Russian nuclear weapons capability【Overview】
Compared with the U.S. French, and UK nuclear capabilities, Russian capabilities are quite vague. As for the data pertaining to the U.S.-Russia New START Treaty, Russia,
unlike the U.S., has not disclosed any breakdown of the number of (deployed/non-deployed) launchers. On March 1, 2019, Russia announced that it possessed a total 524
strategic delivery vehicles and 1,461 deployed strategic nuclear warheads (U.S.Department of State 2019). This chart and the New START Treaty data can be reconciledby replacing the 200 warheads counted under “Strategic bomber payloads” with the estimated number of operational strategic bombers (50) to reduce the number ofstrategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads to 512 and 1,432, respectively. Given Russiaʼs limited transparency and day-to-day ﬂuctuations in deployments in reality,
this is probably a reasonable estimate.
Also, Russia has approximately 160 ballistic missiles on high alert (capable of launch in 15 minutes), and most of them are estimated to be ICBMs (Kristensen, Hans M.
2017). After 2008, 96% of deployed ICBMs are said to be on high alert (Podvig, Pavel 2014).
Russia is in the process of systematically replacing Soviet-era SS-18, -19, and -25 systems with the latest SS-27M2 systems with complete replacement by 2020. SS-18s
are likewise being replaced by SS-X-30 Sarmats under development. Strategic nuclear submarines and SLBMs will also be replaced by the latest Borei-class submarinesand new SLBM Bulava. Elsewhere, Russiaʼs bombers, cruise missiles and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their launchers are all being modernized.
As a matter of fact, maritime patrols by Russiaʼs nuclear submarines have gained in frequency in the recent years. However, this Russian ﬂeet comprises about a total 20
submarines per year. Given constraints on submarine patrols, they are believed to be attack nuclear submarines (Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2017). Last
year Russia conducted the following ballistic tests: three ICBMs and more than ﬁve SLBMs (Space Launch Report 2018). Every October since 2013, Russia has
conducted large-scale military maneuvers involving ICBM, SLBM and cruise missile launches.Last year however,ICBMs were not launched (Podvig, Pavel 2018-3).
In February 2018, the Trump administration released the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), aimed at the maintenance and modernization of strategic nuclear weapons as wellas the development of smaller and more agile warheads and cruise missiles to be launched from surface ships and submarines.In the following month, President Putin, in aState of Federation address, reacted in kind by disclosing the development of a series of new nuclear weapons (Kremlin 2018). Of these, the supersonic ballistic missile“Kinzhal,” to be carried by interceptor ﬁghters, is believed to be in deployment already (TASS 2018-2). Furthermore, both the ﬂight test of the hypersonic glide vehicle“Avangard,” to be carried in ICBMs and capable of breaching missle defense, and the in-water of the “Poseidon” unmanned underwater vehicle have been reported as
successful (TASS 2019-1). All this escalation is enough to raise concerns reminiscent of Cold War nuclear buildup.
Updated : June 1, 2019

Click here for pdf version of this table.
NATO designation

Deployed
Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)

Missile/bomb

No. ofwarheads
perweaponNo. ofwarheads

662

1,582

318

822

Yield (kt)Year ﬁrst
deployed

Remarks

1)

SS-18 M6 Satan466

276 500 or 800

1988

10

6

60

400

1980

10

1

–

?

(2019)

63

1

63

800

1988

60

1

60

800

1997

a)

SS-19 M3 Stilettob1)

SS-19 M4 b2)
SS-25 Sicklec)SS-27 M1 (silos)(Avangard)

d)SS-27 M1(mobile)

18

1

18

800?

2006

99

3

297

100?

2010

12

4

48

100?

2014

–

10

–

500?

(2021)e)

SS-27 M2(mobile)f)SS-27 M2 (silos)g)

SS-X-30 (silos)h)Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)

144

560

2)

SS-N-18 Stingray

Carried by
the Delta III-classnuclear submarine

16

3

48

50

1978

l)

i)

SS-N-23 Sineva

Carried by
the Delta IV-classnuclear submarine

80

4

320

100

2007

m)

j)

SS-N-32 Bulava

48

4

192

100

2014

Carried by
the Borey-class nuclear
submarinek)n)Strategic bomber payloads

200

200

3)
Carried by
the Bear H

AS-15A Kent A
1

200

1984

o)

200

200

r)
Carried by
the Blackjack

AS-15B Kent B
1

200

1987

p)

s)

Nuclear bombReserve / Nondeployed
Ground-based (ICBM, etc.)
ICBM

1

2,749

4)

823
343

1)

480

5)

Ground-based non-strategic nuclear
weaponst)

Sea-based (SLBM, etc.)

980

SS-N-23

64

100

2)

SS-N-32

96

100

2)

Sea-based non-strategic nuclear
weapons

820

6)

u)

Air-launched systems (Bombers, etc.)
Missile , nuclear bomb

946
416

3)

530

7)

〜2,1708)

Non-strategic air-launched nuclear
weaponsv)

Retired warheads awaiting
dismantlement, etc.
Total inventory【Notes】〜6,500

1) This is in line with the latest estimates (Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019-2).Changes from last year include nine (mobile) SS-27M2s replacing nine SS-25s at
the Irkutsk Air Base (Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019-1). Elsewhere, ﬂight tests of the hypersonic glide vehicle “Avangard” continue aboard the SS-19. Its
deployment is believed to date from 2019 (RT 2018). We set aside 10 SS-19s for the “Avanguard,” relegating the remaining original 60 warheads to reserves. Someestimates maintain that SS-19s are free of nuclear warheads (Podvig, Pavel 2017-2).
With a view to complying with the New START Treaty, SS-18sʼ warheads are believed to have been reduced from ten to six and SS-27 Mod 2sʼ from four to three. These
reductions are now in reserve. The SS-X-30, set to replace SS-18s, commenced ﬂight tests in 2019 and will likely begin deployment in 2021 (Podvig, Pavel 2018-4).
2) Russian strategic nuclear submarines currently consists of ten submarines in operational deployment and one in maintenance. The Delta III class, with K-44 Ryazanʼs sole
exception (Navaltoday 2017), is all thought to have been retired (Podvig, Pavel 2018-1). Of the Delta IV class, K-117 Bryansk is believed to be in overhaul (Podvig,
Pavel 2017-5), with ﬁve others in operational deployment.SLBM Blavars on three Borei-class submarines have been reduced to ﬁve warheads from the standard six, inorder to adhere to the New START. The total Russian count, as a result, is 560 deployed warheads (3 warheads/missile x 16 missiles/submarine x 1 submarine + 4
warheads/missile x 16 missiles/submarine x 5 submarines + 4 warheads/missile x 16 missiles/submarine x 3 submarines), leaving 160 in reserve (64 per Delta IV inoverhaul, and 96 not deployed on Blavars.)
3) The estimate (actual number of aircraft tasked for nuclear missions is around 70 aircrafts) for strategic bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons is placed at 70(Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2019-1), comprising 25 (actual 14) Bear H6, 30 (actual 25) Bear H16, and 13 (actual 11) Blackjack aircraft. Since they arecapable of carrying six, 16 and 12 cruise missiles, respectively, we count a combined 616 warheads available for these strategic bombers to be in operational
deployment/reserve. In peacetime, some 200 warheads are allocated to the bombers but not deployed to bombers, and stored on air bases at Ukrainka (Amur Oblast) andEngels (Saratov Oblast).These are counted as being deployed. The remainder are stored at a central depository and are counted as reserve stockpiles. An estimate forstrategic bombers tasked for nuclear assignments is 55 Bear H6s/H16s and 11 Blackjacks for an operational missile total of approximately 200 missiles (Podvig, Pavel
2017-3).
4) Russiaʼs reserve stockpile consists of warheads not loaded on ICBMs, those stored temporarily out of submarines during overhaul or not allocated to bombers, and nonstrategic weapons. These are said to be stored in 48 locations across the Federation (Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009). Since the end of the Cold War,
Russiaʼs tactical warheads have been signiﬁcantly reduced, with current estimates pegging them at some 1,840 (see 520 + 820 + 500 on table). Each warhead, while
tagged to a speciﬁc launch pad, is not deployed operationally and centrally stored (Kristensen, Hans M. 2012). The Russian Foreign Ministry, during the 2014 NPT
Preparatory Committee, aﬃrmed that all non-strategic warheads are categorized as nondeployed and assembled at multiple central storage sites (Uliyanov, M. I. 2014).
According to a new noteworthy research ﬁnding about Russian tactical weapons (Sutyagin, Igor 2012), such concepts as operational deployments, central storages andsurpluses need to be redeﬁned, in accordance with the Russian militaryʼs unique operational practices. Sutyaginʼs analysis says that, of about 2,000 tactical nuclear
weapons, some 1,000 are “operationally allocated” to launch pads and, though not loaded onto delivery means, kept in alert readiness for immediate use. Some of these
may be found aboard ships or with ordnance units under the direct command of strike forces. Although this table adheres to Kristensenʼs reserve category, large amounts,
conceptually, resemble more closely with Kristensenʼs operational deployments.
5)

