Expert Voices on Japan
Security, Economic, Social, andForeign Policy Recommendations
U.S.-Japan Network for the Future Cohort IV

Expert Voices on Japan
Security, Economic, Social, andForeign Policy Recommendations
U.S.-Japan Network for the Future Cohort IV

Arthur Alexander, Editor

www.mansfieldfdn.org

The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, Washington, D.C.
©2018 by The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
All rights reserved.
Published in the United States of America
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018942756

The views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors and do not necessarilyreflect the views of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation or its funders.

Contributors

Amy Catalinac, Assistant Professor, New York University
Yulia Frumer, Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins University
Robert Hoppens, Associate Professor, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
Nori Katagiri, Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University
Adam P. Liff, Assistant Professor, Indiana University
Ko Maeda, Associate Professor, University of North Texas
Reo Matsuzaki, Assistant Professor, Trinity College
Matthew Poggi
Michael Orlando Sharpe, Associate Professor, City University of New York
Jolyon Thomas, Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania
Kristin Vekasi, Assistant Professor, University of Maine
Joshua W. Walker, Managing Director for Japan and Head of Global
Strategic Initiatives, Office of the President, Eurasia Group

U.S.-Japan Network for the Future Advisory Committee
Dr. Susan J. Pharr, Edwin O. Reischauer Professor of Japanese Politics
and Director of the Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University
Dr. Leonard Schoppa, Professor, University of Virginia
Dr. Sheila A. Smith, Senior Fellow for Japan Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations
Dr. Ezra Vogel, Henry Ford II Research Professor of the Social Sciences
Emeritus, Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies, Harvard University

About the Program
The U.S.-Japan Network for the Future
The U.S.-Japan Network for the Future was initiated in 2009 to identify
and support American professionals who demonstrate an interest in andpotential for becoming Japan specialists and policy experts. More information about the program is available on the Foundation’s website: http://
mansfieldfdn.org/program/dialogues/u-s-japan-network-for-the-future/.

The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation is a 501(c)3 organizationthat promotes understanding and cooperation in U.S.-Asia relations. The
Foundation was established in 1983 to honor Mike Mansfield (1903–2001),
a revered public servant, statesman and diplomat who played a pivotal
role in many of the key domestic and international issues of the 20th
century as U.S. congressman from Montana, Senate majority leader andfinally as U.S. ambassador to Japan. Maureen and Mike Mansfield’s values,
ideals and vision for U.S.-Asia relations continue through the Foundation’s
exchanges, dialogues, research and educational programs, which create
networks among U.S. and Asian leaders, explore the underlying issues
influencing public policies, and increase awareness about the nations andpeoples of Asia. The Foundation has offices in Washington, D.C.; Tokyo,
Japan; and Missoula, Montana.

Contents
Foreword
Sheila A. Smith  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

Japan’s Current Interest in National Security
Is Not (Only) Made in China, It Is Also Homegrown
Amy Catalinac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

Beyond Singular Tasks: Labor-Saving Technologies
and Systems of Labor
Yulia Frumer  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

Japan-Taiwan Relations under Abe and Tsai in Historical Context
Robert Hoppens  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49

Building the Strategy of Deterrence in Cyberspace:
Proposals for Japan
Nori Katagiri  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

The Myth of LDP Dominance under Abe: Komeito, Coalition Politics,
and Why It Matters for Japan’s Security Policy
Adam P. Liff  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

The Enigma of Shinzo Abe’s Long Tenure and How
His Success Can Undermine His Party’s Dominant Position
Ko Maeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

State-Building and Counterinsurgency Campaigns:
Lessons from Colonial Taiwan
Reo Matsuzaki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
Japan’s Long-Term Financial Stability Challenges Requirea New Macroprudential Framework
Matthew Poggi  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
What Can the United States and Japan Learn from
Each Other’s Immigration Policies?
Michael Orlando Sharpe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
Religious Freedom and the U.S.-Japan Alliance
Jolyon Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Trade, Multilateralism, and U.S.-Japan Relations
Kristin Vekasi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
Globalizing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st Century
Joshua W. Walker  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Author Biographies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210

Foreword
Sheila A. SmithAs 2018 unfolds, the U.S.-Japan partnership is once again in the headlines. In mid-April, when President Donald Trump met with Prime
Minister Abe in Mar-a-Lago for the second time, the U.S.-Japan partnership seemed under strain. Earlier in the year, the sudden announcementthat the U.S. president would meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un
surprised Tokyo, as did the Trump administration’s announcement thatJapan’s steel and aluminum exports would be subjected to punitive tariffs.
Yet the two leaders came away from their latest discussions with a renewed
commitment to the relationship, if not with a complete agreement on
how it should be managed.
The United States and Japan are adjusting to the changing geopolitics ofAsia, including North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and growing
popular discontent with the liberal trading order in the United States andelsewhere. The rise of Chinese influence, both economic and military,
has also been cause for concern. Yet each country has their own view of
how to adjust, and their expectations for the alliance are not always insync. More broadly, Japanese and Americans also feel the impact of thesecurrents of global transformation differently. While the interests of bothnations may overlap, there will be times when their policy priorities andpreferred solutions may not. Living in interesting times may be intriguing, but it also calls for greater understanding. As partners, Americans
and Japanese will need to understand each other’s societies in far greater
depth than ever before as they seek to navigate these important shifts in
the Asia Pacific and beyond.

6For thirty-four years, the Mansfield Foundation has led the way in ensuring that Americans are well-versed in Japan. As the late U.S. Ambassador
to Japan and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield famously said, theU.S.-Japan relationship is “the most important bilateral relationship in theworld, bar none.” While other relationships have emerged to dominate
the headlines, our partnership with Japan continues to be the foundation of our security and our prosperity. More than three decades later,
the Foundation established to honor Ambassador Mansfield sustains his
appreciation of the importance of this relationship through programs
including a fellowship that sends U.S. government officials to Japan toensure both governments can effectively translate the relationship into
better and more informed policy.
Equally significant, the Mansfield Foundation has also ensured that ourscholars and policymakers share their in-depth knowledge of Japanthrough the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future. When understanding
Japanese domestic debates and global choices is ever more critical to U.S.
policymaking, this program has encouraged four cohorts of scholars tobring their expertise to bear on policy debates in the United States. As
global politics have increasingly been shaped by other, rising powers,
Japan has often seemed less important to American interests. Yet as thesescholars of Japan can attest, nothing could be further from the truth. In
fact, as the United States too reimagines its future role in Asia and in theworld, the partnership with Japan offers a grounding that few others do.
Understanding the dynamics of Japanese society, economy and politics
offers a far more enlightened vantage point for U.S. policymaking.

7Foreword

Depth of scholarship on Japan, and the wide-angle lens available toscholars of Japan, offers a rich set of insights on one of the world’s
most complex and intriguing societies. As educators in universities andcolleges around the United States and as policy professionals serving
in the U.S. government, the authors of the essays in this compilation—
the fourth cohort of the U.S.-Japan Network for the Future—bringsophisticated research experience on Japan and first-hand knowledgeof Japanese society and politics.
Their essays here address the myriad ways in which the United States
and Japan interact in 2018. Three broad areas of analysis highlight theimportance of the U.S.-Japan partnership.
First, both the United States and Japan are facing the complex challengesof the post-industrial era, challenges that at times seem to place strain on
liberal democratic practice while at other times offer unique new ways tomanage our rapidly changing societies. Matthew Poggi, a U.S. Treasury
Department expert currently serving in the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, tackles the new realities of global financial markets in the wake of the Lehman
disaster in an essay offering his assessment of Japan’s need for policy
reform. In their essays, Yulia Frumer and Michael Sharpe share theirinsights on the impact of automation and of immigration, respectively,on the United States and Japan, comparing their different narratives andtheir changing policy goals. The contrast between U.S. concern about
automation and the Japanese embrace of it is particularly marked, andreveals the structural dynamics at play in each society. Likewise, the immigration debate in Japan and the United States shows signs of change as
the global debate over human migration intensifies. Again, the policychanges in each capital reveal a move away from past orthodoxies, andperhaps a greater convergence with mixed implications for each society.
Finally, our democratic values and our care for human rights also infuse
these seemingly technocratic decisions over the future of our economy.
How our societies tolerate—or discriminate against—minority voices is8

Foreword

addressed in the essay by Jolyon Thomas as he examines recent Japaneseconversation on the need to return to traditional values of Shintoism.
Second, in the increasingly fraught geopolitics of our time, domestic
leadership choices have tremendous consequences for regional and global
cooperation. Japanese political choice is front and center for several
Network scholars. Political scientists Ko Maeda, Adam Liff and Amy
Catalinac offer their insights into the dynamics that shape the politicaldebate in Japan. Maeda tackles the curious longevity of Shinzo Abe’s ruleas prime minister, even in the face of low public approval ratings. Liff
alerts readers to the coalition dynamics that have shaped governance, anddemonstrates how the Komeito, the Liberal Democratic Party’s juniorpartner, has had a pervasive effect on the Abe cabinet’s security policy
choices. Finally, Catalinac puts forward a theoretical appeal for looking
at the domestic drivers of Japan’s national security policy, locating thecritical turning point of electoral system change in 1993 as an important moment of change in the nature of Japan’s security debate. Robert
Hoppens presents an important look at the relationship between Prime
Minister Abe and Tsai Ing-wen, Taiwan’s new president, revealing an often
overlooked relationship in Northeast Asia that offers a different vantage
point from which to observe the rise in Chinese influence.
Third, the United States and Japan face new policy conundrums, born of
emerging technologies and evolving global dynamics, but also some persistent dilemmas. Kristin Vekasi takes on the current differences between
Japan and the United States over the best framework for managing ourtrade, and offers a stalwart defense of the Trans-Pacific Partnership,a multilateral adjustment to managing our increasing economic interdependence. Security expert Nori Katagiri tackles the challenges ofcyber security, and offers his recommendations for improving Japanesecapabilities in this ever-evolving new arena of strategic competition. Reo
Matsuzaki’s provocative essay takes us back in time to Japan’s colonial
strategy for remaking Taiwan in order to examine our contemporary

9Foreword

effort at counterinsurgency and “state-building” strategies and the UN and
U.S. concern with strengthening the capacity of governance institutions.
Joshua Walker advocates bringing a new strategic vision to the U.S.-Japan
partnership, and suggests the lens of an open and free Indo-Pacific as
the most promising approach to enhancing our security and economic
cooperation. Building a new regional architecture, premised on shared
U.S. and Japanese interests, offers the opportunity for partnerships withothers across the vast periphery of the Asian continent.
These scholars bring a range of expertise to their analysis of U.S.-Japan
relations. The span of their academic specialization is impressive: history,
religious studies, political science, sociology and finance. So too are themethods they bring to their inquiry. For some, comparative studies of
U.S. and Japan policy practices offer enlightening contrasts, revealingdifferent approaches to solving very similar problems. Others place
Japan and the United States in a broader global setting, revealing that
our challenges are not necessarily idiosyncratic to our bilateral relationship, but also suggesting the profound influence our decisions have on
the global management of shared problems. Finally, with well-honed
research training, these scholars can take us deep into the institutions
and the practices of Japanese actors in order to challenge and correct thewidespread generalizations we often encounter in the media about Japan.
Americans and Japanese face considerable challenges, and in 2018, theworld seems more fragile and contested than ever. Elections around theglobe test ideas and prescriptions that have been widely accepted forgenerations. Rising powers suggest the need for Washington and Tokyo
to take a new look at the global rules and norms we have often taken for
granted. Demographic and generational changes are transforming oursocieties, and prompting contentious debates over the future of the U.S.
and Japanese nations. While the economic well-being of millions aroundthe globe is improving, many in Japan and the United States are beginningto fear that they will no longer benefit from the economies of the future.

10Foreword

Ensuring that we are prepared for those challenges with knowledge andinsight is the first step in meeting them, and the essays presented hereby the Network for the Future scholars offer a rich starting point. They
also offer a critical window into the many opportunities for Japanese andAmericans as we continue to strengthen our partnership and together
tackle the social challenges of our time. n

11

Japan’s Current Interest in National
Security Is Not (Only) Made in China,
It Is Also Homegrown
Amy Catalinac

Those of us who study national security, whether scholars or practitioners, are all motivated by the same goal: how can we increase
security so that wars will not break out and costly arms races are avoided?
Understandably, this is a worthwhile goal. To do this, we typically focus
on increasing our collective understanding of the drivers of the security
policies of different countries. With a view to increasing our collective
understanding of the drivers of Japanese security policy, for example, we
ask questions like “how did North Korea’s test of the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in November 2017 impact Japanese
security policy?” or “How did the change of government in 2009 impact
Japanese security policy?” The rationale for asking such questions is thatonce we know how previous missile tests or changes of government influenced Japanese security policy, we can say something about how future
missile tests or changes in government might influence Japanese security
policy. We will know what to expect, and if what we are led to expect risks
decreasing national security, we can use this information to try to, forexample, prevent future missile tests, or at the very least, advise interested
parties as to their anticipated effects on national security.

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Tokyo, We Have a Problem (of Causal Inference)
Unfortunately, there is a problem with this approach. This problem is notalways acknowledged by scholars working on national security, despite thefact that our subject area has consequences for the lives of everyone on theplanet. This is as follows: when we look back in time at previous instancesof missile tests or changes of government, it is virtually impossible for
us to tell whether any possible changes in Japanese security policy that
happened afterward were actually caused by the missile test, or by thechange of government, or whether they were caused by something else. If
the changes were actually caused by something else, then we have failed
to shed light on the determinants of Japanese security policy because wehave not identified what that missing variable is, and any predictions wemake about the changes in Japanese security policy that ought to follow
instances of missile testing are likely to be wrong.
Why is attributing causation so difficult? If we observe a missile test
and then an increase in Japanese defense spending, for example, thenwe have observed a correlation between the test and the spending. We
have observed the test, and then the spending increase. But correlation
is not causation. Why not? It is possible that the causation actually flows
in the opposite direction: recent trends in Japanese defense spending or
Japanese security policy more broadly were what prompted Kim Jong
Un to launch the missile. Even if Japanese defense spending increased
after the missile test, it is still difficult to refute the possibility that Kim’s
decision to launch the test was influenced by his anticipation that theJapanese government was about to increase defense spending. In social
science we refer to this problem as endogeneity, or more simply, reverse
causation. It represents the idea that the outcome we are trying to explain(our “dependent variable,” which in this example is Japanese defense
spending) is actually being influenced by the variable we think explainsit (our “independent variable,” which in this case is the missile test). If
this were the case, then even though we have observed a correlation
between the missile test and the spending increase, we cannot conclude
that missile tests lead to spending increases.

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It is also possible that another variable can explain both Kim’s decision
to launch the missile and the increase in Japanese defense spending. For
example, if the resolve or capabilities of the United States to defend its
allies in East Asia were perceived to have waned, it is conceivable that
Kim might decide to launch a missile to take advantage of the decline insecurity and the Japanese government might decide to increase its defense
spending to try to bolster its security. If this were the case, then while we
did observe a correlation between the test and the increase in defense
spending, we cannot say that the former caused the latter because they
were both caused by a third variable. A failure to identify this “omitted
variable” means that we have not increased our knowledge of the driversof security policy, and we are likely to observe missile tests in the future
not being followed by increases in Japanese defense spending.
Even if we can rule out the possibility that recent trends in Japanese
defense spending caused the missile test or that both the increase in
spending and the test are caused by an unidentified third variable, anotherpossibility is that any correlation we observe between increases in spending and missile tests is due to random coincidence. In other words, there
are factors that drive both spending and tests, but those factors are unrelated to each other. They just happen to coalesce at the same time, giving
rise to the appearance of a relationship between the two that is actuallyspurious. Without many cases of tests and spending, which we do not
have, we cannot definitively rule out this possibility.

Solutions Are Difficult to Apply in theRealm of National Security
How can we say that the test caused the increase in Japanese defense
spending? There is only one way of saying this definitively, and that is in
the event that we observe two Japans, one that experiences the missile
test and one that does not. If we observe two Japans that are identical in
every way, with one experiencing the test and the other not experiencing
it, we can compare levels of defense spending in both Japans after one of15

Amy C atalinac

them experiences the test. Because our two Japans are identical apart fromthe experience of the test, if we then observe the Japan that experienced
the test increasing its defense spending, we can definitely say that thisspending increase was caused by the test.
Obviously, we cannot ever observe two Japans. To get around the problem
of not being able to observe two identical “units,” one that receives theexperience of interest (we call this the “treatment”) and the other which
does not, scholars have developed strategies to try to approximate thissituation. In some areas of social science, scholars have pioneered the useof experiments. They might take a group of people and randomly assign
half of them to an experience (for example, reading a newspaper article
or receiving a campaign flyer) and the other half to no experience (or to adifferent experience). Because each group’s “assignment” to the treatment(that is, the experience) is random, which means that the people in thatgroup did not have a particular feature that made it more likely they would
receive the treatment, then we can attribute any difference in outcome
across the two groups after the treatment as the effect of the experience.
Being able to randomly assign people to an experience and then measuring whether those people then differ from other people after the fact is theclosest proxy we have to observing two identical units and assigning oneof those units the treatment. Even if the people in our experiment are quite
different from one another, we have managed to make those differences
irrelevant to the fact that they got the treatment. Returning to the above
example, this strategy eliminates concerns about “endogeneity” because
it eliminates the possibility that there is something special about Japan(or Japanese defense spending) that caused it to experience the missile
test. It also eliminates any concerns about bias arising from an omitted
variable like the strength of the U.S. commitment to Japanese security
because it is unlikely that the group of people randomly assigned to thetreatment is systematically different from the group that were not (andanyway, this can be verified after the fact).

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As is probably obvious, while experiments can approximate a situation in which we observe two identical units, which differ only in that
one of them experiences the treatment, they have received many fewer
applications in the realm of national security. This is because mostvariables we think matter for security policy cannot be manipulated.
We cannot randomly select a group of countries and ask North Korea
to send a missile over those countries, but not others, and then measure
whether there are any differences in defense spending between thetwo sets of countries. Similarly, we cannot randomly select a group ofcountries and bring about a change of government in those countries
and not others, and then observe whether the two countries go on tocraft different security policies.
Given that we cannot observe two Japans and we cannot manipulate ourvariable of interest in an experiment, the next best strategy is to compile
a group of countries that resemble Japan when it received the missile test.
To make the best inference as to the effects on defense spending, of theuniverse of potential countries that resemble Japan, some would haveexperienced the missile test and some would not have.
Unfortunately, this is much easier to do in other areas of social science
than in the realm of national security. Why? If one is interested in theeffects of a municipality receiving more money or an individual receivinga campaign flyer, one typically has thousands of cities and individuals
from which to find cities and individuals like the ones that received themoney or the flyer. Obviously, there are a limited number of countries
in the world and countries differ on so many metrics, such as region of
the world, constitutional structure, wealth, religious background, sizeof security threats they face, degree of reliance on external balancing(an alliance partner) in their security policy, and so on, that a group ofcountries that resembled Japan in 2017 on these metrics and varied as towhether they received the missile test simply does not exist.

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Amy C atalinac

Knowing this, scholars sometimes find it fruitful to compile a set ofobservations, some of which received the treatment and some of which
did not, from the country’s own past. For example, if we are interested
in the effect of North Korea’s missile launch in 2017 on Japanese defense
spending, we can find years from Japan’s own past that resemble Japan
in 2017. Because North Korea has been launching missiles since 1994,
we can find years in which Japan experienced a missile test and did notexperience a missile test. Because we are dealing with the same country
over time, we can eliminate the effects of variables such as region of theworld, constitutional structure, or religious background because thesevariables are the same over time. If there was an increase in defense
spending after 2017 and the other years in which there was a missile test,
but not after years in which there was no missile test, we can have more
confidence concluding that missile tests increase defense spending.
The problem with this strategy is probably obvious: while it eliminates
the effects of variables that are the same over time, it cannot eliminate
the effects of variables that change over time. There are many variables
that could influence either the propensity that Japan experiences a missile
test or Japanese defense spending, or both. We have already mentioned
the strength of the U.S. commitment to Japanese security. Another might
be the state of the Japanese economy, and yet another might be the sizeof the security threat Japan faces. Even if we found increases in defense
spending after years in which missile tests occurred and not after years inwhich missile tests did not occur, if any of these variables were different
across the two sets of years, we would not be able to rule out the possibility
that changes in these other variables were driving the increase in defense
spending, not the missile tests.
Of course, if we had hundreds of years to choose from, we could collectdata on all these variables and conduct a regression in which they arecontrolled for. But we do not have hundreds of years to choose from. In
this example, we only have twenty-four years since North Korea launched
its first missile.

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An Even Thornier Problem: Measurement
Unfortunately, as this discussion probably illustrates, there is another,perhaps even more fundamental, problem plaguing work on national
security. This is one of measurement. There is simply no agreed-upon
way of measuring how much national security a government is providing
at any given point in time.
Why not? Governments choose a medley of means to secure themselves. Some may rely on being physically separated from othercountries by a large body of water. Others may choose to form an alliance and rely on their ally’s capabilities. Others may forgo an allianceand decide to secure themselves via their own capabilities. Among
those forming an alliance, there are states who invite the ally to station forces on its territory and there are states that do not, and there
are states that face a higher risk of being entrapped in wars that areof little consequence to their security, and there are those that face alower risk of this. Among states relying on their own capabilities, there
are states that dedicate high proportions of government resources todefense and those that dedicate less, and there are those that invest
primarily in offensive weapons and those that invest primarily in
defense weapons. There are also states that rely on a combination ofan alliance and their own capabilities.
It is perhaps unsurprising that there is no formula into which we could
plug a state’s values on all of these variables and receive a measure of theamount of national security it is providing.
Whereas we can gain reasonably accurate measures of the proportion of
GDP being spent on defense in a given country, as these examples should
illustrate, defense spending is not the same as national security. Or moreaccurately, the amount a state spends on defense is not the same as theamount of national security it is providing.

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Not being able to measure how much national security a state is providing
at any given time severely impairs our ability to understand the driversof security policy. If we could measure how much national security theJapanese government was providing at various points in time, for example, we could ascertain whether a North Korean missile test decreased
Japanese security and if so, by how much. If we found that the missile test
reduced the amount of security the Japanese government was providing,then we would expect Japan to take measures to bolster its security. If
it did, we could conclude that states are likely to respond to security
threats by bolstering their defenses. If we found that the missile test did
not reduce Japanese security, then we would not expect it to take suchmeasures. In other words, if we observe Japan sitting on its hands after
being confronted with such a missile test, the correct conclusion might
not be that it does not respond to security threats, but that the missile
test did not reduce Japanese security.
As this discussion illustrates, an even bigger measurement problem lurks.
As scholars interested in national security, we want to understand thedrivers of a state’s security policy. The drivers we tend to be the mostinterested in are security threats (or more formally, shifts in the balance of power between states). Even if we could calculate the amount of
security a state is providing at any given time, it does not make sense to
exclude the size of the security threat facing a state from this calculation.
A state could have no allies and low levels of defense spending, but noadversaries. Another could have powerful allies and high levels of defense
spending, but a powerful adversary. Once we take the capabilities of theiradversaries into account in our estimation of how much security a state isproviding, however, we cannot then try to estimate the effect of changes inan adversary’s capabilities on the amount of security a state is providing.

An Alternative Approach: Looking Within the StateMy research is also motivated by a desire to understand the drivers of
security policy, and in particular, Japanese security policy. Mindful of the20

Japan’s Current Interest in National Securit yaforementioned problems, I adopted an alternative approach: I decided tolook within the state, at how politicians in Japan treated the subject areaof national security. Once we turn the spotlight onto politicians within aparticular country, we can draw upon the large literature in the subfieldof comparative politics about how political institutions work. There areat least three advantages to relying on theories from comparative politics.
One, these theories are about variables that are measurable. For example,
we can easily tell whether a country has a coalition government or asingle-party government. We know whether it is a democracy or an
autocracy, or a parliamentary system or a presidential system. We knowwhether its politicians are allowed to receive money from businesses ornot. We know how many political parties are represented in the parliament, and we know what type of electoral system is in use and we havetheories about how that system works. Being able to measure a hypothetical independent variable we might be interested in means that we canbetter evaluate the relationship between changes in that variable andchanges in a state’s security policy.
Two, these theories are about variables that are manipulable. While states
rarely change their constitutional structures, they do sometimes change
their electoral systems and tinker with campaign finance regulations. Even
though states may not voluntarily choose to change their institutions very
often, international organizations and the United States are sometimes
placed in the position of helping to design a political system for a country.
Whereas it is inconceivable that we would want to manipulate a security
threat (because a security threat is dangerous and therefore no security
threats are always better), it is conceivable that we may want to manipulatea political institution if we identified one that had a range of “good” effects.
Three, these theories have the added bonus of being totally separate fromthe outcome I’m interested in: Japanese security policy. In other words,
they were not developed with Japanese security policy in mind.

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A lot of work on security policy proceeds in the following way: countries
are observed interacting with each other and a variable such as “national
identity” appears to influence their relationship. Scholars then come up
with a theory about how national identity influences a country’s security
policy. The problem with this approach is that theories must be falsifiable.
We have to be able to collect evidence and use that evidence to assess
the probability that a theory we are evaluating is correct or not. When atheory is developed on the basis of the case used to generate it, it cannot
be evaluated with that case because it will never be incorrect.
It is a fairly safe assessment that the scholars developing theories of how
party competition plays out under different electoral systems, for example,
were not thinking about the security policies of those countries when
they came up with their theories. This means that if those theories can beused to explain how politicians treat national security, this can be taken
as evidence they are correct.
The particular institution I study is Japan’s electoral system. From my perspective, it is enormously helpful that the Japanese government chose toreform the electoral system used to select members of the more-powerful
House of Representatives (HOR) in 1994. While there was some evidence
that key architects of the reform such as Ichiro Ozawa were considering
Japan’s position on the world stage when they were thinking about thereform, by and large it was driven by a public sick of corruption (and who
had been told by the media that the electoral system was partly to blame)
and a government comprised of seven opposition parties, which was thefirst government not formed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in
thirty-nine years, who were able to capitalize on the public mood.
It turns out that we have very clear theories in comparative politics about
how politicians ought to have treated national security under both Japan’s
old and new electoral systems. In a nutshell, these theories suggest thatthey ought to have paid it little attention under the old system and more
attention under the new.

22

Japan’s Current Interest in National Securit yElectoral Systems and Japanese Security Policy
Why is this? Under Japan’s old electoral system, politicians faced what
is called “intra-party competition.” Intra-party competition arises when
voters not only have a say over which party gets elected in any given election, but also over which of the party’s candidates get elected. Intra-party
competition arose because Japan’s HOR used multi-member districts andgave voters a single, non-transferable vote, which means that votes cannot
be transferred to other candidates of the same party after a candidate gains
enough votes to be elected. This system is called “SNTV-MMD.” In each
district, between two and six candidates were elected.
In this system, parties aiming for a majority of seats need to run more than
one candidate in the most districts. This means that candidates of thoseparties had to compete against each other in the same district. Theories
in comparative politics say that when politicians have to compete against
their co-partisans, they will concentrate on cultivating supporters thatwill be loyal to them, not their party. Those theories also say that if thesepoliticians control government, as LDP politicians did in and after 1955,
they will cultivate these supporters by using their access to government
resources to come up with goodies that benefit them, rather than the
supporters of other candidates.
In this system, politicians have trouble paying attention to broad policy
areas like national security because they cannot use those policy areas
to generate goodies they can target back to their supporters. If there are
two politicians from the same party in a district, voters will always be
more inclined to choose the politician who spends his or her time coming
up with goodies of benefit to them only over the politician who spends
his time coming up with broad policy issues like national security that
benefit everyone.
Knowing this, this research suggests that politicians facing intra-party
competition will wind up spending almost all of their time trying to23

Amy C atalinac

deliver targeted goods for their supporters, and will seek to minimize
the amount of time spent in non-targetable policy areas like national
security. In the case of the LDP, the establishment of intra-party committees that concerned policy issues such as commerce and industry,
telecommunications, construction, and agriculture; the decision thata politician could request membership in up to two committees; andthe publication of a roster indicating which politician was a member ofwhich committee made it very difficult for politicians to pay attention
to non-targetable policy areas like national security, even in secret. A
politician who was interested in national security and wanted to devote
time to it would have been forced to forgo membership in a committeethat would have enabled him or her to deliver benefits to supporters.
The roster would have made the politician’s priorities clear to his or
her supporters, increasing the chance that they could be poached byanother LDP politician in the district, who might be signaling, throughcommittee memberships, that his or her priorities lay with funnelinggoodies back to constituents.
In 1993, a group of politicians left the LDP, prompting an election. Afterthe election, a seven-party coalition government was formed. All of theseparties had campaigned on a platform of electoral reform. It was implemented in early 1994.
Japan’s new electoral system is comprised of two tiers: initially, threehundred members were elected in single member districts (SMDs), while
two hundred politicians were elected from party lists according to theprinciple of proportional representation (PR).
For my purpose, the critical distinction between Japan’s old and newelectoral system is that the new system eliminated intra-party competition. The fact that LDP candidates didn’t have to compete against other
LDP candidates in the same district gave all LDP candidates the incentive
to cultivate a party label and all run on this label. Because the party isrunning candidates in districts all over the nation, it makes sense for the24

Japan’s Current Interest in National Securit y

LDP’s label to be comprised of broad policy issues like national security;
policies that influence voters in all the districts.
To summarize, theories of comparative politics suggest that we ought toobserve LDP politicians paying little attention to national security before
reform and more afterward.

Evidence for My Claim
Looking at the Japanese politics and security literature revealed a wealthof evidence that politicians were behaving as these theories suggested.
Secondhand accounts revealed that LDP politicians seemed to have paidnational security very little attention under the old system, and had started
paying more attention as soon as the electoral system was reformed.
But this literature also revealed other theories that could also plausibly account for this increase in attention to national security. Scholars
pointed the finger at Japan’s weakened economy, new security threats(in the form of North Korea and China), and changes in the strengthof Japan’s anti-militarist culture. In the words of Richard J. Samuels, thechanges in Japanese security policy that occurred after LDP politicians
started paying attention to national security are “overdetermined.” Thismeans there are many factors that could account for them, so many that
it is difficult to disentangle one from the other.
To properly evaluate whether Japan’s electoral system exerted an “independent effect” (meaning, an effect all on its own) on the amount ofattention politicians paid to national security, I collected evidence thatwould help me evaluate my theory and also adjudicate between thesecompeting theories. In Japan, candidates for election to the HOR produce
candidate election manifestos, which are distributed to all registered votersin a candidate’s district by the local electoral commission. I collected the
manifestos produced by the universe of candidates who contested thethree elections immediately prior to electoral reform (held in 1986, 1990,
and 1993) and the five elections held afterward (held in 1996, 2000, 2003,

25

Amy C atalinac

2005, and 2009). I used quantitative text analysis—specifically, a new tool
called a “topic model”—to analyze the topics in my collection of 7,497
manifestos.
I found that LDP candidates promised pork-barrel projects for their districts and did not talk about national security in the three elections held
under the old electoral system. As soon as the system was reformed, they
began discussing national security, and this switch to security accompanied a broader shift in their electoral strategies from pork for the district
to policies for the nation. This is exactly in keeping with the expectationsof these theories.
Concretely, my analysis revealed that the average LDP candidate manifesto
was comprised of two-thirds discussion of pork and one-third discussionof policy prior to reform. After reform, the proportions reversed, and LDP
politicians began producing manifestos comprised of two-thirds policy
and one-thirds pork. In spite of the coming down of the Berlin Wall andthe collapse of the Soviet Union, which wiped out the threat around which
the U.S. had extended a security guarantee to Japan, and the 1991 Gulf
War, which resulted in a U.S. plea for Japanese assistance, LDP politicians
devoted a mere 0.1% of their manifesto to national security. After electoral
reform, their discussion of national security increased to 0.5% in 1996,
1.5% in 2000, 6% in 2003, 4% in 2005, and almost 7% in 2009.
While these proportions may seem small in absolute terms, it pays toremember that candidates had access to a second type of manifesto after
electoral reform: a party manifesto. Given that party manifestos are
distributed to voters across the country and candidate manifestos are
distributed to voters in a candidate’s district, it is reasonable to expect thata savvy candidate might decide to concentrate on policy, which affects
voters across the country, in their party manifesto, and pork, which
affects voters in their district, in their candidate manifesto. The fact that
we observe an increase in discussion of national security in candidate

26

Japan’s Current Interest in National Securit y

manifestos is powerful evidence that they believe the issue can help themwin votes after reform.
However, the possibility still remained that something other than electoral
reform, which changed at exactly the same time, could plausibly accountfor these changes. Revisiting what I said earlier, a research design thatexamines what happens when a variable like the electoral system is suddenly changed can eliminate the effects of variables specific to the country
that do not change over time, the constitutional structure, but they cannot
adequately control for the effects of variables that do change over time.
I was therefore still left with the possibility that another variable, whichchanged at exactly the same time, could account for their increase in attention to national security (and other broad policy areas, for that matter).
To evaluate this, I weighed evidence in support of seven categories ofalternative explanations. The variable I will focus on in this brief is thepossibility that LDP politicians’ new attention to national security is
explained not by electoral reform, but by concerns about the new security
threats facing Japan at the time, in the form of China and North Korea.
In other words, I will consider whether this new attention was “made in
China” (that is, driven by what is perhaps the larger of the two security
threats) or “homegrown” (that is, driven by the electoral reform).

Is It Homegrown, or Made in China?
I reasoned that if these new security threats were driving their attention,
we should observe their attention correlating with the seriousness ofthese threats. We do not observe this. The 1990 election happened after
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Candidates talked about how this meant“the end of socialism,” but did not mention its security implications.
The 1993 election happened after the so-called “embarrassment” of the
Gulf War, in which Japan contributed $13 billion yet was not properly
thanked by Kuwait. Yet there was no discussion of national security inthe 1993 election.

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Amy C atalinac

To examine the possibility that politicians actually were paying attention to national security, just did not discuss it in elections, I examinednewspaper articles from the 1994–1995 period. These contained stories
berating LDP politicians for not giving national security a second thought.
They described LDP politicians as “not showing much interest in,” forexample, the changes in Japan’s security environment, “not having a soundunderstanding of security matters,” and being “unwilling to help theirgovernment study those issues.”
I also examined books written by LDP politicians. In one, Shigeru Ishibadescribed Japan as a country in which the politicians entrusted with its
protection “knew nothing about national security.” He went as far as toblame this on the electoral system, describing it as making elections into
popularity contests between conservative politicians over who was thebest “handyman” for the district. He lamented the fact that “nobody inJapan is actually doing the work of the Diet Member.” He also described
how bureaucrats at the Japan Defense Agency, who were very much under
the thumb of LDP politicians, never wrote any legislation and served no
purpose other than spending the money assigned to them in the budgetof each year on equipment for the SDF and supervising the SDF.
This evidence is, of course, very convincing. However, I kept being told byothers: “Perhaps politicians weren’t paying attention to national security
in this period because even though the cold war had ended, there wasn’t
a serious enough threat to convince them to pay attention.” This critique
is not entirely fair because Japan was (and still is) dependent on the U.S.
security guarantee for deterrence against large-scale security threats. In
this situation, anything that weakened either the resolve or capabilities of
the United States to defend Japan (and one could argue that the collapseof the Soviet Union weakened U.S. resolve) should have been sufficient
to compel LDP politicians to pay attention. Nevertheless, I tried to findevidence to address this critique head on.

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Japan’s Current Interest in National Securit y

It turns out that Japan faced a very serious security threat from thelate 1970s until at least the mid-1980s, which is not always described
as and recognized as a security threat. This is North Korea’s abductions of Japanese citizens. Between 1978 and 1982, a bunch of Japanesepeople went missing from beaches in Japan and from places in Europe.
Newspapers at the time unearthed evidence that these people were notmissing; but rather, abducted by North Korean spies.
Even though this security threat was so serious that it resulted in Japanesepeople losing their freedom and lives, it is not an exaggeration to say thatLDP politicians ignored the possibility that this was happening until muchlater; until 1997, to be specific. Early in 1997, four months after the firstelection under the new electoral system, LDP (and other) politicians
formed a league to draw attention to the issue. In the ensuing years they
became so angered by the abduction issue that they brought it onto theinternational stage, and into multilateral attempts to resolve the threat
posed by the North’s nuclear weapons, like the Six Party Talks. LDP politicians vowed to Japanese people that they would “never let the abduction
issue get buried under the nuclear issue.”
By examining how politicians dealt with the same security threat under
the old electoral system, when they faced intra-party competition, andunder the new electoral system, when they did not, I am able to definitively
rule out the hypothesis that LDP politicians were not paying attention
to national security because there was nothing to pay attention to. Sadly,
there was “material” they could have paid attention to, had they had the
incentives.
It is of course true that there would have been LDP politicians under theold electoral system who probably wanted to pay attention to national
security. It is possible that they all did. After all, a commitment to constitutional revision was central to the founding of the party in 1955. But
spending time on national security meant less time for policy areas thatenabled them to bring back pork for their constituents. It is likely that29

Amy C atalinac

LDP politicians figured this out as soon as they fought their first election
as one unified party in 1958, which explains why, a few years later, they
stopped focusing on national security.

Lessons for Scholars of International Relations
A lot of work on national security focuses on the players who make security policy and their preferences. Research on politicians, for example,
might describe them as favoring force or diplomacy, depending on theirpersonality, military background, or changes in the external security
environment. My point is that while politicians probably do have preferences, if they cannot get elected, they will not be able to enact any of theirpreferences. So it makes sense to study what they need to do to get elected.
What the Japanese case reveals for the broader scholarly community isthat when it comes to democracies, no matter what a politician’s preferences might be, there are democracies in which that politician will havefew incentives to try to implement those preferences and democracies
in which he will have more incentives to do so. In systems where politicians have few incentives to try to implement their preferences, we may
observe very little relationship between external security threats and thestate’s security policy. We may observe security threats happening, withfew changes in security policy. This is because security threats influence
security policy through the intervening variable of politicians’ attention,
which my project shows is in turn influenced by the electoral system. If
this intervening variable gives politicians few incentives to pay attention,then we probably will not observe many changes in the state’s security
policy, even against the background of serious security threats. At least,
not until the country adopts a new electoral system.
In a nutshell, my research explains why we observe so much more attention to national security after 1994 than before. It is tempting to attributethe focus on national security in the HOR elections of recent years as
the product of China or North Korea. It is true that the security issue30

Japan’s Current Interest in National Securit ypoliticians are paying the most attention to presently is how best to deal
with the threat posed by North Korea. But it pays to remember that theNorth Korean threat has existed, in different forms, for decades. It has
existed in its current form since 1994. The North Korean threat is not, byitself, sufficient to push politicians to talk about it. Without the electoral
incentives to talk about it, the debates we are observing in Japan right
now would not be happening.
Going forward, it pays to remember that domestic political institutions
have profound effects on a state’s security policy. If we observe a shift
in attention to national security or a shift in content of a state’s security
policy, we should not assume that this is being driven by a new playeror new preferences on the part of the old players. We should at leastconsider the possibility that the players and their preferences are thesame or similar as before, but that a change in the country’s domestic
political institutions—whether it be in the electoral system, legislative
procedure, or procedure for electing the prime minister, to offer a few
examples—has enabled the players to realize their preferences. There isa lot of literature in comparative politics about how these institutions
work, and we should consider whether they are having unforeseen andunimagined consequences for security policy. n

31Beyond Singular Tasks: Labor-Saving
Technologies and Systems of Labor
Yulia Frumer

IntroductionT

he difference between the current state of labor markets in the UnitedStates and Japan is striking. United States is haunted by the fear of
unemployment; Japan is struggling to fill job vacancies. Yet the discourse
surrounding the labor market in the two countries is surprisingly similar.
Both focus on the ways developing technologies obviate the need forhumans to perform certain tasks, thus substituting human labor for arobotic one—albeit one side treats this phenomenon as a problem while
the other as a solution. Namely, while Americans are dreading the lossof jobs due to automation, the Japanese are hoping that robots will fill
the vacancies left by humans.
Current economic scholarship that explores the relationship between
automation and labor markets is divided into two camps. One camp
maintains that automation displaces human workers and contributes tounemployment. Members of this camp often rely on studies publishedby a working group of MIT economists.1 Even though the researchers
themselves often warn of unnecessary exaggeration and panic,2 their33

Yulia Frumer

work became particularly popular with the media that predict a looming
robotic unemployment apocalypse.
Another group of economists challenge the conclusions that automation
leads or will lead to unemployment. They point to a series of problems inabovementioned research, such as reliance on a limited data set (industrial
robots in specific industries), which makes extrapolation to the national
level unreliable.3 According to this camp, focusing on a single type oftechnology and its effects on job markets misses the bigger picture, inwhich technologies not only eliminate but also create jobs.4
The reality of labor markets in the United States and in Japan is challenging for the first approach particularly— we see neither a gradual increasein unemployment levels in the United States, nor a significant change inlabor markets in Japan that one would expect to accompany technologicaldevelopment and automation. Not oblivious to this reality, many offer
suggestions to explain this apparent anomaly and claim that the existing
trends are not representative because we are entering an unprecedented
era.5 To claim that something is “unprecedented,” however, we need tomake sure that we understand the precedents first.
By looking at the precedents, both in the United States and in Japan, thisessay argues that technologically automated tasks should be seen as apart of larger systems of interconnected labor. Apocalyptic predictionsof technological unemployment, hopes of technological salvation, andvisions of the “unprecedented” near future alike, all focus on specific,
visible tasks that were previously performed by humans but now arebeing automated. History, however, shows that these tasks do not exist
in a vacuum, but are rather enmeshed in a network of less visible supporting tasks of maintenance. Automating a singular task may save laborpreviously dedicated to a singular function, but cannot dispense of all the
related labor. Furthermore, in many cases automating one task creates
new maintenance needs and thus new labor demands that did not exist
before. Consequently, rather than seeing robots as a magical solution to34

Beyond Singul ar Tasks: L abor-Saving Technolo gies and Systems of L abor

the problem of aging population in Japan, or dreading them as potential job destroyers in the United States, this essay calls for exploring thechanges emerging technologies bring to the socio-economic systems oflabor, and paying closer attention to less visible labor involving various
forms of maintenance.

