Japan Asssociation for United Naations Studies (JAUNS)

East Asia and the United Nations
Regional Cooperation for Global Issues

Edited by
Yasushi Katsuma and Miki Honda

Published by
Waseda University Global COE Program“Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)”

For
Japan Association for United Nations Studies (JAUNS)East Asia and the United Nations
Regional Cooperation for Global Issues
The 9th Japan-Korea Seminar on the United Nations System

December 11-12, 2009
Waseda University

Organized by:
Japan Association for United Nations Studies (JAUNS)

andKorean Academic Council on the United Nations System (KACUNS)

Supported by:
Waseda University Global COE Program“Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration (GIARI)”;
Waseda University Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies (WIAPS); and2009 Waseda University Grant for International Workshop Operation

CONTENTS
Preface ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 3
Session 1
I

Peace and Security in East Asia
The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK in the Search for Peace and Security in East
Asia: Focusing on the Implementation of UN Resolution 1874
Miki Honda ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 4

IIPeace and Security in East Asia: Why Democracy Slept?
Sung-Hack Kang ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 21

Session 2
Global Human Rights Regime and Human Rights in East Asia
III
Human Rights Regime and East Asia: Major Issues and Assessments
Heung-Soon Park ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 30
IV

China’s “Floating” Population and Issues of Human Rights in a Globalizing Economy
Tomoko Ako ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 68

Session 3
V

Human Migration in East Asia
Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
Yasushi Katsuma ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 84

VI

Session 4
VII

Human Migration in East Asia: Human Trafficking of North Korean Women in China
Yoojin Rhee ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 98
Sustainable Development in East Asia
Sustainable Development in East Asia: What Do the Numbers Say?
Intaek Han ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 113

VIII

Development and Human Rights
Jun Matsukuma ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 128

Session 5
IX

The Possibility of an East Asian Community
The United Nations and East Asian Community for Enhanced Human Security andSustainability
Ryokichi Hirono ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・138

X

The Possibility of an East Asian Community: A Korean Perspective
Wongi Choe ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 154

Program of the 9th Japan-Korea Seminar on the United Nations System ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 160
About the Contributors ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ 162

Preface
This book results from the 9 th Japan-Korea Seminar on the United Nations System held at Waseda
University Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies in Tokyo on 11-12 December 2009, at which
drafts of the chapters were first presented.
This 9th annual Japan-Korea seminar, with the theme entitled ―East Asia and the United Nations:Regional Cooperation for Global Issues,‖ was the result of a joint initiative taken by two
co-organizers: the Japan Association for United Nations Studies (JAUNS) and the Korean
Academic Council on the United Nations System (KACUNS). In preparation of the seminar,
Professor Akio Watanabe, President of the JAUNS, consulted with Professor Jin-Hyun Paik,
President of the KACUNS, who was extremely supportive in organizing the Korean delegation to
Tokyo. Professor Takeo Uchida, Director of External Relations of the JAUNS, was also very
helpful throughout the preparation process.
The two-day seminar saw a coming together of varying perspectives and a cross-fertilization ofideas across different academic disciplines on several global issues that East Asia faces, including
the following:
1.

Peace and security in East Asia

2.

Global human rights regime and human rights in East Asia

3.

Human migration in East Asia

4.

Sustainable development in East Asia

5.

The possibility of an East Asian Community

In the light of the discussions that took place, some of the drafts presented at the seminar were later
revised to be included in this edited volume for publication.
We are grateful to Waseda University Global COE Program ―Global Institute for Asian Regional
Integration (GIARI),‖ Waseda Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies (WIAPS), and Waseda University
International Affairs Division for financial and other support that made this seminar possible.
Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to Assistant Professor Miki Honda who was instrumental inarranging the logistical organization for this seminar and formatting the papers for publication.
March 2010
Yasushi Katsuma
Secretary-General
Japan Association for United Nations Studies

3

Miki Honda

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK in the Search for Peace and Security in East
Asia: Focusing on the Implementation of UN Resolution 1874
Miki Honda, Ph.D.1
Introduction

On April 5, 2009, the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a variant of the
Taepodong-2 missile, followed by Scud and No-dong missile tests on July 4, 2009. Between thetwo missile tests, it also conducted a second nuclear test on May 25. Moreover, on November 10,
2009, North Korea violated the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a maritime borderline drawn up by theUnited Nations Command in 1953 to separate the North and the South, and a naval clash ensued
between North and South Korea.
Although North Korea‘s nuclear and missile tests and the NLL violations must be strongly
condemned, its recent actions suggest that the country has started to prepare for future negotiations
by strengthening its bargaining position. North Korea put three major diplomatic cards on the table– nuclear, missile, and peace agreements – in order to have bilateral talks with the U.S.
The recent situation may remind international society of the year 1994 when the DPRK broke off
the US-DPRK Agreed Framework. This required the United States to make arrangements for theprovision of light water reactors and heavy fuel oil to North Korea in exchange for the halting andeventual dismantling of its graphite-moderated reactors and related processing facilities.
This time President Barack Obama has said that he aims to ―break the pattern‖ in dealing with
North Korea in which the regime in Pyongyang alternates between provocation and negotiation.2
The U.S. has no intention of easing sanctions on North Korea to try to bring Pyongyang back to the
Six-Party Talks on denuclearization, and will not meet directly with North Korea unless it commits
to returning to the table. The ultimate goal remains the complete and verifiable denuclearization of1

Assistant Professor, Global Institute for Asian Regional Integration, Waseda University.
U.S. President Barack Obama and his counterpart South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak
agreed on November 19, 2009, at the bilateral summit held in Seoul to join forces and push the‗grand bargain‘ strategy in dealing with North Korea. 19 Nov. 2009, Bloomberg.com at
http://www.bloomberg.com
2

4

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK

the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. has always put priority on multilateral talks, avoiding bilateraltalks with North Korea. This position is shared by all of the other main players who are fully
engaged in the North’s nuclear issues.
Immediately after the second nuclear test on May 25, 2009, the United Nations Security Council(UNSC) unanimously adopted wider sanctions against the DPRK, condemning it in the strongest
terms. The June 12 Resolution 1874 demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its
obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 of October 14,
2006. Resolution 1874 (2009) banned all weapons exports from North Korea and most arms
imports into the reclusive Communist state. It also called upon all states to inspect, with theirnational authority and legislation and consistent with international law, all cargo to and from the
DPRK into their territory, including seaports and airports, as well as calling upon all states toimplement their obligations pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006).
Despite these severe sanctions, the DPRK can still maintain a low-growth economy. This ispartly because of the non-fulfillment of resolutions by UN member states.
In this paper, I will overview the current situation regarding the implementation of UN
Resolution 1874 (2009) by the major participating states. I will focus on implementation andcurrent actions among the members of the Six-Party Talks: the United States, South Korea, Japan,
Russia and China; these are the countries that are all strongly affected by the nuclear issues of theNorth. I will also make a modest attempt at analyzing whether the resolutions are an effective wayof improving the situation in North Korea.

1.

Reactions of the International Community

A Security Council Committee pursuant to Resolution 1718 (2006) was established on 14 October
2006 to oversee the relevant sanction measures and to undertake the tasks set out in paragraph 12of that same resolution. Additional functions were entrusted by the Security Council to theSanctions Committee in Resolution 1874 (2009). Through Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874

5Miki Honda(2009), the Council imposed certain measures relating to the DPRK.3 These measures included:An arms embargo (which also encompasses a ban on related financial transactions,
technical training, or services), with the exception of the provision by states to the DPRK
of small arms and light weapons and their related material, on which states are required to
notify the Committee in advance.

An embargo on nuclear and ballistic missiles and other programs related to weapons ofmass destruction.



A ban on the export of luxury goods to the DPRK.

Individual-targeted sanctions – namely, a travel ban and/or an assets freeze on designatedpersons and entities.



Inspection of all cargo to and from the DPRK.

In Resolution 1874 (2009), the Council provided for the creation of a ‗Panel of Experts‘ for an
initial period of one year to carry out certain tasks under the direction of the Committee. Bothresolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009) call upon all member states to submit reports on theimplementation of the relevant provisions of the resolutions. The Panel, an organization created toobserve the implementation of resolutions by member states, asked member countries to submit aninterim report on implementation to the Council no later than 90 days after the adoption of
Resolution 1874 (2009), and a final report to the Council no later than 30 days prior to thetermination of its mandate.
Regarding Resolution 1718 (2006), out of 192 UN members, 73 states and the European Union(EU), or just one third of the total, had submitted an interim report by May 2007. And for
Resolution 1874 (2009), the number of states that had submitted their reports as of August 2009amounted to only 38.
I will give a brief overview of these reports on Resolution 1874 (2009) submitted by the U.S.,
South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia, and summarize their recent actions and measures toimplement Resolution 1874 (2009).
3

S/RES/1718, 14 October 2006. S/RES/1874, 12 June 2009.

6

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK

United States4
The United States, the leading advocate of sanctions against North Korea, immediately enforced
the resolution after its adoption. In fact, in early June 2009, the U.S. pursued the North Koreancargo ship, the Kangnam, suspecting it of carrying items related to weapons of mass destruction,
forcing it to return to North Korea by the end of the month. It was widely assumed that the
Kangnam was headed to Myanmar/Burma via Singapore to exchange weapons for food. However,during this incident, Myanmar‘s central government made it clear that it would actively support theinternational community‘s efforts by denying entry to the ship into Myanmar.
Playing an omni-directional role in pressuring North Korea, the U.S. carried out sanctions
against North Korea that were unrelated to the resolution. In fact, there have been calls, mainly
from the U.S. Congress, to re-designate North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism.
The Obama Administration announced on June 30, 2009, new sanctions on companies involvedin suspected missile proliferation by North Korea and purchases of equipment that could be used ina nuclear weapons program.5
The Treasury and State Department said they had targeted Iran‘s ‗Hong Kong Electronics‘ andNorth Korea‘s ‗Namchongang Trading Corporation‘ under an executive order that would freeze
their U.S. assets and ban U.S. firms from dealing with them. These moves aimed to further isolate
such companies from the U.S. financial and commercial system, and to influence other countries‘
banks and corporations that may now cease doing business with North Korea at the risk ofalienating the U.S.

South Korea6
South Korea‘s ultimate hope is to achieve unification with North Korea. One possible way forward
is to realize the policy of Lee Myung-Bak‘s administration, ‗Vision 3000: Denuclearization and
4

The U.S. report submitted to the Council is S/AC.49/2009/21, 9 July 2009, which is available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml
5
CNN, 30 June 2009.
6
The report submitted to the Council by South Korea is S/AC.49/2009/13, 27 July 2009, which isavailable at http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml

7

Miki Honda

Openness.‘ This aims to promote financial assistance to the North by raising the North‘s average
income from the present US $500 to US $3,000 within ten years, and to completely denuclearize
the North.
According to the foreign policy and national security vision the administration announced,
relations with North Korea should be driven not by ideology or politics but by earnest dialogue andcooperation. The North Korean nuclear issue is a serious detriment not only to global nuclear
non-proliferation but also to peace on the Korean Peninsula. The key to the problem lies inchanging the perceptions of North Korea. North Korea needs to realize as soon as possible that the
only way to ensure its own survival while serving the interests of all Koreans is to completely
abandon its nuclear weapons in an internationally verifiable manner.
To realize the denuclearization of the North, South Korea seeks to ensure real progress in the
resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through international cooperation within theframework of a multilateral security system.
South Korea‘s Foreign Minister, Yu Myung-Hwan, has often stated that South Korea‘s stance is‗hard-and-fast.‘ The Minister has also said that the U.S. and South Korea are apparently determined
to maintain sanctions against the North until it denuclearizes. They believe that their mistake in thepast has been their piecemeal approach to negotiations that immediately rewarded the North forevery small, reversible step. Yu Myung-Hwan recently told the National Assembly‘s Foreign
Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committee, ―Even if its talks with the North resume, the U.S. will
maintain UN Security Council sanctions unless the North takes tangible measures toward
denuclearization.‖7

Japan8Resolution 1874 (2009) is of great significance as it embodies the international community‘s strong
condemnation of and profound concerns over nuclear testing. Japan has emphasized the extreme
importance of its early and full implementation and the need for member states to coordinate their
7

The China Post, 8 October 2009.
The report submitted by Japan to the Council is S/AC.49/2009/7 which is available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml
88

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK

measures to the greatest extent possible, so that the resolution can be implemented effectively.
The Japanese government has long maintained measures to prevent any imports or exports to the
DPRK of all arms and related material. It also prevents financial transactions and technical training
as stipulated in paragraphs 9 and 10 of Resolution 1874 (2009). This is based on Japan‘s generalpolicy of not allowing any arms exports, and through its ban on all imports and exports to the
DPRK under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act (introduced on 14 October 2006, and 18
June 2009, respectively).
Japan has introduced measures, also based on the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Act, toprevent the provision of financial services or the transfer of any financial or other assets orresources that could contribute to the DPRK‘s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or otherweapons of mass destruction-related programs. Japan has also implemented a total ban on the entryof DPRK vessels to Japanese ports based on the Act on Special Measures concerning theProhibition of Entry of Specified Ships into Ports. In addition, the Act on Navigation of Foreign
Ships through the Territorial Sea and Internal Waters does not allow foreign vessels to anchor ormove through Japanese territorial waters save for humanitarian purposes.
Concerning the inspection of foreign ships, Japanese envoy Yukio Takasu proposed that theresolution not permit the use of force, even during inspections of suspicious North Korean cargo,
and that inspections must be carried out on the basis of cooperation and consent and the only
recourse would be to report refusals to the Security Council. 9 The resolution did speak of a‗required‘ inspection if a ship refused to be inspected. However, the ship‘s flag country could thensend the vessel to any port it chose, where the local authorities would carry out the cargo inspection.
This weakened the inspection regime.
Japan continues to observe the strict implementation of its ban on the entry of all DPRK
nationals into Japan based on the Act on Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition. Since 16
June 2009, Japan has denied entry to foreign sailors and re-entry into Japan of foreign residents
who have violated the trade and financial measures against the DPRK.

9

Reuters, 12 June 2009.

9

Miki Honda

Russia and China
After North Korea‘s nuclear test and its missile launches, China and Russia – the North‘s closest
allies on the Security Council – initially signaled that they would oppose any new sanctions on
North Korea, pointing out that Pyongyang maintained that the rockets carried satellites and notwarheads.
China‘s Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said, ―All sides ought to look at the big picture. They
should avoid taking actions that may exacerbate the situation further.‖ Russian Foreign Minister
Sergi Lavrov also called on the international community to demonstrate a balanced approach and touse caution.10
However, Russia and China, which in the past have used their status as veto-wielding permanent
UN Security Council members to soften Western-backed sanctions against North Korea, have thistime supported the new sanctions after expressing unusually strong concern over North Korea‘s
nuclear test and missile launches.

Russia11
The report submitted by the Russian Federation to the Sanctions Committee was just half a pagein length. In it Russia showed its intention to implement Resolution 1874 (2009), however no
specific measures were mentioned, just as in the report for Resolution 1718 (2006). Russia‘sreluctance to implement sanction measures was apparent. It was only in May 2007, about sevenmonths after Resolution 1718 (2006) had been adopted, that Russia announced President Putin‘sdecree to join the sanctions regime.12
This time, with regard to the implementation of Resolution 1874 (2006), Russia seems to want toback sanctions against North Korea.13 Russia has renewed its support for UN sanctions designed tohalt North Korea‘s efforts to expand its nuclear arsenal. Moscow has sometimes positioned itself in
opposition to Washington on international issues and was reluctant to back tough new controls
10

The Australian, 7 April 2009.
The report submitted to the Council by Russia is S/AC.49/2009/6 which is available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml
12
Nikkei Shimbun, 31 May 2007.
13
Reuters, 4 August 2009.
11

10

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK

against North Korea, but it has condemned Pyongyang‘s continual defiance of successive UN
resolutions.
According to the report Russia submitted to the Sanctions Committee on 24 July 2009, 14 Russia
is working to revise and expand the list of entities, individuals, and goods to which the measuresenvisaged in Resolution 1718 (2006) were to be applied; for example, in addition to the originaleight entities, including North Korea‘s General Bureau of Atomic Energy, five North Korean
individuals are now on the UN sanctions list.
Russia believes that the measures contained in the resolution should not have any adverse
humanitarian consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK. Russia commented in thereport that the procedures to revise and expand the list were included in a draft presidential decreeon the implementation of Resolution 1874 (2009); however, more detailed information as towhether Russia is fully implementing the UN sanctions has not yet been heard.

China 15
In late July, 2009, Chinese authorities confiscated quantities of the strategic metal, vanadium,
which North Korea was trying to smuggle through Dangong. Also in late July, a Chinese steel
company that was collaborating with a North Korean company on a business project in North
Korea abruptly requested the suspension of construction. And on July 27 and 28, 2009, at a meeting
held in Washington to discuss economic strategies, the Chinese government threatened North
Korea by encouraging the U.S. to strictly enforce Resolution 1874 (2009). In response to thedemands of the international community, China, which used to fully support North Korea, appeared
to have changed its position.
However, in mid-October, 2009, Chinese premier Wen Jiabao visited the North to sign a numberof commercial pacts.16 Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, did not release many details
about the deals, merely stating that the two communist states had signed a series of agreements on
14

S/AC.49/2009/6, 24 July 2009.
The report submitted to the Council by China is S/AC.49/2003/23 which is available at
http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1718/mstatesreports.shtml
16
The Wall Street Journal, 15 October 2009.
15

11

Miki Honda

cooperation and announced that a new highway bridge over the Yalu River would be built.
However, reports from South Korean newspapers indicated that Beijing, as part of a comprehensive
economic package, had also agreed to provide financial assistance to Kim‘s destitute state. Chinese
grants to the North totaled at least $200 million.
Resolution 1874 (2009), unanimously adopted on June 12, forbids many, if not most,commercial contacts with North Korea. Paragraph 19 calls on U.N. member states ―not to enter into
new commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional loans to the DPRK, except forhumanitarian and developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population,or the promotion of denuclearization.‖ Paragraph 20 calls on members ―not to provide publicfinancial support for trade with the DPRK where such financial support could contribute to the
DPRK's nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-related programs or activities.‖

Other nations
Other governments, including India and Hong Kong, also put forth sincere efforts to enforce theUN sanctions. On August 7, after six hours of pursuit off the coast of India, the Indian Coast Guard
apprehended the North Korean vessel, Musan, for docking without permission. In order to enforce
Resolution 1874 (2009), the Hong Kong government prepared to enact a new bill. This was inaddition to investigating two North Korean companies involved with a North Korean investment
fund called the Choson Fund, to determine whether or not they were in violation of Hong Konglaws in relation to Resolution 1874 (2009).
The European Union (EU)17 also agreed to observe Resolution 1874 (2009). On July 27 at aconference of foreign ministers of EU nations, the 27 countries agreed that the EU would observe
Resolution 1874 (2009) and strengthen sanctions against North Korea. At the conference, theforeign ministers clearly stated that the EU would strengthen its inspections of North Korean cargoships. They also listed items banned from export, people who would be prohibited from entering
the EU, and North Korean assets that would be frozen.
17

European Union (EU) submitted the report pursuant to Resolution 1718 to the Council on 13
November 2006 (S/AC.49/2006/7), but it has not submitted the report pursuant to Resolution 1874
as of 1 December 2009.

12

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK

2. Economic impact on the DPRK

Overall, Resolution 1874 (2009) has been enforced relatively effectively by the international
community. Still, an examination of the growth rates on both sides of the demilitarized zone overthe last year shows that the regime in Pyongyang managed to deliver better growth than South
Korea.
According to statistics released in late June, 2009, by the Bank of Korea, the basket-caseeconomy in the North registered growth of 3.7% in 2008 after two consecutive years ofcontraction.18 That is better than the 2.2% posted last year by South Korea, which, like otherexport-dependent Asian countries, was hurt by the recession in the U.S., Japan, and Europe.
The surprise is underscored by the tiny size of the North Korean economy, which is easily
swayed by such factors as weather and outside assistance. Just over two-thirds of the 3.7% growthcame from the agricultural sector, which is heavily dictated by the weather. As it managed toescape from major floods and drought, North Korea‘s agricultural output increased by 10.9% in2008 after falling by 12.1% in the previous year. Its 2008 manufacturing production also grew by
2.5%, compared to a gain of a mere 0.8% in 2007, thanks to supplies of heavy oil from the U.S. andits allies as a result of Pyongyang‘s agreement last year to begin dismantling its nuclear facilities.
But North Korea‘s nuclear test in May and the missile tests in April and July have led to asuspension of outside help and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.N. This will lead to apoor performance in the manufacturing sector, which will almost certainly face an acute shortage ofoil and electricity this year.
Pyongyang cannot count on the agricultural industry for any major contribution to economic
growth in 2009, either. Even if North Korea manages to maintain the 2008 grain output of 4.3
million tons, which will be difficult to achieve unless last year‘s exceptionally good weather isrepeated, this will not help the economy grow as it starts from a high base.

18―
GDP of North Korea in 2008,‖ released on 28 June 2008 by the Bank of Korea.

13

Miki Honda

3. UN sanctions and violators

North Korea
The economy of North Korea is being damaged gradually as a result of the UN economic sanctions
but it can still maintain some growth. Why? According to a UN report by the Security Council
Panel, which was established in June to assess the effectiveness of UN sanctions, this is partly
because the DPRK violates UN sanctions by selling weapons to nations in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, and by hiding financial transactions that support its missile and nuclear programs.
The UNSC Panel claimed in its report that the DPRK continues to evade UN sanctions.
According to the report, which has not yet been publicly released but was reported by Bloomberg,
North Korea is likely to have used correspondent accounts in foreign banks, informal transfer
mechanisms, cash couriers, and other well-known techniques that can be used for money
laundering or other surreptitious transactions.19
The report said that arms sales banned by the UN have increasingly become one of the country‘s
principal sources of obtaining foreign exchange. North Korea has used reputable shipping entities,
false descriptions of goods, and multiple transfers to hide arms smuggling. The report also pointed
out that the DPRK has established a highly sophisticated international network for the acquisition,marketing, and sales of arms and military equipment.
The report raised the case of the seizure of a substantial cargo of weapons from North Korea,
apparently referring to arms seized in August by the United Arab Emirates from anAustralian-owned ship. The report also said that despite the UN embargo the North continued toimport luxury goods intended for its leadership. It noted that in July, Italy blocked the sale of two
yachts that police said were destined for North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il.
The panel, which began work in September, said it would work on recommendations to the
Security Council for further firms and individuals to be put on the sanctions list as well asrecommend goods imported by North Korea that should be banned. It also promised a more exact
definition of small arms as well as luxury goods.
19

Bloomberg, 18 November 2009. Reuters, 18 November 2009.

14

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK

China
In a bid to ensure the resolution remains strong and to achieve the full effect of economic sanctions,cooperation with China is especially crucial because China accounts for over 70% of North Korea‘sforeign trade. China‘s trade with the state has soared since Pyongyang‘s October 2006 nuclear test,
thereby helping the impoverished regime survive the tightening sanctions. In 2008, China‘s tradewith the North increased 41.3% from the year before to $2.79 billion. This jump helped account forthe previously mentioned 3.7% expansion in North Korea‘s economy in 2008 as the country pulled
out of a downturn especially evident in the two preceding years.
According to Reuters, in the first eight months of 2009, trade was down slightly by 6.2%. 20 It
would seem that it is futile working through the UN if permanent Security Council members areallowed to violate its resolutions. The resolution urges but does not require member states andinstitutions to prohibit new grants or loans to North Korea, except for humanitarian or development
aid.
Victor Cha, a former deputy American nuclear negotiator with North Korea, said that China‘spackage of assistance in mid-October leads to the repetition of a failed negotiating pattern with
North Korea. Cha said at a forum in Seoul on the nuclear standoff that, ―We end up in the same
cycle, in which they get some assistance to come back to talks. There is some negotiation that leads
to some interim steps. There is another crisis, another provocation, and the cycle starts all overagain.‖21 China‘s new contract with the North can strengthen the country‘s economy, bolster the
regime, and allow it to keep its weapons programs. Averting that kind of cycle seems to have been
the rationale behind paragraphs 19 and 20 of the Security Council‘s strictly worded resolution in
the first place.
International society does not officially criticize China‘s assistance for the North because they
believe that China‘s strong ties with the North can be used as a diplomatic channel in case theNorth escalates aggressions. Thus, they have kept the Beijing channel open in order to persuade the20
21

The Wall Street Journal, 15 October 2009.
Associated Press, 16 October 2009.

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Miki Honda

North at a potentially critical moment.

4. Are UN resolutions effective?

To be sure, the actions of China undermine the effectiveness of UN resolutions. If China was so
inclined, it could have used its extraordinary leverage to much better effect on the implementationof the resolutions. China accounted for about 73% of the North‘s total international trade last year,
and Beijing has provided an estimated 90% of North Korea‘s oil, 80% of its consumer goods and
45% of its food.22 Without China, the North would not have had the ability to fund either its
expensive nuclear weapons or missile programs.
Therefore, can we conclude that the UN resolutions are ineffective? Not exactly. As North Korea
has often cited, it considers any sanctions or pressure applied against its rocket launches as a―declaration of war.‖ This comment can be regarded as the most decisive evidence of theeffectiveness of sanctions.
The ultimate objective of sanctions is to denuclearize and to change the policy of the DPRK;
however, this cannot be achieved only with UN sanctions. Through diplomatic channels such as
bilateral talks between the U.S. and the DPRK, multilateral discussions through the Six-Party Talks,and UN resolutions, the objectives can be achieved step by step from one level to the next. The UN
resolutions can continue to send a strong message that sanctions will not be lifted until the North
complies fully with its obligations under Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). Even if somenations closest to the North lift sanctions, the UN itself should not lift them so easily. It is
important for the UN to show its resolute presence and to watch the North‘s political movements tosend a powerful message to the North.
Clearly, the UN must find a way to make the resolutions more effective. One reason behind thenon-fulfillment of the resolutions is because of the member states‘ domestic laws, but it is mostly
because of the lack of penal provisions related to those who fail to implement or who violate aresolution. Resolutions are implemented under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which
22

The Wall Street Journal, ibid.

16

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRK

excludes the use of force, thereby lacking the authority for mandatory enforcement.
The same can be said of the report submission to the Council. In fact, the resolution says that ―…
all Member States are called upon to take, in accordance with their national authorities andlegislation, and consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspectionof cargo to and from the DPRK, as necessary.‖ Using the words ―call upon,‖ implementation is leftto each nation‘s discretion. Therefore, in accordance with its economic, political, cultural, social,historical, and geographical relations with North Korea, the level of implementation differs in eachmember country.
Here I must propose an important question; what can the UN resolutions do in order to avoid
such violations? One measure that the UN can take is to name and shame a violator and to send astrong signal that such violations cannot be allowed by the international community. The Panel ofExperts of the North Korean sanction regime can carefully apply this ―naming and shaming
strategy.‖ The strategy was quite successful in the Angola (UNITA) sanction regime. 23 The Panelof Experts tabled a detailed report that identified sanctions violators and set out a number ofrecommendations for action. The strategy initially was strongly opposed by some UN member
states, which perceived their own interests to be affected indirectly, but the strategy soon came tobe accepted. The panel made the violators‘ names public in the reports and shamed them. As aresult, some states, which had given military assistance to UNITA, abandoned their support of therebel force and joined the sanction regime. This strategy is extended to other sanction regimes suchas in the case of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebel force in Sierra Leone and in the caseof Liberia.

Conclusion: The way forward for peace and security in East Asia

North Korean leaders are always bold in taking negative, hostile actions but extremely cautious in
23

The UNSC imposed sanctions on Angola (UNITA: União National para a Independência Totalde Angola) from 1993 (Res. 864) to 2002 (Res. 1448). The Angola sanction regime was successful
from when Canadian ambassador Robert Fowler was assigned as a chairman of the Sanction
Committee in 1999. David J.R. Angell, ―The Angola Sanctions Committee,‖ David M. Malone (ed),The UN Security Council: from the Cold War to the 21 st Century.

17Miki Honda

taking positive, conciliatory steps. They risked war in the nuclear crisis of 1994 and they failed totake up the offer made by the Clinton administration to normalize relations in 2000. They agreed todisable part of their nuclear program but did not go any further.
The Obama administration has recently become the latest target of North Korean brinkmanshipdiplomacy. It seems that the DPRK‘s behavior has been quite rational as its actions remind of the
1990s when relations between the North and the U.S. gained ground. By strengthening the threepolitical cards of nuclear issues, missile issues, and peace arrangements, the North has tried tonegotiate in a tough manner. By salvaging its relationship with the U.S, the North aims to maintainorder and gain financial support.
If, in a bid to pull the U.S. to the negotiation table, the DPRK conducts one more nuclear test or
launches another missile, tensions in East Asia will run higher than ever and the Security Council
will have to take even more coercive measures against the North. But there are few measures left
for the Council; the unfulfilled sanctions proposals of the Clinton administration were quite similar
to the measures of Resolution 1718 (2006). These proposals included the discontinuation ofassistance and the contraction of diplomatic relations with the DPRK.
Calling for UN members to stop economic and development aid and for a reduction in
diplomatic ties with the North are possible further measures; however, the international community
needs to think about other options because such crucial ones could lead to a repeat of the tragedy ofthe Iraqi sanction regime which severely hurt innocent civilians.
Until now, North Korea has used every possible tool in its brinkmanship diplomacy and willprobably keep playing the same game. What will make a difference this time is the strong
determination of the Obama administration and the member states of the Six-Party Talks. The U.S.
has repeatedly stressed that the visit is "not for negotiation, but efforts to pave the way for DPRK's
return to the six-party talks.‖ 24 South Korean Foreign Minister Yu Myung-Hwan said his county
would not accept any peace treaty adopted between Washington and Pyongyang. 25 The bilateraltalks between the U.S. and the North are ―a part‖ of the multilateral talks. The nuclear issues of the
24

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton speaking during a news conference at the APEC Summit
in Singapore November 11, 2009.
25
2 December 2009 at www.xinhuanet.com

18

The Role of UN Sanctions against the DPRKNorth should be always discussed among the six states, South Korea believes.
U.S. special envoy for North Korea Stephan Bosworth visited Pyongyang for a U.S. – DPRK
bilateral meeting from Dec. 8, 2009. Considering that the trip marks the first U.S. – DPRK
dialogue since the inauguration of the Obama administration, it was highly unlikely that this trip
alone would be enough to bring the DPRK back to the multilateral negotiation table. At the press
conference after the visit to the North, Bosworth said that the visit and the conversations in
Pyongyang were very useful and he was able to exchange views in a candid and business-likefashion. The envoy also said that North Korea had told him UN sanctions must be lifted. 26
While the envoy failed to secure a firm commitment from North Korea on resuming the
Six-Party Talks he said he was assured that the North Koreans wanted to return to the table forwhat could lead to its nuclear disarmament. In fact, North Korea called for an end to hostile
relations with the U.S. in a New Year‘s message and said it was committed to making the Korean
peninsula nuclear-free through negotiations27.
Japan, another key player in the Talks, has another important concern with the North – theabduction issue. The North has utilized the position of keeping Japan in the dark about the truth of
the abduction and maintaining a level of ambiguity. This has been in North Korea‘s interest,
especially because it has seemed to work. As long as the abduction issue remains unsolved, allJapan can do is to comply with the UN resolutions to the best of its ability, and to develop domestic
laws to make way for the full implementation of the resolutions.
The way forward for the international community seems to be strenuous engagement,
including an option to normalize U.S. – DPRK relations, and sometimes combined with counter
proliferation and defensive efforts, as has always been done.

26
27

AP, 16 Dec. 2009.
AP, 2 January 2010.

19

Miki Honda

Reference―
GDP of North Korea in 2008,‖ released on 28 June 2008 by the Bank of Korea.
―
Global Korea: The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Korea,‖ The Lee Myung-Bak
Administration‘s Foreign Policy and National Security Vision, June 2009.
Honda, Miki. ―DPRK‘s ‗Nuclear Crises‘ and UN Sanctions,‖ in The United Nations Studies
Number 9: Challenges to the Institution of the UN Charter, The Japan Association for United
Nations Studies, Kokusai Shoin, 2008, pp. 159-187.
Malone, David M. The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, International
Peace Academy, 2004.
Michishita, Narushige. ―Playing the Same Game: North Korea‘s Coercive Attempt at U.S.
Reconciliation‖ in The Washington Quarterly, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
October 2009, pp. 139-152.
S/RES/1718, 14 October 2006; S/RES/1874, 12 June 2009; S/AC.49/2009/21, 9 July 2009;
S/AC.49/2009/13, 27 July 2009; S/AC.49/2009/7; S/AC.49/2009/6; S/AC.49/2003/23;
S/AC.49/2006/7
Wit, Joel S., Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci. The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis:
Going Critical, The Brooking Institution, 2004.

20

Peace and Security in East Asia

Peace and Security in East Asia: Why Democracy Slept?
Sung-Hack Kang1
Every thousand pages published on the causes of wars there is less than one
page directly on the causes of peace. And yet the causes of war and peace,
logically, should dovetail into one another. A valid diagnosis of war will bereflected in a valid diagnosis of peace.
---Geoffrey Blainey--Prologue

In general, maritime hegemonic powers are threatening because of what they do; continental land
powers are threatening because of what they are and security in East Asia is in danger. Unless thepolitical leaders of the East Asian countries change their national security policy, the precarious but
long peace in the region (my discussion shall be mostly confined to North East Asia) that has been
ensured since the end of the Korean War will disappear sooner or later. There are, broadly speaking,two main sources of looming danger that East Asia is facing willy-nilly: underlying (remote)sources and precipitating (immediate) sources of danger. 2

1. Underlying Sources of Danger: Rising China.

The rapid growth of China‘s GNP (gross national power) over the last three decades is alreadychanging the Gestalt of East Asia (the Asia-Pacific region). International history teaches us thatthe emergence of a new great power is at least initially a destabilizing factor in the international
system, whether it is bipolar, multipolar, or unipolar. A rising power tends to be a revisionist power,
desirous of greater prestige and political influence commensurate with its newly enhanced grossnational power in international society. China ultimately turned out to be a winner in World War II,
1

Professor, Korea University.
It should be clear that I am employing here the mode of analysis initiated by Thucydides, theGreek historian, in his analysis of the Peloponnesian war, when ―history‖ meant not a simple
sequential narration of events but an‖ inquiry‖ into human affairs.
221Sung-Hack Kang

subsequently transforming itself into a revolutionary, revisionist, communist state by the time of
the late 1960s, when it confronted the Soviet threat. Since then it seems to have become a moderatecommunist state. Further, it began to concentrate on building growth in national power since Deng
Xiaoping‘s reform of China in 1978 and is now referred to as ‗the Rising China,‘ meaning a
potential superpower in the near future.
The new power and subsequent new sense of confidence and recovered pride of contemporary
Chinese has changed their perception of themselves, of their national interests, of their properinternational standing, and of how they expect to be treated by others. The new Chinese grossnational power has revived the old feeling of their so-called Middle Kingdom syndrome, a deeply
rooted belief that China is the center of the world. China has gained a new set of far-flung global
economic interests. It needs modern military forces to protect them and has been spending
increasing amounts of its growing wealth on strengthening its military power, including aerospacecapability. Although China faces no immediate external military threat and is stronger than at any
time in the modern era, it has shifted its strategic doctrine away from defending the homelandagainst foreign invasion toward a strategy of projecting its military power overseas.
Recovered pride in China‘s growing international status has become one of the great sources ofpolitical legitimacy for the ruling oligarchy of the Chinese Communist Party. Popular nationalism
has grown dramatically, sometimes aimed at Japan and at other times at the US. Therefore, what
began as China‘s desire to restore its national pride and honor has become intermingled with thelarger question of its historical ambitions. As China grows more and more powerful, it will becomeless and less tolerant of any obstacle in its way toward its self-conceived, historical, and rightful
status of hegemony in East Asia, to say nothing of Chinese unification.
While many countries have territorial issues with their neighbors, in the case of China this tends
to take on greater significance when the claimant is already a giant. More to the point is China‘srole in competition with the US for influence and power in the western Pacific from Japan toAustralia and from the Philippines to Myanmar. Here the US has been the long stabilizing force.
China is the first great power to mount a challenge to the US in the 21st century, creating a stage
for hegemonic competition.