There are estimated to be 480 ground-launched tactical nuclear weapons. Of these, defensive missiles account for approximately 360 warheads, anti-air missiles 290
warheads, anti-ballistic missiles 68 warheads, and anti-ship missiles for coastal defense ﬁve. On the other hand, 16 platforms for the ground-launched cruise missile
variant SSC-8 (for dual nuclear and non-nuclear use), which the US claimed to be an INF Treaty violation, have been identiﬁed (Gordon, Michael R., 2019), although thenumber of warheads in actual deployment is unknown.

6) There are estimated to be approximately 820 sea-launched tactical nuclear weapons, allocated to approximately 190 warships, submarines, ship-based aircraft, andhelicopters. They are made up of anti-ship cruise missiles, anti-submarine rockets, land-attack cruise missiles, torpedoes, and depth charges. Most of the missiles are fordual nuclear and non-nuclear use (Kristensen, Hans M. 2012). Following the US notiﬁcation to leave the INF, Russia responded by announcing a conversion of the sealaunched Kalibr cruise missiles to a ground-launched variant (TASS 2019-2).
7) Approximately 530 warheads are estimated to be allocated to aircraft in cruise missiles, short-range attack missiles, and gravity bombs. They are carried by the Tu-22M3(NATO reporting name: Backﬁre C) intermediate-range bomber and the Su-24 (NATO reporting name: Fencer D) and Su-34 (NATO reporting name: Fullback) strategic
bombers.
8) In the Megatons to Megawatts program carried out after the end of the Cold War, the high enriched uranium (HEU) from Russiaʼs retired nuclear warheads was diluted andsold to the United States as fuel for nuclear power plants. This program was concluded at the end of 2013. Under this program, 20,000 nuclear warheads weredisassembled over a 20-year period (NNSA 2013). With dismantling continuing, warheads retired and to-be-dismantled are now fewer in stock. In the coming years,
Russia is expected to continue dismantling at a rate of 200-300 warheads per annum. (Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019-2).

【Source】
Gordon, Michael R. 2019: “On Brink Of Arms Treaty Exit, U.S. Finds More Oﬀending Russian Missiles,” Wall Street Journal, January 31. https://www.wsj.com/articles/onbrink-ofarms-treaty-exit-u-s-ﬁnds-more-oﬀending-russianmissiles-11548980645 (accessed May 18,2019)
Kremlin 2018: “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly,” March 1, 2018. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957 (accessed May 27,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,” Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012.
https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed May 27,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. 2017: “Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons,” brieﬁng to George Washington University Elliott Schoolʼs Short Course on Nuclear Weapons and Related
Security Issues, April 21, 2017. https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Brief2017_GWU_2s.pdf (accessed May 27,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019-1: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891(accessed May 15,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019-2: “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, 2019. http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/statusworld-nuclear-forces/ (accessed May 15,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Norris, Robert S. 2017: “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 73:5, 289-297, DOI:
10.1080/00963402.2017.1363995 (accessed May 27,2019)
Navaltoday 2017: “Russian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine Ryazan returns to service,” February 16, 2017. http://navaltoday.com/2017/02/16/russiannuclear-powered-ballistic-missile-submarine-ryazan-returns-to-service/ (accessed May 27,2019)
NNSA 2013: “Under U.S.-Russia Partnership, Final Shipment of Fuel Converted From 20,000 Russian Nuclear Warheads Arrives in United States and Will Be Used for U.S.
Electricity,” December 11, 2013. http://nnsa.energy.gov/mediaroom/pressreleases/megatonstomegawatts (accessed January 8,2014）
Podvig, Pavel 2014: “Russian missile force readiness rate,” http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/russian_missile_force_readines.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Deployment of RS-26 Rubezh reportedly postponed until 2017,” May 12, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/05/deployment_of_rs26_rubezh_rep.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Flight tests of Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM are said to begin in 2019,” January 19, 2017.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/01/ﬂight_tests_of_barguzin_rail-.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-4: “Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is cancelled (again),” December 4, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/barguzin_rail-mobile_icbm_is_c.shtml(accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-5: “Bryansk begins overhaul,” December 29, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/bryansk_begins_overhaul.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-1: “Two Project 667BDR submarines withdrawn from service,” March 14, 2018.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/03/two_project_667bdr_submarines.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-2: “By cancelling RS-26 Russia keeps its options open,” April 2, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs-26_russia_kee.shtml(accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-3: “Annual exercise of the strategic forces, this time without ICBMs,” October 11, 2018.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/annual_exercise_of_the_strateg.shtml (accessed May 18,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-4: “Sarmat deployment is said to begin in 2021,” October 31, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/sarmat_deployment_is_said_to_b.shtml(accessed May 18,2019)
RT 2018: “ʻBest New Yearʼs gift to Russiaʼ: Putin boasts successful test of Avangard hypersonic glider,” December 26, 2018. https://on.rt.com/9l8x (accessed May
18,2019)
Space Launch Report 2018: “2018 Major Suborbital Log,” http://www.spacelaunchreport.com/log2018.html#log2 (accessed May 15,2019)

