nd

DALBAR’s 22 Annual
Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior
2015 ended:
For period
12/31/2015
DALBAR © 2016

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR

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TABLE OF CONTENTSABOUT THIS REPORT: QAIB 2016 ......................................................................................................... 3
KEY FINDINGS OF 2015 ........................................................................................................................ 5
DEFENSE WINS CHAMPIONSHIPS! ........................................................................................................... 7
SHOULD “BEST INTEREST” INCLUDE INVESTOR BEHAVIOR? .......................................................................... 10
THE CAUSES OF POOR DECISION MAKING ............................................................................................... 12
THE EVIDENCE OF POOR DECISION MAKING............................................................................................. 13
THE CONSEQUENCES OF POOR DECISION MAKING ..................................................................................... 16
CONSISTENT UNDERPERFORMANCE ....................................................................................................... 16
SYSTEMATIC INVESTING ...................................................................................................................... 18
APPENDICES .................................................................................................................................... 21
YEAR-BY-YEAR INVESTOR RETURNS ....................................................................................................... 22
LONG-TERM ANNUALIZED INVESTOR RETURNS ......................................................................................... 24
GLOSSARY ...................................................................................................................................... 25
INVESTOR RETURN CALCULATION: AN EXAMPLE ....................................................................................... 27
RIGHTS OF USAGE AND SOURCING INFORMATION...................................................................................... 29

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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR

2ABOUT THIS REPORT: QAIB 2016
Since 1994, DALBAR’s Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior (QAIB) has measured the effects ofinvestor decisions to buy, sell and switch into and out of mutual funds over short and long-term
timeframes. The results consistently show that the average investor earns less – in many cases, muchless – than mutual fund performance reports would suggest.
The goal of QAIB is to improve performance of both independent investors and financial advisors bymanaging behaviors that cause investors to act imprudently. QAIB offers guidance on how and where
investor behaviors can be improved.
QAIB 2016 examines real investor returns in equity, fixed income and asset allocation funds. The
analysis covers the 30-year period to December 31, 2015, encompassing the crash of 1987, the dropat the turn of the millennium, the crash of 2008, plus recovery periods of 2009, 2010 and 2012. This
year’s report examines the results of investor behavior on the average investor and poses thequestion as to whether an investor’s “best interest” should include investor behavior.
No matter what the state of the mutual fund industry, boom or bust: Investment results are more
dependent on investor behavior than on fund performance. Mutual fund investors who hold on totheir investments have been more successful than those who try to time the market.

About DALBAR, Inc.
DALBAR, Inc. is the financial community’s leading independent expert for evaluating, auditing andrating business practices, customer performance, product quality and service. Launched in 1976,
DALBAR has earned the recognition for consistent and unbiased evaluations of investment companies,
registered investment advisers, insurance companies, broker/dealers, retirement plan providers andfinancial professionals. DALBAR awards are recognized as marks of excellence in the financial
community.

Registered Fiduciary (RF™)
DALBAR is the registrar of the RF™ (Registered Fiduciary) designation. RF™ is evidence that holders
have adopted a Superior Standard of Care that promises to always act in clients’ best interest, charge
fair compensation, avoid conflicts of interest, is highly qualified, and has a favorable history. For
more information, please see www.FiduciaryRegistry.com.

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Methodology
QAIB uses data from the Investment Company Institute (ICI), Standard & Poor’s, Barclays CapitalIndex Products and proprietary sources to compare mutual fund investor returns to an appropriate
set of benchmarks. Covering the period from January 1, 1986 to December 31, 2015, the study
utilizes mutual fund sales, redemptions and exchanges each month as the measure of investor
behavior. These behaviors reflect the “average investor.” Based on this behavior, the analysis
calculates the “average investor return” for various periods. These results are then compared to thereturns of respective indices.
A glossary of terms and examples of how the calculations are performed can be found in the
Appendices section of this report.

The QAIB Benchmark and Rights of Usage
Investor returns, retention and other industry data presented in this report can be used as
benchmarks to assess investor performance in specific situations. Among other scenarios, QAIB has
been used to compare investor returns in individual mutual funds and variable annuities, as well as
for client bases and in retirement plans. Please see the “Rights of Usage” section in the Appendicesfor more information and appropriate citation language.

Visit the NEW QAIB Store!
Renowned investor behavior research is now at your fingertips! Visit the QAIB Store at
www.QAIB.com for images, infographics and data feeds from the 2016 study.

For questions, please contact Cory Clark at cclark@dalbar.com or 617-624-7100 for additional questions.

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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR

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KEY FINDINGS OF 2015In 2015, the average equity mutual fund investor underperformed the S&P 500 by amargin of 3.66%. While the broader market made incremental gains of 1.38%, theaverage equity investor suffered a more-than-incremental loss of -2.28%.

In 2015, the average fixed income mutual fund investor underperformed the Barclays
Aggregate Bond Index by a margin of 3.66%. The broader bond market realized a slight
return of 0.55% while the average fixed income fund investor lost -3.11%.

