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Humanitarian Intervention asa ‘Responsibility to Protect’:
An International Society Approach
Saban Kardas

Introduction
The issue of humanitarian intervention has been approached from different
angles. The topic has been a subject of intense academic discussion ininternational law, ethics, political theory, and international relations. In thefield of international relations, there appear to be two competing broad schoolsof thought on humanitarian intervention. Some see it as incompatible with theexisting world order, based on Westphalian norms of sovereignty andnonintervention due to humanitarian intervention’s disruptive repercussions on
interstate affairs. Along the same lines, some view it as a resurrection of the
traditional gunboat diplomacy where human rights justifications are used as acloak to cover selfish national interests behind grand schemes to create aworldwide imperial order. Hence, humanitarian intervention as a part ofHobbesian world of power politics. In contrast, a competing school of thought
treats it as a precedent heralding the down of a new era in world politics where
universal values, such as human rights, are the benchmark of the emerging newworld order. Hence, humanitarian intervention as a practice of the cosmopolitan
world society.
A third approach posits humanitarian intervention somewhere between
these two competing positions, which is also the position taken in this paper.
The big puzzle that attracts my attention to study this topic is the question
where we stand in the evolving balance between the normative order of humanrights and the modern international system. I discuss humanitarian
intervention within the context of the developments regarding the promotion ofhuman rights on international level and their transformative impact on theexisting principles of international order. I am driven by a normative concern to14

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allow for a greater room for humanitarian norms in international relations. Yet,in so doing, I also do recognize the enduring power, and the realities, of thecurrent world order, which hinder a wholesale incorporation of humanitarian
intervention within the framework of modern interstate system. Therefore I
approach it rather as a limited practice whose life-course is stringently bound by
the contingencies of the existing international order. Nonetheless, the fact thathumanitarian intervention received recognition in state practice raises atheoretically interesting question. In order to explain the emergence anddiffusion of this new norm in state practice, I address two questions in thischapter. First, what does the practice of and discourse on humanitarian
intervention imply for the irresolvable dilemma between Westphalian worldorder and the promotion of human rights? Second, what theoretical approach tointernational relations can help explain this new practice and discourse?
I argue that although sovereignty versus human rights debate traditionallyhas been framed in dichotomized terms, the post-Cold War practice ofhumanitarian intervention illustrates the possibility of a via media approach tothese competing normative claims. Further, I argue that English School
provides a relevant theoretical framework to explain this new consensus onhumanitarian intervention. Drawing largely on Hedley Bull’s work on
international society, I expand on how English School’s concepts such as theprimacy of the states, the international society of states, and shared norms offer
a powerful explanation for the incorporation of humanitarian intervention instate practice.

Westphalian order versus human rights: two worldsof International Relations?
Humanitarian intervention may be defined as “forcible action by a state, agroup of states or international organizations to prevent or to end grossviolations of human rights on behalf of the nationals of the target state, throughthe use or threat of armed force without the consent of the target government,
1with or without UN authorization.” I treat humanitarian intervention as apractice pertaining to the advancement and protection of human rights.

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Despite its moral appeal as a norm to promote universal human wellbeing,
however, the humanitarian intervention debate cannot escape the wider
political context it belongs to: military intervention in international relations.
The question of intervention raises two complementary issues. First, thequestion of whether force can be used legitimately in international relations
2

becomes the crux of any discussion about humanitarian intervention. For, theorganization of coercion has been the basic concern of any social structure,including international society. Therefore the place given to humanitarian
intervention is directly related to the international milieu, i.e. the receptivity of
the international community toward ‘military’ intervention. Although the idea
to use force for other-regarding purposes has a long history in international law
and politics, and is morally compelling, the application of the idea into statepractice has been inconsistent, depending mainly on international rules and3practices regarding the use of coercive force. Since the principles of nonintervention and non-use of force underpin the current international system, theroom allowed for humanitarian intervention has been limited.
Second, humanitarian intervention is closely interwoven with theinternational society’s attitude toward intervention into ‘domestic affairs.’
Modern international relations have been characterized by a clear separation
between the internal and external affairs of the states, basic actors of theinternational society. Traditionally it was the established practice to treat therelationship between a sovereign and its subject as one of internal jurisdiction;
hence, outside the scope of interference by other governments. Moreover, issues
such as human rights that were considered to fall within the domestic realm ofstate-citizen relationship were excluded from the subject matter of international
relations. They were beyond the boundaries of legitimate intercourse between
the states. Therefore, the debate about whether an issue falls within agovernment’s exclusive realm of authority also determined the ways in whichhumanitarian intervention is perceived as it involves a dictatorial interference
within the domestic jurisdiction of another state.
Why study these two questions?
As such, the questions I raised above are of theoretical importance. Behindthe specific issue of humanitarian intervention lies a fundamental contradiction

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between two different sets of moral concerns, and two different approaches to4international relations . From a cosmopolitan perspective, using force forstopping extreme human rights violations appears to be a higher ethical end
because it aims at upholding the basic rights of human beings, the primarysubjects of any social order. It however contradicts with the principles
constituting the basis of the modern Westphalian international system that puts
the moral priority on the preservation of the integrity of its actual members,
nation-states, and the maintenance of the precarious world order. In otherwords, this is the tension between realism and idealism that had been the main
divide through much of the history of the modern international relations theory.
The crux of this issue revolves around the incompatibility between the
promotion of human rights on international level and the principle of non5

intervention which is a derogative of the norm of sovereignty. As Donnelly puts
it, humanitarian intervention presents “a genuine moral dilemma in which
important and well-established principles (human rights and nonintervention)
conflict so fundamentally that reasonable men of good will may disagree on how
6that conflict is to be resolved.” Therefore it became almost a stereotype to talkabout the legal/political tension between human rights and state sovereignty,
non-intervention, and non-use of force in most of the scholarly works onhumanitarian intervention. Moreover, this has been mostly presented as a7dichotomic relationship.

Due to its being situated at the center of this tense relationship,
humanitarian intervention has important implications for international
relations theory. Arguments based on the tension I identified constitute one of8

the major theoretical objections to humanitarian intervention. As I will
elaborate further below, humanitarian intervention as an assertive form of
human rights promotion continues to create discomfort among the defenders of
the existing world order in that humanitarian intervention would violate the9doctrine of sovereignty, the organizing principle of the international order. As
Corten aptly puts it, “the doctrine of ‘the right to intervene’ is an attempt tochallenge this traditional legal structure [of UN system of collective security] bycalling into question the very concept of sovereignty it is based on.”10

In otherwords, the opposition to humanitarian intervention is not the result of a mere

Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach17

indifference to human suffering elsewhere. But it is largely a reflection ofdifferent conceptualization of how to organize interstate relations, and what
principles should guide the appropriate state behavior. As such thehumanitarian intervention debate turns out to be a subset of the debate about
the nature of the international society and its institutions; i.e., whether there
exists an international society, what its organizing principle is, who its members
are, and what norms underpin it.