Sutyagin, Igor 2012: “Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russiaʼs Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Royal United Services Institute, November 2012.
https://rusi.org/sites/default/ﬁles/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf (accessed May 27,2019）
TASS 2018-1: “Avangard Hypersonic Missiles Replace Rubezh ICBMs in Russiaʼs Armament Plan through 2027,” March 22, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/995628(accessed May 18,2019)
TASS 2018-2: “Russian ﬁghters armed with Kinzhal hypersonic missiles hold drills with strategic bombers,” July 19, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/1014048 (accessed
May 18,2019)
TASS 2019-1: “Russian Navy to put over 30 Poseidon strategic underwater drones on combat duty – source,” January 12, 2019. http://tass.com/defense/1039603(accessed May 18,2019)
TASS 2019-2: “Russia may develop land-based Kalibr cruise missile by end of year – source,” Feburary 7, 2019. http://tass.com/defense/1043620 (accessed May
18,2019)
Uliyanov, M. I. 2014: NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/17, 25 April 2014. http://undocs.org/NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/17 (accessed May 27,2019)
U.S. Department of State 2019: “New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Oﬀensive Arms, Fact Sheet,” March 1, 2019. https://www.state.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2019/05/AVC-03012019.pdf (accessed June 5,2019)©RECNA Nuclear Warhead Data Monitoring TeamICBM R-36M2 Voevodaa)Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓

Р-36М2 “Воевода”
RS-20V
SS-18 Mod. 6 Satan
Two-stage liquid propellant
Silo
Maximum 10 warheads
500kt/800kt per 1 warhead
Length 34.3 m, Diameter 3.0 m, Weight 211 ton
11,000 km
220 m
Dombarovsky Air Base : 18 missiles
Uzhur Air Base : 28 missiles
Voevoda means commander. The payload is thought to have been reduced to about six warheads, so as to comply
with the New START Treaty. Its last test was belived to be on October 30, 2013, during a large-scale exercise on
Russian Strategic Forces, in which a Voevoda was launched from Dombarovsky Air Base and successfully impacted
on Kura test range in Kamchatka.
The Voevoda is expected to be retired by 2022. Its replacement program, liquid-fueled Sarmat, has suﬀered delays
but is expected to commence deployment in 2021.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.218
CNN 2016: “Russia unveils ʻSatan 2ʼ missile, could wipe out France or Texas, report says,” http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/26/europe/russia-nuclear-missile-satan2/index.html (accessed May 29,2019)
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “RS-20/R-36M/15A14/15A18,” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.95-98.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 75, NO. 2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, VOL. 65,
NO. 1, pp.62–69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008 (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2012: “New heavy ICBM expected to be ready in 2019,” December 14, 2012.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/new_heavy_icbm_expected_to_be.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2013-1: “Russia conducts large-scale exercise of its strategic forces,” October 30, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/10/russia_conducts_largescale_ex.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2013-2: “Some new missile system to be deployed in Dombarovskiy,” December 18, 2013.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/some_new_missile_system_to_be.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2018: “Sarmat deployment is said to begin in 2021,” October 31, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/sarmat_deployment_is_said_to_b.shtml(accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

Intercontinental ballistic missile UR-100N UTTH

b1)

Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓

УР-100Н УТТХRS-18
SS-19 Mod. 3 StilettoTwo-stage liquid propellant
Silo
Maximum 6 warheads
400kt per 1 warheads
Length 24.3 m, Diameter 2.5 m, Weight 106 ton
10,000 km
350–430 m

Wheredeployed︓
Remarks︓

Tatishchevo Air BaseUR is the abbreviation for “Universal Rocket” and UTTH for “improved tactical and technical characteristics.”
Replacement with the ﬁxed silo-based Yars(SS-27 Mod2) began in 2014, and the UR-100N UTTH is expected to be
retired by 2019. Some observers believe warheads have been removed from SS-19s.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.222.
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “RS-18/UR-100N/15A30/15A35,” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.94-95.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 65:1, 6269, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008 (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

Intercontinental ballistic missile UR-100N UTTH

b2)

Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓

УР-100Н УТТХRS-18
SS-19 Mod. 4
Two-stage liquid propellant
Silo?
?
Length 24.3 m, Diameter 2.5 m, Weight 106 ton
10,000 km
350–430 m
Dombarovsky Air Base
Tests are under way with the hypersonic glide vehicle Avangard using the SS-19. The latest test took place on
December 26, 2018, from an SS-18 silo from Dombarovsky Air Base and striking a target at the Kura test range in
Kamchatka. The previously successful test was on October 26, 2016.
The Avangard delivers multiple conventional and nuclear (in excess of 2,000 kilotons) warheads and, gliding at Mach
20, is said to be capable of breaching missile defense.
Reports have it that two Avangards will be deployed at Dombarovsky Air Base. Russiaʼs plan is to enhance thisarsenal to a total 12 by 2027.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.222.
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “RS-18/UR-100N/15A30/15A35,” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.94-95.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Maxim Starchak 2009: ʻComplexities and Challenges of Russiaʼs Avangard Hypersonic Glide Reentry Vehicle,ʼ Eurasia Daily Monitor, March 5, 2019.
https://jamestown.org/program/complexities-and-challenges-of-russias-avangard-hypersonic-glide-reentry-vehicle/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2016: “UR-100NUTTH launch from Dombarovskiy, most likely with Project 4202 payload,” October 25, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/10/ur100nutth_launch_from_dombar.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-1: “Avangard hypersonic boost-glide system deployment plans,” October 29, 2018.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/avangard_hypersonic_boost-glid.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-2: “Avangard system is tested, said to be fully ready for deployment,” December 26, 2018.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/avangard_system_is_tested_said.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Tass 2018: “Russia to use SS-19 ICBMs as carriers for Avangard hypersonic glide vehicles ̶ source,” March 30, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/995167 (accessed May
27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

ICBM RT-2PM Topolc)

Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓Where

РТ-2ПМ “Тополь”
RS-12M
SS-25 Sickle
Three-stage solid-propellant
Transporter erector launcher
1 warheads
800kt
Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton
10,500 km
350–430 m
Yoshkar-Ola Air Base : 9 missilesdeployed︓
Remarks︓

Novosibirsk Air Base : 18 missiles
Barnaul Air Base : 36 missiles
Topol means “poplar”. On October 26, 2017, Russian Strategic Missile Troops carried out a major exercise in which a
missile was launched from the northwestern Plesetsk test range, which landed in the Kura test range on Kamchatka.
This was thought to be for obtaining data for extending the service life of the missiles. Previously, the test was
conducted on October 2, 2016. Currently, replacement by the mobile-launched Yars(SS-27 Mod2) is underway, andthe Topol is expected to be retired by 2021.
Using RT-2PM Topol, Russia is believed to be developing payload for the 4K51 Rubezh ICBM system. The latest test
launch was conducted on December 26, 2017, with a missile launched from Kapustin Yar in southern Russia landing
in Sary-Shagan in Kazakhstan. The latest test, dated December 10, 2018, was a failure. The previous text, a
success, took place December 26, 2017.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.232.
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “RS-12M Topol,” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.91-92.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 65:1, 62–
69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008. (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2013: “Topol launch from Kapustin Yar tests new combat payload,” October 10, 2013.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/10/topol_launch_from_kapustin_yar_1.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2014: “Topol-E launched from Kapustin Yar,” May 20, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/05/topol-e_launched_from_kapustin.shtml (accessed
May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Launch of Topol from Plesetsk,” September 9, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/09/launch_of_topol_from_plesetsk.shtml (accessed May
29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Annual exercise of strategic forces,” October 26, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/10/annual_exercise_of_strategic_f.shtml (accessed
May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Launch of Topol from Kapustin Yar,” December 26, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/launch_of_topol_from_kapustin_1.shtml(accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-1: “Yars missiles continue to replace Topol,” March 29, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/03/yars_missiles_continue_to_repl.shtml(accessed May 28,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-2: “By cancelling RS-26 Russia keeps its options open,” April 2, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/04/by_cancelling_rs26_russia_kee.shtml (accessed May 28,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-3: “Looks like a Topol-E failure in a launch from Kapustin Yar,” December 12, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/looks_like_a_topole_failure_i.shtml (accessed May 28,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

