PREFACEIn November 2003, the Secretary-General establisheda High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, towhich he assigned the tasks of examining the major threats
and challenges the world faces in the broad field of peace andsecurity, including economic and social issues insofar as they
relate to peace and security, and making recommendations fora collective response. The report of the Panel is expected to beissued in December 2004.
In response to a request by the Secretary-General tocontribute to the work of the High-Level Panel, the Advisory
Board on Disarmament Matters, chaired by Professor Harald
Müeller, undertook intensive deliberations in 2004 on issues
relating to weapons of mass destruction, small arms and light
weapons, landmines, export controls, and ways and means tostrengthen the United Nations role in disarmament and nonproliferation.
The discussions resulted in a comprehensive document containing an in-depth analysis of the strengths andweaknesses of current disarmament and non-proliferation
regimes, an insightful evaluation of old and new challenges,
and practical recommendations on how to meet those challenges, with a particular emphasis on the dangerous combination of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. I pay
tribute to the Chairman and his fellow members for their
devotion and diligence in fulfilling their mandate.
The Department for Disarmament Affairs is publishing the outcome of the Board's consideration in its Occasional
Papers series, hoping that its rich and thought-provoking content will help contribute to the work and deliberations of thegovernmental and non-governmental disarmament community and the interested general public.
Nobuyasu Abe
Under-Secretary-Generalfor Disarmament Affairs

INTRODUCTION
Harald Müller*
In response to a request by the Secretary-General, theAdvisory Board on Disarmament Matters devoted most of its
sessions in 2004 to the formulation of recommendations to theHigh-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change on
issues related to weapons of mass destruction and their meansof delivery, small arms and light weapons, and landmines, aswell as how to strengthen the role of the United Nations in
those fields. After intensive deliberations, the Board produced
a content-rich report. Besides contributing to the work of theHigh-Level Panel, the document stands on its own as a blueprint on how to tackle the double danger of the spread of dangerous weapons among nation-states and to non-state actors.
This report demonstrates the capability of goodwilled representatives of the international community to tackle difficult and controversial issues. It proves the immensely
cooperative and positive spirit among the Board members intheir work, and the energy they have devoted to producing
useful advice for the Secretary-General. As chairman, I feel
humble and much obliged to my fellow members for enabling
me to submit this report which, we all hope, will assist the
Secretary-General in tackling the demanding and difficult
tasks ahead. It goes without saying that, given the sensitivityof the issues covered and their intimate relationship to thenational security of states, not every member can subscribe toevery conclusion and recommendation in this report. It has tobe emphasized, however, that most of the content of the document rests on consensus, and other elements on near-consensus among Board members.
* Chairman of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters

1

Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes

It is impossible in a brief introduction to do justice tothe wealth of ideas contained in the report. A few highlights
must suffice to stimulate the reader's interest. In the case of awithdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereport calls for an emergency meeting of States Parties to theTreaty, with a view to agreeing on a common response and to
making recommendations to the Security Council to redress
the situation. It recommends a five-year moratorium for theconstruction of new nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It envisages
further reduction and eventual elimination of non-strategic
nuclear weapons which present the highest risk in the light of
non-state actors threats. It urges the prompt start of negotiations for a verifiable treaty to cut off the production of fissile
material for weapons purposes. A convention to ban radiological weapons and warfare is also recommended, as are measures to prevent radiological material from falling into thehands of terrorists.
The Board emphasizes the necessity to strengthen the
Biological Weapons Convention and sees the need forenhancing cooperation between all relevant internationalorganizations, notably the World Health Organization(WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and
the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE). In the context of both biological and chemical weapons, national measures to prevent access by non-state actors to weapons andrelated materials are seen as the most important task ahead.
On missiles, the report records some possibility ofpromoting a universal development of binding norms while
recognizing specific conditions in various regions. It emphasizes the urgency of effective means to deal with manportable air defense systems (MANPADS), a particularly dangerous instrument to civil aviation in the hands of terrorists.
The report underlines the intimate relationship between regulation of the legal possession of small arms and light weapons2

Introduction(SALW) and the risk of their uncontrolled spread, as theobjects of main concern, SALW in illegal trade, quite frequently originate in the legal realm. A legally-binding instrument for marking and tracing SALW is thus of particularimportance to sever this link. In addition, the report pleads fora prohibition of any transfer of SALW to non-state actors andfor the inclusion in all post-conflict disarmament processes ofcombined efforts for addressing the SALW problem and reconciliation simultaneously.
The document recognizes the different approaches tolandmine problems by Parties and non-Parties to the MineBan Convention (Ottawa Convention). It invites the Ottawa
community to address the problem of anti-vehicle mines
promptly, and urges the universality of the Ottawa
Convention and the Amended Protocol II to the Convention
on Certain Conventional Weapons.
Considerable attention was devoted to export controls, an item highlighted by Security Council resolution 1540
that has made certain commitments by States Parties to thevarious WMD non-proliferation and disarmament treaties, aswell as the related supplier regimes, universally obligatory.
The report recommends some steps to narrow the gap between
participants and non-participants of supplier regimes. Most
prominent among these recommendations is the suggestion toestablish open-ended working groups to disseminate information on legal and technical issues. In a bold move, the reportinvites all United Nations Member States to support theProliferation Security Initiative, the effort of a group of states
to stop shipments of dangerous materials and technology thatare already beyond the reach of export control agencies. The
transformation of this initiative launched by a small group ofstates into a regular multilateral instrument is regarded ashighly desirable.
The report recognizes the need to offer assistance to3Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes

developing countries by states and group of states in a position to do so. Capacity-building is one of the most importantand effective tools for preventing the proliferation of dangerous weapons. Gone are the times where the proliferation problem resided in technology transfer from North to South. The
spread of technological and industrial capability has thedownside of presenting new dangers, and help from moreexperienced to less experienced states on how to cope withthis danger is an indispensable part of the overall effort of theinternational community to stem the proliferation of dangerous weapons, particularly to non-state actors.
The gravest and most consequential considerations
concerned the role of the United Nations, the Security Council
in particular, notably in crises concerning weapons of mass
destruction. The report recognizes the role of the multilateralregimes as the first line of defence against the risks of proliferation to states and non-state actors, and the pivotal functionof the Council as enforcer of these regimes. Concluding frompast experiences, the report judges that independent technicalexpertise must be available to the Council since national
assessments are not sufficient to establish a clear and unequivocal picture on which to base sound political judgment. The
core of such a technical capability could be located in the
United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs, which
would have a broad roster of experts to draw upon. The reportadvises taking the views of the states of regions concerned
into account whenever the Council has to decide on how todeal with a WMD crisis in the future.
The report recognizes the need for the Council to fillin the void if a clear and present danger exists for which theinternational community has not yet devised multilateral,binding measures. The Council must use this authority withcircumspection and prudence. The report proposes to add a"sunset clause" to all measures taken in this way, i.e., to revis-

4Introduction

it them after an appropriate time span.
I want to thank all Board members for their devotion,commitment and friendship. Without their cooperation andindulgence, it would not have been possible to produce thisreport. I also thank Under-Secretary General Abe and the
DDA staff for their support. I wish to express my particulargratitude to the Board's secretary, Mr. Xiaoyu Wang, whose
diligence and invaluable expertise in disarmament issues wereindispensable in producing this document.