Humanitarian intervention in post-Cold War period
The emerging international system and the global wave of democratization
have enabled human rights groups to exert more pressure and persuasion onliberal states and international organizations to take up the promotion ofhuman rights. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the emerging
international system were characterized by the increasing possibilities forinternational cooperation among major powers. Therefore, in the new era the
UN Security Council was able to realize its powers under the UN Charter andthus come closer to orchestrating the collective security system laid down in theCharter. Humanitarian intervention, as a result, made its way into the practiceand study of international relations in the post-Cold War period.
Because the use of force is currently regulated by the UN SC, any
humanitarian intervention can be categorized according to the existence of a
UN-authorization. By interpreting its Chapter VII powers in an expanding
manner, the SC was successful in accommodating humanitarian intervention
within the UN system and providing it with a certain degree of legitimacy.
Moreover, despite its unsettled legal position, the practice of humanitarian
intervention without SC authorization also endured during this period and wasreceived receptively on moral and political grounds by many actors. As a result,incorporation of humanitarian intervention into state practice has taken two
distinct forms: UN Security Council-authorized, and unilateral interventions.
Although the latter is more controversial than the former due to its shaky
legal standing, there is a growing international consensus around the concept.
This consensus recently has been captured by the idea of ‘sovereignty as

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responsibility,’ which has been advocated by the United Nations and someWestern states in the form of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine. Under the
emerging norm of humanitarian intervention, extreme cases of human suffering,caused by a state’s failure to respect or protect individual rights of its own
citizens, could warrant intervention by the international community.

How did we get here? An International Society approachto humanitarian intervention
Through various practical and conceptual innovations that are largely
covered in this volume, humanitarian intervention came to be recognized as areality of modern interstate system. It was emphasized earlier that the
problematic relationship between human rights and sovereignty is an offspringof different approaches to international relations. It was further underlined thattraditionally this relationship was understood in dichotomic terms. That means
prioritizing one norm over another was also understood as subscribing to two
opposite notions of international system, or two interpretations of international
relations. In this sense, the appearance of humanitarian intervention in statepractice in the post-Cold War era was viewed as a substantial transition from astates-system based on respect for sovereignty and non-intervention to acosmopolitan one where individual rights trump over a state’s right tosovereignty, and where some sort of universal governance prevails.
Yet, despite the accumulation of state practice on humanitarian
intervention and the erosion of the norms of sovereignty and nonintervention itis difficult to claim that we have moved beyond the state centric modern world
system. Nor would it be an accurate description to call the current system apurely anarchic one. So it is my contention that we stand somewhere in between
these two extreme positions. Similarly, although universal ideas have assumed
increased importance in state practice, they did not transform the realist power
politics where coercion matters. What we need therefore is a theoreticalconstruct that will help us capture the actual reality in the grey zone. In what
follows, I will draw on the English School scholars’ discussion about the natureof the international society, the centrality of states, the importance of norms,
and normative change to develop an explanation for the practice ofHumanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach19

humanitarian intervention.

1. The nature of the international system, and the primacyof the society of states
The tendency to conceive humanitarian intervention and Westphalianinternational system as incompatible owes a great deal to the realism’s legacy.
Realism takes the international system as anarchical consisting of sovereign
nation-states. It is anarchic in the sense that there is no overarching authority
to govern the relations among the members of the system. Moreover, realists’understanding of the international system is also static, such that a systemchange is difficult to occur; hence they accept no room for normative/ideationalchange.
Scholars writing within the English School tradition question such rigid,
sharp characterizations of the international system. They have a broader andmore diverse perspective on international system, partly because of theiremphasis on historical analysis. Hedley Bull’s work, Anarchical Society, is the11most widely known representative of English School. Bull first defines a systemof states (international system), which comes into being “when two or morestates have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one
another’s decisions, to cause them to behave –at least in some measure– as partsof a whole.” This necessitates regular contact in the sense that the interaction
between states is sufficient to make the behavior of each a necessary element in
the calculations of the other. States could interact directly or indirectly, and thisinteraction could be in the form of cooperation or conflict. A society of states(international society) is formed “when a group of states, conscious of certain
common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they
conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with
one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” As such,international society presupposes an international system, but an international
system may exist that is not an international society.
In that sense it is the injection of a ‘societal’ element into a mechanicalsystem that turns an international system into international society. Bull

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identifies three apaches to the idea of international society: Hobbesian,Groatian, and Kantian, and adds that the Grotian idea of international society
has always been present in intellectual thinking and state practice. Bull also
notes that the goals of international society include a) the preservation of thesystem and the society of states itself, b) maintaining the independence –external sovereignty– of the states, c) goal of the peace –subordinate to thepreservation of the states system–, d) common goals of the social life. I will
return to these different goals while discussing humanitarian intervention
below.
This way of approaching international system provides a better means for
explaining how the practice of humanitarian intervention affects the nature ofinternational relations. Although some advancement has been made to uphold
universal values in a way to limit the autonomy of nation-states, it is more
appropriate to define the current international system as one of a Grotian world,
where a certain degree of norm-guided behavior coexists with states’ drive forindependent, autonomous action.
First of all, the aversion to humanitarian intervention is best captured byHedley Bull’s first fundamental goal of the international society: “thepreservation of the system and the society of states.” One implication of thisprimacy of world order is somehow reflected in the supposed tension between
order and justice –i.e., realization of human rights– which I will discuss ingreater length below. In the realist approach to international relations, due totheir destabilizing effects, issues of secondary importance, such as promoting
human rights, were sacrificed to the maintenance of international order. In his
discussion about the limited place given to human justice in international
affairs, Bull catches this point cogently. He comes closer to the realist position
and argues that the framework of international order is inhospitable also to
demands for human justice”
The same emphasis on the primacy of systemic stability also explains thechanging attitude toward humanitarian intervention, and gives us important
clues about the limitations on the applicability of this new norm. As will be
explained in the next section on the changing interpretations of the conventional

Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach21

norms of nonintervention and sovereignty, humanitarian interventions have notbeen justified on purely humanitarian –cosmopolitan– basis; instead, they werelegitimized to the extent that they had some impact on international peace andsecurity. As such, the practice of humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold
War era has served the goal of preserving the ‘precarious and imperfect’ worldorder, by addressing the destabilizing effects of the civil wars, and humanitariancrises. This appears to be a via media solution, which endeavors to find abalance between concerns for maintaining the current system on the one hand,and allowing a room for humanitarian values on the other. The application of
the concept, thus, remained selective, depending on the specific politicalconditions within which a humanitarian crisis emerged. As such, humanitarian
intervention does not signify a transition to post-Westphalian system. Therefore,
as will be further discussed, its application and future evolution will also bebound by the realities of the existing order, which will not allow a wholesale
incorporation of the concept into state practice.

