Session 1: Key Determinants of Asian Regional Integration

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Presentation 1:

Kang Choi

Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security

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An Assessment of the Current Developments on the Korean Peninsula 1
1. Introduction: Where We are Now
Ten years ago, when the first South-North Korean Summit took place in Pyongyang, almost everyone
thought the long waited opportunity to end the confrontation and to establish a permanent peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula finally arrived. In the following years, two Koreas held various meetings and talks 2
and produced some agreements to promote exchange, cooperation, and reconciliation mostly in economic
and social field. And some people believed that inter-Korean relationship became rather somewhat
independent from other relations and they also thought that progress being made in inter-Korean relations
could function to reduce tension and confrontation not only between the two Koreas but also between North
Korea and the others, most notably the U.S.
However, such expectations and hopes for the improvement of overall situation on the Korean Peninsula
have become overshadowed by the unfolding North Korean challenges again, mainly by nuclear problem.
The security situation in and around the Korean Peninsula has become much more uncertain, maybe unstable,
esture, inreform and open, it is very unlikely to see the substantial progress in programs and projects for inter-Korean
exchanges and cooperation in near and mid-term period.
The security reality looks even worse than ever before. The Six-Party Talks, which was introduced in 2003 toresolve North Korean nuclear problem peacefully, has stopped functioning since December 2008. Against theother five partie
opposite direction. North Korea clearly stated that it would not return to the Six-Party Talks and staged the
2nd nuclear test in May. While in recent days it has signaled its interest in coming back to the Six-Party Talks,
North Korea attached conditions: lift-up of sanctions and meaningful progress in US-North Korea bilateralrelations i.e. security guarantee. It seems that, by signaling some soft or reconciliatory gestures, North
Korea is trying to avoid further sanctions and to drive a wedge among the five parties.
go its own way to be recognized and aconcerns and urges. So the prospect for the resolution of North Korean nuclear problem is not so promising,maybe cautiously pessimistic at least in short- to mid-term perspective.
What makes such prediction possible and makes the situation more complicated and unpredictable is theissue of succession and stability of North Korean leadership in succession process. After the strokes of
Chairman Kim Jong-il in 2008, the issue of leadership succession and regime stability has come forward
because of the possible impact of leadership succession upon the policy directions and stability of North
Korea. Kim Jong-Un has finally showed up himself as the heir to his father at the 3 rd Party Representatives
Meeting. It is totally unclear and unpredictable how effectively and smoothly the leadership succession will
directions during and after the succession. The bottom line is that the upcoming leadership succession is notlike the one we have witnessed in 1994 and there will be some turbulence due to the possible change inpower structure. But, despite distinctive durability of North Korean regime, it is not possible to rule out theregime instability situation.

1

This is the updated version of the paper, which was published in the Task Force Report North Korea Policy and
ROK-US Alliance (June 2010, Seoul Forum for International Affairs). The views and ideas in this paper are thoseof the author. They do not represent the official position and views of IFANS and MOFAT.
2
These include South-North Ministerial Talkss, SouthSouth-North Talks on Economic Cooperation and Exchange, and etc.

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2. An Assessment of North Korean Threats and Challenges
North Korean threats and challenges have become diversified and been transformed from conventional toconventional and non-conventional (or asymmetrical or catastrophic); from peninsula-wise toregional/international; and from regular to irregular. What is more important than the transformation andmultiplication of North Korean threat is the complexity, multidimensionality and interconnectedness among
the challenges. For South Korea and the directly concerned countries, North Korean issues and challenges
can be divided into four groups: non- or counter-proliferation of North Korean nuclear program andcapability; deterrence of North Korea aggression; collapse of North Korea; and opening and reform of North
Korea.
A. Non- or Counter-Proliferation
As being said before, North Korea is expected to increase nuclear capabilities. They have claimed thaturanium enrichment program has almost to the completion and reprocess of spent fuel rods is under way. It is
nuclear capability will increase and possess more nuclear material for its own use and export. Given the-North Korean nuclear cooperation,
Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation and Myanmar-North Korean nuclear connection, it is inevitable for
us to have serious concern over No
completes the construction of 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors, the situation will become even worse.
Consequently, the integrity of global non-proliferation regime would be seriously undermined and we shallbe living in nuclear-prone, not nuclear-free, world. The task ahead of us is to make the current NPT regime
more responsive to the violator. Second, we must become able to cut off the nuclear connection among thecountries outside the NPT. Currently, we are enforcing Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). But we have toreview the effectiveness of PSI and to make it more effective in handling proliferation threats.
B. Deterrence and Defense
From the end of the Korean War in 1953, deterrence of North Korean aggression has been the primaryobjective of the ROK-US security alliance. Over the years, the ROK and the US have tried to makedeterrence and defense posture credible and reliable and, despite some incidents and clashes, our efforts havebeen quite successful in deterring North Korean aggression.
However, today, we should ask ourselves whether we have reliable deterrent/defense posture vis- à-vis Northmagnitude ofNorth Korean threat. It is doubtful whether we can handle the new security situation challenge effectively
and credibly. While, at every occasion, the U.S. has reaffirmed its extended deterrence, including nuclear
umbrella, 3 and security commitment to the defense of South Korea, the credibility of such security
commitment can be challenged by everther than diminishing at all
Korean Peninsula and possibly reach the U.S., the most critical issue is how to make the ROK-US
deterrent/defense posture reliable and credible.
Second, the combined defense posture, which was introduced in 1978 with the establishment of Combined
1, 2015. While both sides are working hard to meet the requirements,
whether a new defense posture and command relations is as much effective, reliable and credible as the3

At the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) of 2009, the ROK and the US agreed on three measures ofextended deterrence: conventional; nuclear; and missile defense. Based on this agreement, they are working on thedetails.

