はじめに
2022 年 2 月 24 日、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻が始まり、本報告書執筆時点でまもなく 1 年が経過しようとしている。いまだウクライナ東部を中心に激しい戦闘が繰り広げられており、ミサイル攻撃などによりウクライナで死亡した市⺠は 7,000 人を超えている 。
ウクライナ侵攻は、世界的なインフレ率上昇、金利上昇、そして株式市場の急落など世界経済に影響を及ぼすだけでなく、海事業界にも様々な影響を及ぼしている。本
調査報告書は、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻の記録とともに、欧州海事業界にどのような影響を及ぼしたのかを取りまとめたものである。本調査報告書が関係各位の参考となれば幸いである。

目次

はじめに
1. 概要 ········································································································································ 12.

ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻の背景 ··············································································· 4
2.1

ウクライナとは ············································································································· 42.2

ロシアとの関係性 ········································································································· 5

2.3

クリミア危機················································································································· 5

2.4

ドンバス戦争················································································································· 6

2.5

ミンスク議定書及びミンスク 2 ·················································································· 8

2.6

ミンスク 2 合意後のウクライナ政府の動き ····························································· 8

2.7

ロシアと⻄欧⽶の動きと軍事侵攻 ··········································································· 10

3. ロシアに対する制裁 ·········································································································· 12
3.1

REPowerEU···················································································································· 12

3.2

EU による対ロシアの法的制裁 ················································································· 16

3.3

3.4

3.2.1

制裁の背景（EU） ······························································································ 17

3.2.2

製品の輸出入を対象とする経済制裁（EU） ·················································· 18

3.2.3

輸出入禁止の対象品目（EU） ·········································································· 18

3.2.4

国際的な原油等の上限価格設定（EU） ·························································· 20

3.2.5

海運業を対象とする制裁（EU） ······································································ 23

英国による対ロシアの法的制裁 ··············································································· 25
3.3.1

制裁の背景（英国） ·························································································· 25

3.3.2

製品の輸出入を対象とする経済制裁（英国） ··············································· 26

3.3.3

製品の輸出入を対象とする経済制裁（英国） ··············································· 27

3.3.4

海運業を対象とする制裁（英国）··································································· 28

対ロシアの法的制裁の EU と英国の違い ································································ 28

4. 穀物海上輸送 ······················································································································ 31
4.1

船員及び船舶の安全確保 ··························································································· 32

4.2

⿊海穀物イニシアティブ ··························································································· 32

4.3

海上穀物貿易量 ··········································································································· 36

5. エネルギー貿易と安全保障 ······························································································ 38

5.4

5.1

原油······························································································································· 38

5.2

天然ガス······················································································································· 41

5.3

石炭······························································································································· 44

エネルギー安全保障 ········································································································ 45

6. まとめ ·································································································································· 48【付録】（REPowerEU 計画関連文書） ················································································· 50

1.

概要2022 年 2 月 24 日、ロシアのプーチン大統領は、国営テレビを通じて緊急演説し、ウクライナ東部における軍事作戦を開始すると表明した。演説後、ウクライナの首都
キーウ近郊及びウクライナ東部各地で砲撃や空襲が開始され、ロシア軍によるウクラ
イナ侵攻が始まった。ロシアによるウクライナへの軍事侵攻は、2014 年 3 月にクリミ
ア半島を併合して以来となる。
国際通貨基金（IMF）の統計1によると、ロシアとウクライナの国内総生産（GDP）が世界全体に占める割合は合計で 2％ほどであり、経済規模としては一見すると大きいようには見えない。しかし、両国は主要な一次産品輸出国であり、経済協力開発機構（OECD）がまとめた報告書2によると、世界全体の⼩⻨の 30％、トウモロコシや化学
肥料、天然ガスの 20％、原油の 11％を両国で占めている。このウクライナ侵攻に伴い、原油や天然ガス、穀物などの国際価格の急騰、さらに当初ウクライナから穀物が輸出できなかったことにより、中東や北アフリカなどを中心に食糧不足などの混乱が生じた。こうした一次産品の価格高騰は、新型コロナウイルス感染拡大による影響か
ら緩やかな回復基調であった世界の経済成⻑を鈍化させるだけではなく、インフレ圧
力の上昇へとつながった。
ウクライナは⼩⻨の輸出量で世界第 5 位3（2021 年）であり、その大半がウクライナ
最大の輸出港である⿊海沿岸のオデッサ港やチョルノモルスク港、ミコライフ港などから海上輸送されていた。しかし、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻によって⿊海が事実上封鎖され、侵攻直後から港には数百万トンともいわれる穀物が滞留し、ウクライナ
産穀物の輸出は陸路や河川港を経由したものに限定されたことで輸出量が激減した。
その後、2022 年 7 月にトルコと国連の仲介により、国連、トルコ、ウクライナ及びロ
シアの 4 者間で、⿊海からのウクライナ産穀物の輸出合意である「⿊海穀物イニシア
ティブ」が署名4されたが、合意直後のロシアによるオデッサ港への攻撃や、10 月には

1

https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/RUS/UKR
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/4181d61b-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/4181d61ben
3
https://www.fao.org/3/cb9236en/cb9236en.pdf
4
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123062
2

1
－ 1 －

ロシア側による一方的な穀物輸出合意の履行の無期限停止が表明されるなど混乱を極めた。
欧州は、ウクライナ侵攻による影響が最も大きい地域とも言えるだろう。2020 年時
点において、欧州連合（EU）の 27 カ国は、エネルギー需要全体の 24.4％をロシアからの輸入に依存しており、天然ガス輸入量の 41.1%、原油輸入量の 36.5%、石炭輸入量の 19.3%をロシアが占めていた5。しかし、ウクライナ侵攻以降、EU はロシアに対するエネルギー禁輸政策を進めており、ロシア産エネルギーからの脱却は欧州にとって重要な課題の一つである。欧州委員会（EC）は 5 月、天然ガスを中心としたロシア産化
石燃料依存からの早期脱却計画「REPowerEU」計画の詳細を発表した6 7。REPowerEU
は、（１）エネルギーの効率化などによる省エネの向上、（２）エネルギー供給の多様化、（３）欧州における再生可能エネルギーへの移行の加速を通じた化石燃料の早期代替を計画の柱に位置付けている。
先進 7 カ国（G7）や北大⻄洋条約機構（NATO）を中心とした⻄側諸国ではロシアの軍事侵攻を受けて、半導体などのハイテク製品のロシアへの輸出停止や、ロシア産エネルギーの輸入停止、ロシアの個人・企業・銀行の資産凍結や一部銀行の国際銀行間通信協会（SWIFT）システムからの排除8など、ロシアに対して厳しい経済制裁を科した。制裁の目的は、ロシアの物資や戦費の調達を困難にし、資金不足によって継戦能力を奪うことである。
ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻は、海事業界にとっても大きな影響を及ぼした。侵攻開始時には、ウクライナ入港中の船舶等が留め置かれるなど、周辺海域における商船の安全運航が脅かされる状況になるとともに、船員交代、船舶保険、燃料価格など影響は広範囲となった。ロシア・ウクライナ発着の貨物が激減する一方で、遠距離からの代替調達によるトンマイルの船腹需要の増加、さらにはタンカーやガス船などで海運マーケットが高騰、LNG 船は欧州がパイプラインでのロシア産エネルギー脱却によ5

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-202203282#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20the%20EU%20imported,and%2011%25%20solid%20fossil%20fuels.
6
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_22_1511
7
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131
8
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/03/02/russia-s-military-aggressionagainst-ukraine-eu-bans-certain-russian-banks-from-swift-system-and-introduces-further-restrictions/

2
－ 2 －

る輸送需要が増加、プロダクト船もロシアから代替国による石油製品の需要が上昇する面もあった。
本調査報告書は、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻が欧州海事業界にどのような影響を及ぼしたのかを取りまとめたものである。

3
－ 3 －

ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻の背景

2.

ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻が欧州海事業界にどのような影響を及ぼしたのかを述べる前に、まずはウクライナとロシアの関係性、そして侵攻に至った背景について整
理する。

2.1

ウクライナとは1991 年に旧ソ連の崩壊に伴って独立したウクライナは、国土面積が日本の約 1.6 倍となる 60 万 3,700 平方キロメートルで、首都はキーウにある。ロシアが一方的に「編入」を宣言した南部のクリミア半島（クリミア自治共和国とセヴァストーポリ特別市）を除いた人口は 4,159 万人（2021 年：ウクライナ国家統計局9）で、人口の約 78%
はウクライナ人、約 17%はロシア系10となり、親欧⽶の⻄部・中部と、ロシア系の多い
東部・南部に色分けされる。公用語はウクライナ語だが、親ロシア派の多いウクライ
ナ東部・南部では第一言語はウクライナ語ではなく、ロシア語となるのも特徴である。欧州連合（EU）とロシアの間に位置しており、ロシアからすれば欧州への玄関口

11ともなることから戦略的な要衝となっている。
ウクライナの⻄部や中部は、かつてオーストリアやポーランドの支配を受けたこともあり、欧⽶との関係を重視する傾向があるが、東部や南部はロシアの勢力下にあった期間が⻑いため、ロシアとは経済的に強く結びついていた。そのため、文化や産業も東⻄で異なり、⻄部は産業の中心は農業で、東部に⽐べて⼯業化は遅れている。一方で東部や南部は、ロシア向けの軍需・宇宙産業や精密機械、鉄鋼業が盛んな⼯業地帯である。なお、首都キーウの約 100 キロ北のベラルーシとの国境付近には、旧ソ連が建設したチョルノービリ（チェルノブイリ）原子力発電所12があり、1986 年 4 月に原子炉が水蒸気爆発する事故が発生している。

9

http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/ukraine/data.html
11https://ca-voir.com/ukrainian-language-jp/
12https://chnpp.gov.ua/ua/
10

4
－ 4 －

2.2

ロシアとの関係性

経済的な重要性や安全保障の観点から、ロシアと欧⽶諸国は旧ソ連崩壊後、ウクライナの政治に関与し続けていた。ロシアとウクライナは同じスラブ系⺠族で、歴史、文化、⺠族の面で強い結びつきがあり、旧ソ連をともに牽引してきた「兄弟国家」とも言える。ロシアは EU に対抗するため、旧ソ連のベラルーシやカザフスタン、アルメ
ニア、キルギスとともに 5 カ国の関税同盟となる「ユーラシア経済連合」13を締結しており、ウクライナをこの同盟に引き入れようとしていた。

図 2.1

2.3

ユーラシア経済連合加盟諸国（ウィキメディア・コモンズより筆者作成）

クリミア危機ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻の背景を理解するには、2014 年 2 月ヤヌコヴィッチ政権下で起きた政変である「クリミア危機」にまで遡る必要がある。
1991 年のソ連崩壊後、ウクライナでは親欧⽶派と親ロシア派の対立が激化し、たびたび政情不安に陥っていた。親ロシア派とされていた当時のヴィクトル・ヤヌコヴィ
ッチ大統領は 2010 年の政権発足当初、前任のヴィクトル・ユーシェンコ元大統領の親13

https://www.investopedia.com/terms/e/eurasian-economic-union-eeu.asp

5
－ 5 －

欧⽶路線を一部踏襲し、EU との包括的な協力策を盛り込んだ連合協定の締結を目指した。しかし、この動きに反発したロシアからの強い圧力により、2013 年 11 月に協定締結を土壇場で取り止めた。これに反発した親欧⽶派による反政府集会やデモが起こり、治安部隊との大規模な衝突に発展すると、2014 年 2 月ヤヌコヴィッチ元大統領はロシアへと亡命し、親欧⽶派の野党が暫定政権を樹立した14。
親欧⽶派の政権が発足すると、今度は東部と南部で親ロシア派の抗議運動が広がり、ロシア系住⺠が人口の 6 割を占めるクリミアではウクライナからの分離運動に発展。親ロシア派武装勢力が地方政府庁舎と最高議会などを占拠し、クリミア自治共和国及びセヴァストーポリ特別市を事実上掌握した親ロシア派は 2014 年 3 月 16 日、ロ
シアへの「編入」を前提とする独立宣言を議会で採択した上で、「ロシアへの編入」
か「ウクライナの下での自治権拡大」を問う住⺠投票を実施15。結果は、「ロシアへの編入」賛成派が 96.77%と多数であったことから、投票日翌日となる 3 月 17 日にウクライナからの独立とクリミア共和国の樹立が発表されると、ロシアは直ちにクリミアを併合した16。なお、⽶国・英国・フランス・ドイツ・カナダ・イタリア・日本の先進主要 7 カ国（G7）はオランダのハーグで緊急首脳会談を開き、ロシアに対する経済制
裁強化と主要８カ国（G8）の枠組みから同国を除外することを決定した17。

2.4

ドンバス戦争2014 年 4 月、ウクライナ東部ドンバス地域にあるドネツク州及びルハンスク州の両地域において、親ロシア派武装勢力がウクライナからの独立を一方的に宣言18。それぞれ「ドネツク人⺠共和国」（DPR：Donetsk People's Republic）、「ルハンスク人⺠共和国」（LPR：Luhansk People's Republic）と名乗った。DPR と LPR は、同地域において準軍事組織を構成して分離派武装勢力となりウクライナ政府と対立、これを巡りウクラ
イナ政府との紛争が生じることとなった。ウクライナ政府は、両分離派武装勢力をテ
ロ組織とみなしており19、ドンバス地域における軍事行動に対して、「対テロ政策」と

14

https://www.reuters.com/article/l3n0ls0vh-ukraine-crisis-idJPTYEA1M03I20140224
https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-idJPKBN0DR0OM20140511
16
https://www.cnn.co.jp/world/35045398.html
17https://edition.cnn.com/2014/03/24/politics/obama-europe-trip/index.html
18
https://time.com/96102/ukraine-donetsk-independence-russia/
19
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/7524
15

6
－ 6 －

称する大規模な武力行使を行うとともに、ロシア軍がドンバス地域において両分離派
武装勢力に加担し、大規模に軍事力を展開していると主張する一方でロシア側はこれを否定した20。

図 2.2

図下部のロシアが併合したクリミア半島と、図右の一方的な独立宣言をし、地域を実効支配している「ドネツク人⺠共和国（ドネツク州）」及び「ルハンスク人⺠
共和国（ルハンスク州）」（筆者作成）
2014 年 7 月 17 日、オランダ・アムステルダムからマレーシア・クアラルンプールに向かっていたマレーシア航空 MH17 便が、ウクライナ東部ドネツク州上空を飛行中にロシア製ミサイルシステム「ブク」で撃墜され、乗客乗員 298 人全員が死亡するという痛ましい事件が起きた21 22。オランダ主体の国際合同捜査チーム（JIT ：Joint20

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-says-russia-firing-across-border-into-ukraine-1406231618
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/09/world/europe/netherlands-ukraine-mh17report/index.html?hpt=hp_t2
22https://jp.reuters.com/article/topNews/idJPKBN0FM1YV20140717
21

7
－ 7 －

Investigation Team）は、撃墜に関与した分離派武装勢力に対してロシア政府高官が指示を出していたとみられると発表23していたが、ロシアは関与を否定している。

2.5

ミンスク議定書及びミンスク 22014 年 9 月 5 日、ドンバス地域における戦闘（ドンバス戦争）の停止について合意
した「ミンスク議定書」がウクライナ、ロシア、ドネツク人⺠共和国、ルハンスク人
⺠共和国間において調印された24。これは欧州安全保障協力機構（OSCE：Organizationfor Security and Cooperation in Europe）援助のもと、ロシアとウクライナの隣国となる
ベラルーシの首都ミンスクで調印され、これによりドンバス地域での即時休戦の実施を合意している。しかしドンバスにおける戦闘は再び勃発することとなり、ミンスク
議定書による停戦は完全に崩壊した25。
これ以上の戦闘の拡大を避けるため、ドイツとフランスが仲介に乗り出し、2015 年
2 月 11 日夜、ベラルーシ・ミンスクにおいてウクライナ、ロシア、ドイツ、フランスの 4 カ国の首脳による和平交渉が夜を徹して行われ、ウクライナ東部を巡る紛争の停戦を目的としたパッケージとなる、いわゆる「ミンスク 2」に合意し26、2 月 15 日午
前 0 時からの停戦の発効が発表、ウクライナ政府と親ロシア派武装勢力の停戦が実現した。ミンスク 2 の内容は 13 項目から構成され、全面停戦や OSCE による監視、ウク
ライナとロシア国境の管理回復、外国部隊・兵器・傭兵の撤退の他、ドネツク、ルハ
ンスクの「独立宣言」した一部地域の地位を規定する特別地位法適用の恒久化、脱中
央集権化などを軸にする憲法改正などがポイントになったが、停戦合意後も一部地域
では緊張状態が続いた。

2.6

ミンスク 2 合意後のウクライナ政府の動き

23

https://www.prosecutionservice.nl/topics/mh17-plane-crash/criminal-investigation-jit-mh17
https://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/123591
25
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/21/russia-ukraine-war-fighting-east
26
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/05/minsk-conundrum-western-policy-and-russias-war-easternukraine-0/minsk-2-agreement
24

8
－ 8 －

ウクライナのペトロ・ポロシェンコ前大統領は 2018 年 4 月 12 日、ウクライナの首都キーウで行われた安全保障に関する国際フォーラムで演説し、独立国家共同体（CIS：Commonwealth of Independent States）の枠組みから離脱することを正式に表明した27。CIS は旧ソ連の構成共和国で形成された国家連合の独立国家共同体で、本部はベラルーシの首都ミンスクに置かれる28。EU 型地域同盟を目指しており、加盟国の最高指導者で構成される首脳会議が最高意思決定機関となる。加盟国の中心であるロシ
アは、北大⻄洋条約機構（NATO）の東方拡大に対抗して CIS の結束を強化したい意向
であるが、各国の利害が一致せず、形骸化の傾向がみられる29。
CIS を離脱したウクライナは、NATO と EU への加盟を中心目標とし、2018 年 9 月ウ
クライナ議会は、外交政策の主要な目標とする憲法改正を承認し30、翌年 2019 年 2 月に同議会は、ウクライナの NATO と EU への加盟を支援するためにウクライナ憲法を変更することを賛成多数で可決した31。
2019 年 4 月、ウクライナ大統領選挙の決選投票で、現職であったポロシェンコ前大統領を破り当選したヴォロディーミル・ゼレンスキー氏が 5 月 20 日、第 6 代目となる
ウクライナ大統領に就任した32。ゼレンスキー大統領の中心的な選挙公約の一つは、ドンバス戦争を終わらせ、分離主義運動を解決することであった33。ゼレンスキー大統領
はジョー・バイデン⽶合衆国大統領との電話会談で、NATO 加盟国に対してウクライナを支援するために NATO への加盟を早めることを促すよう求めたとされている34。
その後もウクライナ東部のドンバス地域では停戦違反が増加し対立が激化すると、2021 年 3 月、ウクライナ政府とゼレンスキー大統領は、ロシアによって 2014 年に併27https://web.archive.org/web/20180413043051/https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2018/04/12/717745
4/28
https://cis.minsk.by/29
https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOGR13DW30T11C22A0000000/
30
https://apnews.com/article/dff40992fcc446f6808d02d03b35e4bc
31

https://twitter.com/poroshenko/status/1097831162406412288?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Et
weetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1097831162406412288%7Ctwgr%5E3c8151e2fcb13063cc30cc31357e3ed6e
55aa1fb%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.ukrinform.jp%2Frubric-polytics%2F2643688poroshenko-da-tong-ling-lu-qin-lue-kai-shinian-jing-guono-te-bie-guo-huinite-jia-meng-lu-xianniguansuru-xian-fa-gai-zhengni-shu-ming.html
32
https://www.rferl.org/a/29951792.html
33
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-49903996
34
https://www.ctvnews.ca/world/ukraine-s-zelensky-on-frontline-as-merkel-urges-putin-to-pull-backtroops-1.5379725

9
－ 9 －

合されたクリミアの脱占領と再統合に向けた新国家戦略「クリミア・プラットフォー
ム」を開設35。同年 8 月には、プラットフォームの発足サミットがウクライナの首都
キーウで開催され、40 以上の国・機関が参加した。このサミットで、「クリミア併合を容認せず、非難し続ける」との共同宣言が採択された36。
2021 年 9 月には、ウクライナとアメリカとの間で、「戦略的パートナーシップに関する共同声明」が両国政府から発表された37 38。

2.7

ロシアと⻄欧⽶の動きと軍事侵攻

こうしたウクライナ政府の動きをけん制するように、ロシアはその後もウクライナとの国境地帯に大規模な軍を配置し続け、緊張状態が続いた。緊張が高まる中、ロシ
アは 2021 年 12 月に NATO とアメリカに対して、これ以上 NATO を東方拡大させない確約など、自国の「安全の保証」に関する条約案を提示39したが、NATO とアメリカ側
は「全ての国が自らの道を選ぶ権利がある」（イェンス・ストルテンベルグ NATO 事
務総⻑）、「NATO の門⼾は開かれたままである」（アントニー・J・ブリンケン⽶国国務⻑官）として、ロシアの要求には応じないとの方針を明確にした40 41。これ対してロシアは、ウクライナに対する侵攻計画を否定する一方で、NATO 不拡大などの要求で強硬姿勢を崩さず、ロシア側の要求が拒否された場合は、軍事技術的な措置を取ると警告した42。
情勢が緊迫する中、2022 年 2 月 21 日にプーチン大統領は、ドネツク、ルハンスク
州で「建国宣言」を行った 2 つの地域を「ドネツク人⺠共和国」、「ルハンスク人⺠

35

https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/svyatkovi-zahodi-do-30-richchya-nezalezhnosti-ukrayinitriva-68593
36
https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/prezident-ukrayini-vidkriv-inavguracijnij-samit-krimskoyi-pl70269
37
https://www.president.gov.ua/news/spilna-zayava-shodo-strategichnogo-partnerstva-ukrayini-ta-s70485
38
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/01/joint-statement-onthe-u-s-ukraine-strategic-partnership/
39
https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/rso/nato/1790803/?lang=en
40
https://www.bbc.com/japanese/60136071
41
https://www.ft.com/content/e75a76dd-0f49-4fb7-b974-cd764a1e19c1
42
https://nypost.com/2021/12/21/putin-threatens-america-if-ukraine-allowed-to-join-nato/10－ 10 －

共和国」として独立を承認する大統領令と、両国との相互援助条約に署名43。そして2022 年 2 月 24 日、プーチン大統領は、国営テレビを通じて緊急演説し、ウクライナ
東部における軍事作戦を開始すると表明し、演説後にウクライナに向けて大規模な進行を開始した。これに対して、国連総会は 3 月 2 日に開催した緊急特別会合において、ロシアに対して軍事行動の即時停止を求める決議案を 141 カ国の圧倒的多数で採択した44。

43

https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-2122/h_fcf8c95f9e69b343087651747ab9acd1
44
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152

11－ 11 －

ロシアに対する制裁

3.

ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻は、人道的被害及び国際経済に大きな影響を与えるとともに、海事産業にも甚大かつ広範囲な影響を及ぼしたと考えられる。こうした影響としては、世界的なコロナウイルス感染拡大によるサプライチェーンの混乱、港湾の混雑、対ロシアの制裁措置、エネルギー安全保障、海上貿易パターンの変化などが挙げられる。
海事業界に影響を及ぼすロシアに対する制裁措置としては、とりわけ、カナダ45、アメリカ46、イギリス47、EU48によるロシア産の原油や石炭の輸入禁止、ロシア関係船舶の EU 域内港への寄港禁止49、国際船級協会連合（IACS：International Association ofClassification Societies）50及びパリ MoU（ポートステートコントロールへの合意に関するパリ覚書）51へのロシアの加盟取り消し等が挙げられる。これに、その他の法的制裁として、個人及びロシアの銀行を含む事業体への資産凍結や渡航制限などの「個別制裁」、また、ロシア製品の輸入禁止、特定の製品・技術の輸出禁止、一部のコンサル
ティング・アドバイザリー業務の提供禁止などの「経済制裁」の数々が加わる。

3.1

REPowerEU

ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻を受けて、欧州委員会（EC）は 2022 年 5 月、欧州連合（EU）がロシア産化石燃料への依存を 2022 年末までに大幅に低下させ、2030 年よりも早い段階で脱却を目指すための、各種イニシアティブをまとめた新たなパッケージである「REPowerEU」計画を発表した52。脱却を急ぐ背景として、EU はロシア産化石燃料への高い依存度が挙げられる。EU の 27 カ国は、2020 年におけるエネルギー需要
45
https://www.canada.ca/en/natural-resources-canada/news/2022/02/government-of-canada-movesto-prohibit-import-of-russian-oil.html
46
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2022/03/08/executive-order-onprohibiting-certain-imports-and-new-investments-with-respect-to-continued-russian-federation-effortsto-undermine-the-sovereignty-and-territorial-integrity-of-ukraine/47
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-phase-out-russian-oil-imports
48
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/06/03/russia-s-aggression-againstukraine-eu-adopts-sixth-package-of-sanctions/49
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/04/08/eu-adopts-fifth-round-ofsanctions-against-russia-over-its-military-aggression-against-ukraine/
50
https://iacs.org.uk/news/iacs-council-withdraws-russian-register-s-membership-of-iacs
51
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32022D0762
52
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131

12－ 12 －

全体の 24.4％をロシアからの輸入に依存しており、天然ガス輸入量の 41.1%、原油輸入量の 36.5%、石炭輸入量の 19.3%をロシアが占めている53。
REPowerEU の計画は、「ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻によって引き起こされた困難と、世界的なエネルギー市場の混乱に対する EU の対応策の一つ」と EC は述べている
54。本パッケージには、EU 法令のほか、拘束力を有しないスキーム、各国政府が採用しうる勧告などが混在している。提案された措置は、いずれも厳密には対ロシア制裁にあたらない点を強調しておくことが重要である。むしろ、これらの一連の措置は、
ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻が、エネルギー供給の安全保障とエネルギー価格にもたらす影響に対処することを目的としている。EU がロシアに科した法的制裁について
は、（海事業界に影響があるものを中心に）後に取り上げる。
「REPowerEU」計画は、EC のコミュニケーション（政策文書）として指針や方向性を示す位置づけであり、具体的には法令案（含む改正案）ごとに今後、欧州議会と EU
理事会の立法手続きを経ることになる。その構成は以下のとおりである。
●「REPowerEU」計画に係るコミュニケーション（非立法措置）●「EU ‘Save Energyʼ」コミュニケーション（非立法措置）●「変化する世界における EU の対外エネルギー関係」共同コミュニケーション（非立法措置）●「湾岸諸国との戦略的パートナーシップ」共同コミュニケーション（非立法措
置）●

再生可能エネルギー指令（RED）およびエネルギー効率指令（EED）、建築物のエネルギー性能に関する指令（EPBD）の改正指令案（立法措置）●

再生可能エネルギー（RES）プロジェクトに係る許可手続きの加速ならびに電力購入契約（PPA）の推進に関する勧告（非立法措置）●「EU 太陽光戦略」コミュニケーション（非立法措置）●

復興・レジリエンス計画中の「REPowerEU」関連章に関する規則案（立法措置）●エネルギー市場向けの緊急措置に係るコミュニケーション（非立法措置）

53

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-202203282#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20the%20EU%20imported,and%2011%25%20solid%20fossil%20fuels.
54
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131

13－ 13 －

●

2022 年後半に EU は、ガスの共同購入やガス不足時の加盟国間の連帯強化、ガス価格上限設定に関する緊急規則を採択「REPowerEU」は（１）エネルギーの効率化などによる省エネの向上、（２）エネ
ルギー供給の多様化、（３）欧州における再生可能エネルギーへの移行の加速を通じた化石燃料の早期代替を計画の柱としており、これに投資の組み合わせを目指すもの
である。

図 3.1

REPowerEU の構成（欧州委員会）

採用されたアプローチは、EU 全体として 2050 年までに気候中立を実現すべく前進
し、各加盟国のニーズに応えるバランスのとれた様々な対応策を提案している。それは、現在 EU で立法手続きが進められている「Fit for 5555」提案の完全な実施を土台とした上で、再生可能エネルギーの移行の加速やエネルギー効率に関する目標の引き上げを提案するなど、さらに踏み込むことを提案している 。
再生可能エネルギーについては、最終エネルギー消費における割合の 2030 年目標
を、現行の 40%から 45%への引き上げを提案。具体策として、迅速な展開が可能な技

55

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_3541

14－ 14 －

術の 1 つとして太陽光発電（PV）を強化する EU 太陽光戦略を策定56し、現状の 2 倍以上となる 320 ギガワット以上の PV を 2025 年までに新設。2030 年までに約 600 ギガワ
ット分の新設を目指すこととしている。また、エネルギー効率化目標については 2020年を基準値として、想定使用量と⽐較した 2030 年までの改善目標を現行の 9%から13%に引き上げることが提案57されている。
表 3.1

2030 年目標の変遷（いずれも最低目標値）（EC の資料を基に筆者作成）

項目2021年提案

2022年提案「Fit for 55」「REPowerEU」

2014年合意

2018年改正

40%削減

40%削減

55%削減

55%削減

再生可能エネルギー⽐率目標

27%

32%

40%

45%

エネルギー効率化目標

27%

32.5%

温室効果ガス（GHG）削減目標（1990年⽐）36%（2020年⽐で9％改善）

2020年⽐で13％改善

EC は、「REPowerEU」の目標達成には、「Fit for 55」提案の目標達成に必要な投資に加えて、2027 年までに 2,100 億ユーロの追加投資が必要であると試算している58。
財源としては、国や EU の資金源だけではなく、⺠間資金を組み合わせて資金調達するとしており、EU レベルでは復興基金の中核政策「復興レジリエンス・ファシリティー（RRF：Recovery and Resilience Facility）」を挙げた。RRF は返済不要の補助金と融資から構成され、2,250 億ユーロ分の融資枠がまだ残っており、加盟国は REPowerEU の目
標達成のために、新たな融資を 2023 年 8 月 31 日まで申請できる。さらに、「Fit for
55」枠組みと「REPowerEU」計画の実施により、EU は 2030 年までに年間のガス輸入
費を 800 億ユーロ、原油輸入費を 120 億ユーロ、石炭輸入費を 17 億ユーロ削減できると試算している59。
「REPowerEU」計画のもうひとつの不可欠な要素として、EC は 2030 年までに域内で1,000 万トンの再生可能エネルギーを用いた水素（グリーン水素）を生産するとともに、1,000 万トンのグリーン水素を輸入するという目標を設定している60。EC は、2030
56

https://energy.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-05/COM_2022_221_2_EN_ACT_part1_v7.pdf
https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/energy-efficiency/energy-efficiency-targets-directive-andrules/energy-efficiencytargets_en#:~:text=In%20May%202022%2C%20in%20the,primary%20energy%20consumption%2C%20r
espectively).
58
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131
59
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_3132
60
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_2829
57

15－ 15 －

年までに 2,000 万トンの水素を生産、輸入、輸送するための水素インフラを整備するには取り組みの加速が必要であるという点を指摘しつつ、水素インフラに関する暫定的なニーズのマッピングを行い、いくつかの主要な水素輸入ルートの開拓を支援し、業界と協力して電解装置の生産能力を増強する予定であるとしており、グリーン水素の生産に必要な電解槽の製造業者など 20 社の最高経営責任者（CEO）とともに共同宣言に署名した61。風力発電（陸上と洋上の両方）は、再生可能エネルギーの普及を加速する上で、電力の直接利用とグリーン水素生産の両面で重要な役割を果たすことが期待されている。
正式には「REPowerEU」の一部には含まれていないものの、EC はエネルギーや海運分野を含む重要インフラの保護を強化するための措置も採択している。ノルドストリ
ーム・パイプラインに対する最近の妨害行為62や、ロシアのウクライナ侵攻によって生じた新たなリスクに対応すべく、重要インフラの強靭性を高めるための EU 全体の協調的アプローチに関する理事会勧告 が採択された63。同勧告では、EU の現行の「海洋安全保障戦略64 」が改訂の時期を迎えており、同戦略を更新する際には重要な海洋インフラの保護に関してさらなる提案が含まれる予定であることが再確認されている。
さらに、重要な事業体の強靭性に関する指令65では、加盟国に対して、重要な事業体の強靭性を高めるための国家戦略を策定し、少なくとも 4 年ごとにリスク評価を実施
し、運輸を含むいくつかの部門において基幹的なサービスを提供する重要な事業体を特定することを義務付けている。貯蔵システムおよび LNG システム、天然ガス精製・処理施設の事業者、ならびに原油の生産、精製、処理施設および貯蔵、輸送の事業者
は、同指令の附属書に記載された基幹的サービスのカテゴリーに含まれる。

3.2

EU による対ロシアの法的制裁

前節で述べたように、ロシアによるウクライナへの違法な軍事侵攻を受けて、EU はロシア産化石燃料への依存に終止符を打つことを目的とするいくつかの戦略的決定を

61

https://ec.europa.eu/docsroom/documents/50014
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_207733.htm?selectedLocale=en63
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-15623-2022-INIT/en/pdf
64
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST%2011205%202014%20INIT/EN/pdf
65
https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/PE-51-2022-INIT/en/pdf
6216－ 16 －

行っている。前節で詳述した「REPowerEU」計画は EU の戦略のひとつの要素だが、もうひとつの要素としてロシア政権に対する法的制裁の導入がある。ここでは、海事産業に影響を与える措置に注目し、各種エネルギー源を対象とする制裁、ならびに海運部門を特に対象とする制裁について整理する。
3.2.1