2. Element of society and the emphasis on common norms
as regulating state conduct
Any theoretical framework to explain the practice of humanitarian
intervention must be accommodative to the role of ideas and norms as affecting
state behavior. In that sense, even the very idea of sovereignty or nonintervention can be seen as norms that govern state conduct. As we move our
focus to human rights, the need to explain the place of universal ideas becomeseven more pressing.
English School scholars accept that international society is anarchic in thesense that there is no common orderer. Yet they part company with those who
reject societal dimension of international relations on the grounds that it isorganized anarchically. For instance, Bull claims that the common belief that“states have to submit themselves to a common authority in order to realize asociety does not apply to international realm.” Thus an ‘anarchical’ society isalways possible, and the element of society has always been present andremains present in the modern international system. It exists “because at nostage the conception of the common interests of states, of common rules accepted22

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and common institutions worked by them has ceased to exert an influence.”
As underlined by Chris Brown, according to English School scholars,
although international society is not a perfect one it is still bound and regulated
12by shared norms. As Brown further notes, their approach to norms is both
descriptive –is– and normative – should. For English School, norms have
13

constraining and enabling impact on state behavior and strategies. It is statesthat generate the norms to regulate their affairs. This is so because normgoverned behavior better serves the primary goals of international society. In
his treatment of how order is maintained in international society, Bull argues
that order is a consequence of common interests, rules, and institutions. Rules
function to provide guidance as to what behavior is consistent with common
goals of the international society.
This conceptualization of norms as regulating state behavior in a way toserve the common goals of international society provides English School with apowerful means to explain the practice of humanitarian intervention. In thissense, both the Westphalian principles and humanitarian values can be seen as
different sets of norms, with differing degrees of relation to the basic goals of theinternational society. Hence, both set of norms play certain functions for the
maintenance of order in an anarchic international society. The developments
relating to those norms had important implications for the practice ofhumanitarian intervention. On the normative level, what happened throughout
the 1990s was the coalescence of basically two complementary processes: anormative shift regarding the place of human rights, particularly as far as it
relates to domestic-international distinction, and the redefinition of the norms of
non-intervention and sovereignty.
a) Human rights as a legitimate international concern
In her constructivist explanation of the developments regarding
intervention, Finnemore maintains that the shift in the 1990s cannot be
understood without considering the changing normative context in which it
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occurs. Because traditional legal/political interpretation of sovereignty confined
the issues of human rights to the national jurisdiction of sovereign states,
human rights was by default of no legitimate concern to other states; thus they

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were dropped out of the agenda of international relations. As the Cold War had
made the non-intervention a universal norm, with the end of the Cold War,norms pertaining to the protection of individual rights have increasingly
received a general acceptance within international community.

16

The

achievements in the field of human rights have reached a stage where thequestion whether human rights is subject to international scrutiny is no longer
17

controversial. Consequently, the idea that the violations of these basic rights
are no longer matters which are purely within the domestic jurisdiction ofstates, and therefore the nonintervention norm cannot be invoked as a barrier
against international interference for the protection of these rights gained
ground during this period.
These developments have been further strengthened by the growing belief
that the maintenance of international peace and security and the protection of
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fundamental human rights are interdependent. In the post-Cold War period, aconsensus emerged that massive and widespread violations of human rights
stemming from the repression of governments, internal conflicts, or failed states
and the human suffering that they generate may constitute threats tointernational peace and security. Therefore, such matters do not fall exclusively
within the domestic domain of states. The SC, acting as the representative of
the international community, may take necessary measures, including the use
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of force to address such situations. Against this background, the SC has
assumed a more assertive role for the protection of human rights by invoking its
powers regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, andorchestrated several humanitarian interventions. In so doing, the SC has
engaged in a broader interpretation of what amounts to threat to the peace.
Similarly, the interdependence between human rights and international
20

security has been the basic driving motive of un-authorized interventions.

The new normative concern on universal human rights has had an enabling
impact for broadening the scope of intervention. Consequently, the international
opposition to acts of intervention on humanitarian grounds has diminished inbreadth.

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b) redefinition of sovereignty and non-intervention
As stated, the post-Charter international state system was inspired by theso-called Westphalian legacy. The Westphalian norms, particularly sovereignty
and non-intervention, which for a long time constituted an obstacle to thepromotion of human rights, are derived from the anarchical conceptualization of
21

international system. Because anarchic international system is composed ofsovereign units, states are granted exclusive jurisdiction over the territory they
control and people living on this territory. The logical corollary of sovereignty is
the norm of non-intervention which prohibits states from taking action in theinternal affairs of other states.
I noted that there is a tension between these twin-norms and human rights,
and traditionally, this tension has been resolved in favor of the nonintervention
side of the dilemma. The norms of sovereignty and nonintervention were treatedas sacrosanct principles. It was traditionally understood that intervention into
each other’s domestic affairs did not belong to the proper behavior of sovereign
equals; hence be prohibited, however laudable the motives might be. Therefore,
the strongest criticism against humanitarian intervention has been implicitly
based on this ‘statist paradigm’ which prioritizes the rights of states over therights of individuals, thus norms of sovereignty and non-intervention overprotecting human rights.

