ISSN 1341-2930
BRI Proceedings No.21

PROCEEDINGSOFInternational Symposium on“Sustainable Reconstruction from Super Earthquake Disaster”
Joint Project on Dissemination of Research Outcome andTechnology for Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster Mitigation

国際シンポジウム「巨大震災からの復興を考える」報告書
地震・津波防災対策に係る研究成果及び技術の普及に関する共同事業

February 21 2012
Tokyo

Building Research Institute (BRI)
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)

Published in March 2013 by the Building Research Institute, Incorporated Administrative Agency
1, Tachihara, Tsukuba, Ibaraki, Japan 305-0802
Phone: +81-29-864-2151

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C 2012 by the Building Research Institute, Incorporated Administrative Agency, Japan
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国際シンポジウム「巨大災害からの復興を考える」
2012年2月21日（火）13:00 ‑ 17:00

目

於：政策研究大学院大学

想海楼ホール次

Ⅰ.はじめに................................................................................................................................. 1

Ⅱ.国際シンポジウム
１．国際シンポジウムの概要 .................................................................................................. 3
２．第１セッションの概要（1）主催者挨拶...................................................................................................................... 5（2）基調講演 東日本大震災からの復興 .............................................................................. 6（3）趣旨説明 近年の世界の巨大震災と復興の状況............................................................ 7（4）巨大震災と復興についての各国からの報告 ................................................................... 8（5）地震の概要と特徴 ......................................................................................................... 10
３．第２セッションの概要（1）パネラーの紹介・趣旨説明 .......................................................................................... 12（2）パネリストからの論点提起 .......................................................................................... 13（3）パネルディスカッション .............................................................................................. 15（4）閉会挨拶 ....................................................................................................................... 16

Ⅲ.専門家会議
１．専門家会議の概要 ........................................................................................................... 17
２．参加者によるプレゼンテーション及び意見交換の概要 ................................................. 18

Ⅳ.国際ビデオ会議
１．国際ビデオ会議の概要 ................................................................................................... 20
２．プレゼンテーション・質疑応答・議論の概要 ............................................................... 22

Ⅴ.現地視察１．現地視察概要・報告 ....................................................................................................... 25

参考資料
１．各国災害事例資料、各国基礎情報 ................................................................................. 31
２．国際シンポジウム発表資料 ............................................................................................ 68
３．専門家会議レポート ....................................................................................................... 94
４．専門家会議発表資料 ...................................................................................................... 116
５．国際ビデオ会議発表資料 .............................................................................................. 127

Ⅰ．はじめに
近年、地震・津波による巨大災害が世界的に頻発しており、地震・津波による被害の軽減が地球規模の課題となっています。防災に係る研究や技術において先進国であるわが国でも、2011
年 3 月に発生した東日本大震災により甚大な被害が発生し、地震・津波防災対策の重要性を再認識することとなりました。このため、独立行政法人建築研究所と政策研究大学院大学は、
世界の地震・津波災害の軽減に寄与し、防災に係る兵庫行動枠組 2005-2015 に対しても貢献するため、東日本大震災で得られた知見も踏まえ、地震・津波防災に関する研究成果や技術を、途上国を中心に積極的に普及することを目的とした共同事業を、2011 年度から実施しています。
この共同事業の一環として、2011 年東日本大震災の約 1 年後に当たる 2012 年 2 月に、地
震・津波防災に係るわが国の知見や海外の経験等の共有と普及を図るため、国際シンポジウム、専門家会議、国際ビデオ会議を開催しました。2 月 21 日に政策研究大学院大学の想海楼ホールで開催した「国際シンポジウム―巨大震災からの復興を考える―」では、東日本大震災後に重要な課題となる復興に焦点を当て、ハードのまちづくり、住宅つくりに加えて、コミュニティ再生、災害弱者への配慮など、社会的な側面を含めた、地域の復興･再生についての議論を行いました。
また、復興が進展しつつある、近年の世界の巨大震災との比較検討も行い、それぞれの国・地域の経済・社会状況による課題の違いとそれにあった対応の必要性や、普遍的な復興への教訓等についても議論を行いました。2 月 22 日には、復興に関する重要論点を掘り下げるための専門家会議を開催し、招聘有識者による報告を踏まえて、コミュニティの再生、災害弱者、防災技術の普及、国際的な支援などについて議論を深めました。
さらに、2 月 22 日の午後には、「国際ビデオ会議―復興を通じた安全な住宅つくりを考える―」を、世界銀行東京開発ラーニング・センター（TDLC）を中心に、9 カ国 12 会場をビデオ会議システ
ムでつないで開催しました。災害時に死傷者発生の主要な原因となる建築・住宅の被害に焦点を当て、被害の実態と背景、被害軽減のための技術とその普及などについて、参加各国からの報告をもとに、国際社会における取組に寄与するため、知見の交換、今後の取り組みへの教訓について議論を行いました。 なお、プレゼンテーション・スライドは講演者のご厚意により掲載させていた
だき、講演内容の要約は編集者の責任で行いました。
本報告書は、これらの活動の内容と成果を取りまとめたものです。大震災からの復興に関心のある皆様の今後の参考になれば、主催者として幸甚に存じます。
独立行政法人建築研究所国際地震工学センター長
安藤 尚一
政策研究大学院大学教授
岡崎 健二

1

Ⅱ．国際シンポジウム
１．国際シンポジウムの概要（１）開催目的
近年、世界的規模において、⼤規模な地震・津波災害が頻発し、多数の犠牲者をもたらすとともに、地域社会が壊滅的な被害を被ってきている。このため、これらの災害の教訓を生かした災害に対して抵抗⼒のある地域の復興が⼤きな課題となっている。そこで、安全なまち・地域づくり、暮らしやすく、活⼒のある地域へ向けての復興再生を目指すという観点から、国際的なパースペクティブからの近年の地震・津波被害の復興過程の⽐較検討する。さらに、教訓の抽出、今後の取り組
みの在り⽅の検討を⾏う。これら検討を通じて、⽇本において今後、議論が⾼まっていくことが予想される東⽇本⼤震災からの復興に向けての⽰唆を得る。この場合、復興過程は、より安全なまちづくりのチャンスであること、被災の経験が強く残り、被害軽減を実現するための防災関係技術の普及のための条件が優れていること、各国の経済・社会状況によって、効果的な普及の⽅法、実施主体等は異なることに留意する。国際シンポジウムの実施に当たっては、近年の巨⼤震災の復興に参画している有識者を招聘するとともに、阪神・淡路⼤震災等から得られた我が国の知⾒の活⽤を図る。

3（２）実施概要①日時：2012 年 2 月 21 日（火） 13:00～17:20②場所：政策研究大学院大学 想海楼ホール③プログラム：・第１セッション 13:00～15:20
13:00 主催者挨拶
独立行政法人 建築研究所
政策研究大学院大学理事

伊藤弘

政策研究センター長

森地茂

13:10 基調講演 東日本大震災からの復興
東京大学大学院教授、日本学術会議

会長

大西隆

13:55 趣旨説明 近年の世界の巨大震災と復興の状況
独立行政法人 国際協力機構

国際協力専門員

楢府龍雄

14:10 巨大震災と復興についての各国からの報告－2010 年 ハイチ地震災害
ハイチ公共事業・輸送・通信省

建物評価技術室技師

フリッツ・オプラン（ハイチ）－2008 年 中国四川地震災害
北京師範大学壹基金公益研究院

院長

ワン・ツェンヤオ（中国）－2004 年 スマトラ沖地震・津波災害
インドネシア公共事業省

水道環境衛生訓練センター長

バンバン・スディアトモ（インドネシア）

15:10 地震の概要と特徴
独立行政法人 建築研究所

研究専門役

古川信雄

・第２セッション 15:40～17:20
15:40 パネルディスカッション
１．趣旨説明 復興・減災に関する論点提起
独立行政法人 建築研究所

国際地震工学センター長

安藤尚一

２．パネリストからの論点提起－復興の実態：2005 年カシミール地震の事例にみる
建築家、災害リスク管理者

ガザラ・ナイーム（パキスタン）－災害復興におけるジェンダー・社会包摂の視点
静岡大学

教授

池田恵子

－安全な建物づくり、まちづくり
独立行政法人 建築研究所

上席研究員

福山洋

－復旧・復興における防災対策の推進
国際防災戦略アジア太平洋事務所

上級地域コーディネーター

ケス（タイ）

３．ディスカッション
４．質疑応答17:15 閉会挨拶
政策研究大学院大学

教授

岡崎健二

4

ジェリー・ヴェラス

２．第１セッションの概要（１）主催者挨拶
１）独立行政法人 建築研究所 理事 伊藤弘
建築研究所は政策研究⼤学院⼤学と共同で本⽇の国際シンポジウムを開催している。東⽇本⼤震災で亡くなられた⽅々のご冥福、被災された⽅々の⼀⽇でも早い復興を祈念する。今回のシンポジ
ウムも震災で犠牲となった⽅々や被災された⽅々の思いを、今後の世界各地での対策に生かすことをテーマとしている。
2004 年インド洋⼤津波、2005 年カシミール地震、2008 年四川⼤地震、2010 年ハイチ地震など⼤規模な津波、地震被害が毎年発生しており、何れの都市でも防災、建築、都市の専門家が様々な教訓を後世に伝える努⼒をしている。今回の国際シンポジウムがこれらの活動を拡げていく場になればと願っている。
建築研究所では住宅・都市の研究・開発や地震工学研修を総合的継続的に実施しており、防災政策プログラムを持つ政策研究⼤学院⼤学と共同して巨⼤災害に取り組むのはハード、ソフトの総合的視点から防災対策の構築に意義深いと確信している。
建築研究所、政策研究⼤学院⼤学はＪＩＣＡと協⼒して若⼿研究者、技術者を対象とした国際地震工学研修を実施している。建築研究所ではこれらのネットワークを活かし、ユネスコと連携し国際的な地震、津波防災情報のセンターとして機能する事を目指している。
本⽇招聘した基調講演者や世界的な第⼀線の学識者からの貴重な経験を学び、それぞれの⽴場で役⽴てていただきたい。最後に、被災地のより良い復興の⼀⽇も早い達成を祈念し挨拶といたします。

２）政策研究大学院大学 政策研究センター長 森地茂
仙台を含む東北被災地の復興はまだこれからの段階である、
現在は地震、水害等⼤変な災害が多発する時期に入っており、財政や合意形成、将来を⾒据えた復興の将来像など多様な課題がある。
各国の第⼀線で復興に取り組んでおられた⽅々と共に学び、今後に生かすのが本会議の趣旨である。安全なまちづくり、コミュニティの再生、災害弱者への配慮など、経済的、社会的な⾯を含めてご議論賜れば幸いである。
GRIPS と政策研究センターを簡単に紹介すると、３月 11 ⽇
以降、本学の全教員が集合し復興について勉強し政策提⾔をしている。学校のホームページに⽇本語と英語でその内容が掲載されているのでご覧いただきたい。
昨年は「緊急事態における科学者の情報発信－福島からの教訓」国際シンポジウムを開催した。英国政府主席科学顧問ジョン・べディントン⽒を招聘しご議論いただいた。
センターではリサーチプロジェクト：教官、外部との共同研究の仕組みを持っており、政策決定や実施課程、漁業補償や農業基盤の研究を実施している。
防災政策プログラムを JICA、建築研究所、土木研究所と実施し、中南米、アジア、アフリカ、
中近東から毎年約 40 名の学生が参加している。震災を機に工学、社会科学両⾯の研究を⾏う
ために、消防庁の Dｒ.や国交省の防災の教員を迎えて、2012 年４月から⽇本⼈⽤の防災政策、
防災専門家養成プログラムを発足させる。
5本⽇の議論で巨⼤震災から復興に役⽴つ成果が少しでも得られれば幸いである。
（２）基調講演 東日本大震災からの復興（東京大学大学院教授、日本学術会議会長 大西隆）
今⽇の講演では（1）東⽇本⼤震災の簡単な整理、（2）中央政府、
都道府県政府、市町村政府の復興に向けた活動の整理、（3）津波災害に対する教訓、復興の⽅向性、（4）過去の津波対策の検証と今後の復興の在り⽅、（5）経済活動、産業、雇⽤の復興についてお話しする。
今回の災害は３重の複合的な災害だと⾔われている。被害範囲が⼤きく 11 県で死者が出ている。
特に、東北３県の 40 市町村で、死者、⾏⽅不明：19,000 ⼈、全壊建物：12 万件、被害額：16.9
兆円と試算されている。この被害額は都市型の震災の阪神淡路の1.7 倍であった。三陸地⽅ではハッキリ判るだけでも明治以降４回の津波被害があり、将来的にも津波被害の恐れが確信されている。
復興過程での安全な街、漁村集落の実現だけではなく、子孫の安全のために自らの選択が重要と考えている住⺠が多い。津波以前から三陸地域⼈⼝減少地域であるが、３月以降の 10 カ月で過去５年間を上回る⼈⼝減少に⾒舞われている。物理的な復興に合わせ、社会、経済活動の復興を含まなければいけない。
今回も地震によって津波が引き起こされているが、歴史的に⾒ると多様なケースがある。明治の津波でも２万⼈以上が亡くなっているが、震度自体は⼩さかったがその後の津波で被害が出ている。
昭和の三陸津波は夜中に発生し、逃げ難い状態で到達している。チリ津波では⽇本は全く揺れを感じなかったが 24 時間後に津波が到達し 42 ⼈が亡くなっている。東⽇本⼤震災は午後の活動時間中に発生し逃げ易いハズであったが、極めて⼤きな津波で多くの⼈命が失われた。津波は様々な時間
帯、様々な揺れ⽅で到来し、⼈命を守るには居住、住宅が安全な場所にある事が極めて重要である。
⾼齢化社会が進む我が国では住宅自体が安全な所に⽴地することが極めて重要になっている。
復興資⾦の供給、制度構築の重要な役割は中央政府にあり、実際の復興事業は現在の財政年度で⾏われており、2011 年度には合計で約 18 兆円、３回の補正予算が組まれている。この予算は来年も繰り越されて具体的な復興事業に充てられる。今月新たに、復興庁を設⽴し前線部隊を被災地に配置する政府の体制が整った。６月の復興基本法、復興特区法、津波防災地域づくり法が制定され被災地復興のための制度的枠組みが整えられた。津波被災地ではまちの再建が始まろうとしているが、特に、福島県では放射線被害のために帰れない場所もあり、その復興過程も複雑になると考えられている。
市町村が復興の現場の最前線に居る。岩⼿、宮城、福島では約 30 の被害の⼤きな市町村があり、そのほとんど市町村で 2011 年中に復興計画がつくられ、残りの市町村も 2012 年３月には復興計画が出揃う予定である。現状の復興計画は基本計画で具体的な⼿続き、合意やプランが⽰されていないが、具体的な復興の地域プランはこれから定められる。東⽇本⼤震災は想定を超える災害であり、防災計画から減災計画への発想の転換が必要になる。1933 年の津波を契機に政府が主導の組織的な⾼台移転が 100 箇所以上で進んだ。それに加え 60 年代以降の防潮堤、防波堤、避難施設等の防災施設を組み合わせた津波対策が⾏われて来た。
今回の災害を踏まえると、必ず想定を超える自然災害が起きるので、防災施設では防げないことを前提としている。命を守るために住宅を安全な場所に整備する。津波については⾼い場所に住宅を移すまちづくりによる対策が必要である。

6

防災施設、まちづくり、避難路確保の３点を組み合わせて減災に取り組むのが重要なポイントであり、被災地では３点を具体化する計画づくり、合意形成⾏われているが、中々簡単ではない。今回の被災地では、⾼台に移転して安全を確保したケースは少なく、防潮堤に頼った防災対策のため
２万⼈弱の被害が出てしまっている。明治以降、適当な⾼台がある地域では、既に⾼台移転が進んでいたが、移転が出来ない地域では被害が出てしまったと⾔える。
被災地では住宅から港までの自動⾞による移動、ＩＣＴによるモニタリング、土木技術を組み合
わせ、安全な内陸部への移転に取り組んでいる。街の再生と⾞の両輪に産業、雇⽤の再生が必要であり、産業再生のためのまちづくり会社が必要になる。これからはエネルギー供給、新しい中心市
街地の活動、水産業の多角的な展開を⾏う産業・雇⽤創出が必要になる。
海外からの招聘の皆様にも貴重なご提⾔を頂ければ被災地の助けになると確信している。

（３）趣旨説明 近年の世界の巨大震災と復興の状況（独立行政法人 国際協力機構 国際協力専門員 楢府龍雄）
自然災害の規模に加え、それぞれの地域の脆弱性、災害に対する対応⼒によって規定される。
将来の安全な地域づくりには脆弱性の除去、防災能⼒の向上が必要になる。災害からの復興は
将来の災害危険性の除去に貴重な契機になる。近年頻発する巨⼤災害の復興過程の⽐較により防災に関する深い考察を得る。
５つの巨⼤災害の⽐較の際は、コミュニティの視点からの復興の実態、社会奉仕の視点、建物・街づくりの観点、国際的な視野からの論点提起をいただきたい。これらによる有効な復興、
安全な地域づくりの議論を期待している。
⼥川町では１年を過ぎても⽇常的に海水が浸水している状況にあり、⾼潮や台風についても
危険な状況が続いている。災害復興の建築物もその後の地震で破壊される場合もある。途上国
では災害復興は難しく、建設・供給セクターの生産能⼒、品質管理能⼒の低下や被災者の目先のリスク対応の問題が挙げられる。
取上げた５カ国では⼈⼝で 130 倍、ひとりあたりＧＮＩは 30 倍、途上国の⾼い低所得者⽐率、災害の種類などの⾯が異なっている。ハイチでは構造物の脆弱性、中国では建築基準の順守の問題、インドネシアでは広⼤な地域に津波被害が及んでいる。プラスの⾯として中国でのペアリングによる復興の実績やインドネシアの復興による反政府勢⼒との軋轢の緩和等が挙げられる。
阪神淡路では巨⼤災害への不⼗分な対応、土木構造物の不⼗分な耐震基準、旧建築基準の建築物の補強が重要になった。⼀⽅、災害弱者への配慮、コミュニティの重要性が認識された。
東⽇本⼤震災では津波警報発令⽅法を含む巨⼤災害対策の抜本的な⾒直しが議論されている。復興に時間がかかるもう⼀つの側⾯として、被災者の⾼齢化、住み慣れた復興住宅からの移転、借入による企業経営の悪化、地域経済、雇⽤の悪化などの課題がある。
緊急援助や応急対応と⽐べて災害予防の国際協⼒は⼗分ではない問題が残されている。このイベントが今後の安全な地域づ
くり、まちづくりの知⾒の国際的な共有に貢献できれば有意義である。

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（４）巨大震災と復興についての各国からの報告
１）2010 年ハイチ地震災害（ハイチ公共事業・輸送・通信省 フリッツ・オプラン）
ハイチでは 1751 年⾸都崩壊被害、1770 年⾸都他２都市の破壊、1887 年ハイチ北⻄部⼤被害、1942 年北部被害、1971
年⼤震災の自然災害の歴史がある。特に、2010.1.12 には壊滅的な地震が発生している。地震発生は平⽇の午後４時 50 分。
マグニチュード７。震度VIIIで 52 回の余震が発生した。負傷30 万⼈、死者 23 万⼈。約 130 万⼈が住まいを失った。経済的には 80 億ドル相当の被害得を受けた。
被災の原因として、地震に関する活動の⽋落、技術基準の未整備、⼈⼝密集の⾼さ、建築物の品質管理が劣る、設計上の⽋陥、工法の⽋陥などが挙げられている。緊急支援は地元による閉じ込められた市⺠の救出から始められ、その後外国の支援を受けている。政府によりメインストリートの整備、医療活動も地元が始め後から政府、国際社会が参加している。緊急支援の 25％は地元、⺠間、政府が参加しており、75％が国際社会の支援となっている。避難所の建設・整備の対応は非常に難しく、個⼈個⼈のバラバラの対応にならざるを得なかった。水は政府が配給し、⾷糧は⼈道団体が配給し、ＩＣＴについては国際的なメディアの支援を受けた。
復興については教育省が震災数ヵ月後に学校を再開している他、公共事業省もサイクロンに備えて河や運河の浚渫を実施している。また、日本等の⼿法を適⽤した損害建物の再開の査定
法ＡＣＴ20 を作成し、健全な建物、損害はあるが構造に危険はない、危険の３段階で色分け表⽰をしている。防災⾯での課題はリスクの分散化、平等な成⻑、近代化へのコミットメント、
ハイチ⼈で⾏う復興、国際的支援からの独⽴である。
復興に当たっての政策⾯の課題として統合的な災害管理、地⽅分権、零細企業育成が必要であり、復興基⾦は国際社会、ＮＧＯ、政府、⺠間部門が出し合っている。復興の教訓として自然災害に常に備える。ローカルコミュニティも政策的な対応により災害管理の計画を持っておくこと、分散的に実施することが重要である。
自然災害は世界のどこかに必ずあるので、忘れてはならない。このようなシンポジウムは自然災害の存在や危険性を忘れないためにも良い企画である。
２）四川地震災害（北京師範大学 壹基金公益研究院 院長 ワン・ツェンヤオ）マグニチュードは８、沢山の町が影響を受けた。約 1,500 万⼈
が直ぐに移住を迫られた。激甚地域の⾯積は 116,700 ㎢の広⼤な地域が影響を被った。死傷者も多く、経済損出は１兆元を超えている。
地震で映秀の町は全⾯的に崩壊した。1949 年以降山岳地帯が課題になっていたが、橋が破壊され救援活動が届かなかった町があった。幅 100Km、⻑さ 300Km が震災地域で地震２⽇後に１万⼈以上がスタジアムに集結し、⾷糧や水を待っていた。映秀－四川の道路が寸断し、約４か月は成都からは 800 ㎞の迂回あるいは雪山越えが必要であった。道路は 2010 年９月２⽇に復旧し、復興の主要な活動も９月末には終わっている。農村部の 200 万⼾、都市部の 28 万⼾、3,000 以上の学校、2,000 以上の病院、その他の医療施設のインフラの復興が四川、山⻄、⽢粛では終わって8