制裁の背景（EU）

EU は、2014 年のロシアによる違法なクリミア併合への対応として、2014 年 3 月にすでにロシアに対する法的制裁を発動していた66。その上で、2022 年のウクライナに対する未曾有の軍事攻撃を受けて、それらの制裁措置は EU による一連の制裁パッケージの導入を通じて徐々に強化されてきた。その全体的な目的は、ロシア経済を弱体化させるとともに、ロシアから重要な技術と市場を奪い、ウクライナに対する戦争を継続するロシアの能力を制限することにある。
制裁は EC によって提案され、27 の EU 加盟国すべてによって採択されて初めて適用可能となる。こうした制裁には全加盟国による全会一致の合意が必要になるため、その導入は時としてかなり困難な作業になっている。ロシアに対する立場や見解は加盟国間で異なり、中にはより厳格な制裁措置を支持する国もある。そうした中、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻以降、EU はこれまで 9 つの対ロシア制裁パッケージを採択している67。加盟国は、違反を発見し罰則を科すことによって、EU による制裁の実施に責任を負っている。EC は、EU 全域での統一的な適用を確保するために、制裁の執行を監視する。この EU による対ロシア制裁は、個別制裁と経済制裁の形をとる。
個別制裁には個人および事業体に対する資産凍結と渡航制限が含まれ、制裁対象者は自らの資産にアクセスできなくなるほか、いかなる資金も利用できなくなり、また、EU への渡航が禁止される。

66

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-overukraine/67
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A02014D0512-20221204

17－ 17 －

図 3.2

個人及び事業体に対する資産凍結と渡航制限イメージ（EU 理事会）

経済制裁にはロシア製品の輸入禁止、特定の製品・技術の輸出禁止、一部のコンサ
ルティング・アドバイザリー業務の提供禁止が含まれる。こうした経済制裁が海事産
業に最も大きな影響を及ぼしているため、以下ではこの点について詳述する。
3.2.2

製品の輸出入を対象とする経済制裁（EU）

上述のとおり、経済制裁が EU による対ロシア制裁の重要な一部となっており、ロシアに対して輸出入の制限が科されている。EU の事業者はロシアに対して特定の製品を販売することを禁止され、また、ロシアの事業者も EU に対して特定の製品を販売することが許されない。これは、ロシア経済を弱体化させると同時に、欧州の企業と市⺠
に対する影響を可能な限り抑えることが目的となっている。輸出入の禁止措置は、EU内の税関当局によって執行・実施される。
3.2.3

輸出入禁止の対象品目（EU）

輸出入禁止の対象品目の種類について概観するために、下に非網羅的なリストを示す。これらの製品の中には海上輸送されているものがあるため、海上貿易のフローに一部影響を及ぼしている。

18－ 18 －

現在実施中の法的制裁（輸出禁止）によって EU からロシアへの輸出ができない製品には、とりわけ以下が含まれる68。
●

最先端技術（先進半導体など）●

石油精製に係る特定の製品・技術●

エネルギー産業向けの機器・技術・サービス●

航空宇宙産業関連の製品・技術（ジェット燃料など）●

航海機器・無線通信技術●

⺠生目的と軍事目的の両方に使用可能な特定のデュアルユース品（ドローンなど）●

奢侈品（贅沢品）●

⺠生用⽕器およびその他の軍事資材ロシアから EU に輸入することができない製品（輸出禁止）には、とりわけ以下が含まれる69。
●

原油（2022 年 12 月以降）および石油精製品（2023 年 2 月以降）（一部例外あり）●

石炭およびその他の固体化石燃料●

鉄鋼・鉄鋼製品・鉄●金●

セメント・木材・紙・プラスチック

エネルギー部門、特に原油と石油製品を対象とする制裁は、ロシア産原油の大半が海上輸送されていることから、海事業界に大きな影響を与えている。 これらの制裁
は、EU の対ロシア制裁パッケージ第 6 弾の一環として 2022 年 6 月に採択された70 。

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-overukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/
68

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-overukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/
69

70

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.153.01.0053.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A153%3ATO
C

19－ 19 －

より具体的には、これらの制裁によってロシアから EU に原油および一部の石油製品を購入、輸入、移送することが禁止されている。（筆者注：理事会規則 833/2014（2022 年改正）第 13 条により、制裁は EU 領域内および EU 籍船内、EU 加盟国国⺠、EU 加盟国の法律に基づいて設立された事業体、EU 域内で全部または一部が行われる事業に適用される。）
また、この制裁措置によって、EU の事業者は、原油または石油製品の海上輸送（第三国向けを含む）に関連する技術支援、仲介業務、融資、金融支援を提供することも禁じられている。実務上、これは EU の保険会社や再保険会社が（EU 向けか第三国向けかを問わず）ロシア産の原油及び石油精製品を輸送する船舶に保険を提供できなくなることを意味する。これらの制裁措置は、原油については 2022 年 12 月 5 日以降、その他の石油精製品については 2023 年 2 月 5 日以降適用される。
内陸国でロシアからの供給への依存度が特に高い EU 加盟国（ハンガリーやスロバキ
アなど）に対しては、パイプラインによる原油輸入について一時的な適用除外が認められた71。ブルガリアとクロアチアについても、それぞれロシア産の原油（2024 年末まで）と減圧軽油（2023 年末まで）の輸入について、個別の一時的な適用除外が認められた72。ロシア産原油の大半が海上輸送されていることに鑑みて、2022 年末までに
EU によるロシア産原油輸入の約 90%がこれらの制裁の対象となり73、原油を原動力とするロシアの資金力に重大な影響を与えることになると予想された。
3.2.4

国際的な原油等の上限価格設定（EU）

ロシア産原油の販売による収入を制限すると同時に、現下の地政学的状況に起因す
る世界的な原油価格ショックを回避することを目的に、2022 年末に国際的な原油等に係る上限価格の設定について合意された74。EU 域外へのロシア産原油の供給を維持しつつ、ロシアが原油輸出から得る収入を抑制しロシアによる戦争継続を困難にすることが狙いである。価格上限は、EU および G7 諸国、オーストラリアから構成される国

71

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/best-we-could-get-eu-bows-hungarian-demands-agreerussian-oil-ban-2022-05-31/72
https://seenews.com/news/bulgaria-croatia-get-oil-ban-exemptions-as-eu-agrees-new-sanctionsagainst-russia-787039
73
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-overukraine/sanctions-against-russia-explained/74
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2022/12/03/russian-oil-eu-agrees-onlevel-of-price-cap/20－ 20 －

際的な連合「プライス・キャップ連合」によって合意された。上限価格の水準に関しては、EU 加盟国間でも意見が対立していたが、原油の上限価格は 1 バレル 60 ドルに設定され、2022 年 12 月 5 日からの適用が開始された（原油輸入禁止措置の発効と同日）。
今回の措置に対しては、一部摘要の除外要件が設けられており、（１）適用時点（2022 年 12 月 5 日）以前にロシア産原油の購入契約が締結され、（２）適用時点前に船積みが行われ、（３）2023 年 1 月 19 日より前に船卸しが行われる、という全ての条件を満たす取引については規制の適用除外となる75。なお、日本がサハリン 2 事
業を通じて生産された原油については、我が国のエネルギー安全保障の観点から、今回の原油価格上限設定の対象外となる76。
この価格上限設定は、EU（および他の G7 諸国）によって導入されたロシアの原油産業に対する制裁措置に適用除外を設けるものである。これにより、上限価格以下で購入される原油については、EU の事業者は第三国向けの重要なエネルギー供給に対して貿易や仲介、輸送、その他の関連サービスを提供することが可能になる77。海事部門
にとって重要なのは、上限を上回るロシア産原油の海上輸送に関する保険は提供が禁止される点である。つまり、EU の保険会社は、原油の価格が上限価格を下回る限りにおいて、第三国向けのロシア産原油の輸送を支援することが可能になる。 現在、2023
年 2 月 5 日から石油精製品の輸入禁止措置が発効するのを前に、ロシア産石油製品について別途上限価格を設定する作業が進められている。この価格上限は、2022 年 10
月に、EU の対ロシア制裁パッケージ第 8 弾の一環として EU 法に組み込まれた78。
エネルギー・クリーンエア研究センター（CREA：Centre for Research on Energy andClean Air）が 2023 年 1 月に公表したリサーチペーパー79によると、2022 年 12 月 5 日に発効した EU による原油輸入禁止と価格上限を理由にロシアの原油輸出が 12%低下したほか販売価格も 23%下落し、その結果ロシアの原油収入は 32%落ち込んでいる。
CREA はまた、「ロシアはバルト海と⿊海の港から⾃国の原油・石油製品を輸送する上75

https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/1094
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/japan-sets-price-cap-russian-crude-oil-excluding-sakhalin2-2022-12-05/
77
https://finance.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2022-12/guidance-russian-oil-price-cap_en_0.pdf
78
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:259I:FULL&from=EN79
https://energyandcleanair.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/CREA_Press-release_EU-oil-banand-price-cap-are-costing-Russia-EUR-160-mn_day-but-further-steps-can-multiply-the-impact.pdf
76

21－ 21 －

で、G7 諸国が所有する船舶あるいは保険提供者である船舶に代わる実質的な代替手段を見いだすことが出来ていない。」とも述べている80。さらに、今のところ価格上限によって価格の高騰は引き起こされていない。
世界的な原油価格の上限設定を受けて、プーチン・ロシア大統領は 12 月末に、価格
上限設定国に対して 2023 年 2 月 1 日以降原油および石油製品の供給を 5 か月間禁止する大統領令に署名した81。
EU は、原油の輸入禁止に加えて、上記リストで挙げたように、ロシア産石炭の輸入に関しても制限措置を導入している。これは EU の対ロシア制裁パッケージ第 5 弾の一環として 2022 年 4 月に採択され82、EU にとってロシアのエネルギー産業を直接対象とする初の制裁となった。EU はロシアにとって最大の石炭輸出先（全輸出の 4 分の 1を占める83）であるため、この措置はロシアに大打撃を与えると考えられた。EC は当時、この措置がロシアにとって年間 80 億ユーロの収入減少につながると予想した。この輸入禁止措置によって、EU の事業者は 2022 年 8 月以降、ロシア産またはロシアから輸出される石炭を EU へ向けて直接的あるいは間接的に購入、輸入、移送することを禁止されている。しかしながら、EU の事業者がロシア産石炭を第三国に輸送することは許されている。EU の事業者が、第三国向けのロシア産石炭の輸送に関連する保険を提供することも認められている。EU はこれまでのところ、英国等の他の国々とは異なり（後述参照）、ロシア産ガスに関しては輸入禁止措置を導入していない点には注意が必要である。

80

https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/eu-oil-ban-and-price-cap-are-costing-russia-eur160-mnday-but-further-measures-can-multiply-the-impact/
81
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-64102180
82
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R0576
83
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_22_2333

22－ 22 －

図 3.33.2.5

エネルギー部門を対象とする EU の対ロシア制裁イメージ（EU 理事会）

海運業を対象とする制裁（EU）

上記で概説した海事産業の貿易パターンに影響を与えた経済制裁に加えて、EU はロ
シアの商船隊を特に対象とする制裁も導入している。EU は、対ロシア制裁パッケージ
第 5 弾84の一環として 、2022 年 4 月 16 日以降、ロシア籍船舶（2,800 隻超）に対して
EU 域内の港湾へのアクセスを禁止することを決定した。EU はまた、2023 年 4 月 8 日
以降、ロシア船級協会（RS：Russian Maritime Register of Shipping）の認証を受けているすべての船舶に対して EU 域内の港湾への寄港を禁止した。
しかしながら、これらの措置にはいくつかの適用除外が合意されており、加盟国当局はエネルギー製品、医薬品、医療製品、農産物、食料品、人道支援物資、一部の金属・肥料、⺠生原子力施設の機能に必要な核燃料およびその他の製品の輸入に関してはロシア籍船舶の寄港を許可することが認められている。また、避難場所を求めた
り、海上の安全や海上における人命救助を理由に緊急寄港を行ったりする船舶も措置の対象とはならない。

84

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.111.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A111%3ATO
C

23－ 23 －

入港禁止措置の目的は、ロシアを発着する海運を寸断することにより、ロシアの産業が重要製品を入手する手段を制限することであった。
EU はさらに、2022 年 10 月に採択された対ロシア制裁パッケージ第 8 弾85 において、制裁の対象をロシア船級協会（RS）に拡大することを決定した。これは、RS を取
引禁止の対象であるロシアの国有もしくは国の管理下にある企業のリストに追加する形で行われた。これにより、2022 年 10 月 7 日以降、EU の事業者は RS と直接的ある
いは間接的にいかなる取引を行うことも禁止されている。同パッケージの一環として、EU は RS の承認を取り消すことも決定し、RS は EU 加盟国に代わって業務を行うことができなくなった。EU の取引禁止対象事業者リストには他の海事関連事業者も含まれており、ロシアの主要なタンカー船主 Sovcomflot は 2022 年 3 月にすでにリストに加えられていた。EU はさらに、ロシアに対する航海用機器・技術の輸出を禁止する制裁も導入している86。

図 3.4

運輸部門を対象とする EU の対ロシア制裁イメージ（EU 理事会）

全体として、EU による対ロシア制裁は海運部門にかなり大きな影響をもたらしており、ロシア発のエネルギー輸送に関する制裁措置の導入が海上貿易のパターンに影響を与えている。EU による制裁は EU の事業者が一部のロシア産化石燃料の輸送とそれに関する保険の提供を行う余地を残している一方で、多くの事業者は EU（とその同盟

85
86

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ:L:2022:259I:FULL&from=EN
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32022R0394

24－ 24 －

国）によって導入された制裁への違反を回避するべく自粛の方針をとり、ロシアとの関係を断つ決定を行っている。

3.3

英国による対ロシアの法的制裁

上記で述べたように、EU はクリミアの違法な併合とウクライナ東部の不安定化におけるロシアへの対応として、2014 年にすでに制限措置の導入を開始していた。当時、英国はまだ EU に加盟していたため、そうした制裁の採択（と実施）にも関与していたが、英国の EU 離脱が決まると、英国はいわゆる「2019 年ロシア（制裁）（EU 離脱）
規則87」を採択し、ブレグジット後も引き続き対ロシア制裁が適用されることを確保した。これらの規則は、一連の制裁パッケージの採択（現在までにパッケージ 17 に上る）を反映させるべく、2022 年を通じて改定された。
3.3.1

制裁の背景（英国）

2022 年 2 月にロシアがウクライナに対する違法な軍事侵略を開始して以降、英国はEU を含む同盟国と制裁方針について緊密に連携してきた。英国の考えは、「独自の制裁を科すことは可能な一方で、最大限の効果を得るためには同盟国、とりわけ EU および⽶国との連携がしばしば追求される。」というものである。そのため、同様の人物
や事業体、部門を制裁の対象にしてきた。英国は EU と同様に、ロシアに対してウクラ
イナの領土一体性を侵害あるいは脅かすなどの行動を停止するよう促すことを全体的な目的としつつ、金融や貿易、輸送、移住の面で制裁を科してきた。
2022 年 2 月にロシアがウクライナに対する違法な軍事侵略を開始して以降、英国はEU を含む同盟国と制裁方針について緊密に連携してきた。英国の考えは、「独自の制裁を科すことは可能な一方で、最大限の効果を得るためには同盟国、とりわけ EU および⽶国との連携がしばしば追求される。」というものである。そのため、同様の人物
や事業体、部門を制裁の対象にしてきた。英国は、EU と同様に、ロシアに対してウクライナの領土一体性を侵害したり脅かしたりする行動を停止するよう促すことを全体的な目的としつつ、金融や貿易、輸送、移住の面で制裁を科してきた。

87 https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2019/855/introduction/made25－ 25 －

英国では、財務省の一部局である金融制裁執行局（OFSI：Office of Financial Sanctions
Implementation）が国内における金融制裁の実施・執行に責任を負っている。英国の制裁は、英国全土とその領海、ならびに英国外にいる英国人（国⺠および法人）に適用される。英国は、個人や企業のほか、エネルギー部門などロシア経済の戦略的部門を対象とする金融・貿易制裁を導入している。EU の制裁に関する前節と同様に、以下では海事産業に最大の影響をもたらしているこれらの経済制裁を整理する。
3.3.2

製品の輸出入を対象とする経済制裁（英国）

2022 年中に次々と採択された制裁措置の一環として、英国は輸出入禁止措置を通じてロシア経済の主要部門に対する制限措置を科している。これらの禁止措置は広範囲の製品を対象としており88、それには特に以下が含まれる。
●

エネルギー関連製品・サービス●

石油精製製品・技術●

石炭・石炭製品●

原油・石油製品●

海上製品・技術●

鉄・鉄鋼製品●

液化天然ガス

海上輸送される原油の割合が大きいため、EU の制裁と同様に、原油部門を対象とす
る制裁は海運部門にかなりの影響を与えている。英国政府は 2022 年 3 月にロシア産原
油輸入の段階的停止を最初に発表し、同年末までにロシア産原油の輸入を段階的に停止する意思を明らかにした。その時点で、ロシアからの原油輸入は英国の全需要の 8%を占めていた89。
この最初の発表に続いて、英国は 2022 年 11 月、ロシア産原油・石油製品の英国への輸入を全面的に禁止する措置を採択し90、（EU の禁止措置に沿う形で）原油については 2022 年 12 月 5 日から、石油精製品については 2023 年 2 月 5 日から実施されるこ88

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/russia-sanctions-guidance/russia-sanctions-guidance
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-to-phase-out-russian-oil-imports
90
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1122/contents/made89

26－ 26 －

とになった。これには、第三国向けあるいは第三国間の一部ロシア産原油・石油製品の海上輸送を対象とする関連サービス（保険など）の提供禁止も含まれる。
英国は 2022 年 4 月にすでに、「ロシアの石油生産・輸出能力を低下させるべく、石油産業の資金のみならず全体としての能力を標的にするために」、ロシアに対する重要な石油精製設備・触媒の輸出を禁止していた91。
3.3.3

国際的な原油等の上限価格設定（英国）英国は、EU および他の G7 諸国、オーストラリアと連携して、2022 年後半に世界的な石油価格の上限設定導入に向けて取り組んだ。3.2.4「国際的な原油等の上限価格設
定（EU）」でも触れたが、その目的は、「ロシアの収入を減少させ侵略戦争の資金を捻出する力を弱めると同時に、ロシアによる戦争が世界のエネルギー価格、とりわけ低・中所得国に与える影響を抑制すること92」であった。その後英国は、2022 年 11 月に石油の価格上限を法制化するための法律を成立させた93。これにより、石油の購入価格が合意された上限価格（60 ドル）を下回る限り、第三国の輸出入業者に対して英国の海事サービスを提供することが可能になった。EU のルールと同様に、石油の価格上限に関する法律は 2022 年 12 月 5 日に発効した。
英国政府は、2022 年 3 月に石油の輸入を同年末までに段階的に停止する意図を発表したのと同時に、ロシア産ガスの輸入停止を検討する意思も表明したが、その時点ではロシア産ガスは英国の供給の 4%を占めるにすぎなかった94。それから数ヶ月後の2022 年 10 月、英国は 2023 年 1 月 1 日以降ロシア産液化天然ガス（LNG）の輸入を全面的に禁止する法律を制定した95。注目すべきは、こうした制裁措置に関係なく、英国は紛争開始以降ロシア産ガスをまったく輸入していない点である96。この輸入禁止措置
によって、英国は、現時点ではロシア産ガスの輸入に関する制裁措置を導入していな

91

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/452/contents/madehttps://www.gov.uk/government/news/g7-finance-ministers-statement-on-russias-war-ofaggression-against-ukraine
93
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1122/contents/made94
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-on-the-phasing-out-of-russian-oil-imports
95
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/1110/contents/made96
https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp9523/#:%7E:text=The%20UK%20imported%20no%20coal,the%20year%20to%20September%202022.
92

27－ 27 －

い EU とは異なるアプローチをとることになった。英国は、EU のルールに倣って、ロ
シア産石炭の輸入禁止措置97も導入している。この措置は、2022 年 8 月に発効した。
3.3.4

海運業を対象とする制裁（英国）EU による制裁と同様に、英国はかなり早い時期（2022 年 3 月）に、「ロシアが所有、運航、管理、チャーター、登録する全船舶、あるいはロシア籍のすべての船舶に対して英国の港湾への入港を禁止する」法律を制定した98 99。この禁止措置は 2022 年
3 月 1 日から適用が開始された。 加えて英国は、2022 年 3 月 24 日「ロシアの違法な侵攻を支援する」戦略的産業に対する制裁を採択した100 101。これには、ロシア最大の海運会社であり炭化水素輸送の世界的リーダーである Sovcomflot に対する制裁が含ま
れている。

3.4

対ロシアの法的制裁の EU と英国の違い

ロシアに対する法的制裁に関しては、EU と英国は緊密に連携しているが、1 点大きな違いがある。すなわち、英国は液化天然ガス（LNG）とガスの輸入禁止措置を導入しているのに対して、EU はやがては排除する意思を示しつつも、依然としてロシアからガス（特に LNG）を輸入している。EU は、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻以前からロ
シア産ガスへの依存度が高かったため、現実的なアプローチをとることを余儀なくされている。そうしたアプローチは「REPowerEU」戦略に反映されており、代替供給源の開拓と省エネ、再生可能エネルギー導入の加速を行いつつ、ロシアからのガス輸入を徐々に縮⼩する内容となっている。
当初、ロシアは有利な立場にあるように見られたが、EU の対応は功を奏し始めており、欧州が「エネルギー戦争に勝利を収めつつある」とする分析もある102。ロシアは97

https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/850/madehttps://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/203/made99
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2022/241/contents/made100
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/foreign-secretary-announces-65-new-russian-sanctions-tocut-off-vital-industries-fuelling-putins-war-machine
101
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/tariffs-on-goods-imported-into-the-uk
102
https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-winning-energy-war-putin/
98

28－ 28 －

2022 年にはエネルギー価格高騰の恩恵を受けたものの、より⻑期的な財政見通しには陰りがみられる103。

103

https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-eropean-union-energy-war-dents-kremlin-coffers/29－ 29 －

図 3.5

対ロシア制裁措置と政策のタイムライン（各種報道及び資料より筆者作成）30－ 30 －

4.

穀物海上輸送ウクライナは、世界の農業市場の重要な供給国であり、2021 年には世界の穀物海上輸送のおよそ 10％を占めており、米国、アルゼンチン、ロシアに次ぐ穀物の輸出大国となっている104。例えば、⼩⻨の輸出量は世界第 5 位105（2021 年）であり、同 2021
年のウクライナの⼩⻨輸出総額は 51 億ドルで、エジプト、インドネシア、トルコ、パキスタン、バングラデシュが主な輸出先であった106。それら穀物の大半の輸出はウク
ライナ最大の輸出港である⿊海沿岸のオデッサ港やチョルノモルスク港、ミコライフ
港などから海上輸送されていた。

図 4.1

穀物の海上輸送（2021 年）（クラークソンより筆者作成）

104

https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/restarting-ukraines-agricultural-exports
https://www.fao.org/3/cb9236en/cb9236en.pdf
106
https://www.fas.usda.gov/sites/default/files/2022-04/Ukraine-Factsheet-April2022.pdf
10531－ 31 －

4.1

船員及び船舶の安全確保

ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻開始後、ウクライナのオデッサ港を含め⿊海の主要港は封鎖され、ウクライナの港や近海では約 2,000 人の船員及び 100 隻以上の船舶が身動きの取れない状況となった107。さらに、侵攻後 1 週間で、5 隻の一般商船が砲撃や機雷などによる直接的な被害を受け、その中には日本船主が保有するパナマ船籍のバルカーも被害を受けていた108。国際海事機関（IMO）は、2022 年 3 月 10 日、11 日に臨時理事会を開催し、暫定的な緊急措置として、⿊海とアゾフ海の紛争地域から船員及び船舶を安全に避難させ、船員の命を守るための「海上回廊」を設置することに合意した109。

4.2

⿊海穀物イニシアティブ

⿊海の封鎖により、侵攻直後からウクライナの港には数百万トンともいわれる穀物が滞留し、ウクライナ産穀物の輸出は陸路や河川港を経由したものに限定されたこと
で輸出量が激減した。その後、2022 年 7 月にトルコと国連の仲介により、国連、トルコ、ウクライナ及びロシアの 4 者間で、⿊海からのウクライナ産穀物（⼩⻨やトウモ
ロコシ、大⻨、大⾖）をはじめ、食料品（ヒマワリ油等）やアンモニアを含む肥料の安全な輸出再開と航路の合意である「⿊海穀物イニシアティブ」が署名された110。
本イニシアティブによる穀物等は、⿊海に面したウクライナの 3 つの主要港（オデッサ港、チョルノモルスク港、ユーズニー港）から海上輸送され、機雷のあるエリアを避けて⿊海の国際海域に船舶を誘導し、ボスポラス海峡（トルコのヨーロッパ部分とアジア部分を隔てる海峡）に向かって運航する111。

107

https://mfame.guru/2000-seafarers-stranded-in-ukrainian-waters/
https://www.tradewindsnews.com/casualties/fifth-commercial-ship-hit-in-black-sea-amid-ukrainerussia-conflict/2-1-1178559
109
https://www.nautilusint.org/en/news-insight/news/imo-demands--safe-blue-corridor-for-ships-inukraine-warzone/#:~:text=The%20International%20Maritime%20Organization%20(IMO,humanitarian%20deliveries%20to%20Ukraine%27s%20ports.
110
https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1123062
111
https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/black_sea_grain_initiative_full_text.pdf
10832－ 32 －

輸出の実施を監視するための共同調整センター（JCC：Joint Coordination Centre）がトルコ・イスタンブールに設立され、ウクライナの港を出入りする船舶は、JCC の支援の下、合同チームによって無許可の貨物（武器等）が積まれていないかの検査が行われる112。

図 4.1

112「⿊海穀物イニシアティブ」の輸送ルート（国連）

https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/background33－ 33 －

⿊海穀物イニシアティブは署名した日から 120 日間有効で、一方の当事国が他方の当事国に対し合意を終了または修正する意図を通知しない限り、自動的に有効期間を延⻑することができる113。しかし、署名後もロシアによるオデッサ港への攻撃、さらに同年 10 月末にはロシア側による一方的な穀物輸出合意の履行の無期限停止が表明114されるなど混乱を極めていた。
ロシア外務省は、この無期限停止表明は、クリミア半島のセヴァストーポリ海軍基地にあるロシア⿊海艦隊の船舶が、ウクライナ軍の攻撃を受け、⺠間船舶の安全が保障できないことを理由としていた115。その数日後ロシア国防省は、⿊海穀物イニシア
ティブに復帰すると表明した116。クリミア半島の港湾をロシア軍への攻撃に使用しないことを保証した文書をウクライナ側から受け取り、この保証が十分である判断したためである。
上記の通り混乱は散見されたが、合意後の 10 月におけるウクライナの穀物輸出は、侵攻前の水準近くまで改善されている117。JCC は、⿊海穀物イニシアティブによる輸送を JCC ホームページにて情報公開しており、本調査執筆時点で既に約 2,120 万トンもの貨物が 830 隻の船舶において輸送されている。主な輸出先はヨーロッパ及び中央アジア地域で全体の約 52%を占めている118。主な輸出相手国は中国、スペイン、トル
コ、イタリア、オランダ、エジプトなどが挙げられる119。

113

https://maritime-executive.com/article/un-confirms-black-sea-grain-initiative-was-extended-for-120days#:~:text=UN%20Confirms%20Black%20Sea%20Grain%20Initiative%20was%20Extended%20for%201
20%20Days,UN%20Secretary%2DGeneral&text=UN%20officials%20confirmed%20that%20all,by%20the%20UN%20a
nd%20Turkey.
114
https://press.un.org/en/2022/sc15089.doc.htm
115
https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/1835797/
116
https://t.me/mod_russia/21420
117
https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/ukraine-oct-grain-exports-almost-return-pre-war-levelsministry-2022-10-17/118
https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements
119
https://data.humdata.org/dataset/black-sea-grain-initiative-vessel-movements

34－ 34 －

図 4.2

⿊海穀物イニシアティブによる主な輸出先地域と輸出量（JCC より筆者作成）

⿊海穀物イニシアティブの合意は、2022 年 11 月 17 日にトルコのイスタンブール
において 120 日間延⻑された120。ウクライナ・インフラ省は、少なくとも 1 年間は同イニシアティブを延⻑し、さらにウクライナ南部のミコライフ港を合意の対象輸出港に含めることを関係国に求めた121。
ロシア側は、合意条件や範囲を変更することなく期間を延⻑することを認めたとする一方で、ロシア産の農作物輸出の正常化にも取り組むよう要請するとともに、合意が延⻑された 120 日間以内に解決されなければならないと訴えた122。国連のアントニ
オ・グテーレス事務総⻑は⿊海穀物イニシアティブ輸出合意の延⻑を受け、「ウクライナからの穀物、食料品、肥料輸出の安全な航行を促進するため、すべての当事者による本合意の延⻑を歓迎する。国連は、重要な供給が今後も円滑に機能するように、

120

https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/operational-update-17-november-2022
https://mtu.gov.ua/en/news/33838.html
122https://mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1839126/
121

35－ 35 －

JCC とともに支援することに全力を尽くす。また、ロシアからの食料と肥料の輸出に関する障害を取り除くことにも全面的に取り組んでいる」とコメントした123。

図 4.3 ウクライナの穀物輸出動向（クラークソンより筆者作成）

4.3

海上穀物貿易量

英国のクラークソンによると、月次海上穀物貿易指標（Monthly Global Seaborne
Grain Trade Indicator）は 9 月-10 月の期間において、前年⽐で約 3%のプラスとなった。その背景には、⿊海穀物イニシアティブによりウクライナからの穀物輸出が改善したことに加え、ブラジルの粗粒穀物（トウモロコシ）の収穫が好調だったなどのプ
ラス材料がある。

123

https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/2022-11-17/statement%C2%A0of%C2%A0thesecretary-general-%E2%80%93-the-renewal-of-the-black-sea-grain-initiative%C2%A036－ 36 －

クラークソンの最新の予測では、世界の海上穀物貿易量は 2022 年に約 3%後退する
が、2023 年に約 5%の堅調な回復が続くと見込んでいる。一方で、2023 年第 1 四半期に迎える、⿊海穀物イニシアティブの更新などの不確実性も残っている。

図 4.4

世界の海上穀物貿易量（2014-2024）（クラークソン）

37－ 37 －

エネルギー貿易と安全保障

5.

