Session 2: Asian Regional Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges

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Presentation 6:-

Rizal Sukma(Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies)

103

ASEAN and Non-Traditional Security
Introduction
The growing salience of non-traditional security (NTS) problems in Southeast Asia has made it increasingly
difficult for regional states to insist on strict separation between domestic affairs and regional problems. No
regional state can continue to insist that various non-traditional problems within their respective domestic
boundaries can be addressed unilaterally through national response by the state concerned. The magnitude of
the problems, and their impacts beyond national boundaries, render any national response inadequate. In
other words, the nature of non-traditional security problems requires not only national response but also
close regional cooperation to address them.
Indeed, what are now regarded as non-traditional security issues have always been on the agenda ofcooperation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since its inception in August 1967,
ASEAN has always approached security matters in a comprehensive manner. For Southeast Asian countries,
security has always encompassed wide arrays of issues in social, cultural, economic, political, and military
fronts. Problems in those areas especially within the domestic context-- are seen to have the potential todestabilise nation-states and regional peace and security. Based on such conception of security, ASEAN has
always distinguished security in terms of what traditional and non-traditional threats. However, until very
recently, ASEAN countries tended to see non-traditional security issues primarily as domestic problems ofmember state which required national solution. It was only after the end of the Cold War, and more so after
the 1997 economic crisis, which brought about the growing threats posed by non-traditional security
problems, that ASEAN began to intensify inter-state cooperation in dealing with the problems.

Initially, in resolving regional security issues, both at national and regional levels, ASEAN from the outset
undertook two interrelated approaches. First, threats from non-traditional security problems were left toindividual member state to resolve, especially through nation-building measures. Second, to enable
individual states resolving those problems, regional cooperation is necessary to create a peaceful external
environment so that states would not be distracted from domestic priorities. These approaches later evolved
ketahanannasional
overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience will automatically result
1Inmuch in the same way as a chain derives its overall stother words, ASEAN believed that the management of inter-state relations in the region should be foundedon the sanctity of national sovereignty of its member states. Regional cooperation was sought in order toreinforce, not erode, that sovereignty.
countries continue to face security challenges in multiple forms, especially in non-traditional forms. For mostSoutheast Asian countries, the threat of terrorism is but one problem alongside other security problems suchas extreme poverty, trans-national crimes, natural disaster, maritime pollution, environmental problems,
piracy, human trafficking, and communal violence. ASEAN began to recognise the imperative forcooperation among member states to resolve domestic problems with cross-border effects.
It was the implication of economic crisis of 1997 on human suffering that demonstrated further thesignificance of non-traditional security problems in the region. In 2003, the health crisis triggered by the
problem of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and then the Avian flu, clearly showed how
security threats in Southeast Asia has increasingly become trans-national, and therefore blurred thedistinction between internal and external security. The SARS epidemic clearly reinforced the permeability of1

Soesastro, eds.,, Research Papers and Policy Studies
no. 11 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984), p. 305.

