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International Journal of Korean Studies
Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2

Disabling “Nuclear” North Korea
for Regional Balance and Security

and, third, draw possible implications of the nuclear fallout onsustaining the future U.S.-ROK alliance and inter-Korean
relations. This article will conclude, finally, by adding ahistorical perspective to “denuclearization” of Korea and the“nuclear-free” Korean Peninsula.

Young Whan Kihl,Ph.D.
Iowa State University
The reality of a rising “nuclear” North Korea, with its testfiring of seven missiles on July 5, 2006, and underground testingof a nuclear device on October 9, was met by world-wide
condemnation and emergency sessions of the United Nations
Security Council. The world had not yet gotten accustomed tothe two UN Security Council resolutions (1695 and 1718),
imposing limited economic sanctions on North Korea, when it
was surprised once again by the breakthrough announcement of
February 13, 2007: the Six-Party Talks Accord on “Disabling theNorth Korean nuclear program.”1
The regional security environment surrounding the Korean
peninsula was jolted, and may still undergo a structural change,
as a result of the 2006 nuclear test and the subsequent “nuclear
accord” of 2007. If carried out strictly, it may usher in a newchapter-- heralding a major shift-- in international politics ofNortheast Asia. Whether a peaceful alternative to defusing the“nuclear standoff” is likely, and whether some of the chronic
conflict issues between North Korea and the United States aresettled, remains to be seen.2 The same is true for policy issues
involving the other Six-Party Talks partner countries of China,
Russia, South Korea and Japan.
The nagging question still remains: “Will the dark nuclear
cloud hanging over the Korean Peninsula be lifted soon, once
and for all,” because of the 2007 implementation plan of the SixParty Talks accord? Although the answer remains uncertain, thetime for Korean denuclearization has yet to arrive. The obvious
follow-up points are “how come?” and “why not?”To draw certain policy implications for future U.S.-Korea
and inter-Korean relations, this article will proceed in several
steps: first, examine the likely shifting power balance and new
security environment, in the wake of the North’s nuclear test;
second, analyze the Six-Party Nuclear Accord of February 13,
2007, as it impinges upon the future of inter-Korean relations;94

Shifting Power Balance Surrounding the Korean Peninsula
North Korea’s testing of a nuclear device, on October 9,
2006, attested to its capacity for system maintenance in a dual
sense: not only of a technically demanding program of nuclear
weapons development, but also of a politically-motivatedleadership determined to play an active role in international
diplomacy and foreign relations.
North Korea’s nuclear
weapons program, backed up by its testing of a nuclear device, is
now a fact of life, and is no longer a bargaining chip.
North Korea’s state-run Korean Central News Agency(KCNA) announced that the nuclear test was carried out safely
and successfully: “The field of scientific research in the DPRK
successfully conducted an underground nuclear test under secure
conditions on October 9, Juche 95 (2006) at a stirring time when
all the people of the country are making a great leap forward in
the building of a great prosperous powerful socialist nation.” Italso added that there was no danger, such as from radioactive
emission in the course of testing: “The nuclear test was
conducted with indigenous wisdom and technology 100 percent.
It marks a historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the
Korean People’s Army (KPA) and people that have wished tohave powerful self-reliant defense capability.”3
The timing of the nuclear test was also notable, in its intent
to maximize both internal and external influences. Internally, thetest took place between two commemorative dates: first, the day
when its leader Kim Jong-il became the general secretary of the
Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) nine years ago in 1997, and on
the eve of the 60th anniversary of establishing the North Koreanchapter of the Korean Communist Party in Pyongyang on
October 10, 1946. 4 On the day of testing, Japanese Prime
Minister Shinjo Abe was on a state visit to Seoul from Beijing.
After the two-hour summit meeting with Abe, the ROK
President Roh Moo-hyun said his government’s policy on

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Pyongyang “will change course in the wake of the nuclear test.”
A few hours later Roh spoke by telephone with U.S. President
George W. Bush, agreeing “to deal with the nuclear test calmly
and strategically.” In a statement Bush said that North Korea’s
reported nuclear test posed “a threat to global peace andsecurity” and that it was an “unacceptable” action requiring an
immediate response by the U.N. Security Council.5

terrorist groups “would be considered a grave threat to theUnited States,” and that the North would be held “fully
accountable.” The U.S. could issue this credible warning in part
because the IAEA had a library of nuclear samples from North
Korea, obtained before the agency’s inspectors were thrown outof the country, and the U.S. has access to that database of
nuclear DNA.8
The U.S. declaration aimed at North Korea was unique
because it can be differentiated from similar warnings to othernuclear states, like Russia and Pakistan, and the would-be
nuclear states, like Iran. “We need to distinguish between theleakage problem, where it would be inadvertent, and the provider
problem, where it would be an intentional act,” according toRobert S. Litwak the author of “Regime Change: U.S. Strategy
Through the Prism of 9/11.” “To the provider we should say,‘Don’t even think about it,’ and this more explicit declaratory
policy can get us traction because these regimes value their own
survival above all else.” Kim’s North Korea would be a primeexample of that. “For the leakage problem, we don’t want to be
trapped into a question of how we retaliate against” them (i.e.,
Russia or Pakistan). “But through calculated ambiguity, [theU.S.] can create incentives for them to do even more in the areaof safeguarding their weapons and capabilities.”9Moreover, “what if the regime is able to revive its economy
through a process of incremental reform without foregoing its
nuclear capabilities and longer-term nuclear potential?” 10 In
speculating about North Korea’s nuclear program a decade laterin 2015, there are three scenarios identifiable, according to
Pollack: (1) pursuit of a symbolic nuclear capability; (2) pursuitof an operational nuclear deterrent; and, (3) a deficient (or failed)effort to achieve an operational capability. 11 These and related
questions will require careful studies and frank discussion,“unburdened by unrealistic preconceptions about North Korea”
and “without remaining tethered to past policy decisions andtheir consequences.”12
Four immediate policy considerations that the United Statesand international community would benefit from exploring,according to Pollack, are:Checkmating the Rise of a New Nuclear State?
Even if the results of the underground test may not havebeen what Pyongyang had expected, this act cannot be“undone.” 6 Despite its isolation and internal vulnerabilities,
North Korea succeeded in conducting a nuclear test, in open
defiance of non-proliferation norms and regimes of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The immediate policy questions, as
Jonathan D. Pollack of the U.S. Naval War College has noted,
relate to “what outside powers can do both to minimize the risks
posed by North Korean actions” and “to make it as difficult as
possible for North Korea to achieve significant headway in its
nuclear goals.” It is imperative for the United States and its allies
that’ “communication channels remain open” to North Korea
without triggering responses from Pyongyang “that make theexisting situation even more dangerous.”7
It is encouraging to hear, in this regard, that China’s efforts
to induce Pyongyang’s return to the Six-Party talks following its
nuclear testing were eventually successful in December 2006.
The U.S. display of its willingness to meet bilaterally with North
Korea in Berlin in mid-January 2007 also constituted new
evidence of the Bush Administration’s diplomatic flexibility.
These efforts eventually yielded meaningful results in the formof the February 13, 2007 “joint statement” of the Six-Party Talks
on “disabling the North Korean nuclear program.”
At the same time the United States and its allies needed toseek policy alternatives in case North Korea either refused to“fold its tent” or “undertook additional, even riskier steps tocounter perceived threats to its (regime) survival.” On October 9,
the day North Korea detonated its nuclear test, the U.S.
responded with an explicit warning to North Korea that the“transfer of nuclear weapons or material” to other countries or9697

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Determining additional measures to discourage or
impede North Korea’s future weapons development,
which in the near term should focus on convincing
North Korea to forego additional nuclear tests orfurther tests of ballistic missiles.

