COE
Waseda University Global COE Program: Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration

The 4th International Symposium

Security Cooperation and Regional Integration in Asia

2010 12 3
Friday, December 3, 2010

International Conference Center, Waseda University
Ibuka Masaru Memorial Hall

GIARI

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ࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘㊃᪨࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 4ࢩ࣏ࣥࢪ࣒࢘ ࣉࣟࢢ࣒࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࣛ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 5㛤఍ᣵᣜ࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 9㙊⏣⸅㸦᪩✄⏣኱Ꮫ࣭⥲㛗㸧ၥ㢟ᥦ㉳ࠕᆅᇦ⤫ྜࡢ᪂ᶵ㍈ࢆồࡵ࡚࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࠖ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 11ኳඣ្㸦ࢢ࣮ࣟࣂࣝ &2(*,$5, ᣐⅬ࣮ࣜࢲ࣮ࠊ᪩✄⏣኱Ꮫ࣭ᩍᤵ㸧➨  㒊ࠕ⤫ྜ࡬ࡢ㘽ࢆᥱࡿㅖせᅉ࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࠖ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 25
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・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 27ࢳ࢙࣭࢝ࣥ㸦㡑ᅜእ஺Ᏻ඲ಖ㞀◊✲㝔࣭ᩍᤵ㸧Ⓨ⾲㸰ࠕ୰ᅜࡢྎ㢌࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࠖ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 57⋤㐓⯚㸦໭ி኱Ꮫ࣭ᩍᤵ㸧Ⓨ⾲㸱ࠕ⡿ᅜࡢࣉࣞࢮࣥࢫ࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࠖ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 61࣋ࣥࢪ࣑࣭ࣕࣥࢩࣗࣞ࢖࢔㸦࣮࢜ࢫࢺࣛࣜ࢔ᅜ❧኱Ꮫᡓ␎㜵⾨◊✲ᡤ࣭ୖ⣭◊✲ဨ㸧㉁␲ᛂ⟅㸦➨㸯㒊㸧࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭69
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・➨㸰㒊ࠕ࢔ࢪ࢔ᆅᇦ༠ຊࡢ⌧≧࡜ㄢ㢟࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࠖ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 77Ⓨ⾲㸲ࠕࣃ࣮࣡ࠊつ⠊࡜࢔ࢪ࢔ᆅᇦࡢไᗘᵓ⠏࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࠖ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 79ᑎ⏣㈗㸦᪩✄⏣኱Ꮫ࣭ᩍᤵ㸧Ⓨ⾲㸳ࠕ࢔࢖ࢹࣥࢸ࢕ࢸ࢕࡜Ᏻ඲ಖ㞀ࢥ࣑ࣗࢽࢸ࢕࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࠖ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 87࢔ࣛࢫࢸ࢔࣭࢖࢔࣭ࣥࢪࣙࣥࢫࢺࣥ㸦ࣁ࣮ࣂ࣮ࢻ኱Ꮫ࣭ᩍᤵ㸧Ⓨ⾲㸴ࠕ㠀ఏ⤫ⓗᏳ඲ಖ㞀࡜ $6($1࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭ࠖ
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 103ࣜࢨ࣮࣭ࣝࢫࢡ࣐㸦࢖ࣥࢻࢿࢩ࢔ᅜ㝿ᡓ␎◊✲ᡤ࣭ᡤ㛗 ㉁␲ᛂ⟅㸦➨㸰㒊㸧࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 107㛢఍ᣵᣜ࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 116᳜ᮌ㸦ᕝ຾㸧༓ྍᏊ㸦᪩✄⏣኱Ꮫ࣭ᩍᤵ㸧௜㘓㸦㸯㸧㸯᪥┠࣮࣡ࢡࢩࣙࢵࣉ࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 118௜㘓㸦㸰㸧ཧຍ⪅ ⤒Ṕ࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭࣭
・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 122Objectives of the Symposium
Peace and stability are prerequisites for Asian regional integration. We are hopeful the de facto integration ofregional economies will contribute to peace in the region. However, it is also a fact that many security
problems still exist in the area. Countries pursue military buildup and nuclear weapons development.
Disagreements over territorial issues are yet to be resolved. For regional integration to occur, the biggest
question is whether or not cooperation and integration extend to the security realm.
There have been efforts to build a regional multilateral security institution like the ASEAN Regional Forum(ARF) but the region is still heavily dependent on the bilateral alliances of the United States.
As cooperation in economy and other fields continue to develop, can the U.S. bilateral alliances continue tomaintain regional security? Alternatively, in the long term, will the countries in the region be able to maintainregional security by themselves? Is the U.S. presence in the region an impediment or a stimulus to regional
cooperation? How is the region to manage the rise of China?
This symposium addresses the issues of regional integration and regional security. We ask two questions:
What are the determinants of regional security cooperation? And what is the current status and future
prospects for regional security cooperation? We hope the symposium will provide a forum for both academic
and policy relevant debates.

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Program Outline of the Symposium
9:00
Door opens
9:30-9:40
Kaoru Kamata (President, Waseda University)
9:40- 10:00
Satoshi Amako (Global COE Program GIARI Project Leader; Professor, Waseda University)
10:10-12:10
Session 1: Key Determinants of Asian Regional Integration
MC:
Hatsue Shinohara (Professor, Waseda University)
Discussants:
Alastair Iain Johnston (Professor, Harvard University),
Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki (Professor, Waseda University)
10:10-10:30

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Kang Choi (Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)
10:30-10:50
Wang Yizhou (Professor, Beijing University)
10:50-11:10
Benjamin Schreer (Senior Lecturer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
11:10-12:10
Discussions, Questions & Answers
12:10-14:00
Lunch
14:00-16:30
Session 2: Asian Regional Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges
MC:
Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki (Professor, Waseda University)
Discussants:
Benjamin Schreer (Senior Lecturer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
Rumi Aoyama (Professor, Waseda University)
14:00-14:20
Takashi Terada (Professor, Waseda University)
14:20-14:40
Alastair Iain Johnston (Professor, Harvard University)
14:40-15:00
and NonRizal Sukma (Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies)
15:00-15:20
Coffee Break
15:20-16:20
Discussions, Questions & Answers
16:20-16:30
Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki (Professor, Waseda University)
17:00-19:00
Reception

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COE

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120
560
180

4,000
200

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COE

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Agenda: Searching for a New Linchpin of Asian Regional Integration
Satoshi Amako
COE GIARI(Global COE GIARI Program Leader; Professor, Waseda University)

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Agenda: Searching for a New Linchpin of Asian Regional Integration
Satoshi Amako(Global COE GIARI Program Leader; Professor, Waseda University)
Understanding the International Structure of the Asia-Pacific Region
How should we understand the present state of international affairs, in particular, international
relations in Asia? Three features stand out: first, a significant change in the international system; second, theregionalization ofvariety of terms, including the Cold War structure and the hegemonic system, were used to characterize theinternational system of the 20 th century. In any case, the Cold War structure has already been dismantled. The
term describing the longest standing international system up to today is the Westphalian system (nation-statesystem). It refers to the effort after the conclusion of the Thirty Years War in 1648 to establish a stableinternational order among territorial states with fixed national borders, serving as the core constituents ofinternational society.
This system spread around the globe with the subsequent rise of European nations in theinternational arena. To put it in different terms, the nation-state system considers states to be the main actors
in international society, and attempts to create an international order based on agreements between states,
including the agreement not to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states. As is widely known, thenation-state system remains unchallenged till today, and resolutely preserves the status of the major actors.
However, with the advance in recent years of bilateral cooperation, interdependence and interaction
in a variety of areas centered around economics and information, the areas that traditionally had been
considered to be under the purview of national sovereignty are being eroded. For example, in the realm of
economics, multinational corporations, foreign direct investment, trade liberalization, and financial
cooperation have shattered the traditional concepts of national economy and national interests, and generated
a new stratified structure based on common interest. Yet this does not mean that the nation-state system isgradually dissolving and that the tide of trans-nationalism is on the rise to the extent that the international
system is experiencing a shift from the nation-state (NS) system to a trans-nation (TN) system.
It is likely that, at least in the 21 st century, international society will continue to feature thecoexistence and interaction of the values, roles, and functions of both the NS and the TN systems. I refer toan amalgam of these two as a nation and trans-nation (N-TN) system. In the present era, in which thesignificance of the N-TN system is beginning to increase, we should not underestimate the significance ofcooperation and interdependence in areas outside the realm of politics and state sovereignty. We must not
subordinate the logic and practice of transnational actors to those of nation states. However, it can also be
said that, since the institutionalization of the TN aspect of the system has not progressed, despite the steadytransition to an N-TN system, when interstate tensions increase, national sovereignty comes before anythingelse. The recent suspension of China-Japan economic and cultural exchanges resulting from the conflict over
the Senkaku Islands/Diaoyu Islands is a case in point.
The second feature, encapsulated in the notion of the regionalization of globalization, is that,paradoxically, the progress of globalization has had regional consequences, mainly by facilitating the trend ofregionalization. The transnational movement of goods, people, and money on a global scale brings with it avariety of regional issues and problems. Against this background, we now face challenges for regional
cooperation and integration. In post-war Japan, the governmental agencies, such as the Ministry ofInternational Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance, pushed forward the Japanese economy while
protecting Japanese businesses, in order to enhance their ability to compete internationally. The national
economy within the nation-state was the dominant paradigm in the post-war era. Prior to the war, theexpansion of the national economy through colonization was seen as an additional means of securing thenational economy.
However, since the 1990s, the pace of market liberalization has exhibited a remarkable increase,and the trend towards deregulation and the elimination of tariff barriers has intensified. This is the so-calledtide of globalization. Multinational corporations have expanded beyond the boundaries of national

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economies and their profits have come to be shared by their business partners in other countries. Yet this has
not led to instantaneous globalization, but to the entry of multinational corporations into Asia and to thepromotion of Asian regional cooperation through economic initiatives such as ODA. Thus, the global trend
accelerated the move towards regional integration through trade, investment, and financial cooperation.
In addition, we face a number of global issues related to human security and non-traditional
security, such as increasing environmental degradation, the spread of infectious diseases, frequent large-scale
natural disasters, and the increasing gap between rich and poor across Asia. As one of its advocates, Japan
has taken a proactive stance towards human security that crosses national borders. China is suffering from avariety of environmental problems including acid rain, CO 2 emissions, SO2 pollution, the pollution of
streams and rivers, and waste disposal. To be sure, China is not alone in this area, and it is necessary torecognize that these trans-border issues are common challenges to non-traditional security in the Asian
region as a whole.
Advancement of de facto Trans-border Regional Cooperation and Integration
The two features discussed above have prompted de facto cooperation and integration in Asia. Fivepoints are noteworthy in this respect. First, we can observe the de facto advancement of transnational
phenomena. For example, the expansion of multinational corporations has created multinational interests.
The traditional unique mass culture of each country is being changed dramatically by the trans-border tide,and this is evident in the increase in international marriages, changes in national identities, the increase in thenumber of individuals living overseas for a long time, and the exchange of culture and information, including
popular culture such as manga, anime, and other types of entertainment. The sharing of common interests
through economic, social, and cultural interactions, made possible by the advancement of regional
cooperation and interdependence, unequivocally demonstrates that national borders have become lessrelevant than ever before.
Second, as is often noted, the advancement of de facto regional integration has been remarkable.
The global-level approach to promoting regional integration has underlined the advancement of free tradethrough the removal of tariff barriers, the guiding principle of the WTO. However, total barrier-free
conditions are difficult to achieve over the short run. As such, a more practical approach, to do what can bereasonably done, has been adopted, resulting in the creation and spread of FTAs, worked out on acase-by-case basis between regions and countries. However, underlying this development was preexisting
intraregional trade, direct investments, and technology transfers, i.e. advances in cooperation andinterdependence towards regional integration. It is in this historical context that bilateral FTAs, EPAs, ECFAs,
and partial regional FTAs have emerged today.
Third, globalization has spread some negative social phenomena across borders, leading to theformation of de facto cooperative networks in specific areas. In particular, the trans-border nature of
atmospheric pollution (e.g. CO 2 emissions and acid rain) and environmental pollution, due to waste products
and waste water, the trans-border nature of infectious diseases such as SARS, HIV, and avian influenza, theincrease in severity of the gap between rich and poor in many parts of Asia, have become common to theentire Asian region. In response to these challenges, expert groups and NGOs have formed a variety
networks beyond national borders to establish cooperative relationships to find solutions to these problems.
Fourth, the trans-border nature of daily life has led to the de facto dissolution of national identities.
For example, a rapid increase in the mobility of goods, people, culture, and information beyond borders has
enabled the economic, social, and cultural interactions and collaborative activities of individuals beyond
national borders, the sharing of the benefits of such interactions, and the emergence of regional cooperationand interdependence that makes such interactions possible. In addition, the idea of national identity is being
challenged by the increasing number of international marriages and the number of expatriates living abroadfor extended periods of time. These trends over the last two decades are especially notable in Asia.
Finally, the intertwining of these various trends has had the effect of substantially removing
national borders relative to the past and of calling for the partial modification or transformation of theconcepts of national sovereignty, national consciousnesses, and national interests. That is to say that the defacto dissolution of national sovereignty has begun, to a certain extent. Of course, it is undeniable that thenotion of national sovereignty is strongly supported in Asia, and that nation-states remain important actors in
the international society. However, while the relativization of national interests as well as the stratificationand diversification of identity are proceeding, the relativization of some aspects of national sovereignty and19national interests as well as the stratification and diversification of sovereignty is on the increase. As aconsequence, the very foundation of the nation-state system is, if only in part, being dissolved. And so, I
believe that the transition to the N-TN system discussed above has begun.