104

state boundaries and highlighted the growing imperative for transnational cooperation. The fact that the
spread of SARS could be checked by close regional and international cooperation sent a strong lesson thatthe containment and resolution to such problems would require close inter-state cooperation. Without acoordinated cooperation, which will be much more effective if it is done within a multilateral institution,
this kind of threat could lead to a global catastrophe. Indeed, these problems serve as the latest reminder toall regional states that security interdependence has become an undeniable reality in Southeast Asia.
While the depth and scope of NTS cooperation in ASEAN remain subject to criticism, it does have its merits.
For one, the focus of cooperation on non-traditional security issues does provide an additional platform fordeveloping the habit of cooperation among ASEAN states within a formal multilateral setting. Within thisdominant paradigm for interence has shown, the process is also important,especially for the institution to mature and induce a level of comfort among the participating states.
Addressing NTS problems, however, still constitutes a formidable challenge for ASEAN for a number ofreas
Burma --which led to the displacement of people and refugees-- has also reinforced the point that humanrights is a security issue for the region. The same can also be said regarding the problem of trans-boundary
pollution. In other words, NTS problems do relate closely to the issue of national sensitivity. In this regards,
the cliché problem of non-interference should not be overlooked.
The second constraint is the continuing problem of limited state capacity to address the NTS challenges. The
financial crisis of 1997, for example, clearly reduced the capacity of some states such as Indonesia-- to pushthrough some policy measures and allocate the needed fund for addressing the problem. As most ASEAN
countries are facing multiple NTS problems at the same time, there is a competition for limited state
resources, thus making it difficult to prioritise.
mechanism. Despite recent institutional
adjustments after the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, ASEAN still lacks a mechanism to enforce
compliance. The trans-national nature of the problem clearly requires a collective effort among affectedstates to address and resolve the problems. It is precisely on this imperative that ASEAN has been weak.
The fourth constraint comes from the fact that ASEAN remains an inter-governmental form of regional
cooperation. Despite its declaration to become a people-oriented or people-centred, some governments in theregion remain suspicion of the civil society organisations (CSOs) and reluctant to work them. Meanwhile,
most NTS problems need a strong state-CSOs partnership in addressing them.
Concluding Notes
ASEAN, however, has begun to consolidate its efforts in addressing the NTS problems through a number of
initiative. Two most important steps towards this direction have been the adoption of the ASEAN Politicaland Security Community (APSC) in October 2003 and the APSC Blueprint in 2004. Indeed, greater
cooperation has been evident with regards to the management of the problem of terrorism, natural disasters,
and maritime safety. While the extent of the implementation of these measures remain unclear, ASEAN does
have a platform through which NTS cooperation could be intensified.
Regarding the principle of non-interfence, ASEAN should continue to adhere to this principle. However, thisprinciple should not become an obstacle to greater cooperation in addressing NTS. The principle ofnon-interference needs to be employed in a flexible way so that it would allow ASEAN to cooperate ontrans-boundaries issues, internal problems with clear regional implications, and issues with identifiable
humanitarian dimension such as gross violation of human rights, natural disasters, humanitarian crisis,internally displaced persons (IDP) and other human security problems. In other words, ASEAN needs toemploy the principle of non-interference within the context of interdependence among states.
Despite the growing recognition on the importance of NTS, however, the place of NTS in security discourseand policy in the region should not be taken for granted. East Asia is at the most important juncture of great105

strategic transformation. While the existing regional security architecture is better equipped to tackle NTS
regarding the viability of the current regional architecture in coping with strategic challenges resulting fromthe changing dynamics and power relations among major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Changes andstrategic re-alignments in the relationship among the major powers, as a result of global transformation andregional power shift, have begun to galvanise the discourse and studies on the adequacy of the existing
Indeed, as the discourse on the need for a new regional security architecture intensifies, traditional security
concerns may once again overshadow the attention and preoccupation with NTS issues. Governments could
be easily distracted by the imperative of addressing traditional security problems. In East Asia, there is no
shortage of such problems. In addition to the problem of major power relations and regional security
architecture, there are also unresolved territorial disputes, bilateral tensions, the implications of militarybuild-up, and nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula. Government officials and traditional security analysts
less deadly than wars could be easily lost within the overriding concerns over traditional security concerns.
These traditional security concerns are important, but they should not be allowed to dominate security
discourse and practices in Asia.

