European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)

European Integration and Trade Unions:
the Role of Interest Groups in Policy-Making of European Integrationand its Impact on National Welfare States
Hitoshi Suzuki (Ph.D.)
Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies
From April 2009;
Lecturer, Faculty of International Studies and Regional Development
University of Niigata Prefecture (Niigata, Japan)
Paper presented at the International Symposium“Implications for State Sovereignty of EU Integration in a Transnational World”
26 November 2008
Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies
Keio University (Tokyo, Japan)(Draft, not to be cited without permission of the author.)
Abstract
This paper focuses on the role played by interest groups, especially trade unions, in theprocess of policy-making of European integration since the Schuman Plan. While theEuropean Constitution was vetoed in France and the Netherlands in 2005 due to fears
against unemployment, efforts have been made at the European level in order to solve
or prevent such social problems by trade union representation in the High Authority of
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Commission of the
EC/EU. The Schuman Plan and the ECSC played an indispensable role in setting up
formal decision-making processes and informal lobbying procedures for trade unions to
influence social related policies. Such direct participation of the unions eased workers’
fears that European integration would become a cartel of industry owners and assured
them that it would improve workers’ income and living standards. This could be called
as a “post-war settlement at the European level”, a reconciliation between workers,
industry and decision-making bodies responsible for social issues. The settlement
secured unions’ support for policies of economic growth under European integration.
The Schuman Plan became a starting point of the settlement, helping to reconstructnational welfare states on one hand and securing the successful launch of the newEuropean institution on the other. Whether the EU still functions as the same“settlement” of the 1950s is, however, put into question today.
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Index
Introduction
1. The Schuman Plan: an invitation for trade union participation
2. The European network of trade unions in the Paris negotiations and the ratification
debates of the Paris Treaty
3. Post-war settlement at the European level
Conclusions
Bibliography
Introduction1
Whether European integration could prevent or solve social problems, especiallyunemployment, has been one of the most central debates since the Schuman Plan. Is
unemployment caused by European integration? How could the EU prevent or solve
unemployment? Should the EU be responsible for solving it, or should national
governments? Debates heated up when economic crisis occurred or further European
integration was put into question, or even both. This was typically the case when the
French and Dutch voters vetoed the European Constitution in 2005. Based on researchof public opinion, the European Commission concluded that the Constitution was
vetoed due to fears of further unemployment.2 The Lisbon strategy of the EU, which
was launched in 2000 and was planned to both minimise unemployment and maximise
competitiveness of European countries, 3 received citizens’ critics for not achieving its
goals. Academics agree that the Lisbon strategy has not reached its goals.4 While
citizens are not satisfied with EU’s efforts to reduce unemployment, their expectations
for the EU to play a more decisive role have increased steadily. It is ironical that
increased expectations ended in further disappointments.
Has European integration been powerless in social issues?5 It is true that the social
1This paper is a revised version of an article presented at the International Symposium of the IPSA
RC-3 (European Unification), European Integration between the Past and the Present, 6 September
2008, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan, with the title, “Overcoming “National” Narratives ofWelfare States: the Schuman Plan as a European-wide “Post-war Settlement” for Trade Union
Participation and Economic Growth..” Many thanks to Ken Endo and Kazuto Suzuki, hosts of the
Symposium, and all the participants of the Symposium in Sapporo for their helpful comments.
2Standard Eurobarometer (Fieldwork: October – November 2005; Publication: December 2005),
No.64, Autumn 2005, pp.15-19. One must note that whether unemployment is solely the result ofEU’s policies or not is not certain.
3
European Council, Lisbon, 2000.
4
Kenneth Armstrong, Iain Begg, Jonathan Zeitlin, “JCMS Symposium: EU Governance after
Lisbon”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.46, No.2, March 2008; Gilles Raveaud, “TheEuropean Employment Strategy”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.45, No.2, June 2007.
5
Some works have looked into the development of the European Works Council, an example of
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European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)policy of the EU has a small financial basis,6 and that the mainstream policies of the
EU have taken neo-liberal lines. This fact does not, however, provide the full picture of
how European integration since the Schuman Plan has contributed to social progress ofEuropean countries after the end of the Second World War. Why and how has welfare ofEuropean countries so rapidly been improved in the post-war era and steadily sustained,
although with some exceptions, up to present? One of the reasons of this success wasdue to workers,’ or trade unions,’ hesitating but continuous support for European
integration ever since the Schuman Plan.7 Workers’ income improved most rapidly inthe 1950s, a leap which never took place before the end of the Second World War. This
raised the purchasing power of workers in European countries and became one of theengines for further intra-European trade and economic growth. This theory of growth
being proposed by the Schuman Plan, phrased as “improving the living standards ofworkers”,8 the trade unions of the six countries, 9 except for the communist unions,
supported European integration and continued to cooperate up to present.
