚䈢䇯
upper parts of the reactor buildings and the sea.
㪲ᵈ㪋㪴
*4:TotalේሶἹᑪደ਄ㇱ෸䈶ᶏ਄䈱䉻䉴䊃Ớᐲ᷹ቯ⚿ᨐ䈎䉌ᢙජਁ
release rate of Cs-134 and Cs-137 was estimated at approx. 0.1 billion Bq/hour based on theestimationof approx. tens of millions of Bq/hour䇮 utilizing
the results of dust concentration䊔䉪䊧䊦䋯ᤨ⒟ᐲ䈫⹏ଔ䈘䉏䈢䈖䈫䈎䉌㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪋㪃㩷㪚㫊㪄㪈㪊㪎ว⸘᡼಴₸䉕
measurement
at the upper parts of the reactor buildings and the sea.
⚂䋱ం䊔䉪䊧䊦䋯ᤨ䈫䈚䈢䇯

Approx. 0.29 trillion Bq/hour⚂ళ㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ
11(approx. 2.9×10
Bq/hour)*1⚂ 㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ =ᵈ?
Approx. 1 billion Bq/hour⚂ం㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ(approx. 1.0×109Bq/hour)*2⚂ 㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ =ᵈ?
Approx. 0.2 billion Bq/hour⚂ం㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ(approx.
2.1×108Bq/hour)*2

Approximately eight millionthof the release rate
immediately after the accident⚂㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ =ᵈ?
Approx. 0.2 billion Bq/hour⚂ం㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ(approx.
2×108Bq/hour)*3

⚂㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ =ᵈ?

⚂ం㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ
Approx.
0.1 billion Bq/hour㩗㩨㩂㩤㩣ᤨ8⚂
Bq/hour)*4(approx.
1×10=ᵈ?
0am, Mar 25
3 - 13
Mar
15- Aug 12 Sep
1 - 17 Oct
20 - 28 Jul 26
9am,
Apr 4 Jun 



ᤨ
ᤨ
11am, Mar 26 - 0am, Apr 6
1pm-5pmᤨ - ᤨ

ᤨ

⹏ଔኻ⽎ᤨᦼ
Evaluatedperiod㪄㩷㪈㪋㩷㪄㩷

z

The radiation exposure per year at the site boundaries is assessed at approx.
0.2 mSv / year provisionally (The target is 1 mSv / year, excluding the effectof the radioactive materials already released up until now.)

Exposure⊒㔚ᚲ䋱䌾䋳ภᯏ䈎䉌䈱᡼኿ᕈ‛⾰䈱⃻ᤨὐ䈪䈱᡼಴㊂䈏㩷
doses in case that the current release rate from PCVs of Units 1 to 3㪈 ᐕ㑆⛯䈒䈫઒ቯ䈚䈢႐ว䈱ⵍ䈳䈒✢㊂㩿䌭䌓䌶䋯ᐕ㪀㩷
continues for one
year (mSv/year)䋨䈖䉏䉁䈪䈮ᣢ䈮᡼಴䈘䉏䈢᡼኿ᕈ‛⾰䈱ᓇ㗀䉕㒰䈒䋩㩷(Excluding theeffect of already released radioactive materials)࿾࿑಴ౖ䋺䇸㔚ሶ࿖࿯䇹㩷[Map 㪬㪩㪣㩷㪿㫋㫋㫇㪑㪆㪆㪺㫐㪹㪼㫉㫁㪸㫇㪸㫅㪅㫁㫇㪆㩷
Source: “Digital Japan" URL http://cyberjapan.jp/ ]





MO



MO



MO



MO

















Unit:
mSv/yearන૏䋺mSv/ᐕ

z

MO





MO



MO



MO



MO



MO

(Overview of the estimated figures)
Site boundary: Less than or equal to approx. 0.2 mSv/year
5km radius: Less than or equal to approx. 0.03 mSv/year

10km radius: Less than or equal to approx. 0.009 mSv/year

20 km radius: Less than or equal to approx. 0.003 mSv/year

As a reference, the dose limit by reactor facilities at an outside ofa nuclear power station is 1 mSv/year.

Continuously implement the measurement of airborne radioactivity
concentration at the upper parts of the reactor buildings and in surroundingarea (land and sea), thus grasping the reduction tendency of the radioactivity
release rate due to the mitigation countermeasures.

㽳 Joint

monitoring

by

the

centralgovernment,

municipalities and the operator [Countermeasure 62]㪄㩷㪈㪌㩷㪄㩷

prefectures,

z Having instructions from the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Scienceand Technology, the operator has implemented sampling and measurement atland and sea as below.
[Land]<Monitoring within 20km radius>䊶Measurement of airborne radioactivity concentration by the support team fromthe Federation of Electric Power Companies at 50 points 䋨once a week䋩䊶Dust sampling at 5 points near 10km radius by the same team 䋨once a month䋩[Sea]<Fukushima Prefecture>䊶Seawater at 11 points within the site bay (once a day)䊶Seawater at 4 points along the coast (once a day)䊶Seawater at 8 points within 20km radius (every two days)䊶Seawater at 3 points within 30km radius (once a week)䊶Seawater at 10 points outside 30km radius (once a week)䊶Seabed soil survey at 25 points (once a month)<Ibaraki Prefecture>䊶Seawater at 5 points (once a week)<Miyagi Prefecture>䊶Seawater at 6 points (twice a month)䊶Sampling of seawater and seabed soil at a few kilometers offshore in front of
the power station will be implemented with an unmanned survey boat.

㪄㩷㪈㪍㩷㪄㩷

z The Cabinet Office and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science andTechnology announced the implementation of “Wide Area Monitoring” at
restricted areas and deliberate evacuation areas (Sep. 1.)

Wide Area Monitoring results map 䋨height: 1m䋩 andselection method of monitoring points
Divide the target areas by 2km
x 2km meshes, selected
approx. 20 points*1 from eachmesh based on the basic datacollection results*2 and monitor
theairborne
radioactivity
concentration (Jul.4 – Aug.20.)*1 Various places such as 16 points
by dividing each mesh 500m x
500m as well as crowded places(schools, public facilities, parks,
shopping malls, supermarkets,
shrines and temples, etc.) wereselected.
*2 Airborne radioactivity concentration
was monitored at around Namie
Station and Tomioka Town Station
which have various types ofenvironments. The distribution of
air dose rate was developed
based on the density ofradioactive materials that weredischarged by the accident andaccumulated in the soil etc.

䊶The operator also developed the “Wide Area Monitoring” plan and conducted
monitoring together (approx. 800 persons in total.)

Measurement work of Wide Area Monitoring㪄㩷㪈㪎㩷㪄㩷

䊶Based on the result of Wide Area Monitoring, the “Individual Detailed
Monitoring” on houses, roads and school grounds is being implemented inorder to collect the basic data for the development of implementation plan to
improve the environment in these areas (from mid-June to the end of October.)z The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology published“Map of radioactive contamination (Cesium contamination map)” (Aug. 30.)

Cesium contamination map

This map is developed
based
on
the
measurementof
airborne
radioactivity
concentration at approx.
2,200 points within
about 100km radiusfrom the station and thesampling of soil at 5cm
depth from the groundsurface at around 5
points for each radiation
measurement
point.
Nuclide analysis by
germanium
semiconductor detector
wasconducted
onthose sampled soil.

䊶Measurement of airborne radioactivity concentration and soil sampling wereconducted by universities, Japan Atomic Energy Agency, National Institute ofRadiological Sciences, Japan Chemical Analysis Center and the team fromFederation of Electric Power Companies.

㽴 Consideration and commencement of full-scale decontamination[Countermeasure 63][Countermeasures implemented by the central government]
䊶The decontamination support team (composed of Ministry of the Environment
and Cabinet Office etc.) for Fukushima prefecture started providing municipals
with advice on the development of municipal decontamination plans andallocating experts (Japan Atomic Energy Agency, TEPCO) (Oct. 3.)
䊶Utilizing the Great East Japan Earthquake Recovery and Reconstruction
Reserve Fund, the central government is swiftly preparing the model project of
decontamination at the areas that possibly have over 20mSv of additional
exposure dose per year (restricted areas and deliberate evacuation areas).
Currently, the preliminary monitoring is underway.
䊶The central government started planning of the interim storage facilities thatwould stably store the contaminated soil for a certain period. The roadmap will
be developed by the end of October.

㪄㩷㪈㪏㩷㪄㩷

[Activities where the operators are participating]䊶Through the Wide Area Monitoring and the “Individual Detailed Monitoring, theoperator collects information that would contribute to the effective
decontamination work. (With these outputs and the knowledge about theradioactivity management, the operator will support the decontamination test
conducted by the central government at the restricted area.)䊶In order to support the developments of municipal decontamination plans, theoperator started personnel support for the experts allocation program by thecentral government (Oct. 3.)
䊶The operator also provided Fukushima Prefecture with personnel support forthe model project for reduction of radiation at general residential areas (Aug.
25 and 26.)

㪄㩷㪈㪐㩷㪄㩷

IV. Countermeasures against aftershocks, etc.
(7) Tsunami and reinforcement, etc.
1. Target for Step 2 “Mitigation of further disasters”
z Preventsituation

fromdeteriorationbymitigating

disasters

withcountermeasures against emergencies (earthquakes and tsunami, etc.)z Consideration of reinforcement work of each unit as necessary.
z Continue implementing various radiation shielding measures.

2. Current status and work implemented
㽲 Implementation of seismic resistance evaluation for each unit
[Countermeasure 71]䊶Consideration of current seismic resistance and reinforcement, etc. for reactor
buildings of Unit 2, Unit 5 and Unit 6 was implemented and evaluated by Aug.
26 (Unit 1 and Unit 4 were completed by May 28 and Unit 3 was completed by
Jul. 13.)䊶As a result of the analysis, it was evaluated that seismic resistance can be
secured without any reinforcement.
䊶A survey inside the buildings will be conducted after implementation of
measures to reduce radiation dose.
Installation status of support structures in Unit 4(Completed on Jul. 30)

Before installing steel support pillars(photographed on May 31)<Before concrete㪓䉮䊮䉪䊥䊷䊃ᛂ⸳೨㪕placement>㍑⵾ᡰᩇ⸳⟎⁁ᴫ䋨䋶᦬䋲䋰ᣣ᠟ᓇ䋩
Installation status of steel support

Concrete placement status䉮䊮䉪䊥䊷䊃ᛂ⸳⁁ᴫ䋨䋷᦬䋲䋱ᣣ᠟ᓇ䋩pillars (photographed on Jun. 20)(photographed on Jul.21)

Grout filling status(photographed on Jul. 30)

Completion of support structures(photographed on Jul. 30)

૶↪ᷣ
Spent
Άᢱ䊒䊷䊦
fuel pool

Steel㍑⵾
supportᡰᩇ
pillar<Afterconcrete㪓䉮䊮䉪䊥䊷䊃ᛂ⸳ᓟ㪕placement>
Steel㍑⵾
supportᡰᩇ
pillar䍘䍻䍖䍶䍎䍢ოConcretewall䉮䊮䉪䊥䊷䊃ოConcrete
wall

Image

㪄㩷㪉㪇㩷㪄㩷

V䋮Environment improvement(8) Living/ working environment
1. Target for Step 2 “Enhancement of Environment Improvement”
z Improve workers’ living/working environment that had been harsh during the initial
phase of the accident, thus leading to maintaining workers’ motivation.
z Expansion of temporary dormitories and on-site rest stations.
z Improvement of environment such as meals, bath, laundry, etc.

2. Current status and work implemented
㽲 Expansion status of temporary dormitories [Countermeasure 75]䊶 Completed construction of temporary dormitory able to accommodate 1,600
persons (Aug. 31). Approx. 1,100 persons have already moved in (as of Oct.
1.)

㽳 Establishment status of on-site rest stations [Countermeasure 75]䊶 Twenty on-site rest stations have been established (approx. 4,400m2 in sizewith a capacity to accommodate approx. 1,500 persons) (as of Oct. 5.)Exterior (left) and interior (right) appearances of on-site rest stations

Inside of on-site rest stations (from left: drinking water, etc., restroom and air shower䋩㩷㪄㩷㪉㪈㩷㪄㩷

(9)Radiation Control/Medical Care
1. Target for Step 2 “Enhancement of Healthcare”
z Thorough radiation exposure control and countermeasures against heat stroke
and influenza.
z Reinforcement of radiation control by NISA.
z Increase in the number of whole body counters, monthly measurement ofinternal exposure.
z Automated recording of personal radiation dose, report of personal exposure
dose in writing, introduction of workers’ certificates with photos.
z Consideration of a long-term healthcare such as enhancement of workers’
safety training and establishment of a database.