In addition to the two features discussed thus far
a significant systemic change and theregionalization of globalization a third feature can also be considered: the rise of China. Three decades
have passed since China shifted to a reform and open policy and began its efforts toward modernization. In
terms of culture, China hosted the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and the Shanghai World Expo in 2010. In terms
est
economy. In terms of its military, after 20 years of continuous double-digit increase in military expenditures,experts agree that China has become a military superpower, second only to the United States. Indeed, somehave come to call these two superp
evolution of the international system, the successor to the U.S.-Soviet-China three-party system that emergedin the 1980s and the Cold War system dominated by the U.S. and the former Soviet Union.
remains, as previously, at a high level; and, as evidenced by its large-scale trade surplus with the U.S., China
In this context, taking decisive action and committing to large-scale internal investment to increase domestic
demand, China not only achieved economic recovery faster than any other country but also managed toregain its previous vigorous growth in GDP. With an enormous population, sustained economic growthcoupled with increasing domestic purchasing power, and measures to stimulate domestic consumption with
abundant investment, it can be said that, beyond being the factory of the world, China has increased its
potential to become the market of the world.
Although Chinese leaders have stated emphatically that their country will not become a superpower
or a hegemonic power, in addition to the on-going transformation into an economic and military superpower,
China has proactively begun to try to increase its global influence through soft power. This is symbolized by
the push in recent years to establish Confucius Institutes in countries around the world to promote theChinese language and Chinese culture. Furthermore, China also started its first full-fledged English-language
broadcast by Xinhua News Agency, with sights set squarely on CNN and the BBC. Of course, suchsoft-power attempts have not always achieved their intended effect, evoking, instead, images of China as a
power is undeniable; while its serious internal problems are
growing, China can be said to be the only country with the capacity to stand up to the U.S.

n regional integration? It is not an exaggeration
to say that this issue represents the most significant challenge to the future of Asia. Motivated by a sense of
caution regarding the rise of China, Toshio Watanabe, president of Takushoku University, who has
advocated and contributed to Asian regional integration since the 1990s, published Shin-datsu-a-ron (Post
De-Asianization) in 2008, in which he explained his position as follows.
In order for East Asia to achieve the next level of integration, it should work to create amultilayered network of functional institutional mechanisms to support liberalization in the Asian region by
actively promoting the formation of bilateral and multilateral FTAs and EPAs. However, the ultimate goal of
East Asian integration should be the establishment of functional institutional mechanisms such as FTAs and
EPAs and nothing more. This region lacks the conditions necessary for the development of a sense of
Furthermore, as it should becommunity, an East Asian community would be a dangerous path for Japan, of course, and for East Asia as awhole (p. 286).
The m
network of functional institutional mechanisms, what needs to be avoided is the creation of a system in favor
up dominating weaker countries, resulting from the20

argues that it is by maintaining the U.S.-Japan alliance that Japan can economically advance into East Asianand Chinese markets without fear.
status; rather, I agree with some aspects of this view. However, there are several fundamental problems withhis assessment. Firstly, if the creation of a robust, multilayered functional economic network is achieved, willbrought about such a network would demand that the next step be taken.
Secondly, his argument relies on the presumption that community means a common housegoverned under a Chinese hegemonic framework. However, is this inevitable? The term community itself is
open to a variety of interpretations. In some cases, one could call the framework of integration created by theaccumulation of functional cooperative efforts a community. This was certainly the case for the European
Community (EC), predecessor of the European Union (EU). Furthermore, no examples of a common houseeven exist in Asia. To decide that this is a house for Chinese hegemony is too prejudicial and is a leap in
logic. Rather, Japan should be proactive in contributing to the creation of a community that is not built onhegemonic relations.
Thirdly, and most importantly, if there is no further development of the integration framework
beyond the creation of functional institutions and networks, continuing within such a framework will only
accelerate unbalanced economic development and will intensify the survival of the fittest. More specifically,
under which the economies of weaker neighboring countries will be eroded. For example, if we examine
Asian countries, resulting in the rapid increase of mutual trade. The success of the Greater Mekong
Sub-Region Plan (GM-Southfrom Kunming in China to southern Thailand serve as examples of the rapid advancement in economic
cooperation and infrastructure construction under Chinese leadership. Indeed, these ASEAN and Chinese
In addition, in June, 2010, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between
ECFA, the number of free trade items allowed for Taiwan greatly exceeds the number for China. As a result,Taiwan has gained a more advantageous position in the Chinese market than Japan and Korea; the greaterthan 9% growth experienced by the Taiwanese economy in 2010 over the previous year can be said to be dueto the ECFA effect. In response to the signing of the ECFA, Korea has started to proactively pursue an FTA
with China, and it is expected that the two countries will begin full-scale negotiations in 2011. Should Japanlag behind in establishing an FTA with China, Japanese exports to China, its largest trading partner, will be ata significantly disadvantageous position. The less enthusiastic Japan becomes in establishing an FTA with
China, the harsher will be the environment for the Japanese economy.
From de facto to Formal Asian Regional Integration
The functional approach is often regarded as the basic method toward achieving regional
integration. Asia comprises a diversity of values, standards of living, as well as economic development andpolitical systems. In such an environment, any cooperation will have to be functional. In order to solve
various problems and to attain common interests, the formation of networks of expert groups, governments,
and NGOs, taking a functional approach, will be both realistic and effective. In this respect what can be
regarded as a problem-solving formula in the economic arena should take the shape of prioritizing economic
growth while pursuing the goal of sustainability. The question of how to achieve sustainable development
while dealing with intensifying environmental issues remains one of the main challenges today. In terms of
non-traditional security, there is a need to form networks to cooperatively address a variety of individual
problems such as (1) poverty and social issues, (2) environmental protection, (3) energy conservation, (4)natural disasters, and (5) infectious disease, and to resolve common issues such as pirates, the protection ofsea lanes, and regional-scale natural disasters.
In addition what can be regarded as a mutual-benefit formula should involve, in its economic
sphere, the formation of FTAs, a common currency, and a common market; and in its development and social

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environment sphere, the creation and implementation of a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM).
Furthermore, for the sake of human security, coordinated security efforts and regional cooperation towards
collective security can be explored, and for the sake of non-traditional security, the joint development ofclean energy and energy storage can be explored as a means of generating common benefits.
In any case, regarding both the problem-solving and mutual-benefit formulas, the formation of
networks is an important starting point and conduit for developing cooperative mechanisms. The three main
actors in these networks are governments, groups of individuals forming NGOs, and the respective
organizations of medical, environment, and disease control experts. It is important that these groups organize
themselves and form networks. Considering the current conditions in Asia, individual government agencies
play a large role to govern the network as a whole. Trans-border coordination of these three actors isextremely important; the institutionalization of this coordination is the challenge.
In addition to these two formulas, if the formation of a pan-Asian community is indeed a futuregoal, the creation of networks to promote a common lifestyle and cultural identity will need to be considered.
If, hypothetically, the daily lives and culture of people in the Asian region become closely connected, if
traditional ideologies and cultures become fused and develop into a common ideology and culture, and if apan-Asian identity evolves, there will emerge a new sense of we-ness, which is different from a sense ofbeing Chinese or Japanese. I believe that it is important to see this as the ultimate goal and to keep this inmind.
To achieve this goal, the actors must become connected, undertake cooperative action, and shareverse. One of the goals
the sense of weof Asian integration is to realize a harmonious society through strengthening a sense of cohesiveness by
undertaking and successfully concluding a variety of cooperative actions. The framework necessary toachieve this should be incorporated into the process of constructing a comprehensive structure, covering theentire region, in the context of pursuing benefits for the region as a whole. The sense of we-ness and thecreation of a harmonious society should be achieved through the creation of these frameworks forcooperation.
One final point that should be made is that, to push regional integration to the next level, a
conscious effort must be made to advance strategic-coordination and bottom-up approaches. By
strategic-coordination approach, I mean the strategic promotion and coordination of efforts toward
cooperative security, joint energy development, joint energy storage, and so on. By bottom-up approach, I
mean the networking of NGO activities and cooperation, the building of connections between NGOs andexpert groups and relevant government agencies, intended to tackle human security issues such as theprotection of the environment, the prevention of infectious diseases, the alleviation of poverty, the protectionof human rights, and so on. The overall framework that synthesizes these functional, strategic-coordination,and bottom-up approaches could be called an Olympic torch approach.
Toward Asian Regional Cooperation: Our Future Tasks(1) Promotion of economic regional cooperation (Japan-China-Korea FTA) as a starting point for developing
an East Asian FTA:
i.
tions: (a)keep up the current pace of East Asian economic development; (b) learn from the EU (the keys tosuccess are to advance intraregional integration, stimulate intraregional investment, enhance politicalstability, etc.); (c) use this as a chance for Japan to increase its low degree of dependence on foreign
trade; (d) use this as an opportunity to break away from an inwardly-directed Japan; (e) advance
multidimensional regional cooperation; (f) learn from the Asian currency crisis (pursue an AMF
starting with regional financial cooperation); and (g) support peaceful and politically-stabledevelopment in China.
ii.
(and Taiwan) and to use this Japan-Korea cooperation as a base for negotiating an FTA with China(by achieving fundamental agreement on a Japan-Korea FTA).

22

iii.
The goal should be to increase theentry into the free market and the trade of agricultural products. To achieve this, it will be importantto (a) establish market differentiation of Japanese agricultural products and transition to an exportindustry (by supporting the development of necessary infrastructure, training of personnel, etc.); (b)transform local agricultural cooperatives from interest groups into nuclei for production, marketing,and developing human resources.
(2) Promotion of Mechanisms for Non-Traditional Security in Asia:i.

Convert networks dealing with (a) alleviation of poverty and social problems, (b) environmental
protection, (c) energy conservation, (d) natural disaster response, and (e) prevention of infectious
diseases into multilayered cooperative organizations. The key will be to establish a
track of and collecting information related to the activities of specialist groups and NGO groups andnetworks dealing with (a) through (e) above, and to develop mechanisms for facilitating thecoordination and cooperation of these groups with relevant government agencies.

ii.

Cooperative efforts to achieve non-traditional security will be extremely important not only in(3) Establishment of an Asia-Pacific Security Treaty Organization:i.

Start with a realistic assessment of the status quo and take a realistic approach to incrementally
expanding and deepening relations. Specifically, (a) while taking a traditional (hard), zero-sum
approach to security as a basis, endeavor to actualize regional multilateral security cooperation. The
rationale behind developing such an organization would be the ability to coordinate a joint response
to foreign or potential threats or to mutually inhibit or restrain the actions of internal actors. In any
event, any response to a threat cannot be made without the presence of the U.S. As such, it isnecessary to create a mechanism for regional multilateral security that involves the United States.

ii.

A permanent Japan-U.S.-China security forum should be established. This is because, at present
and even more so in the future the U.S.-Japan security treaty is essential since even the U.S. alone
would be incapable of restraining the threat of China; on the other hand, the U.S.-Japan security
treaty represents the greatest threat to China. Such a forum, therefore, should be established not only
for the purpose of mutual restraint, but also to pursue positive results, such as the reduction ofantagonistic sentiments and the reduction of real tension through participation in such a framework.

iii.

In Asia, there currently exist a number of forums, including the six-party talks dealing with North-La Dialogue providing a discussion forum for Asia as a whole,
the Asian Regional Forum (ARF) as a forum to discuss security issues in an expanded ASEAN
setting, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) initiated by China. Yet, taking all of these
into consideration, the most essential and substantial framework for coordinating efforts would be a
Japan-U.S.-China security forum. In the future, the forum can be used as a starting point to address
the security issues of other Asian countries.

iv.

The final goal should be to develop an Asia-Pacific Security Treaty Organization (APSTO). A
Japan-U.S.-China security treaty, in addition to the U.S.-Japan security treaty, should reside within
this organization. APSTO would further be envisioned to include Korea, Australia, New Zealand,
ASEAN, and others. It goes without saying that such a security framework would be impossible in
the near future, but I want to propose it here as a goal to be worked towards.

23

v.

The actions proposed here should guide the transition from the NS system to the N-TN system
discussed at the beginning of this paper. Within this new paradigm, the idea of joint sovereignty
should become the foundation for the resolution of on-going territorial and territorial-water disputes
between Japan and China, between Japan and Korea, and between various East Asian countries andChina; in addition, stable international governance can be achieved by formalizing andinstitutionalizing the multidimensional and multilayered forums for dialogue comprising the TN
system.

In this manner, it is expected that the development of a mechanism for non-traditional security in
Asia, the establishment of an Asia-Pacific Security Treaty Organization on the basis of a Japan-U.S.-China
security forum, and economic cooperation in APEC will progress, parallel with the comprehensive
integration of the region. When we enter the stage of formal and comprehensive regional integration, thespecific nature and boundaries of Asian integration are certain to evolve. The most critical key will bewhether Asia, over a relatively long time span, is able to develop a structure for collective action, common
interests and mutual sympathy.

24

Session 1: Key Determinants of Asian Regional Integration

25

26

Presentation 1:

Kang Choi

Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security

27

An Assessment of the Current Developments on the Korean Peninsula 1
1. Introduction: Where We are Now
Ten years ago, when the first South-North Korean Summit took place in Pyongyang, almost everyone
thought the long waited opportunity to end the confrontation and to establish a permanent peace regime on
the Korean Peninsula finally arrived. In the following years, two Koreas held various meetings and talks 2
and produced some agreements to promote exchange, cooperation, and reconciliation mostly in economic
and social field. And some people believed that inter-Korean relationship became rather somewhat
independent from other relations and they also thought that progress being made in inter-Korean relations
could function to reduce tension and confrontation not only between the two Koreas but also between North
Korea and the others, most notably the U.S.
However, such expectations and hopes for the improvement of overall situation on the Korean Peninsula
have become overshadowed by the unfolding North Korean challenges again, mainly by nuclear problem.
The security situation in and around the Korean Peninsula has become much more uncertain, maybe unstable,
esture, inreform and open, it is very unlikely to see the substantial progress in programs and projects for inter-Korean
exchanges and cooperation in near and mid-term period.
The security reality looks even worse than ever before. The Six-Party Talks, which was introduced in 2003 toresolve North Korean nuclear problem peacefully, has stopped functioning since December 2008. Against theother five partie
opposite direction. North Korea clearly stated that it would not return to the Six-Party Talks and staged the
2nd nuclear test in May. While in recent days it has signaled its interest in coming back to the Six-Party Talks,
North Korea attached conditions: lift-up of sanctions and meaningful progress in US-North Korea bilateralrelations i.e. security guarantee. It seems that, by signaling some soft or reconciliatory gestures, North
Korea is trying to avoid further sanctions and to drive a wedge among the five parties.
go its own way to be recognized and aconcerns and urges. So the prospect for the resolution of North Korean nuclear problem is not so promising,maybe cautiously pessimistic at least in short- to mid-term perspective.
What makes such prediction possible and makes the situation more complicated and unpredictable is theissue of succession and stability of North Korean leadership in succession process. After the strokes of
Chairman Kim Jong-il in 2008, the issue of leadership succession and regime stability has come forward
because of the possible impact of leadership succession upon the policy directions and stability of North
Korea. Kim Jong-Un has finally showed up himself as the heir to his father at the 3 rd Party Representatives
Meeting. It is totally unclear and unpredictable how effectively and smoothly the leadership succession will
directions during and after the succession. The bottom line is that the upcoming leadership succession is notlike the one we have witnessed in 1994 and there will be some turbulence due to the possible change inpower structure. But, despite distinctive durability of North Korean regime, it is not possible to rule out theregime instability situation.