Technology Always Eliminated Jobs
If there is one thing we can learn by taking a historical perspective, itis that technological inventions have always destroyed professions andeliminated jobs. In the late nineteenth century, within the span of justone decade, mechanization in brickmaking, printing, shoe production,and many other manufacturing specialties disrupted hereditary occupations and eliminated entire professions. Railroads reduced the need inhorse-breeders, barrage-drivers, and canal maintainers, and threateneda large number of lumber and grain dealers.6 Around the turn of the
century, the adoption of stone-planing machines and pneumatic tools
cut the number of stonecutters in half. Between 1921–30, the installation of dial telephone systems displaced 72,000 switchboard operators at
Bell. The emergence of “talkies”—movies that recorded sound as well as
image—eliminated 10,000 movie musicians in just three years.7
A second historical observation is that there is no clear correlation
between unemployment levels and waves of automation. In the late nineteenth-century, when mechanization brought about the disappearance ofsome professions and a considerable decrease in the number of workers
in others, employment outpaced population growth by 75%.8 The major
wave of technological development and automation in the early twentiethcentury—associated with the introduction of assembly lines, as well as
automobile, radio, and telephone industries— correlated with higher wages
and lower unemployment. Similar patterns can be seen between the lateforties and 1973, and between 1995 and 2002. At the same time, the historical record shows that economic lows characterized by stagnant wages
and high unemployment were also the periods of stagnant technological35

Yulia Frumer

developments. The first decade of the twenty-first century, troubled by rising
unemployment levels, saw a slowdown in automation, not acceleration.9“Unprecedented Times” Claims Are Based on
Technological Optimism
Theorists who warn of potential technological unemployment are awareof the fact that one cannot find a correlation between automation andemployment so far. But, they claim, today is different. This time the economic threat is real. In our time the crisis is imminent.
Some of these theorists, such as MIT’s Erik Brynjolfsson, focus on the paceof invention. In an interview on the television program “60 Minutes,” hewarned that “[t]echnology is always creating jobs. It’s always destroying
jobs. But right now the pace is accelerating. It’s faster we think than everbefore in history…We are not creating jobs at the same pace that weneed to.”10
It is not the first time, however, that people felt they lived in “unprecedented times.” At any major wave of technological development people
experienced the change in technological landscape as simply overwhelming. Expansion of railroad networks at the end of the nineteenth century
transformed the economy, as well as the whole ecology of the country.
In just two decades, railroads rearranged labor structures, compelledchanges in agricultural practice, shifted boundaries between prairies andforests, and forced mass migration. The common sentiment among people
was that in this short period of time trains managed to “compress space
and time.”11 In the early twentieth century, the invention of the assemblyline and labor-saving machinery contributed to the sense that technological development outpaces human labor. Consider President Franklin
D. Roosevelt’s 1940 State of the Union address in which he laments thecountry’s inability to “fin[d] jobs faster than invention can take themaway.” “We,” he exclaimed, “have not yet found a way to employ a surplusof our labor, which the efficiency of our industrial processes has created!”36

Beyond Singul ar Tasks: L abor-Saving Technolo gies and Systems of L abor

Others claim that the “unprecedented” character of our time is not thepace, but the nature of current technology. MIT economist David Autor
refers to theories proposed by philosopher of technology Michael Polanyi
to explain why machines so far failed to eradicate human labor.12 Polanyi
pointed out that the performance of tasks relies on a “tacit knowledge”—
something that is acquired through practice and embodied in movement
but cannot be explained in words.13 Using Polanyi’s theory, Autor claims
that technology has so far failed to eliminate human labor because
machines—which are built according to explicit criteria—lack the “tacitknowledge” required to complete the task. Therefore, the logic goes,human jobs produced by new technology were created to supplement
the tacit skills acquired through experience—something that machines
cannot do. Or, as some claim, could not do. Surely—they say—with
the development of machine learning, robots will be able to learn thetacit elements of tasks as well, and we will finally see rising levels of
unemployment.
Such claims rely not on what technology can do in the present, but
on extrapolation from the present state of technological development.
Oftentimes, such predictions are accompanied by timelines—claims
about what technology will be capable of in five, ten, fifty years. If similar
predictions of past visionaries came true we all would have had a flying
automobile by the year 2000 (if not personal wings). Although these
imagined scenarios make wonderful science fiction, they cannot stand at
the basis of real policy—and the cautionary tale from Japan is living proof.
Today, Japan faces a problem opposite to the American one—there aren‘tenough people to fill job vacancies. Low birthrates combined with record
longevity, and women’s low participation in the labor force have resulted
in a rapidly aging society with a shrinking workforce and dwindling pension funds. Consequently, whereas elsewhere people fear robot-induced
unemployment, the Japanese government wants robots to take overhuman jobs.

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Yulia Frumer

Informed by extrapolations from the current state of technology, in 2007
the Japanese government introduced the so-called Innovation 25 policy
draft. Written during Prime Minister Shinzō Abe’s first term in office, thedraft promised to enlist technological innovation to “revitalize” Japanesesociety by the year 2025. Virtual reality would allow people to work from
home; in-ear automatic translators would eliminate language barriers;
humanoid robots would take up household chores, childrearing, eldercare, and nursing; they would also replace manual laborers to fill vacancies
in less-than-prestigious occupations.
But ten years after—and more than halfway through to the 2025 deadline—none of the landscape painted in Innovation 25 can be found. Virtual
reality is confined to the entertainment industry, translation engines for
East Asian languages only work for basic tasks, and humanoid nurses draw
a lot of media attention but do nothing to remedy the shortage in nurses
and caretakers. Robots are certainly nowhere near replacing humans inother demanding sectors. This clear failure to make imaginary technology
real did not prevent the government from acting further, however. In 2016
Japan’s METI announced the “Robots for Everyone” project that doubled
down on the promises of translating, serving, care-taking robots.14
Similar to the U.S. media, Japanese media cherry-pick advances in robotic
research to portray them as an actuality, or at least part of a very near
future. One takes a music-playing robot, and imagines a “near future”
where household robots play a nighttime lullaby and tuck you into bed.
Another presents advances in geriatric-care robots that can lift immobile patients as an indication of the imminent disappearance of humancaretakers. The invention of a laundry-folding machine—at about $16K
cost, taking a space of a room, and taking ten minutes to fold a T-shirt(one at a time)—immediately was translated into the declaration thathousewives will soon be without work to do.
Historical observation shows that these predictions are eerily similar to theones we have seen before. An image of a robotic housewife that appeared38

Beyond Singul ar Tasks: L abor-Saving Technolo gies and Systems of L abor

in 1969 is almost identical to the one illustrating the 2007 Innovation
25 policy draft. A cartoon of robots outpacing human capabilities andobviating human labor made in 1969 could have been made today.
Technology, of course, has changed tremendously in the past fifty years.
The 1969 robotic housewife image was made with the introduction of thefirst pneumatically-operated robotic human arm, while today we havefull-bodied humanoid robots playing soccer, climbing stairs, and shaking
hands without crushing them. But, we are still nowhere near the “nearfuture” painted fifty years ago. Today, when we ask Japanese roboticists
whether their robots would be able to replace caretakers in the near future,they answer with a confident negative. Current robots are only attempting
to reach the cognition level of newborn human babies, they say.15
The assumption that we can predict when a certain technology willdevelop from infancy to maturity can be described as naïve technological optimism. We can only pose timelines when we know all the factors
involved in the process—if a certain task takes a certain amount of time,
we can calculate the output and the timeline for completion. But inquestions of technological innovation the problem is that we don’t know
which factors are involved in the process—in many cases, we are noteven aware of the problems that will require solutions. Predictions of anear-future innovation is a paradox—if we knew what this innovation
would be and how to achieve it, we would have already been there. To
claim that we are on a brink of innovation is akin to one claiming tohave “almost” found a lost item—either you have found it or not, there
is no “almost.”
What we see at play here are exaggerations of technological capabilities.
In the same way that the American media portray data about inevitablejob losses as a looming robotic apocalypse, the Japanese media takes news
about baby-step advancements in robotic technologies and portrays themas the realization of technological utopia. One response is driven by fears
of technology, the other by naïve technological optimism.

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Yulia Frumer

Exaggeration of technological capabilities is by no means a new phenomenon. Despite the job losses discussed above, in America the early 1920s
were characterized by an extreme technological optimism and a solid
trust in the ability of technological innovation to solve social problems.
In 1922 Henry Ford claimed that “our modern industrialism, changed tomotives of public service, will provide means to remove every injusticethat gives soil for prejudice.”16 Three years later he declared that “manminus the machine is a slave; man plus the machine is a freeman.”17 In
1928, an article titled “There is Magic in the Air” declared:
Today you can’t spring anything too wild for people to believe.
[…] You don’t have to be an inventor to know we’re on thethreshold of an age of wonders made ordinary, which willbring health, wealth, and happiness to each of us.18
At that very time, while Americans were raving about miraculous technological inventions that were destined to bring prosperity for all, theJapanese were fearful of job-stealing machines. In 1931, the designer of
one of the first Japanese modern-day robots wrote: “[Today’s] “useful”
robots are like a message from heavens to factory owners, but for an
ordinary laborer they are a rampant evil. With the coming of the robot
age, robots who manage road traffic, take over jobs of concierge […],
enter households and reduce house servants to vagrants—those robots
provoke […] fear.”19
In America too, the tone changed after the economic crisis of 1929, andthe rosy visions of technological panacea were replaced by fear of an
apocalypse of technological unemployment. Machines came to be seenas the main culprit behind the hardships associated with the financial
crisis. In 1946, Fortune magazine expressed the commonly felt fear thatmachines are replacing people in an article titled “Machines without
Men.” “Nowhere,” it stated, “is modern man more obsolete than on afactory floor.”40Beyond Singul ar Tasks: L abor-Saving Technolo gies and Systems of L abor

Exaggerations about the power of technology to decimate human labor—
whether it is perceived as a threat or as a utopian dream—stem fromour tendency to focus on the concrete and the tangible. We notice whenmachines accomplish a task, we notice when they produce something,
we notice the result of action. We see the emergence of labor-saving
household appliances, we witness the introduction of newer and moresophisticated industrial robots that take over tasks previously done byhumans, and we recognize that newly developed algorithms are cable ofperforming calculations in a much faster and efficient way than humans
do. Yet these concrete manifestations of tasks accomplished by machinesconceal a bigger picture.

Technologies That Accomplish Singular Tasks Are
Part of Larger Technological Systems
Already several decades ago historians of technology began pointing
out that no task exists in a vacuum. Rather, singular tasks are a part of alarger system bound by social structures and the material environment.20
Consequently, the introduction of new technology that completes a task
reverberated throughout the system, changing norms, requiring new labor
relationships, demanding yet newer technologies, and creating anotherset of tasks.
Whereas technology can alleviate the labor burden with one particulartask, it often creates demands for labor in other areas. Take, for example,
the introduction of household appliances. In the fifties and sixties people
expected that labor-saving household devices would liberate housewives
from work. Yet the opposite proved to be true—despite all the appliances
women saw the number of hours they spend on household chores
increase, not decrease. Sure, the washing machine made the washing of
the single load of clothes easier and faster, but it also facilitated changing
norms of cleanliness. New norms required buying more clothes and doing
laundry more frequently, and each laundry cycle women were doing
more sorting, stain removing, loading, unloading, starching, ironing,

41

Yulia Frumer

folding, sorting again, and putting away. Furthermore, the introductionof labor-saving household appliances meant that women no longer had
to lift heavy buckets of clothes and water, seemingly eliminating the needfor help from domestic workers, children, or spouses. With no help, andwith new norms of cleanliness, each housewife now spent more hours
each month on laundry than she did before.21
In another example—more visible to those who do not engage withhousehold work—the introduction of automatic teller machines (ATM)to the banking system did not decrease the number of bank tellers.22
ATMs require significant human labor to load and unload money; sortand deposit checks; develop and debug software; link the machines within
information networks; and enhance the user interface, among other tasks.
Additionally, the existence of ATMs brought about a higher demand forbank services in general, increasing the number of branches, and withmore branches more personal interaction with customers requiring more
employees to offer advice, analysis, and customer service. So even if somebranches dismissed a certain number of bank tellers, the overall numberof bank employees in all branches increased.
What these examples tell us is that each task that visibly produces something is entangled in a network of countless other, less visible tasks, which
are necessary and require human labor. When new technology is introduced, it saves labor for a particular task but it cannot do away with all the
supporting and related labor. However, new technology almost certainly
alters labor relationships surrounding the task, creating new needs andnew labor demands.
Another point stressed by historians of technology and confirmed by theexamples above, is that the majority of labor is maintenance— repairing, adjusting, customizing, finding and procuring materials, sortingand packing, but also planning, organizing, communicating, pacifying
disputes, and caregiving.23 Production is what makes a given task visible—there is a visible process at the end of which there is a tangible

42Beyond Singul ar Tasks: L abor-Saving Technolo gies and Systems of L abor

product, such as a car, a chip, a graph, a report, or a meal. Maintenancetasks are essential to the making of the final product yet they leave no
visible trace in it. It is the maintenance tasks that require labor and which
are not easily substituted by automation.
When we look at the labor markets from the perspective of technological systems and maintenance, we get an insight into the roots of labor
troubles in both Japan and the United States. In Japan, the idea was to use
robots to do undesirable maintenance work—mostly caregiving, usuallydelegated to temporary workers and women, and oftentimes poorly (if atall) compensated. A robot can help with a task, such as lifting a geriatricpatient or delivering food. But even such tasks require supervision andadjustment, making sure the patient is comfortable, the food delivery
is correct, the robot’s settings are changed per patients’ feedback, etc.
Meaning, a labor-saving device requires numerous humans in still undesirable jobs.24 In the United States, introduction of industrial robots also
requires maintenance tasks, but in a poor economy such invisible labordemands are often ignored, while long-term benefits are sacrificed for
immediate profit. In other cases, new maintenance tasks are imposedon existing personnel without additional compensation, resulting inlower job satisfaction, and higher attrition rates. When new tasks—suchas customer service—are acknowledged, there is no guarantee that theresulting jobs will be created in the same area. Conversely, maintenancetasks such de-bugging and re-programming may require a different levelof expertise, which manual workers do not possess.
The question then is not whether technology creates new forms of labor,
but whether and how new forms of labor are being compensated. Because
supporting tasks are less visible, these tasks are often taken for granted.
Consequently, while the introduction of labor-saving technology resultsin the displacement of human labor, it comes with supporting tasks thatare not necessarily desirable and/or well-paid. Jobs of maintenance—or
caregiving, as we refer to the maintenance of humans—are perceived ascontingent and are thus poorly compensated and seldom seen as good43

Yulia Frumer

career choices. It is not enough to turn labor demands into jobs, they alsoneed to become “good jobs.”

Policy Recommendations
I therefore conclude that despite seemingly opposite problems faced by
Japan and the United States, the solution to both unemployment andthe inability to fill job vacancies is the same—creating value for jobs indemand. Despite job losses, the United States faces shortages of nurses
and of railroad engineers. The former are perceived to be unfit for maleworkers, the latter are not prestigious and well paying enough for welleducated employees. In Japan, jobs that stay vacant are the ones that werelong perceived to be fitting only for temporary workers—women andretirees. These jobs are not seen as careers, and people who stay in suchjobs are perceived as social failures.
A more diligent path to charting out a policy guideline would requirea careful study of changes in the system of supporting labor caused by
the introduction of each and every type of technology. Looking beyond“tasks” and “products,” there is a need for better understanding of invisible
labor within larger systems. Once we identify new maintenance tasks, we
can encourage investment in them, valuing them socially and monetarily.
A shorter answer that emerges in the current socio-economic landscapein both the United States and Japan is that the jobs that are in demand
are in the work of maintenance. Maintenance work should be reframed asnecessary and desirable. America needs maintenance—in infrastructure,
healthcare, education, and other fields. Maintenance needs left neglected
become costlier to address in the future. Maintenance tasks can only beoffloaded on free laborers in the short term— in the long term, the cost of
free labor is the cessation of maintenance. There is work for humans, but
it must first be recognized as valued work through proper compensationand status. Japan needs maintenance too—mainly in caregiving—and it
can no longer assume that this work is going to magically take care of44

Beyond Singul ar Tasks: L abor-Saving Technolo gies and Systems of L abor

itself with the invisible labor of women. One would not need a robot tolift a patient if there were more male nurses, and in order for there to be
more male nurses, nursing needs to be seen as a legitimate profession
worthy of one’s career. The simple logic of supply and demand would notbring people to fill these vacancies. Cultural values dictating what makesa job desirable or undesirable need to change. n

Reference List
Acemoglu, Daron and David H. Autor. “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for
Employment and Earnings,” Handbook of Labor Economics Volume 4, 2011, Amsterdam:
Elsevier, Orley Ashenfelter and David E. Card (eds.), 1043–1171.
Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual Restrepo. Robots and Jobs: Evidence from U.S. Labor
Markets. NBER Working Paper No. 23285, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017.
Alexander, Arthur. “Japan’s Robots Stumble into Services,” Oxford Analytica, October
11, 2017.
Alexander, Arthur, “Is there a technological singularity in your future? or “Hey, Buddy,
wanna buy a singularity?”,” Oxford Analytica, July 30, 2017.
Atkinson, Robert D., and John Wu. “False Alarmism: Technological Disruption and the
U.S. Labor Market, 1850–2015,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation,
May 8, 2017.
Autor David H. “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace
Automation,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Summer 2015a, 29(3), 3–30.
Autor, David H. “Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape of Employment Growth,” Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis: Economic Policy Proceedings, Reevaluating Labor Market
Dynamics. 2015b. 129–177.
Autor, David H. “The “Task Approach” to Labor Markets: An Overview,” Journal forLabour Market Research, February 2013, 1–15.
Bessen, James. “Toil and Technology.” Finance and Development 2015, 52(1).
Bix, Amy Sue. Inventing Ourselves Out of Jobs?: America’s Debate Over Technological
Unemployment, 1929–1981. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
Cowan, Ruth Schwartz, More Work for Mother: The Ironies of Household Technology From
the Open Hearth to the Microwave. New York: Basic Books, 1983.

45

Yulia Frumer

Croft, Steve. 60 Minutes: March of the Machines, Jan. 13, 2013. https://www.cbsnews.com/
news/are-robots-hurting-job-growth-13–01–2013/
Cronon,William. Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West. New York: W. W.
Norton, 1991.
Edgerton, David. The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007.
Hughes, Thomas Parke. Networks of Power: Electrification In Western Society, 1880–1930.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983.
Ishiguro Hiroshi, interview. Osaka University, April 2, 2017.
Mishel, Lawrence and Bivens Josh, “The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On,” Economic
Policy Institute, May 24, 2017.
Nishimura, Makoto. “Hyōjō Jinzō Ningen: Gakutensoku no sōsaku [Expressive artificial
human: building Gakutensoku],” Kagaku Chishki [Scientific Knowledge] 9, no. 6 (June1931): 14–17.
Polanyi, Michael, and Mary Jo Nye. Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy.
Enlarged edition / Chicago: University of Chicago Press, (1959) 2015.
Russel Andrew and Lee Vinsel, “Making Maintainers: Engineering Education andEthics of Care,” Wisnioski, E.S. Hintz, and M. S. Kleine, (eds.), The Innovator Imperative,
Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 2019 (forthcoming)
Vinsel, Lee. “Hail the Maintainers,” Aeon.co, April 2016: https://aeon.co/essays/
innovation-is-overvalued-maintenance-often-matters-more

Chapter Endnotes1

Mainly David Autor, Daron Acemoglu, and Pascal Prestrepo. See Daron Acemoglu
and David Autor, “Skills, Tasks and Technologies: Implications for Employment andEarnings,” and Daron Acemoglu and Pascal Restrepo, Acemoglu, Daron, and Pascual
Restrepo. Robots and Jobs: Evidence from U.S. Labor Markets.

2

See, for example, David Autor’s “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and
Future of Workplace Automation.”3

Lawrence Mishel and Josh Bivens specifically focus their criticism on Acemoglu andRestrepo’s 2017 study. See “The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On.”

4

Robert Atkinson and John Wu. “False Alarmism: Technological Disruption and the
U.S. Labor Market, 1850–2015.”

46

Beyond Singul ar Tasks: L abor-Saving Technolo gies and Systems of L abor

5

See, for example, Autor “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs?”

6

Cronon,William. Nature’s Metropolis.

7

Amy Bix, Inventing Ourselves Out of Jobs?: America’s Debate Over Technological
Unemployment, 1929–1981. p. 29

8

Ibid.

9

Michel and Bivens, “The Zombie Robot Argument Lurches On.”

10 In Croft’s 60 Minutes: March of the Machines, Jan. 13, 2013.
11 Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis.
12 David Autor, in “Polanyi’s Paradox and the Shape of Employment Growth,” and “The“Task Approach” to Labor Markets: An Overview.”
13 Polanyi, Personal Knowledge.
14 Arthur Alexander, “Japan’s Robots Stumble into Services.”
15 Ishiguro Hiroshi, interview. Osaka University, April 2, 2017.
16 Ford News, November 1, 1922.
17 Ford News, July 1, 1925.
18 Roger W. Babson, Collier’s, April 7, 1928. Cited in Bix, Inventing Ourselves Out of
Jobs?, 11.
19 Nishimura, Makoto. “Hyōjō Jinzō Ningen: Gakutensoku no sōsaku,” p. 14.
20 Thomas Hughes, Networks of Power: Electrification In Western Society, 1880–1930,
Ruth Cowan, More Work for Mother, William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis.
21 Cowan, More Work for Mother.
22 James Bessen “Toil and Technology.”
23 David Edgerton, The Shock of the Old: Technology and Global History Since 1900,
Lee Vinsel “Hail the Maintainers,” and Andrew Russel and Lee Vinsel, “Making
Maintainers: Engineering Education and Ethics of Care.”24 Arthur Alexander stresses the face-to-face element of human labor in “Is there atechnological singularity in your future? Or “Hey, Buddy, wanna buy a singularity?”.”47

Japan-Taiwan Relations under
Abe and Tsai in Historical Context
Robert HoppensIn December 2016, U.S. president-elect Donald Trump accepted a congratulatory phone call from Tsai Ing-wen, president of the Republic ofChina (ROC) on Taiwan. As the first direct contact between American
and Taiwanese heads of state since the normalization of relations between
the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1979, thephone call brought intense international attention to the Taiwan issue.
Most of this attention focused on the possibility of significant change
in U.S. China policy and what such change portended for cross-strait
relations between Taiwan and the mainland.
Taiwan’s relationship with Japan also deserves the attention of American
policy makers. The relationship is one of Taiwan’s most important, following
only those with the People’s Republic and the United States. In President
Tsai and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, Taiwan and Japan haveleaders predisposed to expanding and deepening relations in ways that
accord with American interests but which could also pose challenges for
U.S. policy. Understanding the complex mix of interests and identities
that shape the contemporary relationship under Tsai and Abe requires anappreciation of the historical evolution of postwar Japan-Taiwan relations.1

49

Robert Hoppens

Japan’s surrender in 1945 ended a half century of Japanese colonial ruleof Taiwan. During the ensuing cold war, Japan-Taiwan relations were
founded on an uneasy marriage of convenience between Japan’s rulingconservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Chinese Nationalist
Party (KMT) under Chiang Kai-shek. Anti-Communist ideology
grounded the relationship but different concepts of national identity led
to divergent attitudes toward the history and people of Taiwan. The endof authoritarian KMT rule and Taiwan’s democratization since the 1980s,
however, has led to the establishment of friendly relations between two
vibrant democracies based on shared interests and convergent national
identities and supported by widespread positive public sentiment.2

The Cold War and Japan-KMT Relations
The relationship between Japan and the Republic of China, formerly
bitter enemies, took time to develop. After the Chinese Communist
victory on the mainland and the Nationalist retreat to Taiwan in 1949,
the Japanese leadership worked to maintain relations with both Chinese
regimes. In 1952, however, under pressure from the United States, theJapanese signed a peace treaty with the ROC, foregoing diplomatic relations with the mainland. Even after conclusion of the Japan-ROC treaty,
however, mainstream conservative Japanese leaders looked the other way
as Japanese politicians and businesspeople established informal contacts
and trade relations with the PRC.
In response to these expanding ties with the PRC, influential politiciansfrom the right wing of Japan’s ruling LDP, including Nobusuke Kishi andOkinori Kaya, established direct, personal contacts with Chiang Kai-shek
and other ROC leaders. These contacts gave the ROC leadership directaccess to Japanese leaders and were instrumental in thwarting PRC efforts
to use economic ties to advance political relations.3
It proved easier to recognize a common interest in opposing the Chinese
Communists than it was to arrive at a common historical understanding of

50

Japan-Taiwan R el ations under Abe and Tsai in Historical C ontext

Japan’s colonialization of Taiwan. Many Japanese conservatives displayedconsiderable nostalgia for Taiwan as a former colony and took pride inJapanese contributions to Taiwan’s modernization. Some justified their proTaiwan position as a moral obligation to support former colonial subjects
rather than the ROC. Chiang’s conservative Japanese allies also did notnecessarily share his ultimate goal of Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. Instead, they tended to favor eventual independence for Taiwan andlamented Chiang’s commitment to unification as an obstacle to this goal.4
In contrast, Nationalist leaders saw themselves as liberating Taiwan andreturning the island to Chinese rule. This made them hostile to Japanesecultural influence, wary of sympathy for Taiwanese independence in Japan(where some Taiwan independence activists initially found safe haven)and often doubtful of the loyalties of the Taiwanese population. Whileforging close relations with Japan, the Nationalists carried out a campaignof Sinification to root out Japanese cultural influences and inculcate a
Chinese national identity. ROC authorities banned the Japanese language
and Japanese cultural products, and imposed Mandarin Chinese as thenational language. The political system reflected suspicion of local loyalties by concentrating power in the hands of newly arrived mainlanders(waishengren), while excluding local Taiwanese (benshengren).
The monopolization of political power by mainlanders provoked discontent among the Taiwanese, especially after the 2.28 incident in 1947,
when the KMT violently suppressed an anti-government uprising. After
this incident, the KMT maintained power through martial law and a
White Terror that subjected thousands to imprisonment and intimidation.
Authoritarianism encouraged the growth of a Taiwanese national identity
opposed to KMT rule and imposed Sinification, one that tended toward
a more positive view of Japanese colonial rule.5
The close, personal contacts between the pro-Taiwan conservatives andthe KMT leadership could not protect Japan-ROC relations from theNixon shock, President Nixon’s surprise announcement in July 197151

Robert Hoppensthat he would visit the PRC, or prevent the normalization of Japan-PRC
relations in September 1972. In the joint communiqué establishing
diplomatic relations with the mainland, the Japanese government recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China and declared that
the Japanese government “understands and respects” the PRC position
that there is only one China. The Japanese government announced theend of diplomatic relations with the ROC, although unofficial contacts
would continue. Pro-Taiwan politicians in Japan committed themselvesto opposing this “1972 System” that guided Japan’s relations with China
and Taiwan.6 Despite their efforts, Japan-ROC relations deteriorated in
the 1970s. Chiang Kai-shek passed away in 1975 and was succeeded byhis son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who lacked the personal ties to Japan of his
father and many of his colleagues who had been students in Japan before
the war. Meanwhile, historic changes in Taiwan ushered in a process of
democratization that transformed the island’s relationship with Japan.

Taiwanese Democratization andJapan-Taiwan Relations
On assuming power, Chiang Ching-kuo sought to reform the ROC political system in the face of an increasing opposition movement and to open
the KMT to local Taiwanese in order to secure the party’s future as theolder generation of mainlanders passed on. As part of this effort, in 1986
Chiang brought in a native-born former mayor of Taipei, Lee Teng-hui, as
his vice president. When Chiang died in 1988, Lee became KMT chairman and the first Taiwanese president of the ROC. As president, Leecontinued the democratization of the ROC political system, culminatingin legislative elections in 1991 and direct presidential elections in 1996.
Lee also accelerated the localization, or Taiwanization, of ROC politics
and gave voice to a new Taiwanese national identity.
Born and raised in Japanese-occupied Taiwan, Lee had been educated inJapan at Kyoto University. His father had worked for the Japanese colonial
police. His brother served in the Japanese military during the war and52

Japan-Taiwan R el ations under Abe and Tsai in Historical C ontext

was killed in the Philippines, as result of which his spirit was enshrinedin Tokyo’s Yasukuni Shrine to Japan’s war dead. As Lee pointed out, he
had been a Japanese citizen for the first twenty-two years of his life while
he had only once briefly visited China and was always more comfortable
expressing himself in Japanese than in Mandarin Chinese.
As a result, Lee did not identify with China nor did he share the goalof reunification with the mainland. Instead, although as president he
did not openly advocate Taiwanese independence, Lee worked to raise
Taiwan’s international profile and create international space for Taiwan
as a separate entity. In 1991 Lee renounced the ROC claim to rule themainland. After his election in 1996, despite PRC missile tests meant
to prevent it, Lee went further in asserting Taiwan’s separate identity,
describing cross-strait relations as a “special state-to-state relationship.”7
After stepping down in 2000, Lee left the KMT to establish a new party,
the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), and joined the opposition in openly
advocating Taiwanese independence.
Lee also had a deep affinity for Japan and espoused a Taiwanese national
identity that encouraged an identification with Japan over China. Lee’s
government lifted the ban on Japanese language and culture. In a 1994
interview with the Japanese author Ryōtarō Shiba, Lee praised the Japanesecolonial legacy for Taiwan’s modernization and dismissed the KMT as
an alien regime imposed on Taiwan. In another interview, Lee said thatJapan no longer needed to apologize for the war.8 Lee cultivated ties
with leading lights of the Japanese right wing like Shintarō Ishihara, theprovocative governor of Tokyo, and Yoshinori Kobayashi, a popular rightwing manga artist, and echoed their attacks on the “masochistic” view ofJapanese history that dwelt on Japanese colonialism and aggression. In a
2002 interview, Lee stated his opinion that the Senkaku or Diaoyu islands,
over which both the PRC and ROC claim sovereignty, were Japanese
territory. Not surprisingly, Lee remains popular among conservatives inJapan, where a Friends of Lee Teng-hui Association (Nihon Ri Tōki tomo
no kai) pushes his agenda.953

Robert Hoppens

Lee was succeeded by Chen Shui-bian, a Taiwan-born lawyer, of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), an opposition party associated witha pro-independence position.10 The new administration continued thedrive for separation from the mainland. In his speeches, Chen increasingly referred to Taiwan rather than the ROC, and in 2002 characterizedcross-strait relations as “one country on each side [of the strait]” (yibian
yiguo). In 2006, he suspended the National Unification Council andlaunched a “diplomatic war” with the PRC for international recognition.
Most provocatively, Chen held referenda on cross-strait relations and UN
membership in conjunction with presidential elections in 2004 and 2008.
Chen also sought closer relations with Japan. In 2006, the administration
floated the idea of a Japanese version of the American Taiwan Relations
Act. Taiwanese independence advocates, many of whom had been active
in exile in Japan, were welcomed into the administration. They and others
associated with the pro-independence, pan-green coalition often added
their voices to Lee’s in support of right-wing Japanese political and historical positions.11
Chen’s moves led to a deterioration in cross-strait relations, including
the passage in 2005 of a PRC anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan, thatalarmed leaders in Washington and Tokyo. In addition, despite generally
favorable public sentiment toward Japan, the identification with Japan
could be pushed too far. For example, Lee’s renunciation of ROC claims
to the Dioayu islands was anathema to those in the popular movement toprotect Taiwan’s territorial claims and efforts on the part of some associated with the DPP to defend Japan’s treatment of Taiwanese “comfort
women” provoked popular resentment.12
The KMT returned to power in 2008 under President Ma Ying-jeou committed to improving relations with the mainland. Ma reiterated the KMT’scommitment to eventual reunification, accepted the “1992 consensus”
that there is only one China, and restarted intergovernmental cross-strait
contacts. There was a cease-fire in the diplomatic war for international

54

Japan-Taiwan R el ations under Abe and Tsai in Historical C ontext

recognition and the two sides reached a series of agreements on issues liketourism, direct air links, mail and shipping. On the economic front, the twosides signed an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)
in 2010 and a Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in 2013.13
Ma also sought to strengthen a Chinese sense of national identity. Ma
played up Taiwanese resistance to Japanese colonialism, used the term
“occupation” to describe Japanese colonial rule and in 2011 dedicateda new memorial to Victory in the Anti-Japanese War and the Recovery
of Taiwan. In the summer of 2015, Ma’s plans to commemorate theseventieth anniversary of the ROC victory over Japan in World War II
provoked a public row with former president Lee Teng-hui, who opposedcommemoration on the grounds that Taiwan (as opposed to China) had
never been at war with Japan. Ma also reasserted Taiwan’s claim to the
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, and in the summer of 2008, a Taiwanese fishingboat in the area sank after a confrontation with Japanese Coast Guard
ships, raising tensions with Japan. In 2016, at the end of Ma’s term, adispute over whether the Okinotori reef is merely a rock, as the ROC
claims, or an island that can be the basis for an exclusive economic zone,
as the Japanese government contends, flared up when the Japanese Coast
Guard seized a Taiwanese fishing boat in the area.14
Although Ma’s policies and rhetoric convinced some that he was anti-Japanese, progress in Japan-Taiwan relations continued. The two sides signed
a memorandum of understanding on strengthening mutual exchanges
and cooperation, agreements on investment and taxes, and an open skies
agreement. Taiwan was the largest contributor of financial assistance inthe wake of the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. In 2013, thetwo sides concluded a long-delayed fisheries agreement that helped tomitigate tensions in disputed waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands
and launched an East China Sea Peace Forum.15 Even commemorationsof Japan’s colonial contributions to Taiwan continued. In 2011, Ma dedicated a memorial commemorating the contributions of Yayoi Hattori, acolonial-era hydraulic engineer.16

55

Robert Hoppens

Like those of his predecessor, some of Ma’s moves went too far. An attempt
to rewrite history textbooks, including the insertion of references to theJapanese “occupation” of Taiwan, provoked popular protest. Fears of economic dependence on the mainland and Ma’s handling of the services
trade agreement in the Legislative Yuan led to the 2014 Sunflower Student
Movement. Protests and a weak economy swept Tsai Ing-wen and the
DPP to an overwhelming victory in the 2016 presidential and Legislative
Yuan elections.17

Japan-Taiwan Relations under Abe and TsaiFor Prime Minister Shinzō Abe, scion of one of Japan’s most prominent
political families, the relationship with Taiwan is very much a family
affair. Abe’s maternal grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, was the first Japaneseprime minister to visit Taipei in 1957 and a primary political benefactorof the organizations involved in relations with the ROC. Kishi’s brother(Abe’s great-uncle), Eisaku Satō, was the last sitting prime minister tovisit Taipei in 1964. Abe himself visited Taiwan in 2010 and 2011 before
becoming prime minister in 2012. Abe’s younger brother, Nobuo Kishi,a member of Japan’s Upper House and chair of the LDP’s Japan-Taiwan
Young Diet Members League (Nittai wakate giren), acts as the prime
minister’s contact with the Taiwanese leadership.18 Even Abe’s mothergets involved. In June 2017 she attended the performance of a Japanesesymphony orchestra in Taipei with President Tsai.19
Unlike Abe, Tsai Ing-wen is not heir to a political dynasty. Daughter of an
auto mechanic, of Hakka and aboriginal Paiwan descent, unmarried andchildless, Tsai is in many ways a political and social outsider. As such, herrise to become the first female president of Taiwan is a vivid illustrationof Taiwan’s democratic transformation. A former lawyer, Tsai enteredpolitics in the early 1990s as an independent working with the KMT. A
protégé of Lee Teng-hui, she became associated with a pro-independence
political position and by some accounts is credited with helping develop
Lee’s “special state-to-state” formulation of cross-strait relations. Tsai went

56

Japan-Taiwan R el ations under Abe and Tsai in Historical C ontext

on to join the DPP and served as chair of the Mainland Affairs Council
during Chen Shui-bian’s first term. Tsai has also cultivated contacts inJapan and with the Abe family in particular. She met with Abe during his
visits to Taiwan in 2010 and 2011. As a presidential candidate in October
2015 Tsai embarked on a “Japan-Taiwan friendship” tour during which
she visited the Abe family’s home prefecture of Yamaguchi with Nobuo
Kishi and met surreptitiously with Prime Minister Abe himself.
Tsai’s election, therefore, raised expectations for improvement in JapanTaiwan relations after a perceived downturn during the Ma years. The twosides quickly made a series of symbolic moves to upgrade the relationship. For example, in December 2016 the Interchange Association, theoffice charged with conducting Japan’s informal relations with Taiwan,
announced that it would change its name to the Japan-Taiwan Exchange
Association. The Taiwanese later reciprocated, renaming the Associationof East Asian Relations the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association. There
was also a series of high-profile contacts between the two sides. In May
2016, just before Tsai’s inauguration, Nobuo Kishi met with both President
Ma and the president-elect to discuss the Okinotori issue. In March 2017
Jirō Akama, senior vice minister of internal affairs and communications,travelled to Taipei to discuss Taiwan’s ban on agricultural products fromareas affected by the Fukushima nuclear disaster, becoming the highestranking Japanese government official to visit Taiwan since 1972. The samemonth, Keisuke Suzuki of the LDP Youth Division visited Taiwan andmet with president Tsai and former president Lee Teng-hui. In November
2017, on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in Vietnam, Prime Minister
Abe himself met with President Tsai’s representative, James Soong of thePeople’s First Party.20
More substantive accomplishments include Tsai’s early announcementthat the Okinotori issue would be resolved through bilateral negotiations and the creation of a Taiwan-Japan Maritime Affairs Cooperation
Dialogue (which held its second round of talks in December 2017). In
April 2016, trilateral Tokyo-Taipei-Washington track II defense talks,57

Robert Hoppens

suspended under Ma, reopened. In September 2016, cooperation between
Japanese and Taiwanese law enforcement authorities successfully broke
up a Taiwanese crime ring smuggling drugs from China to Japan.21
Despite these accomplishments, problems remain. Chief among these
are the conflicting sovereignty claims to the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
Similarly, the dialogue on maritime issues has failed to produce agreementon the legal status of Okinotori. Notwithstanding the generally positive
view of Japan, historical issues like that of the “comfort women” can still
rankle in Taiwan. In addition, in spite of the close economic and tradeties between the two countries, Taiwan has not met Japanese requests tolift a ban on agricultural products from areas affected by the Fukushima
nuclear disaster.22
That said, there are considerable expectations for the further development of relations. The return to power of the DPP has revived interestin Japan in a Japanese version of the American Taiwan Relations Act(JTRA), an idea first broached under the Chen Shui-bian administration.
A JTRA, it is argued, would give a legal basis to Japan’s unofficial relations with Taiwan. Like the name change for the Japan-Taiwan Exchange
Association, it would also signal Japan’s commitment to maintaining
relations with Taiwan under its own understanding of the one-China
principle agreed to in 1972.23
In light of the continuing build-up of the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) and shared concern regarding Chinese intentions in the East
China Sea and Taiwan Strait, there is also considerable interest in theprospects for greater defense cooperation between Japan and Taiwan.
In response to worries about the relative decline of Taiwanese militarycapabilities, the Tsai administration has committed to increase defense
spending. There also is strong sentiment among Taiwanese leaders infavor of greater indigenous defense production capabilities, especially in
an indigenously produced submarine. Japanese technological assistanceand advice could be instrumental in pursuit of these goals. The two sides

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Japan-Taiwan R el ations under Abe and Tsai in Historical C ontext

could also cooperate on further developing anti-submarine capabilities tocounter the expansion of the PLA Navy’s submarine fleet. The two sides
could revive Japanese participation in Taiwanese military exercises that
had occurred under the Chen Shui-bian administration. Of course, any
cooperation on defense would draw Chinese opposition and would need
to be implemented cautiously. In addition, despite the lifting in 2014 of
the ban on Japanese weapons exports, the Japanese government has madeclear that it is not contemplating large-scale arms sales to Taiwan, so thata JTRA would not include the commitment to supplying defensive arms
to Taiwan that is at the heart of its American counterpart. 24
In economic relations, the Japanese government had championed theinclusion of Taiwan in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). After theAmerican abandonment of TPP, the inclusion of Taiwan in any agreementthat replaces TPP could enhance the Tsai administration’s “southbound”
strategy of fostering economic ties with South and Southeast Asian nations
to diversify the Taiwanese economy and counter perceived economic
dependence on China.