106

2

Discussant 3
Thank you. Five minutes is very short, so I ll ask
such excellent presentations to come up with some. First, some questions for the first presentation: One ofthe points-lateralsecurity institutions, their willingness to jump ship and support other institutions if they no longer see theirinterests fit in the current institution. It seems to me that one of the problems, from this rather non-committal
behavior, is that
ess any severe consequences of leaving the institution. So the question
for me would be, can the Asia-Pacific region develop multi-lateral security institutions that would over time
make it difficult for major powers to leave without really suffering negative consequences? Or do we have tolive with the fact that they will pick and choose as they see fit? The second question is related: what could be
the negative consequences for Asian regional integration from this institutional Darwinism? Could that in thelong run undermine the willingness of Asia-Pacific countries to engage in these efforts?
Three short questions for the second presentation. I was thrilled to hear that we need more money
for these kinds of projects. I would also suggest that we need more money for projects looking at how
Australia could fit into the security community, but that relates already to my first question, namely whether,in the face of a rising China that will challenge fundamentally the order in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific in
broaden the focus here and also look on the prospective for an Asia-Pacific security community, which ofcourse would complicate the whole endeavour by an order of magnitude.
For the second question, regarding
focused on interstate
relations. What do you see in terms of the effect of security communities on intrastate affairs in the
Asia-Pacific region? Would development of a security community also affect the way these states would
perceive the violence acceptable in their domestic affairs? This relates to my third question: how should wetalk about the development of an Asia-Pacific or East Asia security community without discussing the natureof the political system at the same time? Does it make a difference in talking about security communities
whether we have a homogeneous system of countries such as in Europe, or as in the East Asian theater, wehave democratic states working side by side with non-democratic states? Does that make a difference?
Finally, I have one question for the third presentation on a very concrete non-traditional security
challenge that: cyber-security. I think this is a topic that is not only very sexy,
but it also has a high potential of becoming not only a non-traditional security issue, but also a
non-traditional threat issue. How does ASEAN look at cyber-security, and what do you assess are theabilities of ASEAN to deal effectively with it? Quite clearly, it does affect the national security of eachindividual country to a very significant degree. Thank you.
Discussant 4
4
3

2

Editorial note: the Chatham House rule was applied to this session, and thus the names of the participants are notprinted here.

107

3

ASEAN

ASEAN
ASEAN
ASEAN
3
security communication of nations
EU
EU

MC

Presenter 4
Thank you very much, I think the first discussant raises two very interesting and very difficult questions. One
concerns the consequences of differ
this question is quite similar to what the second discussant also raised just now. The second question seems
to be related to some negative impact arising from institutional Darwinism. Let met touch on the second
issue first. First of all, as I mentioned in my presentation,
institutional Darwinism. Also, I
think the two questions are relatedly answer each of them. Rather, my comments are108

generally based on the two questions.
I
future-oriented question, so therefore difficult to answer. However, at the moment, different
leaders from powerful nations have different interests, especially in terms of regional integration frameworks.
The classical example is the TPP Trans Pacific Partnership. According to APEC Yokohama declarations,
FTAP Free Trade in the Asia Pacific can be pursued by developing three different frameworks,
ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the TPP, but the TPP currently has nine member countries, but only a couple of
ASEAN member states. FTAP is based on APEC, but
or Cambodia as
official members. This is why ASEAN is not happy with the APEC-wide FTA and has prioritized includingthese three Indo-China nations into APEC.
If the United States continuous to promote the TPP to achieve FTAP, that would be a big concern
to ASEAN, and the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 frameworks. Also, some nations, like Japan, which are putting
a priority on these frameworks to achieve regional integration, would be faced with very difficult policyquestions. For example, if Japan tries to pursue the TPP or FTAP, how can Japan pursue its policy of ASEAN
and Mekong River development when ASEAN member countries would be quite disappointed?
This is just one example of how different institutions supported by different countries are actuallydeveloping. These complex regional politics will probably continue, and from the Japanese viewpoint this isa big concern because China might be able to take advantage of its most favorable frameworks, ASEAN+3
and the Mekong River development. This is something that Japan would like to avoid in the future. Again, I
an be solved, particularly since Japan has decided tojoin the TPP next year.
I think the second discussant also asked about some of the examples of economic cooperation thatare keeping tensions from escalating. There is a lot of historical and territorial tension in this region: between
Japan and China, between Japan and Korea, and even between Korea and China. South East Asian countries
still have some territory disputes. However, economic integration has continued despite these disputes. The
question is whether integration could have proceeded faster without these disputes. In other words, areterritorial disputes or bilateral tensions acting as a hindrance to regional integration? My observation is no.
The causation is very difficult to demonstrate, but as I mentioned in my presentation, we have a hugeterritorial dispute between Japan and China. However, talks among China, Japan, and Korea are going on
this week. They don t mentioning anything about the Senkaku or Daioyu problems. They simply focus onregional integration. How can we explain that if hindrance exists? Why would the Chinese trade official saythat thePresenter 5
The advantage of having a short amount of time to answer lots of questions is that I can pick the easyquestion to answer. T
important question because what it underscores is a fundamental tension between building a security
community and maintaining domestic legitimacy. For a lot of countries the maintenance of domestic
legitimacy requires accentuating differences between self and other, accentuating and stressing theuniqueness of your own cultural ethnocentric traits, and characteristics precisely opposite, which you need tosee for the construction of an interstate security community.
For example, American exceptionalism, Chinese exceptionalism, Japanese exceptionalism, French
exceptionalism, all these exceptionalisms emphasize the value superiority of their traits and characteristics.
peaceful people in the world, and the construction of a security community requires actually deemphasizing
uniqueness and emphasizing similarities or traits or characteristics that are shared across boundaries. This
raises a problem for states that worry about their legitimacy because emphasizing your uniqueness through109

