ARTÍCULOS

Geopolítica(s) Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder
ISSN: 2172-3958
https://dx.doi.org/10.5209/geop.69163

Covid-19 Pandemic in Japan: Containment Failed or Successful?
Takashi Yamazaki 1
Recibido: 16 de abril de 2020 / Aceptado: 10 de mayo de 2020

Abstract. This short article examines key governmental measures against the spread of Covid-19 inJapan from a geopolitical perspective. “Geopolitical” in this article means to see the measures asspatial strategies. At the stage of globalized pandemic, state territoriality or border control is no longer able to effectively control the spread of the virus. Instead, this article argues, multi-scalar intergovernmental coordination is inevitable to tackle the virus moving along increasing trans-border/local
human flows. Using the case of Japan, this article overviews how effective social distancing as a
spatial strategy has been and illustrates how the limits to such a strategy to control human behavior
can affect anti-virus measures. In conclusion, this article argues that the effective devolution of state
power to local governments and the strengthening of state supplementary function to sustain local
healthcare system and economy would be more desirable than the authoritative concentration of state
power in the state of emergency.
Keywords: Covid-19 pandemic; Japan; containment; territoriality; intergovernmental coordination.

[es] La pandemia del Covid-19 en Japón: ¿contención fallida o exitosa?
Resumen. Este breve artículo examina medidas gubernamentales clave contra la propagación delCovid-19 en Japón desde una perspectiva geopolítica. “Geopolítico” en este artículo significa ver las
medidas como estrategias espaciales. En la etapa de la pandemia globalizada, la territorialidad estatalo el control fronterizo ya no pueden controlar de manera efectiva la propagación del virus. En cambio,
este artículo argumenta que la cooperación intergubernamental multiescalar es inevitable para abordar
un virus que se mueve a lo largo de crecientes flujos humanos transfronterizos / locales. Usando elcaso de Japón, este artículo examina cuán efectivo ha sido el distanciamiento social como estrategia
espacial e ilustra cómo los límites de dicha estrategia para controlar el comportamiento humano
pueden afectar las medidas antivirus. En conclusión, este artículo argumenta que la devolución
efectiva del poder estatal a los gobiernos locales y el fortalecimiento de la función suplementaria
estatal para sostener el sistema de salud y la economía locales sería más deseable que la concentración
autorizada del poder estatal en el estado de emergencia.
Palabras clave: pandemia del Covid-19; Japón; contención; territorialidad cooperaciónintergubernamental.

_____________
1

Professor, Department of Geography, Osaka City University (Japan).
E-mail: yamataka@lit.osaka-cu.ac.jp

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Yamazaki, T. Geopolítica(s) 11(Especial) 2020: 81-91[pt] A pandemia do Covid-19 no Japão: contenção fracassada ou bemsucedida?
Resumo. Este pequeno artigo examina as principais medidas governamentais contra a disseminação
do Covid-19 no Japão, de uma perspetiva geopolítica. “Geopolítico” neste artigo significa visualizar
as medidas como estratégias espaciais. No estágio da pandemia globalizada, a territorialidade estatalou o controle de fronteiras não podem mais controlar efetivamente a propagação do vírus. Em vez
disso, este artigo argumenta que a cooperação intergovernamental em várias escalas é inevitável nocombate a um vírus que se move ao longo do aumento dos fluxos humanos locais / transfronteiriços.
Usando o caso do Japão, este artigo examina a eficácia do distanciamento social como estratégia
espacial e ilustra como os limites dessa estratégia para controlar o comportamento humano podem
afetar as medidas de antivírus. Em conclusão, este artigo argumenta que a devolução efetiva do poderdo estado aos governos locais e o fortalecimento da função suplementar do estado para sustentar osistema de saúde e a economia locais seriam mais desejáveis do que a concentração autorizada dopoder do estado no estado. emergência.
Palavras-chave: pandemia do Covid-19; Japão; contenção; territorialidade; cooperação
intergovernamental.
Sumario. Introduction. 1. Lessons taken/not taken. 2. Covid-19 in Japan. 3. Territoriality still mattersor failed? Conclusion. References.
Cómo citar: Yamazaki, T. (2020). Covid-19 pandemic in Japan: containment failed or successful?
Geopolítica(s). Revista de estudios sobre espacio y poder, 11(Especial), 81-91.

