Yamazaki, Takashi ed. Report for the JSPS Grant-in-Aid for challenging Exploratory Research 2015-16 (No.
15K12954) Cultural Practices against Militarization: The Compilation of Regional Geographies and the
Restoration of Landscapes in Okinawa and Palestine, September 2017. Osaka: Osaka City University. pp. 48-80.

2. Special Contribution

De-facto Counter Planning against the Sophisticated Matrix of Control:
The Palestinian and Israeli Case in Area C
Rassem Khamaisi 1
The Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territory (PT) (including the West Bank, East
Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip) may constitute one of the unique and longest traditional
occupations in the world. From 1967 to the present, the Israeli state has occupied andcontrolled the PT using various strategies and mechanisms. This occupation has functioned tosecure Israeli’s PT control, using the sophisticated matrix of control (SMOC). This matrix
includes Palestinian people, institutions and territories. During the long period of occupation,
the situation and status of Palestinian people and territories in the PT was changed after theannexation of East Jerusalem to Israel in June 1967, by imposing full Israeli sovereignty on
the land, but avoided giving the Palestinians a status of Citizens, while give them a status of
permanent residents. After that and since the Oslo Interim Agreements (1993-1995) between
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Israeli government, the PT has been
fragmented into three sub-areas (Areas A, B and C) with different status and situations. Thenin 2005 the disengagement/withdraw of Israeli from the Gaza Strip took place, and Israel
imposed a closures on this part of the PT. As of 2017, the PT is territorially and geopoliticallyfragmented, and the Palestinian people living in PT have been divided to different official
status by Israeli occupation (military and administrative) authorities’ attitude and institutional
system, while the official Palestinian attitude represented by the Palestinian National Authority(PNA) is to finalize the occupation and to establish one united contiguous territorial state.
Such contradicted attitudes, goals, policies, systems of implementation hinder appropriate
service provision for the people living in the PT where Israel creates the SMOC that includes
soft and hard components of control.
The objective of this paper is to frame and present this matrix of control used by the Israeli
occupation, and to concentrate on the statutory regulative spatial planning in Area C as an
example of one component of the matrix of control. This paper will shed light on Palestinian
local experiences and initiatives to cope with the regulative planning as de-facto counterplanning. This paper will illustrate and briefly discuss this initiative and its problematics,
barriers, implications and consequences. The de-facto counter planning for Palestinian villages
in Area C has come to replace the restrictive planning done by the Israeli Civil Administration(ICA) 2. The counter planning is initiated by the representatives of local communities as
1

Rassem Khamaisi is an urban and regional planner and geographer. He is Professor at the Department ofGeography and Environmental Studies at the University of Haifa. Khamaisi leads the counter planning in area C
through IPCC and CPS as a private planner and researcher.
2
The Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) is an official body which was established through Israel occupation in1981 to manage the civic life of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territory outside and under the Israeli
military rule. The ICA is given authority from the Israeli government and allows the military governor to control

48

bottom-up planning, which is authorized by the ICA institutions. The top-down restrictiveplanning done by the Israeli ICA restricts the socio-economic development of Palestinianvillages. The counter planning more enables the socio-economic development of communities
in the villages spatially and functionally, as opposed to the restrictive planning that limits andthreats individuals and groups in Palestinian villages, particularly in Area C which isdetermined according the 1994 Oslo Intermediate Agreement between Israelis andPalestinians.
This paper is based on the methodology discussed in the literature, the data collected form
Israeli and Palestinian resources, and employs a critical approach to spatial planning as part ofthe sophisticated matrix of control. In addition, this paper is based on the experience of theresearcher practicing de-facto counter planning, as part of the methodology of “researcher as aplayer”.
This paper attempts to show the current situation and status of the Israeli occupation in the PT.
It constructs a theoretical frame of the notion of the SMOC and its components and thenpresents and discusses the restrictive planning vis-a-vis the counter planning. In so doing, thispaper tries to answer the following research question: How does the de-facto counter planningfor the Palestinian villages in Area C influence the spatial and functional socio-economic
development of the Palestinians villages and towns, comparing with the traditional restrictiveplanning done through the Israeli occupation over Palestinian villages as part of the SMOC?
This paper finally examines a case of Tuwani village. The main hypothesis is as follows:
The de-facto counter planning for Palestinian villages, which is initiated by the
Palestinian village councils, represents the community, using a bottom-up approach. It
begins with informal developmental planning ‘with’ the community and not ‘for’ thecommunity, and is planned by the Palestinian planners who are aware of the local culturethat has an impact on the spatial and functional planning and socio-economic
development of the community. On the contrary, the restrictive planning, which has been
done by Israeli Civil Administration after the Interim Oslo Agreement, limits the land
allocated for development, does not allocate land for functional sectorial developments,
and contributes to worsening the problem of building without permits. This leads in somecases to house demolishing threats and push some community residents to out-migration.
After this hypothesis will be examined through the afore-mentioned and other cases, this paper
will be concluded.

Palestinians without their participation in the process. Since the establishment of the PNA in 1994, the role of the
ICA, including land and spatial planning, has been shrunk mainly in Area C.

49

General Framing of the Current Status and Situation
The conflicts over Palestine between Arab Palestinians and Jewish Zionists were initiated forthe establishment of one country, in which both sides claimed “it is our homeland” leading to
the United Nation’s Resolution No. 181 in 1947. It divided the county into the territory named
Falestine-Palestine according Arab Islamic and Palestinians attitudes and narratives and that
named Eretz Israel according the Jewish/ Hebrew narratives. As a result of this division, Israel
as a nation-state of the Jewish people was established in 1948. Arab Palestinians, however, did
not accept the terms because their nation-state was to be established upon Palestine. Hence, a69-year geopolitical and national conflict that still awaits a solution.
The Zionist movement began to colonize the country with the help of colonial states such as
Britain that held the Mandate over Palestine (BMP) from 1920 to 1948. During this period, theground was paved to fulfill the Balfour Declaration that promised the Zionist leaders in 1917
"the establishment of a national homeland in Palestine for the Jewish people". Based on the
narratives of emotional connection, the Zionist movement sought to establish a newnation-state. The Arab Muslims argued that this land is a Wakf (an Islamic religious
endowment). This is the turf that the Christians called the Holy land and over which they
waged the Crusade to capture Palestine. In this country, there are three monotheistic religions
each of which believes that they have a religious, ideological and emotional relation to theland. This phenomenon adds a unique dimension to the geopolitical conflict. In addition togeographical, demographic and ideological claims and calculations, the religious and symbolic
belongingness intensifies the dilemmas and complexity of the geopolitical conflict between
the Israelis and the Palestinians and induces some external involvement in determining thepast, present and future of the country (Hasson, 2010).
Ethno-national demographic changes and conflict since the beginning of the twentieth century
lead to the development of several plans and suggestions to divide historic Palestine, where
there were a number of plans on the agenda of different Palestinians and Israelis politicalgroups (Hilal, 2007). In 1948, as a result of war, Palestine was divided into three territories:
one is where the new state of Israeli was established (about 21 thousand km2 which consists of
78% of the country); the second is what is known today as Gaza Strip (GZ) (about 365 km2)
and was under the Egyptian rule between 1949-1967; and the third is what is known today as
the West Bank (WB) (about 5,655 km2) and was under the Jordanian rule between 1950-1967.
According to these three territorial entities the border line known today as the Green Line wasdetermined. It was demarked as the Armistice lines between Israel and the Arabs as acceptedin Rodeus in 1949 (Khamaisi, 2008, see Figure 1). There is no territorial continuity orconnection between GS and the WB. Every area abides to be managed under a different
regime until what became to be known as the "Palestinian Question" is solved (Khalidi, 1997,
2006).
In 1967, and as a result of war, the rest of the PT was occupied by Israel. Israel decided to50annex East Jerusalem (about 71 km2) and instated it under its sovereignty, giving thePalestinian residents in East Jerusalem special status of "permanent residents", but notcitizenship. This action is part of the Israeli strategy and policy to gain more land from
Palestinians to secure Jewish majority (Masalha, 1997). In 1967, within the PT, Israel initiatedand implemented colonial policies, which included land confiscations, the building of Jewish
Israeli colonies and settlements, and the control of the movement of Palestinians by militaryand civic organizations. This was an implementation of the soft and hard SMOC which
reigned over the population, the territory and the institutions of Palestinians.
Figure 1: Falestine-Palestine/Earet Israel One Country (left) and the Division Imposedby Outside Powers According to UN Resolution No. 181, 1947 (right).