29

combined defense posture under the CFC should be tested. In addition, under the given economic situation, it
looks hard for the South Korean military to achieve what it initially planned to acquire. Defense expenditure
is not likely to be that level being projected in Defense Reform 2020. Defense Reform 2020 has beenreviewed and revised. The Revised Basic Plan for Implementation of Defense Reform 2020 looks that somemajor acquisition plans and programs have been suspended, delayed, or scaled down. More importantly, theestablishment of ground operation command has been rescheduled from 2012 to 2015. So there could bemismatch among capability, structure, and plan(s).
Third, whether the U.S. can bring in sufficient augmentation forces on time is another concern. According to
OPLAN (Operational Plan) 5027, the U.S. augmentation force is around 650,000. Based on the experiencesin and observation of Iraqi and Afghan war, it can be argued that the U.S. may not be able to mobilize andbring in that size of force in time. 4 Of course, nowadays the U.S. is emphasizing the quality, or capability,
over the quantity. But sometimes quantity matters, especially if we are thinking about post-hostility phase.
In a word, unlike official position, deterrence and defense posture of the ROK-US security alliance seems to
be under serious challenges. Or the projected change or transformation in the ROK-US deterrence/defense
posture seems to be ahead of the reality. On the other hand, ever-increasing North Korean WMD capabilities
present new dilemmas and challenges for both allies.
entional military capabilities have not diminished substantially yet. It seems
that North Korea is still capable of managing its conventional military establishment in a meaningful way.
The Cheonan incident proves this fact. North Korea has developed means and ways to utilize its
conventional capabilities to achieve political and military objectives. It can be assumed that North Korean
military establishment is and will not be affected by the worsening North Korean economy. Thus it ispossible to say that North Korea will continue to exercise its military tools whenever it feels necessary.

C. Instability
Despite the very high level of durability of North Korean regime, concerns have been raised over the
possibility of regime instability of North Korea since the report of Chairman Kim Jongis believed that the North Korean leadership has begun to study and/or completed succession plan. It seems
that the KWP, not National Defense Commission (hereafter NDC), is in charge of managing succession
process with the leading role of Mr. Jang Seongtaek and three other figures. Whether the succession fromfather to son will proceed as it is planned or not is uncertain. The upcoming succession, should it happen,
will be substantially different from the previous one and could be very volatile and turbulent for several
reasons. First of all, the preparation for and process of succession are not so well done and have been done inhaste. So there could be many loopholes and unexpected things to take place. Second, consequently, Mr.
KIM Jung-Un is not so well prepared to do jobs. Third, there could be change in power structure at the top
from one-man rule to collective leadership. Fourth, consolidation of power base of new leadership might takelong and could be turbulent. Finally, even deeper hibernation and isolation of North Korea, more aggressive
and provocative external behaviors, could be expected during and after the succession.
In addition, economic situation of North Korea cannot improve due to its systemic problems. North Korea is
expected to suffer from chronicle food and energy shortage. Thus it must rely on the external supply. It is
uncertain how long the external world could and would provide what North Korea needs. Furthermore, therecent currency devaluation measure, which is believed to be a measure to regain state control over themarketleadership. So, if this is combined with political instability, the future of North Korea is going to be very

4

In 2010 QDR, the U.S. has hinted the possibility of shortage of augmentation force in contingency byemphasizing the leading role of the ROK to defense itself against North Korean aggression.

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unstable.5
The question arises on how much we know about North Korea and whether we are able to handle possible
sudden change(s) or instability in North Korea. In both, it seems we cannot get high scores. In understanding
and assessing North Korea, there is huge discrepancy depending upon where one stands. And thisdiscrepancy leads to differences, or different preference and approaches, in handling possible North Koreanchallenges during and after the succession. But one thing for sure is that the upcoming succession will be
more likely to make North Korea to be primarily concerned with internal affairs and to go its own way
establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. and nuclear weapons are not bargaining chip any more. So thepossibility of confrontation between North Korea and the international community is likely to increase andisolation and pressure seems high, the possibility of instability is likely to increase as time goes by and theOver the years, we have been focusing on specific issues such as WMD, refugees, limited armed clashes or
provocation, 3rd party involvement (or intervention), and humanitarian operations. Among these issues,
WMD and refugee issue has received much attention. Issue-specific approach may have its own merit. But it
rarely touches the fundamental challenges of contingency. If contingency took place, there would be several
aspects or dimensions we should think of: political/diplomatic; military/security; legal and jurisdictional;
economic; and social aspect. And these aspects/dimensions would be highly influenced by patterns and typesof contingency.
It is time for us to think about scenario-based and time-phased approach, in which various challenges aretackled either simultaneously or sequentially in a more systematic way. In each time period or phase, wemight have a different set of challenges. Or same challenge might have different weight or magnitude over
the time period. To assess the nature and magnitude of challenges, we should think of how and why thecontingency would happen. In addition, by doing so, we can deepen our understanding of North Korea.
D. Opening and Reform of North Korea
reform of North Korea peacefully and constructively. Over theyears, we have adopted various strategies: containment, malignant neglect, benign neglect, and engagement.
Most agree on the fact that among others engagement is the most realistic approach. But it has two problems
or challenges: time and mix of tools and means. Given the nature of North Korea regime, it takes relatively
long time for the engagement policy to bear its fruits on the Korean Peninsula. And throughout theengagement process, there will be so many ups and downs so that engagement policy shall be challenged by
the incidents. Without domestic and regional/international support, it is very difficult for any political leader
to maintain consistency in carrying out engagement policy. On the other hand, to get domestic andinternational support, political leaders are tempted to acquire North Korea policy legacy, which often
undermines the integrity of engagement policy. Consequently and unfortunately, engagement policy tends tobecome appeasement policy.
To make the engagement policy work properly, there should be a good mix of tools and means, or carrots andsticks. And words should be translated into concrete actions in proper time-frame. Otherwise, credibility will
be ruined. Sometimes we often argue for sticks. But we are often self-constrained in using sticks. On theother hand, functional approach, which assumes economic cooperation and exchange will result in politicalchange, has not been so successful.
What makes the engagement poli5

