(Project of Kajima Institute of International Peace)(Emergency Proposal)

Facing the Inconvenient Truth:
Re-examining Policy for Peace and Denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula

May, 2017
Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies

Facing the Inconvenient Truth:
Re-examining Policy for Peace and Denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula

1. Two "Inconvenient Truths"
An "inconvenient truth" has been revealed from the crisis on
the Korean Peninsula in this spring --- we have no effective
measures available to solve the North Korean nuclear missile
development problem in the short term. If military
enforcement measures are taken, that would bring about
disastrous consequences jeopardizing the security of Japan.
The nuclear armament of North Korea has become anestablished fact, whereas we have no choice but to condone ittacitly as de facto or to pursue efforts to realize thedenuclearization of the Peninsula in a long term perspective ofabout ten to twenty years. If we choose the latter option, thelong term option, we must start from scratching once again tomake North Korea realize that they are overestimating thevalue of their nuclear missile holdings. In other words,
Chairman Kim Jong-un must definitely recognize another"inconvenient truth" that even if North Korea succeeded innuclear armament and long-range missile development, such
efforts would only amount to the acquisition of extremely
rudimentary nuclear deterrence, but will not fundamentallychange relations with South Korea and other countries, norguarantee the survival of the current North Korean regime.
Otherwise, any negotiation with North Korea would be1

difficult. The international community would not be able toimpose restrictions upon the North such as nuclear andmissile test freeze, and international inspection --- still less tomake North Korea abandon nuclear missiles they have so far
developed.
2. Elimination of Appeasement Policy
Therefore, in the short term, any appeasement policy
toward North Korea should be eliminated. It would not only
encourage the North’s overestimation of their nuclear missile
program but might also in the worst case induce them toconduct military provocation to confirm the deterrent effect of
their missiles. In that sense, the policies already implemented
or in development after the 2nd nuclear crisis are all pertinent
ones:1) the secondary boycott by the US government against third
country financial institutions failing to fulfill the UNresolutions;2) the demonstration of US deterrent capabilities (nuclearumbrella), including deployment of strategic bombers andstealth fighter aircraft over the Osan Air Force Base;3) the promotion of THAAD deployment for US military basesin the South Korea and in the Pacific region;4) the strengthening of the security partnership between
Japan, the US and South Korea, including the conclusion ofJapan-Korea GSOMIA (General Security of Military
Information Agreement); and5) on top of these, economic sanctions against the North basedon UN resolutions must be implemented 100%. In particular,cooperation by China will be the focus of attention.
2

3. Reintroduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
If North Korea, regardless of these measures, intends tocontinue nuclear tests and missile launches, it is desirable toredeploy tactical nuclear weapons at the US military bases inSouth Korea as a counter measure. From a military point ofview, South Korea is already protected by US extended
deterrence; but from a psychological and political point of view,
redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons will increase
reliability of stable mutual deterrence. Moreover, it will
provide an underpinning for an equal-footing dialogue
between North and South Koreas. If the North is resolute tocontinue nuclear tests despite the reintroduction of tactical
nuclear weapons, we need to consider other measures toprevent them. The new "nuclear posture review" undertakenby the Trump administration should be taken into
consideration the strategic environment of Northeast Asia
including the progress of North Korea's nuclear and missile
development, while Japan and South Korea should beguaranteed protection by US extended deterrence.
4. New "Containment" Policy
The policy goal of Japan, the United States and South Korea
is not to use full-scale military force against thenuclear-armed divided state, or to expedite the collapse ofNorth Korea by other means. If in an unpredictable
contingency North Korea's counterattacks were directed
inside the country, the situation would develop into a
Romanian-style civil war and invite China's militaryintervention; in the worst scenario a military clash may occur
3between the North and the South, and an intervention by theUS Forces stationed in South Korea. If North Korea strikes
outward, US military bases in South Korea, Japan and thePacific will be targeted, and even the possibility of the North’s
ultimate use of nuclear missiles cannot be denied. One very
serious concern is that it has now become almost impossible toeradicate all nuclear weapons and missile facilities scatteredthroughout North Korea by "surgical operations." Instead, weshould learn from the "containment" policy George Kennan
propounded early in the Cold War era, in order to frustrate
North Korea's strong will to hold nuclear weapons over a longspan of time. It is most appropriate for Japan, the UnitedStates and South Korea to maintain robust defense
capabilities and to collaborate to carry out what Kennan
termed, the "long-term, persevering, but firm, vigilantcontainment," which will provide the most proper basis for thethree countries’ North Korea policy. It is high time for Japan toreexamine its missile defense system and seek a legal solution
regarding attack operations on enemy bases. North Korea is asmall, poor country but it is not stupid. If they realize thelimits of their nuclear deterrent capabilities, they will
sincerely explore the possibility of negotiations relatively
earlier than expected. Such a move from North Korea may
constitute the first step toward a long-time peacefulcoexistence of the two Koreas and the peace and security ofsurrounding countries.
5. Necessity of Dialogue with North Korea
North Korea’s brinkmanship that evolved from February
through April this year after the start of the Trump4