•

Reiterating to Pyongyang that any transfer of nuclear
materials, technologies, or completed weapons
outside its borders would constitute a grave danger
to the international community as a whole.

•

Imposing additional costs on North Korea for any
further nuclear tests.

•

Fully weighing the trade-offs in pursuing partial
steps to restrict nuclear weapons development versus
pursuit of maximal policy goals.13

There is virtually no possibility that North Korea will
irrevocably yield the totality of these capabilities in the absenceof fundamental internal change in North Korea or extraordinarychanges in the negotiating strategies of the U.S. and otherpowers. Given this reality, the most likely outcome, according to
Pollack, would be a symbolic nuclear capability “given that
Pyongyang still confronts major technical hurdles.” Even if sucha move of “symbolic nuclear capability” would not entail adefinitive end to the program, this possibility warrants carefulconsideration by the U.S. and its allies seeking a negotiated end
to Pyongyang’s nuclear program. It is not prudent to anticipate,
therefore, “an early end to Pyongyang’s program” or to thedangers this program poses both for security in East Asia and forthe future viability of the non-proliferation regime.14
North Korea’s nuclear program, whether successful or not,will have implications and an impact for other countries in theregion, such as Japan, South Korea, and the ROC in Taiwan, in
terms of their own nuclear ambitions. Failure of the UnitedStates and regional governments in Northeast Asia to halt North
Korea’s nuclear program, however, need not yet dissolve into a
process of wider nuclear proliferation in the region, according toa recent study by Christopher W. Hughes. 15 This is because
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan seem set to continue hedging

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their nuclear bets “as long as the U.S. remains impeccable andengaged in its security commitments.” Under thesecircumstances the United States faces a major challenge in its
attempt to roll back the North Korean nuclear program; the U.S.
may, in fact, already have failed in its endeavor. 16 The
challenging question is “for how long is this U.S.-led status-quo”
likely to endure?
Forging a New Security Order?
In the aftermath of the North Korean nuclear test, the major
power relations in Northeast Asia are expected to change with a
gradual shift in the power balance surrounding the Korean
peninsula. The United States’ security role in Northeast Asia in
the fundamental sense, however, is “no different in the wake of
the North Korean nuclear test from what it was before,”according to one astute observer. The reason is that “the UnitedStates will continue to be the most powerful nation present in theregion” and will continue to have “vital political, economic andsecurity interests that will . . . continue to play the role ofregional balancer or stabilizer for the foreseeable future.”17
The military balance on the Korean peninsula itself, forinstance, “has not been changed by the DPRK test, nor would it
be fundamentally changed even if the North were believed tohave a truly deliverable weapon,” so Aland D. Romberg notes.
“The latter would, of course, raise the ante not only in terms ofthe threat to South Korea, but most especially to Japan and U.S.
forces there given the substantial Rodong missile force in the
North’s inventory.” Nonetheless, according to the same author,“a workable Taepodong II missile would expand the North’s
reach substantially, but even in that case, to put it in its crudest
terms, the balance of forces ensures that if North Korea started awar, we would finish it.”18
Nonetheless, the nuclear test has altered the situation insome important ways, according to Romberg, in that thechallenge for the United States and its allies “is to rise to theoccasion to manage the new situation constructively.” “Handled
well, the net effect could be to strengthen the American role andthe prospects for peace and security of the region. Mishandled,
the net effect could be to diminish U.S. influence over time, and99

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to generate forces toward a much less certain future for allconcerned.”19
The North Korean nuclear test, in short, “has not had a
harmful effect so far on U.S. interests or substantially changed
the role in North East Asia,” according to Romberg. However,“the situation is not static” and, if the U.S. does not seize themoment to press the advantages that have been created, the U.S.
will “not only have squandered an opportunity presented by theNorth Korean test to consolidate” U.S. relations with its allies
and with China, but the U.S. might ironically find itself“relatively isolated and cast in the role of spoiler. There is no
reason for the United States to allow that to happen, and every
reason to ensure it doesn’t.”20
General Burwell Bell, commander of U.S. Forces in Korea,
warned in 2007 of a second nuclear test by North Korea, which
he claimed could continue nuclear development, making North
Korea a moderate nuclear power by 2010 if it goes unchecked.
Speaking before a U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee
hearing, he said: “Unless the Six-Party talk’s process prevails,
we expect North Korea to continue nuclear weapons researchand development to perpetuate its strategy of intimidation,
adding that Pyongyang “may ultimately aim to develop nuclear
armed missiles to threaten regional countries and even the U.S.”
He said North Korea has 50 kg of plutonium, enough to produce
seven nuclear bombs. He also warned that North Korea’s recordof selling missiles and arms could lead the regime to “proliferate
nuclear weapons technology, expertise or material to antiAmerican countries, rogue regimes or non-state actors.”21
In the aftermath of the DPRK’s nuclear testing in 2006, andits demonstrated WMD stockpile and missile launchingcapabilities, a potential shift in the balance of power has beenoccasioned in Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean
peninsula.22 It is imperative, therefore, that the United States andits allies begin to explore the alternative path to nuclear
disarmament, through diplomacy, that the Six-Party Talks “jointstatement” on February 13, 2007 stipulated.

The Six-Party Talks Accord of February 13, 2007 and Its
Implementation: An Analysis
The bi-multilateral (i.e., 2 + 4) approach to diplomacy
toward North Korea, which the Six-Party Talks on North Korean
nuclear standoff epitomize, finally came to bear intended fruit on
February 13, 2007. 23 On that day the chief negotiators from thesix nations, the U.S., North Korea, China, South Korea, Russia
and Japan, managed to issue a “joint statement” on theimplementation of “the Principles of September 19, 2005,”
thereby upholding the principle of “denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.”
Under the 2005 plan, the Six Parties had agreed to (1) reaffirm the goal of attaining the verifiable denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner; (2) undertake, in theirrelations, to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charterof the United Nations and recognized norms of international
relations; (3) promote economic cooperation in the fields ofenergy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally;(4) commit to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability inNortheast Asia; (5) take coordinated steps to implement the
afore-mentioned consensus in a phased manner in line with theprinciple of "commitment for commitment, action for action;”and, (6) hold the Fifth Round of the Six-Party Talks in Beijing inearly November 2005, at a date to be determined throughconsultations.24
Under this plan, which reflected the norm of a “quid-proquo” diplomatic settlement, North Korea agreed to “disable” its
nuclear facilities in exchange for a series of incentives andrewards packages. North Korea was to shut down nuclear
facilities in Yongbyon within 60 days, which included a halting
operation of its 5 mw nuclear reactor and canning spent fuel rods.
The North also agreed to admit IAEA inspectors to conduct thenecessary monitoring. In return, South Korea would initiallyprovide 50,000 tons of heavy oil worth US$20 million, an
additional 950,000 tons to be delivered depending on how far
North Korea went along the road to disabling the facilities.
Asked what the “disabling” meant, a South Korean official wasquoted as saying: “This goes a step further than halting theoperation of nuclear facilities and involves processes all the way

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to–but just one step away from—completely dismantling
them.”25
The six nations would establish within the month fiveworking groups to discuss issues, including denuclearization of
the Korean Peninsula, a security mechanism in Northeast Asiaand the normalization of diplomatic ties between the U.S. andthe DPRK (an official name for North Korea) as well as between
Japan and the North. Although the agreement prevented theNorth from producing more plutonium that could be used tomake nuclear weapons, it did not affect North Korea’s existing
nuclear arms; hence, full denuclearization was still a long way
away. It also remained to be seen whether North Korea would
keep it’s “word for word” and declare its nuclear programs in
full.
The six nations agreed to “share the cost of the rewards”
equally, except that Japan still maintained that it could contributeonly when the issue of Japanese nationals abducted by the Northwas resolved. The six agreed that matters regarding the North’s
existing nuclear weapons and the highly enriched uranium
program that the U.S. claimed would be discussed later. They
also agreed to start negotiating the removal of North Korea fromthe U.S.’ list of states sponsoring terrorism and the subsequent
removal of U.S. economic restrictions under the Trading with the
Enemy Act.