5

MULTILATERAL DISARMAMENTAND NON-PROLIFERATION REGIMESINCLUDING THE ROLE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: AN EVALUATION
Contribution of the Advisory Board on Disarmament
Matters to the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change
On 24 December 2003, the Secretary-General asked
his Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters "to provide evaluative input to the Panel Secretariat on the status of efforts tocontrol light weapons, landmines, and weapons of mass
destruction. Specific recommendations on how to strengthen
the various weapons control regimes would also be helpful".
The current report was the response to the Secretary
General's request. It gives an overview of the utility of theexisting instruments for combating the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missiles, as well as smallarms and landmines, both to State and to non-State actors; andassesses the relation of these instruments to extra-regime multilateral cooperation and to the role the United Nations may
play as the ultimate guarantor of these regimes. It details thestrengths and weaknesses of each of the regimes in the face of
new challenges and gives recommendations on how to
improve them. It discusses and makes recommendations on
the role of the United Nations in ensuring and enhancing their effectiveness.
The Board took up this task at its February 2004 session. At the outset, it discussed the issues broadly. In the second part of the session, it focussed on the role of the United

7Nations. In intersessional work, six Board members preparedworking papers on the various regimes, as requested by the
Secretary-General. On this basis, and drawing on the discussion of the February session, the Chairman prepared a draft
report and circulated it in advance of the July session. The
July session was devoted almost in its entirety to the discussion of the draft. It resulted in a second draft that was largely
built on the consensus of the members present.1
Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes:
An overview
Principally, multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes are legal or political agreements between
States. Their main purpose is to curb the spread of weapons
between states and to foster disarmament by them. However,each one contains, implicitly but more frequently explicitly,
obligations that address the risk that non-state actors mightcome into the possession of the arms, or the means to produce
them, which the respective instrument is meant to prohibit orregulate. Full use should be made of these instruments to prevent weapons, materials and technologies from falling into thehands of terrorists.
There are vast differences between the character,membership, and stipulations of these instruments. Thosedealing with weapons of mass destruction and anti-personnel
mines are legally-binding treaties or conventions. Small arms
are dealt with by a politically binding Programme of Action
to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small
Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects. Missiles are
addressed by a multilateral export control regime with very
limited membership, and a broader code of conduct which is,
however, less demanding than the export control regime. The

8

Contribution of the Advisory Board

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical Weapons
Convention have intrusive verification systems, and someverification is mandated for the Ottawa Convention prohibiting anti-personnel mines. No verification is attached to the
Biological Weapons Convention nor to the instruments concerning missiles and small arms.
Participation is not universal in any of the instruments. The NPT is the most widely adhered to instrumentwith 188 States parties. Parties to other treaties and agreements are fewer.
Note
1 In the July session, the following members participated:
Harald Müller (Chairman), Vicente Berasategui, Pascal Boniface,
Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier, Perla Carvalho Soto, Michael Clarke,
Hasmy Agam, Kuniko Inoguchi, Mahmoud Karem, Ho-Jin Lee, Liu
Jieyi, U. Joy Ogwu, Boris D. Pyadyshev, Stephen G. Rademaker(joined the discussion after the Board had already discussed the first
four items), Tibor Tóth and Patricia Lewis.

9

NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Existing Regimes: success and challenges
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) was set up to prevent interstate nuclear the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and is built on three pillars— renunciation by the non-nuclear-weapon States of nuclear
weapons, nuclear disarmament and cooperation in peacefuluses of nuclear energy.
In stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons, theNPT has been largely successful. The number of countries
disposing of nuclear weapon capabilities today is far less than
predicted in the years before the NPT entered into force. The
Treaty also served as a salient norm persuading several countries to cease considering nuclear weapons programmes, toterminate such programmes or even eliminate existing nuclear
weapons in their possession.
The verification system of the NPT is built on safeguards agreements which all of its non-nuclear-weapon-States
parties are obliged to conclude with the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA). This verification system contained
initially very limited rights of access for IAEA inspectors. In
practice their access rights remained confined to sites declaredby non-nuclear-weapon States as containing fissile material.
After the revelations about Iraq's comprehensive nuclear
weapons programme and concern about the Democratic
Republic of Korea's nuclear activities — both countries are
NPT member states under inspection by the Agency — theverification system was profoundly revamped. The reform
process resulted in the adoption of the Model Additional
Protocol that enhances the right of access for inspectors tonuclear-related sites that do not harbour fissile material, and11

Nuclear weapons

to sites adjacent to declared nuclear facilities. The IAEA
includes in its assessment additional information, e.g., satellite images bought from private companies, media accounts
and expert studies, and information provided by member
states. Laboratory technology has vastly improved, so thatvery tiny samples taken at sites or in their environment cangive reliable hints of the presence of fissile material. Nuclearweapon States, while not submitting to all stipulations of theAdditional Protocol applicable to non-nuclear-weapon States,
have concluded additional protocols with a view of helping toprevent the proliferation of material, equipment and technology, including to non-state actors.
Recommendations
Those NPT parties that have not yet
done so should conclude safeguard agreementswith the IAEA promptly.
The NPT Review Conference shouldmake it politically binding for all NPT members to conclude Additional Protocols with the
IAEA and to bring them into force expeditiously.
Complementary access as provided forin the Additional Protocol should be used regularly and effectively to create and uphold confidence in existing regimes.
The NPT gives all parties the right of the full development of civilian nuclear energy, including sensitive activities such as enrichment and reprocessing. At the same time, it
allows withdrawal within a period of 90 days. This leaves
open the possibility of a party preparing, in bad faith, all thenecessary facilities for a break-out of the Treaty and thendeclaring withdrawal.

12

Nuclear weapons

Recommendation
Without prejudice to any action that the
Security Council may decide to take, withdrawal should trigger an emergency meeting of NPTStates parties, with a view to taking urgent
action to correct the situation. The meetingshould scrutinise the reasons given by the withdrawing state on its withdrawal in the declaration required by the Treaty; determine, on thebasis of IAEA reporting, if the withdrawal waspremeditated in bad faith under the deceptive
cover of peaceful intentions; recommend to
States parties the appropriate reaction towards
the withdrawing state; and convey the resultsof the meeting to the Security Council.

Presently, there exists a surplus of nuclear fuel supply
and an on-going debate on the back end of the fuel cycle. At
the same time, the construction of fuel cycle facilities thatappear not to be economical has raised concern. While article
IV of the NPT gives the right to States parties to develop fully
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, States should refrain fromprojects that give suspicion of non-peaceful intentions.
Recommendation
A five-year moratorium on the new construction of such fuel cycle facilities should be
declared, accompanied by a guarantee for fuelsupply, at market prices, by present suppliers to
all parties respecting the moratorium.
The results of the group of experts convened by the IAEA Director General to assessways to "multinationalize" the fuel cycle which

13

Nuclear weapons

will be available in 2005 should be carefully
considered and, as appropriate, implemented
by the international community.
The use of highly enriched uranium andplutonium in civilian uses should be considered. States using highly enriched uranium in
naval fuel should consider turning to reactor
technology that makes use of lower enrichment
grades.
In the field of nuclear disarmament, much remains to
be done. Among non-nuclear-weapon States, there is strong
criticism that the nuclear-weapon States have not lived up to
their undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals. This rift
creates permanent tension within the Treaty membership,diminishes the solidarity within the Treaty community, anddiverts attention from the few, but crucial cases where breaches of the non-proliferation commitment are suspected orproven. It is thus essential to ensure the full commitment of
the nuclear-weapon States with article VI of the NPT and torecognise the unequivocal relationship between nuclear disarmament and international peace and security.
Recommendations
The thirteen steps agreed at the 2000
NPT Review Conference, including, inter alia,
enhanced transparency, the irreversibility of
nuclear weapons reduction, bringing into force
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty
and beginning negotiations on a fissile material cut-off instrument should be implemented
promptly.
The further reduction and eventual elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons is ofparticular priority with regard to the non-state
actor threat, as these weapons are most sus-

14

Nuclear weapons

ceptible to theft and easily usable by unauthorised persons.
While the NPT is the most universal multilateral nonproliferation and disarmament treaty, it is not fully universal.
This detracts from its effectiveness and creates risks, dangers
and underlying incentives for States Parties to reconsider theirmembership.
Recommendations
The achievement of the universality of
the NPT should remain one primary objective
to be actively pursued and eventually realisedby the international community.
Pending universalisation, non-parties
should undertake to take all necessary measures as contained in the safeguard agreement
and the additional protocol for preventing theproliferation of nuclear weapons and related
technology to other actors, and to be accountable, to the degree compatible with national
security, to the international community forsuch measures. Parties should avoid the transfer of all nuclear-related materials, technology,
equipment and scientific assistance to non-parties.
Non-parties should take all necessary
measures — and the international community
should insist they do — to prevent the dangers
associated with a nuclear arms race andimplied by operating unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities.

