Labor Tribunal System: Prospects of Japan’s New Approach
Towards the Efficient Settlement of Individual Labor
Disputesby Reylito A. H. Elbo**
Executive Summary
This study examines the current development approach in Japan’s
individual labor dispute resolution system with particular reference to thereported efficiency of its newly-established Labor Tribunal System (LTS). It will
trace the history of LTS, its related legislations, practices and how the tripartite
sectors are gearing up for its implementation. At the end of the study, it will
identify the challenges, issues, and prospects of LTS and how the tripartite sectors
could build on them.
Methodology
Most of the data in this paper were culled from JILPT official publications
and other reference materials from its library. These were supported using the
primary data gathered from personal interviews with officials of Japan Business
Federation, Japan Trade Union Confederation, the Ministry of Health, Labor, andWelfare, and one academic personality in the person of Dr. Ryuichi Yamakawa of
Keio University Law School, who was also instrumental in drafting the LTS law.
From Cultural to Statutory Duty to Compromise
It is always a tempting analogy to describe the Labor Tribunal System(the name was first used by Japan Times) as a form of national commandmentthat gives a viable option to both labor and management to negotiate as long-timefriends, if not mutually-beneficial partners before they go into an actual,
expensive, and prolonged court battle.
Such “commandment” would fit neatly with the “obligation” of each party
to enter into a compromise with one another as a reflection of the true character of
the Japanese ie, the traditional “household” where family members live together
in almost perfect harmony.
**The author is a Visiting Researcher of Employers Confederation of the Philippines at The
Japan Institute for Labour Policy and Training, April 25-May 24, 2004, Tokyo, Japan.
Indeed, one should examine the extent of this “commandment” within thecontext of ie as a cultural approach to solving, in an efficient and effective manner
the increasing number of individual labor disputes in Japan. But all of these canonly be done if the tripartite sectors (the government, labor, and management) are
more than willing to agree doing it in the spirit of compromise or based on a “giveand take” approach.
It is in this context that we analyze the LTS and other related
legislations on individual labor dispute settlement.
When the bill was passed in the Diet on April 28, 2004 and subsequently
promulgated on May 12, 2004 (Takamura, May 11, 2004, Yamakawa, May 18,2004), there appears to be no heated debate at all among the tripartite sectors,
except for some intellectual discussions that helped a lot in thepassage of thispopular bill.

The tripartite sectors appear to be doing it in the right direction. Why
not? When we talk of conflict, we can almost imagine that it is not expected tohappen in a traditional Japanese society. Even if dissatisfaction is expressed
openly and conflict ensues, the parties usually try to make concessions to eachother in an attempt to resolve the issue in such a way that both parties are
satisfied and would result to the resumption of their harmonious relationship.
Conventionally, the Japanese way of dispute settlement is very well
expressed by the idiom arasoi o mizu ni nagasu (literally speaking, let the dispute
flow to the water). This means, in effect, telling the parties to forget a disputeand be friendly again. Related Japanese sayings such as kenka ryoo-seibai (bothdisputants are penalized equally) or arasoi o maruku osameru (to settle thedispute in circle) also express traditional approaches to dispute settlement.
Sometimes, when both parties find it almost impossible to reach anamicable settlement by themselves then they may soon decide to do an arasoi oazukeru or allowing a third party to decide on the matter and to accept hissuggestion without any further argument. The third party then tries toconciliate the dispute by appealing to the antagonists’ goodwill and to the friendly
sentiments which form the basis of traditional personal relationships (Hanami

203:1979).

The LTS and its antecedent government regulation – Law on Promoting
the Resolution of Individual Labour Disputes (Law No.112, July 11, 2001) are thecontemporary equivalent of arasoi o azukeru (to leave the dispute to someone else)
only that this becomes now a statutory duty for every one to obey. But only thistime, the government plays an active and dominant role in labor disputesettlement, just like when it established a similarly-situated law like the age-old
Labour Relations Adjustment Law (No.25, September 27, 1946), among others.
The participation of the government in promoting and establishing LTS
and all other legislations is an important factor toward its successful
implementation. Clearly, in any society, respect for government authority is animperative proposition, and Japan is not an exception. It is a must for the
conflicting parties to seek settlement from such government authority as it isdifficult to find any other entity that could command considerable power andprestige to be respected by equally antagonistic parties.
The LTS is seen as one notable development in the landscape of Japan’slabor relations. It has been bruited as one effective approach to arrest the rapid
increase in individual labor disputes between employers and their workers, suchas those involving sudden dismissals and reduction of pay. In fact, it is seen as a“system (that) will provide workers with a more effective means of resolving
disputes with employers” (Japan Times, 01-09-2004) as much as it would benefit
the latter (Watanabe).
It is a welcome sign for a constantly changing Japan, trying to develop
and implement what could be the best remedy under the circumstances. Not
only a welcome development, but a ground-breaking approach to dramatically
improve the handling of individual dispute settlement in the country.
It must be noted that, unlike other countries, Japan has no courts
specially designated for labor litigation. All labor and employment related
lawsuits must be filed with the ordinary courts manned by sitting judges as
professional jurists. Also, there are no lay judges who take the helm in settlingindividual labor disputes in European labor courts such as the Arbeitsgerichte or
employment tribunals like conseil des prud’hommes (Araki 11:2002).
This is the apparent vacuum that the LTS is trying to fill which cannot be
handled alone by Law No. 112.