ICBM RT-2PM2 Topol M

d)Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓

РТ-2ПМ2 “Тополь-М”
RS-12M1
SS-27 Mod. 1 (silo)
Three-stage solid-propellant
Silo
1 warhead
800kt
Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton
10,500 km
350–430 m
Tatishchevo Air Base : 60 missiles
Deployment of 60 silo-based Topol M missiles seemed to be completed at Tatishchevo.
The latest test launch was conducted on January 16, 2017. A missile launched from the Plesetsk test range landed at
the Kura test range on Kamchatka. It is assumed the objective was to validate ballistic stability and other technicalcharacteristics.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.233.
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “RS-12M1/2 Topol-M (RT-2PM2),” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.93-94.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 65:1, 62–
69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008. (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2015: “Topol-M deployment in Tatishchevo continues,” February 13, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/02/topolm_deployment_in_tatishch.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Test launch of silo-based Topol-M from Plesetsk,” January 16, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/01/test_launch_of_silobased_topo_1.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

I t

ti

t l b lli ti

iil RT 2PM2 T

lM

Intercontinental ballistic missile RT-2PM2 Topol M

e)Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓

РТ-2ПМ2 “Тополь-М”
RS-12M2
SS-27 Mod. 1 (mobile)
Three-stage solid-propellant
Transporter erector launcher
1 warhead
800kt
Length 21.5 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 45.1 ton
10,500 km
350–430 m
Teykovo Air Base : 18 missiles
Deployment of 18 mobile-launched Topol M missiles has been completed at Teykovo Air Base.
The latest test launch was conducted on November 1, 2014. A missile launched from the Plesetsk test range landed
at the Kura test range on Kamchatka. It is assumed the objective was to gather relevant data for potential lifetime
extensions.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.233.
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “RS-12M1/2 Topol-M (RT-2PM2),” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.93-94.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Norris, Robert S. & Kristensen, Hans M. 2009: “U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles, 1959–2008,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 65:1, 62–
69, https://doi.org/10.2968/065001008. (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2012: “Topol-M and RS-24 Yars deployment plans,” December 14, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/topol-m_and_rs24_yars_deploym.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

ICBM Yarsf)

Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓

Ярс
RS-24
SS-27 Mod. 2 (mobile)
Three-stage solid-propellant
Transporter erector launcher
Maximum 4 warheads
100kt? per 1 warhead
Length 20.9 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 49.0 ton
10,500 km
250m
Teykovo Air Base : 18 missiles
Novosibirsk Air Base : 27 missiles
Nizhniy Tagil Air Base : 27 missiles
Irkutsk Air Base : 9 missiles
Vypolzovo Air Base : 9 missiles
The mobile-launched Yars is consecutively replacing the SS-25.
The most recent test on February 6, 2019, took a missile from the Plesetsk test range to the Kura test range in
Kamchatka. The purpose was to validate desired missile attributes. The previous test was in June 2018.
Russia undertook to develop a railway-borne ICBM system, RS-24 Yars (Barguzin BZhRK), in reaction to the U.S.
Prompt Global Strike (PGS) initiative. The program is now believed to have been postponed or abandoned.

【Source】
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “RS-24 Yars,” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.98-99.
Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Trimming Nuclear Excess -Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, Special
Report No. 5, December, 2012. https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/TrimmingNuclearExcess.pdf (accessed May 29,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2013: “Two RS-24 Yars regiments begin combat duty,” December 30, 2013. http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/two_rs24_yars_regiments_begin.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2016-1: “Barguzin project refuses to die,” May 18, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/05/barguzin_project_refuses_to_di.shtml (accessed May
29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2016-2: “RS-24 Yars is replacing Topol in Vypolzovo and elsewhere,” September 21, 2016. http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/09/rs24_yars_is_replacing_topol.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Flight tests of Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM are said to begin in 2019,” January 19, 2017.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/01/ﬂight_tests_of_barguzin_rail-.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 27,2019)Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Training launch of Yars ICBM from Plesetsk,” September 20, 2017.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/09/training_launch_of_yars_icbm_f.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-4: “Barguzin rail-mobile ICBM is cancelled (again),” December 4, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/barguzin_railmobile_icbm_is_c.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2019: “Yars launch from Plesetsk,” February 6, 2019. http://russianforces.org/blog/2019/02/yars_launch_from_plesetsk.shtml (accessed May 28,2019)
TASS 2018: “Avangard Hypersonic Missiles Replace Rubezh ICBMs in Russiaʼs Armament Plan through 2027,” March 22, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/995628(accessed May 18,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

ICBM Yars

g)Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓

Ярс
RS-24
SS-27 Mod. 2 (silo)
Three-stage solid-propellant
Silo
Maximum 4 warheads
100kt? per 1 warhead
Length 20.9 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 49.0 ton
10,500 km
250
Kozelsk Air Base : 12 missiles
Fixed silo types have been deployed by replacing the SS-19s at Kozelsk Air Base from August 20,2014. The latest
test launch was conducted on September 12, 2017. A missile launched from the Plesetsk test range landed at theKura test range on Kamchatka. While the objective was likely to validate ballistic stability and other technicalcharacteristics, some reports claim that the test was also about “minibus” warheads targeting the U.S. missile
defense.

【Source】
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “RS-24 Yars,” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015-2016, pp.98–99.
Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Trimming Nuclear Excess -Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, Special
Report No. 5, December, 2012. https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/TrimmingNuclearExcess.pdf (accessed May 26,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2012-2: “Topol-M and RS-24 Yars deployment plans,” December 14, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/12/topol-m_and_rs24_yars_deploym.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2014: “First two RS-24 Yars installed in silos in Kozelsk,” August 20, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/08/ﬁrst_two_rs-24_yars_installed.shtml(accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2015: “Test of silo-based RS-24 Yars from Plesetsk,” October 28, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/10/test_of_silo-based_rs-24_yars.shtml(accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic Rocket Forces,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/missiles/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Test launch of Yars missile with “experimental warheads”,” September 12, 2017.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/09/test_launch_of_yars_missile_wi.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Yars launch in September tested parallel deployment of warheads,” October 4, 2017.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/10/yars_launch_in_september_teste.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018: “First silo-based Yars regiment in Kozelsk is fully operational,” December 15, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/ﬁrst_silobased_yars_regiment.shtml (accessed May 28,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

