Proceedings of the International Symposium on Engineering Lessons Learned fromthe 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, March 1-4, 2012, Tokyo, JapanTECHNICAL AND SOCIETAL PROBLEMS TO BESOLVED IN GEOTECHNICAL ISSUES
Ikuo TOWHATA1, Hiroyoshi KIKU2 and Yuichi TAGUCHI3
1

Professor, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Tokyo,
Tokyo, Japan, towhata@geot.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp
2
Professor, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Kanto Gakuin University,
Yokohama, Japan, kiku@kanto-gakuin.ac.jp
3
Engineer, Fudo Tetra Corporation, Tokyo, Japan, yuichi.taguchi@geot.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp

ABSTRACT: The authors were impressed by their damage investigations after the quakethat many problems were caused by insufficient development and dissemination of
geotechnical engineering despite that actually more advantage is available from this fieldof engineering. For improvement of this situation, there has to be new philosophies inapplication of geotechnical engineering because many application fields are notfinancially well-supported. Budget saving may lead to catastrophic damage if
unexpectedly severe natural disaster occurs. Finally, the importance of wider scope isdiscussed in future scope of re-construction and retrofitting of existing facilities. In
addition, data interpretation on ageing effect on liquefaction potential is addressed.
Key Words: Great East Japan earthquake, geotechnical engineering, sea wall,liquefaction, performance-based design, policy for disaster mitigation

INTRODUCTION
After the occurrence of the earthquake on March 11th, 2011, the authors have been substantiallyengaged in damage investigations in many affected areas, ranging from the Tokyo Metropolitan Area
to the Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures where tsunami and liquefaction damages were significant. It was
surprising during the investigation trips that the damage extents were so severe in spite of thedevelopment of disaster mitigation technologies and social systems in the past several decades. For
example, many sea walls were destroyed by overtopping of tsunami water and then allowed further
attacks of tsunami on the local community. Slope failure and subsoil liquefaction in residential areas
caused profoundly negative impacts on houses and other private properties. A question arose on thesignificance of many efforts that have been so far done for mitigation of natural disasters.
Another impression comes from the future scope of disaster mitigation. It seems still uncertain
what aim is sought for in discussion of future. Immediately after the earthquake, the majority of public
opinions were talking about the importance of human lives that have to be protected from natural
disasters. After 10 months have passed, media reports difficulties in reconstruction of life and local

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communities that survived people encounter. However, the new scope has to be established as soon as
possible because another gigantic earthquake is expected in the western Pacific coast of Japan within a
few decades. In this regard, the present paper intends to discuss the desirable aim of reconstruction of
the earthquake-hit community. Because the present symposium is addressed to people from a variety
of fields of professions, the authors attempt to touch upon more societal topics than geotechnicalissues.

DAMAGE CAUSED BY TSUNAMI
The importance and severity of tsunami-induced damage is already well-known. It is attempted here todescribe additional remarks on the tsunami damage. Fig. 1 is a post-earthquake shape of a sea wallnear the mouth of the Abukuma River to the south of Sendai. Evidently the soil behind the wall was
lost because of scouring and this loss of passive earth pressure behind the wall allowed the wall to be
removed easily under the tsunami pressure. Thus, the community that was supposed to be protected by
the wall was severely destroyed.

Fig. 1 Destroyed shape of sea wall near themouth of Abukuma River

Fig. 2 Destroyed industrial area in thewater-front area of Kesen-numa CityOne of the limitations of a sea wall as a tsunami protection measure was that the disaster was verysignificant once tsunami overtopped the wall. Hence, after the earthquake, discussion has been madeon the goal to be achieved by the future tsunami-protection program undergoing such an extremely
strong tsunami as experienced in 2011. Because of the financial difficulty in constructing very highwalls (more than 10 m) along the entire tsunami-prone coast, the majority of public opinions has
preferred to implement tsunami education for people and emergency evacuation programs. It is
certainly true that high sea walls alone cannot solve all the problems, in particular people's lives, butsuch "soft" measures as education and evacuation cannot solve all the problems either. In the areas
where there is no high ground for evacuation, a safety shelter such as high embankment or building
has to be constructed. It is therefore pointed out that both conventional and new "soft" approaches
should be combined to achieve the best goal.
One year after the quake, re-construction of the tsunami-hit area is focused on. In this stage, oneof the most important issues is the unemployment of survived people. Without regular income, people
cannot start activities for re-construction of their community. The main reason for unemployment
seems to be the fact that the local main industries, which is fishery and marine products industry in thetsunami-affected area, were totally devastated by tsunami (Fig. 2). The authors believe that efforts
have to be made to protect, at least to some extent, industrial infrastructures from the tsunami effect.
Obviously fish industries have to be located near the sea where tsunami risk is high. Because those
infrastructures cannot evacuate upon the attack of tsunami, good sea walls and/or hightsunami-resistant buildings are meaningful.