It is reported that the North Korean official admitted the failure of currency devaluation measure and opened up
the market again.

31

exchange and cooperation with the outside world. Over the years, South Korea has cultivated several
economic cooperation projects with North Korea including Gaesung Industrial Complex (hereafter GIC),
Geumgangsan Tourism Project, South-North Railway Connection, and etc. Unfortunately, recently most ofthem have come to a near complete stall. North Korea has put forward the unreasonable and unacceptableconditions and demands for economic cooperation. South Korea, who tries to establish new norms andpractice in inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, cannot accept those terms. Thus it is not likely that
economic cooperation and social exchange between the two Koreas can be back on the track in near future.

3. Recommendations
It is not possible to solve North Korean problems, including nuclear challenges, in short period of time sincemost of North Korean challenges are the product of regime character. Unless the regime character changes,
the North Korean challenges will cyclically come back with different magnitude and shapes. So we shouldtake rather long-term approach than immediate resolution. For that purpose, the following must be seriously
considered.
First of all, South Korea and the U.S. should strengthen and maintain reliable deterrent and defense postureessment of North Korea
which will take into account not the current capabilities but also the trends. Then we should come up with theand pace of transforming the ROK-US security alliance should be carefully reviewed and managed fromrather traditional peninsula-wise perspective.
Second, along with the first, we should be able to handle and contain cases of low intensity provocation of
North Korea. While avoiding the uncontrolled and unwanted escalation, we should be able to demonstrate
our resolve in action and we should not be self-contained, trapped, because of escalation fear. We shouldhave more options and means to carry the missions. It requires us to look at FDOs (flexible deterrent options)again with great care and to develop new CASOPs (crisis action standard operating procedures).
Third, while strengthening defense/deterrent posture, we should keep dialogue channels open and active. It
includes not only the Six-Party Talks but also other bilateral and trilateral talks such as US-ROK-Japan and
US-ROK-China. Especially engaging China is very critical. Having China on our side is very importantelement in bringing about some kind of breakthrough as we have witnessed in the past. China has become
very cooperative in dealing with North Korean nuclear issue. But there exists some kind of self-imposed
limit in Chinese cooperation and collaboration due to its concerns. Without Chinese cooperation, especiallyin implementing UN sanctions, it would be very difficult to solve North Korean problems. By using bilateral
strategic dialogue channels, we can bring China much closer to our position and establish common
understanding and common approach toward North Korea. From this regard, the five-party (or six minusone) consultation or meeting should be seriously considered.
Fourth, possibility of sudden change and regime instability in the North should be reviewed. As being
aforementioned, North Korea is a quite durable regime. But, currently and further down the road, North
Korea is faced with power succession, which might bring about some turbulent. In dealing with this specificissue, in the post, we were primarily concerned with specific issues such as WMDs, refugees, humanitarian
than focusing on specific issue, it would be better for us to understand the overall situation and challenges ina bigger picture and to plan for the second worst case, next to war. There should be some kind guiding
principles in handling sudden change should it happen.
Finally, while we are handling and containing the most imminent challenges of North Korea, we must thinkof how to bring about the strategic changes in North Korea. That is, while we are preparing the worst, we

32should not neglect the positive side normalizing North Korea: that is, while denying North Korea any
military provocation, we must also devise ways and means to bring about meaningful and significant
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55

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56

:
Presentation 2:
Wang Yizhou(Professor, Beijing University)57

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60:
Presentation 3:
Benjamin Schreer(Senior Lecturer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