1

This is the updated version of the paper, which was published in the Task Force Report North Korea Policy and
ROK-US Alliance (June 2010, Seoul Forum for International Affairs). The views and ideas in this paper are thoseof the author. They do not represent the official position and views of IFANS and MOFAT.
2
These include South-North Ministerial Talkss, SouthSouth-North Talks on Economic Cooperation and Exchange, and etc.

28

2. An Assessment of North Korean Threats and Challenges
North Korean threats and challenges have become diversified and been transformed from conventional toconventional and non-conventional (or asymmetrical or catastrophic); from peninsula-wise toregional/international; and from regular to irregular. What is more important than the transformation andmultiplication of North Korean threat is the complexity, multidimensionality and interconnectedness among
the challenges. For South Korea and the directly concerned countries, North Korean issues and challenges
can be divided into four groups: non- or counter-proliferation of North Korean nuclear program andcapability; deterrence of North Korea aggression; collapse of North Korea; and opening and reform of North
Korea.
A. Non- or Counter-Proliferation
As being said before, North Korea is expected to increase nuclear capabilities. They have claimed thaturanium enrichment program has almost to the completion and reprocess of spent fuel rods is under way. It is
nuclear capability will increase and possess more nuclear material for its own use and export. Given the-North Korean nuclear cooperation,
Syrian-North Korean nuclear cooperation and Myanmar-North Korean nuclear connection, it is inevitable for
us to have serious concern over No
completes the construction of 50 MWe and 200 MWe reactors, the situation will become even worse.
Consequently, the integrity of global non-proliferation regime would be seriously undermined and we shallbe living in nuclear-prone, not nuclear-free, world. The task ahead of us is to make the current NPT regime
more responsive to the violator. Second, we must become able to cut off the nuclear connection among thecountries outside the NPT. Currently, we are enforcing Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). But we have toreview the effectiveness of PSI and to make it more effective in handling proliferation threats.
B. Deterrence and Defense
From the end of the Korean War in 1953, deterrence of North Korean aggression has been the primaryobjective of the ROK-US security alliance. Over the years, the ROK and the US have tried to makedeterrence and defense posture credible and reliable and, despite some incidents and clashes, our efforts havebeen quite successful in deterring North Korean aggression.
However, today, we should ask ourselves whether we have reliable deterrent/defense posture vis- à-vis Northmagnitude ofNorth Korean threat. It is doubtful whether we can handle the new security situation challenge effectively
and credibly. While, at every occasion, the U.S. has reaffirmed its extended deterrence, including nuclear
umbrella, 3 and security commitment to the defense of South Korea, the credibility of such security
commitment can be challenged by everther than diminishing at all
Korean Peninsula and possibly reach the U.S., the most critical issue is how to make the ROK-US
deterrent/defense posture reliable and credible.
Second, the combined defense posture, which was introduced in 1978 with the establishment of Combined
1, 2015. While both sides are working hard to meet the requirements,
whether a new defense posture and command relations is as much effective, reliable and credible as the3

At the Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) of 2009, the ROK and the US agreed on three measures ofextended deterrence: conventional; nuclear; and missile defense. Based on this agreement, they are working on thedetails.

29

combined defense posture under the CFC should be tested. In addition, under the given economic situation, it
looks hard for the South Korean military to achieve what it initially planned to acquire. Defense expenditure
is not likely to be that level being projected in Defense Reform 2020. Defense Reform 2020 has beenreviewed and revised. The Revised Basic Plan for Implementation of Defense Reform 2020 looks that somemajor acquisition plans and programs have been suspended, delayed, or scaled down. More importantly, theestablishment of ground operation command has been rescheduled from 2012 to 2015. So there could bemismatch among capability, structure, and plan(s).
Third, whether the U.S. can bring in sufficient augmentation forces on time is another concern. According to
OPLAN (Operational Plan) 5027, the U.S. augmentation force is around 650,000. Based on the experiencesin and observation of Iraqi and Afghan war, it can be argued that the U.S. may not be able to mobilize andbring in that size of force in time. 4 Of course, nowadays the U.S. is emphasizing the quality, or capability,
over the quantity. But sometimes quantity matters, especially if we are thinking about post-hostility phase.
In a word, unlike official position, deterrence and defense posture of the ROK-US security alliance seems to
be under serious challenges. Or the projected change or transformation in the ROK-US deterrence/defense
posture seems to be ahead of the reality. On the other hand, ever-increasing North Korean WMD capabilities
present new dilemmas and challenges for both allies.
entional military capabilities have not diminished substantially yet. It seems
that North Korea is still capable of managing its conventional military establishment in a meaningful way.
The Cheonan incident proves this fact. North Korea has developed means and ways to utilize its
conventional capabilities to achieve political and military objectives. It can be assumed that North Korean
military establishment is and will not be affected by the worsening North Korean economy. Thus it ispossible to say that North Korea will continue to exercise its military tools whenever it feels necessary.

C. Instability
Despite the very high level of durability of North Korean regime, concerns have been raised over the
possibility of regime instability of North Korea since the report of Chairman Kim Jongis believed that the North Korean leadership has begun to study and/or completed succession plan. It seems
that the KWP, not National Defense Commission (hereafter NDC), is in charge of managing succession
process with the leading role of Mr. Jang Seongtaek and three other figures. Whether the succession fromfather to son will proceed as it is planned or not is uncertain. The upcoming succession, should it happen,
will be substantially different from the previous one and could be very volatile and turbulent for several
reasons. First of all, the preparation for and process of succession are not so well done and have been done inhaste. So there could be many loopholes and unexpected things to take place. Second, consequently, Mr.
KIM Jung-Un is not so well prepared to do jobs. Third, there could be change in power structure at the top
from one-man rule to collective leadership. Fourth, consolidation of power base of new leadership might takelong and could be turbulent. Finally, even deeper hibernation and isolation of North Korea, more aggressive
and provocative external behaviors, could be expected during and after the succession.
In addition, economic situation of North Korea cannot improve due to its systemic problems. North Korea is
expected to suffer from chronicle food and energy shortage. Thus it must rely on the external supply. It is
uncertain how long the external world could and would provide what North Korea needs. Furthermore, therecent currency devaluation measure, which is believed to be a measure to regain state control over themarketleadership. So, if this is combined with political instability, the future of North Korea is going to be very

4

In 2010 QDR, the U.S. has hinted the possibility of shortage of augmentation force in contingency byemphasizing the leading role of the ROK to defense itself against North Korean aggression.

30

unstable.5
The question arises on how much we know about North Korea and whether we are able to handle possible
sudden change(s) or instability in North Korea. In both, it seems we cannot get high scores. In understanding
and assessing North Korea, there is huge discrepancy depending upon where one stands. And thisdiscrepancy leads to differences, or different preference and approaches, in handling possible North Koreanchallenges during and after the succession. But one thing for sure is that the upcoming succession will be
more likely to make North Korea to be primarily concerned with internal affairs and to go its own way
establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. and nuclear weapons are not bargaining chip any more. So thepossibility of confrontation between North Korea and the international community is likely to increase andisolation and pressure seems high, the possibility of instability is likely to increase as time goes by and theOver the years, we have been focusing on specific issues such as WMD, refugees, limited armed clashes or
provocation, 3rd party involvement (or intervention), and humanitarian operations. Among these issues,
WMD and refugee issue has received much attention. Issue-specific approach may have its own merit. But it
rarely touches the fundamental challenges of contingency. If contingency took place, there would be several
aspects or dimensions we should think of: political/diplomatic; military/security; legal and jurisdictional;
economic; and social aspect. And these aspects/dimensions would be highly influenced by patterns and typesof contingency.
It is time for us to think about scenario-based and time-phased approach, in which various challenges aretackled either simultaneously or sequentially in a more systematic way. In each time period or phase, wemight have a different set of challenges. Or same challenge might have different weight or magnitude over
the time period. To assess the nature and magnitude of challenges, we should think of how and why thecontingency would happen. In addition, by doing so, we can deepen our understanding of North Korea.
D. Opening and Reform of North Korea
reform of North Korea peacefully and constructively. Over theyears, we have adopted various strategies: containment, malignant neglect, benign neglect, and engagement.
Most agree on the fact that among others engagement is the most realistic approach. But it has two problems
or challenges: time and mix of tools and means. Given the nature of North Korea regime, it takes relatively
long time for the engagement policy to bear its fruits on the Korean Peninsula. And throughout theengagement process, there will be so many ups and downs so that engagement policy shall be challenged by
the incidents. Without domestic and regional/international support, it is very difficult for any political leader
to maintain consistency in carrying out engagement policy. On the other hand, to get domestic andinternational support, political leaders are tempted to acquire North Korea policy legacy, which often
undermines the integrity of engagement policy. Consequently and unfortunately, engagement policy tends tobecome appeasement policy.
To make the engagement policy work properly, there should be a good mix of tools and means, or carrots andsticks. And words should be translated into concrete actions in proper time-frame. Otherwise, credibility will
be ruined. Sometimes we often argue for sticks. But we are often self-constrained in using sticks. On theother hand, functional approach, which assumes economic cooperation and exchange will result in politicalchange, has not been so successful.
What makes the engagement poli5

It is reported that the North Korean official admitted the failure of currency devaluation measure and opened up
the market again.

31

exchange and cooperation with the outside world. Over the years, South Korea has cultivated several
economic cooperation projects with North Korea including Gaesung Industrial Complex (hereafter GIC),
Geumgangsan Tourism Project, South-North Railway Connection, and etc. Unfortunately, recently most ofthem have come to a near complete stall. North Korea has put forward the unreasonable and unacceptableconditions and demands for economic cooperation. South Korea, who tries to establish new norms andpractice in inter-Korean cooperation and exchange, cannot accept those terms. Thus it is not likely that
economic cooperation and social exchange between the two Koreas can be back on the track in near future.

3. Recommendations
It is not possible to solve North Korean problems, including nuclear challenges, in short period of time sincemost of North Korean challenges are the product of regime character. Unless the regime character changes,
the North Korean challenges will cyclically come back with different magnitude and shapes. So we shouldtake rather long-term approach than immediate resolution. For that purpose, the following must be seriously
considered.
First of all, South Korea and the U.S. should strengthen and maintain reliable deterrent and defense postureessment of North Korea
which will take into account not the current capabilities but also the trends. Then we should come up with theand pace of transforming the ROK-US security alliance should be carefully reviewed and managed fromrather traditional peninsula-wise perspective.
Second, along with the first, we should be able to handle and contain cases of low intensity provocation of
North Korea. While avoiding the uncontrolled and unwanted escalation, we should be able to demonstrate
our resolve in action and we should not be self-contained, trapped, because of escalation fear. We shouldhave more options and means to carry the missions. It requires us to look at FDOs (flexible deterrent options)again with great care and to develop new CASOPs (crisis action standard operating procedures).
Third, while strengthening defense/deterrent posture, we should keep dialogue channels open and active. It
includes not only the Six-Party Talks but also other bilateral and trilateral talks such as US-ROK-Japan and
US-ROK-China. Especially engaging China is very critical. Having China on our side is very importantelement in bringing about some kind of breakthrough as we have witnessed in the past. China has become
very cooperative in dealing with North Korean nuclear issue. But there exists some kind of self-imposed
limit in Chinese cooperation and collaboration due to its concerns. Without Chinese cooperation, especiallyin implementing UN sanctions, it would be very difficult to solve North Korean problems. By using bilateral
strategic dialogue channels, we can bring China much closer to our position and establish common
understanding and common approach toward North Korea. From this regard, the five-party (or six minusone) consultation or meeting should be seriously considered.
Fourth, possibility of sudden change and regime instability in the North should be reviewed. As being
aforementioned, North Korea is a quite durable regime. But, currently and further down the road, North
Korea is faced with power succession, which might bring about some turbulent. In dealing with this specificissue, in the post, we were primarily concerned with specific issues such as WMDs, refugees, humanitarian
than focusing on specific issue, it would be better for us to understand the overall situation and challenges ina bigger picture and to plan for the second worst case, next to war. There should be some kind guiding
principles in handling sudden change should it happen.
Finally, while we are handling and containing the most imminent challenges of North Korea, we must thinkof how to bring about the strategic changes in North Korea. That is, while we are preparing the worst, we

32should not neglect the positive side normalizing North Korea: that is, while denying North Korea any
military provocation, we must also devise ways and means to bring about meaningful and significant
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Presentation 2:
Wang Yizhou(Professor, Beijing University)57

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60:
Presentation 3:
Benjamin Schreer(Senior Lecturer, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University

