The North Korean Air Force: A Declining or Evolving Threat?1
Noam Hartoch Ph.D.
Independent Researcher
andAlon Levkowitz Ph.D.
Beit Berl College
Abstract
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests during the Kim
Jong-un era have strengthened the country’s military power, deterring
South Korea, Japan and, in particular, the United States. While North
Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are rapidly improving, paralleldevelopments aren’t occurring in the traditionally technical air and air
defense forces. Plagued with aging airframes, technical problems, parts
shortages and budget shortfalls, the North Korean Air Force no longer
challenges the South Korean and American air forces. This paper
examines the North Korean Air Force, analyzing its organization anddeployment, air defense and early warning capabilities, aircraft
acquisition, and aircraft production. Shortfalls in each of these areas
caused Pyongyang to develop, test, and operate an increasingly
sophisticated drone fleet. While North Korea won’t be able to build astate-of-the-art aircraft industry, it will nonetheless find creative ways tostrengthen its air force capabilities.
Keywords: North Korea, South Korea, United States, Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, Russia, China, New Zealand, Poland, Air Koryo, airdefense, early warning, acquisition, production, drones
Introduction
The Korean People's Army Air and Anti-Air Force (KPAF)
celebrated its 70th Anniversary on August 20, 2017. Other services thatare similarly based on technology—the armored corps, the navy, and themissile force—have evolved to challenge potential adversaries on the
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. However, the KPAF has
deteriorated to a point where it can no longer contend with its neighbors’1modern air arms. This disparity is particularly acute when compared withthe capabilities of the Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) and U.S.
Air Forces Korea/Seventh Air Force arrayed on the southern half of thepeninsula.
The KPAF’s deficiencies are well documented and frequently
reported in international media, aerospace publications, and defense
journals. Its combat power is based on a collection of obsolete fighters ofSoviet and Chinese origin. The majority of the KPAF’s aircraft were
procured during the 1960s, and include Soviet jets fielded in the 1940s
and 50s, such as the Ilyushin Il-28, Sukhoi Su-7 and Miyokan-Gurevich
MiG-17 and MiG-21 aircraft, as well as their Chinese derivatives. The
KPAF’s MiG-23, MiG-29 and Su-25 aircraft are certainly more capablethan their predecessors. Yet even the latter category of airframes has anaverage age of 25 and 27 years.2 North Korea’s rotary wing aircraft facesimilar problems, with the most modern helicopters having enteredservice in the mid-1980s. The KPAF’s aging transport aircraft reportedly
limited locations for the summit between President Donald Trump andChairman Kim Jong-un, underscoring deficiencies in that sector.3 Whenthe two leaders met in Singapore, the supreme leader traveled aboard an
Air China Boeing 747 that had been formerly used by Chinese leaders.4
Limited pilot training exacerbates problems with aging airframes.
While most fighter pilots in western air forces fly a minimum of 180
hours each year, KPAF pilots are limited to 20 to 40 flight hours
annually in an effort to preserve aging airframes and conserve limited
stocks of aviation fuel.5 Consequently, North Korean pilots struggle tomaintain proficiency in the most basic skills—takeoffs and landings—
while their adversaries train for the most complex air combat scenarios instate-of-the-art aircraft.6
Analyzing changes in the KPAF is not only essential to assessing thethreat posed by North Korean aircraft, but key to understanding changes
in other services and branches. This paper examines the KPAF andassesses its ability to perform its assigned roles and missions. This fivepart analysis begins with an overview of the KPAF’s organization anddeployment. The second section describes the air defense and early
warning systems. The third and fourth sections provide an overview ofaircraft and air defense acquisition and domestic production activities,
respectively. Given the shortages and inability to address them via
foreign purchases or domestic production, the final section analyzes
North Korea’s offsetting strategies, with a focus on drones. While the2