Coverage and Definition
The ideal situation is not to have any labor disputes at all. That is
utopia in the corporate world. Unfortunately, disputes cannot be avoided and tosome extent must occur to pave the way for a new and lasting relationship. Thisis the law of nature. And there is nothing that people can do about it, except totake it with a grain of salt and the tripartite holders would hope for the best.
To best describe this law of nature is to take note of an applicable
Japanese proverb – “Ame futte ji katamaru” (after the rain, comes a fair weather)which is often quoted by both labor and management once a dispute has been
settled. The rain in this case is a labor dispute.
In strict legal sense, “a labor dispute” (roodoo soogi) is different inmeaning from “an act of dispute” (soogi kooi), the former being a disagreement ofclaims between labor and management with or without an act of dispute (or massaction done by union members and their sympathizers), and the latter is best
manifested through a mass action like a strike, slowdown, lockout, or other acts
and counteracts that hamper the normal course of work (Inohara 136:1990).
In our context, we use the term “labor dispute” when it is initiated, filed,and pursued by an “individual employee.” It must be distinguished from a“collective” action normally done by trade unions when they try to amplify theirdisagreement or press their demands with management.
While it is true that sometimes a suit is filed by a labor union to protect
its own interest and its members, however, most of the labor cases involve“individual” employment cases or issues in that they are based on the legal rightsof the individual employee. Since the employment status and wages inherently
belong to each employee, such cases may be litigated solely by the employee.
However, it is of course possible that the employee’s complaint may be supported
by a labor union. (Nakakubo 5:1996).
It is in this light that we analyze the “individual labor dispute” within thepurview of Article 1 of Law No.112, arguably, as the pioneering legislation on thematter. Under the said law, “individual labor dispute” refers to “disputes
between individual workers and business owners (including disputes between
individual job applicants and employers with respect to matters concerning therecruitment and employment of workers)…with respect to working conditions andother matters concerning labor relations.”
Excluded from the said law and this study is any labor dispute that falls
within the purview of any “disagreement over claims regarding labor relations
arising between the parties concerned with labour relations resulting in either theoccurrence of acts of dispute or the danger of such occurrence” (Art. 6, Labor

Relations Adjustment Law).

Further, also excluded from this study is the individual complaint by aunion member to which Prof. Tadashi Hanami has defined as “a one-person
strike,” also known as “nominated” strike, primarily intended to disturb work on alarge scale at little cost to the union (Hanami 165:1979). On the other hand,“industrial conflicts” refer to “group conflicts” as defined under Article 6 of theLabour Relations Adjustment Law (Shirai 103:2000).
Also, one important dimension in studying a labor dispute settlement inany context is by means of making a clear distinction between the “disputes ofright” and “disputes of interest.” Under the Western European practice ofindustrial relations, industrial conflicts are divided into two types: the dispute ofright (Rechtstreit) and the dispute of interest (Interessentreit), with methods forhandling these different kinds of dispute. (Shirai 106:2000). Fortunately or
unfortunately, “disputes of right and disputes of interest are not perceived as
distinctly different” in Japan. This is primarily because industrial relations inJapan are different from contractual relationships in the Western European
nations; they are not based on clear relationships of rights and responsibilities

Shirai 107:2000).