Introduction
It is still too early to make a comprehensive assessment on the spread of Covid-19
in Japan. Since the first case of infection was confirmed in mid-January 2020, thenational and local (prefecture) governments have implemented several key
measures against the outbreak of the virus (Suzuki, 2020). This short article examines these measures from a geopolitical perspective. By “geopolitical” this article
refers to governmental policies to control the spatial spread of Covid-19. In order
to contain the spread, the spatial behavior of ―the physical contacts between―
infected and non-infected people needs to be controlled. Without any vaccine forthe virus at this moment, a main focus of anti-virus measures needs to be placed on
the control of human behavior at various spatial scales.
At the stage of globalized pandemic, state territoriality or border control is nolonger able to effectively control the spread of the virus. Instead, this article argues,
multi-scalar intergovernmental coordination is inevitable to tackle the virus moving
along increasing trans-border/local human flows. By looking at the case of Japan,
this article overviews how effective social distancing as a spatial strategy has been
and illustrates how the limits to such a strategy can affect anti-virus measures. Finally, this article concludes that an effective devolution of state power to local governments and the strengthening of state supplementary function to sustain local
healthcare system and economy would be more desirable than the authoritative
concentration of state power in the time of emergency. At the end of the article,
some concerns and prospects for a coming post-Covid-19 society are presented.

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1. Lessons taken/not taken
In my first textbook published in 2010 (Yamazaki, 2010), I referred to the global
spread of the 2003 SARS and the 2009 novel influenza (H1N1) to illustrate theeffect of Japan’s state territoriality or border control. One of the measures the Japanese government employed on these two occasions was strict quarantines (thermometry) at airports against visitors and returnees from overseas infected regions(e.g. China or North America). In the SARS case, although nobody was infected
within Japan, a Taiwanese doctor who had visited Japan developed the disease
after he returned to Taiwan. Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare immediately released the detailed information about the entire route of his travel and theplaces he visited. The transportation and other facilities he used were thoroughly
sanitized. Such governmental reactions caused the cancellation of travels to andreservations of hotels at places where he visited. At the same time, international
travel to the infected regions was self-restrained and many international conferences planned to be held in Japan were postponed or cancelled. These reactions
have an effect that possible visitors from the infected regions were excluded fromthe territorial space of Japan.
The H1N1 case induced similar governmental and social reactions. As infection
cases increased in Japan, the media sensationally reported strict quarantine at airports and each case of suspected infection. When it was reported that high-school
students were infected during their school trip to Canada, their school was exposed
to harsh criticism by the public. The disease rapidly spread nationwide andprompted many schools to be closed in fear of infection although the virus tunedout to be attenuated and caused less serious health problems. The H1N1 case also
illustrated how Japanese society treated a novel epidemic as coming from outside
Japan.
Clearly the globalization of human flows promoted these incidents. It is understandable that Japan as an island state first employed an “edge of water” policy tofilter and control the flows at its state borders (mainly airports). Given an incubation period, however, such a territorial policy has obvious limits in preventing anovel virus from entering Japan. Once the virus crosses a state border, the spread of
the virus becomes a multi-scalar phenomenon ranging from the local to the global
scales and vice versa. The territorial policy, however, has an ideological effect tomake people believe that the territorial space of a state can be kept safe. This effectcomes from the function of a nation-state as a scale of ideology (Flint & Taylor,2011) and constitutes an epistemology called a territorial trap (Agnew, 1994). In an
era of globalization, it is unrealistic to believe that the infected external world canbe separated from the non-infected internal space of a state. This ideological effectseems to have hindered the formation of effective domestic policies against the
spread of a novel virus within Japan compared to its well-established crisis control
in the time of natural disasters.
The important lesson taken from the H1N1 case led to the legislation of the Act
on Special Measures Concerning Countermeasures against Novel Influenza andOther Diseases (hereafter Anti-H1N1 Act) in 2012. Reflecting on the confusions
caused by the H1N1 outbreak, the Japanese government enacted the Act to secure
its healthcare system and clarify the legal authorities of prefecture governors in thecase of novel virus outbreak. The Act provides inter-governmental coordination