2020 年は新型コロナウイルス感染拡大によりエネルギー需要が軽減し、エネルギー
価格は下落した。2021 年は新型コロナウイルス感染拡大の落ち込みから経済回復に向かう中で、エネルギー需要が増加するとともにエネルギー価格も全体的に上昇した。
しかし、2022 年 2 月のロシアによるウクライナ侵攻により、EU をはじめとする各国
でロシア産エネルギーの禁輸政策が進められると、エネルギー価格の高騰に拍車をかけ、世界のエネルギー情勢は混迷を深めた。
2020 年時点において、欧州連合（EU）の 27 カ国は、エネルギー需要全体の 24.4％
をロシアからの輸入に依存しており、天然ガス輸入量の 41.1%、原油輸入量の 36.5%、
石炭輸入量の 19.3%をロシアが占めていた124。しかし、ウクライナ侵攻以降、EU はロ
シアに対するエネルギー禁輸政策を進めている。ロシア産エネルギーからの脱却と欧州におけるエネルギー供給の安全保障は重要な課題の一つであり、その政策の礎となるものが、3.1 にて挙げた REPowerEU 政策である。

5.1

原油

ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻後、原油価格は上昇し、侵攻後 1 ヶ月で WTI（⽶国南部産原油と中⽶産原油などの価格指標）、ブレント（北海産原油などの価格指標）、
ドバイ（UAE 産原油などの価格指標）の全てが 100 ドル/バレルを超えた125。2021 年時
点では、ロシアは世界の原油輸出全体の約 12％を占めており、世界 1 位であった126。
原油価格高騰は、ロシアが戦争の当事者となり、各国のロシア産エネルギーの禁輸政策により原油の供給が行われなくなることへの警戒感（供給への不安）が原因である。

124

https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-202203282#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20the%20EU%20imported,and%2011%25%20solid%20fossil%20fuels.
125
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51498
126
https://www.iea.org/reports/russian-supplies-to-global-energy-markets/oil-market-and-russiansupply-2

38－ 38 －

図 5.1原油価格の推移（OPEC より筆者作成）（筆者注：OPEC バスケットは、OPEC 諸国の代表的な原油価格を加重平均した値）
EU 等による原油と石油製品を対象とする法的制裁は、ロシア産原油の大半が海上輸送されていることから、海事業界に大きな影響を与えている一方で、輸送距離の増大（トンマイルの増加）をもたらすという現象も生じている127。クラークソンによると、ロシア産原油への EU の制裁措置によって、ロシアによる欧州への原油輸出量は大きく減少し、ロシアの輸出は次第にアジア（特にインド）へと向かっている。また、
トンマイル増加の理由としては、欧州各国は中東、⻄アフリカ、⽶国、南⽶からの資源輸入量を増やすであろうことによる輸送距離の増大が考えられている。

127

https://shippingwatch.com/carriers/Tanker/article13812913.ece

39－ 39 －

図 5.2

ロシア産原油の主要国/地域への海上輸送量（クラークソンより筆者作成）

図 5.3

海上石油貿易における平均輸送距離の増大（クラークソンより筆者作成）

40－ 40 －

5.2

天然ガス

ウクライナ侵攻後、EU のロシア産天然ガス輸入への依存が再び浮き彫りとなった。
EU によるロシアからのパイプラインを経由した天然ガス輸入は 2021 年に年間で約1,400 億立方メートルに達した。それに加え、約 150 億立法メートルが液化天然ガス（LNG）として輸入されていた128。
欧州は、2020 年時点において、天然ガス輸入量の 41.1%をロシアから輸入129していたが、上記からそのほとんどが天然ガスパイプラインによって輸入されていたことが分かる。ロシア産ガスからの脱却には、REPowerEU の柱である（１）エネルギーの効率化などによる省エネの向上、（２）エネルギー供給の多様化、（３）欧州における再生可能エネルギーへの移行の加速、が必要となるが、足元では LNG 輸送船による代替国からの輸入が考えられるだろう。一方で、LNG 輸入には受入基地で液体から気体に戻す再ガス化が必要となるが、欧州には再ガス化のための施設が不足しているという問題点もあった130。
ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻直前の 2022 年 2 月 21 日、ロシアのプーチン大統領
は、「ドネツク人⺠共和国」、「ルハンスク人⺠共和国」の独立を承認する大統領令と、両国との相互援助条約に署名した131。これを受けて、ドイツのオラフ・ショルツ
首相は、ロシアによる独立承認は「ミンスク 2 合意に反する国際法上重大な違反」と厳しく非難するとともに、ロシアとドイツを結ぶ天然ガスパイプライン「ノルドスト
リーム 2」の承認手続き停止を表明した132。「ノルドストリーム 2」は、天然ガス輸入の 50%以上をロシアからの供給に依存する133ドイツにとって重要なプロジェクトとなっていたが、地政学的なリスクなどからこれまでも稼働について議論されてきた134。

128

https://www.iea.org/reports/a-10-point-plan-to-reduce-the-european-unions-reliance-on-russiannatural-gas
129
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/ddn-202203282#:~:text=In%202020%2C%20the%20EU%20imported,and%2011%25%20solid%20fossil%20fuels.
130
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/brimming-european-lng-terminals-have-limited-spacemore-gas-2022-02-17/131https://edition.cnn.com/europe/live-news/ukraine-russia-news-02-2122/h_fcf8c95f9e69b343087651747ab9acd1
132
https://www.deutschland.de/en/videos/federal-government-halts-nord-stream-2-certification
133
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/08/energy-crisis-germanyeurope/#:~:text=Germany%20has%20decided%20to%20replace,the%20end%20of%20June%202022.
134
https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20220130-nord-stream-2-russia-germany-gas-pipelinebecomes-a-geopolitical-lever41－ 41 －

図 5.4欧州のロシア産ガスの依存度（IMF）

天然ガスの主要市場は原油と同じく北⽶、欧州、アジアだが、価格決定方式は地域ごとによって異なる。原油のような指標（WTI、ブレント、ドバイなど）となるガス価格は存在（⽶国ヘンリーハブガス価格（HH）、オランダガス価格（TTF）、英国ガス
価格（NBP）及び北東アジアのアセスメントされたスポット LNG 価格（JKM））する
が、各国の天然ガス需給によって価格が決定されることが多い。すなわち、各国における LNG 輸入価格は、ガス需給の逼迫状況等によって異なると考えられる。
ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻後、欧州がロシア産天然ガスからの脱却を目指したことで、短期的な需給バランスが大きく崩れた結果、天然ガス価格は欧州のみならずア
ジアでも高値を付けた。

42－ 42 －

図 5.5

天然ガス価格推移（世界銀行より筆者作成）

上記に挙げたように、欧州では LNG 再ガス化のための受入れ施設が不足135していたが、LNG 輸入能力は今後 2024 年末までに 2021 年⽐で 34%まで拡大する見込みである。欧州各国は再ガス化プロジェクトに着手している。

136

欧州の再ガス化プロジェクトの多くは、浮体式貯蔵・再ガス化装置（FSRU）を用船し、再ガス化した天然ガスを陸上のパイプラインに接続するためのターミナルを建設することにより、⽐較的短期間で開発することが可能である。欧州におけるその他の再ガス化プロジェクトは、既存の陸上ターミナルの容量及び処理能力を拡大させるものである。中でも、パイプラインでロシア産ガスへの依存度が高かったドイツは FSRU
による LNG 受け入れに積極的である。パイプラインによる輸入を減らす一方で、これ

135

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/brimming-european-lng-terminals-have-limited-spacemore-gas-2022-02-17/136
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=54780

43－ 43 －

まで 6 隻の FSRU を用船（ドイツ政府として 5 隻、⺠間コンソーシアムで 1 隻）し137、
⽶国138やカタール139などから LNG 調達の⻑期契約を締結している。その他の EU 各国
も FSRU の用船契約を締結している140。LNG 船のスポット用船料は高騰し、一時は日建てで 44 万ドル超となった141。

5.3

石炭

第 3 節で触れたように、EU 及び英国はロシアからの石炭の輸入を禁止している。特に EU は対ロシア制裁パッケージ第 5 弾142の一環として 2022 年 4 月に採択され、EU にとってロシアのエネルギー産業を直接対象とする最初の制裁となった。
ロシアのエネルギーから脱却する一方で、欧州としては REPowerEU 政策の柱の一つである「エネルギー供給の多様化」を目指すのだが、エネルギー不足への懸念が深刻化すると、エネルギー安全保障の観点から、短期的には原油や天然ガスの輸入よりも単価の安い石炭に一時期な回帰を見せることとなった143。
英国では、冬（2022 年冬）のエネルギー安全保障強化のために、発電大手の Drax
及び供給事業者の National Grid ESO が英国政府の要請を受け石炭⽕力発電所の稼働を一時的に延⻑することに合意した144。ドイツもまた、ガス消費量を抑える緊急措置を発表し145、代替策として石炭⽕力発電の稼働を増やした146。こうした石炭⽕力発電所の稼働延⻑や再稼働の動きは、EU 各国でも見られるが、あくまでエネルギー安全保障

137

https://lngprime.com/europe/germanys-first-lng-terminal-starts-supplying-gas-to-grid/69441/
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-21/germany-s-enbw-signs-long-term-deal-tobuy-lng-from-the-us
139
https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/qatarenergy-conocophillips-sign-lng-supply-dealgermany-2022-11-29/
140
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=54780
141
https://splash247.com/lng-rates-climb-to-450000-a-day/142
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32022R0576
143
https://www.euronews.com/green/2022/06/24/all-the-european-countries-returning-to-dirty-coalas-russia-threatens-to-turn-off-the-gas
144
https://www.drax.com/investors/six-month-extension-of-coal-operations-at-request-of-ukgovernment/145
https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Pressemitteilungen/2022/07/20220721-bundesministeriumfur-wirtschaft-und-klimaschutz-legt-zusatzliches-energiesicherungspaket-vor.html
146
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-reactivates-coal-fired-power-plant-to-save-gas/a-62893497
138

44－ 44 －

の支援のための緊急的措置であると考えられる。短期的ではあるが、こうした石炭への回帰の影響を受けて、石炭の価格も他のエネルギー源と同様に上昇した。

図 5.6

石炭価格推移（世界銀行より筆者作成）

クラークソンによると、欧州における石炭貿易は、オーストラリア、南アフリカ、
インドネシアといったより遠方のサプライヤーからの輸入を増やし、欧州におけるトンマイルベースの石炭輸入は、2021 年⽐で約 2 倍の水準になると考えられている。

5.4

エネルギー安全保障

世界的にエネルギー価格が急騰し、各国がエネルギー源の確保に奔走する中、エネ
ルギー安全保障が大きくクローズアップされた。このエネルギー問題の状況は、新型
コロナウイルス感染拡大に始まったと考えられる。当時はロックダウン等の影響によ45－ 45 －

り外出が制限され、主にサービス業界や産業界において特に石油の需要が大きく減った147。産油国は石油の需給バランスが崩れる中、OPEC+（中東、アフリカを中心とした産油国からなる石油輸出国機構（OPEC）の加盟国 13 カ国に、ロシアやメキシコなど 10 カ国を加えた組織）による生産調整が成立し148、投資と生産のペースを落とした。新型コロナウイルス感染拡大から世界経済が回復基調に向かう中、今度は石油の需要が供給を上回った。
この状況下、ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻によって、「石炭を段階的に廃止し、再生可能エネルギーを段階的に導入するエネルギー源の転換期において、ロシアの天然ガスに依存」していた欧州は、ロシアのエネルギーからの脱却を目指すことになるのだが、ロシアは欧州の制裁措置への報復として、欧州へのガス供給を大幅に削減した。このような状況がエネルギー危機を招く大きな要因となったと考えられる。

149

欧州はロシアからの天然ガスのほとんどをパイプラインによって輸入していた150
が、パイプラインはかつて、完全に地域的な燃料供給であった。しかし、LNG の台頭
により天然ガス供給がグローバル化し、とある場所での危機が LNG 市場を通じて他の地域に波及する可能性が出てきたと考えられている151。
結果的にではあるが、ロシアからのガス供給の大幅な削減と、代替国からの LNG 輸
入、REPowerEU 計画による再生可能エネルギーへの移行の加速などによって、2022 年
10 月時点では、欧州はロシア産ガスの依存度をこれまでの約 40%から 7.5%まで引き下げている152。
ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻を受けて、3.1 で述べたように、欧州委員会（EC）はロ
シア産エネルギー問題の対応策となる「REPowerEU」計画を発表した153。2022 年 5 月
147https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-impact-of-coronavirus-covid-19-and-theglobal-oil-price-shock-on-the-fiscal-position-of-oil-exporting-developing-countries-8bafbd95/
148
https://www.ft.com/content/2a91fd26-c337-427f-8b24-9f53bc321bb2
149
https://www.iea.org/news/natural-gas-markets-expected-to-remain-tight-into-2023-as-russiafurther-reduces-supplies-to-europe
150
https://www.iea.org/reports/a-10-point-plan-to-reduce-the-european-unions-reliance-on-russiannatural-gas
151
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/12/cafe-econ-in-search-of-energy-security
152
https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/eu-has-reduced-share-of-russian-gas-imports-to-75-eucommissionchief/2707526#:~:text=The%20European%20Union%20has%20reduced,in%20the%20country%27s%20c
apital%20Tallinn.
153
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_3131

46－ 46 －

にデンマークで開催された北海サミットでは、ドイツ、デンマーク、オランダ、ベル
ギーの 4 カ国が洋上風力発電の導入を大幅に加速させる誓約（コミットメント）を発表した154。この誓約では、北海における洋上風力発電ファームと電力グリッドを結び、複数の加盟国に接続するハイブリッド洋上風力提携プロジェクトを開発し、北海地域を「Green Power Plant of Europe」として発展させ、EU へのグリーン電力を供給することが定められている。上記 4 カ国における洋上風力の発電容量を、2030 年までに少なくとも合計 65 ギガワット、2050 年までに少なくとも合計 150 ギガワットまで拡大するという目標を掲げている155。150 ギガワットは現在の発電能力の 10 倍に相当す
るとともに、EU の気候中立達成のために必要な洋上風力発電容量の半分以上を北海地域が供給できることになる156。さらに、将来的には洋上風力発電によるグリーン水素の製造や地域における水素インフラの拡充に関する協力も強化していくとしている
。

157

154

https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/Energie/20220518-declaration-of-energyministers.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=10
155
https://investindk.com/insights/north-sea-summitrepowereu#:~:text=THE%20north%20sea%20summit,On%20May%2018th&text=At%20the%20summit%2C%20Belgium%2C%20the,reach%20climate%20neut
rality%20in%20Europe.
156
https://www.iea.org/reports/renewables-2021
157
https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Pressemitteilungen/2022/05/20220518-energieminister-dervier-nordseeanrainerstaaten-unterzeichnen-kooperation.html

47－ 47 －

6.

まとめ
ロシアとウクライナ両国のこれまでの複雑な歴史的な背景により、ロシアは強行的にウクライナに軍事侵攻を開始した。同じルーツを持つ兄弟国であり、元々はソ連の構成国であった両国だが、次第に親欧⽶路線へと舵を取るウクライナ政権に対して、
かつての大国復活を目指して勢力を取り戻すことを狙っているロシアが圧力をかけ、違法な侵攻を開始したと考えられる。
両国は世界における重要な一次産品輸出国であり、世界全体の⼩⻨の 30％、トウモ
ロコシや化学肥料、天然ガスの 20％、原油の 11％を両国で占めていた。しかし、このウクライナ侵攻に伴い、原油や天然ガス、穀物などの国際価格は急騰した。こうした一次産品の価格高騰は、新型コロナウイルス感染拡大による影響から緩やかな回復基調であった世界の経済成⻑を鈍化させるだけではなく、インフレ圧力の上昇へとつながった。
穀物の輸出に関しては、侵攻直後から⿊海が事実上封鎖されたことにより、ウクラ
イナの港には数百万トンともいわれる穀物が滞留した。さらに、穀物が輸出できなかったことにより、中東や北アフリカなどを中心に食糧不足などの混乱が生じた。その後、トルコと国連の仲介により⿊海からのウクライナ産穀物を中心とした貨物の安全輸出のための合意である「⿊海穀物イニシアティブ」が署名され、同合意による穀物輸出は侵攻前の水準近くまで改善されるとともに、現在までに主に中国、スペイン、
トルコ、イタリア、オランダ、エジプトなどに向けて約 2,120 万トンの穀物が 830 隻の船舶で輸出されている。一方で、2023 年第 1 四半期に迎える、⿊海穀物イニシアテ
ィブの更新などの不確実性も残っている。
欧州連合（EU）の 27 カ国は、2020 年時点において、エネルギー需要においてロシアへの依存度が高く、需要全体の 24.4％をロシアからの輸入していた。エネルギー源
ごとに見ると、天然ガス輸入量の 41.1%、原油輸入量の 36.5%、石炭輸入量の 19.3%をロシアが占めていた。しかし、ウクライナ侵攻以降、EU はロシアに対するエネルギー
禁輸政策を進めており、欧州委員会（EC）はロシア産エネルギーからの脱却と対応策となる「REPowerEU」計画を発表した。EU がロシア産エネルギーへの依存を 2022 年末までに大幅に低下させ、2030 年より早い段階で脱却を目指すものである。
「REPowerEU」は（１）エネルギーの効率化などによる省エネの向上、（２）エネル48－ 48 －

ギー供給の多様化、（３）欧州における再生可能エネルギーへの移行の加速を通じた
化石燃料の早期代替を計画の柱としている。
ロシアによるウクライナ侵攻後、EU、英国、米国などを中心にロシアに対して厳しい法的制裁を科した。制裁の目的は、ロシアの物資や戦費の調達を困難にし、資金不足によってロシアから継戦能力を奪うことにある。さらに、ロシアの原油輸出から得る収入を制限するとともに、世界的な原油価格ショックを回避する目的で、国際的な原油等の上限価格を設定した。海事業界に影響を及ぼすロシアに対する制裁措置等としては、欧米によるロシア産の原油や石炭の輸入禁止、ロシア関係船舶の EU 域内港への寄港禁止 、国際船級協会連合（IACS） 及びパリ MoU へのロシアの加盟取り消し、設定した上限価格を上回る原油の海上輸送に関する保険提供の禁止等が挙げられる。
欧州は、ロシア産エネルギーからの脱却、ロシアに対するエネルギー禁輸政策、欧州の対ロシア制裁措置への報復となるロシアから欧州へのガス供給の大幅な削減、世界的なエネルギー価格高騰などから生じたエネルギー危機を招くこととなったが、代替国からの輸入や再生可能エネルギーへの移行の加速などを通じて、2022 年の冬を乗り越えることは出来た。
欧州各国による再生可能エネルギーへの移行は着実に進んでいると考えられ、各地域において新規のプロジェクトが開発される。ロシア産エネルギーからの脱却によって、欧州のグリーンエネルギーの推進は加速するだろう。
最後に、このロシアによる違法なウクライナ侵攻によって、多くの命が奪われ続けている。ウクライナの情勢に深く憂慮すると共に、様々な関係者の間で行われている
平和的解決への努力が早期に実を結び、平穏な日常が取り戻せることを心から祈念している。

49－ 49 －

【付録】REPowerEU 計画関連文書（１）REPowerEU 計画文書 ····································································································· 51
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE
EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEEAND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS REPowerEU Plan

（COM/2022/230 final）（２）EU 省エネルギー政策 ··································································································· 85
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE
REGIONS EU 'Save Energy'（COM/2022/240 final）（３）EU 対外エネルギー戦略 ····························································································· 101
JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEANECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS EU externalenergy engagement in a changing world（JOIN/2022/23 final）（４）EU 太陽光戦略 ············································································································· 123
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL,
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONSEU Solar Energy Strategy（COM/2022/221 final）

50－ 50 －

EUROPEAN
COMMISSION

Brussels, 18.5.2022
COM(2022) 230 final

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEANPARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEANECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE
REGIONS
REPowerEU Plan
{SWD(2022) 230 final}EN

EN－ 51 －

Introduction
Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine, has massively
disrupted the world’s energy system. It has caused hardship as a result of high energy prices
and it has heightened energy security concerns, bringing to the fore the EU’s over-dependence
on gas, oil and coal imports from Russia. High amounts paid for Russia’s fossil fuels are
helping Russia sustain its war against Ukraine.
In March 2022, EU leaders agreed in the European Council1 to phase out Europe’s dependency
on Russian energy imports as soon as possible. Drawing on the Commission’s communication2,
they invited the Commission to swiftly put forward a detailed REPowerEU plan. Coal and oil
imports are now to be covered by the sanctions regime. The recent gas supply interruptions to
Bulgaria and Poland demonstrate the urgency to address the lack of reliability of Russianenergy supplies.
REPowerEU is about rapidly reducing our dependence on Russian fossil fuels by fast
forwarding the clean transition and joining forces to achieve a more resilient energy
system and a true Energy Union.
We can significantly reduce our dependency on Russian fossil fuels already this year, andaccelerate the energy transition. Building on the Fit for 55 package of proposals and completingthe actions on energy security of supply and storage, this REPowerEU plan puts forward an
additional set of actions to3:





1

2

3

save energy;
diversify supplies;
quickly substitute fossil fuels by accelerating Europe’s clean energy transition;
smartly combine investments and reforms.

European Council Conclusions (24 and 25 March 2022)
Communication on REPowerEU: Joint European Action for more affordable, secure and sustainable energy,COM(2022) 108 final, (8.3.2022)
See the complete list of actions in Annex 1

1－ 52 －

Taken together, these actions will structurally transform EU’s energy system. They require
effective coordination between European regulatory and infrastructure measures, as well as
national investment and reforms and joined-up energy diplomacy. They also require
coordination between action on the demand side, to reduce energy consumption and transform
industrial processes to replace gas, oil and coal with renewable electricity and fossil-freehydrogen, with action on the supply side to create the capacity and framework to roll out andproduce renewable.
Fairness and solidarity are defining principles of the European Green Deal. Our joint action toaccelerate the clean energy transition therefore reinforces the need for effective employment,
skills and social policies, in line with the European Pillar of Social Rights.Dependence amongst
Member States on Russian energy sources differs as the energy situationand energy mixes
differ from one country to the other. The approach taken in this REPowerEU plan reflects thesedifferences and proposes a variety of balanced responses corresponding to the specific Member
States needs whilst moving the EU as a whole towards climate neutrality by 2050.
REPowerEU builds on the full implementation of the Fit for 55 proposals tabled last year
without modifying the ambition of achieving at least -55 % net GHG emissions by 2030 andclimate neutrality by 2050 in line with the European Green Deal. It will have a positive impact
on EU’s emission reduction over the decade. However, the fast phasing out of fossil fuelimports from Russia will affect the transition trajectory, or how we reach our climate target,
compared to that under previous assumptions.
The REPowerEU plan cannot work without a fast implementation of all Fit for 55 proposals
and higher targets for renewables and energy efficiency. In the new reality, the EU’s gas
consumption will reduce at a faster pace, limiting the role of gas as a transitional fuel. However,shifting away from Russian fossil fuels will also require targeted investments for security ofsupply in gas infrastructure and very limited changes to oil infrastructure alongside large-scale
investments in the electricity grid and an EU-wide hydrogen backbone. In parallel, some of theexisting coal capacities might also be used longer than initially expected, with a role for nuclear
power and domestic gas resources too.
The public expects the EU and its Member States to follow through on the commitments madeto reduce our dependence on Russian fossil fuels. 85% of people polled believe that the EUshould reduce its dependency on Russian gas and oil as soon as possible. 84% agree that
Russia’s aggression against Ukraine makes it more urgent for EU Member States to invest in
renewable energy4.
While some Member States have already announced their intention to end fossil fuel imports
from Russia, no Member State can tackle this challenge on its own. By carrying out jointneeds assessments and planning, joint purchases and greater coordination, we will ensure thatthe phasing out of our dependency on Russian fossil fuels is both achievable and affordable for
all Member States. Legislation on renewable and energy efficiency will help realise ambitious
targets. A truly interconnected and resilient EU energy network will provide energy security
for all. These actions constitute our plan to repower the EU.

4

Flash Eurobarometer 506: EU's response to the war in Ukraine, 5 May 2022.

2－ 53 －

1.

Energy savings

Savings are the quickest and cheapest way to address the current energy crisis. Reducing energy
consumption cuts households’ and companies’ high energy bills in the short and long term, anddecreases imports of Russian fossil fuels. Reducing energy consumption through higher
efficiency is a vital component of the clean energy transition which increases the resilience of
the EU economy and shields its competitiveness against high fossil fuel prices.
Saving energy will help our supplies go further in the critical months ahead, while investments
are being rolled out. The accompanying EU Save Energy Communication presents a twopronged approach: strengthening structural change with mid- to long-term energy efficiency
measures and achieving immediate energy savings through behavioural changes.
Fit for 55 would lower our gas consumption by 30% by 2030, with more than a third of suchsavings coming from meeting the EU energy efficiency target. Updated modelling assesses theimpact of the phase out of Russian fossil fuel dependence5 in terms of higher energy prices andlower use of natural gas. A further reduction of energy consumption compared to the previous
Energy Efficiency Directive proposal6 and higher renewable energy targets would enable the
EU to fully meet the REPowerEU objectives, with other parts of the Fit for 55 package
unchanged.


The Commission therefore proposes to increase to 13% the binding target in the Energy
Efficiency Directive.

In addition, the Commission invites the Parliament and Council to enable additional savingsand energy efficiency gains in buildings through the Energy Performance of Buildings
Directive, and to uphold the ambition of the Commission proposal for a Regulation on
Ecodesign for Sustainable Products7, the rapid deployment of which will lead to further energy
savings through improved energy and resource efficiency of a broad range of products.
Pending agreement on the legislative measures, immediate energy savings can be made bychanging our behaviour. The European Commission has launched, in cooperation with theInternational Energy Agency (IEA), a nine-point plan “Playing my part” for reducing energy
use in the EU. Based on input from stakeholders, the IEA estimates that these types of shortterm energy saving measures could achieve a 5% reduction in the demand for gas (around 13bcm) and in that for oil (around 16 mtoe).
Member States should also make full use of supporting measures such as reduced VAT rates
for high efficiency heating systems and for insulation in buildings and other energy pricing
measures, which encourage switching to heat pumps and purchase of more efficient appliances.
Such measures should cushion social and distributional impacts, e.g. focusing on vulnerable
households struggling to pay their energy bills and to manage the potential impact of theaccelerated energy transition on the labour market, with immediate upskilling and reskillingneeds.

5
6

7

REPowerEU scenario in the staff working document Implementing the REPowerEU Action Plan: Investment Needs,
Hydrogen Accelerator and Achieving the Bio-methane Targets, accompanying this communication.
COM(2021) 558 final, 14.7.2021
COM(2022) 142 final, 30.03.2022

3－ 54 －

Stepped up implementation and ambitious updating of National Energy and Climate Plans(NECPs) are key in delivering the REPowerEU objectives. NECPs have a crucial role inenhancing investor confidence and investment predictability. They provide a good frameworkfor planning and encouraging the reduction of use of fossil fuels.


The Commission intends to publish guidance later this year for the Member States’
update of their NECPs in 2024 and will report progress on REPowerEU, among others,
through the State of the Energy Union and Climate Action reports.

Regions and cities are playing a leading role in developing energy saving measures tailored totheir local context. They should launch awareness and information and support schemes,
energy audits and energy management plans, pledging savings targets, and ensure citizens’
engagement such as through the European Mission on climate-neutral and smart cities or theEuropean Urban Initiative under cohesion policy.
2.

Diversifying energy imports

The EU has been working intensively with international partners for several months to diversify
supplies8 and mitigate the rise in energy prices.
Following the mandate by the European Council in March, the Commission and Member States
have set up an EU Energy Platform for the voluntary common purchase of gas, LNG andhydrogen. On 5 May, the Commission and Bulgaria set up a first regional taskforce, as part of
the EU's Energy Purchase Platform, in coordination with neighbours in the south east of Europe.
The EU Energy Platform will fulfil three functions supporting common purchase of gas:

Demand aggregation and structuring: The demand pool will identify and aggregate
contestable volumes based on expiring long-term contracts as well as flexible volumes
under existing long-term gas contracts which could lead to roughly 30-70 bcm ofdemand in the short term. In addition, the Commission will encourage diversificationof supply and will consider legislative measures to require such diversification overtime. Demand pooling will be supported by electronic tools, which will make theprocess secure, automated and user friendly.
 Optimised and transparent use of the import, storage and transmission gas infrastructure
maximising security of supply and replenishment of storage.
A mechanism and an IT tool will be put in place to improve the transparency ininfrastructure bookings i.e. remaining availability, secondary markets, rerouting andexisting bottlenecks. The exchange of information will be in line with antitrust rules.
 International outreach: Joined up international outreach will focus on concluding longterm cooperation frameworks with trusted partners via binding or non-binding
agreements that support the purchasing of gas and hydrogen and clean energy project
development, while fully using the collective strength of the Union.

As a next step, the Commission will consider developing a voluntary operational ‘jointpurchasing mechanism’ responsible for negotiating and contracting on behalf of participating
Member States of the aggregated gas demand and competitive release to the market. Suchmechanism could take the form of a Joint Venture or a business-owned entity, leveraging the8

EU-US_LNG_2022_2.pdf (europa.eu)

4－ 55 －

power of the European market. Such a construct will be subject to review of its impact oncompetition.
The Platform will also work through Regional Task Forces, which will identify needs anddiversification of supply options and coordinate on contractual issues9. The Platform will set
up a dedicated work stream with Member States on joint purchasing of hydrogen10.
Industry expertise on the global energy market will be important for the success of the Platform.
An Advisory Group will inform the Platform on issues such as LNG trade, financing, hedging
and other elements along the value chain. The exchange of information will have to becompliant with antitrust rules.
In line with the conclusions of the European Council the EU Energy Platform is open for the
Energy Community Contracting Parties (Western Balkans, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia). The
Platform should also benefit EU’s partners in its close neighbourhood, partners who arecommitted to the EU’s internal market rules and joint security of supply. The Platform will
work closely with the Energy Community Secretariat to assist the Contracting Parties to makethe most of the Platform.
The emergency synchronisation of the electricity grids of Ukraine and Moldova with Europe’s
grid mid-March shows the commitment to ensure Ukraine’s and Moldova’s interconnection
with the EU’s power grid. As soon as the necessary technical improvements are completed, it
will allow Member States in the region to purchase excess electricity from Ukraine, thus
compensating for some of the reduced gas imports.
With a full implementation of the REPowerEU plan, high prices, gas alternatives (sustainablebiomethane, renewable hydrogen), further deployment of renewables, and structural demandmeasures such as energy efficiency, EU gas demand is expected to decrease at a faster rate thanforeseen under Fit for 55. The EU will provide its international partners with long-term
perspectives for mutually beneficial cooperation by integrating hydrogen and renewable energy
development and trade, as well as cooperation on methane emission reduction strategies in thegas diversification efforts, as described in the External Energy Engagement Strategy11.
Diversification options are also important for Member States currently dependent on Russia
for nuclear fuel for their reactors serving either power generation12 or non-power uses13. Thisrequires working within the EU and with international partners to secure alternative sources ofuranium and boosting the conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication capacities available inEurope or in EU’s global partners. In addition to diversifying external suppliers, continuing
domestic natural gas production for Member States where this is possible can contribute tostrengthen security of supply.

9

10
11
12
13

On 5 May, the Commission and Bulgaria set up a first regional taskforce, as part of the EU's Energy Platform, incoordination with neighbours in the South East of Europe. Further Regional Task Forces, covering Central Eastern
Europe, North-West and the Baltics will be proposed soon. In this context, it is important that the biggest energy marketsof the EU, with access to diversification infrastructure such as LNG terminals, are active participants inthe diversification and security of supply efforts of the Platform.
This dedicated hydrogen purchasing work stream will operationalise the European Global Hydrogen Facility, drawing on
the experience of H2Global and of the Euratom Supply Agency, to be established under the EU Energy Platform.
EU external energy engagement in a changing world, JOIN(2022) 23, (18.05.2022)
Five Member States (Bulgaria, Czechia, Finland, Hungary, Slovakia) currently have VVER reactors operated on theirterritory, all fully reliant at present on fuel supplied by a Russian provider.
Medium Power Research Reactors (MPRRs), which include reactors in Czechia, Hungary, Poland, are characterised bytheir original Soviet design and are still dependent for fuel on the monopoly Russian manufacturer.

5－ 56 －

3. Substituting fossil fuels and accelerating Europe’s clean energy transition

A massive speed-up and scale-up in renewable energy in power generation, industry,buildings and transport will accelerate our phasing out of Russian fossil fuels. It will also,
over time, lower electricity prices and reduce fossil fuel imports.
Boosting renewable energy







Based on its modelling of impacts and feasibility14, the Commission is proposing toincrease the target in the Renewable Energy Directive to 45% by 2030, up from
40% in last year’s proposal. This would bring the total renewable energy generation
capacities to 1236 GW by 2030, in comparison to 1067 GW by 2030 envisaged underFit for 55 for 2030.
Solar photovoltaics (PV) is one of the fastest technologies to roll out. That is why theCommission sets the REPowerEU target of over 320 GW of solar photovoltaic
newly installed by 2025, over twice today’s level, and almost 600 GW by 2030. As
part of the increased ambition for solar, the Commission:presents the EU solar strategy15 ;introduces the European Solar Rooftop Initiative anchored around a legally binding
EU solar rooftop obligation for certain categories of buildings.

Wind energy, in particular offshore wind represents a significant future opportunity: resources
are stable, abundant and public acceptance is higher. Europe is the global leader in offshore
wind. To further strengthen the EU wind sector’s global competitiveness, and achieve the
REPowerEU ambition with fast wind energy deployment, supply chains need to bestrengthened and permitting drastically accelerated.
The European Union should aim at doubling the current deployment rate of individual heatpumps, resulting in a cumulative 10 million units over the next 5 years. Member States canaccelerate the deployment and integration of large-scale heat pumps, geothermal and solar
thermal energy in a cost-effective way by:

developing and modernising district heating systems which can replace fossil fuels inindividual heating;clean communal heating, especially in densely populated areas and cities;
exploiting industrial heat whenever available.

To strengthen the supply chains for solar, wind and heat pump technologies and make themmore sustainable, the Commission will:


14
15

enhance the regulatory framework and ensure life-cycle sustainability, by tabling, inthe first quarter of 2023, ecodesign and energy labelling requirements for solar PVs,
and by revising existing requirements for heat pumps.

Commission Staff Working Document Implementing the REPowerEU Action Plan: Investment needs, Hydrogen
Accelerator and Biomethane Targets, accompanying this communication.
EU solar energy strategy, COM(2022) 221, (18.05.2022)

6－ 57 －



support efforts from Member States to pool their public resources via potential
Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) focused on breakthroughtechnologies and innovation along the solar and wind energy and heat pumps value
chains.

To promote the development of electricity storage capacities, the Commission proposes toconsider storage assets as being in the overriding public interest and facilitate permitting fortheir deployment.
Accelerating hydrogen
Renewable hydrogen will be key to replace natural gas, coal and oil in hard-to-decarbonise
industries and transport. REPowerEU sets a target of 10 million tonnes of domestic renewablehydrogen production and 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen imports by 2030. The
Commission:








calls upon the European Parliament and the Council to align the sub-targets forrenewable fuels of non-biological origin under the Renewable Energy Directive forindustry and transport with the REPowerEU ambition (75% for industry and 5% fortransport) 16 and to rapidly conclude the revision of the Hydrogen and Gas Market
package;will top-up Horizon Europe investments on the Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (EUR 200
million) to double the number of Hydrogen Valleys;
publishes for public feedback two Delegated Acts on the definition and productionof renewable hydrogen;intends to complete the assessment of the first Important Projects of Common European
Interest on hydrogen by the summer;
calls on industry to accelerate the work on missing hydrogen standards, in particularfor hydrogen production, infrastructure and end-use appliances;
will regularly report, in close cooperation with the Member States, starting in 2025, onhydrogen uptake, and the use of renewable hydrogen in hard-to-abate appliances inindustry and transport.

Accelerated efforts are needed to deploy hydrogen infrastructure for producing, importing
and transporting 20 million tonnes of hydrogen by 2030. Cross-border hydrogen infrastructureis still in its infancy, but the basis for planning and development has already been set by the
inclusion of hydrogen infrastructure in the revised trans-European networks for energy. Total
investment needs for key hydrogen infrastructure categories are estimated to be in the range of
EUR 28 – 38 billion for EU-internal pipelines and 6 - 11 billion for storage.
To facilitate the import of up to 10 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen, the Commission
will support the development of three major hydrogen import corridors via the Mediterranean,
the North Sea area and, as soon as conditions allow, with Ukraine. Green Hydrogen
Partnerships will facilitate the imports of green hydrogen while supporting the decarbonisation

16

Commission Staff Working Document Implementing the REPowerEU Action Plan: Investment needs, Hydrogen
Accelerator and Achieving the Bio-methane Targets, accompanying this communication.

7－ 58 －

in the partner countries. Other forms of fossil-free hydrogen, notably nuclear-based, also playa role in substituting natural gas (see map).
To help achieve these targets, the Commission will:

map preliminary hydrogen infrastructure needs by March 2023, based on the TEN-E
Regulation, in a process involving Member States, national regulatory authorities,
ACER, ENTSOG, project promoters and other stakeholder;mobilise EU funding under CEF, Cohesion Policy and RRF;
set up a dedicated work stream on joint renewable hydrogen purchasing under the EU
Energy Platform.