Environmental and Historical Context
With more non-regular workers in the workforce, wider adoption ofindividualized and merit-based performance appraisal system, and less union
organizing, collective labor disputes have declined proportionately, but individuallabor disputes have become indisputably on the rise.
In 1994, the courts received almost 3,400 civil labor cases, more than
twice the figure for 1990. Although the figure rose as well in the economicallytroubled 1970s and 1980s, the current situation is remarkable insofar as surge of“regular procedure cases” are concerned. Traditionally, labor litigation centeredon the preliminary injunction procedure, where the court renders a provisional
decision in an expedited manner. In reality such a decision often determines the
final outcome of the dispute because the losing party must necessarily comply
with it. Today, however, parties are more inclined to push their case fully andsquarely through the regular procedure, resulting to the increase in the number ofcases to intensify the number of pending cases for litigation. (Nakakubo 5:1996).
Largely due to the prolonged economic recession and subsequent wave of“risutora” (corporate restructuring), the number of individual disputes against
dismissal, forced retirement, reduced employee pay and benefit package, and soon has been increasing (Japan Labor Bulletin, October 2000). On the other hand,and over the same period of time, the number of collective disputes has been
declining. This is because of a shift to personnel administration on an individual
worker basis and changing employment patterns, resulting in more individual
workers bringing suit directly without going through a labor union (Japan

Business Federation, 2003).

In year 2000, the number of civil suits involving labor relations brought todistrict courts across Japan exceeded 2,000 for the first time, with 2,063 suchdisputes being recorded in preliminary statistics. This figure has increased bymore than three times over the past ten years (JIL Public Policy, 06-01-2001).
While there has been an increased number of employees’ suing theiremployers, such approach is obviously not the ideal means to obtain justice. It is
not easy for the employees and the companies because judicial procedures are
painfully slow (Nakakubo 6:1996). Hearings are held in a sporadic manner, as
infrequently as less than once a month in each case. In 1994, it took an averageof 15 months for a district court to dispose of a regular case, including
withdrawals and settlements, and cases pending at the end of the year were 18.5
months old. The situation has improved considerably since 1990, when the
figures were 25.2 months and 26.9 months respectively. Nevertheless, simple
cases aside, two years before a district court is hardly surprising. If an appeal istaken eventually to the Supreme Court, the litigation time would amount to fiveto ten years. Petitions for preliminary injunction are processed quickly thanother cases, but there is a need to for more than one year settle complicated cases.
There are other factors why the regular courts are not attractive to theeyes of individual employees. Japanese cultural norms do not encourage people
in general to bring a legal action in order to resolve a dispute, much less againsttheir employer. Further, lawyers are scarce and hard to find. The approximate
number of practicing lawyers is only around 15,000 and they are prohibited fromadvertising their services. There is neither a specialized labor court nor any
special procedure for labor-related cases. Professional judges of the ordinary
court decide a labor case the same way as in any other civil case. (Nakakubo

6:1996).

Since the enforcement of Law No.112 in late 2001, some 300
Comprehensive Labour-related Counseling Desks were set up across the country.
At the same time, two systems were established: a system of advice and guidanceby the directors of Prefectural Labour Bureaus, and a system whereby a Dispute
Adjustment Committee of scholars and experts provide aid to resolve the disputes.
In fiscal year 2002, directors of Prefectural Labour Bureaus received
2,332 applications for advice and guidance (an increase of 63 percent over fiscal
year 2001). The requests for conciliation by Dispute Adjustment Committees
numbered 3,036 (or an increase of 98 percent). The substantial increase in thenumbers reflects the current economic stagnation and company measures aimed
at reducing the number of corporate workforce.
Workers accounted for the vast majority, 97.9 percent, of applicantscalling for conciliation; of these, part-time, arubaito (temporary work), dispatched,
fixed-term contract, and other non-regular workers accounted for more than 22
percent. At the same time, 55.7 percent of these applicants were not unionized.
After one year from the passage of the October 2001 law, the MHLW
announced that it “has been launched successfully” resulting to about 90,000
consultations on individual labor disputes throughout Japan during the same
period. In addition, there were about 4,000 cases that resulted with the Ministrygiving advice, guidance, and mediation services to both the Japanese labor andmanagement, “showing that the system is being used as actively as the courts”(JIL website, Status of the Law for Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor
Disputes).

As for the time required for conciliation, 96.5 percent of the cases weresettled within three months, and 61 percent within one month, indicating thatmost labor disputes were handled promptly and in accordance with the law. To
strengthen its ability to resolve the increasing number of individual labor
disputes, the MHLW gave extra allocations in April 2003 to increase the number
of Dispute Adjustment Committee members from 174 to 300 (Japan Labour

Bulletin 07-01-2003).

