Presentation at session8‐2 “Fukushima‐Daiichi lessons learned” WECC2015, Kyoto, December 1, 2015

Utilization of Nuclear Powerin Japan
Yoshiaki OkaChairman, Japan Atomic Energy Commission
Emeritus professor, the University of Tokyo

The views expressed here are of my own and do not necessarily reflect those of JAEC nor the government

contents
1. Japan Atomic Energy Commission
2. Energy demand and energy security
3. Nuclear power plants
4. Strategic energy plan
5. Mitigation of mental and social impact of big nuclear accidents

Administrative Organizations for Nuclear Energy PolicyCabinet Office
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)
Discuss and form a plan on:• Policy on nuclear energy research, development and utilization
・General Idea
・Lessons learned from Fukushima Dai‐Ichi accident
・Approach to utilization of nuclear power generation
・Research and development
・Utilization of nuclear resources under a volatile international environment
・Public understanding, education＆development of human resources•Important policy matters on nuclear energy utilization e.g., coordination
among relevant ministries on nuclear energy research, development andutilization

Basic Guidelines
Ministries that own individual policy matters
MOFAMEXT

Cabinet Office・Foreign policy on

・Policy on nuclear• Nuclear Disaster
Prevention

nuclear science andPeaceful use of nuclear
energyscience
・Nuclear fusion andnuclear applications

METI
・Policy on nuclear
energy・Nuclear fuel cycle
・High level RW・Fukushima Daiichi

MOENRA・Nuclear
regulation
・N. Security
・Safeguards

Source: http://www.fepc.or.jp/library/pamphlet/zumenshu/pdf/all_english.pdf

Source: http://www.fepc.or.jp/library/pamphlet/zumenshu/pdf/all_english.pdf

Source: http://www.fepc.or.jp/library/pamphlet/zumenshu/pdf/all_english.pdf

Source: http://www.fepc.or.jp/library/pamphlet/zumenshu/pdf/all_english.pdf

Source: http://www.fepc.or.jp/library/pamphlet/zumenshu/pdf/all_english.pdf

8Energy Security• Developed countries have only 20% of the global population. Emerging countries willneed huge energy resources for their development.
• Japan’s self‐sufficiency rate of primary energy excluding nuclear energy is only 6%.
Japan largely depends on the Middle East for crude oil and LNG supply.
• Fossil fuel resources are unevenly distributed around the world. Most of the wars anddisputes around the world are conflicts over energy resources.
• High dependency on imported energy resources is a high risk.
• Due to the suspension of operation of nuclear power plants, Japan has to buy
expensive LNG. Electricity tariff rose about 30%. Approx. 4 Trillion Yen of national
wealth is lost a year.
9Nuclear Power Utilization in Japan
43 LWR plants; BWR and PWR
9 utilities (TEPCO, Kansai, Chubu etc.) by region andJAPC and J‐Power(EPDC)
First LWR demo (JPDR, 12MWe BWR) in 1959
First commercial plant (GCR) in 1965, LWR in 1970
3 Manufacturers; Toshiba, Hitachi and MHI
3 nuclear fuel manufacturers; GNF, Mitsubishi NF, NFI
Commercial nuclear fuel cycle program by JNFL
(enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing and low level
radioactive waste disposal) in Rokkasho‐mura
Only for peaceful use, no nuclear weapon by law

10Uniqueness of Nuclear Energy
Nuclear energy can serve all of the needs,① Energy security② Economic efficiency③ Mitigation of global warming

It is economical electricity source if used long and stably.
11Strategic Energy Plan (METI, April 2014)
Chapter 2: Basic Policy – Nuclear Power

Position:• Quasi‐domestic energy source with superiority in stability of energy supply and efficiency, lowand stable operational cost and free from GHG emissions.
• An important base‐loaded power source contributing to stability of energy supply‐demandstructure.
Policy Direction• On the premise that safety comes before everything else, proceed with the restart of thenuclear power plants in case the NRA confirms conformity with the regulations.
•Dependency on nuclear power generation will be lowered to the extent possible by energy
saving and introducing renewable energy as well as improving efficiency of thermal power
generation, etc. Will carefully examine a volume of electricity by nuclear power generation.
• Steadily make efforts to deal with spent fuel problem as a responsibility of the currentgeneration.