2. Current status and work implemented
㽲 Expansion of whole body counters (WBC) [Countermeasure 78]䊶 Increased WBCs as planned ( 12 units have already been added as of Oct. 3.)
䊶Started measuring internal exposure once a month from September.

㽳 Written notification of exposure dose etc. [Countermeasure 78]䊶Provided recording format of personal exposure in every entry (Aug. 16.)
Started to use workers’ certificates with photos step by step (July 29.)
Automated recording of personal exposure is under preparation. (Exposure
data are currently manually secured in preparation for the use in future.)㽴 Consideration for long-term healthcare such as establishing a
database [Countermeasure 78]䊶Announced the report of expert committee on the database creation andlong-term health management (Sep. 26.)
䊶Obligate utilities to submit exposure dose records and health check records forlong-term health management by revision of the Ordinance on Prevention of
Ionizing Radiation Hazards, and announced a guideline regarding
implementation of examination, etc. according to exposure dose (Oct. 11.)

㽵 Continuous reinforcement of medical system [Countermeasure 80]
䊶 Changed Units 5/6’s emergency medical

room’speriodofoperations
fromsummer-only to all year round andemergency doctors, etc. have continuously
been in place after September.
䊶Assigned nurses and radiation specialists(not regular basis in the meantime).
䊶Reinforcement of medical facility anddecontamination facility to enable the speedy㪄㩷㪉㪉㩷㪄㩷

Preparation of Ambulance(near Units 5/6’s emergency medicalroom)transportation of patients and also the direct transportation of
non-contaminated severely ill or injured patients to hospitals.
䊶Ambulance has been prepared (Sep. 16.) * Three transportation cars in total.
䊶Implementation of prevention and mitigation countermeasures against
influenza (Start of protective vaccination, etc. from Nov. 1).

㪄㩷㪉㪊㩷㪄㩷

(10) Staff training/personnel allocation
1. Target for Step 2 “Systematic staff training and personnel allocation”
z Promotion of staff training in conjunction with the Government and utility
operators, etc.

2. Current status and work implemented
㽲 Promote staff training, etc. in conjunction with the government andutility operators in order to train and allocate staffs systematically.
[Countermeasure 85]
䊶Conducting training for staffs engaged in radiation related work, who will be ingreat demand.
䊶TEPCO has been conducting “radiation survey staff training” targeted for
employees and TEPCO group companies’ employees and has already trained
approx. 3,000 personnel.
䊶The government has been conducting “radiation survey staff training” (7 times
till Oct. 7 and approx. 200 personnel were trained.), “radiation protection staff
training” (approx. 10 personnel were trained from Aug. 8 to 12, approx. 30
personnel were trained from Sep. 26 to 30) and will continue these trainings.
䊶According to affiliated companies needs, launched a new framework of looking
for workers widely through Japan Atomic Industrial Forum (JAIF).

Radiation survey staff training㪄㩷㪉㪋㩷㪄㩷

VI. Action plan for mid-term issues
1. Target for Step 2z Development of “Policy on the mid and long term security” by the governmentz Development of plant operation plans by the operator based on the above
policy2. Current status and work implemented
㽲 NISA instructed the operator to comply with “Policy on the mid andlong term security”
䊶NISA disclosed (on Oct. 3) “Policy on the mid and long term security” regarding
Units 1 to 4 of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station of TEPCO” in order tosecure safety during the period (mid-term: within approx. 3 years) which starts
from completion of Step 2 and ends before starting the work fordecommissioning the reactors”.
*In order to manage additional emission of radioactive materials from the nuclear reactor facilities
and to restrain radiation dose, it requires the following four (4) items and also requires setting
basic targets and necessary conditions for safety securement.
䊶To identify emission sources of radioactive materials, implement adequate restrain measuresand monitor them (Emission restraining and managing functions)䊶To adequately remove the decay heat of the reactor pressure vessels, the primary containment
vessels and the spent fuel pools (Cooling function)
䊶To prevent criticality in the reactor pressure vessels, the primary containment vessels and thespent fuel pools (Criticality preventing function)
䊶To detect, adequately manage and treat flammable gasses (Hydrogen explosion preventing
function)¾Emission restraint and managem ent¾Decay heat r emoval¾Criticality prevention¾Hydr ogen explosion prevention

Facilities etc. considered in “Policy on the mid and long term security”
䋼C irc ul atin g w ater c oo li ng s ystem for SFP䋾

Water Pr ocessing Facility䋼Ta kin g-o ut faci li ti es fro m SFP䋾

D es al ina tio nP
T ank

D eco ntami n ati on

Ad so rp tio nFacil iti es rela ted to ci rcul ati ng
wate r cooli ng system whi ch is
requirement for c old
shutd own co ndition are to bereported to th e g over nmen t
by Oct 17.
Oi l
se pa ratio n

Reactor Building䋼 PCV 䋾
䋼H ig hl y con tami na ted w a te r trea tm en t fa cil ity䋾Boric acid solution
䋼 Bo ric a cid inj ec ti on facil ity for R PV
a n d PC V䋾䋼W ater i nj ecti on fa cil ity for R PV an d
ᾲ੤឵ེ
PC V䋾

Spent Fuel Pool
Primary
Containment
Vessel䋼 Bui ld in g wi th a ccum ul ated hi gh ly
co ntam in ated wa ter䋾R eactor
Pressu re
Vesse lTurbine Building
Steam Turbine

P
Centralized Waste
Processing F acility

P

Additionally-installed
Tank

C ondenser P

Suppression
ChamberP䋼Mi tig atio n o f ra di atio n d os e risk 䋾䋼El ectri cal system 䋾䋼C om mo n sp en t fue l p oo l䋾䋼 Ma na ge men t of䋼Te mp ora ry stora ge faci lity for c asks 䋾
so li d w aste such as
䋼Pr eve nti on a n d ma na ge me nt of rad ia tio n do se䋾 d eb ris 䋾䋼M on itori n g rad ia tio n do se 䋾䋼M on itori n g an d co ntro lli n g roo m䋾㪄㩷㪉㪌㩷㪄㩷

PipingPumps

䋼Stor ag e of l iqu id wa ste䋾㽳 The operator shall report to NISA in accordance with the instructions
䊶Reported on operation plan and safety assessment results regarding
circulating water cooling system (Oct. 17.)䊶Other systems, etc. shall be reported on as well in a rapid manner.
END㪄㩷㪉㪍㩷㪄㩷Issues(

1) Reactor

I.㻌 Cooling() Spent
Fuel Pool

Fresh water
injection() Accumulated Water
Mitigate oceancontamination() Groundwater㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 Removal / management of debris

II. 㻌 Mitigation

Installation of PCV gas
control system

Consideration of reactor
building container

Removal of debris(top of Unit 3&4 R/B)

Installation of reactor building
cover (Unit 1) 䖪Removal / management of debris (continued)㻌 㻌 㻌

Dispersion of inhibitor 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 Dispersion of inhibitor (continued)

Design / implementationof impermeable wall 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌against groundwater(Restoration of sub-drainage pumps with㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 facilities)㻌
expansionof storage㻌 /㻌 processing㻌㻌 Mitigation of contaminationin the ocean

Storage / management ofsludge waste etc. 䖪㻌 㻌 㻌 Consideration㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 of
㻌 㻌method 㻌of㻌 㻌 㻌㻌 㻌 㻌 impermeable㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 wall㻌 㻌 㻌 against㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌 㻌 㻌 groundwater㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌 Mitigation of contaminationin groundwater 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌Installation of storage facilities /decontamination processing㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌

Installation of storage / processing facilities 䖪Mitigate ocean
Contamination(continued)() Atmosphere / Soil5㻌 㻌 Consideration / installation㻌 㻌 of heat exchanging function

Remote-controlled
injection operation

Expansion 䖪 / consideration of
full-fledged processing facilities㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 Decontamination 䖪 / desalination㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 processing (reuse), etc

Securestorage place㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌㻌

Storing water with low
radiation level

Transferring waterwith high radiationlevel*partially ahead of schedule

Circulation cooling system(installation of heat exchanger)䖪

Reliability improvement in injection operation/ remote-control operation *ahead of schedule

Improvement ofwork environment 䖪Stablecooling

Reduction of total amountof accumulated water4

Circulatingwater cooling(continued)

current status䠄as of Oct. 17䠅

Step 2 (through the end of this year)

More stablecooling3

Fresh water Injection

2

Stable cooling㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 Nitrogen gas injection 䖪㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 Nitrogen gas injection (continued)

Consideration and preparation ofreuse of accumulated water

Circulatingwater
cooling(start) 䖪

Step 1 (around 3 months)

Cooling by minimum injection rate
(injection cooling)

As of Apr. 17

Appendix 3
October 17, 2011
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Government-TEPCO Integrated Response OfficeInstallation of PCV gas
control system

Start of installation work ofreactor building container

Removal of debris / installation ofreactor building cover (Unit 3&4)

Removal / management of debris

Dispersion of inhibitor

Establishment of impermeable wall
against groundwater

Mitigation of contamination in
groundwater

Mitigation of contaminationin the ocean

Research on processing ofsludge waste etc.

Storage / management ofsludge waste etc.

Continuous processing ofaccumulated water

Installation of
full-fledged water processing facilities

Start of removal work of fuels*partially ahead of schedule

Protection against corrosion
cracking of structural materials*

Continuous cold shutdown
condition(around 3 years)

Mid-term issues

Red colored letter: newly added to the previous version, 䖪: already reported to the government, Green colored shading: achieved target

Current Status of “Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident
at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO” (Revised edition)

Cold shutdown condition
Mitigate scattering(continued)

Mitigate scattering(6Issues( )( ) Tsunami, 㻌Living/working㻌 㻌 㻌 Reinforcement, etc
environment

III. Monitoring/
Decontamination

IV. Countermeasures
fort aftershocks, etc

8) Measurement,
Reduction andDisclosure㻌7() Radiation
control /㻌 Medical care( ) Staff Training /personnel allocation

V. Environment improvement㻌

Establishing plant operation plan
based on the safety concept

Government’s concept of
securing safety

Systematic implementationof staff training / personnel
allocation

Improvement of radiation control / medical system

Exhaustive
radiation dose
control

Action plan for
mid-term issues

Consideration ofreinforcement work ofeach Unit 䖪Improvement of workers’ living / working environment(Unit 4 spent fuel pool)
Installation of supporting structure 䖪

Enhancement of countermeasures against aftershocks and tsunami,
preparation for various countermeasures for radiation shielding

Consideration / startof full-fledged decontamination

Enhancement of Enhancement ofenvironment
Healthcare
Improvement

10

current status䠄as of Oct. 17䠅

Step 2 (through the end of this year)

Mitigate disasters

9

Step 1 (around 3 months)

Expansion, enhancement and disclosure of radiation dose monitoring in and out of the power station

As of Apr. 17

ϹOctober 17, 2011
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
Government-TEPCO Integrated Response Office

Response based on the plant
operation plan

Systematic implementationof staff training / personnel
allocation

Improvement of radiation control /medical system

Improvement of workers’ living /working environment

Reinforcement work of each Unit

Continue various countermeasures
for radiation shielding

Continuous decontamination

Continuous environmental
monitoring(around 3 years)

Mid-term issues

Red colored letter: newly added to the previous version, 䖪: already reported to the government, Green colored shading: achieved object

Current Status of “Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident
at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, TEPCO” (Revised edition)

Decontamination

Reactor
Pressure
Vessel(RPV)

Primary Containment
Vessel (PCV)

Enhancement of radiation control and medical system (77, 78, 79, 80);
Systematic implementation of staff training / personnel allocation (85)Improvement of living/working environment of workers(74, 75);
Improvement of site environment(76) 䖪

Prevent contamination of groundwater (66, 67);
Consideration of impermeable wall against groundwater(68, 83)

Decontamination

Cooling at minimum water injection rate
(7, 12, 14)
Reuse of processed water 䠄45䠅(Implement circulating water cooling) 䖪