22

Peace and Security in East Asia

2. Precipitating Sources of Danger: North Korea’s Nuclear Gamble.

It goes without saying that the most pressing, specific, and immediate source of danger in East Asia
at the moment is North Korea‘s blind, ambitious nuclear gamble. To understand the true nature of
the Kim Jong-Il regime‘s frightening nuclear gamble, it might be useful to recollect how Hitler‘s
German regime drove first Europe and then the whole Western world to disaster in the 1930s.
In October 1933, Germany withdrew from the League of Nations Disarmament Conference,(North Korea withdrew from the NPT) and Goering was already secretly building the Luftwaffe,
the German air force (Kim Jong-Il was developing nuclear weapons). The allies knew about this in
1934, but they made no effective protest. (The world and the UN knew about Kim‘s nuclear project,but no effective countermeasure was taken.) In 1935, German rearmament became common
knowledge. On March 16, conscription was introduced in Germany and the plans for an army ofover half a million men were announced. Goering proudly unveiled the Luftwaffe. On March 7,
1936, in the midst of the Italo-Ethiopean War, which had been caused by Italy‘s all-out invasion of
Ethiopia four days previously, Hitler deliberately sent a small contingent of soldiers into thedemilitarized Rhineland to test the Allies‘ reaction. This was a blatant breach of the Treaty of
Versailles and of the Locarno Pact. But as Hitler expected, the Allies did nothing. The League of
Nations did nothing positive to uphold the Treaties of Versailles. We know the rest of the history
only too well.
As with Hitler‘s successful rearmament gamble of the 1930s, Kim Jong-Il had secretly preparedNorth Korea‘s nuclear armament during the 1990s and accelerated the process of nuclear
development in the midst of the Iraq War, during the early 2000s. In the end, he successfully
revealed the ultimate possession of nuclear weapons on October 9, 2006. Since then Kim Jong-Il
has continued to show more and more defiant behavior toward the international community‘s NPT
regime, threatening peace and security in East Asia.
Nevertheless, the UN, the US, the most directly affected country, South Korea, and mostpeace-loving countries, including Japan, have all, in a sense, slept (nay, overslept) for the last two

23

Sung-Hack Kang

decades while the Kim regime was developing nuclear weapons. In the case of South Korea, if
anything, it contributed to Kim‘s nuclear development at least partially through the appeasement
policy of the governments of the former two Presidents. As a consequence, South Koreans are now
driven up against a wall and it may be said that they will now have to face the writing on that wall.

3. A Hedging Strategy is not the Right Answer.

Already military weakness, the lack of political will, and confusion over foreign and defense policyin the democratic countries of East Asia have allowed, (nay, encouraged) the development of thesedreadful weapons of mass destruction by a hostile state that challenges the interests and security ofthe democratic states and their allies. Without American support, the countries of democracy andhuman rights in East Asia would cry out in vain for protection against the forces of repression,
which persist and will intensify in this region from which American power will have to bedisengaged due to the popular mood, the lack of will of its political leaders, and out ofrisk-avoiding military strategies in the coming years. Even if China is not strong enough to balance
the US at the present, even if it tends to be less strident than other countries in criticizing American
foreign policy internationally, it may eventually be forced into a confrontation. There is also no
immediate reason why the US should be unduly concerned at the rise of China itself. Structurally
speaking, the US is likely to remain the Number One power (the only superpower) until the
mid-twenty-first century. Despite the politico-military predicament in Iraq and Afghanistan, it
would be wrong to think that the US is dangerously over-extended. It is still spending only 3.5
percent of its GDP on the military, compared with 35 percent in the Second World War.
However, it is a mark of its coming to terms with the post-modern age of pacifism that the US
has also come to the conclusion that it cannot contain a rising China. Instead it is seeking to hedge
against China‘s rise. Hedging has been a feature of market economies. Hedging strategies are
extremely varied. Given the wide diversity, we may not expect to find that the US has a coherent
foreign policy and security strategy. US policy could be best described as hedging plus engagement.
The US and China have sharply contrasting world views, competing geostrategic interests and24

Peace and Security in East Asia

opposing political systems. The differences are real. They cannot be papered over with joint
communiqués, any more than eliminated simply by narrowing differences on specific policy issues.
China is not perceived to be a revolutionary power like the past Soviet Union. It is seen more as alate-comer in the Great Power game, which is seeking to establish its position in a world that has
been ordered strategically by earlier rival powers. What the US wants to do is to fold China into theexisting security architecture. Its intention is to create an interest in stability to encourage a rising
China to become a responsible stakeholder in the present international system. If China is moreinterested in securing a greater voice in the management of the current international system, rather
than challenging its fundamental operating principles and procedures, then containment may not benecessary. Stakeholders may not be allies, but they do have common interests.
The point about hedging, however, is that while it can avoid risks it cannot eliminate them.
Companies and countries are very different. When they fail to compete, companies often go out ofbusiness, but countries rarely do so. Unlike the market, security is subjective. National security is
only as secure as the people and leaders of a nation feel themselves to be. China‘s actual integration
into the existing security architecture has so far proved shallow and self-serving. China is a longway from becoming a democratic cosmopolitan state willing to acknowledge, let alone accept, any
reduction of its sovereignty. China wants to return to the good old days and to have its own
hegemonic position, at least in East Asia, as most Chinese believe to have been the case for several
thousand years. The Chinese do not believe that they have a claim to a new historic international orregional position, but that they simply want to recover their rightful lost one. Therefore, their claim
is believed not to be compromised. This is a quite unique claim in modern international history,
incomparable with other historical rising powers. American engagement is thus likely to turn out tobe no more than pseudo-engagement, and its hedging strategy a simple holding operation. Hedging
and engagement is not by itself an appeasement policy, but in the light of avoiding all the risks outof immediate fear, in due course it might ultimately lead to the same difficult situations as
appeasement policy would.

4. The UN is Impotent, as Expected.

25

Sung-Hack KangOn October 9, 2006, North Korea crossed the threshold of ―nuclearization‖ and became a de facto
nuclear-armed state (or rouge state). In its wake, the UN Security Council condemned North Korea
via UNSC Resolution 1718. That was all. Little action followed. North Korea conducted a second
nuclear test, in contravention of the UN Resolution, on May 25, 2009. In response to South Korea‘sdecision, following the second test, that it will fully join the US-led PSI (Proliferation Security
Initiative), North Korea declared that it would no longer be bound by the 1953 armistice agreementthat had suspended the Korean War. The Korean peninsula is now in a ―state of war.‖
The danger is real, but it is also a social construction. We are inclined to compare one danger
with another which throws it into perspective. But precautionary measures are bound to be highly
divisive. The precautions which one person may think reasonable may appear unreasonable toothers. The problem lies in ourselves, not in the world we are trying to analyze. The precautionary
principle cannot be a unifying principle for the use of military force. It cannot unite countries under
the looming danger of North Korea‘s increasing weapons of mass destruction.
On June 12, The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1874, seeking financial sanctions aswell as an overall arms embargo on North Korea. But this is implemented under Article 41 ofChapter VII of the UN Charter, which excludes the use of force, thereby lacking the authority for
mandatory enforcement, just as in the case of Resolution 1718 and others adopted after North
Korea‘s nuclear and ballistic missiles tests in the past. As in the past, China is lukewarm to theimplementation of Resolution 1874. A new approach to North Korea‘s unequivocal nuclear
ambitions is urgently needed, but the UN has proved again that it is impotent when great powers
cannot reach unanimous decisions. The UN has now revealed its Panglossian attitude, but this isquite

understandable, since the UN was not intended to solve conflicts among the great power

UNSC permanent members when it was founded sixty-four years ago.

5. Wake Up, Peoples of Democratic Countries!

America today is not isolationist, just as England was not in the 1930s. Far-reaching national

26

Peace and Security in East Asia

interests around the globe, economic, political, and emotional, prevent domestically-oriented
political leadership from simply turning inward and forsaking the outer world. Yet, America is notseriously committed to shaping the international environment, a task that only it can perform.
American leaders proclaimed a powerful commitment to global engagement, saying over and overagain that American interests required its participation in the world and even the use of force toshape it. But when crises demanded decisive action, they almost invariably hesitated to adopt
military options, and sought peaceful resolutions to crises, preferring economic leverage andnegotiated settlements to the effective and necessary use of armed might. For democratic
Americans, it is not enough to win a victory. The victory must come at almost no cost. There is no
reason to believe that the American people will not accept casualties, even larger casualties, in a
war they understand and support. Nevertheless, America‘s political leaders refuse to take the risk,even when the cause requires some risk of losses. The situation in North Korea is the mostalarming of all in East Asia (or the Asia-Pacific region). In 1994, the threat posed by the North
Korean development of dangerous nuclear weapons led not to a confrontation with the US-South
Korea alliance, but to a bribe to North Korea‘s tyrant. The North Koreans have repeatedly
demanded and received further bribes simply to keep their part of the bargain ever since 1994.
Evidence has continued to mount that the North Korean tyrant is not keeping his side of the bargain.
The US and South Korea have given the North Koreans every incentive to threaten the lives ofSouth Koreans through the weakness of their military forces in South Korea and their patentinability to reinforce them before North Korea has struck. The declaration of victory without
combat in 1994 may have deceived many Americans and South Koreans, but it surely did not fool
North Koreans. They have not learned that the development of weapons of mass destruction andthe means to deliver them will not be tolerated.
America may not want to be the world‘s policeman, but it is the lesson of the past century thatthe world requires a police force to preserve the peace. If the US is not to take a leading part insuch a constabulary, who will? The threat from North Korea has only been delayed. America
should look realistically to its position in the world. It must strengthen its alliance system bydemonstrating the willingness to bear its inescapable responsibilities. It must make the necessary27

Sung-Hack Kang

commitment and be ready physically and morally to meet these responsibilities. Should it falter anddelay, the price of failure will be higher, as it was for Britain while she slept.

6. But, Alas!

However, American military action against North Korea is not likely to occur. It could not be
localized geopolitically. The so-called collateral damage of South Koreans would be too great to be
accepted. China would not condone the simple destruction of North Korea, as has been proved by
its entry into the Korean War roughly sixty years ago. Unlike Iraq, North Korea is a small, poor
country without any valuable natural resources such as petroleum. But above all, the US will recoil
from another expensive and politically risky war while the results of the wars against Afghanistan
and Iraq are reassessed by the American people. In war, numbers still matter. No commander has
ever wanted to suffer more casualties than strictly necessary, but in the last century it was still
possible to replace losses. The production lines allowed this: conscription, trading depots an dformations and reserves in the case of soldiers, and industrial assembly lines in the case of theweapons which they used. Most of these production lines have been shut down. Today American
forces are unable to replace losses, and as a result have become excessively risk-averse. It is
expensive to acquire, move and prepare new men and equipment, and political leaders, uncertain of
the people‘s support for their venture, wish to keep the costs to men and material within what ispolitically sustainable in the circumstances. Therefore, if anything could be done in East Asia, theUS will be more than willing to shift the very dangerous and expensive burden of neutralizing
North Korea‘s WMD threat to peace and security in East Asia to East Asian countries, thereby
accelerating a new and serious arms race in the region. The US is no longer in the business ofbuilding a New World Order, but muddles through in the age of risk. The contemporary age of risk
did not come into being overnight. It was foregrounded in the age that preceded it, especially in thegrowing recognition that the world was becoming so complex that everything has consequences,many of which could not been foreseen. Americans have become increasingly self-reflexive and as
a result increasingly risk-averse.

28

Peace and Security in East Asia

In sum, the US is not likely to act as the world‘s policeman on the Korean peninsula in the
coming years, as it did in the last century. Rather it will act, ironically in the name of peace andsecurity for the region, like an Iago who speaks aside, ―Everyway makes my gain.‖ This is the very
reason why East Asia will be more and more in danger year by year, though maybe not day by day.
Asian peoples can live peacefully with each other through accommodation on one occasion or
another. But they are unlikely to be at peace for a long time, because doing too little, or―
under-balancing,‖ is as fatal as doing too much. As Carl von Clausewitz warned:―
The fact that slaughter is a horrifying spectacle must make us
take war more seriously, but not provide an excuse for graduallyblunting our swords in the name of humanity. Sooner or latersomeone will come along with a sharp sword and hack off ourarms.‖

29

Heung-Soon Park

Human Rights Regime and East Asia:
Major Issues and Assessments
Heung-Soon Park1
Introduction
Human right has emerged as a great concern of global issues, along with development, peace andsecurity, and environments in international community. One of the tremendous gains ininternational society since the middle of the 20th century has been widespread acceptance of thehuman rights norms and their institutionalization. Thus international community has dealt with
unprecedented expansion of norms and institutions, mechanism, applied to a variety of humanrights issues from abuses in political and civil rights, to women's rights, to cruelty of war crimes
and crime against humanity in internal conflicts. Human rights concern has expanded with thenotion of "human security" in lieu of national security in the era of global governance.
The global human rights regime as a universal network and system plays a central role in theprotection and promotion of human rights. The global regime has been formulated and developedby the collaboration among the United Nations (UN), major states and Non-governmental
Organizations (NGOs), as well as influential individuals. Especially the UN human rights bodies
are prominent creators, shapers and implementers of norms and programs in the field of humanrights worldwide.
However, human rights are often complicated and politically sensitive issue for most state actors
and their representatives, as in many cases the states are abusers and protectors of human rights. In
East Asia as well, human rights issue has been a controversial issue, especially with regard topolitical repression, economic problems or internal strife in some regions and countries.
The East Asian region as a whole, covering Northeast Asia of Japan, Korea, and China, andSoutheast Asia, including most of the ASEAN, has lately risen as an affluent economic region andarea of peace and prosperity, with rapid economic and social development over the decades. Many
1

Professor, Sunmoon University, Korea.

30

Human Rights Regime and East Asiaof these countries also have steadily improved political environments, by introducing morepluralistic society as well as political democracy and market economy. However, compared toEurope and other regions, the East Asian region is also a place where political and economic
rivalry is strong, combined with historical legacy of hostilities. Moreover, for various reasons, suchnations as North Korea, China, Myanmar, East Timor, and Cambodia, have had problems ofserious violations of human rights. These nations have been the targets of international criticism
and actions in the policy and practices of human rights, from the global human rights regime.
However, they defend their poor human rights records with the repudiation that state sovereignty ismore important the popular sovereignty or human rights are essentially matters within the domestic
jurisdiction.
In light of increasing importance of human rights, and particularly in the atmosphere of calling
for the formation of an East Asian community, it will be a meaningful to examine human rights
regime in the context of East Asia. For the benefit of peace and stability in the region, there ar e
several questions to answer. Specifically, what is the current status of human rights regime ininternational community? What are the main characteristics of human rights regime in East Asia ifany, or the limitations and potentials of human rights issues as a regional agenda? What kind ofissues for some countries indeed have been the subjects of human rights agenda in East Asia? How
those human rights issues have been handled internationally and regionally? And, what are theimplications of these evaluations upon the East Asian nations, particularly on Korea?
Therefore the main focus of this paper is to examine the role of human rights regime in thecontext of major human rights in East Asia. Thus this study, first, describes the basic structure andmechanism, and actors of the global human rights regime, second, examines some selected humanrights issues with regard to several East Asian nations, and third, makes assessment on the role andcontribution of the human rights regime, and lastly finds implications for Korea and thedevelopment of human rights regime in the East Asian region.

1. Global Human Rights Regime: Structure and Mechanism

31

Heung-Soon ParkThe global human rights regime is consisted of basic principles, rules, decision-making
mechanisms and actors in the area of human rights issues. As principles of international humanrights and human rights law, we may identify universality, democratic legitimacy, justice,protection, legality, respecting and ensuring the protection of human rights, equality andnon-discrimination, and remedy. 2 As adopted in a set of bill of rights, 3 human rights visionusually contains three parts: a declaration of moral principles, treaties and conventions that would
contain legally binding obligations, and measures of implementation.
In this regard, there are over several dozens of important international conventions and treaties in
the area of human rights over time. Among them the most fundamental ones are commonly
considered International Bill of Rights, which include 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights (1966, "Covenant A")
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, "Covenant B"), and others. 4
The actors in human rights include the United Nations system and other international
governmental organizations, NGO (Non-governmental Organizations), and multinational
corporations, as well as states.5 For the promotion and protection of human rights, the UN system
as a whole plays an important role, as what is called "Charter-based" bodies. Therefore, under the
UN Charter, especially the General Assembly (GA) and the Economic and Social Council
2

Bertrand G. Ramchran, 2007, (Human Rights) "Norms and Machinery," Thomas Weiss and Sam
Daws, eds. 2007 The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press) p.439
3So-called Three Generations of Rights are referred by the first generation (political and cilvil
rights), the second one (economic, social, and cultural rights), and the third one (collective rights,
such as minorities, women, as well as a safe environment, peace, development )4
Others include Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aiming at theabolition of the death penalty.
5
Major sources of discussion on the basics of international human rights include: Rhona K. M.
Smith, 2007, International Human Rights, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford Univ. Press; Julie A.
Mertus, 2007, The United Nations and Human Rights (New York: Routledge); David P. Forsythe,
2000. Human Rights in International Relations (New Yok: Cambridge Univ. Press); Jack
Donnelly,1998, International Human Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Westview Press); Jack
Donnelly,1989. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press)

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

(ECOSOC), have broad mandates to deal with human rights matters. The UN Charter envisaged
that the ECOSOC would set up functional commissions for the promotion of human rights. Here,the main machinery of human rights includes the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) establishedin 1947, which was then in 2006 replaced by a new organ of the Human Rights Council (HRC).
The Commission over the years has established and operated numerous working groups and the
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in 1999 to carry out its vitalfunctions. It has also entrusted designated special rapporteurs, experts, and representatives to
examine and publicly report on specific human rights situations, either Country Mandates orThematic Mandates.6
In 1967, the ECOSOC passed Resolution 1235, authorizing the Commission to make a throughstudy of situations which reveals considerable pattern of human rights violations. This mandate
was further developed in 1970 with the adoption of ECOSOC Resolution 1503, which created a
confidential procedure in which states and other bodies could submit human rights abuses to theCommission. Through theses resolutions, the Commission gained an authority to engage in publicdebate about serious human rights violations in particular countries, and to have private discussions
with states accused of such violations.
The newly-launched the HRC (Human Rights Council) has been considered to be an
improvement over the CHR, in composition, authority and functions. The Council basicallyinherited the Commission„s system of special procedures, expert advice and compliant procedures.
However, unlike the Commission which was under the ECOSOC, the HRC has elevated to becomea sub-organ of the General Assembly. The authority of the HRC, however, remains advisory andrecommendatory, though the number of the members changed to 47 from 53 in the CHR.7
6

http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx
The Council members would be directly and individually by secrete ballot by the majority of themembership of the General Assembly. The GA, by a two-thirds majority of the members present
and voting, may suspend rights of membership in the Council that commits gross and systematic
violations of human rights. It is emphasized that the universal and non-discriminatory criteria for
the HRC membership: contribution to the promotion and protection of human rights and voluntarycommitment for human rights. Access to the Council is not limited to members alone. There is a
7

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Heung-Soon Park

Other important human rights mechanism is "treaty-based" bodies, established under the maininternational conventions. Each of these treaties has established a committee of experts to monitor
implementation of the treaty provisions by its state parties. They include 8 committees as CCPR
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966), CSECR (International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 1966), CERD (International Convention on the Eliminationof All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 1965), CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, 1979), CAT (Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984) CRC (Convention on the Rights of theChild, 1989), CMW (International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All MigrantWorkers and Members of Their Families, 1990) and CRPD (Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities). Some of the treaties are supplemented by optional protocols dealing withspecific concerns.8
These committees respectively have certain rules and regulations for their operations: review
reports from state parties to their particular convention; engage in a dialogue with governments,
make country-specific or general recommendations; react to situations of concern, and consider
individual or group petitions.
Beyond the ECOSOC and the General Assembly, the tremendous growth of the human rights
movements over the decades has resulted in the creation of further UN bodies and agencies.
Among these, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has served as acentral organ of the UN human rights system since 1993, in the aftermath of the World Conferenceon Human Rights in Vienna. The High Commissioner would act as "the United Nations official
with principal responsibility for the UN human rights activities under the direction and authority of
the Secretary-General."provision for participation of non-members of the HRC, the specialized agencies, otherintergovernmental organizations and national human rights institutions, as well as NGOs as
observers.
8
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

It should be also noted that the UN Security Council play increasingly expanding role in the
global human rights regime. The Security Council as the primary organ of the UN has an exclusive
authority in the "maintenance of international peace and security." In fact the Security Council isfree to define what constitute a "thereat to" or "breach of" international peace and security. The
concept of international security has been expanded in the post-cold war environments.
International security now includes the dimensions of not merely military or state security, but thenotion of comprehensive security or "human security". Accordingly, the UN has expanded theconcept of "international peace and security", to include not only traditional security such as
regional or internal conflicts, but also human security such as human rights, AIDS, environments,
and refugees. Accordingly, the Security Council has expanded the scope and nature of the function
and activities.9
Thus the Security Council has repeatedly dealt with such issues as "ethnic cleansing", genocide,and crimes against humanity, for instances, in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, andEast Timor. Subsequently, the UN SC either directly intervened in "peace-enforcing" under
Chapter VII of the Charter, or helped establish to set up international tribunals, including the ICTY
(International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia), and ICTR (International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda).10
As part of enforcing international justice in serious human rights violations, the idea of
establishing a permanent criminal court was realized in July 1998, when the UN member states
signed the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC has a jurisdiction toprosecute the "most serious crimes of concern to the international community," such as genocide,crimes against humanity, war crimes, since the statute entered into force on July 1, 2002.
9

The concept of "maintenance of international peace and security" is a general clause, whichmakes it possible to interpret and apply it with flexibility. In fact, the Security Council suggested in
its Summit meeting of 1992 the notion of Human Security as part of international peace andsecurity. In February 2000, the Council dealt with the AIDS epidemic in Africa as an issue of
danger to international peace and security.
10
Joanna Weschler, "Human Rights" in David M. Marlone, 2004. The UN Security Council: From
the Cold War to the 21st Century (New York: Lynne Rienner) pp.55-68

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Heung-Soon Park

Jurisdiction under the Rome Statute is automatic: a state party to the treaty accepts the court's
jurisdiction over all crimes within its scope. However, the ICC is not a substitute for national
systems, but may only act where national systems do not themselves investigate or prosecute, orwhere they are "unable' or "unwilling" to do so adequately, as defined in the statute.
Private actors, such as NGOs and Civil society actors, also play an increasingly important role in
the global human rights regime. 11 They embrace almost every aspects of human rights regime:
thus they do research, outreach education, advocacy, and norm promotion, agenda setting, lobbying
governments and intergovernmental organizations, implementing programs, and delivering services,and humanitarian assistance, monitoring implementations, and direct action.
Some NGOs are also presented on official delegations for human rights discussions. The best
known international human rights NGOs include Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch(HRW), and International Commission of Jurists. NGOs, within and along side with the UN system,
became an active contributor, with such position as "Consultative Status" in the ECOSO C underthe Article 71 of the UN Charter.
Of course, states are probably the most important actor in the human rights field. In fact, states
set standards and monitor violations, but states are also the primary violators and the target of
enforcement efforts. Thus, states become a party in human rights issues, positively or negatively. In
the protection and promotion of human rights, especially some states, like many Northern
European states, have been active participants and implementers in human rights norms andprinciples. On the other hand, many other states, including several East Asian states, have been
subject of UN resolutions of mandate on human rights.

2. East Asia and Major Human Rights Issues

2-1. East Asia's View and Positions on Human Rights

11David P. Forsythe, 2000, ibid, pp.163-190

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

Regional human rights systems have emerged over the years, drawing inspiration from the humanrights provisions of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They were
further stimulated by a variety of historical and political factors in each region. Examples of theregional systems include four major ones: the Council of Europe, the Organization of American
States (OAS), the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or AU (African Unity) and the Arab
League.12
Why there are several regional human rights regimes, besides the global regime? And, what are
the advantages of having regional human rights regime, as now existed? In short, the regional
system will be easier to make consensus in norm-setting, accessibility, and implementation. 13
Specifically, the regional arrangements, with fewer states, are easier to draft and administer texts
on human rights, to make a geographical, linguistic access for implementation, or to enforce thedecisions of the regional bodies.
Thus, for example, the European human rights system, which had been developed with thecreation of the Council of Europe, adopted the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in
1950. Furthermore the European system was the first to create both an international court, theEuropean Court of Human Rights, and a procedure for individual complaints. It also has theEuropean Commissioner on Human Rights,
In inter-American system, the OAS Charter proclaimed the "fundamental rights of theindividual" as a founding principle, with the earlier adoption of 1948 American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man. In 1959, the OAS created a seven-member Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, which expanded its power subsequently to include the power to receive
complaints from victims. The American Convention of Human Rights, signed in 1969, and enteredinto effect in 1978, created also Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
For Africa, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (African Charter) was adopted in
1981. The Charter differs from others in its inclusion of "people's rights". The African Charter (or12thers include CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) of 12 former Soviet republics (withConvention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1995)
13
Rhona K. M. Smith, ibid. op.81-82

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Banjul Charter) establishes the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. In June 1998,
the OAU adopted a Protocol to the Banjul Charter, approving the creation of an African humanrights court. Meanwhile, the League of Arab States approved an Arab Charter on Human Rights in
September 1994. The Arab Charter requires periodic reporting by states and implies that Arab
League Human Rights Committee may request a report. However, the Charter specifies yet noother promotion or protection functions for the committee.
In contrast to these developments, however, East Asia as a whole has not developed a regional
human rights system. Despite the efforts by NGOs and the United Nations, East Asia, or
Asia-Pacific region remains the only area without regional human rights regime or system in theworld. In 1993, more than a hundred Asia-Pacific NGOs adopted an Asia Pacific Declaration of
Human Rights supporting the creation of a regional system. In 1997, some Asian NGOs adopted
Asian Human Rights Charter. In East Asia, the ASEAN possesses a human rights commission, and
the APEC forum has the Human Resources Developing working group. Nonetheless, the calls forthe establishment of a regional human rights regime were not realized yet. At a 1996 UN-sponsoredworkshop, in fact, the thirty participating governments concluded that "it was premature, at thecurrent stage, to discuss specific arrangements relating to the setting up of a formal human rights
mechanism in the Asian and Pacific region".
There are several reasons and backgrounds why East Asian, or the Asia-Pacific region, has notdeveloped or could not develop a human rights regime. First of all, in spite of some solidarity andincreasing interactions, most of the nations in the region do not share a common identity as"Asian-ness". There is a far greater diversity of language, culture, legal systems, religious traditions,and history, compared to other regions of the world.
Second, many of Asian nations have "strong" governments, claiming state sovereignty as asacred principle of international relations. Regardless of whether authoritarian, socialist, or liberal
democracy, Asian nations have a tendency to preserve their sovereign prerogatives against othernations, as well as vis-a-vis civil society.

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

Third, the governments in the region are often reluctant to criticize other governments for humanrights violations. Many have been unwilling to ratify human rights instruments, fearing their own
human rights policies and records. Fourth, China, as a dominant regional power, as well as apermanent member in UN Security Council, exercises considerable, mostly negative, influence
over the discussion of human rights issues. Despite economic success with open economy, as wellas improving living standards, China as a whole maintains authoritarian regime with one party
system, not allowing further political freedom and democracy.
Lastly, there are fundamentally serious philosophical differences of opinion on the issue ofhuman rights between the East and the West. In principle, Asian nations tend to cherish "Asianvalue", which in general includes such elements as belief in strong government, obedience toauthority, and respect for the community. 14 Thus the debates in this regard have progressed in two
specific aspects, especially with the notion of "Asian Value." The first debate concerns the subject
matter and definition of human rights: whether focusing upon the political rights of the individualor the socio-economic rights of the collective group. The second debate has to do with the questionof whether human rights is a relative or universal concept.15
On the first question, the Western nations in general insisted that the individual is the mostimportant component of any political system and an individual rights must be protected fromencroached by the state. China, Malaysia and many Asian states reject this notion of human rights,
arguing that collective rights had to come first. On the second question, the west in generaladvocates the universality of human rights, applicable to all peoples, in all states, religions andculture. But, many Asian states have argued that human rights is relative, taking into considerationof different culture, history, and traditions. They have criticized that the West was unjustifiably
using the notion of universality interfering in the domestic affairs with its own interpretation ofhuman rights. Accordingly, East Asia, in spite of a generally high standard of human rights, still14

For a critical analysis of the notion of Asian values, Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights
ibid., pp.131-135
15or discussion of the debates on individual rights vs. collective rights, and universalism vs.
relativism in human rights, see Jack Donnelly, ibid., pp.32-35

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lags behind in developing stronger human rights regime or governance, comparing to other regionsof the world.

2-2. Major Human Rights Issues in East Asia
East Asia, like other regions of the world, has a variety of human rights issues in national, or
regional context. The issues range from North Korean prison camps and refugees to China's
repression on separatist movement, to Myanmar's military rule, to the remnants of the serious
human rights violations in East Timor and Cambodia.

1) North Korea
Human rights violations in North Korea (DPRK) have been widely known over a period of several
decades. In maintaining totalitarian regime under the current political leadership of Kim Jong-il,
human rights have been seriously suppressed in Korea. Such words as political prison camps,
detention center, arrest without warranty, and trial without legal procedures, are symbols of
pervasive human rights abuses in North Korea. It is obviously clear by many indications that theNorth Korean socialist regime has not strictly observed the basic human rights of its own people, as
stipulated in the international norms, such as ICCPR, or ICESCR. General and specific informationon the North Korean human rights problems have been periodically reported by the testimony ofmany North Korean defectors (refugees), NGOs reports, and press reports, as well as annual White
Paper on North Korea's Human Rights by a few institutions.16
Over the last several years, the international community has expressed its concern on the humanrights issues in North Korea. As many as over estimated 200,000 defectors fled from North Korea
in part as a result of serious food shortages, and in part to avoid political oppression. For South
Korea (ROK), North Korean human rights issues are much more than simply refugee issues.
Generally speaking the issues have wide range of dimensions: South Korean prisoners of war still
16

There are several resources on human rights situation in North Korea, for example, Investigative
Report on Prison Camps in North Korea 2009 (Korean Human Rights Commission), White Paperon Human Rights in North Korea 2009 (Korean Institute for National Unification)

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

held in North Korea, prisoners in political prison camps, North Korean defectors crossing into
China, South Koreans kidnapped to North Korea, the separated families during the Korean war,and general human rights conditions of the North Korean people.
However, South Korea's resolve to improve North Korean human rights through various means
have been not so strong and effective. Over ten years, under President Kim Dae-jung and President
Roh Moo-hyun governments, North Korea's human rights issues were often sidelined, under the"Sunshine policy" or an engagement policy of detente. The Korean government policy under
President Kim and Roh was that the main concern should be focused upon supporting "the right tosubsistence" of the North Korean people. Thus Korean government took the position that in light ofsevere food crisis and economic hardship among the North Koreans, the assistance for economic
development and elevation of standard of living should take priority over the overall improvementin political and civil rights.
The 'soft' approach on North Korean issues raised a dilemma for South Korean people and NGOson human rights, as they were divided on the government policy and positions on human rights.
Still many Koreans called for a "two track" approach, both "sticks and carrots", combined politicaland diplomatic pressure with economic and humanitarian assistance, in dealing with North Korea.
Furthermore, they wanted to "internationalize" the issues for putting stronger pressure on North
Korea by international support.
Therefore, since 2003, the UN has been addressing North Korea as a country of foremost
concern in the area of human rights. The UN CHR in 2004 session appointed a special rapporteuron North Korean human rights situations. 17 The UN General Assembly also adopted resolutions on
North Korea, first one in December 2005, expressing serious concern at continuing resorts ofsystematic, widespread and grave violations of human rights in North Korea. Since then the UN asa whole continuously adopted resolutions every year, among others, calling for drastic
improvement of human rights conditions, and for observing the international norms North Korea

17

Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic ofKorea has been Mr. Vitit Muntarbhorn (Thailand) since 2004.

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Heung-Soon Park

has committed. For instance, in his report to the Human Rights Council in 2009, Dr. Vitit
Muntarbhorn, the special rapporteur, stated that various critical challenges need to be urgently
addressed:"The miasma ensuing from the broad range of egregious human rights violations in the
Democratic People‟'s Republic of Korea requires urgent attention at all levels, from national tointernational. Of particular concern are the pervasive transgressions in relation to the right to foodand other basic necessities, personal security, fundamental freedoms, and asylum and migration
issues. Specific groups face great vulnerability. The tragedy of the country is that those at the top
seek to survive at the expense and to the detriment of the majority of the population, and are behindthe environment leading to these transgressions, with entrenched impunity. It is thus important thatthe challenge of human rights in the country be addressed more from the angle of how to prevent
violations, protect human rights more effectively, ensure more efficacious provision of assistance,and enable more people‟'s participation in relation to an omnipotent State and those who personifyit."18The United Sates and European Union collectively or respectively, have made considerable
efforts in adopting the resolutions, or calling for direct measures on the part of North Korea. The
US Congress passed "North Korean Human Rights Act 2004" (HR 4011), 19 and the US
Administration appointed a special envoy on North Korean human rights. Moreover, the active roleof NGOs, notably protestant human rights groups in America, as well as various groups in Korea,
contributed to draw international attention to the issues. In Korea, under the more conservative
government under President Lee Myung-bak, inaugurated in January 2008, North Korean human18"Human Rights Situations that require the Council's Attention: Report of the Special Rapporteuron the situation of human rights in the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea", 2009, The General
Assembly, A/HRC/10/18
19
On September 23, 2008, the U.S. Congress extended the Act for four more years. The North
Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act of 2008 (HR 5834) was signed by President Bush on
October 7, 2008. There were some revisions in this newest iteration of the Act, including elevating
the post of U.S. special envoy on North Korean human rights to full ambassador.

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

rights issues became a more salient issue, and recognized as an important policy agenda ininter-Korean relations.
North Korea's representatives challenged the special rapporteur's reports, or the UN resolutions,saying that they did not accept the role of rapporteur or the existence of human rights abuses.
DPRK often rebuffed the rapporteur's reports or the resolutions as part of a propaganda plot
fabricated by hostile forces. North Korean government rejected the UN resolutions, criticizingthem as an unjust interference in to the integrity of North Korean sovereignty and attempt toinstigate dissatisfaction among the North Korean people. Thus the special rapporteur on North
Korea never had a chance to enter North Korean for on-site visit or verification of North Koreanprisons.20

2) China
Despite its spectacular economic growth and booming industry in recent years, serious concerns
have been periodically raised on human rights situation in China.21 Four specific issues are notable
among others.
First, in general, China (PRC) has been known for implementing a harsh system of state control
over many aspects of life in the country and little tolerance for dissents among its people.
Individuals who attempt to speak out against the system are routinely detained and prosecuted onstate charges. Often serious concerns arise about the cases of arbitrary detention of human rights
activists. Other serious human rights issues include such violations as torture and mistreatment ofdetainees, and numerous abuses of the people and groups considered to be advocating secession.
China has been criticized for suppressing religious activities such as Falun Gong as well.