Moreover, as union density declines and the number of workers employedthrough individual labor contract increases, there has become an urgent need forestablishing mechanisms to resolve individual labor disputes (Koshiro 200:2000).
Truly, the spotlight in Japan’s labor relations system will focus onproblems concerning the treatment of individual employees, rather than oncollective labor relations problems involving corporations and labor unions. For
the very reason that employees are more interested in apportioning personnel
costs to correspond with performance than they are in acquiring better working
conditions, we will need to establish appropriate corporate mechanisms to settle
individual disputes (Fukuoka 2004).
The need to establish a new dispute mechanism that is more efficientthan the existing set-up was generally recognized by the tripartite sectors. Since
the late 1990s, various reform plans have been proposed. The Japanese Trade
Union Confederation (Rengo) for one, in its 1998 position paper entitled Atarashii
Roshi Funso Kaiketsu Shisuutemu no Kenkyu (Study on the New System forLabor Dispute Resolution) advocated the reorganization and strengthening of theLabor Relations Commission giving it the full authority to deal with individuallabor disputes.
On the other hand, the then Nikkeiren, in the same year (1998) proposedin its white paper called Rodo Iinkai Seido no Arikata ni Tsuite (On the System of
the Labor Relations Commission) the utilization of civil mediation procedures atordinary courts rather than through the Labor Relations Commissions (see note
below.)
After consulting Rengo and Nikkeiren, the then Ministry of Labor choseto expand the function of the Prefectural Labor Bureaus to include labor dispute
resolution. Consequently, Law No.112 was enacted in July 2001 and put into
effect on October 1, 2001 (Arai 14:2002). This offers four separate solutions forhandling disputes.
It allows the Prefectural Labour Bureaus to offer“assistance,” “guidance,” or an “opportunity to set up a dispute conciliationcommittee.” In a last minute amendment by both the government and the
opposition, the law allowed the Prefectural Labor Relations Commission
whenever authorized by the Prefectural Governor to help conciliate disputes.
This last solution which is a concession to Rengo is considered a big step forward
because it allows labor representatives in addition to Prefectural Labor Bureaus achance to mediate disputes (JIL website, Individual Labor Dispute Law Passed).
The promulgation of Law No.112 in October 2001 and the birth of Labor
Tribunal System in May 2004 come at the right time when the “individualistic
value system” of Japanese young generation has become apparent, particularly
these days when “freeters,” become the new working class of Japan” (Danke
6:2003). This has become true as younger generation tends to prefer “equitabledifferentiation” of remuneration by performance rather than “solidarity-prone”
non-discriminatory pay systems (Koshiro 199:2000).
The Anatomy of LTS
The central questions remain the same. How do we distinguish LTS
from Law No.112? What makes LTS appear to be popular than Law No.112? Or
is it? Further, it is also necessary to have a clear answer to the even more difficult
question of what basic advantages that LTS can offer which are not found in Law
No.112?
The LTS and Law No.112 complement each other and there is no question
about the popularity of one over the other. “Both laws have built their relative
strength from judicial and administrative mechanisms provided by the Supreme**JIL’s interpretation of Nikkeiren position refers to “priority should be for the disputes tobe settled within the company concerned, and that only a case which fails to be settled
within the firm should be submitted to court. See also Japan Labor Bulletin, October
2000.
Supreme Court and MLHW, respectively” (Takamura and Yamakawa).
In the first place, both laws have the same objectives: to find a prompt,
proper and effective solution for individual labor dispute settlement. This is inanswer to the prevailing “painfully slow” justice system before the LTS law wasenacted when even ordinary cases dragged on for “13 months” (Hasegawa) andin some cases, an average of 15 months for the year 1994 alone with cases pendingat the end of the year were 18.5 months old” (Nakakubo 6:1996).
Under the LTS, a panel of arbiters composed of one professional judge,
one trade union representative, and one employer representative who have expert
knowledge of, and experience in, handling labor-management problems must
conduct a maximum of three sessions of hearings into a labor dispute and attempt

to mediate when there is a prospect for settling such dispute. In each case, thepanel proposes a means of settling the dispute through consultations (labor
dispute arbitration), link the proceedings to litigation, and attempt to find asolution that suits the substance based on the litigation, and attempt to find asolution that suits its substance based on the majority decision of the panelists.

(Labor Dispute Arbitration System in Outline Form and Yamakawa).