Policy Implications
Despite initial uncertainty, American policy under President Trump has
settled into a traditional pattern of support for Taiwan. The administration includes people friendly to Taiwan. The White House has also
been encouraged in this direction by bipartisan support for Taiwan in
the 115th Congress, which has passed two important pieces of legislation strengthening relations with Taiwan: the Taiwan Travel Act andthe Taiwan Security Act. Therefore, there are now administrations in
all three capitals—Taipei, Tokyo and Washington—in favor of greater
cooperation, and a deepening of Japan-Taiwan relations should be
welcome in Washington.
American interests in Taiwanese security, the protection of Taiwanese
democracy, stable cross-strait relations and opposition to any unilateral59

Robert Hoppenschanges to the status quo remain unchanged.25 The main challenge to
American interests comes from the PRC. The continued growth of PRC
military capabilities is changing the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.
In addition, Chinese nationalist sentiment could push a more aggressive
PRC policy toward Taiwan. Although Chinese leaders have not publicly
set a deadline for unification, Xi Jinping’s drive for the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and impatience with the lack of progress
toward unification could encourage the Chinese to force a resolution.
Indeed, after Tsai’s election the PRC took much more assertive policies
toward Taiwan. Beijing has insisted that Tsai publicly accept the so-called
1992 consensus as a precondition for any contacts and cut the numberof mainland tourists to Taiwan. The PRC has lifted the ceasefire in the
diplomatic war with Taiwan, peeling away countries that had recognized
the ROC like Sao Tome and Principe and Panama. More provocatively,
the PRC has sent bombers and fighter aircraft on flights around Taiwan.
There is another challenge to American interests latent in Taiwanese
domestic politics and Taiwan’s relationship with Japan. Democratizationand localization have legitimized the expression of nationalist and proindependence sentiment in Taiwan. As on the mainland, Taiwanesenationalist sentiment can lead to frustration. Tsai has committed heradministration to the maintenance of the status quo, and polls show thatthe majority of Taiwanese support this policy. Yet pro-independence
sentiment in the pan-green coalition on which the DPP depends could
push Taiwanese leaders toward more explicit expressions in favor ofindependence.
Among Japanese conservatives, there has long been an undercurrent of
support for Taiwanese independence. Japanese historical revisionism also
encourages an identification with Taiwan, where it finds some support
among those in favor of independence. The generally positive view ofJapan’s modern history that prevails in Taiwan stands in stark contrast
to constant recriminations from the mainland. Championing Taiwanese60

Japan-Taiwan R el ations under Abe and Tsai in Historical C ontext

independence can be a way to stand up to what many Japanese see as athreatening and overbearing China.
There is a danger, therefore, of pro-independence forces in Taiwan andJapan reinforcing each other to provoke PRC fears and upend stability
in the Taiwan Strait to the detriment of U.S. interests. Indeed, almost
every move Japan and Taiwan have made since Tsai’s election has invited
Chinese condemnation.26 Nor do Chinese leaders view Japan-Taiwan
relations in isolation. In combination with American moves to strengthen
relations with Taiwan, closer Japan-Taiwan relations will only appear
more provocative.
The United States needs to strike a balance, therefore, between reassuring
its partners in Japan and Taiwan while at the same time not encouraging forces that might upset stability. To date, both Abe and Tsai havedone a commendable job in their own balancing acts. Abe has provenhimself a pragmatic and flexible leader despite international misgivings
about his nationalist and revisionist proclivities. Tsai has also shown great
pragmatism in resisting pressure from both the PRC and from within
the pan-green coalition pushing her to adopt public positions in favorof independence.27
The United States should support and encourage Abe and Tsai in thispragmatic direction. The goal of U.S. policy toward Taiwan is to deter
rather than provoke the PRC. The United States should encourage
substantive improvements in relations that would preserve the statusquo and reinforce deterrence of PRC military action over symbolic
assertions of independence meant to gratify nationalist sentiment in
Taiwan and Japan. n61

Robert Hoppens

Chapter Endnotes1

On the history of Japan-Taiwan relations see, Kawashima Shin, Shimizu Urara,
Matsuda Yasuhiro and Philip Yang, Nittai kankeishi 1945–2008, (Tokyo: Tokyo
daigaku shuppankai, 2009).

2

Ayumi Teraoka, “What’s Next for Japan-Taiwan Relations,” Council on Foreign
Relations, January 19, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/blog/whats-next-japan-taiwanrelations; Emily S. Chen, “Japan’s Practical Taiwan Policy,” The Diplomat, April 14,
2017, 3, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/japans-practical-taiwan-policy/.

3

The most important organization for carrying out these contacts was the JapanChina Cooperation Committee (Nikka kyōryoku iinkai). These contacts are seen as
instrumental in blocking the extension of Japanese government credit to support
trade with the mainland in the 1960s. Robert Hoppens, The China Problem in Postwar
Japan: Japanese National Identity and Sino-Japanese Relations, (London: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2015), 35–38; Kawashima, et al., Nittai kankeishi, 76–84.

4

Hoppens, The China Problem in Postwar Japan, 122–123.

5

Shelley Rigger, Why Taiwan Matters: Small Island, Global Powerhouse, (Lanham, MD:
Rowmn & Littlefield, 2011), 64–66. Yinan He, “Identity Politics and Foreign Policy:
Taiwan’s Relations with China and Japan, 1895–2012,” Political Science Quarterly, 129,
no.3 (2014), 469–500; Leo Ching, “Colonial Nostalgia or Postcolonial Anxiety: The
Dōsan Generation between Restoration and Defeat,” in Richard King, Cody Poulton,
and Katsuhiko Endo, eds., Sino-Japanese Transculturation: From the Late NineteenthCentury to the End of the Pacific War (Lanham, Md: Lexington Books, 2012), 211–226.

6

Pro-Taiwan politicians now organized themselves in the Japan-ROC Diet members’
Consultative Council (nikka kankei kondankai, or Nikkakon) to replace the earlier
Japan-China Cooperation Committee. The group today still serves as an important
point of contact between Japanese Diet members and politicians in the Taiwanese
Legislative Yuan. Hoppens, The China Problem in Postwar Japan, 95–96; Dreyer,
Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun, 337.

7

On Lee Teng-hui and his relations with Japan see, Dreyer, Middle Kingdom and Empireof the Rising Sun, 337–343; June Teufel Dreyer, “Taiwan and Japan in the Tsai Era,”
Orbis, 60, no. 4 (2016), 595–597; He, “Identity Politics and Foreign Policy,” 481–489;
and Richard MacGregor, Asia’s Reckoning: China, Japan, and the Fate of U.S. Powerin the Pacific, (New York: Viking, 2017), 147–152.

8

Dreyer, Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun, 340.

9

Friends of Lee Teng-hui Association in Japan, http://www.ritouki.jp/.

10 Chen made a name for himself defending opponents of the KMT regime involvedin the 1979 Kaohsiung incident. Chen’s vice president, Annette Lu, served time inprison for her part in the Kaohsiung incident. Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History,(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), 228.

62

Japan-Taiwan R el ations under Abe and Tsai in Historical C ontext

11 On Chen Shui-bian and the relationship with Japan see, Dreyer, “Taiwan and Japanin the Tsai Era,” 597–598; Dreyer, Middle Kingdom and Empire of the Rising Sun,
344–348; He, “Identity Politics and Foreign Policy,” 481–489.
12 He, “Identity Politics and Foreign Policy,” 487–488; Shogo Suzuki, “The Competition
to Attain Justice for Past Wrongs: The ‘Comfort Women’ Issue in Taiwan,” PacificAffairs, 84, no. 2 (June 2011), 223–244.
13 On the other hand, Ma stuck to a campaign pledge known as the three-nos (noTaiwanese independence, no unification negotiations, and no use of force), and statedthat unification would be possible only once the mainland had democratized. Dreyer,“Taiwan and Japan in the Tsai Era,” 598–600; Dreyer, Middle Kingdom and Empire of
the Rising Sun, 349–350.
14 He, “Identity Politics and Foreign Policy,” 490–498; Dreyer, “Taiwan and Japan in the
Tsai Era,” 605.
15 Shin Kawashima, “The Formation of the New Government in Taiwan and JapanTaiwan Relations,” Asia-Pacific Review, 23, no. 1 (2016), 56.
16 Indicative of the ongoing contest over national identity in Taiwan, however, the statueof Hattori was decapitated by a pro-unification activist in April of 2017. Dreyer,“Taiwan and Japan in the Tsai Era,” 600. “Japanese engineer whose statue was decapitated lauded by Taiwan,” Japan Times, April 20, 2017, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/
news/2017/04/20/national/japanese-engineer-whose-statue-decapitated-laudedtaiwan/#.Wmgn-6inG70.
17 Kawashima, “The Formation of the New Government in Taiwan,” 46–50.
18 The different surnames among siblings is due to the common practice of adoption
in Japan. Nobusuke Kishi was born into the Satō family and is the older brother of
Eisaku Satō, but was adopted into the Kishi family. Two generations later, Shinzō
Abe’s younger brother Nobuo was similarly adopted into the Kishi family.
19 Lauren Dickey, “Taiwan-Japan Ties Deepen Amid Chinese Assertiveness,” China
Brief, (October 26, 2016), 9, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/
CB_16_16.pdf?x87069. “Tsai, Abe’s Mother Enjoy NHK concert in Taipei,” Focus
Taiwan, June 3, 2016, http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aedu/201606030036.aspx.
20 Chen, “Japan’s Practical Taiwan Policy,” 1–2.
21 Dickey, “Taiwan-Japan Ties Deepen,” 12.
22 Since the 1990s a Taipei Women’s Rescue Foundation and a museum have been
established but, unlike their counterparts in South Korea, Taiwanese comfort women
have as yet received neither apology nor compensation from the Japanese government.
Dreyer, “Taiwan and Japan in the Tsai Era,” 600–607; Jeff Kingston, “Complicating
Taiwan’s love affair with Japan,” Japan Times, September 28,2016, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/09/03/commentary/complicatingtaiwansloveaffairjapan/#.
VxmK_krJdg.

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23 Teraoka, “What’s Next for Japan-Taiwan Relations,” 3–4.
24 Dickey, “Taiwan-Japan Ties Deepen,” 10–12.
25 Comments by Ambassador James Moriarty, The Brookings Institution, “U.S.-Taiwan
Relations under Trump and Tsai (and Xi),” Washington, D.C., October 12, 2017, 2–3,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/fp_20171012_taiwan_transcript.pdf.
26 For example, the PRC denounced the name changes to the offices that handle relationsin Japan and Taiwan and lodged a formal diplomatic protest over Jirō Akama’s visit
to Taiwan in March. He, “Identity Politics and Foreign Policy,” 488; Chen, “Japan’s
Practical Taiwan Policy,” 3. Joseph Yeh, “Beijing ‘dissatisfied’ with name change
of Japan’s de facto Taiwan embassy,” The China Post, December 29, 2016. Reuters,
December 28, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-taiwan/chinaupset-at-name-change-of-de-facto-japan-embassy-in-taiwan-idUSKBN14H0GQ;
Isabel Reynolds, “Japan’s Abe Meets Taiwan Envoy Hours After Xi Warning,”
November 11, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017–11–12/
japan-s-abe-meets-taiwanese-lawmaker-hours-after-xi-warning.
27 For example, Tsai personally presented the Taiwanese Olympic flag, rather than a
Taiwan national flag, to Taiwanese athletes at the Taipei Universiade games in 2017.
Comments by David G. Brown, The Brookings Institution, “U.S.-Taiwan Relations
under Trump and Tsai (and Xi),” 25–27.

64

Building the Strategy of Deterrence in
Cyberspace: Proposals for Japan
Nori Katagiri

Securing cyber space has become a long-term challenge for Japan. The
challenge comes in part from the growing dependence of Japanesepeople on the internet and their exposure to illicit activities in the digital world. A large number of Japanese people have used the internet tobecome highly dependent on the internet. According to the Internet
World Stats, Japan surpassed South Korea in June 2017 to become themost “wired” nation in East Asia, with the rate of people using the internet at 94 percent.1 The internet has made many things convenient andefficient, but people’s dependence on it has renewed the sense of vulnerability. Like its people, the Japanese government has been a victim to cyberattacks. Worse, it has become known for its lack of effective responses todeter and defend against them.
Of course, Japan is not alone. The United States has seen its government and private-sector websites hacked in a significant manner. China
says that it, too, has long been a victim of cyber attacks. Various sites in
Russia are targeted by hacktivists and a variety of activities, including
the global ransomware incident in 2017. In addition, South Korea has
also fallen victim, including the 2013 attack on its banking networks.

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Nori Katagiri

Japan’s case seems unique in that its vulnerability has generated no real
response in strengthening cyber defense. The United States, for instance,
has taken a range of actions from proactive attacks on foreign targets
via programs like Stuxnet, to retaliation against North Korean attacks
on Sony Entertainment, to setting up webpages to protect current andformer government employees. In contrast, Japan has refrained from
responding in kind to foreign attacks. What explains this predisposition
toward defense at the negligence of everything else? Why is Japan so slow
in adapting to important changes in cyber security, arguably one of themost important national security issues these days? In this paper, I takethree steps to answer these questions. First, I discuss the state of affairs
in Japan’s response to cyber attacks. Second, I identify a set of problems
associated with the response. Finally, I offer a set of policy recommendations to mitigate Japan’s cyber vulnerability.

State of Affairs
Japan has taken a number of approaches to reduce its vulnerability incyber space, but the central tenant of its response has been highly lopsided
to favor strengthening defense over offense.2 While no evidence suggeststhat the Japanese government has ever conducted cyber attacks on foreign
targets, it is widely known that it has long been a victim of such attacks
from overseas. Mass media have reported web systems across Japan havebeen attacked for over a decade. Paul Kallender and Christopher Hughes
offer the best list of incidents involving cyber attacks on targets in Japan.
Between 2010 and 2015, the Ministry of Education, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, and Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications had their websites
and laboratories overwritten or attacked by concerted multi-country,
industry spear phishing campaigns.3 Known incidents in 2011 involving
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and the House of Representatives in theJapanese Diet found virus infection by targeted attacks from China.4 In
2013, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries had information
related to Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations stolen, and theJapan Aerospace Exploration Agency had their systems infected with66Building the Strategy of Deterrence in Cyberspaceviruses, and a similar virus struck the Japan Atomic Energy Agency thefollowing year. These incidents are among the few thousands of attacks
Japan gets on a daily basis, making it difficult to say whether or not Japanis successfully defending its cyber space. It is reasonable to argue, however,much information we receive about Japan’s vulnerability in cyberspaceis negative, in part because the media tend to stress failure over successand because the media can report only so much. As a result, most publicrecords point to Japan being not only on the defensive but also being
unsuccessful in defending.
Drawing from these selected but major cases, it is possible to generalize
Japan’s reactions as passive and reactive. Its reactions have primarily
been characterized by belated and inadequate legal patchworks. Japan
passed the Cyber Security Basic Law in 2014, which gave the National
Center of Incident Readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC)
the authority to issue and enforce cyber security guidelines, order
audits of government agencies, and investigate security incidents. In
2015, the Shinzo Abe cabinet approved the Cyber Security Policy tocall for collaboration between the government and private sector. The
problem, however, is that cyber attackers are always upgrading theirskills to target enemy vulnerabilities at the time and location of theirchoice, and defenders like the Japanese government have been unable tokeep up with these developments. As a result, these legal changes haveleft Japan mostly vulnerable. In 2015, the Japan Pension Service had
its desktops infected with email viruses and lost 1.25 million records.
These prominent cases include major corporations and government
facilities, but unreported cases could conceal the number and extent
of attacks on smaller agencies and firms. It is safe to assume that manysmall companies have slimmer defenses and are more vulnerable andthat incidents involving them were not always widely reported. Because
it takes an average of several years for victims to realize, if at all, thatthey have been massively attacked, we are likely to learn about a greaternumber of victims than today.

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To date, individuals and institutions in China, North Korea, and Russia
as well as non-state actors like Anonymous have been linked to cyberattacks on Japanese government agencies. Their motivations may vary;
agents in China have been angry about Japan’s attitude toward history
and may be seeking strategic advantage and financial gains through themass stealth of industrial and national security secrets. North Korea
may be driven more by the financial prospects of stealing customer
information than by seeking to narrow the gap in conventional militarycapability with Japan. The most well-known suspects of cyber attacks inJapan have been individuals in China. In some of the most prominent
cases, agents in China allegedly attacked the websites of the Ministryof Defense and Self-Defense Forces in 2015 and the travel agency JTB
the same year.
In 2016, the Diet amended the Cybersecurity Basic Law to give both the
Cybersecurity Strategic Headquarters in the Cabinet and the NISC thepower to monitor the security of government organizations and independent agencies. It allowed the NISC to delegate parts of its operations
to the Information-technology Promotion Agency (IPA), a government
entity responsible for protecting and nurturing a “reliable IT society.”5 The
same year, the Diet also amended the Law on Promotion of Information
Processing to create a new professional credential, “Information
Processing Security Supporter.” Applicants who qualify or who pass atest will register with the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry as
Information Processing Security Supporters and give advice to businesses
on cyber security.6
People in Japan have generally taken a balanced if careful approach tothese regulations. On the one hand, they understand that threats of cybersecurity are so serious that they need the government to play a central
role in working with the private sector to defend cyberspace, so they havegenerally accepted these laws. On the other hand, they often feel uncomfortable with the government conducting proactive, possibly aggressive
cyber operations overseas because of the concern that the government

68Building the Strategy of Deterrence in Cyberspace

might use such operations against Japanese nationals in the future. They
are also concerned about the possibility that the government may lose
personal information of the citizens to foreign hackers, making themeven more vulnerable to external infiltration, as a result of such offensive
operations.7 People’s desire at this point, therefore, tends to reflect the
government’s stance to strengthen defense, not offense. The predisposition toward defense, however, is but one of the problems that I identify
below. More importantly, these cyber attacks have failed to make Japan
get real defense of its own. The pace of Japan’s defense growth has not
stopped Chinese attacks.

Identifying the Problems
The main cause of Japan’s inability to effectively address its cyber vulnerability is the combination of inadequate defense and lack of effective
response. The first problem is that Japan’s response has been inadequate
to stop foreign attacks. Even as Japan seeks to augment its defense, itdoes not have instruments to deter adversaries effectively. International
relations (IR) scholar Kenneth Waltz once wrote that “purely defensive
forces provide no deterrence. They offer no means of punishment.”8 Oneof the fundamental reasons why Japan’s cyber deterrence is not keeping up
with outside developments is that it does not take action or have means
to deter cyber attacks. For deterrence strategy to work, Japan needs tosend credible signals to potential attackers that it has the ability to punish
them.9 IR scholar Joseph Nye discusses the availability of four such instruments: punishment, denial by defense, entanglement, and normative
taboos. Punishment strategy is to impose unbearable costs on adversaries
to deter future attacks. Denial by defense is to deny target capability bystrengthening defense. Entanglement is to dissuade adversarial attacks
by sharing a web of interdependence—areas of common ground liketrade and mutual investment—with the target to raise the cost of attacks.
Finally, normative taboos can be established by generating a culture of
behavior where cyber attacks are socially not accepted.1069

Nori Katagiri

Of the four strategies, Japan has heavily engaged in denial by defense
and entanglement. On the one hand, efforts at denial by defense are an
important part of defense,11 but it is inadequate in cyber space whereattackers have an advantage over defense. As long as that offensive advantage continues, Japan’s deterrent capability will remain behind. On theother hand, the strategy of entanglement has certainly facilitated Japan’s
trade and investment relations with a number of countries, including
those that undermine Japan’s national security, but it has not dissuaded
such attackers. In contrast, Japan has comparatively underused the strategies of punishment and normative taboos. The former would require
Japan to be capable of imposing unbearable costs on the target. The latter
requires efforts to institutionalize the cyber taboo on the international
stage. According to Nye, “normative considerations can deter actions
by imposing reputational costs that can damage an actor’s soft power
beyond the value gained from a given attack. Norms can impose costs
on an attacker even if the attack is not denied by defense and there is no
retaliation.”12 IR scholars Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink showthat the process to make a norm internationally accepted is complex andtime-consuming and involves a sufficient number of0 “norm entrepreneurs” who would play a central role in spreading, institutionalizing, andembedding the norms in the international community.13 Cyber norms
have yet to mature that way. The international community has not agreed
on even basic issues like what a cyber attack is and why it is bad.14 A
global leader in soft power, Japan has not taken the lead in this respectwhen the stakes are high.
The other problem lies with Japan’s limited ability to influence international public opinion against cyber offenses. Ever since Japan has become
a victim of cyber attacks, the international media has tended to highlightits inability to defend its cyber space. Most mass media point to Japanas an inept victim of cyber attacks, trying to do something about it but
unable to do so. This characterization further undermines Japan’s cyberdefense. That is, the more media describe Japan as a passive and reactive
cyber warrior, the more attacks it is likely to get. Unless Japan undertakes

70Building the Strategy of Deterrence in Cyberspace

an effective response to change its image, it is likely to get more attacks.
Additionally, Japan has so far failed to mobilize the international community in generating a norm of counter-attacks on cyber hacktivists.

Policy Recommendations
Within the current strategic and legal frameworks, making policy recommendations that will work is not an easy task. I acknowledge that making
recommendations in general is easier said than done. Furthermore, recommendations made at one point may get old quickly because cyberweapons are developing on a daily basis. Additionally, it is importantto remember that defense, attack, and deterrence need not be confinedto the cyber world, but can occur much more broadly. As Nye notes, a
response to a cyber-attack need not be by cyber means any more thana response to a land attack need be by the army rather than naval or air
forces. Hitting a suspected attacker with missile retaliation could theoretically be a response to cyber attacks. Thus, cross-domain deterrenceis possible.15 Given all these considerations, I limit the scope of policy
recommendation to actions related to cyber deterrence.
First, Japan needs an effective deterrence strategy in cyber space. Granted,
Nye points out that of all the nuclear strategy concepts, deterrence theory
is probably the least transferable to cyber war. Deterrence is what Japanneeds, however, because defense has been inadequate and more expensive
than deterrence. To deter enemies, Japan has to develop offensive cybercapability to preemptively undermine enemy capabilities and impose
tremendous costs on adversaries before it gets attacked. Research has
demonstrated that it is possible to incorporate offensive cyber operations
into conventional deterrence strategies. An advantage in this approachis that Japan will not necessarily be breaking its own law, because cyber
operations do not necessarily violate the constitutional ban on the use offorce. Since there is no law that allows Japan to do this, however, Japan will
be better off passing a law enabling it to do so. Security expert Michael
Fischerkeller argues that there are four ways for countries to conduct

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offensive cyber activities: specific intrusion with autonomous malware,
specific intrusion, generic intrusion, and generic actions.16
Of the four, the first three are theoretically plausible, but not realistic forJapan at this moment. First, what Fischerkeller calls the “specific intrusion
with autonomous malware” is similar to the 2010 Stuxnet attack that
Israel and the United States used on Iran to severely slow down Tehran’s
nuclear weapons development programs. The method would be designed
to influence a targeted process on Japan’s own timeline; it does not requirecommand and control directly because the virus can operate within target
bodies on its own. If Japan learns the skill to acquire this attack method,
it would drastically boost Japan’s ability to deter attackers in the future.
Yet, there is a high technical hurdle to cross to gain skills to do this, andthis type of activity would be beyond what Japan’s general public canaccept. Second, what Fischerkeller calls the “specific intrusion” method
is less aggressive than the first, exemplified by the BlackEnergy malware
attacks, a Trojan known to have been used in attacks on Ukraine power
providers that caused a massive outage in 2015. The difference from thefirst method is that this method can put its duration, intensity, and visibility subject to Japan’s own command and control system, requiringa generally constant watch to ensure operations. This is still too high ahurdle for Japan, as it requires highly skilled cyber activists. Third, the“generic intrusion” method is similar to the so-called ILOVEYOU worm
attack in the Philippines in 2000. Unlike the previous two methods, thisone has lesser impact on target intelligence capability and is not capableof influencing a target process but it does allow the attacker to show off
its capability.
Finally, what Fischerkeller calls a “generic attack” is generally equivalent to a set of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, a massive
amount of traffic that floods the victim’s computer networks to shut it
down temporarily. This is the least aggressive method of the four and themost realistic one for Japan to adopt—for now—for the sake of deterrence. It is also likely the most common method that cyber activists in72

Building the Strategy of Deterrence in Cyberspace

China have adopted when attacking Japan. The advantage of using thismethod is that it does not intrude on the target system, has low impact
on target intelligence capability, and will not influence a targeted process.
It is also a good choice because Japan can conduct cyber attacks throughreversible damage.17 DDOS attacks would not boost Japan’s deterrent
power either immediately or drastically, but it will be an important step
toward establishing a starting line for deterrence and, if necessary, raising the level of such aggressive moves. Yet it is important to know thelimits of punishment strategy. Retaliatory threats of cyber punishment
are less likely to be effective, Nye cautions, because the identity of theattack is uncertain. The well-known attribution problem is that it is difficult—if not impossible—to know the origin of the attacker and to holdthe attacker responsible. As a result, punishment will not play as large arole in Japan’s strategies. However, it remains a crucial part of the dissuasion equation in cyberspace.18 A range of proven retaliatory capabilities
will make Japan’s deterrence more robust. However, it is important tonote that I am not necessarily recommending the Japanese government
conduct preemptive cyber attacks per se and be public about it. Rather, myrecommendation is instead to encourage the government to work closelywith the private sector and other interested parties to jointly develop thecapability to make its deterrence more robust, certainly robust enoughto deter adversaries from conducting as many cyber attacks as before.
My aim here is to clarify options for more effective deterrent strategies,
rather than advocate them.
Second, Japan needs a well-organized public affairs strategy to generate
and then institutionalize a global taboo against cyber preemption. There
are two parts to such a strategy. The first part is the establishment of anational advertisement structure, preferably on a centralized governmentrun webpage where the Japanese government will widely report incidents
of successful defense against cyber attacks. The government logs selectsamples of successful defense against attacks and selectively makes public
information on attacks, origin, time, frequency, and type of such attacks.
Of course, disclosure of such attacks will not be immediate; it will take73

Nori Katagiri

time to accurately collect, analyze, and disseminate data and determine
the origins of malicious activities. A large number of cyber-attacks occur
every year against all sorts of targets in Japan, making it difficult for thegovernment to select which incidents to disseminate in a timely manner.
There is a danger that publication of successful results would give potential
attackers information on what has and has not worked for the government
and provide useful information for future attack directions. As a result,what can be made public must be based on close analysis and accompanied by a disclaimer that information is selective and only non-sensitive
materials are shared. Accordingly, it is recommended that the government
take enough time to collect information and ascertain accuracy of theinformation before it disseminates it. After all, the aim of this programis to deter future attacks by showing how the government manages toreduce vulnerability and defend itself. The other part of the public affairs
strategy is to establish a multilateral community where such reports will
be accumulated and shared with other countries. In addition to building
a national advertisement program, I believe that multilateral methods
with similar-minded nations will make it far more effective. Of course,
this part must follow the first part of building the advertisement structure,
because without an adequate national PR foundation, Japan would not
be able to lead other states to join it.
In so doing, Japan must be discreet with what information to announceand share. Four types of actions and inactions are summarized in Table
1 below. On the one hand, Japan should announce cases of successful
defensive operations as they arise to the global audience using government webpages, social media, and other media channels. To do so would
help Tokyo convey to a global audience that it has increased its ability to
defend its cyber space and persuade potential attackers that their aggressiveness will not work as well as before. Of course, this risks emboldening
otherwise disinterested cyber hacktivists into attacking Japan, but it also
benefits government strategy because it allows Tokyo to improve its negative image and instead show its ability to deny enemy attacks by defense
and establish normative taboos against cyber preemption.

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Building the Strategy of Deterrence in Cyberspace

Table 1. Types of public affairs strategy
Actions

Types of cases

JustificationDoannounce

Successful defensive
operations

To do so will allow Japan to demonstrate its
ability to defend cyberspace and deter enemies

Do notannounce

Failed defense

Announcement would reinforce Japan’s imageof having weak defense and invite more attacks

Successful offensive
operations

Announcement would put Japan in an aggressive
light when it is trying to discourage offensive
attacks and build a norm against them

Failed offensive
operations

Announcement would show the limits of Japan’s
cyber offensive capability and reduce its ability
to deter future attacks

On the other hand, Japan should consider refraining from announcing
three types of incidents because the net effects of such announcement
would be negative: (1) those of failed defense, (2) those of successful
offensive operations, and (3) those of failed offensive operations. The
first kind (incidents of failed defense) should not be announced widely
because information about failed defense efforts would reinforce Japan’s
image of having weak defense and invite more attacks. The second kind(incidents of successful offensive operations) should not be announced
widely, either, because that would put Japan in an aggressive light andconvey a bad image when it is actually trying to discourage offensive
attacks. Finally, the third kind (incidents of failed offensive operations)should not be announced widely because that would show the limits ofJapan’s cyber offensive capability. While the public has a right to know
these incidents, news of these incidents will help embolden potential
attackers to do more than they have done. The “don’t announce” category
is more important than the “do announce” category because it is moredifficult to control the current hyper-media environment once information gets out. Thus, the Japanese government must work closely with mass
media when it selects what kind of incidents it will report.

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Nori Katagiri

Conclusion
In this paper, I discussed the state of affairs in Japan’s response to cyberattacks. Second, I identified a set of problems associated with the response.
Finally, I offered a set of policy recommendations to mitigate Japan’s cybervulnerability. In so doing, I have stressed the importance of making cyberdefense more robust and finding new means of cyber deterrence. I havealso explored several ways for Japan to acquire instruments of strategic
deterrence against future cyber attacks. The analysis produces a set ofpolicy recommendations for Japan to deter cyber attacks for the future.
One is to gain skills to conduct cyber attacks in order to deter adversarial
actions and explore options at various levels of aggressiveness. The otherrecommendation is for Japan to establish a national public affairs office
to demonstrate its ability to defend freedom in cyber space and lead aninternational effort to build an institution where countries share information about types of attacks and ideas to mitigate them in the future. Taking
these steps will neither be easy nor make cyber insecurity disappear, butthey provide a hope that the international community can see a better
future in cyber space. n

Chapter Endnotes
1

Internet World Stats, June 30, 2017, http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm.

2

Nori Katagiri, “Between Structural Realism and Liberalism: Japan’s Threat Perception
and Response,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 19, No. 4 (Fall 2018).

3

Paul Kallender and Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s Emerging Trajectory as a ‘Cyber
Power’: From Securitization to Militarization of Cyberspace,” Journal of Strategic
Studies, Vol. 40, Nos 1–2 (2017), p. 123.

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Building the Strategy of Deterrence in Cyberspace

4

Reuters, Japan’s defense industry hit by its first cyber attack (September 18, 2011).

5

Information-technology Promotion Agency, https://www.ipa.go.jp/english/about/
about.html.

6

Library of Congress, Japan: Cyber Security Basic Act & Information
Processing Promotion Act Amended, Global Legal Monitor (Washington, DC:
Library of Congress, 2016), http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/
japan-cyber-security-basic-act-information-processing-promotion-act-amended/.

7

For public opinion surveys, see Cabinet Office, Government Of Japan,「治安に関する世論調査」の概要, 2017, https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/tokubetu/h29/h29-chian.
pdf.

8Scott Sagan and Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate(New York: W.W. Norton, 2013), p. 5.

9Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).

10 Joseph Nye, “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” International Security, Vol.
41, No. 3 (Winter 2016/17).
11 Robert Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1996).
12 Nye, “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” p. 60.
13 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change,” International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Autumn 1998).
14 For a latest international effort of this kind, see Michael Schmitt, Tallinn Manual 2.0
on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017).
15 I thank Arthur Alexander for raising this important point.
16 Michael Fischerkeller, “Incorporating Offensive Cyber Operations into Conventional
Deterrence Strategies,” Survival, Vol. 59, No. 1 (February-March 2017).
17 Fischerkeller writes that “Offensive cyber operations must remain under the commandand control of its originator and inflict damage of only limited visibility. The target
should be a system that plays an important role in a low-visibility process valued by
the adversary, the exploitation of which imposes costs that are high enough that thetarget cannot simply tolerate the operations, but at the same time not so severe thatits response is to terminate the system’s operation.” Fischerkeller, “Incorporating
Offensive Cyber Operations into Conventional Deterrence Strategies,” p. 120.
18 Nye, “Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace,” p. 55.

77

The Myth of LDP Dominance under
Abe: Komeito, Coalition Politics,
and Why It Matters for Japan’s
Security Policy
Adam P. Liff *S

ince Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s impressive political resurrection in late 2012—following three rare years for his conservative
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the political wilderness—the LDPKomeito ruling coalition has steamrolled a fractious opposition to fiveconsecutive national election victories. Coming immediately on theheels of a “revolving door” of a half-dozen prime ministers in six years(2006–2012), Abe’s now six-year-old administration stands out as exceptionally stable. He is already Japan’s longest-serving prime minister since1972. Despite major headwinds owing to a festering scandal concerning a
discounted sale of public land to a controversial private academy with ties
to the first family, the ruling coalition’s “landslide” October 2017 election
result prompted the latest round of influential commentary declaring that
Abe is Japan’s “strongest and most successful leader in the postwar era.”1
Indeed, the LDP’s repeated electoral success under Abe, together withhis own prime ministership’s longevity and relatively stable popularity
since 2012, appear to have given his administration a powerful mandate* The author thanks Arthur Alexander, Margo Grimm Eule, Ko Maeda, and Sheila Smithfor feedback on an earlier version of this article.

79Adam P. L iff

to carry out his ambitious agenda: including pushing through major
economic structural reforms, transforming Japan’s security and foreign
policy, and amending for the first time Japan’s 1947 constitution’s Article
9 “Peace Clause”—which renounces war and the threat or use of force tosettle international disputes.2
No stranger to bold rhetoric, in the foreign policy domain Abe early
on declared that “Japan is back” as a “first-tier nation.” Throughout
his tenure and repeatedly this spring, he has called revision of Japan’s
never-amended constitution an “historic task” necessary for “national
rebirth” and an end to the post-war “regime” he and many fellow conservative LDP Diet members have long identified as shackling Japan
since World War II.3 With the 2020 Olympics rapidly approaching, onconstitutional revision and other key policy priorities Abe has deemed2018 “a year of action.”4
Yet if one looks beyond the headlines and rhetoric to focus instead on
the ability of Abe and his allies to implement its coveted policy priorities,
especially in the security domain, the domestic political constraints on
the administration appear far more significant than much of the public
discourse about Abe’s and LDP “strength” would suggest. Significant
concessions made thus far on matters central to his national security
agenda, such as collective self-defense, coupled with the fact that Abe
continues to proceed so cautiously on constitutional revision and othercore objectives the LDP has championed and campaigned on for, literally,
decades, carry significant policy implications. That the administration’schary approach persists today despite Abe enjoying the ruling coalition’sLower House supermajority – now maintained over two election cycles—and a supra-partisan super-majority of “pro-constitutional revision
forces” in the Upper House since 2016 presents a clear puzzle.
After nearly six years in power, and despite a now five-time electoral
renewal of what appears to be a powerful domestic political mandate,
what explains the Abe government’s inability to achieve constitutional

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The My th of LDP D ominance under Abe

revision and a more radical security policy reform agenda the prime
minister transparently covets?
The question is hardly academic: Understanding the less conspicuous
domestic political headwinds his government confronts on the security
front is critical to assessing the significance of his administration so far, as
well as prospects for major change in the years ahead. In particular, withimperial abdication (April 2019) and the 2020 Olympics over the horizon,
if he wants to revise Article 9 to enable more fundamental security policy
reforms—a goal he has expressed repeatedly—Abe is running out of time,even if he survives his current political difficulties and is elected to a third
term as LDP president in September.5
In deciding whether and how to move forward, Abe faces one of themost significant domestic political dilemmas of his career.6 Central tohis calculations will be one inconspicuous yet hugely important factor:
Komeito, the LDP’s small and pacifist junior coalition partner, whichenjoys significant leverage over Abe’s (much) larger party on key issues
greatly exceeding its actual Diet strength.

A Deceptively Limited Mandate
Abe’s second prime ministership has coincided with gradual but transformative changes to Japan’s strategic environment. According to Abe, “thesecurity environment surrounding Japan is its most severe since WorldWar II.”7 The administration’s most urgent concern is North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear weapons and missile programs, including missile
testing that has accelerated significantly under Kim Jong Un. In 2017,
Pyongyang threatened to strike Japan and U.S. bases in the region; carried out its first-ever test of a thermonuclear weapon; tested two ICBMs
it claimed could hit Washington, D.C.; and launched missiles both into
Japan’s exclusive economic zone and which overflew Japanese territory.
Beyond North Korea, seen from Tokyo other security concerns also challenge Japan’s current policies, in particular: China’s growing military and81Adam P. L iff

paramilitary (especially coast guard) capabilities and apparent willingness to use operational and economic levers to coerce Japan and otherneighbors, and qualitatively new security threats in the gray zone, cyber,and space domains.
These external developments, in turn, have accelerated a longer-term
post-cold war trend significantly predating Abe: the gradual opening ofdomestic political space as the long-time major anti-LDP political forces
have shifted from a more ideological, pacifist left to a moderate, pragmatic
center-left. This shift manifests itself most conspicuously in support acrossthe major political parties—including from the (now defunct) erstwhileleading opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) during its three years
in power (2009–2012)—for evolutionary expansion of the roles, missions,capabilities, and authorities for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), within
and beyond a U.S.-Japan alliance context.8
To be sure, under Abe these trends have enabled important security policy
shifts. Since 2012, chief among these is the Cabinet’s successful effort topush through a 2014 “reinterpretation” of Article 9 to allow “limited”
exercise of collective self-defense, effectively overturning sixty years ofgovernment policy.9 This shift, in turn, paved the way for a major package of security legislation in 2015, which came into effect the following
year.10 Faced with a rapidly changing regional security picture, to many
security experts in Tokyo and Washington such changes to Japan’s security
posture are long overdue.11
Such global headline-making developments are undoubtedly significant
in any practical sense. Yet often lost in the noise are two important signals:
First, practically speaking, these changes are incremental; evolutionary
rather than revolutionary. Major, largely self-imposed constraints on
Japan’s ability to develop JSDF capabilities, much less allow it to employ
kinetic force, within and beyond an alliance context, persist.12 Second,
Abe and his allies have repeatedly dialed back their policy ambitions
owing to intense political pushback, often behind the scenes. The resulting82

The My th of LDP D ominance under Abe

policy concessions, in turn, expose a significant political reality: that theadministration enjoys a far weaker political mandate than the idea of Abe
as a dominant leader or the LDP’s post-2012 success in national elections
would suggest. Domestic politics has repeatedly compelled pragmaticand practically significant restraint—even on the administration’s top
policy priorities.
With actual revision of Article 9—a fundamental objective of the LDP
since its 1955 establishment—now on the docket for 2018, understanding the roots of the administration’s cautiousness is crucial to assessing
prospects for major change.