It is not easy for one to describe, however, the role of the Schuman Plan in social
issues. The social policy of the ECSC did exist,10 but was not the size of national
welfare policies, especially in terms of budget scale and its impact on every day life ofworkers. One would have to view the social aspects of the Schuman Plan and the ECSC
workers’ social rights realised at the European level. See for example, Wolfgang Lecher,Hans-Wolfgang Platzer, Stefan Rüb, Klaus-Peter Weiner, European Works Councils: NegotiatedEuropeanisation, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2002; Wolfgang Lecher, Bernhard Nagel, Hans-Wolfgang
Platzer, The Establishment of European Works Councils: from Information Committee to Social
Actor, Ashgate, Aldershot, 1999; Wolfgang Streeck, “Industrial citizenship under regime
competition: the case of the European Works Councils’,” Journal of European Public Policy, 1997.
For wider perspectives about European social citizenship see, Colin Crouch, Klaus Eder, Damian
Tambini (eds), Citizenship, Markets, and the State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; GaryMarks, Fritz Scharpf, Phillippe C. Schmitter, Wolfgang Streeck (eds), Governance in the European
Union, Sage, London, 1998.
6
Stephan Leibfried, Paul Pierson, “Social Policy”, in Helen Wallace, William Wallace (eds),
Policy-Making of the European Union, 4th Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York,
2000.
7
Hitoshi Suzuki, Digging for European Unity: the Role Played by the Trade Unions in the SchumanPlan and the European Coal and Steel Community from a German Perspective 1950-1955, Ph.D.
Thesis, Department of History and Civilization, European University Institute, Florence, December
2007.
8“Declaration of 9 May 1950” in Pascal Fontaine, Jean Monnet, a grand design for Europe, Officefor Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 1988, p.44.
9The six Member States of the ECSC were France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium andLuxembourg.
10
Lise Rye Svartvatn, “In Quest of Time, Protection and Approval: France and the Claims for Social
Harmonization in the European Economic Community, 1955-56,” Journal of European Integration
History, Vol.8, No.1, 2002, pp.85-102; Lorenzo Mechi, “L’action de la Haute Autorité de la CECA
dans la construction de maisons ouvrières,” Journal of European Integration History, Vol.6, No.1,
2000, pp.63-90.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)from a broader view. I aim to focus on the social perspectives which were embedded
into core economic policies of the ECSC, especially the coal cartel policy and thedebate of labour productivity. The trade unions of the six countries pressured Jean
Monnet, Delegates of national governments and industry in order to represent workers’
interests in these policy fields. The unions were successful in their lobbying, andtherefore workers’ fears and anxiety against the Schuman Plan was considerably eased.
Workers’ peaceful cooperation helped to stabilise and sustain the economic boom. This
was the case in the Federal Republic of Germany (Germany), and therefore this paper
will mainly focus on the German trade unions. The German trade unions, represented by
the German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB), was the largest trade union Federationin the six countries 11 and was therefore one of the most influential unions who
participated the Paris negotiations.12 Furthermore, Germany itself was indispensable forthe success of the Schuman Plan because of her economic and industrial potential,
especially the coal resource of the Ruhr. Coal from the Ruhr was indispensable, not only
for Germany but for all six countries in order to reconstruct its national economies.13
Coal was still a major energy resource in the 1950s.
If the Schuman Plan played a crucial role in post-war reconstruction of national
welfare states, what was the Schuman Plan and how have historians and politicalscientists viewed it? The Schuman Plan was a proposal announced on 9 May 1950 by
the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman.14 The Plan proposed that coal and steel
of France and Germany (and other European countries, in cases they wished to join)should be pooled at the European level. A supra-national institution, later on the High
Authority of the ECSC, would be in charge of the policies of both industries, once thenational governments had given away their national sovereignty. Historians such as
Alan Milward have interpreted the Schuman Plan as a European rescue of nation states,
stating that the former was necessary for the latter to reconstruct itself after the Second
World War.15 Milward concluded that national governments gave away its sovereignty
because they had to reconstruct and sustain its national economy, and that European
integration has advanced as far as it agreed with national interests of its Member
11

At the point of 1950, the German DGB had around 5,181,000 members, the Italian CISL with1,600,000 members, the French FO with 1,200,000 members, and the three Benelux countries with
far modest numbers.
12
For the role played by the German trade unions and the European wide network which the tradeunion of the six countries constructed, see Suzuki, Digging for European Unity, 2007.
13
Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51, Methuen, London, 1984.
14
Dirk Spierenburg, Raymond Poidevin, The History of the High Authority of the European Coaland Steel Community, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1994; Klaus Schwabe (Hrsg.), Die Anfänge
des Schuman-Plans 1950/51, Nomos, Baden, 1988.
15
Alan Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation-State (2.ed), Routledge, London, 2000.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)States.16 Although many critics rouse against Milward’s hypothesis, his conclusions
were basically accepted by historians. Historians carried out detailed and in-depth
analysis of various national interests and interests of industry, and have developed
historiography of European integration since the 1980s.17
There is, however, a crucial lacuna in the above mentioned literature. If theSchuman Plan played a crucial role in reconstructing nation states, how much impact
did it have on one of the most dramatic development in the post-war era: thereconstruction and strengthening of national welfare states? How did it contribute tobuild and sustain welfare states and social related policies? While the mainstream
literature focused on European institutions, national governments and industry, one
crucial participant has been almost totally absent: the workers, or trade unions, of thesix countries. 18 The lack of literature on trade unions seems to result in the lacuna of
explaining the impact of the Schuman Plan on reconstructing national welfare states.
