2024/5/11
日本軍縮学会2024年度研究大会
慶應義塾大学三田キャンパス

核軍縮の規範論に一致する国民は日本人だけなのか？
世論の核保有支持・不支持の決定要因の共分散構造分析

芝井清久
ROIS-DS / 統計数理研究所
kshibai@ism.ac.jp* This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 20K01517 and 20K20416.

Research Objectives
This study aims to verify the normative effect of nuclear disarmament
on public support for the possession of nuclear weapons.
n The danger of nuclear war has increased since North Korean
nuclearization.
• The Doomsday Clock was reset at 90 seconds to midnight in 2024.
nNuclear proliferation will be promoted if more public opinions support
national nuclear possession in Northeast Asia.
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is under serious military and nuclear threat.
Ø Even Japanese public opinion is suspected of agreeing on nuclear possession.
Øn

To prevent public support for nuclear possession, the causal
relationship of the public support should be clarified.
2nPrevious studies have mainly highlighted military threat andnuclear deterrence in nuclear proliferation issues.
Ø

Trust in security effect of nuclear deterrence is an important reason of
nuclear possession.
• Many countries tried to develop nuclear weapons during the cold war (Campbell, etal., 2004).

ØCitizens of countries facing strong military threats, especially nuclear
threats, tend to express greater support for the possession (Fuhrmann,
2009; Jo and Gartzke, 2007; Singh and Way, 2004). Public opinion polls
confirm this tendency (ICRC, 2019, 17; Spektor, 2022).
• Normative values of nuclear disarmament and abolition have been partiallydiscussed on the reasons of nuclear possession.
– The experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led people to believe that nuclear first strikes weretaboo (Tannenwald, 1999). However, it is also clear that ethical constraints are not an absolutevalue criterion, as people tend to show greater support for nuclear attacks if there is no fear of
nuclear retaliation (Dill, Sagan, and Valentino, 2022; Horschig, 2022; Press, Sagan, and Valentino,
2013; Sagan and Valentino, 2017).
3

nHowever, in international community, nuclear disarmament has
been often promoted as an alternative security policy tonuclear deterrence.
ØnNPT, IAEA inspection, TPNW are also security effect.

The effect of nuclear disarmament on support for possession
has not been verified.
ØIs normative perspective of nuclear disarmament weakened?

4n

How is the normative effect of disarmament measured?

If people have normative values in nuclear disarmament, trustin nuclear disarmament are negatively correlated with trust in
nuclear deterrence.
Security effect of
nuclear deterrence

Security effect and/or
normative values of nuclear
disarmament
Military threat
Security environment

Public support for nuclear
possession5

Nuclear arms control, disarmament, and abolition are strongly related to nuclear deterrence. Their correlations and effect on support for nuclear
possession should be clarified.

https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/07/561122

Trust in Nuclear Disarmament

Nuclear arms control and disarmament are useful for the stability of nuclear
deterrence (Brenann, 1961; Bull, 1965; Schelling and Halperin, 1961).

Support for nuclear possession

Security effect of nuclear deterrence with nuclear possession is needed in severe security
environments (Security policies based on Schelling (1960); Waltz (1993, 2002)).

Trust in Nuclear DeterrencenDecreasing nuclear threat with nuclear disarmament and refraining from dependence on
nuclear deterrence (Norm and peace movement since the Russell-Einstein Manifesto).
https://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/atomicbomb-peace/346475.html

6Research Methodn

To measure the variables and correlations, this study classified states
into four categories based on the security environment and nuclear
status, and selected states and regions from each group to obtain data.
Table 1. Four Classifications of States According to the Nuclear Issue
Country to have everNation that has experienced a nuclear attack: Japan.
suffered atomic bombings
Nuclear power
States with nuclear weapons: U.S., U.K., France, Russia, China, India,
Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.
Potential nuclear power
Non-nuclear weapon states that face a strong military threat, especiallynuclear threat, and have an incentive to possess nuclear weapons:South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, etc.
Non-nuclear power
States that have no strong military threat, especially nuclear threat, andno incentive to possess nuclear weapons: Australia, Canada, etc.

