User Controlled Accessat NSRL
Vincent Schoefer
Peter Ingrassia
Adam Rusek
Jonathan Reich
Dean Green
Susan Kennell
Charles TheisenSummary of the Presentation
 The Accelerator Complex
 NASA Space Radiation Laboratory
 Operator monitored access to high radiation area
 Computer monitored access to high radiation area
 User Controlled Access system elements.
 User Controlled Access Sequence Conclusions

WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

NASA Space Radiation Laboratory
 Radiobiology facility
used to simulate theradiation
environment inouter space.
 Funded by NASA tostudy risks toHumans during amanned mission toMars.
WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

NASA Space Radiation Laboratory
 Exposes BiologicalSystems (ranging fromcells to complexorganisms) to ionsdelivered from theBooster synchrotron.
• Ions ranging from 1H(50-2000 MeV/n) to56Fe (100-1000
MeV/n)
 In operation since 2003(~24 weeks/year).
WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

Operator Controlled Access NSRL >5 access per hour
 @ BNL Strict rules for

access to high radiationareas.
Operator turns off source ofradiation.
Operator/biometric scanner
identifies entrant
Operator performs in/out
body count by logging
entry/exit
Operator turns on source ofradiation.

WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

User Controlled Access Programmable Logic
Controller driven
 Interfaced with “safetysystem”
 Counts entries & exits
 Logs identity ofentrants Human turns off sourceof radiation

WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

UCA “Field” Components
 Key Tree
• Captured key & RfID

 Iris Recognition
Camera• Identifies trained userand releases capturedkey

 Mode Change Button• Disables radiation

source Entry/Exit Monitor (2)• Go/Green No-Go/Red
WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

UCA “Field” Components
 Door Optical Turnstiles (2)• Body count• Ensures serial entry

 Light Curtain• Enables RfID identifier• Guards against malicious

turnstile use RfID Antennae• Determines entrant

carries captured key(radiation source cannot
be enabled)
WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

UCA “Field” Components
 Barrier in place• Barrier ensures serialentries.
• Barrier “In place” verified
by the system

 UCA PLC
• Determines actions

follow pre-programmedsequence PASS PLC• Drives safety system• Gets input from UCA

PLC
WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

UCA Entry Sequence (1) Prerequisites to enter• Enclosure is “swept” free of personnel• All keys are captured in the Key Tree & Key Tree is “ready”• UCA PLC informed that radiation source is disabled (mode =Controlled Access) Entrant’s eye is read by Iris identification camera Validated entrant is instructed to remove captured key
 PASS PLC commands door motor open activation
 PASS PLC told by UCA PLC specific key is missing• Another entrant is permitted to scan iris and get a key

 Monitor gives Go/Green indication and entrant passes
through doorway
WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

UCA Entry Sequence (2) Entrant breaks light beams of first Optical Turnstile• UCA PLC “Begin Entry Process”• UCA PLC told to start 10 second transit timer• UCA PLC increases Turnstile_1 count by +1• UCA PLC alerts Turnstile_2• UCA PLC activates RfID reader• Monitor gives No-Go/Red indication (system in use)

 Entrant breaks light beams of Light Curtain• RfID reader identifies Token Light Curtain beams unbroken as entrant passes• RfID sends UCA PLC token/key number

 UCA PLC matches token/key with (iris) logged entrant
 Entrant breaks light beams of second Optical Turnstile
WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

UCA Entry Sequence (3) Entrant passes second Optical Turnstile• UCA PLC End “Entry Process”• UCA PLC recognizes “Target Area NOT Empty”

 UCA PLC disables RfID reader
 Monitors give Go/Green for entry or exit

WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia

Conclusions
 UCA first used September – November 2009
• Humans observe error messages & watch for unsafe

failures (beam on with entrant in the target room)• Bugs worked out – good experience• NO Unsafe Failures

 UCA first stand alone operation April – June 2010
 Well received by users & MCR operators

WAO2010 April 15, 2010 – Schoefer, Ingrassia