61

The Future of US Presence in Asia
For over half a century, US military presence in the Asia-Pacific has been a key determinant of the regional
security order. Forward deployed land, air and maritime forces underwrote US hegemonic leadership in the
Asia-Pacific by reassuring allies and secu
by deterring potential adversaries. Importantly, China since the 1970s also by and large accepted US
presence in the region. This has led to a distinct pattern of Asian regional security integration: multilateral
security integration among Asia-Pacific nations today is predominantly focussed on non-traditional security
challenges, whereas traditional security, i.e. the prevention of major power war, is still largely left to thesecurity umbrella provided by the United States and manifested in a bilateral system of alliances, security
partnerships as well as US military presence.
Yet, doubts have grown over the future of US military presence in the Asia-Pacific. Three interrelated factors
contribute to the discussion of whether US presence can continue to play a key role in maintaining regional
stability:
Firstly, the rise of China is seen by many as inevitably eroding the foundations of US hegemonicleadership. Already, some Chinese leaders have questioned the legitimacy of US regional force
posture. Moreover, the continued buildmaritime power projection and anti-access/ access denial capabilities might deny the US the ability
to control the sea and undermine its maritime power projection capabilities. In the future, the PLA
Navy might be able to hold US carrier groups at significant risk given its investment in submarinesand other anti-access military capabilities. For example, the future costs for the US in standing up to
China in another crisis over Taiwan might be perceived to be too high by Washington.
Asia-Pacific to many appears to be diminishing. In this view, not only long-term Chinese growth but
allies such as Japan this raises the question over the future credibility of US extended deterrence
guarantees which is intimately related to the military presence, and which has both a conventionaland nuclear dimension. There was also a widespread perception that US attention had diverted fromthe Asia-Pacific region, reflected in the costly military engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan. Many
America at home.
Finally, there is the assumption among some experts that US military presence in the region might be-Pacific power. US
presence as part of a potential containment strategy against China is seen as destabilising andconfrontational. In this logic, US military presence is regarded as an impediment for regional
security cooperation.
Asia-Pacific is unlikely for the foreseeable future and that its forward presence will continue to provide themilitary foundations of its leadership position. It will also claim that US military presence will not obstructonal security order but will rather be a precondition for thisdevelopment. Finally, the point will be made that Asian regional security integration will continue to be
characterised by bilateral and multilateral modes of security cooperation that interact and compete with eachother depending on the security issue at stake.
US leadership renewed
maintain a strong military presence as part of its continued leadership role in the Asia-Pacific. US Secretary
strategy of sustaining and strengthening leadership in the region, of increasing regional security, and ofheightening prosperity and promoting US values. Clinton also stressed that securing US strategic interests as

62

partners in the region. 1 While-Pacific will certainly increase in importance for
the US to project power into the region, the US will continue to see its forward deployed presence in Japan,
South Korea and Guam as a key to reassure allies.
Rhetoric about renewed US commitment will also be matched by resources. Predictions about major US
defence cuts disregard that what is causing problems for the Pentagon at the moment are the huge operationalcosts stemming from deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet, these will end rather sooner than later, taking
off the pressure from cuts which would go to US military substance. And there is much to the argument that
US foreign and security policy will continue to be driven by the objective to maintain its global militarypresence, in particular in the Asia-Pacific given its strategic eminence in US grand strategic thinking. The
presence in the region.

and its forward deployed military presence was vital to secu
maintain regional stability. Despite its impressive economic growth, China is far from offering an attractive
alternative leadership model for most Asia-Pacific countries. In this context, a narrow focus on growing
Chinese economic and military capabilities underestimates the difficulty for Beijing of translating theseassets into actual political influence and leadership capacity. In other words, a possible Chinese intention to
replace US leadership and its ralternative regional security model. If China fails to provide an acceptable alternative leadership model anduses its growing leverage to bully its Asia-Pacific neighbours, these countries will only move closer to the
US.
Cheonan and its
growing assertiveness in the South China Sea have done much to reinvigorate US traditional alliances withJapan and South Korea, and to strengthening security partnerships with Southeast Asian countries likeagainst uncertain Chinese behaviour seems to become more attractive for many countries in the region. Thus,
contrary to widespread assumptions about a decline in US leadership the opposite might actually be the case.
Growing Chinese assertiveness will work detrimental to any plans Beijing might have to undermine thelegitimacy of US leadership and military presence in the region.
In sum, the likelihood of an American retrenchment from the Asia-Pacific region seems rather low for theforeseeable future. 2 For this to happen, a combination of events will need to occur. These factors include a
dramatic shift in US foreign policy thinking coupled with a continued, massive downturn of the US
economy; the evolution of an attractive Chinese leadership model; the conclusion of US allies (foremost
Japan) and partners that they are better off without American military presence; and the development of new
bilateral or multilateral defence structures. In this light, the assumption that the US will no longer be able andwilling to sustain its military presence in the Asia-Pacific is premature. Likewise, the possibility that
Asiats militarypresence but rather what functions it will perform in a future Asia-Pacific security order. The key issue here

Rather than bepeaceful accommodation in an evolving Asia-Pacific security order. This argument is based on the
U.S. Department of State,, 28 October 2010,
http://www.america.gov/st/texttransenglish/2010/October/20101028191722su0.9814875.html&distid=ucs, accessed 30 October 2010.
2, vol. 89, no. 6 (November/
December 2010).
1

63

proposition that absent effective alternative bilateral or multilateral structures to deal with traditional security
dilemmas and enduring questions of deterring major power wars, US military presence will be critical inreassuring allies and partners, and in encouraging responsible Chinese strategic behaviour.
A number of different order-building concepts in the future Asia-Pacific beyond uncontested US primacy canbe envisaged, including a new balance of power with a high potential for US-Chinese strategic competition,(including Japan, India, South Korea, Indonesia andUSpotentially Russia). In all of these scenarios, however, US military presence will be critical to maintaining
stability:, US presence will be instrumental to guarantee stable conventional
antagonistic parties, thereby contribut
Asia and Australia could be turned into bases to project power in a containment strategy.
In the case of a US-Chinese condominium, where both China and the US reach a stable and mutuallyacceptable power sharing arrangement (a scenario which will take significant time to develop andwhich will suffer from setbacks), US military presence will provide two central functions. US basesin Japan, South Korea and Guam will still be kept even if in reduced numbers to reassure allies
such as Japan in the case of a resurgent China. Beyond this, US maritime forces will provide vital
military capabilities in a new division of labour between China and the US to, for example, jointly
secure the SLOCs.
scenario in which powers like the US, China, Japan,
India, South Korea and potentially Russia will aim at securing influence in a maritime environment
aritime power again will prove crucial in

Very likely, the future security order in the Asia-Pacific will be characterised by no single country being able
to dominate the mar-access capabilities over time
capabilities. Also, Chinese military ability to holding
US Navy carrier strike groups at risk does not necessarily translate into political influence, nor is it sufficient
to prevent the US from continuing to project power to protect its strategic interests. As a consequence, China
powers to accommodate an increased Chinese strategic reach as long as Beijing is not overstepping
well-defined boundaries. In the end, managing the new maritime security order in the Asia-Pacific will

Conclusion
An end of US military presence in the Asia-Pacific is neither desirable for the mutual goal to maintaining astable security order, nor is it likely to happen any time soon. US presence, primarily build around a set ofbilateral alliances and new security partnerships, should be regarded as a stimulus rather than an impedimentto future strategic stability, also in regards to approaches to accommodate the rise of China. Since security
to maintain regional peace and stability, the Asia-Pacific region will benefit much from keeping the existing
system of bilateral and multilateral structures of security cooperation. It is hard to imagine current
multilateral settings providing any credible alternative to the US-based system when it comes to addressing
the manifold security dilemmas and the core questions of war and peace related to the future Asia-Pacificsecurity order.
US-based bilateralism will continue to effectively contribute to regional security. Allies, partners and evenpotential adversaries will think twice before asking the US to leave as absent effective alternative
sorts of security dilemmas in the Asia-Pacific. A look at the European theatre might be instructive here. Over64

20 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, European NATO allies still shiver at the prospect that the US
might withdraw its forces from the region altogether. And, unlike the Asia-Pacific, this is a region commonly
perceived to having overcome traditional security problems.
Those who ponder about Asia-standing contresultin disastrous consequences. Anyone in for an Asian NATO?

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683Discussant 1
Thank you very much. We only have five minutes to comment on a very rich and thoughtfulpresentation so let me get straight to my questions and comments. First, with regard to the first paper, as I
understood it, the key problem the paper outlines is how to both deter and to normalize the DPRK. By
normalize it implies a fundamental change in both internal and external policy behavior. So my question is, isthere any evidence, or are there any cases, out there where this has happened in the past? In other words, arestate without regime change?
The only example I can think of is China. There was a fundamental reorientation of Chinese
domestic development strategies and domestic foreign policies in the post-Mao period after Deng Xiaoping
came to power with no fundamental change in the political system. A Marxist-Leninist party ruled China
before 1978 and a Marxist-Leninist party continues to rule China after 1978.
But although there was no change in system, there was a change in regime, a change in leadership.
So the question I have to ask is, can this balance between deterrents and normalization of the DPRK be done
without a change in the current DPRK leadership. In other words, can you have this kind of normalization
The second question has to do with the second presentation. It has to do in particular with thea peaceful rise. From the perspective of outside actors, there are at least three problems with the claims topeaceful rise, three issues that undermine the credibility of claims to a peaceful rise. The first is that China is
now the second-largest economy in the world. The second is that it has a rapidly modernizing militarycapability, and the third, from the perspective
question is, given those three characteristics, is there anything China can say that is reassuring or that iscredible when it comes to signaling its peaceful rise.
My question is, if you were a Japanese leader, what from your perspective would China have to
do to credibly convince you
China have to do to credibly signal that its rise was peaceful? If you were an American leader what would
China have to do in order to credibly signal that its rise was peaceful?
I asked this question to some friends in Beijing before and you get a very interesting answer. I
asked this of colleagues in the national security realm, and one of them said that if he were in Washington the
only thing that would convince him that China was not aiming to kick the United States out of East Asia
emocratic
would be China s democratization,interested in your perspective on what China would have to do to credibly bind or constrain itself to reassurecountries in the region that its rise was peaceful?
The third question is for the third presenter, and I just want to mention that I agree wholeheartedlythat I think people have overestimated the power transition occurring between China and the United States,
and it partly depends on which indicators you use. Some indicators show that China has already passed the
US in comprehensive power; some suggest that China is catching up in relative terms; and some show that
China is falling behind in terms of military expenditures, where, for example, the gap between the UnitedStates and China is actually widening. But I have a couple of questions that arise from the presentation.
For one, I think it would be useful to have more details on how you define stability. Is stability
defined by a lower probability of militarized disputes? Is it defined in terms of a lower probability ofconflicts of interest? Is it defined in terms of better crisis management practices? Is it defined in enhanced
deterrents? Is it defined in reduced probability of security dilemmas? Is it defined in terms of the enhanced
ability of the United States to preserve its primacy? Because different definitions will require different typesof American presence, and it would be useful to have more details about what types of American presence
you think are stabilizing and what types may be destabilizing, and that leads to my second question.
3

Editorial note: the Chatham House rule was applied to this session, and thus the names of the participants are notprinted here.

69

Are there any downsides to the American presence in the region? If, for example, you assume that
China is a status-quo-oriented state, as many Chinese do, and if you assume that the United States is astatus-quo-oriented state, then a strong and powerful American military presence in combination with
Chinese military modernization creates a security dilemma, and that is not something that people would
consider to be stabilizing.
Related to this, it seems hard to determine the effects of the American presence without knowing
its efvery little evidence that the American military presence has deterred China from using force in the past. If
you look at all the cases where China has used force the Korean War, various Taiwan crises these arecases where deterrence clearly has failed. Within these crises
played because in most cases China has entered these crises or used force with very strict time limits andexample, from various Taiwan crises that it was because of an American counter-deterrent or because theChinese had already put limits on their use of force. You have to look at the soC
States military presence deterred China from attacking Taiwan in the 2000s? Has the American militarypresence deterred China from grabbing the Senkaku Diaoyu Islands? Has the American military presence
people in China even acknowledge that the American military presence has that kind of deterrence effect.
intended to use force in these cases.
For example, in 2007, when Chen Shui-bian was pushing for a referendum to get Taiwan into theUnited Nations under the name of Taiwan and people considered this a highly destabilizing move, was there
evidence that if the United States had not been present militarily that the Chinese would have used force
against Chen Shui-bianShui-bian wou
been there in the first place.
So this is kind of an intellectual exercise. It seems to be important to determine whether or not theroblem is that you have to focus on
US presence is stabilizing by de-thatns
they did not make is very difficult to do, so it leaves this big question mark as to whether the US presence isin some instances positive, in some instances negative, and in some instances irrelevant.
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Discussant 22

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preconditon70

reassureMC

Presenter 1
Thank you for your question about the possibility of co-development between deterrence and engagement. I
think you correctly pointed out
was conditioned by the leadership change.
I docreate those kinds of events in the N
kepticalabout this father to son, Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un, succession. Since Kim Jong-71

the inheritance of the polici
keptical about that. That means we have to enhance ourdeterrent capabilities and postures for the time being unless a new leader with a reform-oriented mindset
emerges. Unfortunately, we ve actually tried that kind of engagement policy within the past ten years, but
unfortunately it was only during the Kim Dae-jung administration from 1998 to 2002. The Roh Moo-hyun
administration also tried to engage North Korea, but it actually contributed to the destabilizing of thesituation, as there were a couple of provocations as well as nuclear and missile tests.
We have to provide North Korea with an alternative future. Actually, we are in a position toprovide two alternatives if they can live up to it. This actually leads to the peace treaty issue. I recall theagreements we made with North Korea in 1994, 1998, 2000, and 2005. If you take a look at the September
19 joint statement, the United States, along with the other five parties, assured that we are going to normalize
relations with the DPRK with progress made in the denuclearization process. We actually established aworking group on the normalization process, but North Korea walked out on the negotiations and, since
December of 2008, we have not held any talks at all.
I think it is critical for all of us to remain on the same page in persuading North Korea to comeback and realize peace and stability on the Korea Peninsula and in the region. When we talk about how toapproach this we have some differences. China actually emphasizes patience and flexibility, but
how much more flexible and patient we can be in handling North Korea. From the South Korean perspective,
the attack on Yeonpyeong reversed the cu
In the media
there was a report that Wikileaks leaked the contact between the two Koreas to host summit meetings to
unfortunate to see South Korea put more emphasis on deterrence and defense
improvrather than engagement for the time being. I hope that future leaders, maybe Kim Jong-un, can make astrategic choice to open up and reform the North, but we should be very concerned about the consequences.
About the US presence, I think that we now maintain a 28,500 troop level in the Korean Peninsula.
number of the USFJ, but it would be conditioned by the developments made in themulti-lateral security cooperation. I think we now have the minimum level of US presence. Once we makemore substantial progress in the multi-lateral security forum, I think the US Congress might reduce the US
presence. The United States will also push allies to shoulder more responsibility, so there will be a problem
for those US allies urging more US engagement in East Asia. Nevertheless, we have to think about what
responsibilities can be shared with the United States in maintaining or enhancing peace and stability in East
Asia. Thank you.
Presenter 2
Thanks for the questions. I will try to make a quick response on the following two points: what China canpromise international society; and what international society, especially those in dominant positions, can do
to make the Chinese feel comfortable. I think two aspects are important: international policy and domesticchanges. Frankly, I have more confidence in the international aspects.
In the international system, we are mostly satisfied. But we are not totally satisfied, which is why
we hope for some reform. Commerce is basically good, but we need to strengthen the voices of developing
countries, especially those that are free.
Regarding the regional security system, the United States should continue its hegemony in East
Asia. This is inevitable in the coming years or decades, but we want this dominant system to engage andinclude China. We also see the US, Japan, and Korea doing military exercises and having closed-doorbi-lateral and tri-lateral dialogs. If the door were open to engage China the way that NATO engaged Russia,
we would like to havethe situation would be much more comfortable. We donmore cooperative coordination, even in sensitive areas such as the Taiwan issue.
It s the same with climate issues and the world trade system. China is basically okay with thedominant international system, but we do hope for some gradual reforms to enhance the capacities ofdeveloping countries. W
to set up another system. Sometimes Russia makes suggestions toward
an alternate system, a Marxist system, another trade system, or a nuclear system. We say that the current one
is okay, but we do hope for some changes.
It is rather easy to explain what China can say to make international counterparts feel comfortable,
but domestically, China is a very different from Western countries in that the Communist party is the single
dominant party. This fact makes the majority of Western citizens, mass media, and politicians feel thatsomething must change. They imply that the Communist party must be doing some very bad things, but I
hesitate to say whether this is true or not.