KPAF will be unable to directly confront the combined air forces on thesouthern half of the peninsula, these new strategies and technologies will
nonetheless pose challenges for American and South Korean defense
planners.
Air Force Organization and Deployment
Beginning as an Aviation Division within the Korean People’s
Army, the KPAF has operated as an independent service 1948. A
separate Air Defense Command was responsible for air defense until the
KPAF assumed that mission and accompanying personnel in the late1980s. The KPAF’s primary mission is to provide air defense of thehomeland. Its secondary missions include tactical air support,
transportation, and insertion of Special Operations Forces.7 The KPAF
Commander is a member of the Central Military Commission of theCentral Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Colonel General
Kim Kwang-hyok currently commands the KPAF.8
The KPAF Supreme Headquarters is located in Pyongyang. It
oversees 92,000 officers and airmen operating an estimated 1300 aircraft,
air defense systems, logistics and support units, and maintenance, repair,overhaul and upgrade facilities. The supreme headquarters is organized
in a command element and air staff. The principal operational units
include six aviation divisions, an unknown number of Surface-to-Air
Missile (SAM) brigades and Anti-Aircraft Regiments, as well as
independent operational, maintenance, logistics, and communications
units. Although not the focus of this article, the KPAF also has threesniper brigades responsible for strategic reconnaissance, raids,
assassinations, and sabotage. The 11th, 16th, and 21st Sniper Brigades areeach estimated to have approximately 3,500 personnel organized into
seven to 10 sniper battalions.9
The KPAF's responsibility within the DPRK's military establishment
runs along the orthodox lines of world air forces. Its roles and missions
include offensive air operations (tactical ground support and bombing),
air defense, offensive air operations, transport and liaison,reconnaissance and training. The KPAF is organized along the classic
Soviet air force structure of divisions, regiments and squadrons. In somecases, divisions are referred to as bases or wings, and squadrons known
as units. The air division is the highest operational echelon with the
KPAF. There are six air divisions: three air combat divisions, twotransport divisions, and one training division.
3

The 1st Air Combat Division commands five regiments from its
headquarters at Kaechon. The 1st Air Combat Division’s Area of
Responsibility (AOR) covers the northwest region of North Korea,
extending from the country’s border with China to Pyongyang. The 35th
Attack Regiment also operates from Kaechon, flying the MiG-23 and F-6
aircraft. (The F-series aircraft cited in this article are export versions ofChinese aircraft; the F-5, 6, and 7 are based on designs of the MiG-17,
19, and 21, respectively). The Uiju-based 24th Regiment operates
Chinese-built H-5 light bombers, which are copies of the Ilyushin Il-28
aircraft. The 24th Air Regiment’s missions are believed to be aerial
reconnaissance and target towing. The 55th and 57th Air Regiments
operate from Sunchon Air Base. The 55th Air Regiment is equipped with
the Su-25K, the export version of the light attack Su-25 aircraft. Pilots inthe 57th Air Regiment fly the MiG-29 to perform air defense andintercept missions. The Pukchang-based 60th Air Regiment is the 1st Air
Combat Division’s training unit, flying MiG-23U, F-7 and the nearly
obsolete MiG-15UTI aircraft.
Headquartered at Toksan, the 2nd Air Combat Division oversees six
regiments. The 2nd Air Combat Division’s AOR covers northeastern
North Korea. The 56th Air Regiment also operates from the Toksan Air
Base, flying MiG-21, F-5, F-6, and F-7 aircraft. The 25th Air Regiment
operates Il-28 and H-5 aircraft from Changin Air Base. The Wonsanbased 46th Air Regiment is equipped with MiG-21 and F-5 fighter
aircraft. The 71st and 72nd Air Regiments fly the MiG-21 PFM fighter
aircraft from Kuum-ni and Hwangsuwon Air Bases, respectively.
The Hwangju-based 3rd Air Combat Division’s AOR covers thesouthern portion of the country, including the area adjacent to the
Demilitarized Zone. Its five regiments fly fighter-bomber and attack
aircraft and attack helicopters. The 86th Regiment is collocated with its
higher headquarters. Its pilots fly the Q-5A, the export version of theChinese A-5 ground attack aircraft. The 4th Air Regiment is based in
Taetan and flies a mixture of MiG-21 and F-5 fighter-bombers. The 32nd
and 33rd Air Regiments fly the F-5 aircraft, operating from Nuchon-ni
and Kwail Air Bases, respectively. An unidentified unit of the 33rd Air
Regiment is believed to fly F-6 and F-7. A regiment formerly located atHyon-ni is reported to have been disbanded in recent years.10
The 5th and 6th Air Transport Divisions provide fixed- and rotarywing transportation. Headquartered at Taechon Air Base, the 5th Air
Transport Division is composed of five regiments. Each of the four air
4