Equity fund retention rates decreased slightly in 2015 from 4.19 years to 4.10 years.



Fixed Income retention rates were virtually unchanged from 2014 to 2015 (2.94 years vs. 2.93
years).



Asset allocation funds were the only funds to experience a material change in retention rates.
In 2014 asset allocation fund retention rates were 4.86 years, but decreased to 4.54 years in
2015.



In 2015, the 20-year annualized S&P return was 8.19% while the 20-year annualized return for
the average equity mutual fund investor was only 4.67%, a gap of 3.52%.

The gap between the 20-year annualized return of the average equity mutual fund investor
and the 20-year annualized return of the S&P 500 narrowed from 4.66% to 3.52% in 2015.
Investor Returns1
Asset
Fixed
EquityAllocation
Income
Funds
Funds
Funds

Inflation

S&P 500

Barclays
Aggregate
Bond Index

30 Year

3.66

1.65

0.59

2.60

10.35

6.73

20 Year

4.67

2.11

0.51

2.20

8.19

5.34

10 Year

4.23

1.89

0.39

1.88

7.31

4.51

5 Year

6.92

3.28

0.10

1.58

12.57

3.25

3 Year

8.85

3.81

-1.76

1.07

15.13

1.44

12 Months

-2.28

-3.48

-3.11

0.95

1.38

0.55

1.

Returns are for the period ending December 31, 2015. Average equity investor, average bond investor and average asset allocation
investor performance results are calculated using data supplied by the Investment Company Institute. Investor returns are represented by thechange in total mutual fund assets after excluding sales, redemptions and exchanges. This method of calculation captures realized andunrealized capital gains, dividends, interest, trading costs, sales charges, fees, expenses and any other costs. After calculating investor returns
in dollar terms, two percentages are calculated for the period examined: Total investor return rate and annualized investor return rate. Total
return rate is determined by calculating the investor return dollars as a percentage of the net of the sales, redemptions and exchanges for eachperiod.

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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR

5 In 9 out of 12 months, investors guessed right about the market direction the following month.
Despite “guessing right” 75% of the time in 2015, the average mutual fund investor was notable to keep pace with the market, based on the actual volume and timing of fund flows.
 Money Market assets, as a percentage of all mutual fund assets, tends to increase
substantially during periods of market downturn but is only reinvested into the market
slowly during market recoveries.
 During the downturn of 2008, the percentage of mutual fund assets that were in Money
Market surpassed 40%.
 Asset classes tend to become more correlated during market corrections, somewhat muting
the benefits of diversification and necessitating a downside protection strategy that goesbeyond traditional diversification.
 No evidence has been found to link predictably poor investment recommendations toaverage investor underperformance. Analysis of the underperformance shows that investor
behavior is the number one cause, with fees being the second leading cause.
 Acting in the investor’s best interest should include affirmative practices to curb harmful
behaviors.
 The average equity fund investor outperformed a hypothetical systematic investor on anannualized basis for the period 1996-2015 (4.67% vs. 3.99%). For that same period, thesystematic fixed income investor outperformed the average fixed income investor on anannualized basis (2.58% vs. 0.51%).

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DEFENSE WINS CHAMPIONSHIPS!
Ron Santangelo, CFA

When you think of the great sports dynasties the majority have one thing in common, they had agreat defense. You think of the Steelers’ four Super Bowl wins anchored by their defense “the steel
curtain,” the San Antonio Spurs smothering man-to-man defense, or the pitching of the San Francisco
Giants that helped win 3 of the last 6 World Series.
Defense in investing can be thought of as controlling downside risk.
We believe that defense in the investing world is the ability to preserve capital by controlling
downside risk. Let’s take a look at investor behavior during the last two major market drawdowns
2000-2003 and 2007-2009. During both periods the market decreased over 40%, red line. According
to data from Thompson Reuters Datastream the percentage of money market assets versus total
mutual fund assets, blue line, tended to increase as the market declined and slowly was reinvested as
the market improved (see exhibit 1 below). What we believe this indicates is that investors are loss
instead of risk averse. As the DALBAR studies have indicated over the years, investor behavior has
resulted in dramatically lower returns versus market indices. Therefore, a different investment
approach may be required to gain investor confidence so as to avoid major downdrafts while
participating as fully as possible during recoveries.
Exhibit 1: Money Market Assets as % of All Mutual Fund Assets