Survey Countries
Japan, Hiroshima andNagasaki
The USSouth Korea

Australia

7

⺟集団
⽇本
広島県・⻑崎県
アメリカ
韓国
オーストラリア
標本
⽇本

⽇本在住の 18 歳以上の有権者
広島県および⻑崎県在住の 18 歳以上の有権者
アメリカ在住の 18 歳以上の有権者
韓国在住の 18 歳以上の有権者
オーストラリア在住の 18 歳以上の有権者

広島県・⻑崎県
アメリカ
韓国
オーストラリア

計画標本 1000 名 （47 都道府県の全国調査．回収サンプルには広島県
⺠ 8 名，⻑崎県⺠ 5 名を含む）
計画標本 800 名（各県で 400 名ずつ）
計画標本 1000 名
計画標本 1000 名
計画標本 1000 名

調査期間
⽇本
広島県・⻑崎県
アメリカ
韓国
オーストラリア2022 年 1 ⽉ 25 ⽇から 2022 年 2 ⽉ 22 ⽇にかけて実施．
2022 年 1 ⽉ 25 ⽇から 2022 年 2 ⽉ 22 ⽇にかけて実施．
2022 年 1 ⽉ 25 ⽇から 2022 年 2 ⽉ 22 ⽇にかけて実施．
2023 年 2 ⽉ 7 ⽇から 2 ⽉ 17 ⽇にかけて実施．
2023 年 2 ⽉ 7 ⽇から 2 ⽉ 20 ⽇にかけて実施．
8

Analysis: Trust in Nuclear Deterrence
Questions to measure the evaluations on nuclear deterrence.
n JP and HN havenegative opinions
on nuclear
Nucleardeterrence.
threatn

Q16. When the threat of nuclear weapons exists,
do you think the possession of nuclear weapons
increases the security of the nation?

100%

100%
80%

Q18. Do you think that alliances with a nuclear
power to counter nuclear threats enhancenational security?

0.386

0.405

0.532

60%

80%

0.642

0.646

40%

40%

20%

20%

Hiroshima &Nagasak i

Japan

Australia
Disagree

The USSouth Korea

Hiroshima &Nagasak i

Japan

0.618

0.680

0.685

Australia

The USSouth Korea

DisagreeAgree

Q17. When non-nuclear threats exist, do you
think the possession of nuclear weapons
increases the security of the nation?

Ø

Agree

Q19. Do you think that alliances with nuclear
powers to counter non-nuclear threats enhancenational security?

100%

Non-nuclear60%
40%
military 20%
threat 0%

0.480

0%

0%

80%

0.456

60%

100%
0.373

0.418

0.535

0.594

0.655

80%

0.441

0.451

Hiroshima &Nagasak i

Japan

60%

0.570

0.647

0.663

Australia

The USSouth Korea

40%
20%
Hiroshima &Nagasak i

Japan

Australia
Disagree

The US

Agree

nuclear deterrence

South Korea

0%

DisagreeAgreenuclear umbrellanNuclear umbrella
is relatively betterfor them thanpossession.

US, KR, and AU
have positive
opinions.
Ø

KR have thehighest rate of“agree” in all Qs.
9n

Questions to measure the evaluations on fear of military conflicts.
Q34. To what extent do you worry about serious
conflict around South China Sea?

Q33. To what extent do you worry about serious
conflict around Korean Peninsula?
100%

100%

80%

80%

60%

0.854

0.850

0.711

0.742

0.747

40%

60%

0.844

0.824

0.777

0.734

0.708

Hiroshima &Nagasak i

Japan

Australia

The USSouth Korea

40%

20%

20%

0%
Hiroshima &Nagasak i

Japan

Australia
Not worried

Worry

The USSouth Korea

0%

Not worried

Worry

The response rates of “worry” are high in all nations. Japanese aremost anxious.
n Regardless of nuclear status and security environment, there is no
significant difference in anxiety among the other three countries.
n

10

The response rates for why nuclear possession is justified in theinternational community after the NPT.
n The response rate for“When a nation is undernuclear threat” is KR >US > AU > JP & HN.
n The response rate for“There is no reason tojustify the possession of
nuclear weapons” wasremarkably high among
the Japanese, and theorder was JP & HN > AU
> US > KR.
1968年の核不拡散条約（NPT）の調印以降、国家が核保有する妥当な理由といえるものはあるでしょうか。あなたが妥当だと考える理由をすべて選んでください。もし無ければ「核保有を妥当とする理由はない」を選んでください。
1 核の脅威にさらされているとき