As a result of the 1948 and 1967 wars, the imposed territorial divisions of Palestine createdthree main categories among Palestinians:
1)

2)
3)

Arab Palestinians residing in Israel (so-called Arab Palestinians in Israel),comprising of about 1.5 million. They continue to live in their former villages
and towns (e.g., Nazareth) as indigenous communities and are today citizens ofIsrael (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016)
Palestinian residents of the PT, about 4.55 million inhabitants at the end of 2014
(about 2.79 million in the WB and about 1.76 million in GS) (PCBS, 2014)
Palestinian Diaspora (El-Shatate) residing in other countries of the Middle Eastand elsewhere, numbering about 5.43 million (PCBS, 2014: 253). Most, if notall, are united by a tenacious, albeit thus far not successful, demand to return toa sovereign country ruled by Palestinians.
51

Although the three Palestinian subgroups all consider themselves part of a common
Palestinian people, they tend to evince differing attitudes towards the region’s geopoliticalissues and rights to a homeland and self-determination.
Today the division is limited to the PT occupied in 1967. This division is a result of the peacetalks and interim agreements between the Palestinian and Israeli leaders, which began
officially after signing the Oslo Agreement in 1993. The WB and GS were divided into three
Areas: A, B, and C. This Jurisdictional division was created in 1995 under the Oslo II
Agreement. Area A is comprised of urban centers only. These areas are under the PNA’s
administrative and internal security responsibility and constitute about 18% of the West Bank;
Area B includes the built up areas of large Palestinian villages and constitutes 22% of WB,
remaining under Israeli military occupation, but the PNA takes responsibility for service andcivil administration including spatial planning. Area C, constituting about 60% of the West
Bank, remains under full Israeli civil and military administration including spatial planning(see Figure 2, Khamaisi, 2016).
Through these actions, Israel has managed to dodge its responsibilities required byinternational laws and conventions, which has created a situation of "luxury occupation"
serving Israeli interests while Palestinians continuing to suffer from the occupation. On theother hand, Israel continues to build and expand Israel colonies and settlement (Hareuveni,2010), and enjoys free movement and accessibility, whereas Palestinians’ movement isconstricted unless Israeli permits are granted. The existing division of the three Areas today in
the West Bank creates another level of fragmentation in the PT. Adding the apartheid system tothe equation, created two separate road systems where one is used solely by Israelis and theother by Palestinians (Barsala, 2007).
Figure 2: Fragmentation and Division of the West Bank and Gaza

52

The process of determining the borders of the country was either imposed by external powers,
brought about as a result of war or violence, or carried out through unilateral actions by Israel
such as the disengagement/withdrawal from GS in 2005. Both sides still claim that all thecountry belongs to one side and deny the right and permanent existence of the other based on
historical, religion and ethno-national justifications. The two sides, despite asymmetricaljustifications between them, continue to strive and feel threatened.

Current Situation and Challenges in Building the State
By the end of 2014, about 13 million were living in Mandate Palestine (including Israel and
the PT), where fifty percent of the population were Israeli Jewish while the rest were
Palestinians (CBS, 2016: 86). The country witnesses a rapid population growth andurbanization process. The Palestinians have a large and rapidly growing population. In 2014,
the average annual population growth was 2.9% compared to 1.9% in Israeli. The PT has ahigh population density, placing it near the top of the world's highest density nations (Suisman
et al. 2005: 10). In 2014 the general population density was about 765 persons per square
kilometers. The population density in the WB then was about 493, compared to about 4,822 in
the GS (PCBS, 2014: 26) and 366.2 in Israel (CBS, 2016).
The urban and rural system of Palestine is characterized by a large number of localities. Today
there are about 537 localities in the PT (121 urban and the rest rural), and about 1,186
localities in Israel (233 urban and the rest rural) (CBS, 2010: 86). In both areas, Israel and thePT, a rank-size of localities exists and shows a semi-normal hierarchy, with two concentrationsin the PT, urbanized regions in Gaza and East Jerusalem. Alongside the suggested futureborder between Israel and the PT, and where Israel built the Separation Wall, such zonefunctions as a periphery and in some cases as a fringe of Israel and the PT, where spatialplanning on the two sides relates to each other.
Differences between the PT and Israel can also be seen in other realms like landscape andtopography, housing conditions, open lands, relative advantages, potential capacities andeconomic activities (Khamaisi, 2010). Israeli closures over PT began after the first intifada in
1987 and particularly the second intifada in 2000. The Separation Wall began to be built in
2003, surrounding most of the WB territory and completely containing the GS. After theseIsrael has no longer functioned as a work place for the Palestinians. Despite material,
economic, structural and functional differences within the country and imposed territorial
divisions and demarcation boundaries, there are some similarities such as diversity withinevery sub-region and psychological attachment to places all over the country.