transport regiments is equipped with approximately 45 light transport
aircraft, primarily the Antonov An-2 and its Chinese derivative, the Y-5.
These regiments are located at air bases at Taechon, Kuktong, Sondok
and Yongro-Ri. The 5th Air Transport Division has a single regiment of
Mil Mi-2 helicopters that flies from two helipads at the Mirim heliport(Pyongyang East Airport).11 The division is also responsible for the Air
Koryo fleet based at Pyongyang International Airport, as well as some
Mil Mi-8 and Mil Mi-17 helicopters. Distinctly painted white, thesehelicopters are used for VIP flights.
The 6th Air Transport Division is headquartered at Cheagun-Dong
Air Base. Its units operate a variety of helicopters. A composite squadron
operates Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters at Kowon. There are two regiments
at Pakchon, one operating Mil Mi-2 helicopters, and a second operating
Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters. Another Mi-2 squadron is based at
Samjangkol, and two regiments at the same base have each some ten Mil
Mi-24 combat helicopters, the only dedicated assault helicopters in the
KPAF's inventory. The 64th regiment is the only unit to operate theremaining Hughes 369D/E helicopters.
The KPAF’s Civil Aviation Bureau operates the Air Koryo, North
Korea’s state airline. Air Koryo’s fleet consists of a variety of passenger
aircraft primarily acquired from the former Soviet Union. Although thenational carrier has four Ilyushin Il-62M long-range passenger jets, only
two are used for scheduled passenger service. Of the remaining two
aircraft, a 38-year old model is reserved for Kim Jong-un’s personal use.
The second aircraft was acquired from Cuba in 2012 but has been usedsolely for spare parts to support the other three jets. Beginning in 2007,
Air Koryo introduced the Tupolov Tu-204 and Antonov An-148 aircraft
to replace several aging passenger airframes including the Tu-154 andAn-24. Air Koryo’s cargo fleet consists of three Ilyushin Il-76 aircraftthat have been in service since 1990. Although the trio of aircraftprimarily transport civilian cargo while bearing Air Koryo’s livery, theaircraft are often pressed into military service. For air shows andparadrops, the KPAF repaints the aircraft in a camouflage pattern.12 Eachaircraft is capable of inserting 125 fully equipped paratroopers.13
The 8th Aviation Training Division is responsible for training all
KPAF aviators, as well as air defense of the country’s northeast area. The
division’s headquarters is located at Chongjin Air Base, which also hosts
the Kimchaek Air Force Academy. All cadets begin basic flight training
in the Nanchang CJ-6, the Chinese variant of the Yakovlev Yak-18/18A
5

two-seat primary trainer. Fixed-wing pilots slated for service in fighter or
attack aircraft complete advanced instruction in the training variant of theMiG-15, the MiG-15 UTI trainer. Cadets pursuing careers in rotary-wing
aircraft begin training in the CJ-6 trainer, followed by basic helicopter
training in the Mi-2 helicopter.
The 8th Aviation Training Division is composed of six regiments,
each flying a different model of aircraft. Primary flight training is
conducted at the regiment collocated with the 8th Aviation Training
Division using the Nanchang CJ-5/6 trainer, as well as a Kangdon-based
regiment equipped with the same aircraft. The aviation training
regiments at Irhygang-dong and Samiyon Air Bases fly MiG-15 UTIaircraft that first entered service in the 1950s. Future cargo and passenger
plane pilots train at Hyesan Air Base on the Antonov An-2 and its
Chinese variant, the Shijiazhuang Y-5. Upon completion of this training,pilots are assigned to Air Koryo, where they begin training as Antonov
An-24 co-pilots before assuming pilot-in-command duties on moreadvanced aircraft. Helicopter training is done at the aviation training
regiment at Kilchu Air Base using the Mi-2.
The lack of long-range aircraft and in-flight refueling capability
affects the KPAF’s deployment, organization, and tactics. Offensive air
operations are limited to those targets within countries bordering North
Korea, with an obvious focus on the U.S. and ROK forces deployed in
the South. Reflecting a bygone offensive doctrine, more than two-thirds
of KPAF air bases are located south of the Sondok-Kwaksan line. While
the proximity to the DMZ was originally designed to preserve theelement of surprise, it now denies the KPAF advanced warning in theevent of hostilities. The more advanced combat aircraft—such as theMiG-29 and Su-25 fighter aircraft—are housed in aboveground or
underground Hardened Aircraft Shelters (HAS). The use of HAS reflects
the lessons learned from foreign conflicts, including the 1967 ArabIsraeli War in which a pre-emptive Israeli Air Force attack destroyed the
majority of Arab air power.14 However, the majority of the KPAF’s
aircraft are parked in the open.
As stated in the introduction, fuel shortages and aging airframes limit
KPAF aviators’ flight hours to the point where pilots are only proficientin basic tasks. It is worth noting that from the 1960s to the 1980s, theKPAF dispatched pilots and mechanics to conflicts across the globe tobetter understand modern air combat tactics. From the Winter of 1967 to
the Spring of 1969, “Group Z” flew MiG-17B and MiG-17C from Kep
6