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The defenders of the Westphalian principles,

including English School scholars, note the important functions of these norms
for the maintenance of world order and point out the disruptive implications ofhumanitarian intervention. As such they draw our attention to the factors that
constrain the place of humanitarian intervention. They, however, also recognize
the prospects that with the changes in international relations, the rationale
underlying these norms might also be altered. In such cases of change, in order
to better serve the maintenance of world order, these norms might be subjected
to reinterpretation.
Nonintervention
As a historical fact, the idea that nonintervention holds a primary place had
a distinctly utilitarian rationale. The norm of state sovereignty and its
corollaries, which are the products of centuries long Western historicaldevelopment characterized by the atrocities inherent in wars for ideological andHumanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach25

religious purposes, have important moral standing, and nonintervention
principle has not served badly in maintaining world order since the enactment
23of the UN Charter. As Bull argues, nonintervention is part of the rules ofcoexistence in an anarchic society as it serves important purposes. As analyzed
by Damrosch, nonintervention has two principal functions; to minimize
interstate conflict and to preserve a state’s autonomy. On the issue of autonomy,
Bull writes:
there is the goal of maintaining the independence of external sovereignty
of individual states. From the perspective of any particular state what itchiefly hopes to gain from participation in the society of states isrecognition of its independence of outside authority, and in particular of
its supreme jurisdiction over its subjects and territory. The chief price it
has to pay for this is recognition of like rights to independence and25

sovereignty on the part of the other states.

Similarly Vincent underlines that nonintervention allows a degree of26

pluralism and variety within the states, which strengthen and protect theautonomy of the state. As such this principle also upholds the right of the people
living within this state to self-determination. This idea goes back to John StuartMill and is advocated in modern times by Michael Walzer. His idea of communal
integrity leads to the conclusion that states are moral entities and should
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therefore enjoy the right of nonintervention. By endeavoring to restrain the useof armed force and reduce war among states, nonintervention norm implies
somehow an orderly world, where different societies may coexist in a relatively
peaceful atmosphere of harmony and concord. This set of norms, therefore, wasenshrined in the UN Charter and gained a wide acceptance among theinternational community as the fundamental values to be upheld. These
principles were treated so valuably that they could allow no room forhumanitarian intervention in breach of the international order even for the
purpose of alleviating human suffering. This position is best summarized byWheeler and Morris. They note that, from a realist perspective, the main
weakness of the defenders of humanitarian intervention is that because they
focus on individual cases of human suffering, they fail “to see that issuing alicense for humanitarian intervention is likely to bring about a generalized26

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erosion of the norms of non-intervention and non-use of force, and with it a longterm reduction in general well-being.”

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Yet, in the current era of spreading ethnic conflicts and state collapses
resulting in extreme human suffering on the one hand, and growing global
awareness and increasing possibilities for international cooperation on theother, a need for revisiting this dilemma is obvious. As noted, UN Charter also
advances norms pertaining to human rights. Then the question can be put asfollows: What happens when these two sets of values are in conflict with eachother and the nonintervention norm stands as an obstacle to justice and therealization of basic human rights? Hence, the question posed by Adam Roberts:
can that rule [of nonintervention] really apply when the situation is so
serious that the moral conscience of the mankind is affronted? What isthe ethical or logical foundation of the rule that make it so rigid, so
uncomprehending of misery, that it cannot allow for exceptions?

29

Or, as Hoffmann starkly puts it, refusing unilateral intervention at all may
improve global social order, yet, by allowing grave injustices to persist, it could30

also harm justice which is another respectable value for the world community.

For this reason, in certain conditions a blind attachment to the norm of nonintervention would create inconsistencies with the real world and put the very
idea of nonintervention norm into question, and this weakness has been the
primary concern expressed by the scholars and practitioners about the scope of
the principle of nonintervention.
Cognizant of the tension between order and justice and the relationshipbetween this tension and the norm of nonintervention, Bull devotes a chapter to31this problematic relationship. He highlights the incompatibility between
demands for individual/human justice and cosmopolitan justice and world order.
He thinks that only interstate justice can be accommodated within the current
system. Although his realist side dominates and he sees order as a precondition
for the realization of other values, including justice, he still concedes tocontextual judgments; i.e., the decision about order versus justice should be
evaluated on the basis of the merits of a particular case. This leaves

Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach27

international society an important avenue to accommodate concerns for justice.
Along the same lines, he later observed that non-intervention norm in its
absolute meaning does not reflect the reality and therefore begs for being
modified and adapted to meet the particular circumstances and needs of the32

present time. As Hoffmann points out, “there are many cases in which theeffects of nonintervention might be worse than those of intervention, either on
33

political or moral grounds”. Against this background, Roberts notes that, “onemight even say that if a coherent philosophy of humanitarian intervention weredeveloped, it could have the potential to save the non-intervention rule from its
34

own logical absurdities and occasional inhumanities”.

A coherent, and universally agreed-upon philosophy of humanitarian
35

intervention has not been developed yet. But, the developments in the postCold War period amount to a significant shift in this direction. The
achievements regarding the internationalization of human rights and thecontracting scope of domestic jurisdiction have already been noted. The
emergence of the practice of UN-authorized humanitarian intervention was alsoquite influential in undermining the absolute interpretation of the norm ofnonintervention. This practice made it clear that under certain circumstances ofextreme humanitarian emergency, traditional norms of sovereignty andnonintervention can be overridden by the international community for the
purpose of ending human suffering, provided that political conditions allow forrealization of such an intervention. This has been, moreover, the common theme
36

expressed by three successive UN Secretaries-General in the 1990s, and thus
paved the way for the new consensus on humanitarian intervention.
Indeed, the developments in the post-Cold War period that culminated in
R2P were basically a reconsideration of the principles of nonintervention andstate sovereignty. As a result, though these developments did not transform thenorm of nonintervention, they created conditions favorable to the emergence ofhumanitarian intervention as an acceptable form of policy instrument at the37

disposal of the international community to end human suffering. As such, theyalso helped redefine the norm of nonintervention and make it better fit to therealities of the current world politics.

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This was in a sense the realization of what Bull observed about the futureof intervention in world politics: intervention through multilateralism andcollective action. He notes that “if, however, an intervention itself expresses thecollective will of the society of states, it may be carried out without bringing that38

harmony and concord (of the society of sovereign states) into jeopardy”. In thesame vein, it is noted by Damrosch that the shift from unilateral intervention tocollective involvement allows the preservation of the values of conflict
39

containment and autonomy implicit in nonintervention norm. The practice of
the UN, as the expressed will of the international society, helped eliminate theobjection to humanitarian intervention. Although the opposition to unauthorizedintervention still continues, the fact that the post-Cold War cases ofhumanitarian intervention without authorization from the SC were also
conducted by different regional organizations or a group of states which enjoy agreat legitimacy among the society of states should be kept in mind. These
interventions were also carried out in a multilateral fashion and therefore theycome closer to Bull’s observation. They express the collective will of at least acertain part of the society of states. Their multilateral character puts important
checks and balances on the way the intervention is conducted and therefore does
not let the interventions jeopardize the order. For this reason, these acts ofintervention were realized without posing any serious threats to the40international order.
Sovereignty

The objection to humanitarian intervention is also justified with reference
to an absolute understanding of the principle of sovereignty. Within such a
conceptualization, sovereignty is the basic guarantee for the enjoyment of thebasic rights of the people, due partly to the autonomy principle inherent insovereignty, discussed above. If there will be attempts to promote andimplement international human rights, according to this way of thinking, they41

must pay due attention to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention.