Bush explained, “The second phase is to disable and abandon
their [North Korean] facilities. If they do the second phase . . .
there will be about the equivalent of a million tons, minus the
50,000 tons [from South Korea] each available (in) food,economic assistance and fuel. Now, that’s not going to happen
until there are some verifiable measures that have been taken.”27
It was U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and U.S.
Chief Negotiator Christopher Hill who sought direct instruction
from Bush. A “turning point came on January 17,” according toa press account, when Hill met with his North Koreancounterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, in Berlin. According to the New
York Times, Bush approved last-ditch negotiations after getting aphone call from Rice, who stopped in Berlin on her way homefrom talks with Arab leaders in Kuwait. At the time, shecommunicated with President Bush and White House National
Security Advisor Steven Hadley after receiving a one-page
document on North Korea’s demand from Assistant Secretary ofState Hill. In the phone call, she asked President Bush, “Do you
think we should proceed on this basis?” and Bush answered,“Yes.”28
Former U.S. negotiator on North Korea Jack Pritchard said
that the Berlin meetings were held with Bush’s direct approval.
Facing the fact of becoming a lame duck president, bogged downin Iraq, and confronting Iran’s nuclear development, the U.S.
president appears to have undergone a profound change from theman who once called North Korean leader Kim Jong-il a“tyrant.” 29 The U.S. Government’s senior North Korea
intelligence analyst, Joseph DeTrani, said during a
Congressional hearing that American officials now had only
“midlevel confidence” in the same intelligence that had led theBush administration to assert in 2002 that North Korea “wasactively ‘enriching’ uranium—and could have a bomb-making
plan up and running soon.”30
In the Berlin meetings, the U.S. promised North Korea tosettle the issue of Pyongyang’s frozen accounts with the Macaubased Banco Delta Asia, according to the Washington Post
report. Informal talks with Victor Cha, U.S. National Security
Council Director for Asia, including a chance encounter in the
Beijing airport in December, helped lead to the unusualBush’s New Pragmatism Prevails
From the perspective of the U.S., the February 13, 2007
“nuclear accord” reached beyond resolving the immediate North
Korean nuclear crisis. It also signified a general shift in U.S.
relations with North Korea, Northeast Asia and the Korean
Peninsula security. The Bush Administration, which remained
mired in Iraq and Afghanistan, seemed to have changed its
policy on pragmatic grounds.26
The U.S. called the accord a “unique deal,” “the first step
toward implementing” the statement of principles that wereagreed upon in September 2005. These were to be implemented
on “a step-by-step basis.” During a subsequent press conference
Bush responded by saying that his former ambassador to the
U.N., John Bolton, was “flat wrong” in criticizing the agreement.

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negotiations Hill and Cha held with North Korean counterpartsin Berlin in January. In those informal talks Cha hinted at thepossibility of unfreezing some BDA accounts which North
Korea called legitimate; this lead to the Berlin meeting.31
Opinions are divided as to the real meaning and significanceof the February 13 nuclear accord. Did North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il make the strategic decision to give up his nuclear
program this time? Or did he just make what short-term
concessions he needed to overcome financial sanctions and afood shortage? The cynics naturally wondered how long theagreement would last.32 Others also tended to be cautious. “Thisis a freeze with a promise to negotiate subsequent disarmament,”
said Gary Samore, director of studies at the Council on Foreign
Relations, who took part in the nuclear negotiations with North
Korea under the Clinton administration. “And a North Korean
promise to negotiate later is pretty worthless.” Joel Wit, a former
U.S. State Department official who coordinated the Agreed
Framework in 1994, commented: “It gives the illusion of moving
more rapidly to disarmament, but it doesn’t really require
anything to happen in the second phase.”33 Underlying these andother remarks was and is a fundamental American distrust of
North Korea.
Following the six-party talks in February, U.S. negotiator
Hill invited his North Korean counterpart to New York as thefirst step in the working-group talks between the U.S. and North
Korea. During a March 5 meeting in New York, the North
Korean chief negotiator Kim Kye-gwan was quoted as asking
Hill to “treat us the way you treat India.” In 2006 U.S. President
had visited New Delhi and signed the U.S.-India Nuclear
Cooperation Agreement, which reversed 30 years of U.S.
criticism of India for not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty; it then allowed sales of nuclear technology to New Delhi.
The U.S. rejected Kim’s demand, noting that North Korea could
never become India.34
In making such demands North Korea seemed to be
attempting to normalize relations with the U.S. without
scrapping the nuclear weapons it said it had already built. It
remains to be seen, however, whether Kim’s demand reflects
North Korea’s bottom line or was merely a statement fornegotiation purposes. The February 13 agreement did not
mention the dismantling of nuclear weapons, even at the stage
when the nuclear facilities have been disabled; some observers
say this will necessitate separate negotiations to dismantle thenuclear weapons.35
Speaking at a seminar in Washington, D.C. Hill said theUnited States “will not form any ties with a nuclear-equipped
North Korea” adding that the Indian precedent would not apply
to North Korea. Washington’s goal, as he put it, was “theabolition of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and thedenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” 36 The six-nation
nuclear agreement of February 13 did not include a concrete
deadline for North Korea’s removal from the list of state
sponsors of international terrorism. It is no surprise to see,
therefore, that North Korea was still on the U.S. list of states thatsponsor terrorism, when the U.S. State Department sent its
annual report on international terrorism to the U.S. Congress.
Removing North Korea from the list would take at least 45
days.37

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Unexpected Delay and Hurdles
The February 13 agreement to resolve the North Korean
nuclear crisis soon started to crack. Within 60 days the U.S. wasto release North Korean funds frozen at Macao’s Banco Delta
Asia, and North Korea was to shut down and seal its nuclear
reactor at Yongbyon after having it verified by IAEA inspectors.
South Korea was to supply to the North 50,000 tons of heavy oil,while the six-nation talks were to put into motion working
groups discussing a wide range of outstanding issues. The
deadline came and went without the scheduled resumption of thesix nation talks immediately after April 14. What went wrong?38
All parties share responsibility. North Korea, needless to say,
was a responsible party. The North missed the April 14 deadline
to shut down its main reactor, as agreed under the February
agreement; it cited a failure to release the funds at Macau-based
Banco Delta Asia (BDA). The release of the money, frozen after
the U.S. blacklisted the BDA where the North had 52 accounts
allegedly linked to money laundering and counterfeiting, proved
harder than expected since no other bank would touch the money.