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The industry preaches to stay fully invested with diversification as a means of loss mitigation. The
issue is that there are few capital preservation investment strategies, such as QID’s Rotation
Strategies, to protect investors from extreme downside risk. As expected, during major economic
events such as the bursting of the technology bubble in 2001-2003 and the mortgage meltdown of
2008-2009 most asset classes participated in the stock market carnage. Therefore, the major
benefits of diversification across asset classes failed investors when needed most. The relationshipbetween asset classes is known as correlation. Correlation ranges between -1 and +1, where thecloser to one the more asset classes tend to move together and the closer to -1 tend not to move
together. Asset classes that are near zero or negative are considered good diversifiers. For example,
during the mortgage meltdown in 2008, asset class correlations to the stock market moved towards+1 (see exhibit 2 below). The only asset class that maintained a negative or low correlation to thestock market was U.S. Treasuries.
Exhibit 2: Correlation to the S&P 500 Converged Towards One during Market Duress
Asset Class
Russell 2000 (IWM)
MSCI EAFE (EFA)
U.S. REITS
U.S. Inv Gr Corp (LQD)
U.S. Hi Yld Cp (HYG)
Commodities (GSG)
Emerg Mkts Eq (VWO)
Currency (DBV)
U.S. Treasury (IEF)

Correlation 10/31/2007
0.80
0.81
0.67
-0.04
0.69
-0.13
0.41
0.27
-0.45

Correlation 10/31/2008
0.95
0.95
0.83
0.66
0.90
0.60
0.90
0.81
-0.15

Difference
+0.16
+0.14
+0.16
+0.70
+0.21
+0.73
+0.49
+0.54
+0.30

Source: Morningstar Direct

Controlling Downside risk must also be considered when selecting the managers for your portfolio.
Investors have a tendency to select investments that have performed the best over the last couple ofyears. What worked in the past may not be necessarily what will work in the future. A study
performed in 2005 by Rajiv Mallick, former Merrill Lynch Quantitative Manager Due Diligence
Analyst, questioned the persistence of manager performance. The probability of maintaining a top
two quintile ranking, top 40% of managers, over three year rolling periods on average was low (seeexhibit 3 below). A fund that was in the top 40th percentile, top two quintiles, had less than a 20%
probability of maintaining its top 40th percentile ranking the following three years. The bottom line,
do not chase yesterday’s winners.
In addition, it was also pointed out that risk-adjusted measures were also questionable selection
criteria due to the lack of sustainability of returns. The factor that tended to have the most
persistence was ability to predict future performance, was a measure of downside risk known assemi-variance that focused on probability of receiving a return less than zero. Therefore, it would

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appear that investors, advisors and asset managers must use a different measure to select or focus
on managers with downside risk being a leading factor.
Exhibit 3: Persistence of Top Ranked U.S. Equity Funds
Large-Cap
Value

Blend

Mid-Cap

Growth

4/5
15.6
6.7
4.3
Source: Rajiv Mallick

Small-CapMulti-Cap

Value

Blend

Growth

Value

Blend

Growth

Value

Blend

Growth

16.1

4.4

6.3

14.3

19.1

3.6

13.4

15.1

10.3

A Plan Participants savings rate, portfolio risk and equity allocation are also critical factors incontrolling downside risk during retirement.
We ran retirement studies for individuals with starting salaries from $25,000 to $250,000. The
analysis indicated that a plan participant, including employer contribution, should save 6% or more,
select a moderate risk portfolio and not to be too conservative with the equity allocation after age
65. Based on the U.S. longevity studies, the likelihood of one if not both spouses living into their 80’s
and 90’s are increasing. We performed a sensitivity analysis of the probability of a plan participant’s
running out of money twenty years after retirement, age 85. We assumed two savings rates at 3%
and 6% which combines participant and sponsor contributions. In exhibit 4 below, we note theexpected assets at 10 and 20 years after retirement for a plan participant with a starting salary of$50,000. At the 6% savings rate the forecasting model suggests there is only a 5% probability that
one may run out of money. Whereas, at a 3% savings rate there appears to be a 95% probability of
one running out of money as the projected cash flows are all negative. What was very clear from thesensitivity analysis was that the more one makes the more one should save to ensure they may
maintain their life style throughout their lifetime.
Exhibit 4: Future Asset Level Estimate for a Participant with Starting Salary of $50,000 and a moderate risk
asset allocation.

Probability
Savings Rate

95th
10Yr

3%
135.2
6%
2265.6
Source: Morningstar Direct

50th

5th

20Yr

10Yr

20Yr

10Yr

20Yr

-928.51724.1-3.2
1262.2-1,098268.6-104.3635.5-1,299-447.1

Assumptions: wage inflation rate average over the past 40 years of 3.88%. At retirement we used a base case asset
allocation in line with industry standards of equity 20%, bonds 60% and cash 20%. Expense level at retirement was 60% ofcompensation.

The above are excerpts from an in depth report on Retirement available through Quantitative Investment
Decisions, LLC prepared December 2015 at a subscription of $930. In addition, a quarterly screen of managers
that meet our quantitative factors is also available at an annual subscription of $1200. The subscriptions can beordered by emailing ron.santangelo@qidllc.com.