Air Base northeast of Hanoi.15 An estimated 384 KPAF personnel servedin Vietnam. Of the 96 pilots, 87 are believed to have flown in combat.16
North Korean pilots participated in Middle East wars against Israel.17
Pyongyang dispatched 25 pilots to Syria during the 1967 Arab-Israeli
War and 30 to Syria and Egypt during the 1973 conflict; 40 pilots and 75
KPAF instructors served in Syria in 1975 and 1976.18 As late as 1981,
North Korea maintained a contingent of 20 KPAF personnel, including
pilots, in Libya.19 Since then, no other country has accepted North
Korean aviators, denying KPAF personnel air combat experience.
Air Defense and Early Warning
Pyongyang, air bases and major military installations are protectedby a wide array of anti-aircraft guns, surface-to-air (SAM) missiles, andman-portable air defense missiles (MANPADs). The Soviet 14.5 mm
ZPU-4 anti-aircraft system is the most commonly used system. First
deployed by North Korean and Chinese forces during the Korean War,the towed system is locally produced in large quantities. This system isused to protect key targets from American and South Korean helicoptersand light transport planes. The ZPU-4 is linked to the MR-104 (NATOdesignation Drum Tilt)' fire-control radar. In recent years, the KPAF has
partially replaced the ZPU-4 with an indigenous 7.62 mm x 54 mm and
30 mm rotary cannon gun system. Because these manually operated
systems lack radar guidance, they are highly inaccurate and ofquestionable effectiveness.20
The KPAF operates an estimated 19 SAM batteries throughout thecountry to provide high and medium altitude air defense capabilities. The
SAM batteries are equipped with old Soviet and Chinese designs. The
KPAF has 15 S-75 SAM batteries (NATO designation SA-2 Guideline)
and two S-200 SAM batteries (NATO designation SA-5 Gammon) to
provide high altitude air defense capabilities. Two S-125 medium
altitude air defense systems (NATO designation SA-3 Goa) compliment
the aforementioned low and high altitude air defense systems.
Like other major weapons systems, many of the KPAF’s SAMs havebeen in service since the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, a few
modern systems have appeared over the last decade. At the October 2010
military parade commemorating the 65th anniversary of the Workers’
Party of Korea, the KPAF revealed a missile system known locally as the
Pongae-5.21 The ROK Ministry of National Defense reported that theNorth Koreans had successfully fired the missile, now known as the KN7

06, in June 2011.22 The KN-06 is similar to the Russian S-300 missile
system or its Chinese derivative, the HQ-9. The KPAF also modified theS-75 and S-200 systems, mounting the missiles on MAZ-630308-224
and KrAZ-255B trucks, respectively. The upgraded systems’ enhanced
mobility provides more flexibility in deploying the system and better
concealment from air attacks.23 The enhanced systems were first seen in
2012.
The SAMs’ fire control and command centers still rely on antiquatedSoviet radars. The S-75 SAMs rely on the ST-68 (NATO designation Tin
Shield), a radar that was first fielded in the 1950s. North Korea’s otherhigh-altitude SAM system, the S-200, uses the 5N-69 radar (NATOdesignation Big Back). Other Soviet radars in the KPAF’s inventory
include the P-3 (NATO designation Dumbo), the ST-68, and the P-8/10(NATO designation Knife Rest).24 The KPAF’s more modern systems
include the P-35/37 (NATO designation Bar Lock). However, the term isrelative as this system was first fielded in the late 1960s. The S300/Pongae-5 systems operate with the 5N-63 (NATO designation Flap
Lid). The China Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation(CPMIEC) exported the 2FA radar (NATO designation Gin Sling) to
North Korea and other countries.25
There are more than 3,000 MANPADs distributed among North
Korean People's Army infantry units. The common systems include the
9M-32 Strela-1, (NATO designation SA-7 Grail) and the follow-on 9M34/36, Strela 2/3 (NATO designation SA-14 Gremlin). North Korean
soldiers also use the 9M-313 Igla MANPADS (NATO designation SA16 Grouse). North Korea has produced many of these versions since the1980s. Additionally, many systems imported from the former Soviet
Union remain in the field. North Korean engineers have also improved
more modern Soviet-designed systems, fielding the 9K-38 (NATOdesignation SA-18 Igla) and 9K-338 (NATO designation SA-24 Igla-S).
Some sources believe the North Koreans have reverse engineered aversion of the U.S. Stinger missile.26
The KPAF’s Airborne Early Warning (AEW) capability is limited to
two modified transport aircraft. One of the three remaining Antonov An24 aircraft was rumored to have been converted to a rudimentary AEW
aircraft by mounting a MiG-29 pulse Doppler radar on its fuselage
during the 1990s. However, recently released photos of the aircraft inquestion don’t show any external additions such as "humps" or antennas
to the original airframe.27 It is possible that it never matured beyond the8experimental stage.28 Separately, one of two Tupolev Tu-134B aircraft
delivered in 1984 has also been reported as equipped for reconnaissance,electronic intelligence, and signals intelligence collection. However, no
photo of an aircraft in that configuration has surfaced to date.29
Aircraft Acquisition
The KPAF relied heavily on China and Russia to acquire its aircraft
and air defense systems. Approximately 85 percent of the current fleet
and 50 percent of combat aircraft come from these countries. The KPAF
now relies on those countries, as well as former allies who alsopurchased aircraft and air defense systems from China and Russia, forthe spare parts and technical support needed to keep the fleet airworthy.
The KPAF’s last large-scale modernization drive took place during
the 1980s. The KPAF took delivery of MiG-21MF and MiG-23ML
fighters, Su-25BK attack aircraft, and Mi-2 light- and Mi-26 heavy
helicopters.30 The KPAF received approximately 40 Nanchang A-5
attack aircraft, a Chinese version of the MiG-19. They also acquired an
estimated 150 Polish built Mi-2 light helicopters to augment and partiallyreplace older Mi-4 helicopters.31 Lastly, the KPAF obtained nearly 90
Hughes 369D/E light utility helicopters through Delta Avia Fluggeraete,
a West-German company that acted as Hughes Helicopters European
distributor. The company declared the helicopters to be “machinery” anddeclined to reveal the helicopter’s destination, contrary to the U.S.
Trading with the Enemy Act. Lastly, the KPAF took delivery of 14
Sukhoi Su-25BK Frogfoots (including a pair of two-seat UBK trainers)
arrived from the Soviet Union in 1987, followed by 26 additional aircraft
in 1988.
Despite the acquisitions, few of these aircraft remain in service.
Although a pair of the Hughes helicopters appeared during the military
parade marking the 60th Anniversary of the end of the Korean War in
2013—armed with Soviet AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missiles—fewer
than 50 are believed to be in service.32 Few of the Nanchang A-5 arebelieved to be operational.
The KPAF’s acquisition efforts continued in the 1990s. Following
Kim Il-song’s visit to Moscow in 1990, the KPAF began taking delivery
of approximately 30 MiG-29 fighters in 1992; this included four twoseater trainer models. The KPAF sought to purchase 133 surplus MiG-21
aircraft from Kazakhstan in 1996, but the U.S. Government intervened toblock the sale. However, North Korea successfully acquired 30 MiG-21B
9