20

Special Representatives, on the right to freedom of opinion and expression (2002), on freedomof religion or belief (1999), on the right to food (2003/2009), and on the Democratic People‘s
Republic of Korea (2004/2005/2006/2007/2009) each requested the visit to North Korea, but was
refused. See, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/special/countryvisitsa-e.htm#dprk
21
For an excellent analysis of China's human rights policy and practices, see Ann Kent, 1999
China, the United Nations, and Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press)

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Heung-Soon Park

Second, China has been dealing with separatist or independent movements very harshly,
especially in Tibet and Uighur. On the issue of Tibet, China took over Tibet in 1950, and claimed ithistorically as part of China. Since then China has made efforts to re-create Tibet in its own image,by force, if necessary. Under the 1951 "Seventeen Point Agreement" between China andrepresentatives of the Tibetan Government, which incorporated Tibet into China, China guaranteed
no alteration of Tibetan political, cultural, and religious systems and institutions. The failure of
China to adhere to or uphold the Seventeen Point Agreement, and the imposition of so-called
democratic reform, led to the March 1959 uprising in Lhasa. A Tibetan uprising for independence
at Lhasa in 1959 was crushed by the Chinese military forces. An estimated 87,000 Tibetans were
killed, arrested, or deported to labor camps, and flight to exile. It is estimated by one account thatsince 1950 as many as 1.2 million Tibetans have been killed, and more than 6,000 religious sites
were destroyed.
In 1959 and thereafter several times, the International Commission of Jurists examined theChinese policy in Tibet, violations of human rights in Tibet, and the position of Tibet ininternational law. The Commission found that "the PRC had committed `acts of genocide.....inTibet....an attempt to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group' and that Tibet was at least `a defacto state' prior to 1951." The United Nations General Assembly adopted resolutions in 1959,
1961, and 1965 calling on China to ensure respect for fundamental human rights of the Tibetan
people and for their distinctive cultural and religious life, and the right to self-determination.
The Chinese Government strictly controls access to and information about Tibet. Thus, it isdifficult to determine accurately the scope of human rights abuses. However, according to credible
reports, Chinese government authorities continued to commit serious human rights abuses in Tibet,
including instances of torture, arbitrary arrest, detention without public trial, and lengthy detentionof Tibetan nationalists for peacefully expressing their political or religious views. 22
22

In 2009, tight controls on religion and on other fundamental freedoms continued and intensified
during the year, especially during sensitive anniversaries and occasions. These included the 40th
anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in March, the June visit of Gyaltsen
Norbu, the boy recognized as the Panchen Lama by the Chinese Government, Dalai Lama's

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

The Chinese government has continued its campaign to discredit Dalai Lama, the Tibetan
spiritual leader, and repeatedly described him as a separatist who was determined to split China. 23
The Chinese government maintained tight controls on religious practices and places of worship.
Chinese government considers their independence movements as a formidable threat to its national
unity and security. China considers the Tibetan issue as internal problems of China, not those that
foreign countries could interfere with. Thus China harshly crushed an uprising in the Tibet capital
Lhasa in March 2008, when hundreds of Tibetans marched thorough the streets of Lhasa protesting
Chinese occupation there.24
Third, another serious "separatist" issue is the human rights situation in the Xinjiang Uighur
Region. Xinjiang, a largely Muslim area of over 20 million population. became a province of China
in 1881, and remained one of Autonomous Regions since 1949. As it did with Tibet, China sent
native Chinese to the area in order to gradually integrate it with China. As a result, the population
balance drastically changed, for numerical parity. Much like Tibetans, the Uighurs in Xinjiang
have struggled for religious and cultural survival in the face of massive influx of Chinese
immigrants, as well as harsh repression of political dissent.25
China has long claimed to be confronted with "religious extremist forces" and "violent" terrorists
in Xinjiang. Especially since September 11, 2001, with the rise of fear of international terrorism,
birthday on July 6, the August National Minority Games, and the 50th anniversary of the foundingof the Peoples' Republic of China on October 1.
"Tibet" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/tibet.htm)
23
The Chinese government continued to insist that Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy it recognizes andenthroned in 1995 is the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. The Panchen Lama is Tibetan
Buddhism's second highest figure, after the Dalai Lama.
24
In the past China has not hesitated to crush major protests in Tibet or to jail disobedient monks.
President Hu Jintao, who is also the general secretary of the Communist Party, served as party bossin Tibet during a violent crackdown in 1989. "Violence in Tibet as Monks Clash With the Police."
New York Times (March 15, 2009)25
Uighurs are the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang but are a minority in Urmuqi, where Han
Chinese make up more than 70 percent of the population of two million or so. The Chinese
government has encouraged Han migration to the city and other parts of Xinjiang, fuelingresentment among the Uighurs. Urumqi is a deeply segregated city, with Han Chinese there rarely
venturing into the Uighur quarter.

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the Chinese government has cracked down the Muslim Uighur community, which was labeled as
supporting terrorism. According to the Human Rights Watch, "China has used these claims tojustify ruthless repression in Xinjiang against religious activities, personnel and individual
believers in what as "campaigns to rectify social order." 26 The U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Mary Robinson in a meeting with the Chinese leaders, stressed that the war on
terrorism “must not infringe on the human rights of China‟'s Muslims.”27
Additionally, China has drawn criticism from a number of Uighurs and human rights advocatesbecause it “"consistently fails”" to live up to its own constitutional provisions governing
autonomous regions. For example, Amnesty International cites several instances of Uighurs being
detained “"merely for being relatives or friends of political prisoners or fugitives,”" or they say
Uighurs could be detained and held without charge for a number of months. Chinese officials denythese allegations and insists that “China strictly distinguishes the separatists from the rest of the 10
million Chinese Muslims in the Xinjiang region.”
A huge demonstration in Urmuqi, the capital of Xinjiang province, in July 2009 brought again
the issue of harsh treatment of Uighurs. The riot was the largest ethnic clash in China since the
Tibetan uprising of March 2008, and perhaps the biggest protest in Xinjiang in years.28 At least
197 people were killed and 1,721 wounded, according to the government, and most of the deadwere considered the Han people. Tensions between Uighurs and Han have remained high since therioting in China‟s worst ethnic violence in decades. Like the Tibetan unrest, it highlighted the26

Dewardric L. McNeal, 2001, "China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems withTerrorism" CRS Report for Congress (December 17) op.cit.
27―
U.N. Voices Concern Over Rise in Alleged Abuse of Chinese Muslims,‖ Los Angeles Times(November 10, 2001)
28
The violent demonstrations were initially a reaction to a June 26 incident at a factory inGuangdong province, where two Uighur workers were beaten to death by Han Chinese colleagues.
The Uighur protesters were very angry about the security forces who did not take any actions on
the Chinese.

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

deep-seated frustrations felt by some ethnic minorities in western China over the policies of theCommunist Party. The Chinese government blamed separatist groups for instigating the protests.29
And the fourth issue regarding human rights is a problem related to North Korean defectors(refugees), who entered or stranded into China. There are estimated 50,000 to 300,000 North
Koreans who escaped or voluntarily crossed to China, for mainly economic reasons, like foodshortages in North Korea. In many cases, they are considered refugees either economic or political,
who involuntarily left their hometown for searching their basic needs.
However, it is well known that North Korean refugees, often living in hiding in China are subject
to various human rights abuses, such as illegal trafficking, sexual exploitation, arbitrary arrest anddetention. On the North Korean defectors, China has generally taken the position that they are notrefugees but "illegal aliens" who unlawfully entered the country, though China has not made public
about its policies and positions. Thus China both arrests and punishes them or forcibly repatriates
them to North Korea. Although China is a party to the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 protocols, China not only practices refoulement, (or repatriation) but also
refuses to allow North Korean access to asylum procedures or to allow the UNHCR (UN HighCommissioner for Refugees) access to them. And it is also believed that China also repatriate or let
the North Korean agents to capture the North Koreans on the basis of special agreement on border
between North Korea and China. Those returned to North Korea face interrogation, mistreatment,
torture, and long-term imprisonment, or execution.
On the policy and practices regarding the matters of North Korean refugees, as well as Uighur
and Tibet, China has been strongly criticized by international community and NGOs, both Korean
and international. They called for the Chinese government stopping treating and punishing them asillegal aliens.
China has defended its policy and positions on Tibet and Uighur as only "internal" problems of
China, criticizing any hint of interference from outside. Moreover, having a seat in the UN
Commission on Human Rights, and subsequently in the Human Rights Council, China has been
29

"Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension" New York Times (July 5, 2009)47

Heung-Soon Park

hostile toward many UN human rights mechanisms in general. It still has not ratified theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and not allowed several of themandate-holders to visit the country. In 2004, for example, China invited the special rapporteur on
torture to conduct state visit, but at the last minute requested the visit to postpone indefinitely.
China's human rights record was a high profile issue in the UN forums over the years. The
United States through the 1990s usually coordinated the leadership regarding the draft resolutions
on China with other sponsors, such as Australia or the European Union. However, when aresolution in the UN CHR was introduced on it, China usually employs all the procedural tactics toprevent action on substantive vote: calling for motion not to take action-which, if adopted, prevents
further consideration.30 "No action" procedural motions were utilized almost every year since
1990, except in 1995. In the early 2000s, however, the US government efforts to take “China issue”
in the UN were slowed down.

3) Myanmar
Today, Myanmar (Burma) is a troubled country, with crippling poverty, gross human rights
violations, under a power-hungry and superstitious military ruler. The military government in
Myanmar has taken reign over the people with authoritarian rules over two decades since 1988.
The military regime has had considerable control over the life of its people, without guaranteeing
their basic freedoms and human rights. There have been a few uprisings by students and Buddhist
monks, demanding for democracy and political freedom, including the famous massdemonstrations in August 8, 1988 and in September 2007.

30

For example, in the CHR in 2001, China's "no-action" motion was approved by a vote of 23-17
with 12 abstentions and one absent, Ten Asian members of the Commission supported China, while
Japan opposed and Korea abstained. Ten African nations supported China, and four abstained aswell. UNA_USA, 2002, A Global Agenda: Issues before the 56th General Assembly of the United
Nations (Lanham,MD: Rowman & Littlefield) pp.160-163

48

Human Rights Regime and East Asia

However, the massive protests of "8888", 31 initiated by students, were joined by a cross sectionof society, estimated 500,000 people, which included monks, government workers, and teachers.
The protest, lasting over 6 weeks, was the largest mass movement since the 1948 independence
struggle, and the people of Burma were standing up for democracy. The military, however, harshly
crushed the movement, massacring 3,000 innocent civilians, systematically killing the spirit of the
Burmese people. There were many arrests, and certain prominent leaders were also victimized.
As a symbol of democratic movement and a national leader, Aung San Suu Kyi was placed
under house detention, without clear charges or trial. As of now, she remains under house arrest,
and the Burmese military several times hinted that she would be released, but she was rearrested
for extended detention.
In 1990, the military regime conducted its promised general elections, and Aung San Suu Kyi ‟sparty won a landslide victory. Despite her continuing detention, her National League for
Democracy party won a landslide victory by securing 82% of the vote. However, the Burmese
military refused to recognize the results of her victory and rather further clamped down on
freedom.
The world saw again, in September 2007, the "Saffron" revolution taking place, by Buddhist
monks who spearheaded the movement. This attracted massive world-wide support, and renewed
sanctions from countries such as the United States. Through the internet, people all over the world
were able to get first hand information of the struggle, as the military was unable to censor thechannels.
However, by suppressing any further political protests, the government intentionally blocks any
challenges to their regime rules. The authorities tightened its control over its society with stringent
laws. For example, State Emergency Act can be quite widely applied, allowing the state to charge

31This date is the anniversary of the 8888 uprising, which sparked off the worldwide movement
for the freedom of the Burmese people from the oppressive military junta. There was rising
discontent, and the lack of democratic systems only angered the Burmese people. Students at
Rangoon University protested and, in retaliation, the military killed a student activist, This paved
the way for the 8888 uprising, on August 8, 1988.

49

Heung-Soon Parkanyone accused of discussing confidential matters relating to the state. Another infa mous act, theElectronics Act, prohibits sending information, including photo and videos, which the authorities
think can be used to damage the state‟s image. It is known that the number of media workers inprison has dramatically increased since the junta‟s crackdown on demonstrations in September
2007. There are still more than 2,000 political prisoners languishing in the prisons.
The responses of the international community have been mostly slow and tedious. Theinternational community has been telling the Junta for more than 20 years to release politicalprisoners and stop human rights abuse but without any appreciable success. Why is that so? One of
the reasons is that there are several nations whose interests are at stake with the Burmese military
regime. For example, France supports the French Oil giant Total, which is opposed to sanctions
against the Burmese junta. France has been defending Total‟s interests, which fund the military.
India also acts on similar lines, and does not support sanctions for the junta.
Most of East Asian countries have also taken ambiguous positions on the issue, fearing
offending the Burmese regime. For example, China has taken lenient policy toward Myanmar,
since it has economic interests at stake in natural resources like oil and natural gas. The ASEAN
nations have taken “constructive engagement” policy as its official policy. Some of the strongest
supporters of the "quiet diplomacy" have been the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore
and Thailand. Although more willing to publicly criticize the Burma‟s government, the ASEAN has
not shown a greater willingness to impose economic sanction on its own member of the ASEAN.
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand are major trading partners with Burma, and may be reluctant toforswear the economic benefits of bilateral trade and investment. 32 Indonesia‟s civilian

32

Thailand has had an ambivalent view of Burma, as its domestic unrest has had a more
immediate adverse impact on Thailand. However, the new civilian government in Thailand decided
to support Burma‘s admission to ASEAN and follow a policy of engagement. Under the Suharto
regime, the Indonesian government shared some ideological views with Burma‘s military
government that led to its support of Burma‘s ASEAN membership and closer relations. Malaysia
at the time was concerned about both Chinese and US influence in the region, and found similarviews among Burma‘s military rulers. The Singaporean government saw economic opportunity incloser relations with Burma, and for a time was a major supplier of equipment and arms for the50

Human Rights Regime and East Asia

government may be more willing to consider economic pressure on Burma, in part because of its
history of military rule and in part because of its concern about Burma‟s Muslim minority. A US
Congressional report has said that ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement with military rulers
in Burma has proven to be ineffective. 33
The US, along with European Union, imposed economic sanctions against the Burmese
government in 2003, and at the same time tried to put pressure or use a "quiet diplomacy" topersuade the military regime. 34 President George W. Bush on 29 July 2008 renewed a ban on
imports from Myanmar, aiming to keep Burma‟s gems from entering US markets via third-party
countries.
The efforts by the UN have not produced any meaningful results. The UN Secretary General Ban
Ki-Moon visited in the wake of the natural disaster in May 2008, and called the military regime torelease the madame Suu kyi, but was refused. 35 In August, the UN special envoy to Burma, Mr
Ibrahim Gambari, has failed to meet her during his trip to Burma. Tomos Ojea Quintana, the UN‟s
new human rights rapporteur for Burma, in August, visited Rangoon, and met some politicalprisoners in Insein jail, but not any real high-ranking officials of the government or military. In the

Burmese military. ―US Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations" The
Congressional Research Service (December 18, 2009)33
The Congressional Research Service (December 18, 2009), ibid.
34"The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act" of the United States renewed a sanctions regime
imposed since 2003 over the suppression of opposition leader Aung San Suu kyi's democracy
movement. The gems trade is one of the most lucrative sources of profit for the Junta, The
so-called Tom Lantos Block Burmese Jade Act is estimated to have deprived its ruling junta ofhundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue. "Bush signs law to ban gems trade" AFP(August 29, 2008)35
On 2 May 2008, cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, leaving an estimated 140,000 people dead or
missing, and an estimated 2.4 million people severely affected. In response to the cyclone, theSecretary-General visited Myanmar. Following the visit, a Tripartite Core Group coordination
mechanism was set up between Myanmar, the United Nations and the ASEAN to facilitate aneffective large-scale humanitarian response. On 25 May 2008, the Secretary-General visited
Myanmar to co-chair a joint high-level pledging conference in Yangon with Myanmar and ASEAN.
"Situation of human rights in Myanmar: Report of the Secretary-General" 2008, The General
Assembly (A/63/356)

51

Heung-Soon Parkabsence of stronger measures, the military junta has only disregarded the international attention
without big difficulties.
In February 2008, the Government of Myanmar for the first time made public a time frame in its
political "road map" process towards the establishment of a civilian and democratic government.
They announced that a national referendum on a draft constitution would be held in May 2008,
followed by multiparty elections in 2010. On 10 May 2008, Myanmar held a constitutionalreferendum as planned, except 47 townships where voting was postponed due to an humanitarian
emergency by the cyclone. About two weeks later, the Government announced that the draft
constitution had been formally adopted, with a reported 92.48 % approval and 98.12 % turnout ofvoters. Despite the announced plans to hold elections in 2010, however, there is no clear timeline
for when the election will be held. Obviously, the junta wants to ensure victory in the election
because it would be disastrous if it loses again, as it happened in May 1990. 36

4) East Timor
The tragedy of East Timor has it origins in the Indonesia's occupation of the island during the 24
years from 1975 to 1999. Indonesian armed forces and pro-Indonesian militia was reported to havekilled an estimated 200,000 East Timorese and committed extensive brutality in the island against
independent movements.
Especially in August 1999, almost 80% population of East Timor voted for independence in areferendum. But over 700,000 persons were displaced by widespread violence and destruction
committed by pro-integrationist militias backed by Indonesian troops. The security forces allegedly
committed numerous crimes, including church massacres, rapes and arbitrary arrests and killings
against East Timorese.
36

The reason for keeping a tight rein over the election date is purely tactical. The announcement
will be made when the junta's handpicked cronies are ready to enter the race. The suspicion is thatthe election could be held late in the second half of 2010, toward the third quarter, when thecontracts that international humanitarian and relief organizations have with the regime will end inJune this year, and the representatives leave the country. "Burmese junta already manipulating
upcoming poll," Asianews Network (Jan 7, 2010)52

Human Rights Regime and East Asia

The international community made an urgent intervention in the East Timor crisis by organizingby the INTERFET (International Force East Timor), a multinational force, led by Australia under
the UN mandate. The operation was successfully conducted, stopping brutality and bringing instability in the area. Subsequently, the UN transformed it as peace-keeping operations, the
UNTAET (UN Transitional Authority in East Timor) on October 25, 1999. There was anincreasing pressure in international community to punish those offenses committed in the colonial
period. The United Nations itself did proceed to make prosecutions in pursuing East Timor. The
UNTAET created the Serious Crimes Panel in 2000 for the prosecution of serious criminal cases
committed in the period between January 1 and October 25, 1999, through the District Court ofDili.37
As a result, the UNTAET adopted the legislation, which gave the District Court an exclusive
jurisdiction over the following offenses: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, murder,
sexual offenses, and torture. And, the creation and composition of Special Panels was elaborated asa "mixed" international court, with two international and one East Timorese judges, where as incases of special gravity or importance three international and two local judges. Thus, in the East
Timor Special Panels, the East Timor national court exercises its jurisdiction over the crimes
mentioned, but they would be assisted by the UN.
By June 2000 more than 50 militia members were being held in UN custody for alleged crimes
arising out of the transitional violence. In early December 2000, then UN Chief Prosecutor for East
Timor, handed down the first indictments for crimes against humanity.
However, the functioning of the trials in East Timor have faced many hurdles, such as lack ofaccess, and political will, as well as scarce resources in professionals, officials, and supporting
staffs.38 For example, with the international arrest warrants for those indicted and in submitting

37

Heung-Soon Park, 2007, "The Role of the UN and International Courts," The Proceedings of theSeventh Japan-Korea Seminar on the United Nations System "Human Security and the Role of theUnited Nations," (December 14-15, The United Nations University, Tokyo) pp.268-270
38
Tellingly, the only defendants the Tribunal was able to obtain custody of were relatively
low-level militia leaders. Top-level officials and Indonesian military indictees were and still remain,53

Heung-Soon Park

those warrants to the Interpol, 77 of the 165 arrest warrants issued are on record with Interpol. With
regard to many of the highest-level commanders, the East Timor government has blocked
submission of those warrants to Interpol. As part of its activities, the East Timor tribunal issued anarrest warrant in May 2004 for the former Indonesian military chief Wiranto. The indictment
brought against Wiranto in February 2003 charged him "with command responsibility for murder,
deportation and persecution committed in the context of a widespread and systematic attack on thecivilian population in East Timor."39
However, the Indonesian government is also reluctant to cooperate with the East Timor hybrid
tribunal. Despite existence of an MOU between the UNTAET and Indonesia, singed in April 2000,
Indonesia has not been cooperative in transferring the accused to the Special Panels. Indonesian
government made clear that it does not consider the East Timor court to have jurisdiction over its
nationals and it has no intention of arresting or extraditing those charged by the panel. The key
high-level suspects in the militia, and government are in Indonesia. Indonesia also rejects thepossibility of an international tribunal on the East Timor violence, insisting that it could itself
investigate and bring to justice through its own judicial system. The East Timor government aswell is opposed to the establishment of an international tribunal, saying it would rather forget thepast and focus on its economic ties with Jakarta. 40
Indonesia indeed issued a decree stipulating the creation of its own ad hoc Human Rights
Tribunals to prosecute human rights violations in East Timor occurred after August 30, 1999.
at large, mostly in Indonesia. The hybrid Serious Crimes Panel began hearing these cases in early
2001. David Cohen, "Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for
the Future? " 2002. Analysis from the East-West Center, No. 61 p.3
39"East Timor Judge Issues Arrest Warrant for Wiranto" Reuters (May 10, 2004)40
It became clear in May 2004 that the East Timor government was interested in pursuing arapprochement with Wiranto, by then a presidential candidate, The Prosecutor General has
increasingly been under pressure by the President and Foreign Minister of East Timor, who vocally
opposed the Wiranto indictment, claiming that it harms East Timor' s relationship with Indonesia,
The strange events in the Wiranto case are indicative of a lack of political will on the part of the
Timorese government to pursue prosecutions. "Unfulfilled Promises Achieving Justice for Crimes
against Humanity in East Timor," 2004. The Open Society Institute and the Coalition forInternational Justice pp.34-45

54

Human Rights Regime and East Asia

These were created under an Indonesian law of 2000 that for the first time made military andcivilian leaders accountable for human rights violations. Significant indictments of relatively
high-ranking Indonesian and Timorese military and civilian leaders have been handed down.
Rather than a serious attempt to convict those who orchestrated the killing in East Timor, however,the Jakarta trials seem more like political theater playing.
Thus the results of the Indonesian trial have not been promising. For example, in a trial thatbegan March 19, 2002, four Indonesian military officers and one police official were accused ofcrimes against humanity. The indictment alleged their “"command responsibility”" for the Suai
Church Massacre, in which as many as 200 people are believed to have been killed. However, allwere acquitted.41 Domestically, they aim at whitewashing the role of the Indonesian army (TNI).
Internationally, they pander to the United Nations, which has threatened Indonesia with a true
international tribunal, and the United States, where Congress has an authority to resume military
aid to Indonesia.
The UN expressed its concerns about these tribunals, especially with tribunal exclusion of theviolence before the independence referendum in August 1999. Another concern arose from the factthat the Indonesian legislature passed a decree barring retroactive prosecution of war crimes andcrimes against humanity for military officials accused of abuses in East Timor. The implication ofthese Indonesian actions is that the accused might be indicted or punished for lighter "ordinary"crimes rather than serious international crimes. Most of all, the domestic situations in Indonesia,
from economic crisis and natural disasters to separatist movements seemed to make it moredifficult to pursue justice on the accused within the Indonesian jurisdiction.
The UN deferred to the Indonesian government and has stayed discussion of creating aninternational ad hoc tribunal. However, it is unclear whether there is sufficient political resolve
among the Security Council members to establish an international tribunal for Indonesia.
41

One conviction of East Timor Governor Abilio Soares, for ―"widespread and systematic‖"
murder and persecution as crimes against humanity resulted in only a three-year sentence. Thisverdict left international observers puzzled, as under the Indonesian law governing the tribunals theminimum sentence for these crimes is 10 years. David Cohen, ibid. p.4

55

Heung-Soon ParkThus, for example, Amnesty International, in August 2009, has asked the Security Council toestablish a special East Timor tribunal to prosecute human rights violations during Indonesian ruleand to investigate those responsible for the killings in 1999. Amnesty International also wants thetribunal to investigate abuses committed during Indonesia's occupation from 1975 to 1999.

5) Cambodia
Under the Khmer Rouge government led by Pol Pot, about 2 million people died in a "Killing
Field" massacre from 1975 to 1979 in Cambodia. The human catastrophes was committed as partof political and indoctrinate campaign of social revolution by the warring factions in the Cold War
environment. The Cambodians spent much of the two decades coming to terms with the legacy of
violence.
By the middle of 1999, most of the top leaders of the Khmer Rouge were either dead or
surrendered, while a new national parliamentary election was held. For example, Pol Pot, hiding
over 18 years after the collapse of the regime, was arrested and put into life imprisonment in housearrest, but died of heart attack in April 1998. The issue of accountability for the crimes of the
Khmer Rouge emerged as a nagging question. The question became all the more complex, as Hun
Sen, the former Cambodian Communist Party leader, took power as the prime minister on alegitimate election.42
Questions had been raised with regard to accountability of the crimes whether these individual
should be prosecuted, and if so, on what procedures. 43 Specifically, if these Khmer leaders are to
be prosecuted, who should be the main body for prosecution: the international community throughan ad hoc tribunal, the current Cambodian government through special national courts, or a mixtureof national and international court? The Cambodian government's position was that it would
organize the court, while the UN was limited to playing a supporting role. The government insisted

42

UNA_USA, 1999, A Global Agenda: Issues before the 54th General Assembly of the United
Nations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield) pp.42-47, pp.278-280
43
Heung-Soon Park, "The Role of the UN and International Courts," ibid. pp.266-270

56

Human Rights Regime and East Asia

that, for the sake of the Cambodian people, the trial must be held in Cambodia using Cambodian
staff and judges together with foreign personnel.
Cambodia invited international participation in light of the weakness of the Cambodian legal
system and the international nature of the crimes, and to help in meeting international standards ofjustice. An agreement with the UN was ultimately reached in June 2003 detailing how theinternational community will assist and participate in the Extraordinary Chambers. Cambodian
Prime Minister Hun Sen voiced concerns that the UN tribunal would not help the reconciliation
process that Cambodia was undertaking.
After dragging negotiations, the treaty between the UN and Cambodia was finally signed in
March 2003. The Cambodian government tried to back out of the deal at the last minute, but in
October 2004, the Cambodian Legislature ratified the agreement to create the Khmer Rouge
Tribunal (KRT). The chamber of the KRT has been consisted of "mixed" international court, inwhich a majority of the judges is Cambodian, with three Cambodians and two internationals, butdecision requires a super-majority so that at least one international judge will have to vote in favorof each decision. While Cambodian procedural law is to apply, the substantive law is international.
The KRT has jurisdiction to prosecute senior Khmer Rouge Leaders for genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, as defined international conventions, as well as homicide, torture andreligious persecution, as defined by Cambodian law. By the early 2006, the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) were formally established. 44
As the KRT comes to terms with its ugly past, the process remains very slow for exercising its
prerogatives as many of the accused former leaders and perpetrators die away. The KRT in July
2007 charged the commandant of the main Khmer Rouge torture house with crimes against
humanity, bringing the first charge in a long-delayed trial. The commandant, Kaing Guek Eav, 64,
known as Duch, was the leader of the Tuol Sleng prison in Phnom Penh where at least 14,000 men,
women and children were tortured and sent to killing fields. As of November 2009, the trial of44

For a full description and operation of the ECCC, refer to a UN website,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/ english/ In the meantime, UNAKRT (UN Assistance Khmer Rouge
Trials) provides technical assistance to the ECCC, see http://www.unakrt-online.org/02_court.htm

57

Heung-Soon Park

Duch has been coming to end, and the prosecution, making its closing arguments, demanded alengthy prison term, 40 year life-in-prison, for him.45 Only four other defendants have been
indicted and waiting for trials. It took about 13 years of negotiation to establish the special Khmer
tribunal. But even after the operation of the tribunal, the trial processes have moved very slowly.

3. Assessment on the Human Rights Regime and Its Practices in East Asia.

As reviewed, human rights regime has grown exponentially in the late 20th century. With the endof the cold war, and in the wake of a series of human tragedy in the post-Cold War environments,
human rights issues became an utmost global issue. However, the role of human rights regime,
including the function of norm setting, promoting, monitoring, and enforcing, have been generally
considered mixed results with successes and failures.
At a global level, most of all, the human right regime in spite of the limitations has a successstory in some aspects. As reviewed, the global human rights regime, centered upon the UN systemwith complex but sophisticated mechanism, has established as a firm foundation serving for humandignity, peace and prosperity of international community. Such developments as evolving
international norms, such as 'RtoP' (Responsibility to Protect), 46 and the newly created Human
Rights Council and its UPR (Universal Periodic Review) system, 47 all together, indicate a greater
potential for further progress of the human rights regime.
The success of the regime can be attributed to several factors: first, the very nature of humanrights as a legitimate claim of human being with innate desire for protection from abuse; second,
the role of NGOs and civil society creating global human rights movement; third, early consensus
of civil society and state actors on the normative content of human rights, in the UN Charter and45"Last Khmer Rouge defendant charged with genocide," Associated Press (December 21, 2009)
Ramesh Thakur, 2006 " Chpater 11, 'responsibility to protect'," The United Nations, Peace andSecurity (Cambridge, UK,; Cambridge Univ. Press) pp.244-263
47
Jae-young Park, 2009, "Working and Assesment of the UPR Mechanism of the UN HRC,"
Korean Journal of International Organizations, Vol.4 No,1 pp.117-140
4658

Human Rights Regime and East Asia

the Universal Declaration; fourth the evolving set of international institutions, such as the UN
system, with a mandate to address human rights issues; and lastly the linking human right topic toother issue areas, such as peace and security, economic development, and environmental protection.
In other words, in human rights issues the role of different actors of global governance have beenintertwined and complimented each other. And the human rights issues also were effectively
discussed and institutionalized as a key global agenda, with the progress of international society.
In other aspects, however, the human rights regime has seen failures and limitations. First, there
are legal barriers working against human rights. For example, the legal restraints, widely accepted
as a general rule, include traditional concepts of state sovereignty and non-interference of domestic
jurisdiction, as well as the consent-based nature of many international obligations. Some politicalleaders or nations tend to invoke "cultural relativism," challenging universality of human rights,
while endorsing normative instruments. Second, most states exhibit a reluctance to criticize othersfor human rights violations. States tend try to balance, and often subordinate, consideration ofhuman rights issues to other national goals or issues, including trade, military and strategic policy,
and foreign investment. And, third, human rights regime is limited by its own design. International
human rights institutions and systems lack the real power, such as legal or binding power, to rectify
or mend the situation, but exercise mostly moral power against the abusing state.
At a regional level, regarding the East Asian case, the human rights practices have also mixtureof success and failures. The East Asian region has seen a general improvement of human rights
over the years, as a result of steady elevation of economic and social standards. In addition, thepolitical developments in many nations of the region, with trials and errors, have contributed to thepromotion and protection of human rights in general.
However, the East Asian region has not only lacked a regional regime in terms of common
perception and institutionalization, but also mostly lagged behind in terms of practices in humanrights issues. Some of the worst human rights abuses have, and could, not been dealt effectively at
the regional level, mainly due to a strong sense of state sovereignty, consideration of political andeconomic interests, and China factor. A poor record of human rights situation in East Asia, as

59

Heung-Soon Park

reviewed, has been demonstrated in "Freedom in the World 2010" annual report by Freedom House.
Three nations, North Korea, Myanmar, and China plus Tibet, have been named among the ten“worst of the worst” category out of 194 countries and 14 territories around the world. On the East
Asian human rights situation, the VOA commented:"The U.S.-based human rights monitoring group, Freedom House says Asia still struggles withthe basic issues of rule of law and freedom of expression......Freedom House says that while Asia
saw the most significant improvements in freedom last year, it still struggles with the basic issuesof rule of law and freedom of expression. The group says situations in China, Tibet, North Korea
and Burma are worrisome. In its latest annual survey, Freedom House says that Asia received amixed rating in 2009, a year marked by political progress and repression." 48
The human rights issues in East Asia, briefly summarized, reflect diverse views and positions of
the actors with regard to global human rights regime. There are positive and negative factors whichmight affect further development of human rights mechanism and its applications in the East Asian
context. On the positive side, many East Asian nations have committed to further economic andsocial developments of the society, emboldened by the confidence and expertise they experienced
with successes. The notion of "Asian Value" serves as a motivation for its own development model,
distinct from the Western or other regions of the world. Many NGOs in East Asia, based upon
rapidly growing civil society, have much engaged in the empowerment of its own, in partnershipwith the governments, the UN system and other intergovernmental organizations. In light of theactive and potential role as a facilitator, educator, and mobilizer, NGOs will help to make further
progress in human rights in East Asia.
On the negative side, heterogeneity in the political system, especially North Korea, and China,
would be harmful to the general promotion of human rights not only in those nations, but also in
East Asia as a whole. Asian value also may work negatively against the expansion andinstitutionalization of East Asian human rights regime. Opinions have been diverged, but many48

http;//voanews.com/english/news/human-rights/Report--Asia-Sees-Some-Significant
Progress- 81235887.html

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

Asian states have argued for the need to respect historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds inconsidering human rights issues. The notion of Asian value is utilized for the defense of their own
political and social system and their own human rights record. Moreover, in the cases of North
Korea, China, and Myanmar, such principles as state sovereignty, and non-interference into
domestic affairs are main sources of negating the UN resolutions or the criticism by international
community on human rights. In the absence of a regional human rights regime, there have been no
meaningful, collective efforts to deal with the issues.
Even under the framework of global human rights regime, the human rights mechanism of
sanctions, due to its own limitations, has not been effectively worked. Except basic resolutions with"naming and shaming" in the UN forum, the global regime, as well as many member states, are notwilling to confront those abusive countries with stronger measures. Thus, for instance, China
expressed its negative view over the authority and ability of the HRC in the country-specificresolutions.
But for Cambodia and East Timor, the global human rights regime made limited degree ofachievement with peace-enforcing (East Timor) and peace-keeping (Cambodia). The global humanrights mechanism was not effectively applied in the high days of on-going human rights abuses inboth nations, when these countries were engulfed in severe internal strife. More immediate anddirect measures, such as "humanitarian intervention" were not taken. The global regime only began
its work in both countries, as part of post-conflict peace-building operations after the end of brutal
human rights abuses there. The application of international criminal justice, with special tribunals,
to the leaders of both countries on war crimes or crime against humanity, however, has contributed
to a realization of the promotion of human rights. In this regard, the introduction of transitional
justice in the Asian region would serve as a useful precedent of implementation of human rights
norms and also have good implications for the international community.
An interesting development in this regard is the activities of NGO actors in dealing with North
Korean issues. There have been rising interests in international community to charge responsibility
against the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il and other leading figures for human rights abuse in61

Heung-Soon Park

North Korea. For example, several Korean human rights NGOs have just launched an international
campaign to demand the indictment of the North Korean leaders on charges of crime against
humanity under the statute of the ICC. 49 This move might cause controversy in its usefulness andeffect, as well as jurisdiction and other legal questions. Even without some immediate tangible
results, however, the campaign effort may contribute to revealing the miserable human rights
situation in North Korea to the world, and also to rallying a political support of pressure on the
North Korean leadership.
More fundamentally, one should remind that states are the most important actor in human rightissues in East Asia. as well as in the global human rights regime. The governments could be thevery sources of the problem, important agents of progress, or obstacle to progress in human rights.
Human rights is an "important" factor in a national foreign policy. Therefore, many governments
have participated in efforts to build international law and regimes to promote them; they figure out
the utility of human rights issues over other goals; they respond to human rights abuses with
diplomatic protests and economic sanctions; and they also take steps to improve human rights intheir own societies. For the improvement of human rights and the establishment of East Asianhuman rights regime, various actors, such as the UN, NGOs, and major advanced states, should
more closely cooperate to encourage other states and governments to take more positive views andmeasures on human rights issue as a key global issue of concern in international community.

