Emissions Gap Report 2018© 2018 United Nations Environment Programme
November 2018
ISBN: 978-92-807-3726-4
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Emissions Gap Report 2018
November 2018

V

Acknowledgements

UN Environment would like to thank the members of thesteering committee, the lead and contributing authors,
reviewers and the secretariat for their contribution to the
preparation of this assessment report.

Center for Climate Change Strategy and International
Cooperation, China), Heleen van Soest (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency)

Authors and reviewers have contributed to the reportin their individual capacities. Their affiliations are only
mentioned for identification purposes.

Chapter 3

Project steering committee
John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Navroz K.
Dubash (Centre for Policy Research, India), Thelma Krug
(Brazilian National Institute for Space Research), Harry
Lehmann (German Environment Agency - UBA), Jian Liu(UN Environment), Simon Maxwell (Independent), Surabi
Menon (ClimateWorks Foundation), Bert Metz (European
Climate Foundation), Katia Simeonova (United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change), Oksana
Tarasova (World Meteorological Organization), Merlyn
van Voore (UN Environment)

Chapter 1
Lead authors: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), John
Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

Chapter 2
Lead authors: Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute),
Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency), Kelly Levin (World Resources
Institute), Glen Peters (Centre for International Climate
and Environmental Research, Norway)
Contributing authors: Gabriel Blanco (National
University of the Center of the Buenos Aires Province,
Argentina), Jasmin Cantzler (Climate Analytics),
Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute), Alexandre
Koberle (Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institute for Graduate
Studies and Research in Engineering, Brazil), Lisa Luna
(NewClimate Institute), Ritu Mathur (The Energy andResources Institute, India), Marilena Muntean (Joint
Research Centre, European Commission) Jos Olivier(PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency),
Jorge Villarreal Padilla (Iniciativa Climática de México),David Rich (World Resources Institute), Fu Sha (National

Lead authors: Gunnar Luderer (Potsdam Institutefor Climate Impact Research, Germany), Joeri Rogelj(Imperial College London, UK; International Institute forApplied Systems Analysis, Austria), Michel den Elzen(PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency),
Jiang Kejun (Energy Research Institute, China)
Contributing authors: Daniel Huppmann (International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)

Chapter 4
Lead authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute),
Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute)

Chapter 5
Lead authors: Angel Hsu (Yale-NUS College/DataDriven Yale), Oscar Widerberg (IVM, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam)
Contributing authors: Fatemeh Bakhtiari (UNEP DTU
Partnership), Sander Chan (German Development
Institute), Katharina Lütkehermöller (NewClimate
Institute), Mark Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency), Amy Weinfurter(Data-Driven Yale)

Chapter 6
Lead authors: Matthias Kalkuhl (Mercator ResearchInstitute on Global Commons and Climate Changeand University of Potsdam), Brigitte Knopf (Mercator
Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate
Change), Kurt Van Dender (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development)
Contributing authors: Harro van Asselt (University ofEastern Finland), David Klenert (Joint Research Centre,
European Commission), Ruben Lubowski (Environmental
Defense Fund), Tobias S. Schmidt (ETH Zurich), Bjarne
Steffen (ETH Zurich)

VI

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Chapter 7

Chief scientific editors

Lead authors: Mariana Mazzucato (UCL Institute forInnovation and Public Purpose), Gregor Semieniuk (SOAS
University of London)

Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership), John Christensen(UNEP DTU Partnership)

Contributing authors: Kelly Sims Gallagher (Tufts
University), Anna Geddes (ETH Zurich), Ping Huang(Tufts University), Friedemann Polzin (Utrecht University),
Clare Shakya (International Institute for Environment andDevelopment), Bjarne Steffen (ETH Zurich), Hermann
Tribukait (Mexico Energy Innovation Funds)

Editorial team

Reviewers

Lars Christiansen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Olivier
Bois von Kursk (UNEP DTU Partnership), Anne Olhoff(UNEP DTU Partnership), John Christensen (UNEP DTU
Partnership), Philip Drost (UN Environment), Edoardo
Zandri (UN Environment)

Juan Carlos Altamirano (World Resources Institute),
Juan Carlos Arredondo, (Latin America Regional
Climate Initiative), Céline Bak (Centre for International
Governance Innovation), Maria Belenky (Climate
Advisers), Pieter Boot (PBL, Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency), Sylvain Cail (Enerdata), Jasmin
Cantzler (Climate Analytics), Maria Carvalho (London
School of Economics), Alex Clark (Climate Policy
Initiative), Heleen de Coninck (Radboud University
Nijmegen), Jacqueline Cottrell (Green Budget Europe),
Steffen Dockweiler (Danish Energy Agency), Philip Drost(UN Environment), Donovan Escalante (Climate Policy
Initiative), James Foster (UK Department for Business,
Energy & Industrial Strategy), Junichi Fujino (National
Institute for Environmental Studies, Japan), Ajay Gambhir(Imperial College London), Arunabha Ghosh (Council
on Energy, Environment and Water), Olivia Gippner(European Commission DG CLIMA), Jenny Gleed (CDP),
Vaibhav Gupta (Council on Energy, Environment andWater), Thomas Hale (Oxford University), Stephen Hall
(University of Leeds), Stephane Hallegatte (World Bank),
Yasuko Kameyama (National Institute for Environmental
Studies, Japan), Gerd Leipold (Humboldt-Viadrina
Governance Platform), Karan Mangotra (The Energy andResources Institute), Molly McGregor (World Resources
Institute), Laura Merrill (International Institute for
Sustainable Development), Rachel Chi Kiu Mok (World
Bank), Milimer Morgado (The Climate Group), Helen
Mountford (New Climate Economy), Caetano Penna(Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro), Miles Perry(European Commission DG CLIMA), Sumit Prasad(Council on Energy, Environment and Water), Jun Erik
Rentschler (World Bank), Marcia Rocha (Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development), Mark
Roelfsema (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency), William Scott (Smart Prosperity), Jean-Charles
Seghers (The Climate Group), Malcom Shield (C40),
Neelam Singh (World Resources Institute), Marcel Taal
(Netherlands government), Kentaro Tamura (Institute for
Global Environmental Strategies, Japan), Oras Tynkkynen(SITRA), Christopher Weber (WWF Global Science),
Shelagh Whitley (Overseas Development Institute),
William Wills (Laboratório Interdisciplinar de Meio
Ambiente), Harald Winkler (University of Cape Town),
Peter Wooders (International Institute for Sustainable
Development), Zhao Xiusheng (Tsinghua University)

Lars Christiansen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Olivier
Bois von Kursk (UNEP DTU Partnership), James Arthur
Haselip (UNEP DTU Partnership)

Project coordination

External global and national modelling data
contributors
Joint Research Centre, European Commission (Kimon
Keramidas and Giacomo Grassi) Princeton University(Hélène Benveniste)

Scenario database hosting and support
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis(Daniel Huppmann and Peter Kolp), and the Integrated
Assessment Modelling Consortium

Media and launch support
Keith Weller (UN Environment), Shari Nijman (UNEnvironment), Philip Drost (UN Environment), Roxanna
Samii (UN Environment), David Cole (UN Environment),
Mette Annelie Rasmussen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

Design, layout and printing
Caren Weeks (independent consultant), Joseph und
Sebastian (cover), Phillip Amunga (UN Environment),
Kailow A/SLanguage editing and translation of
Executive Summary
Strategic Agenda

Thanks also to:
Climate Transparency, Nick Mabey (E3G), Niklas
Hagelberg (UNEP), Jacob Ipsen Hansen (UNEP DTU
Partnership), Ghita Hjarne (UNEP DTU Partnership), Pia
Riis Kofoed-Hansen (UNEP DTU Partnership), Susanne
Konrad (UNEP DTU Partnership) Thomas Kragh Laursen(UNEP DTU Partnership) and Lana Schertzer (UNEP DTU
Partnership)
Finally, UN Environment would like to thank theGerman Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU), the Netherlands
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy, theClimate Works Foundation, and the Danish Ministryof Foreign Affairs for their support to the work of the
Emissions Gap Report

VII

Contents

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VContents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

VIIGlossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

IXAcronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

XII

Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  XIII
Executive summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  XIVChapter 1. Introduction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

1

Chapter 2. Trends and progress towards the Cancun pledges, NDC targets and peaking of emissions  . . . . . . . . . . . 

3

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.2

Peaking of greenhouse gas emissions  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.3

Current global emissions: status and trends  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4

2.4

Assessment of current policies: are G20 members on track to meet the Cancun pledges for 2020
and NDC targets for 2030, and to peak their emissions?  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Chapter 3. The emissions gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

16

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

3.2

Scenarios considered and updates made . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16

3.3

The emissions gap in 2030  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

3.4

Temperature implications of the NDCs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

3.5

Implications of 2030 emission levels  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

Chapter 4. Bridging the gap: Strengthening NDCs and domestic policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

23

4.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

4.2

Rationale and context for enhancing Nationally Determined Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23

4.3

Options for Parties to enhance mitigation ambition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

24

4.4

Strengthening domestic policies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

4.5

The scope for bridging the emissions gap through enhanced ambition and strengthened action  . . . . . . . . .

26

4.6

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

28

VIII

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – CONTENTS

Chapter 5. Bridging the gap: The role of non-state and subnational actors  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

29

5.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

5.2

Non-state and subnational actors and climate change negotiations: from Paris to Katowice . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

5.3

Overview of cooperative initiatives and individual commitments by non-state and subnational actor . . . . . .

30

5.4

The potential contribution of non-state and subnational actors to enhancing ambition and bridging
the 2030 emissions gap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5.5

36

Opportunities for harnessing the potential of NSA climate action to enhance ambition and bridge
the emissions gap  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

Chapter 6. Bridging the gap: Fiscal reforms for the low-carbon transition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

43

6.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6.2

The current state of fiscal policies and their potential for the low-carbon transition  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43
43

6.3

The political economy of green fiscal reform and carbon taxes: lessons learned  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

46

6.4

Addressing the broader fiscal policy framework: policy packages, coordination and alignment  . . . . . . . . . .

51

6.5

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

Chapter 7. Bridging the gap: The role of innovation policy and market creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

7.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

7.2

Innovation policies  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

7.3

Solar photovoltaic innovation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56

7.4

Barriers to implementing innovation policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

7.5

Conclusion: opportunities and challenges  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

59

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

60

Bridging the gap: Sectors and topics covered in the UN Environment Emissions Gap Reports  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 

84

IX

Glossary
This glossary is compiled according to the Lead Authors of the Report drawing on glossaries and other resources available
on the websites of the following organizations, networks and projects: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,
Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action, United Nations Environment Programme, United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and World Resources Institute.

Baseline/reference: The state against which change ismeasured. In the context of transformation pathways,
the term ‘baseline scenarios’ refers to scenarios thatare based on the assumption that no mitigation policies
or measures will be implemented beyond those thatare already in force and/or are legislated or planned
to be adopted. Baseline scenarios are not intended to
be predictions of the future, but rather counterfactual
constructions that can serve to highlight the level ofemissions that would occur without further policy
effort. Typically, baseline scenarios are then compared
to mitigation scenarios that are constructed tomeet different goals for greenhouse gas emissions,
atmospheric concentrations or temperature change. The
term ‘baseline scenario’ is used interchangeably with‘reference scenario’ and ‘no policy scenario’. In muchof the literature the term is also synonymous with theterm ‘business as usual (BAU) scenario’, although theterm ‘BAU’ has fallen out of favour because the ideaof ‘business as usual’ in century-long socioeconomic
projections is hard to fathom.
Bioenergy: Energy derived from any form of biomass
such as recently living organisms or their metabolic byproductsBlack carbon: The substance formed through theincomplete combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels, andbiomass, which is emitted in both anthropogenic andnaturally occurring soot. It consists of pure carbon inseveral linked forms. Black carbon warms the Earthby absorbing heat in the atmosphere and by reducing
albedo – the ability to reflect sunlight – when depositedon snow and ice.
Cancun pledge: During 2010, many countries submitted
their existing plans for controlling greenhouse gas
emissions to the Climate Change Secretariat and these
proposals were formally acknowledged under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC). Developed countries presented their plans inthe shape of economy-wide targets to reduce emissions,mainly up to 2020, while developing countries proposed

ways to limit their growth of emissions in the shape ofplans of action.
Carbon dioxide emission budget (or carbon budget):For a given temperature rise limit, for example a 1.5°C
or 2°C long-term limit, the corresponding carbon budget
reflects the total amount of carbon emissions that canbe emitted for temperatures to stay below that limit.
Stated differently, a carbon budget is the area under acarbon dioxide (CO2) emission trajectory that satisfies
assumptions about limits on cumulative emissions
estimated to avoid a certain level of global mean surface
temperature rise.
Carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e): A way to placeemissions of various radiative forcing agents on acommon footing by accounting for their effect on
climate. It describes, for a given mixture and amount ofgreenhouse gases, the amount of CO2 that would havethe same global warming ability, when measured overa specified time period. For the purpose of this report,
greenhouse gas emissions (unless otherwise specified)
are the sum of the basket of greenhouse gases listed
in Annex A to the Kyoto Protocol, expressed as CO2e
assuming a 100-year global warming potential.
Carbon intensity: The amount of emissions of CO2
released per unit of another variable such as grossdomestic product, output energy use, transport or
agricultural/forestry products.
Carbon offset: See Offset.
Carbon price: The price for avoided or released CO2 or
CO2e emissions. This may refer to the rate of a carbon
tax or the price of emission permits. In many models thatare used to assess the economic costs of mitigation,
carbon prices are used as a proxy to represent the levelof effort in mitigation policies.
Carbon tax: A levy on the carbon content of fossil fuels.
Because virtually all of the carbon in fossil fuels is
ultimately emitted as CO2, a carbon tax is equivalent toan emission tax on CO2 emissions.

X

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – GLOSSARY

Co-benefits: The positive effects that a policy ormeasure aimed at one objective might have on otherobjectives, without yet evaluating the net effect onoverall social welfare. Co-benefits are often subject
to uncertainty and depend on, among others, local
circumstances and implementation practices. Cobenefits are often referred to as ancillary benefits.
Conditional NDC: NDC proposed by some countries thatare contingent on a range of possible conditions, such as
the ability of national legislatures to enact the necessarylaws, ambitious action from other countries, realizationof finance and technical support, or other factors.
Conference of the Parties (COP): The supreme body of
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. It currently meets once a year to review theConvention’s progress.
Crowding in: The mobilization of private sector financefor innovative investment projects through public sector(co-)financing of these investments
Current policy trajectory: This trajectory is based on
estimates of 2020 emissions considering projectedeconomic trends and current policy approaches including
policies at least through 2015. Estimates may be basedon either official data or independent analysis.
Deforestation: Conversion of forest to non-forest.
Economic mitigation potential: The mitigation potential,
which takes into account social costs and benefits andsocial discount rates, assuming that market efficiency
is improved by policies and measures and barriers are
removedEffective carbon rate: Is the sum of carbon prices andexcise taxes per unit of carbon contained in a specificfossil fuel.
Emissions gap: The difference between the greenhousegas emission levels consistent with a specific probabilityof limiting the mean global temperature rise to below 2°C
or 1.5°C in 2100 above pre-industrial levels and the GHG
emission levels consistent with the global effect of the
NDCs, assuming full implementation from 2020.
Emission pathway: The trajectory of annual greenhousegas emissions over time.
Excise tax: A tax on the consumption or use of a specificgood, service, or activity. Excise taxes are mainly
introduced with the intention to create public revenues
for local, state or federal governments. Common
examples for excise taxes are taxes on alcohol, tobacco,
or fuel.
Global warming potential: An index representing the
combined effect of the differing times greenhouse gases
remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectivenessin absorbing outgoing infrared radiation.
Green fiscal reform: A major change in the tax systemwith the intention of introducing or increasing taxes
on environmental bads (such as pollution, carbon

emissions) while simultaneously decreasing other taxes(such as income taxes).
Greenhouse gases: The atmospheric gases responsible
for causing global warming and climatic change. The
major greenhouse gases are carbon dioxide (CO2),methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O). Less prevalent,but very powerful, GHGs are hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).
Innovation landscape: The entirety of the activities ofinnovation from research and development to diffusionof competitive products
Integrated assessment models: Models that seek tocombine knowledge from multiple disciplines in theform of equations and/or algorithms in order to explore
complex environmental problems. As such, they describe
the full chain of climate change, from production ofgreenhouse gases to atmospheric responses. This
necessarily includes relevant links and feedbacks
between socio-economic and biophysical processes.
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC):
INDCs are submissions from countries describing thenational actions it intends to take to reach the Paris
Agreement’s long-term temperature goal of limiting
warming to well below 2°C. Once a country has ratified
the Paris Agreement, its INDC is automatically converted
to its NDC (see below), unless it chooses to further
update it. INDCs are thus only used in this publication inreference to countries that have not yet ratified the Paris
Agreement.
Kigali Amendment: The Kigali Amendment to theMontreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer aims for the phase-down of hydrofluorocarbons(HFCs) by cutting their production and consumption.
Kyoto Protocol: An international agreement, standing
on its own, and requiring separate ratification by
governments, but linked to the UNFCCC. The Kyoto
Protocol, among other things, sets binding targets for the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by industrializedcountries.
Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF): A
greenhouse gas inventory sector that covers emissions
and removals of greenhouse gases resulting from direct
human-induced land use, land use change and forestry
activities.
Likely chance: A likelihood greater than 66 percent
chance. Used in this assessment to convey theprobabilities of meeting temperature limits.
Lock-in: Lock-in occurs when a market is stuck with astandard even though participants would be better off
with an alternative.
Mitigation: In the context of climate change, a humanintervention to reduce the sources, or enhance the sinksof greenhouse gases. Examples include using fossil fuels
more efficiently for industrial processes or electricity
generation, switching to solar energy or wind power,
improving the insulation of buildings and expanding

XI

forests and other ‘sinks’ to remove greater amounts of
CO2 from the atmosphere.
Monitoring, reporting and verification: A process/concept that potentially supports greater transparency inthe climate change regime.
Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC): Submissions
by countries that have ratified the Paris Agreement
which presents their national efforts to reach the Paris
Agreement’s long-term temperature goal of limiting
warming to well below 2°C. New or updated NDCs areto be submitted in 2020 and every five years thereafter.
NDCs thus represent a country’s current ambition/target
for reducing emissions nationally.
Non-state and subnational actors: ‘Non-state andsubnational actors’ includes companies, cities,
subnational regions and investors that take or commit toclimate action.
Offset (in climate policy): A unit of CO2e emissions thatis reduced, avoided, or sequestered to compensate foremissions occurring elsewhere.
Scenario: A description of how the future may unfold
based on ‘if-then’ propositions. Scenarios typically
include an initial socio-economic situation and a
description of the key driving forces and future changes
in emissions, temperature or other climate changerelated variables.

Source: Any process, activity or mechanism that releases
a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of agreenhouse gas or aerosol into the atmosphere.
Sustainable development: Development that meets theneeds of the present without compromising the ability of
future generations to meet their own needs.
Technical mitigation potential: Such potential
is estimated for given scenarios assuming full
implementation of best available pollutant reduction
technology, as it exists today, by 2030 independentof their costs but considering technical lifetime oftechnologies and other key constraints (e.g., culturalacceptance) that could limit applicability of certain
measures in specific regions.
Uncertainty: A cognitive state of incomplete knowledge
that can result from a lack of information or fromdisagreement about what is known or even knowable. It
may have many types of sources, from imprecision in thedata to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, or
uncertain projections of human behaviour. Uncertainty
can therefore be represented by quantitative measures(for example a probability density function) or by
qualitative statements (for example reflecting thejudgement of a team of experts).
Unconditional NDCs: NDCs proposed by countries
without conditions attached.
2020 pledge: See Cancun pledge.

XII

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – ACRONYMS

Acronyms°C

Degree Celsius

CDR

Carbon Dioxide Removal

CO2

Carbon dioxide

CO2eCarbon dioxide equivalent

COP

Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCCETSEmissions Trading System

EU

European Union

EV

Electric Vehicle

G20

Group of twenty

GHG

Greenhouse Gas

Gt

Gigaton

GW

Gigawatt

ICI

International Cooperative Initiative

INDC

Intended Nationally Determined Contribution

IPCC

Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change

LUC

Land Use Change

LULUCF

Land use, land-use change and forestry

m2

Square metre

Mt

Million metric ton

NDC

Nationally Determined Contribution

NSA

Non-state and Subnational Actor

OECD

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PV

Solar Photovoltaic

R&D

Research and Development

SIB

State Investment Bank

tCO2

Metric ton of CO2

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

USA

United States of America

XIII

Foreword

The world is at last beginning to tackle its fossil fueladdiction. Coal is no longer competitive, and windfarms and solar installations are gathering pace – inAustralia, northern Europe, China, India and elsewhere.
Electric mobility and ride sharing are redefining transport,
especially in cities tired of breathing dirty air. Huge
strides in energy efficiency are being made.
The problem, as the science here is telling us, is that
we’re not making the change nearly as quickly as weneed to. This is of course not new – it’s an almost
carbon copy of what we were told last year, and theyears before that. But what we do have is yet morecompelling science, and something that adds to thatprovided by the 1.5 degree report recently released by theIntergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
The message is clear: we need to make an almost
existential change, the solutions are there, and we haveno excuse.
And yes, it is still possible to bridge the emissions
gap to keep global warming below 2°C. However, theopportunity to bridge the 1.5°C gap is dwindling. We
can also see that the kind of unprecedented action weurgently need is not happening yet: in fact, global CO2
emissions did increase in 2017 after a few years ofstagnation.
Even if the nations of the world live up to their current
commitments, that will likely result in global warming ofaround 3°C by the end of the century. That’s a numberthat would be catastrophic – and fatal for many small
island states and coastal areas. The fact is that we are
already seeing climate change play out in front of us.
From the Caribbean superstorms to droughts in the Hornof Africa, or record temperatures and wildfires, our planetis already changing.

Closing the Emissions Gap means upping our ambition.
Net zero must become the new mantra, and we mustpursue this goal with confidence. After all, the scienceand data also show us that reducing and offsetting
emissions does not mean cutting growth. Quite thecontrary.
The science also shows emission reduction potentialfrom other actors such as regional and local
governments and businesses – is very large. Thatmeans that initiatives like the C40 cities coalition must
be commended and supported. So too must action to
improve air quality in cities – a double win that sparesboth children from the trauma of asthma and tackles
some of the root causes of other emissions.
Current impacts of actions by other actors are still
limited and not well enough documented, but we need tolook for action in all corners of the modern world.
We can also see that fiscal policies provide a huge
opportunity to reduce future emissions but need to be
designed and implemented carefully to deliver desired
results without creating economic and social issues.
The space for policies to boost innovation and open newmarkets for emerging technologies and practices also
has significant mitigation potential.
The key is to understand we are not powerless in theface of climate change. The science may be frightening,but the solutions are clear. The only missing link isleadership.

Joyce Msuya
Acting Executive Director
United Nations Environment Programme

XIV

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary

This is the 9th edition of the UN Environment Emissions
Gap Report. It assesses the latest scientific studies oncurrent and estimated future greenhouse gas emissions
and compares these with the emission levels permissible
for the world to progress on a least-cost pathway toachieve the goals of the Paris Agreement. This difference
between “where we are likely to be and where we need tobe” is known as the ‘emissions gap’. As in previous years,
the report explores some of the most important options
available for countries to bridge the gap.
The political context this year is provided by several
processes and events:•

The Talanoa Dialogue – an inclusive, participatory
and transparent dialogue about ambitions
and actions, conducted under the auspices of
the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) and designed to help
build momentum for new or updated Nationally
Determined Contributions (NDCs) to be submitted
by 2020.

•

The Global Climate Action Summit in September
2018 – bringing together many non-state andsubnational actors (NSAs) that are actively
involved in climate issues.

•

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming of
1.5°C – focusing on “the impacts of global
warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels
and related global greenhouse gas emission
pathways, in the context of strengthening the
global response to the threat of climate change,sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate
poverty”. The Emissions Gap Report has benefited
significantly from the IPCC Special Report and its
underlying studies.

This Emissions Gap Report has been prepared by aninternational team of leading scientists, assessing all
available information, including that published in thecontext of the IPCC Special Report, as well as in otherrecent scientific studies. The assessment production
process has been transparent and participatory. The
assessment methodology and preliminary findings weremade available to the governments of the countries
specifically mentioned in the report to provide them withthe opportunity to comment on the findings.
1. Current commitments expressed in the NDCs are
inadequate to bridge the emissions gap in 2030.
Technically, it is still possible to bridge the gap
to ensure global warming stays well below 2°C
and 1.5°C, but if NDC ambitions are not increased
before 2030, exceeding the 1.5°C goal can no longer
be avoided. Now more than ever, unprecedented
and urgent action is required by all nations. The
assessment of actions by the G20 countries
indicates that this is yet to happen; in fact, global
CO2 emissions increased in 2017 after three years ofstagnation.
This year’s report presents the newest assessment of theemissions gap in 2030 between emission levels underfull implementation of the unconditional and conditional
NDCs and those consistent with least-cost pathways tostay below 2°C and 1.5°C respectively.
•

With the results of the new global studies
prepared for the IPCC report, the emissions
gap – especially to stay below 1.5°C warming –has increased significantly in comparison withprevious estimates, as new studies explore morevariations and make more cautious assumptions
about the possibility of global carbon dioxideremoval deployment.

•

Pathways reflecting current NDCs imply global
warming of about 3°C by 2100, with warming
continuing afterwards. If the emissions gap is not
closed by 2030, it is very plausible that the goal ofa well-below 2°C temperature increase is also outof reach.

XV•

The assessment of country action for thisEmissions Gap Report concludes that while mostG20 countries are on track to meet their Cancun
pledges for 2020, the majority are not yet on apath that will lead them to fulfilling their NDCs for
2030.

•

Concerns about the current level of both ambition
and action are thus amplified compared toprevious Emissions Gap Reports. According to
the current policy and NDC scenarios, global
emissions are not estimated to peak by 2030, letalone by 2020. The current NDCs are estimated tolower global emissions in 2030 by up to 6 GtCO2e
compared to a continuation of current policies.
As the emissions gap assessment shows, thisoriginal level of ambition needs to be roughly
tripled for the 2°C scenario and increased aroundfivefold for the 1.5°C scenario.

•

Action by non-state and subnational actors(NSAs), including regional and local governments
and businesses, is key to implementing the NDCs.
The strong engagement by NSAs demonstrated
at the recent Global Climate Action Summit ispromising and can help governments deliver on
their NDCs, but the impact of current individual
NSA pledges on reducing the gap is extremely
limited. Chapter 5 of this Emissions Gap Report
was pre-released at the Summit, and documentsthat if international cooperative initiatives
succeed in increasing their membership andambition, substantially greater potential can berealized. The chapter emphasizes that enhanced
monitoring and reporting of actions and resulting
emissions reductions will be essential for thecredibility of NSA action.

•

Countries therefore need to move rapidly on theimplementation of their current NDCs; at thesame time, more ambitious NDCs are necessary
by 2020 to meet the jointly agreed goals. This
report summarizes the different approaches
countries can take to build enhanced ambitionand enhance the scale, scope and effectivenessof their domestic policy.

•

The policies and measures chapters in this year’s
report address two key aspects for the longerterm transition to a zero-emission economy andsociety. Fiscal policies provide a key opportunity
for reducing future emissions, and there are
options to design them in such a way that they
deliver the desired results without creating
economic and social problems. Several countries
have demonstrated that it is possible to overcomesocial resistance, but few have gone far enoughto have the necessary emissions reduction
impact. Innovation policy and market creation
also offer significant mitigation potential andgovernments should play a key role in ensuring
the development and market introduction of
new and emerging low-carbon technologies andpractices.

The key messages from the 2018 Emissions Gap Report
send strong signals to national governments and to thepolitical part of the Talanoa Dialogue at the 24th sessionof the Conference of the Parties (COP 24). Along with therecent IPCC Special Report, these messages provide thescientific underpinning for the UN 2019 Climate Summit,
which will convene on the theme of ‘A Race We Can Win.
A Race We Must Win’. By way of the summit, the United
Nations Secretary-General will seek to challenge States,
regions, cities, companies, investors and citizens to stepup action in six key areas: energy transition, climate
finance and carbon pricing, industry transition, naturebased solutions, cities and local action, and resilience.
2. Global greenhouse gas emissions show no signsof peaking. Global CO2 emissions from energy andindustry increased in 2017, following a three-year
period of stabilization. Total annual greenhousegases emissions, including from land-use change,
reached a record high of 53.5 GtCO2e in 2017,an increase of 0.7 GtCO2e compared with 2016.
In contrast, global GHG emissions in 2030 need
to be approximately 25 percent and 55 percent
lower than in 2017 to put the world on a least-cost
pathway to limiting global warming to 2°C and 1.5°C
respectively.
In 2017 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions - excluding
emissions from land-use change - reached a record
49.2 GtCO2e. This is an increase of 1.1 percent on theprevious year. Emissions from land-use change, whichvary from year to year because of weather conditions,
added another 4.2 GtCO2, bringing the total to 53.5
GtCO2e.
Despite modest growth in the world economy, CO2
emissions from fossil fuel combustion, cement
production and other industrial processes remained
relatively stable from 2014 to 2016. This brought
optimism to climate policy discussions, indicating that
global GHG emissions might show signs of peaking.
However, preliminary estimates of global CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels, industry and cement for 2017 suggest
an increase of 1.2 percent (figure ES.1). The main driversof the increase are higher gross domestic product(GDP) growth (about 3.7 percent) and slower declines
in energy, and especially carbon, intensity, comparedwith the 2014–2016 period. The 2017 increase leaves
considerable uncertainty as to whether the 2014–2016
slowdown was driven primarily by short-term economic
factors.
Since CO2 emissions from fossil fuels, industry andcement dominate total GHG emissions, the changes
in CO2 emissions had the largest influence on GHG
emissions from 2014 to 2017. Land-use change
emissions have remained relatively flat, despite large
annual variations driven by weather patterns anduncertainty in input data.
Global peaking of emissions by 2020 is crucial
for achieving the temperature targets of the Paris
Agreement, but the scale and pace of current mitigation
action remains insufficient. Following on from theTalanoa Dialogue, which has raised confidence in
implementation efforts and has shown that increased
ambition is possible, national governments have theopportunity to strengthen their current policies and their
NDCs by 2020.
Global peaking of GHG emissions is determined by theaggregate emissions from all countries. While there has
been steady progress in the number of countries thatXVI

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Figure ES.1: Average annual growth rates of key drivers of global CO2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components of
GHG emissions (right of dotted line).

Average Annual Growth Rate(% per year)

6
2004 - 201452014 - 2016

4

2017

3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3

P)

P

GD

im

Pr

y

ar

ity

ity

gy

P
(P

r
ne

E

gy

er

En

s
en

t

In

on

s
en

t

In

rb

Ca

/o

4

C
LU

CH

2O

N

2w
O
C

as

g
F-

G

GH

/o

C
LU

w

Note: Land-use change emissions are not included due to large inter-annual variability. Leap-year adjustments are not included in the growth rates.

have peaked their GHG emissions or have pledged to
do so in the future (figure ES.2), the 49 countries thathave so far done so, and the 36 percent share of global
emissions they represent, is not large enough to enable

the world’s emissions to peak in the near term. By 2030,
up to 57 countries, representing 60 percent of global
emissions, will have peaked, if commitments are fulfilled.

Figure ES.2: Number of countries that have peaked or are committed to peaking their emissions, by decade (aggregate)
and percentage of global emissions covered (aggregate).

Number ofcountries thathave peaked:

49

53

57

33
19

Percentage ofglobal emissions
covered by thesecountries:

Source: Levin and Rich (2017).

21%

18%

36%

40%

60%

By 1990

By 2000

By 2010

By 2020

By 2030XVII

Countries that have already peaked have a critical roleto play in determining the timing and level of global
emissions peaking, as each country’s decarbonization
rate after peaking will be a defining factor in global
cumulative emissions. However, it is clear that countries
that have peaked their GHG emissions have not reduced
their emissions at a fast-enough rate since the peak year.
Collectively, G20 members are projected to achieve theCancun pledges by 2020, but they are not yet on track
to realize their NDCs for 2030. Consistent with past
Emissions Gap Reports, this report finds that the GHG
emissions of the G20 countries, as a group, will nothave peaked by 2030 unless there is a rapid increase inambition and action within the next few years.
While G20 members collectively are on track to achieving
the target emission levels in 2020 implied by the Cancun
pledges, some countries (Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, theRepublic of Korea, South Africa and the USA) are either
not projected to achieve their Cancun pledges, or there is
uncertainty on whether they will achieve them.
At present, the G20 countries are collectively not on track

to meet their unconditional NDCs for 2030. Around halfof the G20 members’ GHG emissions trajectories fallshort of achieving their unconditional NDCs (Argentina,
Australia, Canada, EU28, the Republic of Korea, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa and the USA). Three G20 members(Brazil, China and Japan) are on track to meeting their
NDC targets under current policies, while emissions
under current policies of three additional countries(India, Russia and Turkey) are projected to be more than
10 percent below their unconditional NDC targets. Thismay, in some cases, reflect relatively low ambition in the
NDCs. It is uncertain whether two countries (Indonesia
and Mexico) are on track to meeting their NDC targets in
2030 under current policies.
G20 members will need to implement additional policies
to reduce their annual GHG emissions further by about
2.5 GtCO2e to achieve their unconditional NDCs and by
about 3.5 GtCO2e to achieve their conditional NDCs by
2030. These additional reductions needed have gone
down by approximately 1 GtCO2e compared with 2017,
due to lower projections of emissions under current
policies in China, the EU28 and the USA.

Table ES.1: Total global greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile
range), temperature implications and the resulting emissions gap.
Numberofscenarios
in setGlobal total
emissionsin 2030[GtCO2e]No-policy
baseline179

65 (60–70)

Current policy

4

Unconditional
NDCs
Conditional
NDCs

Scenario(rounded to
the nearest
gigatonne)

Below 2.0°C(66% chance)

Below 1.8°C(66% chance)

Below 1.5°C in
2100(66% chance)

Estimated temperature outcomes

Below
2°C

Below
1.8°C

Below
1.5°C
in 2100

59 (56–60)

18 (16–20)

24 (22–25)

35 (32–36)

12

56 (52–58)

15 (12–17)

21 (17–23)

32 (28–34)

10

53 (49–55)

13 (9–15)

19 (15–20)

29 (26–31)

29

43

13

40 (38–45)

34 (30–40)

24 (22–30)

50%
chance66%
chance90%
chanceEmissions Gap in 2030
[GtCO2e]Peak:
1.7–1.8°C

Peak:
1.9–2.0°C

Peak:
2.4–2.6°C

In 2100:
1.6–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.8–1.9°C

In 2100:
2.3–2.5°C

Peak:
1.6–1.7°C

Peak:
1.7–1.8°C

Peak:
2.1–2.3°C

In 2100:
1.3–1.6°C

In 2100:
1.5–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.9–2.2°C

Peak:
1.5–1.6°C

Peak:
1.6–1.7°C

Peak:
2.0–2.1°C

In 2100:
1.2–1.3°C

In 2100:
1.4–1.5°C

In 2100:
1.8–1.9°C

Note: The gap numbers and ranges are calculated based on the original numbers (without rounding), which may differ from the rounded numbers (thirdcolumn) in the table. Numbers are rounded to full GtCO2e. GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year global warming potential (GWP) values of
the IPCC Second Assessment Report. The NDC and current policy emission projections may differ slightly from the presented numbers in Cross-Chapter
Box 11 of the IPCC Special Report (Bertoldi et al., 2018) due to the inclusion of new studies after the literature cut-off date set by the IPCC. Pathways weregrouped in three categories depending on whether their maximum cumulative CO2 emissions were less than 600 GtCO2, between 600 and 900 GtCO2, or
between 900 and 1,300 GtCO2 from 2018 onwards until net zero CO2 emissions are reached, or until the end of the century if net zero is not reached before.
Pathways assume limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation thereafter. Estimated temperature outcomes are based on the method used in the
IPCC 5th Assessment Report.