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Although the U.S. allegedly did everything it could toresolve the BDA question, the bottom line was that a
precondition North Korea set was not met. The U.S. Treasury
Department acted to release all the US$25 million frozen at thebank, both legal and illegal funds, so that Pyongyang could
withdraw them anytime it wanted to, but the North also insisted
that the situation be restored to what it had been before the BDA
affair flared up. It also increased demands, not only to release thefunds, but also to normalize all its overseas financial transactions.
This was an impossible demand unless the alleged illegal actions
that led to the initial financial sanctions stopped.
The U.S. was also responsible for letting the deadline to slip.
The Bush administration, in the wake of its defeat in the 2006
mid-term elections, was impatient for quick results by changing
its North Korea policy. Washington hastily pushed ahead with aworking-level conference on normalizing diplomatic ties with
Pyongyang before the nature of the February 13 accord had fully
been disclosed. The U.S. made a mistake by overstraining itself
to reconcile the position of the Treasury Department and thelegal issues involved in releasing the frozen funds. As a result ofoffering the North excessive expectations, the U.S. lost a lever in
the negotiation and, in effect, wasted the 60 days.39
South Korea must also share the blame. When the February
13 accord was announced, the Roh government proposed
resuming the inter-Korean dialogue as a separate track. It was
eager to induce North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons
program voluntarily. Seoul went ahead, during the 20th interKorean ministerial talks in Pyongyang, proposing to link rice aid
to the initial implementation of the February 13 accord.
Whereas the North stalled, citing the unresolved BDA question,
the South resumed the talks on fertilizer aid and rice delivery. In
this way Seoul seems to have deprived itself of a card it could
have used to pressure the North into implementing the February
13 agreement.40
Eventually, progress was made to find a solution to the
Macau funds that Pyongyang liked. North Korean officials heldtalks with authorities in the Chinese territory of Macau, on April
28, reportedly requesting that some of the money be transferredto unspecified financial institutions in Russia and Italy. The newsof North Korea proposing a transfer of its released funds wasconveyed by China’s Vice Foreign Minister Wu Dawei toJapan’s visiting delegation in Beijing headed by former Foreign
Minister Masahiko Komura, according to Japan’s Mainichi
newspaper.41 North Korea was expected to transfer the released
money to Pyongyang, via a third-country bank. After the BDA
accounts were frozen, Pyongyang opened accounts with United
Overseas Bank (UOB) in Singapore, the Vietnam Bank for
Foreign Trade (Vietcombank), and Golomt Bank of Mongolia.42
In the end, despite the lifting of the freeze, no bank in theworld proved willing to receive the funds. They were afraid that
handling the funds could be seen as helping North Korea laundermoney from illicit activities. Under these circumstances allowing
a U.S. bank to play an intermediary role in transferring the fundto designated banks was considered the best solution. In fact,
U.S. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack confirmedthat Charlotte, North Carolina-based Wachovia -- the fourthlargest American bank – was asked to play an intermediary rolein the transfer of funds but declined to offer specifics.43
Also, the South Korean government reportedly consideredletting the state-run Export-Import Bank of Korea handle North
Korea’s unfrozen US $25 million from a Macau bank before
these funds would go to a third country. The U.S. reportedly
agreed to Seoul’s suggestion and promised not to take issue with
the Korean bank.44 If true, Seoul’s offer to play an intermediaryrole helped the stalled Six-Party talks meeting to resume, but it
also injected new controversy to the election year domestic
politics in South Korea. The lesson of the BDA issue, according
to one analyst, is that “bilateral frameworks must be in sync withthe multilateral framework.” DPRK-U.S. negotiations require
proceeding “simultaneously with other active discussions
between the U.S. and China, North Korea and China, and thetwo Koreas” that “can serve as a buffer to help resolve issues."45
On May 15, the DPRK acknowledged that it might soonreceive the frozen funds and would start to shut down its nuclear
reactor. “Currently, a process is ongoing to wire the funds inMacau's Banco Delta Asia to our bank account in a third
country," a DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman told the North
Korean official KCNA news agency. "If the money transfer has

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been completed, we will immediately take steps to close nuclear
facilities as agreed upon under the February 13 deal," thespokesman was quoted as saying. In Washington, the U.S. State
Department said it did not have any updates on the BDA issueand did not know whether the problem with the frozen funds had
been sorted out. 46 In the end U.S.-Russian deal on moneytransfer was worked out and lead to resuming the stalled SixParty talks in Beijing sometime late in June.47
On March 25, South Korea and the U.S. started military
drills, dubbed Reception, in Staging, Onward Movement andIntegration (RSOI). North Korea urged the South to halt thedrills warning that they could disrupt six-party talks on
Pyongyang’s nuclear program.48 On April 24 North Korea went
ahead with a military show of its own, with a 90-minute military
parade through the capital’s central Kim Il Sung Square,
including a massive display of 48 missiles of four different sizes,
reviewed by the North Korean leader Kim Jong-il. This
procession marked the 75th anniversary of the Korean People’s
Army, which dates its origin to anti-Japanese resistancemovement during the Japanese occupation of Korea before its
defeat in 1945.49
The Korean military tension and security threat remain,
despite the February 13 agreement on denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula. On May 25 North Korea test-fired several
short-range guided missiles into the East Sea, in response to
South Korea’s launch of its first destroyer equipped with hightech Aegis radar technology. 50 This was followed by North
Korea’s firing two short-range anti-ship missiles into the WestSea on June 7.51 Despite tensions provoking the Six-Party Talks,
aimed to find a peaceful resolution to the regional security
concerns relative to the North Korean nuclear programs, havemade headways in a series of meetings.
On July 15, 2007, North Korea announced that it had shut
down its nuclear reactor in Yongbyon. IAEA inspectors flew infrom Beijing, and verified this fact the next day. These newdevelopments made it possible for the resumption of the SixParty talks in Beijing, on July 18-20, when the delegatesdiscussed the next phase of implementing the February 13
agreement on denuclearization. The Six-Party Talks during the

6th round of its meetings, on July 20, adopted a joint statement inwhich North Korea confirmed its prior announcement of July 15,
regarding its decision to stop the Yongybyon nuclear reactor andfacility, and also “to disclose all nuclear programs and disable all
facilities” related to nuclear programs.52
The second phase of the Six-Party Talks met, on September
27-30, to hear the working groups report, and reaffirmed theroadmap to complete the implementation of the DPRK
commitment “to disable all nuclear facilities” including threefacilities at Yongbyon by December 31, 2007: the 5 MW
Experimental reactor, the Reprocessing Plant, and the Nuclear
Fuel Rod Fabrication Facility.53 This suggests what has not been
included and left out from the agreement. The February 13, 2007
Denuclearization Action Plan, for instance, did not include
actions that would address fissile material stocks, the uranium
enrichment program, or dismantlement of warheads, but instead
focused on shutting down and disabiling, for at least a year’stime, the key plutonium production facilities.
A six power foreign ministers conference was to beconvened shortly, but did not happen, in the closing months of2007. The third phase stage, to begin in January 2008, wassupposed to address “all aspects of North Korea’s nuclear
program,” including weapons, using North Korea’s declaration
as a basis for future action. This understanding of the scope of
the program and the North’s weapons capability, however,required transparency and careful verification for “complete,verifiable, irreversible” disarmament, the essence of the Bush
Administration stance, to be achieved down the road.
In the Six-Party Talks negotiation North Korea demanded, in
return for its “freeze” of its plutonium nuclear program, that theUnited States agree to a number of U.S. concessions, including
removing North Korea from the U.S. terrorism-support list.54 If
the Bush Administration removes North Korea from theterrorism list, it is required under law to notify Congress 45 days
prior to removal. For Congress to prevent removal, it would haveto pass legislation (not a resolution) that would be subject to apresidential veto. The Bush Administration, at the time of thiswriting, seems ready to the requirement of providing Congresswith a 45-day notice.55