aircraft in 1999; the majority of these aircraft are still in use.33 At thesame time, Pyongyang attempted to strike deals with Moscow for Sukhoi
Su-30MK fourth-generation fighters and Beijing for the Xian JH-7
fighter-bomber. Neither deal materialized.34 Since then no new deals are
known to have been negotiated for combat aircraft. The KPAF alsoacquired rotary-wing aircraft from Russia during the 1990s, including
four heavy-lift Mil Mi-26 helicopters and an estimated 60 Mil Mi-8/17
helicopters.
As noted, the KPAF acquired an obsolete Ilyushin Il-62 transport
aircraft from Cuba in 2012. At North Korea’s first air show in October
2016, the KPAF revealed a Pacific Aerospace PAC-750 Extremely Short
Take-Off and Landing utility aircraft. The PAC-750 is manufactured in
New Zealand and the aircraft were sold to the DPRK through a Chinesecompany, Shendong General Aviation Services, in violation of UN
sanctions.35 Although the PAC-750 is an ideal replacement for the An2/Y-5 aircraft, it is doubtful the KPAF will be able to procure more than
the three aircraft and spare parts delivered. Pacific Aerospace pleaded
guilty in August 2017 to three violations of UN sanctions and one
violation of the New Zealand’s Customs and Excise Act.36
Aircraft Production
Despite having limited capabilities for indigenous aircraft
production, the KPAF has nonetheless assembled both rotary- and fixedwing aircraft of foreign origin. Beginning in 1979, the KPAF began toassemble the Polish variant of the Mi-2 helicopter. Using components
and parts supplied by Poland, North Korean engineers assembled
approximately 150 PZL-Swidnik light utility helicopters. Although
primarily used as for training and transport, the KPAF armed somehelicopters with 57 mm rocket tubes and a 23 mm cannon.
The ubiquitous An-2 light transport aircraft is another example of the
KPAF’s production efforts. Some of the aircraft are believed to havebeen modified to insert Special Operations Forces. Others are known tohave been armed with air to ground rockets, possibly the same 57 mm
projectiles used by the armed Mi-2.37
The most ambitious local production effort was the assembly ofMiG-29 aircraft using “knocked down” parts. The KPAF establisheddedicated facilities near the Panghyon Air Base to support the arrival of
the first aircraft in 1988. Over the next decade, North Korean engineersreportedly produced MiG-29B single-seat fighters and MiG29 UB dual10