XVIII EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

3. The gap in 2030 between emission levels underfull implementation of conditional NDCs and thoseconsistent with least-cost pathways to the 2°C
target is 13 GtCO2e. If only the unconditional NDCs
are implemented, the gap increases to 15 GtCO2e.
The gap in the case of the 1.5°C target is 29 GtCO2e
and 32 GtCO2e respectively. This gap has increased
compared with 2017 as a result of the expanded andmore diverse literature on 1.5°C and 2°C pathways
prepared for the IPCC Special Report.
The 2018 Emissions Gap Report draws on a substantial
number of new, least-cost scenarios for meeting the 2°C
and 1.5°C warming limits. Last year 16 scenarios wereavailable for both the 1.5°C and 2°C pathway categories;
this year, there are a total of 85. These new scenarios are
more diverse and often set a lower maximum potential
for carbon dioxide removal, which in turn results indeeper emissions reductions over the coming decades tostay within the same overall carbon budget. Each of the
scenarios considers least-cost climate change mitigation
pathways that start reductions from 2020 and is basedon the climate model and set-up used in the IPCC 5th
Assessment Report.
Three temperature levels – 2°C, 1.8°C and 1.5°C – arechosen to provide a more nuanced overview of pathways
that keep warming in the range of 2°C to 1.5°C, including
providing an overview of the peak and 2100 temperature
outcomes associated with different likelihoods (tableES.1). The inclusion of the 1.8°C level allows a morenuanced interpretation and discussion of the Paris
Agreement’s temperature targets.
Current policies are estimated to reduce global
emissions in 2030 by around 6 GtCO2e compared with

Figure ES.3: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030
(median estimate and 10th to 90th percentile range).

XIX

the no-policy scenario (table ES.1). This is in line withthe 2017 assessment, implying that studies have not
identified significant and unambiguous progress in theimplementation of policies that would enable the NDCs
to be achieved by 2030.
The updates to this year’s assessment result in changesof the GHG emission levels in 2030, compared with the2017 Emissions Gap Report, consistent with limiting
global warming to 2°C and lower. According to the new
scenario estimates, emissions of all GHGs should notexceed 40 (range 38–45) GtCO2e in 2030, if the 2°C
target is to be attained with about 66 percent chance.
To keep global warming to 1.8°C with about 66 percent
chance, global GHG emissions in 2030 should notexceed 34 (range 30–40) GtCO2e. For a 66 percent
chance of keeping temperature increase below 1.5°C
in 2100 (associated with no or a low overshoot), global
GHG emissions in 2030 should not exceed 24 (range
22–30) GtCO2e.
The full implementation of the unconditional NDCs isestimated to result in a gap of 15 GtCO2e (range 12–17)
in 2030 compared with the 2°C scenario. This is about
2 GtCO2e higher than the gap assessed in the previous
report because the most recent 2°C scenarios indicate
a lower benchmark. If, in addition, the conditional NDCs
are fully implemented, the gap is reduced by about 2
GtCO2e. The emissions gap between unconditional NDCs
and 1.5°C pathways is about 32 GtCO2e (range 28–34).
This is about 13 GtCO2e higher than the assessmentin the 2017 report, due to the much larger number ofavailable scenario studies that rely less on large volumesof carbon dioxide removal and thus show lower 2030
benchmark values. Considering the full implementationof both unconditional and conditional NDCs would
reduce this gap by about 3 GtCO2e.
Implementing unconditional NDCs, and assuming thatclimate action continues consistently throughout the
21st Century, would lead to a global mean temperaturerise of about 3.2°C (with a range of 2.9–3.4°C) by 2100
relative to pre-industrial levels, and continuing thereafter.
Implementation of the conditional NDCs would reducethese estimates by 0.2°C in 2100. These projections are
similar to the 2017 estimates.
4. Countries need to strengthen the ambition of NDCs
and scale up and increase effectiveness of domestic
policy to achieve the temperature goals of the Paris
Agreement. To bridge the 2030 emissions gap andensure long-term decarbonization consistent with
the Paris Agreement goals, countries must enhancetheir mitigation ambition. Enhanced ambition in
the NDCs sends an important signal regarding
mitigation commitment, both internationally anddomestically. However, domestic policies are crucial
to translate mitigation ambition into action.
Ambition can, in this context, be viewed as a combinationof target-setting, preparedness to implement and acapacity to sustain further reductions over time.
There are various ways in which a country could reflectenhanced mitigation ambition in its NDCs (figure ES.4).
These options are not mutually exclusive, and whether

an NDC revision results in enhanced ambition depends
on the scale of the revision rather than its form. It is
important for countries to consider a wide range ofoptions to identify those that are most meaningful andpractical in their unique circumstances, and to bringabout the deep emission reductions required to bridge
the gap.
Major gaps in coverage and stringency of domestic
policies remain, including among G20 members, in, forexample, fossil fuel subsidy reduction, material efficiency
measures in industry, oil and gas, methane, support
schemes for renewables heating and cooling, emission
standards for heavy-duty vehicles, and e-mobility
programmes. Even in areas where policy coverage ishigh, stringency can be improved. For example, while all
G20 countries have policies to support renewables in theelectricity sector, stringency of these policies can still beenhanced.
The technical potential for reducing GHG emissions
is significant and could be sufficient to bridge
the emissions gap in 2030. A substantial partof this potential can be realized through scaling
up and replicating existing, well-proven policies
that simultaneously contribute to key sustainable
development goals.
The 2017 Emissions Gap Report provided an updated
assessment of the sectoral emission reduction
potentials that are technically and economically feasible
in 2030, considering prices up to US$100/tCO2e. It foundthat global emissions could be reduced by 33 (range
30–36) GtCO2e/year in 2030, compared with the current
policy scenario of 59 GtCO2e/year (Chapter 3). If, inaddition, a number of newer and less certain mitigation
options were included, the mitigation potential would
increase to 38 (range 35–41) GtCO2e. The emissions
reduction potential is thus sufficient to bridge the gap in2030. As the 2017 Emissions Gap Report showed, a largepart of the technical potential lies in three broad areas:
renewable energy from wind and solar, energy-efficient
appliances and cars, and afforestation and stopping
deforestation.
In these and many other areas – and across all
countries – there is significant potential to realize asubstantive part of the technical mitigation potential
through the replication of proven good-practice policies
that can simultaneously contribute to key sustainable
development goals. Realizing this potential would
significantly narrow the gap by 2030, beyond current
NDCs.
5. Non-state and subnational action plays an importantrole in delivering national pledges. Emission
reduction potential from non-state and subnational
action could ultimately be significant, allowing
countries to raise ambition, but the current impacts
are extremely limited and poorly documented.
NSAs provide important contributions to climate action
beyond their quantified emission reductions. Theybuild confidence in governments concerning climate
policy and push for more ambitious national goals.
They provide space for experimentation or act as

XX

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Figure ES.4: Typology of strengthening mitigation ambition of NDCs.

Strengthen or add a
GHG target

Strengthen or add asectoral non-GHG
targetStrengthen or add
policies and actions

Increase thestringency of an
existing GHG target

Increase the stringencyof a sectoral
non-GHG target

Strengthen existing
policies and actions

Expand the scopeand coverage of an
existing GHG target

Advance the target
year of a sectoral
non-GHG target

Add new
policies and actions

Change thetarget period of an
existing GHG target

Declare an intent tooverachieve a sectoral
non-GHG target

Declare an intent
to overachieve an
existing GHG target

Adopt a new sectoral
non-GHG target

Align imlementationof the existing NDC
with long-term goals
Commit to achieving
the existing NDC via
policies and actions
that support long-term
decarbonization
pathwaysStrengthen themodalities of an
existing GHG target
Change the type of an
existing GHG target

Adopt anew GHG target
Source: adapted from Franzen et al., (2017)

Source: adapted from Fransen et al. (2017).

orchestrators, coordinating with national governments on
climate policy implementation. Initiatives and actors also
incentivize, support and inspire additional climate action
by exchanging knowledge and good practices, engaging
in advocacy and policy dialogue, assisting in formulating
action plans, and rewarding and recognizing climate
actions.
The number of actors participating is rising fast:
more than 7,000 cities from 133 countries and 245
regions from 42 countries, along with more than 6,000
companies with at least US$36 trillion in revenue, havepledged mitigation action. Commitments cover large
parts of the economy and are gradually expanding inregional coverage. Many of the actors are engaging in
so-called ‘international cooperative initiatives’, which
are characterized by multi-country and multi-actor
engagement.

The numbers seem impressive, but there is still huge
potential for expansion. Based on available data, noteven 20 percent of the world population is represented
in current national and international initiatives, and many
more of the over 500,000 publicly traded companies
worldwide still can, and must, act. On the financial side,a record of just over US$74 billion of Green Bonds were
issued in the first half of 2018, but this still represents
only a very small fraction of the capital markets aroundthe world.
The emission reduction potential from NSAs is large, butestimates vary considerably across studies (figure ES.5).
If international cooperative initiatives are scaled up to
their fullest potential, the impact could be considerable
compared with current policy: up to 19 GtCO2e/year by2030 (range 15–23 GtCO2e) according to one study.
If realized, this would be instrumental in bridging theemissions gap to 2°C pathways.

XXI

Figure ES.5: The range of estimated potential emission reductions in various NSA studies.
Figure ES.5a: Emission reduction potentialof pledged commitments by NSAs.

Figure ES.5b: Scaled up potential emission
reductions based on single and multiple initiatives.

70

Annual GHG emissions in 2030 (GtCO2e)

Individual commitments

Single Initiatives

Multiple Initiatives
No policy

65 baseline
0.4

0.53

60
0.46

0.74 1.40

Current policy

59 scenario

5.5
1.85

0.02 0.45

50

0.55

Unconditional

56 NDC scenario
3.7
3.7
8

40 2ºC scenario

40
19

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potential
based onassumptions

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Ranges* Data-Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL Netherlands

Source: Based on data in table 5.2.
Note: a) For studies that include ranges, median estimates are provided with ranges indicated in figures ES.5a and ES.5b.
b) Studies that are cross-hatched evaluate single and multiple ICI goals rather than individual actors’ recorded and quantified pledges. They rely on
assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantified analysis of individual actors’ NSA pledges.
c) Extrapolation of 2025 estimates has been made.

However, the additional emission reductions under full
implementation of pledged commitments made so far
by individual non-state actors are still quite limited: up to
0.45 GtCO2e/year (range 0.2–0.7 GtCO2e/year) by 2030
compared with full unconditional NDC implementation,and up to 1.85 GtCO2e/year (range 1.5–2.2 GtCO2e/year)
compared with current policy. A more comprehensive
assessment of all non-state and subnational climate
action occurring globally is limited by the current low
level of available data and lack of consistent reporting on
non-state and subnational climate action.
Non-state actors need to adopt common principles
when formulating their actions. Such principles should
include clear and quantifiable targets based on relevantbenchmarks, technical capacity of the actors, availabilityof financial incentives and the presence of regulatory
support.
6. Fiscal policy reform can play a key role in creatingstrong incentives for low-carbon investments andreducing GHG emissions. Revenues from carbon

pricing can be used for reducing other taxes,
increase spending on social issues or compensating
low-income households. Well-designed fiscal
reform packages can reduce the costs of mitigating
emissions, thereby making these fiscal reforms
more socially acceptable. The use of carbon pricing
to reduce GHG emissions is still only emerging
in many countries and generally not applied at a
sufficient level to facilitate a real shift towards lowcarbon societies.
Fiscal policy is a key government tool for managing andinfluencing the national economy and can be used to
tax fossil fuels or subsidize low-emission alternatives
as a way of influencing carbon emissions and ultimately
investments in the energy sector.
Pricing of carbon emissions through taxes or domestic
emissions trading systems is, in many countries, partof the national climate policy and is referenced in many
NDCs as one of the possible policy tools to be used.
Before 2005, when the Kyoto Protocol entered into force,
hardly any emissions were covered by carbon taxes or

XXII

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Figure ES.6: Key issues for making fiscal reforms politically viable (upper part) and solutions and measures to address
them (lower part).

Key issues

Alleviate effect of
unilateral policies:
Tackle carbon leakage

Ensure equitable distributionof costs:
Support households and firms

Solutionsandmeasures

Foster public support:
Political and behavioral enablers tohigher energy prices or taxes

Establish trustin governments

Affected industry support:targeted compensation(firms & workers)

Carbon tariffs andborder-carbon
adjustment (BCA)

Avoid solution aversion
Information andcommunication about
impacts

Investments fostering
structural change(energy, infrastructure)

Appropriate timing
and sequencing
Affected industry support:
trade-exposedindustries

Consider wording
and framing

Reduce income taxes
Cash transfers forhouseholds/consumers

Climate projects, lowcarbon investment

Use revenues appropriately
Note: The green arrows show different ways to use revenues from carbon pricing. Measures that are related to financial flows have a green mark.

trading systems. Coverage of explicit carbon pricing
policies increased to about 5 percent of global GHG
emissions between 2005 and 2010, primarily becauseof the introduction of the European Union’s Emissions
Trading System. Between 2010 and 2018, coverage rose
to about 15 percent of global emissions, with 51 carbon
pricing initiatives now in place or scheduled. If China
implements carbon pricing as announced, coverage
would rise to about 20 percent of global GHG emissions.
However, in most countries, fiscal policy is currently not
yet geared towards delivering the required transition to a
low-carbon economy. Effective carbon prices are too low
and inconsistent, and the broader fiscal policy framework
is often poorly aligned with climate policy goals. Besides
carbon pricing, many governments levy specific taxes onenergy use—partly to collect additional revenues. Even
when considering energy-specific taxes together with

explicit carbon pricing policies, half of the emissions
from fossil fuels are not priced at all, and only 10 percent
of global emissions from fossil fuels are estimated to be
priced at a level consistent with limiting global warming
to 2°C.
Studies show that a carbon tax of US$70/tCO2 in addition
to existing measures could reduce emissions from justabove 10 percent in some countries to more than 40
percent in other countries. Furthermore, in developing
and emerging economies, an additional carbon tax ofthis order could raise the equivalent of 2 percent of grossdomestic product (GDP) in public revenue.
Fiscal policies are used for different purposes and many
countries actually subsidize fossil fuels for various
economic and social reasons. If all fossil fuel subsidies
were phased out, it would lead to a reduction of global
carbon emissions of up to about 10 percent by 2030.

XXIII

Innovation in solar photovoltaic (PV)technology illustrates both the nonlinear
nature of innovation and how the various
innovation policies reviewed drive and shape
it. PV was deployed with a compound annual
growth rate of about 38 percent from 1998
to 2015, continually defying forecasts. PV
diffusion spurred cost reductions through‘learning by doing’, scale economies andR&D, and also lower profit margins throughincreasing competition, which in turnstimulated further deployment of evercheaper systems. From 1975 to 2016, PV
module prices fell by about 99.5 percent, andevery doubling of installed capacity coincidedwith a 20 percent drop in costs. Public
innovation policies were, and continue to be,
crucial for this process across the innovation
chain.

Several key issues need to be considered whenintroducing carbon pricing and phasing out fossil
energy subsidies with the aim of reducing carbon
emissions. These issues, along with possible ways ofaddressing them, are illustrated in figure ES.6 below.
Embedding carbon pricing in fiscal reform packages
that are progressive, equitable and socially acceptable,
and incentivizing investment in new and job-creating
industries is essential. It is instructive for policymakers
to reflect on experience with other environmental fiscal
reforms, where positively worded narratives, transparent
communication, engagement with stakeholders andappropriate compensation have often helped overcome
political and popular resistance to policies that increase
fossil energy prices.
7. Accelerating innovation is a key component of any
attempt to bridge the emissions gap, but it will
not happen by itself. Combining innovation in theuse of existing technologies and in behaviour withthe promotion of investment in new technologies
and market creation has the potential to radicallytransform societies and reduce their GHG emissions.
Based on an assessment of existing studies of whatworks, there are five key principles or ‘success factors’
that policymakers should consider when designingpolicies and programmes to accelerate low-carbon
innovation:
1. Public organizations must be willing to take on thehigh, early-stage risk that private organizations shy
away from.
2. At the mid-stage of the innovation chain, publicorganizations must be able to nurture feedback
effects among different parts of the innovation
landscape and help de-risk private investment incommercial-scale projects.

3. Green policies must set a direction for the whole
economy, not for each sector separately.
4. Mission-oriented innovation is useful for stimulating
investment and innovation across different parts ofthe economy to reach concrete, target-specific goals,
such as X percent cost reduction in a specific lowcarbon technology, by a specific date.
5. Policy instruments need to be structured tomobilize actors through bottom-up exploration andparticipation. All these policies benefit from a longterm design horizon that creates certainty for private
finance to be crowded in.
While these principles apply to countries at any stage of
economic development, a country’s financial resources
and technological capacity determine what types ofconcrete policies are most appropriate.
In order to illustrate these rather abstract concepts, theglobal solar photovoltaic (PV) technology development
is presented as a case example of how application of thevarious innovation policy components has been driving
and shaping PV technology and market development,with different countries in the lead during different
periods.
The PV experience cannot be applied as a universal
model, but it illustrates the various innovation successfactors and the vision, patience and long-term thinking
often required. Indeed, it is useful to reflect on howcommercially viable, low-carbon technologies, such as
PV and on-shore wind turbines, achieved their present
status, when thinking about what is needed to reach
new goals. For example, how can we deliver on theneed for commercially viable and sustainable batteries
and other power-storage technologies to rapidly reduce
global transport-sector emissions by 2030? What kindof political vision and combination of public and private
resources, at what scale, should be agreed upon andcommitted to in order to make this happen?

In addition to assessing the emissions
gap, the Emissions Gap Reports coveropportunities for bridging the gap. Previous
reports have demonstrated how provenpolicies and measures, if scaled up acrosscountries and regions in terms of ambition,
stringency and geographical reach cancontribute to bridging the emissions gap,
while supporting broader development goals.
A summary of key areas and sectors covered
in previous reports is provided at the back ofthis report.

1

Chapter 1.
Introduction
Authors: Anne Olhoff (UNEP DTU Partnership) and John Christensen (UNEP DTU Partnership)

The year 2018 will most likely be the fourth warmest
year on record since 1880, with the past five years thefive warmest ever recorded (NOAA, 2018). In addition
to increased temperatures, 2018 has experienced
numerous other climate-related extremes, including
devastating storms, floods, heatwaves and droughts,
causing thousands of casualties and huge economic
losses for citizens, companies and states. While it isdifficult to attribute single events to climate change, thepatterns are well aligned with the findings of the recently
released Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change(IPCC) Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C(IPCC, 2018). The report details how climate variability
and extreme events will escalate with increased global
temperatures and determines that many impacts willbe irreversible, even if temperatures decrease again in
the long term. This Emissions Gap Report has benefited
significantly from the IPCC Special Report and its
underlying studies and scenarios.

specifies that countries must update their NDCs every
five years and that each update should reflect progressin terms of enhanced ambition (UNFCCC, 2015). NDC
updates will be informed by global stocktakes, the firstof which will take place in 2023, leading to revised NDCs
by 2025.

In its decision to adopt the Paris Agreement, theConference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
invited the IPCC to produce the special report on ‘theimpacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial
levels and related to global greenhouse gas emission
pathways, in the context of strengthening the global
response to the threat of climate change, sustainable
development, and efforts to eradicate poverty’.

The 2018 Talanoa Dialogue1 is an important precursor
to the global stocktakes. It is convened by the UNFCCC
as an inclusive, participatory and transparent dialogue
about future ambitions and current actions, designed
to take initial stock of countries’ collective efforts
and inform the preparation of new or updated NDCs
to be communicated by 2020 (UNFCCC, 2015:4). The
Dialogue consists of a preparatory and a political phase.
During the preparatory phase, Parties and non-Party
stakeholders are invited to submit inputs and participate
in discussions addressing three questions: Where are
we? Where do we want to go? How do we get there?
So far, Parties and non-Party stakeholders have sharedalmost 500 stories, submitted over 280 written inputs
and attended over 75 events (UNFCCC, 2018). This
will be synthesized and presented at the 24th sessionof the Conference of the Parties (COP 24) in December
2018, where the political phase will take place, informedby the outcome of the preparatory phase, the IPCC
special report and the forthcoming Yearbook of Global
Climate Action (United Nations Climate Change
Secretariat).

The IPCC special report is a major scientific input tothe political process of the United Nations Climate
Convention, in which the Talanoa Dialogue plays a keyrole this year. Both the IPCC report and the Talanoa
Dialogue are inputs to the stepwise ‘ramping-up’
mechanism of the Paris Agreement, created to address
the huge gap between the level of ambition reflectedby countries in their current Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs) and the level required to achieve
the goals of the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement

The Global Climate Action Summit held between 12
and 14 September 2018 in San Francisco was anothersignificant event under the climate change politicalprocess. It brought together more than 4,500 local andregional government and business leaders and othernon-state and subnational actors on climate change
to showcase climate actions around the world (Global
Climate Action Summit, 2018). The Summit resulted in
more than 500 announcements to strengthen climate
action by non-state and subnational actors.

1

Previously referred to as the ‘Facilitative Dialogue’, the Dialogue was re-named under the COP Presidency of Fiji in 2017.

2

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – INTRODUCTION

This Emissions Gap Report is the 9th independentscientific assessment produced by UN Environment toassess how countries’ mitigation actions and pledges
are affecting the global greenhouse gas emissions trend,
comparing it against the emission reductions necessary
to limit global warming to well below 2°C and 1.5°C inaccordance with the Paris Agreement. The difference
between these is known as the ‘emissions gap’. This
report has been prepared at the request of numerous
countries as an input to inform international climate
negotiations as the full implementation of the Paris
Agreement moves closer. A special pre-release versionof chapter 5 of this report was published in time for the
Global Climate Action Summit.
This year, the Emissions Gap Report has focused onproviding information relevant to the Talanoa Dialogue,
offering an updated assessment of the important roles
and potential contributions of non-state and subnational
actors to climate change, and updating and improving
the gap assessment, using the most recent studies andscenarios.
The report is organized into seven chapters, including
this introduction. Chapter 2 presents an update ofcurrent global emissions and assesses the trends andprogress of G20 members towards achieving pledged
2020 emission reductions, the Cancun pledges and NDCemission targets. The chapter also considers whether
global greenhouse gas emissions show signs of peaking,which is crucial for achieving the temperature targets of
the Paris Agreement and depends on when emissions
peak in individual countries, the level at which emissions
peak and the rate of decline following this. Chapter 3
provides an updated assessment of global emission
levels in 2030 consistent with the temperature goal of theParis Agreement, based on the significantly expanded setof new least-cost scenarios, which were prepared in thecontext of the IPCC Special Report. Updated estimatesof global emission levels in 2030 under different policy
and NDC implementation scenarios are also provided.
Together, these form the basis for an update of the 2030
emissions gap.

In line with previous editions, the report provides insight
into how the emissions gap can be bridged. Chapter
4 presents an overview of options for enhancing theambition of NDCs, while strengthening action througha suite of domestic policies targeting climate change.
Chapter 5 assesses the role and potential of non-stateand subnational actors in bridging the emissions gap,
based on the most recent studies, while chapter 6
examines the role of fiscal policy reform in creatingstrong incentives for low carbon investments andreducing greenhouse gas emissions, with particularattention given to carbon pricing and taxation. Finally,
chapter 7 assesses how accelerating innovation canhelp bridge the emissions gap, while also transforming
societies. Previous Emissions Gap Reports have covered
a number of other important areas and sectors withsignificant potential to bridge the emissions gap. A
summary of these is provided at the back of this report.
This report has been prepared by an international teamof 42 leading scientists from 25 scientific groups in 14
countries. As in previous years, a renowned steeringcommittee guided the assessment, which followed atransparent and participatory production process. The
assessment methodology and preliminary findings
were made available to the governments of countries
specifically mentioned in this report, which were invited
to comment on the findings.
The information contained in the report provides
important inputs to the current debate on global climate
policy and the actions needed to meet the goal of theParis Agreement. Meeting the 2030 targets is crucial
for limiting the adverse impacts of climate change andcreating the foundation necessary to develop more
ambitious mitigation targets under the NDCs beyond
2030, aimed at achieving emission neutrality in thesecond half of this century alongside sustainable
development and poverty eradication efforts.
UN Environment hopes that this 9th edition of the
Emissions Gap Report will support the much-needed
move towards enhanced ambition and accelerated actionin the forthcoming climate negotiations in Katowice.

3

Chapter 2.
Trends and progress towards the Cancun pledges,
NDC targets and peaking of emissions
Lead authors: Takeshi Kuramochi (NewClimate Institute), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency), Kelly Levin (World Resources Institute), Glen Peters (Centre for International Climate and Environmental
Research, Norway)
Contributing authors: Gabriel Blanco (National University of the Center of the Buenos Aires Province, Argentina), Jasmin
Cantzler (Climate Analytics), Frederic Hans (NewClimate Institute), Alexandre Koberle (Alberto Luiz Coimbra Institutefor Graduate Studies and Research in Engineering, Brazil), Lisa Luna (NewClimate Institute), Ritu Mathur (The Energy
and Resources Institute, India), Marilena Muntean (Joint Research Centre, European Commission), Jos Olivier (PBL
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Jorge Villarreal Padilla (Iniciativa Climática de México), David Rich
(World Resources Institute), Fu Sha (National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation, China),
Heleen van Soest (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)

2.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the latest trends in greenhousegas (GHG) emissions and progress towards achieving
both the Cancun pledges and Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs). Particular focus is given to thepeaking of emissions at the global and national levels(section 2.2), the current status and recent trendsof global GHG emissions and for emitting countries(section 2.3), and whether GHG emissions are peaking
at the national level and the implications for global
peaking. In addition, this chapter also assesses whether
countries are on track to meet their Cancun pledges and
NDC targets and provides and update of recent policy
developments in G20 member countries (section 2.4).

2.2 Peaking of greenhouse gas emissions
To limit global warming to well below 2°C and 1.5°C,
global GHG emissions have to peak and decline rapidly
thereafter. Mitigation pathways consistent with a likely
chance of achieving the temperature targets require that,
global emissions peak by 2020. The Paris Agreement
suggests that Parties should collectively aim to reachglobal peaking of GHG emissions “as soon as possible”,
recognizing that “peaking will take longer for developing
country Parties” and should be guided by the principleof equity, acknowledging common but differentiatedresponsibilities and capabilities.
Global and national peaking of emissions and the ability
to meet the climate objective of the Paris Agreement
are dependent on three factors: the timing of nationaland global peaking, the level of emissions peaking and1

the rate of decline in emissions following the peak. It
is therefore crucial that countries not only commit topeaking their emissions at lower levels, but that they
achieve this as soon as possible and that the subsequent
rate of emissions decline is substantial (Levin and Rich,
2017). Although this applies to all countries, major
emitters play a key role in determining when and at whatlevel global emissions peak. This chapter therefore pays
particular attention to G20 members, who currently
account for around 78 percent of global GHG emissions.
Figure 2.1 shows the steady progress from 1990 to 2030
in the number of countries that have either peaked theiremissions or are expected to do so, provided that theymeet their commitments, alongside the percentage ofglobal emissions of these countries. By 2030, up to 57
countries representing 60 percent of global emissions
will have peaked, if they fulfil their commitments.
A country is considered to have peaked its emissions
if two criteria are met: its emissions reached theirmaximum level at least 5 years before the most recent
GHG inventory year; and the country has unconditionallycommitted to continue lowering its emissions below thepeak emissions level in the future. In some countries
classified as having peaked, emissions declined after the
initial peak year and then increased again, rather thandeclining steadily after the initial peak year. Despite thesefluctuations, the initial peak year is still considered as thepeak, since emissions are below this maximum emission
level.1

See Levin and Rich (2017) for a full discussion of the methodology and assumptions on how peaking was determined. One limitation of the referenced study is that it takes
countries’ commitments at face value by assuming they will be achieved by the target date, without considering whether targets will be underachieved or overachieved.

4

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – TRENDS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CANCUN PLEDGES, NDC TARGETS AND PEAKING OF EMISSIONS

Figure 2.1: Number of countries that have peaked or are committed to peaking their emissions, by decade (aggregate)
and percentage of global emissions covered (aggregate).

Number ofcountries thathave peaked:

49

53

57

33
19

Percentage ofglobal emissions
covered by thesecountries:

21%

18%

36%

40%

60%

By 1990

By 2000

By 2010

By 2020

By 2030

Source: Levin and Rich (2017).

Of the 19 countries that peaked their emissions inor prior to 1990, 16 were former Soviet republics or
economies in transition or both.2 Other countries thatpeaked by 1990 include Germany and Norway. By 2010,
39 of the world’s 43 Annex I countries peaked theiremissions. The 10 non-Annex I countries that peakedby 2010 or earlier are Azerbaijan, Brazil, Costa Rica,
Georgia, Micronesia, Moldova, Montenegro, San Marino,
Serbia and Tajikistan. Brazil is the first major emitting
developing country to peak their emissions, reaching amaximum level in 2004.3
By 2020, all but one Annex I country (Turkey, an emerging
economy) are expected to have peaked their emissions.
15 non-Annex I countries are committed to peaking theiremissions by 2030 or sooner, including China (for CO2
only) and Mexico,4 among others.
By 1990, three G20 members (the EU28, Germany andRussia)5 had peaked emissions. Half of G20 members(additionally, Australia, Brazil, Canada, France, Italy, theUnited Kingdom, and the USA) had peaked emissions by

2010 and another four member countries’ emissions will
peak by 2020 (Japan and the Republic of Korea), or by2030 (China (for CO2 only) and Mexico) if commitments
are achieved. Given existing unconditional commitments,
six G20 members’ GHG emissions show no sign ofpeaking, (Argentina, India, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa6 and Turkey).
Figure 2.1 indicates that the number of countries
expected to peak by 2030 and the share of global
emissions they represent is insufficient for global
emissions to peak in the near future. The following
sections provide further insight into issues relating to
the timing of national and global peaking, the level ofemissions peaking and the rate of decline in emissions
following peaks, examining the status and trends incurrent global emissions and progress of G20 members.

2.3 Current global emissions: status and trends
Total GHG emissions7,8,9 have increased steadily since1970, with trend variations usually explained by changes

2

It should be noted that while some of these countries’ commitments for 2020 and 2030 indicate an intended increase from recent emissions levels (e.g. Russia), futurecommitments do not propose to surpass 1990 emissions levels.

3

Brazil’s peak and subsequent decline in emissions reduction is primarily the result of actions to reduce deforestation in the Amazon region (Azevedo, T. R. et al. (2018)).
Any reversal of policy implementation could lead to increased emissions. Brazil’s emissions, excluding land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), have not yet peaked.

4

Mexico’s NDC mentions “a net emissions peak starting from 2026” (UNFCCC, 2016).

5

Russia’s emissions peaked prior to 1990. Although Russia’s commitments for 2020 and 2030 indicate an intended increase from recent emissions levels, its futurecommitments do not propose to surpass 1990 emissions levels.

6

As a conservative assumption, South Africa is not considered as having a firm commitment to peak, since there is no guarantee that the conditions upon which they made thepledge will be met.

7

This analysis is based primarily on GHG emissions data (fossil and industry CO2 and sources of CH4, N2O and fluorinated gases, but excluding land use CO2) using EDGAR
v5.0 (CO2)/v4.3.2 FT2017 for non-CO2 gases (Olivier et al., 2018). The largest changes compared with v4.3.2 FT2016 (Olivier et al., 2017) are in the CO2 emissions, since
the energy consumption data have been revised and expanded to include updated energy statistics from the International Energy Agency (IEA) for the whole time series
to 2015 instead of to 2012 (from v4.3.2 to v5.0) and revised BP statistics for the latest years. Furthermore, revisions for cement clinker and gas flaring were made using
updated statistics, which also changed the data before 2012, and the coverage of 3 other sources was improved (ethylene production, other chemical product use and waste
incineration).For non-CO2 sources updated statistics from IEA, BP, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and UNFCCC (reported data), among
others were used to estimate the 2012–2017 CH4 and N2O emissions. This means that statistics-based emissions are now updated to 2016 or 2017, with new statistics
and several revisions available for previous years. In total, these revisions show that total GHG emissions are roughly 0.9 GtCO2e higher than figures presented in recent
Emissions Gap Reports.

8

There are various estimates of emissions from LUC based on different system boundaries (Grassi et al., 2018) and different methods (Le Quéré et al., 2018). There is nocommonly accepted value of emissions from LUC, with different estimates giving different emission levels and trends (Le Quéré et al., 2018). Global emissions from LUC also
have large inter-annual variability driven by weather phenomena (e.g. El Niño). For this reason, LULUCF is not a focus of the analysis of global or country GHG trends.

9

Alternative datasets exist (particularly for CO2 emissions), though they generally lead to the same conclusions due to similar growth rates. For this reason, the discussion
focuses only on one dataset.

5

Figure 2.2: Average annual growth rates of key drivers of global CO2 emissions (left of dotted line) and components ofgreenhouse gas emissions (right of dotted line).

Average Annual Growth Rate(% per year)

6
2004 - 201452014 - 2016

4

2017

3
2
1
0
-1
-2
-3

P)

P

GD

im

Pr

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w

Note: Emissions from LUC are not included due to large inter-annual variability.

in economic output (such as recessions, Peters et al.,2011). In 2017, the total GHG emissions, excluding
emissions from land-use change (LUC),10 reached arecord 49.2 GtCO2e.11 Including LUC adds another 4.2
GtCO2, bringing the total to 53.5 GtCO2e, which is anincrease of 0.7 GtCO2e (1.3 percent) compared with2016. All GHGs have shown strong growth in the last
decades (figure 2.2), except for emissions from LUC,
which have remained relatively steady.
From 2014 to 2016 there was a distinct change in the
GHG emissions trend (excluding the more variable
emissions from LUC), even though the economy
continued growing (figure 2.2).
The slowdown brought renewed optimism to climate
policy discussions, since it may indicate a necessary
peak in global GHG emissions. Preliminary estimates ofglobal GHG emissions suggest they grew12 1.1 percent
in 2017, leaving considerable uncertainty as to whether
short-term economic factors were primarily responsible
for the 2014–2016 slowdown.