2 軍事的脅威にさらされているとき
3 将来の脅威に備えるため

4 大国の都合に振り回されないため

5 核保有国が増えたほうが戦争は起きづらくなる

6 軍事力の拡大は主権国家の権利

7 米英仏露中だけが核保有を禁止されないNPTは不平等だから
8 NPTに未加盟（もしくは脱退した）ならば違法とする法的根拠がない

9 核兵器と他の軍事兵器に大きな違いはない

10 その他

11 核保有を妥当とする理由はない

0%

広島・長崎

日本

10%

20%

オーストラリア

アメリカ

30%

40%

50%

60%

韓国

11

n

Correlations between trust in nuclear deterrence and fear of conflict clearly
differ among nations.
ØJP and HN decrease confidence in nuclear deterrence as their anxiety increases.
• Only JP and HN lose trust in nuclear deterrence when they strongly worry about conflicts.

US and AU’s confidence in nuclear deterrence and the intensity of their anxiety are
independent.
Ø KR increases confidence in nuclear deterrence as their anxiety increases.
Ø• KR’s values are clearly primarily based on nuclear deterrence, and nuclear disarmament is correlated to it.
Table 2. Correlation coefficients between the level of anxiety about military conflict and the level of confidence in the security effects of nuclear deterrence and the nuclear umbrella

q16 q17
q17
q16
q18 q18
被爆国
jp_q33 hn_q33-0.105 **-0.098 -0.141**-0.099-0.122****-0.134**
Atomic bombed*-0.002-0.102
jp_q34 hn_q34-0.044 -0.054 -0.083 -0.080**
state
hn_q33 jp_q33-0.098 **-0.105 -0.134**-0.122-0.099****-0.141**
hn_q34 jp_q34-0.054 -0.044 -0.080 -0.083*-0.102-0.002****
Non-nuclear ⾮核保有国
au_q33 au_q33-0.052 -0.052 -0.050 -0.050 -0.008-0.008
power
au_q34 au_q34-0.040 -0.040 -0.060 -0.060 0.003 0.003
核保有国
Nuclearus_q33 us_q33
0.049*
0.049 0.000 0.000 0.068 0.068*
0.011 0.089 0.089
power
us_q34 us_q34
0.080 * 0.080 0.011**
kr_q33 kr_q33
0.138 **0.138 0.127******
0.127 **0.100 0.100
Potential潜在的核保有国
nuclear
kr_q34 kr_q34
0.123 **0.123 0.108******
0.108 **0.096 0.096
power** p < 0.01,< 0.05* p < 0.05** p* <p 0.01,

q19 q19** **** -0.124-0.107** -0.026-0.080 *** **** -0.107-0.124-0.080*-0.026-0.070-0.070* *-0.050-0.050* 0.0490.049** 0.0920.092
** **
** **
** 0.1310.131** **** 0.1320.132

Trust in nuclear
deterrence

weakstrong
12

The more serious the security environment, themore people trust nuclear deterrence.
n

Only JP & HN lose trust in deterrence when they worry about
military threat.
The order of the positive evaluations on nuclear deterrence is
KR> US > AU > JP & HN.
Ø Potential nuclear power > Nuclear power > Non-nuclear power > Atomic
bombed state.
Ø

13Analysis: Trust in Nuclear DisarmamentnQuestions to measure the evaluations on nuclear disarmament.
Q8. To what extent do you agree or disagree withthe following statements? Nuclear disarmamentcontributes to your nation's security.

Q7. To what extent do you agree or disagree withthe following statements? Nuclear disarmamentcontributes to international security.
100%

100%

80%

80%
60%

0.803

0.827

0.778

0.732

0.598

60%

40%

40%

20%

20%

0.810

0.812

0.794

0.743

Hiroshima &Nagasak i

Japan

Australia

The US

0.650

0%

0%
Hiroshima &Nagasak i

Japan

Australia
DisagreeAgree

The USSouth Korea

DisagreeSouth Korea

Agree

The majorities of all nations agree on security effect of nuclear disarmament.
n The response rates of agreement with both Q7 and Q8 were in the order of JP &HN > AU > US > KR.
nØ

Only the response rate of agreement for KR is distinctly lower.
14

nCorrelations between trust in nuclear deterrence and disarmament also clearly
differ among nations.
ØJP and HN’s confidence in deterrence decrease as trust in disarmament increases.
• JP and HN’s evaluations are compatible with the normative disarmament and abolition perspective.