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QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIOR

9SHOULD “BEST INTEREST” INCLUDE INVESTOR BEHAVIOR?
The argument made for regulating the practice of acting in an investor’s best interest is largely basedon the presumption that investors would earn considerably greater returns if they received better
investment recommendations. While this presumption has never been actually tested, the deep
belief is that conflicts of interest are the root cause of the diminished returns. Again, this belief has
never been tested!
Based on presumptions and beliefs, regulators have introduced rules that prohibit conflicts ofinterest and require best interest contracts for business arrangements with most investors.
DALBAR has been analyzing investor returns for over 20 years and found that there are in fact greatly
diminished returns. The diminished returns is the gap between what an investor would earn from a
representative group of investments (index) and the actual returns that an average investor received.
For the 30 years ended December 31, 2015, the S&P 500 index produced an annual return of 10.35%,
while the average equity mutual fund investor earned only 3.66%. The gap of 6.69 percentage points
represents the diminished returns. Recovering a portion of this shortfall would mean hundreds ofbillions of dollars earned by investors.
Additionally, over the 30 year period, the equity index was ahead of investor return in 22 of those
years, showing that the odds of winning are heavily against the investor.
Over and over, it emerged that the leading cause of the diminished return is the investors’ own
behavior. No evidence was found that predictably poor investment recommendations were amaterial factor. Analysis of underperformance shows the following are the primary causes.

Major Causes of Equity Investor Underperformance (20 year analysis)% Contributed toUnderperformance

Cause
Lack of Availability of Cash to Invest

1

Need for Cash (planned and unplanned)

2

Fund expenses (including management fees)
Voluntary investor behavior underperformance
Total

3

Underperformance($Billions)

0.54

44

0.68

55

0.79

65

1.50

122

3.52

286

1

Lack of availability of cash represents the investor return that is lost by delaying the investment.
Need for cash represents the percentage of investor return that is lost or gained by withdrawing the investment before
the end of the period being measured.
3
Voluntary investor behavior generally represents panic selling, excessively exuberant buying and attempts at market
timing.
2

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The causes of underperformance shown here are consistent with extensive other research thatreports on the inadequacy of retirement savings (Lack of availability of cash) which in turn defines
plan leakage (Need for cash) as another major cause of underperformance.
It is not difficult to conclude that the goal of raising investors’ returns should start with the causes ofthe diminished returns.
Capturing the Investor’s (Best) Interest
Acting in the investor’s best interest should be to reduce the investor’s harmful behaviors. Foursuccessful practices to reduce harmful behaviors were introduced in 2014:
Set Expectations below Market Indices … change the threshold at which the fear of failure causes
investors to abandon investment.
Set reasonable expectations and do not permit expectations to be inferred from historical records,
market indexes, personal experiences or media coverage. The average investor cannot be above
average. Investors should understand this fact and not judge the performance of their portfolio basedon broad market indices.

Control Exposure to Risk … include some form of portfolio protection that limits losses during market
stresses.
Explicit, reasonable expectations are best set by agreeing on a goal that consists of a predetermined
level of risk and expected return. Keeping the focus on the goal and the probability of its success will
divert attention away from frequent fluctuations that lead to imprudent actions

Monitor Risk Tolerance… periodically reevaluate investor’s tolerance for risk, recognizing that thetolerance depends on the prevailing circumstances and that these circumstances are subject to change.
Even when presented as alternatives, investors intuitively seek both capital preservation and capital
appreciation. Risk tolerance is the proper alignment of an investor’s need for preservation and desire forcapital appreciation. Determination of risk tolerance is highly complex and is not rational, homogenous
nor stable.

Present forecasts in terms of probabilities …simply stating that past performance is not predictive
creates a reluctance to embark on an investment program.
Provide credible information by specifying probabilities or ranges that create the necessary sense of
caution without negative effects. Measuring progress based on a statistical probability enables theinvestor to make a rational choice among investments based on the probability of reward.

It stands to reason that acting in the investor’s best interest should include affirmative practices, suchas those listed above, to curb harmful behaviors.

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THE CAUSES OF POOR DECISION MAKINGINVESTOR PSYCHOLOGYWhen discussing investor behavior it is helpful to first understand the specific thoughts and actions
that lead to poor decision-making. Investor behavior is not simply buying and selling at the wrong
time, it is the psychological traps, triggers and misconceptions that cause investors to act irrationally.
That irrationality leads to buying and selling at the wrong time, which leads to underperformance.
There are 9 distinct behaviors that tend to plague investors based on their personal experiences andunique personalities.