Since CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial
processes dominate total GHG emissions, changes
in CO2 emissions have the largest influence on GHG
emission trends. Despite the strong growth in economic
activity (Gross Domestic Product (GDP)) from 2014 to
2016, growth in energy consumption and CO2 emissions
from fossil fuels, industry, and cement slowed due tofaster than expected declines in energy and carbon
intensity (figure 2.2). Other GHGs (methane (CH4), nitrous
oxide (N2O), fluorinated gases) continued to grow from2014 to 2016, but with smaller changes compared withthe decadal trend (figure 2.2).
Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and industrial
processes grew at an annual rate of 2.3 percent from2004 to 2014. During 2014–2016 emissions had no
growth despite the economy growing 3.2 percent/year,
meaning that energy and carbon intensity reduced fasterin these years than in the previous decade. The increasein global CO2 emissions in 2017 (1.2 percent) resulted
from stronger Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth(estimated at 3.7 percent) and slower declines in energy

10 The scientific community uses different definitions for land-use change emissions compared to UNFCCC, leading to higher estimates in section 2.2 compare to the rest of thereport (Grassi et al., 2018).
11 Calculated using the Global Warming Potentials metric from the Second Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), similar to the 2017
Emissions Gap Report.
12 Growth rates are not adjusted for leap years.

6

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – TRENDS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CANCUN PLEDGES, NDC TARGETS AND PEAKING OF EMISSIONS

and especially carbon intensity. The 2017 growth raises
concerns that the progress made in the 2014–2016
period may be short-lived.
Global CO2 emissions from LUC are less strongly linked
to economic activity, more volatile owing to changes
in climatic conditions and uncertain due to purely
constrained input data (Le Quéré et al., 2018). For thesereasons, CO2 emissions from LUC are often considered
independently from emissions from fossil fuels andindustrial processes. Over the last decade, emissions
from LUC accounted for 10 percent of total GHG
emissions, a share that is declining due to the strong
growth in emissions from fossil fuels and industrial
processes. Emissions from LUC have remained relatively
stable for decades, albeit with high uncertainty on
the level and trend of these (Le Quéré et al., 2018). In
2015, emissions from LUC were relatively high due to El
Niño causing hotter and drier conditions in the tropics,
resulting in more intense fires and thus more rapid
growth in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere (Peters etal., 2017; WMO, 2017).
The remaining GHGs (CH4, N2O, fluorinated gases) areresponsible for 25 percent of GHG emissions over thelast decade when excluding LUC, rising to 32 percent
when including LUC.13 Non-CO2 GHGs have grown atroughly half the rate of CO2 emissions since 1990. CH4emissions are responsible for 16 percent of global GHG
emissions (excluding LUC) over the last decade andgrew at an annual rate of 1.4 percent from 2004 to 2014
and only 0.5 percent from 2014 and 2016, with growthestimated to be 0.3 percent in 2017. Concentrations of
CH4 in the atmosphere have grown faster than expectedin the last decade (Saunois et al., 2016), primarily due
to biogenic emissions in the tropics and fossil fuelemissions in temperate regions (Worden et al., 2017),
though scientific debate on the causes continues.
N2O emissions are responsible for 6.3 percent of
GHG emissions (excluding LUC) and had more rapid
growth from 2014 to 2016 (1.4 percent/year) and 2017(1.4 percent) than from 2004 to 2014 (0.8 percent/year), compared with other gases. Fluorinated gases(hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs),
sulphur hexafluoride (SF6)) are only responsible for 2.4
percent of total GHG emissions and continue to havestrong growth at around 5 percent/year.
While global emissions statistics provide important
information on collective progress, they mask the
dynamics at the country level (figure 2.3). The 2014–2016 slowdown in the growth of global emissions andthe return to modest growth in 2017 is indicative ofcountries’ underlying behaviour. The top 4 emitters(China, USA, EU28 and India) contribute to over 56

Figure 2.3: Global greenhouse gas emissions per type of gas (left) and top greenhouse gas emitters excluding land-use
change emissions due to lack of reliable data (right).
60

GtCO2e40

GHG w LUC
GHG w/o LUC
CO2 w/o LUC
CH4
LUC
N2O
F-gas

12

GtCO2e

50

15

30

China
USA
EU-28
India
RussiaJapan
int. transport

9

6
20
3

10

0
1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

2017

0
1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

Source: EDGAR v5.0/v4.3.2 FT2017 CO2 (Olivier et al., 2018) and Global Carbon Project (Le Quéré et al., 2018).

13 Weighted using a Global Warming Potential of the IPCC Second Assessment Report and 100 years as the time period, which is common in climate policy.

2017

7

percent of the total GHG emissions over the last decade
when excluding LUC, the top 7 (including Russia, Japanand international transport) account for more than 66
percent, while G20 members contribute 78 percent.
Aggregated GHG emissions from G20 countries grew at
2.1 percent/year from 2004 to 2014, remained relatively
steady from 2014 to 2016 and are estimated to grow
0.9 percent in 2017. Even though emission reductions
are needed from all countries, the top emitters are
responsible for most of the changes in global emissions.
China emits more than one quarter (27 percent) ofglobal GHG emissions (excluding LUC), and the ups
and downs of Chinese emissions leave an importantsignature on global emissions growth. From 2004 to
2014, Chinese GHG emissions grew at an annual rate of
6 percent (accounting for two thirds of global emissions
growth), before declining slightly from 2014 to 2016.
The slowdown during the 2014–2016 period was acrossall GHGs, though CO2 dominated the trend due to amarked decline in coal consumption. Some reports havespeculated that Chinese emissions, more specificallycoal consumption, may have peaked (Qi et al., 2016).
However, the increase of 1.2 percent in global CO2
emissions in 2017, due to renewed growth of emissions
at a rate of 0.9 percent, suggests that it may be too soon
to consider Chinese emissions to have peaked.
The European Union (EU) and USA play key strategicroles in global climate policy due to their historicalresponsibility, and together account for more than 20
percent of global GHG emissions (13 percent for the
USA and 9 percent for the EU, excluding LUC). Emissions
in the USA likely peaked in 2007 and decreased at anannual rate of 0.4 percent from 2004 to 2014. The rateof reductions increased from 2014 to 2016 (annual
declines of 2 percent), with significant drops in 2015 and2016 due to less coal-powered electricity generation.
Emissions decreased slightly in 2017 by 0.3 percent.
Reductions have been strongest for CO2 emissions,but there has been strong growth in fluorinatedgas emissions. This indicates that the USA madeconsiderable contributions to the observed slowdown inglobal GHG emissions growth for the 2014–2016 period.
The EU has had steady declines in GHG emissions
since 1990, with accelerated reductions of 2 percent/year from 2004 to 2014. However, EU emissions havebeen increasing since 2014 (on average 1 percent/year),reversing the long-term trend. Increases in CO2 emissions
due to strong growth in oil and gas use are largely
responsible for the overall rise, though N2O emissions
have also increased and the growth of fluorinated gas
emissions has also remained strong. CH4 emissions
continued to decline but at a slower rate.
Due to its large population, India’s GHG emissions
represent 7.1 percent of the global total, despite its low
per capita emissions and large parts of the populationneeding better living standards. Indian emissions grewstrongly in the 2004–2014 period, at an annual rate of 5

percent, with only a slight respite during the 2014–2016
period, when the annual rate dropped to 3 percent.
India’s GHG emissions are estimated to grow at a rateof 3 percent in 2017 due to the demonetization process(removal of some rupees from circulation) and theintroduction of a goods and services tax.14
Although the top 4 countries represent 56 percent of
global GHG emissions (excluding LUC), this does not
downplay the importance of the remaining countries.
GHG emissions in the Russian Federation are 4.6 percentof the global total and since 2014 have continued to
grow by about 1 percent/year (excluding LUC). In Japan,
GHG emissions (2.9 percent of the global total) havedeclined on average 1 percent/year since 2014, despite
significant fluctuations following the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear disaster. Emissions from international aviationand marine transport, which represent 2.5 percent of
global GHG emissions, have grown strongly at an annual
rate of over 2 percent since 2014.
Despite a distinct slowdown in emissions growthfrom 2014 to 2016, initial data for 2017 indicates GHG
emissions have started to increase, both globally andin key countries. It is unclear whether the 2017 growthtrend will be sustained in the next few years or whether
2017 will just be an anomalous year as global emissions
reach a plateau. While it seemed that global GHG
emissions could peak in the near future, recent changes
have now delayed this.

2.4 Assessment of current policies: are G20
members on track to meet the Cancun
pledges for 2020 and NDC targets for 2030,
and to peak their emissions?
2.4.1 Overview and comparison of G20 members
As G20 members currently account for around 78
percent of global emissions, they will greatly influence
the achievement of the Paris Agreement climate goal.
This section provides an update of the extent to which
G20 members are putting in place and implementing
policies that enable them to meet the Cancun pledges
and NDCs. In addition, it offers an overview of G20
members’ respective shares of global emissions, theimplications of their unconditional NDCs for per capita
emissions and where they stand with respect to peakingof emissions and decarbonization rates. Table 2.1
provides a comparative overview of this information for
all G20 members (with the EU28 represented collectively
instead of as the four Member States that are also
individual G20 members).

Collective progress towards the Cancun pledges
and NDCs
G20 members are collectively projected to achieve theconditional end of the Cancun pledges for 2020 undercurrent policies. However, as table 2.1 indicates, six G20

14 https://www.carbonbrief.org/guest-post-why-indias-co2-emissions-grew-strongly-in-2017.

8

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – TRENDS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CANCUN PLEDGES, NDC TARGETS AND PEAKING OF EMISSIONS

members (Canada, Indonesia, Mexico, the Republic ofKorea, South Africa, the USA) are either not projectedto achieve their Cancun pledges, or have uncertainty on
whether they will achieve it.
At present, G20 countries are collectively not on track
to meet their unconditional NDCs for 2030. Based on
an assessment of current policies, around half of G20
members fall short of achieving their unconditional
NDCs (Argentina, Australia, Canada, EU28, the Republicof Korea, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the USA) (table
2.1 and figure 2.4). Under current policies, three G20
members (Brazil, China and Japan) are on track to meettheir NDC targets, while emissions under current policiesof three additional countries (India, Russia and Turkey)
are projected to be more than 10 percent below theirunconditional NDC targets. It is uncertain whether two
countries (Indonesia and Mexico) are on track to meettheir NDC targets in 2030 under current policies.
It is estimated that G20 members will need to implement
additional policies to reduce GHG emissions further by
about 2.5 GtCO2e/year to achieve their unconditional
NDCs and 3.5 GtCO2e/year to achieve their conditional
NDCs by 2030. The estimate of additional reductions
needed has decreased by approximately 1 GtCO2e
compared with 2017, due to lower projections ofemission reductions under current policies in China, theEU28 and the USA.
It is important to note that a country likely to meetor exceed its NDCs based on current policies is notnecessarily undertaking more stringent mitigation action
than a country that is not on track. It can also indicatethat the ambition of the current NDC could be enhanced.
According to the Paris Agreement, countries are obliged
to regularly update and strengthen their NDCs. The
assessment conducted in this section is based on
current NDCs, recognizing that they are to be revised andshould be strengthened considerably by 2020 to reduce
global emissions to levels consistent with limiting global
warming to below 2°C or 1.5°C by 2030 (see chapter 3).

Peaking of emissions and decarbonization rates
Countries that have historically peaked have a criticalrole to play in determining the timing and level of global
emissions peaking, as each country’s decarbonization
rate after peaking will be a defining factor for global
cumulative emissions. Countries that have alreadypeaked their GHG emissions have not reduced theiremissions at fast enough rates since the peak year. For
example, an 80 percent reduction of emissions between
2005 and 2050 requires a constant annual reduction
rate of 3.5 percent/year for the period. By contrast, theG20 members that have peaked show constant annual
emission reduction rates ranging between 0.6 percent/year (Canada) and 2.5 percent/year (Russia) up to 2016
for all GHG emissions, including land use, land-use
change and forestry (LULUCF) (table 2.1). Brazil, the only
non-Annex I member of the G20 that has peaked its GHG
emissions to date, showed an average reduction rateof 12 percent/year between 2004 and 2012 due to thelarge reductions in emissions from LULUCF. Brazil’s GHG
emissions from non-LULUCF sectors have increased by
2.4 percent/year on average (table 2.1).

9

Table 2.1: Overview of the status and progress of G20 members, including on Cancun pledges and NDC targets.

Country

Share ofOn track to meet the
global GHG targets with current
emissions policies?
in 2017a
CancunUnconditional

Unconditional NDC: percapitab GHG emissions

Emission peaking

Argentina

pledges

NDC

tCO2e/cap in
2030c

versus 2015
levelsPeaking yeard

Averageannual growth
after peakinge

0.8%

No pledge

No

9.8

-6%

No
commitment
to peak---Australia

1.2%

Yes

No

15.4

-29%

2006

-1.6%/year

Brazil

2.3%

Yes

Yes

5.3

-22%

2004

(2006–2016)-12.0%/year(2004–2012)(+2.4%/year
excluding
LULUCF)

Canada

1.6%

No

No

12.9

-33%

2007

-0.6%/year(2007–2016)

China

26.8%

Yes

Yes

10.0

+17%

By 2030 (CO2
only)

---

EU28

9.0%

Yes

No

6.1

-23%

1990 or earlier-1.1%/year(1990–2016)

India

7.0%

Yes

Yes*

3.5

+67%

No
commitment
to peak---Indonesia

1.7%

Uncertain

Uncertain

6.9

+15%

No
commitment
to peak

---

Japan

3.0%

Yes

Yes

8.6

-13%

By 2020---

Mexico1.5%

Uncertain

Uncertain

5.1

-2%

By 2030---

Republic of
Korea

1.6%

No

No

10.1

-21%

By 2020---

RussianFederation

4.6%

Yes

Yes*

18.9

+33%

1990 or earlier(former Soviet
republic)-2.5%/year(1990–2016)+0.5%/year(2000–2016)

Saudi Arabia

1.5%

No pledge

No

23.1

+19%

No
commitment
to peak---South Africa

1.1%

Uncertain

No

9.5

0%

No
commitment
to peak---Turkey1.2%

No pledge

Yes*

10.5

+102%

No
commitment
to peak---

United Statesof America

13.1%

UncertainNo

14.0 (2025)-25% (2025)

2007-1.5%/year(2007–2016)

Notes:a Olivier et al. (2018), excluding LULUCF.
b Population projections are based on the medium fertility variant of the United Nations World Population Prospects 2017 edition (UN DESA, 2017).
c The G20 average in 2015 was 7.5 tCO2e/cap (based on national GHG inventories and using the EDGAR GHG trend if emissions for the latest years were
missing). Using EDGAR estimates only, the G20 average in 2015 was 8.0 tCO2e/cap (Olivier et al., 2017).
d G
 iven the unconditional pledges. Expected peak years are based only on commitments that countries have made and assume the achievement of suchcommitments.
e A uthors’ calculations based on UNFCCC (2018) data (including LULUCF). For Australia and Canada, the peak years based on 2018 GHG inventories were2007 and 2004 respectively, which differs from those assessed by Levin and Rich (2017), since they used older inventory data. Peak years reported by
Levin and Rich (2017) are used here for the calculations. The average emission growth rates were -1.8 percent/year for Australia with 2007 as the peakyear and -0.5 percent/year for Canada with 2004 as the peak year.
* Denotes that the current policy trajectory is more than 10 percent below the NDC target.

10

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – TRENDS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CANCUN PLEDGES, NDC TARGETS AND PEAKING OF EMISSIONS

To assess whether the changes in emission-related
indicators as a result of NDCs are both ambitious
and fair (in line with the long-term goal of the Paris
Agreement) would require a thorough evaluation of
normative indicators of burden-sharing indicators, which
is beyond the scope of this report. However, a number ofrecent peer-reviewed studies attempt this task, based on
various effort-sharing considerations (Höhne et al., 2014;
Pan et al., 2017; Robiou du Pont et al., 2017; CAT, 2018a;
Holz et al., 2018).
Figure 2.4 provides a detailed comparison of
estimated emissions under current policies and the full
implementation of NDCs for all G20 members, mappingthese against 1990 and 2010 emissions. For each of
the G20 members, median GHG emission projections
have been calculated for current policies and full
implementation of the NDC, using information from a
recently published study (den Elzen et al., forthcoming),
which updates and expands the data sources covered in
the 2017 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2017), using themost up-to-date data from countries’ recently published
National Communications, 3rd biennial reports of 7
G20 members, and several other new national studies
for policies and NDC projections. The estimates draw
on official country data and independent sources (seeden Elzen et al. 2018 for further details). GHG emission
projections under current policies from independent
analyses presented in this chapter cover main energy andclimate policies implemented by a recent cut-off dateand do not consider prospective policies that are being
debated or planned. Similarly, current policy and NDC
estimates only partially cover commitments and actions
made by non-state and subnational actors to date anddo not fully reflect the implications of recent significant
declines in the cost of renewable energy sources. The
role and potential of non-state and subnational actors is
assessed in chapter 5, while chapter 7 discusses the roleof innovation policy and market creation.

Figure 2.4: Greenhouse gas emissions (all gases and sectors) of the G20 and its individual members by
2030 under different scenarios and compared with historical emissions.
Figure 2.4a.
16
1990
2010
Current policies (official data)

Emissions (GtCO2e/yr)

12

Current policies (all studies)
Unconditional NDC (all studies)
Conditional NDC (all studies)8

4

4 GtCO2e

0
China

EU-28

India

USA (2025)*

4.0

4 GtCO2eEmissions (GtCO2e/yr)

Notes:For reporting reasons, the emission projections for China, the EU, India and the USA are shown in figure 2.4a with and the other1990
3.5 shown in figure 2.4b, using 2 different vertical axes.
countries
As a conservative assumption, South Africa is not considered as having a firm commitment to peak, since there is2010
no guarantee thatthe conditions upon which they made the pledge will be met.
* For
Current policies (official data)
3.0the USA, the unconditional NDC is for 2025.

Current policies (all studies)

2.5

Unconditional NDC (all studies)
Conditional NDC (all studies)

2.0
1.5

11

plans for the energy, forestry and transport sectors,
with plans for industry, infrastructure and agriculture
to be introduced shortly. The action on implementing
Argentina’s revised NDC introduced at COP 22 in 2016
renewable energy in Argentina’s energy mix is particularlypresents an unconditional GHG emissions target of 483
notable and is supported by 2 laws, one promoting
16
by 2030 and a further conditional target of
MtCO2e/year
renewable energy and implemented primarily through
369 MtCO2e/year (Government of Argentina, 2016). If thethe RenovAr programme (which auctions renewable
1990
unconditional target is met, emissions would increase
power capacity) and the other introducing distributed
2010
by 19 percent above 2010 levels in 2030. The current
generation (though implementation is pending detailed
Current policies (official data)
policies scenario projected by Climate Action Tracker for
ruling). The entire package of unconditional actions
12 2018b) was lowered by about 5 percent fromCurrent policies
2030 (CAT,(all studies)in sectoralplans is expected to reduce emissions by
its projection in 2016. Nevertheless, Argentina is likely
approximately
Unconditional NDC (all studies) 110 MtCO2e/year by 2030 compared withto miss its NDC targets if it does not change its current
the baseline. The success of these mitigation actions in
NDC (all studies)policies (Ministry of the Environment and Sustainable Conditional achieving
the 2030 unconditional NDC target depends on
Development Argentina, 2015).
several factors, including the opposition of civil society
8
to the construction of two mega hydroelectric dams in
To help achieve its NDC targets, the Government ofPatagonia and to two new nuclear power plants, and theArgentina established a National Cabinet for Climate
country’s recurrent financial constraints to sustain the
Change to facilitate discussions and agreements
implementation of some actions, such as the RenovAr
between 17 ministries on policies and measures to be
program.
implemented
relating
tothetargets.
These
discussions
4 GtCO2e4
have resulted in the development of mitigation action

Emissions (GtCO2e/yr)

2.4.2 Emissions trends and targets of individual
G20 members15

0

Figure 2.4b.

China

EU-28

India

USA (2025)*

4.0

4 GtCO2e
1990

3.5

2010

Emissions (GtCO2e/yr)

3.0

Current policies (official data)
Current policies (all studies)

2.5

Unconditional NDC (all studies)
Conditional NDC (all studies)

2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
Argentina

Australia

BrazilCanadaIndonesia

Japan

MexicoRussiaSaudi
ArabiaSouth
Africa**Republicof Korea

Turkey** S outh Africa’s Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) is based on an emissions trajectory with an emissions range of 398–614 MtCO2e
including LULUCF over the 2025–2030 period.

15 For a more comprehensive assessment of climate change mitigation policies including sector- and technology-specific policies in G20 countries, see, for example, Climate
Transparency (2017).

12

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – TRENDS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CANCUN PLEDGES, NDC TARGETS AND PEAKING OF EMISSIONS

Under its Cancun pledge, Australia proposed 3 targets
for 2020 with different conditions: 5 percent, 15 percent
and 25 percent below emission levels in 2000. The goalof 5 percent currently stands as Australia’s unconditional
pledge. In accordance with the Kyoto Protocol, Australia
uses a carbon budget approach that accounts forcumulative emissions between 2013 and 2020 in order
to assess progress against its pledge. For the budget
period, Australia is on track to overachieve its 2020
target by 166 MtCO2e without including carry-over fromthe Kyoto Protocol’s 1st commitment period and by 294
MtCO2e with carry-over (Department of the Environment
and Energy, 2017b). Independent studies consider theyear 2020 in isolation and find Australia’s current policy
trajectory close to achieving its target.
In its NDC, Australia announced a 26–28 percent
reduction below 2005 levels of GHG emissions by 2030
(UNFCCC, 2016). There has been no improvement inAustralia’s climate policy since 2017 and emission levels
for 2030 are projected to be well above the NDC target.
The latest projection published by the government showsthat emissions would remain at high levels rather than
reducing in line with the 2030 target (Department of
the Environment and Energy, 2017a; CAT, 2018c). The
Emissions Reduction Fund, which aims to purchaseemissions reductions at the lowest available costthrough auctions, and its safeguard mechanism are themain existing policies.
Brazil’s Cancun pledge aims to reduce GHG emissions
in 2020 by 36.1–38.9 percent compared with businessas usual and its NDC target aims to reduce emissions
to 1.3 GtCO2e/year by 2025 with the emission level
dropping to 1.2 GtCO2e/year by 2030 (37 percent and43 percent below 2005 levels respectively). Recent
independent studies suggest that current policy scenario
projections are well below the Cancun pledge level and inline with the NDC targets (Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi
et al., 2017a; CAT, 2018d). GHG emission projections
have been revised downward compared with previous
year’s (referenced in the 2017 Emissions Gap Report).
Uncertainty remains about the future of the country’s
GHG emissions growth. For example, emissions from
LULUCF reduced by 86 percent between 2005 and 2012
(Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, 2016),
but recent data and analyses suggest that the decreasing
trend for deforestation and the resulting reductions in
GHG emissions have slowed down or even stopped(Azevedo et al., 2018). In fact, the recent political crisisin the country has forced a weak government to concede
reversals in environmental regulation as a bargaining
chip to maintain power, which may potentially impact
GHG emissions from land use as well as Brazil’s
contribution towards global climate targets (Rochedo
et al., 2018). The newly elected president of Brazil
has indicated that he wants to limit environmental
constraints on agriculture.
In February 2018, the National Congress approved
the National Biofuels Policy (RenovaBio – Decree No.
9.308), which seeks to boost the use of renewablefuels and expand its share in the energy mix. Recent
electricity auctions have targeted solar energy, signallinga potential increase in solar capacity in the country inthe coming years. Existing contracts for solar electricity
in operation and under construction total around 4 GW
nominal capacity (CCEE, 2018).
Canada pledged to reduce its economy-wide GHG
emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels by 2020
and 30 percent by 2030 (UNFCCC, 2014; UNFCCC,
2016). Canada could achieve its 2020 target under alow economic growth scenario, but it is not likely toachieve its NDC target (Government of Canada, 2017;
CAT, 2018e). However, recent analysis suggests that
Canada’s emissions will be 4–6 percent lower in 2030
than projected in 2016, suggesting that progress is being
made towards the target (Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi
et al., 2017a; PBL, 2017; CAT, 2018e). In October 2017,
Canada published regulations to phase down the
production and consumption of HFCs in accordancewith the Kigali Amendment. Canada is also planninga federal carbon pricing backstop system to enforce
carbon pricing in provinces that have not implemented
a provincial system by the end of 2018 (Government of
Canada, 2017).
China pledged to reduce the intensity of CO2 emissions
by 40–45 percent by 2020 and its NDC includes 4 major
targets for 2030: (1) peak CO2 emissions around 2030,
making best efforts to peak earlier; (2) reduce the carbon
intensity of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 60–65
percent from 2005 levels; (3) increase the share of nonfossil fuels in primary energy consumption to around20 percent; and (4) increase the forest stock volume
by around 4.5 billion m3 from 2005 levels. Independentstudies, including those recently published (Sha et al.,2015; den Elzen et al., 2016; IEA, 2017; CAT, 2018f),
suggest that China will likely achieve emission leveltargets in line with its Cancun pledges and NDC targets.
Recent independent studies (Kitous et al., 2017;
Kuramochi et al., 2017a; CAT, 2018f) have revised theiremissions projections down compared with previous
years (UNEP, 2017), but do not strongly suggest that CO2
emissions will peak before 2030. Contrastingly, otherrecent studies argue that recent structural shifts in theeconomy are likely to result in much steeper reductions
in CO2 intensity of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Greenand Stern (2017) provide an illustrative pathway in which
intensity is halved from 2005 to 2020, resulting in peaked
CO2 emissions between 2020 and 2025. Guan et al.
(2018) also conclude that the decline of CO2 emissions in
China is structural and is likely to be sustained if recently
started transitions of industrial and energy systems
continue.
China announced a new national emissions trading
system in December 2017, which is expected to be
fully operational by 2020. Initially, the system will apply
only to the power sector, but may be expanded to othersectors in the future. The system’s overall impact on
CO2 emissions is currently unclear, as many operational
details are yet to be shared, including the start date andthe level and distribution of emissions allowances. It isestimated that the full scheme will cover 5 GtCO2/year
when it includes both the power and industrial sectors,
and 3–3.5 GtCO2/year when only applied to the power
sector as planned for the first few years (NewClimate

13

Institute, PBL and IIASA, 2018). Further features ofChina’s national emissions trading system are describedin Jotzo et al. (2018). The National Development andReform Commission announced it will reduce steel
capacity by around 30 million tonnes and coal output by
about 150 million tonnes in 2018, thus achieving its FiveYear Plan targets ahead of the original target year 2020.
In its Cancun pledge, the EU28 committed to reducing
GHG emissions by 20 percent below 1990 levels by
2020, which it is expected to overachieve. In its NDC,
the EU has put forward a binding, economy-wide targetof reducing domestic GHG emissions by 40 percent
below 1990 levels by 2030. Recent independent studies,including (CAT, 2018g), the European Environment
Agency Trends and Projections Report (European
Environment Agency, 2017) and the EU Reference
Scenario (European Commission, 2016b), suggest that
the EU will fall slightly short of its NDC target under
existing policies. The EU recognizes that it is not on
track to meet its 2030 target with current policies andhas adopted a large package of measures aimed ataccelerating the reduction of GHG emissions in different
areas. The impact of these adopted measures is notincluded in the analysis of the studies cited above. Morespecifically, the revision of the EU Emissions Trading
System (EU ETS) for 2021–2030 was adopted in March
2018, encompassing 3 key elements: (1) reducing thecap at an annual rate of 2.2 percent from 2021 onwards;(2) doubling the Market Stability Reserve feeding rate
between 2019 and 2023 to reduce surplus of allowances;and (3) invalidating allowances in the Market Stability
Reserve exceeding the number of allowances auctioned
in the previous year from 2023 onwards (Council of theEuropean Union, 2017b). The provisionally agreed Effort
Sharing Regulation applying to GHG emissions fromsectors not covered by EU ETS (transport, buildings,
agriculture and waste management) was adopted
in May 2018. The overall targeted reduction in GHG
emissions from these sectors is 30 percent by 2030,
relative to 2005, which is to be achieved by legallybinding annual emission limits for each Member Statefor the 2021–2030 period (Council of the European
Union, 2017c). The EU has also adopted a regulation to
integrate GHG emissions and removals from LULUCF
into the 2030 climate and energy framework (European
Parliament, 2018) and proposals to amend the Energy
Efficiency Directive and the Energy Performance of
Buildings Directive (European Commission, 2016a;
Council of the European Union, 2017a). By June 2018, theGovernance of the Energy Union Regulation was agreed,
which sets out the trajectory and interim targets forachieving the recently agreed 2030 goals of 32 percent
renewable energy and 32.5 percent energy savings andrequirements for regular progress reports.
India’s Cancun pledge aims to reduce the emissions
intensity of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 20–25
percent below 2005 levels in 2020. In its NDC, India
commits to reducing its emissions intensity of Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) by 33–35 percent below 2005
levels by 2030, increasing the share of non-fossil energy
in total power generation capacity to 40 percent (withhelp of international support), and creating an additional

cumulative carbon sink of 2.5–3 GtCO2e through forest
and tree cover. These translate into emission levels of
4.4–7.5 GtCO2e/year and 4.2–5.9 GtCO2e/year in 2030
for the unconditional and conditional NDCs respectively.
With its currently implemented policies, India is likely toachieve its Cancun pledge and conditional NDC targets(IEA, 2017; Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017a;
Mitra et al., 2017; PBL, 2017; Vishwanathan and Garg,
2017; CAT, 2018h; Dubash et al., 2018). Dubash et al.
(2018) reviewed several studies and found that India’s
NDC intensity pledge is consistent with current (circa2015) policies. Recent analysis by The Energy andResources Institute (TERI) (COMMIT, 2018) indicatesthat India is also likely to meet and even overachieve its
emissions intensity reduction target.
Several recently proposed initiatives have the potential
to contribute significantly towards this target. Of major
relevance are the actions that are likely to be undertaken
under the National Solar Mission, the programmes
implemented under the National Mission for Enhanced
Energy Efficiency such as the Perform, Achieve andTrade scheme and the Standards and Labelling scheme,
and the Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of (Hybrid&) Electric Vehicles initiative adopted in April 2018.
However, there are considerable uncertainties regarding
the scale and pace of adopting various technologies
such as electric vehicles and renewable-based power
generation. The scale-up and adoption of these options
depends on how quickly technology and battery costs
can attain commercial viability and become the preferredalternatives.
In its Cancun pledge, Indonesia pledges an unconditional
26 percent and a conditional 41 percent reduction
below business as usual GHG emissions by 2020.
Similarly, its NDC sets an unconditional 29 percent anda conditional 41 percent (with sufficient international
support) reduction target below business as usual for
GHG emissions by 2030. The NDC includes emissions
from deforestation and peat land destruction, which
are the country’s largest sources of GHG emissions.
There is large uncertainty on the GHG emission level ofIndonesia’s Cancun pledge due to the business as usual
emission data used. Studies, including those recently
published (Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017; CAT2018) do not agree on whether the Cancun pledge and
NDC targets are likely to be met under policies currently
implemented. Two recent studies (Kitous et al., 2017;
CAT 2018i), both excluding LULUCF, suggest that theconditional NDC may be achieved, while Kuramochi et al.
(2017) project that Indonesia will fall short of achieving
its Cancun pledge and unconditional NDC target, partially
due to large growth in emissions from LULUCF.
Japan is committed to reducing its GHG emissions by
3.8 percent below 2005 levels by 2020 and 26 percent
below 2013 levels by 2030. Recent studies (Kitous etal., 2017) project that Japan will overachieve its 2020
pledge due to low growth in electricity demand since2012. Japan may reach its 2030 NDC target with existing
policies, but uncertainty over future nuclear and coal
power remains (CAT, 2018g). Compared with previous
year’s projections, the 2017 update from the EU Joint
Research Centre (JRC) (Kitous et al., 2017) projected 7.5

14

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – TRENDS AND PROGRESS TOWARDS THE CANCUN PLEDGES, NDC TARGETS AND PEAKING OF EMISSIONS

percent lower emissions in 2030, while latest projections
from the Climate Action Tracker only changed marginally(CAT, 2018g).
In July 2018, the new Basic Energy Plan was adopted
by the Cabinet (METI, 2018). While the plan did notrevise the electricity mix target underlying the NDC, it
now refers to renewables as ‘main power sources’ of
the future, which suggests a positive policy shift fromthe 2014 plan. Another positive sign from the new Basic
Energy Plan is that for the first time it mentions phasingout old, inefficient coal-fired power plants, though it
continues to promote high-efficiency coal-fired power
plants.
Mexico’s NDC makes an unconditional commitment to
reduce GHG emissions by 22 percent below business as
usual in 2030, implying a net emissions peak from 2026,
and a conditional commitment to reduce emissions by
36 percent below business as usual in 2030. Mexico’s
NDC also addresses black carbon emissions (UNFCCC,2015). Studies disagree on whether Mexico is likely tomeet its 2020 pledge (30 percent below business as
usual) or NDC targets under current policies (Kuramochi
et al., 2017a; CAT, 2018j). Recent Climate Action Tracker
projections for 2030 are 1–4 percent lower than levels
projected a year ago (CAT, 2018j).
By the end of 2017, Mexico’s National Institute of
Ecology and Climate Change (INECC) had assessed theadvancement of the Special Climate Change Program
2013–2018 (PECC by its Spanish acronym), which is the
Mexican federal administration’s instrument for climate
action. The assessment noted that only 43 percent of the
programmed climate actions for the 2013–2018 period
were completed (INECC, 2017) and that they reduced
emissions by 30 MtCO2e, a third of what the government
expected for the period. Furthermore, there are nomechanisms in place to effectively monitor mitigation
actions of subnational governments and private sector
companies, hindering the tracking of the climate efforts.
Mexico updated its General Climate Change Law in late2017 to create a mandatory carbon market from 2018with a 3 year pilot phase (Secretaría de Medio Ambientey Recursos Naturales, 2017). Moreover, the update also
incorporated a mandate for the country to contribute to
the fulfilment of the Paris Agreement.
The new federal government (2018–2024) has
recognized the importance of the Paris Agreement andof increasing the proportion of renewable energy inthe electricity mix. However, tensions are anticipatedbetween the energy outlook (with a significant share offossil fuels) and the expected emission reduction targets
which will increase the NDC ambition.
In its NDC, the Republic of Korea has committed toreducing its GHG emissions by 37 percent below
business as usual by 2030 (Ministry of Environment,
2018). The Government of Korea set up a road map in2016 to achieve the national GHG emissions reduction
target for 2030, which specifies emissions projections,
reduction targets and major emission reduction plansfor 8 sectors (Government of the Republic of Korea,2017), though there is limited information about theimplementation status of these sector-level plans.