nationalism is an important source of legitimacy for regimes that worry about support from their population.
It may be that the implication here is that building a cross-national security community necessarily requires
challenging the uniqueness of national identities, and this is difficult particularly for authoritarian regimes,
democracies, such as the United States. Interstate security community construction may requiredemocratization, or at least regimes whose legitimacy does not rest on emphasizing the uniqueness of theirown traits and characteristics, which is a much more pessimistic conclusion about security communities thanI thought I would arrive at.
Presenter 6
Thank you for all the questions. Let me begin by answering the questions from the first discussant. I actually-security, but to the best of my knowledge they are
beginning to address the issue within the transnational crimes network of the ASEAN police.
Let me turn to the three points that have been raised specifically on the ASEAN experience by thesecond discussant. Number one, what is needed to avoid tension? Institutionally speaking, there are a numberof mechanisms within ASEAN, such as the high council provisions within the Treaty of Amity andCooperation and the ARF Chair, which can be utilized when tensions arise. But so far, we have never used
these mechanisms. Instead, ASEAN continues to rely on the personal ties of leaders, which of course has
begun to change. Because of the regular exchanges among the leaders of the ASEAN member states, andalso because of their close personal relationships, they actually talk directly to each other either in an
informal or formal setting, whenever tensions arise. I can tell you that when Indonesia had a problem with
Malaysia it was easy for both leaders to come together and talk about it in order to diffuse tension, especiallyon the streets in Jakarta. As we have become a democracy, foreign policy issues are no longer a monopoly ofoften the first channel we use.
government officials, and NGOs and NPs take part in the process, but
Another mechanism is what I call the restraining effects of institutions, in which by simply
invoking the fact that we are members of ASEAN, that actually helps conflicting countries who are having adispute to think twice before they actually escalate tensions.
The second question is on the impact of the involvement of China, the US, and Japan on
non-traditional security cooperation within ASEAN. In general, I can say that ASEAN, through its various
institutions, especially the ASEAN Regional Forum, prov
not perfect, for the three major powers to cooperate under the ASEAN umbrella on those issues. But
unfortunately the activities have been confined to workshops, study groups, and desktop exercises that are
more bilateral: China-ASEAN, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-US.
In fact, different bilateral exercises on NTS serve different purposes. With China, for example,
ASEAN, by bringing in NTS issues as an agenda of cooperation between ASEAN and China, expects tointegrate China further into the web of cooperation, not only with ASEAN, but also with other East Asian
countries. It really helps to achieve the purpose of CBM, and also to strengthen mutual trust between
ASEAN and China.
With the US, I think it would be fair to say that bringing in NTS issues, and also expecting a USrole in this area, will help
support to ensure the success of ASEAN community building, and this is quite evident from the last 20 years
of ASEAN-Japan cooperation.
The third question is regarding any difference between the so-called ASEAN security community
and the EU? When we came up with the idea of the ASEAN security community, it was not actually a
Deutch security
AN security community, so ASEAN
serves an objective basically. With the expansion of ASEAN from six to eight and then to ten members, weworried that with the emergence of new security problems, and also because of the surge of territorial

