Petroleum Association of JapanTokyoAN OVERVIEW OF THE PRESTIGE OIL SPILL INCIDENTDavid Salt,
Technical Director
Oil Spill Response Limited
Southampton,EnglandOn 13th November 2002 the Bahamian registered tanker, built in 1976, was in transit
from Ventspils in Latvia to Singapore with a full cargo 78000 tons of various grades ofheavy fuel oil. The ship had crossed the Bay of Biscay and was just off the Northwest
coast of Galicia in severe gale conditions when it suffered severe structural failure in wayof the starboard cargo tanks. The hull was breached and oil loss began immediately.
Spanish coastguard,(SASEMAR), were notified of the incident and began to respond tothe incident. The ship was adrift and being driven towards the shoreline. A Spanishcoastguard (SASEMAR) vessel managed to get a line on the vessel and towed it backout to sea. Salvage vessels then took over the tow.
The extreme weather had an immediate effect on the oil. The cargo had a highasphaltene content, of the order of 9%, this type of oil has a tendency to form oil andwater emulsions, these typically, and this was no exception, tend to form viscous
residues that do not readily disperse naturally or chemically, and are extremely persistent.
Salvors were appointed and the fate of the ship was considered.

Ship-to-shiptransfer operations were not feasible given the prevailing weather conditions and theusual discussions of safe haven and port of refuge began. The Spanish Authorities
would not accept the vessel into any port to permit stabilisation of the vessel or cargoremoval. Subsequent events suggest that this may not have been the optimum technicalFebruary 2003

Petroleum Association of JapanTokyodecision but hindsight is a wonderful and the intense political consequences of thesedecisions should never be underestimated. The ship was directed to be towed further out
to sea, in a vain attempt to reduce the possible effect of any oil pollution.
The Coastline in Galicia is locally known as the ‘Coast of Death’, a name it has
acquired over the years as a result of the number of ships lost from being driven onto a‘lee shore’. At this time of year the winds are persistently from the West, any oil wasbound to ultimately hit the shoreline.
As the ship moved off to the south-west, the hull was subject to immense stresses
from the seas breaking into the damaged area of the hull. As time progressed the hull
was weakened to the extent that the vessel broke into two sections. The break occurredin way of Nos. 3 and 4 cargo tanks, which contained an estimated 25,000 tonnes of oil.
This total quantity was lost as the ship broke up. The two sections of the hull stayedafloat for a period of time, before sinking in 3,500m of water with the subsequent releaseof oil.
The oil released from the ship was immediately exposed to storm force westerly winds
and waves in the region were in excess of 7.5m. This weather precluded the use ofrecovery vessels to contain and recover the oil. A number of at sea containment andrecovery operations were provided from European Nations using the multilateralconventions that are in place between the various countries. The support was provided
on a Government to Government basis, at no stage during the entire spill was it the casethat the response was equipment limited. In fact quite the reverse, there was moreequipment available than could ever be deployed. Much that was, was damaged as aresult of bad weather and done more in the interest of public perceptions than any
expectation of success.
The coastline of north-west Spain is a rugged, harsh environment.

There is a

predominance of rocky shoreline, probably 70% of which is difficult to access, virtually
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Petroleum Association of JapanTokyo

impossible to clean and representing a serious safety risk to people engaged in clean up
operations.

The remaining 30% is a combination of low environmental sensitivity

beaches and high sensitivity sand dune and salt marsh systems. One major advantage
was the presence of a comprehensive, illustrated and annotated shoreline atlas for theentire coastline. This document proved to be of immense value in the ensuing clean up
operation.
At sea containment and recovery, and aerial surveillance of the oil, continued to behampered by the weather and the oil remained at sea for a considerable period of time. A
combination of shoreli ne topography, wind and waves meant that oil was held off thecoast. As the weather abated, a collection of vessels from Spain, France, Germany, UKand Holland all commenced at sea operations. Eventually oil started to come ashore
along the coastline to the West of La Corunna. The response to the shoreline impact
and the pollution of the various fishing ports had not yet gained momentum nor coherent
organisation. The response was fragmented in its command and control and various
issues such as waste management and disposal had not been addressed.
The system soon became choked with waste and secondary pollution became animmediate and important problem. A system of waste transfer storage, transport and,disposal had to be rapidly established to enable the clean up to be continued. This wasdone but the issue of waste minimisation and segregation needed to be addressed toprevent a repeat of the situation that occurred in the ERIKA. Training was provided tomachinery operators and clean up workers to teach them in the best clean up techniques.
Clean up teams were mobilised from many of the local communities, armed forces andvolunteers. Early attempts at using these teams were less than efficient. Briefing notes
and training programmes were produced in Spanish for these workers, and supervisors
were trained to ensure that clean up workers were controlled when entering the beachareas, waste was minimised and secondary pollution was avoided. The process to train
February 2003

Petroleum Association of JapanTokyoand equip these people took approximately two weeks to make an impression on theoverall response efficiency.
The local fisheries were severely impacted by the incident. The region is renowned forits production of shellfish and high levels of local fishing industry. Many of these areas
were protected by booms, but the severe weather and exposed nature of the coastline
rendered many of these operations futile. Local fisherman assisted in the operations andwere heavily involved in near-shore recovery operations, this group provided a valuable
contribution to he clean up effort but the co-ordination of the logistics of waste
management was a problem that hindered the effectiveness of the operation.
The clean up of the shoreline continued with a high level of activity. It is fair to say that
there was no particular place on the coast where huge quantities of oil came ashore, butthere were an huge number of places where some oil impacted the shoreline, leading toa need for prioritisation and management of the clean up effort.
The consequences of the incident are still emerging, many of the wounds freshly
healed from the Erika incident have been re-opened, the issue of single hulled tankers,
200 mile exclusion zones of single hulled fuel oil cargoes around European shorelines.
Classification societies, port and flag state controls and compensation regimes are allagain at the top of the priority list for marine administrations. These discussions will ringaround the marine sector for a significant time to come with the possibility that serious
implication may arise from the incident for shipping world.

February 2003