Therefore, an intervention amounting to the breach of sovereignty is also seenas the violation of the basic rights of the people. Or, foreign interference is seen
as a greater evil than the violation of some of the rights by the sovereignauthority itself. Although they accept the importance of human rights, thesupporters of this view stress that the main and sole responsibility for theHumanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach29

realization of these rights rests in national states. This view is nowadays voiced
by non-Western countries as well. As Chinese President Zemin put it,
42

sovereignty provides the best guarantee for human rights. For this reason,concerns for human rights cannot override sovereignty.
The idea that individual justice can only be achieved through the agency ofstates, and the implementation should be confined to domestic level is also
recognized by Bull. Otherwise, it may lead to disorder in international society.
As such, English School provides a strong explanation for the inherent
tendencies among the states against the incorporation of humanitarian
intervention into state practice.
I noted earlier that humanitarian intervention is a subset of the debate
about ‘military intervention.’ When it comes to the humanitarian intervention
debate, under the existing realities, the terms in which sovereignty andintervention are debated need to be altered. It has been increasingly agreed thathumanitarian intervention is different in essence from other forms ofintervention. This can be best stated by an analytical distinction between
internal and external aspects of sovereignty. Intervention in general aims at theexternal dimension of sovereignty in order to affect the relations of the target
state with the other sovereign counterparts. Humanitarian intervention,
however, relates to the internal aspect of sovereignty.
It is true that for the citizens of a state to be free and enjoy their rights
there must be an independent political space for them, thus the state in question
must be free from external interference in order to provide its citizenry with aspace as such. This is what external aspect of sovereignty and nonintervention
norm assure. As discussed above, besides minimizing interstate conflict thesenorms also aim at the preservation of a state’s autonomy. Yet, in the post-Cold
War era a common understanding emerged that the preservation of theautonomy should not be seen as an end in itself. Rather, it is a means for therealization of the basic human rights of the individuals living within theboundaries of sovereign states. For instance, Kofi Annan reflected this newunderstanding by maintaining that30

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State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined--not least by
the forces of globalization and international co-operation. States are now
widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, andnot vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty--by which I mean
the fundamental freedom of each individual, enshrined in the charter of
the UN and subsequent international treaties--has been enhanced by arenewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights. When we readthe charter today, we are more than ever conscious that its aim is to
43protect individual human beings, not to protect those who abuse them.

Seen from this perspective, the question of humanitarian intervention has
little to do with the external aspect of sovereignty; rather it is related to theinternal aspect of sovereignty and how it is constructed. Indeed, humanitarian
intervention is about the very essence of the relation between sovereign
44

authority and its citizenry. As it is pointed out by the liberal political theory,the internal aspect of sovereignty is built on the assumption that the sovereignauthority is charged with the duty to create a suitable atmosphere for the people
living within its jurisdiction to fulfill their basic rights. The problem, then, starts
when the sovereign authority fails to provide the conditions essential to thefulfillment of basic rights –the problem of failed states– or itself abuses theserights –the problem of oppressive governments. Humanitarian intervention, in
this light, aims at rectifying the relationship between the government and thegoverned and the way the internal aspect of sovereignty is constructed. In otherwords, it has no direct bearing on the external aspect of sovereignty.
Thus the argument that sovereignty is prerequisite for the fulfillment of thebasic rights of the individuals has undergone an important transformation,
without undermining the power of the sovereignty norm itself. Today, most of
the humanitarian emergencies are taking place in countries where the sovereignauthorities are unable to provide the basic conditions for the enjoyment of basic
rights. Although decolonization process created a great number of new states
and there was nominally a Westphalian system throughout the Cold War years,
in reality most of these states lacked the attributes of internal sovereignty. Mostof the time they lacked domestic cohesion and the central authorities werehardly able to monopolize the use of force, which is the defining character ofHumanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach31

being a ‘sovereign.’ Yet, the Cold War politics helped them avoid confronting
underlying problems. With the shield provided by the Cold War conditions isover and the globalization process is underway, the discrepancy between thereal conditions prevailing in the developing world and the absoluteinterpretations of sovereignty has become more and more visible. As a result,
the world is now faced with a range of “totally or partially failed, troubled ormurderous states whose claims to sovereignty are either unsustainable or45

unacceptable.” This is actually where the dilemma of nonintervention starts.
The rulers which lost the internal legitimacy by their inability to provide anautonomous domestic sphere have been mostly protected by the external aspectof sovereignty, which was expressed by the principle of recognition in theinternational community. They stayed in power at the expense of the society as
a whole and this led to the protection of injustice by the nonintervention norm
itself.
In this regard, the post-Cold War practice of humanitarian intervention
reflects a new understanding of the twin principles of sovereignty andnonintervention. Rather than going beyond the traditional Westphalian norms,
this new way of thinking seeks to reconcile the international intervention withthe traditional state sovereignty in what Francis Deng first called ‘sovereignty
46

as responsibility’. As discussed above, this concept has also influenced most of
the conceptual attempts to generate a consensus on the issue. This approach
underscores a state’s responsibilities and accountabilities to domestic andinternational constituencies. Accordingly, in order for a state to claim theprerogatives of sovereignty it must meet internationally agreed responsibilities
which include respecting human rights and providing life-sustenance to its
citizens. What is important in this conceptualization is that the first instance forthe protection of individual rights is still the state in question. As such, thisapproach represents an attempt to allay the concerns of developing countries,
mentioned above. Only in case a state fails to meet such obligations, then it
47

becomes legitimate for the international society of responsible states to intrude48

in and even undertake military intervention.

The culmination of the post-Cold War practice of the UN showed that whensuch an act is carried out by the SC the opposition seems to dissolve. Despite the32

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continuing opposition, in cases of extreme human suffering there is also a
growing support for, or at least acquiesce to, unauthorized intervention.
Therefore, it could be concluded that post-Cold War practice of humanitarian
intervention approaches the notion of sovereignty as responsibility and offers apromising amendment to the unrestricted interpretation of nonintervention and49

sovereignty.