seat trainers. By the time production ended in 1999, approximately 35
aircraft had been assembled38 However, operational losses and spareparts shortages has reduced the number of indigenously produced MiG29s to less than 30.
Offsetting Strategies
Faced with challenges ranging from aging air frames to a limited
number of suppliers, the KPAF has nonetheless developed andimplemented new technologies to offset declines in traditional air force
capabilities. North Korea’s increasingly sophisticated unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) highlight the regime’s ability to field new systems, and to
do so amidst growing international sanctions. However, it’s not apparent
if the KPAF is the sole operator of these drones, or whether they werefielded to offset declines in conventional air force capabilities. North
Korea’s intelligence agencies, as well as artillery and infantry units may
operate the UAS.39
Pyongyang’s drone program reflects three decades of foreignacquisition and domestic engineering and production efforts. In the late1980s, North Korea acquired its first UAS from China, the Xian ASN104.40 In the mid-1990s, Syria began providing North Korea access to its
drone programs, which included the Russian DR-3 Reys; the Korean
People’s Army (KPA) used this system. By the end of the decade,Pyongyang had acquired systems directly from Moscow.41 In addition toacquiring drones, North Korean engineers were producing indigenous
drones based on various foreign designs.
The ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff first reported a North Korean drone
monitoring KPA artillery exercises near Yeonpyeong Island on August 9,
2010. Drones first appeared at the April 15th Military Parade in 2012,
confirming earlier reports that North Korean engineers were building
attack drones in addition to reconnaissance platforms. From October
2013 to September 2014, South Korean civilians found drones on four
locations across the peninsula, ranging from Paengyoung Island along
the Northern Limit Line to Samcheok City nearly 200 kilometers southof Seoul.42
North Korea has drastically increased the size and capability of its
drone fleet. Although estimates vary greatly on the number of drones,
most analysts believe North Korea has at least 300 drones.43 Pyongyang
is known to have fielded reconnaissance drones and is reported to havedeveloped a UAS capable of dispersing chemical and radiological11materials. In June 2017, the ROK Ministry of National Defense
announced the discovery of a suspected North Korean drone that had
captured images of the U.S. Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense site in
Seongju.44 The single-engine drone was equipped with a Sony Single
Lens Translucent camera. It flew a pre-programmed route nearly thelength of the peninsula before crashing near the DMZ.45
Reports of drones that can disperse chemical, biological, andradiological matter are more disturbing. In May 2017, a former North
Korean diplomat to Pyongyang who uses the alias Han Jin-myeong
stated that the KPAF had developed 300 to 400 drones capable ofdispersing chemical and biological agents. According to Han, who
served over a decade with the KPAF prior to entering the foreign service,
the drones can strike Seoul within an hour.46 Kim Heung-kwang, aformer computer science professor who founded the dissident group
North Korea Intellectuals Solidarity following his defection, stated that
Pyongyang engineers had developed a drone capable of spreading
radioactivity. The Banghyun-5 drone reportedly carries a payload ofenriched uranium that is detonated with conventional explosives,
dispersing lethal radioactivity over a large area.47 In March 2017, thestate-run Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU) released areport estimating that North Korea possessed approximately 1000
drones. The KINU report further noted the drones were being developed
to compensate for deficiencies in the KPAF, as well as bridge gaps inreconnaissance.48
The nation’s flag carrier has pursued a different tack to support its
operations. Capitalizing on the regime’s tolerance of someentrepreneurial activities, its status as one of the country’s mostrecognizable brands, and a newly renovated Pyongyang-SunanInternational Airport, Air Koryo sells a variety of products and services
to supplement its core transportation business:
Air Koryo runs at least one gas station and car washin Pyongyang, has its own fleet of taxis, and operates
several retail shops, including a boutique at the airport.
At the relatively upscale Potonggang Department Storein central Pyongyang, whole aisles are devoted to Air
Koryo brand products, from crates of liquor to row afterrow of Coke-like sodas and a half dozen varieties of12canned goods, including pheasant soup and canned
peaches.49
Like its drone program, Air Koryo’s retail operations highlight the
KPAF’s ability to adapt to changing conditions and overcome obstacles.
Conclusion
The KPAF faces significant challenges as it begins its eighth decadeof service. Aging airframes, an inability to procure spare parts, and fuelshortages lead to fewer flight hours, decreased pilot proficiency, andreduced readiness. Limited suppliers and economic sanctions are further
obstacles to reversing a decades-long decline. In the event of hostilities,
KPAF aviation assets are incapable of overpowering the ROK and U.S.
Air Forces. However, its air defense systems remain formidable
challenges to military operations.
These challenges notwithstanding, one should not underestimate the
KPAF’s desire to overcome these disadvantages. North Korea’s
increasingly capable and growing drone fleet has the potential to offset
many of the lost capabilities. Pyongyang has already flown drones
against a variety of targets in the ROK, gaining critical insight into
American and South Korean abilities to detect and respond to this new
system. While North Korea won’t be able to develop an indigenous
aviation industry, it will nonetheless find creative ways to strengthen its
air force capabilities.
Notes:
1