Coalition Politics and Komeito’s Constraining Role
Fundamental to the political calculations informing the Abe administration’s cautious approach on security policy and constitutional revision
has been its junior coalition partner: Komeito.
In a fateful, opportunistic step aimed at ending a divided Diet in 1999,
the conservative LDP controversially invited Komeito, its ideological,
political, and pacifist nemesis theretofore, to rule in coalition.13 Excluding
the three years both were in the wilderness (2009–2012), this political
odd couple has governed Japan ever since—in a remarkably stable coalition, and with extremely close cooperation in every national election
campaign. Continuing into the Abe era, the benefits for both are clear.
Most recently, in last October’s election, the coalition partners retained
a two-thirds supermajority in the powerful Lower House.
Remarkably, despite Abe’s LDP consistently accounting for over 85 percent of the coalition’s Diet strength, less than 3 percent of Japanese votersidentifying Komeito as their party of choice, and Komeito politicians
averaging less than 7 percent of Lower House Diet seats, the smaller party
has repeatedly extracted hugely consequential policy concessions (seebelow) from its ostensibly dominate senior coalition partner. As noted

83Adam P. L iff

above, this remarkable deference has continued despite five consecutive
and decisive national election victories under Abe’s leadership, to say
nothing of the LDP’s single party Lower House majority (currently 61
percent of seats).
Why, exactly, does Abe’s LDP, unabashedly revisionist on constitutionaland security matters, continue to tolerate a costly coalition with thepacifistic, status-quo-oriented Komeito—a small minority party which
repeatedly frustrates its policy ambitions?
Though the LDP numerically dominates the coalition’s Diet seats, notwidely appreciated outside Japan is that a significant minority of LDP
Diet members actually depend on Komeito to get elected. The net effectof this electoral dependence is that the much larger LDP faces powerful intra-coalition headwinds when its own policy objectives clash withthose of its junior coalition partner. Given Komeito’s largely lay-Buddhist,pacifist base, security affairs (especially Article 9) are particularly salientissues to party leaders. The net effect is that despite its size, Komeito
can punch significantly above its weight in intra-coalition negotiations
on defense matters—in key cases effectively exercising a virtual vetobehind-the-scenes.
The specific secret to Komeito’s disproportionate influence lies in a strange
electoral codependence induced by Japan’s electoral system, as well as theparty’s unique ability to rally its supporters to the polls. Here’s the rub:Over the past two decades, these strange political bedfellows have becomeso reliant on mutual stand-down agreements for their candidates to getelected in single-member districts that a critical mass of each party’s
Diet members would probably be out of a job without the other’s help.
Case-in-point: in the critical 2014 general election immediately prior to
the Abe government’s major overhaul of security legislation the following
year, votes from Komeito supporters in single-member districts where
the smaller party agreed not to run a candidate put as many as fifty-nine
LDP candidates over the top.14

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The My th of LDP D ominance under Abe

Why LDP-Komeito Codependence Matters forJapan’s Security Policy
As noted above, this electoral dependence on Komeito can be particularly
costly to Abe and the LDP on issues highly salient to Komeito’s pacifistic
support base: above all, security policy.
Komeito’s ability to tie the LDP’s hands in the security domain is not new.
It has manifested previously when past LDP prime ministers pursued
major, unprecedented security policy shifts—e.g., efforts to enable Japan
Self-Defense Force (JSDF) participation in peacekeeping operations in the
1990s, before the coalition even existed, or as the Koizumi administration
sought ways to “show the flag” in support of U.S. military operations
after 9/11.15
But as electoral cooperation has deepened in the new millennium, candidates from each party have become increasingly reliant on support fromthe other’s supporters.16 One consequence is that since 2012 Komeito
has become the most direct force compelling Abe and his allies to significantly dial back their most high-profile security policy ambitions.
Without Komeito support in 2014, for example, the LDP probably would
not have had the single party-majority that granted it crucial leverageover summer 2015’s historic, controversial security legislation.17 Less
conspicuously, concessions to Komeito behind-the-scenes appear tohave significantly watered down the historic 2014 Cabinet Resolution“reinterpreting” Japan’s constitution to allow limited exercise of collective
self-defense. A more recent case is Abe’s formal plan—first announced
in May 2017—for revising Article 9 by 2020.18
In the former instance, LDP-Komeito negotiations behind-the-scenes
deboned the 2014 Cabinet Resolution formally “reinterpreting” Article 9
to enable “collective self-defense” operations: basically, the UN Chartersanctioned right to use force to aid an ally suffering armed attack. So
significant were LDP concessions that Abe, ignoring the recommendation

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Adam P. L iff

of his own advisory panel, abandoned a push to allow collective security operations (à la Operation Desert Storm in the 1991 Persian Gulf
War). Meanwhile, lost in the noise regarding the fact of the Abe government’s reinterpretation itself was the signal of its actual substance: Abe’s
original goal—rendering constitutional full exercise of Japan’s collective
self-defense right under international law—proved politically infeasible.
More to the point—what emerged was an enabling of a “limited” exerciseof collective self-defense severely limited by three internationally exceptional, strict conditions heavily shaped by Komeito.19
In the case of Abe administration’s Article 9 revision proposal, despite
years of talk and the centrality to the LDP’s platform since 1955 of fundamental rewriting of Article 9, what Abe ultimately proposed in May
2017 shocked key leaders in his own party for its lack of ambition andthe extent to which it bore no resemblance to the LDP’s own 2012 proposal—negotiated when they were in the opposition (and out of coalition
with Komeito).20 Indeed, Abe’s 2017 proposal bore an uncanny resemblance to a Komeito party proposal from 2004. Abandoning (at least
for now) a sixty-year-old LDP goal of fundamentally revising Article 9
itself, Abe ultimately called only for the addition of a new third clausemerely recognizing the constitutionality of Japan’s sixty-four-year-old
Self-Defense Forces. Shigeru Ishiba, a multi-time cabinet minister and—most likely—one of Abe’s leading challengers for the LDP presidency thisSeptember, has openly opposed the plan, judging it a major departurefrom the party’s longstanding position on constitutional revision.21 In
case there was any doubt why things played out this way, Abe reportedly
explained his decision not to even attempt to eliminate Article 9’s second
clause as due to Komeito resistance, stating “It would never get throughKomeito. It’s impossible.”22
Even despite Abe’s effective adoption of Komeito’s own Article 9 revision
proposal, recent reports suggest Komeito is nevertheless slow-walking
the constitutional revision effort.23

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The My th of LDP D ominance under Abe

These two high-profile policy concessions are remarkable not only becauseof Abe’s repeated identification of these goals as his top personal priorities
but also because of their status—literally—as foundational LDP objectives written into the Party’s 1955 establishing charter.24 They reveal thecentral, if often inconspicuous, role played by the LDP’s junior coalition
partner in constraining Abe (and LDP) ambitions in the security domain.

Takeaways
Since Abe’s remarkable return to the prime ministership in 2012, muchof the discourse has focused disproportionately on the rhetoric andalleged personal ambitions of the prime minister himself. Together witha widespread penchant among observers to privilege conspicuous metrics
such as cabinet support rates—and even Diet seat totals—when accessing the administration’s (often ambiguously-defined) “strength,” thistendency frequently distracts from the issue of primary importance forpolicymakers: the practically significant but incremental nature of actualchanges to Japan’s security policy over the past six years, especially whenbaselined against transformative changes under way in Japan’s security
environment. It also tends to overlook powerful, yet often inconspicuous
domestic political constraints the Abe administration confronts daily inthe formation of national security policy.
Despite the headlines heralding the ruling coalition’s admittedly remarkable string of electoral successes, its supermajority in the Lower House,
the relatively high support rates for the Abe cabinet, and the fact that“pro-revision” forces make up two-thirds of the Upper House, the prime
minister and his party continue to face stiff domestic political headwinds
in their efforts to revise Article 9 and transform Japan’s security posture.
Beyond the Komeito factor, the Abe government also seems well awarethat other metrics also suggest its mandate is not as robust as Diet seat
totals would suggest—especially on issues of high salience to voters andwhere public opinion can be widely variant, such as security policy andconstitutional revision.

87Adam P. L iff

For one thing, this is not Abe’s father’s LDP: since 1992 LDP-specific support has plummeted from over 50 percent of voters to less than 20 percent
by 2012—and unaffiliated voters now make up a majority of the electorate.25 Remarkably, the LDP’s vote share in proportional representation
districts was only slightly higher in its landslide election victory (2012)
than its landslide election defeat three years earlier; demonstrating theextent to which its representation in the Diet is at least a partial artifact oflower turnout.26 Indeed, historically low voting participation across all age
groups and apparent widespread public disillusionment with their choices
must also be factored in.27 According to one recent poll, even among theroughly 46 percent of voters who supported the Abe cabinet, half did soonly because they saw no alternative.28 In sum, though elections havegiven Abe robust LDP support within the Diet building itself, these otherfactors further urge caution—especially about pursuing more ambitious
measures that could embolden an opposition party or compromise the
LDP’s very advantageous cooperation in national elections with Komeito.
In sum, Abe’s mandate is more fragile than much of the discourse would
suggest. To a large extent it is because of, rather than despite, Komeito
support that the LDP enjoys the Diet strength it has today. And as thelandslide elections of 2009 and 2012 showed, voter preferences can behighly volatile. For advocates of a fundamental transformation of Japan’s
defense posture, the analysis herein should be sobering. Regardless of thefractiousness of Japan’s formal opposition, Abe’s ambitions are powerfully constrained by a junior partner able to punch significantly above
its weight and yielding a virtual veto inside the ruling coalition. Barring
an unexpected collapse of the ruling coalition, major structural change,
or a large-scale military crisis, even if the opposition remains weak andAbe stays in power through 2021—two bigger ifs today than just a few
months ago—Komeito alone is likely to continue to function as a powerful“brake” on Abe and LDP ambitions in the security domain. n

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The My th of LDP D ominance under Abe

Chapter Endnotes
1

For example, see Ian Bremmer, “Shinzo Abe’s Big Win in Japan Gives Him
Time to Make History,” Time, October 26, 2017. http://time.com/4998275/
abe-win-japan-election-history/.

2

CHAPTER II, RENUNCIATION OF WAR, Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war
as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settlinginternational disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph,land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The
right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized. https://japan.kantei.go.jp/
constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html .

3Shinzo Abe, “Japan is Back” (Speech) (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic andInternational Studies, February 22, 2013) http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/
abe/us_20130222en.html; “Shinzo Abe calls for Japan’s ‘rebirth’ in 2020 along withconstitutional revision,” Japan Times, December 19, 2017.

4“2018 seen as make-or-break year for Abe’s constitutional revision quest,” Japan Times,
January 1, 2018.

5

Abe’s ability to win a third term in September is less assured than it appeared to many
only a few months ago. Tobias Harris, “Scandal raises doubts about Abe’s ability to
win a third term,” Japan Political Pulse, March 16, 2018. https://spfusa.org/category/japan-political-pulse/.

6

Japan Times, January 1, 2018.

7

Shusho Kantei, “Abe Naikaku Sori Daijin nento kisha kaiken” [“Prime Minister
Abe’s New Year Address”], January 4, 2018, https://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/
statement/2018/0104kaiken.html.

8Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary,” The Washington
Quarterly, 38, no. 2: 79–99.

9Defense of Japan 2014 (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2014), 125–127, http://www.mod.
go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2014/DOJ2014_2–2–1_web_1031.pdf; “Cabinet Decisionon Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival andProtect its People,” July 1, 2014 (Tokyo: Cabinet of Japan, 2014), https://www.cas.
go.jp/jp/gaiyou/jimu/pdf/anpohosei_eng.pdf.

10 Satoru Mori, “The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction,” Tokyo
Foundation, December 2, 2015, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/
security-legislation-and-public-reaction.

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Adam P. L iff

11 Sheila A. Smith, “Japan’s Military Reforms are Long Overdue,” Room for Debate(New York Times), August 20, 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/08/18/should-japan-allow-its-military-to-fight-in-foreign-wars/
japans-military-reforms-are-long-overdue.
12 Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy.”
13 “A Sect’s Political Rise Creates Uneasiness in Japan,” New York Times, November
14, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/14/world/a-sect-s-political-rise-createsuneasiness-in-japan.html; For a seminal review of all things Komeito, see Ehrhardt,
George, Klein, Axel, McClaughlin, Levi, Reed, Steven R., (eds.), Kōmeitō: Politics
and Religion in Japan (Berkeley, Calif: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2014).
14 One recent study argues that without mutual stand-down agreements and Komeito
supporters’ votes, the LDP would have lost as many as a quarter of the single-member
districts it won. Adam P. Liff and Ko Maeda, “Explaining a Durable Coalition ofStrange Bedfellows: Evidence from Japan,” Working Paper, 2017.
15 J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional
Reform in Japan. (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2005), esp. 27–61.
16 Liff and Maeda, “Explaining a Durable Coalition of Strange Bedfellows.”
17 Satoru Mori, “The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction,” Tokyo
Foundation, December 2, 2015, http://www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2015/
security-legislation-and-public-reaction.
18 Liff and Maeda, “Explaining a Durable Coalition of Strange Bedfellows.”
19 Adam P. Liff, “Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and the Politics ofJapan’s Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations,” Asia Policy, 24 (2017): 139–172.
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/free/ap24/AsiaPolicy24_Liff_July2017.pdf.
20 “Former defense chief courts controversy by questioning Abe plan to revise
Constitution,” Japan Times, May 24, 2017.
21 Ibid.
22 Mainichi Shimbun, October 12, 2017.
23 “Komeito, Kaiken Sakiokuri no Shinbo Enryo ka?”, Nikkei Shimbun Online, April 3,
2018. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXMZO28968080T00C18A4EA1000/.
24 Liberal Democratic Party, “To no Seiko,” November 15, 1955, https://www.jimin.jp/
aboutus/declaration/100285.html.
25 Tanaka Aiji, “Japan’s Independent Voters: Yesterday and Today,” Nippon.com, July 18,
2012, https://www.nippon.com/en/in-depth/a01104/ . It appears, however, that LDP
support has increased since this study was published. In January 2018 NHK reported
38 percent of voters supported the LDP.

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The My th of LDP D ominance under Abe

26 Ko Maeda, “Explaining the Surges and Declines of the Japanese Communist
Party,” Asian Survey 57, no. 4 (2017), 686.
27 The 2012 election that returned Abe to power marked a postwar nadir of 59.32
percent. This record was then broken in 2014, when turnout plummeted to 52.66
percent—a seventeen-point drop from 2009. “Kokusei senkyo no tohyoritsu nosuii ni tsuite” Somusho, September 2016, http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000255919.pdf ; “Kokusei senkyo no nendai betsu tohyoritsu no suii nit
suite, Somusho, September 2016, http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/
news/sonota/nendaibetu/index.html.
28 “NHK poll: Cabinet support rate at 46%,” NHK, January 9, 2017, https://www3.
nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/en/news/20180109_32/.

91

The Enigma of Shinzo Abe’s Long
Tenure and How His Success
Can Undermine His Party’s
Dominant Position
Ko MaedaT

he electoral victory of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) in October 2017 is unprecedented. No
other prime minister in Japan’s constitutional history has led his party tothree consecutive victories in general elections, where victory is defined
as securing control of a majority of seats. The LDP was in opposition forthree years, but since its return to power in December 2012 with Abe as
the party leader, the LDP’s government has been remarkably stable. Thisis a curious contrast with the preceding six-year period (2006–2012) inwhich the country had six prime ministers. In this essay, I will discuss thispuzzle of long- and short-tenured prime ministers and point out that thestate of opposition parties is a major factor that created this pattern. I willfurther argue that opposition parties can greatly change the fate of the Abeadministration and explain how a possible constitutional amendment,
for which Abe has long been arguing, can—paradoxically—weaken the
LDP’s position in Japanese politics.

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Strong, but Unpopular?
The durability of Abe’s tenure is an enigma. Between 1993, when the LDP
lost power for the first time, and 2012, when Abe’s current tenure began,Japan had thirteen prime ministers. Their average tenure was only eighteenmonths, and five of them did not last for a year. In contrast, Abe is currently
the third longest-serving prime minister in the post-World War II era,and he will set a new record as the longest-serving prime minister in the
country’s constitutional history if he stays in office until November 2019.
What makes Abe’s tenure as prime minister even more enigmatic is thefact that he is not enjoying a high level of public support. During themonth preceding the October 2017 general election, the disapprovalrate of his cabinet was higher than the approval rate.1 However, the LDP
and its junior coalition partner Komeito were able to secure a two-thirds
majority in the election. Why? It is because the opposition forces are notunified to compete against the ruling coalition but are highly fragmented.
Nine opposition parties nominated candidates in the election. The largest opposition Democratic Party (DP) split into two shortly before theelection. As a result, many opposition candidates ran and consequently
divided anti-government votes, helping the LDP. In fact, 41 percent of
the LDP candidates who won their local district races did so with lessthan 50 percent of the votes. Fragmentation of the opposition parties waswhat gave the not-so-popular prime minister a resounding victory witha two-thirds majority of the seats.

Why Opposition is Fragmented
The asymmetric structure between a dominant ruling party and a fragmented opposition is not new but has been a key characteristic of Japan’s
party system for half a century. One of the factors that helped the LDP’s
one-party dominance was the opposition forces’ failure to form a unified
front. It has been widely argued and accepted that the electoral systemthat was used until the early-1990s facilitated opposition fragmentation

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The Enigma of Shinzo Abe’s L ong Tenure(Reed and Bolland 1999). After the introduction of the current electoral
system in 1994, the opposition became less fragmented, which eventuFigure 1. A simpified illustration of Japan’s party system
ally led to the historic alternation in power in the 2009 election. Yet, theopposition became fragmented again after the LDP’s return to power in
2012, still giving an electoral advantage to the LDP. Since the opposition
Left
Right
is
fragmented even with a new electoral system that favors
consolidation,
there must be a factor other than the electoral system that fragments the
opposition“Type A” in Japan.

“Type B”
opposition opposition
LDP
I arguethat disagreements
amongopposition
politicians on fundamental
partiesparties

policy issues are keeping the opposition fragmented. All of the opposition
parties are against the LDP, and all of the anti-LDP voters want the LDP tolose power, but they cannot be unified due to the differences amongst them.
Share views on, e.g.,
Figure 1 is an illustration of the basic structure of Japan’s party system. On
national defense policy
the right-wing side, there is the LDP (its partner Komeito is omitted to keep
the figure simple). The other side is the opposition, and it is divided into
two. At the far-left, there are parties such as the Japan Communist Party(JCP) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Let us call them the “TypeA” opposition parties. “Type B” parties are ones located between Type A
and the LDP. The line between the LDP and Type B is slanted, indicating
the fact that some of the Type B parties are not necessarily left-wing on the
traditional left-right spectrum (for example, the Ishin Party).

Figure 1. A simpified illustration of Japan’s party system
Figure 1. A simplified illustration of Japan’s party system
LEFT“Type A”
opposition
parties

RIGHT“Type B”
opposition
parties

LDP

Share views on, e.g., national defense policy95

Ko Maeda

Type A and Type B disagree on fundamental policy issues. In the past,
the socialism/capitalism divide was one of those issues, but it is no longer
relevant. Currently, the national defense policy is one of the prominent,
if not the only, issues that divide Type A and Type B. For example, thesecurity alliance with the United States which started in 1952 has been afoundation of the foreign and defense policies of the country since then.
The basic strategy of Japan’s national defense has been to stay under the
U.S. nuclear umbrella, but the “Type A” parties—the main opposition
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the smaller JCP—strongly disagreed withthe government’s strategy during the early years of the alliance. Then aType B party emerged. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) was founded
in 1960 and took a position closer to the LDP on the national defense
debate, and it was supported by voters who were located between Type A
and the LDP. While the JSP for many years maintained friendly relationships with communist countries such as the Soviet Union and China, theDSP was openly an anti-communist party. While the JSP kept arguing that
the Self-Defense Force (SDF) was unconstitutional, the DSP’s position
was that it was constitutional.
For the supporters of Type A parties, issues such as the U.S.-Japan allianceand the SDF were exactly what made them oppose the LDP governments.
Yet, for Type B party supporters, having the SDF and U.S. troops to defend
the country should not be a matter of a national debate but something on
which there should be a broad national consensus. Type B voters were
opposed to the LDP for some reasons, but they did not want a Type A
party’s government that might radically alter fundamental policies of
the country and strain the relationship with the United States. On thecontrary, for Type A voters, Type B parties are not true opposition parties
because they agree with the LDP on the issues that are most important
for Type A voters. Disagreements over the national defense policy havebeen a wedge splitting the opposition.

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Consequences of Opposition Fragmentation
The deep gap between Type A and Type B makes it hard for the oppositionin Japan to become a unified force. As demonstrated in Maeda (2010),
ruling parties’ electoral fortunes are influenced by the degree of opposition fragmentation. If there is a unified opposition party, voters see it asa clear, natural alternative to the government, making an anti-incumbent
vote swing easier. If there are many opposition parties, even when voterswant to punish the incumbent ruling party, they cannot find a viable
alternative that can serve as a convergence point of anti-incumbent votes.
The LDP, throughout its history, has enjoyed this advantage. Without acredible alternative, the LDP continued winning elections even when theparty and its leader were not particularly popular.2
The only time the non-LDP camp was somewhat unified was the period
from 2003 to 2012. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which had been
the largest opposition party since 1997, solidified its status as the only
viable alternative to the LDP in 2003 when it incorporated the second
largest opposition party, the Liberal Party, and increased its seat share in
the subsequent general election. After that election, the DPJ controlled
86 percent of the total opposition seats. The DPJ was unique in Japan’s
opposition history in that it contained both Type A and Type B elements. The DPJ was internally diverse, including left-wing politicians who
belonged to the JSP in the past and right-wing members who defectedfrom the LDP. As a result, it continually suffered from internal disputes,
and it was criticized by the media and opponents for being incoherent.
Although the DPJ was able to attract votes from both Type A voters andType B voters and finally defeat the LDP in 2009, containing conflicting
opinions within it ultimately became its weakness. The party suffereda split in July 2012, leading to a crushing defeat in the December 2012
general election. The non-LDP camp has been fragmented since then.
So-called “Third Force” parties, which positioned themselves as TypeB parties, obtained many seats in the 2012 election (see Reed 2013).
The DPJ’s successor party, the DP, split into two shortly before the 201797

Ko Maeda

election, as mentioned at the beginning of this essay. The two parties thatemerged out of the DP are a Type A party (Constitutional Democratic
Party) and a Type B party (Party of Hope). The dividing line between the
two types has become clear again.
Table 1. Contrasting periods of Japan’s party politics

2006
Unstable
period2012

P.M. & Ruling Party

Opposition

Abe
FukudaAso
Hatoyama
Kan
Noda

LDP

Unified (DPJ)

DPJ

Unified (LDP)

Abe

LDP

Fragmented

StableperiodAs mentioned at the beginning, Japan has had both long- and shorttenured prime ministers in recent years. I argue that this puzzle can be
explained by the composition of their respective opposition parties. As
shown in Table 1, the period from 2006 to 2012 was an unstable time thatsaw six prime ministers in as many years. In contrast, the period since2012 has been stable years in which Abe and his LDP kept winning inelections. The rightmost column of the table shows whether the opposition was unified or fragmented. As described above, the DPJ was the
only viable opposition from 2003 until it won power in 2009. The LDP
then went into the opposition and was the only viable opposition until it
returned to power in 2012. Therefore, the unstable period of 2006­–2012
was also the years with a unified opposition. In contrast, the post-2012
years of Abe’s dominance have seen fragmented opposition parties.

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When there is a strong, credible opposition party that can be a convergence point of anti-incumbent voting, ruling party politicians arein constant fear of losing in the next election. Unlike the old electoral
system under which individual politicians were able to maintain theirseats only with their local support bases, regardless of their parties’
popularity, the new system made electoral competition party-centeredand nationalized. This means that individual politicians’ electoral
fortunes are tied together and strongly influenced by their party leaders’ popularity (Maeda 2009). In this situation, incumbent politicians
inevitably become sensitive to their party leaders’ popularity. When aparty leader’s popularity declines, the members of his party become
concerned and may try to replace him with someone more popular.
This process occurred repeatedly during the 2006–12 period. I by nomeans intend to argue that all six prime ministers from 2006 to 2012
lost their positions solely for this reason, but I argue that it was one of
the main factors behind this series of short-tenured prime ministers.
All six of them experienced a sharp drop in their approval rates while
in office, and as their popularity declined, more members from theirown parties asked for their resignations. Among the six, Aso and Noda
did not lose their positions by pressure from within their parties but byelectoral defeats. Yet, there were failed attempts within their parties toreplace them before the elections (see Arase 2010 for the case for Aso
and Pekkanen and Reed 2013 for the case for Noda).
However, if the opposition is fragmented into many parties, ruling party
politicians’ elections become easier. Multiple opposition candidates divide
anti-incumbent votes, giving an advantage to ruling party candidates.
Thus, ruling party politicians in this situation do not become as sensitive to the prime minister’s popularity as they would become when the
opposition is unified. This explains why Abe, since 2012, does not facemuch pressure from within the LDP, even when his popularity declines.
There should be many reasons why Abe’s tenure since 2012 has beenstable, but opposition fragmentation must be one of them.3

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Will Article 9 Be Revised?
Based on the preceding discussions, I now turn to an explanation of how
a possible constitutional revision, for which Abe has long been arguing, could undermine the LDP’s dominant position in Japanese politics.
The current constitution, which was ratified in 1947 when the country
was still under occupation, has never been amended. How to view this
occupation-era constitution, and whether it should be revised or not,has been a major political issue. The contention surrounding this issue
divided political parties and citizens for a long time.
In particular, Article 9, which bans the possession of military forces, hasarguably been the most controversial political issue in Japan since the endof World War II. Most debates on the constitution center on this article,
and arguments for and against a “constitutional amendment” are usually
about Article 9. Left-wing activists and organizations say they want to“protect” the constitution, and their central focus is always on Article
9, which they say symbolizes the Japanese people’s determination for
eternal peace. On the contrary, right-wing people express their desire torevise the constitution, and Article 9 is always on their agenda. To them,
Article 9 is unrealistic, and as an independent country Japan must possess military forces to defend itself. The division of opinions on Article 9
roughly corresponds with the division between “Type A” and “Type B”
opposition parties illustrated in Figure 1. It is true that there have been
LDP politicians who were pro-Article 9, but it is undeniable that the LDP
as a whole has always made a constitutional revision one of its goals. The
current Type B opposition parties, which are the Party of Hope and the
Ishin Party, both advocate for a constitutional revision.4 In contrast, allthree Type A parties—the CDP, the JCP, and the SDP—strongly argued
against an Article 9 revision in their 2017 manifestos.5
Abe has long been a proponent of a revision of Article 9. Even before
becoming the prime minister, he was known as a hard-liner within the
LDP on foreign affairs (Park and Vogel 2007). As a result of the 2016100

The Enigma of Shinzo Abe’s L ong Tenure

Upper House election, the so-called “pro-revision” parties obtained twothirds majorities in both chambers of the Diet, clearing an important
hurdle for a constitutional revision. On May 3, 2017, Abe announced
a concrete plan for a constitutional revision. Unlike the LDP’s previous
proposals, which called for a complete revision of Article 9, Abe’s plan was
to preserve the two existing clauses and add another clause that stipulates
the SDF’s existence and constitutionality. Presumably, he reasoned that
adding a clause while keeping the rest would be easier to achieve thancompletely revising the entire article (see Liff and Maeda 2017). The LDP’s
manifesto for the 2017 election noted that it would seek a constitutional
revision that included a change to make the existence of the SDF explicit.6
Yet, many opinion polls show that public support for an Article 9 revision
is not high. An Asahi poll conducted right after the election in October
2017 shows that 45 percent of respondents oppose it, while only 36 percent support it.7 Since a majority in a national referendum is required
for a constitutional amendment, those poll results are not good news to
Abe. His plan to have a revised constitution promulgated in 2020 is notlooking very feasible as of now.

Constitutional Revision Can Erase the
LDP’s Advantage
Feasibility aside, let us consider what would happen if an amendment of
Article 9 were actually achieved. Its biggest and most immediate consequence would probably not be on Japan’s defense system or its foreign
relations. Rather, it would most likely be on the country’s public opinion.
Article 9 has been an issue with such great importance, as discussed above,that its amendment would have a substantial impact on the ideologicaldimension along which both citizens and political parties located themselves. If Article 9 is revised, will the current pro-Article 9 force fightback and try to start a movement to revise the article back to the original
wording? There will certainly be people who will argue for that, but mostof the current pro-Article 9 people will keenly realize that it will be a
far-fetched dream. A constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds

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majority in both houses of the Diet and a simple majority in a nationalreferendum. After an article is revised with such a large majority, revising
it back to the original would require an enormously massive swing inpublic opinion.
A very small minority of citizens think that the country should not have
the SDF.8 Many (or most) of those who currently oppose a revision of
Article 9, in fact, accept that it is necessary to have a military force todefend the country. They are opposing a revision not because they support
the current wording of the article itself but because of other reasons. For
example: approval of the status quo situation (“Why change something if
we didn’t have a war for seven decades?”), support for the symbolic valueof the article (“Maintaining Article 9 shows the nation’s commitment topeace”), or a concern for further changes in defense policies that could
come after revising Article 9 (“We will fall into a slippery slope towarda dangerous militarism once Article 9 is revised”). Those “passive” supporters of Article 9 who approve the existence of the SDF would surely
be disappointed if Article 9 were revised, but they would most likely notjoin a movement to revise it back to the original wording, which does
not, literally, allow the SDF to exist.
The size of the pro-Article 9 force, therefore, would shrink greatly if
Article 9 were revised. The small number of “genuine” supporters of
Article 9 would remain and try in vain to argue for a re-revision, but
the size of them would be significantly smaller than the current size ofthe pro-Article 9 force. Consequently, the importance of the debate on
Article 9 in political competition would diminish significantly. Article
9 has divided Japan’s public opinion ever since it was enacted in 1947,
but once revised it would most likely not remain as a divisive politicalissue, and therefore, a major transformation of the configuration of public
opinion would follow. (Imagine what would happen to U.S. politics if
the abortion rights issue suddenly disappeared from the political scene!)

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In other words, a revision of Article 9 would alter the balance between
Type A and Type B opposition parties, illustrated in Figure 1. Many citizens who currently vote for Type A parties only do so because they areagainst a constitutional revision, but many of them are, in fact, “passive”
supporters of Article 9. If a revision is achieved, they will be disappointed
but will soon realize that they no longer have a reason to support a TypeA party. After all, those “passive” supporters think that Japan should have
the SDF. Support for Type A parties will thus decrease, and the dividing
line between Type A and Type B in Figure 1 will move leftward, making
Type A smaller.
What all this means is that a revision of Article 9 can end opposition
fragmentation, which has given an electoral advantage to the LDP. As
the support for Type A parties diminishes, it becomes likely for a large
Type B party to emerge and become the only viable opposition party.
The current electoral system already has a tendency to favor a two-party
system (Maeda 2008). Article 9 has been playing a role as a wedge thatsplits the opposition. When that issue becomes non-salient, Japan’s party
system may transition to a two-party system. The two will compete on
various policy issues, but not on Article 9.
Thus, as paradoxical as it may sound, Abe’s success can cause irreversible
damage to his party. Revising Article 9 has been a long-held desire for Abe
and his party, and many right-wing supporters of the LDP have dreamt ofthe day it is achieved. Yet, what can follow this revision of the constitution
is the permanent loss of the LDP’s electoral advantage and the end of anasymmetric party system between the dominant LDP and numerous small
parties. Japan’s constitutional revision is an important issue all the morebecause it can completely transform Japan’s party politics. n

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References
Arase, David. 2010. Japan in 2009: A Historic Election Year. Asian Survey 50(1): 40–55.
Liff, Adam P., and Ko Maeda. 2017. Explaining a Durable Coalition of Strange Bedfellows:
Evidence from Japan. Working Paper.
Maeda, Ko. 2008. Re-Examining the Contamination Effect of Japan’s Mixed Electoral
System Using the Treatment-Effects Model. Electoral Studies 27(4):723–31.
Maeda, Ko. 2009. “Has the Electoral System Reform Made Japanese Elections PartyCentered?” in Steven R. Reed, Kay Shimizu, and Kenneth Mori McElwain (eds.)
Political Change in Japan: Electoral Behavior, Party Realignment, and the Koizumi
Reforms. The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.
Maeda, Ko. 2010. Divided We Fall: Opposition Fragmentation and the Electoral Fortunesof Governing Parties. British Journal of Political Science. 40(2): 419–434.
Park, Gene, and Steven Vogel. 2007. Japan in 2006: A Political Transition. Asian Survey
47(1): 22–31.
Patterson, Dennis, and Ko Maeda. 2007. Prime Ministerial Popularity and the Changing
Electoral Fortunes of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party. Asian Survey 47(3): 415–433.
Pekkanen, Robert, and Steven R. Reed. 2013. “Japanese Politics Between the 2009 and2012 Elections” in Ethan Scheiner, Steven R. Reed, and Robert Pekkanen, eds.,
Japan Decides 2012: The Japanese General Election. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Reed, Steven R. 2013. “Challenging the Two-Party System: Third Force Parties in the2012 Election,” in Ethan Scheiner, Steven R. Reed, and Robert Pekkanen, eds.,
Japan Decides 2012: The Japanese General Election. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Reed, Steven R., and John M. Bolland. 1999. “The Fragmentation Effect of SNTV in Japan,”in Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall(Eds.), Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable
Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution. Ann Arbor: Universityof Michigan Press.

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Chapter Endnotes
1

See, for example, https://spfusa.org/category/japan-political-pulse/.

2

For example, the LDP fought the 1976 general election with Takeo Miki as the prime
minister, whose approval rate was only 19 percent before the election. Yet, the LDP
was able to stay in power after the election. See Patterson and Maeda (2007).

3

The period from 2003 to 2006 had a stable government and a unified opposition. It
may seem as if this period does not fit with my explanation, but that is not the case.
Junichiro Koizumi (LDP) was the prime minister from 2001 and 2006 and maintained
a high popularity while in office. My explanation for the 2006–12 period is that an
unpopular ruling party with a unified opposition scrambled to switch its leader fromthe fear of losing to the opposition in the next election. When a prime minister enjoys
a high approval rate, his party members do not feel the need to replace him.

4

Hope’s manifesto for the 2017 election stated that it will advance a discussion on aconstitutional revision, including Article 9. Ishin clearly argued for an amendment of
Article 9. Parties’ manifestoes are summarized in https://mainichi.jp/senkyo/48shu_
koyaku/, accessed on January 10, 2018.

5

The CDP will “thoroughly fight against” a revision, the JCP will “stop” a revision, andthe SDP will “protect and make use of ” Article 9, https://mainichi.jp/senkyo/48shu_
koyaku/, accessed on January 10, 2018.

6

The manifesto is found at https://jimin.ncss.nifty.com/pdf/manifest/20171010_manifest.pdf, accessed on January 10, 2018.

7

Asahi Shimbun, October 24, 2017, online edition.

8

A 2015 poll conducted by the government had a question about how the country
should be defended, to which 84.6 percent answered “the U.S.-Japan alliance andthe SDF,” 6.6 percent answered “the SDF only,” and 2.6 percent answered “abolishthe U.S.-Japan alliance and either abolish or downsize the SDF.” The same poll also
asked the respondents’ overall impressions on the SDF, and the answers were 92.2
percent positive and 4.8 percent negative. See https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/h26/
h26-bouei/index.html.

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State-Building andCounterinsurgency Campaigns:
Lessons from Colonial Taiwan
Reo MatsuzakiAdefining feature of contemporary state-building, as practiced undercolonialism, and more recently in the form of U.S. and UN-led“nation-building” missions, is imposition.1 Unlike the imperialist powersof the bygone era, today’s state-builders do not seek to permanently
control foreign territories, and are committed to restoring self-rule andnational sovereignty as quickly as possible.2 The liberal and democratic
institutions and practices advanced by recent and ongoing state-building
campaigns are also vastly different from those established by colonial
rulers.3 However, much like colonialism, U.S. and UN-led state-building
efforts are perceived by large segments of the subject population as
unwanted intrusions into domestic and local affairs, and hence are met
with resistance. In turn, regardless of the intentions of state-builders,current efforts to reconstitute the so-called “ungoverned” and “undergoverned” territories in the Western liberal and democratic image havebeen typically accompanied by vigorous counterinsurgency campaigns.
Yet, despite counterinsurgency campaigns being a pervasive component of recent and ongoing state-building missions, and longstanding
scholarly research on the historic and macro-level relationship between

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R eo Matsuzaki

war-fighting and state-building,4 we have yet to fully grasp the connections
between these processes. For the most part, a successful counterinsurgency campaign is assumed to be a component of, or precondition to,
the establishment of a strong state. Consequently, this view has led to apractice of leaving strategic decisions concerning counterinsurgency togenerals, while civilian reformers and administrators focus on building
institutions and enforcing rules and regulations in pacified territories.
Through an examination of Japan’s successful state-building efforts incolonial Taiwan, I argue that how military victory is achieved has significant and lasting impacts on the development of political institutions;and that strategies maximizing wartime goals may in fact undermine
state-building’s success in the long run, and vice versa.
Specifically, I contend that rulers who seek to establish modern government institutions by way of imposition face a dilemma: on one hand,
territorial control and suppression of armed resistance are more easily andeconomically obtained when state-builders ally with powerful tribal leaders, provincial bosses, and warlords, whose support can single-handedly
ensure peace in a region. As respected regional leaders, owners of large
plantations, and/or feared fighters, they have the capacity to mobilize sizeable militia armies. However, with their wealth and power founded upon
private and societal sources, they are likely to view the actual constructionof a strong state—a state with the capacity to monopolize coercive andrule-making authority—as a threat to their political and socioeconomic
interests. As a result, tribal leaders, provincial bosses, and warlords,
even if they prove to be effective wartime allies, will become formidable
obstacles to state-building once they are entrenched in the post-conflict
governance structure due to their substantial contributions during thecounterinsurgency campaign.
In contrast, town- and village-level community leaders, embedded within
the locality and possessing comparatively limited power and authority,
are likely to serve as effective partners in postwar state-building. Statebuilders will struggle, however, to oversee and manage a multitude of local

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community leaders, all with their own sets of interests and sympathies,
under the fog of war. These individuals, moreover, are unlikely to contribute militarily to the pacification campaign, compelling the state-builder
to expend more of its own money, manpower, and time to win the war.
Alliances with local elites that increase the chances of military victoryand minimize its costs are therefore not necessarily those that lead tostate-building success in the long run; conversely, local allies that are
ineffective during the counterinsurgency campaign may prove to be ideal
state-building partners.
I advance this argument through an analysis of Japan’s colonial occupationof Taiwan, which resulted in arguably one of the most successful instancesof state-building in the modern era. Prior to Japanese colonization, theisland of Taiwan was a violent frontier province of the Qing empire, where
the exercise of government authority was highly uneven at best. Just as intoday’s so-called ungoverned and undergoverned spaces, this was a resultof animosity between the island’s various ethnic and lineage groups, madeworse by the relative scarcity of agricultural land. Yet, despite such adverse
underlying conditions, and despite widespread armed resistance to statebuilding, Japanese occupiers succeeded in thoroughly transforming Taiwan
into a strong state that fit their modernist vision. As I demonstrate below,
Japanese state-building success was, to a large extent, a result of the decision
to exclude the scholar-gentry—Taiwan’s most powerful and influential elites
under Qing rule, who were distinguished from the rest of the populationby their possession of official rank that signified their scholarly or militaryachievements—from the wartime alliance, and, instead, partner with townand village-level community leaders.
To the extent that we may draw, with much caution, lessons from the colonial past for contemporary policymaking, the Taiwan case demonstrates
that if state-building is to succeed, the establishment of new governmental
institutions and the counterinsurgency campaign must be closely coordinated, with the former guiding strategic decisions concerning the latter. In
particular, we should be cognizant of the fact that wartime alliances with109

R eo Matsuzaki

local elites have long-term effects on the evolution of the political order.
Decisions regarding who to partner with, and how to incorporate theminto the governance structure, should therefore be made to maximize
attainment of the state-building mission’s overall goals. State-building
will not succeed without military victory, but a flawed victory could very
well become the cause of the state’s weakness and failure in the long run.
————Annexation of Taiwan was not within the Japanese government’s strategic objectives when it went to war against the Qing empire in July
1894. Rather, it resulted from opportunism made possible by Japan’s
resounding victory against China, when the island was included within
Japan’s extensive territorial demands in the 1895 peace treaty. Although
the concession of Taiwan to Japan may have been relatively easy andpainless for Qing negotiators—after all, it was an island that the empire
had struggled to govern for centuries and offered little strategic value
under Beijing’s defensively oriented military doctrine—it was a heartwrenching act of treachery for Taiwan’s scholar-gentry, which constituted
the island’s upper class both in terms of their wealth and political influence. While born in Taiwan, they viewed themselves as members of theChinese civilization, and retained family, lineage, and business ties totheir ancestral homeland across the Taiwan Straits. Hence, rather thanabide by Beijing’s orders to transfer control over Taiwan to the Japanesepeacefully, Taiwan’s scholar-gentry, with the support of Qing Governor
Tang Jingsong, declared Taiwan to be an independent republic and sought
to resist the Japanese invaders.5
Nonetheless, while most of Taiwan’s scholar-gentry initially supported thecreation of the Taiwan Republic and mobilized militia armies to defend
the island, their commitment to independence was shallow. They were
fundamentally conservative individuals whose personal wellbeing—as110

State-Building and C ounterinsurgency C ampaigns

landlords and capitalists—depended upon peace being quickly restored.
As such, as soon as Japanese forces captured Taipei and the surrounding areas, the scholar-gentry in northern Taiwan quickly shifted theirstance from that of resistance to accommodation. If the Japanese could
not be repelled, perhaps an arrangement could be reached with the newcolonial overlords, whereby the scholar-gentry would retain their priorsocial status, economic benefits, and political autonomy in exchange for
accepting Japanese sovereignty?
In August 1895, Taipei’s scholar-gentry and wealthy merchants presented
to Governor-General Sukenori Kabayama a plan whereby they would
participate in Taiwan’s colonial regime as equal partners. The proposal
called for creating gentry-led local administrative offices throughout
Taiwan, to be known as baoliangju, which in turn would be coordinatedby a group of the island’s most respected and influential scholar-gentry
at the baoliangju headquarters in Taipei. In exchange for their assistancein defeating the insurgents, maintaining law and order, mediating local
disputes, and enforcing various rules and regulations, the scholar-gentry
would be granted special political, social, and economic privileges—
essentially those they had enjoyed under Qing rule—and be treatedwith respect and dignity as co-rulers of Taiwan. The baoliangju proposal
basically envisioned a system of indirect rule, where Taiwan, as was thecase during the Qing period, would be in effect governed by the island’s
scholar-gentry elites.6
Japanese officials, having yet to establish a large bureaucratic presence on
the island, initially welcomed this plan for the sake of expedience, andbaoliangju offices were created in the greater Taipei area and surrounding
regions. However, this system, despite its success at maintaining peaceand stability in northern Taiwan, was never implemented in the rest of
Taiwan, and quickly abandoned in the north once a sufficient number ofJapanese military and civilian officials arrived to fully staff the colonial
bureaucracy.7 It was, after all, never the intention of Japanese officials toshare political power and authority with Taiwan’s traditional elites. Japan’s111

R eo Matsuzaki

long-term goal for Taiwan was to culturally, economically, and politicallymodernize and assimilate the Taiwanese and make Taiwan into an integral
part of the Japanese nation-state.8 Preservation of the scholar-gentry’s
political autonomy and prior socioeconomic status would have directly
contradicted this modernist and assimilationist vision.
Denied their request for political autonomy and the continuation of
their socioeconomic privileges, most members of Taiwan’s scholargentry joined the rebellion or left the island for their ancestral lands
in mainland China. Whereas approximately 350 individuals holding
upper scholar-gentry ranks resided in Taiwan prior to Japanese takeover,
only forty-seven such individuals could be identified in 1900. Overall,about two thousand individuals belonging to the larger scholar-gentry
class migrated to mainland China following the Japanese invasion.9 The
consequence of Japan’s refusal to work with the scholar-gentry and theresulting decimation of Taiwan’s traditional political elite stratum would
be far-reaching. As we will see shortly, this complicated Japanese efforts
to pacify Taiwan and nearly forced Japan to abandon Taiwan altogether.
In the long run, however, this decision was among the key contributors
to Japan’s state-building success.
————