53

Area C in the Occupied Territory
As mentioned above, the 1995 Oslo Interim II Agreement defined and determined Area C
which has no PNA security and administrative control. All surrounding land in Areas A and B,
totaling over 60% of the West Bank, was designated as Area C and placed under the full
administrative and security control of Israel, continuing the occupation of the land which had
been maintained since 1967. The arrangement between the Israeli government and the PLO
was designed as a temporary measure that would gradually transfer sovereignty over Areas B
and C to the PNA in five years. This transfer has never been completed, and as a result, Israel
still maintains sovereign power over Area C with its 350,000 Palestinian inhabitants living in
more than 200 Palestinians villages and towns. Some of them fully complete their everyday
lives in Area C while others possibly live a life beyond the Area. In Area C, exist all the Israeli
Jewish settlements with their military governor and its civic arm called the ICA. The Israeli
occupation has planned and developed Israel settlements in this Area for further colonization,
Israelization and Hebrewization. Even some of the Israeli extremist political parties rise in
Area C and claim full annexation of the Area to Israel. Palestinians in this Area have sufferedfrom various regulations and restrictions on their lives in addition to the apartheid
administrative system imposed through the statutory planning regime. In this context, Israeli
planning policies use the issuance of building permits as an effective tool to control
Palestinians in Area C. In order to ensure their individual and collective human rights, it iscritical to make appropriate planning and zoning schemes in the Area. Diakonia’s legal review
of Israeli planning policies in Area C 3 concludes that Israel’s discriminatory planning policies
directly impact the economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights of those living there(UN-Habitat, 2015).
Under Israeli occupation control, Palestinian communities have faced significant restrictions
on both the new construction of buildings and the utilization of natural resources such as
agricultural land. The Israeli planning system, as it is applied, makes it almost impossible forPalestinian communities to obtain building permits. So Palestinian development has rarely
taken place in Area C under the Israeli governance.
Restrictions on development have contributed to high levels of poverty within the Palestinian
population, 24% of which are categorized as food insecure. 4 Communities lack basic
infrastructure such as waste disposal and sanitation networks while 70% of them are notconnected to a water network. Educational and health services in Area C are often inadequate,
and the under-developed and fragmented transport network makes travelling to Areas A and B
for better services extremely difficult. Within Area C about 200 villages are still notrecognized by the Israeli regime. Based on that, all the unrecognized and unpermitted
constructions face the risk of demolition. On average, 490 Palestinian structures have been
3

Diakonia, PLANNING TO FAIL The planning regime in Area C of the West Bank: An International Law
Perspective, September 2013
4
OCHA, Area C of the West Bank, Key Humanitarian Concerns January, 201354

demolished by the ICA per year since 2010.5 In some cases, the homes of entire communities
have been demolished because the ICA has refused to recognize villages. Thousands of
unenforced demolition orders constantly pose a displacement threat to Palestinian households
and communities. Without permits, structures built for humanitarian purposes by international
aid agencies are also at risk of demolition; 122 structures were demolished in 2013 alone,denying assistance to some of the country’s most vulnerable communities.
The geopolitical divisions between the two administrative systems in the same country havecreated two types of planning. One is “restrictive planning” which aims to impose colonial
policies, and the other is “counter development planning” that has been initiated to recognize
and protect Palestinian villages in Area C. This paper tries to compare and critically examine
these two planning approaches in the West Bank by reviewing planning processes and outline
plans for the same village by the ICA and Palestinians. This comparison reveals that the(bottom-up) development planning approach is expected to have a more positive impact. The
approach of counter planning gives residents a sense of security in their space and place
without any threats from the ICA (UN-Habitat, 2015). Because of the ‘illegal’ status of
localities in Area C, many residents depend on lawyers hoping to freeze demolition orders. So,
the counter planning approach could be used as a defense tool in court to protect Palestinian
houses.

Territorial Domination and Socio-Economic Impact
Constraints on Palestinian development have been simultaneously matched by the rapid
growth of Israeli Settlements. In contravention of international law, the Israeli Government has
fueled the transference of Israeli Jewish settlers into Area C. Including East Jerusalem, thesettler population now totals over 500,000, more than doubling since the Oslo Accords weresigned. 6 Israel’s priority for increasing the settler population is demonstrated by their planning
practices in Area C, where approximately 70% of the land is allocated for the exclusive use of
Israeli Settlements.
The human cost from decades of development restrictions is vast, affecting not just theresidents in Area C but also the wider Palestinian population. The World Bank estimates theannual cost of restrictions in Area C on the Palestinian economy to total US$3.4 billion,around 35% of GDP 7. This has a direct impact on unemployment in Palestine which in turnkeeps many Palestinians’ living in poverty, affecting health, education and the quality of life.
Typically, Area C is either inaccessible for private investment or can only be accessed throughsignificant barriers which often add prohibitive costs. Such economic burdens maintain thePalestinian Authority’s dependence on foreign aid, and strongly impair the formation of an
5

OCHA, Humanitarian Update January 2014
http://www.btselem.org/settlements/statistics
7
World Bank, Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy, 2013655

independent functioning state.
Area C is critical to Palestinian economic growth as it has a rich supply of natural resources
and it is contiguous compared to Areas A and B, which when considered alone are isolated
from other Palestinian controlled areas. The World Bank has completed detailed analyses on
the potential for growth in multiple sectors including agriculture, the use of the Dead Sea
minerals, mining and quarrying, construction, tourism, telecommunications and cosmetics. 8This potential can only be realized by reducing the restrictions in Area C, and planning work is
critical to achieving this.
It is important to consider socio-economic development in any planning initiative. Without
prioritizing this, the benefits of any infrastructure or facility development will not be
maximized. Job creation and attracting investment to a locality are critical to improving the
lives of the residents in a sustainable and long-term manner.
The isolation, fragmentation and restrictions on development in Area C significantly impact
the daily lives of the Palestinian residents as shown below:--

In addition to a lack of residential accommodation, it is impossible to build adequate
public facilities, which negatively impacts health, education, agriculture and otherbasic needs.
A lack of infrastructure development means that many residents have insufficient or
no supply of water, electricity, transport and waste networks.
Restrictions on movement hinder economic, employment, educational and social
opportunities.
Reduced income particularly due to the restrictions on agricultural production.
Lack of security and living in fear of demolitions or evictions.
Poverty and low living standards.
Dependency on humanitarian aids.

These challenges to life in Area C are increasing each year. Meanwhile, the pressure to better
utilize Area C is also continually growing. Since 1995 the Palestinian population in the WestBank has grown by over 52%. 9 Area C is a vital resource for housing expansion, agriculture,industry and infrastructure, and is the only potential place that can accommodate growth andprevent Areas A and B from being pushed to unviable densities. Historically, people living in
Areas A, B and C have close social and economic ties that are negatively impacted by thefragmentation caused by the current situation. OCHA reports that restrictions on movement,
disconnecting people and areas in the West Bank, are undermining livelihoods and impacting

8
9

Ibid.
PCBS Population Estimates 1997-2013

56

access to basic human needs as well as hindering humanitarian organizations’ ability to help.10
Good planning is crucial in order to overcome this and provide functional relationships
between the different areas; it is essential that Area C is considered in parallel with Areas A
and B for any planning activity to be viable and holistic. So, the ability to understand andinfluence planning policy is a core ingredient of a democratic society; to be able to influence
the spatial and economic climate in which one lives, and to have the freedom to move fromone location to another without restriction is widely understood as a basic right.