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Effects of the Nuclear Fallout 1: South Korea and InterKorean Relations
It can be argued that the day after North Korea carried out its
nuclear test in 2006, South Korea and the United States saw a“very different world.” South Korea was increasingly vulnerable
in the face of the North’s nuclear threats. It can only confront a
nuclear-armed North Korea with its conventional military might.
In reality what can protect South Korea from the North’s
nuclear threat is only the nuclear umbrella of its ally the UnitedStates. But the United States is no longer the ally it once was. It
is ironic that independent exercise of war-time operational
control of the ROK troops, that the Roh Moo-hyun
administration sought and negotiated with the Bushadministration in 2006, had little to do with North Korea’s
nuclear testing. South Korea must, henceforth, seek new ways ofprotecting itself from North Korea’s threat. 56 A recent CSIS(Center for Strategic and International Studies) study reports thatboth Republicans and Democrats in Congress are skeptical about
Seoul’s North Korea policy as “too generous, naïve, and/or
dangerous.”57
Seoul’s Crisis Response and Management
Engagement or sanctions are the two opposite strategic
options open to the U.S. and South Korea as they seek to deal
with the North Korean nuclear threat and to defuse the nuclear
standoff with Pyongyang. Engagement, a non-hostile interaction
between two parties, is usually considered a positive action withmany different forms, whereas sanctions are generally looked
upon as negative actions that can be imposed by both the U.S.
and South Korea to deter, punish, or compel the North Korean
regime.58
The Roh Moo-hyun administration, since its inauguration in
2003, pursued a policy of reconciliation with Pyongyang as its
top priority. The Peace and Prosperity Policy, as it was called,
was intended not only to expand the scope of the Sunshine
Policy of its predecessor, the Kim Dae-jung administration, butalso to accelerate the level and intensity of inter-Korean
exchanges and cooperation via so-called co-activity and co-

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prosperity. Mt. Kumgang tourism, which was initiated by the
Kim administration, and the Kaesong Industrial Complex,
promoted by the Roh administration, are the twin pillars ofSeoul’s engagement policy, and both take great pride in thepromise of inter-Korean economic co-prosperity.
Roh’s three-stage implementation strategy was aimed at
resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis in the short-term,bringing lasting peace to the peninsula in the mid-term, andbuilding a Northeast Asian economic hub in the long-term. 59
However, without achieving the denuclearization of the North as
the first step, Roh’s entire edifice and strategy of peace andprosperity undermined and became little more than an idealistic
dream.
As the news of the nuclear test spread like a wild fire, South
Korea was hit the hardest. It is possible that President Rohconfronted the news of nuclear testing, with a sense of personal
responsibility for his government’s failed policy of engagement,
as well as with a new resolve to cope with future crisis situations
with sound decision making. The essence of leadership isrational decision-making, and Roh must have resolved to movein two separate fronts of domestic and foreign policies, so as torespond to the crisis situation. Roh was keenly aware that theengagement policy had not been successful and that he would
have to move decisively to overcome the post-nuclear test
security environment of South Korea: both by addressing theelection and party politics at home and by repairing the South
Korea-U.S. alliance through pressing the on-going KorUs FTA
negotiations to a successful conclusion.
Despite North Korea’s having crossed an imaginary red lineby going nuclear, President Roh’s preferred policy, on balance,
seems to have been engagement over sanctions. This is based on
the continued belief that South Korea with a rich economy canand must render “humanitarian” assistance to the poverty
stricken North Korea in the spirit of fraternal and ethnic
solidarity as a divided nation-state.
The year 2007 for South Korea was the presidential election
year and the Korean voters went to the polls to select the nextpresident on December 19, 2007. Naturally, the political climate
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Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2

presidential campaigns and partisan contentions. 60 Although anuclear North Korea loomed large on the voter’s minds, the issue
did not exercise decisive pressures upon the electoral campaigns
and political process of choosing the next ROK president.
Nevertheless, the Korean voters elected the opposition Grand
National Party candidate Lee Myung-Bak who demanded thedismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program as aprerequisite for the South’s provision of economic aid to theNorth over the ruling United New Democratic Party candidate
Chung Dong-young, with a large margin of 48.7 percent of thevote for Lee and 26.2 percent for Chung. Lee Hoi-chang, theunsuccessful GNP candidate in 1997 and 2002 who stood as anindependent this time, finished third with 15.1 per cent.

aid to Pyongyang once North Korea started meeting its
obligations under the February 13 six-nation agreement. He
indicated that the North could get rice aid “if it honors just oneof the requirements, namely, either shutting down its nuclear
facilities in Yongbyon or readmitting inspectors from the
IAEA.”63
In the economic cooperation talks, the two Koreas agreed
once again to conduct a test run of the Donghae and Kyungui raillines in the East and West on May 17. They had already agreed
three times before, since 2004, to conduct a trial run of therailways, but each time they floundered because of last-minuteresistance from the North Korean military. The Unification
Minister Lee said that yet another cancellation of a trial run ofcross-border railways would severely strain inter-Korean
relations. Lee also announced a plan to sell the remaining 1.75
million square meters in the inter-Korean Kaesong Industrial
Complex in the North starting on April 30. Sale of the land wasindefinitely postponed after North Korea test-fired missiles in
July 2006.64
A pair of passenger trains did cross in opposite directions on
a test-run, on May 17, 2007 marking a historic journey across theDMZ. Each train carried 100 South Koreans northward on a 27.3
kilometers (17 miles) of track, between the South’s Munsan
station and the Kaesong station in the North, and 50 North
Koreans southward on a 25.5 kilometer (16 miles) track,
between the North’s Diamond Mountain station and the South’s
Jejin station.65 Marking this event Seoul’s Unification Minister
Lee Jae-joung was quoted as saying: “It is not simply a test run.
It means reconnecting the severed bloodline of our people. Itmeans that the heart of the Korean peninsula is beating again.”Pyongyang’s Senior Cabinet Councilor Kwon Ho Ung was also
quoted as saying the two sides should not be “derailed from thetrack or hesitate” in moving towards unification.”66
To entice the North to allow this railway crossing, the South
reportedly offered some $80 million in additional aid for its lightindustries. 67 South Korea had already spent $589 million onreconnecting the rail system, including $195 million worth ofequipment, tracks and other material lent to North Korea. 68
Whether “this is a precious first step for a 1,000 mile journey,”Inter-Korean Relations on a Faster Track?
The Roh Moo-hyun administration appeared more than eager
to use the February 13 accord as justification for resuming its
promised aid of rice and fertilizer delivery to North Korea,
which was suspended in July 2006 in the wake of the North
Korean missile launching.61 During the Inter-Korean ministerialtalks, held in Kyungju in mid-July, the North Korean chiefdelegate dismissed the missile launching by the North, which
precipitated the crisis, as a separate issue. He walked out of thesession and left for home one day earlier than expected during athree-day scheduled session.
Early in March 2007 Unification Minister Lee Jae-joung
attended the sessions of economic cooperation talks in
Pyongyang and pledged to resume the negotiations on thepromised delivery of rice and fertilizer. At the end of the fivedays of meetings South Korea promised to send 400,000 tons ofrice and 300,000 tons of fertilizer to North Korea starting in late
May.62
The joint statement itself, in the end, showed an agreement
over the rice aid with no strings attached. The South Korean
government contended that the two sides had a verbal agreement
to link rice aid and North Korea’s adherence to the February 13
nuclear accord. Yet, South Korea as a donor country was notable to get it put in writing by the North. Minister Lee, upon his
return from Pyongyang, said that Seoul would start sending rice