72On one hand we can say that domestically we have tried to improve the system, make thisso-called authoritarian regime more efficient and more beneficial to most people. You could see similar
situations in Singapore and South Korea ten years ago. But for the future, I must honestly say that there is
still a lot of uncertainty inl reform. Maybe our younger generation will have a more Westernview and be brave enough to make some further changes. In this regard it is very hard to make internationalcounterparts feel comfortable.
On the other hand, I agree, the majority of Chinese people feel so uncertain. What major powers
can do to make China feel comfortable in the international security, monetary, and trade systems would be togive China more voting rights, given our territory and population. This is seemingly difficult; we always
engaging, struggling, and having lots of dialogs, but we don t get very far. This, in turn, sometimes makes
the domestic aspect more difficult, which is why we are contained. We cannot easily support this inequality.
So, from both sides effort is needed to close the gaps. Thank you.
Presenter 3
Thanks very much to both of you for these very challenging questions. Starting with the first three, how todefine stability? I think there are several ways. I would say for me at least, a rather traditional approach isthat security in the Asia-Pacific has to be the absence of major power war, not only between the US andChina, but also between Japan and China, etc. But let me stress right away that I do think, and hopefully thiscan be avoided, there would be a major power war in Asia-Pacific, not because both sides had intended to go. Here, I would argue that the US
to war, but rather out of cross-misperception
presence plays a major role in preventing and deterring a major power war.
Also, with regards to the second function, or the second definition of security, namely, in
addressing a whole variety of security dilemmas that exist in the region that continue to exist and willcontinue to plague policy makers in Japan and South Korea and the US and in China and elsewhere, I would
say to imagine a scenario where the credibility of the US presence is in decline in Japan or South Korea. Thismight induce thinking in these two countries about their respective roles maybe vis-à-vis China and certain
conflicts.
Thirdly, I would say that we can think about the US military presence in terms of the function ofcontributing to confidence building. I think that in the long run the US military presence can play a majorrole in contributing to confidence building measures between the US and China.
Fourthly, the US military presence, I think, will be a good vehicle, or a good structure, underwhich a whole different set of bi-lateral or tri-lateral forms of security mechanisms between otherAsia-Pacific players will emerge, such as Japan-Vietnam and Japan-India strategic dialogs. Indonesia willprobably play a more important role in the future, and here I think the key question is whether there ways tointegrate China into these new emerging tri-lateral, and quadrilateral security dialogs in a way that are
acceptable to the US, China, and all others who participate. That is to ask, is the US willing to accept thoseand if China is taking part? Regarding
tri-lateral and quadrilateral security mecha
your question about the downsizing of the US presence, there could be a downsize if the US militarypresence is contributing to a dynamic where we are failing to integrate China, and if China feels it is being
encircled by a growing containment strategy, particularly if India is also playing a dominant role in the
Asia-Pacific. If China feels the weight of the US military presence, plus the Indian military presence, plus
the Japanese military presence, I think the US military presence could have a negative impact.
The use of force question is very difficult to answer. As you all know, we only know whether
But I would agree with your argument. It canhave positive effects in that it would prevent and it has prevented at least the possibility of a major power
war. It is probably irrelevant in many other instances of minor levels of violence because it is not a credible
option for the US to send its carrier group to deter if, for example, China and Japan clash over some fishingboat incident.
With regards to the question of the quality of the US military presence required in the future, I
a forward presence in Japan and. We can even think about a much reduced US militarypresence to guarantee the credibility of the US deterrent threat as long as the North Korean situation is as it is.
Congress will vote for much reduced US military presence in both cases
because the number of the troops deployed is actually not that big. Secondly, the strategic interests at stake
are perceived to be so high that a reduction would be seen as counterproductive.

73

Finally, regarding your question about the relative decline of US military power and how can wemanage this, I think it all comes down to whether we can find some shared concept of leadership in theregion. If we want to accommodate the rise of China, and everyone agrees that we have to give China alegitimate role in the Asia-Pacific as a great power, we have to find ways to share leadership. The question isthen, is the US willing to give up its goal of maintaining US primacy? On the other hand, is China willing toaccept that the US will be a key, major power in the region?
have the answer to this, but I think this will be the key issue here. Can we find sharedconcepts of leadership, or concepts of leadership that operate alongside each other? This will also require
what my Chinese colleague has already alluded to: this key question about the Chinese concept of self-powerthat in the long run will spillover or could contribute to a more positive approach in terms of addressing allof these security dilemmas.
MC

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Presenter 1
Thank you. These are very challenging questions. First of all, about the relations between the DPRK andChina,
on that. I think China has been trying to improve its relations with North Korea
since Premier
Kim Jong-74

the Five Point agreement between Hu Jintao and Kim Jong-il, we can see that fact very well.
y kind of instability
Of course, I can understand that China is doing this because it
in or around its territory. Nevertheless, we need to have a different North Korea. It seems to me that North
Korea is going to be more of a liability than an asset for China, but Chinese behavior in recent days has
actually stirred up some public resentment in the South. I hope we can get on the same page again. Nobody
wants North Korea to collapse, so everybody will work together to have a better, stable relationship on the
Korea Peninsula. This leads to the second questiona strategy among thefive parties or six parties. Of course, the pre-coordination mechanism is quite crucial. We used to havetri-lateral coordination and oversight groups, what we called the TCOG, during the Perry Process establishedin 1999, with extensive consultation between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. We have to think
about the revival of this TCOG mechanism. At that time it was only designed to denuclearize North Korea,
For that purpose I think we need to include China, and maybe a four-party consultation isnecessary to eliminate or reduce Chinese suspicion about whether this tri-lateral coordination or consultation
mechanism is directed toward China. In this regard, we highly encourage the US, Korea, and China to begin
tri-lateral cooperation and dialog as a mechanism. US, China, and Japan dialog might also be welcome.
Also, we have to think about mini-lateral dialogs and comprehensive multi-lateral dialogs as steps
toward comprehensive multi-lateral security cooperation, but I have to reemphasize that you should not.S
old and outdated, but they
underestimate Northare still capable of maintaining a high level military establishment. Thank you.
Presenter 2
Thank you for the questions from the audience. I have three I need to answer. First, regarding
domestic reform, especially its political and economic reform, I think China s peaceful rise requires moredomestic reform. This is why domestic debate recently has been about whether we should continue with, keep a low profile internationally, and reform domestically. There are some who sayDthat we are not strong enough so we shouldn t reform further, but I think further reform is needed, including
economic and political reform. But as I said before, this is a crossroads for China. The new generation ofleaders will need to have a lot of tough discussions. In the coming decades I think China s political andeconomic reforms will fluctuate and there will be some uncertainties. But I am cautiously optimistic. Ten
years from now we may see a stronger but more democratic and harmonious China.
Another question is whether thel stability andeconomic growth. There is a lot of influence, especially in the coastal and urban areas. The former 11-12
it influenc
percent yearly growth rate is
I emphasize again that
future, international elements are not influential
success or failure is not based on international elements relayed to the United States, Japan, or the Korean
strongly dependent on domestic elements
need further Deng
Peninsula. Rather,reforms.
The second question was about rare earth exports. We know that in Japan there has recently been a
lot of criticism, but I think there are two facts that have not been
China s reserves comprise one-third of these rare earth elements. But 95 percent are exported to theinternational community. Because the pricing system should be fair, China needs to bargain. The second fact
is that the Chinese export the raw material of rare earth, but the Japanese do the high-tech refining of thisrare earth. We think this is unbalanced and unsustainable, and in the future we should redesign this strategy.
This is not to criticize only Japan, but rather the whole world and ourselves as well.
The third question was about the unification of Korea Peninsula. I think this must be a bad
position for my colleagues, not me, but I will tell you the story, I personally recall. Years ago I came to Seoul
and got a chance to meet President Kim Dae Jung. He emphasize that the unification of our peninsula willtake at least three decades. His words were surprising because we were eager for them to unify. But in fact
they werein this process. If both sides have made somearrangements or have a consensus, we prefer they decide it by themselves. No country should, by force,change the internal unification process, but China will provide some help to make sure it is peaceful andwithout any nuclear proliferation. Tha
Presenter 3

75

Thank you. Coming from a country that has been recently unified I cannot help but make a minor
observation on the unification issue. For those who want to unify, they should start saving money, because
ive exercise. Anyway, I was asked two questions.
About whether the US hub-and-spokes system is a facilitator or inhibitor, I think during my talk I
tried to make the point that I see it as a facilitator, precisely for the reason that there is an absence of any
effective alternative to addressing the security dilemmas, and my assumption is that as long as countries arege the fundamentals of thishub-and-spokes system, which of course inhibits the danger of a self-fulfilling prophecy, namely at that point
when they perceive the hub-and-spokes system to be a primary tool of containing China by all means. Then
this becomes a dangerous, self-fulfilling
Korea, Australia or others engaging in an uncertain social experiment by asking the Americans to leave or towithdraw from the region.
Finally, I would also say that I think the hub-and-spokes system and the US presence really should
be seen as providing Asia-Pacific countries with the opportunity to, below the hub-and-spokes system,
develop other multi-lateral forms of security mechanisms, and thereby building trust amongst each other. I
think this a function that we should not easily discourage. To put it another way, I would ask the question,
would we see these forms of rather non-committal multian overarching framework that, imperfect as it may be for the time, at least provides some reassurance that
we might not have to experience a major power conflict?
Japanese debate on this, but if it were to happen, and if we had no alternative in Japan to shifting troops, thenyes I would think this has the potential to shape and shake the order for the very fact that the moment that
happens, Japan would really need to have an answer ready to its neighbors, because I think a number ofneighbors would be as scared then of Japanese intentions and Japanese policies as they are now of China,
and again looking at the European experience, let me tell you that when the wall came down the first thingthat our beloved British and French friends did was to pick up the phone and tell the Americans that in noway would they support a unified Germany posing again a threat to the European continent. This was after
Germany, arguably, for 40 years trying everything it could to persuade its neighboring countries and its allies
that it was not embarking on any expansionist policy again. Yes, I know analogies are difficult, but I think in
MC

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Session 2: Asian Regional Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges

77

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Presentation 4: Powers, Norms and Regional Institution-

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Presentation 6:-

Rizal Sukma(Executive Director, Centre for Strategic and International Studies)

103

ASEAN and Non-Traditional Security
Introduction
The growing salience of non-traditional security (NTS) problems in Southeast Asia has made it increasingly
difficult for regional states to insist on strict separation between domestic affairs and regional problems. No
regional state can continue to insist that various non-traditional problems within their respective domestic
boundaries can be addressed unilaterally through national response by the state concerned. The magnitude of
the problems, and their impacts beyond national boundaries, render any national response inadequate. In
other words, the nature of non-traditional security problems requires not only national response but also
close regional cooperation to address them.
Indeed, what are now regarded as non-traditional security issues have always been on the agenda ofcooperation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Since its inception in August 1967,
ASEAN has always approached security matters in a comprehensive manner. For Southeast Asian countries,
security has always encompassed wide arrays of issues in social, cultural, economic, political, and military
fronts. Problems in those areas especially within the domestic context-- are seen to have the potential todestabilise nation-states and regional peace and security. Based on such conception of security, ASEAN has
always distinguished security in terms of what traditional and non-traditional threats. However, until very
recently, ASEAN countries tended to see non-traditional security issues primarily as domestic problems ofmember state which required national solution. It was only after the end of the Cold War, and more so after
the 1997 economic crisis, which brought about the growing threats posed by non-traditional security
problems, that ASEAN began to intensify inter-state cooperation in dealing with the problems.