US and AU’s confidence in deterrence and confidence in disarmament are independent.
Ø KR increases confidence in disarmament as trust in deterrence increases.
Ø• KR’s evaluations are compatible with the realist arms control and disarmament theory.
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between the level of confidence in the security effects of nuclear disarmament and the level of confidence in the security effects of nuclear deterrence
Opinion on nuclear

q16 q17
q17
q16
q18 q18
q19 q19disarmament
Normative
被爆国 -0.225
hn_q7 ** -0.151** **-0.175 -0.164**-0.163**-0.174-0.118jp_q7-0.257**** **Atomic bombed
hn_q8 ** -0.246** **-0.225 -0.210**-0.207**-0.225-0.168jp_q8-0.273-0.294
**
** **
state
jp_q7
**
**
-0.164 **hn_q7-0.151** -0.225-0.175**-0.257 -0.163**-0.118-0.174
** **
jp_q8
-0.273 **-0.294 **-0.210 **-0.225 **hn_q8-0.246 **-0.225 **-0.207 **-0.168 **⾮核保有国 au_q7
0.006-0.089 **-0.008-0.033
Non-nuclear
au_q7
0.006
-0.089**-0.008-0.033
au_q8-0.031-0.061-0.006-0.065 *
power
au_q8
-0.031-0.061-0.006-0.065*
核保有国 us_q7
0.054-0.0130.109 **
0.057
Nuclearus_q7
0.054-0.013
us_q8
0.061-0.002 0.109 **0.105 ** 0.0570.083 **
power
us_q8
0.061
-0.002**** **潜在的核保有国
kr_q7
0.323
**
0.283 0.105**
0.341 ** 0.0830.313
Potential nuclear
kr_q7
0.323
0.283
**
** **
kr_q8 **
0.372** ** 0.353 0.341**
0.362 ** 0.3130.347
Realism
power
kr_q8
0.372
0.362 **
0.347 **** p < **0.01, * p <0.353
0.05 **** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

15

Do only JP & HN have the normative perspectivesof nuclear disarmament?
KR’s values are consistent with the realist perspective of nuclear
arms control and disarmament.
n US and AU’s trust in deterrence are independent of trust in
disarmament.
n

The orders of the positive evaluations on nuclear disarmament are JP &HN > AU > US >KR.
Ø Atomic bombed state > Non-nuclear power > Nuclear power > Potential
nuclear power.
Ø

16Analysis: Correlations between Variables with SEMn

To analyze the structure and correlations between fear of conflict (fer),trust in deterrence (det), trust in disarmament (dis), and support for
nuclear possession (pos), I use Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).
• R ver 4.3.3.
• Package: lavaan, semPlot.
Ø

The influence of the latent variables and differences among nations are measured
with the survey data.
• The dependent variable is constructed by Q20’s option 1 – 9, and 11 (Yes = 1, No = 0).
• The independent variables are constructed by Q7 and Q8 (trust in nuclear disarmament), Q33
and Q34 (anxiety about military conflict), and Q16, Q17, Q18, and Q19 (trust in nuclear
deterrence), and Q33 and Q34 (fear of military conflict).

For more information, see Shibai (2024b).
17

nFigure and Table of the SEM of JP.
fer: fear of military conflict.
det: trust in nuclear deterrence.
dis: trust in nuclear disarmament.
pos: support for nuclear possession.

18

Severity of security
environment

Positive effect
Negative effect(Significant at the 5% level)

kr

us

au

hn

jp

The values are the standardized coefficients.
n
dis → det has negative effect in JP, HN, AU,
and US.
ndis → pos has negative effect in JP, HN, AU,
and US.
nn

Trust in nuclear deterrence is a general cause toincrease support for nuclear possession.
Fear of military threat influences trust in nuclear
deterrence only in high serious security
environment.