15

Nuclear weapons

States Parties regard the prevention of non-state
actors obtaining nuclear material as being within the scope of
their undertakings under the NPT. The final declaration of the2000 Review Conference emphasized "the paramount importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear materialand called upon all states to maintain the highest possible
standard of security and physical protection of nuclear materials". The Conference expressed "concern about the illicit
trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive materials" and"urged all States to introduce and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to protect and ensure the security of suchmaterial".
The combination of material accountancy and comprehensive safeguards, such as contained in the Additional
Protocol, with strict measures of physical protection such aslaid down in the IAEA guidelines (INFCIRC/225/Rev.4) andthe Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Materials provides the best assurance that the possibility ofaccess by non-state actors to nuclear materials will remain
remote.
Recommendations
The 2005 NPT Review Conference
should explicitly address the risk of non-state
actor access to nuclear weapons, material andtechnology and declare explicitly that preventing such access is included in the undertakingsof all parties to the Treaty.
All states should adhere to theConvention on the Physical Security of Nuclear
Materials.
The Convention should extend frommaterial in international transport to all
nuclear material in domestic use, storage, andtransport with a view to making protection for16

Nuclear weaponsthat material comparable to that recommended
in the IAEA guideline INFCIRC 225/Rev. 4.
Parties should be requested toreport to the IAEA on the adoption of measures
undertaken to bring national regulations into
conformity with this amendment.
Member states should also consider making extensive use of peer review mechanisms offered by the IAEA to obtain expert
checks and recommendations on their national
systems to control nuclear materials.
The IAEA should install a "physical security assistance pool", making available
on request to member states in need of assistance its own technical, legal and personnel
resources as well as resources offered by member states in a position to do so.
The IAEA counterterrorism programme should continue with adequate funding.
The organizations administering
existing nuclear-weapon-free zones should
alert their membership to the problem of physical security of fissile material.
The NPT does not oblige nuclear-weapon States tosubmit any nuclear material to international verification
measures. Some of them have done so on a voluntary basis.
Coverage, however, is very limited. The same applies forStates outside the NPT who have nuclear weapons capabilities. Here, only material of foreign origin or processed inimported civilian nuclear facilities might be under safeguards.
Material outside international verification creates concern as
there is no assurance that it is accounted for. If a fissile mate-17

Nuclear weapons

rial cut-off were concluded with an appropriate verification
system, the scope of accounting to the international community would extend considerably, with real gains in terms of
security. An FMCT would leave material in military uses stilloutside international scrutiny. However, countries holding
such stocks could undertake to apply the strictest internal
accountancy and physical security to all such material until
complete nuclear disarmament is achieved.
Recommendations
Negotiations on a fissile material
cut-off treaty should begin forthwith in the CD
and be conducted expeditiously.
Pending nuclear disarmament,
States possessing unsafeguarded stocks of fissile material should undertake unilaterally toobserve strict accountancy and physical security measures, and confidence-building measures and transparency should be applied.
The “10 plus 10” programme of
the G-8 that offers assistance to republics ofthe former Soviet Union to secure fissile material both in the civilian and the military realm
should be extended, on request, to other statesin need of such assistance.
The nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
regime does not address the issue of radiological weapons andwarfare, as it is strictly devoted to nuclear weapons and therespective fissile materials. No international instrument isavailable in the realm of radiological weapons. The IAEA has
initiated a programme to secure better radiological sourcesthat could become the basis for non-state actors to fabricate

18

Nuclear weapons

radiological weapons, and to search for orphanized sources,
i.e., radiological sources no longer in registered custody.
Recommendations
The CD should begin negotiations
on a convention for the prohibition of radiological weapons/warfare.
This convention should also explicitly address the obligation by States Parties toprevent the diversion of radioactive material tonon-state actors. This should include licensing,registration, reliable custody and orderly disposal of radiological sources.
IAEA activities to recoverorphanised radiological sources must continue
with adequate funding.

19

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Existing regime and challenges

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was
concluded in 1972. It has presently 151 States parties. It waschallenged in the nineties by revelations about past offensive biological weapons projects by several States, by thesuspicion that several countries were conducting BW offensive programmes contrary to the international norm and by
the increasing concern that non-state actors might strive toacquire and use biological weapons, as proven by the effortsof the Aum Shinrikyo terrorist sect to produce anthrax andrelease it into the environment and the anthrax scare in the
United States after 11 September 2001. These concerns were
sharpened by the growing technical possibilities offered byprogress in biogenetic science.
In an effort to strengthen the Convention in order tocope with these concerns, the parties to the BWC worked
towards a protocol on transparency and compliance that wasmeant to improve the level of mutual confidence-building
and to provide measures to deal with the problem of clandestine biological weapons programmes. However, in 2001
this attempt failed on objections that no measure could provide assurance that such programmes were absent and could
even be abused for non-BWC related objectives. As a result,the negotiations of the Ad Hoc Group on transparency andcompliance were suspended. Regrettably, an opportunity tostrengthen the BWC and its capability to address terrorist
threats was therefore missed.
The Fifth BWC Review Conference in 2002 barely

21

Biological weapons

reached consensus to initiate a new process focused on annual expert meetings dealing in each session with a specificissue to strengthen the Convention, and annual meetings ofState Parties discussing the expert meetings' results. While thedanger of a complete shut-down of the multilateral prohibition regime until 2006 was averted by this new process, thiswas only possible by explicitly renouncing the intention to
codify new measures and seek possibilities to install verification instruments.
Nevertheless, this new process offers the opportunityof focused and substantive work that is relevant to copingwith the most urgent challenges. Participation takes place at
higher than the technical level. It is more representative thanat review conferences and thus helps promote increased
awareness of the norm against BW. The meetings are also
conducive to creating links between States Parties, andbetween relevant IGOs and States Parties.
The 2003 meeting of experts and the ensuing meetingof States parties dealt with the adoption of necessary national
measures to implement the prohibitions set forth in theConvention, including the enactment of penal legislation andthe related topic of national mechanisms to establish andmaintain the security and oversight of pathogenic microorganisms and toxins. The adoption of national measures
empowers national law enforcement and judiciary bodies totake preventative and responsive action. Criminalizing BW
relevant activities expands the reach of the BWC to individuals. National legislation solidifies international norms.
The meetings in 2004 are dealing with enhancing
international capabilities for responding to, investigating andmitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or
toxin weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease; andstrengthening and broadening national and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for the surveillance,

22

Biological weapons

detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases
affecting humans, animals and plants. This addresses theurgent need to increase international capacity to respond toand detect disease outbreaks.
In 2005, the experts will address the content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. This isof great importance in order to assist scientists involved inresearch with dual use applications. A strong input from thescientific community will, of course, be essential to achieving
this objective.
Recommendations
States parties should make a major
effort to make good use of the measures identified in the draft protocol.
The achievements in the new BWC
process must be consolidated.
Measures developed in the new
BWC process should be made politically binding.
There should be an organized effort
by countries in a position to do so to offer
assistance in further national implementation
efforts by countries in need of such assistanceon a voluntary basis. Efforts should be made at
global, regional and national levels.
The threat of BW proliferation,
including to non-state actors, should be
addressed at all relevant levels. Beyond theglobal level, efforts should be undertaken multilaterally, regionally, nationally and locally.
Strong efforts should be undertaken to raise awareness about ongoing activities

23

Biological weapons

and further needs outside the BWC framework
Proposals should be prepared intime on how to carry forward the process in thecontext of the BWC beyond 2006.
All relevant organizations such as
the World Health Organization (WHO), theFood and Agricultural Organization (FAO),
the World Organisation for Animal Health(OIE) must be part of a sustained, integrated,
multifaceted effort in a continuing process withfrequent review.