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between national, prefecture, and municipal governments. The territorial assumption of the Act is clearly multi-scaler and not based on a single scalar measure suchas border/migration control. Article 45 of the Act grants prefecture governors an
authority to control the behavior of people in their prefecture to prevent novel virus
outbreak (without any compensation for the economic losses caused by the exercise of this provision). The Article provides that prefecture governors are able torequest people not to go out (Paragraph 1), request managers of facilities/events foreducation, social welfare, and entertainment to close/cancel them (Paragraph 2),
instruct 2 those who refuse the request to accept it (Paragraph 3), and make public
the requests made for Paragraphs 2 and 3 immediately (Paragraph 4). According to
the Act, therefore, anti-virus measures should be coordinated among the three tiersof government with a prefecture governor (and government) at the center of thisinter-governmental coordination.
In my textbook mentioned above, I pointed out the limit of state territoriality
against a globalizing novel epidemic and criticized an “edge of water” policy as
being ideological. One of my students responded to this passage by saying “I believe the policy is still effective to protect people in Japan.” I wondered what madeher believe so and why she could believe she was protected. This response mademe add the following passage when I revised the textbook in 2013 (Yamazaki,2013):
It is undoubtedly important to maintain quarantine at state border. However, it is
impossible to control all kinds of flows only with state border. It would be morepractical to implement multi-scalar policies to combine preventive and symptomatic domestic measures at multiple scales of municipality, workplace, school,
neighborhood, home, and body. (p.131).

Seven years later, Japan is exposed to a crisis unprecedented in people’s
memory. As I foresaw in my revised textbook, multi-scalar measures against
Covid-19 are being implemented nationwide by the public and private sectors andpeople themselves.
2. Covid-19 in JapanThe first Covid-19 patient (a Chinese national) in Japan was confirmed on January
14, 2020. He came back from Wuhan, China in early January. The first wave ofoutbreak was brought about mostly by returnees and travelers from Wuhan, China.
As in the previous cases, Japan first employed an “edge of water” policy to filterand control human flows from Wuhan, which was too late because the secondary
infection from Chinese tourists visiting Japan to Japanese had already started (particularly in Hokkaido as their destination). Responding to a constant increase ininfection cases and their spread in February, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe requested
the nationwide closure of public elementary and junior high schools from March 2,
followed by the closure of public high schools and other public facilities such as_____________
2

In this Paragraph, “instruct” (shiji) is used as a more coercive term than “request” (yōsei).

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libraries, gymnasiums, and museums. Although school children are neither spreaders nor a high-risk group, the Japanese government attempted to minimize the possibility of outbreak without harming the state economy (i.e. the activities of adults).
Fortunately, the Japanese government had already enacted the above-mentioned
Anti-H1N1 Act and quickly modified it for Covid-19 in mid-March. Any incident
of infection takes place at the local scale (e.g. live music clubs, sports gyms, drinking bars, hospitals, etc.). This general aspect promoted local (prefecture) initiatives
earlier than national measures as seen in Hokkaido and Wakayama Prefectures.
However, local authorities and agents, particularly hospitals, are not necessarily
well equipped with resources essential for increasing infection cases. Continuing
restrictions on business, tourism, and event holding have been weakening national
and local economies. The Japanese government’s supports and compensations forthese shortages and losses are still not enough although the spread of infection has
just begun to slow down (as of May 4). This has been the most concerning element
for Japanese society.
Figure 1. Cumulative confirmed cases of Covid-19 by country(as of 27 April 2020)

Source: Prime Minister and His Cabinet (2020b).