This research was supported by the Academy of Korean Studies Grant (AKS-2017R35).
2 Craig Hoyle, (ed.) Flight Global World Air Forces 2016, (flightglobal.com/waf)., p. 25.
3 Ali Watkins, “Meet Me in Mongolia: How Aging Aircraft May Dictate Kim-Trump
Venue,” New York Times, April 18, 2018, Available online athttps://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/18/world/asia/kim-jong-un-plane-trump.html.
4 Jane Perlez, “How Did Kim Jong-un Get To Singapore? With Some Help From China,”
New York Times, June 11, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/11/world/asia/trumpkim-summit-plane.html
5 Andrea Berger, "The State of the North Korea Military, Past, present, and future"
NKNews, November 13, 2014, available online at https://www.nknews.org/2014/11/thestate-of-north-koreas-military-past-present-and-future/.
6 Grace Oh, "N. Korea halts operations of Soviet fighters after serious of crashes,"
Yonhap News Agency, July 30, 2014; John F Schank (et al). Finding the Right Balance:

13

Simulator and Live Training for Navy Units (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2002),
pp. 94, 123-140.
7 Global Security, “Korean People’s Army Air Force,” Available online athttps://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/dprk/airforce.htm
8 North Korean Leadership Watch, “Central Military Commission Meeting Held,” May
18, 2018, available online at http://www.nkleadershipwatch.org/2018/05/23/centralmilitary-commission-meeting-held/
9 Kyle Miyokami, “North Korea Has 200,000 Soldiers in Its Special Operations Forces(And They Have One Goal),” National Interest, November 19, 2017, Available online at
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/north-korea-has-200000-soldiers-its-specialforces-they-have-23270
10 Ian Carroll, World Air Forces Directory 2015-2016, 9th ed. (Hillingdon, U.K.: Mach III
Publishing, 2016), pp 586-591.
11 John G. Grisafi, "The An-2: N. Korea's Surprisingly Capable Soviet-era Biplane"
NKNews, September 16, 2014.
12 Chad O’Carroll, “North Korea repaints Air Koryo cargo planes for military show,”
NKNews, August 14, 2013, Available online at https://www.nknews.org/2013/08/northkorea-repaints-air-koryo-cargo-planes-for-military-show/ and David Cenciotti, “This is
the First Image of a North Korean Militarized, Camouflaged IL-76 Cargo Plane,” The
Aviationist, August 14, 2013, Available online athttps://theaviationist.com/2013/08/14/nk-il-76/
13 Chad O'Carroll, "Air Koryo cargo plane again used by North Korean air force"
NKNews, June 18, 2014, Available online at https://www.nknews.org/2014/06/air-koryocargo-plane-again-used-by-north-korean-air-force/
14 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "KPA Lessons Learned from Foreign Conflicts 1960-present"
KPA Journal, Vol.1, No.9 (2010), p. 4.
15 “N. Koera sent pilots, military supplies during Vietnam War,” Kyodo, July 7, 2001,
cited in James F. Durand’s “Operational Overview of the Koreans in Vietnam,” paper
presented at the International Council of Korean Studies’ conference, May 17, 2018.
16 Tuoi Tre Weekend Edition, August 17, 2007 cited in Merle Pribbenow, “North Korean
Pilots in the Skies over Vietnam,” North Korea International Documentation Project,(Washington: The Wilson Center, November 2011), pp. 2-5, available online athttps://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/NKIDP_eDossier_2_North_Korean_Pilot
s_in_Vietnam_War.pdf, , cited in James F. Durand’s “Operational Overview of the
Koreans in Vietnam,” paper presented at the International Council of Korean Studies’
conference, May 17, 2018.
17 Alon Levkowitz, "North Korea and the Middle East" Mideast Security and Policy
Studies, No.127 (2017).
18 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Is North Korea Fighting for Assad in Syria?” The Diplomat,
March 24, 2016, available online at https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/is-north-koreafighting-for-assad-in-syria/
19 Richard C. Thornton, The Reagan Revolution I: The Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy,(Victoria, Canada: Trafford Publishing, 2003), p. 1925.

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20 Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, "On the Upgrade: North Korea's Rotary Cannons"