To put the conclusion of this paper short, the Schuman Plan and the ECSC both
functioned as an agreement between the ECSC institutions, the Member State
governments, the trade unions and, to a lesser extent, industry owners. The SchumanPlan ensured direct participation of union leaders in negotiations and decision-making
processes at the European level, hence enabling post-war reconstruction of the six
countries. In other words, the Schuman Plan was a European-wide “post-war
settlement” in order to appease the trade unions and make them cooperate for economic
growth. In exchange to agreeing with the policies and methods of economic growth, the16

Milward was, although being the first case, not the only one who focused on national intereststhat drove European integration forward. Historians other than Milward have confirmed the fact that
the Schuman Plan proposal and its negotiations were based on national interests of the participating
countries. See for examples, Wilfried Loth (ed.), Crises and Compromises: the European Project
1963-1969, Nomos Verlag, Baden-Baden, 2001; Anne Deighton, Alan S. Milward (eds), Widening,
Deepening and Acceleration: the European Economic Community 1957-1963, Nomos, Baden-Baden,
1999.
17
Research of European integration history has been developed since the 1980s, in which the launchof the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians and its journal, Journal of European
Integration History, have played a decisive role.
18
For some exceptions which focused on trade unions see, Werner Bührer, “Les syndicats
ouest-allemands et le Plan Schuman,” in Andreas Wilkens (eds), Le Plan Schuman dans l’Histoire:
Intérêts nationaux et projet européen, Établissements Émile Bruylant, Brussels, 2004; Wilfried Loth,“The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU)” in, Walter Lipgens, Wilfried Loth (eds), Documents on the History of European
Integration, vol.4, Transnational Organisations of Political Parties and Pressure Groups in the
Struggle for European Union, 1945-1950, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin / New York, 1991; Ernst B.
Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stevens & Sons, London, 1958. For current issues of trade unions andwage bargaining see also, John Driffill, “The Centralization of Wage Bargaining Revisited”, Journalof Common Market Studies, Vol.44, No.4, November 2006; Andreas Bieler, “Integration and theTransnational Restructuring of Social Relations”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol.43, No.3,
September 2005.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
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unions of the six countries were promised direct participation in the decision-making
processes of the most sensible issues concerning coal and steel industry: those weretrade, investment, rationalisation, productivity, housing of workers and other social
policies, all which affected workers living and working standards. Participation in the
ECSC institutions provided the unions with crucial information of the two industry
sectors, more than they had ever obtained before in national wage bargaining. 19 This
helped the trade unions, especially in the case of the German unions, to strengthen theirbargaining power in domestic wage bargaining.20 The unions, especially its leaders,firmly supported the ECSC and the following developments of European integration up
to present. As a result of their reinforced influence, resulting in workers gaining higher
wages, the unions did not frequently strike or demonstrate against the Schuman Plan
and the ECSC but cooperated instead for running the coal and steel industry in peacefulmanner. This was an indispensable aspect of the Schuman Plan and the ECSC enablingpost-war economic boom and the reconstruction of nation states.
After defining the term “post-war settlement” in the next section, we will look into
the Schuman Plan and the idea of German trade unionism of Mitbestimmung(co-determination), meaning trade union participation, and will see how and why thetrade unions supported the Schuman Plan. In the second section we will look into theParis negotiations and the ratification debates of the Paris Treaty and see what role thetrade unions played in the debates. The third section will focus on the decision-making
process of the ECSC, mainly the High Authority and the Consultative Committee, andwill analyse the impact of trade union participation on the policy of coal cartel
dismantlement and policies of improving productivity. Finally, we will come back to the
hypothesis that the Schuman Plan was a post-war settlement at the European level in the
conclusion section.
1. The Schuman Plan: an invitation for trade union participation
Before looking into the details of the Schuman Plan and its negotiations, one must
define what the “post-war settlement” was. The term of post-war settlement first
appeared in Charles Maier’s article of 1977 when he analysed the policies of
productivity in post-war America, German, Japan and other Western European
countries. 21 He explained how and why American officials in Washington pursued
19

Conversation between Walter Freitag and Hans Brümmer, DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 72, 9.11.1952;
DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 60, 29./31.1.1951.
20
Suzuki, Digging for European Unity, 2007, pp.226-228.
21
Charles Maier, “The politics of productivity: foundations of American international economic
policy after World War II,” International Organization, Vol.31, No.4, autumn 1977, pp.607-633.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)policies of productivity in the immediate post-war period, which functioned in the
United States, Western Europe and Japan as a political agreement for economic growth.