61

The Future of US Presence in Asia
For over half a century, US military presence in the Asia-Pacific has been a key determinant of the regional
security order. Forward deployed land, air and maritime forces underwrote US hegemonic leadership in the
Asia-Pacific by reassuring allies and secu
by deterring potential adversaries. Importantly, China since the 1970s also by and large accepted US
presence in the region. This has led to a distinct pattern of Asian regional security integration: multilateral
security integration among Asia-Pacific nations today is predominantly focussed on non-traditional security
challenges, whereas traditional security, i.e. the prevention of major power war, is still largely left to thesecurity umbrella provided by the United States and manifested in a bilateral system of alliances, security
partnerships as well as US military presence.
Yet, doubts have grown over the future of US military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Three interrelated factors
contribute to the discussion of whether US presence can continue to play a key role in maintaining regional
stability:
Firstly, the rise of China is seen by many as inevitably eroding the foundations of US hegemonicleadership. Already, some Chinese leaders have questioned the legitimacy of US regional force
posture. Moreover, the continued buildmaritime power projection and anti-access/ access denial capabilities might deny the US the ability
to control the sea and undermine its maritime power projection capabilities. In the future, the PLA
Navy might be able to hold US carrier groups at significant risk given its investment in submarinesand other anti-access military capabilities. For example, the future costs for the US in standing up to
China in another crisis over Taiwan might be perceived to be too high by Washington.
Asia-Pacific to many appears to be diminishing. In this view, not only long-term Chinese growth but
allies such as Japan this raises the question over the future credibility of US extended deterrence
guarantees which is intimately related to the military presence, and which has both a conventionaland nuclear dimension. There was also a widespread perception that US attention had diverted fromthe Asia-Pacific region, reflected in the costly military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many
America at home.
Finally, there is the assumption among some experts that US military presence in the region might be-Pacific power. US
presence as part of a potential containment strategy against China is seen as destabilising andconfrontational. In this logic, US military presence is regarded as an impediment for regional
security cooperation.
Asia-Pacific is unlikely for the foreseeable future and that its forward presence will continue to provide themilitary foundations of its leadership position. It will also claim that US military presence will not obstructonal security order but will rather be a precondition for thisdevelopment. Finally, the point will be made that Asian regional security integration will continue to be
characterised by bilateral and multilateral modes of security cooperation that interact and compete with eachother depending on the security issue at stake.
US leadership renewed
maintain a strong military presence as part of its continued leadership role in the Asia-Pacific. US Secretary
strategy of sustaining and strengthening leadership in the region, of increasing regional security, and ofheightening prosperity and promoting US values. Clinton also stressed that securing US strategic interests as

62

partners in the region. 1 While-Pacific will certainly increase in importance for
the US to project power into the region, the US will continue to see its forward deployed presence in Japan,
South Korea and Guam as a key to reassure allies.
Rhetoric about renewed US commitment will also be matched by resources. Predictions about major US
defence cuts disregard that what is causing problems for the Pentagon at the moment are the huge operationalcosts stemming from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, these will end rather sooner than later, taking
off the pressure from cuts which would go to US military substance. And there is much to the argument that
US foreign and security policy will continue to be driven by the objective to maintain its global militarypresence, in particular in the Asia-Pacific given its strategic eminence in US grand strategic thinking. The
presence in the region.

and its forward deployed military presence was vital to secu
maintain regional stability. Despite its impressive economic growth, China is far from offering an attractive
alternative leadership model for most Asia-Pacific countries. In this context, a narrow focus on growing
Chinese economic and military capabilities underestimates the difficulty for Beijing of translating theseassets into actual political influence and leadership capacity. In other words, a possible Chinese intention to
replace US leadership and its ralternative regional security model. If China fails to provide an acceptable alternative leadership model anduses its growing leverage to bully its Asia-Pacific neighbours, these countries will only move closer to the
US.
Cheonan and its
growing assertiveness in the South China Sea have done much to reinvigorate US traditional alliances withJapan and South Korea, and to strengthening security partnerships with Southeast Asian countries likeagainst uncertain Chinese behaviour seems to become more attractive for many countries in the region. Thus,
contrary to widespread assumptions about a decline in US leadership the opposite might actually be the case.
Growing Chinese assertiveness will work detrimental to any plans Beijing might have to undermine thelegitimacy of US leadership and military presence in the region.
In sum, the likelihood of an American retrenchment from the Asia-Pacific region seems rather low for theforeseeable future. 2 For this to happen, a combination of events will need to occur. These factors include a
dramatic shift in US foreign policy thinking coupled with a continued, massive downturn of the US
economy; the evolution of an attractive Chinese leadership model; the conclusion of US allies (foremost
Japan) and partners that they are better off without American military presence; and the development of new
bilateral or multilateral defence structures. In this light, the assumption that the US will no longer be able andwilling to sustain its military presence in the Asia-Pacific is premature. Likewise, the possibility that
Asiats militarypresence but rather what functions it will perform in a future Asia-Pacific security order. The key issue here

Rather than bepeaceful accommodation in an evolving Asia-Pacific security order. This argument is based on the
U.S. Department of State,, 28 October 2010,
http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2010/October/20101028191722su0.9814875.html&distid=ucs, accessed 30 October 2010.
2, vol. 89, no. 6 (November/
December 2010).
1

63

proposition that absent effective alternative bilateral or multilateral structures to deal with traditional security
dilemmas and enduring questions of deterring major power wars, US military presence will be critical inreassuring allies and partners, and in encouraging responsible Chinese strategic behaviour.
A number of different order-building concepts in the future Asia-Pacific beyond uncontested US primacy canbe envisaged, including a new balance of power with a high potential for US-Chinese strategic competition,(including Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia andUSpotentially Russia). In all of these scenarios, however, US military presence will be critical to maintaining
stability:, US presence will be instrumental to guarantee stable conventional
antagonistic parties, thereby contribut
Asia and Australia could be turned into bases to project power in a containment strategy.
In the case of a US-Chinese condominium, where both China and the US reach a stable and mutuallyacceptable power sharing arrangement (a scenario which will take significant time to develop andwhich will suffer from setbacks), US military presence will provide two central functions. US basesin Japan, South Korea and Guam will still be kept even if in reduced numbers to reassure allies
such as Japan in the case of a resurgent China. Beyond this, US maritime forces will provide vital
military capabilities in a new division of labour between China and the US to, for example, jointly
secure the SLOCs.
scenario in which powers like the US, China, Japan,
India, South Korea and potentially Russia will aim at securing influence in a maritime environment
aritime power again will prove crucial in