On the other hand, the level of infection (and death) cases in Japan has beensignificantly low compared to Europe and the US where an exponential growth of
infection appeared earlier (Figure 1). This has been realized without highly strict
regulations such as lockdowns and curfews. There are various theories to explain
this: limited PCR testing to prevent the collapse of healthcare system, infectioncluster based measures, early stage social distancing, the custom of wearing a maskfor preventive purposes, and no tradition of shaking hands, kissing, and hugging(Boyd, 2020; Margolis, 2020; Suzuki, 2020). Nevertheless, the growth of infection
has been accelerating and became nationwide since late March (Figure 2). It isreported that this second wave of outbreak was caused by returnees from Europe
and the US (National Institute of Infectious Diseases, 2020).

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Figure 2. The trend of the number of confirmed cases

Source: Prime Minister and His Cabinet (2020b).

As the soaring of infection became evident in the metropolitan areas, the Japanese government declared a State of Emergency on April 7. The Declaration basedon the Anti-H1N1 Act first covered seven prefectures including the Tokyo andOsaka metropolitan areas. Unlike other countries where strict curfews and radical
measures have been employed, the Declaration does not include orders but requests
for coordination and cooperation among the public and private sectors. Prime Minister Abe explained the intent of the Declaration (Prime Minister and His Cabinet,
2020a):
This declaration of a state of emergency does not in any way intend to close cities or a lockdown as we are seeing take place overseas. I state that clearly. Trains,
buses, and other forms of public transportation will continue to operate. We will
under no circumstances particularly block off roads, and in the view of the experts, there is no need whatsoever for such measures. Overseas, when cities were
put under lockdown, there were some places where a large number of people
slipped out of the cities, resulting in havoc and a spread of infection.

The Declaration has no penalties to impose on its refusers. No police or militaryforces have been used to enforce national and local measures based on the Declaration. What is seen on the media and street every day is that cabinet ministers, governors, mayors, and local government officials repeatedly request people to voluntarily follow the measures. While it seems that Japan’s anti-virus measures haveworked so far (Suzuki 2020), there are critical views in the international press on
the effect of the moderate Declaration (Rich, Ueno, and Inoue 2020, see also Jiji.com, 2020).
3. Territoriality still matters or failed?