Tank

Desalination
Adsorption

Condenser

P

P

Preventive measuresagainst leakage ofhigh radiation-level water (29)Prevent contaminationin the ocean (64)Isolation of high-level
radioactive water (65)

Additionally-installed
Tank

Continue/Enhance monitoring (55-62),
Consideration / start of full-fledged
decontamination (63)Seismic assessment (20) 䖪,Continued monitoring (21),(Unit 4) Installation of supporting structure under thebottom of spent fuel pool (26) 䖪
Install various interconnecting lines of offsite power(8);Enhance countermeasures against tsunami (69, 70);
Consideration of reinforcement work of each Unit (71) 䖪;Various countermeasures of radiation shielding (72, 73)

Storage: tanks, megafloats
Process: decontamination by zeolite

Centralized Waste
Processing Building

Dispersion of inhibitor (47, 48, 52)
Removal / management of debris (49, 53, 87)Consideration of countermeasures forcontaminated soil (51)P

Turbine Building
Steam Turbine

Consideration of full-fledged water
processing facilities (82)Storage / managementof sludge waste etc. (81) 䖪heat exchangers,
water processing
facilities

Storage/process of low
radiation-level water(33, 34, 35, 40, 41, 44, 46)

pumps

P

Storage of high radiation-level water(30, 32, 37, 39, 42) 䖪Oilseparation

pipingProcessing high radiation-level water (31, 38, 43䠅 䖪

P

Water processing facility

Circulation cooling of spent fuel pool
(23, 24, 25, 27) 䖪Sampling of steam/pool water and measurementof radioactive materials (19)Sealing the leakage location (6, 16)

Suppression
Chamber

Injection of fresh water with pumps (1)Processing of sub-drainage water
after being pumped up (36)Installation of heat exchangers(13)

Heat Exchanger

Flooding up to top of active fuel(3, 9)

PCV venting (with filtration) (10)

PCV gas control (86)

Reactor
Building

Lower the amount of steam generated (4)Maintain and enhance countermeasures in Step 1 if needed (17)Cooling of spent fuel pool byexternal water injection (18, 22, 28)

Full-fledged container (50, 56)

Reactor building cover (5, 50, 54, 55, 84) 䖪

Nitrogen gas injection (2, 11, 15) 䖪ϺUnderlined: deleted countermeasures, red colored: newly added countermeasures, 䖪: already reported to the government

Overview of Major Countermeasures in the Power Station as of October 17

Term to complete measures to improve reliability
and reduce the amount of accumulated water

I. CoolingTemperature at thebottom of RPV (Υ)
Water injection
flow rate (m3/h)

㻤㻛㻝㻣

㻥㻛㻝㻣

Unit
3
㻟ྕ
ྕᶵ

㻝㻜㻛㻝㻤
: Under construction

㻞ྕ
ྕᶵ2
Unit
㻝ྕ
ྕᶵ1
Unit

Unit
2
㻞ྕ
ྕᶵ

䖪: Safety check by government (reported)

㻟ྕ
ྕᶵ3
Unit

㻝ྕ
ྕᶵ
Unit
1

: Implemented (monitored by government as necessary)

㻜
㻣㻛㻝㻣

㻡

㻝㻜

㻜
㻝㻡

㻡㻜

㻝㻜㻜

㻝㻡㻜

㻞㻜㻜

: Field work started3ϻ: Field work not started yet

Injection toward cold shutdown condition
without increasing the amount of accumulated water

Temperature at the bottom of RPV (upper) and water injection flow rate (lower)

Nitrogen gas injection [Countermeasure 11] 䖪

Change injection flow rate
experimentally, and verify transition of reactor temperatures

Injection of water required to achieve “stable cooling” (Inject water
through core spray line in addition to feed water line (Sep. 1) )Injection toward cold shutdown condition
without increasing the amount of accumulated water

Injection toward cold shutdown condition
without increasing the amount of accumulated water] Cold shutdown condition

Legend3) Reactor

Establishment of centralized monitoring system in the main anti-earthquake building (Sep. 30)

Implementation of circulating water cooling [Countermeasures 12,14,45] 䖪Current status (as of Oct. 17)
Term to inject enough water for cold shutdown condition
without increasing the amount of accumulated water

Change injection flow rate
experimentally, and verify transition of reactor temperatures

Injection of water required to achieve “stable cooling” (Injectwater through core spray line in addition to feed water line (Sep. 14) )Establishment of centralized monitoring system in the main anti-earthquake building (Sep. 30)

Implementation of circulating water cooling [Countermeasures 12,14,45] 䖪

Nitrogen gas injection [Countermeasure 11] 䖪Injection of water required to achieve “stable cooling”

Construction of centralized monitoring system in the main anti-earthquake building (Sep. 30)

Implementation of circulating water cooling [Countermeasures 12,14,45] 䖪Term to keep the amount of accumulated
water and to improve reliability

Start of Step 2 䠄Jul. 17䠅

(1

Red frame: progressed countermeasures from theprevious version, 䖪: already reported to the government<Step 2 (through the end of this year)>: Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down

Nitrogen gas injection [Countermeasure 11] 䖪

2

1Issues Unit

Current Status of Countermeasures (1)Target [(2) Spent Fuel PoolI. Cooling: Implemented (monitored by government as necessary)

Cooling by installation ofheat exchanger 䖪[Countermeasures 25,27]-Circulating water cooling
operation (from Jul. 31)[Countermeasure 24]-Water injection by
installation of alternative
system to “Giraffe”( Jun. 17 )Restoration of
injection throughnormal cooling system

5] More stable cooling

Legend4

32Cooling by installation ofheat exchanger 䖪[Countermeasures 25,27]-Circulating water cooling
operation (from Jun. 30)

Cooling by installation ofheat exchanger 䖪[Countermeasures 25,27]-Circulating water cooling
operation (from May 31)

1[Countermeasure 24]

Water injection throughnormal cooling system

Start of Step 2 䠄Jul. 17䠅

䖪: Safety check by government (reported): Field work started

Desalination of Spent Fuel
Pool water: Field work not started yet

Desalination of Spent Fuel
Pool water

Current status (as of Oct. 17): Under construction

Desalination of Spent Fuel Pool water (from Aug. 20)

ϼRed frame: progressed countermeasures from theprevious version, 䖪: already reported to the government<Step 2 (through the end of this year)>: Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down

Cooling by installation ofheat exchanger 䖪[Countermeasures 25,27]-Circulating water cooling
operation (from Aug. 10)

Issues Unit

Current Status of Countermeasures (2)Target [Issues(3

Term to complete measures to improve reliability
and reduce the amount of accumulated water

Test
operation

Installation (termϩ)Test operation(termϩ) (Oct. 9)

Capable of processing (termϩ) (Oct. 10)

Processing start (Aug. 7, 31)

Processing start (Aug. 18)

Elimination, continuous processing andsystem enhancement of accumulated
water in the building [Countermeasure 43]

Term to inject enough water for cold shutdown condition
without increasing the amount of accumulated water

II. Mitigation) Accumulated Water
23,000 t (Sep. 16䠅㻌: Implemented (monitored by government as necessary)䖪: Safety check by government (reported): Under construction: Field work started: Field work not started yet

Continue mitigation of contaminationin the ocean [Countermeasure 64]8] Decrease the total amount of accumulated water

Legend- Decontamination with decontaminant (zeolite) (May 1)

Continue decontamination [Countermeasures 44,46][ Low level ]Circulating decontamination of the seawater
Installation of steel pipe sheet pile (Sep. 28)

Mitigation of contamination in the ocean [Countermeasure 64]

22,000 t (Aug. 13䠅㻌

33,000t 䠄until Jul. 14䠅
Approx. 20,000t/ monthInstallation of 2,800t (Sep. 17)

15,000 t (Oct. 8䠅㻌

[Countermeasure 42]- continuous expansion of tanks[Receiver tanks for processed water]

Expand sufficient storage place

Installation

Secure sufficient storage place [Countermeasures 42]

Preparation[Receiver tanks for high radiation level water]

Design of additional storage facility-Storage and management at existing tanks

Continue storage / management ofsludge waste etc. [Countermeasure 81]

Consideration of full-fledged water processing facilities [Countermeasure 82]

Capable of processing (Jul. 20)

Storage / management of sludge Waste etc. [Countermeasure 81] 䖪Installation work ofdesalination facilities(reverse osmosis) (termϩ)Installation work of desalination facilities (reverse osmosis membrane type) (term Ϩ) : Processing start (Jun. 17)

Preparation for desalination facilities (distillation) (termϩ)

operation

Construction of desalination facilities
Test(distillation) (termϨ)Construction of Cesium adsorption
facilities (SARRY)䖪

[Countermeasure 43]䖪Elimination, continuous processing and system enhancement of accumulated water in the building

Term to keep the amount of accumulated
water and to improve reliability[ High level ]ϽRed frame: progressed countermeasures from theprevious version, 䖪: already reported to the government<Step 2 (through the end of this year)>: Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down
Current status (as of Oct. 17)
Start of Step 2 䠄Jul. 17䠅

Current Status of Countermeasures (3)Target [Issues(4) Groundwater(5) Atmosphere / Soil

II. Mitigation(

6(planned around the end of Oct.)

Start establishment of impermeable wall
against groundwater [Countermeasure 83]) Measurement, Reduction andDisclosure

III. Monitoring / Decontamination: Implemented (monitored by government as necessary)䖪: Safety check by government (reported): Under construction: Field work started: Field work not started yet] Sufficiently reduceradiation dose

Legend“Basic Concept for Pushing Ahead with Decontamination Works” and “Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Work”, etc.
have been established (Aug. 26). Substantiative decontamination operations have been conducted since the end of Aug.

Consideration / start of full-fledged decontamination [Countermeasures 63]

Implementation of monitoring in cooperation with the government, prefectures, municipalities and operators [Countermeasures 62]

䞉Continuously implement the measurements of airborne radioactivity concentration at the upper part of reactor buildings, the land and thesea to grasp the reduction tendency of the release rate due to mitigation countermeasures.

12

Target [㻌 㻌 - The radiation exposure per year at the site boundaries is assessed at approx. 0.2 mSv / year at the maximum (provisional figure) basedon the aforementioned release rate (The target is 1 mSv / year. Excluding the effect of the radioactive materials already released until
now).

- The current total release rate from Units 1-3 based on the assessment this time is estimated at approx. 0.1 billion Bq/h at the maximum(provisional figure), which is 1/8,000,000 of that at the time of the accident.

䞉The current release rates from PCVs of Units 1 to 3 were assessed comprehensively utilizing the airborne radioactivity concentration(dust concentration) at the upper part of the reactor buildings, the land and the sea.

Continue to assess current release of radioactive materials from PCVs [Countermeasures 60,61]

10

Removal of debris on 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌
top of reactor building (Sep. 21)㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌Consideration of reactor building container [Countermeasure 50]
installation work (Unit 1: Oct. 7, Unit 2: Oct. 10,
Installation of PCV gas control system [Countermeasure 86] Start
Unit 3 ( preparatory work): Sep. 30)

Preparation for Unit 4 䠄Removal of debris on the ground, maintenance of road for crane etc,䠅

Removal of debris on top of reactor buildings (Unit 3&4) [Countermeasures 84]- Under preparatory construction (Unit3: Jun. 20, Unit4: Jun. 24)
Preparation for Unit 3 䠄Removal of debris on the ground, maintenance of road for crane etc,䠅

completed at around the end of Oct.)