Very likely, the future security order in the Asia-Pacific will be characterised by no single country being able
to dominate the mar-access capabilities over time
capabilities. Also, Chinese military ability to holding
US Navy carrier strike groups at risk does not necessarily translate into political influence, nor is it sufficient
to prevent the US from continuing to project power to protect its strategic interests. As a consequence, China
powers to accommodate an increased Chinese strategic reach as long as Beijing is not overstepping
well-defined boundaries. In the end, managing the new maritime security order in the Asia-Pacific will

Conclusion
An end of US military presence in the Asia-Pacific is neither desirable for the mutual goal to maintaining astable security order, nor is it likely to happen any time soon. US presence, primarily build around a set ofbilateral alliances and new security partnerships, should be regarded as a stimulus rather than an impedimentto future strategic stability, also in regards to approaches to accommodate the rise of China. Since security
to maintain regional peace and stability, the Asia-Pacific region will benefit much from keeping the existing
system of bilateral and multilateral structures of security cooperation. It is hard to imagine current
multilateral settings providing any credible alternative to the US-based system when it comes to addressing
the manifold security dilemmas and the core questions of war and peace related to the future Asia-Pacificsecurity order.
US-based bilateralism will continue to effectively contribute to regional security. Allies, partners and evenpotential adversaries will think twice before asking the US to leave as absent effective alternative
sorts of security dilemmas in the Asia-Pacific. A look at the European theatre might be instructive here. Over64

20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, European NATO allies still shiver at the prospect that the US
might withdraw its forces from the region altogether. And, unlike the Asia-Pacific, this is a region commonly
perceived to having overcome traditional security problems.
Those who ponder about Asia-standing contresultin disastrous consequences. Anyone in for an Asian NATO?

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683Discussant 1
Thank you very much. We only have five minutes to comment on a very rich and thoughtfulpresentation so let me get straight to my questions and comments. First, with regard to the first paper, as I
understood it, the key problem the paper outlines is how to both deter and to normalize the DPRK. By
normalize it implies a fundamental change in both internal and external policy behavior. So my question is, isthere any evidence, or are there any cases, out there where this has happened in the past? In other words, arestate without regime change?
The only example I can think of is China. There was a fundamental reorientation of Chinese
domestic development strategies and domestic foreign policies in the post-Mao period after Deng Xiaoping
came to power with no fundamental change in the political system. A Marxist-Leninist party ruled China
before 1978 and a Marxist-Leninist party continues to rule China after 1978.
But although there was no change in system, there was a change in regime, a change in leadership.
So the question I have to ask is, can this balance between deterrents and normalization of the DPRK be done
without a change in the current DPRK leadership. In other words, can you have this kind of normalization
The second question has to do with the second presentation. It has to do in particular with thea peaceful rise. From the perspective of outside actors, there are at least three problems with the claims topeaceful rise, three issues that undermine the credibility of claims to a peaceful rise. The first is that China is
now the second-largest economy in the world. The second is that it has a rapidly modernizing militarycapability, and the third, from the perspective
question is, given those three characteristics, is there anything China can say that is reassuring or that iscredible when it comes to signaling its peaceful rise.
My question is, if you were a Japanese leader, what from your perspective would China have to
do to credibly convince you
China have to do to credibly signal that its rise was peaceful? If you were an American leader what would
China have to do in order to credibly signal that its rise was peaceful?
I asked this question to some friends in Beijing before and you get a very interesting answer. I
asked this of colleagues in the national security realm, and one of them said that if he were in Washington the
only thing that would convince him that China was not aiming to kick the United States out of East Asia
emocratic
would be China s democratization,interested in your perspective on what China would have to do to credibly bind or constrain itself to reassurecountries in the region that its rise was peaceful?
The third question is for the third presenter, and I just want to mention that I agree wholeheartedlythat I think people have overestimated the power transition occurring between China and the United States,
and it partly depends on which indicators you use. Some indicators show that China has already passed the
US in comprehensive power; some suggest that China is catching up in relative terms; and some show that
China is falling behind in terms of military expenditures, where, for example, the gap between the UnitedStates and China is actually widening. But I have a couple of questions that arise from the presentation.
For one, I think it would be useful to have more details on how you define stability. Is stability
defined by a lower probability of militarized disputes? Is it defined in terms of a lower probability ofconflicts of interest? Is it defined in terms of better crisis management practices? Is it defined in enhanced
deterrents? Is it defined in reduced probability of security dilemmas? Is it defined in terms of the enhanced
ability of the United States to preserve its primacy? Because different definitions will require different typesof American presence, and it would be useful to have more details about what types of American presence
you think are stabilizing and what types may be destabilizing, and that leads to my second question.
3

Editorial note: the Chatham House rule was applied to this session, and thus the names of the participants are notprinted here.