NKNews, October 14, 2016; Oliemans Mitzer, "A Force Unknown: North Korea's Radar
Network" NKNews, September 27, 2016.
21 U.S Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security
Developments Involving the DPRK (Washington: Department of Defense, 2013), pp.8-19.
22 “N. Korea 'Successfully Test Fired Short-Range Missile,” Chosun Ilbo, June 14, 2011,
Available online at
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2011/06/14/2011061400518.html
23
Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, "SAM Exercise Reaffirms Modernization of N.
Korean Air Defense Forces," NKNews, November 4, 2015, available online athttps://www.nknews.org/2015/11/sam-exercise-reaffirms-modernization-of-n-korean-airdefense-forces/
24 United States of America Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress, Military
and Security Developments Involving the DPRK (Washington D.C., United-States ofAmerica Department of Defense 2013), pp 18-19, see also Cenciotti David,
xairforces.net/airforces.asp?if=168, 2011
25 John C. Wise, “PLA Air Defense Radars,” Technical Report APA-TR 2009-0103, Air
Power Australia, January 2009, available online at http://www.ausairpower.net/APAPLA-IADS-Radars.html
26 Oryx, "North Korean HT-16PGJ MANPADS in Syria" March 22, 2016. Accessed
March 1, 2017. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2016/03/22/north-korean-ht16pgj-manpads-in-syria/.
27 The aircraft in question had tail numbers P-532, P-533 and P-537.
28 Joost Oliemans and Stijn Mitzer, "A Force Unknown: North Korea's radar network"
NK Pro, September 27, 2016.
29 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The MiG-29 in KPAF Service" KPA Journal, Vol. 2, No. 4(2011), p. 2.
30 Roegis Patrick, van-Toor Jurgen, "Beyond The Bravado", Air Forces Monthly, No.
345, December 2016 (UK, Key Publishing Ltd.), p. 45.
31 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "Mi-2 Hoplite in KPAF Service" KPA Journal, Vol. 1, No. 9(2010), pp 1-2.
32 David Cenciotti, theaviationis.com/2013/07, July 20, 2013.
33 Patrick Roegis and Jurgen van-Toor, "Beyond the Bravado" Air Forces Monthly, No.
345 (2016), p. 44.
34 Joseph S. Bermudez, Ibid.
35 Grant Bradley, "MFAT Probes How Kiwi Plane Made it Into North Korean Air Force",
The New-Zealand Herald, 3 October 2016, Roegis Patrick, van-Toor Jurgen, "Wonsan
Air Festival", Air-Forces Monthly No. 344, November 2016, (UK, Key Publishing Ltd.)
p. 27.
36
Sam Hurley, “Revealed: What NZ company Pacific Aerospace Really Knew about isNorth Korean Plane,” New Zealand Herald, June 7, 2018 available online athttps://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=12015790

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37 John G. Grisafi, "The An 2: N. Korea’s surprisingly capable Soviet-era biplane,"

NKNews, September 16, 2014.
38 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Ibid.
39 John G. Grisafi, "Crashed Drones Reveal State of North's Drone Program" NKNews,
April 3, 2014; Hamish Macdonald, "Possible Evidence Links Kim Jong-Un to Drones"
NKNews, April 18, 2014; Rob York, "Third Drone Found in S. Korean territory"
NKNews, April 7, 2014.
40 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea Drones On: Redeux,” 38 North, January 19,
2016, available online at https://www.38north.org/2016/01/jbermudez011916/
41 Steven J. Zaloga, “Russian Unmanned Aerial Vehicles,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
July 1994, pp.291-296.
42 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea Drones On: Redeux.”
43 See Matt Stiles,“As the world focuses on its nuclear ambitions, North Korea deploys
another weapon: Drones” Los Angeles Times, June 28, 2017, available online at
http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-north-korea-drone-2017-story.html, andElizabeth Shim, “North Korea has 300 drones to spy on South, analyst says,” UPI,
January 1, 2016, available online at https://www.upi.com/Top_News/WorldNews/2016/01/20/North-Korea-has-300-drones-to-spy-on-South-analystsays/6651453307126/.
44 Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Suspected North Korean drone photographed advanced U.S.
missile defense site, report says,” Washington Post, June 13, 2017, available online athttps://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2017/06/13/suspected-northkorean-drone-photographed-advanced-u-s-missile-defense-site-reportsays/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ba685018a558
45 John Aldred, “Sony SLT Camera Found in Crashed North Korean Spy Drone,” DIY
Photography, June 17, 2016, available online at https://www.diyphotography.net/sonyslt-camera-found-crashed-north-korean-spy-drone/
46 Guy Taylor, “North Korea attack drones carrying biological, chemical weapons canstrike Seoul within 1 hour,” Washington Times, May 22, 2017, available online athttps://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/22/north-korea-attack-drones-canstrike-seoul-in-1-ho/
47
Kyle Mizokami, “Experts: North Korea May Be Developing a Dirty Bomb Drone,“
Popular Mechanics, December 28, 2016, available online athttps://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a24525/north-korea-dirty-bombdrone/
48 David Choi, “North Korea reportedly has a fleet of 1,000 drones it can use for chemical
attacks,” Business Insider, March 30, 2017, available online at
http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-drone-attack-2017-3
49 Associated Press, “Canned Soup May be Fueling North Korea’s Air Force,” March 14,
2018, Available online at https://www.voanews.com/a/north-korea-airline-fueling-airforce/4299578.html.

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