14

Target [ ] Prevent scatteringof radioactive materials

Removal of debris on top ofreactor building (Sep. 10) 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌 㻌Spraying treated water, which meets the guideline in the bathing area,in the NPS to prevent radioactive dust from scattering (Oct. 7)㻌Installation of reactor building cover (Unit 1) [Countermeasures 54,55] 䖪 - Under construction (planned to be

Removal / management of debris [Countermeasure 53, 87]-Collected debris (Volume of approx. 900 containers (as of Oct. 17))
-Management of collected debris etc. in storage areas

Confirmation of solidification of inhibitor [Countermeasure 52][Countermeasure 68]

Design of impermeable wall against groundwater

Implementation of preventions against expansion of groundwater contamination [Countermeasure 67]- Restoration of sub-drainage pumps with expansion of storage / processing facilities<Step 2 (through the end of this year)>: Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down
Current status (as of Oct. 17)
Start of Step 2 䠄Jul. 17䠅

colored letter: newly added countermeasures, Red frame: progressedϾcountermeasures from the previous version, 䖪: already reported to the government
Current Status of Countermeasures (4) Red

Target [ ]Mitigation of oceancontamination

Issues( ) Tsunami,
reinforcement, etc
IV. Countermeasuresagainst aftershocks, etc

7( ) Living / working
Environment

8

(

9

) Radiation control /Medical care personnel allocation

V. Environment improvement(

Legend: Field work started) Staff Training /: Field work not started yet]: Under construction

21

Target [䖪: Safety check by government (reported)

Exhaustive
radiation dose
control: Implemented (monitored by government as necessary)- Promote human resources training in conjunction with the government and operators

20

18

Target [ ] Enhancementof healthcare

Systematic staff training and personnel allocation [Countermeasure 85]- Install new emergency medical facility, establish organization with resident specialists (on call 24 hours a day), speedy transportation of patients- Intensive preventive measures against heat stroke 䖪 (trainings for new workers), countermeasures for mental health, conducting medical examination, prevention andmitigation of flu- Establish industrial hygiene system such as preventive healthcare

Continuous reinforcement of medical system [Countermeasure 80]- Reinforcement of radiation control by NISA
- Expansion of whole-body counters, implementation of monthly internal exposure measurement 䖪- Automated recording of personal radiation dose, written notification of exposure dose 䖪, introduction of workers’ certificates with photos 䖪- Consideration of long-term healthcare such as enhancement of safety training for workers and establishing database etc.

Continuous improvement of radiation control [Countermeasure 78]- Accommodations for approx. 1,600 people have been prepared. Approx. 1,100 people have already moved in (as of Oct. 1)-20 on-site rest stations have been established (approx. 4,400m2 in size with a capacity to accommodate approx. 1,500 people) (as of Oct. 5)

Continuation and enhancement of improvement of workers’ living / working environment [Countermeasure 75]

16

Target [ ]Enhancement ofenvironment
improvement10- Evaluation of seismic resistance has been completed (Aug.26) 䖪

Consideration of reinforcement work of each Unit [Countermeasure 71]

Continue various countermeasures for radiation shielding [Countermeasure 73](Jul. 30)

(Unit 4) Installation of
supporting structure underthe bottom of the fuel pool[Countermeasure 26] 䖪<Step 2 (through the end of this year) Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down
Current status (as of Oct. 17)
Start of Step 2 䠄Jul. 17䠅

colored letter: newly added countermeasures, Red frame: progressedϿcountermeasures from the previous version, 䖪: already reported to the government
Current Status of Countermeasures (5) Red

Target [ ] Mitigation ofdisasters͟dŚĞ DƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ZĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ^ƵƉƉŽƌƚ dĞĂŵ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ EƵĐůĞĂƌ ĐĐŝĚĞŶƚ͕͟ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ZĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĂƚ ĂƐƚ :ĂƉĂŶĂƌƚŚƋƵĂŬĞ ŝŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ƚŽ ĂůǁĂǇƐ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽŵƉƚůǇ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ
ƉĞŽƉůĞ͕ ŝƐ ŶŽǁ ĞǆĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ͘фĞĨŽƌĞ ƚŚĞ ůŝĨƚŝŶŐхфĨƚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ůŝĨƚŝŶŐхĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĨŝǀĞ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶͲWƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ƌĞĂƐ ŝŶ ĂƐĞ ŽĨ ŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ͕ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂƌĞĂƐ͕ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ŵĂŝŶůǇ ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŽĂĚƐ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ĨŽƌ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǁĞůůǁĂƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƌŝǀĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽǁ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ͘/Ŷ ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ǁŝƚŚ ƚŚĞ ZĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ŝŶ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ 'ƌĞĂƚ ĂƐƚ :ĂƉĂŶĂƌƚŚƋƵĂŬĞ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůĂƚĞĚ ŵŝŶŝƐƚƌŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ͕ ĞǀĞƌǇ ĞĨĨŽƌƚ ǁŝůů ďĞ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŽ ƚĂŬĞ ƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ ĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ŚŽŵĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĂĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ͘;ϭͿ dŽ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ƚŚĞ ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌǇ ƉůĂŶ ĨŽƌ ĨŝǀĞ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ
;ϮͿ dŽ ƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ĚĞĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂƚĞ ƚŚĞ ĂƌĞĂƐ ǁŚĞƌĞ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ǁĂƐ ůŝĨƚĞĚKŶ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ϯϬ͕ ƚŚĞ EƵĐůĞĂƌ ŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ůŝĨƚĞĚ ƚŚĞ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶͲWƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ƌĞĂƐ ŝŶ ĂƐĞ ŽĨ ŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ͘ ͕>ŝĨƚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶͲWƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ƌĞĂƐŝŶ ĂƐĞ ŽĨ ŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ

&Žƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ &ƵŬƵƐŚŝŵĂ WƌĞĨĞĐƚƵƌĞ Ăƚ ĂŶĚ ƵŶĚĞƌ ƚŚĞ ĂŐĞ ŽĨ ϭϴ Ăƚ ƚŚĞ ƚŝŵĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚ ;ĂƉƉƌŽǆ͘ ϯϲϬ͕ϬϬϬ ƉĞŽƉůĞͿ͕ Ă ƚŚǇƌŽŝĚ ĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶ ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ ƐŝŶĐĞ KĐƚŽďĞƌ ϵ͘dŚĞ ƐƵƌǀĞǇ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĞǆƉŽƐƵƌĞ ĚŽƐĞ ŽĨ Ăůů ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ŝŶ &ƵŬƵƐŚŝŵĂ WƌĞĨĞĐƚƵƌĞ ;ĂƉƉƌŽǆ͘ ϮŵŝůůŝŽŶ ƉĞŽƉůĞͿ ŝƐ Ɛƚŝůů ŽŶŐŽŝŶŐ͘ ůŽŶŐͲƚĞƌŵ ŚĞĂůƚŚ ĐĂƌĞĂƐĞĚ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƋƵĞƐƚ ĨƌŽŵ ƚŚĞ ĨŝǀĞ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ĚĞƐŝŐŶĂƚĞĚ ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ĞǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶ
ƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚ ĂƌĞĂƐ ŝŶ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ ĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ͕ ĂƐ ƉĂƌƚ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ƚŽ ƌĞĐŽǀĞƌ ƚŚĞƐĞ ĂƌĞĂƐ͕ĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ ŵĂŝŶůǇ ĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ƌŽĂĚƐ ŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ĨŽƌ ůŝǀŝŶŐ ĂƐ ǁĞůů ĂƐ ƚŚĞ ǁĞůůǁĂƚĞƌ ĂŶĚ ƌŝǀĞƌƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽǁ ƵŶĚĞƌ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ͘ ;ƌĞͲƉŽƐƚĞĚͿ/ŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ĂŶĚ ƌĞůĞĂƐĞŽĨ ŵŽŶŝƚŽƌŝŶŐ

ŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ŵŽĚĞů ƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ĚĞĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽǁ ďĞŝŶŐ ŵĂĚĞ ƚŽƉƌŽŵƉƚůǇ ŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ ŝƚ ŝŶ Ăůů ϭϮ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚ ĞǀĂĐƵĂƚŝŽŶ ŽƌĚĞƌ ǁĂƐ ƉůĂĐĞĚ͘dŽ ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ ƉƌĞƉĂƌŝŶŐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĚĞĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ƉůĂŶ ďǇ ŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ͕ ǀŝƐŝƚŝŶŐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞŵƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ĂŶĚ ĚŝƐƉĂƚĐŚŝŶŐ ŽĨ ĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĞŶ ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ͘DĞĞƚŝŶŐƐ ĂƌĞ ŶŽǁ ďĞŝŶŐ ŚĞůĚ ƚŽ ĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ͞ƚŚĞ ĂƐŝĐ WŽůŝĐǇ ĨŽƌ ŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ ĞĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ
tŽƌŬ͟ ĂŶĚ ͞Đƚ ŽŶ ^ƉĞĐŝĂů DĞĂƐƵƌĞƐ ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ,ĂŶĚůŝŶŐ ŽĨ ZĂĚŝŽĂĐƚŝǀĞ WŽůůƵƚŝŽŶ͟ ŝŶ&ƵŬƵƐŚŝŵĂ WƌĞĨĞĐƚƵƌĞ ĂŶĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ŶĞŝŐŚďŽƌŝŶŐ ƉƌĞĨĞĐƚƵƌĞƐ͘ĨĨŽƌƚƐ ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ĨƵůůͲƐĐĂůĞ
ĚĞĐŽŶƚĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ

ĐƚƵĂů ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞƐ ĂůůŽǁĞĚ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ƌŽƵŶĚ ;ĂƐ ŽĨ KĐƚŽďĞƌ ϭϰͿϱ͕ϰϯϱ ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐ͕ ϭϮ͕ϰϰϴ ƉĞŽƉůĞ
;ƚŚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐ ĂĐĐĞƐƐĞĚ ďǇ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ͗ ϯ͕ϵϭϳ ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐͿŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐ ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ZĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚ ƌĞĂƐ͕ ŽŶ ƚŚĞ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ ƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐ ƐĂĨĞƚǇĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ͕ ƚŚĞ ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ƌŽƵŶĚ ŽĨ ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ ďǇ ƉƌŝǀĂƚĞ ǀĞŚŝĐůĞ ŚĂƐ ďĞĞŶĂůůŽǁĞĚ ƐŝŶĐĞ ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ϭϵ͘^ƵƉƉŽƌƚƐ ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ĨŽƌƚŚĞ ĞǀĂĐƵĞĞƐ ;WƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ
ƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇ
Ɖ
Ǉ ĂĐĐĞƐƐ

KĐƚŽďĞƌ ϭϳ͕ ϮϬϭϭEƵĐůĞĂƌ ŵĞƌŐĞŶĐǇ ZĞƐƉŽŶƐĞ ,ĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ

DĂŝŶ WŽŝŶƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ WƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ^ƚĂƚƵƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ͞ZŽĂĚŵĂƉ ĨŽƌ /ŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ ĐƚŝŽŶƐ ĨŽƌ ƚŚĞ ƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ ZĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ
ĨĨĞĐƚĞĚ ďǇ ƚŚĞ EƵĐůĞĂƌ /ŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ͟DĂŝŶ ĚĞƚĂŝůƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐ ŵĂĚĞ ĚƵƌŝŶŐ ƚŚĞ ƚĞƌŵ ;ĨƌŽŵ ŵŝĚͲ^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ƚŽ ŵŝĚͲKĐƚŽďĞƌͿ

Progress of the “Roadmap for Immediate Actions for the Assistance of Residents
Affected by the Nuclear Incident”