69

Are there any downsides to the American presence in the region? If, for example, you assume that
China is a status-quo-oriented state, as many Chinese do, and if you assume that the United States is astatus-quo-oriented state, then a strong and powerful American military presence in combination with
Chinese military modernization creates a security dilemma, and that is not something that people would
consider to be stabilizing.
Related to this, it seems hard to determine the effects of the American presence without knowing
its efvery little evidence that the American military presence has deterred China from using force in the past. If
you look at all the cases where China has used force the Korean War, various Taiwan crises these arecases where deterrence clearly has failed. Within these crises
played because in most cases China has entered these crises or used force with very strict time limits andexample, from various Taiwan crises that it was because of an American counter-deterrent or because theChinese had already put limits on their use of force. You have to look at the soC
States military presence deterred China from attacking Taiwan in the 2000s? Has the American militarypresence deterred China from grabbing the Senkaku Diaoyu Islands? Has the American military presence
people in China even acknowledge that the American military presence has that kind of deterrence effect.
intended to use force in these cases.
For example, in 2007, when Chen Shui-bian was pushing for a referendum to get Taiwan into theUnited Nations under the name of Taiwan and people considered this a highly destabilizing move, was there
evidence that if the United States had not been present militarily that the Chinese would have used force
against Chen Shui-bianShui-bian wou
been there in the first place.
So this is kind of an intellectual exercise. It seems to be important to determine whether or not theroblem is that you have to focus on
US presence is stabilizing by de-thatns
they did not make is very difficult to do, so it leaves this big question mark as to whether the US presence isin some instances positive, in some instances negative, and in some instances irrelevant.
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Presenter 1
Thank you for your question about the possibility of co-development between deterrence and engagement. I
think you correctly pointed out
was conditioned by the leadership change.
I docreate those kinds of events in the N
kepticalabout this father to son, Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un, succession. Since Kim Jong-71

the inheritance of the polici
keptical about that. That means we have to enhance ourdeterrent capabilities and postures for the time being unless a new leader with a reform-oriented mindset
emerges. Unfortunately, we ve actually tried that kind of engagement policy within the past ten years, but
unfortunately it was only during the Kim Dae-jung administration from 1998 to 2002. The Roh Moo-hyun
administration also tried to engage North Korea, but it actually contributed to the destabilizing of thesituation, as there were a couple of provocations as well as nuclear and missile tests.
We have to provide North Korea with an alternative future. Actually, we are in a position toprovide two alternatives if they can live up to it. This actually leads to the peace treaty issue. I recall theagreements we made with North Korea in 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2005. If you take a look at the September
19 joint statement, the United States, along with the other five parties, assured that we are going to normalize
relations with the DPRK with progress made in the denuclearization process. We actually established aworking group on the normalization process, but North Korea walked out on the negotiations and, since
December of 2008, we have not held any talks at all.
I think it is critical for all of us to remain on the same page in persuading North Korea to comeback and realize peace and stability on the Korea Peninsula and in the region. When we talk about how toapproach this we have some differences. China actually emphasizes patience and flexibility, but
how much more flexible and patient we can be in handling North Korea. From the South Korean perspective,
the attack on Yeonpyeong reversed the cu
In the media
there was a report that Wikileaks leaked the contact between the two Koreas to host summit meetings to
unfortunate to see South Korea put more emphasis on deterrence and defense
improvrather than engagement for the time being. I hope that future leaders, maybe Kim Jong-un, can make astrategic choice to open up and reform the North, but we should be very concerned about the consequences.
About the US presence, I think that we now maintain a 28,500 troop level in the Korean Peninsula.
number of the USFJ, but it would be conditioned by the developments made in themulti-lateral security cooperation. I think we now have the minimum level of US presence. Once we makemore substantial progress in the multi-lateral security forum, I think the US Congress might reduce the US
presence. The United States will also push allies to shoulder more responsibility, so there will be a problem
for those US allies urging more US engagement in East Asia. Nevertheless, we have to think about what
responsibilities can be shared with the United States in maintaining or enhancing peace and stability in East
Asia. Thank you.
Presenter 2
Thanks for the questions. I will try to make a quick response on the following two points: what China canpromise international society; and what international society, especially those in dominant positions, can do
to make the Chinese feel comfortable. I think two aspects are important: international policy and domesticchanges. Frankly, I have more confidence in the international aspects.
In the international system, we are mostly satisfied. But we are not totally satisfied, which is why
we hope for some reform. Commerce is basically good, but we need to strengthen the voices of developing
countries, especially those that are free.
Regarding the regional security system, the United States should continue its hegemony in East
Asia. This is inevitable in the coming years or decades, but we want this dominant system to engage andinclude China. We also see the US, Japan, and Korea doing military exercises and having closed-doorbi-lateral and tri-lateral dialogs. If the door were open to engage China the way that NATO engaged Russia,
we would like to havethe situation would be much more comfortable. We donmore cooperative coordination, even in sensitive areas such as the Taiwan issue.
It s the same with climate issues and the world trade system. China is basically okay with thedominant international system, but we do hope for some gradual reforms to enhance the capacities ofdeveloping countries. W
to set up another system. Sometimes Russia makes suggestions toward
an alternate system, a Marxist system, another trade system, or a nuclear system. We say that the current one
is okay, but we do hope for some changes.
It is rather easy to explain what China can say to make international counterparts feel comfortable,
but domestically, China is a very different from Western countries in that the Communist party is the single
dominant party. This fact makes the majority of Western citizens, mass media, and politicians feel thatsomething must change. They imply that the Communist party must be doing some very bad things, but I
hesitate to say whether this is true or not.