110disputes among members, that the use of force could actually return to the ASEAN context. In that context,
we were quite modest even though the original proposal from Indonesia for the ASEAN security community
really envisions a full security community. We also brought in the imperative of democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law, and the free movement of people so that we could have a shared regional identity.
The agreement in 2003 to make war, or the use of force, impossible between member states, is thebasic characteristic of the ASEAN security community. In that context,
is kind ofundertaking a security community, especially if you bring in the literature on security communities, because
it deviated from the general understanding of what security communities are. But we hope that as countries
begin to implement those policy measures that can create the conditions where the use of force, or even war,
become impossible among the member states, then in the next step after 2015, we can move in order toaddress other requirements before ASEAN can become a real security community.
MCMC
k the third presenter first and go in reverse order and ask two questions.
MC
ASEAN Way

non-traditional security

ASEAN
MC
The first question to you is, does the ASEAN Way challenge non-traditional security cooperation? The
second question is about new countries that want to join ASEAN, for example, East Timor. What are theresponses from the current member states? It could bsome arguments that ASEAN started out being very open and is now becoming more closed.
MC

MC
The first question is about the relations between national identity and regional identity. Many people raised
the question that national identity might be a hindrance to close regional identity assimilation, and several
people raised historical issues and reconciliation issues. Would national identity be an impediment to agreater regional identity? Some of the questions raised the fact that although there is a regional identity inEurope it does not mean that German identity, French identity, or British identity have disappeared as aresult.

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MCregional
identityMC
What kind of East Asian regional identity should we discuss? In the age of globalization maybe there could
be a regional identity that is different from that in Europe, meaning different from ones based on democracy,
human rights, etc.
MC2Presenter 6
Let me answer the second question first, on the prospect of East Timor becoming the eleventh member of
ASEAN. Yes, two or three days ago Ramos-Horta gave a speech in Singapore and said that he expected next
year that East Timor could officially become a member of ASEAN. For symbolic reasons because Indonesia
is going to chair ASEAN next year, if East Timor becomes a member when Indonesia is the chair, that could
provide a good image of ASEAN as a whole and also for Indonesia s
But my own guess is that it would not easy for East Timor to become a member next year for anumber of reasons. First, even though East Timor applied a couple of years ago, we have not been able toreduce the demand of being a member of ASEAN. We still have 617 meetings a year, and there are questions
about the capability and capacity of East Timor to commit is. Also,
have reached aconsensus within ASEAN on when East Timor will be admitted as a full member because there are still somecountries that may be more suitable or more appropriate for the expansion of ASEAN because at the moment
the main focus of ASEAN is to consolidate itself and try to implement the ASEAN community blue print.
This is supposed to be completed by 2015.
On the ASEAN Way and non-traditional security challenges, let me first rehearse what the ASEAN
Way means. I think it usually denotes notions of informality in ASEAN countries dealing with each other,
especially in resolving conflict. It also relates to the question of sovereignty and non-interference as cardinalprinciples of interstate relations in South East Asia. Finally, it refers to the primacy of consensus inpolicy-making mechanisms.
The need to address non-traditional security issues, I think, erodes the ASEAN Way. If you
continue to invoke these three elements of the ASEAN Way,e could go very far incooperating and addressing NTS problems. For very obvious reasons, because when you talk about NTS
problems, especially those problems that originate from a domestic domain of a member state but withtrans-boundary implications, you have to compromise about the strict distinction between internal andexternal environments, and you have to compromise on the sanctity of the principle of non-interference. In
fact, if you look at ASEAN cooperation in this area over the last ten years, there have been some changes and112