A crucial aspect of the settlement was that workers, mostly organised under trade unions,would halt class struggles against industry owners and would, in exchange to obtaining
higher wages, cooperate peacefully to improve labour productivity. In other words, thepost-war settlement was a consensus, or reconciliation, between labour, national
government and business, aiming for post-war reconstruction of capitalist economy andnational welfare state.22
The settlement in post-war Germany was agreed between the German government,
business and labour, and also functioned as reconciliation between Konrad Adenauer’s
conservative coalition and the Social Democrats, both the political party (SPD) and thetrade unions. The post-war German economy has been described as social market
economy, a system which combined free market economy and national welfare policies.
According to Esping-Andersen’s categorising of welfare states,23 the German welfare
state is defined as a conservative model: welfare services have been provided by bothnational welfare schemes and one’s household. The German welfare state kept a
conservative, or Christian Democratic, view of emphasising the role of family inwelfare issues, though also provided generous national pensions, unemployment
insurance and other financial coverage. These national schemes were realised understrong presence and pressure of the Social Democrats, especially the trade unions. How
were the German trade unions able to influence the conservative cabinet, when the SPD
was out of the coalition?
The German trade unions, led by the DGB, were not only the largest Federation in
the six European countries. It was also efficient in integrating its member workers undera single slogan: the idea of co-determination. The German unions abandoned Marxist
claims in early periods of the twentieth century and shifted to accept capitalist economy,
though trying by all means to ease workers’ sacrifices. The idea of co-determination,
defined by a trade union academic Fritz Naphtali in 1928,24 aimed to keep watch on
national government and industry owners in economic and social issues so that workers’
living and working standards be improved. They aimed to participate in22

Christopher Pierson, Beyond the Welfare State?, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1991; Gøsta
Esping-Andersen, The Three World of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
1990; Robert Boyer, La flexibilite du travail en Europe, Editions La Découverte, Paris, 1986.
23
Esping-Andersen, Three World of Welfare Capitalism, 1990. He categories welfare states in three:conservative model, social democratic model and liberal model.
24(Hrsg.) im Auftrage des Allgemeinen Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes von Fritz Naphtali,
Wirtschaftsdemokratie –Ihr Wesen, Weg und Ziel, Verlagsgesellschaft des Allgemeinen Deutschen
Gewerkschaftsbundes, Berlin, 1928.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)decision-making processes at two levels: in management boards of industry and innational government. The former concerned wages and other working standards, and thelatter concerned industrial policy, economic policy and its planning. By participating
and influencing, the German unions aimed to ease the crude circumstances andsacrifices of workers under capitalist economy. 25 The Weimar Republic, however,collapsed by the rise of Hitler, and trade unionism was forbidden in 1933. The unions
lost their chances of enforcing co-determination and had to wait until the Second World
War ended.
In the post-war period, Germany was divided into four occupation zones, eachgoverned by the United States, France, Britain and the Soviet Union. Except for the
Eastern zone, German trade unions were reconstructed in the three Western Zones. The
Marshall Plan, proposed in 1947, was a crucial moment when German trade unions
clearly stated that they would reject communist economy and would stay firmly withcapitalist economy. While the SPD under Kurt Schumacher opposed the Marshall Planas being “too much capitalistic,” 26 the German trade unions led by Hans Böckler
opposed the SPD and supported the Plan with the aim to attract American investment toGerman industry and to revive German economy. 27 His aim was not achieved, due toseveral reasons: Germany was still under occupation, the Allies restricted German
industry, and the Allied démontage policy hindered German economy because
equipments of German industries were taken apart and shipped away to the Alliedcountries. This ended up in further decline of German economy. 28 It was only after the
Schuman Plan was announced and after German diplomacy “was permitted” to act on
its own that the German economy finally revived.29
Although not realising post-war economic reconstruction, the Marshall Plan was animportant test case which showed that German unions would cooperate peacefully forcapitalist economy and would keep away from communists. The only condition for suchcooperation was that equal righted co-determination (paritätische Mitbestimmung) be
25

For the idea of co-determination and its history, see Bo Stråth, The Organisation of LabourMarkets: Modernity, Culture and Governance in Germany, Sweden, Britain and Japan, Routledge,
London, 1996.
26
Willi Arbrecht (Hrsg.), Kurt Schumacher, Rede – Schriften – Korrespondenzen 1945-1952, Verlag
J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., Berlin / Bonn, 1985.
27
Karl Lauschke, Hans Böckler : Gewerkschaftlicher Neubeginn 1945-1951, Bund-Verlag,
Frankfurt am Main, 2005.
28
Letter from the Executive Council of the AFL to American President Harry Truman, 24
November 1947, OF 198, Harry S. Truman Library; Letter from Walter P. Reuther to US President
Harry Truman, 10 May 1949, OF 295, Harry S. Truman Library; PA, BD I 294 A, Änderungsantrag
der Fraktion der SPD, Umdruck Nr.407, Bonn, 8. Januar 1952.
29
Thanks to the fact that Adenauer agreed to sign the Paris Treaty of 1951, the Allies authorised
Adenauer to launch the German Foreign Minister in March 1951.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)realised immediately in German industry and national economic planning. 30 Germany
once more stood as a nation state in September 1949, and negotiations for easing Allied
restriction on German industry was under negotiation. The German unions insisted on
co-determination being embedded into the post-war institutions, and claimed that theymust be represented in the negotiations.