ICBM Sarmath)Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓Сармат
RS-28
SS-X-30 Satan 2
Two-stage liquid propellant
Silo
Maximum 10 warheads ?
500kt per 1 warhead ?
Length 36.3 m, Diameter 3.0 m, Weight 200 ton
11,000 km?
Dombarovsky Air BaseUzhur Air Base
Under development as an SS-18 replacement. But there have been signiﬁcant delays due to test launch troubles.
Flight tests commenced in 2019, with deployment due in 2021. Reportedly, they are to comprise an ordnance of 46
missiles for the Dombarovsky and Uzhur Air Bases: six each for six regiments plus ten for another regiment.
In October 2016, the Russian developer of Sarmat released the photographs. Sarmatʼs test launches commenced on

December 27, 2017, and a second test, conducted either on March 28 or 29, 2018, had some public disclosure.
Sarmat is named after the once-ﬂourished early nomadic Sarmatians.
【Source】
Gady, Franz-Stefan 2018: “Russiaʼs Strategic Rocket Force Tests Ejection of Deadly Sarmat Intercontinental Ballistic Missile,” The Diplomat, March 30, 2018,https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/russias-strategic-rocket-force-tests-ejection-of-deadly-sarmat-intercontinental-ballistic-missile/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
The Missile Threat 2017: “SS-X-30 “Satan II” (RS-28 Sarmat),” 17 May 2017. https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/rs-28-sarmat/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2013: “Some new missile system to be deployed in Dombarovskiy,” December 18, 2013.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/some_new_missile_system_to_be.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Sarmat to be deployed in Uzhur and Dombarovskiy,” May 9, 2016.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/05/sarmat_to_be_deployed_in_uzhur.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Sarmat ejection test, at last,” December 29, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/sarmat_ejection_test_at_last.shtml (accessed May
27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-1: “Second ejection test of Sarmat,” March 30, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/03/second_ejection_test_of_sarmat.shtml (accessed
May 27,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2018-2: “Sarmat to begin ﬂight tests in 2019,” October 3, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/sarmat_to_begin_ﬂight_tests_i.shtml (accessed
May 27,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2018-3: “Sarmat deployment is said to begin in 2021,” October 31, 2018.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/sarmat_deployment_is_said_to_b.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
TASS 2018-1: “Key facts about Russiaʼs advanced Sarmat ICBM system,” March 1, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/992360 (accessed May 27,2019)
TASS 2018-2: “Russia completes building infrastructure for Sarmat ICBMs,” December 17, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/1036386 (accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

Submarine-launched ballistic missile R-29R

i)

Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Remarks︓

Р-29Р
RSM-50SS-N-18 Mod. 1 Stingray
Two-stage liquid propellant
Project 667BDRM Strategic Nuclear Submarine Delﬁn
Maximum 3 warheads
50kt per 1 warhead
Length 14.1 m, Diameter 1.8 m, Weight 35.3 ton
6,500 km
900 m
The latest test launch was conducted on October 11, 2018. Russian Strategic Forces carried out a major exercise inwhich Delta III K-44 Ryazan ﬁred multiple Stingray missiles from the Sea of Okhotsk, which landed in the Chizha test
range on the Kanin Peninsula.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.331.
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “R-29R Volna (SS-N-18 ʻStingrayʼ/RSM-50/3M40),” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015–2016, pp.89–91.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic ﬂeet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018: “Annual exercise of the strategic forces, this time without ICBMs,” October 11, 2018
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/annual_exercise_of_the_strateg.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

SLBM R-29RMU Sineva

j)Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Remarks︓

Р-29РМУ Синева
RSM-54SS-N-23 Mod. 1
Three-stage liquid propellant
Project 667BDRM Strategic Nuclear Submarine Delﬁn
Maximum 10 warheads (Minimum seems to be 4 warheads)
100kt per 1 warhead
Length 14.8 m, Diameter 1.9 m, Weight 40.3 ton
8,300 km
500 m
Sineva means “blue”. The latest test launch conducted on October 11, 2018. Russian Strategic Missile Troops carriedout a major exercise in which a Delta IV nuclear submarine (name unknown) launched a Sineva missile from theBarents Sea, which landed in the Kura test range on Kamchatka. Russia has developed the R-29RMU2 Liner, which isan improvement over the R-29RMU Sineva, and the Russian Navy reportedly began receiving Liner SLBMs in2014.The latest test launch was conducted on September 29, 2011. In reality, the Liner is a Sineva with four
warheads.
【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.336.
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “R-29RM Shetal/Sineva (RSM-54/3M27),” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015–2016, pp.88–89.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2011: “Second test of the Liner SLBM – Blog – Russian strategic nuclear forces,” September 29, 2011.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2011/09/second_test_of_the_liner_slbm.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2014-1: “Liner version of the R-29RM SLBM accepted for service,” April 2, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/04/liner_version_of_the_r29rm_sl.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2014-2; “Sineva missile launched from Tula submarine,” November 5, 2014.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/11/sineva_missile_launched_from_t.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic ﬂeet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018: “Annual exercise of the strategic forces, this time without ICBMs,” October 11, 2018
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/annual_exercise_of_the_strateg.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
RusNavy.com 2012: “Russia Finished Development of SLBM Liner,” February 24, 2012. http://rusnavy.com/news/navy/index.php?ELEMENT_ID=14406 (accessed May
29,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

SLBM R-30 Bulavak)Russiandesignation︓
Alternate
name︓
NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
Launchplatform︓
No. ofwarheads︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Circular error
probability︓
Remarks︓

Р-30 Булава
RSM-56SS-N-32
Three-stage solid-propellant
955 class submarine (Borey)
Maximum 10 warheads (6 warheads seem to be carried.)100-150kt per 1 warhead
Length 12.1 m, Diameter 2.0 m, Weight 36.8 ton
8,300 km
300 m
Bulava means “cudgel”. Currently deployed on three Borei-class submarines. The last test launch was conducted on
May 22, 2018, with the ﬁrst vessel of this class, K-535 Yuriy Dolgorukiy, ﬁring four Bulavas from the White Sea andstriking the Kura test range on Kamchatka. To date, while there had been three consecutive launches of two missiles
each, a quadruple salvo was unprecedented. 29-32 Bulavas are known to have been test-launched. The last test was
conducted on June 26, 2017.
Even though the maximum payload is said to be six warheads, the Russians are seen keeping it down to about four,in compliance with the New START Treaty.

【Source】
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “Bulava (RSM-56),” Janeʼs Weapons, Strategic 2015–2016, p.79
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2014; “Missile deliveries in 2014 and plans for 2015,” December 19, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/missile_deliveries_in_2014.shtml(accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2015; “Alexander Nevskiy with missiles on board,” April 13, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/04/alexander_nevskiy_with_missile.shtml(accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2016: “Success reported in salvo Bulava launch from Yuri Dolgorukiy,” September 27, 2016.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/09/success_reported_in_salvo_bula.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic ﬂeet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-1: “Four-missile salvo launch of Bulava from Yuri Dolgorukiy,” May 22, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/05/fourmissile_salvo_launch_of_b.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018-2: “Bulava is ﬁnally accepted for service,” June 29, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/06/bulava_is_ﬁnally_accepted_for.shtml (accessed
May 29,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

667BDR Strategic nuclear submarine Kalmarl)Russiandesignation︓NATO
designation︓
No. of tubes︓
SLBM︓Speciﬁcations︓
Submerged
speed︓
Where
deployed︓
In service︓