One important feature of the LTS is the combination of mediation,
conciliation and adjudication in the process of settling the individual labor disputeon hand (Yamakawa). Regardless of the objection of one party to mediation, theproceedings will proceed. In case when mediation fails to settle the dispute, thenthe panel may proceed to decide the case based on the merits of the case (Labor
Dispute Arbitration System in Outline Form).
Another remarkable feature of the LTS which cannot be found under Law
No.112 is the application of the Principle of Three Sessions. All in all, theproceedings should be completed by holding not more than three sessions ofhearings, to include the clarification and definition of issues, cross-examination of
the parties, and the recommendation of the panel which contain the solution for
acceptance by the parties (Yamakawa). The judgment will be arrived at “on thebasis of a majority decision of the aforementioned three arbiters,” only after
conducting three sessions with the parties (Labor Dispute Arbitration System in
Outline Form). While this appears to be difficult at first glance, it is a must thatthe concerned court officials endeavor to “have a different mindset” in order tomake the LTS successful (Yamakawa 05-18-2004).
“Any party to a labor dispute may ask a district court to start proceedings
for arbitration of a labor dispute by submitting an application that mentions the
purpose of and reasons for the application. The application form shall permit asimple, clear presentation” (Labor Dispute Arbitration System in Outline.
Form).
The Stakeholders
No doubt about it. The tripartite sectors, or rather the stakeholders
have all agreed that there is really an urgent need to establish a permanent
solution to the increasing number of individual labor disputes. On the side of thethen Japan Federation of Employers’ Associations (Nikkeiren), now known asJapan Business Federation (Nippon Keidanren) after its May 2002 merger withJapan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), proposed that insolving the increasing number of individual labor disputes, “priority should be forthe dispute to be settled within the company concerned, and that only a casewhich fails to be settled within the firm should be submitted to court (for civil
mediation, in particular)” (Japan Labor Bulletin, October 2000).
Nippon Keidanren supports the LTS in a way as it believes that it is acost-effective method of settling individual disputes, “particularly among thesmaller companies that cannot afford a costly and time-consuming legal battle”(Watanabe and Takamura). The MHLW accepts this position when it said thatthe “tendency of seeking outside mediation is particularly strong amongsmall-and-medium-size companies” (Japan Times, 11-30-2000).
On the other hand, Japan’s largest labor federation, the 7.44
million-strong Japanese Trade Union Confederation, popularly known as Rengo(Japan Times, 04-30-2004) also known as the major national center of labor“argued that the Labor Relations Commissions should be reorganized so that they
can deal with individual labor disputes” (Japan Labor Bulletin, October 2000).
Rengo felt at the time that a “European model” should be implemented to settle itonce and for all (Hasegawa).
The positions of Nikkeiren and Rengo “seem to be directly opposed” butthat did not stand much in the way when in April 2000, the then Ministry ofLabor set up the prefectural labor bureaus across the country with the intentionof having htem handle individual labor disputes “(Japan Labor Bulletin, October2000).

The disagreement of Nippon Keidanren and Rengo on the issue becamemoot and academic when the Diet passed the LTS as a concession to both as they
all agree that “it will help a lot of workers, as it is made to protect the rights of theworkers” (Hasegawa 05-12-2004).
The Obsolescence of Grievance System?

The labor contract governs the day-to-day employment relationships. It
is a living document for both labor and management. In case of any differencesin the interpretation of such employment contract, then the best option is toresolve the same through the Grievance Machinery System (GMS). It is amechanism for employees to voice their disagreement with the way the contract isadministered. Hence it must be a key part of the employment contract(Milkovich 669:1988).

Most enterprise unions have set up grievance procedures under collective
bargaining agreements. Unfortunately, these procedures have remained largely
ineffective because the sense of individual rights is still weak in Japan. Only asmall number of dis-satisfied workers have dared to appeal through theseprocedures because the complainants are normally treated as trouble makers not
only by management, but also by their fellow workers (Koshiro 200:2000).
That explains the reluctance of individual employees to use the GMS to
air their complaints against management. This view is supported by the 1999
Survey on Labor-Management Communication which was released by the thenMinistry of Labour in June 2000. It was discovered that 25.2 percent of the 4,000
establishments with 30 or more regular employees who responded (70.9
percent response rate) showed that they had an “internal grievance system
involving representatives of labor and management” dealing with complaints
from individual employees on the issues of labor conditions and other related
concerns.
The remaining 74.7 percent did not have any GMS at all. The smaller
establishment, the less likely it was to have such a system in place. And the fact
remains that more than 80 percent of the firms with less than 300 employees (andsome 88% of firms with less than 50 employees) did not have such a system.
Among those firms with a GMS in place, 65.3 percent answered that
employees often withdrew their complaints when they were given an explanation;
another 20.3 percent replied that workers had been helped by the system withsome kind of settlement. This suggests that such systems like the grievancemachinery can play a certain role in the settlement of complaints (Japan Labor

Bulletin, October 1, 2000).

The under-utilization of the GMS is proven in yet another survey
conducted by the then Ministry of Labor in 2000. Its findings show that most“Japanese firms lack formal channels to handle employee complaints” (Japan

Times, 11-30-2000).