24

CHEMICAL WEAPONS
Existing regime
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is by far
the most complete architecture for a WMD disarmament
regime because it leads to the elimination of a whole category of WMD and because of its comprehensive and robust verification system. Several countries have reported their possession of CW, or the existence of CW left on their territories byformer enemies, and are in the process of dismantling thesestocks. The CWC also obliges member states not to contributeto the spread of CW agents. The treaty organization, theOrganisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons(OPCW), is undertaking verification and demilitarization (ofchemical weapons) activities vigorously. CWC serves as avery solid foundation for more intense international cooperation in the area of chemical weapons with a view to blocking
their access to terrorists. The OPCW and its member states,
after 11 September 2001, have initiated activities to achieve
this objective. This important regime must be strengthened
and fully utilized.
Challenges
Chemical weapons have been actually obtained andused by terrorists (the Sarin release in the Tokyo subway in1995). The casualty figure (12 people killed and over 5,000
injured) could have been much higher had it not been the
rapid reaction of the Japanese authorities or had the terroristgroup commanded a more sophisticated means of delivery at
the time.
The probability of a repetition of the Tokyo episode25

Chemical weapons

or similar incidents does unfortunately exist for several reasons:
1. If used efficiently, chemical weapons can cause
high lethality and massive panic while posing relatively low
risk for those delivering the chemical agent.
2. Chemical weapons could be obtained by terrorists
either through diverting existing weapons from the arsenals ofStates or by gaining access, through different means, to industrial facilities which manufacture chemicals that can be diverted to produce chemical weapons. Chemical industry facilities
are spread all over the world and many chemicals which areof dual use nature are accessible with relative ease. It is relatively easy to conceal the illicit activities of a plant falling in
the hands of a terrorist group. Deadly chemical agents could
also be produced on a small scale in terrorist-run, small-sizedlaboratories, making use of technology and raw materials
available on commercial markets.
3. The variety of chemical weapons agents poses
problems for early identification and warning. And there are
no immediate antidotes to stop their effects on people affected. To plan a defense against chemical terrorism is difficult.
Recommendations
Strengthening and fully utilizing
the existing regime The legal basis is solid andthe legitimacy is flawless and there is no doubtthat a stronger regime is the best way to prevent access to chemical weapons by terroristgroups and to establish, through mechanisms
of international cooperation, means of defense
against possible attack by terrorists with such
weapons. Specifically, a) achieving universality of the CWC must be accorded priority; andb) providing means and resources to OPCW to26

Chemical weapons

utilize fully the instruments of monitoring andverification with regard to both existing chemical weapons (prior to their destruction) and to
relevant chemical industry facilities that produce, consume or store sensitive dual use
chemicals.
States parties should fully comply
with all their obligations under the CWC.
Achieving chemical weapons disarmament is fundamental to guaranteeing nonproliferation. It is vital that chemical disarmament should be tackled with urgency. Everyeffort should be made by those member States
possessing chemical weapons in cooperation
with the OPCW to ensure compliance with thedestruction deadlines for chemical weapons
stockpiles as provided in the CWC, if not sooner. The full implementation of the disarmament
provisions of the CWC will contribute greatly
to combating chemical terrorism. The possibilities of chemical weapons being subject to theft
manifest the importance of destroying all
stockpiles of chemical weapons as soon aspracticable.
Promoting national implementation, including export controls The ultimate
responsibility for preventing CW from falling in
the hands of terrorists rests with States. Statesshould enact national legislation to implement
fully the CWC, including criminalizing any
activities that violate it. States should adopt
stringent regulations obliging private actors
handling dual use chemical substances andtechnologies to prevent the diversion of those27

Chemical weapons

assets into unauthorized hands, as well as
strict export control measures with regard todual use chemicals, especially those provided
in the schedules of the CWC, reporting duly to
OPCW on those transfers stipulated by CWC.
Fostering international cooperation and assistance Practical mechanisms andmeasures need to be developed to promote thepeaceful use of chemical activities by member
States of CWC and to provide emergency assistance to member States against possible CW
attacks. This would contribute greatly to promoting the universality and implementation of
CWC. Training for special national police andmilitary units to identify CW agents should be
provided and on decontaminating affectedareas. Technical knowledge should be shared
about effective protective suits and modern gas
masks preventing the intrusion of aerosolized
particles into the respiratory system. Methods
and experiences should be made available withrespect to civil protection against chemical
attacks, including an appropriately preparednational health system.
Following technical developments
OPCW should give high priority to developing
its capacity to monitor and assess the risk of
new chemical agents that could be relevant to
the CWC in view of rapid scientific and technological developments. In this regard, full use
should be made of the work of the Scientific
Advisory Board. State parties should fully
cooperate with the OPCW in this field.

28

MISSILES
Existing regimes and initiatives
The United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on missiles in all its aspects
The first Panel submitted a report in 2002 (A/57/229).
This report was mainly descriptive of the complex situation
regarding missiles and did not single out any specific courseof action to be pursued. The second Panel will report its findings to this year's General Assembly. In the deliberations of
the first Panel, there were significant differences regarding the
focus and scope of concern regarding missiles, the difference
between vertical and horizontal proliferation, the problem ofballistic missile transfers, the extent of export controls, the useof space for peaceful purposes as a cover for development ofballistic missile technology and the implications of ballistic
missile defense. The report addressed some types of missiles,
such as Man-Portable Air-Defence Systems (MANPADS) andUnmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) in the context of terrorist
acquisition and use of missiles and rockets.
The UN Register of Conventional Arms
The Register includes seven categories of weapon
systems the transfer of which should be reported annually to
the UN Secretariat by States. Category VII of the Register
includes a definition of "Missiles and Launchers" and a new
sub-category regarding MANPADS. This mechanism is a useful measure of transparency but is modest in its present scope
and also not applied on a global basis.

29

Missiles

The Hague Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Ballistic
Missile Proliferation
Launched in autumn 2002 in the Hague and initiatedby members of Missile Technology Control regime (MTCR)[see section on export control], the Hague Code of Conduct isa politically binding arrangement with a membership ofapproximately 110 countries. The code contains several confidence-building measures (transparency and pre-notification)in the missile area as well as a call on member states to exercise restraint in their national holdings. This initiative is considered a modest first step but does not include at this point
significant countries in the Middle East and Asia. There aredifferences of opinion regarding the effectiveness of the confidence-building measures, their nature, whether they should
be mandatory or voluntary and whether they are sufficiently
flexible for application in the various regional contexts.
The INF Treaty is a bilateral Treaty concluded in
1987 to eliminate intermediate-range missiles by the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union. As a consequence, it led to thedestruction of a whole class of missiles not only in these twostates, but also in allied countries and in the successor statesof the Soviet Union. As the stability in many regions is threatened by this class of missiles, opening up this Treaty to additional signatories could offer a useful disarmament tool. At
the same time, concern exists that the stability of this treaty
could be jeopardized by missile programs at the Euro-Asian
periphery.
As is evident from the above efforts and initiatives,
there is no overarching framework, universal norm, treaty or
agreement governing the development, testing, production,acquisition, transfer, deployment or use specifically relating
to missiles. The international community should look into thepossibility of fostering a consensus for establishing the conceptual basis for an overarching treaty regulating missiles in30

Missiles

their various contexts. (There are different views on ABM,
missile defense versus missile proliferation and outer space)
In addition, even where there are more defined efforts
and initiatives, their relevance to high-tension areas such as
Asia and the Middle East is questionable. Their relevance tothe prevention of missiles and rockets reaching the hands ofterrorists is also limited. It should be recalled that the Code of
Conduct and the MTCR deal with missiles with a range above
300 kilometres and terrorists would be far more likely to seek
and use rockets with a lesser range.
Challenges
Missiles have become in recent years the focus of
renewed concern in view of the accelerated proliferation of
longer range ballistic missiles, their capacity to deliver WMD
and the destabilizing role of such systems in high-tension
areas. Concerns vis-à-vis the extended range, greater accuracy and relative ease of availability of these systems have led
to diplomatic efforts and initiatives dealing with different
aspects of missile proliferation.
The development of missile defense capabilities has
ambiguous consequences for the field of missile proliferation.
On the one hand, it may stimulate efforts to develop ever moresophisticated missile technologies so as to defeat suchdefences. Also, the spread of interceptor missiles may
become a new source of proliferation of missiles for offensive
purposes, as a change in the ballistic curve in which interceptors fly could enable them to serve in this role. On the other
hand, do missile defences serve the same objective as efforts
to counter missile proliferation, namely, to curb the dangers
inherent in the spread of missiles. Effective defences maylead in the long term to a reduced motivation to procure what
would then be useless missile technology.