October 17, 2011
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters

The progress status of the “Roadmap for Immediate Actions for the Assistance ofResidents Affected by the Nuclear Incident” decided on May 17 is as follows:
1. Efforts to support evacuees(1) Providing of temporary access- Concerning temporary access to the restricted areas, the second round of
temporary access by private car in addition to the existing bus system has
been ongoing, on the assumption of securing safety for the residents.
* Results of the second round of temporary access (as of October 14):5,435 households; 12,448 people(number of granted temporary access by private car: 4,989 households)- The Ministry of Environment and Fukushima Prefectural Government are
working together to retrieve and protects pets, in conjunction withtemporary access. As of August 26, arrangements to protect 302 dogs and
190 cats have been made. Since the second round of temporary accessgranted to residents, the requests from residents to protect their pets havebeen accepted at Sousou Public Health Office, and the activity to protect
and collect pets is being taken based on their requests.
(2) Maintaining order in the evacuation areas- On June 2, a “Special Security Team” (of approx. 300 individuals) was
organized to maintain public safety in the 30km-radius zone of Fukushima
Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) as well as the Deliberate
Evacuation Areas, and is conducting patrols, questioning suspects,
implementing movable checkpoints, etc.
- Additionally, to secure more peace of mind and safety for the residents
through improved crime prevention in the Deliberative Evacuation Areasand previous Emergency-Prepared Areas in Case of Emergency, “Iitate
Village Minders”, consisting of the Iitate Village residents, was formed andbegan patrolling the village on June 6. The town of Kawamata’s“Kawamata Regional Safety Patrol” began operating on June 20, thevillage of Katsurao’s “Katsurao Special Watch Team” on June 21, and thetown of Hirono’s “Hirono Watch Patrol” on July 10. Ongoing patrols are1

being conducted in these villages. In the village of Kawauchi, the“Kawauchi Village Regional Security Team” has newly started patrollingsince September 30.
(3) Promptly obtaining emergency temporary housing and other related
housing- As of October 11, the construction of about 90%, or 15,787 units, hasstarted (of these, the construction of about 90%, or 15,199 units, has been
completed).
- There has been ongoing coordination of the relocation of affected residents
into government employees’ housing, employment promotion housing andlocal governmental public housing, etc. As of October 7, 2,073 households
in Fukushima Prefecture had moved into their new houses or have been
assigned housing (nationwide, 16,537 households have moved into their
new houses or have been assigned housing).
(Note) Emergency temporary housing and other related housing include thosefor residents affected by the earthquake and tsunami.
(4) Implementation of Deliberate Evacuation
1) Progress status of Deliberate Evacuation- Resident evacuation has been almost completed in the five municipalities
that were wholly or partially designated as the Deliberate Evacuation
Areas.
- As an exception to continuing business operations in Deliberate
Evacuation Areas, on May 17, the Nuclear Emergency Response
Headquarters informed Iitate Village and Kawamata Town which had
applied for exceptions that, in case the municipality permits a business tocontinue operating on the basis of an exceptional reason, there should be
no impediment provided that ample safety precautions are taken (8businesses in Iitate Village and 2 in Kawamata Town are continuing
operations on this basis).
2) Livestock relocation and other related issues- In addition to providing necessary assistance such as identifying a
relocation destination outside the area, there were notifications provided
to Fukushima Prefecture on procedures and other related issues forlivestock screening and decontamination.
- As of October 5, 126 cattle remain in the Deliberate Evacuation Area out of
the approximately 9,300 heads subject to evacuation.
(5) Establishing “Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation”
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Multiple spots, where the cumulative dose over a one-year period after theaccident is estimated to exceed 20mSv, located in areas that are outside
the Deliberate Evacuation Areas or Restricted Areas and do not show asmuch regional spread as the Deliberate Evacuation Areas, are designatedas “Specific Spots Recommended for Evacuation”, to raise the residents’awareness and to assist and promote evacuation. (On June 30, 104 spots(113 households) were designated in the city of Date, and on July 21 andAugust 3, 122 spots (131 households) were designated in the city of
Minamisoma and 1 spot (1 household) in the village of Kawauchi.)Efforts towards homecoming(1) Review on evacuation areas and supports after lifting the designation forevacuation areas- On September 30, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters lifted
the designation of Evacuation-Prepared Areas in case of Emergency.
- In cooperation with the Reconstruction Headquarters in response to theGreat East Japan Earthquake and related ministries and agencies,
prudential efforts are being made for residents’ homecoming by means ofrealizing the recovery plan of the affected five municipalities (Hirono Town,
Naraha Town, Kawauchi Village, Tamura City, and Minamisoma City),
decontaminating the areas where the designation was lifted, and so on.
- Taking into account the request from the affected municipalities, including
the expansion and strengthening of monitoring in line with the Recovery
Plan of the affected five municipalities which had been previously
designated by the Evacuation-Prepared Areas in case of Emergency, theSupport Team for Residents Affected by the Nuclear Incidents, theMinistry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT),the Ministry of Environment, etc. are now carrying out in-depth
monitoring mainly on the roads for living, the well water, rivers, etc. (theresults will be officially announced around October to November, andaround February in 2012).
- The Municipalities Reconstruction Support Team in response to the
Nuclear Incident, which was established in the Reconstruction
Headquarters in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake in order toalways and promptly respond to various requests from the affected people,
has been exchanging opinions with the affected municipalities.
- Concerning the subsidy for employment coordination, the business owners
of private schools and hospitals whose major users are children and thecare needed persons among the business owners with offices located in theprevious Evacuation-Prepared Areas in case of Emergency were, on
principle, not regarded as the grantees of the subsidy; however, it has been
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decided that these business owners are also granted provided that theirbusiness has been reduced (including the prospects) after the day when thedesignation as the Evacuation-Prepared Area was lifted, and that a certain
requirement is satisfied.
With regard to the special measure on employment insurance (themeasure the persons who are under suspension of business or temporarilyout of employment can be granted with unemployment allowance), it has
been decided that the measure will be continuously applied even after the
day when the designation is lifted.
Concerning the Restricted Areas and Deliberate Evacuation Areas,
although the review will be conducted at the completion of Step 2, efforts
will be made in advance for decontamination, monitoring, andreconstruction of the living environment.

(2) Efforts towards full-scale decontamination- On August 26, the “Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling ofEnvironment Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by NPS
Associated with the Tohoku District-Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that
Occurred on March 11, 2011”, a lawmaker-initiated bill, was enacted by
the Diet. As a result, work is underway for the legislation to come into
effect on January 1, 2012, with the Ministry of Environment leading theinitiative.
- The Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, determining that
decontamination was an urgent matter for immediate action, put together“The Basic Concept for Pushing Ahead with Decontamination Works” and“Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Works”, andestablished that thorough and ongoing decontamination would be carriedout in partnership with relevant parties. Within the scope of this plan,
areas whose annual exposure dose exceeds 20mSv will be targeted for dose
reduction to under 20mSv, and areas whose exposure dose under 20mSv
will also be targeted for reduction towards an estimated annual exposure
dose of 1mSv, with cooperation of municipal governments and local
residents. In addition, highest priority was given to thoroughdecontamination of the everyday environment of children, with an aim of
reducing the estimated annual exposure dose towards 1mSv as soon as
possible, and eventually undercutting that figure.
- In order to support efforts based on these policies, a Cabinet decision wasmade on September 9 to expend approximately JPY220 billion of the fundallocated to Great East Japan earthquake recovery and rebuilding fordecontamination and organize a “Fukushima Decontamination Promotion
Team” within the local off-site center.
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Given this decision, the Support Team for Residents Affected by the
Nuclear Incident is preparing to take the decontamination work which has
been conducted in advance as pilot projects in the cities of Date andMinamisoma since late August, and rapidly deploy them in all 12municipalities subjected to evacuation orders.
In Fukushima Prefecture and neighboring prefectures, sessions for related
municipalities are being held to explain about “the Basic Policy for
Emergency Decontamination Work” and “the Act on Special Measuresconcerning Handling of Radioactive Pollution.”
In addition, consecutive visits to each municipality and dispatch of experts
have been started in order to support planning out the decontamination
scheme by municipalities.
With regard to contamination by radioactive materials, on August 25, theCabinet Secretariat established the “Office of Response to Radioactive
Materials Contamination” in order to ensure close partnership, and tocarry out comprehensive coordination, among the relevant ministries andagencies, in terms of the regulations other responses necessary fordecontamination of contaminated areas, rubble disposal, healthmanagement for the residents and preventing the spread ofcontamination.

[The basic approach to cleanup work (decontamination) in residential areas]- On July 15, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters put together“The Basic Approach to Cleanup Work (Decontamination) in Residential
Areas (Except Restricted Area and Deliberate Evacuation Area) in
Fukushima Prefecture”, and notified Fukushima Prefecture and theMinistry of Environment of cautions to be taken when residents perform
cleanup work, and the approach to the waste collected during cleanup.
[Decontamination of agricultural soil]- In collaboration with Fukushima Prefecture, the Ministry of Agriculture,
Forestry and Fisheries began verification testing on May 28 for thedevelopment of decontamination technology for agricultural soil. Based on
tests conducted by the end of August, methods for decontaminating
agricultural soil according to use classification and concentrations ofcontaminants were released to the public on September 14.
- On September 30, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
officially announced appropriate methods for decontamination ofagricultural soil based on the “Guidelines for Municipal Decontamination
Work”.
5

[Decontamination of forests]- With regard to the investigations on the distribution status of radioactive
materials in forests and verification tests on decontamination in forests,
which the Forest and Forest Products Research Institute (an Incorporated
Administrative Agency) has been conducting as the central body, theMinistry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries officially announced on
September 30 the results obtained so far, and the decontamination points
in the forests near residential areas which have been determined based onthese results.
- On September 30, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
officially announced appropriate methods for decontamination of forests
based on the “Guidelines for Municipal Decontamination Work”.
[Dose surveying for schoolyards and managing the soil]- The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology(MEXT) and the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) set a goalof limiting every student’s annual exposure at schools to 1mSv, andallocation of financial support was decided for those schools with aschoolyard air dose rate of higher than 1mSv/hour that seek soil dose
reduction measures (May 27, June 6). The support was also extended tocommunities outside Fukushima Prefecture (June 20).
- MEXT distributed approximately 1,800 cumulative dosimeters to every
elementary and junior high school in Fukushima Prefecture. Cumulative
dosimeter allocation was also approved for schools outside Fukushima
Prefecture that request them, provided those institutions have aschoolyard air dose rate of higher than 1mSv/hour (June 20).
- The second supplementary budget included appropriations for dose
reduction work on schoolyards and other locations, including those regions
outside Fukushima Prefecture (approximately JPY4.5 billion through
MEXT and JPY0.5 billion through MHLW) and (JPY18 billion out of
JPY96.2 billion) for the aforementioned “Health Fund for Children and
Adults Affected by the Nuclear Accident” created by Fukushima Prefecture,
to be used for dose reduction projects for public facilities such as schools,
parks, and school zones.
- In response to the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters’ “The Basic
Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Works” and“Guidelines for Municipal Decontamination Work”, MEXT and MHLW
sent out notices that the dose received by children at schools, day caresand other facilities was to be under 1mSv annually as a rule, theschoolyard air dose rate should be under 1μSv/hour in order to achieve thisdose, and that spots with relatively high reading should be identified and6their decontamination started. The Ministries also informed Fukushima
Prefecture of the future approach to dose reduction in child welfare
facilities other than day cares (August 26).
(3) Review of revitalization and reconstruction of local communities- On June 25, “Proposal for Reconstruction” was put together by the
Reconstruction Design Council in Response to the Great East Japan
Earthquake.
- With the enactment of the Basic Act on Great East Japan Earthquake
Reconstruction (June 24), the Headquarters for the Reconstruction fromthe Great East Japan Earthquake and the Local Headquarters in Iwate,
Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures were established.
- Based on the above Act, a “Basic Policy on Reconstruction” was put
together on July 29.
- Based on the above Basic Policy on Reconstruction, the Japanese
government and Fukushima Prefecture established the “Council for
Reconstructing Fukushima from the Nuclear Accident”. In the first session
on August 27, the topics for future exploration were organized such as the
proposition of the Special Act on Reconstruction from Fukushima
Prefecture, and in the second session on October 17, the governmental billon the tertiary supplementary budget was reported.
3. Ensuring security and safety of affected residents(1) Managing the long-term health of local residents (assessing radiation levels)- More than 220,000 people have been screened in terms of body surface
contamination as of October 1 (from March 13), with experts sent from
related organizations, universities and local governments working under
the supervision of Fukushima Prefecture. No cases of adverse healtheffects have been found to date.
- In light of request from Fukushima Prefecture, appropriations were madein the secondary supplementary budget for the “Health Fund for Children
and Adults Affected by the Nuclear Accident” created by Fukushima
Prefecture through mid- to long-term projects (JPY78.2 billion out of
JPY96.2 billion in total).
- For the Health Management Survey for the Residents in Fukushima
Prefecture which is implemented using the Health Fund, Fukushima
Prefecture will conduct a basic survey to estimate exposure dose and an
in-depth survey to grasp health conditions. A preliminary survey was
initiated in the town of Namie, village of Iitate, and the Yamakiya ward of
the town of Kawamata, where environmental monitoring results indicateda possibility of higher external and internal exposure relative to other
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communities. The results of this preliminary survey will be taken into
account, and questionnaires will be mailed to residents beyond thesecommunities starting on August 26 (as of September 30, thequestionnaires were mailed to approx. 400,000 people).
Concerning the in-depth survey, mid- and long-term investigations arescheduled, including the ultrasonic thyroid examination for all residents inFukushima Prefecture at and under the age of 18 at the time of theaccident for early discovery of the thyroid cancer (started on October 9),
the health checkup for the residents in evacuation areas with additional
necessary checkup items in addition to the existing ones, the checkup
opportunities to be newly given to the residents in the prefecture who were
excluded from the existing checkups, the survey on mental health andlifestyle for the residents in evacuation areas, and the survey for pregnant
women who were provided with a maternity passbook during the period
from August 1, 2010 to July 31, 2011.
Since June 27, the National Institute of Radiological Sciences (NIRS) has
been evaluating methods for measuring internal contamination level using
whole body counters and internal exposure level using urine bioassays andother means, with cooperation from 122 residents of those areas subject tothe preliminary survey as well as 52 people who were evacuated out of the
20km zone soon after the accident.
The Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) carried out an internal exposure
survey by whole body counters, etc. for approx. 3,200 evacuees (Namie
Town, Iitate Village, Kawamata Town) between July 11 and the end of
August. In addition, since September, the survey has been conducted forapprox. 5,300 people, by extending the target areas to towns and villages
in Futaba County (except Namie Town).
Fukushima Prefecture is now supporting the loan business of personal-use
cumulative dosimeters (such as film badges) for children and pregnant
women (approx. 300,000 people), and the municipalities which will
implement the mental and physical health care business for children.