667БДР “Кальмар”
Delta III
16
Stingray (RSM-50)
Length 155 m, Width 12 m, Displacement underwater 13,000 ton
25knot（km/h46 km）
Paciﬁc Fleet base (Vilyuchinsk)
K-44 Ryazan

Remarks︓

Deployment began in 1976, and 14 submarines were commissioned. Today the K-44 Ryazan, returned to service
from long-term overhaul in February 2017, remains the only active submarine of this class. It was understood that
Russiaʼs plan was to begin replacing three Delta III submarines in active commission with the new 955 Borei I class.
Recently, the K-223 Podolsk and K-433 Svyatoy Georgiy Pobedonosets were retired.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.233.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic ﬂeet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Ryazan Project 667BDR submarine is back in service,” February 15, 2017.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/02/ryazan_project_667bdr_submarin.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018: “Two Project 667BDR submarines withdrawn from service,” March 14, 2018.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/03/two_project_667bdr_submarines.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

667BDRM Strategic Nuclear Submarine Delﬁnm)Russiandesignation︓NATO
designation︓
Propulsion︓
No. of tubes︓
SLBM︓Speciﬁcations︓
Submerged
speed︓
Where
deployed︓
In service︓

Remarks︓

667БДРМ “Дельфин”
Delta Ⅳ
Three-stage solid-propellant
16
Sineva (RSM-54)
Length 167 m, Width 12 m, Displacement underwater 13,600 ton
22–23knot（km/h41–43 km）
Northern Fleet base (Gadzhiyevo)
K-51 Verkhoturie
K-84 Ekaterinburg
K-114 Tula
K-117 Bryansk
K-18 Karelia
K-407 Novomoskovsk
Deployments began in 1985, with seven constructed to date but the six listed above in service today. Four and ﬁve
are regularly kept in operational deployment, with the remainder in overhaul.
As of June 1, 2019, only K-117 Bryansk is believed to be in overhaul.
Since 2013, the 667BDRM Kalʼmar has participated in each annual maneuver and test-ﬁred missiles.
Currently, ﬁve 955A (Borei II) submarines, an improvement over the 955 Borei I class, are under construction, toreplace the 667BDRM.
All 667BDRM submarines will have retired by 2019, according to some reports.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.233
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-1: “Strategic ﬂeet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-2: “Tula submarine completed overhaul,” December 28, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/tula_submarine_completed_overh.shtml(accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017-3: “Bryansk begins overhaul,” December 29, 2017. http://russianforces.org/blog/2017/12/bryansk_begins_overhaul.shtml (accessed May
29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018: “Annual exercise of the strategic forces, this time without ICBMs,” October 11, 2018
http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/10/annual_exercise_of_the_strateg.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2019: “Project 667BDRM submarines will stay in service until 2029,” March 18, 2019http://russianforces.org/blog/2019/03/project_667bdrm_submarines_wil.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

955 Strategic nuclear submarine Boreyn)

Russiandesignation︓NATO
designation︓
No. of tubes︓
SLBM︓Speciﬁcations︓
Submerged
speed︓
Where
deployed︓
In service︓
Remarks︓

Борей
Borey
16
Bulava (RSM-56)
Length 170 m, Width 13.5 m, Displacement underwater 19,400 ton
25 knot（km/h 46 km）
Northern Fleet base (Gadzhiyevo) (1st and 3rd vessels)
Paciﬁc Fleet base (Vilyuchinsk) (2nd vessel)
K-535 Yuriy Dolgorukiy
K-550 Alexsandr Nevskiy
K-551 Vladimir Monomakh
Three 955 (BoreyI) vessels are being built as the successor to the 667BDR type. The ﬁrst vessel, the Yury Dolgorukiy
was commissioned in January 2013, and the second, the Alexander Nevsky in December 2013. The third vessel, theVladimir Monomakh was also commissioned in December 2014. All three vessels have successfully launched SLBM
Bulavas. On the other hand, ﬁve 955A (BoreyA/II) vessels are being built as substitutes for the 667BDRM type.
Previously each vessel was reported to have 20 missiles, but now the general view is that there are 16. The ﬁrst
vessel, Knyaz Vladimir, was launched in November 2017 and expected to be commissioned in the late 2019. The
second vessel, Knyaz Oleg, the third Generalissimus Suvorov, the fourth vessel, Imperator Aleksandr III, and the ﬁfth

vessel, Knyaz Pozharskiy will be commissioned in 2020s.
Two more Borei-A submarines and four of the Borei-B class, with greater propulsion capability, are going to beconstructed, as per media reports.
【Source】
Gady, Franz-Stefan 2019: “Will Russia Build Borei B-Class Ballistic Missile Subs?,” The Diplomat, April 18, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/will-russia-buildborei-b-class-ballistic-missile-subs/ (accessed May 29,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Trimming Nuclear Excess -Options for Further Reductions of U.S. and Russian Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, Special
Report No. 5, December, 2012. https://fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/publications1/TrimmingNuclearExcess.pdf (accessed May 29,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2013-1: “Yuri Dolgorukiy submarine oﬃcially accepted for service,” January 10, 2013.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/01/yuri_dolgorukiy_submarine_oﬃ.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2013-2: “Project 955A submarines to carry 16 missiles,” February 21, 2013.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/02/project_955a_submarines_to_car.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2013-3: “Aleksandr Nevskiy submarine joined the Paciﬁc Fleet,” December 23, 2013.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2013/12/aleksandr_nevskiy_submarine_jo.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2014-1: “Ekaterinburg and Vladimir Monomakh join the ﬂeet,” December 19, 2014.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/ekaterinburg_and_vladimir_mono.shtml (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2014-2: “Sixth Project 955 Borey submarine laid down,” December 26, 2014.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/12/sixth_project_955_borey_submar.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2015-2: “Seventh Project 955 Borey submarine laid down,” December 18, 2015.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/12/seventh_project_955_borey_subm.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2016: “The eighth Project 955 Borey submarine laid down at Sevmash,” December 23, 2016.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2016/12/the_eighth_project_955_sub.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic ﬂeet,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/navy/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2018: “Two more Borey-A submarines to be built by 2028t,” December 4, 2018. http://russianforces.org/blog/2018/12/two_more_boreya_submarines_to.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
TASS 2014: “Russiaʼs Sevmash shipyard lays down 5th Borei-class nuclear sub – Knyaz Oleg,” July 27, 2014. http://tass.com/russia/742472 (accessed June 11,2018)
Tass 2017-1: “Russia starts development of Borei-B nuclear-powered submarines,” November 7, 2017. http://tass.com/defense/974454 (accessed May 29,2019)
Tass 2017-2: “Russian Navy to receive improved Borei-class strategic submarine in 2026 ̶ source,” December 25, 2017. http://tass.com/defense/982864 (accessed
May 29,2019)
Tass 2018: “Russian Navy to get improved Borei-class nuclear submarine in 2019,” April 25, 2018. http://tass.com/defense/1001781 (accessed May 29,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

Cruise missile Kh-55

o)Russiandesignation︓NATO
designation︓
Carried by︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓
Remarks︓