While the Americans and British were positive on giving the Germans theirsovereignty back, it was the French who insisted on restricting German sovereignty.
Based on French proposal, the International Ruhr Authority was launched in 1949 andwas expected to solve the so-called Ruhr problem: France and other Western countries
having access to coal resources of the Ruhr, so that these countries could reconstructtheir national economy. Based on French claims, the Ruhr Authority was to exclude theGermans out of the negotiations where plans of production and export of German coalresource were decided. The Ruhr Authority turned out a failure shortly after its launch,
because it did not treat the Germans equally and therefore the Germans (the government,
industry and workers) did not cooperate. Moreover, its coal policy was far fromrational.31 The Schuman Plan was proposed as an alternative of the Ruhr Authority, thistime ensuring the Germans equal status. This was one of the cores of Jean Monnet’s
strategy when he prepared the draft of the Plan, which the French Foreign Minister
Robert Schuman agreed to and supported.
The Schuman Plan proposal was not only a break through in terms of offering theGermans equal status. It was also a crucial break through in terms of labour issues andtrade union participation in economic planning. The Schuman Plan defined the role ofthe High Authority, the ECSC’s decision-making organ and also its administration body,as planning and carrying out policies of coal and steel of all participating countries. The
proposal stated that the persons who would be in charge of the High Authority,
estimated as around 8 to 10 people, hold “equal rights” regardless of one’s nationality or
any other background. Monnet firstly meant that this statement assured equal status for
the German Delegates,32 though the trade unions understood it in a slightly different
way. They understood that trade union members, once nominated by national
governments as High Authority members, could participate in the decision-making
process with equal rights as labour representatives, and not as powerless observers as
was mostly the case for union representatives in national economic planning. Leaders of30

Suzuki, Digging for European Unity, 2007, pp.95-134.
Germany was forced to export coal with cheap prices while forced to import expensive coal. This
ended up in shortage of coal in Germany which damaged the economy. Coal policy required a morerational European policy, and this was what the Schuman Plan proposed.
32
Jean Monnet, Memoirs, Collins, London, 1978.
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the DGB understood the Schuman Plan as a chance to realise co-determination at theEuropean level. 33 Being joined with trade union leaders of the other European countries,
the German union leaders aimed to participate in the Paris negotiations and to influence
its outcomes based on trade union perspectives.
2. The European network of trade unions in the Paris negotiations and theratification debates of the Paris Treaty
The Paris negotiations took place from 20 June 1950 under the chair of Jean Monnet.
Delegations sent from the six governments, mostly officials of the Foreign Ministry
who were supported by specialists of economy and industry, met regularly until April
1951 when the Paris Treaty was signed. In the negotiations, Monnet’s original proposal
had to retreat, due to the claims raised by the national Delegates. Two issues weresignificant. One was about the definition of the High Authority’s power, described as“supra-national” in the proposal. The Dutch opposed and proposed to settle a council of
Ministers where crucial national interests could be represented.34 The proposal was
supported by the other Delegates who feared to give too much autonomy to the High
Authority, or in other words to Jean Monnet himself.
Another crucial issue of the negotiations was the coal cartels. As mentioned before,
the international distribution of coal from the Ruhr was decisive for all six countries toreconstruct. Based on American pressure,35 Monnet first emphasised that the High
Authority would dismantle coal cartels in order to realise economic growth. The ownersof coal industry, especially Germans and Belgians, opposed such policy and suspected
Monnet’s dirigisme. The trade unions of all six countries also opposed Monnet’s policy,
though from very different reasons. The German, French and Belgian unions led thedebate, arguing that the coal cartels functioned in protecting employment of coalminers,
especially in marginal coalmines. If cartels were forbidden and free competition was
suddenly introduced into the coal market, smaller coalmines would have to facerationalisation and immediate closure, ending up in the workers loosing their jobs.36
The German unions insisted on this point and asked help from the American AlliedHigh Commissioner John McCloy in order to persuade Jean Monnet and Konrad
33

DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 529, 8.7.1954.
Spierenburg, Poidevin, History of the High Authority, 1994.
35
Clifford P. Hackett (ed.), Monnet and the Americans, Jean Monnet Council, Washington DC,
1995; Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the United States of Europe, St. Martin’s Press,
New York, 1993.
36“Bericht der Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau an den Ausschuss für Kartelle undZusammenschlüsse, innerhalb des 21er Ausschusses der Gewerkschaften,” DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1,
91, 28.8.1954.
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Adenauer.37 A month before the Paris Treaty was signed, the DGB stated in March
1951 that trade unions’ support for the Schuman Plan depended on the coal cartel issue,
and that their support was conditional if cartels were to be dismantled.38 The Paris
negotiations were concluded by not giving clear definition of what the High Authority
could do to tackle the coal cartels.39
During the ratification debates in the German parliament, the Bundestag, Adenauer
needed support from the German trade unions. 40 His cabinet consisted of conservative
parties, but it was not clear whether members from the FDP, representing the German
industry owners, would agree to the CDU’s ratification bill of the Paris Treaty.
