The Nexus of Development
pandSecurity Cooperation:
Possibilities for EU-Japan
EU Japan
Cooperation
Knowledge
The NTNU Japan Program

By Paul Midford
NNorwegiani UUniversityiit ffor SScienceianddTTechnology
h lPaul.Midford@svt.ntnu.no

December 2, 2009
Do not quote or cite without permission!
European Japan Advanced Research Network - EJARN
2009/12/5

1Main Argumentsg
Japan now appears to be suffering from “alliance fatigue”
SDF dispatch
pto Iraqq subsequentlyqy undermined p
public and elite support
pp foroverseas SDF humanitarian and reconstruction (H&R) deployments Yet, the SDF counter-piracy deployment off-Somalia suggests Japan’swillingness to participate in non-US
non US centric broad multilateral coalitions
 Foreign Minister Okada’s recent proposal for reviewing the 5 PKO Principles
suggests a willingness to expand multilateral-centric and less US centricdeployments


The EU has a special role to play as a partner, helping Japan to redefine
SDF overseas dispatches for H&R missions outside of a narrow alliance
context,t t relegitimating
l iti ti thesethddeployments
lt iin th
the eyes off ththe publicbli andd DPJelites
However, relegitimating these dispatches is predicated upon their continued
non-combat nature

Japan and the EU are natural co-leaders for strengthening stability throughpromoting development and human security in unstable regions
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2

A Model for EU-Japan Cooperation in
Post conflict Reconstruction
Post-conflict
Although the SDF deployment to Iraq never reallyachieved public support in Japan, the GSDF
deployment to southern Iraq nonetheless offers agood model for how to integrate aid and military
units for post
post-conflict
conflict reconstruction
 Reflects unique strengths of the GSDF

This is a model that the EU and Japan should
build on cooperatively to help stabilize countries
such as Afghanistan, Sudan, Somalia, etc., andthis should be one major focus of the new EUJapan Action Plan

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3Foreign
g Aid vs. Militaryy Deploymentsp yForeign Aid Paradigm
 Humanitarian Assistance Development and Reconstruction Assistance Traditional Japanese emphasis

 Non-involvement in combat or other military activities

MilitMilitaryDeployment
D ltPParadigmdi Involvement in combat, security, stabilization and policing

missions

Grey Zones
 Use of “foreign aid” to train and supply police Transportation of supplies for allied militaries
 Reflects recent trend

2009/12/5

toward “securitization” of foreign aid
4

The GSDF Deployment to Southern Iraq
was integrated with ODA


Reflects the adoption of “Human Security” as a central tenet of Japanese
F i PForeignPolicyli b
by PM Ob
Obuchihi iin 1998
1998, andd itits iintegration
tti iintot JJapan’s’ODA Charter in 2003
The main difference is that SDF aid operations focus more on humanitarianrelief and grant aid than does traditional Japanese ODA
 Also reflects securitzation of development aidJapan s MOD and ODA Policy makers explicitly linked the GSDF Iraq
Japan’sdeployment with ODA:
 “The dispatched SDF units have conducted operations forhhumanitarian
it i assistancei t
iin cooperation
ti withith supportt provided
id d bby
Official Development Assistance (ODA)”• Defense of Japan 2007, p. 336
“To date, Japan has conducted the reconstruction assistance of Iraq
by combining the human contribution of Self-Defense Forces (SDF)passistance as an ‘inseparable
pppair’”and development

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ODA White Paper 2008, p. 96
5

GSDF Operations
pin Samawah,, SouthernIraq, 2004-2006
Medical Services
 Water Purification
 Public Facility Restoration & Construction
 Local
LlE
Employmentlt
 Isolation from, and non-involvement in, combat Samawah was relatively safe area As was the case in Cambodia,, GSDF was guarded
gby foreign troops, including French and Dutch
troops, reducing potential SDF use of side-arms tomostly a theoretical possibility
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6Linked ODA and SDF Operations inSamawah

Japanp p
provided over $$200 million in Grant Assistancefor SDF related projects in Al-Muthanna province Provided under the rubric of “GrassGrass Roots HumanSecurity Projects” as well “Emergency Grant Aid”
Examples SDF medical officers provided instruction on how touse medical equipment purchased with ODA funds
 ODA funds paid for asphalting roads graveled by theSDF
 ODA funds were also used for bridge construction andreconstruction and for various irrigation projects
reconstruction,
2008 ODA White Paper, p. 97