(2) Ongoing implementation of environmental monitoring (atmosphere, soil, rivers,
ground water, seawater and seabed) and its evaluation
1) Implementation of ongoing environmental monitoring- In order to implement radiation monitoring related to TEPCO’s
Fukushima NPS accident in a certain and deliberate manner, MEXT
organized a Coordination Meeting for Monitoring to unify and coordinate
the radiation monitoring work being conducted by the related ministries
and agencies, local authorities and operators (1st round on July 4, 2ndround on August 2). The meeting resulted in the creation of a “Total
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Monitoring Plan” on August 2, which lays out the content and role
allotments for the monitoring to be conducted in partnership among theJapanese and local governments and other entities by the end of 2011.
Regarding the Evacuation-Prepared Areas in case of Emergency, achild-centered perspective and the wishes of the community wereemphasized in the monitoring of schools, hospitals, libraries, and theirenvirons implemented by MEXT and the Support Team for Residents
Affected by the Nuclear Incidents, and the results were officiallyannounced on August 9, 16, and September 22. (The results were used as areference data for lifting of the designation “Evacuation-Prepared Areas incase of Emergency.)
Taking into account the request from the affected municipalities, including
the expansion and strengthening of monitoring in line with the Recovery
Plan of the affected five municipalities which had been previously
designated by the Evacuation-Prepared Areas in case of Emergency, theSupport Team for Residents Affected by the Nuclear Incidents, MEXT, theMinistry of Environment, etc. are now carrying out in-depth monitoring
mainly on the roads for living, the well water, rivers, etc. (the results will
be officially announced around October to November, and around February
in 2012). (Re-posted)
On September 1, the Support Team for Residents Affected by the Nuclear
Incidents and MEXT officially announced the “Results of Wide-Area
Monitoring in Restricted Areas and Deliberate Evacuation Areas”.
MEXT conducted aircraft radiation monitoring on a zone approximately
100km in radius around Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS over the Prefectures of
Miyagi, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Yamagata, the western Fukushima, Gunma,
Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa, Niigata, Akita, as well as Tokyo Metropolitan
Area, and published the results. Aircraft monitoring is currently being
conducted over the Prefectures of Iwate, Shizuoka, Nagano, Yamanashi,
Gifu, Toyama, Aomori, Aichi, and Ishikawa. Aircraft monitoring isscheduled to be implemented over the whole East Japan, aimed to becompleted by the end of 2011.
MEXT has updated the “Dose Rate Map” and “Accumulated Dose
Estimation Map”. (So far, updates have been released on April 26, May 16,
June 3 and 21, July 20, August 19, and September 16.)2) Creation of dose rate map and other maps
- Between June 6 and July 8, MEXT conducted air dose rate measurements
and soil survey as a means of creating maps of radiation dose and other
distributions all over Fukushima Prefecture and neighboring regions. An
air dose map was released on August 2, a surface deposition map of9-radioactive cesium on August 30, and a surface deposition map of iodine
131 on September 21. In addition, a survey of migration of radioactive
materials was conducted, and the study results on the migration ofradioactive materials in forests were published on September 14.
Furthermore, a nuclide analysis on plutonium and radioactive strontium
was conducted and the result was announced on September 30.
In terms of forests, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries iscurrently conducting air dose rate and soil survey of forests as a means ofmapping the concentration distribution of radioactive materials by the endof February 2012.

3) Implementation of environmental monitoring on farm land
- The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries began conducting asoil survey of farm land on May 30 as a means of mapping the distributionof radioactive materials concentration, and released the map on August 30.
4) Implementation of environmental monitoring offshore- MEXT has expanded the target area for marine radiation monitoring off
the coasts of Fukushima, Ibaraki and Miyagi, and will continue to conduct
seawater and seabed soil measurements.
- The Ministry of Environment implemented radiation as well as hazardous
materials monitoring off the coasts of Miyagi and Iwate prefectures.
- In terms of concentrations of radioactive materials in offshore seawaterand seabed, MEXT and the Ministry of Environment released their survey
results on October 5 and July 8, respectively.
- The Ministry of Environment implemented radiation as well as hazardous
materials monitoring for public water basins (rivers) and groundwater inFukushima Prefecture. The measurement results for concentrations ofradioactive materials for public water basins were released on June 3 andAugust 1 (the measurement during high water levels following rainfall),and for groundwater on June 21 for 5 spots, on July 7 for 41 spots, on July
14 for 55 spots, and on August 4 for 10 spots.
5) Implementation of monitoring for radioactive materials in food and tap
water- Regarding radioactive materials in food and tap water, the relevant local
governments are conducting ongoing examinations, and the results arebeing disclosed daily by the Government.
(*) Of the 27,015 cases of examination for food, 675 cases exceeded theprovisional regulation limit (as of October 3), and of 48,521 cases of
examination for tap water, 69 cases exceeded the indicator values (as of10

-October 3). There have been no instances of tap water level exceeding thelimit since March 30.
The Consumer Affairs Agency will provide assistance to local governments
for installing radiation dose inspection equipment for food through the“Funds to Improve Regional Consumer Policy” and existing subsidies forthe operating costs of the National Consumer Affairs Center of Japan.

6) Others- MEXT has been proceeding the procurement procedures necessary forstrengthening the environmental monitoring in Fukushima Prefecture,such as building of real-time radiation monitoring systems and installingof transportable monitoring posts. In addition, MEXT is now undercooperation with relevant organizations to enhance the environmental
monitoring nationwide, such as installing of additional monitoring posts inother prefectures and the maintenance of environmental sample analysis
equipment (an additional appropriation of approximately JPY23.5 billion
was made in the secondary supplementary budget, part of which is for the“Health Fund for Children and Adults Affected by the Nuclear Accident”).

(3) Disposal of rubble, sludge and other waste[Disposal of rubble]- On June 23, the Ministry of Environment finalized the disaster waste
disposal policy for Fukushima Prefecture.
- The temporary storage method for incinerated ash of between 8,000Bq/kg
and 100,000Bq/kg was organized, and the Ministry of Environment
published “Temporary Storage of Disaster Waste Disposal in Fukushima
Prefecture” on July 28.
- The handling of electric air cleaners and the monitoring frequency forincinerated ash and exhaust were organized, and the Ministry ofEnvironment published “Incineration Facilities and Monitoring of Disaster
Waste Disposal in Fukushima Prefecture” on August 9.
- A policy on the disposal method for incinerated ash and other waste of
between 8,000Bq/kg and 100,000Bq/kg was announced by the Ministry ofEnvironment on August 31, taking into account technology-oriented
examination by the Review Meeting on Safety Assessment of Disaster
Waste.
[Disposal of sludge and other waste]- Radioactive materials have been detected from sewage sludge and otherby-products outside Fukushima Prefecture, mostly in eastern Japan.
11Consequently, on June 16, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
put together a provisional policy regarding the handling of sludge andother byproducts of water and sewage treatment found to containradioactive materials.
4. Ensuring employment and support for agriculture and industries(1) Ensuring employment- The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) and Fukushima Prefecture havejoined forces to expand job opportunities for, and offer management
assistance to, residents and businesses affected by the nuclear incident,
and are aiming to create 20,000 jobs in the prefecture through thefollowing measures.
- To provide the affected people with employment opportunities, joint job
fairs will be held in the prefecture with a target of 5 events by the end of
2011. (So far, three fairs have been held. A 4th fair is scheduled in the city of
Koriyama on November 24.)
- A request was made jointly by METI, MHLW and Fukushima Prefecture
to 26 economic organizations in manufacturing, retail and other sectors tomaintain or create job opportunities in light of the Fukushima NPS
accident (May 26).
- A plan to hire 11,000 people in Fukushima Prefecture has been arrangedby the Job Creation Fund Programs, and of these, 6,769 people havealready secured jobs (according to the data processed by MHLW as of
September 29).
- Limited to the New Graduate Employment Support Project (Internship
Project) held in Fukushima Prefecture, matching of new graduates andsmaller businesses is now being proceeded under the condition of morerelaxed requirements than before during the practice period at work
places.
(2) Agricultural, livestock and fishery industries, etc.
- To ensure swift and appropriate processing of compensation for damages tothe business operators in agricultural, forestry and fishery industries,
liaison conferences were held (a total of 7 since April 18) by the Ministry ofAgriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the prefectures and cities involved
and other relevant parties (190 organizations as of September 29) to offer
information and exchange views regarding the development in nuclear
damage compensation.
- In response to the identification of cesium exceeding provisional limits inbeef and rice straw, emergency support measures were issued on July 26,
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namely 1) measures to restore trust in domestic beef, 2) assistance to beef
cattle ranchers, and 3) assistance to enable emergency supply of rice straw.
On August 5, given that there are now 4 prefectures subject to shipping
restrictions, new measures were announced, including support for thede-facto purchase of shipping-delayed cattle by prefectural livestockindustry associations.
In terms of rice, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters issued
instructions on April 22 to refrain from planting in Restricted Areas,
Deliberate Evacuation Areas and Evacuation-Prepared Areas in Case of
Emergency. In addition, 2-stage radiation surveys were conducted on therice before and after harvest, in those municipalities outside the above andshowing high soil concentration of radioactive materials.
Bridge loans are being offered by Japan Agricultural Cooperatives (JA)and Japan Fisheries Co-operatives (JF) groups to support those business
operators in agricultural, forestry and fishery industries subjected toshipment suspension, and approximately 630 loans have been made as of
September 20 (approx. JPY2.2 billion).

(3) Measures for small and medium enterprises- The new long-term, low-interest (some no-interest for all intents andpurposes) loan system “The Great East Japan Earthquake Special
Recovery Loans” for small- and mid-sized companies that saw significant
direct or indirect damage from the disaster, including via the nuclear
incident or harmful rumors, and the new guarantor system “The Great
East Japan Earthquake Emergency Guarantee for Recovery”, which
establishes a new framework completely separated from the existingguarantor system, began operating on May 23. Between May 23 andOctober 7, “The Great East Japan Earthquake Special Recovery Loans”
served 92,298 cases totaling JPY2.85 trillion, and “The Great East Japan
Earthquake Emergency Guarantee for Recovery” served 55,571 cases
totaling JPY1.38 trillion.
- For small and medium enterprise owners with their places of business in
the restricted area who were therefore forced to relocate to new premises,
METI and Fukushima Prefecture agreed on a system of special support toprovide them with long-term, no-collateral, no-interest loans independentof regular funding support. The program began accepting applications on
June 1 at Fukushima Prefectural Industrial Revitalization Center as well
as chamber of commerce offices throughout the prefecture. There havebeen 343 applications, for a total of approximately JPY7.8 billion (as of
October 12).
- For small- and medium-sized businesses whose places of work are located
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in the Evacuation-Prepared Areas in Case of Emergency, METI andFukushima Prefecture have made a basic agreement on providing newloans which are required for continuing and restarting businesses in theseareas after the designation was lifted. Discussions are now being madetowards planning of a system.
Regarding the restoration projects for temporary storefronts and plants(taken in the primary and secondary supplementary budgets) by theOrganization for Small & Medium Enterprises and Regional Innovation,
the organization received restoration requests from 35 locations in 16
cities, towns, and villages in Fukushima as of October 6. Works wereconsequently initiated in 23 locations where a basic agreement was
finalized: Iwaki City (2 locations), Shinchi Town (2 locations), Bandai Town
(1 location), Minamisoma City (3 locations), Soma City (2 locations), Koori
Town (1 location), Iitate Village (5 locations), Naraha Town (1 location),
Fukushima City (1 location), Namie Town (4 locations), Okuma Town (1location), Katsurao Village (3 locations). Of these, works have been
completed in a total of 13 locations in Iwaki City, Shinchi Town (2locations), Minamisoma City (2 locations), Soma City (2 locations), Koori
City, Fukushima City, Iitate Village (2 locations), and Okuma Town.
Ongoing requests for appropriation on this business are also made in thetertiary supplementary budget.
Concerning the Restoration Assistance Business for Small and Medium
Enterprises, Groups and Facilities to support recovering the facilities andequipment owned by core small and medium enterprises in the regions,offers were made for public applications in Fukushima Prefecture from
September 5 to 22, and the applications are now under review. Ongoing
requests for appropriations are still made in the 2012 initial budget, sothat the business will be continuously implemented.
JETRO, in cooperation with the Organization for Small & Medium
Enterprises and Regional Innovation, has extended assistances formeasures such as participating in exhibitions at home and abroad, holding
business meetings by inviting overseas buyers, and dispatching trade
missions to open overseas sales channels, with an aim of predominantly
supporting small and medium businesses in Tohoku District for theiroverseas business deployment (JPY1.98 billion in the secondary
supplementary budget and request is being made for appropriation of thetertiary supplementary budget).