In June 2018, the road map was amended to reducereliance on overseas credits from 11.3 percent to
4.5 percent (Ministry of Environment, 2018). Recent
independent analyses (CAT, 2017a; PBL, 2017) indicatethat the emission projections under current policies
may fall short of the NDC emission level target. Whilethe country has not rescinded its pledge to the UNFCCC
for 2020, it has amended its Green Growth Basic Act toreplace the 2020 pledge with the NDC target for 2030
(National Law Information Center, 2016).
In 2017, President Moon Jae-in announced that theRepublic of Korea will reduce its dependency on
coal-fired and nuclear power generation (Cheong
Wa Dae, 2017; MOTIE, MOE and MOLIT, 2017), while
increasing renewable electricity. Following this, thegovernment adopted a new Basic Plan for Long-Term
Electricity Supply and Demand covering the next 15
years, confirming the country intends to produce more
electricity from renewable energy sources, while reducing
its use of coal and nuclear power (CAT, 2018n; Ministryof Trade, Industry and Energy, 2018). This plan may
result in an electricity generation mix in 2030 that is 23.9
percent nuclear, 36.1 percent coal, 18.8 percent natural
gas and 20 percent renewable energy. Analysis indicatesthat these announcements, if fully implemented, together
with the expected lower level of electricity demand, may
lead to reductions of 53–69 MtCO2e/year (7–9 percent)below current policies scenario projections in 2030.
However, this is not enough for the country to achieve its
NDC target (CAT, 2018n).
Russia pledged to limit GHG emissions by 15–25
percent below 1990 levels by 2020 and proposed in its
Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC)
to reduce GHG emissions by 25–30 percent below
1990 levels by 2030. Although Russia has reaffirmed
its 2020 target in subsequently adopted policies, it had
not ratified the Paris Agreement as at August 2018 andis the only major emitter that has not done so. Whileaccounting of emissions from LULUCF remains unclear,provisions in the INDC suggest that its target includes
these emissions. Recently published studies (Kuramochi
et al., 2017a; CAT, 2018k) suggest that under current
policies, Russia is likely to meet its 2020 pledge andreach the lower end of its 2030 INDC range. In July 2017,
the Government of Russia introduced a plan to reform
all existing federal laws concerning energy generation
facilities to include renewable energy microgeneration
for facilities with installed capacity up to 15 kW(Government of Russia, 2017; Ministry of Environment
and Natural Resources, 2017).
In its NDC, Saudi Arabia commits to reducing emissions
by up to 130 MtCO2e/year by 2030 through actions that
contribute to economic diversification and adaptation.
The baseline for this NDC target has not beencommunicated as at August 2018, due to unresolved
questions on the allocation of oil production to domestic
consumption or export. Under current policies, Saudi
Arabia is expected to achieve GHG emission levelsof 1,115–1,175 MtCO2e/year by 2030 (CAT, 2018l).
According to these projections, Saudi Arabia will clearly
miss its NDC emissions levels of 940–1,120 MtCO2e/
year by 2030, quantified using a baseline range (the15lower end based on European Commission’s Joint
Research Center and the upper end based on King
Abdullah University of Science and Technology (KAUST)(2014), see Kuramochi et al. (2017a)). Starting in January
2018, Saudi Arabia implemented an economy-wide 5
percent VAT on fossil fuels (Nereim, 2017). However,
the government announced a delay in fossil fuel pricereforms in December 2017 by slowing down the pace ofenergy subsidy cuts (Toumi, 2017).
In its Cancun pledge, South Africa aims to reduce
its GHG emissions by 34 percent below business as
usual in 2020 and in its NDC commits to achieving a“peak, plateau and decline” of greenhouse emissions,peaking between 2020 and 2025 and plateauing at
398–614 MtCO2e/year between 2025 and 2030. Recently
published studies (Kitous et al., 2017; Kuramochi et al.,2017a; CAT, 2018m) indicate that under current policies,
South Africa may just meet the upper end of its Cancun
pledge range, but will miss its NDC target by emitting
650–770 MtCO2e/year in 2030. In February 2018, theproposed Carbon Tax Bill entered the parliamentary
process after 2 years of consultations. After further
parliamentary hearings and revisions, the final draft
was expected to be completed by mid-2018 (EY, 2017;
Republic of South Africa, 2017; Ensor, 2018), though
it is yet to be released. The Department of Energy
released its update of the Integrated Resource Plan
(IRP) (Department of Energy, 2018) on future energy
supply planning in August 2018 for public comments
until November 2018. The plan’s update proposes todecommission 12 GW of old coal power plants by 2030,
while increasing gas, wind and solar generation capacity.
First estimates suggest that the proposed update, if
implemented, would allow South Africa to meet the upper
range of its NDC target by 2030 (CAT, 2018m).
Turkey submitted its INDC on 30 September 2015, with atarget to reduce GHG emissions up to 21 percent below
business as usual in 2030 (Republic of Turkey Ministryof Environment and Urbanization, 2016). With currently
implemented policies, Turkey is expected to achieve
GHG emission levels of 959–1,075 MtCO2e/year in
2030 (excluding LULUCF). The lower estimate is basedon both planned and current policies. According to anindependent analysis based on government projections,current policies are insufficient to meet Turkey’s INDC
and the country has an ongoing investment in expanding
coal power production (CAT, 2017b).

The United States of America set a 2020 target to
reduce GHG emissions by 17 percent below 2005 levels
in 2020 (UNFCCC, 2014) and committed to reducing
emissions by 26-28 percent below 2005 levels by 2025
in its NDC (UNFCCC, 2016). However, under President
Donald Trump, the USA has communicated its intent
to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, unless it canidentify suitable terms for reengagement, and to cease
implementation of its NDC (The Representative of theUnited States of America to the United Nations, 2017). In
October 2017, the US Environmental Protection Agency(EPA) proposed to repeal the Clean Power Plan (US EPA,
2017), which would have required states to meet CO2
emission standards for electricity generation. In April
2018, EPA announced that it would revise GHG emission
standards for cars and light trucks (US EPA, 2018). 17
states led by California have filed a lawsuit to preventthese rollbacks (State of California, 2018). In January
2018, the USA increased tariffs on imported solar cells
and modules by 30 percent (The Executive Office of the
President 2018).
Under currently implemented policies, the USA is unlikely
to meet its NDC target for 2025 and it is uncertain
whether it will meet its 2020 target (Kuramochi et al.,2017b; CAT, 2018o; Larsen et al., 2018), though action
by non-state and subnational actors in the country could
contribute significantly to reducing future emissions(Kuramochi et al., 2017c). A range of studies findthat given policy rollbacks, GHG emissions in 2025
will be between 0.8–1.9 GtCO2e/year higher than had
the NDC been achieved (Fransen and Levin, 2017).
However, despite federal efforts to weaken emission
standards and other policies, recent analysis projects
that GHG emissions in 2030 will be 3–8 percent lower
than projections made in 2017 (Kitous et al., 2017;
Kuramochi et al., 2017a; PBL, 2017; CAT, 2018o), partially
due to a higher projected share of gas and renewables
in electricity generation (U.S. Energy Information
Administration, 2018). There will be a time lag between
policy rollbacks and their impact on emission levels.

16

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – THE EMISSIONS GAP

Chapter 3.
The emissions gap
Lead authors: Gunnar Luderer (Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research), Joeri Rogelj (Imperial College London/
International Institute for Applied System Analysis), Michel den Elzen (PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment
Agency), Jiang Kejun (Energy Research Institute, China)
Contributing authors: Daniel Huppmann (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis)

3.1 Introduction
This chapter presents an update of the emissions gap
in 2030. In line with previous reports, the emissions
gap is defined as the difference between where global
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are heading under thecurrent Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) andwhere science indicates emissions should be in 2030
to be on a least-cost path towards limiting warming to
below 2°C or further to 1.5°C. The 2018 assessment
draws on several new studies that present updated
NDC estimates and additional low emission scenarios
in line with achieving the climate objective of the Paris
Agreement.
The chapter starts with an introduction to the scenariosthat have been used and the updates made (section
3.2). This is followed by an updated assessment of theemissions gap in 2030 (section 3.3), which builds on an
updated assessment of emission levels in 2030, undercurrent policies, NDCs and emission levels consistent
with least-cost mitigation pathways to below 2°C to
1.5°C. The chapter then provides an update on theimplications of temperatures projections anticipatedunder current NDCs (section 3.4), concluding with ananalysis of the effects of higher or lower emissions in
2030 (section 3.5)

3.2 Scenarios considered and updates madeThe emissions gap assessment draws on three maintypes of scenarios of total global GHG emissions in
the future: reference scenarios, NDC scenarios andleast-cost mitigation scenarios consistent with specifictemperature targets (see UNEP, 2016, 2017). Each ofthese scenarios and the updates made since the 2017
Emissions Gap Report are described below.

3.2.1 Reference scenarios and updates
Reference scenarios are useful benchmarks against
which progress in emission reductions can be tracked.
Two reference scenarios are considered: the no-policy
baseline and current policy scenarios. The no-policy
baseline scenario explores the trend of global GHG
emissions in the absence of climate policies post-

2005. It is based on mean projections of 179 baseline
scenarios assessed in the 5th Assessment Report of
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)(Clarke et al., 2014). Recently, new no-policy baselines
have been published, though these have not resulted insignificant changes to the no-policy baseline scenario
estimates (Riahi et al., 2017; Luderer et al., 2018).
The current policy scenario estimates future global GHG
emissions, assuming that all currently adopted andimplemented policies (defined as legislative decisions,executive orders or equivalent) have been realized andthat no additional measures are to be undertaken. The
scenario is based on the country analyses in chapter
2 and updated global analyses that use new data fromeight modelling groups. These include updated analyses
from the four modelling groups considered in the 2017
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2017), namely, the Climate
Action Tracker (CAT, 2018), the Joint Research Centre(Kitous et al., 2017), PBL Netherlands Environmental
Assessment Agency (Kuramochi et al., 2017; PBL, 2018)
and the International Energy Agency (IEA, 2017).

3.2.2 NDC scenarios and updates
NDC scenarios are used to estimate what the total
global GHG emissions would be in 2030 if countries
fully implemented their pledged contributions. Following
previous Emissions Gap Reports, two NDC scenarios
are considered: the unconditional and conditional NDC
scenarios.
Under the unconditional NDC scenario, it is assumed thatcountries only implement mitigation-related actions of
their NDCs that have no conditions attached. Countries
that do not have an NDC or have only included aconditional target are assumed to follow a current policy
scenario instead. Under the conditional NDC scenario, it
is assumed that countries implement both conditional
and unconditional mitigation actions of their NDCs.
Countries without an NDC are assumed to follow acurrent policy scenario and those without a conditionaltarget follow the unconditional scenario.
Global emission projections from 15 modelling groups
are considered for the two NDC scenarios. These17

projections include five new model estimates with full
GHG coverage and 10 modelling groups from the 2017
Emissions Gap Report (UNEP, 2017). Appendix A.1, whichis available online, provides a full overview of the studies
considered for the current policy and NDC scenarios.

3.2.3 Least-cost mitigation scenarios consistent
with the Paris Agreement’s temperature
limits and updates following the IPCC
Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C
Compared with previous Emissions Gap Reports, twomajor changes have been made to the 2018 assessmentof global GHG emission levels in 2030 that are in linewith least-cost pathways to limit warming to below 2°C
or 1.5°C. As section 3.3 shows, these updates have
implications for the estimated emissions gap in 2030,
particularly for the 1.5°C target.
The 2018 assessment builds on the new scenario
database compiled in the context of the IPCC Special
Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (Huppmann et al.,2018a, 2018b). Whereas 16 scenarios were available
in 2017, 85 scenarios for 1.5°C and 2°C pathways areavailable this year.1 This expansion has enhanced thediversity of available scenarios that are consistent withthe stringent temperature goal of the Paris Agreement. In
particular, recent scenarios often set a lower maximum
potential for carbon dioxide removal (CDR), which resultsin deeper emissions reductions over the next decades tostay within the same overall carbon budget (see section
3.5.1)2.
The second major update concerns the method forgrouping pathways. Previous Emissions Gap Reports
used a simple climate model to estimate the temperature
outcome of pathways, which were then used to groupand describe various pathway classes. This year’s
assessment still groups pathways as a function of theirestimated temperature outcome, but uses the pathways’
cumulative CO2 emissions as a simpler proxy. The
rationale behind this is that a nearly linear relationshipexists between the total amount of anthropogenic
CO2 emissions released into the atmosphere and theincrease in global mean temperature (Allen et al., 2009;
Matthews et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; Zickfeld
et al., 2009; Collins et al., 2013. See also UNEP, 2014),
meaning that warming under a specific future pathway
can be estimated from its cumulative CO2 emissions.
Alternatively, if a certain temperature limit is set, acorresponding consistent carbon (CO2) budget can becalculated. The linear relationship also implies that CO2
emissions need to become net zero at the global scale
if warming is to be kept below any level (Matthews etal., 2012; Knutti and Rogelj, 2015). Achieving global net
zero emissions means that CDR will compensate for any
remaining human-related CO2 emissions.
The use of the cumulative CO2 emission proxy forgrouping pathways has the advantage of linking more

directly to the discussions on emissions pathways under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). It also facilitates future updates
and improvements in understanding how the climate
responds to anthropogenic GHG emissions.
Based on these updates, pathways are grouped inthree temperature scenario groups, according to theirmaximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018
onwards. These three scenario groups provide a morenuanced overview of pathways that keep warming
below 2°C to 1.5°C and also help to identify theconsequences of strengthened action at various degrees
of ambition: from limiting warming to 2°C, over potential
interpretations of ‘well below 2°C’, to pursuits to limit
warming to 1.5°C and the corresponding emission
reductions (see table 3.1). Each scenario considers
least-cost climate change mitigation pathways that start
reductions from 2020 and follow the climate model andset-up used in the IPCC 5th Assessment Report (see box
3.1).
•

Below 2°C scenario: This scenario limits
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018
until the time net zero CO2 emissions are reached(or until 2100 if net -zero is not reached before)
to between 900 and 1,300 GtCO2, and cumulative
2018-2100 emissions to at most 1,200 GtCO2. It isconsistent with limiting end-of-century warming
to below about 2.0°C with about 66 percent or
greater probability, while limiting peak global
warming during the 21st century to below 2.1°C
with about 66 percent or greater probability.

•

Below 1.8°C scenario: This scenario limits
maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018
until the time net zero CO2 emissions are reached(or until 2100 if net-zero is not reached before)
to between 600 and 900 GtCO2, and cumulative
2018-2100 emissions to at most 900 GtCO2. It isconsistent with limiting peak and end-of-century
warming to below about 1.8°C with about 66
percent or greater probability.

•

Below 1.5°C in 2100 scenario: This scenario
limits maximum cumulative CO2 emissions from2018 until the time net zero CO2 emissions arereached (all model realizations in this scenario
reach net zero before 2100) to below 600 GtCO2,
and cumulative 2018-2100 emissions to at most
380 GtCO2, when net negative CO2 emissions inthe second half of the century are included. It isconsistent with limiting global warming to below
1.5°C in 2100 with about 66 percent probability,
while limiting peak global warming during the 21st
century to between 1.6°C and 1.7°C with about 66
percent or greater probability. This scenario groupis consistent with scenarios in the IPCC Special
Report that limit warming to 1.5°C with no or
limited overshoot.

1

These include several model-intercomparison studies from the ADVANCE project (Luderer et al., 2018; Vrontisi et al., 2018), CD-LINKS (McCollum et al., 2018), EMF-33 (Baueret al., 2018) and Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs) (Riahi et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2018), as well as a number of individual model studies focusing on various aspects
of climate stabilization in the 1.5°C to 2°C range (Bertram et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018; Kriegler et al., 2018; Strefler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018).

2

For more information, see the Summary for Policymakers of the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C (IPCC, 2018).

18

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – THE EMISSIONS GAPBox 3.1 Uncertainties surrounding
carbon budgets and corresponding
temperature limits

Box 3.2 Technical comparison with
the IPCC Special Report on Global
Warming of 1.5°C

Carbon budgets in line with a specifictemperature limit have an uncertainty
range to which various factors contribute,
including the proportionality factor between
cumulative CO2 emissions and the increase inglobal mean temperature (Gillett et al., 2013;
Matthews et al., 2017) and the contributionof non-CO2 forcers (Rogelj et al., 2016b). Dueto this, IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report (IPCC,
2014) indicated a variation in the carbon
budget (from 1870 onwards) for limiting
warming to 2°C of about 1,250 GtCO2 (rangeof 33–66 percent, with a median estimateof slightly above 3,000 GtCO2). As past andongoing emissions continue reducing theremaining carbon budget, these uncertainties
become more important in relative terms(Peters, 2018).

The analysis included in this chapter isconsistent with the latest assessment of the
IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of
1.5°C (IPCC, 2018). The range of Kyoto-GHG
emissions in 2030 consistent with limiting
warming to 1.5°C used in this report (24
GtCO2e/year with a range of 22–30 GtCO2e/year) is consistent with the 25–30 GtCO2e/
year range reported in the recent IPCC
Special Report (IPCC, 2018) for scenarios
limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or
limited overshoot. Differences are attributed
to the exclusive use of scenarios that startemissions reductions from 2020 onwards
in this report, compared with a wider set in
the IPCC Special Report. Overall, these minorchanges do not affect the assessment of
the adequacy of current NDCs for limiting
warming to 1.5°C or well below 2°C.

Recent studies have attempted to reducethese uncertainties, for example, by using
a more recent reference period to express
carbon budget estimates, such as 2006–
2015 instead of pre-industrial times (see,for example, Millar et al., 2017; Tokarska
and Gillett, 2018). Although this approacheliminates some uncertainties that haveaccumulated over the historical period, itcomes with caveats and limitations, which
result in higher carbon budgets comparedwith estimated provided in the IPCC 5th
Assessment Report (Pfleiderer et al., 2018).
The choice of method to estimate warming
until the present is an important contributor
to these higher budget estimates. Recent
research also showed that Earth system
feedbacks could cause additional warming,
both during (Comyn-Platt et al., 2018; Loweet al., 2018) and beyond the 21st century(Fischer et al., 2018). This new literature on
additional feedbacks therefore suggests thatcarbon budgets consistent with warming of
1.5°C or 2°C may be approximately 100 GtCO2
smaller.
Although this report groups scenarios basedon their cumulative CO2 emissions, it alsouses the climate model and set-up used in the
IPCC 5th Assessment Report (Meinshausen etal., 2011; Clarke et al., 2014) for comparability
with earlier reports.

From 2018 to the time of reaching net
zero, the below 1.5°C by 2100 scenario has
cumulative CO2 emissions of less than 600
GtCO2. This broadly corresponds to theremaining carbon budget for limiting warming
to 1.5°C with 50 percent probability (580
GtCO2 from 2018 to the time of reaching netzero) of the IPCC Special Report, limiting
temperature overshoot to less than 0.1°C.
Cumulative CO2 emissions until the end of
the century for any available below 1.5°C by
2100 scenario are at most 380 GtCO2, whichis less than the remaining carbon budget of
420 GtCO2 for limiting warming to 1.5°C with
66 percent probability of the IPCC Special
Report. Maximum cumulative CO2 emissions
for the below 1.8°C scenario are 900 GtCO2
from 2018 to the time of reaching net zero.
Using the IPCC Special Report assessment,
this 900 GtCO2 equates to a 66 percent
probability of limiting warming to about
1.8°C. This also corresponds to about a 50
percent probability of limiting warming to
1.7°C. For the below 2°C scenario, maximum
cumulative CO2 emissions from 2018 to thetime of reaching net zero are 1,300 GtCO2 andfrom 2018 to 2100 are 1,200 GtCO2. Using the
IPCC Special Report assessment, this 1,200
GtCO2 equates to keeping warming below 2°C
with at least 66 percent probability by 2100,
though there is a slightly lower probability
at peak warming during the century. Thissuggest that the probability of limiting
warming to 1.9°C is about 50 percent.

19

3.3 The emissions gap in 2030
The emissions gap for 2030 is defined as the difference
between global total GHG emissions from least-cost
scenarios that are consistent with the 2°C and 1.5°C
temperature limits and the estimated total global GHG
emissions resulting from full implementation of NDCs.
To allow for a more nuanced interpretation of the Paris
Agreement’s temperature targets, this assessment
includes a below 1.8°C scenario. This section updates
the gap based on estimated levels of GHG emissions in
2030 for the scenarios described in section 3.2. Table 3.1
provides a full overview of 2030 emission levels for allseven scenarios considered in this assessment, as wellas the resulting emissions gap. Figure 3.1 illustrates theemissions gap in 2030.
Table 3.1 indicates that in the absence of further climate
action since 2005, that is, under a no-policy baseline
scenario, the total global GHG emissions in 2030 wouldbe 65 GtCO2e (range of 60–70 GtCO2e). Current policies

are estimated to reduce global emissions in 2030 byaround 6 GtCO2e compared with the no-policy scenario.
There are no substantive updates to these estimatescompared with the 2017 assessment. The mediancurrent policy estimate for 2018 is roughly 0.5 GtCO2e
lower than the 2017 estimate, which is within rounding
precision. The lower and upper limit of the range forthe current policy estimate has decreased by 2 GtCO2e
and 1 GtCO2e respectively due to lower projections(see chapter 2, section 2.4). Overall, this implies thatstudies have not identified significant and unambiguous
progress in the implementation of policies that would
allow the NDCs to be achieved by 2030. However,
the estimates of global emissions in 2030 under thecurrent policy scenario have decreased slightly since2015, from 60 GtCO2e (range of 58–62 GtCO2e) (UNEP,
2015) to 59 GtCO2e (range of 56–60 GtCO2e) in 2018,indicating that some studies show slight progress inpolicy implementation since the adoption of the Paris
Agreement.

Table 3.1: Total global greenhouse gas emissions in 2030 under different scenarios (median and 10th to 90th percentile
range), temperature implications and the resulting emissions gap.
Numberofscenarios
in setGlobal total
emissionsin 2030[GtCO2e]No-policy
baseline179

65 (60–70)

Current policy

4

Unconditional
NDCs
Conditional
NDCs

Scenario(rounded to
the nearest
gigatonne)

Below 2.0°C(66% chance)

Below 1.8°C(66% chance)

Below 1.5°C in
2100(66% chance)

Estimated temperature outcomes

Below
2°C

Below
1.8°C

Below
1.5°C
in 2100

59 (56–60)

18 (16–20)

24 (22–25)

35 (32–36)

12

56 (52–58)

15 (12–17)

21 (17–23)

32 (28–34)

10

53 (49–55)

13 (9–15)

19 (15–20)

29 (26–31)

29

43

13

40 (38–45)

34 (30–40)

24 (22–30)

50%
chance66%
chance90%
chanceEmissions Gap in 2030
[GtCO2e]Peak:
1.7–1.8°C

Peak:
1.9–2.0°C

Peak:
2.4–2.6°C

In 2100:
1.6–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.8–1.9°C

In 2100:
2.3–2.5°C

Peak:
1.6–1.7°C

Peak:
1.7–1.8°C

Peak:
2.1–2.3°C

In 2100:
1.3–1.6°C

In 2100:
1.5–1.7°C

In 2100:
1.9–2.2°C

Peak:
1.5–1.6°C

Peak:
1.6–1.7°C

Peak:
2.0–2.1°C

In 2100:
1.2–1.3°C

In 2100:
1.4–1.5°C

In 2100:
1.8–1.9°C

Note: The gap numbers and ranges are calculated based on the original numbers (without rounding), which may differ from the rounded numbers (3rdcolumn) in the table. Numbers are rounded to full GtCO2e. GHG emissions have been aggregated with 100-year global warming potential values of the IPCC
2nd Assessment Report. The NDC and current policy emission projections may differ slightly from the presented numbers in Cross-Chapter box 11 of the
IPCC Special Report (Bertoldi et al., 2018) due to the inclusion of new studies after the literature cut-off date set by the IPCC. Pathways were grouped inthree categories depending on whether their maximum cumulative CO2 emissions were less than 600 GtCO2, between 600 and 900 GtCO2, or between 900
and 1,300 GtCO2 from 2018 onwards until net zero CO2 emissions are reached, or until the end of the century if net zero is not reached before. Pathways
assume limited action until 2020 and cost-optimal mitigation thereafter. Estimated temperature outcomes are based on the method used in the IPCC 5th
Assessment Report.

20

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – THE EMISSIONS GAPFull implementation of the unconditional and conditional
NDCs is estimated to reduce global emissions in 2030
by about 3 GtCO2e and 6 GtCO2e respectively, comparedwith the current policy scenario (table 3.1). Some of the
new studies included in this year’s assessment havehigher NDC estimates, resulting in a slight increase of
1 GtCO2e in the median unconditional NDC estimate
and an increase in the upper end of the range for theunconditional and conditional NDC estimates by 2
GtCO2e and 1 GtCO2e respectively.
Studies underlying the current policy trajectory scenario
and the NDC scenario differ in various ways, such as
their treatment of conditional versus unconditional NDCs
and their assumptions regarding non-covered sectors
and gases. These methodological differences cannot
be fully harmonized, which leads to some uncertainty as
indicated by the ranges around the median estimates(see table 3.1 and online appendix A.1). These
differences and their implications are further describedin online appendix A.2 and in the 2016 Emissions
Gap Report (UNEP, 2016), which also provides a more
complete discussion of the different types of scenarios.
The major change compared with the 2017 Emissions
Gap Report is in the assessment of 2030 GHG emission
levels consistent with limiting global warming to
below 2°C and lower. As discussed in section 3.2, the2018 assessment draws on numerous new 1.5°C and
2°C-consistent least-cost emissions pathways that havebecome available in the context of the IPCC Special
Report (Huppmann et al., 2018a, 2018b). Furthermore,
the assessment adopts a new methodology, whichgroups pathways under three temperature scenarios
based on their cumulative CO2 emissions. These
updates result in target emission levels for 2030 that

Figure 3.1: Global greenhouse gas emissions under different scenarios and the emissions gap in 2030
(median estimate and 10th to 90th percentile range).

21differ from the ranges assessed in the 2017 report.
Table 3.1 shows that in the below 2.0°C scenario(about 66 percent probability), which is consistent withmaximum cumulative emissions of 900–1,300 GtCO2,
GHG emission levels for 2030 are 40 GtCO2e (range of
38–45 GtCO2e). This is around 2 GtCO2e lower than 2017
estimates but well within the reported uncertainty range.
For pathways with maximum cumulative emissions of
600–900 GtCO2, which is consistent with keeping global
warming below 1.8°C with about 66 percent probability,
GHG emission levels for 2030 are 34 GtCO2e (range of
30–40 GtCO2e). For the below 1.5°C in 2100 scenario,
based on pathways where cumulated maximum CO2
emissions from 2018 are below 600 GtCO2, emission
levels in 2030 are as low as 24 GtCO2e (range of 22–30
GtCO2e). This is 12 GtCO2e lower than the estimate in2017 of 36 GtCO2e (range of 32–38 GtCO2e), mainly
because many recent studies assume that less negativeemissions will be available over the course of thiscentury, thus requiring steeper emission reductions in thenext decades to keep peak warming as low as possible.
The inclusion of pathways consistent with keeping global
warming to below 1.8°C, combined with the indication oftemperature outcomes for about a 50 percent, 90 percent
and 66 percent probability, allow for a more nuanced
interpretation and discussion of what ‘well below 2°C’
means and implies in terms of emission reductions
required.
The emissions gap between estimated total global
emissions in 2030 under the NDC scenarios andpathways limiting warming to below 2°C and 1.5°C is
illustrated in figure 3.1, where the no-policy and current
policy scenarios are also included. Full implementationof unconditional NDCs is estimated to result in a gap of
15 GtCO2e (range of 12–17 GtCO2e) in 2030 comparedwith the below 2°C scenario. This is about 2 GtCO2e
higher than the gap assessed in the 2017 report, due tothe lower 2°C scenario estimate. If the conditional NDCs
are also fully implemented, the gap reduces by about
2 GtCO2e. The emissions gap between unconditional
NDCs and below 1.5°C pathways is about 32 GtCO2e(range of 28–34 GtCO2e). This is about 13 GtCO2e higher
than assessed in the 2017 report, due to the lower 1.5°C
scenario estimates as explained above. Considering thefull implementation of both unconditional and conditional
NDCs would reduce this gap by roughly 3 GtCO2e.
In summary, the assessment amplifies concerns
regarding both ambition and action compared withprevious Emissions Gap Reports. According to thecurrent policy and NDC scenarios, global emissions are
not estimated to peak by 2030, let alone by 2020. The
NDCs are estimated to reduce global emissions in 2030
by a maximum 6 GtCO2e compared with a continuationof current policies. As the emissions gap assessmentshows, reductions that are roughly 2 to 3 times higher are
needed to bridge the gap between conditional NDCs and
2°C pathways, and five times higher to align emissions
with 1.5°C pathways.

3.4 Temperature implications of the NDCs
The implications for global warming by the end of the
century can be estimated based on the 2030 level of
GHG emissions resulting from full implementation of
the NDCs. The Emissions Gap Reports use a methodthat builds on information from scenarios available in
the peer-reviewed literature. Such scenarios provide
internally consistent long-term emission projections
and relate 2030 GHG emission levels to temperature
outcomes throughout the 21st century (Rogelj et al.,2016a). The method used in these reports has beenassessed in a recent study (Jeffery et al., 2018) toprovide consistent and useful results for a wide range ofemissions reduction levels in 2030, in contrast to someof the other methods found in the literature consulted.
Assuming that climate action continues consistently
throughout the 21st century, implementing theunconditional NDCs would lead to a mean global
temperature of around 3.2°C (with a range of 2.9–3.4°C),
relative to pre-industrial levels by 2100. Since theseprojections do not reach net zero CO2 emissions by
2100, temperatures are further projected to increase
thereafter. Full implementation of both unconditional andconditional NDCs would reduce these estimates by 0.2°C
in 2100. These projections are identical to those made in2017, within rounding precision.

3.5 Implications of 2030 emission levels
The large ranges in least-cost 2030 global GHG
emissions reported in table 3.1 for limiting warming to
below 2°C or 1.5°C not only reflect variations between
models, but also differences in societal choices thatshould be made to achieve desired climate outcomes.
Such outcomes may include deciding the degree towhich it is acceptable to rely on large-scale CDR after
2050, how mitigation action should be spread overtime or what an acceptable level of burden is for future
generations. Recent studies allow these choices tobe better understood by illustrating the implications
associated with aiming to achieve the higher or lower
end of the identified ranges, or with missing themaltogether. The recently approved IPCC Special Reporton Global Warming of 1.5°C points out that the global
emissions outcome from the aggregate effect of the
NDCs is too high to prevent exceedance of the 1.5°C
threshold (IPCC, 2018; Rogelj et al., 2018). Here, thefocus is on implications of 2030 emission level choicesfor (1) the future reliance and scale of CDR; (2) thesimultaneous achievement of other sustainability
objectives; and (3) lock-in of carbon-intensive
infrastructure that makes future emission reductions
more difficult.

22

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – THE EMISSIONS GAP

3.5.1 Limiting future reliance on carbon dioxide
removalMitigation scenarios that stabilize global warming towell below 2°C or 1.5°C differ widely in their use of CDR(Rogelj et al., 2018b), which is associated with several
environmental and social sustainability risks (Smithet al., 2016; Minx et al., 2018). CDR of some form will
likely be required for these warming limits, especiallythe 1.5°C goal, though its extent may vary (Rogelj et al.,2015; Luderer et al., 2018). A recent study (Strefler et al.,2018) shows that strengthened action in the near future
can significantly decrease CDR requirements for theremainder of the century. Reducing CO2 emissions by
22–53 percent below current NDC levels in 2030, which
would align emission levels with below 2°C and 1.5°C
pathways, would substantially alleviate the trade-off
between disruptive emission reduction requirements
post-2030 and potentially unattainably and unsustainably
high CDR deployment. The IPCC Special Report indicatesthat the CDR requirements to compensate for an
overshoot of 0.2°C or larger during this century might not
be achievable (IPCC, 2018). Furthermore, optimal 2030
GHG emission levels depend strongly on the availabilityof CDR: below 1.8°C and below 1.5°C pathways withlimited CDR have 7–12 GtCO2e less 2030 GHG emissions
than corresponding pathways with a full technology
portfolio. The six 1.5°C pathways available from theliterature that limit the availability of biomass with carbon
capture and storage technologies (Bauer et al., 2018;
Bertram et al., 2018; Grubler et al., 2018; Holz et al., 2018;
Kriegler et al., 2018; van Vuuren et al., 2018) all have GHG
emission levels of at most 25 GtCO2e in 2030.

3.5.2 Achieving sustainability
Numerous interactions and potential synergies andtrade-offs between climate change mitigation andother sustainability objectives are highlighted in the
recent literature (von Stechow et al., 2015; 2016; Jakob
and Steckel, 2016; UNEP, 2016; Bertram et al., 2018;
McCollum et al., 2018). Broad societal choices anddevelopments regarding lifestyles and socioeconomics
will determine the feasibility and effort required
to simultaneously achieve the Paris Agreement’s
objectives and the Sustainable Development Goals(Rogelj et al., 2018a). The literature also shows thatstronger near-term emission reductions have thepotential to increase mitigation co-benefits in both thecoming decade and later in the century, for example,
through reduced air pollution, lower water demand anddecreased dependence on bioenergy (Bertram et al.,2018; IPCC, 2018). For instance, Rao et al. (2016) showthat combining deep decarbonization with stringent
air pollution control policies can decrease the share of
global population exposed to high particulate matter
concentrations from 21 percent to 3 percent in 2050.

Markandya et al. (2018) estimate that air pollutionrelated mortality during the 2020–2050 period can be
reduced by around one quarter compared with businessas usual if CO2 emission reductions are in line with theParis Agreement targets. In addition, dedicated policies
for differentiated carbon pricing or energy efficiency
regulation have been identified to effectively mitigate
potential adverse side effects, such as exceedingly
large land requirements for bioenergy (Bertram et al.,2018) or impacts of climate policies on food and energy
prices (Fujimori et al., 2018). Grubler et al. (2018) haveshown that strong efforts towards improving energy
efficiency lowers near-term GHG emissions, increases
sustainability co-benefits and could keep the 1.5°C limit
within reach with much lower CDR levels.