a degree of flexibility when it comes to the invocations of the principle of the ASEAN Way. I
theASEAN Way makes it difficult for the non-traditional security cooperation, but I think the imperative ofworking together to address NTS actually erodes and also changes the way the ASEAN Way is being
implemented within ASEAN. But of course there is still tension, especially between old members and newmembers, with regard to how flexible you can be in order to allow greater cooperation on non-traditional
security issues.
Presenter 5
Thank you very much for the questions. To some degree the questions actually lead me to comments similar
to those I gave earlier. The first question, is national identity a hindrance to the emergence of regional
identity? As I said, in principle
the sense of uniqueness. In other words, when you ask Chinese people to place Chinese people, Japanesepeople, and American people, where do they think Chinese people, Japanese people, and American people lie
on scales of peaceful to warlike? Overwhelmingly, Chinese people think that Chinese people are down at thepeaceful end, Americans are somewhere in the middle, and Japanese are down
obviously a variation across individuals, but the averages work out that way.
teresting is, people who believe that they are peaceful but believe that they are uniquely
peaceful, in other words different from Japanese or Americans, are people who also have strong realpolitik
preferences. In other words, they see their relationship with people who are different from them in acompetitive, potentially conflicting way, even though they see themselves as being peaceful. Wha
here is they see themselves as being unique and different, so even if the content of the identity or theuniqueness emphasizes their peacefulness, the fact is that what overwhelms that is the sense of differentness
which then leads to a set of specific preferences such as increasing military spending, being more
about attitudes
toward territory, but my guess is that people who believe they are uniquely different from Japanese andAmericans and believe they are uniquely peaceful as Chinese people, are more likely to believe that territory
matters and are more likely to see high salience in preserving territo
would find.
, and that is the morethat you believe you are different the more that you are likely to view this as an important, salient issue inon European identity show that people can hold both a national identity and a regional identity at the sametime, but what appears to have occurred in Europe is that the definition of German-ness, French-ness, orBritish-ness has changed such that to be German is also to be European, and so the question is, could you see
in East Asia the emergence of a definition of Chinese identity or of Japanese identity where to be Chinese is
to be Asian, to be Japanese is to be Asian, where the definition Asian-ness is shared?
The second question was about regime type and obstacles to security dilemmas. As in my earlier
answer, it may be that democratization is a requirement for the emergence of a security community based onshared identity. ASEAN may be an exception because ASEAN clearly has a mixture of regimes, and thepresenter s very important work that he himself has done and others working with him have done to promote
an ASEAN security community seems to be actually quite positi. But note that
it was a democratic Indonesia that promoted the idea of a security community in the region; it was not a
non-democratic regime in ASEAN. Not all democracies are probably suited for or interested in promoting
security communities, and the obstacle that will run interference here is the degree to which the legitimacy ofthat democracy rests on this notion of a unique, different, superior national identity.
The third question, what kind of regional identity can emerge in East Asia, and how different might113

this be from Europe? Again, I want to come back to the first point that I made, that in some sense the content
shared-ness, the degree to which they believe these traits are shared by others. As I mentioned, in thesesurveys done in Beijing, people who believed that Chinese people were the most peaceful people in theworld were people who actually tended to have realpolitik preferences and see the world as a threatening anddangerous place, precisely because they saw themselves as different and others as, in a sense, holding
inferior values.
Basically, when you have an identity relationship where somebody believes that they are uniquely
peaceful and they believe the other group is uniquely warlike, the chances of community for that person arevery, very low compared to the chances of a community between people who see themselves as moderately
peaceful. Namely, what matters there is that they see themselves as having relatively shared traits or values.
Whether shared East Asian traits and an emerging security community is based on a notion of East Asianvalues or a notion of democratization shared democratic values or shared Confucian values may notmatter as long as these values are perceived to be shared.
Presenter 4
4

ASEAN+3
CJK

+6

APEC

4
FTA

4
+3

TPP
APEC

FTAP

+6

CJK

+3
CMI

M

multilateralization
decision
multilateralize

CMI
97

+3
IMF
100

8

IMF

IMF
CMI

2009
+3

ASEAN+3
EAS +6+6

FTA

confidence building

114

M

EAS

APEC
FTA

TPP
CJK

10
7

ministerial meeting (
8

CJK

EU
APEC

115

)

2010
2007
1995
2006
2006
Construction within Contradiction: Multiple
Perspectives on the relationship between China and International Organizations)
Professor and Deputy director of School of International Studies, Peking University. Former deputy directorof Institute World Economic & Politics, Chinese Academy of Science (CASS) and Professor of international
politics, senior fellow. Graduate School of CASS, Beijing, received MA. and Ph.D degrees, 1982-1988. He
was visiting Scholar, Hungary Academy of Sciences in 1988 and Associate Professor and researcher of
CASS, 1988-1993. He became visiting Scholar, at CFIA of Harvard University during 1996-97. He became
IR theories in the West and China and trends of international institutions and Laws. His publications are
Construction within Contradiction: Multiple Perspectives on the relationship between
China and International Organizations

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