Initially, in resolving regional security issues, both at national and regional levels, ASEAN from the outset
undertook two interrelated approaches. First, threats from non-traditional security problems were left toindividual member state to resolve, especially through nation-building measures. Second, to enable
individual states resolving those problems, regional cooperation is necessary to create a peaceful external
environment so that states would not be distracted from domestic priorities. These approaches later evolved
ketahanannasional
overall national development and overcome internal threats, regional resilience will automatically result
1Inmuch in the same way as a chain derives its overall stother words, ASEAN believed that the management of inter-state relations in the region should be foundedon the sanctity of national sovereignty of its member states. Regional cooperation was sought in order toreinforce, not erode, that sovereignty.
countries continue to face security challenges in multiple forms, especially in non-traditional forms. For mostSoutheast Asian countries, the threat of terrorism is but one problem alongside other security problems suchas extreme poverty, trans-national crimes, natural disaster, maritime pollution, environmental problems,
piracy, human trafficking, and communal violence. ASEAN began to recognise the imperative forcooperation among member states to resolve domestic problems with cross-border effects.
It was the implication of economic crisis of 1997 on human suffering that demonstrated further thesignificance of non-traditional security problems in the region. In 2003, the health crisis triggered by the
problem of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), and then the Avian flu, clearly showed how
security threats in Southeast Asia has increasingly become trans-national, and therefore blurred thedistinction between internal and external security. The SARS epidemic clearly reinforced the permeability of1

Soesastro, eds.,, Research Papers and Policy Studies
no. 11 (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1984), p. 305.

104

state boundaries and highlighted the growing imperative for transnational cooperation. The fact that the
spread of SARS could be checked by close regional and international cooperation sent a strong lesson thatthe containment and resolution to such problems would require close inter-state cooperation. Without acoordinated cooperation, which will be much more effective if it is done within a multilateral institution,
this kind of threat could lead to a global catastrophe. Indeed, these problems serve as the latest reminder toall regional states that security interdependence has become an undeniable reality in Southeast Asia.
While the depth and scope of NTS cooperation in ASEAN remain subject to criticism, it does have its merits.
For one, the focus of cooperation on non-traditional security issues does provide an additional platform fordeveloping the habit of cooperation among ASEAN states within a formal multilateral setting. Within thisdominant paradigm for interence has shown, the process is also important,especially for the institution to mature and induce a level of comfort among the participating states.
Addressing NTS problems, however, still constitutes a formidable challenge for ASEAN for a number ofreas
Burma --which led to the displacement of people and refugees-- has also reinforced the point that humanrights is a security issue for the region. The same can also be said regarding the problem of trans-boundary
pollution. In other words, NTS problems do relate closely to the issue of national sensitivity. In this regards,
the cliché problem of non-interference should not be overlooked.
The second constraint is the continuing problem of limited state capacity to address the NTS challenges. The
financial crisis of 1997, for example, clearly reduced the capacity of some states such as Indonesia-- to pushthrough some policy measures and allocate the needed fund for addressing the problem. As most ASEAN
countries are facing multiple NTS problems at the same time, there is a competition for limited state
resources, thus making it difficult to prioritise.
mechanism. Despite recent institutional
adjustments after the adoption of the ASEAN Charter in 2007, ASEAN still lacks a mechanism to enforce
compliance. The trans-national nature of the problem clearly requires a collective effort among affectedstates to address and resolve the problems. It is precisely on this imperative that ASEAN has been weak.
The fourth constraint comes from the fact that ASEAN remains an inter-governmental form of regional
cooperation. Despite its declaration to become a people-oriented or people-centred, some governments in theregion remain suspicion of the civil society organisations (CSOs) and reluctant to work them. Meanwhile,
most NTS problems need a strong state-CSOs partnership in addressing them.
Concluding Notes
ASEAN, however, has begun to consolidate its efforts in addressing the NTS problems through a number of
initiative. Two most important steps towards this direction have been the adoption of the ASEAN Politicaland Security Community (APSC) in October 2003 and the APSC Blueprint in 2004. Indeed, greater
cooperation has been evident with regards to the management of the problem of terrorism, natural disasters,
and maritime safety. While the extent of the implementation of these measures remain unclear, ASEAN does
have a platform through which NTS cooperation could be intensified.
Regarding the principle of non-interfence, ASEAN should continue to adhere to this principle. However, thisprinciple should not become an obstacle to greater cooperation in addressing NTS. The principle ofnon-interference needs to be employed in a flexible way so that it would allow ASEAN to cooperate ontrans-boundaries issues, internal problems with clear regional implications, and issues with identifiable
humanitarian dimension such as gross violation of human rights, natural disasters, humanitarian crisis,internally displaced persons (IDP) and other human security problems. In other words, ASEAN needs toemploy the principle of non-interference within the context of interdependence among states.
Despite the growing recognition on the importance of NTS, however, the place of NTS in security discourseand policy in the region should not be taken for granted. East Asia is at the most important juncture of great105

strategic transformation. While the existing regional security architecture is better equipped to tackle NTS
regarding the viability of the current regional architecture in coping with strategic challenges resulting fromthe changing dynamics and power relations among major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. Changes andstrategic re-alignments in the relationship among the major powers, as a result of global transformation andregional power shift, have begun to galvanise the discourse and studies on the adequacy of the existing
Indeed, as the discourse on the need for a new regional security architecture intensifies, traditional security
concerns may once again overshadow the attention and preoccupation with NTS issues. Governments could
be easily distracted by the imperative of addressing traditional security problems. In East Asia, there is no
shortage of such problems. In addition to the problem of major power relations and regional security
architecture, there are also unresolved territorial disputes, bilateral tensions, the implications of militarybuild-up, and nuclear issue in the Korean Peninsula. Government officials and traditional security analysts
less deadly than wars could be easily lost within the overriding concerns over traditional security concerns.
These traditional security concerns are important, but they should not be allowed to dominate security
discourse and practices in Asia.

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2

Discussant 3
Thank you. Five minutes is very short, so I ll ask
such excellent presentations to come up with some. First, some questions for the first presentation: One ofthe points-lateralsecurity institutions, their willingness to jump ship and support other institutions if they no longer see theirinterests fit in the current institution. It seems to me that one of the problems, from this rather non-committal
behavior, is that
ess any severe consequences of leaving the institution. So the question
for me would be, can the Asia-Pacific region develop multi-lateral security institutions that would over time
make it difficult for major powers to leave without really suffering negative consequences? Or do we have tolive with the fact that they will pick and choose as they see fit? The second question is related: what could be
the negative consequences for Asian regional integration from this institutional Darwinism? Could that in thelong run undermine the willingness of Asia-Pacific countries to engage in these efforts?
Three short questions for the second presentation. I was thrilled to hear that we need more money
for these kinds of projects. I would also suggest that we need more money for projects looking at how
Australia could fit into the security community, but that relates already to my first question, namely whether,in the face of a rising China that will challenge fundamentally the order in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific in
broaden the focus here and also look on the prospective for an Asia-Pacific security community, which ofcourse would complicate the whole endeavour by an order of magnitude.
For the second question, regarding
focused on interstate
relations. What do you see in terms of the effect of security communities on intrastate affairs in the
Asia-Pacific region? Would development of a security community also affect the way these states would
perceive the violence acceptable in their domestic affairs? This relates to my third question: how should wetalk about the development of an Asia-Pacific or East Asia security community without discussing the natureof the political system at the same time? Does it make a difference in talking about security communities
whether we have a homogeneous system of countries such as in Europe, or as in the East Asian theater, wehave democratic states working side by side with non-democratic states? Does that make a difference?
Finally, I have one question for the third presentation on a very concrete non-traditional security
challenge that: cyber-security. I think this is a topic that is not only very sexy,
but it also has a high potential of becoming not only a non-traditional security issue, but also a
non-traditional threat issue. How does ASEAN look at cyber-security, and what do you assess are theabilities of ASEAN to deal effectively with it? Quite clearly, it does affect the national security of eachindividual country to a very significant degree. Thank you.
Discussant 4
4
3

2

Editorial note: the Chatham House rule was applied to this session, and thus the names of the participants are notprinted here.

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3

ASEAN

ASEAN
ASEAN
ASEAN
3
security communication of nations
EU
EU

MC

Presenter 4
Thank you very much, I think the first discussant raises two very interesting and very difficult questions. One
concerns the consequences of differ
this question is quite similar to what the second discussant also raised just now. The second question seems
to be related to some negative impact arising from institutional Darwinism. Let met touch on the second
issue first. First of all, as I mentioned in my presentation,
institutional Darwinism. Also, I
think the two questions are relatedly answer each of them. Rather, my comments are108

generally based on the two questions.
I
future-oriented question, so therefore difficult to answer. However, at the moment, different
leaders from powerful nations have different interests, especially in terms of regional integration frameworks.
The classical example is the TPP Trans Pacific Partnership. According to APEC Yokohama declarations,
FTAP Free Trade in the Asia Pacific can be pursued by developing three different frameworks,
ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, and the TPP, but the TPP currently has nine member countries, but only a couple of
ASEAN member states. FTAP is based on APEC, but
or Cambodia as
official members. This is why ASEAN is not happy with the APEC-wide FTA and has prioritized includingthese three Indo-China nations into APEC.
If the United States continuous to promote the TPP to achieve FTAP, that would be a big concern
to ASEAN, and the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 frameworks. Also, some nations, like Japan, which are putting
a priority on these frameworks to achieve regional integration, would be faced with very difficult policyquestions. For example, if Japan tries to pursue the TPP or FTAP, how can Japan pursue its policy of ASEAN
and Mekong River development when ASEAN member countries would be quite disappointed?
This is just one example of how different institutions supported by different countries are actuallydeveloping. These complex regional politics will probably continue, and from the Japanese viewpoint this isa big concern because China might be able to take advantage of its most favorable frameworks, ASEAN+3
and the Mekong River development. This is something that Japan would like to avoid in the future. Again, I
an be solved, particularly since Japan has decided tojoin the TPP next year.
I think the second discussant also asked about some of the examples of economic cooperation thatare keeping tensions from escalating. There is a lot of historical and territorial tension in this region: between
Japan and China, between Japan and Korea, and even between Korea and China. South East Asian countries
still have some territory disputes. However, economic integration has continued despite these disputes. The
question is whether integration could have proceeded faster without these disputes. In other words, areterritorial disputes or bilateral tensions acting as a hindrance to regional integration? My observation is no.
The causation is very difficult to demonstrate, but as I mentioned in my presentation, we have a hugeterritorial dispute between Japan and China. However, talks among China, Japan, and Korea are going on
this week. They don t mentioning anything about the Senkaku or Daioyu problems. They simply focus onregional integration. How can we explain that if hindrance exists? Why would the Chinese trade official saythat thePresenter 5
The advantage of having a short amount of time to answer lots of questions is that I can pick the easyquestion to answer. T
important question because what it underscores is a fundamental tension between building a security
community and maintaining domestic legitimacy. For a lot of countries the maintenance of domestic
legitimacy requires accentuating differences between self and other, accentuating and stressing theuniqueness of your own cultural ethnocentric traits, and characteristics precisely opposite, which you need tosee for the construction of an interstate security community.
For example, American exceptionalism, Chinese exceptionalism, Japanese exceptionalism, French
exceptionalism, all these exceptionalisms emphasize the value superiority of their traits and characteristics.
peaceful people in the world, and the construction of a security community requires actually deemphasizing
uniqueness and emphasizing similarities or traits or characteristics that are shared across boundaries. This
raises a problem for states that worry about their legitimacy because emphasizing your uniqueness through109

nationalism is an important source of legitimacy for regimes that worry about support from their population.
It may be that the implication here is that building a cross-national security community necessarily requires
challenging the uniqueness of national identities, and this is difficult particularly for authoritarian regimes,
democracies, such as the United States. Interstate security community construction may requiredemocratization, or at least regimes whose legitimacy does not rest on emphasizing the uniqueness of theirown traits and characteristics, which is a much more pessimistic conclusion about security communities thanI thought I would arrive at.
Presenter 6
Thank you for all the questions. Let me begin by answering the questions from the first discussant. I actually-security, but to the best of my knowledge they are
beginning to address the issue within the transnational crimes network of the ASEAN police.
Let me turn to the three points that have been raised specifically on the ASEAN experience by thesecond discussant. Number one, what is needed to avoid tension? Institutionally speaking, there are a numberof mechanisms within ASEAN, such as the high council provisions within the Treaty of Amity andCooperation and the ARF Chair, which can be utilized when tensions arise. But so far, we have never used
these mechanisms. Instead, ASEAN continues to rely on the personal ties of leaders, which of course has
begun to change. Because of the regular exchanges among the leaders of the ASEAN member states, andalso because of their close personal relationships, they actually talk directly to each other either in an
informal or formal setting, whenever tensions arise. I can tell you that when Indonesia had a problem with
Malaysia it was easy for both leaders to come together and talk about it in order to diffuse tension, especiallyon the streets in Jakarta. As we have become a democracy, foreign policy issues are no longer a monopoly ofoften the first channel we use.
government officials, and NGOs and NPs take part in the process, but
Another mechanism is what I call the restraining effects of institutions, in which by simply
invoking the fact that we are members of ASEAN, that actually helps conflicting countries who are having adispute to think twice before they actually escalate tensions.
The second question is on the impact of the involvement of China, the US, and Japan on
non-traditional security cooperation within ASEAN. In general, I can say that ASEAN, through its various
institutions, especially the ASEAN Regional Forum, prov
not perfect, for the three major powers to cooperate under the ASEAN umbrella on those issues. But
unfortunately the activities have been confined to workshops, study groups, and desktop exercises that are
more bilateral: China-ASEAN, ASEAN-Japan, and ASEAN-US.
In fact, different bilateral exercises on NTS serve different purposes. With China, for example,
ASEAN, by bringing in NTS issues as an agenda of cooperation between ASEAN and China, expects tointegrate China further into the web of cooperation, not only with ASEAN, but also with other East Asian
countries. It really helps to achieve the purpose of CBM, and also to strengthen mutual trust between
ASEAN and China.
With the US, I think it would be fair to say that bringing in NTS issues, and also expecting a USrole in this area, will help
support to ensure the success of ASEAN community building, and this is quite evident from the last 20 years
of ASEAN-Japan cooperation.
The third question is regarding any difference between the so-called ASEAN security community
and the EU? When we came up with the idea of the ASEAN security community, it was not actually a
Deutch security
AN security community, so ASEAN
serves an objective basically. With the expansion of ASEAN from six to eight and then to ten members, weworried that with the emergence of new security problems, and also because of the surge of territorial

110disputes among members, that the use of force could actually return to the ASEAN context. In that context,
we were quite modest even though the original proposal from Indonesia for the ASEAN security community
really envisions a full security community. We also brought in the imperative of democracy, human rights,
and the rule of law, and the free movement of people so that we could have a shared regional identity.
The agreement in 2003 to make war, or the use of force, impossible between member states, is thebasic characteristic of the ASEAN security community. In that context,
is kind ofundertaking a security community, especially if you bring in the literature on security communities, because
it deviated from the general understanding of what security communities are. But we hope that as countries
begin to implement those policy measures that can create the conditions where the use of force, or even war,
become impossible among the member states, then in the next step after 2015, we can move in order toaddress other requirements before ASEAN can become a real security community.
MCMC
k the third presenter first and go in reverse order and ask two questions.
MC
ASEAN Way

non-traditional security

ASEAN
MC
The first question to you is, does the ASEAN Way challenge non-traditional security cooperation? The
second question is about new countries that want to join ASEAN, for example, East Timor. What are theresponses from the current member states? It could bsome arguments that ASEAN started out being very open and is now becoming more closed.
MC

MC
The first question is about the relations between national identity and regional identity. Many people raised
the question that national identity might be a hindrance to close regional identity assimilation, and several
people raised historical issues and reconciliation issues. Would national identity be an impediment to agreater regional identity? Some of the questions raised the fact that although there is a regional identity inEurope it does not mean that German identity, French identity, or British identity have disappeared as aresult.

