AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies
NPIRIPS

Nakasone Yasuhiro
Peace Institute

The Japan Institute ofInternational Affairs(Secretariat)

Research Institute for
Peace and Security

No. 298
29 September 2022

THE IMPACT OF THE WAR IN UKRAINE ON
THE GLOBAL SYSTEM

Hiroshi Nakanishi

・ The war in Ukraine marks the end of theneo-liberal post-Cold War global order.
・ Whatever end this war reaches, the world willbe less prosperous and more divided anddangerous.
・ With wisdom and luck, mankind may turn thisordeal into a catalyst for the transformation ofthe global order.
The views expressed in this piece are the author’s own and should not be
attributed to The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies.

AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

What Russian President Vladimir Putin declared a “special military operation”
that started on February 24 has had enormous impact upon the global system.
Whatever label is put on the operation, it is a war as defined in the traditional sense, so
it is called as such in this paper.
The most fundamental characteristic of this war is that it has virtually ended thepost-Cold War era during which Western liberal ideology was the dominant force in theglobal system. In that sense, the war is more appropriately called the final nail in thecoffin since Western liberal ideology has been receding from at least the middle of thefirst decade of the 21st century. The literature on democracies in retreat is now
expanding, and the supremacy of Western-style capitalism is also in decline. It was US
President George W. Bush’s idea in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy
in September 2008 to call for a G20 leaders’ meeting where the West solicited help fromthe emerging non-Western economies to save global capitalism. However, an oversized
membership as well as conflicting interests among members had already hollowed outthe G20.
That said, the explicit act of invasion by one of the permanent members of theUN Security Council has been devastating to the global system. There is no starker
contrast than to August 1990, when US Secretary of State James Baker was in theSoviet Union to meet Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze when theIraqi military under Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait. At that time the two foreign
secretaries quickly came to a consensus on responding to this outright invasion in theUN Security Council, which opened the way for the multilateral use of force under theauspices of the Security Council. Given the deep division now between the US, GreatBritain, and France on the one hand and Russia and China on the other, the UN
Security Council is highly unlikely to recover as a substantial security forum for theforeseeable future.
In addition, whatever course the war in Ukraine follows, the result will not
produce the resounding optimism for the West that came with victory in the Gulf War.
There are basically three scenarios imaginable. The first is a protracted quagmire
between Russia and Ukraine. As the war nears its half-year mark, the situation seems tobe following this scenario. Given the opposing territorial claims between the twocountries, over Crimea in particular, the prospect of a negotiated truce is much lower
than in the case of the Korean War in the early 1950s. A prolonged war in which themajor Western economies are closely involved will perpetuate the division of the world
economy already started by the US-China rivalry and exacerbated by the COVID-19

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AJISS-Commentary
The Association of Japanese Institutes of Strategic Studies

pandemic. Even if a truce is agreed, the West will not return to business as usual with
Russia as long as the country is ruled by Putin or his allies.
The second scenario is an escalation of the war to more countries and/or
deadlier weapons. So far, both the US and Russia have avoided a direct military clash,largely because of the fear of a global-scale war, probably with nuclear exchanges.
Nevertheless, massive Western military assistance to Ukraine as well as severe
economic pressure over the Russian economy may become enough of an excuse forPutin to escalate, especially if he fears defeat and a loss of power. In addition, anylarge-scale war in Europe will inevitably spill over to East Asia because of Russia’sEurasian identity and the US’ Pacific presence. The Northern Hemisphere at least will
face warfare on a scale not experienced since the end of the Second World War.
The third scenario is a Russian regime collapse. Of course, this may well bethe best scenario for the West and possibly for the world, but it is highly unlikely that thiswould follow the pattern of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Then there were 15
republics within the Soviet Union that had taken on substantial political authority during
Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms. There are no viable political forces within Russia toreplace Putin’s regime nor any established political institutions to cushion the politicalexplosion. For the West, the most acute concern would be control of the six thousand
nuclear warheads as well as the nuclear facilities and materials, including several dozen
nuclear power plants, within Russia. As the failures of Napoleon and Hitler show, it isbeyond the capability of any outside power to occupy and control the vast territory ofRussia.
Whichever end the war reaches, the prospects for this war are not rosy to say
the least. The world will most likely be less prosperous and more divided and dangerous.
However, there is no turning back the clock. All the world can do now is achieve justicewith the least damage possible, even though the war has already been inhumane anddisastrous.
If with wisdom and luck mankind can survive this ordeal, several changes could
be made in the global system to produce some improvements. First, there will be achance for broad international organizations to be reorganized in ways that reflect thecurrent realities of global power distribution and civilizational diversity. It is an ironicaltruth that, as the United Nations becomes less effective, there are more chances ofreformulating the UN or even creating a new universal organization whose presiding
powers would reflect the current balance of power across the world. Second, the war is
likely to enhance the power shift, already started some time ago, from the Atlantic to the

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AJISS-Commentary
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so-called Indo-Pacific, or the area called “Asia” by the West before the modern age. The
rise of China and India, as well as the notion of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific advocatedby late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, had indicated this trend. The notion of“Global Britain” as post-Brexit UK foreign policy and the ongoing economic separation ofEurope and Russia may enhance this shift from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. Third,
global capitalism, which flourished from the 1980s to the 2000s under the ideology of
neo-liberalism and ever-growing monetary assets, may be replaced by technologicalglobalism, where actions against global natural disasters are based on a globalized
cyberspace. COVID-19 has already changed our sense of normalcy by imbedding
online activities deep into our daily lives. The Ukraine war has changed the context ofthe energy problem but, given the severity of climate change effects, the war willenhance medium- and long-term de-carbonization rather than inhibit it. Combined,
these changes may move mankind into the next stage of governance, but that remains
conjecture.

Hiroshi Nakanishi is Professor of Graduate School of Law, Legal and Political Studies at
Kyoto University.

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