ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTERDISCUSSION PAPERNo.183

China’ s Exchange Rate Policy and International
Competitiveness ( Export ) 1994-2005 :IS IT A LESSON FOR VIETNAM ?
byNGUYEN Phuc Hien*August 2011

ECONOMIC RESEARCH CENTERGRADUATE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICSNAGOYA UNIVERSITY* Visiting Associate Professor, Economic Research Center, Graduate School of Economics,
Nagoya University, from April 1 to September 30, 2011.

Email : phuchienth@yahoo.com

CHINA’S EXCHANGE RATE POLICY AND INTERNATIONALCOMPETITIVENESS (EXPORT) 1994-2005 :IS IT A LESSON FOR VIETNAM ?
NGUYEN Phuc Hien,

Abstract 1This paper aims to examine China’s exchange rate policy in theperiod 1994-2005 and its international competitiveness (export),
especially the context of China in the end of 1993. The paper shows thatthe “wise” exchange rate policy (1994-2005) helped China to reverse froma country with trade deficit to surplus trade one in the period 1994-2005.
Inaddition,

thispolicy

has strengthened

China’sinternational

competitiveness through a rapid productivity improvement. The paper
investigated the situation in China before implementing the Yuan “shock”
devaluation policy in 1994 is relatively similar to the current situation inVietnam. The exchange rate policy therefore provides good experiences
for Vietnam to overcome the current issues and create fundamentals for
improving international competitiveness (export) and trade balance.

Keywords : Exchange rate, Vietnam, China, International
Competitiveness, Trade, Export
JEL classification: F13, F31 and F33

1This views expressed in the publication are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of
these institutions

1

1. Introduction
China has had remarkable economic achievements and become a “miracle”
economy in East Asia, following Japan and South Korea. The GDP growth
remained highest in the world, having an average annual rate of 10.1% (ADB,2010) between 1994 and 2009. The GDP per capita (current price in US dollar)rose from 466 (1994) to 3734 (2009) (IMF, 2010). These incredible economic
fruits are resulted from different reasons. The paper shows that the “shock”
yuan devaluation policy in 1994 and then peg the yuan to the dollar until 2005
helped China to reverse from a country with trade deficit to surplus trade one(Figure 2). More importantly, this policy has strengthened China’s international
competitivenessthrougharapid

productivityimprovement.

Labourproductivity (defined and measured as output per employee) growth gained anannual average of 14.34% 2 between 1994 and 2009, which is higher thaneconomic growth (10.1%) in the same period. The export increased by anaverage of 18.4%, from 121 to 1201 USD billion between 1994 and 2009 (ADB,2010).
The paper explored the situation in China before implementing the yuandevaluation policy in 1994 is relatively similar to the current status in Vietnam.
The “wise” exchange rate policy therefore provides good experiences forVietnam to overcome the current issues and create fundamentals for improving
international competitiveness (export) and trade balance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 examines
China’s exchange rate policy and international competitiveness from 1994 to2005. Section 3 presents the current status of Vietnam’s exchange rate policy
and its international competitiveness. Section 4 shows a relative comparison of
the circumstance of China in 1993 and the current status of Vietnam. Finally
Section 5 concludes.

2The author’s calculation based on data of Key Indicator for Asia and Pacific, ADB 20102

2. China’s exchange rate policy and international competitiveness(1994-2005)
In line with comprehensive economic reforms began 1978, China’s exchange
rate policy has gradually transformed from one that was centrally planned to
one that is more market-oriented. The entire process has been accompanied bya gradual liberalization of the current account, inward direct investment aimed
at strengthening productivity and China’s international competitiveness as wellas the establishment of a capital control mechanism targeted at protecting thedomestic fragile financial sector (Yi, 2008).
The yuan exchange rate, used as an accounting tool in financial planningunder the central planning economy, had long been fixed at overvalued levels.
After 1978 when the reform and open-up policy began, the official yuan rate
was devalued repeatedly over a fairly long period in response to economic
fundamentals. Figure 1 shows the policy of the official USD/Yuan exchange rate,
indicating that the rate of yuan per dollar increased over time and stabilized ata constant level after 1994. A dual-track system, co-existing of an official
exchange rate and an internal settlement rate (ISR) for foreign trade-relatedtransactions was introduced in 1981. The foreign exchange swap market rate
was also gradually developed to replace the ISR in foreign trade-relatedtransactions in 1986 (Lin and Schramm, 2003). The dual-track exchange rate
policy became a barrier to trade activities and inward FDI flow. The dual-trackexchange rate system therefore was eliminated in 1994 when the Chinese
authorities unified the official rate with the swap rate (Yi 2008).
Figure 1: China’s USD/RMB Exchange Rate (1978-2001)