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In case that financial limitation does not allow construction of long and sufficiently high sea walls,
an attempt has to be made to reduce scouring and erosion caused by overtopping of tsunami. It should
be intended therein to maintain the shape of walls as much as possible after overtopping and to reduce
the kinetic energy of tsunami water so that inundation and damage to structures may be minimized.
Fig. 3 illustrates an idea to install geo-tubes behind and probably in front of a sea wall so that the tube
may prevent erosion of geo-materials undergoing tsunami water flow. Geo-tube is a kind of soil
reinforcement by which soil is placed in a long and large tube and soil is separated from contact withwater flow.

Fig. 3 Schematic illustration of prevention of scouring and erosion behind sea wall by geo-tubes

COSEISMIC SUBSIDENCE
Tectonic actions upon rupture of fault mechanism are often associated with vertical displacement at
the earth surface that is either upwards or downwards. In 2011, the coseismic subsidence occurred
upon rebound of the hanging-wall side of the reverse fault rupture; at some distance from the fault. In
contrast, the sea bed near the fault got uplifted. Coseismic subsidence is important because the groundlevel along the coastal line sank at maximum 1.2m (Geospatial Information Authority, 2011) and ahuge area was inundated (Fig. 4). Hence, reconstruction of local community has been postponed until
filling of soil and lifting up of the ground surface. Until their completion, the inundated area isvulnerable to high tide and poor drainage during storms and heavy rains.
(a) Ishinomaki City(b) Onagawa Harbor

Fig. 4 Inundation and low ground level caused by coseismic subsidence (in Miyagi Prefecture)
Although much cannot be discussed about coseismic subsidence in this text, it is noted that similar
phenomena occurred during past gigantic earthquakes: Kohchi in 1946 during the Nankai earthquake,Japan, Valdivia City in 1960 in Chile, and Andaman as well as Nicobar Islands during the 2004
Sumatra earthquake. It is peculiar that the inundated areas in Kohchi and Chile came up again after thequakes (Towhata, 2008), while the subsided areas in 2011 do not come up or are coming up at an839

extremely low rate: 10 cm or less per year after 40-50 cm of subsidence (GIA, 2011). Thus, artificial
restoration of the ground surface is needed.

Fig. 5 Distribution of sites of liquefaction (MLIT and JGS, 2011)

ON MITIGATION OF LIQUEFACTION DAMAGE
The authors have been engaged in damage survey and official investigation on mitigation and future
design principles in the context of subsurface liquefaction. These activities have been conducted bothindividually and as national as well as local governmental programs. The major issue to be discussed
therein has been the cost-performance of liquefaction mitigation in relatively inexpensive structures
for which financial limitations do not allow expensive existing technologies.
Since 1960s when liquefaction was first recognized as a hazard to the human society, as
exemplified by the Alaskan and Niigata earthquakes in 1964, much effort has been made to develop
technologies that can reduce or prevent liquefaction-induced damage. Methodologies have beendeveloping for the past 40 years or more so that a variety of mitigation measures may be available;
ranging from total prevention to reduction of induced damage together with post-liquefaction
emergency actions. In spite of those, the earthquake in 2011 still induced significant liquefaction
problems at many places. The back ground for this adverse situation is going to be discussed.
Figure 5 illustrates the locations of liquefaction in the Kanto Region around Tokyo Metropolitan
area. It is therein found that the locations are classified into two groups; those along major rivers suchas the Tone River in the middle of the Kanto Plain and those in the Tokyo Bay area.
First, liquefaction along rivers occurred because of local geological conditions. Throughout thehistory, those rivers have been changing their channels, both naturally and artificially, leaving hence
former river channels everywhere where liquefaction-prone loose sandy deposits exist. Moreover,lakes and swamps in the lower reach of the Tone River have been reclaimed and filled with loose sandfor residential development, and liquefaction-vulnerable soil condition has been produced. The present
discussion focuses on the problems of dikes resting on former river channels in the present section andthe problem of residential development will be discussed later on together with liquefaction in theTokyo Bay area.
Liquefaction in levees
Figure 6 illustrates the distorted shape of the Tone River levee in Sawara City that is situated upon aformer river channel. Because the foundation soil liquefied easily, the overlying body of embankmentdistorted. Levee is an inexpensive structure for which limited budget is allocated for construction and840