X-55
AS-15A Kent A
Tu-95MS（NATO reporting name︓Bear H）
200kt
Length 8.09 m, Diameter 0.51 m, Weight 1.7 ton
2,500 km
The Tu-95MS6 carries six missiles internally, and the 95MS16 can carry a further 10 missiles underneath the wings.
The sea-launched variant of these missiles is the non-strategic nuclear RK-55 (SS-N-21). The much stealthier (250kT) Kh-102 is in development to replace the Kh-55. The conventional Kh-101 warhead is already in deployment andsaw action for the ﬁrst time on November 17, 2015, when Tupolev Tu-160 and Tu-95MS strategic bombers in Syria
ﬁred the missile in an air raid.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.365.
FAS 2013: “AS-15 KENT – Russian and Soviet Nuclear Forces,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/bomber/as-15.htm (accessed June 11,2018)
IHS Janeʼs 2015-1: “Kh-55 (AＳ-15 ʻKentʼ/Kh-555/RKV-500/Kh-65)”, IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.184–186.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-2: “Kh-101/-102 “, IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.189–190.
IHS Janeʼs 360 2015: “Russia launches long-range air sorties into Syria,” 18 November 2015. http://www.janes.com/article/56062/russia-launches-long-range-airsorties-into-syria (accessed June 10,2016)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Missile Defense Project 2018: “Kh-101 / Kh-102,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 26, 2017, last modiﬁed June 15, 2018.
https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kh-101-kh-102/ (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2015: “Tu-95MS and Tu-160 strategic bombers used in Syria strikes,” November 17, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/11/tu-95ms_and_tu160_strategic_b.shtml (accessed May 29,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Sputnik News 2012: “Russian Air Force to Get New Cruise Missile in 2013,” September 26, 2012. http://sputniknews.com/military/20120926/176233341.html(accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

Cruise missile Kh-55SM

p)

Russiandesignation︓NATO
designation︓
Carried by︓
Yield︓
Speciﬁcations︓Range︓

X-55CM
AS-15B Kent B
Tu-160（NATO designation︓Blackjack）
200kt
Length 8.09 m, Diameter 0.77 m, Weight 1.7 ton
3,000 km

Remarks︓This is a longer range version of the Kh-55. The Tu-160 carries 12 missiles.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.365.
FAS 2013: “AS-15 KENT – Russian and Soviet Nuclear Forces,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/bomber/as-15.htm (accessed June 11,2018)
IHS Janeʼs 2015: “Kh-55 (AＳ-15 ʻKentʼ/Kh-555/RKV-500/Kh-65)”, IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.184–186.
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73–84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 27,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

Strategic bomber Tu-95 MS6/-16r)Russiandesignation︓NATO
designation︓
Nuclearweapon︓Speciﬁcations︓Max. speed︓
Range︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓Туполев Ту–95MC6/-16
Bear H6/16
Air launch cruise missile Kh-55. The Tu-95 MS6 can carry six missiles internally. In addition, the 95 MS16 can carry afurther 10 missiles underneath the wings for a total of 16 (however, its ﬂight range drops commensurately)。
Length 49.5 m, Span 51.1 m (Propeller aircraft)
830 km/h
10,500 m
Ukrainka Air Base and Engels Air BaseIn the Russian Strategic Forcesʼ annual large-scale exercise, Tupolev Tu-95s ﬁre cruise missiles. Russia is planning todeploy a new aircraft to replace the current strategic bomber from 2025. At the same time, the Tu-95MS is being
modernized. In November 2015, the Russian Air Force began to receive Tu-95MSMs, with improved combat andradar and target-acquiring/radionavigation capabilities. The new Tupolev bomber is capable of carrying up to eight of
the newest long-range cruise missiles, Kh-101 (conventional) or Kh-102 (250 kT nuclear, still in development). The
bomber will remain in service until 2025. On November 17, 2016, the Tu-95MSM saw its ﬁrst combat in Syria,
launching Kh-101s in an air strike.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.382.
Gady, Franz-Stefan 2018: “Russia Conducts Large-Scale Exercise With its Nuclear Forces,” The Diplomat, October 12, 2018. https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/russiaconducts-large-scale-exercise-with-its-nuclear-forces/ (accessed May 31,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2012: “Modernization of Tu-95MS bombers,” September 20, 2012. http://russianforces.org/blog/2012/09/modernization_of_tu-95ms_bombe.shtml(accessed May 31,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2014: “Tupolev design bureau to work on new strategic bomber,” February 18, 2014.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/02/tupolev_design_bureau_to_work.shtml (accessed June 11,2018)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 27,2019)
Sputnik News 2012: “Russia Looking at 2020 for New Generation Long-Range Bomber,” July 2, 2012. http://sputniknews.com/military/20120702/174358197.html(accessed June 11,2018)
Sputnik News 2014: “Russian Tu-95 Bear Bomber Launches Cruise Missiles During Drills,” May 8, 2014. http://sputniknews.com/military/20140508/189674387.html(accessed June 11,2018)
TASS 2016: “Russiaʼs Tupolev-95MSM bomber delivers ﬁrst-ever strike on mission to Syria,” November 17, 2016. http://tass.com/defense/913163 (accessed June
1,2018)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

Strategic bomber Tu-160/M

s)Russiandesignation︓NATO
designation︓
Nuclearweapon︓Speciﬁcations︓Max. speed︓
Range︓
Where
deployed︓
Remarks︓Туполев Ту-160 ʻБелый лебедьʼBlackjackIt carries 12 air-launched Kh-55SM cruise missiles, or 24 short-range Kh-15 attack missile gravity bombs.
Length 54.1 m, Span 55.7–35.6 m
2,200 km/h
14,000 km
Ukrainka Air Base
The Russian nickname is the White Swan (Belyy Lebed).
Russia began to modernize a dozen Tupolev Tu-160 from the mid-2000s. The Tu-160M, capable of carrying two new
long-range cruise missiles, the Kh-101 (AS-23A, conventional warhead) and the Kh-102 (AS-23B, nuclear warhead),
is an upgrade with greater ﬁrepower. Russia has replaced almost all its electronics, with a view to improvements incommunications and avionics. The Tu-160Mʼs maiden ﬂight was in November 2014.
A further modernized Tu-160M2 is expected to go into production in 2023. This series is reported to number 50
planes at a minimum. The new Tupolevʼs maiden ﬂight was on January 25, 2018. On the same date, the Russian Air
Force placed its purchase order for the ﬁrst ten Tu-160M2s.
PSC Tupolev is set to manufacture Russiaʼs proposed next-generation stealth strategic bomber: Perspektivnyi
Aviatsionnyi Kompleks Dalʼney Aviatsii (PAK DA) or “”prospective aviation complex for long-range aviation.”” This ﬁrst
ﬂight is projected for 2021. This new product is expected to replace Tu-160s, Tu-95MSs and Tu-22M3s.