As such, this reinterpretation also serves to consolidate international50

system, rather than undermine it. Despite his warnings against incorporationof human justice, noted above, Bull nonetheless admits that the continuation ofstates system necessitates that the element of international society in it should
be preserved and strengthened. This requires maintaining and extending
51

consensus about common values, as well as common interests. Moreover, healso believes that prospects for international society are bound up by theprospects of a cosmopolitan culture, which will increasingly need to absorb nonWestern traditions. To the extent that it helps advance common values, andgenerates a universal consensus on minimum standards of behavior, thepractice of humanitarian intervention is likely to enhance the societal dimension
in international system; hence strengthen it.
This practice also realizes the last goal of international society, identified by
Bull: upholding the “common goals of the social life.” Unlike many realists, Bull
does not isolate international society from domestic realm; rather he treats it as
an extension of human social life. In Bull’s understanding, the elementary goalsof social life include securing life against violence, keeping the promises andobserving agreements, and ensuring the possession of things. By securing life
against violence, humanitarian intervention thus becomes an important
instrument in realizing the goals of international society, hence further
contributes to its proper functioning.

3. State-centrism and restoration of actorhood
As the foregoing treatment of the English School suggests, state is theprimary actor in the international society. Bull maintains that “world politicalsystem is currently system of states but there is nothing to suggest that it may

Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach33

not be transformed one day. There could be new forms of universal politicalorganizations.” Although English School Scholars recognize the possibility ofalternatives to states system, they also point at strong tendencies thatperpetuate contemporary states system. Therefore they put emphasis on themaintenance and strengthening of the existing society of states. This statecentrism is a source of strength that adds to the explanatory capability of the
English School. This applies to both ends of intervention: the actors and objectsof intervention.
The actors: State-driven process
Indeed, a careful examination of the new consensus on humanitarian
intervention suggests that states and state-controlled institutions are still the
major actors in the intellectual and practical aspects of humanitarian
intervention. Despite the involvement of NGOs, and UN Secretary-General, themain push for the responsibility to protect approach came from some liberal
Western states. Although the UN SC has the legal authority to authorize
interventions for humanitarian purposes, actual decision to intervene and the
conduct of interventions still remains dependent on the policies of states,
particularly great powers. Especially the conduct of interventions is still boundby the availability of effective means of armed coercion, which is still under thesole possession of individual states, or regional alliances, such as NATO. So, as
expressed by Bull, in the absence of a supreme government or solidarity among
themselves, states took the initiative for the realization of common rules. Statesare, in that sense, the primary institutions or agents of the international society.
Bull underlines specifically that the realization of individual justice andprotection of human rights can be realized only through the mediation of states.
He also notes that protection of human rights will be selective and through themechanisms of international politics.
The nation-states are still around and will continue to be with us for sometime to come. Therefore, they would oppose to a process which will eventuallylead to the emergence of supranational authority structures above themselves,
hence undermine the current system drastically. For this reason, despite theenhanced place given to humanitarian intervention, it still remains as an
exception rather than a rule. States opposed to the emergence of a norm that34

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would create legal and political obligation to intervene in every case. As argued
earlier, currently the decision to intervene is still conditional on the politicalconditions, i.e. the readiness of the states to bear the material and human costsof humanitarian intervention. As a result, post-Cold War norms onhumanitarian intervention are permissive rather than binding. Looking at thissituation we can argue that the application of the concept will continue to be
selective, depending on the specific political conditions within which ahumanitarian crisis has emerged. Thus some human rights violations will still
remain untouched, as in Chechnya. The declining interest in humanitarian
intervention in the post-September 11 era, and the inability of the international
community to stop the bloodshed in Brundi and Darfur for a long time arereminders of how untenable the new consensus on humanitarian intervention
is. As the American commitment to global norms has been eroded by the concern
to counter threats to US national interests, the use of force has assumed a new
rationale, the international community has developed aversion to permissive
uses of force and the global hegemon itself has become the violator of thefundamental rights, the post-September 11 period witnessed the declining place
for humanitarian intervention.
Objects of intervention: restoration of sovereignty
In my discussion about reinterpretation of sovereignty, I underlined how
humanitarian intervention came to redefine the internal dimension of sovereignstatehood. With its emphasis on the primacy of the state as the main actor inworld politics, English School has an analytical superiority over cosmopolitan
approaches. As I argued above, under the current consensus, the state becomesthe first instance to address the rights of individuals. Only after it fails to fulfill
its obligations can international society step in to enforce the rights ofindividuals.
What is important, however, is what happens to the state in question after
intervention. One important consequence of the cases of humanitarian
intervention in the post-Cold War period has been the post-conflict
52

reconstruction of the target states. In none of the cases did the intervening
53

states attempt to occupy the country in question, but rebuild it. I think this has
important implications for the tension between sovereignty and humanitarian

Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach

35

intervention. Humanitarian interventions aimed at strengthening, notovercoming, state and state sovereignty. The target states were provided ahelping hand to (re) emerge as sovereign states. On this point, English School
also has superiority over realism, which similarly emphasizes the primacy ofstate. What happened during this process was consolidation but at the sametime redefinition of sovereignty. While strengthening the norm of statesovereignty, the new practice also added important qualifications to it, discussed
54

before. In this new understanding, sovereignty does not guarantee a state anautomatic right to protection under nonintervention norm. In order to claim thisright, a state now has to fulfill its duties, which is to respect fundamental
human rights of its own citizens. In other words, the legitimacy of state isredefined to include respect for individual rights. This new normative condition
now constitutes one of the basic conditions for the membership into
international society. From this perspective humanitarian intervention becomes
an important tool for restoring state authority to create more respected
members of the society of states. By rectifying the weak states possessing little
attributes of sovereignty, this process in fact strengthens the existing statessystem, based on sovereign nation-states. The idea that a state’s right to enjoy
the privileges of sovereignty depends on its possession of certain qualifications
has always been underlined by the scholars of English School. This idea dates
back to the founders of modern international law –natural law tradition–, such55

as Grotious, Wolf, and Vattel, who English School scholars highly value.