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As mentioned above, state territoriality as border control is only one of the possible
measures countering the spread of a novel epidemic and is probably effective for alimited time (e.g. before virus spread from outside a state). This, however, does notmean that territoriality at a different scale is ineffective as a spatial anti-virus strategy. According to Sack (1986), territoriality is a spatial strategy to influence social
relations using a demarcated space (i.e. territory). Such a strategy can be employed
for an infectious disease as a means of social distancing or other coercive measures(for venereal disease and overseas US military bases, see Yamazaki, 2011). The
exercise of territoriality involves the relationship between the controlling and thecontrolled over the use of space, meaning that the existence of a territory is a manifestation of power based on the space.
Thus, closures, blockades, off-limits, curfews, containments, and lockdowns arecoercive measures by the powerful to control ―exclude, include, transfer, etc.―
human behavior. These measures may violate individual (human) rights but may bejustified by their collective objectives or public utilities. Such justifiability needs tobe proved by the anticipated results or effects. Otherwise, rights or even lives of thecontrolled might be seriously jeopardized. This leads to a normative conclusionthat territoriality be exercised in a right place and time and in a right way according to the socio-cultural norms involved.
In the case of Japan, spatial strategies to contain or restrain infection (e.g. public
facility or business closure, request not to go out, and other ways for social distancing) do not seem to have been executed in a right place and time and in a right way.
This has so far resulted in an increase in and spread of infection cases. Ineffective
spatial strategies are not understood as legitimate crisis control, leading to criticisms for infringing on private rights. Compared to Europe and the US, Japan
seems to be careful of the infringement of private rights or afraid of its negative
impact on economy (Rich, Ueno, and Inoue, 2020, see also the poll results by Gallup International Association, 2020). Although Japanese society has been considered more authoritarian than the western counterparts, Japan’s way of exercising
spatial strategies seems less strict. This may also be related to the initial reluctanceof the national government to compensate economic losses caused by stricter business regulations.
Spatial strategies to control human behavior have geographical spill-over effects
as seen in crime prevention with a CCTV camera. One of the effects is positive; theadoption of an effective strategy spreads and covers a wider area. The other is negative; the target subject of the strategy may move (transfer) to other areas not covered by the strategy. Regarding the moderate Declaration, while it may be successful in that it has induced cooperative reactions from local governments, businesses,
and people, it has failed to contain the spread of infection in some cases. In order tospatially contain infection, it is necessary to prevent the transfer of the infected.
Most troublesome features of the coronavirus include its relatively long incubation
period and mild and asymptomatic spreaders. People can be careful of being infected and of infecting if they have clear symptoms. This is not necessarily the casewith those infected with the virus. It takes some time for them to realize that they
can infect others and change their behavior accordingly. Therefore, in conjunction
with moderate countermeasures, these features of the virus infection and the time
lag caused by them generate the spatial transfer of infection (i.e. failed containment). I explain four cases of failed containment below.

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Case 1: travelling and infected abroad
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan raised the Covid-19-related Travel Advice& Warning on Infectious Diseases to Level 2 (Avoid non-essential travel) forthe entire world on March 26. Before the end of March, it seems that some Japanese who had traveled or stayed in Europe and the US and returned infected.
This inflow of Japanese tourists is thought to have caused the second wave ofoutbreak (National Institute Infectious Diseases 2020). The danger of travellingabroad except to some hardest-hit countries were neither announced earlier nor
recognized well so that the transfer of tourists from Japan―then suppressing thefirst wave of outbreak―brought the virus back to Japan.
Case2: lack of effective inter-prefectural coordination
On March 19, Governor of Osaka Prefecture Hirofumi Yoshimura requested
people in the prefecture not to move between neighboring Hyogo Prefecture andOsaka during the coming long weekend (March 20 to 22). He made this request
according to an informal warning advise from the Anti-Covid-19 Expert Panelfor the national government. The actual advice, however, stated that it was recommended to restrict people’s movement not only between the two prefectures
but also between the two prefectures and other neighboring prefectures (i.e.
simply inter-prefectural movement) because there was an increasing trend of infection in the two prefectures. He did not properly understand but mispresented
the real intentions of the advice. According to the transportation survey conducted during the long weekend, the volume of inter-prefectural traffic between
the two prefectures was reduced only by 5% compared to the previous weekend(Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 2020). On the contrary, prefectures in the Tokyo metropolitan area issued better coordinated requests according to a similar advice
from the Panel.
Case 3: evacuation from the infected areas
The April 7 Declaration covered seven prefectures including the Tokyo andOsaka metropolitan areas where an outbreak would have been anticipated without any intervention. However, some of the prefectures which were not coveredbegan to declare a state of emergency on their own as the spread of infection
became accelerating nationwide. On April 16, the Japanese government extended the application of the Declaration to the entire state and designated six newand the original seven prefectures as Special Warning Prefectures. As a reason
for this expansion, the Novel Coronavirus Epidemic Countermeasures Headquarters in the national government states “For prefectures other than theseSpecial Warning Prefectures, infection clusters have emerged in non-urban areas due to people’s movement from urban areas and a tendency towards outbreak
can be seen” (Novel Coronavirus Epidemic Countermeasures Headquarters,
2020: 5). The movement this statement refers to is tourist and homecoming outflow from the original seven prefectures (Matsuzawa, 2020). This is also atransfer of those who should have been contained within where they live (e.g.
asymptomatic spreaders). This type of transfer is called “Corona evacuation.” Inorder to control this transfer, nationwide inter-prefectural coordination would benecessary.