3.5.3 Avoiding lock-in of carbon-intensive
infrastructure
Sociotechnical systems in general and energy systems
in particular are characterized by inertia and pathdependency due to long-lived capital stocks with slow
turnover, infrastructure requirements, learning by doing
and cultural practices. As noted in previous Emissions
Gap Reports, these inertias give rise to the notion ofcarbon lock-in, which is large-scale committed emissions
resulting from existing infrastructures (see also Unruh,
2000; Davis et al., 2010). The scenario literature clearly
demonstrates that weak near-term climate policy
ambition increases the long-term emissions commitment
from fossil-based infrastructures, decreases the
economic mitigation potential (Bertram et al., 2015;
Kriegler et al., 2015; Luderer et al., 2018) and greatly
increases the risk of stranded assets when switching
to a 2°C-consistent mitigation pathway (Johnson et al.,2015; ; Riahi et al., 2015; Luderer et al., 2016). Attempting
to hold the below 2°C limit from the 2030 emission
levels implied by the NDCs would require rapid emission
reductions after 2030, resulting in stranded assets
of several hundred billion US$ from coal power alone(Johnson et al., 2015). Coal-based power is the mostimportant cause of carbon lock-in today (Davis et al.,2010; Bertram et al., 2015; UNEP, 2017), with all plants
currently in operation committing the world to around
190 GtCO2 (UNEP, 2017; Edenhofer et al., 2018). If allcoal-fired power plants currently under construction go
into operation and run until the end of their technicallifetime, the coal emissions commitment will increase byanother 150 GtCO2, jeopardizing the achievement of NDCemission reduction targets and the Paris Agreement’s
long-term warming limits (Edenhofer et al., 2018).
Strengthening 2030 efforts beyond the NDCs will not only
reduce near-term emissions, but also crucially reducecarbon lock-in, paving the way for the deep emission
reductions required in the longer term.

23

Chapter 4.
Bridging the gap:
Strengthening NDCs and domestic policies
Authors: Taryn Fransen (World Resources Institute), Niklas Höhne (NewClimate Institute)

4.1 Introduction
The previous chapters of this report highlight the urgency
of enhancing ambition and strengthening mitigation
action without further delay. This chapter explores how
countries can reflect increased mitigation ambition
through enhanced Nationally Intended Contributions(NDCs) and strengthened domestic policies.
Furthermore, it looks into the opportunities for bridging
the emissions gap by delivering on enhanced ambition.
This chapter first sets out the rationale and context
for enhancing ambition in NDCs, including the legal
context of the Paris Agreement, which requires regularly
enhanced ambition through five-year cycles, as well
as factors that facilitate greater ambition (section
4.2). Next, it describes existing concepts of mitigation
ambition in the context of NDCs, as well as options forthem to reflect enhanced ambition in their NDCs (section
4.3). Enhanced ambition sends an important signal to
stakeholders regarding mitigation commitment bothinternationally and domestically. As domestic policies
are crucial to translating mitigation ambition into action,
this chapter subsequently explores the extent to whichmain policy types, focusing specifically on G20 members,
cover key sectors (section 4.4). Finally, it summarizes
the main insights into how much global greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions could be reduced through enhanced
ambition and action from different perspectives (section
4.5), before highlighting the main conclusions (section
4.6).

4.2 Rationale and context for enhancing
Nationally Determined Contributions
To increase climate ambition over time, the Paris
Agreement establishes a five-year pledge-and-review
cycle. Under this cycle, Parties prepare and communicate
successive NDCs every five years. Each successive
NDC is to represent a progression beyond the Party’s

1current NDC, reflecting its highest possible ambition(UNFCCC, 2015). The Agreement notes that developed
country Parties should continue taking the lead bysetting economy-wide absolute emission reduction
targets, while developing country Parties should continueenhancing their mitigation efforts, gradually moving
towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation
targets in light of their capabilities and different national
circumstances. From 2023, a five-yearly1 ‘global
stocktake’ will assess collective progress towards theAgreement’s long-term goals and inform the next roundof NDCs.
Prior to this, the Paris Decision invites those Parties with
NDCs for 2025 to communicate a new NDC, and thosewith NDCs for 2030 to communicate or update their NDC,
by 2020. This follows the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue to takestock of Parties’ collective efforts in relation to progress
towards the Agreement’s long-term goals and to inform
NDC preparation (see also chapter 1). The Decision also
invites Parties to undertake mid-century, long-term, lowGHG emission development strategies, which may in turninform near-term NDCs and policies (UNFCCC, 2016).
A number of factors have changed since Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) werecommunicated in the lead-up to 2015, creating a newcontext in which Parties may consider communicating
or updating their NDCs for 2020. For example, the Paris
Agreement has been adopted and ratified, indicating
the terms under which international climate policy
will proceed, and a growing number of countries
have adopted or strengthened their domestic policy
frameworks for addressing climate change (Iacobuta etal., 2018). Furthermore, the price of renewable energy
and other low-carbon solutions has continued to fall
more rapidly than expected (IRENA, 2018), and countries
are continuing to decouple economic growth from GHG
emissions. The 2018 Global Climate Action Summit
revealed new actions and commitments on the part ofnon-state actors.

Unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement.

24

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: STRENGTHENING NDCS AND DOMESTIC POLICIESBox 4.1 Examples of enhanced
mitigation ambition in NDCs
Several Parties have either enhanced theambition of their NDCs relative to their
INDCs or have articulated their intent to doso.2 For instance, Morocco has moved froma 13 percent to a 17 percent unconditional
reduction in GHG emissions relative to abusiness-as-usual scenario by 2030, while
increasing its conditional target from 31 to
41 percent. Argentina and Indonesia havealso adopted more modest increases in
GHG target stringency. Likewise, Morocco,
Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uruguay haveadopted new commitments and actions,while Mali has adopted an unconditional GHG
target in addition to its existing conditionaltarget (Fransen et al., 2017).

4.3 Options for Parties to enhance mitigation
ambition
Chapters 2 and 3 presented detailed estimates of thelevel of GHG emissions that will occur in future years
if a country implements its NDC, and if it continues
to implement its current domestic policies. The two
seldom match, for multiple reasons. First, countries mayneed time – often many years – to adopt and begin to
implement the domestic policies necessary to achieving
the targets contained in their NDCs. In the meantime,
NDCs will reflect a higher level of mitigation ambition(that is, lower future emissions) than current domestic
policies. In other cases, countries may establish
relatively conservative NDCs, and then, through domestic
policies or other economic trends, find themselves on
track to over-deliver. In these cases, NDCs will reflect alower level of mitigation ambition (that is, higher future
emissions) than will domestic policies. Finally, someParties intend to purchase offsets to close any gap
between their domestic policy ambition and their NDC
commitments, in which case current policies would
reflect future emissions that were higher than NDC
targets, but which would be offset.

2

Ultimately, as domestic policy has the power to control
emissions, through regulation or economic incentives,ambitious NDC goals will be irrelevant unless domestic
policy follows suit. Nevertheless, the ambition reflected
in NDCs is also important because it signals to theinternational community the contribution that the country
intends to make to solve the global issue of climatechange, and it delineates the commitments on which
the country will report to the international community.
This section therefore outlines options for increasing
ambition both in NDCs and in domestic policy.
An NDC with enhanced mitigation ambition can be
defined as an NDC that “if fully implemented, would
result in lower cumulative [GHG] emissions than the
fully implemented existing NDC” (Fransen et al., 2017).
Furthermore, it is argued that “ambition should be viewed
as a combination of target-setting, preparedness to
implement, and a capacity to sustain further reductions
over time” (Levaï and Baron, 2017). While both definitions
consider the impact on cumulative emissions, the latter
more explicitly considers a time frame to mid-century, as
well as implementation capacity.
There are a number of ways in which a country could
reflect enhanced mitigation ambition in its NDC: figure
4.1 illustrates four categories of options for doing so(based on Fransen et al. (2017)). First, a country could
strengthen its existing GHG target, for example byincreasing its stringency, expanding the sectors andgases that it covers or strengthening its modalities, suchas those related to land-sector accounting or market
mechanisms. It could also adopt a new GHG target.
Second, it could pursue similar options vis-à-vis sectoral
non-GHG targets, such as those to enhance renewableenergy or energy efficiency or to limit deforestation.
Third, a country could opt to strengthen or expand thepolicies and actions mentioned in its NDC. At sufficientscale, this could enhance the NDC’s overall ambition,
as well as providing confidence in the country’s
preparedness to implement. Finally, the country couldcommit to an implementation pathway that will sustain
GHG reductions over the long term, limiting cumulativeemissions.
These options are not mutually exclusive and whether
an NDC revision results in enhanced ambition according
to the definitions above depends on the scale of therevision, rather than how it is articulated in the NDC.
It is important for countries to consider a wide range
of options, in order to identify those that are mostmeaningful and practical in their unique circumstances,and in order to enable deep emission reductions.

https://www.wri.org/blog/2018/04/insider-whats-changing-countries-turn-indcs-ndcs-5-early-insights.

25

Figure 4.1: Typology of strengthening mitigation ambition of NDCs.

Strengthen or add a
GHG target

Strengthen or add asectoral non-GHG
targetStrengthen or add
policies and actions

Increase thestringency of an
existing GHG target

Increase the stringencyof a sectoral
non-GHG target

Strengthen existing
policies and actions

Expand the scopeand coverage of an
existing GHG target

Advance the target
year of a sectoral
non-GHG target

Add new
policies and actions

Change thetarget period of an
existing GHG target

Declare an intent tooverachieve a sectoral
non-GHG target

Declare an intent
to overachieve an
existing GHG target

Adopt a new sectoral
non-GHG target

Align imlementationof the existing NDC
with long-term goals
Commit to achieving
the existing NDC via
policies and actions
that support long-term
decarbonization
pathwaysStrengthen themodalities of an
existing GHG target
Change the type of an
existing GHG target

Adopt anew GHG target
Source: adapted from Franzen et al., (2017)

Source: adapted from Fransen et al. (2017).

4.4 Strengthening domestic policies
Domestic policies are critical for translating mitigation
ambition into action. The suite of domestic policies toaddress climate change can be strengthened, both by
expanding policy coverage to additional sectors andissues and by enhancing the stringency of existing
policies.
A number of studies and initiatives analyze the coverageand stringency of domestic policies in G20 member
countries (see, for example, OECD, 2016; CD-LINKS, 2018;
Climate Transparency, 2018). As described in chapter 2,
these countries account for roughly 78 percent of global
emissions. These studies find that there is significant
scope for enhancing the ‘coverage’ of G20 members’
national policies – that is, the presence of a policy
addressing a particular sector, without considering
its stringency. Evaluation of the coverage of ‘goodpractice polices’ highlights that while policies to support,

for example, renewables in the electricity sector are
widespread (100 percent of G20 members), coverage isscattered in other areas. To illustrate (CD-LINKS, 2018):•

Reducing transport-related fossil fuel subsidies iscovered by only 38 percent of G20 countries.

•

Overarching carbon pricing for the electricity
sector is covered by only 44 percent of G20
members.

•

Material efficiency measures in industry show
38 percent coverage, while CH4 from oil and gas
production have 38 percent coverage.

•

Support schemes for using renewables inbuildings’ heating and cooling systems arecovered by only 19 percent of G20 members.

•

Emission standards for heavy duty vehicles arecovered by 56 percent, while e-mobility programs
are covered by 31 percent of G20 members.

26

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: STRENGTHENING NDCS AND DOMESTIC POLICIESEven if an area is covered by a policy instrument or policy
package, the stringency of policies varies significantly
between countries. Assessments of stringency are
more challenging than those of coverage and directcomparison is difficult due to very different domestic
circumstances and choices of policy instruments.
Although methods to rate the stringency of policy
packages are emerging, there are still relatively few. For
example, the Allianz Climate & Energy Monitor (Allianz,
2017) compares the stringency of a policy package
to support renewables in the electricity sector of G20
countries; the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI,
2018) rates overall climate performance using expert
surveys; and the OECD (2016) assesses and compares
the stringency of environmental policies in OECD
countries. A common insight from these initiatives is that
there is significant potential to enhance the stringency ofdomestic policies in all countries, including in the area ofcarbon pricing, which is explored further in chapter 6.
A few examples of policies that have had – or could have– a significant effect on reducing GHG emissions are
given below (based on Fekete et al., 2015; Kriegler et al.,2018; Roelfsema et al., 2018). These areas could be used
as a starting point for countries to consider options to
expand the coverage or stringency of their policies:
•

•

•

•

Renewable electricity share in global total
electricity generation has increased significantlyin the EU-28 by, on average, 1.5 percentage
points/year during 2005–2014 (IEA, 2016). This
increase is related to the Renewable Energy
Directive (European Parliament, 2009), which is
implemented in member states in various ways.
Phase-out of unabated coal-fired power plants(that is, without Carbon Capture and Storage(CCS)), is planned in a number of EU countries(Jones and Gutmann, 2015). At the subnational
level, Alberta (Government of Alberta, no date)and Ontario in Canada phased them out in 2014
(Harris et al., 2015), followed by South Australia
in 2016 (Parkinson, 2016). Canada has a plan tophase out coal-fired power plants without CCS by
2030 (Government of Canada, 2016). Meanwhile,
India’s Electricity Plan (Central Electricity
Authority, 2018) also projects significantly fewer
new coal-fired power plants than previously
planned.
In terms of industrial energy efficiency, there
is only limited evidence that existing policies inmajor emitting countries have made significant
impact well beyond business-as-usual. The
literature suggests that autonomous energy
efficiency improvement is about 1 percent
annually (Blok, 2004; UNIDO, 2010) and an
improvement of anywhere close to 2 percent
annually is considered challenging, especially indeveloped economies (Blok, 2004).
In heating and cooling for new buildings, aparticularly stringent example is the EU Energy
Performance of Buildings Directive (European
Parliament, 2010), which calls for all newbuildings to be nearly zero energy by 2020. The
EU also has an encouraging national target torenovate 3 percent of all public buildings/year toincrease their efficiency. Nevertheless, challenges
remain in implementing these targets.
•

For electrical appliances and lighting, Japan’s
Top Runner Program (METI, 2015) is worth
mentioning. The energy efficiency improvement
rates for 24 appliances (including heating andcooling as well as cooking appliances) overvarying time periods of 4-9 years was, on average,
0.9 percentage points/year higher than thetargeted rates (Ibid.).

•

The global market share for electric vehicles(EVs) is still small, with 3 million sales in 2017
(IEA, 2018). In Norway, however, EVs (including
plug-in hybrids) accounted for nearly 39 percentof new cars in 2017 (IEA, 2018) and evenhigher recently. A multi-layered policy package
comprised of financial incentives and behavioral
incentives (e.g. allowing EV drivers to use bus
lanes and free public parking) contributed tothese high EV sales (Figenbaum et al., 2015).

•

For fuel economy of new vehicles, the EU sets
one of the strictest standards in the world (Yangand Bandivadekar, 2017), recognizing that there
is a performance gap between test mode andreal-world fuel-economy figures, estimated at 30
percent (ICCT, 2016).

•

For freight transport, only Japan, the USA, Canada
and China have CO2 or efficiency standards forheavy duty vehicles (Muncrief and Rodriguez,2017); the USA and Canada have separate engine
standards in addition to full-vehicle regulations,
including aerodynamic and rolling resistanceto specifically drive improvements in engine
efficiency.

Gaps in coverage as well as stringency suggest that
there is considerable scope for countries to strengthen
their domestic policies and to achieve emission
reductions that are considerably beyond the ambitionreflected in current policies and NDCs.

4.5 The scope for bridging the emissions gap
through enhanced ambition and strengthened
actionThis section explores the answers to two central
questions of the Emissions Gap Reports: Is it possible
to bridge the emissions gap by 2030? What are themain opportunities? It summarizes the main insights
into how much global GHG emissions could be reduced
through enhanced ambition and action from different
perspectives: by realizing the full technical potential
for mitigation; applying existing good-practice policies
universally; maximizing development benefits; andfilling gaps in NDC coverage. These perspectives offerdifferent, but not mutually exclusive, lenses throughwhich to approach both domestic policies and NDC
enhancement.

27

4.5.1 Technical mitigation potential in 2030
Estimates of the technical mitigation potential shedlight on the upper limit for emission reductions in given
future years. The 2017 edition of the Emissions Gap
Report (UNEP, 2017) provided an updated assessmentof the sectoral emission reduction potentials thatare technically and economically feasible in 2030,
considering prices up to US$100/tCO2e.3 The
assessment showed that, based on basic potentials,
global emissions could be reduced by 33 (range of 30–36) GtCO2e/year in 2030, compared to the current policy
scenario of 59 GtCO2e/year (chapter 3). If, in addition,
a number of newer and less certain mitigation options
were included, the mitigation potential would increase
to 38 (range of 35–41) GtCO2e. The emissions reduction
potential is thus sufficient to bridge the gap in 2030.
It is more than twice the size of the emissions gap for
2°C and still sufficient to bring global emissions in 2030
to a level consistent with least-cost 1.5°C pathways.
However, the significantly higher 1.5°C gap estimated inthis year’s report implies that there would be less leeway
in delivering the required emissions reductions.
Estimates of technical emission reduction potential
differ significantly between studies and realizing thepotentials assumes that all technologies available are
fully deployed nationally and globally. The feasibility ofthis depends on removing various barriers, including
technical, financial, capacity and political barriers.
However, it is worth noting that around 40 percent of thetechnical mitigation potential is estimated to comprisemeasures in solar and wind energy, efficient appliances,efficient passenger cars, afforestation, and avoiding
deforestation (UNEP, 2017). All these measures canbe realized at low and, in some cases, net-negative
incremental costs and primarily build on proven policies.
While national circumstances determine the scope andappropriateness of specific measures, studies point tosignificant mitigation potential in all countries.

4.5.2 Good-practice policies and their global
application
Since 2012, the Emissions Gap Reports have provided
examples of policies in key areas and sectors thathave proven successful in reducing GHG emissions
in countries and regions around the world, while
contributing to national development goals (an overview
of sectors and issues covered in previous Emissions
Gap Reports is provided at the end of this report).
Such policies have the potential to make a significant
contribution to bridging the gap, if they are scaled up interms of their ambition and geographical coverage.
Several studies provide estimates of the global emission
reductions that could be achieved, if existing goodpractice policies were replicated universally (see forexample Afanador et al., 2015; Fekete et al., 2015;
Kriegler et al., 2018; Roelfsema et al., 2018). The studies

3

An order of magnitude referred to by, for example, Stiglitz et al. (2017).

differ in assumptions, approaches and policies covered,and subsequently also in their estimates of global
emission reduction potentials. However, they typicallyfind that global emissions in 2030 could be reduced
to levels of between 42–49 GtCO2e/year. The studies
highlight that significant potential exists in all countries
and that replication of proven good-practice policies
could reduce global emissions considerably comparedto the full implementation of the current NDCs, thereby
narrowing the 2030 gap compared to a 2°C pathway.
As studies of the global emission reduction potentialfrom universal replication of existing good-practice
policies do not consider the implementation of alltechnically feasible options, they arrive at lower reduction
estimates than those based on total technical mitigation
potential. On the other hand, their implementation may
be more feasible as the policies considered have alreadybeen proven in some countries. However, they may not
be directly applicable to all other countries.

4.5.3 Maximizing sustainable development
benefits
National development priorities such as economic
development, reduced air pollution, employment, andenergy security are often the main drivers of domestic
policies. However, as mentioned above, sound climatechange policies will often contribute to national
development goals and vice versa.
A growing number of studies analyze how maximizationof development benefits can reduce global GHG
emissions significantly in the near future, thereby
contributing to narrowing the gap. The New Climate
Economy report of 2015 (The New Climate Economy,2015), for example, estimated that actions in eight focus
areas could achieve significant economic benefits andreduce global GHG emissions by between 43–53 GtCO2e
in 2030. The New Climate Economy report (2018) statesthat “low-carbon growth could deliver economic benefitsof US$26 trillion to 2030”. Other studies find that meetinga trajectory compatible with the Paris Agreement’s longterm goals can support the fulfilment of Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) in terms of energy access,clean water, air pollution and food security (McCollum
et al., 2018). The IEA World Energy Outlook (IEA, 2017)
includes a sustainable development scenario, whichmeets the Paris Agreement’s long-term goals andachieves cleaner air and universal access to modern
energy and reducing energy security risks.

4.5.4 Filling gaps in NDC coverage
One option for enhancing ambition in the NDCs is toexpand them to cover all sectors and gases (see figure4.1). Previous studies have reviewed the emission
reduction potential associated with expanding thecoverage of current NDCs to all sectors and gases.
Assuming that reductions achieved in the newly covered

28

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: STRENGTHENING NDCS AND DOMESTIC POLICIES

sectors and gases are comparable with those in sectors
and gases currently covered by NDCs, the global
potential is limited to a few GtCO2e by 2030 (Rogelj etal., 2016). At the same time, countries could elect to go
beyond the existing level of ambition in increasing theircoverage. Ross et al. (2018) finds significant potential,
including development benefits, in addressing short-lived
climate pollutants. However, while some countries haveimportant gaps to fill in sectors and gases, from a global
perspective, the bulk of the mitigation potential lies instrengthening the emissions reductions from sectors
and gases that are already covered by NDCs.

4.6 Summary
To bridge the 2030 emissions gap and ensure long-term
decarbonization consistent with the Paris Agreement
goals, countries must enhance their mitigation ambition.
This chapter has illustrated how enhanced ambition
can be reflected in revised NDCs as well as in domestic
policies, each with unique value. NDCs establish
international accountability and convey a direction of
travel to both domestic and international stakeholders,
while domestic policies directly incentivize actions to
reduce emissions.

Chapter 6 looks at the role that strengthened fiscal
policies can play in creating stronger incentives for lowcarbon investments and for reducing GHG emissions,with a particular emphasis on carbon pricing.
The technical potential for reducing GHG emissions
is significant and could be sufficient to bridge theemissions gap in 2030. Three broad areas have thelargest potential: renewable energy from wind andsolar power; energy-efficient appliances and cars; andafforestation and stopping deforestation.
In all countries, there is significant potential to realize
a substantive part of the technical mitigation potential
by replicating proven good-practice policies thatcan simultaneously contribute to key Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). Realizing this potential
would narrow the gap by 2030 significantly beyond
current NDCs.

When considering the mitigation ambition of either NDCs
or domestic policies, it is important to consider the effectnot only on the 2030 emissions gap, but also on longterm emissions trajectories to mid-century.

This chapter summarizes only an initial list of
perspectives, leaving out a number of important
perspectives and opportunities. Non-state andsubnational actors in particular have the opportunity
both to be part of implementing mitigation commitments
made at the national level and to go beyond current
pledges and create the space for, and the trust of,national governments to raise ambition. Chapter 5
assesses the role of these actors in enhancing global
climate ambition and bridging the emissions gap, basedon the most recent literature.

There are a range of options for enhancing both thecoverage and stringency of domestic policies, includingof G20 members. While all G20 countries have policies
to support renewables in the electricity sector, stringencyof these policies can still be enhanced. Gaps in bothcoverage and stringency remain in, for example, fossil
fuel subsidy reduction, material efficiency measuresin industry, oil and gas methane, support schemes forrenewables in heating and cooling, emission standards
for heavy duty vehicles, and e-mobility programmes.

Another important issue is the role that accelerated
innovation can play in bridging the emissions gap
and realizing the longer-term emission reductions
required to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreementwith global implications. Chapter 7 explores how
combining innovation in behavior and in the use ofexisting technologies with promoting investment in newtechnologies and market inventions has the potential
to radically transform societies and reduce global GHG
emissions.

29

Chapter 5.
Bridging the gap:
The role of non-state and subnational actors
Lead authors: Angel Hsu (Yale-NUS College/Data-Driven Yale), Oscar Widerberg (IVM, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
Contributing authors: Amy Weinfurter (Data-Driven Yale), Sander Chan (German Development Institute), Mark Roelfsema(PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency), Katharina Lütkehermöller (NewClimate Institute), Fatemeh
Bakhtiari (UNEP DTU Partnership)

5.1 Introduction•

Global climate change governance is diversifying
rapidly: in recent years, political attention has been
acknowledging the increasingly important role of nonstate and subnational actors such as cities, states,
regions, companies, investors, foundations, civil society
organizations, and cooperative initiatives.

Encourages Parties to work closely with non-Party
stakeholders1 to catalyze efforts to strengthen
mitigation and adaptation action (paragraph 118).

•

Encourages non-Party stakeholders to register
their climate actions in the Non- State Actor Zone
for Climate Action platform (paragraph 117).

•

Convenes a high-level event building on the
Lima–Paris Action Agenda during the period
2016–2020 in conjunction with each session of
the Conference of the Parties (paragraph 120).

•

Appoints two high-level champions on behalf of
the President of the Conference of the Parties tocatalyze NSAs (paragraph 121).

This chapter, assesses the role of non-state andsubnational actors’ in enhancing global climate ambition
and bridging the emissions gap, based on the mostrecent literature.
The chapter begins with a brief overview of theincreasing engagement of non-state and subnational
actors (NSAs) in the UNFCCC process (section 5.2),
before examining the landscape and trends in termsof NSAs’ individual commitments and international
cooperative initiatives (ICIs) (section 5.3). Section 5.4
provides an assessment of the emission reduction
potentials estimated by the latest studies and looks
at non-quantifiable, roles of NSAs that have important
implications for global climate change governance. The
final section summarizes some of the key ways forward
for harnessing the potential of NSAs’ climate action tobridge the emissions gap (section 5.5).

5.2 Non-state and subnational actors andclimate change negotiations:from Paris to Katowice
The 2015 Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC heldin Paris showed an increased institutionalization of NSA
processes and engagement (UNEP, 2016), paving theway for NSAs to play an increasingly prominent role insupporting Parties’ mitigation and adaptation efforts.
Specifically, the Paris Agreement:

1

Non-Party Stakeholders is the term the UNFCCC uses for NSAs.

2

Dr. Laurence Tubiana (France) and Dr. Hakima El Haite (Morocco).

Following Paris, the first two high-level champions2
launched the Marrakech Partnership for Global Climate
Action during the 2016 Conference of the Parties tocontinue mobilizing NSAs’ support of the Parties, andalignment with the Sustainable Development Goals (MPWork Programme 2017–2018).
During the 2017 Conference of the Parties, thechampions were asked to align the Marrakech
Partnership with the 2018 Talanoa Dialogue that takes
stock of Parties’ efforts towards the Paris Agreement
goals and aims to inform the preparation of new or
updated NDCs by 2020 (Decision 1/CP.23, Annex II).
They also presented the first yearbook on climate actionthat reports on NSA actions and is expected to informthe Talanoa Dialogue. By April 2018, 109 NSA inputs
had been registered with the Talanoa Dialogue, which
will take place at the 24th Conference of the Parties in
Katowice December 2018.
In parallel with the UNFCCC process, national andregional initiatives have emerged to stimulate andsupport NSAs in the European Union, Latin America andAsia, among others (Chan et al., 2018).

30

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE AND SUBNATIONAL ACTORSIn September 2018, the Global Climate Action Summit
held in San Francisco, CA showcased climate actions
by NSAs around the world, convening over 4,500
local and regional governments and business leaders(Global Climate Action Summit, 2018). More than 500
announcements were made, including:•

A coalition of over 100 subnational leaders andCEOs committed to become carbon neutral by
2050.

•

A 40 percent increase in the number ofbusinesses committing to adopt ‘Science-based
Targets’ in line with the Paris Agreement goals.

•

The launch of a forest, food and land-focusedcoalition aiming to deliver 30 percent of climate
solutions needed by 2030.

•

A new waste initiative involving more than 20
subnational governments committing to zerowaste.

•

More ambitious NSA commitments, including
California’s Governor committing to carbon
neutrality by 2045 and a coalition of around 65
members committed to full decarbonization in the‘Powering Past Coal Alliance’.

The outcomes of the Summit will inform the UN 2019
Climate Summit, which will be convened by the UN
Secretary General to challenge states, regions, cities,
companies, investors and citizens to step up action in six
key areas: energy transition, climate finance and carbon
pricing, industry transition, nature-based solutions, cities
and local action, and resilience.

5.3 Overview of cooperative initiatives andindividual commitments by non-state andsubnational actor
NSA climate action comes in many forms. This section
focuses on two categories: individual NSA actions(section 5.3.1) and cooperative actions throughinternational cooperative initiatives (ICIs) (section 5.3.2),
both of which are on the rise. By 1 October 2018, justover 19,136 commitments to action had been recordedin the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA),
the largest online platform showcasing climate efforts
by subnational and non-state actors. Almost two-thirdsof these commitments are by individual actors, while justover one-third are cooperative initiatives (including ICIs.
See also box 5.1).

Box 5.1 Defining international
cooperative initiatives
Although there is no single definition of aninternational cooperative initiative (ICI), a
number of terms and common characteristics
help characterize them. When non-state or
subnational actors from at least two different
countries “adhere to rules and practices that
seek to steer behaviour towards shared,
public goals” across borders (Andonova et al.,2017), they engage in “transnational climate
governance” (Andonova et al., 2009). Broader
coalitions made up of countries, companies,
non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
academia, international organizations or
subnational public actors, such as cities andregions, form cooperative initiatives (Bloket al., 2012). When these coalitions crossnational borders they become “international
cooperative initiatives” (Widerberg and
Pattberg, 2015).

Box 5.2 Framing climate action
in developing countries
Linking sustainable development and climatechange provides a powerful rationale forclimate action. Evidence suggests thatcitizens are more likely to take climate action,or to support government action on climatechange, if the sustainable development
benefits of these efforts are emphasized(Floater et al., 2016). Communicating thesustainable development gains that are often
co-generated alongside climate mitigation
or adaptation may be particularly importantamong NSAs in developing countries and the
Global South.
One example is the Indian city of Rajkot,
which “has emerged as a climate innovator”
by focusing on projects that deliver urban
development benefits, and support climate
action as a supplementary goal or co-benefit.
The political feasibility of climate action
increases when connected to “more familiar,
and often more immediate, urban priorities”(Bhardwaj and Khosla, 2017).
However, if actions and policies that generate
substantial mitigation or adaptation benefits
are framed and registered according to theirability to reduce poverty, create jobs, foster
economic growth, or protect public health,they may fall under the radar of climate
accounting efforts. This might be one of thereasons for the lower representation of NSA
climate action in developing countries andthe Global South.

31

5.3.1 Individual commitments by non-state andsubnational actors
Individual NSA climate actions are referred to as‘commitment’, ‘action’, ‘initiative’, and ‘target’ and include
a “diverse set of governance activities taking placebeyond strictly government and intergovernmental (ormultilateral) settings” (Chan and Pauw, 2014).
NSAs often pledge climate action through networks
that collate individual climate pledges and inventories(for example, C40 Cities for Climate Leadership) or
reporting platforms such as the CDP (formerly known
as the Carbon Disclosure Project). The criteria forparticipation within these networks and platforms
vary: some networks require members to pledge
specific commitments, such as greenhouse gas(GHG) emission reduction targets, or to submit regularemissions inventories. Others emphasize peer-to-peerknowledge sharing and capacity-building, while some aremembership-based networks that do not require actors
to commit to specific goals.
While these networks capture many NSA climate actions,they do not comprehensively cover all NSA climate
actions occurring globally.
For instance, national networks of NSAs and individual
actions that are not reported in global climate action
databases are not included in the analysis here (see also
box 5.2). Analysis suggests, however, that individual
NSA participation through these networks has increased
since the 2015 Paris climate negotiations (table 5.1 possible overlaps are not taken into account). These
positive trends indicate the continued and growing roleof NSAs in global climate governance. The following
section captures an overview of some of these NSA
constellations and their membership.

Table 5.1: Examples of the growth in individual NSA actor participation from 2015 to 2017.

Actor group

2015

2017

Cities7,025 from 99 countries,
representing 11 percent of
the global population

7,378 from 133 countries,
representing 16.9 percent of the
global population

States and regions

116 regions from 20
countries, representing
11 percent of the global
population

245 regions from 42 countries,
representing 17.5 percent of the
global population

Companies and investors

4,431 companies from 88
countries and over 400
investors, with more than
US$25 trillion in assets undermanagement

6,225 companies and investors
from 120 countries, representing atleast US$36.5 trillion in revenue

Banks

15 of the 20 largest banks

34 of the 57 largest banks,
representing US$3.1 trillion inmarket capitalization

Not assessed

700 colleges and universities in the
United States of America, with a
total student population nearing 1
million and a collective endowmentof over US$250 billion

Higher education
institutes

Data source: Hsu et al., 2015b; Hsu et al., 2016, Hsu et al., 2017.

32

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE AND SUBNATIONAL ACTORS

Figure 5.1: Regional distribution of NSA city participants in carbonn, C40 Cities, CDP Cities, Global Covenant of Mayors
for Climate & Energy, and Climate Mayors

83%

Europe

7%
5%

North
Americano initiatives
1-3
3 - 10
10 - 30
30 - 100
100 - 330
330 - 1,000
1,000 - 3,000%

Asia andthe Pacific2%0.3%West Asia

Africa3%

Latin America
and the Caribbean

Share of actors
worldwide

Source: Data-Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL Netherlands (2018).

Subnational governments– cities, states and regions
There are several networks connecting city, state
and regional action on climate change. Figure 5.1
illustrates the number of NSA city participants andtheir geographical distribution in some networks.,
including the Global Covenant of Mayors for Climate& Energy, signed by 9,149 cities representing 780.8
million people worldwide or just over 10 percent of
the global population (Global Covenant of Mayors
for Climate & Energy, 2018). The Global Covenant ofMayors for Climate & Energy includes the EU Covenantof Mayors for Climate & Energy that reports 7,755
signatories with 252.6 million inhabitants within the
EU (EU Covenant, 2018). All of these members commit
to either submitting individual Sustainable Energy andClimate Action Plans or pledging a 40 percent reduction
in carbon dioxide emissions by 2030. ICLEI, a global
network of subnational governments, has developed thecarbonn Climate Registry that includes more than 1,000
cities, towns and regions, drawn from 89 countries andaccounting for 9 percent of the world’s total population(ICLEI, 2018a).
In terms of state and regional governments taking action,
the Compact of States and Regions (2017) includes 110
regional governments from 36 countries, representing
658 million people and 18 percent of the world
economy and baseline emissions of 3.9 GtCO2e. These
governments have committed to 290 climate actions
focused on emissions reductions, renewable energy
and energy efficiency that are estimated to result in
total (cumulative) emissions reductions of 21.9 GtCO2e
between 2010 and 2050, if climate targets are reachedon time (The Climate Group, 2017).

Companies and investors
CDP reports that over 6,300 companies representing
a combined purchasing power of over US$3 trillion
responded to their climate change questionnaire, andthat over 650 investors with assets of US$87 trillion
participate (CDP, 2018). In 2017, CDP recorded primarydata from over 4,800 companies, of which 47 percent
noted an emissions reduction or renewable energy target(CDP, 2018).
A few reports detail financial investors’ actions on
climate change. The Climate Bonds Initiative’s 2018
Green Bonds Summary found that US$74.6 billion ingreen bonds were issued during the first half of 2018, by
156 issuers from 31 countries (Climate Bonds Initiative,2018). The United States of America and China topped
the list of countries where the most bonds were issued,
and most proceeds support projects in the energy,buildings, and land-use sectors (Climate Bonds Initiative,2018). The Low Carbon Investment Registry currently
includes 53 investors from 21 countries, with US$50
billion in low-carbon assets (Global Investor Coalition
on Climate Change, 2018) – a slight increase on the2014 assessment, which found 45 investors reporting
investments valued at US$24 billion, most of which (44percent) focused on renewable energy (Global Investor
Coalition on Climate Change, 2014).