While a GMS proves to be helpful in resolving employee complaints, it ispuzzling to note that the Japanese labor and management are disregarding, if notunder-utilizing it in favor of external interventions like arbitration, conciliation,

mediation and litigation services provided by government agencies (Elbo).
While it may be true that the GMS may not be functioning well, we mustalso consider the fact that “it all depends on the nature of the complaint,
particularly when an employee finds it futile to use it, then they go out of theorganization to seek help from MHLW or other government agencies. Rengo
even provides counseling and giving of labor advice even to non-members”(Hasegawa 05-12-2004).

OutlookAt the end of World War II and throughout the 1960s, Japan experienced
turbulent labor-management relations. There were many labor confrontations at
the time. In contrast, industrial relations have been very stable in years after
that, with only few labor disputes. One of the reasons for this trend is the spreadof the joint Labor-Management Consultation (LMC) as a complimentary tool forcollective bargaining. That is, most issues are settled during the LMC process
before the parties enter into the collective bargaining stage (Araki 182:2002).
In a government survey done in 1997, the following reasons were cited
why the labor and management stakeholders have resorted to LMC: First is theprospects for a settlement by mutual negotiation (61.1%); Second is mutual
obligations or expectations to strive for peaceful settlement (53.1%); Third,
consideration of the social effects and criticism for engaging in disputable acts
(23.2%); Fourth, the awareness that disputable acts would not help achieve theexpected results (20.4%); and Fifth, the possibility of the company’s decrease inprofits (14.5%) (Ministry of Labor, 1997).
Clearly, the LMC is useful in promoting discussions between labor andmanagement, regardless of whether the enterprise in question has a labor unionor not. This system enables the two sides to share awareness of management
issues and reach a consensus concerning quick reforms. Companies without labor
unions should build channels for joint consultation together with workers in orderto smooth the way for face to face talks. Showing a willingness to hold talks on
an ongoing basis can avoid sparking individual labor disputes (Japan Business

Federation 38:2004).

The employer-employee relationship is, in any language, whether Asianor Western is the one of domination and subordination. Japan is not an
exception. The employer commands and the employee is expected to obey. A
willful refusal to accommodate the employer’s wishes is insubordination.
Against this backdrop, the employee who manifests dissatisfaction with theemployer’s proffered employment terms and conditions will necessarily court theemployer’s displeasure. In this context, not every Japanese employer will
understand or appreciate every issue that would be raised by an employee.
The threshold question is whether there is any justification at all orcommon sense for both Japanese labor and management to wash their “dirty
linen” in public and seek external interventions through arbitration, mediation,
conciliation, or if not, go into full court litigation? This comes to mind when wetalk about sensitive issues like sekuhara (sexual harassment), rosai (power
harassment), and even karoshi (death by overwork).
Typically, when parties are faced in a deadlock, then they are free to seekoutside help in the spirit of arasoi o azukeru. This has become apparent, not onlywith government agencies using the mantle of LTS and Law No. 112, but also withthe emergence of private consulting firms and the creation of new form of tradeunions. Of late, there is already at least one private consulting firm that iscashing in on this increasing problem by both labor and management. For one, acertain Yasuko Okada has become a popular hit among victims of abusive bosses
or power harassers who secure her counseling service, among other things(Schaeffer, 01-03-2003). Aside from this comes a cyberspace labor union thatcaters to settling labor disputes via the internet, even without the benefit of aface-to-face negotiation which is “expected to play a major role in the future asworking conditions continue to diversify” (Japan Times, 04-11-2001).
“In order to win the survival race in the global competition whilerenovating its own operation, it is indispensable for business firms to maintaintheir good labor-management relations and further develop it based on thein-house labor-management relations. It is important that the labor union andmanagement closely consult with each other to respond to the ever-changing
business environment without delay.
Such labor-management relations will be required that both parties
mutually discuss or consult on a daily basis the changes in business environment
and the management issues such as wage, working hour, employment problems,diversified working methods, development of the career of each employee,
development of employee’s ability and skills, mental health care and corporate
ethics” (Miyahara 2004).
The discussion must not be limited to the LMC and the GMS. There areother related composite communication forms such as workplace meetings, small
group activities, and employee suggestion systems that could well provide many
options for the employees aside from labor unions, so that they too can voice theiropinion (JIL 46:2002).
To my mind, the resolution of individual labor disputes must necessarily
be done at the organizational level rather than outside of it. The then Nikkeiren
supports this view as it gives “first priority” to it (Japan Labor Bulletin October2000).
There are several approaches that could be maximized within theorganization. Labor and management must either choose between the LMC andthe GMS or any other way as long as it will help exhaust all remedies to achieve
its benefits and enjoy its full potential (Takamura, Yamakawa, and Hasegawa).
If there are problems, adjustments must be done by both parties to make it workand adjust to their ways. If this cannot be done by labor and management within
the four walls of its organization, and both parties are satisfied that they havedone everything within their prerogative, then may be that could only pave theway for the application of LTS and Law No.112.
In a nutshell, I believe that labor and management cannot simply look“outside of the window” and be trigger-happy to seek external or third party
interventions at the first sign of trouble. The LTS and other pertinent laws are
established as the next step prior to the last resort of actual court litigation. The
labor and management stakeholders cannot be lulled into submission that the
LTS is the ultimate solution, when it is not.
Employers and its management may well to do what is necessary – byanswering the question: What is it, then, that is deterring Japanese labor andmanagement from exhausting all efforts under the LMC and GMS? The answer
could be found in two basic norms that can be found inside the organization. The
first norm concerns the form, i.e., an internal, amicable settlement that must be
secured at the beginning of a dispute. The second norm concerns the nature, i.e.,a settlement is made with a long-term perspective. Since both parties directly
involved have to work together in the same workplace, a settlement should neverbe short-sighted. The long-term motivational and economic implications have tobe taken into account (Inohara 138:1990).
Besides, the implementation of LTS is not necessarily easy….(expound)This will surely hit the point. Does a third-party arbiter, mediator, orconciliator must necessarily come from outside the organization? Obviously, theanswer is in the negative. Inside many organizations, there is usually a sort of
go-between on each side of the labor and management fence. They are absolutely
needed to maintain the expectedly long-lasting labor relations in the company.
When negotiations reach a deadlock in the formal phase, these go-betweens (likethe personnel manager or a union steward) can play the role of internalinterveners who must take charge so that a settlement would be reached (Inohara