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THE EVIDENCE OF POOR DECISION MAKING
Short-Term Focus and Market Timing
One thing that all the negative behaviors have in common is that they can lead investors to deviate
from a sound investment strategy that was narrowly tailored towards their goals, risk tolerance andtime horizon. The best way to ward off the aforementioned negative behaviors is to employ astrategy that focuses on one’s goals and is not reactive to short-term market conditions. The datashows that the average mutual fund investor has not stayed invested for a long enough period oftime to reap the rewards that the market can offer more disciplined investors. The data also showsthat when investors react, they generally make the wrong decision.
Retention Rates
Over the past 20 years, equity mutual fundinvestors have seldom managed to stay invested
in their funds for more than 4 years. When they
have done so, it has generally been during
periods of bull markets. Equity fund retention
rates surpassed the 4 year mark in 2004, after the
S&P rose over 28% in the previous year, andstayed there for the 3 years leading up to 2007.
Equity fund retention rates are currently back on
a 3 year streak of exceeding 4 years, starting in2013 with an S&P surge of over 32%.
Fixed income mutual fund investors have notremained invested in their funds for longer than 4
years at any time in the past 20 year and has
exceeded 3 years only once in the past 8 years.
Asset allocation mutual fund investors havecontinued to stay invested longer than theirequity and fixed income counterparts. This data
illustrates the importance of an asset allocation
strategy and how it tends to curb negative
behavior and lead investors to stay morecommitted to that strategy. Asset allocation fundretention rates have stood above the 4 year markfor 7 straight years.

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Market Timing
The retention rate data for equity, fixed income and asset allocation mutual funds strongly suggeststhat investors lack the patience and long-term vision to stay invested in any one fund for much morethan 4 years. This short-term retention does not adhere to a prudent, long-term strategy and is likely
the result of short-term thinking and market timing. This begs the question: has investors’ market
timing been successful?
DALBAR continues to analyze the investor’s market timing successes and failures through theirpurchases and sales. This form of analysis, known as the Guess Right Ratio4, examines fund inflows
and outflows to determine how often investors correctly anticipate the direction of the market thefollowing month. Investors guess right when a net inflow is followed by a market gain, or a net
outflow is followed by a decline.
DALBAR looks at the data to determine when investors correctly guess the timing of their purchases orsales and what impact those decisions have on their returns. The Guess Right Ratio shows thatinvestors who execute purchases or sales in response to something other than a prudent investment
decision reduce the return created by the markets and portfolio managers.

4

Please note that the Guess Right Ratio is not dollar weighted, so it cannot be used to measure returns.

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As is often the case, fund inflows and outflows generally corresponded with the direction of themarket the following month. This was the case 75% of the months in 2015. This would leave one tobelieve that investors are correctly timing the market and should therefore have the returns to proveit. Unfortunately for the average mutual fund investor, they gained nothing from their
prognostications. On the contrary, the average mutual fund investor left a considerable amount ofmoney on the table. Why is this so?
Fund flows may coincide with the market direction the following month, but to what extent? Is it
enough to make up for the damage done in the current month? January and February of 2015 areillustrative of how an investor can guess right but still be wrong. In January of 2015 fund flows
increased by .15% while the S&P shaved -3%. While buying into a weak market in January, investors
guessed right; February brought positive returns that more than recouped the losses of the previous
month. However, mutual fund assets grew in February at only a fraction of the rate they did in
January (.10% versus .15%), suggesting that more investors bought into the -3% correction of January
than bought into the 5.75% surge in February. A look at the S&P performance and fund flows
throughout the calendar year of 2015 shows several instances in which the data series are on
extreme opposite sides of the X-axis (money coming in while the market is going down or money
going out while the market is going up).

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THE CONSEQUENCES OF POOR DECISION MAKING
Consistent Underperformance
We have seen the various psychological phenomena that take hold of an investor at various points ofthe market cycle. Some are driven by fear, some by greed, and others by misconceptions
perpetuated by our limited experiences and outside influences.
We have seen that these psychological factors led investors to move into and out of investments too
frequently, and that their timing in doing so is askew. But what about the alternative? What areinvestors losing by engaging in such behavior? If one looks at the returns of the average investor
against the returns of the overall market, it is clear that the consequences of this investor behavior isserious and detrimental to long-term financial goals.
LONG-TERM RESULTS
When looking at the long-term annualized returns5 of the average equity mutual fund investor
compared to the S&P 500 we see that the average investor has always lagged the overall market.
While the gap between the average equity mutual fund investor and the S&P 500 has narrowed
considerably in the past 15 years, the average investor still has only earned almost half of what theywould have earned by buying and holding an S&P index fund (4.67% vs. 8.19%).

5

The original analyses began in 1984, so 2001 represents an 18 year analysis and 2002 represents a 19 year
analysis. Starting in 2003, the long-term analysis covers a 20-year timeframe.

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2015 RESULTS

The QAIB study has seen much greater underperformance over the years than it did in 2015; the year
2014 being the most recent example. Although the underperformance of 2015 was not quite asacute as other years, the difference between the average fund investor and the overall market was
the difference between making money and losing money.
The underperformance of the average equity and fixed income investor was coincidently the same
(3.66%) when compared against the S&P 500 and Barclays Aggregate Bond Index respectively. The
underperformance of the average asset allocation investor was greater (4.86%). Last year wasparticularly noteworthy because the overall market did make modest gains, but the average investor
suffered depreciation in their account value.