Scaling up biomethane
Boosting sustainable biomethane production to 35 bcm by 2030 is a cost-efficient path toachieve our ambition to reduce imports of natural gas from Russia. To increase the capacity of
biogas production in the EU and promote its conversion into biomethane, the estimatedinvestment needs amount to EUR 37 billon euro over the period.
As outlined in the Biomethane Action Plan in the accompanying staff working document, theCommission proposes to address the main barriers to increased sustainable biomethane
production and use and facilitation of its integration into the EU internal gas market by:







establishing an industrial biogas and bio-methane partnership to stimulate therenewable gases value chain;taking additional measures to encourage biogas producers to create energy
communities;
providing incentives for biogas upgrading into bio-methane;promoting the adaptation and adjustment of existing and the deployment of new
infrastructure for the transport of more bio-methane through the EU gas grid;addressing gaps in research, development and innovation;
facilitating access to finance, and mobilise EU funding under CEF, Cohesion Policy,
RRF and the Common Agricultural Policy.

The focus should be on sustainable production, ensuring that biomethane is produced fromorganic waste and forest and agricultural residues, to avoid impacts on land use and foodsecurity.
Bioenergy makes up 60% of the renewable energy in the EU. It is a domestically available andstable energy source but sustainable sourcing is key. Current estimates show a moderate but
steady increase of biomass use until 2030. Prioritizing use of non-recyclable biomass waste
and agricultural and forest residues will ensure a sustainable energy production that cancontribute to the REPowerEU objectives.
Reducing fossil consumption in hard-to-abate industrial and transport sectors
Replacing coal, oil and natural gas in industrial processes will not only reduce carbon emissions,
it will also strengthen industrial competitiveness by shielding industrial production fromvolatile fossil fuel markets and support international technology leadership.

8－ 59 －

Energy efficiency, fuel substitution, electrification, and an enhanced uptake of renewablehydrogen, biogas and biomethane by industry could save up to 35 bcm of natural gas by 2030
on top of what is foreseen under the Fit for 55 proposals. Production of non-metallic minerals,
cement, glass and ceramics, production of chemicals and refineries provide the biggest
opportunities for reducing fossil gas demand – almost 22 bcm.
There is also great potential for electrification of industry. Current technologies already enableindustrial companies to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels. Opportunities to adopt electric
technology will continue to expand as technologies improve and renewables are rolled out.
To support hydrogen uptake and electrification in industrial sectors, the Commission:will roll out carbon contracts for difference and dedicated REPowerEU windows underthe Innovation Fund to support a full switch of the existing hydrogen production inindustrial processes from natural gas to renewables and the transition to hydrogen-based
production processes in new industrial sectors, such as steel production17;
publishes guidance to Member States on renewable energy and power purchaseagreements18 (PPAs);
will, in cooperation with the EIB, develop a technical advisory facility under theInvestEU Advisory Hub to support PPA-financed renewable energy projects. To unlock
industrial investment, the Commission will double the funding available for the 2022
Large Scale Call of the Innovation Fund this autumn to around EUR 3 billion. A
specific REPowerEU window will support (1) innovative electrification and hydrogen
applications in industry, (2) innovative clean tech manufacturing (such as electrolysers
and fuel cells, innovative renewable equipment, energy storage or heat pumps forindustrial uses), and (3) mid-sized pilot projects for validating, testing and optimisinghighly innovative solutions.

In transport, electrification can be combined with of the use of fossil-free hydrogen to replacefossil fuels. To enhance energy savings and efficiencies in the transport sector and accelerate
the transition towards zero-emission vehicles, the Commission:will consider a legislative initiative to increase the share of zero emission vehicles inpublic and corporate car fleets above a certain size;
calls on the co-legislators to swiftly adopt the pending proposals on alternative fuels
and other transport related files supporting green mobility;
will adopt in 2023 a legislative package on greening freight transport;

Delivering REPowerEU – with skilled people, raw materials and a complete regulatory
framework
Achieving the REPowerEU goals will require diversifying the supply of renewable energy
equipment and of critical raw materials, reducing sectoral dependencies, overcoming supply
17

18

Based on REPowerEU, the Commission expects that around 30% of EU primary steel production will be decarbonizedwith renewable hydrogen by 2030, [requiring 1.4 million tonnes of renewable hydrogen and investments of EUR [18-20]
bn to replace blast furnaces with direct reduced iron (DRI) processes fueled by renewable hydrogen.]Commission Recommendation on speeding up permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects and facilitate
Power Purchase Agreements, C(2022) 3219, SWD(2022) 149, (18.05.2022).

9－ 60 －

chain bottlenecks and expanding the EU’s clean energy technology manufacturing capacity.
While the EU is a global leader in electrolyser, wind and heat pump technologies, the EU solar
panels and heat pumps market has seen increasing imports from Asia over the last years.
For heat pumps, a doubling of the deployment rate should be matched by a fast ramp up of the
production of the necessary equipment, including, where necessary through facilitated accessto finance.
Beyond ensuring suppliers diversification, strengthening circular economy models must be apriority. Support for research and innovation, including through Horizon Europe, will be
provided to reduce materials consumption, enhance recyclability of renewable energy
equipment and substitute critical raw materials.
To enhance industry’s contribution to REPowerEU and reinforce its competitiveness, theCommission:will set up an EU Solar Industry Alliance;
will work with industry to scale up electrolyser manufacturing capacities, as laid out inthe Electrolyser Declaration19;
will intensify work on the supply of critical raw materials and prepare a legislative
proposal. The Commission will step up ongoing EU policies and actions (e.g.
implementation and negotiation of Free Trade Agreements, cooperation with likeminded partners, etc.) and reinforce the EU’s monitoring capacity and help secure thesupply of diverse critical raw materials. This initiative will aim to strengthen theEuropean value chain through the identification of mineral resources and of critical raw
materials projects in the European strategic interest, while ensuring a high level ofenvironmental protection, including projects that promote a circular economy andresource efficiency

Accelerating and amplifying the deployment of renewables and increasing energy efficiency
relies on a skilled workforce and strong supply chains to meet the increased demand for clean
technology and roll-out in the construction sector. The clean energy transition offers ample job
market opportunities and helps ensure reskilled jobs for transition sectors.
To address the skills shortages, the Commission:

encourages stakeholders in renewable energy production (solar, wind, geothermal,
biomass, heat pumps etc.) and permitting authorities to establish a large-scale skills
partnership under the Pact for Skills20;
will support skills through ERASMUS + and the Joint Undertaking on Clean Hydrogen,with the launch of a large project to develop skills for the hydrogen economy.

Speeding up permitting and innovation

19
20

Electrolyser Summit Joint Declaration. Electrolyser manufacturers in Europe committed to a tenfold increase of theircapacity to manufacture electrolysers to 17.5 GW by 2025.
The Pact for Skills supports large-scale skills partnerships in different industrial ecosystems, including Energy Intensive
Industries, Construction and Renewable Energy. The Pact gathers and inspires commitments from individual companies,
training providers and social partners to upskill or reskill people of working age, such as developing skilled professionals
and the reskilling of gas boiler installers in new technologies such as heat pumps, solar panels, etc.

10
－ 61 －

Slow and complex permitting processes are a key obstacle to unleashing the renewables
revolution and for the competitiveness of the renewable energy industry. Obtaining a permit
can take up to 9 years for wind projects, and up to 4.5 years for ground-mounted solar projects.
Varying permitting times between Member States demonstrate that national rules andadministrative capacities complicate and slow down permitting.


To help Member States exploit all possibilities for acceleration that exist within thelegislative framework, the Commission presents a Recommendation on permitting21.

It proposes measures to streamline procedures at national level, addresses ambiguities in theapplication of EU legislation and sets out good practices in Member States. It recommends
participatory approaches that involve local and regional authorities and providing authorities
with the necessary resources so as to facilitate the timely realisation of locally adapted
investments.
To kick-start the implementation of the Recommendation, the Commission will
convene renewable energy experts with environmental assessment experts from
Member States on 13 June.

High Level Summits hosted by Member States, such as the North Sea Summit in Denmark,will enhance the case for investment in cross-border wind parks and renewable projects.
Member States should as a matter of priority implement the permitting-related Country
Specific Recommendations in the European Semester and already adopted Recovery and
Resilience Plans. Equally, the full and rapid transposition by all Member States of theRenewable Energy Directive22 is a matter of urgency to simplify permitting procedures.
In order to support an acceleration of permitting procedures for renewable energy
projects and related infrastructure, the Commission is amending its proposal on the
Renewable Energy Directive 23 and asks the European Parliament and Council toensure a swift agreement as part of the Fit for 55 package.

The revised proposal operationalises the principle of renewable energy as an overriding
public interest, introduces the designation of ‘go-to’ areas24 and other ways to shorten andsimplify permitting while also minimising potential risks and negative impacts on theenvironment. It also provides for the possibility to create regulatory sandboxes to foster
innovation in the sector.
The Commission also calls on the Member States to speed up the transposition of the Electricity
Directive to effectively allow consumers to participate in energy markets (individually or via

21
22
23

Commission Recommendation on speeding up permit-granting procedures for renewable energy projects and facilitate
Power Purchase Agreements, C(2022) 3219, SWD(2022) 149, (18.05.2022).
Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the promotion of theuse of energy from renewable sources (recast).
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of theEuropean Parliament and of the Council as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources, COM (2022)222,(18.5.2022)
24Renewables go-to area’ means a specific location, whether on land or sea, which has been designated by a Member
State as particularly suitable for the installation of plants for the production of energy from renewable sources, other thanbiomass combustion plants.

11－ 62 －

energy communities or collective self-consumption schemes) to produce, self-consume, sell orshare renewable energy.
4. Smart investment
The Commission’s analysis indicates that REPowerEU entails additional investment of 210
billion euro between now and 2027, on top of what is needed to realise the objectives of the Fit
for 55 proposals. Such investment will pay off. Implementation of the Fit for 55 frameworkand the REPowerEU plan will save the EU EUR 80 billion in gas import expenditures, EUR
12 bn in oil import expenditures and EUR 1.7 bn in coal import expenditures per year by2030.
During the transition, the fast decoupling from Russian energy imports can lead to higher andmore volatile energy prices. Targeted measures are needed to minimize volatility, keep prices
in check and protect the individuals in or at risk of (energy) poverty in order to ensure a fairtransition for all25. The Commission calls upon the European Parliament and the Council toadopt its proposal for a Social Climate Fund to support vulnerable households and small
business in the transition.
4.1 European interconnection and infrastructure needs
The REPowerEU plan brings a significant change to the energy system in terms ofquantities and directions of energy flows. This is the time to implement many long pending
projects, with a particular focus on cross-border connections to build an integrated energy
market that secures supply in a spirit of solidarity.
The Trans-European energy networks (TEN-E) framework has helped establish a more
resilient European gas infrastructure based that enables more diversified supplies. Once theongoing Projects of common interest and Projects of mutual interests are implemented, all
Member States and Neighbouring countries will have access to at least three gas sources or to
the global liquefied natural gas (LNG) market. In 2022 alone, gas PCIs with a total additional
gas transmission capacity of 20 bcm/year have been or will be commissioned26. Very recently,
a number of key projects co-financed by the EU were completed or launched, such as the Gas
Interconnector Poland-Lithuania (GIPL)27 of key importance to the Baltic region and a new

25
26

27

See for example the proposal for a Council Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality(COM(2021) 801 final).
In 2022 alone, PCIs with a total additional gas transmission capacity of 20 bcm/year have been or will be commissioned,
e.g. the gas interconnector between Poland and Lithuania (the GIPL pipeline), the Poland-Slovakia interconnector, theBaltic Pipe between Poland and Denmark, the Greece-Bulgaria pipeline (IGB). LNG terminals in Cyprus (2 bcm/year)
and Alexandroupolis Greece (5 bcm/year) are due to be operational in 2023. Moreover, several gas PCIs are expected tobe completed in the coming years which include several storage projects in South Eastern Europe (Greece, Romania,
Bulgaria) as well the LNG Gdansk in Poland (at least 6 bcm/year). Besides, the support of the expansion of the Southern
Gas Corridor to 20 bcm per year will play a major role to secure gas supply for South Eastern Europe (Greece and Italyat the beginning) and the Western Balkans.
Opened on 5 May, GIPL is a major EU project developed under the Baltic Energy Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP).
The 508-km-long pipeline connected Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Lithuania to the gas market of the EU. Of some EUR
500 million spent on the project, the EU contributed ca. EUR 300 million.

12－ 63 －

liquefied natural gas terminal in Northern Greece that will help Europe and the Balkans becomeless reliant on Russian supplies28 .
The maps and project lists shown here are the result of analysis by the regional groups of theadditional needs strictly linked to REPowerEU. They complement the existing list of projectsof common interest, some of which, such as the Iberian interconnectors and connections forisland Member States, have been under preparation for many years. These projects should now
also be accelerated to complete the European infrastructure. The gas projects to be included in
the REPowerEU chapters of the Recovery and Resilience Plans should build on the analysis of
the needs currently represented on the maps below.
The regional assessment of additional gas infrastructure needs for REPowerEU shows that it
will be possible to fully compensate the equivalent of Russian gas imports by a combination ofdemand reduction, a ramp up of domestic production of biogas/biomethane and hydrogen, andlimited additions of gas infrastructure. The most important needs are linked to meet demand inCentral and Eastern Europe 29 , and in the northern part of Germany 30 , as well as thereinforcement of the Southern gas corridor. This limited additional infrastructure, as describedin annex 3, should solve the needs for the forthcoming decade, without leading to a lock-in of
fossil fuels and stranded assets that inhibit the long-term transition to a climate-neutral
economy.
Storage is key for enhancing the security of supply. Appropriate support, including financial,should be provided to those projects that aim at increasing the storage and withdrawal
capacities in order to ensure an increased level of preparedness and response to risks in the
security of gas supply. To import sufficient LNG and pipeline gas from other suppliers,
investments estimated at EUR 10bn by 2030 will be required for a sufficient level of gas
infrastructure, including LNG import terminals, pipelines, to connect underutilised LNG
import terminals and the EU network, and reverse flow capacities. Additional investments toconnect LNG import terminals in the Iberian Peninsula and the EU network through hydrogenready infrastructure may further contribute to diversify gas supply in the internal market andhelp tap into the long-term potential for renewable hydrogen. Also, a very limited investment
will be needed to ensure security of supply in Member States almost fully dependant on
pipeline oil from Russia.
Dependence on Russian fossil fuels also extends to crude oil and petroleum products. Whilefor the majority of cases the world market allows for quick effective replacement, someMember States are more reliant on Russian pipe oil. The stop of supply fromthe Druzhba pipeline, which delivers crude oil to Europe directly from central Russia, will
increase pressure on alternative supply routes, namely ports (such as Gdansk, Rostock,
Trieste or Omisalj) and alternative pipeline infrastructure, currently not prepared to handle
such additional pressure, that serves the same regions.

28

29

30

The LNG facility in Alexandropoulis (a floating storage and regasification unit) is set to be completed in the end of 2023
and will have a capacity of 153,500 cubic metres, with a yearly potential throughput of 5.5 billion; the budget is ca EUR
364 mn with EUR 167 mn from the 2014-2020 cohesion policy.
Of great importance for the security of supply in Central and Eastern Europe are two gas corridors: the Trans-Balkan
Corridor (Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania) and the Vertical Corridor (Greece-Bulgaria interconnector, Romania-Bulgariainterconnector and BRUA) which will facilitate the supply of gas from third countries in the region.
See indicative projects in Annex 3.

13－ 64 －

In this context, very limited and targeted investments to ensure the security of oil is needed.
Projects building on and expanding the capacity of the existing infrastructure and tacklingexisting bottlenecks (namely in the Transalpine (TAL), Adria or SPSE oil pipelines) are key toensure viable alternatives to the most affected Member States. The establishment of alternative
supply routes must also be accompanied by targeted investments in the reconfiguration andupgrading of petroleum product refineries, as replacing Urals crude oilby alternative oil grades entails technological changes. The total investment needs to ensure
the security of oil supply is expected to amount to up to EUR 1.5 -2bn.
An additional EUR 29 billion of additional investments are needed in the power grid by2030, to make it fit for increased use and production of electricity. All relevant projects are
already included in the 5th PCI list31. The accelerated implementation of electricity PCIs is
crucial for an interconnected system with an increased share of renewable energy sources. The
current high electricity prices in the Iberian Peninsula highlight the importance of improving
cross-border electricity interconnections as a cost-effective way to ensure secure and affordable
electricity supplies. The Commission will continue to support and encourage the Spanish andFrench authorities for accelerating the implementation of the three existing projects of common
interest through the High Level Group South West Europe aiming at increasing theinterconnection capacity between the Iberian Peninsula and France. The EU has already taken
action for the synchronisation of the Baltic States' electricity networks with the continental
European network. Once completed, no later than 2025, neither the electricity trade nor system
operation can be used to threaten the energy security of the region.
Energy storage plays a significant role in ensuring flexibility and security of supply in theenergy system by facilitating the integration of renewable generation, supporting the grid, andshifting energy to the time when it is most needed. Ultimately, energy storage reduces the useof gas power plants in the energy system.
The Commission will also encourage the swift development of crucial offshore grids and crossborder hydrogen infrastructure.

European map of infrastructure for gas – PCIs and additional projects identified through
REPowerEU, including hydrogen corridors

31

https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/default/files/fifth_pci_list_19_november_2021_annex.pdf

14－ 65 －

European infrastructure map for electricity

15－ 66 －

4.2 National reforms and investments
While most of the targets and objectives are European and require a strong coordination,
implementation of many of the measures remain with Member States and require targetedreforms and investments.
The Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) have proven highly suitable to implement urgent
priorities in a joint EU framework, based on needs by Member States and with a strong resultsorientation. They are already providing a set of ambitious reforms and investments to deliveron the twin transition. Their milestones and targets are more valid than ever.
The Commission invites Member States to add to their existing RRPs a dedicated chapter withnew actions to deliver on the REPowerEU objectives of diversifying energy supplies andreducing dependence on fossil fuels. Technical support to Member States is available under theTechnical Support Instrument32 for that purpose. Cross-border investments are essential tostrengthen interconnection and ensure the security of energy of supply for the Single Market.
When assessing the dedicated RepowerEU chapters, the Commission will take its contribution
towards the security of supply for the Union as a whole into account. The 2022 countryspecific recommendations will guide the new RRP chapters. The Commission issued together
with this communication tailored recommendations for all Member States on energy policy inline with the REPowerEU objectives.
The RRPs should ensure complementarity between measures funded under the RRF andactions supported via other national or EU funds. In particular, synergies must be increased
32

Technical Support Instrument: 2022 country factsheets | European Commission (europa.eu)

16－ 67 －

between cohesion policy, in particular the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), theEuropean Social Fund+ (ESF+), the second pillar of the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP),
Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) and the REPowerEU chapters in the RRPs. For example forgas, mature projects for grids, storage or LNG located in one Member State but having
European importance can be included in the RRF REPowerEU chapter. RRPs could also for
example support energy infrastructure projects selected in TEN-E regional groups for theircommon interest because they link Member States' energy networks, connect regions currently
isolated from European energy markets, strengthen existing cross-border interconnections,help integrate renewable energy, and respond to market integration, competitiveness andsecurity of supply objectives. This allows freeing CEF energy funds for interconnectors inelectricity, off-shore, hydrogen and other infrastructure projects of common interest that
require cross-border planning and regional cooperation for their implementation as provided
under the TEN-E policy.
The RRPs provide for a fast and effective way to frontload investments focused on
REPowerEU needs, combined with accompanying reforms to maximise their impact. As the
REPowerEU chapter and cohesion policy funds both support the green energy transition, inenergy efficiency and renewable energy investments can be supported under both. In view ofenhancing synergies between these policies, Member States have the possibility to plan theirinvestments over the lifetime of the programming period in a coordinated manner, taking into
account the available funding and implementation timelines.
4.3 Financing
To mobilise finance for covering the short term REPowerEU investment needs, theCommission proposes a targeted and swift amendment of the Recovery and Facility Regulation.
The amendment foresees allocating additional funding from the auctioning of allowances of
the Emissions Trading System (‘ETS’), in a limited amount. It also proposes that Member
States benefit from a higher flexibility to transfer resources allocated to them both under the
Common Provisions Regulation (EU) 2021/1060) and the Regulation on CAP strategic plans(EU) 2021/2115). These grants will complement the remaining EUR 225 billion of loans under
the RRF, resulting in a total amount close to EUR 300 billion. It is proposed that if part of theremaining EUR 225 billion of loans under the RRF is not requested by the member Statescurrently entitled to them within 30 days after the entry into force of the amended RRF
Regulation, these resources will be made available to other MS.
Member States will have the possibility to transfer up to 12.5% of their allocation under thecohesion policy to the RRF by adding a 7.5% transfer possibility for REPowerEU objectives
based on demonstrable needs and provided that Member States have used the already available
5% transfer possibility. This new transfer possibility will allow Member States to include in
their RRPs new investments and reforms for that contribute to a rapid reduction of fossil fuelimports from Russia. Such a transfer possibility is justified by the urgent timeline and natureof some the investments needed.
In addition, Member States will have the possibility to transfer up to 12.5% of their allocation
under the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development to the Recovery and Resilience
Facility. Delivering part of the Common Agricultural Policy financing under the Recovery and
Resilience Facility speed up implementation of relevant projects, allowing farmers to receive17－ 68 －

the necessary financial support to reduce the use of synthetic fertilizers and increase theproduction of sustainable biomethane or renewable energy.
The process for undertaking voluntary transfers by Member States of cohesion policy funds
and CAP funds to the REPowerEU chapters of the recovery and resilience plans has been
designed to ensure a swift adoption process, and should not delay the adoption andimplementation of the strategic plans and programmes.
Above all, it is important that Member States engage in a wide consultation process during the
preparation of their REPowerEU chapters, in particular with local and regional authorities,
social partners as well as stakeholders from the agricultural sector, to ensure broad ownershipthat will be key for the successful implementation of the measures.
Cohesion policy funds with their strong record of supporting energy-related investments willcontinue to complement and strengthen the REPowerEU and European Green Deal objectives.
Under the current MFF, cohesion policy will support decarbonisation and green transition
projects with up to EUR 100 billion. To ensure swift disbursement, the Commission will put
forward a flexible instrument to help member States mobilise private resources and intends toadopt by the end of 2022 a delegated act to speed up the design and reimbursements of energy
efficiency projects and renewables projects through standard reimbursement schemes incohesion policy. The Commission will also work with Member States in promoting thedevelopment of regional and local energy agencies as single entry point for energy projects.
State aid rules fully apply to the reforms and investments included into the REPowerEU
chapters. It is the responsibility of each Member State to ensure that such measures comply
with the EU State aid rules and follow the applicable State aid procedures. In light of theunprecedented urgency to reduce dependence on Russian fossil fuels, the Commission will
look into ways to facilitate State aid control for REPowerEU measures while limiting
distortions to competition. In particular, the Commission will provide guidance on how
measures can be designed in line with State aid rules and fast track decisions once it hascomplete information. The Commission will also assist Member States in designing measures
which can be exempted from notification under the General Block Exemption Regulation.
Finally, it will keep the Temporary Crisis Framework for State aid under constant review toensure that it is apt for enabling Member States to address the effects of the current geopoliticalsituation, including in the field of energy, and it will continue ensuring that the State aid
framework is generally fit-for-purpose.
The Connecting Europe Facility –Energy (CEF-E) will support projects of common interest(PCIs) not implemented by the market or not implemented otherwise within the timeframe
needed to deliver on the REPowerEU objectives. The Commission launches together withthis communication a new CEF Energy call for proposals for Projects of Common
Interest (PCIs) with a total estimated budget of around EUR 800 million. Successful projects
will be selected in the second half of 2022 to support the most urgent infrastructure projects
needed for realising the REPowerEU priorities. In early 2023, the Commission will launchanother CEF Energy call for proposals for PCIs for projects to apply that may not be ready forthis year’s call.
Member States can consider taxation measures to support REPowerEU objectives so as toincentivise energy savings and reduce fossil fuels consumption. Member States are encouraged18－ 69 －

to consider additional tax measures such as reductions and exemptions from vehicle taxation
for both the purchase and use of electric and hydrogen vehicles, tax deductions linked to energy
savings and the phase-out of environmentally harmful subsidies. The Commission’s pending
proposal for a revision of the Energy Taxation Directive (ETD), contributes to the objectivesof REPowerEU by setting price signals to reduce consumption of fossil fuels and save energy
and the Commission calls on Member States to swiftly reach an agreement.
The InvestEU Programme will mobilize private finance to support a wide range ofinvestments that contribute to achieving the REPowerEU’s policy goals, by sharing risks with
implementing partners. The Commission will work closely and in a Team Europe approachwith the EIB Group, other implementing partners of the InvestEU Programme and EU Member
States to accelerate lending, blending and advisory products for renewables, energy efficiency
and electricity networks.
To enable the Innovation Fund to cover 100% of the relevant costs in the case of competitive
bidding, the European Parliament and the Council should swiftly examine the proposed
amendment to the ETS Directive for the Innovation Fund, after which the Commission willswiftly adopt the necessary amendment to the Delegated Act establishing the Innovation Fund.
5. Reinforcing preparedness
Europe must be ready and prepared for a severe supply disruption. While the risk for unserved
gas demand for this summer will be limited, there could be a risk that, without further actionin the coming months, storages will not be sufficiently filled for next winter.
Together with the swift adoption of the storage regulation in view of starting implementationof refilling storage levels this summer, the Commission calls on Member States to:








pre-emptively implement the EU Save Energy Communication. The gas saved in
the short term can be used notably to refill underground storage ahead of the next
winter;update their contingency plans, taking into account the recommendations containedin the Commission’s preparedness review. The updated contingency plans should
identify the essential customers which play a key role for critical supply chains in theUnion;
ask transmission system operators to accelerate the technical measures, which canincrease the reverse flow capacities from west to east by the next winter, including
regarding the technical requirement concerning the composition of gas;conclude the outstanding bilateral solidarity arrangements between neighbouring
countries.

The existing EU legal framework already foresees that in case of extreme crisis Member States
can request their neighbouring Member States solidarity measures. Solidarity measures aremeant as last resort in the event of an extreme gas shortage to ensure supply to households,
district heating systems and basic social facilities in the affected country.

19－ 70 －

The Commission will issue guidance on the prioritisation criteria of non-protectedcustomers, in particular of industry. The guidance will focus, on the one hand, on theidentification of national and cross-border value chains of key and critical importance which,
if disrupted, could negatively impact on security, food, health and safety at European and global
level. It should also assess the impact on the competitiveness of the different territories. The
Commission will also facilitate setting up a coordinated EU demand reduction plan with preemptive voluntary curtailment measures which should be ready for activation before an actual
emergency arises. This plan would include voluntary market-based measures to reduce theconsumption of undertakings and thus guarantee that supplies to protected customers areprioritised. In addition, the Commission is reviewing Member States’ Risk Preparedness Plans
in the electricity sector to minimize the impact of potential gas disruptions on electricity
generation.
Conclusions
The time to reduce Europe’s strategic energy dependence is now. REPowerEU accelerates
diversification and more renewable gases, frontloads energy savings and electrification withthe potential to deliver as soon as possible the equivalent of the fossil fuels Europe currently
imports from Russia every year. It does this with coordinated planning, in the joint interest andwith strong European solidarity.
There is a double urgency to reduce Europe’s energy dependence: the climate crisis, severelycompounded by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, and EU’s dependence on fossil fuels,
which Russia uses as an economic and political weapon.
The green transformation of Europe’s energy system will strengthen economic growth,
reinforce its industrial leadership, and put Europe on a path towards climate neutrality by 2050.
The European Commission calls on leaders, Member States, regional and local authorities, andindeed every citizen and business, to reduce Europe’s energy dependence from Russia throughthe implementation of this REPowerEU plan.

20－ 71 －

EUROPEAN
COMMISSION

Brussels, 18.5.2022
COM(2022) 230 final
ANNEXES 1 to 3

ANNEXESto theCOMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEANPARLIAMENT, THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEANECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE
REGIONS
REPowerEU Plan

{SWD(2022) 230 final}

EN

EN－ 73 －

ANNEX 1

STARTING POINT: ALL FIT FOR 55 MEASURES WILL REDUCE EU GAS DEMAND BY 116 BCM, OR 30% REDUCTIONRePOWER PLAN

Equivalent GASSAVEDJOINT EU AND MS RePOWER EU ACTIONSINVESTMENT NEEDS(EUR)

EU Save Energy communication
Play my part campaign
EU Save Energy communication
Higher 13% EED target by amended EEDEcodesign and energy labelling requirements for solar PVs
heat pumps
Potential Important Projects of Common European Interest(IPCEI) focused on breakthrough technologies and innovation
Higher 13% EED target by amended proposal
Higher 45% RES target by amended proposal
Innovation fundRRF chapter
EU coordinated demand reduction plan-

SAVINGS
Citizens : Behavioural change

10 bcmResidential sector: energy
efficiency and heat pumps

37 bcmIndustry: energy efficiency
and electrification

12 bcmCurtailment

56

41

-

FUEL DIVERSIFICATIONLNG and pipeline gas

50 (LNG) + 10
bcm (pipeline)

Biomethane

17 bcmRenewable Hydrogen+ 14 Mt ofadditional
H2/ammonia of
which 8 Mt
replace natural
gas equivalent
to = 27 bcm
10 Mt is imported
and about 4 Mt ofadditionaldomestic
production

Diversification obligation
Joint Gas and Hydrogen Purchasing
EU IT tool for demand aggregation and infrastructuretransparency
MoUs with partner countries
Adoption of the storage proposal
RRF chapter
Biomethane action plan
RRF chapter
RFNBO sub-targets in line with higher RED targets
Hydrogen Valleys
Regulatory framework: Delegated acts on definition andstandards
Imports: Joint Gas and Hydrogen Purchasing Vehicle andInternational Hydrogen Partnerships
Industrial Capacity: Electrolyser Declaration
Innovation fundRRF chapter

37
27 bn is direct
investment indomestic electrolysers
and distribution ofhydrogen in the EU.
(excludes theinvestment of solar
and wind electricity
needed to produce
renewable hydrogen,and it excludes theinvestments for theimported hydrogen)

RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY
Solar & Wind1

21 bcm1

Higher 45% RES target by amended RED
PPA guidance
Solar strategy
Solar roof top initiative by amended RED
RRF chapter
Solar alliance

86 bn EUR

In the scenario around 12 bcm is achieved through 4 Mt of additional domestic hydrogen production and 9
bcm through additional substitution of gas in the power system. These bcm savings are distributed in thetable in other sectors.

1－ 74 －

Permitting

Potential Important Projects of Common European Interest(IPCEI) focused on breakthrough technologies and innovation
Legislative proposal on permitting amending RED
EC recommendation-

SMART INVESTMENTS AND REFORMS
Infrastructure

Integrated EU-wide infrastructure gaps and needs assessment
for gas, electricity and hydrogen

RRF

Revised RRF proposal close to EUR 300 billion (225 bn loans+up to 72 bn grants)
RRP guidance
Revised Innovation Fund proposal rolling out carbon contracts
for difference
Dedicated RePowerEU call in Autumn 2023
Dedicated RepowerEU funding windows
Dedicated RePowerEU calls, starting May 2022

Innovation Fund

CEF
ReformEuropean semester
Country-specific recommendations
Permitting
PPA guidance
RRF chapters2－ 75 －

29 bn (power grids) +10 bn (power storage)+
10 bn (gas) Oil for
security of supply 1,5bn[hydrogeninfrastructure see Staff
work document]

ANNEX 2 – maps

3
－ 76 －

4－ 77 －

5－ 78 －

ANNEX 3
Infrastructure needs for gas
Achievements of the TEN-E framework to establish resilient European electricity andgas networks
The TEN-E Regulation has established a new approach to EU-wide infrastructure planning
based on regional cooperation with Member States and relevant stakeholders to identify
projects of common interest (PCIs) that contribute to the development of energy
infrastructure priority corridors and thematic areas. It also requires Member States tostreamline permit granting procedures for PCIs and provides access to financing from theConnecting Europe Facility (CEF) to enable their timely implementation.
Since the TEN-E Regulation was established in 2013 gas PCIs have helped to establish amore resilient European gas infrastructure based on more diversified supplies. Gas PCIs havecontributed to reduce bottlenecks in the European gas infrastructure, diversify supply sources
as well as counterparts and routes. Once the ongoing PCI projects are implemented all
Member States will have access to at least three gas sources or the global liquefied naturalgas (LNG) market.
In 2022 alone, PCIs with a total additional gas transmission capacity of 20 bcm/year havebeen or will be commissioned, e.g. the gas interconnector between Poland and Lithuania (theGIPL pipeline), the Poland-Slovakia interconnector, the Baltic Pipe between Poland andDenmark, the Greece-Bulgaria pipeline (IGB). LNG terminals in Cyprus (2 bcm/year) andAlexandroupolis Greece (5 bcm/year) are due to be operational in 2023. Moreover, several
gas PCIs are expected to be completed in the coming years which include several storage
projects in South Eastern Europe (Greece, Romania, Bulgaria) as well the LNG terminal in
Gdansk in Poland (at least 6 bcm/year).
It is thanks to these projects, many of which have benefitted from financial support throughthe Connecting Europe Facility, that Member States are able to react to recent supply cuts ina spirit of solidarity.
In addition to significant improvements in the European gas infrastructure, key electricity
interconnectors have been kick started also through CEF grant for works, e.g. the Biscay Bay
electricity interconnector between France and Spain to increase the interconnection capacitywith the Iberian Peninsula, the Celtic interconnector between France and Ireland and the
EuroAsia interconnector between Greece and Cyprus which both will end the isolation fromthe Union’s electricity grid of Ireland and Cyprus respectively supporting the integration ofrenewable energy sources and enhancing security of supply. Moreover, the synchronisationof the electricity grids of the Baltic States, the last Member States having electricity systems
still dependant on third countries, is well underway for completion at the latest by 2025.
Support under the TEN-E policy as well as financially, under CEF for over EUR 1.2 billion,
have been essential to set the project on track.