139:1990).

The possibility is endless.
If one charts the labor-management
relationship where it is successful, more often than not, it is characterized by one
common ingredient: objective, sincere, and honest two-way communication.
With the experience of Japan in industrial relations, this is not difficult toaccomplish.
Reference Materials and Personal Interviews Cited

Araki, Takashi, “Labor and Employment Law in Japan,” The Japan Institute ofLabor, Tokyo, Japan, 2002.
Danke, Shun, “Freeters: Japan’s New Working Class,” Japan Close-Up,
Tokyo, Japan, December 2003.
Elbo, Reylito A.H., “Grievance as a Manager’s Necessary Evil,” LaborManagement, Business World Publishing Inc., Manila, May 21, 2004.
Hanami, Tadashi, “Labor Relations in Japan Today,” Kodansha Intl., Ltd.,Tokyo, Japan, 1979.
Fukuoka, Michio, “The Current State of Labor Relations and Employment
Practicesin Japan, and Future Problems,” JIL website, downloaded on April 26,
2004
from http://www.jil.go.jp/english/laborinfo/library/2_02.htm
Hasegawa, Yuko, Rengo’s Director for Employment and Labor Legislation,
personal
interview conducted on May 12, 2004 at her office.
Japan Business Federation, “The Current Labor Economy in Japan,”International Labour Policy Bureau, Tokyo, Japan, 2003.
Japan Business Federation, “Creating Higher Added Value, Utilizing Diverse
Human Resources,” Position Paper 2004, Tokyo, Japan, 2004.
Japan Institute of Labour, JIL Home, “Individual Labor Dispute Law Passed,”
downloaded from http://www.jil.go.jp/emm/vol.1/disputelaw.htm
on May 5, 2004.
Japan Institute of Labour, Japan Labor Bulletin, Vol. 39, No.10, October 2000,
Tokyo, Japan, 2000.
Japan Institute of Labour, Japan Labor Bulletin, July 1, 2003
Tokyo, Japan, 2003.
Japan Institute of Labour, Public Policy, Vol.40, No.6, June 1, 2001, downloadedon
May 7, 2004 from http://www.jil.go.jp/bulletin/year/2001/vol40-06/03.htm
Japan Institute of Labour, “Status of the Law for Promoting the Resolution ofIndividual Labor Disputes, one year after its enactment,” downloaded on
May 5, 2004 from http://www.jil.go.jp/emm/vol.31/law/htm