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SYSTEMATIC INVESTING
On the next three pages you will find charts that compare a hypothetical $10,000 investment madeby the average investor to a series of systematic investments totaling the same $10,000. This
comparison is provided for the average equity, fixed income and asset allocation mutual fundinvestor over a comparable twenty year time horizon.
WHY HAS THE SYSTEMATIC INVESTOR UNDERPERFORMED THE AVERAGE INVESTOR?
In comparing the average equity mutualfund investor to a systematic equity
investor, the results may surprise you. The
average investor outperformed thesystematic investor by an average annual
rate of 0.68% (4.67% vs. 3.99%).
But isn’t dollar cost averaging supposed
to be the holy grail of long-term
investing? Surely the average equity
investor, subject to all the poor decision
making discussed earlier, could notoutperform the discipline of a systematicinvestor over 20 years!
These results should not besmirch themerits of dollar cost averaging. For thetwenty years leading up to 2015, theaverage equity investor had a tremendous
advantage. Both sets of hypotheticalinvestors were greeted with a very
harmonious market. The S&P surged over
20% in every year from 1996 to 1999.
The average investor had substantiallymore assets to invest, $3,300 to start andhad invested $5,689 total by the end of
The systematic equity investor is represented by the S&P 500, an unmanaged index of common
stock. Data supplied by Standard & Poor’s. Indexes do not take into account the fees and expenses
1999. During those same years, theassociated with investing, and individuals cannot invest directly in any index. Systematic investing
systematic investor steadily invested only
involves continuous investing in securities regardless of price levels. It cannot assure a profit orprotect against loss during declining markets. Past performance cannot guarantee future results.
$40.67 each month and had only invested$2,000 during that same timeframe.
The average investor had access to cash that the systematic investor did not, and consequently theaverage investor had an account balance of $9,099 by the end of 1999, while the systematic investor
had an account value of only $3,344. A fortuitous entry point provided the average equity investor ahead start over the first 4 years; a head start that it would not relinquish to the systematic investor
over the next 16 years.

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FIXED INCOME
Any doubts regarding the virtues ofsystematic investing based on the equity
analysis on the previous page should bequickly dispelled when looking at their
fixed income counterparts. Fixed income
did not see the extreme gains that
equities did in 1996-1999 and therefore
the average fixed income investor gained
less of an initial advantage over thesystematic fixed income investor.
The average investor started 1996 with
$1,837 invested compared to thesystematic investor who started with $0
invested and systematically invested$40.67 each month. By the end of 1999
the average investor had a hypotheticalaccount value of $2,624 versus a
systematic investor who had an accountbalance of $2,204. Without 20%+ returns
for the first 4 years, the systematicinvestor was almost able to keep up withthe average fixed income investor.
The systematic fixed income investor is represented by the Barclays Aggregate Bond
However, as the years rolled on, andIndex. Systematic investing involves continuous investing in fixed income assets
the extreme bull market of the midregardless of price levels. It cannot assure a profit or protect against loss during
declining markets. Past performance cannot guarantee future results.
late 90’s faded away, slow and steadybegan to win the race.
By August of 2000, the systematic fixed income investor had surpassed the average fixed income
investor and would never look back. Fast forward fifteen years and the systematic fixed income
investor has earned over 5 times that of the average fixed income investor.

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Asset Allocation

The average asset allocation fundinvestor was outperformed by thesystematic equity investor for the periodof 1996-2015. The average asset
allocation investor started 1996 with
$1,990 and doubled his hypotheticalaccount balance in a little over 2 years,
but it would stay at that general level
until 2003.
During that same period, the systematic
equity investor was able to narrow thegap between he and the average asset
allocation fund investor, but would not
eliminate the gap until many years laterin 2009.
From 2009 until 2015, the systematic
equity investor pulled away from theaverage asset allocation investor andended with more than double the money
earned.
The systematic equity investor is represented by the S&P 500, an
unmanaged index of common stock. Data supplied by Standard & Poor’s.
Indexes do not take into account the fees and expenses associated withinvesting, and individuals cannot invest directly in any index. Systematicinvesting involves continuous investing in securities regardless of pricelevels. It cannot assure a profit or protect against loss during declining
markets. Past performance cannot guarantee future results.

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APPENDICES
1. Year-by-Year Investor Returns
2. Long-Term Annualized Investor Returns
3. Glossary
4. Investor Return Calculations: An Example
5. Rights of Usage and Sourcing Information

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YEAR-BY-YEAR INVESTOR RETURNS
The following table shows the one-year investor return since inception from 1985 to 2015. These
calculations assume that investors start investing on January 1 of each year and withdraw theirinvestments on December 31. The effect of compounding across years is therefore lost. Additionally,
because of the year-by-year nature of the calculation, returns cannot be asset weighted.