6－ 79 －

The accelerated implementation of electricity PCIs2 will be crucial for a better interconnected
system that will enable to increase the share of renewable energy sources and reduce
renewable energy curtailment significantly faster in line with the REPowerEU objectives.
ENTSOG assessment of additional gas infrastructure needs
The REPowerEU communication announced that the Commission would assess as a matterof priority whether measures and investments are needed in hydrogen-ready gas
infrastructure and interconnections to overcome bottlenecks to the full use of the EU’s LNG
capacity. The Commission has requested ENTSOG to support this assessment with the
purpose of identifying any remaining gas infrastructure gaps that require immediate
alleviation under the REPowerEU plan.
The ENTSOG assessment 3 analysed to what extent infrastructure bottlenecks exist in theEuropean gas network in case of an end to Russian gas flows to Europe using two different
demand scenarios (current demand and 2030 demand assuming full implementation of fit for
55 proposals with a 27% lower gas demand compared to today which is expected to be evenlower with the implementation of REPowerEU) and assuming different levels of
infrastructure development4.
The assessment shows that it will be possible to fully compensate the end to Russian gas
imports by a combination of demand reductions as envisaged by the Commission’s fit for 55
package5, a ramp up of domestic production of biogas and fossil-free hydrogen in particular,
and rather limited additions of gas infrastructure beyond what is already included in thecurrent 5th PCI list. Mitigating the few remaining bottlenecks will also increase the European
gas system’s resilience and flexibility.
As regards the geographic distribution of needs, it is clear that the biggest challenge would be
to meet demand in Central and Eastern Europe, but also in the northern part of Germany, if
RU gas imports cease. The assessment, which was subsequently discussed with Member
States in a regional context, has shown that different possible solutions exist to address theRussian supply dependency, mostly in geographic proximity to the needs and requiring
cooperation between two or more Member States.
Additional gas infrastructure needs per region
Baltic Sea region
The three Baltic States and Finland are significantly dependent on Russian gas, whilst Poland
shows a lower extent of dependence to such imports.

2

3
4
5

The current 5th PCI list includes in total 67 electricity PCIs.
Covering all EU Member States and several third countries i.e. North Macedonia, Bosnia Herzegovina,
Serbia, UK.
Level 0 = current infrastructure, level 1 = advanced projects (FIDs+ advanced PCIs), level 2= level
1+additional LNGs and TAP expansion.
Even with current demand and domestic supply levels, the projects identified would mitigate Russian
dependence almost fully, with a remaining 5% dependence in CZ, SK, HU, RO and BG.

7－ 80 －

Projects such as the Balticconnector between Estonia and Finland, the enhancement of theinterconnection between Latvia and Estonia, the Klaipeda LNG Terminal, and theŚwinoujście LNG Terminal have already ensured market integration and decreased
dependence on Russian gas in a region historically dependent on a single supplier. The
situation is expected to significantly further improve with the recent launch of theinterconnector between Poland and Lithuania (GIPL), and imminent completion of the
expansion of the Świnoujście LNG Terminal, the Baltic Pipe, bringing for the first time gas
from the Northern Seas to the region through Poland, the enhancement of the interconnection
between Lithuania and Latvia and the enhancement of the Inčukalns UGS. The link between
the Baltic Sea region and Central-Eastern Europe will be completed in the 2nd half of 2022with the interconnection between Poland and Slovakia. The region has also benefited to thegreatest extent from grants from the Connecting Europe Facility for Energy.
In the short term, the assessment showed that the temporary rented floating storage
regasification unit (FSRU) to be installed in either Estonia or Finland later in 2022 cansignificantly reduce dependence on Russian gas. Latvia has also been invited to join the
project development.
In the medium to longer term, the assessment has clearly established that the region aroundthe Baltic Sea would benefit from the development of a second LNG terminal in Poland, inGdansk (completion in 2026 which could be accelerated to 2025) which is a project on the
5th PCI list. The project could alleviate also any additional needs of the Baltic States, by
freeing up capacity in the Klaipeda LNG terminal in Lithuania to serve any additional
remaining needs in the Baltic States and Finland.
Western Europe
Most Western European countries show no or minimal dependence on Russian gas alreadytoday. However, Germany is strongly exposed to dependence on Russian gas, especially its
northern market area where demand is concentrated. In the absence of Russian gas imports,
the infrastructure bottlenecks are related to insufficient pipeline capacity from West to East as
well as insufficient import capacity, including LNG infrastructure.
Unlike most European countries, Spain and France odorise gas in the transmission system.
Therefore, infrastructure and regulatory limitations prevent South-Western countries fromcooperating with countries in North-Western as well as Central and Eastern Europe; nosignificant gas capacities are available from France to Germany.
In the short term, the assessment has clearly shown that the additional FSRU in Eemshaven(NL) and FSRU Wilhelmshaven (DE) and an additional LNG terminal in Germany(Brunsbüttel) will alleviate infrastructure limitations in North-Western Europe. In general, it
will be important to avoid overcapacity in LNG import infrastructure that could become
stranded assets in the future.
In the mid-term, the assessment and the discussions have concluded that the development of adeodorisation unit enabling gas flows from West to East between France and Germany
would remove a key bottleneck to reduce Russian gas dependence in Central Europe. In

8－ 81 －

combination with gas infrastructure reinforcements to increase export capacity from
Belgium to Germany this would enable full utilisation of the LNG capacities in Western
Europe to address dependence on Russian gas also in the Central and Eastern European
regions.
An additional cross-border infrastructure project on the Iberian Peninsula should be further
assessed in view of its long-term potential to tap into the important renewable hydrogen
potential of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as Northern Africa, and whether it could become
the first element of the hydrogen backbone considering the Hydrogen Accelerator.
Central and South – East Europe
In Central and South – East Europe, including the Energy Community, most of the countries
show significant dependence on Russian gas taking into account today’s gas demand.
In South – East Europe, key gas priority infrastructure projects became operational in thecourse of 2020-2021, including notably the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, the 1st phase of the
BRUA pipeline corridor and the Krk LNG terminal. The remaining priority infrastructure
investments in the region which are set to be finalised in 2022 are the rehabilitation,
modernization and expansion of the Bulgarian transmission system, the new interconnector
between Greece and Bulgaria (IGB) which in its first operational phase will offerbidirectional capacity of 3 bcm/y. The interconnector Serbia - Bulgaria (IBS) which aims at
creating bidirectional interconnection of 1,8 bcm/y, as well as the construction of the FSRU
in Alexandroupolis, which will provide import capacity at the level of 5.5 bcm/y, arecurrently expected to be completed in the second half of 2023. Furthermore, the expansion of
the underground gas storage facility in Chiren, Bulgaria, is planned for 2025.
The assessment has shown that, in the medium term, South East Europe would benefit tosome extent from the FSRU terminal in Poland (PCI project on the 5th PCI list) while themain benefits will occur in the Baltic Sea region. Transportation of natural gas from Gdansk
to the SEE region and Ukraine would require the accelerated construction of the North-SouthGas Corridor in Eastern Poland. The assessment of ENTSOG has also shown that, in themedium term, an expansion of the capacity of the LNG terminal in Krk will further help
mitigating Russian supply dependence, but to reap these benefits, it would be necessary toenhance the Croatian transmission grid towards Slovenia and Hungary. . Further
supplies to the region could come through full scale TAP expansion , but upgrading TAP
would require accelerated additional infrastructure investments in the Italian transmission
grid (Adriatica Line and Mattagiola – Massafra pipeline which are PCI projects on the 5th
PCI list). If the Italian transmission network is reinforced, it would enable increased flows
from the South to the North of Italy which would be relevant for additional flows from TAP,
EastMed, and Northern Africa. Furthermore, expansion of Interconnector Greece Bulgaria (IGB phase II), could further mitigate dependence further notably in Bulgaria andin the entire SEE region by allowing to increase flows from TAP and LNG terminals in
Greece.
Furthermore, the ENTSOG assessment has shown that projects of common interest andadditional projects recognised by the REPowerEU plan, if implemented, would provide
9－ 82 －

additional benefits also to the Energy Community Contracting Parties, whose needs would befully satisfied. With the completion of Projects recognised by the flagship 5 of the Economic
Investment Plan for Western Balkans (EIP projects), the Energy Community Contracting
Parties will have access to various alternative sources and routes. The implementation of theEIP projects would need to be assessed on a case-by-case basis in order to avoid the risk of
stranded assets.
Member States should ensure that the identified projects are implemented as quickly as
possible in line with the needs and timeline of the REPowerEU Plan. In particular, identified
projects, alongside PCIs, should be allocated the status of projects of highest nationalsignificance and priority ensuring rapid implementation. The Commission will be ready tofacilitate this.

10－ 83 －

EN

EN－ 85 －

1.

INTRODUCTION

Saving energy, i.e. reducing energy consumption through price signals, energy efficiency
measures or voluntary efforts can often be the cheapest, safest and cleanest way to reduce
our reliance on fossil fuel imports from Russia. Moreover, using less energy supports
security of supply, facilitates storage requirements and underpins the clean energy
transition.
Voluntarily reducing unnecessary energy consumption and fast-tracking energy efficiency
measures will reduce the volume of gas and oil shortage in case of a disruption of flows
from Russia. As such it is a critical element to stabilise markets and prevent further pricevolatility. Over the medium to long-term, energy savings would contribute to lower the
prices of energy, help responding effectively to sudden price hikes and supply shortages.
Saving energy directly reduces our energy bills and makes our economy more resilient.
High prices for fossil fuel-based energy already hurt households and all industrial sectors,
from services to manufacturing and from agriculture to transport. For the energy poor,
vulnerable households, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises and for energy
intensive industries, they force uncomfortable choices about forgoing energy use. Higher
energy prices also affect the relative competitiveness of firms with possible knock-on
effects on employment and incomes.
Last year, as part of the ‘Fit for 55’ package and delivering on the European Green Deal,
the Commission proposed an increase of the energy efficiency ambition by the end of thisdecade. While primarily framed to support the decarbonisation of the EU economy, theproposal also implied other substantial benefits such as higher energy security and lower
GHG emissions, air pollution and natural resources depletion.
Implementation of the full “Fit for 55” package would lower our gas consumption by 30%(equivalent to 100 bcm) by 2030. More than one third of this would come from meetingthe EU energy efficiency target put forward in the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED)
recast proposal. The target would be delivered by the implementation of the relevantenergy efficiency policy proposals such as the recast EED itself, the recast of the Energy
Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD), Ecodesign and Energy Labelling legislation,
as well as other policy instruments with an impact on energy consumption such as the CO2
emission standards for new vehicles, the EU Emission Trading System (ETS) and the
proposed new ETS for buildings and road transport.
Implementing these policies would deliver a structural reduction in energy use. In the wakeof the Russian invasion of Ukraine, those changes should now happen even faster toincrease the EU’s resilience and energy independence at greater speed.
At the same time, significant energy savings driven by voluntary choices can be achieved
relatively quickly. The latest IPCC report1 highlights that changes to our lifestyles andbehaviour can help significantly lower our energy consumption. Choosing to reduceheating temperatures, drive more economically and shift to more public transport and

1

IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III
to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change－ 86 －

active mobility, use household appliances and air-conditioning more efficiently and switch
off the lights can deliver substantial, short-term savings2.
Therefore, this EU ‘Save Energy’ plan takes a two-pronged approach:(1)

Achieving immediate energy savings through voluntary choices; and(2)

Accelerating and strengthening structural, mid- to long-term energy efficiency
measures.

Both approaches will need to be supported by an effective financial framework andgovernance structure.
2.

ACHIEVING IMMEDIATE ENERGY SAVINGS THROUGH PERSONAL CHOICES

In view of the current geopolitical and market situation, we cannot afford to wait until theimportant structural energy efficiency measures are in place. It is vital to look for
immediate opportunities to reduce energy consumption while the current crisis endures. In
the shorter term, most of those opportunities would come from voluntary choices, some ofwhich could also last into the mid-to-long term if they lead to changes in habits.
These choices should primarily focus on where the greatest savings in gas and oil
consumption can be achieved. Natural gas plays the largest role in heating, accounting foraround 42% of energy used for space heating in the residential and household sectors. Oilis the next most important fossil fuel for heating accounting for 14% while coal accounts
for around 3%. Fossil fuels use in transport represent 288 million tonnes of oil equivalent
per year, or 93% of the transport sector energy needs. Air transport and shipping are almost
entirely dependent on fossil fuels, while fossil fuels provide 93% of the energy use in roadtransport and 23% of the energy use in rail. Around 25% of passenger car activity takes
place in the urban mobility environment.
Therefore, the key sectors for significant short-term savings are heating in households andservices, and transport and mobility, with some additional short-term potential in industry
sectors. Actions to immediately reduce gas consumption are particularly important as any
savings that can be made early will help in refilling storage and thus reduce the supply
risks over the winter season. At the same time, it is also important to save electricity as gas,oil and coal are also used for power generation. The main reductions in oil use are likely
to be achievable by reducing private car use and air travel, as well as more efficient driving
for trucks.
These choices can reduce energy demand that can help to reduce fossil fuel imports andavoid more serious shortages and consequently the imposition of curtailment measureswith all their ensuing economic and social consequences.
Change is, of course, already driven by current high market prices as households andbusinesses seek out ways to curb the increase in their energy bills. Such market-driven
savings, however, may fall short for various reasons. Actors may not be aware of the bestsavings opportunities. Coordination may be necessary to achieve the best results. Fairness
2

Analysis of behaviour change due to electricity crisis: Japanese household electricity consumer
behaviour since the earthquake; Murakoshi et al, 2013. Can Rationing Affect Long Run Behavior?
Evidence from Brazil; Costa, 2012. See also Policies for energy conservation and sufficiency: Review
of existing policies and recommendations for new and effective policies in OECD countries: Bertoldi,
2022 (https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enbuild.2022.112075)
2－ 87 －

and solidarity are also not necessarily guaranteed: the wealthier may or may not adjust
their behaviour. Others, especially the most vulnerable, may instead be forced to takepainful measures. Finally, market prices will not necessarily lead to an appropriate effort
from the point of point of view of the REPowerEU objectives.
The types of support actions that can be taken can therefore be divided into:
 Information actions – to ensure the different types of energy users understand theimportance of reducing energy demand and know what they can do to contribute.
 Incitement and supporting actions –to help energy users in their efforts to reduceenergy consumption, for example by offering rebates on the purchase of the mostefficient appliances.
The key advantage of change driven by this sort of measures is that their impact on energy
consumption is immediate, no (or very little) up-front investment is required, and only asmall change of habit is needed, with no or a very limited impact on welfare as only those
who want and can make such choices will do.
Such measures will mainly be voluntary and rely on goodwill, and on the effective
communication to energy users of the most effective steps they can take. Since the mainuses of gas and oil are relatively limited (primarily heating for gas and transport for oil)the messages can be relatively well targeted.
Delivering targeted information to citizens is crucial for them to make informed choices.
The right messages need to be delivered at the right time. This is likely to mean a small
number of broadly targeted measures underpinned by accessible information.
These actions need to be taken by trusted bodies that have a good understanding of local
circumstances and are able to engage a broad section of the population in concrete action.
Member States often are best placed to promote these types of energy saving actions at theappropriate time and in view of their local circumstances. Local authorities, through e.g.
local, regional and national energy agencies, the Covenant of Mayors and the 100 Climateneutral and Smart Cities Mission have a key role to play.
Information actions may also be reinforced by including energy savings related skills inschool curricula and promoting skills acquisition in the sectors which are crucial forachieving the ambitious targets of the REPowerEU plan.
Quite a few Member States have already taken actions to address the potential for shortterm energy savings 3 but more could be done. To support these efforts, the joint
Commission - IEA ‘Playing my part’ campaign provides simple information on some key
steps that individuals and companies can take voluntarily when possible to contribute to
reducing our energy imports from Russia.
In addition, to support consumers in choosing more efficient appliances, the Commissionis launching the consumer interface of the European Product Registration for Energy
Labelling (EPREL) database 4 . The Commission is also working on an information
campaign to provide awareness raising information and materials to be used forcommunication to individuals by other bodies. Member States should also make full use
3

For example, the Belgian government has launched the ‘J’ai un impact / ik heb impact’ campaign aiming
to achieve short term energy savings in view of the Ukraine crisis. Italy has announced a decision tolimit heating and cooling temperatures in public buildings.

4

For more information see: https://eprel.ec.europa.eu/screen/home3－ 88 －

of the opportunities available to them to promote energy efficiency such as reduced VAT
rates for high efficiency heating systems, ensuring energy pricing encourages switching toheat pumps and encouraging purchase of more efficient appliances. Member States will be
best placed to identify the most effective and fairest ones for their own circumstances
Many specific immediate recommendations can be envisaged and an illustration of thetypes of measures, including indicative estimated savings potentials, is provided in theannex and the most significant ones are summarised in the table below5.
Oil savings Gas
savings(Mtoe)(bcm)
Gas saving measures
Savings from turning down heating, turning off heating in unused ≈1.5
rooms, block draughts etc.
Providing information about keeping condensing boiler temperatures
below 60 degrees and encouraging people to check theirs.
Information about servicing boilers, simple insulation measures, ≈0.3
draught proofing, fitting Thermostatic Radiator Valves and heating
controllers and encouragement to act.
Consider modifying the energy pricing and introducing progressive
tariff structures and other solutions to encourage energy savings andswitch from gas to electricity.
Industry
Incentivise energy audits and implementation to avoid heat losses
from high temperature processes, supporting switching away fromfossil energy.
Transport measures
Recommending reducing motorway speeds.
≈8
Encouraging walking, cycling, public transport, micro-mobility in ≈5
urban areas.
Encouraging train transport.
≈2
Illustrative potential ≈16

≈6
≈3
≈1

≈1

≈2

≈13

The IEA estimates that these types of short-term gas-related measures could achieve a 5%
reduction in (final) gas use (around 13 bcm) over a year. Similarly, and depending on
the Member State and its overall transport demand, measures could achieve up to a 5%
reduction in (final) oil use (around 16 mtoe), while not preventing necessary journeys.
In support of these efforts, the Commission will: Develop a campaign in the context of the EU response to the effects of Russia’s war
against Ukraine and high energy prices, intended to raise awareness and provide
materials for use by other bodies.
 Disseminate information on the ‘Playing my part’ campaign on energy saving actions
for individuals and work with stakeholder groups to increase the reach of theseinformation measures and create the greatest impact.

5

The indicated estimated energy savings are based on a range of sources and are dependent on a wide
range of factors including the degree to which individuals respond to publicity and information
campaigns and other incitements. In view of this, they should be understood as purely indicative of thepossible relative magnitude of effect at EU level. In addition, the impacts of the measures can overlap.
4－ 89 －

 Launch the European Product Registration for Energy Labelling (EPREL) database
consumer interface to support consumers and procurers choosing more efficient
appliances.
3.

ACCELERATING AND STRENGTHENING STRUCTURAL, MID- TO LONG-TERM ENERGYEFFICIENCY MEASURESThe current EU’s energy efficiency targets significantly contribute to the EU’s climate
ambitions. The 20-20-20 targets and the 2030 climate targets set under the Climate Law
are clear examples where energy efficiency measures have allowed growth and reduced
energy consumption to go hand in hand and played an important role for achieving thegreenhouse gas reduction target. As confirmed by research6, energy efficiency policies
also provided wider benefits in terms of that can be monetised to differing degrees. These
include aspects such as reduced energy poverty, increased health and welfare, increased
business competitiveness and enhanced energy security.
Member States have established the necessary frameworks and institutional arrangements
to deliver on their previous and current energy efficiency targets. A governance structure
is in place through the National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs) to ensure that theseambitions are consistent with the overall EU objectives. There is now an urgency toaccelerate these energy efficiency improvements to increase the EU’s resilience. Withhigher energy prices reducing the pay-back period of energy efficiency investment, there
is a need for a renewed effort to remove the liquidity and information constraints holdingback such profitable investment.
Because of the work that has been done over the past decade, this ramping up of effort
should not require the creation of new structures or bodies. For example, all Member States
have long-term renovation strategies, large businesses are required to carry out energy
audits every four years and efforts have gone into adequate training and quality assurance.
Increasing the rate of energy efficiency improvements may however require existing levelsof resourcing to be strengthened, for example for providing advice and information as wellas mechanisms to enable more private investments.
The current EU rules on ecodesign and energy labelling have resulted in 10% lower
annual energy consumption by the products in their scope, significantly reducing EU
primary energy demand and saving costs to consumers. The Commission proposal for a
Regulation on Ecodesign for Sustainable Products7 extends the scope of the Ecodesign
framework to cover the broadest possible range of products. As the use of materials in
products has an important energy footprint, this new framework will significantly increaseenergy savings through boosting both energy and material efficiency.
3.1.

Indication of a higher EU energy efficiency target

The Commission’s EED recast proposal of July 2021 includes a higher energy efficiency
target of 9% by 2030 (compared to the 2020 reference scenario).
In 2021, the Commission also undertook a study on energy savings potentials of energy
efficiency measures, which showed that the economic saving potential for 2030 could be
as high as 13% of FEC (752 Mtoe) if the EU intensifies funding and efforts for energy
6

See for example https://combi-project.eu/

7

COM(2022) 142 final
5－ 90 －

efficiency. According to the same study8, the technical potential for energy savings could
be as high as 19% of FEC (696 Mtoe).
Following the REPowerEU communication of 8 March, further modelling of the
REPowerEU9 scenario with structurally higher gas prices also results in a cost-effectiveenergy efficiency target of 13% in 2030.
3.2.

Possible strengthening of energy efficiency measures

In view of the need to speed up the Union’s independence from fossil fuel imports, Member
States should consider fast-tracking existing, and implementing additional, energy
efficiency measures. Each Member State will know best where to focus its efforts and in
addition there are clear areas at the EU level where a common approach can bring added
value.
In the ongoing co-decision processes on different elements of the ‘Fit for 55’ package theco-legislators may strengthen the regulatory framework for energy efficiency in the shortterm and to deliver more energy savings in the mid- to long-term in the context of
REPowerEU, including:

Increasing the ambition of national energy savings obligation.

Introducing obligations to ensure that in key sectors, energy efficiency will be
increased, subsidies for fossil fuel technologies will be stopped, renewable energy
technologies are consistently promoted and energy savings technologies andequipment are quickly developed.

Strengthening the implementation of energy audit results to ensure that costeffective measures are implemented and that companies (in particular SMEs) and otherentities such as public bodies that are not subject to the energy audit obligation are
incentivised to undertake such audits and act on its results. Data centres and the use ofwaste heat should also be addressed in this context.

Introduce additional Minimum Energy Performance Standards for buildings toboost renovations that encompass also heating (and cooling) systems, with sufficiently
ambitious timelines and setting a pathway to upgrade worst-performing buildingsin the Energy Performance Certificate “G class” up to “D class”.

Phase out Member States’ subsidies for fossil fuel-based boilers in buildings as of2025 as a minimum (noting that in most situations such incentives are contrary to
Article 7(2) of the Energy Labelling Regulation) and encourage redirection to
incentivise support schemes for heat pumps instead.

Strengthen national energy (and resource efficiency) requirements of newbuildings through heating system requirements and introducing zero-emission
standards before 2030 (before 2027 in the case of public buildings).

Tighten national heating system requirements for existing buildings addressing
major renovations and boiler replacements and connection to efficient district heating
systems in densely populated areas. This would work hand in hand with the setting of

8

https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/511bb328-f8b9-11eb-b52001aa75ed71a1/language-en

9

SWD(2022) 230 final
6－ 91 －

stricter ecodesign limits for heating systems at EU level, implying 2029 as an end datefor ‘stand-alone’ fossil fuel boilers being placed on the market and parallel rescalingof energy labels (by 2025/2026) that will result in boilers and other fossil fuel-based
appliances ending up in the bottom energy classes. Such EPBD and ecodesign andenergy labelling measures will incentivise the roll-out of heat pumps and willcontribute to the goal of doubling the rate of installation of heat pumps.
Introduce national bans for boilers based on fossil fuels in existing and newbuildings by setting requirements for heat generators based on greenhouse gas
emissions or the type of fuel used. Whilst the EPBD recast introduces a clear legal
basis for such national bans to address current legal uncertainty, it is already possible
under the existing legislative framework to go ahead with such measures, which are
already being introduced by several Member States.

In the mid- to long-term it will also be important to further increase energy efficiency
in transport with a view to reduce oil consumption, encourage the switch to efficient
renewable alternatives and increase transport energy efficiency, for example through:

Aerodynamic retrofitting of heavy-duty vehicles and facilities to plug refrigerated
trailers; longer trucks with eco-design such as aerodynamic devices on their trailers;

including further eco-design requirements or higher energy efficiency targets forvehicles and trailers the upcoming revision of the CO2 performance standards for
newly sold heavy-duty vehicles, due in December 2022;

incentivising the uptake of zero-emission heavy-duty vehicles and boosting the energy
saving potential of longer and heavier trucks to drive cross-border within the European
Union in the upcoming revision of the Weights and Dimensions Directive;boosting the use of combined transport generating energy savings in the upcoming
review of the Directive on Combined Transport;

In view of this, the Commission: Proposes to increase to 13% the binding target in the Energy Efficiency Directive;

Invites the Parliament and Council to consider, during the ongoing negotiations, therelevant measures outlined above to enable additional savings and energy efficiency
gains in buildings through the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive and theEnergy Efficiency Directive;

Invites the Parliament and Council to uphold the ambition of the Commission proposal
for a Regulation on Ecodesign for Sustainable Products10, the rapid deployment of
which will lead to further energy savings through improved energy and resource
efficiency of a broad range of products;

Will consider a legislative initiative to increase the share of zero emission vehicles inpublic and corporate car fleets above a certain size;

Put forward a legislative package on greening freight transport10

COM(2022) 142 final.
7－ 92 －

The Commission also urges Member States to speedily adopt the reform of the Single
European Sky Regulation on the modernisation of air traffic management in Europe inview of the significant gains in reduced fuel burn this would generate through higher flightefficiency.
4.

FINANCING

As regards financing for energy efficiency and building renovations, the investments put
forward in the national Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs) are a good starting point,with more than 67 billion euro having been committed to such investments under the
Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). The major share of the funding support wasdedicated to building renovations (mainly residential and public buildings), followed by
the construction of energy efficient buildings, with energy efficiency in SMEs, industry
and in tertiary buildings, often being less frequent. The REPowerEU discussions that are
currently taking place with all Member States are a good opportunity to strengthen the
RRPs in these areas.
The EU Emissions Trading System (ETS) including the Modernisation Fund and the
proposed new ETS for buildings and road transport and the related Social Climate Fundare also expected to provide overall revenues of at least a similar order of magnitude, withenergy efficiency investments being a key objective for revenue use. In addition, within
the current Multi-Annual Financial Framework under the cohesion policy funds (ERDF,
Cohesion Fund and Just Transition Fund), will provide significant support for energy
efficiency and sustainable transport. In particular, the InvestEU Programme will mobilize
private finance to support a wide range of investments in energy efficiency, by sharing
risks with implementing partners, including the EIB Group. In addition, the Common
Agricultural Policy, Horizon Europe and the LIFE programme all provide support forinvestments in energy efficiency. In total, under these instruments at EU level, financial
resources allocated to climate related spending amount up to 626 billion euros for the 20212027 MFF and NextGenerationEU (although these resources address several policy areas
beyond energy efficiency).
Measures involving State aid are subject to State aid rules. The Climate, Energy andEnvironmental Protection State aid Guidelines (CEEAG) provide ample opportunities forsupport to energy efficiency projects. Despite significant EU- and national, regional andlocal-level public financing going to energy efficiency, such funding alone will not be
sufficient to cover energy efficiency investment needs and, therefore, scaling up private
investments is essential to achieve these objectives. Further funding needs stem fromnecessary up- and re-skilling of workers to counter the shortage of skilled labour toimplement many of the planned measures, including but not limited to the installation ofenergy saving tools, efficient appliances, or renewable electricity generation, as well asbuilding and renovation measures.
This means, on one side, to make the most cost-effective use of public financial support
based on financing instruments and innovative financing schemes. To achieve this, theCommission will continue to promote technical assistance for energy efficiency
investments, the uptake of energy efficiency innovative financing schemes (such as on-billand on-tax recovery, energy performance contracting and performance-based models), andfinancial products (such as energy efficiency mortgages and green loans and financing
schemes for acquisition of transport zero-emissions fleets).
In view of the importance of developing financing schemes for energy efficiency, by
combining financial instruments and grants, the Commission, with the support of the8－ 93 －

European Investment Bank, provides a model11 to support Member States with developing
Energy Efficiency Financial Instruments and increase the uptake of these schemes under
the Cohesion Policy Funds.
On the other side, it is key to strengthen the cooperation with financial institutions onenergy efficiency investments and to mobilise their active commitment toward theachievement of the REPowerEU and the European Green Deal objectives. In this regard,
the Commission, in cooperation with Member States, continues to strengthen the work of
the successful Energy Efficiency Financial Institutions Group (EEFIG), for example witha view to transforming it into a high-level European Energy Efficiency Financing Coalition
with the financial sector. Additionally, the Commission will examine additional ways totrigger further private investments, e.g. through mortgage portfolio standards or pay-forperformance schemes.
In view of the need for increased private financing for energy efficiency, theCommission will:launch, in cooperation with Member States, a high-level European Energy Efficiency
Financing Coalition with the financial sector, based on the successful Energy
Efficiency Financial Institutions Group (EEFIG);examine possible additional measures to trigger further private investments, e.g.
through mortgage portfolio standards or pay-for-performance schemes.

5.

GOVERNANCE AND PARTNERS

Member States, and their regional and local authorities and organisations, are best placed
to reach out to EU citizens and business to encourage them to take energy saving measuresor to invest in energy efficiency measures. The Commission will complement such efforts
by identifying and sharing expertise among Member States on the most effective actions,where possible through existing structures, for example the Concerted Actions on the EEDand EPBD, local initiatives, etc. Under the Technical Support Instrument, the Commissionis helping Member States to identify reforms and investments to phase out fossil fuelimports from Russia, including for the acceleration and strengthening of energy efficiency
measures. The Commission is keen to work with all relevant national, regional and local
actors to provide the greatest support and sharing of information.
Cities and towns represent three quarters of the EU’s population and have the biggest
potential to support urgent energy savings actions. They also have deep knowledge about,and interface with, people facing or at risk of energy poverty. Within this context, theCovenant of Mayors and the 100 Climate-neutral and Smart Cities Mission are key
partnerships for action. An important aspect to ensure that all consumers can play their roleis strengthening the existing networks with local and regional governments, and networks
of experts and stakeholders active at these levels. At international level the Global
Covenant of Mayors provides an established channel to reach 11 000 cities, including in
Ukraine that can be integrated into similar action after the conflict.
There are specific aspects to be addressed in different business sectors and the Commission
intends to explore whether specific energy savings partnerships could be created withappropriate stakeholders in relevant sectors (e.g. transport, industry, agri-food, ICT
including data centres, water, and energy). Other existing initiatives, for example, the11

https://www.fi-compass.eu/resources/factsheets-and-brochures/model-for-a-financial-instrument-witha-grant-component
9－ 94 －

Clean Islands initiative, the initiative on Coal Regions in Transition, could be used toprovide a framework to households, enterprises and services.
In times of urgency, deep local knowledge and tailor-made hands-on support is needed toadvise people how to best combine renewable energy use and energy efficiency measures,or how to become members of a renewable energy community. It must be ensured that all
citizens have the necessary information to take decisions. Even urgent actions must ensure
inclusiveness, equality and non-discrimination.
In view of this, the Commission will:

continue bringing together the relevant stakeholders, energy savings partnerships,
consumer organisations, skills partnerships and alliances, the Committee of theRegions, local and regional networks, and Member States central authorities, to allow
for the sharing of best practices on energy savings measures across the board andfollow-up on the impacts of the energy saving measures toward next winter;

continue providing dedicated technical assistance on energy efficiency, such as
through the Technical Support Instrument, cohesion policy and ELENA, which will
help authorities and stakeholders removing bottlenecks to the deployment of energy
efficiency programmes;convene Member States to report by 1 July on the actions that they have taken toachieve short-term demand reduction. They will also be invited to set out what further
actions they envisage and the expected impact from them, including on data centres
and industrial waste heat.

6.

CONCLUSION

Energy efficiency is a key element of the European Green Deal and the Union’s strategy
to achieve a decarbonised economy by 2050 in a cost-effective way. The currently highenergy prices and the war in Ukraine have given renewed impetus to the need to saveenergy to ensure the European Union becomes independent from Russian fossil fuelimports as soon as possible.
As indicated in this plan, this requires both mid- to long-term, structural energy efficiency
measures as well as immediate changes. It will require appropriate price signals, smart useof scarce public funding and more private investments, and further support along withaccompanying policies for concrete action on the ground. It will require stronger
involvement of citizens, local and regional authorities and actors to ensure strong
ownership and quick deployment of the needed energy savings actions.
Implementing the recommendations and actions set out in this EU Save Energy
communication will make it possible for everyone to save energy and thereby contributeto Europe’s energy independence.

10－ 95 －

Non-exclusive toolbox of measures to achieve immediate energy
savings
The below table introduces a non-exhaustive list of targeted measures able to generatesignificant energy savings in the short-term (over a one-year period). The indicatedestimated energy savings are dependent on a wide range of factors including the degree towhich individuals respond to publicity and information campaigns and other incitements.
In view of this they should be understood as purely indicative of the possible magnitudeof effect at EU level.
In addition, the impacts of the measures can overlap. For example, the same energy savings
might be achieved by the information campaign measures or by the increasing the roll-out
of EPCs and targeted energy checks. In view of this, it is not possible to sum the estimatedimpacts to arrive at an overall energy saving figure.
Possible measures

Description of measures

Estimated
impacts in
one year(Mtoe)

Cross-cutting energy services and financing measures
Information campaign
on multiple energy
wastage in households
and small businesses

Targeted information campaign, inciting citizens
to turn down heating and boiler temperature,
avoid consumption at peak hours, close doors,
turn off heating in unused rooms, switch-off
lights, block draughts, lower energy use in retailshops. This should also include advice services,such as one-stop-shops or energy efficiency kits,
for citizens and SMEs.