The Japanese pacification campaign, in the populous and Sinicized regionof western Taiwan, proceeded in two stages. The first involved defeating
the militia forces mobilized by the scholar-gentry elites, as the Imperial
Army marched the length of Taiwan, from Taipei in the north to the rebel
stronghold in the southern city of Tainan. While the Japanese ultimately
succeeded in defeating the gentry-led militias and capturing Tainan, thiscampaign turned out to be far more costly, and required much more manpower—over seventy thousand troops in total—than initially anticipated.
Without help from Taiwanese elites, the Japanese could not distinguish112

State-Building and C ounterinsurgency C ampaigns

between friend and foe, and between villages that actively assisted therebels and those that simply sought to be left alone. Rebel-controlled
towns—or at least those believed to be—were shelled from afar withartillery, and entire villages suspected of aiding rebels were burned to
the ground. Once they had captured towns and villages, Japanese soldiers
treated the local peoples with disrespect and relied exclusively on coercive
means to obtain obedience.
Consequently, instead of Tainan’s fall ushering in a period of peace, it
merely served as a transition to a new phase in the conflict. Now, rather
than engaging in conventional battles against the gentry’s well-organized
militias, the Japanese Imperial Army faced the daunting task of suppressing a multitude of small-scale uprisings, insurrections, and ambushes led
by discontent and disrespected community leaders and criminal elements
seeking to profit from the instability. A downward spiral of uprisings
begetting vicious reprisals begetting more uprisings, in turn, made large
swaths of Taiwan ungovernable.10
Having either alienated or driven out most of the island’s scholargentry, Japanese officials thus sought help from town- and village-levelcommunity leaders, who, unlike the scholar-gentry, did not pose athreat to Japan’s long-term vision for the island. Such was the case in
the Chiyai and Yunlin regions of central Taiwan, where the Japanesesucceeded in obtaining the support of local community leaders, who
had become weary of the cycle of violence that was causing much
misery to the local population. Their proposal was to revive the Qingera practice of defending local communities against rebels and bandits
through the organization of lianzhuang baojia, where each household
contributed able-bodied individuals to serve in town- and village-level
militias. The result of this experiment was highly encouraging, at least
initially, as it led to the end of rebel activity in these two previously
volatile regions. Yet, lianzhuang baojia proved unworkable or ineffective elsewhere in Taiwan.11

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R eo Matsuzaki

The problem was twofold. First, there was the matter of coordination:
while in Chiyai and Yunlin local community leaders were willing and able
to coordinate their efforts in defending towns and villages without theleadership of the scholar-gentry, such conditions did not pertain in otherregions of Taiwan. Second, the creation of town- and village-level selfdefense forces in Chiyai and Yunlin followed a vigorous and months-long
Japanese counterinsurgency campaign. What the experience in Chiyai
and Yunlin thus demonstrated was that although local self-defense forces
could help maintain peace and stability in areas that were already pacified, they were ineffective in territories where insurgent organizations
remained strong.
Yet, even as the human and financial toll from the counterinsurgency
campaign mounted, Japanese military leaders, seeing control over Taiwan
as essential for advancing Japan’s grand strategy of “northern defense andsouthern advance” (hokushu nanshin), were willing to do whatever it took
to win the war.12 To this end, the Japanese committed to the island what
would amount to a third of the entire military forces deployed during theFirst Sino-Japanese War.13 The military surge was also accompanied bya civilian one that led to a bureaucratic presence far exceeding even thatof Japan itself on a per capita basis.14 Particularly pronounced was thelarge size of the colonial police—deployed in small three- to five-person
detachments throughout Taiwan—and the outsized role they played inmaintaining peace and stability, and in local administration more broadly.15 Finally, the military and civilian surge was coupled with a highly
coercive approach to governance that saw the execution of 716 rebels
and other criminal elements per year during the height of the insurgency
between 1899 and 1902.16
In sum, while the Japanese eventually succeeded in pacifying Taiwan,
their decision to shun the scholar-gentry greatly increased the financial
and human toll of the counterinsurgency campaign for both the Japaneseand the Taiwanese. Yet, the exclusion of the scholar-gentry from the wartime coalition, and the subsequent embrace of town- and village-level

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community leaders as allies, would come to pay dividends once the focusof the campaign shifted from fighting insurgents to state-building.
————Japan’s strategic choices during the counterinsurgency campaign, while
nearly leading to military defeat, had at least three positive consequenceson the larger state-building mission. First, the decision to exclude thescholar-gentry from the wartime coalition effectively removed from thepolitical landscape the very individuals who had the interests, as wellas the means, to obstruct state-building’s centralizing and modernizing reforms. Denied access to political office of any significance, manyremaining members of the scholar-gentry went on to pursue careers inbusiness, which literally tied their fortunes to the success of Japan’s statebuilding mission in Taiwan and to the prosperity of the Japanese empire
more broadly.17 Second, as we saw above, the political and administrative
vacuum that ensued from the ostracization of the traditional ruling elitecompelled Japanese officials to heavily invest in bureaucratic capacity andpresence. Third, Japan’s reliance on local community leaders as intermediaries contributed immensely to the state-building effort. Given that
town- and village-level elites were thoroughly embedded within theirrespective local communities, they possessed the capacity to convince
and/or compel community members to follow the new set of intrusive
rules and regulations of a modern state.18 Moreover, precisely because
their power and authority were localized, and hence limited in geographic
scope, local community leaders could be easily controlled and disciplined
by government officials.
It was with the help of town- and village-level community leaders, forexample, that Japanese colonial bureaucrats successfully completed anisland-wide cadastral survey by 1903. In turn, the amount of privately
owned—and hence taxable—land recorded in government documents

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doubled from 350,604 hectares in 1887 (when land records were lasted
updated by Qing officials) to 754,515 hectares at the conclusion of thecadastral survey. The multitude of health and sanitation campaigns, mostnotably the successful effort to eradicate the bubonic plague, was also
made possible with the help of local community leaders. Community
leaders ensured that each household participated in a rat catching
campaign, which ultimately led to the extermination of 41,923,644 rats
between 1901 and 1912. In addition, they played an instrumental role inenforcing quarantines, the burning of infected houses, and other highly
unpopular health regulations in areas affected by the plague. By 1917,
the disease, which had caused one- to three thousand deaths per year
during the first decade of Japanese rule, was completely eradicated. Fromefforts to increase Taiwan’s agricultural output through scientific farming to campaigns against opium smoking, foot-binding, and other “evil”
customs, there was hardly an area of public policy where local community
leaders did not play a crucial role in policy enforcement.19
Moreover, it was through the assistance of community leaders that
the Government-General of Taiwan ultimately succeeded in imposinga system of direct bureaucratic governance. As was the case in Japan
itself, Taiwanese society was reconstituted in the 1930s to a wartime, andarguably fascist, footing, with the founding of various state-controlled
administered mass organizations.20 The most important among them wasthe all-encompassing Kōmin Hōkōkai (Association of Imperial Subjects
for Patriotic Services), created for the purpose of mobilizing all of Taiwan’s
subjects and resources for the war effort. Branches of the Kōmin Hōkōkai
were established at the prefectural, county, township, village, ward, andneighborhood levels by grafting them onto existing communal structures.
Town and village-level elites in turn took on leadership positions in village
alliances and public service teams, the two lowermost units of the Kōmin
Hōkōkai, thus making possible Taiwan’s institutional transformation intoa modern state in Japan’s own image.21
————

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State-Building and C ounterinsurgency C ampaigns

Each instance of state-building is unique; strategies and institutionalmodels that lead to success in one setting may not produce the sameoutcome in another. As such, lessons concerning state-building must be
applied cautiously from one case to another, especially across different
geostrategic and normative contexts. Nonetheless, certain features ofcontemporary state-building have remained unchanged from the colonial
era to the present; so too have the underlying problems and dilemmas
associated with state-building by imposition. Whether it was the Japaneseseeking to modernize Taiwan and integrate it into their nation-state, orAmericans aiming to transform Iraq and Afghanistan into independentand democratic states, these seemingly contrasting state-building missions were pursued amidst widespread resistance. As such, they similarly
necessitated a vigorous counterinsurgency campaign at the outset.
As we saw in the above analysis, alliances with local elites that maximize attainment of wartime goals are different from those that lead tothe successful construction of a modern state. In colonial Taiwan, thisdilemma led the Japanese to choose a less effective and more costly counterinsurgency strategy, so that they could achieve their long-term goal oftransforming Taiwan into a strong colonial state. Yet, if we go beyond thecase at hand, the reverse practice of state-builders prioritizing military
victory over any long-term political goals is far more commonly observed
both under colonialism and in the contemporary period.
In attempting to bring northern China under the control of the Nationalist
government in the 1920s, for example, Chiang Kai-shek, whose support
base was in southeast China, relied on regionally powerful “local bullies” (tuhao) to pacify and control the population. This strategy allowed
Chiang to rapidly accomplish his goal of uniting China under a single
government, but at the cost of entrenching the northern tuhao as powerfulpolitical bosses and warlords. This, in turn, not only prevented the government from penetrating, and effectively governing, society in the north,but moreover, led to the corruption of the administrative machinery andthe delegitimization of the Nationalist regime. The Communists, led by117

R eo Matsuzaki

Mao Zedong, would later take advantage of people’s hatred of the tuhao,
and by employing strategies similar to the ones used by the Japanesein Taiwan—that is, relying exclusively on its own military capacity andcultivating ties with local community leaders—successfully reunited andremade China into a strong state.22
Similarly illustrative is the American state-building enterprise in thePhilippines from 1898 to 1942, a case that was comparable in many ways
to the Japanese experience in Taiwan, but led to contrasting state-building
outcomes due in part to the difference in the counterinsurgency strategy employed. Constrained by the self-serving narrative that the UnitedStates was ethically compelled to occupy the Philippines and to remake
the archipelago into an American-style democracy for the benefit of theFilipino people, as well as by the wishes of an U.S. electorate suspicious offoreign entanglements and long-term military commitments, Americancolonial administrators sought to lower the financial and human toll of
the counterinsurgency campaign. They did this, quite successfully, by
forging clientelistic ties with wealthy landed elites. In this process, U.S.
officials transformed what was once a predominantly socioeconomic elite
into a political one. Whereas the Filipino landed elite, despite their wealth,were prevented from having much political influence under the previous
Spanish administration, under U.S. rule, they used their collaborative
relations with colonial officials to entrench themselves as powerful andautonomous political bosses—a legacy that continues to adversely affectthe Philippines today.23
Two policy implications follow from this analysis. The first is that theachievement of policy objectives in various issue areas does not necessarily add up to state-building’s success overall. In fact, institutional
structures that advance policy objectives in one area may negatively affectthe development of a strong state. For similar reasons, in order for statebuilders to achieve their ultimate goal, they may be better off relying
on local allies who are ineffective in any one area or phase of the statebuilding mission. This observation holds vis-à-vis the counterinsurgency

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campaign, as we saw above, as well as in other areas of state-building, suchas judicial reform and provision of various public goods and services. In
some instances it may be that the state-builder simply cannot militarily
prevail if they do not collaborate with powerful provincial elites. If so,they must forge these partnerships with the understanding that they will
profoundly affect how the political order will evolve in subsequent years.
Secondly, the way in which the United States goes about planning andexecuting state-building missions should be changed. In the United States,
which has historically lacked a colonial office or its equivalent, military
officials have become de facto policymakers in the area of state-building.
They do not see counterinsurgency as a component of state-building, butrather, as experts in war-fighting, they approach state-building—dubbed
winning “hearts and minds”—as a strategy for military victory. From theperspective of this study, this is highly problematic, and may explain why
the United States has so profoundly struggled at state-building.24 Due tothe fact that various aspects of state-building are closely interconnected,
strategic decisions and the selection of institutional models in any one
area must be made by carefully considering their effects on the larger
mission. If America is to improve its dismal record in imposing liberaland democratic institutions abroad, it may therefore be necessary to firstdevelop the civilian personnel and capacity to study, plan, and manage
state-building more holistically. n

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Chapter Endnotes
1

As Krasner and Weinstein argue, this is also why contemporary state-building has
rarely succeeded. See Stephen Krasner and Jeremy Weinstein, “Improving Governancefrom the Outside In,” Annual Review of Political Science 17 (2014): 123–45.

2James Fearon and David Laitin, “Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States,”
International Security 28.4 (2004): 5–43; Stephen Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty:
New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States,” International Security 29.2 (2004):
85–120.

3Roland Paris, “International Peacebuilding and the ‘Mission Civilisatrice,’” Review
of International Studies 28 (2002): 637–56.

4

Miguel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America(University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 2002); Jeffrey Herbst, States andPower in Africa (Princeton University Press, 2000); Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital,and European States, AD 90–1990 (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990).

5

Kō Shōdō, Taiwan Minshukoku no kenkyū: Taiwan dokuritsu undō shi no ichi
danshō [A study on the Republic of Formosa: a chapter in the history of the Taiwan
independence movement] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1970); Ōe Shinobu,“Shokuminchi sensō to Sōtokufu no seiritsu [Colonial war and the establishment of
the Government-General],” in Iwanami kōza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi [Iwanami
series on modern Japan and its colonies], ed. Ōe, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten,1992), 3–33.

6

Harry Lamley, “The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule, 1895–1915: A Study of
Their Reactions to the Japanese Occupation and Subsequent Responses to Colonial
Rule and Modernization,” Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1964, 224–27.

7

Lamley, “The Taiwan Literati and Early Japanese Rule,” 228–30.

8Hara Takashi, “Taiwan mondai nian [Two proposals for the Taiwan problem],”in Taiwan shiryō [Taiwan documents], ed. Kaneko Kentarō (Tokyo: Hara Shobō,
1970[1895]); Oguma Eiji, “Nihonjin” no kyōkai: Okinawa, Ainu, Taiwan, Chōsen
shokuminchi shihai kara fukki undō made [The Boundaries of “Japanese”: Okinawa,Ainu, Taiwan, Korea from colonial domination to recovery movement] (Tokyo:
Shinyōsha, 1998), 93–100.

9

Hui-yu Caroline Ts’ai, “One Kind of Control: The “Hokō” System in Taiwan underJapanese Rule, 1895–1945,” Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 19; Lamley, “The Taiwan
Literati and Early Japanese Rule,” 237.

10 Ching-chih Chen, “Japanese Socio-political Control in Taiwan, 1895–1945,” Ph.D.
diss., Harvard University, 1973, 19–26; 19–36; James Davidson, The Island of Formosa
Past and Present: History, People, Resources, and Commercial Prospects (New York:
Macmillan, 1903), 314–70; Ōe “Shokuminchi sensō to Sōtokufu no seiritsu.”

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11 Chiu-fen Hung, “Ri ju chu qi tai wan de bao jia zhi du (1895–1903) [The baojia system
in Taiwan, 1895–1903],” Jin dai shi yan jiu suo ji kan 21 (1991): 437–71; Mukōyama
Hiroo, Nihon tōchika ni okeru Taiwan minzoku undō shi [A history of the national
movement in Taiwan under the Japanese rule] (Tokyo: Chūō Keizai Kenkyūjo, 1987),
124–25; Ts’ai, “One Kind of Control,” 48–49.
12 Katsura Tarō, “Taiwan Tōchi Hōshin [Taiwan Governing Policy],” July 1896, Reel 9,
No. 84.1, Katsura Tarō kankei monjo [Documents related to Katsura Tarō], National
Diet Library, Tokyo.
13 Ōe, “Shokuminchi sensō to Sōtokufu no seiritsu.”
14 In 1901, a total of 8,719 regular and permanent bureaucrats were employed, whichamounted to three bureaucrats per thousand inhabitants. In subsequent years, thiswould increase to four per thousand. In comparison, the entire civilian bureaucracy
within Japan itself was a much more modest 1.6 per thousand during this period.
Okamoto Makiko, Shokuminchi kanryō no seiji shi: Chōsen, Taiwan Sōtokufu to teikoku
Nihon [The political history of the colonial bureaucracy: Korean and Taiwanese
Government-Generals and the Japanese empire] (Tokyo: Sangensha, 2008), 51.
15 Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku, Taiwan Sōtokufu keisatsu enkakushi [A history of the
Taiwan Government-General police], vol. 1 (Taipei: Taiwan Sōtokufu Keimukyoku,
1933), 506–07, 513–15; Jen-to Yao, “Governing the Colonised: Governmentality in theJapanese Colonisation of Taiwan, 1895–1945,” Ph.D. Diss., Department of Sociology,
University of Essex, 2002, 184–88.
16 Tay-sheng Wang, Legal Reform in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945:
The Reception of Western Law (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 108–10.
17 Samuel Ho, Economic Development of Taiwan, 1860–1970 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1978); Chih-ming Ka, Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan: Land Tenure,
Development, and Dependency, 1895–1945 (Boulder: Westview, 1995).
18 On this point, see Prasenjit Duara, Culture, Power, and the State: Rural North China,
1900–1942 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Daniel Mattingly, “Elite
Capture: How Decentralization and Informal Institutions Weaken Property Rights
in Rural China,” World Politics 68.3 (2016): 383–412; Lily Tsai, Accountability without
Democracy: Solidary Groups and Public Goods Provision in Rural China (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
19 Reo Matsuzaki, “State-building Amidst Resistance,” Polity, forthcoming; Joseph
Wicentowski, “Policing Health in Modern Taiwan, 1898–1949,” Ph.D. diss., Harvard
University, 2007, 54–65; Jen-to Yao, “The Japanese Colonial State and Its Formsof Knowledge in Taiwan” in Taiwan under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945, ed.
Ping-hui Liao and David Der-wei Wang (New York: Columbia University Press,
2006), 47–52.
20 On AMOs, see Gregory Kasza, The Conscription Society: Administered Mass
Organizations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

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21 Matsuzaki, “State-building Amidst Resistance”; Ts’ai, “One Kind of Control,” 452–56,
485–91.
22 Victor Nee, “Between Center and Locality: State, Militia, and Village,” in State andSociety in Contemporary China, ed. Victor Nee and David Mozingo (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983), 223–43; Patricia M. Thornton, Disciplining the State: Virtue,
Violence, and State-making in Modern China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2007).
23 Reo Matsuzaki, Statebuilding by Imposition: Constructing a Modern State Amidst
Resistance in Colonial Taiwan and Philippines (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
forthcoming); Alfred W. McCoy, ed., An Anarchy of Families: State and Family
in the Philippines (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2009); John T.
Sidel, Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999).
24 For example, see Astri Suhrke, When More Is Less: The International Project in
Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). On America’s statebuilding record, see Jason Brownlee, “Can America Nation-build?” World Politics
59.2 (2007): 314–40.

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Japan’s Long-Term Financial
Stability Challenges Require a New
Macroprudential Framework
Matthew Poggi*

Summary and Conclusions
The global financial crisis demonstrated that traditional regulation, often
called microprudential, was insufficient to mitigate vulnerabilities thatthreatened the health of the financial system as a whole. Authorities inmany economies, including Japan, subsequently explored and adopted
a more systemic approach to financial regulation—a holistic policy
approach called macroprudential. Japan, however, went much shorterin reforming its systemic oversight framework than its advanced economy
peers, leaving it with a macroprudential architecture that may face challenges in the years ahead. In order to address more effectively its long-run
structural vulnerabilities, Japan needs to develop an effective inter-agency
macroprudential committee with a legal institutional footing; a formal
mandate; clear objectives; and, a sufficient policy toolkit.

* The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily represent thoseof the U.S. Department of Treasury nor the U.S. government.

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Mat thew Po ggi

The Development and Establishment ofMacroprudential Frameworks
The global financial crisis that began in 2007–08 developed due to numerous fundamental micro- and macroeconomic causes such as inappropriate
incentives in the financial sector, unsustainable macro cross-bordersaving-investment imbalances, and insufficient regulatory oversight.1
As the crisis approached, many economies lacked institutions with themandate and capacity to assess such vulnerabilities from a high-level
point of view with respect to the stability of the entire financial system.
Policymakers, therefore, were not prepared well to take sufficient steps
in advance to mitigate the crisis.
Systemic risk can be defined as “the risk of widespread disruption to
the provision of financial services that is caused by an impairment of
all or parts of the financial system, and which can cause serious negative consequences for the real economy.” 2 Inclusive in this definition are
negative externalities—due to, for example, magnitude, interconnectivity,
or excessive leverage—from a disruption or failure of a single financial
institution, market, or instrument to the financial system as a whole.
Prompted by the crisis, international financial institutions (IFIs) suchas the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability
Board (FSB) devoted considerable resources to take stock of the crisis
experience, including institutional frameworks and the policy response.
Backed by the political support of the G20 and a resolve to avoid future
crises, the IFIs and governments considered institutional frameworks
that would yield effective approaches for identifying systemic risks andaddressing systemic vulnerabilities. Many governments undertook
efforts to reform their institutions and introduce frameworks to better
monitor their financial and economic systems from a “macroprudential”
perspective. In other words, bringing together macroeconomic policy(e.g., fiscal and monetary) with microprudential policy (e.g., financial
regulatory policy such as bank capital and liquidity ratio rules) to limit

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Japan’s L ong-Term Financial Stabilit y C hallenges

systemic risks that, if manifest, could disrupt the provision of financial
services and damage the real economy.
The objective of macroprudential policy, which uses microprudential
and macroeconomic tools, is to mitigate systemic risks and maintainfinancial stability (Figure 1).3 Macroprudential policy complements the
microprudential policy focus on the safety and soundness of individual
financial institutions as well as the macroeconomic policy focus on pricestability and economic growth. An example of microprudential policy
is capital requirements imposed on individual banks, which mitigate
Macroeconomic
Macroprudential
the risk of bankinsolvency by requiring
a buffer toMicroprudential
absorb potential
policies
policies
policies
losses. Capital requirements can also be used as a macroprudential
tool if policymakers assess, for example, that asset prices have risen too
far too fast. Policymakers could then require banks to hold additional-Financial stability -Idiosyncratic-Price stability
capital (e.g., a counter-cyclical capital buffer) to dampen lending activity-Economic activity-Systemic risk
risk
(which may be fueling the increase in asset prices) and bolster the banking system’s resilience to potential losses in the event of an asset pricecrash. Macroeconomic policy, meanwhile, can also be employed with a
Figure 1. A stylistic view of macroprudential policy
macroprudential perspective.
Figure 1. A stylistic view of macroprudential policy
Macroeconomic
policies

Macroprudential
policies

Microprudential
policies• Price stability• Economic activity• Financial stability• Systemic risk

• Idiosyncratic risk

Source: IMF 2013.

Source: IMF 2013.

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Mat thew Po ggi

Experience with macroprudential frameworks and policy tools is limited,
but growing, complemented by an increasing body of empirical researchon their effectiveness. Lessons learned and best practices, however, remaintentative as the range of evidence does not yet span a full economic or
financial cycle. Nevertheless, an interim consensus has formed that there
is no “one-size-fits-all” model for effective macroprudential policymaking given the wide range of country-specific institutional arrangements,
political and legal traditions, and existing regulatory architectures.
Broadly speaking, countries have adopted one of three model types underwhich the main macroprudential mandate is held by:4
• The central bank, with its governor or board making macroprudential
decisions. This model is the prevalent choice where the central bankalready maintains the relevant regulatory and supervisory powers (e.g.,
New Zealand, Singapore).5 This model can be complemented withcoordination mechanisms and information-sharing arrangements withsupervisory authorities outside the central bank.
• A dedicated committee within the central bank (often chaired by thegovernor). This structure allows for outside regulatory and supervisory
authorities and external experts to participate in the decision-making
committee (e.g., the United Kingdom). This helps to bring a range of perspectives and fosters an open discussion of trade-offs of policy options.
• An inter-agency committee outside the central bank. This frameworkaims to facilitate information-sharing among agencies to promote
discussion of system-wide risk, and to coordinate policy actions (e.g.,
France, Germany, and the United States). This model often accommodates a strong role of the finance ministry, as in the United States,
where the Financial Stability and Oversight Council (FSOC) is chairedby the Department of Treasury (figure 2). Participation of the financeministry is important for creating political legitimacy and for whenfiscal policy is required to mitigate systemic risk.

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Japan’s L ong-Term Financial Stabilit y C hallenges

Figure 2. Organizational structure of the U.S. Financial
Stability Oversight Council
FSOC
Voting members

Non-voting members

Treasury (chair)FRB

OFR
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

FIO

OCC
FDIC

ADVICENCUA

State insurance
commissioner
State banking
supervisor

SEC

Authorized to:

CFTC• Facilitate regulatory coordination

FHFA• Facilitate information sharing

CFPB• Recommend stricter standards

Indpendent
insurance expert• Designate non-bank financial companies for consolidated supervision

State securities
commissioner

Source: FSOC Annual Report, 2014.
FRB – Federal Reserve Board; OCC – Office of the Comptroller of the Currency;
FDIC – Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; NCUA – National Credit Union
Administration; SEC – Securities and Exchange Commission; CFTC – Commodity
Futures Trading Commission; FHFA – Federal Housing Finance Agency; OFR –Office of Financial Research; FIO – Federal Insurance Office.

Although institutional models differ, there is no theoretical or empiricalevidence to suggest superior performance of one macroprudential modelover another in terms of identifying and mitigating systemic vulnerabilities. Rather, the accumulated evidence can only offer a number of
elements of macroprudential frameworks that have been found effective
for policymaking. Namely, the institutional setup needs to promote:
1. Cooperation and information-sharing between authorities;
2. Transparency and accountability to establish legitimacy andcreate commitment to take action;

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Mat thew Po ggi

3. An ability to act based on a framework for analyzing and monitoring systemic risks, appropriate policy tools, and clear mandateof assigned responsibility for taking macroprudential policy
decisions; and,
4. A willingness to act with well-defined objectives and powers.
Japan’s financial stability framework does not fit into any of the three mainmodel types. It is also less than clear that Japan’s existing institutionalfoundations promote the main elements for effective macroprudential
policymaking.

Japan’s Macroprudential Framework — An Outlier
from Global Models
The foundation of Japan’s current financial stability framework was laidin the late-1990s and early-2000s as pressures from the unresolved consequences of the collapsed asset price bubble eventually led to failuresof large financial institutions and instability. External factors also played
a role in the debate for that round of administrative reforms as Europe
was transitioning its financial regulatory structures to the forthcoming adoption of the euro. During this period, the government made the
Financial Services Agency (FSA) and the Bank of Japan (BOJ) the main
macroprudential authorities.6
The FSA, carved out of the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in 2000 as
the single financial sector regulator, is the designated regulatory andsupervisory authority for all financial institutions with responsibility for“ensuring the stability of the financial system.”7 The FSA also is responsible
for the designation of systemically-important financial institutions. The
FSA uses primarily microprudential regulatory prudential tools for its
macroprudential objectives.

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The BOJ was reformed in 1997 under the New BOJ Law, which strengthened the Bank’s autonomy, increased its transparency, and gave it theobjective of financial stability in addition to price stability. The BOJ derives
its macroprudential responsibilities from the Law’s Article 1 objective for
the Bank to “maintain an orderly financial system” through its monetary
policy powers and its role as the lender of last resort.8 The BOJ also seeks
to provide a macroprudential perspective when conducting monetary
policy with the aim of maintaining sustainable growth and price stability.
To fulfill this mandate, the BOJ conducts regular on-site examinations
and off-site monitoring of financial institutions, and analyzes financial
markets data and information on the functioning of payment and settlement systems. This serves as a basis for its assessment of systemic risks
and of policy measures to address them.
In 2001, the government also established a comprehensive crisis management framework in the event of the failure of a SIFI (systematicallyimportant financial institution). The Financial Crisis Response Council,
chaired by the prime minister and including the BOJ Governor, Finance
Minister, and FSA Commissioner, is intended to provide high-level coordination in times of financial crisis. Outside of crisis periods, however,inter-agency coordination remains largely informal, as the government did
not establish a standing council or committee for macroprudential policy.9

Reforms Since the Global Financial Crisis —Formal Committee Still Lacking
The global financial crisis highlighted for policymakers the need for
macroprudential policy frameworks to be clarified and strengthened,
and generated another opportunity for Japan to reform its approach.
Economies at the center of the crisis, including the United States andthe United Kingdom, made significant changes to their macroprudential
oversight frameworks and decision-making policy processes. In the first
decade following crisis, however, Japan has made only limited changes
to its macroprudential architecture.

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The IMF, which has made assessing countries’ macroprudential frameworks a standard component of its regular, post-crisis Financial Sector
Assessment Programs (FSAPs), has had two opportunities to offer
rounds of recommendations for Japan to improve its approach.10 The
IMF focused, in particular, on ways in which Japan should improve its
inter-agency macroprudential policy cooperation. In its 2012 FSAP,
the IMF made the high-priority recommendation (i.e., for immediate
attention and implementation within three years) that Japan bolster its
oversight of systemic risk by considering “more regular arrangements
for more intensive and continuing interagency cooperation in systemicrisk monitoring and contingency planning.”11 The IMF also made themedium-term recommendation (i.e., within five years and by the nextFSAP) that Japan “strengthen the formal basis for data and information
sharing among supervisory agencies.” More broadly, the IMF stated that,“further advances in the regulatory and supervisory regime would help tobetter anticipate and manage systemic risks. Among all agencies, mechanisms for systemic and macroprudential oversight could be enhanced andmore forward-looking cross-sectoral approaches adopted.”
Japan’s authorities have taken some steps to address FSAP recommendations and strengthen their macroprudential policy framework.12 To
improve interagency cooperation, the BOJ and the FSA created theCouncil for Cooperation on Financial Stability (CCFS) in June 2014
(Figure 3).13 The two-agency committee provides a mechanism for aperiodic exchange of views between the Bank (represented by a Deputy
Governor) and the FSA (represented by the Commissioner) on theirrespective analysis and assessments of risks in the financial system. The
CCFS, however, is not formalized in regulation or law, but works underan agreement between the agencies. The Council, which meets only every
six months, is not a decision-making body, and cannot make requests toassess specific vulnerabilities or issue recommendations or directions to
any authorities. The only public output from the CCFS is a notice that ameeting has taken place.

130Japan’s L ong-Term Financial Stabilit y C hallenges

Figure 3. Overview of Japan’s macroprudential framework
FSA and BOJ co-operation
1. Informal channels
2. Council for Cooperation on Financial Stability—Meets
semi-annually to exchange views on recent financial
conditions which guides each institutions’ risk
assessment

FSA

BOJ

Regular supervisory activities(covering all financial institutions); market intelligenceinterviews; ad hoc requests

Regular supervisory activities(covering all financial institionts with current accounts
at the BOJ); surveys; money
market and payment andsettlement system operations
data

Systemic risk
assessment

Daily monitoring of market
condition; monthly monitoringand meetings with financial
institutions; quarterly
updating of macroprudential
indicators; bottom-up stresstesting of systemically important financial institutions

Top-down stress testing andearly warning system, including a financial cycle index anda cross-sectoral heat map

Publiccommunication

Annual publication of
Financial Monitoring Report,
which focuses primarily on
micro-prudential and regulatory issues (and does notinclude stress test results)

Semi-annual publication of
the Financial Stability Report,
including results of stresstesting and early warning
systemMacroprudential
measures

Bilateral dialogue backed
by on-site inspections andoff-site monitoring; administrative actions if needed andactivation of Basel III macroprudential (for internationallyactive banks)

Bilateral dialogue and recommendations following on-siteexaminations and off-sitemonitoring

Informationcollection

Source: IMF Japan FSSA 2017.

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Mat thew Po ggi

In March 2016, the authorities set up a monthly meeting mechanism
to exchange information on international financial market developments, attended by senior officials from the FSA (Commissioner andthe Vice Minister for International Affairs), the BOJ (Assistant Governorand Executive Director), and the MOF (Vice Minister of Finance forInternational Affairs and the Deputy Vice Minister for Policy Planningand Coordination). The meetings, however, are also not formalized in law,generally do not have a pre-defined agenda, and are not intended to makejoint decisions on specific policies or recommendations for policy action.

The Absence of a Formal Macroprudential
Committee Exposes Japan to Stability Challenges
The absence of a macroprudential committee with a formal mandate andstrong institutional footing makes Japan’s framework an outlier among
advanced economies (Figure 4). Despite improvements to several aspectsof its macroprudential oversight capacity and inter-agency cooperation,
this absence exposes Japan to a potential inability to manage effectively
the structural financial stability challenges it faces as well as identify andaddress potential cyclical financial instability.
Figure 4. Institutional models for macroprudential policy
Feature

Japan

US

UK

EU

1. Financial stability committee

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

2. Chair of financial stability
committee

N/A

Treasury

Central Bank

CentralBank

3. Decision-taking power offinancial stability committee

N/A

Advisory andcompulsive

Advisory andcompulsive

Advisory

4. Degree of institutional
integration of central bank andsupervisory agencies

No

Partial*PartialNo

5. Explicit role of Treasury / MOF
on financial stability committee

No

Chair

MemberMember

* Excludes securities and most banks; regulates systemically-important financial institutions.
# Excludes securities.
Source: IMF Japan FSSA 2012.

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Japan’s L ong-Term Financial Stabilit y C hallenges

Japan’s financial system is currently stable, an assessment affirmed byboth the IMF and the BOJ.14 Low interest rates and demographic trends,
however, pose chronic challenges to the stability of the financial systemwith systemic risks building over time. Bank and insurer profitability is
grinding lower with narrowing net interest rate margins while the shrinking and aging population reduce demand and raise financial institutions’risk profiles in their search for yield. Demographic changes will also
likely lead to structural changes in the financial system with the role ofbanks reduced and regional and shinkin banks (a type of Japanese deposit
institution) facing consolidation and closure.15
Although Japan’s institutional framework has not so far been an impediment to financial stability, there are number of considerations why aformal structure is important for Japan to adopt. Specifically, Japan’s informal settings may not promote effectively the four elements of effective
macroprudential policymaking described above.
1. Cooperation and information-sharing among authorities. The FSA andthe BOJ oversee the financial sector with slightly differing perspectives,
and the agencies conduct differing analyses. The existing CCFS facilitates
understanding and debate, and the deep, informal networks among
bureaucrats raise information-sharing. Neither, however, can drive
forward a long-term agenda to increase the resilience of the financial
system as, for example, a growing number of regional banks (and an
expanding share of the financial system) become loss-making operations and deplete their capital. In addition, the CCFS does not include anumber of agencies that can contribute relevant information, analysis,
and policy tools such as MOF, the Deposit Insurance Corporation ofJapan (DICJ), and the Fair Trade Commission (FTC).16
2. Transparency and accountability to establish legitimacy and create
commitment to take action. In addition to well-defined objectives,transparency through financial stability reports, policy statements,and meeting records can help inform the public of the policy stance.17

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The aim of macroprudential policy communication strategies is toconvey financial stability assessments clearly, link them logically to
any policy actions taken, and manage public expectations about what
can be achieved with those policies. Accountability mechanisms to
the public and legislature can establish legitimacy and create commitment to take action.18 This fosters an effective pursuit of the policy
objective. Japan’s existing CCFS provides no transparency regarding
its agenda, has no ability to set policy, and therefore is not accountable
for macroprudential policy actions or inactions.
Macroprudential policy can be subject to biases toward inaction or
insufficiently timely action when the benefits are uncertain while thecosts are often more immediate. Using macroprudential policy toincrease resilience is typically difficult for policymakers to advance,
especially so when the challenges faced are, as in Japan’s case, longterm and chronic. Promoting anti-cyclical policies to boost systemic
resilience when economic and financial conditions are strong, butwhen risks are growing, is often difficult for policymakers to carryout. Higher capital requirements may improve the safety of thefinancial system as a whole, but it is costly for individual banks. Suchdifficulties can be compounded without effective communication to
the public and credible accountability. The FSA, if acting alone as
the singular financial regulator, would likely face resistance from thefinancial sector (and have to overcome the adverse regulator-regulated
dynamic of “industry capture”) in accepting short-term costs toaddress long-terms risks. The IMF notes that “where the supervisory
authority is a macroprudential decision-maker, coordination withother relevant authorities may be facilitated through the establishmentof a coordinating or advisory body, or by attributing a strong role tothe central bank on its decision-making board.”19
3. An ability to act based on a framework for analyzing and monitoring systemic risks, appropriate policy tools, and clear mandate ofassigned responsibility for taking macroprudential policy decisions.

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Japan’s L ong-Term Financial Stabilit y C hallenges

The absence of a formal structure reduces the authorities’ ability
to ensure that the right instruments and right policy mix are used.
Limitations and interactions between policies are complex and cangive rise to both complementarities and tensions. Conflicts may arise
when the micro- and macroprudential perspectives on the course ofpolicy action diverge, both in benign times and in times of stress.20
Formal institutional arrangements can resolve such difficulties. The
IMF has recommended in its 2017 FSAP that Japan’s macroprudential
framework could be “further strengthened by clarifying the mandateof the CCFS and proactively expanding the macroprudential toolkit.”21
In addition, the most appropriate policy tools could be outside thetwo agencies with macroprudential responsibilities—the FSA and theBOJ—and the only members of the CCFS. Involvement of additional
agencies can be useful to create political legitimacy for macroprudential
policy, and enable a macroprudential policy committee to discuss
potential measures in other fields. Finance ministries, including
Japan’s MOF, are often the most politically powerful ministry. Fiscal
policy or deployment of fiscal resources (e.g., to recapitalize a bank)is a key tool, and therefore inclusion of the MOF in macroprudential
policymaking would expand significantly the macroprudential toolkit.
Finance ministries participate in committee setups in many countries,
including as a chair (e.g., France, Germany, and the United States),a voting member (e.g., Poland), and as a non-voting member (e.g.,the United Kingdom).
4. A willingness to act with well-defined objectives and powers. A clear
mandate forms the basis of the assignment of responsibility for taking
macroprudential policy decisions. According to the IMF-FSB-BIS, anelement of effective macroprudential policy is an institutional designthat “provides the main mandate to an influential central body with
substantial convening power and the ability to take a broad view ofthe entire financial system.”22 Providing the CCFS with well-defined
objectives and powers, or establishing a financial stability committee

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Mat thew Po ggi

within the BOJ, can foster an ability and willingness to act. A properlyempowered chair of a financial stability committee can help legitimize
macroprudential policy action and push agencies away from inaction
bias with a “comply or explain” request.23 This is critical given Japan’s
policymaking history of forbearance, such as in the face of the largely
unchecked buildup in financial stress during the 1990s.24

Conclusions and Recommendations
Japan’s framework for macroprudential policy is an outlier from advanced
economy norms. Although there is no “one-size-fits-all” ideal model, theJapan’s lack of an interagency committee with strong institutional foundations
may prevent policymakers from being able to analyze effectively systemic
vulnerabilities and implement policy measures to mitigate systemic risks.
Japan faces long-term challenges from a macroprudential perspective
related to the decline in financial institutions’ profits and a decline in population. These challenges can be addressed better under a framework withappropriate institutional foundations designed to give the main mandate
to a body with a broad view of the entire financial system. Japan therefore
needs to strengthen its institutional arrangements for financial stability.
Given that international experience indicates that establishing the legal
and operational basis for macroprudential frameworks and tools can taketime (and often only move more quickly following a crisis), the authorities
should seek to reform the existing CCFS. Specifically, the CCFS:• Should be put on a strong, legal foundation with a formal mandate,clear objectives, and a policy toolkit;• Should have an expanded membership to other authorities relevant
for financial stability (e.g., MOF); and,• Develop structures as necessary to support its functioning (e.g., permanent secretariat, standing committees to conduct vulnerability
analysis). n

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Chapter Endnotes
1

Lo, Andrew, Reading about the Financial Crisis—A 21-book Review, Journal of
Economic Literature, January 2012. Prof. Lo reviewed twenty-one books on thecrisis written by academics, journalists, and one former U.S. Treasury Secretary andconcluded that no single narrative emerges.

2

International Monetary Fund-Financial Stability Board-Bank for International
Settlements, Elements of Effective Macroprudential Policies—Lessons from Experience,
August 2016.

3

International Monetary Fund, The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential
Policy, 2013.

4

IMF-FSB-BIS, 2016.

5

The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) is the central bank and integrated
financial regulator in Singapore. Placing both functions under the same authority
provides multiple vantage points for both the soundness of the financial system
as well as individual institutions in identifying potential risk that could arise fromdevelopments in the global and domestic financial systems.

6

Other authorities are only marginally involved in systemic risk monitoring and macroprudential policymaking, including: the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan(DICJ), which is entrusted with bank resolution functions; and the MOF, which has
a mandate to ensure healthy fiscal conditions, maintain trust in the currency, andpromote a stable foreign exchange market.

7

The FSA also promotes the protection of depositors, policyholders, and investors insecurities, and facilitates the smooth functioning of financial services.

8

In March 2006, the BOJ clarified its macroprudential policy objective, stating thatin assessing the outlook for economic activity and prices when making monetary
policy decisions, the Bank analyzes the risks considered most relevant to the conductof monetary policy, including potential risks to financial stability in the longer term.

9

Financial Stability Board, Peer Review of Japan, December 2016.

10 FSAPs, launched in 1999 in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, are conducted
once every five years. FSAPs provide countries with an opportunity to measure theircompliance with financial sector standards and codes, and, therefore, to benchmark
their regulatory and supervisory systems against internationally-accepted practices.
The FSAP also helps identify financial system vulnerabilities and develop appropriate
policy responses.
11 International Monetary Fund, Japan—Financial System Stability Assessment, July 2012.