(4) Countermeasures against harmful rumors and export assistance<Agriculture, livestock and fisheries>- In conjunction with the “Recovery Action” campaign and as a way to assist
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in promoting consumption of agricultural and fisheries product from theaffected areas (catchphrase: “Show Your Support – Eat!”), PR is being
conducted in the form of newspaper advertisements and televisioncommercials (scheduled to be aired 800 times by the end of this year), as
well as information release about private-sector events that support thiseffort through the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Web site(168 releases as of September 30).
For domestic export-related business operators, a spectrum of responses isbeing implemented such as disseminating information regarding
regulations on Japanese food products on a country-by-country basis,readying a contact office to advise affected companies individually andorganizing a system for issuing certificates to the countries that demandcertificates of origin for products.
For alcoholic beverages, the Regional Taxation Bureau handles the issuingof export certificates, and has been issuing the certificates for production
date and place of origin for alcoholic beverages exported to the EU andAsia since April. A radiological analysis system was also organized, andfrom June on, the Bureau has also been handling the issuance ofcertificates linked to radiological analysis. Furthermore, since October, theBureau is making efforts, in cooperation with the National ResearchInstitute of Brewing, to provide brewers with technical information and toinvestigate radioactive materials for the alcoholic beverages prior to
shipment stored in breweries, anticipating ensuring safety for alcoholic
beverages.
To respond to other nations’ demands for radiological inspection of food ofJapanese origin, support is being provided for deployment of inspection
equipment. At the same time, information is being actively disseminated
so that trust in Japanese food can be regained.

<Manufacturing and retailing>- In terms of fee subsidization for radiation dose inspection of export items
conducted by government-designated inspection organizations, these
entities were designated and officially announced on June 7 by METI. On
June 20, the subsidization for radiation dose inspection was initiated forexporters. The scope of assistance was expanded to inspections of export
containers applied for by shipping companies, and the operation began on
September 8.
- The relevant ministries and agencies, overseas diplomatic missions andJapan External Trade Organization’s (JETRO) overseas offices areworking together to hold information sessions for foreign industries inmajor cities (15 cities in 12 nations and regions), on the nuclear accident15-and domestic monitoring as well as Japan’s efforts on securing safety offood and mining/manufacturing products since the accident. Information
sessions have also been held domestically (3 in Tokyo, 3 in Osaka) for
foreign-affiliated firms as well as consulates and internationalorganizations based in Kansai.
Country-by-country information such as export restrictions andradiological inspections are being provided to businesses on the official
METI and JETRO Web sites. JETRO’s urgent help desk, 36 trade
information centers nationwide and 73 overseas offices worldwide are also
advising businesses.

<Tourism>- Dissemination of accurate and timely information is ongoing, including
exhibitor booths at travel expos and through overseas diplomatic missions.
(5) Other actions
1) Assistance to regional financing- In addition to maintaining and strengthening financial functions in theaffected areas overall, an amendment bill for the Financial Function
Reinforcement Law was submitted to the Diet on May 27 addressing thecontent of relaxing the requirements for capital participation by theGovernment, in order to establish in advance a framework to provide
reassurances to depositors. The law was passed on June 22, and went into
effect on July 27.
2) Proper information release to consumers- As a risk communication, the Consumer Affairs Agency held 2 opinion
exchange sessions in August on the topic of radiation and food safety, withparticipation from both experts and consumers at large. In cooperation
with local governments and consumer groups, information will continue tobe shared with consumers nationwide and opinion exchange sessions will
be held, taking these events into account.
- The Consumer Affairs Agency created “Q&A about Food Products andRadioactivity” (to be revised as needed), a clear and accessible guide toradioactivity and safety of food and other related products, currently
available through the Agency Web site.
5. Support for affected local governments(1) Support for affected local governments- With regard to an existing fund endowed by the power plant siting subsidy,
the initial objective was modified to enable utilization in projects geared
towards disaster recovery and rebuilding, leading to use for 12 projects
16totaling approximately JPY3.1 billion. It was also decided that should an
application be submitted from a local authority of an affected area that is
also eligible for the plant siting subsidy, a payout could take place in April
rather than June, the usual month. An estimated JPY 700 million has
been paid out as a result. The subsidy application deadline has also been
extended from the usual end of May to end of July.
(2) Support for municipalities accepting evacuees- Due to the effects of the nuclear power station accident as a result of theGreat East Japan Earthquake, a large number of residents were forced toevacuate, or even relocate, to areas outside of their municipalities. In orderto respond to this situation, The bill for “Law on Measures Involving
Residents with a Change of Address and Special Exemption from
Administrative Processing of Evacuees, as a Means of Coping with the
Nuclear Power Plant Accident Resulting from the Great East Japan
Earthquake” was submitted to the Diet on July 22, passed on August 5 andcame into effect on August 12. The new law established an exemption
where administrative processes for evacuated residents could be
performed by the government of the receiving municipality, anddetermined measures relating to those undergoing a change of address.
- The municipalities designated and notified under the law on September 16
include Iwaki City, Tamura City, Minamisoma City, Kawamata Town,
Hirono Town, Naraha Town, Tomioka Town, Okuma Town, Futaba Town,
Namie Town, Kawauchi Village, Katsurao Village, and Iitate Village.
6. Compensation for affected residents, business operators and others(1) Regarding the guidelines established by the Dispute Reconciliation
Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation- The Dispute Reconciliation Committee for Nuclear Damage Compensation
prioritizes rapid aid to those who suffered damage, and set the guidelines
starting with those cases deemed the most urgent and likely to fit thedefinition of a nuclear damage, such as government-ordered evacuations
and shipping restrictions. To date, it has issued “The First Guideline
Regarding the Judgment of the Scope of Nuclear Damage Due to TEPCO’s
Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni NPS Accident” (4/28), the Second
Guideline (5/31) and the Supplement to the Second Guideline (6/20). In
addition, it has established a Midterm Guideline (8/5) that adds items forconsideration to the content already established and released as above, topresent the big picture of the extent of the nuclear damage.
- In enabling rapid compensation payout by TEPCO, the government will
likely see multiple disputes as well as payout of indemnity (JPY120 billion)17

-according to the nuclear damage compensation insurance contract. The
second supplemental budget proposal includes expenses for organizing aframework for rapid resolution to these.
On August 29, the Dispute Reconciliation Center for Nuclear Damage
Compensation was launched. The Center, which seeks to resolve disputes
related to the nuclear accident by acting as a mediator between the parties
involved, began accepting applications on September 1, and opened a
Fukushima Office in Koriyama on September 13.

(2) Damage compensation for residents, business operators and others- In April, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) began provisional
compensation payments on a household basis to residents forced toevacuate according to instructions based on the Act on Special Measures
Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and approximately JPY
52.3 billion have been paid out to 56,000 households (as of October 3). On
July 5, TEPCO announced additional provisional compensation payout.
(The payout was on individual basis, ranging from JPY100,000 to 300,000
per person depending on the circumstances and duration of theirevacuation and other damage) Payments began on July 25, and to date,approximately JPY4.34 billion have been paid out to approximately
160,000 people (as of October 3).
- With regard to agricultural, forestry and fishery business operators,
TEPCO and the trade associations involved met to work towards a prompt
payout in the light of the May 12 establishment of “Emergency Support
Measures for Residents Affected by the Nuclear Accident”. Actual payout
began on May 31, and to date, approximately JPY19.4 billion (plusapproximately JPY400 million in individually-sought claims, for a total of
JPY19.8 billion as of October 3) have been paid out to agricultural
associations in 7 prefectures (Fukushima, Ibaraki, Gunma, Tochigi, Chiba,
Kanagawa, and Saitama) as well as fishery associations in 3 prefectures(Fukushima, Ibaraki and Chiba).
- With regard to small and medium enterprises, on May 31, TEPCO
announced the concrete framework for provisional compensation payment
including the scope and method of the payment, and began actual payout
on June 10. Approximately 7,200 companies have received payment
totaling approximately JPY8.3 billion (as of October 3).
- On August 30, TEPCO announced the policies and standards for full-scalecompensation. Applications for compensation have been accepted from
September 12 for individuals, and from September 27 for corporations andoperators. TEPCO has also taken organizational steps to prepare for
implementation of full compensation, including personnel increase. It aims
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to expand the staff from 1,200 (before September 30) to 6,500 (after
October 1).
Full-scale payouts have been started on October 5.

(3) “Act on the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation” and“Act on Emergency Measures Related to the Damage Due to the 2011
Nuclear Accident”- In order to ensure 1) an implementation of prompt and appropriatecompensation for damages, 2) an avoidance of adverse effects on business
operators involved in NPS stabilization and incident management, 3) astable supply of electricity essential for everyday life of the nation, as 3
defining components of the Government’s support framework forcompensation for nuclear damages caused by the accident at TEPCO’s
Fukushima NPS, the Cabinet decided on the draft bill for the Act on the
Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation on June 14, andsubmitted it to the Diet. The law was enacted on August 3. The
Corporation was established on September 12, and after the inauguration
ceremony on September 26, full-scale operation has been started.
- On July 29, “Act on Emergency Measures Related to the Damage Due tothe 2011 Nuclear Accident” was enacted as an emergency measure. Thislegislation establishes the particulars needed for rapid and appropriate
payment of provisional payouts by the government to compensate for thedamages of nuclear accident, as well as for assisting local authorities thatwill establish an emergency response fund for nuclear damage. The law
came into effect on September 18, along with other related government
and ministerial ordinances, and claims for provisional payout have been
accepted from September 21.