Dismantle of coal cartels was still referred to in the Treaty, and these clauses were
objected by members of the FDP. If the Bundestag were to ratify the Treaty, Adenauer
had to cut a portion of politicians off from the SPD and stop their veto against the CDU
bill. He expected that the DGB members inside the SPD would take the risk of
supporting the CDU bill. Fortunately this gamble worked, and the CDU bill barely
gained enough votes on 11 January 1952 in the Bundestag.41 In exchange to theircooperation for Adenauer, the DGB gained support from Adenauer and the CDU/CSU
for their Federal law of co-determination in the coal and steel industry, theMitbestimmungsgesetz of 1951.42 This law gave the German unions strong power innational wage bargaining. The SPD alone did not have enough votes to pass the bill, and
the German trade unions needed votes also from the CDU/CSU. Allied HighCommissioner John McCloy pressured Adenauer to pass the bill, which was also a
crucial factor to promulgate the law.43 Ludwig Erhard, the Minister of Economy, was abeliever of free economy and opposed to give the German unions too much power.
McCloy was a strategically significant person for the German trade unions, both inEuropean integration issues and domestic German politics.
The German trade unions not only used the Allied authorities in order to influence
Adenauer’s coalition and the Paris negotiations. They were able to directly influence thenegotiations because trade union leaders became members of the national Delegations.
37

Hackett, Monnet and the Americans, 1995; Monnet, Memoirs, 1978.
DGB-Archiv, Best. 24.1, 528, 11./12.3.1951.
39
Spierenburg, Poidevin, History of the High Authority, 1994.
40
Hans-Peter Schwarz, Konrad Adenauer, Berghahn Books, Oxford, 1995; Horst Thum,
Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie: Der Mythos vom Sieg der Gewerkschaften, Deutsche
Verlags- Anstalt, Stuttgart, 1982.
41
Suzuki, Digging for European Unity, 2007, pp.162-174.
42
Thum, Mitbestimmung in der Montanindustrie, 1982.
43
Thomas Schwartz, America’s Germany. John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1991.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)This was particularly the case of the DGB, who was invited by Adenauer to join andwas the only trade union Federation which regularly participated in Paris.44 The unionsof other countries depended upon the information provided by their German colleagues.
The trade unions, however, were not dominated by the Germans. They cooperated
at the European level by constructing a European network.45 Cooperation had alreadystarted in 1949 when the International Ruhr Authority was launched. The trade unionsof French, Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg, joined by the Germans and supported by
the Americans, launched a liaison committee called the International Trade Union
Committee for the Ruhr in 1949. Their aim was to lobby the International Ruhr
Authority in order to participate as trade union representatives and influence its policies.
Just as the Ruhr Authority turned out a failure, the unions’ Ruhr Committee also cameup with little results. It was, however, a remarkably early case which showed tradeunions’ cooperation at international level, a time when the International Confederationof Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was not yet launched. 46 The experience of the Ruhr
Committee was succeeded to the unions’ network of supporting the Schuman Plan.
The unions of the six countries utilised three organisations at the European level
and coordinated the three as a network of trade unions. During the Paris negotiations,the unions utilised the European Regional Organisation (ERO), a regional branch of the
ICFTU. Because the ERO covered all industry sectors and was not focused on coal andsteel exclusively, the unions had to create a new organisation so that issues of coal andsteel industry could be looked into. This was the case especially after the Paris Treaty
was signed in April 1951 and ratification debates started in each country. In March 1953
the unions launched the Committee of 21, focusing only on coal and steel industry.47
The Committee functioned as a pre-session of trade unions representatives participatingin the Consultative Committee of the ECSC.48 Now having two different trade union
organisations at the European level, the unions needed a liaison secretariat in order tocoordinate the activities of the ERO and the Committee of 21. They reformed theInternational Trade Union Committee for the Ruhr and launched the Bureau de Liaisonin Luxembourg in October 1953.49 The Bureau was in charge of collecting information
44

Suzuki, Digging for European Unity, 2007, pp.95-109.
Ibid, pp.226-234.
46
The ICFTU was launched in December 1949. For details see Denis MacShane, International
Labour and the Origins of the Cold War, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1992.
47
DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 72, 14.4.1953, Sitzung des 21er-Ausschusses.
48
Suzuki, Digging for European Unity, 2007, pp.228-246.
49
DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 72, 15.12.1952, Sitzung des Fünfzehnerausschusses, 15. Dezember 1952;
IISH, Contact Office of Miners’ and Metalworkers’ Free Trade Unions in the European Communities
Collection 2, Sitzung des Fünfzehnerausschusses, 15. Dezember 1952.
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hsuzuki@1998.jukuin.keio.ac.jp45European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)from the High Authority, delivering it to the unions and setting the agenda ofinternational trade union conferences where issues of the ECSC were discussed.50 The
German unions were the largest sponsor of both the Bureau and the Committee of 21,
therefore enjoying the strongest influence, though not dominance, in the European
network of trade unions.51 The network worked in a way not only tying the unions of
the six countries together but also securing trade unions’ commitment to both domesticsocial issues and the post-war settlement at the European level.