いた。
地元政府の被害が非常に⼤きかったので、復興に関しては中央政府が責任を負い、5 月 15 ⽇に中央司令部を成都に設け、軍や警察の活動を調整して救援プログラムを作成した。国務院が 6 月 8 ⽇に四川地震災害復興法を作り、中央政府が地震発生から４か月間で 1,000億 元を復興に充てる⼤きなプログラムを決定した。私は 10 年以上前から効率的な⽇本の体制を学んでおり、中国国務院の体制を変えこの様にコーディネートできるようにした。
２つ目の成果は中央政府が被災者に対して１万元の予算基準を発表し、この基準は以前に⽐べ倍増している。中央本部が地震発生後１週間で生活支援⼿当を提供している。住居や就労機会のない
⼈に３か月間援助をする。中央政府が６月半ばに住宅再建基準を設定し、地⽅政府に対する約 400億元の支出を決定し、被災世帯あたり２万元の助成⾦を担保している。地震後に仮設住宅とテントの２つが議論された。被災地には土地が無いのでテントを提供し、世帯あたり 2,000 ⼈⺠元の助成⾦を提供し、市⺠自らの住宅再建意欲を刺激した。
中央政府がひとつの省がひとつの県を助ける特別なパートナーシップ政策を打ち出した。上海市
や北京市がひとつ県を助ける政策であり、住宅再建に限らず、工場、マーケットなどの復興も⼿伝う。四川省では中央政府の予算や上海市、北京市等の県に対する支援により迅速な復興が進んでいる。⼤きな震災の場合、地方政府や中央政府だけでは⼗分ではないので、ＮＧＯのボランティアによる復興事業の協⼒を得た。
社会的な⼤規模な義捐⾦は意義が⼤きく、今回も 70 億⼈⺠元以上を受け取り多くの事業が実施出来た。ボランティアを奨励しサービスの受け入れ、国際協⼒を奨励した。18 省の⾸⻑をヨーロッパ
グループ、⽇本グループに分けたが、震災後は多くの⼈々は過去の経験に基づく⽇本から学ぶべきだと考えている。メディアを使った透明性の確保も地⽅政府の官僚主義を減らす良い取り組みになった。
復興には制度上のイノベーション、緊急性、自然発生性が重要な役割を担った。政府の意志決定もオープンに変り、様々なアドバイスも受け入れている。中国は機材、装備の⾯では国際社会や⽇本よりもかなり遅れており、まだまだ勉強する課題も多い。

３）スマトラ沖地震・津波被害（インドネシア公共事業省 復興調整責任者 バンバン・スディアトモ）2004 年 12 月のアチェの津波はリヒタースケールで 9.1、震源地はアチェ州から 250km 南⻄、短時間でアチェの全域の広範囲に被害が及んだ、特に⻄部の被災が⼤きかった。津波被害はマレーシア、タイ、遠くはアフリカまで及んだ。３⽇後の写真で⼤きな津波被害が伺われる。中程度の被害で済んだのは唯⼀モスクだけである。津波はスマトラ島北部を含む約 800km に亘る範囲に影響を与えている。
2005.3.28 にはニアスでも地震が発生、計22 万⼈以上の死者、⾏⽅不明者、63.5 万⼈以上が住居を失い、14 万⼾の住居が倒壊
し土地境界線などが判らなくなった。橋や学校など様々な施設が被害を受けている。
アチェはインドネシアの⻄の先端部で、最も貧しく復興能⼒が備わっていなかった、30 年間武⼒紛争に苦しんで来たので、震災当時も治安の問題があった。津波後の公平な資源配分が優先事項となり、生存者支援⾦による貧困への対応も要求されていた。被災者に対する⼀時使⽤施設の提供が喫緊の課題となった。テントは夜寒く、昼間は暑く、⾬漏りもした。同時に復興バラックも建設さ

9

れ、住居をサポートするインフラ、公共事業、経済・社会施設の建設が復興の目的であった。生存者は住居の供給者により正式に確認され、集団のバラック住⺠として登録された。バラック以外に鉄骨フレームで木造壁の広さ 20 ㎡の仮設住宅を２万⼾造った。
地域住⺠の参加によりコミュニティをまとめ、地図を形成、敷地割をして村落計画を作成した。
全ての情報は土地所有者に署名され、村⻑にも情報が把握された。住居の提供者はデータ確認後に建設に着⼿しており、計画〜実施〜住宅引き渡しの通常のプロセスをたどった。
⽂化・社会・経済的なアプローチが復興過程では重要になり、コミュニティの参加が重要で地域
住⺠のニーズを満たし、抵抗を防ぐためにコミュニティのミーティンング、コミュニティによる地図形成、コミュニティ・プランニングの３つが重要であった。
復興再建庁は土地問題等を回避するために法的な問題の解決を重視した。任務終了時には土地に関する紛争は殆んど無くなった。空間計画は災害ベースの空間計画、緩和、ミティゲーションが主なテーマで、コミュニティベースでは村レベルの地図形成、州、県、市レベルでの空間計画にあたった。コミュニティ中心の土地境界線の決定、標準化された、土地省の承認による地図形成、定住
地は空間計画に準拠し、水や電気へのアクセスや洪水に対する脆弱性の除去の課題があった。
住居を建設する際には地震安全基準への適合など８項目の基準があった。コミュニティをまとめる意味では土地の紛争解決等の課題があった。被災者特定の課題や建設計画、資材調達の課題、建設会社の能⼒不足、支援データ不足、住宅やインフラ建設資材の不足、競合の課題、引き渡しの際の被災者からの苦情の課題があった。災害後 2008 年に復興再建庁はＧＩＳ、地理空間システムによるモニタリングシステムを構築した、それらにより住⼾レベルの情報の透明性が確保できた。震
災後の住居、住居に関する情報コーディネーターや敷地、家屋の写真などのデータも掲載されている。
災害直後の活動は被災地情報⼀覧表の作成、被災者と被災建物の⼀覧表作成、被災者登録が地元政府と共に実施される必要がある。沢山の住宅を速やかに整備するために、基礎部分だけを事業者が建設し仕上げは被災者自身が作業するアイディアもある。環境に悪影響を与えない被災地の再開
発の実施は重要である。

（５）地震の概要と特徴（独立行政法人 建築研究所研究専門役 古川信雄）
モーメントマグニチュードＭwはスマトラ・アンダーマン、東北地震では9.0〜9.1、四川地震では 7.9、神⼾、ハイチでは6.9〜7.0だった。神⼾と東北の地震エネルギーは 1,000 倍違う。
スマトラ地震の断層の⻑さは 1,300 ㎞、滑り量は 20ｍである。
東北地震では断層は 500 ㎞、最⼤滑り量は 50ｍとなっている。マグニチュード 8 弱の四川地震は 250 ㎞、滑り量は 13ｍ、神⼾、ハイチでは断層は 50 ㎞、滑り量は 2〜4ｍであった。⻑さで 20 倍、滑り量で 25〜30 倍違う。スマトラ・アンダーマンと東北地震はプ
レートの沈み込みによるものなので、⼤きな津波を引き起こす。これ以外の３つは内陸で発生している。
内陸の地震では横ズレ断層や逆断層断層が生じ、海の沈み込み地
震は逆断層地震になる。1990 年以降の 12 の震災を死者・⾏⽅不明者順に整理すると、ハイチ地震の 31 万⼈が最も⼤きく、スマトラ・アンダーマンの 22 万、四川の 8 万、東北２万、神⼾５千の順になる。余震は断層⾯上で起こる。断層面の長さは、東北地震で 500 ㎞、ハイチ、神⼾地震は 50 ㎞、四川は250㎞、スマトラは 1,300 ㎞と非常に⼤きい。
1960 年以降の地震を規模別に整理すると、1960 年チリ地震が最⼤でＭ9.5、1960 年のアラスカ

10

地震Ｍ9.2、スマトラ地震、東北地震の順になり、９位にインドネシア、ニアス地震Ｍ8.6 がある。
スマトラ地震までは 1950、1960 年代に⼤地震が起きて、50 年間は静かだったが 2004 年以降⼤地震が頻発するようになっている。
⼤きな地震、Ｍ7.9 以上の地震は陸と海の境界、陸と島弧の境界で起こるプレートの沈み込みによる地震である。内陸で発生した四川地震だけが例外であり、津波は無いが被害は⼤きかった。Ｍ
９の全ての地震は陸と海の境界で発生している。ハイチ地震はＭ6.9 で、Ｍ７クラスの地震は内陸でも多発している。神⼾も含めて都市近郊であれば⼤きな被害を及ばす。東北地震は太平洋プレー
トが北米プレートの下に沈み込んでいるため発生した。ハイチ地震は横ズレ断層で⻄側に被害が広がった。カリブ海では地震頻度は少ないが、北米、南米、ココスプレートの間に位置するため、プ
レート沈み込みや横ズレ断層の影響を受けている。四川地震は逆断層地震で多少横ズレ成分もある。
スマトラでは年間５センチの速さで、インドプレートがユーラシアプレートの下に沈み込んでいる。
神⼾地震は横ズレ断層で、破壊が両側に伝播した。

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３．第２セッションの概要（１）パネラーの紹介・趣旨説明（独立行政法人 建築研究所国際地震工学センター長 安藤尚一）
パネラーはガザラ・ナイーム（パキスタン）、池田恵子（静岡⼤学教授）、福山洋（建築研究所上席研究員）、ジェリー・ヴェラスケス（UNISDR）である。
最初にそれぞれのパネリストから復興に当たるキーポイントのご説明をいただき、その後でディスカッションをする。
各地からのレポートを横割りの視点で⾒て⾏こうと考えている。社会的な視点、建築技術、まちづくり、国際活動の視点から説明していただく。
ここ 10 年で多くの震災がまとめて起こっており、急速な都市化、産業や⼈⼝の集中や拡⼤がリス
クを増⼤させ、貧困層の問題、環境の悪化などが巨⼤災害の発生の原因になっている。倒壊建物 100
件あたりの死者数を⾒ると、四川や神⼾、ペルー、ジャワ島の地震は建物被害の割には死傷者が少ないが津波被害の場合は死傷者が多い。簡易な建築物、軽量な建築物が多い地域では死傷者が⽐較的少なかった。サステナブルな復興とは物的な⾯に加えて、社会的、経済的、制度的に総合的に勘案するのが重要である。
本⽇のパネリストには社会的な視点、制度的な視点、物的な視点からの復興のポイントをお話しいただく。時間軸の問題は場合によるが、物的な復興は数年から５年以内、経済的復興には更に時間がかかり、神⼾では社会的な復興に 10 年以上を要している。東⽇本⼤震災では⼈⼝減少期の復興が課題であり、皆様⽅の知⾒を反映させることが⼀つのテーマとなっている。
パネリストからいただいた教訓を国際社会や次の世代に伝えていくための議論もさせていただきたい。

パネルディスカッションの様子

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（２）パネリストからの論点提起
１）復興の実態：2005 年カシミール地震の事例にみる（建築家、災害リスク管理者 ガザラ・ナイーム）
パキスタンでは建築基準法不適合建物により 7.5 万⼈の死者、60 万世帯が居住を失った。パキスタンでは 95％の建物はロウ・
ビルディングボード、石造で脆弱な建物が多く被害が拡⼤した。
制度的な取り決めがパキスタンには無いので、誰が、どの様に復興するのかの課題が⼤きかった。
地震復興庁ＥＲＲＡの設⽴。土地所有の問題を解決する法律支援センターや銀⾏⼝座の開設。未亡⼈に対する⾦銭的支援や相続権、財産権の課題を扱う⼥性⽤委員会の発足。資材調達と訓練を⾏う建設ハブを全被災地に設置。耐震建築基準の議会承認。⼤規模なモニタリングの実施と苦情処
理システムを導入した。
その結果、住居の復興状況は 92％、88％の住⺠が新しい復興住宅の安全性を評価し、65％以上が再建した保健医療施設を評価している。新設の学校が建設され、スタッフは不足しているものの⼩学校就学率が倍増。地震後に上水道整備率も向上している。
今後は、より安全なまちづくりの持続可能性の担保を目指している。

２）災害復興におけるジェンダー・社会包摂の視点（静岡大学 教授 池田恵子）
これまでの災害では⼥性、⾼齢者、貧困層に犠牲者が多い傾向があり、性別により被災経験や復興ニーズは違う。阪神淡路大震災、⻑崎豪⾬災害、アチェやバングラディッシュでは⼥性死亡率が⾼かった。
東⽇本⼤震災の男⼥の経験の違い、○⼥性の⽅が家事の労働負担が⼤きい。○⼥性の就業機会が少なく、生活再建が遅れがち。○⼥性や子供の⼈権が守られ難い。
○⼥性や弱者が復興議論に関わる機会が少ない。
ハザードと社会の脆弱性が重なって災害が起こる。健康、知識、⼈脈、時間、財産、政治⼒が偏っており、復興は平等に様々な資源や機会にアクセスできる必要がある。被災地の⼥性グループ、障害者支援のグループから、頼れるネットワークがあるので強いとも聞いた。災害の際は性別、年齢、国籍などが異なる集団が受けた影響を細かく理解する必要があり、復興に盛り込む工夫が必要である。そのためには、復興議論への様々な⼈々のバランスの良い参加、地域の様々な団体とのパートナーシップの構築、不平等が少ない社会への修正、復興が必要である。

３）安全な建物づくり、まちづくり（独立行政法人 建築研究所上席研究員 福山洋）
今回の主な震動被害はどの震災でも⾒られた柱のせん断破壊で、古い基準の建物に被害が集中している。一方、新基準や耐震改修は良好に機能しており、古い建物の改修の必要性が再認識された。
耐震補強された建物でも非構造部材の部分的な損傷が⾒られ、継続利⽤するには問題が生じた建物もあった。今後は機能維持のための損傷を防ぐ事も考える必要がある。他にも⼤空間での天井落下の被害に関わる基準も検討されている。⻑周期地震動による共振現象も観測され⼤阪の超高層ビル
も非構造部材が被害を受けた。

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津波の教訓として多くの鉄筋コンクリート造建築物は津波に耐えることが出来たが、一部に倒壊、転倒、建物が流された例、漂流物による損傷もあった。
海岸等で活動する⼈々の安全性を確保するために津波避難ビルが必要になり、昨年度は津波避難ビルの構造設計法を検討した。構造
被害が無くても浸水で機能が失われる場合もあり、昨日回復性の考え方も必要になる。
安全性は⼤原則であるが、災害からの回復性、機能の継続性の要求が強くなっており、⼈の感じ⽅、被害の程度、生活や活動への影
響についてのシナリオの共有が重要である。神⼾で地震の前に正しく補強されたビルは地震でほぼ無被害であり、今も使い続けられている。これは耐震技術を使った非常に良い例である。

４）災害後の復旧・復興における防災対策の推進（国際防災戦略アジア太平洋事務所 上級コーディネーター

ジェリー・ヴェラスケス）

災害は様々な場所で発生するが、限られた国に被害を及ぼしている。地震、洪水、旱魃のリスクは中国、インド、バングラデシュ、インドネシアなど限られた国に死亡リスクがある。⼈⼝に対して相対的に⾒ると⼩さな国の影響が⼤きく、後発発展途上国や⼩島嶼途上国が上位に来る。相対的にはドミニカのリスクが⾼い。バヌアツも⼈⼝の⼤部分が災害の影響を受けてしまう。災害は⼀部の地域、⼀部の国に限られている。
世界的に災害は増えている。90－2007 までの死亡リスクは13％増加し、経済損失リスクも 35％に増えている。発展・開発が進み、インフラ整備により脆弱性は減少しているが、危険に晒されている⼈⼝、資産が増えており脆弱性の改善が追い付いていな
い。テクノロジー、早期警報システムを早く改善しなければ危険に晒されている⼈⼝、資産に対応することが出来ない。
災害の影響は国によって異なり、サンタルシア、サモアの⼩国
では災害発生に伴い 10〜15 年も以前の経済状況に逆戻りしてしまう。インド、中国の⼤国は災害の経済に対する影響は少ない。
貧困国での災害が多い訳ではなく、地震リスクが最も⾼いのは成⻑著しい中所得国である。開発、発展、経済成⻑によって災害が助⻑されている。⼿抜き工事の横⾏、危険な場所での居住などが新たな富裕国、中所得国に見られる。
サイクロン被害の危険は増しているが、脆弱性が改善され、死亡リスクは低下しているものの、経済損失リスクは上昇している。例えば、フィリピンでは 18 倍に増えている。フィリピンやタイ、
ベトナムの復興関連予算は多額になっており、こうした趨勢はどれ程続くのか考える必要がある。
⽇本は津波に対する対策が整っていると⾔われていたが、危険に晒されている⼈⼝はインドネシ
アの 500 万⼈に次いで 420 万、津波に晒されているＧＤＰの⾦額は圧倒的に⾼い。⾼台移転がメインであったが、東電の事故により算出不能な経済損失が出ており、防潮堤整備も進んでいるが津波の⾼さ程⾼くはなくそれでは社会的な問題解決は出来ない。将来の災害は複雑性が増すと思われ、多くの⼈⼝が災害に晒されているので災害の影響の可能性は⾼い。
インドネシアの様なコミュニティ中心の復興、土地利⽤と建設の改善の例を紹介する。宮城では住⺠は安全な場所に移住し、沿岸には漁業加工処理施設が建設される。経済成⻑が進む⽇本は特に危険に晒されている⼈⼝が多いので、将来に必要な計画を自治体には検討してもらいたい。

14

（３）パネルディスカッション
１）それぞれの視点からの復興のポイント
想像を超える津波被害で安全な避難所や移住地を探せなかったと聞いた。出来る限り安全な場所を開発し、自然のセーフガードを出来る限り利⽤する。徒歩で移動できる山や丘への避難ルートを設定し実⾏する。仮設住宅を災害管理や社会学の訓練施設として利⽤する。
（ガザラ）
災害は平素の延⻑で被害が拡⼤する。復興の際は地域問題を土台として考える必要がある。防災
分野を孤⽴させない。教育、福祉、産業、雇⽤を含めて地域が災害に対して強くなるかが防災である。被災者や住⺠に⼥性や障害者、⾼齢者は含まれているのか。多様性を復興のうえで如何に担保するかが重要（池田）ハードを如何に⼈の気持ちに繋げるかが重要で、そこに居る⼈々の思いを如何にエンジニアに繋げるかが課題である。目的を持ってみんなの⼒を集積すると、現在の技術では色々な事が可能になる。防災の戦略と⽅向性が⼤切だと思う。安全を進めて安心の観点が必要になる。（福山）
将来の復興はハードの部分だけでは満足できない。そのギャップは避難や教育等ソフトで埋めなければいけない。⽇本のソフト⾯を証明するのは難しいが、震災によってコミュニティ元年になるとの発⾔も聞いた。強⼒な社会活動が生まれ、必要な事が盛り込まれる様になる事を期待している。
ソフトギャップを将来に繋げる。（ヴェラスケス）

２）ハードではカバーしきれない部分への対応
ソフト⾯の自主防災組織の活発化も聞こえて来る。地域の組織が災害復興、防災を如何に結び付けるのか、⽇常の延⻑が防災であり、地域活動組織の⽅がソフト⾯は知っている。地域の弱み、強みを知る⼈が、防災と結び付く必要がある。
（池田）シナリオの共有には沢山の議論が必要で時間がかかるが、先ずは、災害情報を共有し、それぞれの⽴場での⾏動を起こすことが⼤切だと思う。
（福山）
津波の訓練経験を地⽅自治体、研究者、ＮＧＯ、マスコミ、コミュニティと共有し、脅威やリスクに対する認識を持たせる。次の段階は、専門家とコミュニティの絆を築くべきである。（ガザラ）

３）質疑・応答
Q：タイの洪水被害に対するコミュニティ活動や事例などについてお教え願いたい。
Ａ：経済に対する影響が⼤きく、世界中の保険業界が⽇本の地震とタイの洪水で⼤きな痛⼿を被った。⽴地場所が危険に晒されているのではなく、ハードディスクのタイ、自動⾞産業の⽇本への集中、集積が危機を招いている。タイや⽇本の震災がシンガポールにも影響を及ぼしてしており世界中は繋がっている。
タイの再建復興担当⼤⾂の話ではソフト⾯のアイディアは⾒つからない、コミュニティ、労働者への対応について逆に聞かれてしまった。⾦融リスクへの対応は分かるが、⼈への対応は分からないと⾔われてしまった。
洪水は上流から来て貧困な地域が被災した。エンジニアは簡単に計算が出来るが、実際の社会⾯とはギャップが多くソフト⾯の計算はとても難しい。
Ｑ：安全な津波避難ビルとはどういうものか。
Ａ：耐震基準よりも柱や梁、壁を強化し、杭を充分に打つ等既存技術の応⽤で対応は可能。

４）まとめ（独立行政法人 建築研究所国際地震工学センター長 安藤尚一）
ハード、ソフトの両⾯を組み合わせた震災対応が必要であり、全ての関係者が防災に関係する

15

意識を持ち、多くの⼈々と広く関係を構築する必要がある。世界の巨⼤災害の教訓を学ぶと同時に世界やコミュニティとも共有していきたいと考えている。

（４）閉会挨拶（政策研究大学院大学 教授 岡崎健二）
⽇本の場合、広域的な災害には対応し難い。数年に⼀度の巨⼤災害に如何に対応するか、社会的な対策で補うがどのように対応するのかが難しい。
福山先生の被害シナリオの共有が効果的だと思われる。コミュ
ニティの被害シナリオを共有し、想像⼒、対応⼒を涵養する事が出来るのではないか。被害シナリオの共有が社会的なギャップを埋めることに繋がるのではないか。復興の過程で格差を拡⼤しな
いまちづくりを組み込むことが⼤切である。
災害を契機にした家族やコミュニティ、国と国の絆がうまく復興に生かされるのを期待している。

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Ⅲ．専門家会議
１．専門家会議の概要（１）開催の趣旨
前⽇の「国際シンポジウム：巨⼤震災からの復興を考える」における報告者・パネリスト及び当該シンポジウムの主催機関（建築研究所、政策研究⼤学院⼤学）の研究者 10 名の参加により、以下をディスカッションの主テーマとする専門家会議を開催した。
①より災害復旧⼒に優れたコミュニティを構築する機会としての巨⼤災害からの復興②復興を巡る主要な話題（コミュニティの再建、災害弱者と貧困削減の側⾯、より安全な建築物・住宅及び都市や町、国際活動）に係る議論
この会議は、上記のディスカッションを通じ、以下のアウトプットを得ることを共有することを目的とした。
①国際的視点（共通課題等）及び地域的視点・脈略（地域固有の課題等）の双⽅からの検討による、復興への教訓についての理解の深化②⽇本の被災・復興経験を国際コミュニティにおいて共有するための⽅法及び戦略③より災害復旧⼒のあるコミュニティの形成に寄与しうる、専門家、政府、NGO、コミュニティの今後の取り組みについての提案（２）開催日時・場所
⽇時：2012 年 2 月 22 ⽇（水）10:00〜12:00

場所：政策研究⼤学院⼤学会議室（３）会議参加者
司会 楢府龍雄（国際協⼒機構JICA国際協⼒専門員）
ガザラ・ナイーム（パキスタン、建築家、災害リスク管理者）
ジェリー・ヴェラスケス（タイ、国際防災戦略アジア太平洋事務所上級地域
コーディネーター）
バンバン・スディアトモ（インドネシア、公共事業省

水環境衛⽣訓練センター⻑）

フリッツ・オプラン（ハイチ、公共事業・輸送・通信省建物評価技術室技師）
ワン・ツェンヤオ（北京師範⼤学壺基⾦公益研究院院⻑）池田恵子（静岡⼤学教授）
安藤尚⼀（建築研究所国際地震⼯学センター⻑）
斎藤⼤樹（建築研究所国際地震⼯学センター上席研究員）
岡崎健二（政策研究⼤学院⼤学教授）

17２．参加者によるプレゼンテーション及び意見交換の概要
４名の会議参加者がプレゼンテーション（情報提供）を⾏い、各プレゼンテーショについて意⾒
交換を⾏った。その概要は以下の通りである。