Conclusion

Over the past 60 years, the UN, NGOs and states, have played an invaluable role in establishingrespect for human rights as a central issue in international relations. A consensus has emerged that

49

Under the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over: 1.the crimes of
genocide, crimes against humanity, if: 2. Committed on or after July 1, 2009, where: 3. (i) The
crimes have been committed on the territory or by a national of one of the states parties, or (ii) a
state submits voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the ICC, or (iii) the UN SC refers a situation to the
ICC, ie. asking to investigate with a view to prosecution.

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Human Rights Regime and East Asia

the global human rights regime evolved successfully to contribute to the promotion and protectionof human rights, thus peace and prosperity of international society. However, there is also a
recognition that massive crises involving widespread violations of human rights continue to occur
around the world, and the global regime has certain limitations in dealing the issues properly and intime.
As discussed, East Asian nations, as a new and dynamic actor in international affairs, also have
paid attention to the issue of human rights. In general, throughout the region, there have been
gradual progresses in human rights, political and civil, as well as economic, social, and cultural.
However, this is the region also where human rights abuses are notorious in several countries, withpeculiar background and conditions. Some countries, notably North Korea and Myanmar, has been
identified with the worst human rights practices and records, while China in spite of some
improvement has been criticized for its poor human rights conditions as well. For those countries,
the global regime has had limited impact upon the improvement of human rights. Both East Timorand Cambodia have made hard efforts to come to terms with its past, assisted by the United Nations.
The global human rights regime continues to provide its services for criminal justice and otherpost-conflict peace-building operations, for reconciliation and peace in those nations.
Thus the human rights issues in East Asia have been mainly dealt in the global forums , including
the Human Rights Council, the Security Council, and the General Assembly, as well as by someindividual governments and NGOs. Even in its limitations and constraints, thus the global regime
has made efforts contributing to the protection and promotion of human rights issues. The absenceof a regional human rights mechanism in East Asia, the only region of the world, indicates a weakcommon understanding and sharing of human rights as a critical element of global issues andintra-regional agenda. In light of expanding notion of international security into human security,
beyond state security, the international society expects the East Asian nations to further progress inthe policy and practice in human rights as an important barometer of national prestige andinfluence.

63

Heung-Soon ParkThe reviews and lessons from this analysis have several implications and suggestions for Korea
and the development of an East Asian human rights regime. Most of all, Korea should make harderefforts to improve its human rights policy and instrument. Human rights records of Korea as ademocratic, open, affluent society, are relatively in good standing, compared to other nations in theregion. But, with its "pledges" for securing a rule of law and order in society, the Korean
government should try to bridge the gap between such rhetoric and the reality on the ground. The
government should make efforts to improve human rights conditions and records as pronounced.
Second, it is also important for the Korean government to establish human rights issues as aforeign policy agenda of key concerns in pursuing national interests. The government should be
able to balance the values of human rights with other national interests such as economic, political,
and economic goals. Having committed to become a full-fledged middle power nation, the Korean
government should formulate certain principles and priorities on human rights issues, so as to beable to exercise its influence in international affairs, with more prestige. In this way, the Korean
government could better shape and implement its foreign policies toward China, Myanmar, andother nations of human rights concern bilaterally and in the global forum multilaterally.
Third, the Korean government should take more active positions on the North Korea's humanrights situations. North Korean human rights issue, including North Korean refugee issue, emerged
as an urgent international agenda not only in international society but in the annual session of the
UN HRC and the General Assembly. The Korean government, under the leadership of President
Lee Myung-bak, began to change its positions, strengthening more active initiative on the issue. In
light of enhanced function of the HRC, and growing concern on the North Korean human rights
situation, Korea should take up the issues more aggressively, both using "sticks and carrots" on the
North Korean regime for change.
Fourth, Korea should be able to play a more active role in the UN system as a faithful member.
Korea has become a global model of economic success, drastically transforming from apoverty-ridden nation to a mature advanced economy. Korea, the 12th largest economy andfinancial contributor to the UN system, may also utilize the UN as a useful multilateral forum to64

Human Rights Regime and East Asia

advance the protection and promotion of human rights agenda. Korea may also play a mediatingrole between the Western states and developing states in the discussion of human right issue bothas an East Asian nation and as an advanced economy in the conduct of the UN work. It is importantfor Korea for the benefit of the UN system to equip with improved mechanism and instruments.
Fifth and last, Korea should take an initiative to move toward a gradual evolution of an East
Asian human rights regime. It has been a fashionable topic these days among the East Asia nations
and civil society leaders, to explore the possibility of the creation of an East Asian community inthe model of the European community or the European Union (EU). Then human rights sector
should be dealt accordingly in the processes of evolution of an East Asian community. Korea is in aunique and legitimate position, with its own past experience and future potential dynamism ininternational leadership. Moreover, the Korean government at present has committed to a "New
Asian Policy", for seeking enhancing its relationship with the ASEAN and other Asian nations.
Therefore, the Korean government representatives, in collaboration with NGOs and scholars,should began to study the possibility and furthermore to design the vision and strategy for the East
Asian human rights regime in the region.

References
Donnelly, Jack, 1998. International Human Rights, 2nd ed. (New York: Westview Press)
Donnelly, Jack, 1989. Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ.
Press)
Forsythe, David P. 2000. Human Rights in International Relations (New Yok: Cambridge Univ.
Press)
Kent, Ann, 1999. China, the United Nations, and Human Rights (Philadelphia, PA: Univ. of
Pennsylvania Press)
Marlone, David M. The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Lynne
Rienner, New York, 2004)
Mertus, Julie A. 2007. The United Nations and Human Rights (New York: Routledge)
Ramchran, Bertrand G. 2007. (Human Rights) "Norms and Machinery," Thomas Weiss and Sam
Daws, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press)
Smith, Rhona K.M. 2007. International Human Rights, 3rd ed., (New York: Oxford Univ. Press)
Thakur, Ramesh, 2006. The United Nations, Peace and Security (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ.
Press)

65

Heung-Soon Park

Thakur, Ramesh, 2006 "Chapter 11, 'responsibility to protect'," The United Nations, Peace andSecurity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press)
Weschler, Joanna, 2004. "Human Rights" in David M. Marlone, The UN Security Council: From
the Cold War to the 21st Century ( New York: Lynne Rienner)
Weiss, Thomas and Daws, Sam, eds., 2007. The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press)
UNA_USA, 2000. A Global Agenda: Issues before the 54th General Assembly of the United
Nations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield)
UNA_USA, 2002. A Global Agenda: Issues before the 56th General Assembly of the United
Nations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield)
Cohen, David, 2002. "Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor Tribunal Really a Model for
the Future? " Analysis from the East-West Center, No. 61
McNeal, Dewardric L. 2001. "China's Relations with Central Asian States and Problems withTerrorism" CRS Report for Congress
Park, Heung-Soon, 2007, "The Role of the UN and International Courts," The Proceedings of theSeventh Japan-Korea Seminar on the United Nations System "Human Security and the Role of theUnited Nations," (December 14-15, The United Nations University, Tokyo)
Park, Jae-young, 2009. "Working and Assesment of the UPR Mechanism of the UN HRC," Korean
Journal of International Organizations Vol.4, No.1
Investigative Report on Prison Camps in North Korea, 2009 (Korean Human Rights Commission)
White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea, 2009 (Korean Institute for National Unification)―
US Relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations" 2009. The Congressional ResearchService"Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar: Report of the Secretary-General" 2008.The General
Assembly (A/63/356)"Human Rights Situations That Requires the Council's Attention: Report of the Special Rapporteuron the situation of human rights in the Democratic People‘'s Republic of Korea", 2009, The
General Assembly, A/HRC/10/18 (24 February )"Unfulfilled Promises Achieving Justice for Crimes Against Humanity in East Timor" 2004. The
Open Society Institute and the Coalition for International Justice―
U.N. Voices Concern Over Rise in Alleged Abuse of Chinese Muslims,‖ Los Angeles Times(November 10, 2001)"East Timor Judge Issues Arrest Warrant for Wiranto" Reuters (May 10, 2004)"UN urges reform of the Cambodian special court," VOANews.com (October 8, 2007)"Bush signs law to ban gems trade" AFP (August 29, 2008)"Violence in Tibet as Monks Clash With the Police." New York Times (March 15, 2009)"Riots in Western China Amid Ethnic Tension" New York Times (July 5, 2009)"Last Khmer Rouge defendant charged with genocide," Associated Press (December 21, 2009)"Burmese junta already manipulating upcoming poll," Asianews Network (Jan 7, 2010)
http;//voanews.com/english/news/human-rights/Report--Asia-Sees-Some-Significant-Progress-

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81235887.html
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/about_eccc.aspx,
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/tibet.html
http://www.unakrt-online.org/02_court.htm
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/Pages/HumanRightsBodies.aspx

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Tomoko Ako

China’s “Floating” Population andIssues of Human Rights in a Globalizing Economy
Tomoko Ako, Ph.D. 1
Introduction

The transformation from a socialist planned economy to a socialist market economy that China has
experienced in recent decades has made it possible for a variety of agencies to take a more dynamic
part in economic activities. Chinese society has begun to emphasize efficiency in themarket-oriented framework, and the state, which used to take regulatory and redistributive roles in
the political system, has devolved authority as well as responsibilities to localities in accordancewith the principles of the socialist market economy. Such reforms have surely yielded impressive
development results. Nevertheless, the forces unleashed by economic liberalization anddecentralization have also brought with them unexpected negative impacts. A particularly serious
problem is the increase in inequality.
The reform to a socialist market economy, which is neither simply a market economy nor aplanned economy, is fraught with ambiguous processes. The once highly centralized power
structure has been dismantled in a short period of time, and mostly vested interests have beendrawn into the political vacuum created from its demise. Rules for equal competition have not yet
been established, thereby resulting in politically and economically weak organizations and people
being pushed further to the periphery. While the central government has diminished its power toregulate the different interests of local governments and local people, the residential registration
system (huji zhidu: 戸籍制度) still divides urban and rural households unequally. Therefore,
urban-rural disparity has expanded to an amazing extent, and is causing rural unrest and instability.
People with rural registration join the ―floating population‖ (liudong renkou: 流动人口) if they1

Associate Professor, School of International Liberal Studies at Waseda University; Member ofChina Studies Group convened by the Cabinet Secretariat.

68China’s “Floating” Population

work in cities without acquiring urban registration. It is still almost impossible for rural registration
holders to change their status to that of urban citizens. Lack of urban registration makes it
extremely difficult for them to become integrated into the urban community and limits theiropportunities for social mobility. These ―rural‖ people face numerous obstacles when they live in acity: They are prevented from entering certain occupations and trades; they are denied work-related
entitlements to housing, medical care, pensions, and social security; they are often forbidden to buy
or build property and are thus relegated to ―shantytowns‖ that have sprung up on the margins oflarge cities; they and their children are excluded from, or charged additionally to attend local
schools. In short, they are treated as outsiders to the urban community.
Although they face a very inconvenient and difficult life in areas where they are not registered,many of them are likely to stay there for a long time because economic and educational conditionsin their hometowns are much worse than the ―floating‖ life. Urban local governments areapprehensive about overpopulation in the cities, and are also concerned about possible conflicts
between migrants and urban citizens as the unemployment rate and crime rate have risen. Manyrural local governments where migrants are registered face financial difficulties. Therefore, public
services for the floating population have been neglected for many years, and the floating population
is literally adrift.
This paper attempts to illuminate the sorts of problems migrant workers (the floating population)
have faced, thereby revealing how their identities and values are formed, based on the fieldwork I
have conducted in Hubei Province, Wenzhou City and Beijing City in recent years. The concluding
section will also discuss issues of China‘s floating population in relation to a globalizing economy.

1. Why do young people leave their villages?

In March 2009, I visited Shayang County in Hubei Province. It had been announced a month earlier
than that around 20 million migrant workers, twice as many as in previous years, had returned to69

Tomoko Ako

their hometowns before the Chinese New Year holidays in February. Most media reports analyzed
the situation by saying that they had lost their livelihoods after being laid off by factories which
had closed their doors due to the financial crisis. I also expected that this was the situation.
Nevertheless, most of the workers in the county had already left for the cities to work. In brigade
No.4 of Xinhe Village, where I have conducted a series of fieldwork studies in recent years, 79
people, 15 more than in September 2007, and 61 percent of the labor force population between 18
and 60 years of age, were no longer in the village. It was unlikely that they would find jobs onfavorable terms in the recession-hit economy. So why did they not choose to stay in theirhometowns, where they could rely on the assistance of kinship and the social network?
Those whom I interviewed in Xinhe Village revealed that many people left the village because
they were not satisfied with life in a rural area or because they had some trouble with other people
in the area.
For instance, the eldest son of Family X was divorced more than ten years ago, and was later
married for the second time with his current wife. He has children by both his former wife and his
current wife. The eldest son‘s family left the village because the son had gambled away the entire
family fortune and had been persecuted by insistent creditors.
All the children of Family Y were divorced. The eldest son was working in Shenzhen City inGuangdong Province after his first marriage. He later met a woman who had been his teacher inhigh school. They remarried after obtaining divorces from their spouses at the time. The former
high school teacher had achieved excellent results as a teacher and was set to be promoted from atownship school to a city school. However, she chose to leave the area with the Y family‘s eldest
son. Her former husband took charge of their daughter.
The eldest son of Family Z left his home without even giving a destination. His cousin later
happened to see him in Shenzhen City and introduced him to a company. One year later, hedisappeared again. He made only one phone call to his parents in eight years. His parents openedbank accounts for use by billing fraudsters and lost 5000 yuan. Their eldest daughter was70

China’s “Floating” Population

divorced and did not come home even during the Chinese New Year holidays in 2008.
All members of Family R have worked as migrant workers in Shenzhen City. They had
previously run a grain-processing factory in the village. However, the householder became addicted
to a form of gambling called Mark Six and lost a large amount of money. He continued to bet byconverting his customers‘ grain into cash, all of which he lost in the end. A considerable number ofpeople in the four neighborhood villages had left their grain with him. The eldest son of Family R,
who had originally planned to hold his wedding party in the village, gave up the idea because they
could not pay off the huge debt they owed to the villagers.
Drastic social transformation has diversified people‘s views on love and marriage. People havebeen forced to explore different ways of commitment to their families and local communities.
Those who come and go between rural village and city have experienced difficulties inaccommodating to the gap in the ways of thinking and values with their spouses and children who
remained in rural area. Entertainment and social activities are scarce in this area and more andmore people have become addicted to gambling. Two villagers who were deeply in debt for
gambling committed suicide by drinking pesticide.
On the other hand, many people who have remained in the village have been able to lead morestable lives compared with several years ago, since it has been possible to expand their cultivatedacreage by renting land usage rights owned by migrating families. They usually do not want to giveup the rented land because they wish to maintain their economies of scale. There is very little
arable land remaining unrented in the village and therefore there is little room for migrant workers
to return to their hometown.

2. Complex identity of second generation migrant workers

According to a Chinese Academy of Social Science researcher, the characteristics of migrant
workers can be summarized as in the following six points.

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Tomoko Ako(1) Irregular employment (Most workers do not sign a contract with their employers, and areforced to work on unfavorable terms. Most self-employed workers run unauthorizedbusinesses and have become targets for police and neighborhood association crackdowns.)(2) Marginalization of residential areas (Most workers rent jerry buildings that urban residents
have owned, build simple frame cabins by themselves, or live in dormitories provided by
employers. In some cases, more than a dozen workers are squeezed into a flat without toilet
or shower room.)(3) Isolation in life (Most workers have a monotonous and repetitive life without sufficient rest or
leisure time. Many of them live apart from their families and are unable to have normal
conjugal and family lives. Those who have children are very concerned about theireducation.)(4) Subject to discrimination (They are subject to discrimination and prejudice by urban citizens,and their circle of acquaintances is limited to friends from the same hometown, their kinshipnetwork and colleagues. There are some urban citizens who regard migrant workers as
causing a degeneration of the social order and stealing jobs from urban citizens.)(5) Limited opportunities for job advancement (Opportunities for education, vocational training,and social security are not equal to those for urban citizens. Children of migrant workers have
limited access to education.)(6) Inward-looking identity (Migrant workers have neither a sense of belonging to the city nor to
the rural village. They feel unsteady and frustrated, and tend to lock themselves into a small
and narrow sphere between their workplace and dormitory.)

It ought to be much better for migrant workers to return to their hometowns rather than stay insuch poor working and living conditions. Nevertheless, many young migrant workers who left theirvillages right after they graduated from junior high school or senior high school, and have never72China’s “Floating” Population

experienced farming, are used to the urban life and have a different mindset from the older
generation.
Is the consciousness that ―farming is boring‖ widely shared among migrant workers of the young
generation? How do they actually perceive their present situation and the future? Together with
Chinese researchers, I conducted a questionnaire survey for 600 migrant workers in 25 companies
in Wenzhou City, Zhejiang Province. The results show that these migrants had forged very complex
identities.
According to data presented by Wenzhou City Bureau of Statistics, at the end of 2007, 7.64
million people held city registrations, while 3.33 million migrant workers had only temporary
registrations. Interestingly, more than three million city registration holders had also worked
outside the city. Of course these were not unskilled labors, but white-collar employees orentrepreneurs. That is to say, those who did not hold city registrations supported the factories in thecity, while those who held city registrations worked in other areas of China or the world. During
Chinese New Year holidays, the city becomes full of large numbers of luxury imported cars
carrying license plates from such areas as Beijing, Shanghai and Xinjiang. Successful
entrepreneurs return home in their private cars to spend the holidays in their gorgeous mansions
which they have purchased in the city.
Valid responses to the questionnaire were 578, of which 328 were male and 250 were female.
The percentage of the age cohort below 19 years of age was 12 percent, 20 to 29 years of age was
53 percent, that of 30 to 29 years of age was 27 percent, and 40 to 49 years of age was 7 percent.
Concerning educational level, the percentage of junior high school graduates was the highest at 45
percent, the percentage of senior high school graduates was 27 percent, the percentage of juniorspecialized school graduates was 12 percent and the percentage of vocational high school graduates
was 7 percent. 30 percent of the respondents had been resident in the city for less than a year, 16
percent for 1 to 2 years, 12 percent for 2 to 3 years, 9 percent for 3 to 4 years, and 8 percent for 4 to
5 years. Monthly incomes varied in the following way: 1,000-1,499 yuan, 36 percent; 1,500-1,999

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yuan, 20 percent; and 2,000-2,999 yuan, 19 percent. The respondents were from a variety ofprovinces including Anhui, Henan, Jiangxi, Hunan, Hubei, Zhejiang and Guizhou.
Analysis by age cohort revealed differences in the way respondents spent personal time. While
about 20 percent of respondents in their teens and 20s replied that they used the Internet, those in
their 30s and 40s answered that they watched television. While over 80 percent of the respondents
in their 40s said that they never went to a Kentucky Fried Chicken or MacDonald‘s restaurant,
more than 60 percent of respondents in their 20s and about 30 percent of those in their 30s
answered ―go sometimes.‖ Menu prices at Kentucky Fried Chicken or MacDonald‘s restaurants are
not cheap for migrant workers earning low salaries, being about two to three times more expensive
than the ―daily lunch special‖ at ordinary restaurants. However, they prefer to have meals with theirboyfriends or girlfriends in a sanitary and comfortable space.
In this way, the younger generation yearn for the urban life style. Nevertheless, most of theirfriends are migrant workers and they have few friends who have urban citizenship (Graph 1).
Language skills are one of the important factors for becoming adjusted to a local community,
since there are many local dialects in China. To the question, ―Do you understand the local
Wenzhou dialect?‖ about 50 percent of the respondents in their 20s replied, ―Do not understandcompletely,‖ and about 40 percent replied, ―Understand a little.‖ To the question, ―Can you speak
the local Wenzhou dialect?‖ about 70 percent replied, ―Cannot speak at all,‖ and about 30 percent
replied, ―Can speak a little.‖ Low communication skills in the local dialect could be seen in
respondents of all age cohorts.
It has been said that among Chinese dialects the Wenzhou dialect is one of the most difficult tolearn. Moreover, most migrant workers are repeating mechanical work in closed spaces such as
factories and dormitories. They therefore have very few points of contact with local citizens indaily life and it is no doubt difficult for them to learn the language well.
There was little difference in the view, ―The city is the place where I realize my dream, not thehometown,‖ among respondents in their 40s, while about 60 percent of those in their 20s and 30s

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China’s “Floating” Population

did not agree so much, or did not agree at all with this view (Graph 2). In fact, the younger
generation did not have a dream for success in the urban city. Furthermore, there was not muchdifference among the respondents with respect to the idea, ―I am not used to the life in myhometown after living in the city for a long time‖ (Graph 3).
Nevertheless, the percentage of the younger generation who replied ―agree‖ and ―relatively
agree‖ to the question, ―Will you go back to your hometown when you get old and cannot find awork in the city?‖ was much lower than those in their 40s (Graph 4). Further, about 20 percent ofthem answered, ―I am thinking of making an effort to marry a man/woman in the city‖ and someeven said ―I have thought of getting married with a man/woman in the city, but failed‖.
Here we can see the emotional upheaval of young migrant workers. Many of them did not agreewith the views, ―The city is the place where I realize my dream, not the hometown,‖ and ―I am notused to the life in my hometown after living in the city for a long time.‖ However, some of them
did not want to go back to their hometowns even though they could not find a job, and some evendesired to get married with a man/woman in the city.
Some migrant workers whom we interviewed might have actually believed, ―I cannot realize mydream in my hometown,‖ or ―I am not used to rural life‖ in their hearts, even though they disagreed
to these ideas when answering our questions. I had this kind of feeling when I was talking withsome migrant workers at the site. A university teacher accompanying university students who wereborn into more favorable situations than the migrants repeatedly asked them questions about ―農民
工‖ (nongmin gong, migrant workers), a term having discriminative connotations. It would be quite
understandable if the migrant workers had felt hurt or resentful toward us. Particularly those withgreat pride must have felt strongly that they did not want to be looked down upon.
However, the registration system stands inexorably in the way of migrant workers‘
consciousnesses even though they have a high sense of self-esteem. To the question, ―Do you think
you are a Wenzhou citizen?‖ about 70 percent of respondents in all age cohorts answered ―no‖(Graph 5). An average level apartment is amazingly expensive in the city even for ordinary citizens,

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and is far beyond the migrant workers‘ purses. It is not surprising that migrant workers cannot
confirm their identities as urban citizens if they are unable to speak the local dialect and do nothave local friends in the community.

3. Harsh reality faced by stall-keepers

Most unskilled migrant workers are outside the mainstream of the urban community. Many of themcan be easily fired when they become old or when the economy weakens. Those who cannot be
employed by companies have no alternative but to operate businesses by themselves. Most of them
do not have funds to open a store or a factory, and simply sell snacks, fruit, groceries, toys, clothes
and electric devises at their stalls. Consumers in cities welcome stalls run by migrant workers
because the goods they sell are relatively cheap. However, stall-keepers struggle in the highly
competitive market, and at the same time, they have to keep watch for the city management
committee and the residential committee, which attempt to monitor migrant workers, and evencollect management fees and sanitation expenses. In some residential communities, regulations for
authorizing business licenses for stall-keepers contain ambiguities and many stall-keepers havebeen disaffected by unreasonable demands from the city management committee and residentialcommittee.
Among the stall-keepers I interviewed, a man in 30s said, ―Gangs wandering around this area
often try to bum money from us. We could rent a booth in the market for 2-3 yuan a month ago, but
now it has risen to 50-100 yuan. Besides paying the rent, the city management committee people
collect 20-30 yuan per month. I cannot accept this. They claimed that this was for sanitation of thecity, but the environment of the market has not improved at all.‖
A 16 year-old girl who was selling snacks in Beijing after she dropped out from junior highschool told me in a frightened tone of voice, ―The city management committee staff try to turn us
away whenever they see us. When I had just arrived in Beijing, I did not understand circumstances76

China’s “Floating” Populationand had all the goods for my livelihood confiscated. My father is handicapped. He helped me topull the stall, and was hit by one of the people in the committee.
A lady in her 30s selling groceries talked about her experience with a tone of resignation, ―In
2002, I was caught by one of the crime-prevention committee people. Of course, I stood my ground,but he beat me. Eventually, I was locked in a basement with barred windows and released the nextday. In 2004, my eldest son, who was 13 years old at the time, was in Beijing during the summer
vacation. He volunteered to sell bottles of water in order to earn his school expenses. As a result, he
was detained by the city management committee members.‖
Migrant workers start up their stall businesses on a shoestring. They head toward a goal such as
opening their own company or shop in the future. However, the reality is extremely grim for them.

4. Lawless area without “citizens”

Areas with concentrations of migrant workers are called ―城中村 (chengzhong cun, urban
villages)‖. In some urban villages, ―citizens‖ who have formal urban registration rent their houses
or land which is waiting for redevelopment to migrant workers. In other urban villages, those whoare registered as citizens of rural areas located in the suburbs of cities and are included in the sites
for city redevelopment, rent real estate to migrant workers. Most citizens in these areas havealready stopped farming since their villages are now urbanized even though they are registered as―rural areas.‖
The urban villages I visited were exactly ―a vacuum without citizens.‖ Beijing City has put off
the development of living environments in urban villages, and has left disposal of garbage andpolluted water uncontrolled. Thus, many urban villages reek of rot.

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Tomoko Ako

Photo (1) Old lady collecting waste materials

Photo (2) Gully with polluted water

If local governments turn their back on migrant workers, migrant residents in urban villages
naturally do not meet their social responsibilities. Illegal economic activities have prevailed. I saw
many unauthorized clinics in urban villages. An obstetrician and gynecology clinic which I visited
had only two rooms, in which some simple equipment was set up. The clinic‘s sign was simply
placed beside the entrance and was portable, so that it could be moved whenever it was necessary
to clear it away. Surveillance by birth control committees in the migrants‘ hometowns rarely
reaches the cities, and it is reported that not a small number of migrant workers choose to terminate
their pregnancies if the baby in the womb is female.

Photo (3) Unauthorized clinic

Photo (4) Market in an ―urban village‖

Migrant workers depend on unauthorized clinics since they do not have medical insurance.

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China’s “Floating” Population

Recently, the Chinese government has established a ―Rural Cooperative Healthcare Insurance
System,‖ requiring members to pay only 30 percent of a medical bill when they see doctors inpublic hospitals in the townships where they are registered. However, the self-pay burden increases
if they see doctors in hospitals at city or provincial levels.
Prices of commodities in urban villages are much cheaper than those in other areas of Beijing.
For example, three yuan for a haircut and five yuan for one night‘s accommodation in a hostel. In
an urban village, I once bought cooking oil for half the market price; it turned out to be fake. Most
victims of contaminated food and medicine are peasants and migrant workers, who cannot afford
goods of reliable quality. Ironically, there are also some migrant workers who are involved in
malicious business, such as selling fake and contaminated products.
Children of migrant workers have limited access to education. According to data for 2007,
presented by the Statistical Office of Beijing City, approximately 130,000 children of migrant
workers studied in 297 private schools run by migrants themselves, and of which only 58 schools
were authorized. Many unauthorized schools, known as ―black schools‖ do not have sufficient
funds to ensure the children‘s safety, and local governments have forced some schools to close
down.
Beijing City Government has taken measures to allow migrant workers‘ children enter publicschools in Beijing. However, the government usually requires a large number of documents inadvance, such as (1) temporary residence certificate; (2) certification of residential address inBeijing; (3) guardian‘s proof of employment; (4) certification of lack of guardian in the registeredarea; and (5) registers of all family members. Some migrant workers have not taken the formal
procedures to work in the city and it is difficult for them to submit all the required documents.
Furthermore, even though the city government has established this policy, some public schools
have refused to accept migrants‘ children due to limited space or a negative influence on local
students. Some migrant children independently choose to go to schools for migrants because theyfind it hard to become accustomed to the atmosphere of urban public schools due to the differences

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Tomoko Ako

in language and culture. Some of them consider taking university entrance examinations. In China,
there are regional variations in curricula, textbooks, and even enrolment limits and examination
papers. Students are required to take university entrance examination in the area where they are
registered. Therefore, migrant children who want to enter university need to prepare for entrance
examinations by studying the textbooks used in their area of registration.
According to an estimation by Professor Yang Dongping of the Beijing Institute of Technology,
migrant children in Beijing reached 375,000 in 2006. If 60 percent of them entered public schools,
the city would need to build 285 new schools with an enrolment capacity of 500. Migrant workers
have contributed to the city‘s development and the right to basic education should be extended to
all children. Nevertheless, in order to inhibit excessive population inflow, it is unthinkable that thecity will build large numbers of new schools for migrant children.

5. Issues of human rights in the context of a globalizing economy

As we have seen so far, reforms to liberalize economies have made it possible for rural registration
holders to work in cities. However, the level of social security for migrant workers has been kept
far lower than that for urban registration holders. Although the central government has recently
moved further toward relaxing the issuance of urban registrations, or the privileges associated withit, in certain contexts and for migrants who meet particular criteria, the majority of rural-to-urban
migrants still remain unable to transfer their registrations.
The Chinese registration system, which treats different citizens in different ways, is fraught withproblems. Nevertheless, from a wider perspective, foreign companies securing cheap labor in
China have also taken advantage of the system. That is to say, they have become indirectly engaged
in adding to the discrimination against migrant workers.
With the globalization of the world economy, more companies relocate their factories andpromote outsourcing in order to cut costs. It has been almost impossible to visualize the flow of80

China’s “Floating” Population

people, money and goods in each of the countries where foreign companies set up their factories.
The so-called ―floating population‖ is unable to forge an identity either as an urban citizen or arural citizen, and has been unable to extricate itself from its unstable situation. Chinese society will
face political uncertainty if the number of discontented migrant workers increases.
What, then, can we do? Needless to say, the Chinese government should make efforts to reformthe social security and registration systems so that they are applied more equally. Particularly, theright to education should be equally guaranteed. The reform of the university entrance examination
system is also necessary to enable all students from both rural and urban areas to have an equal
opportunity to compete. Rather, preferential treatment should be applied to rural registration
holders of Han ethnicity who are exempted from affirmative action programs for ethnic minority
students.
Although it has been difficult for foreign companies to be directly involved in the process ofpolicy making and implementation, they should be able to influence the Chinese government at
second hand to improve working environments for their workers. They can also contribute tosociety through giving scholarships to poor students, implementing vocational training incollaboration with local governments, and so on. At the time of employing personnel, companies
should not discriminate on the basis of registration. Furthermore, unskilled workers at the starting
point should be allowed the possibility of promotion to higher positions and be eligible to apply for
urban registration if they can successfully complete on-the-job training or continuing education
programs, and pass technical tests which companies require. Skilled workers are valuable assets forcompanies. For those migrant workers who cannot see their family members in their hometowns,
companies can provide a service for mental healthcare and provide subsidies for family support andhome visits. A more human-centered employment system should be established both inside andoutside our countries, and the collaboration of East Asian countries is indispensible for the further
strengthening of ties in this region.

81

Tomoko Ako(Figures)
Graph 1 Do you have friends with urban citizenship?
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

None
Not many
Relatively many
Very many

Below 19

20-29

30-39

40-49

Graph 2 The city is the place where I realize my dream,
not the hometown
100%
Don't answer
Don't know
Agree
Relatively agree
Yes and no
Relatively disagree
Disagree

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Below
19

20―29

30―39

40―49

Graph 3 I am not used to the life in my hometown after
living in the city for a long time100%
Don't answer
Don't know
Agree
Relatively agree
Yes and no
Relatively disagree
Disagree

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Below
19

20―29

30―39

40―49

82

China’s “Floating” Population

Graph 4 Will you go back to your hometown when you get
old and cannot find a work in the city?
100%
Don't answer
Don't know
Agree
Relatively agree
Yes and no
Relatively disagree
Disagree

80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Below
19

20―29

30―39

40―49

Graph 5 Do you think you are a Wenzhou citizen?
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Don't answer
Don't knowNo
Yes

Belo 19

20―29

30―39

40―49

83

Yasushi Katsuma

Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
Yasushi Katsuma, Ph.D.1
Introduction

This paper will assess the situation of trafficking in persons in Japan, and discuss Japan‘s attempts
to internalize global, legal and political agreements within the country through a new national
policy and legislative reforms. On the implementation of the National Action Plan of Japan, threeareas will be analyzed: Prosecution, Protection and Prevention. Additionally, the status of thepromotion of international cooperation will be examined, as it is indispensable in combating thistransnational problem in a globalized world. The actions taken by the United Nations and theUnited States will be summarized, and the role of the regional cooperation mechanism, the Bali
Process, will be discussed.

1. The Magnitude of Human Trafficking in Japan

Japan is predominantly identified as a destination country, to which persons, especially women andchildren, are trafficked for the purposes of forced labour and commercial sexual exploitation.
Nevertheless, Japan occasionally serves as a transit country for persons trafficked from Asia to
North America.
Women and children from Asia, Latin America, Eastern Europe and Russia are trafficked toJapan mainly for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. In other cases, both male andfemale migrant workers from Asia are subject to conditions of forced labour upon arrival in Japan;
they usually migrate willingly to Japan seeking work, but end up being subjected to debts that
1

Professor & Director, International Studies Program, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies(GSAPS), Faculty of International Research & Education (FIRE), Waseda University;
Secretary-General, Japan Association for United Nations Studies (JAUNS)

84

Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons

make them vulnerable to trafficking for exploitation.
The number of trafficked persons protected by the Japanese National Police Agency (NPA)
reached 117 in 2005, the highest figure during the 2001-2008 period. The total number of traffickedpersons protected by the Japanese NPA from 2001 to 2008 was 534. Needless to say, these official
figures are just the tip of the iceberg, as they only represent the victims protected when the NPA
arrested human trafficking offenders. Major countries or territories of origin include Thailand, thePhilippines, Indonesia, Colombia, and Taiwan, comprising 500 of the total 534 victims protectedduring the 2001-2008 period.