Israeli Civil Administration (ICA) Planning Policy
As an occupied territory, Israel has not applied its own planning laws to Area C, but instead
has continued to use the pre-existing Jordanian planning law as a basis. This has been
amended by a series of military orders that have removed regional committees and given all
authority to one ICA committee, the Higher Planning Council. Since 1967, this committee has
been able to control all development in Area C according to Israeli interests. In the early yearsof the Occupation thousands of permits were granted to Palestinians; however, as the Israeli
settlement enterprise grew, restrictions against Palestinian construction were tightened. In
1972, 97% of the requests were approved totaling 2,123 approvals, but in 2005 only 2.7%
were approved, totaling just five approvals. 11
The majority of Palestinian localities in Area C does not have outline plans but are instead
covered by three regional plans such as S-15 and RJ-5 which authorized in 1942 during the
British Mandate. The mandate plans, which were designed to guide development over a
five-year period, has borne little relation to the reality on the ground for more than 75 years
after their original approval. As such, many localities that did not exist in 1942 are still zoned
as agricultural land. While the mandate plans do allow for moderate development even within
agricultural land, their guidelines are being interpreted by the ICA in an increasingly
restrictive manner as evidenced by the dramatic decrease in approval rates between the early
70s and present day.
The ICA planning policy is to restrict Palestinian development in Area C and to evacuate small
rural villages such as seen in Masafer Yatta in the Hebron District. The policy is to avoid andpostpone authorizing plans and recognizing Palestinians villages. This planning policy isagainst the international law which determines that the occupation power must secure thedevelopment of the people living under occupation. This policy leads to the emergence of thede-facto counter planning as this paper will discuss later.

10
11

OCHA, Area C Vulnerability Profile, March 2014
BIMKOM, The Prohibited Zone, 2008, p.11

57

Palestinian National Authority Policy
Despite Israel’s aggressive occupation efforts to restrict Palestinian development in Area C,
the Palestinian Authority has been working to support development there. In 2010, thePalestinian Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) adopted a new planning approach
specifically aimed at halting demolitions and forced displacement. The prevailing Jordanianplanning law states that local councils have the right to create plans for their localities whichshould be binding on both Palestinians and Israelis. The MoLG uses this to pressure the ICA
into reviewing the plans developed by the local communities according to the counterplanning approach with the intention of gaining approval and authorization as statutory
documents, hence achieving the full legal status required for building and development. Oncean outline plan has been accepted and adapted by a locality’s council and the MoLG, the
MoLG initiates the authorization process with the ICA. A representative from the MoLG alongwith a representative from the Palestinian Ministry of Civil Affairs (MoCA) is present at all
the subsequent meetings throughout the process.
This PNA’s planning strategy is crucial to achieving many of their policy goals as set out in
the Palestinian National Development Plan. 12 These include:-

Unifying the Palestinian territories and economy while optimizing the utilization of
local resources.
Developing the national economy with particular focus on improving thecompetitiveness of the Palestinian private sector.
Combating poverty and unemployment and promoting social justice across all social,
racial and gender boundaries.

The PNA aims to end the Israeli occupation and build the Palestinians State in the PT. In orderto fulfill these aims, the Palestinians territorial and functional policies are to support theexistence and development of the Palestinian communities in Area C. This policy includes theempowerment of counter planning and copes with the Israeli SMOC implemented in Area C torestrict Palestinian development.

The Israeli Sophisticated Matrix of Control
To define and discuss the notion of sophisticated matrix of control, we have to understand all
the ideological policies and actions which the occupation exercises to control and monitor
Palestinian collectives and individuals. Such control and surveillance have territorial,
functional, institutional and behavioral dimensions which the hegemonic power assumes andimposes on the occupied people. This SMOC includes hard and soft components. These
12

State of Palestine, National Development Plan 2014-2016, State Building to Sovereignty

58

components can be summarized into at least four categories as shown in Figure 2: 1.
Individual/collective/people’s (status and situation), 2. National, regional and local levels, 3.
Land regime/territorial policy including land ownership, land managements and spatialplanning doctrine, policy and actions, and 4. Local/Municipal and institutional rules andjurisdictions.
This SMOC is emerging and developing as part of the uniqueness of Israeli occupation over
Palestinian territories. This uniqueness includes:
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Existent long occupation (about fifty years), and developing a creeping apartheid andcontrol over Palestinian collectives and individuals.
Mixing between religious believes and Ideological motives, which leads to the moral
and narrative consideration that this land belongs to the Israeli occupier.
Dispute between the Israeli occupier parties (over internal Israeli territorial,
demographic and moral issues) and dispute over the future of the occupied territory
which is populated by Palestinians, particularly today in Area C.
Occupation after the division of a small country by outsider powers (Khamaisi, 2016)(see Figure 1).
Two peoples claim the same land as their homeland, under the asymmetric conditionsof power
Giving the people a feeling of normality under abnormal situation and status.
Davison of Palestinians into different status based on where they live and according to
the division of the territory (Areas A, B and C).
Building a separation wall by Israeli to control Palestinian movements, resulting in the
territorial fragmentation implemented by the SMOC.

Figures 2: Hard and Soft Components of the Sophisticated Matrix of Control Used byIsraeli Occupation in the PT.

59

As part of the SMOC a dual municipal system has been created; one is Jewish Israel which has
been organized in regional or local municipal councils to serve the Israeli settlements. These
regional councils cover about 70 percent of Area C (see Figure 3). They do not serve thePalestinians villages that exist in Area C. The Palestinian villages are provided with public
services by local village councils. They have developed their own committees that belong toPalestinian National Authority (PNA), and they are not recognized by the Israeli occupation.
This duality is part of Israeli de-facto annexation by creating a dual local government of eachjurisdiction area in Area C. Such spatial policy is part of the SMOC, which separates the land
from the humans who live in the land. The Palestinians who live in Area C belong to and aremanaged by PNA while the land including spatial planning belongs to and is managed by the
Israeli occupation.
Figure 3: The Dual Municipal System Governing Area C(The system leads to the implementation of the SMOC, creates de-facto Israeli annexation andput up crucial barrier against counter planning to cope with the existent restricted andunplanned Palestinian communities in Area C.)

60

Figure 4: General Information about the Separation Wall as an Effective Component of
the Israeli SMOC
(The SMOC affects directly the counter planning of Palestinian communities existingalongside the Separation Wall.)To summarize main characteristics of the SMOC, it creates the situation in which thedevelopment of target groups in the Palestinian territory becomes short-lived, non-resilient,and unsustainable. It also violates human rights, creates social instability, and hinders trust andpeace building. The SMOC includes the following components:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Community displacement
Prohibiting the issuance of a building permit
Controlling water supply
Precluding land registration and parcelization
Employment permit
Limiting accessibility and free movement
Reducing education and awareness/consciousness of national collectivism
Changing place names and building narratives on cultural/religious affiliations
Transformation of heritage

61

The implications and consequences of the long occupation using the SMOC include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Fragmenting Palestinian territory and people
Creating an apartheid system beside the occupation
Neglecting international legitimacy and limiting the human rights of the Palestinians
Threating regional stability and the implementation of the two states solution forliving side by side in peace
Maintaining conflicts and transferring them to the next generations.
Using the spatial planning as an instrument for controlling and disabling local
development