Certification andmaintenanceFree-of-charge advice, inspection, energy audits 3.5 Mtoe
and energy performance certificates to createawareness and provide recommendation onenergy savings, as well as spot checks in thermal
heating systems and fast-track maintenance toreduce wastage

Modify energy pricing
to encourage lower
energy use and fuelRemove preferential treatment of fossil fuels and 2.4 Mtoe
flat rates for energy. Introduce progressive
tariffs and other solutions to foster savings andencourage switch from gas to electricity

Encourage purchase of
more efficient
appliances

Member States to provide information andincentives. The EPREL consumer interface
provides readily accessible comparable
information.

Roll-out of innovative
financing practices andfurther support
ESCOs

Fast-track innovative financing schemes and
0.7 Mtoefinancial products can support the increased
uptake of energy efficiency measures andgenerate energy savings in the short-term (on-tax
11－ 96 －

11 Mtoeand on-bill financing schemes, energy efficiency
mortgages, ESCOs financing)
Smarter control
practices in district
heating sub-stations

Introduce smart control and monitoring ofcentralised district heating sub-stations, which
are unequipped to ensure control and eliminate
supply temperature fluctuations and the increase
flow of hot water to radiators

2.5 Mtoe

Heating and airconditioning use inbuildings

Default settings on condensing boilers can often
be adjusted to increase efficiency and save up to
8% of the energy used to heat rooms and water.

2.5 Mtoe

Speedy heat pumps
roll-out throughdedicated financing
incentives

Activate financing and fiscal incentives for fast- 1.5 Mtoe
tracked heat pumps roll-out, for example
through VAT reduction and energy efficiency
obligation. Bonus grants to replace fossil-fuelbased boilers to direct offset natural gas demand.

Building automationand energy
management systems

Encourage fitting of Building automation andcontrol systems (BACS) that monitor andautomatically adjust energy use in buildings.

1.5 Mtoe

Provide information on Address easy to install insulation measures ineasy to install
attics and roofs, and through high performanceinsulation measures in windows and double-glazingbuildings

1.5 Mtoe

Buildings

Industry
Energy audits andactions to address heatloss

Incentivise heat loss audits and actions to avoid
heat losses from high temperature processes.
Encourage SMEs to carry out audits.

2.5 MtoeAccelerate andfinancially support the
replacement of fossil
fuel systems withrenewables

Incentives, such as tax breaks or subsidies, toaccelerate the replacement of fossil fuel systems
with renewables, particularly in existingbuildings with boilers more than 12 years old.

5 MtoeAs regards transport, various ‘win-win’ measures could be taken at local, regional or
national levels as illustrated in the table below, in line with the Sustainable and Smart
Mobility Strategy and particularly the new urban mobility policy framework. These actions
can be quickly put in place or accelerated by public authorities, transport operators andemployers or other agents (individually as per measure) can be quickly put in place or
accelerated.
Possible measure

Potential
Description of the measure
impact(depending
on
the

12

－ 97 －

specific
design)Reinforcethe High
adoption of electricand more efficientcars, vans, trucks andbuses Continued/extended public support for sustainable
vehicle purchase Dedicated support schemes for specialized andcaptive fleets (taxis, shared fleets, logistic fleets,
buses)
 Investment in publicly accessible recharging andrefueling infrastructure (public and private market
actors) Support for the deployment of private recharging
infrastructure (at home/in offices/in businesses) bymeans of subsidies or tax incentives
 Investment in zero emissions public transport
infrastructure with the aim of reducing private car
usage (metro, tram, metropolitan trains,trolleybus)

Encourage reducing Medium to  Reducing motorway speeds
speed while driving high
 Recommend reduced-speed zones in urban
areasDevelop car-free zones to facilitate soft mobility
Reduce the price of Medium to  Price reduction for public and rail transport based
public transport and highon public support to operators
rail
Incentivize walking, Medium to  Support for free bike sharing and other microcycling and micro- highmobility solutions
mobility in cities
 Incentivizing bike purchases through bikepurchase subsidies or tax/VAT reductions
 Incentives/rewards for employees that use public
transport or active modes for commuting to work
 Investing in new bike lanes in and around/towards
cities Promoting/incentivizing last-mile delivery bycargo bike or smaller delivery e-vehicles
 Increasing possibilities to travel on public transport(train, metro) with a bike
Promotemore Medium
efficient driving andoperation of freightvehicles and deliveryof goods

Car free daysLow
medium Ensuring better/full loading of heavy-duty vehicles
through better planning/data Optimising multi-modal delivery solutions,
including through last-mile zero-emission
solutions and pick up stations
 Offering eco-drive training Accelerating rollout of ITS services
to Organizing car free days in cities

13－ 98 －

Adapt existing road Low
charging schemes
mediumto Road charging schemes reducing congestion during
peak times and/or incentivizing more sustainable
vehicles14－ 99 －HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE UNION FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
SECURITY POLICYEUROPEAN
COMMISSION

Brussels, 18.5.2022
JOIN(2022) 23 final

JOINT COMMUNICATION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL,
THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE
COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS
EU external energy engagement in a changing world{SWD(2022) 152 final}EN

EN－ 101 －

1. Introduction
The European Union and the world are facing the existential threat of climate change and aburgeoning energy crisis. If we do not accelerate the fight against climate change and combat
biodiversity loss, the targets agreed in Paris will be out of reach and with that, the possibility to
avoid a full-blown climate crisis with devastating consequences for the people and theenvironment across the globe.
The sixth Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report concludes that global greenhousegas emissions must be reduced by 43% by 2030 to remain on track for meeting the goal of
limiting global warming to 1.5 ºC. As the energy sector is central to delivering greenhousegas emission reductions, it will be at the heart of this transition.
At the same time, Russia has flouted international rules through its unprovoked andunjustified war of aggression against Ukraine. It has upended energy and food markets,triggering heightened price volatility and energy insecurity, impacting not only its immediateneighbourhood, but the entire world. This requires a response that addresses both the short-term
needs and the long-term implications of the EU and its partners. The EU stands in full solidarity
with Ukraine and continues to support its energy system.
The green energy transition is the only way to simultaneously ensure sustainable, secure,and affordable energy worldwide. The EU is thus determined to stay the course and engage
with partners across the globe to encourage partner countries to enhance their climate ambitionand define their pathways to climate neutrality, but also to establish long-term relationships thatare mutually beneficial, in particular in the area of energy.
The EU will continue and step up its engagement around the world through dedicatedpartnerships. This can be done by financial support, assistance, technology transfers, and/or
enhanced trade relationships.
There is also a European need to embark on this course. Despite the diversification and internalenergy security measures taken since the 2009 gas crisis, Europe is still too dependent on a
supplier who is willing to use energy as a weapon. To overcome this vulnerability, the European
Commission presented on 8 March 2022 a REPowerEU communication, providing a
blueprint to put an end to the imports of fossil energy from Russia well before 2030. Thisrequires diversifying the EU energy supply, increasing energy savings and efficiency andaccelerating the green energy transition.
All this responds to the challenges of a fast-changing world and energy landscape. In the
coming years and decades, new opportunities for producing energy will emerge, together withnew trade patterns and transport needs. While trade in conventional energy commodities will
gradually decline, new commodities such as hydrogen and ammonia will begin to be tradedinternationally and demand for low emission technologies will grow. New standards andgovernance arrangements will be required to build more reliable and mutually beneficial
partnerships through a rules-based approach.
1－ 102 －

The European Union must be ready to act in and shape this new, changing environment. There
will be new opportunities for Europe to build on its green technological leadership, and topromote a more just and sustainable development across the world, but also new challenges for
its energy security and the resilience of its supply chains, in particular the critical raw materials,
which are key for the energy transition.
Similarly, the crisis is an opportunity for many countries to leap-frog carbon-intensive
development and benefit from a greener, more equal economy that provides energy access tomillions of people. In line with SDG 7 the EU will work to ensure a just and inclusive
energy transition. The European Commission and the High Representative will partner andsupport those embarking on the green transition, facilitating long-term sustainable investment,
including through the Global Gateway, which is the European Union's plan and value-based
proposition for major investment in infrastructure development around the world.
All these aspects require the EU to update its external energy strategy, more than ten years after
the adoption of the previous one, reinforcing its engagement with partners and strengthening its
climate and energy diplomacy, in line with the Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions of 25
January 2021.
To achieve this, the EU external energy policy will aim to:strengthen its energy security, resilience and open strategic autonomy bydiversifying the EU’s energy supply and boosting energy savings and efficiency;
accelerate the global green and just energy transition to ensure sustainable, secureand affordable energy for the EU and the world;
support Ukraine and other countries that are directly or indirectly affected by the
Russian aggression;build long-lasting international partnerships and promote the EU clean energy
industries across the globe.

2. An EU external energy policy for REPowerEU
As set out in the 18 May 2022 REPowerEU plan published in parallel with this strategy,
Europe’s energy system will increase its efficiency and move to green energy sources at a fasterpace than expected before the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. While the green
energy transition is at the heart of the EU’s drive for energy independence, moving awayfrom Russian fossil fuels will require replacing some of them with fossil fuels from otherinternational suppliers, considering that the EU’s domestic oil and gas production is muchdiminished: we import 90% of our gas consumption, 97% of our oil and 70% of our coal needs.
As the EU’s gas demand will contract at a faster pace than earlier expected and in order tominimise the risk of stranded investments and assets, the EU will favour diversification
strategies that encompass both gas and green hydrogen investments.

2－ 103 －

2.1. Diversifying the EU’s gas supply
Today, Russia is Europe’s largest gas supplier. 1 The REPowerEU plan aims to end ourdependence on Russian gas as soon as possible. Most of this gas demand will be substituted
with renewables, low carbon energy sources, energy efficiency and savings. The remaining
need for natural gas will be covered by diversifying suppliers.
To provide the gas supplies needed over the coming years, the EU must increase its gas
imports from non-Russian sources: mostly of liquefied natural gas (LNG) (+50 billion cubic
meters (bcm)), but also pipeline gas (+10 bcm or more). To this end, the EU has launched the
EU Energy Platform – to pool demand, coordinate infrastructure use and negotiate withinternational partners to facilitate joint gas and hydrogen purchases, as laid out in the
REPowerEU Chapeau Communication.
This builds on the work done by the European Commission since last autumn, reaching out toour main LNG and pipeline gas suppliers. These efforts have resulted in record monthly
LNG deliveries of 12.5 bcm in April 2022 and 42 bcm from January to April 2022. The Platform
will integrate ongoing diversification efforts by EU Member States and be open to Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia, as well as the Western Balkans.
To facilitate the diversification efforts, the European Commission and the US have agreed2
to work for the delivery of additional LNG to the EU (at least 15 bcm in 2022 and approximately
50 bcm annually until at least 2030), through US exports but also in cooperation with otherinternational partners. The Commission has also established a dedicated working group with
Canada to look at possible LNG and hydrogen deliveries in the coming years.3
Before this summer, the EU aims to conclude a trilateral agreement with Egypt and Israelon supplying Europe with LNG. Japan and Korea have already redirected a number of LNG
cargoes to Europe and work continues to use this option in the future. Qatar stands ready tofacilitate swaps with Asian countries. In terms of pipeline gas, Norway has already increased
its deliveries to Europe and both Algeria and Azerbaijan have expressed their willingness to
do so as well. The EU will aim to restart the energy dialogue with Algeria and will intensify
cooperation with Azerbaijan in the light of the strategic importance of the Southern Gas
Corridor. Scaling up the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) capacity would increase the gas supply
to the EU and the Western Balkan countries.
Countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and in particular in Western Africa such as Nigeria (alreadysupplying 15% of EU 2021 imports), Senegal, and Angola also offer untapped LNG potential.
A full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action would facilitatea dedicated reflection on the potential for Iran to become a reliable gas supplier to Europe.
The EU will aim to ensure that additional gas supplies from existing and new gas suppliers arecoupled with targeted actions to tackle methane leaks and to address venting and flaring,
1 In 2021, more than 40% of the EU’s overall gas consumption came from Russia: this equals around 155 billion cubic metres(bcm) of which 15 bcm is in the form of liquefied natural gas (LNG).
2 Joint Statement between the European Commission and the United States on European Energy Security
3 Joint Statement by President von der Leyen and Prime Minister Trudeau3－ 104 －

creating additional liquidity on global markets, while ensuring significant climate benefits. To
that end, the EU will cooperate with its fossil fuel supply partners to reduce methane emissions.
At least 46 bcm of natural gas is lost4 a year to venting and flaring in the countries that could
be supplying this to the EU. The technology exists to capture most of this methane (the main
component of natural gas) in a sustainable and economical way. The EU stands ready to provide
technical assistance to partners to set up such mutually beneficial “You collect/we buy”
schemes.
The EU will also convene partners such as the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank to create incentives
for the rapid collection of wasted fossil gases, including methane, bundling those losses intomeaningful products that can be sold to international buyers.
The EU’s diversification effort takes place against the backdrop of growing global demand andhigh prices of LNG. These actions must take into account the interests of global partners.
Considering the medium-term evolution of the energy mix in the EU and in partner countries,
the EU will promote broader energy partnerships, combining gas cooperation with longterm energy cooperation on hydrogen, renewable gases (including biomethane) and other green
energy sources to avoid stranded assets and ensure the green transition.
EU energy policy will also aim to ensure open, flexible, liquid and well-functioning global LNG
markets, engaging both with the major producer (US, Australia, Qatar, Nigeria, Egypt etc.) andconsumer (China, Japan, Korea) countries. G7, G20, International Energy Agency (IEA) andother international fora provide opportunities for that.
Key actions


ensure the rapid operationalisation of the EU Energy Platform and its regional
platforms;
fully implement the Joint Statements with the US and Canada;
negotiate political commitments with existing or new gas suppliers to increase gasdeliveries to Europe;
set up ‘You collect/we buy’ natural gas and methane capture and trade schemes.

2.2. Preparing the EU for renewable hydrogen trade
The REPowerEU plan sets out that an additional 15 million tonnes (mt) of renewable hydrogen– on top of the 5.6 mt already planned under the Fit for 55 initiative – can replace approximately
27 bcm of imported Russian gas by 2030. This includes 10 mt of imported hydrogen.
The capacity to produce renewable hydrogen is much more evenly distributed across the world
than oil and gas reserves given global wind and solar resources. However, this market has yet

4

46 bcm/a is the baseline IEA estimate based on best practice assumptions.

4－ 105 －

to be developed and requires, globally, a significant expansion of renewable production and theavailability of water.
In order to facilitate imports of 10 million tonnes of hydrogen into the EU, the European
Commission aims to conclude hydrogen partnerships with reliable partner countries to ensure
open and undistorted trade and investment relations for renewable and low carbon fuels. It
envisages three major hydrogen import corridors from the North Sea region (Norway andUK), the Southern Mediterranean and Ukraine, as soon as conditions allow.

International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA): Technical potential for producing green hydrogen under USD 1.5/kg by
2050, in EJ

A region with a particularly high potential to generate renewable hydrogen is the southern
Mediterranean. To create win-win opportunities for both the region and the EU, the European
Commission is working on a Mediterranean Green Hydrogen Partnership between the EU andcountries in the southern Mediterranean. This work builds upon the existing new Agenda for
the Mediterranean and its Economic and Investment Plan and will start with the EU-Egypt
Hydrogen Partnership. This would be the first stepping stone for broader renewable hydrogencooperation between Europe, Africa and the Gulf, another area of abundant resources for
producing hydrogen.
When implemented with local social, economic and environmental needs in mind, cooperationin this field would promote local production and consumption of renewable electricity andrenewable hydrogen and the development of green industry value chains in partner countries.
The EU’s regulatory framework for hydrogen should ensure a level playing field for imported
and domestically produced hydrogen.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, South Africa and Namibia are already advancing in developing theirrenewable hydrogen sector and have attracted the interest of EU industry. Enhanced
cooperation on renewable hydrogen is also part of the EU’s bilateral engagement with countries
5－ 106 －

like Egypt and Morocco, where the European Commission has launched work on an EUMorocco Green Partnership.
Work is also on-going on a strategic partnership with Ukraine on renewable gases,
including hydrogen and biomethane, with a view to scale it up significantly once the conditions
allow.
In our immediate neighbourhood, the EU stands ready to support network development throughthe reviewed Trans-European Networks for Energy Regulation (TEN-E)5. Projects with nonEU countries that contribute significantly to the TEN-E objectives can get the status of Projectsof Mutual Interest, a label indicating joint projects in electricity transmission, hydrogentransport and CO2 network and storage facilities that meet exacting EU safety standards. In
parallel, investments will be necessary to ensure the shipping capacity and logistics to transport
this commodity.
The nascent global hydrogen market must be based on common rules, in particular for
standards, certification and good regulatory practice, in terms of infrastructure access and trade.
The EU regulatory framework for hydrogen is the most advanced worldwide. Based on thisexperience, the EU should lead efforts for developing a solid framework for a global rulesbased and transparent hydrogen market. This process should take into account lessons learnedin gas and oil markets so that these new energy goods can flow freely across borders, thereby
strengthening our energy security as we transition away from fossil fuels.To kick-start the
global renewable hydrogen market, the EU considers the development of a Global European
Hydrogen Facility, as reflected in the REPowerEU Chapeau Communication.
Key actions:








conclude hydrogen partnerships, notably in the EU’s neighbourhood and Africa,
to facilitate the import of 10 million tonnes of hydrogen by 2030 and thedevelopment of local hydrogen markets;
sign a Memorandum of Cooperation on Hydrogen with Japan by the end of 2022;
promote a global rules-based and transparent hydrogen market based on EU’s
experience;
initiate the first trading hubs for renewable hydrogen in Europe and establishingit as the benchmark for Euro denominated transactions in hydrogen;establisha Strategic Partnership with Ukraine on renewable gases in 2022;
develop a Global European Hydrogen Facility.

2.3. Reducing dependency on Russian energy imports other than gas
Shipping 8 million barrels daily, Russia is the world’s largest oil exporter. Its invasion of
Ukraine has therefore created turmoil and uncertainty on the global oil market, with prices
occasionally coming close to the all-time high of USD 150 per barrel.

5

Trans-European Networks for Energy Regulation

6－ 107 －

As a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, market volatility and tightness is likely to continue
and impacts not only the EU, but all oil consumers across the world, especially the mostvulnerable. The EU is working with its international partners to ensure that sufficient oil
supplies remain available globally and at affordable prices. Together with the G7 group ofenergy ministers, the EU calls for oil-producing countries to look into increasing deliveries to
the global market using to the full the available spare capacity.
In this context, the full and effective implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action would facilitate the entry of available Iranian oil supplies into the market easing supply
pressure and price volatility. The Communication on the Strategic Partnership with the Gulf,
published in parallel with this strategy, lays out the EU’s approach to strengthening its
relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council countries rich in oil resources.
At the same time, IEA members have unanimously agreed to draw on emergency stocks torelease 120 million barrels, the largest stock release in IEA history. This has shown theimportance of emergency stocks as a shock absorber. While the decisions on the release ofstocks are a Member State competence, the experience with the IEA collective processdemonstrates the usefulness of the EU taking a coordination role, should additional releases
become necessary.
The EU decided to stop all imports of coal from Russia, as part of its fifth sanctions package in
April 2022. To cope with the crisis in the short term, this means replacing 44 to 56 million
tonnes of coal annually, largely by importing. In the longer term, coal will be phased out in theEU, in most countries by 2030. With the adoption of the EU embargo on Russian coal, prices
in the EU increased around 15% to EUR 325 per tonne, but major difficulties with the coalsupply are not expected with end of April prices returning to pre-embargo level.
Diversification of fuel supplies for nuclear power plants is an important strand of work assome EU Member States are still fully dependent on Russian nuclear fuel. The EU will assist
nuclear utilities in expediting the licensing process of alternative fuel for the Russian design
VVER reactors6 and work with international nuclear organisations such as International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) and Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) under the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to build up cooperation in the area of
security of supply. Work with partners such as Canada is already ongoing.
Key actions:

work with G7, G20 and other international fora as well as bilaterally with relevant
countries to ensure well supplied and well-functioning oil markets;
continue the dialogue with the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries(OPEC) to ensure stability and affordability on the oil market;
coordinate the EU response to the pressure on oil markets, including potential oilstock releases as part of IEA joint action or EU’s reaction to supply disruptions;

6 The Russian abbreviation VVER stands for “water-water energetic reactor”.

7－ 108 －



accelerate the diversification of fuel supply for nuclear power plants, including incooperation with EURATOM7.

2.4. Prioritising energy savings and efficiency
As the EU moves away from Russian energy supply, it will prioritise energy savings andefficiency, aiming to achieve a 5% reduction in oil and gas demand in the short term. This will
decrease the price and demand pressure on the global markets. The EU will also work withinternational partners to make energy savings and efficiency a global priority. Together withother developed economies, the EU will in particular focus on reducing energy consumption,
among other things building on the IEA Playing My Part campaign.
Energy efficiency has numerous environmental, social and economic benefits. In the IEA’s net
zero scenario, the global economy grows by 40% by 2030, but uses 7% less primary energy andthe solutions for that are already today technically ready, cost-efficient and available for all
sectors. The highest saving potentials can be realised in the heating and cooling of public andprivate buildings. Additional major energy savings can be gained from more efficient processes,
the circular economy transition and transport, as well as from more efficient appliances, bothin homes (such as heat pumps) and industry.

IEA: Doubling the rate of energy intensity improvements over the next decade helps reduce energy demand by 95 EJ

The EU has developed regulatory, legislative, standard-setting and labelling experience thatcan be a source of inspiration for many countries. The EU will promote these standards andpractices internationally, while acknowledging the specific circumstances of its partners.
7 A new action will be included in the amendment of EURATOM work program 2021-2022 to increase the EU’s security ofsupply through researching alternative fuel sourced from outside of Russia for Russian-designed reactors in the EU andUkraine.

8－ 109 －

Mobilising large capital investments from both the public and the private sector is also crucial.
The EU best practices on energy efficiency financing can be shared and scaled up, in close
cooperation with the financial institutions and international partners.
The case of stopping methane leakages shows that energy saving measures can come at negative
abatement costs: up to 70% of methane emissions from oil, gas and coal sectors can be stopped
using today’s technology, and almost half of them at a profit or at no cost8.
The European Commission has already adopted an EU Methane Strategy9 and a legislative
proposal to tackle methane emissions that have a clear international dimension. Internationally,
the EU established jointly with the US the Global Methane Pledge10. Participant countries
commit to reducing their collective methane emissions by at least 30% from 2020 levels by2030. Over 110 countries have already joined this pledge, representing about half of global
man-made methane emissions.
Key actions:work with partners to make energy efficiency and savings a global
priority;
support the global transition to more circular economy to reduce energy
consumption;
facilitate the availability of and the access to finance for energy efficiency andsaving investments;
implement the Global Methane Pledge (GMP) and the external dimension of the
EU methane strategy.

3. Supporting partners impacted by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
The Russian military aggression in all its dimensions is producing alarming systemic, knockon effects on the global economy which is already battered by the COVID-19 pandemic andclimate change, with particularly dramatic impacts on developing countries.
Recent projections by UNCTAD11 estimate that the global economy will be a full percentage
point of GDP growth lower than expected due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which is severely
disrupting already tight food, energy and financial markets.12 Commodity prices are reachingrecord highs: crude oil prices have increased by around 60%, gas and fertilizers have more thandoubled, and food prices are 34% higher than this time last year.
Recent United Nations assessments indicate that one third of 1.7 billion people already living
in poverty are set to be exposed to disruptions in food, energy and finance systems13. As a result,

8

The IEA estimates “that it is technically possible to avoid around three quarters of today’s methane emissions from global
oil and gas operations. Even more significantly, around 40% of current methane emissions could be avoided at no net cost”.
9 EU strategy to reduce methane emissions, COM/2020/663
10 Global Methane Pledge
11 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2022) Trade and Development Report 2021, March update
12 United Nations - Global impact of war in Ukraine on food, energy and finance systems, April 2022
13 United Nations - Global Crisis Response Group9－ 110 －

many developing countries will lose further economic ground, while their vulnerability isheightened by rising geopolitical tensions and deepening economic uncertainty.
Acknowledging this impact, the European Union will make use of all existing instruments
to continue supporting developing economies, particularly in Africa and the EU’s
neighbourhood, to recover from the COVID-19 pandemic and achieve an inclusive andsustainable growth, while building economic resilience that is necessary to address these shocks
and the climate change crisis. The EU’s efforts to support a global just and green energy
transition, outlined in chapter 4, are central to this work. The EU will monitor and address theimpact of Russia’s aggression on partners through bilateral and multilateral engagement andwork towards a united global response.
3.1. Repowering Ukraine’s energy system and cooperating with close neighbourhood
Since the start of Russia’s military aggression, helping Ukraine and other nations directly
affected by the war has been a central part of the EU’s energy policy. The EU work has focusedon ensuring uninterruped energy supplies and nuclear safety in Ukraine. The emergency
electricity grid synchronisation with Ukraine and Moldova is a major step towards ensuring
security of supply. The next political priority is to allow for electrcity trade with the EU basedon gradual increases of tradable capacity.
Reverse flows already today allow to bring gas from Slovakia and Hungary to Ukraine.
Opening the EU platform for common purchases of gas, LNG and hydrogen to Ukraine,
Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkans is as well a clear signal of support. Damaged energy
equipment in Ukraine is repaired by chanelling specialised energy equipment from Member
States to Ukraine via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Items Members States cannot deliverare procured via the Energy Support Fund for Ukraine established by the Energy Community.
To allow for future full integration of Ukraine’s energy market, the EU is providing technicalsupport to ensure market reforms. The reforms will also allow for better integration ofrenewable energy and aligment with the EU’s climate ambition. This work is taking place inthe framework of the Association Agrement, and under the EU-Ukraine StrategicPartnership. The Energy Community and the newly establised Ukraine Energy Task Forceplay an important role in this work.
Nuclear safety remains a major priority, in particular following Russia’s reckless behaviourat the Ukrainian nuclear sites. The EU is fully aligned with the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s effort to ensure the safety of Ukrainian nuclear facilities at all times. The EU
mobilises its European Instrument for International Nuclear Safety Cooperation to addressurgent needs and restore nuclear safety to comply with the international legal framework andpursues the long standing support to the Ukrainian regulatory authority. It stands ready to assist
in the reconstruction of the necessary nuclear safety capacity.

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Looking to the future, the EU has set out its approach to longer-term reconstruction frameworkin the Ukraine Relief and Reconstruction Communication.14 The EU will work with Ukraine toprepare the REPowerUkraine initiative, to ‘rebuild better’ the Ukrainian energy system, withthe aim to decarbonise Ukraine’s energy sector thus ensuring Ukraine’s energy independence.
The focus should be on energy efficiency, renewables, renewable hydrogen, biomethane andfuture-proof infrastructure. The EU will support this process both financially and technically.
With the Western Balkans, the EU will continue supporting the region’s Green Agenda andenergy independence, promoting reforms that take the region forward on their European path.
The Energy Community, with the support from the European Commission, is working todetermine the energy and climate targets for 2030. This will send the right investment signals
and ensure political commitment to coal phase-out and energy transition in general.
Implementation of the key legal acts adopted by the Energy Community in November 2021
will allow for a better integration of renewables, storage and demand side response.
The EU will propose to fully integrate the Western Balkans into the EU internal electricity
market in order to enable the change to renewable energy production and the decarbonisationof energy supply in South-East Europe. The progressive introduction of carbon pricing could
contribute to greater alignment with the EU.
Key actions:

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





support the repair and reconstruction of energy infrastructure in Ukraine;increase cross-border capacity to enable electricity trading;facilitate the reverse flow of gas to Ukraine via the Slovak Republic, Hungary and
Poland and to Moldova and Ukraine via Romania (Trans Balkan pipeline);
invite Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and the Western Balkan countries to participate
in the EU’s voluntary gas purchasing scheme;
accelerate the domestic reforms and energy flagships of the Economic andInvestment Plans for the Western Balkans and Eastern Partnership, adjusted tothe current situation, to speed up renewables’ deployment, ensure a green energy
transition and help reduce dependency on Russian gas;take advantage of the Energy Community framework to encourage ambitious
energy and climate targets and market reforms, as well as to boost renewables andenergy efficiency;
launch the REPowerUkraine initiative to ensure energy supply and rebuilding the
Ukrainian energy sector after the war.

4. Leading and accelerating the global green and just energy transition
The green energy transition is crucial for limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees, for boosting
growth, providing opportunities and improving living conditions across the globe, as well as

14

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Ukraine relief and reconstruction, COM/2022/233.

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mitigating price and energy security risks. Following the 1.5 degree scenario would mean 2.3%
more GDP growth until 2030 than with business-as-usual and 85 million new energytransition related jobs15.
The EU is committed to leading and speeding up the global green transition and supporting
its international partners in the process. This includes working together on renewable energy,
energy efficiency and savings, on the circular economy, green growth, natural resource
protection, critical raw materials, clean technologies and future-proof infrastructure.
The European Commission and the EU High Representative have launched the Global
Gateway, a new European strategy to boost smart, clean and secure links in digital, energy andtransport sectors and to strengthen health, education and research systems across the world, inline with the UN’s 2030 Agenda and the Paris Agreement. The Global Gateway – including astrong push for the green energy transition – will be delivered through a Team Europe
approach, bringing together the EU and its Member States with their financial and development
institutions, including the EIB and the EBRD in order to leverage up to EUR 300 billion of
investment in 2021-2027.
The EU supports the global green transition also through its climate finance. 30% of the EU’s
development aid envelope is channelled into tackling climate change, including in the energy
sector. The EU is arguably the largest contributor to the global commitment of the mostdeveloped nations to provide annually USD 100 bln for climate finance and will continue toengage other partners to follow suit.
To succeed, the green transition must be just and socially fair. Especially in the context ofslow recovery, economic turbulence and the global consequences of Russian aggression against
Ukraine, the social aspects of reshaping the energy systems must be central to the transition.
This is a priority for the EU and an integral part of our external energy policy. On the one hand,
it means reducing the social and economic impact of phasing out fossil fuels (in particular coal)and on the other, offering new opportunities via green technologies (chapter 4.1), while tacklingissues like energy access, fossil fuel subsidies, skills development and distributional effects ofthe transition.
While coal is not the only fossil fuel, it is the most polluting one and responsible for 40% of theworld’s greenhouse gas emissions. It is therefore at the heart of EU’s just transition efforts that
focus in particular on the biggest coal-consuming countries.
In follow-up to COP26, the EU, together with its Member States France and Germany as wellas its international partners, the US and the UK, is implementing a just transition partnershipwith South Africa with a budget of USD 8.5 billion to accelerate the decarbonisation of theeconomy with the emphasis on the coal phase-out and minimising the country’s social
adaptation costs. The EU is exploring the possibility to conclude just transition partnerships
with other partners like Vietnam, Indonesia and India.

15 World Energy Transitions Outlook: 1.5°C Pathway

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In line with China’s stated ambitions to reduce its dependence on coal and make progress
towards its goal to become carbon neutral by 2060, the EU-China Energy Cooperation Platform(ECECP) and the annual high-level EU-China Energy Dialogue focus on carbon markets,energy systems, renewable energy, energy efficiency and business cooperation. The EU has
also established labour and social policy dialogues with India, China and Southernneighbourhood within the Union for Mediterranean Regional Platform on Employment andLabour. The EU also provides support for the phase out of coal in the Western Balkans andUkraine via its ‘Coal Regions in Transition’ initiative.
Key actions:

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

accelerate the global green energy transition by facilitating sustainable
investments and connectivity through Global Gateway;collaborate on just transition and coal phase-out with the EU partner countries,
including in the EU’s neighbourhood;work to ensure the global commitment of USD 100 bln annually for climate financeand use the EU contribution to support the green, just transition;
implement the joint energy transition partnership with South Africa and explore
the scope to forge other global partnerships along this model;
implement the ‘Coal Regions in Transition’ initiative in Ukraine and Western
Balkans;align and implement global initiatives to end fossil fuel subsidies and engage withcountries heavily reliant on coal-fired power to achieve this;work with IEA, IRENA and ILO to further a just and inclusive transition globally.

4.1. Promoting renewable technologies and energy efficiency in partner countries
Electricity based on wind and solar is now the cheapest power option in most regions of theworld. In a 1.5 degree world, renewables could represent 90% of the global energy production
by 2050. Global markets will be worth an estimated EUR 24 trillion for renewable energy and
EUR 33 trillion for energy efficiency up to 205016. This represents a major opportunity for theworld’s economy.
The rise of renewable energy will change the dynamics of the global energy system. Whilehydrocarbon resources were concentrated in a few countries, every nation has the potential todevelop renewables and participate in energy trade. Today, around 80% of the world population
lives in countries that are net energy importers. This is set to change.
The EU, which represents 9% of global emissions, has a strong interest in prompting theuptake of renewable energy and improving energy efficiency across the world. To
accelerate the roll-out of photovoltaics, the European Commission is publishing a European
Solar Strategy17 together with the present strategy.