Year

Avg.
EquityAvg.
Fixed Income

Avg.
Asset Allocation

1985

27.79%

11.86%

20.50%

1986

17.53%

7.94%

5.97%

1987

0.51%

-0.84%

6.03%

1988

17.88%

4.70%-1.78%

1989

23.51%

6.63%

20.77%

1990-5.62%

2.18%

6.81%

1991

29.40%

11.94%

17.25%

1992

7.28%

8.60%

1.13%

1993

15.93%

7.87%

16.66%

1994-0.02%-4.99%-5.48%

1995

26.52%

14.37%

25.36%

1996

17.33%

7.71%

11.51%

1997

20.59%

8.14%

16.02%

1998

34.48%

5.92%

32.40%

1999

26.58%-5.68%

5.47%

2000

-10.20%

4.17%

1.39%

2001

-14.92%-0.75%-5.15%

2002-21.86%

2.20%-10.56%

2003

30.08%

4.31%

16.80%

2004

12.60%

1.30%

8.01%

2005

8.45%

-0.58%

1.95%

2006

14.65%

2.09%

11.12%

2007

7.33%

0.80%

3.47%

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Year

Avg.
EquityAvg.
Fixed Income

Avg.
Asset Allocation

2008-41.77%-11.55%-31.35%2009

32.10%

9.78%

19.31%

2010

14.11%

3.05%

8.83%

2011

-5.73%

1.84%-2.60%

2012

15.62%

4.70%

8.53%

2013

25.69%-3.47%

13.72%

2014

5.51%

1.19%

2.60%

2015

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LONG-TERM ANNUALIZED INVESTOR RETURNS
Year

S&P 500

Average Equity Fund
Investor

Difference

19986
19996
20006
20016
20026
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

17.90%
18.01%
16.29%
14.51%
12.22%
12.98%
13.20%
11.90%
11.80%
11.81%
8.35%
8.20%
9.14%
7.81%
8.21%
9.22%
9.85%
8.19%

7.25%
7.23%
5.32%
4.17%
2.57%
3.51%
3.70%
3.90%
4.30%
4.48%
1.87%
3.17%
3.83%
3.49%
4.25%
5.02%
5.19%
4.67%

-10.65%-10.78%-10.97%-10.34%-9.65%-9.47%-9.50%-8.00%-7.50%-7.33%-6.48%-5.03%-5.31%-4.32%-3.96%-4.20%-4.66%-3.52%

6

The original analyses began in 1984, so that between 1998 and 2002, the period covered was less than 20 years. Since 2003, however,the long-term analysis has covered a 20-year time frame.

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GLOSSARY
Average Investor
The average investor refers to the universe of all mutual fund investors whose actions and financial
results are restated to represent a single investor. This approach allows the entire universe of mutualfund investors to be used as the statistical sample, ensuring ultimate reliability.

[Average] Investor Behavior
QAIB quantitatively measures sales, redemptions and exchanges (provided by the Investment
Company Institute) and describes these measures as investor behaviors. The measurement ofinvestor behavior is the net dollar volume of these activities that occur in a single month during theperiod being analyzed.

[Average] Investor Return (Performance)
QAIB calculates investor returns as the change in assets, after excluding sales, redemptions, andexchanges. This method of calculation captures realized and unrealized capital gains, dividends,
interest, trading costs, sales charges, fees, expenses and any other costs. After calculating investor
returns in dollar terms (above) two percentages are calculated: Total investor return rate for the period
 Annualized investor return rate
Total return rate is determined by calculating the investor return dollars as a percentage of the net
assets, sales, redemptions and exchanges for the period.
Annualized return rate is calculated as the uniform rate that can be compounded annually for theperiod under consideration to produce the investor return dollars.

Dollar Cost Averaging
Dollar cost averaging results are based on the equal monthly investments into a fund where
performance is identical to the appropriate benchmark (either the S&P 500 or the Barclays Aggregate
Bond Index). Investments total $10,000 over 20 years. Dollar values represent the total amountaccumulated after the period under consideration. The percentage is the uniform annualized return
rate required to produce the dollar returns.

Guess Right Ratio
The Guess Right Ratio is the frequency that the average investor makes a short-term gain. One pointis scored each month when the average investor has net inflows and the market (S&P 500) rises in

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the next month. A point is also scored when the average investor has net outflows and the market
declines in the next month. The ratio is the number of points scored as a percentage of the total
number of months under consideration.

Holding Period
Holding period (retention rate) reflects the length of time the average investor holds a fund if thecurrent redemption rate persists. It is the time required to fully redeem the account. Retention rates
are expressed in years and fractions of years.

Hypothetical Average Investor
A $10,000 investment is made in a pattern identical to the average investor behavior for the period
and asset class under consideration. Rates of return are applied each month that are identical to theinvestor return for each month. The resulting dollar value represents what a $10,000 investment
would be worth to the average investor. The dollar amount of the return is then converted to anannualized rate.

Hypothetical Systematic Investor
A $10,000 investment is evenly distributed across each month for the period under consideration.
The appropriate benchmark (either the S&P 500 or the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index) is used as an
assumed return rate and applied each month.
The resulting dollar value represents what $10,000 would be worth to the systematic investor. The
dollar amount of the return is then converted to an annualized rate.