The Spatial Planning as Part of the SMOC
Building permits and micro local statutory planning constitute effective tools in hand of theIsraeli government and its arm, the ICA, to implement macro spatial policies as part of the
SMOC. Planning is an approach for public intervention to manage resources to achieve goals
determined by the representative of a community. As Alterman argued (2002), spatial planningis part of and affected by public administration and management. Through spatial statutory
planning, we can allocate land resources, promote socio-economic development and create
opportunities for life (Rauws, 2015). The planning process is a tool for community
development, and its approach can be different from one place to another, according to context(place, community culture, geopolitical situation, and individual statues) (Moroni, 2015).
Moreover, the planning approach connects these components according to the context ofplanning in the West Bank, and there are many kinds of planning approaches due to thevarying occupation situation in the country (Coon, 1992). Development planning andrestrictive planning have different goals and impacts mainly because of the varying politicalsituation in the country (Khamaisi, 1993).
In 1995, Israeli and Palestinian governments reached an agreement temporally, based on the
Oslo Interim Agreement that Israeli occupation continues to control and manage the planningsystem and activities in Area C, including the Palestinians living in this area (Reuveny, 2003).
Israel has established the planning system according to the Jordanian Planning and Building
Law No. 79 since 1966, and the amendments to this law have been done by military orders,such as Military Order No 418, since 1970 (Coon, 1992). On a different occasion, Israeli
government promised the United States that it would not establish new settlements or expand
existing ones, except when necessary. However, during this period (after 1993 until present)
the number of settlers grew from 78,000 to nearly 330,000 after the agreed division (notincluding East Jerusalem). Moreover, Michael (2007) argued that the Oslo process represented
the predicament of effective civil–military relations because of geopolitical conflicts between
the two countries. The Israeli occupation has developed a dual planning system to manage and62control the Palestinians in Area C based on restrictive planning, while using development
planning to manage the Israeli settlers.

Restrictive Planning
Restrictive planning is a kind of spatial statutory planning which restricts the development ofvillages or towns. In many cases, the restrictive planning does not respond to needs of thecommunities. The restrictive planning is a top-down process and is imposed on local
communities with their participation being limited. The restrictive planning used by the Israeli
authorities restrict development in the Palestinian villages in Area C and serves as a tool tocontrol Palestinian expansive activities and movements in their space. The Israeli authorities
focus their concerns on the security aspects and full control of planning activities in Area C(60% of the West Bank) in order to restrict Palestinian growth. Many building permits are
refused in the absence of the full examinations required by the Mandate districts plans, a very
complicated process. Khamaisi (1997) argued that the high planning council in the ICA has
never extended to the very limit new planning areas for Palestinian villages. Handel argued
that Israeli settlements are established to restrict Palestinian construction and prevent theformation of an independent Palestinian entity. As a result, Policies by the Israeli authorities
encourage Israeli settlement complexes to strengthen the network of Jewish communities andfragment the territories of Palestinian communities (Handel, 2013).
Moreover, expulsions take place as a tool to encourage "voluntary" emigration, whichbasically aims to restrict Arab growth and development (Abdulhadi, 1990). While Palestinians
suffer from displacement and demolishing orders under the occupation, Israel is building andexpanding settlements (Hareuveni, 2010). Israeli settlers are enjoying free movement andaccessibility, while the movement of Palestinian inhabitants is restricted (Khamaisi, 2016). As
Fenster (2004) discussed, the patterns of land control, settlement location, urban expansion,and land use are all part of the same mechanism to shape and reshape the Zionist character ofthe landscape. Moreover, the lack of free movement affects economy, education, and social
life in the Palestinian territories (Alatout, 2009).

Development Planning
The approach of development planning aims mainly to provide opportunities for thedevelopment of communities. This approach could be a basis to authorize planning as statutory.
This kind of planning could be initiated by local communities, but has been employed mainly
by Israeli settlers to expand and develop their settlements. The development planning could
also be an important strategy as a tool to legitimize and recognize Palestinian ruralcommunities in Area C. Furthermore, this approach affects the development of spatial
63

planning, infrastructures and socio-economic level of inhabitants through an adoption of theplanning by local communities. Allmendinger and Haughton (2010) discussed that spatialplanning's key emphasis should be placed on the adoption of sustainable development andimproved participation, which provides legitimacy for projects that aim at economic growth.
The World Bank has defined rural development as a strategy to improve the economic andsocial life of a specific group of rural people (Belshaw, 1977). The development planning in
Palestinian communities, or the transition from restrictive planning to development one,allows the improvement of Arab Palestinian communities and administrative mechanisms
including local authorities. Moreover, the development planning could be flexible throughtaking into account dynamic processes occurring within society (Khamaisi, 1993). The
question is how to transform the planning form restrictive approach to development approach,in the context of the continuation of the Israeli occupation in the PT and the control of Area C
by the ICA.
The restrictive planning has a negative impact on spatial planning and socio-economic
development in Palestinian villages. To the contrary, development planning has a positive
impact as seen in Areas A and B. The impact of these two planning approaches has many
aspects as bases for community development. Therefore, several aspects can be chosen toshow such an impact on a village. The aspects include socio-economic development, urban
development, and planning process. As Belshaw (1977) mentioned, these aspects form bases
for the society’s development. Therefore, through planning we could affect and improve theliving conditions of a community. The nature of the impact depends on planning approach,
responsible body and community adaptation.
Because of the division of the West Bank, Area C is under Israeli authority, the occupation
policies towards spatial administration in the Palestinian villages in Area C limit the access tomain resources and minimize opportunities for development. As Moroni (2015) argued, theplanning process in Palestine is affected by its special geopolitical situation and complicatedplanning context because responsibility for planning has been a result of the Oslo Agreement.
Moreover, private ownership and Palestinian traditional culture are also restrictions on
development as Palestinians become more attached to their land, especially after theoccupation.
The Israeli authority uses restrictive planning policy as a colonialist tool, without taking into
account communities’ activities, needs, and cultures. In Area C, the ICA has not made any
community plans according to the community's permission needs. As Handel argued, the main
goal of their plans is to restrict Palestinian development and to keep Palestinians away far
from Israeli settlements. However, Palestinian villages depend on agricultural economy andseek to increase agricultural productivity. The Israeli authority expands settlements on
Palestinian agricultural lands, prevents the villagers from accessing their land and, as
Khamaisi (1993) argued, restricts their movement in Palestinian territories. According to64

Michael`s (2007) and Gilber’s (2007) arguments this results in the continuation of thepredicament of civil and security relations between the two countries.
The restrictive planning limits the resources that allow the Palestinian community to develop
and urbanize. The ICA plans limited the Palestinian ability to grow organically like other
Palestinian villages in the West Bank (Area A and B). Also, according to Abdulhadi`s (1990)
argument, it causes immigration of many residents to closed villages, because there are noservices and infrastructure, a result of the lack of planning. This planning approach did notgive building rights through the approved detailed plans for the Palestinian residents to able
them to build and expand. So, most of the residents are building more and more withoutbuilding permits and there are many illegal houses. In addition, they have an insecure life
because they have demolition orders, a result of complicated process of building permits by
the ICA.
The planning restrictions have been used by the Israeli authority on Area C, as a tool toprevent the authorization and recognition of many Palestinian villages. The most importantplanning restrictions used by ICA are the separation wall, natural reserves, settlements,
national parks, national and regional roads, closed military areas, and the Jerusalem municipal
border. Although there are citizens living on the land and they need services, the Israeli
government uses these planning restrictions as a tool to displace Palestinians.
According to Alterman`s (2002) argument, the approach of development planning could solve
many problems in Palestinian villages in Area C and give them an opportunity for community
development. There are five main goals in this approach:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Stopping displacement according to the planning restrictions, which have been
legitimized by the Israeli government
Improving the reality of living conditions in Area C and providing basic services
Protecting houses from demolitions, allocating needs for current and future
development, and connecting localities in the West Bank
Expanding urban centers into Area C and keeping continuity with other Palestinian
towns.
Raising awareness of the importance of regional cooperation between other
Palestinian governing bodies.