72On one hand we can say that domestically we have tried to improve the system, make thisso-called authoritarian regime more efficient and more beneficial to most people. You could see similar
situations in Singapore and South Korea ten years ago. But for the future, I must honestly say that there is
still a lot of uncertainty inl reform. Maybe our younger generation will have a more Westernview and be brave enough to make some further changes. In this regard it is very hard to make internationalcounterparts feel comfortable.
On the other hand, I agree, the majority of Chinese people feel so uncertain. What major powers
can do to make China feel comfortable in the international security, monetary, and trade systems would be togive China more voting rights, given our territory and population. This is seemingly difficult; we always
engaging, struggling, and having lots of dialogs, but we don t get very far. This, in turn, sometimes makes
the domestic aspect more difficult, which is why we are contained. We cannot easily support this inequality.
So, from both sides effort is needed to close the gaps. Thank you.
Presenter 3
Thanks very much to both of you for these very challenging questions. Starting with the first three, how todefine stability? I think there are several ways. I would say for me at least, a rather traditional approach isthat security in the Asia-Pacific has to be the absence of major power war, not only between the US andChina, but also between Japan and China, etc. But let me stress right away that I do think, and hopefully thiscan be avoided, there would be a major power war in Asia-Pacific, not because both sides had intended to go. Here, I would argue that the US
to war, but rather out of cross-misperception
presence plays a major role in preventing and deterring a major power war.
Also, with regards to the second function, or the second definition of security, namely, in
addressing a whole variety of security dilemmas that exist in the region that continue to exist and willcontinue to plague policy makers in Japan and South Korea and the US and in China and elsewhere, I would
say to imagine a scenario where the credibility of the US presence is in decline in Japan or South Korea. Thismight induce thinking in these two countries about their respective roles maybe vis-à-vis China and certain
conflicts.
Thirdly, I would say that we can think about the US military presence in terms of the function ofcontributing to confidence building. I think that in the long run the US military presence can play a majorrole in contributing to confidence building measures between the US and China.
Fourthly, the US military presence, I think, will be a good vehicle, or a good structure, underwhich a whole different set of bi-lateral or tri-lateral forms of security mechanisms between otherAsia-Pacific players will emerge, such as Japan-Vietnam and Japan-India strategic dialogs. Indonesia willprobably play a more important role in the future, and here I think the key question is whether there ways tointegrate China into these new emerging tri-lateral, and quadrilateral security dialogs in a way that are
acceptable to the US, China, and all others who participate. That is to ask, is the US willing to accept thoseand if China is taking part? Regarding
tri-lateral and quadrilateral security mecha
your question about the downsizing of the US presence, there could be a downsize if the US militarypresence is contributing to a dynamic where we are failing to integrate China, and if China feels it is being
encircled by a growing containment strategy, particularly if India is also playing a dominant role in the
Asia-Pacific. If China feels the weight of the US military presence, plus the Indian military presence, plus
the Japanese military presence, I think the US military presence could have a negative impact.
The use of force question is very difficult to answer. As you all know, we only know whether
But I would agree with your argument. It canhave positive effects in that it would prevent and it has prevented at least the possibility of a major power
war. It is probably irrelevant in many other instances of minor levels of violence because it is not a credible
option for the US to send its carrier group to deter if, for example, China and Japan clash over some fishingboat incident.
With regards to the question of the quality of the US military presence required in the future, I
a forward presence in Japan and. We can even think about a much reduced US militarypresence to guarantee the credibility of the US deterrent threat as long as the North Korean situation is as it is.
Congress will vote for much reduced US military presence in both cases
because the number of the troops deployed is actually not that big. Secondly, the strategic interests at stake
are perceived to be so high that a reduction would be seen as counterproductive.

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Finally, regarding your question about the relative decline of US military power and how can wemanage this, I think it all comes down to whether we can find some shared concept of leadership in theregion. If we want to accommodate the rise of China, and everyone agrees that we have to give China alegitimate role in the Asia-Pacific as a great power, we have to find ways to share leadership. The question isthen, is the US willing to give up its goal of maintaining US primacy? On the other hand, is China willing toaccept that the US will be a key, major power in the region?
have the answer to this, but I think this will be the key issue here. Can we find sharedconcepts of leadership, or concepts of leadership that operate alongside each other? This will also require
what my Chinese colleague has already alluded to: this key question about the Chinese concept of self-powerthat in the long run will spillover or could contribute to a more positive approach in terms of addressing allof these security dilemmas.
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Presenter 1
Thank you. These are very challenging questions. First of all, about the relations between the DPRK andChina,
on that. I think China has been trying to improve its relations with North Korea
since Premier
Kim Jong-74

