GIARI “Political Integration and Identity” Seminar
Title: “China and United Nations: from the Perspective of Chinese Participation in PeacekeepingOperations”
Speaker: Dr. LIU Tiewa (Deputy Director of the Research Center of United Nations andInternational Organizations at Beijing Foreign Studies University)
Moderator: Professor Shinohara Hatsue, GSAPS, Waseda University
Venue: Room 710, Building No. 19, Waseda University
Time: Tuesday, January 25, 2011, 13:00-14:30
Summary of the Lecture
Dr. Liu began the speech by expressing her gratitude to Professor Shinohara, supervisor ofher Ph.D. study at GSAPS several years ago. She also made a brief self-introduction on her own
academic background which is highly relevant to the topic. Her PhD dissertation was an
examination of America’s changing influence in international organizations by doing case studies
of IMF, UNESCO, and UN Security Council, and thus her expertise focuses on UN andinternational organizations studies.
The talk mainly consisted of three parts. Briefly reviewing china’s principles andinvolvement in UN peacekeeping operations; summarizing major features of China’s involvementin peacekeeping after cold-war; and explaining China’s changing attitude towards involvement inUN PKOs through the perspectives of three mainstream IR theories.
Dr. Liu first stressed the important position of PKO and the change of conception of PKO
after cold-war. Based on this, she elaborated China’s principles on UN PKO as follows: china
supports UN PKO according to the UN Charter as an effective method to maintain peace throughUN; sovereignty and territorial integrality should be respected; the target state should actively
cooperate with the other states participating in PKO; every PKO mission should have specifictasks; no country should be allowed to intervene the other countries’ domestic affairs; PKO isunder the authority of UN Security Council; PKO costs should be fairly and reasonablydistributed.
Then she divided the history of China’s involvement in UN PKO into three milestone stages
and elaborated them respectively. 1) Opposing UN PKO in 1949-1978. Precisely speaking, China
didn’t have any PKO activity in this period. This was largely because China held a negative view
about UN and other international organizations. They were controlled by western powers while
third world countries had little leverage. Thus it reflected the inequality of international politicalreality. 2) Limited involvement in 1979-1989. In the 1970s, the “three not doing” principles
dominated China’s policy toward UN PKO, i.e., not participating in voting on PKO resolutions;
not paying for any PKO activities; not donating troops to ongoing PKO activities. However, by theend of 1980s, after realizing its philosophy more compatible with the value and idea of UN PKO,
China began to engage in active and gradual involvement. 3) Deepening and expanding
participation after cold war. The past two decades saw a ramping increase in the number andscale of China’s PKO activities. Dr. Liu exemplified a series of watersheds of China’s PKO
dispatches, and pointed out that these increasing activities received quite controversial evaluations
internationally.
As for the major features of the involvement after cold war, Dr. Liu summarized them as
seven points. 1) From regional to global participation. But she also highlighted that this global

participation had aroused both positive and negative evaluations. 2) Increasing contribution toUN PKO. Dr. Liu showed China’s increasing budget and personnel contribution to UN by detailed
statistics, and especially cited General Zhao Jingmin to demonstrate that China’s participation had
been more accepted. She also exemplified the newly established PKO troop training center inLangfan, Hebei Province, which has been attracting considerable international concerns. 3) Under
the UN authority. This has four aspects of connotation, including: to uphold the council authority
by adhering to multilateralism when it comes to major issues on peace and security; to improvethe efficiency of the security council so as to respond to threats more effectively; to improve theCouncil’s decision-making by giving greater expression to democratic rules; to pay closer
attention to Africa and highlight African interests. 4) National sovereignty and non-intervention
principle. Actually sovereignty and non-intervention have been always reiterated by Chinesegovernment. 5) Minimum or non- use of force. China emphasizes the peaceful settlement ofdisputes and non-use of force in international relations. This is an important principle of UN
Charter as well as a basic norm of international law. 6) Adherence to neutrality in PKO. She
made a distinction between neutrality and impartiality noting that China emphasizes neutrality
rather than impartiality because sometimes impartiality might cause situations that are out ofcontrol. 7) Multilateral cooperation instead of unilateral activities. It is worthy noting that
China’s foreign policy has a long history of favoring multilateralism and discarding unilateralism.
Dr. Liu then answered the main question, i.e., why China had changed its attitude toward
UN PKO, explaining the transformation by using the frameworks of three mainstream IR theories.