33

and sources (UNEP, 2016; Widerberg and Stripple,
2016). The summary of trends in this section focuseson mitigation-related ICIs and is based on data from the
Climate Initiatives Platform, which is regularly updated,
includes clear criteria for inclusion, and is publicly
accessible.3

5.3.2 International cooperative initiatives
By engaging large and growing numbers of NSAs,international cooperative initiatives (ICIs) can lead toconsiderable emission reductions, provided that theirstated goals are realized and emissions reductions do
not displace action elsewhere (Blok et al., 2012; Hsu etal., 2015; UNEP, 2015; Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015;
Graichen et al., 2017; see also section 5.4).

The main features of these ICIs are captured in figures
5.2 and 5.3.

In addition to direct emission reductions, ICIs can playa number of other important roles, including providing
proofs of concept for low-emissions development
strategies, spurring technology development anddiffusion, and helping generate momentum for additional
initiatives and activities (Weischer et al., 2012).

Trend in numbers of ICIs
The Climate Initiatives Platform currently records 244
initiatives, of which 220 are mitigation- focused andare implemented in more than one country.4 Since the2016 UN Environment Emissions Gap Report, 17 new
initiatives have been added to the platform.

Several databases collect information on ICIs. They varyin number of initiatives, often due to different definitionsof ICIs, purposes, focus areas, data collection methods

Over the past two decades, the number of ICIs has grownsignificantly, with peaks in launches of new initiatives

Figure 5.2: Number of international cooperative initiatives launched each year, between 2000 and 2018.

50

44
Initiatives launched

40

34
30

20

10

0

1

5

5

7

2000

5

6

5

6

8

12

2005

15

2010

11 10

10

7

3
2015

Source: Climate Initiatives Platform [accessed 1 July 2018].

3

The Climate Initiatives Platform is hosted by UN Environment and the UNEP DTU Partnership.
It includes ICIs that fulfil the following criteria:• Includes several non-state actors taking voluntary action, and may also include states.
• Have an objective to reduce GHG emissions or to increase resilience, or could bring about GHG emission reductions or increased resilience.
• Have an international scope or the potential for significant impact on a global scale.
• Have a focal point.
Source: http://climateinitiativesplatform.org/index.php/Climate_Database:About.

4

As at 25 August 2018.

2
2018

34

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE AND SUBNATIONAL ACTORS

Figure 5.3: Overview of features of 220 mitigation-focused ICIs.
Global and regional distribution of ICIs

144

Global (only)

North
America

WesternEuropeEasternEurope

34

39

31

220
Total ICIs

29

7
Unknown

26

25

25

Globaland regional

44

AfricaLatin America and
The Caribbean

Regional (only)

Sectoral coverage of ICIs

70%

Asia andthe Pacific% of ICIs that include the given sector

37%

30%

24%

22%

20%

20%

18%

13%

9%

Urban

Finance

Other

Forestry

Buildings

Waste

150
100
50

Industry and Transport Agriculturebusiness

Monitoring and reporting mechanisms

167 Qualitative goal

48 Quantitative goal

Non-specific 5

165 Unclear
Function

57

International organization

54

Network/Consortium/Partnership
NGO/Civil Society
Academic/Research institution

13

Other intergovernmental organization

11

Business

10

United Nations or Specialised agency

National government

3

Corporate2

Local government

1

Other

60

18

Goal
setting

44

production andinnovation

30

Technical
operational
implementation

24 Norm andstandard setting

n

4

90

74 Knowledge

Tech
nic
al
di

ti o

Financial institution

120

nta

4

g
din
un

and exchange

I m ple m e

15

18 Fundraising

121 Knowledge dissemination

ue
og
al

50

13 Financing

b u il d i n g

Lead organization

Regular 51

Irregular or underway 4

c ity

Type of commitment

pa

EnergyCa

0F

Number of ICIs

200

Pol

it i c a l d i a l o g u e

28 Advocacy

59

Awarenessraising andoutreach59 Training andeducation ofindividuals

54 Policy planningand recommendations

Note: Many initiatives are active in several regions and sectors, and include multiple lead organizations and functions. The numbers
and percentages in this figure include all recordings by initiatives, explaining why totals for some elements are higher than 220
initiatives and 100 percent.

35

around large climate events such as COP 15 in 2009,
the United Nations Climate Action Summit convened
by United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in2014, and COP 21 in 2015 (figure 5.2). The slowdown
in the number of new initiatives in 2016, 2017 and2018 may reflect a shift in focus towards implementing
the initiatives created in earlier years, as well as theimportance of global political forums in catalyzing theformation of ICIs.

either by an initiative or an initiative’s members – range
from focusing on emissions reduction (for example,
reduce emissions by a specific amount by a specificyear), to fund-raising (for example, raise, distribute orinvest a specific amount of funds), to capacity-building(for example, reach a specific number of people orcommunities). Similar low levels of quantitative goals arereported in other studies (Pattberg et al., 2012; Hsu et al.,2015; Widerberg and Stripple, 2016; Graichen et al., 2017;
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017; Chan et al., 2018).

Regional participation

Graichen et al. (2017) found that 75 percent of the
174 ICIs they surveyed either did not include sufficient
information about their targets, had unclear goals, or did
not propose concrete actions. Focusing on emissions
reduction targets, Hsu et al. (2015) found that just 8 outof 29 initiatives contained explicit emissions mitigation
targets tied to a particular year. A study conducted by
UNEP (2015) used a similar approach to narrow a list of
184 initiatives down to 15. However, among initiatives
with clear emissions reductions targets, many havemade more ambitious emission reduction commitments
than national governments (Graichen et al., 2017).

As figure 5.3 illustrates, many initiatives operate inseveral regions. Although the overall increase in recorded
mitigation-focused ICIs since 2016 is relatively limited,regional participation in ICIs has increased in nearly
every region of the world. The biggest increase is in Latin
America and the Caribbean, where the number of ICIs
has increased from 6 in 2016 to 25 in 2018. In Western
Europe, Asia and the Pacific, regional participation has
roughly doubled compared with 2016. It is worth notingthat global ICIs may be active in regions with relatively
low participation in regional ICIs, such as South-Eastern
Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, while ICI
activities have been concentrated in high- and middleincome countries (Pattberg et al., 2012; Chan et al.,2015; Chan et al., 2018), the number of ICIs operating inlower-income countries grew dramatically between 2015
and 2017, rising by 56 percent in low-income countries,
and 50 percent in lower-middle income countries (United
Nations Climate Change Secretariat, 2017).5 Despite thisprogress, a sizeable North-South gap remains, with only
22 percent of ICI participation and 23 percent of leadpartners from non-OECD countries (ClimateSouth, 2018).

Sectors
Most ICIs (149 out of 220) cover multiple sectors,
generally focusing on key sectors where the mitigation
potential is significantly higher than the emission
reductions implied by current policies and NDCs: theenergy, industry, forestry, transport, agriculture, andbuilding sectors (UNEP, 2017). An ICI’s sectoral emphasis
often shifts according to the needs and capacities of
the regions where it is implemented. Actions focusedon resilience and agriculture, for example, are mostcommonly implemented in low-income and middleincome economies, while initiatives addressing theindustrial sector are most prevalent in high-income orupper-middle income economies (Chan et al., 2018).

Setting goals and tracking progress
The percentage of ICIs that have set quantitative
goals remains low, at around 22 percent. Quantitative
goals – defined as a specific, measurable goal made5Part of the increase may include adaptation-focused ICIs.

6

See http://www.bonnchallenge.org/.

Monitoring, reporting, and verification practices also
remain weak across ICIs: just under 23 percent of ICIs on
the Climate Initiatives Platform noted regular monitoringor reporting mechanisms. Other studies also report
relatively low percentages of initiatives with establishedmonitoring and reporting mechanisms, ranging from 31
percent (Graichen et al. 2017), to 43 percent (Pattberg
et al., 2012) or 44 percent (Chan et al. 2018). Hsu etal. (2015a) found that more than half (18) of 29 ICIs
announced at the United Nations Climate Action Summit
convened by United Nations Secretary-General Ban
Ki- moon in 2014 included provisions for monitoring
progress, but that very few of these identified specificindicators to track performance. Bansard et al. (2016)
likewise noted that the type and stringency of monitoring
requirements varied widely among city-focused
initiatives. Furthermore, many initiatives do not conduct
or share cost estimates or feasibility studies, adding an
additional barrier to efforts to assess the feasibility andidentify potential barriers to initiatives (Roelfsema etal., 2015). Striving for “more and better” data collection(Widerberg and Stripple, 2016) from initiatives isrequired to facilitate efforts to assess ICIs’ progress
and anticipate their contributions to climate action andsustainable development efforts (Roelfsema et al., 2015;
Widerberg and Pattberg, 2015; Hsu et al., 2016). Some
ICIs have developed approaches that demonstrate how
this could be accomplished. The Bonn Challenge, forinstance, maintains an interactive online dashboard
tracking its signatories’ commitments, and their potential
collective progress towards the initiative’s goal.6

36

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE AND SUBNATIONAL ACTORS

Lead organization and secretariat
The existence of a secretariat and a lead organization
is likely to influence ICI performance (Pattberg andWiderberg, 2016). Initiatives with a permanent secretariat
report both higher-than-average potential emission
reduction contributions in 2020 and 2030, and higher
indirect impacts, complementary goals and co-benefits,
such as diffusion of information, political effects,
technology development, reduced air pollution, improved
health, and strengthened energy security and economic
development (Graichen et al., 2017). Similarly, the active
involvement of NGOs, as either leaders or ICI members,
has been shown to be associated with higher potential
emission reductions and potentially larger co-benefits(Graichen et al., 2017).
Almost all (217) of the ICIs included in CIP state that they
have a secretariat, in many cases hosted by one of thelarger organizations participating in the ICI, but it is notpossible to assess how many of these secretariats arepermanent. In fact, some studies suggest that most ICIs
lack a permanent secretariat (Graichen et al., 2017; Chan,
2018).

Functions
ICIs primarily provide information and knowledge-related
services to their participants (figure 5.3). Although the
distribution of functions has remained relatively stable
over time, a few new functions have recently emerged,
including financing and fund-raising. In a recent surveyof 75 ICIs, funding was found to be the most common
challenge, reported by approximately 30 percent ofrespondents (UNFCCC, 2017). Meanwhile, financial andorganizational capacity tends to be associated with highperforming ICIs (Biermann et al., 2007; Chan and Pauw,
2014; Chan et al., 2015; Galvanizing the Groundswell of
Climate Actions, 2015; Widerberg and Pattberg 2015).
The recent growth in ICIs’ fund-raising and financing
activities is therefore promising and may suggest
increased efforts to address the challenges reported.

5.4 The potential contribution of non-state andsubnational actors to enhancing ambition andbridging the 2030 emissions gap
At the international level, there is particular interestin how much NSAs could contribute to global GHG
emission reductions by 2030 and the extent to whichthese potential contributions are already included innational current policy and NDC estimates. Section
5.4.1 assesses the most recent studies on these issues,
while section 5.4.2 addresses the questions related to
tracking the progress and results of NSA action. NSAs
also play a number of critical roles that do not easily lendthemselves to quantification, but may nevertheless beimportant to enhancing ambition and bridging the 2030
emissions gap. Section 5.4.3 provides a brief overview ofsuch roles.

5.4.1 Estimates of potential emission reductionsin 2030 of non-state and subnational actors
The 2016 Emissions Gap Report (UNEP 2016) publishedan overview of quantitative analysis of the potential
contribution of NSA actions to global emissions
mitigation in 2030, illustrating a wide range of results.
Since these estimates were published, the number ofstudies that quantify NSAs’ potential contribution to
global climate action has grown, with more networks andresearchers conducting analysis of aggregate impact ofmember groups on global emissions. These studies canbe divided into three categories:
1. Individual commitments: estimate the aggregate
impact on emissions from pledges by individual
cities, regions or business actors that commit to fully
implement the targets they set themselves.
2. Single initiatives: estimate the potential impact onemissions from a single cooperative initiative goal,
assuming this is implemented by all actors under
the initiative. Often, individual actors subscribe to acollective cooperative initiative (which can be an ICI)
that together sets a goal for the initiative. The single
initiative studies assess the emission reductionsof the initiative’s goals, rather than pledges that
individual actors take themselves. The estimatedemission reductions subsequently involve somescaling up of the potential.
3. Scaled-up potential of multiple initiatives: estimate
the potential emission reductions from several
initiatives that would occur if the initiatives reacheda transformative impact at the sector- or economywide level. These studies apply a range of significant
assumptions on how actions are expanded; fromassuming that all members within a network will
adopt an ICI’s ambitious emission reduction goal,
to that membership will grow to a certain numberof actors and cover a certain number of additional
sectors. These studies therefore estimate greater
reduction potential at the sector- or economy-widelevel.
Table 5.2 provides an overview of available studies,organized according to these three categories. The tableshows the wide range of potential emission reductions
estimated in various studies – from companies based in
the United States of America contributing 0.026 GtCO2e
in 2025 (America’s Pledge 2018) to as much as 15-23
GtCO2e in 2030 based on an evaluation of the scaled-up
potential of 21 cross-sector, multi- actor ICIs (Data-Driven
Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL, 2018).
Due to the variable baseline methodologies andassumptions adopted by each study, as well as different
scopes in terms of actors and emissions covered, thewide range of overall impact assessment is unsurprising.
Some studies focus on NSA impact in a single country,
such as the United States of America (Roelfsema, 2017),

Not
specified- variableaccordingtoindividualcompany
actor

Baseline
scenario of
the study

Notspecified- variableaccordingtoindividual
city actor

116 cities

Current
national
policies
scenario

54 cities,
22
regions,
250
compa­
nies

Current
national
policies +NDCs

25 cities

Current
policyscenarioand NDCs
scenario

2,175
compa­
nies,
76 regions,
5,910
citiesBusiness
as usual155
busines­ses,
115
cities,20 states.026 in
2025

Business
as usual(no policy
baseline)

228 cities

Comparedto‘referencetechnology
scenario’
that
includescurrent
policies
and theNDCs

110
regional
govern­
ments

550

The
ClimateGroup
and CDP,
Compactof States
andRegions(2017)

Business
as usual(no policy
baseline)

360 cities

740

Compactof Mayors(2015)

Business
as usual(no policy
baseline)

9,149
cities1,400

GlobalCovenantof Mayors(2018)

Current
national
policies
scenario

5 ICIsincluding~ 300
compa­
nies

3,200–
4,200

CDP andWe MeanBusiness(2016)

Current
national
policies
scenarioplus
NDCs

19 ICIs

11 ICIsCounter­factual(no policy
baseline)

5,000–
11,000

Graichen
et al.,(2017)

5,500

Roelfsema
et al.
(2018)

Current
policyscenario

600+
cities3,700

EricksonandTempest(2014)

Current
policyscenarioand NDCs
Scenario

21 ICIs

15,000–23,000

DataDriven
Yale, New
ClimateInstitute,and PBL(2018)

3) Scaled-up potential of multiple initiatives

Note: This table only evaluates reports that include estimated impact in 2025/2030 and excludes those with pre-2025 or post-2030 assessment timeframes. Source: Adapted from Hsu et al. (forthcoming).

Overlaps
quantified?

1,089
compa­
nies

1,000

1,550–
2,200(current
policyscenario
1a);
200–700(NDC
scenario
1b)

402

3–30

500 in2025

360–560
by 2025179 by2035

DataDriven
Yale, New
ClimateInstitute,and PBL(2018)

Arup
and C40
Cities for
ClimateLeadership
Network(2014)

Roelf­
sema(2017)

Ameri­ca’s
Pledge(2018)

Kura­
mochi etal. (2017)

CDP(2016)ICLEI(2015)

2) Single initiatives

1) Individual commitments

Number ofactors or
initiatives
quantified

ICIs

Business

Regions

Cities andmunicipalities

Actorsandsectors

Table 5.2: Potential greenhouse gas emission reductions of selected individual commitments and initiatives (in MtCO2e/year in 2025/2030, by study).

37

38

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE AND SUBNATIONAL ACTORS

while other single initiative studies evaluate emissions
savings relative to business-as-usual scenarios for theactor group, rather than comparing to a global scenario.
Only some studies report a range of results that take into
consideration assumptions such as a lower and upper
range of results (We Mean Business, 2016; Graichen etal. 2017; Kuramochi et al., 2017; Roelfsema, 2017 andData-Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute and PBL, 2018),
and even fewer conduct sensitivity analysis.
Some reports, such as the U.S. Climate Alliance (2017)
report analyzing 15 regions’ contributions to GHG
reductions or the Nordic Council of Ministers’ report(Nordic Council of Ministers 2017), do not provide anaggregate quantified assessment of impact. They are
therefore not included in table 5.2.
Studies included in table 5.2 all assume various baseline
scenarios against which they assess additional impact
of NSAs. These baseline scenarios range from studyspecific “business as usual” or no-action scenarios,
to “current policy scenarios” that take into account a
range of existing government policies and pledges, to an“NDC scenario” that assumes that countries implement
their NDCs under the Paris Agreement (table 5.2; Hsu
et al., forthcoming). Consequently, it is challenging tocompare the estimated impact across studies, althoughmeta-analysis of methodologies applied in each study
demonstrate similar approaches, including the use of
the Greenhouse Gas Protocol standard for distinguishing
between direct and indirect emissions (Hsu et al.,forthcoming). Specifications of baseline scenarios bywhich to compare additional NSA contributions are also
increasingly converging to common terminology andmethods.
A major question with respect to NSA climate mitigation
contribution is the extent to which they lead to emission
reductions that are not accounted for in current national
policies or in the NDCs. A limited number of the available
studies assess NSA mitigation impact relative to global
current policy and NDCs based on an assessment ofoverlap scenarios (see table 5.2). These quantitative
assessments of overlap determine the ambition levelof NSA commitments vis-à-vis current policy scenarios
and NDC scenarios by comparing the rate of emissions
decline in actors’ targets (Kuramochi et al., 2017). For
instance, if a city’s emission reduction target results ina steeper rate of decline in overall emissions compared
to a national government’s NDC, a common assumption
is to consider the emissions reductions that are beyond
what a national actor has pledged as “additional”
reductions.
One analysis focused on the United States of America(Kuramochi et al., 2017), found that 17 states and 54
cities with recorded GHG mitigation commitments
comprising 40 percent of national U.S. emissions were
found to have the potential to meet almost half of thecountry’s NDC by 2025. Another study that quantified
nearly 6,000 subnational and over 2,000 business
commitments determined that emissions would be
0.2-0.7 GtCO2e/year lower in 2030 than with NDCs alone(Data-DrivenYale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL, 2018,
Figure 5.4).

Figures 5.4a and 5.4b illustrates the wide range ofpotential emission reductions estimated in various
studies. The figure includes the studies from table
5.2 that have clear and comparable baseline scenario
definitions by which to assess the magnitude of
additional impact. An assessment of each of thestudies’ baseline estimates was made to ensure theircomparable to the Emissions Gap Report scenario
values for 2030. Figure 5.4a includes estimates fromstudies that aggregate from a bottom-up method of
pledged 2030 commitments made by individual actors.
As this figure illustrates, the pledged 2030 contribution
by NSAs, if fully realized, is estimated to lead to limited
additional emission reductions (ranging from 3-700
MtCO2e, as indicated in Table 5.2) compared to the full
implementation of the unconditional NDCs.
Figure 5.4b includes estimates of scaled-up potential
emission reductions based on an assessment of single
initiative goals and multiple initiatives’ goals. Thesestudies assume that all actors participating within
their initiative fully implement and achieve the larger
goal of an initiative and therefore represent “scaled-up”
potential that is larger than the estimates in figure 5.4a.
The studies behind the estimates in figure 5.4b apply
a range of assumptions on how actions are expanded,from assuming that all members within a network will
adopt an ICI’s ambitious emission reduction goal, to thatmembership will grow to a certain number of actors andcover a certain number of additional sectors.
The figure indicates that NSAs have the potential
to contribute significantly to bridging the 2030
emissions gap, but that realizing this potential requires
commitments and action that go far beyond current
recorded and quantified individual actor pledges as wellas single initiatives.

5.4.2 Tracking progress and results of non-stateand subnational actors
Data limitations and gaps
As the previous sections illustrate, limited availability,
consistency and comparability of data pose significant
challenges to evaluating the potential NSA impact on
climate mitigation and their other benefits. For instance,
Bansard et al. (2016) found in their evaluation of cities
participating in the C40 Cities for Climate Leadership
Network that out of around 40 members evaluated, ninedifferent base years with seven different target years
were found, making an evaluation and comparison oftargets and level of ambition difficult.
Although Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action(NAZCA) acts as an umbrella for various NSA climate
action repositories, no comprehensive database of NSA
actions exists, with each NSA adopting various criteria
for inclusion that are often unclear or opaque (Widerberg
and Stripple, 2016). The reported data are often notsuited to calculating emissions impact, estimating
overlap, or comparing NSA mitigation potential to theemissions scenarios of other actors, such as national
governments.

39

Figure 5.4: The range of estimated potential emission reductions in various NSA studies.
Figure 5.4a: Emission reduction potentialof pledged commitments by NSAs.

Figure 5.4b: Scaled up potential emission
reductions based on single and multiple initiatives.

70

Annual GHG emissions in 2030 (GtCO2e)

Individual commitments

Single Initiatives

Multiple Initiatives
No policy

65 baseline
0.4

0.53

60
0.46

0.74 1.40

Current policy

59 scenario

5.5
1.85

0.02 0.45

50

0.55

Unconditional

56 NDC scenario
3.7
3.7
8

40 2ºC scenario

40
19

Scaled up
potential
based onassumptions

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Ranges* Data-Driven Yale, NewClimate Institute, and PBL Netherlands

Source: Based on data in table 5.2.
Note: a) For studies that include ranges, median estimates are provided with ranges indicated in Figures 5.4a and 5.4b.
b) Studies that are cross-hatched evaluate single and multiple ICI goals rather than individual actors’ recorded and quantified pledges. They rely on
assumptions of future scaled-up impact and therefore represent potential rather than a quantified analysis of individual actors’ NSA pledges.
c) Extrapolation of 2025 estimates has been made.

Key information, such as actors’ target and baseline
emissions, emissions scopes (that is, direct or indirect),and inventory emissions with historic time-series
available, are often inconsistently reported (if at all), withsubnational actors from the European Union reporting
the largest amount of data required for mitigation impact
assessments and the greatest gaps found in emerging
and developing countries (Hsu et al., 2018, forthcoming).
Finally, as the estimates and numbers in this report
exclude national cooperative initiatives and networks,
they underestimate the scale and spread of NSA climate
actions, particularly in regions where actors have lessaccess or capability to engage with transnational
initiatives.

Some efforts under way to address data reporting andmethodological consistency should help improve thefuture data landscape for analyzing NSAs’ contributions.
For example, the World Resources Institute’s Greenhouse
Gas Protocol Initiative released in 2015 (the Global
Protocol for Community-Scale Greenhouse Gas Emission
Inventories (Fong et al., 2015)) and a consortium of nongovernment institutes, through the Initiative for Climate
Action Transparency (ICAT), are currently developing
guidance for NSAs, national governments and otheraudiences to account for and measure NSA climate
mitigation contributions (see also box 5.3). These andother efforts should help improve consistency among
NSA-reported data.

40

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE AND SUBNATIONAL ACTORSBox 5.3 Monitoring, reporting andverification success stories
Monitoring, reporting and verifying theemissions inventories and commitments ofboth national actors and NSAs is key to global
climate change assessment and governance,as there is a risk that actors participate intransnational climate governance initiatives
to “greenwash” or boost their reputations,
without setting or implementing meaningful
climate action targets (Okereke, 2007;
Mayer and Gereffi, 2010; Hsu et al., 2016).
Some NSAs, however, are making theiremissions inventories more transparent andmaking progress on implementing climate
actions. For example, Scotland, Wales, and
the Australian Capital Territory all compile
particularly comprehensive GHG emissions
inventories, which account for the emissionsof one or more GHGs from sources within adefined space and time. Each government
also goes one step further, by having theseinventories externally verified.

Note: This box draws on insights shared by The Climate Group’s Compactof States and Regions initiative.7

Tracking progress on NSA implementationachievement of targets
Although efforts to improve the monitoring, reportingand evaluation of NSA actions are increasing (seeprevious section and box 5.4), studies and information
regarding NSA implementation – progress towards
achieving targets and whether actors are meeting theirgoals – are still scarce (Chan et al., 2018; 2015). Part ofthe difficulty of tracking implementation is that ex-postmeasurement of results is largely lacking, given thenascent nature of many NSA climate actions. Therefore,
most available studies quantifying the mitigation impact
of NSAs assess their potential emission reductions,rather than ex-post or achieved results. An exception is
ICLEI’s (2018b) report analyzing the drivers of emissions
reductions based on 138 local governments submitting
inventories and reporting on policy efforts.
To bolster confidence in NSA contributions to bridging
the 2030 emissions gap, data on implementation are
critical to understanding whether current targets andgoals are being reached and 2030 potentials are likely tobe achieved.

7

Box 5.4 Improving monitoring,
reporting and verification ininternational cooperative initiatives
Many initiatives are improving theircommitment pledging and evaluation
process. For example, CDP is starting tocollect this information through its Assessing
Low-Carbon Transition (ACT) initiative thatprovides data, indicators and feedback
for companies to align their targets with
2ºC scenarios. An application of ACT is
the Corporate Climate Action Benchmark(CCAB) developed by CDP and the World
Benchmarking Alliance (WBA). From 2019
onwards, the CCAB measures the climate
action performance of high emitting
companies on a yearly basis, allowing
stakeholders to monitor progress. The aim of
the CCAB is threefold: incentivize companies
to align their strategies and operations witha well below 2ºC pathway, create a race tothe top by rewarding companies that are bestin class, and visualize progress of corporate
climate action between 2020 and 2030.
Some city networks, including ICLEI and the
EU Covenant of Mayors, are reporting on
their members’ progress, although currently
only a fraction (1,743 out of more than 6,000
members with action plans) list progress
reports on their website. The Science-Based
Targets initiative helps companies to set
internal climate targets that are aligned withthe long-term mitigation goals of the Paris
Agreement. The initiative currently includes
over 100 companies with science-basedtargets and over 300 companies wanting todevelop such targets.

Some studies question the extent to which NSA
implementation and achievements to date havedelivered real emission reductions (Chan et al., 2015;2018; Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2017). One analysis
found that out of more than 300 collaborative non-state
partnerships announced at the 2002 World Sustainable
Development Summit, nearly 65 percent were yet to be
operationalized 10 years later (Pattberg et al., 2012).
Nevertheless, from the studies available, a number of
aspects that are likely to influence the implementationand performance of NSA actions are emerging (seealso section 5.3.2). Graichen et al., (2017); ICAT, (2018);
Michaelowa and Michaelowa, (2017); Pattberg andWiderberg, (2016) show that these aspects include:

In particular, we thank Milimer Morgado and Jean-Charles Seghers for their help in compiling these examples.

41•

Leadership and permanent secretariat (forcooperative initiatives).

•

Target clarity and ownership.

•

The presence of monitoring and progress
reporting mechanisms.

•

Past achievement of results, actors’ technicalcapacity.

•

Financial incentives and the availability of funding.

•

A commitment’s vulnerability to politicalconsiderations.

•

The presence of regulatory support.

It should be noted that while monitoring, reportingand verification procedures are important in termsof enabling learning and boosting credibility amongindividual actors and initiatives, they may dissuade new
NSAs from taking climate action. In ICIs in particular,
if the goals and monitoring, reporting and verification
procedures are considered too much of an administrative
burden, it could discourage their further expansion.

5.4.3 Contributions by non-state and subnational
actors beyond direct emission reductions
NSAs’ contributions to climate change action go beyond
their quantifiable potential emission reductions: they
can play a key role in building government confidence
in implementing climate policies and they can signal
and push for greater ambition. Quantitative analysis
that emphasize NSAs’ direct contributions to climate
mitigation may overlook the critical other roles thatthey play in global climate change governance, suchas capacity-building, knowledge transfer and coalitionbuilding, as these important NSA actions are difficult toquantify. Other examples include facilitative or catalytic
actions, such as low or zero-carbon norm creation,or policy foundations, such as voluntary emissions
registries, which may produce longer-term societal
transitions towards decarbonization (van der Ven et al.,2017).
Nevertheless, studies that analyze difficult to quantify
NSA roles and functions in national and global climatechange governance are emerging. These studies
highlight three roles and functions as particularly
important:•

Facilitating catalytic linkages (for example, Betsill
et al., 2015) with national actors that are often
informal in nature, but allow for actors such as
national governments to address underlying
drivers of emissions, build capacity, or shape lowcarbon development contexts.

•

Acting as potential orchestrators (for example,
Abbott et al., 2012; Chan et al., 2018) in climate
policy implementation and coordination withnational and intergovernmental actors.

•

Providing experimentation (for example,
Hoffmann 2011; Bernstein and Hoffmann, 2018)
for policy instruments or implementation deemed
too risky or costly at the national level.

Box 5.5 provides examples of the orchestration role of
NSAs.

Box 5.5 Orchestration of non-stateand subnational action around theworld
Actors and networks in developed anddeveloping countries are incentivizing NSAs
to act, identifying and addressing possible
barriers to them doing so, and supporting
NSA capacity- building to tackle climatechange.
ActionLAC
ActionLAC, a partnership set up by the
Latin American Fundación Avina, aims toaccelerate climate action and strengthen
ambition in Latin America. Targeting actors
such as community-based organizations,
small enterprises, and local governments,
this partnership fosters inclusive climate
governance in Latin America. ActionLAC
provides support throughout the “life-cycleof climate actions”, including elaborating,financing, implementing, evaluating andcommunicating climate action plans.
Cities and Regions Talanoa Dialogues
ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability,
together with the Global Covenant of Mayors
for Climate & Energy and UN-Habitat, arefacilitating Cities and Regions Talanoa
Dialogues around the world, in response
to similar dialogues in the context of the
UNFCCC. These dialogues – 50 of which havebeen scheduled throughout 2018 – engage
actors that have often not been adequately
involved in national climate efforts to date,
and to advance the New Urban Agenda
adopted in 2016. For instance, they explore
pathways for actively engaging subnational
governments in formulating national climate
investment plans. So far, about half of thescheduled dialogues are in developing
countries.
European Dialogue on Non-State Climate
ActionThe European Economic and Social
Committee (EESC), the EU advisory bodycomprising representatives from workers’
and employers’ organizations, establishedthe European Dialogue on Non-State Climate
Action (ED-NSCA). This dialogue aims tostrengthen and increase the scope andscale of European-based non-state climate
action among constituencies that are often
not traditionally known as main actors inenvironment and climate change, including
workers’ and employers’ organizations in theindustrial, agricultural and transport sectors.
The European Dialogue envisages supporting
non-state climate action by assessing,recognizing, improving, accelerating andsupporting actions.

42

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF NON-STATE AND SUBNATIONAL ACTORS

5.5 Opportunities for harnessing the potential of
NSA climate action to enhance ambition andbridge the emissions gap
The previous sections illustrate the magnitude,
diversity and potential contributions of NSAs to climatechange action, forming the basis for a number ofrecommendations on how to further strengthen NSAs’
action to realize their emission reduction potential. These
recommendations are briefly summarized below.
First, more actors must engage in climate action. Scaling
up individual and collaborative climate action to moregeographic areas, sectors and types of actors could
significantly contribute to realizing the large mitigation
potential of NSAs. NSAs from previously underrepresented regions of the world are starting to takeaction. Many regions, particularly in the Global South,
are still under-represented in terms of participants,
lead organizations, and the location of secretariats.
Encouraging NSAs in developing countries to engage
in initiatives would facilitate climate action in growing
economies with potentially large and low-cost mitigation
potentials. Scaling up also entails ensuring a broad rangeof sectors, including currently under- represented ones
such as oil and gas.
Second, national governments can play a vital role bystimulating this growing movement, and can for example
support non-state actors by providing collaboration
platforms, capacity building and technical and financial
resources. Furthermore, national political institutions
are crucial to transnational climate action (Andonova
et al., 2017). Governments can also support theimplementation of individual commitments. In order tosupport urban climate action, for example, governments
could develop policies and approaches for enhancing
the capacity of local governments, including providing
financial investments and enabling private investments
to lower GHGs (Broekhoff et al., 2018).

Third, transparency is critical to assessing NSA
actions and tracking their implementation. This report
clearly shows that although progress is being made,transparency and related monitoring, reporting andverification standards require improvement at alllevels: individual, cooperative initiative, and global.
Commitments are often vague in terms of goals,
language and enforcement mechanisms, while different
baselines, timelines and assessment frameworks
are used to report on progress. Implementing
monitoring, reporting and verification mechanisms
for cooperative initiatives is particularly important,in order to document tangible results, NSA climate
actions could gain credibility among the broader publicand decision makers. These mechanisms would also
facilitate learning, allowing the organization to assess
performance on an ongoing basis and to experiment withnew approaches.
Data collection and reporting efforts are starting toenable more sophisticated analysis on the potential
for NSA climate action to contribute additional GHG
reductions beyond national governments commitments.
However, data gaps (particularly in high-emitting
sectors and developing countries) limit these analysis,
meaning they do not necessarily capture the diversityof the NSA climate action taking place. Particularly
where sustainable economic development is a pressing
concern, NSA climate action takes on different forms
besides participation in transnational climate action
networks, focusing also on adaptation, capacity- building
and resilience functions that are more difficult to quantify
and aggregate on a global scale.
Finally, NSAs play different important roles andfunctions and their contribution to global climate change
governance goes beyond what can be measured in termsof direct emission reductions. These aspects – including
orchestration, catalytic effects, and experimentation –should therefore be kept in mind.

43

Chapter 6.
Bridging the gap:
Fiscal reforms for the low-carbon transition
Lead authors: Matthias Kalkuhl (Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC) andUniversity of Potsdam), Brigitte Knopf (Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change (MCC)) andKurt Van Dender (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)1
Contributing authors: Harro van Asselt (University of Eastern Finland), David Klenert (Joint Research Centre, European
Commission), Ruben Lubowski (Environmental Defense Fund), Tobias S. Schmidt (ETH Zürich), Bjarne Steffen (ETH
Zürich)6.1 Introduction

While coverage, price levels, and coordination andcooperation efforts are increasing, carbon prices areoften low and inconsistent, as illustrated in figure 6.1.
This depicts the distribution of carbon rates for energy
use across all sectors and fuels for 42 Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) andG20 countries, which together represent 80 percent of
global CO2 emissions from energy use (OECD, 2018b).
Effective carbon rates are policy-induced increases in(relative) fossil fuel prices, expressed per tonne of CO2.
They include carbon taxes and permit prices related toexisting ETS, as well as excise taxes on energy.