16 IRENA, Global energy transformation: a roadmap to 2050, 201917

European Solar Strategy, COM/2022/221

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The efficient roll-out of renewable energy sources and increasing energy efficiency requires awider ‘system approach’ that factors in electricity production, transmission and consumption
as a whole. Installing renewable energy capacity is most effective where it is integrated into
open and flexible regional markets. The EU has been a first mover in creating a large integrated
energy market and our experience can help international partners to accelerate their transition.
Many countries in the Western Balkans, Eastern Partnership and Southern Neighbourhood are
gradually increasing the use of renewable energy in their region. Countries like India andMorocco have already set themselves ambitious targets for renewables deployment,
implemented and further strengthened under the EU-India Clean Energy and Climate
Partnership and the EU-Morocco-Green-Partnership. Similar work is ongoing in ourpartnership with China (including on Emissions Trading Systems based on the EU system).
Fair and reciprocal energy cooperation with Africa is an important priority, both to ensure
energy access to 570 million people currently without electricity in sub-Saharan Africa, but also
to support investments in sustainable energy systems and renewable hydrogen trade, once local
needs are covered. By 2030, the African Green Energy Initiative aims to support the
deployment of at least 50 GW of renewable electricity, providing at least 100 million people
with electricity access. In order to achieve this goal, leveraging private sector investments will
be key.
Under the Global Gateway initiative, the EU will mobilise EUR 2.4 billion in grants for
sub-Saharan Africa and EUR 1.08 billion for North Africa to support renewable energy,
energy efficiency, the just transition and the greening of local value chains. This will also
support the African Union Green Recovery Action Plan which seeks to increase the renewableenergy generation capacity by at least an additional 300 GW by 2030.
The acceleration of renewables uptake worldwide also presents an opportunity to strengthen
trade relations. To develop their home-grown renewables potential, most countries in theworld require access to innovative technologies, knowledge and capital and the EU green techindustry is well positioned to be a partner in those efforts. Half of the world’s wind power comesfrom turbines manufactured in Europe. EU companies are leaders in important segments of thephotovoltaic, hydrogen and heat pump industries and are catching up with Asia on battery
technologies, thanks to the European Battery Alliance.
In order to thrive and to grow further, the green tech industry needs to be able to rely on a stable
regulatory framework, fair competition, sufficient investments, and a fiscal level playing
field – this is equally important and beneficial for the EU and local actors. External energy
policy must work hand in hand with the EU industrial and trade policy, ensuring market accessfor our industry and addressing challenges via the Free Trade Agreements and enforcement
action.
Developing business to business relations requires constant attention: the business networking
events organised under the EU and US Energy Council, most recently on offshore wind, is a14
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model to be replicated. Across Asia (for example in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan) havebeen set up to offer new business opportunities to EU green tech companies.
De-risking and credit export instruments are also key to enable entry into new markets. The EU
clean tech companies increasingly compete with foreign companies that receive direct financial
support from their governments. The Commission will develop an EU strategy for export
credits benefitting green tech companies to improve the level playing field for the EU
businesses in non-EU country markets. The Commission is also seeking to amend OECD rules
to provide further incentive for export credit support for climate-friendly technologies.
Key actions:

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accelerate the roll-out of renewables and energy efficiency across the world,
including in Western Balkans, Africa, the Mediterranean and the Indo-Pacific;
implement the mutually beneficial EU-Africa-Green Energy Initiative;
support the green transition in Central Asia through a Regional Team Europe
Initiative on environment/energy/water;increase the roll-out of renewable energy in cities and rural municipalities, forexample through the Urban Transition mission of Mission Innovation;
advance clean technologies in the context of the Trade and Technology Council(TTC) with the US;
develop an EU export credit strategy.

4.2. Cooperating on research and technology
Many of the technologies needed to achieve full decarbonisation of the global economy are notyet mature or competitive with fossil fuel based heat and power. International cooperation isessential to increase the speed of green energy innovation and roll-out, while lowering theircost, in particular for renewable energy and hydrogen. Other key research areas for an
innovation-driven transition include the development of smart, cyber secure and flexible
power grids, long-duration energy storage, sustainable raw materials, small modular
reactors and sustainable fuels for industry and transport.
Since renewable energy and hydrogen will not be able to substitute all fossil fuels in the energy
mix, carbon removals will also be needed, in particular in industrial sectors where electrificationor hydrogen-based options are not cost-effective. The EU will cooperate with its neighbours
and other countries to bring to global markets innovative zero-consumption energy efficiency
solutions, as well as technologies such as carbon-capture utilisation and storage (CCUS) .
The EU will continue supporting international cooperation and multilateral initiatives in linewith its global approach to research and innovation18. The Commission will provide resources
for international cooperation from Horizon Europe, the EU’s public financing programme forresearch and innovation. The EU will also reinforce engagement with major international

18 Communication on the Global Approach to Research and Innovation, COM/2021/252 final

15－ 116 －

initiatives, like Mission Innovation and the Clean Energy Ministerial, to develop together thegreen energy solutions of the future.
Key actions:develop CO2 sequestration and storage techniques to market maturity, including
in cooperation with Norway;
continue the Long-Term Joint EU-African Union Research and Innovation
Partnership on Renewable Energy and extending its scope to renewable hydrogen.

4.3. Ensuring access to critical raw materials
While the EU is determined to end its dependence on Russian energy, it is equally determined
to avoid new dependencies in the future. As demand for fossil fuels decreases, increased
demand for raw materials, including rare earths and metals could lead to new supply challenges
in the course of the energy transition. According to the Critical Raw Materials in Technologies
and Sectors foresight study, the demand for critical raw materials needed in the low-carbon
energy sector and their costs will increase significantly by 2050. The EU depends in this sector
primarily on rare earths, lithium, magnesium, niobium, germanium, borates and scandium,some of which cannot be procured domestically.19
To continue advancing on its energy transition, EU companies will need to source thesematerials in tight commodity markets or substitute them in the longer term through newindustrial processes. Potential remedies to minimise the EU’s future dependence in this strategicarea include further diversifying global supply chains, prioritising energy efficiency measures,
incentivising long-term investments in new mining and refining activities inside the EU as well
as stepping up circularity efforts to ensure that materials are retained in the economy for as longas possible and that waste is recycled.
The Commission will intensify work on the supply of critical raw materials and prepare alegislative proposal. This initiative will aim to strengthen the European value chain through theidentification of mineral resources and of raw materials projects in the European strategicinterest, while ensuring a high level of environmental protection.20
The EU has already established Sustainable Raw Material Value Chain Partnerships with
Canada and Ukraine. To diversify its supply chains further, the Commission is working towards
establishing additional mutually beneficial raw material value chain partnerships in Africa(e.g. Namibia), Latin America, Western Balkans and with Australia, via trade agreements
or Memoranda of Understanding.
At least in the medium term, access to well-diversified supplies from international markets will
be key to ensure resilience. EU trade policy plays a key role in this regard, by ensuring open
access to supplies and by avoiding market distortions through development and implementation
19 Critical Raw Materials in Technologies and Sectors foresight, 2020

20

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, the European
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: REPowerEU Plan, COM/2022/230.

16－ 117 －

of trade agreements. The Energy and Raw Materials Chapters on EU Free Trade Agreements(FTAs) have a central role in this.
Key actions:

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establish mutually beneficial raw material value chain partnerships, beyond
Ukraine and Canada;
strengthen cooperation on raw materials value chains with Norway under the
EU-Norway Green Alliance;
reinforce the use of EU economic and trade policy tools to ensure undistorted
access to international markets;
promote global resource efficiency and circularity, notably through productdesign measures21;
work with international organisations such as the OECD, the IEA and IRENA
on supply chains for critical raw materials used in the energy transition.

5. Laying the foundations of the new global energy system
5.1. Strengthening established alliances, building new partnerships
The new global energy system does not mean simply replacing fossil fuels with renewables, itwill be fundamentally and structurally different from today’s. Collaboration and partnerships
will be key to how it functions. As the EU strives to make the global green transition a reality,
it will reach out, listen to and work with the entire world.

IRENA: Shifts in the value of trade in energy commodities, 2020 to 2050

The EU will continue to work in tandem with the US, with whom the priorities are wellaligned across the full energy policy spectrum. Through the EU-US Energy Council and in
21 Overview of EU measures to make sustainable products the norm in the EU

17－ 118 －

international fora, EU will endeavour to affect positive change on the global energy landscape.
The energy relationship with Canada has significantly accelerated, building on the existing
High-Level Energy Dialogue.
Both the Eastern and the Southern Neighbourhood will continue to be crucial for the EU.
The energy relations with Eastern Partnership countries will need to be reinforced and reviewed,
while remaining focused on sustainable energy security and the green energy transition,
following the commitments at the 6th Eastern Partnership Summit in December 2021. The
resilience, energy security and green transition of Ukraine, Moldova and Western Balkans
are linked to the EU’s and therefore a central priority. Cooperation with Turkey should
continue on decarbonisation, to ensure alignment of the Turkish legal framework with the EU
acquis, including through the Turkish Investment Platform.
In the Southern Neighbourhood, a common Mediterranean energy policy should be developed
based on the Union for the Mediterranean Ministerial Declaration adopted in June 2021. The
EU will support regional cooperation in the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean region onenergy transition and to unleash the renewable energy potential. The EU will continue to pursue
cooperation on decarbonisation including on methane emissions with all fossil fuel suppliers in
the region, such as Egypt, Israel and Algeria.
Africa is a key partner for the EU. In addition to the cooperation policy objectives, stronger
trade and investment engagement with African countries is expected as they are increasingly
becoming fast growing markets for green energy technologies. African countries can also
contribute to the EU’s energy security, today with oil and LNG supplies, and in future throughgreen hydrogen and renewable fuels as well as raw materials critical to the green energy
transition.
The EU will continue to work with partners like Norway, Japan, Australia, Chile, United
Kingdom and others on energy transition and mutually relevant priorities. The EU is currently
negotiating a FTA with Australia. As a significant future producer of green hydrogen,strengthening energy links should be a priority. Chile is also expected to become a large
producer of green hydrogen in the future, as well as supplying critical raw materials such aslithium.
As part of the EU-India Clean Energy and Climate Partnership, the EU will intensify its
energy cooperation with India in support of accelerating the local roll-out of renewables andthe rapid decarbonisation of its industry. The EU will support joint activities in the areas ofoffshore wind and solar energy and their integration through smart grids.
The EU is continuing to further work with China on de-carbonisation, power market reform
and to render the energy system more effective and efficient. Cooperation will focus onemission trading systems, electricity systems, grid-modelling, financing of energy efficiency
and business cooperation.

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As laid out in the Joint Communication on the Gulf22, the EU will work closely with Gulf
countries to promote the green energy transition, including investments in the Southern
Neighbourhood. In order to better structure its cooperation with the Gulf, the Commission
proposed to hold annual ministerial meetings on the green transition complemented by related
private sector initiatives.
Central Asia is a key region rich in resources. Building upon the region’s potential in solar,
wind and hydroelectric energy, the EU will encourage Central Asia’s reforms of the energy
sector and transition to a low-carbon economy, as well as cooperation on critical raw materials
with countries such as Kazakhstan.
5.2. Geopolitics and global energy architecture
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is a stark reminder that the world is marked by major geopoliticaland economic power rivalries. If not counterbalanced, relations between major powers could
become increasingly confrontational and unilateralist, leading to competing visions andagendas.
The global green energy transition can support the EU in achieving its broader
geopolitical objectives to reinforce resilience and open strategic autonomy. The European
Commission and the High Representative will promote EU’s energy objectives by reinforcing
the role of energy diplomacy in the foreign and security policy. This will require strengthening
monitoring mechanisms, foresight and assessment of the strategic implications of the global
energy transition on partner countries.
Effectively addressing the challenges of the global energy transition requires trust andcooperation within the international community. The EU will step up its multilateral action in
support of EU objectives and global commitments based on the principles of rules-based andeffective multilateralism set out in the 2021 Joint Communication on strengthening the EU’s
contribution to rules-based multilateralism23. Enhanced partnerships within the UN, G20 andG7, and closer cooperation with International Financing Institutions are necessary.
Multilateral energy organisations and forums such as the IRENA, the IEA, the Energy
Community, the International Solar Alliance, the Clean Energy Ministerial and Mission
Innovation, the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy, all have a key
responsibility in promoting the energy transition globally. Some organisations, such as theEnergy Charter, are in urgent need of deep modernisation in order to align them with the 2050
goals, and the EU is actively addressing this. If sufficient reform of the Energy Charter Treaty
cannot be achieved, the EU will consider withdrawing its membership.
The EU will continue to support a more inclusive representation of emerging and developing
economies in international institutions. The EU together with its Member States as part of a
22 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on a Strategic Partnership with the Gulf,(JOIN/13/2/2022)
23 Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council on strengthening the EU’s contribution to rules-based
multilateralism, (JOIN/2021/3 final)

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Team Europe approach will increasingly contribute to leadership and inclusive decision shaping
through greater participation in governing bodies of relevant organisations. The EU should also
weigh up the benefits of upgrading its collective presence to a full membership in the energy
fora considered key and strategic for advancing the European Green Deal and this Strategy.
Furthermore, the EU will reinforce cooperation within multilateral and regional organisations
and seek closer engagement with the Union for the Mediterranean, the African Union and its
agencies, the Latin American Energy Organisation (OLADE) or the Association of South-East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) to address common challenges and work together at the international
level.
Key actions:regularly monitor the geopolitical impact of the green transition;
initiate a review of the EU’s engagement in international energy fora key forthe global energy transition;
step up energy diplomacy in the EU and Member States’ foreign policy.

6. Conclusion
This is a critical time for the global energy policy. Climate change, geopolitical shifts,
technological developments and increased global energy demand create a challenging and fastchanging environment that require our energy systems and relations to adapt.
Adding to that, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has far-reaching consequences for the energy
security of not only the EU, but the entire world. Russia’s actions have triggered unprecedented
price volatility on the energy markets and underlined the need for partnerships based on trustand shared long-term goals.
The green energy transition is the only way to simultaneously ensure sustainable, secureand affordable energy worldwide. To be successful, that transition must be socially just andfair, leaving no-one behind. It means not only phasing out fossil fuels and outdated practices,
but phasing in green energy, innovative technology, better markets and circular economy. It
requires tackling already now the potential future risks and dependencies.
The transition is an opportunity for the EU and its partners to build together a new energy
system that is more sustainable, more equal and more collaborative. This communicationlays out the EU’s strategy to reach that goal.

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EN

EN
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1.

SOLAR ENERGY TO REPOWER EUROPE

Massive, rapid deployment of renewable energy is at the core of the REPowerEU plan - the EU
initiative to put an end to its dependency from Russian fossil fuels. Solar energy will be the
kingpin of this effort. Panel by panel, the infinite energy of the sun will help reduce ourdependence on fossil fuels across all sectors of our economy, from residential heating toindustrial processes.
As part of the REPowerEU plan, this strategy aims to bring online over 320 GW of solar
photovoltaic by 2025 (more than doubling compared to 2020) and almost 600 GW by 20301.
These frontloaded additional capacities displace the consumption of 9 bcm of natural gas
annually by 2027.
Solar energy has a number of advantages that make it particularly suitable to meet today’s
energy challenges.
Solar photovoltaics (PV) and solar thermal technologies can be rolled-out rapidly and reward
citizens and businesses with benefits for the climate and their purses.
This is because solar energy costs have decreased spectacularly over time. The EU’s renewableenergy policies helped bring PV costs down by 82% over the last decade2, turning it into oneof the most competitive source of electricity in the EU. Solar energy, combined with energy
efficiency, protects European citizens from the volatility of fossil fuel prices.
EU citizens appreciate this autonomy to produce their own energy, either individually orcollectively. It is a huge opportunity for whole cities and regions, especially those transitioning
to a new energy and economic model. The solar sector not only creates renewable electricity
and heat; it also creates jobs, new business models and start-ups.
Massive deployment of solar energy is also a chance to reinforce the EU’s industrial leadership.
By creating the right framework conditions, the EU can expand its manufacturing base, building
on its vibrant competitive and innovation-driven environment while ensuring that solar products
are up to the EU consumer’s high standards.
The EU Solar Energy Strategy outlines a comprehensive vision to swiftly reap the benefits ofsolar energy, and presents four initiatives to overcome the remaining challenges in the shortterm.
First, by promoting quick and massive PV deployment via the European Solar Rooftops
Initiative.
Second, by making permitting procedures shorter and simpler. The Commission willaddress this issue through the adoption of a legislative proposal, a recommendation and a
guidance alongside this communication.
Third, by ensuring the availability of an abundant skilled workforce to face up the challenge of
producing and deploying solar energy all across the EU. In line with the call for stakeholders
to establish an EU large-scale skills partnership for onshore renewable energy under the Pact
1
2

All values on electricity generation capacity refer to alternating current (AC).
See IRENA Data Centre
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for Skills, as part of the REPowerEU plan, this strategy will set out its relevance for the solar
energy sector3. This partnership will bring together all relevant stakeholders to take action on
upskilling and reskilling to fill the gap.
Fourth, by launching a European Solar PV Industry Alliance that aims to facilitate
innovation-led expansion of a resilient industrial solar value chain in the EU, in particular in
the PV manufacturing sector.

2.

ACCELERATING SOLAR ENERGY DEPLOYMENTSolar PV is one of the cheapest source of electricity available4. The cost of solar electricity was
already well below wholesale electricity prices before the 2021 surge in prices. This advantage
has become even more relevant now in the face of the crisis. Solar electricity and heat are key
for phasing out EU’s dependence on Russian natural gas. Large-scale deployment of PVs will
reduce our reliance on natural gas used to produce power. Solar heat and solar power combinedwith heat pumps can replace natural gas boilers for heating in residential or commercial spaces.
Solar energy in the form of electricity, heat or hydrogen can replace natural gas consumption
in industrial processes.
By the end of 2020, the EU reached 136 GW of solar PV installed generation capacity, having
added more than 18 GW that year. It delivered around 5% of total EU electricity generation5.
To reach the 2030 target for renewables proposed by the Commission and the objectives of the
REPowerEU plan, we need to radically step up a gear. Over this decade, the EU will need to
install, on average, approximately 45 GW per year.
Solar energy systems have long been a low-cost and reliable solution for heating in many
European countries6 but overall solar heat accounts for just around 1.5% of heating needs7. To
reach the EU 2030 targets, energy demand covered by solar heat and geothermal should atleast triple.
Rooftops have been the place for most of the solar energy deployment so far, but huge untapped
potential remains. It is a low-hanging fruit and the EU and its Member States must join forces
to exploit it rapidly as much as possible, given multiple benefits for consumers.
European Solar Rooftops Initiative3

COM(2020) 274 final, 1 June 2020
Estimated at 24-42 EUR/MWh depending on the location within the EU in Eero Vartiainen, Gaëtan Masson,
Christian Breyer, David Moser, Eduardo Román Medina “Impact of weighted average cost of capital, capital
expenditure, and other parameters on future utility-scale PV levelised cost of electricity” – Estimated at 32-74
EUR/KWh depending on the location within the EU in Lugo-Laguna, D.; Arcos-Vargas, A.; Nuñez-Hernandez, F.
A European Assessment of the Solar Energy Cost: Key Factors and Optimal Technology. Sustainability 2021, 13,3238. Estimated at an average of 60 USD/MWh in the EU according to IEA World Energy Outlook 2021.
Estimated at 75-131 USD/MWh across Italy, Spain, France and Germany according to IRENA Technical Report“Renewable Power Generation Costs 2020”.
5Eurostat6
Competitiveness of the heating and cooling industry and services - Publications Office of the EU (europa.eu)
7
Solar heat accounted for 38 GWth, primarily in the form of solar heating systems for domestic hot water inresidential homes, with 1.6 GWth added in 2019. Eurostat
42－ 125 －

According to some estimates, rooftop PV could provide almost 25% of the EU’s electricity
consumption8 - this is more than the share of natural gas today. These installations – onresidential, public, commercial and industrial roofs – can shield consumers from high energy
prices, contributing to public acceptance of renewable energy. They can be deployed very
rapidly, as they utilise existing structures and avoid conflicts with other public goods like theenvironment.
The EU-wide European Solar Rooftops Initiative, announced in the Commission’s
REPowerEU Communication, aims at unlocking the vast, underutilised solar generation
potential of rooftops to make our energy cleaner, more secure and affordable. To achieve
this swiftly, immediate action is necessary by end 2022
The EU will:-

Increase its 2030 target for renewables share to 45%.

-

Limit the length of permitting for rooftop solar installations, including large ones,
to a maximum of 3 months.

-

Adopt provisions to ensure that all new buildings are “solar ready”.

-

Make the installation of rooftop solar energy compulsory for:o all new public and commercial buildings with useful floor area larger than
250 m2 by 2026;
o all existing public and commercial buildings with useful floor area larger than
250 m2 by 2027;
o all new residential buildings by 2029.

-

Ensure that its legislation is fully implemented in all Member States allowing
consumers in multi-apartment buildings to effectively exercise their right tocollective self-consumption, without undue costs9.

The EU and Member States will work together to:-

Eliminate administrative obstacles for cost-effective extensions of alreadyinstalled systems.

8
Bódis, K., Kougias, I., Jäger-Waldau, A., Taylor, N., Szabó, S.: A high-resolution geospatial assessment of therooftop solar photovoltaic potential in the European Union (2019) Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews,
114, art. no. 109309
9 Both the Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on the
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and the Directive (EU) 2019/944 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2019 on common rules for the internal market for electricity containprovisions on collective self-consumption.

3－ 126 －

-

Set up at least one renewables-based energy community in every municipality
with a population higher than 10 000 by 2025.

-

Ensure that energy poor and vulnerable consumers have access to solar energy,
e.g. through social housing installations, energy communities, or financing
support for individual installations.

-Support building-integrated PVs for both new buildings and renovations.

-

Ensure full implementation of the current provisions in the Energy Performanceof Buildings Directive (EPBD) in relation to the nearly zero-energy buildings
standard for new buildings, including through dedicated guidance.

Member States should:-

Establish robust support frameworks for rooftop systems, including in
combination with energy storage and heat-pumps, based on predictable paybacktimes that are shorter than 10 years.

-

As part of such a framework and where needed to unlock investments, set up anational support programme to ensure as of next year:-

massive deployment of rooftop solar energy, giving priority to most suitablebuildings for quick interventions (Energy Performance Certificate classes A,
B, C or D),-

combine solar deployment with roof renovations and energy storage; thisshould be implemented through a one-stop shop integrating all aspects.

The Member States should implement the measures under this initiative as a priority, using
available EU funding, in particular the new REPowerEU chapters of their Recovery and
Resilience Plans. The Commission will monitor progress in the implementation of thisinitiative on an annual basis, through the relevant fora, with the sector’s stakeholders andthe Member States.
If fully implemented, this Initiative, as part of the REPowerEU plan, will accelerate rooftop
installations and add 19 TWh of electricity after the first year of its implementation (36%more than expected in the Fit for 55 projections). By 2025, it will result in 58 TWh of
additional electricity generated (more than double the Fit for 55 projections).

Financing solar energy deployment
Solar energy technologies have relatively high upfront costs, compared to other sources ofenergy, but low operational costs. Therefore, attractive financing conditions are crucial for theircompetitive deployment. Commission analysis indicates that additional investments in solar
PVs under REPowerEU would amount to EUR 26 billion between now and 2027, on top of
the investments needed to realise the objectives of the Fit for 55 proposals.

4－ 127 －

Most of the financing will be private, but partially triggered by public funding, including fromthe EU. The Recovery and Resilience Facility already dedicated at least EUR 19 billion toaccelerate the roll-out of renewables10. Other instruments are contributing to this effort: thecohesion policy funds, InvestEU, the Innovation Fund, the Modernisation Fund, Horizon
Europe and the LIFE programme. Connecting Europe Facility RES and the EU renewableenergy financing mechanism will support cross-border cooperation on solar energy projects.
Besides dedicated energy financing programmes, Member States should also look forsynergies with transport infrastructure or research and innovation programmes, ensuring acoordinated support framework for solar energy across relevant policy areas. In addition, theyshould use specific technical support provided by the Commission to reduce their dependence
on Russian fossil fuels through the Technical Support Instrument which inter alia supports
reforms to enhance the rollout of solar energy. The new Guidelines on State aid for climate,environmental protection and energy (CEEAG)11 have introduced a set of criteria for tailoredand proportionate support to renewable energy, including solar. Among other things, thisincludes contracts for difference, technology-specific tenders or exemptions from mandatorycompetitive bidding for small projects, including certain energy community projects.
2.1.

Utility-scale deployment and enabling measures

Utility-scale installations
Utility-scale solar installations will be crucial to replace fossil fuels at the required speed. In
recent years, competitive bidding has driven growth in this segment. By 2020, 19 Member
States had carried out national-level tendering processes, also known as renewable energy
auctions12. This mechanism has contributed to drive down costs and recent years have seen
greater emphasis on auction designs which increase reliance on market-based revenues 13 .
Stable, publicly available schedules for the foreseen auctions increase visibility for project
developers and drive up investment. They should cover at least the following five years,
include the frequency of competitive tendering, the related foreseen capacity, the available
budget and the eligible technologies14.
Beyond auctions, public procurement can also be leveraged to further promote solar energy
deployment, while generating incentives to enhance the sustainability of the equipment. In
addition, aggregation of demand for solar energy from large public buyers can reduceinvestment risks and facilitate innovative business models in the solar energy sector. To thisend, the Commission will build on the Big Public Buyers initiative, proposing the creation of
a community of practice dedicated to the procurement of solar energy. This community will
share knowledge and develop best procurement practices for solar energy technologies.

10

Based on the 22 Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP) adopted by the Council of the EU and the two RRPs of
Sweden and Bulgaria endorsed by the Commission on 29 March 2022 and 7 April 2022 respectively.
11
Communication from the Commission - Guidelines on State aid for climate, environmental protection andenergy 2022 (2022/C 80/01)
12
CEER report (2020): 2nd CEER Report on Tendering Procedures for RES in Europe; AURES II project auction
database.
13
For instance, under a two-way contract-for-difference premium model, the State pays the renewable electricity
producer the difference between the actual electricity price and a reference price when the former is lower; viceversa, the producer pays to the State the difference when the electricity price is above the reference price (seehttp://aures2project.eu)
14
Article 6 of Directive (EU) 2018/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 on
the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources.
5－ 128 －

Solar project developers are increasingly relying on a combination of electricity market
participation and corporate renewable Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) to ensure a stable
income. A swift adoption of the revision of the Renewable Energy Directive (RED), proposed
in July 202115, and the implementation of the Commission Recommendation on PPAs adopted
alongside this communication should allow Member States to boost the number and aggregatedvolume of the agreements.
As the share of variable renewables increases in the electricity system, auctions should also
support renewables-based technologies that can reduce the cost of ensuring network
stability and system integration. Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) with thermal storage andsolar PV with batteries are examples of technologies that can provide these benefits.
The public consultation confirmed that a key barrier holding back utility-scale installations,
including solar, is administrative, in particular long and complex permit-granting procedures.
To overcome this obstacle, the Commission has presented a Recommendation on fast
permitting for renewable energy projects and a legislative proposal on permitting
alongside this communication.
Go-to areas and multiple use of space
The required expansion in utility-scale projects will increasingly face competing uses of landand public acceptance challenges. Member States should undertake a mapping exercise to
identify appropriate locations for renewable energy installations needed to collectively
achieve the revised EU 2030 renewable energy target. They should also designate therenewable go-to areas in which permitting will be simpler and faster than elsewhere while
limiting the impact on other uses of land and preserving environmental protection. In addition,
permit-granting procedures for the installation of solar energy equipment in rooftops and otherstructures created for purposes different than solar energy production should be limited to threemonths.
The repurposing of former industrial or mining land represents an opportunity for solar energy
deployment. The Modernisation Fund, as well as the cohesion policy, in particular the Just
Transition Fund, can support this kind of economic diversification and reconversion initiatives.
Innovative forms of deployment (1) – Multiple use of space
Multiple use of space can contribute to mitigating land constraints linked to competition forspace, including for environmental protection, agriculture and food security.
In particular, under certain conditions, the agricultural use of land can be combined withsolar generation in so-called agrivoltaics (or agri-PV). The two activities can establish
synergies, whereby PV systems can contribute to crop protection and yield stabilisation16,
with agriculture remaining the primary use of the land area. Member States should consider
incentives for the development of agri-PV while designing their National Strategic Plans for
15

Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001,
Regulation (EU) 2018/1999 and Directive 98/70/EC on the promotion of energy from renewable sources, andrepealing Council Directive (EU) 2015/652 (COM(2021) 557 final)
16
Barron-Gafford, G.A., Pavao-Zuckerman, M.A., Minor, R.L. et al. Agrivoltaics provide mutual benefits acrossthe food–energy–water nexus in drylands. Nature Sustainability 2, 848–855 (2019). See also research developed
by Fraunhofer ISE on the topic: https://agri-pv.org/
6－ 129 －

the Common Agricultural Policy, as well as their support frameworks for solar energy (e.g.
through the integration of agri-PV in renewable energy tenders). It is also worth noting that,in the agricultural sector, State aid rules allow investment aid to sustainable energy.
Furthermore, thanks to floating PV solutions, the surface of water can be used for solar
generation. Offshore solar installations represent a great potential, integrated in the EU
Offshore Renewable Energy Strategy 17 . Ongoing research and innovation efforts are
dedicated inter alia to developing new mooring solutions, improving the durability of PV
panels in marine environment, monitoring and assessing the impact on the environment andreducing maintenance costs. Within the energy sector, the use of the surface of artificial
lakes created by hydroelectric dams represents a specific potential for PV deployment.
Floating PV panels reduce water evaporation and, connected to the dam’s electric systems,
increase the total output, although the impact on aquatic biomass is still being investigated.
Any intervention on water bodies must respect the conditions set out in the Water Framework
Directive and the Marine Strategy Framework Directive 18.
Finally, transport infrastructure, such as highways or railway tracks, presents an
unexploited potential for solar energy deployment. For instance, if the installation of solar
panels on highway sound barriers in a pilot project in the Netherlands were to be replicatedin the country’s whole system of sound barriers, it would yield enough electricity for 250,000
households19.
The Commission will develop guidance for Member States to promote the development of
the innovative forms of solar energy deployment listed in this strategy.
Rising to the skills challenge
The EU solar PV sector employed 357,000 full-time equivalent (direct and indirect) jobs in2020 and this figure is expected to at least double by 2030. The installation sector is aparticularly strong source of local jobs, representing 80% of the total, while the operation andmaintenance sector accounts for 10%20.
There is already a lack of skilled workers. This bottleneck could grow quickly if unaddressed.
Vocational and Educational Training is an important instrument to address this challenge andMember States are encouraged to analyse the skills gap in the solar energy sector and develop
training programmes fit for purpose, taking into account the potential to increase women’s
participation.
At EU level, as part of the REPowerEU plan, the Commission will bring together the relevant
stakeholders in the renewable energy sector, including from the solar, wind, geothermal,
17

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic andSocial Committee and the Committee of the Regions - An EU Strategy to harness the potential of offshore
renewable energy for a climate neutral future COM(2020) 741
18
Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for Community
action in the field of water policy; Directive 2008/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
establishing a framework for community action in the field of marine environmental policy
19
Solar Highways: solar panels as integrated constructive elements in highway noise barriers. A multifaceted
research into the design, construction and yield of a bifacial solar noise barrier. A LIFE + programme project
executed by Rijkswaterstaat and TNO. ‘Layman’s report’ Author: Minne de Jong, June 2020
20
SolarPower Europe, EU Solar Jobs Report 2021.
7－ 130 －

biomass and heat pumps industries, but also from regional and national permitting authorities,
to set up an EU large-scale skills partnership for onshore renewable energy, including solar
energy, under the Pact for Skills.
The partnership should develop a clear vision of concrete upskilling and reskilling measures forsolar energy expansion. This should include training cooperation between companies along thevalue chain, social partners, training providers, and regional authorities. By joining forces,
stakeholders can maximise the return on their investment in the partnership. Private, local andnational funds can support the partnership’s objectives and be complemented by EU funding,from the European Social Fund to Erasmus+ and Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions.
The Commission will support implementation by the Member States of the Council
Recommendation on ensuring a fair transition towards climate neutrality including actions to
support workforce reskilling and upskilling and labour market transitions towards growing
sectors such as solar energy21.
In addition, to promote mobility, the revision of the RED proposed in July 2021 provides
requirements for mutual recognition of certification schemes across the EU, based on common
unified criteria. It also mandates Member States to publish the list of certified installers toprovide guarantees for consumers.
2.2.

Bringing solar value to citizens and communities

Deploying solar energy on rooftops provides an immediate solution to reduce reliance onnatural gas for citizens, but also SMEs and industry. With every energy consumer turned
producer, the acceptance and democratisation of the transition towards a clean and independent
energy system is reinforced. Accelerating this transition requires lifting the range of regulatory,financial and practical barriers that still prevent most EU citizens from using the sunshine toincrease their independence and reduce their energy bills.
Incentivising prosumers
Prosumers are owners of small, decentralised installations who self-consume part of the energy
they produce. Support and enabling policy frameworks for prosumers take various forms:
investment subsidies, feed-in tariffs, exemptions from certain taxes or the possibility to sell
excess electricity to other consumers or directly in the market. Among other things, the new
State aid CEEAG guidelines include exemptions from mandatory competitive bidding
processes to allocate aid and determine the aid level for small projects, including those below
or equal to 1 MW of installed capacity. In addition, the 2021 proposal for the revision of theEnergy Taxation Directive continues to allow Member States not to tax electricity of solar
origin22.
The full potential of solar energy for the EU can only be exploited if citizens and communities
are provided with the right incentives to become prosumers. The public consultation pointed tothe persistence of some negative factors, such as low remuneration for the excess electricity
produced or a general lack of awareness.