31

Missiles

Areas in which progress may be possible
Notwithstanding the above difficulties, it may be possible to identify the following points on which there may exist
more substantive agreement between countries regarding theissue of missiles.
1. Greater emphasis is being given to the preventionof proliferation of ballistic missiles and MANPADS in viewof the latter's danger to civil aviation if employed by terrorists;
recent efforts to establish an OSCE code of conduct in thisarea are welcome and might be emulated by other regionalorganizations.
2. There is a growing recognition of the importance ofeffective national export controls regarding missiles and theirrelated technology as a means to prevent proliferation to states
and terrorists, as well as their importance in fostering confidence on a regional and multilateral level.
3. Growing recognition that any missiles, rockets or
related technology should be prevented from reaching thehands of terrorists using a combination of tools in the diplomatic arena including supplier regimes (MTCR, Wassenaar),and the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) establishedunder Security Council Resolution 1373.
4. While countries have the right to pursue the peaceful uses of space, this should not be exploited as a pretext todevelop ballistic missiles. In this regard, transparency andconfidence-building measures should be adopted.
5. There is a need to relate to the problems of missiles
in their regional political context and consider the development of regional confidence building measures on the basis ofarrangements freely arrived at between the states of theregion.

32

Missiles

Recommendations
Since Security Council resolution
1540 only refers to the issue of missiles in thecontext of means of delivery of WMD, theSecretary-General should urge the Security
Council to adopt a narrower and more operative resolution addressing the issue of shoulder-fired missiles (MANPADS) and their danger to civil aviation through terrorist use. This
would constitute an important step in the joint
areas of proliferation, terrorism and missilesthat are in need of a combination of practicalmeasures, greater international awareness anddiplomatic leadership. This is a step thatshould be considered in the short and immediate term.
In addition, for the medium term, it
would be timely for the Security Council andthe Secretary-General to call for Member
States of the United Nations to adopt effective
national export controls in relation to missiles,
rockets, MANPADS and any other means ofdelivery in transfers to other States and a total
ban of such transfers to non-state actors that
could cause extensive loss of life and mass-disruption in the post 9/11 context. Such export
controls could also foster and develop confidence between countries in a regional andglobal context.
The present UN Panel ofGovernmental Experts on missiles in all theiraspects should provide the Secretary-Generalwith a more focused attempt to strengthen theemerging elements of 'greater agreement' indi-

33

Missiles

cated above. The Department for Disarmament
Affairs could also provide the SecretaryGeneral with an informal programme of action
to strengthen and consolidate those emerging
trends in the context of a longer time frame.
The Chairman of the CTC should
undertake consultation with the chairmen of
the MTCR, the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group(NSG), the Australia Group, the Wassenaar
Group, the IAEA, the OPCW, the WHO andother relevant organizations, to consider measures that could be taken to enhance the cooperative effort between non-proliferation andcounter-terrorism tools. This could be of relevance to the area of missiles and rockets as
well.

34

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
Existing Instrument/Initiatives
UN Programme of Action
The Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat andEradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weaponsin All Its Aspects (PoA), adopted by Member States at the2001 United Nation Conference, was the first step by theinternational community collectively to combat the problem
and move towards establishing universal norms to eradicate
the global scourge of the uncontrolled proliferation and misuse of illicit small arms and light weapons (SALW).
Since the adoption of the PoA, progress has been
made in the following areas:
Enhanced recognition of a people-centeredaspect of the SALW issue;Improved institutions and capacity building
to tackle the issue of SALW;

Enhanced measures for import/export control, public awareness and resource mobilization;
Tightened measures against terrorism andorganized crime.

Regional initiatives have begun to take shape, with
regional organizations taking a comprehensive approach indealing with issues of mutual concern, including ways andmeans to combat terrorism, transnational crime and trafficking in drugs.

35

Small arms and light weapons

The critical role of international cooperation andassistance has also been a cross-cutting theme, with Member
States aiming to strengthen partnerships to:Enact and apply regulations and legislation inorder to close identified loopholes;
Actively contribute to initiatives to foster international cooperation and develop common standards;
Provide training, financial and technical assistance to affected countries.

Challenge
The illicit transfer and circulation of SALW and theirexcessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread in many
regions of the world, especially in conflict regions, pose aserious threat to peace. Reconciliation among the fighting parties and the stabilization of the situation become more difficult. Security of states and groups within states as well as ofindividuals is undermined. Refocussing on economic development is prevented. Provision of humanitarian assistance tovictims of armed conflict becomes an endangered activity.
The availability of such weapons tends to enhance and perpetuate crime and terrorism.
Areas to be addressed/strengthened
The problems of SALW are multi-dimensional andinterlinked. In order to combat complex and difficult problems related to SALW, a comprehensive approach is essential.
Despite the progress made, the challenges are still
daunting. There is no international legally-binding instrument, nor even a universal code of conduct, in this field.
Transparency at the global level in the trade in SALW is still
elusive. Experiences in conflict regions provide a solid basis

36

Small arms and light weapons

on which such a code of conflict could be built.
Key areas that need to be addressed
The issues of tracing, marking, brokering, importand export controls and law enforcement are at the core ofillicit arms problems. The creation of an international instrument on tracing illicit small arms is therefore an importantelement in addressing arms supply on a regional and global
level by identifying and penalizing illicit arms transfers.
Supply of illicit arms can be curbed throughagreement on common norms and standards and by properly
regulating the legal possession and trade of arms. This would
include guidelines authorizing exports, imports and transit of
SALW, with the issue of end-user certificates deserving special attention. In this connection, the implementation andadherence to arms embargoes, as well as stricter scrutiny ofarms trafficking in violation of such sanctions, should beemphasized.
 Enhanced capacity for law enforcement and conformity to global norms is a prerequisite to capacity building.
Affected countries must be provided with concrete assistanceand training in the areas such as weapons collection, disposal
and stockpile management. A detailed assessment of needs
and required funds as an immediate goal may provide a useful basis for further action if available resources are insufficient.
 To tackle cross-boundary trafficking in weapons
diverted from legitimate stocks, transparency to build confidence is needed to complement effective stockpile management. Although not immediately possible for regions lockedin tense and hostile relationships, information sharing and theexchange of national experiences, including the disseminationof information on arms transfers, could offer a long-term

37

Small arms and light weapons

means to apprehend and deal with transnational activities in
illicit arms trafficking.
 In societies emerging from deep-rooted conflicts,
where small arms are abundant, the political class that hasoften irresponsibly participated in fueling armed conflict must
live up to its responsibility to focus all its efforts on reconciliation. Reconciliation at all politico-social levels, including at
the grassroots level within different communities, is the key toending a violent conflict and reconstructing war-torn societies. It is important to design disarmament programmes witha view to facilitating reconciliation. As an indispensable element in the early stage of post-conflict reconstruction, it is of
crucial importance that disarmament programmes be carefully designed to suit the specific conflict situation and with theconcept of reconciliation at its core.