○プレゼンテーション１：池田恵子（静岡大学）「復興プロセスにおけるジェンダーと社会的包摂」
東⽇本⼤震災の復興プロセスにおいて、⼥性や、子供、障害者、高齢者等の災害弱者の安全とニーズにどのような対応がなされているか、所⾒された課題や、それらの対応に向けたコミュニティ
レベルでの自発的な動き（⼥性たちの主体的な取り組みを含む）について紹介し、コミュニティの構成員のみならず復興の担い⼿としての⼥性や災害弱者のニーズや参加に留意することの⼤切さが述べられた。
プレゼンテーション後は、①被災後の⼥性や災害弱者のニーズ把握は、⽇本でも新しい取り組みであること、②例えば避難所におけるパーティション設置といった⼥性のニーズの高いものへの取り組みについても、自治体の避難所運営マニュアルのちがいにより、⽇本国内でも地域ごとに対応の差があること、③地域の持続発展の担い⼿としての⼥性の重要な役割についてはすでに世界で広く認御識されることとなっており、災害復興プロセスにも意思決定や諸活動（ローカルビジネス、
コミュニティケア等様々）に⼥性の参加を促進することが、世界どの地域でも重要であること――等について意⾒交換がなされた。

○プレゼンテーション２：ガザラ・ナイーム（パキスタン）「復興の実態：2005 年カシミール地震の脈略から」
カシミール地震がどのようなタイプの建築物に被害を及ぼしたかの報告に引き続き、新設されたパキスタン地震復興庁（ERRA）の任務とされた復興上の諸課題（住宅、保健施設、教育施設、水道・衛⽣施設の再建・復旧）とそれらの復興進捗状況と残された課題について報告された。また、最後に、津波対策としての、沿岸市街地の後背に屏風状に広がる断崖を利⽤した避難経路設置への取り組みについて、事例紹介された。
プレゼンテーション後は、①ERRA が専らに地震復興を対象とする組織であり、水害、サイクロン等他の自然災害に総合的に対応する組織でないことの課題、②ノンエンジニアド住宅の耐震性強化に関するトレーニングの実施の仕組み、③崖地の避難経路設置への取り組みにおけるコミュニテ
ィや NGO との協議・協調の⽅法――について、意⾒交換がなされた。

○プレゼンテーション３：斎藤大樹（建築研究所）「日本における近年の巨大地震災害の教訓」
発⽣時刻、マグニチュード、死者・⾏⽅不明者数、主な死因（⽕災、建物倒壊、津波）、地震断層の規模、地震動周期の比較により、関東⼤震災（1923 年）、阪神・淡路⼤震災（1995 年）、東⽇本
⼤震災（2011 年）がそれぞれ特徴の異なる災害であったことが説明された後、関東⼤震災、阪神・淡路⼤震災の教訓が、⽇本の耐震設計基準の強化にどのように⽣かされたかが⽰された。次いで、
東⽇本⼤震災を受け、建築物の耐津波設計基準づくりに向けた取り組みが、どのような観点から進められているか紹介された。
プレゼンテーション後、①津波で被害を受けた建物の種類、②RC 建築物の倒壊原因、③耐津波基
準の適⽤対象（特定の地域や特定の建築物に限られるか）、④⽇本における津波危険地域での避難施設の設置基準の有無、⑤耐津波基準が導入された場合の建物建設コストの上昇程度（途上国にとりコストの問題は重要）、⑥耐津波基準による人命や財産の保護の効果（津波危険地域に住むこと自体を困難と考えるべきでないか）、⑤災害の種類別の避難場所の整備の要否（避難勧告が出せる台風に18

は有効だが地震ではどうか、アチェでの整備状況はどうか）――等、活発な議論が⾏われた。

○プレゼンテーション４：ジェリー・ヴェラスケス（国際戦略アジア太平洋事務所、タイ）「国際協力、防災・減災、気候変動、復旧、復興」
甚⼤な災害のリスクへの財政モデルとして、①自然災害への政府の責任の削減（リスク削減）、②
⺠間セクターへのリスクの移転（保険等）、③国家が負うべきリスクに対する資⾦⼿当て――の３種があるとの提⽰の後、途上国政府は概して①、②の重要性の認識が⾜りず、その結果として③に多くの費⽤を要することとなり、さらにその負担能⼒の問題から国際⽀援頼みになってしまう、という現状の構図が⽰された。続いて、ⅰ）このような構図は国際経済環境から⾒てもはや維持困難であり、低頻度の巨⼤災害は国ともかく、高頻度の比較的⼩規模な災害に対しては、①②を通じて自国で備える必要がある、ⅱ）ところが、途上国における客観的なリスクデータの不⾜の状況から、②に係るリスクを保険会社がとれないことが⼤きな問題である――との認識が⽰された。最後に、ⅱ）に関して、インドネシアで⾏われた災害後復旧ニーズ評価（PDNA）が、ユニークで先進的な取り組みであるとの評価が述べられた。
プレゼンテーション後、①国際協⼒により災害リスクデータ蓄積を進めるアイデアと課題、②保険の限界（人命まで守れない、人命を守るにはリスク削減が重要）、④個人の保険料負担低減による保険の成⽴性向上の⼯夫（個人・コミュニティ・自治体等複層的なレベルでの保険の適⽤）――な
どについて、意⾒交換が⾏われた。

専門家会議の様子

19

Ⅳ．国際ビデオ会議
１．国際ビデオ会議の概要（１）開催の趣旨
近年、地域コミュニティに壊滅的な打撃を与える巨大災害が頻発しており、東⽇本大震災に⾒舞われた⽇本も、被災地の復興に注⼒しているところである。そのような災害の後の復旧・復興段階
は、より災害復旧⼒に優れたコミュニティを建設する重要な機会であり、住宅や建築物の安全性の向上は、災害による人的被害の低減にとって欠かせない要素である。
こうした問題意識を背景に、このビデオ会議は、巨大災害からの復興ならびにより安全なコミュ
ニティづくりについて、近年巨大災害を経験した国々（ハイチ、中国、インドネシア）から⽇本に建築研究所・政策研究大学院大学が招聘した専門家と、地震多発国のビデオ会議参加者が、住宅及び建築物に焦点を当て議論することにより、各国の経験と教訓を共有するとともに、将来の大規模災害への備えへの示唆を得ることを目的として開催した。

（２）開催日時・場所
開催⽇：2012 年 2 月 22 ⽇（水）主会場：

世界銀⾏東京開発ラーニングセンター

サブ会場： ビクトリア大学ウェリントン校

16:00〜19:55（⽇本）
20:00〜23:55（ニュージーランド）

JICA 本部

16:00〜19:55（⽇本）

JICA 筑波国際センター

16:00〜19:55（⽇本）

JICA フィリピン事務所

15:00〜18:55（フィリピン）JICA 中国事務所

15:00〜18:55（中国）JICA インドネシア事務所

14:00〜17:55（インドネシア）

バンドン工科大学

14:00〜17:55（インドネシア）

JICA バングラディッシュ事務所

13:00〜16:55（バングラディッシュ）ネパール地震工学協会

12:45〜16:40（ネパール）

JICA パキスタン事務所

12:00〜15:55（パキスタン）

ペシャワール工科大学

12:00〜15:55（パキスタン）

JICA トルコ事務所

09:00〜12:55（トルコ）（３）プログラム
１）開会挨拶（16:00～16:05）
岡崎健二（政策研究大学院大学教授）
２）住宅・建築物の被害と復興に関する海外招聘者によるプレゼンテーション（16:05～17:15）－2010 年ハイチ地震
フリッツ・オプラン（ハイチ、公共事業・輸送・通信省建物評価技術室技師）－2008 年四川地震：建築物の安全の問題
ワン・ツェンヤオ（中国、北京師範大学壺基金公益研究院院長）－アチェとニアスにおける災害復旧・復興の調整・管理から得た教訓：住宅・居住部門に注目してバンバン・スディアトモ（インドネシア、公共事業省水環境衛生訓練センター長）

20

－日本における近年の巨大地震災害の教訓
斎藤大樹（建築研究所国際地震工学センター上席研究員）
３）近年の地震による被害と復興についてのプレゼンテーション（17:15 ～17:55）－2011 年トルコ・ヴァン地震（トルコ中継）
ナザン・キリク（トルコ、首相府災害緊急時対策庁）－パダンにおける地震リスク認識：公務員、住宅所有者、建設業者の見解（インドネシア
中継）
クリシュナ・S・プリバディ（インドネシア、バンドン工科大学准教授）－大規模な住宅復興のための戦略：パキスタンの経験（パキスタン中継）
ナディーム・アモッド（パキスタン、元地震復興庁副長官）
４）より安全な復興あるいは地震被害軽減に向けた活動・イニシアチブの経験についてのプレ
ゼンテーション（17:55 ～18:35 ）－東ネパール地震の被害、復興のニーズ及び努力：ネパールの経験（ネパール中継）
アモッド・ディキシッド（ネパール、地震工学協会事務局長、緊急対応強化プログラ
ム会長）－フィリピンにおける実大振動台実験地震リスクの認識向上へのアプローチ（フィリピン
中継）
ヘンレマグネ・C・ペナルビア（フィリピン、火山地震研究所）－インドネシアにおけるノンエンジニアド住宅耐震設計基準の普及活動（インドネシア中継）
白川和司（インドネシア、公共事業省 JICA 長期専門家）
５）耐震住宅に係る教訓・知識・手法の共有に向けた国際協力に関するプレゼンテーション（18:35～19:35）－ 耐震住宅供給に向けた努力：世界住宅百科（ニュージーランド中継）
アンドリュー・チャールソン（ニュージーランド、地震工学研究所世界住宅百科編集長）－日本・世界銀行協力プログラム――巨大災害から学ぶ：知識共有・交流プログラム
相良純子（世界銀行コンサルタント）－地震によるノンエンジニアド住宅の被害と国際地震工学会のガイドライン
石山祐二（北海道大学名誉教授）－安全なノンエンジニアド建物へ向けた包括的アプローチの提案
楢府龍雄（国際協力機構国際協力専門員）－安全な住宅の社会・経済的側面
池田恵子（静岡大学教授）
６）討議 （19:35 ～19:50）
７）閉会挨拶（19:50～19:55）
安藤尚一（建築研究所国際地震工学センター長）

21

２．プレゼンテーション・質疑応答・討議の概要
会議は、４つのセッション（上記 2)〜5)）を骨格に進められた（セッション 5)と討議 6)は一体として⾏われた）。各セッションでは、全プレゼンテーション終了後、質疑応答・意⾒交換が⾏われた。各セッションにおいて⾏われた情報・意⾒交換の概要は以下の通りである。

○第１セッション：住宅・建築物の被害と復興に関する海外招聘者によるプレゼンテーション
４つのプレゼンテーションが⾏われた。
オプラン氏のプレゼンテーションでは、2010 年のハイチ地震によりどのような建物被害があり、それに対してどのような修復技術が⽤いられたかが示された。
ワン氏のプレゼンテーションでは、2008 年の四川地震の経験に基づいて、①建築基準を緩くしす
ぎないこと、②建築物の建設場所の慎重な選定、③建築物の１・２階部分の耐震性、④平時における避難訓練の実施、⑤仮設住宅やテントの供給に際しての被災者との対話――の重要性が指摘された。
スディアトモ氏のプレゼンテーションでは、2004 年のインド洋地震及び津波の復興プロセスにおける復旧・復興機関の設⽴、その役割や運営形態、復旧・復興プロジェクトの内容・事例・教訓等
について情報提供された。
斎藤氏のプレゼンテーションでは、1923 年の関東大震災や 1995 年の阪神・淡路大震災の教訓が⽇本の耐震設計基準の強化にどのように⽣かされたか、また、昨年の東⽇本大震災を受け、建築物の耐津波設計基準づくりに向けた取り組みがどのような観点から進められているかが示された。
これらのプレゼンテーションを受け、①四川地震の経験は、国内他地域や他国の災害安全性向上（国際協⼒）に向けどのように⽣かされてきているか、②アチェの経験と⽇本の経験をつなぎ合わ
せて⾒えてくるものは何か、③更新した建築基準を運⽤するための人材育成や、市⺠による基準の遵守意識向上のポイントはどのようなものか――等について意⾒交換がなされた。

○第２セッション：近年の地震による被害と復興についてのプレゼンテーション
３つのプレゼンテーションが⾏われた。
キリク氏のプレゼンテーションでは、2011 年のトルコ・ヴァン地震による建物構造別の被災状況を概観した後、建物被害の主原因が、耐震基準の非遵守、建築材料・技術の質の低さ、施工状況の検査不⾜にあったと述べられた。
プリバディ氏のプレゼンテーションでは、国家公務員、地方公務員、住宅所有者、建設業者の計
４グル―プの人々の地震リスク認識調査の結果から、グループ毎にリスク認識の違いがあることが示された。また、災害に安全な住宅の普及のためには、グループ毎の認識の違いに応じた働きかけが必要であり、そのためにはコンサルテーション・メカニズムの充実が鍵になる、との⾒解が述べられた。
アモッド氏のプレゼンテーションでは、2005 年のカシミール地震後の６つの住宅復興方針の説明の後、それらの方針に基づくプログラムの成功の鍵として、①オーナー主導と公共の監督・支援のバランス、②地域特性に合わせた設計、③計画・制度の遵守率向上の仕組み、④コミュニティ参加
拡大、⑤不動産権利問題への対応、⑥災害弱者の住宅取得支援、⑦恒常的な住⺠との関わり、⑧建
築材料の供給、⑨適時の方針⾒直し――と様々な事項が挙げられた。
これらのプレゼンテーションの後、①復興への取り組み経験を次の災害への備えにつなげる鍵（取り組み経験の安定的な組織・制度への組み込み）、②耐震材料・工法と地域の⽣活文化との調和、③
国と地方政府双方の職員のリスク認識の違い、④政治家のリスク認識、④建築材料の安全性のモニ
タリングの大切さ（基準作成だけでは不⼗分）――について、意⾒交換がなされた。

22

○第３セッション：より安全な復興あるいは地震被害軽減に向けた活動・イニシアチブの経験についてのプレゼンテーション
３つのプレゼンテーションが⾏われた。
ディキシッド氏のプレゼンテーションでは、2011 年 9 月の東ネパール地震による建築物の被害の状況について建築構造別や施設⽤途別に述べられた後、復興に係る政府の取り組み及び NSET の取り組み（石工の研修、児童⽣徒への情報提供等）について紹介された。
ペナルビア氏のプレゼンテーションでは、2012 年 2 月 6 ⽇に発⽣したネグロス島沖地震による建物被害の状況の報告の後、地震リスクに対する認識促進の目的で 2011 年 2 月に⾏われた建築基
準適応住宅と非適応住宅の実大振動台実験の様子が紹介された。最後に、今後への教訓として、①
建築基準とゾーニング規制の厳格な適⽤、②コミュニティ・施設向けの短・中・⻑期防災計画の策
定、③積極的・現実的な災害への備え（避難訓練、キャンペーン、災害・緊急対応組織の強化など）の実施――の大切さが述べられた。
白川氏のプレゼンテーションでは、JICA ⻑期専門家として氏がインドネシアで取り組んでいる、地方政府の能⼒強化を目的としたノンエンジニアド住宅耐震設計基準の普及活動の内容について、情報提供が⾏われた。
これらのプレゼンテーションの後、①RC 造と木造の耐震性比較、②ネパールにおける建築基準の適⽤方法、③耐震建築物普及のための啓発活動と能⼒開発の方法、④安全な枠組組積造の構造上のポイント（部材のつなぎ方、枠組内の壁⾯積の最大値等）――について意⾒交換が⾏われた。

○第４セッション：耐震住宅に係る教訓・知識・手法の共有に向けた国際協力に関するプレゼンテーション
５つのプレゼンテーションが⾏われた。
チャールソン氏からは、地震工学研究所（EERA）と国際地震工学会（IAEE）の協⼒で 2000 年からホームページで公開されている「世界住宅百科」について、開設の目的やホームページの構成
内容等が紹介された。
相良氏のプレゼンテーションでは、⽇本の東⽇本大震災からの復興の取り組み経験の教訓を共有する目的で⽇本政府と世界銀⾏が共同で進めるプログラムの内容及び期待される成果について、情報提供された。
石山氏のプレゼンテーションでは、まず、世界各地の様々なノンエンジニアド住宅やそれらの受ける地震被害の様相について大要が述べられた。その後、ノンエンジニアド住宅の耐震性強化を目指して国際地震工学会（IAEE）が 1986 年版に刊⾏したガイドラインが、四半世紀を経て 2012 年に改訂されたことが、新旧ガイドライン双方の執筆に携わった氏から紹介された。新ガイドラインの最大の特徴は、旧版になかった枠組組積造が加えられていることだ、と述べられた。
楢府氏のプレゼンテーションでは、①ノンエンジニアド住宅の被害削減は急務であるが、②それには、技術的側⾯のみならず社会経済的側⾯の課題が横たわっており、③各種イニシアチブや熱心な人々がその困難な課題に取り組んでいるものの、④それらの関係者の間での知識や教訓の共有が求められており、⑤それを進める総合的なアプローチの適⽤が強く推奨される――との⾒解が、楢府氏を含む 5 カ国 10 名の研究者の共著ʻA Proposal for a Comprehensive Approach to Safer
Non-Engineered Houses’ (2010 年、Journal of Asian Architecture and Building Engineering)を踏まえ、示された。

23

池田氏からは、住宅・コミュニティ復興を進める上では、社会・経済的側⾯に留意することが必要であり、コミュニティが多様なニーズや役割を持つステークホルダーで構成されることを認識し、①全てのステークホルダーの意思決定への参加促進、②異なるニーズに対応するための性別等によるデータ収集・分析（世帯を単位とする大括りのデータでは把握不可）、③居住に関係する性の違い
による役割分担の実状を考慮した、家族やコミュニティの世話をする人たちの労働負荷軽減、④建
設関連就労への男⼥の公平な機会確保――に努めることが大事であると指摘された。
プレゼンテーション後、①国によっては大学で建設工学の教育を受けた⼥性が建設業界で働きたがらないという現実（就業機会の問題だけでない）、②災害弱者である外国人に対する支援に関する
⽇本での取り組みの状況、③歴史的なモニュメント（構築物）を災害から守るための対策、④低所得層によるノンエンジニア住宅建設を抑制する⼿⽴て、⑤⼥性や災害弱者の被災時のニーズ把握や復興プロセスへの参加促進を検討する上で参考になるガイドライン（英語版等）の所在、⑥農村部のノンエンジニア住宅の設計基準――などを巡り、質疑や意⾒交換が⾏われた。

主会場（世界銀⾏東京開発ラーニングセンター）の様子

24

Ⅴ．現地視察
１．現地視察概要・報告（１）現地視察概要① 日

程 ： 2012 年 2 月 19(日) ～ 20 日(月) １泊２日

② 場

所 ： 東日本大震災（2011 年 3 月 11 日発生）の被害地域 （宮城県）
気仙沼市→南三陸町→女川町→仙台市③ 参 加 者 ： 7 名 （国内参加者 1 名、海外参加者 3 名、GRIPS
氏名

所属

池田恵子
王振耀

2 名、BRI 1 名）

静岡大学教育学部 教授

ワン・ツェンヤオ

Ghazala Naeem ガザラ・ナイーム
Jerry Velasquez ジェリーヴェラスケス

中国 ・ 北京師範大学 壹基金公益研究院 院長
パキスタン ・ 建築家、災害リスク管理者
タイ ・ 国際防災戦略アジア太平洋事務所 上級地域コーディネーター

森田高市

建築研究所

岡崎健二

政策研究大学院大学 教授

李愛林

アシスタント④スケジュール
時間
2 月 19 日（日)10:46 発行動内容
気仙沼市～南三陸町
上野駅 （やまびこ 57 号盛岡行：2 時間 33 分）
一ノ関駅

13:13 着移動
14:30 ～ 15:00
移動
16:00～17:00
移動（マイクロバス：約 70 分）

気仙沼市周辺視察（車内）（マイクロバス：約 60 分）

南三陸町観光協会説明会（マイクロバス：約 10 分）

18:00 ～

宿舎：南三陸町ホテル観洋

2 月 20 日（月）南三陸町～仙台市

9:00 ～ 10:00

南三陸町観光協会 現地視察

移動（マイクロバス：約 80 分）

11:20 ～ 12:00
移動（マイクロバス：約 30 分）

12:30 ～ 13:40
移動

石巻市周辺視察（車内） （門脇小学校、石巻高校、日和山公園、石巻市役所）（マイクロバス：約 80 分）

15:00～16:30
移動

東北地方整備局 説明会（マイクロバス）

16:53 発
18:58 着女川町周辺視察（車内） （女川町役場、女川町地域医療センター）

仙台駅 （Max やまびこ 150 号東京行：2 時間 5 分）
上野駅

25

（２）現地視察報告
１）気仙沼市
宮城県北東端の太平洋沿岸に位置する都市。2011 年（平成 23 年）
3 月 11 日、マグニチュード 9.0 の東日本大震災が発生後、気仙沼市
⾚岩で震度 6 弱、本吉町および笹が陣で震度 5 強を記録した。大津波とそれによって流出した石油の引火による広域火災も発生し、被害は甚大。 国⼟地理院の調査の結果、岩⼿県・宮城県・福島県の広範な沿岸地域において、この地殻変動による著しい地盤沈下があったことが明らかとなった。
調査団は、被災した現地（火災による被災も含む）や、津波で流されて陸地の奥まで流されてきた漁船などを視察した。水産業が盛んだ
った漁市場も津波や地震で大きい影響を受けていた。

← 全焼した建物
津波で陸路まで流されてきた漁船→

２）南三陸町
宮城県の北東部、本吉郡の南部に位置し、志津川湾、伊⾥前湾に⾯する町。
志津川湾では、ギンザケ、カキ、ホタテガイ、ホヤ、ワカメなどの海⾯養殖業が盛んに⾏われ、近年では、農漁業体験を含む滞在・体験型の観光にも⼒を⼊れていた。
東日本大震災が発生し、南三陸町は震度 6 弱（観測地点：歌津地区、志津川地区）を記録した。 さらにこの地震が引き起こした大津波は町内の 3 つの川を逆流し、1960 年のチリ地震による津波の到達地点
を越えて内陸を襲った。この地殻変動により、志津川地区の地盤は大きくずれた。
①南三陸町観光協会説明会：
地域観光ガイド（震災前）として働いていた鴻巣氏（現在、震災の語り部）から、協会内で展示されていた南三陸の震災前と震災後の写真を説明をうけた。会議室に移動し、観光地としての南三陸町や震災による被害、災害後の対応、災害後の鴻巣氏の体験等のプレゼンテーションがあり、その後活発な質疑応答があった。
↓南三陸観光協会のビル↓協会内部に展示されている大震災前後の写真

26↓担当ガイドによるプレゼンテーション

②南三陸町観光協会の案内による現地視察：- 公立志津川病院
南三陸町⽴志津川病院も、5 階建てビルの 4 階（高さ 15- 16m）までが津波に呑み込まれて医療機器、ベッド、カルテなどが損壊ある
いは流失し、看護婦ら病院スタッフ 4 人・⼊院患者 67 人が死亡ある
いは⾏⽅不明となった。向かい側の建物に多くの住⺠がいたが、責任者の機転で外に逃げるのではなく、建物内にとどまったため、多くの人が救われた。
- 防災対策庁舎： 天使の声
南三陸町防災対策庁舎の遠藤未希さんは、津波警報を無線で最後まで呼びかけていた。鉄筋三階建の建物は鉄骨だけ残して、津波に破壊された。３０名が屋上に逃げたが、その内町⻑を含む８名が助かったという。「命をかけた防災無線」のニュースを最後まで呼びかけた彼
⼥の声は、「天使の声」と呼ばれている。また、遠藤さんが流された
後、彼⼥の後を受け、最後まで防災無線マイクを握りしめていたのは、
南三陸町危機管理課課⻑補佐の三浦さんだった。

３）女川町
宮城県にあり、太平洋沿岸に位置する町。日本有数の漁港である
⼥川漁港があるほか、⼥川原⼦⼒発電所が⽴地、東北地⽅に電⼒をもたらしている。
東日本大震災の際、⼥川町の⼥川原⼦⼒発電所の震度計が震度 6弱を観測した（町内の検測所は津波で流失）。 さらにこの地震が引き起こした津波に襲われ、沿岸部は壊滅的被害を負った。港湾空港
技術研究所の調査によれば、津波の最大波高は⼥川漁港の消防庁舎
で海抜 14.8m を記録した。
鉄筋コンクリート製のビル 6 棟が基礎部分ごと地⾯から抜けて横倒しになる被害も発生した。液状化現象で基礎が浮き上がった所を津波になぎ倒された。世界的にも例の無い被害である事から、町では被害資料として保存する⽅針を固めている。調査団は、高台にある⼥川町地域医療センターから被害を受けた⼥川町全体を⾒た後、転倒した建物や後背地の高校敷地内に建設された仮設住宅を視察した。

←津波より転倒された建物

仮設住宅→

27

４）石巻市
宮城県東部に位置する、県内第二の人口を擁する市。石巻市の主要な産業は、水産業と県下第二の集積を⾒せる商業である。また、造船業、紙パルプ業なども盛んである。東日本大震災で最大の死者数を出した。
調査団は、⽡礫の⼭や廃棄された⾃動⾞を視察した後、日和⼭公園から市全体の被害状況を視察した。

(左) 廃棄された自動車の山→(右) 日和山公園から見える瓦礫の山①東北地方整備局

説明会

－

発表者：

池口正晃氏（国土交通省

東北地方整備局

企画調整官）－

タイトル：「Actions taken after the Great East Japan Earthquake Towards Rehabilitation and
Restoration 」－

内容：東日本大震災の概要、道路・港・空港の瓦礫撤去作業、国道、高速道路の緊急復旧、道路・川・沿岸部の復興↓池口企画調査官のプレゼンの様子（通訳：岡崎）↓災害危機管理室での説明

28↓岩崎泰彦 東北地方整備局 副局長 表敬訪問

参 考 資 料

参考資料
１．各国災害事例資料、各国基礎情報（１）各国災害事例資料
１）2010 年ハイチ地震災害
Item

Sub-item
Date and Timeof Occurrence
Magnitude(source)

Information
4H53:10 PM, 12 January 2010.