Conclusion: Why English School?
I have endeavored to make a case that existing Wesphalian order has builtin brakes against the incorporation of humanitarian intervention. Yet, post-Cold
War developments regarding the place of conventional norms of sovereignty andnonintervention in world politics on the one hand and the growing space for theprotection of human rights on the other have eased the worries about theprospect for order in international system and created a suitable environment
for the inclusion of humanitarian intervention without jeopardizing that order.
On the contrary, through the reinterpretation of the Westphalian principles inlight of the new realities of international relations, such as increased intrastate
violence, and the linkage between human rights and security, which were the36

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underlying reasons behind the post-Cold War cases of humanitarian
intervention, humanitarian intervention contributed to the precarious worldorder and enhanced the prospects for the preservation of the states-system,
rather than undermining it. Post-Cold War practice of humanitarian
intervention thus can be considered as a via media solution, which endeavors tofind a balance between concerns for maintaining the current system on the one
hand, and allowing a room for humanitarian values on the other.
I have tried to show that the international society approach, particularly
Bull’s discussion about the fundamental goals of international society and theregulating norms of sovereignty and nonintervention, provides important
insights for our understanding of the place of humanitarian intervention inconceptual discussions and state practice. English School directs our attention
to both enabling and constraining factors, and as such there is both promise andcaution about the prospects for humanitarian intervention. By highlighting the
primacy of the world order, and the primacy of the nation states, it explains theexisting tendencies for the opposition to wholesale incorporation ofhumanitarian intervention and alerts us that this incorporation will never fully
take place. Similarly, by studying the power of the founding norms of theexisting Westphalian order, and their function for the preservation of the societyof states, it further underlines the difficulties involved in the incorporation ofhumanitarian intervention. On the other hand, it also highlights the importanceof maintaining the peace and common goals of the social life, and the need forshared values for strengthening the societal element of international system. As
such, it points out the factors that are permissive to the ‘limited’ incorporation ofhumanitarian intervention. Likewise, by highlighting the prospects for
reinterpretation of the traditional norms of non-intervention and sovereignty, itshows the likelihood for the accommodation of humanitarian intervention
within the confines of existing international society, without necessarilytransforming it in a cosmopolitan direction.

Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach

37

Notes
1 For more on the definitional issues, see: Kardas, Saban, “Humanitarian Intervention: A
Conceptual Analysis,” Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations (Vol.2. No.3-4,
Fall-Winter 2003), pp.21-49.
2 Oudraat, Chantal de Jonge, Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Legal and Political Conundrums(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Working Paper 15, August 2000),
p.4.
3 Abiew, Francis Kofi, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Finnemore, Martha, “Constructing Norms of
Humanitarian Intervention”, in Peter Z. Katzenstein (editor), The Culture of National Security:
Norms and Identities in World Politics (New York: Colombia Univ. Press, 1996).
4 Welsh also underlines that it is a debate about the boundaries of moral community, theconsequences of intervention, and the density of values that underpin international society.”
Welsh, Jennifer M., “Taking Consequences Seriously,” in Jennifer Welsh (editor) Humanitarian
Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.53.
5 Kardas, Saban, “Human Rights Policy and International Relations: Realist Foundations
Reconsidered,” Paper presented at ISA-West 2005, Las Vegas: September 30-October 1 2005.
6 Donnelly, Jack, “Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention and American Foreign Policy: Law
Morality and Politics”, Journal of International Affairs (37, Winter 1984), p.320.
7 Kelly, Kate, and David P. Forsythe,“Human Rights, Humanitarian Intervention, and World
Politics,” Human Rights Quarterly (Vol.15, No.2, May 1993), p.312; Dagi, Ihsan, “Human Rights,
Foreign Policy and the Question of Intervention,” Perceptions (Volume VI, Number 2, JuneAugust 2001), pp.105-119.
8 For a detailed analysis of the critics against humanitarian intervention, see: Welsh, op.cit., pp.5168; Holzgrefe, J.L, “The Humanitarian Intervention Debate,” in J.L. Holzgrefe and Robert O.
Keohane (editors), Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp.15-52.
9 Abrams, Elliott, “To Fight the Good Fight,” The National Interest (Spring 2000), p.70.
10 Corten, Olivier, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Controversial Right,” UNESCO Courier (Vol.52,
No.7, July/August 1999), p.58.
11 Bull, Hedley, Anarchical Society (New York: Columbia University Press, 2 nd Edition, 1995).
12 Brown, Chris, “World Society and the English School: An ‘International Society Perspective’ on
World Society,” European Journal of International Relations (Vol.7, No.4, 2001), p.427.
13 Brown, op.cit., p.437; On norms and power, see: Wheeler, “Humanitarian Responsibilities ofSovereignty,” in Welsh (editor), op.cit., pp.30-32.
14 Finnemore, op.cit., p.154.
15 Donnelley, Jack, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2003), p.157.
16 Danish Institute of International Affairs, Humanitarian Intervention: Legal and Political Aspects(Copenhagen: 1999), p.36; Weiss, Thomas G., “The Politics of Humanitarian Ideas”, Security
Dialogue (Vol.31, No.1, March 2000), p.13.
17 Rodley, Nigel S., “Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: The
Legal Framework”, in N. S. Rodley (editor), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness (London: Brassey’sltd, 1992), p.24; also see: Abiew, Francis Kofi, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of
Humanitarian Intervention (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), pp.98-99.