Inflation Rate
The monthly value of the consumer price index is converted to a monthly rate. The monthly rates areused to compound a “return” for the period under consideration. This result is then annualized to
produce the inflation rate for the period.

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INVESTOR RETURN CALCULATION: AN EXAMPLE
Investor return is calculated by measuring the actual gains that investors realize. The following
example is hypothetical:

Step 1: Compute Monthly Net Change
The equity assets at the end of 1/31 are subtracted fromthe assets at 12/31 to determine the change for the month.
The change is the net of investor actions [new investments(which includes the reinvestment of dividends and capitalgain distributions), withdrawals (redemptions), exchanges
in and out], changes in market value, net of loads, fees,
expenses, commissions, etc.

Monthly Change 256
Minus New Investments -123
Plus Withdrawals +105
Minus Exchanges in -25
Plus Exchanges out +12
Equal Net Change in Market
Value 225
(In $ Billions)

1/31 Assets - 12/31 Assets =Change= 256(In $ Billions)

Step 2: Compute Change in Market Value
The change in assets due to investor actions are deducted frommonthly net change, resulting in the market value change that is
net of loads, fees, expenses, commissions, etc. The net change inmarket value is the return earned by the investor for the month,after all fees and expenses are paid. This could be either a gain or
loss.

Step 3: Calculate Total for Period
The calculation is repeated for each month to develop the total forthe periods for which the investor return is being measured – (1, 3,
5, 10 and 20 years.)
The example illustrates a one-year period. Note that the average
investor suffered losses in February, May, June and July but thesewere more than offset by the gains in the other months.

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5196 – 4940

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF INVESTOR BEHAVIORJanuary 225
February -28
March +106
April +106
May -213
June -5
July -20
August +119
September +88
October +195
November +154
December +30
Total for period 757

27

Step 4: Determine Cost Basis
The cost basis is the opening balance for the period adjusted by
the investor actions (new investments, withdrawals, exchanges
in and out).

Opening Assets
4940
Plus New Investments +1288
Minus Withdrawals -1150
Plus Exchanges in +206
Minus Exchanges out -128
Equal Cost Basis 5156
(In $ Billions)

Investor Return $ / Cost Basis =% Return
757 / 5156= 15%

Step 5: Calculate Investor Return Percentage
Dividing the investor return dollars calculated in Step 3 by thecost basis in Step 4 give the total investor return percentage.

(In $ Billions)

Step 6: Find Annualized Rate of Return
Annualized return in then calculated. This is the single rate that can be compounded for each year to
produce the same effect as the varying monthly rates.
Since the period in our example is only one year, the annualized investor return is the same as thetotal investor return.
The formula used to calculate annualized return is:
Annualized Return =[% Return ^(1/# of years)]-1

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RIGHTS OF USAGE AND SOURCING INFORMATION
Rights to redistribute printed or electronic copies, of this complete report to clients is not
permissible. Rights to use portions of the content of this report are granted on the condition the user
makes required regulatory disclosures and sources QAIB and DALBAR as appropriate (see below).
These rights are conveyed to purchasers for their own use and are limited to their own specificpublications. Following are examples of appropriate sourcing and disclosure statements:
Source: “Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior, 2016,” DALBAR, Inc. www.dalbar.com
Equity benchmark performance and systematic equity investing examples are represented by theStandard & Poor’s 500 Composite Index, an unmanaged index of 500 common stocks generally
considered representative of the U.S. stock market. Indexes do not take into account the fees andexpenses associated with investing, and individuals cannot invest directly in any index. Past
performance cannot guarantee future results.
Bond benchmark performance and systematic bond investing examples are represented by the
Barclays Aggregate Bond Index, an unmanaged index of bonds generally considered representative of
the bond market. Indexes do not take into account the fees and expenses associated with investing,and individuals cannot invest directly in any index. Past performance cannot guarantee future
results.
Average stock investor, average bond investor and average asset allocation investor performance
results are based on a DALBAR study, “Quantitative Analysis of Investor Behavior (QAIB), 2016.” DALBAR
is an independent, Boston-based financial research firm. Using monthly fund data supplied by theInvestment Company Institute, QAIB calculates investor returns as the change in assets after
excluding sales, redemptions and exchanges. This method of calculation captures realized andunrealized capital gains, dividends, interest, trading costs, sales charges, fees, expenses and anyother costs. After calculating investor returns in dollar terms, two percentages are calculated for theperiod examined: Total investor return rate and annualized investor return rate. Total return rate isdetermined by calculating the investor return dollars as a percentage of the net of the sales,
redemptions, and exchanges for the period.
Systematic investing examples are hypothetical and for illustrative purposes only. Systematicinvesting involves continuous investments regardless of security price levels. It cannot assure a profit
or protect against loss in declining markets.

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