Japan Institute of Labour, “The Labor Situation in Japan 2002/2003,”
Tokyo, Japan, 2002.
Japan Times, “Nine Out of 10 Employees Have Grievances: Government
Survey,” November 30, 2000, downloaded on April 30, 2004 fromhttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nb20001130b1.htm
Japan Times, “Settling Labor Disputes Efficiently,” Editorial,
January 9, 2004, downloaded on April 30, 2004 fromhttp://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?ed20040109a1.htm
Japan Times, “Net-based Labor Union Resolves Disputes Online,” downloadedfrom
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20010411b8.htm
onApril 30, 2004.
Koshiro, Kazutoshi, “A Fifty Year History of Industry and Labor in Postwar
Japan,”
Japanese Economy and Labor Series No.6, Japan Institute of Labour,Tokyo, Japan, 2000.
Labor Dispute Arbitration System in Outline (Draft), Material 213, original
materials is in Japanese, distributed at the 31st Meeting of theConsultation Group on Labor, Office for Promotion of Justice
System Reform, provisional translation by JILPT.
Labour Relations Adjustment Law, No.25, September 27, 1946, tentativetranslation by s specialist from JIL.
Law on Promoting the Resolution of Individual Labor Disputes, Law No.112 ofJuly 11, 2001, provisional translation by The Japan Institute of Labour,Tokyo, Japan.
Inohara, Hideo, “Human Resource Development in Japanese Companies,” Asian
Productivity Organization, Tokyo, Japan, 1990.
Milkovich, George T. and John Boudreau, “Personnel/Human Resource
Management: A Diagnostic Approach,” Business Publications Inc., Plano,
Texas, 1988.
Miyahara, Masao, “In-House Labor-Management Relations in a Globalized
Economy,” paper presented in a symposium on “Industrial Relations inEnterprises in the Age of the Globalization of Economy,” Manila, The ILO
Association of Japan, March 1, 2004.
Nakakubo, Hiroya, “Procedures for Resolving Individual Employment Disputes,”
Japan Labor Bulletin, June 1, 1996, JIL, Tokyo, Japan.
Schaeffer, Gary, “Japanese Workers Fear Job Bullies,” The Detroit News,
downloaded on May 4, 2004 from the website
http://www.detnews.com/2003/business/0307/04c03-208906.htm
Shirai, Taishiro, Japanese Industrial Relations, Japanese Economy and Labor
Series, No.5, Japan Institute of Labor, Tokyo, Japan, 2000.
Takamura, Hitoshi, Assistant Director, Labor Dispute Settlement Office, Regional
Division, Ministry Secretariat, MHLW, personal interview conducted athis
office on May 11, 2004.
Watanabe, Yoshihiro, JBF’s Manager for Labor Legislation Group, personal
interview conducted on May 10, 2004 at his office.
Yamakawa, Ryuichi, Law Professor and LTS Expert on who helped draft the bill,
personal interview conducted on May 18, 2004 at Keio University Law
School, Tokyo, Japan.
Acknowledgment

This study was made possible under a generous grant given by The Japan
Institute for Labor Policy and Training (JILPT) through its Annual Visiting
Researcher Program. Specifically, this researcher would like to express his
sincerest gratitude to the active and warm assistance given by Dr. Akira Ono,
JILPT President, Mr. Eiji Shiraishi, JILPT Vice Director-General, Mr. Katsumi
Yoshida, JILPT Executive Director, Mr. Hisao Yamamoto, Vice-Director forInternational Affairs, Mr. Sumio Sakai, JILPT Deputy Director for International
Affairs, his assistant Ms. Masumi Seto, and Mr. Hirokuni Ikezoe, my counterpart
researcher
for their active and warm support to this project.
Likewise, deeply acknowledged is the unwavering support given by Atty.
Rene Y. Soriano, President of the Employers Confederation of the Philippines and
Mr. Jose Roland A. Moya, Deputy Director-General of ECOP and its counterpart
employer association – Japan Business Federation (JBF), through Mr. Toshio
Suzuki, Managing Director of Nippon Keidanren International Cooperation
Center.
Most of the data in this monograph were culled from the voluminous
materials offered and maintained by the JILPT Website and its Library, which isprobably one of the best repositories of labor-management materials in the world.
Since the LTS is a newly-developed subject in Japan, I must necessarily rely on
the personal interviews conducted by this researcher in the persons of (in theorder of their interview dates) Mr. Yoshihiro Watanabe, JBF’s Manager for Labor
Legislation, Mr. Histoshi Takamura, Assistant Director for Labor Dispute
Settlement Office of MHLW, Ms. Yuko Hasegawa, Director for Employment andLabour Legislation Division of Rengo, and Dr. Ryuichi Yamakawa, Law Professorof Keio University Law School and one of the framers of LTS.
Lastly, this researcher greatly appreciates his fellow researchers at
JILPT -- Prof. M. Saman Dassanayake, Senior Lecturer of the University ofColombo and Ms. Jeannette Tana, Chief of Employment Research Division at theInstitute for Labor Studies, Philippine Department of Labor and Employment for
their unselfish, kind moral support, and the warmth of friendship, in and out of
office hours.
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