USGS

M 7.0

USGS

Leogane: 18.443oN, 72.571oW
Epicenter
Depth :
Data on Hazard

About 25 kilometers from southwest of P-A-P.
From 10 to 13 kilometers

Intensity of
Shaking“ This earthquake produced violent shaking that can cause damage
even to well-built buildings anywhere in the world”

Ground Motion

A sliding movement of East-West has been observed, however local
movements of subduction and a vertical movement about sixty
centimeters have been recorded. It was a surface fault movement
inducing landslides and soil liquefaction.
Strong shake continued for 35 to 36 seconds.

Tsunami(maximumheight)A tsunami about 3 meters has been observed on the south part of P.A.P

Major Affected
Area

Three departments: West, Southeast, and Nippes were seriously
affected. Particularly the metropolitan P-au-P area
Was suffered enormous damage. 80% of the town Leogane where theepicenter is located was destroyed.
Dead: 230000

Human Damage

Damage of
Buildings

Data onDamages

Data
SourceInjured: 100000
Homeless: 600000
Majority of the death is due to collapsed houses.
Complete destruction : 105000
Damaged: 208000.

Infrastructure/Lif
eline Damage

Road:- The Jacmel road was cut by landslides and damaged by soilliquefaction. Several streets through P-au-P were in the same
situation.
The biggest commercial port was damaged.
All the Ministries and Public Administration have been
destroyed.
Electricity:
The electric distribution lines completely destroyed
within the Capital.
Telephone:
Only one of the four telephone companies worked after theearthquake.

Main Damage
Cause

Extreme vulnerability of constructions:Anchorage 90 degrees
20 centimeters and more between the stirrups
Poor connection between the structural elements
Lack of ductility of the walls
Poor quality of concreteHigh occupation density.
High instable soil.

31

USGS
USGS
PDNA
USGS
MCEER

Item

Sub-item

Information

Characteristics
of Damages(Physical/Social
Aspects)

The earthquake destroyed completely and damaged a large number ofbuildings: schools, medical centers, all the government offices,
residences.
Almost all the old buildings with walls stone masonry around P-au-P
were destroyed or severely damaged due to lack of ductility.
Majority of the damages is due to the ground motion.

Direct Economic
Loss

Total:

8 billion($US)

Infrastructure, including housing:Social:Production sectors:
Education/culture:
Health:Environment:
Water/Sanitation:
Food safety/nutrition:

57.2%
19.4%
17%
6.1%
6%
6.4%
3%
4.2%

Lessons
LearnedNational government, local authorities should take their
responsibilities. Every house must be built under a seismic code
regulation.

Rescueactivities

The first responders were local people, especially the marginalized, theunemployed usually lurking around public buildings. These unarmed
saved what they could during the night. They removed several
authorities under debris.
But, the next day almost the whole world was at our bedside.
In an indescribable mess, Dominicans, Americans, Canadians, French,
Jamaicans, Cubans….came to our rescue.
MTPTC began working to clear the most important streets to promote
the rescue movement, evacuate the dead and remove people underdebris.

Medical services

The Ministry of Public Health and the private health sector have
responded quickly, saving what they could before we can get foreign
aid. However, this national response has been very limited since thestaff and the government facilities were seriously affected.
So, 75% of Health services are delivered by the foreign staff.
Medical attention was given everywhere, under tents and in somestreet corners. Many injured were transported to a US medical ship.
The coordination between different staffs was very complicated. Thus
it was very difficult to follow the Ministry of Public Health norms andguidelines.

Evacuation
shelter

The issue of shelters looked like the more difficult. The earthquake
made about six hundred thousands homeless increasing the number
existed before. At the very beginning, almost everybody around theaffected areas lived in open air. It was quite impossible to find enoughplastics belts or tents to the relocated people. Therefore, some people
built their shelters, using debris as wood, metal sheets and anythingthat they found. And two years later some people is still living inshelters made by them.

Emergency
Response

Food:

Food, water andother relief
goods supply

The issue of food was also very critical. After the earthquake, almost
everyone was anxious for food. In first time humanitarian agencies
tried to distribute food by helicopter. This experience was bad. Thenthey gave some cooking kit. And finally the food was distributed by the
military.
Water:
Fortunately the infrastructure and staff of the national body in chargeof water (DINEPA) were not affected. Therefore, they took action
quickly asking to the private sector to join them in the distribution ofwater.

32

Data
Source

PDNA

Item

Sub-item

Information

Information andcommunication(Information to
the disastervictims)

The Ministry of Communication has used the private medias to informthe public about the government decisions in response to the damages
left by the earthquake. The government held regularly some press
conferences. So, the population could know the organization of thehumanitarian assistance and arrangements to support them at thecritical period.
The issue of Communication, was very complicated for the first days:
The main streets through the Capital have been cut withabandoned cars, debris of destroyed buildings and rubble
from landslides.
Only one of the four telephone companies was available.
The international medias contributions were very significant: theystimulated immediate action by the international community to the
Haitian people.

Data
SourceSupport from
PrivateCompanies
Support fromabroadLessons
LearnedInfrastructure/Lif
elineRoad and Streets:
The road conducing to Jacmel was opened four days later andcompletely restored three months later.
The day after the earthquake, the main streets through P-a-P
were partially cleaned to promote the rescue service.
Telephone:Electricity :-Other services

RecoveryTemporaryHouse

MENFP started with the scholar activities three month later.

MTPTC
Has dredged rivers and drainage canals to cope the cyclonicseason.
One week later, MTPTC began a vast campaign
Of assessment.
1862 builders worker are trained
202 young engineers are trained to work in the field of quality
control.
17862 small and non- severely damaged houses have been
repaired in the Leogane and P-a-P areas for the mostvulnerable victims.
- This issue of temporary house was very complicated. At the very
beginning, some people have obtained some plastics belts; others
received some tents or built their shelters with anything that they
could find.
- By the assessment, the government via MTPTC encouraged somepeople to return to the non-damaged houses two months later.

Shelter
Disaster Waste

Finance

The total amount of the disaster waste is estimated at 10,000,000m3.
-

International Community-

Private sector
NGOs
Ministries

Support from
PrivateCompanies
Support from
Abroad

33

MTPTC

Item

Sub-item

Information

Lessons
LearnedFive priority principles:
Principles-

Leadership and mutual accountability
Decentralization and equal growthCommitment to modernization
Haitian-led
Independence for international aid.

-

How to protect the people against natural disaster?

Key issues-

How to improve the quality of life in Haiti?
What we want to become-

Interim Commission for the Reconstruction of Haiti (ICRH).

Organizations-

Development agency
Multi-Donor Trust Fund (HRF).

-

International Community
Private sector
NGOs

Finance
Support from
PrivateCompanies
Support fromabroadReconstruction

Reconstruction
Schedule

Key Target,featured
strategies/approaches etc.

Economic
Recovery-Governance.

-

Reducing vulnerability of
Economic growth
Infrastructure programs

the people and basic service

By this action plan, they aim to restart rapidly economic, governmental
and social activities, reduce the vulnerability of the country, and put
Haiti on the path of development by:
Including environmental aspects in all decisions and actions.
Integrating risk disaster management in all sectors and in allreconstruction activities.
Establishing an active employment policy: supporting
micro-enterprises, strengthening vocational training,
involving local firms and local labor and communities.
Undertaking the decentralization of the basic services.
Initiating a social safety net for the poorest.
-

Recovery in domestic production
Cultural production
Economic and financial systems
Creation of jobs-

http://www.cirh.ht/files/pdf/cirh_plan
http://housingworgs.org/i/blog/Haiti_PDNA
http://www.refoundation.ht
http://www.haitireconstruction.org
http://www.usgs.gov/natural_hazards/

Other
Characteristics
Lessons
LearnedReferences

Reports

Data/photos

34

Data
Source２）2008 年 中国四川地震災害
Item

Sub-item
Date and Timeof Occurrence

USGS
CSB

M.7.9, 19 km (USGS)

USGS

Epicenter

N31.0, E103.4(Wenchuan County, Southwest Beijing, China)
79 km Off Northwest Chengdu of Sichuan Province, China

CSB

Intensity of
Shaking

Intensity scale:10,

CSB

Depth

Ground Motion

TsunamiMajor Affected
Area

Human
DamageDamage of
Buildings

Data onDamages

2:28PM, May 12, 2008(Beijing Time),

Data
SourceMw. 8.0, 33 km (China National Earthquake Bureau)

Magnitude

Data on Hazard

Information

Infrastructure/Li
feline Damage

The earthquake occurred as a result of motion on a northeast striking
reverse fault or thrust fault on the northwestern margin of the Sichuan
Basin. The earthquake's epicenter and focal-mechanism consistent withit have occurred as a result of movement on the Longmenshan fault ora tectonically related fault. The earthquake reflects tectonic stresses
resulting from the convergence of crustal material slowly moving fromthe high Tibetan Plateau, to the west, against strong crust underlying
the Sichuan Basin and southeastern China.
N/A
More than 116,700 sq.km, including Sichuan, Gansu and Shannxi
provincesDead:69,227

Missing:
Injured:17,824
374,643

Complete destruction: and Partial destruction: 4,140,000 houses

MCA,
China
(June,
2008)

Road- Highway:
21 lines (seriously damaged)- Rural Road:
24,103 km (seriously damaged)
Railway- Baoji to Chengdu: 669 km (Stop Operation more than 12 days)
Airport: Shuangliu Airport at Chengdu
Electricity: millions houses power outages (May 12)
Water Supply:
391 reservoirs damaged differently, more than 5
millionpeople need water supply (May13)
Sewage System:
39 counties waste water treatment plants andpumping stations stop operation in 3 provinces.
Telephone:- Land line
51 counties lines stop operation- Cell phone
2,500 base-station stop operation

China
news

More than 95% death and missing were killed by the earthquake.
After earthquake, lots of mountains collapsed and also killed somepeople.
Majority of human casualties were caused by the earthquake.

Characteristics
of Damages(Physical/Social
Aspects)

MCA
MCA,
China
(Sept.1
8,
2008)

Most of human and physical damages were caused by the earthquake.
Main Damage
Cause

USGS

The majority of the building damages were also caused by theearthquake while many of collapsed houses were found and certain
amount of damages are caused by earthquake.
Many of damaged buildings were constructed because of lack of theenforcement of rural building codes .
Factories in the disaster area were kept stop operation for a while and it
affected the global “supply chain” (especially parts production to car
industry), and eventually it affected the global industry and economy.

35

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceTotal: about 845.1 billion yuan
DirectEconomic Loss

Buildings (House, Shop, Office, Factory, etc.): 27.4%
Lifelines and Infrastructures(Water, Gas, Electricity,
Telephone, Road, River, etc.): 21.9%
Others (School, Gov office, Hospital, etc.).: 20.4%(6.8 yuan = 1 USD)

Stat
Councilof
China<Building codes and disaster reduction are very important>Lessons
LearnedEmergency
Response

Because the earthquake differed from the assumptions, the earthquake
degree height and more than 130,000,sq. km, and the disaster area
exceeded expected districts. In China, there are no codes orstandards about the rural buildings. Even in Sichuan, the protecting
earthquake standard was still below 7 degree which actually canprotecting earthquake below M. 5. There are short of the disastermanagement materials including hazard maps. The evacuation
exercise program is not popular in schools and communities.
In such situation, 5335 students died, only some school students
evacuated to the safer place on their own decisions. The most famouscase is Sangzao Middle School, and this shows a good example ofdisaster education and proper risk evacuation.
<Damage to structures>
Because the structure measures are not so good and also short ofsystematic procedures, after earthquake, a lot of conflicts happened
between local governments and victims parents. The massive victims
and colossal damages witnessed during this disaster exposed thelimitations of disaster management measures of the ordinary building
codes to an excessive degree.
<Early warning system>
In government, the China Earthquake Bureau is very strong, even at
the county level, it also has associated with this organization. Chinese
tradition believed that the scholars can resolve all problems, so if
appointed experts as leaders,then they can do early warning. As aresult, reports asked officials why they cannot do early warning.
Changing this conception, maybe is very important, so should
strengthening communities building including family activities.
<Disaster Management Measures>
Because damages caused by the earthquake greatly exceed thepre-disaster damage estimate, the former policies for disaster relief andreduction need to be fundamentally reviewed and the disastermanagement measures have to be rebuilt.

Rescueactivities

Rescue activities were carried out mainly by local governments, army,
police, firefighters, volunteers. As for the army case, about 157,000
personnel were dispatched for rescued and other emergency operation
activities.
As a result of the efforts, about 5,000,000 people were rescued.

MCA

Medicalservices

DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team): Total of 65,000 doctors andassistances were dispatched and provided medical service for about 3
months.
Other Medical Team: Total of 14950 doctors from other provinces andmedical associations, Red Cross, national hospitals, medical volunteers,
etc. provided emergency medical services. In addition to theemergency medical care, 200 foreign doctors have being provided
mental care for the disaster districts.
Sichuan sent 10015 injurers to 340 hospitals in 20 provinces.

CDRC

Evacuation
shelter

Public facilities e.g. schools, community centers, public gymnasium
were played as evacuation shelters and most of them were designatedas shelters, especially in Mianyang city.
3 days after the disaster event, disaster people kept evacuated got the
public buildings.after 30 days, 15,000 thousand people got more than
1,500 thousand tents and other 1,000 thousand shelters.

CDRC

36

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceFood, water andother relief
goods supply

Foods and other relief goods were supplied by the central government,
local government and others (NGO, other institutions, etc.)
Central government provided 10 yuan and 0.5 kilo rice each day forevacuees during 3 months and after that reduce half, then into thenormal assistance system.

CDRC

Information andcommunication

To provide the information to the evacuee, the followings wereconducted.
1. Handbook- Livelihood support- Livelihood and business reconstruction- Guide for temporary shelter life
2. Flyer
3. Broadcast
4. Each village at least one soldier
Handbooks and flyers were distributed through not only official channel
but also various channels e.g. volunteers (with explanation) and shops.

CDRC

Support from
PrivateCompanies
And NGO

Many private companies and NGO provided food and relief goods to theevacuated people in their areas of expertise. More than 3 millions
volunteers to the disasters.
Internet service providers, other website operators and privatecompanies who had intention to contribute to assist disaster victims
opened the site for donation, and donation through the Internet
becomes one of the channels for donation.

Media

Support fromother provinces
and cities

Central government arrange 21 provinces and cities such as Beijing,
Shanghai, Tianjin and Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong, etc., support todisaster districts, the framework is one province or one city to one
county. This policy established on May 22.
In June, central government arrange this framework into recovery.

Media

171 countries and territories and 20 int’l agencies stated assistance.
Support fromabroadReceived rescue team (incl. medical assistance team) from 6 counties,
territories and agencies.
Received relief goods and money totally more than 5 billion yuan. 273
foreign experts into disaster districts involved the rescue.

Lessons
LearnedBased on the lessons learned previous large-scale disasters,
mobilization of China State Council and other government institutions
were rapid.
A lot of new policies were created in the rescue process. Especially thepolicy "one provine to one county" made the relief action more efficient.
Another policy is "open the door", government encouraged NGO
participation, and welcome foreign rescue team into China.
While many collaboration activities were made, supply of relief goods tothe affected area was in time even the affected areas were so big androads severely damaged by the earthquake.

Infrastructure/
Lifeline

Roads and highways were opened after earthquake except the section
Yingxiu to Wenchuan town, about 80 km, that road was seriously
damaged until after more than 3 months.
The Highway from Dujiangyan city to Jiuzhaigou was destroyed.
All railways were restored in 12 days.
Electricity: Repaired the temporary line to the main towns or townships
in about 1 week
Water Supply: repaired 13649.6 km temporary pipeline to disaster
district.
Telephone: 100% was restored in 10 days at township.
Note: Restoration of lifelines in the areas affected by the earthquake
finished after the implementation of reconstruction plan in 2 years.

Other services

Under the framework of "one province to one county", each province
established the office at the county, if they find some questions, theywould be in charge of resolving them. So, a lot of food supply got fromother provinces.

Recovery

37

CDRC

CDRC

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceAfter 30 days, 15,000 thousand people got in more than 1,500
thousand tents and other 1,000 thousand shelters.

CDRC

Disaster
Waste/Debris

Because of the rehabilitation' s need, after 6 months, according thereconstruction plan, most disaster waste/debris already cleared.

Media

Finance

Central government provided more than 50 billion yuan to supply therecovery. Tents and shelters all provided by central government.

Media

Support from
PrivateCompanies andNGO

Whole donation is about 76 billion yuan. Some NGOs participated in theprocess of recovery.

CDRC

Support from
AbroadN/A

Shelter

Lessons
LearnedAfter the Wenchuan Earthquake, Chinese central government believedthat this national disaster must mobilize whole nation involved the relief
and recovery. Different ministries made effort to do early recovery fromearthquake damages, and another policy is "one province to one
county", this made the risk to be reduced, the recovery is not only justcentral government's task, but also other provinces' task.
Encouraging media to report the recovery process is also important. If
the reporters found something was wrong, the government could
resolve the problems.

Principles

June 8, 2008, The State Council made the regulation of reconstructionof Wenchuan Earthquake. The reconstruction principles include:(1) For disaster districts, the reconstruction should rely on local,
especially encourage to do production, but must combine withcentral government support and the policy of "one province support
one county".
(2) Government should play the leading role but also encourage NGO'sparticipation;(3) Reconstruction on the original place but combine with the project ofmoving other places.
(4) Reconstruction quality must be ensured, but the efficient also
should be combined.
(5) The reality must be considered but combine with the designing
future.
(6) On the one hand, economic and social development should beensured, on the other hand, must combine with the protection of
the ecological environmental resources.

Key issues

N/A

Organizations

National Level: Reconstruction Committee (established in June 2008)
Province level:
Reconstruction Committee of three provinces, governors
were the director.
City/Town Level:
Implementing body for reconstruction

Finance

Since required amount of fund for reconstruction is too large to bear by
the local governments. Therefore, central government allocated 302.6
billion yuan budget for recovery, other budget is provided by otherprovinces and cities.

Reconstruction

Support from
PrivateCompanies

Some of NGOs such as Wanke Compony established one townshipbuilding.

Support fromabroadSome international companies did the donations about hospitals or
schools, etc.
Especially Hongkong and Taiwan gave a lot of support.

Reconstruction
Schedule

As a result, till September, 2010,1908.5 thousand rural houses, 288.3
thousand urban houses, 3839 schools, 2169 hospitals, and more than
5000 projects of infrastructure were established in three provinces
including Sichuan, Gansu, Shannxi .

38

State
Council

State
Council

State
Council

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceKey Target,featured
strategies/
approaches etc.

Because of the policy of "one province to one county", there wascompetition among different provinces. So the new policy is "3 years
task will finish in 2years".

State
CouncilEconomic
RecoveryEconomic development recovery was strong. Sichuan, Gansu, andShannxi provinces got lots of support,and that made the mountain poor
district change a lot, and the buildings more modernized. Only in
Sichuan, the reconstruction plan included 29692 projects and morethan 800 billion yuan investment. Whole reconstruction investment isabout 1000 billion yuan.

State
Council

Other
Characteristics

Lessons
LearnedOpen policy is important, at the process of reconstruction, and theinternational experience were adopted by the government.
First the central government must provide the main budget to local
government. This is the central government's responsibility.
But secondly reconstruction can not be just centralized. It must be
combined decentralized projects. Using the policy "one province to
one county", it is a very important decision. Actually this is the big
reform of the administration management of China.
Thirdly reconstruction must combined the economic with social
construction. This is the weak in the reconstruction process.
Also, the reconstruction law and regulation, especially the overall plan isvery important.
Opening the process of policy making to the society, it is anotherexperience in the reconstruction process. Some experts send a lot
valuable suggestions to central and local governments.
http://www.xinhuanet.com/xhwenchuan

Reports
References

Data/photos

USGS: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/
http://www.512.gov.cn/
http://www.cea.gov.cn/
http://www.ceic.ac.cn/
http://www.eq-igl.ac.cn/
http://www.mca.gov.cn
http://www.jianzai.gov.cn/
http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/
Http://www.scio.gov.cn
http://www.audit.gov.cn/n1057/n1072/n258889/
www.sc.gov.cn/10462/10929/11076/11077
Richard A. Kerr. Chinese Quake Likely a Mega-Catastrophe. Daily News.
ScienceNow. 2008-05-12
UNDP-China Project: Working Report about Relief and Reconstructionof Wenchuan Earthquake, by CDRC.