First, the Constructivism perspective, which focuses on norms, beliefs, knowledge andunderstanding, holds that as a UN P5 ( Five Permanent Members in Security Council) member
state, china needs to go further in the PKO areas to build national images and to live up to its
responsibility as a P5 state. China has put forward a phrase “being a responsible great power”(fuzeren de daguo). This is something quite recent. At the very beginning, China did notparticipate the international organizations, did not trust any guidelines. The speeches delivered byPrimer Zhou Enlai and other leaders then showed we were conserved and prudent about UN. Plus,
China used to hold a very negative image about UN. However, as China developed, especiallywhen recognized as a reliable partner, it began to become active in UN PKO. The
commonly-quoted motto, “we come for peace”, is a demonstration. Second, the Neo-liberalism
explanation, which highlights the regulation of institutionalism, argues that countries must learn
how to behave and cooperate in the institutions under the international framework. In the past,
China knew little about the international organizations. Under institutionalism, if China wants toachieve its goal, it has to resort to negotiation and consultation with other states. Therefore China
must participate in the international organizations and tries to acquire some negotiating skills andmaster the game rules. In some occasions, China tries to join the decision-making process andmake the rules. China has advocated the “three mores”, namely, to cooperate with more states
more frequently in more forums than ever before. Third, the Neo-realism view, adhering tosovereignty power and interests, attributes the motivation to what China can gain from PKO.
China has to prove its peace rising tendency to the other countries. Its engagement to UN
demonstrates that China is a responsible power which is ready and willing to assume its
obligations. Another advantage of participating in PKO is the direct exercise of Chinese army.
This is also a chance to globalize its army to gain mutual understanding on military build-up.
Finally, Dr. Liu drew the conclusion that China’s policy toward PKO would be “selective

and active” in the near future. It is “selective”, because the limited resources at the present time
would not permit China to overstretch its participation too much. The world agenda in a fiercely
changing era is beyond China’s capability. It is “active”, because China has been insisting on
active participation in the PKO ever since it realized the importance and significance in the 1980s.
Especially Haiti earthquake inspired China to recognize the necessity of the missions in the world.
At the end of her speech, Dr. Liu spared several minutes introducing the Research Center ofUnited Nations and International Organizations at Beijing Foreign Studies University, which wasrecently founded on December 18th, 2010. The incentive of the establishment of the center
originated from Tokyo since she was encouraged by Professor Shinohara and other Japanesescholars to expand the researches on UN and international organizations in China. She alsoreached out to Japanese academia for cooperation on this project, by stressing that Tokyo was thefirst stop of their visits.
The last part was the Q&A session. Here is a succinct version of the record.
Q1: What drives the selection as you said the policy was “selective”?
A: China has to restrain itself because of budget and personnel limits. National interests likeeconomic interests should be taken into account. China tends to take care of the neighboring area
first. Remote areas with really serious problems like Haiti would also be considered.
Q2: What would be China’s role in the management of UN and other organizations?
A: Most international organizations today adopt weighted voting system. China’s voting right inorganizations like IMF has been increased in recent years, which means China will play more
important role at the management level of international organizations.
Q3: How about China’s interests in Africa?
A: China does have great economic interests in Africa, for example, a lot of business andcompanies. However, China would not intervene in African countries’ internal affairs. China takes
a neutral stance on the political values and regimes of African countries.
Q4: Who makes the decision on PKO in China, the Military or the Party leaders?
A: Generally military weighs higher than the Party, but it is kind of cooperation or combination.
The military sector and the foreign ministry both play important roles in it.
Q5: What brought China to the expanding participation in PKO?
A: China faces a dilemma in defining its own role. Expanding participation would cause US
containment, but remaining passive would arouse more criticism from both developed anddeveloping countries. As the sole P5 developing country, China is required to be more responsible.
Q6: If situations like Somali case happened, would China be willing to sacrifice?
A: On the “responsibility to protect” China is cautious and conserved. The responsibilities of thesemissions are not clear there. China has no clear remarks on that. Interviews remain to be taken.
Q7: Why didn’t China care about its national image in the past? What change triggered thetransformation in China’s PKO?
A: China always cares about its image, but ideological dispute in cold war obstructed mutualunderstanding. In the context of economic booming, China has developed an idea of “going out ina way of multilateral diplomacy”, namely integrating itself into the world comprehensively.
Q8: What’s the unique consideration of China’s PKO? How does China balance its capability andwillingness to participate in PKO?
The uniqueness is the emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference principles. Both would beconsidered, capability on the first place and willingness the second.