THE LISBON TREATY AND THE
STRENGHTENING OF THE EU SYSTEM
OF GOVERNANCE

Prof. Frank DELMARTINO

Leuven University and College of Europe

Outline of the Lecture
1. Aim of the lecture
2. Sixty years of European integration in a nutshell
3. Deficiencies in the EU system of governance4. The Convention and the Constitutional Treaty
5. The major achievements of the Constitutional Treaty
6. The Lisbon Treaty: watering down the CT?
7. The EU decision-making process
8. The European Council
9. Common Foreign and Security Policy
10. Present-day challenges ad intra
11. Challenges ad extra
12. Conclusions

1. Aim of the lecture
Presently, the EU is involved in a threefold process:ad intra: establishing a trans-national system ofgovernancead extra: shaping a consistent profile on theinternational scene
overall: the quest for an institutional
self-definition
In this lecture we willcomment on the Lisbon Treaty as the latest expressionof the institutional status quaestionis
discuss the challenges the EU is confronted with

2. Sixty years of European integration in a nutshell1948 The European Movement meets in The Hague
1949 Council of Europe: the assembly method of integration1950 The Schuman declaration: the Monnet method of integration
1957 The Treaty of Rome: economic integration
1986 The Single European Act: enlargement of the policy horizon
1992 The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht): thepolitical dimension
1999-2002 The single currency in ‘Euroland’
2000-2001 The Nice Treaty and the start of the process ofconstitutionalisation
2002-2003 The Convention on the Future of Europe
2004-2005 The Constitutional Treaty, however not ratified
2007-2008 The Lisbon Treaty, the ratification is pending3. Deficiencies in the EU system of governanceTechnically speaking, the Nice Treaty (2000-2001) was
successful in preparing the EU for enlargement.
However, the deficiencies of the EU system of governancewere apparent:• no clear ‘philosophy’ on the integration of nationalactors (governments and parliaments) with Europeanactors (Commission, Council, Parliament)• ‘democratic deficit’: the citizens are hardly involvedin the process• complex decision-making procedures in the enlarged
Council of Ministers• no clear profile abroad, due to the segmentation ofresponsibilities and policies• the issue of ‘leadership’ in the Union

4. The Convention and the Constitutional Treaty
The Laeken declaration of the European Council (2001) leads theway to a fully new formula of treaty making: via an assembly ofrepresentatives of all actors involved (national and European)
The Convention on the Future of Europe deals with the issues
mentioned above and reaches consensus. The Heads of Stateand Government largely accept (90%) this draft, including
its qualification as ‘constitutional’, i.e. setting the principles
and the institutional framework of the Union.
The Constitutional Treaty (CT) is signed by all member states
on 29 October 2004.
However, the ratification process is coming to a standstill after thenegative referenda in France and the Netherlands.

5. The major achievements of the Constitutional Treaty
a new document, limited in size, readable, referring to
all major dimensions of the European construction
highlighting the political profile of the EuropeanUnion, including its values, aims, symbols andways of participation
introducing institutional innovations such as:• the permanent presidency of the European Council• the strong profile of the High Representative for CFSP
• the generalization of qualified majority votingin the Council of Ministers• co-decision of the European Parliament as general rule

6. The Lisbon Treaty: watering down the CT?
Following the negative referenda on the CT, the ‘Reform Treaty’, later
to be called the Lisbon Treaty (LT), was elaborated via the traditional
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) method. Some characteristics:• any reference to a constitutional status was avoided• the political symbols (flag, hymn, device) were removed• the Charter of Fundamental Rights was no longer integrated, but annexed• the Treaty is conceived as a series of amendments to the existing Treaties:the TEU and the Treaty on the Functioning of the Union(formerly: EC Treaty)• consequently, the LT is not readable as such

However, the essential institutional innovations have been preserved.
The LT has been signed on 13 December 2007. The ratification process
is ongoing, despite the negative referendum in Ireland.