Source: Lin and Schramm, 2003
3

In the late of 1993, in the context of trade deficit by 13,3 percent of theexport and adopting a reform model of establishing a socialist market economy 3 ,the most comprehensive reform of the official exchange rate system wasadopted since the inception of economic reform 1979 (Lin and Schramm, 2003).
China carried out a exchange rate shock, devaluing its yuan by 50 percent inJan.1994. The yuan official and swap market rates were unified at the swap
market rate of yuan 8.7 per US dollar. In line with the devaluation shock, China
implemented a variety of foreign exchange control measures aimed at setting
up a single national foreign exchange market, and at promoting for its
international competitiveness. The foreign exchange retention scheme wasabolished and the foreign exchange swap business for domestic enterprises
ended accordingly. Under the new policy, domestic enterprises were required tosell all their foreign exchange receipts to designated foreign exchange banks.
Foreign exchange controls on imports were also lifted. Domestic importers could
purchase foreign exchange needed for imports through designated foreignexchange banks upon presentation of import contracts and valid commercial
documents. Foreign Funded Enterprises (FFEs) were allowed to continue
operating in the swap market to meet their foreign exchange demands without
having to through the banking system. In order to replace the old swap market,
the inter-bank foreign exchange market started operation through China’s
Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) based in Shanghai in April 1994.
China also accepted the obligations under Article VIII of IMF’s Articles ofAgreement in 1996 and attained the goal of current account convertibility (Yi2008).
The 1994 exchange rate policy impacted immediately on China’s
international competitiveness. The export increased rapidly by 32% and 23% in1994 and 1995 respectively (ADB, 2010), especially since then the exports ofmachinery have expanded rapidly (Uni, 2007). Figure 2 shows China reversed
dramatically from a trade deficit country in 1993 to trade surplus one since
1994. This success is largely due to the “daring” 1994 yuan devaluation policy
and the exchange rate control measures as well as tight monetary policy
against the rising inflation.

3The Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress stated its most comprehensive reform package,covering major aspects of the economy including taxation, banking, foreign exchange, foreign trade,investment, and state-owned enterprises (Lin and Schramm, 2003)

4

Figure 2: USD/Yuan Rate and Trade Balance
10864201993

1996

1999

2002

2005

2008

-2-4
Yuan/USD

Trade balance (% of GDP)

Source: ADB, 2010
Under the exchange rate policy in the period 1994-2005, the Yuan
exchange rate was allowed to float within a very narrow band of ± 0.3% aroundthe reference rate announced by the People’s Bank of China (PBC) forinter-bank transactions, given a fluctuation of ± 0.15% for retail transactions. A
bilateral monopoly characterized the inter-bank market structure. The Bank ofChina (BOC) controlled the bulk of the retail foreign exchange transactions andabout 70% of inter-bank transactions while the PBC was the largest buyer offoreign exchange, accounting for about 60 to 70 percent of the total purchasevolume (Lin and Schramm, 2003). The total foreign exchange reserves therefore
reached to 819 USD billion (2005), or 36 percent of GDP from a small amount of
21.2 USD billion in 1993, or 3.5 percent of GDP (ADB 2010).
While the current account was liberalized in 1996, the 1997 Asian
Financial Crisis inversely led China to maintain tight controls on its capital
account. Due to uncertainties over the yuan value and unauthorized capitaloutflows resulting from the weak outlook for the Chinese economy, the illegal
capital flight was a major concern of SAFE 4 during that time (Yi, 2008). On 1st
Dec 1998, the PBC permanently shut the swap centres for FFEs because they
were possibly used as vehicle in capital flight. Subsequently, the foreignexchange market was unified and all transactions for domestic enterprises andFFEs were conducted on the inter-bank market. Despite the massive
devaluation of currencies in Asian neighbouring countries, the Chinese
authorities were committed to remain the stability of the yuan exchange rate.
Sufficient foreign exchange reserves, stringent restrictions on capital outflows
4SAFE stands for State Administration of Foreign Exchange

5and relatively solid fundamentals supported the authorities to successfully
maintain the yuan exchange rate at 8.27 yuan per the dollar until July 2005.
China’s capital account liberalization focused on initially on encouraging
inflows of foreign direct investment. Most restrictions in this area have been
lifted (Lin and Schramm, 2003). This stable exchange rate policy has createdthe confidence of foreign investors to invest further in China and enabled theeconomy to gain access to modern technological and managerial resources andenhance its international competitiveness. China has become the largest
recipient of FDI flows in the developing world, stock of FDI in 2009 reached to473 USD billion, from 63 USD billion in 1993. Even thought the Asian financial
crisis impacted negatively on FDI flow, the inward FDI flow still increased inChina (UNCTAD, 2007). As a result, the productivity has improved vibrantly,
an annual average growth of 14.34% 5 between 1994 and 2009, especially thehigh productivity growth of export goods.

3. Vietnam’s current exchange rate policy and its international
competitivenessIn the late of 1988, Vietnam started its exchange rate reform policy. The
multiple official exchange rate system 6 was eliminated and unified to one
official exchange rate announced by State Bank of Vietnam (SBV). The officialexchange rate was stated relying on the parallel black market exchange rate
(Nguyen Van Tien, 2010) in the period 1988-1991. In 1991 the SBV set up two
its foreign exchange centres, one based in Hanoi and another ones in
Hochiminh City and the central exchange rate was relied on the bidding rate ofthe two centres. Until 1994 the inter-bank market was established to replace
two exchange rate centres and the official rate was based on the inter-bankrate.