【Source】
Bukharin, Oleg et al. 2004: “Russian strategic nuclear forces” edited by Pavel Podvig, 2004, MIT Press. p.397.
Gady, Franz-Stefan 2018-1: “Russia Orders First 10 Upgraded Supersonic Nuclear-Capable Bombers,” The Diplomat, January 31, 2018.
https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/russia-orders-ﬁrst-10-upgraded-supersonic-nuclear-capable-bombers/ (accessed May 31,2019)
Gady, Franz-Stefan 2018-2: “Russia Conducts Large-Scale Exercise With its Nuclear Forces,” The Diplomat, October 12, 2018.

https://thediplomat.com/2018/10/russia-conducts-large-scale-exercise-with-its-nuclear-forces/ (accessed May 31,2019)
Gady, Franz-Stefan 2019: “Russiaʼs Next Generation Strategic Bomber to Make Debut Flight in 2025-26,” The Diplomat, May 20,
2019.https://thediplomat.com/2019/05/russias-next-generation-strategic-bomber-to-make-debut-ﬂight-in-2025-26// (accessed May 31,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2014-1: “Tupolev design bureau to work on new strategic bomber,” February 18, 2014.
http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/02/tupolev_design_bureau_to_work.shtml (accessed May 31,2019)
Podvig, Paval 2014-2: “Plans for the new strategic bomber,” May 22, 2014. http://russianforces.org/blog/2014/05/plans_for_the_new_strategic_bo.shtml (accessed
May 31,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2015-1: “Tu-160 bombers to undergo another round of modernization by 2019,” May 27, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/05/tu160_bombers_to_undergo_anot.shtml (accessed May 31,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2015-2: “Russia wants to build 50 new Tu-160 bombers,” May 28, 2015. http://russianforces.org/blog/2015/05/russia_wants_to_build_50_new_t.shtml(accessed May 31,2019)
Podvig, Pavel 2017: “Strategic aviation,” June 20, 2017. http://russianforces.org/aviation/ (accessed May 27,2019)
RUSSIAN AVIATION 2014: “The upgraded Tu-160 performed its ﬁrst ﬂight,” November 27, 2014. http://www.ruaviation.com/news/2014/11/27/2767/ (accessed May
27,2019)
Sputnik News 2015: “Russia to Produce Successor of Tu-160 Strategic Bomber After 2023,” June 4, 2015. https://sputniknews.com/military/201506041022954769/(accessed May 31,2019)
TASS 2017: “Russia will start making prototype model of future strategic bomber shortly – senator,” December 24, 2017. http://tass.com/defense/982771 (accessed
May 31,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

Ground-based non-strategic nuclear weaponst)

Russian designation（NATO designation）

Anti-ballistic missile
53T6 (Gazelle)
Air defense missile
S-300P (SA-10/20)
S-300V (SA-12)
Coastal defense missile
Redut (SSC-1B)
Bostion-P (SSC-5)
Short-range ballistic missile
Tochka/-U (SS-21)
Iskander (SS-26)
Cruise missile
9M729 (SSC-8)

Yield
(kt)

Range
(km)

Launch platform

10

80

?
?

200/400
100

Transporter erector launcher

350
10

500
350

Transporter erector launcher

10-10010-100120
350Transporter erector launcher

10-100~2,500Transporter erector launcher

Silo

Transporter erector launcher

Transporter erector launcher

Transporter erector launcher【Source】
FAS: “Iskander / SS-26,” http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/theater/ss-26.htm (accessed May 27,2019)
IHS Janeʼs 2015-1: “A-30 (SH-08 ʻGazelleʼ),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.261–262.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-2: “Iskander 9M720/9M723 Tender,” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.80–82.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-3: “OTR-21 Tochka (SS-21 ʻScrabʼ/97M79),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.82–85.
Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,”; Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012.
https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed May 31,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Missile Defense Project 2018: “S-400 Triumf,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 15, 2018. https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/s400-triumf/ (accessed May 31,2019)
Missile Defense Project 2019: “SSC-8 (Novator 9M729),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 23, 2019,https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ssc-8-novator-9m729/ (accessed May 31,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weaponsSea-based non-strategic nuclear weaponsu)Russian designation（NATO designation）

Anti-ship cruise missile
P-120 Malakhit (SS-N-9)
P-500 Bazalt (SS-N-12)
P-700 Granit (SS-N-19)
Kh-41 Moskit (SS-N-22)
Land-attack cruise missile
RK-55 Granat (SS-N-21)
Kalibr (SS-N-30A)
Anti-submarine rocket
RPK-2 Vyuga (SS-N-15)
RPK-6 Vodopad (SS-N-16)
TorpedoDepth charge

Yield
(kt)

Range
(km)

Launch platform

200
350
500
200

110
550
625
250

200
?

2,400
1,500-2,500

200
200

35
50

Corvette
Cruiser
Nuclear submarine、Aircraft carrier、Cruiser
Destroyer、Corvette
Nuclear submarine
Nuclear submarine
Nuclear submarine、Cruiser、Destroyer, etc.
Nuclear submarine、Cruiser、Destroyer, etc.
Nuclear submarine
Aircraft carrier、Cruiser、Destroyer, etc.

【Source】
IHS Janeʼs 2015-1: “P-50/-120 (SS-N-9 ʻSirenʼ/4K85 Malaxit),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, p.196.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-2: “P-80/-270 Zubr/Moskit (SS-N-22 ʻSunburnʼ/3M-80/3M82),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.197–198.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-3: “P-500 (4K80 Basalt),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.198–199.

IHS Janeʼs 2015-4: “P-700 (3M45),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.199–200.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-5: “RK-55 Granat (3M410),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.200–201.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-6: “RPK-2 (81R Vyuga/90RU Tsakra),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.235–236.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-7: “RPK-6/-7,” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.236–237.
Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,”; Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012.
https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed May 31,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Missile Defense Project 2018: “SS-N-30A (3M-14 Kalibr),” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, une 15, 2018,https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-30a/ (accessed June 1,2019)
Sutyagin, Igor 2012: “Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russiaʼs Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Royal United Services Institute, November 2012.
https://rusi.org/sites/default/ﬁles/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf (accessed June 1,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weaponsAir-carried non-strategic nuclear weaponsv)
Russian designation（NATO designation）

Anti-ship cruise missile
Kh-22 (AS-4)
Kh-32
Ballistic missile
Kh-15 (AS-16)
Kh-47M2 (Kinzhal)
Unguided bomb

Yield
(kt)

Range
(km)

200
100-500

310
600-1,000

350?
20–1,000

150
1,500-2,000

Launch platform

Tu-22M
Tu-22M
Medium-range bomber
MiG-31K
Medium-range bomber、Fighter-bomber【Source】
IHS Janeʼs 2015-1: “Kh-15 (As-16 ʻKickbackʼ/RKV-15),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.177–178.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-2: “Kh-22 (AS-4 ʻKitchenʼ/Burya),” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.178–179.
IHS Janeʼs 2015-3: “Russian Federation/Nuclear bombs,” IHS Janeʼs Weapons: Strategic 2015–2016, pp.225–226.
Kristensen, Hans M. 2012: “Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,”; Federation of American Scientists, Special Report No. 3, May, 2012.
https://fas.org/_docs/Non_Strategic_Nuclear_Weapons.pdf (accessed May 31,2019)
Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt 2019: “Russian nuclear forces, 2019,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75:2, 73-84,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2019.1580891 (accessed May 15,2019)
Missile Defense Project 2018: “Kinzhal,” Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, July 18, 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/kinzhal/(accessed June 1,2019)
Navy Recognition 2018: “New Kh-32 Antiship Missile Becomes Operational in Russia,” March 26, 2018, https://www.navyrecognition.com/index.php/focusanalysis/naval-technology/6088-new-kh-32-antiship-missile-becomes-operational-in-russia-part-1.html (accessed June 1,2019)→Return to Russian nuclear weapons

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