7. The EU decision-making process
Qualified Majority voting (QMV) becomes the standard procedure
within the Council of Ministers (TEU as amended by LT, art.16)
Presently (until 2014) the Nice Treaty arrangements are still valid:• 255 weighted votes on a total of 345• 1/2 of the member states in favour on Commission proposals• 2/3 of the member states in favour if not on a Commission proposal• The majority should represent 62% of the Union’s population
From 2014 on the weighting of the votes is no longer applied.
The formula is then• approval from 55% of the member states (at least 15)• representing 65% of the Union’s population

7. The EU decision-making process
Co-decision (Council – Parliament) becomes the ordinary
legislative procedure (art. 289, TFEU)
Reduced membership of the European Commission: from2014 on, only 2/3 of the member states will nominate acandidate for the Commission (art. 17 TEU/LT)8. The European Council“ The European Council shall provide the Union with the necessary
impetus for its development and shall define the general politicaldirections and priorities thereof. It shall not exercise legislativefunctions.” (art. 15 TEU/LT)The European Council is a full EU institution, consisting of• the Heads of State or Government of the Member States• its President• the President of the European Commission
The High Representative for CFSP is invited to participate.
The President of the European Council, elected by this Council for amaximum period of two terms of 2½ years, shall chair and drive
forward its work. He represents the European Council abroad.
This position cannot be combined with a national office.

9. Common Foreign and Security Policy
The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is nolonger called ‘European Minister of Foreign Affairs’ (CT).
He is appointed by the European Council, in agreement with thePresident of the European Commission. He combines, indeed, hisresponsibilities in the field of CFSP (a Council matter) with theportfolio of External Relations within the Commission.
He shall conduct the CFSP policy of the Union, contributing throughhis proposals and ensuring the implementation of the decisions of theEuropean Council and the Council of Ministers (art. 18, TEU/LT)
He chairs the Foreign Affairs Council (of Ministers).
He is assisted by a European External Action Service (art.27, TEU/LT)10. Present-day challenges ad intra
The system of governance is not too consistent. The‘community method’ is primarily used in social-economic matters.
The more recently introduced policy fields are approached by‘intensive transgovernmentalism’ ( Helen Wallace).
The member states (and especially the European Council) havesometimes taken over the initiative from the EuropeanCommission. A permanent presidency of the European Council
could reinforce this tendency.
The enlargement process has diversified the Union, not onlyin terms of problems to be tackled, but also with regard to
the culture of consensus building.

11. Challenges ad extra
The pooling of the resources of the Council (High Representative)
and the Commission (External relations) creates a major
opportunity for the positioning of the EU as a global actor.
Especially if the policies of the Member States and the Union
could be converging and the human resources be shared in anExternal Action Service, a historical breakthrough could beenvisaged. However, the Treaty provisions alone do notguarantee the success of the exercise.
The discrepancy between the EU’s positions in the WTO
and its low profile in ‘high politics’ should be tackled.
Precondition is the willingness of the major Member Statesto act collectively, including in matters of international security.
This dimension of the EU’s self-definition is not yet fully developed.

12. Conclusions
The current financial-economic crisis is in many respects
challenging the EU’s institutional framework and policies:• who should deal with this crisis: the States, the Union,
the world community ?
• will the Union as such be an actor at theBretton Woods II negotiations ?
• the strictly monetary policy of the European Central
Bank will probably be complemented by some formof ‘economic governance’ in the Eurozone• the sensitivity vis-à-vis ecological issues iscompromised by the economic recession. Will the EU
lose its ‘pole position’ in the issue of climate change?

12. Conclusions

Apparently, the European integration process is mainly
moving forward in reaction to external crises(economic, political, security) rather than triggeredby constitutional reflection. Management by crisis
seems to be more familiar thanmanagement by objectives. Nevertheless, theLisbon Treaty, however ‘watered down’ it may be,
is an important and significant step forward in theEuropean integration process.

THANK YOU
FOR YOUR ATTENTION