retrofitting. Therefore, quick restoration after a quake has been practiced traditionally in place ofconstructing highly resistant levees. Only in the recent decades, the public concern has focused on
possible breaching and flooding that may occur immediately after seismic damage. In 2011, there wereless than two months of time between the earthquake (March 11) and the beginning of the rainy season(early June). During this short time, it was not possible to perfectly restore all the damaged levees, andthose damaged significantly were tentatively restored to the original height. The fundamental
restoration had to be postponed until the post-rainy-season. During the rainy season and high water,
the levels of patrol and alert were raised in order to avoid possible breaching. Fortunately the worst
situation did not occur because no heavy rain or strong typhoon came to the Kanto Region in the rainyseason of 2011. Noteworthy is that a river levee is a linear structure in which one breaching out of tensof (hundreds of) km of length can be fatal. More efforts are needed to identify potentially liquefiablesections of levees, evaluate the induced damage level, and retrofit the levee and the foundation to an"appropriate" extent. The appropriate retrofitting means that minor distortion is allowed to liquefied
levees unless the risk of flooding during the possible high water level is negligible. Thus, the design
philosophy is probabilistic and performance-based.
Figure 7 shows the subsidence and lateral displacement a levee of Hinuma that is one of thetributaries of the Naka River in north Kanto Region. Noteworthy is that the subsoil (Fig. 8) is totallyclayey (Ac: alluvial clay) and not liquefiable. It is hence supposed that the body of the levee liquefied
and developed significant distortion. To support this idea, the factor of safety against liquefaction (FL)in the lower part of the levee was calculated by using the method of the Highway Bridge Design Code(2002 version). The input parameters were the intensity of acceleration at the surface k=0.546G byreferring to the nearby K-Net record, the depth = 4.3m, and SPT-N = 6, and FL =0.588 was obtained.
Fig. 9 illustrates another example of liquefaction in the body of a levee.

(a) Sand boils in front of the levee(b) Distorted leveeFig. 6 Damaged levee of Tone River in Sawara

Fig. 7 Damaged levee of Hinuma in Ibaraki

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Fig. 8 Cross section of Hinuma Levee and subsoil condition (Sasaki et al., 2012)
The idea of liquefaction inside a levee was proposed after the 1993 Kushiro-oki earthquake in which
levees of the Tokachi and the Kushiro Rivers resting on unliquefiable peaty soils developed significant
distortion (Sasaki et al., 1994, and Kaneko et al., 1996). Initially, the surface of clayey soft deposit islevel and a river levee is constructed upon it (Fig. 10). As long as this initial geometry lasts, the levee
is situated above the ground water level, and its water content is not very high. Hence the risk ofliquefaction is low. In reality, however, the weight of the levee induces consolidation and settlement.
The base of the levee comes into subsoil, and the ground water comes into this part of the levee. The
ground water level in the levee rises further because of the infiltration of rain water. Moreover, the soil
density of this part of the levee might get looser upon subsidence and lateral extension. It is therefore
supposed that, in 2011, liquefaction occurred in many levees resting on clayey subsoil. Further in-situ
verification of this idea is being planned now.
Concerning the liquefaction inside a levee, the following technical problems have to be discussed.
First, how can we identify the location of potentially liquefiable levee? Out of hundreds of km of
length of a levee that is situated on soft clayey subsoil, sections of significant subsidence have to be
identified at low cost probably without subsurface sounding. Also, the density and type (sandy or
clayey) of soils in the levee have to be identified. Possibly a geophysical survey could play some role
therein. Second, the level of ground water has to be determined for assessment of damage extent.
However, the ground level is highly variable with seasons, and the highest water level in design
consideration leads to high cost of retrofitting. Third, it is desired to lower the water table in the levee.
In case the water table is higher than the ground surface, several types of drains are useful, althoughcare has to be taken not to induce unacceptable rate of seepage flow during flooding. Thus, matching
between safety during flooding and earthquake safety is always important. Drainage from the base of
the levee that is lower than the ground surface is not easy. Although a trench excavation at the toe ispromising, cost of the regional drainage system (operation of electric water pumping for example) is
noteworthy. Here is again the conflict between safety and reasonable cost.