３）2004 年 スマトラ沖地震・津波災害

Item

Data onHazardSub-item

Information

Date and Time of
Occurrence

Aceh

:

07:58AM, December 26, 2004

Nias

:

11:09PM, March 28, 2005

Magnitude(source)

Aceh

:

M 9.1

Nias

:

M 8.6

Aceh

:

250 km South west of ACEH (3.316oN, 95.854oE)

Nias

:

2.074oN, 97.013oE

Epicenter

39

Data
Source
USGS
USGS
USGS

Item

Sub-itemIntensity of
Shaking

Information
Aceh:Intensity scale : 4.0 (Soloview-Imamura scale)

Nias

:

Intensity scale : 0.5 (Soloview-Imamura scale)

Aceh

:

45 m (150 ft) around Lhok Nga area of Aceh
Besar District and 24 m (80 ft) according NOAA

Nias

:

4m

Aceh

:

Banda Aceh, Meulaboh (2 cities, 11 districts)

Othercountries:

Thailand, Srilanka, India, Maldives, Malaysia,
Myanmar, Seychelles, Eastern Africa

Data
SourceISET
JournalGround Motion
Tsunami(maximum height)

Major Affected
Area

Nias

:

80 percent of whole area

Dead

:

127,720 in Aceh, around 250,000 in total
678 in Nias

Human Damage
Missing

Damage of
Buildings

Data onDamages

Infrastructure/Lifeline Damage

Main Damage
Cause

:

93,285 (Aceh)

House

:

139.195 units

Social- Economic
Facilities:

93.285 units

School:3.415 units

Health Infrastructure:

517 units

Government Building:

669 units

Agriculture:

73.869 Ha

Roads

:

2.618 Km

Bridges:

119 units

Ports

:

22 units

Airport/Airstrip:

8 units

The distances between the epicenter and the coast line is very near (90km in the perpendicular position from the epicenter)
Large population of people living in the area along the coast
Lack of facilities and infrastructure to support / protect to face thedanger of tsunami
Lack of access to information and education on awareness of thetsunamiTsunami wave hydrodynamic forces contributed to most damages andlosses incurred by the event. Earthquake cause less damages to thearea due to the typical structures in the area were not more thandouble storeys building.
Early warning systems installed in the Pacific Ocean, but not installed in
the Indian Ocean, whereas 85 percent historically recorded tsunami
events occurred here.
Some sophisticated tools owned by developed countries already detect
symptoms of the tsunami, they've released a tsunami warning tocountries in the Pacific Ocean region, but can not provide information
to countries in the Indian Ocean before there was a wave of attacks
tsunami

40

NOAA/
NESDI
S

USGS

Item

Sub-item

Information
Physical Aspects:

Characteristics ofDamages(Physical/Social
Aspects)

Direct Economic
Loss

Public Utilities (school, community health center). Infrastructure(electricity, sanitation, drainage, roads & bridges, clean water).
Social-Cultural Facilities (village hall, mosque/church). One storey
buildings that were located closely to coastal impacted area were
flattened and left only their foundation.
Social Aspects:
104.500 small bussiness were collapsed
15.000 household need to be relocated60.000 farmers were displaced
1.927 teachers died13.828 coastal fishing boats destroyed/lost•

Total Loss (Aceh-Nias) : Rp. 46.56 Trillion•

Approximately Aceh’s GDP loss : up to US$ 4.5 Billion, estimateddecrease of Aceh’s economic growth : 5%
Decrease rate of per capita income : 32%
Inflation rate : 4.45% (April 2005), 3.24% (Agustus 2005)
Impact of national economic growth : 0.1-0.4 % (2005)

•
•
•

•

Pre event knowledge of coastal community to tsunami is important
to make them aware and ready for emergency evacuation soonafter major sea earthquakes.
High structures are potential to be used for escape buildings should
higher ground are difficult to find at reachable distance for
evacuation.
Government should move quickly to clarify which agency will
coordinate the post-disaster reconstruction program, what is
empowered to do, and when its mandate begins and ends
A strong, experienced leadership team should be appointed to gain
the full support of other government agencies amd the donor
agencyA crisis mindset should be maintained throughout thereconstruction effort, adapting usual internal procedures andstructures to a crisis situation
Strong implementation capability should be built early on so thatthe coordinating agency can meet its overall reconstruction targets
by directing resources for meeting emerging needs
reconstruction to ensure funding flows meet actual needs•

Evacuation and searching of victim’s bodies

•

•

•

Lessons Learned

•

•

•

Done by collaborative work by Indonesian National Force (TNI),
police, Indonesian Red Cross (PMI), Indonesia Search and Rescue(Basarnas), community, volunteers from inside and outside thecountry.

Rescue activities••

Handling of victims who were injured done in all hospitals andhealth care units which still functioning in that particular area
coordinated by Ministry of Health of RI
Some of the seriously injured victims who need special treatment
were brought out to Medan and Jakarta
Build emergency health care unit
Re-functionilize the damaged hospital/health care units•562.149 people live in houses/tents (July 1, 2005)•

33.458 people live in barracks/transitional shelter (July 1, 2005)•
Emergency
Response
Medical services

Evacuation
shelter

•

41

Data
SourceItem

Sub-item

Information••

Food, water andother relief goods
supply•••Information andcommunication(Information to
the disastervictims)•••

Support from
PrivateCompanies

Support fromabroad5.000 tonnes rice and foods are delivered (January 9, 2005) by
National Logistic Agency (BULOG)
Fixation of clean water supply and sanitation treatment/piping
units by PDAM with 435 l/s production capacity and 250 l/s
distribution capacity
Aids from other county and university such as portable water
purification
Clean water and electricity supply was cut off and being
rehabilitized in January 2005 except for Meulaboh and west-coastarea
All communication was cut off the day disaster happened. Begin tofunctional again in January 2005 except for Meulaboh andwest-coast area
Communication was being installed in January 2005. IBM installed
250 computer units being to cover Aceh, Medan and jakarta Area
Radio installation also begin to installed in January 2005 by ORARI
and Kodim
PT Telkom Indonesia provided 1 month free for call for Cellular
phone registered under Aceh regional codes

A national-private tv station provided foods for the emergency•

Total involved country : 34

•
•
•
•
•
•

Personnel : 16.000
Medical team : 117
Mothership/carrier : 9
Float hospital : 1
Aircraft : 31
Helicopter : 82•

During emergency period, critical decisions such as who should
lead rescue process and which area should be focused are urgent.
Slow process on this will delay rescue process and save thesurvivors and consequently will increase restive
Overseas support during emergency could be minimum during the
emergency period. Therefore, local and national capacities to
respond quickly are important to prevent further crisis in thedisaster area
Government at the impacted area was mostly paralyzed due tostaggering number of victims and losses. Therefore,neighbourhood provincial government support is crucial to restore
rules and official engagements
Emergency activities to save the survivors should be prioritized.
Top priorities include meeting basic needs, filing supply chain gaps,
building a coordination room, and involving affected communities
in emergency
Efforts should be made to “build back better” at every opportunity,with disaster-resistant construction, improved quality andsustainable institutional capability
Key donors and multi-donor funds should be requested to play
coordinating roles••
Lessons Learned
•

•

•

42

Data
SourceItem

Sub-item

Information••
Infrastructure/Life
line

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

During 2005-2009, done under coordination of Aceh-Nias
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency (BRR Aceh-Nias)
supported by other national and international agencies, such as
Ministry of National Development Planning (Bappenas), Ministry of
Finance, US AID, JICA/JICS, Japan Red Cross, American Red
Cross, IOM, UNDP, World Bank , etc
Communication line, clean water supply line, electricity are starting
to restored in January 2005
Transportations line also started being restored in January 2005
3.696 km of roads are built after 4 years
363 bridges are built after 4 years
23 ports are built after 4 years
13 airport or airstrips are built after 4 years
97% households have electricity supply (des 2008)
Cellular/mobile phone access reach 35 % household needs

Other services

Temporary House

Recovery

The number of victim lived in barrack/transitional shelter :• 106.320 (2005)• 14.280 (2006)• 3.698 (2007)• 871 (2008)• 344 (2009)
Government of RI built barracks/transitional shelter in 24 locations.
977 barracks were built. Each barracks consist of 12-20 transitional
shelter with 4x5 m size for each family
5.765.000 m3 of waste were being cleaned and recycled

Disaster Waste

2.5 millions wood waste are being recycled.
UNEP, UNDP, and several agencies were involved in removing tsunami
waste

Finance

Total Rp. 21.728.136.110 was being used for ACEH rehabilitation andreconstruction
Total of Rp. 2.826.115.886 was being used for Nias rehabilitation andreconstruction.
Supported by Government of Indonesia, UN Bodies, Multi Donor Fund(MDF), EU Community, Governement of Japan and others

Support from
PrivateCompanies

Astra International, Several Indonesia National Companies, PT Telkom,
Indosat, Media Indonesia Corp, PT Coca Cola, and others were involved
during the recovery process

Support from
AbroadIn housing and settlement area :High-Level NGO/IA : 24 NGO/International Agencies : 57.914 units
Mid-Level NGO/IA : 72 NGO/International Agencies : 38.898 units••

Lessons Learned••

Shelter and basic needs of the survivors are top priorities
Accurate survivors data determine how livelihoods supports can bedelivered effectively and efficiently
Traumatized victims may receive less attention and care if carefull
survivors treatment is not conducted involving phsyciatry
observation
Women and children are the most vulnerable community groups
that need serious care during recovery

43

Data
SourceItem

Sub-item

Information•

Implementing islamic law in all aspects of life (especially in Aceh)

•
•
•

•
•

Improve the quality of human resources
Strengthening provincial and districts government
Develop and manage natural resources wisely and in accordance toits capacity
Re-built houses and settlement compeleted with its basic
insfrastructure
Built eficient and reliable infrastructure
Develop an excellence, fair and competitive regional economic
Developing and preserving cultural values and customs that
support sustainable development
Increasing the capacity of local bureaucracy that professional,
authoritative, and trustworthy
Strengthen public understanding of national and state insightStrenghten the implementation of appropriate local government•

Religion, social and cultural rights

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Education, health and gender
Monitoring
EconomyPlanning and Finance
Housing and settlement
Infrastructure
Government operation
Restoring Rules and Law
Institutional and human resources development•
Principles

•
•
•
•

Key issues

Reconstruction

Organizations

Executing Agency BRR, other goverment bodies, local/international
NGO/foundation, United Nation, Other nations such as Japan, German,
Australia, Netherland and many more
Budgeting composition for Aceh-Nias Rehabilitation andReconstruction :Financeon-treasury and on-budget:

Government:

21 trillion rupiahs

Donor

:

8 trillion rupiahs

off-treasury and on-budget

:

Donor

:

Off-treasury and off-budget

:

Donor

:

3 trillion rupiahs
35 trillion rupiahs

Support from
PrivateCompanies
Support fromabroadMulti Donor Fund, UN Bodies (such as UNDP, UNICEF, IOM,), World
Bank, EU Community, JICA-JICS of Japan, Government of Japan, US
AID, Saudi Arabian Government, Turkey, Singapore, and others
supported the reconstruction process

Reconstruction
Schedule

April 2005 – April 2009

44

Data
SourceItem

Sub-item

Information
•
•
•
•
•

Key Target,featured
strategies/approa
ches etc.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
Economic
Recovery••••

The development of spritual and social life of the people of Acehand Nias
Social, economic and cultural community is in a better state
Improving the quality of educational services, health and women’s
roles
Rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh and Nias
New structures and institutions to support sustainable economic
growthDevelop key potential for economic growth in a sustainable Acehand Nias
The rise of of agriculture fisheries and forestry
The presence of holistic-infrastructure development plan
Reconstruction and rehabilitation of housing and settlement thancomply to minimum standard
Availability of access to a healthy and clean water to all citiens
Restoration of public roads and highways in Aceh and Nias
Restoration of docks, terminals and airports which are needed tosupport economic growth
Restoration of drainage system and flood control
Revitalization of government building and insfrastructure
Strenghten the capacity of civil servant
60% of small bussinesses have access to credit. About 60.000
micro-credits to 4% of households in ACEH and 1.5% ofhouseholds in Nias
Fisheries production reached 25% above the production level
before the tsunami in 2004
Fish production reached 350.000 tonnes
In 2007, rice production reached 1.535.375 tonnes exceed the
pra-tsunami production
In 2007, coffee production reached 42.308 tonnes exceed the
pra-tsunami production
In 2007, the poverty level is become 27% from 30% in 2003

Other
Characteristics
•
•

•
•

Lessons Learned

•

•

•

Key donors and multi-donor funds should be requested to play
coordinating roles
Constant communication among partners should be maintained to
manage beneficiary and donor expectations about the pace andprogress of reconstruction
The coordinating agency should ensure integrity and accountabilityof funds to gain donor coinfidence and support
A range of influence skills including diplomacy, authority, andflexibility may be used throughout the course of reconstruction
Quality of reconstruction process as well as to ensure the works
done efficiently and effectively in achieving the reconstruction
goals should be kept as top priority. Due to heavy and large numberof reconstruction agencies during the time, coordination andcontrol of the process will be difficult if frameworks and rule among
the agencies do not conform at the first place
Data of the victims as well as data of land status are difficult toverify. This will slow the reconstruction process or else will put thereconstruction process in legal status obstacle that may not beeasy to resolve
Restoring digital data of land status at remote and save area will
help reconstruction agencies to validate legal status of landowners

45

Data
SourceItem

Sub-item

Information

Reports

Accountability Report of BRR 2008, USGS (United States Geological
Survey), ISET (Institute for Social and Environmental Transition)
Journal, Execution of Emergency Response Audit Report of DPR 2005,
Semester Report of BRR, Progress Report of BRR 2005, Progress
Report of BRR 2006, NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, NESDIS (National Environmental Sattelite, Data andInformation Service)
D-Day + Emergency Response :References

Data/photos

46

Data
SourceItem

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceRecovery, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction:４）2011 年 東日本大震災

Item

Sub-item
Date and Timeof Occurrence

Data on Hazard

Information
2:46PM, March 11, 2011(JST), 05:46 (UTC)

Data
SourceJMA
JMA
USGS
ERI-UT

MagnitudeDepth

Mw. 9.0, Mj 8.4, 24 km (JMA)
M.9.0 (USGS)
Mw 8.8, 23.7 km (Univ. of Tokyo)

Epicenter

N38.1, E142.9 (130km ESE off Oshika Peninsula)
Off Pacific Coast of Tohoku (North East) Region, Japan

JMA

Intensity of
Shaking

JMA Intensity scale:7,
Max. Ground Acceleration: 2933gal

JMA
K-NET

47

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceGround Motion

A strong ground acceleration of over 2933 cm/s/s was observed in
K-NET Tsukidate observation station (Miyagi pref.) near the
hypocenter, and the strong ground acceleration propagated in broad
area. According to the distribution of ground displacement, there
was a major ground motion of maximum above 50cm from Tohoku
to Kanto area. Especially in Sendai plain there was a huge grounddisplacement of more than 100cm.

ERI-UT

average
Northern part of Tohoku
about 15m
(Sanriku)
Southern part of Tohoku
about 5m
(South of Sendai, Ibaraki, Chiba)

Joint
SurveyGroup

Tsunami(maximumheight)Major Affected
Area
Human
DamageDamage of
Buildings

max
more than 30 m
about 10m

Pacific coast of the Tohoku area - Boso Peninsula (Near Tokyo)
Dead:15,845

Missing:
Injured:

3,380
5,894

NPA
(Jan.20,
2012)Complete destruction:

128,471 houses

Partial destruction:
Partial damage:
Fully/partial burned:

242,309 houses
662,514 houses
281 houses

NPA(Jan.20,
2012)

Road

Data onDamages

Infrastructure/Li
feline Damage- Highway:- National Road:
Railway- Shinkansen:- Main lines:
Major Port:
Airport:Electricity:
Water Supply:

Sewage System:

979 km (closed to traffic)
1,119 km (closed to traffic)
990 km (Stop Operation)
1,012 km (Stop Operation)
15 Port
13 Airport
2.6 million houses power outages (Mar. 12)
1.8 million houses out of water supply (Mar.
16)
in 19 Prefectures
48 waste water treatment plants and 78
pumping stations stop operation in 7
prefectures.

CAO1

Gas
- piped:420,000 houses out of supply- supply by cylinders: 1,660,000 houses out of supply
Telephone:- Land line
1 million lines stop operation- Cell phone
14,800 base-station stop operation

Main Damage
Cause

Most of human and physical damages were caused by the tsunami.
More than 90% death and missing were killed by the tsunami(drowning).
It is difficult to identify or distinguish the damages by theearthquake in the tsunami affected area, however according to thesurveys conducted by the some research team (e.g. Architectural
Association), not many buildings were severely damaged by theearthquake.

48

SC

Item

Sub-item

Information

Characteristics
of Damages(Physical/Social
Aspects)

Majority of human casualties were caused by the tsunami. Thoughdeath and missing were reached almost 20 thousands, amount of
injured people of 3,300 was very small, and it would be a typicalcharacteristic of the tsunami disaster.
The majority of the building damages were also caused by thetsunami while many of collapsed houses were found and certain
amount of damages by earthquake was recognized in some inland
areas.
Many of damaged building were constructed before theenforcement of new building codes which was enforced in 1981.
Damaged to the infrastructures were also limited. Effects of theretrofitting were observed.
Factories in the disaster area were kept stop operation for a while
and it affected the global “supply chain” (especially parts production
to car industry), and eventually it affected to the global industry andeconomy.
Nuclear power plant located on the pacific coast was damaged by
the tsunami and totally lost power supply. Due to this power
failure, reactors were uncontrolled and damaged. A radiation
leaked to the atmosphere and it caused nuclear disaster.
Negative impact to the nation’s economy by shortage of electricity
due to power plant failure. Wide range and complexity damage
characteristics

Data
SourceSC
Sangiin

Total: about 16.9 trillion yen

DirectEconomic Loss

Buildings (House, Shop, Office, Factory, etc.):
about 10.4
trillion yen
Lifelines (Water, Gas, Electricity, Telephone, etc.): about 4.3
trillion yen
Infrastructures (Road, River, Port, Airport, etc.): about 2.2
trillion yen
Agriculture, Forest and Fisheryabout 1.9
trillion yen
Others (School, Gov office, Hospital, etc.).:about 2.5
trillion yen(1 trillion yen = 12.5 billion USD)

49

CAO2

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceLessons
Learned<Gap between pre-disaster assumption and the actual hazards>
Because the actual earthquake and tsunami differed from theassumptions, the tsunami height and extent, and the inundation
area exceeded expected levels.
The estimated inundation area
was used for disaster management material including hazard maps.
It is possible that the hazard maps that were prepared based on the
pre-disaster hazard assumptions lead to providing false sense of
security to people, and that the tsunami that exceeded theseassumptions led to an expansion of the damage.
In such situation, some school students evacuated to the safer placethan that of designated place on their own decision, and this shows
the good example of disaster education and proper risk
communication.
<Damage to structures>
Looking at the structure measures, while these are effective against
tsunamis with tsunami heights within the scope of their design, themassive tsunami and colossal damage witnessed during thisdisaster exposed the limitations of disaster management measuresthat rely on coastal protection facilities to an excessive degree.
<Under-estimation of the first tsunami warning and its effects>
The estimation of earthquake magnitude and the tsunami height by
JMA immediately after the earthquake vastly underestimated, andthe size of the earthquake and the tsunami warnings were
subsequently repeatedly revised upwards over time. It is consideredthat the impact of the initial tsunami height prediction wasparticularly great, and it is possible that the evacuation actions ofresidents and volunteer fire fighters were blunted by the initialtsunami warning, leading to expansion of damage incurred.
<Disaster Management Measures>
As damages by the disaster greatly exceeding the damage estimate,
the former principles for hazard assumption need to befundamentally reviewed and the disaster management measures
have to be rebuilt.

SC

Rescueactivities

Rescue activities were carried out mainly by police, firefighter, coast
guard and Self Defense Force (SDF). As for the SDF case, about
107,000 personnel were dispatched for SAR and other emergency
operation activities.
As a result of the efforts, about 27,000 people were rescued.

CAO2

Medicalservices

DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team): Total of 193 teams weredispatched and provided medical service for about 2 weeks.
Other Medical Team: Total of 2,656 teams (12,264 members) frommedical association, Red Cross, national hospitals, medical
volunteers, etc. provided emergency medical services. In addition
to the emergency medical care, some teams have being provided
mental care for the disaster victims.
Also received medical teams from four countries.

CAO2

Evacuation
shelter

Public facilities e.g. schools, community centers, public gymnasium
were played as evacuation shelter and most of them were
designated as shelters.
3 days after the disaster event, about 470 thousand people were
kept evacuate in more than 2,100 shelters.

Food, water andother relief
goods supply

Foods and other relief goods were supplied by the central
government, local government and others (NGO, other institutions,etc.)Central government provided 26.2 million meals and 7.9 million
water bottles for evacuees during 2 months and a half from thedisaster.

Emergency
Response

50

CAS
recon1

CAO2

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceInformation andcommunication

To provide the information to the evacuee, the followings wereconducted.
1. Handbook- Livelihood support- Livelihood and business reconstruction- Guide for temporary shelter life
2. Flyer
3. Special TV and Radio program for evacuees
4. Newsletter through electric media (Internet)
Handbooks and flyers were distributed through not only official
channel but also various channels e.g. volunteers (with explanation)and shops.

CAS

Support from
PrivateCompanies

Many private companies provided food and relief goods to theevacuated people in their areas of expertise. Logistics for relief
goods were also supported by private companies.
Privatecompanies donated money for disaster victims.
Internet service providers, other website operators and privatecompanies who had intention to contribute to assist disaster victims
opened the special site for donation to the public, and donation
through the Internet becomes one of the channels for donation.

wiki

163 countries and territories and 43 int’l agencies stated assistance.

Support fromabroadRecoveryReceived rescue team (incl. medical assistance team) from 29
counties, territories and agencies.
Received relief goods from 63 counties, territories and agencies.
Received donation (money) from 93 counties, territories andagencies and total amount of donation was more than 17.5 billion
yen (USD219 million).
US military forces provided special support called “Tomodachi
Operation” with more than 20,000 military personnel.

Lessons
LearnedBased on the lessons learned previous large-scale disasters,
mobilization of SDF, DMAT, Tech-Force and other government
institutions were rapidly conducted. A principle for emergency
road recovery called “Kushinoha sakusen” was contributed to start
the early relief activities, and it was effective to supply relief goods
to the affected areas.
While many collaboration activities were made, supply of relief
goods to the affected area was in trouble because the affected areas
were too big and roads along the coast were severely damaged by
the tsunami.