2. International Legal Framework and JapanOn the need to combat trafficking in persons, the international community reached a global
consensus in December 2000 when the participating States signed the Trafficking in Persons
Protocol (Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women andChildren, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime ).
The Trafficking in Persons Protocol, or Palermo Protocol, is the first international legal instrument
defining State responsibilities to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons.
Article 3 of the Trafficking in Persons Protocol defines trafficking in persons as follows:―…the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of
the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of
the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person,for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services,slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.‖
The Trafficking in Persons Protocol entered into force in December 2003. As of December 2009,85

Yasushi Katsuma

135 States are parties to the Protocol. Japan signed the Protocol in December 2002, and theJapanese national Diet approved the conclusion of the Protocol in June 2005. However, to be able
to ratify the Protocol, Japan must first become a party to the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime that Japan already signed in December 2000 but has yet to ratify.
The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), almost universally ratified, provides themain reference for the situation of trafficking in children under the age of 18. In addition, the 2000
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) on the Sale of Children,Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, is particularly relevant in combating child trafficking
for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. Article 10 of the Optional Protocol provides
that States must ―take all necessary steps to strengthen international cooperation by multilateral,
regional, and bilateral arrangements for the prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution andpunishment of those responsible for acts involving the sale of children, child prostitution, childpornography and child sex tourism.‖ As of December 2009, 135 States are parties to the Optional
Protocol. Japan signed the Optional Protocol in May 2002, and ratified it in January 2005

3. Japanese Government Policy and Legislative Responses

Recognizing that trafficking in persons was becoming a major issue, in April 2004 the Governmentof Japan established the ―Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee of Relevant Ministries forDeveloping Measures against Human Trafficking‖ in the Prime Minister‘s Office. The members of
the Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee are the Cabinet Secretariat, the Cabinet Office, theNational Police Agency, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministryof Health, Labour and Welfare, with the latest addition of the Ministry of Education, Culture,
Sports, Science and Technology in 2008.

3-1. National Action Plan

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Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons

The ―National Action Plan for Implementing Measures against Human Trafficking‖ (Governmentof Japan 2004) was adopted by the Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee and then approved in the
Cabinet Meeting on Anti-Crime Measures in December 2004. This comprehensive national policy
has three pillars: prevention of human trafficking; prosecution and punishment of those who
commit the crime; and protection of victims.
With a view to ratify the Trafficking in Persons Protocol in the future, the Government of Japan
started reforming the domestic legal system in 2005, developing or amending the necessary laws.

3-2. Legal Reform in Japan
In order to newly establish the crime of trafficking in persons in Japan, the Penal Code wasamended in June 2005. It now directly criminalizes (1) the buying or selling of persons, (2)kidnapping for the purpose of harming body or life, (3) transporting, transferring and harbouring
victims of kidnapping, abduction, buying or selling, and (4) kidnapping, abduction and buying or
selling with the aim of transfer overseas. It has raised the statutory penalty for trafficking inpersons to up to 10-years imprisonment.
An amendment to the Law for Punishment of Organized Crimes, Control of Crime Proceeds andOther Matters was also made in June 2005, in order to designate trafficking in persons as a crime
to be covered as predicate offenses for money laundering. In November of the same year, the Law
on Control and Improvement of Amusement Businesses was amended in order to inhibit illicit workby requiring the owners of amusement and sex-related businesses to verify the immigration statusof foreign employees at the time of their recruitment.
In addition, in order to give a special permission of residence to a trafficked victim for the
purpose of protection, the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act was amended in June
2005. It also facilitates the prosecution and punishment of traffickers for procuring, providing or
possessing a fraudulent foreign passport for illegal entry into Japan.
In spite of the above legal reforms in Japan, as of January 2010 Japan has not yet ratified the87Yasushi Katsuma

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, nor its Trafficking in Persons
Protocol.

3-3. Civil Society Advocacy
In Japan, there is a network of NGOs, academics and lawyers for the purpose of combating humantrafficking. This NGO network, the ―Japan Network against Trafficking in Persons (JNATIP),‖ tries
to consolidate civil society efforts to combat human trafficking, and engage in joint advocacy forpolicy and legislative changes (JNATIP 2004; Yoshida 2007).
JNATIP was launched at an international workshop for the adoption of an anti-trafficking law in
October 2003. In order to eliminate trafficking in persons in Japan, JNATIP advocates an
independent anti-trafficking law for Japan.

4. Prosecution & Punishment of Human Trafficking in JapanThe National Police Agency (NPA) is responsible for the crackdown of human trafficking cases.
Both the number of cases and the number of arrested persons reached a peak in 2005 when the
Penal Code was amended.

Trafficking Cases Identified by NPA
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Total

Cases

64

44

51

79

81

72

40

36

467

Arrested Persons

40

28

41

58

83

78

41

33

402

Victims Protected

65

55

83

77

117

58

43

36

534

Year

Source: National Police Agency (2009)

Among those who were arrested, Japanese offenders were mostly men, while foreign offenders

88

Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons

were predominantly women. In 2007, 15 out of 17 foreign offenders were women. Also in 2008, 15
out of 16 foreign offenders were women, almost all of whom were spouses of Japanese nationals.
After the Penal Code was amended in June 2005, the number of prosecutions for buying or
selling persons was 34, as of December 2007. Among them, 24 offenders were actually convicted
for the buying or selling of persons, and 16 of those were sentenced to imprisonment withoutsuspension of execution of sentence. The most severe punishment was an imprisonment sentence of
5 years and 6 months, while the mildest was 2 years and 6 months.

5. Protection of Trafficked Victims

In order to help trafficked victims seek assistance at Japanese Immigration Offices or foreignembassies in Japan, the Government of Japan has produced a leaflet in 9 languages. The leaflet is
widely distributed at international airports throughout Japan.
The NPA introduced an ―Anonymous Reporting Project‖ in October 2007 allowing citizens tocall toll-free (0120-924-839) a private organization entrusted by the NPA in order to provide
information on human trafficking. From July 2009, in addition to the anonymous telephone line,
citizens

are

now

able

send

information

to

the

organization

throughtheInternet(http://www.tokumei.or.jp). This ―Anonymous Reporting Project‖ is intended to identify cases that
tend to remain underground. From October 2007 to October 2009, a total of 1,231 cases werereported, leading to 11 arrests.

5-1. Victims of Trafficking Protected by the National Police Agency (NPA)As shown in the above table, 534 trafficked victims were protected by the NPA from 2001 to 2008.
The major countries or territories of origin were Thailand (194), the Philippines (126), Indonesia(76), Colombia (58) and Taiwan (46), totalling 500. These are then followed by the Republic ofKorea (10), China (9), Romania (4), Japan (3), Russia (2), Cambodia (2) and others.

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Yasushi Katsuma

In 2007, the majority of trafficked victims came from the Philippines, 22 out of the total of 43.
However, in 2008, half of the victims came from Thailand (18), while there was a significant
reduction in trafficked victims from the Philippines from 22 to 7. This change can be explained bya review of the criteria for the residence status of ―entertainer‖ since March 2005, as will be
explained below.

5-2. Victims of Trafficking Protected by Women’s Consulting Offices (WCO)
A Women‘s Consulting Office (WCO) is a public shelter where victims of domestic violence canreceive food, clothing and medical/psychological treatment. There are 47 WCOs throughout Japan.
The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare started using WCOs for victims of domestic violencesince the Law for the Prevention of Spousal Violence and the Protection of Victims was enacted in
2001. Now, WCOs also function to accommodate trafficked victims. From 2001 to 2006, a total of
186 trafficked victims were protected at WCOs, reaching a peak in 2005.

Victims Protected at WCOs
Fiscal Year
Victims Protected

2001

2002
1

2003
2

6

2004

2005

2006

TOTAL

24

117

36

186

In April 2005, the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare started subsidizing private shelters inorder to respond to the overwhelming demand for shelters. In 2004, there were 50 private shelters
commissioned by local governments in Japan. During the period of FY2005 and FY2006, theMinistry subsidized 54 trafficked victims out of 147.

5-3. Protection by NGOs
In Japan, trafficking in persons is not a new problem, and some civil society organizations havebeen trying to address the issue, although the Government of Japan has not paid attention to it until

90

Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons

recently. For example, the ―House in Emergency of Love and Peace (HELP)‖ is a private shelter
established in 1986 by the Japan Christian Women‘s Organization (Seifu-kai). In addition to victimsof trafficking, HELP is protecting more and more foreign women married to Japanese men, seeking
protection from domestic violence (Takahashi 2004).

5-4. Recognition of Trafficked Persons as Victims
As discussed above, after the 2005 amendment of the Immigration Control and Refugee
Recognition Act, a trafficked victim may be given a special permission of residence for the purposeof protection. A trafficked victim is also exempted from some of the landing refusal grounds anddeportation grounds. The Immigration Bureau granted special permissions of residence to 47
trafficked victims in 2005 and 27 victims in 2006.

5-5. Repatriation Assistance to Victims
Repatriation assistance to victims of trafficking is provided by the International Organization for
Migration (IOM). For IOM repatriation assistance, the Government of Japan funded US$ 222,000
in 2005, US$ 322,000 in 2006, and US$ 300,000 in 2007. By the end of March 2008, 129 victimsof trafficking had been assisted in their return to their home countries and then given support forsocial integration there.

6. Prevention of Trafficking in Persons in JapanThe residence status of ―entertainer‖ had been frequently abused for the purpose of trafficking inpersons. In order to prevent such abuse, several measures have been taken. As a consequence, thenumber of foreigners entering Japan with ―entertainer‖ visas dropped from 135,000 in 2004 to
48,000 in 2006.
Since March 2005, the criteria of the landing permit have been reviewed. An amendment to the91

Yasushi Katsuma

Ministerial Ordinance of the Ministry of Justice in 2006 has strengthened the disqualification
standard for the operators of inviting organizations. It has also required a minimum salary (JPY
200,000 per month) on their contracts with entertainers. In accordance with the revision of theordinance, Japanese embassies and consulates-general abroad have also strengthened the regime for
examining ―entertainer‖ visa applications.
In spite of these efforts, according to newspaper reports in December 2009, an officer at theJapanese consulate-general in Manila and an officer at the Tokyo Regional Immigration Bureau
have been investigated for alleged corruption in facilitating Filipino women to enter into Japanillegally (The Asahi Newspaper 1-5 December 2009).

7. Promotion of International Cooperation

All efforts to combat trafficking in persons need to be coordinated not only at the country level, butalso at the regional and global levels. At the global level, the United Nations offers a forum forcooperation. At the regional level, the Bali Process provides a platform for cooperation, particularly
for Asia-Pacific countries. In addition, the bilateral relationship with the United States has beenvery important for Japan.

7-1. United Nations
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) issued its Global Report on Trafficking
in Persons in February 2009, based on data gathered from 155 countries (UNODC 2009). It is thefirst global assessment of the situation of human trafficking by the United Nations, while theUnited States has been publishing its Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report since 2001, as described
below, and its TIP Report 2009, which covers 175 countries, also provides a very comprehensive
assessment of the situation (United States 2009).
The ―Special Rapporteur of the United Nations on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and92

Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons

Children‖ was established in April 2004. The Special Rapporteur visits various countries ofconcern and reviews the situation of trafficking in persons, and then reports the results to the UN
Human Rights Council. The current mandate holder is Ms. Joy Ngozi Ezeilo, who has produced
reports to be submitted to the UN Human Rights Council and the General Assembly (Ezeilo 2009a;
2009b).
For policy guidance on combating human trafficking, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights(UNHCHR) issued the ―Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human
Trafficking‖ in 2002, providing a practical, rights-based approach to policy guidance on theprevention of trafficking and the protection of trafficked persons (UNHCHR 2002). As part of the
Global Initiative to Fight Human Trafficking (UN.GIFT), the UNODC and the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU) jointly published A Handbook for Parliamentarians so that policymakers could be
guided in taking concrete actions (UNODC & IPU 2009).
The Government of Japan accepted Ms. Ezeilo‘s visit to the country from 12 to 17 July 2009.
She raised some issues of immediate concern after her visit, including the following: (1)non-ratification of the Trafficking in Persons Protocol; (2) lack of comprehensive definition of
trafficking in the national legislation; (3) inappropriate shelters for victims of trafficking; (4)abuses within the trainees and technical interns programs, among others (United Nations 2009).
Based on Ms. Ezeilo‘s report on her visit to Japan, it is expected that the situation of humantrafficking in Japan will be discussed at the UN Human Rights Council, leading to some formal UN
recommendations for Japan.

7-2. Regional Cooperation in Asia-Pacific
The Bali Process is about regional cooperation among the governments of the Asia-Pacific region(43 countries), with the participation of 18 observer countries and 12 observer internationalorganizations. The Process began in Bali in February 2002, and it has been supported with major
funding from Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the United States.

93

Yasushi Katsuma

The Bali Process, with its Regional Ministerial Conferences (February 2002, April 2003, April2009), is providing a platform for regional cooperation to combat trafficking in persons andsmuggling. Therefore, all bilateral cooperation efforts should be integrated into the regional process
so that more effective implementation can be utilized to combat this transnational problem.

7-3. The United States and its TIP Report
The U.S. Department of State has been publishing its Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report annually
since 2001. In July 2004, TIP Report 2004 was released, in which Japan was classified in the Tier 2―
Watch List‖ (United States 2004). The Report states, ―The Government of Japan does not fullycomply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking… Japan lacks acomprehensive law against trafficking… Over the past year, the Japanese government offeredvictims of sexual slavery little in the way of legal advice, psychological or financial support.
Generally, victims were deported as illegal aliens.‖
This was a ―wake-up call‖ to the Government of Japan. Consequently, Japan has since been
taking concrete measures, based on its comprehensive national policy, to combat trafficking inpersons in the country. As discussed above, ―Japan‘s Inter-Ministerial Liaison Committee of
Relevant Ministries for Developing Measures against Human Trafficking‖ adopted the ―National
Action Plan for Implementing Measures against Human Trafficking‖ in December 2004.

Conclusion

Human trafficking is a serious problem in Japan, but its magnitude is still under-estimated due tothe limited availability of data. The problem of human trafficking is not widely known among
citizens in Japan yet. In this sense, the approval of the 2004 National Action Plan of Japan in the
Cabinet Meeting on Anti-Crime Measures was more a response from Japan to the multilateral
cooperation at the global and regional levels, as well as to the bilateral policy dialogues with the94Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons

United States. The civil society advocacy in Japan needs to be strengthened in order to promote
public awareness and to encourage the Government so that further actions will be taken.
The National Action Plan, accompanied by its relevant legal reform, has been implemented inthree areas: prosecution, protection and prevention, bringing about some positive changes.
However, the current efforts have more emphasis on the prosecution and punishment of those whoare responsible for trafficking in persons. On the other hand, the identification and protection of
trafficked victims is still under-invested and needs to be strengthened, in partnership with local
governments and civil society organizations.
For prevention, international cooperation is indispensable, as trafficking in persons is often atransnational problem. More efforts should be made to promote international cooperation at the
global and regional levels. The demand in destination countries and the supply in sending countries
are mostly intermediated by transnational organized crime groups with their local affiliates.
Concerted efforts at the global and regional levels need to be focused on the fight against
transnational organized crime that is increasingly funded by trafficking in persons, in addition to
drug trafficking.

Acknowledgement
This study has been supported by the Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A) ―Gender Dynamics
in the International Regime Change‖ [No. 20243013] (Leader: Prof. Chiharu Takenaka),
FY2008-2010.

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Ezeilo, Joy Ngozi (2009b). ―Report of the Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially
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Yasushi Katsuma

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The Asahi Newspaper (1 December 2009)： 「不正ビザ組織捜査～比の元総領事館員発給」『朝日新聞』2009 年 12 月 1 日．
The Asahi Newspaper (4 December 2009) ： 「東京入管職員を逮捕～収賄容疑、比女性審査で便宜」『朝日新聞』2009 年 12 月 4 日夕刊．
The Asahi Newspaper (5 December 2009) ： 「個人情報もらす～入管職員、贈賄業者に」『朝日新聞』2009 年 12 月 5 日朝刊．
The Asahi Newspaper (5 December 2009) ： 「虚偽申請を助言～入管汚職捜査：審査官、業者に」『朝日新聞』2009 年 12 月 5 日夕刊．
Adachi, Koji (2007)： 安達光治（2007）「人身取引の刑法解釈論的考察～日独の 2005 年改
正規定を中心に」大久保史郎編著『人間の安全保障とヒューマン・トラフィキング』日本
評論社、pp.297-316．
Ikuta, Katsuyoshi (2007)： 生田勝義（2007）「人身取引問題の現状と課題」大久保史郎編著『人間の安全保障とヒューマン・トラフィキング』日本評論社、pp.197-213．

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Japan’s Fight against Trafficking in Persons

JNATIP (2004)： 人身売買禁止ネットワーク（JNATIP）（2004）『人身売買をなくすために～受入大国日本の課題』明石書店．
Katsuma, Yasushi (2004)： 勝間靖（2004）「アジアにおける子どもの人身売買～性的搾取のグローバル化との関連において」『婦人通信』555 号、9 月、pp.8-10．
Kondo, Atsushi (2007)： 近藤敦（2007）「人身取引規制法の現段階」大久保史郎編著『人間の安全保障とヒューマン・トラフィキング』日本評論社、pp.214-232．
Sakanaka, Hidenori (2007)： 坂中英徳（2007）「人身売買と入管行政の課題」大久保史郎編
著『人間の安全保障とヒューマン・トラフィキング』日本評論社、pp.261-273．
Sasaki, Mitsuaki (2007)： 佐々木光明（2007）「人身売買被害者の刑事裁判、何が問われているのか～タイ人女性人身売買事件を契機に」大久保史郎編著『人間の安全保障とヒューマン・トラフィキング』日本評論社、pp.317-337．
Takahashi, Kikue (2004)： 高橋喜久江（2004）「人身売買禁止法にのぞむ」『婦人通信』555号、9 月、pp.11-13．
Tatsumi, Chieko (2006)： 辰巳知恵子（2006）「日本の人身取引対策行動計画策定から１年の成果と課題」アジア太平洋人権センター編『アジア・太平洋人権レビュー2006～人身売買の撤廃と被害者支援に向けた取組み』現代人文社、pp.28-37．
Yamagami, Susumu (2007)： 山神進（2007）「出入国管理行政の現状と課題～欧米との比較」
大久保史郎編著『人間の安全保障とヒューマン・トラフィキング』日本評論社、pp.274-296．
Yoshida, Yoko (2007)： 吉田容子（2007）「人身取引被害者の保護支援と被害防止」大久保史郎編著『人間の安全保障とヒューマン・トラフィキング』日本評論社、pp.235-260．

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Human Migration in East Asia:
Human Trafficking of North Korean Women in China
Yoojin Rhee, Ph.D.1

Introduction: Situation

A non-traditional security challenge in the East Asian region today, particularly for Northeast Asia,
is human trafficking, especially the trafficking of women across international borders. Human
trafficking is one of the fastest growing criminal activities in the world, and results in serious
breaches of human rights and harms the dignity of trafficked persons. 2 This paper will focus on the
trafficking of North Korean women in China for forced marriage and sexual exploitation by taking
advantage of their unstable status in China.In the discussion below, I look at the human traffickingof North Korean refugees as it relates to the human migration issue in East Asia. Unlike studies
regarding North Korean refugees as a mainly human rights issue, I will approach this issue ashuman trafficking issue, since China will be less offended by a human trafficking approach than by
a human rights approach toward North Korean refugees residing in China. UNHCR and many
NGOs have approached the North Korean issue as a human rights issue, which has caused China toreact sensitively without showing improvements. Chinese authorities continue to limit access toNorth Korean refugees in China by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The lackof access to UNHCR assistance and the constant fear of forced repatriation by Chinese authorities
have left North Korean refugees even more vulnerable to human traffickers. 3
Furthermore, in the year leading up to the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympic Games, Chinese
authorities stepped up efforts to locate and forcibly repatriate North Korean refugees in1

Lecturer, the Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea University;
Research Professor, Ilmin International Relations Institute.
2
Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women andchildren, Joy Ngozi Ezeilo (20 February 2009) (A/HRC/10/16), p. 5.
3
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2009, Country Narratives, China

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China—including trafficking victims—in violation of their commitments on the humane treatmentof refugees under international law. China continues to treat North Korean trafficking victims
solely as illegal economic migrants and reportedly deports a few hundred of them each month toNorth Korea, where they may face severe punishment.

Human trafficking in generalIn general, experts caution that trafficking data is rough and hard to gauge because of its
underground nature. The International Labor Organization (ILO) estimates that at least 2.45 million
trafficking victims are currently toiling in exploitative conditions, and that another 1.2 million aretrafficked annually, both across and within national borders. The US Department of State numbers
are similar: between 600,000 and 800,000 women, men and children are trafficked acrossinternational borders each year—mostly for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation. Of
these, the majority—up to 80 per cent—are women and girls. Up to 50 per cent are children.
Trafficked women are usually forced into prostitution and sex tourism, commercial marriages
and other ―female‖ occupations such as domestic work, sweatshops and agricultural labor.
Human trafficking is the third most lucrative illicit business in the world after arms and drugtrafficking and is a major source of organized crime revenue. The industry generates an estimated
US$7 to $12 billion annually—although real numbers are difficult to obtain. These numbers,
however, reflect only profits from the initial sale of victims. The ILO estimates that once victims
are in the destination country, traffickers net an additional US$32 billion a year—half generated inindustrialized countries and almost one third in Asia. 4

Human trafficking in China
China is a destination country for women and children who are trafficked from Mongolia, Burma,
North Korea, Russia, Vietnam, Ukraine, and Laos for sexual and labor exploitation. Most women4

http://www.unfpa.org/swp/2006/english/chapter_3/index.html

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Yoojin Rheeand girls are trafficked from North Korea, Vietnam, Russia, and Burma. While there are no reliable
estimates on the number of trafficking victims in China, the Vietnamese authorities reported that
167 Vietnamese women and children were rescued from traffickers in China.5

Human trafficking of North Koreans in China
Many North Koreans voluntarily migrate to work in China, but are later coerced into exploitative
conditions. North Korean women are often sold into forced marriages with Chinese nationals, orforced to work in the highly exploitative sex industry, including as prostitutes in brothels and ininternet sex businesses.
The most common form of trafficking involves North Korean women and girls subjected to
involuntary servitude after willingly crossing the border into the People‟s Republic of China (PRC).
Many of them are from North Hamgyong Province, one of the poorest provinces in the country,
located near the Chinese border. Once in China, they are picked up by traffickers and sold as brides
to PRC nationals, often of Korean ethnicity. In other cases, North Korean women and girls are
lured out of North Korea to escape poor economic, social, and political conditions by the promiseof food, jobs, and freedom, only to be forced into prostitution, marriage, or exploitative laborarrangements once in China.
North Koreans trafficked into or within the PRC are often passed from one trafficker to the next
until they reach their ultimate destinations. In some cases, women and girls may be sold totraffickers by their families or acquaintances. Women sold as brides are sometimes re-abducted by
the traffickers or are sold by husbands who no longer want them. In some cases, North Korean
women are sold multiple times to different men by the same trafficker. 6

1.

5
6

China, regional groups, the UN‟s role and their work on human trafficking

http://www.humantrafficking.org/countries/china/
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2009, Country Narratives, North Korea.

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1) China
China is a leading global source of international migration, with as many as 33 million ethnic
Chinese living abroad. Rural-urban migration has caused some of this migration. China‟s economic
growth has resulted in attempts by Beijing to attract skilled foreign workers and Chinese students
who have been educated abroad. There is also more undocumented migration (largely from the
DPRK and Viet Nam) and an increasing amount of international travel by Chinese citizens. The
Chinese government is developing policies to further manage immigration and emigration, and isengaging more frequently in international dialogue regarding migration. These changes will
improve the welfare of Chinese migrants.7
On December 13, 2007, the Government of China agreed upon the China National Plan of
Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012). The Plan of Action has
been developed in order to effectively prevent and severely combat the criminal activities oftrafficking in women and children, actively provide assistance and give appropriate aftercare torescued women and children, and finally, to earnestly safeguard the legal rights and interests ofwomen and children.

2) The UN‟s work on human trafficking
UN work includes UN General Assembly resolutions, reports by the United Nations
Secretary-General, the Working Group on Contemporary Forms of Slavery of the former Human
Rights Commission, and the establishment and reports of the Special Rapporteurs of theCommission on Human Rights on the Trafficking of Persons, on the Rights of Migrant Workers,
and on Violence Against Women.

UN Specialized Agencies
7

Van Arsdol, Maurice D., Jr., Stephen Lam, Brian Ettkin and Glenn Guarin, ―Population Trends
and Migration Patterns in Northeast Asia,‖ in Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva eds., Crossing
National Borders: Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia, United Nations University Press,
November 2005, p. 27.

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The UNDP, in its 2009 Human Development Report on migration, asserts that trafficking is
associated with restrictions on human freedom and violations of basic human rights. The UNDP
also acknowledges that human trafficking not only adversely affects individuals but can also
undermine respect for whole groups.
In his 2002 report Strengthening of the United Nations: An Agenda for Further Change, Kofi
Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, called for a comprehensive examination of
the different dimensions of migration, as well as the causes of population movements and theirimpact on development.
UN Specialized agencies such as the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the United
Nations Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP), the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) and UNHCR, amongst others, are continuously engaged in the work of
preventing the trafficking of women and girls and assisting victims.
The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) participates actively in the United Nations
Inter-Agency Project on Human Trafficking (UNIAP). The Fund undertakes many activities to help
prevent the trafficking of women and girls and to assist victims. For example, the Reproductive
Health Initiative for Youth in Asia (RHIYA), a partnership of the European Union and UNFPA,
works in collaboration with NGOs in a number of high-risk impoverished areas in Nepal to keep
girls safe from trafficking. 8 UNFPA also published the 2006 edition of the State of the World
Population focusing on women and international migration and showed how women can bothbenefit from migration and be subject to discrimination and abuse when migrating. The reportexamined the impact of female labor migration on source and destination countries and addressed,inter alia, issues of empowerment and risks, including human trafficking; and the social andeconomic implications of female migration, including disruption of families on the one hand andthe benefits of remittances on the other.98United Nations Populations Fund, ―Policy and Programme work of UNFPA on International
Migration,‖ p. 1.
9United Nations Population Fund, State of the World Population 2006: A Passage of Hope-Womenand International Migration (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 2006)

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UNGA and conferences
The UN has constantly worked on the human trafficking issue, especially trafficking in women.
On 24 February 1995, the UN General Assembly (GA) adopted the Traffic in Women and Girls(A/RES/49/166). In November 2000, to stop human trafficking, the UNGA adopted the first legallybinding resolution toward transnational organized crimes, the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (A/RES/55/25). This resolution aims to act as an effective tool andas the necessary legal framework for international cooperation in response to criminal activities. At
the same time, the GA adopted the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and theProtocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children.
This UN Convention marked the first time the UN had declared human trafficking as aninternational crime.
On January 25, 2002, the Commission on Human Rights, under the Economic and Social
Council, adopted the Report of the Secretary-General entitled Integration of the Human Rights of
Women and the Gender Perspective: Traffic in Women and Girls (E/CN.4/2002/80). Two years later,in 2004, ―Trafficking in Women and Girls: Report of the Secretary-General‖ (A/59/185) was
adopted. In 2005, the General Assembly Resolution adopted the Report of the Third Committee
on the Trafficking in Women and Girls (A/RES/59/166).
UN conferences have also included human trafficking issues. The World Conference on Human
Rights adopted its Report of the World Conference on Human Rights (A/CONF.157/24 (Part 1)) in
Vienna, Austria in June 1993. In 1994, the International Conference on Population andDevelopment discussed the human trafficking issue, and in September 1995 in China, the Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action was adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women(DPI/1766/Wom).

3) Regional coalition

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In 2002, at the Bali Ministerial Conference on People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons andRelated Transnational Crime, ministers from various countries acknowledged that trafficking was
creating political, economic and social security challenges and called for measures to address theissue cooperatively and comprehensively. The Bali Process follow-up has worked on practicalmeasures to help combat people smuggling, trafficking in persons and related transnational crimesin the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.10
Under the Bali process, the monitoring and implementation of related activities and initiatives inareas including the trafficking in persons are guided by a steering group composed of thegovernments of East Asia, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and UNCHR.

2.

Retrospect and Examination

What is the real problem? For the past few years, the issue of trafficked North Korean women has
been raised. Now is the time for us to evaluate whether the situation has been improved or has
become worse.

1) Lack of international awareness and cooperation in fighting human trafficking in generaland in respect to North Korea
In the absence of systematic, reliable statistics on human trafficking, it is hard to know with any
degree of precision whether the number of trafficking cases is increasing or decreasing or why
these trends are occurring. Therefore, some governments indicate that trafficking is “huge andserious” while others believe that it is “declining.”
In the work of the specialized UN agencies, the North Korean human trafficking issue is notcovered and is not receiving attention, and this lack of attention causes relevant work to be
marginalized. To what degree is the North Korean issue taken up among the UN agencies with10

http://www.baliprocess.net/

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projects related to human trafficking? Chinese and North Korean cases were not covered by thisyear‘s Global Report on the Trafficking in Persons by the UN Office on Drugs and Crimes(UNODC).

Source: UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC), Global Report on the Trafficking
in Persons

2) Active work on the North Korean women trafficking issue by UN treaty-based bodies
On February 2003, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, Ms. Radhika
Coomaraswamy criticized North Korea on the reservation to the Convention including the North
Korean women trafficking issue in her report. The Special Rapporteur noted that there have beenreports of trafficking in women and girls from North Korea, but that there is no specific law
addressing trafficking. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur said that North Korean women who
try to leave the country are deceived by smugglers into thinking that they are being helped, but areoften sold as brides or prostitutes in China, some women being sold by their families, and many
enduring sexual and physical abuse.11 Regarding the report, North Korea commented that thetrafficking in women is prohibited by both law and practice, and most of the border-transgressors
voluntarily return to their native places as the food situation gradually improves as a result of the11

Report of the Special Rapporteur, Issues of concern 966 (27 Feb 2003) (E/CN.4/2003/75/Add.1)

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Yoojin Rhee

active measures taken by the Government of the DPRK to increase agricultural production andgenerous assistance provided by international aid agencies.

3) The actual human trafficking situation of North Korean women in China is revealed and isbeing publicized
The 64-page report, Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China,
published in April 2009, verifies the newly emerged fact that, contrary to stereotypes, most of theNorth Korean women in China are not trafficked into sexual slavery. More often they are trafficked
into forced marriages. To find this result, the Committee for Human Rights in North Korea
conducted in-depth interviews with 53 North Korean women defectors to China.12
Many of these women reported that they ended up in the hands of brokers who collect fees forpeddling them to the ―boarding houses‖ of China‘s sex trade or sell them into forced ―marriages,‖in which they have no legal standing and function as virtual slaves. ―Lives for Sale‖ includes a
price list of amounts paid in 2005 for such ―wives,‖ with the price for a North Korean woman forlife ranging from about 2000 Chinese Renminbi (then $257) to upward of 8000 Renminbi($1,027).13
Further, according to victims interviewed in 2007 by RFA‟s Korean service, North Korean
women aged 17 to 40 are trafficked in China, and the men who buy them are Chinese nationals
between the ages of 37 and 58.
North Korean women said they were being sold in China for between 2,000 Renminbi (US$260)
and 20,000 Renminbi (US$2,600), depending on their age and appearance. The traffickers, mostly
ethnic Korean Chinese citizens, operate a well-defined hierarchy and division of labor; there are„merchandise‟ scouts, distributors, brokers, and transporters.14

12

Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China (April 2009)
Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China (April 2009)14
RFA‘s Korean service, 200713

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4) China‟s unwillingness to help North Koreans: China‟s internal matter
The illegal status of North Koreans in the PRC and other Southeast Asian countries increases theirvulnerability to trafficking for purposes of forced labor and sexual exploitation. 15 The Chinese
government continues to treat North Korean trafficking victims as unlawful economic migrants,
and routinely deports them back to horrendous conditions in North Korea.16
Despite being a party to the Refugee Convention and Protocol, China has not allowed UN
agencies, in particular UNHCR, to have access to North Koreans who are residing in China
because it views these individuals as economic migrants (rather than political refugees) who crossthe border illegally, primarily in search of food.
In 1995, UNHCR established an office in Beijing under an agreement with China. During visits
to northeast China in the late 1990s, UNHCR determined that some of the newly arrived North
Koreans were refugees. But China saw the problem as an internal matter and subsequently
prohibited UNHCR from all direct access to the border. The Chinese are suspicious of UNHCR‘sintentions and have prevented aid agencies from entering the region to monitor the situation andpossibly set up refugee camps. Although it continues to push its case for access, UNHCR cannot
provide assistance to the refugees in an open, transparent manner. First-hand information is notavailable to UNHCR, which relies heavily on those ―working on the ground.‖ UNHCR officials
worked behind the scenes with Chinese officials to assist with the challenges posed by refugees andasylum seekers and believe this is the most productive way forward. 175) China facing several dilemmas at once
The continuing influx of North Korean refugees is pushing Beijing to address the current situation
in a more straightforward manner – but this will not be an easy matter. Beijing naturally wants tomaintain its increasing economic ties with Seoul, now its third-largest trading partner. At the same
15

U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2009, Country Narratives, North Korea
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2009, Country Narratives, China
17
Rhoda Margesson, Emma Chanlett-Avery & Andorra Bruno, ―North Korean Refugees in China
and Human Rights Issues: International Response and U.S. Policy Options,‖ CRS Report forCongress, (September 26, 2007), pp. 14-15.
16

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Yoojin Rheetime, while Beijing wants to prove its respect for human rights to the international community, it
does not wish to damage its alliance with Pyongyang, with which it shares a mutual security pact.
China has enough social woes of its own, and does not need any additional, externally-imposed
burdens. Under the circumstances, Beijing will not welcome another source of strain by having todeal with a massive influx of famished people from its neighboring country. Beijing is therefore
faced with several dilemmas at once. China obviously wishes the North Korean refugee problem
would simply go away, but the issue has grown too big to ignore. 186) China‟s Initiative- sustainable and trustful?
Additional challenges facing the Chinese government include the enormous size of its trafficking
problem, and the complicity in trafficking by some corrupt local government officials. Factors that
continue to impede progress in anti-trafficking efforts include tight controls over civil society
organizations, restricted access for foreign anti-trafficking organizations and the government‟ssystemic lack of transparency. 19
To this end, China has implemented the National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in
Women and Children (2008-2012), in which China evaluates the situation by stating that
remarkable achievements have been achieved under the leadership of various levels of thegovernment, as well as through the concerted efforts of relevant agencies, various spheres ofsociety, and practical and effective international cooperation. 20
However, there has been no specific research or evaluation to verify this claim. China lacks theresources necessary for carrying out on-going projects for the NPA.

7) Lack of coalition between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia on Human Trafficking
18

Mikyung Kim, ―Political Construction of Human Rights: With a Focus on North Korean

Refugees in China,‖ Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Aug 30, 2007.
19
U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report 2009, Country Narratives, China
20
China National Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Women and Children (2008-2012)
Issued by the State Council of China, December 13, 2007, p. 2.

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Until now, international society has focused on the human trafficking situation in Southeast andSouth Asia foremost among Asian countries.21According to the United Nations Population Fund‘s,
State of the World Population 2006, Southeast Asia and South Asia are home to the largest numbersof internationally trafficked persons, at an estimated 225,000 and 150,000 persons, respectively. In
Asia, the largest numbers of women trafficked are said to be within or from these regions. The
Greater Mekong region and Indonesia are major trafficking areas. Thailand, in addition to being adestination country, serves as a source and transit hub for other Asian countries, Australia, theUnited States and Western Europe. India and Pakistan are major destination countries for trafficked
women and girls and are also transit points into the Middle East. In South Asia, child trafficking isof particular concern, considered to be ―an extension of a serious child labour problem,‖ which
includes the exploitation of girls for domestic work. 22

3.