The development planning process goes through many challenges due to the geopoliticaldivisions in the region. On one hand, the process needs to meet the needs of Palestinians anddeveloping a planning culture at the same time. On the other hand, it deals with the Israeli
planning control policies. Moreover, the Palestinian rural society is going through anurbanization process under the occupation. The development planning aims to increase social
equity, make a better reallocation of resources, produce space for development, and increase
political efforts to stop demolishing houses. Although local communities are the rural society
65that does not know much about planning, the approach of development planning has been
adopted with them. This process proceeds in stages: community initiative, community
adaptation, authorization, and implementation as Allmendinger and Haughton (2010)
explained.

The Discussions over De-facto Counter PlanningBy simple definition, counter planning means a plan intended to counter or oppose anotherplan. This counter plan presents an alternative that aims to fulfil different needs and goals, andconsiders various narratives, norms, variables and characters which the original plan did notconsider. A counter planning model is implemented for social equity, appropriate resource
reallocation, increased resilience and sustainable development. The counter planning includes
community awareness, capacity building, Planning activities according to adapted, authorized
and implemented plans would create equity in one hand, and they are part of social andpolitical efforts to stop housing demolition and develop communal places and spaces.
Counter development planning attempts to merge different planning approaches, such as
humanitarian, restrictive, advocacy and developmental approaches, in the situation of doingplanning under geopolitical and national conflicts. The de-facto counter planning anddevelopment for Palestinians in Area C under occupation include four main steps: community
initiative, the adoption and acceptance of the plan by the community, the authorization of theplan and its implementation.
Doing de-facto counter planning and development is a response to the needs of thePalestinians communities and a measure for developing planning culture among them underasymmetric conditions. This should occur in parallel with coping with the Israeli planning
control. So the tasks of counter planning are to counter, resist and challenge Israeli national
and urban planning and their development policies and tools on one hand, and to challenge
Palestinian urban and rural societies which go through urbanization process under occupationon the other.
Palestinians in Area C have suffered from the Israeli SMOC and restrictive planning for their
upland development. The Palestinians assumed that in 1999 Area C would be governed by the
PNA according the Oslo Interim Agreement. However, the broken-up of the peace process
between Israelis and Palestinians has led to the postponement of the transference of Area C to
the PNA and the establishment of a Palestinians state in the PT. The Palestinians in Area C
continue to suffer from the Israeli SMOC.
In 2009, with the support of the international communities, launched was the Area C
Community Planning Initiative with the aim of supporting and protecting the livelihoods of66

Palestinian communities through the implementation of better planning practices 13. The goalsof this initiative included empowering communities to take an active role in planning for theirown needs, building trust so that more money (private, public and donor funding) would be
invested in providing for the communities’ urgent needs and facilitating the implementation of
new Palestinian de-facto development planning to respond to needs for sustainable
development in Area C as part of the future Palestinian state.
The process started as a series of formal objections to fourteen plans prepared by the ICA that
restricted development for respective Palestinian communities. The initiative was not stopped
and kept objecting to the plans prepared based on restrictive approach and doing counterplanning as an alternative based on development planning approach. After all the attempts toutilize the ICA’s existing planning framework were exhausted, the initiative began to workwith the communities to develop their own viable alternatives. The initiative has developed
into a comprehensive planning project in Area C and become the very first attempt to provide
suitable spatial planning that responded to the needs of the inhabitants. In 2010, the Ministryof Local Government (MoLG), which rules spatial planning by the PNA, decided to initiate
and financially prepare a pilot outline plan for six Palestinians villages located in Area C
through their local village councils.
The project of counter planning in Area C consists of a variety of planning and training
activities, operating at both regional and local scales. The central focus of the project has beenin the field of statutory planning. Outline plans are developed with communities, which
allocate land-use and density to meet the needs of the communities in line with existingplanning laws. Two other work streams complement this. The first ‘training and awareness’
has built the capacity of communities to use planning tools so that they can take a more activerole in current and future planning processes. The second ‘supplementary or guidanceplanning’ supports the implementation of infrastructure through micro planning and theefficient allocation of resources through macro, regional planning. After 2011, the counter
development planning process started as a project adopted and managed by the MoLG ― aPalestinian authority through the local village council’s initiatives. The planning participation
was realized through workshops for the locality representatives, where their point of views
was discussed as to whether the project fitted with the current and future needs of the local
residents. Then an outline plan was prepared for the locality to deal with private ownership. As
a result, the development planning raised the education level, employment rate, work
opportunities, and the socio-economic level in the village. During the process of doing thecounter planning we (R.K) adopted the methodology of planning with the community and not
for the community.
Among the Palestinian, including the PNA, was a dispute and discussion regarding the13This initiative was done by Rassem Khamaisi as a planners’ leader, through NGO’s body International Peace andCooperation Center (IPCC) located in East Jerusalem. It was the first initiative with the support of the British
Consulate-General, and later different bodies joint this initiative.

67

planning initiative that is done under occupation and submitted to the planning institutions of
the ICA for official authorization. Some Palestinians sharing some international views thinkthat doing planning and authorizing it under the existent situation of Israeli occupation of Area
C mean to:

1. Accept the rule and the role of the game of the ICA
2. Regard the Israeli settlements and the limitations and restrictions imposed by the
SMOC as a function of the Israeli occupation in Area C.

3. Weaken Palestinian attitudes and standpoint to finalize the Israeli occupation andtransfer the rule of Area C to the PNA.

4. Create an atmosphere of informal recognition of the ICA as ruling Area C andproviding services for the Palestinians under occupation.

5. Nurture the clime of such “normalization” with the occupier, which weakens
Palestinian peace negotiation and international support.
On the other hand, other Palestinians with the support of international powers support theinitiative of de-facto counter development planning in Area C. This position is based on thefollowing justifications:

1. There is no connection between the civic counter planning track and the national
geopolitical peace negotiation. They could and should work in parallel. While thecounter planning can protect Palestinian existence and make sustainable theresilience of the Palestinian villages in Area C, it will strengthen the geopolitical
attitude of Palestinians.