Infrastructure/
Lifeline

Roads and highways were re-opened in two weeks except thesections that bridges were washed away.
50% of railways were restored in one month. About 1.5 months
after the disaster, Shinkansen was return to the full operation whilesome main railway lines were still under restoration because somesegments were completely washed away and new alignments of therailways have not been decided yet.
Electricity: Restored in about 1 week
Water Supply: 50% was restored in 1 week and mostly restored in
one monthGas: 50% was restored in 3 weeks and mostly restored in 1.5
months
Telephone: 50% was restored in 3 days and 90% restored in 2
weeks
Note: Lifelines were restored only the areas where not affected by
the tsunami. Restoration of lifelines in the areas affected by thetsunami will be done in accordance with the implementation ofreconstruction plan.

Other services

N/A

51

CAO2

SC
MILT1

SC
JSCE1

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceTemporaryHouse

Provided by prefecture government (Subsidized by the central gov.)
Required number of temporary houses: 53,013 (Completed:
52,182 as of end of Dec. 2011)
Iwate:
Required: 13,984, Completed: 13,984
Miyagi:
Required: 22,095, Completed: 22,095
Fukushima:
Required: 16,619, Completed: 16,226
Start construction: 2 week after disaster
50% completion: middle of June
More than 90%: middle of Aug.

CAO2
MLIT
kasetuDisaster
Waste/Debris

The tsunami produced huge amount (about 23 million tons) of
disaster waste. The amount of waste is the equivalent to 19 years’
waste amount (15.7 million tons) for Miyagi and 11 years’ waste
amount (4.8 million tons) for Iwate.
As of Nov. 2011, about 62% of waste was removed, however, due tolimitation of the processing and disposal capacity, progress of waste
disposal was not sufficiently progressed. As capacity of waste
dumping sites in the disaster affected area is limited, wide area
collaboration for waste disposal is being conducted.

CASdebrisFinance

Since the scale of damage was huge, local governments could not
bear the cost for recovery. Therefore, central government allocate
contingent budget for recovery by supplementary budget
arrangement, and almost all recovery costs will be bared by thecentral government.

MIC
news1

Support from
PrivateCompanies

N/A

Support from
AbroadN/ALessons
LearnedAs the measures had been taken in the various sectors such as road,railways and lifeline service providers etc. based on the lessons
learned from the past disasters, rapid recovery was made possible.
On the other hand, the scale of disaster was huge and affected wide
area and sectors including provision of electricity and supply chains,necessity of BCP (Business Continuity Plan) has been strongly
emphasized.

52

MILT2
news2
ntt

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourcePrinciples

The Reconstruction Design Council in response to the Great East
Japan Earthquake prepared the report and seven principles forreconstruction were proposed.
(1) For us, the surviving, there is no other starting point for thepath to recovery than to remember and honor the many lives
that have been lost. Accordingly, we shall record the disaster for
eternity, including through the creation of memorial forests andmonuments, and we shall have the disaster scientificallyanalyzed by a broad range of scholars to draw lessons that will
be shared with the world and passed down to posterity.
(2) Given the vastness and diversity of the disaster region, we shallmake community-focused reconstruction the foundation ofefforts towards recovery. The national government shallsupport that reconstruction through general guidelines andinstitutional design.
(3) In order to revive disaster-afflicted Tohoku, we shall pursue
forms of recovery and reconstruction that tap into the region’s
latent strengths and lead to technological innovation. We shallstrive to develop this region’s socioeconomic potential to leadJapan in the future.
(4) While preserving the strong bonds of local residents, we shallconstruct disaster resilient safe and secure communities andnatural energy-powered region.
(5) Japan’s economy cannot be restored unless the disaster areas
are rebuilt. The disaster areas cannot be truly rebuilt unless
Japan’s economy is restored. Recognizing these facts, we shallsimultaneously pursue reconstruction of the afflicted areas andrevitalization of the nation.
(6) We shall seek an early resolution of the nuclear accidents, andshall devote closer attention to support and recovery efforts forthe areas affected by the accidents.
(7) All of us living now shall view the disaster as affecting our own
lives, and shall pursue reconstruction with a spirit of solidarityand mutual understanding that permeates the entire nation.

recon

Key issues

N/A

Reconstruction

National Level: Reconstruction Agency (established in Feb. 2012)

Organizations

Finance

Prefecture level:
Branch office of Reconstruction Agency
Reconstruction Headquarters of prefectural government
City/Town Level:
Implementing body for reconstruction esp. land use
planning
Since required amount of fund for reconstruction is too large to bearby the local governments. Therefore, central government will
directly provide fund to the local governments as well as subsidy tothe activities done by local governments.
To secure the fund for reconstruction, central government
established “Special Tax for Reconstruction” and will raise a “Special
Bond for Reconstruction”.
Reconstruction funds in prefectural level will be prepared and someof reconstruction works will be done using the funds.

Support from
PrivateCompanies

N/A

Support fromabroadN/A

53

recon1

MOF
recon3

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceReconstruction
Schedule

Reconstruction of major infrastructures e.g. roads, rivers, transportfacilities are being implemented and it planned to be completed in a
few years.
33 out of 43 cities/towns have already prepared their reconstructionplans.
Many of the reconstruction plans have target period ofreconstruction with the range of 7 to 10 years, and also set phasesof reconstruction e.g. years for recovery, rehabilitation andreconstruction with development.

recon1
miyagikesen
rikuzen

Key Target,featured
strategies/
approaches etc.

Key target, strategies and approaches for reconstruction are varied
depending on the existing situation of the cities/towns.
Some approaches, i.e. “creating a safe city for disasters”, “creating avibrant city”, are common in many cases.
To create a safe city, especially for avoiding any human land use
plans have been prepared by restricting the residents in tsunami
affected areas and relocation of village to the high land.

Economic
Recovery
Other
Characteristics
Lessons
LearnedN/A (Reconstruction is on progress.)
N/A
N/A (Reconstruction is on progress.)

54

recon1
miyagikesen
rikuzenItem

Sub-item

Information

Reports

JMA: http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/2011_Earthquake.html
USGS:
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eqinthenews/2011/usc0001xgp/
ERI-UT:
http://outreach.eri.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eqvolc/201103_tohoku/eng
K-NET:
http://www.kyoshin.bosai.go.jp/kyoshin/topics/html20110311144
626/main_20110311144626.html
Joint Survey Group: http://www.coastal.jp/tsunami2011/
NPA: http://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/index.htm
CAO1: http://www.cao.go.jp/shien/2-shien/1-infra.html
CAO2: http://www.bousai.go.jp/
Sangiin:http://www.sangiin.go.jp/japanese/annai/chousa/keizai_prism/ba
cknumber/h23pdf/20119201.pdf
CAS: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/fukkou/
MIC: http://www.soumu.go.jp/main_content/000117828.pdf
MILT2:
http://www.thr.mlit.go.jp/road/jisinkannrenjouhou_110311/kushi
nohasakusen.html
MILT2:
http://www.thr.mlit.go.jp/road/jishinkanrenjouhou_110311/fukky
uuriyuu.pdf
MOF: www.mof.go.jp/public_relations/finance/201112e.pdf
recon1: http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/
recon2: http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/fukkou/english/index.html
recon3:www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/doc/20110729houshin.pdf
debris: http://kouikishori.env.go.jp/material/
SC:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/jishin/chubou/higashinihon/index_higas
hi.html
JSCE1: http://committees.jsce.or.jp/2011quake/node/86
news1:
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/affairs/news/110327/dst110327120200
31-n1.htm
news2:
http://sankei.jp.msn.com/economy/news/110605/biz1106052327
0007-n1.htm
rekuzen:
http://www.city.rikuzentakata.iwate.jp/kategorie/fukkou/fukkou-k
eikaku/fukkou-keikaku.html
kesen:
http://www.city.kesennuma.lg.jp/www/contents/1318004527115/index.html
miyagi:
http://www.pref.miyagi.jp/seisaku/sinsaihukkou/keikaku/index.htmntt; http://www.keieiken.co.jp/monthly/2011/1109-04/index.html
wiki: ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/東日本大震災に対する支援活動

Data/photos<Photo>http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/defense/saigai/tohokuoki/photo_001.html
http://www.pref.miyagi.jp/snd-doboku/
http://mainichi.jp/select/weathernews/20110311/etc/photo.html
http://www.asahi.com/photonews/gallery/tsunami/
http://archive.shinsai.yahoo.co.jp/

References

55

Data
Source５）1995 年 阪神・淡路大震災

Item

Sub-item
Date and Time of
Occurrence
Magnitude(source)

Information
5:46AM, January 17, 1995 (UTC: 20:46, Jan. 16, 1995)

CAO1

M 7.3 (JMA)

CAO1

M 6.9 (USGS)USGS

The northern part of Awaji Island
Epicenter
Data onHazardIntensity of
Shaking

N34.36, E135.02, Depth: 16km (JMA)
N34.58, E135.01, Depth: 22km (USGS)JMA Intensity scale: 7(Identified by the post-earthquake survey)
Ground shaking were felt wide area of Japan
Max. peak ground acceleration of 818gal was recorded at Kobe.

Ground Motion

Tsunami(maximum height)
Major Affected
Area

Vertical and horizontal shaking occurred simultaneously.
Strong shake continued 10 to 15 sec, and very strong shake(maximum shake) continued about 3 sec.

CAO1
USGS
CAO1

CAO1
CAO2

No Tsunamis
Wide areas of Kinki not only Hyogo pref. but also Osaka and Kyoto
were affected. Especially, Kobe urban area along the fault line wasseverely affected.
Dead:

Human Damage

Data
Source

CAO1

6,434

Missing: 3
Injured: 43,792
65years and more occupied half the number of the dead.
Most of death: Crushing death, about 7 % of the death by fires
Estimated time of death of more than 90% of deaths was before
6:00am which is just 15 min after the earthquake.

CAO1
Hyogo1

Complete destruction: 104,906 houses (186,175 households)
Damage of
Buildings

Partial destruction:
Partial damage:
Fully burned:
Partial burned:

144,274 houses (274,182 households)
390,506 houses
7,036 houses
96 houses

FDMA1

Road
- Highway:

Data onDamagesElevated Hanshin Expressway was collapsed.
Most of highways and urban express ways
were closed for traffic.
7,245 sections closed to traffic
330 bridges damaged
774 places (dykes and other facilities)
damaged347 places- Road:- Bridges:- Rivers:

Infrastructure/Lifeli
ne Damage- Slope failure:
Railway- Shinkansen:- Main lines:- Urban commuters:
Major Port:Electricity:
Water Supply:Gas:
Telephone:

56

Kyoto–Himeji (max.130km, Jan.17, Stop
Operation)
88km ( Stop Operation)
157km (Stop Operation)
Kobe Port andAmagasaki-Nishinomiya-Ashiya Port
stopped operation.
2.6 million houses power outages (Jan. 17)
1.3 million houses out of water supply
860,000 houses out of supply
more than 300,000 lines stop operation

FDMA1
CAO2
Hyogo2

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceMain Damage
Cause

A lot of people were sleeping as the earthquake occurred in the earlymorning. Many people (70 to 80% of dead) were crushed by the oldtimbered houses or by furniture. On the other hand, not many
people were outside and roads and railways were not clouded, thismay be causes of decreasing damages outside houses.

Hyogo1

Characteristics ofDamages(Physical/Social
Aspects)

Large-scale destructions by earthquake and fires were happened in
the areas where old wooden houses were densely constructed.
Severe damages on wooden buildings were found in the range of 6 to
7km form the fault line while fewer damages were found more than
10km away from the fault line.
Damage on the public buildings was also remarkable, and 15 % ofdamaged non-residential buildings were public buildings. As many ofpublic buildings were used for evacuation shelters, some damaged
public buildings were used as emergency evacuation shelters without
confirmation of safety.
Significant damages on buildings that were constructed before 1981
were found and it was pointed out that there was a big difference inthe earthquake resistance before and after enforcement of newbuilding code in 1981.
It was pointed out that severe damages concentrated to the“Inner-City” area. Meanwhile, severe damages also found in theareas where high income people lived.
Many fires occurred in the area where earthquake intensity scale wasmore than 6, especially scale 7, and it was proportionate to the
housing damage.

Hyogo3
CAO1

Direct Economic
Loss

Total:
Buildings:
Lifelines:
Ports:
Industry:
Education/Culture
Agriculture/Fishery/Forestry
Medical and Social Services:
Other Public Facilities

hyogo4

Lessons Learned

In general, preparedness for super-scale earthquake was not enough.
Revised building code enforced in 1981 worked. Revision of seismic
design code for infrastructure is necessary.

57

9,927 trillion yen
5,800 trillion yen
1,488 trillion yen
1,000 trillion yen
630 trillion yen
335 trillion yen
118 trillion yen
173 trillion yen
382 trillion yen

NP

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourcePolice:Rescue activities

4,500 police officers working for helping people per day (Jan.20 toFeb.28)5,500 police officers were dispatched to the disaster area from otherareas and total of 16,000 police officers were allocated to the disaster
relief. Helicopters, mobile units and other cars and equipment were
put in relief activities.
Self Defense Force (SDF):
About 4,500 SDF (GSDF and MSDF) were dispatched the disaster area
on Jan.17 which included cars, ships, airplanes/helicopters andoperation equipment. Max. 21,760 SDF/day worked not only forrescue but also removal of rubbles and disaster wastes.
Fire and Disaster Management Agency:
Total of 32,400 fire department officers were dispatched by the end ofmarch for helping rescue and relief activities.
Community Level firefighting organization:
Members for the community level firefighting organization ware
deployed for search and rescue, firefighting, guide for evacuation andpatrol the area.

CAO4

Collaborative search and rescue activities with several organizations
such as prefectural government, police, SDF and fire department wereremarkable as this kind of collaboration have never happened in theprevious disasters.
Communities played very effective role in rescuing people especially in
More than 70% of rescued people were rescued by community
people.

Emergency
Response

Medical services

Medical service points were established by the Ministry of Welfare(161, currently Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare), SDF (15), Red
Cross (12), and other organizations.
Public and private hospitals, universities, medical doctors associationand other organizations dispatched doctors and medical staffs to thedisaster area. On Feb.7, 1,730 doctors and medical staffs fromoutside of the disaster area worked for taking care of the pacients, andtotal of 75,000 medical staffs worked by the end of April.
Travelling clinics were also operated by those medical staffs andvolunteers.

CAO4

Evacuation shelter

About 317,000 people (at the peak on Jan 23) were displaced in 1,153
evacuation shelters.
Though, regional disaster contingency plans designated certain
schools as evacuation centers but many residents went to schools or
public facilities that nearest to their homes.
Foods, water and other emergency relief goods were supplied,
however despite to the government officials’ effort, those goods were
not smoothly provided to the emergency shelters due to lack of proper
information on the shelters especially immediately after the disaster.
Shelters were mainly operated by the
On Aug. 20, 1995, all shelters were officially closed however even one
year after the disaster, about 800 victims could not move totemporary house or other places and kept displaced in shelters.

CAO4

58

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceFood, water andother relief goods
supplySupply of foods, water and relief goods were mainly done by the local
government with help of the line ministries of central government,
SDF and other local governments. Even though securing water,
foods and other relief goods was the local government responsibility,
the local government could not secure required amount of supplies
because the scale of disaster was extensive. Therefore, the central
government played great role to secure it.
Water supply at temporary water supply point was made by morethan 800 water tender deployed from outside the disaster area and it
was continued till April. Foods and relief goods for displaced people
secured by local government were delivered through various channels
including private companies and volunteers.
Shops of the major retail industry re-opened relatively early and thisgreatly supported the victims’ life because official supply of foods andgoods were not so sufficient.

CAO4

Information andcommunication(Information to thedisaster victims)

Information for the disaster victims were mainly provided by the local
government through various medias.
Local governments opened “information centers” for handlingnumerous inquiries from the residents immediately after the disaster.
The information centers opened around the clock and deployed staffs
who can speak foreign language to address inquiries from theforeigners.
Local government also continuously provided the information on
damage, current situation of shelters, etc. through mass media suchas newspaper, TV and Radio by holding periodical press conference
and having regular programs. That information was also provided inseveral languages.
To improve the accessibility to the information, local governments
provided 15,000 portable radios to the disaster victims.
Paper based information dissemination was also done by the local
governments. These paper based information that covers allnecessary information for the disaster victims were distributed to theevacuation shelters, public facilities, stations and shops.
To provide area specific information, community FM Radio played bigrole and the disaster victims highly depend on it to get the
information.
Information for volunteers were provided through the office ofprefectural government’s volunteer promotion section and social
welfare council. The office also acted as a center for volunteer
registration, coordination and guidance.

CAO4

Support from
Private Companies

Not sufficient information on this item was found because at the timeof the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, supports from privatecompanies were made in ad hoc and voluntary basis and not
systematically provide. After Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake,many discussions on cooperation between public and private company
have been made.

-Support fromabroad70 countries and territories and 3 international agencies offeredsupport and received the supports from 44 countries and territories by
Feb. 9.
Rescue teams from Switzerland, France and England (NGO) were
worked on rescue and recovery of body. 8 medical teams fromabroad were also worked in Kobe under exceptional treatment in caseof emergency.
It was pointed out that receiving assistances from abroad forced
additional work to the people in affected area and there were somemismatch between actual needs at the affected area and support fromabroad.

CAO4

59

Item

Sub-item

Information

Lessons Learned

 Importance of establishment of coordination mechanism between
the agencies related to disaster relief before disasters.
 Necessity of strong coordination and collaboration during disaster
relief
 Government staffs and governments’ facilities also affected by thedisaster and faced difficulties for emergency response.
 Importance of ensuring the means of communication and keepfunctioning of information systems.
 Necessity of designation of evacuation shelters and keep it
functioning and sufficient stockpile of emergency relief goods Necessity of special attention and care to the vulnerable person todisaster and foreigners
 Necessity of mechanism to receive assistance (rescue, relief,
medical) Importance of information dissemination both disaster area andoutside of the affected areas that including abroad.

Infrastructure/
LifelineRoad- Highways and express ways were mostly restored in one to 8
month.
Collapsed express way sections were fully restored one year and 8months after the disaster.
- Major parts of national roads were restored in a few days.
Railway- Damaged section of Shinkansen (130km) was restored about 3
months after the disaster.
- Main lines were also restored in 3 months after the disaster.
- Urban commuters were gradually restored and fully restored in 7
months after the disaster.
Electricity:
5 days after the disaster (except collapsed house)
Water Supply:
40 days after the disaster (temporary restored)
3 month after the disaster (fully restored)Gas:
3 month after the disaster
Telephone:
Switching equipment - one day after the disaster
Telephone line – 2 weeks after the disaster

Other services

No sufficient information

Data
SourceIRP
CAO4

Hyogo4

Temporary House

The temporary houses are provided to all the victims who lost theirhouses by the earthquake. Construction of the temporary houses
was started about one month after the disaster, and total number of
temporary houses constructed was 48,300 (46,617 ware occupied in
Nov. 1995) in Hyogo pref.
All residents of temporary house left in Jan. 2000, and all the
temporary houses were broke down by the end of Mar. 2000. Someof the temporary houses that can be re-used were sent to othercountries such as Turkey and Taiwan as temporary houses for thedisaster victims.

hyogo4

Disaster
Waste/Debris

Total amount of the disaster waste produced by the disaster was
estimated at the 20 billion tons (21.1 billion m3) which was equivalent
to the 9-years waste production of Hyogo pref.
Those disaster wastes were transferred to Osaka Bay reclamation
area and Awajishima reclamation area.

hyogo5

Finance

Central gov. formed a supplementary budget of 1,022 trillion yen for
construction of temporary houses, recovery for lifelines, roads, etc.
and support of victim’s daily life about one month after theearthquake.

CAO2

RecoverySupport from
Private Companies

N/A

Support from
Abroad

N/A

60

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceTemporary housing Policies

Lessons Learned

Principles

 In temporary housing, community members and residents of the
facilities should cooperate with one another and live autonomously.
Coordination of various individuals, including volunteers, specialists
and the government is indispensable to achieving this.
 Project has been undertaken for supporting the day-to-day lives of
those living in emergency housing for disaster reconstruction. The
underlying aims of the project is looking after the community andpromoting social interaction. Various problems, however, have been
pointed out, including the weakening of community ties.
 Securing emergency housing is an important first step in rebuilding
housing for victims, but rebuilding their daily lives is essential toproceeding with full-fledged reconstruction of housing.
 It is therefore important to progress with securing and rebuilding
housing in a way that value the ties among people.
 Some of the emergency housing units constructed after theearthquake that were capable of being reused were provided toTurkey and Taiwan as temporary housing for victims of disasters.
Reconstruction principles of the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake andLaw for reconstruction
1) Promote prompt recovery of livelihood, economy and building safe
community by proper role allocation and collaborative work of central
and national government with respecting the wishes of local residents
2) Through the abovementioned activities, re-create dynamic Kansai
Area.

IRP

CAO2

(1) Support normalization of peoples’ life in affected area

Reconstruction

Key issues

Organizations(2) Disposal of disaster waste/debris(3) Measures for preventing secondary disaster(4) Rehabilitation of port function(5) Early recovery of infrastructure(6) Upgrade of earthquake resistance(7) Measures for housing(8) Urban development/improvement(9) Ensuring employment, preventing of unemployment(10) Enhancement of medical/health services and welfare(11) Early recovery of education facilities(12) Reconstruction of agriculture and fishery related facilities(13) Economic recovery(14) Cross-cutting measures for smooth recovery and reconstruction(15) Ensuring of safety and smooth traffic(16) Measures for disaster prevention/mitigation
Headquarters for reconstruction of the Great Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake
Chairman: Prime Minister
Members: Ministers
Secretariat: Secretary of National Land Agency and Central
government officers from related ministries.
Other members: Hyogo Pref. gov., Kobe City gov., Economic
Association, Chamber of commerce, etc.
Reconstruction committee of the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake

61

CAO2

CAO2

Item

Sub-item

Information

Finance

Central gov. formed a supplementary budget about 1,429 trillion yen
for initial reconstruction activities after 3 month of the earthquake.
(780 trillion yen spent directly by central gov. and remaining werespent as subsidy to the local gov. project)
Central gov. continuously allocate budget for reconstruction activities.
Central gov. directly spent 37 % of total amount for reconstruction of
16,300 trillion yen, but the central gov. also provides money forreconstruction as subsidy to the local gov., and as a result about 95%
of reconstruction budget spent by the central gov.
In addition, followings were made for promoting the reconstruction.
- Establishment of special foundation for reconstruction- Issuance of local bonds- Special grants of the “local allocation tax”

Support from
Private Companies

N/A

Support fromabroadN/A

Data
SourceCAO2ESRI

Hyogo Prefecture

Reconstruction
Schedule

Strategic project for reconstruction: 3 years
 Housing reconstruction
Public: 80,500 houses, Private: 44,500 houses
 Industry recovery
Recover to the same economy/industry production level
before the earthquake Urgent infrastructure rehabilitation
5,700 trillion yen
Project for reconstruction promotion: 10 years

CAO4

Basic Issue for Reconstruction

Key Target,featured
strategies/approac
hes etc.