Suggestions: The Roles of States, Regional Organizations, and the United Nations

1) The family/group approach toward North Korean human trafficking
The recently revealed characteristic that North Korean women trafficked into China are more often
trafficked into forced marriages23 differs from the conventional view held by international society
regarding human trafficking identification. According to the 2009 UNDP Human Development
Report (HDR), the most commonly identified form of human trafficking is sexual exploitation. The
UNDP has stated that about 80 percent of cases in the UNODC database are sexual exploitation. 24
As a result of these forced marriages, the problem is escalating beyond the limited scope of afamily problem for the trafficked person, into larger social issues as children of Chinese nationality
are born to North Korean women married in China.
21

Migration in the Asia-Pacific region
United Nations Population Fund, State of the World Population 2006: A Passage of
Hope-Women and International Migration (New York: United Nations Population Fund, 2006),
Chapter 3.
23
Lives for Sale: Personal Accounts of Women Fleeing North Korea to China, April 2009
24
UNDP, HDR 2009, p. 66.
22

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Yoojin Rhee

In the case of North Korean human trafficking, therefore, a family/group approach is more
preferable than an individual approach. In this case, international society should see the issue as afamily and social problem, not only as a personal problem for the trafficked North Korean women.
The real problem here lies within North Korea, the source community of the North Koreans
fleeing to China. Although anti-trafficking initiatives have burgeoned in recent years, North Korea
has not joined the international community‟s initiative. In other cases, interventions to reduce
vulnerability in source communities, such as awareness campaigns and livelihood projects, havebeen undertaken. Assistance programs have also provided counseling, legal aid and support for
return and re-integration. However, in the case of North Korea, repatriation from China means
harsh penalties in a state replete with human instability and fear.

2) The UN‟s role
The UN may maintain its focus on encouraging and recommending China to focus their attention
on strengthening the national legal framework for identification and protection of, and assistance tovictims, as well as on the capacity building of relevant law enforcement officials throughinstitutionalized training.
This UN work depends upon sound policies which could bring China to the table to cooperatewith international society to fight the human trafficking of North Korean women. Moreover, tofurther international cooperation in fighting human trafficking worldwide as well as in China,bilateral and regional guidelines and procedures should be developed by states to facilitate
cooperation between governments and stakeholders, including international organizations, in theidentification and provision of direct assistance.

3) Human trafficking in China needs China‟s initiative and a regional coalition
The Lives for Sale report stated that China should help by ensuring that marriages between North
Korean women and residents of China are consensual rather than coerced, and should legalize

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children born to North Korean women married in China as Chinese nationals. Furthermore, thereport called on Beijing to prosecute human traffickers and recommended that Beijing use its
influence with North Korea to press Pyongyang to treat returning refugees humanely and allow
thousands of North Koreans access to asylum screening by the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR).
China may participate more actively in the Bali Process, in which it holds membership. That
could facilitate a regional coalition regarding the human trafficking issue in China. Working
multilaterally with international organizations such as the International Organization for Migration(IOM) and UNHCR in the Bali Process will facilitate China‘s interests and policies on the humantrafficking issue.

4) Dividing the Southeast Asia problem and the Northeast Asia problem
To bring the trafficked North Korean women out from the behind the screen, their characteristics
which distinguish them from other human trafficking issues should be made clear. Compared tomany women in Southeast Asia who are trafficked into sexual slavery, North Korean women in
China are more often trafficked into forced marriages, which results in the situation becoming more
complex. These issues require longer-term policies in order to be resolved effectively.

Conclusion

This study suggests that the approach to North Korean nationals in China should be framed as ahuman trafficking issue rather than as a human rights issue. By pursuing the issue from a humantrafficking approach, China will be more willing to accept requests from international society andless likely to be offended.

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Yoojin Rhee

References
Tsuneo Akaha and Anna Vassilieva eds., Crossing National Borders: Human Migration in
Northeast Asia (United Nations University Press) (November 2005)
Sally Cameron and Edward Newman eds., Trafficking in Humans: Social, Cultural and Political
Dimensions (United Nations University Press) (February 2008)
Security and Migration in Asia: The Dynamics of Securitisation
The world vision
Anti-Slavery International
The Bali Process
UN Inter-Agency Project on Trafficking of Women and Children (UNIAP)
http://www.gcim.org/en/ (UN Work)
Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on trafficking in persons, especially women andchildren, Joy Ngozi Ezeilo (20 February 2009) (A/HRC/10/16)
Vitit Muntarbhorn

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Sustainable Development in East Asia

Sustainable Development in East Asia:
What Do the Numbers Say?
Intaek Han1
1. Sustainable Development: Conceptual Evolution

The notion that balance needs to exist between environmental preservation and economic growthdates back to at least the 1960s and 1970s. The term ‗sustainable development,‘ however, spreadwidely only after it was used by the World Commission on Environment and Development(WCED).2 The commission was convened by the United Nations in 1983 in response to growing
concerns about ―the accelerating deterioration of the human environment and natural resources andthe consequences of that deterioration for economic and social development.‖ 3 When used by theBrundtland Commission in its 1987 report, sustainable development mainly referred todevelopment that "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs" and placed emphasis on preserving the environment for future
generations while pursuing economic development, consistent with earlier notions about balancing
natural preservation and economic progress.While largely about the environment—or moreaccurately about balancing the environment and economic development during the initial years of
its use—sustainable development as a concept subsequently grew in scope. In particular, in 1992,
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, also known as the Earth Summit,
was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, where Agenda 21 was agreed on. Agenda 21 is remarkable inthat it was a comprehensive program of action to be taken for sustainable development that was
defined quite comprehensively. Specifically, it contained action plans for social welfare, economic
development, and environmental preservation. Since then, sustainable development has been
1

Senior Research Fellow, Jeju Peace Institute.
The WCED is perhaps better known as the Brundtland Commission named after its chair Gro
Harlem Brundtland.
3
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sustainable_development
2113Intaek Han

understood to consist of three pillars, each of which stands on its own as well as in concert with theother pillars; it builds on ―interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars.‖
However, with its scope now wider and more comprehensive, sustainable development as a goalhas become more difficult to achieve. It will require either extraordinary effort or luck, or perhaps
both, for a country to do well on all three pillars of sustainable development, especially in countries
with a large population and limited natural resources like those in East Asia. More often than not,countries do well on one or two pillars but do poorly on the others.

2.

Three Pillars of Sustainable Development in East Asia

East Asian countries, especially Japan, South Korea, and China, are legendary for their successful
economic development. Few other historic precedents exist for such high economic growth rates
over an extended period, like those commonly found in East Asian countries.
Has East Asia also made progress in the areas of social welfare and environmental protection?
In other words, where does East Asia stand in terms of sustainable development, as opposed toconventional economic development? Also of importance, how do East Asian countries compare toeach other on the three pillars of sustainable development?
These interesting and important questions often go unaddressed. 4 The purpose of this shortpresentation is to take stock of East Asian countries‘ performances in three areas of sustainable
development—environmental

preservation,

economicdevelopment,

andsocialdevelopment—through some simple statistics. This will not be, and is not intended to be, asystematic and comprehensive review of sustainable development. 5 Such reviews must be the taskof projects larger in scope than this presentation.

4

I am not aware of any existing studies that have empirically compared and contrasted East Asian
countries with non-East Asian countries and also with one another in terms of sustainable
development in the Korean language. Such studies may exist in other languages.
5
The selection of statistics is dictated by data availability. Thus, the comparisons made in thispresentation are not entirely scientific.

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Sustainable Development in East Asia

1) The “Environmental” Pillar
The Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI), compiled by the Yale Center for Environmental Law
and Policy, Yale University, and the Center for International Earth Science Information Network,
Columbia University, is intended to ―measure‖ the ability of countries to protect the environment
over the next several decades. To obtain this index, 76 data sets are integrated into 21 indicators,
which are then compiled into a composite figure. 6 The higher a country‘s environmental
sustainability index, the better its environmental conditions will be into the future.
In the 2005 survey, Finland (75.1), Norway (73.4), Sweden (71.7), Iceland (70.8), and Uruguay(71.8) are ranked as the top five countries (Note: ESI indices are in parentheses). Obviously, thesecountries are much different from East Asian countries in several important aspects; among them,
they all have a low population density. Of the five countries ranked the lowest, two countries arefrom East Asia: North Korea (29.2) and Taiwan (32.7); the remaining three are Turkmenistan (33.1),
Uzbekistan (34.4), and Iraq (33.6). It is hard to find a common denominator for the fivelowest-ranking countries. In particular, North Korea and Taiwan have few things in common otherthan that they both have a high population density and are adjacent to China. In other words, thesecountries seem to have found themselves in their current state of environmental (in) sustainability
for quite different reasons.
Among China, Japan, and South Korea (CJK hereafter), Japan has the highest ESI score (57.3)
but ranks only 12th among OECD countries. South Korea is also an OECD country but scores only
43.0, ranking 29th among OECD countries. China has not done well either. It scores 38.6 and isranked 104th among non-OECD countries. In other words, East Asian countries have performed
only modestly (Japan), poorly (South Korea), or very poorly (China, North Korea, and Taiwan) interms of environmental sustainability.
6

The exact process and rationale for calculating this index are beyond the scope of thispresentation. We simply use this index to compare and contrast East Asian countries‘ standing insustainable development. For details of this index, visit http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/es/esi/
where links to the reports and underlying datasets are provided. This presentation is based on the2005 Environmental Sustainability Index but the 2008 Environmental Sustainability Index is alsoavailable from http://www.yale.edu/epi/files/2008EPI_Text.pdf

115Intaek Han

One of the reasons that CJK score low in terms of the ESI may be that they have a highpopulation density. The following table, from the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index,
compares only high population density countries. Among such countries, Japan has done very wellin environmental sustainability. South Korea, on the other hand, has done rather poorly, and China
is somehow not included in the table, probably suggesting that though China has the largest
population, its population density is not comparatively high due to its relatively large size.

High Population Density Countries: Countries and territories in which more than half the landarea has a population density above 100 persons per square kilometre
Rank

Country

ESI

Rank

Country

ESI

Rank

Country

ESI

1

Japan

57.30

8

Poland45.00

15Philippines

42.30

2

Germany

56.90

9

Rwanda44.80

16

Lebanon40.50

3

Netherlands

53.70

10

Jamaica

44.70

17

Burundi

40.00

4

Italy

50.10

11

Belgium

44.40

18

Trinidad & Tobago

36.3

5

Sri Lanka

48.5

12

Bangladesh

44.10

19

Haiti

34.80

6

Nepal

47.70

13

El Salvador

43.80

20

Taiwan

32.70

7

India

45.20

14

South Korea

43.00

21

North Korea

29.20

Note: Countries identified using CIESIN's PLACE data set (CIESIN 2003)
Source: 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index

How have CJK done in comparison with Southeast Asian countries? The following table, also
from the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index, shows that only Japan ranks higher than
ASEAN countries, while South Korea outranks only the Philippines and Viet Nam, and not even bya meaningful margin. China performs poorly, lagging behind the Philippines and Viet Nam bynearly 5 points. In short, East Asia, except for Japan, is doing more poorly than Southeast Asia.

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ASEAN Member Countries: Association of Southeast Asian Nations member countries
Rank

Country

ESI

Rank

Country

ESI

Rank

Country

ESI

1

Malaysia

54.0

4

Cambodia

50.1

7Philippines

42.3

2

Myanmar52.8

5

Thailand

49.7

8

Viet Nam

42.3

3

Laos

52.4

6

Indonesia

48.8

Source: 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index

Lastly, how do CJK do when compared with Latin American countries? The following tablefrom the 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index shows that Latin American countries vary
greatly in the ESI but on the whole, Latin America is doing better, if not significantly better, thanEast Asia. Again, one important reason for this may be the difference in population density.

OAS Member Countries: Organization of American States member countries
Rank

Country

ESI

Rank

Country

ESI

Rank

Country

ESI

1

Uruguay

71.8

9

Bolivia59.5

17

Honduras

47.4

2

Canada64.4

10

Colombia

58.9

18

Mexico46.2

3

Guyana62.9

11

Panama57.7

19

Jamaica

44.7

4Argentina

62.7

12

Chile

53.6

20

Guatemala44.0

5Brazil62.2

13

United States

52.9

21

El Salvador

43.8

6

Peru

60.4

14

Cuba

52.3

22

Dominican Rep

43.7

7

Paraguay

59.7

15

Nicaragua

50.2

23

8

Costa Rica

59.6

16

Venezuela

48.1

24

Source: 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index

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Trinidad &Tobago
Haiti

36.3
34.8

Intaek Han

All in all, East Asia is not doing well in terms of environmental sustainability. This isdisappointing but hardly surprising, as it is not the ―environmental‖ pillar of sustainable
development but rather the ―economic‖ pillar that has given the region its fame, to which we nowturn.

2) The “Economic” Pillar
That East Asian countries‘ performances in environmental sustainability are not stellar is scarcely
surprising. After all, East Asian countries have large populations relative to their land size. What‘s
more, most of them have already industrialized or are currently undergoing rapid industrialization,
which is hardly conducive to environmental preservation.
How do East Asian countries do in the area where they are known to perform well—in otherwords, in terms of economic development? The following chart from the OECD Factbook 2009shows that two OECD countries from East Asia—Japan and South Korea—are indeed doing wellin relation to other OECD countries even when income is measured in PPP. Luxembourg ranked
the highest in 2008 with $79,800 per head. The average income for the OECD was $33,400 in2008 (China is not included because it is not an OECD country.)118

Sustainable Development in East Asia

GDP per capita
US$, using current PPPs

Source: OECD Factbook 2009

However, for high per-capita income to contribute to sustainable development envisioned
comprehensively, income needs to be distributed in a more or less equitable manner. The following
chart, based on OECD StatExtracts data, shows that both Japan and South Korea have poverty rates
above the OECD average, at about 11% in the mid-2000s.7 Among the 30 OECD countries in the7

The poverty rate is the ratio of the number of people who fall below the poverty line to the total
population. In the OECD Factbook 2009, the poverty line is taken as half the median householdincome.

119Intaek Han

chart, Japan has the 4th highest poverty rate (14.9%) and South Korea the 7 th highest (14.6%). Thisis a rather surprising finding, since Japan and South Korea are commonly assumed to have grownboth rapidly and equitably. Recent income statistics, however, suggest that such assumptions need
to be revisited.

Source: OECD StatExtracts

3) The “Social” Pillar
Discussions of sustainable development presuppose the existence of future generations. Because
the existence of future generations is taken as given, environmental preservation is called for.
However, recent developments in Japan and South Korea, and to a lesser extent in China, challengesuch a presumption. The following chart, also from the OECD Factbook 2009, shows us twothings: firstly, suicide rates are very high in Japan and South Korea (in fact, only Hungary has ahigher suicide rate than Japan or South Korea); secondly, economic development, measured as
per-capita GDP, and suicide rates are positively correlated (although admittedly, correlation does
not necessarily imply causation). Therefore, this chart may or may not suggest that suicide rates
increase as the economy develops. What the chart unambiguously indicates is that suicide rates inJapan and South Korea are far higher than other countries at similar levels of per-capita income.
South Korea is similar to the Czech Republic and Greece in terms of per-capita GDP but its suicide120

Sustainable Development in East Asia

rate is far higher than that of the Czech Republic or Greece. Likewise, Japan shows similarities to
Belgium, Finland, France, and Great Britain in terms of per-capita GDP, but it has the highest
suicide rate among the five.

Source: OECD Factbook 2009

Suicides are detrimental to social stability and the negative impact on social development;
however it may be defined, is clear. The important question becomes: Why do people commit
suicide? One of the immediate causes must be dissatisfaction with life (the more fundamental
question of why people feel dissatisfied is not addressed here). The following chart shows that
persons in China, Japan, and South Korea are unhappy with their lives.

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Intaek Han

Source: OECD Factbook 2009

As mentioned earlier, it is to be expected that dissatisfaction with life correlates with suicide
rates. To wit, the more dissatisfied one feels, the more likely he or she is to commit suicide; themore satisfied one feels, the less likely he or she is to commit suicide. The following chart confirms
this correlation: high subjective life satisfaction and low suicide rates go together. What isinteresting to note here is that for a given level of subjective satisfaction, persons in Japan and
Korea are more likely to commit suicide. While persons in Portugal, Slovakia, Poland, South Korea,
and Japan feel similarly satisfied (or dissatisfied) with their lives, the suicide rates of those in Japanand South Korea are higher than their counterparts in Portugal, Slovakia, and Poland. Specifically,
the suicide rate is two times higher in Japan and South Korea than in Portugal even though persons
in Portugal feel slightly less satisfied.

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Sustainable Development in East Asia

Source: OECD Factbook 2009

Not only are Japanese and South Korean persons committing more suicides, but they are also
producing fewer children. In 2006, South Korea shows the lowest fertility rates (1.13) in the chart
below, with Japan showing only slightly higher rates (1.32).

Note: Number of children born to women aged 15 to 49
Source: OECD Factbook 2009123

Intaek Han

Since both countries‘ fertility rates fall below the replacement level, 2.1, population growth has
slowed down. In the case of Japan, the population growth rate was -0.16% (estimate) in 2008,
preceded by 0.33% in 2007. Slow population growth may not be bad for environmental
preservation, as it represents lower demand for natural resources. It may, however, indicate afragile social system or even social disintegration, as it comes as the result of a rising suicide rate
and a declining fertility rate.

Population Growth, 2007/2008

Source: OECD

What‘s more, the populations of Japan and South Korea are aging rapidly. The chart below
shows that Japan and South Korea have the highest ratios of elderly population in the labour force
except for Italy.

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Sustainable Development in East Asia

Source: OECD Factbook 2009

However, in terms of the ratio of thepopulation aged 65 and over to the total population—rather
than to the labour force—South Korea was twice ―younger‖ than Japan in 2009; the ratio for South
Korea was 10.7%, while the ratio for Japan was 22.8% (the ratio for China was 8.2%).

Note: Ratio of population aged 65 and over to the total population
Source: OECD Factbook 2009125

Intaek Han

The picture that emerges from a brief analysis of the ―social‖ pillar is grim. Despite theireconomic success, persons in East Asia are unhappy with life, more prone to suicide, and are
producing fewer children than any reasonable comparison groups. Admittedly, we can reach a very
different conclusion by examining different statistics, such as crime rates or health care. However,the figures we have used in this presentation—life evaluation, fertility rates, and suicide rates—dotell us about how members of society actually think and feel about the society they are in (crime
rates or health care, on the other hand, may tell us more about the quality of the police or hospitals,
or more generally about governance, than society itself). Therefore, the analysis in this section,
though based on selected statistics, does have important messages about the ―social‖ pillar in East
Asia.

3.

Conclusion

East Asian countries are enigmas. They boast the highest economic growth rates in history but theyalso have some of the highest suicide rates combined with the lowest fertility rates in the world.
Furthermore, their populations are unhappy and growing old at record speeds. This indicates,
among other things, that at least one of the three pillars of sustainable development, the ―social‖pillar, may be collapsing or at least decaying. This does not imply, however, that the other pillars
are strong. In fact, the ―environmental‖ pillar is far from strong in East Asia, and more must be
done to protect the environment. This is vitally important as China continues to industrialize in theyears to come, and mostly likely this will be at the expense of the environment. Of the three pillars,
the strongest one must be the ―economic‖ pillar, although it should not be relied upon too heavily.
As evidenced by two financial crises since the 1990s, the economy will never be rock-solid in thisage of financial globalization. Furthermore, as the economy grows it may undermine rather thanbuttress the other two pillars if previous discussions on the relationship between per-capita income
and suicide rates have any validity.

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Sustainable Development in East Asia

In the field of international economics and the international political economy, an unavoidable
regularity has been found among capital mobility, economic policy autonomy, and exchange ratestability. Referred to as the unholy trinity or the impossible trinity, it argues that capital mobility,
economic policy autonomy, and exchange rate stability cannot be obtained simultaneously. At most,two can be achieved but never three at the same time. This author cannot avoid thinking that for atleast Japan and South Korea, there exists an equivalent of the unholy trinity for sustainable
development, and the three pillars of sustainable development may never stand together. We know
all too well that the environment and the economy rarely go together. What our discussion of East
Asia‘s sustainable development here suggests is that the environment, the economy, and society
have not gone together in East Asia, similar to the unholy trinity in international economics. If
there truly exists an unholy trinity in sustainable development, as this analysis seems to s uggest, it
is a sad discovery. East Asia‘s best minds should examine this and better yet, discover how toresolve it.

127Jun Matsukuma

Development and Human Rights
Jun Matsukuma1

Introduction

In his policy statement entitled ―My priorities for a better world,‖ UN Secretary-General Ban
Ki-moon pointed out that the Millennium Development Goals are a blueprint to ensure that in atechnology-rich and prosperous twenty-first century, no human being should be dying of
malnutrition or preventable diseases, or be deprived of education or access to basic health care. 2 In
his recent remarks, he also stated that just six years before the deadline for the Millennium
Development Goals, the danger is growing that many countries will not achieve them because as
many as 100 million people have fallen below the poverty line since the financial crisis began.
For the past several years, international legal scholars have referred to the concepts of the rightto food and the right to health within the broad concept of the right to minimum sustenance.3 Many
academics have concluded that one should see the right to live as a civil minimum of internationalsociety, and should examine ways in which it may be realized. The concepts of the right to foodand the right to health are reflections of this perspective.
In this article, I would like to discuss a human rights perspective on the Millennium Development
Goals. In the first section, I will explain my concept of the right to minimum sustenance. In thesecond section, I will analyze the national implementation of the Millennium Development Goals
1

Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.
Ban Ki-moon: ―My priorities for a better world‖ http://www.un.org/sg/priority_print.htm.
3
In my previous article, I analyzed the concept of the right to minimum sustenance in relation tohumanitarian exemptions of economic sanctions. See Jun Matsukuma, ―The Legitimacy of
Economic Sanctions: An Analysis of Humanitarian Exemptions of Sanctions Regimes and theRight to Minimum Sustenance,‖ in Hilary Charlesworth and Jean-Marc Coicaud (eds.), (2009),
Fault Lines of International Legitimacy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 360–388.
2

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Development and Human Rights

in light of the right to minimum sustenance. In the third section, I will discuss the issues ofinternational cooperation for the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in light of
the right to minimum sustenance. This analysis leads to the conclusion that a human rights
approach would make the Millennium Development Goals much more effective, even though thedefinition of the right to minimum sustenance will require time and broad discussion.

1. MDGs and the concept of the right to minimum sustenance

The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are as follows.
(1) Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger(2) Achieve universal primary education(3) Promote gender equality and empower women(4) Reduce child mortality(5) Improve maternal health(6) Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases(7) Ensure environmental sustainability(8) Develop a global partnership for development
Yet, there have been various criticisms of the MDGs. For example, some argue that ―MDGs
allow that by 2015 at least half of today‘s poor will continue to live in a state of poverty anddeprivation.‖ Or, ―The first Goal might not be met on a global basis because of the progress madetowards poverty alleviation only by India and China.‖ Or, ―The MDG process will be used bygovernments and donors to distract attention from real human rights issues.‖ Or, ―The MDG
process is a top-down rather than a grassroots effort. It is an imposition by governments acting
through the UN General Assembly.‖
Among East Asian countries, the status of the MDGs in China is often criticized from viewpointsof this nature. China has now achieved its target of halving the number of people in poverty with

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Jun Matsukuma

respect to the 1990 figure, but inequality has increased and there is still a need to work towards
balanced regional economic growth and to realize sustainable development with equity. 4
Facing such criticism, I believe that a human rights approach would make the MDGs much more
effective. Before examining the concept of the right to minimum sustenance, I would like to referto the notion of human security that Japan is now promoting to the mainstream.
In the outcome document of the World Summit in 2005, political leaders committed themselves―to discussing and defining the notion of human security in the General Assembly.‖ According to
the Government of Japan, the essence of human security is the conviction that a human being is
entitled to live a healthy, dignified, fulfilling life, irrespective of where he or she is born. 5
In my view, the right to minimum sustenance should include all of the elements of humansecurity—including availability, accessibility, and utilization of a basic human need. The right tominimum sustenance as a basic human need is more than freedom from hunger or the right to themere survival of the people, but a right to realize the health and security of human beings. 6 Before
examining its applicability to the Millennium Development Goals, it is necessary to analyze theprovisions of the international human rights covenants related to the right to minimum sustenance.
Article 11, Paragraph 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights(ICESCR) stipulates that ―The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right ofeveryone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food,clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions.‖ The second
paragraph of the same article provides that ―The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing
the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and throughinternational co-operation, the measures, including specific programs, which are needed: (a) To
improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of
4

UNDP, ―MDGs in China‖
http://www.undp.org.cn/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&catid=32&sid=6.
5Statement by Ambassador Yukio Takasu, Permanent Representative of Japan to the United
Nations at the General Assembly Thematic Debate on Human Security, New York, 22 May 2008.
6
Philip Alston and Katarina Tomasevski, (1984), The Right to Food, Netherlands: Nijhoff, p. 2.

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Development and Human Rights

technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition, andby developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficientdevelopment and utilization of natural resources; (b) Taking into account the problems of bothfood-importing and food-exporting countries, to ensure an equitable distribution of world foodsupplies in relation to need.‖ From this wording, it is clear that Article 11 serves as the central
provision for the right to minimum sustenance.
Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the ICESCR stipulates that ―The States Parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard ofphysical and mental health.‖ The second paragraph of the same article further provides that ―The
steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve the full realization of thisright shall include those necessary for:(a) The provision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy
development of the child;(b) The improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene;(c) The prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational, and other diseases;(d) The creation of conditions which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in
the event of sickness.‖
Brigit C.A. Toebes pointed out the fact that the number of steps mentioned in Paragraph 12(2)implies that the provision is more tangible than similar provisions that do not enumerate such
steps.7
In the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 6 is the article that
relates to the right to minimum sustenance and is the provision of the right to life in internationallaw. To be free from want is to be free from danger to one‘s life, and to be able to live. Hence, this
Article must be realized with the positive participation of the States. In regards to the interpretationof this Article, many States have strongly opposed a broad interpretation. The reason for this is that
7

Brigit C.A. Toebes, (1999), The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law,
Belgium: Intersentia, pp. 292–301.

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Jun Matsukuma

Article 6 was thought to be an article on civil rights and not on standards of living. In other words,
for those who opposed a broad interpretation, the focus of this Article was on protecting people
from having their lives taken arbitrarily, and not on protecting them from hunger, cold, or illness.
However, the Human Rights Committee has adopted a General Comment on this Article, in which
they have criticized the previous narrow interpretation of Article 6 and have stated that theCommittee considers it desirable for States Parties to take all possible measures to reduce infantmortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to eliminate malnutritionand epidemics.8 Based on this interpretation, States that do not take any measures to eradicate
starvation will be violating Article 6 of the Covenant.
In summary, Article 11, Paragraph 2 and Article 12, Paragraph 2 of the ICESCR aim to realize
the right to minimum sustenance by having the States take positive measures, based on theinterpretation that this right is part of common Article 1, as well as Article 11, Paragraph 1 andArticle 12, Paragraph 1 of the ICESCR, and Article 6 of the ICCPR. These paragraphs form thebasic provisions related to the right to minimum sustenance. According to the ICESCR, most East
Asian countries are now ratifying this convention.

2. The national implementation of the Millennium Development Goals in light of the right tominimum sustenance

There has been discussion in which it is assumed that the MDGs have already become customaryinternational law. I believe, however, that this might not be very persuasive. Philip Alston, Special
Advisor to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Millennium
Development Goals, pointed out that the Millennium Development Goals and human rights are not8

Human Rights Committee, General Comment 6, Article 6 (Sixteenth session, 1982), Compilationof General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies,
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 6 (1994).

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Development and Human Rights

just significantly overlapping and mutually reinforcing, but also fully compatible andcomplementary.9 According to him, there is extensive overlap between the MDG indicators andthe provisions of the ICESCR. The following table gives an indication of the extent of thatoverlap.10

Indicators
Malnutrition

Principal relevant provisions of ICESCR―
The fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.‖Art. 11 (2)Access to clean water―
Right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health.‖ Art. 12 (1)Access to sanitation services

Right to health measures including ―The improvement of all
aspects of environmental and industrial hygiene‖ and ―The
prevention, treatment, and control of epidemic, endemic,
occupational and other diseases.‖ Art. 11 (2)Infant mortality rates―
Right to health measures to include reduction of thestillbirth-rate and of infant mortality.‖ Art. 12 (2) (a)There are two approaches that obligate States to realize the right to minimum sustenance underinternational law. The first approach aims to prove the existence of international customary law
regarding this right, and the second approach aims to conclude a treaty that would stipulate thisright under positive international law.
In regards to the former, though repetitive State practice and opinio juris do exist to a certain
degree, it is difficult to conclude at present that an international customary law exists that clarifies
9

Philip Alston, ―Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights andDevelopment Debate Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals,‖ Human
Rights Quarterly 27 (2005), pp. 759–762.
10
Philip Alston, ―A Human Rights Perspective on the Millennium Development Goals,‖ Paper
prepared as a contribution to the work of the Millennium Project Task Force on Poverty andEconomic Development (2004), pp. 30–31.

133Jun Matsukuma

the details of the obligations. Therefore, to consider the issue of States‘ obligations underinternational law today, one must turn to the latter approach. In this sense, Article 11 and Article 12of the ICESCR may be useful.
According to Article 11, the national obligation of the States is to take appropriate steps toensure the realization of the right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate food, clothing, and housing, and to the continuous improvement ofliving conditions. Article 12 stipulates the steps to be taken by the States Parties to achieve the full
realization of the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physicaland mental health.
Since obligations to realize human rights relate to Article 2 of the Covenant, it is closely linked
with the progressive achievement principle of its first paragraph, and the non-discrimination
principle of its second paragraph. Paragraph 1 of Article 11 articulates that the States ―takeappropriate measures‖ and Paragraph 2 of Article 12 articulates ―The steps to be taken by the States
Parties.‖ Whereas the second paragraph of Article 2 of the ICCPR stipulates clear and definite
legislative measures that the States are obligated to take in order to realize human rights, the same
article of the ICESCR does not provide as clear and definite wordings as the ICCPR. Though it
may be inferred from the Covenant that States are requested to take legislative and administrative
measures, this is not an obligation that must be fulfilled immediately, due to the wording―
achieving progressively‖ seen in Article 2, Paragraph 2. The word ―progressively‖ grants theStates some time to implement their obligation, and the meaning of ―progressively‖ is left unclear.
If one extends the meaning of the wording, in the end, the States may get away with taking no
measures at all to realize the right to minimum sustenance.
Since it is necessary to take appropriate policy measures in order to progressively realize thisright, the requests that States legislate basic laws and make policy declarations must not be
neglected due to the word ―progressively.‖ States must implement the Covenants in good faith, andthey must establish comprehensive and consistent plans necessary for the ―progressive‖ realization134Development and Human Rightsof the right to minimum sustenance. The details given in Paragraph 2 of Article 11 and Paragraph 2
of Article 12 are examples of legislative and administrative measures that need to be taken.

3. International cooperation for the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals
in light of the right to minimum sustenanceIn the present international society, where the interdependence of States is becoming greater every
day, the right to minimum sustenance cannot be attained solely by one State‘s national efforts. The
ICESCR, reflecting the international character in the implementation of this right, stipulates theStates‘ obligation to cooperate. For example, in Article 2, Paragraph 1, it is stated that ―Each State
Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps individually, and through international
assistance…‖ Article 11, Paragraph 1 stipulates that ―the States Parties will take appropriate steps
to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to th is effect the essential importance ofinternational co-operation based on free consent.‖ Moreover, the second paragraph obligates theStates to ―take, individually and through international co-operation, the measures, including
specific programs, which are needed.‖
Regarding the scope of the international obligations, the Committee on Economic, Social, andCultural Rights, in its General Comment 12, proposed the following:(a) Regarding the obligations of States Parties:
States Parties should take steps to respect the enjoyment of the right to food in other countries, toprotect that right, to facilitate access to food, and to provide the necessary aid when required;(b) Regarding the obligations of States and international organizations:
1.

States have a joint and individual responsibility to cooperate in providing disaster relief andhumanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internallydisplaced persons;
2.

Food aid should be provided in ways that do not adversely affect local producers and local

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Jun Matsukuma

markets.11
Regarding the scope of the international obligations to protect the right to the highest attainable
standard of health, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in its General
Comment 14, proposed the following:a) States Parties have to respect the enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and toprevent third parties from violating that right in other countries, if they are able to influence thesethird parties by way of legal or political means. Depending on the availability of resources, Statesshould facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods, and services in other countries wherever
possible, and provide the necessary aid when requiredb) States Parties have a joint responsibility to cooperate in providing disaster relief andhumanitarian assistance in times of emergency, including assistance to refugees and internallydisplaced persons. Each State should contribute to this task to the maximum extent of its capacities.
As has been examined above, the right to minimum sustenance has been recognized as a humanright in international law and a human rights approach would make the Millennium Development
Goals much more effective.

Conclusions

In this concluding section, I would like to refer to the traditional concept of the offices of humanity,
which is often regarded as the origin of humanitarian assistance.
In his book, The Law of Nations, Or, Principles of Natural Law, Emer de Vattel argued that theoffices of humanity consist of the fulfillment of the duty of mutual assistance, which men owe to
one another because they are men, that is to say, because they are made to live together in society
and are of necessity dependent upon one another‘s aid for their preservation and happiness, and for
11

United Nations, (1999), ―The right to adequate food‖, E/C.12/1999/5, General Comments,
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, New York: Economic andSocial Council, Para. 12.

136

Development and Human Rights

the means of a livelihood conformable to their nature. 12 He insisted that if a nation is sufferingfrom famine, all those who have provisions to spare should assist it in its need. To give assistancein such dire straits is so instinctive an act of humanity that hardly any civilized nation is to befound that would refuse absolutely to do so.
Yet, we should note that Vattel also pointed out that a nation has no right to force another nationto accept its offer of help, and that an attempt to do so would be a violation of that nation‘s naturalliberty. According to his theory, every nation has a perfect right to ask for assistance and offices ofhumanity from another if that nation thinks it has need of them, but does not have the right todemand them. In other words, a nation has only an imperfect right to offices of humanity andcannot force another nation to perform them. Vattel concluded that if a nation re fuses offices ofhumanity without good reason, it offends against charity but it does no injury, since injury resultsfrom denying a perfect right.
Attempts to link human rights and development issues have a long history in the UN context.
The process of the adaptation of the UN Declaration on the Right to Development is one example;
yet, the succeeding debates over the right to development were not able to make a meaningfulpractical contribution. Thus, in this century, we should aim ahead of Vattel‘s theory in order toensure that no human being will die of malnutrition or preventable diseases, or be deprived ofaccess to basic health care.

12

Emer de Vattel, (1758), Le droit des gens, ou Principes de la loi naturelle [The Law of Nations,

Or, Principles of Natural Law], 2 vols.