2. Although nobody knows when the occupation will end, there are Palestinians
villages in Area C today, and some of the Palestinian towns and cities need to
expand in Area C. So counter development planning is necessary to respond toPalestinian developmental needs on one hand and to protect the existent villages
and buildings from the threat of Israeli demolition on the other.

3. Palestinians villages fully included in Area C are under the process of population
growth and sprawl of the built-up areas as part of urbanization. On the other hand,
many Palestinians towns need to expand in Area C. Such development in Area C
needs to be based on spatial planning as a guide for the development. This type ofplanning should be carried out if the existent situation continues or if the Palestine
state governs Area C after the end of Israeli occupation.

4. Counter de-facto development planning means the opposite to Israeli
governmental/ICA restrictive planning. So the former responds to Palestinianneeds and to the requirement to allocate resources and investments from national
and international bodies to Palestinian villages and towns for developing public
spaces.

68

5. The initiative of local counter planning comes from a community to respond to its
needs and to protect houses from demolition and Israeli settlement expansion.
Any local community and its members have a full right to claim and protect theirhome and land. This is not “normalization”, but part of resistance against theaggression of occupation.

6. Working with the ICA does not mean to recognize and legitimize the occupation,
but means to resist and challenge the occupation on one hand and develop aculture of planning and spatial organization of among the rural, marginal andtraditional local communities of Palestinians on the other.

7. Counter planning does not mean that it should be authorized by the ICA planningsystem. Being authorized might be considered good but what is important is to be
accepted and adopted by Palestinian local communities.
So different views exist among Palestinians regarding how to deal with counter planning anddevelopment initiatives under the current Israeli occupation, creeping annexation, surveillanceand sophisticated matrix of control. While one view argues for ending occupation first,
seeking territorial liberation and state re-building and emphasizes a top-down approach, theother supports counter planning, society and community building, securing resilience andPalestinian development and emphasizes a bottom-up approach. In some views there are nocontradictions between these two approaches. They are continuous and complementary in thecontext of the current geopolitical situation and statute of the Palestinians, particularly in Area
C.

Israeli Occupation Authorities’ Attitudes toward the Counter Planning
Israeli occupation authorities’ attitudes toward the Palestinian initiative of the counter planning
are mixed. They not refuse it in principle by making explicitly rhetorical statements,
particularly in meeting with international representatives. Implicitly, however, they put up
many barriers before authorization and set many technical limitations deriving from the
SMOC. In many cases, they refuse the plans that Palestinians submitted to the ICA using
various arguments. In addition to the long process of discussion and authorization for thesubmitted plans, there are often delays and newly added contradictory requirements.
If the sites of counter planning are not located in sensitive areas for the Israeli occupation, theplans prepared and submitted by Palestinians according to the counter planning approach may
be authorized. However, if planning sites are located in areas defined as militarized zones,
areas close to the Separation Wall or Israeli settlements, areas along bypass roads for Israeli
settlements, areas whose landownership is unclear for Israelis, or areas under dispute from
Israeli’s point of view, the ICA planning system will freeze the process of authorizing theplans or refuse it. Mostly the ICA refuse or freeze the plan prepared and submitted by the69

Palestinians community, using various causes.
Under the Israeli military rule in Area C, approval by the ICA’s Higher Planning Council(HPC) is required for any plans to be recognized as legally binding. The plans are submitted to
the HPC after they have been approved by the local council of each community and endorsedby the Palestinian MoLG. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that the final approvalshould be a simple and quick process. However, this is not the case. The process to receive the
ICA’s approval is extremely long, often involving unpredictable additional requirements thatcause significant delays before a final decision is made.
The ICA’s approval process is very complicated and can be summarized into eight key stages,
which include many sub-stages:
1) Israeli Defense Minister accepts to give an order to technical and professional
employees in the ICA to receive the plan’s documents and discuss the plan.
2) ICA Technical Committee examines the planning (usually through 5-10
meetings).
3) ICA Subcommittee for Villages accepts the documents for the planning (for thePalestinians).
4) ICA Higher Planning Council or its sub-committee decides to reserve theapplication of the plan.
5) ICA Technical Department approves the functional plans on roads, water,
sanitation, custodian of absentee property, archaeology and others6) Official Public Review is held for the submission of objections and comments (for60 days)7) Subcommittee of the ICA Higher Planning Council examines the objections, andsuggests some changes to the plan before authorization.
8) Higher Planning Council of the ICA makes a decision for the possible final
approval.
This process necessitates considerable additional detailed planning work and does notguarantee authorization. The main purpose of submitting plans to the ICA is to protect houses
from demolition. The negotiation of the plans with the ICA maintains pressure to authorize
Palestinian development in Area C with the support of and in coordination with theinternational community in various cases.

Some Outputs of De-facto Counter Planning Practices
According to the report titled New Letter by the Palestinians Ministry of Local Government inApril 2017, there are 113 local plans prepared for Palestinian localities based on de-facto
counter planning for villages in Area C. These plans cover a total planned area of 124,853
70

dunums and targeted population of 191,053 inhabitants. 94 of the plans have been submitted to
the ICA without receiving final authorization yet, while more than 18 months have passed
since 82 plans were submitted. Since the planning project in Area C was initiated based on the
counter development planning approach, only five plans have been fully authorized, seven
under the process for objection, 87 under technical discussion and coordination with therequirements of the ICA planning system, and the remaining fourteen plans still under datacollection and preparation with the communities (see Figure 5). Beside these difficulties, thede-facto counter planning contributes to reducing some negative impacts of the SMOC, someof which can be briefly summarized below.
With the confirmation of the PNA and lobbying support of the international community, the ICA
has been pressured to recognize the plans and freeze demolition orders within their boundaries.
To date, 97 plans have been submitted to the ICA for authorization by local councils. The ICA
has forced the boundaries of planning sites to be reduced and demanded far more additional
detailed changes than is required in Israel. Despite this, five plans have received fullauthorization from the ICA, granting the communities development rights with permanent
security free from building demolition.
A number of plans may never be approved by the ICA due to their location in politicallysensitive areas. However, the endorsement of local councils and the PNA has afforded themlegitimacy enough to stimulate positive change on the ground regardless of the ICA approval.
Local communities and development agencies alike have started implementing plans for new
housing, public services and infrastructure. The EU has agreed to fund development projects in
13 localities, following a de-facto approach instead of waiting for the ICA approval.
This planning project was initiated according to the counter developing planning approach.
Since 2009 it has provided Palestinian communities in Area C with the technical support todevelop valid spatial zoning plans. The acceptance and recognition of the plans by the local
councils, the PNA, the international community and even the Israeli courts has secured social
trust in planning and opened a new way to develop and invest in communities in Area C.

Comparison of Two Plans for a Case StudyIn this section, we briefly examine a case study of two plans prepared for the village of
Tuwani. Tuwani is an agricultural village, located 12 km to the north of the Hebron
governorate in the West Bank, located fully in Area C. It suffers from the lack of land fordevelopment and building demolitions. The number of Tuwani residents is 404 (PCBS, 2014),
80 households, with an average family size of 6.2 persons per household. In Tuwani, there isone mixed primary school for 140 pupils, a medical center which is open once a week, and amosque while there is no kindergarten and cemetery.