Economic
Recovery

Other
Characteristics

 Livelihood recovery- Measures for making stable for the peoples’ life
- Create cultural environment
 Economic recovery- Ensure employment- Recover economy- Create more vital economic environment
 Create safe and attractive community- Create a base for disaster resistance, comfort and convenientarea- Create environmental friendly and barrier free community for
older anddisability people
Economic indicators, such as population, industrial production index,
number of tourists, job-offers-to-seekers ratio etc. were generally
recovered to the level before the earthquake in ten years. For
example, census at Nov 2001, population of the affected area exceed
the one before the disaster
N/A

62

CAO4

hyogo4

Item

Sub-item

Information

Data
SourceLessons Learned

 Importance of community leaded and government assisted
community/urban reconstruction for creating safer communities
against disasters, which includes keeping community tie andcommunity revitalization,
 Importance of continuous mental health care for disaster victims
 Necessity of continuous take care of elders and other vulnerable
people Necessity of revision of design standard of facilities.
(Revision of design seismic intensity for buildings and full-scale
revision of design concept for civil engineering structures) Necessity of mechanisms that help individual/household level
revitalization including funding for victims and employment
measures.
 Necessity of establishment of mechanisms that promote thereconstruction such as establishment of a special foundation,
enforcement of laws and regulations for economic revitalization,and measures for small and medium sized industry recovery, etc.
 Necessity of promotion of disaster education based on the lessons
learned from the disaster and keep memorize the disaster.
 Necessity of laws and/or regulations that promote activities andparticipation of volunteers, NGOs/NPOs who would beindispensable to post disaster recovery activities.

Hyogo6

Reports

CAO1:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/1info/kyoukun/hanshin_awaji/earthquake/index.html
CAO2:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/4fukkyu_fukkou/hanshin_awaji.html
CAO3:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/1info/kyoukun/hanshin_awaji/download/index.html
CAO4:
http://www.bousai.go.jp/kensho-hanshinawaji/chosa/index.htm
USGS:
http://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/world/events/1995_01_16.php
hyogo1: http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/pa20/pa20_000000016.html
hyogo2: http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/pa17/pa17_000000002.html
hyogo3: http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/pa17/pa17_000000001.html
hyogo4: http://web.pref.hyogo.jp/wd33/wd33_000000010.html
hyogo5:
http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/directory/eqb/book/4-367/index.html
hyogo6: Hyogo Prefecture (2005) The Great Hanshin-Awaji
Earthquake. The Report of the 10-Year Reconstruction
hayashi: www.taiwan921.lib.ntu.edu.tw
FDMA1: http://www.fdma.go.jp/detail/672.html
NP : Special issue on report of Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake by the Kobe
Shimbun (Newspaper)
recon: Reconstruction principles of the Great Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake and Law for reconstruction
ESRI: www.esri.go.jp/jp/archive/hou/hou050/hou44-6-2.pdf
IRP:
http://www.recoveryplatform.org/assets/file/irp_casestudies/irp-cs8-jpn.pdf

Data/photos<Photos>
http://www.city.kobe.lg.jp/safety/disaster/earthquake/earthquake0
3.htmlhttp://momo.nishi.or.jp/GIS/AppRoot/hisai_Phot/index.asp
http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/eqb/dlib/eqbdlib-photo.html
http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/directory/eqb/photo/maeda/index.html

References63

（２）各国基礎情報

64

65

66

67

２．国際シンポジウム発表資料（１）趣旨説明 近年の世界の巨大震災と復興の状況（独立行政法人 国際協力機構 国際協力専門員 楢府龍雄）

68

69

（２）2010 年ハイチ地震災害（ハイチ公共事業・輸送・通信省 フィリッツ・オプラン）

70

71

72

73

（３）四川地震災害（北京師範大学 壹基金公益研究院 院長 ワン・ツエンヤオ）

74

75

76

77

（４）スマトラ沖地震・津波被害（インドネシア公共事業省 復興調整責任者 バンバン・スデ
ィアトモ）

78

79

80

81

（５）地震の概要と特徴（独立行政法人 建築研究所研究専門役 古川信雄）

82

83

（６）パネラーの紹介・趣旨説明（独立行政法人 建築研究所国際地震工学センター長 安藤尚一）

84

（７）復興の実態：2005 年カシミール地震の事例にみる（建築家、災害リスク管理者
ナイーム）

85

ガザラ・

86

（８）災害復興におけるジェンダー・社会包摂の視点（静岡大学 教授 池田恵子）

87

88

（９）安全な建物づくり、まちづくり（独立行政法人 建築研究所上席研究員 福山洋）

89

90

91

（１０）災害後の復旧・復興における防災対策の推進（国際戦略アジア太平洋事務所 上級地域コーディネーター ジェリー・ベラスケス）

92

93

３．専門家会議レポート（１）池田恵子（静岡大学）「Mainstreaming gender in disaster reconstruction」
Mainstreaming gender in disaster reconstruction
Keiko Ikeda (Shizuoka University)

Why mainstreaming gender?
Men and women have different experiences and concerns – gender concerns – during disasters. All
dimensions of disaster vulnerability – such as susceptibility to hazards, the potential to suffer damage, and thecapacity for recovery – are affected by gendered patterns of access and control over resources, as well as bygender roles, responsibilities, and norms (Adger 2006; Wisner et al. 2004; Enarson and Morrow eds 1998).
People’s experiences and concerns during disasters also depend on factors like class, ethnicity, age, family
composition, and individual experience. Gender is a cross-cutting factor, and disaster vulnerability changes asother social categories lie on top. Men and women, and boys and girls are differently affected in terms ofhealth, livelihood, security, and life itself, as is being repeatedly reported and revealed to us from the field(Enerson and Chakrabarti eds. 2009). Neumayer and Plumper (2007) analyzed the effect of disaster strengthand its interaction with the socio-economic status of women on the gender gap in life expectancy in a sample
of 141 countries over the period 1981–2002. They found that 1) disasters and their subsequent impact, on
average, kill more women than men; 2) the stronger the disaster, the stronger this effect on the gender gap oflife expectancy; 3) the higher women’s socioeconomic status, the weaker is this effect on the gender gap oflife expectancy.
Every aspect of disaster recovery and reconstruction are related with gender issues. What type of
employment creation schemes is introduced in which economic sectors; how the temporary and permanent
housings are designed and located; how the local welfare institutions are rebuilt; all affect women and men
differently. It is crucial to understand and address how disaster impacted differently to men and women, The
reconstruction, otherwise, will reproduce and fix the gender gap of vulnerability and inequity, which in turnbring same suffering in the next disaster.
Recovery from 3.11 Earthquake and Tsunami
As a member of a research team for Risetogether (an organization for promoting mainstreaming genderand diversity issues in recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake) , I with three other colleagues (Dr.
Azumi Tsuge, Dr. Mieko Yoshihama, and Ms Tomoko Unomae) had interview with 29 reconstruction planners
and operators who worked mostly in Miyagi and Iwate prefectures (June 2011- Jan 2012). In Fukushima
prefecture, interview is still going on. The research aims to understand how people assisting reconstruction
tried to understand various needs of women/vulnerable groups, and to address them in reconstruction
programs. Staff members of rescue and reconstruction related institutions and organizations, women’sorganizations working for women and local government bodies and so on, and individuals in the local

94

community were interviewed.
Gender-sensitive and vulnerability-reduction-focused disaster recovery policies are already in place inJapan. The Government newly enacted Basic Reconstruction Law last June. In the guideline for recovery
issued by the headquarter for reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake, it is emphasized that
responding to women’s/men’s and vulnerable people’s needs especially in 1) rebuilding resilient community,
2) recovery of life, and 3) farming sector, and to ensure participation of women as well as men in allreconstruction process. Disaster Management Basic Plan (amended in Dec. 2011) clearly mentions that
opinion of women’s and various group of people should be incorporated when managing temporary housing
community. While, practicing these basic principles seemed difficult as I understood from interviews, as
follows.
1) How gender and specific needs were identified in reconstruction process
Gathering and sharing gender-specific and socio-economically disaggregated data were not practiced
much in programs of reconstruction – from planning to monitoring and evaluation. Instead, usually, only thehousehold head and community leaders, mostly male, were consulted to provide ideas on the needs of every
affected member in the household or community on their behalf. Women, in front of men and unfamiliar
person, often did not want to speak out their needs. Some local women’s groups held women-only-meetings,
or used enveloped questionnaire to protect privacy. Only then, they could somehow know what were thewomen’s needs. It was further difficult to reach families with the aged/ the disabled or single-mothers withsmall babies who were too sick/week to stay long at emergency shelters, as they are invisible, scattered intheir own house, or moved to house for rent, though they are among most vulnerable. The social workers who
were assigned to temporary housing communities were given gender sensitivity training and were expected togather gender disaggregated data on recovery needs.
2) gender specific needs addressed in reconstruction programs
Women’s workload for family care greatly increased, which made it difficult for women to have wide
choice of jobs. Unemployment among women increased more than among men, as certain newly created jobs
after the Disaster and Tsunami were mostly meant for men, such as clearing debris and construction works.
The government held vocational training courses and entrepreneurship seminars for women.
Consulting facilities including telephone hotlines were established to respond to anticipated increase ofviolence against women and children, especially domestic violence. Psychological counselors were given
special training in affected prefectures. On the other hand, very few programs targeting single-father families
and mental health care for men are planned and practiced, though many interviewees pointed out that they arevery necessity.
Many of the reconstruction programs are still designed based on ‘household model’, not ‘individualmodel.’ In some cases, allocation of temporary houses and distribution of ‘recovery donation money’ to thehousehold head excluded women accessing resources for recovery.

953) Increasing the representation of women and vulnerable groups in post-disaster decision-making
Women/Vulnerable people are not sufficiently participating in decision-making of recovery planning,
and women’s leadership was not very commonly accepted. Number of women in formal reconstruction related
committees of local bodies and central Government are very small. Interviews with some women leaders incommunity reconstruction related institutions revealed women’s leaderships were challenged and womenleaders face hardship accessing information necessary for recovery. Women’s initiatives were displayed when
preparing meals for other affected people. Local women’s organizations are actively engaged in reconstruction.
Although their activities may not be very important for mainstream reconstruction programs, they arecontributing to raise and promote affected women’s leadership. Most of the women’s groups are small andfinancially week, and should be supported in terms of acquiring skills and capacity for financial andorganizational sustainability.
4) Assisting those who assist reconstruction
Many of the reconstruction planner and operators were themselves affected by the Earthquake andTsunami. Improving work environment of female reconstruction planners and operators, e.g. daycare service
for their dependent family, would contribute to better reconstruction programs. Reconstruction planner andoperators should be informed with how to identify gender needs of reconstruction.
Need to learn from international practice
The Japanese experiences mentioned above in tentative research findings contrasts strikingly with
progress achieved in some Asian countries. For example, Bangladesh has mainstreamed gender and social
inclusion in disaster risk reduction process and long-term development goals in both policy and community
levels. Since 2005 when Comprehensive Disaster Management Program was launched, about one third ofmembers of Union (lowest unit of local autonomy) Disaster Management Committee members are women(50% are women in case of NGO assisted disaster management committees). Thus participation of women indecision-making and agenda-setting was made secure. Community-based disaster risk reduction planning
process was standardized, in which discussion sessions only among the poor, the disabled and women
separately. Gender disaggregated vulnerability and capacity analysis was also a part of the process. Number ofwomen in rescue and recovery organizations also increased. Cyclone Prepared Programs that convey cyclone
warning messages to community people and assist their evacuation in coastal areas, initially consisted of only
male volunteers, but now one third of them were women (Ikeda 2011).
Bangladesh and other Asian countries have institutionalized this series of improvement after late 1990s,
adopting frameworks prepared at two World Conferences for Disaster Reduction both hosted by Japan. It is
our turn now to learn how to identify various needs of men/women and address them in reconstruction
operations, and how to promote equal participation of men and women into reconstruction, from international
practices.

96Refferences
Adger, W. 2006. Vulnerability. Global Environmental Change 16: 268–81.
Enarson, Elaine, and Betty H. Morrow, eds. 1998. The Gendered terrain of disaster: Through women’s eyes.
Praeger.
Enarson, E. & P. G. Dhar Chakrabarti eds., 2009, Women, Gender and Disaster: Global Issues and Initiatives，
Sage.
Ikeda, Keiko, 2011, Narrowing the Gender Gap of Vulnerability through Community-Based Disaster Risk
Management: A Case Study of Cakaria Upazila, Banlgadesh, Journal of Environmental Sociology 17:
17：111-125．
（「災害脆弱性のジェンダー格差とその克服―バングラデシュ・チョコリア郡の事
例に見る地域防災の可能性―」『環境社会学研究』，17：111-125．）
International Recovery Platform [no date], Guidance Note on Ricovery –Gender Available from IRP website
http://www.recoveryplatform.org
Neumayer, Eric, and Thomas Plu¨mper，2007， “The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters: The Impact ofCatastrophic Events on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy, 1981–2002,” Annals of the American
Association of Geographers, 97 (3) : 551–66.
Westport, CT: Praeger.Wisner, Ben, Piers Blaikie, Terry Cannon, and Ian Davis. 2004. At risk: Natural
hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. London: Routledge.

97

（２）ガザラ・ナイーム（パキスタン）「Reconstruction Realities In Context of Kashmir
Earthquake 2005」

Reconstruction Realities
In Context of Kashmir Earthquake 2005
1. Background
The phrase “earthquakes do not kill people, it is the unsafe buildings which do” was found to be true
during the 2005 Kashmir Earthquake.
Highly fragile built environment when shaken by the magnitude 7.6 EQ on the Richter scale, devastated
30,000 square kilometers of the area. It killed more than 73,000 people including 18000 school children.
About 600,000 families were made homeless also affecting livelihood and infrastructure in nine districtsof Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK).
Severity of the damage is attributed to theearthquake’s upthrust coupled with poor construction;
built mostly as non-engineered structures without
following any building code. Following chart can help
understanding the typology of built environment ofPakistan.

Above: Aerial view of devastation caused by
EQ 2005- Balakot City, KPK
Right: Graph shows only 5% engineeredbuildings whereas more than 75 % structures ofload bearing brick masonry and Adobe.
Source, Pakistan Built Environment Research
Project, Prof. Sarosh Lodi, NED University
Karachi
Unprecedented efforts and cooperation of national and international community culminated insuccessful completion of relief and recovery phase, which was followed by reconstruction andrehabilitation activities.

982. Reconstruction Targets:
Apart from the huge death toll and the unprecedented number of people injured and displaced, theearthquake destroyed all essential facilities in the entire nine districts.
This mega disaster created a mammoth task to reconstruct 600,000 houses, 6298 educational facilities,
796 health units, 6440 km of road network and 50-70 % of the infrastructure (telecom, power, waterand sanitation) completely destroyed.
Prior to Kashmir Earthquake 2005, no dedicated organization in the country existed to deal with themega disasters like this one, therefore ensuing huge volume of the reconstruction challenge, an“Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority” (ERRA) was constituted on 24th Oct 2005,
soon after the earthquake. Although it was not an easy take off for such an infant organization withhardly any previous established mechanism and procedures in force and any human resource capacity
developed to deal with such mega disasters.
After six months of the earthquake, the relief phase was declared closed, having created enabling
environment for the affected population to start participating in the reconstruction and rehabilitationof their houses and physical infrastructure.
3. Sectoral Challenges and Updates:
ERRA intervened in twelve different sectors grouped under four clusters:
1. Direct Outreach to Households and Individuals1,
2. Social Services2,
3. Public Infrastructure3,
4. Cross Cutting Programmes4.
I.

Housing

ERRA provided financial and technical assistance to the owners of damaged or destroyed houses forreconstructing or retrofitting, following an owner-driven approach but assisted and inspected by theconstruction regime.
• Mobilized Assistance and Inspection (AI) Teams for house to house outreach.
Partner organizations were involved to constitute AI teams trained in assessments comprisingof a government representative, an engineer and a social organizer.
• Provided cash grants of US $ 1667 for reconstruction of a core house of 250-400 square feetand US $ 833 for retrofitting and repair of structurally damaged house. Cash grants installments
were are linked to three stages of construction and adoption of seismic safety design standards.
• Established building standards and earthquake resilient designs for non-engineered and adobe
construction by improving and modification of indigenous and prevailing construction
techniques.
• Technical assistance targeted at local authorities, partner organizations, contractors, masons,and home- owners covering; hazard mapping, damage and eligibility assessments, earthquake
resilient construction solutions, facilitating building material markets as well as land andproperty related issues.
• Developed grievances redress system for house ownerships, land availability and relocation
issues.
1
2
3
4

Rural Housing, Livelihood and Social Protection
Education Health, Water and Sanitation
Governance, Transport, Power and Telecommunication
Disaster Risk Reduction, Environmental Safeguards and Gender Equality99Challenges:
•
•
•

•
•
•

In the absence of updated ownership records/ data base of family properties, finalizing the lists
of beneficiaries as per eligibility criteria and damage assessment was a huge challenge.
Legal Aid Centers were established at district level to resolve the property ownership disputes.
Exclusive Women Committees were established to help and support the female heads of thefamilies to receive financial and technical assistance for reconstruction e.g. widows of thevictims faced family resistance for taking cash grants.
To meet the demand of many fold increase in construction activity in the affected area, large
number of trained workers/ masons were needed; about 80% of the force required was
untrained and hence trained from the scratch. To support aggregated demand and continued
supply/availability of good quality construction material, material hubs were established at
district level.
Financial assistance was planned to be disbursed through banks whereas most of the people
did not have any bank account. Special arrangements were made for opening of the new bankaccounts and re-issuance of necessary documents to affected population.
Relocation of the individual house to an alternate site was comparatively easy but relocating atown or a settlement posed difficulties in terms of finding alternate site as well communities’
acceptance to be relocated.
The massive reconstruction in the area resulted in tremendous pressure on the natural
resources and hence deforestation was monitored and controlled with the help of satellite
images.
Updates: 462546 units of rural housing were completely destroyedand 1010,091 were partially damaged. At the end of 2011, rural
housing programme is near successful completion. By the end ofJune 2012, 92 % of the destroyed houses will be reconstructed as
per ERRA guidelines leaving over 250,000 trained human resources
for seismically safe non-engineered construction.
Put this
information in box
Master plans of urban development projects for the cities ofMuzaffarabad, Bagh, Rawalakot and Balakot have been approved
and Chinese firms are conducting field surveys.

Social Impact: During a survey in 2008; 88 percent responded enhanced level of confidence in theirreconstructed houses. The awareness raising campaigns further enhanced the community’s capacity.
This prompted safer reconstruction methods and new technologies with wide inclination towards ERRA
guidelines.

100

II.

HealthHealth care network was rendered paralyzed and 796 health facilities needed reconstructed or
retrofitting. The required health services were being provided in makeshift arrangements
Challenges: The smaller Units were integrated into primary
health care facilities out of which initially 267 were pledged
by donors but later 92 facilities were dropped. Sustainabilityof interventions is a major challenge which needs to beaddressed by the government.
Updates: 173 health facilities have been completed, 86 areunder construction and 47 are at designing/ tendering stage
as of Jan 2012.
However, very few health facilities are fully operational,
primarily due to the lack of government’s capacity tomaintain and manage.

First dialysis center at AJ& K, Abbass
Institute of medical sciences

Social Impact: patient’s survey showed 65.5 % found the post earthquake health facilities better than
before; whereas only 3.5 % of the facilities had deteriorated. A great proportion of patients felt donor/
NGO provided health facilities are better than the facilities managed by the government. 50 % were of
the view that the new facilities are performing better because of the new equipment and bettersupply of medicine whereas 35 % considered improved construction as the reason of better healthfacilities.
III.

Education

The Kashmir earthquake destroyed 6298 educational institutions killing more than 18000 students.
Surviving teachers and students were traumatized and the objective was to bring them back tonormalcy within the shortest possible time, hence tent schools were established to ensure minimum
disruption of academic activities.
Challenges: Land availability was a big issue, many
institution were to be relocated for reconstruction forimproved facility. Government department haveserious capacity limitations to operate and manage
such a large number of projects spread over a vast area.
Updates: 38 % educational institutions have been reconstructed, whereas 36 % are near completion.
The reconstructed universities are provided with modern state-of-the-art equipment, libraries andlaboratories. The standard of seismically safe educational buildings along with modern day facilities
has been an incentive to attract high enrolment and improve the standard of education. Provision ofstaff, operation and maintenance of completed facilities is the basic responsibility of the concerned
provincial and state government which are finding it hard to cope with sustainability issues.
Social Impact: Students enrolment in schools has been significantly improved. The new enrolment inprimary schools has risen to 385,00 as compared to the 200,000 . The increase in the number ofstudents going to school reflects the restored confidence of the parents to send their children to
educational institutions. 85 % students consider their institutions well equipped and safe.

101

IV.

Water Supply and Sanitation

The objective is to improve community‘s quality of living standards with improved drinking watersupply, sanitation and solid waste management.
Challenges: the scattered water sources in the rugged terrain andinadequate supply system was envisaged as a futuristic problem.
However, the strategy of participatory approach, wasimplemented to overcome the impeding tasks i.e. reconstruction
and rehabilitation of 4001 Water Supply Schemes (WSS) and 623
sanitation projects.
Updates: So far, over 84% of the physical work has been completed;
whereas remaining ongoing works are at advanced stages of completion.
Social Impact: As a result of installation of water supply schemes (WSS)
within the proximity of a radius of 75m compared to pre-earthquake
situation, on average, a household resulted in saving one hour daily.
Improved access to WSS has helped to bring the behavioral changes onhygiene and sanitation in the community.
4. Way forward
A glimpse of reconstruction and rehabilitation process and progress so far reveals unprecedented
achievements by ERRA for a newly established organization with no background experience of handlingdisaster of this magnitude.
However, the experience also reveals that incompatible capacities of other line departments need a lotof improvement to ensure sustainability of all the “build back better” facilities and infrastructure.
The nation was caught unprepared by the Kashmir Earthquake in 2005; but the increased frequency ofnatural and manmade disasters within the past decades has revealed the importance of preparedness
and mitigation for optimum utilization of country’s scarce resources.
Diverse topographic climatic and cultural features of Pakistan coupled with varied disaster threats
ranging from hydro-met to geological, demand extra ordinary care for integrating disaster risk
reduction into development.
The subsequent reconstruction scenario, of 2010 and 2011 mega floods demands integration of lessons
learnt from the reconstruction of EQ 2005 in addition to adapt measures to reduce carbon footprint
and keeping in mind climate change adaptation strategy.

References:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

ERRA Annual Review 2009-10
Summary report on MZD Earthquake destruction by Ali, UET Peshawar
http://www.erra.gov.pk/
ERRA Monitoring and Evaluation Report 2010-June 2011
ERRA Social Impact Survey report 2008102

（３）斎藤大樹（独立行政法人 建築研究所）「LESSONS OF RECENT GIGANTIC EARTHQUAKEDISASTERS IN JAPAN」
LESSONS OF RECENT GIGANTIC EARTHQUAKE DISASTERS IN JAPANTaiki SAITO1
1

Chief Research Engineer, International Institute of Seismology and Earthquake Engineering,
Building Research Institute, Tsukuba Japan, tsaito@kenken.go.jp

1. Introduction
In the last 100 years, there are three gigantic earthquake disasters in Japan which caused
tremendous loss of human life: the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake Disaster (hereinafterreferred to as 1923 Kanto Earthquake), the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster(hereinafter referred to as 1995 Kobe Earthquake) and the 2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake Disaster (hereinafter referred to as 2011 Tohoku Earthquake). Figures 1 showsthe epicenters and Table 1 summarizes the disasters.