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Mat thew Po ggi

12 The FSA and BOJ also strengthened their internal capacities for macroprudential
oversight. In July 2015, the FSA established the Macroprudential Policy Office (within
the Planning and Coordination Bureau) to enhance macroprudential monitoring. The
BOJ, meanwhile, bolstered its semi-annual Financial System Report (FSR) to include
top-down stress tests in 2007 and increasingly sophisticated early warning systems
from 2011.
13 The FSA’s Planning and Coordination Bureau and the BOJ’s Financial System andBank Examination Department jointly provide secretariat support to the CCFS.
14 International Monetary Fund, Japan—Financial System Stability Assessment, July
2017; and, Bank of Japan, Financial System Report, October 2017. The BOJ’s October
2017 states: “No major imbalances have been observed in financial and economic
activities, and financial institutions on the whole have generally strong resilience interms of both capital and liquidity. Thus, it can be judged that Japan’s financial system
has been maintaining stability.”
15 Nakaso, Hiroshi, New Frontier of Macroprudential Policy: Addressing Financial
Institutions’ Low Profitability and Intensified Competition, Speech, 29 November
2017.
16 One approach to mitigate systemic risks and support bank profitability at the regional
level could be through mergers. The FTC, without any mandate for macroprudential
policy, recently blocked a regional bank merger in Kyushu which was supported by
the FSA.
17 In France, Germany, and the United States such communication tools are requiredby law as accountability devices.
18 Bank for International Settlements, Macroprudential Policy Tools and Frameworks—
Progress Report to the G20, October 2011.
19 IMF, 2016.
20 BIS, 2011.
21 IMF, 2017.
22 IMF-FSB-BIS, 2016.
23 The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the United States has the power
to recommend that one or more regulatory agencies take action and can ask each
recipient to “comply or explain” (i.e., take the recommended action or explain why
it will not do so).
24 Ueda, Kazuo, The Japanese Banking Crisis in the 1990s, BIS, October 1999.

138

What Can the United States andJapan Learn from Each Other’s
Immigration Policies?
Michael Orlando SharpeIn this time of contentious debate about the costs and benefits ofimmigration, there is much that the United States and Japan can learn
from each other and their historically linked immigration regimes. The
United States and Japan, both advanced industrialized “older” liberal
democracies1 and global economic leaders have perhaps the world’s most“open” and “closed” immigration regimes. The United States is arguably the international standard bearer as the “country of immigration,”2
with a reputation for heterogeneity, a history of “E Pluribus Unum,” andsocial, political, and economic “openness.” Japan is a “latecomer or recent
country of immigration”3 known for its conservative approach to themaintenance of homogeneity, traditional roles, and social, political, andeconomic “closure.”
Both nations currently are facing the realities of their immigration
regimes. The contemporary United States struggles with demands forunskilled and skilled labor, increasing diversity, a large undocumented
population, immigration reform, job displacement, and retiring baby
boomers exiting the workforce. Many in the United States are concerned
about “immigrants taking away jobs and lowering wages,” “the sleeping

139Michael Orl and o Sharpe

giant” of Latino population growth, and the potentially transformative
effects of the projected continued “browning” of its “multicultural”
society. Under President Trump, the United States appears poised for acontraction of its immigration regime.
Japan, ironically, faces a population crisis and anxiety about the advantages and disadvantages of much needed immigration and the impact on
its “homogeneous” society.4 Japan has one the world’s largest elderly andrapidly aging populations, longest life expectancy, and lowest birthrates.
As Japan’s baby boomers retire, there will not be enough young people tosupport the social welfare system, which heightens concerns about available labor and tax revenue, the viability of the overburdened health careand pension systems, and long-term productivity. Japan’s Prime Minister
Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party and other political actors seek
to balance the country’s self-perception of homogeneity and shrinking
population with demands for unskilled and skilled labor and measures toallow for an increasing foreign worker population. This suggests a halting
accommodation of diversity and possible departure from its previous,
rather closed immigration regime.5
Both the United States and Japan wrestle with the “liberal paradox”6 ofeconomic openness and political closure to protect the legitimacy of theliberal state. As such, the United States and Japan have much to contributeto one another’s as well as the world’s policy discussions around immigration and refugees. This policy paper will first address the intertwined
histories of the United States’ and Japan’s respective immigration policies
and the establishment by postwar U.S. and Japanese authorities of Japan’s
security driven immigration regime. It will then provide backgroundon the current systems of immigration in the United States and Japan.
The paper will conclude with a discussion of what the United States andJapan can learn from one another in the way of policy recommendations.

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C omparing U.S. and Japanese Immigration Policies

The Intertwined Histories of U.S. and Japan
Immigration Policy
The immigration policies of the United States and Japan are historicallyintertwined. For decades, U.S. immigration policy involved selection
based on race and ethnicity and many policies specifically barred entryof Asians. It was only in the 1950s and ‘60s that the United States began
to move away from this approach. with the passage of the Hart-Celler
Immigration Act of 1965, which did away with national origins quotas
and focused on family reunification and attracting skilled labor.7 Thisultimately changed the demographic makeup of the United States andproduced its current multicultural society with citizens and noncitizens
from virtually every part of the world.
Japan remained closed to the outside world for much of its history. There
was little to no emigration/immigration until the Meiji Restoration of
1868 that initiated Japan’s modern state. This was preceded by the isolationism of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1867), American “gun boat”
diplomacy, and Japan’s opening with United States Commodore Perry’s
black-ship expeditions of the 1850s. Not long after the Meiji Restoration,
the first wave of Japanese emigration was organized by emigration companies with the United States and Hawaii as the initial destinations. In
1885, the first acknowledged group of Japanese emigrants was a group ofyoung unmarried males recruited to work in Hawaiian sugar plantations
as contract laborers.8 The United States was a main destination until the
1900s when the United States wanted to limit Asian immigration. The
Chinese Exclusion Act made it possible for Japanese to be replacement
workers, but—prompted by anti-Japanese nativism—the Gentleman’s
Agreement of 1907–1908 redirected Japanese migration to Latin America,
which was then facing labor shortages due to the prohibition of Africanslavery. For these reasons, there are large Japanese descendant (Nikkiejin)
overseas communities in the United States and Latin America.

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Michael Orl and o Sharpe

Following its defeat in World War II, Japan came under Allied occupationand this lasted until 1952. The postwar Japanese and American authorities discouraged labor migration and enforced very strict immigration
and border control. For these reasons, postwar Japan did not experience significant labor migration and its immigration policy has beenformulated around the idea of public order and not integration. The 1951
Immigration Control Regulation and the 1952 Foreign Registration Law
and then Regulation were established to avoid long-term settlement.9 In
the postwar reconstruction, both the Japanese and U.S. authorities madeuse of the idea of Japanese homogeneity for the purposes of politicalconsolidation in the face of communist external and internal threats.10
The collapse of the empire and reduction of ethnic diversity triggered ”theunmixing of Japan” and embrace of homogeneity.11 This helped to set thestage for much of Japan’s contemporary immigration policy.

Contemporary U.S. and Japanese
Immigration Policy
The United States has a population of 320 million. In 2015, someforty-three million foreign born made up nearly 14 percent of the total
population. This included 20.7 million naturalized citizens, 11.1 million unauthorized, 13.1 million permanent residents, and 1.7 million on
temporary visas. The United States admitted around 70,000 refugees in2015. Some 650,000 people were naturalized in 2014, bringing the total
number of naturalized citizens to 20 million or nearly half the immigrant
population.12 The Hart-Celler Immigration Act of 1965 still defines muchof U.S. immigration policy. The United States has around 185 visa categories that can be broken down in terms of immigrant (for permanent
residence) and non-immigrant (for temporary stays including tourism,
work, or business). The largest legal immigrant category remains “family
reunification,” comprising some two-thirds of legal immigration. There
are also visas that facilitate formal guest worker programs for high- (e.g.,
H1B) and low-skilled workers (e.g., H2A). The 14th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution establishes a jus soli (law of the soil) regime, meaning142

C omparing U.S. and Japanese Immigration Policies

that citizenship is granted at birth on the soil of the territory and its
possessions or to the children of a U.S. citizen.
Japan’s contemporary immigration policy includes a prohibition onmost unskilled foreign workers. Japan had a population of 127 million in 2016, with some 2.9 million foreigners (including short-term
stay such as tourists and long-term residents), mostly from Asia,13 orroughly 2.3% of the total Japanese population. There were some 62,818
unauthorized foreign residents who overstayed their visas in 2016.14
Some 40,000 were granted permanent residency each year between
2011–2015.15. The once very strict naturalization process has been eased
and this has resonated with particular increases from the long resident
Zainichi Korean community, descendants of former colonized Koreans,many of whom do not have Japanese nationality.16 Although the naturalization process has been liberalized and some 99% of applications
are approved, only about 1000 people were granted Japanese nationality
between 2010–2016 17. Naturalization is still a very involved process
and permanent residence a bit easier, so most people opt for the latter.
Between 1990–2016, the foreign population increased by roughly 160
percent.18 Japan contributes a great deal of money to internationalorganizations but accepts very few refugees. In fact, Japan took in justtwenty-seven refugees in 2015.
In reaction to increasing foreign workers, the 1990 Immigration Control
and Refugee Recognition Act (hereafter 1990 Immigration Act) tightened
visa requirements and established the teijusha (long-term residence) visa
that allows Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants) to legally reside and work inJapan.19 Spouses and children are also able to stay for up to one year bothwith unlimited renewals. The 1990 Immigration Act essentially established a “side door” for cheap foreign labor and thousands of Nikkeijinfrom Latin America emigrated to Japan.20 Additionally, a trainee program
was later established for pre-college workers from developing countries
to work less than full-time as “interns” for up to three years at “trainee”
wages.21 By 2016, there were roughly 228,589 “trainees”’ in Japan.22 In

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Michael Orl and o Sharpe

the wake of the 2008 world financial crisis with many Latin American
Nikkeijin being laid off, the government established the Kikoku Shien Jigyo(Help Return Program) program that enabled unemployed repatriating
Latin American Nikkeijin to receive about $3,000 per person plus $2,000
for each dependent family member provided they do not reenter Japan
under the same visa status.23 The program ended with some 21,675 remigrants.24 Japan’s immigration regime has many employment-based visas
categories for the highly skilled, such as professor, journalist, engineer/humanities, etc., entertainer, some family related immigrant categories,e.g., “dependent,” “spouse or child of Japanese national,” “spouse of permanent resident,” as well as the defacto guest worker programs for Nikkeijin
and trainees. Japan has a jus sanguinus (law of the blood) regime fornationality, meaning citizenship is granted by blood or citizenship of theparent(s) and not by place of birth. There is no “as of right” acquisition of
citizenship for the second generation born in Japan. With the exception of
the Nikkeijin, Japan is the only advanced industrialized liberal democracythat does not grant family reunification rights.25

What Can Japan Learn from U.S.
Immigration Policy?
Currently, there is much anti-immigrant rhetoric in the United States,
including calls for building a Mexican border wall and excluding certain
groups. In some ways, this rhetoric is a throwback to the nativist andanti-immigrant Know Nothing party of the 1850’s and a much earlier
era of U.S. foreign policy isolationism. Despite this, there is much Japan
can learn from the United States. The U.S. was number one out of the top
twenty-five immigration destination countries in 2015,26 and the U.S.
experience demonstrates that immigration brings more benefits thanliabilities. While some argue the potentially negative effects of undocumented immigration in response to labor demand such as depressed
wages for low skilled and less educated natives, including some historically marginalized groups such as Native Americans and African
Americans, others contend it has long-term benefits for all. A 2017144

C omparing U.S. and Japanese Immigration Policies

report by the National Academy of Sciences concluded immigration is
critical to U.S. economic growth and that immigrant labor has helped
the United States avoid the demographic problems of other countries
with aging populations and falling consumption.27 Additionally, humancapital brought by high skilled immigrants contributes to U.S. capacity
for innovation, entrepreneurship, and technological advancement. The
Center for American Progress (2017) reports immigrants added some$2 trillion to U.S. GDP in 2016.28 In 2010, 40 percent of Fortune 500
companies were founded by immigrants and their children. Fewer than
one in five immigrants live in poverty. The poverty rate in 2015 for
immigrants was 17.3 percent, as opposed to 14.3 percent for the native
born. Working class immigrants use social programs at similar or lower
rates than the U.S. born. Immigrants are less likely to commit crimes or
be incarcerated than the U.S. born. Immigration has a small but positive
impact on U.S. wages in the long run. Immigrants complement rather
than compete against native workers.29
A 2017 New York Times op-ed by retired admiral and former chairmanof the joint chiefs of staff Michael Mullen notes the benefits of accepting refugees include revitalizing U.S. democracy, preserving or restoringstability in volatile parts of the world, fostering respect, and sending amessage of support to countries whose cooperation is needed on a wide
range of issues, such as trade pacts, military coalitions, and peace deals.30
Moreover, Mullen notes that refugees become hardworking Americans
and added some $63 billion to the U.S. economy between 2005–2014.
Immigrants will remain a very important part of the U.S. economy overthe next twenty years as baby boomers retire and people are needed to filljobs. It is estimated that between 2015–2066, immigrants and their children will account for some 88 percent of U.S. population growth and havemuch to contribute to the maintenance and growth of the U.S. economy.31
A key lesson learned from the U.S. case for Japan is that immigration andaccess to legal citizenship is generally beneficial. Limiting immigration
to a trickle or replacing workers with robots will not provide the taxes,
pension fund support, innovations, entrepreneurship or new workers

145Michael Orl and o Sharpe

Japan needs. But when it comes to immigrant integration, the Japanesecontext might necessitate more uniform measures than the American
laissez faire approach.

What Can the United States Learn fromJapan’s Immigration Policy?
The subject of what the United States can learn from Japan in its immigration policy is not often discussed. Some Japanese and U.S. politiciansand others, more recently from the U.S. alt-right, look to Japan’s standing
as one of the world’s most highly ordered, safe, and low-crime societies
and attribute these qualities and Japan’s postwar economic success to its
homogeneity and closure.32 Japan’s case informs U.S. policymakers thata highly restrictive immigration regime may appear to be positive in the
short run and may satisfy certain constituencies, but could be a policy
failure for a country’s long-term demographic and economic future. The
United Nations claims that Japan will need seventeen million foreigners
by 2050 to address population levels, worker scarcity, falling demand, anda possible collapse of the pension system.33 Hidenori Sakanaka (2005), aformer Ministry of Justice official and director of the Immigration Bureau,
has argued that Japan should become an “immigration nation” and welcome twenty million immigrants in the next fifty years to help prevent
demographic collapse.34 The IMD World Talent Ranking’s assessment ofcountries’ attractiveness to foreign talent lists Japan as the last choice inAsia for many skilled foreign workers. Reporter Noah Smith contends
this is due to the perception of a closed society as well as the disincentivesof language difficulties, long hours, and low pay.35
As President Trump tries to limit foreign talent coming to the United States,
Japan’s Prime Minister Abe and his LDP seem to acknowledge the need
to attract high skilled foreign labor. Like the United States, Japan lacks anational integration policy. Local governments have born much of theburden of immigration in Japan and have led the charge in pressing thenational government to come up with more comprehensive policies. Some146

C omparing U.S. and Japanese Immigration Policies

advocates argue Japan’s Local Government Act mandates local authorities ensure the “safety, health, and welfare of all local citizens, including
non-Japanese” and view foreign residents as “local citizens.”36 Japanesemunicipalities have used existing national government “internationalization policies” in ways that provide outreach to foreigners. Several local
governments use international associations to provide language training
and assistance, employment and psychological counseling, multilingual
telephone help lines, and “living guides” about life and basic services inJapan.37 Many problems, particularly for Latin American Nikkeijin foreign
residents, were initially addressed in a policy document demanding moreassistance from the national government. This document, known as the“Hamamatusu Declaration,” was created in 2001 by thirteen cities thatcomprised the Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreigner
Population (CLCF).38 These cities (which by 2004 became sixteen and latereighteen cities) acted together to propose policies that strive for “social
cohesion” and called on national and prefectural governments to reformpublic education, national health insurance, and foreign registration. In
another major meeting of CLCF hosted by Toyota City in 2004, they suggested a national office to coordinate these policies for foreigners.39
The United States can benefit from some of Japan’s municipal innovation in
addressing the needs of noncitizen immigrants such as creating a consultative voice in the form of foreign residents assemblies, local referenda, andombudsmen. The first foreign residents assembly, borrowed from similar
local efforts for noncitizens in Europe, was established in 1996 by Kawasaki
City as an initiative between the mostly noncitizen local Zainichi Korean
community (descendants of former colonized Koreans) and Japanese.
This provided a means for noncitizen residents to interact with the local
municipal government about their concerns as local citizens and is now replicated in several municipalities across the country. In the foreign residents
assemblies of Kawasaki and Hamamatsu, two municipalities with higher
concentrations of foreign residents, the assemblies range in size from ten to
twenty-six people. They meet between once and several times a year, pass
proposals for consideration by the mayor or city council, and have “open147Michael Orl and o Sharpe

discussions” to allow other local residents to participate. A proposal implemented by both the Kawasaki and Hamamatsu foreign residents assemblies
was to use the far easier phonetic Hiragana characters (the most basic ofJapanese written script) on top of regular written Japanese in some policy
documents to make them easier for foreigners to read. Another measureachieved by the Kawasaki City foreign residents assembly combats housing
discrimination by having the local government contract with a guarantor
so that foreign residents, the elderly, and the disabled can access housing
without going through the difficult process of finding a guarantor. In the
United States, noncitizens pay certain taxes, but cannot vote in federal
elections and generally do not have the franchise in local elections. As theUnited States has a very large noncitizen population foreign residences
assemblies could be adopted by municipalities as a measure to facilitate
their participation and representation.
Although there are local initiatives to enfranchise noncitizens in Marylandand elsewhere, the move to grant noncitizens voting rights may be further
along in Japan than in the United States. It is surprising that there has
been ongoing discussion in the Japanese legislature about voting rights for
noncitizen permanent residents. The Komeito Party has long advocated forvoting rights for Zainichi Koreans and other permanent residents. Someposit it is in the interest of the party to promote these types of bills to
capture the votes of the many Zainichi Korean members of Sokka Gakkai,
Komeito’s affiliated Buddhist organization. Many bills around foreign
suffrage have been aimed at “permanent residents” namely the Zainichi
Korean “special permanent residents.” Another mechanism for foreign
noncitizen participation that could adapted from Japanese local governments are local referenda. In 2002, the town of Maibara in Shiga Prefecture
enacted a “Residents Voting Ordinance” in which residents were granted
voting rights along with other residents for the first time. From 2002–2005,
over two hundred municipalities (mostly for permanent residents) passed
resident voting ordinances that recognize the right of foreign residents tovote. For most, these were ordinances to hold a “local referendum by residents” on the merger of local municipalities, establishment of nuclear power148

C omparing U.S. and Japanese Immigration Policies

plants or garbage incineration facilities. It is notable that by 1971 Kawasaki,
Sapporo, and Yokohama were providing National Health Insurance to all
registered foreigners against the wishes of the national government.40
Despite the opposition, beginning with Kawasaki City in 1996, during the
1990s several local governments including Osaka, and Kyoto eliminatedthe nationality clause and allowed foreign nationals to hold civil service
jobs.41 Additionally, some municipalities have established local ombudsman
to allow foreign residents and others to lodge complaints.
Local governments have pushed the national government to adapt throughtheir accommodation of Nikkeijin and other foreigners. By 2008, the national
government openly acknowledged the need for skilled foreign workers
as well as efforts to reduce undocumented immigrants. In the post 2008
crisis, the LDP began to enact coordinated reforms and the Democratic
Party of Japan built on these with a view towards societal integration that“recognized foreigners as settlers.”42 Japan’s first national measure to support recent immigrants was in response to the 2008 financial crisis, and it
included children’s education, language training, employment and training
support, housing, and paid voluntary return for Latin American Nikkeijin.43
In April 2009, the Cabinet Office initiated the “Portal Site for Policies for
Foreign Residents” website44 in multiple languages and the “Council for the
Promotion of Measures for Foreign Residents. Appeals by local officials, theMinistry of International Affairs and Communications, and the Conferenceof Cities resulted in the creation of a new foreign registration system in 2012.
The new national system replaced the old local government-based alien
registration system, eliminated the local fingerprinting requirement which
is now done at the airport, and extended the maximum stay for foreign
residents from three to five years.45 Presumably, this was done because the
Immigration Bureau wanted help in monitoring foreigners. However, local
governments also needed a more accurate system to deliver social services
to the foreign community.46 Since 2012, Japan has introduced a point based
immigration system with easier access to permanent residency after one
year (no longer five years) to attract high skilled foreign talent. Additionally,
the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (IPSS)

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notes such developments as: inclusion of foreign residents into the Basic
Resident Registration (July 2012), governmental targets to increase thenumber of foreign students, reduction of minimum requirements for thepension premium from twenty-five to ten years (August 2017), introductionof the social security and tax number system “My number” (January 2016),
and expansion of international security agreements.47 Japan is making
hesitant and slow strides towards attracting and integrating foreigners,
with particular emphasis on those with specialized training, skills, andknowledge.
In conclusion, as the United States closes to immigration, Japan seems to
be reluctantly opening, at least for the highly skilled. The United States
and Japan can draw on their relative experiences and inform each other’s
immigration policies. Although there are marked differences in theirrespective immigration regimes and self-understandings, both countries share the problem of retiring baby boomers leaving the workforce
and both lack a national immigrant integration policy. As Japan strives
to remedy its shrinking population with more foreign residents, it canbenefit from U.S.-accumulated knowledge on immigration, mechanisms
to streamline access to naturalization and citizenship, regularizing the
undocumented, refugee acceptance, and how to avoid the pitfalls of ethnic
exclusion and intolerance. The United States has much to gain from Japanand its experience with the demographic pressures caused by highly
restrictive immigration. With its very large noncitizen immigrant andundocumented populations, the United States can enhance its immigration efforts by observing and emulating some of Japan’s local governments’efforts to integrate noncitizen immigrants as a step towards these tax
payers’ participation and representation. While Japan will likely have toconsider accepting more refugees as a matter of international credibility,
the United States should better weigh its defunding and withdrawal frominternational organizations and agreements for the same reason. This
exchange of the United States and Japan on immigration policies has thepotential to yield best practices on immigration and integration for thetwo countries and the world. n

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Chapter Endnotes
1

Dahl, Robert A. 1989. Democracy and Its Critics. New Haven and London: Yale
University Press.

2

Cornelius, Wayne A., Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. 1994. Controlling
Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

3

Cornelius, Wayne A., Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifield. 1994. Controlling
Immigration: A Global Perspective. Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press.; Hollifield, James F., Pia M. Orrenius, and Philip L. Martin, eds. 2014.
Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, 2nd Edition. Stanford, Calif:
Stanford University Press.

4

Sharpe, Michael O. 2014. Postcolonial Citizens and Ethnic Migration: the Netherlands
and Japan in the Age of Globalization. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
pp. i-xii, 1–270.; Hollifield, James F. and Michael O. Sharpe. September, 2017. “Japanas an Emerging Migration State,” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume
17, Issue 3, pp. 371–400.

5Sharpe, Michael O. 2014. Postcolonial Citizens and Ethnic Migration: the Netherlands
and Japan in the Age of Globalization. Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
pp. i-xii, 1–270.

6

Hollifield, James F. 1992. Immigrants, Markets and States: The Political Economy of
Postwar Europe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

7

King, Desmond S. 2000. Making Americans: Immigration, Race and the Diverse
Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.; FitzGerald, David S. andDavid Cook-Martin. 2014. Culling the Masses: The Democratic Origins of Racist
Immigration Policy in the Americas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

8

Yamanaka, Keiko. “I will go home, but when?”: labor migration and circular diaspora
formation by Japanese Brazilians in Japan,” Douglass, Mike and Glenda S. Roberts.
(eds.) 2000. Japan and Global Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of aMulticultural Society. London and New York: Routledge, pg. 127.

9

Komai, Hiroshi. 2001. Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan. (Translated by Jens
Wilkinson). Melbourne, Australia: Trans Pacific Press., pgs. 14–15.

10 Kashiwazaki, Chikako, “Citizenship in Japan: Legal Practice and Contemporary
Development,” pg. 439 in Aleinikoff, T. Alexander and Douglas Klusmeyer (eds.)
2000. From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World. Washington,
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
11 Lie, Jon. 2001. Multiethnic Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
12 U.S. Census (2015) Bureau of the Census, Selected Characteristics of the Native andForeign Born Populations: 2015 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates (U.S.

151

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Department of Commerce, 2015) https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/
jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_1YR_S0501&prodType=table.
13 Japan Ministry of Justice, 2016a. Data provided by Japan Ministry of Justice andaccessed on E-Stat Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan, the largest foreign groups(including short-term stay such as tourists and long-term residents), http://www.
estat.go.jp/SG1/estat/GL08020103.do?_toGL08020103_&listID=000001177523&requestSender=dsearch.
14 Ministry of Justice, 2016b. Illegal foreign residents, http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001211227.pdf.
15 Ministry of Justice, 2016c. Permanent Residency, http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001211227.pdf.
16 Green, David, March 28, 2017. “As Its Population Ages, Japan Quietly Turns to
Immigration, Migration Policy Institute” https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
its-population-ages-japan-quietly-turns-immigration.
17 Ministry of Justice, 2016d. Naturalization, http://www.moj.go.jp/MINJI/toukei_t_
minj03.html; Green, David, March 28, 2017. “As Its Population Ages, Japan Quietly
Turns to Immigration,” Migration Policy Institute, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/
article/its-population-ages-japan-quietly-turns-immigration.
18 Green, David, March 28, 2017. “As Its Population Ages, Japan Quietly Turns to
Immigration,” Migration Policy Institute, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
its-population-ages-japan-quietly-turns-immigration.
19 Tsuda, Takeyuki. 1999. “The Motivation to Migrate: The Ethnic and Sociocultural
Constitution of the Japanese-Brazilian Return-Migration System,” Economic Development
and Cultural Change 48.1 (October): pp. 1–31.; Tsuda, Takeyuki. 2003. Strangers in theEthnic Homeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective.
New York: Columbia University Press.; Takao, Yasuo. 2003. “Foreigners’ Rights inJapan; Beneficiaries to Participants,” Asian Survey 43.3 (May/June): 527–52.; Kajita,
Takamachi, Tanno Kiyoto, and Higuchi Naoto. 2005. Kao no mienai teijuka. Nagoya:
Nagoya University Press.; Sharpe, Michael O. “What Does Blood Membership Meanin Political Terms: The Political Incorporation of Latin American Nikkeijin (JapaneseDescendants) in Japan 1990–2004,” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Volume 12,
Issue 1, February, 2011, pp. 113–142.; Sharpe, Michael O. 2014. Postcolonial Citizens andEthnic Migration: the Netherlands and Japan in the Age of Globalization. Houndmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. i-xii, 1–270.
20 Brody, Betsy. 2002. Opening the Door: Immigration, Ethnicity, and Globalizationin Japan. New York: Routledge; Tsuda, Takeyuki. 2003. Strangers in the EthnicHomeland: Japanese Brazilian Return Migration in Transnational Perspective. New
York: Columbia University Press; Sharpe, Michael O. “What Does Blood Membership
Mean in Political Terms: The Political Incorporation of Latin American Nikkeijin(Japanese Descendants) in Japan 1990–2004,” Japanese Journal of Political Science,
Volume 12, Issue 1, February, 2011, pp. 113–142.

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21 Komai, Hiroshi. 2001. Foreign Migrants in Contemporary Japan. (Translated by Jens
Wilkinson). Melbourne, Australia: Trans Pacific Press.
22 Ministry of Justice, 2016e. Data provided by Japan Ministry of Justice and accessed on
E-Stat Portal Site of Official Statistics of Japan, Data on Trainees, http://www.e-stat.
go.jp/SG1/estat/GL08020103.do?_toGL08020103_&listID=000001177523&request
Sender=dsearch,;
23 Masters, Coco. 2009. ‘Japan to Immigrants: Thanks, But You Can Go Home Now’, Time
(20 April); Sharpe, Michael O. “When Ethnic Returnees are Defacto Guestworkers:
What does the introduction of Japanese Nikkeijin (Japanese descendants) (LAN)suggest for Japan’s definition of nationality, citizenship and immigration policy?,”
Policy and Society Volume 29, Issue 4, November, 2010, pp. 357–369.
24 Milly, Deborah J. 2014. New Policies for New Residents: Immigrants, Advocacy, andGovernance in Japan and Beyond. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pg.
173.
25 Chung, Erin Aeran. 2010. Immigration and Citizenship in Japan. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
26 Migration Policy Institute, 2015. “Top 25 Destinations of International
Migrants”, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/
top-25-destinations-international-migrants.
27 National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2017. The Economic
and Fiscal Consequences of Immigration. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press. Htpps://doi.orh/10.17226/23550.
28 Center for American Progress, 2017. “The Facts on Immigration: 2017 Edition,”
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/04/20/430736/
facts-immigration-today-2017-edition/.
29 Center for American Progress, 2017. “The Facts on Immigration: 2017 Edition,”
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/04/20/430736/
facts-immigration-today-2017-edition/.
30 Mullen, Michael C. 9/9/2017. “The Wrong Time to Cut Back on Refugees,” The New
York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/29/opinion/refugee-resettlementtrump.html.
31 Center for American Progress, 2017. “The Facts on Immigration: 2017 Edition,”
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/reports/2017/04/20/430736/
facts-immigration-today-2017-edition/.
32 Lie, Jon. 2001. Multiethnic Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
33 United Nations Population Division. 2001. Replacement Migration: Is it a solution to
declining and ageing populations? New York: UN Publications; French, Howard. (July24, 2003) “Insular Japan Needs, but Resists Immigration,” The New York Times, pp. 1–3.

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34 Sakanaka, Hidenori. 2005. Nyukan Senki: Zainichi sabetsu, Nikkeijin mondai, gaikokujin hanzai to, Nihon no kin-mirai. Kodansha.; Hollifield, James F. and Michael
O. Sharpe. September, 2017. “Japan as an Emerging Migration State,” International
Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Volume 17, Issue 3, pp. 371–400.
35 Smith, Nathan, November 29, 2017. “Japan Wants Immigrants: The Feeling Isn’t
Mutual,” Bloomberg View, https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017–11–30/
japan-wants-immigrants-the-feeling-isn-t-mutual.
36 Pak, Katherine, Tegtmeyer. 2000. “Foreigners Are Local Citizens, Too: Local
Governments Respond to International Migration in Japan,” in Japan and Global
Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, ed. Mike
Douglass and Glenda S. Roberts (London: Routledge), pg. 252.
37 Pak, Katherine, Tegtmeyer. 2000. “Foreigners Are Local Citizens, Too: Local
Governments Respond to International Migration in Japan,” in Japan and Global
Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, ed. Mike
Douglass and Glenda S. Roberts (London: Routledge); Pak, Katherine, Tegtmeyer.
2006; “Cities and Local Citizenship in Japan: Overcoming Nationality,” in Local
Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in Comparative Perspective,
ed. Takeyuki Tsuda (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books); Takao, Yasuo. 2003. “Foreigners’
Rights in Japan; Beneficiaries to Participants,” Asian Survey 43.3 (May/June), pg. 530.
38 Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreigner Population. “Hamamatsu
Declaration and Proposals. October 19, 2001. ACT City Hamamatsu Congress Center.
39 Pak, Katherine, Tegtmeyer. 2006. “Cities and Local Citizenship in Japan: Overcoming
Nationality,” in Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in
Comparative Perspective, ed. Takeyuki Tsuda (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books), pg.
68.
40 Takao, Yasuo. 2003. “Foreigners’ Rights in Japan; Beneficiaries to Participants,” Asian
Survey 43.3 (May/June), pg. 541.
41 Usui, Chikako. 2006. “Japan’s Demographic Future and the Challenge of Foreign
Workers,” in Local Citizenship in Recent Countries of Immigration: Japan in
Comparative Perspective, ed. Takeyuki Tsuda (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books),
pg. 51.
42 Milly, Deborah J. 2014. New Policies for New Residents: Immigrants, Advocacy, andGovernance in Japan and Beyond. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pg. 61.
43 Milly, Deborah J. 2014. New Policies for New Residents: Immigrants, Advocacy, andGovernance in Japan and Beyond. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
pg. 174; Takenoshita, Hirohisa. 2015. “Labor Market Structure. Welfare Policy, andIntegration: Brazilian Immigrants During the Economic Downturn,” in Isjikawa,
Yoshitaka (ed.) 2015. International Migrants in Japan: Contributions in an Era ofPopulation Decline. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, pg. 249.

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44 http://www8.cao.go.jp/teiju-portal/eng/index.html, (Accessed Cabinet Office,
Government of Japan website, April 11, 2010).
45 Green, David, March 28, 2017. “As Its Population Ages, Japan Quietly Turns to
Immigration, Migration Policy Institute,” https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/
its-population-ages-japan-quietly-turns-immigration.
46 Milly, Deborah J. 2014. New Policies for New Residents: Immigrants, Advocacy,
and Governance in Japan and Beyond. Ithaca and London: Cornell University
Press, pg. 86.
47 Hayashi, Reiko. 2017. “Population Dynamics and Policy Challenges in Japan,”Presentation at Next Generation Public Intellectual Network of the Japan Foundation
Center for Global Partnership, held on 12 June 2017 at Japan Foundation Headquarters,
Tokyo, Japan.

155

Religious Freedom and the
U.S.-Japan Alliance
Jolyon Thomas

Executive Summary
Since 1998, the United States Commission on International Religious
Freedom (USCIRF) and the United States Department of State havegenerated annual reports about the state of religious freedom worldwide. In addition to describing global trends, these reports include listsof “Countries of Particular Concern” (CPCs) that are allegedly guilty ofviolating religious freedom principles. While the instances of oppression
or discrimination highlighted in the reports are indeed concerning, thereports usually focus on sensational, violent, and extralegal infringementson religious freedom in countries that are ideologically distant from theUnited States. Meanwhile, the reports are silent on religious freedom disputes within American borders, and they consistently downplay religious
freedom complaints leveled against close U.S. allies.
Because international religious freedom reports are primed to look forreligious freedom abuses, they overlook a deeper, two-fold problem: 1)
religious freedom guarantees are only as good as the legal definitions that
inform them, including definitions of “religion,” “freedom,” “rights,” andwho counts as a citizen; and 2) policies that affect the ability of individuals

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to be free can seem unremarkable rather than sensational and may even
use liberal language to deny individuals’ rights. This policy brief uses thecase of Japan, a close American ally generally deemed “safe” for religion,
to argue that international religious freedom (IRF) policy must not besolely based on policing flagrant abuses of religious freedom. IRF policy
must also be sensitive to how political and legal interpretations of specific practices as “religion” or “not-religion” can have serious, negative
effects for religious minorities and other stakeholders. I focus on religious
freedom here because the United States has been particularly invested inprotecting this right for vulnerable populations in other countries, but
my analysis has implications for rights and liberties in general.

Discussion
Few people would think of Japan as a place where religious freedom isunder threat. By the numbers, the country is one of the least religious in
the world, featuring levels of professed belief and affiliation that rarely
rise above about a quarter of the population. If asked about the current
state of religious freedom in Japan, most professional observers of thecountry would probably point out that promoting religious freedom was acentral pillar of the policies implemented during the U.S-led Allied occupation of Japan (1945–1952) and that religious freedom has been firmly
enshrined in Japan’s postwar constitution since 1947. Unlike Myanmar,
China, the Central African Republic, Syria, and Vietnam, Japan does notappear as a “country of particular concern” in the annual report producedby the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom(USCIRF).1 Indeed, the only two places where Japan appeared in theCommission’s 2017 report were in reference to regional concerns about
North Korea, another country on the Commission’s list of bad actors.2 It
would seem that Japan is a relatively safe place for religion.
Yet some observers regard recent moves by the Shinzo Abe administration
as threats to religious freedom. Last June, the Japanese Federation of New
Religious Organizations submitted a complaint to Abe decrying proposed158

R eligious Freed om and the U.S.-Japan Allianceanti-conspiracy legislation as inimical to religious freedom and reminiscentof the 1925 Peace Preservation Law that allowed the imperial Japanese state
to crack down on minority religious movements.3 The controversial billpassed in the Japanese Diet (Parliament) later that month, with lawmakers citing global antiterrorism efforts and security concerns regarding theupcoming 2020 Olympics as rationales for their votes in favor.4 “Trust us todo the right thing,” they seemed to say, but religious groups and journalists
have greeted that message with justifiable suspicion.5
Prime Minister Abe’s cozy relationships with conservative Shinto organizations have also attracted negative attention, and it is common to readthat his personal politics presage a return to the so-called State Shinto of
wartime Japan.6 Indeed, Abe’s decision to host the 2016 G7 summit at theIse Shrines seems to have been a brazen attempt to legitimize a particularvariant of nationalist Shinto in the eyes of the international community,and his annual New Year’s visits to those shrines link Shinto ritual tothe public calendar and the theater of state.7 People who study Japanesereligion and politics have therefore eyed Abe’s close connections with
the Shinto Seiji Renmei (Shinto Association for Spiritual Leadership, orSAS) with suspicion.8 They expect Abe and his cabinet to try to institutethrough constitutional revision something amounting to a reproductionof the wartime status quo, when shrine rites formed the cornerstoneof Japanese civic rituals and Shinto-based mythology informed publicschool education.
Journalists in Japan and overseas have also picked up this narrative. An
article in the Daily Beast published in July 2016 described Nippon Kaigi(the Japan Council), another lobby with close ties to Abe and many
Japanese legislators, as a secret “cult” designed to restore Japan’s wartime
past.9 Revelations in late 2016 that the Osaka Prefectural Government gavea preferential land deal to the private education corporation Moritomo
Academy under alleged pressure from Abe and his wife Akie have served
as fodder for concerns that Abe’s long-term goal is to erode the firm separation of religion from the state enshrined in Japan’s postwar constitution.