71The Tuwani plan was planned by the ICA in 2005 and approved regardless of public
objections. It covered an area of only 50 dunams. The suggested area of the plan limited theability of residents for agricultural productivity that constitutes their main source of income.
The suggested plan did not respond to local community needs; the community did not adopt
the plan but rather the plan was imposed on it. The planned area did not include any areas forpotential future development areas based on the community culture and background.
Accordingly, this plan was not considered a tool for community development.
Figure 5: The Distribution of the Plans Prepared for Palestinians Villages in Area C andTheir Authorization Status in April 2017
(Source: News Letter of the Palestinian Ministry of Local Government)

72

The outline plan of Tuwani was prepared to meet the community needs according to thede-facto counter development planning approach. The community engaged in the planning
process from the start and was part of it until the end. Many workshops were held and sharedwith the community to raise awareness of the residents’ planning rights. The outline plan
included and proposed many public spaces to be planned by the MoLG and European Union
agencies that gave the community development opportunities. As a result, this plan legitimizedbuilding rights for the residents that enabled their future development. The Tuwani outline
plan allocated agricultural lands to its villagers and promoted the building of a school and akindergarten with donations. These facilities also served pupils from the surrounding villages.
The Tuwani plan was designed by a Palestinian planner in 2009 and approved through public
review in 2014, and its area was 164 dunams. After the community adopted the outline plan, it
was discussed by the ICA for the approval of implementation. The plan also needs theapproval of the Israeli Defense Minister before that of the High Planning Council in the ICA.
Unfortunately, as of today, the outline plan has not received the full approval of
implementation by the ICA for political reasons.
The case of planning in Tuwani village started with the community’s approval for planningtheir village to protect their houses. Data for the planning have been collected through fieldsurvey, interviews with the locals, and questionnaires about their housing and population. Twotypes of questionnaires were conducted: One was a survey for buildings that containedquestions about the buildings such as the number of floors, structural and building condition,building material, number of apartments and household; The other was a questionnaire about
the families that contained questions about the characteristics of the population such as thenumber of residents, their sex and age, and the name of the family, etc. The field survey data
formed a basis for an examination of the current situation and the prospects of development
planning. The preparation of planning alternatives was also proposed according to community
needs. Then the final outline was selected to be submitted to the ICA for authorization, anddetailed plans on water, wastewater, transportation, and other services was prepared to obtain
ICA full approval.

73

Figure 6: Existent Buildings Developed in an Unplanned Manner in Tuwani Village,
2014.

Figure 7: The Location of Tuwani Village in the West Bank and A Comparison between
the Two Plans

74

Figure 8: The Difference between Two Plans Prepared for the Same Village according to
Different Planning Approach

Restrictive
Planning
CounterDevelopment
Planning

Tuwani plan which done by the ICA – 50
dunumsThe Tuwani Plan which done by Palestinian
urban planners Rassem Khamaisi – 164

75

Table 1: A Summarized Comparison between the Restrictive Plan Prepared by the ICA
and the De-facto Counter Development Plan Prepared by Palestinians for Tuwani Village
FactorRestrictive Plan of the ICA

Counter developed plan of
the Palestinian community

InitiativeTop-down from the ICA

Bottom-up from the local
village council

Planning concept

Planning for the community

Planning with the community

Plan area

50 dunums

164 dunums waiting for
authorization

StatusAfter receiving objections
was postpone authorizing

After receiving objections
waiting for authorizing

Pre-study for the planning

Very limited, unable to fit
with the needs of the village

Many studies conducted tounderstand the needs of thevillage

Development

Restricted and shrinking thearea for the development of
the built-up area, based offill-in and impose
urbanization

Allocated new land for future
development, considering
expanding the development
and securing the rural areas

Land use

Just two land use (housing
and roads)

Various suggested land use,consider the variety ofcommunity needs, including
public places and green open
areas

Public participation

No public participation

A lot of meeting with thecommunity for awarenessand discussion the plan anddoing amendments to fit theneed of the community andto secure professional
consideration

No. of objections

25 from the community

Only 2 objections from theIsraeli settlement
organization

76

Adoption, authorization andimplementation

Rejected by the community,
not fully authorized andimplantation refused

Accepted and adopted by thecommunity, and still waiting
for a political decision toissue full authorization; andboth the local village council
and the community began toimplement the plan

Socio-economic
development

Restricted and limited

Enabled and creates various
opportunities

Community general feeling(atmosphere) towards theplan

Denying

Accepting and internalizing

Community behavior

Reacting

Initiated, active and building
capacity

International community’s
attitudes

Reject and criticize

Promote, facilitate andsupport implementation

Conclusion
The Israeli SMOC, being imposed on the Palestinians in the occupied territory, has functioned
as effective tools and mechanisms to secure the edge of occupation, particularly in Area C.
The statutory spatial planning used by the Israel occupation limits, restricts and threats theexistence, sustainable resilience and development of the Palestinians in Area C. On the other
hand, counter outline plans and planning are developed with communities and both directly
respond to their needs and meet the technical standards suitable for their statutory status. Suchplans have provided legal protection against demolition and built communal trust andconfidence, hence paving the way for new development. While in the contexts of occupation
and under the working of SMOC, restrictive planning has mostly done the opposite to theaspiration and the needs of Palestinian communities in the PT, counter outline plans regulate
the land use and population density within a defined boundary. They also define road networks.
Once authorized, they provide a legal reference for the issuance or denial of building permits
by a planning authority. As such, they are a prerequisite to urban development in most of thePalestinian communities.
Palestinians under occupation, particularly in Area C, have been making a great effort to
reduce the negatives impact of the Israeli SMOC. The counter development planning is part ofthis effort and is replacing the top-down restrictive planning prepared and authorized by the
Israeli occupation. The counter development planning is initiated in a bottom-up manner by77the representatives of Palestinian local communities, and is authorized by the Israeli Civil
Administration (ICA). The restrictive planning done by the ICA has a top-down approach,seeking to limit and shrink the development of Palestinian villages without responding to theneeds of the residents. The implications and consequences of the restrictive planning are to
decrease possibilities for development and threaten the individual and collective
socio-economic well-being in Palestinian villages in Area C. The bottom-up approach of thedevelopment planning supports and enables their communities’ socio-economic development
both spatially and functionally.
Spatial planning is part of public policy in which asymmetrical power relations have a direct
impact on the planning approach and the contents of the plans. This paper has shown how
Palestinian communities have attempted to transform their situation, resist the occupation andchallenge the SMOC exercised on Palestinian collective and individual daily lives. We are notnaïve to claim that the initiative of counter planning can immediately end the long and severe
Israeli occupation. There, however, are experiences in which the counter planning has actually
reduced some negative socio-economic effects of the Israeli occupation and sustained theresilience and the development of Palestinians. The promotion of the counter planning willcontribute to the stabilization of geopolitical arrangements over Palestine, which will secure
Palestinian interests and aspirations.

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