1923 Kanto Earthquake

1995 Kobe Earthquake2011 Tohoku Earthquake

Figure 1 Epicenters of earthquakes (figures are cited from Wikipedia)
Table 1 Three gigantic earthquake disasters in Japan after 1900

Date
Time
Magnitude
Death & missing
Main
cause
of
death
Major
building
damage

1923
Great
Kanto
Earthquake
1923.09.01
11:58
7.9
Around 105,000
Fire 85%-

Wooden houses
Brickbuildings
adopting westernstyle

1995 Great Hanshin
Awaji Earthquake
1995.01.17
05:46
7.2
6,434
Building Collapse 75%
Fire 12% (*1)
- Old type buildings
designed
before1981- RC buildings with
Soft first story*1 from statistics of Kobe city
*2 from Japanese National Police Agency (as of 22 Dec. 2011)

103

2011 Great East Japan
Earthquake
2011.3.11
14:46
9.0
19,312 (*2)
Tsunami 92% (*2)-

Minor damage forshaking
Tsunami damage

The cause of loss is different in each disaster. Roughly, it can be categorized as “Fire (1923
Kanto Earthquake)”, “Shaking (1995 Kobe Earthquake)” and “Tsunami (2011 Tohoku
Earthquake)”. Even Japan has learnt severe lessons from earthquake disasters and has
improved knowledge and technology for countermeasures, the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake
reveals the fact that our effort is not still enough. This paper summarizes lessons of eachdisaster and efforts which have been taken, especially focusing on the structural design ofbuildings.
2. Earthquake intensity
Figure 2 shows the sizes of earthquake fault including the 1960 Chile Earthquake which is
known as the largest earthquake in the world.

Figure 2 Size of earthquake fault
The 2011 Tohoku Earthquake is known at the largest earthquake in the history of Japan
from the size of magnitude. However, comparing other two earthquakes, the epicenter was
relatively far from the land. In general, intensity of earthquake ground shaking is getting104

reduced as the distance from the epicenter increases (as shown in Figure 3). This could be thereason that building damage due to the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake was relatively minor.
However, the maximum accelerations of earthquake ground motions recorded at the 2011
Tohoku Earthquake are quite large as shown in Figure 4. Question still remains why thebuilding damage was minor even earthquake ground motion has such a high acceleration
value.

Figure 3 Intensity of earthquake

Figure 4 List of large earthquake ground motions at the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake
Figure 5 shows the comparison of pseudo velocity spectrums between the 1995 Kobe
Earthquake and the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake. The 1995 Kobe Earthquake occurred justbeneath the city of Kobe and produced intensive shaking with high frequency around 1 to 2
Hz as shown in the spectrum. On the other hand, it is seen that the power of the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake in this frequency range is relatively small. Generally wooden houses and low rise
reinforced concrete buildings are affected by the shaking with the frequency component
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around 1 to 2 Hz; this could be the explanation of minor building damage at the 2011 Tohoku
Earthquake.

Figure 5 Pseudo velocity spectrums with 5% damping
3. Seismic capacity of buildings
3-1. 1923 Kanto Earthquake --- from brick to reinforced concrete
There was no seismic design code in Japan before the 1923 Kanto Earthquake. As that time,
Japanese Government decided to introduce Western culture and technology to catch up
Western countries. Fire resistance was the main concern in urban areas since the mostbuildings were constructed by wood. Therefore, Government recommended buildings made ofbrick instead of wood.
At the 1923 Kanto Earthquake, brick buildings were severely damaged. The Ginza Brick
Street, the symbol of Western style town, destroyed completely. Ryou-unkaku, the highest
brick tower in Japan with 12 stories, also the landmark of Asakusa district, has collapsed. On
the other hand, reinforced concrete buildings showed excellent performance both against fireand earthquake shaking. Reinforced concrete has jumped to the leading role in building thecity of Japan. The first seismic design code was enacted next year of the 1923 Kanto
Earthquake.
There are unique structures became popular after the 1923 Kanto Earthquake. One is
the steel encased concrete structures (so called SRC) and another one is the reinforced
concrete shear walls.
3-2. 1995 Kobe Earthquake --- start promotion of seismic retrofit
Japanese seismic design code has been revised many times based on the lessons ofearthquake disasters. The 1968 Tokachi Earthquake caused severe damage to reinforced
106concrete buildings. The Architectural Institute of Japan (AIJ) revised design guideline ofreinforced concrete buildings in 1971, requiring more stirrups to increase shear resistanceand ductility of buildings.
The biggest revision of seismic design code was made in 1981 after the 1978 Off Miyagi
Earthquake. The code adopted two level design procedures as shown in Figure 6; one is theserviceability limit design for moderate earthquakes with a base shear capacity of 20 percent
of total weight of a building, another one is the safety limit design for strong earthquake witha base shear capacity of 100 percent of total weight of a building.
C0 = 0.2 moderate earthquake
1st Level
Seismic force

Elastic analysis

Building must be elastic based onallowable stress design.

Wight W

F = C0 W

Shear resistance
C0 = 1.0 strong earthquake

C0 W

2nd Level

Nonlinear analysis

Building capacity must be checked
to prevent collapse.

Figure 6 Concept of the two level design procedure at 1981 revision
The effect of this revision was proved at the 1995 Kobe Earthquake. As shown in Figure 7,
the ratio of collapse buildings designed after 1981 was very small. The minor revision wasmade after the earthquake to prevent collapse of soft first story buildings. After theearthquake, Japanese Government issued a law to promote seismic retrofit of existingbuildings design before 1981, providing subsidy and other benefits.

Collapse of buildings
After 1981
3%

76%

21%

1971～1981

Before 1971

Figure 7 Building damage at the 1995 Kobe Earthquake
3-3. 2011 Tohoku Earthquake --- need to consider Tsunami force in building design
Tsunami induced by the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake struck the Pacific coast of eastern Japan
including prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki and Chiba. In some areas,
tsunami height reached over 10 m and washed away the houses and buildings in the areas.
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The earthquake shaking was also strong in wide area of Japan; however, the damage ofbuildings due to shaking was limited. Extensive liquefaction of sandy soil occurred in Kanto
area.
In tsunami disaster site, overturning was observed in 4-story or lower reinforced concretebuildings with relatively small size of openings as shown in Figure 8. In all overturnedbuildings, the maximum inundation depth exceeded their height. Most of the overturnedbuildings are of mat foundation. In some overturned buildings on pile foundation, piles were
pulled out from the ground.

Figure 8 Overturning of a reinforced concrete warehouse in Onagawa city
Consideration of the tsunami effect on buildings is not mandatory for the structuraldesign and there is no regulation to define the tsunami force in the Building Standard Law inJapan. However, the Cabinet office, government of Japan released official guideline on the
structural design of buildings for vertical evacuation from tsunamis in 2005. This guideline
provides the simplified method to calculate tsunami wave pressure affecting a building using
design water depth (see Figure 9). The guideline was revised in 2011 to change the run-up
height of tsunami using the parameter α which ranges from 1.5 to 3.0 depending on the
distance from the coast and the existence of shielding fence of tsunami.

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building2005 guidelinezDesign wave pressureqz

q z = ρ g (3h − z )3hDesign water depth: h3ρgh2011 guidelineq z = ρ g (αh − z )α ρgh(α =1.5 – 3.0)

Figure 9 Guideline on the structural design of tsunami evacuation buildings
4. Conclusions
Tsunami has attacked Tohoku regions repeatedly. However, people forgot such lessons andstarted living again in dangerous areas near the ocean. A gigantic earthquake like the 2011
Tohoku Earthquake is supposed to occur every 1,000 years. The 1995 Kobe Earthquake is also
expected to occur every 2,000 years. The return period of the gigantic earthquake is too large
for human to keep awareness of disaster prevention. Therefore, it is important to change
regulations or make the new ones reflecting the lessons as soon as possible. Also, sharing such
experience with other countries is important.
Acknowledgement
The author would like to express his deepest condolences to those who lost their families andthose who are suffering from the disaster. Alos, he would like to express his heartfelt
appreciation to people from around the world for their warm support.

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（４）ジェリー・ヴェラスケス（国際戦略アジア太平洋事務所、タイ）「Promoting
Disaster Risk Reduction in Recovery and Reconstruction」

Promoting Disaster Risk Reduction in Recovery andReconstruction
Jerry Velasquez, D.Eng.
Senior Regional Coordinator, UNISDR Asia PacificIntroduction
The Asia-Pacific region has witnessed remarkable economic growth and development
in recent decades. Since 1990, its aggregate GDP grew three fold – to $17.7 trillion
and the share of people living in poverty fell from 49% to 25%. Even at the height of
2008-09 global economic crisis, Asia and Pacific was still the fastest-growing region
in the world, supported in large part by fiscal stimulus packages adopted by theregion’s biggest economies. Further, the outlook for 2010 has improved significantly,
with Asia-Pacific region developing economies forecast to grow by 7 per cent, led by
China (9.5) and India (8.3).
The Asia-Pacific region is home of 61% of the world’s population and 29% of world's
GDP and from 1980 to 2009 absorbed an average of 58% of global mortality and 42%of global economic damages caused by disasters. This means that the region has
performed better in protecting its human assets than its economic assets, and that
despite the commendable economic performance of the region, the region still has a
lot to do to improve the resilience of its economies to disasters as compared to the restof the world.
Between 2002 and 2011, there were 4130 disasters recorded, resulting from natural
hazards around the world where 1,117,527 people perished and a minimum of
US$1,195 billion was recorded in losses. In the year 2011 alone, 302 disasters
claimed 29,782 lives; affected 206 million people and inflicted damages worth aminimum of estimated US$366 billion.
Increasing Disaster Exposure
If there is one thing that we managed to achieve over the many years of prevention is
the reduction of the number of deaths due to disasters despite the rise in the number of
events. However, what is alarming is the tremendous increase in economic damage
due to these same disasters. It is observed that these increases are caused by increased
exposure coupled with economic development.
More people and assets are located in areas of high risk. The proportion of world
population living in flood-prone river basins has increased by 114%, while thoseliving on cyclone-exposed coastlines have grown by 192% over the past 30 years.
Over half of the world’s large cities, with populations ranging from 2 to 15 million,
are currently located in areas highly vulnerable to seismic activity. Rapid urbanization
will further increase exposure to disaster risk.

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As a background, the recent Global Assessment Report for Disaster Risk Reduction(GAR) notes the increasing trend for disaster impacts worldwide, is measured interms of fatalities and economic effects (mostly losses). This trend is driven,according to GAR, by the rapid increase in exposure, both human and economic. The
GAR also tells us that vulnerability has improved considerably in the last few decades.
Almost 85% of mortality risk to earthquakes is concentrated in lower-middle income
countries, which highlights that while wealthy countries tend to be less risk-prone
than poorer countries; most of the recent risks to earthquakes have accumulated incountries, which are rapidly expanding their economies. This means that disaster riskincreases if the exposure of people and assets to natural hazards increases faster thancountries can strengthen their risk-reducing capacities, including the strengthening ofgovernance capacities, such as the quality of institutions, transparency andaccountability.
In the case of floods, mortality risk increased by 13% from 1990 to 2007, but over thesame period flood economic loss risk increased by 35%. These increases were foundto be due to rapid growth in the people and economic assets concentrated in hazard
prone areas. Globally, the number of people exposed to floods increased by 28% inthis period, while exposed GDP increased by 98%. Most flood risk is concentrated incountries, such as China, India, and Thailand, which had increased their GDP by
550%, 285% and 218% respectively (based on constant 2000 USD) in the same
period.
Also vulnerability declined by 11% in the case of deaths and by 32% in the case of
economic loss, reflecting improved development conditions. This means that we arereally doing well in our preparedness, early warning, etc. But this decline wasinsufficient to compensate for the increase in exposure - we simply put more people
and economic activities in harms way.
In the case of the recent floods in Thailand, the Chao Phraya basin where all of thefloods came from and which drains in Bangkok, covers 30% of Thailand's land area
and is where 40% of the population live. However, it is also where 66% of the total
GDP is generated and where 78% of the people work. There are projections that thebasin will slowly get more urbanized in the coming decade.
In another example, in India, growing cities exposes more assets and people tohazards, with an about 200 million city dwellers likely to be exposed to earthquakes
and cyclones by 2050, which is three times more than the 70 million people exposed
today.
A new global ranking by Maplecroft, calculating the vulnerability of 170 countries tothe impacts of climate change over the next 30 years, identifies some of the world’s
largest and fastest-growing economies, as facing the greatest risks to their populations,ecosystems and business environments. In this ranking 16 countries are rated with‘extreme risk,’ to future climate effects largely due to significant forecasted growth.
Bangladesh (1), India (2), Philippines (6), Vietnam (13) and Pakistan (16) all featurein the highest risk category and are of particular importance as they are major
contributors to the ongoing global economic recovery and are vital to the future
expansion of Western businesses in particular.

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And exposure does not necessarily mean physical location. For example, in assessing
the implications for the Asia-Pacific region of a slowdown in Japan due to last years
tsunami disaster, a recent economics report by ESCAP found that a 1.0 percentage
point shrink by from the baseline growth in 2011 of the Japanese economy would
have a 0.1 to 0.21 percent impact on growth to China, Malaysia, India, Singapore, andPhilippines, including a 0.2 to 0.5 % impact on export growth of these same countries
due to disruption in inputs from Japan as part of regional production chains.
Finally, the IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events andDisasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, whose executive summary was
released last November 2011, and the full report this February 2012, notes that"settlement patterns, urbanization, and changes in socioeconomic conditions have all
influenced observed trends in exposure and vulnerability to climate extremes (highconfidence)."
Strategies for Reducing Disaster Exposure
What are practical strategies to reduce exposure from disasters? Exposure to futuredisasters has the greatest potential to be reduced if disaster risk management approachis incorporated in land use, urban and spatial planning, and in post-disasterreconstruction planning.
The latest worldwide data shows that only 15% of low-income countries reportsuccess in using land-use planning and urban development to reduce risk. Land usechanges exacerbate the impacts of disasters. Locating large numbers of vulnerable
communities or economic assets in flood prone riverbanks, extensive deforestationand mining, and conversion of farmlands into urban development increases the risksof damages due to floods.
The recent floods in Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines have put focus on theurban development, watershed management and community preparedness systems.
There is also some anecdotal data that private investments create new risk throughnew economic areas and zones, which lead to concentration of population and assets
in coastal areas and flood plains.
The private sector, largely accountable for economic growth and financing
infrastructure, should share in the responsibility for the risks they create, rather thanhaving the public sector solely paying for them. There has been greater exposure todisasters, yet there is no apparent link between growth and disaster risk reduction.
The following section looks more in depth at the opportunities for reducing disaster
exposure during recovery and reconstruction.
Reducing Disaster Risks During Recovery and Reconstruction
The Hyogo Framework for Action highlights the importance of mainstreaming
disaster risk reduction efforts within urban planning and reconstruction of building
and infrastructure projects.

112Post-disaster reconstruction is often seen as a chance to rebuild better, reduce futuredisaster risk, and improve the quality of life of the affected communities. However,
the haste to “recreate the familiar” & “return to normal” tends to skip the concept of“building back better” in the post-disaster reconstruction.
A typical barrier to the adoption of more DRR in recovery and reconstruction include
barriers to fundamental land use change (cost, prior investments, property ownership,
and commercial interests), lack of community involvement in the recovery andreconstruction planning, and the haste to reconstruct, which in turn results in lessreduction of exposure during reconstruction.
Community Focused Recovery
One important aspect of incorporation of risk reduction during reconstruction iscommunity-based approaches in reducing risks. For example, considering culturaldimensions and livelihood patterns of affected communities will ensure that policies
and technologies used during reconstruction will cater to the needs of thecommunities.
Importantly a disaster may offer an opportunity for communities to change the way
they think. By involving communities in the very early in the recovery process, it
provides an opportunity to build on community’s cultural and social resilience. For
this to happen, however, communities need to be involved in the planning andexecution of the activities in the recovery. Governments can therefore develop
standards and strategies for community participation and input, based on anunderstanding of community strengths and weaknesses.
Proper Resourcing and DRR During Recovery
The International Recovery Platform has found that one of the most important
requirements for a resilient recovery is to allocate sufficient time and resources. If thetime frame is too short the danger is that the recovery processes may build backvulnerabilities or even increase them, while risk reduction will amount to little morethan a series of add-on training programmes.
In addition to sufficient time, the scale of financial resources available for recovery,
especially from non-governmental sources, is also an important aspect of the successof the recovery and the success of the inclusion of disaster risk reduction. Resources
can come from national, local and community sources within Governments, andthrough pairing of economically strong and less developed local governments.
Linking loans from donor communities and private sector to risk reduction efforts canalso be a means of ensuring that these investments are sustainable and does not create
new risks. Donor aid and post disaster loans are a source of cheap funding to help
recovery and reconstruction in the aftermath of a disaster, and should be encouraged
to also be the source of mitigation and resilience building within recovery andreconstruction period.

113Consider Social, Cultural and Natural Heritage in Recovery
The post-disaster recovery reconstruction processes usually focus primarily on
providing the essential needs for the local communities and on rehabilitating basic
infrastructure. Because of this, the attention paid to the damage caused by this disasterto the cultural and natural heritage becomes limited. However, the reality is much
more complex, and social fabric often requires rebuilding of other social structures,
including cultural heritage and places for worship.
Improve Post Disaster Land Use and Construction Practice
It is often said that post disaster recovery and reconstruction should not rebuild backrisks. However, in the haste to rebuild, sometimes un-intentional risks are re-createdboth in terms of location and in the structures that are rebuilt.
For example, in 1954 an earthquake caused massive damage in a town in Algeria.
Then, just 26 years later following a building boom, an earthquake again devastatedthe same town. Eighty-five schools were destroyed caused by unsafe reconstruction
following the previous earthquake. This means that the rush to rebuild can often resultin lower safety standards being adopted during recovery.
In another example, after the destructive cyclone in Bangladesh in the 1970s cyclone
shelters were built in areas adjacent to the Bay of Bengal. However, the shelters werepoorly designed, ill sited and often located beyond a reasonable distance for people toaccess in times of need. Twenty years later, after a major cyclone in 1991, Bangladesh
redesigned the cyclone shelters, and enlarged, and relocated them in closer proximity
to current population centers.
In another example, after the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami, many affected countries
created “red zones” along the coast moving entire populations out of the way ofpossible future tsunami. However, displaced communities often need the proximity to
the sea because of their livelihood, and thus in the case of Indonesia, lifted the “redzone” area not long after the disaster. It is therefore important to find a balance
between relocation and reducing exposure and creating weak communities due to lackof livelihoods.
Need for More Coherent Approaches for Reducing Risks During Recovery
Most governments have not fully developed coordinated and coherent action on
disaster risk reduction across different sectors and between central and local
governments, and between the phases of the disaster risk management cycle.
Institutional arrangements, legislation, policy for disaster risk reduction, andcapacities tend to be anchored, when in place, in disaster response which may nothave the authority or capacity to influence decisions related to national development
planning and investment.
Some of the lessons that need to be considered to ensure that recovery andreconstruction incorporate DRR thus:•

Promote a community-focused recovery

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•
•
•

Proper resourcing and DRR during recovery
Consider social, cultural and natural heritage in recovery
Improve post disaster land use and construction practice

In addition to the issues identified above, some lessons from literature on how risk
reduction can be incorporated into disaster recovery
•
•
•
•
•
•

Integrating disaster risk reduction into any prior planning of recovery
Prior assessment of risks
Incorporation of risk reduction approaches into the implementation of
emergency preparedness and response
The development or strengthening of institutions, legal mechanisms andcapacities
Building risk reduction values and approaches into the human dimensions ofrecovery.
Ensuring the more tangible aspects of risk reduction are applied in the physicalreconstruction of new buildings and infrastructure.

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４．専門家会議発表資料（１）池田恵子（静岡大学）「復興プロセスにおけるジェンダーと社会的包摂」

116

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（２）ガザラ・ナイーム（パキスタン）「復興の実態：2005 年カシミール地震の脈略から」

118

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（３）斎藤大樹（（独）建築研究所）「日本における近年の巨大地震災害の教訓」

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（４）ジェリー・ヴェラスケス（国際戦略アジア太平洋事務所、タイ）「国際協力、防災・減災、
気候変動、復旧、復興」

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５．国際ビデオ会議発表資料（１）フィリッチ・オプラン（ハイチ、公共事業・輸送・通信省建物評価技術室技師）「2010 年
ハイチ地震」

127

（２）ワン・ツェンヤオ（中国、北京師範大学壺基金公益研究院院長）「2008 年四川地震：建築
物の安全の問題」

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（３）バンバン・スディアトモ（インドネシア、公共事業省水環境衛生訓練センター長）「アチェとニアスにおける災害復旧・復興の調整・管理から得た教訓：住宅・居住部門に注目して」

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（４）斎藤大樹（建築研究所国際地震工学センター上席研究員）「日本における近年の巨大地震災
害の教訓」

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（５）ナザン・キリク（トルコ、首相府災害緊急時対策庁）「2011 年トルコ・ヴァン地震」

137

（６）クリシュナ・S・プリバディ（インドネシア、バンドン工科大学准教授）「パダンにおける地震リスク認識：公務員、住宅所有者、建設業者の見解」

138

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（７）ナディーム・アモッド（パキスタン、元地震復興庁副長官）「大規模な住宅復興のための戦
略：パキスタンの経験」

143

（８）アモッド・ディキシッド（ネパール、地震工学協会事務局長、緊急対応強化プログラム会長）「東ネパール地震の被害、復興のニーズ及び努力：ネパールの経験」

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（９）ヘンレマグネ・C・ペナルビア（フィリピン、火山地震研究所）「フィリピンにおける実大振動台実験地震リスクの認識向上へのアプローチ」

147

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（１０）白川和司（インドネシア、公共事業省 JICA 長期専門家）「インドネシアにおけるノンエ
ンジニアド住宅耐震設計基準の普及活動」

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（１１）アンドリュー・チャールソン（ニュージーランド、地震工学研究所世界住宅百科編集長）「耐震住宅供給に向けた努力：世界住宅百科」

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（１２）相良純子（世界銀行コンサルタント）「日本・世界銀行協力プログラム――巨大災害から学ぶ：知識共有・交流プログラム」

154

（１３）石山祐二（北海道大学名誉教授）「地震によるノンエンジニアド住宅の被害と国際地震工学会のガイドライン」

155

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（１４）楢府龍雄（国際協力機構国際協力専門員）「安全なノンエンジニアド建物へ向けた包括的アプローチの提案」

157

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（１４）池田恵子（静岡大学教授）「安全な住宅の社会・経済的側面」

159