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which will invigorate inter-Korean trade and connect its trains to
China and to the trans-Siberian railways, remains to be seen. The
opposition GNP members were quoted as calling the event a“train of illusion” organized to draw voters’ attention in anelection year.69
South Korea had already agreed to be the sole provider of an
initial 50,000 tons of fuel aid, once Pyongyang allowed IAEA
inspectors in for confirmation. It already sent the first batch of
fertilizer on March 27 and resumed emergency aid the next day
with 20,500 tons of rice, 70,415 tons of cement, 50 eight-ton
trucks, 60,000 blankets and 1,800 tons of iron bars. 70 GNP
Presidential candidate, Park Geun-hye, and both Korean andJapanese newspaper editorials criticized these actions by Seoul,claiming the eagerness could decrease incentives for the North tocomply with the denuclearization deal.71
Fortunately, for the sake of keeping the Six-Party Talk
process intact and credible, the Roh’s government decided topostpone food shipments to North Korea until the Kim’s
Pyongyang government fulfilled its promise to shut down the
Yongbyon nuclear reactor. This position was reconfirmed during
the 21st inter-Korean ministerial talks held in Seoul, May 29June 1. The four-day talks broke up without a deal but managed
to produce a four-sentence statement: both sides “havesufficiently presented their positions and held sincere discussions
on fundamental and actual matters linked to progress in interKorean relations.”72 Hoping that the BDA dispute would havebeen resolved by the end of May, the ROK government had
approved budget spending for the rice aid worth $170 million
and raw materials worth $80 million for North Korea to makesoap, footwear and clothing. The ROK plan was to start sending
400,000 tons of rice late in May 2007 in the form of a loan to be
paid back over 30 years after a 10-year grace period.73
In parallel with an anticipated progress on the Six-Party
Talks in Beijing, the Roh Administration took an initiative
toward holding a South-North Summit, before its five-year term
in office ended. The summit discussed, among others, the idea of
establishing a peace regime on the Korean peninsula and in
Northeast Asia. The lame-duck President Roh was most anxious
to make sure that both North and South Korea had come to play

an active role that was in parallel with the separate track for theUnited States and the North making moves toward improving
their relations, as the progress was being made in their mutual
negotiations over disabling the North’s nuclear facilities.74
The Roh Moo-Hyun Kim Jong-Il summit meeting of
October 2-4, 2007, in Pyongyang, owed as much to the changeof political atmosphere as to an improvement in the Six-Party
talks negotiation on the North Korean denuclearization,
following the July 15th Pyongyang’s important decision tosuspend the operation of its Yongbyon nuclear complex andfacilities. The October 2007 summit was hailed by some as
opening “Korea’s New Era of Détente” by producing a landmark
declaration that contained the more specific details on Korean
security and economic cooperation between the two sides.75 The
gist of the major agreements, and the proposed action plans, atthe summit pertained to three topical issues and issue-areas ofinter-Korean peace, economy and human contacts.
The two Korean leaders agreed, for instance, on the peaceissue “to seek three or four-party summit for signing the Korean
Peninsula peace treaty, to support the Six-Party denuclearization
talks, to end military hostility, to hold defense ministerial talks in
Pyongyang in November, and to oppose any war on the Korean
Peninsula.” On the economy issue, they agreed “to set up a
special peace zone in West Sea, to expand cross-borderinvestments, economic cooperation projects, to construct joint
shipbuilding complexes in Nampo and Anbyon, to open direct
air routs between Seoul and Mt. Paektu, and to open a crossborder cargo railway.” On the issue of promoting humancontacts, they agreed “to allow South’s Olympic cheering squaduse of North Korean railway to reach Beijing, to hold interKorean summits more frequently to discuss pending issues, tohold inter-Korean prime ministerial talks in Seoul in November,and to expand reunions of the separate family members.”76
Interestingly, these agreements between the two Koreanleaders were attained on the eve of the scheduled seventeenth
Presidential election on December 19, 2007 in South Korea.
However, it had rather minimal effect on the election outcome.

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Effects of the Nuclear Fallout 2: the Future of US-South
Korea Relations
The Korean government of President Roh Moo-hyun (20032008) was not always in close consultation and prior policy
coordination with the Bush administration on initiatives of
positive engagement toward North Korea’s Kim Jong-il regime.
The Roh Administration, in fact, was largely responsible for the
failure to prevent a rising tide of anti-Americanism in South
Korea among the progressive forces in the initial phase of his
five-year term in office.
With the North Korea’s nuclear testing and its fallout, time
has changed. South Korea can no longer afford to gamble with
its security requirements and with the future fate of its divided
nation. There is a growing awareness among the public that true
peace will require a sound and healthy partnership in the form of
the Korea-U.S. security alliance and, with it, the need torenegotiate the pace and timing of the handover of the war-time
troop control as already agreed.

concerns over the pace of hand over of the wartime militarycontrol at this time of heightened security concerns.
The defense committee inside South Korea’s National
Assembly, for instance, is reportedly planning to adopt a new
resolution barring Seoul from taking back of its wartime militarycontrol from the U.S. command until the North Korean nuclear
crisis is resolved. Both the ruling and opposition parties are now
backing this resolution, after a few revisions were to be made,including a recommendation for flexibility on timing and not
being fixated on the 2012 deadline.78
After a U.S.-ROK defense consultative meeting held in
Washington on February 7-9, 2007, South Korea Defense
Minister Kim Jang-soo and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates
discussed the new timing for the transfer of wartime operational
control of the Korean forces to Seoul. They reaffirmed an earlier
decision made during the talks of October 2006 when theyagreed to complete the transfer sometime between October 15,
2009 and March 15, 2012. Whereas the United States has
favored the date of 2009, South Korea has insisted on the later
date of 2012.
South Korea clearly needs a mature and healthy alliancepartnership because no country can survive on its own in this ageof complex interdependence and globalization. A country needs
allies that share the same values and interests. Taking a neutral
stance diplomatically, without national defense and preparedness,
is like an invitation to invasion and disdain by the powerfulneighboring countries. South Korea must let its public realize thestrategic payoffs and benefits that will accrue from a revamped
and enhanced U.S. ROK alliance partnership.79
The ROK Constitution stipulates that the President as thechief executive will have strong authority on matters of making
foreign policy and national security policy including the ones oninter-Korean relations. The new president Lee Myung-Bak islikely to make greater strides toward improving relations with
the U.S., which has been strained throughout the Bushadministration, and also to seek better ties with both Japan and
China. Progress is less likely in the highly emotional territorial
dispute with Japan. Lee has said that he wants to see more South
Korean investment in China and closer consultation on security

Revamping the Alliance Partnership?
The military imbalance is likely to prevail in the Korean
Peninsula in the wake of North Korea’s nuclear testing. Thechanging reality is that the North is now armed with nuclear
weapons, whereas the South is force-ready only withconventional arms. To address such an imbalance thegovernments of South Korea and the United States are expected
to make needed adjustments, as shown by a joint decision
regarding the timing of wartime military control transfer movingfrom the initial date of October 15, 2009 to a new date of March
15, 2012.
Independent control over the military by South Korea during
wartime was requested by the Roh administration. This signified
the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command, and would
disrupt the chain of command structure of joint decision making
on military matters through the ROK-U.S. alliance.77 In making
this new decision, both governments seem to have over-looked
and effectively neglected North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear
weapons. The South Korean public, not surprisingly, hadawakened to the new security dynamics, and raised their

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issues. His move toward Beijing is not likely to be pursued,
however, at the expense of the alliance relations with
Washington.