Conclusion and Summary
Japanese, Americans, and Australians have thenormative perspective of nuclear disarmament.
nTrust in nuclear disarmament decreases trust in nuclear
deterrence and support for nuclear possession in JP, HN, US,
and AU.
JP & HN have the largest negative effect of dis → det.
Ø AU has the largest negative effect of det → pos.
ØnHowever, the negative effect of trust in nuclear disarmament
weakens as the security environment becomes more serious.
20

Trust in nuclear disarmament
Positivecorrelation

Negative correlation (normative values)
Trust in nuclear deterrence
Negativecorrelation?
State most exposed tonuclear threat

Positive correlation
Severity of security environment

Atomic bombed state
JP & HN

Non-nuclear power
AU

Exception

Reference pointn

Nuclear power
US

Potential nuclear powerKR

The normative perspective on nuclear disarmament clearly
influence the values of JP, HN, AU, and US.
21

To stop public support for nuclear possession, weakening trust in
nuclear deterrence is basic and important.
n Strengthening trust in nuclear disarmament and normative
perspective can weaken trust in deterrence.
nØØThe negative correlation between trust in disarmament and deterrenceshows the effect of normative values.

Making the negative effect of normative nuclear
disarmament in every nation will prevent
increasing support for nuclear possession.

jp• Increasing the effect of trust in nuclear disarmament is one
important method to decrease support for possession.
Ø

JP & HN show that fear of conflict negatively
influences trust in deterrence.
22

Further Research Findings…
To clarify anti-nuclear
sentiment, comparative
analyses of JP and HN are
conducted.
n The amount of knowledge on
nuclear issues makes thedifference between JP and
HN.
n

Ø

The findings will be publishedat another time.

表4-1 受動的教育によって得た知識量 (Q45で選択した項目数ごとの割合)

0個

1個

2個

3個

4個

5個

6個

7個

8個

mean

mean
w/o 0

hn

0.346

0.218

0.153

0.098

0.07

0.051

0.031

0.023

0.011

1.786

2.732

jp

0.549

0.172

0.105

0.082

0.051

0.02

0.009

0.003

0.008

1.074

2.382

us

0.399

0.239

0.137

0.132

0.055

0.022

0.01

0.004

0.002

1.343

2.235

kr

0.443

0.243

0.166

0.105

0.026

0.01

0.002

0.001

0.004

1.095

1.966

au

0.566

0.154

0.118

0.109

0.035

0.009

0.004

0.001

0.004

0.965

2.224

⽇本と広島・⻑崎の⼀元配置分散分析: F = 71.822, p < 0.000.
⽇本と広島・⻑崎のmean w/o 0の⼀元配置分散分析: F = 10.136, p = 0.002.
表4-2 能動的教育によって得た知識量 (Q47で選択した項目数ごとの割合)

0個

1個

2個

3個

4個

5個

6個

7個

8個

mean

mean
w/o 0

hn

0.591

0.2

0.1

0.054

0.023

0.014

0.01

0.001

0.008

0.849

2.076

jp

0.691

0.149

0.081

0.045

0.022

0.007

0.002

0.002

0.001

0.604

1.954

us

0.515

0.233

0.111

0.092

0.025

0.012

0.006

0.002

0.004

0.973

2.006

kr

0.579

0.22

0.127

0.048

0.014

0.007

0.002

0

0.003

0.745

1.77

au

0.588

0.177

0.106

0.094

0.021

0.007

0.005

0

0.002

0.836

2.029

⽇本と広島・⻑崎の⼀元配置分散分析: F = 16.655, p < 0.000.
⽇本と広島・⻑崎のmean w/o 0の⼀元配置分散分析: F = 1.240, p = 0.266.

23

For more information of my surveys and cross tabulations, see
芝井清久. 2022. 『核軍縮問題に関する国際世論調査：日本，広島・長崎，アメリ
カ2022 調査報告書』統計数理研究所.
芝井清久. 2023. 『核軍縮問題に関する国際世論調査：韓国, オーストラリア
2023 調査報告書』統計数理研究所.
Shibai, Kiyohisa. 2022. Cross-National Survey on Nuclear Disarmament
Issues: Japan, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the U.S. 2022 Web Survey. Tokyo:
The Institute of Statistical Mathematics.
Shibai, Kiyohisa. 2024. Cross-National Survey on Nuclear Disarmament
Issues: South Korea and Australia 2023 Web Survey. Tokyo: The Institute of
Statistical Mathematics.
n

The pdf versions can be downloaded.
https://www.ism.ac.jp/editsec/kenripo/contents_e.html
n24References
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