3. Post-war settlement at the European level
How did the post-war settlement function for the trade unions at the European level? At
the domestic level, the settlement functioned as a compensation for trade unions’compromise with national government and industry. On one hand the unions had toadmit the improvement of labour productivity in domestic debates: if the workers
wanted higher wages, they had to improve labour productivity. This meant that workers
should produce more by shorter working hours, which merely meant harder work, andthat they would agree to rationalisation of industry. If an industry sector was in decline,
workers would be laid off and would have to search for new jobs. On the other hand, theunions opposed rationalisation forced by European policies, especially the dismantlingof coal cartels by the High Authority of the ECSC. Instead of immediate rationalisation,
the unions requested its postponement or, if cartels would have to extinguish, at least acompensation for them provided by High Authority’s policies. Only when the domestic
settlement and European settlement went along together would the trade unions
cooperated for both agreements in peaceful manner and would not go on frequent
strikes and demonstrations.
After all six countries ratified the Paris Treaty, the six governments nominated themembers of the High Authority and the Consultative Committee of the ECSC in early
1952. The nine members were as follows: two Delegates each from Germany, Italy andFrance (including Jean Monnet as the President), one each from Belgium, theNetherlands and Luxembourg, and the ninth member from the trade unions. The unions
sent Paul Finet, the Belgian leader and also the first Chairman of the ICFTU, as theninth member of the High Authority. The German unions were also able to send theirmember into the High Authority. Heinz Potthoff, 52 a trade union economist, was50

Suzuki, Digging for European Unity, 2007, pp.226-246.
Ibid, pp.236-246. On the contrary, Haas argued that the Germans dominated the Committee of 21.
Haas, Uniting of Europe, 1958.
52
Heinz Potthoff, Vom Besatzungsstaat zur europäischen Gemeinschaft, Verlag für Literatur undZeitgeschehen, Hannover, 1964.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
International Symposium(Keio Jean Monnet Centre for EU Studies)nominated by Adenauer’s cabinet a week before the High Authority was launched. The
High Authority was launched on 10 August 1952 in Luxembourg.
One of the first issues which the High Authority tackled was the coal cartel issue.
Cartels and similar business restrictions under government ownership were forbidden
by articles 65 and 66. Monnet took importance of the issue because he thought that thecartels and its restrictive business customs ended up in the economic catastrophe after
1929. According to his views, cartels were not to repeat the same mistake and hinder
economic growth. Thanks to the fact that Germany signed the Paris Treaty in 1951 andratified it in the following year, Allied restrictions on German industry were abolished
one after another. The economy of the six countries took a lift-off and the economic
boom was on. Still, Monnet kept an eye on the cartels, suspecting their negative impact
on economic growth. The High Authority first announced its intention to look into thematter in June 1953.
In response to High Authority’s move, the trade unions reacted fast. The German
union of coalminers (IG Bergbau) prepared a technical report about the functions ofcoal cartels in Germany,53 especially about the Gemeinschaftsorganisation Ruhrkohle
GmbH (GEORG) which controlled nearly 90% of coal supplies in Germany. Their
message was clear: cartels were necessary because it stabilised coal prices and therefore
protected marginal coalmines.54 Without such stabilisation, coalmines would be closed
and workers would be unemployed. This might cause a leftward turn of German tradeunion members towards the communists,55 which might have an effect on the Cold War.
The claim of the German trade unions was accepted by the unions of the other six
countries and became their consensus at the European level in December 1953.56 The
Belgian unions, led by André Renard, firmly supported the Germans. The unions’ claims
on cartels were taken to both the High Authority and the Consultative Committee.
While the German trade unions opposed European policies of rationalisation, they
had little choice but to agree to improving labour productivity in domestic policies. This
was typically the case of launching a productivity agency in Germany.57 The issue was
53“Bericht der Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau an den Ausschuss für Kartelle undZusammenschlüsse, innerhalb des 21er Ausschusses der Gewerkschaften,” DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1,
91, 28.8.1954.
54
Potthoff, Vom Besatzungsstaat zur europäischen Gemeinschaft, 1964, pp.28-36.
55
HICOG Staff Conference of 8 August 1950 and 31 October 1950, File 250/68/10/2, Extracts fromHICOG Staff Conference Meetings, Office Executive Secretary, Records of the Office of the U.S.
High Commissioner, Record Group 466, NARA.
56
Informationsblatt (Bureau de Liaison), 17. Dezember 1953, DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 91,
17.12.1953.
57
For detailed explanation of productivity and productivity agencies, see Anthony Carew, Labour
under the Marshall Plan: the Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science,
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European Integration and Trade Unions
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discussed between American Allied authority, the German government and German
industry in 1951 and 1952. As usual, the unions were at first not invited to thediscussion. The German Productivity Agency was to be in charge of advising both
German government and industry of necessary methods and advices of improving
labour productivity.