administration obviously aimed at a "deal" between Chairman
Kim Jong-un and President Trump, by utilizing the possibilityof the sixth nuclear test and ICBM test as a military anddiplomatic means. The North’s obvious brinkmanshipcarefully avoided military conflict, while urging the US torecognize the importance and inevitability of negotiations withNorth Korea through the creation of a crisis. Moreover, sincemilitary conflict was avoided this time, North Korea has
reserved the possibility of resorting to another military
provocation. Needless to say, if US-North Korea talks ortripartite talks between the US, China and North Korea wererealized, it would be unlikely for North Korea to give up thedevelopment of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles in
the foreseeable future. Yet, without any dialogue ornegotiation with North Korea, it would be impossible to freeze
the development of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles
and to build an international inspection system. On the other
hand, Japan, the US, and South Korea should uphold the jointstatement of the fourth round of the six-party talks in
September 2005, which agreed on the resumption of thesix-party talks presided by China and the denuclearization ofthe Korean Peninsula. We should remember that this jointstatement includes agreement on normalization of theUS-North Korea and the Japan-North Korea relations.
6. Peaceful Unification Policy
The North Korean leader will not accept complete
denuclearization until he can end his state’s international
isolation and become convinced of his personal safety. He isdemanding the realization of federation-type unification with5

"one nation, one state, two systems, two governments."
Although this proposal also includes the establishment of "onefederal government," he evades such enunciation. Such anattitude can be perceived as diplomatic "deceit." However, aslong as, South and North Koreas remain a divided nation, andintense regime struggles, international isolation, and severe
economic sanctions continue, the survival of the North Korean
regime will never be guaranteed. Paradoxically, only when along-lasting peaceful coexistence of two regimes is achieved on
the Peninsula, a peaceful unification of the two Koreas and thedenuclearization of the North will become a reality. Looking
back humbly on the past, one of the causes that brought about
today's situation is that surrounding nations were unable torealize detente on the Korean Peninsula after the end of theCold War: the cross-recognition of the two Koreas by the four
surrounding powers --- the United States, the Soviet Union,
China, and Japan.
Today, in the process of forming its diplomacy toward North
Korea, Japan needs cooperation not only from the six-party
talks member states, but from the international community
including Southeast Asian countries. Japan, in cooperation
with these countries, must formulate a foreign policy based onpressure and dialogue to help realize the return of North
Korea to the international community and a peacefulunification of two Koreas.
7. Strategic Interests Shared by Japan and South Korea
As Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's policy speech defines, SouthKorea is, for Japan, “the most important neighbor sharing
strategic interests." If the US resorts to limited military force
6against North Korea single-handedly or suddenly agrees to aUS-North Korean summit talk, it will impact both Japan andSouth Korea. In the former case, the risk of a war invoked by
the use of military force would plunge the people of SouthKorea into a frenzy and the US-ROK alliance would face thedanger of collapse. Likewise, despite a possible priorconsultation, the Japan-US alliance would nonethelessundergo a serious crisis. In the latter case, a shock comparable
to President Nixon's visit to China in the 1970's will impact
Japan and South Korea. In this sense, Japan and South Korea
certainly share strategic interests; consequently bothcountries must jointly prepare in peace time for a possiblewarfare. A prerequisite to this end is to separate security
issues from history and territorial issues.
The most recent North Korean crisis will be a good
opportunity to discuss a "two-track" policy with a new
upcoming administration of South Korea. Japan should
promote information sharing with South Korea based on theGSOMIA concluded last year, and also expedite the conclusionof Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) withthe country. Based on these agreements, Japan should
advance a broader, concrete defense cooperation with SouthKorea. In addition, Japan and South Korea should closely
exchange views on dialogue with North Korea and maintain
diplomatic cooperation. Assuming the resumption ofNorth-South Korean dialogue and exchange programs, Japan
should reconfirm the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang
Declaration, and make the utmost effort to overcome "theunfortunate past between Japan and North Korea" and tosolve pending problems including the abduction issue. With7

such possibilities in view, Japan should prepare her own
North Korea diplomacy.
May, 2017
Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies
Chief Author Masao Okonogi
Chairman
Masahiro Akiyama
AssociatesTsuneo Watanabe
Hideshi Tokuchi
Yuichi Hosoya
Kazumasa Oguro
Ken Jimbo
Bonji Ohara
Makoto Ogata
Ippeita Nishida
Satoru Ngao

8