111

MCregional
identityMC
What kind of East Asian regional identity should we discuss? In the age of globalization maybe there could
be a regional identity that is different from that in Europe, meaning different from ones based on democracy,
human rights, etc.
MC2Presenter 6
Let me answer the second question first, on the prospect of East Timor becoming the eleventh member of
ASEAN. Yes, two or three days ago Ramos-Horta gave a speech in Singapore and said that he expected next
year that East Timor could officially become a member of ASEAN. For symbolic reasons because Indonesia
is going to chair ASEAN next year, if East Timor becomes a member when Indonesia is the chair, that could
provide a good image of ASEAN as a whole and also for Indonesia s
But my own guess is that it would not easy for East Timor to become a member next year for anumber of reasons. First, even though East Timor applied a couple of years ago, we have not been able toreduce the demand of being a member of ASEAN. We still have 617 meetings a year, and there are questions
about the capability and capacity of East Timor to commit is. Also,
have reached aconsensus within ASEAN on when East Timor will be admitted as a full member because there are still somecountries that may be more suitable or more appropriate for the expansion of ASEAN because at the moment
the main focus of ASEAN is to consolidate itself and try to implement the ASEAN community blue print.
This is supposed to be completed by 2015.
On the ASEAN Way and non-traditional security challenges, let me first rehearse what the ASEAN
Way means. I think it usually denotes notions of informality in ASEAN countries dealing with each other,
especially in resolving conflict. It also relates to the question of sovereignty and non-interference as cardinalprinciples of interstate relations in South East Asia. Finally, it refers to the primacy of consensus inpolicy-making mechanisms.
The need to address non-traditional security issues, I think, erodes the ASEAN Way. If you
continue to invoke these three elements of the ASEAN Way,e could go very far incooperating and addressing NTS problems. For very obvious reasons, because when you talk about NTS
problems, especially those problems that originate from a domestic domain of a member state but withtrans-boundary implications, you have to compromise about the strict distinction between internal andexternal environments, and you have to compromise on the sanctity of the principle of non-interference. In
fact, if you look at ASEAN cooperation in this area over the last ten years, there have been some changes and112

a degree of flexibility when it comes to the invocations of the principle of the ASEAN Way. I
theASEAN Way makes it difficult for the non-traditional security cooperation, but I think the imperative ofworking together to address NTS actually erodes and also changes the way the ASEAN Way is being
implemented within ASEAN. But of course there is still tension, especially between old members and newmembers, with regard to how flexible you can be in order to allow greater cooperation on non-traditional
security issues.
Presenter 5
Thank you very much for the questions. To some degree the questions actually lead me to comments similar
to those I gave earlier. The first question, is national identity a hindrance to the emergence of regional
identity? As I said, in principle
the sense of uniqueness. In other words, when you ask Chinese people to place Chinese people, Japanesepeople, and American people, where do they think Chinese people, Japanese people, and American people lie
on scales of peaceful to warlike? Overwhelmingly, Chinese people think that Chinese people are down at thepeaceful end, Americans are somewhere in the middle, and Japanese are down
obviously a variation across individuals, but the averages work out that way.
teresting is, people who believe that they are peaceful but believe that they are uniquely
peaceful, in other words different from Japanese or Americans, are people who also have strong realpolitik
preferences. In other words, they see their relationship with people who are different from them in acompetitive, potentially conflicting way, even though they see themselves as being peaceful. Wha
here is they see themselves as being unique and different, so even if the content of the identity or theuniqueness emphasizes their peacefulness, the fact is that what overwhelms that is the sense of differentness
which then leads to a set of specific preferences such as increasing military spending, being more
about attitudes
toward territory, but my guess is that people who believe they are uniquely different from Japanese andAmericans and believe they are uniquely peaceful as Chinese people, are more likely to believe that territory
matters and are more likely to see high salience in preserving territo
would find.
, and that is the morethat you believe you are different the more that you are likely to view this as an important, salient issue inon European identity show that people can hold both a national identity and a regional identity at the sametime, but what appears to have occurred in Europe is that the definition of German-ness, French-ness, orBritish-ness has changed such that to be German is also to be European, and so the question is, could you see
in East Asia the emergence of a definition of Chinese identity or of Japanese identity where to be Chinese is
to be Asian, to be Japanese is to be Asian, where the definition Asian-ness is shared?
The second question was about regime type and obstacles to security dilemmas. As in my earlier
answer, it may be that democratization is a requirement for the emergence of a security community based onshared identity. ASEAN may be an exception because ASEAN clearly has a mixture of regimes, and thepresenter s very important work that he himself has done and others working with him have done to promote
an ASEAN security community seems to be actually quite positi. But note that
it was a democratic Indonesia that promoted the idea of a security community in the region; it was not a
non-democratic regime in ASEAN. Not all democracies are probably suited for or interested in promoting
security communities, and the obstacle that will run interference here is the degree to which the legitimacy ofthat democracy rests on this notion of a unique, different, superior national identity.
The third question, what kind of regional identity can emerge in East Asia, and how different might113

this be from Europe? Again, I want to come back to the first point that I made, that in some sense the content
shared-ness, the degree to which they believe these traits are shared by others. As I mentioned, in thesesurveys done in Beijing, people who believed that Chinese people were the most peaceful people in theworld were people who actually tended to have realpolitik preferences and see the world as a threatening anddangerous place, precisely because they saw themselves as different and others as, in a sense, holding
inferior values.
Basically, when you have an identity relationship where somebody believes that they are uniquely
peaceful and they believe the other group is uniquely warlike, the chances of community for that person arevery, very low compared to the chances of a community between people who see themselves as moderately
peaceful. Namely, what matters there is that they see themselves as having relatively shared traits or values.
Whether shared East Asian traits and an emerging security community is based on a notion of East Asianvalues or a notion of democratization shared democratic values or shared Confucian values may notmatter as long as these values are perceived to be shared.
Presenter 4
4

ASEAN+3
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FTAP

+6

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CMI

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multilateralization
decision
multilateralize

CMI
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+3
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100

8

IMF

IMF
CMI

2009
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ASEAN+3
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FTA

confidence building

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M

EAS

APEC
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10
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ministerial meeting (
8

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GIARI116

ASEAN

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2

Pre-symposium Meeting
Date: December 2, 2010
Venue: Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University
Participants (in alphabetical order): Prof. Satoshi Amako, Prof. Rumi Aoyama, Prof. Kang Choi, Dr. Miki
Honda, Dr. Kenji Horiuchi, Prof. Alastair Iain Johnston, Dr. Hiro Katsumata, Dr. Shu Min, Prof Andrew Oros,Prof. Hatsue Shinohara, Dr. Rizal Sukma, Prof. Chikako (Kawakatsu) Ueki, and GIARI RAs.
The issues discussed at the meeting can be divided into the following eight categories:
1. Key terms
2. Regional security architecture
3. Regional communities and identities (1): foundations
4. Regional communities and identities (2): Critical views
5. ASEAN
6. US presence
7. The Korean Peninsula
8. The rise of China
The issues discussed at the meeting, concerning each of these eight categories, can be summarized asfollows:
1. Key terms
If one is to explore the key determinants of Asian regional integration, the first thing he/she has to do is tosoformer may be more relevant to the process in Asia, and the latter may be more appropriate to capture the
There are many ways by which countries can cooperate. For example, European countries have developed
operation may differ,depending on how countries choose to cooperate.
2. Regional security architecture
East Asian countries today do not have an overall/general architecture for regional cooperation that goesbeyond existing issue-specific frameworks.
In the area of non-traditional security issues, various cooperative mechanisms in East Asia do matter.
This is the case, although the US presence continues to have an important role in the area of traditional
security.
Multilateral dialogues at the top/senior-official level may be effective for the stability of the East Asian
region, involving China, Japan and South Korea.
The capacity of East Asian countries is an important issue. Each needs a regional cooperative architecture
because it lacks the ability to address various security issues by itself unilaterally.
For the exploration of a future regional security architecture in East Asia, it is essential to identify thepreferences of key players, including China, the US, Japan, ASEAN, South Korea and North Korea. One
concerning the following five key issues. The first is the membership of any given security framework.
The question of whether the US should be included as a member can constitute a point at issue. The samething can be said of the status of Taiwan and of North Korea. The second is the rules and/or decision
making procedures. Some countries may want all decisions to be made on a consensual basis, while others
may prefer decisions to be made by a majority vote. The third concerns the responsibility involved inmembership. The extent to which countries should contribute their military forces to regional institutions,for example, can be a point at issue. The forth is the issue areas to be covered within multilateral118

frameworks. Some countries may want to avoid liberal issues such as human rights and democracy.
Countries such as China may want to avoid addressing territorial issues within multilateral frameworks.
It can be argued that, in any case, all countries in the region probably want to be involved in regional
what each wants: all want to be a relevant player, having a legitimate stake in regional integration.
3. Regional communities and identities (1): foundations
Socialization and people-to-people exchanges are prerequisites for the formation of regional security
communities. Such communities represent a form of regional order, which should be distinguished fromother kinds of order, such as the concert of great powers and military alliances. Security communities arecharacterized by the prevailing expectation for peaceful change.
Social contract theory may be useful in analyzing the formation of security communities. The key toforming security communities is in- and out-group differentiations, and thus it is important to analyze thedeterminants of such differentiations.
In East Asia, there is robust evidence to show that foreign policy choices are made on the basis of theperceptions of identity differences on the part of policymakers.
It is worth exploring whether economic development/modernization leads to identity changes and themitigation of differences between societies in East Asia. Relevant to this point is the literature arguing that
economic integration leads to the convergence of identities among business elites, and that such
convergence may affect political activities.
It should be noted that the percep
reference groups. In this regard, it can be said that collective identities can be formed more easily whenrelevant parties share a common perception of an out-group.
The existence of a common security threat may be an important factor in shaping a regional identity.
Although people-to-people exchanges may seem like a negligible phenomenon today, their importanceshould not be underestimated because future generations, including students and youngsters, are involved.
They may form a collective identity and lead the process of regional integration in the future. Yet, at thesame time, young people may be passive, and simply bandwagon with dominant phenomena.
4. Regional communities and identities (2): Critical views
The formation of a collective identity at the societal level may not always lead to its formation at thepolitical/elite level. Notable in this respect is the fact that, in Europe, it was an identity at the elite level
which promoted regional integration. Yet it may also be argued that exchanges at the societal level
facilitated inter-governmental integration in Europe.
Activities such as traveling and economic exchanges can work in both directions: integration or
disintegration. It is notable that the Japanese are not welcoming Chinese tourists, who actually account foras high as 70% of the total number of tourists to Japan, according to a survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun.
It is worth adding that tourism is all about experiencing something different/exotic. If this is the case, mass
tourism may not be an effective force for the construction of collective identities.
Politics may matter. Political leaders may play a role in shaping public perceptions. To illustrate, only after
a power-balance change between great powers did Japanese people develop an interest in the Soviet leader,
Gorbachev. Another point to note in this regard is that political cooperation may be a prerequisite for
economic cooperation and perhaps also for collective identity formation.
Regional cooperation may easily be undermined by conflict. Domestic political problems may undermine
efforts for regional cooperation. Thus, functional cooperation may be the most promising. The role ofnational leaders should be emphasized in advancing regional cooperation.
5. ASEAN
It is worth exploring whether identity similarities have contributed to the formation of a regional
community in Southeast Asia. In this regard, it is worth noting that, in Southeast Asia in the past, there had
been continuous conflicts and wars. Hence, the nations there came to recognize that cooperation wasessential. Their understanding that there was no other way but to cooperate led them to address various
issues. One of the first tasks was the joint production of fertilizer.
Recently ASEAN members have agreed to bring their disputes to the International Court of Justice (ICJ),

119

and to accept decisions made by the court.
After the end of the Cold War, Southeast Asian countries expanded the areas of cooperation to include
non-traditional security issues. There was a need to change the goals and means of ASEAN.
Today democratization and human rights protection are indispensable for the formation of a common
identity in Southeast Asia. Thi
restricted. It is worth adding that the development of security communities cannot be planned in a
top-down manner.
It can be said that the development of ASEAN preceded the development of theories of regional
integration. Yet it can also be said that theoretical concepts have served as policy frameworks in Southeast
Asia.
The role of ASEAN in East Asia may be limited to the provision of forums in which the countries ofNortheast Asia and Southeast Asia can meet. In any case, these forums may have a constraining effect on
Chinese behavior
The significance of ASEAN can be understood in terms of the associa

space for addressing these p
6. US presence
The US presence in East Asia may be a prerequisite for regional order. Yet it should be noted, in thisrespect, that the US should think more seriously about multilateral cooperation.
The ways in which East Asian countries respond to various security issues may be determined by thepresence of the US. However, the real effect of the US presence is difficult to determine. In any case,counterfactual analyses may be needed. One may ask, for example, in what way China would have
behaved in the 1995/96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, if US forces were not present in Asia.
An important question for researchers to examine is whether the US has the will and capacity to make acontribution to the stability of East Asia, in particular, by promoting the formulation of regional
cooperation architectures.
It seems that US policy toward China has become more assertive. This may be one of the reasons why
China behaved so assertively in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea in 2010. In
any case, the intention of the US may have been to reassure its allies, and also to signal to others that it is
not in decline, and that it is by no means retreating from the East Asian region.
US domestic politics should be examined. The White House was seen as weak vis- à-vis Beijing during the2009 Obama-Hu summit. Hence, the US government may be intending to show to its domestic audience,as well as to the East Asian nations, that US policy toward China should remain strong, and that it isdetermined to remain engaged in East Asian affairs.
7. The Korean Peninsula
The presence of the US may be serving as a deterrent. Yet another question is whether a decrease in the
degree of US presence would lead to greater cooperation among the East Asian countries to deal with theircommon enemy, North Korea.
relations that Northeast Asian countries have with North Korea are all different. In any case, a stronger
emphasis should be placed on the benefit of cooperation.
One remarkable development in recent years is that the Chinese have mentioned that they could agree tothe unification of the Korean Peninsula, as long as certain conditions were met. They have however not
specified what exactly these conditions are.