7

Use the SDF to Effectivelyy Channel
Japanese Reconstruction Assistance
5 November 2009: Hatoyama Administration announced anew aid package of $5 billion for Afghanistan to be distributed
over 5 years, but excluded SDF involvement
 Problem: how to disburse this aid effectively even in relatively
safef areas?
?
 Hard to use Japanese civilians to disburse aid in thecurrent environment
 Answer: Involve the SDF together with European militaries
 How?
Ho ?
 Four options from least to most ambitious

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Four options for SDF Participationi RinReconstruction
t ti AssistanceA i t
1. Least ambitious: dispatch SDF members to Europeancountries or third countries to train European counter-parts in
how to use /instruct locals on how to use Japanese donatedequipment, use GSDF water purification systems, landmineremoval,, etc.
 Will promote long-term cooperation between Japanese andEuropean militaries in post-conflict reconstruction
 2. More Ambitious: Dispatch ASDF planes to deliverhumanitarian and reconstruction supplies
 In 2001 Social Democratic Party supported dispatch ofASDF to Pakistan to deliver supplies to refugees, suggestingsomething
thi similari il may b
be politicallyliti ll possible
ibl ttodayd

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9Four options for SDF Participation
in Reconstruction Assistance Continued
3. Still More Ambitious: Second （出向）SDF members toEuropean Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) for nonmilitary operations such as water purification, infrastructure,equipment training, etc.
 Resembles old Socialist and other peacekeeping
proposals from early 1990s, so might be politically possible
 Question
Qti off whether
h th secondedd d SDF membersbwould
ld carry
personal weapons
 4.
4 Most ambitious: Dispatch SDF units to relatively safe areas
to implement ODA projects and render more general postreconstruction assistance together with European militaries
 Similar to GSDF dispatches to Cambodia and Iraq
10Conclusions
These four SDF options not only apply to Afghanistan, but holdpromise for post-conflict reconstruction assistance in theS dSudan,
a possible
ibl ffuturetmissioni i tto S
Somalia,li andd otherth postt
conflict zones
 Again,
Again the EU has a special role to play in helping Japaneseelites and the public to disassociate SDF deployments for postreconstruction assistance from the use of force,, or narrow &politically controversial alliance purposes
The tendency of many DPJ leaders to look to Europe for inspiration alsoenhances
hththe EU’
EU’s lleadershipd hi potential
t ti l hhere

EU can learn from Japan’s human security concept
 Working together the EU and Japan have the potential todemonstrate to their US ally and others, that developmentalist
and human security approaches for promoting stability holdmore promise than more combat focused approaches
11Thank you for Listening!
P l Midf d@Paul.Midford@svt.ntnu.noKnowledge
The NTNU Japan Program

Europeanu opea Japan
Japa Advanced
dva ced Researchesea c Netwo
Network - EJARN
J N

2009/12/5

12EXTRA SLIDES

2009/12/5

13Samawah Operations:
Medical Services
Activities by GSDF medical personnel at four regional
hospitals
 Training & advice to local doctors
 Training on use of medical equipment from Japan Technical training of ambulance personnel Technical training for management & storage ofmedicine
Results
 Medical technique support provided 277 times
 Improved emergency medical service
 Infant mortality rate reduced in Samawah by 1/3rd
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14Samawah Water Supply Activities
Water purification for local water trucks supplied at
GSDF base GSDF water supply operations ended when theGSDF completed a water purification plant inFebruary 2005


Water plant was paid for Japanese ODA funds

Results
 53,500 tons of water supplied to 11.89 millionpeople (including multiple requests)
 Stable access to clean water

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Samawah Public Facility Restoration &Construction

Repair of walls,walls floors,
floors electric circuits,circuits etc.,
etc at schools in Al-Muthanna
Al Muthanna
ProvinceR d construction
Roadi

Completed 36 projects

Repair of other public facilities


Renovated 36 facilities, or about 1/3rd of provincial schools

Medical clinic, nursing facilities & low income residential housing, water facilities,
sports stadium, other cultural facilities
 Renovated 66 facilities

Local Employment
 Subcontracting
g for repairsp Locals recruited for interpreting & garbage collection at base 1100 jobs created per day for a total of 490,000 labor days
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