5The author calculated labor productivity by using data from ADB, Key Indicator for Asia and Pacific2010
6Before the reform of exchange rate 1988, three types of official exchange rates coexisted, including
non-tradable exchange rate, tradable exchange rate and the rate for remittance and internal accounting.

6Figure 3: NER and RER, USD/VND (2000-2009)(Basic year: 2000=100)

VND ('000)per USD

1815

12

92000

2003

2006
RERNER

2009

Sources: Author’s calculation from data ADB, CIA, 2010
Since 1999 the central exchange rate has been determined daily by theaverage of the inter-bank rate in the previous transaction day. The
determination process of this average inter-bank rate, however, has not beentransparent and contained a large extent elements of the subjective will of theSBV because it is merely a technical procedure without analytical linkage witheconomic fundamentals (Pham and Nguyen, 2008).
Since the beginning of the exchange rate regime reform, Vietnam has
devalued repeatedly its currency, from 8125 Vietnamese dong (VND) per USD
in 1990 to 14028 VND in 1999 and reached 18932 VND in 2010. Figure 3 shows
while the NER 7 has increased over time, the RER 8 has declined sharply,
especially since 2006. These two opposite trends have made the gap between
the NER and the RER wider. In comparison with 2000, Vietnam’s CPI (2009)
was as high as 99,5 percent and America’s CPI (2009) was as high as 23,7percent, while the NER increased by 23,6 percent. The VND (2009) therefore
appreciated by 23,7 percent compared to 2000. At the same period the pace of
the VND’s appreciation was higher compared with other neighbouring
countries’ currencies such as the Singapore dollar, the Korea Won, the Malaysia
Ringgit and the Thai Baht. This real appreciation of the VND has deteriorated
Vietnam’s international competitiveness and trade balance (Nguyen, Dinh, To,Le, Pham, 2010). As a result Vietnam’s trade deficit has become worse,
especially in recent years (see Figure 4)
7
8

NER stand for the USD/VND bilateral nominal exchange rate
RER stand for the USD/VND bilateral real exchange rate7

In reality Vietnam has yet had a dual-track system, which has coexistedof the official exchange rate (announced by the SBV) and unofficial rate (theparallel black market rate). The scale of the parallel market transactions has
not yet estimated, but the parallel market rate has been being as a signal for
the SBV’s exchange rate policy. The changes of the official exchange rate were
followed by the changes of the parallel market rate. This reflects passivereactions and the weaknesses of the SBV.

0-2-4-6-8-10-12-14-16-18-20

VND ('000)per USD

1815

1292000

2003

2006

RER

Trade balance

Source: ADB and CIA, 2010

82009

USD billion

Figure 4: RER and Trade Balance (2000-2009)

4. A relative comparison between Vietnam and China
We examine and compare the context of China in the end of 1993 before
implementing the 1994 exchange rate shock and the current situation ofVietnam, and found out that both circumstances are relatively similar in termof development strategy, trade balance, foreign reserves, exchange rate regimeand inflation (Table 1).
Table1 A relative comparison between Vietnam and China
Indicators

Vietnam (Currently)

China (end 1993)

Development

Transition economy

Transition economy

strategy

Export-led growth

Export-led growth

Exchange rate

Managed float

Managed float

Pressure of depreciation Pressure of depreciationof the VND

of the Yuan

Trade balance

Deficit (22,5% of Exp)

Deficit (13,3% of Exp)

Foreign Reserves

Small volume

Small volume(22,9% of Imp)

(20,4% of Imp)

High (11,75%)

High (14,7%)

Inflation

95. Conclusion
Obviously, the 1994-2005 exchange rate policy helped China to enhanceitsinternational

competitivenessandproductivityrapidly.

Thehugedevaluation of the yuan in 1994 indicates the PBC is “daring”, “decisive” and“wise” because of the sensitive context of high inflation in the end of 1993
(14,7%). In line with the devaluation of the yuan, the PBC strengthened
stringent foreign exchange control measures. In order to deal with the highrising inflation after the devaluation, the PBC made efforts to tighten themonetary policy and a good cooperation between the exchange rate policy andthe monetary policy has been made by the PBC, while the SBV was reluctant todecide its exchange rate policy and monetary policy in sensitive contexts andfinally a “neutral” policy was frequently opted for. In fact that the SBV’sexchange rate policy has played a limited role in enhancing Vietnam’s
international competitiveness and productivity in recent years. The experienceof the PBC therefore provides good lessons for the SBV.
Currently the rising inflation and a widening trade deficit due to theovervalued VND as well as low exchange rate credibility are expected topressure on the VND depreciation. This current situation is relatively similar to
China’s circumstance in the end of 1993 (Table 1). Hence the 1994-2005
exchange rate policy will be a good experience for Vietnam to deal with thesecurrent issues.

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