the Five Point agreement between Hu Jintao and Kim Jong-il, we can see that fact very well.
y kind of instability
Of course, I can understand that China is doing this because it
in or around its territory. Nevertheless, we need to have a different North Korea. It seems to me that North
Korea is going to be more of a liability than an asset for China, but Chinese behavior in recent days has
actually stirred up some public resentment in the South. I hope we can get on the same page again. Nobody
wants North Korea to collapse, so everybody will work together to have a better, stable relationship on the
Korea Peninsula. This leads to the second questiona strategy among thefive parties or six parties. Of course, the pre-coordination mechanism is quite crucial. We used to havetri-lateral coordination and oversight groups, what we called the TCOG, during the Perry Process establishedin 1999, with extensive consultation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. We have to think
about the revival of this TCOG mechanism. At that time it was only designed to denuclearize North Korea,
For that purpose I think we need to include China, and maybe a four-party consultation isnecessary to eliminate or reduce Chinese suspicion about whether this tri-lateral coordination or consultation
mechanism is directed toward China. In this regard, we highly encourage the US, Korea, and China to begin
tri-lateral cooperation and dialog as a mechanism. US, China, and Japan dialog might also be welcome.
Also, we have to think about mini-lateral dialogs and comprehensive multi-lateral dialogs as steps
toward comprehensive multi-lateral security cooperation, but I have to reemphasize that you should not.S
old and outdated, but they
underestimate Northare still capable of maintaining a high level military establishment. Thank you.
Presenter 2
Thank you for the questions from the audience. I have three I need to answer. First, regarding
domestic reform, especially its political and economic reform, I think China s peaceful rise requires moredomestic reform. This is why domestic debate recently has been about whether we should continue with, keep a low profile internationally, and reform domestically. There are some who sayDthat we are not strong enough so we shouldn t reform further, but I think further reform is needed, including
economic and political reform. But as I said before, this is a crossroads for China. The new generation ofleaders will need to have a lot of tough discussions. In the coming decades I think China s political andeconomic reforms will fluctuate and there will be some uncertainties. But I am cautiously optimistic. Ten
years from now we may see a stronger but more democratic and harmonious China.
Another question is whether thel stability andeconomic growth. There is a lot of influence, especially in the coastal and urban areas. The former 11-12
it influenc
percent yearly growth rate is
I emphasize again that
future, international elements are not influential
success or failure is not based on international elements relayed to the United States, Japan, or the Korean
strongly dependent on domestic elements
need further Deng
Peninsula. Rather,reforms.
The second question was about rare earth exports. We know that in Japan there has recently been a
lot of criticism, but I think there are two facts that have not been
China s reserves comprise one-third of these rare earth elements. But 95 percent are exported to theinternational community. Because the pricing system should be fair, China needs to bargain. The second fact
is that the Chinese export the raw material of rare earth, but the Japanese do the high-tech refining of thisrare earth. We think this is unbalanced and unsustainable, and in the future we should redesign this strategy.
This is not to criticize only Japan, but rather the whole world and ourselves as well.
The third question was about the unification of Korea Peninsula. I think this must be a bad
position for my colleagues, not me, but I will tell you the story, I personally recall. Years ago I came to Seoul
and got a chance to meet President Kim Dae Jung. He emphasize that the unification of our peninsula willtake at least three decades. His words were surprising because we were eager for them to unify. But in fact
they werein this process. If both sides have made somearrangements or have a consensus, we prefer they decide it by themselves. No country should, by force,change the internal unification process, but China will provide some help to make sure it is peaceful andwithout any nuclear proliferation. Tha
Presenter 3

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Thank you. Coming from a country that has been recently unified I cannot help but make a minor
observation on the unification issue. For those who want to unify, they should start saving money, because
ive exercise. Anyway, I was asked two questions.
About whether the US hub-and-spokes system is a facilitator or inhibitor, I think during my talk I
tried to make the point that I see it as a facilitator, precisely for the reason that there is an absence of any
effective alternative to addressing the security dilemmas, and my assumption is that as long as countries arege the fundamentals of thishub-and-spokes system, which of course inhibits the danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy, namely at that point
when they perceive the hub-and-spokes system to be a primary tool of containing China by all means. Then
this becomes a dangerous, self-fulfilling
Korea, Australia or others engaging in an uncertain social experiment by asking the Americans to leave or towithdraw from the region.
Finally, I would also say that I think the hub-and-spokes system and the US presence really should
be seen as providing Asia-Pacific countries with the opportunity to, below the hub-and-spokes system,
develop other multi-lateral forms of security mechanisms, and thereby building trust amongst each other. I
think this a function that we should not easily discourage. To put it another way, I would ask the question,
would we see these forms of rather non-committal multian overarching framework that, imperfect as it may be for the time, at least provides some reassurance that
we might not have to experience a major power conflict?
Japanese debate on this, but if it were to happen, and if we had no alternative in Japan to shifting troops, thenyes I would think this has the potential to shape and shake the order for the very fact that the moment that
happens, Japan would really need to have an answer ready to its neighbors, because I think a number ofneighbors would be as scared then of Japanese intentions and Japanese policies as they are now of China,
and again looking at the European experience, let me tell you that when the wall came down the first thingthat our beloved British and French friends did was to pick up the phone and tell the Americans that in noway would they support a unified Germany posing again a threat to the European continent. This was after
Germany, arguably, for 40 years trying everything it could to persuade its neighboring countries and its allies
that it was not embarking on any expansionist policy again. Yes, I know analogies are difficult, but I think in
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2010
2007
1995
2006
2006
Construction within Contradiction: Multiple
Perspectives on the relationship between China and International Organizations)
Professor and Deputy director of School of International Studies, Peking University. Former deputy directorof Institute World Economic & Politics, Chinese Academy of Science (CASS) and Professor of international
politics, senior fellow. Graduate School of CASS, Beijing, received MA. and Ph.D degrees, 1982-1988. He
was visiting Scholar, Hungary Academy of Sciences in 1988 and Associate Professor and researcher of
CASS, 1988-1993. He became visiting Scholar, at CFIA of Harvard University during 1996-97. He became
IR theories in the West and China and trends of international institutions and Laws. His publications are
Construction within Contradiction: Multiple Perspectives on the relationship between
China and International Organizations

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