Recommendations
Urgent action must be taken by theinternational community to curb the flow ofsmall arms and light weapons to regions ofconflict or with potential for conflict and to ban
the supply of such weapons to non-State actors.
States should be urged to reach consensus on
the issue of banning the supply of SALW to
non-State actors. Legal sanctions against perpetrators should be installed.
The Security Council should adopt
a resolution obligating the UN Member States
to enact national laws that implement Security
Council arms embargoes and to prosecute violators.
The risks that the legal supply ofsmall arms and light weapons could contributeto enhancing violence in local and regional

38

Small arms and light weapons

conflict should be addressed. A universal codeof conduct should be adopted on the trade in
SALW. Global and regional transparency
measures should be adopted.
Develop legally-binding international instruments regulating tracing, marking
and controlling brokering of SALW expeditiously . The present negotiations should be
pursued with expediency.
The UN should take the lead incoordinating more closely with other international organizations and regional organizations to produce synergy in the collective
efforts to address the threat posed by the proliferation of SALW.
The UN should form a coalition
with concerned Member States, parliamentarians, civil society, including non-governmentalorganizations, in launching a global campaign
aimed at preventing, reducing and eradicating
the proliferation of SALW.
Post-conflict small arms disarmament programmes should be community-based
and human security-centred, and should
include local security force reform. The United
Nations should coordinate international efforts
in collectively providing economic and social
incentives to war-affected communities andpopulations. The successful model of "weapons
for development" should be replicated in morecommunities and countries emerging from conflicts.

39

LANDMINES
Existing Regimes
Programme of Action
There are two multilateral legal instruments on landmines: Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
Their Destruction (Mine-Ban Convention) and the Amended
Protocol II to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions
on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be
Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects (CCW).
The Mine-Ban Convention provides a total ban on
anti-personnel mines (APMs). The rapid conclusion of theConvention highlighted the successful formula forged from a
concerted effort by a global coalition of civil society groups,
governments, and international organizations. The international campaign was aimed at addressing the international
humanitarian crisis caused by APMs that was brought to public attention globally in the 1990s. The Mine-Ban Convention
has 141 States Parties, plus 9 signatories as of 1 April 2004.
However, some important mine producers and users are notparty to it.
The Mine-Ban Convention not only created a newinternational norm among its State Parties (parts of whichhave also exerted influence on several non-parties through thenorm has not yet become universal prohibition of theweapon), but also actually implemented its humanitarian
goals on the ground, and has truly made a difference in the
lives of people and their communities. Major progress has

41

Landmines

also been made in the following areas:Transfers of APMs have virtually halted;

Vast tracts of previously mined land have beencleared and returned to productive use, and some mine-affected States Parties have declared themselves mine-free oralmost there;

More than 31 million stockpiled mines have been
destroyed by States Parties to the Convention, removing theseweapons from arsenals and the possibility that they will everbe planted in the ground; Most important, the rate of new landmine casualties has significantly declined (estimates from theInternational Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1997 were
26,000 victims/year, and current estimates range from 15,000- 20,000/year).

Amended Protocol II of the CCW prohibits the indiscriminate use of mines, and their intentional use against civilians. It prohibits the use of APMs that do not contain enoughiron to be detected with standard demining equipment andalso, limits the transfer of landmines. It also requires that
remotely delivered landmines have effective self-destructing
and self-deactivating mechanisms. In 1996, Parties to theProtocol agreed to expand its scope to apply to internal conflicts.
Though the Protocol falls short of a total banof landmines, it plays an important role in imposing a restrictive use of this weapon. Besides, many key countries that are
not party to the Mine-Ban Convention have consented to bebound by CCW Protocol II.

42

Landmines

Challenges
Mine-Ban Convention
The most difficult challenge is sustaining high-level
political attention and public interest and resources on the
APM issue in order truly to eliminate APMs and the threat
they pose. Vast stockpiles of mines remain in the arsenals ofStates outside the Mine-Ban Convention. Several mine-affected countries have not joined the Convention either.
Implementation of the Convention poses challenges. Efforts
must continue to ensure that the number of new mine victims
decreases, and that adequate resources are devoted to the careand rehabilitation of mine survivors, a number which increases every year. Realistic but ambitious national plans must be
put in place to ensure the ten-year deadlines for the clearanceof mined areas are met.
Amended Protocol II on landmines
Much more effort is needed by States Parties toimplement the Protocol, especially meeting the new provisions on mine-detectability criteria, self-deactivation and selfdestruction. The scope of the Protocol was expanded to coverinternal conflicts in 1996, yet its application, including how toensure non-state actors comply with the Protocol, lacks follow-up action.
Recommendation
All States must do their utmost toaddress the humanitarian objectives of themine issue.

43Landmines

Mine-Ban Convention
States Parties should:
Take concrete steps to promote thefull implementation of the Convention, in particular, the prevention and suppression of prohibited acts, and to ensure compliance with theConvention. Greater efforts must be made tomeet deadlines set out in the Convention, suchas those on destruction of stockpiles and mineclearance.
Promote the universality of theConvention as a priority task and undertakestrong efforts to include anti-vehicle mines as
they also have long-lasting effects on civilian
life.
States that believe the Convention
is presently incompatible with their vital security interests should revisit their position regularly. Meanwhile, they should do their utmost
to contribute to the fight against the negative
humanitarian consequences of landmines byadhering to Amended Protocol II to the CCW
as well as through technical developments.
Utilize the First Review
Conference of the Convention to renew thepolitical momentum to continue to seek a comprehensive resolution to the humanitariancrises caused by APMs. The UN, States Parties
and civil society should strengthen their cooperation to ensure the participation in the First
Review Conference at the highest possible level
and the issuance of a strong Political

44

Landmines

Declaration by the High-Level Segment of theConference. All interested actors should help
raise the profile of the Review Conference toensure public pressure is brought to bear inadvance to encourage renewed commitments.
Identify a concrete action plan at
the First Review Conference aimed at achieving the core objectives of the Convention,
namely, clearing mined areas, assisting mine
victims, destroying stockpiled mines, and universalizing the Convention.
Efforts should be made to maintainglobal attention to the Convention. There is aneed for governments and the UN system toassist in implementation by supporting the outcomes of the Review Conference, including
mobilizing sufficient resources and providing
assistance to mine-affected countries, with aparticular emphasis on demining.
Further strengthen comprehensive
cooperation across the United Nations throughthe UN Mine Action Service, in addressing thethreat posed by APMs in the following areas:
global coordination, emergency relief operations, peacekeeping operations, and reconstruction and development; enhance the United
Nations coordination and cooperation withother leading international organization andNGOs, such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross, the International Committee to
Ban Landmines, the Geneva International
Centre for Humanitarian Demining. Anti-vehicle mines should be included

45

Landmines

Amended Protocol II
States Parties should:
Take concrete measures to ensure
the implementation of the Protocol, including
the new criteria on mine detectability, selfdeactivation and self-destruction, as well as
the destruction of old stockpiles inconsistent
with the new criteria.
Promote international cooperation
aimed at assisting states parties to the Protocol
in meeting the new criteria on mine detectability, self-deactivation and self-destruction.
Make efforts to persuade thosecountries not yet parties to the Mine-Ban
Convention to agree to be bound by the
Amended Protocol II to ensure no gap is left.
Develop a mechanism to hold nonstate actors accountable for violating the provisions of the Protocol during intra-statearmed conflicts, e.g., make such violation apunishable war crime.