It can be argued that the bilateral alliances of the US are the only way to deal with the issue of North
Korea, from a certain perspective. It is difficult to imagine effective multilateral cooperation over the issueof North Korea, given the difficulties of the existing multilateral institutions in Asia.
8. The rise of China

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China is trying to create new norms of international politics, on the basis of its own preferences.
The recent use of rare earth exports by the Chinese as a strategic tool raises the question of whether theliberal view of regional peace is really relevant. Economics and politics can always be separated, and thespillover effect may work in a negative direction.
At the same time, it may be counter-factually said that, if the condition of economic interdependence had
been absent in the first place, the situation could have been worse. It may be that the economic measures
were taken, instead of more aggressive measures, because of the significance of economic
interdependence.
Increasingly assertive Chinese behavior in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Yellow Sea in2010 can be seen as the result of exogenous shocks, which were magnified by the media and certain
interest groups. A counter-factual question is how China would have behaved if the exogenous shocks had
occurred last year, and so on.
The Chinese foreign ministry has become aware of the possible impact its regional policy will have on theimage of its country. Some kind of learning process is developing between China and Southeast Asian
nations.
The ways in which countries perceive the status of Taiwan is diverse. In particular, the views of the US andof Southeast Asian countries are different.
between Washington and
Beijing. East Asian countries apparently have not been able to reassure China in the security sphere. Thisissue should be explored in depth in the future.

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(Satoshi AMAKO)

2002
2000
2003

4
1999

1999

)

(
NHK

2003
VS
1

11
2006

2004
2007

2009
2010
Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University. He earned his PhD in
International Relations from Graduate School of Social Sciences, Hitotsubashi University. His specialties areContemporary China and Asian International Relations. He became Professor at Waseda University in April
2002 after serving as Assistant Professor at Ryukyu University, as Professor in the Faculty of International
Economics, Aoyama Gakuin University. He was invited to American University as Visiting Professor in 1999.
Major Publications include(Iwanami, 1999);
Change in Contemporary Chinese Structure, vol.4, The Political Structure of Central and Regional
Government (writing and editing, The University of Tokyo Press, 2000); Life-Size China (Keiso Shobo,2003); How to Associate with China (NHK Book, 2003); The History of China, vol.11: Mao Zedong vs.
Deng Xiaoping (Kodansha, 2004); Road to Asian Union: Theories and Ideas on Capacity Building (Chikuma
Shobo, 2010) and others.
(Rumi AOYAMA )

2007

2007
2009

Professor, The Research Institute of Current Chinese Affairs, School of Education, Waseda University. She
was a visiting researcher at the Stanford University from 2005-2006. She earned a Ph. D. in Law from
Graduate School of Law, Keio University. Her specialty is Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy. Her
ko Mori & Kenichiro Hirano eds., A New East Asia: Toward a Regional(Kang CHOI)
Ph.D
1992 1998 2002 2005

KIDA
KIDA
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis (KJDA)

60

1998

2002

4
-Korean Arms

122

-

-US Security-North Korean Relations:

CHOI, Kang (Ph.D., the Ohio State University) is a professor and Director-General for American Studies at
the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. From 1992 to1998, and from 2002 to 2005, Professor CHOI worked in the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA).
When at KIDA, Professor CHOI assumed various positions such as Chief Executive Officer, Task Force for
Current Defense Issues, Director of International Arms Control Studies, and one of the editors of Korean
Journal of Defense Analysis (KJDA). He has done more than 60 research projects on arms control,
crisis/consequence management including pol-mil games, and the ROK-US security alliance. From 1998 to
2002, he served in National Security Council Secretariat as Senior Director for Policy Planning and
Coordination. He was one of South Korean delegates to the Four-Party Talks. Professor CHOI has publishedArms Control and Inter-Korean
Prospect for USboard membership including Committee on Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification of National Assembly,
Ministry of National Defense, Ministry of Unification, and the National Unification Advisory Council.
(Alastair Iain JOHNSTON)
1993

PhD

Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture andGrand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton 1995)
Social States: China in International Institutions,
1980-2000 (Princeton 2008)
Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging
Power (Routledge 1999)(Stanford 2006) Crafting
Cooperation: Regional Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge 2007)
Measuring Identity: A
Guide for Social Scientists (Cambridge 2009)
Alastair Iain Johnston is the Governor James Noe and Linda Noe Laine Professor of China in World Affairs
in the Government Department at Harvard University. He received his PhD in Political Science from the
University of Michigan in 1993. He has written on socialization theory, identity and political behavior, andstrategic culture, generally with application to the study of East Asian international relations and Chinese
foreign policy. Johnston is the author of Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History (Princeton 1995) and Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980-2000 (Princeton 2008),
and is co-editor of Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (Routledge 1999), New(Stanford 2006), Crafting Cooperation: Regional
Institutions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge 2007), and Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social
Scientists (Cambridge 2009).
(Kaoru KAMATA)
16

1970

1976

78

83
2010

(

1978-80
11

5

)
JICA

123

2001-0316th President of Waseda University. He received a B.A. in Law (1970) and an LL.M. (1972) at Waseda
University. He has served Waseda University as Lecturer (1976-78), Assistant Professor (1978-83) andProfessor (1983- ). He has also conducted overseas research at Paris University I and II on two occasions(1978-80 and 2001-03). He specializes in Civil Law, Real Estate Law and French Law. He also served asCurriculum Coordinator (Student Affairs) at the Faculty of Law, Dean of the Law School and took office as
16th President of Waseda University on November 5th, 2010. Outside Waseda University, he serves in otherpositions including: Vice-chairperson of the Board of Directors of the Japan Association of Law Schools;
Chairperson of the Civil Law Subcommittee (Credit Obligation Sub-Team), Legislative Council of the
Ministry of Justice; Chairperson of the Land Appraisal Committee of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism; Member of the Judicial Apprentice Committee, the Supreme Court; Member of theIntellectual Property Policy Subcommittee of the Industrial Structure Council, Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry; Member of the Medical Ethics Subcommittee of the Medical Ethics Council, Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare; Member of the Special Committee for Law Schools, University Subcommittee,
Central Education Council, Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology; Member of theExpropriation Committee, Tokyo Metropolitan Government; Member of the Civil Law Working Group, theMember of the Japanese Society of Land Law; Board Member of the Japanese Society of Financial Law;
Board Member of La Société Franco-Japonaise de Sciences Juridiques (French-Japanese Society of Legal
Science).
Chikako KAWAKATSU UEKI

Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University. She earned her Ph.D. in
Lucian Pye Award for Best Dissertation in Political Science. Her specialties are International Relations andSecurity Studies. Her areas of expertise include causes and prevention of war and East Asian international
relations, with a special focus on U.S.-Japan-China relations. Prior to joining GSAPS, Dr. Ueki was Staff
Writer and Political Correspondent for The Asahi Shimbun, Visiting Scholar at Institute of International
Relations at Peking University, and Senior Research Fellow at the National Institute for Defense Studies. She
has written extensively on issues concerning threat perception in a unipolar world, transformation ofinternational relations after Cold War, and issues relation to security problems in East Asia. Her major
publications include: Nationalism as a Cause of War: The Case of the Crimean War
East Asia Strategic Review
Security
Access Anzenhoshoron (2005), Repairing the Strategic
SafetyJapan-U.S.-China Relations: The Importance of a Policy of LiberalInternational Affairs(Kokusai Mondai), Vol. 586 (November 2009) (in Japanese).
(Benjamin SCHREER)

Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel
2008
5

PhD
2009

2009

3

2010

2008
6

2

cept andUS Commitments in the AsiaRUSI Journal, vol. 154, no. 5 (October2009), pp. 98-103 The Howard Legacy: Australian Military Strategy, 1996 2007 (Frankfurt: Peter Lang,
2008), (with Stephan Frühling)
IP Global Edition, vol. 10 (November/December 2009), pp. 46-50

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Benjamin Schreer is Senior Lecturer of Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University
and Director of Undergraduate Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. He earned PhD in
Political Science from the Christian-Albrechts-University Kiel, Germany (2008). He was a Deputy Director,
The Aspen Institute Germany, Berlin, March 2009-June 2010 and a CoMay2008-February 09. His
current Publications include(with Stephan Frühling) RUSI Journal, vol. 154, no. 5 (October 2009), pp. 98-103. The Howard Legacy:
Australian Military Strategy, 1996 2007
IP Global
Edition, vol. 10 (November/December 2009), pp. 46-50.
(Hatsue SHINOHARA)

2004
2003
2006
2008
No. 1020(2009No. 2055

2010

Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University. She earned her PhD from
Department of History, Chicago University. Her specialties are History of International Relations andInternational Relations. She became Professor at Waseda University in 2004 after serving as Assistant Professor
in the Faculty of Humanities at Keisen University, Assistant Professor in the Faculty of International Relations at
Meiji Gakuin University, Assistant Professor at GSAPS. Major publications include Forgotten Crusade: The
American Scholars of International Law in the Interwar Period (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2003) (inJapanese), "American Just War Theory," in Globalization and Empire (Kyoto: Minerva Shobo, 2006) (inShiso No.1020 (April 2009) (in Japanese), and League of Nations (Tokyo: Chuokoronshinsha, 2010)(in Japanese).
(Rizal SUKMA)
CSIS
LSE

)

1997

PhD

ASEAN
BDF
IPD
2000 2001

2002 2003
2005
7
100 Global Thinkers 2009
Studies in Asian Security

2009
100
Global Change, Peace and Security
Stanford University Press
East West Center
Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons (Washington, DC: East-West Centre,
2004)(London: Routledge, 2003) Indonesia and China: The Politics of
A Troubled Relationship (London: Routledge, 1999)-ChinaRelations: The Politics of ReAsian Survey (July/August 2009)125

Rizal Sukma is Currently Executive Director at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
Jakarta. He received Ph.D. degree in International Relations from the London School of Economics andMilitary Reform, Islam and Politics, and Domestic
Political Changes in Indonesia. He is also Chairman of International Relations, Muhammadiyah Central
Executive Board; and a member of Board of Governor of the implementing agency for the Bali Democracy
Forum (BDF), the Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD). He has served as a member of National
Committee on Strategic Defense Review at the Ministry of Defence, the Republic of Indonesia, and amember of National Drafting Committee for National Defence Bill (2000-2001) and the Armed Forces Bill
(2002 2003). He is the first Indonesian to receive the Nakasone Award in July 2005. He was named as one of
100 Global Thinkers 2009 by Foreign Policy magazine (US). DR. Sukma also sits as a member of regional
editorial board for Global Change, Peace and Security; and a member of International editorial board forStudies in Asian Security, Stanford University Press and East West Center. His Publication includes Security
Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons (Washington, DC: East-West Centre, 2004); Islam in(London: Routledge, 2003), and Indonesia and China: The Politics of A Troubled
Relationship-China Relations: The Politics of
ReAsian Survey, July/August 2009.
(Takashi TERADA)

2008

4
1
2010

ASEAN
39
8

3

FTA

2010

2010
2009
No.585 2009
APEC

APEC
APEC 20
2009

2005
Takashi Terada is Professor of International Relations at Organization for Asian Studies, Waseda University.
He received his PhD from Australian National University in 1999. Before taking up the current position in
April 2008, he was an assistant and associate professor at National University of Singapore (1999-2006) andassociate professor at Waseda University (2006-2008). His research interests include international relationsin Asia-Pacific, empirical and theoretical studies on regionalism and regional integration, and Japanesepolitics and fo-Structure Analysis," The Pacific Review, 23(1) 2010;"Competitive Regionalism in Southeast Asia and Beyond: Role of Singapore and ASEAN's," Mireya Solis,
Barbara Stallings, and Saori N. Katada (eds.), Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim,
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); "Japan and Evolution of Asian Regionalism: Responsible for Three Normative
Transformations," in Dieter, Heribert (ed.) The Evolution of Asian Regionalism: Economic and Security
Issues (Routledge 2008), and Asia-pacific Economic Co-operation: Critical Perspectives on the World
Economy, 5 Volumes, (Routledge 2007), co-edited with Peter Drysdale. His books written in Japanese
include How to Analyze Asian Political Economy (editor, Kobundo, 2010). He is the recipient of the 2005
J.G. Crawford Award.
( WANG Yizhou )
IWEP

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2010
2007
1995
2006
2006
Construction within Contradiction: Multiple
Perspectives on the relationship between China and International Organizations)
Professor and Deputy director of School of International Studies, Peking University. Former deputy directorof Institute World Economic & Politics, Chinese Academy of Science (CASS) and Professor of international
politics, senior fellow. Graduate School of CASS, Beijing, received MA. and Ph.D degrees, 1982-1988. He
was visiting Scholar, Hungary Academy of Sciences in 1988 and Associate Professor and researcher of
CASS, 1988-1993. He became visiting Scholar, at CFIA of Harvard University during 1996-97. He became
IR theories in the West and China and trends of international institutions and Laws. His publications are
Construction within Contradiction: Multiple Perspectives on the relationship between
China and International Organizations

127