Strategic Energy Plan

Chapter 3 – Section 4 Re‐establishment of the nuclear energy policy
1. Sincere reflection on the TEPCO’s Fukushima nuclear accident
2. Efforts towards restoration and reconstruction of Fukushima3. Untiring pursuit of safety and establishment of stable environment for nuclear
operation
4. Steady approach without putting off implementing measures into the future(1) Solutions of spent fuel management‐ Final disposal of high‐level radioactive waste‐ Expanding storage capacity of spent fuel(2) Promotion of the nuclear fuel cycle‐ Reprocessing and plutonium use in LWRs
‐ Flexibility of mid‐ to long‐term approaches‐ Technology development on volume reduction and mitigation of harmfulness ofradioactive waste
5. Establishment of confidential relationship with people, nuclear host municipalities andinternational community
13Electricity demand and supply in 2030
Power sources

Electricity demand
Economicgrowth
1.7%／yTotal generation
1065
Billion kWhSaving（‐17%）
Loss966.6
BillionkWh

980.8
BillionkWh

Renewables
22‐24%
Nuclear20‐22%

Geothermal
BIomass 1.0‐1.1%
3.7‐4.6%
Wind 1.7%
Solar
7.0%
Hydro
8.8‐9.2%

LNG
27%
Coal26%
Oil 3%

2013

2030

2030

Source; Long‐term energy supply and demand outlook, July 2015 METI

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Challenges for the Government and the Nuclear Industry
after Fukushima Accident(1)TEPCO and the Government need to complete decommissioning ofFukushima Daiichi NPPs and restoration of the area affected by theaccidents.
(2)Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA) needs to establish independent,open, efficient, clear and reliable regulation.
(3)The nuclear industry must pursue the world’s highest level of safety
through continuous safety improvement.
(4)It is our responsibilities to share the lessons learnt from the
Fukushima Accident with the international communities and tocontribute to peaceful use of nuclear energy and nuclear
nonproliferation while many developing countries are
introducing/expanding nuclear power generation.
(5)The nuclear industry as well as the Government must maintain
nuclear technologies and human resources in order to contribute topeaceful use of nuclear energy, decommissioning, and nuclear safety.
Source: METI

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Mitigation of mental and social
impact of big nuclear accidents16• Acute healtheffect occurs
above
threshold(high) dose.
• Linear non‐thresholdmodel (linearhypothesis) isused forestimating
latent healtheffect (cancer)
at low dose

Potential Damage to Health

Health effect of low level radiation

2.4 mSv
Average Yearly Exposure
from Natural Causes

Source: A.E.Waltar

Reliable
Database

Known
Adverse Effects

No known
Adverse Effects

CA

Area ofControversy

100 mSv
B

Dose Causing Observable
Adverse Health Effects

Radiation Dose [mSv]17

Health implications of radiation exposure of the public
resulting from Fukushima Daiichi NPS accident(UNSCEAR 2013 Report, Appendix E)• “No discernible risk”: An increased incidence of effects is unlikely.
Consequences are small relative to the baseline risk and uncertainties.
• The most important health effects would appear to be on mental and social
well‐being as a consequence of the evacuation and their displacement tounfamiliar surroundings, and the fear and stigma related to radiation
exposure. For example more than 50 hospitalized patients died either
during or soon after the evacuation, probably because of hyperthermia,dehydration or deterioration of underlying medical problems. Upward of
100 elderly people may have died in subsequent months.
• Understanding full heath impact of accident forms an important context for
the Committee’s commentary.
18UNSCEAR: United nations scientific committee on the effects of atomic radiation

“Maintaining health” should be the goal
• Order of “sheltering” made most people escape from their homes, but those
weak in disaster (single elderly people, patients etc.) were left and separated
from outside area.
• Displacement worsen health of the evacuees. No working (farming) increases
instability of legs, sugar disease, fatness, osteoporosis• Displacement for avoiding low level of radiation exposure increased otherhealth risks. It is effective, only when other risks do not increase.
• Lack of exercise and fatness increase cancer risk 1.2 times, equivalent to 100‐
200mSv of exposure.
• Telling only “radiation” risk increased fear of “radiation”. Radiation risk is apart of cancer risk. It is a part of health risk.
• “Maintaining health” should be the goal for avoiding mental and social healtheffects of nuclear accidents.
Source: Sae Ochi, Energy review pp7‐10, April 2015,(in Japanese)

19Lessons of risk communication and management ofnuclear accidents• LNT model is a hypothesis, not a scientific fact. But it assumes that risk
is NOT zero. Start to tell “no risk” was a wrong way, failed andincreased fear of radiation in Fukushima. It is logically impossible toprove “zero risk”. Start to tell “Cancer risk of radiation exposure is NOTzero” looks a good way of risk communication.
• Telling various cancer risks in human life and its uncertainty at low
exposure is the way. Cancer risk of low radiation exposure is within theuncertainty.
• Comparing various cancer risks such as radiation, chemicals, etc. isnecessary, but will be not enough to manage mental and social effects.
• “Maintaining health” is good goal for managing the problems andtaking actions at severe nuclear accidents.
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