159

Jolyon Thomas(The Moritomo Academy affiliate Tsukamoto Kindergarten espouses a
militarist ethic reminiscent of Japan’s wartime past; students venerate theimperial portrait and recite the 1890 Imperial Rescript on Education.)
Recent revelations that government officials doctored documents related
to the controversial land deal so as to remove explicit references to both
the Abes and to Nippon Kaigi have prolonged the scandal.
The Prime Minister’s actions have led to questions about his ulterior
motives, but the problem is really about how “religion” is defined, both ineveryday conversation and in the law. Roughly 70–80 percent of Japanesepeople do not identify as religious, but a majority engage in ritual practices that they are likely to interpret as “custom” rather than “religion.”
Prime Minister Abe and organizations like SAS exploit this terminologicalambiguity to portray a particular type of Shinto as the core of Japaneseculture, a repository of national traditions, and as a central part of civic
life. This move can come at the expense of minority religious positions.
Yet to be clear, the widespread narrative about the resurgence of so-called
State Shinto is a little too pat. First, like much conservative rhetoric, thefocus on recovering a “beautiful Japan of which people can be proud” (touse the preferred language of Shinto political lobbies like SAS) does not
so much attempt to reproduce Japan’s past as it aims to create what proponents see as an ideal future. Second, while the effort to normalize practices
associated with Shinto is certainly evident on parts of the Japanese right,
it is striking that few Japanese people use the language of “religion” when
discussing the importance of revering Japan’s war dead at the controversial
Yasukuni Shrine, venerating the emperor, or protecting good old Japanesefamily values through moral education. Third, while there is plenty toconcern Japan’s citizens about the prospect of constitutional revision in
the wake of Abe’s announcement that he would seek constitutional revision by 2020, the main issue on everyone’s minds seems to be the fate of
the famed Article 9 that renounces Japan’s capacity to wage war. Indeed,a March 2017 survey conducted by Japan’s national broadcaster NHK
asked respondents several questions about the prospect of constitutional160

R eligious Freed om and the U.S.-Japan Alliancerevision, but the only specific constitutional clause discussed in the survey
was Article 9.10 The LDP’s previous proposals to diminish the constitutional focus on individual rights and liberties by redefining the basic legal
unit of society as the household and to subtly tweak the constitutional
language regarding human rights received no specific attention in the
NHK survey. In other words, the hot-button issue of Article 9 distracts
from other issues, including legitimate concerns that the LDP might use
security concerns to erode civil liberties such as religious freedom. Abe
is not alone in treating Shinto ritual practices as nonreligious cultural
traditions, but citizens’ and pressure groups’ complaints are no less serious
for this fact. It is this point that I want to focus on here.
One reason religious freedom issues are complicated in Japan lies in how
the constitution imagines religion and rights. The postwar Japanese constitution is rare among constitutions in the world for two reasons. First, it
was written by Americans under the circumstances of military occupation,
which has always left open the possibility that the constitution, despite
the language of its preamble, was not freely chosen. Second, it includes
explicit references to “human rights,” introducing into the national charter
language that calls state sovereignty into question. Whereas civil rights
are guaranteed to citizens by their states, human rights transcend state
power. The inclusion of the language of human rights in Japan’s postwar
charter has thus created a curious dynamic whereby citizens are both
“Japanese” and “citizens of the world.”
This idiosyncratic quality of the postwar “Peace Constitution” reflects
the specific geopolitical circumstances under which the constitution was
written. The definition of religious freedom that was enshrined in theJapanese national charter was also constructed as an antidote for what
the occupiers had only recently come to call “State Shinto,” meaning thatJapan’s postwar constitution was at least as biased against Shinto ideals as
its prewar constitution was inclined to support them. But neither document explicitly mentions Shinto at all, and both the 1889 constitution andits 1946 successor left open the possibility that some ritual practices could161

Jolyon Thomas

appear as culture or tradition rather than religion. Religious freedom
claims are hard to adjudicate when Shinto goes unmarked and when its
status as “religion” or “culture” is in question. The incoherent nature ofJapanese Supreme Court religious freedom jurisprudence over the last
several decades reveals the nature and extent of the problem.11
The definitional issue continues in recent debates about how Japan’sconstitution might change. Chafing at the coercive circumstances underwhich the current constitution was drafted, the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) describes constitutional revision as fundamental to party
identity and as a long-held policy aim. The party advocates revision as away of correcting the putatively “unnatural” language of the preamble,
strengthening the power of Japan’s constitutionally ambiguous Self
Defense Force so as to make it a “normal” military, and making minor
terminological revisions that would have major political effects, includingchanges to the postwar religion/state settlement. Reactions to the LDP
proposals from the left (both within and outside of Japan) tend to describe
these initiatives as renascent militarism and a revival of “State Shinto,”
but it bears mentioning that the LDP proposals use classical liberal language (freedom, peace, rights) to advocate illiberal policy (strengthened
authoritarianism and heightened interest in sovereignty and security).
I am interested in the effects of the LDP’s proposed changes for the governance of religions in Japan, but my interests go beyond mere analysis
of proposed changes to Article 20 (the religious freedom clause) and
Article 89 (the establishment clause). Because religious freedom law isonly as good as the definitions that inform it, the LDP draft constitutionof 2012 and related legal trial balloons offer clues as to how the party
envisions the human who is a bearer of rights. Curiously, the preamble
to the LDP’s draft doubles down on the language of innate human rights,
which by definition precede citizenship and transcend the jurisdictionof the state. But simultaneously, the proposal also diminishes the abilityof individuals to be rights-bearing subjects by giving rights to “humans”(hito) rather than individuals (kojin), limiting the bearers of rights to162

R eligious Freed om and the U.S.-Japan Alliancepeople born “Japanese,” and premising the constitution on ahistoricalessentialist claims about harmony, tradition, and culture. The languageof Article 24 designating the household as the fundamental legal unit ofsociety also infringes upon the ability of individuals to make rights claims,
while strengthened language about citizens’ obligations to preserve publicorder allows collective interests to supersede individual liberties. When
we pair the draft constitutional language with the language of the revised
Fundamental Law on Education (2006) and that of the Anti-Conspiracy
Law of 2017, it becomes clear that the LDP has been using freedom talkto construct a society premised on mutual obligations and duties rather
than on individual rights and liberties.
Although it is questionable whether the LDP will actually be able topush through constitutional revision in the ongoing revelations about
the Moritomo Academy land scandal, the legal changes that the party
has already advanced have profound ramifications for religious freedom
in Japan. By mildly tweaking the constitutional definition of “religion”
so that practices like imperial ritual and veneration of the war dead at
Yasukuni Shrine become collective “social customs,” the LDP eliminates
the possibility that citizens might mobilize religious freedom claims
against state expenditures on Shinto rituals. By defining public order verybroadly and expanding the capacity of the state to surveil citizens in thename of security, the LDP subjects religious minorities to risk. Just as the1925 Peace Preservation Law allowed the Special Higher Police to surveil
and suppress marginal religious movements, the 2017 Anti-Conspiracy
Law and the LDP’s proposed constitution could easily be used to target
minority religions and other groups.
The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom treats
Japan as of little concern because the Commission is primed to lookfor certain types of infringements. Are some religious people treated as
enemies of the state, as in Vietnam? Have people been hacked to deathfor their religious affiliations or lack of religious belief, as in Bangladesh?
Is the global War on Terror being used as an excuse to crack down on

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dissidents, as in China? Is a mounting refugee crisis unfolding due toalleged persecution of religious minorities, as in Myanmar? Because Japan
today lacks sensational instances of violent oppression of the sort that
happened in the 1930s and early 1940s, the LDP’s recent legal machinations fly under the Commission’s radar. There is a humdrum quality to
the legal tweaks and policy proposals that hardly seems to merit serious
attention, especially when the issue of Article 9 takes up so much oxygen.
(Here it is worth noting that American diplomats stationed in Tokyo
in the 1930s were similarly sanguine, even dismissive, about the 1939
Religious Organizations Law. They thought of it as minor “legislative
housekeeping,” but historians would later decry the law as having been
seriously inimical to religious liberty in wartime Japan.12 The cautionary
nature of this tale should be obvious.)
However U.S. commissioners see Japan, clearly concerns about religious
freedom remain for both individuals (like schoolteachers, who have risked
losing their jobs over their refusals to perform the national anthem on
religious freedom grounds) and groups such as the Japanese Buddhist
Federation, which has recently held lecture meetings on whether the State
Secrets Law has had a chilling effect on freedom of conscience since itwent into effect in December 2014.13 As mentioned above, the JapaneseFederation of New Religious Organizations has also decried the Abeadministration’s Anti-Conspiracy Law as inimical to religious freedom.
When Abe’s office used all the social media tools at its disposal to publicize
his January 4, 2018 visit to the Ise Shrines, it drew complaints that he had
infringed upon the constitutional injunction against using state funds
for the promotion of a particular religion.14 But of course Abe would
not describe the visit to Ise as religion, and that is precisely the problem.
It would be too easy to say that the Abe administration is actively trying
to establish a national religion or is eagerly trying to quash religious
freedom. It would also be too easy to simply urge the USCIRF to add
Japan to its list of “countries of particular concern.” The harder work lies inrecognizing that not all threats to religious freedom involve persecution,

164

R eligious Freed om and the U.S.-Japan Allianceviolence, or incarceration. Threats to religious freedom can ironicallyuse the language of liberty and rights to deny those very things. Threats
to religious freedom are often prosaic rather than sensational. Threats
to religious freedom can take the shape of mundane policy tweaks thathave profound impacts. Redefining the human who is a bearer of rights
and redefining religion so that “social custom” does not count can makeit impossible for anyone to make religious freedom claims at all.
It seems unlikely that Abe, the LDP, Nippon Kaigi, or SAS actually intend
to infringe on Japanese citizens’ religious freedom when they talk about
revising the constitution or when they advocate bringing shrine rites
into a more central place in Japanese public life. But even if that is nottheir intent, legal changes they have enacted and constitutional revisions
they have proposed would effectively make shrine rites into national
ceremonies rather than religion, would evacuate individuals’ abilities tomake rights claims, and would make security and public order supersede
liberty. That they do all of this in the name of protecting fundamental
human rights would seem ironic, but the liberal language of rights andfreedom can easily be put to illiberal ends.
I have focused on religious freedom here because international promotionof religious freedom has historically been a central point of American
foreign policy, particularly since passage of the International Religious
Freedom Restoration Act in 1998 (an Act recently amended by the FrankR. Wolf Act of 2016).15 But the concerns I raised above about who actually counts in the eyes of the law can be extended to any number of civil
liberties and human rights. n165

Jolyon Thomas

Chapter Endnotes
1

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom: http://www.
uscirf.gov.

2

Annual Report of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 2017:
http://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2017.USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf.

3Motoyama Kazuhiro, Chair for the Committee on Religious Freedom of theJapanese Association of New Religious Organizations open letter to Prime
Minister Abe dated 5 June 2017. http://www.shinshuren.or.jp/userfile.php?id=
76&hash=f208636d1877da6f3cd4c0f4b69e7c38.

4

The Asahi Shimbun, “Update: Diet enacts anti-conspiracy legislation after hastening vote,” 15 June 2017. http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201706150014.html.

5

Colin P.A. Jones, “Conspiracy Theory Becomes Frightening Reality for Japan,” The
Japan Times, 14 June 2017. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2017/06/14/
issues/conspiracy-theory-becomes-frightening-reality-japan/#.WrujxWaZMWp.

6David McNeill, “Back to the Future: Shinto, Ise and Japan’s New Moral Education,”Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus 11 (50), no. 1. https://apjjf.org/2013/11/50/DavidMcNeill/4047/article.html.

7

Justin McCurry, “G7 in Japan: concern over world leaders’ tour of nationalistic
shrine,” The Guardian, 24 May 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/
may/25/g7-japan-world-leaders-tour-shrine-cameron-obama-abe.

8

See the SAS website (Japanese only): http://www.sinseiren.org/shinseirentoha/shinseirenntoha.htm.

9

Jake Adelstein and Mari Yamamoto, “The Religious Cult Secretly Running Japan,”
The Daily Beast 10 July 2016. https://www.thedailybeast.com/the-religious-cultsecretly-running-japan. The Nippon Kaigi website is http://www.nipponkaigi.org(Japanese only).

10 Yoron chosa: Nihonjin to kenpō 2017. https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/special/kenpou70/yoron2017.html.
11 Ernils Larsson, “Jinja Honchō and the Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan,”Japan Review 30 (2017): 227–52; John Breen, “‘Conventional Wisdom’ and thePolitics of Shinto in Postwar Japan,” Politics and Religion 4, no. 1 (2010): 68–82.
12 Jolyon Baraka Thomas, Japan, the American Occupation, and the Problem of
Religious Freedom. Forthcoming from University of Chicago Press.

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13 On the national anthem issue, see The Japan Times, “National Anthem Debate,”
8 February 2011. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2011/02/08/editorials/
national-anthem-debate/#.WrvGQWaZMWp. On the 15 January 2015 JBF meeting,see “Kore kara mo tekisetsu ni unyō sareteiru ka chūshi ga hitsuyō.” http://www.jbf.
ne.jp/assets/files/pdf/himitu.pdf.
14 See the critical 4 January 2018 tweet by activist lawyer Kitō Masaki: https://twitter.
com/masaki_kito/status/948814691618365440.
15 Anna Su, Exporting Freedom: Religious Liberty and American Power. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2016; Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom:
The New Global Politics of Religion. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015. The
International Religious Freedom Restoration Act: https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2297.pdf. The Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom Act:
https://congress.gov/114/plaws/publ281/PLAW-114publ281.pdf.

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Trade, Multilateralism, andU.S.-Japan Relations
Kristin Vekasi

Summary• Japan and the United States are deeply economically integrated asmeasured by trade and investment relations. The two countries arealso integrated through global supply chains that reflect broader international economic trends.
• Contemporary globalization is inherently multilateral in nature, particularly because of the role of international supply chain integration.
Trade in the global economy is equally about trade between companies
located in different countries as selling finished foreign-made products
to consumers.
• Current trade agreements do not reflect the need in the contemporary global economy for shared production standards, robust disputesettlement mechanisms with broad coverage, protection of intellectual
property rights, and coverage of the service sector. The Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP) is one example of how economic agreements can
respond to new economic conditions.

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Kristin Vekasi• Japan is pursuing deep multilateral integration through agreements likethe TPP because they are in its best strategic and economic interests.
These strategies and interests are reflected in its extensive supply chain
integration in the Asia-Pacific and limited use of litigation within existing bilateral trade agreements.
• The United States should recognize it has similar economic interestsand pursue highly integrated, multilateral economic agreements with
its partner Japan.

Background
Over the past two decades, the international political economy has shifted
towards regionalism, both in terms of trade and flows and also institutional structures such as regional trade agreements. Trade multilateralism,
from deep integration like the European Union to increased scope ofrule-making and conflict resolution like the Trans-Pacific Partnership orTransatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership seemed like the wave of
the future. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), in particular, was soldas a new standard for high-quality trade institutions that would lower
tariffs and non-tariff barriers, and expand its purview to investment rules,
intellectual property rights, and even environmental and labor issues. The
TPP was, in short, an institution designed for contemporary trade withcomplex supply chains and multi-country integration. Then, in the 2016
presidential campaign, both major American political parties seemed
to turn against trade multilateralism, and perhaps against globalization
more broadly.
After the election of President Trump, some TPP countries were yet
optimistic that the negotiated trade agreement would survive with theUnited States. Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pushed his party toratify the TPP, despite uncertainty about the American position. The
TPP was by this point indeed quite popular in Japan, with support for170

Trade, Multil ateralism, and U.S.-Japan R el ations

joining polling in the 60s to 70s in 2016.1 Its popularity reflected yearsof political effort on the part of Abe and his supporters, particularly
in pushing beyond the protests of the powerful agricultural lobby. To
their disappointment, President Trump cancelled American participation in the TPP in his first week of office, leading to uncertainty
about how (and whether) U.S.-Japan economic relations would deepen
institutionally and move beyond the parameters of long-standing
disputes over issues such as liberalization of agriculture and foreign
direct investment. In 2017, Japan showed its continued interest in TPP,
pushing forward with the “TPP-11,” a modified deal that excludes theUnited States.2 In March 2018, the TPP-11 came into force without
the participation of the United States.
Japan’s support for the TPP stems from broader trends of economic
regionalism, the shifting nature of international trade with multi-country
integrated supply chains, and its use of the rule-building mechanisms in
trade agreements. Japan’s commitment to multilateralism is core to its
broader economic strategy. The United States should share these objectives as it stands to reap similar benefits.
Japan is a steadfast security ally and economic partner for the UnitedStates. Japan’s leadership, particularly the government of Prime Minister
Abe, is willing to spend political capital to pursue multilateral economic
agreements that will overall benefit the economy of the United States andJapan. Rather than pursuing a bilateral trade deal with Japan, the UnitedStates should pursue a multilateral institutional web with Japan and otherallies and partners in the Asia-Pacific region. While the TPP provides one
possible framework, other multilateral approaches are also possible. This
brief outlines Japanese positions and incentives for multilateralism andargues that it is in both countries’ interests to pursue deep, multi-country
institutional frameworks.

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U.S.-Japan Economic Relations: Bilateral
Importance within Multilateral Integration
The United States and Japan have deeply integrated economies. Their traderelations are clearly crucial to both partners. Japan is the number four
trade partner with the United States (after China, Canada, and Mexico)and the United States is number two for Japan (after China). Japanese
investment also holds an important place in the American economy. In
2017, Japan was the number one foreign job creator in the United States,with Japanese companies responsible for $8.3 billion newly invested ($424
billion total), and over 860,000 jobs.3
The two economies are also interdependent in other ways that reflect thenature of the contemporary global economy. Key in the U.S.-Japan economic relationship is supply chain integration within global value chains,which are not specific to single countries or bilateral relationships. Supply
chains are often horizontally and vertically integrated across multiple
countries, especially in industries such as electronics or automobiles withhigh levels of research and development and many intermediate components before final assembly of a product. Technology companies such as
Apple or Toshiba spread their innovation and manufacturing processing
across as many as fifty countries. While product engineering and design
may primarily occur in the United States or Japan, raw materials cancome from China, Australia or Malaysia, intermediate components are
manufactured in Taiwan or South Korea, and the final product is frequently assembled in China. The final product is then exported for sale.4
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development estimated in2013 that global value chains accounted for approximately 80 percent of
global trade.5 Trade between companies within global supply chains is acore driver of the contemporary global economy.
The OECD accounts for global supply chains using a “trade in value-added”
approach, which measures how much value was added to a good in anothercountry prior to imports or exports from the next country. Drawing on
the previous example, the data would show what percentage of a Toshiba172

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computer’s worth came from other countries before it was exported from its
final assembly location to the consumer market. In other words, the extent
of the computer’s foreign value-added. As shown in Figure 1, the percentageof foreign value-added in manufactured exports from both the United States
and Japan have increased over the past decades. The percentage for the UnitedStates has increased from approximately 11 to 15 percent, and Japan has seen amuch more dramatic increase from 5 to 18 percent. A similar approach shows
how value added abroad contributes to goods sold in domestic markets, andhow the value added domestically contributes to exports down the road. The
amount of value that is added domestically before a product is sold abroad“reflects how industries…are connected to consumers in other countries
even if no direct trade relationship exists.” The amount that is added abroad
before it is sold domestically similarly shows how “industries abroad areconnected to consumers at home,” typically through intermediate goods
such as electronic components.6 Returning to the example of the Toshiba
computer, the value-added approach includes intermediate goods such as
memory chips as well the final product. The sale and transfer of intermediate
as well as final goods are both crucial in today’s integrated global economy.
Examining the original TPP countries through a value-added lens showsthe extent to which the Asia-Pacific countries are interdependent. The
agreement was widely advertised as representing countries generating 40
percent of the total global economy, and almost a third of global trade. With
respect to trade for Japan and the United States, the original TPP countries
represented 30 percent or 31 percent of their total trade respectively. Usinga value-added approach, the proportions of trade in value-added fromthe twelve TPP countries are proportional to the gross trade percentages.
For Japan, 26.4 percent of value added in Japan is sold to TPP countries,and 31.8 percent of what Japanese consumers buy is reflected in value
added within TPP countries. For the United States, those numbers are 32.1
percent and 34.8 percent respectively. For the American economy, the TPP
countries represent a slightly higher percentage of trade in value added thangross trade. Moreover, overall American trade in value added shows thatdomestic value added is greater than foreign value added.

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Figure 1. Foreign Value-Added Share of Exports

Figure 1. Foreign Value-Added Share of Exports

Share of exports (%)

15

10

Japan
United States

1995

2000

2005

2010

Source: OECD Dataset: Trade in Value (TiVA)

Source: OECD Dataset: Trade in Value (TiVA)

Figure 2 shows the average domestic value added as reflected in final
foreign sales and foreign value added of trade as reflected in final domestic sales for Japanese and American trade with sixty-three major world
economies.7 The figure shows how much of the value of the final productis added domestically or in a foreign country and then where that value
is sold on the market. This figure demonstrates the relative importance of
the Asia-Pacific TPP countries to global supply chain integration for theUnited States and Japan. On average, the TPP countries are responsible
for at least twice as much value-added for both the United States andJapan.8 The gap between TPP and non-TPP countries is even higher for
the United States than Japan. These data indicate how important integration with the Asia-Pacific countries is for multinational American andJapanese firms.

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Trade, Multil ateralism, and U.S.-Japan R el ations

Figure 2. Value-Added as Embodied in Final Demand:
Major World Economies

Figure 2. Value-Added as Embodied in Final Demand:
Major World Economies
USA
Value added domestically,
sold abroad

50000
40000
30000
20000
10000

50000

Vallue added abroad,sold domesticallyAverage Value Embodied in Final Demand, USD Millions

Japan

40000
30000
20000
10000
2000

2004

2008

2000

Non−TPP Countries

2004

2008

TPP-12 Countries

Source: OECD Dataset: Trade in Value (TiVA)
Source: OECD Dataset: Trade in Value (TiVA)

Benefits of Multilateralism
This level of cross-country integration means that any particular production process is covered under many different laws. Different regulations
and tax structures for all aspects of business increase transaction costs forcompanies. It is thus in the interest of both Japan and the United Statesto have liberalized and institutionalized trading relationships with many
countries in the Asia-Pacific in order to make their own exports moreglobally competitive. The current trade infrastructure does not reflect
the need in the contemporary global economy for shared production
standards, robust dispute settlement mechanisms with broad coverage, or
protection of intellectual property rights. One of the key improvementsin the TPP over existing multilateral agreements such as the World Trade

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Organization (WTO) is to start integrating industry standards, disputesettlement mechanisms, and intellectual property rights protection tosmooth cross-country supply chain trade issues.9
The benefits of multilateralism are not embedded solely in globalized supply chains, but also in institutional effectiveness including
rule enforcement and the depoliticization of economic disputes. The
World Trade Organization is effective at rules creation and enforcement because of multilateralism. If a country is suspected of reneging
on its terms of WTO accession (say through government subsidies
to liberalized industries or tariffs), another member country can litigate that policy through the WTO dispute settlement process. If thepanel of judges finds the complaint is accurate and in violation, thenall member countries can legally retaliate against the guilty country.
Commitments to the institution are thus more binding than bilateralagreements because the punishment for violation is widespread andsevere. Multilateralism thus helps member countries avoid “tit-for-tat”
tariffs or other illiberal trade policies.
Disputes in a multilateral context are depoliticized relative to bilateralagreements because they are expanded beyond two countries, particularly in the enforcement stage. Bilateral agreements incur additional
political costs at the initiation and enforcement stages. The negotiationand completion process comes only with high effort and the expenditureof political capital with the inevitable losers from any trade agreement.
Additionally, a country may opt not to formally participate in a dispute
against a treaty partner because it would worsen relations with thecountry. Signing a bilateral trade agreement is a symbol of diplomaticcooperation and closer political ties, in addition to an invitation for
closer economic cooperation. Countries can also participate as “thirdparty observers” in disputes, again potentially broadening the numberof parties involved and keeping a dispute more rooted in economics
rather than bilateral politics.

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A trade agreement’s core purpose is to strengthen an economic relationship with another country, and a negotiated dispute settlement process
is an institutional solution to make the agreements binding. Bilateralagreements, however, do not defray the diplomatic costs to the same
extent that multilateral ones do. They can, in fact, even discourage useof enforcement mechanisms because of fear of political backlash froma dispute.

Japan’s Regional Trade Agreement Strategy
Beyond these broadly known economic and institutional reasons that any
country would prefer multilateralism, Japan also has specific behaviors
and incentives that favor the approach. An original dataset of litigatedand non-litigated trade disputes from Japan and partner countries from1995–2016 sheds light on how Japan behaves within its trade agreements.10 Examining the use and non-use of agreements shows what sortof institutional design Japan favors and why. The dataset includes theuniverse of Japan’s litigated trade disputes, as well as potential but not litigated trade disputes that are published by both the Japanese government
and private industry. Japan’s Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry
publishes two annual reports on non-compliance with major trading
partners.11 Similarly, the private sector organization Japan Machinery
Center for Trade and Investment publishes a report on trade and investment barriers that signals to the Japanese government which international
economic issues they want resolved in the coming years.12 These reports
give detailed assessments of perceived trade violations of WTO or bilateralagreement partners, allowing an assessment of how Japan uses institutional features such as trade litigation.
The data include 120 potential but not litigated and 190 litigated tradedisputes from 1995–2016. Regionally, disputes have been shifting fromtrade with North America (largely the United States) prior to the era
where Japan is negotiating Regional Trade Agreements to East andSoutheast Asia over the last decade. This shift, shown in Figure 3, reflects

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the general shift in Japan’s trade towards the Asia-Pacific. While prior to2008 over 50 percent of disputes were with countries in North America
and 17.9 percent with Asian countries, after 2008 only 23.3 percent werewith North America and 45.4 percent were with countries in East andSoutheast Asia. The dramatic increase in trade disputes with Southeast
Asia in particular, underscores the importance of having a robust institutional structure in place in that region. The Japanese government also
desires to have a more robust institutionalized, rules-based structure inplace in Northeast Asia as evidenced by their now decade-long attempt
to negotiate an agreement with South Korea.
Figure 3. Percent of Disputes by Region and Time Period

Figure 3. Percent of Disputes by Region and Time Period
60

50

Pre-RTA Era (1995 – 2007)
Post-RTA Era (2008 – 2015)

40

30

20

10
50.4

23

18.7

10.2

12.2

28.3

5.7

16.6

0
North America

EuropeEast Asia

Southeast Asia

Japan is seven times more likely to pursue legal recourse if it has the optionof either being a third party or jointly pursuing a case in tandem withanother country. In the data, there are twenty-three cases where Japan
was the solo/primary litigant and 167 where they were the third party/
joint litigant. For example, after China placed strict limits of its exports

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Trade, Multil ateralism, and U.S.-Japan R el ationsof rare earth metals in 2009 and 2010, Japan joined with the United States
and the European Union to contest that policy through the WTO, which
ultimately found in their favor. Japan shows a strong preference to pursuing litigation this way, arguably to avoid a nasty bilateral political disputewith its neighbors. China is once again a case in point. Prior to the adventof Japan’s pursuit of bilateral trade agreements with other Asian countries,
scholars noted Japan was unlikely to use the dispute settlement process
at the WTO with China because of concerns about political fallout, eventhough China was rapidly becoming a major source of trade disputes.13
This phenomenon extends beyond the enormously important and often
fraught Japan-China relationship. The trend has been exacerbated andspread to the East and Southeast Asia more generally. An example fromIndonesian-Japanese relations is telling. After a little over two yearsof negotiations, Indonesia and Japan signed an agreement in 2007,
which included provisions for a dispute settlement mechanism allowing litigation. The agreement stipulated that Indonesia would phaseout its automobile tariffs for Japan to well below the levels establishedin Indonesia’s WTO accession agreement by 2014, but Indonesia failed
to do so. Indonesia violated the Japan-Indonesia agreement by overcharging import tariffs on Japanese automobiles for years, costing theindustry millions of dollars. It appeared that Indonesia was trying toprotect local companies that collaborate with foreign multinationals.
Japan held multiple ministerial-level meetings with Indonesia to resolve
this problem, but did not exercise their right to litigation, despite significant losses to the Japanese automobile industry.14 Japan did however
pursue cases against Indonesia in multilateral contexts. In 2015, forexample, Japan joined two trade disputes over Indonesian iron andsteel safeguards (a type of non-tariff barrier).15 Taiwan and Vietnam
were the primary complainants, and Japan was a third-party along withnine and ten other countries respectively. Japan was not hesitant to use
litigation in this multilateral context.

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Kristin VekasiThis pattern holds true for Japan’s behavior more generally. Despite evidence of many potential violations of bilateral trade agreements that do
not violate WTO rules, Japan has yet to formally file one complaint inthat context. This observation is not simply an artifact of the particular
disputes. The result is confirmed with a statistical model that controls
for factors such as size of trading partner’s economy, trade dependence,prior disputes, region of the world, and sectoral-level factors such as
research and development investments and degree of trade in value
added to predict what factors determine whether Japan decides to litigate
within its negotiated agreements. Controlling for other variables, Japanis far less likely to litigate within a bilateral agreement than a multilateralorganization.
There is also evidence that Japan is more reluctant to litigate in sectorsthat are precisely those that are highly integrated into global value chainssuch as automobiles, high-tech machinery, and electronics. As the averageamount of research and development funds in a sector increases, theprobability of using litigation to resolve an international trade disputedeclines. As the proportion of trade in value-added for a sector increases
the probability of litigation similarly declines. When the presence of abilateral agreement is introduced into the model, the probability of litigation plummets from near 100 percent for a WTO dispute in a low-tech,single-country sector to just over 20 percent. The effect is stronger when
taking regional variables into account. The statistical model shows thatJapan is even less likely to pursue litigation with its Asian neighbors thanother countries with which it has a bilateral agreement.
In sum, Japan’s behavior within existing agreements shows that it finds
the bilateral approach unhelpful in resolving disputes, particularly in theregion of the world and the sectors that are most central to its economy.
From the perspective of supply chain integration and international ruleenforcement, all signs from Japan point toward a desire for multilateralism. The two factors are interrelated: more cross-country integration
within product lines produces stronger incentives for rule harmonization180

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across countries. Given Japan’s economic situation and behavior inexisting institutions, there is scant motivation to pursue anything but
high-quality multilateral agreements.

The U.S., Japan, and Institution Building
Japan’s approach to trade agreements is in line with the overall economic
incentives of the United States if not its current behavior. Institution building is related to goals long-held by the United States, including regional
leadership in the Asia-Pacific and the bolstering of a rules-based international order. Such institution building in part happens within the context
of rule-making and enforcement within trade agreements. If an end goalis truly “fair” trade agreements for American workers, companies, andconsumers, then the United States should pursue multilateral agreementsthat solve some of the persistent complaints of current trade deals. To
resolve complaints of “cheating” in trade agreements, for example, it isimportant to have a robust institutional structure where countries canresolve complaints and litigate disputes. Multilateralism is more effective
than bilateralism for rule enforcement.
The contemporary story of global trade and production processes is notbilateral but multilateral. The interests of countries with global economic
pursuits like Japan and the United States lie in multi-country integration.
Japan, as a steadfast economic partner and security ally of the UnitedStates, has made it clear that it prefers the path of multilateralism anddeep integration. Japan’s behavior in its existing trade agreements shows
how that is in Japan’s historic patterns and strategic interests to rejectbilateralism and pursue multilateralism. The United States should negotiate in good faith with its strongest economic and security partner in the
Asia-Pacific, recognize the interests and goals that are shared, and pursue
a multilateral approach that will advance the interests of both countries
while resolving some of the conflicts.

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Recommendations
American reengagement in the TPP is the most preferred outcome forJapan. Because that option is unlikely in the current political climate, thefollowing potential paths would help deepen United States-Japan ties andadvance the overall economic interests of both countries.
• Leverage mutual security ties with the United States to open U.S.South Korea-Japan multilateral trade negotiations. Japan has currently
suspended negotiations with South Korea for a trade agreement,
but has long been eager to deepen economic institutionalization in
Northeast Asia.
• Enter negotiations for a multilateral Asia-Pacific investment treaty
with TPP member countries that includes some of the dispute settlement provisions and production standards in the TPP. This style ofagreement would lose the benefits of trade liberalization and would be
far less sweeping than TPP, but would preserve the important “rulesmaking” and multilateral features. Moreover, it would avoid some ofthe distributional consequences of trade liberalization, where some
sectors inevitably lose while others win.
• At the least, American officials should continue to give minimal public
signals that indicate potential future interest in rejoining the TPP toavoid further alienating its partners such as Japan. n182

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Chapter Endnotes
1

Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “ＴＰＰ「慎重審議を」66％ 共同通信世論調査,” Oct. 30,
2016. https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASFS30H21_Q6A031C1PE8000/

2This new agreement is called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement forTrans-Pacific Partnership, and excludes some of the detailed features on intellectual
property rights that the United States insisted on including.

3

Japanese government, “Japanese Investment and Job Creation in the U.S.”
Available at https://www.japan.go.jp/investinamerica/_userdata/pdf/japanese_
investment_and_job_creation_in_the_us.pdf.

4

See R. Baldwin R, J. Lopez‐Gonzalez, “Supply‐chain trade: a portrait of global patterns
and several testable hypotheses,” The World Economy. 2015 Nov 1:38(11): 1682–721.

5

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report
2013: Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development, 2014. Available
at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2013_en.pdf.

6

OECD (2013) http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/sti_scoreboard-2013-en/07/06/
index.html?contentType=&itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fchapter%2Fsti_scoreboard2013–65-en&mimeType=text%2Fhtml&containerItemId=%2Fcontent%2Fserial%
2F20725345&accessItemIds=

7

These figures show data from 2011, the most recent year for which data are available.

8

Using the median rather than the average gives a similar result, though the gap
between TPP and non-TPP countries is smaller.

9

See http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/index.html for Japanese documents
related to the CPTPP and https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text for the full text of the agreement.

10 This dataset was developed in conjunction with Sato Shunsuke.
11 METI, Report on Compliance by Major Trading Trade Partners with Trade
Agreements - WTO, FTA/EPA, BIT- and Report on the WTO Inconsistency of Trade
Policies by Major Trading Partners. Available in English: http://www.meti.go.jp/
english/report/index_report.html.
12 JMC, Issues and Requests for Improvements on Trade and Investment Barriers in
2014. Available in English at http://www.jmcti.org/cgibin/main_e.cgi?Kind=Country.
13 C.L. Davis and Y. Shirato, “Firms, governments, and WTO adjudication: Japan’s
selection of WTO disputes,” World Politics 59(02) (2007): 274–313.
14 Mainichi Shimbun, “Jidousha kanzei: EPA hurikoude kyougi nihonnseihuiIndonesia
to,” (Japanese government will have meeting with Indonesia about the non-implementation of EPA rules of automobile tariffs), May 27, 2015. Available: http://mainichi.
jp/shimen/news/20150527ddm008020053000c.html.
15 The disputes are DS 490 and DS 496.

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Joshua W. Walker

Japan today is uniquely placed to play a larger global role than arguably
at any time in its postwar history. Much of this can be attributed tothe personal leadership of Shinzo Abe, who—assuming he can weather
the scandals domestically and win an unprecedented 3rd term as theleader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan—could soon become
the longest-serving prime minister in modern Japanese history. As Japancelebrates the 150th anniversary of the Meiji restoration that launched
one of the most impressive modernization efforts in history, 2018 will
be a watershed year.
Prime Minister Abe’s personal diplomacy, interest in foreign policy andpolitical stability is part of what has led to this unique moment in Japanese
history. However, the alignment of two of the strongest Chinese andRussian presidents at the same time as one of the weakest U.S. presidents—as defined by domestic divisions and polarization—also has muchto do with the place Japan finds itself in the world. Combined with aweakened British prime minister and German chancellor, Abe’s timingon the global scene could not be better for the U.S.-Japan alliance or the185

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future of the liberal international order that has been in place since theend of World War II.
The U.S.-Japan alliance has undergone fundamental structural changes
since the arrival of President Trump, leading Japan to increasingly assume
a leadership role in Asia and beyond rather than to remain a passive
beneficiary of the U.S. security umbrella like during the cold war. 2017
was all about the deepening of the personal relationship between Abe
and Trump, which has borne significant fruit including Washington’s
recent wholesale adoption of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative originally unveiled by the Japanese prime minister in 2007. In otherwords, Trump essentially abandoned the Obama administration’s “pivot toAsia” strategy while adopting Tokyo’s regional vision instead. The upshot
is Tokyo’s emerging role in charting the future of the bilateral alliance on
a global scale.
As the leader with the most stable and solid political base among the
major democratic powers, at least until recently, Prime Minister Abe hasa unique status that affords Japan a welcome chance to play a larger roleon the global stage, much like President Macron in France. While other
Western leaders seem to be facing a populist backlash to their authority,
Abe has emerged on the global geopolitical landscape as both a championof Japanese nationalism and the liberal international order. However,this does not mean that Japan is immune from a difficult geopoliticalenvironment that includes some of the world’s toughest challenges in theform of North Korea, China, and Russia. As the Trump administration
takes a harder “America First” and economic nationalist line, Japan must
balance its relations with these neighbors and its alliance with the UnitedStates as evidenced by ongoing discussions and developments over tariffs,
trade, and free trade deals like the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).
If 2017 was about Japan adjusting to America’s new style of global leadership, 2018 will provide opportunities for Japan to act as a regional leader
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is virtually the only country both willing and capable of defending aliberal international order beleaguered by revisionist challenges. Prime
Minister Abe is one of the few world leaders who can talk and mediate
between Moscow and Washington or Ankara, Jerusalem, Riyadh andTehran (among many other capitals where he has friends) without thethreat of domestic backlash. As a result, he can advance Japan’s role asa bridge builder, facilitating dialogue between the liberal international
order and the rise of revisionist forces.
Given Japan’s new potential and the opportunities Prime Minister Abe
has created, Japanese foreign policy can no longer be studied in silos. A
broader perspective also is needed for the U.S.-Japan alliance; globalizing
the alliance beyond the bilateral is long overdue. Japan’s global leadership must aim to provide new regional orders in the Indo-Pacific andEurasia, serving as an intermediary between local countries and the liberalinternational order by facilitating the self-realization of the populationin accordance with their traditions and the liberal values that benefit thegreater economic good of the world. The U.S.-Japan alliance must therefore integrate and promote Tokyo’s new imperative for global leadership.
This brief seeks to look beyond functional areas of shared concern andcooperation, laying out Japan’s potential in broad strokes and concluding
with a series of policy recommendations for Washington and Tokyo towork together to further globalize this critical alliance.

Realizing an Alliance of Hope: How to Globalize the
U.S.-Japan Alliance and Go Beyond the Bilateral
Any discussion of Japanese foreign policy necessarily begins—and often
ends—with the U.S.-Japan alliance, THE central pillar of Japanese strategic thought since the end of World War II. For Japan, the alliance has been
the overarching security framework through which to engage and often
see the world. Prime Minister Abe’s strong personal efforts in courting
U.S. President Donald Trump, from his impromptu visit to Trump Towers
even before Trump’s inauguration to his warm reception as the “Winter187

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White House’s” (Mar-a-Lago) first official visitor, have paved the way for
globalizing the alliance. Particularly in a world which questions whether“America First” can lead with the type of global leadership necessary
to manage the postwar international system through architecture andinstitutions being challenged by China and others, Japan has an outsizedrole to play.
Abe has come to be widely recognized as Trump’s “best buddy”1 or “loyal
sidekick”2 as the two leaders jointly faced various regional challenges,
particularly North Korea. Trump’s November 2017 visit to Japan elevatedAbe’s status even higher, leading the Japanese leader to increasingly
mentor the freshman American president in regional affairs, culminating in Washington’s official adoption3 of Tokyo’s 2007 “Free and Open
Indo-Pacific” initiative.4 Abe has realized in Trump an opportunity towork toward his “Alliance of Hope,”5 a stronger alliance that he envisions as contributing to the region and the world and leading the liberalinternational order.
The challenge with the personalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance has beenthat domestic changes in Washington have led to historic unpopularity
for President Trump and weakened institutions that could eventuallyaffect bilateral relations. While the two countries’ secretaries/ministers
of state and defense have engaged in “2+2 format”6 strategic dialogues
for decades, this framework for regular meetings is more necessary thanever for institutionalizing the evolving relationship. To reflect Japan’s
growing role as a global bridge builder, the 2+2 format could be expanded
to include other agencies and ministries and other national security functions, such as economic diplomacy and intelligence.
Such an expanded 2+2 format would envision a full-spectrum alliancethat would jointly meet emerging hybrid threats such as from cyberspaceor from non-state actors, while advancing bilateral cooperation worldwide
as well as in emerging war domains. The institutionalization of a new U.S.Japan alliance could lay the foundation for a “U.S.-Japan+Alpha” formula

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that could add other regional countries and like-minded allies with Japanas a global bridge builder. This formula could follow other models of international cooperation. For example, the “Five Eyes” intelligence-sharing
alliance between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom
and the U.S. is based on shared language and common law heritage. The
new U.S.-Japan alliance could include these nations and even other EU
or NATO allies that would benefit from going beyond the bilateral or
geographic scopes to like-minded and mission-oriented partners.
Decades before Washington’s bandwagoning on a “Free and Open IndoPacific,” Tokyo had been a leading player in economic development in
the Indo-Pacific. Japan is fundamentally a maritime power, and its liberalapproach to economic development has invariably centered on the establishment of transparent, democratic economies by encouraging various
local incentives underwritten by Tokyo’s strategic investments. Such an
approach is core to Tokyo’s “Quality Infrastructure Investment” initiative7
aimed to meet Asia’s $1.7 trillion/year infrastructure demand (excludingthat of China) while promoting greater regional connectivity alignedwith the liberal international order. Japan’s historic free trade agreementwith the EU links two of the largest markets in the world that, while
separated by geography, share many other similar characteristics fromdemocracy and demographics to rule of law. Japan is also the leader ofwhat recently became the “TPP 11”8 after the United States’ sudden exit
in 2017 and could integrate its own infrastructure investment initiative
into a greater regional free trade regime. Japan’s infrastructure investment agenda and leadership on free trade zones has enormous potential
to become a powerful alternative to China’s $8 trillion “One Belt, One
Road” (OBOR) initiative9 and therefore must be fully integrated into theglobalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
North Korea As a Unifier?
Beginning in 2017, North Korea’s nuclear ICBM (intercontinental ballistic
missile) brinkmanship emerged to become the most imminent regional
challenge for the U.S.-Japan alliance. With ICBM and nuclear technology

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at its disposal, North Korea is now capable of directly threatening the
U.S. in Guam and Hawaii with mainland capabilities perhaps only a few
years away. This drives a wedge in the U.S.-Japan alliance by presenting astrategic dilemma for Washington. The Trump-Kim summit, while offering a critical photo-op and possibility for short-term victorious headlines,
does not seem to be aimed at addressing the broader underlying issues.
Increasingly Russia and China seem to hold the key to resolving theNorth Korean crisis and their sway over the country’s leadership andeconomy in particular continues to grow. In fact, Japan supported Russia’s
September 2017 proposal for resolving the North Korean crisis10 throughinfrastructure investment by regional countries. This was commonly
known as the 5+1 framework with “5” referring to Russia, China, Japan,
North Korea, and South Korea and “1” referring to the U.S. Meanwhile,
Tokyo continues to support Washington’s potential military action against
Pyongyang and recently decided to purchase a new missile defense systemfrom the U.S.11 Abe’s hawkishness on North Korea seems to have paid
off at home. In his most recent electoral victory voters chose his foreign
policy credentials and experience over untested opponents. Looking
ahead to 2018 and beyond, North Korea provides Japan with a unique
opportunity to globalize the U.S.-Japan alliance by accelerating Tokyo’s
security normalization while acting as a bridge to Russia and China.
However, it also represents the greatest flashpoint for a Third World War.
China As a Shared Security Concern, but Necessary
Economic Partner
The 19th Party Congress and President Xi Jinping’s absolute consolidationof power present the most high-level common threat facing the U.S.-Japan
alliance since the demise of the Soviet Union at the end of the cold war.
From a security perspective the threat is chiefly in the maritime domain,such as the South China Sea. China’s unconventional strategy, such as
the building of artificial islands and soft-power projection of its media,
enables Beijing to drive a wedge in the U.S.-Japan alliance by creating
various perception gaps between the two allies. Therefore, it is imperativefor Japan to assume a more proactive naval role in service of the larger U.S.