of suspected sites and any additional measures needed to verify
the parameters of the uranium program and monitor stockpiles ofnuclear weapons and radioactive material outside of the
Yongbyon facility.81 In addition, North Korea should honor its
commitment to returning to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as soon
as possible.
Disarming Kim’s North Korea is a risky enterprise that
continues to remain highly uncertain. Only time will tell whether
the February 13 nuclear accord, this time around, will represent“an ephemeral diplomatic victory or a real breakthrough.” 82
Nonetheless, the United States and South Korea must continue toplan on foreign policy measures that transcend the nuclear
accord into the broader subjects of maintaining peace andsecurity on the Korean Peninsula as part of building a realistic
regional order in Northeast Asia further into the 21st century.83

Conclusion
A “nuclear-free” Korean Peninsula has been an aspiration ofmany in Korea, and a stated-policy objective of the governmentsof the two Korean states. A historical record shows that both
North and South Koreas signed the “Joint Declaration of theDenuclearization of the Korean Peninsula,” on December 31,
1991. This came into effect on January 19, 1992, but became an
empty promise because it was soon boycotted by the North.80
Attaining this goal of denuclearization, therefore, was like“dreaming an impossible dream” for the Korean people. Its
realization was out of the reach for more than fifteen years andthere were indications that the Six-Party Talks “nuclear accord”
of February 13, 2007 might also end up with the same fate.
Without full compliance and implementation of the agreement,
there is no assurance that denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula will come about, even if the “disablement” phase of
the “Nuclear” North Korea might come to pass in the days ahead.
What must follow, if the February 13 provisions of
implementation are fully to be met, will be a series of logicalsteps that will require specific follow-up measures of mutual
confidence-building with the safeguard of CVID (Complete,
Verifiable and Irreversible Disarmament) before the “peace
treaty and peace framework” regime will come about on the
Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang has agreed to “shut down and seal
for the purpose of eventual abandonment” the plutonium
processing operations at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. It also
agreed to allow International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors
to monitor the cessation of activity. The document carefully
avoided the term “freeze,” which would have elicited directcomparisons with President Bill Clinton’s Agreed Framework,
much resisted by the Bush Administration during its first term in
office.
Left unclear is whether the language of “all necessary
monitoring and verifications as agreed between IAEA and the
DPRK” includes pre-existing authority for challenge inspections

118

Notes:
1

On the U.N. Security Council emergency sessions with sanctions
resolution on North Korea, following the latter’s missile launching andnuclear testing in 2006, see: two excellent and timely reports preparedby Peter Beck from Seoul: (1) International Crisis Group Asia Briefing
No. 51, After North Korea’s Missile Launch: Are the Nuclear Talks
Dead?, 9 August 2006 and (2) International Crisis Group Asia Briefing
No. 56, North Korea’s Nuclear Test: the Fall, 13 November 2006.
Also, see: Young Whan Kihl, “U.N. Sanctions on North Korea and U.S.
Korea Relations.” Nautilus Institute Policy Forum Online 07-021A:
2007.
February
9th,(http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07012Kihl.html#sect2).
A
Korean text version of this piece has appeared in Jayu Kongron(Freedom Forum) Monthly (Seoul), January 2007: 90-95.
2

For the text of the Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks on February
13, 2007, see: the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign
Affairs press release, “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the
Joint Statement.” Also, see: “Joint Statement: Six-Party Talks on N.
Korea Disarmament,” Washington Post, February 13, 2007.
3
Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), 10 October, 2006. Http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm. Also, see: Vantage Point (Seoul), Vol.
29, No. 11 (November 2006): 16.

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Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2

4

Lee Kwang-ho, “North Korea’s Stunning Nuclear Test.” Vantage
Point (Seoul), Vol. 29, No. 10 (October 2006): 2-3.

“USFK Chief Urges no Letup on N. Korea,” Digital Chosun.com,
April 26, 2007.

5
As cited by Lee, ibid. It also coincided with the day of ex-South
Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon being elected by the Security
Council as the new Secretary General of the United Nations.

22
Young Whan Kihl, “Security on the Korean Peninsula: Continuity
and Change.” Security Dialogue 33, no. 1 (March 2002): 59-72.

6Analysis of air sample, collected on October 11, 2006, detectedradioactive debris indicating that it was plutonium fuel testing. Since
the explosion yield was less than a kiloton, some called it a “fizzle”
rather than a full-blown and sophisticated weapon-grade explosion.
Thom Shanker and David Sanger, “North Korean fuel identified as
plutonium.” The New York Times, October 17, 2006.
7

Jonathan D. Pollack, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program to2015: Three Scenarios.” Asia Policy, Number 3 (January 2007): 105123.
8David E. Sanger and Thom Shanker, “Response to Nuclear Threats
Hinges on Policy Debate.” The New York Times, May 8, 2007: A-9.
9As cited by Sanger and Shanker, Ibid.

10

Pollack, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program to 2015, Op. Cit.

11

Ibid, Executive Summary, 106.

12

Ibid.

13

Ibid., Executive Summary, 10.

14

Ibid.

15

Christopher W. Hughes, “North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:
Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, andTaiwan.” Asia Policy, Number 3 (January 2007): 75-104.
16

Ibid., Executive Summary, 76.

17
Alan D. Romberg, “The Role of the United States in the Future of
Northeast Asia in the wake of the North Korean Nuclear Test.” The
North Korean Nuclear Test and the Future of Northeast Asia. Seoul:
Korea Institute for National Unification, 2006: 129-138, 129.
18

Ibid.

19

Ibid., 130.

20

Ibid., 137-38.

120

21

23

As for an analysis of the Six-Party Talks up to the summer of 2005,
see: Young Whan Kihl, “Bi-Multilateral Approaches to Defusing
Nuclear Crisis: Beyond the Six-Party Talks as Peace Strategy” in
Young Whan Kihl and Hong Nack Kim, eds., North Korea: The
Politics of Regime Survival, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2006: 245267.
24
On the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks, which led to an
adoption of the 6-point agreement on the principles, see: Young Whan
Kihl, “The U.S. East Asia Strategy and the Korean Peninsula:
Retooling Alliance, Asymmetry, and Balancing,” International Journalof Korean Studies Volume X, Number 2 (Fall/Winter 2006): 43-74,
especially 60-62.
25

As cited in “N. Korea Agrees to Disable Nuclear Facilities.” Digital
Chosun.com, February 13, 2007. Jim Yardley and David Sanger, “In
Shift, Accord on North Korea Seems to be Set.” The New York Times,
February 13, 2007: A-1, A-11.
26
Helene Cooper, “Pragmatism in Diplomacy: Why the U.S. Is readyTo Talk to its Enemies?” The New York Times, March 1, 2007: A-1, A6.
27“Bush ‘Masterminded Behind Six-Party Agreement.” Digital
Chosun.com, February 16, 2007. On Bolton’s position, see: John R.,
Bolton, “Opinion: North Korea Climb-down.” The Wall Street Journal,
March 5, 2007: A-17.
28

Mark Landler and Thom Shanker, “North Korea and U.S. Envoys
Meet in Berlin.” The New York Times, January 18, 2007, A3.
29“Bush ‘Masterminded Behind Six-Party Agreement.’” Digital
Chosun.com, February 16, 2007.
30

David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “U.S. Concedes Uncertainty
on Korean Uranium Effort.” The New York Times, March 1, 2007: A-1,
A-10. Also see: “Intelligence: Creative Interpretation,” Newsweek,
March 12, 2007, 11.
31Bush ‘Masterminded Behind Six-Party Agreement’, Op.Cit..