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18 Schnabel, Albrecht, “Humanitarian Intervention: A Conceptual Analysis”, in S. Neil Mac Farlane
and Hans-Georg Ehrhart (editors), Peacekeeping at a Crossroads (Clementsport: The Canadian
Peacekeeping Press, 1997), p.27; Dagi, op.cit.
19 Abiew, Francis Kofi, “Assessing Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War Period:
Sources of Consensus”, International Relations (Vol.XIV, No.2, August 1998), p.62.
20 In the case of Kosovo, except two NATO members, no reference to purely humanitarian concerns
were attempted. NATO members rather relied on previous SC resolutions, which defined thesituation in Kosovo posing threats to regional peace and security.
21 Vincent, R. J., Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1986), pp.113-114.
22 Jackson, Robert H., “Armed Humanitarism”, International Journal (XLVIII, Autumn 1993),
pp.582-583; also see Welsh, op.cit., pp.63-67.
23 Roberts, Adam, Humanitarian Action in War: Aid, Protection and Impartiality in a Policy
Vacuum (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 305, 1996),
p.20; Fisher, David, “The Ethics of Intervention”, Survival (Vol.36, No.1, Spring 1994), p.52.
24 Damrosch, Lori F., “Introduction”, in Lori F. Damrosch (editor), Enforcing Restrain: Collective
Intervention in Internal Conflicts (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), p.8; also
compare Hoffmann, Stanley, “Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention”, in Stanley Hoffmann,
The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1996), p.12; moreover see Roberts, op.cit., p.19.
25 Bull, op.cit., pp.16-17.
26 Vincent, op.cit., p.117.
27 Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 3 rd edition-2000). Also see:Welsh, op.cit., pp.60-62.
28 Wheeler, Nicholas and Morris, Justin, “Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at theEnd of the Cold War”, in Rick Fawn and Jeremy Larkins (editors), International Society after theCold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1996), p.166; seealso Holzgrefe, op.cit., pp.23-24.
29 Roberts, op.cit., p.20.
30 Hoffmann, “Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention”, p.22; also see Garrett, Stephan A.,
Doing Good and Doing Well: An Examination of Humanitarian Intervention (Westport: Praeger
Publishers, 1999), p.51.
31 Bull, Chapter IV.
32 Bull, Hedley, “Conclusion”, in Hedley Bull (editor), Intervention in World Politics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1984), p.187; for the shift in the approaches to nonintervention also see Ortega,
Daniel, Military Intervention and the European Union (Paris: Institute for Security Studies,
Western European Union, Chaillot Paper 45, March 2001), p.23; Abiew, The Evolution.., p.73; A
good account of the challenge against non-intervention can be found in Little, R. “Recent
Literature on Intervention and Non-intervention”, in Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffmann (editors),
Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention (London; Macmillan
Press, 1993), p.24.
33 Hoffmann, “Sovereignty and the Ethics of Intervention”, p.20.
34 Roberts, Adam, “The Road to Hell: A Critique of Humanitarian Intervention”, Harvard
International Review (Vol.16, Issue.1, Fall 1993), p.11.
35 See Weiss, Thomas, “The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect ina Unipolar Era,” Security Dialogue (Volume35, No.2, 2004), pp.135-153, for a critical account.

Humanitarian Intervention as a ‘Responsibility to Protect’: An International Society Approach39

36 de Cuellar, Javier Perez, Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization: 1991,(1991);36 Ghali, B. B., An Agenda for Peace (Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of
Organization: UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111, 17 June 1992); Annan, Kofi, “Two Concepts ofSovereignty”, The Economist (18 September 1999), p.49. Also see his: Annan, Kofi, Secretary
General’s Speech to the 54th Session of the General Assembly, 20 September 1999, Press Release
SG/SM/7136 GA/9596, 20 September 1999.
37 The idea that the Westphalian structure is being modified, but a new one has not emerged isadvocated by Weiss, “The Politics of.” He also notes that “non-intervention, the organizing
principle of international relations since Westphalia, is not what it once was”. pp.13, 19.
38 Bull, “Conclusion,” p.195. For his remarks on the impact of “the growing legal and moral
recognition of human rights on a world-wide scale” on the problem of humanitarian intervention,
see p.193.
39 Damrosch, Lori F., “Concluding Reflections”, in Damrosch (editor), op.cit., p.354.
40 The most controversial case in this regards was the NATO intervention in Kosovo which had thepotential of deteriorating the relations between Western countries and China and Russia. Yet,despite this potential danger, the intervention was successfully concluded without the feared
expectations realized. Even Russia later joined the international efforts for the reconstruction of
Kosovo and KFOR.
41 Stanton, Kimberly, “Pitfalls of Intervention”, Harvard International Review (Vol.16, Issue.1, Fall
1993), p.15.
42 quoted in Shulong, Chu, “China, Asia and Issues of Sovereignty and Intervention”, Pugwash
Occasional Papers (Vol.2, No.1, January 2001), p.42.
43 Annan, “Two Concepts,” p.49.
44 For the summary of the liberal case on intervention see Hoffmann, Stanley, “The Politics andEthics of Military Intervention”, Survival (Vol.37, No.4, Winter 1995-1996), p.35.
45 Hoffmann, “The Politics and Ethics,” p.31.
46 Deng, The Secretary General’s Special Representative, articulated his approach in a number ofpublications. Deng, Francis M., Protecting the Dispossessed: A Challenge for the International
Community (Washington DC: Brookings, 1993); Deng, Francis M., at al., Sovereignty as
Responsibility, (Washington DC: Brookings), 1995.
47 This new understandings raises an important moral question about the other side of the coin:
responsibility of the other states to intervene to halt humanitarian crises. This imposessignificant limitations on the external sovereignty of powerful outsiders; i.e. they cannot remainsilent to human suffering elsewhere. A good moral philosophical argument that there are specificlimits to states’ right to ignore the ill-treatment of residents within the territories of other states
can be found in, Shue, Henry, “Limiting Sovereignty,” in Welsh (editor), op.cit., pp.11-28.
48 However the criticism that these new developments undermine the existing rights of democracy,
i.e. sovereign equality, and self-government preserved in the UN Charter framework did notdisappear. This was mainly raised by neo-left, and liberal left. For a strong argument to that
effect, see: Chandler, David, “New Rights for Old? Cosmopolitan Citizenship and the Critique ofState Sovereignty,” Political Studies (Vol.31, 2003), pp.332-349; another strong criticism against‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was raised by Ayoob due to its undermining impact oninternational society. Ayoob, Mohammed, “Humanitarian Intervention and International
Society,” International Journal of Human Rights (Vol.6, No.1, 2002): pp.81-102.
49 Wheeler, employing international society approach and constructivism, provides a powerful
analysis of the emergence of this new norm: Wheeler, “Humanitarian Responsibilities,” pp.32-41;

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also see his Wheeler, Saving Strangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
50 As noted by Wheeler, reinterpretation of existing principles and justifying new practices on thebasis of their conformity with the prevalent norms is a central theme in the constructivist
account of norm creation and diffusion. Wheeler, “Humanitarian Responsibilities,” p.32.
51 Even his notion of common interest, which is one of the instruments of maintaining order,
implies a sense of common interest in the elementary goals of the international society.
52 Keohane also argues for unbundling the concept of sovereignty for the establishment oflegitimate authority after intervention. Non-Westphalian conceptualizations of sovereignty need
to be developed. Keohane, Robert O., “Political Authority after Intervention: Gradations inSovereignty,” in Holzgrefe and Keohane (editors), op.cit., pp.275-298.
53 International administrations / protectorate.
54 This qualifications are also the basis for further criticism for the new practice of interventionism.
Chandler calls it replacing sovereign equality with cosmopolitan ‘sovereign inequality.” Chandler,
op.cit, p.343.
55 Holzgrefe, op.cit., pp.25-28.