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Geopolitics of China’s One Belt, One Road Initiative

Economic Corridor

Railroad

Silk Road Economic Belt

Port

Maritime Silk Road

SIX ECONOMIC CORRIDORS
China–Mongolia–Russia Corridor
RussiaMongolia

China-Pakistan Corridor
Pakistan

New Euroasian Land Bridge
RussiaKazakhstan

Bangladesh–China-India–Myanmar Corridor
India
Nepal
MyanmarBangladesh Bhutan

China–Central Asia–West Asia Corridor
Azerbaijan
Uzbekistan
Tajikistan
Armenia
Turkmenistan IranGeorgia
Kyrgyzstan
TurkeyIndochina Peninsula Corridor
ThailandCambodia
Vietnam
Malaysia
Indonesia

Laos
Bruneimaritime strategy in the Indo-Pacific. In late December 2017, Tokyo wasreported to be considering upgrading its Izumo-class helicopter carrier tocarry F-35b stealth fighters,12 which would be the country’s first offensive
naval capability since 1945 if achieved. The bilateral alliance should be
restructured to incorporate Tokyo’s inexorable security normalization
into a larger alliance strategy in the maritime domain.
In the economic domain, the U.S. and Japan must remain vigilant
toward China’s “One Belt, One Road” agenda to maximize its stabilizing

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potential for developing economies while preventing it from becoming
an exclusionist force. In June 2017, Abe essentially welcomed China’s
OBOR as holding “the potential to connect East and West as well as
the diverse regions found in between,”13 demonstrating Japan’s willingness to forge economic cooperation where possible, particularly on theEurasian continent. Meanwhile, Trump and Abe signed an agreement inNovember 201714 to offer a quality-driven alternative to China’s OBOR in
infrastructure investment for the Indo-Pacific. Filling in the details andoperationalizing initiatives such as this will be key for the U.S. and Japan as
they employ a two-pronged approach consisting of accommodation andresistance in dealing with China’s expanding economic clout. The biggest
unknown for Japan of course is the future trajectory of U.S.-China relations. Despite growing competition between Japan’s two largest markets
and trade partners, the stage could be set for either a major economic
nationalist showdown or pragmatic deal making.
Russia: Opportunity or Perennial Problem?
Japan’s potential as a global bridge builder is perhaps most palpablein Russia. Japan has successfully positioned itself as the only U.S. ally
capable of improving ties with Russia without political backlash, despite
the lingering territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands. Japan’s unique position largely derives from Abe’s peculiar knack for building rapport withstrongman leaders like Putin. Since 2013, Abe has singularly focused on
forging direct rapport with Putin and has succeeded in advancing bilateral
cooperation while essentially shelving the territorial dispute in hopes ofdriving a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Abe’s ambitious Russia
policy has already reaped tangible results ranging from the resumptionof 2+2 talks to the recent increase of bilateral military exercises15 (thirty
already planned for 2018), outcomes that would be unthinkable for most
U.S. allies in Europe. While clearly the level of cooperation and discussion
at the 2+2 and even military exercises (search and rescue vs. joint troop
and weapon trainings) differ significantly, the simple fact that they aretaking place means something to Japan.

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Russia increasingly looms large over the fate of North Korea, and Japan
is virtually the only intermediary connecting Washington to Moscow’s
proposed 5+1 format for North Korea. Moreover, Russia still remains amajor arbiter over the geopolitics of the Eurasian heartland and Eastern
Europe, where China has recently been boosting its geo-economic
presence through its Shanghai Cooperation Organization and OBOR
initiatives. Furthermore, Russia has been emerging as an important stakeholder in Indo-Pacific maritime security by boosting defense ties with
the Philippines, Vietnam, and other ASEAN countries16 while opportunistically supporting China’s maritime stakes.17 As U.S.-Russia relations
remain tense over Ukraine and Syria, a U.S.-Japan+Russia Asia-specificformula might be one way to allow Washington and Tokyo to better
address Moscow’s growing importance in Asia. As the Russiagate scandal
continues to hamper U.S.-Russia relations and Trump’s own options, Aberemains Washington’s best intermediary for addressing Moscow’s Asia
policy, including that for North Korea.

Prioritizing India, the Quad and the Indo-PacificIndia is the geopolitical pivot for the future of the Indo-Pacific. FromJapan’s perspective, India’s inexorable rise as an emerging power mustbe guided in such a way as to ensure its full integration into the liberalinternational order. Going back to Abe’s first term in 2007, the idea of
the Indo-Pacific has been to draw Asia’s two most important democracies closer together by emphasizing their shared interest in keeping theIndian and Pacific Oceans free and open against China’s encroachmentsin the region. After the creation of the National Security Council in 2013
and adoption of Japan’s National Security Strategy, the Indo-Pacific waselevated to a place of prominence that has only grown over time.
Today at a time in which U.S. Asia policy is still being chartered, Japan has
a unique opportunity through its Indo-Pacific strategy to guide India’s rise,
to link it to the greater U.S.-Japan+Alpha formula, and to encourage New
Delhi to look beyond the perpetual India-Pakistan rivalry and become

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a democratic example that could counter Beijing’s expanding regional
influence. Emerging pillars of the Japan-India relationship include: theSeptember 2017 bilateral agreement to align India’s “Act East Policy” withJapan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative;18 Japan’s official participation in Malabar naval exercises since 2015;19 and Tokyo’s arms exports
to New Delhi (i.e., pending sales of U.S.-2 amphibious plane).20 India
also purchased a $17 billion Japanese bullet train system in September
201721 in a move to further solidify bilateral cooperation. Moreover, justlike Abe’s personal relationship with Trump has offered Japan a unique
opportunity on the global stage, his special relationship with Indian
Prime Minister Modi has reinforced the bilateral relationship. Thesebilateral developments would mesh with the fledgling institutionalization of the U.S.-India relationship, such as the 2016 Logistics of Exchange
Memorandum Agreement22 that was one of the regional highlights of
Obama’s pivot to Asia strategy. A U.S.-Japan+India formula should focus
on ushering India’s full integration into the liberal international orderthrough strategic infrastructure investment and greater maritime cooperation aimed to strengthen New Delhi’s role as a responsible stakeholder
in the South China Sea.
Prioritizing the Indo-Pacific as an emerging zone of the 21st-century
geopolitical “Great Game” makes logical sense for the U.S.-Japan alliance. China has sought to transform the Indo-Pacific into Bejing’s lakeor Mediterranean by expanding naval forces, buying up local companies
and ports and even mobilizing maritime militia. Japan is the only otherdemocratic regional power capable of countering these maritime challenges with a combination of instruments of national power. In fact,
Japan now finds itself increasingly urged to take the initiative in leading
the Indo-Pacific at a time when the Trump administration appears to be
reducing its regional commitment.
The so-called U.S.-Japan-India-Australia “quad formation” is a regionalframework revived in November 2017, the first time a quadrilateraldialogue was held since 2008. The original quadrilateral dialogue was

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initiated by Abe during his first term in 2007 and fell apart the following year largely due to the Japanese leader’s untimely political exit. The
framework still suffers various institutional setbacks and perception gaps,
particularly India’s reservations about explicitly resisting China’s maritime
clout with the other three major naval powers.23 Looking to 2018 andbeyond, the revived quad formation could be restructured to become
the ultimate test case of the U.S-Japan +Alpha formula in charting thefuture of the bilateral alliance. It could also become the core pillar of
the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative by re-institutionalizing thequad formula and reinvigorating the liberal international order in the
Indo-Pacific.
Absent an overarching regional vision from Washington, Tokyo must takethe lead by leveraging its growing potential as a global bridge builder aswell as its burgeoning regional partnerships, such as the 2017 U.S.-JapanIndia-Australia quad formation and TPP 11. Indeed, Japan’s leadership in
the Indo-Pacific could eventually become the touchstone for the globalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

Beyond China, India and the Indo-PacificTraditionally, Japanese foreign policy has had little space beyond the U.S.
and China. When there was discussion, it tended to focus on Russia,
Korea and increasingly on the Indo-Pacific. However, under Abe the possibilities for Japanese involvement have expanded beyond its immediateneighborhood to locations as varied as Southeast, Central, and Southwest(Middle East) Asia. While the geographies, histories, and relations vary
widely, Japan’s appeal remains constant. As an economic superpower thatis a highly valued investor and capable of reconciling value promotion
with economic pragmatism, Japan enjoys a special place as a non-Westernchampion of the liberal international order that does not generate thesame type of anti-American or imperial feelings that its European allies
generate in these geographies. This may be because Japan’s own imperialism was felt in very different ways and was linked to a pan-Asianism that195

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connected seamlessly to pan-Islamism. Therefore, while Japan’s capabilities remain limited in these geographies, the possibilities for greater
U.S.-Japan cooperation in these areas has never been greater.
Southeast Asia: Japan’s “Other” Backyard
Southeast Asia is a narrower zone of contention within the Indo-Pacificbut one of the most strategically contested areas given that control ofthis region affects the fates of major regional powers, including China,
India and Australia. During World War II, imperial Japan’s regional control allowed the country to expand into Southeast Asia and the Pacificislands from which it challenged U.S. naval power. Today, China has
been expanding its regional influence through a combination of military
coercion, strategic investments, and ethnic divisions, threatening theliberal maritime order traditionally provided by the U.S. and increasingly by Japan, India, and Australia together. Therefore, Southeast Asia
seems especially ripe for Japan’s infrastructure investment potential tocounter China’s growing regional influence. Specifically, Indonesia, thePhilippines, Vietnam, and Burma are the key regional countries for Japan’s
strategic investment.
Japan has only recently recovered its influence in Indonesia afterIndonesian president Joko Widodo began asking for Tokyo’s participation in the country’s major railway projects. In 2015 Jakarta ditchedTokyo at the last minute for Beijing in the national railway bid. This wasseen as a sign of things to come, but with renewed interest in greater
regional cooperation and Japanese private sector investment, Abe has
prioritized Indonesia. In the Philippines, Abe enjoys a special relationshipwith President Duterte and in November 2017 pledged an $8.8 billion
economic package24 to boost bilateral economic cooperation. Japan’s
economic diplomacy with the Philippines includes arms exports culminating in the sales of five naval aircraft in 2017. This occurred alongside
growing naval cooperation25 between the two countries in recent years.
Japan returned as the largest investor in Vietnam in 2017.26 Apart frominvestment, Japan has been boosting military ties with Vietnam,27 which

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recently decided to allow for greater use of its key Cam Ranh Bay port by
the Japanese Self Defense Forces. Burma is where China and India havehistorically intersected, and the country’s independence and stability
are crucial to the future of the Sino-Indian relationship. China dwarfs
other countries in Burma due to massive investment and politico-military
relations cultivated over decades.28 Japan is nonetheless a wildcard thatcan counter China’s influence in Burma due to its historical ties with thecountry and potential for investment and interest.29 The present imperative is to prevent Burma from becoming China’s de facto geoeconomiccolony by incorporating the country into the U.S-Japan+Alpha framework
via Japan’s special relationship with the Southeast Asian country.
Central Asia: Looking for a Third Alternative
With the arrival of the Trump administration and a strategic rebalance
underway from Washington to Moscow to Beijing and every capital in
between, there has never been a more important time to focus on thisregion as an area of core and strategic interest for America and its criticalallies. Japan’s political stability under Prime Minister Abe, along withhis strong personal relationship with Trump, offers a unique moment
for further cooperation in areas like Central Asia. As evidenced by Arabuprisings characterized by popular rebellion and widespread violence,the combination of autocracy and religious extremists can be lethal to
the liberal international order that America and Japan have championed
since the end of World War II. If such a fate were to fall upon any of thecountries of Eurasia, the stability of the corridor would be lost, alongwith the fragile future of Afghanistan and all the progress that has been
made over a quarter century of independence in these fledgling nations.
To add fuel to the fire, the countries of the Silk Road are surrounded bya rather looming crowd of countries with which global Western ideals
do not particularly resonate. Destabilizing this area would harken backto the cold war days and lead the U.S.-Japan alliance down a path that noone has the stomach to face. America’s alliance structures in Europe andAsia also depend on stability and pro-Western ideology in the countries
bordering the corridor. The amount of investment China and Russia

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are making into Eurasia cannot be met by any other of its neighbors.
This reality leaves the Eurasian corridor both vulnerable and ripe with
opportunity, not only political and security, but economic.
These once poor, post-Soviet republics have developed into market adept,resource rich territories. The countries of Central Asia have historically
been utilized for land transport of natural resources and various othermanufactured products between Europe and the Far East, as the countries rimming the Caspian and Black Sea have facilitated the movementof similar goods via vital sea trade routes. As populations grew, trade
increased and technology flourished, local and regional infrastructure
were overwhelmed and incapable of handling the growing economic
needs of the population and the market. This led to a gradual decline in
the utilization of trade routes across the Eurasian corridor during the 20th
century. Today, this is not the case, thanks to the growing competition
among the great powers.
As the idea of the “New Silk Road” gains popularity, economic interest and energy investment in the corridor have begun to see a steadyincrease. Russia has grand plans for its Eurasian Union, as China mulls
its own institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organizationand its “One Belt, One Road.” The governments of these countries arealso heavily involved in promoting regional economic development,
especially through the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
Program (CAREC), an initiative of the Asian Development Bank or the
Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB). American and Japanese
government agencies have gotten involved, but more on the local levelwith small-scale grants, loans or projects through the World Bank, Japan’sExternal Trade Organization, Japan International Cooperation Agency,
Ministry of Economics, Trade and Investment, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, U.S. State Department, USAID, and the United Nations that havenot always been closely coordinated. American and Japanese interests
have also funneled into the corridor through non-state actors such asprivate businesses and various multi-national corporations like GE, Sojitz,

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ExxonMobil, and Chevron, which were mainly interested in the oil andgas pipeline possibilities of this area. This private sector presence has
allowed for the diversification of energy supply routes for non-OPEC
countries, which has in turn greatly impacted the energy market and its
policies. Despite this targeted involvement, there has yet to be a driving
force that can link the many pieces of this puzzle in an overarching planor program for regional economic development, trade and investmentthat engages the Black and Caspian Sea region and Eurasia more broadly.
This is largely due to the de facto demise of Washington’s 2011 New Silk
Road Initiative, which has only recently regained policy attention under
the Trump administration after years of institutional neglect.30 Although
Abe’s 2015 Central Asia tour essentially kept Washington’s geostrategic
vision afloat with lavish infrastructure investment in all five regionalcountries, the lack of bilateral coordination between the two capitals led
the initiative to remain aimlessly adrift, increasingly allowing Beijing
to wield hegemonic influence. This is a gap that enhanced U.S.-Japan
cooperation and understanding could fill.
In fact, Japan became the first liberal democratic country to establish
a consultative dialogue with all five Central Asian states after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Launched in 2004, the Central Asia
plus Japan dialogue became a model for other liberal democracies, leading South Korea to establish its own in 2006, EU in 2009, and the U.S.
in 2016. As China’s Belt and Road Initiative increasingly traverses theEurasian heartland horizontally from Afghanistan to the Caspian Sea, it
is imperative to include Afghanistan in this dialogue to bolster its politicalstabilization and economic development. Unlike the U.S. and EU, Japan
has unique soft power influence over the region that is free from various
political constraints, such as democracy and human rights, that often
hamper Western countries in the region. Including Afghanistan in theCentral Asia dialogue would also facilitate Japan’s regional connectivity to South Asia. There the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India(TAPI) pipeline, a key infrastructure project of Washington’s New Silk
Road Initiative currently funded by Japanese businesses, remains the only199

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tangible achievement toward this end. Uncertainty perpetually surrounds
the TAPI pipeline, making the project vulnerable to Beijing’s geo-economic opportunism, and leading Japan’s local infrastructure investment
to acquire renewed significance for its regional future. Indeed, China’s
Machiavellian geo-economics has been on full display in its recent courtship with jihadist militants in TAPI’s transit cities, further underscoring
the urgent need for a Japanese alternative in regional development.31
Given that Central Asia has historically fallen into either the Chineseor Russian spheres of influences, most of these nations would prefer athird alternative like the U.S. or Japan that has no capability or interestin domination or regional groupings.
A starting point for reviving the liberal international order in the Eurasian“heartland” would be to craft a bilateral regional strategy following thespirit of Washington’s 2011 New Silk Road Initiative. Unlike Russia’sEurasian Economic Union and China’s OBOR that span horizontally
across the region, the New Silk Road Initiative is a vertical connectivity project linking Central Asia to the burgeoning economies of South
Asia. It therefore has significant potential as a counterweight against
the growing horizontal influence of Russia and China across Eurasia.
Indeed, Kazakhstan is today’s core Eurasian heartland, control of which
would inevitably lead to the status of regional hegemony, a prospect
increasingly being realized by China. Although the country remains a defacto protectorate under Moscow’s security and Beijing’s economic influence, the government in Astana has consistently pursued “multi-vector
diplomacy” to maintain regional independence. Despite Washington’s
lackluster attention to its own regional initiative, the U.S. and Japan must
work together to anchor their sway firmly in Kazakhstan. Given Abe’sstrong personal relations with Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev,
a U.S.-Japan+Kazakhstan formula that links existing C5 (Central Asian
republics) + U.S. and Japan could be combined to lay the foundation forlinking Central Asia to South Asia. The U.S. should complement Japan’s
budding economic and soft power in both regions with necessary security
and intelligence support. Furthermore, given Kazakhstan’s geostrategic200

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significance as the Eurasian pivot, Tokyo must work toward establishing a 2+2 dialogue mechanism with Astana just as it did with its key
Indo-Pacific partner, India. Japan’s security presence in Central Asia incooperation with the U.S. military would significantly bolster the verticalinfluence of the two countries. Finally, a joint U.S.-Japan New Silk Road
initiative would be a Eurasian equivalent to the ongoing bilateral “Freeand Open Indo-Pacific” initiative. Therefore, the U.S. and Japan must
transform the New Silk Road Initiative into a solid alternative to China’s
Silk Road Belt in Eurasia.
Middle East: Balancing Western Asia’s Dynamics
Through Far Eastern Pragmaticism
Japan’s soft power in the Middle East, like in Central Asia, also benefits
from the lack of historic baggage that the U.S. and other Western powers
have in the region. Given Japan’s almost exclusive economic focus in
the Middle East, Tokyo has been able to maintain good relations with
Jerusalem at the same time as Tehran, Riyadh, and even Ankara. Indeed,
Prime Minister Abe’s personal rapport with Israeli Prime Minister
Netanyahu and Turkish President Erdogan further builds on his ability to
get along with strongman leaders. Despite Japan’s interest in further deepening trade with Iran, U.S. sanctions and increased tensions under the
Trump administration have prevented Japanese companies from jumping
in the way European companies have in recent years. Nonetheless, given
Japan’s ability to balance its relations with all the major players in theregion while avoiding strategic entanglement, there is room for greater
U.S.-Japanese cooperation in the Middle East, particularly in the areaof energy and infrastructure investment. Japan’s humanitarian efforts in
Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey (in response to the civil war in Syria) andin Iraq (in response to ISIS) have been particularly well-received andare worthy of greater attention. Especially given the cultural sensitivity
exhibited by Japanese, the unique place that Japan holds as a non-Westernchampion of the liberal international order, and its more pragmatic
focus on economic cooperation and regional stability, Tokyo’s efforts
would go further and have greater long-term resonance than some of201

Joshua W. Walker

the discussions about values emanating from Brussels or Washington.
In effect, Japan could be America’s secret ingredient for a more robust
geo-economic presence in the Middle East even as it draws down its
military engagements. Indeed, Japan has a successful track record ofclosely working with the U.S. military to provide humanitarian support tothe local population during the Iraq War, and a similar U.S.-Japan+Syria
formula could have the potential for offering a solution to the lingering
civil war.32 By working in close coordination with the Abe administration, Washington might be able to learn from Tokyo’s ability to maintain
good relations in the midst of tense regional relations. While shaping thefuture of Syria or confronting Iran will require hard power and leadershipthat only Washington can provide, with Tokyo’s soft power support both
diplomatically and financially, the U.S.-Japan alliance has much to offer
in the Middle East and beyond.
Connecting Two Diamonds: Visualizing Japan’s
Geostrategy in the New Era
2018 presents numerous opportunities for Japan to boost its global presence as a bridge builder across the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia. Geopoliticalstrategist George Friedman once described China as “Japan on steroids”
due to the two countries’ economic-centric approach to geopolitics. At atime when Beijing’s OBOR permeates throughout the Indo-Pacific andEurasia, Tokyo must conceive of a comparable geostrategic initiative ona global scale that incorporates its alliance with Washington as a counterweight to the growing Chinese influence in the world in defense of
the liberal international order.
In fact, Japan already possesses a solid intellectual foundation to offer
such an alternative to OBOR. In 2006, Taro Aso, the then-foreign minister
under the first Abe administration, unveiled postwar Japan’s first geopolitical vision known as the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity.33 The Arc
spanned from Europe to the Far East, including the regions on the shoresof the Indo-Pacific defined as the “Arc of Crisis” by Zbigniew Brzezinski in
1978. Aso envisioned Tokyo’s greater engagement with emerging Eurasian202

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capitals from Ankara to New Delhi, while leveraging a combination ofJapan’s pacifist soft power and development aid to war-torn countries,
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In December 2012, prime minister Shinzo
Abe published a seminal article that laid out his vision for the Indo-Pacificregion known as Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond.34 Abe’s 2012 vision
was largely confined to the Indo-Pacific in scope and revolved around
Japan’s burgeoning maritime cooperation with India and Australia tocounter China’s growing regional clout.
Proposed Eurasian Geostrategic Diamond and Indo-Pacific
Security DiamondContinental countries

Continental/Maritime countries

Maritime countries

Japan (part of both diamonds)

Eurasian Geostrategic Diamond(Russia–Turkey–India–Japan)
Indo–Pacific Security Diamond(India–Australia–Hawaii (USA)–Japan)

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Joshua W. Walker

As the U.S. increasingly sheds its global influence, Japan has a unique
opportunity to globalize the U.S.-Japan+Alpha formula by upgrading
its existing geostrategic visions. Given Tokyo’s budding relations with
Moscow, Ankara, and New Delhi in recent years, a Eurasian Geostrategic
Diamond consisting of Russia, Turkey, India, and Japan would serve
as a solid basis for boosting Japan’s presence on the continent. Aso’s
2006 formula of combining Japan’s pacifist soft power and economic
investment would be particularly effective in boosting the country’s
engagement with Eurasian countries ranging from major powers like
Russia to war-torn countries, such as Afghanistan. Moreover, Japan’s
participation in non-Chinese led regional institutions would significantly contribute to the institutionalization of the proposed Eurasianregional framework. Likewise, the growing operationalization of Japan’s
engagement with emerging maritime powers, such as the revival of thequad formation, is essentially transforming Abe’s 2012 concept into averitable security diamond in the Indo-Pacific. An Indo-Pacific Security
Diamond aimed to further institutionalize Japan’s regional leadershipand value-driven diplomacy would be a significant counterweight toChina’s Maritime Silk Road and its inexorable military assertiveness in
the South China Sea.

Conclusion
For too long the U.S.-Japan alliance has been seen and studied in the
narrow confines of its traditional security architecture, which while vitalin ensuring the foundation of bilateral relations has been greatly expanded
upon in the era of Prime Minister Abe. To take full advantage of thecapabilities and synergies that exist between the U.S. and Japan both
functionally and geographically, a broader framework for globalizing thealliance must be realized. In adapting to the national interests of both
Washington and Tokyo, policymakers on both sides of the Pacific would
benefit from greater coordination and interaction across the spectrumof the issues that go far beyond what this brief could cover. The hope isby laying out some aspirational policy recommendations, the U.S.-Japan204

Globalizing the U.S.-Japan Alliance for the 21st C entury

alliance can continue to adapt for the 21st century and remain as criticalto maintaining the liberal international order in the future as it has forthe past seven decades. It is no longer a one-way road of policy direction
from Washington to Tokyo. Japan is on the frontlines of the Indo-Pacificand Eurasian rivalry with China, and there is much that America canlearn from its experience in the region moving forward. Ultimately, Japan
must craft its own regional orders in the Indo-Pacific and Eurasia andpromote the liberal international order through strategic engagement
ranging from infrastructure investment to defense cooperation. A future
U.S.-Japan alliance must therefore integrate and promote these orders, inservice of the globalizing scope of the bilateral relations.

Policy Recommendations• Institutionalize the personal chemistry that Abe and Trump share toprotect the alliance against domestic (mainly U.S.) backlash in the future.
• Engage a “U.S.-Japan+Alpha” formula that would add other regionalcountries and frameworks as we have seen in the U.S.-Japan-India
trilateral and U.S.-Japan-India-Australia quad evolution.
• Coordinate on the shared strategic threats posed by China and North
Korea while leaving room for tactical divergence on the economic
front.
• Appreciate Japan’s unique role as a bridge builder with Russia andfurther seek to bring Russia into Asia.
• Double down on the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and “the New Silk
Road Initiative” as joint strategies with specific focus on India andKazakhstan, respectively, but with enough flexibility and room forother countries of the region.

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Joshua W. Walker• Conceptualize an Indo-Pacific Security Diamond consisting ofAmerica, Australia, Japan and India along with a Eurasian Geostrategic
Diamond consisting of Russia, Turkey, India, and Japan as a counterweight to China’s regional order.
• Further coordinate and develop areas for U.S.-Japan cooperation inSoutheast Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East to include regular
discussions and even a framework for joint engagement.
• Fully integrate emerging Japan-led regional orders in the Indo-Pacificand Eurasia into the globalizing U.S.-Japan alliance. n

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Chapter Endnotes
1

Walker, Joshua. “Trump Needs a World Leader Buddy” Politico February 9, 2017https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/02/trump-needs-a-world-leaderbuddy-214761.

2

Landers, Peter. “Trumps Loyal Sidekick on North Korea” Wall Street Journal
August 16, 2017 https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-loyal-sidekick-on-northkorea-japans-shinzo-abe-1502875805.

3

Sevastopulo, Demetri. “Trump gives glimpse of ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy to counter
China” Financial Times October 11, 2017 https://www.ft.com/content/e6d17fd6-c623–
11e7-a1d2–6786f39ef675.

4

Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY 2017. April, 2017 http://www.mofa.
go.jp/files/000259285.pdf.

5Abe, Shinzo. Towards an Alliance of Hope. April 29, 2015 https://japan.kantei.
go.jp/97_abe/statement/201504/uscongress.html.

6

Japan-U.S. Security Arrangements. August, 2017 http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/security/scc/index.html.

7

Sonoura, Kentaro. “Japan’s Initiative for Promoting Quality Infrastructure Investment”
September 19, 2017 http://www.mofa.go.jp/files/000291344.pdf.

8“TPP 11 Forge Ahead with Renamed Trade Pact” Japan Times. November 11, 2017https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/11/11/business/economy-business/eleventrade-ministers-reach-deal-tpp-without-u-s/#.Wk6bRd-nFPY.

9Ryder, Marcus. “One Belt, One Road, One Trillion Dollars” January 10, 2017 https://
news.cgtn.com/news/3d63544d3363544d/share_p.html.

10 Escobar, Pepe. “The Russia-China plan for North Korea” Asia Times. September 13, 2017
http://www.atimes.com/article/russia-china-plan-north-korea-stability-connectivity/.
11 McCurry, Justin. “Japan Buys US Missile Defense System to Counter North Korean
Threat” The Guardian. December 19, 2017 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/19/japan-buys-us-missile-defence-system-to-counter-north-korean-threat.
12 Kubo, Nobuhiro and Kelly, Tim. “Japan Considers Refitting Helicoter Carrier for
Stealth Fighters” Reuters. December 26, 2017 https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-japan-defence-carrier/japan-considers-refitting-helicopter-carrier-for-stealthfighters-government-sources-idUSKBN1EK0CF.
13 Abe, Shinzo. “Asia’s Dream” June 5, 2017 http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201706/1222768_11579.html.
14 Tiezzi, Shannon. “In Japan, Trump and Abe Offer Alternative to China’s
Belt and Road” November 8, 2017 https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/
in-japan-trump-and-abe-offer-alternative-to-chinas-belt-and-road/.

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15 Majumdar, David. “Could Russia and Japan Finally Settle Their Island Dispute?”
National Interest. December 12, 2017 http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/
could-russia-japan-finally-settle-their-island-dispute-23630.
16 Eyal, Jonathan. “Russia’s ASEAN moves Part of Putins Power Play”
Straits Times. August 14, 2017 http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/
russias-asean-moves-part-of-putins-power-play.
17 “Putin’s Plan in the South China Sea” ISN Security Watch. April 17, 2017 https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Putins-Plan-In-The-South-China-Sea.html.
18 Miller, J. Berkshire. “How Abe and Modi Can Save the Indo-Pacific” Foreign Affairs.
November 15, 2017. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2017–11–15/
how-abe-and-modi-can-save-indo-pacific.
19 Panda, Ankit. “India-Japan-US Malabar 2017 Naval Exercises Kick Off with AntiSubmarine Warfare in Focus” The Diplomat. July 10, 2017 https://thediplomat.
com/2017/07/india-japan-us-malabar-2017-naval-exercises-kick-off-with-anti-submarine-warfare-in-focus/.
20 Panda, Ankit. “Will India and Japan Conclude a Long-Pending Amphibious Aircraft
Deal?” The Diplomat. September 13, 2017 https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/
will-india-and-japan-finally-conclude-a-long-pending-us-2-amphibious-aircraftdefense-deal/.
21 Kotoky, Anurag and Matsuda, Kiyotaka. “Japan is Selling Bullet Trains to
India” Bloomberg. September 13, 2017 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017–09–13/japan-s-bullet-train-gives-164-year-old-indian-railway-a-jolt.
22 Panda, Ankit. “India, US Sign Logistics Exchange Agreement” The Diplomat.
August 30, 2016 https://thediplomat.com/2016/08 india-us-sign-logisticsexchange-agreement-what-you-need-to-know/.
23 Panda, Ankit. “US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Working Level Quadrilateral
Meeting on regional Cooperation” The Diplomat. November 13, 2017 https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/us-japan-india-and-australia-hold-working-level-quadrilateral-meeting-on-regional-cooperation/.
24 Jennings, Ralph. “Japan Deepens Economic Aide to Philippines in Rivalary with
China” Voice of America News. November 3, 2017 https://www.voanews.com/a/japan-economic-aid-philippines/4098258.html.
25 RSIS. “Japan’s Hard and Soft Power in ASEAN” Eurasia Review. December 28, 2017 https://www.eurasiareview.com/28122017-japans-hard-and-soft-power-in-asean-analysis/.
26 Tomiyama, Atsushi. “Japan Returns as top Investor in Vietnam” Nikkei Asian Review.
December 28, 2017 https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Japan-returns-as-top-investor-in-Vietnam.

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27 Parameswaran, Prashanth. “What’s Next for Japan-Vietnam Defense
Ties?” The Diplomat. November 2, 2017 https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/
whats-next-for-japan-vietnam-defense-ties/.
28 Sun, Yun. “China’s Belt and Road in Myanmar” The Diplomat. December 26, 2017https://thediplomat.com/tag/chinese-investment-in-myanmar/.
29 Chern, Kang Wan. “Why Myanmar is Important to Japan” Myanmar Times. August30, 2017. https://www.mmtimes.com/news/why-myanmar-important-japan.html.
30 “US Revives Silk Road Projects to Counter China’s ‘Soft Power’” Eurasia
Business Briefing. May 26, 2017 http://www.eurasianbusinessbriefing.com/
us-revives-silk-road-projects-bid-counter-chinas-soft-power-ambitions/.
31 “China woos Baloch Separtists to Secure Belt and Road Initiative” Financial Times. February
19, 2018 https://www.ft.com/content/063ce350–1099–11e8–8cb6-b9ccc4c4dbbb.
32 Sen, Ashish Kumar. “Can Japan Help End the War in Syria?” Atlantic Council.
March 18, 2016. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/
can-japan-help-end-the-war-in-syria.
33 Aso, Taro. “On the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
March 12, 2017. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/pillar/address0703.html.
34 Abe, Shinzo. “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond” Project Syndicate. December 27,
2012.

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Author Biographies

Amy Catalinac
Assistant Professor, New York University
Amy Catalinac is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics at
New York University. After earning her PhD in government at Harvard
University in 2011, she was a postdoctoral fellow in the Program on
U.S.-Japan Relations at Harvard (2011–12); an assistant professor atAustralian National University (2012–14); and a visiting assistant professor at Harvard (2014–15). Her research uses the case of Japan to address
core questions in international relations and comparative politics. Her
book, Electoral Reform and National Security in Japan: From Pork to
Foreign Policy, was published with Cambridge University Press in 2016.
Her articles have been published in the American Political Science Review,
the Journal of Politics, Foreign Policy Analysis, and Politics and Policy,
among others. Professor Catalinac has spent close to five years in Japan,
where she has observed the election campaigns of numerous politicians,
conducted interviews with political actors at all levels of the Japanese
government, and interned for the Liberal Democratic Party. She teaches
courses on international relations, comparative politics, Japanese security
policy, and Japanese politics.

Yulia Frumer
Assistant Professor, Johns Hopkins University
Yulia Frumer is the Bo Jung and Soon Young Kim Assistant Professor of
East Asian Science and Technology, History of Science and Technology
Department, Johns Hopkins University. Before joining Hopkins, Professor
Frumer was a postdoctoral fellow at the Max Planck Institute for theHistory of Science in Berlin. She holds a PhD from the History of Science210

Au thor Bio graphies

Program at Princeton University and an MA from the Cohn Institute for
History of Sciences and Ideas at Tel Aviv University. In her research, she
focuses on the history of science and technology in Japan. Her first book,titled Making Time: Astronomical Time Measurement in Tokugawa Japan,
explored astronomical time measurement in Tokugawa-period Japan.
Her current research project focuses on the long history of humanoid
robotics technologies in Japan. In addition, she explores topics of scientifictranslations, science and technology exchange, measurement instruments,and science fiction.

Robert Hoppens
Associate Professor, University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
Robert Hoppens received a PhD in modern Japanese history from the
University of Washington and is associate professor at the Universityof Texas Rio Grande Valley, where he teaches Japanese, Chinese, andEast Asian and world history. His research interests focus on the history of Sino-Japanese relations, cold war history and issues of national
identity in East Asia. He is the author of The China Problem in Postwar
Japan: Japanese National Identity and Sino-Japanese Relations, publishedby Bloomsbury Press as part of the series SOAS Studies in Modern andContemporary Japan.

Nori Katagiri
Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University
Nori Katagiri is an assistant professor of political science at Saint Louis
University, where he teaches international relations, security studies, andEast Asia. He is writing a book on Japan’s military power after publishing
his first, titled Adapting to Win: How Insurgents Fight and Defeat Foreign
States in War (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). Before joining
Saint Louis University, he taught international security at Air War College,a joint military graduate school for senior officers and officials of the U.S.
government and foreign nations. Between 2016 and 2018, he is serving211

Au thor Bio graphies

as a visiting research fellow at the Air Staff College, Meguro Base, ofJapan’s Air Self-Defense Force. He received his BA in international studies
from the University of South Carolina, a master’s degree in international
affairs from Columbia University, and a PhD in political science from the
University of Pennsylvania.

Adam P. Liff
Assistant Professor, Indiana University
Adam P. Liff is Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relationsat Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies(SGIS). He is also an adjunct fellow with the Japan Chair at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and associatein-research at Harvard University’s Reischauer Institute of JapaneseStudies and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. Professor Liff holds
a PhD and MA in politics from Princeton University, and a BA from
Stanford University. His research focuses on international security andthe Asia-Pacific, with particular emphasis on the foreign relations of Japanand China; U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy; the U.S.-Japan alliance; and therise of China and its regional and global impact. His academic scholarship has been published in Asia Policy, International Security, Journalof Contemporary China, Journal of Strategic Studies, Security Studies,
The China Quarterly, and The Washington Quarterly, and has been citedwidely in global media, including in The Wall Street Journal, The New
York Times, and The Economist.

Ko Maeda
Associate Professor, University of North Texas
Ko Maeda is an associate professor of political science at the Universityof North Texas, specializing in elections, party competition, and politicalinstitutions. His work has appeared in journals such as the Journal of
Politics, British Journal of Political Science, Comparative Political Studies,Electoral Studies, and the Journal of Theoretical Politics.

212

Au thor Bio graphies

Reo Matsuzaki
Assistant Professor, Trinity College
Reo Matsuzaki is an assistant professor of political science at Trinity College
in Hartford, Connecticut. His research and teaching interests lie at theintersection of comparative politics and history of East Asia, with a focus
on statebuilding and colonialism. His book, Statebuilding by Imposition:
Constructing a Modern State Amidst Resistance in Colonial Taiwan andPhilippines, forthcoming from Cornell University Press, explores the rolesocietal intermediaries play in the construction of modern states througha comparative historical analysis of Japanese colonization of Taiwan(1895–1945) and the U.S. colonization of the Philippines (1898–1942).
He received his PhD from MIT and was a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford
University’s Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
before joining the Trinity faculty in 2013. He is an associate-in-research
at Harvard University’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and at
Yale University’s Council of East Asian Studies.

Matthew Poggi
U.S. Department of Treasury Representative(Financial Attaché) to Japan
Matthew Poggi is the U.S. Department of Treasury’s representative(financial attaché) to Japan. Prior to his current post, he served as deputy
director of the international banking and securities markets office. His
portfolio included systemic financial vulnerabilities and shadow banking, and his regional responsibilities focused on Asia. Prior to joining
Treasury in 2006, Mr. Poggi worked in the international department at
the Bank of Japan from 2003–05. Before that, Mr. Poggi was an economist
covering Japan at Lehman Brothers in Tokyo for eight years. Mr. Poggi
was a Mansfield Fellow from 2010–2011, spending time at the Bank ofJapan, the Ministry of Finance, the Financial Services Agency, and theoffice of a member of the Upper House of the Diet. He is a graduate of
Boston College, and holds an MSc (Econ) from the London School of
Economics and an MPP from Columbia University.

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Au thor Bio graphies

Michael Orlando Sharpe
Associate Professor, City University of New York
Michael Orlando Sharpe is an associate professor of political sciencein the Department of Behavioral Sciences at York College of the City
University of New York. He holds a PhD and Master of Philosophy
in political science from the Graduate School and University Centerof the City University of New York. Additionally, Dr. Sharpe holds a
Master of International Affairs from Columbia University’s School ofInternational and Public Affairs, a graduate diploma in International
Law and Organization for Development from the Institute of Social
Studies in The Hague, The Netherlands, and a BA degree from Rutgers
College/Rutgers University. Prior to coming to York College/CUNY, Dr.
Sharpe was a senior research associate at the Howard Samuels Centerat the CUNY Graduate Center.
Dr. Sharpe previously was employed as a political analyst for theConsulate General of Japan in New York. Earlier in Tokyo, Japan,
he was a project coordinator for the United Nations-affiliated nongovernmental organization the International Movement Against All
Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR), and he now serves
on IMADR’s board of directors. Dr. Sharpe’s areas of expertise arecomparative politics and international relations and his researchinterests concern looking comparatively at the politics of migration,
immigrant political incorporation, and political transnationalism in
the Netherlands, Japan, and around the world. His first book is entitled
Postcolonial Citizens and Ethnic Migration: The Netherlands and Japanin the Age of Globalization (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). Some of his
work has appeared in the journals Japanese Journal of Political Science,
Policy and Society, Dialectical Anthropology, International Relationsof the Asia- Pacific, and in encyclopedias and popular media. During
his sabbatical leave (2017–2018), he is an adjunct associate researchscholar at Columbia University’s Weatherhead East Asian Institute, anda visiting researcher at Keio University’s Faculty of Law in Tokyo, Japan.

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Jolyon Thomas
Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania
Jolyon Thomas is an assistant professor of religious studies at the Universityof Pennsylvania. He holds a PhD from Princeton University, an MA fromthe University of Hawaii, and a BA from Grinnell College. His current
projects investigate who gets to define religious freedom and with what
political effects, how conceptions of “religion” and “the secular” appear indebates about public school education in postwar Japan and the UnitedStates, and what sort of relationships exist between religion, capitalism,
and sexuality. His first book, Drawing on Tradition: Manga, Anime, andReligion in Contemporary Japan, is available from University of Hawaii
Press. His second book, Japan, the American Occupation, and the Problem
of Religious Freedom, is forthcoming from University of Chicago Press. He
is now working on a third book, tentatively titled The Problematic Subjectof Religious Education: Debates over Morality, Patriotism, and Security in
Postwar Japan and the United States.

Kristin Vekasi
Assistant Professor, University of Maine
Kristin Vekasi is an assistant professor of political science and international affairs at the University of Maine. She received her PhD at the
University of Wisconsin, Madison, and has conducted extensive research
and fieldwork across Northeast Asia, particularly in Japan and China. She
has been a visiting fellow with the Japan Foundation at Tokyo University, aFulbright Fellow at Tohoku University, and a Foreign Language and Area
Studies fellow at the Harbin Institute of Technology. Professor Vekasi’s
research focuses on Japan-China relations, and how multinational firms
manage political risk in a globalized and politicized world. Her mostrecent publications in the Chinese Journal of International Politics and East
Asia Forum Quarterly discuss how private firms use cultural exchange
programs to improve tense international relations. She is currently
working on a book manuscript analyzing the political risk management
strategies of Japanese firms in China.

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Joshua W. Walker
Managing Director for Japan and Head of Global Strategic
Initiatives, Office of the President, Eurasia Group
Joshua W. Walker currently serves as the Managing Director for Japan andHead of Global Strategic Initiatives in the Washington, D.C., Office of the
President of Eurasia Group, the world’s largest political risk consultancy.
He brings almost two decades of international business diplomacy tothis role, most recently serving as the CEO and President of the USA
Pavilion of the 2017 World Expo in Astana, Kazakhstan. Dr. Walker also
was Founding Dean of the APCO Institute and Senior Vice President of
Global Programs at APCO Worldwide, a leading global strategic communications firm. Dr. Walker is concurrently a Transatlantic Fellow at
the German Marshall Fund of the United States, where he focuses on
Japan for the Asia program. He also teaches Leadership and the American
Presidency at the George Mason University. Before joining the private
sector, he worked as a senior advisor at the U.S. Department of State in
Secretary Kerry’s Office of the Chief Economist and prior to this servedin Secretary Clinton’s Global Partnership Initiatives. He has also workedon the Turkey Desk of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at
the State Department, the U.S. Embassy Ankara, and for the Joint Chiefsof Staff at the U.S. Department of Defense. Dr. Walker holds a Princeton
doctorate, Yale master’s, and a University of Richmond bachelor’s. He
speaks both Japanese and Turkish.

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The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
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www.mansfieldfdn.org