46

EXPORT CONTROL: MULTILATERALCOOPERATION AMONG SMALLERGROUPS OF STATESThe need for enlargement
All treaties discussed above contain obligations of
their parties to prevent the unauthorized export of materials,
equipment and technology that could be used in weapons programmes. The regimes are complemented by multilateral
cooperation among smaller numbers of member states. These
more exclusive regimes deal specifically with rules for export
controls. The Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers' Group(NSG), the Australia Group (for chemical and biologicalweapons), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
and the Wassenaar Arrangement (for conventional weapons)
all set up criteria for export licensing, lists of items to be controlled, and procedures for information exchange. A more
recent approach, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),
deals with the situation after export controls have failed, forintstance, the interception of international transport of WMDrelated materials, equipment and technologies.
These regimes have been defended by their members
as necessary to implement their undertakings under the legal
regimes or to prevent dangers to peace and international security. They have been criticized by some non-members as violating obligations to foster international cooperation in thepeaceful uses of the related technologies under the NPT, the
CWC and the BWC. Suspicion has been articulated that they
serve the defence of economic privileges by their predominantly more wealthy, industrialized members. In that sense,
they have been a source of contention and divisiveness47

Export control: multilateral cooperation

throughout their existence.
The members of the NSG, the Australia Group and the
MTCR have initiated outreach activities such as regional
meetings, open seminars, bilateral talks, and general information activities (press statements, websites) in order to fostertransparency and dialogue. These activities have enhanced theunderstanding of non-members of the problems involved andof the measures taken by member. However, they have notcompletely removed all concerns of some non-members.
Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction obliges all Member
States to "establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate
effective national export and trans-shipment controls oversuch items, including appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls
on providing funds and services related to such export andtrans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would
contribute to proliferation, as well as establishing end-user
controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminalor civil penalties for violations of such export control laws
and regulations". The resolution thus makes obligations thatare contained in general form in the treaties on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and have been partially elaborated by the review conferences of such regimes, a universal
obligation. At the same time, it spells out the operative meaning of these obligations.
Recommendations
It might be appropriate to set up
open-ended working groups on the implementation of these export control obligations and to
invite the NSG, the Australia Group and the
MTCR to give input with regard to possible
items to be listed and experiences and models

48Export control: multilateral cooperationfor export control structures and licensing criteria. Other UN Members could draw on suchadvice on a voluntary basis.
Export control systems should
include agreed lists of items to be subjected toexport licensing, a catch-all clause dealing
with non-listed items destined for weapons programmes, measures to cover the activities ofintermediaries such as brokers, measures toascertain the end use of transferred items, theintangible transfer of technology, a standard
for enforcement measures, and an understanding not to undercut negative licensing decisions taken by another state.
At the same time, the members of
the export control regimes should consider
offers of systematic legal, technical, organizational and financial assistance for the creationof effective export control systems on whichthose UN Member States lacking the respective
resources could draw. While the gap between
members and non-members would not be completely closed, it would be narrowed considerably through such practical cooperation.
Open seminars should be offered toenhance the information on export control
issues and help to develop the skills of both
civil society and officials in understanding andimplementing export control law and regulation.
The role of the United Nations
should be strengthened in fostering cooperation and coordination among Member States
on export controls.

49

Export control: multilateral cooperation

The recent discovery of a transnational nuclear trafficking network based on non-state actors in a state with
nuclear weapons capabilities indicates that the exchange of
information beyond the membership of the present export
control regimes is crucial for curbing the flow of WMD related material, equipment, and technology. Given the challenge
posed by non-state actors, export controls in order to be effective should be as much international as national, and more
inclusive than exclusive.
Recommendations
There should be a universal information
system on illegal procurement and trafficking
activities going beyond the present IAEA database and integrating the insights from the various WMD fields to permit a more comprehensive picture; such a broader exchange would
not prevent States from committing to more indepth intelligence sharing in smaller settings ifthey so chose.
Efforts should be made to develop
broad-based, universal norms and rules forexport controls.
A number of like-minded States acting outside theabove frameworks have established the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI). These states are working together to stop theflow of weapons of mass destruction, delivery systems andrelated materials to states and non-state actors of proliferation
concern by virtue of a variety of means, including interdiction
within the boundaries of international law. Currently, morethan 60 states are participating. Members make a strong effort
to ensure the cooperation of coastal states, important flagstates and states of ship owners so that interception of ships
carrying such items would be in accordance with internation-

50

Export control: multilateral cooperation

al law. The international community needs also the assurance
that such transports would not reach their destination in thefew, exceptional cases where such a legal basis is lacking.
Recommendations
PSI should continue to be implemented
in a manner consistent with international law.
Intercepts on the high seas where present legal authority is not sufficient should bebased on specific Security Council authorization. The acting state should be obliged toreport to the Council the evidence forcing
interception and the results of the search.
Participants in PSI operations shouldhave in place arrangements to cover any damages that result from intercept and search oftransports that prove innocent.
It is advisable to initiate negotiations on
ways and means to complement the Law of the
Sea in order to cover the cases where presently
legal authority for intercept is lacking.
All states should consider becoming
supporters of PSI as to make the initiative intoa universal, multilateral arrangement.

51

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The most important role for the United Nations consists of its efforts to work on the most dangerous conflicts
among and within States that provide the key motivations foracquiring weapons, including weapons of mass destruction.
The United Nations must enhance these efforts to combat thisdanger at the source. In this context, the Organization should
continue to support and encourage efforts at the regional levelto cope with the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including to non-state actors, e.g., the proposed
Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle
East, supported by all countries in the region.
Among the instruments of the international community to combat the dangers of the spread of weapons and ofinternational terrorism, the first priority is to strengthen international treaties and other arrangements that serve theseobjectives. To this end, the capabilities of the United Nations,and the Security Council in particular, to uphold these treaties
must be further enhanced, notably the capacity to respond incases of grave non-compliance that could pose a threat topeace and international security.
In the NPT context, the IAEA Board of Governors
can, under article XII.C of the IAEA statute, put cases of noncompliance before the Security Council and the General
Assembly. Each State Party of the BWC as well as a meetingof States Parties, can request the Security Council and theGeneral Assembly in cases of concern of non-compliance, toundertake an investigation of the matter (article VI). The
Executive Council of the OPCW can bring non-compliancecases of particular gravity and urgency directly to the General
Assembly and the Security Council. The Security Council has
addressed the issue of weapons of mass destruction repeated-

53

The role of the United Nations

ly, and has, inter alia, defined the proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, in its presidential declaration of 31. January
1992 and its resolution 1540 (2004) as a threat to peace andinternational security. It thus, could decide to take action onsuch cases under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations. The Council also possesses the authority to take theinitiative on its own in cases of proliferation and non-compliance even if referred to it by other actors or institutions.
Multilateral regimes are a first line of defence against
both state and non-state proliferation; General Assembly andthe Security Council serve as a last line of defence. The
Security Council may choose to act in support of non-proliferation treaties, when such regimes put serious non-compliance cases in its hands. This would happen because theregime-inherent instruments do not suffice to remedy the situation and hence there is the necessity of using the Security
Council's authority to solve the problem. The Security
Council may choose to take the initiative on its own, interalia, when problems other than non-compliance arise thatcannot be dealt with by the instruments currently available to
the regimes themselves, or when they present such urgent
risks that immediate measures are required — until theregimes have been adapted to cope with the problem concerned. Action by the Security Council may also be called forwhen emerging dangers require a universal response.
The specifics of non-compliance cases vary. They
cannot be addressed in a schematic way. Dealing with noncompliance involves a series of crucial decisions. Except forcases where the evidence of non-compliance is unambiguous
and undisputed, the Security Council would develop its judgement of the assessment offered by the treaty organizations thata serious breach of non-compliance that could pose a threat topeace and international security had indeed occurred. It would
have to assess the gravity of the risk posed to international

54

The role of the United Nations

peace and security by this breach. It would also have to decideon the appropriate means under the Charter to remedy the situation. All these decisions require timely and efficient decision-making.
For these tasks, the Security Council should be able todraw upon independent technical expert capacity. Information
available to Member States should be made available to the
Security Council as far as possible. On nuclear and chemical
weapons issues, independent assessment capability on which
the Council can draw is available at the IAEA, the CTBTO
and the OPCW. On biological weapons and missile issues andfor a general assessment of the whole array of proliferation
concerns, capacity must be available to the UN at short notice.
Recommendations
In cases of concern about noncompliance, the instruments available withinestablished regimes should be fully utilized.
Complementary access under the Additional
Protocol (or special inspections as long as theProtocol has not been adopted by all NPT
Parties), challenge inspections under the
CWC, and investigations under the BWC
should be invoked by the respective States
Parties to regimes and the organization’s bodies whenever needed.
For cases referred to the Security
Council, timely and efficient decision-making
should be ensured. All relevant information
and aspects should be made available for consideration, including the views of states fromthe region concerned. If required, the Security
Council should be able to obtain independent
technical expertise on short notice, drawing, as
appropriate, on the verification bodies of the55