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Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2
32David E. Sanger, “Outside Pressures Snapped Korean Deadlock.”
Helene Cooper and Jim Yardley, “Pact With North Korea Draws Fire
from a Wide Range of Critics in U.S.” The New York Times, February
14, 2007: A-1, A-10. “Is Kim Jong-il Serious This Time?” Digital
Chosun.com, February 15, 2007.
33

As cited in “U.S. Likely to Act Swiftly Under Six-Party Agreement.”
Digital Chosun.com, February 15, 2007. Also, see: Gary Samore,“Nuclear Asia: U.S. Policy in an Age of Proliferation.” NBR Analysis:
Nuclear Asia: U.S. Policy in an Age of Proliferation. Volume 18,
Number 2 (March 2007): 5-14.
34“N. Korea Dreams of International Kudos as a Nuclear Power.”
Digital Chosun.com, March 29, 2007.
35“N. Korea ‘Sounded Out U.S. About Keeping Existing Nukes.’
Digital Chosun.com, March 28, 2007.
36“N. Korea Dreams of International Kudos as a Nuclear Power.”
Digital Chosun.com, March 29, 2007.
37

The U.S. State Department of State, in its “Country Reports for
2006,” published on April 30, 2007, named North Korea as a state
sponsor of terrorism, along with Cuba, Iran, Syria and Sudan. Also,
see: “N. Korea Remains on U.S. List of Terror Sponsors.” Digital
Chosun.com, May 1, 2007.Also, see: “N. Korea Stuck on Terror List as
Doubts Linger.” Digital Chosun.com, March 29, 2007.
38“The Feb. 13 Agreement is Creaking.” Digital Chosun.com, April 26,
2007.
39

Donald Greenlees, “Bank Block Plan to Release Frozen Funds toNorth Korea,” The New York Times, March 27, 2007: A-6.
40
“The Feb. 13 Agreement is Creaking.” Digital Chosun.com, April 26,
2007.

International Journal of Korean Studies
Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2
Keun-sik
Kim,“Lessons
from
the
BDA
http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/07041Kim.html.
45

issue.”

46

Reuters “North Korea Says Nuclear Deal Block May be Cleared,”May 15, 2007.
47“Russia to Move North Korea Funds.” The Wall Street Journal, June11, 2007: A-7.
48

Digital49“Kim Reviews parade of missiles, troops.” CNN.com, April 25, 2007.

50“Report: North Korea test-fires missiles.” CNN.com, May 25, 2007.

“N. Korea Asks South to Halt Joint Drills with U.S.”
Chosun.com, March 26, 2007.

51“N. Korea fires two missiles into West Sea.” Digital Chosun.com,
June 8, 2007.
52

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Six-party_talks

53

Ibid.

54

Larry Niksch and Raphael Perl, “North Korea: Terrorism List
Removal?” CRS Report for Congress, January 14, 2008.
55

Ibid.

56

On an analysis of the 2006 changes in wartime operational control of
ROK and US forces, see: Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., “Force Restructuring in
the ROK-US Military Alliance: Challenges and Implications.”
International Journal of Korean Studies, Vol. X, No. 2 (Fall/Winter2006): 19-42.
57“Korea-U.S. Alliance Could End Within 10 Years.’ Digital
Chosun.com, May 21, 2007.
58

41“Media: NK requested Macau funds transfer.” CNN.com, April 30,
2007.

Kongdan Oh and Ralph C. Hassig, “The Failure of Engagement andLimitations of Sanctions,” The North Korean Nuclear Test and the
Future of Northeast Asia. Seoul: Korea Institute for National
Unification, 2007: 25-51, 25.

42

59“Wachovia considers request to transfer of NK funds.” CNN.com,
May 18, 2007.
43

Ibid.

44

“S. Korea’s Exim Bank Could Handle Kim Jong-il’s Money.”
Digital Chosun.com, May 8, 2007.

122

Choong Nam Kim, “The Roh Moo Hyun Government’s Policy
toward North Korea.” International Journal of Korean Studies, Volume
IX, Number 2 (Fall/Winter 2005): 1-33, 14-15.
60
For an analysis of the electoral rules and election cycles in South
Korea’s Sixth Republic, see: Young Whan Kihl, Transforming Korean123

International Journal of Korean Studies
Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2

International Journal of Korean Studies
Fall 2007 • Vol. XI, No. 2

Politics: Democracy, Reform and Culture. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe,
2005: 14-17, 278-289, 343-350.
61“After the North Korea Nuclear Breakthrough: Compliance or
Confrontation.” Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 62 (30 April 2007): 9.
62“Rice Without Guarantee
Chosun.com, April 24, 2007.

ofNuclearResolution.”

Digital63“Rice Aid Depends on First Step, Seoul Tells Pyongyang, “Digital
Chosun.com, April 24, 2007.
64

Ibid.

65

“Trains depart on historic border crossing of two Koreas.” CNN.com,
May 17, 2007.
66“Koreas make tracks towards peace.” CNN.com, May 17, 2007.

67“Two Koreas take historic rail trip.” CNN.com, May 17, 2007.

68

Choe Sang-hun, “North and South Send Trains Across the Korean
Frontier.” The New York Times, May 18, 2007: A-3.
69

Ibid.

70

“Seoul to resume emergency aid to N. Korea next week,” Yonhap
News, March 22, 2007, as cited in Crisis Group Asia Briefing, Op. Cit.,
p. 9.
71

75

For the text of the declaration of the second Korean summit, see:2007 South-North Korean Summit, Korea Policy Review (Seoul),
November 2007: 10-11.
76

See: “The 2007 South-North Korean Summit,” Vantage Point:
Developments in North Korea (Seoul), October 2007 Special Edition, p.
24.
77
On a timely analysis of the controversy surrounding the dissolutionof the CFC, see: Bruce E. Bechtol, Jr., “Force Restructuring in the
ROK-US Military Alliance: Challenges and Implications.”
International Journal of Korean Studies Volume X, number 2(Fall/Winter 2006): 19-42.
78“Renegotiate the Handover of Troop Control.” Digital Chosun.com,
February 20, 2007.
79“Korea Needs Allies to Survive.” Digital Chosun.com, March 1,
2007.
80
On a discussion and analysis of Korea’s nuclear conundrum, see:
Young Whan Kihl, ed., Korea and the World: Beyond the Cold War.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994: 329-338, 347-348. Also, see:
Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds., Peace and Security inNortheast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula. Armonk,
NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1997, passim.
81
Bruce Klingner, “North Korea Nuclear Weapons Agreement Falls
Short.” WebMemo, No. 1358 (February 13, 1907). Washington, D.C.:
The Heritage Foundation.

“SKorean presidential contender criticizes restored aid to North
before nukes dismantled,” International Herald Tribune, April 9, 2007;“Is denuclearization possible with the sunshine policy?” Yomiuri
Shimbun, March 3, 2007 (in Japanese); “If there is no progress on
denuclearization, we should delay rice aid,” JoongAng Ilbo, April 19,
2007 (in Korean).

James Laney and Jason Sharply, “Disarming North Korea,” theCouncil on Foreign Affairs web exclusive site posting, February 21,
2007.

72

83

“Food aid overshadows Korea talks.” BBC News, May 29, 2007.
“Korea talks break up without deal.” BBC News, June 1, 2007. “Noprogress as North-South talks conclude.” JoongAng Daily, June 1, 2007.
73“S. Korea to Postpone Rice Aid Until N. Korea Acts on
Denuclearization,” Hankyoreh, May 24, 2007.

82

As for my conception of a functioning regional order in Northeast
Asia, see: Young Whan Kihl, Building an East Asian Regional Order:
Testing of Propositions. East-West Center Working Papers Series. No.
16, November 2006. Honolulu, HI: East-West Center.

74

Jeong Se-Hyun, “South-North Summit Lays the Basis for Peace
Regime.” Korea Policy Review, October 2007: 9-11.

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