21

COM(2021) 801, SWD(2021) 452 final. Annex 3 provides an overview of funding supporting the fair transition
to climate neutrality and the online source “EU funding instruments for upskilling and reskilling”
22
Proposal for a Council Directive restructuring the Union framework for the taxation of energy products andelectricity (recast) COM(2021) 563 final
8－ 131 －

Better information is key to enhance clarity and predictability on the benefits of selfconsumption for potential investors, citizens and SMEs. Investment costs, financial support,
increase of property value, network tariffs, generation and consumption profiles and return on
investment are all relevant factors impacting investments. One-stop-shops in Member Statesshould share such information and give citizens advice on both energy efficiency measuresand solar energy projects in an integrated manner, from the technical requirements toadministrative steps and support measures. The best available projections on the above
variables should then be used to design support frameworks that reassure those deciding on
an investment in solar energy, energy storage or heat pumps. This should be done in particularthrough a predictable payback period, shorter than 10 years.
Direct public support, multi-stakeholder approaches and innovative financing models should
facilitate access to solar energy for the energy poor and vulnerable. This issue deserves
particular attention in the most remote regions, i.e. the EU outermost regions23, which enjoy alarge untapped solar energy potential.
Member States should support partnerships between local authorities, energy communities andsocial housing managers to facilitate collective and individual self-consumption schemes. Prefinancing shares in energy communities, virtual net-metering schemes (while accounting
separately for calculating network charges) or renting out solar PV, energy storage and heatpumps at a fee lower than retail electricity prices, can all be used for this purpose. Member
States can also24 apply reduced VAT rates to energy efficient, low emission heating systems,
including solar panels, solar water heating systems and heat pumps, as well as to social housing
and residential building renovation expenditure25.
PVGIS, a tool for citizens to evaluate their roof’s PV potential
The free and open web-based PVGIS Photovoltaic Geographical Information System tool,
developed and maintained by the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, provides
information about solar radiation and PV system performance for any location in Europe.
Citizens and installers can use it for an instantaneous assessment of the potential to generate
solar energy on rooftops.26
A balanced allocation of costs and benefits
One of the main barriers to individual or collective self-consumption identified by stakeholders
through the public consultation are charges and network tariffs.
Under the current EU legislation, national regulatory authorities (NRAs) have the mandate andexclusive competence to prescribe transparent, non-discriminatory and cost-reflective tariffs.
Prosumers have the right to sell their excess production without being subject to discriminatory
or disproportionate procedures and charges and should be able to participate in all electricity
23

The EU counts nine outermost regions - French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mayotte, Reunion Island andSaint-Martin (France), Azores and Madeira (Portugal), and the Canary Islands (Spain). They are located in thewestern Atlantic Ocean, the Caribbean basin, the Amazonian forest and the Indian Ocean and are home to 4.8
million EU citizens
24 Council Directive (EU) 2022/542 of 5 April 2022 amending Directives 2006/112/EC and (EU) 2020/285 asregards rates of value added tax
25
See annex III of Council Directive (EU) 2022/543.
26
https://joint-research-centre.ec.europa.eu/pvgis-photovoltaic-geographical-information-system_en9－ 132 －

markets. These principles are not yet widely implemented across the EU, especially inmulti-apartment buildings.
Member States should avoid discriminatory treatment as regards grid injection tariffs between
producers connected at transmission level and those connected at distribution level, such as
prosumers and energy communities. Authorities should enable the development of local energy
markets to diversify remuneration pathways for prosumers, based on energy sharing and peerto-peer exchange arrangements.
In the context of collective self-consumption or peer-to-peer exchanges within multi-apartmentbuildings, NRAs should consider possible cost reductions stemming from the reduced useof the network. At the same time, such cost-reflective tariffs should not lead to discrimination
against those who do not have access to self-consumption. In other words, any discriminatory
cost-socialisation of grid-related costs should be avoided. Looking forward, digitalisation, inparticular smart meters, can greatly facilitate real-time monitoring of electricity flows and theevaluation of the impact on grid costs.
Time-differentiated distribution network tariffs, especially if flanked by dynamic pricing
contracts, would contribute to aligning the choices of prosumers and energy communities withgrid congestion management needs and market conditions.
Energy communities and other collective solar actions
Collective solar energy projects provide another avenue to reduce the consumption of fossil
fuels and address energy poverty and vulnerability.
Current legislation already supports renewable and citizen energy communities, as well as
collective solar initiatives to generate, store, share, exchange, and use energy. However, thesecommunities still face significant barriers, including difficulties in securing financing,navigating licencing and permitting procedures or developing sustainable business models. In
addition, as they are often initiated by a group of volunteers, they suffer from limited time andlack of access to technical expertise. Cross-border energy communities, which can exploit
complementary renewable energy potentials in EU border regions, face additional challenges
linked to legal, technical or administrative inconsistencies across borders27.
To tap into this potential, Member States should establish appropriate incentives and adapt
administrative requirements to the characteristics of energy communities. An integrated
3-step “learn-plan-do” programme could help energy communities build technical expertise andsecure access to financing. The assessment and removal of existing barriers would level theplaying field with more professionalised and established market participants.
In addition, Member States are encouraged to make use of the flexibility provided by the new
State aid CEEAG guidelines, including exemptions for renewable energy community projects
with installed capacity equal to or below 6 MW from mandatory competitive bidding processes,
or to facilitate their participation in such processes.
Collective action can also be organised by consumer organisations, for instance by purchasingof solar energy products. Other types of collective solar energy actions, managed by

27

Report from the Commission “EU Border Regions: Living labs of European integration”, COM(2021) 393 final.
10－ 133 －

professionalised and larger actors, should also be encouraged to engage in innovative businessmodels based on collective self-consumption and energy sharing.
Integrating solar energy through the interaction with other devices
To be seamlessly integrated in the energy system at large, the rapid growth of solar energy
requires new technological, digital and operational advances.
Energy storage is an important asset to contribute to this integration, especially in the context
of heating or transport shifting to electricity. Full system benefits from distributed assets, suchas batteries, can only be reaped if they are properly integrated and able to participate in allelectricity markets, including balancing and congestion management markets, in a nondiscriminatory and homogeneous manner across the EU. At EU level the ongoing work on the
EU network code on demand side flexibility aims at addressing remaining regulatory barriers
and unlocking the potential of such distributed assets as flexibility sources. The July 2021
proposal for a revision of the RED also includes additional provisions to ensure nondiscrimination in the market participation of these assets.
Electric vehicles (EVs) can also serve as energy storage devices and contribute to solar
electricity self-consumption, if parked within the premises of the owner or user. Linking theEV’s consumption at home while recharging away from home, for instance through the same
electricity supplier, can potentially contribute to a more dynamic system integration of
distributed solar energy assets. This may also allow owners and users to use the same contractand data-sharing agreement for their recharging needs.
Off-grid recharging stations equipped with PV panels and energy storage offer the possibility
to increase access to EV recharging infrastructure in rural areas and, in general, in thoselocations with limited grid connection.
Innovative forms of deployment (2): vehicle-integrated PV
Solar energy and electric vehicles can also be integrated in technologically novel ways.
Vehicle-integrated PV presents a high potential to contribute to the reduction of emissions
from the transport sector, by increasing the energy autonomy of EVs and partially replacing
grid power with solar electricity produced on board28. More than other EVs, they can also
become an additional source of electricity for the grid while parked, and an energy storage
solution contributing to overall grid resilience. The opportunities provided by this technology
are being analysed through a pilot project managed by the Commission29.
Devices such as batteries and heat pumps can only contribute to the integration of solar
electricity into the energy system if they can effectively communicate with each other and withsolar energy systems. This interoperability can be facilitated through measures such as
standardisation, or open-source solutions for digital connectivity. One of the objectives of the28

Thiel, C., Gracia Amillo, A., Tansini, A., Tsakalidis, A., Fontaras, G., Dunlop, E., Taylor, N., Jäger-Waldau, A.,
Araki, K., Nishioka, K., Ota, Y., Yamaguchi, M.: Impact of climatic conditions on prospects for integrated
photovoltaics in electric vehicles (2022). Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 158, art. no. 112109
29
Pilot Project – Effect of Energy-efficient and Solar Power Generating Vehicles on Overall Energy Demand in
the EU Transport Sector (2022/S 053-136682) – Contract notice published on 16/03/2022.
11－ 134 －

Commission’s proposal for a Data Act30 is to foster a level playing field for energy solutions
and services, while putting the user in control of data collection and sharing to third-party
service providers. Research and innovation projects jointly develop interoperability and data
sharing solutions, while standardisation organisations are already running activities in thisrespect. In addition, the upcoming Digitalisation of Energy Action Plan will support
interoperability for a wide range of energy consuming, producing and storage devices througha code of conduct for energy smart appliances manufacturers 31.
2.3.

Solar value for buildings and industry

The contribution of solar to decarbonising our building stock
Solar energy can deliver a substantial part of a building’s electricity and heat demand, either
through solar heat collectors, solar PV (with heat pumps) or a combination of the two, including
hybrid PV-thermal technologies. Through support policies and regulations that provide a levelplaying field for all solar technologies and do not favour one against the other, national andlocal authorities can promote the most efficient solution for each situation.
When combined, the installation of solar energy and renovation interventions become mutually
reinforcing, optimising the building’s energy performance. If national support programmes aredesigned accordingly, they can ensure swift massive deployment of rooftop solar energy inbuildings, giving priority to most suitable buildings for quick interventions (Energy
Performance Certificate classes A, B, C or D). Where appropriate, this effort can be combinedwith roof renovations and deployment of energy storage and heat pumps.
As regards new buildings, where technically feasible, the recast of the Energy Performance of
Buildings Directive 32 requires that 100% of on-site energy consumption be covered byrenewable energy as of 2030. This transition towards the decarbonisation of buildings’ energy
consumption will be accelerated by introducing an obligation to install solar energy
equipment on all new and existing public and commercial buildings above a certain size andon new residential buildings in a gradual fashion, between 2026 and 2029. Where the building
is not adapted, renewable electricity can also be acquired through a PPA.
In addition, provisions will be adopted to ensure that all new buildings are “solar ready”, i.e.
designed to optimise the generation potential on the basis of the site’s solar irradiance, enabling
the fruitful installation of solar technologies without costly structural interventions.
Greening of energy taxation and the proposed new emissions trading system for buildings
and road transport can contribute to generating the resources required for these interventions,while setting the appropriate economic incentives. In this context, the proposed Social Climate
Fund can support measures and investments integrating renewables in buildings, principally tothe benefit of vulnerable consumers and micro-enterprises.

30

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on harmonised rules on fair access toand use of data (Data Act) COM(2022) 68 final
31
See the work carried out by the JRC in this area: https://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/development-of-policy-proposalsfor-energy-smart-appliances
32
Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the energy performance of buildings(recast) COM(2021) 802
12－ 135 －

Innovative forms of deployment (3): Building-integrated PV
The opportunities that buildings provide to install solar energy extend well beyond rooftops
and parking spaces. Building-integrated PV (BIPV) represents a novel form of solar
deployment: they constitute a construction product, while at the same time allowing solar
electricity generation from additional surfaces. Despite recent cost reductions, the potentialof this sector remains to be unlocked through uptake by the construction sector and therelated economies of scale. EU-wide deployment would require homogeneous certification
for the affected products, as well as customised professional training and university
programmes. National governments can also provide guidance to local authorities on how
to deal with BIPV in their permitting decisions 33 . Some Member States have introduced
specific opportunities for BIPV in their renewable energy support frameworks. Attachingsuch support to the construction permit stage can further facilitate the uptake of theseproducts by actors in the construction sector.
Solar energy for the industrial sector
To meet their electricity demand, companies are already signing direct PPAs with solar energy
projects. By 2021, more than 5 GW of solar PV projects had directly signed PPAs withcorporate offtakers34. However, corporate renewable PPAs still account for a small fraction of
the sector’s electricity consumption.
Solar energy can also provide industrial heat, which accounts for 70% of industrial energy
demand. Based on solar collectors or concentrated solar, solar heat can deliver heat forindustrial processes from 100 to over 500°C. Nevertheless, the potential of solar heat forindustrial processes is still largely untapped. Two of the main obstacles it faces areadministrative hurdles and the gap between the payback times of these investments and thefinancial requirements of most industrial actors.
Solar electricity can be used in combination with heat pumps or electric furnaces to provide
heat, or it can be converted into renewable hydrogen, to be used as fuel or feedstock in industrial
processes. Due to declining costs, in particular in places with high irradiation and limited land
constraints, it is expected that renewable hydrogen production from solar electricity could
become cost-competitive within the next decade.
The Commission is preparing an EU-wide scheme for carbon contracts for difference underthe Innovation Fund to support innovative solutions for the decarbonisation of industrial energy
demand.
2.4.

Preparing the energy network for the efficient absorption of solar
electricity

Infrastructure investments

33
34

JRC Policy Brief (JRC120970): How Photovoltaics can ride the EU Building Renovation Wave
RE-Source platform (2021)
13－ 136 －

Solar energy is abundant, but the energy infrastructure bringing it to the consumer must change
to enable a more electrified system powered by wind and solar. In the public consultation, solar
industry stakeholders identified grid expansion and grid connection as a key bottleneck for
deployment.
The efficient integration of decentralised solar installations will primarily require significant
adaptations in distribution networks. These include digitalisation investments, such as smart
grids, to enable higher system performance and seize the flexibility opportunity provided bysmall distributed assets. The forthcoming Digitalisation of Energy Action Plan will highlightthe importance of providing clear investment signals to accelerate the digitalisation of theelectricity grid.
A trans-European electricity system provides intrinsic flexibility and contributes to lower prices.
The updated Trans-European Networks for Energy (TEN-E) regulation35 will contribute to
the expansion of cross-border electricity infrastructure and smart grids and facilitate
integrated infrastructure planning, thus enabling a more efficient transmission and integrationof solar electricity produced across the EU.
Member States should use EU funds to remove the bottlenecks to solar expansion in distribution
and transmission grids. This could be done through their cohesion policy funding, including
INTERREG or the Recovery and Resilience Fund which already foresees EUR 9.6 billion
dedicated to energy networks and infrastructure36.
Paving the way for Direct Current solutions
The introduction of high shares of solar PV and wind has an impact on the way the electricity
grid is managed. As renewable power from solar is produced in Direct Current (DC), conversion
to Alternating Current (AC) to feed into the grid and then converting back to DC, e.g. to store
energy, leads to energy losses. Such conversion losses are currently growing because more
devices and system, such as batteries, heat-pumps, data centres, electric vehicles or appliances,
operate in DC. Increasing the use of DC technologies could thus be beneficial to the electricity
system.
The Commission is investigating how low-voltage DC technologies can enhance the clean
energy transition. Based on the conclusions drawn from this process, it will engage with
European and international standardisation bodies for the establishment of the necessary
standards and protocols.

The updates of the National Energy and Climate Plans are a critical tool for the Member
States to adapt and enhance the necessary policies and measures to implement the abovementioned initiatives accelerating massive deployment of solar energy. To ensure this, theCommission will provide Member States with guidance ahead of the update of their plans in
2023.

35

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on guidelines for trans-European energy
infrastructure and repealing Regulation (EU) No 347/2013 – COM (2020) 824 final
36
Based on the 22 Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRP) adopted by the Council of the EU and the two RRPs of
Sweden and Bulgaria endorsed by the Commission on 29 March 2022 and 7 April 2022 respectively.
14－ 137 －

3.

ENSURING ACCESS TO SUSTAINABLE SOLAR ENERGYThe EU currently imports most of the solar energy products it installs: EUR 8 billion of PV
panels in 2020, 75% of which from a single country37. Meanwhile, only a small share of global
production takes place in the EU. This level of supply concentration diminishes the EU’s
resilience in case of global or country-specific events. Expanding the EU solar value chain, inparticular in the manufacturing stage, on the back of its vibrant innovation and competitivemarket, will strengthen the sector’s resilience, while creating jobs and value added. In addition,
the EU will step in to ensure that solar energy products are sustainable and up to the standards
demanded by EU consumers.
3.1.

More innovative, sustainable and efficient solar energy products

Supporting innovation in solar energy
The solar energy sector has become a very dynamic and competitive industry, ensuring a
constant output of innovative technologies. The EU has one of the strongest innovation
environments across all solar energy technologies, from PV to concentrated solar power (CSP).
The challenge now is to ensure that a new generation of breakthrough technologies leads tohigher conversion efficiencies (which translate into less use of resources, such as space, rawmaterials, water, etc), increased circularity in the use of raw materials and a more sustainable
life cycle, including in manufacturing.
Through Horizon Europe, the EU will continue to support research and innovation to reducethe cost of solar energy technologies, while increasing their energy efficiency and theirsustainability, including in the manufacturing stage. These new technologies include
heterojunction cells, perovskites and tandem cells, all of which achieve higher efficiencies thancommercial technologies. Financial support is also needed for innovation in solar thermal or
CSP technologies, as well as products tailored to innovative forms of deployment. The
upcoming 2023-2024 work programme will include a flagship initiative to support solar
energy research and innovation, focused inter alia on novel technologies, environmental andsocio-economic sustainability, and integrated design.
Also under Horizon Europe, the European Partnership for Clean Energy Transition willcrowd in support from Member States, the energy industry and public organisations for researchand innovation in solar energy over the 2021-2027 period. The collaboration with Member
States can be further expanded by developing a common solar energy research and innovation
agenda in the framework of the European Research Area. This initiative will build on theongoing work of the Strategic Energy Technology Plan.
The space sector represents an additional innovation trigger. This strategic sector needs thedevelopment of high-performance solar cells, including multijunction cells. The Commission
will continue to exploit synergies between the space and terrestrial sectors in all initiatives
critical for the EU space programme, including research and development.
To bridge the gap between research results and commercial development, the Innovation Fund
will provide around EUR 25 billion of support over 2020-2030, depending on the carbon price,for the commercial demonstration of innovative low-carbon technologies, including solar
energy. One of the seven large-scale projects selected in the first batch supports innovation in
37

Eurostat - International trade in products related to green energy.
15－ 138 －

the solar sector. Finally, the European Regional Development Fund supports research andinnovation in Member States and regions in priority areas identified through the local smart
specialisation strategies.
Fostering the sustainability of PV systems installed in the EU
Over 20 years of operation, today’s commercial PV systems can produce almost twenty times
the energy needed to manufacture them38. However, it is important to continue to reduce thecarbon and environmental footprint associated with their manufacturing.
The European Commission plans to propose in the first half of 2023 two mandatory internalmarket instruments that would apply to solar PV modules, inverters and systems sold in the EU:
an Ecodesign Regulation and the Energy Labelling Regulation. These measures would
concern the efficiency, durability, reparability and recyclability of products and systems, toincentivise environmentally sustainable devices. The Commission is also assessing options
covering the quality of the manufacturing process and the carbon footprint of PV modules.
Apart from their sustainability impact, these measures are also expected to foster innovationand provide a common reference for potential buyers to compare different products.
The Commission also plans to propose a revision of the existing Ecodesign and Energy
Labelling regulations for space and water heaters in 2023. The interaction between heaters andsolar energy products is key for the integration of solar energy; these regulations would maketheir combined benefits more understandable and visible for consumers.
The EU will provide European consumers with guarantees that the products they buy have been
made respecting human and labour rights. Since private actors play a central role in the fightagainst forced labour, the Commission has put forward detailed reporting requirements
covering this and other labour rights aspects in its proposal for a Corporate Sustainability
Reporting Directive39.In addition, the Commission has announced a new legislative initiative
to effectively prohibit the placing on the EU market of products made by forced labour40.
It will build on international standards and existing EU initiatives in particular due diligenceand transparency obligations, and combine a ban with a risk based enforcement.
3.2.

Supply chain resilienceRaw materials reliance
The use of raw materials for manufacturing of PV panels depends on the technology used. The
market is currently dominated by crystalline silicon cells, which essentially rely on silicon.
Thin-film technologies, which represent less than 5% of the global supply, make a moreheterogeneous use of raw materials41. In addition, the manufacturing and installation of all PV
modules requires glass, aluminium and steel; copper is used for their connection to the grid.

38

Photovoltaics report, Fraunhofer Institute for Solar Energy Systems, February 2022
Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2013/34/EU,
Directive 2004/109/EC, Directive 2006/43/EC and Regulation (EU) No 537/2014, as regards corporate
sustainability reporting COM(2021) 189 final
40
Commission Communication on decent work worldwide for a global just transition and a sustainable recovery(COM(2022) 66 final)
41
There are three main categories of thin film solar cells: cadmium telluride (CdTe), copper indium gallium
diselenide (CIGS), and amorphous thin-film silicon (a-Si, TF-Si).
39

16－ 139 －

Suppliers from within the EU currently cover a small share of demand for processed materials
and depends on international suppliers, often concentrated in one or a small number of countries.
Although materials intensity is set to decrease over time thanks to technological improvements,
silicon demand is expected to increase fourfold by 2030 and then stabilise42. EU policy aims atbuilding resilience in relation to critical raw materials, based on access to resources, circular
economy and sustainability. Achieving resource security requires action to ensure that global
markets are not distorted and to diversify supply. Strengthening the sustainable andresponsible domestic sourcing of, in particular, silicon metal and polysilicon could also beenvisaged.
Improving resource efficiency and circularity is equally important to address this challenge.
Since 2012 EU legislation has called for the recovery, reuse and recycling of PV modules. The
recycling industry today can deliver high levels of circularity, but further innovation is stillneeded. Starting in 2025, the quantity of PV panels reaching their end of life will significantly
increase. This will require ensuring reparability and recyclability by design for new equipment
and building up an ecosystem for the efficient recycling of used materials. The Ecodesign
measures for PV systems would include information requirements on these aspects to promotebetter product design leading to higher long-term energy performance and facilitating recycling
and repair.
Manufacturing: a critical point for resilience
The EU industry holds strong positions in several parts of the solar PV value chain, startingwith the polysilicon sector, but especially in the downstream segment, including inverter andsolar trackers manufacturing or monitoring and control. European companies have also
maintained a leading position in the deployment sector. As shown in the figure below,
downstream segments represent half of the value chain’s gross value added and the EU captures
more than 10% of that value.
Figure: Breakdown of Gross Value Added throughout solar PV value chain43

42

JRC, Joint Research Centre (Carrara, S., Alves Dias, P., Plazzotta, B., Pavel, C.), (2020a), Raw materials demand
for wind and solar PV technologies in the transition towards a decarbonised energy system.
43
First published in the European Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the report from theCommission to the European Parliament and the Council “Progress on competitiveness of clean energy
technologies” (COM(2021) 950, COM(2021) 952)
17
－ 140 －

Source: Guidehouse Insights, 2020

At the same time, the EU is today a small actor in several critical manufacturing and assembly
steps in the upstream value chain, including ingots, wafers and cells44. If the scarcity of EUbased manufacturing is not remedied, it is poised to reduce the EU’s competitiveness in researchand innovation, an area in which proximity to manufacturing clusters is often necessary.
The marginal EU contribution in the manufacturing and assembly stages of the supply chain,combined with the quasi-monopolistic role of one country at the components stage at global
level, diminishes the EU’s resilience in case of extensive external supply disruptions45. This
creates risks for accelerated solar energy deployment.
3.3.

An EU Solar PV Industry Alliance

Increased EU demand for PVs and rising global transport costs are attracting interest ininvestments in PV manufacturing in the EU. At the same time, the industry is finding it difficult
to translate its innovative technological advantages into large scale production and build
economies of scale, notably due to high perceived financing risks.
Nevertheless, at least 14 projects have been announced, covering ingots, wafers, cells andmodules, although many of them have not yet secured financing. This project pipeline would
bring the industry close to achieving a manufacturing capacity equivalent to 20 GW of solar
PV at each step of the value chain - an objective set for 2025 by the European Solar Initiative.
It is estimated to require more than EUR 8 billion in investments.
EU Solar PV Industry Alliance
Securing a diversification of supplies through more diverse imports and scaled up solar PV
manufacturing in the EU of innovative and sustainable solar PVs would contribute to
mitigate supply risks for the necessary massive deployment of solar energy in the EU. Thisobjective will be supported by an EU Solar Industry Alliance.
The alliance will bring together industrial actors, research institutes, consumer associations
and other stakeholders with an interest in the solar PV sector, including the emerging
circularity industry. The Alliance will work to identify and coordinate investment
opportunities, project pipelines and technology portfolios and establish pathways for thesolar industrial ecosystem in Europe.
It will provide a framework for coordinating actions aimed at the development and uptake ofnew, more efficient and sustainable technologies. It will cover innovation/technology,
industrial supply chain, finance, regulation, skills and citizen engagement, and provide
advice to the EU and the Member States. The alliance will map the availability of financial

44

European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Progress oncompetitiveness of clean energy technologies (COM(2021) 950 final) – (SWD(2021) 307 final). Figures citedcover EU + Norway.
45
European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, Guevara Opinska, L., Gérard, F., Hoogland, O., et al.,Study on the resilience of critical supply chains for energy security and clean energy transition during and after
the COVID-19 crisis : final report, 2021
18
－ 141 －

support, attract private investment and facilitate the dialogue and match-making between
producers and offtakers.
At EU level, the following EU programmes are particularly relevant:-InvestEU can provide de-risked financing to private investments channelled via
the European Investment Bank and other public finance institutions.

-

The Innovation Fund can also channel funding towards innovative zero and lowcarbon equipment, such as solar panels and their components.

-

Recovery and resilience and Cohesion policy funds can support relevant projects
boosting local development.

The alliance will include a research and innovation pillar with strong links to Horizon
Europe.
Circularity and sustainability will also be in its focus. It will promote coordination acrossthe value chain to facilitate higher recycling efficiencies. It will monitor developments in this
sector and anticipate possible bottlenecks, in particular with regard to access to safe andsustainable raw materials. It could discuss potential targets for material recovery rates.
Finally, the alliance will cooperate with the EU large-scale Skills Partnership for onshore
renewables to promote the development of a skilled workforce for the solar manufacturingsector.
The Alliance will fully comply with EU competition rules, in particular Article 101 TFEU, inboth its setting-up and its activities46.
The Commission will work on a guidance on permitting procedures for new manufacturing
plants.
The Commission will support efforts from Member States to pool their public resources via a
potential Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEI) focused on breakthroughtechnologies and innovation along the solar value chain.
The innovative forms of deployment highlighted above, such as product-integrated PV or
multiple use of space, also tend to require product innovation and customisation to specificneeds. As PV expands beyond the current model of modular rooftop and utility-scaleinstallations, a proactive, innovative EU industry can fill the emerging gaps on the supply side.
In the context of rapid innovation, the EU must strive to maintain its competitiveness in thevalue-chain segments where it is stronger, such as trackers or inverters, as well as engineering,procurement, and construction.

4.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF SOLAR ENERGY

46

Competition rules should in particular be safeguarded by reporting on meetings, discussions, informationexchanged and agreements reached and making these available to the Commission on request. Furthermore, themembers of the alliance will sign a code of conduct including a competition compliance programme.
19－ 142 －

Solar energy is a cornerstone of the global transition to clean energy and net zero emissions.
While many of the least developed and most vulnerable countries are the most endowed interms of potential, a range of factors have hampered the uptake and development of solar inthese regions. By the end of 2021, 843 GW were installed worldwide, more than double thecapacity installed just four years earlier 47 . And yet, further acceleration in solar energy
deployment and integration is still required to achieve the objectives enshrined in the Paris
Agreement.
The EU has developed an energy model that creates the incentives to attract investments inrenewable energy and integrate them into the grid. Many partner countries in the EU’s
neighbourhood, such as those belonging to the Energy Community, are interested in replicating
this model, backed by regional electricity markets and cross-border cooperation andinfrastructure. The EU, via its diplomatic efforts and strategic engagement with third countries
will be working on expanding solar energy and other renewables to reduce exposure to fossil
fuel volatility and geopolitical risks.
Beyond Europe and its neighbourhood, many countries are firmly committed to solar energy
deployment. India is an example and the EU is offering its support through technicalcooperation and business-to-business interactions, under the EU-India Clean Energy andClimate Partnership. The exponential growth of PV markets also demonstrates the versatilityof solar technologies in countries such as Vietnam or Japan.
While solar power is the cheapest source of electricity in most countries today, it is still
prevented from competing on equal terms by market distortions, subsidies or advantages toincumbent energy producers. The EU is actively supporting the phasing out of fossil fuelsubsidies worldwide and the promotion of open, transparent and competitive investment
conditions. The EU will also work with its partners to remove trade and investment barriers
such as local content requirements and to promote transparent and competitive procurement
procedures. Promoting a more favourable business environment will also be an objective of
future trade agreement negotiations. In the context of the EU-US Trade and Technology
Council, both sides are discussing supply chain resilience in the solar value chain with regard
to transparency and sustainability.
The EU stands ready to support its partners around the world in making use of this technology
to accelerate their transition towards universal access to affordable, reliable, and modern energy
services, as enshrined in the 7th UN Sustainable Development Goal for 2030. Solar energy’s
accessibility, modularity and flexibility makes it suitable both for centralised and decentralised
grid systems.
Africa, which has the richest solar resources on the planet, installed only 5 GWs of solar PV in
2019. At the same time, in sub-Saharan Africa, 570 million people do not have access toelectricity. Last February, during the 6th EU–African Union Summit, the Commission presented
the Africa-EU Green Energy Initiative to support Africa’s green transition in the energy
sector by increasing renewable energy capacity and the number of people gaining access toaffordable and reliable energy. The EU can assist Africa’s efforts to adopt innovativetechnologies maximising solar energy resources, that is through agri-PV or floating solar on
artificial lakes48. As part of the Global Gateway EU-Africa investment package, the EU will
47

IRENA statistics
Gonzalez Sanchez, R., Kougias, I., Moner-Girona, M., Fahl, F., Jäger-Waldau, A.: Assessment of floating solar
photovoltaics potential in existing hydropower reservoirs in Africa (2021). Renewable Energy, 169, pp. 687-699
48

20－ 143 －

support the development of regional electricity markets across the five continental African
power pools through technical assistance and funding for electricity interconnections andtransmission lines. To diversify its suppliers, promote sustainable development and local value
in partner countries, the EU is also exploring opportunities to engage with selected countries insustainable raw material value chains partnerships to support alternative sources of materials
needed for the solar industry.
In cooperation with the International Renewable Energy Agency, the EU is also preparing
Regional Energy Transition Outlooks for Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Europe,
providing a thorough analysis of the regions' potential and options in terms of renewable energy,
energy efficiency, infrastructure, energy access and cross-border cooperation. The EU is also
cooperating with the International Solar Alliance to disseminate its experience in solar energy
technologies, policies and practices. With the International Energy Agency, the EU will also
prepare zero-emission energy roadmaps for just and socially fair transitions in countries
dependent on coal.

5.

CONCLUSIONS

EU solar energy has a significant potential to rapidly become a mainstream part of our powerand heat systems and a main lever to achieve the European Green Deal objectives while phasingout our dependence on Russian fossil fuels. This strategy proposes to seize the plentiful
opportunities offered by energy technologies that run on sunshine. It sets out a roadmap toachieve this while allowing citizens to directly reap the benefits of solar energy technologies
and the EU industry to capture this growth opportunity, creating jobs and added value for theEU.
With the European Solar Rooftops Initiative, the EU will make use of this simple andabundant resource to power our houses, offices, shops, and factories, by decisively lifting thebarriers that are still preventing that momentous shift from taking place.
The EU large-scale skills partnership for onshore renewables, including solar energy, willturn the growing bottleneck in the skilled workforce needed to manufacture, deploy andmaintain solar energy into an opportunity for new green jobs at the service of the clean energy
transition.
On the supply side the proposed EU Solar PV Industry Alliance should help diversify our
supply chains, retain more value in the EU and deliver efficient and sustainable products basedon next-generation technologies.
Amid the energy crisis and geopolitical tensions, the implementation of the Strategy and these
key solar initiatives proposed for the EU and its Member States is of utmost urgency. The
Commission invites the European Council, the Council and the European Parliament to endorse
this Strategy, including its key initiatives.

21－ 144 －

EN

EN
－ 145 －

Annex: Key actions to implement the EU Solar Energy Strategy

Flagship initiatives:-

EU Solar Rooftops Initiative-

Commission’s permitting package – legislative proposal, Recommendation andguidance-

EU large-scale skills partnership for onshore renewable energy, including solar
energy-EU Solar PV Industry Alliance

Other actions:
The Commission will:

develop a guidance for Member States to promote innovative forms of solar energy
deployment;

propose the creation of a community of practice dedicated to the procurement of solar
energy in the framework of the Big Public Buyers initiative;

promote the uptake of Direct Current (DC) technologies and engage with European andinternational standardisation organisations on the areas of DC application;



propose the application of the Ecodesign Directive and Energy Labelling Regulation to PV
systems;

propose a legislative initiative banning products made by forced labour from the Single
Market;

set up an Energy Communities Facility to provide cascade funding to energy community
projects in the EU, under the LIFE programme;develop a joint strategic research and innovation solar energy agenda with Member States;launch a research and innovation flagship on solar energy under Horizon Europe.

Member States should:

integrate incentives for agri-PV, as appropriate, when designing their CAP National
Strategic Plans;1－ 146 －



incentivise installation of energy storage devices to complement distributed renewableenergy systems;

ensure that incentives to renewable heat provide a level playing field for the different
technologies;in order to support energy communities:
o put in place programmes to provide integrated energy efficiency and solar
installation advice and guidance to energy communities;o assess and remove unjustified barriers to the development of renewable and citizenenergy communities;

prioritise investments in both transmission and distribution infrastructure, cross-border andnational, necessary for large-scale deployment of solar and other renewable energy,
including smart electricity grid projects, noting EU funding possibilities;

National Regulatory Agencies should evaluate electricity tariffs in light of:o actual costs incurred taking into account the use of the network in case of selfconsumption, and peer-to-peer energy transactions at building or local level;o ensuring non-discrimination between production connected at the distribution leveland production connected at the transmission level for injection charges as well as
non-discrimination of energy storage or aggregation;o the benefit of time-differentiated distribution network tariffs to manage peak loads
and grid congestion.

The Commission and Member States will collaborate to:facilitate electric vehicle recharging through a single supplier of choice across different
recharging infrastructure;develop a network code on demand side flexibility.

2－ 147 －

この報告書はボートレースの交付金による日本財団の助成金を受けて作成しました。

ロシア・ウクライナ情勢による
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2022 年 度 JSC 追 加 特 別 調 査
2023 年（令和 5 年）3 月発行
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