Fiscal policies can affect fossil fuel prices and therefore
influence carbon emissions and investments in theenergy sector. However, current price signals from excise
taxes and carbon pricing are too low and inconsistent toencourage strong and cost-effective mitigation. In somecountries, and for some fuels, carbon prices are evennegative due to high financial support for fossil fuels.
This chapter assesses the fiscal policy gap between
current fiscal policy and its potential for reducing carbon
emissions and collecting public revenue. It provides
country examples and further considerations of how to
overcome this gap.

6.2 The current state of fiscal policies
and their potential for the
low-carbon transition

Figure 6.1: Effective carbon rates on energy use across 42 OECDand G20 countries (estimate for 2018) and the minimum carbon
price range needed in 2020 for the 2°C target.
200
180

Increasing the price of carbon emissions
through carbon taxes or emissions trading
systems (ETS) is a core element of climate
policy. Before 2005, hardly any emissions
were covered by carbon taxes or trading
systems (World Bank and Ecofys, 2018).
Coverage increased to about 5 percent of
global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions
between 2005 and 2010, primarily because of
the introduction of the European Union’s ETS.
Between 2010 and 2018, coverage has risen
to about 15 percent of global emissions, with
51 carbon pricing initiatives now installedor scheduled. If China implements carbon
pricing as announced, coverage would rise toabout 20 percent of global GHG emissions.

1

Effective carbon rate (€/tCO2)

6.2.1 Carbon pricing

160
Effective
Carbon Rate

140
120
100
80

€34 - 6860
40

2020 Minimum carbon pricerange for the 2°C target

20
0

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

CO2-emissions from energy use
For almost 50% of emissions,the effective carbon rate is zero.

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Only about 10% of emissions
are priced at a level consistent
with the 2°C target.

Note: This figure shows the distribution of effective carbon rates over energy-related
CO2 emissions for 42 OECD and G20 countries, representing 80 percent of global CO2
emissions. Carbon rates include carbon taxes, permit prices related to existing ETS
and excise taxes on energy (also including those not motivated by a climate policy
objective). Source: OECD, 2018b and own illustration.

Opinions expressed are those of the authors and not of the institutions that they are affiliated with. We would like to thank Assia Elgouacem (OECD), Ottmar Edenhofer (MCC),
Michael Jakob (MCC) and Ian Parry (IMF) for their input and comments. We would also like to thank Sarah Beyer and Zeljana Ana Grulovic for their assistance.

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EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: FISCAL REFORMS FOR THE LOW-CARBON TRANSITION

Excise taxes are by far the largest component of theoverall carbon price, although ETS constitute a large
share in the electricity sector in most jurisdictions
where such systems are in place. Accordingly, revenues
from carbon taxes and ETS (US$33 billion [€28 billion]2
in 2017)3 remain much smaller than those of excise
taxes on energy use (ca €421 billion in OECD and G20
countries – Marten and Van Dender, forthcoming).
However, excise sales taxes on energy use are often
poorly aligned with the carbon content of the tax base.
Coal – the most carbon-intensive energy source, andone that also causes significant local environmental
damage – is untaxed in most large economies andtherefore priced at production cost (Coady et al., 2018).
Effective carbon rates tend to be higher for oil products
than for other fuels, and they are significantly higher inroad transport than in all other sectors.4 Fuel prices inthe European countries with the highest fuel taxes may
be high enough to cover non-climate externalities inroad transport, including local air pollution, congestion,
noise, casualties, and road wear and tear (Santos, 2017;
Coady et al., 2018; OECD, 2018a), but they remain too low
elsewhere.
Current carbon prices fall short of the levels needed formeeting the targets of the Paris Agreement. The HighLevel Commission on Carbon Prices (2017) concludes
that the explicit carbon price level consistent with the 2°C
target is at least US$40–80/tCO2 [€34–68/tCO2] by 2020
and US$50–100/tCO2 [€43–86/tCO2] by 2030. Hence,
the lower end of this range indicates the minimum pricelevel needed to close the emissions gap in order to reachthe 2°C target. Figure 6.1 shows that approximately
90 percent of the CO2 emissions from energy use are
priced at rates below the lower end: half of the emissions
are not priced at all, and an additional 40 percent ofemissions are priced at rates below the minimum pricelevel of €34/tCO2.
Major efforts are needed to increase carbon prices.
However, in recent years, progress has been slow, as canbe seen from the ‘carbon pricing gap’ indicator (OECD,
2016 and 2018b). The carbon pricing gap measures
the positive differences between a €30 carbon rate andapplicable rates across all energy use, as a percentage,
and therefore considers the extent of emissions priced
below €30. Against this rate, the gap is estimated to be
77 percent in 2018, which is approximately 6 percentage
points lower than in 2012 and 3 percentage points
lower than in 2015. The rate of reduction needs to bemuch faster to ensure that carbon rates align with theParis Agreement targets. The significant carbon pricing
gap and the slow progress is partly related to political
economy issues, i.e. the distribution of climate policy
costs and political and behavioural barriers to fiscal
reforms. Section 6.3 will discuss the major obstacles andhow to address and overcome these.

6.2.2 Fossil fuel subsidies
Budgetary support for fossil fuels usually reduces prices
and can create negative carbon prices. This leads tohigher fuel use, GHG emissions and local air pollution.
Support includes the direct transfer of funds, market
price support (e.g. setting prices that are different frommarket rates), tax concessions (e.g. exemptions or
reductions), in-kind support (e.g. building a railway froma coal mine to a port), credit support (e.g. favourable
loans or loan guarantees), below-market insurance
rates and caps on liability or preferential government
procurement (Steenblik, 2008). Consumer subsidies aremostly used in developing and resource-rich countries.
Producer subsidies are found in both developed anddeveloping countries (Bast et al., 2015).
Estimates of fossil fuel subsidy levels differ due tovarying coverage and methodologies. In an effort toprovide a consistent figure, the International Energy
Agency and OECD estimate that subsidies for oil, natural
gas and coal amounted to US$373 billion [€319 billion]
in 2015, which is 0.5 percent of global gross domestic
product (GDP) (OECD, 2018c). Total consumer subsidies
declined by 15 percent in 2016 and are currently given topetroleum products (40 percent), electricity (41 percent),
natural gas (19 percent) and coal (less than 1 percent)(IEA, 2017). The recent decrease in support is theresult of reform efforts and declining global fuel prices.
However, this downward trend does not apply to all
countries and energy sources; subsidies are increasingfor electricity consumption in particular, and in countries
including Angola, Azerbaijan, China, Kazakhstan,
Malaysia, Mexico and South Africa (IEA, 2017). Rising
crude oil prices could drive up subsidies and reverse
some reforms.
Reforming fossil fuel subsidies can yield significant
public savings. In the Middle East and North Africa(MENA) region, fossil fuel subsidies averaged
almost 20 percent of total government spending inthe 2013/2014 financial year (El-Katiri and Fattouh,2017). Similarly, before recent reforms, the share ofIndonesia’s government expenditure dedicated tofossil fuel subsidies hovered just below 30 percent,and subsequently dropped to 6 percent (NCE, 2018).
Fossil fuel consumer price support disproportionallybenefits richer households—the top income quintile on
average receives six times more in subsidies than thebottom quintile (Coady et al., 2015). Reducing fossil fuelsubsidies therefore leads to more equitable distributional
outcomes. Moreover, reducing fossil fuel use by reducing
fuel subsidies can improve air quality, public health andeconomic efficiency.

6.2.3 Emissions reduction potential
Better alignment of energy taxes across the carbon
content of fuels and increases in carbon prices would,
over time, reduce demand for fossil fuels. Strong
commitment to announced price paths allows investors
to make low-carbon investments with sufficientconfidence. For example, the Canadian province ofBritish Columbia implemented a schedule to increasecarbon taxes by C$5 [€3] per tCO2 per year as of April
2018, increasing from C$35 to C$50 [€24 to €34] per2

For converting currencies into euros, in this chapter we use the average exchange rate between 2014 and 2017 provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.

3

The revenue is lower than the value of the carbon pricing systems (ca US$82 billion [€70 billion]) because substantial shares of tradable permits are allocated for free.

4

The right tail of the distribution curve in figure 6.1 consists almost entirely of road transport rates.

45

Figure 6.2: CO2 reductions (relative to baseline) and revenues (relative to gross domestic product (GDP)) generated fromadditional carbon taxes of €30/tCO2 and €60/tCO2, 2030.
€ 30 carbon tax

Revenues
in percent of GDP

8%€ 60 carbon tax

Revenues

7%
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%

Ar

ge
nt
Au ina
st
ra
lia
Br
az
i
Ca l
na
da
Ch
in
a
Fr
an
Ge ce
rm
an
y
In
di
a
In
do
ne
si
a
Ita
ly
Ja
pa
n
Ko
re
a
M
ex
ic
o
Ru
ss
ia
Sa
ud
i
So Ara
ut
bi
a
h
Af
ric
a
Tu
Un rkeyitedK
Un ingdoiof teAm d S mt
Si eri ate
c s
m
pl a
e
Av
Em erage
W is
Av eig sio
er ht ns
ag ed
e

0%

Percent CO2 reduction
relative to baseline in 2030

0%
–10%
–20%
–30%
–40%
–50%

CO2 emissions

Source: Parry et al. (2018).
Note: Calculations assume that carbon prices are implemented in addition to existing measures. Revenue calculations account for induced changes inrevenues from pre-existing excise taxes, but not from the broader fiscal system (i.e. income taxes). The original paper refers to carbon taxes of US$35/tCO2[€30/tCO2] and US$70/tCO2 [€60/tCO2]. For comparability with section 6.2, these prices were converted to Euros.

tCO2 by 2021. Other countries have also substantially
increased carbon taxes over time: the carbon tax inFrance amounts to €44.60 per tCO2 and is set to rise
considerably; Sweden has increased rates to €120 per
tCO2 in 2018 and is also abolishing non-European UnionETS industry exemptions this year; and Switzerland has
increased rates to CHF96 [€85] per tCO2 in 2018). Future
price increases could also be rule-based, with carbon
prices increasing more significantly if emissions turn out
to be higher compared with a benchmark (Murray et al.,2017; Hafstead et al., 2017). Energy taxes can also help
reflect other external costs, including air pollution and, tosome extent, traffic congestion.
Based on International Monetary Fund estimates (Parryet al., 2018), an additional carbon price of €30/tCO2 by2030 could lead to emission reductions of more than 10
percent in many countries. According to the High-Level
Commission on Carbon Prices (2017), a carbon price of€60/tCO2 by 2030 is at the lower end of the spectrum

in terms of prices needed to close the emissions gap
in order to meet the 2°C target. A price of €60/tCO2 isestimated to cut emissions by just over 10 percent tomore than 40 percent, depending on the country (figure
6.2).
As the presence of fossil fuel subsidies can undermine
carbon pricing efforts, subsidy reform is an importantcomplement to carbon pricing. Phasing out fossil fuelsupport could reduce global emissions by between
1 percent and 11 percent by 2020–2030, although
regional emissions reductions, e.g. for the Middle
East and North Africa, may be substantially larger(Burniaux and Chateau, 2014; IEA, 2015; Merrill et al.,2015; Gerasimchuk et al., 2017; Jewell et al., 2018).
Emission reductions are strongest for oil and natural
gas use. Since financial support for coal use is relatively
low, subsidy removal has only a small impact on coalconsumption, which would be more strongly affected bycarbon pricing.

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EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: FISCAL REFORMS FOR THE LOW-CARBON TRANSITION

6.3 The political economy of green fiscal reformand carbon taxes: lessons learned
Public support for carbon pricing or the phasing-out offossil fuel subsidies is often limited, in part because
politicians have failed to communicate a clear narrativeon how and why this would benefit consumers and the
local economy. Key concerns relate to (i) the distributionof costs between households and firms, (ii) limited
environmental effectiveness due to leakage of emissions
to other jurisdictions and (iii) broader behaviouraland political factors. Concerns about reduced
competitiveness and relocation of economic activity
due to domestic policy can be separated into costs forfirms, employment effects and emission leakage, andare therefore covered by (i) and (ii). Figure 6.3 gives an
overview of the key issues and proposed measures toaddress them. As fiscal policies create revenue, they
can provide additional space for compensation or otherforms of spending to help make carbon pricing more
appealing.

6.3.1 Distribution of costs
Carbon taxes and energy subsidies affect prices of
production factors, goods and services, so the costsof fiscal policy affect many firms and households(Fullerton, 2011). Addressing the economic costs
borne by politically powerful groups can encourage
support for reform. Equally, compensating vulnerable
and highly disadvantaged groups is important for social
inclusiveness and fairness (i.e. reducing poverty andinequality). Higher energy and carbon taxes have aparticularly negative effect on:

Figure 6.3: Key issues for making fiscal reforms politically viable (upper part) and solutions and measures to address
them (lower part). Measures related to financial flows are marked with a green mark in the bottom corner. Table 6.1 gives
country examples of the political and behavioural factors (listed in the third column) while table 6.2 shows different ways
to use revenues (green arrows).

Key issues

Ensure equitable distributionof costs:
Support households and firms

Alleviate effect of
unilateral policies:
Tackle carbon leakage

Solutionsandmeasures

Foster public support:
Political and behavioral enablers tohigher energy prices or taxes

Establish trustin governments

Affected industry support:targeted compensation(firms & workers)

Carbon tariffs andborder-carbon
adjustment (BCA)

Avoid solution aversion
Information andcommunication about
impacts

Investments fostering
structural change(energy, infrastructure)

Appropriate timing
and sequencing
Affected industry support:
trade-exposedindustries

Consider wording
and framing

Reduce income taxes
Cash transfers forhouseholds/consumers

Climate projects, lowcarbon investment

Use revenues appropriately

47

1. Owners of carbon-intensive businesses (fossil fuelfirms, the steel and cement industries) that haveexcess or idle production capacity, leading to lowerthan-expected returns.
2. Workers in energy-intensive industries who mightlose jobs or face lower wages.
3. Owners of fossil resources in situ, who may not beable to extract and sell their products due to lower
demand or lower market prices.
4. Households and consumers who spend a relatively
high share of their income on energy-intensive goods
and services.
The cost for firms often plays a prominent role in publicdebate about carbon pricing, prompted by their concerns
over maintaining global competitiveness, since unilateralpolicy puts additional costs on domestic business,potentially affecting profits and employment (the impact
on relocation of emissions, i.e. leakage, is discussed
below). However, the cost to capital owners and workers
is only transitory as investment and employment adjustin the long run, without substantial costs resulting fromdepreciation (capital) and retirement (employment).
While costs for firms have been found, on average, to berather low (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2017), they can behigh in carbon-intensive firms that would be particularly
affected by phasing out fossil fuel subsidies or by higher
carbon prices (Jenkins, 2014; Aldy and Pizer, 2015;
OECD, 2015, Rentschler et al., 2017). If firms face strong
international competition, their ability to pass on higher
energy costs to consumers is limited, and this increases
their compliance costs.
A common compensation approach is to grant support
that is both targeted and time-limited, e.g. exemptions
or transfers (Aldy and Pizer, 2015). Allocating permits
based on past emissions (known as ‘grandfathering’)
in trading systems, as occurs in the European Union
ETS, can mitigate economic losses and prevent
industry relocation. However, it also undermines policy
effectiveness (Flues and Van Dender, 2017a) and canresult in substantial overcompensation for a given
carbon leakage risk, as Martin et al. (2014) show for
the European Union ETS. Reduced corporate income
or capital taxes as part of broader fiscal reforms can
reduce or even offset the carbon pricing burden on
firms (Carbone et al., 2013; Goulder and Hafstead,2013; Williams III et al., 2014; Rausch and Reilly, 2015).
Providing additional training and transitional benefits forworkers of affected industries is a more cost-effective
way of compensating them than providing direct support
to employers, in the longer term (Frondel et al., 2007).
Losses for fossil fuel resource owners due to longterm carbon pricing represent a permanent wealth loss
and can be substantial. Ambitious mitigation policies
consistent with the 2°C target are estimated to reduce
discounted fossil resource rents by roughly 40 percent,compared with a no climate policy scenario (Bauer etal., 2016). However, state revenues from carbon pricing
would likely outweigh the losses for fossil resource
owners (Kalkuhl and Brecha, 2013; Bauer et al., 2016).

Higher energy prices can affect lower-income or rural
households disproportionally (Flues and Thomas, 2015;
Levinson and O’Brien, 2018) and may increase energypoverty risk (Flues and Van Dender, 2017b; Atansah
et al., 2017). Carbon pricing tends to be progressive
in developing countries, while it is more likely to be
regressive in middle- and high-income countries
as relatively low-income households have higher
expenditure shares on energy-intensive goods andservices (Dorband et al., 2018; Ohlendorf et al., 2018).
However, middle and high-income countries often havethe institutional capacities to overcome these adverse
effects by pursuing compensation policies. Transfers on
an equal per capita basis are highly beneficial for poor
households (Klenert and Mattauch, 2016), but targeted
transfers leave more revenue for other purposes.
Targeted investment in low-income neighbourhoods (e.g.
in public transport, access to clean energy or income
tax reductions for poorer households) can mitigate
adverse equity effects (Chiroleu-Assouline and Fodha,
2014; Edenhofer et al., 2017; OECD, 2017; Klenert et al.,2018b). Table 6.1 lists examples of measures that havebeen successfully implemented to protect the poorest
households.

6.3.2 Carbon leakage under unilateral policies
A country that unilaterally increases the price ofcarbon could see emission-intensive production
relocate to other countries, which would undermine theeffectiveness of carbon pricing (World Bank, 2015). Thisis known as carbon leakage, which can be fixed by tradeand non-trade measures (Jakob et al., 2014). These
trade measures include tariffs or charges imposed on
countries that do not have comparable carbon prices(‘carbon tariffs’). Trade policies can be used strategicallyto incentivize trade partners to adopt domestic climate
policy measures or to increase or maintain a coalitionof countries with ambitious climate policies (Barrett,1997; Lessmann et al., 2009; Nordhaus, 2015). Non-trade
policies to reduce the risk of carbon leakage include thegrandfathering of emission permits and output-based
rebates to energy-intensive and trade-exposed firms.
Border carbon adjustments are a specific form of carbon
tariff that involve levying taxes on imported goods
according to their carbon footprint and removing thecarbon price component of exported goods. Bordercarbon adjustments aim to level the playing field
between domestic and foreign firms by imposing thesame economic burden on emissions (Mehling et al.,2018). Introducing border carbon adjustments to carbon
prices on domestic emissions is a consumption-based
method for pricing emissions. However, implementing
border carbon adjustments requires substantial (andaccurate) information on production-side emissions
and on the direct or implicit carbon prices in exporting
countries. Improved monitoring, reporting andverification systems can therefore help make bordercarbon adjustments more accurate. Moreover, the impact
of border carbon adjustments on reducing leakage canbe weakened through induced changes in trade andproduction patterns (Jakob and Marschinski, 2013).

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EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: FISCAL REFORMS FOR THE LOW-CARBON TRANSITION

Focusing on particularly carbon-intensive goods (e.g.
cement and steel) and conducting an ex ante evaluation
on trade impacts can help overcome these downsides
and make border carbon adjustments more effective in
reducing carbon leakage.
Carbon tariffs are not necessarily compatible withWorld Trade Organization rules, although they could
be covered by Article XX of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which stipulates that trade
policies can be used for achieving environmental goals
if no other policies are feasible that are less distortive totrade (Cosbey et al., 2012). Even so, retaliation can posean economic risk if carbon tariffs are implemented bycountries with a small share on the international market(Hagen and Schneider, 2017; Böhringer and Rutherford,2017).

6.3.3 Political and behavioural factors
Ensuring broad and stable support for carbon pricing
and the phasing-out of fossil fuel subsidies requires
more than addressing distributional, competitivenessand leakage impacts. A number of additional successfactors can be identified (Klenert et al., 2018a) andtable 6.1 provides country examples for addressingthese. The challenge is particularly significant where
trust in government is limited (Klenert et al., 2018a;
Rafaty, 2018). And yet, where trust is strong, there
is a tendency for citizens to question problems if
policy solutions challenge their world views, e.g. on
the State’s role in the economy (“solution aversion”)(Campbell and Kay, 2014; Cherry et al., 2017). Designingpolicies that are consistent with the prevailing world
views of specific societal groups therefore requires
extensive communication and consultation prior to
implementation.
To secure popular support for carbon pricing, thepublic needs to be informed about its positive effect onemissions reduction targets, as well as the co-benefitsof cleaner air, health and fiscal sustainability (Hsu etal., 2008; Bristow et al., 2010; Kallbekken et al., 2011;
Baranzini et al., 2014; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017).
Timing is also important: a gradual reform is more
likely to be successful than sudden and drastic priceincreases. Similarly, if several fossil fuel subsidies arebeing reformed, this can best be done by sequencing
the reforms (Beaton et al., 2013; Rentschler and Bazilian,
2017b). Language matters too, with terms such as ‘fee’or ‘contribution’ likely to meet with popular support
compared with ‘tax’ (Kallbekken et al., 2011; Drews andvan den Bergh, 2016; Baranzini and Carattini, 2017).
Carbon pricing and fossil fuel subsidy reform generate
public revenues, the use of which can strongly impact
support for carbon pricing. This is discussed in thesection 6.3.4.

6.3.4 Use revenues from carbon pricing to foster
sustainable development
Raising revenue through energy tax reforms relaxes
constraints on broader fiscal policy, creating
opportunities to stimulate more productive and socially
inclusive economic development. With respect to carbon
pricing, its potential for contributing to public budgets
is illustrated in figure 6.2b. In developing and emerging
economies, where tax revenue-to-gross domestic product(GDP) ratios rarely exceed 20 percent, an additional €60/
tCO2 carbon price on top of existing measures would
generate revenues worth more than 2 percent of grossdomestic product (GDP). These revenues would not be
available under non-fiscal climate policies like emission
standards or ETS that do not auction permits.
The way these new revenues are used has an effect on
the economy and equity, and therefore relates directly
to the economic and political arguments for tax-based
environment policy. Revenues can be deployed invarious ways. Policy packages that combine carbon
pricing with political or legal commitments to particularforms of spending have been found to increase thepolitical appeal of, and public support for, fiscal reforms.
However, because revenues from environmental taxes
might be insufficient or too high for a specific spending
objective, legal earmarking of these revenue sources forparticular spending items increases the risk of inefficient
tax and spending patterns. Maintaining some flexibility
for adjusting spending decisions, e.g. through politicalcommitment to policy packages, is therefore important.
Options for such policy packages include:
1. Cutting personal or corporate income taxes.
2. Cash transfers.
3. Investment projects aimed at poor or disadvantaged
regions or neighbourhoods, or regions traditionallydependent on fossil resource extraction (e.g. coal).
4. Temporarily assisting energy-intensive industries
facing strong international competition.
5. Supporting low-carbon technologies or spending that
increases environmental quality.
Table 6.2 gives an overview of spending options,
including some country-specific examples. Choosing
a particular option should be guided by the economic
circumstances and political and social priorities of therespective jurisdiction. Some countries, such as Chile,
Mexico and Viet Nam, have not earmarked environmental
tax revenues or committed to simultaneous tax cuts.
Sweden used a soft earmarking approach, reflecting apolitical commitment to reduce other taxes, in particularlabour taxes. The revenue from ETS is more often
allocated to green spending than that of carbon taxes
and excise taxes and discussions on carbon taxes andexcise taxes are more often embedded in broader tax
policy reform efforts.

49

Table 6.1: Behavioural and political success factors.

Success factor

Example(s)Directly
addressing
distributional
impacts• LPG price increases in Brazil and Mexico were combined with existing social welfare
mechanisms to mitigate the effects of higher prices (Adeoti et al., 2016; Toft et al., 2016).
• Kerosene subsidy reforms in Indonesia and Yemen were accompanied by measures
promoting the use of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) as a household cooking fuel(Clements et al., 2013).
• In Indonesia, social assistance programmes enabled the government to reform fossil
fuel subsidies in the mid-2000s (Chelminski, 2018), while India and Iran provided someform of cash transfer to compensate households (Rentschler and Bazilian, 2017a; Jain etal., 2018).
• Switzerland, Alberta and British Columbia (see table 6.2) have used revenues fromcarbon pricing to compensate households and, to a degree, firms.

Establishingtrust ingovernments• Countries with relatively high levels of trust and low levels of perceived corruption, suchas Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, tend to have higher carbon prices (Rafaty,2018).
• Subsidy reform in Indonesia had previously been difficult due to public distrust in thegovernment; however, more recently, reforms have been accompanied by measures
tackling corruption in the oil and gas sector (Chelminski, 2018).
• Jordan’s 2008 subsidy reforms were introduced following consultations with a wide arrayof stakeholders (Whitley and van der Burg, 2015).

Avoiding solution
aversion• Proposed carbon pricing reforms for the USA as a whole, or for individual USA states, areoften designed to accommodate less interventionist world views. This is accomplishedby minimizing the State’s role in the carbon pricing reform, in part by returning a large
portion of the revenue to its citizens (Nature Editorial, 2017). Further examples are theMassachusetts Bill H.1726—which also features a carbon dividend—that passed thestate senate in June 2018 (DeMarco, 2018) or the reform of the Californian Cap andTrade system (CAB, 2017) and the ‘fee and rebate’ proposal in Washington DC, both ofwhich are focused to some degree on revenue neutrality (Dysen, 2018).

Information andcommunication
about theimpacts• The successful fossil fuel subsidy reform in Iran was carefully prepared by clear
government communication through various channels, such as websites and hotlines
to answer questions about the reform. The government also proactively consulted theprivate sector to discuss potential concerns about the policy reform (Atansah et al.,2017).
• The Government of Malaysia used multiple channels (including a public forum, YouTube
and Twitter) to communicate fossil fuel subsidy reform in 2013 (Fay et al., 2015).

Getting thetiming andsequencing right• Gradual fossil fuel subsidy reform in Iran helped with gaining public acceptance andreducing adverse effects (Rentschler and Bazilian, 2017b).
• Sudden and drastic price increases, by contrast, may spark public protests, as was thecase for subsidy reforms in Bolivia and Nigeria (Beaton et al., 2013).
• Subsidy reform in Egypt in 2014 was possible during the ‘honeymoon period’ of the new
el-Sisi Government (Moerenhout, 2018).

Considering
wording andframing

Using revenues
appropriately• The Government of India successfully framed its Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG scheme
as a means of addressing inefficient service delivery (Jain et al., 2018).
• In the carbon pricing schemes in Alberta and Switzerland, carbon prices are labelled as‘levies’ (FOEN, 2017; Government of Alberta, 2018).
See details and examples in table 6.2.

50

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: FISCAL REFORMS FOR THE LOW-CARBON TRANSITION

Table 6.2: Options for revenue recycling.

Recycling option

Objective(s)Example(s)Reduce income
taxes

Growth,employment• Germany (energy tax reform): A 1.7-percentage point reduction incompulsory public pension contributions increased employment
by 0.6 percent (Bach et al., 2002; Welsch and Ehrenheim, 2004).
• Sweden (energy tax; carbon tax of €120): Revenues led tocontinued reductions of labour taxes; tax revenues comprise
1.6 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 3.6 percent of
national tax revenues.

Cash transfers

Equity, popularsupport• British Columbia, Canada (carbon tax of C$35 [€24] in 2018): up
to C$135 [€92] per adult and C$40 [€27] per child in 2018.
• Alberta, Canada (carbon levy of C$30 [€21] in 2018): tax rebate(on average C$135 [€92] per inhabitant in 2018, dependent on
income and family status).
• Switzerland (CO2 levy of CHF96 [€85] in 2018): Majority ofrevenues recycled to citizens as a uniform transfer (CHF88 [€78]
in 2018).

Investments,
fostering structuralchangeGrowth,equity, popularsupport• Alberta, Canada (carbon levy of C$30 [€21] in 2018): Revenues
spent on infrastructure, public transit and energy efficiency.

Affected industry
supportIndustry
support,leakageavoidance,
employment• Sweden (energy tax; carbon and energy tax of €120): Lower tax
rate for industry, but tax reduction phased out over time andabolished in 2018.

Popularsupport,sustainability• Germany (energy tax reform): support of renewable energy andhousing sector.

Climate projects
and low-carbon
investment• Switzerland (CO2 levy of CHF96 [€85] in 2018): subsidy for
employed workers.

• Switzerland (CO2 levy of CHF96 [€85] in 2018): One third of
the revenues were allocated to helping reduce housing sector
emissions and financing a low-carbon technology fund.
• British Columbia, Canada (carbon tax of C$35 [€24] in 2018):
Used to finance a Clean Energy Fund and provide investment
support for emission reductions projects.
• India (coal tax of INR400 [€5] per tonne of coal, approx.
€2/tCO2): Part of revenues used for clean energy andenvironment fund.
• Colombia (carbon tax of US$5 [€4]): Revenues spent onenvironmental and natural conservation projects.

Note: Carbon prices are per metric tonne of CO2.
Source: Own elaboration, based on information from ministries.

51

If revenues from carbon taxes are used to reduce otherpre-existing taxes, such as income tax, the overall
costs of carbon pricing are lower than if revenues aretransferred lump-sum to firms or households (Goulder,
1995; Bovenberg, 1999). Detailed analyses that take
into account the full range of existing tax distortions
suggest that a green fiscal reform might even create
economic gains (see, e.g., Parry and Bento, 2000;
Parry et al., 2014).5 Such gains may also arise whencountries harbour a large informal economy, prone totax evasion. Energy taxation and environmental fiscal
reform are particularly appealing in low- and middleincome countries where substantial informal economies
make relying on corporate and personal income tax
more difficult, and where administrative capacity is weak(Besley and Persson, 2014). In such countries, income
taxes tend to encourage informal activities, so reducing
income taxes and raising more revenue from energy
taxes can increase economic efficiency (Bento et al.,2018).

6.4 Addressing the broader fiscal policy
framework: policy packages, coordination andalignment
The effectiveness of fiscal policies in the energy sector
can be increased if other market failures and barriers
are addressed by complementary policies. For example,
capital markets, innovation and network externalities
are typically larger for new and emerging technologies,
including low-carbon technologies. As upfront capitalcosts are often higher for renewable than for fossil
projects, low-carbon investment in developing countries
is particularly affected by macroeconomic and policy
risks (Waissbein et al., 2013; Hirth and Steckel, 2016;
Rodríguez-Manotas et al., 2018). Technology support,
innovation and de-risking policies can address thesebarriers and strengthen the environmental impact ofcarbon pricing (Kalkuhl et al., 2012; Schmidt, 2014;
Dressler et al., 2018; see also Chapter 7).
Better alignment of broad tax policy can help reducecarbon emissions. Subsidies or tax deductions related
to commuting (Su and DeSalvo, 2008), company cars
(Harding, 2014) and the aviation sector (Gössling et al.,2017) are common in many developed countries andtend to encourage carbon-intensive transport choices.
Replacing property taxes with land value taxes can
reduce urban sprawl and increase housing density, which
in turn reduces the need for longer commutes (Banzhaf
and Lavery, 2010).

Policy coordination extends across sectors. Increasing
carbon prices in the energy sector can increase
emissions from land-use change due to increased
bioenergy production, if the associated emissions are notproperly accounted for (Searchinger et al., 2009; Haberl
et al., 2012). Consistent policies and price signals acrosssectors can significantly mitigate GHG emissions andhelp manage future risks associated with rising carbon
prices (Golub et al., 2017; 2018 and Lubowski and PirisCabezas, 2017). Fiscal policies such as ecological fiscal
transfers, contingent on environmental performance,
can also play a role in the land-use sector. They could
be a way to implement REDD+6 when international
pay-for-performance or carbon market finance flows
to the national or state government level (Loft et al.,2016). There is growing experience with ecologicalfiscal transfers, including transfers of tax revenues tosupport protected areas and forests in Portugal (Santos
et al., 2012), several Brazilian states (May et al., 2011)
and India (Busch and Mukherjee, 2018). Land taxes on
agricultural land can also help reduce agricultural land
use and deforestation (Kalkuhl and Edenhofer, 2017).

6.5

Conclusion

This chapter provides two important insights. Firstly,
while governments frequently use excise taxes on energy
and fuels for raising public revenues, fiscal policy inmost countries is currently not geared towards delivering
the transition to a low-carbon economy. Core climate
policies are not in place, existing carbon rates are too low
and inconsistent, and broad fiscal systems are not wellaligned with decarbonization. Secondly, this need not be
the case. Increasing the costs of carbon-intensive energy
to steer investment and behaviour towards low-carbon
options and allocating carbon tax revenues to create
a fiscal system that supports inclusive sustainable
development are entirely within reach. Decisions on how
to use revenue are critical to building public support andharnessing the full power of price-based policy to cut
carbon emissions.

5

The first case, where costs of climate policy are reduced when revenues from carbon pricing are used to reduce pre-existing distortionary taxes, is called ‘weak double
dividend’. The second case, where climate policy creates economic gains through reduction of distortionary taxes, even when the environmental effects are not accounted
for, is called ‘strong double dividend’.

6

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, as well as conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks.

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EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF INNOVATION POLICY AND MARKET CREATION

Chapter 7.
Bridging the gap:
The role of innovation policy and market creation
Lead authors: Mariana Mazzucato (University College London - Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose) and Gregor
Semieniuk (SOAS University of London)
Contributing authors: Anna Geddes (ETH Zurich), Ping Huang (Tufts University), Friedemann Polzin (Universiteit Utrecht),
Kelly Sims Gallagher (Tufts University), Clare Shakya (International Institute for Environment and Development), Bjarne
Steffen (ETH Zurich) and Hermann Tribukait (Mexico Energy Innovation Funds)

7.1 Introduction
By pairing innovation in the use of existing technologies
and in behaviour with new technologies, directed
innovation has the potential to radically transformsocieties and reduce their greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions. Therefore, accelerating innovation is a key
component of any attempt to close the emissions gap,
but it will not happen by itself.
As innovation is inherently uncertain and often costly,
it requires access to substantial amounts of financeas well as acceptance of inevitable failures and losses
across the innovation landscape. This landscape covers
everything from basic to applied research, and fromdemonstration to scale-up, deployment and diffusion,
with feedback effects between the various stages,
meaning that funding requirements can escalate quickly.
Moreover, as there are often long lead times fromthe invention of a sophisticated GHG-saving process
or material to its transformation into a commercial
product and its diffusion through newly created markets,
innovators require extraordinary patience.
Well-crafted innovation policy that kickstarts andsteadies innovation across the landscape can makea significant contribution to closing the financing gap,
and in this case the emissions gap. This means thatthe public sector must often lead in terms of taking
risks through ambitious innovation policy. Such policy
requires more considerations to co-create and shapemarkets than simply fixing market failures. In otherwords, the public sector plays a crucial role in directing
the innovation process rather than just filling thegaps. In the past, direction has been shaped through a
mission-oriented approach: framing and solving societal
problems and using all available levers to crowd-inother sources (Mazzucato, 2017; 2018a). This includes
sustaining and accelerating innovation, not just in
research and development (R&D) but across the entire
innovation landscape, such as by providing patientfinance that risk-averse actors are not willing to provide.
No other actor can replace the public sector.