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Case 4: clusters after clusters
Japan’s anti-virus measures have focused on infection clusters. In order to prevent Japan’s healthcare system from collapsing, efforts have been made to doextensive contact tracing and identify infection clusters. Such clusters have been
identified in live music clubs, sports gyms, roofed pleasure boats, buffet-stylerestaurants, etc. The national and local governments have repeatedly emphasized that people should avoid the “three C’s”―Closed spaces where Crowds
meet in Close proximity. According to these criteria, local governments haverequested cancellations and closures, and local businesses and people have voluntarily accepted these requests. This, however, has become an endless process
to chase transfers (i.e. clusters after clusters). Daytime restrictions transferredbusinesspersons to nighttime drinking bars. Containing families in their housefor a long time transferred them to nearby parks for a short break. Shopping
centers also became congested with families. The recent incidents exemplify
this chain of transfers. Although several prefecture governors requested pachinko parlors 3 to close their business temporarily, some neglected this request
for their survival, leading the governors to make their names public according to
the Anti-H1N1 Act. As a result, many customers, some of whom were evenfrom other prefectures, crowded to the parlors remaining open. While this ispartially a matter of addiction, the fundamental problem of this transfer is a lackof legal penalty and appropriate economic compensation for business closure.
Given obvious limits to controlling human behavior nationwide, the occurrenceof a chain of transfers is inevitable. In order to make social distancing as a spatial
strategy more effective in Japan, it would be necessary to complement the strategy
with further spatial and non-spatial measures such as airport quarantine, interprefectural coordination, restriction on domestic travel, legal penalty, and economic compensation.
Conclusion
Nationwide public-school closure in March was a direct request from the national
government, which was a wake-up call for local anti-virus initiatives that havecontinued to date. Since a State of Emergency was declared in early April, prefecture governors and governments have become major players in implementing spatial and non-spatial anti-virus measures. As mentioned above, while social distancing as a spatial strategy has been effective to suppress the spread of infection, theoccurrence of a chain of transfers has shown obvious limits to controlling humanbehavior nationwide. This situation makes it necessary to complement the strategy
with further spatial and non-spatial measures. Under the State of Emergency basedon the Anti-H1N1 Act, prefecture governors have a power to implement local antivirus measures. The Act, however, doesn’t provide any penalties for refusers. Neither does the current national economic compensation for business closures give_____________
3“Pachinko” is a Japanese gambling game played on a vertical pinball machine.

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enough incentives for business owners and workers to follow governmental requests.
Current financial differences among prefectures are reflected on the level of
their economic compensation for business closures. After the Declaration covered
the entire state on April 16, regional differences in infection, anti-infection measure,and medical capacity have become important factors conditioning local initiatives
under the Declaration. These factors are essential to counter the geographicallydifferentiated spread of infection. Non-metropolitan prefectures are not necessarily
equipped with high-level medical infrastructure. An exponential growth of infection in such areas would hasten the collapse of healthcare system and increase
death toll. It can be concluded from this that not only an effective devolution ofstate power to local governments but also the strengthening of state supplementaryfunction to sustain local healthcare system and economy would be more desirable
than the authoritative concentration of state power in the state of emergency.
Another concern needs to be mentioned before concluding this article. Repeatedrequests of behavior change for social distancing can affect individual consciousness. People cannot help self-realizing the fear of infection at the scale of theirbody. The internalization of such fear may make people more susceptible to police
state, surveillance society, and the homogenization of social values as well as restrictions on individual/human rights in post-Covid-19 society. There are also
growing voices for an amendment of the Japanese Constitution so that the national
government can deal more effectively with possible states of emergency. Renewed
local autonomy and people’s voluntary activities to reconnect society might thus
work as a vaccine to these symptoms.
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