The role of the United Nations

regime concerned.
If the threat is not assessed by the
Security Council as requiring immediate effective action and important questions of fact
remain undisclosed, the imposition of intrusive
inspection and elimination activities might be auseful way to address the situation. However, it
must be ensured that inspections do not becomea device to postpone necessary decisions.
There should be a core technical
WMD verification and elimination capability
with particular expertise in the BW and missile
sector available at UN headquarters. This coreorganisation should be capable of drawing on
a broad roster of experts.
In order to make the most economical use of this expertise, consideration should
be given to locating a small core unit, designed
to enhance the resources available to the
Security Council, within the Department for
Disarmament Affairs. Care should be taken to
ensure efficiency while avoiding unnecessary
growth of bureaucracy.
There is a risk of non-state actor proliferation whichcannot be completely averted by the instruments presently
available within the various treaty regime. This risk has motivated the work on Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on
the proliferation weapons of mass destruction. This resolution
marks a landmark in the efforts of the international community to fight the threat of weapons of mass destruction terrorism.
In the course of its considerations, concern was
expressed by non-permanent members and non-members of56

The role of the United Nations

the Council about the general scope of the resolution. Rather
than being case-specific, it obliges the UN membership totake certain quasi-legislative actions. These concerns point toa real dilemma in the fight against proliferation of weapons ofmass destruction, including their spread to non-state actors:
risks are viewed as so high that immediate action cannot be
avoided to compel all UN members to install effective measures at once.
The Council’s establishment of general rules in thisregard augments the inherent inequality between permanentand non-permanent members. No measure will be imposedthat would restrict the core interests of one of the P-5, throughall other Member States do not enjoy the same degree of protection of their national interests. There is also no procedure
to review the compatibility of Security Council’s adopted
norms with general principles of international law nor their
specific utility and effectiveness in achieving their statedobjectives. While the urgency of the risk proposed by nonstate actors may justify the adoption of such stopgap measures, such concerns should be heeded. In the working on the
resolution, these concerns were raised in consultations andopen meetings between the P-5 and non-members.
Recommendations
If existing WMD regimes do not yet
contain necessary instruments to cope withnew and urgent challenges, and the risk emerging from them appears immediate, the Security
Council might decide to mandate steps to remedy the situation.
Measures adopted by the Security
Council in such situations should carry a sunset clause, that is, they should be reviewed by

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the Security Council after an appropriate period of time and be extended only if such a
review proved their effectiveness and they arestill deemed necessary to combat a serious risk
to peace and international security.
When the Security Council adopts
a resolution imposing such measures, it should
invite simultaneously the members of therespective regimes or, where appropriate, theGeneral Assembly to set up a negotiating bodyto create a universal legal instrument for provisions that are not covered by existing treaties
and agreements and are outside their scope.
Security Council resolution 1540
should be utilised to encourage members of thetreaties and agreements to fully implement
those provisions that help prevent the transfer
of related items and technologies to non-state
actors, and to continue their efforts to make thetreaties and agreements universal. The
Committee installed to supervise the operationof resolution 1540 should assist member statesto achieve at effective implementation andshould develop recommendations at the end of
its two-year mandate how the provisions ofresolution 1540 might be improved.

The danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction, including into the hands of non-state actors,
requires that certain measures be applied universally to avert
immediate threats to peace and international security. Suchmeasures may be, so far, only binding on the States party to a

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particular treaty or convention. Such measures may also be
mandated by the Security Council to include non-members of
those regimes. In order to be effective, they should take into
account the security interests of such non-members.
Recommendation
When the Security Council considers universalizing measures which so far are
only binding on regime members, there should
be consultations with states not members tosuch the regimes. Their views and interests
should be taken into account.
When the Security Council acts to address issues
related to the spread of weapons, including to non-state actors,
the involvement of the General Assembly should be ensured
in the light of the shared responsibility under the Charter for
maintaining peace and international security. The effectiveness of universal measures benefits from the support of thewhole international community. To achieve this support,cooperation between the Security Council and the General
Assembly should be close and continuous, in accordance withthe provisions of the Charter. A steady flow of informationand communication between the Security Council and themembers of the General Assembly is conducive to avoiding
misunderstandings and to maintaining a sense of community
on which the success of such critical measures rests. In addition, successful and effective implementation by Member
States is more easily achieved when the objective of suchmeasures is clearly understood and their scope and direction
are clear.

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Recommendation
When the Security Council is considering measures in response to and for theprevention of the proliferation of weapons orother means of mass destruction, the General
Assembly should be fully informed about theCouncil's deliberations and the views ofGeneral Assembly members should be taken
into account. Close consultations and open
sessions of the Security Council are useful inthis regard.
The Secretary-General, under Article 99 of the United
Nations Charter, may bring any subject relating to the maintenance of international peace and security before the Security
Council. It is thus within the powers of the Secretary-General
to alert the Council to any case of real or supposed non-compliance or to other cases of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction to states or non-state actors which, in his view,presents a threat to international peace and security. The
Secretary-General may sometimes dispose of information notgenerally available or may deem it necessary to take the initiative to bring a specific security-related issue to the attentionof the Security Council. In any case, the UN SecretaryGeneral would consult closely with members of the United
Nations when considering making use of article 99.
Recommendation
The Secretary-General shouldmake use of his article 99 authority whenever,in his opinion, this is necessary to face a threat
to international peace and security, including
those emerging from the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.

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To be kept abreast of current developments, the Secretary-General should bring
together regularly the heads of the OPCW, theIAEA, the CTBTO and the World HealthOrganisation to be briefed about events, findings and insights relevant to peace and international security.

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62

ANNEX
Members of the Advisory Board on
Disarmament Matters, 2004
Mariama Bayard Gamatié, Consultant on genderissues and development, former Minister of Culture andCommunications of Niger, Niamey
Vicente Berasategui, former Ambassador ofArgentina to the United Kingdom, Buenos Aires
Pascal Boniface, Director, Institute of Internationaland Strategic Relations, (IRIS), Paris
Elisabet Borsin Bonnier, Permanent Representativeof Sweden to the United Nations Office, Geneva
Perla Carvalho Soto, Ambassador of Mexico to
Uruguay, Montevideo
Michael Clarke, Director, International Policy
Institute, School of Social Science and Public Policy, King’s
College, University of London, London
Gelson Fonseca, Jr., Ambassador of Brazil to Chile,
Santiago
Hasmy Agam, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Malaysia Putrajaya, Malaysia
Kuniko Inoguchi, former Permanent Representativeof Japan to the Conference on Disarmament, Professor,
Faculty of Law, Sophia University, Tokyo
Jeremy Issacharoff, Deputy Director-General for
Strategic Affairs, Strategic Affairs Divsion, Ministry ofForeign Affairs of Israel, Jerusalem

63Mahmoud Karem, Assistant Minister for Asian
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of
Egypt, Cairo
Ho-Jin Lee, Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to
Hungary, Budapest
Liu Jieyi, Director-General, Department of Arms
Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of thePeople’s Republic of China, Beijing
Maleeha Lodhi, High Commissioner of Pakistan to
the United Kingdom, London
Harald Müller (Chair), Director, Peace ResearchInstitute, Frankfurt
U. Joy Ogwu, Director-General, Nigerian Institute ofInternational Affairs, Lagos
Boris D. Pyadyshev, Ambassador, Editor-in-Chief,
International Affairs, Moscow
Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State
for Arms Control of the United States, State Department,
Washington, D.C.
Jill Sinclair, Special Coordinator, Middle East Peace
Process, Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Ottawa
Kongit Sinegiorgis, Director-General for African
Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa
Rakesh Sood, Permanent Representative of India to
the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva
Tibor Tóth, Permanent Representative of the
Republic of Hungary to the United Nations Office and Other
International Organizations, Geneva
Patricia Lewis (ex-officio member), Director, United
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Geneva

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