Fig. 9 Sand boils in the berm at the middle height of the Naruse River levee north of Sendai City

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Fig. 10 Schematic illustration on mechanism of liquefaction in levee(a) Tilting(b) Subsidence

Fig. 11 Damage of private houses caused by liquefaction
Liquefaction in residential development
The aforementioned problem of conflict between cost and safety is encountered in a more serious
manner in mitigation of liquefaction problems in residential areas. Fig. 11 indicates damage of houses
that are classified into two types; tilting in Fig. 11(a) and subsidence (penetration into foundation soil)in Fig. 11(b). Damage investigation revealed that most liquefaction occurred in young (construction in
the second half of the 20th Century) and loose sandy deposits with high levels of ground water(Towhata, 2011). Noteworthy is that, within heavily liquefied municipalities, there are areas where soil
had been improved by densification or installation of gravel drains, and liquefaction damage wasavoided (Fig. 12a). In contrast, there were heavily liquefied areas as well within a short distance fromsuccessful areas (Fig. 12b). Although the areas in Fig. 12 were constructed and sold to people by thesame organization, the earthquake performance was completely different. This situation can be
attributed most probably to different economic policies; the present paper never intends to justify anyof them:1)

As a business by the public sector, the seismic safety should be secured although the price may
rise.
2) Residential land sold to people by the public sector should be of low price for the benefit of thepeople.

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Both philosophies are reasonable. When the land was sold decades ago when people were not yet
serious about the earthquake risk, the second idea was appealing to people more widely than the firstone, although people’s idea is opposite after the disaster. Thus, it is still uncertain which idea isreasonable in residential development projects, although the first one appears more acceptable today.
(a) No liquefaction(b) Liquefaction and boiled sandFig. 12 Contrast of liquefaction in manmade island of Urayasu City
After the quake, the first author received many inquiries from residents whose houses were affected byliquefaction. It is important to note that, although many houses were not structurally damaged, tiltingof less than 10/1000 (Keino et al., 2011) causes dizziness and headache to residents. Obviously,subsidence destroyed connection between the house and buried lifelines.
Then the following issues had to be considered:
1) The risk of a big aftershock or other major earthquake in the near future was of concern.
Therefore, people could not decide when they should repair their damaged houses.
2) People were seeking for relatively inexpensive measures that could restore the tilting andsubsidence, and, at the same time, mitigate the problem of future liquefaction.
3) The restoration of private houses was not eligible to a public financial support, although a limited
amount of public donation was supplied. Hence, people needed an inexpensive restoration
measure that still did not sacrifice the safety.
The authors tried to find a mitigation that would satisfy people, but no good one was found. The major
problem was the existing house at the ground surface that hindered any soil improvement effort or, atleast, increased the cost drastically. One promising idea was the construction of underground walls inthe streets that would restrain shear strain of soil from occurring during strong earthquakes andconsequently would reduce excess pore water pressure. This idea was once considered promising bypeople because any reconstruction works under public roads were supposed to be paid by the public
sector, thus reducing the private expenditures. Unfortunately, the idea of underground walls wasconsidered less promising because the spacing between walls was too large to prevent liquefaction.
The next promising idea is lowering of ground water table, thereby increasing the thickness of
unliquefiable soil layer near the surface and achieving more safety for surface structures (Ishihara,1985). If lowering is practiced in a big scale (involving 100 houses or more), the cost becomesreasonable. The authors suppose there are several problems to be overcome in lowering of the groundwater table;
1)

In case the surface liquefiable soil is underlain by soft cohesive materials, consolidation andsubsidence may be serious.

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2)
3)
4)

In particular, differential settlement of foundation of houses would cause fatal effects on houses.
Lowering of ground water often needs continuous operation of pumps that require substantial costof operation and maintenance.
Safety and reliability of ground water lowering is not very clear during unexpectedly strong
earthquakes.

It is supposed therefore that lowering of the ground water table should be practiced if and only if
100 % of the concerned people agree. Otherwise, lowering should not be done because compensation
for possible house damage during consolidation settlement costs profoundly. Thus, there seems to be
no good mitigation technology that is sufficiently effective but inexpensive. People should accept
lowering of ground water or, in place of any public support for safety of houses, individual houseowners should do efforts. When existing houses are demolished after, probably, 30 years, more
efficient and less expensive mitigation measures for liquefaction problem can be conducted.

EFFECT OF AGEING OF SAND ON LIQUEFACTION RESISTANCE
Figure 13 demonstrates the distribution of liquefied areas (shown by red color) and unliquefied areasin Urayasu City. It is shown here that liquefaction occurred in younger manmade lands that wereconstructed after 1960s while no liquefaction occurred in more aged subsoil. It seems therefore
important for assessment of liquefaction risk to take into account the ageing effects so that thereliability of the assessment may be improved. Note, however, that the study of ageing is meaningful if
SPT-N and other sounding data do not account for the ageing. The study is useful practically if the riskof liquefaction decreases with the increase of age although SPT-N and other sounding data do notincrease with age correspondingly.
Studies on ageing effect on liquefaction resistance of sand were conducted by Mulilis et al. (1977)
and Tatsuoka et al. (1988). Both conducted laboratory tests by changing the time of consolidation andsuggested an increase of liquefaction resistance with time. However, the consolidation time in thelaboratory was limited to 100 days because of many technical limitations. In this regard, Mulilis et al.
(1977) studied case histories to extend the consolidation time to nearly one million days. The present
study attempts to study case histories of liquefaction as well.