137

Ryokichi Hirono

The United Nations and East Asian Community
for Enhanced Human Security and Sustainability
Ryokichi Hirono1
At the time of the founding of the United Nations in San Francisco in 1945, freedom from hunger,
freedom from ignorance and freedom from fear, or the three basic elements of what we call today
Human Security, constituted the basic aims of the international community in creating the universal
institution called the United Nations. The greatest challenge of development facing the global
community in this millennium is not only to realise all three of these dimensions of freedom,
preferably simultaneously, but also to secure one more dimension of freedom, that is, freedom fromself-destruction and self-extermination resulting from the ecological meltdown.
We are now witnessing the age of globalisation. Globalisation has contributed enormously toenhancing economic efficiency in resource allocation within and across national borders and thewellbeing of the people, but unfortunately at the expense of social equity and the human andnatural environment, our precious national and global public goods, and at the expense of diversity
in culture, institutions and life styles, the source and symbol of our human richness and civilisation.
We must now raise our global banner high and high enough, before it is too late to set ourirreversible common goal at enhancing National Human Security in each and every country, while
simultaneously at enhancing Global Human Security at the international level. This requires eachand every country and the international organisations including the United Nations to pursue in an
integrated manner economic, employment and income security (development), political, social andcultural security (democracy), personal, family and national security (peace) and ecologicalsecurity (environment), within each country, sub-national region and local community as well as at
the regional and global levels．
Under these circumstances, we should consider all major issues in developing countries not as
1

Professor, Emeritus of Seikei Univeristy; Visiting Professor, National Graduate Institute for

Policy Studies.

138

The UN and East Asian Community

those happening on the other side of the river that have nothing to do with us in industrial countries,
but as those happening on this side of the river that affect all the people in the global community.
We should also call for the redefinition and recasting of national development in the broader
context of global economic, political, socio-cultural and ecological realities and should target our
national and international efforts on political, economic, social and environmental capacity
building, including the development of not only economically productive facilities, but also viable
political and social institutions and cultural assets and traditions conducive to sustainable humandevelopment and human security in the respective societies.
In spite of a declining incidence of poverty, there still remains a high level of poverty
particularly in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, one of the major factors contributing to social
instability, political conflicts and confrontation, internal displacement, cross-border refugees andenvironmental deterioration. High and rising levels of unemployment and underemployment are
being observed both in developed and developing countries today, though with large differencesamong them. The East Asian economic crisis of 1997-98 and the current financial and economiccrisis of 2007-09 have forced corporate and government restructuring, hitting hard, in particular,
the weaker segments of the population such as children, women, unskilled and even semiskilledworkers.
In spite of vast improvements in human development, much needs to be done in all social sectors,
such as longevity, mortality rates, primary healthcare, sanitation, literacy and basic education. The
political and economic participation of women is also still lagging behind in many countries, andsocial investment as a percentage of total public expenditures has been either unchanged or
declining during the last decade or so. Conversely, defence expenditures have been rising in termsof absolute amounts in many countries, and in some cases even as a percentage of their public
expenditures.
There has also been a rapid pace of urbanisation, contributing to urban slums, traffic congestionand social crimes. With industrialisation, urbanisation and rising income, dramatic increases have139

Ryokichi Hirono

been observed in the consumption of electricity, commercial energy, petrochemicals, lumber andpaper products, and hazardous products, contributing to the deterioration of the naturalenvironment, as represented by a faster rise of CO2, SOx and NOx emissions into the atmosphere,
water, soil and marine pollution, loss of biodiversity, ozone layer destruction, acid rain deposition,
as well as rapid increases in household wastes, particularly in metropolitan areas.
Conflicts are spreading the world over, particularly in the Middle East. Millions of women andchildren, the major victims, would have been left unfed, unclothed, unhoused and unschooled, had
it not been for international humanitarian and development assistance. There is a dire need forreorienting our official development cooperation in the 21 st Century, facilitating the mindset of all
peoples in both industrial and developing economies (including transition countries) that the
problems of human insecurity, including among others poverty, conflicts, health hazards,
environment and social exclusion are global issues to be dealt with by all development actors,
peoples, NGOs, private sector corporations, local and central governments, and internationalorganizations in our ever smaller global village under full partnership, and not just by ―donor andrecipient‖ governments alone, and not just by people and governments in developing countries
alone.
It is against these backgrounds that many national and international NGOs, as well as a large
number of national governments, have appealed to the heads of state in East Asia at its ASEAN
Plus Three and East Asia Summit meetings in the past to enshrine key messages of the Earth
Charter, i.e., a critical need for international commitment to poverty reduction, human rights
protection, the maintenance of world peace without nuclear weapons, and the protection of the
global environment. Our efforts for building an East Asian Community within a decade or two, if
possible by 2020, five years after the official establishment of the ASEAN Economic, Social andSecurity Communities, which the East Asian Community Association of Japan, composed ofgovernment, private sector, academia and NGOs, would like to see happen. The Association has
dedicated itself to spreading these urgent messages around the world. We are urging all countries to140

The UN and East Asian Community

give top priority once again to the eradication of poverty, reduction of income disparity between
urban and rural areas, arresting the violation of human rights, the spreading of democratic
governance, building a world without nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, andpreventing the adverse impact of climate change on the natural and human environment.
The commitment of the international community to achieving the Millennium Development
Goals adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in the fall of 2000 must be fulfilled by
2015, if not before. The 15th Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change is on our doorstep, starting on 7 th December, and yet the international
community has not come to agreement on the post-Kyoto international arrangement to deal withclimate change beyond 2012. It is Mr Hatoyama, the Prime Minister of Japan, who has put thebuilding of an East Asian Community at the top of the international political agenda of Japan under
his administration, and who has officially proposed to the international community of bothdeveloped and developing countries to work together to prevent the further advance of global
warming and reduce worldwide greenhouse gas emissions by 25% by 2020 and by 50% by 2050,
while requesting industrial countries to do their best to reduce GHG emissions by 80% by 2050.
In this connection, I have had the honour and privilege to assist in the production of, and act onstage for, an Environmental Musical entitled Our Blue Planet, Will it Survive till Tomorrow? which
is set in 2100 when mankind and the Earth are facing a critical moment of self-destruction, and is
warning our present generations to do everything we can to prevent such natural and humandisasters. If all the countries should take united and bold actions now and rapidly deal with climatechange, there is no doubt that mankind will be able to survive, and so Our Blue Planet.

Let thepeoples of the United Nations be united to create a dynamic world without poverty and humanrights violations, promote democratic governance, build a world without nuclear and otherweapons of mass destruction, as proposed by President Obama of the United States and as agreed
upon by the United Nations Security Council in September 2009.

141

Ryokichi Hirono

IS EAST ASIA’S RAPID ECONOMICGROWTH SUSTAINABLE UNDERGLOBALISATION ：THE ROLE OF EASTASIAN COMMUNITY ?

YES, For the time being, but DIFFICULT to IMPOSSIBLE
in the long‐term future, unless All Stakeholders
including national governments in the region andinternational community take prompt actions to deal
with the creeping time bombs in the economic, social,environmental and security arenas, and unless willingto accelerate closer cooperation and integration in
Asia such as building of the East Asian Community,
patterned after ASEAN Economic, Social and Security
Communities to be established in 2015 !

RYOKICHI HIRONO
Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
At 9th ROK‐Japan UNSA’s Dialogue
at Waseda University
12 December, 2009

1

2

CONTENTS
１．INTRODUCTION
2. REMARKABLE ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS IN EAST ASIANCOUNTRIES DURING THE PAST FEW DECADES
3. EMERGING THREATS TO SUSTAINABILITY
１）ECONOMIC SCENE
２）SOCIAL SCENE、AND
３）ENVIRONMENTAL SCENE
4) SECUIRTY SCENE
4． SOME SUGGESTIONS ON NATIONAL POLICIES TO DEAL WITH
THESE THREATS TO SUSTAINABILITY IN THE MIDST OF THE
CURRENT INTERNATIONALFINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS. AND
5. PROMOTING REGIONAL COOPERATION IN PURSUITOF SUSTAINABLE EAST ASIA IN FAVOUR OF BAN EVENTUALESTGBLISHMENT OF AN EAST ASIAN COMMUNITY

1.
INTRODUCTION

3

4

2. Historical Background:
As presented by Prof. Wongi Choe, IFANS and discussed by Prof.
Takashi Terada, IAS, Waseda University, Tokyo as well as by manyscholars in ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, ROK and U.S.A, too
numerous to mention;
３． Building Process;1) Need for generating a deeper sense of community amongpeople in those core countries in East Asia and for early
announcements by national governments of their politicalcommitment to establishing an East Asian Community (EAC) at
the earliest possible time, as discussed by Mr. Tadashi Yamamoto,Japan Center for International Exchange (JCIE) et al under Asia‐
Pacific Agenda Project In 1995‐2000;
2) A functional approach to building EAC: open to thosecountries willing and ready to accelerate closer cooperation andintegration in various functional areas such as trade, investment,
finance, environment, social welfare, culture and security, as
discussed by Prof. Ryokichi Hirono, Seikei

1A. Shaping an East Asian Community by 2025, if
not Earlier
1. Objectives:
To accelerate the on‐going process of economic
cooperation and integration through market forces
and social, environmental and security cooperation
through institutional actors such as academic bodies
bodies,NGOs, private sectors, governments and internationalorganisations with a view to staying competitive withthe rest of the world, enhancing the wellbeing of thepeople in the region and maintaining peace andsecurity of the region, thus contributing to peace andsustainable development of the world.
5

6

142

The UN and East Asian Community

University on JIIA/ISEAS’s ASEAN‐ Japan Joint Research Project
during the years 1981‐86 and by the Network of East Asian Think
Tanks (NEAT), by Prof. Kenichi Ito et al, Japan Association for East
Asian Community (JAEAC) during the past nine years and by
ASEAN Economic Research Institute (AERI) during the last two
years;
3) An open‐ended, step‐by‐step approach to EAC building: open
to those countries willing and ready to take functional approachto building EAC, as discussed by Prof. Ippei Yamazawa et al on
PECC Research Project on Regional Economic Integration Project
during the 1990s;
4) A small secretariat within ASEAN at the outset, if need be, tomonitor the progress being made toward EAC and expand it asnecessary, as discussed by Dato Seri. Mohamed Jawhar Hassan,
Malaysian Institute for Strategic and International Studies (MISIS)on its Roadmap for EAC;
4. Different Roles now perceived by Key Players: China and Japan, as
discussed by Prof. Satoshi Amako and Prof. Christian Wirth ,GIARI, Waseda University, and ROK and U.S.A. by Prof. Choe andProf. Jesus P. Estanislao, Institute for Corporate Directors (ICD),
7
Philippines.

2．
REMARKABLE ECONOMIC
ACHIEVEMENTS IN EAST ASIANCOUNTRIES：Changing Positions of
EA in the Global Economy and its
Unchanging Diversity

2A Remarkable Economic Achievements of East
Asia, 1960‐2009

2B Country and Regional
Shares of the World GDP,
1950‐20078.

1960‐70 70‐80
80‐90
90‐00 2000‐07 08 09
Dvlping 5.2
5.8 3.4
3.6
6.2
5.8 2.1
EAP
6.2
7.2
8.0
7.2
8.9
8.0 5.3
China 3.7
5.5 9.5
10.3
9.8
9.0 6.5
SA
4.7
3.0 5.6
5.6
7.3
5.6 3.7
I di 4
India
4.6
6
27
2.7
5
5.4
4
6.0
60
7.4
74 5
5.5
5 4.0
40
Japan
8.9
6.8 4.1
1.3
1.7 ‐0.7 ‐5.3
USA
2.2
2.5 3.2
3.4
2.7 1.1 ‐2.4UK*
2.7
2.3 2.7
2.5
2.6 0.7 ‐2.7
Germany*6.6
2.2 2.2
1.5
1.5 0.7 ‐2.7
World
4.9
3.4 3.2
2.6
3.2 1.9 ‐1.7

1950
1960
1970 1980
1990
2000
2007
Dvlping14.0
16.0
16.3
18.0
20.1
21.0
26.0
EAP
4.0
4.2
5.1
6.2
4.4
6.6
8.2
China 1.3
1.9
3.3
2.5
1.7
3.4
6.0
SA
1.8
1.9
2.6
1.9
2.0
2.0
2.6
India 1.2
1.3
1.9
1.4
1.0
1.5
2.2
Japan
1.2
1.7
7.3
9.9
15.5
14.9
8.1
France 3.4
2.4
5.1
5.6
5.5
4.1
4.7
Germany3.5
2.9
6.6
7.1
7.3
6.0
6.1
UK
3.6
2.9
3.8
4.4
4.1
4.5
5.0
USA 43.7
41.5
36.2
24.7
25.9 31.5
25.4
ROW 30.6 32.6
24.7
30.3
21.6 18.0
24.7
World＊1,100 2,472 7,328 10,674 19,328 31,337 54,347

Sources: World Bank, WDR 1972, 1982, 1992, 2002 & 2009 and Global Economic
Prospects 2009 Update；UNCTAD, TDR 2007; PECC, State of the Region 2007‐2008;
Note: Figures for U.K. and Germany in 2008 and 2009 are for the Euro Area
9
average.

Source: World Bank, ibid;
Note:＊ US$ Billion.
10

2C Varied Growth Experiencesin East Asia, 1965‐2008
1965‐80

70‐80

Cambodia
n.a.
China
4.2
Indonesia
8.0Lao, PDRn.a.
n.a.
Malaysia7.3
7.9
Philippines
5.9
ROK
7.5
Singapore
10.1
Thailand 7.2
7.1
Vietnamn.a.
n.a.
India

n.a.
5.5
7.2
3.7
5.3
6.0
9.6
8.3
7.6
4.6
3.4

80‐90 90‐2000 2000‐07

n.a.
9.5
6.1
6.5
7.0
1.0
9.9
6.7
4.2
7.9
5.4

4.6
10.3
4.2
6.6
5.1
5.
3.2
5.7
7.8
5.4
7.8
6.0

06

2D Benefits of Economic
Growth, 1975‐2007

08*

EAP
SA
SSA
1975
2007
1975
2007
1975
2007
Per Capita GDP(US$)
224
2,180 214
880
205
952
GCF (%GDP)
n.a.
38.0
n.a.
35.0
n.a.
21.0
China, India & South Africa 35.0* 44.0
17.0* 38.0
14.0* 20.0
FER (% Imports)**
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
China, India & SA
1.24
1.52 1.58
1.02
1.30 n.a.
U5 Child Mortality***
56
29
123
83
184
157
Life Expectancy
60.5
70.4
50.1
63.2
45.8
49.1
P Completion Rate***
101
98
62
80
51
60
Adult Literacy Rate+
64.7
90.7
49.1
60.9
34.4
59.3
Access to DRWater++
72
79
72
85
48
56
Access to Internet+++ins. 106
0
29
ins.
26

9.8
6.1 6.7 n.a.
9.8
8.4 6.7 (10.0)
5.1
6.2 5.1 ( 6.2)
7.5 6.8 n.a.
5.9 4.3 ( 5.6)
5.1
5.2 3.6 ( 4.5)
4.7
4.9 2.9 ( 4.6)
5.8
6.0 ‐0.5 n.a.
5.7 2.0 ( 5.0)
8.0 6.5 ( 6.5)
7.8
9.7 5.8 ( 7.4)

Sources: World Bank, WDR 1982, 1992, 2002, 2009 and Global Economic Prospects 2009
Update, ADB, Asian Development Outlook 2009 Update and ESCAP, Economic Social
Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2006.
Note: * Figures in parentheses are estimates made by ADB in Asian Development Outlook
2008 Update.

Sources: World Bank, WDR 1977 & 2009；UNDP, HDR 2000 & 2007/8．
Notes: * for 1970; ** for 2005 & 2007; *** for 1990 & 2006; + for 1975 & 2005, ++for1990 & 2004; +++ Per 1,000.

11

143

12

Ryokichi Hirono

2E Benefits of Economic Growth in East
Asia, 1970‐2007
Indonesia
1970
2007

Per Capita GDP(US$)
80
GCF (%GDP)
16
Industry(% of GDP)
19
ManufExp(%f p( off MExports)2p)
FER (% Imports)* 3.3
8.88
U5 Child Mortality**
104
Life Expectancy ***49.2
Adult Literacy Rate+
74.7
Access to DRWater++
72
Access to Internet++
0

1,650
25
47
45
1.24
34
68.6
90
77
73

China Singapore
1970
2007
1970

130
28
38
70
1.52
120
63.2
71.9
70
0

2,180
44
48
92
5.4
24
72.0
91
77
85

3.
POSSIBLE THREATS TOSUSTAINABILITY IN EAST ASIA：
What, When and How have they
happened ?

2007

950 32,470
39
23
30
31
30
80
7.44
27
3
69.5
78.8
85.6
93
100
100
0
571

Sources: World Bank, WDR 1972 & 2009；UNDP, HDR 2000 & 2007/8．
Notes: * Figures for 1970 are for 1991; ** Figures for 2007 are for 2006; +++ Figures for1970 are for 1970‐75 and for 2007 are for 2000‐05; + Figures for 1970 are for 1985 andfor 2007 are for 2005;
13

14

3A2 Possible Threats
to Economic Sustainability

3A1 Perceived Risks to Economic Growthin East Asia
Low

Moderate

Serious

Very Seriousa) High Dependence on Export‐led Industrialization,

High energy prices
12 (12) 28 (24)42 (38) 18 (22)
Water pollution & shortage
28 (17) 35 (27)30 (37)6 (15)
Global warming
35 (22) 29 (25)
26 (28) 10 (22)Failure of the Doha Round 28 (22) 33 (35)
24 (25) 12 (13)Protectionism
26 (24) 38 (31)29 (34)6 ( 8)
Terrorists
21 (27) 33 (31)
26 (26)8 (11)
Sh
Sharp
declined li iin asset marketsk
31 (22) 37 (39)
23 (24)6 ( 8)Natural disaster34 (30) 34 (32)
24 (24)5 ( 9)
Current account imbalance 30 (22) 38 (40)
21 (22)6 ( 7)
Avian flu and other pandemics
33 (30) 32 (27)
17 (20)6 ( 7)
Proliferation of preferential TAs
40 (22) 36 (39)
18 (20)4 ( 5)
Source: PECC, State of the Region, 2007‐08, Table 2, pp.45‐46.
Notes: Respondents to the above survey taken in 2007 were: 107 businessmen, 68
government officials, 166 academics and researchers, 14 media persons, 5civil society representatives and 22 others. Of these 382 respondents, 228 arefrom Asia.
Figures are for the next 1‐2 years, whereas those in brackets for 3‐5 years or
longer.
15

resulting in Adverse Impact immediately from Recessionary
Trend Overseas,b) Continuing High Dependence on Extra‐Regional Tradein the Age of Regional Free Trade and Cooperation Regimes inNorth America & Europe, in spite of a growing intra‐ASEAN andintra‐East Asian trade,c) High Dependence on Short‐ and Medium‐term Foreign
Capital Inflow, increasing volatility of East Asian Financial
Markets, and High Mobility of MNC Investment in the
Globalised Market,d) Increased Involvement of Individual and Institutional
Investors in the Region, such as
16

3A3 Risks of Export‐led
Industrialisation, 1970‐2007

pension funds, insurance companies, financial conglomerates
and sovereign wealth funds of East Asia in high‐risk investment
trust, commodity index funds, private equity and hedge funds
at home and overseas, as well as increased involvement ofbanking and non‐bank financial institutions in investmentbanking activities through merger and acquisition (M&A), initialpublic offer (IPO), and securitisation of bank lending in particularfor housing markets,e) Inability of National Financial Regulators and International
Financial Architecture to monitor and supervise the exposure ofindividual and corporate investors to growing and high risks in
the globalised financial market,f) High Dependence on Natural Resources and in Particular on
Energy Resources whose prices are extremely volatile, as shownin recent years, causing a varied degree of inflationary pressures.

Export（A）
A/GDP(%) Manufactures/A(%)
2007($M)% 1990 2007
1970 1990 2006
World
13,899,267 100 19 26
63 74 74
High‐income 9,752,088 70 17 21
33 81 77
Developing 4,149,329 30 25 44
24 48 60
EAP
1,783,695 13 34 66
32 72 80SA
184,991
1 10
23
47 72 72
CEE&CA 874,122
6 29 45
n.a. n.a. 39
MENA
297,678
2 38
54
7 10 19SSA
361,373 3 27
33
8
8 33
LAC
750,092
5 17
26
9 34 53
Sources: World Bank, WDR 1992 & 2009; UNDP, HDR 1992&2007/8.

17

18

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The UN and East Asian Community

3A5 Risks of Extra‐Regional Trade Dependence in
East Asia, 1980‐2007

3A4 Risks of Export‐led
Industrialisation, 1970‐2007
Export（A）
2007($M)%
Cambodia
3,750
0.2
China
1,217,939
68.3
Indonesia 118,163
6.6
Lao PDR 980
0.05
12
Malaysia
176,211
9.9
Philippines 50,276
2.8
ROK371,554
20.8
Singapore 299,271
16.8
Thailand
152,469
8.5
Vietnam
48,3872.7

A/GDP(%)
1990
2007
6
65
19
37
25
34
27
n.a.
75
123
28
47
28
42
n.a.
243
34
74
36
70

Manufactures/A(%)
1970 1990 2006
n.a.
n.a.
97
51
72
92
1
35
47
n.a.
n.a.
8
54
75
8
71
89
76
94
91
31
72
81
8
63
73
n.a.
n.a.
53

EAP
India

34

33

1,783,695

100

66

72

ASEAN Exports to: 1980 1990
2000
2007
ASEAN 17.3
19.0
23.0
24.9
Japan/China/ROK29.5/1.0/1.5 18.9/1.8/3.3
13.5/3.8/3.7 10.0/10.5/3.7
USA
16.3
19.4
19.0
12.3
EU
12.5
15.6
14.5
12.4
Others
21.9
22.0
22.6
26.2
China Exports to:
ASEAN 6.6
6.6
7.0
7.7
Japan/ROK
22.2/n.a.
14.6/0.716.7/4.5
8.4/4.6
Indonesian Exports to:
ASEAN 12.6
10.0
17.5
19.4
Japan/China/ROK49.3/n.a./1.3
42.5/3.2/5.3
23.2/4.5/7.0 18.5/8.6/6.8
Singapore
ASEAN 23.0
10.0
27.4
31.8
Japan/China/ROK8.1/1.6/1.5
8.8/1.5/2.2
7.5/3.9/3.6 4.8/9.7/3.5
Source: ASEAN‐Japan Centre, ASEAN‐Japan Statistical Pocketbook 2008.

80

145,228
78.5*
9
12
52
73
70
Sources: World Bank, WDR 1992 & 2009; UNDP, HDR 1992&2007/8; ESCAP, Economic andSocial Survey of Asia and the Pacific, 1991.
Note: * as percent of South Asian exports.
19

20

3A6 Risks of Foreign Direct
Investment Dependence in East
Asia, 1990‐2005 (% of GDP)
EAP

1990
Net FDI inflows 2.5

Cambodia
China
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia

1990
n.a.
1.0
1.0
0.7
5.3

SA

Assets Liabilities
Net
China 218.2
253.1
‐34.9
India
139.6
41.3
98.3
Indonesia
49 5
49.5
12 5
12.5
37 0
37.0
Malaysia
60.0
41.2
18.8
ROK
245.3
77.9
167.4
Taiwan
74.5
146.8
‐72.3
Brazil
167.4
61.2
106.2
Mexico
102.3
81.9
20.4
Source; Bank for International Settlements, website

SSA

2005 1990 2005
5.4
0.3 0.8

1990 2005
0.4
2.4

2005
6.1
3.5
1.8
1.0
3.0

1990
1.2
0.3
15.1
2.9
2.8

Philippines
ROK
Singapore
Thailand
Vietnam

3A7 Financial Assets and Liabilities in East Asiaof BIS Reporting Banks, End March, 2008 (InUS$ Billion)

2005
1.1
0.6
17.2
2.6
3.7

Sources: UNDP, HDR 2007/08
21

3A8 Distribution of Claims
in Different Regions among Major Banks by
Nationality, End 2007
Asia/Pacific Africa/ME Europe

LACs

3A9 Impact of U.S. Sub‐Prime Mortgage Crisis on
Asian Economies*
2007 2008
Asian NIEs
Hong Kong
ROK
Singapore
TaiwanASEAN 4 6.0
60
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam
China
India

Total Claims

France 8.3
18.6
10.3
4.2
9.4
Germany
8.3
11.7
15.2
3.9
U.K.
23.6
36.7
3.4
10.4
Europe
59.8
85.5
93.8
71.9
U.S.A
18.2
7.2
4.0
18.6
Japan
10.0
4.0
1.6
2.4
Others 12.0
3.3
0.5
7.1
5.8
Total Claim* 1,278.0 513.7 1,513.8 891.0 4,196.5

22

10.3
15.1
77.8
11.8
4.6

Source; BIS, International Consolidated Banking Statistics 2008.
Note: * US $Billion.

5.5
6.3
4.9
7.7
5.7
52
5.2
6.3
6.3
7.3
4.8
8.5
11.4
8.7

2009
A
n.a.
n.a.
2.5
‐3.0
2.5
‐3.8
1.2
‐4.2
0.1
‐5.0
38
3.8
53
5.3
6.1
3.8
4.6
‐1.5
4.6
2.0
2.6
0.5
6.2
5.1
9.0
7.5
6.5
5.2

2009+
B
C
5.0
3.8
4.8
4.4
5.0
3.8
5.2
4.5
4.9
3.1
48
4.8
40
4.0
5.5
5.2
5.2
4.2
5.6
4.8
5.0
4.4
n.a.
n.a.
8.7
8.5
9.1
8.4

2010**
2.1
3.7
2.4
2.3
0.4
44
4.4
4.9
3.3
3.6
3.3
n.a.
7.9
7.4

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
5.4
1.6
3.1
1.7
7.5
7.5
7.0

Sources: + NRI, Nomura Fund 21, Table 5, p.7; Asia Monthly, vol.9, no.97, 1/4/09.
Note: * Annual average growth rate of GDP; A growth scenario, B mild recession
scenario; and C deep recession scenario, as estimated by NRI in 6/2008; **‐World
Bank, GEP Update, 2/2009.

23

145

24

Ryokichi Hirono

3A11 Energy Consumption by Country, 1960‐
2030

3A10 Share Market Price Fluctuations inEast Asia, 2007‐9/2009*
Country
10/2007 1/2008
5/2008 10/2008 2/2009
9/2009China
6,252 4,600
3,603
1,816
2,187
2,917
Hong Kong 31,353 23,456 24,533
13,96912,812 20,955
India
19,838 17,649 16,416
9,788
8,892 17,127
Indonesia
2,643
2,627
2,444
1,257
1,285
2,468
Malaysia
1,414
1,393
1,276
864
891
1,202
Philippines
3,759
3,266
2,827
1,951
1,872
2,801
ROK
2,065
1,625
1,852
1,113
1,063
1,673
Singapore
3,806
2,982
3,193
1,794
1,595
2,673
Taiwan
9,711
7,521
8,619
4,871
4,557
7,509
Thailand 907
784
834
417
432
717

160
140

ＢＴＵ（１０００Trillion）

120
USA
Canada

100
80

Japan

EU
RussiaChina
イIndia60
40
20

Source: Asia Monthly, vol.9, no. 97, 1/4/2009 & 01/11/2009.
Note: * ‐ Share price transacted at the end of the month.

01990 2002 2003 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
出所：米国エネルギー情報局（２００７）を基にIGES 作成

25

26

3A12 Energy Consumptionin Asian Countries, 1990‐2015
EnergyResources

Annual average rates of increase
1990‐2005
2005‐2015
World
Asia
World

Asia

3A13 Shares in Total Energy Demand,
1970‐2030 (% of Total)

2015‐30
World

1970

Total
1.7 (1.8) 4.2
2.1 (2.3) 3.2
(1.4)
Coal
1.3 (1.8) 4.1
2.0 (3.3) 2.8
(1.5)
Oil
0.8 (1.5) 3.3
1.9 (1.7) 3.1(1.1)
N. Gas2.7 (2.3) 7.9
2.6 (2.6) 4.7(1.7)
Nuclear
6.6 (2.1) 8.6
0.7 (1.1) 3.2
(0.4)
Hydro
2.1 (2.1) 3.3
2.1 (2.7) 4.4(1.6)
Biomass, waste 6.6 (1.6) 9.4
5.2 (1.5) 6.2(1.3)
Other renewables2.9 (3.8)
19.8
2.4 (9.0) 7.0
(5.2)
Mtoe
6,481
1,054
13,593
4,570
n.a.
Sources: IEA, Energy Balances 2000; Japan Energy Research Institute, Asia/World Energy
Outlook, 2004; and World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009.
Note: Figures in parentheses are the estimates made in OECD/IEA, 2008, Energy
Technology Perspectives: Scenarios & Strategies to 2050, Paris, while those without are
the estimates made by JERI.

1990

2005

2015

2030

Coal
26.0
25.3
Oil 44.0
36.7
Gas
16.0
19.1
Nuclear 1.0
6.0
Hydro
2.0
2.1
Biomass, waste 11.0 10.3
Other renewables n.a. 0.4
Source: IEA, ibid.

25.3
35.0
20.6
6.3
2.2
10.1
0.5

27.8
32.9
21.2
5.6
2.3
9.3
1.0

28.2
31.5
22.3
4.8
2.3
9.1
1.7

27

28

3B1 Possible Threats toSocial Sustainability

3A14 Regional & Country Sharesof Oil Consumption, 2010‐30
Country & Region
1973 2010
North America
29.5
Australia/New Zealand
9.4
Western Europe
60.6* 17.1
Transition Economies 12.5
6.6
Russia33
3.3
Developing Countries 22.8 38.4
42.8
China
7.9
9.8
11.1
India
n.a.
3.7
Other Asian Countries 6.5 +7.8
LACs
3.7
6.1
MENA
0.9
7.4
SSA
3.8
3.7
Source: IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2005 & 2008.
Notes: * ‐ OECD countries; + ‐ Including India.

2020
27.9
8.4
15.4
5.6
33
3.3

2030
26.6
7.7
14.2
5.6
32
3.2

a) Widening Income, Employment and Social Service
Disparities between Urban and Rural Population,
giving rise to and precipitating Protest, if not Riots,
among the Disadvantaged, andb) Social and Cultural Globalization accelerated by the
Rapid Pace of Economic Globalization, raising Concern
with the Loss of Local and National Culture, Identity
and Ethos, and rekindling a Sense of Communalism
and Nationalism once Strong in the Early Post‐
Independence Days.

45.9
11.7
4.2
8.6
6.4
4.4
8.1

4.6
9.3
6.7
5.1
8.5
29

30

146

The UN and East Asian Community

3B3 Income Inequality in East
1990s & 2000s

3B2 Poverty in Developing Countries by Region,
1990‐2015
1990

EAP
CEE&CA
LACs
MENA
SA
SSA
Developing Cs

2005

2015

A

B

A

B

A

B

54.7
2.0
11.3
4.3
51.7
57.6
41.7

79.8
6.9
19.7
19.7
81.7
76.2
63.2

16.8
3.7
8.2
3.6
40.3
50.9
25.2

38.7 6.8 21.6
8.9 2.2 6.0
16.6 5.0 11.8
16.9 2.5 9.3
73.9 23.8 56.6
73.0 37.1 60.8
47.0 15.5 34.6

Note： A－Percent of population earning $1.25/day & below； BーPopulation
earning $2.00/day & below
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009

China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
ROK
Singapore
Thailand
India

4.8
2.0
6.4
20
2.0
2.8
2.5
2.1
2.3
6.4

5.9
4.3
9.8
54
5.4
9.3
4.7
6.5
5.4
9.8

1/2009

1.0
3.1
9.2
39
3.9
7.1
3.7
3.0
‐0.4
10.4

2/20095/2009

‐1.6
0.8
8.6
37
3.7
7.3
4.1
1.8
‐0.1
n.a.

‐1.4‐1.2
0.0 ‐1.6
6.0 2.8
2.4
2 4 ‐22.4
4
3.3 0.1
2.7 2.2‐0.3 ‐0.3‐3.3 ‐1.0
8.6
11.7

Richest 10%
1990s
2002s

Gini index
1990s
2000s

33.8 34.8
34.9 40.3
26.7 28.5
30.6 28.5
38.4 38.4
24.5 24.6
36.6 34.2
24.3 22.5
n.a. 32.8
32.4 33.4
29.9 28.8
33.5 31.1

40.4
45.9
31.7
37.0
49.2
33.2
46.2
31.6
n.a.
41.4
36.1
37.8

41.7
34.3
34.6
49.2
32.8
44.5
31.6
42.5
42.0
34.4
35.8
32

3B5 Poverty and Income Gap Ratios in Urban and
Rural Areas, 2005

3B4 Consumer Price Indices in East Asia,
2007‐9/2009
2008

Poorest 10%
1990s
2000s

Cambodia
2.9 2.9
China 2.4 1.6
30.4
Indonesia
4.0 3.6
Lao PDR
3.2 3.4
Malaysia
1.7 1.7
Mongolia
2.9 3.0
Philippines 2.3 2.2
ROK
2.9 2.9
Singaporen.a. 1.9
Thailand2.8 2.7
Vietnam
3.6 4.2India
3.5 3.6
Source: UNDP, HDR 2002 & 2007/08.

31

2007

Asia,

The Absolute Poor*
as % of Population

8/2009EAP
13.2 (31.9)
CEE&CA
2.5 ( 8.2)
LACs
3.7 (18.6)
MENA
2 7 (152.7(15.4)
4)SA
32.3 (43.3)
SSA
34.1 (54.9)
Developing Cs 15.3 (37.1)

Income Gap Ratios
as % below Poverty Line*

20.3 (23.2)
8.7 ( 6.6)
37.6 (43.9)
17 8 (2217.8(22.9)
9)25.0 (24.0)
38.1 (41.5)
27.1 (28.2)

Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009.
Notes: Figures in Parenthesis are those for rural area, while those without are forurban area.
* ‐ Poverty line is set at 1.25 international dollars a day per capita

Source: Asia Monthly, Vol.9, No. 98, 1 May, 2009 & No.104, 1
November, 2009.
33

34

3B7 Another Source of Social Instability
around the World, 2006

3B6 Sources of Social Instability
under Globalization, 1975‐2005
Cambodia
China
India
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Philippines
ROK
Singapore
Thailand
VietnamA
B+
C
1975 2005 1975 2005 1975 2005
77.7
41.7
52.6 34.9 40.3 46.9 20.4 41.9
86.2 80.4 37.8 36.8 21.2 29.9
52.4
34.3
48.1
74 1
74.1
34 6
34.6
20 6
20.6
9.3
39.2
67.3
43.0
44.5
62.7
<2.0
31.6
80.8
n.a.
42.5
100.0
25.2
42.0
32.3
n.a.
34.4
26.4

D
1975 2005
0.2 0.2
n.a. 0.7
0.1
01
0.1
0.5
<0.1
<0.1
0.3
1.4
0.5

Source: World Bank and UNDP, ibid.
Notes: A stands for Poverty (below $2/day), B for Gini Index, C for Urbanisation, and D for HIV/AIDS ; ** Figures are for 1983‐2000 and 1990‐2005; + Figures are for 1998 and 2004 for China, 1997 and2004‐05 for India; and ** Figures for 1975 and 2004.
35

36

147

Ryokichi Hirono

3B8 Governance in East Asian and OECD
Regions, 2007

3B9 Governance in
Other Developing Regions, 2007

Percentile Rank Governance Score(0‐100)(‐2.5 to +2.5)

East Asia and the Pacific
Voice and Accountability
49.4
Political Stability
59.7
Government Effectiveness48.1
Regulatory Quality
45.2
‐0.18
R l off Law
Rule
L
54 9
54.9
Control of Corruption
45.2
ＯＥＣＤ
Voice and Accountability
91.4
Political Stability
81.4
Government Effectiveness88.7
Regulatory Quality
91.1
Rule of Law
90.3
Control of Corruption
90.5
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators, 2007.