This chapter explores the type of policies that canaccelerate low-carbon innovation for closing theemissions gap, and barriers to implementing them.
Section 7.2 discusses what we regard as the four policy
principles to drive additional investment, while section
7.3 illustrates how these principles have been crucial
to the success of solar photovoltaic (PV). Section 7.4
discusses barriers to implementing active policies,
before section 7.5 concludes by highlighting challenges
and opportunities for accelerating low-carbon innovation
through policy.

7.2 Innovation policies
7.2.1 Risk-taking across the innovation landscapeInnovation policy requires attention to be paid to theentire innovation chain: from the supply side (from basic
and applied R&D to demonstration) to the demand side
(regulations, subsidies and taxes, procurement, andsignificant changes in consumption patterns) (Polzin,
2017; Mazzucato, Semieniuk and Watson, 2015). In
low-carbon sectors, in addition to grant funding, an
important share of research, development and venture
capital funding comes from public sources (Mazzucato
and Semieniuk, 2017) and almost half of the investments
into demonstration projects originate in public innovation
institutions (Nemet et al., 2018). Similarly, governments
are highly active on the demand side with subsidies —whether set administratively (such as feed-in tariffs)
or through auctions — loan guarantees and significant
direct investment (Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017).
Public procurement can also help spur innovation by
favouring low-carbon technologies (Edler and Georghiou,
2007, see also online appendix A.3) and regulation must
be conducive to innovation, which includes avoiding
over-regulation while new business models are still
forming. Successful innovation is often accompanied by
the public sector’s lead on taking risks at all stages of theinnovation chain.

53

Box 7.1 Electric vehicle innovation policy across the innovation chain in China
China’s efforts to innovate in electric vehicles (EVs) are a clear example of a governmental attempt tocoordinate both supply-side (push) and demand-side (pull) measures in order to achieve specific goals.
Policies involve a combination of investments in R&D, the creation of multiple demonstration zones
for the purposes of experimentation, policies to spur industrial development, deployment subsidies for
manufacturers, favourable tax- and fee-based incentives for consumers, and the provision of necessary
infrastructure.
China’s supply-side policies started during its 8th five-year plan (1991–1995), when public R&D funds werefirst allocated to EV technology. This supply-side support has continued and increased, taking different forms
during subsequent five-year plans (Zheng et al., 2012; Hou et al., 2012). Most recently, the Ministry of Scienceand Technology issued a National Key R&D Programme for EV for 2016–2018, which is the most influential
public R&D programme in China. There has been continuous and strengthening complementary supply-side
support.
Industrial policy for EVs lagged behind these early investments in R&D, largely because industrial policy
dating from the first auto-industry policy in 1994 originally aimed to establish a domestically competitive
conventional automobile industry through a joint-venture formation strategy (Gallagher, 2006). In 2009,
however, there was a strategic move to the new-energy vehicle industry, which was listed as one of sevenstrategic emerging industries in 2010, and later as one of 10 key fields in the Made in China 2025 plan. A
combination of policy instruments has been applied, including demonstration programmes, finance andtaxation measures, and administrative regulations. An influential regulation was recently issued, under which
vehicle manufacturers will face compulsory production targets for new-energy vehicles starting in April 2018.
If they fail to meet the targets, they will either need to purchase credits from other manufacturers or pay afine (Lu, 2018). The emphasis on new-energy vehicle is therefore becoming increasingly explicit in industrial
policy.
Demand-side policies also commenced in 2009 with subsidies for the purchase of electric vehicles. In 2016,
these subsidies were renewed for up to US$8,736 per electric vehicle, although they are scheduled to bephased out by 2020. Other purchase incentives include exemptions from purchase tax, travel tax and importtax for selected EV original equipment manufacturers. In some of the pilot cities, EVs are also exempt fromthe licence plate lottery system and the restricted land access applied to conventional vehicles (Harrysson
et al., 2015; Du and Ouyang, 2017). Moreover, EVs enjoy waived or reduced parking fees and highway tolls insome pilot cities (Gao et al., 2015). The state government has also issued a series of policies and standards
for the construction of charging infrastructure (aiming to build 12,000 charging stations by 2020) and many
pilot cities also employ subsidies (Du and Ouyang, 2017; Lu, 2018).
Alongside these supporting policies, clear objectives for industry development and market creation have been
set out. By 2020, EV production capacity (including plug-in hybrids) will reach two million, and EV stocks will
exceed five million. Moreover, the fuel efficiency standard for average fuel consumption of all passenger cars
produced in 2020 is set at 5 litres/100km, down from 6.65 litres/100km in 2015 (The State Council, 2012;
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, 2016).
With this constellation of policies rolled out from 1991, the Chinese Government has pushed and pulled
electric vehicles into the marketplace. China’s stock of EVs grew at an average rate of 69 percent between
2013 and 2017, and the country was home to almost 40 percent of the world’s EVs in 2017.

Table 7.1: China’s EV (including plug-in hybrid) stock from 2009 to 2017 (in thousands)

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

China

0.5

2

7

17

32

105

313

649

1228

World

7

14

61

179

381

704

1239

1982

3109

China’s share

7%

14%

11%

9%

8%

15%

25%

33%

39%

Source: IEA, 2018b

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EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF INNOVATION POLICY AND MARKET CREATION

Policy coordination is as important as attention to thewhole landscape. For example, procurement policies
cannot work unless the demanded products have beendeveloped and demonstrated, but the dependence runs
both ways: feedback effects from deployment anddiffusion stimulate new product development and enable
cost reductions through learning by doing (Lundvall,
1992; Freeman, 1995; Gallagher et al., 2012). Thisdependence also extends to consumer attitudes andtheir definition of the ‘good life’, with consumer demand
for low-carbon products having the potential to drive
innovation (Perez, 2017). By developing a coordinatedpolicy that heeds these interdependencies, the public
sector can not only fix market failures, but also createand shape markets for new innovative technologies(Mazzucato, 2018b).

7.2.2 Patient strategic finance
Innovation policy across the innovation chain ismost effective when it involves patient finance fordirect investments from public organizations placed
strategically at all stages of the innovation process.
Private investors often perceive new technologies
as risky and are unwilling to provide capital at scale,especially given the long lead times (CPI 2013; Schmidt,
2014; Mazzucato and Semieniuk, 2017). However,innovation feeds off patient finance that is looking forlong-term returns. As with any venture, such financemust also welcome risk and endure the failure of several
projects (Mazzucato, 2018b). By being patient, suchfinance becomes strategic and supports innovation
programmes until they reach their goal (Chan et al.,2017). The high-risk, long-term and capital-intensive
character of the demonstration and deployment stagesof innovation makes public investment in this area key.
The growth of renewable energy markets illustrates theimportance of public strategic finance. Financing thebulk of the US$120 trillion needed to steer the energy
sector onto a low-carbon path by 2050 (IEA and IRENA,
2017) will require considerable public investments.
Individual projects are often very capital-intensive; even
early-stage demonstrations in energy and manufacturingsectors may require investments exceeding US$1 billion,
while the pathway to profitability may take many years(Lester, 2014). Almost half of global investments in
the renewable energy sector are now being financedby public agencies and state-controlled enterprises, asprivate financing has stagnated in absolute terms sincearound 2008.1 Public money has been disproportionately
directed to high-risk projects, mobilizing, or ‘crowding in’2,
additional private business and leaving lower-risk
technologies such as onshore wind mainly to private
actors, as figure 7.1 illustrates (Mazzucato andSemieniuk, 2018).

Figure 7.1: Average relative risk exposure on a 0–1 scale of public and private investors in renewable energy assets
2004–2014 globally, excluding investments made in China.

0.5

Risk exposure

Public Risk Exposure
Private Risk Exposure

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Source: Mazzucato and Semieniuk (2018).

1

The public share of finance in directed historical energy transitions was often even higher (Semieniuk and Mazzucato, 2018).

2

Crowding in is a word play on the idea of debt-financed government spending replacing or ‘crowding out’ private investment. In innovative products, as this chapter shows,
government finance (whether itself debt financed or not) may be necessary to mobilise private finance in the first place. (See also online appendix A.4 on state investmentbanks’ crowding in of private investors).

55

One of the most important policy vehicles for strategic
finance and ‘crowding in’ private investors are state
investment banks (SIBs). Several national andsubnational governments have founded green state
investment banks (such as Australia’s Clean Energy
Finance Corporation) or mandated existing SIBs to
support low-carbon technologies (such as the Brazilian
Development Bank) (NRDC et al., 2016; OECD, 2017).
In addition, multilateral development banks (such as
the World Bank) have pledged to green their portfolios(Steffen and Schmidt, 2017). Geddes et al. (2018)
identify five functions through which these SIBs havebeen able to leverage private capital: the provision ofcapital, de-risking, awareness-raising among investors,
market signalling (where an SIB’s endorsement improvesa technology’s reputation) and by providing a crucial
early-mover function. These functions are detailed in
online appendix A.4.
Together, these five functions can help overcome private
investors’ initial aversion towards new technology andproject types. The de-risking, signalling, and early-mover
functions are particularly important for projects that
contain non-incremental technological innovation. As
SIBs take a financial position in such projects, they canalso incur financial losses when a project fails. They
therefore need performance criteria (such as portfolio
benchmark return or leveraged private finance target)
and a capital base that allows them to invest in higher
risk immature technologies. Defining the risk exposurethat a SIB can take is an important part of their mandate,and should be aligned with the overall ambition of
innovation policy, as discussed next.

7.2.3 Directed portfolios
Innovation policy is most effective when it sets ambitious
directions, rather than aiming to simply ‘level the playing
field’. Steering towards a low-carbon economy is one
broad direction that involves additional choices as
to which set of technologies should receive funding
and how much. Unless the public sector sets suchdirections, private actors’ choices will unintentionallycreate directions, which may be into high-carbon sectors(Wüstenhagen and Menichetti, 2012). Due to the longlived nature of many assets created today, this carries
the risk of locking the economy into a high-carbon path
(Unruh, 2000). To avoid doing so, investments into
low-carbon innovation must be directed boldly towards
several strategically selected sectors within the lowcarbon area (Mazzucato, 2017). This portfolio approachpreserves multiple pathways, meaning that if one
path fails, others are available and some will succeed(Schmidt et al., 2016).
A number of developing countries have highly
constrained national budgets that limit their ability tofinance a policy portfolio that goes beyond immediateneeds, such as national security, health care, education,other infrastructure, and energy access and security.

3

Nevertheless, several funding mechanisms have thepotential to boost countries’ finance for innovative
projects, such as the Green Climate Fund. This United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change(UNFCCC) entity catalyses climate finance from bothpublic and private sources to provide investment support
to developing countries. Countries retain ownershipof where the fund’s resources are invested, as suchinvestments are made in the context of their national
climate strategies and plans. They can also use the
UNFCCC’s Technology Mechanism to help develop
relevant strategies and technology investment portfolios.
Another example, focused more on local businessdevelopment, is the World Bank’s Climate Innovation
Centers (infoDev, 2018). Design lessons for these andsimilar mechanisms are available from the Global Fundin the area of public health (Sachs and Schmidt-Traub,2017).

7.2.4 Mission-oriented innovation
One way to structure a complex set of policies is toconceive of innovation policy as targeted towards
achieving a concrete ‘mission’. Mission-oriented
innovation policy defines an ambitious goal and thensets specific steps and milestones to achieve it (Forayet al., 2012).3 The mission requires public innovation
organizations to set out tasks that mobilize various
actors (business, non-profit, public) for bottom-up
experimentation across different sectors (Mazzucato,2017).
Lessons from past mission-oriented innovation policies
suggest that cross-sectoral innovation is necessary
to reach goals: for example, the US Apollo Mission
required not just ‘rocket science’ but also innovation in
the textile sector for the astronaut suits, for instance. In
addition, the German Energiewende [Energy Transition]
policy has required all sectors in Germany to transformthemselves, such as the steel sector lowering energy
consumption through repurpose, reuse and recycling
strategies (European Commission, 2018). Meanwhile,in the USA the SunShot Initiative in PV (see section 7.3)
has mobilized 347 organizations through grants in nine
subprogrammes, covering actors from manufacturingfirms to municipalities seeking innovative solutions topermitting, zoning and financing (DOE, 2018). Box 7.2
describes an international mission-driven initiative foraccelerating innovation in advanced materials.
This section has outlined the key elements of an
innovation policy framework for accelerating lowcarbon innovation. One important takeaway from this
discussion is that innovation policy itself can and must
be innovative: different technologies and different
areas of the innovation chain require different support
mechanisms (Huenteler et al., 2016). Accelerating
innovation may therefore require entirely new approaches
to innovation policy.

This differs from invention-oriented innovation policy, which focuses on R&D only, or system-oriented policy that seeks to provide a good system conducive to innovation, butdoes not set a direction (Edler and Fagerberg, 2017).

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EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF INNOVATION POLICY AND MARKET CREATION

Box 7.2 The Clean Energy Materials
Innovation Challenge — Mission
Innovation
Advanced materials – with ever-increasing
performance requirements – are thefundamental components of new energy
technologies, ranging from non-toxic,
high-density batteries and advanced powerelectronics to low-cost organic solar cells andelectric cars (Chu et al., 2016). Discoveringand developing such materials much fasterwould accelerate the transition to a cleanenergy future. The Clean Energy Materials
Innovation Challenge is part of the larger
Mission Innovation, launched at COP 21,
which aims for a coalition of countries toaccelerate the energy innovation needed for a
low-carbon future.
The challenge aims to bring the rate ofinnovation in materials discovery closer tothat in computing power, the ‘Moore’s Law’ ofmaterials discovery. The goal is to combine
three cutting-edge technologies (artificial
intelligence, robotics, and computing)with materials sciences to accelerate thediscovery of advanced materials by at leasta factor of 10, from around 20 years to under
two years and, eventually, a matter of months.
Mission Innovation launched the Materials
Challenge in September 2016 with limited
funding from the co-leading countries: Mexicoand the United States of America, later joined
by Canada.4 Funding was used to gather
leading scientists in academia and business,thought-leaders, government representatives,
NGOs and civil society observers from 18
countries for a four-day Basic Research
Needs (BRN) workshop to identify thefundamental research needs, challenges andopportunities, and define the path forward.
The workshop developed the concept of an
integrated Materials Acceleration Platform(Aspuru-Guzik et al., 2018), an autonomousor self-driving laboratory with smart robots
that are able to rapidly design, perform andinterpret experiments in the quest for new
high-performance, low-cost and clean-energy
materials (Tabor et al., 2018).
In May 2018, Canada and Mexico funded twointernational collaborative demonstration
projects of US$10 million each. Additionalcountries are launching similar projects incollaboration with this Innovation Challenge,
including India, South Korea, European Union
members, and even non-Mission Innovation
countries such as Singapore. As such, it isa test-bed for increased intergovernmental
cooperation in mission-oriented innovation
policy and effective public private
partnerships.

7.3 Solar photovoltaic innovation
Innovation in solar photovoltaic (PV) technology
illustrates both the nonlinear nature of innovation andhow the various innovation policies reviewed above driveand shape it. PV was deployed with a compound annual
growth rate of about 38 percent between 1998 and 2015
(Creutzig et al., 2017), continually exceeding forecasts(see figure 7.2a). PV diffusion spurred cost reductions
through ‘learning by doing’, scale economies and R&D,
but also lowered profit margins through increasing
competition (Nemet, 2006; Carvalho et al., 2017), which
in turn stimulated further deployment of ever-cheapersystems. However, PV innovation preceded diffusion
by several decades, driving down costs dramatically.
From 1975 to 2016, PV module prices fell by about 99.5
percent (figure 7.2b), and every doubling of installedcapacity coincided with a 20 percent drop in costs(Kavlak et al., 2017). Public innovation policies were —and continue to be — crucial for this process throughout
the innovation chain.
Governments often act as lead risk-takers. For example,
the Sunshine Project launched by the Japanese Ministryof International Trade and Industry in 1974 (IEA, 2016)
made Japan an early leader in PV manufacturing anddeployment (Trancik et al., 2015). As for the US, the firstsilicon PV cell was demonstrated by researchers at Bell
Telephone Labs in 1954, which benefited from large
contracts with US government agencies (Chapin et al.,1954). Subsequently, the US government agencies NASAand the Advanced Research Projects Agency developed
PV for satellite use (Perlin, 2002). As a result of the 1973
oil crisis, new policies were enacted and research on PV
expanded in the laboratories of the newly founded US
Department of Energy (DoE) (Ruegg and Thomas, 2011).
Government-funded innovation continues to this day. Ina mission-oriented policy approach, the DoE launched
the SunShot Initiative in 2011 with the concrete goal of
reducing the cost of US solar energy systems – including
the costs of installation, permitting and financing – by 75
percent to a levelized cost of US$0.06/kWh by 2020. As
SunShot supported innovation that met this goal in 2017
(three years earlier than expected), the target has beenrevised to US$0.03/kWh by 2030 (Chu et al., 2016).
In 1990, the German parliament enacted the first PV
feed-in tariff, which guaranteed the sale of all PVgenerated electricity substantially above market price.
The feed-in tariff subsequently became a major law,setting a direction for innovation in Germany andeffectively creating a PV market. In fact, the feed-in tariffis credited with drawing many producers into the market,
thereby pushing Germany to become a global leader
in solar installations (Trancik et al., 2015). This built
on long-standing collaborations between German PV
companies and a network of public research institutes(Jacobssen and Lauber, 2006), while the German SIB,

4

Eighteen of the 24 Mission Innovation members participate in this initiative. The
Materials Innovation Challenge international workshop and activities have been
funded by Mexico’s Energy Innovation Funds, managed by the Ministry of Energyof Mexico (SENER), the US Department of Energy (DOE), Natural Resources
Canada (NRCAN), and the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR).

57

Figure 7.2a: Cumulative solar PV installations compared
to forecasts from various IEA World Energy Outlooks(WEO).

2013

WEO 2017

100

WEO 2016
WEO 2015

350

WEO 2014

2012

WEO 2013

300

WEO 2012

250

WEO 2011

2011

WEO 2010

2009

WEO 2009

200

2008
2010

WEO 2008

Actuals

80
Solar PV Module Cost

80

Annual Capacity Additions

60

60
40

40

20

20
0

WEO 2006

150

100

120

2017 US$/Watt

400

Gigawatt

2015 2014

Gigawatt

2017 2016

450

Figure 7.2b: Historical price reductions and annual
installations, 1975–2017.

1975

1985

1995

2005

2017

3.0

100

2006

50

2.0
1.0

0
2000

2005

2010

2015

2020

2025

2030

0.0

2010

2015

2017

Source: Updated from ClimateWorks et al. (2015).

Sources: Earth Policy Institute (2018) and Barbose et al. (2018, Fig. 13)
for prices, Earth Policy Institute and IRENA (2018) for capacity.

KfW, boosted German renewable energy deployment by
providing strategic finance in the form of concessionalloans in 2009. In that year, Germany almost doubled its
cumulative PV capacity to 10 GW and 41 percent of all
projects benefited from KfW loans (Bickel and Kelm,2010). The next three years saw unprecedented growthin German PV capacity, which slowed only when the feedin tariff was reduced in 2012.

and Japan to Germany and then China and increasingly
other countries. Yet, what is a success today looked lesscertain and faced many obstacles in the early stages,
revealing the importance of public policies for PV
innovation and market creation along the lines examinedin the previous section. The next section discusses somecommon barriers to implementing innovation policy.

The baton of PV leadership then passed to China, whose
companies have been manufacturing more than halfof global PV cells every year since 2011 (Zhang andGallagher, 2016). In the 2000s, Chinese manufacturers
benefited from the generous demand-pull policies inricher countries (especially in Germany, Italy, Spain andthe US), while transferring technology and verticallyintegrating production processes in China and benefitingfrom financial support from local governments (Zhang
and Gallagher, 2016). In 2011, a feed-in tariff createda major market for PV also within China itself, while
the Chinese SIB, China Development Bank, disbursed
generous credit lines to Chinese manufacturers (Quitzow,
2015).
Against the backdrop of this comprehensive network ofpolicies across the innovation landscape, solar PV is now
nearing cost-competitiveness with electricity from fossil
fuels and is being deployed around the world. The storyof PV innovation is an international one: from the USA

7.4 Barriers to implementing innovation policy
7.4.1 Organizational aims and mandates
The above-mentioned innovation policies recognize
the institutions that plan and carry out the various
polices as being key to their success. Unlike mostpublic organizations and their fear of failure, the US
energy innovation agency (ARPA-E) measures its
success by how many risks it is willing to take andthe impact of its successes (Mazzucato and Penna,
2015a). Nevertheless, most public organisations are risk
averse, so it is important to learn from the US energy
innovation agency’s (ARPA-E) approach in terms of
paying attention to the internal capabilities of public
institutions: their willingness to set bold missions andnurture organizational capacity and experimentation,and their ability to evaluate themselves in dynamic ways,
rather than by static cost-benefit analysis (Kattel and58

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – BRIDGING THE GAP: THE ROLE OF INNOVATION POLICY AND MARKET CREATION

Mazzucato, 2018). Staying abreast of how innovationis changing markets also requires these institutions todeliberately engage with a wider set of actors and to
track and quickly learn from wider innovation progress(Shakya and Byrnes, 2017). Emboldening agencies andinstitutions is easier when they are kept apart frompolitical decision makers and thus independent of theshort-term political process (Haley, 2016).
Setting strong policy mandates also helps strengthen
an institution’s capabilities. For instance, for SIBs toeffectively address the low-carbon finance gap, theirmandate needs to define their sectoral and geographicalfocus areas, specify the instruments to be used, define‘green’ safeguards for project selection, and determine
the SIB’s own financing. Given the high importance of
in-house technological capabilities and the resources
needed to build them, the sectoral focus areas mustbe aligned with the government’s mission-oriented
low-carbon policy (Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). It isalso important that the instruments that a SIB provides
are appropriate for their target sectors and projecttypes. For instance, projects with very long loan tenors
require long-running loan guarantees. Importantly,
these instruments should also be designed in a waythat reflects the financial sector’s existing structures.
One example is household rooftop solar projects inGermany: the KfW channelled loans through Germany’s
local banks, utilizing Germany’s decentralized financial
sector (Hall et al., 2016). Depending on the sectors andthe scale, governments must also decide whether SIBs
can refinance themselves in capital markets, as KfW hasdone (Mazzucato and Penna, 2015b) and, if so, whether
they can utilize a state guarantee.

7.4.2 Funding
Many countries have significant barriers to financing
innovative technologies because, on top of thetechnology being unproven, the countries themselves
are considered high-risk places to invest, with highpolitical risk, policy uncertainty and currency fluctuation(Schmidt 2014; BNEF et al., 2016), now exacerbated byan increased exposure of these countries to climatechange risks (Buhr et al., 2018). This situation makes
both international and domestic investors averse toexposing themselves to additional risk by investing in
new technologies and business models without a solid
track record (Mehta et al., 2017; Kidney et al., 2017).
Most of the poorest countries are also small markets
with a large proportion of low-income consumers wholack credit history, which limits potential investors’interest in engaging with the government to improve
investment conditions (GOGLA et al., 2017). In addition
to these challenges, matching the right type and scaleof finance to the opportunities in innovative small-scale
distributed technologies has significant transaction
costs, as well as the risk of the business models aroundthese technologies having a limited track record (Hystra,
2013; Lewis et al., 2017).
To stimulate innovation in low-carbon sectors, such as
distributed energy, several developing countries have
set up platforms that aggregate finance for small-scale
renewable energy projects, thereby reducing transaction

costs to public and private investors and managing risk
(Shakya and Byrnes, 2017). Various types of aggregation
platforms have successfully reduced the cost of capitalto the energy enterprises by bundling the enterprises’
small ticket deals or their assets into portfolios thatdiversify risk across several projects, and standardizing
project data to build investors’ confidence. This bundlinghas also allowed the platforms to meet the deal size
preferred by larger-scale investors offering cheaper
finance (Wilson et al., 2014). In addition, the platforms
create a space for dialogue among public policymakers,
entrepreneurs and private investors to resolve market
challenges (Bertha Centre and WWF, 2016; Simanis,2012). Once again, it is important to recognize thatas not all sources of finance are the same, those with
an appetite for risk should be sought out (Mazzucato
and Semieniuk, 2018). Financing constraints are alsoprevalent in developed countries, especially at themunicipal level, and the online appendix A.3 explores
innovative financing mechanisms to overcome these
constraints for low-carbon lighting.
Large amounts of funding are by themselves insufficient,as funding needs to be stable over time. Cyclicalspending is problematic on both the supply and demandsides. On the supply side, fluctuations in spending due
to political decisions (or the expectation that spending
will not be stable) can hinder investments in long-term
projects (Chan et al., 2017), whereas on the demand side,
the business cycle is an important consideration. While
the financial crisis of 2008 led to various ‘green stimuli’,
this increased spending was often soon replaced byausterity measures. Perhaps the most dramatic casualtyof tightened fiscal belts was the Spanish support for
renewable energy. Until 2008, Spain’s feed-in tariff
supported one of the fastest expansions of not-yetcommercialized renewable energy. However, the feed-in
tariff was paid by the central government and added
to its fiscal deficit, so when Spain was hard-pressedto tighten the budget, it was reduced retroactively.
Spanish renewable energy investment dropped after2008 and collapsed completely after 2012 (MirArtigues et al., 2018), contributing to a crisis in Spanish
PV manufacturing companies (Ibarloza et al., 2018).
Ringfencing support policies across the business cycle istherefore crucial for long-lead-time innovation processes.

7.4.3 International competition
Countries’ domestic policies are also affected by theindustrial policy aspect of innovations. Developed
countries fear that their expensive R&D efforts will
be appropriated by other, poorer countries that take alarge market share due to lower production costs. The
most prominent case is perhaps the migration of the
PV manufacturing industry to China, reviewed above.
‘Free-riding’ on others’ efforts, whether perceived or real,is prevalent in the literature analysing how countries
contribute to global climate change mitigation efforts(Barrett, 2007). The flipside of this fear is the concernof developing countries — which are almost completely
excluded from the current corporate R&D activities(Nolan, 2018) — that they will remain excluded from anew, green technological revolution. They see themselves
at risk of having to buy the new technology from59

developed countries, without benefiting economicallyfrom the transition to a low-carbon economy, and at
risk of ‘premature deindustrialization’ (Rodrik, 2016).
Overcoming these differences touches on some of
the most controversial aspects of the global political
economy, but may be critical for effective innovation
policies around the world.

Creating markets and shaping innovation policy is
crucial to bringing about the technologies needed toclose the emissions gap. Public sector institutions cantake the lead thanks to their unique ability to take risk
and be patient and strategic from a societal rather thanstrictly financial point of view. Equal attention must be
given to the supply and demand sides, with feedback
loops key to allowing diffusion patterns to feed into
innovation patterns. Common success factors include
specialist organizations coordinating activities acrossthe innovation chain, patient and strategic finance thatleverages other actors, and setting directions while
sustaining a portfolio of innovation processes in that
direction. A mission-oriented approach to policy can
open the innovation process up to a large number ofparticipants.

Challenges remain, however. Sustaining portfoliosof technologies is expensive and identifying whichinvestments to prioritize is challenging, as the innovation
landscape alters so quickly during this unprecedented
and rapid transition. Innovation organizations mustalso constantly innovate themselves in order to match
realities with policies, while competing for talent
with private sector employers. Developing countries
face an uphill battle in competing with better-funded
competitors from developed countries; furthermore,
finding niches that are both emissions-mitigating andrevenue-generating is as uncertain as innovation itself.
The new international initiatives have great potential
but they also face problems inherent in international
cooperation. Governments are inclined to cooperate
but less willing to send funds across borders, and thesame is true of private actors sharing data and insights
when they participate in these initiatives (Cherry et al.,2018). Even if innovation is successfully accelerated, theworld must still grapple with unintended consequences
like the rebound effect where, in the case of energysaving innovations, part of energy saved per unit of
the innovative product is brought back through anincreased consumption of the now more efficient,and hence cheaper product or consumption of otherenergy-intensive products with the money saved on theinnovative product (Sorrell 2008; Gillingham et al., 2016).

International collaboration has the potential to unlock
additional innovation capacity through leveraging greater
pools of money and talent and providing an avenue forinternational best-practice-sharing. Mission Innovationand its sister organization, the Clean Energy Ministerial,
which exists to accelerate technology diffusion, havethe potential to play such a role. Other international
initiatives have also set ambitious targets, such as thepledge by tropical nations under the International Solar
Alliance to help each other mobilize US$1 trillion for solar
energy deployment. They can be even more effective
when they join with powerful private international
initiatives, such as the Breakthrough Energy Coalition,
which is committed to funding clean-energy innovation.

Public institutions carry a large responsibility forinnovation, but in an era of tight budgets, committing thenecessary finance is difficult. Organizations leveraging
private initiatives need to continue learning andimproving. Meanwhile, other issues such as financial
market regulation favouring low-carbon portfolios
would be a useful complement (Campiglio et al., 2018).
Ultimately, however, the policies rely on confident andstable enough public institutions with good governancethat can survive short-term economic and funding
fluctuations. If they are willing to learn from mistakes
while staying confident of their key contribution, they
could help dramatically lower GHG emissions over andabove current policies.

7.5 Conclusion: opportunities andchallenges

60

EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2018 – REFERENCES

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BRIDGING THE GAP: SECTORS AND TOPICS COVERED IN THE UN ENVIRONMENT EMISSIONS GAP REPORTS

Bridging the gap:
Sectors and topics covered in the
UN Environment Emissions Gap Reports
In addition to assessing the emissions gap, the Emissions Gap Reports cover opportunities for bridging the gap. Previous
reports have demonstrated how proven policies and measures, if scaled up across countries and regions in terms ofambition, stringency and geographical reach can contribute to bridging the emissions gap, while supporting broader
development goals. A summary of key areas and sectors covered in previous reports is provided here.
Previous Emissions Gap Reports are available at http://www.unenvironment.org/emissionsgap.

The Emissions Gap Report 2017
Sectoral greenhouse gas emission reduction potentials in 2030•

Assessment of emission reduction options and GHG mitigation potentials in the agriculture, building, energy,
forestry, industry and transport sector.

•

Evaluates the potentials for these options to bridge the emissions gap and compares the bottom up analysis withresults from Integrated Assessment Models.

Phasing out coal•

Assessment of the role of phasing out coal for achievement of the Paris Agreement goal.

•

Provides an overview of incentives that can facilitate and incentivize a smooth transition, including portfolios
of market, non-market based and complementary instruments such as carbon prices, improved support to grid
infrastructures and storage facilities, and de-risking clean investment for financial institutions and governments.

•

Assesses policies for managing impacts on workers, coal owners, industry and energy users such as wage
subsidies, compensatory subsidies, and redistributive policies.

The role of short-lived climate pollutants•

Synthesizes findings regarding the GHG emission reduction potential of methane, tropospheric ozone, black
carbon and hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), as well as sulphur dioxide and organic carbon.

•

Assesses the technical potential of measures available via proven technologies in the exploration and distributionof coal, oil and gas, and in the waste sector.

Carbon dioxide removal•

Provides an overview and assessment of natural (biological) options for carbon dioxide removal options such asafforestation, reforestation and soil carbon sequestration.

•

Provides an overview and assessment of technological engineering carbon dioxide removal options such as direct
air capture, bioenergy combined with carbon dioxide capture and storage (BECCS), Ocean Alkalinity Enhancement
and CO2 to Durable Carbon.

The Emissions Gap Report 2016
The role of energy efficiency•

Assesses energy efficiency policies in the building, industry, and transport sectors and the co-benefits that thesecan provide for governments, businesses and households.

•

Considers GHG emissions reductions opportunities through systems thinking and integration, circular and sharing
economy as well as advances in information and communication technology.

Sustainable Development Goals and climate change mitigation•

Considers the interaction between Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and climate change mitigation
objectives and identifies areas of synergies and potential trade-offs between different goals and associatedtargets.

•

Outlines key elements of an integrated approach to the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
in the context of climate change to minimize trade-offs and maximize synergies between different objectives.

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The Emissions Gap Report 2015
International Cooperative Initiatives•

Assessment of the quantitative impact of international cooperative initiatives on GHGs emission reductions invarious different sectors, and of the role of non-state actors and the UNFCCC process.

•Provides an overview of private sector engagement in GHG mitigation efforts and summarizes key issues for
improved monitoring, reporting and verification of these initiatives.

Forest-related activities•

Provides an assessment of the total technical mitigation potential of reducing forest degradation by: Preventing
selective logging, fire/drought, fuelwood harvest, and peatlands fire while enhancing forest management, and;enhancing carbon sequestration through reforestation, ‘wide-scale’ restoration of closed-canopy forest andmosaic restoration.

•

Assess the economic and technical mitigation potential of forest-related mitigation options such as expansion ofprotected areas, supply chain interventions, positive incentives for landholders and exogenous economic factors
such as falling commodity prices.

•

Considers the REDD+ mechanism’s role as a cost-effective instrument to realizing forest-based emission
reductions from deforestation.

The Emissions Gap Report 2014
Sustainable development and addressing climate change•

Provides an overview of the interface between sustainable development and climate change mitigation priorities
and illustrates areas where these priorities can be mutually reinforcing and deliver multiple benefits for humandevelopment and wellbeing.

•

Assesses international collaborations supporting the sustainable development goals and barriers to attain them.

Energy efficiency•

Assesses the potential GHG emission reductions and multiple economic and social benefits that can be realized
through energy efficiency measures in: buildings, appliances and lighting, industry, transport, and electricity
production, transmission and distribution.

The Emissions Gap Report 2013
International Cooperative Initiatives•

Considers the success factors of global dialogues, formal multilateral processes and implementation initiatives
focusing on their goals; participation criteria; funding mechanisms; incentives and benefits; and transparency andaccountability measures.

Agriculture:•

Provides an overview of the potential mitigation contributions from sustainable agricultural practices such as
no-tillage practices by direct seeding under the mulch layer of the previous season’s crop, as well as improving
nutrient and water management in rice production, preventing GHG emissions from soil disturbances and fossilfuel use by farm machinery.

The Emissions Gap Report 2012
Building sector:•

Evaluates the GHG mitigation potentials and the economic and social co-benefits of improved building codes,
appliance standards and labels, designed to increase energy efficiency.

Transport sector:•

Evaluates the GHG mitigation potentials and the economic and social co-benefits of transit-oriented development,
bus rapid transit, and vehicle performance standards for new light-duty vehicles.

Deforestation:•

Analyzes a set economic instruments and policies as well as command-and-control measures used separately
and in combination to scale-up the protection of forest areas and address the drivers of deforestation.

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