Fig. 13 Distribution of liquefaction in Urayasu City of Chiba845

Cases with and without liquefaction were collected from the eastern part of Tokyo and Urayasu City of
Chiba where the age of land reclamation is clearly known. The information on soil profile wascollected from database that was developed by JGS. Fig. 14 indicates the relationship between thenormalized N1 of standard penetration tests and the seismically induced stress ratio, L. This L value
was calculated by using the maximum horizontal accelerations that were recorded at nearby K-Net
stations. As expected, data from liquefied and unliquefied sites are separated to some extent by the
curve suggested by the Highway Bridge Design Code (2002 version). The study on ageing concerns
whether or not this border curve changes with the age of soil. In other words, the boundary of thefactor of safety against liquefaction, FL, between liquefaction and no-liquefaction may change withage, although the current practice assumes that this boundary is FL=1. The FL value was calculated byusing the Highway Bridge Design Code.
The data of N1 and L in Fig. 14 changes in the vertical direction in a single borehole data. The
particular plotted data correspond to1) the minimum factor of safety against liquefaction, FLmin, at sites of liquefaction because thisFLmin indicates that the abovementioned boundary value is greater than FLmin, (see Fig. 15) and2) the maximum FLmax at sites without liquefaction because this FLmax suggest that the boundary
value is less than FLmax.
Figure 16 plots FLmax and FLmin thus defined against age of soils. Note that the boundary FL lies
between the upward and downward arrows. It seems reasonable to state that this boundary value
decreases as the age increases, implying that aged soil is unlikely to liquefy even when FL value is lessthan unity. In other words, SPT-N values that are employed in calculation of FL does not account for
the increase of liquefaction resistance with age.
For further discussion, the plotted data was modified or improved by considering theamplification of ground motion at liquefied soft ground. The dynamic analysis at liquefied sites of
Urayasu showed that the surface motion was approximately 30% greater than the nearby K-Net record
which was obtained on unliquefied soil (report to the city government, unpublished yet). In this regard,
all the FL values at liquefied sites in Fig. 16 was reduced to 75% (= 100%/130%) of the originalvalues.
The results are presented in Fig. 17. It is more clearly shown that the boundary value of FL
decreases with increase of age and that liquefaction resistance of soil increases with age. This increase
rate is equivalent to the inverse of the boundary FL. Fig. 18 demonstrates this increase in which therange of uncertainty in both the boundary FL and the soil age (construction period is longer than oneyear) are accounted for. The newly obtained data is consistent with those from previous studies.

Fig. 14 Relationship between cyclic shear stress ratio, L, and the normalized SPT-N at sites with andwithout liquefaction.

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The boundary between FL for liquefaction and F L for no liquefaction lies between F L min and F L max.

Fig. 15 Significance of minimum and maximum factor of safety against liquefaction in a single
borehole data.

Fig. 16 Possible ageing effect on the border valueof FL between liquefied and unliquefied sites.

Fig. 17 Revised insights on ageing effect on theborder value of FL between liquefied andunliquefied sites

Liquefaction resistance/ Resistance of fresh sandConsol liq

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

Tatsuoka et al.
Reconstituted samples
Mulilis et al.
Reconstituted samples
Mulilis et al.
Case histories
Case histories in 20112

10.001 0.01 0.1

1

10 100 100010000

Consolidation time (years)

Fig. 18 Assessed effect of ageing on liquefaction resistance of sand obtained from the cases in 2011
(arrows on symbols by Mulilis et al. implies that the true ageing effect is greater than the plottedvalue.)

847

CONCLUSIONS
Geotechnical damage and liquefaction events caused by the gigantic earthquake in 2011 werereviewed and discussed. The major conclusions drawn from this study are as what follows.
1) The role to be played by the geotechnical engineering is more than conventional perception.
Typical example is the mitigation of scouring behind a sea wall undergoing tsunami overtopping.
2) Liquefaction inside a river levee is now suspected to be one of the major causes of damage.
Mitigation of this problem needs lots of efforts from now on.
3) Liquefaction damage in house foundation was serious. There seems to be no good mitigation forthis problem that can be practiced at low cost with good performance.
4) The ageing effect on liquefaction resistance of sand was demonstrated by using borehole databaseand information on onset of liquefaction.

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