Percentile Rank Governance Score(0‐100)(‐2.5 to +2.5)

South Asia
Voice and Accountability
Political Stability
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption

‐0.03
+0.34
‐0.09
+0.15
0 15
‐0.19

Sub‐Saharan Africa
Voice and Accountability
Political Stability
Government Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality
Rule of Law
Control of Corruption

+1.31
+0.96
+1.51
+1.48
+1.51
+1.72

28.0
19.3
36.5
31.9

‐0.69
‐1.32
‐0.50
‐0.61

38.3

‐0.46

33.9

‐0.56

33.2
34.2
26.8
27.8
28.3
30.7

‐0.55
‐0.53
‐0.77
‐0.74
‐0.75
‐0.64

Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators, 2007.
37

38

3B11 Confidence of Asian People
in Governance Institutions, 2004

3B10 Governance in East AsianCountries, 2006

China
Hong Kong
Mongolia
Philippines
ROK
Taiwan 58
ThailandEast Asia
Japan
Africa
LACs

Source: IDEA(2005), Ten Years of Supporting Democracy Worldwide, Table 5.1, pp.
63‐64.

39

b)
c)
d)
e)

f)

40

3C2 Environmental Deterioration under
Globalization,1995 &2025

3C1 On‐going and Possible Threats
to Environmental Sustainabilitya)Army Police Courts Parliament Party Median
95
77
72
86
94
85
６３
n.a. 69
52
22
52
67
48
47
61
42
53
54
47
50
44
35
46
59
50
51
15
15
38
45
41
20
16
36
76
55
60
54
47
58
65
53
56
43
35
50
48
48
61
13
9
36
53
45
47
42
46
47
26
29
20
16
11
21

A Steady Population Increase and Growing Urbanization in
Developing Countries,
Rapid Economic Growth, Export‐led and Resources‐intensive
Industrialization,
Mass Production Economy in Acquisitive Societies, leading to
Mass Consumption/Wastes,
Consumption/Wastes
Competition among Business Enterprises on the Global Market,
resulting in the Transfer of Environmentally Unfriendly
Technologies,
A High Incidence of Poverty in Rural Areas, resulting in
Deforestation and Rural‐Urban Migration which in turnleading to Increased Urban Unemployment and Slum Dwelling,andClimate Change,

1995(A)2025(B)
B/A
Water consumption
Household Use（Billion ｍ３）
354
645
1.8
Asia
160
343
2.1
Industrial Use
714
1,105
1.5
Asia
184
409
2.2
Irrigation
2,504
3,162
1.3
Asia
1,741
2,245
1.3
Deforestation, 1990‐2005
World Dvlped Dvlping EAP
SA SSA LACs
1000 km2‐1,25368 ‐1,382 ‐76
13 ‐550 ‐686
Change (％)‐0.2
0.1 ‐0.4‐0.1
0.1 ‐0.6‐0.5
CO2 Emission（Million mt.）
1990
11,205 6,831 3,414
991 455 1,088
2004
13,319 12,303 6,682 1,955 663 1,423% of World Total（%）
1990
49.4
30.1
15.0
4.4
2.0 4.8
2004
46.0
42.5
23.1
6.7
2.3 4.9
CO2 Emission per GDP (kt. per million 2000PPPUS$)
1990
0.54 0.64
0.90 0.49
1.0
2.5
2004
11.5
2.4
3.5
1.3
0.57 0.36
Sources: MCLT, Water Resources of Japan, 2004 Edition; and UNDP, HDR 2007/08.

41

148

42

The UN and East Asian Community

3C3

Environmental Deterioration
under Globalization,1993‐2010

3C4 Population Expansion, 1950‐2050

Hazardous wastes*
1993
2000
2010
China
50,000130,000
250,000
India
39,00082,000156,000
Indonesia
5,000
12,00023,000
Malaysia
377
400
1,750
Desertification+ Overgrazing Deforestation Agriculture
Mining Industry
Ai
Asia
197 3
197.3
297 8
297.8
204 3
204.3
46 1
46.1
14
1.4
Africa
243.1
66.8
121.4
62.7
0.2
LACs
67.9
100.0
63.5
12.0
0.0
Europe
50.0
83.8
63.9
0.5
20.6
NA
37.9
17.9
90.5
11.5
0.4
Oceania
82.5
12.3
8,0
0.1
0.0
All
678.7
578.6
551.6
132.8
22.7
Sources: UNESCAP, State of the Environment in Asia and the Pacific, 2000; Secretariat of the Base
Convention, The Country Facts Sheets; MOE, White Paper on Recycling Society 2005
Notes:＊ 1,000 tons; + Million hectares.

2050年までの世界の人口予測
10 000
9 000
8 000
7 000
世界
アフリカ
アジア
欧州
ラ米・カリブ
北米

（百万）

6 000
5 000
4 000
3 000
2 000
1 000
0

43

1950

1975

2007

2050

44

3C6 Heavy and Chemical Industrialisationin East Asia, 1970‐2006

3C5 Poverty in Asia, 2005
アジアの貧困アジアの貧困Country

1970
1990
1995
2006
A
B
A
B
A
B
A
B
China
n.a.
n.a.
24
47
27
44
32 41
Indonesia
2
19
10
52
12*
40*
18# 45#
Malaysia
8
63
31
50
42+
42
45+
45
38** 53
38
53**
Philippines
8
45
8
46
13
43
30# 41#
ROK
11 47
32
44
41
42
48 40
Singapore
28 55
53
39
62
33
51 46
Thailand 9
35
12
34
30
40
27+ 27+
Vietnam n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n,a.
12*
41*
15+ 41+
Japan
34 51
39
47
39
47
43 44
Sources: World Bank, WDR1993, 2002 & 2008; UNIDO, CS, D Tables.
Notes： A－Machinery； B－ISIC35－37; * ‐1998; #‐2003; + ‐2000; ** ‐
2004;

タイ
タイ
インドネシアインドネシアベトナム
ベトナム
ウズベスタンウズベスタン
中国
中国
フィリピン
フィリピン
ピピ

一日一ドル未満
一日一ドル未満
の所得者層
の所得者層

モンゴル
モンゴル
パキスタン
パキスタン

国内基準の下で国内基準の下で
の貧困者層
の貧困者層

パプア・ニューギニア
パプア・ニューギニア
バヌアツ
バヌアツ
ラオス
ラオス
バングラデシュバングラデシュ
インド
インド
カンボジア
カンボジア

0.0
0.0

10.0
10.0

20.0
20.0

30.0
30.0
(%)
(%)

40.0
40.0

50.0
50.0

60.0
60.0
45

Source; World Bank, WDR 2008.

46

3C8 Impact of Climate Change
in the 21st Century, 2.4~6.4oC

3C7 Motorisation in East Asian Countries, 1980‐
2020
1980

2000

a) Increase in Drought, causing Shortage of Fresh Water and inparticular Drinking Water,b) Decline in Crop Production and Farm Productivity,c) Increase in Forest Fire,d) Increase in Human Casualties and Physical Damages due to Storms
and Floods.
e) Ecological Changes due to Weakened Ocean Under‐Currents,f) Widespread Disappearance of Beaches and Coastal Swamps andPartial Loss of Small Island Developing Countries (SIDCs) under
Rising Sea Level due to Melting Icebergs,g) Higher Risks of Tropical and Infectious Diseases in Temperate Zones,andh) Increase of Biodiversity Loss
Source: IPCC, The 4th Assessment Report, 2007.

2020

North America67
76
81
European OECD
27
46
60
Asia
2.0
4.2
8.2
China
0.2
1.3
8.2
Indonesia
0.9
2.6
4.3
Malaysia
6.5
23
38
ROK
1.4
57
51
Thailand
1.9
10
26
Japan
32
57
66
Total No. of Autos (M) 389
796
1,281
Sources: Japan Automobile Industry Association, World Automobile
Statistical Yearbook, 2005 and JERI, op. cit.
47

48

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Ryokichi Hirono

3D1 Threats to Security of theRegion4.
NATIONAL AND LOCALGOVERNMENT POLICIES TO DEAL
WITH
THE THREATS TO SUSTAINABILITYIN EAST ASIA: The Sooner the
Better !

a) Increasing defense expenditures of many
countries in the region;b) Lack of bilateral and multilateral defense andsecurity
i cooperationi except among ASEAN
countries, in spite of the on‐going discussion at
the Asean Regional Security (ARS);c) Some uncertainties in the region over the bilateral
security arrangements with the United States on
the one hand and Russian Federation on the other.
49

50

4A1 Need for Maximizing Positive Elements of
Globalisation in 2010s

4A2 Need for Minimizing Negative Elements of
Globalisation in 2010aa) Economic globalisation, inducing the country to adopt those
instruments of economic governance at the national andcorporate levels conducive to internationally agreed or “global”
standards, e.g. monetary, banking, fiscal and industrial(competition) policy measures, and accounting and auditing
standards, with reflections on the current financial andeconomic crisis;b) Political globalisation, spreading the principles of democratic
governance such as accountability, transparency, civil society
participation in the decision‐making process and rule of law at
all levels and across all sectors, with more rigorous enforcement
mechanism;c) Social globalisation, strengthening people’s social values andnorms at all levels such as gender equity, fair and equitable
distribution of income, greening all activities, care for the
disadvantaged, corporate social responsibility and international
cooperation for achieving MDGs;
51a) Liberalisation (Leave‐it‐to‐the‐market): while raising short‐term
efficiency in resource use at the national and corporate levels,has:‐ widened urban‐rural and inter‐personal income gaps throughfurther concentration of both public and private investment andemployment including those by foreign multinationals in
metropolitan, urban and growth areas;‐ downgraded the quantity and quality of public services in ruraland non‐metropolitan areas hitherto available to the masses ofpeople;‐ implanted the seeds of social dissatisfaction among thoseeconomically disadvantaged segments of the population such as
low‐income earners, part‐time workers and the un‐ and under‐
employed; and‐ intensified environmental degradation and other social costs allover the country;
52b) Deregulation of business transactions: while increasing the
inflow of financial and human resources into high‐risk and high–return activities, has:
‐ increased the vulnerability and uncertainty of equity andfinancial markets to the detriment of productive sectors, as being
increasingly apparent in the recent financial crisis the world oversince 2007, triggered by the sub‐prime mortgage crisis; and‐ provided unscrupulous investors and unethical businessmen
with golden opportunities to exploit the innocent consumers, asseen ini th
the recentt iincidencesid
off ffraudulent
d l tbbranding
di andd illi
illicititrice trading, as well as inadequate food safety;c) Individual freedom and competitive pressure: while having
contributed to raising the sense of individual identity, self‐
respect and initiatives, has:
‐ reduced the sense of commitment to and solidarity with thefamily, group, organisation and/or nation to which they belong;‐ intensified the sense of social alienation and political apathy
among people, particularly the youth; and‐ tended to enhance individual claims to “personal rights” out of
proportion to “social obligations,” contributing to individual
malpractices/corruption and social disunity;d) Double TL policies and practices: while welcoming the cautious
stance of the bureaucracy to introduce policy and proceduralchanges at a slow but steady pace to avoid the adverse impact on
the economy, polity and society (East Asian tradition), has:‐ contributed to the bubble since mid‐1980s and bubble burst in
1997‐98, followed by the current international financial andeconomic crisis, 2007‐09;‐ contributed to the prolonged resistance by the vested interest
groups including colluding politicians to any economic, politicaland social reforms and delayed the formulation and effective
implementation of reform agenda;

53

54

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The UN and East Asian Community

4A3 Mainstreaming Economic
Sustainability in National and Local
Government Policies
a)
b)

c)

Domestic Economic Deregulation/Incentives and Open‐Door
Policies, reinforcing Economic, Legal and Administrative
Arrangements conducive to Competitive MNCs at Home andOverseas, as shown by Energy Efficiency and Conservation
Efforts reducing Energy Demand by 56 percent over the past
35 years, 1970 and 2004, prompted mostly by Higher Prices
and Technological Changes. Most important of all will be
Increased Efficiency in the Transport Sector expected toaccount for 75 percent of the Increase of Oil Consumption in
the Future due to Rising per capita Income and Car Ownership,as indicated by Tables 1B and 2A3,
2A3d) Empowerment of People through Enriched Basic Education andTraining as well as Health for All, regardless of Personal
Attributes, ande) Promoting Scientific and Technological Innovations to ensure
Long‐Term Competitiveness of Domestic Industries on the
Global Market and to accelerate Industrial Restructuring infavour of Higher Value Added.

Ensuring Macro‐economic Stability and Steady Economic
Growth through Sound Monetary and Fiscal Policies and Long‐
term Industrial Restructuring and Trade Policies,
Poverty Reduction through Effective Implementation of Pro‐
Pro
poor Policies, Reorienting Investment into Agriculture and for
Productivity Improvement and Employment Expansion in
Growth and Emerging Sectors, assisted by Improved PhysicalInfrastructures in both Urban and Rural Areas,
Improving Efficiency of Resource Use including Energy
Resources through Technological Innovations,

55

56

4B1 Mainstreaming Social Sustainability in
National and Local Government Policies

c) Promoting Capacity Building of Local Governments andDecentralization of Authority to Ensure Effective
Participation of All Groups of Stakeholders in Nationaland Local Decision‐making Processes, with a view toinstalling Government of the People, by the People andfor the People, andd) Reinforcing Social and Political Environments
nvironments underwhich Human Dignity and Human Rights are fully
Respected without any Discriminations on the basis ofage, race, religion, sex and nationality, and under which
the Public has a Deep Confidence in their own
Governance Institutions.

a) Achieving Social Stability through Equitable Distributionof both Income and Wealth among Population andEquitable Distribution of Public Investment between
Urban and Rural Areas
Areas,b) Strengthening Government Capacity to Ensure Effective
Implementation of Anti‐Poverty Policies at the Nationaland Local Levels,c) Increasing Government Transparency andAccountability including reducing Corruption,
57

58

4C1 Mainstreaming Environmental
Sustainability in All Government Policiesc) Integrating Education for Sustainable Development(ESD) at all Levels of Formal and Informal
Education including Community Education and In‐
Service and Corporate Training, with a view toEnhancing Environmental Awareness and Capability
among all Stakeholders, andd) Enhancing the Capacity of Environment Experts withacademic Background of Science, Engineering,
Economics, Management, Politics,l
Humanities anddother Disciplines by emphasizing Inter‐disciplinary
Approach to Sustainability, as well as Increasing
Interns in Public and Private Sectors and Volunteers
working in Local Communities and Improving their
Skills.

a) Mainstreaming Environmental Conservation & Protection
including Climate Change Concerns (Mitigation and
Adaptation) in All Development Policies at the National, Local
and Corporate Levels and Rigorously Enforcing the Polluter‐Pay
Principle and other Economic Instruments in all Public andPrivate Sector Activities to install Disaster‐Resilient, Low‐
Carbon Society;b) Strengthening Government Capacity at National and Local
Levels to Collect, Analyse and Monitor every Possible Data on
Environmental Degradation, Effectively Implement the On‐
going Environmentally Sustainable Development Policies andLegislation, and Predict and Take any Preventive Measures on
any Forthcoming Threats to Environmental Sustainability;
59

60

151

Ryokichi Hirono

4C2 Business Enterprises with ISO
14,000 Certificates, 1999‐2005

5.
Promoting Regional Cooperation inP
Pursuiti off SustainableSi bl EEast A
Asiai
by 2020: Where and How to Start
the Ball Rolling !

Japan China ROK Indonesia India
1999 2,773
85/50*
463
53
117
2002 8,169
8 169 1,085
1 085
880
n.a.
n.a.
2005 18,104 9,220 2,610
369 1,500
Source: Forum on Global Environment, Environmental
Data 2000/2001 and2005/2006.(http://www.ecology.or.jp/isoworld)
Note: * Mainland China/ Hong Kong.
61

62

5A1 Perceived Impediments andChallenges Facing Regional Economic
Cooperation in Asia

5A2 Top Five Policy Priorities for APEC Leaders
to Discuss Now

A(%) B(%) Total(%)
Uncertain legal environments
36
25
61
Poor intellectual property rights protection41
20
61
Poor corporate governance
39
20
59
Lack of physical infrastructure
37
18
55
Barriers to investment
34
13
47
Security and political concerns
29
17
46
Lack of mutual recognition of standards
34
12
46
Proliferation of bilateral PTAs
33
942
Restrictions on the movement of capital32
941
Restrictions on the movement of labour 27 1037

2006* 2007
WTO Doha Round
12%
Free Trade Area of the Asia‐Pacific11
nergy Security
9
EnergyStrengthening the APEC Organization
9
Climate Change
8
Source: PECC, ibid., Table 9, p. 54.
Note: * Tariff reduction, Counter‐terrorism. Investment inphysical infrastructure, Preparing for disease &pandemics, Reducing corruption and increasingtransparency.

Source: PECC, op. cit., Table 5, p.49.
Note: A – Significant impediments; B – Very significant impediments.
63

5A3

64

Enhancing Regional Cooperation inStages, 2009‐2012

emergency liquidity in case of a foreign exchange crisis toproviding liquidity support for (recapitalization of) financial
institutions as well as to purchase toxic banking assets.

In the wake of the current financial and economiccrisis, accelerate the process of:a) Improving ｔｈｅ Chiang Ｍai Initiative
Multilateralisation (CMIM) agreed to be set up by the 7thb) Improving the APEC process;i) by expanding the trade facilitation measures including customs
clearance procedures, andii) by installing a series of bilateral investment regimes and finallya multilateral investment regime applicable to all countries intheh region,i

ASEM meeting in Beijing in 2009;i) byb increasingii theh foreignf i exchangehswap ffund
d ffrom US$80
billion to $120 billion, the amount required during the 1997‐98
Asian crisis or, if necessary, to 10% of the foreign exchange
reserve of the region, i.e., $400 billion,ii) by agreeing on how to quickly disburse the fund and minimize
conditionalities, for instance, by increasing CMI’s 20 per
cent quick disbursement component to 50 per cent,iii) by installing a strong regional surveillance mechanism required
for the fund to be able to function well, andiv) by expanding the fund’s purpose beyond providing
65c) Improving and expanding the core programmes of
ASEAN‐China, ASEAN‐Japan and ASEAN‐ROK as wellas any other ASEAN’s Economic Cooperation
Agreements;i) by reducing import tariff and non‐tariff barriers further to allow
ASEAN exporters a greater access to the markets of China,
Japan and ROK as well as other developed countries in theregion, including agricultural produces,
66

152

The UN and East Asian Community

fund (AMF) a regional regulatory and supervisory mechanism tobring into agreed line the macro‐economic and financial policies
of member states of the region,vi) by initiating joint exploration of energy and other natural
resources on land and under the sea and a regional stockpilingprogramme in energy and other strategic commodities with pricevolatility and insecure availability, assisting the ASEAN in theirearly completion of the ASEAN Grid and the ASEAN Natural Gas
Pipeline as well as in technical and, if necessary, financial
cooperation for improving energy efficiency in all sectors and for
promotingti clean,lrenewable
bl energy sources as committed
itt d byb
participating countries in the Singapore Declaration at the East
Asian Summit in 2007, exploring into nuclear power expansion
within the framework of NPT, mobilising the support of all
countries to the post‐Kyoto international accord to be effective
beginning in 2013 and promoting any regional arrangements forenvironmentally sustainable human resources, infrastructuraland institutional development in ASEAN countries and inparticular in CLMV countries.

other primary commodities and industrial products now classified
on sensitive lists,ii) by liberalising the immigration policies of developed countries,
Australia, Japan, New Zealand and ROK, to allow migrant ASEAN
workers to have a greater access to their job markets, to befollowed by any country in the region ready to open theirdomestic labour market,iii) by accelerating and expanding technology transfer by theregion’ss developed countries and Singapore to other ASEAN
regioncountries to help the latter to upgrade their industrial andeconomic structures at a faster pace,iv) by establishing a regional trade insurance fund and providing
ASEAN countries a greater access to it, including a proposal madeby Japan to increase its own scheme up to US$20 billion, as wellas and the expansion of ADB’s subscription and RTB and theredistribution of member state quota, andv) by installing and if necessary, strengthening a peer review
mechanism in East Asia and a regional monetary
67

5A4

68

Promoting Regional Cooperation in
Pursuit of Sustainable East Asiac) Establishing East Asian Security Community
by 2020 to minimize the threats of internal andexternal terrorism affecting the region, along theline of the ASEAN Principles of Cooperation,

Along the line of the ASEAN Economic, Social and Security
Communities and with the Spirit of International Cooperation
with the Rest of the World, Promote among those countries
ready to join in:d) Establishing East Asian Environment

Community by 2020 to arrest further Local,

National and Global Environmental Degradation
facing the Region and install Disaster‐Resiliant Low‐
Carbon Asia (LCA), andａ) Establishing East Asian Economic Community by
2020, to lay the Foundations for Enhanced Regional
Cooperation in Economic Affairs and to make East Asian
Economic Growth both Sound and Sustainable,e) Establishing East Asian Community by 2025,with step‐by‐step installation of EA Ｃｏｕｎｃｉｌ of
Ministers, EA Central Bank, EA Parliament and EA
Court of Justice to be competitive with the rest of
the world.

b) Establishing East Asian Social Community by 2020, to
lay the Foundations for Enhanced Regional Cooperation in
Social Affairs such as Education, Health and Culture,
69

70

THANK YOU FOR YOUR
KIND ATTENTION !
For any inquiry, please email to:Prof. Ryokichi HIRONO
Seikei University
ryokichi@iea.att.ne.jp

71

153

Wongi Choe

The Possibility of an East Asian Community: A Korean Perspective

Wongi Choe1

1. Origin of the notion of an East Asian community

The original idea of the East Asian community (EAc) came originally from the two reports of theEast Asia Vision Group (EAVG) and East Asia Study Group (EASG), which proceeded under the
initiative of Korea in the process of ASEAN+3 (APT). The main task of EAVG was to present a
vision and plan that would promote and lead to the establishment of an ―East Asia community(EAc).‖ The recommendation for building EAc from the EAVG report in 2001 was ―the evolutionof the annual summit meetings of ASEAN+3 into the East Asia Summit (EAS).‖ The main reason
for the establishment of EAc was the desire of the three Northeast Asian countries, namely China,
Japan and Korea, to have an equal footing in the APT process. In the APT summit meetings,
ASEAN always serves as the host, and Northeast Asian countries attend as guests. This kind of
structure in the APT meetings, which have been exclusively held in ASEAN countries, makes it
hard for the three Northeast Asian countries to have a strong sense of ownership. In order toaccommodate the desire of the Northeast Asian countries to share a leadership role with ASEAN in
terms of the agenda and priority setting in the summit process, there has to be a change in the
structure of the summit format, which would eventually lead to the formation of the EAS.
The EASG report in 2002 confirmed that the EAS was one of the most important medium-and
long-term, though not immediate, goals, which should be carried out through a step-by-step
approach. This was primarily because ASEAN, as a core organizer (or a driving force) of theASEAN+3 process, expressed some concerns about the possibility that ASEAN could be
marginalized within the framework of the EAS. In this respect, the original concept of the EAS was
1

Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea.

154

The Possibility of an East Asian Community

to replace ASEAN+3, eventually integrating into a community, and the main goal of Northeast
Asian countries was to make the ASEAN+3 grouping less ASEAN-centered and more ―East Asian‖by hosting the summit meetings in their respective capital cities.

Membership expansion wasnever considered in the original plan. So when the two reports were adopted by the ASEAN+3
leaders, many analysts and observers predicted that the EAS could be launched at least sometime
after 2010. By this time, cooperative efforts among ASEAN+3 members in trade, investment,
finance and so forth will have deepened and evolved into a more tangible entity of a regional
community, such as an EAFTA or East Asia financial mechanism.
However, such a gradual and incremental approach to the EAS was suddenly abandoned at the
8th ASEAN+3 Summit in Vientiane in 2004 when the leaders of ASEAN+3 agreed to launch thefirst East Asia Summit in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur. With the launch of the EAS, India,
Australia, and New Zealand joined as new members and the group has now expanded beyond theoriginal geographical notion of the EAc. The problem of defining and forging a concrete concept ofidentity in community building, and a geographical boundary of membership, has become aperennial issue in East Asia since then.

2. New initiatives for an East Asian Community

Recently, two important and interesting proposals regarding community building in East Asia havebeen made by Japan and Australia: Japanese PM Hatoyama‘s proposal for an East Asian
community (EAc) and Australian PM Kevin Rudd‘s proposal to create an Asia Pacific community(APc) by 2020.
Advocating that Australia should be more deeply involved in Asian affairs and play the role of acreative middle-power, Kevin Rudd, shortly after taking office, announced his idea of an Asia
Pacific community (APc), aiming at creating an institution similar to the EU in Asia to deal with
regional economic, security and political challenges. According to his proposal, the members of the155

Wongi Choe

APc should include all the major powers in the Asia Pacific, including the United States, Australia,
Japan, China, South Korea, India, Russia, Indonesia, and so on. In his own analysis, none of thecurrent institutional architectures in the region, ARF, APT, EAS, APEC, is adequate to provide theleaders of all major Asian countries with an appropriate platform to discuss the broader issues in
the areas of politics, economy and security. He has expressed concern that none of the existing
Asia-Pacific regional mechanisms (as currently configured) is capable of engaging in the full
spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters, or of meeting
future challenges to security. For example, APEC is limited to economic matters and excludes
India; the East Asian Summit shuts the door to the United States and Russia; and the political- andsecurity-oriented ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) lacks a summit meeting. Moreover, he believes
that existing architectures are numerous, porous, pliable and compete with each other. A
combination of economic and security dialogues, all in the same architecture, would be ideal.
The newly-elected Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama came up with the idea of an East
Asian community as the lynchpin of his administration‘s Asia policy in the coming future. Whilethe idea of the EAc is not yet clearly specified, it was indicated that the EAc will take China, Japanand Korea and other members of the East Asian Summit as its core members. He explained that his
concept of the community is something that would enable countries in the region to share acommon vision of promoting cooperation and forging a multi-layered network of functional
communities based on the principle of open regional cooperation. So far it is not clear whether theUnited States will be invited or not.
One of the main issues involved in the two initiatives proposed by Japan and Australia concerns
the concept of community. There are differences over what ―community‖ means, and thesedifferences generally stem from the political positions taken by the respective governments. Should
the community be geographical, socio-cultural, or politico-economic? A geographical notion ofcommunity was originally promoted by the EAVG and EASG reports in the early 2000s. If thegeographical interpretation is sustained, East Asia community building must be limited to East

156

The Possibility of an East Asian Community

Asian nations, as in the APT. If the community is to be a socio-cultural construct, India may be able
to qualify in an EAc process, but not Australia or New Zealand. Should the ―community‖ be anelastic politico-economic construct, virtually any country can participate so long as there is arationale to support it and consensus among members.
In this respect, the notion of EAc has been highly contested from the beginning of the launch of
EAS in 2005. There now seems to be at least three different schools of thought with regard to thequestion of community building in East Asia. First, there is the school of ―East Asianism‖ (or ―EastAsia only‖ group), which favours using ASEAN+3 as a core mechanism for community building in
the region. This group is led by China, Malaysia and Thailand including the majority of ASEAN
members. Second, there is a school of ―Pan Asianism,‖ (or Pan Asian group), which favours using
the EAS, with its wider membership, as the basis for a future community. This group includes
India, Australia and New Zealand and possibly Singapore. Third, there is a school of ―Asia
Pacifism,‖ which favours US participation in the community building process. This is strongly
advocated by Australia in the new APc initiative. Therefore, it seems highly unlikely that
contention over the putative regional community‘s extent and role will be settled easily or soon.

3. ASEAN and regional cooperation

The idea of these new initiatives is quite alarming to ASEAN countries because, from ASEAN‘spoints of view, any steps to link the regional big powers closer together would likely weaken its
position as an arbitrator among the big powers. This is quite understandable given the fact that after
the Asian economic crisis in 1997, ASEAN became the leading force and has been taking the―driver‘s seat‖ in the process of regional cooperation in various ASEAN+N mechanisms. It is quite
interesting to observe that the driving force for regional cooperation in East Asia came, not fromthe larger countries like China or Japan, but from smaller countries in the region, ASEAN andSouth Korea. In particular, ASEAN has been a catalyst in promoting some of the major institutional

157

Wongi Choearrangements in the process of regional cooperation such as ASEAN+3 (APT), EAS and ARF.
In 1997, ASEAN launched ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, Republic of Korea), and in 2005
ASEAN+6 (adding Australia, New Zealand and India), also referred to as the East Asia Summit(EAS). Given this history of ASEAN‘s central role in the regional cooperation process, to the
ASEAN countries the possibility that these initiatives might endanger their role as the agenda-setterand demote them to the position of less significant players in the process of regional cooperation isquite worrisome. Some scholars in Singapore made it clear that Rudd‘s APc plan fundamentally
disregarded ASEAN‘s interests.
There is no doubt that the countries of ASEAN must guard against the gradual loss of thecentrality of ASEAN. Countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia believe that ASEAN‘s centrality isabsolutely fundamental to any larger regional enterprise in East Asia. They insist that ASEAN must
continue to act as one and be in the driver‘s seat in the APT, EAS and ARF further down the road.
However, while acknowledging the important roles that ASEAN has played over the years in theregional cooperation process, the centrality of ASEAN also signifies the clear limits of the current
status of regional cooperation in East Asia. In order to deepen and expand the regional cooperationand community building process in East Asia, the provision of leadership has to be extended
beyond ASEAN. The bigger and more able countries in the region should take a more active andgreater role no matter what the nature of such institutional architecture might be.

4. The reengagement of the US in East Asia

The US is now making a comeback to East Asia. Quite contrary to the previous Bushadministration, the Obama administration has put much more emphasis on engaging in East Asia.
In the summer of 2009, the US finally signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) thatwould allow it to join the East Asian Summit (EAS) in the future. US President Barack Obama, in aspeech during his visit to Tokyo in November 2009, said that ―the United States looks forward to

158

The Possibility of an East Asian Community

engaging with the East Asia Summit more formally as it plays a role in addressing the challenges of
our time,‖ indicating that the US is now distancing itself from the Bush administration‘sarms-length approach toward East Asia. The strategic adjustment by President Obama seems to bepart of the US efforts to counterbalance the growing influence of China in the region, which has
expanded dramatically during the last decade while the US was preoccupied by the War on Terror.
The problem is that the United States is not a member of the currently existing regional
mechanisms such as APT and EAS. There seems to be no consensus among East Asian countries,
especially between China and Japan, concerning whether or not the United States should be
included in the establishment of an East Asian community.
As a residential power in East Asia, the US has been playing a critical role in providing regio nal
stability in security as well as in economic affairs. However, the presence of the US in the regional
cooperation process in East Asia has been largely absent. In fact, the US has been a formidable
obstacle in the development of East Asian regional cooperation that does not include it, as can beseen from such instances as Japan‘s proposal for an AMF (Asian Monetary Fund), and Malaysia‘s
PM Mahathir‘s proposal for an EAEG (East Asian Economic Group). China, which does not seemto regard the presence of the US in regional cooperation in East Asia as an optimal situation for its
interests, has been making efforts to gain greater presence in the regional cooperation process while
the US has focused its attention elsewhere for the last decade. In this sense, while the specificnature of the extent of renewed US engagement in regional cooperation is not quite clear yet, therecent US efforts to pay greater attention to, and to take a larger role in, regional affairs in East
Asia pose a new challenge to China as well as to other countries in the region.

159

Program of the 9th Japan-Korea Seminar on the United Nations System

Theme: East Asia and the United Nations----Regional cooperation for global issues
Date: December 11-12, 2009
Venue: #710, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies (GSAPS), Waseda University
Friday, December 11, 2009

10:00-10:30 Opening Remarks
Prof. Akio Watanabe, JAUNS President
Prof. Jin-Hyun Paik, KACUNS President
10:30-12:00 1st Session: Peace and Security in East Asia
Moderator: Prof. Tatsuro Kunugi (United Nations University – Institute of Advanced Studies)
Presenters: Japan –Assist. Prof. Miki Honda (Waseda University)
Korea – Prof. Sung-Hack Kang (Korea University)
Commentators: Japan – Prof. Chikako Ueki-Kawakatsu (Waseda University)
Korea – Mr. Young-Hie Kim (JoongAng Daily)

13:30-15:00 2nd Session: Global Human Rights Regime and Human Rights in East Asia
Moderator: Prof. Jin-Hyun Paik, KACUNS President (Seoul University)
Presenters: Korea – Prof. Heung-Soon Park (Sunmoon University)
Japan – Assoc. Prof. Tomoko Ako (Waseda University)
Commentators: Korea – Prof. Wongi Choe (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)
Japan –Assoc. Prof. Misako Takizawa (Oberlin University)

15:15-16:45 3rd Session: Human Migration in East Asia
Moderator: Prof. Hiroshi Ohta (Waseda University)
Presenters: Japan – Prof. Yasushi Katsuma (Waseda University)
Korea – Dr. Yoojin Rhee (Korea University)
Commentators: Japan – Assoc. Prof. Misako Takizawa (Oberlin University)
Korea – Prof. Seo-Hang Lee (Institute of Foreign Affairs and national Security)160

Saturday, December 12, 2009

09:00-10:30 4th Session: Sustainable Development in East Asia
Moderator: Amb. Joun-Yung Sun
Presenters: Korea – Prof. Intaek Han (Jeju Peace Institute)Japan – Prof. Jun Matsukuma (Tokyo University of Foreign Studies)
Commentators: Korea – Prof. Heung-Soon Park (Sunmoon University)
Japan –Prof. Ryo Oshiba (Hitotsubashi University)

10:40-12:10 5th Session: The Possibility of an East Asian Community
Moderator: Prof. Takeo Uchida (Chuo University)
Presenters: Japan –Prof. Ryokichi Hirono (National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies)
Korea – Prof. Wongi Choe (Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security)
Commentators: Japan – Prof. Satoshi Amako (Waseda University)
Korea – Prof. Cheol-Hee Park (Seoul National University)
12:10-12:20 Closing Remarks
Prof. Jin-Hyun Paik, KACUNS President
Prof. Akio Watanabe, JAUNS President161

About the Contributors(Order of appearance)

Miki Honda
Assistant Professor, Waseda University; Lecturer, Kawamura Gakuen Woman‘s
University
Sung-Hack Kang
Professor, Korea University
Heung-Soon Park
Professor, Sunmoon University
Tomoko Ako
Associate Professor, School of International Liberal Studies, Waseda University
Yasushi Katsuma
Professor, Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies, Waseda University
Intaek Han
Senior Research Fellow, Jeju Peace InstituteJun Matsukuma
Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
Yoojin Rhee
Lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Korea
University; Research Professor, Ilmin International Relations Institute
Ryoichi Hirono
Emeritus Professor, Seikei University; Visiting Professor, National Graduate Institutefor Policy Studies
Wongi Choe
Professor, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security

162

Title:Editors:
Publisher:
Date of issue:

East Asia and the United Nations: Regional Cooperation for Global Issues
Yasushi Katsuma; Miki Honda
Waseda University Global COE Program “Global Institute for AsianRegional Integration (GIARI)”
March 31, 2010

Copyright:

Japan Association for United Nations Studies (JAUNS)ISBN 978-4-904618-07-3