The German unions were informed not by the German government but by theAmericans: Michael Saul Harris, the Head of the ECA Mission in Germany, 58 invitedthe DGB leaders to participate in the debates in January 1952. The DGB leaders showed
hesitation to the sudden invitation.59 There were two reasons. Firstly, the German
unions were cautious against the methods and ideas of improving productivity.60 They
wished to concentrate on co-determination rather than American ideas of productivity.
Moreover, information from the American unions told that productivity methods
involved intensive watch, education and punishment of workers who were not able toimprove their productivity. Secondly, the DGB leaders suspected the intentions of both
the American Allied authority and the German government. The sudden invitation
appeared as a trap for the German unions. Once the union leaders participated thedebates, it would give an outlook that they accepted the idea of productivity without theapproval of their member workers. The DGB leaders would be seriously criticised by
the workers and, in the worse case, might have to resign from their leading positions.
After discussion among its leaders, the DGB accepted to launch the Productivity
Committee in January 1952. They were still reluctant to agree, though they had few
alternatives. If the German unions refused participation in such debates, the German
government and industry would move forward without taking trade union perspectives
into account, and the German workers would be forced to obey to productivity methods
without having any chance to voice themselves against it. Absence from the debates wasout of question, and the unions simply had to participate. Still, there was hope for theGerman unions. Participating in such debates and influencing it did agree with the ideaof co-determination, because workers’ working standards would be negotiated under
trade unions’ presence and pressure.61
Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1987. For the German case see, Michael Fichter, “HICOG
and the Unions in West Germany,” in, Jeffry M. Diefendorf, Alex Frohn, Hermann-Josef Rupieper(eds), American Policy and the Reconstruction of West Germany, 1945-1955, German Historical
Institute, Washington DC, 1993.
58
The ECA Mission was in charge of allocating financial aids of the Marshall Plan in Germany.
59
DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 439, 21./22.4.1952, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.
60
Erich Bührig, Wilhelm Gefeller and Hans Brümmer’s opinion. DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 439,
21./22.4.1952, Sitzung des Bundesausschusses.
61
Hans vom Hoff’s opinion, DGB-Archiv, Best.24.1, 439, 21./22.4.1952, Sitzung desBundesausschusses.
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European Integration and Trade Unions
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German federal laws of co-determination did not, however, provide the German
unions with strong representation, because the co-determination law of 1951 did notgive exact parity to the German unions. This was why the DGB had to rely on theEuropean level, specifically their participation in the High Authority and theConsultative Committee.62 Their setback at home had to be recovered by using theEuropean institutions. Participation in these European institutions, in other words
co-determination at the European level, gave them crucial information about theGerman industry. Information was the source of trade unions’ influence whenbargaining against the owners of industry. Trade unionism at the European level helped
the DGB to strengthen their unionism at the national level. The unions had to accept
rationalisation of industry in domestic policies, though achieved policies of postponing
rationalisation at the European level. By both levels combined together, European
countries were able to reconstruct national economies, thanks to workers’ peacefulcooperation. The trade unions agreed to the burden sharing between these two levels
and, though with a not full-hearted satisfaction, decided to cooperate peacefully in orderto realise economic growth.
Conclusions
In sum, what was agreed in the early 1950s between the trade unions, national
governments, industry, and people who started to work for the ECSC in Luxembourg?
What was the post-war settlement at the European level, and what were its implications?
The case of trade unions shows that the unions, especially the Germans, agreed to a
post-war settlement at both domestic level and at the European level under the ECSC.
The settlement confirmed workers’ acceptance, represented by the unions, for
improving labour productivity at the national level. In exchange to this agreement, theEuropean settlement ensured that sudden rationalisation such as dismantling coal cartels
would not be carried out without consulting the trade unions. Furthermore, theEuropean settlement provided the unions with continuous participation indecision-making processes of coal and steel at the European level: an achievement
which the unions had not obtained before the end of the Second World War. Such
participation provided the unions with crucial information about industry and therefore
strengthened their influence. By both the domestic and European dimensions together,
the settlements assured workers’ peaceful cooperation for policies of economic growth.
Only when the agreements at both levels being secured had European countries beenable to reconstruct its national economy without facing upheaval of the workers.
62

Suzuki, Digging for European Unity, 2007, pp.226-246.
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The post-war settlement both at the European level and national level, however,had certain limits. For the trade unions, achieving the agreement at the European level
was a positive deal. Unlike the national post-war settlement, however, the European
settlement did not lead to the realisation of a welfare state at the European level. The
formal institution of welfare states still remained at the national level, and the European
level merely stood as a fussy informal system with small scaled social policies. While
core economic policies of trade and investment were decided at the European level, thesacrifices of workers were not taken care of enough and were left to national policies.
The same structure exists today and seems even more enforced. It is possible toconclude that economic policies of the ECSC did embed social aspects into itself andrespected, though in a limited manner, workers’ and trade unions’ interests. In fact, it
was the Schuman Plan that not merely rescued nation states but secured Europe’s
economic growth and wealth, a legacy which survives today in slightly different
disguise.
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Esping-Andersen, G. The Three World of Welfare Capitalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1990
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