19

Basic Policy for Emergency Response on Decontamination Work
August 26, 2011
Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
1. Purposes of this policy
1) To eliminate anxieties about radioactive contamination resulting from theaccident at TEPCO’s Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station as early as
possible, the national government intends to take responsibility foreliminating radioactive contamination by working with prefectural andmunicipal governments and local residents.
2) Currently, lawmakers are deliberating the bill “Bill on Special Measures
on Environmental Contamination due to Radioactive Materials Emitted
from Nuclear Power Station Accident Caused by the Tohoku district - off the
Pacific Ocean Earthquake on March 11, 2011” in the Diet. If this bill ispassed in the Diet, the government will systematically and drastically pushahead with decontamination work in line with the framework as set forth insaid legislation.
On the other hand, since it is necessary to carefully designate applicable
locations or develop technical standards before putting said legislation into
practice, it will take a certain period of time for the government to begin
drastic decontamination work based on said legislation.
3) Nonetheless, decontamination is an urgent task that should be addressed
immediately. Before a new framework for decontamination work becomes
operational in accordance with said legislation, the Nuclear Emergency
Response Headquarters will clearly describe the basic principles of
emergency decontamination services and intends to eliminate radioactive
contamination in collaboration with prefectural and municipal governments
and local residents.
4) The basic principles described herein are consistent with the purposes ofsaid legislation bill and will be replaced with the new framework when the
new legislation is passed in the Diet and comes into effect.
12. Interim targets for decontamination work
1) In line with the 2007 basic recommendations of the International
Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) and “Basic Policy” 1suggested by the Nuclear Safety Commission, the government aims at
quickly phasing out locations with emergency exposure situations2 (i.e.,
additional exposure dose3 is 20 mSv a year or more, according to thecurrent practices).
2) As a long-term target, the government aims at reducing the additional
exposure dose to 1 mSv a year in areas with existing exposure situations4(areas where the additional exposure dose is 20 mSv a year or less,according to the current practices).
3) As a specific target for decontamination work, the government aims to
reduce the estimated annual exposure dose for the general public byapproximately 50% at radiation-contaminated areas within two years at
the latest.
According to the estimate of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters,
annual exposure dose is expected to decrease by about 40% in two years
from the current level because of physical attenuation of radioactive
materials as well as natural attenuation due to wind and weather (i.e.
weathering effect).
With decontamination work reducing the exposure dose by approximately
10% at least, the government will attain the aforementioned 50%
reduction target and aims to further reduce the exposure dose.
4) In addition, as radiation will pose larger negative impacts on children
than adults, it is important to restore a safe environment where children
are able to live their lives without worry. In this context, by thoroughly
conducting decontamination work in places that children frequent, such
1

Nuclear Safety Commission, “Basic Policy of the Nuclear Safety Commission of Japan on
Radiation Protection for Termination of Evacuation and Reconstruction,” July 19, 2011
2
“Emergency exposure situation” means that emergency action is necessary to avoid or mitigate
undesirable impacts at the time of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency.
3“Additional exposure dose” means the exposure dose excluding natural exposure dose andmedical-purpose exposure dose.
4
The term “existing exposure situation” means that radiation exposure already exists, including
long-term radiation exposure after an emergency, at the time that making management-related
decisions becomes necessary.
2

as schools or parks, in the next two years, the government aims at
reducing the estimated annual exposure dose for children byapproximately 60% in two years at the latest.5
According to the estimate of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters,
annual exposure dose for children is estimated to decrease by about 40%
in two years from the current level due to physical attenuation ofradioactive materials as well as natural attenuation due to wind andweather (i.e., weathering effect).
With decontamination work reducing the exposure dose by approximately
20% at least, the government will attain the aforementioned 60%
reduction target and aims to further reduce the exposure dose.
5) The government has set the aforementioned interim targets based on thelimited information available because it recognizes the necessity to
conduct decontamination work immediately. From now on, it will closely
look into these targets and reexamine them at regular intervals throughdetailed monitoring, data accumulation, actual surveys on exposure doses
for children, and decontamination model projects.
3. How to proceed with decontamination work
(1) Basic concept(a) The national government takes responsibility for proceeding withdecontamination work.
(b) To create an appropriate environment for safer and more efficientdecontamination work, the national government will provide further
assistance, including implementing fiscal policies, enhancing andoperating efficient decontamination/measuring equipment, fostering
human resources and sending experts.
In addition, the national government will, through model projects in local
areas including locations with particularly high radiation dose,
continuously provide support, such as technical information, necessary
for decontamination work (“Decontamination technology catalogue”),
including effective decontamination methods, costs or matters for5This is calculated for the location that would have a current air dose rate of 3.8 micro Sv/h(accumulative exposure dose of 20 mSv a year). If decontamination work is already done beforehand,target achievement will be evaluated through comparison with the pre-decontamination level.
3

consideration.
(c) The national government will take responsibility for treatingradiation-contaminated soil arising from decontamination work.
(d) When pushing ahead with the aforementioned projects, the national
government will work and cooperate with the international community
and mobilize expertise from both at home and abroad.
(2) Appropriate local actions in line with radiation dose levels(a) Areas under evacuation directives
1) If you live in an area designated with an evacuation directive (Deliberate
Evacuation Area) because the cumulative dosage might exceed 20 mSv
within a year of the nuclear accident, decontamination work will require
high-level technologies and considerable attention to the safety ofdecontamination workers. For this reason, until local residents return home
after lifting the evacuation directive, the national government will take theinitiative in decontamination work in collaboration with prefectural andmunicipal governments.
2) In locations designated as Restricted Areas, local governments have been
relocated, and access to such locations is prohibited. For this reason, until
local residents return home after lifting the evacuation directive, thenational government will take the initiative in decontamination work incollaboration with prefectural and municipal governments.
On the other hand, municipalities in these areas are permitted to develop
their own decontamination plans and conduct decontamination work on
their own if they wish to do so, as long as they are able to ensure the safely ofworkers and efficacy of the decontamination work. In this case, the national
government will provide all-out fiscal support or provide experts to aid thoseefforts.
3) In locations where the additional exposure dose significantly exceeds 20
mSv a year, the national government will work on decontamination model
projects to present effective and efficient decontamination techniques and4

safety programs for decontamination workers in high-level exposure areas.
(b) Other areas where the additional exposure dose ranges from 1 to 20 mSv
a year1) If the additional exposure dose stands at 20 mSv a year or less, it iscontaminated with radioactive materials, but the municipality is still able towork, and local residents are able to live there. In this case, systematic
decontamination work on a community-wide basis would be the mosteffective solution because the community grasps the local situation andresidents’ needs.
2) Municipalities will develop their decontamination plans suitable to theircontamination status or residents’ needs in accordance with the “Guidelines
for Municipality’s Decontamination Work.” The national government willassist in ensuring the smooth operation of such decontamination efforts.
If a municipality develops its decontamination plan including
decontamination work at a public facility managed by another entity, it isdesirable that the municipality will work with such other entity in managing
the public facility.
[Important points in decontamination plans]
1. Setting appropriate targets
2. Deciding on appropriate policies and methods for each decontamination
project
3. Responsible organization
4. Setting aside temporary storage space
3) If radioactive dose stands at a relatively higher level from 1 mSv to 20
mSv a year, multi-phase decontamination work will be necessary for
improving contaminated conditions.
On the other hand, if the radioactive dose stands at a relatively low level,
multi-phase decontamination work is basically unnecessary due to physicalattenuation of radioactive materials as well as natural attenuation due to5wind and weather (i.e., weathering effect). However, it is important toeliminate contamination at locations that locally show high radiation dosage,
such as side ditches or rain water gutters.
The national government will provide all-out support when municipalities
develop or conduct their decontamination plans. To be more specific, thenational government will provide support suitable to individualmunicipality’s needs. These support services will include sending experts,
providing fiscal support, giving local residents information on monitoring
results or important considerations in decontamination work, and providing
measuring equipment.
4) If a prefectural or the national government manages a public facility, it
will work closely with the relevant municipality to conduct decontamination
work on the public facility in accordance with the decontamination plandeveloped by the relevant municipality.

(c) Locations where the additional exposure dose is generally 1 mSv or less1) If the radiation dosage is generally 1 mSv a year or less, multi-phasedecontamination work is basically unnecessary on a municipality basis
because of physical attenuation of radioactive materials as well as naturalattenuation due to wind and weather (i.e., weathering effect).
2) On the other hand, since side ditches, rain water gutters or some otherlocations locally tend to show a higher radiation dosage, the national
government will work with prefectural governments and municipalities toprovide necessary support so that local residents or other stakeholders will
be able to safely, effectively and efficiently conduct decontamination work.
4. Treating soil, etc. arising from decontamination work
1) For smoother and quicker decontamination work, it is absolutely
necessary to treat soil arising from decontamination work as well as local
rice straw, farmyard compost or debris.
62) In relation to such treatment of soil, etc., the national government willtake responsibility for allocating repository sites that require long-term
management services as well as providing safety at these repository sites.
It will develop and disclose a roadmap for constructing repository sites assoon as possible.
3) However, since such a drastic solution will require a certain period oftime for securing and developing repository sites of a certain size, andsimply waiting for the establishment of repository sites might prevent
quick decontamination services.
4) For this reason, it would be more realistic that municipalities or local
communities have designated temporary repository sites for soil resulting
from decontamination work. The national government will provide fiscal
and technical assistance for these municipal projects.
5. Prefecture’s cooperation
1) When municipalities develop and conduct their decontamination plans,prefectural government should act as a cross-sectional coordinator asnecessary.
2) In addition, prefectural governments should work with the national
government to provide information, such as monitoring results or importantconsiderations for residents’ daily lives, and to provide an appropriate
environment, such as providing measuring equipment, so that local
residents will be able to efficiently and effectively conduct decontamination
work.

7

Outline of the Act on Special Measures concerning the Handling of Environment Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged
by the Nuclear Power Station Accident Associated with the Tohoku District – Off the Pacific Ocean Earthquake that Occurred on March 11, 2011
PurposeThe purpose of this Act is to promptly reduce the impact of environment pollution on human health and living environment caused by radioactive materials byi tit ti measures off theth national government, local governments, the relevant nuclear operator etc.
instituting

Roles of Stakeholders{ The national government shall implement necessary measures in consideration of its social responsibilities associated with the promotional efforts thus farhl d intoi t its
it nuclear
l energy policy.
channeled{ Local governments shall carry out their proper role in support of measures by the national government.
{ The relevant nuclear operator shall implement necessary measures in good faith, while cooperating with the national and local governments to implement themeasures they have adopted.

Institutions
Basic principles
principle
The Minister of the Environment develops a draft of the basic principles regarding the handling of the environment pollution caused by radioactive materials,
and requests a resolution at a Cabinet Meeting.

Standards
The Minister of the Environment shall set standards for the decontamination and disposal of waste, soil, etc., contaminated by radioactive materials.

Monitoring and measurement
The national government promptly prepares and implements a system of unified monitoring and measurement to figure out the situation of the environment
pollution.

Disposal of wastes contaminated by radioactive materials

Measures for decontamination of soils, etc. (including vegetation,
structures) contaminated by radioactive materials(1) The Minister of the Environment designates areas where wastes may becontaminated by radioactive materials, to such a degree that special
control is required.

(1) The Minister of the Environment, giving due consideration to the degreeof contamination, designates areas where it is necessary for the national
governments to carry out measures for decontamination, etc.

(2) The Minister of the Environment develops a plan regarding disposal, etc.
of wastes in the area of (1).

(2) The Minister of the Environment develops a plan to carry out thesemeasures for decontamination, etc. in the area of (1), and the national
government carries out the measures.

(3) The Minister of the Environment designates wastes which are locatedoutside the area of (1) and whose state of contamination by radioactive
materials exceeds a certain level.

(3) The Minister of the Environment designates areas (city, town, villageetc.) other than (1) where states of contamination are expected not to
conform to requirements.

(4) Disposal of the wastes in the area of (1) and the waste designated as (3)(specified waste) is carried out by the national government on the basisof the standard.

(4) As for zones recognized as not conforming to the requirements throughan investigation on the state of contamination in the area of (3), thegovernor of the prefecture (*), develops plans designating mattersregarding the measures for decontamination, etc.

(5) As for the disposal of waste with low levels of contamination except
those of (4), the regulation of the Waste Management and Public
Cleansing Law is adapted.

(5) Based on the plans of (4), the national government, the governor of theprefecture, the mayor of the municipality, etc. carry out measures fordecontamination, etc.

(6) The unauthorized dumping of waste designated under (4) shall be
prohibited.

(6) The national government implements measures in place of theprefectural governor, or city, town or village when necessary.
(7) The unauthorized dumping of contaminated soil shall be prohibited.
* Including the mayor of the municipality designated by Cabinet Order.

* The relevant nuclear operator shall take necessary measures on decontamination and disposal of on-site waste and soil as well as any rubble from reactor
facilities that has been dispersed beyond the site.

Facilitation of the disposal of specified waste or the contaminated waste and soil, etc.
The national government shall take necessary measures aided by the relevant local government to properly promote measures on decontamination anddisposal of waste and soil polluted by radioactive materials, including the establishment of necessary facilities.

Financial resources{ The national government shall take measures to finance the costs required for the promotion of measures to deal with contamination by radioactive
materials.
{ Measures taken pursuant to this Act shall be considered to be related to damage to be compensated under the Act on Compensation for Nuclear Damage,and are thus to be implemented at the expense of the relevant nuclear operator.
{ Taking its social responsibility into account, the national government shall implement necessary measures to ensure that the relevant nuclear operator
makes timely payments to cover the cost of measures taken by local governments etc. under this Act.

Review clauses{ In three years from the enforcement of this Act, the status of enforcement shall be reviewed and necessary measures shall be taken.
{ The environmental laws concerning radioactive materials shall be reviewed.
{ Necessary measures shall be considered on the nuclear reactors etc. of the concerned nuclear power station accident.